October fifteenth: a history of modern Hungary, 1929-1945, Vol. 2 k643b155b

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EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS No. 6

A HISTORY OF MODERN HUNGARY 1929-1945

Cc. A. MACARTNEY M.A., D.LITT. Professor of International Relations, University of Edinburgh

Part II

EDINBURGH AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1957

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(Cat, ren lw Lhe ar

CHAP. PAGE I. DEAD MAN’s SHOES , ; ; . . , 3 | II. VA BANQUE . , , 17 CONTENTS

III. CALCULATION GOING RIGHT . . , ; , , 33 IV. CALCULATION GOING WRONG . , ; , , , 60 V. INVITATION TO THE DANCE , , , , , , 80

VI. Two STEPS TO THE RIGHT , , , , ; , 90

VII. MARKING TIME , , , , ; , . 110

VII. Two STEps TO THE LEFT ; . , , ; . 124

TX. FASTER! . , ; ; ; ae , . 137

X. LINGER SHIVERING . , ; ; ; , ; ; 153 XI. AND FEAR TO LAUNCH AWAY ; ; ; ; ; 169 XII. CROSS-PURPOSES . , . , , ; ; ; 182

XII. THE LONGEST SHOT OF ALL. , ; ; ; . 204

XIV. A Cup OVERFLOWS , ; , ; ; ; . 22)

XV. SPILTH . , ; ; . . , ; ; . 242

XVI. GADARA , ; ; , ; . 264

XVII. REVULSION . ; , ; , , ; ; . 301

XVIII. HorTHY AGONISTES . . , . , ; . 319 XIX. SZALASI TYRANNUS . , , , , , , . 444

APPENDIX , , . , ; , , , . 471 NOTE ON THE USE OF PLACE-NAMES . , , , . 473

INDEX . . . , , , , , ; . 477 MAPS

CAMPAIGN MAPS OF THE ADVANCE INTO HUNGARY,

1944-1945. , , , , ,.; ;; .| .At PLAN OF BUDAPEST

end

| OCTOBER FIFTEENTH PART II

,|

CHAPTER ONE

DEAD MAN’S SHOES T has often been said that the day when Bardossy succeeded Teleki | eric a turning-point in Hungarian policy: the change from resistance to eager co-operation. There is, as we shall see, some truth in this as a long-term judgment, although, even so, the difference between the two men’s policies was purely one of calculation and tactical approach, not of objective. It was, moreover, a change which was not confined to the Minister President’s office, for when Teleki committed suicide public opinion largely lost faith in the practicability of his policy. But the view that as soon as Teleki was out of the way Bardossy and Horthy hastened to jettison his Yugoslav policy is

unjust to both men. Neither had had his heart in that policy, but both tried honourably to carry it through. Certain projects were, indeed, dropped permanently, not all of them on

Bardossy’s initiative. On the morning of the 3rd April O’Malley rang up Bethlen’s house but received a message from Countess Bethlen that her

husband “had not changed in any respect, but thought it would not be advisable, under the circumstances, for him to see O’Malley.”’ Then the British Minister went to see Horthy—meeting on the Palace stairs Bardossy,

just appointed Minister President and deathly pale and shaking. The Regent, who seemed dull and apathetic, told O’Malley what the decisions of the Defence Council had been. The reasons which had actuated it had been: (1) Hungary’s historical connection with Germany; (2) The need to get access to the sea; (3) The sacred duty of restoring the frontiers of Hungary; (4) No help to be expected from Great Britain; (5) The war would probably end in a deadlock, in which case Germany would be in a position to take savage reprisals on Hungary. The Defence Council, Teleki assenting, had therefore adopted the policy of semi-acquiescence embodied in the Resolution, and the idea of resistance and of forming an émigré government was off; the more so as he, Horthy himself, had received no invitation from London. O’Malley appealed to the Regent in the most forceful terms, begging him above all to make a clear declaration that Hungary would in no sense take any profit from the fall of Yugoslavia; but to all protests and appeals—which O’ Malley couched in the most forcible terms—Horthy, who still seemed to believe that

the worst consequences would be avoided, had only one answer: “It’s no ‘ use talking to me. I’ve made up my mind.” So Horthy remained on the bridge of the ship. Bethlen did not leave Hungary, and of the mission destined for the West only three persons started:

Princess Odescalchi, who was accidentally killed on the journey, and two journalists: V. Sztankovics and G. Paléczy-Horvath, of whom the latter was, as transpired later,! to prove a contentious choice. Barcza, when he proposed stopping on in England, was recalled abruptly and threatened with the loss of his pension if he disobeyed. The money sent to America is, for all the 1 See below, p. 144.

4 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH writer knows, still there.1 The émigré Committees which formed themselves in most Allied countries after this were, with the exception of Eckhardt’s, all oppositional to the Hungarian Governments.

The Russian negotiations, too, petered out. According to Ratz, the Russians, who up to 30th March had treated him with reserve and scepticism, suddenly told him on that day to go back to Budapest and equip himself with

plenipotentiary powers. Russia, he was told, was prepared to sign an agreement promising to declare war on Germany if she attacked Hungary and Yugoslavia, and to send big air and A.A. forces to defend Hungary, with first-class motorised divisions and at least 2,000 armoured cars. Ratz, however, reached Budapest too late to give Teleki the message, and Bardossy did not follow up the proposals.2, As Russia then changed her policy even towards Yugoslavia,? it may be as well that Hungary had not put her trust in Russian help. In other respects, however, Horthy and Bardossy began by following to the letter the policy agreed with Teleki: Horthy even for a while put things into reverse. On the morning of the 3rd, under the immediate shock of the suicide, he cancelled the mobilisation order altogether, except for the Frontier Guards and perhaps the Mobile Corps*—on receiving which news, Werth simply put his pen down on his desk, and walked out of his office and home, whence he sent in his resignation.® This extreme of renunciation, however,

did not last. In the afternoon Bardossy’s inaugural Ministerial Council decided that the Regent should send Hitler a letter explaining that Hungary could not act except under the conditions already described. Horthy asked Bartha if he would take the letter to Berlin, and Bartha took the opportunity

to appeal to Horthy’s honour against the morning’s decision. The Staff talks had been sanctioned and the arrangements under them made in good faith. Large Serb units were concentrating in the Bacska.® If the Hungarian frontier was left unguarded, the flanks of the German armies would be unprotected and Budapest itself endangered. The Regent changed his mind again, and authorised the mobilisation of the Mobile Corps and two other corps (the [Vth and Vth) for the South and for certain units of Mountain and Frontier Chasseur troops to guard the passes of Ruthenia.’ The troops, however, were not to move until the casus was given. Thereupon Werth withdrew his resignation. Horthy drafted the letter to Hitler himself, with Bardossy; a few “‘stylistic changes”’ were Bartha’s work.*® Horthy wrote® that Teleki, of whom he spoke

in moving terms, had taken his own life. He had left behind a letter of self1 The Hungarian Legation in Washington lost control of it when President Roosevelt blocked Hungarian accounts in the U.S.A. The Hungarian Treasury then refunded the equivalent to the National Bank, whose accounts were thus squared, but the money was lost to Hungary until after the war, when the Legation of Democratic Hungary was allowed to draw on it. 2 Ratz to C. A. M. > See Gregoric, op. cit., pp. 214, 227-8, and Hagen, op. cit., pp. 224-7; accounts which throw a new light on Russia’s conclusion of a Pact of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Yugoslavia on 4th April. The Pact now appears not as an advance by the U.S.S.R. but as a face-saving retreat by Molotov from Lebedev’s and Vyshinski’s earlier forward policy. 4 Sz. I. MS., etc. Horthy took this decision spontaneously in the morning, immediately on learning of the suicide.

®° Bartha to C. A. M.

® This was in fact incorrect. ’ The order came so late in the day that zero hour for mobilisation to begin could be given only as 00.00 on the 5th (Lajos). 8 Bartha to C. A. M. ® The full text of this letter is given both in the Barcza and the Sz. I. MSS.

DEAD MAN’S SHOES 5 reproach for not having opposed sufficiently strongly, at the Defence Council, the suggestion that Hungary should “‘rob the corpse” of Yugoslavia. Horthy also felt that Hungary was in a precarious and difficult position in view of the

Russian and Roumanian dangers, etc. He, Horthy, had himself at first felt that in view of the recently concluded Pact Hungary should try to ‘‘save her face’! but finally they had agreed that after the German troops had entered Croatia, the Croats would declare their independence and Yugoslavia, the contracting party to the Pact, would cease to exist. But now Horthy himself and the whole nation had been shattered by the tragedy of Teleki. Hungary had indeed taken certain military measures “‘in the sense of my letter of 28th March,” “‘but the conflict of conscience in which we are involved and which

is so amply proved by the suicide of the Minister President forces us to request the German Supreme Command so to define the tasks of our troops that it may always be possible to reconcile them with our consciences.”’ Bartha was instructed to fly with this letter to Berlin on the following morning and present it to Hitler. Bardossy also charged him to explain to Hitler personally what were the difficulties which Hungary was feeling. So long as Yugoslavia existed, or so long as Croatia refrained from proclaiming her independence, it was morally impossible for the Hungarian Government to attack Yugoslavia or to participate actively in the German military action against her.? Copies of both Horthy’s letters, and an account of the position, were sent to Mussolini. It is obvious that the assessment of such a communication must be largely a matter of nuances. There is still a certain difference between the phrases ‘‘plausible excuse’’ and “good reason’’: between saying that one will not act so long as a certain moral obstacle exists, and saying that one cannot move until that obstacle is cleared out of one’s way for one. A great deal therefore depended on the messenger, and, as it happened, both Bartha and Sztdjay, who accompanied him to the Fihrer at 1.30 p.m., Keitel also being present, were very strongly in favour of Hungary’s complying in the fullest possible measure with Germany’s wishes. On his own evidence, Bartha first agreed with Sztdjay “‘that we would urgently ask the Germans to make Croatia independent, when, the Yugoslav State, with which we had concluded the treaty having ceased to exist, we should recover our freedom of action and would be able to join in the German action.’ He then delivered the letter and the message in terms which can be summed up without unfairness in the words: ““The Regent feels he can’t decently move without some sort of

an excuse. Can’t you arrange one for us? It would do either if Croatia proclaimed her independence, or if Serbia could be shown to be the ageressor.” He and Sztdjay also “put forward their propositions.’’*

1 Das Gesicht wahren. 2 Lajos. 3 Bartha to C. A. M.

4 There are three longish accounts of this interview: one in Nagy, loc. cit., which almost

certainly reproduces Bartha’s notes; a second by Sztdjay in the Sz. I. MS.; and a German Foreign

Ministry report, dated 4th April, which was quoted for the prosecution during the trial of Erdmannsdorff. Also allusions in Ullein, op. cit., p. 95, and a shorter account given by Bartha to C. A. M. The Nagy version runs: “‘Bartha explained that the Hungaro-German co-operation had not been interrupted by Teleki’s death, since Hungary had already ordered the mobilisation of three corps and the G.H.Q. He begged Hitler in the name of the Government that before the Hungarian troops moved and intervened the Germans should create a situation which made Hungary’s intervention, despite the Pact of Friendship, possible. In the view of the Hungarian Government the best pretext would be if it could be proved that Serbia had attacked Hungary.” Sztdjay’s wording is: “Hungary could move only if a casus belli were established.’? Such a case would arise, in the Hungarian Government’s view, “if the Yugoslavs attacked either the

6 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Hitler was forthcoming enough. He expressed his regrets at Teleki’s death and said that he understood Horthy’s scruples. At the same time, he thought that Germany certainly, and in his view Hungary, had received cause enough for action; that Hungary was under no obligation to Yugoslavia, but was under an obligation to Germany, to protect her flank. He advised Hungary in her own interest not to put off her intervention too long. He would “‘think over’’ Bartha’s and Sztdéjay’s “‘proposals”’ and would write to Horthy. This he did in a 16-page letter, dictated by himself, which Bartha

took back next day and the text of which has not survived. For the rest, he held the Hungarians a very long address? which was mainly concerned with the sins of the Yugoslavs and the record of which is valuable principally for the references contained in it to his own negotiations with the Yugoslav Government. But en passant he also made certain important concessions

and gave important assurances. He removed the nightmare of the Prinz Eugen Gau by repeating that Germany had no territorial claims against

Yugoslavia. He proposed to hand over the Bacska and the Banat to Hungary, and after the joint campaign, ““Hungary’s road to the sea would

be opened.’ He also, spontaneously, renounced the supreme command over the Hungarian forces. They might operate quite independently, under Horthy’s command, Hitler giving only “proposals and advice”’ in order to assure co-operation. He would write again to Horthy. Bartha also talked with Keitel, and with a representative of Paulus, both of whom were equally accommodating,’ and returned to Budapest next day, bearing Hitler’s letter to Horthy, and delighted with the results of his own diplomacy. The only thing more which would help, he told Erdmannsdorff, whom he saw on his return, would be “an enthusiastic (schwungvoll) and warmly worded letter from the Fiihrer to Horthy, to remove the latter’s

remaining scruples.’ Already, however, he and Werth had extracted from the Regent permission to mobilise two* more brigades, making five in all, and on the strength of this Werth had withdrawn his resignation. Mobilisation was now going on, and would be complete by the 15th April at the latest.

Meanwhile, on the 4th, Bardossy had convoked a meeting of Parliamentary Party leaders to ask their opinion whether the Hungaro-Yugoslav Treaty ought still to be considered binding. Opinions were, as was to be expected, divided. Rassay and Peyer argued strongly that the Treaty was still valid, and that Hungary must at all costs keep out of the war. Bethlen said it was easy to get into a war but hard to get out of one; the Government should make every possible effort to keep clear. Imrédy, “‘to the general German or the Hungarian troops or if it proved possible to provoke such an attack—or if Croatia proclaimed herself independent.”

The German reports show Bartha as saying that: ‘“‘The Regent would like to be rid of the moral obligations contained in the Hungaro-Yugoslav Pact in a way which could be generally understood—Horthy expresses an emphatic wish that a clear-cut cause for war must be created. A cause might be given either by an attack by the Yugoslavs against Hungary, or at least an encroachment by them, or by a declaration of independence by Croatia. Either would satisfy the Regent’s scruples and appear sufficient cause for a conflict between Hungary and Yugoslavia.” 1 This from Ullein, loc. cit. > According to Bartha: “The audience went off in the usual forms: that is, Hitler talked for 90 per cent. of the time.” * According to Barczy, Keitel confirmed in Hitler’s name that Hungary was to have the Banat.

‘ There is a mistake here, either Bartha’s or Erdmannsdorff’s. The “two more” only brought up the figure to two corps (drawn, indeed, owing to administrative difficulties, from the depots of three) plus the Mobile Corps; not to two (or three) on top of that.

DEAD MAN’S SHOES 7 surprise,” held the Treaty to be still valid, while Baky and Jaross took the opposite view.1 The Government adopted the majority point of view, and seems to have reaffirmed its decision to act only if one of the casus belli on its list occurred. It also showed restraint in two other ways. Pressed from some quarters to denounce the Pact, Bardossy refused to do so, precisely in

order not to make Yugoslavia’s position more difficult.2 Secondly, it

from the Croats.® ,

remained completely aloof from the active intrigues in which Germany and Italy were engaging during these days to secure a declaration of independence

But beyond this Bardossy did not go, and his intentions were fore-

shadowed in fresh telegrams* which he sent to London and Washington® insisting that Hungary had no aggressive intentions, but was interested only in the fate of the Magyars of the Voivodina. He had, it is true, refused even to receive the memorandum which Kovrig had handed in for Teleki. Nevertheless, he himself still seems to have hoped that the Western Powers would

understand Hungary’s policy and not take it amiss, for he was making anxious enquiries of Barcza regarding his authority for his message of the 2nd. Similar enquiries went to Washington, whence Ghika had reported on the 3rd, in terms very similar to Barceza’s, that no one in the U.S.A. would

appreciate the arguments by which Hungary was seeking to justify her proposed action. Barcza replied that his earlier telegram had summarised a series of conversations, not all of them official; but on the 5th he had to report that Cadogan had called him and conveyed to him a most serious warning in exactly the terms which Barcza had forecast; adding, however, that he could hardly believe that the Regent and the Hungarian Government would break their recent treaty of friendship. Barcza might have had an answer of some sort if Csaky had not misled him on the real nature of the treaty, thus causing him, unwittingly, to mislead Cadogan. As things were, he seems to have found no resort but to wash his personal hands in innocence. On 6th April Germany attacked. The officially inspired Hungarian Press sunk itself to a new low level. From this day on, every effort was made to

emphasise and to promote the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav aircraft—if Yugoslav they were®’—dropped a few bombs on Hungarian territory, in most cases clearly aimed at the German troops. By the special direction of the Hungarian Press Bureau the gravity and wantonness of these attacks was emphasised (they were represented as directed against non1 The meeting was mentioned by Rassay at the Bardossy Trial, p. 44, and in Szig. Biz., pp. 340-1. Rassay puts Imrédy on the other side, but Szig. Biz. (although many of its various sources are completely unreliable) seems likely to be right on this occasion, when recording something unexpected. The point appears not to have been raised at Imrédy’s trial. 2 Personal, Ullein-Reviczky to C. A. M. 3 For the German intrigues, see inter alia Hagen, Die Geheime Front, pp. 236 ff., and the evidence of the agent Malletke (N.G. 2449). The Germans were trying to intrigue with Maéek, the Italians with Paveli¢é. The Hungarians had lost all touch with Macek after Ist April (Ullein to C. A. M.) and had made no contact with the Ustasi. Bardossy said at his trial (p. 10) that the first time that he ever heard the name of Kvaternik was when he read out the proclamation of Croatia’s independence.

4 This paragraph from the Sz. I. MS. a

5 He was still keeping the Portfolio of Foreign Affairs in his own hands, and in the event, retained it throughout his period of office. 6 There were rumours that one of the attacks (near Szeged) was a German “‘provocation’’ to give Hungary her excuse for entering the war. This was the general belief in Szeged itself. King Peter of Yugoslavia however, writes in his memoirs A King’s Heritage (p. 80) that on this day he was told in Belgrade by one of his Generals that Hungary had declared war on Yugoslavia and that in consequence a squadron of Blenheims had been despatched to bomb Budapest.

8 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH military objectives, and as claiming civilian victims), while the Yugoslav Government was described as “‘the Serb Putschists’’, etc. The Government was no longer attempting to avert the Yugoslav catastrophe; it was discounting it in advance and trying—by quite singularly clumsy and malodorous methods—to build up for itself an alibi in advance. The disgust inspired by these effusions obscured the fact that Hungary was still, technically, keeping

her treaty to the extent of not actually attacking Yugoslavia. Her mobilisation guarded the flanks of the German armies which attacked Yugoslavia at Gyékény and Barcs in the west and Temesvar in the east; but the Yugoslavs

were able to withdraw their troops from the Bacska frontier, and, in fact, did so. Meanwhile Bardossy telegraphed to London and Washington, now more

explicitly, to say that a separatist movement was taking shape in Croatia, and that Hungary ‘‘felt it her duty to defend Hungarian interests.’’ The Magyar minority in the Bacska was in danger. Hungary had no territorial ambitions of conquest, but her troops ‘“‘would occupy the Bacska, which the

Treaty of Trianon had severed from Hungary.’ Barcza did not even pass on this message.” On the 7th (according to the Hungarian account), British aircraft bombed Pécs, Szeged and Villany, and the same day O’Malley

notified the Hungarian Government that Britain broke off diplomatic relations with Hungary. On the 8th Barcza received the same notification from Mr. Eden, who told him that “it would be an eternal shame on Hungary that she had attacked a country with which, only a few months previously, she had concluded a Treaty of Eternal Friendship. Ifa State was not master of its will and its actions, let it at least not conclude treaties which it then

breaks. Teleki was the last Hungarian whom Britain had trusted. His successors should know that Britain would win the war and would remember this conduct of Hungary’s at the Peace Conference.’’? Barcza does not seem to have attempted to refute any part of this slightly proleptic outburst—Hungary had in fact not yet moved when it was delivered —nor to have tried to put the case, such as it was, for his own Government; but it may be doubted whether Mr. Eden would have been able to see through

Hungarian spectacles to the extent of appreciating any argument which

could have been adduced.

When communicating these remarks from Mr. Eden—which he seems to have done with some relish—Barcza, however, also reported that he had got a “confidant”? of his to explain the position to Mr. Churchill himself. Churchill’s reply came the same evening, as follows: “The Hungarian Minister is really right; we English have been guilty of serious faults and omissions in the past. Hungary, after all, always openly maintained her claims to revision, and now, if the Hungarian troops confine themselves to occupying the territories which were formerly Hungarian, that is, humanly speaking, understandable. I regret that politically it is impossible for me to do otherwise than break off diplomatic relations, but so long as Hungarian troops do not find themselves opposed in the field by British forces, there is really no need for a declaration of war. The Hungarians, incidentally, are very sympathetic people.’”* 1 §z. I. MS. ° Barcza MS. 3 Id.

* Lajos. These words are retranslated from the Hungarian. I do not know who the

“confidant” was.

DEAD MAN’S SHOES 9 The U.S.A. showed more understanding than Britain of the position. On 7th April the Secretary of State told the Hungarian Minister that “‘he wished to speak quite openly and in the strictest confidence. He fully under-

stood Hungary’s difficult position. But nothing was at present more important from the point of view of later developments than the formal attitude adopted by Hungary. It was understandable if the Hungarian Government did everything possible to defend its territory but very important that it should not appear formally as the aggressor.’ On 9th April the Fiihrer sent his promised ‘‘enthusiastic letter’’ to the Regent, arranging, by way of precaution, that it should be handed personally to Horthy by the German liaison officer with the Hungarian Army. At the same time Erdmannsdorff came to Bardossy to say he had been called to Berlin to report, and, “‘while Germany did not wish to press Hungary, she would like to know when her active participation could begin.’ Further,

the Hungarian General Staff ‘obviously on German inspiration,” said Bardossy as he told the story,? warned the Regent that “it was impossible to make the military action dependent on conditions regarding which one could not know when they would be fulfilled.” Bardossy answered Erdmannsdorff most categorically that Hungary’s position, in respect of the Pact of Friendship, had been quite plainly stated by Bartha, and that until Croatia brought about the disintegration of Yugoslavia by declaring her independence it was ‘‘absolutely impossible for the

Hungarian Government to attack the Kingdom of Yugoslavia or to participate actively in the German military action against it.’’* The next day, however, he telegraphed to the surviving missions warning them that the “‘vacuum”’ was likely to be created and that Hungary would probably march into it. If that occurred, the addressees were to try “to win understanding for our military action’’—the phrase by which the civilian Government persisted in describing what Hungary was doing, maintaining

to the last that it had never declared war on, or even attacked, Yugoslavia.°

The same afternoon, too, the Proclamation described below was drafted (in advance of the event), and in reply to Hitler’s letter, Horthy agreed that ‘if no complications arose’’® the date of Hungary’s attack might be advanced from the 15th to the 12th.

No complications did arise. On the evening of the 10th, Kvaternik, describing himself as “‘acting Head of the State in Croatia,” broadcast from

Zagreb a proclamation that “‘Croatia is free and independent.” Bartok telephoned the news to Budapest at 10 p.m. Everything was ready,’ for the same evening, and only a very little later, the Hungarian wireless broadcast two messages. One was an Army Order issued by Horthy as “Supreme War Lord.’ It told the Army that “‘once again the duty of hurrying to the help

of our Hungarian kinsmen who were torn from us calls to you.... The 1 Lajos (also retranslated). 2 Sz. I. MS. 8 Bardossy in his final speech at his trial. 4 Sz. I. MS.

6 So when the U.S.A. Chargé d’Affaires asked whether Hungary had declared war on Yugoslavia, Bardossy answered: “Definitely, no!” 6 The German report recording these words explains them as referring to the possibility of a threat from the U.S.S.R. 7 At midday, in fact, Radio Budapest had suddenly broadcast a tirade vehemently attacking the Yugoslav Government as unconstitutional.

10 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH God of the Hungarians and the every thought of the nation are with you. Forward to the millenary frontier!” The second message was a proclamation signed by Horthy and countersigned by Bardossy. In it Horthy protested that, since becoming Regent, he had ever sought to preserve the Hungarian people from renewed bloodshed and suffering, and in that spirit the treaty with Yugoslavia—‘‘with its peaceful

Government”—had been concluded, in order to serve peace in the Danube basin. But that Government had been overthrown—‘‘apparently by the same elements which already once in 1914 poured so many tears, blood and suffering over Europe.” Now, too, these elements wanted not peace but

war; they had wantonly provoked a conflict with Germany and Italy, Hungary’s allies. They had attacked Hungarian territory, disregarding repeated protests. Now the Croat people had declared its independence, and therewith the

Yugoslav State had ceased to exist. This had imposed on Hungary the obligation to protect and again take into her own hands the great masses of

Magyars living in the districts torn from Hungary in 1918. In fulfilment of this sacred duty, Horthy had that day ordered his troops to advance. The actions of his troops were not directed against the Serbian people, with whom Hungary had no quarrel and with whom she wished to live in peace in the future. The next day a communiqué signed by Werth announced that Hungarian troops had crossed the frontier in the Baranya Triangle. Bardossy himself had drafted the proclamation! and seems not to have

meant it entirely defiantly. At Ullein’s suggestion he had omitted some further anti-Serbian phrases and the words about the millenary frontiers had been inserted as indication that Hungary was not going forward into Croatia or Serbia.2. He seems still to have hoped that the West would understand and condone his policy; but these hopes remained largely unfulfilled. Although the Allies themselves did many things during the war which were easier to interpret in terms of metaphysics than of international

law, they did not like it when other people followed their example. The wretched Minister in Moscow, who called on M. Vyshinski on 13th April, had a rough passage. M. Vyshinski said that the U.S.S.R. did not approve. That Hungary should act thus only four months after signing the Treaty of Eternal Friendship had left a painful impression on the Soviets. It was not hard to see in what a situation Hungary would find herself if her neighbours took advantage of a difficult moment to divide up her territories, since every-

body was aware of the national minorities in Hungary. Kristdffy retorted that Russia had acted in the same way towards Poland; but Vyshinski “‘broke

off the conversation.’”* Afterwards the U.S.S.R. issued a communiqué along the same lines—a public rebuke to Hungary and the first intimation which had been given that the U.S.S.R. might entertain designs on CarpathoRuthenia.

In the U.S.A. President Roosevelt branded Hungary’s conduct as an ‘“‘unjustified action” and officially defined her as an aggressor under the

Neutrality Act; but when, two days later, the Hungarian Minister in Washington protested against this to the head of the Political Section in the State Department the American “listened to my argument without contra-

1 He admitted this himself (Trial, p. 3). ° Ullein to C. A. M. > Gafencu, Prelude, p. 153.

DEAD MAN’S SHOES 1] dicting it and only asked whether the Hungarian military action would stop after the occupation of the Magyar-inhabited territories.’ The Hungarian,

perhaps misunderstanding the situation, or the question, replied in the affirmative. “You will understand,” answered the American, “‘that in the present situation the whole American public opinion views events in the Balkans from an emotional point of view, which also corresponds to the Government’s own point of view.’ For this reason it was not advisable for Hungary to make further protests. ‘“‘Wait until the Balkan situation ceases to be the focus of public attention and then come back to the problem.’”! Britain had said her say, officially; public opinion now reacted most violently against Hungary. Even those with most understanding for Hungary could not, and did not wish to, justify her action. And the position was made worse by the Hungarian military, whose wishes were the exact opposite of those of the civilians. They wanted to make the most of the affair and to take advantage of it to bring about their heart’s desire, a Hungaro-German alliance. Werth on the 12th submitted a new memorandum to the Government urging that “the Hungarian Army also must continue the war until the Yugoslav Army is completely annihilated.”” They must not stop at the Drave-Danube line, but continue the operations “‘in the sense of the original arrangements,” advancing if necessary as far as Sarajevo.’

In fact, however, thanks to their own shilly-shallying, the Hungarians had ended by mustering a small enough force. West of the Danube they had only one brigade; between the Danube and the Tisza, only five and a half. The Mobile Corps was brought down, in forced marches, to stiffen the line, but even so the force could have made little progress against resistance; particularly as the supply arrangements were defective in the extreme.®

The military, by issuing bombastic “war communiqués,” and the Press,

whose ‘“‘special correspondents from the front’ sent back sensational messages, tried to prove otherwise, but the fact was that the troops met with

practically no resistance. The Yugoslavs did not defend the Baranya Triangle at all,* and the single brigade charged with occupying that area accomplished its task in two days, without meeting any opposition. In the Bacska the Serbs had left only light forces to hold their first defensive line, which ran just behind the frontier; and these withdrew after a few hours, blowing up the bridges behind them. The second line, which rested on the

Ferencz Jézsef Canal, was held rather more strongly, but Hungarian

parachutists landed behind the line and held the bridges at Szenttamas and Uj-Verbasz. One Yugoslav regiment (the 31st), which was mainly composed

of Croats and Magyars, went over to the Hungarians. The Yugoslavs’ third line, running in front of Ujvidék and Titel, was not defended at all. The Hungarian troops entered Szabadka and Zombor on the 12th and Ujvidék on the afternoon of the same day. By the evening of the 14th the whole operation was completed. The limits of the area occupied were the lines of the Drave, the Danube and the Tisza. One mobile detachment did 1 Lajos (retranslated). 2 Sz. I. MS. 3 One armoured detachment, on reaching Zenta, had to go round the local chemists’ shops (in some of these remote areas there were no petrol pumps; I myself, in 1938, had to buy my petrol from a chemist) buying up petrol before it could proceed (Suha)j). 4 These details from Naray, op. cit.

12 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH cross the Drave and penetrate as far as Valjevo, in Croatia, but it was recalled

and returned without having taken part in any fighting in Croatia. : Such resistance as had been put up had come mainly from frontier guards

or from irregulars. The Serb authorities had apparently handed out rifles and ammunition indiscriminately enough to anyone willing to receive them, including women and children; sometimes, but not always, throwing in an armband. There was some street fighting with these elements, a few of whom also sniped at the crowds assembling to greet the arriving troops in the larger centres. This desultory fighting went on for some days after the completion of the main operations, although aeroplanes scoured the country, offering the guerillas mercy if they surrendered and gave up their arms. A total of 15,000 prisoners was reported, but many of these were probably deserters. An order issued on the 21st said that the remaining dobrovolcij were to be allowed “‘to leave peaceably.” The total Hungarian casualties in killed were given as 5 officers and 60

men. No figures have been issued for the other side. Undoubtedly some civilians were shot. According to a memorandum afterwards sent in by Bajcsy-Zsilinszky to Bardossy, 2,350 persons, including some women and children, perished during the occupation, most of them having been entirely innocent, or guilty of only slight offences. To be fair, however, it must be said that this figure does not represent 2,350 cases of wanton murder, since the guerilla methods adopted by the Yugoslavs and the arming of civilians made some such casualties inevitable; but all too high a proportion of them were totally inexcusable. Meanwhile, the German troops had passed clean through the Prekomurje (Muravidek) on the north-western frontier of Yugoslavia. This area again

the Yugoslavs had left undefended, and their civilian authorities had evacuated it even before the arrival of the Germans. As soon as the German troops left, the Hungarian Press began to publish “‘appeals’’ from the local population of ““Wends” and Magyars to the Hungarian authorities to occupy the district; which they did without, apparently, having to use any forces

beyond gendarmerie and frontier guards. A few days later, the local commander, on his own initiative, went on and occupied the Medjumurje (Murak6z).

On the other hand, the Banat, through which the Germans had attacked in force, remained full of German troops. The Wilhelmstrasse conveyed a stiff warning that Hungarian troops must not cross the Tisza, as this would have “‘the gravest consequences.’’!

This concluded the military operations, leaving outstanding the question of the liquidation of Yugoslavia, and of the division of the spoils. Hungary

had officially recognised the Croat State as soon as it proclaimed its independence, and thereafter took up the standpoint that the Yugoslav State no longer existed. She had put in a claim to Germany for all territory which had belonged to Inner Hungary, while indicating that she was prepared to make concessions on two points: while maintaining her claim to the Banat, she was prepared for the moment to treat the question “confidentially,” i.e. not to insist on immediate cession; and she was prepared to negotiate with Croatia on the Murak6z, if Croatia met her wishes on other points.2 Meanwhile, Bardossy instructed the officer commanding the troops which had occupied the area to leave the civilian administration intact, and sent Ullein-

1 Sz. 1. MS, * Td,

DEAD MAN’S SHOES 13 Reviczky down to tell Stepinac¢ that “‘the Government would put things right

if people remained quiet.’ Meanwhile, Hitler’s original intention of allotting the Banat to Hungary had been shaken by a message from Antonescu that if Hungarian troops entered the area, he would expel them by force.? On the 12th Hitler issued a new Top Secret Directive? which allocated the Baranya and Bacska to Hungary; also the Muravidék, which was to be handed over by the German command when they thought fit. Croatia was to be independent “‘within its ethnographic boundaries.”” Nothing more happened until 24th April, when Horthy suddenly flew to the Fiihrer’s H.Q. at Miinchenkirchen. Hitler made no difficulty about handing over the Bacska and Baranya, and acknowledged Hungary’s legal claim to the Banat,° but said that he did not want to hand it over immediately, for fear of offending the Roumanians (from whom

he had just received another Note claiming the area). He would satisfy Hungary’s claim in due course. Three days later, the allocation to Hungary of the Bacska, Baranya and Muravidék was announced in a communiqué

which maintained discreet silence on the Banat and the Murakéz. The Germans were keeping the former area provisionally in their own hands; as to the latter, although Bardossy recognised the moral validity of the UlleinMaéek agreement, he did not dare brave his own public opinion by ordering

the evacuation of the area, which remained under provisional military occupation until Hungary herself took the further step described below.® In accordance with international law, the recovered territories were, for the time, not formally re-annexed, but treated as “occupied territory” and kept under military administration. In practice, however, they were treated as already annexed, and a number of measures, many of them extremely brutal, taken accordingly. The first of these consisted in the issue of an Order on 28th April that all “Serbs, Bosnians, Montenegrins, gypsies or Jews’’ who did not (themselves or their parents) possess citizenship within the territory of Greater Hungary before 31st October 1918 must leave within three days. They were allowed to take with them only such jewellery and other effects as they could carry, and sufficient money to cover their expenses (this was put at 50 pengé per head). Persons married to Magyars or Germans, women expecting to become mothers within two weeks, and persons over 75 years of age, were exempted. In the days following the issue of this decree, 50,000

persons are said to have crossed the frontier at Ujvidék alone. A large number of persons were interned under the most miserable conditions, and courts-martial set up which passed many sentences. Summary vengeance was admittedly taken on some oppressive sub-officials, on “‘Magyar traitors” and on guerillas taken red-handed, and many irregularities were committed. While all this was going on, scandalous articles, many of them centrally inspired, flooded the Hungarian Press on the sins committed by the Serbs in the world in general, and in the Voivodina in particular. The mildest thing 1 Personal, Ullein-Reviczky to C. A. M. 2 Hillgruber, op. cit., p. 125. 8 Cit. Nur. Trial, VI, 229.

¢ An obscure phrase in the Directive suggests that Hitler thought of annexing the small German-speaking area on the western fringe of this district, or, alternatively, of ‘‘repatriating”

the population. He did in fact ask for these few villages on 22nd April (Sz. I. MS.). The Hungarians, however, managed to put off granting the request until the end of the war. 6 Hitler said to Horthy: ‘““‘The Banat is yours.”” Horthy answered that he knew this, and was waiting to see the fact recognized (Horthy to C. A. M.). 8 See below, p. 57-8.

14 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH said of them was that they had been intruders, all traces of whose raumfremd rule must vanish before the advent of the New Order.

Meanwhile, current business had to be carried on, and long-term programmes enunciated. In his new character of Minister President, and consequently, Leader of the MEP, Bardossy had had to address the Parliamentary representatives of that body (many of whom he then met for the first time) on 9th April, and to address Parliament on the 24th. His remarks on foreign policy were anything but servile, for he emphasised very strongly that Hungary proposed to play an independent role, and an important one, in international politics; but he showed clearly his rejection of Teleki’s policy of balance by his very strong insistence that it was only in co-operation with

Germany and Italy, and by co-ordinating her actions with theirs, that Hungary could play that role. During the following weeks the inspired Press spared no effort to convince its readers that Britain had been the source of

all evil on the Danube. Thank God, the very idea of a British victory was ridiculous; but if it had been imaginable, it would have been unspeakably disastrous for the world in general, and for Hungary in particular. As earnest of his sincerity, Bardossy ordered the complete liquidation of Teleki’s “‘National-Political Service,’’ the personnel of which was disbanded and its files and material (the latter running to hundreds of books, thousands of pamphlets and hundreds of thousands of leaflets) laboriously burned.

There is reason to believe that the Regent, when appointing Bardossy, had stipulated that he should not change the inner political line, and had made assurance surer by refusing to accept the proferred resignations of Keresztes-Fischer and the other “‘Liberal-Conservative’’ Ministers.1 Bardossy

might have cavilled at this if Germany had shown any unfriendliness over his appointment, when he might have felt it advisable to placate her; but as the German Press registered the news without enthusiasm, but with no signs of hostility, he simply told the MEP that his internal policy “‘would not differ by a hair’s-breadth from that of his predecessor,’’ and this part of his inaugural address to Parliament read like an anthology from Teleki (as, indeed, it probably was). The only possible novelty was that he gave definite notice of another anti-Jewish law; and it may well be that Teleki, who had promised this often enough, would himself have introduced it had he lived. Parliament, and the country at large, received these declarations in the familiar way, with the rather unexpected exception that the Social Democrats announced that they were “‘prepared to support the Government in its search for that unison and harmony which Teleki also had sought, but had failed to find.”* The Arrow Cross and the Imrédists found fault with Bardossy, exactly as they had with Teleki, that he was not seeking the New Order at home; to which he replied, exactly as Teleki had done, that Hungary was ‘‘choosing her political aims from her own arsenal.”’ Only the Transylvanians

announced that they would have to stand a little farther apart from the Government, now that the Minister President was no longer a Transylvanian, and drew up a separate programme of their own, which included a number

of specifically Transylvanian desiderata.* But they still regarded any

1 Kallay to C. A. M. * Népszava, 25th April 1941. ’ These were chiefly for measures to repair the effects of the Roumanian rule. The rights of the Magyars in Southern Transylvania should be safeguarded. The Roumanians in Hungary should receive the same rights as the Magyars in Roumania. The social programme of the Party was somewhat more progressive than that of the MEP, and it was less anti-Semitic.

DEAD MAN’S SHOES 15 differences which they might have with the MEP as relating exclusively to the relationship between Transylvania and Inner Hungary, and declared that

they would continue to support the Government in foreign affairs, and on general internal policy. In the course of the next weeks Parliament dealt with various routine and non-contentious measures which need not be described here, and then turned

to the new Jewish Law. The word “‘Jew” did not, in fact, figure in the official title of this measure, which was ‘‘Act to amend the Marriage Law of

1894,” and it contained certain provisions unconnected with the Jewish question, e.g. one instituting pre-marital medical examination. But it styled itself “‘race-protective” (fajvédelmi), its most important clauses were those which prohibited marriages and extra-marital intercourse between Jews and non-Jews, and it created an important precedent in Hungarian legislation in departing, for the first time on record, from the strictly religious definition of what constituted a Jew. Once this point of principle had been carried—

only after strong opposition, especially in the Upper House, where the leaders of all religious denominations, and also other speakers, severely criticised the racial definition on principle, besides arguing that the provisions would encourage secret concubinage and increase illegitimacy—prolonged

argument went on over the application of it. The Bill as tabled laid down that a person was not a Jew if not more than one of his grandparents had been

of the Jewish faith. If three or four had been of the Jewish faith, he ranked as a Jew, whatever his religion. If two of his grandparents had been Jews, and two not, he ranked as a non-Jew if “‘born Christian.’ If, however, the Jewish partner of a non-Jew had not been baptised before marriage, the son or daughter ranked as a Jew if he or she married a person with even one Jewish

grandparent. The Upper House actually rejected the Bill in this form, but ended by accepting it subject to the amendment that baptism during the first seven years of life allowed a half-breed to rank as a non-Jew—an amendment which did not, indeed, meet the objection of principle, but was very important

in practice, since it saved a considerable proportion of the Hungarian aristocracy, and other very leading figures in Hungary, from being classified as Jews.

It is important to emphasise that this definition of a Jew applied only to the cases mentioned in the Act (marriage and extra-marital intercourse). The law did not alter the incidence or effect of earlier legislation. Another measure relating to Jews was enacted by Order in Council, as a codicil to the Military Service Law of 1939. This laid down that no Jew

should do Levente training or service in the armed forces of Hungary, including the gendarmerie. Jews were to have their own pre-military formations, and when called up for military service, would perform this in the special auxiliary formations prescribed by the 1939 Act for persons unsuited for or incapable of military service. On 4th June Bardossy paid the visit to Rome which it was customary for

all Hungarian premiers to make after appointment. It was an entirely fruitless one, described by Ciano in his Diary as *‘one of the most classically

useless.’ Ciano liked Bardossy, which was more than he did most Hungarians, but did not take him too seriously; in any case, the Italians were not burning their fingers for Hungary at this stage. Bardossy seems to 1 Diary, 4th June 1941.

16 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH have hinted that Hungary might get something—as Hitler had promised— in Fiume, but Mussolini only told him that “the Hungarians were to Fiume as the Swiss to Genoa.”

In May, wheat and certain other foodstuffs suddenly ran acutely short again. The Germans do not seem to have been to blame. The explanation given by the Minister of Supply on 24th May, that large stocks had had to be got together in April and May “‘for the Honvéds marching towards the historic frontiers” is somewhat unconvincing when it is remembered how few

Honvéds were marching in April, and none at allin May. The roots of the trouble apparently lay in the very bad harvest of the previous year and in dilatoriness of the authorities in facing the problem. But the shortage was very real, and the Government had to make sudden and extensive use of its emergency powers. Stocks were requisitioned on a considerable scale, and further restrictions introduced; maize and potato flour again mixed with the bread, the milling ratios of both wheat and rye raised, the fat ration reduced, restrictions placed on the slaughter and sale of fatted stock. Bread gave out altogether in Budapest on 16th June. The coming harvest was awaited with the greatest anxiety, and farmers urged to reap “even before the ears were Tipe.”

Apart from this, general consumer goods were beginning to run short, and books were issued in which purchases (which must not exceed normal

consumption) of certain goods, including clothing and linen, had to be entered.

CHAPTER TWO

VA BANQUE EANWHILE, the day of Hitler’s planned attack on Soviet Russia

Mee approaching.

All the reliable evidence is conclusive that in the various recastings of his plans, Hitler himself never altered his mind about the subordinate role

which Hungary was to play in this operation. She was not even to be told that the campaign was impending, much less be asked to take any active part init. She was only to be asked—and that at the very last moment—to hold

the Ruthene frontier sufficiently strongly for it to be impossible for the Russians to break through and take the Germans’ armies in the rear. The OKH itself thought this risky, since the Heeresgruppe Siid was in any case

being asked to attack forces numerically stronger than its own, and, if it could not use Hungarian territory, its right flank would be dangerously exposed; and at the Conference of 30th April, on which the date was finally fixed for 22nd June, Halder argued that even if Hungarian troops were not to join in the campaign, Hungary should be asked to allow German troops

to deploy on her territory, and move up through their positions. Hitler, however, overruled this, saying that Hungary would not consent, and the point was not raised again.” In his diplomatic communications to the Hungarians, Hitler (and his diplomatic spokesmen) adhered to their original programme to the last. It is true that on 21st March Hitler had spoken at some length to Bardossy of Russia’s threatening attitude, ““which might possibly make it necessary for the German Divisions on the Russian front to give her an answer,” although even then, he said that Hungary’s help would not be required, since Russia would cease to exist in a few weeks.* But on 24th April he told Horthy that his relations with the U.S.S.R. were “‘entirely correct,”* and as late as 10th14th June Weizsacker was equally reticent. Bardossy, by his own account, three times raised the question of a German-Soviet conflict, and Weizsacker replied that “if anyone said that a German-Soviet conflict was imminent, he knew more than the Fiihrer. Germany was making no demands of Russia, and no negotiations were going on.’”

Similarly, the detailed plans worked out in May were based on the Fiihrer’s instructions; no provision was made in them for a last-minute change of plan, and if Hitler had any such idea, he dropped no hint of it to his closest advisers.° Nevertheless, it is difficult not to suppose that after 1 The record of this is in the Nuremberg Document P.S. 872. The American translation perpetrates an important mistake here, rendering “defensive Massnahmen”’ as ‘defensive operations’”’ (for ‘‘measures’’).

2 F, M. Halder to C. A. M.

2 Sz. I. MS. 4 Id. 5 Bardossy’s evidence at his trial.

6 F. M. Halder and General Warlimont to C. A. M. General Warlimont must be the last

surviving senior member of the OK W and his personal testimony to the writer that Hitler took the decision to invite Hungary in only as described below is particularly valuable. B

18 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH the Conference of 30th April, certain German high officers told their Hungarian colleagues of Hitler’s plans, and of the dangers which they saw in them, and at least hinted that an offer of help from Hungary would not be unwelcome. At any rate, by early in May the Hungarian General Staff was in possession of surprisingly excellent information on Germany’s plans,’ and on the 6th of the month Werth submitted to Bardossy a memorandum in which, using language which suspiciously resembled some of the German

documents of the same date,? he argued that Germany’s supply situation alone would force her soon to make war on Russia. Germany was bound

to win quickly, and it seemed inevitable that Finland, Hungary and Roumania would be involved. Indeed, “it could hardly be doubted that Germany wished Hungary to take part, when Hungary’s geographical situation and the requests recently received from the German High Command

for the building and improving of roads were taken into consideration.” Hungary must waver no more. In the interests of her own security and of the achievement of her national objectives, she should conclude with Germany

a military and political treaty of guarantee and mutual assistance; and he asked for authorisation “‘to take up contact with the appropriate German military authorities, through military channels, with the object of preparing

for German-Hungarian military co-operation.”* He sent in a second memorandum, in almost the same words, on 31st May. Sztdjay, meanwhile, was sending in another set of communications which started from the opposite assumption to Werth’s, viz. that Germany meant to leave Hungary out, but ended in the same conclusion, viz. that in her own interest she should at once make the Reich an offer of military assistance, “perhaps even in the form of an offensive and defensive alliance,”’ since if she allowed herself to be left out, she would lose all chance of improving on

the Vienna Award and might even find it reversed against her. War was imminent, so she should act as soon as possible, through himself or through ‘“‘a very high-ranking political personality.””> A military agreement was not enough. He wrote in this vein on 24th May, 7th June and 14th June. To all these importunities Bardossy replied most cautiously and correctly.

He answered Werth on 12th May that he had no reason to suppose war to | be imminent; that in view of the immense discrepancy in size between the two States, it was hardly likely that Germany would want a military alliance with Hungary; and that she would acquire no merit by pushing herself forward

and prying into military secrets. He answered Sztdjay on 14th June by quoting Weizsacker against him. Up to mid-June, moreover, Hungary had hardly any troops under arms. All those mobilised in April had been demobilised, except the Ist Mountain and 8th Frontier Chasseur Brigades, the front-line units of which had been retained with the colours and kept on the Ruthenian frontier. But on 14th June Werth sent in a third memorandum, couched in tones of the utmost urgency. He had absolutely reliable information that Germany 1 See Ciano, Diary, 14th May. Szalasi had the same information (which he did not believe) from ‘‘very reliable General Staff sources.” Halder writes to C. A. M. that when he spoke to Werth on 19th June he was astonished to find that his communication came as no news to the Hungarian, whom he found ‘“‘much better informed than he could have guessed.’’ See also above, I, p. 390. 2 Werth’s economic argumentation is strikingly similar to that contained in Oldenburg’s memorandum of 2nd May to General Schubert of the Economic General Staff. 3 Full extracts of both Werth’s and Sztdjay’s memoranda, and of Bardossy’s answers, are given in all the Hungarian collections, Sz. I. MS., Lajos and “‘Béla.”

VA BANQUE 19 would attack Russia in the next 8-10 days. If a political alliance was impossible, he must at least be empowered to make the necessary arrangements for military co-operation with the Germans. The supply situation must not act as a deterrent, nor the imminence of the harvest, for Russia was so weak —she did not possess a single General capable of handling three Army Corps

—that it was safe to calculate that the war would be over in a few weeks, and the army home in time for the harvest. Hungary was bound, in sheer self-defence, to strengthen her forces on the frontier, since this was practically undefended, and the Russians, who were in considerable strength on the other

side of it,t could simply walk across it. It would be no provocation, for the gap must be filled, and if Hungary did not fill it, Germany would. A most interesting and significant passage in the memorandum ran as follows: ‘J am convinced—and the events of the past have justified this belief—

that the German Government will not take the initiative towards us a long time ahead. Only at the last moment, a few days or a few hours before the war starts will they inform us, and perhaps (esetleg) call on us

to join them. It is precisely for this reason that I propose once more that the Government should immediately get into touch with the German Government and make a formal proposal that we voluntarily participate in the German-Russian war.”

Werth asked for retrospective sanction for certain emergency measures which he had already taken and for sanction to mobilise all the frontier forces, the Mobile Corps, and four other corps.

On receiving this memorandum, Bardossy convoked a Ministerial Council, to which he put the whole position in detail. The Council unanimously resolved:

Not to offer Germany Hungary’s participation in the war; to take care, in any steps which might prove necessary, not to come into conflict

with Germany’s intentions: to take into consideration the approach of the harvest and the fact that the railways were already overloaded with German deliveries.”

Werth was authorised to bring the two brigades already on the frontier up to “‘enlarged war strength” and also to mobilise the VIII (Kassa) Corps, but nothing more.? Bardossy informed Werth orally of what had been decided, and the next day, the 15th, telegraphed an account to Sztojay, to whom he added that it was possible, although not probable, that the Russians might “‘start a strong attack’? on Hungary’s frontiers. The Hungarian Government must take preparatory measures to guard against this, but would have to take extreme care not to provoke Russia into moving. Moreover, the railways were fully

occupied, etc. The Government therefore asked the German Government | to inform them most secretly whether they desired any further measures to be taken in view of the German-Russian position. The question never needed to be asked, for on that same day Ribbentrop 1 According to Adonyi, op. cit., p. 27, the Soviets then had behind the Hungaro-Russian frontier ten infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions and two armoured brigades. 2 The text of the resolution is given verbatim in “Béla.”

3 Adonyi, loc. cit. The orders to the units concerned went out on the 16th. The G.O.C. VIII Corps was placed in command also of the two brigades on the frontier, the whole force being known as the ‘Carpathian Group.”

20 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH had sent word to Erdmannsdorff to tell Bardossy that “‘in view of the strong

concentration of Russian troops on the eastern frontier of Germany, it is expected that the Fiihrer will be compelled, by the beginning of July at the latest, to clarify German-Russian relations and in this connection to make certain demands. Since the outcome of the negotiations cannot be foreseen, the German Government considers it necessary for Hungary also to take the necessary steps to secure her frontiers.” The message was delivered on the 16th? and must have been accompanied by some indication, not preserved

in the records, that some high German military authority would be communicating with the Hungarian General Staff, for Bardossy at once wrote to Werth telling him that he would shortly be talking to one of the highest officers of the German Army, and advising him in those conversations to follow, and not to go beyond, the following principles: Erdmannsdorff’s message (which Bardossy repeated) proved beyond doubt that Berlin wanted from Hungary only defence; it had expressed no wish or desire for Hungary’s military participation in any operations which might be undertaken. The Government therefore abode by its decision of the 14th June, which Bardossy recapitulated as follows:

1. Hungary was not offering her military participation to Germany. “'If, however, the Government of the Reich were later to regard Hungary’s co-operation as necessary and to address us an express request to that effect, we should of course willingly accede to it.” 2. In organising her defensive measures Hungary wished, of course, to proceed in complete harmony with the German Government and High Command.

3. In any steps taken to strengthen, along defensive lines, Hungary’s military preparedness, the fact must be borne in mind that the railways were already largely employed on German military deliveries, a fact which, of course, made close conformity between the measures

taken by the German and the Hungarian Army Commands even more necessary.

4. It must also be remembered that military preparations by Hungary, at that moment, would have serious effects on the harvest work then in progress and might endanger the harvest, which would not merely

not be desirable from Germany’s point of view but actually very strongly against the interests of the Reich itself.

Next day (the 17th) came another telegram from Sztdjay, pleading that Hungary offer Germany her active participation in the war®; but it was easy

for Bardossy to ignore this, for on the 19th Halder, who had been in Bucharest, broke his return journey at Budapest. Out of friendship and courtesy, he spoke to Werth, who had driven out to the aerodrome to see

| him,* but simply said the OKH had now resigned itself to leaving the

gap opposite Ruthenia unfilled,° and Halder, accordingly, said that it

would have been a good thing if Hungary had fortified her frontier better before, but now she should do nothing calculated to alarm the Russians or 1 N.G. 3082. The message appears to have been sent by telephone from Venice (Exhib. 362, Min. Trial). 2 Min. Trial, loc. cit. 3 $z. I. MS. 4 Personal, Halder to C. A. M. > Id.

VA BANQUE 21 to impede the German troop movements across her territory. If Russian troops took refuge on her territory, she should disarm them. If Germany needed the use of the railways in Ruthenia, Hungary should place them at her disposal, and should give her wireless facilities. If any military measures on Hungary’s part proved necessary after all, General Himer, the OK W’s liaison officer, would inform the Chief of Staff.1 This enabled Bardossy to

telegraph to Sztdjay on the 20th that Germany ‘“‘entirely appreciated”’ Hungary’s cautious attitude, and to a friend who asked him if Hungary would be involved in the coming war, he replied: ‘I’m not crazy.’” The 22nd was the Day. At4a.m., Hitler told Sztdéjay that hostilities had

broken out between Germany and the U.S.S.R.; a courier was taking a personal letter from him to Horthy. At 6.15 a.m. Erdmannsdorff (who had been warned on the telephone the night before) made a similar communication as from Ribbentrop to Bardossy, adding (according to Bardossy)* that ‘“‘he

was convinced that Hungary would draw the consequences from this decision.”” The two men do not seem to have discussed matters in further detail at this early hour; it was, indeed, obviously necessary to see first what the Fiithrer had written to the Regent, who was, as it happened, ill in bed, for one of the few times in his robust life, with a mild attack of food poisoning.

The letter,* which Erdmannsdorff delivered at 10.30 a.m., turned out to be exactly consistent with Hitler’s previous communications to Hungary on the Russian question. After spreading itself on self-justification for a couple of pages, it came to the point in the following words (the only important ones in it):

‘As to the attitude of Hungary, I am convinced that she will, in her

national consciousness, appreciate my action. Here I should like to thank Your Serene Highness for the understanding measures taken by the Hungarian Army, which, by the mere fact of having strengthened its frontier defences, will prevent a Russian flank attack and hold Russian

forces down.” |

According to Erdmannsdorff, Horthy, “being an old Crusader against Bolshevism, was jubilant when he heard the news,’ but he did not that day send off an official answer, and if he began to compose one, it was merely a

message wishing the Fiihrer success, cordially enough, but without any suggestion that Hungary should participate in the “Crusade.’’® There is, indeed, no reason to doubt Horthy’s own later statement’ that he would have

thought a declaration of war by Hungary on Russia both purposeless and absurd: purposeless, since Hungary had no territorial claims on Russia, and absurd in view of the disparity in size between the two States. Nor are there 1 Sz. I. MS. * Apor to C. A. M. 3 In evidence at his trial (p. 20). 4 The text of the letter is given in both the Sz. I. MS. and in “‘Béla’’; the latter gives also the subsequent correspondence. In view of this documentary evidence, it is necessary to conclude that the Regent’s recollection, as given in his memoirs (op. cit., p. 234), that Hitler asked him to declare war on Russia, and he refused, has played him false. 5 Erdmannsdorff to C. A. M. 6 Horthy’s answer, which went off on the 26th, is quoted below. Close scrutiny of it suggests that the end of this document is a rewrite of or addition to an earlier version which contained nothing but good wishes.

7 Horthy, loc. cit. The Regent gave C. A. M. the same account in 1945, in the terms reproduced above; it is perhaps significant that between that date and 1952 his memory substituted “lack of provocation’’ for “absence of territorial issues.”

22 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH any signs that on that day or the next Bardossy was expecting any opposition

from the Regent to the first policy on which he had decided, which was simply to take no action whatever. He argued (correctly) that no obligation

on Hungary derived from the Tripartite Pact, since Germany was quite patently the aggressor, and he hoped to make his attitude acceptable to Germany by arguing that a Hungarian Legation in Moscow would be a . valuable source of information to the Germans. The only military step taken by Hungary that day was to man the recently

constructed fortifications on the Ruthene frontier, and to alert the A.A. defences throughout the country. But by the afternoon Bardossy had changed his mind. The sources here do not quite agree. According to Ullein-Reviczky,! journalists came to him seeking information, and he explained Hungary’s policy to the correspondent

of the DNB, in the sense described above. An hour later, Bardossy

summoned him to tell him that Erdmannsdorff had descended on him to demand explanations. When he (Bardossy) put his case, Erdmannsdorff answered “‘in a dry tone” that Germany did not need a Hungarian Legation in Moscow, and would prefer a gesture of solidarity. A rupture of diplomatic relations would be “the least that she could do.’’ Bardossy, at his trial,* did not mention this alleged incident, but said that he interpreted Erdmannsdorff’s words on delivering the message at 6.15 a.m. as an “emphatic hint,’” which convinced him “‘that Germany would never for a moment have endured the presence of a Soviet Legation working behind the line’; the Foreign Ministry had been of the same opinion. When he told Erdmannsdorff of his decision the next day, the German answered that “‘that was the very least that Hungary

could do.’* Finally, Erdmannsdorff not only does not recall having met Bardossy that day after 6.15 but also denies having “‘hinted” anything.* Whatever the truth here, Bardossy seems soon to have come to feel that a policy of complete inaction would be impracticable, particularly since he received news that afternoon that Roumania was sending 10 Divisions against

the U.S.S.R. The following morning, at 10 a.m., he convened an extraordinary Ministerial Council. The proceedings, according to Barczy, lasted ‘“‘barely 20 minutes.’’ Bardossy opened them by pointing out that since the previous day a state of war had existed between Germany and the U.S.S.R. He recalled that Hungary was a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, and suggested that she should break off relations with the U.S.S.R.

Only one Minister is recorded as raising any objections: KeresztesFischer, who intervened: “‘Not so fast!” But Bardossy answered: ‘“‘The faster the better.’ There was already a race for the favour of Germany, not so much the Government as the National Socialist Party. There was Imrédy, there was Mecsér, who had just gone off to Berlin. “If it were not for this competition,” said Bardossy, “I wouldn’t mind being the last in the race.”

This argument (which did not relate so exclusively to purely internal politics as may sound at first) seems to have convinced all members of the cabinet, and they agreed without further demur to the course proposed, especially after Bartha had given it as his expert opinion that the Germans

would defeat the Russians and be in Moscow in six weeks. Bdardossy accordingly rang up the Regent to tell him of the decision and get his consent.

1 Op. cit., pp. 101-2. > Trial, p. 20. * Id., p. 10. * Personal, Erdmannsdorff to C. A. M.

VA BANQUE 23 This having been given immediately, he ordered the decision to be communicated to M. Charanov, the Soviet Minister in Budapest, and had a telegram to the same effect sent to Kristdffy, in Moscow. He himself informed Erdmannsdorff, with whom he had made an appointment for noon, of what

Hungary had decided to do. To this communication, according to him, Erdmannsdorff replied that he had no comments to make; that Hungary should break off relations with the U.S.S.R. “went without saying.” At the same time, an official notice of Hungary’s decision was issued, and a further

notice ordered air defence preparations to be put in force throughout the country, as from noon on that day, while at night the blackout would be enforced. ~ The Russians, by unanimous testimony, took this action with great understanding. M. Charanov is reported to have replied to Voernle that the U.S.S.R. entirely understood Hungary’s position and was quite content provided she did not go to war, as he had indeed expected her to do. On the same morning, as was afterwards revealed, M. Molotov had sent for Kristoffy to ask him what Hungary’s attitude would be in a conflict between

Germany and the U.S.S.R. He said—according to Kristéffy?—that the U.S.S.R. had no demands to make on Hungary and no aggressive intentions towards her. He did not even mind if Hungary’s claims against Roumania

were satisfied, and he would not object to that in the future. M. Molotov further recalled the recent very advantageous commercial treaty now in force

between the two countries, and Russia’s friendly action in returning the Honved flags. There was no need for Hungary to come into a GermanRussian war. The U.S.S.R. had “forgotten” Hungary’s adhesion to the Anti-Comintern Pact. She was a small country; let her keep out of world conflicts. But in view of the swift march of events he must know as early as possible what Hungary was going to do. Finally, he offered Kristdffy special

facilities for telegraphing all this to his Government, and Kristdffy immediately wired to Budapest, where his telegram arrived the next day. When, again on the 23rd, the Minister in Zagreb, Marosy, telegraphed that the local German Commander, General Glaise Horstenau, “thought it most unfortunate that Hungary was not participating, at least with one or two Divisions,’’ Bardossy was still able to wire back that the Germans did not want Hungary’s participation. But this was the last time that he could use that argument. On the same morning, perhaps even while Bardossy was conferring with Erdmannsdorff, had come an all-important move from the

German side. | The Heeresgruppe Siid, forced to make a purely frontal attack, had encountered unexpectedly heavy resistance, and already by the second day of the campaign it had become clear that progress was likely to be slower than had originally been hoped.

At this juncture Hitler was told that Horthy “sincerely regretted not having been called upon to undertake his share in Germany’s struggle against

Communism.’? It is quite impossible today to say anything more definite about this communication. Herr von Erdmannsdorff informs me that it 1 Bardossy at his trial said that Charanov had been “exceedingly surprised when Hungary only broke off diplomatic relations.” 2 Fully in Lajos, and the Sz. I. MS. 3 F. M. Halder to C. A. M.

4 Personal, General Warlimont to C. A.M. General Warlimont definitely recalls this message, although no longer certain whether it came through military or diplomatic channels.

24 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH did not go through him. It might have gone through Himer, but it seems overwhelmingly probable that it was in any case no more than a polite form of words which may well have expressed the Regent’s heart’s feelings, but was in no way intended as anything more.! But Hitler had no reason to doubt its authenticity; he and his Generals had heard the same sort of thing, over and over again, from Sztéjay and Werth. The writer has received first-hand evidence that the message was ‘“‘very welcome” to Hitler, and an authoritative

opinion that it must have been what determined his move.2 Thus hardly had Bardossy parted from Erdmannsdorff when Werth sent in a note that Himer had called to inform him ‘“‘in the name of the OK W and of Halder, that Germany would be grateful for any kind of military co-operation from Hungary, and would like to know, if Hungary participated, on how much help she could count and when it would be available?’’® In transmitting this message, Werth added his own recommendation that Hungary should declare war on the U.S.S.R.* Bardossy seems to have gone first to Horthy, and this may be the occasion to which Horthy refers when he writes that he was asked to declare war and

refused. At any rate, the decision reached was that “this was a political question on which the Government of the Reich should state its views.’ At 5 p.m. Bardossy, therefore, called another extraordinary Ministerial Council,® to which he read out Werth’s letter. He said wrathfully that this constituted an inadmissible interference by the military in the affairs of the Government, whose intention to remain outside the war had not changed in

any particular. Hungary had nothing to seek in this war, which was not hers. He asked his colleagues to vote in turn for or against war, beginning himself with his own “‘against.’’ All present followed his example, except Gyorffy-Bengyel, deputising for Bartha,’ who explained that he had been instructed by Bartha to vote “‘for’’, if the question arose. Bardossy communicated this decision to Werth at 7 p.m., and the next

day, the 24th, he sent for Erdmannsdorff and pointed out to him® that Hungary had repeatedly been told by Germany that there was no question of a German-Soviet war. He also recalled Halder’s recent declaration. He had therefore been surprised to hear of Himer’s communication to Werth. Participation in a war was a political question and one for the Government, not the General Staff, to decide. He went on to argue the difficult position

in which Hungary was placed by the revisionist attitude of both the

Roumanian and the Slovak Governments, and also by her economic tribulations. The Government accordingly regarded it as their prime duty to conserve their forces and to preserve order in the Danube basin. ‘‘All in all,” said Bardossy, “] must say frankly that the Hungarian Government, having regard to these considerations, could not easily decide to participate in the war against the Soviets.” This did not affect Hungary’s complete loyalty 1 This is hypothesis, but seems an obvious one. * General Warlimont to C. A. M.

3 See the archives. Bardossy afterwards repeated the message to the Ministerial Council: Deutschland ware dankbar, wenn Ungarn mittun kénnte (Barczy). 4 Lajos.

5 Bas dessy at the Ministerial Council of 26th June (Barczy). 6 This meeting is recorded by Ullein, op. cit., pp. 103-5.

* Bartha was in Rome, on a visit which the Press had been asked not to mention. He

returned the next day.

§ There are two versions of this interview, that from the Hungarian archives, and the summary sent by Erdmannsdorff, which was produced at his trial. They agree very closely.

VA BANQUE 25 to and solidarity with the Axis, and if Germany wished it, and would say so, the Hungarian Government “‘would willingly examine the question of the participation of units of the Hungarian Army in the attack against Soviet forces and would submit the question to the Regent.’ The question was, however, a political one, and he asked to be informed, through diplomatic channels, whether the participation of the Hungarian Army was desired, and if so, on what scale. Erdmannsdorff sent this message without comment. The Wilhelmstrasse did not reply the next day (nor, so far as is known, ever), but during that day, the 25th, the position got a little more difficult. Roumania and Italy had already declared war and now were followed by Slovakia, whose Leader did not, apparently, share Horthy’s views on the sublime and the ridiculous. Talamo called on Woernle, and “in a long speech expressed his anxiety whether Hungary’s inactivity in the Russian war might not have unfavourable

repercussions.”! But Bardossy remained firm, and, when reports came in

that Soviet aircraft had machine-gunned a train at K6résmez6, on the frontier, he had the news suppressed in order to avoid exacerbating opinion. The Press, meanwhile, while fulsome enough in its protestations of Hungary’s loyalty to the Axis, her traditional hatred of Bolshevism, etc., was defining her own attitude in the headline: “‘Hungary stands guard on the Carpathian Crest,’ and wishing its allies all success, warmly indeed, but as one waves to a friend departing on a journey on which one does not mean to accompany

him. Germany, it was explicitly stated, understood and appreciated this policy.’

But the next morning there occurred the incident which was to prove decisive. At 1.8 p.m. three aircraft appeared over the city of Kassa, circled for a while unmolested (being thought to be friendly), then suddenly dropped some bombs which caused serious loss of life and considerable material damage (among the buildings hit was the big new Post Office built by the Czechs), and flew away.

A report of the event reached the General Staff, apparently in the form that ‘‘Soviet aircraft had bombed Kassa’’; and Werth and Bartha hurried to pass it to the Regent. When the report came in, Bardossy was still on the side of the angels. He

had the first communiqué on the attack, which had been given out by the General Staff, suppressed and hurried across to the Regent. But short as

the Generals’ start had been, they had won the battle. The Regent, as Bardossy himself said, ““took no pleasure in the prospect of the war,” but he was firmly convinced that Hungary had been the victim of a dastardly and

unprovoked attack. All his old prejudices had bubbled up. “The skin would peel off his face,”’ he said in the expressive Magyar phrase, for very

shame, “if the attack was not ‘answered.’ “He had already issued the order to the Hungarian air-force to carry out reprisals.’’® It is not quite certain whether, even now, Horthy was thinking of an actual 1 Lajos. This, incidentally, was not the attitude of the Italian Government. According to “Béla,” Ciano told Villani that the war would be long and that Hungary would be well advised

to keep her powder dry. The later she entered the war, the better her position would be. The existing “order” in S.E. Europe was provisional and would be finally regulated only after the me See in particular the inspired article in Pester Lloyd, 26th June. 3 Bardossy at his trial, p. 23. The printed text does not explain what the “order” given by Horthy was; but Sulyok, op. cit., p. 381, completes the sentence from the official record. The

word used was “‘visszaiités”’ (literally, striking back). |

26 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH declaration of war, or only of reprisals'; and another point afterwards greatly disputed was whether his wishes, whatever they were, were based on a full knowledge of the material facts: for he afterwards strongly and consistently

maintained that Bardossy failed to show him Kristdffy’s telegram from Moscow, which he only learned by accident in August 1944°; had heknown of it, he would have judged the situation differently (a contention which surely itself affords the strongest presumptive proof that, as things were, he was in favour of war). On top of all this, it appears that when the two men parted, after what can only have been a few minutes’ discussion, it was on a misunderstanding as to what they had actually agreed. According to Bardossy, Horthy had at first wanted the action, whatever it was that he favoured, to be taken immediately. Bardossy had persuaded him that the matter must come first before a Ministerial Council, and Horthy had agreed. He then, it appears, had been under the impression that the Council would debate the whole question and come back to him with its decision for his ratification, so that, as he said afterwards, he had been as surprised as anyone else when he heard that war had been declared.* Bardossy, on the contrary, believed that the Regent’s mind was made up, and made up in favour of war; that he himself had actually been ‘‘ordered”’ to put this decision into effect. If, therefore, the Council decided in that sense, there would be no need to consult the Regent further. It was this misunderstanding which enabled Horthy to complain afterwards’ that Bardossy had confronted him with a fait accompli in having war declared. The Council met at 2.30. So hurriedly had it been convoked that Laky arrived only as it was ending, and Zsindely (Secretary of State) not at all (he had gone sunbathing, poor innocent)? while Ullein, who was giving a lunch-party, got the summons to it at table, and sent his deputy in his place. Only an hour and twenty minutes had passed since the bombs fell on Kassa

and less than an hour since Bardossy had ordered the General Staff’s communiqué to be suppressed. But in that short time Bardossy had made up his mind to a complete reversal of his whole policy. As he told Ullein that same afternoon,® with a touch of his typical intellectual arrogance, he had taken only five minutes to reach his conclusions. Another would have taken longer, but the result would have been the same. The conclusions were these’: that the Germans had made up their minds ' When asked by the Court at his trial whether the Regent had consented to the declaration of war on Russia, Bardossy answered: ‘“‘that was what he wanted first of all,’’ and there is much

evidence that he afterwards maintained that he had declared war ‘‘under orders’’; according to Barczy, he told this to Lakatos in August 1944, and the Szalasi Diary records him as having said the same thing to a friend in October. A Right-wing newspaper (Uj Magyarsdg) wrote in November 1944 that ‘‘there was a witness that when Bardossy told Horthy on the 27th that war had been declared, Horthy answered: ‘It should have been done yesterday.’ But in the rest of his evidence, Bardossy usually only reported the Regent as insisting on “‘reprisals”’ or on ‘‘answering the bombardment,” and it is possible that the nature of the ‘‘answer’’ was never exactly defined.

2 See below, p. 324, n. 5, and Horthy, op. cit., p. 235. Bardossy at his trial said that, so far as he remembered, he had mentioned the telegram, but Horthy was at any rate so convinced of the

contrary that in the letter which he wrote to Stalin asking for an armistice (below, p. 354) he assured him that he had not known of it. Moreover, Bardossy’s own explanation, summarised below, of why he did not take the telegram seriously suggests that he did not mention it. 3 So he told C. A. M. in 1945. 4 Kallay, op. cit., p. 8. ° Barczy. § Op. cit., p. 108. ’ These paragraphs are based on Bardossy’s own account of his motives, as given at his trial,

and on his conversation with Ullein, loc. cit. |

VA BANQUE 27 to bring Hungary into the war. The Generals were on the Germans’ side, the Regent was under the influence of the Generals. Hungary had therefore no real choice; for she was not really master of her own will. Sooner or later she would have to yield, and the wisest and cheapest policy for her was “to give the minimum; not to arouse suspicion and mistrust, not to provoke (Germany) to trample us down, destroy us, crush everything dear to us, reshape us irretrievably in her own image. To give the minimum, as promptly as possible, so that they should not be able to ask for something different. Not to ask ‘What do you want?’ because if we asked, we should be told very quickly: “You have got to give this and that.’”’

No doubt, also, his proud and sensitive spirit felt that it was not only cheaper but also more dignified to volunteer than to take orders, thus préserving at least the outward forms of independence and sovereignty.! Similarly, it would be “‘cheaper’’ for him to take the necessary action himself, for if he resigned, a genuinely Right Radical Government would

take his place, which would not only carry out the Germans’ wishes as regards the declaration of war but would also co-operate with them in other fields.

As for the message from Moscow: it was futile for Moscow to ask Hungary to remain neutral when she had already broken off diplomatic relations (a step which had already given Moscow its answer). In any case, it would have been futile to make promises which it would be impossible to keep; he even seems to have thought that the Russians were well aware that Hungary would be unable to keep any such promise, and that their message was not even sincere. It was in this desperate conviction that “if it were done, when ’tis done, then ’twere well it were done quickly,” that Bardossy opened the proceedings

of the Council.2 Wishing, as he said, “not to influence the Council by repeating to them the decision of the Head of the State’? (although since Bartha was there, most of them must have known of it), he said nothing about

his recent conversation with Horthy; on the other hand, he also did not mention the Kristoffy telegram.*? He simply announced that Soviet aircraft

had bombed Kassa, thus creating a new situation. In his view Hungary should declare that in consequence of the attack she regarded herself as in a state of war with the U.S.S.R. Bartha followed him with a vigorous plea that Hungary should make the declaration in question, carry out reprisals against a Russian town, and send an expeditionary force, consisting of the Carpathian Group and the Mobile Corps. When the other Ministers came

to speak, Keresztes-Fischer, although consenting to the suggestion of reprisals, was against any further action, including mobilisation. Radocsay, Varga and, at the end of the meeting (at first he had taken the other view), Banffy agreed with him, while Homan and Reményi-Schneller supported Bartha, thus going further than Bardossy himself, who did not want to send 1 Cf. his outburst in connection with the declaration of war on the U.S.A., below, p. 63-4. 2 There are two versions of this meeting in the Barczy MS., for Bardossy took the minutes of this and certain other Ministerial Councils away from the secretary (Barczy) and produced alternative versions when he left office. Barczy, who hated Bardossy, accused him at his trial of deliberate forgery. Bardossy’s other drafts simply tidied up Barczy’s rather incoherent efforts; in the case of the Council of 26th June, however, the differences are considerable, and it is a fact that Bardossy’s version, which omits the opposition by Radocsay, Banffy and Varga, gives a false picture of the course of the debate, and needs to be corrected from Barczy’s original. 3 This seems certain, although Bardossy said otherwise at the trial; but two persons present at the meeting (Reményi-Schneller and Barczy) contradicted him, and the minutes bear them out.

28 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH an expeditionary force. In any case, whatever force Hungary employed should be as small as possible, but he insisted that something must be done after both Italy and Slovakia had declared war. In the end he summed up the opinion of the meeting as follows: All present were in favour of reprisals. All except Keresztes-Fischer were in favour of stating that in consequence of the attack on Kassa, Hungary regarded herself as being in a state of war with Russia. Participation in the military action against Russia should be as limited as possible; the expeditionary force should be limited to the two brigades already on the frontier (the VIII Corps remaining as reserve) and the Mobile Corps.* Even this does not seem to have reflected the feeling of the meeting quite accurately, for although the records do not show Varga, Radocsay or Banffy as cavilling at Bardossy’s second point, at least two of them made further

objections after it. As no vote had been taken, they do not seem to have realised that Bardossy’s “summing-up”’ was equivalent to the putting of a binding resolution. But the summing-up completed, Bardossy left the room

abruptly, having burned his, theirs and Hungary’s boats. It was all over before half-past three. Bardossy did not even inform the Regent, that day, of what had been done. He appears to have spent the first minutes after leaving the Council in drawing up a communiqué which began by describing

the attack on Kassa, which was designated as “‘an act of unprovoked ageression by the U.S.S.R.” and ended by stating that in consequence ‘““Hungary considered herself from this moment on as at war with the U.S.S.R.”? On the advice of Ullein, who had now arrived, having finished

his lunch and spent a quarter of an hour in an air-raid shelter en route, Bardossy modified this wording to run that “in consequence of the repeated

attacks made by Soviet aircraft, contrary to international law, against Hungarian territory, Hungary considers a state of war to have come into being between herself and the U.S.S.R.,’’? but he had the notification sent out in this form to Sztdjay, who conveyed it to Weizsdcker the same day, although a supplementary telegram was sent after the first, saying that the statement was to be held up until after the reprisals had been carried out.* Meanwhile, incidentally, a strange complication had arisen. The officer commanding the A.A. defences of Kassa, Lt.-Col. Krudy, telephoned to say that the aircraft which had bombed Kassa had been of German make. He afterwards reported that they had borne yellow markings, a further con-

firmation that they had at any rate been Axis aircraft.’ Perhaps then, the Soviets had not “provoked” Hungary, after all? But this suspicion only strengthened Bardossy’s resolution,® and when, in the afternoon, 1 This detail is not in the documents, but has to be inferred from the subsequent moves. ° Laky, who arrived just as the meeting ended, told a friend (Széll) that Bardossy left the meeting abruptly. They expected him to come back and were surprised when, afterwards, they found it assumed that they had taken a decision. > Ullein, op. cit., p. 108. 4 N.G. 2975, 2975a. It was this that enabled the DNB, in its denunciation of Horthy’s sins on 16th October 1944, to say that ““Hungary entered the war of her own free will and at the personal instigation of Regent Horthy” and that her declaration of war ‘‘was brought to the notice of the Reich only after hostilities had been opened between the two countries.” * By this time the system had been introduced that all Axis aircraft carried a broad strip of yellow paint across the lower surface of the fuselage, in addition to their national markings. 6 M. Ottlik informs me that Bardossy genuinely believed the aircraft to have been German, and precisely for that reason was the more firmly convinced that, since Germany meant to have Hungary in the war anyway, she had better act quickly.

VA BANQUE 29 Ullein asked him whether he was certain that the aircraft were Russian, he simply answered: ‘‘Since the General Staff, which is obviously in agree-

ment with the Germans, says they were Russian, and since the Regent believes it—basta!’?!

He did not alter his plans. The order for the reprisals raid and the mobilisation of the Mobile Corps were now sent out® and Bardossy sent for the German Minister. He was not to be found, so Werkmeister, the Secretary of Legation, came over in his stead, at 4.10 p.m.2 To him Bardossy communicated his decision, saying that Hungary was necessarily acting independently “‘because the German

Government had allowed an opportunity of co-ordinated action to the Roumanian and Slovak Governments, but not to us.’* Werkmeister, to whom the news seems to have come as a complete surprise, as it did to all the German Diplomatic service,’ nevertheless expressed his satisfaction in words worth quoting: “‘I must sincerely say that I am glad that this turn has come about and that the Soviet air attack has facilitated your decision. Now, when Slovakia is taking part in the struggle against Bolshevism with an army 30,000 strong, and Roumania is doing the same, I, as a sincere friend of Hungary’s, am glad that the turn which events have taken has made

possible solidarity and co-operation in the military field also between Hungary and the Axis Powers.’’®

The evening Press carried the news of the bombing of Kassa, although the communiqué still gave only the cautious (and apparently truthful) story that: “‘three machines bearing yellow markings appeared over the city from the Banké Erd6 direction,’ and circled round for about five minutes, taking their bearings, which they could do the more easily, because no one at first thought that they were hostile.’”’ Then they dropped their bombs. But the next morning a revised communiqué definitely attributed the bombing to ‘disguised’ Soviet aircraft (the yellow paint was now said to have been put on over the original markings, concealing them). A denial issued by the Soviet Government was suppressed. ‘The reprisals raid (on Stanislau) was carried out early that morning, and at 10.10 a.m. on that morning, the

27th, the communiqué which Bardossy had composed on the previous afternoon, announcing that Hungary was at war, was given out to the Press

in the simple form of an unsigned news item. Twenty minutes later, Parliament met. In the Lower House, the President opened the proceedings

by speaking a few words expressing the sympathy of the House for the victims of the raids. Bardossy then rose and, according to the official report, made the following statement:

‘‘Honoured house! I wish now only to make a very brief report. The President has branded with telling words the illegal and despicable attack by the Soviet Union. The Royal Hungarian Government concludes that in consequence of these attacks a state of war has come into being between Hungary and the Soviet Union.” [Prolonged and tumultuous cheers and applause from the whole House. Shouts from the extreme Left: ‘““Out with the Social Democrats.’’]

Bardossy: ““Only one more sentence. The Hungarian Air Force will , 1 Ullein, op. cit., p. 108. * The Mobile Corps received its orders to mobilise at 6.30 p.m.

36 AtLajos. 4.N.G. 2975. the trial of Sztdjay a witness (Ghyczy, who was then in Berlin) stated that ‘‘the Germans were exceedingly surprised at Hungary’s action” (Kossuth Népe, 19th January 1944).

8 Lajos. 7 T.e. from the north-west.

30 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH take the appropriate measures of reprisal.” [Prolonged cheers and applause on all sides of the House.] The President then immediately adjourned the House.

In the Upper House, Bardossy did not even appear; to that body a notification in the same terms was read out by its President. This communication, too, was allegedly received with cheers, and if these were really uttered, they were not the least remarkable of the many remarkable phenomena which marked these days. For all Hungarians, whatever their

political colouring, agree in being fanatical sticklers for constitutional correctness, and the procedure which Bardossy had—whatever his motives—

adopted drove a cart and horse through the Hungarian constitution. No one in either House, however, appears to have protested even against this disregard of the rights of Parliament, much less against the substance of the declarations. On the 28th a communiqué signed by Bartha announced that Hungarian forces had crossed the frontier on the previous day (in fact, these were Frontier Guards who, no one else being about, had advanced a few yards to create

the fait accompli, an action which was, again, of doubtful constitutional validity).2. On the same day Horthy answered Hitler in a letter? which, to the present writer, smells strongly like the rewrite of an earlier message ending only with wishing Hitler good luck in his, Germany’s, campaign. ‘‘The news of the war against Russia,’’ wrote the Regent, “has awakened both in myself and in the entire Hungarian nation feelings of the sincerest satisfaction and joy.”” Hungary fully appreciated Germany’s motives, and was confident of her early victory; and the whole Hungarian nation, nay, all Europe, must be eternally grateful to the Fuhrer. ‘Immediately after the outbreak of the German-Russian war my Govern-

ment, in the spirit of solidarity, broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviets, and when the Soviet forces repeatedly committed murderous assaults on Hungarian territory, I had war declared on Russia (habe ich den Kriegszustand mit Russland erklaren lassen). “IT count myself happy that my army can take part, shoulder to shoulder, with the glorious and victorious German Army in the crusade for the elimination of the Communist danger and for the preservation of our culture.”’ Horthy ended with the warmest wishes for success and the most friendly greetings. 1 Under Law XIII of 1920, para. 5, the declaration of war was the prerogative of the Regent, but could only be exercised by him after Parliament had previously given its consent. Bardossy

at his trial excused himself by pleading ignorance of this law; alternatively, he argued that Hungary had not declared war, but simply registered the existence of a state of war. The truth seems to be that he deliberately disregarded the constitution for two reasons: firstly, in order that if things went wrong, all responsibility should fall solely on himself (in which he was wholly

successful, for one of the counts on which he was condemned to death was his violation of the

constitution, and no member of the then Parliament could be charged, under those later circumstances, with having voted in favour of the war); secondly, in order to avoid a Parliamentary debate in which the Left might have irritated the Germans by opposing the war, and, more likely, the Right shown itself over-enthusiastic and forced the Government to increase the relatively small contribution which it was proposing to make. 2 Under the same Law of 1920 Parliamentary sanction was required before troops could be despatched across the frontiers. In case of urgently threatening danger, the Regent and the Cabinet might, on their joint responsibility, send troops across the frontier, but must then obtain retroactive sanction from Parliament at the earliest possible opportunity. Bardossy asked for, and obtained, this sanction, but only a month later. 3 This letter was quoted in excerpt at the trial of Bardossy, and is reproduced in full, with the subsequent Horthy-Hitler correspondence, by “Bela.”

VA BANQUE 31 It is perhaps worthy of remark that even after this the Regent preserved for many days a curious reticence about the war. Once Hungary’s decision had been announced, the German Press began to write of the campaign as

having been initiated by “her Supreme War Lord,” i.e. Horthy, and the Hungarian Press reproduced these statements; but it was many days before any Hungarian paper suggested in its own name that Horthy had ordered the campaign. He signed no Order to the troops, and when, on the 29th, he rose from his sick-bed to unveil a monument at Kenderes to the dead fallen in the First World War, his speech made no single reference, direct or indirect, to the new war in which Hungary was, allegedly on his orders, engaged. It was weeks before he broke his sulky silence to welcome home some returned wounded soldiers and to distribute some decorations. The Hungarians’ first war communiqués, too, were oddly reticent. In the first days, the operations were always described as “reprisals,” and the public was told chiefly of air operations which could at least be given that name. Only on 2nd-3rd July was it revealed that Hungarian land forces had

crossed the frontier for more than a few metres, and on that day the Magyarorszag was still talking of “keeping watch.” Hitler answered Horthy on Ist July thanking him for “‘your participation in the war, brought about by your own initiative,’ and emphasising that all

other participants had also entered the war voluntarily. He saw in this a possibility of stabilising the situation and reducing the tension between Hungary and Roumania. Then came a few politely worded but unmistakable commands. Orders given by Rundstedt were to be taken as coming from him, Hitler; would Horthy kindly instruct his Generals that they were

to be obeyed as such? In particular, would the Hungarian troops kindly advance on the line Kolomea-Stanislavov? Would Horthy also please give

orders that every facility be granted to Germany’s oil supplies from

Roumania? Horthy reported on 5th July that all these orders had or would be given; and that he quite understood the necessity for an unified command on the Eastern front. Already they had paid full attention to Halder’s advice not to hamper the German advance by Hungarian troop movements. The letter concluded, like its predecessor, with effusive greetings and good wishes.

M. Molotov maintained his conciliatory attitude to the last. When poor Kristéffy called on him and tried to hand him the notification of a state of war, Molotov adjured him “‘to take back the bit of paper” or at least to wait a little—there was no such hurry.1 But Kristdffy had his instructions. He could not take the paper back, nor even wait.

The mystery of the bombing of Kassa was never cleared up. Krudy stuck to his story, which he repeated on oath after the war. Some people have suggested that he was mistaken, and did not like to admit it, but if the aircraft flew so low that even the yellow paint over the markings could be seen, it is hard to suppose that their shape should not have been quite unmistakable; and Krudy cannot, after all, have been the only man in Kassa acquainted with the shapes of aircraft. The rumour soon spread far and wide—and became an article of faith when Hungary turned democratic— 1 Apor to C. A. M.

32 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH that the attack had been staged by Germans, with or without Hungarian connivance, in order to provide a provocation to bring Hungary into the war. But even if we could attribute such a stratagem to the Germans and Hungarians, and assume that they thought it necessary, it must be remarked that enquiries made afterwards, under K4llay in Hungary! and in Germany”

failed to produce any result whatever, and even the People’s Court was obliged to admit as much.

The story of ““Germans disguised as Russians” was a reversal of the “Russians disguised as Germans” to which Hungarian propaganda originally

resorted when the report that the planes were of German make remained persistent. To counter these, the Hungarian Government invited a commission, which included American observers, to come to Kassa. A bomb, “which by miraculous good fortune had failed to explode’ was dug out of the ground, photographed, and shown to have been manufactured at the Putilov Works in Leningrad and to bear markings in Cyrillic characters. This seems to be authentic; at any rate, Baron Péter Schell, who was Foispan of Kassa, tells me that he never heard the suggestion of a fake. But even if we disregard the Soviet denial, and admit that Soviet pilots might have bombed Kassa by mistake (every air-force made some such mistakes during the war), how, then, is the German shape of the planes to be explained, and why should the markings have been disguised? A version which, according to some sources, was current in the Hungarian Army as early as 30th June* was that the pilots were Czechs or Slovaks who, when Slovakia entered the war against Russia, stole some German aircraft from the airfield at Iglo and escaped in them to Russia. A year later a Hun-

garian newspaper* published a story that when Hungarian troops were in Dniepro-petrovsk, a Russian schoolmaster on whom a Hungarian officer was billeted told him that he had previously had in his house a Czech-born officer in the Russian Army, named Ondrej Andele, who by his own account was

the man who had actually bombed Kassa. This seems to me to be easily the most likely account; but complete certainty is not and presumably never will be possible.° 1 Sz. I. MS.

2 F. M. Halder to C. A. M. ’ Szig. Biz., p. 374. Antal at the trial of Bardossy said that he had given Bardossy this version; but it is not clear on what occasion. 4 Pesti Hirlap, 26th July 1942. 6 At the trial of Bardossy the name of a pilot officer called Cekmek was given as “having been found in some Official papers.’ It was then stated that there had never been an officer of the name in the Hungarian air-force. The name is, of course, Czech.

CHAPTER THREE

CALCULATION GOING RIGHT N the larger sense it is unfair to single out any one point in a continuous

curve as marking a turning-point, or any one step made in a march which is always consistent in direction and even in pace, as more fateful

than any other. Yet the decision which Bardossy had taken on that June afternoon can truly be described as decisive, since it had carried Hungary past that all-important dividing-line which separates the State technically at peace, and thus entitled by international convention to be treated as intangible even by those who hate it, from the belligerent, which, if defeated, can be dealt with by the conquerors at its mercy. Hungary was now committed, as a belligerent, to one of the two parties in the world struggle, and committed irrevocably; for although Bardossy had not promised Hitler not to make a separate peace, the country’s geographical position alone, not to mention her situation in respect of armaments, was such that—as Kallay was subsequently to discover—once fitted into Germany’s operational machine she could not possibly be extricated, or extricate herself, until that machine had ceased to function. She had therefore to reckon with all the consequences

of defeat if defeat came to her party in the war; which consequences, incidentally, were bound in the circumstances to include not only the imposition of whatever territorial terms the victors cared to dictate, but also the annihilation of her entire ruling class. This followed, if from nothing else, from the fact that in default of any other serious pretext (the Kassa incident could easily have been settled without war, even if the Russians were really to blame) she had chosen to announce as the motive for her action her desire to take part in a crusade against Bolshevism, thus leaving the U.S.S.R. no choice—if it wanted one—but to retort in kind and see whose arm was the longer. The stirring up of revolutionary feeling against a regime which had itself chosen an ideological battleground was now a natural and legitimate weapon for the Soviets to use, and if and when in a position to do so, they would inevitably extirpate their challengers. Finally, although Bardossy’s declaration of hostilities was confined to the

U.S.S.R., so that in theory it did not affect Hungary’s relations with the Western Powers, it was, again in the circumstances, impossible that that situation could be long maintained. Germany’s opponents were bound to end by uniting not only against Germany but also against her allies and satellites. War with Russia must sooner or later lead on to war with Britain and the U.S.A. But on 27th June 1941 few people in Hungary, it seems, reflected in these terms. The step which Hungary had taken from where she stood the day

before to where she stood now had been such a short one, so directly in continuation of a long progress, that the fact that it had carried her past a dividing line went almost unnoticed. Furthermore, hardly anyone believed that the passage from cold war into technical war would have any important long-term consequences at all. The vast majority of the country shared the Government’s conviction that Russia would be easily defeated within a few

C|

34 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH weeks. Thus the question of what would be the consequences for Russia’s enemies if she proved victorious, or even if her resistance was protracted, did not seem to arise, and with this danger eliminated, it was also possible, even after Mr. Churchill’s declaration identifying the cause of Britain with that

of Russia, to regard as equally non-existent the risk of a conflict with the West—a prospect which the entire country would have regarded with unaltered dismay. It was regrettable that the West had so entangled itself, but the collapse of Russia would automatically right the position and break the chain before it could drag Hungary into war. Nevertheless, the country was rather dismayed than delighted when it learnt

on that 27th of June that it was at war with the U.S.S.R. The ecstasies into which the Government and Right-wing Press threw themselves meant no more than did the processions of marchers bearing banners in favour of the Crusade which Right-wing organisations got up in Budapest and other towns. Most of the marchers, in so far as they were not simply earning an honest penny, were chiefly concerned in making internal political capital for

themselves by contrasting their own patriotic attitude with that of the allegedly disloyal “‘Marxians.’’ When they laid their banners aside, it was not to rush to the barracks to offer their bodies for the said Crusade, and fewer individuals slipped over the open Burgenland frontier to enlist in the German armies than had toiled across the Carpathians in September 1939 to help Poland against Germany. We may perhaps disregard, in our assessment of the nation’s feelings on that day and during the week or two which followed, that human emotion which displayed itself in certain panic besiegings of the railway stations in North-Eastern Hungary, certain mad canterings up and down cellar stairs in Budapest when sirens gave warnings (always mistaken) of the approach of hostile aircraft. We may grant that the simple peasant or labourer felt no enthusiasm at the prospect of fighting Russians, if only because, his traditional

political horizon not extending beyond the Carpathians, the term Russia meant nothing to him, and his home and accustomed conditions, however miserable, were yet preferable to the hazards and miseries of a campaign. But the first reactions of the historic classes themselves were distinctly uncertain. The product and the beneficiaries of a regime which for twenty years had made counter-revolution its slogan and the justification for its existence, they hailed with the sincerest delight the prospect of seeing Bolshevism extirpated root and branch. Neither at this juncture nor at any other moment until the arrival of the final catastrophe was any difference of opinion on this point perceptible among them: one and all, with exceptions which could almost be counted on the fingers of one hand, they held, and proclaimed on every possible occasion, that Bolshevism was the Evil Thing, Hungary’s mortal enemy. But while they were heart and soul for a Crusade as such, they felt very differently about Hungary’s participation in the operation. They were not convinced that the expense which a mobilisation, however limited, and a

campaign, however brief, must necessarily entail would bring with it an adequate return. It should have been possible for Hungary to get all the undeniable benefits which would accrue from Hitler’s enterprise, free, gratis and for nothing: herself standing aside, letting others exhaust themselves, and conserving her national forces for the real struggle to come, that to be

waged against Roumania. She would thus also have escaped that closer

CALCULATION GOING RIGHT 35 association—unavoidable in the case of a brotherhood in arms—with Germany that was still unpopular among most Hungarians; and would have avoided putting herself further in the wrong with the Western Powers, if, after all, they had something to say in Central Europe when the war ended. These thoughts occurred more readily because most Hungarians assumed of the declaration of war (as they now did, automatically, of nearly every important move by their Government) that it had been made under German pressure; which made it the easier to deduce that it was to Hungary’s dis-

advantage. But even at the outset, no Hungarian of any class carried his objections to the war to the length of active opposition. On the morning of the 28th a few chalked slogans of “down with the war!’ “we will not go against the Soviets!’’ appeared on the walls of certain quarters; but no one, or hardly anyone, in fact failed to obey a calling-up notice served on him. The one or two acts of sabotage which occurred in the first dayst were the work of individuals who may not even have been Hungarians. The workers

in town and country neither struck nor demonstrated. They preserved discipline and ensured continuity of production, and their leaders exhorted them todoso. The ruling classes, if they felt any qualms, kept them to themselves. Moreover, such doubts as these classes, at any rate, felt on 27th June were based on calculation, and would die away if the calculation proved mistaken.

And the balance of the calculation soon began to swing in Bardossy’s favour. Their own fixed idea that Germany had forced them into the war obliged the Hungarians to accept his thesis; the only question was whether the payments on this insurance policy against the loss of Germany’s goodwill would be too heavy. When (as soon happened) the sirens fell silent, the

battle-front receded into the distance and the unbroken tale of victories

poured out from the OK W’s Headquarters promised an early end to the war, the country became confident that the payment would not prove onerous,

while gracious words in which several communiqués paid tribute to the gallantry of the Hungarian troops read like assurances that the reward would be paid when due. By mid-July the policy of entering the war had become popular, and Bardossy with it. Once this stage had been reached, public opinion took a sharp swing to the Right, which was to some extent reflected in the Government’s domestic policy. This time, no pressure from Germany was required, nor, indeed,

exerted. The German Government maintained the principle of non-

interference in Hungary’s internal affairs which it had adopted after the signature of the Tripartite Pact, and seems even to have given the Hungarian Government reassurances on the point. When Bardossy returned from his Berlin visit,2 the inspired Press wrote pointedly that Germany “accepted without demur Hungary’s claim to order her internal affairs in her own traditional way’’®—a claim which the German Press made no motions of refuting—and in winding up the Budget debate a few days later, and replying 1 A munitions dump exploded near Budapest on 25th June (thus before Hungary’s entry into the war), and soon after there was a big fire in the oil refinery of Almaftizito. These exploits were claimed by Moscow to be the work of ‘faithful sons of Hungary,”’ but no real evidence was (naturally) produced in support of the statement. Some leaflets purporting to come from the ‘““Hungarian Soviet Republic’’ were also distributed, again before Hungary’s declaration of war. According to Hadak Utjan, Feb. 1955, the first Soviet parachutists captured in Hungary were four men dropped on Ist September 1941. They had been destined for Germany, but their aircraft had lost its way. But other groups might conceivably have been dropped, and escaped notice.

2 In November; see below, p. 57. 8 Pester Lloyd, 25th November 1941.

36 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH to accusations by the Imrédists that the Government was “‘stagnating and failing to move with the times,” Bardossy said that Hungary “‘had no need to rush into revolutionary experiments.” ‘‘What is expected of us today,” he went on, “‘in the way of fitting ourselves into the New European Order is primarily economic co-operation, economic achievements. No doubt it will not always be so, but so it is at present.... Certainly no one expects us to indulge in experiments or projects during the war.’”} Even stronger evidence of Germany’s attitude is provided by Szalasi’s experiences with a German agent named Rademacher, who visited him in October. Szalasi asked what would happen if the Arrow Cross rose against the Government. Would they enjoy German support, or “would they meet with the fate of the Iron Guard, whom Antonescu had annihilated with the

open support of German bayonets?’’ Rademacher answered that the German Government was in treaty relations with the Hungarian Government,

not with the Arrow Cross. If the Party undertook anything against the Government, it would: encounter German bayonets. As he had already discouraged Szalasi from trying to bring about the “‘transformation’”’ with the help of the Regent, Szalasi asked what Germany did want, if she did not want

him to move either with the Regent or against him. Rademacher only answered that it was neither possible nor desirable to undertake anything against the Government.’ But by attacking the U.S.S.R. Hitler had regained many of the sympathies which he had lost in August 1939, and the ideas and ideals of Nazism, being those in the name of which the Crusade was being waged, were now invested

with a halo; whereas the West was now labouring under the handicap of association with the Accursed Thing, and not only Social Democracy, but even bourgeois democracy, had, in a struggle which was confessedly ideological, acquired something of the stigma of the Fifth Column.

There was one special, local factor which lent the ideas of the Right additional appeal. Even officially controlled prices were now rising sharply, and although no shortage of consumer goods, except of a few imported luxury products, need have existed, shortages were in fact appearing, owing to the conscienceless hoarding in which the whole population was now indulging. Economic life was consequently slipping more and more under the domination of the black market. This, ike most markets in Hungary, was in Jewish hands, and public opinion made the Jews solely responsible for the shortages, the high prices and the manifold inequalities everywhere apparent. Under these stimuli, anti-Semitism was resuming its old leading position in the thoughts and feelings of the greater part of the non-Jewish middle classes, as also of many industrial workers and peasants; and those who hated Jews

usually found it difficult (although a few accomplished the fact) not to sympathise with Nazi Germany. This shift in feeling did not produce the result which would probably have occurred in a country whose political pyramid stood on its base, of a change in the Government. For Horthy, whose sheltered position, the inelasticity of his mentality and the limited range of his contacts (he now talked on intimate terms with few people outside his family circle and a little circle of elder statesmen of his own generation) combined to render him probably the man in all Hungary least susceptible to the influences which were playing on men in humbler positions, | saw neither necessity for change, nor advantage in it, and steadfastly refused 1 Pester Lloyd, Sth December 1941. 2 SzAlasi’s Diary.

CALCULATION GOING RIGHT 37 to hear of appointing a Right Radical Minister President, or of dismissing Keresztes-Fischer; and the MEP, even although many of its members now regarded Keresztes-Fischer as a blind Anglophile and hireling of the Jews, were too disciplined, or too cowardly, or both, to revolt against this decision. The Government thus remained unchanged, but it placated public opinion among its supporters by a not inconsiderable further body of anti-Semitic legislation. After the ““Third Jewish Law” (as it was invariably, and from the angle of the higher truth, correctly described) had at last passed Parliament in July,t a further Law, of minor practical importance but a fraternal gesture from anti-Semitic Hungary to anti-Semitic Germany, was introduced in the autumn to reduce the status of the Israelite Confession from a ‘‘received”’ to a “tolerated”? one.” Several Orders in Council were also issued in enactment of earlier legislation, one of which excluded Jews from medical training, while the application of the First and Second Laws went on, although to some extent

subject, it would appear, to the law of diminishing returns. Nevertheless,

further numbers of Jews were excluded from business and from the

professions? and a further (although modest) quantity of land taken from its Jewish owners.* Some local officials applied the laws and other enactments very brutally, or even went beyond them; Endre, for example, the ill-famed Alispan of Pest Country, took advantage of the introduction of the rationing system (which at first was mainly on a local basis) to discriminate against the Jews in that field also.

The Jewish deportations of 1941 constituted a single, tragic closed chapter.° Considerable numbers of Jews had for some time past been filtering illegally into Hungary from other countries in which their situation was worse: Austria, Slovakia, Roumania and Galicia. Some of these were interned; others were living at liberty, although often without permits. When the initial rapid German and Hungarian advance drove the Russians back from Galicia—as it was expected, definitively—someone—probably the

military, although the question of initial responsibility was never entirely cleared up—conceived the plan of rounding up the illegal immigrants from Galicia and deporting, or re-exporting, them to their country of origin. It appears that a number of Jews which may have been as large as 30,000 to 1 It was promulgated on 8th August as Law XV of 1941. 2 This measure passed the Lower House on 18th December and was promulgated on 19th June 1942 as Law VIII of 1942. For the difference between a “‘received”’ and a ‘“‘tolerated”’ confession,

see above,I. p. 164 n.2. As the Muinister’s right of veto was strictly limited; as the provisions imposing financial obligations on the State vis-a-vis the received religions were never put into force; as modern legislation guaranteed to all religions not inconsistent with public order or morals the same freedom as the older laws allowed to received religions; and as, finally, the Regent did not exercise the religious prerogatives of the Holy Crown, the only substantial differences between a received and a tolerated religion in 1942 were those relating to representation

in the Upper House and to the means of enforcing the payment of their dues by their members. 3 The statistics given in Lévai’s Black Book, p. 36, are not classified by Minister Presidencies. Under the Second Jewish Law, 50,772 Jewish gainfully employed persons, with 82,869 dependants,

had been evicted from their positions by 31st December 1940. Between that date and 30th June 1941 the equivalent figures were 8,678 and 12,262, and by 31st December 1942, the grand total of persons affected, including dependants, was 221,896. 4 A speaker on 20th June 1941 said that by that date 80,000 hold had been transferred from

Jewish to Christian ownership. :

5 An account of this tragic episode is given in the Fekete Kényv, pp. 279-80. There are also references in Szig. Biz., pp. 380-417, in the Bardossy Trial, the Press, etc. The numbers involved are given very variously; the Black Book gives 35,000. The President at Bardossy’s trial spoke

of 30,000 deported; Bardossy protested that this was a big exaggeration. Szig. Biz., p. 381, gives 14,700 and the indictment against an officer concerned in the deportations (Hungarian Press, 7th April 1946), 18,500. A German document quoted at Nuremberg (1197 P.S.) gives 11,000,

38 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH 35,000 was rounded up. and the authorities began to deport them at very short notice, allowing them to take only a little luggage and money with them.

When some 15.000 of them had been deported, the Germans themselves asked for the deportations to stop, as “they could not cope with all these

Jews.1 Manv of the unfortunate deportees perished soon after in the pogroms which the Germans were just beginning to organise in Galicia. The remainder were then interned in Hungary, although Keresztes-Fischer afterwards arranged for the release of the women, children. old persons and sick, and of those who could be supported or usefully employed outside the camps. When attacked in Parliament by the extreme Right for having stopped the deportations. Bardossy answered: ““The Germans asked for them to be stopped, and I think that what is good enough for the Germans may be good enough for us.” It should. however, be recorded that, apart from this special case, the

Government tried, in the main. to make the application even of its antiJewish measures less severe in practice than in theory; Hungary still provided its Jews with more security and equality of treatment in law and fact than any

other State in the Axis orbit. And except for its intensified anti-Semitism. the general line followed by the Bardossy Government in internal policy did

not depart by a hair’s-breadth from that of its predecessor. For example.

Bardossy refused. in the face of considerable clamour from his own supporters. to dissolve the Social Democrat Party or restrict the powers of the Trade Unions. Nor was the treatment of the Polish refugees, of British subjects left in Hungary, or of any other elements presumably hostile to Germany, in any way affected by Bardossv’s professed conviction that Hungary's fate was bound up with that of the Axis. Control over labour was slightly tightened up: the Orders suspending restrictions on overtime, which had been cancelled in 1940. were reintroduced, and in some cases the compulsory Sunday rest was abolished, and employers allowed to substitute a cash payment for the paid holiday. But all such additional work was paid

at the higher rates, and wages were still generally good. The workers accepted these emergency measures without demur and. so far as could be judged, without resentment. Of the new problems confronting the Government, the largest was that of the reorganisation of the Delvidék. Up to the end of July the area was

still treated officially as “‘occupied territory’ and kept under military administration, but even during that period a number of measures were taken which were only appropriate to a definitive regime. These followed | the system which the Government had adopted in all reannexed areas, of , treating all measures taken by the annexing Power after 1918 as in principle . null and void. but affirming them and leaving the situation created by them

in being if. on practical grounds, this seemed desirable. So as early as 18th | July the land question had been settled on these lines: that 1s, all land which | had been expropriated by the Yugoslav State since 1918 (278,000 Ao/d in all) |

was transferred to the Hungarian State. which in most cases kept in its own : hand such land as the Yugoslav State also had left undistributed? and where |

1> ABardossv’s evidence, given at his trial (p. 30). | conspicuous exception was the 20,000 hold estate of Belje, on the banks of the Drave,

which was returned to its former owner, the Archduke Albrecht. Part of this estate was, indeed, | a marshy area unsuitable for cultivation, which had formerly been kept as a shooting-estate and !

had been used as such by the Yugoslav royal family. : |

|

, CALCULATION GOING RIGHT 39 it had been allotted to local beneficiaries, left them undisturbed (if they were

still on the spot). The 53,000 hold which had been given to Dobrovolec colonists (who, as has been described, had been summarily ejected) were, however, used to colonise Magyars: the largest contingent of these being the

Magyar population of the Bukovina, numbering 17,500 souls, who were brought back in the course of the summer and settled with great ceremony, while the rest was given to members of the Vitézi Rend from Inner Hungary or to a few hundred Magyars repatriated from Serbia, Bosnia or Macedonia. Meanwhile, many complaints had been reaching Budapest of the brutality and other shortcomings of the military administrators, whose excesses had by no means ceased with the conclusion of the “‘campaign’’!; and largely in order to remedy these complaints, a civilian administration was introduced on 29th July. The reorganisation now began inearnest. The administration was restaffed, the proportion of schools, cultural institutions, etc., readjusted and other steps taken to reintegrate the area, or rather, areas, into Hungary. The Baranya Triangle was reincorporated administratively in the county of that name; the Muravidék in Vas and the Bacska reconstituted as a county.’ After this the Government made certain efforts which, if they did not go very far, were genuine so far as they went, to conciliate the population. The Magyars, of course, were disproportionately favoured in every way, but

some attempts were made to meet the wishes of the minorities. The Bunyevci, in particular, were almost coddled in the effort to convince them

that they were neither Serbs nor Croats, not even Yugoslavs at all, but ‘‘Hungarians of Bunyevac mother-tongue.”” The Germans were left to their own devices, and although the administration was kept almost exclusively in Magyar hands, an attempt was made to appoint local men known to be conciliatory towards the minorities.

It would appear that this policy enjoyed a certain success among the Bunyevci and the ““Wends”’ or Slovenes of the Muravidék; although not all the protestations of loyalty recorded as coming from these two peoples need be taken very seriously. But the local Germans were now speculating openly on the speedy establishment of the “Prinz Eugen Gau,” and little could be done with the Serbs, among whom the embers of resistance were constantly

fanned by partisans who slipped across the river frontiers from the Banat or from Syrmia, far more disorderly still and already developing into a subcentre of the Serbian national resistance movement of both branches. It had been hoped that the introduction of civilian administration would normalise conditions, but this was not the effect. The maize was now growing tall in the fields, affording cover for surreptitious movement. There

were a number of cases of rick-burning, etc., for which various persons (always described as “Communists” and often as Jews) received heavy sentences.2 In September there was a larger outbreak; something over 100 1 An extraordinary case was that of General Bajor, the first military commandant of Ujvidék, who extorted 5 million peng6 from the local Jews (3,400,000 from individuals, 1,600,000 from the

Communities) by threatening them with expulsion or internment if they did not pay. Of this sum, he gave 550,000 to the Délvidék Cultural Society, 500,000 to General Bagos, 220,000 to General Novakovic, 100,000 to the Settlement Commissioner and a further sum to the Horthy Miklés Flying Fund. The rest he seems to have kept for himself. He was afterwards condemned to two years’ imprisonment for embezzlement, but was pronounced insane and placed in a mental

noe This measure had been announced on 29th June. For the arrangements relative to the Murak6z, see below, pp. 57-8. 3 One of these cases, in which over 30 defendants were involved, was at Csaktornya, in the Murak@6z, the others, all in the Bacska.

40 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH persons, also described as ‘“Communists,’’ were rounded up in and around Zombor, tried by court-martial and executed. After this, according to the version later given by the partisans themSelves, the “‘partisan movement died down” for a while. It was, however, to flare up again shortly.

Elsewhere. too. the Hungarians were now again experiencing the tribulations attendant on the problem of national minorites. The Magyar population of the Felvidék was, indeed, settling into place: the last had been heard of the ““Felvidék Spirit”: but not so the Slovaks. They gave no active trouble, and a few of them, particularly among the older generation that had grown up before 1918. were gravitating back spiritually to Hungary, but among most of the vounger men that mysterious force of nationality which 1s so inexplicably independent of material considerations had taken firm hold after the Vienna Award." The Hungarian Government would have liked to resume its old policy of

assimilation here, but since the Slovak Government, encouraged by the Germans in Berlin. Vienna and Bratislava. insisted that any concession made

to the Magvar minoritv in Slovakia must be balanced by an equivalent concession to the Slovaks in the Felvidék, Hungary had to allow the formation

of a “national group’ under a “‘leader”’ called BOhm,? a weekly paper in Slovak and a reasonable number of schools. The administration does not appear to have been tyrannical. except in minor respects,* but it was not such

as might be expected to create warm attachment to Hungary among the Slovaks, and, to judge bv results. did not do so. In Ruthenia all talk of autonomy had been dropped with the outbreak

of war. Most of the area was now under military occupation, while the civilian administration also changed for the worse when Perénvi was succeeded® by the much less paternal Kozma. Kozma did not change the official cultural policy, which was not to denationalise, but to promote a **Usro-Rusin”™ nationality, attached to Hungary. and he told others, and seems to have flattered himself. that he was succeeding. His confidence was justified to this extent. that in 1940 and 1941 there was, it seems, little active disaffection: the stories spread in London of large-scale partisan movements were inventions. Confidential military reports showed that there was no 1 Some of these appear to have been Slovaks.

* On a visit to Hungary in 1946 I read in the Foreign Ministry, in a confidential repori, which was certainly never drawn up for non-Hunganan eves, sent by a local officer to the Ministry of the Interior, the consrarazion that the national feeling in the area was entirely in favour of Slovakia and had grown by leaps and bounds since the proclamation of the Slovak Republic. There had been, and was, no Czecho-Slovak nauonal feeling. * A somewhat childish attempt was made to treat the Eastern Slovaks as a separate, ‘‘Slovjak”’ nationality and to organise them under that M. Dvorzak whom we have mei before (1. p. 278). There might once have been a real basis for this. since up to the mid-nineteenth centurv there were considerable differences, both linguisuc and other. between the Slovaks of the West. the Centre and the East. Even in the inter-war period the difference in the political atmosphere of the three areas was Very percepuble: the West being Czechophile, the Centre particularist Slovak

and the East Magvarone. But it was too late to make anything of this in the ‘forties and the attempt collapsed.

* The worst grievance was that here, as in the other reannexed territories, the land reform was “revised.” It was stated that this would not affect local peasant recipients. but only the Czech colonists and recipients of Resrgurer. This promise. although honoured in principle, appears to have been broken in several individual cases, and all the lands taken back from the colonists (who themselves did not come off badly since they received compensation under an agreement imposed by Germany) were given to Magyar members of the Witézi Rend from Inner

5 In September 1940: Kozma died in December 1941. His successor, the last Commissioner for Ruthenia. was G. Tomesanyi.

CALCULATION GOING RIGHT 4] cause to complain of the loyalty of the Ruthene soldiers called up. But there was also no fanatic determination to die for Hungary. As for Transylvania, the same principle of reciprocity was applied as in Slovakia, but the result in this case was zero on both sides of the frontier. The Government was spending large sums on the economic rehabilitation of North Transylvania; the benefits of these were, of course, going chiefly to

the Magyar and Szekel districts, in accordance with the Transylvanian Party’s policy of “‘righting the wrongs inflicted under Roumanian rule.” The Roumanians were not actively persecuted, and on their side provided no partisans or saboteurs; but encouraged in that faith by ceaseless propaganda from across the frontiers, they made no pretence of accepting their position as final. They simply had to be taken as a debit item in the national accounts.

Finally, the Volksbund had been both reinforced numerically and radicalised by the addition of some 175.000 Germans of the Bacska and Baranya, vigorously deutschbewusst to a man and lacking any trace of attach-

ment to the Hungarian State. Asa matter of form, the newcomers entered the Volksbund and accepted Basch as ‘‘Fiihrer,”’ but the new tail wagged the old dog, and Basch found himself pushed, not entirely to his own pleasure.

into a new extreme position. The organisation of the Volksbund was now

expanded and elaborated down to the last detail. with Gebiete. Kreise, Ortsgruppen, schools, cultural organisations, women’s and youth groups, etc. The Swabian Levente organisations were indistinguishable from SS. units. The Deputies of Swabian origin formed a separate ‘“‘Parliamentary Group.”! In areas where the Germans were in a local majority, the writ of the Hungarian State almost ceased to run. The most interesting internal political developments of the period were those which were going on under the rose. among both the Right and the Left wing Oppositions. Although the German Government was disinteresting itself in Hungarian politics, the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle was not. They, too, were still only planning for the future, for they still held to the principle that the Hungarian Right must achieve internal unity before 1t could be helped

into the saddle, but they were actively engaged in trving to promote that unity, and they were now also stipulating that their clients must accept, or at least not contumaciously reject. the Volksgruppe theory. The Germans seem to have anticipated no particular trouble with Imrédy,

who was treated, during the period. to several flattering articles in the German Press; a further indication of favour being that that Press now declared that the famous document regarding Imrédy’s ancestry had been forged. Their worst tribulations were, as always. caused by Szalasi. who consistently refused to make anv concessions whatever, either on the point of ideology (Volksgruppe theory versus Hungarism) or on that of leadership. He agreed, indeed, to let Ruszkay act as liaison officer with the Imrédists (for whom Ratz fulfilled the same function) to consult on the possibilities of liaison or co-operation; but he never held out the slightest prospect that those possibilities would be realised, and to judge from his own accounts of the meetings. in which he seems to have diverted himself by firing at his 1 This was established only on 6th February 1942. after the Deputies from the Délvidék had entered Parliament. Similarly, the Levente organisations were not formed until the spring of 1942.

42 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH prospective allies a string of sardonic epigrams about them, he cannot have left them more sanguine than he was himself. This attitude caused intense irritation to many of Szalasi’s lieutenants, a large part of whom cared not a row of pins for Hungarism; while even some who were quite sincere devotees of the PV argued that unless they gave up part of their ideals they would never be able to put any of them into practice at all. So in the early summer the Party councils were in turmoil again. The malcontents accused Szalasi of being unpractical, incomprehensible and

fantastic to the verge of madness, or beyond it. More specifically, they alleged that he had malverted money collected, to the tune of 300,000 peng6, for the purpose of providing a substitute for the Magyarsdg during a period when it was suspended,? instead of which he had used the paper so founded (the Pesti Ujsdg) to attack the Magyarsdg and preach Hungarism. Finally,

he had admitted Communists into the Party and had not tried to convert them, but had let them go on practising the methods of class warfare “‘on the regular Judaeo-Marxist lines.”” On the other hand, the old radical members

of the Party, while endorsing all the accusations of incomprehensibility, dictatorialness, etc., accused Szalasi from the other side of betraying the Party’s old social programme and of thrusting aside old tried followers in favour of gangsters and party bosses.° As we have seen,* the accusation about the Communists was not un-

justified. The Arrow Cross Party had, in fact, admitted many cryptoCommunists as members, and neither they nor Szalasi had found the position at all incongruous so long as Russia was the ally of Germany. MHer overnight transformation into its enemy obviously created a new situation for all concerned. Szalasi himself records in his Diary (apparently in late June or July)® that “‘a fraction of the workers, the Crypto-Communists, secedes from the Party. The Party carries through a merciless purge and excludes all those who are unable to fight unequivocally against the plutocrats, the Marxists

and the Jews.’ But this did not really dispose of the difficulty, for after carrying out his purge Szalasi remained as immovable as ever on the questions . of ideology and leadership. Accordingly, the old campaign to eliminate him, if he could not be brought to reason, went on. Meanwhile, a new

important. | element entered into the situation, or rather for the first time became

We have already mentioned® the Archduke Albrecht’s ambitions and the | fact that by the spring of 1941 the Germans were taking them seriously, although only as a long-term proposition. But fuller developments must 1 Two of the epigrams made by Szalasi at this time deserve recording: (1) “It is incompatible with my honour as a convict to ask pardon of men whom I regard as dishonourable.”’

(2) (To a meeting of country followers.) ‘‘Your Party premises may be shabby, with an earthen floor and a single Arrow Cross flag for decoration, but if you have faith they are worth more than the sumptuous palace of the Budapest Parliament with its feet dangling in the Danube—presumably because they are so dirty.”

2 This was at the beginning of 1941.

3 The case for this group is stated in a highly polemical booklet, Szdlasi Alarc Nélkiil (Szdlasi Unmasked), published in 1942 by A. Torok, one of the expulsees. 4 See above, I. p. 350.

5 The entry, like so many in the Diary, is undated, but the event presumably took place in connection with the war against Russia. § See above, I. p. 456.

CALCULATION GOING RIGHT 43 have taken place in Germany of which we know nothing, which led at least one party there to pay the Archduke more attention. It seemed impossible to do anything against the Regent, but the Regent could not live for ever (he was now 74), and it might be possible, and if possible would certainly be worth while bringing in as his successor, when he died, a man sympathetic to Germany and to the Nazis. This plan, too, was however made contingent on the old requirement of

Right-wing unity: Albrecht must get enough supporters in Hungary (by definition, from the Right) to make his candidature serious. He evidently reached agreement easily enough with the Imrédists, of whom Szalasi writes in his Diary (in the summer of 1941) that he was ‘‘in close touch with them, and financing them’”’ (a cheap operation, which presumably only entailed making good the deficit on the Nemzetér). So here again it was a question of winning over Szalasi.

In July Ruszkay brought Szalasi a message from Albrecht that he was going to Germany in the course of the summer and was willing “‘to utilise his connections in the interests of the Arrow Cross Party’’; if Szalasi would write a memorandum on the Hungarian situation “chow he thought it could be solved, with Germany’s help or without it,’ he would lay this before Hitler

personally. He asked Szalasi for full powers to negotiate with Hitler in his name. He also wanted to know what would be the Arrow Cross’ attitude if he (Albrecht) stood as candidate for the Regency. Szalasi replied, after consultation with his lieutenants, that since the Regent was in excellent health, the Arrow Cross was not going to commit

itself to an agitation in favour of anyone for his post. If Albrecht had political ambitions, let him try to realise them; but “‘the Arrow Cross was

not going to be anyone’s donkey to ride on.’’ Nor was he prepared to authorise anyone to negotiate in his name with Hitler, nor even to give him a memorandum on the situation, although he would be glad to be in contact, as an unofficial person, with an equally unofficial opposite number from the

Nazi party. He asked Albrecht to make this contact, as he had promised to do a year earlier. Albrecht went off, and presently sent back a message to the Imrédists that “‘the official point of view was that they would help the Hungarian National Socialists only if they fused, or at least formed a close bloc.’” Ratz now brought Ruszkay a proposal from the Imrédists that they and the Arrow Cross should fuse, when they would be able “‘to overthrow the

Government and impose their programme.” He had been given plenipotentiary powers to negotiate a settlement. Ruszkay brought the proposal to Szalasi.

At first Szalasi demanded as condition préalable an apology from Imrédy | for his conduct in 1938. He agreed to postpone this, and to allow Ratz to try to work out a joint programme with Ruszkay and a third party, one General Barabas. But once again things broke down. Ruszkay reported that everything was in order if Szalasi would give way on a few “‘unessential

points of form’: to drop the word “Hungarism,”’ to confine the Party’s organisatién to Magyars (to the exclusion, in particular, of the Germans of 1 It is gratifying to reflect that Horthy outlived by many years all the participants in the intrigue against him, including Albrecht himself. 2 Albrecht brought back notes from his journey and Szalasi copied them out as an appendix for the Diary, but they are missing from the typescript copy in my possession (which is, so far as I know, the only one in existence, at any rate this side of the Iron Curtain).

44 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Hungary), and to drop his ‘“‘Duce”’ theory.1_ Szalasi replied, quite correctly, that these were not points of form but points of substance and essential, and he would not abandon any of them.

At this a major crisis broke out. Rupprecht announced that the Magyarsadg no longer supported the Arrow Cross. Baky said that he no longer accepted Szalasi’s leadership. Palffy endorsed Baky’s attitude. After an exciting week in which much dirty linen was washed on both sides,’ to the vast edification of the general public, eight Deputies followed Baky’s lead, the nine reconstituting themselves as the ‘“‘Hungarian National Socialist Party,” with Palffy (who was not in Parliament) Party leader, Baky Head of

the Political Centre and Lill Organising Secretary. Three more Deputies (followed soon after by a fourth) left Szalasi for Imrédy, bringing his direct adherents up to twenty-three. The Magyarsdg, of which Rupprecht remained

Editor in Chief, announced that it would act as official organ of Palffy’s Party, although also continuing to serve, as before, the cause of all true Right Radicals. The Archduke and his proposed candidature were not mentioned in the polemics which accompanied this civil war; but the other points at issue were

stated with great frankness both by Rupprecht and by Palffy. Rupprecht, in an enormous survey of the position, which he wrote in the Magyarsdg of 14th September, said that the aims of the new Group would be, firstly, to unite all National Socialist Parties and persons who sincerely wished for a Hungarian Renewal on a National Socialist basis, and, secondly, to accept

“not merely friendship with Germany, but German leadership.” Palffy put the matter equally unambiguously in two utterances—one, an interview which he gave to the Deutsche Zeitung on 18th September, the other an article

in the Magyarsdg on the 26th. He admitted that he accepted German leadership in the ““New Order in Europe” (although he drew a distinction between “‘total leadership” and “‘dictatorship’’), and also frankly gave as one

reason for the split, Szalasi’s rejection of the Volksgruppen theory, which

he accepted, although maintaining that this was not incompatible with loyalty to the Hungarian State. He would “‘work inside the Hungarian people for the fulfilment of this idea in connection with the German minority.” The second main reason which he gave for the split threw an interesting light on German policy towards Hungary at the time. It was that his party “*had no room for anyone who believed in the possibility of a break-through

by force,’ because revolution would cause internal disturbance, impair production and “not be in the interests of that Power which today is defending the whole of Europe against Bolshevism.” Therefore revolutionary organisation must give way to “preparatory organisation”? which, when the moment arrived, would receive its reward. Accordingly, the Party in its programme rejected ‘“‘violent revolution.”’

It defined its further aims as “‘race-protection, land reform, social justice, 1 T.e. that he “had had, had now and would have a Head of State, and that even if he took power he must have a Head of State beside and above him.” * The accusations against Szalasi have been summarised above. On the other side the chief target was Baky, whom Matolcsy, in the Pesti Ujsdg, accused of being an agent provocateur paid by the Government to split the Party. It was also said that Baky was the only leader not interned after the alleged “‘Putsch”’ of the spring of 1939. Baky retorted that others beside himself had escaped internment, and that anyway he had left the Party on 27th November 1938 on account of its irresponsible agitation, so clearly could not be implicated in the Putsch.

CALCULATION GOING RIGHT 45 Magyar popular community (Népkdézésség) and Magyar popular (népi)} culture’’; but said that it was not pressing for early land reform, but adopting Roosz’ agricultural policy.? On 24th September the new Party formed a Parliamentary alliance with the Imrédists, under an Executive Committee of five Imrédists and four

National Socialists. Ratz was President of the Committee, and Imrédy

Parliamentary leader. Under the terms of the alliance the Imrédists made a somewhat vague and formal obeisance to the “‘vélkisch’’ principle, but this apart, the programme of the alliance was practically that of the Imrédists,

decked out with a few national socialist catch-words. It was credibly reported that the National Socialists had agreed to give up their ““dynamic policy” and to “‘renounce revolution,”’ and even that both parties had agreed not to raise, except in nominal lip-service, land reform or the social question, and to adopt a conservative financial and economic programme; and Imrédy, when he spoke on the Budget a few weeks later, said that ““he might have

repeated his last year’s speech almost word for word.” He also said that ‘“‘the era of revolution had passed in all Europe.”

These events did not bring Right-wing Unity any nearer; rather the reverse, for the two groups were now (so far as Parliamentary representation was concerned) nearly balanced and as mutually hostile as ever. But they were of importance for the inner relationships of the Right. Szalasi emerged

weakened from the struggle: his followers in Parliament were reduced to thirty (whence further secessions, to be described, were shortly to bring the number lower still), while the total Party membership had also sunk considerably, less through secession to the Imrédists than from the splitting off of the Crypto-Communists. Imrédy had gained proportionately. He was now head

of the largest Opposition group in Parliament, and had the Magyarsag at his disposal. No further consequent gains came to him in the shape of

further desertions from the MEP, to whom the Baky-Palffy element in the new coalition probably acted rather as a deterrent; but the coalition was now definitely Germany’s designated favourite, and the alliance between it and the Archduke held firm, with results which will appear shortly. The traditional anti-German Opposition, which had looked to the West for support against Germany, found during this period no answer to the thesis which the official Press of the Government blared out day after day,

even more confidently and more abusively than that of the Right-wing Opposition, that Britain had sold out her interest in Central Europe to Bolshevism: a thesis which it was, indeed, difficult to refute at that juncture in view of the support which precisely the policy of selling out was receiving in The Times. These parties and elements dropped, for the time, clean out of the political equation. The Democrats gave up all pretence of being any-

thing more than a little Parliamentary group. Their most prominent representative, Rassay, occasionally voiced his views discreetly in Parliament 1 The Magyar word nép is the exact equivalent of the German Volk, while nemzet means a “nation.” The words “magyar nemzet’’ have an especial significance to Hungarians as denoting the “indivisible and unitary Hungarian political nation.”

2 See above, I. p. 164.

3 Baky, Imrédy, Incze, Jaross, Lill, Palffy Rajniss, Ratz, Rupprecht. 4 Many Hungarians, including Kallay and L. Baranyai, have emphasised to C. A. M. the immense, and immensely disastrous, effect produced in Hungary at this period by The Times articles, especially that of 1st August 1941. These effusions were, naturally, taken as Foreign Office handouts. Cf. also Bethlen’s remarks to Ciano in January 1942 (Ciano Papers, p. 478).

46 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH or in the Esti Kurir, and more often, sunning himself in the role of oracle, allowed himself to be consulted in private. It was understood that he disagreed with Bardossy’s policy, but he made no attempt to convert the nation to his views. The Smallholders’ virtue had gone out of them when Eckhardt left for America. Of their two official leaders, one, Mgr. Varga, was in charge of the Polish refugees, a task which he performed admirably, but one which

left him little time for other duties; the other, M. Tildy, was a complete nonentity and universally treated as such. The only dynamic figure in the party, Bajcsy-Zsilinsky, was engaged in various lively activities which will be described; but at this stage, his Party was not committed to or by them. The Social Democrats at least kept a skeleton political organisation going,

besides, what was in practice much more important, keeping intact their control of the great Trade Union machine. But they did not use either instrument to embarrass the Government. In the Budget Debate of the autumn, which was the first occasion since June when their leaders were able

to speak with any freedom, Peyer, their main speaker, said that “he had several times expressed disagreement with the Government’s domestic and foreign policy, but did not want to enter into debate now, because the times

were not appropriate for raising foreign political questions.” His Party would not criticise the Government’s foreign policy ““because they did not

want to make its position difficult.” Another Socialist spokesman, M. Kabok, testified that the workers “‘were perfectly aware of the duties incumbent on them, and were carrying them out without the slightest murmur, in a truly exemplary fashion. They were not grumbling at the suspension of the limitation of hours of work, and worked Sundays and at night as the interests of production and the needs of the Army required; they would do their duty towards their country in the factories, if that was what the national defence needed, or on the battlefield, if that was required of them.’” M. Sulyok writes that the Social Democrat leaders were even better than their word and sent the police regular reports on the state of feeling among the workers.? The former “‘Dissidents,”’ the Legitimists, and Bethlen were all silent. The most active oppositional voice in the country (outside the extreme Right) was that of Imre Kovacs, a survivor of the Village Explorers, who had been provided by Baron Kornfeld with the funds to run a small weekly paper, the Szabad Szoé (Free Word) in which he aired his views week after week with fluency and verve; but what Kovacs was criticising was not the foreign policy of the Government but the social structure of Hungary, particularly in relation to the agrarian question. On the other hand, the Communists now at last went seriously, although still very cautiously, into action.*

Scrupulously as she had avoided giving Hungary cause for complaint since September 1939, Russia had, of course, taken her precautions. As soon as Rakosi arrived in Moscow, in November 1940, a “‘Foreign Committee 1 These words were reported in the Hungarian Press of 1st December. ? Press of 20th November. It is true that the debate took place at the moment, to be described, when the first expeditionary force had been withdrawn from the line, and it then appeared as though Hungary had contracted out of the war. $ Sulyok, op. cit., p. 402. 4 My main sources for the following paragraphs are the booklet A Reakcid Ellen and the works by Kallai, Darvas and Kovacs quoted in the Notes on Sources. A small amount of further information has come to me from private sources, and some was gleaned from the Press of the time.

CALCULATION GOING RIGHT 47 of the Hungarian Party of Communists” had been formed under his leadership. In January 1941 a “Central Committee and Secretariat” was established in Budapest under the direction of one, Zoltan Schénherz (who had previously been summoned to Moscow and there given his directions) with Ferencz Rozsa and G. Kallai as his two chief coadjutors.1 The instructions received by Schénherz seem to have been practically

identical with those issued to the Hungarian Communists in 1936. The Party was not, at that time, required to organise or undertake sabotage: such acts of this as followed the outbreak of war (and there were not many of them) seem to have been most often the work of Serb, Slovene or Slovak nationalists, or the undirected efforts of Hungarians whose prime ambition may well have

been less to help the U.S.S.R. than to damage Hitler—a spontaneous wish that was naturally ardent in a large part of the Jewish population. A few may have been the work of agents parachuted into the country.

The mission assigned to the Communists was not even to preach Communism: it was simply to create a broad anti-German Front, using the

slogans best calculated to achieve that object. Thus their propaganda called, indeed, for social and political reforms along “‘democratic”’ lines, and

announced that, in the new democratic Hungary, the leading place, or at

least a leading place, was to be taken by the “workers, peasants and progressive intellectuals.”> The object of this was, however, represented to be not to bring Hungary under the heel of Moscow but to create a core of inner strength so that Hungary, “‘free within, independent without,” should be able to resist any foreign oppressor.*

The ideals of freedom and independence for which this propaganda purported to stand were, of course, precisely those confessed (and quite sincerely) by a large number of Hungarians. Even the method advocated, of democratising Hungary, had respectable precedents: Kossuth in 1848 had pressed for the emancipation of the peasants precisely on the ground that Hungary would be too weak to defend her independence so long as nine-tenths of her population was unfree. Hungary’s great poet, Petofi, had preached the same doctrine (both Kossuth and Petofi being, incidentally, vehemently anti-

Russian). It had been rejected by the Compromise Era and again under Bethlen, but it was one to which the mind of a patriotic Hungarian might easily turn again and even publicly invoke at this juncture when the only danger to Hungary’s independence appeared to come from Germany and anything which appeared as a contrast with Nazism seemed respectable. It had, in fact, as we have seen, been preached again in 1939 and 1940 by Sandor Peth6d and was still officially, if rather lukewarmly, sponsored by the Magyar Nemzet, largely with an eye to the favour of the West. The story of the Hungarian “Popular Front” is thus only in one sense that of Communist activity, since by far the greater number of the persons participating in the movement were non-Communists, and a substantial proportion

of them strong anti-Communists. Had the war ended differently, the role . played in the movement by the Communists (which was not even suspected by most of their unconscious collaborators)? would doubtless never have been revealed at all, and it would have gone down to history as simply another chapter in Hungary’s national resistance to Germany. Yet it remains true that it was the Communists who revitalised the idea, set it on its way and largely determined its course. 1 KaAllai, op. cit., pp. 76 f. * This is frankly admitted by Darvas, op. cit., p. 63.

48 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH | Even after these preparations had been made, the Soviets held their hand until Hitler’s attack on Yugoslavia. Then, however, their agents in Hungary were given the green light, and at its April meeting the reactivated Party passed a resolution (in other words, Schénherz passed on the order) to create an ‘‘Independence Front under the leadership of the working class.”! The idea was to be propagated through the Népszava and other Social Democrat organs, through the Communists working on them, of whom Kallai was one. In his lecture, Kallai actually dates the whole beginning of his activities from

the day ‘‘when Hitler marched his predatory hordes through Hungary against Yugoslavia.’ It was then, said M. Kallai, that the Hungarian Communist Party decided to move in defence of Hungary’s independence (a decision which, his listeners might have reflected, had been taken, and acted upon, long before by Horthy, Teleki, and even Csaky). The publicistic side of the enterprise seems to have been in the hands of M. Kallai. He appears to have had no contact with the Smallholders’ Party. His first move was therefore to contact Imre Kovacs, with whom he had been

acquainted since the days of the ‘‘March Front,” and whose principal collaborator on the Szabad Szé, M. Darvas, although disguised as a Village

Explorer, was probably even then a crypto-Communist. Kovacs had, hitherto, proceeded on the somewhat naive assumption that the class which

| he claimed to represent could make its way unaided: its sole leaders were to be persons like himself, who had sprung from that class and had not repudiated

their origins. But he now consented to admit, and to preach the idea of, an alliance between the industrial and the agricultural workers, and even, somewhat grudgingly, to agree that “intellectuals,” not of peasant origin, might have their part to play in the new world. On the “‘intellectuals’”’ side a certain number of individuals started writing in the Magyar Nemzet, claiming a role

for themselves in the new world which was to emerge after the war. The exact relationship which was to exist between the various factors was argued throughout the spring and early summer in a good deal of extremely tedious talk, since the usual procedure was for someone to write an article (which, being paid by the line, was always quite twice as long as it need have been) in the Sunday issue of one paper, and for someone else to answer it the next Sunday. It was only on 15th June that some individuals belonging to the Left Wing

of the Social Democrat Party, including A. Szakasits, Editor in Chief of the Népszava, were initiated into, and won over to, the new policy? and only, it appears, after the outbreak of war did the official leaders of the Party give to it a half-consent, which certainly did not imply any active resistance to the Government.? The Népszava itself went into action only at the end of July,‘ 1 Kallai, op. cit., pp. 89 ff. 2 Erdédy in A Reakcio Ellen, p. 70, describes the resolution taken at this meeting as having been “‘to continue in more definitive form propaganda for the movement, proclaimed long before, to unite the workers, peasants and intellectuals, and to build up on this broad mass-basis the new thought to be thrown afresh into public opinion, the resistance movement marching under the flag of Hungary’s freedom and independence.” 3 Erdoédy, op. cit., p. 71, quotes Peyer as having said at this meeting, ‘‘If Churchill doesn’t

mind Stalin as an ally we can really have no objection to him.” Peyer was undoubtedly antiBolshevist. How far Szakasits was initiated into Kallai’s real designs or how far he was only

a catspaw will probably never be known. His subsequent fate (he was made President of

Democratic Hungary and then stellenbosched) leaves the question unresolved. 4 The first article from the Népszava in the Press-cutting file on the subject which I made at the time is dated 3rd August 1941. Erddédy refers vaguely to some earlier utterances, but if his memory is not at fault (and he admits that he wrote from memory), these were so discreet that

when reading them at the time I did not gather what they were driving at. i

CALCULATION GOING RIGHT 49 when it started publishing “replies” (usually from the pen of Kallai), welcoming the idea of an alliance between “workers, peasants and intellectuals” and maintaining, rather disingenuously, that the Social Democrats had sponsored the cause of their rural brethren for half a century past; also insisting strongly that the Hungarian workers were a patriotic class devoted to the independence of their country—a claim justified for those on whose behalf it was made, although not for those who were making it. There were still a number of questions to be resolved (by the tedious method of article and counter-article, Sunday by Sunday) before the movement could be put, even temporarily, on the lines desired by Moscow. The Communists insisted that the big peasants must be included in the ‘‘Indepen-

dence Front’ (of course, a purely tactical move, since when Communism triumphed in Hungary membership of that class was treated as a criminal offence). Kovacs differed, as he did also on the questions of the relationship

between the classes composing the Front (he did not want to admit the leadership of the industrial workers) and on the Communists’ other requirement that any revolutionary action likely to frighten the bourgeoisie away must be postponed;! and the differences remained in being for a full year, during which, also, the Smallholders’ Party refused to rise to the Népszava fly. Against this, when a certain number of bourgeois writers began to show interest in the movement, Erdédy, on 7th September, announced that the

alliance of the bourgeoisie as a class was not wanted, only that of the ‘progressive intellectuals.’’ This seems to have been partly due to objections from the orthodox Social Democrats in the Hungarian Party, who did not appreciate the “‘elasticity” of Moscow’s tactics. It was only in October that the Népszava’s scruples were, apparently, overcome and that paper

suddenly began preaching “‘class alliance.’ This, again, had no party political effect, since the only then existing bourgeois party which might possibly have accepted the “‘alliance’—that of the Democrats—gave the movement a conspicuously chilly reception: a fact which probably originated in personal factors connected with Rassay and had certain rather peculiar

results later. |

For the time only a handful of “progressive intellectuals’? responded, and of these about half were probably crypto-Communists, the remainder being genuine “‘progressive intellectuals” of high integrity and courage. With their encouragement, a couple of minor demonstrations were staged in the autumn, the stress in each case being laid on the independence motif. On 6th October

a little group laid a wreath on the memorial to Count Batthyany” and on Ist November a much larger deputation, composed mainly of workers, laid wreaths on the graves of Kossuth and Tancsics.* This was rightly taken as an anti-German demonstration, and provoked a loud outcry from the Right, and also, for the first time, serious interference from the authorities, who up to that date had let the journalists write fairly freely, so long as they did not actually preach revolution, or make their references to Germany too explicit. Although the demonstration had not been forbidden in advance, numerous

arrests were made among the participants and the censorship was now 1 KaAallai, op. cit., pp. 99 f.

2 6th October was Hungary’s day of national mourning for the ‘Martyrs of Arad” executed in 1849 by the Austrian authorities for rebellion. Count Batthyany, one of the martyrs, had been Hungary’s first responsible Minister President. 8 The name of Kossuth needs no commentary. Tancsics, himself a peasant, had been the one radical and class-conscious representative of the Hungarian peasantry in 1848. D

50 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH applied more rigorously to the journalistic exchanges. This was, however, as we Shall see, only a very temporary set-back.

After the declaration of war, the Government was obliged to occupy itself seriously with the task of reorganising its national economy for war-

time conditions. The supply scare of the spring was not relieved when harvest came, for the harvest turned out to be below average again,’ and an elaborate machinery had to be devised to entice out of the farmers the foodstuffs needed for the non-agricultural population, and distribute the same. Without going into detail, we may say here that, in the course of the summer and autumn, all important cereal and fodder crops came under a system of registration and control, the producers being obliged, under threat of heavy penalties for evasion, hoarding, etc., to offer all the surpluses left to them, after deduction of a stated quantity for personal and family needs, and for seed, to the Government, which bought them at a fixed price. Analogous restrictions applied to fatted livestock. Production was not yet regulated, but was influenced by the prices, which were announced in advance. Agricultural labour came under fairlv strict direction. At the other end, rationing

was extended until all the main urban centres, and in January the entire country, were rationed for bread and flour, fats and sugar. There were now three meatless days a week. Most of this work was in the hands of the Ministry of Supply, which in the course of the year shot up mushroom-like from a modest department charged with the prevention of hoarding, into a full-blown Ministry’; but inevitably, the control (under the general direction of Reményi-Schneller, as Minister of Economic Co-ordination) extended until by the end of the year it covered almost all fields of economic life. Almost all wages, prices and profit-margins came under control; factories required for war production were requisitioned, and more direction of labour introduced, especially on the land, where disciplinary measures were introduced against men deserting their jobs and against “‘work-shy elements.”’ All this was not yet very terrible. General Gy6érffy-Bengyel, who had told his staff when he assumed office that their first duty was to supply Hungary’s

allies with everything they needed; then came the needs of the Hungarian Army, and the civilians could have what was left—made a lot of ferocious 1 No figures were issued at the time, but those published after the war (Sztatisztikai Zsebkoényyv 1947) gave the following figures for the Trianon area, for 1938 and 1941 respectively

(thousands of quintals):

1938 1941

Wheat. .. oo, 26,883 Rye . Coo, 8,046 18,855 5,681

Barley . .. ..... .3,104 7,240 3,394 6,027 Oats . . Maize. . .. ..... .26,620 Potatoes 21,406 18,062 21,196 Sugarbeet 9,694 29,522 9,060 Swedes, etc. .. .. ., .. 35,210

The production of Hungary within its 1941 frontiers must have been substantially larger than this, but Ruthenia and Transylvania were passive areas, and the population was also up some 40 per cent. on 1938. Published after the event, these figures are probably genuine, but they show, of course, only quantities declared. > The first Minister of Supply was M. D. Laky, who, however, was accused by the military of being too lax, and replaced on 15th September by General Gydrffy-Bengyel, formerly Bartha’s second in command in the Ministry of Defence.

CALCULATION GOING RIGHT 51 speeches, but the rations were ample, even if people had stuck to them, which they seldom did. Ciano, when he visited Budapest in January 1942, noted that ‘‘one did not feel the war there. ... The city was fully lighted, traffic appeared almost normal, there were few restrictions on goods, and those were more formal than effective. Bread was white, exactly as before the war, and as abundant as it was then.’! How far the country was above starvation level appears from the fact that the animal population had increased over the 1939 level by figures which, in the case of swine, amounted

to 50 per cent.2. Where shortages did appear, this was chiefly because the country was now engaged, nationally and individually, in accumulating stocks, with the full connivance of the Government, which prosecuted a certain number of Jews for hoarding, but left the farmers, big and small, alone, provided they preserved an appearance of decency.

But life was certainly less easy than before. The period was one of considerable inflation, partly owing to the policy of Baranyai, at the National Bank, who—against the opposition of Reményi-Schneller, whose policy was anti-inflationary—was deliberately encouraging a certain rise in prices in order to discourage over-selling to Germany. The cost of living, which had gone up some 10 to 12 per cent. between 1939 and 1940, rose by nearly double that figure in 1940-41, and was still on the increase.? Agricultural prices kept approximately pace with the rise in the cost of living*; industrial wages lagged a little behind, higher salaries further behind still,° while the worst sufferers were, as everywhere, the fixed income groups. Profits and large incomes were taxed heavily.®

Meanwhile, Hungary’s active contribution to the common cause had been

substantially more modest than the readers of her descriptions of it might reasonably have supposed. After the mobilisation of the VIII Corps, the A.A. defences and certain other units, she had a considerable number of men 1 Ciano Papers, p. 479. 2 The position here, according to the source quoted above (p. 50, n1.), was: 1938 (autumn) February 1941

Cattle . ; . ; . 1,882,031 2,376,475 Swine . , ; . . 3,110,060 4,669,922 Sheep Horses. ;. ,. .;.;1,628,730 , 813,5911,708,464 900,434

(Sztat. Zs., loc. cit.) These figures are presumably also for the Trianon area, and again those complied for confidential use. The Germans were told a different story: in April 1941, the Pester Lloyd wrote that the pig population was down 40 per cent. on 1938. 3 Some relevant figures are as follows:

| Cost of living index (1913=100):

1939 1940 1941

Inclusive of rent , . , , . 101-6 110-1 130 Exclusive of rent , , ; , . 106-4 117 143-8 Wholesale prices . . . , , . 86:3 100-3 122-7

4 Agricultural prices were raised by another 15 per cent. in the summer. The Pester Lloyd then wrote that the money income of agriculture was the same as in 1939-40, but the real income down by some 15 per cent. According to the statistics published in the Sztatisztikai Zsebkényv for 1946, the rise between 1939 and 1941 had been about 30 per cent. in the case of wheat, rather

less for oats and maize, but substantially more for rye and barley. 6 Wages were given another 15 per cent. rise in December, making a rise of 30 per cent. since August 1939. The rise then given to the highest grade salaried employees was only 3 per cent.

6 The chief new tax was a 6 per cent. surcharge on all existing taxes, for armaments. Persons excused military service paid a special exemption tax. All duties and indirect taxes were raised. The income tax was graduated more steeply in the Budget.

52 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH under arms in Hungary!; but her expeditionary force, counting in a small home-based air-force of one fighter squadron, one bomber squadron and two

short-range reconnaissance squadrons that had been added to it, still numbered only about 36,000 men, of which little force the Mobile Corps, some 24.000 strong, constituted by far the largest single element. It was also the only one whose equipment fitted it, even approximately, to take part in field operations, and even in its case the word “‘approximately”’ is operative.

for the “‘motorised”’ brigades were largely composed of cyclists, and of its

cars. only a few ran on tracks, and some of the others were not even armoured, but simply private cars which had been requisitioned. The Mountain and Frontier Brigades were only quite lightly armed. In fact, these units, after leading the way for a few days, dropped behind when the Dniester was reached, thereafter doing service only behind the lines. The Mobile Corps, when it came up, was attached to the German XVIIth Army, in which capacity it took part in advances which brought it to the Bug by the end of July and to the Dnieper by the end of August; in these, 1t seems to have fought with dash and courage, and to have suffered considerable losses. The casualties in manpower were not very heavy: up to Ist September they amounted to 27 officers and 451 O.R.s killed, 71 officers and 1,283 O.R.s wounded and 4 officers and 128 O.R.s missing. But the losses in equipment had been severe, ranging from 50 per cent. in some units to 80 per cent. in others. What Germany chiefly wanted from Hungary was still supplies rather than

soldiers, and when Clodius arrived in Budapest in July on his annual visit

. to negotiate the revision and renewal of the annual trade agreement, he made no secret that he wanted more imports from Hungary. In fact, the new agreement, which was concluded on 3lst July, provided for a substantial increase. Hungary’s exports to Germany in 1941, in terms of money values, were nearly double those of 1940 (477-0 million peng6é against 250-0) and the

active balance of trade was now heavy, since the increase in imports from Germany, although substantial, was very much smaller than this (429-4 m.p. against 318-7).2, Moreover, Germany was not at the time willing to make

this deficit good by any of the methods used later, so that Baranyai was obliged to grant her a 300 million R.M. credit, which he arranged to be given

through Hungarian banks. The bargain, was, however, still not too onesided. The higher figures were due largely to the bigger area which Hungary now covered, and to the increased price-level, so that the percentage of her total trade which related to Germany had hardly risen?; moreover, Germany had made the important concession of allowing her imports from Hungary to be valued at the level of the corresponding German products instead of

the lower Hungarian price level. She also paid real consideration to the Hungarians’ contention that their own difficulties made it impossible for them to export larger quantities of basic foodstuffs. Exact figures are difficult to obtain, and where they exist, never agree mutually, but it seems clear that 1 Adonyi, op. cit., p. 104, gives a total of 215,000 men mobilised behind the line in 1941, but it is not clear whether this figure represents the total number of’men receiving calling-up notices for such service during the year, or the maximum figure with the colours at any date. * These figures do not, of course, adequately indicate the increase under the new agreement (the details of which were never published), as they are for the calendar year, while the agreement ran from 31st July to 30th July. The 1942 figures were: exports, 632°5 m.p.; imports, 483-3 m.p. 3 Germany’s share of Hungary’s total exports was 60 per cent. in 1941, against 58 per cent.

in 1940; of imports, 58 per cent. against 52 per cent. But the increases in the Italian, Swiss, Spanish, Turkish, etc., figures were relatively larger still.

CALCULATION GOING RIGHT 53 Germany consented now to take smaller quantities of agricultural produce than before the war, and to allow a smaller proportion of those to consist of wheat, livestock, etc.1 She made up the agricultural quota with specialised

products such as fruit, wine,” etc., and the total quota with more manufactured goods and non-agricultural raw materials; these last including, above all, besides the Transylvanian timber already mentioned, a large share of the now rapidly increasing production of the Lispe oil-fields, and of the Hungarian bauxite which was also coming into full production; the export of oil, which had been valued only at 133,000 pengo in 1940, was 18,508,000 pengd in 1941 and 45,476,000 peng6é in 1942,° the corresponding figures for bauxite being 11-4, 14:6 and 24-3 million peng.

Arrangements were also made for more Hungarian workers to go to Germany (by the end of the year these totalled 35,000),* and considerable discussions also took place on the economic role which Hungary was to fill in the New Europe to be established at the end of the war. Since these plans were never realised, they need not be described here, but 1t is worth mentioning

that they were conducted in an atmosphere of mutual goodwill, and that the Hungarians apparently carried their point that Hungarian industry was not to be reduced and that her agricultural exports were to consist chiefly of specialised crops (the granary of the New Europe, which was to serve Hungary

as well as Germany, was to lie in the Ukraine).

Up to the end of August Hungary had at least made the motions of ‘“‘siving willingly’; but there now occurred an event which—only briefly mentioned in the Hungarian Press at the time, and hardly remarked at all by observers abroad—in reality signified a fundamental change in Hungarian foreign policy. That event was the fall of Werth, the most prominent and by far the most effective advocate in the whole country (for Bartha was never more than his second and Sztdéjay was tucked away in Berlin) of sincere and

unreserved co-operation with Germany. Having, as we saw, been more responsible than any other single man for bringing Hungary into the war, and having always advocated a policy of maximum co-operation, Werth 1 [ have had to leave the statement in this general form, but give here one or two figures from various sources: (a) Clodius said in August 1942 that in 1940-41 Hungary had exported to Germany ‘‘no cereals worth mentioning”’ and in 1941-42 ‘tno cereals at all from Old Hungary.”

(6) The booklet ‘*‘Hungarian Economic Resistance against German Pressure” gives statistics of exports ‘‘based on the average 1939 prices,’’ as follows (millions of pengs):

| 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 Livestock and meat products. , 112:1 76:3 51:6 37:5 37-4 26:2

Fats and oil seeds. , ; , 190 60 03 3-6 108 1-3

Grain and flour , ; ; , 62:3. 203 30°5 21:9 33:8 19-5 Vegetables and fruit , . . 28 22 88 84 12:7 13:8 Miscellaneous food . , , ; 8-1 6:3 11:3 6:3 2:6 1-2

(It is not clear whether all these figures refer to the same area.) 2 As in 1940, a separate agreement had been concluded on 31st May for fresh and preserved

fruits, of which the exports were to be 24 million R.M. for the period Ist April 1941 to 31st March 1942, against 14 million in the previous year. Other agreements related to exports of wine, tobacco and timber. 3 In 1942 422,200 tons of raw oil were produced from Lispe, against only 2,215 in 1937. 214,000 tons of petrol were consumed and 49,967 exported to Germany. In addition, the Wintershall A.G., of Berlin, had been granted a concession for exploiting oils, methane gas and

minerals on Hungarian soil. | 4 This was still a relatively small figure, amounting to only 0-2 per cent. of the population,

compared with 0-7 per cent. for Yugoslavia, 0-8 per cent. for Denmark, | per cent. for Holland, 1-4 per cent. for Belgium, 3 per cent. for Slovakia and 9 per cent. for the Protectorate.

54 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH had continued to work for the same. In August he had, apparently, promised the Germans that the Hungarian expeditionary force should be reinforced,

and that Hungarian troops should be trained for the purpose in Germany, negotiations to the effect were going on through General Toussaint, the German Military Attaché. But he had omitted to consult the Regent, who was offended at this disregard of his prerogatives?; and now he suddenly encountered opposition from another quarter. On or about Ist September, Szombathelyi sent in a memorandum in which he declared that “‘Blitzkriegs were over’? and even the issue of the war was uncertain. Hungary’s policy should be to withdraw and look after her own interests.2 He was called home for consultation, and he and Werth argued their respective points of view before the Regent, who decided in favour of Szombathelyi. On 6th September he took Werth’s place as Chief of Staff, while a certain Janos Vérés succeeded Laszlé as Chief of the Operational Section.

This change of personnel was all-important. In many respects Szombathelyi was not unlike Werth. Like him he was of Swabian stock (his original name, which he had Magyarised only a few years earlier, was Knauz) and of humble origin: his father had been a cobbler. He was technically a highly efficient soldier, but the sergeant-major type, a man without academic attainments or personal refinement, rough in his manner and heavy in the hand. He was not an anti-German in the sense in which some Hungarians were, on the look-out to defame or injure his country’s ““brothers in arms.’ But

he had none of that blind faith in and admiration for the Germans which made Werth unable to see any alternative for Hungary outside the closest partnership with Germany. An émigré journal has actually described him as having been, in the ’30s, “‘the strongest Anglophile in Hungary except Imrédy,”” with whom he was on friendly terms. Rather unexpectedly, he was one of the few Hungarian generals who believed it both possible and

desirable to do a deal with Russia at the expense of Roumania, and a document written by him in 1946 shows* that from 1942 onward he was privy to Kallay’s attempts to get in touch with British and American military circles; by his own account, he was even willing to go further than Kallay. He was a man of integrity and loyalty, who always behaved well towards the Regent and also towards Kallay, even when he disagreed with his policy. He had no political affiliations or known sympathies whatever. He did not deserve the fate which overtook him.° Vo6r6és, who now came in to occupy what was in practice the second most

important post in the Army, also passed for a talented and even a brilliant soldier. His political sympathies were believed to be with the Imrédists. Later events, which will be described in detail, were to prove that he was a

man whose fixity of purpose was unequal to the strain put on it by his problems. For the time, however, he had no opportunity to display this. Meanwhile, it was of great importance for Hungary’s future policy that Horthy’s chief military adviser was now a man who advocated limiting 1 Tombor typescript. 2 Horthy to C. A. M. 3 Nadas to C. A. M. ‘4 §z. I. MS.

5 He was extradited to the Yugoslavs and by them executed as a ‘‘War criminal’’ for his alleged responsibility for the Ujvidék massacre described below (pp. 69 ff.).

CALCULATION GOING RIGHT 55 Hungary’s commitments and loosening her ties with Germany, instead of the contrary policy which Werth had always urged so strongly. The Hungarians lost no time in acting on Szombathelyi’s suggestions. The very day after the change in personnel, Horthy, Bardossy, Szombathelyi

and Szentmikléssy, with the new German Minister Jagow,! left for the Fihrer’s headquarters. The Regent, as he has written,” personally requested Hitler to let the Hungarian troops come back home and on the 9th Ribbentrop

asked Bardossy whether this was Hungary’s special wish.2 Bardossy answered that the losses of the troops in equipment had been so heavy as to make it pointless to leave them at the front, and they could not be relieved by others, since Hungary possessed only one Mobile Corps. Nor could she

“continue her participation with other kinds of arms,” for this would so weaken her both militarily and economically as to make her unable ‘“‘to fill her role of preserving order in South-Eastern Europe,”’ which would not be

in Germany’s own interest (Bardossy seems to have spent a good deal of time in explaining how unreliable, from Germany’s point of view, all Hungary’s neighbours were).

The Germans did not like the idea; Ribbentrop thought that Hungary’s withdrawal from the struggle against Bolshevism would ‘“‘be very alarming

from the point of view of morale.’* On his own confession, Bardossy assented to this, but asked Ribbentrop what he proposed to do about the matter, and Ribbentrop then proposed, subject to higher approval, that the armoured brigades, which, it was said, were just being taken out of the line, should be re-equipped by the Germans and then remain at the front until the end of the operational season, which would probably be not much after

15th October. They should then be brought home, with the rest of the Mobile Corps. The Germans would fit Hungary out with a complete new -motorised division. The two brigades then behind the line would be relieved

by their opposite numbers and twelve more infantry battalions sent out, making up a force of four Brigades at peace strength. These were to be employed only on lines of communication work.

This programme was agreed, and carried out in the following weeks, although the Germans were a little behind their schedule. Some units of the Mobile Corps were carried on as far as the Donetz in mid-October, and were

then asked to advance again. Lakatos had to reply that the whole Corps could not raise more than three to three and a half weak battalions, with at the most two or three light howitzer batteries and one or two A.A. batteries. There were no tanks or armoured cars left. The cavalry and cyclists were already many leagues behind, embogged in the Ukrainian mire. The Corps had, incidentally, suffered another 2,000 losses in dead, with 600 wounded and 600 missing. The Germans now relented and the Corps was withdrawn from the line. Its units arrived back in Hungary at various dates in November and December,°® as did the Danube Flotilla, which had been doing transport service in the Black Sea. The relief of the Mountain and Frontier Chasseur brigades by their second-line units (at peace strength) was duly accomplished - and the two additional brigades (the 121st and 124th) sent out (most of them having to do the journey on foot)*®; and in December, after a long quadri1 Von Jagow had replaced von Erdmannsdorff in July.

2 Horthy, op. cit., p. 238. 3 Sz. I. MS. 4 Id.

5 The last unit whose return was reported arrived at Szolnok on 5th January 1942. 6 Magyarorszdg, 19th July 1942,

56 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH partite wrangle between the two Foreign Ministries and the two General Staffs,1 a fifth brigade joined them, bringing the total of these occupying forces up to about 40,000 men.? The personnel of all these forces was made up of elderly reservists; their equipment was of the lightest—rifles, a few machine-guns and trench mortars and a very few guns, these being ““usually

two or three worn-out light mountain howitzers or clumsy, antiquated garrison guns.”® Their work was to cope with the guerillas who had begun to appear in November (this was why the Germans had asked for reinforcements) and displayed great activity from mid-December onward, so that their

operations, besides being always arduous, were not without danger. But

the Hungarians now believed their active part in the campaign to be over.

The Hungarians had thus now openly and officially abandoned that policy of maximum military participation in the war which they had been at any rate pretending to follow for the two preceding months, in favour of almost the exact opposite: a policy of conservation of forces, 1.e. minimum participation. Their Press was extraordinarily frank in explaining to its own readers what it was doing, and why. So on 16th September the Pesti Hirlap

wrote with simple candour that Hungary’s prime need was to keep her armies intact, in order to have them intact—the word was repeated again and again—when the war ended, in order “‘to solve the problems of the Carpathian basin” and “‘to undertake the leading role there’? which properly belonged to her. M. Svatko, Editor in Chief of the Magyarorszdg, wrote in almost the same words on 23rd November—it was all-important “‘that a strong, modern, big and enthusiastic army should be at our disposal when the New Europe is born.”

To their allies, they naturally could not put things nakedly; for them, some argument had to be devised showing that Hungary’s non-participation

in the military effort was in Germany’s interest, and the thesis which the Hungarians thought up was that everyone in South-Eastern Europe, except themselves, was unreliable. Only Hungary was 100 per cent. pro-German, and it was thus to Germany’s advantage that she should be as strong as possible. Bardossy had already argued this to Ribbentrop in September, explaining that Antonescu was the only real pro-German in Roumania; the Serbs were all crypto-Pan-Slavs; and so on. He repeated these arguments when he went to Berlin on 25th November for the renewal of the Tripartite Pact.

Up to a certain point, the Hungarians got away with it. The Germans, as we saw, had made no particular difficulties about the withdrawal of the ill-armed and not very useful Hungarian troops from the line, provided that a symbolic force was left behind. When Ribbentrop met Bardossy, he did not try to get the decision reversed, nor even press very hard the reasonable suggestion that the reduced military contribution should be compensated by a larger economic effort. He did beg Bardossy “‘very earnestly’? for more 1 The wrangle, which went on for weeks, was whether the Hungarians had volunteered extra troops (as the Germans maintained) or the Germans had asked for them (as the Hungarians insisted). In any case, the Germans wanted two more divisions and some railway troops; they got, at last, the one division. * This is how I disentangle the position from the correspondence in the Sz.I. MS. According to Adonyi, op. cit., p. 34, the 121st and 124th relieved the Mountain Brigade and the Frontier Chasseurs altogether, and were followed by three further brigades. The result is the same: five brigades in Russia by the end of the year. 3 Adonyi, loc. cit.

CALCULATION GOING RIGHT 57

all she could. ,

wheat and oil,' but accepted Bardossy’s assurance that Hungary was doing

No political questions at all were raised at this meeting; indeed, the

Germans appear, as we have said, specifically to have repudiated any wish to

interfere in Hungary’s internal affairs. The get-away was, however, not complete, for the Germans were not such fools that they could not see through

the Hungarians’ special pleading, and had no intention whatever of letting them have it both ways. Throughout the autumn, and especially during the Berlin visit, the Hungarian Press made frantic efforts to show that Hungary really occupied a special position in the now extensive queue of signatories to the Pact: was regarded by Germany with peculiar affection and respect and really designated as watchdog to keep her neighbours in line. There was no shadow of justification for any of these pretensions. The utterances of Germany’s public men (notably Hitler’s speech of 14th October) and, in general, the inspired comment of their Press, preserved throughout a complete

. impartiality as between the various satellites, and behind the scenes no action was taken which might offend the much more important and valuable Roumania. This applied in particular to the outstanding question of the allocation of the ex-Yugoslav Banat, which was still in abeyance in the autumn, although on 22nd May Weizsacker had told Sztdjay that the Fuhrer

would fix the date when Hungary could take possession, and had again assured him in July that the area should indeed return to Hungary, as Hitler had promised in March, when the “‘psychological moment” arrived: this he put now at the time when Roumania had recovered Bessarabia.” But at the meeting of 10th September, although the Roumanian armies were now long since across the Dniester, the Hungarians were told again that the Banat question was “‘res judicata,”’ but that “‘external factors would determine the date of transfer.’’> Meanwhile, the local German Volksgruppe, which had taken over the civilian administration of the Banat, closed a high proportion of the Magyar schools, made German and Serb the official languages, and forbade listening to the Hungarian wireless.“

In Slovakia, the Germans continued to patronise the strongly antiHungarian Slovak Government; in Croatia, they did not intervene. In short, their attitude was that if Hungary wished to stew in her own juice, she was welcome; but she could not have the juice and escape the stewing.

Hungary’s relations with her neighbours thus simply reverted to the status quo ante her declaration of war, and little need be said of them except that, on balance, the prospect of any reconciliation, or of co-operation with any of them against any outside force—Germany or another—dimuinished

still further. So far as Slovakia and Roumania were concerned, the story continued to be merely one of dreary squabbles, occasionally lightened by comic relief,®> while Hungary’s relations with Croatia dropped definitively

into the same category early in July, through action of her own. The commander of the troops occupying the Murak6z insisted that he must introduce his own military administration, and Bardossy having consented 1 Sz, I. MS. In particular, he asked for the consignment of oil to be raised from 80,000 to 120,000 tons, and for a consignment of 100,000 quintals of cereals.

1d 4 Id.

5 Christmas-tide was marked by a grand outburst of rage in the Slovak Press against the Magyar minority, which, it was said, had been indulging in irredentist gestures by burning green Christmas candles.

58 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH to this, the measure was taken at midnight on 6th-7th July. The commander,

however, went further, and proclaimed the annexation of the area. The news was published in the local Press of Zala County and then Bardossy said that it was useless to suppress it and impossible to retract the measure, which the Government accordingly covered, thereafter incorporating the area in Hungary, together with her other acquisitions. A message was sent to the Croats that the step was not to be regarded as final, but, not unnaturally, they received it with scepticism, and thereafter refused all overtures,

pending a settlement of the question satisfactory to themselves. Bardossy in his survey of foreign affairs in December could do no more than express a hope that Croatia would ‘“‘find a way to establish normal relations with Hungary.” Herewith the dream of an Italo-Hungaro-Croat bloc joined the rest of Hungary’s vanished illusions, not to revive again,! and there was no substitute.

The local Serbs could not reconcile themselves to the occupation of the Voivodina, nor to the many brutalities which still accompanied Hungarian rule there; the Yugoslav Government in exile, of course, demanded complete restitution of the status quo ante April 1941. So Hungary was now actually near-surrounded by a double ring of ill-wishers: the one consisting of the existing Slovak, Roumanian, Serb and Croat States—not mutually allied,

and indeed, often mutually hostile, but all anti-Hungarian; the other composed of the former Little Entente Governments, now established in London. From the latter the Roumanian link was still technically missing, but her friends represented Roumania so effectively that her absence was hardly noticed. It was for Hungary a position of near-isolation which was made worse

by the almost complete indifference shown to her in the period, so far as politics were concerned, by Italy. In her own interest Italy showed a certain readiness to replace some of Hungary’s missing sources of industrial raw materials,” but politically she simply washed her hands of her former ally.? The Hungarians made some attempts to bring in the Bulgarians to fill

the gap. Filov visited Budapest on 15th October, and the Press, making much of the visit, suggested that Hungary, the most powerful Danubian State, and Bulgaria, the biggest Balkan State, were destined to collaborate. No concrete results, however, emerged from this, nor from a visit paid by Szombathelyi a few weeks later, to Sofia. 1 Cf. the bitter complaints of Hungary’s conduct, including her alleged ambitions to reunite Croatia with herself, made by Pavelic to Ciano on 12th December (Ciano Papers, p. 472). 2 Hungary’s imports from Italy in 1941 were nearly three times the 1940 figure, and in 1942 substantially more again, much the largest items being now textile goods and textile raw materials. Her exports to Italy rose also, less fast in 1941, but with a bound in 1942, the biggest items being cattle and flour. The figures (000 pengo) were:

1940 1941 1942

Imports from Italy . , . 55,788 155,353 243,479 Exports to Italy Lo . 83,961 113,460 229,040 3 Ciano in his Diary does not record a single conversation with the Hungarian Minister in Rome during the period, except on 19th July, when Villani paid his farewell visit, and 26th September, when Villani’s successor, Mariassy, presented himself. Of the latter, he writes that Mariassy ‘“‘wanted to address some political questions to me,”’ which Ciano apparently evaded answering, and he describes Mariassy as ‘‘a fine specimen of an imbecile.”” The Sz. I. MS. records no conversations with the Italian Minister in Budapest. Ciano’s visit to Budapest in January is mentioned below (p. 66). It, too, was entirely empty. His other papers contain only one mention of Hungary—a sarcastic reference to the ‘‘campaign of cordial mutual denigration” in which Bardossy, Tuka and M. Antonescu indulged in Berlin. The Hungarian Minister of Finance visited Italy on 13th November, but no real information was given of his doings or conversation

CALCULATION GOING RIGHT 59 It need only be added that the Hungarian Government was itself at pains to make clear that its withdrawal from active participation in the fighting implied no change in its attitude towards any of Germany’s enemies. The abusive propaganda against the Western Powers continued unabated. So Pester Lloyd wrote on 22nd October that: ‘The transitory victory of the two peripheral Powers, France and England, has been the source of all the unhappiness and misery which came upon Europe and held the Continent in their claws for two decades.”’

The reiterated assertions not only that Great Britain was irrevocably committed to fulfilment of all President Benes’ most extreme ambitions, but also that she had already handed Central Europe over to the U.S.S.R. lock, stock and barrel, are simply too numerous to quote; they are also (since they remain on record) far too numerous to be buried under any denials.

CHAPTER FOUR

CALCULATION GOING WRONG OR all the qualifications enumerated in the last pages it was still up to

Pie: late autumn possible to say that the revised calculation was going to work out successfully. If the promised Blitz victory had failed to materialise, this was no very great matter, since Hungary had successfully withdrawn her own soldiers. The Germans seemed as confident as ever of early victory, probably in the spring, and few Hungarians even yet took seriously the possibility that Russia would not in the long run be crushed, without great cost to themselves. No very disastrous consequences had emerged in the West, the worst being the British recognition of the Czechoslovak Government; but even those who believed that Britain would escape defeat did not think that she would be able to influence affairs in Central Europe after the war, and in any case, she had pledged herself to the Atlantic Charter. If this were honourably interpreted it was certain that Hungary would not again lose the Felvidék and probably not Ruthenia. This St. Martin’s Summer lasted over Bardossy’s visit to Berlin. But hardly had Bardossy got home from that visit, when a whole series of blows descended on the Hungarians’ heads.

The first came from England. As early as October the Hungarian Legations had reported that the U.S.S.R. was pressing its allies to declare

war on Germany’s satellites. Since H.M. Government had not at once acceded to the request, the Hungarian Government seems to have attached no great importance to the reports; but on 29th November Mr. Pell, the U.S. Minister in Budapest (who was acting as postman between the British and Hungarian Governments), suddenly handed the Foreign Ministry a Note containing an ultimatum. The Hungarian Government, said the Note, had for months past been “‘making a substantial contribution to the German war effort” through her troops on the Russian front. Unless by midnight on 5th December Hungary had “‘ceased military operations and withdrawn from

all active participation in hostilities,’ H.M. Government would “‘have no alternative but to declare the existence of a state of war between the two countries.’”!

In conversation with Mr. Pell, Bardossy pointed out that the troops were

already being withdrawn from the line. It was physically impossible to bring back those units which were to do service on the lines of communication,

but the Hungarian Government had no intention of participating further in military operations. He hoped that Britain would not make things more difficult by declaring war. Mr. Pell, who said that his country had done all it could to prevent a declaration of war, offered to mediate, but he asked Bardossy to put his case in writing, and this Bardossy, who was afraid that the communication might be published,” refused to do; also arguing (reason1 The text of the Note is given (in extract) by Kertész, op. cit., p. 209. 2 Ullein, p. 111.

CALCULATION GOING WRONG 61 ably enough) that the attempt would be useless, since the British démarche was not being addressed to Hungary alone.! In asking for an exception to be made in her case, Hungary would only be courting a snub. In his heart, Bardossy would probably have disliked seeing the exception granted, more than having it refused, for it would, of course, have put him in an extraordinarily disagreeable position vis-a-vis Germany, and in so far

as the race with Roumania (who was certainly not asking anything of the sort)" was concerned, would have undone all his work of the preceding six months, including the declaration of war on Russia itself. Mr. Pell tried all the same, on his own initiative, to stop the British declaration; he sent (as he told Bardossy on the 6th) three messages to Washington (one of them direct

to Roosevelt) urging that the British move was ‘“‘most unwise.’ Another attempt at intervention was made through Vatican channels.* It must, however, be said that Bardossy lent no help to any of these endeavours. In the communication which he sent to his missions in Berlin, Rome and Stockholm he said that he had told Mr. Pell that the Hungarian Government had accepted the British communication without comment (minden tovabbi

nelkul), as Hungary could not have her policy made dependent on the decisions of the British Government. The whole nation, moreover, ‘‘would

hear with profound indignation the British Government’s decision, which , meant that Britain was trying to help the Soviets by terrorising and, if necessary, sacrificing Hungary.” On 5th December he made a statement in Parliament in exactly this tone of aggrieved innocence, saying inter alia that the British decision, which was

‘contrary alike to law and justice,” was “directed not only against us, and

those States in a position similar to ours, but against all Europe.” His strictures on Great Britain were received, according to the Press, with “applause and cheers from all sides of the House’; at one point the Deputies got to their feet in order to exult more emphatically. When the declaration of war followed (conveyed by Mr. Pell at midnight on the 6th-7th, with expressions of his deep personal regret), the Press commented in the same vein, the Pester Lilovd writing that Hungary was the poorer by an illusion, but the richer by an experience. She would preserve her dignity and “‘perhaps

our example will teach the English what being a gentleman means.’ On the very day that the Hungarian public learnt of the British declaration

of war there came also the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, 1 Similar communications were being made to Roumania and Finland.

2 In her Note, Roumania said that “she could accept the British demand only if H.M. Government on its side ceased to support the Soviets.” 3 Sz. I. MS. 4 Ullein, op. cit.. p. 112, writes that this step was taken on his personal initiative; he said nothing of it either to Bardossy or to any other person. But he hurried down to Esztergom and got Cardinal Serédi to write to the Holy See asking for its intervention. Apor reported on the 13th that Cardinal Maglione, on receiving Serédi’s message (transmitted via the Nunciature in Budapest), had spoken to the British Minister, who gladly agreed to pass the message on, saying that ‘“Hungary enjoyed much sympathy in England.” But the news that war was declared came next day. 5 So far as the British subjects left in Hungary were concerned, the Hungarians in fact behaved in exemplary fashion. They were simply required to report periodically to the police, but otherwise were left entirely unmolested and treated by the population with the utmost friendliness. When the Germans occupied Hungary in March 1944, many of them were rounded up (a large haul was taken at the races), and about 100 of them, chiefly persons of Jewish origin and recent British citizenship, were interned: but, even so, they were treated with great consideration. The Pester Lloyd’s ‘example’ was, however, unnecessary, for the Hungarians in Britain were yreated just as well.

62 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH and four days after that Germany’s declaration of war on the U.S.A., simultaneously with which Weizsacker called Sztédjay and said to him that ‘the hoped that the Hungarian Government would draw the consequences of the attitude of the Government of the Reich, in the spirit of the Three Power Pact.”’

Bardossy had already convoked an extraordinary Ministerial Council to discuss the situation arising out of Germany’s declaration of war.

He said that Hungary had undoubtedly obligations under the Three Power Pact (although not under the supplementary treaty between Germany,

Italy and Japan, to which she was not a party), but there were still two possibilities: the one, to break off diplomatic relations with the U.S.A., the other “to go to the maximum and declare that a state of war had come into being between Hungary and the U.S.A.” The latter was perhaps unnecessary, but would Germany be satisfied with the former? No one was very keen on war, even Bartha, who thought that this might be the more paying course, conceding that in view of the disparity between

the strengths of the two countries, it might look ridiculous. KeresztesFischer argued that Japan had undoubtedly been the aggressor, and urged extreme caution; but nobody suggested taking no action at all. Bardossy then proposed a formula, which he described as “elastic and capable of being developed,” whereby Hungary declared her “‘solidarity” with the Axis Powers in the spirit of the Pact. This would involve breaking off diplomatic relations with the U.S.A., but Bardossy hoped that this would be taken as sufficient, particularly if the declaration came quickly, as a spontaneous gesture (his old theory of “giving quickly’). If, however, Germany afterwards insisted on a state of war, ‘“‘that, too, could be deduced from the decision.” The Council accepted the formula, expressing the hope (which Bardossy

certainly shared) that the rupture of diplomatic relations would prove sufficient, but nevertheless agreeing that the wider interpretation could be used if necessary... The Regent, to whom Bardossy reported, concurred. That evening Bardossy informed Mr. Pell of the rupture of relations, and when asked ‘“‘does this mean war?’’ answered unequivocally, “No! He telegraphed in the same sense that evening to Sztdjay (whose message had arrived

in the interval) and Mariassy, explaining what had been done and adding that “‘the Government is convinced that we have thereby satisfied to the maximum anything that can be expected of us.”” Should the Government of the Reich (or Italy) want further explanations, Sztd6jay (Mariassy) was to

explain that by declaring its “solidarity” and by breaking off diplomatic relations, the Government “‘had fulfilled the maximum that could be expected ,

of it.” They were already fulfilling their political and economic obligations | under the Three Power Pact; they could not be expected in practice to give military support against the U.S.A. Hungary could gain nothing, even if the 1 The minutes of this meeting are in Barczy, in two versions, for this is one of the cases in | which Bardossy rewrote Barczy’s original notes (see above, p. 27 n.2). The changes made by him

do not seem to me to bear out Barczy’s accusation of falsification, and my narrative above is based on a combination of the two versions. 2 Ullein, p. 115, “Béla.’’ To the Italian and German Ministers, next day, Bardossy said he had told Mr. Pell that ‘‘for the present this does not mean a state of war.”

CALCULATION GOING WRONG 63 U.S.A. was defeated. Moreover, further action would seriously endanger the interests of the million Hungarians of the U.S.A. He begged Sztdjay urgently “to maintain this point of view, and to use these arguments (for the present) as representing his own personal opinion.”! The German and Italian Ministers in Budapest were asked to put the same argument to their Governments.? The same night Sztdéjay telephoned that Roumania and Bulgaria were declaring war, and the next morning he wired that “‘it is my impression that the German Government, for reasons of high politics, Jays extraordinary stress on Hungary’s proving her solidarity by the further step of, like the Axis States, declaring a state of war to exist with the U.S.A.” Mariassy reported from Rome “that after Ciano had been informed of the contents of the Notes being sent to the U.S.A., he asked whether we had not declared a state of war. And without awaiting my answer, he said that of course I could not

know, but this morning the Italian Government, in conjunction with the German, had approached the Hungarian, Roumanian and other Governments to say that the rupture of diplomatic relations was not enough: the German and Italian Governments wanted a state of war declared. This, Ciano intimated, was being done on German initiative.”’ In fact, the German, Italian and Japanese Ministers had on that morning (12th December) sought out Bardossy and informed him that it was the duty of the Powers adhering

to the Three Power Pact, including Hungary, to make this declaration. Bardossy told them what his Government had decided, and what he had told Mr. Pell, and again argued, amongst other things, the need for considering

the position of the Magyars of America. They agreed to ask for fresh Instructions from their Governments, but warned him emphatically that ;

“higher political interests necessitated an unanimous attitude of the European States’? and there was a danger that all the others might declare the state of war, leaving Hungary isolated with her declaration of “‘solidarity.”’

Bardossy now wired to his Legations in Rome and Berlin that if the. respective Foreign Ministries described the declaration of a state of war as indispensable, and if all signatories of the Pact had declared war, they might,

without awaiting further instructions, give that interpretation to the ‘‘solidarity’” formula. He would not be convening another Ministerial Council. Several officials of his own Foreign Ministry tried to get him to confine himself to breaking off relations, but (although it is not recorded that

a reply had come in in the meantime from Rome or Berlin) he obviously regarded his boats as burnt. He rang up Mr. Pell and informed him that his formula of the previous day had after all meant that a state of war now existed between Hungary and the U.S.A. Mr. Pell, who had throughout shown the greatest possible patience and understanding, made a last effort to get out of Bardossy something that he could use in Hungary’s favour, and said: “‘T suppose you are doing this under heavy pressure from Germany, and that the declaration reflects no hostility on the part of the Hungarian people towards the people of the U.S.A. ?” But far from taking advantage of this opening—although he himself had a week before made a similar distinction between the British Government and the British people—Bardossy answered indignantly: 1 Lajos. 2 Bardossy’s final speech (Sz. I. MS.).

64 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH ‘‘Hungary is a sovereign and independent State and makes this intimation

as such. Her Government and her people are entirely at one.’ Mr. Pell having refused to accept so important a message as this in oral form only, Bardossy had a Note sent over the same evening. For the rest, he had a communication to the same effect issued by the MTI, and wired to Rome and Berlin that the Hungarian Government “‘gladly interpreted its declaration of solidarity as constituting a state of war.’’ It had not at first thought that this would be necessary, ‘‘but was, of course, prepared to draw all the consequences of its solidarity, in the spirit of the Three Power Pact.” To the routine Ministerial Council which was held that evening, he simply reported briefly what he had done; so also to the Regent, whereafter what had happened was announced in a special communiqué.

This time Bardossy did not even make a special announcement to Parliament simultaneously with the event, but simply included the item in his routine report on foreign affairs at the next discussion on the subject, which was held on 16th December. There is no doubt that this time he knew that he was acting unconstitutionally, and did so deliberately, in order to avoid a situation which would have been still more difficult than that of June. The loose-mouthed lackeys of his party would certainly have obeyed his orders in the Lower House, and would probably have unnecessarily offended America by making ridiculous “‘patriotic’’ speeches. On the other hand, he had been warned that the Upper House would refuse to vote a declaration of war,’ thus bringing about a crisis of the first magnitude when either the Lower House would have somehow to impose its will on the other Chamber, or Germany would have to be told that Hungary refused to obey

. her wish—a prospect which few people felt inclined to face. By thus imposing a fait accompli on Parliament, Bardossy was able at once to carry through the policy which he personally felt to be inescapable, and also to createa situation in which, given a sufficient measure of bad faith on the one side, and goodwill on the other, it was possible to argue that the whole thing was

his personal doing, and the sole responsibility his. He helped himself through the constitutional difficulty that a declaration of war had to be approved by Parliament and signed by the Regent, by never, in any of his communications, saying that Hungary “‘declared war”’ (hadat tizent) but only

that she regarded, or registered the fact, that she was in a state of war (hadiallapotban levOnek tekinti magat). He seems really to have regarded this as a milder action and got the Budapest Professor of International Law, Professor B6lény, to write a memorandum explaining this, for Mr. Pell to take with him; which Boélony did, although according to his own evidence at Bardossy’s trial, he could not see the difference.* Actually, the U.S.A. did not, even now, declare war on Hungary, nor on

any of the satellites; it was not until after Bardossy’s fall that it took the action described below.” The Hungarian Government, however, ignored in 1 These exchanges were given in slightly different forms in the indictment against Bardossy, in evidence at the trial, in the Barczy MS. and by Ullein. The differences are, however, not

material. 2 L. Baranyai to C. A. M. 3 The Regent actually told Mr. Travers, the American First Secretary, at the time: ‘‘Remember that this so-called declaration of war is not legal: not approved by Parliament nor signed by me”’ (Montgomery, op. cit., p. 153). He had, however, certainly not vetoed Bardossy’s formula, nor did the procedure prevent the House from cheering Bardossy’s announcement enthusiastically. 4 Bardossy Trial, p. 37. 5 See below, p. 94.

CALCULATION GOING WRONG 65 its turn this ignoring of its own act, and treated itself as officially at war with the U.S.A., as well as Great Britain, drawing through its inspired Press the full logical conclusions of the situation. So (to quote one utterance of many) M. Svatko, writing in the Christmas

number of Magyarorszdg, argued that there was no changing Hungary’s course now. The fall of Germany and Italy would mean “‘the tragic fall of Hungary—a defeat more fatal from the national point of view than that of - Trianon.... We know Bene’S’ and Stalin’s ideas, we know what awaits us.... If we are defeated, there are only two possibilities: either a resuscitation of Liitle Entente aggression, much greater, much more frightful than before. . .

or Bolshevism. ... England and America are bound, as things stand, to back Benes against us. There is no changing this—no recriminations, false optimism or self-deception can help.... If Germany does not win, we fall with her, and perhaps deeper than she, as we are weaker than she is.”

But the argument was not popular. When America entered the war, Hungarian public opinion began, for the first time since May 1940, seriously to envisage the possibility of defeat for Hungary and her allies, and logical as M. Svatko’s conclusions were, many people preferred to cling to a hope that

it might be possible, on the contrary, somehow to wriggle out through a loophole in the Western wall, even if this meant repudiating Bardossy and his circle. In any case, the enthusiasm for the war fell with a bump. And just at that moment, the Hungarians received a pressing invitation to take the war more seriously.

On 19th December Hitler took over command of the German Army, dismissing Brauchitsch and Rundstedt. At once reports went round that a serious effort was going to be made to wind up the war in the East before the West could develop its full war potential, and that the satellites, all of whom had practically retired from active participation,! were to be invited to pull their weight. The rumours were soon confirmed. When in Berlin Bardossy had invited Ribbentrop, in the Regent’s name, to come to Hungary

“for a shoot.’ Ribbentrop had had to put off acceptance in view of the political situation, but on 4th January Hitler wrote Horthy a letter of which, and of Horthy’s reply, it is known only that the letter contained, in substance, a request for more active participation in the war, and that the answer was

“essentially negative.”* Then, on the 6th, Ribbentrop came to Hungary

after all. He spent two days in the country, with Horthy, and two in Budapest.*

In talking to Horthy, Ribbentrop seems to have confined himself pretty much to generalities; indeed, the Regent could not afterwards remember having talked politics with his guest at all, only having shot a great number of pheasants. To Kallay, who to his own great surprise had been invited to

be of the party, he put the question whether Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria between them could raise a million men, to which Kallay replied, discouragingly, that the Bulgarians could not be got to fight against Russia 1 By this time Roumania also had withdrawn most of her troops. She probably had then about 75,000 men east of Transnistria, nearly all of them in the Crimea. Her casualties—a total of perhaps 200,000, including 80,000 dead—had been much heavier than Hungary’s. 2 Sztdjay had reported in September that Ribbentrop would be “‘very much flattered” by such an invitation (Sz. I. MS.). 3 Sz. I. MS. 4 For this visit there are fairly full accounts in Barczy, the Sz. I. MS. and “‘Béla.”? Iam also indebted for certain details to Horthy and to Kallay. E

66 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH at all. The Roumanians would fight well until they had gained their national objectives, but not thereafter. The Hungarians would fight well in advance, but not inretreat. Anyway, Hungary was deficient in trained men and equipment. Ribbentrop answered that the troops would be needed only for service on the lines of communication. Ribbentrop was more explicit to Bardossy, with whom he had four long

conversations. He was at his most unpleasant. He asked for complete mobilisation of the whole Hungarian Army—twenty-eight divisions on the German scale. It would be cheaper in the long run to make one big effort which would finish the war off quickly, than to trickle in reinforcements little by little. When Bardossy demurred, pleading Hungary’s difficult situation and her undefended frontiers, Ribbentrop replied that if Hungary refused, Roumania would say that Hungary was keeping back her troops in order to march into Southern Transylvania when it was undefended, and would in

her turn refuse to mobilise. On the other hand, Roumania had promised 100 per cent. mobilisation if Hungary would do the same. It was therefore essential for Hungary to do her share. The fate of Europe was in the balance. Ribbentrop also indicated, openly enough, that the satisfaction for which Hungary might look for her territorial claims, especially in the Banat, might depend on her answer to this appeal. If this were negative, the Hungarians

“could not, knowing Hitler’s dignified but passionate nature, know what

might be the result of their decision. ... It was possible that in such circumstances the Fiihrer might renounce Hungary’s help altogether . . . and carry out all the operations himself.... Ribbentrop would not conceal what an effect such a decision—the complete exclusion of the Hungarians from the war against the Soviets—would have on all German public opinion—in the Party and in the Government of the Reich. The Hungarians would have to take the consequences.”’

It might have been thought that the Hungarians would jump at this chance of getting out of their ill-fated military adventure; but the threat of ‘““consequences”’ terrified them, and they attached extreme importance, at that time, to having a token force in the field; they still assumed an Axis victory and presumably still reckoned that if technically belligerent they would

be treated with consideration at the Peace Conference, but not otherwise.’ In any case, Bardossy gave a reluctant half-promise that he would see what he could do. He also made another concession: he promised that the entire bread-grain surplus from the Bacska should, for the duration of the war, go to Germany and Italy in the proportions of 60-40.2. Ribbentrop went away

partially appeased, and promising to send Keitel to make concrete and detailed arrangements. The next episode—a flying visit from Ciano, who was in Budapest from 15th to 18th January—can be passed over with the note that nothing of any 1 According to one source (Michaelis, who had it from Bardossy), Ribbentrop especially wanted smashing early victories in order to induce Japan to declare war on Russia. 2 When Bardossy circularised missions on the results of his autumn negotiations, he pointed out that by sending some occupation troops, Hungary “would still be participating in the military effort’”’ (Sz. I. MS.).

3 The Germans had originally asked for the Bacska to be kept, economically, as a separate unit under German management (Kallay MS.). Bardossy refused this, so that the arrangement described was not entirely a concession but partly a compromise. In any case, according to Kallay, the Hungarians ingeniously and successfully sabotaged it throughout the war, habitually smuggling the harvest up into Inner Hungary and then inviting the Germans to come and see for themselves that there was nothing to export. Note 1 on the next page shows that the Italians, too, got little out of it.

CALCULATION GOING WRONG 67 significance was even discussed, much less settled. on it.) Then, on the 20th. Keitel arrived, with a considerable staff of experts.” He was met by the combined forces of the Hungarian General Staff, who had been called together as soon as Ribbentrop left to discuss what, if any-

thing. should be done. Sztdjay had wired from Berlin that the future of Transylvania depended on Hungary’s reply to the appeal. and no one thought of refusing altogether: the Regent himself. as he told Ciano afterwards,’ was

prepared “‘to intensify his participation in the field”: all the Hungarians concerned considered the defeat of Bolshevism to be in Hungary's interest, but they had no intention of giving much, certainly not the whole army. nor even half of it. The reasons which Horthv gave to Ciano were. firstly, shortage of man-power—a large-scale call-up would disrupt the national economy—and secondly, that if Hungary sent her troops out of the country, the Roumanians would attack her.* They first offered three brigades of two regiments each. This offer. when put before the Germans, was extremely ill received; the

more so when Szombathely1 produced a draft agreement which said that Hungary would give the troops enumerated, but only “‘on condition that they were as well equipped as the German.” “‘Wer spricht hier von Bedingungen?”’

cried the German Staff officer. Germany would give what she could, but there was no question of “conditions.” When asked what they wanted, they at first asked for total mobilisation and total participation: viz. fifteen ordinary fighting divisions, the Mobile Corps and seven occupying divisions.” But they themselves admitted that this demand was impracticable when they learned how weak the Hungarian equipment was.° Finally, agreement was reached that Hungary was to send out, besides the seven occupation divisions.‘ nine “‘light divisions,’ as the brigades were now renamed (the equivalent of six German divisions)* and one motorised corps, with corps and army troops.

These were to be accompanied by the appropriate auxiliary troops. so that 1 Many rumours, of course. circulated about this visit, particularly that the Germans had sent

Ciano to put the screw on the Hungarians. or, alternatively, that the Hungarians had sent for him to defend them against the Germans: further, that the Croatian question was discussed. But Ciano’s own account (Papers, pp. 477-80) records little except impressions and a request for

§00,000 quintals of grain. According to Ciano (Diary, Sth Apml 1942). Hungary promised one-third of this, but Mussolini did not want to take it, describing it as a ““mere pittance.*” The Regent's recollection was that Ciano (whom he disliked strongly) simply came “to have himself

féted’’ and to shoot, which he did very badlv (Ciano admits that he had a poor bag, but says that Ribbentrop had killed off all the big game). 2 For this: the usual sources, plus Press reporis of the trial of Szombathelvi. and reminiscences from two private military sources. There are minor discrepancies between the various accounts, but in substance they agree.

84 ThisCiano Papers, pp. 477-8. . seems to have been a genuine fear. When, later, Kallay announced that an army

was going to the front, he added pointedly that enough men were remaining behind to guard the frontiers.

5 At the trial of Szombathelyi it was stated that Keitel, when asked at lunch what he really

wanted, wrote this down on a sheet of paper. .

6 According to Barezy, Ribbentrop himself had admitted this. Thus Keitel’s scribble must have been perpetrated in a fit of temper. 7 That is, seven in all, an addition of two to the force already there. $ The Hungarian ‘“‘dandar,” consisting as it did of two three-battalion regiments, was only two-thirds of the strength of a German division, which consisted of three three-battalion regiments. Many Hungarian writers have since complained bitterly that the device of rebaptising the brigades ‘“‘light divisions’ involved them in fresh misfortunes, since the German High Command, in making its calculations, reckoned any division as being of the same strength and allotted duties accordingly. Whether the hard-bitten German Staff was thus misled, or deceived, as others proudly boast. into thinking that they had got 50 per cent. more than they did, may be doubted.

68 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH the total strength of the forces destined for the first line would be about 200,000 men,! and of the occupation divisions another 40,000-50,000. This number was to be kept up by the replacement of casualties, but not increased. At Horthy’s special request, the force was to form a single unit under Hungarian command. Since it was well beyond the Hungarians’ power to equip even this modest

force out of their own resources, even by scraping the depots of all the twenty-six divisions” clean, the Germans consented to make up the deficiency, including the complete material for the armoured division; although saying

that this could not be handed over until the troops were east of the Carpathians. The Hungarian Army renounced its right to booty of war, and to prisoners.

It was to supply itself, and to pay the Germans for any supplies locally acquired from them.

The internal organisation of the force was left to the Hungarians’ discretion, and it will be convenient to describe here what were the arrangements made, although these were, of course, not completed until some time later. The force, which was called the Second Army, was made up of three corps, each composed of three light divisions and divisional troops, and of army troops, under which heading the Mobile Division was included. The corps selected to go out were the IIIrd (Szombathely), [Vth (Pécs) and VIIth (Miskolcz), but in order “‘to spread the sacrifice evenly’’ these were made up

of units from all parts of the country, except that the Vth (Szeged) VIth (Debrecen) and perhaps [Xth (Kolozsvar) Corps areas were left untapped, in order to leave a force on the Roumanian frontier. It appears that the authorities included a somewhat although not very disproportionately high number of such non-Magyar “‘nationalities” as could be expected to fight at all.t Those nationalities which were considered to be politically unreliable, or whose “‘level of education was so low that they were not worth training, especially if they did not speak Magyar’’ (this excuse was alleged especially in the case of the Roumanians, although the Ruthenes were called up freely), were drafted into the auxiliary Labour Formations, the bulk of which were, however, composed of Jews.° Under a special arrangement,

concluded on Ist February, Volksdeutsche called up were to be given the choice of entering the Hungarian forces, or the Wehrmacht or Waffen SS. 1 The Tombor MS. gives 204,000 for the strength of the II Army, and 44,000 for the occupation troops. 2 The IX Corps, formed at Kolozsvar in the previous summer, had as yet only two divisions. > There have been many versions of this agreement, but the one given above seems to be the most probable one. I have not been able to confirm from other sources Ullein’s story (op. cit.,

p. 129) that the Germans went back on any promise at the last moment, but they may have found themselves unable to produce certain promised articles. They were short themselves; Keitel admitted that they had miscalculated in 1941, reckoning that the Russians would be crushed

by the end of September, and as early as July had turned over their war industry to making material needed for the campaign against England. Now they were having to re-adapt their plants. The Tombor MS. writes that the Hungarians’ renunciation of captured material, their undertaking to supply themselves, etc., was their own wish: they made these renunciations ‘“‘for the sake of military and political independence” and ‘“‘the forms of the agreement partly expressed

their désintéressement.”’ Had they been willing to co-operate as fully as the Roumanians, they could have received the same supplies from Germany. 4 Hungarian writers such as Tombor admit that the nationalities were called up in excessive numbers, but they put the proportion at only 20 per cent., which was only a little in excess of justice.

5 According to Fekete Kényyv, p. 272, 37,200 persons were serving in the Labour Battalions in the summer, most of these being Jews. A few were members of ‘““Communist-Socialist penal formations.”’

CALCULATION GOING WRONG 69 A mixed German-Hungarian Commission was to preside over the operation and ensure that the freedom of choice was real. The calling-up notices, which in general applied to men between the ages

of 19 and 30, went out on 24th February. It was then calculated that the troops would require five weeks’ training in their new weapons before they could go out. It may be remarked in passing that even this sacrifice on Hungary’s part did not secure for her the restoration of the Banat. A report by Sztdjay in February indicated that a decision to that effect had at last been reached, but

in April came another report that the Germans meant to divide the area, giving a small part in the north to Hungary and the rest to Roumania.! But

this, too, remained unhonoured. ‘ |

The military conversations with the Germans were actually still in progress when a ghastly event occurred in the Bacska.

Here, as we said, the fires had died down after the big round-up in September, but by the second half of November they were flickering up again. Patrolling Hungarian gendarmes and, above all, river guards were fired on, in some cases with fatal results; some trains were derailed and outlying farms burnt.

Most of these outrages occurred near the frontiers, the worst centre of disturbance being the so-called Sajkas area—the triangle formed by the confluence of the Danube and the Tisza—while the secondary foci were mostly dotted along the right bank of the Tisza. It was fairly obvious that although elements among the local population were acting as accomplices, sheltering and helping the perpetrators of the outrages, the perpetrators themselves were nearly always men who infiltrated across the river frontiers

and returned to their bases when their work was done. The evidence of those of them who fell, alive or dead, into Hungarian hands showed all of them to have been Serbs, but a point of peculiar interest was that their chief

bases seemed to be not in Croat-controlled Syrmia but in the Germancontrolled Banat; moreover, the arms found on them were nearly always of

German origin. On the strength of this and other circumstances, reports were circulating, even as early as this date, that the trouble was being deliberately fomented by the Germans to prevent the Hungarians and Serbs

from “‘getting too friendly,” or, alternatively, in order to induce the Hungarians to occupy Serbia; and while it would clearly be absurd to suggest

that but for the Germans there would never have been any trouble in the Bacska, there does, in this particular case, appear to be considerable evidence that certain German circles played a very sinister part behind the scenes in the tragedy which was now opening.” 1 $z. I. MS. 2 According to Suhaj, reports in the form given above reached him as early as November, the source of them being an official in Ujvidék. Later, the Germans’ guilt became an article of faith among Hungarians; Kallay, for example, writes that he is ‘“‘sure”’ of it (op. cit., p. 110). It must be pointed out that neither of the circumstances quoted above is conclusive, for the Tisza is a much easier river to cross than the Danube, and the German arms need not have been acquired with their owners’ consent. Moreover, Kallay quotes no evidence in support of his assertion, although he had ordered an exhaustive enquiry into the whole incident; nor, so far as the records show, did any of the criminals tried for the massacres allege that they had been acting on orders, or even under encouragement, from Germany. On the other hand, the quite extraordinary protection and patronage subsequently extended by the Germans to the main criminals (see below, pp. 202, 254, 267) is hardly to be explained by the fact that all of them were, as it happened, of Volksdeutsch origin, and amounted, at the very least, to an ostentatious retrospective endorsement of the crime.

70 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH The Hungarian authorities took severe measures against any of these partisans whom they caught (and they caught a considerable number),! but

without stopping the outrages, which went on sporadically throughout December (in the course of which month, it may be noted, the formal reannexation of the area was proclaimed).? Then, early in January, things began to work up to a climax. According to one version? the outbreak of the worst tragedy was in part

the outcome of good intentions. The commander of a certain internment camp at Zsablya, containing 700 prisoners, had released them out of humanity when the very cold weather set in, since the quarters were so defective that some of the prisoners had frozen to death. Some of the men, instead of going

home, dug up a store of hidden arms, collected reinforcements of other fugitives from the authorities, returned to the camp and attacked their former guards. Other stories simply have it that conditions grew steadily worse in and around the village of Zsablya, which was obviously full of partisans who

were living sheltered by the inhabitants. The local authorities decided to “smoke the nest out,” and a detachment of gendarmes, with a machine-gun section of Frontier Guards, began a house-to-house search of the farms in the

, district. They were met with rifle fire from one farm, and something like a pitched battle took place in which six gendarmes were killed. This was on 4th January. As the situation seemed beyond his powers to tackle, the local gendarmerie commander, a certain Col. Foti, appealed for help to his official superior, the

Foispan of Bacs-Bodrog County, a man called Fernbach. He in his turn telephoned to Keresztes-Fischer, who was responsible for the gendarmerie. Having been told that the gendarmerie could not cope with the situation,

Keresztes-Fischer asked for authorisation to employ military. This was

granted by the Ministerial Council and approved by the Regent, and Szombathelyi passed on the order to the senior military officer in the neighbourhood, General Feketehalmi-Czeydner, commanding the Szeged Corps.

Unhappily Feketehalmi-Czeydner was both close with the Germans (he was himself, as his name shows, of Swabian origin) and a brute of the first order. He seems to have believed that a display of the iron hand would be a good thing in itself and would also be of service both to his country and to Germany: repression of the disorder, once and for all, would free German troops for the Russian campaign and would also so favourably impress the Germans that they would hand the Banat over to the Hungarians. With the 1 According to the presiding judge at the trial of Bardossy, the court at Ujvidék passed 323 sentences of death on Serb partisans between 24th November 1941 and the middle of February 1942. This appears to have been exclusive of the persons shot in fighting, or in the massacres to be described.

2 This took place as soon as Hungary was at war with Great Britain and the U.S.A. The Act was passed by the Lower House on 16th December and by the Upper House the next day, and promulgated immediately. 3 This version is given in Szig. Biz., p. 469, where it is said to have been that submitted to the Regent by G. Szullo in a memorandum on 29th January. Here the gendarmerie’s casualties are put at 36 dead and 60 wounded, but Kallay in Parliament put the figures much lower

° att these various motives were stated at the trial of Czeydner, either by himself or by witnesses. He himself said, according to a Press report (Szabadsdg, 26th October 1946), that he

sent his reports on the situation to ‘“Szombathelyi, Horthy and Keitel,” also that when the operation was over, he reported that “‘sedition had been stamped out for at least a year to come, and now the units of the Vth (Szeged) Corps could be sent out to the Eastern Front.’’ Lévai’s

: CALCULATION GOING WRONG 71 military conversations impending, the moment was particularly favourable for such a demonstration. He sent down three battalions of infantry, under a certain Col. Deak. In the meantime, order had been restored in Zsablya, where half a dozen partisans had been executed. But Deak reported back that “‘a regular pitched battle had taken place,” and Foti confirmed the widespread character of the unrest. Czeydner decided “‘to make an example,’ beginning in Zsablya. He reinforced his troops by arming “home guards”’ of the local Magyars,! commanded by gendarmerie officers, and these carried out a series of massacres. In Zsablya itself an unknown number of persons were killed*; on Czeydner’s own admission, these included women and children ‘‘because they had supported the partisans.’® Their bodies were thrown into the Tisza. The avengers then moved up and down the Tisza. In Csurog, a still larger blood-bath took place; at the trial of the criminals the number of victims was placed at 1,800, of whom 150 were shut up together

in a barn and mown down.* Executions on a somewhat smaller scale took place also in Mosorin, Gyurgyevo, O-Becse and Titel.® On 12th January Czeydner reported that it would be necessary to extend the ““purge”’ to the whole area, including the local centre, Ujvidék, in which, it is probable, some of the partisans had in fact taken refuge. He applied for authority. Bartha reported to the Ministerial Council that “defensive measures’ were necessary, and the Council authorised the extension of the “purge” to Ujvidek, while stipulating that no “superfluous” or “exaggerated”

measures should be taken.® On the 17th, meanwhile, a fuller account of what had been happening on the Tisza seems to have reached Budapest, brought by a Smallholder Deputy

named Rupert, who passed it to Bajcsy-Zsilinszky and then, on the 19th, went with him to Bardossy, whom Zsilinszky adjured to stop the atrocities. Bardossy told him that he had already given orders that there were to be no atrocities; but he sent down a further message. Going, however, as this did to the civilian authorities, it was both superfluous and useless. A detachment of troops under a Major Grassy, and a body of gendarmerie reinforced by a contingent sent down from Szekszard under an officer called Zéldi, entered Ujvidék on the afternoon of Tuesday, 20th January. A cordon was thrown round the town and telegraphic and telephonic communications cut. Then Czeydner arrived. At 7 p.m. he called the authorities together and

told them that the matter was now out of the hands of the civilians: the military were taking charge for three days “‘to clean up.’ The commanders of the local gendarmerie and police’ were called in, and Czeydner warned Black Book (p. 25) also speaks of *‘a confidential memorandum issued at the time’ in which the High Command “hinted” that, as the partisans were filtering in from German-occupied territory, it would be better for those areas to be placed under Hungarian control.

* In 1945 Tito razed Zsablya to the ground in revenge for this. It was a Magyar-Serb ears Bajcsy-Zsilinszky’s memorandum the number of victims at Zsablya alone was put at 1,400, but there seems reason to believe that many of his figures were exaggerated. * Czeydner himself admitted at his trial that there was talk of killing the children “lest they took revenge when they grew up.” 4 Bajcsy-Zsilinszky’s figure here is 3,000. 5 Kallay afterwards gave the figure of Serb victims in O-Becse at 89 and in Titel at 50. He

swore to the accuracy of the figure, which, however, does not include non-Serbs. Most of the local Jews seem to have perished. § Bardossy admitted at his trial that he knew of the ‘‘Zsablya affair’? before authorising the extension of the operations to Ujvidék. It was, however, not proved that his knowledge extended to the details of the repressive measures. * A Colonel Gaal and an officer named Tabian.

72 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH them against “the danger of using arms too late.”” No weakness was to be shown. Placards were posted up saying that no one was to go into the streets, except to buy food. The next day, 21st January, at 8 a.m, the “‘razzia’’ began,

the town having been divided for the purpose into eight sectors. On that

day relative order was kept. About 6,000-7,000 persons regarded as suspicious were taken to a central H.Q., where their papers were examined. Most of them were let go, but about 40 or 50 were detained, and of these 15, as it afterwards transpired, were taken to the bank of the Danube, shot and their bodies thrown into the Danube.” On Thursday, 22nd January, the searches went on, but now it had been decided to take hostages, and not only suspected partisans were arrested but a large number of the wealthier citizens of the town were also taken into

custody. Most of these were Jews—a fact which contributed to the zest with which the butchers afterwards carried out their work. The versions differ on when the actual massacres took place: some accounts at the trial put the change as occurring on this day, while Kallay, in Parliament, said that the conduct of the troops was still relatively orderly until the 23rd— orderly in the sense that, while suspected partisans were being executed after only the most summary examination, hostages were not yet being massacred. But even this measure of order was not maintained. There had been a little

resistance. Shots were fired from some houses, and here and there, in the streets, and in one place a hand grenade was thrown.* The gendarmes, who had been excited by issues of rum, replied with indiscriminate fire. But what was much worse was the wholesale execution of hostages which Czeydner ordered in reprisal for the shots fired on the troops. This began either on the evening of the 22nd or the morning of the 23rd. It was carried through with unbelievable brutality. The victims were taken to the swimming-baths on the Danube, and shotin batches. They were then stripped and their valuables

taken from them. The naked bodies, some of them mutilated, were found when the ice melted, weeks later. On the afternoon of the 23rd the Foispan of the city, a man called Deak,’ succeeded in making his way out through the cordon and walked on foot to

a place whence he could telephone to Budapest. He brought back orders that the shooting was to stop instantly; and at 7 p.m. Czeydner had a notice placarded up that “‘at the request of the Féispan, he had ordered military measures to cease as from 9 p.m. He had decided to do so only with great reluctance. If any harm whatever happened to any soldier, the culprit, if identified, would be executed out of hand; if not, reprisals would be taken against 20 citizens of Ujvidék.”’ So the “‘purge’’ ended.” It is difficult to state the number of victims quite

exactly, but the total number of persons massacred during the whole series 1 Ample evidence to this effect was given at the trials of the main perpetrators, although Zoldi blamed Grassy, and Grassy, Czeydner, for the order. * One of the defendants at the trial put the number of dead on the first day at 50, but the lower figure seems better authenticated. 3 No Hungarian soldier or gendarme was, however, killed in Ujvidék, but several were wounded.

4 Deak, a most moderate man and a good friend to the Serbs, was shot by Tito’s men in 1945 by mistake for the other Deak. 6 According to some versions, the “‘cleaning up” of some villages, including Szent Tamés and O-Becse, went on up to 29th January; and the Court of Ujvidék seems to have been trying cases of offenders up to mid-February.

CALCULATION GOING WRONG 73 seems to have been about 3,300, of whom about 2,550 were Serbs, about 700

Jews, and the rest Magyars, Germans, Slovaks or Russians.1 Many were women, children or old persons.’ What had happened seems first to have been revealed to the outer world when corpses were carried down the Danube and the Tisza to Belgrade. Soon refugees brought details, and the story was announced—with some inevitable inaccuracy of detail—by foreign wireless stations. The Hungarian Press Bureau chose to pick on the mistakes of detail, and by denying those to try to give the impression that there was nothing in the story at all—doing this with an air of injured self-righteousness which was something more than sickening. Naturally, the world knew that these denials were lies in the larger

sense, and the massacres were utilised—in some quarters with a glee as disgusting as anything in the whole story—for the most violent attacks on Bardossy’s Government. Hardly any action perpetrated within her frontiers before 1944 harmed Hungary so deeply as the Ujvidék massacre. But the effect in Hungary itself was devastating also. The news was first brought to Budapest by refugees who fled to the capital as soon as the cordon round Ujvidék was lifted. Ninety-five per cent. of the population of Hungary was genuinely horrified. It appears that both Bajcsy-Zsilinszky and Rassay went to Bardossy to demand enquiry and punishment of the guilty. On the

29th the question was raised in the Foreign Affairs Committees of both Houses of Parliament, in the Upper by Janos Zichy and in the Lower by Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, who, incidentally, was violently abused as he spoke by ‘“‘the entire extreme Right, from Jurcsek to Matolcsy, for impugning the honour of the army.’”®

On this occasion Bardossy, who was possibly still ill-informed on the question, took the side of the military and said that their honour ought not to be impugned. He would, however, make enquiries, and if any excesses had taken place, the perpetrators should be punished. Szombathelyi and he sent for Czeydner, who ‘‘denied everything.’’* No irregularity had been committed; he would “know how to deal with slanderers.’’” Szombathelyi believed him,® and Bardossy was left in a position which was more difficult than a West European can easily appreciate. He had come up against the conventions of the k. und k. army, and these were stronger than he. However humane Szombathelyi, Bartha and their colleagues may have been—and there

exist no grounds whatever to attribute to any of them sadism or sympathy with atrocities—they were solid in their professional objection to any attack on an officer by a civilian and even unable to believe that an allegation by a 1 There was in Ujvidék a small colony of Russian survivors from the Wrangel army. 2 The figures were most variously given; some accounts (e.g. that given later by Kallay in Parliament) mentioned only the Serbs, passing over the non-Serb victims; others (e.g. that put out by the Yugoslav radio from London) counted all victims, whatever their nationality, as Serbs.

Some took the total figure of victims as representing that for Ujvidék alone, and so on. It seems that in fact the total number of civilian victims of the “pacification” was as given above.

In Ujvidék itself, 879 persons were massacred, these including 292 Serbs and 550 Jews, 13 Russians

and 11 Magyars. In O-Becse, 89 Serbs perished, and in Titel, 50. 144 of the victims were children, 294 aged persons, and many women. It is not clear whether the 323 Serbs executed by court-martial should be included in this figure or not. 3 Szig. Biz., p. 467.

4 Bardossy Trial, p. 28,

5 Szombathelyi admitted at his trial that he took Czeydner’s word, as he had never had reason to suppose him to be anything but a normal, “‘correct’’ officer. ‘‘We called Czeydner up,” he said, ‘‘and he denied everything. I could not believe that a senior General could give false information.” He sent for the confidential official record, but this again had been falsified: the massacre had been represented as a “‘military action”’ (Trial, p. 42).

74 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH civilian against an officer’s conduct could possibly be justified by the facts. The ‘‘solidarity” extended at least as far as the Regent’s military Chancery, if not to the Regent himself.1 Horthy had received two memoranda, one from Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, the other from Sziill6, each insisting on the need for an

enquiry, but he, too, was unwilling to let civilians interfere. Finally the Provost Martial General, a certain Babos, was sent down. Babos, who was a secret member of the Arrow Cross Party,” was not the man to take a Jew’s side against an officer. He and Czeydner together compiled a short report which appears simply to have consisted of statistics of persons executed as “partisans.” Bardossy, who on his own admission did not want the matter brought before Parliament, said at his trial that “‘he got the impression that secret forces were at work preventing the enquiry,” and thought of resigning; but it would have been almost impossible for him to resign at that particular

juncture when other affairs were before Parliament which demanded continuity of treatment.

It will be remembered that one reason why Szalasi refused to promise Albrecht his party’s support for the Archduke’s candidature for the Regency was that the question was not opportune, since the Regent, Horthy, was in excellent health. Butin November Horthy fell ill so seriously that the doctors at one time despaired of his life. He made a marvellous recovery, and was back at his post by the end of December little the worse. His illness, however, had reminded him of his mortality and had given new urgency to the question of his succession. The arrangements made (in 1937) for the succession have already been

described. The Regent had exercised his right of nominating three successors, and it was understood when he first did so, that the names which

he had enclosed in the three sealed envelopes were those of the Minister : President of the day (Daranyi) and two of his predecessors (Gyula Karolyi and Bethlen). To offer the nation a choice between three of the men who had in their day filled the most important post in it, under the Regent himself,

was a discreet and unexceptionable device; but by 1942 it was hardly

practicable any more. Daranyi was dead; so was Teleki. The other surviving ex-Minister Presidents,* Maurice Esterhazy and Gyula Karolyi, were almost as old as the Regent himself. Bethlen was only a few years

younger and had made himself so unpopular with the Germans as to make his election a practical impossibility. There remained only Bardossy himself and Imrédy, whom the Regent would in no circumstances have nominated.

In any case, Parliament was not bound to accept the Regent’s choice; and the Archduke Albrecht’s ambitions were now common knowledge. In these circumstances, the idea of making the Regent’s elder son, Istvan Horthy, his successor, came into the picture. 1 At his trial Czeydner said that he had received a letter signed by L. Keresztes-Fischer (then head of Horthy’s military Chancery) in Horthy’s name, saying that he was being strongly attacked in Jewish circles but that no harm should come to him, because he was a good soldier and a good

patriot. It was not, however, stated when this alleged letter was written. 2 An interesting passage in Szalasi’s Diary reveals that the Arrow Cross once blackmailed Babos into acquitting an Arrow Cross officer accused of irregularities by threatening to publish his membership ticket. 3 See above, I, pp. 189-90. 4 Strictly speaking, two more ex-Minister Presidents were alive and in Hungary: Huszar and Friedrich, but neither was a serious candidate for the Regency.

CALCULATION GOING WRONG 75 In a sense, the idea had always been an obvious one, if only by virtue of historic precedent: few persons placed by history in a position like Horthy’s

had been unable to resist at least dallying with the thought of founding a dynasty. The circles who dined out on anti-Horthyism had made it one of their habitual accusations against him that he, too, entertained such an

ambition. Actually, he was far too correct and scrupulous to take any initiative in this direction, but there were certainly persons in his entourage who did not see the objections to the course so emphatically as he did, and if they did not directly suggest that Istvan should be put forward as candidate for the Crown, at least they saw no objection to his succeeding his father as Regent.

Nor was the idea extravagant. Istvan Horthy had hitherto played only a minor part in public affairs, nor was he credited with any ambition to do more, but he was really a man of great ability, besides very exceptional charm. Even those who judged his capacities somewhat lower than his father did— doubting his ability for sustained and serious application to affairs—saw in him the one great quality which was so appreciated in his father, that he was ‘(100 per cent. Hungarian.” And when the Regent’s illness suddenly made the question actuel, a very considerable party among the influential men at the heart of things decided that Istvan Horthy would after all be the most suitable successor to his father. Difficult as it is to write apodictically on a subject always treated as one of the most extreme delicacy, it does appear as though Horthy, who adored his son, had the highest opinion of his abilities, and would have thought it the most natural thing in the world if the Hungarian people had chosen him by acclamation to be their Regent, had embraced this idea very eagerly, and report had it that he had listened sympathetically to proposals put forward by its sponsors for assuring its success: these ranging from his own abdication during his lifetime in his son’s favour to the reduction of the names in the envelopes to the single one of his son; or finally, the enactment of special legislation conferring on Istvan the jus successionis. When, however, the proposal was discreetly mooted, it soon became clear that there would be considerable opposition to it; and even some of those most favourable to it in principle doubted whether too naked a dynastic policy might not defeat its own ends. Thus the idea arose’ of circumventing that awkwardness by creating, in the Regent’s lifetime, the new position of Deputy Regent, the holder of which would take off the Regent’s shoulders some of the work which, it was said, his advancing years made burdensome to him. In theory this would not affect the question of succession, which would not be mentioned in the Bill at all; but in practice it was meant to determine it, for it would be easy and natural for Parliament to promote the Deputy Regent to the Regency when the time came without further formality. It was, indeed, perfectly obvious that the whole purpose of the manceuvre was not to provide a Deputy, for which there was in fact no need whatever, but to secure the succession of Istvan; for it was an integral part of the whole scheme that Istvan was to be the appointed Deputy. Horthy was by now so anxious to secure his son’s succession, and so firmly convinced that this was the nation’s wish as well as its interest, that he 1 According to one strongly supported version, the suggestion emanated from Cardinal Serédi, who put it forward after securing the support of Bethlen, G. Karolyi, M. Esterhazy and others.

76 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH regarded even this as rather a defeat than a success!; but more could not be achieved, and the Bill was drafted in this non-committal form at the end of January. It began by laying down the functions of the Deputy Regent, these including acting for the Regent while the office of Regent was vacant until the new Regent had taken the oath. He was to bear the title Foméltdosagu (Sérénissime), hitherto confined to the Regent. The second part of the Bull defined the procedure for election. The Regent was authorised to nominate a maximum of three candidates, one of whom it was the duty of the two Houses, meeting in joint session, to elect. Should the Regent choose not to exercise his right, a candidate or candidates might be put forward by Parliament; but for a candidacy to be valid, it had to be supported by the signatures of 150 members of either House. If the will of Parliament was obvious, it might be expressed by the old Hungarian method of acclamation, without

registration of votes. .

The whole affair had blown up very suddenly. The idea was probably only broached late in December. When Ciano visited Budapest, the city was humming with it: Ribbentrop had, of course, heard of it and did not appear enthusiastic; but as he said nothing against it, rumour had it that Germany would not oppose the plan.* The MEP, the Transylvanians and the Christian Party were prepared to

accept the Bill; so was the Left-wing Opposition. The Archduke and his supporters were furious—Ruszkay came to Szalasi to enlist his help, armed with a bundle of excessively scurrilous reports on Istvan Horthy’s character and conduct.? Szalasi was unsympathetic. He had his own, quite individual objections to having a successor to the Regent (for he saw that this was what the Bill meant) elected at all: firstly, that the present provisional position ought not to go on indefinitely, but when Miklos Horthy died, definitive powers should be given to the Head of the State.* Secondly, the existing Parliament, being unrepresentative, was not entitled to pass a measure of such constitutional importance. Before any such measure was adopted, free, secret elections should be held. But he had met young Horthy, and liked him (a couple of passing allusions in his Diary show that he even entertained hopes of winning over Istvan to his own cause, and through him realising his plan of “‘carrying out the transformation with the Head of the State’’), and was not prepared to launch a personal campaign against him (he also pointed out, with his own maddening logic, that the Bill did not mention 1 There is fairly strong, although admittedly second-hand, evidence for this. Horthy himself told Kallay that there was no point whatever in the institution of a Deputy Regency, since he was perfectly capable of performing his duties. A Deputy would be at best superfluous and at worst

‘‘a centre to which everyone will run who can’t get at me” (Kallay to C. A. M.). It is true that Horthy himself writes that the omission from the Bill of the jus successionis was due to his own express wish (op. cit., p. 243). ° Private, Michaelis to C. A. M. According to Szalasi, when Ribbentrop was in Budapest,

Albrecht wrote him a letter “sharply criticising the Regent and saying that he had entirely

broken with him.” * Similar reports were being sent in to the Germans by a secret agent who was the nephew or

nephew by marriage of the ex-Premier, Count G. Karolyi (Doc. Secrets, Nos. 38, 39). This agent had a theory that Istvan Horthy, when the time came, would abdicate in favour of Otto of Habsburg. This had been arranged with Count Sigray, whose wife was financing Otto. He also wrote that everyone was discontented with the choice of Istvan except the aristocrats and the Jews. Won Jagow, commenting on these reports (id. doc. 40), agreed that Istvan’s only supporters were the Jews and the /egitimist (but not other) aristocrats; but queried the rest of the reports, in particular as they related to the alleged place-making for the Habsburgs. The ultimate source of the reports seems to have been Baky. ‘ All enactments under the Regency were in theory provisional and required confirmation when a definitive Head of the State (under the Regency Act, a crowned King) was appointed,

CALCULATION GOING WRONG 77 Horthy at all, so could not be opposed on that ground), nor did he think it wise for his Party “‘to occupy itself with the person of Albrecht’? (whom he regarded as “‘an agent of German imperialism’’).

Ruszkay went away in dudgeon. Meanwhile, before introducing the Bill, Bardossy called together the Parliamentary leaders of all the parties and appealed to them to let it go through without controversy, and unanimously. All three Right Radical parties said that they must see the text before deciding

their attitude. On 9th February Bardossy tabled the Bill and then called another inter-party Conference. The Transylvanians, Christians, Social Democrats and Smallholders were amenable, but Szalasi’s deputy said that his party could not (for the reasons given above) accept the Bill. Jaross, who was attending as representative of the Imrédists, insisted on his party’s right to speak. When the Bill was debated in the Lower House the next day, the Arrow Cross spokesman, Csia, read a declaration opposing it on the grounds which Szalasi had explained to Ruszkay. But far more scandalous was the long, bitter and highly controversial speech made by Imrédy. He did not, indeed, mention Albrecht, although the Archduke’s candidature to the succession depended in practice on the rejection of the Bill, for it was obvious that no other candidate than Istvan Horthy could possibly muster 150 recommendations; but he frankly and even savagely attacked the Regent for making a ““dynastic’’ policy. Bardossy, who seems to have expected from the Imrédists only a short and non-polemical declaration (and to have assured the Regent in this sense) was furious and accused Imrédy and Jaross of a breach of faith (which they strongly denied); but the mischief was done. Fuel was added to the flames when the streets of Budapest were suddenly flooded with leaflets attacking the Regent, his sons and the Government in the most unmeasured language.! The leaflets bore the regular Arrow Cross slogans—‘‘Long live Szalasi’’, etc. Actually they were the work of Ruszkay and of the Arrow Cross Deputy, Sito.” Szalasi himself was totally innocent of them. The Lower House naturally passed the Bill by a large majority, on the

10th, and four days later the Upper House accepted it unanimously, the Archduke Joseph and a few other opponents absenting themselves. On 18th February the election took place. The Regent waived his right of nominating candidates. A large Parliamentary group put forward the name of his son, but this list was not used. Instead, the assembled Houses, in spontaneous accord, intoned the name of Istvan Horthy, who was thereby declared to have been duly elected by acclamation. The other main official event of the period was the formal reannexation of the Délvidék, which was announced on 15th December. After this, the area was given Parliamentary representation in the form of 4 seats in the Upper House and 26 in the Lower. The Deputies took their seats in January. This time there was no talk of elections, or of a separate local party. As soon as the civilian administration was introduced, the MEP had blandly

announced that it was ‘“‘extending its organisation” to the area. The Opposition parties, if not legally forbidden to follow suit, were prevented in 1 Szig. Biz., pp. 478-85, reproduces the texts of three of these leaflets. 2 In April Stité suddenly resigned his mandate and fled the country. It was then announced that the police were searching for him in connection with the leaflets. Ruszkay’s part is made clear by certain passages in the Szalasi Diary. Ruszkay was not, however, molested in connection with the leaflets; the other better-known persons arrested were Omelka and B. Kerekes.

78 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH practice from doing so, and Keresztes-Fischer also built up the administration out of hand-picked elements loyal to himself and sympathetic to his ideas. Certain motions were gone through to make the Parliamentary “represent-

ation” look genuinely representative. The Serbian Orthodox Bishop of Ujvidék was given the seat in the Upper House to which the constitution entitled him, and to the Lower House, 3 Germans, 2 Serbs and 2 Bunyevci

were admitted, besides 19 Magyars; 1 industrial worker, 1 agricultural labourer and 2 peasants, besides 22 representatives of the landowning or official classes. But all the Deputies were picked, so far as was humanly possible, from among elements favourable to the Government. All took their seats as members of the MEP, and although the 3 Germans, who were past praying for, seceded soon after and proclaimed themselves non-Party, the

other 23 continued to sit on the Government benches. Soon after, the

Government nominated 7 more Deputies (6 Magyars and a German) for

Transylvania, and in February, when one or two further inter-party migrations had taken place, the MEP possessed 209 representatives in the Lower House out of a total membership of 373. The Transylvanians (who had now formally promised to support the Government in return for an

undertaking by the MEP not to organise in Transylvania) had 46; the Imrédists, 24; the Palffy group, 9; Szalasi’s Arrow Cross, 30; the Smallholders, 12; the Christians, 7; the Social Democrats and the Liberals 5 each; the Ruthenes 9; and there were 17 non-Party members or oddments. The election to the Deputy Regency resulted in another split in the Arrow

Cross. Szalasi violently expelled from his party his two most prominent lieutenants, Hubay and Ruszkay, and shortly afterwards, three Deputies. Seven others left him, so that his Parliamentary following was reduced to 20, of whom 14 were reported to have sworn loyalty, while 6 were “‘waverers.”’ On the other side, the unhappy developments of the winter had greatly

strengthened anti-war and anti-German feeling in Hungary, producing a widespread reaction which was basically purely nationalist, but poured water

on the mills of the Communist organisers of the “Independence Front.”’ For, as we have seen, Russia’s agents were, at that time, masking their true intentions behind a facade of nationalist slogans, and even where they advocated social reform, representing this only as a means to the end of ‘““internal freedom, external independence”’ for Hungary; and there were non-Communists enough in Hungary who, even if they did not—and some did—think radical social reform desirable for its own sake, were willing to pay it as the price for achieving these ends; particularly as they thought that reform would get Hungary a good mark not in Russia but in the West. By taking advantage of this feeling, and continuing meanwhile to keep their disguise impenetrable, the Communist agents were able to score a considerable success at Christmas. The Népszava produced a grand Christmas

number which contained articles not only by a large number of cryptoCommunists, genuine Social Democrats and Village Explorers, but also by

two very prominent figures of quite different political complexion: the Catholic historian Gyula Szekfii and the extreme nationalist, Endre BajcsyZsilinszky.

The Christmas number caused an enormous sensation, not so much on account of what the writers said (this consisted mostly of unexceptionable patriotic sentiments) as at the spectacle of such a team appearing together in such colours. It evoked thunderous disapproval from the Right, but wide-

CALCULATION GOING WRONG 79 spread approval among the opponents of the Right in Hungary. It was also blessed by the B.B.C., whose own exhortations to Hungary to save herself from servitude to Germany chimed very well with what most of the writers had said. Thus it achieved what G. KaAllai later described! as its two-fold object: “to legalise the Independence Movement, making of it a political line which the broadest masses could confess openly and legally and... to form

the first move made jointly by the workers, peasants and progressive

intellectuals.” It also indicated to the West that the “Popular Front’? would be the most effective starting-point for the organisation of a resistance movement against Germany. Nevertheless, the Népszava was not a safe headquarters for such a move-

ment. It was closely spied upon and always liable to have its utterances deleted by the censor. Moreover, although Bajcsy-Zsilinszky—a fiery chauvinist to whom no chance of inveighing against Germany came amiss— and Szekfiti, whose studies had driven him into conviction of the necessity of broadening the basis of Hungarian society,? had been willing to contribute to it, the feeling against Marxism was still too strong in Hungary to make even the Social Democrat Party (whose ideas, not those of the Communists, the Népszava was still purporting to voice) a rallying-point acceptable to those wider elements behind whom the Communists had to shelter. They therefore changed their ground, and in January organised the constitution of a broader Committee, which included, besides crypto-Communists and genuine Social Democrats, various non-Party “‘intellectuals”’ and nationalists, and the leaders of the Smallholders’ Party.2- This Committee, which took the name of the “‘Historic Memorials Committee’’* issued a national appeal

to the public “to collect those data and documents which constituted the eternal memorials of Hungary’s struggle for independence.” One writer describing this says that “‘everybody understood the meaning

of the appeal except the unsuspecting censor, who let it through.’ One may doubt whether it was the censor who was the innocent here, for Keresztes-Fischer, although anti-Communist, was as good an anti-German as any member of the Committee. But in any case, the appeal went out and the Popular Front had taken another pace forward; moving, interestingly enough, in exact step with Horthy. 1 Op. cit., p. 7. 2 One of the few pure-blooded Magyars in Hungary, Szekfti had been led by his studies to realise how small was the genuine Magyar element in the Hungarian ruling class. He regarded the Jews as a separate element, which could never be perfectly assimilated, and had observed (and described in an article which created a considerable sensation) the movement of ‘“‘dissimilation’? which had been taking place among the Swabians since about 1930. He also had a feeling for social justice, and the effect of all this had made him a patron of and sympathiser with the Village Explorers, some of whom had been his pupils.

> The signatories of the appeal mentioned below were: (1) E. Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, (2) I. Barankovics, (3) A. Bernath, (4) J. Darvas, (5) Z. Gaspar, (6) A. Huszar, (7) G. IIlyés, (8) T. Jod, (9) G. Kallai, (10) A. Karpati, (11) Janos Katona, (12) Jeno Katona, (13) I. Kovacs, (14) M. Krenner, (15) E. Mihalyfi, (16) F. Nagy, (17) I. Nagy, (18) G. Parragi, (19) P. Patzay, (20) I. Raics, (21) M. Somogyi, (22) A. Szakasits, (23) J. Szentimrei, (24) I. Szonyi, (25) Z. Tildy, (26) B. Varga, (27) P. Veres, (28) S. Veress. I am not certain of the affiliations of all these gentlemen. So far as I recollect Nos. 4, 9, 15, 22(?), 24 were crypto-Communists. Nos. 1, 16, 25, 26 were the four most prominent leaders of the Smallholder Party. Nos. 6, 10, 12, 18, 27 were Village Explorers (as was No. 4, nominally). Jo6d was a historian. Nos. 2 and 26 were strong Catholics, while Tildy was a Calvinist parson. 4 Torténelmi Emlékbizottsag. 5 Erdoédy, op. cit., p. 79.

CHAPTER FIVE

INVITATION TO THE DANCE ITHIN* three weeks after the election to the Deputy Regency, \ \ Bardossy had ceased to be Minister President. On the reasons for his fall, two versions are available. Public rumour had it at the time that Horthy had wanted his son to be given, with the Deputy Regency, the jus successionis, or even to be nominated simply as his father’s successor, with or without the office of Deputy; that Bardossy had prevented this, and that Horthy had dismissed him in pique. On the other hand, when talking to Bardossy’s destined successor, the Regent did not even mention his son, but recited a long list of political grievances: Bardossy had not kept to the non-committal role which the Regent had assigned him, but had “plunged whole-heartedly into internal, and even into world-ideological, politics; he had sought for popularity and tried to build up his position on the Germans and the Hungarian Right. He had confronted Horthy with one fait accompli after another, when declaring war against Russia and America, etc., etc.”

And now he “was trying to squeeze out of the Cabinet its three ‘decent’ members, who possessed Horthy’s own confidence, Keresztes-Fischer, Banffy and Varga, and had even proposed names of successors to them, in the persons of three extreme pro-Germans. He had even recently raised the question of another Jewish Law, and even of deporting the Jews.’ It is not easy, perhaps not even possible, to assign to these very different versions their exact respective measures of truth. The fact would seem to be that each was, in its way, true: the one being the deeper underlying cause,

the other, the immediate occasion. It seems to be attested that Bardossy had in fact been opposed on grounds of principle to Istvan Horthy’s receiving the jus successionis, and had even fostered the opposition to it; that this had been reported to the Regent (with embellishments) by Bardossy’s enemies,

who had told the Regent, with doubtful truth, that but for Bardossy, the proposal would have gone through to the acclamations of a majority of the House.” It is impossible to suppose that Horthy, with his notoriously strong family sense, could have been unaffected by this news (which is said, indeed, to have offended him deeply); and it is probable that he was also influenced, unconsciously, by other considerations which, wider and less specific, were still personal. In general, the two men did not get on well together. Much

the more brilliant, but also much the younger of the two, Bardossy was inclined to talk down to and lecture the Regent in a way which the latter resented; his sickly appearance, too, grated on Horthy, who was himself a singularly robust man and disliked the look of ill-health in others. On pure grounds of incompatibility of temperament, Horthy had conceived a personal hostility to Bardossy which the news of his attitude in this latest most personal question intensified until he could see nothing right in what Bardossy did. 1 Kallay, op. cit., p. 8.

MEP. have been assured of this, in some detail, by several persons deep in the secrets of the

INVITATION TO THE DANCE 81 This appears clearly enough in his political indictment of Bardossy to Kallay, which was obviously no fair representation of the facts, some of the charges in it being exaggerated, and others altogether baseless. Bardossy

does seem to have thought of making Ministerial changes, for reasons derived from his philosophy of “‘giving freely means giving cheaply,’ but he was not pressing the suggestion hard.? I can find no evidence at all that he was seriously planning to introduce fresh anti-Jewish legislation.* Some of Horthy’s complaints read, to be honest, like unconscious attempts by the Regent to silence a voice of inner self-reproach, after things had gone wrong, by putting the blame on someone else. Bardossy, at least, would certainly so have described the accusation that he had jumped the Regent into war with Russia. Yet in some of the charges there was indeed a certain substance, although

this is not to say that Bardossy had always been in the wrong. He had indeed refused from the outset to accept the somewhat humiliating role assigned to him by Horthy of technical executant of the Regent’s policy in foreign affairs and rubber stamp to Keresztes-Fischer’s decisions at home; revolting in the latter field, at the very first normal Ministerial Council after his appointment,* with what may well have had lasting consequences, since Keresztes-Fischer seems, as will be seen, to have been the chief agent of his later dismissal.° After this, Bardossy had not tried to intervene much in domestic politics, either in broad lines or in detail; but it does appear to be attested that he had really been trying to organise his own personal following; that he was seeking these followers in the Right Wing of the MEP (although

not among the Imrédists)® and that he had hoped, when he was strong enough, to make certain Ministerial changes, and then to swing Hungarian policy on to a line further to the Right in domestic affairs, and more compliant

to Germany, than Horthy thought either necessary or desirable. This was out of no desire to persecute Jews for the persecution’s sake, and certainly out of no desire to sacrifice Hungarian interests to German; but simply a logical deduction from his view of the necessities imposed by the recent developments of the situation. For these, as he saw them, had really burnt the last of Hungary’s boats, except that in which she was now sailing. If the West would not have saved Hungary in the autumn, when 1 He seems to have thought of replacing the more conspicuous anti-Germans in the Cabinet by Civil Servants without known political affiliations; but this was precisely because he calculated

that Germany would content herself with less practical collaboration from such quarters. 2 None of my regular MEP sources had even heard of the plan; only, of all sources questioned by me, the German, Michaelis, and Kallay (who heard it from Horthy). 3 It is true that Bardossy had said in public, a little earlier, that the provisions of the Second

Jewish Law would have to be clarified in order to give an intelligible definition of the term ‘‘Jew.”? He had also said that ‘“‘a final solution of the Jewish question could not be achieved before the end of the war,’’ admitting in those words, by implication, that the “‘final solution” of the Jewish question lay in deportation. But Teleki, among many others, had said a hundred times that the Jewish Law must be made intelligible: it was a stock remark. And the second phrase quoted could also be taken as an intimation that the deportation could not be undertaken immediately. It again had been used by Teleki, and was to be used by Kallay, precisely as an excuse for postponing action. Several persons who should certainly have known if Bardossy had been planning new legislation have all told C. A. M. that, in their opinion, this was not the case.

4 On this occasion Keresztes-Fischer had begun to lay down the law in somewhat magisterial fashion when Bardossy struck his fist on the table and said: ‘‘Please take note that I am Minister

President.” (Béry to C. A. M.). 5 Kallay himself told this to C. A. M. ® Horthy accused him of this also to Kallay (Kallay to C. A. M.); but he was certainly mistaken. F

&2 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH she was still at war only with Russia, and hardly a belligerent de facto against

her, it would certainly not save her after the declarations of war and the despatch of the Second Army. Hungary’s only hope now lay in a German victory, and if this could not be brought about, as he had hoped at first, without Hungary’s bringing sacrifices, then the sacrifices must be brought— and (this was his old argument) brought with a good grace, since this would prove cheaper in the long run. And here he had really found himself in flat opposition to the Regent on

the most fundamental of all possible issues of policy. Whatever he had thought before, after America entered the war, Horthy was entirely convinced (proving himself on this point a better prophet than Bardossy) that no effort

by herself or her allies could save Germany from defeat. And with his eternal, unconquerable optimism, Horthy simply could not bring himself to believe that Britain and America would sacrifice Hungary to Bolshevism’ unless she herself absolutely forced them to do so. He was even convinced beyond power of persuasion that the West did not mind Hungary’s fighting Bolshevism (indeed, that they were secretly glad that she should do so). And he held that Hungary could still save herself (and, indeed, could not save

herself otherwise) by dissociating herself from Germany to the utmost measure and most conspicuously, and following a ““Hungarian line.” The Hungarian line! This was what Hungary must follow, ought always

to have followed, should never have left. It was her leaving of this line, Bardossy’s leaving of it, that had brought her to her present pass! As the eggs so light-heartedly laid in June hatched out and the unexpectedly illfavoured chickens came home to roost, Horthy, certainly forgetting a great deal of his own part in their earlier life-history, came increasingly to lay the blame for the whole mess on ‘‘Bardossy’s un-Hungarian policy’? and to look about him for some “real Hungarian” who would bring Hungary back on to the true path. His eye fell on, or was drawn to, Mikl6és Kallay. We have already mentioned Kallay, but only to record briefly his appointment to the portfolio of agriculture in G6mbé6s’ first Cabinet, his resignation from office in January 1935, and his further resignation from the Government Party itself at the height of the great Bethlen-GémbéGs crisis in which his own relinquishment of office had been one of the first moves. It was not necessary to say more of him at that point, for although he had undoubtedly shown a capacity above the average in the handling of his own portfolio, he had not

gone outside its field. He had, of his own choice, held aloof from party intrigues and battles, and neither by accepting office nor by leaving it had he noticeably affected the general current of Hungarian political history. Neither had his activities since 1935 called for mention in these pages. He had not wholly withdrawn from public life, for in 1937 the Regent, who

had always appreciated him, had made him a life member of the Upper House, simultaneously appointing him Commissioner for Floods and Irrigation—problems on which he was an expert; but his labours in this field, important as they were, were again not such as to make a description of his personal qualities or his political tenets necessary for the understanding of Hungarian history. From the present point in our narrative onward, on

the other hand, his personality and qualities, his ideas and ideals, were 1 When asked by C. A. M. in 1945 why he had dismissed Bardossy, Horthy answered: ‘‘I came to the conclusion that he was not following a Hungarian policy.”

INVITATION TO THE DANCE 83 destined to influence Hungary’s fortunes in a measure only second to the Regent’s own.

Miklés Kallay was a Kallay of Szabolcs County; and that itself, to any Hungarian, was a characterisation. Szabolcs County, on the left bank of the middle Tisza, had always been one of the most Hungarian parts of all Hungary. Its open expanses, very fruitful in a good season but too easily ravaged by summer drought, by black winter frost or by the still more devastating floods of spring and autumn, were the very embodiment of the tourist’s idea of the ‘““Hungarian puszta’’—and rightly, for on its plains the invading Magyars of the ninth century had pitched almost their earliest tents. It lay just south of the line reached by the Ruthene infiltration, just west of the Roumanian; and having escaped the worst fury of the Turkish conquest, it had been little affected. by the “impopulatio” of the eighteenth century. Ethnically, it was a very purely Magyar area, except that in the nineteenth century a very considerable Jewish population had established itself in the towns, notably, as it happened, those belonging to the Kallay domains. But the towns were few, and small. There was little industry. It was a country of squires (not of mammoth estates) and of peasants. It was a place where things did not change easily. In Szabolcs County of the 1930’s the Szabolcs

County of a century earlier was still recognisable. The old political and social life went on in the old way. The local gentry fought out the struggle

for predominance among themselves, and the winners exercised their authority in the old patriarchal fashion; their secure existence threatened often enough by the caprices of nature, but only little by man. Of this local aristocracy the Kallays were the most prominent represent-

atives. The family was not so much famous as proverbial. It could trace its descent through authentic documents back to the twelfth century, and by

well-buttressed tradition, had intermarried before that into the Bulgarian royal family. For all that time it had inhabited Szabolcs County, and for most of it, if not all, it had belonged to the most essentially Magyar of all the classes of Hungarian society—the “bene possessionati nobiles,” the comfortably situated local landowners. Without ever rising to great wealth or great fame, the Kallays had lived in their corner of Hungary, century in, century out, keeping their estates and serving their country, not often brilliantly but always honourably. Part of Szabolcs County was practically their family domain. The whole area belonged to one or another member of the family, and for nearly a century it had returned no one except a Kallay

to Parliament. Bitter electoral struggles had been fought out, but only between two cousins, or even two brothers. And the family had always taken its wives not from the internationalised aristocracy but from their own class and locality. Any gentleman in the neighbourhood who was not himself a Kallay was almost certainly related to the Kallays by blood, or connected with them by marriage, or both. If Szabolcs might be called the quintessence of Hungary, and the Kallays

of Szabolcs, Miklés Kallay was the quintessence of the Kallays. He had been born (in 1887) at Nyiregyhaza, the capital, as it were, of the family domains, and spent his childhood in the same surroundings, on his father’s considerable estates. He had gone afield as far as Budapest to take the obligatory Doctorate in Political Science, but for a career had simply returned

to the administrative service of his own county, in which he served for some ten years as an official, afterwards presiding over its destinies for

84 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH another eight years as Féispan. In the meantime, he had married his own cousin. Next came his excursion into national politics, from which he had retired without regret to take up what was essentially a continuation of his old life, in its old milieu; for the centre of his work as Commissioner lay in his own

home district, and the duties were not so exacting that he could not conscientiously combine them with the care of the family estates to which he had by now succeeded.

Neither ancestry, environment nor career could be more Hungarian; nor even physique. His handsome, sun-burnt face with its noble moustachios, his rather thick-set but muscular form, would alone have proclaimed him a Hungarian country gentleman, a squire from Szabolcs, a Kallay. His social and political outlook was to match. It was strongly nationalist, but without the extremes of chauvinism or xenophobia which flourish most rankly in frontier districts; but his views of Czechs and Roumanians were exactly those of his class as a whole. In internal affairs, he was a typical ““Bethlen man”’;

patriarchal Conservative, but what he would have called “LiberalConservative’; profoundly opposed to revolution from the Left, and in the writer’s own view—which he can but record—essentially undemocratic, as the West understands democracy. It has been said of him that for him the ‘“‘nation’’ ended at the village schoolmaster and notary. He could not really conceive of Hungary ruled otherwise than she had always been ruled, nor that she could want to be ruled otherwise. But these same views made him also an opponent of radicalism from the Right; and in particular he was a genuine Liberal on the great Jewish issue: Hitlerian anti-Semitism seemed to him unreasonable, new-fangled, and disgusting. In personality, he was kindly, generous and courteous—unmilitant and if not, perhaps, unambitious, at least too proud to jostle for place. He had some experience of the world, for he had spent a little time at Swiss and German Universities (England he hardly knew)! and afterwards had made various journeys abroad studying his special subjects of agriculture and irrigation, or attending international conferences. Nevertheless, his interests and his experiences were mainly local, and his enemies sneered at his lack of metropolitan veneer. Yet he was really shrewd (the present writer has often been struck by his original, penetrating and humorous remarks on world affairs), a real expert in his own field, acquainted with every process

in the practical farmer’s cycle, from the amelioration of the soil to the marketing of produce abroad, and for all his conservatism, intelligent enough

fully to understand and take into account the problems presented by new economic forces and factors inside Hungary and outside it. It was his appreciation of these things that had caused Bethlen to recommend him for a place in G6mb6s’ Cabinet. He had retired, as we have said, in 1935, with Bethlen; but his retirement, unlike Bethlen’s, had been areal one. There was no place for him in Imrédy’s regime, nor even in Teleki’s (in spite of his personal respect and affection for

Teleki). To the generation which the GémbGs elections had brought into politics he was a Csaklyas. The tide was setting against him and his kind, but he did not feel the call to step forward and offer himself as a barrier against 1 As a young man he had taken a trip across the Channel from Paris, but having been so luckless as to choose a Sunday in November for his first sight of London, had found a few hours of that awful experience enough for him and had taken the evening train back.

INVITATION TO THE DANCE 85 it. He did not mind being a back number. The rarefied, non-Party atmosphere of the Upper House was still sympathetic to him, but he rarely attended the sessions even of that body and spoke still more rarely. Budapest itself was become a strange world to him, which he did not care to visit often. Then came the war. He viewed the situation which now came into being

with the eyes of his class and kind. Most certainly, what he wanted for Hungary was the restoration of her historic frontiers. But not only did he not share the view—which, indeed, all but a few of the wilfully blind had been forced to renounce by 1940—that Hitler would ever help Hungary to revision: he also saw in German Nazism an extreme danger to Hungary’s independence and to her social and political structure. Thus, by the same reasoning process as Teleki and Horthy, he longed for the defeat of Germany;

only, also like them, he regarded Bolshevism, and Russia, as even more dangerous, the ultimate peril. So, once again like Teleki and Horthy, he became an “‘Anglophile,” setting his hopes on the victory of the Western Powers and refusing to believe that they would not somehow come to see the justice of Hungary’s case and the force of the argument that a big and strong Hungary would be a “factor of order’ in Europe and a bulwark against both tyrannies. He had not voiced these ideas openly, and this was all the better, for Hungary could not well, at that juncture, afford herself the luxury of appointing a Minister President who was known to want Germany’s

defeat; and in the honeymoon months of June to September 1941, when Bardossy’s policy of whole-hearted co-operation was still regarded as a good

investment, his reappearance would hardly have been practicable. But, as we have seen, the honeymoon had soon ended; the replacement of Werth by Szombathelyi had marked its true close, and now certain people began to feel that if anyone could lead Hungary back up the slope down which she had been slipping, it was Kallay; and something of an organised movement began to convince the Regent to offer Kallay appointment, and to persuade Kallay to accept the offer.

There is no need to repeat here M. Kallay’s own account! of the intimations received by him that such a movement was on foot; we need only point out that Keresztes-Fischer was obviously its spiritus rector, and that the seed planted by him was clearly germinating in Horthy’s mind as early as September 1941, 1.e. before the question of the Deputy Regency had

arisen at all. Horthy’s mind was probably made up by early January, and it is not known that he took any further preliminary step beyond consulting Cardinal Serédi (the usual consultations with the Privy Councillors and political leaders were omitted).? He held his hand, however, until the Deputy Regency Bill was through the two Houses, and even beyond that, until the

first days of March. Then, after first dropping a hint of his intentions to Ullein Reviczky, who passed it on (as he was doubtless intended to do) to Kallay,? he sent for Kallay himself to come secretly to the Palace. When Kallay obeyed this summons, on a day which must have been the 2nd or 3rd March, Horthy expounded to him his grievances against Bardossy, general and particular, said that in view of all this, he could no longer keep Bardossy, and offered K4allay the Minister Presidency, and that on singularly favourable

1 See Kallay, op. cit., pp. 5S ff.

2 Personal, Kallay to C. A. M. According to M. Ottlik, who had this from Bethlen him-

self, even Bethlen did not know what was in the wind. 3 Ullein, op. cit., pp. 136 ff.

86 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH terms. Horthy reserved for himself only such ulumate control over the Army, including the choice of the Minister of Defence. as the Constitution allowed him as “Supreme War Lord.” In all other respects he gave Kallay a completely free hand in the composition of his Ministry, in foreign, domestic

and economic policy. He would appoint no other Minister President. but would always support Kallay, who might, if he liked. dissolve Parhament and *“‘make™ his own elections.

Kallay, he tells us. refused at first. He believed that Germany would be defeated, and being sincerely and deeply anti-Nazi, hoped for her defeat. His principles therefore forbade him to follow a pro-German policy. But ‘“Germany and her satellites held Hungary so closely in her grip that he did not see how she could extricate herself. In any case. 1t was impossible to follow an anti-German policy with the existing Government and Parliament.

and too dangerous to hold elections. He left on the refusal, but Horthy called him back the next day, and the next. He repeated the article of his faith. which should be printed in block capitals. because it gave the clue to the policy which he and Kallay were to follow for the next two years, that “Germany's defeat could not mean that Russia would be let into Europe.” The Western Allies would prevent this, if only in the interest of the balance of power. Even the Russians did not need the Magyars. Hungary could still be saved, and Kallay—but he alone—could save her.

At last, after several days’ arguments, Kallay gave up his opposition. Next day he laid before Horthy a programme which may be summarised as follows: The supreme object was to be “‘at all casts to defend. preserve, and, where

it had been infringed. restore the complete independence. internal and external, of Hungary,” doing this “from a position above parties and above

internal problems, as leader of the nation” and making it quite clear to foreign countries what he was doing. Towards the Germans, to “‘develop

the highest measure of spiritual and moral resistance’ and to confine concessions, even economic, to the minimum short of provoking a German occupation, which he was not prepared to risk. The Army, too, was to be kept as intact as possible. If. then. Germany won the war after all, Hungary would be strong enough to stand out against her, exhausted as she would be:

if the Allies won, they would not be tempted to treat her as a satellite of Germany's and might even enlist her help as a ‘‘factor of order in South-

Eastern Europe.” He proposed to seek contact with the British, but ‘‘precisely in order to cover this, to emphasise his anti-Russian policy.” He would ‘‘call a halt to anti-Semitic measures” and inaugurate a new policy towards the minorities. At the same time, while he would keep these objects in view and work towards them as fast and as soon as he could, yet in view of the hostility which his appointment would arouse, both in the Hungarian Parliament and in Germany, who would occupy the country if he made a false step, he could not even begin to follow most of them openly for a considerable time. It would not be possible to hold new elections, nor even to alter the composition of the Cabinet, nor to go back on the promises made to the Germans about

the expeditionary force. He would have to let this go out, although he would try to raise a new Army at home; and he would carry on with an unchanged Cabinet and Parliament, dissimulating his intentions and even placating the Right by certain concessions, first and foremost in the shape

INVITATION TO THE DANCE 87 of further anti-Jewish measures. But he would place these on an economic and social, not a racial, basis and make them as harmless, practically, as possible.

The Regent only stipulated that the “Hungarian Nazis” (among whom he seems to have included Imrédy) were to be “treated as outlaws.” For the rest, he approved the programme in its entirety and prophesied success; for— he maintained once again—England “‘was bound sooner or later to square

accounts with Bolshevism.” The anti-Bolshevik peoples were Britain’s “natural allies” and she would therefore not take it ill of Hungary for having participated in the war against Russia. At this point the historian may perhaps comment that it is particularly

fortunate that this conversation stands on record. For the policy which Kallay followed in office was not one of those which are their own interpreters. The graphs both of his words and his actions during that period would have appeared, had anyone drawn them, as series of violent zigzags to which it

would have been difficult, if they were regarded over a short period, to attribute any consistent direction whatever. Moreover, the two lines, such as they were, clashed more often than they coincided; for it was Kallay’s habit to use words only occasionally as interpreters of action; far more often he used them as a substitute for it, or as a smoke-screen to conceal it—or the absence of it. Foreign observers usually compared his motions to those of a tight-rope

walker, swaying dizzily this way and that in order to escape falling. The Hungarian popular genius borrowed its metaphor from the national dance of the czardas, in which two steps to the right are followed by two to the left, and spoke of the “‘Kallai kettés’’ or two-step.” It is in fact undeniable that Kallay took quite a number of steps to the right, and that the voice with which he was accustomed to chant a copious and spirited accompaniment to

his measures almost always came out of a mouth turned over his right shoulder. At the same time, it also gradually became apparent that while at first the right foot had most often taken the lead, there came a time when the

movements, for all their flourishes, left the dancer on the same spot, and finally one in which the movement was on balance clearly towards the left. So much is certain; but it can reasonably be asked—and it is the historian’s duty to answer the question—how far the movement in the one direction and the other corresponded to the dancer’s real wishes, and, especially, whether those wishes were constant throughout all Kallay’s period of office. Did he

change his policy half-way, when a German defeat from an improbability became a probability, in which case his earlier progress rightward must be accounted sincere, and his later retracing of his steps as a forced virtue; or was the movement rightward made by Hungary during his first months of office simply due (to change the metaphor) to the momentum imparted to her course by her predecessors, which had been so powerful that he could not immediately put the vehicle into reverse, nor even apply the brakes abruptly without snapping their cables and finding himself thrown over the windscreen?

Kallay’s evidence makes it safe to adopt the latter interpretation of his 1 Kallay to C. A.M. According to Kallay he made one further stipulation: that Horthy should take no political step, and write no letters to Hitler, without consulting him. 2 The play on words goes deeper than translation can render, for the phrase really denotes a local dance (a genuine one, of which Kodaly has preserved a setting) from Nagykallo, the village which was the family seat of the Kallays.

88 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH policy. It shows that he was, if not anti-German, at least anti-Nazi from the first, and from the first sincerely worked to prize Hungary free from Hitler's grip at the earliest possible moment. This, of course, implied the wish to

reach understanding with other forces opposed to Hitler. But the same passage also shows that it would be a dangerous over-simplification to call his policy, on that account, “pro-Albed.”’ The very essence of it resided in the absolute distinction which it drew between the Western Allies on the one side and Soviet Russia on the other. He was (as Horthy was also) as anti-Bolshevik as Hitler himself, and although quite prepared to contract out of active participation in the Crusade, certainly wished it success from his heart; and an absolute postulate of his policy was that Hungary must be defended from Bolshevism. In the last resort, he would have accepted even German help for this defence, but his great hope was to buy the protection of the West at the price of the dissociation of Hungary from Germany. The premise on which he and Horthy based their policy (this being, as we have said, the cardinal point on which they differed from Bardossy) was that this differentiation was possible, even if carried to the extreme length of continuing to fight against Russia while behaving towards the West, de facto, as a benevolent neutral. The history of the next two years is largely that of the gradual fading of this hope, never quite abandoned. This is, of course, not quite the whole story. Kallay also hoped that it might be possible to wean the West from others of their regrettable entangle-

ments such as their support of a Czechoslovak republic, and to lead them to see that the best guarantee of that order and stability in Central Europe which, he was convinced, was their chief interest, would be afforded

by a Hungary which was not only firmly based on its traditional social foundations, but also reinstated, at least approximately, in its historic frontiers. His memoirs do not reveal this latter aspect of his policy very clearly; and it is obvious that he was realist enough to see that active revisionism was not practical politics in 1942 and 1943, but certain documents

which we shall quote show that integral revision was always present in his mind as a long-term ideal. It was only after Horthy and Kallay had reached the agreement described

above that Bardossy was informed of it. He appears to have been quite unaware of what was brewing, and was bitterly hurt and angered,! besides remaining entirely unconvinced of the practicability of Kallay’s policy, on the nature of which he seems to have been in no doubt. When Kallay paid him the customary courtesy visit, he warned him that he was “leading the country into a catastrophe,”’ since everyone knew his views. “He would lose the friendship of Germany, without gaining that of England, which was committed to Russia and the Little Entente.’’ “There is no changing the fact,” he said, ‘‘that if Germany is defeated, we too shall finish on the list

of defeated enemies. That was decided in the First World War and at Trianon.”

For the rest of his career, Bardossy harboured a deep personal hostility to Kallay and (it appears) also to the Regent. But in the hour of his fall he preserved the traditional Hungarian loyalty and discipline. On 7th March 1 He told a friend (Baross) that he would never go to see Horthy again, unless ordered to do

39. M. Ottlik writes that ‘“‘Bardossy hated and despised Horthy for his behaviour to an unbelievable extent.” 2 Op. cit., p. 19.

INVITATION TO THE DANCE 89 he retired to a sanatorium and handed in his resignation on grounds of ill-health. This was made public on the 8th, the announcement stating that Keresztes-

Fischer would act as Minister President ad interim; but Kallay was now officially invited to meet the Cabinet and the leaders of the MEP as Minister President designate. There were stormy interviews, calculated to make Kallay feel that all his

fears were more than justified. The pro-German members of the Cabinet declared that they would resign. The leaders of the MEP were clearly as unillusioned on the real nature of Kallay’s intentions as Bardossy had been, and took exactly Bardossy’s line. A Soviet victory would be the worst imaginable disaster for Hungary, and it was hopeless to think of splitting the Allies and winning the support of the West. Hungary was therefore forced

to wish for a German victory. Asa corollary to this she could not, even if she wished, afford to be lenient towards the Jews, since whatever she did in other fields, Germany would regard her as an enemy so long as she remained ‘“Jew-ridden.”’ They would themselves support Kallay out of loyalty to the Regent, but could not answer to the rank and file unless he made pro-German declarations and “in some way relieved the anxiety of the Right, who had

regarded him with suspicion ever since he had resigned from Gémbés’ Cabinet’’—1i.e. brought in some more measures against the Jews. Kallay got Keresztes-Fischer to talk over the malcontents in the Cabinet by invoking the Regent’s wishes and the necessity, not least in Germany’s interest, of maintaining continuity. He told the Party leaders that he accepted their conditions, subject only to the stipulation that his anti-Semitic measures

were to be based not on racial and ideological grounds but on social and economic. It was agreed after some argument that the practical proof of his anti-Semitism should take the form of the introduction of amendments to the Second Jewish Law and the Land Reform Act, making the expropriation of Jewish-owned land compulsory instead of facultative. Now Kallay was able to report back that he was in a position to take office. On 10th March he was gazetted Minister President with provisional charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the appointments dating as from the previous day. 1 I am even informed (Michaelis to C. A. M.) that after his resignation he called a German agent (Michaelis) to him and told him that the situation required that Kallay should be his successor. He then asked Michaelis to send to Berlin a list of 100 per cent. ““Csaklyasok,”’ not including the name of Kallay, who were being proposed for Minister President, with the idea that if they were ‘“‘dropped,’’ Kallay would be accepted more easily. The trick succeeded: the Germans sent Sztdjay down to stop the faked Ministry, and then accepted Kallay.

CHAPTER SIX

TWO STEPS TO THE RIGHT ALLAY’S interview with the MEP leaders, most of whom had known

k him all his life and were acquainted with every detail of his career, his

circumstances and his opinions, had necessarily been conducted in an atmosphere of relative sincerity. He did not regard this recipe as appropriate

for wider circles, which, on the contrary, were subjected to a barrage of untruths which was almost majestic in its audacity. On the evening of his appointment, the editors of the Budapest newspapers were circulated by Ullein with the following extraordinary communication:

“You are requested to develop the following points of view in connection with the formation of the new Government. The remodelling of the Government was necessitated by one circumstance only: Bardossy’s lilness.... Except that Bardossy is resigning on account of health there is no sort of change in the composition of the Government.... This fact

in itself completely proves the fixed determination of the Minister President and the Government to follow exactly the same policy as its predecessor. ... ‘*Please emphasise that the Minister President . . . does not intend to keep the portfolio of Foreign Affairs permanently. ...

‘As to the personality of the Minister President . . . he first held ministerial office under GOmbés. He completely shared, and shares today

that internal and foreign political conception of which Gémbés was the most outstanding representative. He is a Right-wing politician in the

strictest sense of the term ... well known for his rigidly racialist, progressive and 100 per cent. Magyar ideology and unshakable, unwearying energy... . “Please emphasise that Kallay has always been and is today a close friend of Bardossy’s and that the most complete harmony has always prevailed and prevails today between them.’”! Kallay himself, when he met the full MEP on the 12th, told it the same

story. ‘“The fact,” he said, “that he came before it with an unchanged Cabinet also meant the unqualified retention of the policy of the old Cabinet, as regards both principles and world philosophy.” He had only taken over the portfolio of Foreign Affairs provisionally and expected Bardossy to return to it” (this was the one sentence in his speech which the Party applauded,

demonstratively), and this fact meant that “‘there would be no change in Hungarian foreign policy, but that Hungary would continue undeviatingly along that path from which no honourable Hungarian would ever stray. .. . Hungary’s place could be nowhere else but where her policy after the First World War had set her: at the. side of Germany and Italy.’’ His internal policy was that of Gémb6s’ 95 Points, of which he had been a co-author. He was an adherent of social reform, but any extensive measures in that field, and especially in the field of land reform, would have to wait until the 1 Quoted in Szig. Biz., pp. 494-5. “ Rumours that this was the fact were being spread from the Press Bureau.

TWO STEPS TO THE RIGHT 91 Crusade against Bolshevism had been carried to a successful conclusion. He devoted almost the whole of the rest of his speech to the Jewish question, and while it is true that he described the problem as a specifically Hungarian one, and as one the roots of which were not racial but social and economic,

he yet gave a picture of it which was anything but flattering to the Jews; conceded that in this one field immediate measures were not only possible

but necessary; and announced that the Government was immediately introducing legislation for the expropriation of Jewish-owned land. He sent flattering telegrams to the Heads and Foreign Ministers of the States allied or associated with Hungary; that to Italy asked for the support

of the Fascist Party. When he faced the full Parliament on the 19th, he repeated that Hungary’s policy had undergone no change. For her to stand

by Germany and Italy was “not a policy but an axiom.’ Turning to the question of Hungary’s participation in the war against the U.S.S.R., he went on, ““My programme can be summarised in the one sentence: we must all

place all the energies at our disposal in the service of this war—and I emphasise—this war of ours, for it is not foreign interests that have dragged us into this war; we are fighting first and foremost for Hungarian interests. ... We are struggling in this war for our own selves, for our existence, for our

historic survival. ... We have entered this war for our ideals, because the Hungarian nation struggles with all its strength against Bolshevism. In this

fight we must take part to our utmost strength; this fight decides our future, ! the life and death of our entire Hungarian nation.” Many, many were the affirmations of enthusiastic devotion to the Axis and all its works which poured forth during these weeks from the lips of Kallay and of his authorised mouthpieces, more voluble during this period than ever before; for not even satisfied with his own eloquence, he took Antal

into his Cabinet on April 17th, as Minister without Portfolio, and put him in charge of all propaganda.t’ A month later he promoted Ullein-Reviczky to the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary and gave him authority over the entire

Press.2, Antal, as we know, had been Gdmb6s’ Chief of Press, and was a sincere devotee of the G6mb6s line; Ullein was a convinced believer in the effectiveness of the word, if shouted loud enough, as a substitute for the act. Thus the chorus reached a volume and stridency which equalled the records achieved in 1940 and far surpassed what had been attained under Bardossy. In view of M. Kallay’s assurance that the purpose of these utterances was simply to throw dust in the eyes of the Germans and of their partisans in Hungary, or at least to allow them no handle against him until he had consolidated his position, we may abstain from anthologising them. Yet the same comment must be made on this campaign, as on its predecessors, that it was not without its effect on debauching still further Hungarian public opinion.’ And certain further observations on it are both legitimate and necessary. Firstly, it must be emphasised that the description of dust-throwing does

not apply to the endorsement of the war against Russia. On this point, Kallay went further than Bardossy himself. After his speech of 19th March, 1 B. Lukacs was taken into the Cabinet on the same date, also as Minister without Portfolio. 2 According to two reliable sources, Kallay had originally meant to make Ullein-Reviczky Foreign Minister, but Bethlen learnt of the intention in time to frustrate it. 3 In fairness to Antal, it should be said that neither he nor Lukacs appears to have tried to impose his ideas on policy inside the Cabinet. At any rate, Kallay writes (op. cit., p. 78) that all his pronouncements there were accepted unanimously. It is true that he did not impart most

of his more important decisions to the Cabinet at all. He discussed them, if at all, only with Keresztes-Fischer.

92 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH he reverted to the subject on 19th April, and then he said: ‘I declare openly that I shoulder the responsibility for this war, for I know what we are fighting

for.... We were not forced into this war, neither did we drift into it; we undertook it in full awareness.... It isa Hungarian war.” It was even, he said, the first war since 1849 which Hungary had waged in her own interests. Kallay has explained that he chose these expressions in order to dissociate

Hungary from Germany and to emphasise that she was a free agent with whom other Powers could treat.1_ But it remains true that he did everything in his power to commit Hungary irretrievably against Russia; and further, that while he had told the Regent that he meant to emphasise his real antiSoviet policy in order to divert attention from the different attitude which he meant to take up towards the Western Allies, there were few signs of any such

differentiation in Hungarian policy during this period. Kallay himself usually tried to convey, by the implication of silence, that Hungary had no quarrel with the Western Powers: her only enemy was Bolshevism. But the Press continued to follow with extreme emphasis the pure Bardossy line of the indivisibility of the ‘““Grand Alliance” and the solidity of Britain’s commitments

both to Russia and to the ex-Little Entente. So Antal said, on 18th May: “The Hungarian nation can await the assurance of its national existence and independence, and the fulfilment of its justified national claims, only from a victory of the Axis Powers. From the Russians we can expect only annihilation, and from the victory of the Anglo-Saxon policy a new and perhaps even more bitter Trianon.” And in its comment on the speech next day, Magyarorszdag rubbed 1n the

theme of ‘‘a new and worse Trianon” with various bogies which included Benes and a “‘Holy Alliance of British colonial soldiers, Texas heroes, Papuans

imported from New Guinea and Ogpu terrorists.”” That was the gang that would rule over Europe, including Hungary, if the Allies won.” When the news of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty was made public, Magyarorszdg gave its full authority to the story of a secret clause in an article which quoted no authority for its statements and bore the heading ““They betrayed

Europe” (it is true that Hungary was not among the countries which the article allocated to the Soviet sphere of influence, also that no Ministers commented on the Treaty). The comment on the Eden-Masaryk exchange of Notes (6th August 1942) was that all such documents were quite unimportant; but they were a “‘devilish

trick,’ characteristic of Britain, and showed what would be the fate of Hungary if Britain and Soviet Russia were to dictate the peace conditions after the war. Britain had now “returned officially to the conception of the old Czechoslovakia created at St. Germain and Trianon.” Hungary would defend herself against this by fighting to the last on the side of her allies. Another relevant comment on this campaign of words is that its futility proved, after all, equal to its vulgarity. Naturally, the inner ring of Hungarian politicians were not deceived for a moment: they all knew too much about Kallay. ‘“‘Kallay’s appointment,” Szalasi wrote when it was announced, “inaugurates the most complete reaction.... Kallay is the representative of naked reaction, the mouthpiece of the High Priests, High Jews and High Aristocrats.”?> He continued to work on that assumption, as did the rest of the political leaders. The Germans were equally unillusioned: Goebbels wrote in his Diary:

1 Op. cit., p. 80. * Magyarorszdg, 25th June 1942.

TWO STEPS TO THE RIGHT 93 “The new Minister President, Kallay, has long been known as an antiGerman. Young Horthy is a definite pro-Jew and wants no truck with the Axis. Thank God, we have never had any illusions about Hungary, so we

are undergoing no disillusionment now.’

. On the other hand, the rank and file of the Left in Hungary was further discouraged and depressed, and the British Political Warfare experts, for whom it was always axiomatic that any change in Hungary must have been effected under German pressure and must be for the worse,? took all the flourishes at their face value (they only started disbelieving Kallay when he began telling them the truth) and wrote the new Hungarian Government down as no less pro-Axis than its predecessor. Meanwhile the Czech and Yugoslav Governments ensconced in London gleefully compiled enormous dossiers for the conviction of Hungary out of her own mouth. These negative results of the clumsy campaign were to prove of some importance at a later stage.

Meanwhile, Kallay’s initial actions had not been greatly out of tune with

his words. On 22nd May he broke one of his promises to the MEP when (although Bardossy had long since recovered from his diplomatic illness) he

took the portfolio of Foreign Affairs definitively into his own hands, announcing this in what was, perhaps, the shortest speech of his public career. This, however, was simply the occupation of a strategic position for

future use. For the time, his actions in the field of foreign policy hardly differed from what Bardossy’s would have been.

The cardinal question of the hour was, of course, that of the Russian campaign, and on this, as we have said, Kallay did not even wish to alter the decision which Bardossy had taken (and Horthy endorsed). The obligation was, accordingly, honoured, if not punctually, yet according to plan. The Army Command, part of the Army Train, and the Corps troops of the \lIrd and IVth Corps began to go out on 11th April. They were followed by part of the Armoured Corps and by the three divisions of the IJIrd Corps (the 7th, 9th and 6th), which, after a little fighting with partisans, were put into the line south of Kursk. The divisions comprising the [Vth Corps (the 10th, 12th and 13th) and the Corps troops of the VIIth Corps began to follow on 30th May.? Meanwhile, incidentally, some of the occupation troops which had been left behind in the previous autumn had found themselves involved in duties which went beyond what had been agreed; for an emergency having arisen, the Germans sent them into the line at Kharkhov, where they were engaged in considerable fighting during April and May.‘ In the field of armament production, the two countries recognised (as they had before, and were to continue to do to the last) a common interest which overrode all other considerations, and concluded in April a further industrial agreement dealing (inter alia) with the exchange of war materials “‘important 1 Diaries, Ist April 1942. 2 A Hungarian émigré paper in the U.S.A. wrote in March: “It is obvious that no Hungarian Minister President could be appointed today without Hitler’s agreement, for Hungary is simply an occupied country.”’

3 For these details, besides the usual military sources, see Hadak Utjdn, vol. IV, No. 27

(1952), Adonyi, op. cit., pp. 42 ff.

4 This was first revealed in a message from the Regent, dated 5th April, to the officers commanding the two groups, Generals Olgyay and Sikray. On 20th April Kallay said that the troops had gone into the line “‘at the request of Germany and with the consent of the Hungarian Government.”

94 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH for the war effort.” Each country pledged itself not to interrupt the supply of materials important for the other’s war industry: Germany, coking coal and certain other products, and Hungary, oil and bauxite. The German Press, meanwhile, had treated the appointment of Kallay with marked froideur, and Sztdjay had even sent him a message that he should

not suggest a meeting with Hitler, since this would be refused.1 But they made no new demands of him, perhaps for the very purpose of not giving him a chance to refuse them, and as he was himself adhering to the principle

of fulfilling all obligations contracted by his predecessors, he had few opportunities to prove by his actions the sincerity or otherwise of his protesta-

tions in this direction. His scope of action as regards the Western Powers was naturally even more limited, but he made no move whatever, during this

period, to approach them secretly, and when, once, an opportunity arose to make an official gesture, Kallay refused to take advantage of it. This was when, on 7th April, the U.S.A. sent Hungary, with the other satellites, a Note which said that the U.S.A. had not yet taken action on the satellites’ declarations of war, because it regarded them as having been made under

foreign pressure, and as not corresponding to the wills of the peoples concerned; but action would have to follow unless the recipients gave assurances that they would not engage in military aid or operations on the side of the Axis. Hungary’s reply (which was in the form of a Note Verbale to the Swiss Legation in Budapest) was that Hungary was “‘carrying on a defensive war against the U.S.S.R. in consequence of the attack on Kassa, which had inflicted on her enormous losses in life and property.’ Worse

than this: the Press published the substance of this answer in a most contumelious inspired article which described the American warning as ‘“‘“empty threats” and wrote that Hungary was already at war with the U.S.A.

and had “‘drawn all the consequences.’ Another article made mock of the American Army, ‘‘which would never be a factor in the European war.’”* Naturally, it was the United States which really drew the consequences, registering a state of war between itself and the satellites on Sth June. British policy, too, continued during the period to justify Bardossy’s thesis against Horthy’s. On 26th May came the Anglo-Soviet alliance. On 5th August Mr. Eden told Benes that Britain regarded the First Vienna Award as null and void, and when he announced this in a broadcast on 8th August, Benes

added that he was authorised to state that the Soviet Government, too, ‘‘recognised none of the changes effected in 1938 and 1939 and took its stand on the pre-Munich Czechoslovak frontiers.” Kallay’s opening experiences with the other states lying within Hungary’s regular diplomatic purview were much the same as Bardossy’s had been, only a shade worse. When he suggested paying the usual courtesy visit to Rome, he was told that ‘‘the Italians would receive him after he had visited Hitler.’ There were no other important contacts with Italy.° In his inaugural speech 1 Kallay to C. A. M. 2 The Sz. I. MS. gives the text of the American Note; M. Kertész has kindly obtained for me the above summary of the Hungarian answer. ’ This article appeared in Pester Lloyd, 18th April. Ullein’s instructions for it are given by Szig. Biz., pp. 508-9.

46 Cavallero, 11th the April. ® Kallay, op. cit., pp. 144-5. Italian Chief of Staff, had arranged to visit Budapest on 27th March. The

visit was not cancelled, and Szombathelyi was allowed to return it on 11th April, when he saw the Holy Father, as well as Mussolini and Ciano. The Pope seems to have talked sympathetically,

TWO STEPS TO THE RIGHT 95 he had expressed a wish to establish good relations with Hungary’s neighbours

purposely so phrasing this that Roumania could take it as applicable to her-

self.* Croatia and Slovakia did not even reply, and although it proved possible afterwards to whitewash over the cracks with both parties, they were not mended.” As for Roumania: Mihai Antonescu had been told by German agents that Kallay was going to attack him in his speech and had chosen the

day and hour of its delivery himself to make a sharp verbal attack on Hungary.® In spite of this, Kallay made him proposals for a modus vivendi to be based on the provisional acceptance by both parties, without prejudice, of the existing status quo.*| Antonescu refused this, and his counter-proposals were unacceptable to Kallay. The next news which came from Transylvania was of a meeting passing a resolution that the Roumanian frontier must extend to the Tisza, and of large-scale requisitionings at the expense of the Magyar population of Southern Transylvania. On this, Kallay complained to the German Minister and asked that the German Government should instruct its occupying authorities not to en-

courage and abet the Roumanians in their anti-Hungarian attitude. This brought him his first direct contact with the Germans, for Hitler now invited him to visit him at the OK W Headquarters near Rastenburg, in East Prussia.

Here Kallay spent 7th and 8th June, but the visit was neither fruitful nor important. Nearly all the conversation was devoted to the Roumanian problem, on which Kallay seems to have put Hungary’s case with rather more verve than his own narrative would suggest.’ Hitler, for his part, said the Hungarians were, of course, welcome to attack the Roumanians after the war, although he warned Kallay, as he had warned Teleki and Csaky two years before, that the Roumanians were better fighters than the Hungarians thought. But there must not be any scrapping just now. Hecould not interfere with Roumania’s private affairs, nor with Hungary’s, but would tell them that they must respect the Vienna Award and would instruct the German officials that they must not take sides. Nothing which could be called discussion passed between the

two men on any wider topic. Kallay assured Hitler that Hungary was

‘completely loyal to her war commitments,’ and also promised that she ]

would send Germany not less food than in the preceding year. He also hinted

that Hungary, in her difficult situation, would have to preserve a certain independence in her foreign policy, although he only put this as entailing the

maintenance of good relations with the neutrals. He said that Hungary could not suddenly or violently eliminate the Jews without throwing her economic machine out of gear. On all this Hitler made no comment whatbut according to Ciano, nothing of importance was said by the politicians. The Hungarian

1 Kallay, pp. 83-4.

diplomatic sources do not even mention the visit. .

2 In April the speeches in the Croatian Sabor had been so violent that, as Ullein told a Press Conference, there was a danger of a rupture of diplomatic relations (Szig. Biz., p. 490). He himself managed to arrange for a cessation of the mutual invective, and later, to negotiate a similar arrangement, which was accompanied by a few concessions for the minorities concerned, and an extended commercial treaty with Slovakia. 3 Kallay, loc. cit. 4 These are described in detail by Kallay, op. cit., pp. 84 ff. 5 For KAllay’s story, see op. cit., pp. 89 ff. (the date of the visit is here given incorrectly as

15th April); and a shorter but rather less discreet version in Barczy; for Hitler’s, Hitlers Tischgesprache, ed. Picker, pp. 93-4: ‘‘Hitler erzahlte . . . dass Kallay . . . lediglich zwei ‘kleine Bitten’ des Reichverwesers Horthy iibermittelt habe: dass ndmlich (a) der liebe Gott und (bd) er, der Fuhrer, ruhig zuschauen mochten, wenn sich die Ungarn mit den Rumdnen auseinandersetzen.”

96 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH ever. The next day. on the other hand, which Kallay spent with Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop did all the talking and KaAllay sat in silence. The theme this time was Hungary’s failure to fulfil her obligations towards the Volksdeutsche. Thus the visit ended with only two practical results. One was Hitler’s promise to mediate between Hungary and Roumania, the sequel to which

may for convenience be given here. Precisely as he was giving it, as it happened. the Roumanian Government issued a further decree confiscating

the stocks of wheat and flour belonging to the Magyars of Southern Transylvania. The Hungarian Government kept the news out of its own Press, but after discussing the matter with much heat at two Ministerial Councils, wired complaints to Berlin and Rome and announced that they would not send out the third echelon of the expeditionary force, which was then on the point of entraining, until the Roumanians had stopped persecuting

the Magyars of Southern Transylvania! The end of this was that, after further vigorous representations had come from Hungary, a mixed GermanItalian Commission was sent to Transylvania which, after two visits lasting

from 15th July to 15th September and 20th October to 20th November respectively. produced a report? which was received by the Hungarians, and

doubtless also by the Roumanians, with rage, as biassed and inaccurate, although neither was in a position openly to disregard its recommendations, and the Hungarians did send out the rest of the promised troops. Hungaro-Roumanian relations, however. remained as bad as ever, and this fact had an important bearing on a large proportion of the Hungarian

Government’s later moves, particularly in the military field. Fear of Roumania was a big and genuine factor in the Hungarians’ determination not to let their country be denuded of troops: on other occasions it was perhaps used as an excuse when Hungary wanted to keep her troops at home

for other reasons. And the Hungarians’ hostility to Roumania was one of the main reasons for the caution with which the Germans handled them, and in particular for their reluctance to give Hungary arms. The Roumanians, of course, took exactly the same line mutatis mutandis, and it must be admitted that each side was justified in accusing the other of

ill-will and hostile intentions. The Hungarian speakers and Press were usually more moderate than the Roumanian (as they pointed out selfrighteously on many occasions), but their ultimate intentions were just as uncompromising.

Both countries, incidentally, continued to keep considerable forces on their common frontier, and there were frequent incidents, one or two of which, in 1943, were on a considerable scale.

The other fruit of Kallay’s visit was an unexpected one. In the course of his disquisition on Volksdeutsch questions, Ribbentrop remarked that

Hitler “regarded himself as the Fithrer of the whole German people; consequently all Germans, wherever they lived, must participate in Germany’s

struggle.’ He therefore asked that Germany should be allowed to recruit, via the Volksbund, 30,000 Germans for the German SS. formations (an analogous concession had been granted by Roumania in September 1940). K allay laid the question before his Cabinet on his return, and the Hungarians, while not conceding the Fiihrer’s theoretical claim, saw the practical advantages to themselves of the proposal. Accordingly, in the calling-up notices

1 Barczy. : 2 A MS. copy of the report, with the Hungarians’ comments on it, is in the writer's possession.

TWO STEPS TO THE RIGHT 97 which were then going out to men of between 19 and 30, they offered members

of the Volksbund the choice between the Hungarian army or the SS. The great majority chose the latter alternative, and in 1942 over 20,000 young Germans joined the colours.!' This led, incidentally, to a conflict with the Reich, as the Hungarian Government, applying an old but still valid law, began issuing notices depriving such persons of their Hungarian citizenship. The Germans, although they had accepted the principle, protested against this as an “unfriendly act’? when Hungary began publishing the names, and the Hungarian Government revoked it for persons joining under the agreement,

although not for earlier volunteers.” But, in any case, they were rid of the presence, under this agreement and its successors,® of a considerable number of persons whose room they preferred to their company.

Except where these special questions were concerned, the Germans relapsed after Kallay’s visit into the same surly silence as they had maintained before it.

Meanwhile, as has been said, the rest of the force originally promised (the 19th, 20th and 23rd Divisions, comprising the VIIth Corps, the Panzer units of the Armoured Division and the remainder of the details) went out according to schedule, the last train leaving Hungary on 27th July. Owing to the various delays (for some of which the Germans were to blame, for they detrained the [Vth Corps 600 km. behind the Front, leaving it to do the rest of the journey on foot) the Second Army was unable to participate as a unit in the German summer offensive which opened on 28th June. The troops which reached the line in time—the three divisions of the IIIrd Corps and the advance units of the Armoured Corps—were accordingly grouped with some German units to form the German VIIth Corps, of which Jany was given command. As such, they took part in a rapid advance which carried them forward 160 km. in ten days and brought them to the Don, south of Voronezh, on 10th July, afterwards taking part in severe fighting for the bridgeheads over the Don. The [Vth and VIIth Corps now caught up with them, and the entire Army, now grouped as a self-contained unit, settled down, after further fighting which brought its casualty list up to a fairly high figure,* to hold a front 186 km. long running along the Don (except that the

Soviets held a 10-km. bridgehead at Uryv) from a point a little south of Voronezh. Of the three Hungarian Corps, the [Ird was on the left, the [Vth in the centre and the VIIth on the right. On the left of the HIrd Corps was

the German Second Army, on the right of the VIIth, the Italian Eighth Army, and south of that again, the Third and Fourth Roumanian. 1 The figures vary; according to one report, 27,000 volunteered and 18,000 were accepted. The great majority of these, and of the later volunteers, came from the Bacska. 2 2.500 Germans appear to have volunteered before the agreements were concluded. The

first decrees apparently applied to them. It was only in 1944, under Sztdjay, that Hungarian citizenship was restored to all volunteers. Another pin-prick inflicted by the Hungarians was to

make the Germans pay the family allowances for the men called up. In the end, ReményiSchneller had to allow Germany a secret credit to meet this obligation (N.G. 2550, Nazi Consp. and Ager. 519; Min. Trial, p. 6088). 3 See below, pp. 154, 267-8.

4 The official casualty list for the Second Army for the period Ist April to 19th August

recorded the following losses: Officers O.R.

Killed . ;. ;. ,. .154 Wounded 456 2,259 11,093

Missing. . , , 30 530

No detailed list was issued after this, but the total casualties between 20th August and 9th January 1943 were given as 13,332. G

98 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Last of all (it may be mentioned at this point) followed the two additional occupation divisions. These formations (the Ist and 201st Light Divisions) actually did not leave until December 1942, and were still assembling behind the line when the catastrophe of January 1943 occurred. The other occupation divisions had meanwhile been withdrawn from the front (after suffering not

inconsiderable casualties),! and some units even brought home,’ although where this was done, others were sent out in their places to keep the numbers up to the agreed figures (about 45,000 until the end of the year, when the new divisions brought it up to 59,000). They had gradually been moved eastward, and the bulk of them, under General Olgyay, were now stationed along the southern fringes of the Briansk forest, while a smaller group (General-Major

Siklay) was further west. The headquarters of the G.O.C. (General Bakay) were in Kiev. The main duty of these troops was to deal with partisans in the forests—a task which, it appears, they were never able fully to achieve, although it is recorded that they established good enough relations with the local inhabitants and with Ukrainian volunteer bands, who helped them in their task.®

Meanwhile, the Germans had carried out their promise to equip the Second Army in a way of which the Hungarians complained bitterly— although those who remember how demonstratively half-hearted was the Hungarians’ attitude to the whole business; how they told everyone that this war was none of theirs; how openly they avowed their intention to use any arms which they did get, at the first opportunity, on the Roumanians,* if not on the Germans themselves—such persons will not, perhaps, put all the blame on one party. But, at best, they were not lavish. What they eventually gave for the Armoured Division was Panzer IV tanks sufficient for one regiment and “‘47 mm. out-of-date infantry guns captured in Belgium, which were to

be used as anti-tank guns.’ They also supplied the mixed divisions with certain quantities of light guns, trench mortars and anti-tank guns, some of German manufacture, others, captured French and Belgian material. For the latter, the stocks of ammunition were low. The best material all went to the Roumanians, who, it was said, “‘were fighting better’; nothing at all was sent for the Hungarian Home Army.

Kallay’s domestic political record during his first few months of office was also Hogarthian enough on paper. As we have said, the very day that ’ The casualties suffered by the occupation forces in 1941-2 were officially given as follows: Ist Dec. 1941-1st July 1942 = Ist July-1st Sept. 1942

Officers O.R. Officers O.R. Killed. . , . ,26 516 — 11 102 245 Missing , , 4 122 Wounded . , , 58 965 19 416

Frostbite. . . 4 119 — —

> The return of various units was reported on different dates in July and August. They were brought back in principle after a year’s service. A battalion returning to Esztergom on 13th July was said to have spent nine months on active service and a unit arriving at Miskolcz on 17th

August to have done ‘‘more than a year.”’ Other units returned to Szeged, Ujvidék and ErsekUjvar, these last being cyclists who had been reported in the line in May. 3 Hadak Utjan IV. 35.

* When Nagy asked Goring for some Messerschmidts for training purposes, Géring

refused precisely on the ground that the Hungarians, if they got the machines, would use them against the Roumanians (Nagy, op. cit., p. 123). He was willing to give purely defensive implements

such as searchlights. In the end the Hungarian pilots were sent to train in France, subject to a stipulation that they were not to be used operationally in the West. 5 Czebe-Petho, pp. 22-3.

TWO STEPS TO THE RIGHT 99 he met Parliament he gave notice that he was introducing the new antiSemitic legislation which he had agreed with the MEP Party leaders, adding that he had that day issued an Order freezing ownership of the estates affected by the proposed legislation. The Bill, which provided for complete expropriation, against compensa-

tion, of all Jewish-owned land and all implements and stock attached to larger estates, was duly tabled on 12th May, introduced on 22nd May and passed through Parliament in the following weeks.? It was accompanied by a large number of other measures against the Jews. Jews were debarred from the calling of wholesale dealers in wine, and the equipment and in some cases the premises of such dealers confiscated.* Conversion from any “‘received”’ or “‘recognised”’ religion to the Jewish faith was made illegal.* The further training of Jewish doctors was forbidden. The Bill tabled for the revalorisation of the 1914-18 War Loan limited the amounts which could be paid out to Jews to 5,000 peng6 (the residue was to be paid into a fund for assisting Jewish emigration), and a special tax on persons not doing military service

primarily affected them. Jews were forbidden to rent, except by special permission, business premises not previously occupied by them,” or to become members of sports clubs.® It was made illegal in principle to employ them as

private employees in “‘intellectual’’ positions. If this was done at all, a

non-Jew had to be taken on at the same time.’ Another measure was introduced in June by a group of MEP Deputies. This Bill, which was accepted by Parliament on 31st July to become Law XIV of 1942, elevated to the status of a separate law the Order in Council of 10th

April 1941 (itself a codicil to the Military Service Act of 1939), which excluded Jews from armed service in the Defence Forces. While in the main

this enactment simply lent further sanction to an existing situation, it ageravated it by adopting the 1941 definition of a Jew, and further added a number of new harsh and humiliating provisos. Up to that date only the officer commanding an auxiliary formation had been a non-Jew, while the subordinate officers and N.C.O.s had been Jewish, but it was now laid down that a Jew, even if he had formerly held commissioned or non-commissioned

rank, could only be a private. Jews had to address their officers as ‘instructor’; persons of Jewish faith wore yellow armlets, while persons “racially” Jews but of Christian faith wore white, etc. These measures constituted in their aggregate a very substantial addition

to the corpus of Hungarian anti-Semitic legislation; but in this case the 1 All land was to be expropriated, and all implements and stock attached to farms exceeding 500 hold or vineyards exceeding 10 hold. Compensation was to be in 3% per cent. blocked, non-

negotiable bonds amortisable in 30 years. The definition of a Jew was that of the 1941 Law, and exceptions were allowed for patriotic service, etc. The land expropriated was to become the property of the State, which would then distribute it; meanwhile “curators” would be put in to manage it. It was estimated that 1,250,000 hold would become available (described as 630,000 hold already reported, i.e. scheduled for expropriation under previous legislation, 125,000 hold ‘which would be revealed by more careful scrutiny’ and 500,000 hold forest). Landlords were further empowered to give notice to Jewish tenants.

2 The Lower House passed it on 10th June and the Upper House a month later. The latter body proposed various amendments, the most important of which would have raised the

limits relating to the expropriation of stock, but the Lower House rejected these. It was promulgated on 6th September and the enactment Orders began to appear on the 8th.

$ Order in Council of 20th March. -

| 4 This was introduced as an amendment to the Law depriving the Jewish confession of the status of a received religion, a measure which was promulgated only under Kallay’s regime

(as6 Law VII of 1942). 6 Order of 13th May. Order of 12th June. 7 Order of 22nd July.

100 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH contrast between appearance and reality was really important. The Jews’ own historian has revealed that K4llay was acting throughout in consultation with the representatives of the Jewish communities, who fully recognised the necessity of throwing some morsels to the pack of wolves in Hungary, and

still more in Germany, who were thirsting for their blood The same writer has described KAllay’s anti-Semitic measures as ‘‘apparent,’’ and it is certainly true that while the despatch of the Second Army constituted a very real contribution to the Axis cause, the sufferings inflicted on the Jews by K allay’s measures were relatively light. They lost little of substance under the economic enactments, of which that relating to the Jewish-owned land was gradually watered down,? while several of the other measures were either

rescinded or disregarded in practice. The one measure among those enumerated which inflicted genuine and substantial suffering on its victims was the amendment to the Military Service Act. Even this did not greatly alter the existing position in law, but this had not been very burdensome in practice before the big call-up of 1942, for although auxiliary formations had accompanied the force sent out in June-July 1941, they had been relatively few.* The larger-scale callings-up of 1942 altered all this. Jews appear to have been called up with less regard to age than non-Jews; the callings-up were sent by individual notice, covering a wide range of age-groups, and the

persons receiving them were largely those classed by the authorities as politically or socially undesirable. According to their own historian,’ some 40,000 of them went out in 1942-43, while according to official figures, Labour formations sent out in 1942 had a man-strength of 37,200, most of them Jews.

Some of them had the ill-fortune to come under officers and N.C.O.s of

sadistic brutality, a number of whom were executed as war criminals in 1945. Some of the commanders are reported to have told their charges that “*they were not meant to come home.”’ It does not appear that their casualties were proportionately heavier than those of the combatant troops: in dead or wounded, they were, in fact, much

deplorable. :

lighter,® but their sufferings, physical and moral, were undoubtedly most

1 Lévai, Fekete Kodnyv, p. 66. 2 Ibid.

> On 8th September an Order was issued allowing Jews, under certain conditions, to sell

fortifications in Hungary. .

holdings up to 5 Ao/d in area on the open market.

4 A few Jews were also employed at the outbreak of the European war on digging field

§ Lévai, op. cit., p. 272. For this whole question see pp. 271 ff. of that work. ® The casualties suffered by the regular and auxiliary forces respectively were, according to the Hungarian Ministry’s figures, as follows: (a) June 1941 to 31st December 1942

Regular Forces Auxiliary Forces Total Killed or died .. .23,736 8,506 1,628 10,134 Wounded . . 318 24,054 Missing or P.O.W. . 3,224 202 3,426 (5) 1st January to 31st December 1943

Killed or died .15,781 6,560 2,158 8,718 Wounded . , , 716 16,497 Missing or P.O.W. , 59,436 20,434 79,870 117,243 25,456 142,699

It will be seen that the casualties suffered by the auxiliary formations were proportionately below those of the regulars, and the great majority of their losses were men missing or P.O.W. Most of these were taken prisoner at Voronezh, and thereafter fared much better than their non-

Jewish colleagues. They came into the hands of Hungarian Jewish émigrés serving with the Soviet forces, who looked after them and secured their priority of repatriation after the war.

TWO STEPS TO THE RIGHT 101 Actually, even this measure was not in force, in its full rigour, for very long, for a new Minister of Defence took office in September precisely for the

purpose of getting the conditions in the Jewish Labour Formations ameliorated.t Taken all in all, Hungary continued during these months, and right up

to March 1944 to be the single country in Europe within arm’s-length of Hitler in which the Jews enjoyed de facto something approaching civilised conditions. She was a haven of refuge, and not for the Hungarian-born Jews

only, for large numbers of foreign-born Jews? sought refuge within her frontiers, especially from Galicia, after the Germans had occupied it, but also

from Slovakia, Roumania, etc.

When he met Parliament, Kallay (like Bardossy before him) had further , been assailed with demands to dissolve the Trade Unions and the Social Democratic Party, and to suppress the Liberal Press and the “‘Independence

Front.’’ He had replied that to do these things would be contrary to the Hungarian political tradition. Fortunately for him, the minds of the MEP were so set on the Jewish question that provided he satisfied them on that (and being Hungarians, they were ready to take a good measure of words for deeds)

they did not greatly care what else, within reason, he did at home. They certainly did not want to relinquish the sweets of power to either Imrédy or Szalasi, nor to accept the leadership of either of them. So they accepted Kallay’s anti-Semitic laws and speeches, his appointment of Lukacs and Antal to the Cabinet, and the despatch of the troops to the front, as sufficient payment on account, and settled down happily enough to transacting routine business® and to discussing (quite inconclusively) what should be done with

the land taken away from the Jews. No Deputy disliked Kallay’s policy enough to secede from the Party. One Minister—Hdéman—left the Cabinet,

but he refrained from making political capital out of his gesture, and continued to support the Cabinet from outside Parliament.’ His successor, Szinyel-Merse, was a somewhat colourless individual, rather more tractable

than Homan. The only other change in the Cabinet was due to death: Gyorffy-Bengyel, the Minister of Supply, died suddenly on 14th June. Kallay

simply replaced him by his Secretary of State, M. G. Lossonczy, a man of

similar type who, however, was destined to hold office only for a few weeks.°®

The Transylvanians and the Christian Party promised the Government definite support, and on 13th June the Transylvanians allied themselves with

the MEP and accepted Kallay as leader while retaining their internal autonomy.’ Kallay was even able slightly to strengthen his own (and 1 See below, p. 114. 2 KAallay put the number as 70,000 in 1944 (Kallay to C. A. M.).

3 The only other major Bill introduced during the session was one which Bardossy had already promised, for ‘‘ensuring the purity of public life’ by tightening up the restrictions on financial positions held by Deputies, and on the conduct of elections. A further Bill dealt with the reorganisation of the National Health Service. Finally, the enormous Agricultural Development Bill was passed at last, after many months of discussion, the only beneficiaries of which were the Communist planners after the war. 4 Jewish holdings of between 5 and 10 hold were eventually transferred to the Vitézi Rend, but most of the large estates were never touched at all. 5 The date was 4th July. There was no special reason, but Kallay told Homan that their views differed too widely for easy co-operation, and Homan agreed (Kallay to C. A. M.). 6 See below, p. 114. ? The MEP now took over control over the Partium,

102 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Horthy’s) party at the centre of things. In May. three of the big patriotuc associations—the Vitézi Rend. the Tiizharcosok and the Association of Holders of the Cross of National Defence—were brought under a jomt Committee and given the task of supporting the Government and authorines against “espionage. sabotage. subversive agitation. the spreading of false rumours and. in general. anv manifestation of defeatism or any activities injurious to the interests of the nation and the army.” Other organisauons such as the Turani Vadaszok were subsequently drawn into the network. and armed. Represented as a step for ensuring Hungarws more whole-hearted

participation in the war, this measure was in fact designed chieily to concentrate power in the hands of factors loval to the Government and the Regent and capable of being used in an emergency against either the extreme Left or the extreme Right. and was so regarded in the country at the time: “resistance”? Ue. Communist) literature dealing with the period descmbes the organisations in question as existing solely to crush democracy, while Szalasi, in a twpicallv self-regarding entry in his Diary. designated them as “expressly and unambiguously directed against National Socialist Hungarv—in the first

instance. of course. against the Hungarist movement.” It should be added that the excellent veterans did not perform either role very effecuvely. In this situation, Kallav was able to follow out his own policy towards both the Right and the Left Oppeositions without much hindrance from others Or TOO much Violence to his own principles. Towards the Right. this line consisted simply of calling Szalasi a subversive near-lunatic. and watching.

censoring. impeding and generally harassing his movements: while he dismissed Imrédv by explaining blandly that since he was himself already

carmving out a full Right-wing policy. there was no need for anv substitute.

Neither movement constituted a semous threat to his position. The upheavals over the Deputy Regency had. indeed. brought Imrédv somewhat

more representation in Parliament. The ten Depuues who had left Szalasi during the crisis began by forming themselves into a Parliamentary sroup which called itself non-Party but announced its intention of collaborating with the Imrédist-Nanional Socialist alliance if terms could be agreed. On 7th Apml Ratz resigned from the Vice-Presidency of the Imrédists “in order tO take up the more important task of co-ordinating the forces of the Right-

wing Opposition.” A working agreement appears to have been reached awing to the other two parties agreeing “to refrain from exacerbating the national question in the hope that the Government's policy will guide this question on to the path of a healthier development.” Similarly. when Hubav adhered. from outside Parliament (as did Ruszkay) to the Palffv-Baky group. he signed a declaration that his new frends were not thereby committed to

the Nationalities Bill which had lost him his mandate in 1940. The allies thus constututed a not inconsiderable numerical force. their united Parliamentarv voting strength. however computed. being not much under 50. Yet they had lost ground in another way. as a result of the events of February. The antagonism between the Regent and Imrédv had deepened into a bitter personal hatred and it was now quite clear that Imrédv’s road to power could lead only over Horthy’s body. Horthy. meanwhile. had entirely recovered his strength and looked set for a century. Imredy, who, incidentally, was much occupied during the spring with two

TWO STEPS TO THE RIGHT 103 libel actions brought by him against some journalists on the staff of Count Bethlen’s 8 Orai Ujsdg—actions from which, in spite of an ultimately adverse verdict, he emerged, on the whole, with credit!—confined himself in Parliament to criticising Kallay’s internal policy as insufficiently progressive and

insufficiently anti-Semitic, repeating his demand for the dissolution of the Social Democrat Party and the Trade Unions and reaffirming his tenet (which, as we have said, the Government did not at the time seek to controvert) that

it was impossible to drive a wedge between the Western Allies and the U.S.S.R.* In the debate on the prolongation of the Government’s Emergency Powers he even went so far as to hint broadly that if Kallay would offer to take him back into the Government in his old post of Minister of Economic Co-ordination, he would accept the offer.

In any case, when Parliament rose on 18th July, he, like the other Deputies of military age, went off to join their units at the front (or behind it, since most of them were given Staff jobs). This was presently to make it possible for him to pose in a new role, as leader and protector of the “‘servicemen of the Eastern Front’; but that was a later development. For the time

being, his military service removed him from politics. The National Socialists hardly gave tongue at all; their most important real activity was probably the card index of enemies of Germany which Baky was secretly compiling. The Archduke had faded entirely into the background.

As for Szalasi, his star was at its nadir in 1942. His diminished Parliamentary following was reduced still further in April when Stits suddenly resigned his mandate and fled to Croatia, where he made things worse for his ex-colleagues by allowing himself to be appointed head of the section for anti-Hungarian propaganda in Zagreb; it was then announced that the police were looking for him in connection with the leaflets against Istvan Horthy.

He was tried in absentia and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment, while another prominent Nyilas, Omelka, who had lost his mandate earlier, received 10 years’ sentence for the same offence. In July Szalasi was deserted by one of the very most important members of his party, Malnasi-Metzler, who had been the Party’s “ideological leader’? and appointed by Szalasi, in a political testament drawn up by him on 20th April 1941, occupant of that post, director of education and a perpetual member of the Party Council. It was the usual story: Malnasi had gone over to the Germans, tried to convert Szalasi to the

German plan for South-Eastern Europe and got expelled for his pains. He then joined up with the National Socialists, with the mission (entrusted to him by the Germans) of organising a “fighting-fit National Socialist organisa1 The articles, which were obviously instigated by Bethlen and had been avowedly written (cf. M. Kertész’ evidence, Magyar Nemzet, 18th October 1942) with the object of discrediting Imrédy for good and all, had contained bitter attacks on him, firstly for his conduct in connection with the Deputy Regency Bill and secondly for his alleged attempt to introduce dictatorship in November 1938 and alleged disloyalty towards Teleki in the autumn of 1939 and spring of 1940. The first Court gave Imrédy a verdict, with costs; this was afterwards reversed on appeal, but while the impartial reader of the records cannot but feel that the judge of the lower instance was biassed in Imrédy’s favour, he equally cannot escape the feeling that the Judges of Appeal were at least as strongly biassed against him. At any rate, the defence entirely failed to produce any

evidence that Imrédy had acted incorrectly over the Bill, or disloyally at any time towards Teleki. The records of the trial are valuable to the historian for the light which they throw on the incidents discussed. 2 So, speaking on the Anglo-Soviet Treaty on 24th June, he said that it ‘‘must convince everyone that the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets could not win the war separately. But if they could win it together the whole Continent would be delivered over to Bolshevism.”

104 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH tion among the workers’’; it is interesting that, on the Germans’ own admission, this attempt was a complete failure.! The Germans were now not even trying to bring Szalasi into their ““Right-

wing Union.’ In the summer he sent Gal and Vajna to Berlin to try to establish contact with the NSDAP. At first they received nothing but rebuffs. When they made it clear that they were not asking for money, the atmosphere improved a little and they were given an official contact-man, a person with the curiously un-Nazi name of Major Mandl. The Diary does not, however,

record a single communication from this gentleman. At home, one or another of Szalasi’s lieutenants occasionally approached the Imrédists, but always without success, as neither Party would abandon its fundamental conditions, and these were mutually incompatible. According to newspaper sources (hostile ones, it is true) the total Party

membership was down to 127,000; in Debrecen the Party had only 939 adherents left, compared with 18,536 in 1939.

All this seems to have left Szalasi personally unmoved. He continued peaceably working out his long-term plans for the organisation of the Hungarist Corporative State, with such refinements as “‘a compulsory anthropological examination for all officials.’’ But in the opinion of almost everyone except himself and the little band of lieutenants who remained true to him, he had ceased to be a political force. The relationship which developed between Kallay’s regime and the Left was more complex, although the complexity was, for once, not of his making.

He was really anxious to preserve the parties and organisations of the moderate Left, which were, after all, his unconfessed allies against Germany, so long as they remained true to the Western orientation which was also in secret his own; and he consistently extended (in this case without any concealment) to those institutions and their representatives the same protection that he was affording in practice to the Jews. In this respect also Hungary stood out as an island of relative freedom, toleration and decency in the Axis and near-Axis sea. The professed ideals of the ““Independence Front,” too, differed very little

from his own; but, as it happened, just after Kallay took office, the Front had given a handle to those who accused it of revolutionary designs. The ‘“Historical Monuments Committee” had decided to make the name of the poet Petdfi their slogan for the year, on the ground that Petdfi was, as Kovacs wrote,” “‘a revolutionary, yet a good patriot.” It then arranged to celebrate Hungary’s great national festival, 15th March, by depositing a wreath at the foot of Petdfi’s statue. As usual, the bourgeois members of the Committee had been given the leading roles, and the speeches were to be made by three non-Marxians: Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, Barati Huszar Aladar and Count Gyula Dessewffy. Even Social Democratic participation, originally planned, had been called off: the Népszava, after calling on the workers to attend in their masses, had later asked them not to do so, allegedly on hearing that the Arrow Cross was preparing a counter-demonstration? (the real reason 1 A report from the German Legation on Malinasi’s activities subsequently came into Hungarian hands. It is reproduced in the Sz. I. MS. and contains the interesting admission that nearly all the skilled workers had remained obstinately loyal to the Social Democrat organisation. The few members of the “Lumpenproletariat’” who had joined Malnasi’s organisation were quite unimportant. 2 In the Magyar Nemzet, 15th February 1942. 3 So Erdédy. op. cit., p. 80. The Szalasi Diary does not suggest that any such demonstration was really envisaged.

TWO STEPS TO THE RIGHT 105 being that they had been requested to do so by the police). But the order

came too late, and furthermore, was intentionally sabotaged by the Communists. Excited masses turned up, allegedly to the number of 10,000, and insisted on going on from the first ceremony to the statue of Kossuth—

a journey which led them through the heart of Pest and was made to the accompaniment of shouts against the war and against Germany.

The police arrested 120 persons, including several leading cryptoCommunists. A deputation from the Social Democrat Party secured the release of nearly all the prisoners, although only against assurances of future

good behaviour. It was on the strength of these assurances that Kallay, a few days later, refused to take any further action against the Social Democrats

or the Front. But his refusal implied no sort of indulgence towards Communism, to which Kallay was as hostile as any man in Hungary, and in

the next weeks the Communists began at last to develop certain private activities of their own. They circulated some leaflets and organised a couple of fairly large-scale attempts at sabotage, as well as many minor cases, chiefly

of rick-burning.t The authorities retaliated with a series of big antiCommunist razzias which extended throughout the spring months and resulted in the arrest of some six hundred Communists or sympathisers, including two of the three members of the central Secretariat (Sch6nherz and

Rozsa) and, according to one source,” 80 per cent. of the active trained cadres of the Party. 450 of these were held in prison, awaiting trial,* and a large number of other suspects (including many Social Democrat leaders of secondary rank and Trade Union officials) were got out of the way by the

device of calling them up and sending them out to the ordinary, or, in extreme cases, the penal detachments of the Labour Service units at the Front

(not always a very effective procedure, as the new men were often more uncertain quantities than the old). In connection with these measures, the law against subversive activities was made stricter. The death penalty could now be inflicted on both principles and accessories to crimes of sabotage, including arson. At the same time, factories working on war production (under which category most of the larger concerns now fell) were placed under

military discipline. The amount of compulsory overtime which could be required in such factories was now made unlimited. Meanwhile, in the course of this drive, a good deal of material had come to light which was, apparently, revealing not only to the authorities but also to the non-Communist members of the Independence Front; and the embarrass-

ment into which the latter persons were thrown by the developments 1 On 15th July Keresztes-Fischer said in Parliament that there had been “three organised attempts to spread Communism” in the preceding six months. He said that no important persons were involved, but admitted that ‘‘the lowest classes of the population showed from time to time a certain sympathy with Communism.”’ One of the ‘‘outbreaks,’’ when 91 persons were tried for Communism, may really have been Croat irredentist: it was in the Murakoz. This year there were allegedly 142 cases of rick-burning during the threshing in the Alfold. Some of these may, of course, have been accidental, or due to individual initiative, and some, perhaps, were the work of infiltrated agents; on 31st July three Russian parachutists were caught dropping near Gyor. The biggest sabotage attempt (in the Gy6r munition works), for which one person was executed and several others, including the famous comedian, Békeffy, sentenced to long terms of

imprisonment, was organised from Great Britain. Incidentally, it was given away to the Government by the Social Democrat leaders, to whom the workman approached by the agent had reported the incident. 2 Champions hongrois de la liberté contre le fascisme, p. 9. 3 Szig. Biz., p. 512, records the internment of ‘‘360 leading members of the Social Democrat Party.”

106 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH was enhanced by an unfortunate incident which occurred at the beginning

of May. Mr. Basil Davidson, formerly a newspaper correspondent in Budapest, but now otherwise employed in Istanbul, indited letters to Szakasits and Imre Kovacs.1 These stated most categorically that it was untrue that the Anglo-Saxon Powers “‘were abandoning Central and Eastern

Europe to Bolshevism.’? The Soviets had no revolutionary or imperialist aims in the States of Central and South-Eastern Europe and would not interfere in their affairs if those States were led by real popular governments. ‘Agreement between the U.S.A., Britain and the Soviet Union on this point is complete.” On the other hand, none of the three wanted Horthy’s rule to continue, still less a Habsburg restoration, nor a regime which had suddenly swung round at the last moment. They knew that they could not rely on the existing regime, and while not wishing to undervalue the work of émigres

such as Karolyi and Eckhardt, yet felt that their real allies must be found inside Hungary. They therefore wanted a strong Opposition which should start building up during the war and be able in time to take over the government ‘‘against the existing regime.’’ Therefore they had watched the progress of the Popular Front, which they regarded as their allies, with warm approval,

and the recipients were invited to persevere courageously in their work. Szakasits was asked to send a reliable personal representative, and, if possible, a representative of the Social Democrat Party, to London and Washington to maintain touch.

These letters were brought to Budapest by a certain Baroness Miske Gerstenberger, the English-born wife of the Hungarian Consul-General in Istanbul, who handed them over on 2nd May. Szakasits was scared out of his wits. He consulted the Party’s two principal Parliamentary leaders, Peyer and Mme Anna Kéthly, and it was decided not to answer the letter, but

to deposit it, in a sealed envelope, with a lawyer. A day or two later, the military counter-espionage service searched the offices of the Népszava, found the lawyer’s receipt, followed it up and discovered the letter. Kovacs had already been caught with his letter. He and Szakasits were arrested and brought before a military Court.’ The affair was hushed up to this extent that Kallay had Szakasits released

from arrest (although he had to resign the Secretaryship of the Party) and blocked the efforts of the military to get Peyer’s and Mme Keéthly’s Parlia-

mentary immunity suspended in order that they might be put on trial as accomplices after the event. Kovacs, however, did a turn in prison. The result of all this was that the Independence Front practically disintegrated for the time. Kallai himself writes* that under these conditions “the Right Wing of the Social Democrat Party raised the question whether they should continue the policy of national co-operation now that it had become clear that Communists were standing at the head of the Independence Movement.”’ They not only raised the question (partly, it seems, on Kallay’s advice‘) but answered it, for the time, in a decided negative, and during the whole spring and summer they reverted to an almost complete passivity. 1 At the trial the courier allegedly said that she had also brought letters to Kertész and Barankovics. 2 Under a Law of 1930 it was an offence to have cognisance of such matters and not to report

them to the authorities. 3 Kallai, loc. cit.

4 Kallay once advised the Social Democrat leaders against concluding a coalition with bourgeois parties because, he said, “if the Western Allies win, the bourgeois parties will be compromised by their association with you, and vice versa if the Russians win”’ (Kallay to C. A. M.). | |

TWO STEPS TO THE RIGHT 107 Their spokesmen in Parliament registered the stereotyped vote of nonconfidence in the Government on the appropriate occasions, but only in the ritual formula which they had used for twenty years past and without making

any attempt to raise awkward questions! The Népszava devoted itself exclusively to the affairs of the industrial workers and did not so much as mention the idea of co-operation between the workers and other social classes. The Smallholders, on their side, did not talk of co-operation with the workers. Their Parliamentary spokesmen did not even take up an anti-Governmental

attitude, except on some specific points of detail (on others, such as rearmament, and to some extent anti-Semitism, they expressly supported the Government), and they did not attempt to revive their dormant organisation in the provinces.” The Peasant Union held some meetings, but at its annual meeting on 20th June its President, M. Nagy, described the organisation as “Interested, not in questions of Party politics, but only in raising the moral and material level of the Hungarian peasantry” and as being ‘‘fundamentally anti-revolutionary and anti-subversive.’”® In so far as the slogans of the Independence Front were still voiced, this was done exclusively in the Magyar Nemzet and exclusively by the bourgeois members of the Historical Monuments Committee—Szekfii, Andorka* and BajcsyZsilinszky. To their credit, these men still continued to maintain the need of social reform and of political democratisation; but they were only a few voices preaching in the wilderness, for Rassay’s vanity still held him aloof from any co-operation with others, while the Christian Party refused to touch any movement which did not expressly repudiate any possible contact with Marxism.

In fulfilment of his promise to bring about a reconciliation with the minorities, Kallay visited Transylvania (at the end of April) and Ruthenia and made speeches promising the minorities good treatment in return for loyalty, and some relatively liberal linguistic measures were in fact enacted during this period and a few concessions made to the Slovak minority; but in Transylvania the question of the minorities was now so completely bound up with that of the future status of the country that administrative questions had become practically irrelevant.’ Far the most important question in this field was, in Kallay’s eyes, that of the Serb population of the Bacska. As 1 In the opening debate on Kallay’s programme, Peyer said that he accepted Kallay’s request

to leave the Army and the war, and certain other questions, including that of the national minorities, undiscussed. He did not object to the Bill for expropriating Jewish estates, although he did say that the measure ought to extend also to non-Jewish lands. 2 Bajcsy-Zsilinszky now took over the Szabad Szd as Editor-in-Chief, Kovacs working under him. This was rather a private concern, linking the Smallholders to the Village Explorers. The Kis Ujsdg, under Gyula Dessewffy, became the official Smallholder organ. 3 Erdédy, loc. cit., gives a very different account of these six months: he draws a picture of intense activity inside the Social Democrat Party, of close and regular co-operation between the Party and the Smallholders (including weekly meetings between the Party leaders) and of equally

close co-operation with the ‘“‘progressive intellectuals.”” He admits that he is writing from memory, and I can only say that the records of the Press and of Parliament over the period do not bear out his account. I can find no article in the Népszava between 15th March and October which so much as hints at the idea of the ““‘Independence Front.” The same applies to the Smallholders. In March, Tildy endorsed what Kallay said on questions relative to the Army and to Hungary’s military contribution to the fight against Bolshevism. Later, he approved the measure expropriating the Jewish landowners, only criticising the absence of any provision for distributing the land confiscated. In June he opposed the Agricultural Development Bill on the ground of insufficiency, but again only in mild and non-polemical terms. 4 Andorka had been Chief of Military Intelligence, then Military Attaché in Madrid. Bardossy had had him pensioned off on account of his pro-Allied sympathies and connections. 5 It is, however, true that a ‘‘revision of the Roumanian land reform” was put through during this period. Not many Roumanian peasants, however, lost their land under this measure, the chief effect of which was to give compensation to Hungarians expropriated during the Roumanian period.

108 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH soon as he had taken office, he had sent down an agent to enquire afresh into the facts of the Ujvidék massacre. When the report was ready, he laid

it on the table of the House and arranged for M. Popovics, the most prominent Serb who had been willing to co-operate at all with the Hungarian

regime, to raise the question. This was done on 14th July, just before Parliament rose. Kallay replied, emphasising the provocation given by the partisans but admitting that there had been excesses: he gave a figure, which he swore to be correct, of 2,250 Serb victims (he seems to have omitted the victims of other nationalities), and said that proceedings were already being taken against the offenders. In fact, the enquiries on the highest level were (as will be seen) blocked again, but about 250 gendarmes and officials were transferred, and a genuine effort made to inaugurate a new policy of friendship towards the Serbs. That this did not go further was due mainly to the reluctance of the Serbs.1 The Serb Deputies from the Bacska, however, entered the MEP.

Towards the Swabians, Kallay had words which were kind, but mingled with strong admonitions on their duty towards the State. In fact, the Swabian question was quiescent during the whole year, except for the recruiting, which, of course, was drawing away the more turbulent elements.”

The economic position was still serious. The supply position had continued precarious. Stocks ran low again before the harvest, and the prospects for the future were threatening. There were serious floods again, not quite so bad as those of 1940 but more extensive than those of 1941 (a million and a half hold were under water at one time or another), and more prolonged. Besides much damage to houses in parts of the Alf6ld, spring

sowings were delayed. In the late spring a number of restrictions were introduced on foodstuffs, including milk rationing in Budapest and meat rationing in some of the provincial towns. Harvest came only just in time, and then there were difficulties in getting it in: manpower was short, owing to the callings-up, and such machinery as the under-mechanised Hungarian agriculture possessed was beginning to suffer under a shortage of spare parts. The Levente was mobilised and strong measures were taken to ensure that

professional agricultural labourers did their job. Farmers were ordered to deliver their entire stocks of the main cereal crops (beyond certain specified quantities which they were allowed to keep for domestic consumption, and for seed) to the authorities, at official prices. Just before the harvest, the bread ration was even reduced for six weeks to 150 grammes, although the meat position was reported as good: if, said the Minister of Supply (who en passant accused Budapest of possessing the world’s worst black market), there were runs on the butcher’s shops “‘this was because nowadays everyone wanted, not merely to eat meat, but to eat best-quality meat.”

The industrial supply situation, especially as regards textiles and iron 1 One informant (M.S. Unghvari) tells me that Szinyei-Merse sent him down in July to try to arrange a ‘‘common front of the small peoples against German and Russian imperialism.”’ He was taken to Belgrade, but the Serbs whom he met there told him that this would have been possible before Ujvidék, but not after it. They did, however, put forward certain cultural

desiderata, which Szinyei-Merse promised to meet. : 2 According to Kallay (personal to C. A. M.) Basch, whom he saw several times, was never | disloyal or offensive to him. The writer takes this opportunity to register the fact that Basch | was a decent and honourable lad who became caught between the millstones of two loyalties. | He did not deserve the fate which overtook him in 1945 of being shot as a “‘war criminal,”

TWO STEPS TO THE RIGHT 109 ware, was also getting more difficult, largely owing to the shortage of industrial raw materials, and also to the demands of the Army, although there were as yet few serious shortages of essential commodities. The index figure of the cost of living, in spite of a slash in the cost of clothing, went up from 145-9, including rent, or 164-6, excluding it, in January, to 152-0 and 172-7

respectively, in July. Wages in industry were, on the whole, raised rather more than proportionately (the average rise during the year was 20 to 25 per cent.) but the fixed-income classes were suffering severely. The harvest, however, was got in somehovw;; the bread ration was restored

to its former figure, and the customary post-harvest tranquility brooded again over the Hungarian landscape.

CHAPTER SEVEN

MARKING TIME N 20th August this tranquility was suddenly shattered by an unlooked

( )é« and tragic event.

Istvan Horthy was 38 years of age, and thus no longer a very young man in the military sense; moreover. if the duties of Deputy Regent meant anything. they surely required his presence at his father’s side. But he himself had been anxious to take his share of his country’s sacrifices, and his father, besides agreeing that such was his duty, had felt that for him to periorm it would help to make the war more palatable in Hungary, and also to convince the Germans of Hungarw’s sinceritv. He had therefore gone out with the Hungarian Air Force. and had, on his own insistence, been

taking his full share of operational flights. Kallav had always disliked the position, and when the Regent repeatedly

refused to recall his son. had finally had a resolution passed through the Ministerial Council instructing the Minister of Defence to order Istvan Horthy’s recall. The telegram went out on 19th August. In reply. a wire. came that he had perished. By a macabre coincidence, this message reached

Budapest on the morning of St. Stephen's Day, Hungary’s most solemn national festival, on which. by a centuries-old practice, her most venerated relic. the Holy Dexter of St. Stephen, was carmed in procession through Buda, followed by the chief dignitaries of the State. Kallay was appraised just as the procession was starting out. He carried the secret with him during the ceremony, walking behind the unsuspecting Regent, to whom he broke the news when the two men returned to the Palace. A statement recording the bare fact of Istvan Horthy’s death at the Front was issued immediately, but no details were given. Next came a German communiqué that Horthy had last been seen in contact with a Russian fighter. Then, forty-eight hours after, a Hungarian communiqué stated that Horthy, who had been ordered to return home and was thus on his last flight, had been accompanying. as fighter escort, a short-range reconnaissance machine. the pilot of which had asked him to fly low. His machine had failed to make a turn at the low altitude at which it was flying. and had crashed. In the interval Hungary had buzzed with rumours, which were, of course, not allaved by these announcements, with their mutal inconsistencies. It was pointed out that nothing was said of the nationality of the reconnaissance

pilot: that the Hungarian communiqué did not mention a Russian in the Vicinity: and so on. Soon nearly the whole country believed that something sinister had taken place. The Germans had deliberately brought about the accident by making Horthy fly at an altitude at which an accident was bound

to occur. They, or perhaps some Hungarian supporter of the Archduke Albrecht’s, had tampered with the machine. Alternatively, or complementarily, Horthy’s commanding officer had suppressed the order for his return, to allow the plot to take effect. It does not seem that any of these allegations were, in fact, justified. To 1 Kallay MS.

MARKING TIME 111 begin with, it was Istvan Horthy’s own wish that he should do his turn of service at the Front! and the Germans do not seem ever to have liked the idea.” There had certainly been no suppression of the order. In fact, this had been sent to Istvan Horthy not through the ordinary official channels but

direct through the G.O.C. Second Army. But he had just been scheduled

for an operational flight the next morning. This would have made his twenty-fifth flight over the lines, and he was anxious to put up his quarter century. He put it in his pocket, without even reporting it to his superior officer.* As to the flight itself, the Hungarian version was correct. There was no Russian about, and the reconnaissance pilot was a Hungarian. There is no evidence that the machine had been tampered with. But like all those in use at that time in the Hungarian Air Force, it was of Italian make, and bad in its original design, and had been made more unwieldy still by additions

made to it by Hungarian builders. It was notorious among the Hungarians for its unreliability and the frequency with which it broke down. The real mystery about the accident was that the Regent’s son and Deputy Regent should have been allowed to fly at all—and that at the age of 38—in such a ‘ramshackle piece of old iron. But the country did not easily believe in accident, and less easily than ever when, only ten days later, the Regent’s son-in-law, Gyula Karolyi, jun., also

met with a fatal air accident, this time while training near Budapest. His machine disintegrated in the air. Machine and man fell into the Danube, whence the body was recovered only days afterwards. Thus one effect of the tragedy was to add yet another grain to the heap of dislike and distrust with which the Hungarians regarded the Germans and the war. The internal political consequences of the tragedy were very far-reaching. The whole question of the succession to the Regency was thrown wide open

again. Horthy had a second son, Miklos Horthy, jun., who had returned shortly before from Brazil, where he had been serving as Minister until the rupture of diplomatic relations between that country and Hungary. He was notoriously anti-German and on good terms with the Hungarian Left, to which he was destined to render valuable services two years later, but he had never been considered, nor considered himself, as a candidate for high political

position. No one now suggested that he should step into his brother’s place.

Istvan Horthy had left a little son, his own namesake. In the days following the funeral, which took place on 23rd August, rumours circulated that a Bill was to be introduced conferring on the boy some political dignity which would make it possible for him to succeed his grandfather, or even,

after adopting the Roman Catholic faith, be crowned king. A few Press organs, notably that conducted by the amiable and eccentric Mesko, ‘“‘Horthy’s nyilas” urged that a ““Horthy dynasty’”’ should be founded, and it really appears that “‘the most serious and prominent people in the country”’

discussed the project and waited on KaAllay to win his approval for it. He himself, however, was strongly against it, and wrote to the Regent in that

sense. The Regent accepted his arguments, and if he had himself ever 1 Kallay, op. cit., p. 104. 2 According to a note by Barczy, some Germans had said that Horthy would have to shoot down at least 50 Russians to redeem his country’s behaviour, but Hitler had been against his going out, because of the risk of his being taken prisoner. 3 Kallay, op. cit., p. 105. 4 On this, see Horthy, op. cit., pp. 246 ff.

112 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH thought of countenancing the project, he dropped it now.! This killed the possibility of a ““Horthy dynasty,” for although the idea still commanded some adherents,” their voices would clearly not count unless reinforced by the Regent’s own. The Government now did draft a Bill “‘to commemorate Istvan Horthy’s services,” but it contained no serious implications. It simply provided a pension for Istvan Horthy’s widow and child, and conferred on the Regent’s male descendants through the late Deputy Regent, the title of Serene Highness (Féméltésagu). But it was easier to eliminate one candidate for the succession to Horthy

than to find another. When Ciano came to Budapest to represent the King of Italy at the funeral, Kallay sent him a message through Kanya to say that if a Hungaro-Italian union, which might be extended to include Croatia and

even Poland and other states, under the King of Italy, would be strong enough to guarantee the independence of Hungary, he was willing to accept it, and would guarantee that the Regent would accept it also, even retiring during his own lifetime. Ciano, who, according to Anfuso, was personally delighted with the idea, promised to discuss the matter on his return to Italy, but wired to Anfuso a few days later that Italy did not find the question | actuel*; in fact, Mussolini had been “‘totally indifferent’? to the idea, partly because he thought that Hitler would either refuse permission, or else exact an exorbitant price, and partly because of his growing hostility towards monarchy in general and the Italian monarchy in particular.* It would be natural to suppose that the Archduke Albrecht’s hopes, and those of his supporters, revived, but there is no evidence on this point, and, as we shall see, Imrédy did not take the occasion to revive the Archduke’s claims. More important were the effects of the new situation on the position and policy of the Legitimists. However correct Horthy’s attitude towards them had been in the past, they had inevitably always seen a possible obstacle

to the realisation of their hopes in the idea of a “‘Horthy dynasty.’ This being now eliminated, there was no obstacle to their collaborating with the Government; and their hopes were also raised by the sympathy with which the idea of a restoration was allegedly regarded in various quarters, including the Holy See and the U.S.A. For some considerable time past the stock of the Archduke Otto had been steadily although inconspicuously, rising, especially in the U.S.A. As early as 1940 Roosevelt had remarked discreetly that he favoured the Archduke’s ideas, while the British Government was at that time allegedly ready ‘“‘not to

hinder, if they could not help” the plans for a Habsburg restoration.’ By 1 Kallay, op. cit., pp. 106-7. * A group in Parliament, lead by B. Lukacs, favoured it, and Szabolcs County in November 1942 passed a resolution in favour of a national king—without, however, circulating it (as it was entitled to do) to the other County Assemblies. But I have been unable to find any traces of the movement after the autumn of 1942. The religious difficulty (Horthy being a Calvinist) would, of course, have been formidable.

° Kallay to C. A. M.; cf. Ciano Diary, 26th, 29th August 1942 and Anfuso, op. cit.,

pp. 390 ff. * Ciano Diary,loc.cit. Itshould be noted that Horthy writes very categorically that he was never consulted about the plan and would have opposed it if he had been so consulted (op. cit., p. 240).

® See J. A. Lukacs, The Great Powers and Eastern Europe, p. 775. Mr. Lukacs has given me

generous help in my endeavours to unravel this story. For some further details of it I am indebted to the Archduke Otto himself, who kindly wrote out for me a memorandum of which he has authorised me to make use. A few documents relating to the negotiations are in the appendix to the Kallay MS. Unfortunately the collection is obviously incomplete, while the Archduke’s account was written from memory. The details which I give in subsequent chapters of these negotiations thus cannot be taken as constituting the complete story.

MARKING TIME 113 this time the Archduke had made his headquarters in Washington, where, as

the Hungarians knew, he was in touch with many of the most influential

members of the U.S.A. Administration and of the Senate. His chief Hungarian contact in the U.S.A. was Eckhardt, who had salvaged this connection from the wreck of his larger plans. In January 1942, the Archduke set out his ideas on the future co-operation of the nations of the Danube Basin in an article published by him in “Foreign Affairs” under the title “Danubian Reconstruction.” It was, according to himself, this article which “decided some highly ranking personalities in Hungary to try to enlist his help.”’” The death of Istvan Horthy cleared away another obstacle from the path. From this date onward the Legitimists developed a greatly increased

activity. They could not found a new political party (and, indeed, their point of view had always been that the question was not one for party politics), but they established a sort of central club, known as the ““Hungarian

Social Circle’? (Magyar Tarsaskor), which was in effect a Legitimist Committee. It had about 600 members, which included, besides members of the MEP, certain members both of the Christian Party and of the Smallholders, as well as non-Party men such as Lipot Baranyai. The Legitimists kept in close touch with Kallay, and an interesting point in their policy was that they were prepared to co-operate even with forces apparently quite antagonistic to them. We shall in fact shortly find them entering the Popular Front, of which they proved in 1944 to be far the most courageous and enterprising members. No successor was ever appointed to the Deputy Regency. Kallay himself

would have liked to see the post filled, not with an eye to determining the succession but in order that there should be someone with authority to act if the Regent died or was suddenly incapacitated from acting in a crisis. But Horthy was “‘not interested’? in the idea of a new Deputy. The only man whom he trusted for the post was Gyula Karolyi, who detested ceremonial and would not have accepted it. The idea of conferring some of the powers of the Deputy Regent on the Minister President of the day was raised, but met with the objection that something might happen to Kallay, and his successor might not be reliable.’ Meanwhile the supreme burden of the State now rested more exclusively than ever on the sole shoulders of the Regent. The possibilities of what might happen if and when death overtook him were more alarming than ever. For the moment, however, the effect of this cruel personal tragedy was greatly to strengthen his position in Hungary. The nation, as Kallay writes, “‘took

him completely to their hearts.’ His popularity and his personal authority were, for the moment, overwhelming, and opposition to his known wishes was even more hesitant than before in expressing itself. The funeral brought a galaxy of foreign statesmen to Budapest, but no important developments resulted from this. Ciano discussed the situation with KAallay and Kanya, but, it appears, inconclusively enough.* The only fruit of his visit—since Italy ended by rejecting the proposal for an ItaloHungarian union—was that it was agreed that, since Kallay had now seen

1 Kallay, op. cit., p. 107. .

2 Cjano in his Diary for 26th August refers to a memorandum of his conversation with Kanya, which he seems to have regarded as the most important which he had, but the record appears to have been lost. Anfuso’s narrative, however, suggests that the conversation was at least mainly concerned with the offer of the Crown. H

114 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Hitler, he might also visit Rome. A date was fixed for Sth November (only, as the event proved, to be cancelled)! Ribbentrop seems to have had nothing at all to say on this occasion.?. So after the guests had departed, tranquillity reigned again, at least at home. There were two Ministerial changes, of which one—the replacement of Bartha by Vilmos Nagy as Minister of Defence, on 25th September—brought about the disappearance from the Cabinet of the last prominent representative in it of the strong pro-German influence which had been so effective when Bartha was working hand in hand with Werth. But Bartha was dismissed not because he had favoured a more active war effort but because he had ‘‘played politics,’ and, above all, had tolerated scandalous conditions in the Jewish labour battalions.*? In this respect the change was very important, for Nagy at once introduced big reforms which greatly alleviated the sufferings

of many thousands of human beings. On the other hand, while he was soon drawn into association with the Left, neither his recorded speeches nor his book suggest that he ever attempted to influence Hungarian policy in the direction of less activity at the Front; and, indeed, he has himself admitted that he was not at that time convinced that the Axis would lose the war.* Incidentally, Kallay, who thought him garrulous, confided no secrets to him.° The replacement of Lossonczy as Minister of Supply, on 19th October, by Lajos Szasz, Permanent Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, was,

politically, a change in the opposite direction, since both Szasz and his Secretary of State, the Deputy Béla Jurcsek,® were men of pronouncedly proGerman views, both of whom, as we shall see, ended (in 1944) by taking the German side very decisively on the political issue. But neither of them was

an appeaser within his own field,’ and what was equally important, both were competent men, so that under them the Ministry of Supply became vastly more efficient.

Official reports issued in September stated, incidentally, that the breadgrain harvest had, after all, been unsatisfactory: the national wheat harvest had amounted only to 26 million quintals, which was 5-5 million quintals less than what Hungary needed for her own consumption (including seed for the next year). It seems something more than probable that the yield had in fact been much heavier than this: even if the figure of 26 million was that actually reported by the Hungarians’ own authorities, the farmers had been hoarding on a grand scale.* There was also, allegedly, a shortage of barley 1 It was put off owing to the British victories in Africa (Ciano Diary, Sth November 1942). * ‘The Sz. I. MS. has nothing to say on the subject. Kallay writes that Ribbentrop said that he did not want to inflict politics on Kallay on such an occasion, but was at his disposal if he

had any points to raise. Kallay had none. Ribbentrop talked generalities for half an hour. ° Nagy tells the story of his interview with Horthy when he was offered the appointment in his Végzetes Esztendok, pp. 88 ff. He also refers to certain friends of his who are precisely the persons mentioned by Lévai, Fekete Kdnyv, pp. 272-3, as having been instrumental in securing an improvement in the conditions in the Labour Battalions. See also Szig. Biz.,

pp. 512 ff.

4 Nagy, op. cit., p. 116. * Kallay to C. A. M.

* Jurcsek was a member of the “Cs” Agrarian Group of the MEP. See above, I, p. 130. 7 | have M. Kallay’s testimony for this. * The Sztatisztikai Zsebkdnyv for 1947 gives the 1942 harvest for the Trianon area at: wheat, 22,785 thousand quintals; rye, 6,692; barley, 7,053; oats, 3,516; maize, 12,462; potatoes, 18,212; sugar beet, 7,259; roots, 19,951. Given the normal ratios between the different areas, it should be expected that the figures for Hungary within her 1942 areas, excluding the Bacska, would be as follows: wheat, 29-4 million quintals; rye, 8-3; barley, 9-4; oats, 5-6; maize, 15-5; potatoes, 27; sugar beet, 9-9. According to Szig. Biz., p. 557, Kallay told a Press Conference on 22nd September that the wheat harvest reported by the farmers was 7 million quintals below the estimated yield.

MARKING TIME 115 and rye. On taking office, Szdsz therefore again cut the normal bread ration to 160 grammes, simultaneously reducing the quantities which farmers were allowed to keep for their own use, and raising the extraction rates for wheat and rye. For the future, Jurcsek! worked out a highly ingenious system, the basis of which was that every farmer’s holding was rated at a certain number

of points, calculated on the quantity and quality of the land. He had to deliver a corresponding number of produce-points, and these corresponded to values fixed by the authorities; e.g. if his land was rated at 500 points, and wheat was rated at 10 points a quintal, potatoes at 20, rye at 15, castor-oil at 100, he could deliver 20 quintals of wheat, 10 of potatoes, 1 of castor-oil, or any other combination which he pleased, but the authorities ensured the maximum production of those crops which they most needed by fixing the points values accordingly. In connection with this, the prices of the main

agricultural products were again raised by an average of some 10 to 12 per cent. The drive against the political extremists of both wings went on. Two or three more of Szalasi’s lieutenants were sentenced for subversive activities. The Communists arrested in the great drives of the previous months—over 400 in number—were brought to trial by court-martial. Schonherz was condemned to death and shot (Rozsa had already died in prison as the result of

the maltreatment inflicted on him). Others were saved by what M. Kallai himself acknowledges to have been the courageous attitude of the bourgeois members of the Independence Front, of whom Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, Szekfii and others “‘exposed themselves to the limit in favour of the defendents.’”” An interesting and important result of this was that at the end of October

the Independence Front was reborn, but of another spirit. The old slogans of co-operation between workers, peasants and intellectuals were retained, but this time they were not masks disguising different objectives. Communist influence was destined, indeed, later to regain control of the movement, as it had helped to bring the earlier avatar of that movement into being, but it is

the contrary of the truth to say that it was responsible for its revival in October 1942. It was precisely the absence of that influence that made possible, and characterised, the developments which took place now. The initiator of the revival was Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, who, whatever he was

(at that moment his anti-Germanism, always sincere, entirely filled his mind), was no crypto-Communist. He meant the slogans in their literal sense, and was encouraged to revive them because he believed that the movement had now been purged of its falsities—a belief shared by Kallay himself.

It was on the assumption that the participants in the Front would henceforward mean what they said that Bajcsy-Zsilinszky now took the initiative of reviving it. He called a meeting, which was attended by himself and Tildy

for the Smallholders, Szakasits and Szeder for the Social Democrats, the Legitimists Sigray and Csekonits, and certain other persons, including Rassay and Mer. Apor, the Bishop of Gy6ér.* The real difficulty was with the Social

Democrats, since the non-Socialists insisted that the co-operation must be sincere and on a basis of democracy. The Socialists must therefore abandon the principles of the class war and of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It 1 Strictly speaking, the author of the plan was an official in the Ministry, Sandor Hubay, brother of the Arrow Cross leader. 2 Kallai, op. cit., p. 13. 5 Rassay was not prepared to co-operate actively, but agreed to do so “‘passively,’’ which was all that was required of him.

116 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH

° e f °>$9

was only after considerable internal debate that the Social Democrats

accepted these conditions, but they did so eventually, and early in November a written agreement was drawn up providing for co-operation between the parties on this basis. KAllay himself and his stooges made numerous speeches during the period, but they contained nothing new or remarkable except, perhaps, that Kallay’s tone had grown rather more confident. He referred to himself as “‘leader of the nation, and his constant appeals for national unity tended to take the character of demands for national discipline. At the Front, it was a period of quiescence. Once again it was said that Hungary had forgotten the war—although she was rudely reminded of it on 6th September, when Soviet aircraft raided Budapest, doing only moderate material damage (although it caught the defences completely unaware),’ but evoking from the Hungarian Press an amazingly comic exhibition of injured innocence. In German-Hungarian relations it was a transition period. Von

Papen came to shoot with Horthy in September, but had nothing to say.° At the anniversary of the signature of the Tripartite Pact, Hungary was simply

represented by Sztdéjay. The only Hungarian Minister to get a glimpse of Hitler was Nagy, who after his appointment went out to inspect the troops at the Front, and was received by the Fiihrer, who talked him out, so that he did not get a word in—most fortunately, as one must think, for he had come primed with an enormous discourse on the Roumanian question, to include

the suggestion that Hungary should be given all Transylvania, while Roumania compensated herself in Transnistria.* But the Reichward vis momenti with which Kallay’s regime had started

was running down, and Hungary now refused German requests on two important points. One was the Jewish question. Hitler had probably not been deceived by 1 After all references to the Independence Front had disappeared from the Press for many months, Bajcsy-Zsilinszky wrote an article in the Népszava of 31st October in which he “regretted

that Social Democracy and organised labour had not been able to fit into the spiritual unity of the nation as the Socialists did in Denmark, Sweden and Finland—not to give further examples at the moment.’ But the bourgeoisie of those countries understood the value for their nations of their working classes, and so should the Hungarian bourgeoisie. ‘“‘I believe,’ the article went on, “that momentous decisions are now maturing in the soul of the Hungarian working classes, and that these decisions will determine the future of the nation. I hope that the working class will not let itself be diverted from the right path by those who find fault with it and hope to trip it up. If the Hungarian workers, united with the peasantry and the intelligentsia, adopt the message of 1848, then Hungary will be able to face all dangers which the future may hold in store.” On 7th-8th November the Népszava replied in two articles which protested their own national character. The organised workers, the peasants and intellectuals ‘‘want a free, independent and strong Hungary, and a progressive spirit in which to develop our country. This true Hungary will be created by the close union of the workers, peasants and intellectuals.”’ I have been unable to obtain a copy of the written agreement; but in the Christmas 1942 number of the Népszava, Szekfii wrote categorically that the Social Democrats had ‘‘abandoned

the class war.’’ Apor told Dessewffy that the Socialists’ conditions were ‘‘absolutely acceptable.”

I am informed by a Communist source that it was again with the ‘‘old-fashioned Social Democrats” that the chief difficulties arose when the Left were discussing the conditions among themselves; for those pedantic men held that promise and performance should stand in a certain positive relationship. The motto of the crypto-Communists at the time was: ‘“‘the more elastic the tactics, the more easily shall we gain ground,” and they did not mind what they promised. ° The city was not blacked out and the sirens were rusted or choked up, so that few of them sounded. * Horthy remembered nothing of the visit afterwards. For von Papen’s account of the visit, see his Memoirs, p. 492. + Nagy, op. cit., pp. 84 ff. Nagy writes that Kallay had instructed him to make this proposal, but Kallay has denied this (personal to C. A. M.) most emphatically.

MARKING TIME 117 Kallay’s anti-Semitic gestures, but throughout the spring and summer he had

made no attempt to intervene in Hungarian policy on this point. But his own attitude on the Jewish question had been maturing. Up to the spring, as others have noted, he had shown a certain readiness to accept the view that the final settlement of it could wait until the end of the war; but in his Reichstag speech of 26th April he had announced that the problem must be “solved” without delay, and completely. On 8th August Sztdjay reported from Berlin that the Germans now wished “‘to cleanse Europe completely from Jewish elements, of any nationality” by deporting them to the Germanoccupied areas of Russia, where they would be confined in ghettoes or put to work in labour camps. Luther, in mentioning this to Sztdjay, had “hinted at the deportation of the Hungarian Jews, and had expressed regret that the

attitude of Germany’s friend, Hungary, differed from her own on this

point.’ Kallay sent no answer to this message, and on 8th October Sztdjay reported that “‘it was Germany’s definite wish that Hungary should enact and

put into operation, as soon as possible, appropriate legislation excluding Jews completely from all cultural, political and economic activity,” and, further, arrange for their expulsion; they could be taken over by the German

authorities and settled in the eastern territories. To Sztdjay’s objections, Luther replied that, as Germany had herself found, the difficulties were not so formidable as they appeared at first, that arrangements had been made with Slovakia, Roumania and Croatia to deport their Jews. Mussolini had agreed to conclude a similar arrangement, and conversations were going on with France. The German Minister in Budapest would shortly be handing in a Note on the subject. On 17th October the Note itself arrived. On the question of Hungarian Jews resident in Western occupied territory or in Germany, it proposed “‘the

territorial principle,” i.e. each state should deal as it pleased with Jews resident on its territory, irrespective of their nationality. On the question of the Jews in Hungary, it stated that while the Government of the Reich had ‘“‘noted with pleasure the preliminary steps taken by the Hungarian Government’’ towards solving this problem, it considered that those steps were still “far from keeping pace with the development in Germany and other European States” and recommended the following measures as “‘appropriate’’: (a) Complete elimination of the Jews, by progressive legislation, from the cultural and economic life of Hungary. (b) The immediate introduction of distinctive marks. (c) Preparations to begin for expatriation and transportation to the East.

Kallay put this message, also, aside for later action. The second fairly sharp conflict with the Germans was over the economic

issue. The mild Clodius had come to Hungary at the end of July, as usual, to negotiate the renewal of the German-Hungarian commercial agreement. Agreement was reached for ‘“‘an increase in exchanges,” to be fulfilled by Hungary chiefly through larger deliveries of oil, bauxite and processed food 1 There had been a conflict when the Germans ordered all Jews in Paris to wear the Star of David, and the Hungarian Government insisted that Jews who were Hungarian citizens must be exempted. 2 This correspondence is in both the Sz. I. MS. and the Kallay MS. A memo. by Luther was

also produced at Nuremberg (N.G. 2586). The plan was to remove all Jews out of Europe. An official was to be sent to Hungary to start the deportations.

118 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH products, while Germany supplied more coal and manufactured goods.’ But on 7th September the tougher Funk arrived in Budapest, accompanied by a large staff of experts, to propose a more elaborate and extensive system of economic co-operation, and also to ask for an extension of the credit which Hungary was granting, to 2,000 million R.M. The Germans suggested that they would easily pay off this debt after they had won the war, when they would also have the Ukrainian industry at their disposal. And they had a number of other proposals to make, including the important one that certain bombed-out German factories, or factories likely to be bombed in the future, working on war production, should be transferred to Hungary, where they should work for the needs of both countries. This last proposal raised the very largest issues. If Hungary accepted it, she was integrated more fully than ever into the German war machine, and further, became an obvious target for Allied bombers. If, on the other hand, she rejected it, Germany might cut down supplies and thus completely cripple

her rearmament programme. There were prolonged and acrimonious discussions, in which Kallay took part and the Regent himself was dragged in; the plain speaking extended to the Press, which wrote with very unwonted openness of the issues involved.°

The result was a compromise. On the credit issue, Baranyai refused altogether to alter the existing system, under which the credits were granted through private banks. Reményi-Schneller was prepared to grant a direct inter-Governmental credit up to 1,000 million R.M. and Kallay, although all his sympathies were with Baranyai, did not dare back him, so that ReményiSchneller’s offer was adopted, an unfortunate outcome of the controversy being that Baranyai resigned.’ But the full German request was rejected, as was the proposal for transference of industries, which the Hungarians said that they would accept only if they had a two-thirds control over the industries

concerned. In this connection the only change which the Hungarians accepted was a small extension (the details of which the writer does not possess) of the aircraft programme.

This decision had been prompted by political considerations, but it greatly aggravated the difficulties of the Hungarians’ immediate military problem; for on top of the task to which they were committed under their agreement with the Germans, of keeping their expeditionary force of some 250,000 men up to strength and supplied with its needs in light arms and equipment, they had also set themselves the aim of raising a new force for home defence. This, according to an instruction issued by Szombathelyi in July, was to consist of ‘220,000 men, fully armed and equipped.” The two-fold effort was proving far beyond their capacities, and was resulting, again, in a series of compromises which left neither task properly fulfilled. + Figures on this point always disagree, but the Szratisztikai Zsebkényv for 1946 gives the following figures (in thousands of pengo) for the imports from and exports to Germany:

Imports from Exports to

Germany Germany

1941. . . 429,414 477,034 1942. . . 483,332 632,501 1943. . . 612,372 776,569

94 See especially the article ““Wirtschaftliche Wochenschau” (Pesrer Lloyd, 27th September 3 “st the Regent’s request, he remained in office until 2nd February 1943.

MARKING TIME 119 Even the manpower problem—the easier of the two—proved formidable. The original plan had been to raise complete new units at home, train them and fit them out and send them to the Front, to relieve the formations there, which would then come home and form the backbone of the home army. This was carried through in so far as the units which had been in Russia since 1941 were concerned; they were in fact brought home in the late spring, and new complete units sent out in their places. But when it came to the Second Army, the wastage was higher than had been anticipated,! while the civilian Ministries also tenaciously resisted the Army’s calls for manpower. All that could be done during the autumn was to fill the gaps. No units in the field were relieved. In October, indeed, enough men were got together to relieve twelve battalions, but as there were no rifles for them they were sent out unarmed. General Jany then decided to keep these men in trainingcamps behind the line, and they were only just being sent up to carry through the relief when the catastrophe of January, to be described presently, occurred, incidentally overwhelming these men with the others.’ Then the two new occupation divisions had to be sent out at the end of December, so that the home army was still, by the end of the year, far below

its target strength; while the men at the Front (who, as will be described,

had been given so long a sector to hold that almost all of them were continuously in the line) were exhausted and dispirited. The position as regards arms and equipment was far worse. Stocks had been dredged to supply the original Second Army (Jany said in January 1943 that this had taken out “‘three-quarters of Hungary’s arms, motor vehicles

and aircraft’). By this time the national production of coal, iron and steel had reached a level which had to be regarded as the maximum, since it was not practically possible to begin constructing new plant: there were even signs of diminishing production as plant wore out, or in consequence of labour shortages. The process of adapting the manufacturing and finishing industry was, indeed, far from complete: a disproportionately high fraction of the national production was still being devoted to satisfying civilian needs. The task of adaptation was now taken in hand more seriously, but this was a slow business, particularly as it met with much tacit obstruction from many of the firms concerned, on political grounds,* and in any case the amount of plant which could be adapted to producing the heavier requisites—guns armour, aircraft—was strictly limited. The wastage at the Front in arms and equipment, like that in manpower, proved heavier than had been anticipated, and the position throughout the autumn proved to be that Hungarian production was not able to do much more than make that wastage good in rifles, ammunition and the lighter arms. If this task was properly carried out, practically nothing would be left for the home army, and of heavier material there was, so far, as good as no production at all. The aircraft programme was only just beginning to come into production: in 1942 actually only one prototype each of the two Messer1 As we said, the casualties up to 19th August were officially given at about 14,500. Those from 20th August to 9th January 1943 were officially given as 13,332, although other estimates put the figure much higher. * Nagy, op. cit., p. 125. 3 Cf. A. Jécsik, German Economic Penetration in the Danube Valley, p. 29; and Hungarian Economic Resistance, pp. 11-13. The latter booklet quotes instances of “resistance to Germany”’ which amounted in practice to sabotage of Hungary’s own rearmament. It admits that even in 1943 only 20 per cent. of the power used by the manufacturing industry was employed on war purposes.

120 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH schmidts, four Focke-Wulfs, and one of the new Hungarian “‘Héjjas’’ which it had been decided to manufacture to replace the old types which had proved unsatisfactory, were produced.

The Germans were little help here. They were prepared to replace wastage of heavy material at the Front, where they had agreed to do so; but after Hungary’s refusal of their proposals for co-operative production, they flatly refused to supply any heavy material for her home army. Thus, up to the late autumn, the home army was almost unarmed. Meanwhile, not only the always threatening attitude of the Roumanians but also the raid on Budapest had strongly stimulated the interest in home defence. Szombathelyi is then alleged to have given out the slogan “‘not a nail for the Don.’ This was later put explicitly in the form that: “‘Articles which are needed for the material equipment of the home army are not to be sent as

replacements to the Second Army or the occupation troops.’ Even so, Nagy reported to a Ministerial Council in December that “‘the Home Army was only half equipped.’* Nagy’s anecdote of the unlucky reinforcements sent out in October shows that the same could now be said of the Second Army also; proof even more disastrously clear was soon to be given.

The early autumn of 1942 saw the beginnings of what developed in subsequent months into a serious attempt by the Hungarian Government to establish fruitful contacts with the Western Allies. These had been sadly lacking for a long year.

When Bardossy succeeded Teleki, he put his foot down on all “reinsurance policies,’ so that by the time Eckhardt arrived in America? he found a new situation to which he had to adapt himself. He proclaimed himself accordingly leader of a movement which was oppositional to the Government in Budapest, and to the Regent, but representative of the true democratic forces in Hungary; and he called on other democratic Hungarians

abroad to rally behind him. At first he met with a certain success both in

America and England, where he was accepted as leader by a ‘“‘Free Hungarian” association which had formed itself after the rupture of diplomatic relations, under the guidance of M. A. Bajesy-Zsilinszky, former Secretary of Legation, and A. Révai, London correspondent of the Pester Lloyd. Soon, however, the combined forces of the Czecho-Slovak emigration and of the Hungarian-born Left in New York (most of these being émigrés from the days of Karolyi and Kun, although some recruits had come to them in 1937 and 1938) opened a concentric and co-ordinated attack on Eckhardt’s

mission (which they alleged to be to save feudal and imperialist Hungary from its just retribution) and his person (his early political career providing material for these attacks). After enduring some months of these attacks, Eckhardt lost his temper and issued a declaration which seemed to make many of them plausible, and after this, not even the Hungarian Government’s

cancellation of his Hungarian citizenship could save his reputation for democracy; and, for a while, the only circles which American policy seemed inclined to regard as representative of the true Hungary, or worthy of any 1 Tombor MS. > Suhaj.

3 Id.

4 Barczy. Later, in the spring of 1943, we find Nagy telling the Regent that Hungary

possessed arms only for 44 light divisions. 5 See above, I, p. 469.

MARKING TIME 121 encouragement at all, were the said friends of Czecho-Slovakia. In England, too, the Zsilinszky-Révai association was being pertinaciously discredited by Count Mihaly K4rolyi himself, now appropriately ensconced in North Oxford,

but seeing visions of himself presiding a second time over the destinies of Hungary. Here there was not even any Hungarian sufficiently in the inner ring of Hungarian politics to be used as an agent if circumstances altered.

Naturally, there had always been unofficial “‘contacts’’ of a sort. Those members of the Hungarian Legations in neutral countries who had Western friends communicated with them whenever they got a chance (the commercial attachés, in particular, enjoying as they did relative freedom of movement, were active in this way), as did any journalists whose work took them abroad.

Gradually these communications became more frequent, and while the majority of them were taken first on non-official, or at any rate nongovernmental initiative, they provided a groundwork of which the Kallay Government was able subsequently to take advantage, in some cases by the simple method of giving official sanction and authority to a previously unofficial enterprise.

The earliest of these enterprises which merits mention here was in some sense a sequel to the unfortunate affair of the ‘‘ Davidson Letters.”” In 1938

Teleki had sent one, M. A. Gellért, to Berlin to act there as his private ‘‘eye’’ under cover of representing the Pesti Mirlap. Gellért had become friendly with some members of the American Embassy who, when the Embassy closed down in December 1941, had been moved to Stockholm. In the summer of 1942 it was decided to send Gellért to Stockholm, under cover of representing the Revision League, to re-establish the contact. When he visited Budapest before taking up his new post, Gellért was also commissioned by members of the Popular Front and of the Social Democrat Party to try, in addition, to make contact with their opposite numbers in Great Britain. Arriving in Stockholm, he approached a certain M. V. Bohm, a gentleman of Hungarian-Jewish extraction who in his salad days had left his respectable occupation of traveller in typewriters to become Secretary

of State for Defence under Mihaly Karolyi, then Commissary for War under Kun; had spent many years in exile and had, shortly before M. Gellért’s arrival, been taken on by the British Press Reading Bureau in Stockholm to read the Hungarian Press. M. Bohm had friends in the Labour Party and agreed to make the contact with them. The details of what followed are not available to the writer; but it appears that he sent a message to the appropriate quarters in the Labour

Party, who received his communication affably. They appear to have suggested that they would like to discuss the situation with a leading Social

Democrat, and the Hungarian authorities consented to let Peyer go to Stockholm for the purpose. This plan fell through on the Germans’ refusal to grant Peyer a transit visa, so Bohm and Gellért were left to supply the link themselves, with results which will appear in due course.’ The Hungarian Government lent its assistance by allowing Gellért diplomatic facilities, a privilege which it then extended to the other surviving foreign representatives of the Revision League. Meanwhile, a group of the more Western-minded officials in the Foreign Ministry, the spiritus rector among whom was Aladar Szegedi-Maszak, now

second in command of the Political Division of the Ministry, had been 1 See below, pp. 127-8, 163-4.

122 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH considering the possibilities of making better contact with the West through Lisbon. Here, too, there was a Revision League man named Tamas, but he was not very experienced, and to strengthen his hand it was proposed to send

two more men to Lisbon, to make contacts under the cover of genuine journalistic work: A. Frey, the diplomatic correspondent of the Magyar Nemzet, and J. Melocco, formerly correspondent of the MTI in Rome and Berlin. This plan fell through owing to the opposition of some of the official circles whose consent was necessary for its successful working, but had a sequel. Ullein-Reviczky, whose wife’s family were British subjects resident in Constantinople, went down to spend his summer holiday with his parents-inlaw, and he also, acting (it appears) on his own initiative and authority, took the opportunity to contact the Allied representatives. This offer was taken seriously, and agreement was reached ‘“‘that a trusted agent, equipped with instructions from the Government and powers from the military authorities, might be sent out.’! This reply placed this line on an official footing, and M. Kallay, in his book, ranks it as the earliest of his own attempts to contact the Allies. It was. however, soon apparent that full official contact could not

be forthcoming immediately. Szombathelyi, on his own testimony, was already in touch with Ullein and prepared to co-operate, even to the extent of promising that the Hungarian Army would not only not fire on British troops but would surrender to them. It proved, however, impossible, for

reasons of secrecy, to send a soldier, as the German and Hungarian intelligence services were too mingled’; it is possible, too, that Kallay himself

was not yet prepared to go so far. In any case, the next step taken by the Hungarians was rather political. Ullein was aware of the plan to send Frey to Lisbon, and of its failure. He now approached Frey and asked him, in Kallay’s name, whether he would undertake a secret political mission to

negotiate with “‘some Western Governments.” Frey agreed, and the Hungarians now set about the task of getting him the Turkish visa, the Hungarian exit permit from the military and the German transit visa through Yugoslavia. All these papers, however, especially the last-named, took time to procure, and the preparations had not been completed before the close of

the period now under description.° |

Another initiative was taken,* by what may perhaps best be termed the ‘“pro-Allied Conservative-Liberal group’ whose unofficial but acknowledged

leader was Count Bethlen. This group had “‘already in the summer’”’ received broad hints from American circles in Switzerland® that the Allies would be 1 Kallay, op. cit., pp. 389 ff. 2 From a statement made in 1946 by Szombathelyi and reproduced in the Sz. I. MS., pp. 838 ff. 3 The above details personal from Frey to C. A. M.

‘ For this narrative I have two sources: Kallay, op. cit., pp. 302-5, and the Barcza MS. They differ to this extent, that each writer represents Bethlen as approaching him first, and also in their dates, Barcza saying that Bethlen came to him “‘in the summer of 1942.” It is possible that Kallay is right on both points and that Bethlen came to him first in the summer and went to Barcza only in October, but Barcza’s account seems to me more reasonable, and I therefore adopt it. 6 Kallay describes the group as ‘“‘drawn chiefly from the Upper House, from various social clubs, the Revision League, the Economic Association and banking and industrial circles.”

® The initiative came to the Hungarians from Mr. Royall Tyler, the former League of Nations Commissioner in Budapest and a good friend of Hungary’s. After Tyler had left Hungary for the last time, on the errand described above (I. p. 377), he had spoken to General Marshall, President Isaiah Bowman, and other persons, and had arranged to act as liaison with

Teleki. Later, he had been attached to the U.S.A. Legation in Berne. Here, in the summer, he had met Ottlik, to whom he had given the aforesaid “hints.”

MARKING TIME 123 prepared to enter into contact outside Hungary with some properly qualified Hungarian. The person designated by the Americans themselves had been Bethlen,! but since Bethlen, for his old personal reasons, refused to leave Hungary, the group decided that the best available man for the task would be M. Barcza, formerly Minister to the Court of St. James’s, who, since his return from the United Kingdom in the spring of 1941, had been living in retirement. His views that an Allied victory was both inevitable, and to be welcomed, were well known, and it was also known that he was personally esteemed in London and would be listened to with attention. It appears indeed, from M. Barcza’s own account, that much wider circles than this group were willing to trust him as emissary, and even urged him to

undertake the mission, but it was only at the beginning of October that Bethlen approached him and definitely requested him to do so. Barcza’s objection was that as he disagreed with Kallay’s foreign policy (he thought that a much more active stand against the Germans was advisable) he could not go abroad as representing the Government. He agreed, however, to go as spokesman of the “group,” and while insisting that he must be independent, was prepared to undertake not to attack the Government. On this understanding, Bethlen promised to talk to Kallay and the Regent and arrange for

Barcza’s journey to some neutral country to be facilitated. On second thoughts it was decided that the Regent should, after all, not be initiated, so that he would be able with a clear conscience to deny all knowledge of such

matters if questioned by the Germans’; but Bethlen took the message to Kallay and brought back an answer that the Minister President agreed with the plan in principle and would shortly be getting in touch with Barcza. This was as far as matters had gone by the end of October.

Finally, there was Lisbon, which was, of course, an extremely active receiving and distributing centre for every kind of intelligence work as well as the European terminus of the lines to America. The Hungarian Minister in Lisbon, M. Wodianer, was, for many good reasons, strongly anti-Nazi, and he and his staff had for long maintained more or less close unofficial contacts with various Allied or neutral personages. One of these was Colonel K owalewski, whom the Polish Government in London had appointed in 1940 to organise and act as liaison with the Polish Resistance on the Continent and who was also interested in the pro-Allied movements among the satellites.®

Kowalewski had been meeting Wodianer since the spring of 1941. The meetings now became gradually more frequent and regular, although what passed was still rather a series of messages between the Hungarian Government and the Poles in London than negotiations in the true sense of the word. 1 Tyler had told Ottlik that Bethlen was the one man in Hungary who might get the ear of President Roosevelt, and had offered, if Bethlen would come to Berne, to arrange for him to be flown to the U.S.A. (Personal, Ottlik to C. A. M.). 2 KAllay had told him in general terms that he was negotiating with the West, but had given him no details. + For a description of Colonel Kowalewski’s activities, see Crusader in the Secret War, by the Countess of Listowel, especially pp. 162 ff.

CHAPTER EIGHT

TWO STEPS TO THE LEFT ARLIAMENT had reassembled early, in mid-October, for the special

Prone of enacting the Bill commemorating the services of Istvan

Horthy. This was first submitted to an inter-Party Conference, which » raised no difficulties, and it had a decorous passage enough when it came before the full House on 15th October. The Arrow Cross spokesmen read a declaration substantially on the same lines as those adopted by the Party in the preceding February. Imrédy, still on his best behaviour, accepted the Bill, saying that ‘‘he was convinced that the soul of the nation felt the need to express its admiration and gratitude for Istvan Horthy and that the Bill met his Party’s condition that it must not influence the future formation of the nation’s will, nor create prejudice for the future.”’ The Social Democrats were at this stage letting pass no occasion of emphasising their attachment to the Regent; on Istvan Horthy’s death their Chairman had sent a message expressing grief at this “irreparable loss to the whole nation.’’ Now they warmly supported the Bill, which K allay was thus able to present as endorsed by ‘‘all Parties in Parliament, the House and all Hungarians, except [the Arrow Cross].”’

The House then passed two more Bills, one raising the numbers of the Upper House to equality with the Lower, the other, temporarily suspending much of the autonomy of the Counties and, in particular, giving the Minister of the Interior power to nominate County officials and to transfer them at will (a measure devised and sponsored by Keresztes-Fischer, who had argued that the central authority needed strengthening), whereafter it proceeded to discuss the Budget. This was again conservative in trend and provided for only a small deficit in ordinary expenditure, although war expenditure was left to be met partly by new taxes, partly by loans.? The discussion both on the global budget figures and on the votes for most of the Ministries went on in an atmosphere of calm, even near-apathy, which Montgomery’s victory at El Alamein did little to affect: the Government Press laughed it off as unimportant, if not fictitious, and the public, long accustomed to ding-dong vicissitudes in the desert, seems to have accepted the official view. But on 8th November there came the Allied landing on the North African

coast. This was a different matter. It could neither be concealed nor belittled, and the effect of the news in Hungary was enormous. Szalasi wrote

in his Diary that it ‘entirely transformed the internal and foreign political situation of the country’; and this was no more than the truth. A Russian success of the same magnitude, with the Anglo-Saxons still inactive, would probably have strengthened the Right, for it would have reinforced their argument that the only factor on “‘the other side” with which Hungary would have to deal would be Russia, to whom not 1 per cent. of the members of the

regime was prepared to surrender. But this was different. It had suddenly made into a real possibility what for so long had been only the beautiful dream—too beautiful to come true—of a large and influential section of the 1 Népszava, 15th October 1942. > Estimated revenue was 4,047 million pengé and expenditure 4,247.

TWO STEPS TO THE LEFT 125 population of Hungary, that the war might end leaving the Anglo-Saxons with a predominant voice in the peace settlement. From that day on, the ‘Anglophiles” were a force again, and the day may also be taken as that on which the whole Government policy of Hungary changed: the tide set to the ebb, the movements of KAllay’s csardas were towards the Left. These movements were still at first very cautious. In his numerous public speeches of the period, Kallay repeatedly and solemnly maintained that Hungary’s foreign policy had not altered in any way. His speech on the Foreign Ministry vote (22nd November) was practically a repetition of his

inaugural speech in Parliament. On 16th December he was affirming ‘“‘Hungary’s unshakable loyalty to her allies and complete fulfilment of obligations assumed” as one of the twin pillars on which her policy rested. The prophecies of an Axis victory did not slacken, and the endorsement of the war against Russia was as whole-hearted as ever. But, simultaneously with this stout thumping of the old keys, other notes were now also touched, and in the resulting chords the familiar tones were often weakened and sometimes almost drowned. The second pillar on which Hungarian policy rested was, according to Kallay, “‘constant stress of her independence,” and this independence was now, in fact, the main theme of all the Government propaganda. Hungary was fighting Russia for two reasons: firstly, because she had been attacked and was defending herself (the pronounced insistence on the ‘‘defensive”’

character of her war, and on the fact that she had no territorial claims on Russia, were the only new elements in his utterances on Russia, which otherwise were as hostile as ever); secondly, because by doing so she was serving a national interest of her own which was “‘identical with the interests of Europe,

and indeed of Christian civilisation.”’ As this theme was developed, it was indicated more and more clearly that this ‘“‘Europe’’ had nothing to do with the Axis-conceived “European New Order,’’ to which, only a little before, Hungary had been so eloquently proclaiming her devotion; it appeared ever more clearly that her future partners were to be the neutrals and (with certain exceptions) the small nations of Central-Eastern Europe, who were to form a bloc, the political leadership of which might be assumed by Turkey and the spiritual by the Vatican. In this bloc Hungary was to play a leading part as a ‘factor of order,”’ for which purpose it was her duty to conserve her strength.

Many of these articles and utterances were directed towards the said neutrals and neighbours, but even more of them were openly addressed to Great Britain and the U.S.A. The speakers and writers forgot that they themselves had been agreeing, a few months earlier, that the Western Allies and Russia were indivisible, and now tried most strenuously to divide them.

Unmeasured abuse of the Bolsheviks alternated with what were in effect impassioned appeals to Britain and America to understand how foolish they were being in allying themselves with such monsters and with other noxious creatures such as Bene’. Why could they not be sensible and accept Hungary’s proposals for her own future and that of Europe? Grossly tasteless, stupid and arrogant as these articles usually were, they did at least make plain to their readers that the Hungarian Government, whatever it might say to the contrary, really expected the Allies to win the war and thought their favour 1 The Hungarians’ own blindness on this point is remarkably illustrated by an astonishing statement in M. Kallay’s book (p. 358) that even if the Press ““was occasionally guilty of lapses,”’ he ‘“‘knew for a fact that this never happened in his time.”

126 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH better worth the winning than that of the Germans. This was emphasised by the fact that if—as still happened regularly enough—the Allied plans for the future were discussed in an obnoxious tone, what was said on the subject

by Ribbentrop or Mussolini was hardly mentioned at all. The Allied war communiqués were now published as fully as those of the Axis.? Another theme which Government speakers, led by M. Kallay himself,’ and the Press now took up very profusely was that of the socially progressive

nature of the Hungarian regime. These effusions, again, were pointedly directed towards Great Britain (often they took the form of comparing British

and Hungarian social institutions, and, still more often, that of polemics against statements appearing in Britain) and were meaningless on any other assumption than that of an Allied victory. There was not very much positive action that Hungary could take at that stage in the way of self-dissociation from Germany: the troops could not well

be recalled from the Front, nor the newly concluded trade agreements cancelled. She was herself not suggesting any interruption of the joint armament programmes, and it is a remarkable comment on her policy in this field that Nagy went to Berlin as late as 12th January to ask Goring to give Hungary fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft guns, and to arrange to have Hungarian pilots trained by the Germans in night-fighting.* But Kallay now answered Germany’s Note on the Jews, his reply (which Sztdéjay handed in on 14th December) consisting of an explanation that Hungary could not at present carry out point (a) of Germany’s demands, and a flat refusal to carry out points (b) and (c).* Further, when the German debit balance reached the 1,500 million R.M. mark, as it did at the end of December, Hungary refused to extend the limit. She made Germany instead sell the Hungarian assets in her possession and take over Hungary’s debts to Holland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.® Incidentally, she refused a request for more Hungarian workers to go to Germany. Kallay now began calling back, one by one, those of his Ministers abroad whom he trusted (these were all except Sztdéjay in Berlin, Wettstein in Berne and Voernle in Turkey) and instructing them in the new policy; and he also now took up seriously the business of making contact with the Allies.

Frey was still waiting for his visas, and although Wodianer was now meeting Kowalewski regularly, their mutual exchanges were not getting any-

one much further. But Kallay was now ready to entertain the idea of ‘unofficial’? conversations on a higher level. Sometime in late November or early December he met Barcza secretly,° and at this and a second meeting, 1 This was in pursuance of a special order issued to the Press. * A note by Barczy shows that Kallay himself gave out this parole at the first Ministerial Council of 1943; but the campaign was already in full swing by that date. Kdallay’s speech of 14th December was largely devoted to the subject, and in it he expounded at great length his favourite thesis that the “‘slanders’’ against Hungary were simply propaganda inspired by the Hungarian émigrés. 3 Nagy, op. cit., p. 118. M. Kallay informs me that the request was a “‘ruse”’: the Hungarians

knew that it would be refused, and calculated that this would give them an excuse to proclaim Budapest an open town. General Nagy’s narrative does not, however, suggest that he had been initiated into this stratagem. 4 $z.I. MS. According to Barczy, Ribbentrop took the occasion to complain of the ‘“‘defeatist propaganda” going on in Hungary. 6 When Horthy visited Hitler in April 1943, the figure had sunk to 1,121 million R.M. 6 The following combined from the accounts given by Kallay, op. cit., pp. 384 ff., and Barcza in his MS. Kallay antedates Barcza’s journey, for it is certain that he left only in March. But he himself puts his second meeting with Kallay at the New Year, so the earlier meeting must have been before Christmas.

TWO STEPS TO THE LEFT 127 held immediately after the New Year, agreement was reached. Barcza was to go first to Rome, where he should call on the Holy See and make contact

with Mr. (as he then was) D’Arcy Osborne, the British Minister to the Vatican and an old friend of Barcza’s own. Then he was to go to Switzerland, to seek further contacts with the British. He was to figure as a private person

and to speak as the mouthpiece of the “‘group’”’ which had suggested his mission; but he was to stress that he and those for whom he spoke were in agreement with Kallay’s policy and he was to enjoy all official facilities. He

was not authorised to enter into immediate concrete discussions about surrendering, “jumping out” or turning against the Germans; indeed, Kallay’s own account of the instructions which he gave Barcza suggests

rather the opposite of this: he was to “‘enlighten the British’? on Hungary’s position, which, taken in conjunction with his promised “‘support of Kallay’s policy,”’ might easily be read as meaning that he was to explain why Hungary could not do more than she was doing. Barcza did, however, insist on getting an assurance from Kallay that Hungary would break with Germany and turn against her at the appropriate moment, a condition of this again (made by Kallay) being that she should not be occupied by Soviet troops only but also by Anglo-Saxons. Kallay writes that he told Barcza that he was “to oppose any suggestion either of bringing back Mihaly Karolyi and his émigrés or of setting up any other regime of the extreme Left, not only because neither of these had any roots in the country, but also because both would lead Hungary into the arms of the Soviets, as had happened in 1919”; and “‘to take up Karolyi would make Hungary a political satellite of BeneS’.”’. Under the Regent, on the other hand, Hungary would remain a factor of order in Europe.

At the same time, he was authorised to say that neither Bethlen nor Kallay had any idea of trying to save the present regime. After Kallay had turned down, as too dangerous, a further suggestion by Barcza for the gradual formation of a sort of shadow representation for Hungary abroad, Barcza was left to work out the technical details of his journey with Ghyczy and Szentmiklossy. Another move on much the same lines was being made at the same time by the little group in and round the Foreign Ministry which, while not in any sense working against Kallay, had for some time past been following a

policy which may be described as putting ideas into Kallay’s head and translating those ideas into quasi-official action always one step ahead of him. The move in question was made in Stockholm.’ Gellért, who had been back in Budapest, called on Bohm again in November, and this time said that he was not merely the spokesman of the Independence Front and the Tarsadalmi K6r: he had consulted Ghyczy, Szegedi-Maszak and Ullein, and come not, indeed, as their representative but with their cognisance and goodwill. He had been asked to get in touch with the British and find out from

them what line they wanted Hungary to follow. Hungary was anxious to get out of the war, but simply did not know what to do. A few days later the Hungarian courier brought Gellért further instruc1 In practice, Barcza used the diplomatic bag and his reports were read and answered by Kallay, or by Szentmikldssy on Kallay’s behalf. 2 For the Stockholm conversations I have used the personal reminiscences, given to me at

various dates, of three of the participants. They do not always exactly agree in detail; above all, it is not always easy to say from which side some proposition originally emanated, but I believe the synthesis made by me of the various accounts to be substantially accurate.

128 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH tions. Hungary was now prepared to send one or more politicians to carry on unofficial negotiations or submit proposals, and Gellért was to find out which politicians or diplomats Britain would accept as negotiating partners. This last offer seems to have been simply ignored: the Hungarians were not told that Britain was not yet ready for unofficial negotiations, but no names were proposed as possible negotiators on either side. M. Bohm, however, speaking in his own name, made a few virtuous but rather obvious suggestions of things the Hungarian Government might do—revise her internal policy, send no more troops to the front, stop attacking the British and Americans in the Press—and these suggestions offered the possibility of further correspondence. The Hungarian Minister, Matuska, wrote officially to Budapest late in December, urging that Hungary should adopt them and should make “‘positive proposals” to the Allies. The next message in the

series, recorded on a later page,! was in fact an answer to M. Bohm’s intimations. About the same time? K4llay and Sigray sent a joint message to Wodianer, for transmission to the Archduke Otto in America, asking him “‘if he would establish contact between the Hungarian Government and the Government

of the U.S.A. in order to prepare the way for Hungary’s leaving the side of the Germans and joining that of the Allies at the appropriate moment.” One further tentative arrangement made at this stage deserves mention.

On Kallay’s instructions, Nagy sent for M. B. Fabian, President of the ‘““Committee of War Veterans” which represented the interests of the Labour

Battalions, and arranged with him for caches of arms to be made in the cellars of the main Synagogues, and certain other hiding-places. If the fighting went in favour of the Allies, the Labour Battalions were to be brought back from behind the Front and at the given moment, issued with the arms and set to attack the Germans in the rear.? The effects of the Allied landing were much less immediate or striking in the foreign field than in the domestic. Here the transformation was almost sensational. The rebirth of the Popular Front had, it is true, preceded (by a day or two) the landing, and no anticipation of that event had stood midwife to Bajcsy-Zsilinszky’s initiative. But no baby could have wished for a happier

christening-present. Under the influence of the Davidson letter and of broadcasts in a similar vein which had been addressed to them from London, the participants in the Front saw themselves as the favoured god-children of the Western Powers; and now that the position seemed likely to bring rewards of substance, they rushed to claim it. The Smallholders, so long a flock of timid yes-men (Bajcsy-Zsilinszky had never been this, but, as we have said, he had never been a real Smallholder), burst into loquacity in the concluding stages of the Budget debate and in the Enabling Debate which followed it;

not on the technical wishes of their alleged constituents but on the wide

political issues. One of them complained of the censorship. Another attacked the prevailing anti-Semitism of the Right. Bajcsy-Zsilinszky again

produced his King Charles’ head, the Ujvidék massacre, and further demanded eloquently that no more troops or material should be sent to the front.4. The Social Democrats had missed the boat in the Budget debate, for 1 See below, p. 141.

2 The Archduke puts the date at “the late autumn of 1942” (Personal to C. A. M.). 3 Personal (Fabian to C. A. M.). 4 After his speech he was challenged to duels by no less than seven persons, none of whom, however, ended by crossing swords with him.

TWO STEPS TO THE LEFT 129 which, not anticipating the changed situation, they had not nominated a speaker, but in the Enabling Debate they vigorously attacked both the Government’s foreign and its domestic policy. They prophesied ‘“‘a radical social revolution and the realisation of true Socialism after the war,” and

laid lustily about the Government, the Right-wing Opposition and the Swabian minority (which, as always, was belaboured as whipping-boy in lieu

of the Germans themselves). Nothing like the tone of this had been heard in the Hungarian Parliament for twenty years. Even while the debates were going on, the two parties had begun reorganising. The Smallholders had let matters slide too far for immediate recovery, but they were able to take advantage of the organisation of the Peasant Union, which now blithely jettisoned, with one heave, its nonpolitical character and its secret connections with the Government, and turned itself in practice into another aspect of the Smallholders’ Party. It was a considerable body (in a New Year’s message, Nagy, the President, said

that “hundreds of thousands of recruits had joined it’’), and its secretary, _ Béla Kovacs, said that it possessed 293 branches, while 93 more were in course of formation; and even if this was an exaggeration, it provided the Smallholders with a shadow organisation extending over all Hungary. The Social Democrats already possessed their organisation intact, but the Press reported them to be advertising for new branch secretaries and to be arranging courses of instruction for officials. Simultaneously the Independence Front rushed into renewed asseverations of its own existence. From mid-November onward the columns of the Népszava, the Kis Ujsag, the Mai Nap and the Magyar Nemzet began once more to overflow with articles affirming the need for union between “‘workers,

peasants and progressive intellectuals.”” This Press boom culminated in another great Népszava Christmas number, 1n which Szakasits, Tildy, Szekfi, Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, Gyula Illyés and a large number of other writers, including several Social Democrats and a Ruthene Deputy, Vladimir Homicsk6, spread themselves on the theme. From this time onward the Social Democrat and

Smallholder parties were in regular touch. Regular meetings (which were also attended by some of the “‘progressive intellectuals’) were held to coordinate parliamentary and Press policy.!* These took place on the basis of the agreement concluded at the beginning of November, and the Social Democrats continued to proclaim that they were the most patriotic of Hungarians (a statement which was true of the rank and file of the Party) and to say, or at least to allow other people to say for them, that they had abandoned the class struggle; and at that moment, the statement appears to have been true, for the Communists, although far from pleased at the line which the movement was taking, were not, at that juncture, able to

do much to influence it.? :

1 Erdédy, op. cit., p. 83. Erdddy gives as the regular participants in the meetings, the Socail Democrats Peyer, Szakasits, A. Kéthly and F. Szeder, the Smallholder leader Tildy, and the “‘intellectuals’’ Andorka and Szentgyorgyi. Erdddy dates the beginning of these regular meetings back to the summer of 1942, but, as I have already said, he seems to me to antedate at least the active co-operation. 2 In his lecture, indeed, M. Kallai attributes.the rebirth of the Front to the “‘continued vitality of Communism in Hungary” and also claims credit for the Christmas Number, but in his book he has little but abuse for the Number, or for anything done by the Front during this period. It is true that he contradicts himself copiously: the strain of trying to claim credit for every enterprise that turned out right while simultaneously denouncing the participants in it as traitors and Fascists, has proved rather too much for him. I

130 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH It is true that for the tme the Frent did nothing whatever except talk and

that they did not even talk in complete harmony. Two main questions Temained unreselved. One was the positien of the bourgeoisie. [he bourgeois figures in the Front were sull only a handful of individuals. No polincal party had signified its adherence. The official Catholics developed much activity at this time along their own lines: a whole galaxy of their officia! leaders. from Cardinal Serédi downward. issued messages at Christmas

or ihe New Year which were veiledlv anu-German in that thev strongly stressed the independent and Christian wadinens of the histone Hunganan

State+ They were. moreover. very bustiv engeged in expanding and strengthening their own organisations througheut the country and in fornfving the spimt of their members.- But they either ignored or indirectly attacked the Front. repeatedly stating that Catholicism could have nothing to do with Marnism. Id., 11th 7th May. Id., 21st 4th July. 7 Id., July. ® 6 Jd., May.

LINGER SHIVERING 159 even a temporary one, with Marxism or the Social Democrats.’ Rassay remained silent. Failing response from any of the bourgeois parties, the Smallholders and Social Democrats tried to enrol bourgeois members in their own ranks, and in June the Smallholders actually founded an “‘intellectuals’”’ or “bourgeois” section, into which, it was said, any ‘“‘conscientiously thinking

bourgeois able to fit in with the general ideology of the Party’? would be admitted. This was a move destined to prove of some importance after 1945,

when the parties of the Centre and the Right were prohibited and their members sought refuge with the Smallholders; but the effect does not seem to have been very great in 1943, for although the Smallholders’ Press reported conscientiously minded bourgeois as flocking into the new organisation in

large numbers, it was not able to record the name of a single person of national repute as being among the recruits, nor did any Deputy from the Conservative Parties go over to the Smallholders.1 Even fewer bourgeois

joined the Social Democrats.

There was even, at times, a suggestion of acerbity in the exchanges between

the two major parties themselves. Not all of the Smallholders trusted the Socialists’ professions. At the Peasant Union’s annual meeting in June, Nagy

said that the peasants must be the foundation of the new Hungary, and as late as 3rd August he wrote that the peasants ‘“‘would not allow any other class to exert any influence at their expense.”” They would work fraternally with the industrial workers “‘when the latter were willing to co-operate with them in opposing destructive and revolutionary forces.” There appeared to be some jealousy over who was to acquire the bourgeois camp-followers (when the Smallholders set up their Intellectuals’ Section, the Népszava wrote that the professional classes and civil servants were “‘workers”’ and belonged to the Socialists) and still more over the agricultural labourers (Imre Kovacs, as usual, intervening): the Peasant Union now at last took the long-delayed

plunge and set up sections for the agricultural labourers, but the Socialists continued to court the class and to try to draw its members into their own Trade Unions. Thus most of what was written and said about the “‘Front’’ was distinctly proleptic; but the way was gradually being paved for the agreement which, as will be seen, was actually concluded later. Nor did the Front manage to enlist the nationalities, most of which went

their own way.? Kallay and Keresztes-Fischer had really succeeded in improving the general standard of administration in the minority areas. In the Délvidék, in particular, a very tolerable modus vivendi had been reached with the local Serbs, and there were few cases of violent revolt on the one ! side or violent oppression on the other. To judge, however, from later events, | there was also little attachment to the Hungarian State in any of the recovered areas.

Kallay now regarded the preparation of a suitable understanding with the Western Allies as an urgent task of an importance second to none, and from May 1943 onward his efforts to achieve this became very active. At the same time it was, as we have indicated, his fixed determination not to 1 One Transylvanian Deputy (I. Angi) did so on 20th August.

2 In the memorandum quoted below (II. pp. 187-206) Peyer complained that, except for the Germans who were active on the other side, all the “‘nationalities’’ (he mentioned the Roumanians, Slovaks, Ruthenes and Serbs) were ‘“‘completely passive politically, so that they could not be used in the fight against the regime.”’

160 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH commit himself prematurely, and the contact established in Istanbul seemed to him, at the moment, positively dangerous, not only because of the high probability of leakages but because of the attitude adopted towards it by the simple soldiery in charge of the British end. In the end, the desired information service was established: a reliable man (M. Ujvary) was put in charge of the Consulate in Istanbul, and regular information sent down to him by courier. But Kallay, as he writes, “‘put off sending the officers,”’ particularly as “‘the military situation did not seem to have reached such a stage as to make the immediate establishment of military contacts an urgent matter.” The courier’s inward post accordingly came to consist exclusively of a series of demands from Paléczy-Horvath, couched in what Kallay describes as “increasingly threatening language,” that he should ‘“‘stop shilly-shallying”’ and send the officers to talk business. To these he sent either no reply or evasions.

The attempts to establish contact on a diplomatic level in Western countries also went very slowly, largely because the Allies, on their side, Clearly felt that the time had not yet come for them to engage themselves politically. They made no approach either to Matuska in Stockholm or to Wodianer in Lisbon, and Radvanszky’s message in Berne remained unanswered for many weeks. The reply sent back by the Archduke Otto to Saldanha’s message was that more precise proposals would be needed; also some official document authorising the Archduke to act in the name of the Hungarian Government. As the Archduke writes, “‘it took some time before

more detailed proposals could arrive from Hungary, as Kallay and those who shared his views had to be extremely careful.’’? In fact, no perceptible progress seems to have been made along this line during the whole spring and

summer. This left, in the West, only Barcza, who had now taken up his quarters in Montreux to await the promised approach from a British agent. He himself writes that he proposed to leave the British to make the next move,” and had done no more than call on Royall Tyler to announce his presence, and to ask Tyler to pass on any messages coming for him. The

British did not hurry matters, and it was only in the middle of May that Tyler asked him to meet a gentleman described by Barcza as “‘Mr. H.,’’ who was officially empowered to talk to him. The first meeting with “Mr. H.” followed on 21st May. Barcza explained to ““Mr. H.”’ that he was there as a private person, representing “‘the patriotic, uncompromised Hungarian Opposition,” but in a position to transmit any

message to Kallay, who was, of course, informed of his presence. He expatiated on the Anglophile sentiments of the group which he represented and its readiness “‘to place all its forces at the service of the Anglo-Saxons,”’ but it could not do so until the Anglo-Saxons approached the frontiers of Hungary. Hungary could not make a sudden ‘“‘jump-out,” as this would

simply entail a German occupation. He also argued that it was most important that order should be maintained in Hungary after the war, which would be best assured by not allowing her neighbours, or Russia, to occupy - her, and by letting the ‘““Bethlen group” take charge when the “‘transition

period”’ arrived. Finally, he presented ““Mr. H.’’ with a memorandum containing a detailed presentation of Hungary’s case and defence of her policy in the past—more precisely, perhaps, a defence of the policy of the Bethlen group, and excusal of that of the Right.

1 Personal to C. A. M. Barcza MS.

LINGER SHIVERING 161 So the ice, if not broken, was cracked. ‘Mr. H.” promised to report to London and to arrange a second meeting, which in fact took place, and was followed by others. The leisurely conversations went on throughout the following weeks! Up to a point, they were satisfactory enough, from the point of view both of Barcza and of KA4llay himself. It is true that “Mr. H.” represented London as insisting that Hungary’s future fate would depend on her own conduct: Kallay’s speech of 29th May was appreciated, but its value was only Platonic, and what was needed was not words but deeds—deeds,

either active or passive, which would help the Allied war effort and thus contribute towards shortening the war. On the other hand, ‘“‘Mr. H.’’ seems to have told Barcza most specifically that no one in London thought seriously

of the possibility of Hungary’s “jumping out” at that stage, and showed much understanding for K4llay’s arguments regarding the disastrous effects

that a German occupation would bring on the Hungarian Jews and other elements disliked by the Nazis; he assured Barcza that there would be no punitive peace, and he appears to have been most reassuring on the Western

Allies’ attitude towards the Hungarian regime; they even seem to have envisaged letting Horthy guide the country through the “‘transition.”’ Mr. Dulles, with whom Barcza had a conversation on 11th July, took the same line, adding that no territorial promises had yet been made to the “‘smaller

Allies.” The messages which were reaching Hungary from the Polish Government in London, via Wodianer, were in exactly the same sense.” They were also reassuring on the Allies’ intentions regarding Russia after the war.®

These messages were the more welcome to Kallay for the soothing contrast which they presented to the ferocious communications which he was receiving from Paléczy-Horvath and the incessant objurgations lavished on him by the B.B.C. (whence the only voice which had seemed to show any sympathy for his difficulties or understanding of his intentions had abruptly vanished) and the Voice of America, both of which ceaselessly and abusively denounced him and every other member of the regime—drawing no distinction whatever between them—for “‘Quislings”’ and left all Hungary under the

- impression that the only element in the country which the West was not determined to destroy was the extreme Left. It may well be that the nervous irritation produced in Kallay by these outpourings—a feeling which finds ample expression in his correspondence with Barcza—aroused in him a determination even stronger than he would otherwise have felt to preserve every possible detail of the regime and to refuse any concession to democracy. Yet his critics should in fairness remember how far his Swiss contacts played

into his hands. Moreover, even when “‘Mr. H.” told Barcza that London wanted ‘“‘deeds not words,” he never produced any serious list of what deeds were wanted, nor did his messages reveal any sense of urgency (incidentally,

he never once referred to the Istanbul deadlock). If Kallay chose to regard 1 The following is based on the Barcza MS. and on the correspondence in the Kallay MS., which supplement one another. 2 On 31st March Kowalewski wrote to Wodianer that it was “our wish that Hungary should

retain her independence and not expose herself to useless reprisals.”” A Polish note of 3rd August said that “up to the end of July all suggestions coming from London about the attitude of Hungary were marked by a tendency to spare Hungary a too abrupt or sudden decision which might endanger her sovereignty by evoking a reaction from Germany and interference by Germany in Hungary’s internal affairs’ (Kallay MS.: Wodianer to Kallay, 5th August 1943). 3 In the same Note, Kowalewski said that the Poles “‘regarded it as out of the question that the British and Americans would allow the Russians into the Carpathian basin.”

L.

162 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH ‘““Mr. H.’s” voice as more authoritative than that of M. Paléczy-Horvath, and

to take advantage of a situation which happened to suit him very well, that is humanly understandable. One communication conveyed at this time from Hungary to the West, calls for special mention. This is a detailed exposé! which was drafted by Szegedi-Maszak, but also revised by other persons, including Kallay himself,

and then sent to Stockholm to be passed to the British. This document began with a clearly ex parte but very able defence of Hungary’s past policy,

foreign and domestic. It went on to complain with some acrimony (but complete justice) that Britain never treated Hungary to anything but threats if she did not commit sabotage, turn openly against Germany, etc., but never indicated what her reward would be if she did these things: and wrote that under existing conditions, “‘Hungary would follow her present policy, because she had no other choice. If she had another choice, a new situation would arise, the consequences of which she was prepared to draw. She was prepared to take risks and accept sacrifices if there was sense in them, 1.e. if they were

not entirely without prospect and did not verge on suicide.’ After this the memorandum went on to sketch, in terms which, however sensible in themselves, must have left its recipients gasping at the Hungarian Government’s complete failure to appreciate the realities of the situation, Hungary’s view of an acceptable settlement. To begin with, in no case must “‘the Bolshevik form of life’ extend further west than in 1939, For the ‘“‘Middle Zone”’ it was admitted that some new political form was necessary, and Hungary did not “‘reject a priori the idea of a federation,” but only provided Britain and

America not only participated in creating it but also presided over its working. And this must be combined with adjustments inside the Danube basin. On her western frontier, Hungary required only minor adjustments. In the north, she must keep Ruthenia and also re-acquire Eastern Slovakia, Central and Western Slovakia remaining an independent State. In Transylvania she might possibly content herself with the Maros line, but really

ought to have the whole area, with “Dominion Status.’’ The southern frontier was to be settled through friendly negotiation between the interested

parties. She did not wish to interfere in the relations between Serbia and Croatia, but if the Croats liked to return to their pre-1918 relationship with her, she would accept them. Such were the proposals that Hungary still felt able to make in June 1943

to two States, on one of which she had declared war, while the other had declared war on her. In July things began to move a little faster. It at last proved possible to get a sympathiser, Colonel Kadar, placed at the head of the Intelligence and Counter-Espionage section of the General Staff. After this had been done, a message was sent down to Istanbul (incidentally, without Kallay’s knowledge) that “‘the major obstacles had been removed and the desired emissary would be at the service of the Allies.” The message, as it happened, went down the day before the Allied landing in Sicily, thus arriving on 9th July. About the same time, 1.e. early in July,? the Americans at last answered Radvanszky’s question in the affirmative, and suggested that they would be

prepared to negotiate further with any one of three men: Bethlen, Count 1 Referred to hereafter as the Sz. M. Memorandum. 2 Kallay to Barceza, 29th July.

3 The following personal to C. A. M. from Baranyai, with additions from Radvanszky.

LINGER SHIVERING 163 Maurice Esterhazy or Baranyai. Bethlen still could not bear to leave Hungary, and Esterhazy was, on his own pleading, already something of a

back number. Accordingly, Baranyai was chosen. In consultation with Bethlen, he drafted a memorandum on what Hungary wanted, which was to resist Russia but not the West. The frontiers after the war were to be left to the decision of the Peace Conference, but the administration was to be Hungarian. Hungary would co-operate with the Allies to this effect. In July Baranyai, accompanied by Radvanszky, took this memorandum to Switzerland, where the two men talked to Mr. Dulles and to Mr. Royall Tyler (the contact was with the Americans only, they being left to inform the British, while the Americans themselves asked the Hungarians, for reasons of

secrecy, not to contact the Russians directly). The Americans agreed to continue the conversations on the basis proposed by the Hungarians. Mr. Tyler was to be their main agent, while as the Hungarian link in the chain they offered a choice between three men: Apor, the Minister to the Vatican; Velics, Minister in Athens; and Bakach-Bessenyey, nowin Vichy. (Wettstein,

then Minister in Berne, was reputed to be rather pro-German.) They also proposed to send to Hungary by air a team of parachutists with a wireless set so that communications need not go through the cypher department of the Foreign Ministry, where it was suspected that the Germans had agents. When Baranyai returned to report (which he did to Kallay, Ghyczy and Keresztes-Fischer), Kallay refused to receive the mission, saying that this was too dangerous (although Keresztes-Fischer was prepared to arrange it). But

he agreed to follow up the diplomatic negotiations and chose BakachBessenyey to conduct them. It was arranged that he should be transferred to Berne.

This was settled at the end of July, although the move was not to take place till rather later. Naturally, during this period also, as during the preceding one, many persons besides those mentioned above made passing appearances on the scene aS would-be mediators or informants, some of these having authority

for their missions, others not. Most of these did no good, but also no particular harm, a conspicuous exception in the latter sense being a Trade Union official called Gibson, who after a visit to Stockholm found fit to announce in the Daily Telegraph' that he had been meeting “‘politicians from

Hungary, Bulgaria and Roumania who had direct contact with their own countries.” He had conveyed to these “‘politicians”’ “‘the views of the British Labour movement, which has, of course, representatives in the Cabinet.” Mr. Gibson went on to tell the journalist who was interviewing him that: ‘the views which related particularly to Hungary were:

1. Hungary is regarded as Axis territory; the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist Democratic Press which is still allowed to exist should demand the return of the Hungarian divisions from the Russian front and the return of Hungarian nationals from Germany. 2. They should insist that Hungary must give a guarantee that she will return to Czechoslovakia and other Allied nations territory she has acquired since the start of the war.

3. They should take steps to see that the Central European and Balkan countries raise the standard of living of their people and resolve 1 A shorter reference appeared also in the Daily Herald.

164 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH their agrarian problems and thus prevent that part of Europe being again made the political cauldron in which wars start. 4. Hungary should make known at the first possible opportunity its

desire to attach itself to the bloc which the Governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and Greece propose to establish. Hungary

should be made aware that the estrangement of Russia and Poland will be resolved.

Mr. Gibson made it clear to those whom he met (the interview went on) that onlv on these lines would Hungary and Balkan countries under Axis domination be able to command the support and goodwill of those nations who could rescue them from the grip of the Axis. He said to me last night: ““You may take it that these are authoritative views. You may expect further action.” The fact was that all this was the outcome of the unofficial negotiations initiated in the preceding summer by Gellért. The Hungarian “‘politician” and representative of the “‘leading democratic elements” in the country was simply M. Bohm. the poor little Jewish ex-Commissary and exile of twentytwo years’ standing, now blamelessly engaged in reading the Hungarian Press for the British Government. The “‘views’’ had been concocted between Mr. Gibson and M. Bohm. When all this came out, the Hungarian Right had the time of its life with the God-sent windfall. Firstly, it pointed out with gusto that in spite of her

hypocritical assurances to the contrary, Great Britain had now herself ‘“‘authoritatively” declared that it was her intention to mutilate Hungary again at the end of the war. Secondly, it was able to enlarge on its familiar theme of the treachery (a) of all Hungarian Jews, (5) of the Social Democrat Party. No incident during the whole summer gave it so much pleasure, or brought it so much advantage.

Some of the moves described above involved changes-round at various Legations and Consulates. At the same time, Kallay was now beginning to

find the task of conducting foreign policy without some sort of cushion between himself and the Germans an impossibly difficult one. In July, there-

fore (the announcement was made on the 24th), he resigned the Foreign Ministry to Jené6 Ghyczy, who had for some years been Deputy Foreign Minister. Szentmiklossy moved up into Ghyczy’s place, and SzegediMaszak into Szentmiklossy’s. These changes meant, incidentally, a further strengthening of the ‘“‘surrender’’ tendency in the Ministry. The views and

principles of Ghyczy, a career diplomat, were the same as Kallay’s. Szentmikléssy was even more pronouncedly on the Allied side, while Szegedi-Maszak was the spiritus rector of the whole “‘get-out’’ movement. As one of his first acts, Ghyczy relieved Ullein from his exposed position as Chief of Press and appointed him Minister to Stockholm, vice Matuska,

who retired. L. Haeffler became Chief of Press in the Minister President’s office, and I. Bede in the Foreign Ministry. The Government’s remaining principal preoccupation during the summer was to reconstitute Hungary’s shattered defence forces. It was prepared to

reorganise the Army on the German model, the old light divisions, or 1 He perished in Dachau in 1944.

LINGER SHIVERING 165 brigades, being replaced by three-regimental ‘‘mixed divisions.’’ A regiment would consist of one regiment of infantry, one battery of artillery, one troop of cavalry (or cyclists) and divisional troops; its peace strength would be about 3,800 men and its war strength 4,900. Thus a full mixed division at war strength would have been nearly 15,000 men strong. Each Corps District (the old numbers of which were retained) was to be given, as a general rule, one mixed division (which, confusingly, did not bear the same number as its Corps District),! and one ‘‘reserve division,’ more lightly equipped. The completed scheme? was as follows:

I Corps (Budapest) (Armoured), consisting of: Ist Armoured Division

(Budapest); 2nd Armoured Division (Kecskemét); Ist Cavalry Division (Nyiregyhaza).

II Corps (Székesfehérvar) with 6th (Mixed) Division (Komarom) and Sth (Reserve).

Lif Corps (Szombathely) with 7th (Mixed) Division (Sopron) and 9th (Reserve).

IV Corps (Pécs) with 10th (Mixed) Division (Kaposvar) and 12th

(Reserve). ,

(Reserve).

V Corps (Szeged) with 13th (Mixed) Division (Szabadka) and 15th VI Corps (Debrecen) with 16th (Mixed) Division (Szolnok) and 18th (Reserve).

VII Corps (Miskolcez) with 20th (Mixed) Division (Eger) and 19th (Reserve).

VIII Corps (Kassa) with 24th (Mixed) Division (Ungvar), 2nd Mountain Brigade (Munkacs) and 23rd (Reserve) Division.

IX Corps (Kolozsvar) with 25th (Mixed) Division (Nagyvarad) 26th (Reserve), 27th (Light) Division (Marosvasarhely)? and Ist Mountain Brigade (Beszterce).

Troops under G.H.Q., Air Force, Anti-Aircraft troops (seven brigades), River Flotilla. In Transylvania there was also a “‘Szekel Frontier Defence Force,” consisting of seven battalions of Frontier Chasseurs and twenty-seven of Szekel Frontier Guards. The transformation could, of course, only be carried through gradually. By October 1943 only four first line divisions had reached the full “‘mixed”’ state,* and they, like the other regular divisions, were only at peace strength. Two of the reserve divisions (the 15th and 26th) were still only on paper. The other reserve divisions were those constituting the Dead Army. They, too, were being regrouped to form six full divisions out of the nine light ones, and this process had been almost completed in the case of the VIIth Corps, whose units were emerging as the 5th, 9th, 12th and 23rd (Reserve) Divisions. The units composing the VIIth Corps were to be consolidated into the 18th and 19th (Reserve) Divisions, but this process was not begun until the spring of 1944.° 1 Except the I Corps. 7 See Adonyi, op. cit., pp. 52-9. 8’ This remained to the last a two-regimental light division of the old type. 4 Three of these were stationed in Transylvania.

5 The above numbers may contain mistakes. No two sources quite agree. Suhaj writes that the Hungarians ‘‘were always changing the numbers of units in order to confuse the Germans.’* Whether they succeeded in that or not, they have certainly confused me, and, | think, their own historians too.

166 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH In the field of rearmament, not many factories had been converted to war production in the preceding months (the reasons being those given above!), and owing to the deterioration of machinery and other causes, the total national output of coal, raw iron and steel was in each case rather below its 1942 figure, and showing, moreover, in each case a small but regular fall from month to month.” On the other hand, the production both of oil and of bauxite had risen very rapidly,? and at the next level of production the

preparations begun in previous years were now beginning to bear fruit: factories the conversion of which had been begun in 1941 and 1942 were now fully converted, types were past the prototype stage. According to Adonyi,* “‘production rose sharply in 1943,’’ and the figures which he gives bear out this statement: the production of automatic pistols rose from 3,600

to 12,000, of trench mortars from 77 to 684, of assault guns from 0 to 54 and of 7-5 anti-tank guns from 2 to 205. Adonyi does not break down the figures for other products, except aeroplanes, but it seems likely that the greater part of the total (1941-44) output of 4,583 light machine-guns, 180 armoured cars, 102 8-cm. anti-aircraft guns, 236 field howitzers, 81 15-cm. guns and 28 21-cm. guns was achieved in 1943. Of aircraft, production in that year was 80 Messerschmidt 102s (1 in 1942), 57 Messerschmidt 210s (1 in 1942), 130 Héyas (1 in 1942), 30 Focke-Wulf 58s and a substantial figure of training and transport machines and of aeroplane engines. These figures were, however, still far short of covering Hungary’s needs,

which the same writer puts (for an army fully mobilised) at 20,000 light machine-guns, 2,000 trench mortars, 330 armoured cars, 240 assault guns, 1,900 anti-tank guns, 400 howitzers, 132 medium guns, etc. Further, even the respectable level of production which the Hungarian factories had now attained had been achieved only with the help of ever closer integration into the German machine. Hungary obviously could not remedy her shortages of coal, iron, etc., and her increased production of oil and bauxite did not make her self-sufficient even in these respects, since she possessed no refineries

for either material. Almost all her production of both therefore went to Germany, which returned to her a quota of the refined products.® She was still producing no machine tools or ball bearings of her own. At the next level, many of the components which she was now making—magnetoes, gun sights, etc.—were useless in themselves without other components supplied

by Germany. Finally, for aeroplanes and some other complete items, she was almost entirely dependent on the joint production agreements.® The dependence was so complete that in his Budget speech at the end of

the year Csatay said that 60 per cent. of Hungary’s rearmament was in German hands, and if Germany cut off supplies, Hungary’s entire armament

production would come to a stop in a fortnight. And this was, of course, only one half of the picture. The principle underlying the joint production programme was the exchange of complementary products, or in other cases, the division of products pro rata of capital, etc., employed. Such figures as have seen the light of what Hungary was delivering to Germany in this field 1 See above, p. 119. ° Figures can be found in the Sztatisztikai Evkényv, 1943 and 1946.

* Production of oil in 1943 was valued at 106,381,000 pengéd, and of aluminium ore at 34,721,000 pengo.

1 Op. cit., p. 103. * The value of the oil exported to Germany in 1943 was 79,762,000 peng6, and of aluminium ore, 28,892,000 pengo.

6 See above, pp. I. 462, II. 118.

LINGER SHIVERING 167 vary greatly: those supplied to Barcza in August, for the address of the Western Powers,' stated that at that time ‘“‘at the most 20 per cent. of Hungary’s war production was going to Germany: of aircraft, where the percentage was highest, 30 per cent.’ This memorandum also stated that up to date only 15 complete aircraft had been sent to Germany. The value of the material of war which Hungary had since the beginning of the war contracted to supply to Germany had been 1,453-6 million R.M., of which 517:4 million R.M. had actually been delivered by June 1943. Germany had contracted to supply raw materials to the value of 556-7 million R.M., of which 110-3 million R.M. had been delivered. Under the aircraft programme Hungary had exported to the value of 287-9 million R.M., in return for 103-6

million R.M. worth of materials; the figure for the ‘“‘military works in commission” were 229-5 million R.M. exported, 6-7 million R.M. materials received. But these figures perhaps related to an early stage; for according to other authorities,? two-thirds of the Messerschmidt 102s and half the 210s went to Germany. A confidential report of February 1944 put the proportion of the total output of Hungary’s armaments industry which was then going to Germany at no less than 65 per cent.*

These arrangements had three separate unfortunate results. Firstly, Hungary simply could not afford to push her defiance of Germany too far; if she did, Germany could cut off supplies and leave her defenceless—not to mention such retaliation as she might make in other fields.° Secondly, the Hungarian factories were, after all, rendering Germany an assistance which was not entirely insignificant. The memorandum quoted above calculated that the industrial imports which she received from Hungary were equivalent only to some 2-3 per mille of her own production, but even this was not negligible; especially as the figure does not include Hungary’s important exports of oil and bauxite. And the Hungarian factories, which were concentrated, to an overwhelming extent, in and round Budapest, ran

a serious risk of getting bombed when the Allied air-forces got within range.

Finally, whatever the exact proportion of production which went to Germany, the necessity of parting with any of it helped to make the process of rearmament painfully slow, and the purchases of aircraft, etc., even if the quality was satisfactory (which was, allegedly, not always the case), probably did not go far to make up the deficit.° There was one further way in which Hungary was, willy-nilly, accom-

modating Germany: as a transit area. No German troops at all were stationed in the country, except for a few R.T.O.s and a medical post for the benefit of the leave-trains,’ but much traffic serving military purposes was 1 Szentmikldéssy to Barcza, 24th August 1943. (Kallay MS.)

2 Up to the surrender of Italy, Hungary was still buying some aircraft from that country, but the deliveries, of course, stopped after August 1943. 3 Tombor MS.

4 This document (N.G. 3338) was produced at the trial of Veesenmayer. It allegedly summarises a report delivered to Horthy by a General of Reserve Moritz von Fleischmann, itself a summary of the plan on which Kallay was working at the time (see below, p. 223, n. 1). 5 When Csatay gave the figure quoted above, he was arguing the impossibility of withdrawing the Dead Army.

® I have no adequate information on what was purchased, or when. As to quality: Suhaj writes that the Germans ‘‘unloaded on to”’ Hungary at stiff prices French aircraft of various out-of-date types, which could not be flown, and old Me 109F fighters which had already been used by the Roumanians. 7 Szentmikldssy to Barcza, loc. cit.

168 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH passing across her railways, and up and down the Danube, to and from both Roumania and the Eastern Front, and the Balkans.

The rearmament programme resulted in full employment, but its calls both on manpower and on stocks brought about considerable shortages for the civilian population. Building for civilian purposes had almost stopped.’ Both agriculture and such proportion of the workshops as were working for the civilian population were suffering from deterioration of machinery and shortage of such objects as nails. Luxury goods were obtainable only at exorbitant prices, and even clothing and footwear were in short supply. The

fuel position, too, was growing difficult. } The general control of the supply position was, however, now at last incom-

petent hands, and thanks to the measures of economy taken in the previous autumn, the food shortages of the springs of 1941 and 1942 did not recur in that of 1943. The coming harvest promising well, the bread and flour rations were put back on 23rd June to the figures of 200 gr. daily and 2 kg. monthly respectively.

The Jurcsek plan, now in force, had imposed much more compulsion

than heretofore on the farmers, who were now obliged to offer to the authorities, at officially fixed prices, practically all their produce above certain quantities which they might retain for their own consumption and for seed. As industrial prices had been rising faster than agricultural, the fixed prices in the latter field were raised on 27th June by an average of about 30 per cent. In the following weeks a big general readjustment of price and wage levels, which indeed largely nullified, by its very comprehensiveness, the purpose of the earlier measure, was carried through. Wages in munitions factories and on the land were put up by the same figure of 30 per cent.; other wages and

salaries for Government employees by 20 per cent., and all indirect taxes, railway and postal charges, social insurance contributions, etc., went up substantially. When these increases were announced, Kallay and Reményi-Schneller, both of whom made several speeches in connection with them, said that they were meant to be “final” and that the new wage and price level was to hold until the end of the war. There was obviously a widespread feeling that this

would not prove possible and that inflation was now setting in in earnest. A wave of what Kallay described as “hysteria’’ swept over Budapest in July. There was a run on the shops and the population began seriously accumulating hoards of foodstuffs, travelling out into the country to do so—in the face of official exhortations and of the law, but, as things transpired, greatly to the advantage of all parties in 1944. On their side, the farmers, untempted

by the official prices, put up a manful resistance to the authorities’ new requirements. On one day in July, 4,000 farmers in the single County of Csongrad (1,200 in the town of Szentes alone) were prosecuted for failure to

deliver their maize quotas, and the resistance to the new system of cattle requisitioning was so widespread that the regulations had to be modified. 1 The Army had gone in for building barracks on a large and, as some said, wasteful scale.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

AND FEAR TO LAUNCH AWAY N the morning of 27th July Hungary suddenly learned that Mussolini had fallen. The effect of the news, which was quite unexpected, on

the volatile national public opinion, was electrifying. All Hungary jumped to the conclusion that within a few days Italy would have joined hands with the Allies, whose triumphant forces would be within a few days’ march from the frontiers of Hungary, or a few hours by parachute. The extraordinary optimism which prevailed, especially on the Left, was reflected in a speech made by Peyer on the 30th, which hailed in exuberant terms the imminent return of democracy in Italy and said that ‘“‘the workers of Hungary sent fraternal greetings to the workers of Italy.”’ In Hungary, he went on, the workers would have to play their part in the new democracy in which the political forces of the country, headed by the Social Democrats and Smallholders, must unite.! The Left thought that Hungary could, and should, act at once. On 31st July Zsilinszky and Tildy waited on Kallay in the name of the Smallholders’ Party, and presented him with a long memorandum? (Zsilinszky’s work) which afterwards became extremely famous: for a year, quoted against its authors as proof of their treachery and pusillanimity and then for another year (until times changed again) quoted by themselves as evidence of their farsighted patriotism. This essay, after an elaborate historical introduction attacking the wisdom and even the legal validity of Hungary’s policy during

the previous years, ended by demanding withdrawal from the war and resumption of neutrality (including the recall of the troops from the Russian Front), and at home the re-establishment of full constitutional life, repeal of the Jewish laws, the dismissal of officers and officials who had collaborated with the Germans or had committed atrocities, reconciliation with the Serb, Croat and Slovak minorities and the establishment of self-government in Transylvania and Ruthenia. Thereafter Hungary’s foreign policy must be based on a return to the Pact of Friendship with Yugoslavia (this involving renunciation of the Bacska) and an alliance with Slovakia, within a framework of co-operation of the smaller nations from the Baltic to the Aegean,

and of friendship with Russia. The policy admittedly involved risks, but these could be overcome by a few weeks’ education of the people, which would

then be ready and able to defend the national independence. Germany would probably not risk trying to occupy Hungary, and if she did, the occupation would only be temporary. The Hungarian Army would have, of course, to resist, and at the worst could withdraw into the Balkans. The Allies apparently shared for a few days the illusions of the Hungarian

Opposition about the situation in Italy. All the broadcasting stations, 1 Not the least remarkable incident in connection with Peyer’s speech was that, after the Népszava had been allowed to reprint it in full, Radio Budapest, on 2nd August, transmitted the greetings of the Hungarian to the Italian workers. 2 A fuller summary of this memorandum, which includes a verbatim translation of its last paragraphs, is given in Kallay, op. cit., pp. 232-43.

170 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Western as well as Russian, had thundered adjurations at Kallay to act while there was still time, and most of them had denounced him ferociously for a Quisling when he failed to do so. And now the diplomatic middlemen took the same line. On 5th August Wodianer sent in a Polish note, dated the 3rd, which said that since Mussolini’s fall “‘the tone of the suggestions (coming

from London) had changed and become more precise.” The British now wanted ‘‘a move towards neutrality”’ or “‘a reversal of alliances,’ which should

take place when the Allied troops entered Yugoslav territory. Pending this,

there should be some demonstrative anti-German activity in Hungary, including sabotage, combined if possible with a political move towards the Left and a declaration to Yugoslavia recognising the territorial status quo before the war.

Even these suggestions were a watering-down of much sharper ones which had first been communicated orally, but which Wodianer had refused even to transmit, rejecting some of them flatly and, by his own account, in contumelious and arrogant language. Again on the 3rd, Barceza wrote urgently advising Hungary to declare her ‘‘stepping-out” of the war the moment Italy made a similar declaration (as she was bound to do shortly), and on the 5th he wrote again that “Mr. H.”’ had told him that day that Italy’s withdrawal from the war would “‘create a

new situation also for Hungary and the Hungarian Government.” This would be Hungary’s last chance. She should immediately follow Italy’s example, at whatever risk, including that of a German occupation. If she did not do so, she would lose for ever her chance of being treated differently

from Germany. Hitherto ““Mr. H.” himself and many people in England had understood that Hungary, in her position, could not take the initiative in seceding. But now action was possible, and if she failed to take it, “‘she would be accepting slavery not under the Axis but under Germany.” It was useless for her to hope that she could “‘trim and shuffle until the end of the war, remaining good friends with the Germans and helping them, and then expect the Allies to treat her with consideration.’’ He asked for an assurance that Hungary would act in the sense indicated. Kallay himself had been prepared to take “‘a bold decision’”’ if the new

Italian Government acted quickly.2, Ghyczy and Keresztes-Fischer had agreed with him at once. Csatay and Szombathelyi, who did not like the idea

of ratting on an ally, had been talked over. The Regent had agreed that if the national interest required that Hungary turn against the Germans, he would, after first giving them notice—for he would not stab an ally in the back—give the order; and the soldiers had assured Kallay that if the Regent gave the order, the Army would obey. Sealed orders had even been sent out to the Army of Occupation, telling it how to act if such an order was given. But the soldiers had warned Kallay that the Allies did not appear to have the forces on the spot to invade Italy successfully, and that the Italians were not likely to turn round and fight effectively against the Germans; and KA4llay 1 According to his own despatch (reproduced in the Kallay MS.), Wodianer had replied that the Allied suggestions, as made, “‘could have no attraction for Hungary.’’ He had asked whether

in return for “a possible change in her attitude’’ the Allies would give Hungary ‘‘binding assurances,’ including in particular guarantees that the areas recovered by her under the two Vienna Awards would be left to her. Sabotage was out of the question. It was impossible to take a Smallholder or a Social Democrat into the Cabinet. It was out of the question to make the suggested declaration to Yugoslavia, as this would mean “‘the final renunciation of Hungary’s millenary rights.”’

> Kallay, op. cit., pp. 203-4.

AND FEAR TO LAUNCH AWAY 171 dared not take the “jump” so long as it was a jump in the dark. He wrote to Barceza on 31st July (in a postscript to a long letter composed before the fall of Mussolini), that the Government’s policy for the moment must be to “wait and see” [sic]. ‘From our point of view,” the letter went on, “‘the essential factor in the situation is the German attitude, which so far is completely unknown; we have not even indications. But the fundamental fact, our geographic situation, remains unchanged; so does our main objective, which is to ensure by all means in our power the continuity of the Government, as the only way to guarantee the working of the constitutional machine and preserve the order

which your interlocutors also think necessary.”” What had happened to date had made Hungary’s position more difficult, not easier. It was Mussolini who had to some extent protected her against Hitler. ‘‘Now this considera-

tion falls away, and there is nothing, except the limitations of his own strength, to stop Hitler from resorting to violence. And Hitler’s strength is still very considerable where Hungary is concerned, especially considering that we are immediate neighbours.”’ And by this time, and thus already before the written exhortations of the Allies had arrived, the news bulletins were bringing a whole series of cold

douches. The King of Italy and Badoglio had declared their loyaity to the Axis. The Italian Army was still resisting the Allies. German troops were moving down into Italy. By 5th August Kallay had definitely decided that immediate action was impossible. On that day he invited Zsilinszky, Tildy, Rassay, Peyer, Mme Kéthly and certain other leaders of the Opposition to meet him and discuss future policy: in particular, whether the policy advocated in the Smallholders’ memorandum could be followed. Kallay told his auditors! that he agreed with all their objects, but did not

think that they were reckoning with the realities. If Hungary acted as the memorandum advised, the practical result would be that the Germans would occupy her, set up a Quisling government and wipe out the Opposition. Then the Allies would bomb her, and chaos would ensue. Even if the Germans had not technically occupied her first, the Russians would certainly do so in the end. The Communists, who might have reacted differently, were not present;

the representatives of the Opposition who were there accepted Kallay’s arguments almost to a man, and with little resistance. Only Bajcsy-Zsilinszky remained unconvinced, and Tildy’s view is not known, for when he tried to speak, Rassay rudely shut him up; but if he still had any counter-arguments,

he did not press them—indeed, he afterwards begged Kallay’s pardon for having interfered.” Rassay, while he wanted greater firmness shown against the Right, was not in favour of Hungary’s showing her hand or “‘taking any

course which would precipitate catastrophe on us for the sake of a noble gesture.”’? Peyer argued on grounds of “‘Weltanschauung” that Hungary must dissociate herself from Germany as soon as practicable, but Kallay begged him to consider that in any case his party would come into power after the war, and pleaded “‘make it possible for me to keep you and your organisations in a state in which you can survive this crisis,” and Peyer

1 Kallay, op. cit., pp. 245 ff. 2 Kallay to C. A. M.

3 Rassay knew of Kallay’s negotiations with the West, and allegedly for that reason had refused to associate himself with the Smallholders’ memorandum. (Kallay to C. A. M.)

172 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH agreed that it was essential to stave off a German occupation for as long as possible, and not to give the Germans a chance to intervene.

His rear thus safeguarded, Kallay turned to replying to his Western correspondents in terms which consisted in effect of a series of flat refusals, not merely to ‘‘jump out,” but, except in one respect, to do anything at all. To Wodianer he wrote approving and endorsing the ludicrous reply that the Minister had given to the Poles; to Barcza he wrote that he could give *‘no positive answer” to his message. ‘‘Mr. H.’s’’ suggestions were “based on a misapprehension of the situation, and were really the same as other advice

which the Government had dismissed as frivolous.’’ ‘Risks’? must not

amount to suicide, which was what provocation of an occupation by Germany

would amount to. Developments in Italy would make Hungary’s position more difficult, not easier. The British were offering Hungary no inducement beyond a vague promise of “‘not being treated exactly like the Germans after the war’’; and where was the guarantee that, if Germany (and her satellites) did occupy her, it would be the Anglo-Saxons and not the Russians who would “liberate” her? Unless and until Anglo-Saxon troops arrived on the Yugoslav border, nothing more could be done than a continuation of the ‘“‘sradual withdrawal from the German orientation.” Anyway, a Hungary

“de facto neutral, whose order and calm might be used in the sense of European reconstruction,” would be more use to the Allies themselves than a country occupied by the Germans. Therefore: “‘whatever happened in

Italy, whether de jure or de facto, to invalidate the provisions of the Tripartite Pact, the Hungarian Government would be in no position to issue a declaration of withdrawal.”’ The Yugoslav question elicited a memorandum justifying Hungary’s action in April 1941, although it did say that the Hungarian Government would be willing to bring the question of its action before a neutral Court. The day that this was despatched, Keresztes-Fischer made a speech in the Bacska saying that Hungary was determined to defend the integrity of her frontiers.

Far from wishing to speed up the negotiations, Kallay now seemed anxious to slow them down. Bessenyey, who was now about to make his first contact with the Americans,! was instructed to go cautiously and not to commit himself, since no agreement reached at that juncture would be fruitful. Ullein, when he went up to Stockholm, seems to have been given no mandate to negotiate with the Allies, but only to put to them the case both of Hungary and of the Hungarian regime.® And the great majority of Kallay’s

remaining communications with his representatives abroad, during this month, consisted simply of piéces justificatives to prove how innocent Hungary

was, how insignificant was the help that she was giving to Germany, how impossible it was to reduce that little, and how unfair and unreasonable it was of the Allies to take any part of her conduct amiss. Above all things—how wicked, as well as purposeless, it would be to 1 Bessenyey’s first report on his preliminary meeting with Tyler is dated 28th August. * Baranyat to C. A.M. Baranyai disagreed so strongly with this line that he refused to take any further part in the conversations. * His instructions, sent to him by Ghyczy on 24th August, may be summarised as follows: The Government still regarded the preservation of internal order as ‘“‘the best service it could render.” It did not see how it could shorten the war by ‘“‘confronting Germany.” The bombing of Budapest would not seriously damage the Germans nor help the Allies. There was no consider-

able German military traffic on the Hungarian railroads. .

This agrees approximately with the instructions sent to Barcza on the same date.

AND FEAR TO LAUNCH AWAY 173 bomb Budapest. “Mr. H.” had warned Barcza that this might happen if the factories went on working for Germany. Barcza and Kallay made aggrieved protests. Then, on 7th August, the B.B.C. repeated the warning seriously. Thereupon such a squeal of injured innocence went up—most loudly of all from the very voices which had gloated most lusciously over the bombing of British towns in 1940 and 1941—as beggars description. The factories were working only on peace-time production, the railways transporting innocent

_ holiday-makers, Budapest was practically an open town, to bomb which would be “a doubly unworthy act if committed by those with whom Hungary had never in her history crossed swords.” On this occasion a Social Democrat speaker! was put up to plead to the

Labour Party, and a week later the representative leaders of Hungarian Jewry, following an initiative which had come from themselves,” addressed a memorandum to influential Jews in the U.S.A. and Great Britain defending the attitude of the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian people towards the Jews and pleading strongly that it was a vital interest of the 800,000 Jews of Hungary that there should be no air-raids on Hungary and nothing else

done which might provoke a ‘“‘whole or partial’ German occupation of , Hungary (under “partial occupation’? was meant, presumably, the establish-

ment of a Right Radical Hungarian regime resting on German support). Kallay forwarded this to Switzerland with further representations of his own. Lawyers were also set to study the possibility of declaring Budapest an open city, and Wodianer was actually authorised to tell the Poles that the Government was prepared to make the announcement.* Nothing came of this, the lawyers having (presumably) pointed out that for the declaration to be made plausible, Hungary would have to lay off some 80 per cent. of her munition

workers. That she was “‘preparing to evacuate the factories” was given afterwards to the Germans as a pretext for denying them use of the Budapest railways, but no steps were actually taken in this direction. But the pleas and protests continued sostenuto. To restrict Germany’s use of the Hungarian railways was one of the two

practical steps to which Kallay succeeded in nerving himself, holding it necessary if the bombing of Budapest was to be averted. He did not dare stop

the traffic altogether, but he gave orders that it was not to pass through Budapest except in cases of absolute necessity. Otherwise, it was routed via

Szombathely-Nagykanizsa if destined for the Balkans, or via LosoncHatvan-Szolnok if going to Roumania (both of these being highly inconvenient and roundabout routes over single-track lines).* The other point on which Kallay tried to meet the Allies’ wishes was that of the Dead Army, which unlucky Lazarus had suddenly, and much against its own will, emerged from the grave; for the Russian summer offensive,

re-opening in July, had caused the Germans to retreat fairly rapidly on several sectors, including some behind which Hungarian occupation troops were stationed; and the latter, to whom the Germans had not always even troubled to give notice of their intentions, had more than once found themselves, most reluctantly, in the fighting line. 1 A perfectly genuine one.

* First a deputation of Hungarian industrialists and a Jewish deputation had approached KAallay asking him to save Hungary from occupation. Kallay asked the Jews to put their case

in writing. (Kallay to C. A. M.) 3 Listowel, p. 179.

4 The date of this communication appears to have been about 22nd August.

174 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Their presence there probably did not greatly affect the course of operations either way, but the Russians, by quoting both the new and the old numbers of the units involved in their communiqués, made the forces engaged appear much larger than they really were, as did the German communiqués, which either out of chivalry or out of malice always expatiated

on any engagement in which Hungarians happened to find themselves involved, thus producing an impression difficult to reconcile with the asser-

tions which KA4llay was lavishing on his Western correspondents, that

Hungary was de facto non-belligerent and her few troops east of the Carpathians completely non-combatant. The British and Americans pressed Kallay most strongly to withdraw the troops, and this was a point on which the Hungarians would, in their own interests, have been only too glad to meet their correspondents’ wishes. Accordingly, Csatay was sent up to the OKW on 18th August, nominally to pay his respects to the Fiihrer, as Nagy

had done before him, but actually to get the troops withdrawn. But this one attempt to follow the Allies’ instructions proved a fiasco. The Germans were not prepared to release the troops, and it seems possible that they even threatened reprisals if Hungary tried to act unilaterally.2. They did, however, revert to their proposals of six months before. While expressing complete confidence in the final outcome of the war, they admitted that the sudden defection of Italy had created a difficult situation for them in the Balkans, where they would only be able to defend the coast effectively (it appears that they too were expecting an Allied landing in Dalmatia) if they did not need to spread their forces in depth. They therefore asked the Hungarians to take over the task of occupying the hinterland of the Balkans and guarding the

lines of communication there. They were prepared to let the occupation troops come home, and even to fit them out, if they would undertake these duties.

Csatay himself, when he brought this proposal back, was in favour of Hungary’s accepting it, subject to the consent of the Croat Government, since he saw no other means of getting the troops back. And Kallay himself does not seem to have thought it quite unreasonable, for he did not reject it out of hand. He said that the matter must be discussed at a full meeting of the Supreme Defence Council and meanwhile telegraphed to Barcza and Bakach-Bessenyey, who had by now had his first preliminary meeting with Tyler, pointing out that if the Hungarian troops were in Croatia, they would be in a better position to make contact with the Allies.® Tyler, however, while strongly pressing for the withdrawal of the troops

from Russia, was as strongly opposed to their being sent to the Balkans,’

and “‘Mr. H.” said the same thing. Thus, when the Supreme Defence Council met on 4th September, although Szombathelyi strongly supported

Csatay, reading out a long and elaborate exposé in favour of the pro1 Nagy, op. cit., pp. 161 ff., reproduces what is obviously Csatay’s report on his visit. This describes in some detail what Hitler, Ribbentrop and Keitel said to the writer of the report, but none of the remarks are of much interest except for an admission by Ribbentrop that the events in Italy had taken the Germans completely by surprise. * T have been unable to find confirmation of the Press reports (which are in no way supported by Kallay’s narrative) that on this occasion the Hungarians definitely threatened unilateral action, but Csatay’s remark during the Budget debate (see above, p. 166) that it was not possible to bring the troops back without the Germans’ agreement, since Germany would then bring Hungary’s rearmament to a standstill within a week, does suggest that exchanges of a fairly brusque character

took place. ’ Kallay MS.

‘Id.

AND FEAR TO LAUNCH AWAY 175 posal,! the Council, by a majority, rejected the “Balkan solution.” The British and Americans were informed that ‘under no circumstances’? would Hungary send troops to the Balkans. This, however, meant that they could not come back from the Eastern Front. By this time the British had themselves begun to simmer down. When Barcza passed him Kallay’s message of the 16th, ‘“‘Mr. H.”’ indicated that London was no longer expecting Hungary to “jump out” immediately, and the texts do not even show him as protesting at Kallay’s uncompromising refusal to act even if Italy surrendered. He went on murmuring rather feebly that Hungary really must do something more than make pretty speeches, and in any case should withdraw her troops from Russia, but he found nothing else to ask for except information (which was not given him, except in the

form indicated above) and was quite consoling about the bombing: the Allies, he said, reserved their rights, but were in practice unlikely to spend bombs and petrol on the little Hungarian factories.2. The Americans had not yet had their spirits so far broken (they may not have been told in detail of Kallay’s message), and when Tyler met Bakach-Bessenyey on the 28th, he still told him that Italy’s surrender would still provide Hungary with “‘her last chance of escaping relatively unhurt.’’ The surrender would render the Tripartite Pact legally invalid, and Hungary should take advantage of the legal pretext and withdraw from the war. Bessenyey had argued against this,

but Tyler had stuck to his point; and even advised Hungary to face an occupation, if need be. Kallay’s reply to this (dated 6th September) consisted of another flat refusal to risk an occupation, at any rate unless the Allies gave Hungary “‘assurances.”’

That these weeks of barren exchanges did not end with the complete abandonment of efforts to reach understanding which seemed to fade into nothingness the moment the light of actuality was brought to bear on them, but, on the contrary, with the conclusion of very precise understandings for the future, was due to developments which took place unexpectedly to most people, and most of all to Kallay. Even after sending the message of 9th July, Kallay had put off despatching the military emissary. On his own admission he had temporised, in the hope

that it might be possible to eliminate the Istanbul line, with its dangerous demands, in favour of a diplomatic agreement with the West.* He had even

vetoed as too dangerous proposals for more vigorous action made by Szombathelyi and Kadar themselves, who had wanted to send down an officer

to arrange for an Allied parachute landing, under cover of which Hungary should rise.*

Finally, however, the British in Istanbul had sent an ultimatum. Something definite must be done by 20th August or they would break off the negotiations altogether. Kallay did not dare risk this happening before the alternative line through Barcza was secure, and at the beginning of August 1 KAllay, op. cit., pp. 309 ff., and Nagy, pp. 167 ff. 2 This was on Ist September (according to Barcza) or 2nd September (Ka4llay). Both texts give this despatch, but it must be stated that each version is, on the evidence of the other, incomplete. 8 Ka4llay to Barcza, 31st July.

4 Szombathelyi wrote this in his prison statement (Sz. I. MS.; see also Kossuth Népe, 29th March 1946). The officer concerned was one Colonel Tomosi. The exact date is not given, but it must have been after the fall of Mussolini. Later, said Szombathelyi, he got the contact established through Colonel Hatz, Military Attaché in Sofia, who also took over the post in Istanbul.

176 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH he had sent Veress down again. Veress was to wait in Istanbul. If he received, via the Consulate-General, a code telegram with a pre-arranged meaning,” this meant that he had “‘full powers to negotiate,” which actually meant that he was empowered to negotiate also on behalf of the General Staff, i.e. presumably to give, on behalf of the military, whatever undertakings the demands of the British made unavoidable. On 7th August (according to one version) the military themselves agreed

that it was unsafe to cut the Istanbul line. Veress was sent his telegram, which he received “‘some time between the 10th and the 16th.”’ He and Ujvary now pressed for a meeting with some “‘authorised and responsible British representatives,’ indicating that they had an important message to convey. They concocted this between them, using as basis Veress’ earlier message and later instructions; but since Veress was convinced that “‘there was no basis on which conversations, political or military, could take place unless Hungary decided to bring her interests fully into line with the political and military interests of the Western Powers,” he interpreted in a wide sense his authorisation to negotiate on behalf of the military. The message ran as follows:

Hungary renewed her undertaking that if the Western Allies reached the frontiers of Hungary she would in no case oppose them, but would turn against Germany to the extent of placing her airports and transport system at the disposal of the Allies. She would accept the guidance and instruction of the Allies, and although at the moment no General Staff officer was available, she would establish wireless contact and provide information.

She asked that this offer should be taken as an advance notification of

unconditional surrender, and asked the British to communicate their “preliminary conditions.”

On 17th August the two Hungarians met Mr. Sterndale-Bennett, Councillor of the British Embassy, and handed him this message, which he

took away for communication to the competent quarters. ,

While all this was going on, an unofficial approach (not counting whatever was being done by the Communists) had been made also to the Russians.

The Hungarian concerned was the honorary Consul in Geneva, M. Honti. M. Honti was a member of the Smallholders’ Party and was empowered by Bajcsy-Zsilinszky® to represent abroad the Party, and through it the Oppositional Front, which, it was assumed, would eventually succeed to the power. It was actually a British diplomat who advised M. Honti to turn to Russia, saying that “it was there that the fate of Hungary would for the present be decided.” Honti got into touch with “‘a Soviet citizen who had previously held a high office in the Soviet Diplomatic service’ and was now 1 Many versions of these events have been published. Kallay gives one, op. cit., pp. 373-4 various others, most of which seem to have emanated directly or indirectly from Ujvary, have appeared in various quarters, inter alia in an article published by Mr. Sulzberger in the New York Times, 5th February 1945. My own narrative is based on a check-up of these with information personally supplied from private information and supplemented also from the correspondence in the Kallay MS. 2 This was: ‘‘Veress should purchase missing copies of Times.” ° The following paragraphs are based on M. Honti’s own narrative, as given in a roneoed memorandum: Jelentés Honti Ferenc, a Figgetlen Kisgazda Part kiilfdldi megbizottja, 1943 Szeptember eleje és 1946 November vége k6zétt Svajcban és Franciaorszagban folytatott tevékénységérd6l. Geneva, November 1946.

AND FEAR TO LAUNCH AWAY -177 living in retirement, but was known “‘to play a certain part as intermediary.”

The two men met at Sion on 29th August 1943, and Honti explained his position and wishes. The Russian was much more forthcoming than Honti had dared hope, and a few days later brought to Honti a message which may be summarised as follows:

The first and all-important task was to break Germany’s military power. There were differences between the Allies, but they were secondary compared to this task, and after the war, also, they would have to co-operate—which was not to say that their alliance would be eternal. At the Peace Conference the victors would jointly discuss and would have to agree on the solutions to the political and economic problems which would present themselves. The Soviet point of view was that—apart from existing Treaty and moral obligations—the following principles would apply: The Baltic States and Bessarabia would belong to the U.S.S.R.; the

Bukovina, not so certainly. In Poland the U.S.S.R. wanted the nonPolish Eastern territories, although possibly not the exact 1939-40 frontier. Ruthenia was not a national problem for Russia; its fate would depend on whether Russia thought that her security needed guarantees against Hungary. In general, however, the Soviets, in their relations with their neighbours, were guided only by their need for security and their desire to create conditions which would last. They rejected the idea of ‘“Lebensraum,”’ and did not propose to extend their own frontiers unreasonably. Generally, they believed in the ethnic principle for frontiers, but must also allow for economic considerations and for existing treaties and certain moral obligations. As for Hungary, she had committed grave errors in the past; but more

important was her behaviour in the future. The withdrawal of the Hungarian troops from the Front, and in particular, the way in which it had been done, had made a good impression. But there were still troops in Russia whose activities there amounted to hostile actions against the U.S.S.R. If Hungary stuck to Germany to the last, she would have to take the consequences, and would receive the harshest treatment. If she wanted to avoid this, she had one way of doing so: to break with Germany,

that is, to cease all co-operation with her and to stop her propaganda against the Allies. This would certainly involve dangers and probably bring about a German occupation. But delay was dangerous, since Roumania might anticipate her and then her chances would greatly diminish. “The risk might seem too great under existing conditions, but would diminish substantially if a large-scale Anglo-American landing took place; this would perhaps be the most suitable moment for the decisive move.” As to Transylvania, that might possibly be made autonomous; but for the present, while both Hungary and Roumania were fighting against the Allies, the latter ‘“‘had no reason to favour one of them against the other.”’

| Meanwhile there were valuable military services which Hungary could perform without calling down on herself the wrath of Germany. He suggested that the conversations be continued in Ankara.

Honti at once returned to Hungary to impart this message to his confidants in the Foreign Ministry there; but the answer which they had to M

178 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH give him, a few days later, was unfavourable. The Government did not dare enter on even secret conversations with the Soviets, since the slightest in-

discretion would be fatal. Any serious attempt at rapprochement would break down in the last instance on the resistance of the Regent. The Minister

President himself would not dare take the responsibility for such a step. Secret military co-operation, moreover, would involve bringing in the General Staff, which would oppose any such idea vehemently. Honti was asked to keep the thread unbroken, but does not seem, in fact, to have followed up his initiative.

The month saw the beginning of the end of Hungary’s last hopes of reaching agreement with her neighbours; and that although, as the “Sz. M. Memorandum” shows, she was by now beginning to modify substantially her own—previously so intransigent—claim for integral revision. She even— somewhat later, it is true—let this fact be known by one of the extraordinarily roundabout methods which it was the local fashion to use for such purposes.? But even if these renunciations had been sufficient to satisfy her neighbours, they came too late.

Under the shock of Roumania’s heavy losses at Stalingrad, Mihai Antonescu (whose policy throughout this period had been singularly like Kallay’s) had in fact told the Italians that he wanted a “‘joint action”’ to convince Germany that the smaller belligerents could no longer carry on. He wanted Mussolini to ‘“‘co-ordinate”’ this.2 The “‘action’’ was to include Hungary, and Antonescu had allegedly talked of “‘common action” and had even said that “‘it was not important today where the frontiers ran.’’® Presumably as a result of messages from Italy, Kallay sent Count Miklos Banffy down to Roumania in mid-July. But precisely Roumania was the direction in which Hungary was still most intransigent, and she herself had not contributed markedly to the success of the enterprise. Kallay admits that he had received Antonescu’s message only with ““benevolent reserve,’”*

and Banffy’s cousin, the Minister, had, just before this journey, made a thoroughly chauvinistic speech in which he assured the Magyars of Southern Transylvania that they were not forgotten and ended with the words: “The nation as one man adopted the slogan: ‘For Transylvania!’ and we

Transylvanians answer with the cry: ‘With Transylvania for millenary

Hungary!’

Meanwhile, the Roumanians had been making speeches in just the same 1 In October a party of Swedish journalists visited Budapest. On 30th October the Svenska Dagbladet, which was commonly used for hand-outs where the Hungarians did not dare make a statement direct, wrote:

‘‘Budapest hopes that the Allied Foreign Ministers have agreed in principle that they can secure peace and peaceful development only through international co-operation. The Hungarians have been induced by their hereditary political insight to renounce the integrity of the Crown of St. Stephen. No one can any longer indulge in the illusion that the northern and southern territories which belonged to the Crown of St. Stephen will remain Hungarian. The realisation prevails that peace in this quarter of Europe can only be guaranteed when the small nations have an opportunity to live their national lives within frontiers drawn in accordance with ethnography and economics.” ° This statement is based on an unpublished document, dated 5th June, in the Ciano MS. The date of ‘‘after Stalingrad” is taken from Ghyczy’s speech to the Foreign Affairs Committee in November 1943.

3 Kallay to Bessenyey, 6th September.

s HTonearian Press, 6th July. : 4

AND FEAR TO LAUNCH AWAY 179 vein, and they also had been trying to make terms for their surrender and forwarding to London memoranda on what parts of Central Europe they would like to receive as reward for deserting their allies. And they, too, had thought they should have the whole of Transylvania, which, they thought, would be appropriate “‘compensation” for the losses which they now saw that they were doomed to incur in the East.1

And the Roumanians were much more favourably placed than the Hungarians. They possessed in London friends who had the ear not only of the Pink Press but of the B.B.C. and the Foreign Office itself. Most important of all these friends was President Bene’, who was already by now thinking again (if he had ever stopped doing so) in terms of a revived Little

Entente, and encouraged the Roumanians to do likewise. In July he had promised them that he would back their demands and help ‘“‘to restore Roumania to her former position.’ In possession of this assurance, they had no need of Hungary. They kept Banffy waiting for three days and then asked him to put down in writing that Hungary recognised the Trianon frontier in its entirety.2 Of course, he refused, the Hungarian thesis being that the territorial question

should be left aside altogether. The Hungarians did not thereafter abate either their public speeches (Antal made a most violent one on 10th August, which included the assurance that Transylvania would “‘not again be lost to Hungary’’) nor the fullness of their private demands*; but they proceeded now without any hope of reaching agreement with Roumania, or indeed, any further attempt to do so.° In fact, during the autumn both countries kept considerable numbers of troops stationed on their common frontier,® and numerous clashes occurred, some of which led to loss of life on a severe scale.’ It was the same with Slovakia. Here, too, certain unofficial conversations had gone on in the summer.® But in July the Slovak Press suddenly burst

into another most acrid polemic against Hungary, which was accused of

imperialism and of oppressing the Slovak minority in Hungary. The Hungarian Press in this case remained on the pained defensive. The Slovaks’ attitude was probably in part a reaction to the articles which the Hungarian Press had been publishing about the beauties of a strong, multi-national state 1 Listowel, pp. 142 ff.

2 Listowel, pp. 150-2. Actually, the recrudescence of the anti-Hungarian campaign had begun in May and seemed then to have German support. It seems very likely that this first agitation was in fact instigated by the Germans as a move in their game against Kallay; but the Roumanians were now, as before, in the happy position of being able to court two lovers with one gesture. 3 Private, Kallay to C. A. M.

4 Cf. the Sz. M. Memorandum quoted above. Wodianer told his Polish opposite number on 9th September that Hungary wanted Transylvania to be excluded from any negotiations about Hungary’s post-war frontiers, because Roumania had renounced the British guarantee before the Vienna Award (Listowel, p. 182).

6 There were also reports that about this time Bethlen revived the idea of an independent Transylvania, and approached both Antonescu and Maniu. I have no details of these negotiations, which in any case were quite unimportant. Veesenmayer in November still found traces of them, but in my belief it was a cold trail by then. ® The Hungarian troops seem to have been furnished chiefly by the “‘Szekel Frontier Guard.” According to Ghyczy, the Roumanians had eight divisions on the frontier and four behind it; Bethlen put the figure at eleven in Transylvania and three in the Bukovina. ? Ghyczy, loc. cit. 8 These were between Slovak and Hungarian officials and landowners in Bratislava. Tiso was not involved (Kallay to C. A. M.). These were, apparently, the conversations which so alarmed Veesenmayer, but he also was able to satisfy himself that Tiso was sound and that there was no danger (Veesenmayer, M.T. 13012, 13087 ff.).

180 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH in the Danube basin. but in part it seems to have been inspired by the same influences from London as had affected the Roumanians. The only quarter among Hungary’s neighbours or near-neighbours where she still found some degree of friendship (except possibly Bulgaria)! was in the camp of Mihailovi¢, and if certain rather dubious information is to be

believed (and although the source is a tainted one and the details have certainly been further distorted by those to whom the story was told, in order

to make it more suitable for their purposes, there is probably some truth at the bottom of it),? the contacts established earlier were considerably strengthened at this point. A Colonel of the former Yugoslav Army named Trumbi¢é was sent down to Istanbul on a Hungarian passport bearing a fictitious name, and there, through Ujvary, put in touch with Lt.-Col. Peric, the local representative of the Royal Yugoslav Government in London. He was to offer the help of the Hungarian Government to Mihailovic “‘in his struggle against Tito.”’ Trumbi¢ returned with a message from Nin¢ic in London, agreeing to the proposal and asking for an official Hungarian representative to be sent to Istanbul to discuss the details of the proposed collaboration. The representative must be accompanied by? a Serb politician from the Bacska. The question of the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier was to be left until after the war and then settled on the basis of an exchange of populations.* These negotiations petered out almost immediately,’ owing to the British

action in recognising Tito. The direct contact between Hungary and Mihailovic, on the one hand, continued; a Yugoslav officer named Bosnjakovic was appointed representative of Mihailovic in Budapest; information was exchanged, radio contact established, arms and medical supplies sent to Mihailovic down the Danube and Serb internees and prisoners of war willing to serve with Mihailovié released and sent down to him.

The remaining events of this agitated transition period can be treated briefly. In the optimistic days when the Italian prospect still looked fair, the Smallholders and Social Democrats had at last announced that they had reached ‘“‘complete agreement,” this apparently consisting in an understanding that the two parties would co-operate in domestic questions and would refrain from poaching on one another’s preserves.® General as its terms appear to have been, the agreement was an important one, for it was recognised thereafter by both parties as binding. The Centre and moderate Left were now widely regarded as the winning side, and there was a certain 1 Writing to Bessenyey on 6th September, Kallay said that he was “‘attempting to develop and deepen his relations with the Bulgarians,” but I have no information on this point. > The source in question is the statement made by the renegade Hungarian General Ujszaszy and transmitted on the Moscow wireless home service, 14th June 1946, 12 noon. * The statement as monitored writes “‘must be,”’ but that is quite impossible. * It was worth noting that the Sz. M. Memorandum makes exactly this proposal regarding the frontier in question.

5 Ujszaszy said that Kallay had entrusted the further negotiations to Bakach-Bessenyey,

who, however, informs the writer that this is completely untrue. ° On 6th August the Smallholders said that ‘‘while retaining their own programme intact, they would remain in continuous contact with the Socialists and would move in unison with them in all internal questions, acting with them in Parliament.’ On 20th September Bajcsy-Zsilinszky said that “the essence of the agreement was that the two great working classes, the workers in the villages and those in the towns, should not attack one another.”” According to M. Sulyok, op. cit., p. 481, the agreement had been reached on 9th August between four leaders from each side; but of its substance M. Sulyok writes only: ‘We settled everything that it was possible to settle at that time.”

AND FEAR TO LAUNCH AWAY 18] rush away from the exposed rearguards of the Right. Reports told of a great

influx of recruits to the various components of the Independence Front, including in particular the ‘Intellectuals’ Section” of the Smallholders. Both

the Smallholders and the Social Democrats enjoyed the unaccustomed pleasure of announcing that they were picking and choosing among applicants, rejecting mere time-servers. No less than eight members of Imrédy’s party left it for the MEP, to the accompaniment of sardonic allusions from the Left to rats and sinking ships. Two tiny parties, both unrepresented in Parliament—the Independent Hungarian Bourgeois Party! led by Albert Bartha’ and J. Vazsonyi’s National Democratic Party*—declared their intention

of “co-operating with other progressive elements.’”? None of the more important figures and parties of the Centre followed this example, but both the Liberals and the Christians joined with the Social Democrats? on 24th August to pay homage to the memory of Istvan Horthy in what the Magyar Nemzet described as “‘a grandiose expression of the wish for national unity.” The discouraging news of the latter half of the month, however, checked the flow to the Left, and the internal situation reverted to the static, pending the further developments in Italy.

The harvest was now in, and proved to be well above the average in breadgrains and several other important crops,° so that the country was able

to face the future with a certain assurance. Finally, the regular economic negotiations with Germany, for which Clodius had turned up at the end of July, ran more or less their normal course. The Hungarians refused to accept orders for delivery after the war, or otherwise to extend credits, except as agreed under the armaments programme.® Otherwise an agreement on the usual lines was concluded. As usual, Hungary’s exports were to consist of _ foodstuffs, raw and processed, an increased quantity of industrial plants, and

raw materials; her imports, of coal, semi-finished articles and industrial products. Her total exports to Germany in 1943 were 776:5 million pengo and her imports 612-4 m.p.; the adverse balance was due mainly to the exports of oil and bauxite. 1 Fiiggetlen Magyar Polgari Part. It had formerly been entitled the ‘Independent EconomicPolitical Party” (Fiiggetlen Gazdasagi-Politikai Part).

2 Not to be confused with the Bartha who was Minister of Defence 1939-42, although,

curiously, he had held the same post—but under Mihaly Karolyi in 1919. 3 Nemzeti Demokrata Part. 4 The occasion was a meeting of the Budapest City Council. The Smallholders were thus unrepresented. 5 According to the Sztatisztikai Zsebkényv for 1947, the yields for the Trianon area were (in millions of quintals): wheat, 22-8; rye, 6:7; barley, 7:1; oats, 3:5; maize, 12:5; potatoes, 18-2; sugar beet, 7:3; fodder roots, 20-0. ® Both oil and bauxite went under this heading.

CHAPTER TWELVE

CROSS-PURPOSES OMPARED with the excitement caused by the overthrow of Mussolini, Badoglio’s surrender fell relatively flat. On 9th September, which was the day on which much of the public, and even many members of the

Government, first heard the news,! there may have been a few people who

believed that Hungary could immediately follow Italy’s example. The Communists, who in August had called into being a new organisation, the “Peace Party,’ as cover for their own further activities, distributed leaflets calling for a separate peace and alleging that this demand was supported by all democratic elements in the country.? There is, however, no evidence that the latter statement was truthful. The Smallholders and Social Democrats held a joint meeting on the 10th, at which they “discussed all questions of the day and reached identical conclusions,” but these “conclusions”? seem to have been that, for the moment, the only course was to “‘wait and see”’ how things developed.* On the evening of the 9th Kallay had a previously billed speech to make. Here he simply said that Hungary must always remain grateful to Italy, but

that it was impossible to discuss foreign policy at that juncture. When the papers did appear, they recorded events in Italy without any comment, giving the communiqués of all parties.

In private, Kallay had told his Cabinet that ‘all agreements binding Hungary to the Axis had automatically been dissolved,’ but even in this

circle he had concluded only that Hungary had recovered her ‘‘moral freedom,’’ and when asked by Banffy ‘““What do we do?” had answered: ‘‘We

policy remains static.’” |

act at the appropriate moment, as our interests demand; pending this, our It takes, however, more than one to make a static policy, and that very

1 Owing to a public holiday no newspapers appeared on the evening of the 8th or the morning

of the 9th. For the Government, see Anfuso’s humorous account (op. cit., pp. 361-2). When he was rung up urgently from Rome with the notification of the surrender, he could find no responsible Minister to whom to deliver it, for it was the ‘“‘nuit des cerfs’’ and the whole Govern-

ment, from Kallay down, had gone off stag-shooting. At last Anfuso managed to unload the notification on Szentmiklossy. * One of the leaflets duly signed A Békepart (the Peace Party) is in my possession. It makes the following demands: (1) Regular convocation of Parliament; (2) Replacement of the Kallay Government by a “national” one; (3) Immediate initiation of negotiations for a separate peace; (4) Abolition of the censorship; (5) Release of political prisoners; (6) Dissolution of the Arrow

Cross and the Volksbund. It then writes that “the Social Democrat Party, the Smallholders’ Party, the Legitimists and the other forces of Democratic Hungary have taken the first step: they

have demanded a separate peace.”’

* Various foreign newspapers, especially the Swedish papers, fed by the Hungarians with items calculated to place Hungary in a favourable light with the Allies, published stories of the

leaders of the two parties waiting on Horthy with demands for an immediate jump-out (see Dagens Nyhater, 9th September), but I have found no confirmation of this. 4 The Baseler Zeitung of 12th August wrote that the parties in question had ‘‘agreed to cooperate with the Government in seeking the nearest road towards peace.” 5 Kallay, p. 206. The Foreign Ministry had discussed whether the Tripartite Pact had lost its validity, but had decided that no public statement was possible.

CROSS-PURPOSES 183 day the German Service Attachés called at the Ministry of Defence with the following demands:

(a) All Italian military missions, attachés, transport officers, etc., stationed in Hungary to be arrested. (6) All Italian aeroplanes to be handed over to the Germans. (c) Hungarian oil transports to Italy to be discontinued.

(d) Roumanian deliveries to be prevented from reaching the Italian

frontier.1

Forced to show its hand, the Government rejected these demands, and the next day Horthy summoned a special Council to consider the whole position. Kallay, Keresztes-Fischer and Ghyczy were there, and “all exMinisters President and Foreign Ministers of Hungary, except Bardossy and Imrédy.’? As a result, mainly of the strong line taken by Bethlen, KeresztesFischer and some of the ‘‘ex-Ministers President,” a resolution was adopted as follows: “‘High civilian and military representatives’ were to be sent to the Germans “‘in the very near future” to demand immediate repatriation of the entire Army of Occupation; all demands for troops to the Balkans should be refused definitively; the Germans were to be told that in future no German

military transports were to pass through Budapest, although they could continue to use the side-lines. If the Germans refused to release the Dead Army, it was to be ordered home. The appropriate secret preparations were to be set on foot. In the future, the policy of the Government was to be dictated ‘exclusively by the interests of self-defence.’’ No troops were to cross the frontiers. The army was to fight against guerrillas and partisans, but to be ordered not to resist Anglo-Saxon troops. This resolution was sent to Barcza by special messenger, with a note that the participants were “‘well aware of the serious consequences which the

independent repatriation of the troops might provoke.” Nevertheless, Horthy was going “‘to place Hitler before a fait accompli.’’ Barcza was asked to pass the news urgently to ““Mr. H.’”?

On the same day Kallay wired to Wodianer that he wanted to despatch a secret military mission to Lisbon.‘ Now, however, the history of the previous month repeated itself, except that this time the German counter-measures preceded rather than followed the moves of Italy and the Allies. The Italian divisions were disarmed. The

Allies did not even land near Rome, but in the South of Italy, which the Germans had written off, and there they made slow and precarious progress.

It was soon apparent that Italy’s sole reward for having accepted the humiliating formula of unconditional surrender was going to be to find herself fought over, her cities bombed and her installations destroyed by both sets of belligerents at once. The German propaganda machine pointed the moral in great detail and thundered out pointed warnings, but it was preaching to the converted, and 1 Barcza MS. (from a despatch sent to him from Budapest). * Kallay MS. * Barcza MS. * Listowel, p. 184. 5 So the Donausender said on the 11th: ‘“‘The European peoples may learn a lesson from the

Italian drama; they would do well to keep an eye on their home front so that people like Badoglio cannot undermine their future. The liquidation of possible traitors is no task in which mercy can have any place. Both the enemy and the traitors should know that we have an effective remedy for everything.”

184 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH its comments on the folly of people who advocated precipitate jump-outs and were willing to surrender unconditionally were hardly more forcible than those in which not merely the Hungarian Right-wing Opposition but members of the Government itself indulged (with gusto) during the next weeks. It was left to the representatives of the Right in the Government— Lukacs, Jurcsek and Antal—to make the speeches, but what they said clearly expressed the views of the Government as a whole, and of Kallay himself. For if Kallay had ever entertained any thought of “jumping out,” he had soon dropped it. Even the decisions taken on the 10th now seemed too bold, and were revised. Szombathelyi was still to go to Hitler, but as sole emissary,

no civilians, important or not, accompanying him, and the letter of instructions written to him by Kallay on the 15th! recapitulated, indeed, the demands laid down by the Council, saying that “‘these were guiding principles no deviation from which could be admitted by the Hungarian Government,”’ but, none the less, softened them down in important respects. There was no more talk of a fait accompli or of ordering the troops home if the Germans refused. Szombathelyi’s instructions were always “‘to extract’ this and that from the Germans, and the letter ended: “‘In so far as, in the course of the discussions ... you do not see that a result can be obtained I think it better for us not to extract a change in the present position, although you should always try to extract all possible alleviations for our troops.” Szombathelyi was definitely to refuse the German troops transit through Budapest, and also to refuse to send troops to the Balkans,* but for the rest was instructed only to get the troops home if possible, but if not, at least _ to get them nearer to Hungary, along the Kiev-Lemberg railway line, ‘“‘where they could avoid contact with the Russian forces, and if necessary, be used for the defence of the Hungarian frontiers.’’ Szombathelyi, was, however, “‘to avoid giving the impression that Hungary wanted to withdraw from participation in the Russian campaign.” In fact, when he met the Germans on the 18th, Szombathelyi did not even get this much satisfaction.* The Balkan question passed off smoothly: Hitler did not raise it at all, and Keitel only mentioned having made the request previously. The Germans seem to have accepted without too much demur the Hungarians’ denial to them of transit facilities. But they firmly refused to let the troops come back. They said that “‘they understood the military reasons for the request, from the Hungarian point of view, but for political

reasons it could not be fulfilled’; they gave the excuses that Antonescu would have made trouble, and that “the enemy would make political capital out of it.” Keitel only promised that the Eastern Occupation Group, which

was that which had got involved in the fighting and was now with the German troops in the same sector, falling back in any case to a line further west (it was, at the time, standing on the Desna), should come right back, its H.Q. being located in Kameniec, on the Galician border, its depot in

Stanislav, in Galicia itself, and the troops “strung out along the Kiev-

Lemberg railway.’

1 Text in Nagy, op. cit., pp. 179-80.

* Kieszkozolni.

* Typically, this part of Szombathelyi’s mission was advertised in the Press and underlined by several articles stating demonstratively that Hungary was not a Balkan State but a Danubian one, and did not propose to intervene in Balkan affairs. * The following account is from the Kallay MS. and Nagy, op. cit., pp. 182-4. These write in almost identical terms and are clearly drawing on a common source, viz. Szombathelyi’s report. 6 From Ghyczy’s report to Bessenyey.

CROSS-PURPOSES 185 It was at this juncture that Kallay learned that understandings had been reached in his name which, if he ratified them, pledged him, after all, to the

principle of unconditional surrender and to active co-operation with the Allies.

The British had kept Veress waiting a long time for his answer; if the Hungarians understood aright, their message had been submitted to the Quebec Conference and also passed to Moscow. Then, on 8th September, Veress was told to meet Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugesson at midnight on the latter’s yacht in the Sea of Marmora. Sir Hugh, after showing Veress his own authorisation in the shape of a telegram from Mr. Eden, informed him in the name of the United Nations that H.M. Government had “‘taken note”’

of Hungary’s communication, and read out the following “preliminary conditions,’ which Veress took down from his dictation?: (1) Hungary to confirm her offer, and her acceptance of the Allies’ conditions, through regular diplomatic channels. (2) The agreement to be kept secret until published at a moment to be agreed, which should in no case be before the Allies reached the frontiers of Hungary. (3) Hungary progressively to reduce her military co-operation with Germany, to withdraw her troops from Russia and to assist allied aircraft flying across Hungary to attack targets in Germany.

(4) Hungary similarly progressively to reduce her economic co-

operation with Germany and not to participate in Germany’s war | production.

(5) Hungary to resist if Germany attempted to occupy her, and to that end to reorganise her High Command so that her army should be able to attack the Germans.

(6) At a given moment, Hungary to place all her resources, communications and air bases at the disposal of the Allies for the continuation of the fight against Germany. (7) At a suitable moment, Hungary to receive an Allied air mission, to advise on the preparations for the break-away. (8) Hungary to establish regular radio contact with the Allies and to keep them informed of the German and Hungarian situation. (9) Hungary to engage in no further negotiations with other quarters.”

The Allies did not bind themselves not to bomb Hungarian territory: they reserved their right to bomb when and where they deemed necessary. But they said that the necessity would probably not arise so long as Hungary kept her side of the engagement, and so long as German transports across Hungary, or Hungarian deliveries to Germany, did not increase. It was only on the 14th that Veress reached Budapest, with a memorised account of this document and two wireless transmitters; andsome of those members of the Foreign Ministry and of the Government to whom the results of his

negotiations were now communicated (it being the first that some of them knew that anything of the sort had been in the wind) were taken somewhat

aback. Ghyczy thought that Veress had promised more than Hungary would be able to perform, and that it might be necessary to disavow him 1 For the exact text, see Kallay, op. cit., pp. 373-4. Another version, differing in minute and unessential respects, appeared in Haladds, 22nd August 1946. This seems to have emanated from

oe his stipulation was added at the last moment. |

186 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH under the pretext that he had exceeded his instructions. Kallay objected on principle to the formula of unconditional surrender. Keresztes-Fischer, however, pressed strongly that the agreement should be ratified, and eventually Kallay consented, if the Allies would accept a compromise: while not admitting the principle of unconditional surrender, Hungary would agree in advance to carry out ‘“‘any conditions” imposed by the British and Americans, which would come to the same thing in practice. When, after some delays, the formalities which the parties had agreed to accept as constituting ratification were carried through,* Wodianer, representing Hungary, made this reservation formally. Sir Ronald Campbell, who was acting on behalf of the Allies, said that he could not accept it, but when the Hungarians suggested that the point could be left in suspense, as being of no immediate urgency (since the surrender would in any case not take place till the Allies reached the frontiers of Hungary) provided Hungary fulfilled her practical undertakings meantime, the Allies did not formally dissent, and the agreement was in fact treated as having entered into force. Yet to shelve disagreement was not the same as to resolve it, and it was not the case that Hungary and the Allies were at one in their interpretations even of the immediate consequences to be drawn from the “agreement.” M. Kallay himself writes that he and the Allies were thinking in different terms. He puts it? that he regarded the agreement as a political gesture from which Hungary expected political consequences, viz. to be “struck off the list of enemies” and given “British protection,” which, he intimates openly enough, was to operate against Russia as much as, or even more than, against Germany; while the Allies “‘sought only to derive military advantage” from it. And he goes on to complain with acerbity of the way in which the British, in particular, sought to obtain this military advantage. It is true that they had given up asking for an immediate “‘jump-out’’; there is fairly good evidence that they had dropped this demand as early as August,* and the correspondence in the Kallay MS. does not show it as having been seriously renewed during the autumn‘; indeed, the abandonment of the demand is implicit in the agreement itself. But they did insistently demand “action” in various fields, including in particular sabotage on a serious scale. Kallay

maintains, and maintained at the time, that fulfilment of these demands would at once have brought about the occupation of Hungary by Germany, and rejected it the more stubbornly because he thought that the Allied agents were actually anxious to see this come about, in the calculation that it would provoke resistance from the “democratic elements’ in Hungary (whom, according to this view, Kallay was holding back), hamper production and tie down an appreciable German occupying force in Hungary. 1 The Allies, it appears, had at first wanted either Kallay’s or Ghyczy’s signature to the document. Then they said that they would content themselves with the signature of either Apor or Wodianer. In the end they came down to accepting a verbal declaration from Wodianer that Ujvary had been properly accredited and that his communications were to be taken as authentic.

Wodianer made this declaration to Campbell on 10th October. His report on the interview, which includes the statement that he then made the reservation described above, is in the Kallay ae See KAllay, op. cit., pp. 375 ff. In the paragraphs which follow I have also drawn on records of personal conversations with M. Kallay. 3 K allay has stated this personally to C.A. M.; Szombathelyi also testified to the same effect in his prison statement. 4 The correspondence in the Kallay MS. does show occasional suggestions in the opposite

sense, but it also shows both Dulles and “Mr. H.” agreeing quite specifically that they did not expect a “jump-out” until the military situation changed.

CROSS-PURPOSES 187 Kallay’s reply was that a German occupation would not even bring the Allies the advantage which they expected, because the “‘regime’’ was not, in

fact, holding the forces of resistance back. On the contrary, resistance in Hungary was “‘an official operation undertaken with the knowledge of the Regent and under the direction of the premier.’”” An occupation would only sweep this away. Moreover, the contrast drawn by the Allies between the ‘regime’ and the “democratic forces’” was unreal. The whole country was

behind him, except for the pro-Germans and for the ‘“‘small, subversive minority behind which Moscow stood.” In any case, an occupation would entail frightful sufferings for precisely those elements whom the Allies desired to see spared. Consequently, he could not undertake any action which would provoke an occupation. These arguments, however, did not convince the Allies, who retorted that Kallay was simply stringing them along. He was giving them fair words and excuses, while really collaborating against them with the Germans. His only real object was to save his “‘regime.’” So they tried to counter by stirring up against him that subversive agitation which he denounces so bitterly—going so far as to complain (and this belief of course made his own attitude more rigid) that the Allied agents were playing Moscow’s (and Bene’) game for its own sake.

The truth was that both parties were right up to a point. The history of Hungary after March 1944 shows only too tragically how accurate Kallay’s forecast was of the dreadful consequences which a German occupation would bring on precisely those elements in Hungary whom the Allies regarded as

their friends. It also shows that he was completely right in his forecast of the effects of occupation on Hungary’s war effort. A few hundred German policemen sufficed to crush the “‘resistance’” of those elements in which the Allies trusted, and the occupation as such did not cause production even to

falter (the large fall which took place was due exclusively to the Allied bombing). Her military contribution to the war effort increased substantially.

Kallay was also telling the exact truth when he claimed that not only the Jews but the workers stood squarely behind him in his policy of avoiding an

occupation. The Social Democrats themselves put this with a clearness which left nothing to seek when, in January 1944, they were able (that is to say, given facilities by the Government) to send a memorandum abroad. In

this they took up exactly the same attitude as Kallay, justifying it by ingeniously mutating the necessary mutanda: as he was arguing that the

interests of Western civilisation required the preservation of a strong Conservative Hungary as a factor of European order, so they asked the Allies to preserve the Hungarian working class as a factor of European democracy. Like Kallay, they argued that a German occupation would only benefit Germany, and declared that they would not provoke it by sabotage; drawing a picture of what Hungary was already doing which cruelly resembled Kallay’s 1n its unconvincingness: the examples of “‘opposition”’ and “‘nation-

wide sabotage’’ included “‘the whispering campaign against Germany and for the Allies” and “‘the black market, which hinders deliveries to Germany.”’ When, at about this time, an Allied agent visited Hungary with a request

that certain factories should be destroyed as a sign that Hungary was in earnest with her anti-German protestations, and made his way not to Kallay but to certain workers’ leaders, those persons flatly refused. They said that

the passive resistance which they were carrying out, owing to which

188 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH production was only 40 per cent. of capacity, was enough. They were not prepared to authorise the destruction of factories.* On the other hand, when Kallay thus declared that the upper limit of the help which he could give the Allies was the point above which Germany would be provoked to intervene, he was certainly not guided solely by the

calculation that that point was that which gave the Alles the greatest advantage, nor even solely by the wish to spare the lives of the Hungarian Jews. He was also in fact trying to save his ‘‘regime,’” and more than that: to save for Hungary, not only socially and politically but also economically and militarily, everything that he could save for her; and in that cause he

did indeed string the Allies along. He consistently evaded fulfilling any demand which would have weakened Hungary, militarily or economically; any which might have weakened her established political system; even any which would have hampered the German war effort, in so far as this was directed against the U.S.S.R. In brief: he honoured his undertakings where it suited his own purposes and ignored them where it did not, following, in each case, exclusively his own judgment. It is probable that in intimate conversation he would not have denied this description of his conduct and would even have maintained that it was his duty as Hungarian Premier to follow exclusively the interests of Hungary. But the Allies saw only that he had promised them to fulfil any practical condition laid down by them, and was quite patently not doing so. Thus the functioning of the “‘agreement’’ degenerated all too largely into a sorry affair of cross-questions and crooked answers, arising out of what were in fact cross-purposes. The details of what Hungary did during the autumn to help the Allies may be read in Kallay’s own pages.? There was one point of the agreement— and it was, of course, a very important one—which the Hungarians honoured in full from the first. They refrained scrupulously from interfering with the

Allied aircraft which, after the beginning of October, were flying over Hungary almost daily’; they for their part leaving Hungary unbombed. This tacit mutual understanding was observed throughout the entire autumn and winter,* being applied also to the Soviet aircraft which in the later months were flying to and from Yugoslavia (a journey which, incidentally, used

to carry them directly over Budapest). Germany’s protests that the Hungarian attitude endangered the factories across the Austrian frontier, especially those in Wiener Neustadt, were disregarded. Here KAllay was doing the Allies a substantial service, while the immunity from attack which Hungary, on her side, enjoyed, although less directly due in reality than the Hungarians imagined to the agreement, was booked to KaAllay’s credit in Hungary and contributed in no small measure to the stability and popularity enjoyed by his regime through the autumn. * The names of the agent concerned (a Hungarian), and of the persons with whom he spoke, are known to me. = Op. cit., pp. 376 ff.

* S.E. Europe came within practicable bombing range of aircraft based in Italy after the capture of Foggia on 27th September. The flights over Hungary began a few days after this. * On 7th January 1944, Allied aircraft bombed the railway near Zalaegerszeg, which was one

of those used by the Germans. Hungarian fighters then went up. An informant of Szalasi’s

heard Szombathelyi telling off the officer responsible. The officer replied, not unreasonably, that he wanted to know whether Hungary was at war with the Allies or not, and asked for instructions

in writing, ‘‘as he did not want to share the fate of Feketehalmi-Czeydner.”’ Szombathelyi answered that such things could not be put in writing.

CROSS-PURPOSES 189 Apart from this, the Hungarians undoubtedly “resisted”? Germany very

stubbornly in certain fields. By some trick of ingenuity, it proved

possible to escape applying the agreement to send the Bacska harvest to Germany: only small quantities of cereals went to that country, and huge stocks (amounting according to one version to 18 million quintals!) of wheat were saved and stored away, chiefly in East Hungary (where most of them

were eventually taken over by the Russians). Numerous devices were employed to cut down various exports to Germany, and it is probably true that Hungary was giving Germany less economic help than any other country

within the Axis orbit. But even the economic resistance stopped short at the point where continuance of it would have hampered Hungary’s plans for herself. The exchange of material of war was not cut down and the integ-

ration of the German and Hungarian war industries made further progress. | The German military traffic across Hungary was limited, but not to a degree which the Germans found intolerable.”

The repatriation of the Dead Army was another Allied desideratum which chimed in with Hungary’s own wishes, and which she tried hard to fulfil. After Szombathelyi’s visit the Germans had in fact withdrawn the VII Corps some distance: the troops were now stationed along the line of the Desna river, with Corps H.Q. in Kameniec. Some Jewish labour battalions were allowed to come home altogether. The VIII Corps, however, was further away than ever, for the Germans had moved it due west to the sheltered but

inaccessible edge of the Pripet marshes. On 8th November Szombathelyi actually sent an order to the Generals commanding the two Corps to move their men further back, but three days later the Germans issued a counterorder to their troops that any unauthorised retreat by the Hungarians was to be prevented at all costs, if necessary by force of arms. On the 21st

Szombathely1 went up again to thrash matters out and got out of the Germans a promise that “‘the scattered divisions should be assembled in the Kovno area, and in case of a further Russian advance, withdrawn towards the Hungarian frontier,” but this promise was fulfilled only in relation to the VII Corps. The VIII Corps remained in the north, and with it those units of the Hungarian Air Force which had remained in Russia. It seems probable that Szombathelyi was told that if the request was repeated, supplies for the Hungarian Army would be cut off altogether.® It is true that the Dead Army was doing little harm to anyone. The men possessed neither the arms nor the physique for serious operations, and they had developed an understanding, which was afterwards put in the form of

a regular agreement between Szombathelyi and the Polish, Russian and Ukrainian partisans, that the parties should not interfere with one another and should even exchange prisoners. The importance of the force was now almost entirely political: it was at once a symbol, a touchstone and a hostage. Out of these three capacities it was soon to develop a fourth: that of a spark in a powder-keg. Even here, it should not be concealed that while Kallay was telling the Allies that he was endeavouring to meet their wishes by withdrawing from 1 So Kertész, op. cit., p. 62. Other sources put the figure only at 7 million. 2 The position during the autumn was that the number of German trains either entering or leaving Hungary was limited to 40 daily, of a maximum of 100 axles. Six per cent. of this traffic went via Budapest. Traffic for the Balkans went via Nagykanizsa or Pécs-Ujvidék; for Roumania via Szolnok; the usual German routes for the S.E. Front were, however, through Galicia. 3 KaAallay hinted at this strongly in the Budget debate in the Upper House, 15th December.

190 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH active participation in the war, he was simultaneously assuring Germany of his undiminished determination to resist in the East. Information was now going out from Hungary through various channels

and M. Kallay maintains that he gave “‘complete information on every question put.” Other persons concerned have described the service in the same terms. It can only be said that the specimens preserved in the Kallay MS. itself? do not bear out this description. They consist mainly of screeds proving how innocent Hungary was, and how futile it would be to bomb her,

because so few of her factories were working for Germany. But Kallay refused to say which those factories were, since “it would hardly be fair for us to designate targets ourselves, even indirectly.”* Information on Hungarian military dispositions and equipment was refused on the ground that military secrets were ‘“‘things which people try to keep even from their own friends and allies.”* When the Allies asked about German dispositions, they were told that the Hungarians knew nothing themselves.°® As we have seen, M. KA4llay himself confirms that he always refused every demand for sabotage, under which term he seems to have included any move for reducing Hungarian production in any direction which did not suit his own book. He found ever fresh excuses to put off sending a military mission to Cairo, and from behind these there emerges clearly from his own narrative

that his true motive was to avoid having to receive direct orders from an authorised channel. The Americans were asking for a mission of their own, of observers, to be received in Hungary,® and this request, too, was put off throughout the autumn with repeated evasions,’ as was a similar British request.2 No serious attempt was made to “‘purge’’ the General Staff; here, indeed, Kallay was up against a real difficulty, since he had no control over military matters, and the Regent, who believed implicitly that “‘his’’ officers would always obey him, did not think radical changes necessary.

Finally, the suggestions made from time to time that Hungary should democratise her Government—a change which Dulles, for example, thought ‘““iImperatively necessary’—were, again, refused most flatly. “I wish you

would get them to understand,’ wrote Szentmikléssy in reply to Dulles’ suggestion, “‘that wars always, automatically, bring about changes of regime,

so that there is no need to stress this question so insistently.... Itis in the interest of the post-war regime that we should maintain order and calm.’’® When ‘“‘Mr. H.” advised “‘strengthening the Left-wing elements,’’?° he was simply told that “‘the Parliamentary activities of the Left-wing parties could 1 Op. cit., p. 382. * These are, indeed, very incomplete, as they contain none of the messages exchanged with Istanbul, which had been going on since 26th September. 3 Szentmikldossy to Barcza, 24th August. 4 Ghyczy to Bessenyey, 4th December.

6 Id., November (nearer date not given).

® The first request had been made in July. It was renewed in September, and constantly pressed thereafter.

7 When Bessenyey passed on this request for the second time (30th September) he got no answer at all until 26th October, when he was told that it would be impossible. The Americans then whittled down their request to ‘‘at least one radio-telegraphist, who should be supplied with information from Hungarian sources.’’ He was told, a fortnight later, that this was ‘“‘technically impossible.”” If the Americans cared to send someone with a neutral passport, the Hungarians ‘“‘would try to keep him concealed, although it was improbable that he would get much information.” Objections against a parachute landing were also found. ®’ Kallay told C. A.M. frankly that the persons whom the British wanted to send were instructors in sabotage, and he was determined not to receive such persons. ® Szentmikléssy to Barcza, 6th December. 10 Barcza to Ghyczy, 8th December.

CROSS-PURPOSES 191 not be regarded as restricted.”"! There is an exactly parallel series of questions and answers in the Bessenyey correspondence. Having said all this, we will, however, repeat that on many of the points at issue between him and the Allies, Kallay was certainly right and they wrong, and also, that he got very little encouragement to act otherwise than he did.

He was never offered more than quite unbinding prospects that if Hungary took a leap into the dark, the wounds and fractures which, as he correctly foresaw, she would incur in the process would presumably be visible on the day of judgment. Except in one instance, to be described shortly, they never went beyond this. When Bessenyey told Tyler how hard it would be for Hungary to change her course unless given some reason to hope that she would not be occupied

by the Soviets, or assigned to their sphere of influence, Tyler could only express sympathy, but say that Hungary “‘could not hope for such encourage-

ment now.”? When, on 17th September, Bessenyey cautiously raised the question of frontiers, pointing out that it was all very well to quote the example of Yugoslavia, but Yugoslavia had something to gain, Tyler said that the Allies, having learned a lesson from the last war, “were making no promises regarding frontiers to anyone, and could not make an exception for Hungary, which was in the enemy camp.” Hungary must take her risks blind, and hope for the best. There was one line which for a moment looked as though it were going to be more hopeful. As we have said, no perceptible progress seems to have been made during the spring and summer with the Archduke Otto’s negotiations; but on 20th September Wodianer forwarded a message (written six weeks before) from Eckhardt that “‘the position of Hungary had recently so much improved in

Washington that there was a certain willingness to treat with her.”’ She would have to make “‘a willing offer of active military co-operation with the U.S.A.”’, but if she did so, she might hope for advantageous terms. These would have to be approved by Roosevelt. It was absolutely necessary that she should make a firm offer. Eckhardt asked for telegraphic authority to negotiate.’ At the beginning of November, two more letters from Eckhardt reached Lisbon, dated Ist and 10th October respectively.* The Archduke had seen

Roosevelt and Churchill together at the time of the Quebec Conference (17th-24th August). Both men, according to Eckhardt, had “said that they believed in a conservative solution for Central Europe’? and had advised Hungary to reach agreement with the Allies in good time, and before she came under direct military pressure (although they knew that the actual change-over could take place only when the situation allowed it). Then, on Ist October, Roosevelt had received the Archduke alone and had allegedly

gone much further. If Hungary would now “nerve herself to settle her relationship with the Allies,” they would be prepared to accept her as a co-belligerent and not insist on her unconditional surrender. She could, moreover (so Eckhardt reported the conversation), be reasonably sure, if she

behaved intelligently, of recovering the whole of Transylvania, since the 1 Szentmikldéssy to Barcza, 14th December.

* Kallay M.S.

83 Id. The second letter actually arrived after the first, but the two appear to have been based on the same information.

192 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH present proposals were that Roumania (and Bulgaria) were to be left to the Russian sphere of influence. but not Hungary. To give Transylvania to Hungary would thus be to save it from Russia.} Hungary would have ‘‘to make up her mind to dismiss certain leading

persons” (which presumably meant that Horthy would be required to abdicate in due season. although his immediate retirement did not seem desired). and should be ready to enter a federation, to include Poland. The Archduke himself was forwarding his own account of what Roosevelt

had said via his brother. the Archduke Charles Louis. who was going to Lisbon to act as his permanent representative there.2 But Eckhardt felt strongly that what the President had said offered ‘‘an acceptable basis for negotiation” (!) and urged Kallay to respond to it immediately. He sketched out a detailed draft agreement, to be concluded between Hungary and the Allies. which was couched in the most optimistic terms. Hungary was to stipulate that her sovereignty and constitutional institutions should be left

intact and her laws. Courts and administration continue in force (no AMGOT). Her military forces must not be disarmed; on the contrary, the Allies were to be prepared to give her modern equipment. The territories recovered since 1938 were to remain under her complete sovereignty until the Peace Treaty. Her claim to recover the whole of Transylvania must be secured in writing.

Glamorous as these prospects were. they were still subject to the awful drawback of requiring Hungary to take immediate and decided action, and Kallay’s first answer to Eckhardt seems to have consisted simply of one of his usual reasoned refusals to act before he was sure it was safe. The next weeks even wiped off some of the glamour. The British, when sounded, replied discouragingly that “‘with regard to Otto’s claims about his contacts with United Nations spokesmen. H.M.G. is always willing to listen to any anti-German proposals, when made by Habsburgs or others. British policy (however) gives no support to Habsburg scheme in Austria or Hungary and we should be surprised if American policy were different..." The Archduke

Charles Louis duly arrived in Lisbon, and although information on his activities is lacking, 1t may well be presumed that he brought an account of

Hungary's prospects much less rosy than that which had flowed from Eckhardt’s sanguine pen, which no other source to which I have had access justifies, even remotely. Under these circumstances, Kallav was still

unable to “‘nerve himself.” On 28th November he seems to have sent Wodianer a further document, to be used only if the occasion arose, authorising Otto to act as Head of the Hungarian State if the Germans invaded Hungary and Horthy abdicated or was deposed®; but the message which he sent to Otto at the same time conveyed no suggestion that he was 1 The Archduke confirms (personal to C.A.M.) that at this meeting Roosevelt said that if Hungary changed hands while Roumania remained with the Axis, and Hungary then occupied South Transylvania, he was willing to support her claim to that area. Later he dropped the idea—** if he ever held it seriously "’ (in fact, as we shall see, below, p. 216, he did not go so far in the following March).

= Otto had, in fact, Just arranged for this. The original suggestion had come from Sigray, who had grown impatient with the slow progress of the negotiations.

3 The Kallay MS. contains a long memorandum in these terms, dated 16th November. It is addressed simply to Wodianer, but it seems a good guess that it was meant for Eckhardt, Otto and the Americans. * Cit. Lukacs. op. cit., p. 803. The Kallay MS. records a similar answer from Istanbul, dated 12th December. 4 The date from Lukacs; the contents of the credentials, Kallay to C. A. M. (personal).

CROSS-PURPOSES 193 any more prepared than before to take the plunge. The two chief points in it seem to have been that Hungary was willing to surrender to the Western Allies, but not to Russia; and that Bene’ must not be allowed to learn about the negotiations, or he would betray everything to the Russians.? This line therefore now looked like running into exactly the same cul-de-

sac as all the others. There was, however, one basic assumption made throughout the autumn by all the Hungarians’ Western contacts which was infinitely encouraging to them, and so long as it was made, allowed both parties to the Istanbul agreement to skate safely over the ultimate question on which that agreement was destined to founder a few weeks later. This was that, in spite of the check encountered by the Allied armies in Italy, and

the continued and rapid advance of the Soviet armies, it was the Western armies and not the Russian which would in due course reach the Danube. On 18th September the American Deputy Military Attaché in Lisbon told Wodianer that “Central Europe belonged to Eisenhower’s sector. Their plan was to arrive in Central Europe before the Russians, nor did they wish to see the Russian influence in the Balkans.’’ The Western armies were meeting “momentary difficulties” in Italy and “‘time would elapse before they reached the Drave or the Danube’’; but the question, he intimated, was only one of time. Two days later, General Eisenhower’s representatives repeated this

declaration to Kowalewski.? Nothing said by any of Kallay’s British or American correspondents during the autumn gave the Hungarians any grounds to assume that this assumption did not hold good.* The Hungarians

had thus perfectly reasonable grounds for basing their own policy on the

assumption that it was the armies of the Western Allies which would eventually enter Hungary, the more so as their own General Staff, basing its views on what the Germans told Csatay and Szombathelyi, confidently main-

tained that the German retreat in the East, rapid as it was and far back as it was taking them, was still only a strategic one. Germany’s enormous lines of communications had placed her in great difficulties when her armies were far in the East, and the position would be reversed when the line ran further West. She had ample reserves which she would soon be able to move to the Eastern Front, and she would then be able to hold the Russians when

and where she would. For the southern sector, in particular, there was no danger so long as Vinnitsa, which was regarded as the key-point, was held.°

The Germans do not seem to have known of the Istanbul agreement, but they were, of course, well aware that Kallay was negotiating with the Allies; of the Berne conversations, in particular, every word spoken there was known to the Germans the same day.® This knowledge was doubtless one of the factors determining their refusal to let the Dead Army out of their hand. Otherwise, they seem to have thought it wiser not to precipitate a crisis at that juncture (particularly, it may be thought, since the negotiations were being so patently inconclusive). They accepted the Hungarians’ rulings over the use of the railways and the stationing of troops in Hungary; fulfilled their 1 Lukacs, loc. cit. 2 Kallay MS. 3 Id. 4 It did in fact hold good among the Allies themselves. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, p. 328, writes that Eisenhower was still working on 13th November on the assumption that his front would expand into the Balkans. 5 Cf. Nagy, op. cit., pp. 165 ff. 6 They also knew of the existence, although not the tenor, of the Stockholm talks. N

194 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH side of the joint munitions production programmes so long as the Hungarians fulfilled theirs (and here, admittedly, they had no cause for complaint), and on Kallay’s own admission! did not even attempt to exert any active diplomatic pressure on Hungary, except on one occasion.

This was when Mussolini proclaimed the Italian Republic, and the Germans made Hungary a very strong request, which was accompanied by veiled threats, to recognise the new State. M. K4llay has himself told the

story of this episode in considerable detail,? and we need only say here, summarising his narrative, that the Hungarians stood out and refused to give the Republic more than de facto recognition, although afterwards giving

de jure recognition to its Minister; with complicated social, political and financial results, since they did not withdraw recognition from the Royal Italian Government. The Germans may still have had some hopes of the Regent, for on 16th October Admiral Raeder and Secretary of State Meissner arrived in Budapest to present him with a yacht as a belated 75th birthday present—an unsolicited

and unwanted gift which only embarrassed the Regent. But the Germans did not talk politics even with him,* and avoided contact with the Government, refusing an invitation to lunch.*

They had now reverted to their policy of not communicating with the Government at all on a high level, either in Budapest or in Berlin. It is true that on 19th December Sztdjay had a bleak interview with Ribbentrop in the latter’s shattered office,> and here Ribbentrop ended by complaining, querulously enough, of Hungary’s defeatist attitude, her secret negotiations in Madrid [sic], Stockholm and Switzerland, her tolerance to the Jews and her unsatisfactory behaviour over the recognition of Mussolini. He brushed aside Sztdjay’s denials (to do Sztdjay justice, he rebutted the accusations to Ribbentrop, while privately advising Kallay to mend his ways), saying that he was accurately informed of everything that was going on in Hungary, and possessed reliable reports and documentary evidence. But Ribbentrop had not asked for the interview: Sztdjay had asked to see him because he was just leaving for a prolonged visit to Budapest and had not talked to Ribbentrop for months previously. Moreover, Ribbentrop did

not volunteer his complaints: his mind had, apparently, been full of the bombing which was making him so uncomfortable, and Sztdjay had tried to steer the conversation into other channels.

Doubtless certain Germans expressed their dissatisfaction to their Hungarian friends when occasion arose: Jurcsek was in Berlin in November on official business, and it is alleged that the Germans then warned him of

‘the danger of Kallay’s ambiguous policy’ and hinted that they were watching Kallay with deep mistrust, and “would take drastic steps unless a change came about quickly.”® Under “‘drastic steps” they presumably meant occupying Hungary, rumours of which were circulating as early as October, whereafter they cropped up with great frequency. Probably most of the Germans who had to occupy themselves with Hungarian affairs were by now saying to themselves, and to Hungarian friends, that this step would have to be taken one day, when KAallay overstepped the mark. But while the relevant German documents are not available to me, I have not been

Kallay MS. (letter to Barcza). 2 Op. cit., pp. 214 ff. 315 Sztdiay’s Horthy to C. A. M. 4 Barczy. report is in the Sz. I. MS. 6 Szig. Biz., p. 631.

CROSS-PURPOSES 195 able to find proof that the Germans were yet making serious preparations for this eventuality and think it highly likely that many of the rumours to the effect (where not the spontaneous product of the Pest mind—there are few cities in the world in which rumour travels so fast, or so inaccurately, as

Budapest) were deliberately spread by the Germans and their agents in Hungary as an obvious means of keeping the toes of the Government, the industrialists and the workers on the line. The Germans were certainly not yet organising any active conspiracy against the Government inside Hungary. The first move made by them to which even the later Hungarian People’s Court attributed this character was made in mid-November, when Ribbentrop sent Veesenmayer on a second visit to Hungary, with instructions to “study the situation there.” This time, Veesenmayer (who travelled under the guise of the representative of the Standard Electricity Company) stayed longer than he had in the spring, and cast his net wider. He avoided Kallay and other members of the Government, and, at the other extreme, the Arrow Cross, but spoke to several members of the MEP and the Imrédist Party, in which, and in the person

of its leader, he showed special interest. The climax of this part of his activities was a dinner party given in his honour by an industrialist named Felix Szentirmay, and attended by Imrédy, Jend Ratz, Ruszkay, Prince Lajos Windischgritz, Hubay, a lawyer called Walton and Otto Braun (with Mme Szentirmay).

Here it appears that the guests confirmed Veesenmayer’s own view that

Hungary was “taking part in the war with only one hand,” and Imredy agreed that there were in Hungary large reserves both of manpower and material which could be utilised, but only if the regime were changed: Kallay and Keresztes-Fischer, someone said, were ‘“‘swindlers.” But who was to succeed them? And how was he to be placed in office?

All those present at the party. and doubtless others of Veesenmayer'’s informants, advised him against having anything to do with Szalasi, who was roundly described as a “‘nit-wit.”” who must absolutely be “‘excluded from any

future combination”—a principle to which, as we shall see, the German adhered until compelled by force majeure to depart from it in the autumn of 1944. No actual name was mentioned as that of the most suitable Minister President. but Veesenmayer’s own previous impression that Imréedy was, by virtue of his sentiments and of his economic expertise, the right man for the job, and that his followers constituted the most **serious”’ element in Hungary. was strengthened. Everybody warned Veesenmayer against trying a “*putsch”; and when the

People’s Court subsequently found Imrédy guilty of having “solicited German intervention,” it did so in the face not only of his own denials but 1 The first trace which I have found of these rumours is in mid-October. Szig. Biz. p. 612, then records a discussion on the possibility between three friends. none of whom ranked the probability very high. About the same date, a journalist named VY. Gorgey. of whom we shall hear more (see below, p. 303), brought one of Szalasi’s lieutenants the story that the Germans ‘“*had taken the fixed decision to occupy Hungary. but this had been cancelled at the last moment owing to the intervention of two influential Germans.” German troops were, however, standing by, and would march in, accompanied by contingents from Hungary's neighbours, unless Hungary altered her domestic policy. He wanted to know how the Arrow Cross would then behave. Szdlasi, who incidentally sent the messenger away with a flea in his ear, thought that the reports were spread by the Germans and not reliable. 2 Veesenmayer described this visit at his own trial (Min. Trial, 21st February 1948, pp. 3108 ff.).

His report was allegedly produced among his defence documents. but has not been seen by me. Many references may be found also in the trial of Imrédy, and a few in that of Bardoassv.

196 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH of the direct evidence of both Veesenmayer and Kunder. What the company most truly said was that there was no hope of getting Kallay outvoted in Parliament; the majority of the MEP ‘“‘would stand behind Kallay so long as the Regent kept him’’—especially since Kallay was not only Minister President but also Party Leader. The only resource was therefore to get Horthy to appoint another Minister President; in which case the MEP would toe the line fast enough. Veesenmayer seems then to have tried to see for himself how the Regent could be approached. He first saw Bardossy! (to whom Mecseér introduced him), and said to him that the situation was anxious: Hungarian politicians had ‘‘a duty” (to save it). Bardossy replied that he could not himself criticise his successor’s policy nor approach the Regent: Veesenmayer should talk to Bethlen, or to Gyula Karolyi. Veesenmayer had two long conversations with Bethlen (who, apparently, did all the listening and none of the talking?) which confirmed him in his view that it was essential to work with the Regent; but also that the Regent was

in practice unapproachable. Bethlen and certain others were surrounding him with an iron ring through which no ordinary influence except their own could penetrate; and their own influence was implacably anti-German. The only way to convert Horthy was thus to bring about a meeting between him and Hitler. At the time, Veesenmayer sent in only a brief interim report. It was only in mid-January that he made a full report to Ribbentrop, first orally and then in writing.®

All this time Kallay was also pursuing his policy of public appeals to and

private negotiations with the neutrals. In private, the Turks now took up again the idea which they had dropped in the spring, and offered Hungary ‘on immediate agreement to work out a detailed military plan to form a ‘bloc of order’ in Central Europe and the Balkans after the war.’’* The plans were discussed in Budapest, for safety’s sake, and got as far as the initialling of a preliminary agreement, which, however, was destined to be short-lived.®

Hungary’s immediate neighbours were unapproachable, except that a pragmatic understanding was reached with—of all people—Tito.® The partisans had begun raiding Hungarian territory to such an extent that special security measures had to be brought into force all along the southern frontier. The Hungarians then sent down their principal counter-espionage officer for the area—a man called Janos Marty’—to arrange with Tito an unofficial pact of mutual non-aggression: the partisans were not to enter Hungary and the Hungarians would abstain from doing what they would otherwise find necessary, occupy the bridgeheads. After this, Marty made a second journey to ask Tito officially what he proposed to do if the British invaded through the Balkans: would he order the partisans to enter Hungary with the British or not? Tito answered that if the Hungarians refrained from helping the Germans against the partisans, he would halt his forces on the

1 Bardossy’s evidence at his trial, p. 11. * Veesenmayer to C. A. M. 3 Min. Trial, 21st August 1948, p. 19091. 4 Kallay, op. cit., p. 276. 5 See below, p. 205.

6 The following is combined from the Kallay MS. and private information (Michaelis to - o Macty was a Viennese born, whose original name had been Martin, who had taken service

with the Hungarian police. His official position was commander of the frontier post of Gyékényes, where the Budapest-Zagreb line crossed the frontier.

CROSS-PURPOSES 197 Hungarian frontier and leave Hungary to the British. The promise cost him little, but contributed towards the near-truce which continued to prevail on the border.

The Tito-Marty connection was, incidentally, destined to play a sensational part in the events of October 1944.!

The fact that Kallay was negotiating with the West was. of course. a secret de Polichinelle in Hungary as well as Germany. The Government spokesmen themselves dropped broad hints on the subject: also letting it be

understood that the negotiations were proceeding favourably and that Hungary could expect of the West not merely terms but very advantageous ones, of which Hungary's immunity from bombing was a foretaste. Details at least of Barcza’s negotiations reached Bethlen (to whom. after all. Bareza’s reports were addressed), and through him. the entire “*Liberal-Conservative” group, Which was in fairly continuous touch with the other “resistance” leaders. The Smallholders knew what Eckhardt (who was still the official leader of the Party) was doing.? and by this time they and even the Social Democrats had their sympathisers in the Foreign Ministry, who kept them abreast, at least in a general way. of the developments. This knowledge largely governed the internal political developments of the autumn, which were influenced particularly by the belief. gathered from Eckhardt’s reports, that the U.S.A. would look favourably on a Habsburg restoration, democratic in outlook. but not based on the Popular Front. in

Hungary. This thought came as a vast relief not only to the professed Legitimists but also to that big body of middle opinion which still regarded the Social Democrat leaders with invincible mustrust. and vigorous efforts Were made to bring about the appropriate political grouping in Hungary. [t Was against the principles of the Legitimists to found a specifically Legitimust

party. since they always maintained that the Legitimist issue was a national one, which could not properly be made the subject of Party controversy. but at the end of October two members of the Upper House and six Deputies

of the Lower House announced their intention of reviving the old pre1914 Christian People’s Party for the purpose of organising “Christian Democracy.” The programme. as read out by Count Zichy at Budget time, was based on the Papal Encyelicals. with emphasis on their reformust aspects, and also called for “the restoration of the legitimate Hungarian Monarchy.”

It was thus at once an open declaration in favour of a restoration and a gesture of conciliation towards the masses and of dissent from the unbendingly reactionary attitude of the official Catholic leaders. At the same time, the recognised Legitimist leaders were advocating their cause directly. Count Sigray. in his Budget speech. which had clearly been co-ordinated with Zichy’s, openly called for the restoration of the Monarchy. A movement was even set on foot to collect signatures in favour of this.

The Smallholders fell into line behind them. They re-afirmed their loyalty to their pact with the Socialists. but the "Declaration of Policy” Which they published on 10th September. strongly emphasised the “genuinely 1 See below, pp. 333. 360n.. 399ff. By October Marty appears to have been in German pay, and may have been serving the Germans earlier also, but his activities deseribed on this page were quite genuine.

2 The Archduke writes (personal to C.A.M.) that the persons in Hungary informed of his Negotiations were, besides Kallay and one or two persons in the Foreign Ministry. Sigray. Marquis Alfons Pallavacini. Bethlen. Tildy, Bajcsy-Zsilinszky and Bela Varga. The Regent “was told some part af it and approved it.”

198 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Christian character” of the Party’s ideals and called for the fullest respect for Hungary’s traditional constitutional forms and methods of Government, which, it stated, were those of a constitutional monarchy, only stipulating

that these should be practised in a democratic spirit which allowed due representation to the broad masses. ‘The political, social and economic demands of the programme, while progressive enough, were such as any British conservative would have accepted cheerfully. Tildy then let himself be elected chairman of the Gydérgy Apponyi Society, a specifically and professedly Legitimist organisation, mainly composed of the members of the high aristocracy.

The Social Democrats could not go so far as this, nor, indeed, would — most of the other factors concerned have wished them to do so. But the Right wing of the Party was genuinely sympathetic to the idea of a Western solution for Hungary, while the Communist wing, while disliking the wider development and meaning to torpedo it when the time came,! was still under its orders to work with all ‘‘anti-Fascist’”’ forces. The Party accordingly sat on the fence, or squatted on the pendulum, prepared to let itself be carried whichever way that instrument swung. In his Budget speech, which (except for Bajcsy-Zsilinszky’s effort, which was individual) was the only really fighting speech made on that occasion by any speaker of the Left or Centre, Peyer said that neither he nor his party was willing to be identified in any way with the Government’s policy, much less to accept responsibility for any Government measures. On the other hand, the Party did not reject the idea of co-operation with the parties of the Centre, and allowed the Smallholders to act as bridge. In the late autumn negotiations were set afoot, under Bethlen’s auspices, to effect, if not a formal union of those concerned, “‘at least a spiritual accord which in the event of a change in the political situation would on the one hand

prevent any independent action on the part of any one party and on the other make it impossible for one party to outbid the others.’”’ In December he was able to report” that Rassay,® the Smallholders and the Dissidents were all participating and that it was hoped that the resulting group “‘might, in the event of a change in the regime, draw to itself the more moderate members

of the Government Party, and when the proper time came enter into a . collaboration with the Social Democrats,’’ who were “‘behaving very sensibly and intelligently,”’ on terms to be defined. It had “‘proved possible to smooth over the differences arising out of the Smallholders’ attempt to forestall the 1 According to Kallal, op. cit., p. 200, the Communists had at first welcomed the Social Democrat-Smallholder alliance, changing their mind when its authors unmasked their essentially

Fascist purposes. It appears from his narrative, however, that they did not dare denounce it openly.

2 In a letter sent to Barcza on 23rd December (Kallay MS.). ° This is almost the only mention in the records of any activity by Rassay in the autumn, except that in October he either caused to be written for him, or wrote himself under a pseudonym,

an extraordinary pamphlet called ‘‘Rassay the Politician.”” This work, after calling Rassay ‘‘a rock of bronze,” “‘a potential worker of miracles” and “‘a spiritual force with which everyone

preoccupied with the future of Hungary must count,” and comparing him with Thiers,

Tocqueville, Cavour, Bismarck and the elder Andrassy, asked why he was not merely standing

aloof from the Popular Front, but showing active hostility towards it, and answered that ‘in the combination planned Rassay did not see the possibility of securing a proper place for the bourgeoisie, and thus saw no guarantee of liberty.”” What was needed was a strong bourgeois bloc, under his leadership. If this could be brought about, the bourgeoisie could go ahead and find ‘‘alliances.”’

When the bourgeoisie did not rush to place itself under his leadership, Rassay relapsed into

suence.

CROSS-PURPOSES 199 other parties by an independent approach to the Social Democrats,”’ with whom even the clerical members of the Christian Party had recognised the necessity of co-operating. It should be added that while the persons participating in these activities

all belonged to the “‘opposition,” they neither wished to weaken KAllay’s position, nor, in fact, did so. What they attacked was the official policy which he was really doing his utmost to sabotage; the things which they advocated were the things that he was really trying todo. Many of the things which they said, e.g. when they maintained that the Tripartite Pact had lost its validity with Italy’s defection or that the Jewish laws were inhumane, were

exactly what he would have said if he had dared, and he was very glad to hear them. He on his side made them no difficulties; neither, for that matter, did Horthy, who showed no sign of displeasure at the Legitimist propaganda. The Right continued to fulfil to the best of its ability its accustomed and

ungrateful role of spoil-sport. Its professional publicists said the usual things on the appropriate occasions: so after the Moscow Conference Jaross

wrote in the Magyarsdg that “‘since the Conference there had been no possibility of an Anglo-Saxon victory in Europe, but only of a German or Soviet victory’! and Milotay wrote in the Uj Magyarsdg that ‘‘whatever was agreed upon in Moscow, the aspirations and the plans of the Bolshevik

imperialism can only be checked by German resistance. Anglo-Saxon resistance, hoped for by so many, will not take place either in the Carpathians

or in the Balkans, on the Vistula or on the Oder.’” On Ist October Imrédy presented the Government with a long memorandum® in which he maintained, in the same way (quoting, to prove his point, the ill-fated B6hm-Gibson revelations and various articles in the British Press), that “in the event of an Anglo-Saxon victory all Eastern Europe would be handed over to Russia,”’ and adding (here too, as the events proved, with perfect truth) that it was useless todream that when that happened

only the extreme Right would be made the scapegoats: if the bill was ever presented, the MEP would be called to pay it, just as much as the Right Radicals: ‘‘only those elements which had gone over to Communism would be rewarded.” This accurate prophecy, however, glanced at the time off the armour of the prevailing optimism. In any case the Imrédists confined themselves to arguing their point of view. There is no evidence that they were, at this point, organising any para-military force or other illegal means of getting their way.*

Szalasi, ostracised by the other Hungarians, ignored by the Germans,

was for the moment out of the picture. At the end of 1943 he himself recorded ‘‘apprehension”’ among his lieutenants on the following grounds:

Party membership had sunk to well below 100,000. Not only the rank and file, but also the party hierarchy was generally tired and dispirited. Propaganda and organisation practically nil. The existing Party hierarchy was unfit to lead a national party. 1 7th November 1943. 2 14th November 1943. 3 Reprinted in Uj Magyarsdg, 1st April 1944. 4 4 Tizhénapos Tragédia speaks of preparatory conversations, which it dates in the autumn;

but this little work is extraordinarily inaccurate in its datings. No evidence for so early a date was brought at the Imrédy Trial, nor does any other contemporary document, etc. (the accounts of the Szentirmay dinner, the Peyer Memorandum, the Szalasi Diary, etc.) refer to the subject.

200 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Further Parliamentary defections were to be expected. Szalasi apparently thought all this unimportant, and went on quietly with his long-term plans, which now included the establishment of an Institute of Racial Biology. He

was “‘convinced that both the foreign political and the military situation would change and then the fetters imposed on the Party would fall from their wrists.”” The only immediate step to which he still attached importance was that he should get his audience with the Regent, in order to explain what he

was driving at and make it possible for him to carry out his programme ‘through the common will of the Head of the State and the nation.’ He continued persistently to petition for his audience, which was as persistently refused him. All these various points of view were able to find full and free expression

in the late autumn when Parliament was reconvoked, as the Hungarian Constitution required, to discuss the Budget. It met on 21st October, went through the usual detailed discussion of the global Budget and the Depart-

mental estimates and then proceeded, as usual, to the “‘Appropriation Debate’—the occasion on which, by tradition, each Party, through one or more speakers, explained its views on the world situation and what was to

be done about it, and expressed its approval or disapproval of the Government’s policy.

The appetites of the Deputies had been whetted by their long enforced silence, and the debates were exceedingly lively—when Bajesy-Zsilinszky was

speaking, tumultuous to a degree. The speeches will not, however, be recapitulated here, since the lines which were now being taken by the different

parties have already been indicated, and in the debates themselves hardly anyone said anything out of character—except, indeed, Kallay himself, who after quarrelling with Imrédy across the floor, got an attack of emotion and walked across and shook hands with him; an impulsive gesture which the

Press Bureau spent many days explaining away to a world which (quite mistakenly) persisted in attaching to it a sinister political importance (Imrédy, incidentally, repudiated, quite as vigorously, the suggestion that he was compromising on his Party’s principles.) In general it was clear that the optimists felt themselves on strong ground; when the Imrédists accused the Left of defeatism for its condemnation of the war, Sigray retorted that it was, on the contrary, “‘the greatest defeatism’’ to say that Hungary would be turned over to Bolshevism if Germany collapsed.! Kallay, too, refused to accept such a thesis “‘or to strengthen in their belief those inside or outside Hungary who reckon on this.’ Actually Kallay made at this juncture only a single concession to the Right, whose wishes here probably chimed in with his own. In response to well-

founded complaints that the Peasant Union was disregarding its own charter and turning itself into a mere political body, he demoted Nagy and put L. Pataky, one of the vice-presidents of the MEP, in charge of the Union, with the task of “guiding it back into its original paths.” The change had, however, little effect, for Nagy continued to convoke and address meetings; moreover, the Smallholders now possessed their own organisation and were no longer dependent on that of the Union.

Three other events of the period deserve mention. The case of the Davidson Letter®? had been one for the military to deal with, and after

1 14th December. ° 4th December. ° See above, p. 106.

CROSS-PURPOSES 201 prolonged investigation the Military Courts had applied to Parliament to have the immunity of the two Social Democrat leaders, Peyer and Anna Kéthly, suspended so that they could be charged (as accessories) with

treasonable correspondence with the enemy. Under pressure from the Right, Parliament granted the request; but Kallay was able to get things dragged out so that the two Socialists (who were not arrested, and pending

their trial went about their political activities as though nothing had happened) were, in fact, never required to face the charge. Indeed, an officer who enquired why the presumed culprits were not being prosecuted was himself transferred to the provinces, and when Milotay, the Right-wing publicist, made a Press attack on Peyer, the latter sued him for libel and was awarded fat damages. Szakasits, who had been arrested, had been quickly released.

The second incident, trivial in itself, acquired importance through the extreme annoyance which it provoked in Germany. Kallay had never ceased to protest how foolish and impracticable was the formula of unconditional surrender. He devoted part of his Budget speech to this theme, and got Sztll6 to read out in the Upper House another argument, drafted by himself, on the subject. Finally, Ghyczy produced an irritated article which appeared above Svatko’s signature, in the New Year’s issue of Magyarorszdg. The article made no concealment whatever of Hungary’s earnest desire to get out of the war, but insisted that her surrender at that moment could not benefit the Allies. Anyway, it asked, how could “‘countries wishing to end the war’”’

surrender, if they had no Allied forces on their frontiers, or near them, to receive the submission? “By telephone?”’ This outburst probably relieved the Hungarians’ feelings, but it was taken quite extraordinarily ill in Germany.

The third incident was genuinely sensational. In pursuance of the promise made by him in July 1942, Kallay had really re-opened the enquiry into the Ujvidék massacres. This, again, had taken a very long time, and it even appears that one attempt had resulted simply in another whitewashing

report. Kallay then sent down a civilian investigator. Fresh depositions were taken, again at the cost of much time, but they gave a different picture.

Certain persons were committed to trial before a Military Court, which opened on 13th December. Besides a number of minor offenders who received summary punishment, eight officers were sentenced to heavy terms

of imprisonment: Field-Marshal-Lieutenant Feketehalmi-Czeydner, the criminal in chief, to 15 years’ imprisonment; General-Major Grassy to 14, Lt.-Col. Deak to 13, Captain Zoéldi, of the Gendarmerie, to 11, and four others to 10 years each. Under the Hungarian military code, a senior officer accused of a crime could be left on parole unless the finding in case of an unfavourable verdict was so severe as to tempt him to flight, and this provision had been stretched to allow Czeydner, Grassy, Deak and Z6ldi to enjoy that privilege. On 18th January 1944, all Hungary was startled by the news that the four officers had broken their parole and fled across the Austrian frontier. The entire Press, except only (as one paper was careful to point out) that of the extreme Right and the German minority, featured the announcement with every device of publicity, dredging the dictionary for terms of scorn. Never before, it was written, in the annals of the Hungarian Army, had such a 1 The depositions ran to 600 pages.

202 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH disgraceful incident occurred. It had been held unthinkable that an officer should fail to appear duly before the Court, unless, indeed, he had taken his own life—the proper course for the guilty. Flight was something unheard of. It was, of course, the Government’s policy to make the most of the affair, as it enabled KAllay to show the West that he was trying to free Hungary from

the stain of Ujvidék. The contrast between Hungary and Germany was pointed by the facts (apparent from the reports, although not specifically stated) that it was to Germany that the guilty men had fled, and that all four were of Swabian origin and extreme Right mentality. There was one detail more that Kallay did not dare make public, although he would have been glad to do so when the inevitable happened and the Government was accused of conniving at the escape. This was that the person who had smuggled the four officers away was the Archduke Albrecht.

The affair had many consequences. It was one of the things taken exceptionally ill of the Kallay Government by the Germans, whose behaviour in connection with it lent much colour to the old suspicion that they had been accessories before the fact to the 1942 massacre; for they not only received

the fugitives, but took them over into the Waffen SS., with their existing ranks, and when the occupation of Hungary took place two months later, one of the first demands made by the Germans—with particular insistence— was that the officers should be reinstated without delay. The Government’s action was also resented even by many officers who were themselves horrified by the brutalities of Ujvidék but could not endure seeing officers abused and derided by Jewish journalists; and above all, by the Gendarmerie, which felt it was being made a scapegoat for acting in a spirit inculcated in it by the system which now condemned it. It may be added that considerable progress was being made at this period with the organisation of para-military forces which, it was hoped, would be loyal to the Regent even if he made a stand against Germany. The Turani Vadaszok were greatly expanded and their organisation extended outside its original home of the Délvidék; branches were founded in the Felvidék, in

particular. Their opposite numbers in Transylvania were ‘‘sharpshooter units” organised by a certain Baron Aczél.! Other “shooting clubs’’ were founded in central Hungary and secretly supplied with rifles from the military

depots.?- The Vitézi Rend and the holders of the Nemzetvédelmi Kereszt were activated and harangued (Kallay himself addressed them on 19th February 1944, in his biggest speech of the period). A new civilian cross was established and bestowed on many recipients. The Socialists put the numbers of these organisations at 450,000-500,000 and wrote that they were “‘at the moment, absolutely reliable servants of the regime.’’? 1 Aczél was a curious and picturesque character: the empoverished descendant of an ancient Transylvanian family whom the Peace Treaty had left with a few acres under Roumanian rule. A physical giant and a born adventurer, he occupied himself largely—as much for sport as anything—with organising a sort of maquis against the Roumanians, who duly locked him up on

various occasions. ‘Then he became an adherent of Szalasi’s, afterwards going over to the National Communists. Later, as will be seen (p. 349), he undertook to mediate between Horthy

and Moscow, and afterwards to make contact between the Budapest “‘Resistance’” and the Russians. His ultimate fate is unknown; but reports of his death were circulating in 1947. 2 One of these groups was the Magyar Hazafiak Szabadsag Szovetsége (Freedom Association of Hungarian Patriots), which, with other bodies, formed an Orszagos Lévészegyesiilés (National

Shooting Club). V6rds promised them arms captured by the Hungarian Army in the Délvidék in 1941, but nothing came of it all. In his statement Szombathelyi wrote that he had begun training ‘‘partisans’’ by agreement with the Allies. 2000 were trained but afterwards disbanded by Sztojay. 3 Peyer memorandum.

CROSS-PURPOSES 203 One further, not unimportant, step was taken at this time. It was clearly important to establish a safe centre of communications which should be out of reach of German informers and situated near the heart of things. Nikki _ Horthy, the Regent’s younger and now his sole surviving son, was the ideal person to take charge of such an organisation, for his sentiments regarding the Germans were unexceptionable, and his personal position rendered him immune, except in a moment of supreme crisis, from interference. He was given premises in a wing of the palace, with a separate and inconspicuous

entrance and there a little office was set up with the nominal purpose of repatriating Hungarians from abroad, staffed by a couple of members of the Foreign Ministry. In fact, the office, which was opened on the 10th January, was the link between the Regent and the “underground” in general—and, it may be said at once, a very efficient one.

1 —D. Szentivanyi and G. Sods. ,

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE LONGEST SHOT OF ALL reading in speeches the light ofof after-knowledge; for even before make the lastpathetic of them [os optimistic the Appropriation Debate

had been spoken, the ‘‘Western Solution’? had, in fact, been dealt its mortal wound at the Teheran Conference. The Hungarians were, of course, not informed of the decisions of the Conference, on which, indeed, the first

reports received by them were rather encouraging on the largest issue:

Wodianer wrote on 6th December that “‘he had received information from the American Legation via an entirely trustworthy source, that the settlement of the Central European problem had been left to the British and Americans.”’?

The Government’s correspondents in the West continued to talk as though

this assumption was valid; ‘‘Mr. H.’ went on discussing the future of Hungary with Bareza, and Tyler and Dulles with Bessenyey, all three, incidentally continuing to press Kallay to receive military missions. Where warnings in the opposite sense were received they were not believed.” More-

over, a new correspondent who arrived in Lisbon on 9th January—an American citizen of Hungarian origin named Francis Deak—brought messages which were even more comfortable than those of his predecessors. As each of those had done in his day, Deak announced that he was now

‘‘the only authorised channel.’ He had a dual commission from the State Department and the High Command. Tyler and Dulles were out of it, not to be used. His messages did not mention the Archduke, but he said that he had received verbal communications from Otto and Eckhardt, thus claiming

by implication a direct link between his mission and the Otto-Roosevelt conversations.* He did not, indeed, claim to be speaking also for the British; on the contrary, he said that his mission was “‘100 per cent. the Americans’ own, because the Americans felt themselves freer from the Russians than the British were, and also more objective,”’ although he said that if the Hungarians

could make better terms with the British, they were free to do so; but as Eisenhower was still clarming to be competent to issue military directives relating to Central Europe, the Hungarians had no reason to prefer anyone else in the field to Deak, particularly as the trend of the various political messages and memoranda brought or sent by him was extraordinarily satis-

factory to them. The Americans wanted to save Hungary from being occupied by Russia or assigned to the Russian sphere of interest. They wanted to avoid revolutions in the Danube basin and “‘hoped that a Hungary which had not been disarmed would be the central focus of consolidation.” They did not want to see a regime of the Karolyi type in power. They hoped 1 KAllay MS.

@ Eckhardt wrote in Hungaria, 1st April 1954, that he told Bethlen in December 1943 that ‘the fate of Hungary was sealed and it would pass under Russian rule for many years.’ Bethlen replied on 19th March 1944 that “‘he was confident that Eckhardt would prove mistaken.” ’ The Archduke Otto writes (to C. A. M.) that Deak ‘“‘was sent to work with the Archduke Charles,” but Deak’s memoranda suggest that he regarded himself at any rate as the senior of the two.

THE LONGEST SHOT OF ALL 205 to find a territorial settlement more or less satisfactory to Hungary; most likely they could get her Transylvania, and they were not committed to the

Trianon frontiers to the north or south. Nor did they want Hungary to commit sabotage or provoke an occupation. The interests of Hungary would be better served if this did not happen. Kallay greeted Deak’s arrival, as he writes, with especially high hopes,

which is understandable. It is therefore the more melancholy to have to record, which may as well be done at once, that Deak’s mission proved exactly as fruitless as all its predecessors. Even he said that Hungary must be ready to join the Allied side actively, as a co-belligerent, at the appropriate

time, and must give speedy and definite proof of her readiness to do so. Meanwhile, she must do something quickly; the modest suggestion was that, besides withdrawing her troops from Russia, which was essential, she should furnish information on Roumania, Slovakia and the Balkans. In return, the

Americans would do their best for her along the lines sketched above, although they could give no definite promises, and it was hopeless for Hungary to try to make conditions.

But all he got was explanations of what Kallay calls “the large gap between what goodwill suggested and what was practically possible’; the usual hesitations and excuses. Even the information which was sent to Lisbon was—to judge from the documents—almost grotesquely inadequate.

As regards the Dead Army, the stereotyped reply was given that the Hungarians would like to recall this force (although it was doing no harm) but were unable to do so. By this time the credentials and messages which Kallay had sent to Otto had reached their recipient, who took them to Roosevelt on 15th January. Otto cannot have been discouraged by their reception, for he sent his brother, the Archduke Charles Louis, to Lisbon to act as his liaison officer there. The records do not, however, show any further messages as passing through this channel. Other developments in the situation were, meanwhile, uniformly disheartening. General Smuts’ speech of 25th November caused the Hungarian Government great anxiety. After the Cairo meeting of 4th December came what Kallay regarded as an ominous sign; he read (the Turkish code was easy to break) a message from Sarajoglou to his Minister in Budapest that Eden had received with ‘“‘conspicuous reserve” his account of the TurkishHungarian understanding, and two days later another message had come ordering that the conversations be discontinued.* ‘Then came Benes’ journey to Moscow and the signature, on 12th December, of the Soviet-Czechoslovak

Treaty. This seemed to the Hungarians to prove that the Soviets were assigning to Czechoslovakia the role in which conservative Hungarians had

always seen their northern neighbour, of outpost of Slav expansion and Bolshevik thought—an impression strengthened when the Moscow wireless simultaneously dropped its reproaches to the Czechs for their inactivity, and indulged in a series of extraordinarily venomous attacks (delivered by M. RAkosi) on the Hungarian “‘reactionaries.’’ Further, they quickly learned through secret sources that Stalin had shown himself “very unfavourably

disposed towards Hungary,” and had promised Benes that the whole of Transylvania should be restored to Roumania after the war. And Maniu, the well-known democrat, went further still, announcing to friends (through 1 Kallay, op. cit., p. 277.

206 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH whom this also reached Hungarian ears) that as “‘compensation”’ for losing Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Roumania was to get Hungarian territory up to the Tisza. The West—this was the worst—did not seem to be opposing all this. Mihaly Karolyi spoke on the B.B.C., advising Hungary that her road led through Prague and Moscow. This was followed by a lecture on democracy from M. Slavik, the Czechoslovak Minister of the Interior. In the south, the Russians sent a military mission to Tito and the British announced that they also were supporting the Partisan forces. In the north, Russia was claiming from Poland a frontier approximating to the Curzon Line and violently attacking the Polish Government in exile. The British

were obviously uneasy, but were, as clearly, not opposing the Russian demands in full, nor opposing her suggestion that Poland’s frontiers with

, Germany should be shifted westward. Then came Mr. Churchill’s extraordinary statement that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to Germany as a matter of right, nor forbid territorial transferences or adjustments in enemy countries. An immediate effect of all this in Hungary was to shatter the short-lived dream of a coalition of the Centre. The Social Democrats may have preferred

a Western solution under Conservative leadership to an Eastern one— although, as an irritated writer to the Magyarsdg justly complained, it was possible to read the Népszava daily from cover to cover without getting any clear idea of the Party’s attitude, either to Bolshevism or to the Soviet Union. But they obviously liked even better a Western solution resting on themselves and their friends, and as soon as they gathered from the B.B.C. that this was again a practicable prospect, they went all out forit. At the end of January the Government offered them facilities for transmitting, through the diplomatic bag, a memorandum on their wishes, addressed to quarters in the West

sympathetic to them,' and they used this opportunity to present to their friends a vigorously reasoned justification of their own claim to the political succession in Hungary. It is true that, as we have said, they endorsed from their own angle the policy which Kallay was then following towards Germany, and did not suggest repudiating the de facto protection which he was then

according them, nor that they should assume any responsibility in the existing situation. But they did not propose reciprocating that protection when conditions altered. On the contrary: they wrote that the “‘regime”’ must be forced to take the whole responsibility for the war, and be swept right away. They and, they claimed, the Smallholders “‘were not prepared to enter a regime in which power factors remained in the hands of the old set .. . which allowed those anti-social and undemocratic conditions which had prevailed for centuries to remain for all practical purposes unaltered.” They would ‘‘come on to the scene and try to rescue the country’’ when, and

only when, the regime admitted that it had lost the war, and drew the consequences. The memorandum painted the “‘regime”’ and all its works in the blackest

of colours. It systematically discredited all classes in Hungary except the workers, urban and rural, and all the political parties except the Socialists 1 This is the memorandum mentioned above (p. 187). It has been stated that the Socialists compiled it ‘‘with the help’ of some other factors, but I have been assured from both sides that the Government did not censor it, although made aware of its contents, and arranging for its transmission.

THE LONGEST SHOT OF ALL 207 themselves and the Smallholders. The word “opposition” was used exclusively of the parties of the Left, as though the two terms were identical ;

‘the Arrow Cross, the semi-Arrow Cross and their allies” appeared as indistinguishable from the “‘regime,” and the “‘regime” and the “‘ruling classes’ were made collectively responsible for all the actions which had put

Hungary in the Axis camp. Thus when the power of Germany went, the entire Hungarian ruling class must go with it. The memorandum asked, it is true, for sensible frontiers, on the ethnic

basis where this could be applied, but said that its authors wanted unconditional, far-reaching understanding with all Hungary’s neighbours, and above all with Czechoslovakia, emphasising their friendship for that country.

They saw no reason why they could not live on peaceful terms with the U.S.S.R. as good neighbours.

The Socialists were almost as hostile to the Government in public as in | private. Speaking at Kassa on 30th January, Peyer repeated that they took no responsibility for the actions of the Government and did not identify themselves with its policy. Any alliance with the regime would be absurd, ‘“because when the storm broke, it would sweep the Government camp away

like chaff.” Three days later, the Népszava wrote that “unity with the Government Party never enters our heads.’? This would not necessarily have excluded participation in a Left-Centre bloc, to which the Communists at that time were still paying lip-service,! but after the B.B.C.’s interventions, the Socialists (less discreet at this point than the Communists) seem to have thought this unnecessary. The negotiations still went on, but the Socialists bound the Smallholders to refuse any co-operation to which they were not parties? and did not, in fact, themselves offer to co-operate with the Centre, even truculently rejecting such overtures as were made to them.? The result was that the negotiations got no further than agreement “‘to keep the matter open and call the bloc into being at the agreed moment.’ The Smallholders swung back to making their alliance with the Socialists

the king-pin of their position, and were no less active, and scarcely less

aggressive, than their partners. They announced that in view of the approaching hour when they would be taking over the power, they were widening the entire basis of their Party. They were keeping the name of Smallholder, because the necessary reforms could be achieved only with the help of the peasantry, but did not propose to be any longer solely rural, but national, in token whereof they had founded an “‘Intellectuals’”’ section in Pest.5 They were seconded by the Peasant Union, as active as ever, and as political. Pataky, the new Government-appointed President, remained a mere figurehead—perhaps he did not want to be more—and Nagy was still the real leader. 1 In January the Peace Party issued a long memorandum which said that “the aim of the resistance movement was the creation of a broad national concentration.’ The Party also - gucceeded in launching in the Swiss Press stories of the formation of an Independence Front which included in that body Legitimists, clericals, industrialists, and indeed almost everybody not belonging technically to the Government camp. 2 Tildy stated this at Kecskemét on 10th March. 3 On 30th January the Népszava suddenly and savagely bit the two midget bourgeois parties which had announced their acceptance of the ideals of the Popular Front, saying that ‘“‘the real Hungarian Opposition does not need these dinner-party size parties.” Rassay’s paper commented with justice that the Left had for months been urging the bourgeoisie to organise and rejected them when they did so. 4 4 Tizhénapos Tragédia, p. 34. 5 Varga’s speech in Magyar Nemzet, 29th January.

208 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Both parties claimed large increases in membership. Of the Socialists, a Swedish paper reported that the Party membership had risen by 127 per cent. in a few weeks, and that the circulation of the Népszavahad quadrupled. There

were now Socialist organisations in all the main centres of the enlarged country, including Transylvania. The Trade Unions, including that of the agricultural labourers, expanded rapidly. The Smallholders claimed at one meeting to be the largest party in Hungary, and the Intellectuals’ Section was said to have a large membership. The Socialists described the Peasant Union

as the largest single organisation in the country, with a membership of hundreds of thousands. The little group of Village Explorers whose mouthpiece was the Szabad

Szo were also very vocal and claimed to enjoy wide sympathies in the country; indeed, the only party of the Left which, on its own admission, was almost completely inactive during the period was that of the Communists.* This did not, however, mean that all Hungary was swinging Leftward. It is a fact, unfortunate indeed but undeniable, that the chances of democracy’s

making a nation-wide appeal were gravely prejudiced by its association precisely with the names of Mihaly Karolyi and Benes. Slavik’s broadcast brought a most violent reaction from B. Zsilinszky, who wrote a propos of it that “‘every decent Hungarian, whether he belongs to Government or Opposition—and it is well that our friends and our enemies alike should

know this—stands on the basis of Historic Hungary, both ideal and geographical, and the further democratisation which we demand can only enhance this deep and unshakable loyalty of the Hungarian people to its millenary traditions.” This was certainly going much further than most of his Party would have endorsed. The Magyar Nemzet at this period was accepting the prospective resuscitation of Czechoslovakia tranquilly enough, and writing some very interesting and sensible articles on the possibility of a new and better relation-

ship with that State. But distaste for a revival of Czech hegemony in the Danube basin was certainly not confined to the extreme reactionaries of Hungary. The reaction of the Catholic Uj Nemzedék to the broadcast was just as vigorous as Bajcsy-Zsilinszky’s. National feeling in Hungary, in general, reacted to the utterances from London with a vigour which was only

intensified by the activity and the self-congratulations of the Left. The parties of the Right began to stir. On 4th January the Imrédists produced a new programme calling for a fight against Reds, Liberals and Jews, social reforms, the “heroic outlook” and fight until final victory at the side of the Reich. The National Socialists adopted an identical resolution a few days later.

The speakers of both parties were more active, and their meetings better attended, than had been the case for a long time. It was at this time, too, that Imrédy’s secretary, a young man called Ney, began to organise, chiefly from among his own ex-regimental comrades, an association known as the Association of Comrades of the Eastern Front (Keleti Arcvonal Bajtarsak * The Communists’ own historians write that they were making no mass propaganda at this time, and Darvas himself writes that their activities amounted to little more than meeting in clubs,

cafés and private houses and talking (op. cit., p. 97). M. Kallai’s ‘‘Revised Version” contrives to give a different picture, by the simple method of giving the ‘‘Peace Party” the credit for every development of the period which he regards as creditable; but he is even more unconvincing than usual on this period. The fact is that the Communists were on the horns of a dilemma and found their safest course to be to do as little as possible.

THE LONGEST SHOT OF ALL 209 Sz6vetsége, or KABSz) which was afterwards to develop into a sort of Imrédist Party Guard. And although neither party claimed many recruits, a large section of Centre and Moderate Right opinion hardened visibly

behind them. The Catholics repudiated the Independence Front more strongly than ever, and a considerable faction of the MEP itself showed signs of revolting against Kallay’s indulgence towards the Left.

At the beginning of February a group of Right Wing MEP Deputies handed Lukacs, as Party President, a long memorandum which described the assumption that the Anglo-Saxons could win the war ‘“‘without, or, if need be, against, the Russians” as completely untenable. If Germany was defeated, Hungary would be lost, and her only salvation was to stand firm by Germany’s side. The favour shown by the Government towards the Left could not help Hungary abroad. It was only weakening and dividing the country, sapping

its courage and demoralising it, and might end by provoking a German occupation. The memorandum called for “a hard, militant Right-wing policy, based on the Szeged idea’’ at home, with stern measures against subversive elements and “‘new and effective measures” against the Jews. As only thirty Deputies signed this document (only one of them, Héman, being a man of any weight), the claim made by the signatories that they spoke for “the majority of the MEP” may be exaggerated, but it can fairly be guessed that many Deputies sympathised with the sentiments who had not the courage to sign their names to them; and for that matter, Lukacs himself, only a few

days earlier,” had made a speech expressing very nearly the views of the memorandum. The tone of the Fiiggetlenség, which was the official organ of the MEP, was at this time quite indistinguishable (except for being much more primitive) from that of the Imrédist Uj Magyarsdg. Kallay, as he writes, did not even answer the memorandum and did not alter his internal policy by one iota, but the growing feeling in the circles of the Right and Right Centre that even if a Western solution came it would be in many respects an undesirable one for Hungary, certainly weakened his position and partly accounted for the relative ease with which those circles accepted the German occupation a few weeks later. But what now seemed doubtful, above all, was whether there was going to be a Western solution at

all. For towards the end of December the Russians had resumed their advance in the Ukraine which had been temporarily checked, earlier in the

month, by von Mannheim’s counter-offensive. The ground so painfully gained by the Germans in weeks of hard fighting was lost to them again in a few days. By the first week of January the Russians were attacking heavily along almost the whole Ukrainian Front, and the possibility that they would before long come within striking distance of the Carpathians could no longer be dismissed. And therewith the ultimate inner contradiction of Kallay’s surrender policy revealed itself nakedly. The Western Allies were quite categorical. Istanbul had for some time been advising the Hungarians to approach Moscow direct. When ‘“‘Mr. H.”’ took up the subject of the Russian advance with Barceza on 12th January, he, wrote Barcza, “‘gave us credit for sufficient common sense not to wait until they reached our frontiers, nor, still worse, to commit the incredible blunder,

not to say crime, of attempting armed resistance or defence against the 1 K4llay quotes long extracts from this document (which, however, he antedates by some weeks), op. cit., pp. 223-37. = 25th January. O

210 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Soviets. Such an act of reckless bravado would not only lead to the complete annihilation of our Army but would place us politically in the same category

as the Germans.” He seemed quite impervious to Barcza’s counterarguments. Nothing in any of the messages passed to Kallay through any of his Western contacts ever hints at any other point of view, and Kallay’s persistence in crediting the Allies with a secret desire to see the Russian advance held up! can only be described as wilful self-deception. But he on his side was just as determined. He would not surrender to the Russians nor allow them inside the frontiers of Hungary. Even a joint surrender to the Allies was impossible if it meant in practice surrender to the Russians. Better fight to the last, if need be, at the worst, with the Germans. In the situation as it now stood, he would not even weaken the Germans, where this meant weakening them against Russia. ““If,”? he wrote to Deak on the 25th, ‘“‘there are no Anglo-American troops

in the vicinity, it cannot be in Hungary’s interest to weaken the German Army, which is, after all, holding up the Bolsheviks.”’

“If we have to choose—until another factor turns up—” ran another letter,” ““‘between an essentially defensive Germany and an expansionist Russia, we cannot but hold with Germany.” ‘*T must insist,” ran a third, “‘that even without any artificial propaganda,

the entire country is united in the resolve that we should defend ourselves from the Russians’ attempt to invade us. It would be unimaginable to lay down our arms on the appearance of the first Russian soldier in the vain hope that the Russians will treat us better if we surrender than if they enter fighting. The example of the Baltic States in 1940 is not reassuring in this respect.’”

A fourth letter* insists again that this resolution was shared by all Hungary. ‘“Everyone, including the pro-British circle, agrees that we must, if the

need arises, defend the Carpathians against the Russian danger. No one regards this as a question on which opinions might differ. It is simply a question of the vital interests of the country.”’ By “‘everyone”’ Kallay obviously did not mean every man, woman and childin Hungary. Itis certain that most of the Jewish population of Hungary and a perceptible number of non-Jews did not regard the Germans as a lesser evil than the Russians. But it is quite true that most of the thinking population felt certain that if the Russians overran their country, they would never

leave it, certainly not recognisable as the old Hungary. The Right was determined to resist this, and even the Left did not, as a whole, relish the prospect. The Svenska Dagbladet wrote at this time that “‘even the Social Democrats and Smallholders, who had always opposed the war against the U.S.S.R. . . . seemed unwilling to accept unconditional surrender without guarantees as to what the Allies intended to do with Hungary.” And as the danger became more obvious, a growing proportion of the Right and Centre felt that there was nothing for it at present but to admit that Imrédy and Bardossy had been right, write off the negotiations with the West as failures, and throw Hungary’s whole weight into the war, even if 1 “Our impression,”’ he wrote to Deak on the 25th, “is that the Anglo-American ideas on timing assign to the Germans the task of keeping the Russian Army out of central Europe.” 2 Ghyczy to Barcza, 2nd February. 3 Id., 14th February. 4 Id., 24th February.

THE LONGEST SHOT OF ALL 211 this involved far closer co-operation with Germany and would probably entail meeting her wishes, in large respects, in the internal field. It looked, indeed, as though the point had been reached when no more “shuffling” was possible. Yet such was the tireless fertility of Kallay’s mind that even now he essayed one last, desperately long shot, which, if it had come

off, would have saved Hungary from either of those alternatives, both of which he regarded as exceedingly disastrous. His plan, which was his own invention,! took for basis the physical fact

that the Carpathians are an extremely strong natural barrier, to penetrate which in the face of any adequate resistance would be a difficult and costly task. Knowledge that such an attempt would be resisted should prove a

deterrent to any army. Before the Russians reached the Carpathians Hungary should therefore mobilise forces for their defence (also bringing back the Dead Army and thus killing two birds with one stone), and should make clear to the U.S.S.R. and to the Allies in general that the Hungarian

troops would not advance out of their defences. The Soviets could thus leave this sector of their line unguarded without fear of a thrust through the gap, and could move forward left and right of it without fear of an attack against their flank. They should, to all intents and purposes, be in the same position as though the frontier were that of a neutral state.” Hungary would not declare herself legally at peace with her ex-enemies

nor formally dissolve her partnership with Germany, but she would not allow German soldiers on her territory and would give Germany the minimum of economic support. In particular, her armament production, which was to be intensified, was to be kept exclusively for her own use.? Thus she would be a neutral de facto even if not de jure.

The ingenuity of the plan is undeniable. For Hungary, if it came off, it would have every possible advantage. She would build up her own armed

forces and, at the end of the war, she would be the strongest and most consolidated State in Central Europe (a situation of which Kallay undoubtedly meant to take advantage). But the difficulties were formidable. Kallay had to convince the Soviets both of his own sincerity in proposing the bargain and of his ability to keep it; for it was easy to conceive the possibility that the troops might be aligned for the purely defensive purpose indicated but that Kallay himself might be overthrown and the troops sent into an attack by a new hand. The products of the armaments drive might not, after all, be keptin Hungary. The Soviets might, for strategic reasons, prefer a longer line to a shorter one, and might not be convinced that the Hungarian Army was worth buying off. They might reject the plan for the political reason that it would leave the Conservative regime in Hungary intact, and even having acquired merit in the eyes of Europe. And even if Russia proved amenable, could Germany conceivably allow her ally to contract out in this way? Could she allow the assistance which she was still getting from Hungary to drop to a lower level still without making an effort to reverse the trend through the many agencies open to her? Could she in her turn be convinced that Kallay was either able to keep or sincere in his intention to keep the other side of his promise: that he would 1 For this, Kallay, op. cit., pp. 316 ff., and personal to C. A. M. 2 An ingenious chemist suggested to Kallay a plan for filling the Carpathian valleys with a heavy gas prepared with mercury. This, however, he rejected. 3 M. KaAllay does not explain how this was to be reconciled with the situation which had arisen

under the joint production programme.

212 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH really defend the Carpathians and not, perhaps, join hands with the Russians and turn against Germany, or, at the best, even given good will, fail to hold the Soviets? Could Germany afford to have her direct communications with Roumania cut—Roumania, in which lay the vital oil-fields and beyond which

stood so many German and Roumanian troops? Finally, Germany, too, had allies—Slovakia, Croatia and, above all, Roumania—to whom the prospect

of a strong Hungary at the end of the war was just as unpalatable as it was to the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments. Hungary might even make a bargain with the Soviets and attack Roumania (an idea which, as we shall

see, some Hungarians did entertain). And in any case, what was to be done about the passes of Southern Transylvania, which were in Roumanian hands? Kallay himself did not expect it to succeed, but thought that it had one chance in a million, whereas any other course must lead to certain disaster. And his first moves, which were directed towards winning over his own public, went unexpectedly smoothly. He began, in the first days of January, by calling together all officers of the General Staff of the rank of Colonel and upward, and giving them a version of his policy which might appeal to them. He argued that correctness and loyalty meant holding not to methods but to principles. The basic principles of Hungarian policy were three: the defence of the frontiers against attack from any quarter; the preservation of national unity, and loyalty to Hungary’s Christian and humanist past and principles. At the beginning of the war it had looked as though the method to attain these ends was by the alliance with Germany and Italy. Now the situation had

changed. Germany and Italy could no longer safeguard Hungary’s principles; therefore, since these could not be abandoned, other methods must be sought to achieve them. These methods could only lie in the concentration of all internal forces. Deliveries to Germany must, so far as possible, be stopped and used for internal purposes, and the Army, in particular, must

be transformed from a “Hilfsarmee” of the Alliance into an independent

national force. This speech went down well. The officers, who had been out of humour with him since he had cut down the Army estimates in the autumn,! were attracted by the ideas of a really independent army and of a big rearmament. The atmosphere was so good that Szombathelyi assured K allay that the whole

Army would now follow him. Similarly, he carried through without difficulty the next step of taking over from Reményi-Schneller the post of Minister of Economic Co-ordination.” This was done on 11th January, and two days later the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee also accepted without demur what it was told of Kallay’s intentions. Neither the Socialist nor the Smallholder representative on the Committee opposed the principle of defending the frontiers (it is true that after the stormy Budget debate both Peyer and Bajcsy-Zsilinszky had been dropped from the Committee), and Imrédy confined himself to pointing out that the rearmament programme would break down if Germany was offended past remedy. The only real 1 Before the Budget, the Ministry of Defence had put in plans for a great rearmament programme which had been very grandiose but excessively long-term. Kallay had vetoed various proposals which would have taken several years to realise.

* The functions of this office were undefined, and in the hands of a departmental Minister, not very far-reaching, but in the hands of the Minister President, gave him control of the allocation of war material and other deliveries as between Hungary and Germany, and by this side-door, a constitutional right to exercise at least an indirect control over military questions.

THE LONGEST SHOT OF ALL 213 opponent of mobilisation was Rassay, who thought it would be “‘provocative”’ (to Germany).

Further discussion of the plan took place at a meeting of the Defence Committee on 22nd February (at which, incidentally, Csatay gave a reassuring description of the military position).1 At this meeting Bethlen produced an idea for filling in the obvious technical gap in the plan, which was that Hungary should occupy Southern Transylvania and hold it in pledge until the end of the war. There appears to have been some support for this

plan, which would have to be carried through by agreement with the Germans, but the majority opinion which prevailed was that it could only be attempted after the Dead Army had first been rescued. The chief objections raised against Kallay’s plan related to the proposed mobilisation, regarding which there were the usual hesitations and cavillings: fear of arousing discontent among the war-weary population, shortage of labour both in the factories and on the land, fear of arousing the suspicions both of the Germans and the Roumanians. Most important of all was the report of the ordnance that there were not yet sufficient arms to equip the whole Army. Hungary now possessed light armaments enough for about 300,000 men, but she still had practically no armour or heavy artillery, and her air-force, in spite of recent purchases (which had proved disappointing in quality) was still very deficient.” It was therefore decided to carry through the mobilisation by stages, as and when the need arose. For the moment, only the two Mountain Brigades were mobilised, whereafter they were sent to Ruthenia and Transylvania respectively. There was to be a further partial mobilisation if the Soviet forces reached the Bug, and total mobilisation if they crossed the Pruth. The only preparation undertaken for this was that the men of the 24-33 agegroups were registered and given medical inspection. As soon as Kallay had manceuvred his plan through its first stages at home, he put it up both to Barcza and Bessenyey.’ “Mr. H.’s” reply, given on 18th February,* was that he understood the Hungarians’ point of view, but that resistance in the Carpathians was a completely hopeless enterprise. His most earnest advice to Hungary was that when the Soviet Armies reached the Carpathians she should at once break with the Germans and sue for peace. This was her last chance of getting treated differently from the Germans at the

Peace Conference. He does not appear even to have suggested passing Kallay’s proposals on to the Russians.

The Americans were more forthcoming. Bessenyey wrote on 27th January® that Dulles and Tyler said that neither of them thought that there was the slightest prospect that Washington would show the smallest understanding in the event of military co-operation between Hungary and Germany even though directed towards warding off the Bolshevik peril. But after a prolonged conversation they volunteered, on their own responsibility, to ask 1 It is of course true that six months were yet to pass before the Russians reached the Carpathians.

2 I have the authority of a high officer that the main reason for the partial state of the

mobilisation was the shortage of arms. We shall see this continuing to operate in the following

mot Ghyezy to Barcza, 5th February. The outgoing letter to Bessenyey is not in the file. 4 There are two letters on the subject in the Barcza MS., one dated the 19th, the other, the 26th February. Both refer to the same interview and must be combined to discover just what Mr. H. said. 5 Kallay MS.

214 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH their Government whether it would ask Moscow if it would undertake to halt on the Hungarian frontier, provided Hungary undertook officially (a) not to co-operate with Germany in the defence of those frontiers; (5) not to allow German troops to pass through the country; (c) to resist, if necessary by armed force, any attempt by Germany to enforce (a) and (5). Dulles and Tyler actually put their suggestion up to Washington, where, as they afterwards told Bessenyey, it was “‘favourably received and referred

to the military and political departments for consideration.’’ But by the time Bessenyey was able to report this, he had been obliged to pass on Kallay’s answer to it, which ran that he was unable to accept the three conditions suggested.

‘“We have repeatedly explained,’ wrote Kallay, “‘that so long as the Russian menace is not only unchanged but constantly increasing, we cannot turn against Germany, and the execution of the three conditions mentioned

would inevitably involve this. Faced with a choice between Russia and Germany, we cannot opt against the latter, for we cannot identify the Russians

with the Anglo-Saxons.’’ Hungary was not in a position to turn against Germany.

It is understandable that Dulles and Tyler should have received this answer with “‘deep disappointment.’ They presumably forwarded it to Washington, but did not report receipt of any reply. In fact, the West probably took this message as final.

A little later Radvanszky was in Switzerland again, and on Kallay’s instructions approached Dulles once more. The American answered: ‘“‘The

Russians play ball with us. Perhaps they will deceive us, but we shall certainly not deceive them.’’! Wodianer and Deak seem, oddly enough, not to have received Kallay’s proposal, and put up, in reverse, a very similar suggestion to his own, themselves offering to get Moscow approached through Washington.? The files do not contain Kallay’s answer to this.

At this last hour, yet another set of negotiations took place. After some preliminary manceuvrings, Ullein-Reviczky, in Stockholm, had, on Ist December 1943, met an American representative of the Allied United General Staff. Ullein had then, on his own initiative, evolved a plan very similar to Kallay’s, with the important difference that Kallay was to announce openly that Hungary would resist invasion “‘from any quarter’? and would undertake

to offer armed resistance to Germany if she were the invader. He had indications that this plan might prove acceptable to the Allies. But this was, presumably (the documents are incomplete), too much for Kallay, although he had adopted the public formula,+ and when Ullein met the American again, on 23rd January, the latter was not prepared to go so far. He did, however, say that he was empowered by his H.Q. to say that the Allies would, jointly, discuss Hungary’s surrender in any neutral place that she liked to designate. The British and Americans would be present, which would be more favourable for Hungary than if she had to face Russia alone. Yet Ullein himself, although he recommended acceptance of the offer, 1 Radvanszky to C.A.M. The journey was in connection with the “*Horthy Fund’’

mentioned below (p. 216). 2 Kallay MS. 3 Some of the Ullein correspondence is contained in the KAallay MS., but it is clearly incomplete. M. Ullein himself refers to it briefly, op. cit., pp. 178-89. ‘ He used it himself in several public speeches, and even Antal made use of it on 23rd January.

THE LONGEST SHOT OF ALL 215 had entered certain personal caveats, including that Hungary could not negotiate on the basis of unconditional surrender. Kallay’s reply, dated 10th

February, confirmed this refusal. It said that Hungary would under all circumstances resist the Russians. She would capitulate to Anglo-Saxon troops if they reached her frontiers, but this undertaking did not apply to ‘Partisan Cetniks’’ or similar formations of Yugoslavs or “‘Vlachs.’! The Allies had nothing more to say. All this while, incidentally, the position was being aggravated, and those who questioned Kallay’s good faith were finding their arguments reinforced, by what was taking place at the Front. The Russians were continuing their advance, in the course of which they twice—once at the end of January and again a week later—came into contact with units of the Dead Army (always last served in the matter of transport), from whom they took prisoners and

published the numbers of the units concerned. The Hungarian wireless, which had at first attempted to deny the existence of the troops altogether, was forced to eat its words, although it still insisted that the men were doing only garrison work and strongly—and now probably truthfully—denied the allegations of the Soviet radio that the men had committed atrocities against the civilian population.?, Matters looked even worse than they were, for the nine light divisions were just being reorganised into six full ones,? and by publishing both the old and the new numbers the Russians again gave the impression that the force was larger than it was. The incident made a painful impression on the Allies, particularly as the American Command was, just at that moment, finding reason to question the accuracy of some other information sent down from Hungary, and were in any case asking why it was necessary for Hungary to allow any troops or supplies to go down to the Balkans at all. The only advantage gained by the Hungarians was that the 18th and 19th Reserve Divisions, which had been

on the right flank of the forces attacked, were driven back nearer to the Hungarian frontier. In spite of this, there is some reason to suppose that for a brief moment Russia herself was attracted by the Hungarian offer. At the end of February, Ullein reported that he had received, through an intermediary, a suggestion

from the Russians that they might conclude a non-aggression pact with Hungary. When, however, he replied asking for further details, none came.* This might be said to end the serious discussions between Hungary and the Allies.

The Hungarian diplomats who had been in contact with the Allies now realised that their role would soon be ended, and it was in these days that, under Barcza’s and Bessenyey’s auspices, a shadow organisation of “‘dissident diplomats” took form, with the purpose of providing some sort of machinery

for the continuance of the diplomatic contacts if Hungary was occupied. If 1 Viach (in Hungarian Olah) is the old Hungarian term for Roumanians, but is regarded by the Roumanians as insulting and never used, for example, in diplomatic correspondence. It is perhaps symbolical that the last word in the surviving text of Kallay’s correspondence with the Allies should be this contemptuous and derogatory term. 2 See above, p. 189, for the arrangements existing at this time between the troops and the partisans. It is also a fact that Polish refugees in Hungary who were in touch with Poland testified that the population drew a sharp distinction between the treatment which they received from the German and the Hungarian occupying forces respectively. The latter, they said, treated the population humanely and as friends and often helped them. 3 The five battered units of the Eastern Group were just being combined into two new reserve divisions, the 18th and 19th. 4 Ullein-Reviczky to C. A. M.

216 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH the occupation was effected without Horthy’s consent, or if he could be persuaded to take refuge abroad, even a Government in exile might be formed.

Barcza got from the British and American Governments assurances that they would regard such an organisation with favour, and secured agreement in advance from most of his leading colleagues abroad—Bessenyey, Apor, Wodianer, Ghika, Ullein, Pelényi and some others—that they would join it

if the event arose. It also proved possible to secure the consent of the Hungarian Government and National Bank for the transfer to Switzerland of a substantial sum in gold to cover expenses. The transaction was carried through at the end of February—yjust in time. At the end of February, when the Russians were really close and the German attitude growing unmistakably threatening, Szegedi-Maszak sent Veress to Istanbul again, partly to hasten the arrival of the British mission,

whose adventures will be described shortly, but also to enquire more generally about the prospects of unconditional surrender and to try to get into contact with the Russians through the British. He brought information on the position of the Hungarian troops, and requested that the Russians should be asked to help the troops to extricate themselves; the Hungarians offered an undertaking to conduct no offensive operations. The reply was that the Hungarians should seek to make contact with the Russians elsewhere,

perhaps in Stockholm. Turkey was an unsuitable venue, owing to the Turkish attitude. Veress never knew whether his offers had been transmitted.”

Just about the same time the efforts of the two Archdukes had borne another tentative fruit. In the first days of March President Roosevelt had another conversation with Otto and told him that if Hungary would give a binding assurance of her willingness to support the Allies at the decisive moment he would be willing to support Hungary’s claim to the 1940 line in Northern Transylvania, and to a reasonable and amicable settlement of

her frontier with Czecho-Slovakia on the basis of the principle of selfdetermination. He authorised the Archduke to communicate this offer to Kallay, and allowed him (not for the first time) the use of the American code

to cable it to his brother in Portugal. A Hungarian courier was en route towards Budapest with this communication on 19th March, when the Germans occupied Hungary. The courier, who knew what was in the communication, destroyed it before reaching occupied Budapest.® Yet the story of the negotiations is not yet closed. It had, indeed, a last chapter, possibly more important in its effects (which, if disastrous, were

at least tangible) than all the inconclusive diplomatic conversations. The Americans had never dropped their old request to have a military mission received, and the negotiations over this had been going on quite independently

of those on a higher plane. In January, Kallay agreed to have a transmitter brought by his own courier if the emissary would come on foot, and that the transmitter was never delivered seems not to have been his fault. Then the + The sum in question, 35 kg. of gold (known misleadingly, as “the Horthy fund,” for Horthy never touched a penny of it), was deposited in the Swiss National Bank, in the joint custody of B.-Bessenyey, Radvanszky and Vladar. After the war it was the subject of prolonged litigation which need not be described here. 2 Veress to C. A. M. 3 Personal (The Archduke Otto to C. A. M.). * Count Pejacevic, who was travelling with the bag, brought the transmitter, which he had arranged to leave at his sister’s flat. She, however, was in the country when he arrived and had left no instructions, and the bearer of the transmitter destroyed it in a panic. (I. P. to C. A.M.)

THE LONGEST SHOT OF ALL 217 Americans found it impossible to send their man by land and reverted to the

idea of an air-borne mission. On 27th February Kallay agreed to this, although warning the Americans that the plan might fail. The arrangements were entrusted to three officers of the General Staff: General Ujszaszy, Col.

Kadar and Col. Kéri. The party was to be dropped at Csaktornya in the

Murak6z. Meanwhile, the messages between the Foreign Ministry group (using the transmitter brought back by Veress) and Istanbul had also been continuing;

through this channel, also, the British had been demanding reception of an air-borne mission, but no agreement had been reached on the practical modalities. But, in January, a new element was introduced, in a curious and unexpected fashion, into these conversations. A certain number of British and American prisoners of war, escaped from Germany, had been recaptured in Hungary making their way south. They had been quartered first in the old fortress of Komarom, then in a castle at Siklés, near Pécs, and finally allowed to work in the fields on the estate of Count Mihaly Andrassy, at Szigetvar. The Unitarian Bishop, Szentivanyi, had been placed in charge of their welfare. Among the escapees was a South African Colonel named Howie,” who had arrived in September 1943, and through Szentivanyi’s intervention had been allowed to remain at liberty. Through a neutral business man travelling

to the Balkans, Howie sent down word to Istanbul that he was ready to escape, but thought he could do good work if he stopped in Hungary. He was told to stay. Szentivanyi then put him in touch with Szombathelyi, N. Horthy, jun. and (through a third party) with Kallay. Szentivanyi was also in touch with Prince Sapieha, General Bor’s representative in Hungary, who had been in contact with his chief for two years. Sapieha had just lost one

of his two transmitters, seized by the Germans, but the mechanics had escaped, and Sapieha placed them at Szentivanyi’s disposal. Another transmitter was found in the American Legation and installed in Szentivanyi’s flat. The Poles at first failed to obtain contact. Two mechanics of Hungarian origin but Turkish legal nationality sent in by the British by

air also failed at first, but obtained contact early in February. The two threads now ran together. The British promised that the purpose of the

mission would not be to organise sabotage, whereupon Kallay consented to receive a mission. On 20th February it was agreed that three senior officers should be dropped by parachute. The arrangements for this enterprise were made by Sombor Schweinitzer, the head of the Budapest political police. The officers were to be dropped on Andrassy’s estate, where the prisoners were set to making the necessary signalling-lamps, etc. Schweinitzer was to throw a police cordon round the estate, and when the officers landed, take them to Szentivanyi’s flat. Both parties were delayed, the British putting off their enterprise twice, on grounds of bad flying-weather,* while the Americans also postponed theirs several times before telegraphing on 10th March that the party would start 1 The following from Szentivanyi, who told his story to C. A. M., and also to a journalist who published it in Vildg, 12th May 1946. Howie described his experiences (as the Editor notes, ‘““with reservations’’) in the Diocesan College Magazine, Cape Town, April 1947, pp. 77 ff. This article is summarised in J. Caminada’s book, My Purpose Holds, pp. 145 ff. 2 Col. C. T. Howie, O.B.E., T.D. ©

3 Kallay to Bessenyey, 27th February. An analogous enterprise in Roumania had just been frustrated.

218 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH between the 12th and the 15th.1 In the meantime, all other lines having snapped in their hands, the Hungarians had come to attach enormous importance to receiving these missions. They had persuaded themselves that the officers would come armed with large political powers and with authority at least to make proposals to very high military quarters.2, And a plan was being considered which would have constituted a considerable advance on its predecessors. When the missions arrived a proposal was to be laid before them that at the given moment Horthy was to go with Bethlen to Transylvania (where the two mobilised divisions and Aczél’s ‘“commandos”’ would protect him) and proclaim Hungary’s surrender. Aczél had volunteered to go over, if necessary, and get in touch with the Russians, and the Dead Army was to be ordered to go over en bloc to the Russians. The Western Allies were to be urgently begged to support this action with a parachute landing in West Hungary.? Howie himself was booked to meet Bethlen on 19th March. More important than this “‘plan,’’ which was probably little more than a lunch-table discussion, was the fact that as soon as it had been agreed that

the missions should arrive, all Hungary knew that British and Americans were coming to Hungary by plane, and half Hungary had got the report in the form that the landing was to be a full-scale military operation, to be accompanied by the Hungarian troops in the country turning against the Germans, while the Occupation Troops went over to the Russians. And

the Germans, who had intercepted and decoded at least some of the messages and of the rest knew at any rate that they were passing between the Allies and Horthy’s entourage, at least believed that an Allied air-borne landing was being planned, and was probably imminent.® The reports of their espionage service on the subject formed part of the background against which Kallay had to persuade the Germans to accept his plan. On 24th January Szombathelyi went up again to the German H.Q.®° He took with him instructions from the Regent to request that the Hungarian Army should be brought south, if possible to Galicia. He was also charged

by Kallay to say that Hungary wished the defence of her frontiers to be entrusted solely to her own forces, to the exclusion of any German troops. Szombathelyi saw first Keitel, then Hitler. Keitel ridiculed the idea that the

Russians could reach the Carpathians. They were exhausted and had no | Bessenyey to Ghyczy, 10th March. * It is true that the party was to have included a diplomat (Mr. H. K. Travers, Councillor of Legation in Budapest, 1936-41), but he failed to leave Washington in time (KaAllay, op. cit.,

p. 387).

* Bishop Szentivanyi to C. A. M. The plan was discussed at a lunch at the Palace on 15th March, at which the guests were Bishop Szentivanyi, his cousin Dominic, Tibor Gyulay, and F. Horvath, Military Commandant for the Szekel Counties. The resemblance of the plan to that which Horthy tried to carry through in October 1944 (as described below) is Striking. An Allied air-borne landing was, of course, always the Hungarians’ dear dream. Kallay tells me that he once really asked the Americans for 20,000 air-borne troops. They refused, but offered to arrange for as many Russians to be dropped, but Kallay said, with thanks, that he could get the Russians himself, whenever he liked.

‘ I myself have been solemnly assured that all was arranged. If the Germans had not marched in on 19th March, the British would have been there two days later. The Social Democrats had the same report. (A Reakcio Ellen, p. 93). ® The Germans could break the code used between Budapest and Berne. On 15th March

an indiscreet German (Kornhuber) warned some Hungarian friends that all details of the American enterprise were known, including the nationality both of the aeroplane and the mission, and the time and place of the landing. They had picked up the Foreign Ministry messages and asked the Hungarian General Staff to locate the transmitter. The officers succeeded,

and had to be warned that this was an “official enterprise.”’ (Private to C. A. M.) * For this, Kallay, op. cit., p. 316, and Nagy, op. cit., pp. 185 ff.

THE LONGEST SHOT OF ALL 219 fresh reserves, whereas Germany was going to send 42 regular divisions and 3 SS. divisions to the Eastern Front between the beginning of March and the end of May. As the Carpathians would not be reached it was supererogatory to discuss how they should be defended. He did not, incidentally, believe in an Allied landing in the West. Hitler, next day, used an argument somewhat in contradiction of this, by saying that the Germans had not sufficient troops to replace the Hungarians if they were relieved. But the result was the same: the Dead Army had to stay put. The Germans’ reasons were presumably the old and comprehensible ones; but, in addition, Antonescu had already refused to send troops up the line so long as there were armed Hungarian forces in his rear.+ His personal application having proved unsuccessful, Szombathelyi tried putting his request in writing,” and on 14th February sent a memorandum to

Keitel. He argued that the situation on the Eastern Front was becoming increasingly dangerous; that there was a real prospect that the armies of the Central Powers would be forced back on the Carpathians, and that, in that case, Hungary would be participating actively in the campaign “‘as she was

resolved to defend her frontiers under all circumstances, and there the Hungarian Army will put up a stubborn resistance.’ As mobilisation in Hungary was a slow process, she must have advance information of the German intentions, and she wanted the VIIth and VIIIth Corps united and brought to a place where they could link up with the newly mobilised Hungary

Army. This memorandum elicited no answer at all.? At the end of February Kallay had one more try. He wrote to Keitel again, in very strong terms which amounted to an ultimatum. He now said that he was going to withdraw the troops whether the Germans liked it or not;

and he was not going to allow any German troops in Hungary. Hungary would undertake the defence of the Carpathians alone, and was confident that she could perform this, although he hoped that, under such conditions, the Soviets would not attack Hungary at all, but divide their movements north and south of it. At the same time, he got the Regent to write a personal letter to Hitler, in friendly terms, but making the same request. In this letter, it appears,

Horthy discussed the question of a possible joint German-Hungarian occupation of Southern Transylvania, although exactly in what sense it is difficult to conjecture.* 1 Nagy, op. cit., pp. 187-8. 2 Hitler’s request had been made on 24th October 1943: Antonescu’s refusal went back to 15th November (Hillgruber, op. cit., p. 176). 3 Unless, as some thought, it was an answer that the German SS. General Lorenz arrived in

Hungary and toured the German minority district. Rumour at the time ran that Lorenz was organising the Volksdeutsche to act as advance guards of Germany-occupied Hungary, but it is more likely that the ostensible purpose of his journey—to whip up new recruits for the Waffen

SS.—was also the real one. . — 4 Horthy paraphrases his own letter, op. cit., pp. 260-1. This is the only source for the reference to Southern Transylvania. Horthy says that Germany suggested the joint occupation to Hungary, and he refused it. No other source tapped by me, German or Hungarian, has any knowledge of such a proposal. It is true that Hitler had considered the idea and had even ordered plans for it to be worked out as early as 26th January, but dropped the idea of allowing Hungary and Bulgaria to participate only three days later, and gave up the thought of occupying Roumania altogether after Antonescu’s visit to Klessheim on 28th February (Hillgruber, op. cit.. p. 278). On the other hand, as we have seen, several Hungarians were urging the occupation, and Horthy’s own whole argument is much more consistent with a proposal by himself that Hungary should occupy the area. Veesenmayer said in the Ministries Trial (p. 1313) that the reason why Horthy asked for the troops was “because of a certain tension with Roumania.”’

270 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH The letters went off by aeroplane, to emphasise them ultmative character.

No answer ai all came to them for some days; then came a message from Hitler to Horthy acknowledging receipt of the letter, but saying that the Fibrer had influenza and would not write, lest the paper carried germs and infected the Regent! 1 Kallay to C. A. M.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

A CUP OVERFLOWS HE chronicler of Hungary’s story during the first fortnight of March 1944 is haunted as he writes by a sense of macabre unreality. For, quite obviously, the moment was approaching now, with giant strides,

when a final decision would have to be taken on the Russian issue. The advance of the Soviet armies had become spectacular. Their great victory at Korsun in mid-February had almost coincided with equally striking successes at the mouth of the Dnieper, which laid open the road across the Southern Ukraine right up to the Dniester; the German forces in this area— the Sixth Army—had suffered heavy losses and the survivors were in consider-

able confusion. Further north, although Vinnitsa held out long and obstinately, the Soviet forces advanced north-west of it as far as Tarnopol and

Kamenietz-Podolsk. Soon after, the Russian armies were not only well across the Dniester, but in places even across the Pruth. This should, by the Hungarians’ own decision, have been the signal for general mobilisation, but this decision was not put into effect. Two divisions,

the 16th (Szolnok) and the 24th (Ungvar), were given definite orders to mobilise, and began to do so, so that by the middle of the month they were approaching war strength. The 2nd Armoured Division, next on the list, was warned, but was still left at peace strength. The remaining troops in the country—the Ist Armoured, the Cavalry, and the 6th, 7th, 10th, 13th, 20th, 25th and 27th Divisions—were given no orders at all: later records marked them as at “‘peace strength,’ but, in fact, some were only cadres. Apart from these mild preparations, life in Hungary went on as though no cloud of any sort lay on the international horizon: as though, indeed, a

benevolent sun was concentrating its rays precisely on Hungary. It was carnival season, “‘and never,’’ writes Barczy, “‘was the season so filled with dinners, déjeuners, teas and cocktail parties. Each Legation sought to outdo the others in hospitality.”’ The streets were still crowded with well-dressed flaneurs, the shops with luxury goods at immense prices which yet found buyers.

It was political carnival too. Three-quarters of Budapest society openly

féted the coming victory of the Western Powers. A book by the present writer was published in a (pirated) Hungarian translation, advertised and sold out in half an hour. Jews occupied the best tables in the restaurants and the best seats in the theatres. Those Socialist and Smallholder politicians who,

a month later, would be either prisoners in Mauthausen or lurking in the attics of friends, addressed the largest audiences of their lives, which they tickled with promises of a democratic world just round the corner—a world which neither speakers nor audiences would ever see. Never had the Press spun prettier visions of a Europe organised on the principles of liberty and good sense, the last hopes of which Roosevelt’s folly and Stalin’s realism had already killed. The Magyar Nemzet carried a series of articles on a Danubian

Federation, which stated the case for such a formation as intelligently as it

has ever been done in print. The Turkish publicist, M. Yalcin, having 1 T.e. “‘increased peace strength.”’

222 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH launched a suggestion for a congress of small nations, the entire Hungarian Press took the idea up with enthusiasm, and no one pointed out—perhaps no one remembered—that some of the proposed participants were neutrals, others belligerents on the Axis side, and others on that of the Allies. The MEP gave KaAllay a vote of confidence on 2nd March. On the 9th— the second anniversary of his appointment—the Regent conferred on him the very signal honour of the Grand Cross of the Hungarian Order of Merit, with a most special expression of confidence in him and hope that he would

continue his work. Kallay then asked the MEP for another vote of confidence and a mandate “‘to proceed along the path which he had followed

hitherto.” He got both vote and mandate from those same men the great majority of whom, a fortnight later, when Kallay was a fugitive in peril of his life, were to pledge their confidence in and loyalty to a new Premier pledged to an entirely different policy.

Patriotic associations drilled in preparation for a resistance which they were forbidden to exhibit when the hour came. The country prepared for the usual ‘‘freedom”’ celebrations on 15th March, and this year the usual festivities were not to suffice. There was to be an even greater occasion on 20th March, the 50th anniversary of Lajos Kossuth’s death. Parliament was to meet on that day and Kallay was to make a speech of exceptional importance. Many people thought that he was going to proclaim Hungary’s surrender and perhaps announce the arrival of Allied air-borne divisions.1 But Kallay was not destined ever to make another public speech in Hungary.

As we have said, there is no evidence that during the autumn Hitler had made any preparations to occupy Hungary, or even that he had seriously considered doing so. But as the Soviet armies drew nearer and nearer to the Carpathians, so, clearly, it became less and less possible for him to leave Hungary in the hands of a regime on whose loyalty he could not rely. Once the Lemberg-Odessa line was cut, the importance to Germany of the alternative lines of communication across Hungary increased enormously; if the Lemberg-Cernauti line went, there was no other route between Germany and the Ukraine; and if the Russians reached the Carpathians there would be direct contact between them and the Hungarians, who might then turn and let the enemy into Central Europe. Already, since the southward move of the 18th and 19th Divisions, there was one sector in which only Hungarian troops stood between the Russians and the passes. At that moment the Hungarian Army was actually a negative factor in Hitler’s war effort. Not only was it not fighting itself: it was preventing the

Roumanians from doing so; and Hitler could hardly deny the force of Antonescu’s case in face of the proposals (which had certainly reached his

ears) made in the Hungarian Defence Committee—even supposing that Horthy’s letter was, as he writes, in the opposite sense.

Clearly all these considerations were cumulative, and with so many trickles running simultaneously into the cup of Hitler’s patience, it is hard to

say exactly which drop topped the brim, or on what day. It was probably 1 See above, p. 218. Actually, as M. Kallay informed me, the speech was not going to be nearly so sensational as that. He meant to announce that Hungary had not entered the war to prosecute an ideology but only in self-defence against another ideology. She was willing at any moment to stand before the bar of world opinion, and Hungary would cease to have any reason for continuing to be a belligerent the moment her national, ‘tpopular,”’ territorial, and spiritual integrity was guaranteed. She would adhere to any side which guaranteed these things, but them she could not betray. (Kallay to C. A. M.)

A CUP OVERFLOWS 223 very nearly full by mid-February, and some of the later witnesses gave only quite general grounds for Hitler’s decision. Others, however, were fairly definite that matters were precipitated in the last days of February by two specific things: the arrival of Horthy’s letter and the almost simultaneous arrival of a report (unfortunately now lost)! from the German espionage service 1n Hungary which reported the impending arrival of the British and American air-borne missions, repeated and probably endorsed the current Hungarian belief either that the landings were to consist of as many divisions as they actually would have numbered men, or at least that the divisions would follow hard on the missions’ heels, and named Horthy and his son as parties to the treasonable correspondence.’ After he had received this report, it was no longer a question for Hitler whether he should or should not occupy Hungary; the only question still undecided in his mind was whether it would be enough to send a German

occupying force into the country, purge it thoroughly and then give it a chance to work its way home, or whether he should allow Roumanian, Slovak and Croat forces to participate in the operation and thereafter treat Hungary as a conquered country, truncated for the benefit of its neighbours, or perhaps wiped off the map altogether.

Hitler sounded Antonescu, and (it is believed) also Tiso at the end of ' It was not produced at Nuremberg. The only S.D. report presented there (N.G. 3332, Veesenmayer’s Defence Doc. 218, Doc. Book, No. 4) and invoked by Veesenmayer, is a remarkably inoffensive document which reached the Wilhelmstrasse on 9th February, to the effect that Horthy was being informed on military matters by a retired General named Moritz von Fleischmann [sic], whose reports “‘were based on a preconceived plan aimed at convincing the Regent

of the necessity of drawing apart from the Reich with the ultimate aim of defection at some opportune moment.” One of Fleischmann’s reports was appended, but it was simply a fair enough summary of Kallay’s intentions to get the Dead Army back, and to arm up, keeping Hungary’s arms production for herself. There was no question of early action, and Germany was not to be provoked into conflict. Incidentally, I have been totally unable to identify this unusually named General. The most specific of the evidence on what really goaded Hitler into action is that given by Ritter at the Ministries Trial (15.7.48, p. 12224), who said that while the Germans were waiting about after the departure of the Hungarians, Ribbentrop told him and Gans that the two pieces of news which had decided Hitler to move were: “‘A short time previously Horthy had demanded

that the Hungarian divisions be withdrawn from the Russian Front. Simultaneously, we had received news that the Hungarian Prime Minister, with Horthy’s knowledge, was negotiating with Britain concerning Hungary’s giving up the common struggle.” Germany had, of course, often before received reports of Kallay’s negotiations, but not that these were going on with Horthy’s knowledge; and under interrogation (Nazi Consp. and Agg., Suppl. B, pp. 206 ff.) Ribbentrop, besides enumerating more general grievances, said specifically: ‘‘There was talk of parachute divisions, English parachute divisions, landing in Hungary.”’ With this should be combined the account given by “‘Hagen’”’ (H6ottl) in Die Geheime Front, pp. 343-4, who says definitely that Hitler’s decision was due to reports from the German espionage

service in Hungary (of which he was the chief) of negotiations between Kallay and the West; “The Hungarian intermediaries had announced that Hungary wanted to get out of this war and to receive armistice conditions.... An American Colonel had sent a wireless message to Ujszaszy that he was ready to come by air to Hungary and negotiate details. The visit was to take place in the middle of March. ... Hungary had to be prevented from leaving the war, as otherwise the southern sector of the Eastern Front would be placed in extreme jeopardy. The necessary preparations began at once at G.H.Q.” 2 There seems no doubt that the report contained information relating to the Horthy family which the Germans, at any rate, thought would compromise them irretrievably in the eyes of the world, if published. Ribbentrop used the threat that this material would otherwise be published as his most cogent argument when appealing to Sztdjay at Klessheim (Nazi Consp. and Agg., Suppl. B, p. 1210) and ordered Veesenmayer to use the same threat when Horthy wished to dismiss

Sztdjay in July (see below, p. 308). See also Ribbentrop’s memoirs, p. 167. Such part as Horthy and his son were playing in the secret negotiations did, in fact, contrast rather painfully with the sometimes rather extravagant language which Horthy used to use when corresponding with Hitler, but if, as seems probable, the dossier was that used as a basis for the attacks on Horthy made

by the DNB on 16th October 1944, the material was unpleasant to listen to, but not worth throwing away a country for.

| 224 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH February.!. Both of them expressed their readiness to participate, if duly rewarded,” and at this stage, Hitler had provisionally decided on the more drastic solution, afterwards described, rather oddly, as “‘a clear-cut military operation.”’® Hungary was to be simply invaded, as an enemy country, and

that by a mixed force which was to include contingents from Roumania, Slovakia and Croatia, besides Germans. The satellites were, it seems, to be rewarded by satisfaction of their national claims: Roumania and Slovakia by

cancellation of the two Vienna Awards; Croatia by the attribution of the Murak6z, and it seems likely that the old plan of forming South Hungary into a Prinz Eugen Gau was revived. What was left of Hungary was to be placed under direct German government, involving at any rate the introduction of the Reichsmark as currency and the incorporation into the Wehrmacht, under direct German command, of such elements of the Hungarian Army as

were allowed to remain under arms. Gestapo and specialist detachments were to carry through a complete clean-up of the country. Both Himmler and Ribbentrop approved of this plan, and certain advance preparations were begun. The designated organisers of the Gestapo operations were called to Mauthausen on 10th March, and Eichmann, the head of the Sonderkommando which was to liquidate the Jews, began constituting his group on the 12th. It must also be supposed that orders were given to the local military commanders to hold available troops in readiness, for even by early March, reports were reaching the Hungarians that German troops were moving into the Burgenland in unusual numbers. At this stage, too, a step was taken which suggests that the Germans toyed with the idea of infiltrating part or all of the occupying force into the heart of Hungary by getting permission from the Hungarian Government to let a large force cross Hungary via Budapest, and then detraining it in the capital; for on or about 10th March (the exact date, unfortunately, is uncertain) Greiffenberg told Kallay that “having to eliminate a Russian point of resistance, the Germans wished urgently to send 100,000 soldiers with the appropriate equipment, including 5,000 mechanised vehicles, up the line, via Budapest, as the shortest

possible route.”’ But this plan, if it existed, had to be dropped, as Kallay told Szombathelyi to refuse, on the pretext that Budapest was being evacuated

so that it could be declared an open city; although he gave permission for the route through Pécs and Ujvidék to be used.* Now, however, the German Secret Service agents in Hungary, perhaps * Antonescu had spent 26th to 28th February with Hitler (Hillgruber, op. cit., p. 179)-

Hungarian sources believe that Tiso visited Hitler about the same time. * According to Hillgruber, loc. cit., Hitler gave up the idea of letting Roumania participate

after his interview with Antonescu, because the latter insisted on immediate cession of East Hungary as his reward, and Hitler was unwilling to commit himself to this. I cannot reconcile

this either with the document quoted below, which quite clearly assumes Roumanian participation, or with the explicit and repeated threats made to the Hungarians at K lessheim, as described below. Since, however, the plan was susceptible of cancellation, no final promises can have been given; which is why I use above the word “‘provisionally.”’ ° No text of this plan has survived, but most of the details given above can be deduced from

the counter-memorandum quoted below, which argues the unwisdom of them. The intention to restore N. Transylvania to Roumania appears quite clearly from the memorandum; the other

revisions are admittedly guesswork. For the Prinz Eugen Gau, see Horthy, op. cit., p. 258. Reference to the other points was made at the Crown Council of 19th March, and in the private diary mentioned in the Notes on Sources, p. xiii. 4 Kallay, op. cit., p. 410. On 15th March KAallay reported to Lisbon that ‘“‘since the Russian

advance threatened vital Hungarian interests, he had agreed that 5,000 waggons might cross Hungary, not touching Budapest, the operation being carried through as speedily as possible” (Kallay MS.). I have not been able to fix the date of the request (to which the Germans did not return) more exactly, and it is not even certain whether there is any connection with the planned invasion of Hungary: but see the odd phrase at the end of the SS. memo., below.

A CUP OVERFLOWS 225 drawn on for consultation, got wind of the plan, and on the I1th' one of them—Kienast or Hottl?—hurriedly composed a powerfully argued memorandum against it. The proposed forceful measures, it was contended, would not achieve their object. They would prove difficult, expensive and unfruitful. Especially if the Roumanians and Slovaks were allowed to participate, the

Hungarians would form ‘“‘an united defence front, extending from the Communists to the Arrow Cross.” It would be impossible to find Hungarians to co-operate. Horthy would resign. There would be ‘“‘military, political and

economic chaos.” Resistance and partisan activity would develop. Numerous German divisions would be tied down for an unlimited length of time. If Roumania were assigned Northern Transylvania, and allowed to enter it, the Roumanians and Hungarians would fight bitterly and, ‘even assuming the more advantageous case of a final Roumanian victory,” the Roumanians would have their hands full for many months to come. The

political effect of reversing the policy of the Vienna Award would be disastrous on such countries as Bulgaria.

If, on the other hand, ‘‘evolutionary methods” (which, the writer complains, had never been properly tried out in Hungary) were applied, an entirely different result would be achieved. A message should be sent to Horthy—it was suggested, through von Papen*—referring to the ‘‘debit balance of the previous Government” and “expressing the thought that the full employment of Hungary’s potentialities for the aims of Germany and Europe would alone assure Hungary’s future existence.”” The conditions and guarantee for the execution of these demands would have to be created by a complete change of regime, which could, however, be effected. The Regent should legally appoint a new Government, on a broad basis stretching from the Right of the MEP to the Arrow Cross, the matter being organised in a “putsch-like fashion” so that the public did not know what was going on and would have no chance to react. The writer was in touch with enough men who would be willing to act. Ratz, Ruszkay, Imrédy and Baky would form the Government, and “ta number of popular leaders of the Right Wing, as well as acknowledged experts, would also immediately be at our disposal.” The results would be: A Hungary internally consolidated and friendly to Germany. Horthy still at his post. The Army and Police collaborating. Hungary’s economic resources at the full disposal of the Reich. Roumania would be free to send her troops to the front, and the German troops could also go up the line; order could be maintained in Hungary by quartering units in training throughout the country. The memorandum goes on: “I venture to maintain that such an attempt could, through my collaboration, bring about a Government consisting of the above-named persons within three days,” and it ends with the mysterious words (hardly explicable unless as a reference to some plan for infiltrating * The draft memorandum, produced at Nuremberg as D. 679, is undated, but one page of it is typed on the back of an unfinished letter which is dated the 11th. * Hagen (H6tth), loc. cit., seems to take the credit for himself. Kienast at the Ministries Trial (1.6.48, p. 6093) says that when he learnt of the earlier plan he ‘‘got Kaltenbrunner and Schellenberg to protest against it.” $ Von Papen, who was on friendly terms with the Regent, had visited him shortly before. The visit, to which both men refer in their memoirs (Horthy, pp. 308-9, von Papen, pp. 258-9), was unimportant politically. P

226 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH troops into Hungary under the pretext of a transit operation): “‘the military undertaking (transports to the Eastern front) will make its own contribution

towards this. The Trojan method remains assured, but so also does our good reputation.” Kaltenbrunner himself did not dare put the memorandum forward in quite its original form. He (and some of his subordinates) made substantial alterations to it, including the addition of the words “in any case with a German occupation”’ after ““complete change of regime.”” Even so, according to Hattl,

neither Ribbentrop nor Himmler was willing to put the proposal up to Hitler.1 Hewel, however, did so, and Hitler proved unexpectedly amenable. He agreed that ‘‘a last attempt should be made to carry through a friendly policy towards Hungary,” and the plan was submitted to revision accordingly.

It is, however, important to be clear that the revision was both partial only and also only conditional. There was to be an occupation in any case, the concession being that in the first instance the operation, which may for convenience be called the “‘restricted occupation,”’ was to be carried through only by German troops, and the country was not to be dismembered immediately. But whether this was to prove the last stage, as well as the first, was to depend on Horthy. The Regent was to be summoned to the Fihrer’s presence (the idea of sending von Papen to him was tacitly rejected) and the restricted occupation was to be carried through while he was out of Hungary. Horthy was then to be confronted with the fait accompli; and if he could be induced to put a good face on the operation, order the Hungarians to accept it and also pretend to the outer world that it was being done with his consent, and, finally, give guarantees that Hungary would in the future co-operate fully and sincerely, then Hitler, too, would pretend that the whole affair was a transaction between friends and would even let the occupying troops leave

the country when the situation was stabilised. If not, the full original programme, or “‘total occupation,”’ including the use of the satellite troops, would be put into effect. Furthermore, even the restricted occupation was not to be purely military. The purge of political undesirables and Jews was an unconditional operation

which would be initiated as soon as the Germans entered Hungary, and carried through to the end, whichever alternative Horthy chose; his choice would simply decide within which framework it was accomplished. The orders for ‘““Operation Margarethe I,”’ as the restricted occupation was named (the name “‘Margarethe II’ was reserved for the “total occupation’), were issued on 12th March over Hitler’s own signature.

This remarkable document”? opened with one of Hitler’s usual highfaluting self-justificatory preambles in the form, this time, of a denunciation of the treachery of the Kallay Government. Hitler had decided ‘‘to remove

this clique of traitors forthwith.” German troops would “invade Hungary and occupy the country temporarily,” thus “‘preparing the way for a national Hungarian Government which had the true interests of Hungary at heart and would make an all-out effort for the final victory of the common cause, in the spirit of the ancient brotherhood and comradeship in arms between the German and the Hungarian peoples.”” The operation was to be under the general command of Field-Marshal Weichs, with Colonel-General Lohr as his Deputy. The occupation was to be carried out “by means of a concentric advance 1 Hagen, op. cit., p. 346. > This order was produced at the trial of Veesenmayer, Doc. No. 167 (Doc. Book V, A).

A CUP OVERFLOWS 22/7 on Budapest by four operational commands.” Each unit as it advanced was to disarm all troops of the Hungarian Army, Air Force and Danube Flotilla found on its route, to take away all their equipment and ammunition, and to advance on the capital as rapidly as possible with the rest of the troops at its disposal. Railways and bridges were to be secured. ‘All resistance,” said the Order, “‘is to be broken ruthlessly. Furthermore, all methods of warfare are permissible which will lead to the rapid attainment of the desired goal and will eliminate the possibility of a menace to the rear of the advancing troops.” A special force under Major-General von Pfahlstein was to go ahead of the main body, and, co-operating with a parachute regiment which was to be dropped near Budapest, to occupy all vital key positions. ‘Strong units of the Luftwaffe’ were to eliminate the Hungarian Air Force, cover the advance of the land forces, ward off any attacks by the Anglo-Saxons and drop the parachutists. For the first stage, the occupation was to apply only to the area west of the Tisza, the two halves of the country being sealed off by acordon. Whether or no troops were afterwards sent across the Tisza was to ‘‘depend on the development of the political situation.”

The troops were to move into their positions behind the frontiers inconspicuously. The movement was to be “‘substantially’’ completed by the

I5th. The date on which the infantry should cross the frontier was to be notified later. No one inside Hungary not concerned with the operation was to be informed before zero day except by the Fiihrer’s permission.

The forces to be employed for the operation, and listed on a schedule attached to the order, were a miscellaneous lot, scratched together from any available source.” As some of the units involved were very small, others, as 1 At some later date, Kaltenbrunner wrote on the draft of the SS. memorandum that on the 13th the date was not yet fixed. > The schedule is missing from the Nuremberg document; Professor Schramm, of Gottingen, has kindly supplied it for me. Units marked with a * were not used in the event. A. Two Battle Groups to be supplied by G.H.Q. Siid-Ost:

1. Group Sid: Battle Group A: Grenadier Regiment 92 (motorised). 4th Regiment *“‘Brandenburg.” SS. Police Regiment $5.

Panzer ABT. 202. Sturmgesch. Brigade 201. Pi. Battalion 45 (motorised).

Battle Group B: Strong detachments of the 8th SS. Cavalry Division. 2. Group Stid-Ost (LXIX) Akz. b.u.): Battle Group A: Ist Mt. Division. Battle Group B: 367th Infantry Division. 3. Other formations supplied by G.H.Q. Siid-Ost: 1 SS. parachute Chasseur Battalion; units of the 42nd Chasseur Division, 18th SS. Panzer Grenadier Division (this was not fully mobilised). *100th Chasseur Division. B. From G.H.Q. Stid-West, parts of the 16th Panzer Grenadier Division.

C. From G.H.Q. West: seth Reserve Panzer Corps. *Panzer Training Division. 21st Panzer Division. Panther section of the Viking SS. Panzer Division. Police and auxiliary troops.

D. The G.H.Q. ‘Heeresrtistung und Bd.E." to supply the 389th Infantry Division from the Protectorate, and two reintorced Frontier Guard Regiments (1028 and 1030) for the 357th and 359th Infantry Divisions, which were to be assembled. *One detachment of heavy motorised artillery from Denmark.

228 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH the schedules show, incomplete, while others not shown as incomplete were undoubtedly not up to full strength (not to mention the fact that many of them were only partially trained), it is difficult to say what their total strength

added up to. Greiffenberg, when he told the Hungarians that they were being occupied, talked of “eleven divisions,’ but he may have been exaggerating for effect’s sake, and in any case the word “division,”’ even if at that stage of the war it normally possessed any numerical significance, could not have been used by him in an exact sense, since the various units were certainly not made up into neat “divisions,” and the same qualification must be made when quoting the Hungarian writers, the most authoritative of whom! give about the same figures, or a little less: 4 or 5 divisions entering Hungary from the north-west, 1 from Eastern Slovakia, 3 or 4 from Syrmia and 1 or 2 from the Roumanian Banat. Other estimates put the figure lower,’ but when all reservations are made, it must have been a substantial force, as well as an

efficient one (the schedule will show what a high proportion of it was mechanised), and one which could be reinforced, if necessary, both from Germany and from the satellites. The latter were warned to hold themselves in readiness, and were in considerable force.? All the units, with one small exception,* were German; a considerable number of them were composed of ex-Hungarian Swabians. The Order did not lay down what measures were to be taken under the “unconditional programme,”’ simply stating that Kaltenbrunner was to be in charge of the SS. operations, and that “‘the Waffen SS. was to provide the

police and S.D. to go forward with the advance troops.’ The special detachments were not numerous: an “‘Einsatz gruppe,’’ 500-600 strong, of Gestapo and S.D. men, under Standartenfithrer Geschke, for political arrests

and security questions generally, and a ‘“‘Sonderkommando,” 200-300 strong, for Jewish questions, specially organised for the occasion by Eichmann, the head of Section A.4b (Jewish questions) of the R.S.H.A.® Finally, four senior “‘experts,’’ Schmidt, Six, Ruhle and Benzler, each with a

staff of assistants, were designated to deal directly with the Hungarian Ministries concerned on questions of the Press, the wireless, cultural affairs generally, and economics. They were entirely independent, reporting directly

to their own Ministries in Berlin. They were part of the unconditional programme, although it was not thought likely that they would have to stay in Hungary long. The Order did not deal with the political representation which would be required if (and only if) Horthy proved amenable. Even in that case Hitler

proposed to keep a strict control over Hungary’s internal affairs. The representative was therefore to bear, in addition to the title of Minister, that of Reich Plenipotentiary. It was agreed that von Jagow, the existing Minister, was not to do the job,® 1 Tombor MS. and Czebe-Petho, op. cit. ? General Naday told C. A. M. that only 6 divisions occupied Hungary: 4 round Budapest, 1 in the south and 1 in the north-east. 3 According to Kallay, there were waiting 10 Roumanian divisions, 1 Slovak, and considerable Croat forces which, besides native UstaSi, included Cossacks. 4 The Croat Mountain SS. Division was partially composed of Bosnian Mohammedans. > Eichmann, who was in general charge of the Jewish question in Germany and all countries occupied by her, only organised the Sonderkommando and started it off: its actual commanders

in6 When Hungary were Wysliceny and Krumey. ; he told this to Horthy on the 19th, von Jagow explained that ‘“‘he had been much criticised in Berlin for his failure to restrain the Hungarian Press or to influence the Government.”

A CUP OVERFLOWS 229 but there was much disagreement over his successor. The SS. Group— Himmler, Bormann and their following—wanted one of their own men, so

as to keep the future control in their own hands even if the more lenient solution was adopted. Their candidate was Jury, the Gauleiter of Western Austria.t Ribbentrop wanted one of his own men in charge, and eventually accepted Kempner’s proposal to give the job to Veesenmayer, although he himself was not satisfied with the choice.2- Veesenmayer was ordered to come to Salzburg and hold himself in readiness, and was given a hint of the honour which might be in store for him, but the appointment being only conditional, was given nothing which could be called instructions.?

The plan makes no mention of assistance from inside Hungary, and the manifold subsequent sensational “‘revelations’” to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no evidence that any Hungarian, Magyar or German, was initiated into itin advance. But this would hardly have been necessary. The eventuality of an occupation had been so long and so freely canvassed that the whole of Hungary’s vast Fifth Column must long before have known in general terms how it was expected to behave, and certain members of it, Baky and Hain in particular, must have had their specific tasks assigned to them.?

After signing the order, Hitler had nothing more to do except to wait until the troops were in position, since Horthy was not to be enticed out of Hungary until all was ready to take advantage of his absence. Till then, the sitting bird was not to be alarmed. But this was not so easy. The movement of German troops into the Burgenland had, of course, attracted the attention of the Hungarian Government, which had its informants®; other suspicious indications of coming trouble were noted also. Kallay asked both Ghyczy and Szombathelyi to make enquiries® of von Jagow and Greiffenberg respectively whether the movements were directed against Hungary. Both replied that they knew nothing, but would enquire in the appropriate quarters. A day or two later the General Staff got its reply. Greiffenberg was away at the Fiihrer’s H.Q. (presumably he was helping to plan Operation Margarethe), but the Air Attaché, Ftitterer, repudiated with indignation the suggestion that

the movements were directed against Hungary; the troops—so he told Szombathelyi’s second in command, Bajnoczy—were formations withdrawn

from the Front to rest, and the Burgenland had been chosen as a central point, whence they could be moved to any sector of the Front. He gave his word of honour that there was nothing more to it. The next day von Jagow saw Ghyczy (who meanwhile had heard the 1 Veesenmayer’s evidence, Min. Trial, 21.7.48, p. 13111. > Veesenmayer, loc. cit., said that Ribbentrop himself had told him that he did not want the appointment. 8 The printed evidence in the Imrédy trial makes Veesenmayer say that he had his preliminary

interview with Ribbentrop on 10th February, but this is probably a misprint. Veesenmayer informed C. A. M. that he was called to H.Q. at the end of February, but sat about for weeks without even being invited to take part in any thorough discussions. 4 At their respective trials, all the leaders of the Right, including Basch, denied that they had had any foreknowledge of the putsch, and the contrary was not proved against them. Baky, as we shall see, was ready and waiting. It is probable that he (and only he) had been given warning just before the operation started. 5 Inter alia German officers had been refusing social invitations for anything except the immediate future (Barczy). ® The following from Kallay, op. cit., pp. 407 ff., Barczy (who heard the story from Bajnéczy at a lunch on the 12th) and A Tizhdnapos Tragédia, which for its narrative of these days seems to draw on information the ultimate, although not the direct, source of which is Ghyczy.

230 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Italian Minister say at a tea-party, to anyone who wished to hear, that the occupation was imminent), and expressed himself scandalised that suspicious

thoughts could have entered a Hungarian’s head. He added sarcastically that Hungary’s conscience must be bad indeed if the presence of German troops in Vienna troubled it. The troops were en route for Italy. The date of these two communications must have been about 9th-10th March.

It was about the same date that the German request, mentioned above, was made for passage for 100,000 troops. When he received Kallay’s refusal, Greiffenberg growled that “‘the Hungarians were practising sabotage again,”

but did not return to the request. Kallay discussed the situation with both Szombathelyi and KeresztesFischer; but, remarkably, none of the three believed, even at this late date, that the occupation was imminent. Even Keresztes-Fischer thought that the moves were only a tactical threat made to force Horthy to dismiss Keresztes-

Fischer himself and Kallay. Szombathelyi thought that the occupation would not serve the Germans, particularly since Hungary was now mobilising

and had pledged herself to defend her eastern frontier; honour, too, would prevent Germany from attacking a military ally. Kallay also believed that the Germans would not move, because an occupation would be for them a confession of political failure, and would weaken Germany’s position among both her friends and her enemies.! Yet, by a day or two later, numerous and circumstantial reports of the most ominous character were pouring in on the Hungarian authorities. Kuhl, the Hungarian Minister in Bratislava, came to Budapest to report that Tiso had warned him that an occupation was imminent. Bothmer, the ConsulGeneral in Vienna, sent a similar message and specified the number of forces on the Austro-Hungarian frontier: 5 divisions. The Hungarian Consul in Belgrade reported two SS. divisions assembling in Pétervaradin. A private individual named Kolos, manager of some Hungarian estates in the Burgenland, hired an aeroplane and came to Budapest with quite specific and, as it proved, accurate information, which he conveyed to the Foreign Ministry and the Regent’s Cabinet, on the number of forces to be employed and even the hour fixed for the operation. From Transylvania and Slovakia came warnings of Roumanian and Slovak concentrations, and from Zagreb a report that a German division and Croat “‘Domobran”’ irregulars were moving up towards the Murak6z. A Press official in Berlin told a Hungarian business man on 16th March that ““Hungary was finished: the Germans had decided to occupy the country and put Sztdjay in as Minister President.”’ The Hungarian told Hardy, who wired the news to Szegedi-Maszak. The Hungarians could not now doubt that the occupation was at last an imminent threat, and it is therefore most important for any fair assessment of what happened afterwards to make clear that the possibility of armed resistance was discussed by the Government before the event, and dismissed by it after consideration. Kallay writes that he discussed the matter with Szombathelyi, who said that the possibility of resistance did not exist. Had full mobilisation been ordered earlier, there might have been a chance. As 1 Kallay, op. cit., p. 408. Kallay’s account of Szombathelyi’s attitude is confirmed by Nagy, op. cit., p. 190, in the Tombor MS. and by Nadas (personal to C. A. M.), who writes that both Szombathelyi and Kadar (of the Military Intelligence) thought that the reports must be canards, since Germany could not conceivably gain anything by invading Hungary at that juncture,

A CUP OVERFLOWS 231 it was, the only formations in Hungary under arms, or even in course of mobilisation, were away in eastern Hungary. It would take “‘weeks”’ to transfer them to the west, and if this were attempted, the Germans would be

able to mobilise the Roumanians against Hungary. In Budapest and the west there was not a single formation capable of action.

The Regent must have accepted this view, and there is no record that any single Minister dissented from it. Nor can it be said that on this point the Government was lagging behind public opinion. Kallay writes how in these days of suspense, men, representative of every shade of opinion except the Right, came to see him. There were, of course, isolated individuals who advised a bold course. Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, who brought with him a retired General called Janos Kiss, the unofficial leader of a certain group of Army officers, advocated “‘the most resolute counter-action and the arming of the workers’; a few other individual voices were raised in the same sense, but they were the minority. Bethlen said that “‘the Anglo-Saxons must decide whether they would help or not: if they did, armed resistance was possible; if not, there was nothing to be done.’’ The Socialists’ own version, given after the event, is that they demanded of Kallay “‘urgently to break with the Axis, quite openly and unmistakably, and to seek support from the Allies against the Nazi danger’’*?; but on their own evidence, when Kallay put them off, saying that the crisis was not really imminent and that their policy was

too risky, they let themselves be comforted. Kallay does not write, nor do they themselves claim, that they offered to support the Government in resisting Germany, threatened (or promised) to do so alone if the Government would not lead the way, or asked for arms. They certainly made no arrangements of their own for strikes or other resistance by the workers. The spokesman of the Jews, in tears, begged Kallay to make any concession which would save Hungary from occupation. Maybe Hungary erred fatally in not resisting the occupation; but if so, it was not in Klessheim on the 18th, nor in Buda in the small hours of the 19th, that the error was committed. If it was not long before, when the conditions

- were brought into being which motivated the decision, it was, at the latest, on the 14th or 15th. More suicidal, and surely more inexplicable than the decision not to challenge an armed conflict which could only possibly go one way, was the total failure either of the Government, or of any party or individual whose

well-being or existence was jeopardised by the occupation, to make any provision whatever against it. From Sigray to Szakasits, not one man took any thought for the future or made any preparation for carrying on underground, if forced into hiding,* with the result that when the catastrophe came, the leaders scuttled pell-mell for shelter, some reaching it and others not, and

left their followers without guides or guidance. The consequences were particularly heavy for the Social Democrats, since the leadership of the workers thus passed automatically to the Communists, who, being underground already, were hardly affected by the change in the atmosphere above

the surface. It is true that the activities of the Communists themselves were being severely hampered by the dissolution of the Party. 1 The same Kiss who organised resistance after 15th October, was caught by the Arrow Cross and executed (see below, p. 455).

2 Kallay, op. cit., p. 412. 3 A Reakcié Ellen, pp. 97-8.

4 Keresztes-Fischer had prepared passports for 50 prominent members of the Left to leave the country, but had not distributed them, so that they were never used.

232 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Those circles of the Right which looked forward to profiting by the occupation do not seem to have been much more active. There is, for instance, no trace of discussions between the Imrédists and the Right Wing of the MEP. The most elaborate plans were, as usual, those of the Arrow Cross, which had been expecting the occupation ever since the previous January, and had at least considered what to do about it, even if its calculations were unrealistic. If the occupation took place after the “‘retaliation”’ (i.e. after they had themselves ‘“‘cleaned up” Hungary and eliminated their enemies there), the Party expected to take over the power; the only question was whether to allow further converts to enter the Party, or to work exclusively

with the Old Guard. If the occupation took place before the retaliation had

begun, the position would be more difficult. The problem was how to organise the country on a Hungarist basis under the German occupation. They were not to take office under the Germans, but were to propose to them

a plebiscite to find out whether the nation wished for a Hungarist form of state. What was to happen if the Germans refused this naive request was not stated. The Arrow Cross made no attempt to contact the Germans in order

toSinceconcert policy in advance. } no one knew what ought to be done, no one did anything, with the

single qualification that Szombathelyi secretly ordered a “‘state of preparedness” for the Army. The officers and men were to “‘hold themselves ready,” but as they were to be ready to do nothing, the order was not conspicuously

effective. No orders were given to the para-military formations. The civilian population carried on as usual. So there arrived 15th March. This time, as we have said, the Government was not leaving the catchwords to the Left, and in the spate of Press articles celebrating Hungary’s devotion to her freedom, the voices of the Government Press and of the Opposition—alike sounding fortissimo—were practically

indistinguishable. The day passed in festivities, which culminated in the presentation at the Opera of the premiere of a new patriotic opera “Petdfi.”’

The Regent was there with his wife (Mme Horthy’s first public appearance | since the tragic death of her son eighteen months earlier); Kallay with Mme Kallay, and all the notabilities of Hungary. In the interval, an Attaché of the German Legation asked Horthy’s Aidede-camp to tell the Regent that von Jagow urgently requested an audience for that evening; he had an autograph letter from the Fuhrer to hand over.

When Horthy received him, von Jagow handed over the letter. Hitler excused himself for not having replied before to Horthy’s communication: he had been indisposed. He now begged him urgently to come, with the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defence, to Klessheim and there to talk over the question of the withdrawal of the troops and the military situation in general. As Hitler had to be at his own Headquarters on the 20th, Horthy should come at once.

The next day the Regent first talked matters over with Kallay. Both men thought that it would be dangerous for Horthy to go; Szombathelyi should be sent in his stead. Horthy then called in Szombathelyi himself, Csatay and Ghyczy, for a small Crown Council in miniature,’ and the 1 Kallay wanted Keresztes-Fischer, whom he knew to be of his own mind, to be called in also, but Horthy, with his punctilious regard for form, said that the matter was one for his military and foreign political advisers only,

A CUP OVERFLOWS 233 question was thrashed over again for weary hours. Horthy and Kallay defended their agreed point of view, but Szombathelyi (who, it will be remembered, thought that Hungary was proposing to do what the Germans

wanted, if they only knew it) opposed it strongly. Horthy ought to meet the Fuhrer as man to man and put Hungary’s case, assuring the Fiihrer of Hungary’s sincere determination to defend the Carpathians. If he did so, he, and he alone, would probably get the Dead Army back and put over Kallay’s plan for an unaided defence of the Carpathians. Ghyczy, with some hesitation, agreed, saying that a refusal would make Hungary’s case worse

and contrast Horthy’s attitude towards Hitler unfavourably with that of Antonescu and Tiso. Csatay, who had at first agreed with Kallay, came round to Szombathelyi’s view, which Horthy ended by accepting, as he said in one of his accounts, ““because I had the feeling that if I didn’t, I should

never see my divisions again.’”’ Szombathelyi and Csatay were already included in the invitation, and it was decided that Ghyczy should accompany

the party, since the presence of a civilian was advisable and the sight of Kallay would probably enrage the Fiihrer beyond all bounds. The Germans were told that the party would start the next day, the 17th; and even a historian who regards it as his prime duty to record rather than

criticise cannot refrain from one comment at this point. Szombathelyi’s arguments are understandable, and not without force, for Hitler had, up to that point, always shown a remarkable readiness to make concessions to Horthy personally: Szombathelyi could not know of the change which the recent reports had wrought in the Fiihrer’s feelings. Yet all present must have remembered the cases of Schuschnigg and Hacha; they must have been aware of the mechanical regularity with which Hitler repeated a successful technique. They even knew of the concentration of satellite troops on the frontiers. Yet no one suggested laying down any limit as the line at which Horthy should declare further concession impossible, nor was Kallay left with any instructions how to act if the inevitable occurred in the Regent’s

absence. At least, one may think, Horthy should have left behind some signed proclamation and an authorisation for Kallay or another to act in his name, in Hungary or abroad, if he failed to return. ‘The only precautionary measure taken was a private one by Ghyczy that if he wired to Szentmikldssy “‘the visit is not to be communicated to the Press,” this meant that an occupation was certain.

The explanation given in one work? is that even those who expected an | occupation thought that it would be preceded by some “‘preliminary diplomatic steps” which would give them time to make their own preparations. This is an explanation; hardly an excuse in March 1944. Nor was this paralysis confined to the Hungarians. Full details of the German military preparations and of the invitation to Horthy were wirelessed

to Istanbul, with a request that Tito should be asked to receive political refugees. It was, said the Hungarian concerned,® “‘like talking into a dead telephone.”’

The little party left Budapest on the evening of 17th March, secretly, since it was feared that if the news leaked out the Left would raise an outcry that Kallay was selling out to the Germans. Sztdjay, who had been on leave on

t Horthy to C. A. M. | ? A Tizhénapos Tragédia, I, 45, 3 L, Veress (personal to C.A. M.).

234 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH the Semmering, had been ordered to join them, and did so at Vienna. Salz-

burg was reached on the morning of the 18th. Hitler, accompanied by Ribbentrop, Keitel and other Germans, was waiting on the platform, but in spite of this courtesy, the atmosphere was frigid—“‘different,’’ said Horthy,

‘from that to which I had been accustomed.’ This was perceptible even when the greetings were being exchanged, and during the short drive to Schloss Klessheim. When this was reached, the guests were shown the rooms at their disposal.

Then Hitler asked Horthy for a private conversation. The two men went into a room on the ground floor. Schmidt, the interpreter, followed them in

and shut the door behind him.*? Horthy objected. Hitler replied that Schmidt was only there to take notes, but Horthy said that if the conversation was not to be strictly téte-a-téte, he must have his own advisers with him. Schmidt was bowed out, and the Fiihrer and the Regent remained alone together. ‘‘Hitler began,” said Horthy afterwards,* ‘“‘by beating about the bush.”’

Then he turned to speaking of the catastrophic situation in which Germany had been placed by Italy’s “‘treachery.’’ He had seen it coming, had known about it, and now his conscience was gnawing him for not having taken counter-measures in time. For this reason he owed it to the German people

to prevent Hungary’s defection. Yes, Hungary was preparing to desert Germany. Hecould not again allow treachery to be perpetrated behind his back. He had to protect himself, and had therefore decided to make the necessary dispositions.

Horthy was furious at the word “treachery,” and replied that Hungary had never, in a thousand years of history, betrayed an ally. If circumstances ever forced him, in the national interest, to ask for an armistice, he reserved the right to do so, but would communicate his intention honourably to the Germans first. Hungary would never be the first to turn her arms against her German comrades.® She was not now preparing any act of “‘treachery.”’ 1 There have been many versions of this interview. I have had before me when writing four versions by Horthy himself: that which he gave the next day to the Crown Council (as recorded by Barczy); that which he gave the same day to KAallay, as remembered by Kallay (Kallay, op. cit.,

pp. 429-31); one given to myself in 1945; and that given in his own book, op. cit., pp. 263 ff. At the Crown Council, Sztojay spoke at some length, and other participants made a few remarks. What appears to be Szombathelyi’s story is given by Nagy, op. cit., pp. 150-2. An account in A Tizhénapos Tragédia, pp. 41-5, and an article signed by D. Gelej in Szabad Szd, 14th-15th April 1946, both seem to be based on information from Ghyczy (these are so written up as to be worse than valueless). Some scraps can be gathered from the Press reports of the trial of Sztdjay. From the German side, Ribbentrop gave his version under interrogation (Nazi Consp. and Agg., Suppl. B, pp. 1208 ff.).. Schmidt has published his (pp. 567-8 of the German edition). Schmidt, Ritter and Veesenmayer gave evidence at the Ministries Trial. _ Unfortunately, this collection justifies in a high degree Thucydides’ complaint about the difficulty of reconciling eye-witnesses’ accounts. Even Horthy’s four stories are mutually inconsistent—less as regards substance than as regards number and time of conversations, and

on which occasion which thing was said. All of them pass over, practically entirely, the

concessions to which Horthy undoubtedly agreed. An inextricable confusion surrounds the roles

played respectively by Szombathelyi and Sztdjay, etc. The probability of error on matters of detail in the following account cannot therefore be excluded. * Horthy to C. A. M. * According to Schmidt (op. cit., p. 552), Hitler had said to him in April 1943 that he wanted to have a record by a third party; “otherwise Horthy will twist my words.’’ But, as when talking to Chamberlain in 1938, he seems to have been unwilling to allow the other party the same privilege.

4 In the following paragraph I have tried to combine Horthy’s various accounts, but have followed chiefly that in Barczy, which is that given when his recollection was freshest. 6 These words were afterwards to prove very important, for, as we shall see, Horthy held himself bound by this promise, and this powerfully affected the course of the armistice negotiations,

A CUP OVERFLOWS 235 Hitler replied that he had proofs. Horthy asked, what proofs? Hitler said that he had documentary proof that Kallay was intriguing with the enemy, and referred to the activities of the Hungarian Missions abroad. Argumentation over the value of Hitler’s reports, which Horthy challenged, must—since the interview lasted an hour and a half in all—have taken up some time, and it seems likely that Hitler expatiated also on some of the

other items in Hungary’s Newgate Calendar. “After all this,” he said at last, “I have decided to occupy Hungary militarily.” At this Horthy lost his temper altogether. “If I had had my revolver with me,” he said afterwards, “‘I should have shot the scoundrel dead; and I shall regret all my life not having done so.”! He got up and stamped out of the room. Witnesses of the scene? have described how they saw Horthy emerge from the conference room, red in the face and muttering under his breath, and begin to mount the stairs towards his own apartments. Then they saw Hitler, also looking angry and upset, run after him, catch him up (Dornberg having ingeniously obstructed him) and follow him, pleading. But Horthy shook

him off and made for the room allocated to him. Hitler turned back and

disappeared into his own room with Ribbentrop. The only other conversation which had, apparently, taken place during this period was one between Ribbentrop and Sztdéjay. Ribbentrop asked Sztojay whether he had forwarded the complaints which Ribbentrop had addressed to him when they met in December, and complained that ‘“‘nothing had altered since.’’* The other Hungarians seem to have been kept hanging about. Now Horthy called them together and told them what had passed between him and Hitler. It is clear that already at this point Horthy must have considered making certain concessions, for he said himself at the Crown Council that he wanted a further conversation with Hitler*; he also said that he never thought of resistance, since Hungary’s only troops were in Russia.°® His later version, that he wanted to leave immediately,® must therefore be due to the telescoping

in his mind of two situations. But he was furious with Hitler, and when a message arrived from the Fiihrer that the Hungarians were invited to lunch, he at first wanted to lunch upstairs, in his own room. His staff, however, dissuaded him, and the lunch took place, although in a glacial atmosphere of near-silence. After it, Hitler and Horthy withdrew again. Horthy seems to have asked again for proof of Hungary’s alleged misdeeds, requesting that complaints be given to him in writing. He was told

of various sins—not, one would think, the worst ones: Professor

SzentgyGrgyi’s ill-fated extratour in Constantinople, and Svatko’s article. He went on to argue against the occupation in what, by his own account, was anything but a defiant tone. Hungary was the only state which was 1 Horthy to C. A.M. Horthy was in his Admiral’s uniform, which he always wore when meeting Nazis; according to one account, because the wearing of gloves was de rigueur with this

uniform, and he was thus saved the necessity of shaking hands with men whom he disliked. A

revolver was not carried with this uniform. ;

2 Schmidt describes this scene vividly in his book (loc. cit.) and at the Ministries Trial, where, however, the prosecutor seems to have imagined Horthy to have been not angry but frightened. 3 The only source to mention this conversation is Sztojay himself, at the Crown Council, but he is quite specific about it. 4 Barczy. 5 Td.

® Ein Leben fiir Ungarn, loc. cit,

236 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH still treating the Germans as friends. Occupation would poison the relation-

ship. There had been neither strikes nor sabotage in Hungary. If the Germans occupied it, the Anglo-Saxons would bomb its war industries and communications, which would be disadvantageous to the Germans them-

selves. There would be partisan resistance. To the writer’s mind, it is inconceivable that Horthy should not at this stage at least have indicated that he would make further concessions if the Germans would call off the occupation altogether; but in vain. Hitler answered that he only wanted to safeguard his rear, but that the occupation was inescapable; and finally Horthy said since the Germans’ decisions were irrevocable, there was no point in going on talking. He would go home. He asked for his train to be brought round. The Germans, however, had no intention of letting Horthy go home just like that. Hitler had, in fact, decided to arrest him unless he toed the line. Horthy was told that his train was not available; there was an air-raid over Salzburg, and the engine had been driven out for safety. According to some accounts, the Germans lent verisimilitude to this by putting up an artificial fog-screen over the Schloss. The Hungarians were further told that the raid had interrupted telephonic communications, and although Horthy made several attempts to ring up Kallay, it was always in vain. During this time, Ribbentrop had been talking to Ghyczy (no record of this conversation has survived) and Keitel to Csatay and Szombathelyi, of

whom, according to Horthy, he had been demanding ‘100 per cent. reorientation of policy and 100 per cent. co-operation with Germany.”? Now Szombathelyi went to tackle Hitler,” whom he found fuming (it was not often that someone walked out on him twice in a day) and talking about arresting Horthy on the spot. With great difficulty, Szombathelyi dissuaded him by arguing what capital the Allied propagandists would make of such a scandal. He must have put very forcefully what was, as we have seen, his own sincere conviction that the occupation was unnecessary, because Hungary was really

ready to defend herself whole-heartedly against the Russians, and to the writer’s mind it is quite certain that by this time Horthy had seen the necessity of replacing Kallay, and authorised Szombathelyi to say so: for without this

card in his hand I cannot believe that Hitler would have gone as far as he did now, even if, as Horthy thinks, he was only making an insincere gesture: after assuring Szombathelyi that he wished no harm to Hungary and had no thought of annexing it; that he only wanted political guarantees; and that if he was satisfied, the troops would move on in two or three weeks, and (it is

to be inferred) being told that his conditions could be met, he told

Szombathelyi that “he would trust his word, as a soldier” and actually called in Keitel and asked whether the occupation could be cancelled, after all. Keitel, however, answered that it was too late: the orders had been given, the troops were on the move, and some of them had already crossed the frontier®; and when Szombathelyi took this message back to Horthy, the fat was in the fire again. Horthy went back to Hitler and told him that in that * Ribbentrop at his interrogation insisted that there was never any question of arresting Horthy, but he himself said: “The Fuhrer was very angry. He said: ‘the Hungarians have betrayed me. I’m going to take my own measures.’” And Schmidt testified (Min. Trial) that Ribbentrop said to him: “If Horthy does not give way, you will not be accompanying him back to the frontier’? (the escorting of distinguished visitors was one of Schmidt’s duties): ‘“‘he will be travelling as a prisoner under guard.”’ ° The fullest account of this interview is that given by Nagy. ‘ This was untrue: it was some hours more before the frontier was crossed.

A CUP OVERFLOWS 237 case he would abdicate. Hitler begged him not to do this, lavished friendly words on him, and promised solemnly that “‘the German troops should be withdrawn the moment a Hungarian Government which enjoyed his confidence

was formed.’ Horthy answered that he would think it over, and returned to his apartment.! Meanwhile, Ribbentrop had been priming Sztéjay, whom, alone of the Hungarians, he knew and trusted. He begged him to induce the Regent ‘‘to: acquiesce in the inevitable. He must not stand aside, for that would have catastrophic consequences.’ There must be a new Government, which

‘must pursue its policy in a friendly relationship with Germany.” He appealed to Germany’s “‘guarantees.”’ Sztojay asked that the occupation should be delayed while the Hungarians

talked things over; also, that the Germans should put into writing their “guarantees,” including Hitler’s assurance that he did not want to infringe the

sovereignty of Hungary. Ribbentrop said that it was too late to recall the troops; Sztojay’s other request raised a point of principle, but he would put it up to the Fiihrer. But Sztdjay (who, according to Ribbentrop, took the main part in talking the Regent over) was in any case in favour of Hungary’s co-operating with Germany, on the best terms she could make, and he was seconded by Ghyczy, Csatay and Szombathelyi, all of whom unanimously

testified at the Crown Council that the Germans told them that if Horthy abdicated, Hitler “‘would give a free hand to the Slovaks, Croats and Roumanians.”’ Horthy himself was now beginning to repeat to himself his old thesis that

it was his duty, as captain of the ship, to remain on the bridge, and to tell himself that Hungary would be far better off if he accepted Hitler’s assurances and remained, than if he allowed the extended occupation to take place, with

the German authorities, or some Hungarian extremist, in supreme charge. So he let himself be talked over, and the way was now clear for the agreement which was now reached. There is no record of how Horthy conveyed his capitulation. The natural procedure for a communication of such importance would have been for him

to meet Hitler (perhaps in the company of Ribbentrop) again, and some of the exchanges which he reported as having passed between him and Hitler would seem to fit best a conversation held at this stage. Yet none of his own accounts of the day specify such a conversation, nor do any of the other eyewitnesses’ accounts, although Szombathelyi’s (apud Nagy) speaks of “‘an agreement,’ and Ritter said definitely at the Ministries Trial* that Ribbentrop

had told him that “‘there had been a discussion with Horthy, which had resulted in agreement.’ Nor is there any exact and comprehensive record of the ‘‘agreement,” for, unfortunately, Sztdjay’s sensible suggestion was not followed up, and nothing was put into writing. But that an understanding of sorts was reached is quite certain, and the main features of it are not in doubt. The essential concessions which Horthy made were that he would not 1 This only from Horthy’s printed account.

2 Both Ribbentrop at his interrogation and Sztdjay at the Crown Council described this conversation. Their accounts hardly overlap, but are not mutually contradictory. 3 What these would be Sztdjay did not explain. Ribbentrop said that “‘the Fiihrer would publish the documents and German troops would march into the country.” The last clause cannot be accurate, but Ribbentrop was talking long after the event. 4 Min. Trial, 15.7.48, p. 12224.

238 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH himself abdicate. and that he would dismiss Kallay and appoint a Government which enjoved the confidence of the Germans. It is true that. clinging to the

rock of the Hungarian constitution, whith required that the resignation or appointment of a Government should be countersigned by the Minister President. he refused to sign an order, which the Germans laid before him. dismissing Kallay on the spot. He must. he replied. proceed constitutionally.

and on the same pretext he refused to commit himself in advance on the person of Kallaw’s successor. He was thus able to tell Kallay next day that ‘he had concluded no agreement. given no promise, and given no indication of his intentions.”"= But, in fact. he was bound. and he knew it, as witness not only the tesumony of the Germans® but all Horthy’s own subsequent conduct. including his first conversation with Veesenmayer.* and indeed. his own words in nis autobiography, where he wnites:

“The most important factor determining my decision was .. . Hitler's promise to withdraw his troops from Hungarv immediately. as soon as I had appointed a Government acceptable to him.’ According to Ritter, Horthy “stated his loyalty.” Ritter also said (and Horthw’s later actions bear this out also) that Horthy took back his request to have the Hungarian troops withdrawn from the front; **on the contrary, he

promised to throw in the whole Hungarian Army on the Russian Front, in so far as the Hungarian Army was supplied with new weapons.” It is also to be assumed that it was at least understood that Hungary would make her full economic contribution to the war effort—an obligation which had never been denied.

In return. Hitler undoubtedly promised that the occupation should be a purely temporary one. lasung only untl the new Government was appointed and the position consolidated. The satellite troops should not be used.° He gave the Hungarians no reason to guess that their troops. even after agreeing to the occupation. were to be confined to barracks and disarmed. He most certainly promised that “the sovereignty of Hungarv should be respected”? and he concealed from the Hungarians the whole of his “‘unconditional programme.” He gave no hint of the sinister hordes of Gestapo men who had been designated to accompany the army. nor that Horthy’s own Ministers and friends would be arrested on the plea of security.‘ The Jewish question was undoubtedly raised. The Hungarian records

pass this point over. except that they show Horthy as telling the Crown Council that Hitler “had complained that Hungary had not yet taken the necessary steps to settle the Jewish question.”” Another witness at the Ministries Tral.* however, said that he was told by Winkelmann that “‘the * So he told C. A. M. He alluded to this at the Crown Council, but Barezy’s note on the subject does not make the subject of the allusion clear. > Kallay. op. cit.. p. 431. 3 Ritter, loc. cit. * See below. p. 246. 2 Op. cit.. p. 266. § See below, p. 257. This promise was kept. * Wvsliceny in his afiidavit (Nac Consp. and Agg., VILL. 618) testified that ‘“‘no mention was

made of the S.D.” A private diary by a Countess Zichy. seen by the author, relates how on the 22nd Horthy told the writer of it that “he had to appoint a Government, because then thev accepted my conditions: they guarantee Hungary's sovereignty, they won't force their money on us. and they will evacuate the country within ten days. I said: "Whom do they mean—the Army or the Gestapo?” He said: “What Gestapo? There was no question of that.” I said: "Well. that Gestapo which has caught and arrested some of your Ministers and most of our friends.” He did not answer, but looked away.” $ Kienast. Min. Trial. p. 7145.

A CUP OVERFLOWS 239 necessity for a solution of the Jewish question in Hungary was unequivocally established by Hitler at Klessheim and urgently pressed through,” although ‘“*no agreement was reached on the form which the solution should take, nor on the extent of the programme.” And, again in the light of what happened afterwards, it seems impossible not to conclude that Horthy knew that something would be done in this field; he probably expected this to take the form of the imposition by the Hungarian Government of fresh economic, political

and cultural restrictions on the Jews.

It seems established only that Horthy agreed to one specific step in this

field: that a considerable number of Hungarian Jews should be sent to Germany for work in the German munitions factories.!_ This transpired later to have been a most disastrous concession, for it was used as an excuse for the

deportations in which hundreds of thousands of Jews perished. It seems, however, certain that the request and the consent were framed in terms of labour service, which, such service being in Hungary the recognised substitute for military service exacted from persons not called to the colours, may have seemed natural at a moment when the non-Jewish population was being called

upon for a full military contribution. Nothing, at the time, indicated that

the request held any more sinister implications. |

Such, in broad terms, was the agreement; although it was, as we have said, a loose affair, not put into writing, perhaps not all terms of it agreed between the same pair of negotiators, what was agreed possibly not always understood

in the same sense by both parties to it. Horthy was afterwards sharply criticised in many quarters for having given way, and in particular for having himself consented to remain at his post and thus to give an appearance of legality both to the occupation and to the shameful things which happened

during the following months. Had he abdicated, it was said, even if these things had happened, at least they would have been demonstrably wounds inflicted on Hungary, without her consent, by a conqueror, and thus not to be counted against her afterwards. At least he should have adopted the attitude of the King of Denmark, withdrawn from public life and demonstrated his refusal by refusing to sign any documents.’ Horthy’s case for his decision may be read in his own book? or in those pages of M. Kallay’s book which record his discussion with the Regent on the subject. Briefly, Horthy argued that if he remained at his post he would be able to save something, whereas no one else would be able to save anything at all. And it can surely not be denied that he was right in this. It must not be forgotten that the alternative offered him in Klessheim was not between the same operation, conducted in an amicable spirit or a hostile one, 1 Veesenmayer testified at his trial (Min. Trial, 22.7.48, p. 13243) that “Ribbentrop pointed out that at the time of the discussions at Klessheim, Horthy and Hitler had agreed that a consider-

able number of Jewish workers were to be made available for German war production.”” He pointed to other evidence in support of his statement, and Winkelmann also maintained that there had been one “‘legal’’ agreement reached at Klessheim, on the strength of which Veesenmayer, on orders from his superiors, had later “‘approached the Hungarian Government to get their approval for the deportation of what was initially 100,000 Jews” (id., 18.10.48, p. 26172). Horthy agreed (id., 4.3.48, p. 26172) that he knew about the deportations when they began, but ‘‘was told that the Jews were going to Germany for labour service and would be allowed to take their families with them.’ It was only at the end of June that his eyes were opened. 2 He did, in fact, consider this course and asked an official of the Foreign Ministry about it (Szegedi-Maszak to C. A. M.), but then decided against it. 3 Op. cit., pp. 265-6. 4 Op. cit., pp. 432-4, 444-5.

240 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH but between the restricted operation and the total one, carried out with the help of the satellites. The latter would certainly have inflicted on the majority of the population far worse sufferings than they actually underwent. Even the Jews have reason to be thankful that he decided as he did. He did not

save the Jews outside Budapest (and it may well be that a more subtle politician, or one less easily influenced, could have done more than Horthy did in this direction). But he saved the Jews of Budapest, and no other man could have done it. Horthy was undoubtedly right if all that needs to be considered is what Hungary suffered as it was, and what she would have suffered had he defied Hitler. He was wrong if it can be taken with assurance that those sufferings would have been outweighed by rewards accorded Hungary by an appreciative Peace Conference. But who can honestly believe this of a Conference at which the name of Teleki was not even mentioned?

There was one point on which Horthy dug his toes in. After the agreement had been reached, Ribbentrop came to him and asked him to sign a communiqué on the meeting, which said that the entry of the German troops into Hungary had been effected “by mutual agreement between Germany and Hungary.” This he flatly refused to sign, saying that he had never lied in his life, and was not going to begin now. ““You might as well have added,”’

he said, “‘that I asked Hitler to have us occupied by the Slovak and Roumanian troops he threatened me with.” Ribbentrop promised to leave the phrase out, which he could easily do, for the text with the offending words in it was afterwards issued in the satellite capitals.+

Horthy was now anxious to be off, and again asked for his train to be brought round. He was told that the air-raid was still on; and the delays lasted so long that he sent down to ask whether he was to regard himself as a

prisoner. Shocked denials came back; but the Germans could not let the Hungarians go before they were certain that the occupation would go through smoothly. They, therefore asked Szombathelyi to send a telegram to Bajnéczy, ordering that the German troops should be treated as friends, and no precipitate action taken before the party returned. The message went off, in the reassuring wording that the troops were passing through Hungary.? With it the Germans sent off Ghyczy’s code message for him. The Germans were ready now, and at 7 p.m. Dornberg came up to say that the train would be able to start in an hour. While Horthy was getting ready, Ribbentrop came up once more to say that Hitler would like another

word with him. When Horthy went down, Hitler again begged him to ‘remain at his post,” and lavished assurances on him.? ‘He had always been fond of Hungary” (this was a complete lie: there is copious evidence that he 1 Horthy, op. cit., p. 267, writes that it appeared in the German Press, but such is not my impression. There was some purpose in issuing it in the satellite capitals, as an intimation to them that the larger operation was off. Incidentally, the Hungarians signed the text after all on 22nd March. 2 At the time, Szombathelyi’s message was widely stated to have been forged by the Germans,

but there can, I think, be no doubt as to its authenticity, which Szombathelyi is said to have admitted before the Yugoslav People’s Court (Hungarian Press, 27th-29th September 1946). But there might be a doubt about the verb used, which was regularly given in the Hungarian Press as ‘“‘entering”’ (bevonuld), whereas it apparently arrived in the form “passing through’’ (dtvonuld), and precisely for that reason caused no alarm (see below, p. 242). The point of the exact wording was, so far as I know, never discussed, and it is just possible that some German who knew Hungarian, or even someone in Hungary, made this small but important change. + The following paragraph from Horthy’s account to the Crown Council.

A CUP OVERFLOWS 241 had always disliked Hungary and the Hungarians). He would never infringe her sovereignty (“ich will die Souveranitéat Ungarns nie antasten’). It was quite ridiculous to impute to him any intention of incorporating Hungary in the Reich—hers was quite a different case from that of Bohemia,” which had formed part of the Reich. ‘‘Do not misunderstand us,” he said; “‘we do not trust Kallay, but if you appoint a Minister President whom we trust, we will recall the troops.”” The whole operation would not even be an occupation, but a movement of troops in transit. He went on: ‘‘I have invited Antonescu to come here. When I appealed to him to send more Roumanian divisions

against Russia, he said that he couldn’t, because the Hungarians would immediately stab him in the back. Now I am wiring him to send his troops into the line against Russia at once.” After this, Hitler accompanied his guests to the station and took a smiling leave of them. But just as the train was moving off, he called Szombathelyi to him and warned him that: “‘If a single shot is fired during the occupation, there will be incalculable consequences.’”?

The train lumbered off at 8 p.m. It carried, besides the Hungarians, Schmidt, ceremonially escorting Horthy to the frontier (he dined with the Regent, who was charming to him‘); von Jagow, going back to pack; and von

Jagow’s successor, Veesenmayer, with his staff. For, with the Hungarians toeing the line, Veesenmayer’s services would be required. He had been kept

sitting about the whole day waiting, but when the train was almost due to leave, Ribbentrop called him, and walking up and down the platform with him for ten minutes, told him that he was going to Hungary as Minister, with

the task of seeing that the Hitler-Horthy agreement was carried out; specifically, he was to help in the formation of a new Government, which was to have “‘a more active and intensive orientation towards Germany than its predecessor.”’ He was to receive fuller instructions from Ambassador Ritter, who would call him in Linz. Veesenmayer’s commission was, however, still only provisional. He had three days in which to complete his task; if he failed, the total occupation would, after all, be put into force.° Moreover, the “‘unconditional programme”’ still stood, and the SS. side of the programme would, moreover, be autonomous, even if Veesenmayer proved successful and the total occupation was called off. Kaltenbrunner was personally supervising the initial stages of it, and having sent his second in command, Winkelmann, on with the troops, was himself following in comfort by train—yet another member of that ill-assorted company. 1 Horthy quoted these words in the German. 2 Hitler had at least remembered what Csaky told him (see above, I. p. 320 n. 1). 3 Sztdjay’s evidence at his trial. 4 Veesenmayer’s evidence, Min. Trial, 21.2.48, p. 13119.

6 Many witnesses at the trials of Imrédy, Jaross and others testified that Veesenmayer repeatedly used this argument (which it would be unfair to call a threat, since he himself did not want it fulfilled) when pressing them to hurry up with the formation of the government.

6 According to Ritter (Min. Trial, loc. cit.), Himmler had put this through at the last

moment, because he did not believe that Horthy would keep the agreement.

—Q

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

SPILTH N Hungary the evening of the 17th and the whole of the 18th had passed |: an uneasy and ominous silence. KAllay was unable to get communication with Klessheim, or even with Vienna. Only one indication of the Germans’ intentions reached him during the day. The police, who listened in on the German Legation’s telephone, reported that Kornhuber, a German officieux journalist, had rung Rajniss to tell him that Horthy was with Hitler, and if he did not sack Kallay, would be thrown out himself.1 This message, which was probably an indiscretion, roused Kallay to order Kornhuber’s expulsion, but not to take any further action. He went to bed shortly before midnight, still without information on what was going on in Austria.” Actually, although they had not reached Kallay, the first messages from Klessheim—the wires obligingly forwarded by the Germans—had already come in. At about 10 p.m. Ghyczy’s wife rang up the Foreign Ministry with her husband’s message’; that it only reached KAllay at 1 a.m. is one of the minor mysteries of the evening. At about the same time* Bajndoczy received Szombathelyi’s message, which, phrased as it was that the German troops were passing ‘“‘through’’ Hungary, caused no special alarm. Bajndczy passed the message to the Operational Section, whence it was sent out to all units.° And by this time the invasion was well under way, for the hour when the first German troops, coming from the Banat, Syrmia and Slovakia, crossed the frontiers cannot have been long after dusk. But those frontiers had been effectively sealed off, and no message ever came from them, while even Hegyeshalom only reported at 2.45 a.m. But shortly after midnight news began to come in from other stations or road posts in the west, that Germans were crossing the frontier by road and rail. And now Keresztes-Fischer rang Kallay and told him to get dressed, since “‘ominous reports were coming in.”’ A few minutes later he arrived himself. In the next hour or two reports were arriving from every side, some from railway employees, some from the police, others from military commanders, several of whom rang to say that there was something wrong, because the Germans were not passing through, but detraining and/or deploying. The General Staff sent to ask whether in that case, Szombathelyi’s message (which,

with Ghyczy’s, was now brought in) was applicable. Some frontier posts, etc., had, under the circumstances, been firing on the Germans. While each fresh message modified the picture in detail, it was soon clear enough in general outline. As the Fiihrer had ordered, a concentric invasion was taking place from four directions. On the north and north-west, the main lines running from Hegyeshalom and Pozsony were packed with troop 1 Kallay MS. 2 Id.

A junior official in the Foreign Ministry, who was on duty and is certain of the time, to

- «Nadas (who again is certain of the time) to C. A. M. $ Nadas.

SPILTH 243 trains (10 or 12 trains were reported on each line), and the first arrivals were discharging infantry and armour at Bicske and Szob respectively. Motorised detachments were moving along the roads in the same area. Other smaller forces had crossed the Slovak frontier at Losonc and were moving, also by train, to a station near Hatvan, where they were detraining; others again had

, occupied Kassa and Miskolcz. Parties from these detachments were moving swiftly eastward towards the crossings of the northern Tisza. Large forces had crossed the Save and the Danube at Eszék and Ujvidék. One division had halted in the Bacska; the rest were moving northward by road and rail, dropping off detachments at the strategic points. Finally, yet another body, having crossed the Tisza at Titel, was making its way up the right bank of

the river, sealing off the passages at Szeged, Csongrad and Szolnok. Roumanian, Slovak and Croat troops were massing behind the frontiers.

Kallay sent on the one hand for Greiffenberg, and on the other for Bajnoczy, for the Generals commanding the three West Hungarian Army Corps (Naday, V6rés and Beregffy), Bakay, commanding the troops in Budapest, and Miklés, the head of Horthy’s Military Chancellery. Greiffenberg, who arrived at 3 a.m., said that he had no information, but would telephone on his direct military line. A quarter of an hour later he reported that German troops had in fact been ordered to occupy Hungary. Eleven divisions had already started, and would encircle Budapest by 5 a.m. This was not, however, to be regarded as an unfriendly act, since it had been undertaken by agreement between the Regent and Hitler; moreover, the Regent had asked that no resistance should be offered and that the German troops should be treated as friends. Non-Germans were not at present being

allowed to cross the frontier. But any resistance was to be “ruthlessly crushed,” with the help, if necessary, of those troops.

No provision having been made for the eventuality of this situation, Kallay wasin a quandary. Firstly, the Army, which was not constitutionally bound to take the Minister President’s orders, might disobey an order to resist, and although the police, which was bound to take Keresztes-Fischer’s orders, would probably obey, a partial resistance would, in Kallay’s mind, be more compromising than none. But worse still, he did not know what the

Regent had decided, and was not himself prepared to raise the country against what might prove to have been Horthy’s will. For the same reason he dismissed the idea of fleeing abroad and proclaiming a government in exile. As for the soldiers, Bajnéczy arrived only after two hours, saying that he had been unable to find a taxi, and was totally unhelpful; while when Kallay asked the three Corps Commanders whether they would take his orders if he ordered resistance, Naday, who was a strong anti-German,! said that he would do so, but that it would be unwise to issue the order pre-

maturely, before the Regent returned; the other two, whose political sympathies were on the other side,” said categorically that in the absence of the Regent and in the face of Szombathelyi’s telegram they would not only not order resistance, but would forbid their subordinates to carry it out. Eventually, Kallay agreed with the Generals that pending the arrival of the Regent, and the issue by him of orders, all resistance should cease. Troops 1 Naday was an old friend of Horthy’s; according to Suhaj, he was the only senior Hungarian General who never believed in a German victory. 2 Vo6ros was the brother of the better-known General. Beregffy, as we shall see, had Arrow Cross, sympathies.

a4 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Were to withdraw into their camps or barracks. bolt the gates, issue ammunition and man their batteries. but unless themselves attacked (when they should

resist), not attack or otherwise molest the Germans. Aircraft capable of

regular Army.”

being moved should be fHown off the airfields and hidden. The police was not to resist. so as “not to emphasise the inactivity of the

Miklos was to take Ambrozy. commandeer a locomotive and go out to Irv to meet the Regent's train. Kallay also sent messages to Bethlen. Gyula Karolyi and Kanya to come and consult with him (it mav be said at once that none of the elder statesmen had any counsel to offer). and for the rest. set himself to organising (for otbers) a sauve gui peut. The Foreign Ministry sent out telegrams of warning (which. unexpectedly. got through) to the foreign Missions, and a wireless warming to [stanbul: but when an attempt was made to broadcast a message on the situation. the wireless station was found to be already in hostile hands.t The various Ministries. etc.. in possession of compromising papers Were set to burning them. a task which thev accomplished with a completeness

disastrous for the historian although fortunate for the persons concerned.* Then Kallay set his son, Kristof, at the telephone to send warnings to persons and institutions likely to be endangered “*beginning with the Left-wing parties.

prominent Anglophiles and the representatives of the Jews.’ The persons in Charge of the Polish, French. etc., prisoners of war and refugees were told to give their charges a month’s pay each and release them.

Meanwhile. dawn had broken. With the coming of the light, German aeroplanes flew low over Budapest. Parachutists floated down and were $OOn In possession of the airfields (from which onlv verv few machines had been removed in ume) and other strategic points designated in Hitler’s plan. The last of the land-borme troops slipped smoothly into their places: outposts picketed the lines of the Tisza and the Drave. and guarded the key centres of

communications in the provinces: the main body had thrown a great ring round Budapest and was closing in on the city in a rapid concentric movement. By six o'clock the advance guards Were in the suburbs and by an hour or two later. the bridges. the wireless station. the police H.Q. and the other

buildings designated for immediate seizure were in their hands. Pickets Were posted outside every Hunganan barracks or military camp, guarding the

ents.

No land-borne troops had crossed the Tisza, but in that area, too, parachuusts had occupied the airhelds. Everything had gone like clock-work, and practically without bloodshed. A few shots, as we saw, had been fired on the frontiers. and a few more on one or two of the airfields. and in one place on the railway, outside Bicske. where a company of railway workers had tried to pull up the line. But then

the orders from H.Q.. forbidding resistance. had arrived. They had been punctually obeyed everywhere; not one officer or soldier in Hungary had defied discipline for the sake of a beau geste. East of the Tisza, Veress. commanding the IX Corps. had. on his own responsibility. ordered mobilisation of the two divisions (the 25th and the ~ So Kallay. Another source (the Foreign Ministry official mentioned above, p. 242, n. 3) says that Kallay himself vetoed the issue of a proclamauon that Hungary had been occupied on the ground that this might not agree with the Regent’s intentions. > So the police destroyed the records of proceedings against persons of the Left.

SPILTH 245 27th Light) under his command, and Farkas had ordered his division, the 16th, which was in course of mobilisation at Szolnok, to resist the Germans if they tried to cross the river, but as they did not do sa, this area, too, was unstained by blood.

The morning of the 19th went just as smoothly. Some of the country towns, into which the Germans had not penetrated, seem to have been unaware that anything had happened at all. Arrangements were not cancelled and some Social Democrat and Smallholder orators addressed political meetings hours after the occupation had been completed. In Budapest itself the cafés and restaurants had opened as usual, the trams, buses and suburban trains were running according to schedule, the ordinary organised amuse-

ments of the day had not been called off Most of the population only learnt that their country had been occupied when they strolled out of doors

after completing their long Sunday lie-in and consuming their leisurely Sunday breakfasts. When the news penetrated, it was received by some with positive pleasure: they exulted, as Darvas, a writer from the opposite camp, records, at “‘the end of the Jewish underground work, the trifling with an honourable ally and the betrayal of Hungary’s interests, Hungary’s honour.””*

This could not be the feeling of all, for the 230,000 Jews must have felt like rabbits caught in a pen from which there is no outlet and aware of the approach of a pack of weasels. And the masses of non-Jewish workers and others must have known that all the slogans of freedom and democracy to which they had been paying tribute had suddenly turned overnight into dangerous heresies. Moreover, the morning saw not only the first stage of Hitler’s programme completed but the second well under way. Winkelmann had entered Budapest with his Gestapo squads with the advance guard of the German troops. He had driven straight to the German Legation and had

there at once been joined by Baky, who, said Winkelmann, “put his gendarmes at our disposal.’’* Little parties had been made up, the Hungarians

to show the way, the Germans to do the actual arresting. The first arrests were being made by eight o’clock; what woke many of the victims from their Sunday sleep was the hammering of the foreign police on their doors. But even this did not stir those whose own existence was not threatened

to more than mild curiosity, or, at the most, Platonic disapproval. ‘One thing is certain,” writes Darvas. “On March 19th not one order to resist was given, and that day brought forth not merely no masses fighting for liberty but not even heroes.’’* The Germans made no attempt, in these morning hours, to interfere with any of the Ministries up on Buda Hill. but Kallay, of course, received reports of the arrival of the troops. and even indications of the Gestapo’s activities:

for men sent to arrest Bethlen in his villa, learning that he had gone to the Minister Presidency, followed him there, and even penetrated into Kallay’s own study in search of their quarry, although they flinched at the last moment

from carrying him off. But by this time the situation was entirely out of Kallay’s hands; even the police was no longer under his control. He could do no more than wait for the arrival of the Regent’s train. 1 These included the races, at which a number of arrests were made. 2 Vadros az Ingovanyon, p. 91.

3 Min. Trial, p. 13449. Baky had spent the night in readiness at Rupprecht’s house. The ‘“‘sendarmes” must have been men privately organised by Baky. since he was no longer an active officer.

246 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH This was slow in arriving, for it was an essential part of the Germans’ plan that Horthy should not reach home until a converted Hungary was ready to receive him. So there had been many delays; one (apparently due to natural causes) of an hour and a half in Salzburg; another of two hours at Linz, while Veesenmayer received further instructions on the telephone from Ritter!; another at Vienna; another at Hegyeshalom; and finally, at nine in

the morning, a long stop at Bicske, only twenty or thirty miles from the capital. Here an attempt was made to carry out the converse side of the

programme and to arrange that a converted Horthy should arrive in Budapest: while the train was standing in the station, von Jagow tapped on the Regent’s door, explained that he was being recalled and asked for permission to present his successor; and Horthy and Veesenmayer had a few minutes’ conversation, which, according to Veesenmayer, was not unfriendly; and, indeed, Horthy was naturally courteous and Veesenmayer both rather young and timid, and anxious to be conciliatory. He tried to get Horthy on to the business of drawing up the new Government list at once, and in his evidence? gave an interesting glimpse of Central European mentality. When Horthy asked him whom he had in mind as Minister President, he replied with the name of Imrédy; whereupon Horthy ejaculated: “What! the Jew?” Following this up by giving “‘the most unfavourable picture imaginable of Imrédy.”’ This reduced Veesenmayer to embarrassed silence; and in any case, Horthy refused to discuss the formation of Cabinets until he had seen his own Minister President. Horthy had a second audience at Bicske, and a less pleasant one still. SS. General Kaltenbrunner was presented to him. This was the first inkling which he had received that Himmler was going to operate in his country, besides Keitel and Ribbentrop; nor was the pill sweetened by the fact that the man presenting Kaltenbrunner was Peter Hain, Horthy’s own personal detective, who now transpired to have been for years past a paid German agent, and to have in his pocket his nomination to be chief of the Budapest police under the new regime.’ At 1] a.m., the Regent’s train at last arrived at Kelenfdld station. Kallay had gone to meet it—to find waiting there also General Weichs, a crowd of German Staff officers, and a German “Guard of Honour.”’ Forms were being preserved and Weichs introduced himself to Kallay. The Regent drove back with Kallay to the Palace (outside which another German guard was standing) while each told the other what had been happening in Klessheim and Hungary

respectively. Horthy ordered a Crown Council for 1 p.m., whereupon Kallay went over to the Minister Presidency, where the rest of the Klessheim

party, and the remaining members of the Government, were assembled. Again the travellers told their story and Kallay his, explaining particularly why he had not ordered resistance. Then those entitled to do so went across to the Crown Council, which was attended also by Szombathelyi and Sztdjay, Ambrozy and Miklos (who had returned with Horthy).*' The story was told * These have not been recorded, but seem to have amounted to an order to Veesenmayer to confine himself for the time to negotiating the formation of a pro-German Government. Further, all messages for Ribbentrop were to be sent via Ritter. 2 Min. Trial, p. 13115. * At his trial, Hain confessed that when accompanying Horthy to Kiel in 1938 he had struck up a friendship with General Hubert, of the German Gestapo, whom he had thereafter regularly informed of political events in Hungary. 4 The procés-verbal of the Council is given in Barczy, op. cit.

SPILTH 247 all over again; it is unnecessary to recapitulate the accounts here. Then came the question of the future. No one seems to have questioned that it would be impossible now to order resistance, or to keep Kallay, and K4llay himself said (the rest of the Cabinet, whatever the private thoughts of some of them may have been, concurring) that it would be impossible for him, in any event, to continue in office. He tendered his resignation accordingly (and his colleagues with him), even refusing the Regent’s request that he should continue in office provisionally pending the appointment of a new Government. He would not even sign the minutes of the meeting, nor counter-sign any document

issued by the Regent. As to the succession, both Kallay and KeresztesFischer expressed the opinion that it would be best to appoint a non-political Cabinet composed of senior administrative Secretaries of State from each department, but no decision was taken. Finally, what should the Regent do himself? He explained, and Csatay, Ghyczy and Szombathelyi confirmed, that the Germans had insisted on his staying at his post as the price for their

refraining from sending the satellite troops into the country. Kallay also argued strongly that Horthy should not abdicate, since only so could the Army be kept intact and unified, under national command, and this was allimportant. Horthy should, however, withdraw, as far as possible, from the conduct of affairs. Here, too, however, no fixed decision was reached, and

on this indecisive note the Council broke up. The Regent left. Barczy dictated the formal resignation of the Government, which Kallay and the other members of the Cabinet signed.t Then they, too, went away to their respective ploys, such as they were. Kallay himself could think of nothing to do, so he went to bed, to finish the sleep from which Keresztes-Fischer had roused him those twelve long hours earlier.

So Kallay had gone, but a successor to him, agreeable to the Germans, had still to be appointed, and that within three days, failing which the total occupation would be enforced after all.

The three days were an eerie period which was half one of agonised waiting, half of sinister activity. The occupation was no longer invisible. The shops and businesses were, it is true, open and the factories at work, but all entertainments and public gatherings were prohibited, including, of course —and chiefly—the planned Kossuth celebrations, of which only so much

survived that a memorial service for the national hero was held in the

Lutheran Church of Pest, after which the Speakers of the two Houses laid wreaths on his grave. At the hour when Kallay should have addressed the Hungarian people, listeners were treated instead to a talk on philology (otherwise, the programmes consisted chiefly of music). Parliament met, it is true, at noon on the 22nd, according to schedule, but its Speaker, TasnadiNagy, simply announced the session opened and then immediately proposed that the House adjourn indefinitely; and when a single courageous Deputy, J. Kozi-Horvath, attempted to raise the violation of the Hungarian Constitution and of the dignity of the Hungarian Parliament involved in the arrest 1 When the appointment of the Sztdjay Government was announced, the notification of the resignation of its predecessor was countersigned by Sztojay. This gave rise to rumours that Kallay had never resigned, consequently on which the Sztojay Government was illegal. But Kallay’s own evidence and also Barczy’s show that Kallay did resign, although, of course stating that the action was legally null and void, as taken under foreign duress.

248 OCTOBER. FIFTEENTH by a foreign Power of a number of its members,! including the Minister of the Interior, he was prevented by the Speaker’s announcement of the closure and adjournment from speaking. When he continued to protest, he was ruled out of order by the Speaker and shouted down by his colleagues. The wooden-faced German soldiers were standing guard now outside all the Ministries, and even outside the Palace itself, and the much less impassive

satellite armies waiting behind the frontiers. The Gestapo agents were rounding up their victims and the Sonderkommando spreading its nets, at leisure, before the eyes of its victims, for these activities belonged to the unconditional programme. But the soldiers and the satellites’? were not moving, and would not do so unless the three days’ grace expired before the next step had been accomplished: the formation of a constitutional Government, acceptable to the Germans. It was Veesenmayer’s task to bring this about. Veesenmayer had definite

ideas—which, indeed, he never much modified—on what he wanted. Although a convinced National Socialist and a Party member of some standing, he was in his fashion a moderate, even on the Jewish question, and a pragmatist. He regarded his job to consist in getting the maximum contribution to the war effort—military and economic—out of Hungary, and he knew that the vast majority of the Hungarian ‘“‘political nation,” including above all the Regent, while willing enough to co-operate against Bolshevism, disliked the German control and hated bitterly the extremists in their own country. He was convinced that the best policy for Germany, in her own interests, was to ménager these feelings, to jettison for the time being any idea of introducing pure National Socialism and to work, up to the very limit, “‘with Hungary, not against Hungary,” and above all, “‘with Horthy, not against Horthy.”’ The collaboration which he would get might be only half or three-quarters hearted, but the deficit would be compensated by the superior experience and efficiency of his collaborators, and the greater willingness with which their subordinates would obey their orders. Thus he wanted only a relatively slight shift towards the Right, far enough to bring in the Imrédists, whom he regarded as “‘the most serious economic elements’”’;

but was quite prepared if necessary to sacrifice the National Socialists, whom, | indeed, he did not regard as important; he dismissed the Arrow Cross from his calculations altogether. In attempting to negotiate a Government on these lines he was, however, under fire from both flanks. Himmler still hankered after a true National Socialist Government. His representative, Kaltenbrunner, was on the spot, and although Veesenmayer had been entrusted with the political negotiations, Kaltenbrunner was far above him in the Nazi hierarchy. Moreover, Himmler would always back Kaltenbrunner, whereas Ribbentrop, as we saw, had accepted Veesenmayer only as a pis aller, never liked him, never fully trusted him, and never gave him more than half-hearted backing: his chief contribution during the negotiations was to harass Veesenmayer with almost hourly telephone calls asking whether he had completed the job. Already on the train Veesenmayer had had a discussion with Kaltenbrunner, who had then tried to persuade his colleague to appoint a National 1 Nine members of the Upper House and thirteen Deputies of the Lower House were arrested by the Germans during these days. 2 On the morning of the 23rd Croat UstaSi crossed the Drave at four places near Legrad, saying that the Germans had told them that Communism had hroken out in Hungary and that they were required to maintain order. They were, however, induced to withdraw.

SPILTH 249 Socialist Government. When Veesenmayer said that he meant to try to work with Imrédy and Bardossy, there was quite a sharp exchange of words

between him and Kaltenbrunner, ending with each man maintaining his point of view. Kaltenbrunner could not deny Veesenmayer the right to conduct the negotiations, but later, he, or Winkelmann speaking in his name, and even Himmler himself, insisted absolutely on having some of their own

favourites in the Government. Knowledge that they enjoyed this support incidentally enabled the National Socialists to be particularly intransigent during the negotiations.

On the Hungarian side, Veesenmayer had to wrestle with the mutual rivalries and jealousies of those who wanted the power, and also with the even more embarrassing readiness of others to stay in office, of their own volition or under Horthy’s orders, in order “‘to save what could still be saved”; which offers, if accepted too fully, would have resulted in the formation of a Government which was not National Socialist at all and

perhaps not even pro-German. ,

It is not, perhaps, worth while recording all minutiz of the complicated transactions which occupied these three days.?, Veesenmayer, who began his

task by calling together selected politicians from the Right wing of the MEP, , the Imrédists and the National Socialists,*? begging them most earnestly to help him achieve what he called the “elegant solution” of a Government

“acceptable alike to Germany, to Hungary and to the Regent” and also warning them of the consequences if they failed to do so,? first tried to secure

from his consultants acceptance of his own pet candidate, Imrédy, for the Minister Presidency. The representatives of the MEP appear to have agreed to serve under Imrédy, and although Baky objected, Veesenmayer thought that it would be possible to ignore the National Socialists’ opposition. Imrédy, however, when consulted, although willing in principle to form a Ministry, made it an absolute condition that he must be legally appointed by the Regent,® and when Veesenmayer sent him to Horthy the next day,’ Horthy politely but absolutely® refused to appoint him. He proposed instead

the administrative Cabinet recommended by Kallay. | This suggestion, besides taking for granted the willingness to serve of the administrative Secretaries of State (which was, after all, not quite certain), did not meet the Germans’ specific demand for a cabinet of politicians. Ordered to produce a political Minister President, Horthy now spent a day 1 Veesenmayer’s evidence, Min. Trial, 21.7.48, p. 13113.

2 Many minute details are to be found in the trials of Imrédy, Sztdjay, Veesenmayer, Ratz and Kunder; I have taken a few more from Barczy, op. cit., and from one or two private sources. 3 According to Ratz at the Imrédy Trial, those present at the meeting were himself, Ruszkay, Rajniss, Jurcsek, Jaross and Baky. Ratz was called by phone from a matinée—so normal was life in Budapest that day. 4 Veesenmayer said at the Imrédy Trial that it was improbable that he had threatened the total occupation if the negotiations failed; but nearly all the other witnesses maintained that the threat (or inducement) was used. One quoted Veesenmayer as saying that if the ‘‘elegant solution” could not be achieved, “someone would come in his place who would treat Hungary as an enemy state.” 5 He had not been at the first meeting, and indeed refused to go at all until assured that the conversations were only “informative,” when he consented to see Veesenmayer, but only in the presence of Ratz and Ruszkay. 6 According to Horvath (personal to C. A. M.), Imrédy told his party: “I’m not going to ride into Hungary on a German horse. I won’t take office at the hands of the Germans.”’ 7 That is, got Barczy to arrange an audience. 8 According to Horvath, Horthy was “‘charming.”” The excuse which he gave for his decision was that it would be unconstitutional for him to appoint the representative of a minority political party (Horthy to C. A. M.).

250 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH trying one candidate after another, each of whom in turn either refused to undertake the job or was rejected as unacceptable by one party concerned or another. At last Horthy fell back on the idea of Sztdjay,t whom he did not, indeed, particularly like, nor think a political genius; but he believed that, being a professional soldier, he would be honourable and loyal and would carry out his (Horthy’s) instructions? (as we have seen, Horthy always believed that almost any officer would do this), while he was notoriously persona grata in Berlin; indeed, his name had already been suggested at Klessheim, and the Germans had then, apparently, favoured it.* Sztdéjay himself was not anxious for the job, for which he felt himself to be unfitted both mentally and physically (he was a sick man, who in the event

escaped natural death only just long enough to be executed), but Horthy pleaded with him most earnestly to undertake it: “‘He took me by the coat,”

said Sztdjay, “‘and besought me. He pleaded with me for an hour and a half. He said that if I succeeded in regaining the confidence of the Germans he would put up a statue to me on the finest site in Budapest.’

Even so, Sztdjay said that he could only take office if the Germans ‘“‘would guarantee to restore Hungarian sovereignty except in respect of any occupation necessitated by strategic reasons,” and the objections were not all on his side. Weesenmayer had wanted a professional politician, and when, nevertheless, he telephoned the proposal to Ribbentrop, the latter (who had

evidently changed his mind since Klessheim) made the same difficulty. Veesenmayer, who was convinced that it would pay to take Horthy’s candidate if at all possible, pleaded with him, and Ribbentrop ended by consenting only subject to three conditions, all, apparently, made to satisfy Himmler; that Ratz should be Deputy Minister President, Ruszkay Minister of Defence and either Endre or Baky Minister of the Interior. Subject to these conditions, Veesenmayer now gave Sztdjay his guarantee, and next morning (for all the telephoning had lasted late into the night) he went back to Horthy, reported the Germans’ consent and was duly entrusted with the formation of the new Government, with less than thirty-six hours in which to do it. Now followed a fresh tussle. Weesenmayer compiled for Sztdjay a list embodying Ribbentrop’s nominees, and otherwise representing, in the main, an Imrédist-National Socialist coalition. Horthy, meanwhile, had decided on the tactic of packing the Government with his own men. He appears to have approached personally a number of members of the MEP and asked them to continue in, or resume, office and “‘save what could still be saved.”’ Almost all of those so approached had agreed to serve,® and when Sztdjay ' The authorship of the suggestion to appoint Sztdjay has been attributed to many people, but Horthy himself told C. A. M. that it was his own. It may, of course, have been put into his head by someone else. * Horthy explained this to Countess Zichy. * According to Nagy, p. 191, Ribbentrop at Klessheim had wanted Szombathelyi to take on the job, and Szombathelyi had then suggested Sztdjay. There is some evidence that when the train returned from Klessheim Sztojay already believed himself to be the Minister President designate. 4 Sztojay’s evidence at his trial. * Sztdjay’s evidence at his trial. There is evidence that he really tried to get the Germans to put in writing a promise not to intervene further in Hungarian domestic affairs, or arrest any more Hungarian citizens, and even to restore those arrested if Hungary undertook to carry out her own side of the engagement punctually (Szegedi-Maszak to C. A. M.). * It was reported that of all the men thus approached by Horthy, only Homan returned a refusal (which he followed up by a written protest) to serve under a foreign Occupation. But in justice to the others it seems safe to say that at least some of them took office against their own inclinations and at Horthy’s request. In his own memoirs (p. 270), Horthy does less than justice to such of these men who sacrificed themselves, at his bidding, to fulfil roles parallel to his own.

SPILTH 251 brought round his list, Horthy took a pencil, scratched out precisely those names on which Ribbentrop was insisting, further rejected a proposal to make Imrédy Minister without Portfolio, declared strongly that he would have no one but Csatay for Defence, and for the rest, suggested a string of members of the MEP, in most cases the previous occupants of the posts.

This was too much for the Germans. After prolonged telephoning, Veesenmayer got his superiors to give in over Csatay, to drop Ruszkay, and to allow Baky and Endre to be given only the secondary posts of Secretaries of State; but he did himself insist that the Government must be “‘indisputably National Socialist,’ not a mere continuation, minus one or two members, of

the regime which he had been commissioned to replace. Meanwhile, the threat of complete breakdown drew ever more imminent, for the National Socialists pressed their claim (and Winkelmann appeared with a message from Himmler supporting it) and the Imrédists said at first that they could

not enter a cabinet from which their leader had been excluded. They yielded to Sztojay’s urgent appeal to them not to provoke a complete breakdown, only on condition that Ratz was made Deputy Minister President and that they received at least one other portfolio immediately, and they reserved

their right to re-raise Imrédy’s claim later. At last, at 3.45 a.m. on the morning of the 22nd, the Hungarian politicians reached agreement. Sztdjay took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, besides the Minister Presidency.

Ratz was Deputy Minister President without Portfolio. The important Ministry of the Interior went to Jaross, with an undertaking that both Endre and Baky should be given Secretaryships of State under him. ReményiSchneller remained in charge of Finance, and Csatay of Defence. Jurcsek took over Supply, and Szasz Industry. Kunder became Minister of Trade

and Communications, Antal Minister of Education and Cults, and an especially bitter struggle over the Ministry of Justice! ended in Antal’s taking over this portfolio also, provisionally.’ The Ministerial team thus consisted of four MEP politicians (ReményiSchneller, Szasz, Jurcsek, Antal), three Imrédists (Ratz, Jaross, Kunder) and two Generals, of whom one (Csatay) was really Horthy’s personal representative; the other (Sztdjay), who was adopted into the MEP after the agreement had been reached,*® was, as we saw, designated by Horthy for a similar role,

although he did not succeed in fulfilling it. The National Socialists got no Ministries at all, only Baky’s Secretaryship of State. It was a compromise to reach which all concerned had made concessions,

and none of them could be completely satisfied with the result. The Conservative element—to group under that name Horthy and the MEP—had been forced to yield nearly half the Ministerial posts to an Opposition which they had always treated with deep hostility. On the other side, the National Socialists had come off very nearly empty-handed, and the Imrédists had only

a minority of the official posts, from which their own leader had been excluded. Among the Germans, the defeat of the National Socialists had been the defeat of the SS. This gave Veesenmayer no headaches, but neither 1 Horthy had asked Radocsay to retain this post; but Radocsay was particularly objectionable to the Imrédists on account of his handling of the Imrédist libel action (see above, p. 103). Their candidate was a man named Szemak, whom Horthy in his turn refused to appoint.

2 This was an emergency solution indeed, for Antal was one of those MEP men whom Veesenmayer disliked most. 3 Sztdjay was then made “‘leader’’ of the Party, and afterwards legitimised by being given Radocsay’s mandate for Balatonfiired.

252 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH could he regard as truly satisfactory a set-up in which his own candidates were in a minority: one Minister (Csatay), the admitted representative of the opposition to the New Course, and hardly one of the other MEP representatives 100 per cent. collaborationist except on the single point of hostility to Russia. He himself confessed at the time that he thought that the Ministry would have to be remodelled later, when also it would be possible to carry out a thorough purge of the administration. On the other hand, the team was technically an efficient one: Reményi-

Schneller, Szasz and Jurcsek were far superior, as specialists in their respective fields, to most of the possible alternatives. The very fact that twothirds of the Government belonged to the traditional ruling party in Hungary,

and that over one-half of them had actually held office (as Minister or Secretary of State) in its predecessor, lent plausibility to the contention that Kallay and his followers had been merely a clique of unrepresentative heretics and that the true Hungary endorsed the new course. Above all, Horthy was

prepared to appoint it legally, thus giving what the Germans so much wanted, a constitutional Government brought into being without fuss and bloodshed, and over the Regent’s signature. Moreover, Horthy agreed that with the news of the appointment a special communique should be issued in terms dictated by Veesenmayer. On these conditions the Germans, too, while warning Sztdjay that he was still only on trial,’ accepted the compromise. At 6 p.m. on the 23rd—thus just before the expiration of the period of grace—the Sztdjay Ministry was sworn in in the Great Hall of the Palace. Official notification of the fact was immediately published, together with a statement that: “In order to assist Hungary in the common war waged by the European nations united in the Tripartite Pact against the common enemy, and in particular in effectively combating Bolshevism by the mobilisation of all

forces and by the giving of effective securities, German troops have arrived in Hungary as the result of a mutual agreement. ... The two allied Governments have agreed that the measures which have been taken will contribute towards Hungary’s throwing into the scale every resource calculated to help on the final victory of the common cause, in the spirit

of the old friendship and comradeship in arms between the Hungarian and German peoples.”’ Press statements from Berlin hailed the announcement with enthusiasm

and dwelt ecstatically on the cordial spirit of collaboration in which the operation had been carried through, and the delight with which all Hungary, except a few traitors and Judeo-Marxists, had received it. Very special stress was laid on the part allegedly played by Horthy, who was lauded to the skies. ‘It is no mere chance,’’ wrote the D.N.B. on the 23rd, ‘“‘that the man who is

saving Hungary today is the man who saved her once before: the Regent Horthy.”’ And in their utterances the Germans were very careful to spare Hungarian susceptibilities. Far from having overrun Hungary, Germany had only helped her to help herself. “‘Hungary and Germany,” said one official German spokesman, “‘have resorted to measures which would in no way infringe Hungary’s independence or rights.”” The object of the operation had been simply military defence. 1 Veesenmayer told Sztojay that his Government would have to prove its sincerity by its

conduct, especially on the Jewish question and that of supply, where production would have to be increased and hoarded stocks handed over.

SPILTH 253 One commentator dwelt at some length on the truth that the Government

contained no representatives either of the Arrow Cross or of the Volksdeutsche.?

In the meantime, however, another problem had arisen out of what a witness at Nuremberg described as ‘‘a discrepancy between the political and the military situations.”” Under Hitler’s original dispositions, the Hungarians were not only to be confined to barracks, but also disarmed. The latter order had not been carried through everywhere, but the former had, and the officers,

most of whom were perfectly willing to fight by the side of the Germans against the Russians if treated as equals, were growing hourly more restive at their confinement. Horthy, who both shared their feelings and was also particularly anxious, with a view to later possibilities, to keep the Army armed, intact and under his own control,? announced that ‘‘although he wanted to help the Germans defeat the Reds, he would do so only if the Army was properly treated.’ He even threatened to abdicate after all, unless satisfied on this point.

} If this happened, the whole of the previous days’ work would be undone and the full occupation become necessary after all. So there followed another

period of suspended animation, pending the Fiihrer’s decision on this question. Both Weichs and Veesenmayer appealed to their respective superiors to get the objectionable orders rescinded, urging in repeated telephone conversations that the “‘desired and promised co-operation”—and

Hungary had now publicly promised to mobilise all her forces against Bolshevism—could not develop unless this was done. For two days they could get nothing out of Keitel and Ribbentrop, mainly, no doubt, because on the 23rd and 24th Hitler was again closeted with Antonescu, who was

pressing him to order the Hungarian troops to be withdrawn from East Hungary, especially from the Szekel area, as a preliminary to the re-cession (or cession) of those areas to Roumania.*® But although Hitler told Antonescu that “‘for him, the Vienna Award no longer existed,”’ he hesitated to spoil his game in Hungary by making the fact clear at that juncture. He agreed only to make Hungary east of the Tisza a German “operational area’’ and to place

the troops in it under a German commander. The order enacting this was issued on the 25th, and on the 26th Hitler sent an order, through Greiffenberg, that the Hungarian Army “‘was to be given a chance to wipe out the sins of the former Hungarian Governments.” There were conditions: Hungary was to contribute “‘total military effort”’

on an agreed plan. To make certain of this, Szombathelyi (whom Veesenmayer had reported as being Horthy’s “‘willing tool in his plans for revenge’’) was to be replaced by a genuinely co-operative Chief of the General Staff}; to which personal demand another, typically Hitlerian, demand was presented, 1 Students of ethnology could, however, note that of the nine Ministers, three (ReményiSchneller, Kunder and Antal) were of immediate, and two (Szasz and Csatay) of remoter German

origin; two (Jaross and Jurcsek) were of Slovak, one (Sztojay) of Serb and the ninth (Ratz) of Roumanised Serbian stock. 2 When Horthy gave his audience to Szalasi in May he told the Arrow Cross leader, with characteristic indiscretion, that he was ‘‘not bothering about politics, he was only concerned to keep the Army in his hands.’’ It will be remembered that it was in order to preserve this control that Kallay had, on 19th March, advised Horthy not to abdicate. 8 Hillgruber, op. cit., p. 182. 4 Greiffenberg was also given secret orders that he would have to institute a general purge of the Corps of Officers.

254 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH that Feketehalmi-Czeydner and the other criminals of the Ujvidék massacre were to be reinstated: and Veress was, of course, to desist from his hostile demonstrations in Transylvania. If all this was done, the Hungarian Army should be treated as an equal fighting partner. On 29th March a military conference reached agreement on the details. The personal demands were accepted. The military effort was to be achieved in four stages. Firstly—as an immediacy measure—the agreement exempting the occupation troops already in Russia from service in the line was to be cancelled. Secondly. all forces in Hungary which were already on a war

footing were to be sent across the Carpathians without delay. Next, the formations which were now at peace or cadre strength were to be brought up to war strength and sent to the Front as and when the process was completed. Finally, reserves of military age were to be called up and trained for later utilisation. The figure for the total manpower which Hungary could supply in due course was put at no less than 1,500.000 men. The Germans’ first proposal had been that the Hungarian units mobilised should simply be distributed piece-meal among German commands. but the Hungarians had objected so strongly to this that the Germans yielded. The

divisions still up in the Pripet sector had to be left there: the Germans declined to have them moved. But two of the ex-occupation divisions (the 18th and the 19th) were now, as we have said. in Galicia, and the Germans consented that these should form the nucleus of an independent Army under Hungarian command, the rest of that Army to consist of those units which could be moved up at once. These were, first and foremost, the two Mountain

Brigades, which were already standing in the Carpathian passes and could be moved forward immediately; and following them, as and when they could be moved, those units already in process of mobilisation—the 16th and 24th, whose mobilisation was now complete, the 2nd Armoured, which was almost ready, the two divisions (the 25th and 27th) the mobilisation of which Veress

had ordered a week earlier, and one more division (the 20th). The other forces in the country (the Ist Armoured, the Cavalry, and the 6th, 7th, 10th and 13th) would follow when arrangements could be made to release the

appropriate manpower, and when the equipment for them was available.

General Naday was appointed to command the new First Army. and ordered to report immediately to Mannstein in Lemberg, and the appropriate orders were sent to General Lakatos, commanding the troops in Galicia (now known as the VII Corps). Even now the Germans had to be satisfied on the progress to date and the

future prospects of their unconditional programme; until they had this assurance, as Winkelmann told Baky, they would not leave Hungary. But things had been going smoothly enough in both areas of this field. The Gestapo, aided by Baky’s gendarmes, had been working steadily

through its programme. Bajcsy-Zsilinszky had been the first of all the victims, among whom (and, indeed, in all Hungary) he stands out for another

reason: he drew a revolver on his captors, wounded two of them and was himself injured in the affray, his being, so far as is known, the only civilian blood spult in Hungary on 19th March. Other V.I.P.s apprehended on that day, or soon after, included the brothers Keresztes-Fischer, the Legitimist leaders Counts Sigray, Ivan Csekonics and A. Szapary, the Deputies Count

SPILTH 255 G. Apponyi, Gusztav Gratz, D. Laky, K. Rassay, J. Vazsonyi, G. Somogyvary,

the Smallholders L. Szentivanyi and F. Nagy (of the Peasant Union), the Social Democrats Peyer, Buchinger, Monus, Malasits; L. Baranyai of the National Bank, Sombor-Schweinitzer of the police, with several of his subordinates, Szentmikléssy and Szegedi-Maszak of the Foreign Ministry, several Catholic priests who had been prominentin the Resistance movement,

the publicists Parragi, I. Lajos, Svatko and Andorka, the industrialists and financiers L. Aschner, E. Vida, E. Matyas, M. Madarassy-Beck, M. Kornfeld,

F. Chorin, L. Goldberger, the Regent’s doctor, Professor Adam and his friend, Admiral Konek, several of the leading Poles in Hungary, one of whom (General Kollontay) was shot, the diplomatic representatives of the Badoglio Government and several persons connected with other foreign missions, the members of the American air-borne mission (which had arrived on the night

of 16th-17th March and been taken to the Hadik barracks, but promptly scooped up there after having thus spent something under three days at liberty) and the officers (Ujszaszy and Kadar) charged with receiving them; and twenty or thirty secondary figures of the Social Democrat Party. This list may not cover all those who had been apprehended in their individual capacities, for several hundreds or even thousands of persons were

arrested in the first week of the occupation,! and lacking H6ttl’s lists, we cannot tell exactly which of the victims had been personally selected and which (although these certainly constituted the large majority) were politically quite unimportant Jews caught trying to escape from Budapest, or even Arrow

Cross men who had been obstructing the police by their too flamboyant demonstrations of enthusiasm; while 200 unfortunate Jewish lawyers or doctors who had been arrested individually, owed their fate, as H6ttl himself has written? to an afterthought. Himmler rang through on the afternoon of the 19th to ask whether “‘all the Jewish leaders had been rounded up” and the Gestapo picked the names at random out of the telephone book. These

unlucky persons had been arbitrarily classified as V.I.P.s and taken to Mauthausen, the usual destination of the political prisoners; but most of the

less important Jews, and some of the wealthiest ones, had been kept in Hungary as “‘hostages,”’ or for other purposes to be described. The soldiers had been detained in German military custody. The Italians were handed over to the Fascist Government. Nor is it possible to say just how nearly complete the Germans’ haul had

been by their own standards. It did not comprise nearly all Hungary’s V.I.P.’s. Bethlen, after his escape in Kallay’s office, did not return home, but slipped away through one of the underground passages which honeycomb Buda Hill and thence (disguised, it is said, as a policeman and at the sacrifice of his characteristic moustache) to a hunting-lodge in West Hungary. Kallay made his way next morning by a similar route, to the Regent’s Palace, and thence (the Germans having threatened to break in and take him by force) to the Turkish Legation, there to spend many uncomfortable months, watched

over the fence by relays of Gestapo men.? Several of the leading Social Democrats and Smallholders—Szakasits and Mme Keéthly, Tildy and Varga —had been out in the country addressing political meetings, and, warned in 1 Estimates of the total number of arrests range from 2,000 to 6,000. 2 Op. cit., p. 349. 3 He remained there until 25th October 1944, when the Arrow Cross threatened to break in and seize him by force, so he came out and gave himself up.

236 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH time. did not return to Budapest. Others got the Warning in ume in Budapest, and went to earth: indeed. only one prominent Social Democrat—Monus— was arrested at all on the first dav. and many of those captured later owed their fates only to their own rashness: on the 22nd a number of them arranged a meeting “to discuss how to organise resistance.” and as they had advertised this pretty freely. the Gestapo made a lucky haul2 Pever and Buchinger gave themselves up when the Germans threatened their famihes with reprisals. but Szakasits got away altogether.* as did Szeder, Kabok. almost all the important Communists and crypto-Commuanusts. all

the Village Explorers and most of the Smallholders and “progressive intellectuals” of secondary stature. Laszlo Veress got away through Transylvania. Of the non-Hungarians. Colonel Howie was smuggled safelv back into shelter. and even the transmitter which he had been using dismantled and stored in the house of a Foreign Ministry official. One of his operators had left Hungary the previous day. This list of **escapees”’ clearly includes some men—Bethlen and Kallay. for example.* and presumably most of the leading Social Democrats. Communists and Village Explorers who got awav—who had been on the Germans’ books. But H6étt]l himself has written® that the Gestapo had not thought in terms of mass arrests. and the example of some individuals—a priori obvious vicums—

who sat quiet and were not molested® suggests that in fact a considerable proportion of the many. many hundreds of Hungarians who ducked under in those davs. and of whom it was afterwards famed that only their prompt action had saved their skins. could really have remained above ground in pertect safetv. Thus the Gestapo’s misses probably did not constitute an alarmingly high proportion of its shots. and the sum of those arrested. those driven into hiding, and those whose attitudes guaranteed their future good behaviour. was probably high enough for them to feel that no immediate danger threatened. Moreover. the Government and the Regent had allowed the arrests to pass without a murmur of protest.‘ The positon of the Jewish question was the same. The steps taken hitherto by Eichmann (which it will be more convenient to describe at a later stage)§ * This was where they caught Millok, responsible editor of the Nepszava, Marosan, Partv organiser for rural districts. Selig. Party Secretary for Outer Pest. and many others. See -4 Reakcid Ellen. p. 101. * Szakasits’ brother. too, had been arrested. but the later Resistance Leader was not tempted into premature rashness. Ss For his experiences. see his narrative. loc. cit.

* Ribbentrop had especially insisted that Kallay was to be arrested and taken to Germany

“for quesuoning.”” The Germans had. as we have seen. made for Bethlen at once. It is

characterstic of the similarity in method but difference in efficiency between the Germans and the Russians that the former suggested that Bethlen should be taken into ‘honourable captivin’” in Germany. but in the event failed to secure his person: while the Russians destined him for the same treatment. and succeeded in applying it. In 1945-46 Bethlen was in fact being held in “honourable captivity’ in Russia: and not only he. but a number of other prominent Hungarians whose presence in their country would, it was thought. “endanger consolidation.” > Hagen. loc. cit. * So nothing happened to Professor Szentgydrgvi except that his passport was taken away from him. Professor Szekft retired to a sanatorium. * As we saw. KOzi-Horvath had tried to raise the subject when Parliament met on the 22nd, but was shut up by the Speaker. Before Parliament met again in May. Sztdjay, according to Barezy. told the Ministry that the arrests were not to be mentioned. Horthy. op. cit., quotes this with scorn, but private information dating from the end of March suggests that he himself made no protest to Veesenmayer. The “ladies of the Palace.” according to this source, showed more determination than the Regent. The only other person recorded as having protested against the arrests was Szombathelyi. * See below. p. 274 ff.

SPILTH 257 had been only preparatory, but had met with no resistance whatever, either from the Jews or from the Hungarian authorities. Presumably, then, Kaltenbrunner also reported himself as satisfied with the position: at all events, the Hungarian Press reported on 31st March that the Wilhelmstrasse “‘regarded the situation as stabilised.” The Hungarian

Government responded with a declaration which explained that it was Hungary’s vital interest that the battle against Bolshevism should be won, and only Adolf Hitler could achieve this. German troops had therefore, as the only resort, been invited into Hungary. Hungary was Germany’s loyal ally. Let the nation rally behind the Government! This was ‘‘the will of the First Hungarian, the Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary.” Sztdjay followed this up with an exchange of telegrams with all the appropriate persons— signal that his position was now regarded as legitimised. All this meant that the total occupation was off, unless things changed again. The satellite armies were told that their services would definitely not be required, and in the following days Hitler honoured a further instalment

of his promises. Weichs returned to his own H.Q., and the bulk of the troops which had carried out the occupation either returned to their previous quarters or went up the line. Most of them had left by mid-April, and at midnight 24th-25th April ‘‘Operation Margarethe’’ was officially liquidated. It had, however, never been Hitler’s intention that the Hungarians, however docile they showed themselves, should be allowed to revert to the status

quo ante 19th March. Even the “‘liquidation’”’ meant little more than the departure of some, but not all, of the invading force and a consequent small readjustment of competences between the various German authorities. For the rest it simply meant that the German control system which had been provisionally established on 20th March was now made permanent. That system was as follows: When Hitler satisfied himself that total occupation would be unnecessary,

he sent Veesenmayer down credentials in the ordinary diplomatic form, accrediting him to Horthy. The letters gave Veesenmayer the unusual title of “Minister I Class and Plenipotentiary of the Reich in Hungary,” and he also received private instructions? conferring on him powers and duties which

far exceeded those of an ordinary diplomatic representative. He was “responsible for the whole political development in Hungary,” and after bringing into being a co-operative Government (his first task, accomplished

by 23rd March) he was “‘to see to it that the entire administration of the country was conducted with the object of utilising to the maximum all Hungary’s resources, especially in the economic field, for the purposes of the 1 According to Lévai, Black Book, p. 79, when the Germans first began issuing orders to the Jewish leaders, the latter appealed in turn to the Ministries of Cults and the Interior, the Minister Presidency and the police. In every case they were told: “‘Carry out whatever orders you receive

from the Germans.” The official at the Ministry of Justice said frankly that “the armed power maintaining the sovereignty of the Hungarian State has collapsed, the Regent is a prisoner, and

two armed German grenadiers are standing outside his door.” (Id., p. 81.) When the

Hungarian Government was formed it similarly made no attempt to interfere with Eichmann’s dispositions, and, as we shall see (below, pp. 275 ff.), itself enacted all the anti-Jewish measures required of it by the Germans, and more.

2 One version of this document (N.G. 2947) was produced at the trial of Veesenmayer. According to Miss Hacke, there was also a second, later version, which exempted the SS. and S.D. officers from his authority. R

258 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH common war effort.’’ Although Veesenmayer never seems to have come to

an exact understanding with the Hungarians on the extent of his special powers,* yet throughout the duration of his mission he certainly claimed, and they conceded to him, a right to intervene extensively in Hungary’s internal politics, in particular, in the composition of her Government, and to negotiate directly with departmental Ministers or other officials and with politicians, including those of the Opposition.

Veesenmayer now became responsible for the work of the economic “expert,” Bunzler,? who also.remained on in Hungary, with a large staff, throughout the occupation. Military arrangements seem to have remained in the hands of Weichs up to the official liquidation of “‘Margerethe,”’ but after that date Veesenmayer

was given an opposite number in the military field, in the shape of a ‘Plenipotentiary General of the Wehrmacht in Hungary.” The holder of this post was Greiffenberg, the former Military Attaché, but his new duties went similarly far beyond those of an ordinary Military Attaché. He was instructed to treat Hungary as “a friendly and allied sovereign State,’ and he put his requirements to the Hungarians through their own authorities, 1.e. regularly, through Csatay, in the form of requests; but the requests were, of course, often more in the nature of commands. There could henceforward be no question of Hungary’s refusing the use of her railways, roads, etc., to German or other Axis troops moving to and from the line, of her airfields (all of which now passed under German control), or of her territory for such troops as the Germans chose to quarter there in training, in rest-billets, or for any other purpose; and Hungary was under an obligation, which was subsequently regulated in detail by the agreement summarised below,?® to supply such troops with rations, billets, etc. Among these units were a certain number which the Order appointing the Plenipotentiary General described frankly as the “‘occupation forces.” These comprised, originally, certain units left behind when the remainder of the occupying force of 18th-19th March left the country. They were not then very numerous: one division of the Wehrmacht (the 389th) and two of

the Waffen SS.—the 18th (Horst Wessel) Panzer Grenadiers, who were quartered for a while on the outskirts of Buda, and the 8th Cavalry SS. in the Bacska, this last being a newly raised formation which was neither at full strength nor fully trained. Later, as we shall see, some of these units left Hungary’; but others entered it, or were born in it, so that Hungary was never without an “‘occupying force,” even apart from any operational forces passing through the country, or the very numerous officers and men who hereafter came to Budapest on leave from the Front. Greiffenberg’s headquarters on the Svabhegy were practically a German military compound, as was the adjacent Pasareti quarter of Buda. Finally, although the Hungarian 1 Perhaps the only person ever to press for a complete legal definition of Veesenmayer’s position was (characteristically) Szalasi, who drove Veesenmayer into saying that he was ‘not just Minister but at the same time Hitler’s personal plenipotentiary delegate for Hungary.”’ Szalasi asked if such a position was one known to international law, whereupon Veesenmayer explained that his special powers had arisen out of the needs of the situation; otherwise he could not negotiate with Opposition parties. Szalasi thanked him for the explanation, and asked whether Germany would receive a similar Hungarian plenipotentiary. Veesenmayer said that that would become necessary only if the Hungarian Army ever marched into Germany. 2 Bunzler himself was replaced in May by one, Boden. 3 See below, p. 297. 4 The 389th and the 18th were sent to the Front in August (see below, p. 317). The 8th remained in the Bacska until the late autumn, when it was pressed into the fighting.

SPILTH 259 Army kept its technical independence, German liaison officers were attached to all its commands other than the most junior, and to all departments of the Honveéd Ministry.

From the German point of view there was, indeed, a doubt as to the status of some of these forces. The original Order placed the whole occupa-

tion force under Greiffenberg’s command. Afterwards an inter-German dispute arose, as Himmler claimed for Winkelmann, his representative in Hungary, the control of the Waffen SS. units. The battle seems to have swayed to and fro: according to one version! the question was never decided, but according to another? it was decided on 2nd May in favour of Winkelmann, and this seems to be borne out by the events of 15th October, when the Waffen SS. units then round Budapest were indubitably at the disposal of the SS. commander.? The liquidation of Operation Margarethe brought with it the de facto reassimilation of the status of Hungary east of the Tisza to that of the rest

of the country. The Tisza Line had been reopened on Ist April, and the civilian administration had been reinstated, but only as the hand-maid of the German military authorities, who passed to them such orders as they wished through a liaison officer dignified by the title of ‘““Hungarian Government Commissioner.’’* These special arrangements had, as we have seen, been made as a concession to Antonescu and they were cancelled in practice after 24th-25th April. The German General was now placed under the orders of the Wehrmacht Plenipotentiary in Budapest, and hereafter his duties consisted mainly of securing local fulfilment of Germany’s requirements; above all, perhaps, of seeing that the Hungarians did not abduct military stores destined for the Roumanians, or molest any Roumanian troops whose duties led them on to Hungarian soil.

In mid-April, on the other hand, certain areas of Hungary were proclaimed “‘Operational Zones’ in a more real sense. In two of these, a relatively small area round Nagykanizsa and a larger one in the Bacska, both of which were being harassed by Yugoslav partisans, the local German

commanders took, de facto, complete control. This was not publicly announced at the time, and may never have been made the subject of a diplomatic agreement. But Ruthenia, with Maramaros, and Northern Transylvania, were officially proclaimed Operational Zones on 13th April. To meet Hungarian susceptibilities, the adjective “‘Hungarian’’ was included in the title, and each was given a Hungarian Commissioner® as head of the entire civilian administration, with extensive powers to issue decrees and orders necessary for the prosecution of the war and the maintenance of order

and security. This was still a civilian administration, but provision was made that if the civilian administration should cease in any part of Hungary,

a military administration should take its place. Meanwhile the Commissioners were in practice largely at the orders of the local military commanders, and except in Transylvania, it was the Germans who gave the orders. 1 Ritter’s evidence, Min. Trial, p. 13441. 2 Veesenmayer’s evidence, id., p. 13426. 3 See below, pp. 388 ff.

4 The name of this gentleman was B. Ricsov-Uhlarik. The appointment was gazetted on st : Pr Ruthenia, Tomcesanyi, the former High Commissioner for Ruthenia, and on his resignation, General Vincze; in Transylvania, Ricsov-Uhlarik took over the job direct. 6 These powers were defined in an Order issued on 6th April.

260 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH The remaining German organs to stop on in Hungary were the S.D. and SS. personnel in charge of the “unconditional programme.” It is impossible to explain exactly the precise status and terms of reference

of these organs. for the good reason that the Germans themselves never reached agreement on the point! The senior SS. representative (after Kaltenbrunner had left=) was General Winkelmann, whose terms of reference (as stated in Veesenmaver’s instructions) covered “SS. and police measures to be carried out in Hungary. and in particular. police measures in the field of the Jewish question.*” At least Veesenmaver’s original instructions said

that Winkelmann would “‘follow his (Veesenmayer’s) instructions in the political field.” but it was also stated (and confirmed in April, after the question had been referred to Germany for decision on the highest level) that he was autonomous in his own field. which included that of security. This term was capable of bearing various meanings. It was quite clear

that it covered the control over the operations of Geschke, the Gestapo officer: but while Veesenmayer maintained (in 1944) that it went no further than police duties in the ordinary sense of the term. Winkelmann, or rather Himmler. who had never reconciled himself with Hitler’s change of plan. interpreted it as covering the entire maintenance of a regime “‘safe’’ for Germany. Himmler had seen to it that his agent was equipped with all the apparatus for carrying out these wider duties. Winkelmann had his own H.Q.,° his

independent wireless for direct communication with Himmler, and a considerable staff. which included a “‘political adviser’ and haison officers of his own with all Hungarian Ministnes. And while Winkelmann himself, who was a police officer of the old school. is said to have been a relatively passive and inoffensive man, he was constantly stirred into activity by Himmler on

the one hand, and on the other bv Kienast, his political adviser. and above all by his second in command and controller of political security and counterespionage,* Hott.

Both Hottl and Kienast were energetic and ambitious men. Both. especially Héttl. who had been the chief agent for the S.D. in South-eastern

Europe. knew Hungary well—much better, they were convinced, than Veesenmayer. It was they who in March had pressed for a National Socialist regime. and they were deeply dissatished both with Veesenmayer’s having been put in charge of policy at all and with the policy which he was trying to carry out. The only point on which they agreed with him was on rejecting

Szalasi. But they abhorred Imrédy for a Jew, distrusted Horthy and the MEP men for reactionaries. and regarded the near-total exclusion of their own men from the Szto6jay Government as a calamitous error to be reversed bv any means and at the earliest possible moment.

Hottl and Kienast kept in quite as close touch with the Hungarian politicians of the Right as did Veesenmayer and his own political adviser, 1 These questions were argued again and again in 1944, when each party to them was fighting for authority. and again in 1948, at the tal of Veesenmayer, when each was disclaiming it, the point at issue on the latter occasion being that of responsibility for the Jewish atrocities. I do not think it necessary to enter here into detail of this inter-German question, and have therefore described the position only very shortly, and from the Hungarian angle. * He went back only two or three days after the occupation, although he visited Hungary

several times thereafter. . * For this, the British Legation in the Werboczi Ut was commandeered. The Gestapo had a

separate H.Q. in the Astona Hotel. + These branches were amalgamated under Hott] in the spring.

SPILTH 261 Haller, and from late June or early July onward (not, it must be admitted, in April and May) conducted active intrigues on the grand scale, which, had they come off, would have involved the remaking of the Cabinet. It was difficult to claim that Winkelmann’s mandate extended so far as this, and Szalasi, on that ground, always refused to let his lieutenants hold more than informatory conversations with the SS. men. Others, however, were less pedantic, and if they got no change out of one of the two Germans, turned to the other. The intense rivalry between the two Germans (according to

one witness at Nuremberg, Veesenmayer spent 70 per cent. of his time struggling against the SS.) influenced every phase of the political developments of the period. Eichmann, the “‘specialist’”’ for Jewish questions, undoubtedly came under Winkelmann, as the senior SS. officer in Hungary, for administrative purposes.

But Himmler had given him “plenipotentiary powers” in his own field, so that Winkelmann was able to claim afterwards! that, the terms of reference

quoted above notwithstanding, he had had no control over Eichmann’s operations. The fact that Winkelmann was not afterwards put on trial, either in Hungary or by the Allies, for the atrocities committed against the Jews by Eichmann’s men, must, presumably, be accepted as proof of the truth of this contention. In this case the conflict of competence, if any, was between Eichmann and Veesenmayer. For while Himmler could give orders to Winkelmann, who was another SS. man, he had no authority over Veesenmayer, who was on

Ribbentrop’s staff. True, Hitler had in March placed the SS. side of the operations in Himmler’s hands. He never went back on this, and a whole host of witnesses testified at Nuremberg that Veesenmayer was even less competent than Winkelmann to interfere with Eichmann’s operations. At the same time, he was himself repeatedly being instructed by Ribbentrop to

require of the Hungarian Government that it should itself take various measures against the Jews. Thus the Hungarian Jews were under fire from two sides: the Hungarian Government, acting on orders from Veesenmayer, or actuated by a desire to please him (and themselves), passed enactments attacking their freedom, their dignity and their property, while independently

of these, Eichmann was carrying on his still far more sinister campaign against their lives. Occasionally the two sets of orders clashed, and the Jews

benefited by the mutual jealousy that caused one German to thwart the dispositions of the other. More often, their effects were simply cumulative.

Such were the authorities with which the Hungarians had to deal—for how long, no one knew. None of the terms of reference were limited, but in any case, all the officers and units concerned would stay until Hitler was satisfied that he could safely recall them. Thus when Sztdjay visited the Fiihrer in June, and raised the question of the anti-Jewish measures, he was told flatly that the SS. team would not leave Hungary until the full Jewish programme had been carried through.” Indeed, if the Hungarians proved 1 Sc. at the Ministries Trial. 2 The visit, on which Sztdjay was accompanied by Voros, was on 6th June. This happened to be D Day, and for that and other reasons Hitler had so little time for the Hungarians that the visit was purely episodic. I have thus given no separate account of it, but refer to the subjects which were raised (the Jews, the Hungarian political prisoners and the troops) in their respective

contexts (see pp. 270, 288, 301). For the rest, Hitler was in jovial mood, confident that the Allied invasion would be defeated. He said that “‘19th March had been bridged over’’, expressed full confidence in Sztéjay, and sent Horthy his greetings (Barczy).

~62 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH seriously recalcitrant. the whole process might be put into reverse, the ecupation troops reinforced. and even the total occupation carned through.

There was one further respect im which the conditions under which the Sztdizy Government had to work differed markedly from its predecessors. Hardiv had Aallay relinquished office when the air-raids on Budapest. which re bad worked so feverishly to avert. began in earmest. Jhev started with a Gavucht attack by American aircraft on 2nd April. and 2 further attack on tne night of the 3rd-th. by Boiush aircraft. both of them directed against the marsnalies vards of Pest. the munition works of Csepel and the Thdékdl airerait components rectory. Both raids were very heavy, several hundreds

Of airerait being emploved. and both did extensive damage. The great Manfred Weiss works in Csepel and the Messerschmidt works on the Horthy

Lise. as well as the marshalling vards. were heavily damaged. and—the A.R.P. arrangements being inadequate, the shelters (as 1 proved) insufficient

and the populanon unused to such experiences—there were also severe casualties among the civilian population: the official figure issued was 1073 dead and 326 severely injured. On 12th April the oil-wells in West Hungary Were attacked: on the 13th. Gvér, Banhida and other industmal centres in

West Hurgary and some suburbs of Pest: on the 16th and the night of the léth-l th. Pest again. On the 19th there was a destrucuve raid on Gvor. The capital was raided again on 4th and 18th May. several ttmes in June. on

. srd July (a heavy daylight attack) and in force again. after various lighter attacks. on 27th and 30th July. Many provincial industmal and mulitarv targets and centres of communication were bombed also: among these. Szeged, Debrecen, Szolnok, Kolozsvar and Nagvvarad suffered heavily on ond June. Techmicallv. the raids had a considerable effect. In the course of

April. the Government evacuated from Budapest some $3.000-100,000 persons, among them manv non-Jewish children. expectant mothers. elderly people and renters who had relanves to whom to go. But this in itself took

up much ume and made heavy calls on the transport and administrative services. It was not possible to evacuate the war industries, whose great concentration in Csepel and a few neighbouring districts made them a particularly easy and vulnerable target. The workers had to be forbidden to

leave Budapest. and the same ban was imposed on State and municipal emplovees. doctors and chemists, etc. Work went on. but there is evidence that large parts of the more important factones were out of action for weeks at a time and that production was seriously diminished: it was, for example. calculated that production in the Mantred Weiss works at the end of April was only 37 per cent. of the March figure. Nforeover. communications—both the trams and local lines which took the worker to and from Pest. and also the long-distance services which carried his products away or brought the capital its supplhes—were repeatedly thrown into great disorder. The psychological and politcal effects of the raids were profound also. The extreme Right sought to make capital out of them for its own cause by screaming that the “terror raids” proved that the Anglo-Saxons were just such barbarians as the Bolsheviks and that Hungary must now see that she

could look for no more mercy from the West than from the East. These outcries acquired added bitterness after. by a whimsical chance. bombs had hit the residences of two of the most eloquent publicists of the Right, Vajta and Milotay. They were not, however, very effective. Undoubtedly, some

SPILTH 263 popular resentment was caused by the American bombing, which was very indiscriminate. The raid of 2nd July, in particular, was quite wild. Many buildings far from any target of military importance were hit in it, including the Millenary Monument, the Museum of Fine Arts and the Vanderbilt-

Széchényi Palace, together with a villa in which British and American internees had been housed. The building had been chosen precisely because it was in what could be presumed to be a safe spot. It received a direct hit, and nearly all its inmates, about 100 in all, were killed. The accuracy of the British bombing was, however, appreciated, and in general the people seem to have recognised that Hungary, having acted as she had, could not hope to escape punishment, and to have laid the blame where it belonged—on those who had made of Budapest a legitimate target. The fortunate accident which had delayed the coming of the raids until just

after the Wilhelmstrasse had expressed its satisfaction with Hungary’s behaviour of course contributed to this salutary feeling—even although the Allies themselves tried to undo the good work.t Thus the raids rather strengthened the desire for peace than steeled the will to resist. Furthermore, the comparative immunity with which the Allies carried most of them out (heavy losses were incurred in a few of them, but only in a few), belying the repeated and confident assurances which the Germans had given that they would defend Budapest from the air,* did very much:-to shatter the legend of German invincibility and to strengthen the belief that an Allied victory was inevitable. The one unfortunate political effect of the raids was to increase antiSemitism. The simple facts that, while some 25 per cent. of the population of Budapest was Jewish, hardly any Jews were workers, and that the raids

were aimed at the factories and railways, and at the workers’ quarters surrounding those objects, produced the result that hardly any of the casualties were Jews. This, again, the Right made much of, alleging that the ‘‘Judezo-terrorists’’ were purposely sparing their fellow-gangsters. This story found considerable credence, and, as will be shown, had its effect both on the development of anti-Jewish feelings and policy. 1 On one raid, leaflets were dropped saying “that Budapest could see now how foolish Kallay had been in believing that he could save Hungary by his double-faced policy.’ Of such inconceivable depths of idiocy was the military mind capable! 2 Not only could the Germans not save Hungary, but they could not stop the Soviet aeroplanes, which now flew night after night clear over Budapest, quite unmolested.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

GADARA marked period” phases: one from the conclusion of thetwo agreements [= “Sztdjay of lasting Hungarian history falls into clearly described above until the end of June, the other from that date until 23rd August. The first was one of nearly complete compliance with the Germans’ wishes; the second, one of near-active resistance. The decisive factor which imprinted its character on each period was the attitude of the Regent, for Hitler and Veesenmayer had been right in calculating that 99 per cent. of the nation would, under the existing conditions, simply take its cue from Horthy, and Horthy’s attitude up to mid-June equally justified Hitler’s policy in “giving Horthy a last chance.” Once he had secured the points which he regarded as the irreducible minimum in respect of the com-

position of the Cabinet and the supreme control over the Army, Horthy relapsed into nearly complete passivity. He remained in Budapest, at first perhaps out of some feeling that the Palace was the physical bridge which the Captain must not leave, and after the bombing began, in order to share the

dangers of the population; but he made himself a virtual prisoner. During these weeks he left the Palace only twice: once on 8th April, when, to show his sympathy with the population, he visited the heavily bombed areas of the capital, attended by Sztdjay, Ratz, Csatay and Jaross; once on 12th May, to attend manceuvres and the tests of certain new weapons in West Hungary. He washed his hands of political affairs: on 2nd May he told Szalasi (and it was a measure of his indifference that he was talking to the P.V. at all) that “he was not bothering about the Government, let them do what they liked. The Germans had wanted it, he himself was concerned only to keep the Army in his hands.” For the rest, an observer who saw him often wrote that “he did nothing

but sit, often with tears in his eyes, complaining that he had been cheated by the Germans.”” This was also the burthen of his utterances to Szalasi (during which audience, also, he wept three times). Under these circumstances, a proportion of Hitler’s requirements were fulfilled without too great difficulty. The position was simplest of all in the field of foreign policy, which

really readjusted itself. For as soon as the news of the occupation became known, almost all the Hungarian Ministers abroad (Woernle in Ankara and Marosy in Helsinki were almost the only exceptions) resigned, accompanied in most cases by their entire staffs, except, as a rule, the Military Attachés. As those resigning included Bakach-Bessenyey, Wodianer and UlleinReviczky, the Hungarian Government’s lines to the outer world automatically

went dead at the outer end, while at home the same effect was achieved

through the arrest of Szentmiklossy and Szegedi-Maszak, and of the American mission; the transmitter used by the Foreign Minister to communicate with Istanbul had also been confiscated. His friends had indeed succeeded in hiding Howie (who now spent many weeks in various hidingplaces, most of them hazardous),! and the transmitter which he had been

. 1 Howie, loc. cit.

GADARA 265 using had also been dismantled and hidden. But while this was a card which

could be played in the future, and other cards remained up the Foreign Ministry’s sleeve,! they could not be played at once. Not only did the Government strictly forbid the resumption of the underground contacts ;? Horthy himself was against it and made, during this period, no effort to reopen communications. Soon after 19th March the Archduke Charles Louis succeeded in getting in touch with “‘several Hungarian leaders who had not been arrested.” They advised him that the Sztdjay regime would probably not last, so he did not

give up hope; in fact, after a visit to Washington, he returned to Lisbon, followed soon after by his brother, the Archduke Rudolph. Contact was, however, not resumed so long as Sztdjay was in office.® To speak of a Hungarian foreign policy after this time was really a mis-

nomer, for she had nothing to do beyond carry out Germany’s orders. Of Hungary’s attitude it is only worth mentioning further that those of her publicists who were still writing did not tire of impressing on their readers that the Western Powers were not merely inseparable from the U.S.S.R. but of one colour with it. ‘Britain,’ wrote Milotay in one article, which may be taken as typical of hundreds, “instigated the World War, has betrayed Europe, destroyed the great cities of Europe and murdered tens of thousands of innocent children and women. Britain has brought on herself the terrible indictment that retributive justice can be applied only by force of arms.’ The only one of Hungary’s former foreign political contacts still kept up during this period was that with Mihailovic. This contact was maintained by a diplomat named L. Hory, who had previously served in Belgrade and had

been friendly with the Yugoslav royalists. In 1944 Hory, at Mihailovic’s invitation and with the consent of the Regent and V6rés, twice visited Mihailovic in Bosnia and succeeded in sending down to him considerable quantities of munitions and medical stores, which were passed from Ujvidék clean across the UstaSi-controlled territory. The other side of the medal requires some words. The Foreign Office and the State Department began by describing the Sztdjay Government as “‘unconstitutional and illegal’? and asking neutral Governments not to recognise it. Fortunately for the Hungarian Jews, the neutrals did not take this advice, and the Allies themselves did not go so far as officially recognising

any “‘free’? Government. Naturally, however, they did not accord to the Sztéjay Government such consideration as they had allowed to Kallay, and they now declared themselves ready to encourage any movement in Hungary prepared to work on the Allied side. This involved a further shift in the emphasis of all Allied propaganda towards the Left. The Soviets now preconized pure Bolshevism, while in Britain the various Free Hungarian movements fused into one, under the 1 It is, however, worth mentioning that after the relatively few arrests and resignations mentioned above, the personnel of Foreign Service did not change. The head of the Personnel Department, Bartheldy, succeeded in preventing the infiltration of new elements, and a private report in August recorded that the Ministry was working “‘almost in the old spirit.”” Csopey, who had succeeded Szegedi-Maszak at the head of the Political Department, held views not materially different from his predecessor’s, nor were all the Charges d’Affaires who now took over the Missions abroad by any means convinced collaborators. 2 On one occasion Sztdédjay even had the Foreign Ministry bag to Switzerland opened and searched because he suspected that it contained forbidden communications. 3 Personal (The Archduke Otto to C. A. M.). 4 Uj Magyarsdg, 5th May. When I had the pleasure of meeting M. Milotay again in 1949 he told me that he had always been pro-British,

266 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH presidency of Count Mihaly Karolyi, which issued a declaration which declared Horthy Public Enemy and War Criminal No. 1 and was almost as hard on Kallay. Free Hungarian movements of similar political colouring were now in existence in many Allied and neutral countries: bodies very deserving in themselves, but all, of course, rather less than useless from the point of view of the military interest of the Allies, whose sole real prospect of drawing Hungary away from her pro-German course lay not in destroying Horthy’s authority but in heartening him and contriving a means of concerting action with him; and to this task neither the genius of M. Rakosi, nor that of Count Karolyi, was well adapted. The only Hungarian group which could hope to fulfil this function, when the time came, was the Committee of “Dissident Diplomats,”’ the preparations for which have been described. This now took shape, in the form of a group of some thirty ex-Ministers, Consuls-General, etc. So long as Horthy remained passive, they could render no active service. But they were there ready to be used when the situation changed. Meanwhile, they were also able by their attitude to prove to the world that there were other Hungarians besides the extreme Left who did not think like the Sztojay Government.

The promised military co-operation started badly, for the troops earmarked for the Front were late in arriving: the Mountain Brigades, the only units actually in position, were held up by heavy snow in the passes, and the next echelon (the 16th, 24th and 2nd Armoured) could not be moved at all for some days, because the Germans had commandeered the main Hungarian railway—now their principal line of supply for the Roumanian Front—for

their own use. This was not the Hungarians’ fault; but when Naday, who had started immediately his appointment was announced, reported next day at Mannstein’s H.Q., it took only a few hours to show that the ‘‘agreement”’ of the 29th had not been an agreement at all, in the sense that the two parties understood the same thing by it. Horthy had chosen Naday precisely because he was one of the least proGerman of all the senior Hungarian Generals, and had instructed him! to say

that the First Army, owing to its shortage of equipment, was unfitted for offensive operations and should therefore not go into the line but remain on the defensive in the Carpathians. When Mannstein ordered him, on the contrary, to attack as soon as his troops arrived, Naday refused and the Germans at once sent him home. The Germans, however, ended by getting their way after what, although the records are silent, must have been a sharp clash. Lakatos took command of the First Army, and when the reinforcements arrived, which they did in the next few days (the Germans having made up the equipment of the 2nd Armoured, while Horthy signed an enthusiastic Order of the Day speeding

the troops on and regretting that he could not be with them), the desired offensive was undertaken, as part of a larger operation of which we need say here only that it met with considerable success, establishing, by the end of May, a line. which then remained stable for several weeks, which ran some distance east of Carpathians. In this the First Army held a sector about 1 The evidence only testifies that Naday made these proposals, but he can hardly have done so on his own responsibility. It is known that all his successors, Lakatos, Beregffy and Miklés, received similar orders.

GADARA 267 90 km. long, running almost due North and South, a little eastward of Stanislavov.

It should be mentioned that certain German units had been attached (under Lakatos’ command) to the First Army: an arrangement with which the Hungarians had not reckoned, but one that proved to have its advantages, since the Germans made few difficulties about supplying the mixed force with heavy armour, anti-tank guns, petrol, and air support.?

Meanwhile, Horthy had met the Germans’ wishes on one more point: he had dismissed Szombathelyi and had sanctioned the appointment—strongly

pressed by the Germans’—of Janos Vorés as the new Chief of the General Staff, abandoning the candidature of his own nominee, Lakatos.* Such other changes of high military personnel as the Germans demanded—they were not, indeed, many*—were also made, and the Ujvidék criminals reinstated.°® Now a fresh difficulty arose, and most of April and May were filled with a vigorous controversy between the Germans and the Hungarians which, on

the surface, seemed truly paradoxical: the Hungarians demanding to be allowed to do more than the Germans would let them.

At the root of the matter lay the old question of equipment. ‘The Hungarians declared themselves willing, even anxious, to fulfil the total agreed programme of mobilisation; but the Germans must supply them with arms, the more so since their own factories, already inadequate, were now being subjected to Allied bombing. The Germans, on the other hand, were themselves now beginning to feel the pinch; they had (on the strength of the experiences of Voronezh) got an unfavourable impression of the Hungarians’

fighting qualities; and above all, they were not convinced that if the Hungarians got arms they meant to use them for fighting—at any rate, for fighting Russians. They now announced that they did not expect more than 700,000 men from Hungary as its eventual total military effort; the rest would be more profitably employed in agriculture and munitions. For the moment, they wanted only the eight units mentioned above sent to the Front, and one

more, the Cavalry Division. The rest not only could but must remain at cadre strength. The available arms, including even those already in the hands of the depot units, should be given not to these divisions but to new Waffen SS. units, of which they proposed to raise two new cavalry divisions,

with a total manpower of 35,000 men, to be raised from the Hungarian Volksdeutsche, defined on a racial basis. The argument swayed backwards and forwards, the advantage, of course,

always lying on balance with the Germans, who pressed their point very

| strongly. On 15th May the Germans were given direct control over all 1 Hadak Utjan, loc. cit. 2 This is not to be doubted. Four separate sources, Lakatos (in his affidavit at the trial of Veesenmayer), Suhaj, the Szdlasi diary (recording the report of an Arrow Cross informant in the Ministry of Defence) and a fourth, private source of C. A. M.’s, agree that the appointment, which incidentally promoted V6rés over the heads of some thirty officers senior to himself, was directly due to German influence. As will be seen, V6rds, who belonged to the Imrédy clique, was very well in with Veesenmayer. 8 Horthy had actually signed Lakatos’ appointment when the Germans intervened (Barczy).

As we shall see, Horthy had already begun to look on Lakatos as his key man, for the characteristic reason (as given by him to C. A. M.) that he was “‘at least a gentleman.”’ 4 Bajnoczy was replaced as deputy Chief of Staff by Rusziczkay-Riidiger. Naday, Naray and one or two more generals were retired.

5 One of Feketehalmi-Czeydner’s first acts on his return was to challenge Kallay to a duel. Kallay had to send a message that he could not fight with propriety inside the Turkish Legation,

nor with safety from arrest outside it. (Kallay to C. A. M.)

268 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH ‘““Volksdeutsche” in Hungary; and although the Hungarians still refused the Germans’ demand for an ancestral criterion, they now allowed all those to be counted as Germans who in the 1941 census had registered their ‘“‘*mother-

tongue”? as German, irrespective of their definition of “‘nationality.” All such persons, male and between the ages of 18 and 62, were liable to military service, and the obligation, although nominally voluntary, “could,” as the Deutsche Zeitung wrote, ““be interpreted as compulsory.” Persons enlisting retained their Hungarian citizenship, which was also restored to those who had lost it previously for joining the Waffen SS. (another cause of annoyance to the Hungarians, who found themselves saddled again with some 40,000 disloyal citizens of whom they had thought to be rid).

In spite of a vigorous recruiting campaign, and although allegedly gendarmes were sent to fetch Volksdeutsche of military age who refused to

volunteer, and accepted several thousand pure Magyars who did come forward! (to the equal annoyance of Csatay and Szalasi, who both complained that the Germans were taking away the only people willing to fight) the full

number of 35,000 could not be got together. One new Waffen SS. cavalry division (the 22nd) was, however, established, and set to training outside Buda, where in October it was to play an important role, and several smaller formations elsewhere. Meantime, Hungarian callings-up had perforce been on a small scale, and

the equipment of such units as the Germans still asked of them had gone slowly, since the Germans requisitioned supplies as they wanted them (at one Ministerial Council Csatay reported demands for 38,000 horses and 5,000

waggons, more than half the entire stock in the country). Early in May, nevertheless, the 20th, 25th and 27th Divisions (the last-named reinforced by the 66th Frontier Chasseurs) were passed as ready for service (although

their training was still very incomplete and their equipment lamentably defective), and duly sent up the line: the Transylvanian units to the First Army, while the 20th was put in the line further north, under German command. It was now the turn of the Cavalry Division and of the single remaining mixed division—the 7th—whose equipment was reasonably complete (the 6th, 10th and 13th were still at cadre strength). This evoked a fresh conflict, for the Cavalry Division was the apple of Horthy’s oldfashioned eye. He had contrived to get it fitted out very completely, had put it under a trusted commander (General Vattay) and was keeping it as his own special reserve for use at need against either Russians or Germans.” After prolonged correspondence Horthy agreed to its leaving Hungary, but

only on condition that it was kept near the frontier, in reserve behind the First Army. The two divisions then left the country at the end of June, whereupon the Germans, while duly attaching the 7th to the First Army, promptly—to Horthy’s extreme and most enduring rage*—sent the Cavalry up to the VIII Corps in the Pripet Marshes.

In the meantime the First Army and the VII Corps had been engaged in fairly heavy fighting and had suffered not inconsiderable losses (estimated * The Dessewffy diary records that the ““kubikusok”’ (navvies) of the Tisza area were joining up in their hundreds, attracted by the good pay. 2 According to Barczy, the division had wanted to resist the Germans on 19th March, but Horthy had forbidden it, as he wanted to preserve it intact for later use. 3 See Horthy, op. cit., D. 270 (but his account is not accurate in every detail). Adonyi, op. cit., p. 189, gives the slightly different version that Horthy had also stipulated that the division must not be placed where it could be exposed to attack by armour, and it was for that reason that Keitel sent it to the sheltered Pripet area,

GADARA 269 in private reports at 17,000 men), and Lakatos in his turn had on 27th May been replaced by Beregffy, who was more sympathetic to the Germans. While all this was going on, the internal political developments had been taking their own, still more complex course. The completion of the Govern-

ment, in its wider sense, was substantially carried through by the end of March. It had, as we have seen, been agreed that both Endre and Baky should be given Secretaryships of State in the Ministry of the Interior, the original idea being that Baky should be made Commissioner for Jewish Affairs, with autonomous powers. For some reason—probably inter-party jealousy—this idea was dropped. The supervision of the whole Jewish question was entrusted to the Minister of the Interior. Baky was made Jaross’ second in command for the whole work of the Ministry, while Endre was made Secretary of State (in the Interior) specially concerned with Jewish affairs. The new Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arndéthy-Jungerth, was a career diplomat who returned from the Legation in Sofia, of which he had been in charge, to take up the post. The other Secretaries of State were either MEP men or Imrédists.

The turn-over in the other political posts was very large and covered many appointments which, while admittedly of political importance, did not

usually change hands when Governments changed; this being the result, partly of dismissals and partly of resignations tendered by persons unwilling to serve under what they regarded as foreign rule. Resignations or dismissals

included those of 29 out of the 40 Foispans, the Lord Mayor, Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Budapest, the Lord Mayors or Mayors of some two-thirds of Hungary’s other large towns, the President and Director of the National Bank, the Directors of the Royal Opera, the National Theatre and the Radio,

the Editor-in-Chief of the Pester Lloyd,‘ and a host more. The new men were, again, mostly drawn from the Right Wing of the MEP or the Imrédists,

with a sprinkling of National Socialists, the last-named being strongly represented in the posts connected with security. Where, however, Winkelmann did not interpose, or where an appointment was not in the direct gift

of another Minister, it was usually in the hands of Jaross, who used his | advantage unscrupulously enough for the benefit of his party, to which a disproportionate number of the appointments, particularly among the FGispans, accordingly fell; so that the influence of the Imrédist party over the administration became out of all proportion to their numbers in the Govern-

ment, and still more in the country, where some of the Imrédist Féispans simply established Imrédist party dictatorships in their own Counties.’

The resultant team was thus much more Right Radical than its

predecessor, and it included a certain number of genuine zealots for Right Radical reform, as they saw it, a large number of servile place-hunters and some sadistic beasts. Yet the turn-over was anything but complete. As in the Cabinet, so among its immediate servants a full half were men associated with the old regime, and while some of these found the Germans’ programme better to their taste than Kallay’s, a great number of those who retained their 1M. Ottlik’s view was that the Pester Lloyd ought stop publication altogether, rather than act as mouthpiece for a regime so un-Hungarian as that of Sztdjay. Failing to persuade the Board of the paper to consent to this course, he resigned from his own position, which he had, indeed,

only retained so long in deference to Pal Teleki’s wishes, and with it, his membership of the MEP siukevich, in the Bacska, simply dissolved all urban and rural Councils which refused to join his party.

270 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH positions. and even some who took office, did so, often at Horthy’s personal

request. some of them even at that of the “Left,” in order “‘to save what could still be saved.’”’ Thus even the Sztdjay Government was collaborationist only to a modified extent, while the civil service was almost unchanged.

For although the wireless of 25th March had announced an impending ‘*ereat comb-out of the administration” in which “‘all those hostile to German acuvities’” would be summarily dismissed, this never took place. There were big changes here in two fields only: in the top ranks of the police, and in the foreign Missions, in the latter, chiefly, as has been said, through resignation. Outside these, there were, with very few exceptions, neither dismissals nor arrests in all this great body. This does not. of course, mean that the Gestapo ceased from its pursuit of its onginally designated victims. nor refrained from pouncing on any new

ones brought to its notice. The internment camp at Kistarcsa soon overflowed its complement of 2.000 inhabitants, and two smaller internment camps had to be set up to take the overflow, which also included persons arrested by the Hungarian authorities. But so far as Hunganan Aryans were concerned. both arrests and internments were, by modern standards, on a relatively modest scale. Not many such persons were molested after the end of March, either by the Gestapo or the Hungarians, and the movement of the first few days was even, to some small extent. put into reverse.

For the Hungarians had bitterly resented, especially, the abduction to Germany of members of their venerated Parliament. They repeatedly protested against this “violation of Hungarvw’s sovereignty’; even Sztojay

raised it with Hitler on 6th June. He, indeed, got no change out of the Fuhrer, but the Hungarians hammered at the point persistently, and in fact. with the assistance of some friendly Germans, got one or two of the prisoners

released* and most of the rest returned to Hungary. Thus, at the end ofa few weeks, only a small number of the most important political prisoners (including Keresztes-Fischer and Bajcsy-Zsilinszky) were still in Dachau or

Mauthausen, with the unfortunate Jewish doctors and lawvers picked out of the telephone book. A second group was in German custody but on Hungarian soil, in the Foutca prison in Buda; a larger number, including

nearly all the later captives, in Kistarcsa. Ujszaszy and Kadar had, at Veesenmayer’s request, been retransferred to Hungarian custody; and a piquant detail given by Veesenmayer at his trial? was that the officers then abused him for his pains, saying that the Germans had treated them better. When, however, they were brought by their colleagues before a court-martial, they were acquitted on the ground that they had only been obeying orders, and simply placed under a “house arrest”’ which seems not to have impeded

their movements, since in the autumn Ujszaszy was conspiring with the underground Resistance, including the Communists.* Another question which the Hungarians made a point of honour was that of the Allied refugees and prisoners of war. The regime was tightened up, and most of the French and British P.O.W.s sent to Germany. The civilians + According to a Hungarian work, the Gestapo received no less than 30,000 denunciations (some signed, some anonymous) of Hungarians by Hungarians within the fortnight after its

we a included the Social Democrat leaders released to take part in the negotiations described below (p. 299). The “ladies of the Palace” eventually got Count Szapary released through the mediation of the King of Sweden. $ Min. Trial, 22.7.48, p. 13721. * See below. p. 365-6.

GADARA 271 were, in theory, interned, and this was in fact the fate of most of those of Jewish origin; but a considerable proportion of the non-Jews were not in practice touched: they remained in their lodgings, or in friends’ houses, in a ‘hiding’? which was transparent enough. The Poles’ national organisation was dissolved, as were the Hungarian-

Polish Association and the Polish Institute of the University. Most of the Hungarian officials who had been dealing with Polish affairs were removed from their posts. Some hostages were arrested even after the first stage of the

arrests, and the Polish Jews were deported with the Hungarian. But good treatment of the Poles was one of the points which Hungary regarded as incumbent on her honour. Private reports had it at the time that the Regent intervened several times on the question, and public opinion was certainly strong in the same sense, but there is no reason to suppose that the Government needed stiffening. At any rate, it consistently refused repeated requests from the Germans to hand over all Polish soldiers, pleading that this would

be contrary to international law. On 12th June the various Committees concerned with Polish affairs, meeting in the Honvéd Ministry, reached an | agreement whereby unmarried men were placed, under control, in industrial undertakings. Refugees with families were sent to work on the land, where

possible on Government estates. Intellectual workers remained in their places of employment and students at the Universities and High Schools were allowed to continue their studies. The Polish Gymnasium at Balaton Boglar continued in being, although State subsidies were stopped, except to the Polish hospital at Keszthely and to persons in exceptional need.

In these cases the Hungarians were resisting Germany, and deserve due

credit for what they did. But the Hungarian Government itself, in an announcement dated 2nd April, proclaimed its intention of “destroying all germs of destruction and bringing to fruition the ancestral virile and martial

qualities of the Hungarian people.” Under “germs of destruction’’ it included all classes, races, organisations and movements hostile to itself, and

to the elimination of these its first weeks were largely directed. ‘The dissolution of the Social Democrat and Smallholder Parties and of the Peasant Union was announced on 28th March; the funds of the two parties being handed over to the War Orphans’ Fund, and those of the Peasant Union blocked. The turn of the Liberals and of the minor “‘progressive’’ bourgeois parties came a few days later. There were left the Christian People’s Party and the parties to the Right of it (the MEP, the Transylvanians, the Imrédist-

National Socialist coalition and the Arrow Cross), but of these, the MEP received an intimation that it would be required to purge itself. A Committee

of six members was set up to investigate the spiritual credentials of their

colleagues, and announced in due course that four members (Kallay, Keresztes-Fischer, Somogyvary and Laky) had been expelled from the Party (actually three of them had been arrested and the fourth was in hiding) and 23 more ‘had compromised themselves and would be required to lay down their mandates.’’ Of these, besides Ottlik (who sat in the Upper House) 14 had in fact already resigned—two of them, indeed, to join the Imrédists, but the remainder as a sign of their disagreement with the new course. Next came a vast purge of associations, which affected primarily every association, club or organisation which could be accused, however remotely, of fostering opposition to the new regime. The adverb is used, because the

272 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH axe fell on many bodies which, to the uninformed eye, hardly seemed subversive: the Anti-Alcohol Association, the National Centre of Home Crafts Industries, the National Association of Hungarian Plastic Arts, and many sporting and athletic clubs, of which no less than 124 were dissolved in a single

day. The Pen Club, the League of Nations Association and the AngloHungarian Society were more obvious victims. All political associations of the Left went without exception, and also all the Legitimist clubs and circles, the Nemzeti Osszetartas KGre at their head. Indeed, special attention was paid to these associations, as the central stronghold (in default of a specific Legitimist Party) of a movement which the Germans and the Hungarian Right Radicals regarded as at least as dangerous to them as the Left, and the dis-

solution of the NOK was celebrated in the Press by personal attacks of extreme violence and scurrility against its leading members. A large number of women’s associations apparently owed their downfall to their Legitimist sympathies.

Purely religious associations were respected, and nationalist and ““natriotic’ associations of pronouncedly Right-wing character and leadership were, naturally, not touched; but the ‘“‘national’’ label did not necessarily guarantee immunity. Those “‘patriotic’’ associations which were tarred with

the Kallay brush, such as the Turani Vadaszok, fell like so many pinks, and those which had nominally no political colouring except the patriotic were, in most cases, put under new leadership. Government Commissioners were put in charge of the Tiizharcosok Szévetsége (whose President and all its officers had resigned when Ullein-Reviczky, who had been a Vice-President, was deprived of his citizenship) and of the blanket organisation, the Orszagos Nemzetvédelmi Szévetség. The Vitézi Rend got a new President. Professional and vocational organisations were, as a rule, left in being, but placed, where necessary, under new leadership, often that of a Government Commissioner, and required to undergo purges, especially in connection with the anti-Jewish measures described below. The Trade Unions and the various associations or institutions controlled by or associated with them (workers’ sports clubs, recreational associations, reading rooms, etc.) were turned over to Béla Marton, leader of the Fascist NMK,* who was appointed Government Commissioner in charge of Labour, under the general direction of Szasz, as Minister of Industry. The Unions’ funds were blocked, and it was announced that they would be used in future “‘exclusively for the benefit of the workers and to raise their standard of living.’”” The Unions would be allowed to continue in existence, but Marxist influence would be “‘completely eradicated” from them. Similarly, the great social insurance institutions, the OTI and the MABI, were placed under Government Commissioners, who promised to reorganise them in the interests of the workers.

The entire Press, together with the MTI, the wireless and the news censorship service, was placed under a Government Commissioner in the person of M. Kolosvary-Borcsa, an extreme anti-Liberal and anti-Semite from the Right Wing of the MEP. The wireless of 27th March had already reported that “‘the Jewish, Liberal or Marxist papers which daily falsified Hungarian public opinion had either been closed down or had voluntarily ceased publication on seeing that there was no room for them in Hungary ‘ This gentleman, however (General Igmandy-Hegyessy), was a Horthy man, who took the post at the Regent’s request “‘in order to save what could be saved.’’ He was arrested by the

Germans on 16th October 1944. * See above, I. p. 101.

GADARA 273 after her awakening.” This meant that all the principal dailies and weeklies of Left-wing or Liberal colouring had already vanished On taking office, Kolosvary-Boresa at once abolished 2 news agencies, 19 periodicals in the capital and 5 provincial dailies and 3 weeklies. This list was followed by many others, one of which suspended simultaneously 15 dailies, 1 weekly and 156 periodicals, including many of purely local or technical character, and even a large number of medical, professional and technical trade journals. There remained the Government Press (Pester Lloyd and Magyarorszdg) both under new editorship and completely gleichgeschaltet), the MEP’s

organs figgetlenség and Esti Ujsdg (now edited by Rajniss), Milotay’s Uj Magyarsdg,* the Imrédist Virradat and Nemzetér, the National Socialist Magyarsag, the Arrow Cross Osszetartds, the Deutsches Volksblatt of the

German Volksgruppe, and finally, the Catholic Nemzeti Ujsag and Uj Nemzedeék.

New and much stricter censorship regulations were introduced, as a result of which most of these organs, outside reproductions of Government decrees and records of daily events, carried little beyond praise of the Sztdjay regime or of Germany, or attacks on the enemies of the regime, inside or outside Hungary; although rival supporters of the regime were allowed also

to attack one another. The Catholic Press made up its space-quota with treatises on Catholic hagiology and on practical farming. The purge extended to films and to literature. The ‘“‘Trash Law’ was revised and tightened up. Works regarded with disfavour in view of their contents or their authorship (Jewish authorship gave a presumption of un-

desirability) were collected and ceremoniously cremated. Listening to foreign programmes, even purely musical ones, other than those of the Axis, was forbidden. It became a punishable offence to possess a wireless receiver or transmitter without a permit.

As counter-part to the repression of the Left, a general amnesty was issued on 23rd April in favour of all persons convicted of or awaiting trial for political offences “‘arising out of a national outlook.” The only exceptions

were for cases of high treason or offences which had involved the use of explosives. At the same time, the outstanding paragraphs of Decree 3400 were repealed.

The measures described above almost completed the Government’s programme of destruction, except in the field of the Jewish question: a field which was, indeed, easily the largest of them all, and one in which a combina-

tion, in proportions which to this day cannot be exactly determined, of design and circumstance® was destined to lead to the most appalling, and 1 The compositors of the Népszava had wrecked most of their own machines. * These three were now strongly under Imrédist influence. 8 It is an extraordinary thing that this qualification should still be necessary after the amount of time which has been devoted to this subject, yet the fact remains that while what happened

is on record, even to the smallest detail, we are still unable to say how far this was done in pursuance of a prearranged plan, or how far in obedience to conditions and circumstances unforeseen by the Germans themselves, and a fortiori by the Hungarians. The only course, as I have seen it, has been to tell the story as it occurred, leaving the unexplained questions— unexplained, and where a mental process has to be attributed, giving, without long justification, that which I think the most probable. If asa result I have credited any individual with too much, or too little, guilty intention, this is, after all, a relatively minor matter. For further details see in particular Lévai, Black Book, and G. Rettlinger, The Final Solution (London 1953). The existence of these two very full accounts allows me to treat the subject more shortly than its human importance deserves. I have, in particular, not thought it necessary to enter into details of the various financial plans for saving all or part of the Jews. S

274 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH also the most shameful, human tragedy with which these pages have to deal.

To both the Hungarian authorities and the Hungarian Jews the Germans’

ultimate intentions were unknown when the German forces occupied Hungary. On the afternoon of 19th March, then, Eichmann’s two lieutenants Krumey and Wysliceny (Eichmann himself was not present) appeared at the premises of the Jewish religious community and left word that they wished to meet the Jewish leaders on the following morning. At this meeting they

simply informed their audience that “‘in accordance with an agreement concluded between Germany and the Hungarian Government, the right of dealing with Jewish questions rested exclusively with themselves,” and enquiries made by the Jews of the various Hungarian Ministries apparently confirmed this statement. The Jews were naturally filled with the worst forebodings, but the Germans assured them that if they obeyed orders, no harm would come to them. There would be certain restrictions, the chief of which, for the moment, was that Jews might not travel nor change their domiciles, but there would be no arbitrary arrests and no deportations, and the Germans would assure security for life and property. The Jews were required to form

Germans’ orders. |

a Jewish Council (Judenrat) for the transmission and execution of the Whatever Eichmann’s ultimate intentions, he preserved this unthreatening attitude during the whole of the first phase of the occupation. It is true that some hundreds of Jews who tried to disobey the travel ban were arrested and taken to Kistarcsa, and the Germans also commandeered certain Jewish

premises for their own use. The victims of the Gestapo’s raids also included many prominent Jews. But when the Jews complained to Krumey of the arrests, he reassured them that ‘“‘no one would be ill-treated just because he was a Jew. No one would be detained except persons who had played a particularly prominent political role—those as hostages—or scoundrels.”’

On 24th March the elderly persons and juveniles detained in Kistarcsa were in fact released, and a promise (never redeemed) was given to release other persons not guilty of any offence. The Jews were assured that there would be security for life and property, freedom of worship and no deportations. Greatly relieved and in high good humour, they willingly issued an appeal to their respective communities to preserve discipline and continue production. The requisitions and arrests went on during the next days, crescendo; by Ist April the latter numbered 3,451. Nevertheless, when Eichmann met the Jewish representatives on 31st March, he repeated his underlings’ assurances that the Jews as such were not going to be harmed. What was important for the Germans was that the output of the Hungarian war industries should rise, and the Jews were going to be asked to “‘volunteer’’ for service in these

formations. Compulsion would be applied if volunteers did not come forward, but the workers would be well treated and paid on the scale of other

workers. The Jews were still “virtually hypnotised’ by the Germans’ promises, in which they placed unbounded confidence, particularly in view of the obvious venality of the Germans on the spot and the apparently bright promise of larger transactions. For the SS. had for some time past shown readiness to do financial deals, selling the Jews safety against money or food. At least one of the men who had been prominent in these dealings on the

GADARA 275 Jewish side—Dr. R. Kastner—was in Budapest, while one of the chief bargainers on the German side was none other than Wysliceny. Kastner and

an assistant of his named Brand had taken an early opportunity to call on Wysliceny and to offer him a large sum of money as price for the safety of all

or some of the Budapest Neolog Jews. Negotiations had begun, together with a parallel series conducted by the Orthodox Jews.

Here, then, matters rested for the moment, so far as Eichmann was concerned; but in the meantime the Sztéjay Government had been appointed and its first Ministerial Council was told that: ‘“‘Veesenmayer recommends that the Jews should be placed in ghettoes in the towns and in internment camps in the country districts. The property of the Jews should be taken over by the State. Veesenmayer says that the Germans don’t want a sou for this for themselves; everything to the Hungarian State.’”! Another demand, according to the same source, was that the Jews should wear a distinctive badge. The energies of most of the members of the Government were, during the subsequent weeks, largely occupied with devising the means of satisfying the Germans in this field; and at this point it is necessary to write plainly. The Hungarians were undoubtedly acting under orders, and orders behind which there stood dire and unconcealed threats; for the full occupation had not yet been called off, and even after this had been done, Hitler (as we shall see)” threatened to enforce it after all if Hungary failed in any of various respects, one of these being full compliance on the Jewish question. When,

years after, some of the Germans alleged that the Hungarians could have resisted had they wanted, they were flatly belying what they themselves said at the time.

Nevertheless, it must be said that so far as the initial programme was concerned, which did not, it is true, include physical brutality, deportation

or massacre, but did cover incarceration in ghettoes, humiliation and despoliation, none of the available records show any Hungarian in authority displaying the least reluctance to execute the Germans’ wishes. Barczy’s minutes show, on the contrary, many of the Ministers pressing forward with suggestions of their own which at times went beyond those which the Germans

had so far issued. Nor did they ever experience any difficulty in finding agents to carry out their most brutal orders, often in the most brutal fashion. Of all those who might, at this time, have shown any official resistance, the only man ever to display a touch of personal fastidiousness was Horthy, who said that he would not sign any anti-Jewish laws: all enactments must therefore go out as Ministerial Orders (which did not require his counter-signature). And Horthy, at this stage, went no further than Pontius Pilate: he washed his hands, but made no suggestion that any demand made by the Germans should be refused. And while it is true that the members of the Government (except Csatay) had been picked because they were “‘Right-wing’’—largely because they were

anti-Semites—they were neither the most extreme nor the worst men in Hungary. It was not only from Germany, but from within Hungary, that they were under constant pressure to go further still. Compared with the incitements which appeared daily in the Press under the names of Rajniss, Vajta and others, the utterances of most of the Ministers read respectably, even humanely: and these publicists were voicing the views of a very consider-

1 Barczy. - See below, p. 301.

276 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH able proportion of the population, which urged them to take even more extensive measures! After the long air-raids of 4th-S5th April, which hit chiefly the working quarters and left those inhabited by the Jews untouched, Sztdjay sent Ratz and Kunder to Veesenmayer to tell them that there was

danger of a revolution unless something drastic was done. Leaflets were scattered demanding that 100 Jews should be executed for every Hungarian non-Jew killed by bombing. Veesenmayer wired to Ribbentrop suggesting that, although the figure of 100 to 1 was excessive, the threat might be issued

that 10 Jews should be shot for every non-Jew killed. It is true that he expressed the opinion that it would be preferable to offer the Jews as a gift to Roosevelt or Churchill.” Obviously there were honourable exceptions in all walks of life, ranging

from the working classes and peasants, through the intelligentsia, to the aristocracy and the Regent’s own circle. From Hungary itself came evidence,

in the form of irritated articles in the anti-Semitic Press, of demonstrative sympathy evinced by non-Jews for Jews. A case was reported of a young aristocrat, belonging to one of the purest and oldest Hungarian families, parading the fashionable Pest Corso with a huge Star of David on his breast. Many employers connived at evasion of the dismissal orders by their Jewish employees, and the vast majority of the workers, instead of reporting such cases to the authorities, condoned them. Non-Jewish domestic servants objected to leaving the service of Jewish masters and mistresses. There were sO many cases of non-Jews taking charge of Jewish assets, instead of letting them be handed over to the State, that repeated amnesties had to be granted. In spite of this, the Press was full of reports of persons prosecuted for this offence; the defendants including persons in position of high authority. There were also numerous prosecutions for other forms of connivance: sheltering of Jews in Christian houses, smuggling them across the frontier, and the like. Even the authorities proved in many cases large-minded in securing exemptions or winking at evasion of the law. Many persons shared their rations with the Jews and, after the ghettoes were established, carried provisions to them, with the connivance of the guards. When the second stage—that of the deportations—began, these demonstrations hardened into a degree of open resistance. Yet it is impossible to write that in the earlier stages—t hose of the Decrees

now to be described—the Government was acting against the clear will of the majority of the people. Even the Churches hardly moved against the Decrees. The Calvinist Bishop, Ravasz, did, on 12th April, beg Horthy to

keep his own hands clean of atrocities? The Cardinal Primate, Serédi, visited Sztdjay on the 13th to point out the measures of which the Catholic Church disapproved,* and ten days later put the point of view of the Catholic Church in writing. But in this document, although it does enumerate the principle that no one should be deprived of his human rights without trial,

nor denied, without due cause and judgment, the right “to life, personal freedom, freedom of religion, freedom to work, to earn a living, to own private property, the right to human dignity, to a virtuous life and honour’”’— the Cardinal confined his specific demands exclusively to the cases of baptised 1 Inter alia, the Ministry of Justice received a letter from the Catholic prostitutes of Hungary, asking them to dismiss their Jewish fellow-workers.

2 N.G. 1807, Min. Trial, Doc. Book, 624; c.f. also N.G. 2239.

> Lévai. p. 117. + Ibid.

GADARA 277 Jews; thus maintaining, indeed, the principle that Judaism is a question of religion and not of race, but by implication washing his hands of the fate of persons of the Jewish faith. A counter-reply which he sent to Sztdjay’s answer to this document (which was that the Jewish question was a racial, not a religious one) again confined itself to insisting on “‘discrimination between converted Jews and Jews adhering to the Israelite faith.”

The Papal Nuncio had several interviews with Sztdédjay and other Ministers,! and expressed regret at Hungary’s behaviour, but the first time that he entered a written protest was when the Government agreed to send 100,000 workers to Germany.” Against this the Nunciature protested and wrote that, ““not from a false sense of compassion, but on behalf of thousands

of Christians, it once again appeals to the Hungarian Government not to continue this war against the Jews beyond the limits prescribed by the laws of nature and the commandments of God.”’

The Nuncio’s covering note again concentrated on the position of the baptised Jews, although it did say that “‘to persecute persons on account of their racial origin is 1n itself a breach of the law of nature.” Several of the Hungarian Bishops, headed by Baron Vilmés Apor, Bishop of Gyér, Bishop Hamvas of Szeged, and the saintly Bishop of Transylvania,

Aron Marton, and a proportion of the lower clergy, took up a bolder and more humane attitude, but the Government was able to treat their utterances as not representing the official voice of the Church. The Ministry in general charge of Jewish affairs was that of the Interior, although a part of the work fell within Antal’s field. The Secretary of State in charge of Jewish affairs was, as has been said, Endre. The man appointed to be liaison officer with the Germans was a certain Colonel Ferenczy of the Gendarmerie. Special aspects of the business were entrusted to J. Kultsar, Government Commissioner for Intellectual Unemployment, and Z. Bosnyak, director of a Jewish Institute which had the task of studying, and enlightening

the public on, all aspects of the Jewish question. His duties included the publication of a periodical entitled Harc (Struggle), an imitation of Der Stiirmer, and in no way superior to its model. The Ministerial Decrees began to pour out on 3lst March. Only on one point did they differ advantageously from the German: in their definition of

a Jew. A Decree, issued on 30th March, universalised the provisions of paragraphs 9 and 16 of Law XV of 1941, which had, as has been said before, applied to two subjects only—marriage or extramarital intercourse between Jews and non-Jews, and service with the armed forces; and as this was more severe than that of the Law IV of 1939, which in other respects had held good

right up to 1944, the change was thus one for the worse; but even so, the Hungarian definition remained somewhat more favourable than the German, as it allowed for a considerable number of exemptions, including 75 per cent.

war invalids and persons who had served with distinction in the counterrevolution or resistance campaigns, and widows and orphans of such persons

(not, however, of persons killed or dying on auxiliary labour service). To these categories were at once added persons employed in essential war industries and Jews of foreign nationality, provided the country of their nationality afforded reciprocity, and on 5th May two other categories of 1 Id., p. 197. 2 See below, p. 280.

3 Application for exemption under these headings was to be made to the Minister of the Interior, the former Minister for the Felvidék, the High Commissioner for Ruthenia, or the President of the Vitézi Rend.

278 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH persons of mixed Jewish and non-Jewish extraction. The last-named exemptions were those which the Upper House had unsuccessfully demanded

in 1941, and were conceded by the Germans, as a confidential document’ reveals, because “‘application of a stricter definition would have resulted in classifying as Jews a large part of Horthy’s circle of friends and of the Hungarian aristocracy.” Otherwise, the Hungarian enactments were a slavish enough copy of the Nuremberg Laws. They were so numerous and complicated as to make it impossible to give here more than a summary of the more important of them. Every person subject to them under the above criteria had, if 6 years old or over, to wear a yellow Star of David on his breast. Jews were dismissed from

all branches of the public or municipal services, and also debarred from holding licences of profit, including those of chemists. They were forbidden to practise as teachers, except in the special Jewish schools, lawyers, actors, publishers or journalists, except the staffs of two purely Jewish newspapers

(all other Jewish organs were closed down). As, however, there was a shortage of doctors, they were allowed to exercise that profession until June,

when they were forbidden to treat other than Jewish patients. They were expelled from all bourses and from the transport trade. They might not be directors of businesses, and it was announced that they would be expelled from banking, from the Federation of Hungarian Employers, and, indeed, from any other branch of gainful employment. All Jewish businesses of all kinds were successively closed and their stocks blocked, except that shops selling perishable goods might continue to serve ‘Christian’? customers. The proprietors had, however, to go on paying their

staffs. The enterprises were then divided into two categories. If their continued existence was thought desirable in the national interest, they were to be placed under non-Jewish management; if not, they were to be shut down and their stocks distributed among their non-Jewish competitors. On 25th April it was announced that Jews were to be excluded from salaried employment in industry, trade, agriculture, etc. 25 per cent. of employees were to be dismissed immediately, 25 per cent. by 31st May and the remainder by 30th September. Exceptions were permitted in the national interest, or in the interest of continuity of production. This elimination of any possibility for the Jews of making any money in the future was followed by the confiscation of what they already possessed. First, all Jewish assets were blocked and all sums exceeding 10,000 peng6 had to be declared (all dispositions regarding Jewish property made after 22nd March having been invalidated). Next, all cash over 3,000 pengé had to be surrendered. An inventory was taken of all Jewish strong-boxes and

safe deposits. The Jewish balances acquired by the State were placed in charge of a Government Commissioner, while another (D. Csanthy) was also put in charge of the valuables, works of arts, etc., which were confiscated also.° 1 These were persons of mixed extraction whose originally Jewish parent had been baptised before marriage, and persons converted before their 7th year, even if the Jewish parent was never

bapnisee to These persons, however, were not exempt if they had themselves married Jews. 3 Hopes ran high that the loot would be distributed at once, but the Commissioner (A. Turvélgyi) seems to have been one of those who were not too keen on their job, and most of the treasures remained undistributed and even intact until the end of the Sztdjay regime: a fruitless endeavour, since the Szalasi Government and the Germans eventually carried away every-

thing on which they could lay hands. Nor was the transfer of businesses, or even the distribution of stocks (except perishable goods), carried very far before the advent of the Szalasi regime.

GADARA 2719 . Jews were issued with special ration cards, valid for quantities much inferior to those allowed to non-Jews. They were forbidden to travel, except on urgent business, when a special permit might be granted on payment of a fee. Otherwise, they might not use cars, taxis, trains, ships or other vehicles, except trams or omnibuses in towns. They had to surrender their bicycles, as well as firearms and wireless licences. They were forbidden to employ non-Jewish servants. They were excluded from hotels, cafés, restaurants, _ theatres, cinemas and public halls used by non-Jews, a limited number of

such establishments being set aside for their use. It was, however, stated that they were not forbidden to keep dogs. Christians were forbidden to adopt Jewish children. Jews were expelled from the Union of Ex-Servicemen and from various other associations, although more often, if an association was “‘Jew-tainted,” it was dissolved altogether, as were all purely Jewish associations except the single central Jewish Council.1 Jewish literature was subjected by KolosvaryBorcsa to a drastic purge and the works of Jewish authors, Hungarian and foreign, ceremonially burned (the knowledge possessed by the Hungarian Press Section of foreign authors seems to have been mediocre, since the only English-speaking writer whom they got on to was Mr. Israel Zangwill). In the meantime, scores of Jews were arrested daily on charges of sabotage, espionage, Communist sympathies, etc. Inhuman as these decrees were, they were only the prelude to something which, either by accident or design, turned out to be infinitely worse. While these enactments were going out—and the last of those mentioned here did not see print before July—Baky was organising the segregation of the Jews “in ghettoes, or in the rural districts, in concentration camps,”’ which had been another demand of the Germans’. Draft orders were sketched out in the first days of April, under Endre’s supervision. These provided that all Jews, regardless of age and sex, with the exception of those employed in essential war industries, mines, agriculture and large businesses, were to be transferred to assembly camps. They were to take only small quantities of luggage, and to leave their other effects in a single room, which would be

locked, of their dwellings. Cash and valuables were to be handed over, against receipt, to the authorities. The Jews would then be divided into two categories. “Jews considered dangerous to the safety of the State’? were to be detained in the assembly centres; the others were to be allowed to go back into special ghettoes or “‘Jewish houses”’ which would be prepared for them, if necessary by transferring other occupants. This order, as will have been noted, did not provide either for massacre, deportation out of Hungary,” nor even, on paper, for spoliation, but only for segregation inside Hungary, and it is possible that those who drafted it— and perhaps at the time even Baky and Endre—were thinking only in those

terms. On 4th April, however, a conference was held, under Endre’s presidency, at which there were present, besides a number of Hungarian administrative officials, representatives of the Wehrmacht, the Honvéd and 1 This had 22 provincial branches. 2 The order, as translated by Lévai, pp. 112-13, uses the word “‘deportation”’ and also the phrase “‘rid the country of Jews.’ The body of the document is in clear contradiction to these phrases. Some words may have been added after the conference, but even so they do not

necessarily imply removal out of the country. ‘Deportation’? could mean “removal into ghettoes’”’ and such segregation would “rid the country” of its victims.

280 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH the Hungarian Gendarmerie, and of Eichmann’s Commando; and here the

threads which were soon to lead to the ghastly ‘“‘final solution’ ran disastrously together. For the military commanders of the Operational Zones raised objection to the plans as inadequate; they, too, did not ask for the Jews in their areas to be exterminated, but they did insist that the Jews constituted an element of military insecurity, and demanded that they should

be cleared out of the Zones altogether. It appears, indeed, that in the Bacska they had already rounded up the local Jews, numbering some 15,000, and put them in camps!; and they demanded similar action in north-eastern

Hungary. Although, accordingly, the conference had been meant as an exploratory one, Baky, on his own authority,” sanctioned an Order for total concentration and added that it was to be carried out by the gendarmerie in the different Corps Districts, beginning with the north-east: the order was to be VIII (Kassa), IX (Kolozsvar), X (Marosvasarhely),® II (Székesfehérvar), III (Sopron-Komarom), IV (Pécs), V (Debrecen), VI (Szeged), VII (Miskolcz),

I (Budapest). In the north-east the operation was to begin immediately. Endre, Baky and Eichmann went up personally to select the five great camps to be established for the VIII District, at Kassa, Satoraljaujhely, Ungvar, Munkacs and Beregszasz respectively. The Ungvar “‘camp” was a brickworks, unprovided with any shelter from the weather; the others, not much better.

Now came another move, which, for all its coincidence with those described, seems to have been entirely independent of them. On or about 14th April, Veesenmayer presented the Hungarian Government with an official demand for 50,000 Jewish workers for the Reich. This was an entirely bona fide demand (the workers were wanted for constructing underground aircraft factories)* and as Horthy had already, at Klessheim, agreed to supply the Reich with Jewish labour, the Hungarians made no difficulties about granting it. On the 15th Veesenmayer reported to Ribbentrop that Sztojay had given him a “binding assurance” that the men would be at the service of the Reich by the end of April. The practical measures were already under way by action initiated by the S.D. and the Hungarian police. The Regent, the Ministry of the Interior and the Honvéd had agreed. At the same time, Jews between the ages of 36 and 48, who had not yet been called on for labour service, were being called up. In this way and through the measures already on foot it should be possible to place another 50,000 “labour Jews’’ at the disposal of the Reich, and at the same time to raise the number of Jews employed in Hungary in labour battalions to 100,000-150,000 men.°

On the next day (the 16th) Veesenmayer reported again that the Honvéd Ministry had told him that 5,000 Jews could be provided at once, and thereafter another 5,000 every three or four days until the figure of 50,000 was made up.° Two transports of 3,000 men each in fact now left. They went,

it is true, to Ausschwitz first, but were sent on thence to factories in the Reich; and so far was this measure from forming a co-ordinated part of a * Ujvidek, Szabadka and Bacska Topolya. These Jews seem to have been deported in April. * Jaross, on trial, denied that he knew either of the conference or of the order. * A new Gendarmerie District, to which no Military Corps District corresponded. * On 9th April Hitler had told Milch that 100,000 Hungarian Jews were to be found for the construction of underground aircraft factories in the Reich (Doc. R. 139). 5 N.G. 1215. ¢ N.G. 2191.

GADARA 28 1 plan for exterminating Jews that it seems to have caused two clashes: one between Veesenmayer and Winkelmann, who objected to a non-SS. man interfering in Jewish questions, and one in Germany, which caused Ritter to write to Veesenmayer on 27th April warning him that Jews could not be employed “free” in Reich factories, ‘‘as this would render illusory the deJewing of the Reich, which has already been effected, and the removal of the Jews from factories of the Reich.”” There was, however, no objection to taking over Jews from Hungary in labour camps in the Reich which were under the authority of the Reichsfiihrer SS.1 Precisely because this demand was bona fide and regular, it exercised a disastrous influence on the events which now followed. On 16th April, which was also the Jewish Easter Day, the rounding up of the Jews in northeastern Hungary began. It started in the rural districts, whence the Jews were driven in part into local camps but in most cases direct into the five great camps, where, two days later, they were joined by the Jews of the big towns. The operation was carried out most ruthlessly and brutally. The Jews were not always allowed to take with them even the prescribed 50 kg. of luggage. The gendarmes hounded them on their way with blows and curses. Little heed was paid even to such saving measures as the order had prescribed. In most cases the Jews’ flats and houses were simply abandoned, and then completely looted where they were not wrecked. Some Hungarian officials, including the Governor of Ruthenia, resigned in protest, but the work went on. By the 20th, according to Winkelmann, 38,000 Jews were in the camps, and a day later, 100,000. The operation, which was proceeding “‘according

to plan and without friction,” was now about to extend to Maramaros and north-western Transylvania, to serve which areas further camps had been set up in Nyiregyhaza, Szatmarnémeti, and many towns of Transylvania. It was reported, the German wrote, that the north-east, with its 300,000 Jews, would be “‘cleared’’ by the end of April, leaving some 250,000-300,000 Jews to be rounded up later.

A similar process had begun on the 19th in the Operational Zone of Nagykanizsa. By “‘cleared”” Winkelmann seems simply to have meant that all the local Jews would have been lodged in camps. By the time he wrote, however, this

solution was already out of date, for in fact the concentration proved to be only a step to worse things still.

As soon as it began, Ferenczy had gone up to look at the camps. He returned on the 20th and reported to Baky that conditions were impossible: the inmates could not be fed or looked after, and there was a danger that epidemics would break out. Baky sent him to Eichmann to ask what was to be done about it; according to himself, 1t was motives of humanity which prompted him, since the problem was one with which he himself was unable to cope. ‘“‘This,” said Wysliceny, ““was the moment for which Eichmann had

been waiting.’ He said that he would take over the Jews if the Hungarian Government would request him to do so. At 4 p.m. Baky made the request. Eichmann at once arranged a conference of transport officials and wired to the Commandant of Ausschwitz camp, warning him that the Hungarian Jews were coming and telling him “‘to make all necessary preparations for their reception.” 1 N.G. 5535, 3705. 2 Wysliceny’s affidavit, Nazi Consp. and Agg., VIII, p. 615, Doc. V.U. 81.

282 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH The evidence. which is not quite complete or consistent. suggests that this agreement. which was not even put into writing, was so far only a personal understanding between Bakw and Eichmann; and there seems reason to

believe that Bakv had not consulted his superiors. But meanwhile the concentration of the Jews in the [Xth and Xth Districts was going on. under conditions approximately the same as those which had marked the drive in Ruthenia. This time complaints came in. some of which reached Horthy, who sent for Jaross and ordered enquiries to be made. Jaross passed the

order to—Endre. who after a tour of the camps (made in company with Eichmann, Wysliceny and Z6ldi, one of the reinstated butchers of Ujvidék) had the effrontery to report that:

“Everything was in perfect order. The provincial ghettoes had the character of sanatona. At last the Jews had taken up an open-air life, and exchanged their former mode of living for a healthier one.’”}

And incredible as it may seem. Horthy, Jaross and others to whom this piece

of cynicism was submitted, seem to have believed it. Nevertheless, the difficulty of maintaining the camps, bad enough on the 21st, was far greater still bv the end of the month, and now the Germans came forward with a fresh demand: the Operational Zones were to be cleared altogether, 1.e. the inmates even of the camps and ghettoes in those areas (thus including the bulk of the great camps) were to be moved right down into inner Hungary. This demand appears to have tipped the balance. Jaross consulted Endre (now back from his tour), who said that the move simply could not be carried through and the only practicable solution was to take advantage of the offer which the Germans had made “‘to accept those Jews, male or female, who were capable of working, into German labour camps, while those unable to work would be taken care of in concentration camps. The legal position was in order, since the Regent had given his consent to the transfer of the Jews to German labour camps.’”* This proposition, which was for the despatch of at least the entire local Jewish population, the aged and the infant. the sick, the halt and the maimed. as well as the lustv and able-bodied. was of course, a very different one from that to which Horthy, and following him, the Hungarian Government, had

really consented when it agreed to Veesenmayer’s demand for 50,000 or 100.000 “‘Arbeitsjuden’’; so different as to have called—so one would have

thought—for reconsideration of the whole problem. It seems, however, certain that not one of the Hungarians objected on principle to Endre’s and Eichmann’s proposal. It is not clear whether Horthy, who was afterwards to prevent the deportation of the Budapest Jews, realised in April that this was intended at all: the situation taken as necessitating the deportations had

arisen as a specific problem of the Operational Zones, and the Germans themselves, of set purpose, spread the report that only the unassimilated masses of the north-east were going to be deported: the Magyarised Jews would not be touched (a report which, incidentally, strongly affected the attitude of the Jewish Council itself).? But there seems no doubt that Horthy 1 Lévai, p. 125. 2 Id., p. 117. $ Lévai himself admits this (pp. 175, 178), and the German emissary, Thadden, wrote on 26th

May that: “The news of the transports had caused considerable consternation among the Jews in other parts of Hungary, but the authorities continued to pour out the [anti-Jewish decrees], useless as they were, and got the Judenrat in Budapest to announce that the deportations would

GADARA 283 consented to the deportation at least of the Jews from the north-east, and probably of all the Jews outside Budapest.1 Otherwise the only objection seems to have come from Csatay, who on grounds of military necessity objected to the wholesale removal precisely of the able-bodied Jews. It is also quite impossible to doubt that all the Hungarians concerned,

from Horthy downwards, meant the deportations to be final. The victims were never to return to Hungary. The many scores of speeches and articles poured out in the subsequent weeks, extolling the Government for having rid Hungary “‘for ever’’ from its Jews, admit of no other interpretation. Thus

when the Hungarians described the transaction as “not deportation but a simple transfer of labour” and adduced the analogy of the Hungarians already working in German factories, they were lying. On the final question, how-

ever, whether Hungarians knew that they were sending the Jews away to their deaths, the answer would seem to be in the negative. There may have been one or two among them who were in the secret of the gas-chambers of Ausschwitz,”? but most of them seem genuinely to have believed the Germans’

story that the families of the ““Arbeitsjuden’’ would be kept in camps until

the end of the war,? and after it they were to be settled in Palestine, Madagascar, Eastern Poland—where, the Hungarians concerned neither knew nor cared, so long as they did not return to Hungary. The view of those concerned was probably put most fairly by Szasz on 28th May, when, discussing the economic aspects of the final and radical solution of the Jewish question, he said: ‘In regard to this solution, let us state publicly and clearly that no one

intends the extermination, annihilation or torture of the Jews... . Nobody intends to rid the world entirely of the Jews; we merely wish to apply only to the non-assimilated Jews. The Magyarised Jews in other districts would be treated differently—otherwise all this legislation would be superfluous. Either thanks to this propaganda

or for whatever reason, the Jews in other parts of Hungary remained quiet, in spite of the deportations” (N.G. 2190). The Germans themselves, according to Barczy, told the Hungarian Government on 29th April that their target was 300,000. 1 In the memoirs written by him in prison, Baky wrote that Horthy said to him: “‘Baky, you are one of my old Szeged officers. The Germans have cheated me. Now they want to deport

the Jews. I don’t mind. I hate the Jews and the Communists. Out with them, out of the country! But you must see, Baky, that there are some good Hungarian Jews too, like little Chorin and Vida. Aren’t they good Hungarians? I can’t let them go, can I? But take the rest, the sooner the better!’ Horthy afterwards denied having used these words, but Veesenmayer in his evidence said: ‘‘Horthy himself told me that he was interested only in protecting the prosperous, the economically valuable Jews in Budapest, those who were well off. As to the remaining Jewry—and here he used a very ugly term—he had no interest in them and he was quite prepared to have them go to the Reich or elsewhere for labour.” (Min. Trial, 22.7.48, p. 13260.) Endre also said in his evidence that “the Regent raised no objection to the deportations, saying that the sooner the operation was concluded, the sooner the Germans would leave the country.” 2 Lévai, p. 140, writes that the reports which Ferenczy sent between 3rd May and 9th July

to the Ministry of the Interior prove that he knew the purpose of the transportations to have been ‘‘extermination by selection” and that the recipients of the reports must therefore have had the same knowledge. He does not, however, give quotations in proof of this statement, for which I can find no confirmation. The only person who has admitted that he knew of the death camps is the Jew Kastner, who testified to this effect at Nuremberg but made the extraordinary statement that he did not tell Horthy ‘“‘because contacts were lacking and it took some time before we found the men and the opportunity to inform Horthy about it.”” (Min. Trial, 9.3.48, p. 3621.) 3 On 28th April Horthy told Bishop Ravasz that: ‘“‘Only a few hundred thousand Jews had been scheduled to leave the country with the labour battalions. No harm would befall them, not

a hair of their heads would be touched.” a

Similarly, an official spokesman told foreign journalists in June: “The Hungarian authorities have placed Jewish manpower at the disposal of the Reich in order to meet the wish [for labour] of the German ally in the interest of the joint conduct of the war without prejudicing Hungarian war production. It is therefore a question, not of deportation but of normal transfer of labour.”

284 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH save our race from their noxious influence. I think that all of us... will be very happy when at last the unfortunate people of Ahasuerus finds, far from our borders, a home somewhere on the globe where it can establish a state of its own.” There was one other important difference between the respective attitudes

of the Germans and the Hungarians over the deportations. The Germans wanted the Jews to take as much of their property with them as possible. This was, of course, simply with the intention of taking it away from the deportees, or from their corpses, at the end of the journey. The Hungarians aimed at forcing the Jews to leave their property behind, not, of course, with any idea of restoring it to them afterwards, but of themselves appropriating it.

This unsavoury competition led to a good deal of friction between the two partners to it.

The decision taken, everything was ready to go forward. The main difficulty arose over the Honvéd’s wish to keep the able-bodied Jews for work in Hungary, and various negotiations took place. The final outcome would appear to be that about 75,000-80,000 able-bodied Jews were exempted from deportation on this ground and a proportion of them enrolled in Hungarian

labour formations, most of which were quartered in Budapest. No further exemptions seem to have been stipulated at the time, unless the final extent of exemption from the Jewish Laws which was enacted on Sth May” was made with an eye to the deportations. Meanwhile, on 29th April the Ghetto Order for Hungary as a whole had

been issued. This followed, in the main, the lines of the Ministry of the Interior’s earlier draft. Communes with a population of 10,000 or more were empowered to create ghettoes, and smaller communes to move their Jews to larger centres. The exceptions were the Operational Zones, from which the Jews were to be cleared altogether, and Budapest, where the Jewish

population was so large that it seemed an administrative impossibility to segregate it. The Jews could have been moved out of the capital altogether, but apart from the objections still felt by Horthy and others to treating the established Jewish colony of the capital in the same way as the population of the north-east, the Hungarian anti-Semites of the lunatic fringe had got the idea firmly implanted that the Allies would not bomb Jews. It was thought that if the Jews were concentrated in one area of Budapest, that area would be spared and the rest bombed, while a fortiori, if the Jews were taken out of the capital altogether, the whole city would be attacked. It was therefore decided to place the Jews in ‘“‘Jewish houses’? which should be 1 The figures vary considerably. Veesenmayer reported on 8th May that ‘‘in order that the execution of urgent military works shall not be endangered by the planned removal of the Jews to Germany, it was proposed to raise the existing number of 210 Jewish labour companies to

575. This would mean excepting about 150,000 Jewish workers from the evacuation.” The S.D. had no objection, provided the Jews were kept in concentration camps and guarded by the gendarmerie (N.G. 2059).

Thadden, on the other hand, reported in June that: ““The Hungarian Government has consented to having all Hungarian citizens ranking as Jews under Hungarian law moved into the Eastern territories. Only 80,000 Jews are to be kept back to work in the Hungarian munitions factories, under the supervision of the Hungarian Army.”’ According to Lévai, p. 472, the true figure was rather less still: 74,000-75,000. Calling-up notices affecting 80,000 men went out on 3rd June, but although the Honvéd, to the annoyance of the Germans, raided even the concentration camps, some of the men were probably deported.

Veesenmayer has stated, incidentally, that he encouraged the idea of leaving the Jewish

workers in Hungary in connection with the plan for transferring German factories to Budapest. 2 See above, pp. 277-8.

GADARA 285 distributed throughout the whole city, but most densely in those quarters which would be the natural targets of bombing, e.g. in the vicinity of the great munitions factories, the railway marshalling-yards, etc., or near Ministries, artistic monuments, etc., which it was especially desired to preserve. A list

of these houses was published prominently in the Press, and Jews were forbidden to participate in the evacuation of Budapest. The Ghetto Order (which was put into operation immediately) had been drafted when there was still no thought of deportations, and its appearance just as the deportions were sanctioned was probably a coincidence; but it greatly facilitated the planning of the further operation. This was the joint intellectual product of Eichmann, Endre and Baky, and constituted a happy proof of the will to collaborate which now existed between the German and Hungarian authorities. The Germans undertook the transportation outside the frontiers of Hungary,” while the help which they needed up to that point—

for the few hundred men constituting Eichmann’s commando could never have carried through the process unaided, less still in the face of a prohibition

from Horthy or Jaross—was readily forthcoming. The Honvéd refused, indeed, to touch the business, but General Faraghd, the administrative head of the gendarmerie,* readily placed his men at the Germans’ service for all operations required of them. A Jew passed from freedom to the deportation train through three stages. The first was segregation in the ghetto or Jewish House, in accordance with the Order just described. In the second stage, the Jew was moved again from the ghetto to a concentration camp,‘ where he was kept under guard until

taken to the final entraining station, which was normally Kassa; and the whole operation was so organised that while the victims of the first echelon

were being entrained at the death-railhead, those of the second would be moving into their camps. When the first echelon was gone, the second would move from camp to railhead, and so on. The order was to be: first echelon,

the Jews from Operational Zones (Zone I, Ruthenia and the Eastern Felvidék, Zone II, Northern Transylvania, and the Southern Operational Districts), these Jews being already in camps; second echelon, or Zone III, Gendarmerie Districts II and VII; third, Districts V and VI; fourth, Districts III and IV and Outer Pest; and lastly, Budapest itself. Only for the capital was an exceptional procedure envisaged. Not only

was it to be left to the last, but in order to lull the suspicions of those (including Horthy) who might oppose the move here, no preparations were

to be made until the last moment. An idea of organising a discovery of explosives in synagogues, and of revolutionary plots among the Jews, as an excuse, was dropped owing to the opposition of Veesenmayer, who objected not to the deportation but to the excuse, which he said would not have the

desired effects.° There was simply to be a sudden, unadvertised swoop, carried out on a single day by strong gendarmerie detachments from the provinces, and all special units and $.D. men. All postmen and chimney1 Other communes were allowed to copy this idea if they wished, and some, such as Uj-Pest,

oe the Hungarian Exchequer paid for this service the sum of 2:5 billion R.M. (5,000 R.M. per Jew, taking the deportees at the round figure of 500,000). 3 Later leader of the pre-armistice delegation to Moscow (see below, pp. 353 ff.) and, later still, Minister of Supply in the first Government of Democratic Hungary. 4 An order governing this process in the Pécs and Szombathely districts was reprinted in Viladg, 8th May 1946.

6 N.G. 2260 of Ist June.

286 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH , sweeps in Budapest were to be used as “pilots.” Tram and motor-bus traffic in the capital was to be stopped for the day and the vehicles used to move the Jews, who were to be concentrated on an island in the Danube above

Budapest. It was hoped in this way to catch all the Jews except those reserved for labour, and to have them all moved off by the beginning of September at the latest.+ As last stage came the deportation itself, normally, as has been said, from

Kassa, whence the trains would proceed via Slovakia and Galicia to Ausschwitz. The whole time-table depended on the speed at which this movement could be carried out, and the Germans said at first that they could provide daily only two 45-waggon trains, of the type in which soldiers were

regularly transported in war, 40 to a waggon. The Hungarians, in a hurry to finish the job, pressed for 6 trains daily. In the end the Germans agreed to provide 4 trains daily, and so that the operation should not be delayed, the complement per waggon was raised to 70. In this way, it was calculated,

the operation could begin in mid-May and be completed in 60 days. The

provisional date for the surprise raid on Budapest was fixed at midJune.

The process began on 15th May, when the original inmates of the Kassa camp were entrained, while simultaneously the Jews from Nagysz6llés and Maramaros were moved to Kassa. After them came the Jews from the rest of Ruthenia, then those of northern Transylvania, and so on. So speedily and efficiently was it carried on that by midnight, 21st May, 94,667 Jews had been deported (in 29 trains) and by a week later, 184,049 (in 58 trains). By 7th June, the whole of Zones I and II had been cleared (275,415 Jews in 92 trains), with another 13,000 or so from the Southern Operational Zones.* The deportations themselves were carried out, in all their stages, with sickening brutality? and the great majority of those of the luckless victims who survived to the end of the journey—which was made during the height of the summer heat. under conditions of gross overcrowding, with hardly any food or water, doors padlocked and even windows and ventilators boarded over—proved to have prolonged their lives by only a few days. It is true that they were then sorted over and those capable of working carried away to do so, but the Hungarians themselves had already reserved as many of the ablebodied men, and even women, as.they could for their own purposes. Those who made the journey were thus by definition “unutilisable material’ and the Germans also found their general physical standard abnormally low. Thus the Ausschwitz technicians sent to the gas-chambers a higher proportion of the Hungarian deportees than that of any other contingent with which they dealt.* Of the 450,000-odd Jews deported under the Sztdjay regime (including 1 N.G. 2190. * These included 5,000 Jews who were sent to the copper mines in Bor in Yugoslavia. Some of these escaped in October 1944 and tried to make their way back to Hungary. Most of them were butchered by the Germans en route, but a few escaped into Bulgaria and survived to tell the

toe Vinkelmann reported that up to 17th June 326,000 had been deported. The figures given by different authorities vary, particularly as their Black Book contains very many misprints. Furthermore, Endre’s report (p. 238) adds together two cumulative figures, thus reaching a figure of 615,000 at a date when the true figure was 340,000. * The Germans actually produced a film of which the first part showed the Jews being entrained at Kassa by the Hungarians with blows and curses, while the second depicted them being comforted and succoured on their arrival at Ausschwitz. The second half was a fake, but the first was genuine. + Lévai, p. 472.

GADARA 287 those deported at the end of June and the beginning of July), a maximum of 120,000 can have survived. The Jews of Budapest itself, numbering about 230,000, had not yet been touched except that they had been required to move into Jewish Houses. The negotiations between the Jewish leaders and the Germans were still going on, but it is not proposed to relate here in detail this complicated story, which has been fully treated elsewhere.! Suffice it to say here that although at one time Eichmann offered to suspend the deportations, or at least the gassings, pending the conclusion of a bargain, his price was far higher than anything which the Hungarian Jews could pay. Most of the negotiations concerned : relatively small numbers—in the first place, only 750 emigrants for Palestine. Later, Brand was allowed to go down to Istanbul, and larger numbers were

mentioned, partly in connection with a remarkable offer made by the Germans to trade the Jews for war material. The Allies rejected this; and in

the end the Kastner-Brand negotiations brought release to only a few thousand Jews. A few Jews bought their way out privately, and these included one group whose fate involved issues of nation-wide importance. These were the inter-linked families of the Weiss, the Kornfelds, the Chorins

and the Mauthners, who between them owned not only the vast Weiss Manfred works on Csepel, by far the biggest heavy industrial plant in Hungary, which alone employed over 40,000 workers, but also a very large number of other assets, of which the following are only the main items:

The subsidiary aluminium factory attached to the Weiss Manfred works themselves. The ““‘Donau”’ aircraft factory, manufacturing Messerschmidt aeroplanes.

Two canning factories and one factory manufacturing vegetable oils. Much urban housing property and large real estates.

The controlling financial interest in Hungary’s largest bank, the Pesti

Kereskedelmi Bank, and also large holdings of shares in the Salgdétarjan coal-mines (the third largest industrial undertaking in

Hungary); the Hungarian Aluminium Works and their holding Company, the Bauxite Trust, Chur, Switzerland; the Industrial Explosives Company, Budapest; and the Csepel cloth factory. The concern thus dominated the heavy industries of Hungary, and indeed, to a large extent, the whole industrial life of the country. Its importance in time of war was even greater than in peace, for its factories were vital to Hungary’s entire war production. Further, many members of the families named above (all of which were closely interrelated by marriage) took a high and deservedly respected place in Hungarian society. Dr. Chorin, a member of the Upper House, was on excellent personal terms with the Regent. Baron Moritz Kornfeld, who also sat in the Upper House, was the financial power

behind many liberal and pro-Allied organs and societies, including the Magyar Nemzet, the Magyar Szemle, the Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie and the

Hungarian Quarterly. He and his wife were notable also for their charitable activities. In the 1930’s the vast holdings of these gentlemen had been converted into a company known as the Labor Trust, Limited, in which 51 per cent. of the shares were held by persons ranking as non-Jews: the wives of Baron Weiss’ two sons, the Earonesses Jené and Alfred Weiss, Baroness George Kornfeld, 1 See for full details, Lévai, p. 261.

288 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Dr. Borbely (grandson-in-law), and one or two others. Thanks to this device, the Labor Trust as a whole could claim to be an “‘Aryan” concern under the Hungarian Jewish laws, although the private fortunes of many members of the group were, under the same laws, indisputably Jewish. Throughout the war the Labor Trust had turned out large quantities of arms and munitions

for the Axis, including some special engine parts, etc., which it made in Budapest for the German Army. At the same time, the mere fact of its essentially Jewish character was a beam in the German eye, and the works were suspected in certain cases of not going about their tasks with wholehearted energy. The pro-Allied character of the Press financed by Baron Moritz Kornfeld was another cause of offence. Finally, the mere existence of a very rich Jewish concern in Central Europe was at once a scandal and a temptation. Most of the leading Jewish members of the Group—Baron Jend Weiss, Chorin and others—were arrested and interned immediately after 19th March. As early as 4th April, however, Jené Weiss was visited by a high SS. official who said that he was authorised by Himmler to negotiate with the group in the interests of the Waffen SS. The terms of the proposed bargain were that the “‘Aryan”’ interests of the group (the Jewish property being already liable to confiscation under the decrees then in course of enactment) should pass to a “‘trustee’’ (““Treuhander’’) group representing the SS. (G.e. Himmler), which

should administer them and enjoy the usufruct of them for 25 years. If during that period or at the end of it the interests were sold outright, the SS. should enjoy first option. In return, the members of the family group were to get safe transport abroad to a neutral country and to receive a cash payment of 600,000 dollars and 250,000 R.M. They were also to be allowed to take their valuables with them. The negotiations dragged on for many weeks, since not only the family group but the Hungarian State also was vitally interested, in so much as if

the deal went through, practically the whole of the Hungarian munitions industry, and much of the rest of its economic wealth, would pass for a bagatelle into German hands. Very big artillery was brought up on both sides. On the German, the actual negotiator-in-chief, one SS. Colonel Kurt Becher, several times called in Winkelmann to help him,! and Winkelmann himself was admittedly only a post-box for Himmler and the Goring family. For the Hungarians, Horthy himself took the rare step of ordering Sztdjay

that no military or civil authority should transfer to ‘‘a foreign power,” “agricultural, industrial or commercial enterprises, or the lands, buildings, equipment or raw materials necessary to maintain them’ without reference to a Ministerial Council, and without his own consent, as well as that of all Ministers.2 Sztojay made representations to Hitler when he visited him on 6th June. Imrédy, when he became Minister of Economic Co-ordination, spent much of his time on this affair, to which we shall have to revert in other

connections. Here we may say that the Germans ended by securing acceptance of their offer, in return for a permit for 45 members of the family group concerned to emigrate to a neutral country, while three hostages were

to remain in Vienna. The party in fact reached Lisbon at the end of June, + It was a purely SS. affair, with which Veesenmayer had no truck. Indeed, he disapproved of it and offered his resignation in connection with it. * This was a general ruling, for other cases also had occurred. But the Weiss Manfred case was by far the most important.

GADARA 289 although, characteristically, the Germans had forged their Portuguese visas and never paid the bulk of the dollar price.

All this destruction should have been merely the preliminary to a great social and economic regeneration of Hungary, out of which was to come in its turn the full co-operation with Germany to achieve which was the ultimate

raison d étre of the Sztdjay Government. But while the destruction went forward smoothly enough, weeks passed before even a beginning could be made with the second stage, owing to political rivalries which occupied the Government’s time and diverted their energies. The old Opposition, indeed, gave no trouble, dropping, for the time, right out of the picture, following the drastic repression of the first days. Such of

the Liberal, Smallholder and Social Democrat leaders as had escaped imprisonment were in hiding, and by their own accounts found it impossible to stir far enough even to exchange ideas. Their followers did not appear to miss them particularly; the industrial workers (who were soon, as will be described, to make their own terms with the Government) continued to preserve perfect discipline, and there is not the smallest sign that the former rank and file of the Smallholders devoted one thought to politics from March until the following December. The Communists issued a few leaflets which had no discernable effect on anyone. The Conservative wing of the former Opposition was quite passive. Resistance from this side was, in fact, knocked out, not to recover until the Regent’s political reawakening provided it with a rallying-point again. But to make up for this, all the three parties nominally represented in the Government were, as we have said, discontented, for different reasons, with

their positions and determined to improve them; and it must be said that behind their differences there lay not only personal considerations—although these counted for disproportionately much—but also deep-lying considerations of principle. The Right Radicals—Imrédists and National Socialists alike—were really desirous of introducing radical social changes which would, as one of their effects, have helped the Germans, but were also, in their eyes, desirable for their own sakes, whereas the Conservatives were secretly determined to ‘‘save all that could be saved’’ of what was left, after the elimination of Jews and

Marxists, of Hungary’s old social, political and economic structure. And behind this first cleavage, the Imrédists and National Socialists, nominal allies, were in fact divided by a bitter mutual hostility.

The Government was therefore hardly formed before all three parties were locked in a triangular wrestling-match to alter the balance of power in

the Government each to its own advantage; or a better word might be pentagonal, since both Veesenmayer and Winkelmann were in the ring as active participants. On the edge of the ring were also the Transylvanians, the Christian People’s Party and the Arrow Cross. The Transylvanians could at this stage be counted, in practice, as part of the MEP. The Christians—the nearest approach to an Opposition of the old style which still survived—were too weak to matter. But the Arrow Cross now proved to matter a great deal. Much as the components of the regime hated it, they had not been able

to deny its title to rank in principle as a party of the Right, and thus to qualify for the amnesty and other benefits enjoyed by such parties, nor even T

290 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH to discriminate largely against its members in practice, since any attempt to

unravel, with that purpose, the complicated skeins of the Right Radical movement in Hungary would have led to impossibly absurd results. The Arrow Cross had thus necessarily been legalised and legitimised, with the disconcerting effect that it had emerged as a very considerable force. Its old

adherents among the middle classes, including the Army officers and the petite bourgeoisie, proved unexpectedly numerous, and it was now even threatening to develop into a mass movement; for as Szalasi claimed with full justice, it had been the only party of the Right ever to occupy itself seriously with the workers, and the dissolution of the Social Democrat Party had played

into its hands. Of the masses which that measure left without any political guiding line, many, no doubt, remained secretly faithful to their old creed and others became secret Communists. But a very substantial number joined the Arrow Cross, while practically none transferred their allegiance to the MEP, the Imrédists or the National Socialists. Szalasi, however, approached the problem, as usual, from an individual

angle. He had begun by ordering his followers to demonstrate against the occupation (a gesture followed by no other party, of the Right or the Left) and scattering leaflets which announced that, while he was willing to take over

the power and mobilise the nation’s entire forces against Bolshevism, he could do so only “by the common will of the people and of the Head of the State.” When (after this the offer had been disregarded by all concerned) the Sztédjay Government was formed, he described it to his followers! as “not National Socialist, and especially not Hungarian National Socialist, lacking either the personal or the factual qualifications for the title ...a transitory phenomenon, brought into being without the wish or the will of the nation, by the sins and omissions of the Governments which had preceded

it. ..a petit bourgeois Government composed of men who had already lost the confidence of the nation.’”’ The Arrow Cross had no part or lot in it, and repudiated responsibility for its actions. Then, on 3rd April, he met Veesenmayer (for the first time), and after cross-examining him minutely, recognised the German’s right to negotiate with the Hungarian parties and to approve the composition of the Hungarian Government. But even when satisfied so far, Szalasi continued to insist that if he took office, it must be on his own terms. The Germans must accept the Hungarist Idea and the rest of his programme, and must, in practice, give him full power; for when asked on what terms he would join a coalition, he demanded for his party the portfolios of Minister President, Foreign Affairs, the Interior and Defence, together with full compensation for all injuries suffered in the past, guarantees of undisturbed development in the future, and early elections on a revised franchise. Also, he must be received in audience by the Regent before accepting any appointment.

The fact that Szalasi thereafter treated Veesenmayer with respect, recognised him as a competent negotiating partner and allowed his followers to treat with him, whereas he did not so recognise Winkelmann, and only let

them hold informatory conversations with his agents, had the important result that Winkelmann and H6ttl (and indeed, many others) believed that Veesenmayer had now settled on Szalasi as his Hungarian client-in-chief. This was very far from the fact. * At a Meeting of the Hungarist Grand Council on Ist April. The speech was, however,

composed on 28th March.

GADARA 29] This interview had simply confirmed Veesenmayer in his earlier view that there was nothing to be done with Szaélasi, who seemed to him “‘a buffoon who alternately swaggered and grovelled,” and his followers ‘‘a gang of fantasts.”’ He did not wish to drive them into opposition, for he realised that they represented a certain force, even a card which it might be necessary to

play in the last resort, but he put them absolutely at the bottom of the pack. Accordingly, he temporised, handling Szalasi, incidentally, with consider-

able skill. He made him no promises, and in fact left him out of his next combinations, after extracting from him a promise of neutrality towards the Sztojay Government (exactly what he wanted). But he arranged to ‘‘keep in

touch” and managed to leave Szalasi under the illusion that the good impression which he had himself made on the P.V. was reciprocated. He did Szalasi one service for which Szalasi was boundlessly grateful to him: he procured him that audience with the Regent which the P.V. regarded as the indispensable preliminary to the realisation of his programme, and for

which he had been vainly importuning for so many years. This meeting, however, which took place on 3rd May, although valuable for the historian (for Horthy let Szalasi talk, and himself chattered in his usual incurably confiding manner, blurting out much information which Széalasi duly recorded in his diary!) had otherwise no results at all, or only negative ones. Poor Szalasi had gone to it with the highest hopes, and armed with the most elaborate plans for the future conduct of every aspect of Hungarian policy,

foreign and domestic. But Horthy (who probably had not taken in half of what Szalasi said) simply advised the P.V. to “‘wait and see.’’ The real outcome of the interview was, mutatis mutandis, exactly that of Szalasi’s talk

with Veesenmayer. Szalasi believed that he had made an excellent impression and that another wall had been demolished, while the Regent had simply been confirmed in his resolution never, under any circumstances, to appoint the P.V. Minister President. The only immediate advantage which Szalasi got out of the audience was

an incidental one. The negotiation of it brought him into contact with Sztéjay, and the two men took a strong fancy to one another. Sztdjay, by all accounts, was really impressed by the Arrow Cross, and owing to his insistence they thereafter were regularly, if only formally, consulted in all political negotiations, while Szalasi, for his part, took Sztdjay into his little Pantheon, always thereafter treating him with deep respect. This did not, however, alter his attitude towards the Government as a whole, or to the parties represented in it, all of which he continued to regard with implacable and openly voiced hostility and contempt; nor theirs to him, which was just as hostile. Not that that disturbed him, still less moved him to any thought

of compromise. He simply went on “organising” and planning for the 1 Some of the things which passed at this meeting are of real tragi-comedy. When Szalasi expounded the theory of Hungarism, the Regent replied sadly that he had never been able to understand what National Socialism meant. ‘“‘National’’ he understood, and ‘“‘Socialism”’ (his explanation of which, however, while engaging, showed that he had overestimated his learning); but no one had ever made clear to him the meaning of the combination. His contribution to the Jewish question was to say what a fine old chap Goldberger (the textile magnate) was; to that of land reform, the observation (not so silly as it was thought) that the land would not go round. He appears to have repeated himself in almost identical terms (for his thoughts were few and simple) to the leaders of the “‘Resistance Movement”? who had audience of him in the following October. He also told Szalasi that “‘he had travelled very widely and met very many people, but such a genius as his son Istvan he had never known.”’

292 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH future, serenely confident that one day both Horthy and Veesenmayer would call him to power on his own terms.

Meanwhile, the MEP, the Imrédists and the National Socialists were manceuvering around the formula of Right-wing Unity, which was still a German desideratum. The lead fell of right to the MEP, as the Party to which the Minister President belonged, and the first public initiative in fact came from that quarter. On Sth April, the Party announced that they had “decided that it was advisable to bring about collaboration between the Right-wing parties’? and had entrusted Vay with the negotiations. The proposals were colported round the other parties a few days later, by Ratz; they consisted of a proposal that the MEP, the Transylvanians, the Imrédists, the National Socialists and the Arrow Cross should jointly issue a “‘short but dramatic declaration” that they had jointly agreed to dissolve themselves and merge in a new party, to be known as the ‘“‘Party of National Concentration’”! on a programme combining certain tenets of each but omitting such extreme postulates of any party as were quite unacceptable to the others. The offer was not, perhaps, a very tempting one to the other parties. It is true that it left open for negotiation the question of what items should be included in, and what omitted from, the joint programme, and also that of how the positions in the new party and the Government were to be allotted. If, however, the allocation of either was made in any way proportionate to the Parliamentary representation of the parties, the MEP would clearly enjoy an overwhelming advantage. Imrédy, surprisingly, accepted it, but it was rejected out of hand, not only by the Arrow Cross but also by the National Socialists, who described it as a manceuvre for placing them in a permanent

minority, and declared that nothing short of integral National Socialism, under their own leadership, would satisfy them. As the Imrédist-National Socialist coalition still existed, the Imrédists declared themselves bound by the decision of their allies, and the project fell to the ground.

On list May Bardossy (apparently prompted by certain conservative forces) made another attempt to reconcile the Right-wing parties. As the ex-Premier enjoyed very general esteem, all those concerned, except the Arrow Cross, which refused in advance, empowered representatives to negotiate with him, with exactly the same result as before. The National Socialists laid down conditions unacceptable to anyone else,? and on 4th May Bardossy “‘gave back his mandate.”

On the 13th Sztdjay called a joint meeting of leaders of all Right-wing parties, this time including the Arrow Cross, and made to them a strong “last appeal.’’ Szalasi’s representative, Vajna, simply said that his party 1 Nemzeti Osszefogas Partja. > The case of Bardossy illustrates the difficulty of attributing motives to the others in these negotiations. At his trial Bardossy was, of course, accused by the prosecution of having undertaken his task in the interest of the Germans, and it was, of course, true that the Germans wanted

Right-wing unity, and that Veesenmayer was very anxious to work with him. But he himself denied (Trial, p. 2) that he had been commissioned by either Sztéjay or Veesenmayer. He told a friend that what he wanted was, just as much, to strengthen the Hungarians’ hand against the Germans (see an article by “Dr. L. H.” in the Buenos Aires A Magyarok Utja, 15th October 1950) and Szalasi put the same interpretation on it (Bardossy Trial, p. 35). At the time, according to his diary, Szalasi thought that the attempt was inspired by Cardinal Serédi. 3 According to Mme Zenkay (Sztojay’s secretary), these were: (1) all trials since 1918 in which a Jew had participated as judge, witness, advocate or party should be cancelled and retried; (2) full satisfaction should be given to everyone who had suffered in any way for his national socialist opinions and the judges officials, etc., responsible for those sufferings should be called to account; (3) they should have control over the press and propaganda of the new party. (Demokrdcia, 29th July 1945.)

GADARA 293 could not collaborate with ‘“‘compromised elements”? and walked out of the room; the others got no further than before. All the parties concerned now burst into a spate of independent activity,

even the Transylvanians producing their own programme, which, they admitted cheerfully, was just the same as before March. The Arrow Cross—

in spite of strong obstruction from the Government, which arrested their agents and even raided their premises—developed a vigorous agitation, especially in the working-class districts. The National Socialists, who were well-supplied by the SS. with funds and facilities to develop their propaganda,* expanded their Press, which at this time was:as copious as it was violent, and

founded new branches up and down the country. Outside official politics,

they possessed a trump card in the shape of Baky’s control of the Gendarmerie, and Baky was also reported to be founding a small “Order

Force” of his own. The Party also founded a smaller and more secret organisation, for employment on special assignments, which was known as

the “Service for the Preservation of the Nation.’ The head of this was a

certain Vincze Gorgey, an adventurer of an obscure and inconstant past.? The Imrédists, too, at last provided themselves with a “body” to go below their “‘head.’”’ Jaross sanctioned the statutes of the ““KABSz.’? This was nominally non-party (except for being Right-wing); but its organiser and secretary, Ney, had never had any idea of making it anything else but an Imrédist Party Guard, and as soon as its statutes were promulgated, had it elect Imrédy (who had served a term, although a short one, on the Eastern

Front) President. Kunder and Jaross also joined it. To it was added a Youth Organisation, the ABI (Anti-Bolshevik Youth), organised on the same lines and with the same purpose. The agitation of the National Socialists and the Imrédists was in large part directed against one another, for the deep latent rift between them in policy, or at least in tactics, was now becoming open. The National Socialists were still going banco on Himmler’s support. They demanded “‘total power’’. for themselves, and ‘“‘uncompromising National Socialism.” The Imrédists, while still professing, and presumably sincerely wanting, to achieve National

Socialism (of their own brand), knew that Veesenmayer did not mean to support a team or a programme which would have to be imposed on Horthy against his will and perhaps at the price of his resignation. They had therefore decided on a policy of accepting the form of a mixed Government, partly

Conservative, but increasing their own representation inside it, and then working for the realisation of their aims from inside. Zero hour, by general consent, was 24th May, when Parliament was to meet in order to legitimise itself.t The Imrédists, declaring that **the period of waiting imposed on the Party by the unwritten law of loyalty had ended with the failure of the negotiations for Right-wing unity,” sent an ultimatum to the Government to find Imrédy a place in it before that date; otherwise 1 Winkelmann had calmly commandeered one of the largest Hungarian printing-presses, the Globus (in which the Magyar Nemzet used to appear) and turned it over to his protégés. The Magyarsdg now appeared in the format formerly used by the Magyar Nemzet. 2 We have mentioned Gorgey once before (above, p. 195, n. 1). He had connections with Ratz, Ruszkay and Baky, and with the KABSz, but it seems certain that his “‘service,” if not an individual enterprise, was most closely connected with the National Socialists. 3 See above, pp. 208-9. 4 The meeting duly took place, but need not be recorded in detail. Sztdjay made a formal speech in which he said frankly that he had “‘no programme”’ except to prosecute the war. The House then voted him confidence and adjourned.

294 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH ‘the Party would withdraw its Ministers and go into vigorous opposition.” This was accompanied by a veiled threat that the Regent’s own position would be endangered if he continued to withhold his consent to the appointment. Horthy had in fact been reluctant to make the appointment,! but in face

of this threat he gave way. On 23rd May Imrédy entered the Cabinet as Minister of Economic Co-ordination. This brought a complete and final break between the Imrédists and the National Socialists. The Imrédists insisted that they were sacrificing none of their principles in entering the Cabinet. On the contrary, they were now going to force through those measures of general reform which the resistance of the Conservatives had hitherto prevented.?, They were also going to begin an era of sincere co-operation with Germany in the economic field. But as the National Socialists, on the other hand, chose to see it, their former ally had sold himself to the “‘clique’’ and the Jews, and had destroyed their own hopes of coming to power in virtue of the party alliance which, on paper, had still existed. They promptly declared the alliance dissolved and announced that unless something radical was done, they would be “‘driven into opposi-

tion.’ When, a few days later, Imrédy secured the cancellation of a first agreement, already signed, between the SS. and the heads of the Weiss Manfred concern, the fury of the National Socialists knew no bounds, and they opened against Imrédy a personal campaign of extraordinary scurrility,

which took the form, partly of bitter attacks on him in their Party Press, partly of the issue of a flood of leaflets, which were distributed throughout Hungary by post or through other channels, reviving the story of Imrédy’s Jewish ancestry, which was set out in the form of a family tree.* Things were now far more troublous than ever, for Himmler’s agents were touched to the

quick, partly by the political defeat of their protégés, and even more— probably—by the threat to their great business deal. There were hurried journeyings to Germany, and conversations on a very high level indeed. Palffy and Hain were in Berlin, H6ttl in Salzburg, where he talked to Himmler himself. The outcome of these conversations may be gathered from proposals which Hottl and his friends made to Szalasi on their return, for a union between “‘all the genuine National Socialist parties,” i.e. the National Socialists themselves and the Arrow Cross. The two parties were to sign a joint declaration agreeing to bury their differences for the duration of the war, appoint a mixed Committee for the settlement of any differences in the future and “‘advance together towards the great end.’’ The leader of the united forces was to be Count Fidél Palffy, who was thought to be the most suitable man, especially as, being a Count, he would have easy access to the Regent, the high aristocracy and the clergy. The first step was simply 1 According to Barczy, the Regent at first refused to make the appointment unless it was balanced in some way. Sztdjay then offered Bela Teleki, of the Transylvanian Party, a Ministry without Portfolio, which Teleki refused on the ground that the Transylvanian Party was not a Party of the Right (actually, the representatives of the Transylvanian Churches, whom he had consulted, had said that Transylvania must not be represented in the Quisling Sztdjay Govern-

ment). Bardossy was then asked to take over the Portfolio of Cults, but Imrédy refused to serve with Bardossy, and at last the Regent gave way to Sztdjay’s strong insistence.

? A private report of the period attributed the activity of the Imrédist Party in May chiefly to the discontent felt especially by the rank and file at the reactionary attitude of the MEP members of the Government, which “had proved itself even more reactionary than its predecessors over social questions.”’

3 To this was appended a genealogy of the late Premier, Count Pal Teleki, whose mother had been of Greek origin. The leaflets were widely attributed to the Arrow Cross, but were certainly the work of the National Socialists. They appeared on or about 11th June,

GADARA 295 to consist of getting the Imrédists out of the Government and replacing them by Ministers from the new coalition, but there were discreet murmurs that more might follow. Palffy might presently replace Sztdjay, then he might become Deputy Regent, and finally Regent himself. It was even hinted that

the change might be put through by a putsch if it could not be effected peacefully.

The National Socialists were as unsuccessful with Szdlasi as everyone else had been. When first approached by Hdottl, the P.V. said that he did not in the least mind Imrédy’s grabbing positions. The more he did so, the sooner he would reveal his own incompetence. His own terms for a reunion of the two National Socialist Parties were as he had announced them in the

preceding January: complete recantation by his former followers and acceptance by them of his own absolute authority as leader. He would have nothing to do with a putsch and would take over power only “‘by the joint will of the nation and the Head of the State’’ (and he even warned the police

of the possibility of a putsch and dissociated himself from it). He would enter a coalition only if his Party possessed in it “‘both the personal and the

real leadership.”” Indeed, he could hardly be bothered with immediate politics, for he was just putting the finishing touches to 2 plan (which, in fact,

he forwarded to Hitler in mid-June) for the reorganisation of Europe into tribes (T6rzsek) under Hitler as Supreme Tribal Leader, with Mussolini as Deputy Tribal Leader, himself Tribal Leader for Hungary (Horthy, however, remaining Head of the State) and so on. The National Socialists and their backers evidently felt too weak to act quite alone, so their plans remained only plans during the next weeks. It was, however, relevant to subsequent developments that although they did not withdraw from the Government (it was too useful to them to have Baky

in it) they were now, in fact, in the most violent opposition to it, and especially to the Imrédist members; and that in Germany the SS. was actively abetting them.

Imrédy’s followers managed to parry the assault on their leader by securing from Fritzsch, in Berlin, and publishing (over the signatures of five unimpeachable anti-Semites) an affidavit! that the papers attributing a Jewish

, ancestry to him were forged. By now they hated the National Socialists as bitterly as they were hated by them. But the compensating solidarity which should have developed between them and the MEP also failed to materialise. Reményi-Schneller, at the trial of Imrédy, put it that “the powers of the Minister of Economic Co-ordination had been imperfectly defined, so that his fiats conflicted with the principle of Ministerial responsibility.” This meant, in other words, that the Ministers of the two parties spent their time in thwarting one another, partly on principle, partly out of jealousy. The others also complained that Imrédy spent too much of his time in political intrigues and in speechifying, in defiance of the ban on political meetings.” Szalasi’s prophecy of the results of Imrédy’s achieving office proved cruelly accurate. With all this it will easily be understood that the walls of the New Hungary

rose slowly, and the total mobilisation of Hungary’s economic resources went as slowly. In the latter field, a few measures had been taken at once: on 29th March it was announced that the manufacture of luxury goods would 1 Published in the Press of 14th-15th June. > He got round this by addressing the KABSz.

296 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH be forbidden thereafter, that no fuel or power would be allowed for such

purposes, and that the utilisation of stocks of raw materials would be governed exclusively by war needs. The regulations tieing labour in essential

jobs, including agriculture, were tightened up and the Government took further powers to direct labour and to punish refusal to work, inefficiency, etc. The Germans meant this only as a beginning: they had brought down with them, besides Bunzler, the ‘‘chief economic adviser,’ a whole staff of specialists, a representative of the armaments industry, a representative of Sauckel’s for the recruitment and allocation of labour, the German team for a joint industrial commission, and many more, who were going, as one of them told the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, ‘“‘to help and advise Hungary

in the development of her economic resources... and... to make available to her the economic experience which was the basic requirement for the total mobilisation of the country’s economic resources.”” Those resources were not only to be developed, but also to be closely integrated with the German economy by the development of such branches of production as Germany needed, the closing down of others, etc. The already existing joint munitions production programme was to be largely developed. Hungarian labour was to go to Germany in increased quantities, but as the German factories were by now suffering heavily from bombing, while the Hungarian were relatively intact, a reverse movement of labour was also envisaged, and the Germans were also considering a plan (specially pressed by Veesenmayer, who thought that not only were the sites ideal, but that it would be possible in this way

to utilise the materials which Hungary had accumulated through her ‘pronounced policy of reserves’), for transferring part of their aircraft production to the great underground caves in and outside Buda. Finally, a suitable social framework was to be constructed within which the economic forces in question were to be deployed. During April and May, however, there was almost total standstill. The plans for transferring aircraft factories were pursued, but got inextricably

tangled up with the Jewish question, which also swallowed up, in the disastrous fashion described, the converse plan of sending Hungarian workers to Germany. The influence of the Conservative members of the Government blocked all proposals to reorganise the structure of Hungarian economic life, or even to introduce certain innovations, including a measure of land reform, for which both the Hungarian Right Radicals and the Germans pressed.” The Germans had during these weeks proposed to create a special lendlease agreement, outside the clearings, under which Hungary should furnish

Germany with agricultural produce and some industrial articles against payment after the war. The Hungarians resisted this, but after some weeks of negotiation, accepted an enlargement of the framework of the old clearing system which extended the credits which Hungary was allowing Germany, and when this had been agreed, Jurcsek sent to Germany a large part of those stocks of wheat, etc., which preceding Governments had hoarded away.® 1 Veesenmayer’s evidence, Min. Trial, 22.7.48, p. 13222.

° This was partly because the Germans wanted to buy up land and settle Germans on it. As Barczy writes, ‘this was too much even for Jurcsek,”” who thereupon forbade the sale of land altogether for the duration of the war. 3 At the trial of Reményi-Schneller it was stated that the value of these deliveries was 150 million pengd. Mecsér told Szalasi that they included 4-5 million quintals of wheat, 1 million q. maize, and other produce. The Sztatisztikai Evkényv for 1946 does not reveal the quantities or values of wheat or maize exported to Germany in 1944, but puts the value of the total wheat exports at only 20-5 million pengo. Hungary’s total exports in 1944 were, according to this

| GADARA 297 | The deadlock was to some extent broken after Imrédy became Minister

of Economic Co-ordination. On 2nd June he signed with Bunzler’s successor, Boden, an ambitious agreement for the closer integration of the war

production of the two countries. Germany was to supply tanks and other weapons, while Hungary manufactured anti-aircraft guns, automatic pistols and lorries. She was also to manufacture, for Germany (but retaining a share), several hundred light aeroplanes monthly in Ko6banya, Germany sending

down machinery and some skilled workmen. On the same day Reményi Schneller and Veesenmayer signed a comprehensive agreement regulating the mutual financial obligations of the two countries.! This laid down the principle that each country should contribute its maximum to the joint effort, and to obviate difficulties arising out of transfers, etc., established, firstly, a ‘““Hungarian War Fund,” into which the Hungarian Government was to pay the sums of pengé incurred, as from 19th March 1944, by the German Wehrmacht and ‘“‘the organisations attached or assimilated thereto

in Hungary” for personal expenditure, including rations, except where covered under special agreements,” buildings and billets, cost of transport by road or river, costs of the new SS. formations, allowances for the families

of the persons described above, construction of aerodromes, roads and bridges, a proportionate share of the cost of moving factories endangered by air-raids and the cost of German civilian services in Hungary. The sums due from Hungary for May, June and July were put at 200 million pengo per

month. Certain Hungarian credits accumulated in Germany, including savings of Hungarian workers in Germany, were paid by Germany into a second account (Sonderkonto K), while a third account was established for German deliveries of arms and material of war to the Hungarian Ministry of Defence. All other Hungarian-German payments and deliveries went on

as before, i.e. through the ordinary clearing; but for the time being the different accounts were not to be set off against each other. Price levels were so far as possible to be equalised and stabilised. About the same time, the Ministers in charge of the economic portfolios were becoming vocal, and on 4th June the Press carried an announcement that preparations (which, it was admitted, it would take several months to realise) were on foot for reorganising the entire economic life of Hungary on a corporative basis. It must, however, be admitted that little came of any of these plans or agreements, except, indeed, the financial agreement, which brought Germany, on balance, not inconsiderable financial advantages.* The plan for transferring German aircraft production to Hungary could only be carried out on a source, 946,798,000 peng6, of which 697,167,000 p. went to Germany; her imports 808,306,000 p.

(568,300,000 from Germany). Nevertheless, this must have been much less than was expected, for according to one source, on Ist August Hungary was four weeks behind with her industrial deliveries. Herr Veesenmayer informs me that Hungary had 1,200,000 tons of cereals available. After much haggling, Jurcsek consented to send 700,000, and actually only 90,000 were ever sent.

1 The text of this (in German) is contained in the Szalasi Diary. 2 Two such special agreements, dated 4th April 1941 and 20th March 1944 respectively, existed. They were now taken over by the War Fund. 3 The total payments made by Hungary under this and analogous agreements is not known, but it has been stated that the Ministry of Defence paid into the War Fund, in all, 1,157-4 million pengd, including 36 m.p. for building of aerodromes, roads and fortifications, 120 m.p. for moving industries and 611 m.p. for the maintenance of the German troops. Germany’s total debt to Hungary rose during the Sztdjay regime from 997 to 2,224 million R.M. Another statement made at the trial of Rajniss was that by the end of September 1944 Germany owed Hungary 3,319,870,000 R.M.; another, that Hungary had delivered goods to Germany (not paid for) to the yalue of 1,800 million R.M.

298 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH very modest scale, owing to the disorganisation caused in Hungary itself by the Allied bombing.’ The reconstruction of Hungarian economic life hardly made any progress at all. Jurcsek ended by prolonging the powers of the existing agricultural organisations for another two years, and maintaining in force (with only slight modifications to adapt it to the needs of the moment) the existing system of agricultural deliveries. The chief innovations in this field were the increasingly drastic measures of compulsion to which both owner-producers and labour had to submit. Failure to deliver the prescribed quotas was subjected to heavy penalties, and persons leaving their land uncultivated could have managers putin. Vigorous steps were taken to remedy

the labour shortage, which was growing severe. Persons whose main occupation was agriculture were forbidden to leave it without a special permit. Persons refusing to work, committing sabotage or leaving their place of work could be interned. Where labour was short, application could be made to the Army Labour Service. Leventes and other organisations did compulsory service during the harvest. The Ministry of Commerce found its hands entirely full with clearing up the mess caused by the eviction of the

Jews from economic life, and the same applied to a large extent to the Ministry of Industry, although Szasz did get as far as producing a blueprint of the future corporate system. In practice he, again, could do no more than apply increasing compulsion; on 2nd June he assumed the widest powers to

allocate raw materials, and to transport, enlarge, reduce, close down or compulsorily amalgamate firms, and also to control labour. Conscription and direction of male labour now became in fact fairly complete, and conscription was also extended (fairly generous exceptions being allowed) to unmarried women. There is only one aspect of all this activity which calls for fuller description. If these measures were to yield the desired results, and continuity of production to be assured, both on the land and in the vitally important munitions factories, it was, of course, above all necessary to secure the co-operation of labour; and it should in fairness be added that, pragmatic necessity apart, the Right Radical wing of the Government was quite sincere in its wish to improve the social conditions and status of labour in the community. Thus

when the Government dissolved the Social Democrat Party it took great pains to emphasise—and so far as many of its members were concerned, with all sincerity—that this step had not been taken because the Party protected the workers’ interests, but on the contrary, because it preached a subversive

foreign policy. The regime would itself regard the workers as a positive factor in the nation and would see to it that their material and social interests were properly safeguarded. Compulsion would have to be applied, but wages and social conditions should be better, not worse, than before.

It cannot be denied that the Government made considerable efforts to honour this promise. The great social insurance institutions, the OTI and MABI, were placed under Government Commissioners, but an assurance was given that when “Marxist influences” had been eliminated from them, their autonomy would be restored. Meanwhile, contributions were received and benefits paid as before, or rather, with some improvements. The age 1 His enemies attributed the failure of this and the other agreements to the inefficiency, or even sabotage, of the Jew Imrédy; but even Jurcsek, whose good will was not in question, found jt impossible to keep deliveries up to schedule.

GADARA 299 limit for old age, widows’ and orphans insurance was lowered from 65 to 60, and the benefits raised. The social insurance system for agriculture labour

was extended and systematised. The law on holidays with pay was made more generous. Wages were kept as nearly as possible in step with the rising cost of living; a considerable proportion of them was now paid in kind. A relatively generous allowance was made for time lost during air-raids, and 30 per cent. extra pay given for work carried out during alerts. Workers,

industrial and agricultural, were given priority in the issue of textiles, footwear, etc. Employment exchanges, except in agriculture, were nationalised.

On 16th June a species of Whitney Council was introduced, which provided very elaborate and abuse-proof machinery for ensuring prompt and impartial hearing for any complaints of the workers, and on 23rd July a new

National Organisation of Hungarian Industrial Workers (MIMOSz) was set up, which, although forbidden to occupy itself with party politics, was genuinely representative in the composition of its Executive Committee and Sub-Committees, which were electoral, enjoyed “‘complete autonomy” under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, and was given extensive terms of reference: to ensure and preserve among its members national points of view and the requirements of Christian morality, to provide for their spiritual and economic well-being, to watch over the honour and good name of labour and to represent its professional and social interests. After a little while the Government went further still. Its original plan

, had been to keep the bodies of the old Trade Unions, etc. (which, in theory, were non-political), intact, but to inform them with a new spirit within the framework of Marton’s Fascist NMK. As the workers refused to accept the new leaders, the Government dropped Marton and opened negotiations! with the two most important Social Democrat Trade Union leaders who had

escaped arrest (Szeder and Kabok) and with a third, Malasits, who was fetched back from Mauthausen for the purpose. The Government now actually offered to rescind the dissolution of the Social Democrat Party. This proved impossible, as the Social Democrats made their acceptance conditional on the release of all the political prisoners (of the Left), which the Hungarians could not do if they would, since the Germans were inexorable

in the case of their Jewish prisoners. A pact was, however, concluded— whether orally or in writing I do not know—under which the premises and funds of the Trade Unions were restored to them against a promise to maintain labour discipline and continuity of production and to abstain from sabotage or subversive action. This undertaking was honoured punctually on both sides. Strikes and sabotage remained as unknown under the Sztdjay regime as they had been under its predecessors. Indeed, when asked by the leaders of the ‘“‘underground resistance” to join them, Kabok refused at first, as he was unwilling to hazard the Trade Union movement.’ It was only later

that he changed his mind. And even then, it is a fact that the workers of Csepel remained at their benches in October 1944 when the sound of the gunfire on the front was audible to them as they worked. Thanks to the accommodating spirit shown by both sides over this 1 The details of this story are not very clear, as both parties, for obvious reasons, concealed the facts both before and after the event. A few indications are given in A Reakcid Ellen, ch. 6, and I have obtained a few more from persona! sources, > 4 Reakcio Ellen, p. 107,

300 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH question, production was maintained reasonably well, so far as the air-raids allowed.! The political importance of the agreement needs no underlining. This was the position in mid-June, when the central pillar of the whole structure—the Regent’s acquiescence in the new course—began to grow unsteady. What shook it was his own disapproval, and the indications now reaching him of the disapproval of others, of the excesses against the Jews. 1 Adonyl, op. cit., p. 103, writes that production of arms fell in 1944 owing to the bombing, and although he does not break down all his figures, it looks as though the fall in certain branches

of production had been fairly serious: thus only 90 7:5 anti-tank guns were produced, against 205 in 1943; only about 5,000 automatic pistols (against 12,000), etc. But the production of aircraft continued to rise; in 1944 367 Messerschmidt 109s were produced, 106 Hejjas, 215 Messerschmidt 210s and 85 transport and training machines (for the 1942 and 1943 figures, see above, pp. 119-20, 166).

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

REVULSION HE brutality which accompanied the concentration of the Jews! in ) north-eastern Hungary and the inhumanity of the conditions under

which they were confined had, when they first became known, evoked protest both from the Jewish Council and from other quarters, including the

official leaders and many prominent individuals among all the Christian - Churches. When the intention to deport Jews to Germany became known —even though it was still believed that they were really to be used for labour—the Holy See had, as we said, protested. But no one was yet ready to make a stand. The Cardinal Primate, in the main, confined his interventions in May to protesting against the inclusion of baptised Jews in the concentration. The Jewish Council was still hopeful, right up to 15th May, that the Kastner-Brand negotiations would lead to an early result which would avert the deportations altogether. Eichmann was still promising them, up to the day when the first trains started and even after it, that if they behaved sensibly, there would be no deportations; and when it became known that these had begun, said that the deal would be concluded in Germany, so that no real harm would come to the deportees. Furthermore,

the Jews of Budapest still believed that it was only their “‘unassimilated brothers’”’ from the north-east who would suffer; they themselves would be spared. Throughout May the Government, which, as we have said, still genuinely

believed that the deportations, although final, were not to end in the extinction of their victims, but only in their permanent removal from Hungary, simply replied to all protests by declaring itself unable (as most of its members were unwilling) to stop them. On 5th June the Nunciature returned to the charge with a further Note in which it said that what was afoot was not labour transfer but total deport-

ation under the most inhumane conditions. It now asked that the deportations should stop altogether, that all Jews should receive more humane treatment, and that baptised Jews should be exempted from all anti-Jewish legislation. This was the day before Sztojay visited Hitler, and he appears to have raised the subject with the Fithrer. But Hitler only answered that so long as the Jewish question was not settled, the German forces would not leave Hungary. Veesenmayer, too, is said to have told Sztdjay that the deportations ‘‘had to be.”’ Thus the Nuncio’s letter was not even answered, and although instructions were given (not for the first time) that “‘brutalities

must be avoided,” the concentrations and deportations went on. The concentration of Zone III, begun on 5th June, was completed by 10th June and the deportation (50,805 Jews) carried through between 11th and 15th June. Now, however, fuller news was beginning to trickle through at least of

the conditions under which the transportation was being carried out. A 1 For full details see Lévai, op. cit., pp. 129 ff.

302 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH couple of Jews had managed to escape from one of the trains. They got back to Hungary, and drew up a memorandum which they handed to the leaders

of the Orthodox Jewish Community, who in their turn passed it to the Government, the Heads of the Churches, various leading political figures and the foreign Missions in Budapest. Even now, the secret of the gas-chambers does not seem to have leaked

out: at any rate, none of the surviving documents of the dates contain any allusion to it. But the Jews did point out that it could not be the Germans’ intention to use the aged and infirm for labour; it could hardly be doubted that the fate which awaited them in Germany was death. And others shared this view. Renewed representations were made to the Government by both the Catholic and Protestant Churches. Count Maurice Esterhazy took the memorandum to Horthy. When the Ministerial Council met on the 19th and again on the 20th, the

protests of the Churches were mentioned, and Arnothy-Jungerth also reported that the deportations were creating a hostile atmosphere abroad. Jaross denied the authenticity of the reports from abroad, and most of the Ministers were inclined to dismiss them as propaganda. Several of them argued that the proper retort (which was in fact frequently made in the Press of the next weeks) was to say that the Allies, in bombing Budapest with its

civilian population, were the persons really guilty of brutality. It was, however, decided to call for Endre and Baky to attend the next day’s meeting and report to it.

At that meeting Baky described the origin of the operation. Endre, in a long report, denied most strongly that there had been any brutality. The complaints were exaggerated or completely unfounded. There had been some

overcrowding in the camps, but that was because there had proved to be many more Jews than had been expected, owing to the illicit presence of unregistered foreign Jews. The Jews had roofs over their heads, food, water to drink; everything was being done in a Christian spirit. Several of the Ministers, including Sztdjay and Imrédy, deprecated brutality, and renewed orders were given that this should be avoided. Several

minor decisions in the right direction were taken. The order that nonYellow Star Jews were to be exempted was repeated, and proposals put forward by M. Mester, Antal’s Secretary of State, for enlarging the exemptions were adopted. But even now no one so much as suggested stopping the deportation of the provincial Jews, which went on quite unchecked. The Jews of Districts V and VI had been assembled between 11th and 20th June. Deportation took place between 25th and 28th June, when 40,505 Jews were taken out of the country. On 22nd June Endre was in Sidfok arranging for the concentration of the Jews of Districts III and IV, after which only Outer Pest and the capital itself would remain. Now, however, diplomatic interventions were multiplying. All the heads of the diplomatic missions in Budapest, except the German, Italian and Croat, approached Arnothy-Jungerth. The Pope sent a personal protest, as did the

head of the International Red Cross. Cardinal Serédy issued a strong Pastoral Letter, which he ordered all priests to read out from the pulpit. The Government forbade the postal authorities to forward the letter, and after animated negotiations, the Cardinal acquiesced in this suppression, but

only in return for solemn promises from the Government that the worst abuses should cease. A deputation from the Protestant Churches sent

REVULSION 303 in a protest signed by the nine Bishops. On the 26th President Roosevelt sent

a Note through the Swiss legation demanding immediate cessation of the deportations and other anti-Jewish measures and threatening further armed reprisals in case of refusal. Horthy was by now seriously perturbed. On the 26th he called a Crown

Council. He said that Baky and Endre, whom he described as ‘‘filthy sadists,”” must go, and that the deportation of the Budapest Jews must be cancelled.

| A Ministerial Council met next day (when, incidentally, Mr. Cordell Hull repeated Roosevelt’s warning) to consider how to execute these orders. It got not much further than advising, by a majority, acceptance of the offers made by the various foreign and international bodies, following which

decision Sztdjay called on Veesenmayer with a memorandum? asking permission to accept these offers.

Nothing would have been done in any case about the remaining Jews outside the capital; for, unfortunately, the word ‘‘Budapest”’ in Horthy’s order was operative. During all the tumultuous days that followed, no finger was lifted to save these unfortunates. Theconcentrationin Districts II] andIV was completed by 30th June, and the 29,556 victims taken off in the first days of July. The concentration of the 34,123 Jews from Outer Pest was completed on 8th July; the deportation followed. As regards the cancellation of the deportations from the capital and the dismissals of Endre and Baky, it appears that on the 28th Sztdjay did not dare mention these decisions to Veesenmayer. They stood, however, and on the same day Baky was confined

to administrative duties. His separate Security Police was abolished, and the various organs charged with political security were centred in a separate department of the Ministry of the Interior, under the command of Col. G.

Kiralyi, a loyal adherent of the Regent’s and a personally decent man. A number of changes were made in the higher command of the police, which was brought under military discipline.®

On the evening of the 29th there occurred an extraordinary episode which, despite its relatively trivial dimensions, would deserve recording if only for the light which it threw on mentality and methods of an all too large fraction of the Hungarian Right. The National Socialists decided to murder Istvan Barezy, chef de protocole in the Minister Presidency, and Horthy’s personal friend, and the keeper for nearly thirty years of the minutes of the Crown and Ministerial Councils. This task was assigned to Vincze Gorgey, the head of the above-mentioned “‘Service for the Preservation of the Nation,” which was mobilised for the purpose for the first and last time.

Exactly what purpose the National Socialists expected to gain by removing from the world this innocent and delightful old gentleman, the friend not only of Horthy but of all Budapest society and of every decent foreigner who had visited Budapest during the past generation, is still not quite clear. There had been much talk in Right-wing circles of the impossibility of getting at the Regent and bringing him to a proper frame of

mind so long as he was surrounded by his “‘clique of pro-Allied and pro-Jewish advisers,’ and the intention was probably only to make a physical 1 Some persons (Faragho in a statement quoted by Lévai, p. 243, and Ambrdozy at the trial of Sztdéjay) put this order two or three days earlier, but, if so, no action was taken on it. 2 Text in Lévai, pp. 245-6. 3 This last measure had been decided some weeks earlier.

304 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH breach in the ring. Another theory was that the keys which opened the secret door giving admission to the Palace by the underground passage were to be taken off Barczy’s corpse. Patriots were then to enter the Palace and

brow-beat Horthy into submission, or possibly even abduct him. In any case, the enterprise ended in a farcical fiasco. Barczy was staying at Szent Endre, a few miles out of Buda, in the villa of Goldberger, the “‘textile king of Hungary.” The man whom Gérgey commissioned to do the murder —a pilot-officer named Lang—borrowed a car and drove out to Szent Endre,

taking with him, besides the chauffeur—a man called Rozsa, who was also , a member of the “‘Service’’—a soldier named Gréman. All three were armed to the teeth; nevertheless, their nerve failed them, and they decided to recruit

reinforcements. A soldier named Goczan, on leave from the Front, was trudging along the road. They stopped the car, hailed him and (although he

was totally unknown to any of them) invited him to join them in the assassination. Goczan demurred, but the others, undaunted by his reluctance, insisted, and pulled him into the car. When they reached the garden gate of the villa they all got out, and Lang rang the bell. While he was waiting for the gate to open, the soldier Goczan shot him in the back of the neck with his revolver. He then held up and disarmed his two other hosts. The police now arrived and took all the three too confiding assassins

into custody. Here this particular matter ended for all immediately concerned!; but it seems to have had its part in stiffening Horthy’s attitude.

Moreover, on Ist July he received a personal appeal from the King of Sweden to save what remained to be saved of the Jews. On the same day he replied that he would “‘do everything in his power under existing circum-

stances to secure respect for the principles of humanity and equity.” A message in similar terms was sent to the Pope. By now the Germans, realising that Horthy meant to stop the deportation of the Budapest Jews,” had dropped the plan (the execution of which had been fixed for 30th June) of a grand operation led by the chimney-sweeps of the capital,* but only in favour of an alternative plan which had been worked

out by Eichmann, Baky and Faragho. Sufficient numbers of Hungarian gendarmes were to be brought to the capital on the pretext of a presentation of colours (a singularly ill-chosen excuse, since the gendarmerie battalions, un-

like the military, had no colours), then sent, nominally, on three days’ 1 Lang, whose injuries had not been fatal, was not even put on trial, a doctor having been found to certify that he was not responsible for his actions. The matter was hushed up, and neither Gorgey nor his superiors were in any way touched.

2 It is hard even today to be dogmatic as to the full truth of the mysterious affair described in the following paragraphs. It was greatly obfuscated, not only by the rumours circulated by the Jews but also by the extraordinary role played by Faraghd, who on his own admission, confirmed by the evidence of Ferenczy, helped in the original arrangements. His own version was that he did this under orders from Horthy to prevent the Germans from deporting the Jews and only became aware at the last moment that Baky was on the Germans’ side (see the evidence given by him at the trial of Baky and Endre, Press of Ist April 1946). But he had discussed the plans with both Baky and Eichmann, and I myself cannot doubt that all three had meant to use the gendarmes against the Jews. But for the rest, the best source available to me (Col. G. Kirdalyi) said that according to his information Baky was “exclusively interested in the Jews,” and even believed that the Regent’s orders against the deportation were only provisional. The stories of the projected coup against the Regent had been invented by the Jews and other enemies of Baky’s to stir Horthy into action. I have interpreted the story in this sense. It should be remarked that the gendarmerie was almost the largest Hungarian armed force left in the country, and much the most formidable, man for man, since its members (unlike most of the soldiers) were fully armed and trained. 3 Veesenmayer reported to Germany on the 30th that “the big Jewish scheme which had been planned’”’ for that day had been dropped owing to Horthy’s opposition.

REVULSION 305 leave, actually to occupy strategic posts. When all was ready they were to pounce.

On 2nd July 1,500 gendarmerie cadets actually arrived in the capital. 3,000-4,000 gendarmes were closing in behind them, but were still outside Buda.

The Jews acted quickly and shrewdly. They sent a message to Horthy that Baky was planning a coup in which even more than the deportations was

involved. Horthy himself was to be imprisoned and the National Socialists to take over the power. Vajna, of the Arrow Cross, sent a message to the same effect to the Palace. Horthy sent for Faraghd, who according to his own evidence confirmed the rumours. Horthy now ordered General Lazar, Commander of the Bodyguard, to surround Buda Hill with the Bodyguard and armed police. General Szilard Bakay, Commander of the Buda garrison, mobilised such forces as were at his disposal, including the cadets from the Ludovika and the personnel of the tank school in Esztergom. Finally, the Ist Armoured Division was called up from Pilis-Csaba. It arrived on the evening of the 6th and took up positions in O-Buda, confronting the gendarmerie. For a day it looked as though there might be aclash. Then Faraghé obeyed Horthy’s orders. The gendarmerie were sent back to their stations.

Horthy now told Sztdjay officially to inform the Germans that the deportation of the Budapest Jews would not be permitted. Baky’s powers were still further reduced and Endre relieved of his functions altogether. These facts were not published, but the two men were sent on indefinite leave.

The reaction on all sides to this extraordinary series of events was very violent. Eichmann, who seems not to have realised until he got Sztdjay’s message that the Regent’s decision was final, was furious. Veesenmayer and

Winkelmann reported urgently to their respective chiefs. In Hungary, all the enemies of the National Socialists jumped at the chance to acquire merit and influence by disowning them. The Arrow Cross sent round another official circular proclaiming their innocence of any putsch and their loyalty to the Regent. Imrédy, who travelled down to Pécs and made a long speech there on 9th July, filled it with dark references to subversive elements. He declared that his Party would be loyal to the Regent, and said that the armed force of the Hungarian State would meet any attempt to upset internal order. Behind this force, too, stood the KABSz, with all honest men, and those honest hands would bring to naught all senseless attempts. The MEP went a little further still. They had been in the throes of reorganisation for some weeks past. On the failure of the proposals for a party fusion, their Chairman (Vay) and Vice-Chairman (F. Barcsay) had resigned, leaving the affairs of the Party to a committee of three members (Count M. Teleki, B. Marton, K. Bocsary). On 30th June (after Teleki and Marton had quarrelled) they had then appointed Teleki Party Chairman, with Bocsary and A. Hunyadi Buzas Vice-Chairmen, and an Executive Committee of 24, drawn largely from the Old Guard of the Party. This Committee had carried through another purge, this time evicting those of the MEP Deputies whose financial records in connection with the Jewish Laws were dubious.’ The Party had meanwhile lost the 7 Ruthene and 7 Volksdeutsch Deputies, who had formerly nominally belonged to the Party

but in May constituted themselves separate groups, so that their total numbers were down to 183 (against 224 in March), but they were reasonably homogeneous; and the prospect that the Regent was again going to interest

himself in internal affairs, added to the obvious failure of Imrédy, had U

306 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH encouraged them to resume the offensive. ‘‘With 183 members of its own and 33 Transylvanians,’ wrote Pester Lloyd on 2nd July, ‘‘against 76 Deputies of all other parties and 76 non-Party members, the MEP had the right to take

the initiative.’ The Regent, however, was by this time thoroughly sick of all the parties

alike. His own first reaction was to get rid of the Szt6éjay Government altogether, and on 7th July—the morning after the defeat of the “Baky Putsch’’—he sent an urgent message to his own special candidate, General Lakatos, to come to Budapest. He had been keeping Lakatos in reserve since the General had been recalled from the Eastern Front, when he had told him to go on leave and hold himself in readiness. Lakatos had never had anything to do with politics, nor indeed does he seem to have had any political ambitions. But the Regent liked him because he was a soldier, a gentleman and of true Magyar blood (although his wife had allegedly a Jewish strain). It was thought that he would be acceptable to the Germans, in spite of his recent quarrels with them at the Front, because he had got on well with them before and was the only Hungarian to possess the Grand Cross of the Deutscher Verdienst Orden. When Lakatos arrived, late in the afternoon of the 8th, Horthy told him

that on the following Monday, 10th July, he proposed simply to issue a decree “‘putsch-wise’” announcing the resignation of the Sztdjay Govern-

ment and the appointment of a new Government with him, Lakatos, as Premier. He had talked it over with Bethlen and Rakovszky, who was to be

Vice-Premier. Both of them had approved the plan. The names for the other Ministries had all been chosen.’ Lakatos asked for twenty-four hours’ grace to think things over, but at

the end of that time said that in his view the plan was impossible. The Germans could not afford to “let Hungary slip out of their claws’? and would

at once occupy the country. He asked for permission to discuss the matter with Bethlen and Rakovsky, both of whom eventually agreed with him, saying it would be necessary to remain content with a change in the Ministry of the

Interior, which had been responsible for the anti-Jewish excesses. This, indeed, was urgently necessary.

For the moment Horthy dropped his idea of dismissing Sztdjay, but he returned a truculent refusal to Veesenmayer on the 12th, when the German called on him to convey his Government’s insistence on the execution of the anti-Jewish measures.

““T haven’t the faintest intention,” he said, “‘of doing to the Jews the things the Reich is asking me to do. The Holy Father has written to me from Rome, the King of Sweden has written to me, and the King of England has written to me through an intermediary. I don’t like being blackmailed like this by the Reich to act against the Jews.’’® 1 Most of the members purged or resigned from other parties were now counted as ‘“‘nonParty.” The figure of 76 defiantly includes those who were in prison or hiding. There were also 18 seats genuinely vacant, including those still being kept for the Roumanian representatives from

Transylvania. My own calculations make the “other parties’ add up to 84 (27 Imrédists, 15 Arrow Cross, 6 Christians, 2 Dissident Right Radicals, 7 Ruthenes, 7 Volksdeutsche), but no two lists ever entirely agree. > It is not known what these were, but the Arrow Cross heard that Generals Bakay, Lazar and Csatay were to be included. Probably, therefore, the list was much the same as that which the Regent tried to put through after 24th August. 3 Quoted by the prosecution, Min. Trial, 13436, Doc. N.G. 5577 (cf. No. 3702). This document is Veesenmayer’s report on the interview. It is dated the 13th.

REVULSION 307 And now he was being as good as his word. Without the collaboration of the Hungarian gendarmerie, Eichmann could undertake no large-scale operations, but on the 14th, with his own men, he put together a transport of 1,500 internees from Kistarcsa and two other camps and actually started them off on a train. Horthy had it stopped and returned to Kistarcsa with all its inmates. Then he reverted, after all, to his plan of a week before. On the 15th he

caused three battalions, including the 9/11 (a special battalion, known as ‘*Horthy’s own,’”’ which was being held as a last reserve) to be moved to Budapest; sent for Sztojay, and told him that he no longer enjoyed his (Horthy’s) confidence and must resign. He also sent for Lakatos, to whom he said that “‘the fait accompli had been created’’ and he was to take over. The appointment was already signed. The Government was to be a military one. All political parties were to be dissolved and the military was to run the country. Baky and Endre were to be arrested, or at least dismissed from all functions.

Lakatos again objected that such a step was impossible without the consent of the Germans; Veesenmayer must get the appointment confirmed. Horthy called Veesenmayer to him in the afternoon. Naturally the Germans had been watching these moves. The SS. were in high alarm, and talking of putsches again. Mecsér told Szalasi that the Germans proposed “‘to make a radical clean-up of the situation in the next few days,”’ possibly “‘forcibly removing the clique round the Regent’ and then establishing either Mecsér himself, or Jurcsek, as Minister President. Weesenmayer himself had been warned, from a Hungarian source, of Horthy’s intentions, and after telling Sztdjay that he still enjoyed Germany’s confidence, had himself asked for an audience.

According to Veesenmayer’s own evidence,” he most urgently advised Horthy by all means to consult Hitler before taking so important a step, and

warned him that unilateral action would probably have the most serious consequences. Horthy thereupon wrote Hitler a letter explaining the reasons which, in his mind, necessitated the step; the German, however, said that he could not deliver it, as he did not know where Hitler was. Eventually General Miklés was sent off with the letter, Horthy, apparently agreeing to suspend his ‘‘fait accompli” until the answer came back*; but Veesenmayer had, of

course, reported directly by telephone to Ribbentrop, who on the 16th dictated to him personally down the telephone in Hitler’s name what must be one of the most formidable messages ever addressed to a Head of a State from a nominal ally. Veesenmayer was to call immediately on the Regent and to inform him, in the name of the Fihrer, that Hitler had learned with “‘extreme displeasure”’ of Horthy’s intention to dismiss the Sztéjay Government and to replace it 1 The programme appears to have been the same as that given to Lakatos in August (see below, p. 320). At any rate, it quite certainly included the alleviation of anti-Jewish measures. 2 Min. Trial, 22.7.48, p. 13277. 3 According to the Szalasi Diary, Miklos only returned on the 24th. He had ‘‘a very cold

reception” and brought no answer at all. It may be believed that after his miraculous escape from death on the 20th, Hitler was in no mood to be very patient with Horthy. On the 25th Horthy was talking about abdication again. 4 Veesenmayer said afterwards that one reason why Ribbentrop had used such strong language was that ‘‘the persons concerned were protégés of Himmler’s, and Ribbentrop did not want to appear a weakling compared with Himmler” (Min. Trial, p. 13279). The text is in N.G. 2739. It is dated the 16th.

308 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH by a military Government, and with even greater displeasure, of his intention to arrest Ministers and Secretaries of State of the Szt6jay Government who had carried through measures against the Jews. The Fiihrer saw in these intentions ‘‘a repetition of the intrigues which

. had led to Germany’s intervention on 19th March,” for which the same ‘‘clique of traitors’? who had led Hungary to the edge of the abyss in March were responsible. He regarded any deviation from the agreement of March as “‘gross treachery to the European cause,” and if Horthy persevered, would at once recall Veesenmayer and “‘take measures to exclude a repetition of such events in Hungary once and for all.’ If any ‘““members of the clique’”’— all of whose identities were exactly known to the Germans—inside or outside the Palace! tried to return to active politics, Hitler would have them arrested immediately by the S.D. and called to account within twenty-four hours. The measures against the Jews were to be carried through without further delay. No hesitation or retraction could be permitted. Hitler went on to say that he had hitherto treated the Regent personally with great consideration, but if things like this continued or recurred, this consideration would be dropped. He would even be obliged to publish the copious documentary material in his possession which proved that Hungary

had meditated a treachery not less crass than that of Italy. The person of the Regent would necessarily be implicated in the revelations. To lend force to this argument, Veesenmayer was to use the contents of a further telegram,

which authorised the arrests at which the main message hinted. He was further instructed ‘“‘to intimate casually that two more Panzer divisions would shortly be moved to Hungary.” Veesenmayer carried out his instructions at 5 p.m. on 17th July, reading the message out, as he said, to make it less painful for Horthy (and perhaps also for himself); while to underline the serious nature of the warning, the

two Panzer divisions, which had just been moved into the Burgenland, probably in anticipation,? made a forced march through west Hungary that same night, and on the following day, taking with them the SS. Cavalry division in training outside Buda, made a triumphal parade (which took an hour and a half to pass the saluting point) through the streets of Budapest. And faced with pressure which he could not resist, the Regent gave way as

regards the personnel of the Government. Lakatos was sent back to his home, Sztojay was reinstated, Imrédy, Kunder, Jaross and Ratz, who had already resigned on the 19th, withdrew their resignations, and the dismissal of Baky and Endre was cancelled. So the status quo had been restored on paper; but only on paper. Horthy’s emergence from his political hibernation had in reality entirely altered the balance of forces and had ushered in a new period. The first and chief beneficiaries were the Jews. The determined Eichmann

succeeded after all in getting two more trainloads of internees smuggled * Apparently an allusion to Bethlen; possibly also to N. Horthy, jun. > Veesenmayer said in evidence (Min. Trial, p. 13281) that he omitted the “threat about the

S.D.” and the word “‘justificieren’” (call to account), which he could not bring himself to repeat. He also tried to reason with Horthy, appealing to his honour. * The Szalasi Diary reported their presence on the 12th. * Veesenmayer told Szalasi on the 24th that the German “leadership” had made it a point

of honour that the two men should not be dropped. The German ‘‘Command” could not tolerate the dismissal of men who—Baky in particular—had fulfilled their duty towards the Reich.

REVULSION 309 away from Kistarcsa and Sarvar camps,! but when the Red Cross protested, through the Hungarian Legation in Berne, against this action, it received the astonishing reply that the deportation had been effected without the consent of the Hungarian Government, which had “‘lodged a strong protest with the German Government.” A repetition need not be feared. Nor did it occur. Eichmann made one more attempt to smuggle away the Hungarian political prisoners in the Féutca prison, this time by lorry and at night; but, one of the prisoners” having managed to smuggle out a warning, Horthy had the prison surrounded by police, while a battalion of gendarmes blocked the road to Vienna and set it with tank traps. After this Eichmann attempted no more coups. The total number of Jews deported up to that date had been approximately 450,000.

In the course of the next weeks, the situation of the Budapest Jews was alleviated in many ways. The delegates of the Red Cross were allowed to visit interned Jews and to organise relief. Rations were raised slightly and the ghetto restrictions slightly relaxed. Some Jews married to Christians were allowed to return to their homes. The baptised Jews were allowed to form a special organisation in defence of their interests, and were exempted altogether from most of the anti-Jewish restrictions. The other categories of exemption were made more generous, in particular by the institution of a provision under which the Regent took power to exempt any Jews who had achieved distinction in the arts, sciences or economic life, or ““deserved

especial consideration for other reasons.”” Something over 600 such

certificates were issued. The distribution of confiscated Jewish wealth was not stopped, but was slowed down, and it really appeared as though the Commissioner was to collect the objects in question and to keep them safe pending further developments. The Harc was suspended and the rest of the Press given orders (which were not always obeyed) to moderate its force. Further negotiations opened up through the Red Cross and with various neutral countries resulted in a few thousand Jewish persons (mainly children) being allowed to leave Hungary for Palestine, Sweden or Switzerland, while some hundreds more bought their way out as the result of various complex financial negotiations, which cannot be described here, with Himmler’s men

in Germany. Horthy also refused, after all, to accept in its entirety Hitler’s dictation | regarding his Cabinet. He had reinstated Sztdjay, but he refused to restore Endre and Baky to their old functions. He insisted that the Ministry of the Interior must be ‘‘depoliticised,”’ by which he meant given to an adherent of

his own; designating for the post N. Bonczos, an old MEP man who had 1 These deportees did not go to Auschwitz, but to political concentration camps in Germany. According to Horthy’s evidence at Nuremberg, when he taxed Veesenmayer and Winkelmann with the episode they said that it was ‘“‘only a business deal,” and it seems in fact to have been connected with some of the negotiations mentioned below. 2 This was L. Baranyai, who got the letter out through his wife.

3 There was at this time such a rush for baptism that the Churches issued orders that this was not to be granted without an adequate period of instruction ranging from three months to a year. Many priests, however, disregarded the order. 4 Ribbentrop had wired to Veesenmayer on 3rd July to tell the Hungarian Government that ‘it was not opportune to accept the various foreign offers in favour of the local Jews.”” He was “to ensure appropriate treatment of the affair.”’ This may, however, refer to the Weiss Manfred

oa one effect of the slowing down of the anti-Jewish campaign was that the sadists turned their attentions to the gypsies, against whom many measures were enacted in July and August.

310 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH earned the name of a competent administrator in various posts, as Commissioner for the settlement of displaced persons,! as Kallay’s successor in charge of Floods and Irrigation, and as Commissioner for ex-servicemen’s welfare.

Veesenmayer, who was depressed and nervous at the time,” and in any case, still anxious to work with Horthy up to the limits of possibility, seems not to have objected to Bonczos, who, although no National Socialist, was a thorough-going reactionary in domestic policy (in earlier years he had been

a close crony of G6mbé6s’) and a convinced upholder of the fight to the last against Bolshevism. But the “Liberal Conservatives,’ encouraged by Horthy’s attitude, were now hinting broadly that they could, and should, take over the entire power. This was more than Veesenmayer could well stomach, and much more than his German rivals were prepared to consider at all. According to Hungarian reports, Himmler’s influence in the Reich had been suddenly increased by the failure of the attempt on Hitler’s life on 20th July. Whether this be true or not, he began, immediately after that event, to intervene most vigorously in Hungarian affairs, and at the end of July sent Winkelmann specific orders that a genuinely National Socialist Government was to be brought into beingin Hungary. If Veesenmayer could not or would

not do this, he, Winkelmann, was to doit. In one letter, dated 2nd August, Winkelmann wrote to Veesenmayer that “Himmler had expressly charged him to inform Veesenmayer of his wishes” that Ruszkay had got to be Minister of Defence, that Imrédy was “‘inacceptable’’ and that Endre was ‘“‘the only possible candidate for the Ministry of the Interior.” He urged Veesenmayer “‘to go and see Horthy and confront him with the necessary candour,”’ hinting very broadly that Veesenmayer’s own position depended on his readiness to fall in with Himmler’s wishes.

A struggle accordingly opened into the details of which—since the solution found at the end of three weeks’ manceuvre was destined to last only

a fortnight—it is hardly worth entering. In many respects it presented an uncanny mirror-picture of the similar struggle which had filled April. Once again, first Tasnadi-Nagy, then Sztojay, strongly supported by Veesenmayer,

who still favoured this solution, put forward proposals for a ‘“‘national concentration” of all the Right-wing parties on a coalition basis, accompanied by a stand-still agreement to refrain from recruiting and from mutual attack. Once again the MEP, the Transylvanians and the Imrédists agreed, under certain conditions,* while the National Socialists and the Arrow Cross

refused. The National Socialists now saw power, undivided, within their grasp, while Szalasi’s standpoint was approximately as before. First of all he had to be assured that the Regent would consent to the Arrow Cross entering a coalition. Sztojay, after allegedly making enquiries, told him that this was the case, but he still insisted that before taking office he must see the Regent again and expound his views to him personally. And if the Party did enter a coalition it must have at least the Ministries of the Interior? and Justice, a Minister without Portfolio, two Secretaries of State and a veto on 1 Including in particular the Hungarians from the Bukovina settled in the Bacska in 194] (see above, p. 39). > Hetried to resign again during these days, and even threatened to commit suicide with his wife.

* The MEP said that the ‘social organisations” and similar bodies of the Right Radicals (viz., the KABSz) must stop agitating simultaneously with the parties, and the administration must be “really depoliticised.” The Imredists retorted that the “‘clique”’ round the Regent must also stop work. 4 Later he consented to Bonczos’ having this post if he really depoliticised the administration.

REVULSION 311 the appointment to other Ministries of persons to whom it objected. Szalasi himself would not take office, nor even enter Parliament, but would remain Party leader, exacting absolute loyalty and obedience from his followers. When asked how the P.V. meant to exercise this authority, Szdllési could

only answer that: ‘As Attila was the Scourge of God, so Szalasi would remain a scourge in the strict sense of the term; a scourge whereof none knew when or where it would descend.” In any case, he rejected the stand-still agreement, which he said, justly enough, would work out unfairly to his own Party (which was undoubtedly growing stronger day by day) and would only result in the workers joining the Communists, and when pressed by Sztéjay to sink his own programme in one of “concentration,” answered, why they had had 19th March and all the consequent hullabaloo at all, if this was all that was to come of it? They might as well get Kallay and Keresztes-Fischer back at once, and put them in charge of the proposed ‘“‘New Course,” which was exactly their old one. When questioned about his own programme, he produced enormous drafts which, so far as they were intelligible, suited no one: not the Hungarians, who were to be required to make a real effort in the common cause, and not the Germans, who were to accept the Hungarist Idea and treat Hungary on a footing of meticulously observed equality. So Szalasi once again passed off the immediate stage, although not so

far into the wings as in the spring, for his Party was indubitably gaining adherents hand over fist, and Veesenmayer seems to have recognised the fact,

and to have been impressed by it. He was still resolved not to use Szalasi until every other possibility had been exhausted, and had concluded no sort of agreement with him. But the Diary now shows him and his advisers consulting the Arrow Cross much oftener, and much less perfunctorily, than in the spring, and he seems already in August to have promised to protect the persons of their leaders, if threatened by their opponents. | Meanwhile, Winkelmann expressed nothing but pleasure at the P.V.’s refusal to collaborate! and kept pressing Veesenmayer to adopt Himmler’s solution, which would seem to have been for a coalition between the National

Socialists and certain other elements, some of the MEP, others nominally non-Party, who were willing to work with the latter. This solution would, however, have to be imposed on Horthy by something like an ultimatum. Veesenmayer apparently boggled at this, and the next development was an intermediary one: the elimination of the Imrédists. They had already lost Ratz, who had resigned again on 20th July,” and now Palffy dug up the old papers relating to Imrédy’s Jewish ancestry. He took them to Sztdjay, who asked Winkelmann to have them checked up in Berlin and at the same time to discover whether the certificate of purity issued by Fritzsche in June had 1 In his letter of 2nd August, quoted above, Winkelmann wrote: “‘Szalasi refuses the combina-

tion which we regard as advisable. . .. He maintains that there is no justification for intervention

by Germany until all the cards have been played.... Such an attitude is an impossibility.”’ It was useless to try to get Szalasi in any more, and they should proceed as instructed by Himmler. 2 When Ratz resigned he said that he had been meaning to take this step for a long time, and had attended no Cabinet meeting since 14th June. Afterwards he told his party friends that this was because Horthy had refused to let the anti-Jewish enactments be passed through Parliament

and had said that the Government was only a “‘provisorium’’, and he would not work on that basis. He gave, in public or in private, several other reasons. The consensus of informed opinion is that generally speaking, he disliked both the “‘New Course” and the German control.

3 At the trial of Imrédy, Palffy admitted authorship of this initiative. Winkelmann gave evidence at the Ministries Trial that Reményi-Schneller rang him up, speaking for Sztdjay, and asked to have the papers verified.

312 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH been authentic, or only given to oblige. Half political Hungary was now back again with delight at the old game of discussing Imrédy’s ancestry, and it had become customary to say that the unfortunate great-grandmother was not

the only blot on the scutcheon. Another grandparent, hitherto unmarked,

: had been a pure Jewess, so that Imrédy was not even only 124 per cent. Jew but 37 per cent. Back came an answer from Berlin, whither Winkelmann had

telephoned. Fritzsche had, indeed, obliged. The papers were carried in triumph to the proper quarters and once again Imrédy was branded Jew. Both Szasz and Jurcsek now refused to serve further in a Cabinet which

included this monstrosity. Sztdjay did not defend Imrédy, neither did Veesenmayer, who probably thought the team Reményi-Schneller-JurcsekSzasz more valuable than Imrédy, Kunder and Jaross (whom he was already prepared to let go to please Horthy). Nor did Imrédy himself want to stay.? On 8th August the three surviving Imrédists in the Cabinet announced their

resignation. In a public statement not wholly lacking in dignity the Party repudiated all blame for the failure to bring about the desired unity and declared that once the possibility of achieving this object had disappeared, they could not remain one moment more in the Government. The effect of this pronouncement is perhaps somewhat marred by the knowledge that one of the three Ministers concerned had really been kicked

out by Horthy for being an intolerable Jew-baiter and a second had been kicked out by the Germans for being (perhaps) a 124 per cent. Jew. But Kunder is entitled to credit for his loyalty, and it must be said that the Imrédist Party leaders now, in the main, drew the consequences from their defeat. Imrédy himself, Kunder and Jaross and several other of the leaders took little further part in active politics. Rajniss resigned from the editorship

of the Esti Ujsag? and the Party Press lapsed into neutrality tempered by exhortations to the nation to stand behind the Regent. On 16th August Imrédy resigned the Presidency of the KABSz. The Right Radicals had now got their bitter enemy out of the way, and

the victory was not entirely without its fruits. Rajniss, with a few more Imrédists, later linked up with the Arrow Cross; a few others with the National Socialists. Ney, who now took over the KABSz, announced that, after conversations with the local representatives of all Right-wing political parties, he had “‘succeeded in securing recognition of the Union’s independence of all political parties.’’ Branches were “‘to respect the right to existence

of all Right-wing parties and the purity of their intentions, but not to serve

as their organs.” But, in fact, although for personal reasons Ney never reached a modus vivendi with Szalasi, he eventually, as we shall see, made the KABSz into something far more radical than it had ever been under Imrédy. Nevertheless, the immediate benefits of the disappearance of this middle

bloc went far rather to the Conservatives than to the Right Radicals. When the National Socialists, confident in their coming success, announced that

they would not enter the Government except on their own terms, their opponents simply took them at their words. Bonczos duly succeeded Jaross. Szasz provisionally took over Kunder’s portfolio, while that of Imrédy was dropped altogether. The MEP was now in a big majority in the Cabinet: 1 According to Barczy, Imrédy visited Sztdjay (who was ill) and told him that he was tired of the whole business. Nothing had gone right for him; he had made a mess of everything. > Characteristically, rumour at once ran round Budapest that he had skipped it to Portugal with the Party funds.

REVULSION 313 the more so as Sztdjay now retired to a sanatorium and Reményi-Schneller, as senior Minister, became acting Minister President. The MEP itself was at pains to avoid the appearance of having won too much. It was lavish with assurances, public and private, that as soon as the

emergency was over a means would be found to allow “‘all serious and constructive Right-wing forces of goodwill’ to participate in the Government.

This was undoubtedly still Sztéjay’s wish, and it was also the case that a considerable section of the MEP itself, of which Jurcsek was emerging as the

| leader, disapproved of the trend towards Conservatism and was by now more

in sympathy with the National Socialists than with the real Conservatives among their own colleagues. But the latter were in the saddle for the moment, and did not mind saying so. On 13th August Count M. Teleki, who two days before had taken over the editorship in chief of the Magyar-

orszdg, devoted his inaugural leading article to making it discreetly but unambiguously plain that the Government proposed to rely in the future on

“the constitutional majority in the Parliament, the MEP and its ally the Transylvanian Party, which would henceforward govern alone, and would

really govern.” And although thereafter both the MEP and the Transylvanians made many pronouncements insisting that Hungary’s policy was

that of the Right Radicals, they made it equally clear that Right Radicals were not going to be asked to carry that policy out. Parallel with this revival of the more official wing of the old “Opposition Front,’ and under the same influence, there had been going on a perceptible strengthening of the secret and semi-secret “‘resistance.”’ It is naturally not meant that mid-July saw an abrupt change from total passivity to strenuous activity in this field. No term in this phrase would be accurate. The spirit of resistance had not been extinguished in March, and its subsequent revival

was gradual. As the German grip gradually relaxed, as the troops grew thinner in the country and the first fervour of the Gestapo waned, so those who had ducked under only out of excess of caution felt it safe to move about more freely, and the grape-vine began to operate between those for whom continued hiding was a real necessity. In early May the Communist leaders to whom, since they alone still possessed any semblance of an organisa-

tion, the lead naturally fell, had re-established contact with Szakasits and Tildy, with whom they agreed to resuscitate the ““Hungarian Front’ as a ‘“‘“concentration of the democratic parties of Hungary,’ in whose name a leaflet, signed by the Peace Party, the Smallholders and the Social Democrats, was issued early in June, calling on workers, peasants and intelligentsia to resist.1* As the flush of renewed confidence in a German victory faded under the effects of the bombing and the continued advance of the Soviet armies, so the strength of this appeal grew, and it increased enormously—possibly not

as regards numbers but in the way in which it spread upward into more influential circles—when the successful Allied landing in Normandy revived the hopes of a ‘‘Western solution.” Many little groups were gathering now round different foci; one round Dessewffy, who was now in Eastern Hungary,

one round some of the younger Legitimist leaders, others again round Pal Teleki’s old confidants in the Foreign Ministry, who formed a little group calling itself the “Hungarian Independence Movement’; and so on. There was still no question of active resistance from below. The calling1 Text in Darvas, pp. 99-104. * Magyar Figgetlenségi Mozgalom (MFM).

314 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH up notices were invariably obeved without cavil. There was no sabotage in the factories. where Szeder and Kabok continued to honour the terms of their agreement with the Government. The “Resistance” was not even anxious to cause Sztdjav too much trouble. as they thought that he would do less harm than either Imrédy. Baky or the Arrow Cross.! Indeed. so peaceable was the general picture. even in Julv, that the Gestapo rejected a plan itself to organise resistance groups round agenrs provocateurs on the cround that it was not worth the trouble.° But meetings and contacts now multiplied. There was regular contact between Szakasits. Tildy. Dessewfty. Pfeiffer. Imre Kovacs. the representatives of the Peace Party (for whom Rajk and Kallai usually figured as spokesmen), some of the Legitimists (whose spokesman, G. Pallavicini, again agreed to co-operate with the Left) and representatives of certain circles in both the

Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches. Some of these persons had also re-established the all-important connection with the Palace, through N. Horthy. jun.. whose assistants. Sods and D. Szentivanyi, both belonged to the MFM. Other lines to the outer world ran through Ambrozy and Lazar.

The first thought of all the non-Communist members of the new “Resistance” was to reopen the communications with the West. One or two

individual attempts to do this were made. but all ended in fiasco.? and indeed evervone. the Communists included. recognised that in the existing situation the contact, if it was to be effectual at all, must go through Horthy. He alone would probably be taken seriously abroad; he was certainly the only man in Hungary whose word had the least chance of swinging the nation over on to a new line of action. The first task was thus to convert Horthy; and one attempt was made as early as the beginning of July. Bishop Szentivanyi approached N. Horthy. jun.. for authorisation for Howie to offer, on behalf of the Regent. a revised version of the plan discussed in the previous March. The Western Allies were to be asked to make an air-borne landing in south-west Hungary (or, alternatively, a quick dash by land across Croatia). Simultaneously with their arrival, such Hungarian troops as were in the country, assisted by the Polish P.O.W.s (who were to be armed). were to turn against the Germans, while the First Army at the Front was to turn round and let the Russians through.?

At first Horthy refused: he said that he ‘“‘would not stab his ally in the back.” His son, however, talked him over, so that one of the two obstacles had now been got over. He agreed to receive Howie and Sapieha, and gave permission for the two men to be put up in the barracks of the Bodyguard. At the time, however, the plan broke down on the opposition of V6rés and of Kuthy, the new head of the Deunxiéme Bureau. V6r6ds explained his objections by the remarkable (and 100 per cent. untruthful) assertion that his Military Attachés in Lisbon and Ankara were already in touch with the Allies; the conversations were proceeding satisfactorily and there was no need for anyone else to meddle. Kuthy. who seems to have been intimate 1 Sods to C. A. M. * Michaelis to C. A. M. $ Prince M. Odescalchi, who was a pilot-officer in the Hungarian Air Force, undertook to fly his machine down to Italy, but he landed in error at Ancona instead of Foggia. and was arrested by the Germans. Subsequently a few Allied military agents crossed the frontier, or were even dropped by parachute, but most of them were quickly arrested. 4 This, according to Szentivanyi, was due to the insistence of Howie. who always maintained that his instructions forbade him to negotiate on anv other basis.

REVULSION 315 with the Germans, suggested that Howie was an agent provocateur—the truth being that neither of them wanted the plan to go forward and probably took

the most appropriate steps to frustrate it. At last, after the two officers had got as far as threatening resignation, Horthy yielded. Howie and Sapieha were returned to their previous hiding-place. Meanwhile, after the landing in Normandy the Russians had resumed their attacks; at first in the south, where they gained some further ground against stiffening resistance, and in mid-July also in the Lemberg sector. To meet this last thrust, the Germans withdrew those of their troops which had been under Lakatos’ command, leaving the First Army now a purely Hungarian force, but also a sadly weakened one. The 6th, 10th and 13th Divisions were

mobilised and sent up to fill the gaps, but they were insufficient for the purpose, and when, on 23rd July, the Russians attacked the First Army in its turn, it was driven back with heavy losses. After a week’s retreat it reached the fortified positions known as the ‘‘Hunyadi Line’’ which had been

prepared along the foothills of the Carpathians. Here it was able to halt, and although for some days the Russians tried to rush the passes, especially the so-called ““Tatar Pass’! which offered the easiest route into Hungary, the

defenders (the VIth Corps) gave no further ground; on 12th August the Honvéd communiqué announced that, thanks to the heroic resistance put up by this Corps, the situation was now stabilised. Competent opinion believed that the passes could be held indefinitely. But the situation was now that the line both in Ruthenia and left and right of it (for the Roumanian and German troops south of the First Army had been driven back similarly into the foothills of the Bukovinian Carpathians, and soon afterwards the Germans in East Galicia were also back in the passes) was running only a few miles outside the frontier. If the line here did crack, the next big natural defensive line was that of the Danube itself. Nor was Hungary itself any longer untouched by war. The Allied air-

raids were continuing remorselessly, devastating cities and disrupting communications. The stream of refugees, which was soon to swell into a great flood, was beginning, although the forerunners were not Hungarians but Ukrainians or Roumanians, who entered the passes in Moldavia and

were passed out again into Southern Transylvania. Public security was deteriorating rapidly, particularly, of course, in the peripheral regions. Nowhere was there anything like a general rising, but reports of guerillas and

partisans, and of the dropping of parachutists, came from Ruthenia, and Yugoslav partisan activity increased greatly in the Bacska. Even the heart of the country was unsafe: a Colonel of Gendarmerie complained that the roads were infested not only by ordinary criminals but by “international vagabonds, deserters, escaped prisoners of war, enemy mercenaries, homeless

and desperate criminals, partisans and saboteurs.” The “Special Administrative Regulations” applicable to Operational Zones had to be extended to the whole of Transylvania, and then to a considerable sector of the hinterland. A curfew was imposed, all political activities forbidden, etc. Similar measures

were taken in the Bacska, where a special self-defence organisation, the ‘“‘Pandurs,”’ was created. In Budapest itself the police were authorised to use firearms against persons refusing to halt when challenged. 1 The pass at Kérésmez6 (Jablonica). It was by this route that a Tatar Army had entered Hungary in the thirteenth century; as, incidentally, had the Magyars themselves when they arrived in their new homes 350 years before that.

216 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Tre rapid detemoration of the military situation was. of course, used by the Resistance as a further argument in favour of getting out of the war, and tO their Voices others were addad now which weighed very heavily with Honey. Kanye. whom Hardy tnow commanding the Danube Floulla) had

approached. begging him io use his influence, sent the Regent a typical memorandum saving that “not only stupid soldiers. but also expenenced then” Thouget that the war was lost and begging Horthy to extmecate Hungary fIOM IL Since "2 realisae policy could not make death in battle its objective.” Tre operation. re addad. would have to be carnied through by “a completely

reizble Government with adequate muitary support.” It would seem that Dy This Time—thai is. by approximately the end of the frst week In August. Horthy nad become convinced that the war was indeed lost. and that Hungary TUS? get out of if at the earliest possible moment. In this respect. therefore.

ihe situztion had been reached which was destined to prevail unal Ish Ocroder. But it was not a pracuecable possibilty for Hungary to move so tong 2s Roumania was fighting Germanws enemies. Horthy had. indeed. receivad reuabie private information tmat King Michael was preparing a renversement! d aQiiances: Dut the situation. after this had haprened. would Si continue to be governed Dy one au-imporiant factor which. again. was destined to remain unchanged aimost io ihe iast—the immense reluctance

bota of Horthy pimself and of the great majorty of his advisers to admit tre Russign troops mmto the country. He had now come to consider the Possibly, as an extreme resort. of surrendering in the east uf this could pe s¥yrcnronised with the entry of Angio-Saxon forces. air-borne or by land. into West Hungary. Dut not otferwise. His policy was therefore to contnue Tesisiance Im thé east Unt arrangements had been made for the armva! of the

Angio-Saxon oops. ly and when these arrangements could be concluded. 12 Would be necessary for tre Regent to Rave behind him sumcient force. both military and pohieal. iO carry Through the actual surrender. He nad. therefore. to take into most careful account the situation in both melds. as it now stoad. In the political ceid it was. Tor the Moment. unfavourable. Nothing could be done without a reuiabdle Minister President. and so long as Hitier’s veto. backed with the inreat of Margaretne LI. stood. this abstacie could not be overcome. For the

moment. Horthy took omy one caudous preparatory step in this feid: on mis immfauve Bonezos proposed to the parties that if a situation jusufving the move arose, ali alixe should submit to having their acuvities suspended. their premises closed and their funds frozen. The MEP. the Transvivanians and the Imredists agreed without dimcuity. so that Horthy was assured of support if ne did wish to introduce a non-party Government. The miutary condiuons for a coup had. in one paradonical respect. been

improved by te latest developments at the front. The First Armvyv—a considerable force—was at last In the place into which the Hungarians had so long been ving to Manceusre it: on the countm’s frontiers. and with no German forces elifer interspersed with it or between it and the interior. Bui lt Was still outside the frontiers. and had to be kept there so long as the policy of resisung Russia held. so that it could not be used to help carry through the western operation. For this. a home army would be needed. and this did not emst. The despatch to the Front of the three latest divisions had scraped the country bare again. Pracucally the only Hungarian units under arms in Hungary. outside the Danube Fioulia and the A.A. defences. which

REVULSION 317 | had of their nature to be kept at home, were the Ist Armoured and the 9/11; of which the latter was only a battalion strong and the former little more than a depot unit, since any armour which it acquired usually had to be sent up

to its sister unit at the Front. There were also the depot units at the nine Corps H.Q., which on 18th July had been brought under a single command but numbered in all only a few thousand men. Against this, there were still a considerable number of German troops in the country. It is true that of the three original occupation divisions which had stopped on in the country two (the 389th Infantry and the 18th Waffen SS.) were sent up to the Front in August, leaving of that force only the 8th Waffen SS. Division in the Bacska. But there was now also the half-formed 22nd Waffen SS. encamped

outside Buda, another Waffen SS. unit in formation outside Pécs,! and, besides various smaller training and replacement units, two armoured and five ordinary divisions (including, probably, the two which had made their march through Buda on 18th July) in rest billets in West Hungary or just across the frontier. Some of these were probably not up to strength, but even so they easily outnumbered the scratch Hungarian formations still west of the Carpathians. The Germans were in possession of all the Hungarian airfields, and although VGros had refused a suggestion that the Hungarian Air

Force should be placed under German command, the effect of this was somewhat nominal since almost all the few Hungarian machines still in use, and their crews, were with the VIJIth Corps in North Poland. Thus, even after the retreat, Horthy felt unable to take more than one or

two cautious preparatory steps. On 5th August he ordered the formation of a new “‘Depot Reserve Army,”’ to consist of a ““‘Depot Reserve Corps,”

corresponding to the Corps at the Front, in each Corps District. The next day” he took the command of the First Army away from Beregffy® and entrusted it to General Béla Miklos, the head of his own Military Chancellery. Both Miklos and his successor in the Chancellery, General Vattay,* belonged to what their enemies called ‘*The Palace clique,” and both could be—or at

least so it was thought—trusted to carry out the Regent’s orders, even if these were contrary to those of the Germans or of V6r6s. Neither of these moves brought any immediate change in the situation. Of the Depot Army, which, if it sprung into instant life, would have provided Hungary with a home force sufficient to keep the German units in the country in check, it may be said at once that owing to the shortage of both manpower (this owing to the claims of the harvest)® and above all, of arms,® the unwillingness of certain commanders, and the general disorganisation, only a few of these Reserve Corps were raised at all and the strength of the best of them (the VIIth and [Xth in Ruthenia and Transylvania), never exceeded a battalion of infantry with a section or so of light artillery. And Miklés made no immediate motions which could be alarming to the Germans. But every1 This was the Bosnian unit. It never got beyond a very primitive condition. 2 The change was made on 6th August, although not announced until the 24th. 8 Szdlasi in his Diary writes that Beregffy had refused to obey secret orders from Horthy and Csatay ‘‘to spare the Hungarian troops and be ready to withdraw to the rear if occasion arose, even if the Germans refused their consent.”

4 Vattay had been G.O.C. the Cavalry Division. The Szalasi Diary repeatedly describes him as one of the two or three most dangerous members of the “clique round the Regent.” 5 Owing to these claims, there were no callings-up at all during August in Central Hungary, except among the German minority, which, under a new agreement concluded in July, had to submit to a fresh drive.

gendarmerie. | ’ To arm even such formations as could be raised, rifles had to be taken away from the

318 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH thing that Horthy was doing now seemed to them, and to their partisans in Hungary, to be fraught with danger. On or about 10th August Winkelmann again urged Veesenmayer to carry through a coup. When Veesenmayer refused again, Winkelmann appealed to Kaltenbrunner, who took the extreme step of writing to Ribbentrop to complain in very sharp terms of Veesenmayer’s “‘defeatist’’ attitude. On 15th August Veesenmayer was summoned to East Prussia to defend himself. Winkelmann left with him, presumably in order to present the case for the prosecution. At the same time, Eichmann reappeared and gave notice that the deportation of the Budapest Jews was, after all, to be carried through on 29th August. Veesenmayer had just reached East Prussia when alarming reports from

Budapest followed him that Horthy was after all about to dismiss Sztdjay and replace him by Lakatos. These reports, which did not lack all substance,?

might have seemed to justify the SS. thesis and to prove the necessity of a putsch against Horthy; but, rather strangely, Hitler did not take this view,

and Veesenmayer, who only the day before had been told by Gavs (Ribbentrop had not even received him) that an enquiry was going to be opened into his conduct and that he would probably be suspended from his — functions until this was terminated, was instead put into a special aeroplane and sent back to Hungary with orders ‘‘to save what was still to be saved.’

He was back in Budapest on the 19th. A couple of days later a special courier brought him a sealed letter to be delivered into Horthy’s hands. The letter contained an appeal from Hitler to Horthy to continue to fulfil loyally the obligations of an ally into which he had voluntarily entered; a refusal to allow the return of the Hungarian divisions from Russia, and a warning that Hitler would not tolerate any reconstitution of the Hungarian Cabinet which was aimed at altering its Germanophile character. In particular, Hitler laid the greatest stress on the retention of those Ministers in whom the Germans reposed special confidence. Veesenmayer received personal instructions that if a Cabinet reconstruction was unavoidable, it was to be ““influenced”’ in the above sense.?

At the same time, V6r6s received an invitation from Guderian to visit him.

On 22nd August Horthy instructed Reményi-Schneller to tell the Germans that any attempt to carry out the Jewish deportations would be resisted, if necessary, by force of arms. On the other hand, Hitler’s letter seems for a brief moment to have caused him to postpone once again his thought of dismissing Sztojay.* But late in the evening of the 23rd the situation was changed yet again by the arrival of the news of Roumania’s defection. 1 On 19th August Horthy told Hardy that he was determined to dismiss Sztdjay in favour of Lakatos; Hardy was to be Foreign Minister. 2 Veesenmayer to C. A. M.

4 On the 21st he told Hardy that he could not, after all, change the Government without consulting Veesenmayer.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

HORTHY AGONISTES I

OUMANIA’S defection was momentous for Hungary, for it swept

Res at one blow, half of her outlying defences, both political and military. The Allies, if they won, were bound now to contrast the

one country’s obduracy in refusing to leave the enemy camp—in which she stood out ever more conspicuously as the list of its occupants dwindled—

with the repentance of the other. Strategically, a great gap had been torn in the line which was keeping the enemy at bay; unless this could be stopped,

Russian forces would penetrate the South Carpathian passes, turn the defences to the north of them and easily overrun the country. What course should Horthy be persuaded to follow in face of this situation (it was characteristic that everyone in Hungary—even, at that moment, the Communists—assumed that Horthy’s will was the only factor which counted, and that the only method of securing the adoption of any policy was to induce

him to adopt it)? To the Left the position seemed quite clear: he should immediately follow King Michael’s example. The ‘Peace Party’ sent him an urgent appeal, through Lazar!; Dessewffy sent a similar message through Baron Perényi.2, And this view was not altogether confined to the Left. General Naday, whom Horthy saw on the morning of the 24th, gave him the same advice.* And several of the “‘dissident diplomats” who were in touch with the Western Allies telegraphed to the same effect through the Hungarian

Legations in the countries in which they were living, where the Ministers allowed them the use of their codes (these included Apor and Bareza). Even the non-dissident Voernle chimed in, transmitting a message from the British

Ambassador in Ankara. Naturally there were people prepared to use arguments on the opposite

side—arguments which did not derive only from the psychological reluctance which was natural to any Hungarian to see his country’s policy take the form

of a lame and belated imitation of that of Roumania. The Roumanians, in publishing the terms of their surrender, skilfully ignored the small saving reservation which the Western Allies had inserted, under which, although the Second Vienna Award had indeed been cancelled, Roumania had been promised the restoration only of “‘the whole or the greater part’ of Transylvania, and represented the entire Transylvanian issue as definitely settled in their favour. The Germans and their partisans in Hungary could, and did, argue from this that if there had ever been a time when it was worth while competing with Roumania for the Allies’ favour, that time was past now; whereas if Hungary remained faithful to Germany, she would receive her reward when Germany won (as this camp maintained that she could still do). Furthermore, the German Press launched a story that Roumania’s instrument of surrender contained a clause obliging her to send 150,000 men to Siberia

op. cit., p. 119. * Dessewffy to C. A. M. 3' Darvas, Naday to C. A. M. 4 Barczy.

320 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH or Russia for forced labour. Hungary, they said, had simply no choice now but to fight on, if she would escape the same fate. Believing as he did—and now more firmly than ever—that Germany’s defeat was inevitable and near at hand, Horthy necessarily rejected the idea of fighting on at her side through thick and thin. But neither could he make up his mind to proclaim Hungary’s immediate surrender. Considerations of three categories held him back. Firstly, a moral scruple. He could not regard it as consistent with Hungary’s honour in general, and in particular, with the retort discourteous which he had given Hitler at Klessheim, to desert an ally—even a hated one—without warning; a fortiori suddenly to turn

against him. Secondly, the practical difficulties. He told Naday that to proclaim immediate surrender would be “‘a leap in the dark’’; but it would be, much more likely, a jump down a visible precipice. He did not doubt that Miklé6s would obey his orders, and the First Army, those of Miklos. But the First Army was still outside the frontiers and the German troops inside the country still numerically stronger than the Hungarian. Moreover, the civilian Government was still that of Sztéjay; and he could hardly hope to carry through a surrender policy until he had a Minister President who would obey his orders.

But the overriding consideration was, no doubt, his still unconquered repugnance to the idea of throwing Hungary’s frontiers open to the Russian Army alone. His belief was unshaken that Hungary’s true salvation lay in Kallay’s policy of holding out defensively in the east and opening the frontiers to the west; and he had not yet abandoned hope that this might be achieved.

So the policy on which he decided was, after all, simply that of Kallay, adapted to the altered situation. At noon on the 24th he told Veesenmayer (who had requested an urgent audience to discover what he was going to do in the face of the new situation) that he proposed to continue the “defensive struggle against the Soviets” and he asked for German troops to be sent to take over the defence of the Southern Carpathians.t On the other hand, now that the threat of ‘““Margarethe IT” no longer hung over him,” he felt safe in taking the next essential step towards realising the other half of his policy.

His very first move seems to have been to tell Bonczos to order the dissolution of the political parties,? and in the afternoon he sent Ambrozy and Barczy to Sztdjay in his sanatorium, to present the surprised general with a typed letter of resignation and request his signature to it.1/ Then he sent again for Lakatos and told him that this time he really must take on the Premiership, with the following programme: firstly, to restore Hungary’s sovereignty, as far as possible, in the face of the German occupation; secondly,

to put an immediate stop to the persecution of the Jews; and thirdly, to prepare Hungary’s exit from the war and carry through the operation at the appropriate moment.? 1 So Veesenmayer told Szalasi; according to whom Veesenmayer said that Horthy ‘had made a definite declaration of loyalty to the Axis and had ordered the fullest resistance to the Bolsheviks, and that V6rds had been commissioned to carry an assurance of loyalty to the German H.Q.” Horthy denied (to C. A. M.) that he had spoken of “‘loyalty.”’ 2 Cf. his own statement, op. cit., p. 274. * The order was published in the afternoon hours of the 24th, but according to Szalasi, the news had been known in Budapest since 9.30 a.m. * Barczy. Other sources state that Sztojay’s resignation had been signed earlier, but kept secret; but Barczy is specific that it was extracted only on the 24th, and that Sztdjay was ‘‘exceedingly surprised.”’

5 Lakatos’ evidence, Szalasi Trial, p. 127.

HORTHY AGONISTES 321 Late the same evening he sent for Howie and asked him to try again to get in touch with the Anglo-Saxons in Italy, offering him the use of a secret

transmitter which was hidden in the Palace, if he could bring his own

mechanics. On the same crowded day, Himmler (presumably under the influence of the Roumanian situation) suddenly gave way on the question of the Jewish deportations and offered to discuss terms. Reményi-Schneller made the following proposals:

(a) Germany to hand back the control over Hungarian Jewish affairs to the Hungarian authorities. (b) The Jews of Budapest, where able to work, to be set to work in the country. (c) Those unable to work to be put in camps outside Budapest, under the supervision of the Red Cross. (d) The imprisoned Deputies to be handed over to the Hungarian Courts and the Jews in the internment camps released. (e) Jewish property in German hands to be returned.”

Himmler wired back at midnight, accepting the proposals and ordering immediate cessation of the deportations. The next day Eichmann and his squad left Hungary. On the 25th a Ministerial Council, under Reményi-Schneller, adopted Horthy’s policy (or rather, the overt parts of it) as their own. Immediate surrender was impossible, as it would only turn Hungary into a battlefield between the Germans and the Russians. The struggle must go on, although it must be defensive only. The Germans must be asked to send reinforcements.* And on the same afternoon Voérés returned from Germany, bearing the message that Germany proposed to act in Hungary not as she was acting in Roumania but as she had done in Italy, i.e. “‘she would defend Hungary to the last as her own vital interest, whatever the attitude of the Hungarian Government or of the Regent.’’* Thus immediate surrender to the East was clearly excluded by common consent.

Even this agreement, however, was imperfect in one very important respect. Ullein, it appears, had transmitted a message that “it would be fatal for Hungary to attack Southern Transylvania; this would irretrievably lose

her all British and American sympathies.” Germany, on the other hand, asked the Hungarians to send all available forces into Southern Transylvania to seize the passes. * Howie, op. cit., p. 78. The transmitter had been installed during the Bardossy regime,

allegedly to jam foreign broadcasts. * This document was produced at the trial of Veesenmayer. * Barczy. The (Communist) Hungarian Bulletin of 20th November 1954 contains an article by one, D. Nemes, entitled ‘“‘The last days of the Horthy Regime’’. This purporting to quote from the Minutes of the Council (of which Barczy has preserved only jottings) records an alleged statement by Arnothy-Jungerth that ‘“‘the Anglo-Saxons would like the Hungarians to hold the Russians back until the Anglo-Saxons could occupy Hungary themselves.’”’ The Ministerial Council, in deciding to ask for German troops to help hold the Russians back, “‘hoped that the Germans would be wise enough to open the path for the British-American occupation of the Balkans’’.

Nemes’ article, besides being tendentious, is demonstrably inaccurate in several details, but

his quotations may be authentic. If so, it is of course, still no evidence that the ‘“‘AngloSaxons” ever sent any message of the kind reported, but it is evidence of the Hungarians’ hopes; and J may add that Veesenmayer once told me that he once promised Reményi-Schneller to urge that the Germans should not oppose the ““Anglo-Saxons”’ in such an event.

4 Id. ® Id. X

322 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Militarily speaking, the Germans’ request seemed reasonable, for the remnants of the fifteen divisions which had constituted the German Eighth Army, now in process of fighting their way back from the Ukraine, were so badly mauled that the Heeresgruppe Ukraine, in a confidential report issued at the time,! while describing its task as the holding of the Focsani gap, did

not commit itself to more than the hope that it would be able to do so if reinforced from the west. It would not even attempt to do so unless reinforced by all available Hungarian forces. But the request conflicted, of course, with Ullein’s advice, and also raised a central question which was destined to haunt Hungary’s transactions with Germany for the next six weeks. The main reason why the Germans were demanding that it should be Hungarian troops, not those of their own units which were stationed in Hungary, that should move into Southern Transylvania was that they did not propose to denude Hungary of their own troops and leave an unreliable Hungarian Army as the only striking force in it.2, And one main objective of the Hungarians was to bring about precisely that situation. It was one political calculation against the other, and for the moment Horthy forced his own point of view through. Another Ministerial Council was held the next day to consider how the Germans’ request should be answered. Horthy had briefed his spokesmen. When the question came up, Arnothy-Jungerth, attending to represent the Foreign Ministry, opposed it on political grounds and was supported by Csatay and VG6rés, who said that Hungary did not possess the forces for the operation. At the most she could hold Northern Transylvania, and that only if given arms.? The Second Army, then just being formed,* was unfit for offensive operations. Although supported by Reményi-Schneller, Jurcsek, Szasz, Kolosvary-Borcsa and, according to report, the majority of those present, the request, was accordingly, rejected,

and a counter-request sent to Germany herself to occupy the southern passes and even to help hold those of the Eastern Carpathians, which Hungary would be unable to hold unaided.°® So was taken a decision which may, as the Right afterwards declared, have been a very fateful one. It is possible that the Hungarian troops might have been unable to reach the passes in time, but if they had done so, they could

probably have held them against far superior numbers. As it was, the gap 1 Homonnay in Czebe-Petho.

* When Hitler saw Beregffy on 6th December, he told him that he had intended to move his troops up and occupy all passes as far as the Red Tower Pass, but would not do so unless he was certain of the Hungarians. “The Fuhrer could not again expose himself to what happened in Italy and Roumania—to send German troops to defend the country in question and then have the Government betray those troops from the rear and thus leave open a path to the enemy.” (Osszetartds 10th December 1944.) 3 According to an article in Egyediil Vagyunk, 3rd November 1944, Vorés afterwards said that he had acted according to orders, but that his attitude did not correspond with his own convictions or estimate of the military situation. V6rds’ own views are, for that matter, set out in a memorandum dated 4th September (reproduced by Nagy, op. cit., pp. 206-8) in which he argues strongly in favour of entering Southern Transylvania and occupying the passes (also the Dukla pass in Slovakia), chiefly on the grounds that if Hungary did this, Germany would give her the arms and munitions formerly destined for Roumania and Slovakia. With these she could build up a “‘strong central reserve with which she could defend herself and hold out even if Germany collapsed,”’ when she would be able ‘to negotiate, supported by internal order and by military force.”” The General Staff was apparently confident that the passes could be held. 4 See below, p. 336.

6 A similar order was given to the Hungarian forces in the north not to enter Slovak territory, either to help in the defence of the passes or in operations against the partisans. This was of smaller military importance, since the Germans were already holding the passes of the Northern Carpathians in force.

HORTHY AGONISTES 323 was left open, and when (as will be described) the decision was reversed, it was too late; the Russian and Roumanian forces were already through the gap, whereafter they were able to turn the German and Hungarian positions in Northern Transylvania and reach the Alféld before the defenders (who by this time had lost all the advantages of terrain) engaged them.! In conformity with this decision, an official announcement was also made, to the address of Bucharest, that Hungary intended to defend her frontiers and to abstain from any offensive action; and certain proposals were made (which Roumania accepted) to reduce friction between the two countries.” Meanwhile, the negotiations over the formation of the new Government had been proceeding. They had gone unexpectedly smoothly. Veesenmayer’s superiors had accepted the dismissal of Sztdjay as “‘inevitable” and had only ordered him to influence the formation of the new Government in the sense

desired by them.? He himself had been greatly reassured by the Regent’s declaration of his determination to continue the struggle against the Soviets (he had not perhaps fully realised how operative the last three words of this phrase were in Horthy’s mind) and did not particularly object to the choice

of Lakatos. Rightly appreciating the pro-German tendencies of the Hungarian General Staff as a whole, he thought that Horthy’s attitude would actually be stiffened if he had a soldier as Minister President*; and Lakatos personally had a first-class record as a fighter on the Eastern Front.

He had already once again put aside the importunities of the Arrow Cross,> who had stormed in on the Legation, firmly convinced that their hour had struck, at 4.30 a.m. on the 24th, demanding replacement of the unreliable Generals, arrest of the ‘“‘Generals’ clique,’® confrontation of Horthy with Reményi-Schneller, General Laszlé and Csatay “‘to clear up the

internal situation’? and half a dozen other measures which, in excited conference, they had decided to be necessary to meet the crisis. When he saw the P.V. at 8 a.m. (for once, he had revolted and refused to get up before 7), Veesenmayer had told him to wait and see what the Regent said; mean_ while, the Arrow Cross leaders might, if necessary, take asylum in the German

Legation and draw on him for funds, but no more. After seeing Horthy, he had told them (through Haller) that the situation was *‘not so serious after

all.’ It would not be necessary, nor even advisable just now, to arm the Arrow Cross Party Guard (the German troops would be quite sufficient to act alone, if action was necessary), much less to effect a coup, or even start

political disruption. He then turned to negotiating the composition of Lakatos’ team with the more orthodox constitutional factors.

1 The same Right-wing Press did not remark that the Germans might have seen whether the remedy was not in their own hands; and it is, of course, true that as soon as Bulgaria surrendered, which she did on 9th September, the route through that country was open to the Russians, who

in fact used it for part of their troops; but it was slow and roundabout in comparison, and not available for ten days after 26th August. 2 These included the proposal that each country should abstain from arresting or interning those of its subjects who belonged, ethnically, to the other nation and should also refrain from calling them up for military service. One or two immediate measures which had been taken on the 24th—the imposition of a curfew in Transylvania and the suspension of local Roumanian newspapers—were also rescinded. The friendliness did not extend to the Press, which continued to attack Roumania bitterly for her defection. 3 Veesenmayer to C. A. M. 4 Haller’s affidavit at the trial of Veesenmayer. 5 These lines based on the Szalasi Diary. 6 Under this heading the Arrow Cross seems chiefly to have understood Lakatos, Miklos, Vorés, Naday, Hardy, Hennyey and Vattay.

324 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH It is true that this took a little time. Horthy’s first idea had been to appoint a small, entirely new Cabinet consisting mainly of Generals, with administrative Secretaries of State not holding Cabinet rank to look after the technical posts. He had got together a ready list which included, besides Lakatos and Csatay, General Szilard Bakay for the Interior; General Farkas, who had recently been much publicised in the Press as the “‘hero of the Tatar

Pass,” as Minister of Cults; General Hardy as Foreign Minister; General Decleva for Justice, and B. Csizik for Finance;! and he had first intended simply to present this list to Veesenmayer as a fait accompli. He was, however, Overpersuaded by Csatay, who argued that Veesenmayer must be consulted on the composition of the Cabinet, as otherwise “the Germans . would become suspicious and try to prevent the step, by force if necessary,” and therefore showed Veesenmayer the list, not as a fait accompli but as a proposal, in which light he also put even the appointment of Lakatos.” Veesenmayer was by no means prepared to accept all Horthy’s candidates. He did not like either Bakay, Farkas or Declava; of Hardy he remarked that

‘“‘Ribbentrop would have a fit.”* On the other hand, he insisted, as an absolute sine qua non, that Reményi-Schneller and Jurcsek must be retained in the two key economic posts; he pressed strongly for the appointment of Bardossy as Foreign Minister, and of Ruszkay as Minister of Defence; and

he also had other candidates for Ministerial rank: Sztdéjay, Marosy, Hellebronth, Endre* (none of them, it may be noted, Arrow Cross men). So a Kuhhandel began, which, after three days, ended in the usual compromise. The Germans kept Reményi-Schneller and Jurcsek, thus retaining their two most reliable and efficient economic experts and, incidentally, their two best informants, whose presence in the Cabinet ensured that Veesenmayer would be constantly, immediately and accurately informed of everything that

went on inside that body. Reményi-Schneller retained the portfolio of Finance, while Jurcsek took over provisionally (and as it proved, for the duration of the Government) the portfolio of Supply in addition to his own Ministry of Agriculture. Veesenmayer failed, however, to secure the appointment of Ruszkay, whom Horthy flatly refused to consider, or of Bardossy, who himself loyally refused the appointment, at the Regent’s request,® and Horthy was thus able to keep Csatay and to secure the portfolio of Foreign

Affairs for a loyal servant of his own, General Gusztav Hennyey, a professional soldier who had had some years’ quasi-diplomatic service as military attaché in various foreign posts. Bonczos remained at the Interior. Rakovszky (Cults and Education), who had been Bethlen’s Minister of the 1 Lakatos at the Szalasi trial, p. 140.

* Lakatos’ affidavit at Veesenmayer’s trial. See also Hardy MS. The Regent had again offered Hardy the job two days before telling him Veesenmayer objected—therefore on the 24th. 5 Personal, Hardy to C. A. M. ‘ Lakatos at Sztojay’s trial (Kossuth Népe, 12th March 1946).

5 Veesenmayer told Szalasi on 26th September, when explaining why he was not so keen on having Bardossy in a new combination, that he had wanted to get Bardossy into the Lakatos

Government, so as to have the Government entirely in his hands, but Bardossy had ratted at the last minute, ‘‘making the situation much more difficult and the Government’s shift-over much easier.” .

According to Barczy (personal to C. A. M.), Horthy had said that he could not in any circumstances take as his Foreign Minister the man who had declared war on the U.S.S.R.; but he sent for Bardossy and asked him himself to reject the invitation, ‘‘as this would be the easier

way.” Bardossy obeyed the order, but there seems then to have been a controversy over the facts of the declaration of war on Russia, each man accusing the other of the responsibility. It was on this occasion that Horthy, he maintained, first learned of the Kristdffy telegram (see above, p. 26).

HORTHY AGONISTES 325 Interior from 1922 to 1926 and more recently President of the Administrative Court, was generally supposed to represent the Bethlen tradition. G. Vladar (Justice), and O. Markos (Trade and Communications) were civil servants,

and T. Gyulay (Industry) was Secretary General of the Chamber of Commerce in Budapest. None of the three had any pronounced political past, although Vladar and Gyulay had been in Horthy’s confidence in his earlier plans for concluding an armistice.!

The composition of the greater part of the Cabinet was not in fact a question of the first importance, for during the subsequent weeks most of the Ministers had only purely routine duties to perform. They were not initiated at all into high policy; above all, they were given no inkling of the secret negotiations which comprised the most important part of Horthy’s activity—

a fact so obvious that at the war criminal trials it was not thought worth while even to call any of them as witnesses.?, Horthy’s real, effective Cabinet

consisted of Lakatos, Hennyey, Csatay and V6r6és, the Heads of the two Chancelleries, Ambrozy and Vattay, his adjutant Tost, the Commander of the Body Guard, Lazar, and his own son and daughter-in-law. Since all of these, except Ambrdézy and the members of Horthy’s family,

were military men, it may be remarked in passing that Horthy had at last, in practice, realised his old dream of a military Cabinet; and it may also be remarked that he had in the event little cause to be satisfied with the experiment. All of the Generals, except V6rés, were decent, honourable men, and all—again with the exception of V6rdés—carried out the Regent’s orders loyally. On the other hand, few of them did so willingly. Most of them shared to the full Horthy’s aversion from the Bolsheviks, so that in so far as their hearts were in surrender at all, it was only in that surrender to the Western Powers alone which proved impracticable. Most of them, if they had no particular liking for the Germans, at least regarded a sudden volte-face

against allies as an act of treachery to be avoided if avoidance was at all possible. All of them were amateurs in politics and, as the event showed, quite unable to follow the tortuous workings of Soviet diplomacy; to which amateurishness must be added, in the case of one or two of them (Vattay in particular) a quite incredible levity. Furthermore, although there may have been some pairs of them between whom there existed mutual liking and respect, yet as a generalisation it seems true to say that most of them disliked the others personally and that they were as jealous of one another as so many cats. Each succeeded in concealing from the rest most of the important steps taken by him, and the absence of co-ordination between their various doings reached heights which tax the credulity of the observer.

The measure of their enthusiasm for their task is, again, shown by the treatment which they received after 15th October, when a full half of them were left almost entirely unmolested. Nor did all of them even prove secretive. No leakages were traced to Hennyey or to his department; yet Szalasi’s Diary, that comprehensive give-

away, records indiscreet remarks even by Hennyey, and many more by 1 See above, p. 218. 2 In fact, Schell, when he became Minister of the Interior on 13th October, was only told that

negotiations were on foot, but that it was better for him to know nothing about them (Schell to C. A. M.). Markos, at midday on the 14th, had no idea that anything was in the wind for the next morning (Széll to C. A. M.). Jurcsek:.and Reményi-Schneller were told nothing whatever, as it was assumed that they would pass all information on to the Germans.

326 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Lakatos and Csatay, several of which were passed on, in all innocence, by their nearest dependants. As for VGrds, even his loyalty is questionable: he was, as we have seen, Veesenmayer’s nominee, and there seems little doubt

that he had given the German reason to suppose that he would work on his side.t Anyway, he was a loose-mouthed creature, who could keep nothing to himself: a particularly unfortunate weakness for a man in his position, for his official duties brought him into close and daily touch with the Germans, including the German liaison officer in the Honvéd Ministry. He was in any case bound in duty to tell them much, and possessed neither the discretion nor the perception to guide him where to stop. And where he did not blab to the Germans, he blabbed to his subordinates, including his second in command, Laszl6, who was heart and soul on the German side, and his able and energetic young acting Head of the Operational Section (who accompanied him everywhere), Col. Lajos Nadas, from whose office (although

he has assured the writer that he was ignorant of the fact) a highly efficient bush-line carried all V6r6és’ confidences straight to the Arrow Cross, and most of them also straight to the Germans.” In fairness it must be added that indiscretion was not the exclusive prerogative of the Hungarian Generals. On 12th September an American paper gave from London an accurate account, with names and detauls, of Hungary’s

negotiations in Switzerland. For that matter, the London Observer of 15th October, some hours before Horthy’s proclamation, carried the armistice terms given to Hungary as “‘approved by the Allied leaders in Moscow.” The Economist of the previous day had forecast them accurately enough.

Another report of the negotiations appeared in the Svenska Dagblatt of 5th October; but the Swedes were at least not honourably bound to silence.

The Government was sworn in at 8.30 p.m. on the 28th (although the announcement was not made until the 29th). Lakatos then made a brief statement on the wireless summarising the Government’s programme in these sentences: continuation of the struggle as honourable Hungarians, in defence of the frontiers; absolute preservation of peace and order; increase of production. The appointment of the Cabinet was followed, in the course of the next days, by that of the new Secretaries of State, Féispans, etc. The turn-out was a very radical one, even more complete than that which had been effected in the previous March and, of course, in the opposite sense. The ‘‘March Men” —Imrédists, National Socialists, and Right wing MEP men—vanished, the procession being headed by that ill-omened couple, Baky and Endre, who 1 A most revealing remark was made by Veesenmayer to C.A.M., that ‘the had been disappointed in Vords on 15th October.’’ Yet on that day V6rds betrayed Horthy at least 98 Pere The Szalasi Diary for September and October 1944 contains numerous reports of highly secret information which are registered as coming from one, “‘Lajos.”’ In many cases these refer to things known at the time—to judge by all indications—only to VG6rés and Nadas, whose Christian name was Lajos. As Col. Nadas has assured me that he never consciously passed on, nor did Szalasi ask for, secrets, 1 must leave to others the task of determining how Szalasi obtained

this information. (An Arrow Cross source writes me that the Party’s direct informant was one Col. Andreanszky, on Nadas’ staff.) It should be recorded that not quite all the information which went to the Arrow Cross also reached the Germans. Another useful source for the Arrow Cross was Ern6 Gombds, son of the deceased Premier. The young Gémbés naturally had many connections in the Army from his father’s day, and in September decided on his own initiative (he did not then know Szalasi) to discover which officers were in favour of carrying on the fight if Horthy tried to surrender. Later he was put in touch with the Arrow Cross and reports from him figure not infrequently in the Szalasi Diary.

HORTHY AGONISTES 327 were sent packing at Horthy’s special order. Others of the fallen included Kolosvary-Borcsa, Szasz and Antal. The new men were either soldiers or sober conservatives, solid adherents of Horthy’s and men connected with the name and tradition of Count Bethlen. In the event, these new men were destined to have few duties to carry out and those not for long, and only two will figure at all largely in our story. Baron Peter Schell, a close friend of Lakatos’, who had for many years been Féispan of Kassa, and had retained that post, at the Regent’s request, under Sztdjay, now became Secretary of State to the Minister of the Interior, and Endre Hlatky! became Secretary of State in charge of the Press. A gentle, cultivated and unassuming man, a patron of literature and himself a poet of no mean order, Hlatky accepted his post with fatalism, prophesying, like Lakatos, that it would bring him down.’ Before the sudden and dramatic intervention made by him on 15th October, which will be described, he made

only one public appearance—on 11th September—when he told an incredulous assemblage of journalists that in the future Hungarian Government statements were going to be truthful. It will be convenient to get out of the way at this point our description of these governmental activities and political and general developments of the opening weeks of Lakatos’ regime which, while forming a background to the

Government’s main activities and also, of course, possessing their own intrinsic significance, were yet subsidiary to the high politics the description of which must fill most of our pages. The Jewish question now received immediate and (for the time) definitive settlement. A detailed written agreement was signed with the Germans on

30th August. There were definitely to be no more deportations out of Hungary, but as the Germans insisted strongly that Budapest must be cleared of Jews,® the Hungarians agreed to move the Budapest Jews into camps in the country. The executive orders carrying this agreement into effect were issued on 7th September. All Jews of both sexes between the ages of 14 and 70 were to be called up for service, and as this measure was taken under the Hungarian military service law, which applied to non-Jews as well as Jews, the order applied to exempted as well as to non-exempted categories of Jews. Those found fit for military service would probably be placed in munitions factories. Their quarters, provisions, etc., would be placed under the control of the Red Cross. Those found unfit for such service were to be sent “‘to the

provinces,” where the Jews themselves, with the co-operation of the Hungarian Red Cross, would arrange centres where they could be employed

on suitable work. They would receive regular pay and rations, and the demands made on them would be “‘strictly in accordance with Hungarian labour legislation.”” The Red Cross would look after the young children; the sick and aged would probably be placed in Jewish hospitals in Budapest. The whole operation was to be carried out in “the humane spirit characteristic of Hungarian chivalry.” The distribution of the Jewish-owned stocks was to continue but the value 1 See above, p. 430. Hlatky had resigned from the Foispanship of Bihar, which he had held from September 1941, in March 1944. 2 Hlatky was, as we shall see, arrested on 16th October, but he escaped with his life.

8 According to Veesenmayer at his trial, this was due to security reasons, as the Germans knew that the Jews were disaffected and even thought that the Jewish labour battalions might

endanger the security of the German occupying forces. .

328 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH of them was to be credited to the ex-owners. Inventories of personal properties left behind by Jews were to be taken. It may be remarked that so long as the Lakatos Government remained in office. this agreement operated even more favourably for the Jews in practice

than in theory. The Germans duly handed over the internment camps, whence the Hungarians released all their occupants except some 300-400 Jews against whom criminal charges were pending. The Hungarians, on the other

hand, pleaded the difficulty of finding suitable accommodation outside Budapest, and in fact not a single Jew was moved out of the capital into an internment camp.

On the “restitution of Hungarian sovereignty,” i.e. the release of the arrested Deputies, etc., negotiations were initiated, the result of which will be described in due course.’

Most of the other internal activities of the Government were purely administrative, and, of necessity, largely consisted in the imposition of everfresh restrictions on the population at large. Early in September the activities and autonomous rights of all organs of local government—County, municipal, district and communal—were suspended, the entire responsibility for every branch of administration being left in the hands of permanent officials,? whose powers were, in their turn, progressively and drastically curtailed as, with the westward advance of the armies, area after area of Hungary was declared an Operational Zone,* thus coming under military law. In these zones, of course, not only was the word of the authorities supreme but the restrictions to which

the civilian population had to submit were fairly drastic. In most cases curfews were imposed, travel was forbidden and public assemblies, even Church processions, were prohibited.

The public authorities could do little more than issue hand-to-mouth enactments for having the population somehow or other fed and sheltered and making provision for the future. The task was increasingly difficult, for it was admitted that traffic in Hungary was now “practically 100 per cent. military’; moreover, Allied aircraft made transport difficult by frequent raids on railroads and on road and river bridges; in the first days of September, railyards at Miskolcez, Ujvidék and Nyiregyhaza, and road and river bridges at Szob, Szolnok and Budapest were raided. The attack on Budapest, which took place on Sth September, was heavy. Szeged also received attention. Magnetic mines were regularly dropped in the Danube. The raids made the movement of food supplies, and even more that of fuel for the coming winter, difficult, but the situation was facilitated in practice by the large-scale hoarding which had been going on everywhere during the preceding three years. Every village and smaller town was in a position to look after itself. The only real problem was that of Budapest, and even Budapest was not as yet In extremis. Industrial consumption goods 1 The persons released comprised about 600 Jews and some Serbs and Roumanians. = See below, p. 348.

> Local authorities were told simply that they would have to obey the orders of the Féispan or Burgomaster (8th September).

* On 8th September a third Zone was created covering the area adjacent to the southern part of the frontier with Roumania, and the whole frontier with Serbia and Croatia. On 19th September this new unit was enlarged and divided into two: Middle Zone and South. On 3rd October the whole area between the Danube and the Tisza was declared an Operational Zone and amalgamated with the Southern Zone. This left only Budapest, the Dunantul and the western

half of the Felvidék under civilian administration. Further, on 11th September the Germans proclaimed all Hungary an Operational Zone for the German armies, which meant in practice that they issued any orders which they wished to the Hungarian administration.

HORTHY AGONISTES 329 had vanished from the shop windows and black-market prices were soaring fantastically, but the normal rations remained unchanged on paper, and a reasonable distribution of the prime necessaries was still somehow achieved.

Meanwhile, all available hands were put to working on the harvest, concerning which optimistic reports were issued.

In view of the situation, various further precautionary measures were taken. On 9th September all male Hungarian citizens between the ages of 14 and 60, and all females between 14 and 50, whatever their present occupations, were required to register, “with a view to the systematic utilisation of the available national labour forces.”” A Government Commissioner for the Allocation of Manpower was appointed with the functions of directing the whole national manpower, co-ordinating military and civilian needs, etc., and with very wide authority for the carrying out of these tasks. Youths of the 1925 class were called up for national labour service, and girls and childless married women of military ages in Budapest were registered for service. But it must be agreed that most of the measures enacted in this hour of national

crisis were extraordinarily half-hearted. For Government offices, they consisted of the stoppage of leave, the abolition of the ‘‘week-end”’ and the

introduction of an eight-hour day. The general public had to undergo the closing of bars and cinemas and the abolition of music in open-air restaurants.

Private travel, especially in the east, was restricted, and the censorship tightened up. But although labour secured a restatement of overtime rates for hours worked above 48 weekly and on Sundays and public holidays, the working week was not lengthened in practice, even in vital munitions factories (as the events of 15th October were to prove), and the Right-wing Press was full of complaints of idlers in Budapest and on the Balaton. Personal records of the time—letters, diaries, etc-—show the Hungarians as living existences of which they complained very much but which seem to us most enviably normal. Political life during this period was in a state of semi-suspense. The decree

dissolving the political parties affected them, in practice, in very unequal measure. To most of the MEP it made no perceptible difference. To them, the adjuration to stand behind Lakatos and the Regent meant no more than an invitation to carry on as before, and the dissolution of the Party political organisation meant little when the same men were in complete charge of the administration. The Transylvanians had fallen out of national policy, for with danger threatening their home they simply withdrew there and occupied themselves with its affairs. The Imrédists had really ceased to exist as a party when their representatives resigned from the Government. Imrédy himself retired to West Hungary

and, with his original followers, took no part in the new developments. Rajniss and some other individuals clung to Veesenmayer, or put out feelers to the Arrow Cross. The KABSz, too, had disintegrated as a large-scale organisation, but Ney succeeded in keeping a ““Commando formation” together. He offered the services of this body in turn to the Security organisation of the gendarmerie, to the Ministry of the Interior and to Csatay. As none of them wanted him, he approached Veesenmayer, and when he too was uninterested, Winkelmann, with whom he reached agreement. The Germans took over some of

330 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH his followers and put them in Waffen SS. uniform: the remainder acted as a

sort of Hungarian auxiliary troop to the Waffen SS. Interestingly, the Hungarian Government was better informed about them than about the Arrow Cross and regarded them as the more dangerous body of the two. A somewhat similar split occurred in the ranks of the National Socialists. The prohibition really meant for them an order to dissolve their organisations, abandon their ideas and, in effect, line up behind the MEP. Naturally, they did not dream of following this course sincerely, but they could not openly refuse to obey. Palffy seems at this time really to have remained quite in-

active. Baky visited the Minister of the Interior early in September and assured him that his party was not preparing any armed rising, which appears

to have been literally true. Like Ney, however, he had got into touch with Winkelmann. His own and his party’s strongest emotion was hatred and

jealousy of Szalasi, so that he could not join forces with the P.V. He contented himself with waiting, in a certain passivity, from time to time reminding Winkelmann of his presence and willingness to take charge when the moment of action came.

The Arrow Cross, meanwhile, were deeply disgruntled. While the negotiations for the formation of the Lakatos Government had been going on, the Germans had found one excuse or another for putting them off. Then, to their rage, they discovered that while Haller had been discussing with Kemény the possibility of arresting Lakatos, or alternatively of laying before the Regent proof of his wife’s alleged Jewish origin, Veesenmayer had all the while been quietly negotiating the formation of a Cabinet under the same General; and when Kemény caught Lakatos coming out of the German Legation, in full-dress uniform, obviously from paying his first official respects as Premier, there was a real explosion, and bitter words passed. Veesenmayer tried to pacify the ruffled Leader by arranging for him a second audience with the Regent, and this duly took place on 29th August, but Szalasi got no more out of the Regent than he had in the previous April. He expounded his views

on world affairs, and began with his old proposal that the Regent should boldly place himself at the head of the nation. Horthy did not even reply. Szalasi next suggested that he should himself form a concentration Cabinet. The Regent again did not reply, and when the P.V. continued with a modified

form of the same suggestion, the Regent, according to Szalasi’s account, interrupted him to say that unfortunately the war would soon be over. All his own efforts at Parliamentary Party Government had failed; now he was going to form a military and administrative Cabinet. For the rest he maintained, in answer to Szalasi’s objections, that he was acting in strict conformity with his constitutional rights; politely declined the P.V.’s offer to go and see Hitler on Hungary’s behalf, advised him to keep quiet and regretted that he had no more time for him. The meeting was thus totally ineffective, but it was nevertheless not unimportant, for it destroyed, on both sides, the last hope of any co-operation between the two men. The Regent, as we know, had never had any use for Szalasi, and this latest audience confirmed his earlier impressions. He told Ambrozy afterwards that Szalasi ““gave the impression of an idiot or a fantast. It was impossible to talk sense with the man; he saw only himself in every-

thing.’

1 Szalasi in his Diary gives what seems to be a practically verbatim record of the interview. * Demokracia, 26th August 1945.

HORTHY AGONISTES 331 But this impression was, for Horthy, nothing new. Szalasi, on the other

hand, had hitherto clung with extraordinary tenacity to his idea of cooperating with the Regent in happy partnership. Now, however, he convinced himself that the Regent ‘“‘no longer believed in a German victory and was a puppet in the hands of Bethlen and the Anglo-Jewish gang,” and drew the conclusion that henceforward the Arrow Cross need have no further scruples, but must fight against the Regent with the arms which he was using against

them. When, however, he went back to Veesenmayer to urge immediate action, the German put himself off once more, saying that the German High Command needed three weeks’ breathing space. Szalasi was not convinced and voiced his own private and characteristically egocentric belief that the

purpose for which the Germans really wanted to gain time was not to reorganise against the Russians, whom he seems to have believed that the Germans could defeat any time they took the trouble to do so, but to crush the Hungarist movement in favour of German imperialism in South-Eastern Europe. On the 31st he met Winkelmann for the first time, told him that Horthy

and Lakatos were trying to get out of the war, and again offered his own services. Much capital was made out of the interview when Szalasi was on trial, since he was alleged to have urged Winkelmann to help him to take over the power with or without the Regent, but preferably without him; but,

in fact, the conversation had no important results. The two men had now made each other’s acquaintance, but the effect seems rather to have been to confirm Winkelmann in his distrust of the Arrow Cross. At any rate, he told Szalasi that if he took over the power, as he wished to do, he must do it on his own responsibility, since he, Winkelmann, recognised the existing Government. Meanwhile, Szalasi was so angry with Veesenmayer that tactful mediation proved necessary before the two men met again, which was not until 26th September. Their boasts notwithstanding, the Arrow Cross was really hit very hard

by the dissolution of the political parties. Its leading members were now under constant surveillance and interference from the police, while, above all, the disruption of communications and the general disorganisation prevailing in Hungary made any long-term work extraordinarily difficult. Headquarters could not even maintain touch with the local organisations. Party activity, as such, was thusin suspense. Szalasi’s restless spirit, however,

could not settle to inactivity. In the first days following the dissolution of the parties, a number of interviews took place between Arrow Cross leaders and members of the Government. On 31st August Vajna saw Bonczos, and on 2nd September Csatay, and later in the day Lakatos himself, with whom he

had a long talk.’ The discussions were conducted in an amicable enough tone, the Arrow Cross, despite patent misgivings, preferring to assume the good faith and goodwill of their interlocutors; and indeed Bonczos and Csatay, if Vajna’s reports were true, were sympathetic enough, at least in their language. The 1 Csia, who in early September was assigned the duty of “preventing the disintegration of the local organisations,’”’ found this task quite beyond his powers, and in attempting to perform it got so out of touch with the centre that he did not even know until long after the great decisions taken there. 2 The Szalasi Diary contains Vajna’s reports on these interviews. At the Szalasi trial Lakatos

said that his object in granting the interviews was to discover how much opposition the

extremists would raise if and when he tried to conclude an armistice,

afas ~

332 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH main omect of the Arrow Cross at this stage. when they were out of contact with the Germans. was to suiten the Government's attitude. To this end they paintad as lund a picture as they could of the subversive and pro-Bolshevist amiaton going on in Hungary, at the same ume emphasizing the willingness of their own organisation to deal with it and their ability to do so. Szaigsi Rimseif seems to have reored after his mtermiew with Lakatos to the country (to Reszthely. on the Balaton). where he amused himself for a formight with his favourite game of drawing up masinarv Cabimets. Kemenv and Vajna. however, remamed in Budapest in close touch with the Germans. for Whom they consututed an invalusble source of informanon. Tre Arrow Cross reports on the Left were unnecessamiy alarmist. The Lem was at the time undergoing 2 provess of reorganisation which was to

: -_: * . * 2 2 - : ~ ~ : ba a -

Drove importact at a later date. and valthough not fully completed untl shoruy before 13th October) may conveniently be descmbed here. On [2th September the “Peace Party” omecialv retransmuted itself back into the Communist Party. ¢s which tt was reinforced bv several erypro-Communists Who now seceded from the Social Democrats. In Hunger. the Party appears TO have worked. at this periad. under the joint leadershin of G. Kalla: and L. Rajx. then Known under the pseudonym of ““Abirgiz.”+ This move was, however. kept 2 close secret. The Communists. who on

1? . _ _ - ~ . ~ nm nene - oo 3

Oth September had concluded an agreement (which was not alwavs honoured)

WIL the Smainolders. (to co-operate smoothiv with them) thereafter kept in the background, especialiv in the negotiations with aurhonnmes. which were conducted bv the Smallholders and the Social Democrats alone.-

i ae

. % _ a . . =| . iL : ¥ ‘ “ . . ; ~ ame. * oS eh ee ; ; _ ? ~ -_~ a. - :

A litte later the Front was enlarged again. Imre Kovacs was at the ume in close associggen with Rajk—at one meeting in September he appeared. indeed. 28 representanve of tne “Peace Parity.” But he was sull arming at an independent role. and on 19th September had announced that he and his friends (the survivors of the old “Village Explorers’) had founded a new party (National Peasant Parmnw—Nemzen Paraszt Pari to represent the interests of the agricultural labourers. He askad that this should be admitted to the ““Magvar Front.” The appheanon was considered at a meeting of “Resistance Leaders” on 6th October. The Communists (who undoubtedly

PE \ 3 3

- -_ +. : af : * .

hoped to use the Party for their own ends*) and the Social Democrats

supported it. The Smaltlholders were very divided. some of them believing That the creatton of the new party would split their own ranks and weaken their position Vis-3-Vis the indusmial workers: but Tildy eventually let himself

be talked over. and the application was erantad. Meanwhile private negouations had been going on between the Social Democrats and Communists to form 2 sert of inner ring Within the Movement. > Ma. Agcai’s giutuce towirds Ristorical ruth may be fudged fom the fact that his account

of this Pema published in took form im ISS 3 amis any mention even of the came of his UNfOrmunate eX-parimer.

* There seems to be good evidence, M. Kailai’s explicit statement ro the concrery nonwithSLEMCGIDNS. Lit Curing ihe later negotiations neither Herhy nor Vords mew of the Communisn” auisiernce.

} The CeCISIOL to found this party had acrusliv been taken vby Kovias, F. Erdei and ane or

two Others! in July [S39. burt no sters had been taken to implement in. Kovacs ippears to have mace ihe present applicadon m the terms usad by me here. * In Demoxrate Hungerv the Communists in fact used the National Peasants 2s stooges to put over the Communist programme to the stuniy messes of landless proletariat: whom their OWN Prodies and casmimes would have alienated. Before long the Hiile party (always a head Without a ody) split: most of those unwillims to accept the role of stooge Umcluding Kovacs) emusraing: ine others dropped the “ompie” from their oypte-Communism.

HORTHY AGONISTES 333 On 10th October Szakasits for the Social Democrats, K4llai for the Communists and L. Kabok for the Trade Unions signed a formal agreement.! The two Parties, agreeing that the final objective of each of them was the realisation of socialism in Hungary and that the realisation of this objective called for the immediate conclusion of peace and the creation of an independent, free and democratic Hungary, accordingly covenanted to turn their forces not against each other, but against the common enemy, preserving their structurally independent organisations, but regarding one another as brother parties. Co-operation between them was to be assured through a Liaison Committee composed of representatives of both Parties. Each Party was bound to accept, and to require its members to carry out, unmodified, the decisions of this body. The Committee was to issue a newspaper, which should advocate unity, but allow “benevolent, honest and constructive” criticism by either Party of the other. The Trade Unions were to remain, as before, under unitary control, and the Communists wished the same system to apply to the Youth Organisations. As, however, the Social Democrats refused to allow the Communists a share of the control over their organisations in this field, the Communists later (28th October) founded their own Youth Groups, mostly small bands entrusted with carrying out works of sabotage and violence.

Finally, a new party known as the “Hungarian Communist Party” was founded in September by a bookseller named Faust and a workman named Dudas, with a following composed chiefly of ex-Social Democrats. This party had no connection with Moscow, took no orders from that quarter, and envisaged future collaboration with the bourgeois parties. None of these parties, however, attempted much independent action during this period.* The few acts of sabotage which occurred in Budapest were mainly the work of independent small bands which had formed themselves by spontaneous generation.” The partisan activity now perceptible

in Ruthenia and the Bacska was directed from Russia and Yugoslavia respectively. The official leaders of the “‘Front’’ concentrated on trying to influence Horthy’s policy by pulling the threads which ran through the hands of his son, who in this difficult time was proving a tower of strength to his

father. On 8th September, at Horthy junior’s invitation, the Smallholders, Social Democrats and Peace Party (as it rebaptised itself for the occasion) drafted a joint memorandum,? which they sent on to Horthy through a Calvinist clergyman named Bereczky, arguing that Germany had lost the war and that Hungary was not morally bound to her. They asked the Regent (since, they wrote, they knew that the Allies would deal only with the legal and recognised authority): (1) To send an accredited representative to Russia to ask for armistice terms.

(2) To arrange for the despatch of missions also to the Anglo-Saxon Powers.

(3) To ask the three Allies to lay down a demarcation line between Hungary and her neighbours. 1 In 1945 the original of this document was reported lost, but Kallai reproduces what purports to be the text of it, op. cit., pp. 242-4.

2 For details see the brochure “Champions hongrois de la liberté contre le Fascisme.”’

PP ext in Kallai, op. cit., pp. 252-4.

334 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH (4) To remove the unreliable officers and to put trustworthy men in their places.

To this they received no reply: not unnaturally, for in the existing situation, and with his own negotiations proceeding as they were, it was equally impossible for Horthy to return either a positive or a negative answer to such requests.

I

We may now return to pick up the main thread of events, which for many days ran a bewildering zigzag. Immediately on appointment, the Government held a Ministerial Council at which it reaffirmed unaltered the policy of continuing the struggle and “‘of making every effort to hold the Carpathians and Eastern Transylvania.” In

reply to a direct question from Reményi-Schneller. Lakatos answered categorically: “this is not a jump-out government’*—a statement which to the common man may seem to contain a substantial measure of suppressio veri, not to say suggestio falsi. For by this time Horthy was in effective touch with the West. Howie’s efforts had, indeed, not proved very successful. He managed to send out one message on the Palace transmitter, conveying the offer to which Horthy had been persuaded to agree in July. but this brought a visitation from the ““German Commander.” who allegedly threatened to shell the city with heavy artillery if the ““monkey business’? did not stop.* Howie and his men reverted to the use of their own, less noisy, transmitter, but even this was audible to the Germans. who. whenever it was used sent aircraft to fly over to the Palace. Horthy was obliged to send Howie away to a hidingplace in the country. Although the usual sanguine rumours to the contrary went round,® he does not appear to have received any answer (in any case, any authoritative answer) to his messages. Alternatives, however, had presented themselves. A message had been got through to the Archduke Charles Louis. in Lisbon, asking him to find out whether it was still possible to talk to the West, ‘‘not so much with a view to confining the talks to the West, as to making it possible for the Western Powers to take part in any armistice negotiations conducted between Hungary and Russia, so that Hungary should not be left facing Russia alone.”** The answer to this message was slow in coming, for the Archduke Otto himself received it only on 9th September, just as President Roosevelt was starting for

Quebec, whither the Archduke had to follow him before putting the Hungarians’ question to him. But in the meantime, Horthy had really established contact with the Allies through a third channel. BakachBessenyey was still in the confidence of the representatives of the Western Allies, and although now living as a private person, was in touch with Col. Rakolezay, the Military Attaché in Berne, who had stopped on in office, at 1 See above, p. 314. - Howie, loc. cit. * Bishop Szentivanyi (who was still managing Howie's movements) told C. A. M. that they “thought they had received"’ an answer from the Allies accepting their proposals. Another “Resistance” man has stated that on 5th September the ‘‘Resistance’’ received a message from ‘‘one of its members abroad,” transmitted through the Swedish Legation, that Anglo-Saxon troops would be arriving on the Drave about the 10th. The Poles got a similar message. On the strength of these, Polish refugees were moved down to the Drave area. I have, however, been unable to confirm the sending of any such message from the other end. ‘ Personal, Archduke Otto to C. A. M. * The following (and later references to the same negotiations) chiefly from Bakach-Bessenyevy,

who kindly showed me the telegrams which passed between him and Budapest. i

HORTHY AGONISTES 335 the Regent’s express request, to keep an emergency line open. On 26th ~ August Bessenyey had, on his own initiative, sent the Regent (through Rakolezay) a cable, urgently adjuring him to take this last opportunity to avoid the total destruction of Hungary by withdrawing the Hungarian Army into the interior of the country and sueing for an armistice. On 28th August Bessenyey got an answer, sent via the old transmitter in the Var, authorising him to conduct negotiations with the Western Allies, with full authority. There were no Hungarian fighting forces outside the frontiers, and the occupation troops were in process of being brought home (the Government still clung to its thesis that the army of occupation did not constitute “‘troops’’).1 The message contained the important instruction: ‘*Territorial questions not to be raised at present. Important is independence with democratic tendency.”’ On receipt of this message, Bakach-Bessenyey called on Mr. Harrison, the American Minister. He was told that the Allies’ terms were unconditional surrender and that Hungary could not possibly

negotiate with the Western Allies alone, to the exclusion of Russia. Accordingly, he sent two wires: on the 29th that “‘to avoid any misunderstanding he must make it clear that the negotiations could not be confined to the Anglo-Saxons; any attempt to exclude the Russians from them would mean immediate failure’; and on the 30th that the British and American Ministers had asked their Governments for instructions, and himself asking for clear instructions that Hungary was asking for armistice conditions to be communicated to her. He expected those conditions to include the obligation to disarm the German forces. The next day (1st September) he asked again for ‘“‘urgent and express instructions to ask for an armistice,’ with a warning that unless these were received immediately, the moment would pass.

Such a course, would, however, have been incompatible with Horthy’s policy of holding out in the east, to which, in the meantime he had committed himself more fully even than on 26th August. The decision of that day had

brought Guderian down to Budapest.?, He saw Lakatos on the 3lst and afterwards conferred with Horthy, and with V6rés. Guderian assured the Hungarians of Germany’s goodwill and intention to defend Hungary’s territory as though it were her own, provided Hungary would do her part. 1 This statement also anticipated, by a few days, the withdrawal across the frontier of some fighting units. 2 There is no full account of these important negotiations, the course of which has therefore

to be reconstructed from various fragments and, by deduction, from events. Guderian’s assurance of Germany’s willingness to help, but his cautious estimate of the dimensions of that help, emerge from Lakatos’ wireless statement of 2nd September, when he announced that steps

had been taken to defend Hungary’s frontiers and to meet the new emergency. “In this

connection,” said Lakatos, ‘‘I have personally got into touch with the German High Command and can say confidently, on the basis of my conversations, that besides our own forces, we shall have at our disposal a degree of support commensurate with the position and possibilities.”” In his Parliamentary speech Lakatos also referred to the “‘moral obligation freely undertaken by the Reich towards us.’’ According to Szalasi’s Diary, Guderian promised to defend Hungary ‘‘as it were the Reich.’’ The promise to move up the forces round Budapest emerges from the fact that they were in fact moved; that to allow the repatriation of the Hungarian ‘“‘Dead Army” also from the event; the VGr6s Memorandum mentioned above speaks of them as being already on the way. The same memorandum show that Germany was prepared to defend Hungary, but only along a defensive line. Guderian himself described this visit (Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, pp. 333-4) only shortly.

Horthy succeeded in awakening his mistrust by saying “Schauen Sie, Herr Kamerad, in der Politik muss man immer mehrere Eisen im Feuer haben.”’ For the rest, he treated Guderian to a lecture on the multi-national state, complained of Hitler’s treatment of the Poles and asked for his cavalry division back. Guderian had to report to Hitler that he had “‘not gained a positive picture .. . all VGrdés’ fine words notwithstanding.”’

336 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH If satisfied of this, he promised, subject to the Fiihrer’s consent, to send up

to the Front immediately such German combatant units as were then stationed in Hungary; he would also arrange the return to Hungary—again if the Fiihrer agreed—of the Hungarian forces then on the Russian Front— both the Army of Occupation and the formations which had got separated

from the main body and were now under German command; to supply air cover for Hungary, and to send her certain stocks of arms, formerly destined for Roumania. But Hungary must help to hold the Carpathian passes, since it was not likely that Germany would be able to send any large reinforcements quickly: most of the German units stationed in Hungary were

‘in training’ and not fit for action. The Hungarians also asked that the Weichs Army should be brought back

and used for the defence of the Lower Danube. To this request Guderian again replied that the decision lay with the Fiihrer; but he seems to have held out a certain prospect that the request would be fulfilled. Of the “‘secret weapon,” on which he was questioned, Guderian replied—

with more caution than was usual at the time—that something was in the wind, but that it could not be a decisive factor in the war.+ Accordingly, the decision of the 26th was altered. The new directive ran

that the enemy, whether Russian or Roumanian, was to be halted, and if possible prevented from crossing the Carpathian passes. For this purpose it would not be possible to respect the line of the Vienna Award, although Germany was still to take the lion’s share of operations south of that line.’ The week before, the mobilisation of all Depot Divisions for which any arms whatever could be scraped together had been ordered and the 7th and 9th Depot Divisions and the Depot formations of the two Mountain Brigades had been hurriedly combined into an “Army’”’ (the Second) under General Veress. This force, to which the 25th, 27th and 2nd Armoured were added when they reached Hungary (at the moment they, with the German Eighth

Army, were falling gradually back through the Bukovina and Northern Moldavia), was ordered to move south, with the line of the Maros as the first objective; later, the passes were to be occupied.? This order appears to have been given on the 2nd and the forces to have started the next day.‘ The defence of the eastern passes was to be left mainly to the local levée, the Szekel Guards, although these unfortunates were for the most part armed only with sporting weapons, or even scythes and cudgels; but they were

reinforced by the 2nd and 3rd “Depot Divisions” (each, indeed, only consisting of a battalion of infantry and a battery of artillery). Horthy communicated this decision innocently to Bakach-Bessenyey, with another

request for Hungary to be enabled to surrender to the West only. The British, whom Hennyey at the time believed to be in or approaching Dalmatia,

were asked to send three divisions, if possible by air. Till they arrived, Hungary meant to go on holding a defensive line in the east.

Alas for those intentions! Probably the Depot formations would not 1 Lakatos, Szalasi Trial, Dp. 128; Nagy, op. cit., p. 215. VWeesenmayer writes me: ‘At this period

the VI and V2 were just coming into operation, and all German representatives abroad had received secret instructions that further, and decisive, new secret weapons would be ready shortly ; they must therefore make every effort to keep Germany’s allies from defection.” 2 Homonnay ap. Tombor.

3 The Voro6s Memorandum indicates that the Army was “to occupy and build up on the Southern Carpathians the defence line most naturally advantageous for defending Hungary.”

* The Vords Memorandum, dated the 4th, says that the force has already started

(megindultak).

HORTHY AGONISTES 337 have been able to do much if they had arrived in time, for their equipment was only a degree superior to that of the Szekel Guards.! There were only two machine-guns per battalion. The artillery consisted of pieces dating from 1908, which had been out of date before the First World War. There was no anti-tank material at all, and hardly any transport, and what there was was drawn by buffaloes, the strongest but also the slowest of all draught ; animals, who were no match in the race for the passes for the Russian tanks and light horse. In the event, they did not even reach the Maros until 15th September. Meanwhile, the German troops in Hungary did not move at all, with the exception of a single SS. division, apparently from Székesfehérvar, which was sent up as far as Temesvar and halted there. The German troops retreating from Roumania did not halt in the passes, but poured through them and only halted when they reached the Hungarian plain, where they presented Hungary with the embarrassing gift of eleven German divisions or the remnants of them. These were in an utterly disorganised state, and so disintegrated as hardly to count as a fighting force; but those left in Hungary (some were sent back west) brought the total number of Germans under arms

in the country to 500,000 and cost her 12 million pengd a day in upkeep alone.”

The Russians took full advantage of the situation. The eastern passes were left alone, after a single, light attack on 3lst August to Ist September had been repelled by regular troops and Szekel Guards; but Soviet and Roumanian forces marched unopposed through the Predeal and Red Tower passes, occupied the Brasov and Fogaras basins unresisted, and followed the retreating Germans down the Aluta valley. On 7th September three Russian armoured divisions were reported almost clear of the mountains,® and five more to be marching through the passes. The Germans themselves reported that they would not be able to hold the south-eastern Front against this concentration of armour. With this, all Horthy’s plan of holding out in the east had collapsed. It seemed useless to hope for the timely arrival of Allied troops, impossible to wait even for the reply from Bakach-Bessenyey. That evening, accordingly, Horthy summoned his little “inner Cabinet’’—Lakatos, Csatay, Hennyey, Vorés, Vattay and Ambrozy. He explained the situation and said that he had decided to sue for an armistice.

His advisers all concurred. The conditions were then debated. The form would of course, have to be that of unconditional surrender, but it was decided to make the following requests: (a) The Allies to occupy only strategic centres in Hungary. (6) Roumanian and Yugoslavian troops not to take part in the occupation. (c) Hungarian police and administrative officials to be left at their posts. (d) The Allies to allow the German troops to evacuate Hungary.°® The request was to be put through the Swedish and Turkish Legations, which 1 Homonnay, op. cit. ® Hennyey to C.A.M. Guderian, op. cit., p. 332, writes that 16 German divisions were entirely lost when the Roumanians changed sides, following which they cut off the retreat of their ex-allies.

3 Lakatos, Szalasi Trial, p. 129 (‘three Soviet armoured divisions advancing towards Lugos, Nagyszeben and Temesvar’’). 4 Nagy, p. 216. This report proved afterwards to be misleading, for the divisions in question were directed to Bulgaria. 5 Hennyey to C. A. M. Y

338 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH were also to be asked to arrange for a plenipotentiary to be sent to conclude the armistice. Hennyey instructed the appropriate section in his Ministry to prepare the necessary documents in due form,! and also telegraphed to Bakach-Bessenyey:

“Most urgent. We are about to take steps tomorrow, the 8th, to conclude an armistice. The appropriate concrete instructions following.”

So firm did the decision appear that the Legations in Stockholm and Ankara were actually informed of the proposed request, or requests; while the ‘‘Resistance Movement” was also told that the Regent proposed to proclaim unconditional surrender the next day. This particular conference does not seem to have discussed whether it was constitutionally necessary to consult Parliament before asking for an armistice; but as the question was raised on later occasions, and treated as

important, a word on it will be in place here. Parliament itself would certainly have maintained that no such step would be legal without its consent; it was equally certain that, as then constituted, 1t would have refused

that consent. Horthy’s position throughout the period now under review was that Parliament could not, under the existing circumstances, be convoked; moreover, since the Germans had arrested certain members of it, 1t was incomplete and therefore incapable of fulfilling its functions. In any case, an armistice was a military transaction, and as Supreme War Lord he had full control over the Army and its actions.

While willing to by-pass Parliament, the Regent was not, however, prepared to act without having consulted the Cabinet; and he brought the question before a Crown Council that same evening, repeating to its members

his earlier statement of his intentions. Opinions here were not unanimous, Reményi-Schneller and Jurcsek being doubtful; but when the vote was taken, they voted with the rest for surrender. Now, however, a serious obstacle was raised by the Regent himself, for he insisted, on the grounds of honour previously described, that he must give the Germans notice before surrendering. There was no budging the Regent from this honourable but impracticable scruple, which, indeed, some of his advisers seem to have shared. Csatay then produced a bright idea. Let Hungary present Germany with a 24-hour ultimatum, to send immediately five armoured divisions to Hungary to stop the threatening Soviet advance in the Mako-Békescsaba area. If this were not done, Hungary, being unable to defend herself without this help, would be obliged to ask for an armistice. The universal opinion in the Crown Council was that this demand was

quite beyond Germany’s ability to fulfil and that her consequent refusal would give Hungary an honourable way out. Meanwhile it was still hoped that British troops would arrive from the west, and in these beliefs the proposal

was adopted. Hennyey made his preparations to transmit the request to the Swedish and Turkish Ministers. Lakatos and Vérés put the demand to Veesenmayer and Greiffenberg respectively, and Vérés backed this up by a letter to Guderian in which he announced that Hungarian troops had started, four days previously, to occupy Southern Transylvania and would continue to conduct the operation “‘throwing in all our forces and with all our energy” if given sufficient help from Germany in the form of armoured troops and

aircraft. Failing such help, however, Hungary, whose forces were only 1 Id.

HORTHY AGONISTES 339 secondary, would be unable to hold the line, and ‘“‘would be obliged to consider gradually withdrawing on the Eastern Front to avoid encirclement.’ The Regent sent Hitler a similar but stronger letter, saying that if the German help did not come he must ask for an armistice.2*

This was the great casting of the die; and all the little group round Horthy nerved themselves for a supreme struggle—only to encounter anticlimax. The next day, even before the expiration of the 24 hours, Greiffen-

berg appeared and informed Lakatos that four divisions, armoured and mixed, were being sent down instantly, being in fact already on the way. A fifth would follow in a few days.. It was also stated that four or five divisions from the Weichs Army in the Balkans would reach Belgrade and Orsova within a few days. Further, supplies formerly destined for Roumania would be directed to Hungary.? And, in fact, the plaguey Germans proved as good as their word—or, rather, not entirely good, but just good enough to frustrate the Hungarians’ intentions. Hardly were the words out of Greiffenberg’s mouth when there arrived, not five armoured divisions, but one armoured and three infantry. These appear to have been units which had been resting in West Hungary, or just across the frontiers, and to have comprised all the

German battle-worthy troops which had been left in that area after the earlier departure, already mentioned, of the SS. division sent to Temesvar, so that had they gone straight up the line, they would have left Hungary practically denuded of her German garrison.‘ Instead of doing so, however, they settled down round Budapest. Accordingly, on 9th September, instead

of the formal request for an armistice, Bakach-Bessenyey received the following telegram:

“Planned get-out postponed owing to the following compelling reasons: we must count without fail on intervention by the German forces

in the country. Danger of civil war owing to German intervention and Russian invasion—clash between extreme Right and Left. Fundamental condition Anglo-Saxon occupation and arrival by air of two or three Anglo-Saxon divisions. Russians’ behaviour in Roumania exercising

deterrent influence.”

This seems to have crossed Bakach-Bessenyey’s reply to the earlier message. He had answered that the suggestion of a Western occupation was totally impracticable: it had been agreed between the Allies that only the

Soviets were to occupy Hungary.® After this second message, BakachBessenyey wired that if the Hungarian Government did not propose to act in accordance with his advice, it had better let him drop out and conduct any further negotiations, if it could, through Rakolczay or Baron Bothmer, the Sztéjay Minister in Berne.® In fact, no more messages passed through

this channel.

1 Text in Nagy, op. cit., pp. 220-1. It is noticeable that V6rés does not threaten with defection by Hungary, but only with retreat. * Personal, Horthy to C. A. M. 3 According to D. Nemes, loc. cit., Veesenmayer also conveyed a message from Ribbentrop that if there were “internal revolts in Hungary’’, Germany “‘would by all means send troops and police reinforcements from Vienna to put down any kind of subversive attempt.”’ * This statement is necessarily somewhat conjectural, as are all my statements regarding the movements of the German troops; but all German troops figuring in later reports seem to be new arrivals from beyond the frontiers, except the 22nd SS., the SS. division in the Bacska and the training formations. 5 Bakach-Bessenyey correspondence. 6 Personal, Bakach-Bessenyey to C. A. M. (not in correspondence).

340 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Meanwhile the Soviet advance continued. There was little activity on the First Army Front, which by now ran along the crest of the Carpathians in Ruthenia, and to the right of it, along the watershed between the Bukovina

and north-eastern Transylvania. Vatra Dorna was not taken until 16th September, and Szaszrégen was still holding out ten days later. Right of that again, however, Soviet and Roumanian forces, after penetrating the Focsani and Sinaia passes, turned northward and compelled the German and

Hungarian forces to retreat. The Szekel area was evacuated—the official admission to this effect was made on the 14th—and a new line taken up which, following the main mountain crest as far south as the Borga pass, then

ran eastward to Besztercze, thence south to the Maros, the line of which it

followed into the Hungarian plain. Along this line, too, once it was established, there was only slight fighting. Torda changed hands several times, but without materially affecting the situation. But south of this line, the picture was very different. By the 8th and 9th the Soviet advance guards were already beginning to debouch into the plains round Temesvar, whence one part of them turned north to threaten the Crisana while others moved across into the Yugoslav Banat. They were still extremely light—in some cases detachments only of a few hundred men apiece, and were not always able to hold places which they took in swift dashes.1 But unless the large advance of which this was only the foretaste could be checked, it was clear that Hungary would sooner or later be overrun; and thisraised again the earlier

conflict of political and military considerations. The only real hope of stopping the advance lay in meeting it in the tangled mountains of the eastern Banat, in which a relatively small force might hope to hold up the

advance of a much larger one; but this operation involved entering Roumanian territory, and unless the Germans could be persuaded to send up the newly arrived units from the Budapest area, it would have to be performed by Hungarian troops. Roumania had, indeed, made things easier for Hungary by declaring war on her on the 8th, but the Regent was again reluctant to risk alienating Western sympathies by invading Roumanian territory. A new Hungarian scratch force, dignified by the name of the Third Army, had by now been assembled. It was extremely small, poorly equipped and of

dubious fighting value: as originally composed it consisted of one regular division—the 20th?—with the 23rd Reserve, the 5th and 8th Depot Divisions and the Depot Formation of the First Armoured. But it was a force of sorts,

and it had been placed under the command of a fighting General named

Heszlényi—an appointment which proved most unfortunate for the Hungarians but was made on the insistence of the Germans, who also , intervened afterwards, on more than one occasion, even threatening sanctions, to prevent Heszlényi’s being replaced by another General. 1 A detachment which entered Nagyvarad was said to have consisted of 200 men and one single armoured car. It was driven out by the local police. The forces, which, a week later, entered Mako and Nagyszalonta were hardly more considerable. * This had been brought back from Russia to refit. * Hennyey to C. A. M. Iam, however, assured (by M. Teleki, who knew him well) that the stories afterwards broadcast of Heszlényi’s extreme pro-Germanism are quite untrue. He was anti-Soviet and much against surrender; but disliked the Germans and said that although he would take his troops back he personally could not live outside Hungary; and in fact killed himself on the frontier when the troops retreated into Austria. He was, however, at least Naziminded. His first act after retaking Arad (which he held for about three days) was to introduce the Jewish laws there (Széll to C. A. M.).

HORTHY AGONISTES 341 Heszlényi besieged Budapest with urgent requests—-entirely justified from

the military point of view—to be allowed to attack before it was too late. Vo6rés wavered this way and that, saying that the decision was a political one, which it was not for him to take. Lakatos said helplessly that he had

“higher orders’? and could do nothing. And the German divisions

which might have stopped the gap sat round Budapest, while through the open breach the Soviet reinforcements poured out into the Hungarian plain.

Meanwhile the Regent had decided to ask the advice of a larger number of trusted councillors, political and military. Accordingly, he convoked a private meeting of Privy Councillors for 6 p.m. on the 10th. Of the Government, only Lakatos, Hennyey and Csatay were present; also V6rés. The other participants originally invited were the ex-Premiers Count Maurice Esterhazy, Count Istvan Bethlen (specially and secretly brought from his hiding-place) and Count Gyula Karolyi; the ex-Foreign Minister, Kanya; Baron Perényi, Keeper of the Crown and President of the Upper House; and three retired Generals: R6der, SOnyi and Naday. Before the little company could assemble, however, the Regent had been approached, ultimatively, from another quarter: Transylvania.’

Social antagonism between the Magyars of Transylvania had been partially smoothed out by the years of affliction spent by all classes under

Roumanian rule. Moreover, all felt a certain solidarity not against Roumanians alone but—after the re-annexation—against other Hungarians also. Thus the Transylvanian Party itself was socially more broadly based than the MEP, and co-operation between the Party and other organisations was much easier. In May 1944, rumours having reached Transylvania that Roumania was seeking a separate peace, a secret Committee, very broadly

representative and including not only representatives of the now illegal political parties (Smallholders, Social Democrats and Communists) but also

the Rector of Kolozsvar University and several of his professors, the Transylvanian Bishops of all four denominations, and many other personali-

ties, had been established, with the express purpose of advocating that Hungary should get out of the war before Roumania. On 23rd August this Committee set up a National Council which adopted a resolution which included the following demands:

Hungary to seek an immediate armistice from the Allies. Transylvania not to be defended, still less used as a base for an offensive, so that it should pass into Russian hands without resistance. The evacuation of both population and material to be prevented. No reprisals against or arrest of democratic elements and a conciliatory policy towards the Roumanian population. This resolution, to which 46 signatures were appended, was to be taken to the Regent and delivered in ultimative form. Even the Communists had agreed that the Regent was to be approached first, and that they would co1 So “‘Lajos,”’ as repeated by “‘Ede” (? Edmund Keksz, head of the Air Intelligence). 2 The following paragraphs are based partly on a memorandum submitted by the Hungarian Government to the Peace Conference, partly on private information (Géza Teleki to C. A. M.) It is interesting that neither the Arrow Cross nor the Resistance Movement knew of the Transylvanian intervention, which was also not mentioned at the Szalasi trial. The Transylvanians concerned succeeded in keeping their own council to a degree with which the Hungarians from Trianon Hungary entirely failed to compete.

342 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH operate with him if he accepted the demands. If, however, he refused, the Communists would go straight to the Russians, as indeed would the whole of Transylvania, including Veress and the Second Army. Count Béla Teleki, Chairman of the Transylvanian Party, and his cousin

Géza (son of the dead Premier) were detailed to take the resolution to Budapest and to carry out the necessary steps there, while others of the signatories did what was needed in Transylvania. Béla Teleki went to Budapest at the end of August, and his intervention was probably largely responsible for the conciliatory attitude shown towards Roumania in the succeeding days. Géza Teleki, bearing the written memorandum, did not reach Budapest until the morning of 10th September; but his cousin Béla knew the substance of the memorandum, and both he and Baron Banffy attended the meeting. At this, Horthy expounded the situation. According to the version received by Szalasi, which presumably came ultimately from

Vorés, he said that he had received a message from Switzerland urging Hungary to seek an armistice from all the Allies. Even so, she would be occupied by the Russians, since the Teheran decisions had recognised Hungary as belonging to the Soviet sphere of influence; but Britain and America “would try to obtain certain advantages for Hungary if she acted quickly.’? He felt himself no longer bound by his promise to Hitler, and thought that an armistice must be sought without delay. After this the Transylvanians communicated their resolution. According to some versions of the discussion which followed, a little opposition came at first from some of the soldiers, but the civilians, Bethlen in particular,? endorsed Horthy’s views with great emphasis and the meeting decided:

“To follow the Finnish example, viz., to tell the Germans of the decision; not to lay down arms but to stop fighting; to allow the Germans to leave the country; not to offend the Russians and Roumanians” (which meant calling off the attack on Arad), and “‘to evacuate the portions of

Transylvania occupied beyond the Belvedere frontier. The Germans were not to be told anything of what was going on, or ‘only so much that they could draw the consequences.’”’

It appears, also, that the decision to send General Naday to Rome, on the mission described below,° was taken at this meeting.

Lakatos was instructed to convene the Ministerial Council for the next day. He was then to inform them that the Regent had taken ‘‘a final and

unalterable decision” to ask for an armistice and to ask which of the

Ministers would take the political responsibility of carrying the decision into

effect. The understanding, presumably, was that those who did not do so would resign and be replaced by men who would take the responsibility; for whatever the Government’s reply, the decision was ‘“‘unalterable.”’ 1 A person who was in long and intimate contact with Veress said that he never heard the General refer to this. On the other hand, he let the Transylvanian Communists out of prison on the faith of a promise that they would defend Hungary’s interests loyally against everyone,

including the Russians.

“ Horthy confirms this (personal to C. A. M.) although it is not in the Bakach-Bessenyey

correspondence.

3 Apor to C. A.M. According to Hardy, Bethlen said, verbatim: ‘“‘Hungary must get out

of the war, otherwise it will be wiped off the map.” Someone allegedly objected that the Russians

would pillage and rape if they entered the country. Bethlen replied: “‘They’ll do that anyway, but not so badly if they come in as friends.”’ 4 The Transylvanians insisted on this. 5 See below, p. 351 ff.

HORTHY AGONISTES 343 But things did not work out that way at all. One of the most important decisions of the Privy Council was that the Germans were not to know what

was going on; and whether through treachery, or through Vordés’ tipsy blabbing (he called on Veesenmayer immediately after the meeting and was

by him treated to suitable potations), or a mixture of the two, before the evening was out Veesenmayer was in full possession of practically complete details of the whole proceedings. The Arrow Cross was equally quickly and

completely informed’; not to mention the anti-surrender elements in the General Staff, who determined to resist any attempt to conclude peace.? Veesenmayer appeared next day and treated Lakatos and Hennyey to the most vigorous protests.2 On top of this, the Ministerial Council, when it met at 3 p.m. on the 11th, took up a very unfavourable attitude to the whole suggestion. When Lakatos informed them of the Regent’s consultations and his decision to ask for an armistice, Jurcsek opened with a “‘very bellicose

speech in favour of continuing the war.’ Bonczos thought the proposal premature and could not “assume responsibility”; neither could Vladar, Markos, Reményi-Schneller or Gyulay. Csatay pointed out the practical difficulties caused by the arrival of the wretched German reinforcements—a Danaid gift indeed—which had just arrived and were still in or near Budapest. He suggested that the Government should resign in favour of one which had not asked the Germans for help. Rakovszky was the only Minister to speak who seemed genuinely in favour of the Regent’s proposal, but even he seemed to agree with Csatay’s view that if the proposed action was to be taken, it

should be taken by another Cabinet, not one that was morally bound by having a few days previously presented an ultimatum and having seen it accepted. In sum, not a single Minister present was willing to “accept the responsibility.”

Lakatos declared accordingly that he would convey this, the unanimous view of the Cabinet, to the Regent, and since the Regent’s decision was unalterable, he would tender his own resignation and that of the Cabinet. According to Barezy, the Regent received Lakatos twice that afternoon. He asked him in astonishment whether not one Minister had stood by him? Not Vladér? Not Rakovszky? Not Csatay? When Lakatos insisted that the Cabinet had been unanimous, the Regent said that he would “‘defer,” and abstain from executing his ‘‘final and unalterable decision.”” Lakatos wanted to resign, but Horthy asked the Government to remain in office. They met again at 10 p.m. that evening and agreed todoso. Veesenmayer was assured that the idea of unilateral surrender was off; Hennyey told him that the meeting of the Privy Councillors had no constitutional effect but was just a conversation. Meanwhile, on the morning of the 11th, and thus even before the events described above, a message had suddenly arrived from Hitler that he wished a conversation with Vérés—presumably in answer to the ultimatum and to

Vorés’ letter to Guderian. The bearer of the message had brought an 1 The Szalasi Diary, which itself contains a full account of the meeting, reports that Veesenmayer had the same report within an hour of the conclusion of the meeting and read it out to Voérds, ‘‘as proof that the Germans knew everything.” 2 The Diary reports from ‘“‘Lajos” that “the resolution of the General Staff is to answer any compromise with sabotage and armed resistance. The armies will fight on—no concluding

Peat is remarkable that Veesenmayer should not have suspected the Hungarians earlier, but according to Barezy, he visited Sztdjay in the sanatorium where he was lying and said to him: ‘Just imagine, the Regent wants to get out of this war! A scandal! Treachery!”

344 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH aeroplane ready to take Vérés back with him.! There was some discussion whether it was wise to accept the invitation,” but it was finally decided to do so and to take the opportunity to restate the position. On 12th September,

accordingly, Vorés left in the company of Greiffenberg and Nadas. With him he took the Regent’s latest attempt to square the circle constituted by his own conviction that he must at all costs get out of the war, his reluctance to betray his ally, his practical difficulties and his unaltered aversion from the

idea of surrender to the Bolsheviks. It was another ultimatum—in sum, a repetition of Csatay’s unfortunate inspiration, elaborated this time into eight

points. It demanded an assurance that no further Hungarian territory be evacuated without previous consultation; that effective military help should be given; that the question of the command of the fighting forces in Hungary be regulated; that the political prisoners in Hungary be released (this had not

yet been secured) and that the activities of the Gestapo and the SS. in Hungary cease. Finally, that Hungary should be informed immediately if the Reich entered into negotiations with any enemy Power.? A strange document indeed, with its compound of political demands and

military conditions. Some of the latter were, on the face of them, quite reasonable, but the real purpose of them would have been obvious enough even had Hitler been in ignorance of the real situation. But in fact, as we have seen, Hitler was perfectly informed of the whole background. It is not

surprising that V6rds, according to his own account,* had a very rough passage. Hitler, who knew exactly what had happened at the Privy Council,* and also at the Ministerial Council of the 11th, ranted at him for two hours,

while Himmler, Keitel and Guderian listened in silence. Germany, said Hitler, would be defended to the last drop of blood. ‘‘He who jumps overboard—man or nation—will assuredly drown.’’ Barczy’s account of Vorés’

subsequent report to the Regent concludes with the charming epitome: ““V6rdés deduced from Hitler’s words that he was mistrustful of the whole leadership of the Hungarian State.”’

In spite of this not unnatural feeling, Hitler showed a remarkable moderation and patience. He confined himself, so far as Lakatos was concerned, to saying that he did not know the Lakatos Government and required that the Government and the Army prove by their actions that they

were prepared to go on fighting with all their strength. (It is true that he knew that the Government had decided against surrender on the 11th.) He * All published reports, including a version given by Vérés himself to an English newspaper (Manchester Guardian, 17th January 1945) suggest that the initiative came from Horthv (so

also Barczy), but Lajos’ report in the Szalasi Diary makes it quite certain that it came from Hitler:

presumably on Veesenmayer’s instance. Weesenmayer was friends with Vérés and probably thought he would use his influence in the German sense. ? The Diary notes: **Csatay isin favour, Lakatos is against’’. Lakatos disliked Vordés. The Diary records a conversation between the spy ‘‘Ede”’ and an officer of Lakatos’ staff named Szentpaly, who voices the opinion that ““V6r6s is a. . . y, cowardly swine, and Lakatos thinks SO, too.” * Demokrdacia, 5th August 1945. Lakatos afterwards stated that this demand was justified, because Hungary had received information of “‘discussions between Oshima and von Papen in

Lisbon, etc.’’ Words’ memorandum of 4th September also speaks of information received of “preparations for a Russo-German-Japanese alliance.” According to private information (Michaelis), the Hungarians were regularly informed of these negotiations, as also of the activities of the Resistance Group in the German General Staff; he himself had been asked by an emissary of General Olbrecht (who was shot on 20th July) to establish contact between the German “resisters’’ and the Hungarian General Staff. He refused, as he ‘‘thought the objectives of the Resistance Group too utopian.”’ * Manchester Guardian, loc. cit. 5 According to Barezy, he even used of the participants the same description—‘‘the old men”’

—as figures in the “Lajos” reports and in the Hungarist Diary.

HORTHY AGONISTES 345 repeated that Hungary would be defended ‘“‘in the same sense as East Prussia.”’

There might be temporary retirements, but the German Army would cooperate with the Hungarian, with its full strength, to recover any ground that might be lost. He promised again that five armoured divisions should be sent, the Dead Army repatriated and arms and munitions sent down.!_ Not only would all Transylvania be freed in a short time, but a great offensive would follow which would liberate the whole of Roumania also. Indeed, he would soon be putting in the “‘secret weapon” and ending the war for good and all.”

Although the records do not mention it, the Hungarians must have accepted these assurances as sufficient and agreed in their turn to play up; thus another brief chapter opened during which both parties behaved, at any rate in the military field, as though a veil had been drawn, by mutual agreement, over the immediate past. The fatal German reinforcements whose arrival had caused such consternation started for the Front. The armoured division, it is true, was detrained again at Orkény, on the Kecskemét road, as

the German G.O.C. in the North had asked for it to be sent up to help defend the Dukla pass. At Horthy’s special request, it was not sent north, but also not committed to the south-eastern Front, remaining in general reserve. The three infantry divisions, however, seem to have been put into the line opposite Arad. At the same time, three more armoured divisions arrived in West Hungary,

where, however, they remained re-forming and refitting; it is quite possible that they were still unfit for immediate action, although the Hungarians did not believe it. The Dead Army was duly started on its homeward journey; and finally, according to “‘Lajos,’® large quantities of arms and munitions formerly

destined for Roumania were diverted to Hungary, for the use of the Hungarian and German forces there; it is true that the Germans got more of them than the Hungarians. The Hungarians, on their side, lifted the ban on military operations against Roumania. The Second Army, whose reinforcements from across the Carpathians* had now arrived, reached the Maros at certain points in its advance, and was able also to undertake a small offensive in the Bihar

Mountains. Further south, the German divisions took Temesvar (then weakly held by Roumanian forces) on the 12th. The next day the Hungarian Third Army took Arad and penetrated as far as Lippa. These successes were short-lived, since Soviet troops came up and retook Temesvar on the 16th and Arad on the 19th, then pushing forward to reach a line approximately identical with that of the then Hungaro-Roumanian frontier. But there were

at this moment only some half-dozen Roumanian divisions across the Carpathians and even fewer Soviet forces. The reserves, estimated by the Germans at three armoured divisions, were far in the rear, since, when Bulgaria surrendered, the Soviets had directed most of their reserves into that

country. The advance could not be followed up, and the line on the south1 Hennyey to C. A. M.

2 T.e. the V2. Hitler appears to have told Voros that “he had now decided to put in the decisive and annihilating weapon which would cost the lives of innocent millions because the English people had not been able to prevail on their leaders to take a wiser view.”’ There seems ample evidence that VOrés was deeply impressed by what Hitler said on this point and on his return reported that the war was as good as won for Germany. 8 Szalasi Diary. 4 The 25th and 27th Divisions. The 2nd Armoured was, however, attached to the German Sixth Army.

346 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH eastern Front remained stationary—with local fluctuations—for the rest of the month. Similarly, there was for a long fortnight little fighting on the Second Army Front, and hardly any on that of the First Army. The Germans even told the Hungarians that they expected Weich’s army to arrive in time definitely to consolidate the Front in South-Eastern Hungary. It was the hinterland which suffered most severely during this period. Between 13th and 23rd September all three Allied Air Forces (the Russian joining in the operations almost for the first time) made heavy and repeated raids on the industrial centres and communications of the country. During a whole week the population of Budapest was reported to have spent an average of six hours daily in shelters. Munitions works, marshalling-yards, etc., in several country towns were also heavily attacked. The bombing was reported to be on the whole accurate, being directed chiefly against genuine military objectives, and the civilian population suffered relatively little from it; but it produced great disorganisation in the country’s economic life. After each raid on Budapest notices appeared of tram lines diverted. On 27th September the service on nineteen tram routes in Budapest as well as the underground was suspended and that on other lines curtailed. A considerable part of the population of Budapest was walking to work. The bridges over

the Danube at Budapest still stood, although one of them (the Horthy Miklos Bridge) was closed to traffic, but outside Budapest many of the bridges over the Danube and the Tisza were reported out of action, and many railway

stations and yards rendered unserviceable. The parcel and even the letter post was repeatedly suspended for longer or shorter periods. Among the various effects of the bombing was a substantial deterioration in the supply sources of Budapest. Rations were still not nominally reduced, but in practice many foodstuffs vanished from the market altogether. The

munition workers still got a little pork and bacon, but to judge from the periodical announcements, the normal civilian now seldom received anything but horse flesh or sausage on his card, and allocations of butter were rare enough to achieve headlines. Once bread ran out. Eggs and salt were periodically short. Footwear and textiles were practically unobtainable, and the fuel situation was extremely serious. It is true that hoarded stocks and and a very extensive black market enabled three-quarters of the population to live much more comfortably than the official figures would have suggested. The Government began to make preparations as though for a siege. The population was encouraged to go out into the country and bring in supplies. Cattle was driven in to Pest on the hoof. Flour-mills were required to send in all available supplies to the capital and dealers to report stocks. An issue of iron rations was promised for the near future. The worst dislocation of all was caused by the influx of refugees. When evacuating the Székely area, the Germans took with them, besides their own troops and the regular Hungarian forces, also the unfortunate Szekel Guard, which, since it had been formed by a /evée en masse, comprised a large part

of the able-bodied male population of the area. The Government also

ordered the officials to leave, and although the Transylvanians themselves opposed the order, and many of them disobeyed it,! a number went, accom* An unpublished work on the position of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania after the

war says that the Government ordered the evacuation of Kolozsvar University, but the Committee of Deans decided to disobey, saying that Transylvania would need them later.

HORTHY AGONISTES 347 panied by a proportion of the bourgeoisie and even some of the poorer classes, to a sum total of about 300,000 refugees from Transylvania (in the larger sense) alone.1 The operation, as Csatay himself afterwards admitted, was Carried out without due preparation or organisation. There were hardly

any trains and little road transport, and what there was, was in general required for the military. The miserable civilians plodded on foot, or jolted in ox and buffalo carts, along the dusty, ill-kept and congested Transylvanian

roads, a prey to hunger, thirst and fatigue. The first part of their journey

had to be made through wild country, largely inhabited by a hostile Roumanian population; afterwards they had to struggle across rivers, the bridges of which had been destroyed by Allied bombing, or even to run the gauntlet of the bombing itself. At first the Government was optimistic, and on 22nd September Bonczos was promising the refugees that they would be settled on the banks of the Tisza. A few days later, however, the Tisza area itself was unsafe, and such of them as had not fallen by the wayside were swept further. The male Szekels, indeed, became one of the worst casualties of the war. Possessing no natural resting-place in inner Hungary, they were afterwards dragged by Szalasi into Austria and Germany, where many of them spent months in forlorn wanderings or in Allied concentration camps; and when at last they were allowed, or forced, to return home, they found in many cases that the Roumanian authorities, now again in possession of the Székelyf6ld, denied them Roumanian citizenship.

The only other evacuation officially ordered in September by the Hungarian authorities, so far as can be traced, was that of the unfortunate Magyars from the Bukovina who had been settled with such ceremony in the Bacska three years earlier and were now ordered to move to the Dunantul. But as the tide of the invasion swept on, it rolled before it increasing masses

of voluntary refugees. By the end of September, Budapest probably contained 300,000-400,000 refugees from Eastern Hungary, and the Dunantul

as many more, besides large numbers who had fled from the capital itself before the bombing or the threat of siege. The Red Cross, helped by the Levente and other organisations, tried to arrange for transport, shelter, emergency meals, etc., and the Churches appealed for funds. But no effort could do more than palliate a small portion of the indescribable misery and confusion resulting from this vast human movement. It must be added that while some of the victims had now no further wish than to see their troubles ended at any price, yet on balance the psychological effect of this influx was probably rather to strengthen than to weaken the will to resist; at any rate, among the classes who gave out orders. Had the invading army consisted of highly civilised and highly disciplined troops, the position would have been different. They would have been welcomed almost everywhere, particularly since the conduct of the retreating Germans, who destroyed, where they could, all communications behind them and carried off all objects which could be of use to the enemy (an operation which, as

they interpreted it, was often tantamount to the most wholesale looting), aroused bitter resentment among the Hungarian population, including the local Army authorities. But the refugees too often brought with them pitiable

stories of looting, wanton destruction, sacrilege, and filthy defilement, of cruelty and massacre, and above all of beastly mass rape from which neither 1 Figure from the memorandum quoted above. The Germans also evacuated separately 25,000 Volksdeutsche.

348 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH young children nor old women were exempt, while personable girls had to endure violation from dozens or scores of Asiatic brutes. Similar stories, very exactly documented with dates, places and names of witnesses, came from places such as Nagyszalonta, which the Russians took and failed to hold. They were exploited in very great detail by the German Press and wireless, and by the right-wing Hungarian Press, and undoubtedly caused widespread consternation. In telling Bakach-Bessenyey that the behaviour of the Soviet troops was exercising a “‘deterrent effect,’’ Horthy had, if anything, understated the case. In fact, that behaviour had brought over almost the entire non-Jewish bourgeoisie, many of the workers and even some peasants, to a desperate faith that almost any fate was preferable to occupation by such beasts as composed the Soviet forces. Overt political life, meanwhile had been at a standstill, except that on

22nd September Parliament was convoked, as constitutional practice demanded, to hear the Government’s official programme. Lakatos’ speech (which had been closely censored by Horthy') was above all an explanation, a la Kallay, almost openly addressed to the Western Allies, of Hungary’s foreign political wishes. ““The charge of an alleged desire for expansion or

of a so-called class rule,” said Lakatos, “‘has never been brought more unjustly against any nation than Hungary, particularly post-Trianon muttlated Hungary. All Hungary wanted was to maintain a secure livelihood and a peaceable family life in accordance with a social ideology in the best sense

of the term.’ Of the Anglo-Saxon bombing, he said that: “It 1s possible that the Anglo-Saxon Powers do not after all intend to direct against us alone the blows with which they try finally to crush and mercilessly destroy an

innocent small nation; but at the same time they do not seem to consider that in achieving their momentary aims they are depriving a noble, defenceless

race, which for a thousand years has been the bastion of the West, of moral and material values which at some time may not be immaterial, even to them.”

This was coupled with the complaint that threats were showered on Hungary which “‘forecast the gloomiest future, but do not give the slightest indication of the advantages to be extended to us should we give in at once.”

Together with this extraordinanly open hint of Hungary’s wish to surrender, Lakatos stressed the firm resolution of his Government to continue the defence of Hungary’s frontiers, in spite of all difficulties. Hungary had

‘“‘no other way open to her.’ And she hoped to be able to fulfil this task. There were resources yet untapped, military cadres not yet completed, besides the nation’s own tradition and courage and “‘the moral obligation towards us undertaken by the German Reich.”’ Lakatos also described Hungary’s new Jewish policy (in words every one

of which carried an implicit contrast between Hungarian civilisation and German barbarism), and finally announced that some of the ‘‘violations of

Hungarian sovereignty’ were now to be remedied. He had received a promise that several members of both Houses of Parliament would be handed over to the Hungarian authorities or set free in the near future, and he could reckon that the delivery of further members would follow in the near future.”

The applause which greeted this statement was, again, quite obviously not ’ According to Mme Zankay, loc. cit., the Regent drastically revised Lakatos’ original text, ‘especially striking out of it all passages not compatible with the principle of equality of rights.” * Soon afterwards an instalment of eight persons arrived: G. Gratz, G. Apponyi, E. Bajesy-

Zsilinszky, D. Laky, F. Nagy, S. Makkai and two more. They were not set free, but kept in custody with some other Hungarians in the Foutca of Buda.

HORTHY AGONISTES 349 so much a tribute to Germany’s generosity in making the concession as to Hungary’s stubbornness in extorting it. Having given Lakatos his vote of confidence, Parliament adjourned sine die. \t was, of course, constitutionally in being and could be reconvoked at any moment. Behind the scenes, meanwhile, intricate marches and counter-marches were going on.

IT The surface reconciliation with the Germans and the reluctance of his own Ministers notwithstanding, Horthy was still resolved to get out of the war at the earliest practicable moment: particularly as he now came under pressure to do so from yet another side; for the day after the Council, Géza Teleki arrived to present him with the Transylvanian memorandum, and pressed on Horthy most strongly his duty to surrender, further threatening that if he did not do so, Transylvania would act independently.’ The will was there; but the way was not so simple, for Horthy wished to accompany this military offer with political desiderata, and he had no direct political line to Moscow which he cared to use. Hungary had no dissident diplomat in Moscow, and the U.S.S.R. was unrepresented in Switzerland. Direct contact was possible in Turkey and Sweden, but it hardly seemed likely that communication through either of these centres would remain secret, and Horthy had decided that his future activities must be kept the closest of secrets, even from his Ministers.* The alternative was a direct emissary, and Horthy seems to have been unable, at this point, to think of a suitable person.?

For a while, therefore, he delayed, comforting himself with the hope of an early reply from Bakach-Bessenyey. The Transylvanians, however, fearing just this, had determined to force his hand. Already, on 11th September, Banffy and Géza Teleki had approached a cousin of Banffy’s, one Count Vladimir Zichy, owner of an estate in Slovakia, which he was accustomed to visit periodically. Him they asked to go up to his estate on the pretext of business and to get in touch with Colonel Makarov,

the Soviet military agent working with the Slovak partisans in Banska Bistritza. Zichy went off on 12th September. Almost simultaneously with

this, and quite independently, came a second offer: Baron Ede Aczél° approached N. Horthy, jnr., as spokesman of the “‘Hungarian Communist Party” with an offer to go up to Moscow and find out whether the U.S.S.R.

would be willing to treat with the Regent. Horthy took Aczél, who was personally known to the Horthy family, to the Regent, who authorised the 1 Horthy afterwards told Hardy that his “‘deference” to the decision of the Ministerial Counci] had been a ‘‘comedy.”’

2 Teleki spoke so sharply that Horthy said: ““Your dead father would not have spoken like that.’’ Teleki answered: ‘‘He would have spoken exactly like that.”” Horthy said: ‘Well then, it seems that I have no choice.”’ 3 As we shall see, he conducted them almost entirely through Ambrozy, Vattay and the members of his own family. When Lakatos and Hennyey were given any information (which was not often), it was in their personal capacity, so that as Ministers they could deny knowledge. 4 Actually, Horthy did make one private attempt, immediately after the talks. An old Jew who had acted as ‘‘manager”’ for Voroshilov years before, when he had come to Hungary to buy blood-stock horses for the Russian Army, came to him and volunteered to go over and get in touch with Voroshilov. Horthy sent this old man up to the line, but there he took fright and refused to go any further.

5 See above, p. 202, n. 1. .

350 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH journey; and Aczél set out, accompanied by Faust and Dudas, being taken

up to the frontier by General Vattay and passed across it on the 16th September. Zichy came back! on 18th September with an extremely favourable report. Makarov, he said, had received him very kindly. He had asked why Hungary did not change sides and fight with the Soviets, and said that the matter could

be easily arranged, since the Russians had a weekly air service between Presov and Moscow, and would take a Hungarian envoy on it. He should, however, be a properly accredited plenipotentiary and a man of Cabinet rank. Makarov further gave Zichy two letters which he alleged to have been written at the order of Stalin himself, containing extraordinarily favourable conditions for Hungary. These alleged letters were afterwards to play a big part in the negotiations of the following weeks, and it is unfortunate that no text of them seems to have survived, since Horthy’s copy vanished in the ransacking of the Palace after 16th October; but one of the Notes submitted by the Hungarian Delegation in Moscow summarised “‘the most important of the promises”’’ in them as follows:

“The complete independence and territorial integrity of Hungary within its present frontiers will be guaranteed. In Transylvania the advance of the Roumanian troops will be halted; the Russian troops alone will continue to advance. The existing Hungarian administration will continue to act in all towns and villages where the Hungarians have not collaborated conspicuously with the Germans: the Hungarian Army, gendarmerie and troops will not be demobilised; the three Powers will not intervene in the form of Government and internal political affairs of

Hungary; the bombing of Hungary will be suspended; the Hungarian | Delegation will enjoy the customary diplomatic privileges and immunities; etc.’”?

It will be noted that these assurances are substantially identical with those which Aczél brought back from Moscow (as will be described) a few days

later; and there is no doubt whatever that Makarov represented the pledge

as a binding one, and one given by Stalin himself. It is no wonder that Horthy was—as an observer reported—“‘overjoyed’’ at the communication, in faith whereof he took the next steps. The very day that he saw Zichy, he decided to send the mission, and asked the Swedish Legation to inform the

British, American and Soviet Governments that Hungary had decided to 1 The story of the mission to Moscow was told by Faragho several times in 1945 ff.; at greatest length, in an article by him entitled “‘Az ut, amely a Varbdl a Kremlbe elvezet’’ (the road which leads from the Palace to the Kremlin) in A debreceni Feltamadds, pp. 29 ff. Faragho, however, did not know everything, and is inclined to attribute too much initiative to himself and his friends. Two articles on the story appeared in the Délamerikai Magyarsdg, 21st and 23rd October 1954: the first reproduced an affidavit by six of the other participants relating to the role played by

Kudar; the second was a memorandum by Banffy on his own activities. G. Teleki produced some further reminiscences in Hiriink a Vildgban, vol. V, no. 3-4 (March-April, 1955) and I have received further details from a number of the persons engaged in or connected with the enterprise,

including the Regent, N. Horthy, jnr., G. Teleki, Hardy and K. Ratz. * G. Teleki, loc. cit., gives a fuller version of the promises, which, besides those given above, adds the following: In spite of the clause in the Soviet-Roumanian pre-armistice agreement attributing Transylvania to Roumania, the Soviet Union would at the Peace Conference support the principle of plebiscites for Transylvania. All three Allied Great Powers would be represented at the negotiations with the Hungarian Armistice Delegation. The Soviet Union did not wish to expand into Europe. The Hungarian armistice would be modelled on the Finnish, Bulgarian and Roumanian.

HORTHY AGONISTES 351 terminate hostilities, and to ask when and where plenipotentiaries for concluding an armistice could be sent. The Army was addressing itself to the Soviet High Command to arrange for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

The preparations for the Russian journey were now set on foot immediately, the first step being to find a suitable mission. At the same time,

however, Horthy decided to make one more attempt to secure the cooperation of Western air-borne or land forces in the proposed surrender, and this time to send a special mission with the request.1 The emissaries were to be Col. Howie, who had long declared this to be the only practicable method, and General Naday, who, as a senior officer unquestionably loyal to the Regent, favourable to the idea of surrender, acquainted with the military situation, and at the moment en disponibilité, seemed suitable in every way. With considerable difficulty, a trustworthy pilot was discovered in the person of an officer called Majoros, who was engaged on repair work for the Germans. It was also difficult to lay hands on a machine, but warned to prepare in advance for a possible emergency, Majoros had put aside and gradually fuelled an old Heinkel which appeared past praying for, and had conveyed it to an obscure airfield near Pest. On the evening of the 20th Howie and Naday were called to the Palace and given a final briefing. So great was the fear of capture and search that Howie was given no written instructions at all. Naday was given, for credentials, a personal letter from Horthy to the Holy See; verbal instructions to lay Hungary’s request, the essential point of which was the request for troops, before the Allies in Italy, urgently and secretly, and for his own use, an aide-memoire in the Regent’s hand, running as follows?:

“Our troops are all on the frontiers, and we have no forces at home with which to throw off the German occupation. It is necessary to know whether the request for an armistice would prevent the Russians and

Roumanians from overrunning the country, for, if not, it would be better | to fight on, when at least we should escape being assaulted and bombed

to death by the Germans. It would be desirable if the Entente could prevail on the Soviets not to cross our frontiers; then we could bring back all our forces and take decisive steps. Or let the Entente urgently land a few divisions in Fiume and come to West Hungary. ‘““Every day now American, Soviet, English and Roumanian aeroplanes

bomb us. Why can’t they leave us in peace? (ne bantsanak). They have already destroyed every factory, munitions plant, airfield, petrol depot,

bridge, etc., and only the Germans profit from the destruction of the competing industry. “It was not we, but the Roumanians, who got half Transylvania from

the Germans. Hitler emphasised many times that he undertook the arbitration of Vienna only at the repeated request of the Roumanians, who accepted the award in advance. The King’s (sc. King Michael’s) Proclamation does not accord with the facts.”’ Naday was also given some military information, which, however, he was told on arrival was out of date. 1 Sources of the following: chiefly, Horthy, Szentivanyi, Naday, Majoros, N. Horthy, Jnr., G. Kiraly, and Col. Howie, op. cit. 2 Naday left this letter in safe keeping in Rome. It has been communicated to the writer by the person in whose keeping it now is.

352 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH The very next day, Bakach-Bessenyey’s final answer came: that nothing would meet the case for Hungary except unconditional surrender; that there could be no question of sending Western troops to defend Hungary against the Soviets or her other neighbours; and that Hungary’s only course was to offer unconditional surrender as speedily as possible.

This answer was a profound disappointment to the Regent and his advisers, who also felt that the real difficulty occasioned by the superiority of the German forces over the Hungarian in Hungary was not appreciated;

but they decided nevertheless to send the mission to Italy, and on the 22nd the Heinkel wobbled off, bearing with it as passengers, Naday, Howie and Majoros’ wife; the wretched girl having been given ten minutes’

notice that she was leaving Hungary, perhaps for life, for an unnamed destination. It may be said at once that, although the emissaries reached Foggia safely, their mission was a complete failure. The little party in the Castle waited in

vain for an answer, but after a single message that Naday had arrived, no communication of any sort arrived from Italy until 14th October, when an emissary (a Hungarian priest) reached N. Horthy, jnr., with codes—too late to be used. Ndaday, on arriving in Italy, found himself treated with courtesy, but with the utmost suspicion, owing to his lack of credentials. He was separated from Howie, kept incommunicado, and subjected to prolonged interrogations. Ultimately he seems to have convinced the Allies of his good

faith and of his authority, but not to have made clear to them the real purpose of his mission, which, indeed, he does not seem himself to have described very lucidly, or perhaps to have comprehended very exactly (he complained himself to a friend that his instructions were vague); announcing himself to be the bearer of an offer of Hungary’s unconditional surrender, and then proceeding to describe the conditions under which this was to be effected. He was then rated for attempting to approach the West instead of Moscow—the proper venue for such communications (the Western Powers by this time were almost ardently repelling all advances); and his offer to go

to Moscow, if the Allies would carry him thither, was not accepted. He was escorted back to his place of detention and heard nothing more of events.

Howie was taken to Field-Marshal Wilson on the 23rd, and presumably put forward the military proposals; but they were regarded as too vague, and as coming too late, and dismissed accordingly!; although the Hungarians continued to the last to cherish hopes, and even beliefs, to the contrary. This will be a convenient place to record the end of the Archduke Otto’s attempts to intervene for Hungary in the West. He had followed Roosevelt

to Quebec, where he had duly spoken to most of the main participants. He found them worried and aggrieved with the Russians over their highhanded conduct in Bulgaria, but not able to suggest much of a remedy. Roosevelt, however, did promise that he would insist that the U.S.A. should be kept informed of the progress of Hungary’s negotiations with Russia, and

would also arrange for an American military mission to be flown into Hungary, from Italy, the moment the armistice was concluded. Otto was authorised to send a message to this effect to Hungary, via Portugal, and the telegram was duly handed to Roosevelt’s secretary, Miss Tully, on the 21st. 1 Field-Marshal Lord Wilson to C. A. M.

HORTHY AGONISTES 353 For one reason or another, it never reached Hungary. It looks as though the orders for the mission were sent out but the departure cancelled when the armistice failed to materialise on 15th October. Meanwhile, the search for suitable emissaries for Moscow was going on. After Hardy, K. Ratz and other candidates had been considered and dropped

for one reason or another (this process occupying several days) N. Horthy’s assistant, Domokos Szentivanyi, was chosen as the main diplomatic agent.and given the rank of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary (although by an unfortunate omission not specifically accredited to conclude the armistice). With him was associated Géza Teleki, Pal Teleki’s

son and the hero of the dramatic interview with the Regent of ten days earlier. As leader of the mission, Horthy chose General Faragho, the administrative head of the gendarmerie, who had been Hungarian Military Attaché in Moscow in 1940-41 and was therefore presumed to have ““Russian connections.” If those connections were not necessarily of the best,” Faraghdé was at least unquestionably loyal to the Regent, and had long been secretly active in the “‘resistance movement,’ while, as he afterwards boasted somewhat tactlessly, the position which he had filled at the head of the organisation

which had carried out the Jewish deportations for Germany was such that no one imagined that he could be anti-German, or suspected anything when he visited the Regent. The preparations were already completed when Aczél and his companions returned, which they did on 24th September, not without having experienced exciting adventures; for their advent had not been properly notified, and they

were fired at as they crossed the frontier, both Dudas and Faust being wounded, and Aczél receiving six bullets through his coat. The report which

they brought thus came too late to influence events, unless indeed it had been so different from Zichy’s as to call for reconsideration of the position. Far from doing so, however, it exactly confirmed Zichy’s story.’ The three Hungarians had been received behind the lines by Marshal Zhukov, and by

him sent on by aeroplane to Moscow. Here, it appears, they had at first met with some mistrust, as the great Rakosi declared that they were not representative of the true Communist tradition. Nevertheless, they were cordially enough received by the official in charge of South-East European affairs in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, who first told them that since

Horthy on his side had negotiated in Hungary with the Communists, the U.S.S.R. would for its part treat with him (a reassuring divergence from the assurances of the émigré-run wireless, which had persistently been trumpeting 1 The above account of the Archduke’s fortunes in Quebec was given by him personally to C.A.M. Mr. Lukacs gives, op. cit., p. 623, a more sensational version, based, as he writes to me, on information from M. Eckhardt, according to which Mr. Eden (President Roosevelt ‘‘ apreeing substantially ’’) told the Archduke that Hungary should “* go ahead, and if necessary make a separate armistice with the Western Powers.’’ The Archduke informs me that he is unable to confirm this. I write that the orders for the mission were sent out, because I have been repeatedly assured by Hungarians that on 15th October American troops in Italy were, when Horthy’s proclamation was received, ordered to start by air for Hungary, but the order was cancelled when Voéroés’ counter-order was heard. Lord Wilson informs me categorically that there was by that time no question of sending combatant troops to Hungary, but an American military mission would have been a different thing and Lord Wilson might not even have been

consulted about it. . 2 He had written a book on his experiences on the strength of which he passed as a ‘‘Russian expert.” The book was, however, so unfavourable to the Soviet system that it was placed on the index in Democratic Hungary in 1945, at a time when Faragho was himself Minister of Supply. 3 Following from Géza Sods, confirmed by Faust and I. Kovacs. Z

354 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH out that the formation of the Lakatos Government was meaningless, and that only ‘“‘the elimination of the entire Horthy clique’ could save Hungary).* They would, indeed, at once begin consulting with the British and Americans, and would like as soon as possible to begin conversations with a semi-official Hungarian representative, who should be a politician, if possible one who had held cabinet rank. The final stage should then consist of the reception of a properly accredited official representative with powers to sign an armistice. Further, the official—presumably in reply to requests made by the emissaries —gave Aczél very comforting oral reassurances, as follows: (1) The armistice line in Transylvania would be that on which the troops

were standing when the armistice was concluded. The ultimate fate of Transylvania would be decided at the Peace Conference.

(2) No undertaking could be given at that stage as regards Hungary’s frontiers with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but Soviet policy did not, as a matter of general principle, favour frontiers so drawn as to leave compact ethnic masses under foreign domination.

(3) The U.S.S.R. had no intention of establishing a Soviet regime in Hungary.

(4) War criminals would be tried and punished, but Hungarian officers and soldiers would not ipso facto be treated as war criminals.

By the time Aczél brought back his report, the preparations for the journey were already practically complete. After another meeting had been held to discuss details, Zichy went up once again to Slovakia with a neighbouring landowner, Count Forgach, and Col. Kudar, of the gendarmerie, to confirm that the invitation was serious and that the party would be duly taken on to Moscow. The reply being reassuring, Faraghdé saw the Regent again at 11 a.m. on the 26th, and was given passports, signed by Ambrozy, and a personal letter written by Horthy in his own hand to Stalin. In this letter the Regent asked for an armistice and for mercy for Hungary, at the same time protesting that the communication made by M. Molotov to Kristdffy in June 1941, which should have made avoidance of war between Hungary and the U.S.S.R. possible, had never reached him. By his own account,’ Horthy further gave Faragho instructions (presumably verbal) to try to obtain the following armistice conditions: Immediate cessation of hostilities. Participation of the British and Americans in the occupation of Hungary. Free exit for the German troops. Communications with the Palace were to be made by wireless, in a code of which the mission was given a copy. At the Palace end the work of coding and decoding was entrusted to the few people left whom the Regent still felt that he could trust: his son, his daughter-in-law (who appears to have kept the secrets entrusted to her much better than most of the allegedly more reticent sex), and his adjutant, Tost. At a further meeting, held without the Regent, to arrange details, the party was told that another envoy, properly accredited with plenipotentiary 1 Later, when the “Democratic” Hungarian Delegation was in Moscow (in January 1945) to conclude the armistice, M. Molotov allegedly told one member of it that the U.S.S.R. would gladly have reached agreement with Horthy, and if he succeeded in mastering the situation on 15th October, “‘he might have kept his job, like Michael of Roumania.”’ * Horthy, op. cit., p. 282.

HORTHY AGONISTES 355 powers, would be leaving immediately after them by another route. Vattay was arranging this.1

The party left on the 28th in great secrecy (disguised as sportsmen),” Teleki going by one route and Faragho by another. Shortly before this N. Horthy, junior, had, on his own initiative, thrown another fly. Although the Hungarian General Staff was still in touch with Mihailovic, from whom they received a message as late as 13th October,?

the real controller of central Yugoslavia was now obviously Tito, and N. Horthy conceived the idea of arranging with him a co-ordinated move against the Germans: this was to include an agreement that there should be no partisan warfare in the Bacska, but the inhabitants should be left in peace and protected against the Germans.* Marty, the Hungarian frontier control officer at Gyékényes, was known to possess a line to Tito’; to him Horthy sent down an officer named Papp-Almas, and eventually received what

purported to be an affirmative reply from Tito. Thereupon (on 22nd September) N. Horthy got into touch with Felix Bornemissza, the director of the Hungarian Danube Shipping Company (M.F.T.R.), and with Hardy,

whom he told to choose an officer for a courier job and to send him to Bornemissza for further instructions.6 These proved to be that the officer was to go down to Ujvidék, to meet a messenger from Tito, and bring him

up to Pest. The messenger was to be brought across the frontier by the help of Count Pejaéevié, a Slavonian landowner and cousin of Mme Ilona Horthy’s. This enterprise was, as we shall see, destined to have a startling sequel.

Another question which had been much discussed during these days had been whether Horthy should not leave Buda, at least when the negotiations were on the verge of completion, and place himself under the protection of either the First or the Second Army. He had decided (contrary to the advice of many of his entourage) not to do so, but had agreed that if things went wrong and he himself was taken prisoner, General Veress should carry on in his name and should form a Government. Banffy, who was himself to fill this position if Veress, in his turn, was put out of action, had travelled to Transylvania to inform Veress and discuss details. 1 Private, Géza Teleki to C. A. M. * They pretended to be going on a shooting-party. As G. Teleki had never shot in his life, he took with him an old elephant gun belonging to his father. (Countess Teleki to C. A. M.) * This message, given to me by Col. Nadas, ran as follows: ‘‘The Anglo-Saxons do not want the conflict between themselves and the Russians to be brought to a head by a clash between my troops and Tito’s. I have therefore been instructed to withdraw with my Cetniks into Dalmatia. But the expansion of Russia is not in the interest of the Anglo-Saxons. So let the Hungarian troops resist to the last, and when forced out of Hungary, let them try to make contact with me.”’ 1 am informed on very high authority that this message in no sense whatever reproduces any

instructions given by the British to Mihailovi¢; but I have also independent confirmation (from the Liaison Officer, Hory—above, p. 265) that both V6rés and Nadas attached great importance to the connection and were “‘absolutely in favour of co-operation with the British.’’ * These were N. Horthy’s real purposes in starting the contact: Skorzeny’s assertion (Missions Secrétes, p. 195) that he was trying to conclude peace with the U.S.S.R. through this channel is mistaken. ° See above, pp. 196-7. On the following story, including its sequel in Budapest, see also Hagen, Die Geheime Front, p. 372. Hagen gives many interesting details of this intrigue, as does Skorzeny, op. cit.; but both accounts are to be used with great caution. Several of Hagen’s most picturesque anecdotes, in particular, are entirely incorrect. 5 Hardy MS.

356 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH IV

It was not only the Palace that had been active behind the scenes in the fortnight following 10th September. Veesenmayer had, as we have seen, been genuinely surprised by Horthy’s lapse, but his confidence, once shaken, could not easily be restored. He was bound to consider, more seriously than before, the eventuality of having to call on the Arrow Cross. The Arrow Cross itself was most strongly of the opinion that the time for it to take over had already come. In its view, the decision of the Council

of 10th September had transformed the constitutional position. On the morning of the 11th, Kemény called on Haller to inform him officially that ‘in so far as the Privy Council definitely decided to ask any armistice from the Anglo-Saxons, the Americans and the Soviets, Szalasi now declared that he did not recognise the decision as binding on the nation; from this moment on, he regarded the work of the Government and the Regent as illegal and unconstitutional; he would immediately, on his own initiative, set up his

own Government and take over the power’—on one condition: that the Germans initiate “‘the essential political police measures . . . since we, for example, cannot arrest the Minister President.” On that day the German still hesitated. He asked Kemény what sort of Government Szalasi proposed to set up—a concentration Cabinet or a purely Hungarist one; he questioned him as to exactly what degree of support the Arrow Cross required—whether the Germans were to take the initiative, or Only, as it were, to hold the ring. Kemény gave confused and ambiguous answers. But Haller was not yet sure whether the Regent’s decision was legally valid and finally binding; until the picture was quite clear, it was extraordinarily hard to take a decided step. It was necessary to wait until

the other side had gone beyond the limits of what was morally possible ‘“‘before drawing the conclusions.’ Kemény replied that Szalasi did not even want to take over the power without cause; but he was reporting in advance that he proposed to take action in case of an armistice. The Ministerial Council was meeting that afternoon, and it was expected that they would refuse to execute Horthy’s decision, but that the Regent would stand by it and would appoint a new and purely military Government.

Then, Haller agreed, ‘‘a new situation would arise,’ and he asked that Szalasi should come to Budapest at once with his staff and hold himself in

readiness in case he was wanted in the night. ,

That afternoon, however, as has been narrated, Horthy “‘deferred”’ to the opinion of the Cabinet, which consequently remained in office; and Lakatos and Hennyey told Veesenmayer that the idea of seeking an armistice had been dropped. There followed Vérés’ journey and the renewed arrangements for co-operation. Szalasi was not wanted, after all. The Arrow Cross protested 1 There was much discussion on this point when Kemény was on trial for his life; the point at issue being whether the Arrow Cross had asked for German “‘initiative’”’ (kezdeményezés) or only for a ‘“‘negative’’ attitude: a guarantee that they would at least not intervene on the side of

the Government. The truth is that Kemény contradicted himself in the conversation. He did use the word ““kezdeményezni”’ when asking for the Germans to “initiate the necessary political police measures,”’ but it is also true (although the Presiding Judge refused to allow the reference)

that Haller asked him on the 11th: “Then you want German initiative?’’ I answered, ‘“‘No: Szalasi wants to take the initiative.”’ In reality, Szalasi wanted to come in as a Hungarian, not as a German agent and wanted the Germans to obey his orders; but he was well aware that many,

if not most of the practical steps would have to be taken by the Germans. It was they who would have to make the arrests, they would have to protect the Arrow Cross. Certainly, if the Germans took the other side, the Arrow Cross would be doomed to “‘the fate of the Iron Guard.’

HORTHY AGONISTES 357 vigorously enough. Kemény argued to Haller that Lakatos’ rejection of the armistice proposal was not sincere but a blind to deceive the Germans. The same situation would recur, probably in still more acute form, in a week or two. The decision of the Privy Councillors and of the Government was illegal. It was necessary to draw the consequences and Szalasi saw no reason to wait

any longer. He suggested that he, Veesenmayer, Winkelmann and Greiffenberg should meet urgently to discuss the final arrangements. Veesenmayer now yielded a little ground. Greiffenberg had gone off to the Fuhrer with V6rés, so was not available. Veesenmayer did, however, consent to an Arrow Cross representative’s meeting Winkelmann; and on

being told this, Szalasi, on 13th September, summoned to him his “‘technical , specialist,” Emil Kovarcz,! appointed him Supreme Commander of all Arrow

Cross “‘forces’ and invested him with plenipotentiary powers to make all preparations, ordering him to have things ready so that the measures devised by him—generally defined as “the mobilisation of the whole Party and the nation’’—should commence automatically when the signal for action was given. That signal would be “‘the breach by any party of the Tripartite Pact’; and it does not appear that Kovarcz was even expected to wait for Szalasi to tell him when the “breach”’ occurred. He was to judge for himself and act accordingly. It is true that it was reasonable to expect (as in fact proved the case) that the “breach”? would be unambiguous. Kovarcz met Winkelmann and his second in command, Major Krumpholz, the same afternoon. According to Kovarcz’s later account, he asked the Germans for four things: a safe headquarters in Buda; assurances that the Germans would not negotiate with any rival body and that they would inform the Arrow Cross organisations in the country that they were the only authorised partners of the Germans; and, finally, thirty-six hours notice before “the action was initiated.”’ The Germans gave the promises, so that the agreement was considered by the Arrow Cross to be highly satisfactory. Kovarcz moved next day to a villa in the Pasaréti ut, on the western outskirts of Buda—an area occupied

by German troops, in which the writ of the Hungarian authorities did not run—and set about his preparations. He seems to have done this with a determination and energy which fully justified Szalasi’s confidence in him. He arranged with Beregffy, who was his “‘group leader” for the Army,’ that when the signal was given a German and a Hungarian officer should appear in every barracks and call upon the soldiers to join them. At the Front, all unreliable officers of the rank of Colonel and upward were to be replaced by other men, who were nominated in advance for their roles.

Analogous preparations were made for the gendarmerie; Vajna was in charge of these. Envelopes were sent out containing sealed orders for taking over the posts, telegraph and telephone, the wireless, the water, electricity 1 For Kovarcz, see above, I. p. 427 andn. Hehad returned from Berlin in April 1944 and had then been placed by Szalasi in charge of the paramilitary side of the Arrow Cross’s work and had won golden opinions both from the Arrow Cross and from the Germans for his keenness and efficiency. Szalasi’s opinion of him was so high that once he had given him the general order quoted above, he added no detailed instructions and did not even ask for progress reports. This confidence was, as we shall see, not misplaced as regards technical efficiency; but the result was a certain confusion on 15th October, when Kovarcz (to the advantage of his cause) over-rode certain technical forms which Szalasi would have preferred to observe. 2 Beregffy at his trial denied that he had been initiated into the advance plans, but his denials were among the least convincing of all the trial. It does, however, appear that he was unaware of many details of what had been going on, and he was away in the country, all unsuspecting, on the 15th October.

358 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH and fire services, the airways and the Budapest Transport Corporation, the new commanders being in each case selected and advised. A leader named Zako was entrusted with the organisation of the youth movement—a forma-

tion known as the Anti-Bolshevik Youth Camp; their task was to be the carrying of messages and the distribution of leaflets. The preparation of the leaflets was entrusted to Vajna. All these preparations were completed by the end of the month, by which date only one measure remained outstanding, although that was, of course, an all-important one: the distribution of the arms, for which the Arrow Cross was still dependent on the Germans and which had not been issued. For the rest, Brother Kovarcz was able to report

that “‘everything was in order as regards the party, the nation and the national reconstruction.” So confident was Szalasi in Kovarcez’s energy and capacity that he did

not even wait for his report on his stewardship. Already on the 14th Kemény was back again with Haller saying that the technical arrangements

had now been made (by the Winkelmann-Kovarcz meeting) so that it remained only to get on with the political side. But Haller put him off again. Under pressure, he agreed that on the 10th the Regent had “‘overstepped the limits of what was morally possible,” and had broken his pledges, so that on the Fiihrer’s own definition, “‘a new situation had arisen.’ He agreed, moreover, that he saw in Szalasi “a perfect synthesis of the politician and the man, a political perspicuity and instinct such as were rare in history.’ But again nothing could be done yet. These were the highest possible politics, and the Fuhrer had to take the decision himself. Haller even suggested that Germany

did not want to intervene in Hungary’s private affairs. All the Germans would do at present was to take the persons of the Right Radical leaders under their protection; and this was done—as it appears, none too early. On 16th September Horthy ordered the Arrow Cross leaders to be arrested,

but although Veesenmayer denied to Hennyey that they were under his protection, he really kept them safe. Szalasi was already tucked away. Haller put Kemény up in his own flat; Kovarcz, as we have seen, was safely ensconced in a German guardroom. Even so, the Germans were still clinging to their policy of co-operating with the Hungarian Government up to the last possible moment!; and if the final possibility broke down, then they wanted the power to be taken over, not by Szalasi alone but by a coalition based on the principle of “‘right-wing unity,” a desideratum to which Veesenmayer returned again and again in the negotiations which occupied the next fortnight. He pressed Szalasi strongly

and repeatedly on this point, and there can be little doubt that he was simultaneously using his influence elsewhere also; and with a measure of success; while Szalasi also showed a degree of elasticity which surprised and pleased the Germans, agreeing ““to form a Government on a very broad basis, to include all persons who were technically competent and of consistent and straightforward political convictions, and who enjoyed the confidence of the nation.” The draft Cabinet lists which he drew up during these days in fact cast their nets extremely wide. On 16th September definite agreement was reached between Szalasi and

Rajniss—the partner to whose co-operation Veesenmayer seems to have + Veesenmayer even made another attempt at this time to persuade the Hungarians to take Szalasi, and one or two of his followers, into the Cabinet, but Hennyey told him that the Regent would never hear of it,

HORTHY AGONISTES 359 attached special importance. Rajniss begged pardon for all that he and his

party had said about Szalasi in the past, while SzAlasi promised to recognise } and deal with only Rajniss and his followers from among the MMP (both

parties thus agreeing to repudiate Imrédy and such of his followers as remained loyal to him).!. The two parties pledged themselves henceforward

to stop all attacks on one another and to work in closest collaboration. If the extreme Right succeeded to the power, both groups should be represented.

The “organisations of the MMP” (viz. the KABSz) were to come under Kovarez. Similar negotiations were initiated a few days later with Palffy (Winkelmann acting as mediator), and these led to promising results, although the final agreement with Palffy was not reached until Ist October. Veesen-

mayer himself had already personally made sure of the three economic specialists, Reményi-Schneller, Jurcsek and Sz4sz, whose co-operation meant so much to him. No agreement could, for the moment, be reached between Szalasi and Baky: the personal antagonism between the two men was too deep.

Meanwhile, notwithstanding his promise to Kovarcz and the nominal subordination of Ley to Kovarez, Winkelmann had been pursuing certain independent negotiations with the KABSz, for whom, as ex-soldiers, he had a higher regard than for Szalasi’s bands? and with whom, of the two bodies, he would certainly have preferred to work. He had taken their leaders into safe keeping near his own quarters, while some of the rank and file had been snugly put into SS. uniform and placed under German command. Certain

fairly exact arrangements had been made also with some units of the gendarmerie, through Baky, who had promised to have them ready to serve

against Horthy on a given signal. These units were gathered round the Gellérthegy and the Taban, where Baky had taken up his own quarters. Finally, the Germans had certainly reached private understandings, into which the Arrow Cross was not initiated, also with a number of senior Hungarian officers. But the role which the Germans assigned to any of their Hungarian henchmen was a minor one. Even Winkelmann wanted to work

as far as possible with Germans: he only negotiated with the KABSz at all because he had few other forces at his command. And in mid-September the Fiihrer himself had decided to alter this. On either the 16th or the 17th of the month? he called to him his “‘specialist,”’

Major Skorzeny, and told him that, according to information received, Horthy was trying to negotiate a separate peace not only with the West but also with Russia. Skorzeny’s task would be to occupy Buda Hill should this event occur, although not otherwise: he was to move “‘as soon as notification was received that the Regent was betraying his obligations under the alliance with Germany.’ He would be operating under the ruling of “‘General N,’”* the new commander of the German forces in Budapest, who, however, had

official MMP.

1 This emerges clearly from the account in the Hungarist Diary. Imrédy was thus certainly justified in maintaining, as he did at his trial, that Rajniss was not acting as representing the 2 At his trial Kovarcz complained that the Germans had not kept any one of their promises to him. They had not issued him arms until 15th October, they negotiated independently with other bodies, they did not give the promised assurance to the local bodies (that they could not fulfil the final promise was not their fault, since the “‘action’’ was finally initiated not by them

but by Horthy).

3 The following from Skorzeny, op. cit., pp. 189 ff. The date has to be inferred by calculating the intervals given by Skorzeny after the last definite date mentioned by him, 10th September; and the calculation cannot always be made with certainty. 4 Presumably General Friesner, or, if Skorzeny did not entirely understand the position, General Von dem Bach.

360 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH not yet formed his staff. Skorzeny was then told (by Jodl) that he would have at his disposal a battalion of Luftwaffe parachutists, another battalion of Waffen SS. parachutists, a battalion of motorised infantry, composed of

, cadet officers, and some transport planes. It seems possible that Hitler himself gave Skorzeny the plan, which the “‘specialist” afterwards used, of the underground labyrinth which honeycombed the Hill.’ Besides this, Skorzeny had been given a further assignment after his own

heart. At one point or another? N. Horthy, jnr.’s, secret channel of communication with Tito had sprung a leak, and the German Intelligence Service

had worked out a plan that when Tito’s emissary appeared, young Horthy was to be caught red-handed in commerce with him. It seems likely that he was to be detained under all circumstances: he was a danger in himself, and the Germans wanted him out of the way. Then, according to one version, the Regent was to be given the choice of abdicating gracefully in favour of a nominee of the Germans or of having his own disloyalty to his ally, and his son’s, broadcast to the world.?

The operation was to be effected by Skorzeny, in co-operation with Winkelmann; Veesenmayer was kept in ignorance of it.4 Four days later Skorzeny proceeded to Hungary, where he first booked quarters in a village near Pilis, under the name of “Doktor Wolff.” He then moved to Buda, where he spent his time working out plans, in the course of which he appears to have changed the original plan suggested by the German

General Staff for a landing by parachutists (for which Buda Hill was singularly ill adapted) in favour of an ordinary land attack, involving the

penetration of the underground passages. His troops had arrived unobtrusively from Vienna and were stowed away in the suburbs of Buda, where their presence entirely escaped the notice of the Hungarian Intelligence Service.°

Skorzeny writes of ‘‘certain Hungarian personalities who took part in our deliberations,’’® but I have failed to identify these ““personalities”’; persons

quite high up in the inner ring of the Arrow Cross only just heard that he was in Buda, with no further details. The Hungarian General Staff and Military Intelligence knew no more; it had identified Skorzeny in Pilis, but lost track of him when he left his quarters there.’

The way in which affairs were being conducted over their heads was extremely galling to the Arrow Cross, who had to submit day by day to excuses and evasions. The Szalasi Diary for the period contains long reports 1 Hardy, when in prison, was informed by a German in a position to know (Dr. Schmidt) that Hitler had himself considered the possibility of an operation of this kind and had procured

a complete plan of the Var, with all its underground passages, exits, etc. He had personally discussed with informants various possible kidnappings. He enjoyed making this sort of plan. * According to Hagen, op. cit., p. 335, the informant was Marty. * This is the version given by Hagen, and Winkelmann confirmed in evidence at Nuremberg that “‘the main purpose of the operation was to blackmail the Regent, but N. Horthy was also a danger in himself.” 4 This seems certain. When the kidnapping took place, Veesenmayer denied all foreknowledge of it, and Winkelmann bore him out at his trial, saying that Veesenmayer had been informed only after the event. Rahn (personal to C. A. M.) confirms this and writes that Veesenmayer received the news with the utmost consternation and indignation. 5 Col. Nadas tells me definitely that he was unaware of their arrival ‘‘although there was so much coming and going of German troops that the arrival or departure of one or two battalions did not strike anyone as remarkable.”’ 6 Op. cit.. p. 197. 7 G. Kiraly to C. A. M.

HORTHY AGONISTES 361 of endless conversations between Szalasi, Kemény and Vajna on the one hand and Greiffenberg, Haller, etc., on the other; and some of these conferences were debated at some length when Szalasi was being tried for his life. From a judicial point of view the examination was perhaps justified; the records proved that Szalasi did indeed urge on the Germans to put him in power and let him follow out a “total” policy. From the historian’s point of view, however, the meetings simply constitute a tale of familiar pleadings by the Arrow Cross and familiar tergiversations by the Germans. After V6rdés’ return, they even seemed to go back on their earlier estimate of the Regent’s “‘moral impossibility.”” “The Fuhrer,” said Haller on the 17th (Kemény was now besieging him daily, and twice daily after the two men came to share rooms), ““*has to decide; the discussions on this subject are proceeding now, and we are waiting for the answer.’’ On the 21st he was saying that: ‘““The question was—with the Regent or without him? And in either case—how? ‘These were questions which the Fiihrer must ponder, weigh every aspect, so that the decision, when he took it, should be the most historic possible, from every point of view.’ But at last Haller brought Szalasi a message from Veesenmayer asking him to supper on the 26th. Szalasi was to be ready to put forward all his proposals for every eventuality. Then the date was suddenly advanced to lunch, because both Veesenmayer and Winkelmann had been ordered to leave immediately for an audience with the Fuhrer. The party was held in the flat of Rekowski, the German Consul,* and was attended by Szalasi, Kemény, Veesenmayer, Rekowski and Hottl.

This proved to be a very important meeting, although there was a good , deal of inconclusive talk in it. Szalasi was again asked about the Regent, and replied that in his view it would be almost impossible to win him over. Veesenmayer agreed reluctantly. They discussed various ways and means. Szalasi suggested that Hitler should invite Horthy to come to H.Q. and talk things over; Veesenmayer said drily that Horthy was unlikely to agree. They wondered whether someone could bring Horthy to his senses by a last appeal; whether he could be induced to flee the country; how they could deal with

him. There seemed no solution. It was then considered how the question could be resolved without him, i.e. by persuading him to abdicate or by simply announcing his abdication. Szalasi had got this all worked out. The mystic theory of the Hungarian Holy Crown made the change possible so long as the Crown remained in the country. But he insisted that the Regent must be given a last chance, in the shape of a final conversation, either with Hitler in Poland, or with Szalasi himself on some neutral ground in Budapest. Without this condition he would not act. If this appeal failed, he was willing to take over the power himself, on certain further conditions. These were, firstly, that he received satisfactory assurances that Germany would defend Hungary sincerely and effectively. He admitted that a retreat to the Tisza or even to the Danube might be necessary, but he must be informed in advance (partly in order to arrange the necessary evacuation of men and material) and he must know exactly what Germany meant by “‘defending Hungary.”’ 1 On another occasion Haller said that neither Ribbentrop nor Himmler would have anything to say in the matter, but Hitler alone. 2 Rekowski at this time was acting as a sort of “‘liaison officer’ between Veesenmayer and Winkelmann, who were hardly on speaking terms,

362 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Secondly, he must have an assurance that he and his movement would be properly supported. They did not propose to share the fate either of the Iron Guard and Codreanu (i.e. to be deserted and massacred) or of Tsankov or Horia Sima (inglorious exile).

On the question when the coup should be effected: the moment for this, said Szdlasi, was when the German troops now in Hungary closed up behind the two Hungarian armies at the Front,! to prevent the latter from turning round and intervening. He had indeed made arrangements, through Beregffy, to replace the Hungarian commanders, down to the rank of Colonel, at the given moment, but the armies still represented a danger. Finally, his own formations must receive the promised arms. Veesenmayer took note of these points and gave reassuring replies, except,

indeed, on the subject of the last appeal to Horthy, which he seems to have thought impracticable. The last minutes before he left were devoted to a discussion of the new Cabinet which Szalasi was to form—one which was to be on “‘a broad national basis.’’ Szalasi suggested and Veesenmayer agreed

to the names of Rajniss, Jaross, Palffy (but not, said Veesenmayer, in a responsible post), Ruszkay (as Minister in Berlin), Jurcsek, ReményiSchneller, Szasz. Then Veesenmayer suggested Bonczos, as likely to bring over with him a group of sympathisers from the MEP; Szalasi was willing. Szalasi suggested Bardossy, but Veesenmayer said that Bardossy had ratted on him twice, and he would not insist on him. Finally, it was arranged that Szalasi should move into a room in Buda, in a house occupied by the SS.” where, as Veesenmayer pointed out, he would be safe. Another consideration may have been that he would be unable to do any mischief, for after he had moved in (which he did the next day), Szalasi found himself practically a prisoner until 15th October. Veesenmayer now took his leave of the P.V. and set off for Hitler’s H.Q. V

Some days were bound to pass before Horthy got any news from the Faragho mission. He employed the interval in taking what steps he could to

gather a dependable force round him at home. Unfortunately, the troops available were extraordinarily limited. The only considerable regular fighting unit in the vicinity was the 9/11, now stationed at Fot, a few miles north of Pest. This battalion was at full war-strength and fully armed, thus disposing (besides rifles) of 27 machine guns, 12 automatic rifles, 2 anti-tank guns and 4 light trench mortars.

. The Depot H.Q. of the I Corps was in the Karoly Kuiraly barracks, below the Sashegy (Buda), and had under it, in the same barracks, a depot signals battalion, of which some of the men had rifles but most of them only pistols. Under the same command was a depot artillery regiment, with 20 1 T.e. the First and Second Armies. It was rightly assumed that the Third, under Heszlény), presented no danger. 2 In point of fact, the building was that of the British Legation. It was then occupied by the

Commander of the German SS. group, Pfeiffer-Wildenbruck. Szalasi moved here on the 26th, after two days spent in a house adjoining the German Legation, and regarded as exterritorial (Szalasi Trial, p. 21). 3 The following list has been supplied privately (Hardy), checked from the spies’ reports in the Szadlasi Diary. It differs in many respects from the account given by Lazar at the trial of Szalasi, as the reporters made him give it, but the reporting on that occasion was, as usual, grossly inaccurate.

HORTHY AGONISTES 363 officers (only two of them regulars) and 600 men, but possessing only light arms. This, in September, was outside Pest, at Pusztaszentjakab. There were

two detachments of pioneers or engineers (the 20lst and 203rd) at Dunaharaszti and Vac respectively. One battalion of the mine-sweeping troops from Baja, under General Hardy, had recently, by arrangement between Hardy, Bakay and V6rdés, been moved unobtrusively up the river, and half of it was in O-Buda, the other half assembling between Szob and Vac. A second battalion, then in Ujvidék, was also ordered to move north. Another was at Erd, and there were two gunboats at Ercsi and two (moved

up under the same arrangement from Ujvidék) at God. Another unit was still doing mine-sweeping on the Danube, and a small detachment was down at Titel, under Germancommand. A reserve squadron of Hussars (a motorised company, with 16 light Ansaldo cars) was at Ocsa. There were also certain

anti-aircraft units; the “‘Béry,’’ a reserve regiment 500 strong, in Buda,

another detachment of the same strength in Vasartelep and a balloon company, 1,000 strong, at Csepel. The A.A. units were the most serious force in the capital, being armed with Bofors and Swedish guns; on the other

hand, their Hungarian Commanding Officer (Justhy) was a strong proGerman,! and the whole force was under German command, while the Germans had also units of their own, placed at various strategic points, including the Gellérthegy.

Finally, the Hungarians had also the Bodyguard itself, under General Lazar, a body of fine picked men, but only some 200 strong and for the most

part antiquely armed. It had, however, attached to it a ““Duty Battalion” rather larger, which possessed a few trench mortars, a couple of anti-tank guns,

and an armoured platoon with 7 cars.2. The police, etc., forces (of which General Temesvari took charge when Faragh6o left) consisted of two battalions

of gendarmerie (the Galanta and the Nagyvarad), each of two companies,

armed with rifles, the staff of the gendarmerie training school and the ordinary police force, mounted or unmounted, of Budapest. There were a few anti-aircraft units, lines of communication troops, etc., scattered about the country. On 27th September General Bakay was made G.O.C. of both the I and II Corps Districts, thus assuming command over all the units of this little force. In the last days of September Bakay toured the stations, haranguing the officers and warning them that they might be required to act at a moment’s notice against a putsch from the Right. They were to be ready, but not to

tell the men anything until the last moment. On 30th September and the ~ following days the units outside the capital were brought into it, the bulk of the 9/11 being quartered in the Werbéczy gymnasium, on the slope of the Varhegy,? the Artillery Depot Regiment in the Hidegkuti ut; the Hussar squadron in the Manége outside the Palace. The armour, such as it was, was in the Andrassy barracks. These forces were ridiculously weak, but the remains of the ““Dead Army”

—or rather of most of it, for the Germans kept behind one division (the 5th Reserve) and the few remnants of the Air Force—were now trickling back. The 1 In January 1945 he presided over the court-martial which tried Veress, Hardy, Kuthy and Utassy for high treason.

2 So Lazar at the SzAlasi Trial, p. 147, who put the strength of the battalion at 800 men.

Dezsényi gives: 3 armoured cars, 6-7 7-cm. anti-tank guns, 160 automatic pistols, but only | 200 men.

’ This move took place on the 6th,

364 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH 12th, and what was left of the 8th and 9th, came back via Bratislava at the end of September, and the Cavalry Division a day or two later. Of these, the 8th and 9th appear to have been broken up (they do not figure again on any further Order of Battle) and the 12th had to be sent into the line again, being attached to the Sixth German Army!; but the Cavalry Division was sent down

to Kecskemét, not too far from Budapest, to refit, and on 3rd October an order was issued that it was to be kept as a central reserve, under Horthy’s personal orders. It was hoped to bring this division, with the 10th (which at that moment was in reserve in Ruthenia, where it formed part of the Farkas’ VI Corps), back to Pest, under the pretext of forming a “*bridgehead’”’

at G6doll6é against the Russian advance. These reinforcements would, it was hoped, make possible the defence of the capital, which for this purpose was to be divided into five sectors. There were to be three concentric rings: an outer ring, enclosing the whole capital; a second, excluding the outer suburbs; and a third running round Buda Hill alone. The plan, however, also included various operations which were rather in the nature of sabotage and guerrilla warfare than of open combat. At the same time, contact was renewed with the Resistance leaders, who on 24th September? had sent in

a fresh memorandum to the Palace, signed, like its predecessor, by the Smallholders, Social Democrats and Peace Party, and running (in brief) as follows: The signatories would not make their active participation in the struggle against the German occupation dependent on any conditions. Ifthe Government would turn against the Germans, it could count on the complete support

of the Resistance, even without previous agreement or organised contact. The signatories regarded, however, the establishment of political contact as desirable in the interest of the cause. Resistance could only hope to succeed if based on the broad masses of the people. They therefore proposed:

(1) The formation of a democratic Government, including real representatives of the workers and peasants.

(2) Immediate cessation of the activities of the German and Hungarian political police. * The 2nd Armoured was at this time also moved across from the Hungarian Second Army and attached to the German Sixth. It may help the reader to restate at this point the position of the Hungarian forces: At the front, First Army (Miklds), now consisting of 6 divisions (the 6th, 7th, 10th, 13th, 16th and 24th), the Ist and 2nd Mountain Brigades and the 62nd (?) Frontier‘Guards. The order of battle, reading from left to right, ran: III Corps (6th and 7th Divisions, 2nd Mountain Brigade); V Corps (13th Reserve Division, lst Mountain Brigade); 16th Division (independent); VI Corps (Farkas) (24th and 10th Divisions, latter in reserve). Second Army (Veress), consisting of 25th and 27th Regular Divisions, 7th and 9th Depot, Depot formations of the Ist and 2nd Mountain Brigades and Mobile Frontier Guards. On the right of the Hungarian Second Army was the German Eighth Army, which included the Hungarian 12th Division and the 2nd Armoured. Third Army (Heszlényi), consisting of 20th Regular and 23rd Reserve Divisions, 4th, 5th and 8th Depot and Depot Formation of 1st Armoured. To the right of this again came the German Sixth Army. Each army also contained, according to the sources, some “‘remnants”’ of earlier formations: thus the 18th and 19th had been absorbed into other units of the First Army, and the Second Army presumably contained survivors from the Szekel Guards and the 2nd and 3rd Depot Divisions, which no longer figure in the lists of this time. But little fighting value could be attributed to these. Behind the line there was now the Cavalry Division, in general reserve, and the units enumerated in the text; and in East Poland, the 5th Reserve. The Ist and 6th Depot Divisions had never been formed. * It was drafted on the 22nd and given, as before, to Bereczky, who handed it to Ambrozy for transmission to the Regent,

HORTHY AGONISTES 365 (3) The release of the political prisoners of the Left. (4) The State not to prevent organisation and agitation in the democratic and anti-German direction. (5) The workers to be armed. (6) Military co-operation with the Red Army.

To this Horthy sent no direct answer,? but he had already agreed to a suggestion by his son that the Resistance should be brought into touch with

Vorés.2 The messages had to pass through intermediaries—a journalist friend of Vérés’ named Felkai, and Dessewffy—and it took some time before

the mutual mistrust was dispelled so far as to make a meeting possible.’ Even then, the Resistance posted armed pickets all round the rendezvous,

in case it turned out to be a trap; while V6rés was afraid that he was being observed by Gestapo agents, and perhaps for that reason turned up at this highly secret rendezvous in full uniform and accompanied by an aidede-camp. The meeting took place on 27th September at 21 Ilona Utca, the house of aretired Féispan named Pongracz Kenessey, where Szakasits was in hiding. Szakasits and Tildy, with Dessewffy in attendance, represented the Resistance. The discussions, we are told, lasted an hour and a half, and agreement was reached that any successful move against the German occupying forces would

require the co-operation of all the Hungarian military forces and of the organised workers. Szakasits and Tildy urged the necessity of concluding an armistice, but Vérés replied that the preparations, including the purging of the Army, would take three weeks. The meeting seems to have ended on this somewhat inconclusive note. Meanwhile, what appear to have begun as an entirely different set of negotiations had been going on along parallel lines. N. Horthy, jun., was putting into the fire all the irons he could find, and he now asked General Ujszaszy, the former head of the Military Intelligence,” if he had any contacts.

Ujszaszy bethought him of Imre Kovacs, whom he had arrested and cross-

examined eighteen months earlier in connection with the affair of the Davidson letter. Others might not have thought this to constitute the happiest of foundations for future collaboration, but Ujszaszy sent a message to Kovacs through the usual chain of intermediaries, claiming acquaintance

on the strength of it, and eventually succeeded in arranging an interview between Kovacs and Horthy. Horthy explained to Kovacs that his father would like to “jump out” of ‘the war but found the operation technically difficult, and Kovacs promised

to send him his suggestions in writing. He consulted Rajk, with whose collaboration he drew up, and submitted in the name of the “Hungarian 1 Darvas, op. cit., pp. 121-2. 2 Darvas, loc. cit., writes: ‘““Horthy’s answer: ‘No!’.” This is wrong.

3 Bakay would have been the more obvious contact, but he seems to have been against co-operating with the workers, and above all, with the Jewish labour battalions, by whom he was also personally hated on account of certain incidents which had occurred in the Ukraine. Vorés, on the other hand, was anxious to reinsure himself. 4 For this, see Vérés (in Kossuth Népe, 23rd February 1946) and Szava (in A Reakcio Ellen, pp. 108 ff.); but Vérés attributes the initiative to himself, whereas Mme. I. Horthy informs the writer that the facts were as above. The date of the meeting is recorded by Countess Dessewffy in her Diary. Both V6rés and Szava agree that it took some days to arrange. 5 The Regent had got Ujszaszy released from arrest and had him quietly tucked away in the Hadik barracks (the Bodyguard’s barracks immediately outside the Palace). ® See above, p. 106.

366 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Front,’ a memorandum in which it was argued that it was hopeless to count

on Anglo-Saxon intervention. The Regent should apply at once to the Russians, and while waiting for the answer should put trustworthy officers at the head of the Army, place reliable guards on the bridges, railway stations, aerodromes, etc., and also form a ‘“‘National Guard’’ out of trustworthy

workers, peasants and bourgeois elements. Finally, he should invite the leaders of the Front to discuss with him the modalities of the “‘jump-out.”’ The next chapters of this story are rather Hungarian. Kovacs succeeded in bringing Ujszaszy together with Rajk, who was somewhat unforthcoming and talked of ‘“‘political conditions.” But a few days later (this must have been about 25th September) Kovacs and Rajk were again summoned, this time to meet General Lazar, who told them that he had been put in charge of ‘‘all troops” and was going to “‘throw the Germans out of Hungary.”” He

was prepared to issue bombs, machine guns, rifles, etc., sufficient to arm 15,000 men. These could be issued the next day. Lazar and Ujszaszy undoubtedly believed what they said, and on that afternoon a notice actually appeared in the papers calling on volunteers to enrol in a National Guard. The Resistance also believed that the operation was imminent, for the local leaders were notified that a putsch was to take place on the 28th. But nothing came of the plans for the moment, for when Kovacs and Rajk turned up next morning to arrange with Ujszaszy for the issue of the arms, they were told that the arrangements had been altered. Horthy had ‘“‘taken the command out of Lazar’s hands’’ and entrusted it to Bakay, who “‘had not yet been able to make his dispositions.”’ We call this story ““Hungarian,” for it appears that both Ujszaszy and Lazar had been speaking without the book, or their interlocutors had misunderstood them. The Regent had never thought of putting Lazar in charge of ‘‘all troops,”’ nor even of all the home defences, for which last post he had

never had anyone in his eye except Bakay.” Nor had he been planning a putsch for the 28th. It was thus not so much a case of “altering arrangements”’ as of scrapping plans which ought never to have been taken beyond the blueprint stage. And Bakay, who now in fact took charge in Budapest, made no

move to implement Lazar’s offer to the Resistance.* Several days indeed passed before the Resistance leaders heard again at all from the Palace, even though on the 6th they sent Ambrézy yet another memorandum, this time couched In very strong terms.’ Even the recruiting for the proposed National Guard was dropped. To turn to the other side: after Veesenmayer and Winkelmann had left on their visit to the Fuhrer, their Hungarian protégés could do little but mark time until their return. Szalasi beguiled his enforced leisure, happily enough, in composing a portentous string of documents which were to constitute the 1 These were the remnants of the caches which V. Nagy had made two years previously. They had remained in their hiding-places until March 1944, when the Honvéd authorities had taken most of them over as “‘Army reserves,’ in order to escape awkward questions by the

Germans. These stocks had then of necessity been issued to the fighting troops. A few

caches had, however, remained undetected, and Lazar had the secret of these (Personal, Fabian

to C. A. M.). * Horthy to C. A. M. 3 His reasons need not have been solely undemocratic, for the Germans and the Arrow Cross would certainly have got to know of the operation, which might have precipitated a crisis before Horthy was ready. * Szakasits’ broadcast, 15th October 1945. The memorandum was being drafted on the 5th (Dessewffy Diary).

HORTHY AGONISTES 367 basis of his activities when and after he took over the power.! First came an elaborate constitutional justification of his own actions, then an enormous

Order of the Day to the Nation in Arms, to be issued at the appropriate moment.? A few days later he drafted the Act of Abdication which he was to lay before Horthy’s indignant eyes on 16th October; a high-flown and pathetic document in which the Regent was made to refer to his advanced age and shattered health (as a matter of fact the old gentleman was as robust as a horse), thanking the Hungarian nation and calling down the blessing of the Almighty on all its future decisions and actions (this, as we shall see,

ended in the waste-paper basket, as Horthy refused to sign it). Another plan (also modified subsequently) provided in detail for the appointment, according to ancient Hungarian constitutional practice, of a Palatine (Nador)

to be elected by Parliament and receive the oath of the new Government (Szalasi proposed to take this office himself). Yet another plan of action— an enormously elaborate document—went into minutest detail on every step to be taken on the Day and during the following weeks. The question of the Head of the State was to be regulated by 4th November. The Government

was to rule constitutionally, with Parliament, whose activities, however, must not conflict with the nation’s will to live. The plan mentioned many very ambitious targets which might have been thought distant but were to be attained by Ist January 1945. The nation was to be organised in corporations, the entire administration reorganised on a dual system under which the real authority was placed in the hands of a central organ, while the Ministries were to be concerned only with submitting plans and organising and supervising the execution of them; mines and power-stations were to be nationalised

and big industry and trade placed under State control; agriculture to be mechanised and emancipated from its indebtedness to plutocracy; a new criminal code introduced, the services of the Hungarist Movement and the other Right-wing parties given fitting recognition; education permeated with the Hungarist idea and the National Socialist outlook on life; foreign policy so reorganised as to fit Hungary integrally into the nationalist and socialist European community; the Jews (the definition of a Jew was racial) employed on public works inside Hungary until the end of the war, when they were to be found a place designated by international agreement for the reception of them. Most of the other tasks assigned to the various Ministers may be summed up in the phrase: ‘““Total mobilisation of the nation, and political, military and social conduct of the war until final victory by the side of the Powers of

the Three Power Pact.’? While each Minister—of Defence, Industry, Agriculture, etc.—was entrusted with specific measures in his own field, a special Minister without Portfolio was placed in general charge of “the total mobilisation of the nation.”’ These documents could have been very important for the historian if the assumption on which they were based had been fulfilled; since Szalasi would certainly have carried into practice the principles set forthin them. As things turned out, they remain psychological curiosities over whose irrealism the reader may perhaps laugh; although, if he is just, he must admit the genuine, if fantastic, patriotism which inspires them. 1 Some of these documents were drafted only after Veesenmayer’s return; but the exact dating is immaterial.

2 This is the document which was read out at 8.21 p.m., Central European time, on 15th

October.

368 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH The other development of these days of waiting was the foundation of a new political organisation which was destined to play a not unimportant part

in the crisis which was now approaching. On Ist October Rajniss (from whom the initiative thus nominally came, although he was certainly acting with Veesenmayer’s blessing and probably on his initiative) asked Szalasi’s approval of a plan to form a Parliamentary Group to be known as the Nemzeti

Szovetség (National Alliance). This should consist of not less than 150 Deputies, a number which would represent a majority in Parliament, so that its wishes and views could not constitutionally be ignored. A delegation from this body was then to go to Lakatos, inform him that he did not enjoy the confidence of the House, and call on him to resign. The Alliance was

also to demand that its views should be laid before the Regent and that he should be asked to take into account the wishes of the Parliamentary majority in his future steps, particularly in his selection of a new Government.

In practice, as Rajniss represented it, this meant that the Alliance was to force Horthy to appoint Szalasi Minister President; as Szalasi put it, it was to be “the body of the constitutional movement for effecting the transition, of which the Arrow Cross was to remain the background and Szalasi the guiding brain.” He therefore blessed the project and told Rajniss and Széllési to recruit members. The enterprise, in fact, made considerable progress during the next few

days, but not along the lines intended by its authors. The Upper House, which on this occasion, as on so many others, showed more dignity than its sister body, refused to touch it at all; the Archduke Jézsef volunteered to act as Chairman, but could get no one to co-operate with him.? In the Lower House the enterprise prospered, but suffered a typically Hungarian transmutation asit didso. After a certain number of Arrow Cross or near-Arrow Cross Deputies had signed, Mihaly Teleki took the list to Lakatos and his

Secretary of State, Fay, who then told him to get as many signatures as possible, in order to neutralise the extremists.* Furst, the statutes had to be de-Nazified, since the MEP and Transylvanian members were not willing to

subscribe to anything which would promote the internal Nazification of Hungary. The initial draft, as submitted by Rajniss, was therefore carefully revised to omit all passages “‘serving National Socialist ends,” leaving the avowed object of the Alliance only “the unification of the whole nation under the leadership of the Regent.’”* The continuance of the war was understood, but not stated in the statutes. Once this was done, 138 signatures were quickly collected, from Deputies

belonging to the MEP, the Transylvanians, the Imrédists, the National Socialists, the Arrow Cross and Volksgruppe. This was an imposing * There was much discussion about this body at the trials of Szalasi and (in particular) Bardossy—much of it entirely off the mark owing to the inability of many of the witnesses (and still more, of the prosecution and the Bench) to distinguish between the earlier attempts made under Sztdjay to create “‘Right-wing Unity”? and this later achievement of it. While Szdalasi meant it to be an instrument through which he could recruit and control influential politicians

not belonging to his party, the object of many Deputies in joining it, and of Veesenmayer in promoting it, was undoubtedly precisely the opposite—to prevent Szalasi’s getting control of that party in Hungary which wanted to continue the fight. It is true that, in the end, the purpose which it served was much rather that of Szalasi than of his opponents. * After 15th October a Committee of three members of the Upper House was formed, with the Archduke presiding. 3M. Teleki to C. A. M. Fay had been so instructed by Lakatos. 4 Bardossy’s evidence at his trial, p. 13.

HORTHY AGONISTES 369 figure, and if the body chose to undertake the task of legalising Szalasi’s assumption of the power, it could make a good show of doing so. On the other hand, as it had developed, it could equally well be used for keeping Szalasi out of power in favour of any other government prepared to continue the war. On 2nd October Veesenmayer and Winkelmann returned to Budapest. Their interviews with the highest quarters had covered a wider field than

Veesenmayer had revealed to Szalasi1 The true reason why he and Winkelmann had been summoned to Headquarters was that the differences

between the two had again come to a head over the appointment of the Lakatos Government, and Winkelmann had sent in, via Kaltenbrunner, a circumstantial report” accusing his colleague of slackness, defeatism and over-

indulgence towards the Regent and his Government, and urging a more active policy, involving the replacement of Veesenmayer by Jury and the immediate establishment of a genuine pro-German Government, actively supported by the Gestapo and SS. Veesenmayer had to defend himself against these charges, and to justify his own policy. There appears to have

been a considerable set-to, in the course of which both Himmler and Ribbentrop took Winkelmann’s side. After a private interview with the Fuhrer, however, Veesenmayer had managed to justify himself and to secure

official authorisation to go on a little longer with his policy of working through Horthy, if he could. This was definitely agreed, and on the 28th Horthy and Lakatos were given a public intimation that they were to receive one more chance—but no more—in the form of an astonishingly frank DNB communiqué, entitled ““The Last Crossing,” which, after referring to the defections of Roumania, Bulgaria and Finland, went on: ‘‘Perhaps the nations which now tread this road to Calvary could not be taught their lesson differently. But one thing is certain: there will be no more crossings of that kind. The German Command is determined from now on to proceed ruthlessly and with all means at its disposal against such events. If there are still Governments in Europe which, out of cowardice, weakness, defeatism or ill-will believe that they too can lead

their peoples along the trodden path of disaster, they are mistaken and have forfeited their office. The Reich will see to it that they cannot misuse it... . Where this warning has not been heard, Germany will ruthlessly make sure that it is not ignored.”’ It had, however, also been settled that, if and when the replacement of Horthy became inevitable, the succession should follow the course advocated by Veesenmayer, with Szalasi acting at once as head of the Government and

Supreme War Lord ad interim. Pending this, Veesenmayer was to be responsible for Szalasi’s personal safety.

When Szalasi and his lieutenants learned something of these decisions 1 The following paragraphs, which necessarily contain a certain amount of combination, are based chiefly on affidavits and evidence given at the trial of Veesenmayer.

2 Winkelmann’s report was dated 4th September. It was sent to Kaltenbrunner, who forwarded it to Ribbentrop on the 6th. Veesenmayer’s defence was produced at his trial. It

was dated 4th October, so he was presumably told to put it in writing after the meeting. Amongst other things he writes that he “‘fought like a lion in defence of German interests,”’ and, according

to one story produced at his trial, Ribbentrop commented, “Yes, a toothless lion.” Ribbentrop also said Veesenmayer had been bought by Jewish money (Sonnleitner’s affidavit).

2A

370 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH from the returning party, there was at first considerable excitement, for they understood the decision in favour of Szdlasi to mean that he was to be instated

almost at once. The party was hardly back in Budapest before Kovarcz, accompanied by Kemény, was round with Szalasi, to tell him that “‘the decision regarding the taking over of the power had arrived: it was to be executed within a few days.’’ He asked urgently for a copy of Szalasi’s Order of the Day, which he had to take up to Vienna and get printed for distribution _ on the Day.

Winkelmann, for that matter, apparently had the same impression, for he sent urgent messages to various of his protégés to place themselves under German protection, ‘‘since Szalasi was just about to take over the power and there was a danger that in their hatred of their rivals they would act against

them.’’ Some of the National Socialist leaders in fact took refuge in the Waffen SS. barracks. Szalasi himself was equally convinced that the decision in his favour had been unconditional (Veesenmayer never succeeded in disillusioning him on this point), and promptly set about negotiating the final arrangements for the “‘transition”’; on which point the Germans could meet him, for 1t made no difference to the arrangements whether they were mentally conceived in the future indicative or the future conditional. Thus Veesenmayer agreed with Szalasi that when (or if and when) the “‘change-over”’ took place, the two men were to go together to the Regent to arrange the formal transference of the power, which Szalasi insisted (and Veesenmayer concurred) must be effected in constitutional form.? Further, after a long struggle (Veesenmayer afterwards testified that he had had “‘to fight hard for each post’’) the list of the future Government was agreed. It was to consist of eight Arrow Cross men:

Szalasi himself (Minister President and Acting Head of State), Szdllés1 (Deputy Minister President), Baron G. Kemény (Foreign Affairs), G. Vajna

(Interior), L. Budinszky (Justice), E. Szakvari (Industry), F. Kassai (Propaganda and National Enlightenment) and E. Kovarcz (Total Mobilisation); Reményi-Schneller (Finance), Jurcsek (Supply) and Szasz (Trade and Communications) from the MEP; one National Socialist, Palffy (Agriculture); one ex-Imrédist, Rajniss (Education and Cults), and two Generals: Beregffy, who doubled the posts of Minister of Defence and Chief of the General Staff, and V. Hellebronth, who was to be in charge of “‘continuity of production.” Finally, Szalasi stipulated for a written agreement defining the terms of his “‘assumption of the responsibility.”” To this also Veesenmayer consented,

and the two men spent several hours together negotiating the text of this proleptic treaty. It was the difficulty of satisfying Szalasi which delayed the completion of this particular item, for he insisted that Germany must give most precise and inescapable guarantees of her obligation to defend Hungary,

and also made prolonged attempts to have the agreement put in a strictly symmetrical and reciprocal form. Meanwhile, the one thing that he could not get out of Veesenmayer was

a date for zero hour. Their conversations on this point grew less and less 1 Michaelis to C. A. M. * This was arranged at a meeting held immediately on Veesenmayer’s return, and attended also by Winkelmann, Krumpholz and Kovarcz. An interesting point is that Winkelmann said

that once the Regent had resigned, he must be taken to Germany, to keep him out of harm’s way. Szalasi opposed this. He said that it would only make Horthy into a martyr. He could be looked after just as well in Hungary. The Hungarist Movement would ensure his safety, and when the great war criminal trials opened, he could appear as a witness and pronounce the

verdict on himself.

HORTHY AGONISTES 371 satisfactory. Szalasi pressed for action again and again. On 7th October he was urging desperately that the Government was purposely allowing confusion to gain ground in eastern Hungary in order to have a plausible excuse for “jumping out,”’ on the ground that it could not go on fighting. It was urgently necessary to act, both for political and for military reasons, and

the military situation could not be cleared up without the political. Since the plans for the coup were all ready, they should be put into effect at once.

But Veesenmayer still hedged. He now said that the political steps must depend on the military. First there must be a military success, to create a favourable psychological atmosphere. Then, on the strength of this, the National Alliance was to take a Parliamentary initiative to force the Government to resign on a motion of non-confidence. Then either the Government would resign, ““when things would get moving and the German help come

from the rear so that such a turn would come about as would lead to the

desired result’; or it would not resign, but on the contrary arrest the sponsors

of the motion of non-confidence, and perhaps even dissolve Parliament. Then it would have shown its hand, and the plan could be carried through with the most complete moral justification. Considering that the National Alliance was rapidly developing into an instrument for keeping Szalasi out of power, he received this exposition with some impatience. And some of Veesenmayer’s other excuses could hardly be taken seriously: e.g. that the Regent would take no decisive step before the Moscow Conference was over, or perhaps not even before the U.S.A. Presidential Election, which was due on 7th November. It was hardly surprising that Szalasi lost his temper and

said that if the Germans did not trust him, they had better put him and the whole Hungarist Movement aside and make order themselves; only let them

do something, instead of letting everything go rotten with their shillyshallying. He would then organise the Hungarian nation independently of them. Even this outburst, however, failed to stir Veesenmayer into giving the signal for action. One more rather obscure event of early October requires mention. General Bakay’s Intelligence Service came on a list of the officers who were members of the KABSz, together with an exact plan, worked out by Ney, for occupying

various parts of the capital. His officers, then, on the night of the 6th/7th, arrested a group of active and reserve officers, the leader of which was a Major allegedly named Sopf-Sike (or Scheftsik), and had them imprisoned to await trial for high treason and plotting to abduct the Regent. Following this, the KABSz was officially dissolved.t It is, however, quite uncertain whether the group had been planning any immediate action, and if so whether it was acting independently or under orders from Winkelmann or Hottl. In any case, the affair seems to have been on quite a small scale* and to have

been unconnected with the Arrow Cross,* which, indeed, it benefited indirectly, for the Government seems really to have believed that by this swoop t It is characteristic of conditions in Hungary at the time that it was thought necessary to balance this by dissolving simultaneously the great Iron Workers’ Union, the Vasas. This however, was only a paper measure, and no steps were taken to implement it in practice. 2 An exultant article in Egyedil Vagyunk, 20th October 1944, describes how in the evening of the 15th the prisoners were released from jail by their comrades, assisted by some German helpers. There were only three of them: Major Sopf-Sike, a Captain and an N.C.O. According to other Press ‘‘revelations”’ the total number of persons arrested was 66. 3 One of Szalasi’s informants reported on 10th October that the investigations and arrests

by the military counter-espionage had been confined to the KABSz and its members. ‘None

of our men have been arrested.”

372 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH it had eliminated the chief danger to itself, and to have remained in ignorance of the far more formidable preparations of Brother Kovarcz.* With this brief account of the interim preparations on both sides, we may return to the fortunes of Faragho and his colleagues in Moscow. VI

The first stages of Faraghdé’s journey had gone smoothly and swiftly. As

soon as the party, which had joined up at Gacs and then waded on foot through the stream which formed the local frontier between Hungary and Slovakia, reached the rendezvous where the Russians were awaiting them, they were taken off to Zolyom and put up for the night. Another wire was sent to Moscow. On the 29th the answer came that they were expected. The next day Stalin’s own aeroplane arrived. Leaving just before midnight, the party was flown to Kiev and thence to Moscow, where they arrived at

8.30 p.m. on Ist October. Two aides-de-camp of General Kuznyecov, Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff, met them at the airport and took them, “before they had even had time to change their clothes,” straight to their chief.” Kuznyecov’s first words to the mission, however, revealed a fundamental difference between the views taken of the Hungarians’ mission by the Russians

and by the Hungarians themselves. He opened the conversation by telling his visitors that Stalin and Molotov knew of their arrival, but since the problems to be discussed were exclusively military, he had been instructed to discuss them. In the Russians’ view, in fact (and this was the attitude which they main-

tained throughout) there was no political problem to discuss. The Allies’ terms were unconditional surrender, and the very presence of the mission was proof that Hungary recognized this. The practical problem to be solved now was simply how Hungary could contribute to the defeat of the German armies in the field, and what they expected from Faraghé was that he should work out plans to this effect with the Soviet High Command. When agreement on

this was reached, it need not even wait for the conclusion of a formal

armistice. A ‘“‘preliminary armistice’? was all that was needed. It is true that they carried this conception to its logical conclusions. From the day of the mission’s arrival in Slovakia the Soviet armies had suspended active hostilities on the Fronts of all three Hungarian armies, while at the same time the British and American bombers had called off their attacks on the Hungarian cities, this giving rise, incidentally, to a revival of the rumours

that an air-borne landing by the Anglo-Saxons in West Hungary was imminent. The inactivity of the Anglo-Saxons may have been coincidental, but that of the Russians was almost certainly designed to facilitate their transactions with the Hungarian armies. Faragho, however, was so unmodern in his ideas of international law as 1 Lakatos in evidence at the Szalasi trial admitted that while he had known about the arming

of the KABSz, he had not known about Kovarcz and his band; although Bakay knew, and informed both Vattay and Lazar. 2 The following paragraphs are based partly on copies of the telegrams exchanged between Moscow and Buda, with the texts of the Notes submitted by Faraghdé at Moscow, and partly on Faragho’s article in A debreceni Feltdmadds. ‘The latter supplements the documentary evidence with valuable descriptive and background material, but discreetly passes over all reference to the

rtm Thus a good deal of reading between the lines is necessary, but, I think,

HORTHY AGONISTES 373 to be unable to understand how military co-operation between ex-belligerents

could begin before an armistice. He said that he had been sent to conclude such an armistice. Moreover, the question was not solely one of how the Hungarian armies were to facilitate the defeat of their allies by their enemies,

but also of how to secure practical fulfilment of the promises contained in Makarov’s two letters, on the strength of which, and only in faith thereof,

Horthy had sent the delegation and had written his letter to Stalin. Kuznyecov appears to have denied all knowledge of this side of the question;

whereupon Faraghé demanded a more competent negotiator. Meanwhile, he refused to hand over Horthy’s letter. Kuznyecov accordingly disappeared after the second conversation, and the Hungarians were left to kick their heels in the suburban villa in which they had been housed until Tuesday, 5th October. Then another negotiator appeared, again a soldier, but a more important one: Kuznyecov’s superior, General Antonov, the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armies. Antonov repeated _ that the most important point was to arrange the military co-operation: if this could be settled satisfactorily, the Soviet troops would be able simply to pass across Hungarian territory, without turning Hungary into a theatre of war. Faragho again insisted that he had been sent to conclude an armistice,

and Antonov retorted by asking whether the delegation was properly accredited. Faragho now handed over Horthy’s letter, repeating that it had been written in faith of the Makarov promises. The reply to this was that the letter did not constitute sufficient credentials: Moscow could not discuss armistice terms except with a properly accredited emissary. Faragho was allowed to telegraph to Buda, and did so on the same day, asking that credentials for the Delegation be despatched immediately, and suggesting as their bearer a rather obscure friend of his named Jozsef Nemes. On the following day he telegraphed again, repeating that the Soviets refused even to begin detailed conversations until a plenipotentiary had been sent and begging urgently that Nemes be sent at once, armed with the necessary powers in writing. On the 7th he sent a third wire that there would be no discussions before

the arrival of the credentials. Thus a whole long week had passed in deadlock, and during the same week other discussions along similar lines had

ended in the same way. For the Russians did not feel bound to treat the Faragho’s mission as their only channel of communication with the Hungarian armies.* Behind Marshall Zhukov’s Fourth Ukrainian Army,’ which was facing

that of Miklés, there were at the time some 35,000 Hungarian prisoners, both combatant troops and labour battalions, taken at Voronezh, who were working under their own officers, close behind the line. The Communists had been devoting great pains to indoctrinating these prisoners with their Nemes had started his career as a regular soldier, and as a cadet had been a contemporary of Faragho’s. He then had left the Army and studied painting. Rejoining in 1914, he had been taken prisoner by the Russians, learnt Russian and became an enthusiast for Russian affairs. On his return from captivity he had again left the Army and entered the Ministry of Cults. 2 The whole background of this story is exceedingly obscure. One article by T. Petho which appeared in Uj Magyarorszdg, 3rd July 1946, gives what is evidently Miklds’ account, while another, given in the Communist Szabadsdg, 14th October 1945, tells the story from the

Communist end, as known to the Hungarian officers concerned. Thirdly, a novel called Honfoglald, by B. Ilés, which appeared in instalments in the Communist Csilldg, September 1953, contains alleged extracts from a diary written by an eye-witness (a Hungarian Communist), (allegedly) reproduced verbatim. The diarist seems to be G. IIles.*

374 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH tenets. and had won over a certain number of them. including a few officers.1 On 29th September, three of these officers, led by a certain Col. Gvulai, came across the lines to Miklés and asked him to bring his army over to the Russian side. There seems, incidentally, to be little doubt that the Hungarian negotiators brought a message similar to that given by Col. Makarov to Zichy; for the chronicler of Mikldés’ story writes:

“Had the operation succeeded, the conversations leave no doubt that the question of Northern Transylvania would have been solved in a sense favourable to us.” On receiving this message. Mikldés consulted the Regent, who told him to answer the message favourably in principle, but explained that Faragho was in Moscow, where the definitive arrangements would be concluded. Vattay would send him a copy of the code which was being used for the messages between Moscow and Buda, and Miklos was to listen in and time his move-

ments accordingly. Vattay would send him a code message, with final Instructions when the time came for decisive action.?

It may be inferred that Horthy also told Miklos (as he afterwards told Faraghé—and that later message probably only confirmed earlier, verbal instructions) to arrange with the Russians to leave the occupation of Budapest

to Hungarian forces, which would have to be in the capital in sufficient strength before the signal for action was given, both to prevent the Germans from blowing up the bridges and to save the Jews from massacre at the hands

of the Germans and the Arrow Cross. For when. on 2nd October, Miklos sent over a message that he was prepared, at the appropriate moment, to stop hostilities, come over to the Russians and turn against the Germans, the Russian reply (which Mechlis, the Chief of Staff of the Russian Army Group in Galicia, sent over on the 4th) was that in that case they would release and

arm a force from among the Hungarian prisoners of war and combine this force with the Hungarian First Army into an ““Army of Liberation.” The Russians would supply this army with air cover and armour of their own, and would allow it to make the advance on Budapest and defend the capital while they themselves marched direct on Esztergom. But this message also was based on the assumption that once the military arrangements were completed there was nothing more to wait for; for Miklos was told to act at once, and “‘arrest’’ the six German Divisions sandwiched

in among the Hungarian troops. Miklos replied that he must wait for the Regent’s final authorisation before acting. Nevertheless, he began retreating on the night of the 7th December, telling General Algyay-Papp, who was commanding his rearguard, not to attack the Russians unless he was himself attacked, which did not occur, since the Russians let the Hungarians retire unmolested. There had been no similar negotiations on the Second Army Front, but a similar result had been reached in practice without them. The Transylvanian

Committee had been serious in its threat to “‘jump out” independently if 1 For details, see Kallai, op. cit. pp. 227 f. * Miklos ap. Petho, loc. cit. appears to attribute the initiative to himself, but the Szabadsdg article attributes it to the Hungarian P.O.W. officers, whose leader was a certain G. Illes (afterwards editor of the Communist Szabad Szd). I prefer to think that the first message came from that side; but the Hungarians can obviously not have been acting without authorisation. ° G. Teleki (who had it from Miklos) to C. A. M. The code, incidentally, never arrived.

HORTHY AGONISTES 375 Hungary failed to do so; Béla Teleki had actually returned from Budapest

(an action which was reckoned highly to his credit") to help carry the operation through if, as he expected, Faraghd’s mission failed.2 Their determination was strengthened by wireless reports, purporting to emanate

from Bari, of peace negotiations in progress. A representative of the Commuttee* went to Veress’ H.Q. on the 6th and asked Veress and his Chief of Staff to agree to retire to Zilah, on the western edge of Transylvania, so

that Kolozsvar should escape bombing. Veress agreed to this, and on the night of the 7th the Second Army began to move back, the German Sixth Army retiring with it. The Russians let these forces, also, retire unmolested. By this time it was two days since Faragho had sent off his first message, but the communications between Moscow and Buda had been delayed by an unfortunate factor which, as we shall see, also operated with disastrous effect at a later stage: the parties engaged on coding and decoding, at both ends of

the line, were amateurs, and mistakes occurred either in the encoding of Faragho’s first wires in Moscow, or in the decoding of them in Buda. Horthy’s first wire, despatched on the 7th, was thus a request for repetition of Faragho’s first three telegrams; this request crossing two other messages from Faragho which explained his vain endeavours to make his point about Makarov’s promises. It was only on the 8th that Horthy was able to answer the substance of Faraghdé’s messages, and by that time the military situation had changed again. On the 6th the Soviets, who had employed the interval usefully in bringing up further forces from Wallachia to the Arad-Temesvar front, had suddenly renewed their attacks against this, the weakest point of

the Hungaro-German defences. On that day Gyoma, Endréd, Gyula and Mako were taken, and by the evening of the 7th most of the Yugoslav Banat, up to the line of the Tisza, was in Russian hands. The left wing of the Soviet

armies now began a drive across the Tisza. The right wing turned north, not as a rule attempting to cross the Tisza, the passages of which at Csongrad

and Szolnok the Germans held in some force, but occupying Hodmezévasarhely, Szentes and Mezoétur on the 8th. The Soviet forces in this region thus formed a broad line running from the south-west to the south-east of Debrecen—the focal point of the German and Hungarian communications between the armies in Transylvania and Ruthenia and their bases.

On the 7th the Western Allies recommenced their air offensive, and although the capital was spared again, a fleet of several hundred American bombers appeared and bombed Szombathely, Ersekujvar, Komarom and Gyor. This should have facilitated Hungary’s surrender, for strong Soviet forces

were now almost within striking range of Pest. Moreover, the Germans, in the face of this danger, at last moved up the bulk of the troops which had 1 So Szalasi records in his diary. * Béla Teleki to C. A. M. 3 Vasarhelyi (the last Féispan of Kolozsvar) to C. A.M. This is a remarkable story, for M. Vasarhelyi, an entirely serious and responsible person, informs the writer categorically that at

6 a.m. on 2nd, 3rd and 4th October the Bari radio read out a statement that Hungary was

negotiating in Moscow, which had laid down the following conditions: ‘‘The Government to be democratised. The Regent to remain, for the time. The Army must turn against the Germans. Allied prisoners of war to be freed. War criminals to be prosecuted, but the decision on the war

guilt of the Hungarian State to be reserved for later.” I have received equally categorical assurances, in response to enquiries, not only that no such message was ever sent out from Bari but that Bari had no early morning transmission. The station involved must have been some other one, but I cannot trace it. 4 Va4sarhelyi (the emissary in question) to C. A. M,

376 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH been surrounding the capital. The 13th Armoured left Orkény for Szolnok,

where it arrived on the evening of the 6th. Next day the three armoured divisions which had been “‘resting’’ west of Buda started off towards the Debrecen front, leaving the environs of the capital practically bare of German troops, except for the 22nd SS. and Skorzeny’s commandos. On the other hand, the same armoured divisions constituted a substantial screen between the First and Second Hungarian Armies and the capital, and a new armoured division appeared behind them; on its way to the Front, but not yet well clear of Budapest.t It was further believed that the arrival of the reinforcements had once

again altered the balance of forces at the Front. The information in possession of the Hungarian General Staff at the time was that there were in Transylvania only weak Roumanian units, which the Hungarian Second and German Eighth Armies would be able to hold with part of their forces, leaving the remainder free to face round to the south and join up with the German Sixth and Hungarian Third on their right. Opposite these, 1t was thought, the Soviet forces were in no great strength; they were estimated at 15 weak divisions, with no reserves behind them nearer than Focsani and Bucharest. Thus the German and Hungarian Command believed that with the help of the newly arrived reinforcements, added to the existing armies, it would be

possible to break up the Soviet attack, surrounding and cutting off the advanced units south of Debrecen, and restore the whole line down to the Iron Gates. The Yugoslav partisan forces in the south were not taken very seriously, and it was still believed that the Weichs Army would get back in time to prevent any serious threat from developing from that quarter. On top of all this, all Horthy’s carefully laid plans for the home front were suddenly thrown into confusion by a remarkable coup which, someone or other—exactly who has remained to this day a closely guarded secret!— effected at dawn on the 8th. General Bakay, the key man of Budapest’s

defences, was returning in the foggy small hours from a night tour of inspection to the Duna Palota hotel, where he had his headquarters, when a band of men leaped out from the shadows, dazzling him by shining torches into his eyes and disappeared with him, and incidentally with all his papers, including the all-important plans for the defence of Budapest.? This was a most effective blow, for Bakay’s position had been a very personal one. Not only was he implicitly trusted by the Regent but he was also a man of iron will and of great authority, and, moreover, a very senior officer. There was simply no one to replace him. Hardy was offered the job, but refused it. The Regent then thought of Farkas, who was, however, at the Front. As a provisional measure, Aggteleki, who had been in charge

of the I Corps before Bakay took it over, was reappointed to the Corps 1 A report in the Szalasi Diary, dated the 11th, shows four German armoured divisions at the Front and a fifth just arrived outside Budapest. I make the four the 13th and the three which I describe here as “‘starting off’ on the 7th. On the 12th, Csatay reported one armoured division near Budapest; this I identify with the ‘‘new arrival” in my text (‘‘fifth’’ of this note).

> A passage in the Szalasi Diary shows that Szalasi had foreknowledge of the coup. AS planned, not only Bakay but also Hardy was to be “‘eliminated,”’ and the operation was going

to be carried through by “‘persons who belonged to the most immediate staffs of the two Generals and were always with them . . . very valuable officers who would play a great part in the Hungarist movement of National Reconstruction.” It was thus almost certainly planned by Kovarcz, although he probably had German help; Winkelmann knew of it (Min. Trial, p. 26160), but Veesenmayer was told only after the event. Hardy escaped (until 15th October) because he took the Precaution of always travelling armed, and only in the company of his chauffeur, who

HORTHY AGONISTES 377 Command; but he was not given general charge of the home defences, Hardy and Temesvari remaining in independent charge of their local units; nor did Horthy take him into his confidence about his secret negotiations. Finally,

someone, taking advantage of the interregnum, succeeded in interfering effectively with the plans for bringing further forces back to the capital. The 10th Division was actually sent forward from the First Army reserve to

join the VI Corps on the Carpathian Front, and the battalion of Danube mine-sweeping troops from Ujvidék, which had got as far as Ercsi, was sent across to Szabadka. Thus the meagre defences of the capital were not only disorganised but also greatly weakened. Thus when, on the 8th, Horthy did succeed in answering the substance

of Faraghd’s messages, his answer was a hesitant one. It was that his intention to concludé an armistice was fixed, and that Faragho’s credentials were in order. But he was to ask for communication of the conditions before any plenipotentiary powers could be given to sign the acceptance, and the arrival of “large-scale German reinforcements” would necessitate delay. When Faragho passed on the essentials of this message, the Allies did,

however, at last condescend to treat him as a diplomatic negotiator. At midnight on the 8th/9th the delegation was summoned to the Kremlin, where M. Molotov, speaking in the name of Great Britain and the U.S.A. as well as the U.S.S.R., informed them of the Allies’ “‘preliminary conditions,”’ as follows:

Hungary to evacuate all Slovak, Roumanian and Yugoslav territories

beyond the frontiers of 3lst December 1937. All troops and civilian authorities to be withdrawn. The evacuation to begin forthwith and to be completed within ten days, as from the date of reception by the Hungarian Government of the Note. An inter-Allied Commission under Soviet chairmanship to supervise the evacuation. Hungary to break off all relations with Germany and to declare war on her immediately. The Soviet Government, it was added, was prepared to help Hungary with its military forces. If Hungary accepted these conditions, the Allies were prepared to discuss with her the conditions of an armistice (which would still have to be signed by an accredited plenipotentiary) which would be drafted in Moscow by a Commission on which all three Allies could be represented. If not, ‘‘there was nothing more to be said.” This communication came as a deep shock to the delegation. In the first

place, its conditions were completely and dismally at variance with the promises contained in the Makarov letters. In the second place, they imposed an obligation which was entirely unprecedented in the history of international law—except, indeed, that the same obligation had been accepted by Roumania a few weeks earlier: to wit, that of declaring war against an ally, and even commencing active hostilities against it, not as the result of an armistice but as a condition preliminary to the conclusion of an armistice; since what was offered was not even an armistice proper but a “preliminary armistice.”

The delegation does not seem to have argued the latter point at all exhaustively; but Faraghé invoked the Makarov letters with all the vigour at his command in a discussion which was prolonged for three full hours. He was simply told that the Allies had no cognisance of the promises. When he protested that they had been given to the Regent in writing, that Horthy had sent his emissaries on the faith of them, and that “‘the facility with which

378 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Colonel Makarov arranged the crossing of the frontier and the transportation by air of the Hungarian delegation to Moscow seemed to show that his action

was authorised,’ he was rated for having tried to make conditions. The only basis which the Allies would consider was that of unconditional surrender. He replied that he was not making conditions: he was invoking promises which had been volunteered. Same reply; and he was ordered—if he wished matters to proceed at all—to inform the Regent that the Soviet Government considered the Makarov promises to be null and void. At3a.m. on the 9th he bowed to the inevitable and went away to telegraph the terms to the Regent.

We now come to an important point in our history of errors. The record of the correspondence shows two telegrams going from Budapest to Moscow on the 9th or immediately after. At 6.15 p.m. Horthy wired that an important communication would be sent at 11 p.m., and at 0.20 a.m. on the 10th he wired:

“Conclusion of armistice desirable. Authorisation to sign given. Prepared to carry out stipulated co-operation. Major Nemes starting with written authorisation via Kérésmez6 (Ladomer line under observation). Please communicate conditions urgently before signing.”’ Faragho took this latter message as signifying acceptance of his wire of the morning,! but this was not in fact the case. Horthy’s two wires were in reality answers to Faragho’s earlier communication of the 7th. The search for Nemes appears to have been delayed by some difficulty in identifying and locating him, but at 5.30 p.m. on the 9th Colonel Kudar found him in his flat? and ordered him to go up immediately to the Var and there to report to the Regent’s adjutant, Tost. Tost then asked him whether he was pre-

pared to undertake a very dangerous mission which might cost him his life: to carry an important document to Moscow. On Nemes’ consenting, he was told to go back home and wait for further orders. The result of this conversation was the wire sent just after midnight; in which the words ‘authorisation to sign given’’ certainly mean that Nemes had been handed the credentials for the Delegation. Faragho’s all-important wire of the 9th can only have arrived, or at any rate can only have been deciphered, fairly late in the evening, and Horthy took no action on it that day. It was only on the morning of the 10th? that he called together Lakatos, Hennyey, Csatay, V6rdés, Vattay and Ambroézy to debate what answer should be sent. By that time the military situation had taken another turn for the worse. The Soviet forces north of the Maros turned out to be much stronger than had been believed: not I5 divisions but 25. The advances of 8th October were continued on the 9th. In the south the left wing of Malinovsky’s army was across the Tisza and moving forward almost unopposed (it took Szeged on the 11th and Szabadka on the 12th). His right wing drove up the left bank of the river almost as far as Debrecen, cutting the communications between that city and Szolnok, and thence Budapest. The German divisions on the right wing of the Eighth Army tried to carry out a counter-attack round

Nagyvarad, but were thrown back in confusion, effecting nothing. It was * Géza Teleki told C. A. M. that when the delegation sent a wire by day they got the answer back in three hours or so. * A debreceni Feltamadas, pp. 129 f. (a narrative based on Nemes’ own diary). 3 Hennyey to C. A. M.

HORTHY AGONISTES 379 not the Russians who were threatened with encirclement, but the whole of the German and Hungarian forces, except the Hungarian Third and German Sixth, who still had a clear road back to Budapest. The Hungarian Second and the German Eighth, which were not yet clear of the Transylvanian foothills, and even the Hungarian First, which was still retreating down the valleys of Ruthenia, with the six German divisions in the same area, were in imminent danger of being cut off and surrounded. If Debrecen fell, the only line of retreat left to them—if they could get back to it—was that running through Miskolcz. Thus already on the 9th the G.O.C. commanding the Heeresgruppe Stid ordered the troops under his command to fall back from Transylvania and Ruthenia and told V6rdés that he was proposing to the German High Command to take up a new defensive line running from the Dukla pass south-westward to Budapest, thence to the eastern tip of Lake Balaton, and from the western tip of the lake, southward through Nagykanizsa to Fiume. He asked V6r6s to agree to this plan. Meanwhile, Debrecen was to be held as long as possible, at any rate until the troops east and north-east of the city had had time to extricate themselves. Battle was, in fact, joined in the

Debrecen area, where it continued to rage with great fury and varying fortunes for the next four or five days. This was the position which confronted the little company which met on the 10th. Horthy (or Ambrozy) reported the gist of Faraghdo’s message, giving the Allies’ “‘preliminary conditions.” All of them, naturally, found

the communication indescribably disappointing, but Lakatos, at least, favoured acceptance, because, according to his own account, they had no alternative, and if they delayed accepting, the whole First Army would be cut off and lost anyway.” He proposed, therefore, that the conditions be accepted, but the Russians be asked to halt their advance opposite the Third Army front, as otherwise the First Army would be unable to get back, and the Hungarian forces would be physically unable to attack the Germans. At 0.30 a.m. on the 11th, accordingly, a message went off that Hungary accepted the “‘preliminary armistice conditions” and asked for the earliest possible opening of the detailed discussions on the armistice proper, transmitting at the same time Lakatos’ request for the Soviet advance to be halted.

Nothing must leak out until Hungarian troops had reached Budapest in sufficient numbers to prevent a German putsch and a pogrom.

On the 10th, Faragho had had another conversation with Molotov, in the course of which he appears to have made a last vain appeal to the Makarov letters. At 3 a.m. on the 11th, then, he received Horthy’s wire accepting the pre-armistice conditions, and after decoding it, took it round at once to Molotov, who received him at 4a.m. As he reported at 6.30 a.m., “the atmosphere became warmly friendly.”” Molotov pointed out that the presence of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden assured that matters would be conducted seriously and quickly. He asked Horthy to repeat his acceptance of the conditions, repeating what those conditions were, and to send his 1 These details about the German proposals are taken chiefly from the Szalasi Diary. Szalasi’s spy “Ede” reported on the proposal on the 10th, and also reported that a Crown Council had accepted it. This is obviously a mistake, since another part of the same work—Vajna’s report of the meeting of the Parliamentary Defence Committee (of which he was himself a member) held on the 12th—only shows Csatay as mentioning the proposal as something that the Germans had suggested as a course which might perhaps have to be followed. It is clear from the course of that meeting that the Hungarian Government had not agreed; indeed, Csatay spoke (on the 12th) as though it might still be possible to hold large parts of East Hungary. ® Szalasi Trial, p. 134.

380 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH plenipotentiary immediately. Faragho sent off these requests at 6.30 a.m. on the 11th, and at 6 p.m. on the same afternoon sent another message which reflected at once the Russians’ haste to put the agreement into effect and the genuine understanding of the Hungarians’ wishes which they showed through-

out the negotiations! He asked which Hungarian troops could reach Budapest, in what time, from what quarter? What were the numbers and dispositions of the German troops in the capital and the vicinity? How were the Jews behaving, “‘because this was very important’? Was the Government still in Budapest? Had the evacuation of the areas outside the Trianon

frontiers begun? What proposals had Hungary to make regarding the direction, method and strength of the military help which she required?

At 10.30 p.m. Horthy replied to the wire of 6.30 a.m. with detailed acceptance of the preliminary conditions. He also said that Nemes was starting next morning. But even before this wire had arrived, the Allies had taken another fateful step. At 7 p.m. Molotov called the delegation to him. Dekanazov and Kuznyecov were in the room. Molotov explained that there was no need to wait for Nemes before signing the preliminary agreement; and this was duly signed, two copies in French and two in Russian, at 7.57 p.m., llth October. The telegram communicating the fact of the acceptance went off at 9.30 p.m. ‘““We signed the preliminary conditions,” it said, “at 8 p.m. They have accepted the Regent’s request and are halting the advance of the Russian

troops for one or two days as from midnight. They have agreed that Hungarian troops should be sent to Budapest. They will tell me which Hungarian Commander must go over the Front to which Russian Commander to discuss details... .” We call this step fateful because it created a situation which was inter-

preted quite differently in Moscow and in Budapest. The Russians supposed that Hungary was now committed to immediate action in the sense of the agreement which she had signed. It remained only for the practical details to be arranged, i.e. for Marshal Malinovsky (who was in charge of these at the Russian end) to work out his dispositions and issue his orders. The armistice proper, which the diplomats would conclude in due course when they found the leisure to do so, would be a quite different document (the Russian idea of an armistice, as it emerges from the history of the period, resembled much more what Western writers call a preliminary peace). The Hungarians, at least those in Budapest, saw the matter differently. All of them present at the meeting on the 10th must then have understood that the “preliminary armistice conditions” stipulated that Hungary would have to withdraw within the Trianon frontiers, turn against the Germans, etc. But they still believed that these obligations would enter into force only when the armistice proper was signed. And Horthy, at least, hoped that before signing, the delegation would be able to secure revision of the terms. Indeed, Horthy was not giving Faragho himself absolutely plenipotentiary terms: he ‘ Not only did the Soviet commanders adapt their operations in every practicable way to Faragho’s request, but M. Molotov, as Faragho reported, showed full appreciation of Horthy’s point that the presence of Hungarian troops in Budapest at zero hour was necessary to prevent a massacre of the Jews. > According to G. Teleki, he personally advised Molotov not to accept this condition, as he

thought it would give the Germans time to attack. Dekanazov went out and consulted Mr. Eden, who was in the next room (G. T. heard their voices). He then returned and spoke to Molotov. who told the Hungarians that the condition was granted. Faraghd, on his own Initiative, had further asked for the bombing of Budapest to stop, and this request also was granted.

HORTHY AGONISTES 381 had stipulated that he was to be consulted before authorising the final signature.! Faragho’s wire of the 11th (received in Budapest early on the 12th) did

not alter Horthy’s view of the situation in any essential respect. He still understood the agreement as having been only “‘initialled,” so that the possibility of revision still remained open. Moreover, as he writes explicitly in his own memoirs, the “preliminary agreement’ did not provide for a date; on the contrary, this point was left for ‘‘further negotiation.’ Possibly Hennyey or Lakatos might have taken a different view of the position had they been more fully informed. But Horthy does not seem to have seen either of them on either the 12th or the 13th, and Ambrézy, who was now in general charge of the negotiations, seems also to have kept his counsel. There is, at any rate, first-hand evidence that it was not until nearly midnight on the 15th that any of the Ministers knew that the “‘preliminary armistice’ had been signed at all.’ It was with Ambrozy, again, that Horthy worked out his final programme, which, again, he did not communicate either to his Ministers or to his partners in negotiation. It would appear that the signal for action was to be given by

receipt of the news that the armistice terms had been definitely agreed.’ Then, before finally authorising the signature, he would tell the nation of his intentions by a proclamation on the wireless, which at this time he still meant to read himself, and also inform Veesenmayer. When the armistice had been signed, Miklés and Veress would be told, by a code order, what action they had to take. Heszlény was to be left out, as it was assumed that he would not obey an order to turn against the Germans.° The only item in this list which was quite ready, even in Horthy’s own view, was his Proclamation, which had been in draft for something like a fortnight,® and even that was not ready in the sense of having been fixed into

the scheme of things to the general satisfaction. Horthy regarded it as a personal statement by himself of the reasons which led him as Supreme War Lord to ask for an armistice. It had no legal significance, and thus did not require the Minister President’s counter-signature. He had shown the draft to Lakatos, but simply as a matter of courtesy. Lakatos had not altogether liked the draft,’ which consisted largely of complaints of Germany’s conduct towards Hungary, and had also failed to understand that Horthy regarded it as a purely personal statement. He had expected to be required to counter-sign it, and consequently supposed that it 1 These points have been made absolutely clear to me by both Horthy and Hennyey. 2 Op. cit., p. 282. 3 See below, pp. 398, 420. 4 Here, and in the later passages dealing with the subject, I have assumed that when, on the 15th, Hennyey sent out a request for an armistice, via the Swedish and Turkish Legations, he did so without Horthy’s knowledge and himself in ignorance of the pre-armistice. This assumes an absurd situation, but makes the action taken logical. 5 The tenses used in the Proclamation show that this was the order originally envisaged.

6 This dates the decision to draft the Proclamation, and even the composition of the first draft of it, much earlier than has usually been supposed. But Ambrozy told Hlatky at the end of September that the Proclamation was ready, and that Lakatos had seen it and disliked it. Ambrézy offered to show it to Hlatky, who, however, he said he preferred not to see it, so that the Press Section could not be blamed if there was any leakage afterwards. MHlatky is quite positive on the date of Ambr6ézy’s communication to him: it was within a day or two either way of the 30th September. According to one informant (Harsanyi), the first draft was composed by an official in the Foreign Ministry called Henrik Nives. 7 He thought the recriminations undignified and also said that if Germany had treated Hungary so badly as all that, she ought to have revolted long before. (Hlatky to C. A. M.)

382 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH would be submitted to him, and indeed to the Cabinet, before it went out. On the Day, as we shall see, the absence of the counter-signature caused some delays, while the fact that the Ministers were expecting to be consulted further before the decisive step of the issue of the Proclamation was taken, contributed to the misunderstandings in which that day proved so rich.

Horthy, however, being unaware of Lakatos’ ideas, regarded the Proclamation as settled. All the other items on the programme obviously required preliminary action. and Horthy took such action in many directions on the 12th. Nemes, who had been warned the night before to report in the morning at Miklos’ flat, was put in a car and started off for Huszt, where he was to receive his further orders. Mikldés and Veress, both of whom had been called back to Budapest, were informed by Vattay, who for reasons of secrecy had (to the extreme annoyance of both Lakatos and Vérés) been put in charge of this side of the arrangements, that on receipt of a code message running ‘“‘Order

of lst March 1920 to be executed,” they were to make contact with the Russians, wherever they were, and turn their arms against the Germans. The two Generals were then sent back to their armies. Vorés was told to order the retreat of the First and Second Armies, and according to his own account,! composed ‘‘a long written memorandum” to the German High Command, in which he pointed out the danger in which those armies now stood of being cut off by the Soviet troops, and pleaded that they should be withdrawn to the Tisza-Bodrog-Meszeg line. The VI Corps (10th and 24th Divisions) and the Hussars should be brought back to Budapest immediately and should form a “‘bridgehead”’ for the defence of the capital, together with one (German) armoured division.?, When the Germans rejected these proposals, saying unkindly that they meant to defend Budapest themselves, V6rds sent the orders in defiance of them.’ Farkas, who was to be in charge of the bridgehead, was ordered to return to Budapest on the 13th. His Corps was to follow “‘as fast as possible.’’* Similar orders should have been sent to the Cavalry division, but for some reason, this was

not done.° ;

This completed the military arrangements proper which Horthy could

make; although it may be added that he seems still to have been hoping, even

at this hour, that an air-borne landing by the Western Allies could still be

fitted into the scheme. At 10 p.m. on the 11th we find him radioing to Moscow that he could get no contact with Naday in Rome, and that his wireless messages to Italy remained unanswered, and asking Faragho to arrange for resumption of contact. There also seems reason to suppose that 1 As given at the Crown Council of the 15th and recorded by Barczy. - Sic. This was presumably the division “just arrived’’ on the 11th (see above, p. 375, n. 1.) Exactly why Voros suggested this, considering that everyone else was trying to get the German armoured forces away from Budapest, is obscure. 3 The order sent to Miklos, which puzzled him completely, especially when taken in conjunction with the message to Farkas, was to “‘begin disengaging movement, continue to resist the Russians” (Elszakadasi mozdulasokot megkezdeni; oroszokkal tovabb ellenallani). (G. Teleki, who had it from Miklos, to C. A. M.) 4 The message to Farkas, as recorded by him in his diary and kindly transmitted to C. A. M., ran: ‘The VI Corps is to be moved to Budapest. The General Officer Commanding to return

on the 13th, accompanied by one staff officer, and to report for further instructions to the Operational Section of G.H.Q. The remainder of the staff, after arranging for the withdrawal of the troops, to return by car on the 15th.” > When Utassy called in at their H.Q. at Kecskemét at noon on the 13th, on his journey to Szeged, he found them just preparing to move up the line, to reinforce Heszlényi. They had received no orders to return to Budapest. (Szemes to C. A. M.)

HORTHY AGONISTES 383 Faragho’s suggestions for the combined operations included a landing by the Western Powers!; but we have no record of how that suggestion was received, or whether the Soviets took any steps to implement it.” The military arrangements for the defence of the capital were left un-

altered, pending the arrival of Farkas. But simultaneously with his negotiations with the Allies, Horthy had made one move in another field which interlocked with his other preparations. On the 10th the Resistance leaders in touch with Vérés had petitioned

him to arrange a meeting between them and the Regent. When Vorés passed this message on to Horthy, the Regent agreed without the slightest hesitation—indeed, he wanted the meeting to take place immediately, and when told this was impracticable, suggested the following morning, which was also vetoed on grounds of security. Finally, Tildy and Szakasits were conveyed to the Palace by secret routes after nightfall on the 11th. The Resistance leaders, before setting out, had hurriedly agreed on a programme, which was simply a repetition of their previous demands, with the added request that Horthy should appoint a Government of the “‘National Independence Front,” preceded, if necessary, by a transition Cabinet, under Bethlen. They found the Regent completely amenable, except as regards the immediate appointment of the Government. He thought this impracticable

at the moment, although agreeing that such a Government would have to be formed in the future. For the rest, he readily agreed to release the political

prisoners and to arm “‘reliable workers.’ He told them further that he entirely shared their view about the necessity of ending the war. He had, in fact, taken a final decision on the point. The preparations to give effect to

it were far advanced, and the decisive step would probably come in the following week. The rest of the conversation was, by all accounts, unsensational and rather

typical,? but at any rate left the participants well pleased with one another? and prepared to carry out their respective pledges with goodwill. Horthy told Vladar to have the main political prisoners taken to the Gyiitofoghaz, in the outskirts of Budapest (this he did the next day); while the arrangements for arming the workers were left to Lazar, and to the representatives of the Resistance Movement. These arrangements appear to have been concluded the following day.

They were that when the First and Second Armies (or more probably the : VI Corps) were approaching Budapest, Lazar was to hand out arms to the 1 Faragho’s telegram No. 16, dated 6.30 p.m. on the 13th, lists the suggestions made by him: that the Soviets should stop the bombing of Budapest and should ask the Anglo-Saxons to do likewise;

that Roumanian troops should be kept separate from Hungarians, who should only come into contact with Yugoslavs; further ‘“‘parachutists in Bakony and a break-through from the North

towards Vac, Esztergom and Parkany.”” The break-through on the Vac-Esztergom line was what the Russians had themselves proposed to Mikl6s, but they had not mentioned parachutists to him. The Bakony was the area where Western agents had hitherto been accustomed to land. 2 The correspondence of the Delegation shows that the request was forwarded, but does not record any reply.

3 Tildy afterwards told the writer that the deputation hardly opened its collective mouth: ' Horthy did nearly all the talking. It was widely reported that he had warned his auditors against introducing land reform, but this is not strictly true; he warned them against letting themselves be forced into it (kényszer hatasa alatt) and pointed out—what was true enough—that Hungary did not contain sufficient land to provide every family of its agricultural population with a viable smallholding. (E. Dessewffy to C. A. M.) 4 Szakasits, who, according to Tildy (to C. A. M.), behaved at the meeting with “‘unexampled servility’—and incidentally had held up the start to the Var while he sought to borrow a morning

coat—said afterwards that “‘this meeting with a truly great statesman had been an elevating experience.”’ The Regent found his interlocutors “‘quite decent men.”

384 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH “reliable workers.’’ Some of these arms were to be issued to the Jewish Labour Battalions, while the distribution of the rest was entrusted by the Resistance Movement to Jozsef Palffy and Marquis Pallavacini, representing

respectively the Christian Democrats and the Legitimists. The day that the troops reached the capital, the workers were to stage a general strike and

demonstration against the war. The troops would turn out, nominally against the workers, but would in reality join hands with them against the Germans and the Arrow Cross. It was in the favourable situation which, it was hoped, would result that the Regent was to announce the conclusion of the armistice.t The Resistance leaders were to draft a proclamation to the workers calling on them to strike, and Lazar promised, when the time arrived, to send across final instructions, to be added to the Proclamation, saying when and where the arms were to be issued. This should be the place to put our description of the action taken by the Resistance leaders on the 13th and 14th to have everything ready for instant

action on the Day; but unfortunately, there is little to describe. Tildy and Szakasits duly reported on their audience to the Committee of the Re-

sistance. The Catholic leaders of the movement (and presumably the Marxists also) warned their group leaders to stand ready; and some of the latter arranged rendezvous where their groups should meet and receive leaflets or arms, but no general signal was pre-arranged for the workers to turn out in case of emergency. The members of the innermost ring of all seems to have devoted themselves solely to the fascinating task of drawing up their Proclamation, and even with this they did not hurry, expecting as they did that there would be time to put the finishing touches when Lazar’s instructions arrived. ‘These, of course, were not sent, as the notification was to be a last-moment affair. All Horthy’s preparations, would, of course, take time, for Nemes himself could hardly reach Moscow in less than two or three days, after which would

come the final negotiations on the armistice terms.2 Nor could the VI Corps be expected to arrive in very much under a week. Horthy himself appears, at this date, to have put the probable date of the Proclamation at the 18th. But it is a most unfortunate fact that through some misunderstanding or other the Russians were not informed of this.* They, meanwhile, were working on quite a different time-table, which probably envisaged the volte-face of the Hungarian Army for the 14th at the very latest. At 2.30 a.m. on the 12th Faragho had sent word that a senior officer was to go 1 Szava in A Reakcid Ellen is the only source to give the details of the proposed cooperation between the strikers and the troops, and to show that the strike was meant as a prelude to the proclamation, but he seems to me authoritative. 2 In fact, he spent the whole of the 12th on the road, arriving at Huszt only in the evening. On the 13th Miklos handed him a sealed evelope containing his orders and put him across the line, but he arrived in Moscow, eventually, only at 2.30 a.m. on the 15th. 3 According to Szava, Lazar told the Resistance to be ready to strike on the 17th. Horthy himself (loc. cit.) writes the 20th.

* Horthy writes (loc. cit.) that he had a wireless message sent telling the Russians of the kidnapping of Bakay and of his intention to bring the agreement into force on the 20th. But the record of the correspondence (which is indubitably complete, since each message was numbered) shows that no such intimation was sent; moreover, a Note from Faraghdo shows that it was only from Nemes, when he arrived on the 15th, that the Delegation learnt of the kidnapping of Bakay. It seems necessary to conclude that Horthy’s memory js at fault, and that the message about the date was not sent by wireless, but was given to Nemes.

HORTHY AGONISTES 385 immediately across the lines to Szeged ‘“‘to discuss details.” Meanwhile, the Soviet troops would not attack on that Front, from which the Hungarians could withdraw all their troops. But, by misfortune, both this wire and Faragho’s earlier message demanding information on the dispositions of the German and Hungarian troops arrived in mutilated form, and had to be repeated. At 4.30 a.m. on the 13th Horthy had reported, in reply to agitated enquiries, that the emissary to Szeged, Col. Utassy, who had been hurriedly

and (as the event was to prove) inadequately briefed at midnight, was starting at dawn; and later, that he had crossed the lines at noon. But this

was still twenty-four hours later than the Russians had expected, and the : delay had put them in an ill-humour and made them suspicious of the Hungarians’ good faith.

Finally, the list of dispositions of German and Hungarian troops, for which Faragho had asked earlier, went off only—to Moscow—at 11.20 p.m. on the 13th. Marshal Malinovsky’s not unreasonable irritation was, then,

strongly enhanced by another unfortunate circumstance. He had loyally halted his advance on the Tisza in order to enable the Hungarians to retire. But the Hungarian commander on this front was precisely Heszlényi, who, as we have seen, had not been initiated into Horthy’s plans; and Heszlényi promptly took advantage of the lull to attack the Russian positions at Szentes. At this point we must turn back again to the German side of the story. Vil

While Horthy was exchanging mutually misleading telegrams with Faraghdé, Veesenmayer had been largely occupied in negotiating with Szalasi the written agreement on which the P.V. insisted. After prolonged argument, this was at last signed on the 11th, in the following form!:

(a) The P.V. is in the eyes of the Fiihrer the only responsible man in Hungary. (b) Hungary is a free, sovereign and independent state, which acquires its freedom, sovereignty and independence by virtue of fighting for them and in the measure in which it does so. (c) Hungary is, from the point of view of the German High Command,

no area in which Germany fights to gain time, but a bastion which forms an integral part of every decision of the German High Command and for which Germany fights as decisively as she does for Western Germany or for East Prussia. But Veesenmayer did not regard even this agreement as committing him unconditionally to instal Szalasi in power, still less as binding him to carry through the “‘transference’’ immediately. He kept the P.V. safely mewed up in his protective custody, and in fact the two men did not meet after the 11th until the afternoon of the 15th (during which interval the history of the Arrow Cross is a blank). The German was even still prepared to do a deal with Lakatos: and the Szalasi Diary records, with some natural irritation, that on the 12th he had made Lakatos fresh proposals, as follows: 1 By a remarkable error this text was published in the Hungarian Press of 18th October as an introduction to the ‘“‘Plan of National Reconstruction’’—a blunder which necessitated republishing the Plan, without the introduction, on the following day.

2B

386 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH (1) The Regent and the Government to issue a proclamation to the Hungarian people calling on them to fight to the last in the spirit of

brotherhood in arms with Germany.

(2) The Jewish question to be finally solved. (3) Persecution of the Right to stop. (4) All outstanding questions to be finally threshed out at a conference attended by Veesenmayer, Winkelmann, Greiffenberg and H6ttl on the German side, and persons of equal authority on the Hungarian. (5) The Germans would show Hungary the amount of confidence which she earned by her actions. So far, said Veesenmayer, the record of the Lakatos Government was inferior to that of Sztdjay.

Veesenmayer left Lakatos free whether he informed Szdsz and the National Alliance of these proposals; to which, it may be added, Lakatos seems to have returned evasive answers, although promising to arrange the meeting for 15th October. Veesenmayer was now pinning high hopes on the ‘“‘National Alliance,” the formation of which, with the names of the officers and Executive Com-

mittee,’ were announced on the 12th. The Press communiqué conveying this news further declared that:

‘‘the country can and must be defended against all enemies, together with

our only faithful ally. The Alliance is ready and resolved to draw the full consequences of the continuation of the war and the maintenance of internal order.” On the same day, Tasnadi-Nagy was sent, in the name of the Alliance, to the

Regent to warn him “that the Constitution required him to consult and concert with Parliament in taking any steps of vital import to the nation,” while the officers and the other members of the Executive Committee waited on Lakatos, who called in Hennyey and Csatay to support him.

Of Tasnadi-Nagy’s audience with the Regent, the accounts conflict. Vajna said at his trial? that Horthy had replied that he was aware how serious these questions were: the Deputies might be reassured that he would

not take any decisive step before first hearing the views of Parliament. Horthy, however, denied having given this assurance.® We have fuller accounts of the meeting between the deputation and the

Ministers. It was stormy. Szasz began by explaining the programme of the Alliance. Lakatos countered by asking: (a) why the body had been brought into being, not only without his knowledge but behind his back—a proof that it was directed against the Regent and the Government; and (d) how they thought the war could be continued without arms or an army? * The officers of the Alliance were the following: President, L. Sz4sz; Vice-Presidents, F. Rajniss and J. Szdlldsi; Executive Committee, O. Andrejka, L. Baky, L. Bardossy, K. Bocsary, F. Hamm, B. Homan, L. Huszovszky, A. Jaross, M. Kolosvary-Borcsa, B. Marton, I. Milotay, J. Nyir6, J. Ratz, A. Tasnadi-Nagy, Count M. Teleki, G. Vajna. I. Nagy was co-opted later. * Szalasi Trial, p. 102. 3 I. Horthy to C. A. M. ‘ In fact, too many, as the Press accounts which appeared in 1945 often confused it with the

meeting of the Parliamentary Defence Committee, which occurred on the same day. I have taken as my chief sources for the former meeting Lakatos’ account at the trial of Szélasi (pp. 132 ff.) and the story given by Nagy (pp. 226 ff.); for the latter, the report made to Széilas by Vajna, who was present. But I cannot be certain that some details are not misplaced.

HORTHY AGONISTES 387 Csatay and Hennyey then joined in with vigour in Lakatos’ support. Hennyey

pointed out that it was largely Germany’s failure to keep her promises to Hungary which had brought about the present situation. She had failed to supply arms; she had exposed Budapest and the other industrial centres to Allied bombing and had provided no air protection; and she was keeping troops round Budapest instead of sending them up to the Front. Szdsz then asked Rajniss to read out a written statement—which Lakatos described as “very bellicose’’—of the aims of the Alliance. This was followed by a still sharper verbal declaration from Jaross, who shouted out: “‘Here there will be no jumping out and no treachery!” Touched on the raw, Lakatos took

hold of the chain of the German Ritterkreuz, which he, alone among Hungarians, wore round his neck, and said: “‘So long as I wear this, there will be no treachery.” He still had to face angry protests against the dissolution

of the KABSz, and to parry awkward questions about the mission of Faragho, of which he denied knowledge, telling, on his own later admission, a pack of lies, bound as he was to secrecy. His assurances, however, seem partially to have pacified the deputation, who were also, according to Nagy, impressed by the picture of the situation as given by the Ministers and left the room in a much less provocative mood than they had entered it: not so

convinced that the Hungarians had always been wrong and the Germans right; and somewhat reassured as to the intentions of the Government. Nor was their confidence unnatural, for this was not the only reassuring statement made by members of the Government even after the conclusion of

the “preliminary armistice’? with Russia. The Parliamentary Defence Committee had been convoked on the same day, and to it Csatay said point blank that on the previous day the Government “‘had resolved unanimously

not to lay down arms’? their feeling being (this Jurcsek told Vajna) that “there were so many Germans about that if they tried to get out they would catch it from both sides, like the Italians.’ They had even decided, at the same meeting, and again unanimously, “that if it was only the existing Government that was the cause of the mistrust, they would gladly resign and give way to men who were more sympathetic to, or better trusted by, the Germans.’” _ Bonczos, in fact, resigned next day (thus enabling his successor, Schell,

to achieve the remarkable record of serving as Minister of the Interior in two Cabinets, with a combined duration of three days, without signing a single order—a fleeting glory for which he paid with five months’ imprisonment by the Germans, six months’ internment by the Americans, and subsequent indefinite exile), and this may have been because he felt that the Government’s policy involved him in a certain conflict of conscience. But none of the other Ministers found any difficulty in assuring both the Germans

and their own Parliament of Hungary’s intention to fight on, nor even in issuing orders calculated to produce this effect. On 22nd September Csatay had issued a general appeal to all patriots to volunteer for the fighting services.

On the same day, all reserve officers born after 1903, and not in reserved occupations, were called up with immediate effect. Serving soldiers who captured or destroyed enemy tanks were promised grants of land. If they were killed in performing the feat, their dependants got twice as much. On 1 Nagy, op. cit. * Vajna, who reports this, says that he was so struck by the statement that he asked Jurcsek whether it was true. Jurcsek said yes, he himself had proposed it and the others had accepted it.

388 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH 6th October Lakatos was inspecting a new Hungarian anti-tank gun. As late as 12th October Csatay ordered the formation of the “‘Szent Laszlo Division,” an élite troop composed of units drawn from other formations and armed by the Germans, and on the 13th he revived the plan of a “National Guard,’! a unit of which was to be formed in every village not occupied by theenemy. Placards in the national colours and signed by Csatay were posted up on the walls of Budapest, calling on all patriots to leap to arms to defend

the country. The Jewish labour battalions, and also other able-bodied civilians, were marched out of Budapest to dig trenches. At the same time, Csatay was arranging with Winkelmann for the further conscription of Volksdeutsche, and making plans for raising Hungarian SS. divisions, to be armed

and trained by the Germans—plans which were not put into immediate execution only for lack of arms and trained officers.2, And throughout it all not only the Right-wing Press but the official wireless kept up a barrage of atrocity propaganda against the Soviets so violent that even Voernle telegraphed a warning on the 12th that ‘‘Stalin is such a powerful enemy that to insult him is not only untimely, but also extremely dangerous.’’* There are even certain indications that even some of the Ministers who

were comparatively fully initiated into the secret negotiations were not entirely convinced, up to the 12th or the 13th, that the Debrecen battle might not end in a German victory which would so re-establish the position as to

make the whole idea of surrender impracticable. And some of them may have regarded the prospect not altogether without relief.* Veesenmayer might have been willing to continue working through these

channels, but at this point his hand was forced by Winkelmann. The SS. General had not taken the defeat inflicted on him at the end of September as final. He had left Budapest, probably on the 10th, for a “‘flying visit’’ to the Fiihrer, whence he returned to Hungary on the afternoon of the 12th. While in Germany he had submitted and received approval from highest quarters for plans for an emergency coup, to be carried out immediately.

The plan was® that the leaders of the extreme Right were to be taken out

. under guard to Esztergom, as the seat of the Primate of Hungary. Here the Hungarian Parliament was to be convoked and to proclaim the deposition of Horthy and his Government, and the appointment of Szalasi in his place. Any resistance by Hungary was to be broken by force. Neither the existing political German representation in Budapest nor the 1 See above, pp. 365-6.

- They were taken up after 15th October by Beregffy, who claimed that he had only been building on foundations laid by his predecessor. See below, p. 451. 3 Quoted at the trial of Kemény (Szalasi Trial, p. 68). 4 The Szalasi Diary quotes a remark, allegedly made by Lakatos on the 12th, that: ‘‘they had received news from Turkey that the Soviet forces were weakening. If they now succeeded in cutting off the two cavalry divisions and three full divisions round Debrecen the Soviet danger would be past for a considerable time, and in that time much might happen.’’ _ Similarly, Hennyey told Marosy, the Sztojay Minister in Helsinki, who called on him on the

11th with a message from Ullein urging Hungary to seek an armistice and offering his own services as mediator, that “‘they were waiting to see how the Debrecen battle developed’’ (Ullein, op. cit., pp. 210-13). 6 These dates from the Szalasi Diary.

® The following is compiled chiefly from the evidence and affidavits given at the trial of Veesenmayer; but Herr Rahn has kindly supplemented his affidavit with a long and most valuable

personal account. He has also described his experiences in his autobiography Ruheloses Leben (Dusseldorf, 1949, pp. 262 ff.).

HORTHY AGONISTES 389 existing military authorities were thought adequate to carry this operation through unaided. Winkelmann himself, a few days earlier, had told General Friesner, commanding the German troops in Hungary, that “he could not guarantee that there would be no clashes in Budapest,” and Veesenmayer, as we have seen, was distrusted by both Ribbentrop and Himmler. Accordingly, Obergruppenfiihrer Von dem Bach-Zalewski, then stationed in Warsaw, was

to be sent to Budapest and take over the supreme command of all local police and SS. units there “‘in case of warlike complications,” in the event of

which he was to carry out an operation known as ‘‘Panzerfaust” (mailed fist). The political stiffening was to be provided by Herr Rahn, the German Ambassador to Mussolini’s Italy, who was then with the Duce at Gargagno, on the Lago di Garda. Von dem Bach must have received his orders on the 12th, for he arrived

in Buda on the 13th. He was not empowered to call on any Wehrmacht formations, either combatant or training—a prohibition which had been recently reinforced by a new and very specific order! and was the more galling because two more armoured brigades, also coming from Cracow, had reached

Esztergom precisely on the 13th—and he brought no reinforcements of his own with him, unless one account is correct which says that he brought with him a heavy siege mortar, with its crew. Since, therefore, the SS. formations

in Pécs were too far away to be used, the whole forces originally at his disposal were those so often enumerated: the 22nd SS., Skorzeny’s three battalions, and such oddments of Gestapo, etc., as could be scraped together.?

On the 14th, however, 42 new Tiger tanks and a company of “‘Goliath”’

armoured cars arrived at the East station in Pest by train, and Von dem Bach obtained permission to keep these at his disposal for a couple of days.

A piquant feature about this force was that the tanks were only replace- | ments. They had no fighting crews, only the drivers and mechanics necessary

to get them along the roads; no ammunition, and some of them so little petrol that on the 15th they were unable to reach the stations allotted to them.’ 1 On 24th September another reorganisation of the German chain of command had been carried through. This had placed all Hungary east of the Danube under the territorial command of the Commander in Chief Heeresgruppe Stid-Ukraine (now Stid). The troops in West Hungary were said to belong mainly to the Army General Staff. Care, it was stated, must be taken that

the head of the Army G.S. should not be given control over those troops stationed in West Hungary which were under the command of the Reichsfthrer SS., the Chief of Army Equipment, and the Commander of the Replacement Training Army. By inference, the converse obviously held good and the Reichsftihrer SS. had no authority over any units of the various Wehrmacht commands.

2 Von dem Bach, in his evidence at the trial of Veesenmayer, said specifically that he had brought no reinforcements with him; but Skorzeny writes (op. cit., p. 196) that he brought with him ‘‘a giant 65-cm. mortar, which had only been used twice before: to demolish the vast ramparts

of Sebastopol, and then, in the recent fighting in Warsaw.”’ He does not include the crew of this mortar in his list of the forces used in ‘‘Panzerfaust,’’ which he gives as follows: 1. SS. Parachutist Jager battalion No. 600. 2. One Luftwaffe Parachutist battalion.

3. One motorised infantry battalion. ,

4. One reinforced company “‘Jagdverband Mitte.” 5. One Panzer company (Panther). 6. One Special company (Goliath). 7. 22nd SS. Division. Nos. 1-4 seem to be Skorzeny’s own men; No. 5 the Tiger tanks and No. 6 the armoured cars; No. 7 we know.

Skorzeny writes that he objected to the use of the mortar, as unnecessarily brutal. It was certainly never used. 3 See Von dem Bach’s evidence at the trial of Veesenmayer,

390 | OCTOBER FIFTEENTH These facts, however, were not revealed by the Germans, and remained to the last hidden from the Hungarians, who were also unaware of the disinterested-

ness of the armoured brigades; which, although on the 14th they moved

from Esztergom to Szent Endre, took no part in the operations of the following day.' Rahn arrived a day later than Von dem Bach, for it was only on the 13th

that Ribbentrop called him to the telephone and told him to proceed immediately by car to Riem-Miinchen, where an aeroplane and secret instructions awaited him. He was not anxious to go, but as Ribbentrop insisted, he had to give way and left, instructing his second in command to call him back, on some pretext, if he had not returned within three days. He

arrived at Munich next morning and found the plane, the pilot of which handed him his instructions in a sealed envelope. The substance of these was that, according to information received, a “treacherous defection’”’ by Horthy was to be expected. Rahn was to go at once to Budapest and to co-operate with Veesenmayer in thwarting Horthy’s plan by the device described above.

And after all, Rahn arrived in Budapest with a different purpose from Von dem Bach’s. For he disliked his orders, and rang up Ribbentrop from the airport to say so. He argued that a putsch of the kind proposed was excessively dangerous, if practicable at all. In any case, it was a job to be carried out, if at all, not by a diplomat but by an SS. or military Commander. The only useful purpose which he could possibly serve in Budapest would be

to make a last appeal to Horthy. Ribbentrop “‘began to waver’’ during the conversation, and then asked Rahn to wait on the phone for a few minutes. After a short interval—during which he had obviously consulted the Fiihrer—Ribbentrop came back and, rather surprisingly, authorised Rahn to talk to Horthy. Rahn then took off, arriving in Budapest at noon. He went straight to Veesenmayer, whom he found in a state of some agitation. Veesenmayer showed him a telegram, addressed to both men and beginning with the words,

“You will answer for this with your life’ (“Sie haften mit Ihrem Kopf dafiir’’).

There followed instructions identical with those previously received by Rahn. Veesenmayer said that he had already objected to these instructions and had “‘had a clash with the SS. detachments, which, however, were not under his orders.”’ The two men consulted together and found that their views were identical: both agreed to make every effort to reach a compromise with Horthy which should avoid violence.

At Rahn’s request, Veesenmayer then asked Winkelmann to come up to the Legation. He did so, and Rahn begged him to prevent the SS. or police from doing anything rash until he had had his own interview with Horthy. * Lakatos (Szalasi Trial, p. 142) described the forces arriving on the 14th as ‘‘the 24th

Armoured Division with 42 new Tiger tanks’’ and believed Von dem Bach to be in command of

both; but Von dem Bach’s evidence is explicit. The Tigers and the 24th Armoured must certainly be distinguished. The latter seems to have been incomplete. N. Horthy’s list and the Tombor map put two armoured brigades at Szent Endre on the 14th; Arrow Cross information,

only one, but the former version is probably right. It is quite certain that this force took no part in the operations of the 15th, on which the actual work, such as it was, was carried out almost exclusively (so far as German forces were concerned) by the Tigers, the 22nd, and later, Skorzeny’s Commandos,

HORTHY AGONISTES 391 Winkelmann replied that he personally was prepared to fall in with Rahn’s wishes, but he was no longer in charge of the situation. Von dem Bach was now in charge of all local SS. and police units, and to judge from his attitude it was unlikely that he would allow political considerations to prevent him from carrying out any orders to use more drastic measures.! Von dem Bach, when appeal was made to him,? duly announced that “everything was subordinated to him, as Commander-in-Chief, during the period of emergency.” He did not, however, try to censor the diplomats’

activities, and Veesenmayer rang up the Foreign Ministry to ask for an audience with Horthy the next day. Although he did not know it, the request was, for once, highly welcome to the recipient.

VI On the morning of the 14th (at seems)? Horthy suddenly awoke to the fact that his original, comparatively leisurely time-table was impracticable. Events were crowding on him. It seemed certain that the armies in the field would not get back within an appreciable time; the air was full of rumours of an impending Arrow Cross coup and of the arrival of more German troops, which, it was alleged, were being kept round the capital, so that it seemed likely that any change in the local balance of German and Hungarian forces would be for the worse. Above all, the tone of the messages now arriving

from Moscow had apparently made him realise that the Russians were interpreting the preliminary armistice as imposing an obligation of immediate action which, whatever his own view of the legal nature of the document, he

could not in practice refuse to take. He decided that he would have to act on the next day, Sunday the 15th. Not only that, but the whole process would have to be telescoped. The Proclamation would go out immediately Veesenmayer had been given his notice, and the Code Order to Miklds and Veress would go out simultaneously

with the Proclamation, thus making the notice given to the Germans a formality indeed. The audience with Veesenmayer was fixed for 12 noon: the issue of the Proclamation for 12.30 p.m. This abrupt change of time-table necessitated immediate action in several directions on the morning of the 14th. Horthy appears to have gone through the Proclamation with Ambrézy. Whether purposely or of forgetfulness, he disregarded Lakatos’ objections; indeed, the list of grievances was amplified 1 Winkelmann at the Szalasi Trial. * From Veesenmayer’s evidence at his trial it would appear as though he saw the General, but according to Rahn the arrangements were left to Winkelmann.

3 All sorts of reasons were subsequently advanced for this disconcerting change of plan, which, whatever its justifications, undoubtedly (as will be seen) caused much confusion and upsetting of arrangements: the workers were caught unprepared, the loyal troops had not arrived, etc. One story was that the decision was motivated by Veesenmayer’s request for an audience; another—one very widely current—that Horthy was stampeded into it by the kidnapping of his son on the morning of the 15th. But the Regent himself in his book (p. 233) dates his decision at the morning of the 14th, while to the writer he gave “either the night of the 13th or the morning of the 14th,’ and as we shall see, all the machinery was set on foot on the 14th, ie. a

day before the kidnapping of N. Horthy, jnr. . .

Although all the Regent told C. A. M., when cross-examined about his reasons, was that ‘“when he saw that the Germans were not sending their reinforcements to the Eastern Front, but keeping them in Budapest, he decided to act as quickly as possible,” he seems in his book to attribute his change of date to the Russian ultimatum described below (p. 397). Here his memory must have played him false, for the ultimatum did not arrive until the small hours of the 15th. Butit is a plausible guess that Faraghdo’s impatient telegrams of the 13th made him realise, as written above, that the Russians were expecting him to act immediately.

392 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH with references to the kidnapping of Bakay and the recent subversive leaflets. The phrase with which Horthy had meant to announce his intentions—"‘I am informing the representative here of the German Reich that we are concluding an armistice with our enemies and are ceasing all hostilities against them,” was brought half up to date by the insertion of the word “‘preliminary”’ before ‘armistice,’ but not completely, since the tenses of the verbs “‘are concluding”’

and “are ceasing’ were left unaltered.1 The troops were told that their commanders were being given the appropriate instructions, which it was their

duty to obey in accordance with an Order of the Day which was going out simultaneously with the Proclamation. The Order, which was to be countersigned by Csatay, repeated this adjuration in emphatic terms. Horthy had by now dropped his original idea of reading the Proclamation himself, as it was thought that the Germans would cut the wires from the Palace. The Proclamation was to go out from the studios in Pest, in as many

languages as possible, and Hlatky was to look after this. Ambrozy accordingly instructed Hlatky ‘“‘to be at the Palace at 11.30 a.m. next day without fail, as he might have a very important duty to perform.’’ Knowing as he did of the Proclamation, Hlatky was thus one of the very few men who knew what was coming the next day. Next, Horthy told Hennyey to have Veesenmayer called to the Palace at noon; and here the Hungarians experienced one of the few pieces of luck which they enjoyed during all the critical days, for before the message went out, Veesenmayer himself had rung up for his audience, which Horthy was thus able to grant without suspicions being aroused that he was himself preparing to make a communication; the more so since Hennyey himself, when he received Veesenmayer’s message, was unaware that anything was in the wind.’ The Government would, as on previous occasions, have to be given its

choice between endorsing Horthy’s action or resigning. Horthy’s original idea was to call a Crown Council at 7.30 p.m. that evening. He would then

bring evidence that the military position was untenable, announce his intention of seeking an armistice, and ask his Ministers whether they would ‘accept the responsibility.” It was expected that some of the Ministers (at any rate, Jurcsek and Reményi-Schneller) would refuse to do so and resign. When they had left the room, Ambrézy was to give the survivors an account

of the armistice negotiations, and was also to show them the text of the Proclamation.?

When, however, Ambrozy went across to Lakatos’ office with this message, as he did late in the forenoon,? it was decided that even this procedure was unsafe, since Jurcsek and Reményi-Schneller would certainly tell the Germans what had happened. It was therefore decided to hold the Crown Council proper at 10.30 a.m. on the 15th, but to allow the reliable members of the Cabinet to discuss the position first between themselves. Lakatos’ secretary, Péter Incze, accordingly rang each of these individually,

telling him to go at 4 p.m. to Lakatos’ office for an important meeting, * A last-minute alteration on the 15th changed the tenses of the verbs, “I am informing” (the German Ambassador) and “I am instructing” (the Army Commanders) to the past. A German translation of the Proclamation is given in Horthy, op. cit., pp. 323-5, but it may be remarked that this omits the word “‘preliminary.”” The Hungarian text is given in Nagy,

PP ennyey to C. A. M. * Ambrozy’s evidence, Szalasi Trial, p. 145.

* Mme Zankay, loc. cit. |

HORTHY AGONISTES 393 suitably dressed to be able to go on afterwards to the Regent if necessary. The message gave no hint of the purpose of the summons, and each Minister,

when he arrived, was surprised to find that he was to partake in what was practically a full Cabinet meeting.! Horthy himself took one other preparatory step in the morning.” At 1 p.m. he saw Farkas, who had just arrived, after a journey rich in delays.’ To him (almost alone among his servants) he appears to have revealed the situation almost complete, for he told him that he had asked for an armistice from the Russians, assuming personal responsibility for the action; and that he had sent Faraghé to Moscow, Naday to Rome and Utassy to Szeged. Farkas’ note in his diary of the Regent’s next remark is, ‘‘Under the armistice conditions we must withdraw to the Trianon frontiers and join the Russians

in attacking the Germans, but I shall find some way out of that somehow.’”4

He also told Farkas his full programme for the next day, and informed the

General that his own task would be to defend the “bridgehead,” while Aggteleki kept order in Budapest and Lazar defended the Var itself. Later,

however, as he has told the writer, Farkas was called back and told by Vattay and Ambroézy that on the Regent’s explicit orders, if the Lakatos Government resigned, he was to form a Cabinet with dictatorial powers.° In the afternoon® Horthy saw Lazar and told him to organize the defence of the Var, which Lazar did that night with the forces at his disposal: the Bodyguard, the Duty Battalion’ and the 9/11. The bulk of the Bodyguard

he disposed round the Palace itself, with a small outpost in the barracks overlooking the Krisztina Tér, with orders to fire on anyone entering the gate. The Duty Battalion was placed forward in the Nandor barracks, guarding the Bécsi Kapu (Vienna gate), through which ran the only easy entrance into the Varhegy. The 9/11 was placed at the foot of the hill, to guard the Buda end of the bridges.* The streets were barricaded. Lazar’s instructions, however, related exclusively to the Var. He was not responsible for the rest of Buda, nor for Pest, which indeed it had been decided not to defend if things went wrong, since this would only cause useless loss of life.” For a combination of these two reasons, Lazar did not follow up his plan of arming the workers, and no notification was sent to the Resistance of the change of time-table, much less were they assigned a role in the next day’s

programme. Neither did Horthy assign any tasks to Aggteleki, Hardy or Temesvari, nor even inform them that anything extraordinary was due to happen next day. 1 Schell to C. A. M. 2 The following paragraphs, personal, Farkas to C. A. M. 3 He had reached the outskirts of the capital at 11 p.m. on the previous night, but his car had then sat waiting, in deference to an air-raid warning, until4 a.m. He reported at the Honved Ministry at 10 a.m., when he found the message calling him to the Var. 4 De ezt majd valahogyan kijatszom. 5 Horthy afterwards told C. A. M. that he had never given any such order, since he never expected Lakatos to resign, and if he did, never thought of anyone but Veress as his successor. But Lakatos might have resigned, and if so, someone would have had to take charge, and Farkas was certainly waiting in the Palace the next day. 6 Lazar, in evidence at the trial of Szalasi (p. 147), said explicitly that “‘it was on the afternoon of the 14th that he first learnt of what was going to happen.”’ He only heard of the Proclamation “semi-officially.”’

7 See above, p. 363. 8 Part of the 9/11 only arrived the next morning, when it was sent straight to its battle stations.

® This was admitted by Lazar at the Szalasi Trial (p. 142) and confirmed to C. A. M. by Hennyey, who even thought of declaring Budapest an open town.

394 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH The next important event of the day was the dress rehearsal Cabinet Council,’ which was indeed a rehearsal only of one scene in a drama, the full script of which the actors were even now not allowed to see. For Ambrézy, it seems, had not communicated even to Lakatos the information which it was proposed to impart to the Crown Council after the departure of such Ministers as refused “‘to take the responsibility.” Consequently, Lakatos himself was still uninformed of two essential facts in the situation: firstly, of the existence of the preliminary armistice, and secondly, of the Regent’s intention to issue the Proclamation after his interview with Veesenmayer. He had personal knowledge of the earlier phases of the negotiations, as had Hennyey; but neither Minister knew of them in his official capacity, so that not even those were mentioned, and the remaining Ministers were led to believe that whatever decision they took would relate to a process which was about to begin, not to one which in all essentials was already completed. Lakatos did mention at one point that the Regent was going to announce his decision to the nation in a proclamation, but he said that “‘he had not yet counter-signed it, as he wished to make certain stylistic amendments to it.”

His auditors believed, as he did himself, that the document would be submitted to them at the Crown Council. None of them knew that it was going out before the Council was well over, or even on the same day, and although they were told that the Germans were going to be informed of Horthy’s decision, they expected further negotiations, such as had occurred in September.?

The record of the meeting thus makes rather queer reading. Lakatos opened the proceedings by saying that Hungary’s position was untenable and that the time was come for immediate action, if the country was to be saved from complete disaster. It was de rigeur in Hungary that statements of this kind should be supported by “expert” opinion, which was normally delivered by the Chief of Staff. But V6rés was out of Budapest; so in his place the expert opinion was delivered by none other than Colonel Nadas (the Lajos of Szalasi’s Diary). He had been coached by Lakatos beforehand what to say, and depicted the military situation accordingly in suitably black terms (which were not, indeed, blacker than the reality). Lakatos asked him a prearranged question: Would the Germans really be able to surround and annihilate the Soviet forces at Debrecen? Nadas replied, as arranged, in the negative; then he withdrew.

Lakatos then said that the Regent was going to hold a very important Crown Council the next day, to debate the question of the armistice. This meeting was being held to enable the Ministers to decide on their own attitude towards the Regent’s request for an armistice. All present were in favour of an armistice, but all, including Lakatos, felt that the pledges given, previously or recently—including Lakatos’ assurances

to the National Alliance and the various promises made, not only by the Regent, to the Germans that Hungary would not seek an armistice without first informing them—must in honour be respected. There was also the question whether a request for an armistice would be constitutional without the consent of Parliament. Lakatos reported that the Regent would break the news to the Germans * An account of this meeting is given by Nagy, op. cit., pp. 229-30, I have supplemented it from information from Hennyey, Schell and Nadas. ” Hennyey to C. A. M.; cf, also Nagy, p. 235,

HORTHY AGONISTES 395 himself; and after discussion, the meeting decided—whether rightly or wrongly, the present writer would not venture to offer an opinion—that the constitutional powers possessed by the Regent as “‘Legfels6bb Hadur”’

entitled him, in an emergency, to ask for an armistice without previous consultation of Parliament. To disarm Reményi-Schneller and Jurcsek, however, Lakatos was to request the Regent, pro forma, to consult Parliament; to which Horthy would reply that “‘it was technically impossible.” The Government’s own position still remained equivocal; and those present felt that they ought at least to clear themselves technically; but the idea of letting an entirely new Cabinet—Left-wing or military—take over, although it was discussed, was dropped: time would be lost in seeking a new Premier, Veesenmayer might put his oar in, the Right Radicals might get wind of what

was afoot and spoil the whole plan. The Ministers therefore decided to resign, but to accept re-appointment, when they would, as a new Cabinet, be free of any obligations undertaken by them in their earlier avatar. All present agreed to accept re-appointment; it was assumed that neither Reményi-Schneller nor Jurcsek would do so.

Vattay was then called in and told what had been decided, for transmission to the Regent. He, on his side, told the Ministers his side of the story. It was expected that the Germans and the Arrow Cross would try to prevent the conclusion of the armistice by force, and if the Xth and the Cavalry did not arrive before zero hour, only the Varhegy would be defended.

Lazar, however, was confident that the arrangements made by him (which Vattay described) would be sufficient, as the reinforcements might be expected to arrive shortly.!

The arrangements with the Armies were in order. The Commanders of the First and Second Armies had been informed, and would know when to act. There was no doubt that those forces would obey the Regent’s orders. Heszlényi had been written off, but was not dangerous, since his forces were weak and disorganised. The Ministers then proceeded to discuss the modalities of the request for the armistice—still on the assumption that this was a step still to be taken. As soon as Veesenmayer had been notified, Hennyey was to pass the request to the Ministers of Sweden and Turkey, as the two countries in which all the three main Allies had representatives, for transmission to the Allies. The request for the armistice was to include the following points: 1. The German Army to evacuate Hungary in the same way as it had Finland. 2. Hungary to be occupied simultaneously by the armies of all three Allies.

3. Hungarian police to take part in the keeping of order.”

This concluded the business of the meeting, except for a few minor decisions: when the request for an armistice went out, Lakatos was to sign an Order lifting the ban on the Left-wing Press and imposing one on that of the Right, and all political prisoners were to be released. It may be mentioned here that Vladar signed the order relating to the prisoners on the same evening. Dessewffy was delegated to go out to the 1 Lazar was so optimistic throughout that he even refused an offer by G. Kiralyi, the Gendarmerie Commander on the Var, to reinforce the garrison with another battalion of gendarmes, saying: “I have only to press a button and it will work.”’ (Kiralyi to C. A. M.) 2 These are approximately the conditions which Horthy (op. cit., p. 202) says that he asked Faragho to secure. The irrealism of putting them forward now is explicable only by Hennyey’s and Lakatos’ ignorance of the real situation on 15th October.

396 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Gyiitéfoghaz at 1 p.m. next day and take over the leading prisoners, which

he duly did. It is a curiosity of history that a train bringing some other prisoners released by the Germans arrived at Budapest at almost the same hour. It is true that few of the persons concerned enjoyed their liberty for long.

Later that evening, the Regent held his final, decisive Council of War. It was a curious little assembly that met now in the Palace, a pathetic indica-

tion of the narrowness of the limits to which the circle of those whom Horthy could trust implicitly had now shrunk. It consisted only of his wife,

his son, and his daughter-in-law; Vattay and Ambrozy; Lazar; and the adjutant, Tost.

Horthy informed them that he had decided that the request for an armistice should go out next day. He then explained that he wanted the Proclamation to go out at the earliest possible moment at which it could be said that he had technically fulfilled his word to the Germans of telling them

first. Accordingly, it was decided not even to wait until the end of the interview with Veesenmayer, but to get going as soon as the actual words

had been spoken. So it was arranged that Mme. Ilona Horthy, being slender and light on her feet, should listen to the interview from the next room, and when the words were spoken, give the sign to Ambrozy, who would

then set his arrangements with Hlatky in motion. The Regent had still to see V6rés,1 who, remarkably (considering the situation), had been spending most of his time during the last week down at

Balaton-Fiired, where he had a villa. The Military Academy was in the neighbourhood and he had spent the 14th—of all occupations—in addressing the cadets in that salubrious retreat, and had returned again to his villa when

a despatch rider summoned him to the Var. He arrived at 11 p.m. and was received immediately by the Regent. Horthy told him of the signature of the preliminary armistice. He said nothing about the proposed proclamation;

but said: ““Tomorrow I am going to have it out with the Germans.’” Terrified, V6rds begged the Regent to flee with him to the safety of the First Army, arguing with him that if he “‘had it out”? he would be arrested within two hours. To which, according to V6rés, Horthy made a reply which, had it really been made (Horthy denied it afterwards),? would have showed a faith in the practicability of the “Finnish Solution” for which it would have been

difficult to discern the grounds: “I am confident that if I ask the German Minister for the Germans to leave Hungarian territory, the position in Hungary will be the same as it was in Finland, where the German troops left Finnish territory at once.’ As to the move, it was now too late.

Vorés pleaded with him for an hour and got a half-promise that the Regent would “think over’ the question of leaving Budapest. With that he had to be content and scampered home to spend the night packing for his own getaway. Horthy then went to bed, without, apparently, reflecting that, while making all these dispositions, the one measure which, for whatever 1 Voros gave his story of this interview several times: in evidence at the Szalasi Trial, in various newspaper interviews, and in A debreceni Feltdmadds pp. 43 ff. * Holnap a németekkel t6résre akarom vinni a dolgot.

3 Horthy to C. A.M. In general, the Regent always maintained to C. A. M. that he never expected the Germans to take his move quietly. * During the earlier negotiations conducted by Miklds, Horthy had really thought of joining

the General when he got far enough back to establish his H.Q. at Martonvasar or Lillafiired (J. Horthy to C. A. M.); but had dropped the idea when it was seen how slow the First Army’s retreat was likely to be.

HORTHY AGONISTES 397 reason, he had entirely omitted to take was to give the Russians any warning whatever of his change of programme.! And hardly had he sunk into his well-earned sleep when bad news reached the Palace. Things had gone seriously wrong in Szeged. We have described how, owing to misfortune, the emissary to Szeged had started late; it now transpired that he had started under a misapprehension as

to the purpose of his mission. This does not appear to have been Col. Utassy’s fault, although it is a fact that his heart was probably not in his mission;* but possibly owing to loose language used by Faragho in transmitting the message,? he had gone under the impression that he was going to learn from the Soviet Commander what armistice terms the Soviets were now prepared to offer. He imagined his mission to be solely informatory; he was not empowered to conclude any agreement, nor to receive or transmit

any orders. Nor had he been given any information about the disposition of the German and Hungarian forces. Marshal Malinovsky, on the other hand, supposed that all discussion of any terms needing to be settled at this juncture had been closed when Horthy accepted the pre-armistice. He expected Utassy to bring detailed information on the German and Hungarian forces, and finally expected him to take _ back to Buda his (Malinovsky’s) orders, which would be instantly obeyed. Thus when Utassy arrived at Szeged, Malinovsky began by demanding information on the German and Hungarian troops. Utassy had no information to give (Malinovsky, said Utassy’s adjutant at his trial, knew more than he did). Malinovsky then issued his orders, which were blunt and sweeping. The First and Second Armies were to surrender to the Soviets. The Corps

in Pécs was to surrender to the Yugoslavs. The Third Army was to turn round and march on Budapest; if it arrived in time, and cleared and held the capital, the Russians would not march on it. Utassy replied that he was unable to transmit these orders, or any others. He asked in return for “‘armistice terms,’ which Malinovsky ‘“‘refused most categorically to give.”

Consequently, Ilona Horthy had in the small hours of the 15th to decode a message sent by Faraghé at 11.45 p.m. of the 14th, and transmitting a furious note sent to him by Antonov to the effect that Utassy had proved totally useless and that Hungary was, apparently, not attempting

to fulfil the armistice obligations undertaken by her. She was therefore 1 I have found no explanation for this remarkable fact, but fact it is that Horthy sent no message to Moscow on the 14th, and the message which his daughter-in-law sent in the small hours of the 15th (see below, p. 398) did not reveal Horthy’s plans for the morning. ° Utassy had recently been in charge of the P.O.W. department, in which capacity he had done good and humane work; which was why Csatay recommended him as a suitable envoy. But he did not belong to the pro-Allied group in the Army; his reputation in London and Washington, where he had served as Military Attaché, had been that of a pronounced pro-German. When court-martialled, later, by the Szalasi Government, he defended himself by saying that he had only been obeying instructions, and the court-martial acquitted him, saying that “‘no blame attached to him, since he had no order when he went on his mission that he was to arrange the volte-face of the armies; he was not privy to the treason.’ (Hardy to C. A. M., from notes taken at the court-martial.) 3 One of Faragho’s wires had asked for ‘‘a parliamentarian to discuss (megbeszélni) details”’ and the other, for ‘‘a parliamentarian to negotiate (targyalni) with the local Commander.” 4 The court-martial verdict said that Utassy’s instructions were: ““He was to describe the situation in Hungary, in accordance with instructions from the Chief of the General Staff, and to find out just what conditions the Soviet Supreme Command was laying down for the theatre of war in Hungary. He was not, however, empowered to conclude any agreement.”’

398 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH required to fulfil these obligations within forty-eight hours, and in particular:

(a) to break off all relations with Germany and to commence active operations against her;

(b) to begin withdrawing her troops from Roumanian, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak territory;

(c) at 8 a.m. on the 16th to send to the Soviet Commander at Szeged complete details of the dispositions of the German and Hungarian forces and an exact statement of how far the pre-armistice conditions had been fulfilled. A copy of this note! had been given to Utassy.

Faraghé urgently requested for himself information on how these instructions were being carried out, and asked that a “‘first-class’’ General of

high rank should be sent to Szeged, accompanied by Nadas (on whom Faragho seems to have relied as completely as V6rdés did).

Some time after, Utassy arrived back bringing with him a copy of this formidable document. The little group in the decoding station who received these messages (the decoding of which was not finished until 2.30 a.m.) decided that it was no use waking the Regent, since in any case nothing more could be done than was being done. They simply telegraphed back (the message leaving in the small

hours)? that it was impossible to undertake armed action against the Germans, who were in greatly superior strength, until the Hungarian reinforcements arrived. The Palace expected to be attacked as soon as the request for an armistice was transmitted or published, but would defend itself; only let relief come quickly! The emissary would reach Szeged at the time required. The message and reply were given to Tést to hand to the Regent in the morning. This procedure, although reasonable enough, led to curious results. The next morning, as it happened, things occurred which seem to have driven the

telegrams out of everyone’s head. The Regent cannot remember when he first saw the ultimatum, or passed it to Ambrozy, but neither man made any mention of it either at the Crown Council or during the discussions which followed the meeting. Thus Hennyey certainly,? Lakatos almost certainly, knew nothing of this new development until nearly midnight on the 15th. It is difficult to see what alterations Horthy could have made in his dispositions at this stage, so long as he clung to his decision to give the Germans

preliminary warning. Yet the fact that no mention of the ultimatum was made at the Crown Council lends the proceedings of that meeting an added air of unreality, which hangs still more heavily over the negotiations which Lakatos, assisted by Hennyey, afterwards undertook with the Germans in total ignorance of this factor which made nonsense of them. As things were, the morning’s programme of a Crown Council, to be followed by the audience to Veesenmayer and the issue of the Proclamation, was left unchanged. But before the Council could meet, two other events occurred. Firstly, Vorés, after waiting in vain for the hoped-for order that he might

flee to Beregszasz, taking the Regent with him, rang up the Var, and was 1 That is, of Malinovsky’s demands, which Antonov was only relaying from Moscow. 2 The reply is timed 3.30 a.m.; but Mme Horthy has informed the writer that she did not finish her work until an hour later. * Hennyey to C. A.M.

HORTHY AGONISTES 399 told that there was nothing doing. Instead, he was bidden to attend a Crown Council at 10.30 a.m. On his way thither he looked in at his office and there

was handed an ultimatum, timed 10.10 a.m., from Guderian. The withdrawal of the Hungarian troops was to stop. V6érés was given twelve hours in which to reverse his orders. All Hungary was now a German “‘strategic area,’ in which only the German Command was entitled to issue orders. In so far as the Hungarian Command did not satisfy the German demands, the German Command would be obliged, and was resolved, to take steps exclusively in accordance with German interests and with entire disregard of Hungarian interests. Guderian added that the Germans were bringing up two fresh armoured divisions, with which they would be able to hold the line in the north-east.t To this V6rés, according to himself, replied that he was not in a position to withdraw his order, and that any further communications must be made through the German Minister. The second event of the early morning of that fatal Sunday was one of first-class sensation.

We have mentioned Nikki Horthy’s attempts to get in touch with Tito. Now, on the 14th, a man representing himself as a General of Tito’s had duly

arrived at Bornemissza’s office in the Eskti-Tér, on the Left bank of the Danube, requesting to meet Nikki at 8.30 on the next morning. Bornemissza passed on the message.

Nikki had actually been for some days past under a fatherly “Shouse arrest’; for his activities had attracted the attention of the Arrow Cross, one of whose leaflets had borne the words: ““Let the young man who is trying to play the Umberto in Hungary beware!’ After this, his father, while authorising the continuation of the negotiations, had forbidden him to leave the Palace.

This, however, was an invitation which he could not resist, and at the hour named—8.30 a.m.—he borrowed from Lazar a car not known to be his, took with him a chaffeur and two men of the Bodyguard, and drove down to the Eskii-Tér. Here he got out and went into the house, telling the soldiers to follow him in ten minutes if he was not back, or to get help.

The only thing wrong with this precaution was its belatedness and its insufaciency. The good faith both of Bornemissza and of Pejacevic is unquestionable; but at some point or other the Germans had succeeded in tapping the line. Whether the original man with whom Pejagevi¢ negotiated was already an agent provocateur, or whether he was genuine and the Germans succeeded in arresting him on his journey, and substituting their own man

for him, the writer does not know.” In any case, the Germans knew all 1 Later Vorés said that he had learned that Hitler had also ordered that the Hungarian troops were to be disarmed (presumably if the ultimatum was rejected). This was really done to the 5th Division, in Russia. 2 The whole story is not quite clear. ‘“Hagen,” op. cit., pp. 375 ff., says definitely that the Germans knew of the affair from the first. Some doubts are, however, cast on this narrative by his inclusion in it of a picturesque tale that the agent, or rather agents, had arranged the meeting for the 13th, but that their plans were disturbed by the appearance at the meeting of the Regent himself, with his son. They were not prepared to tackle the Regent, so had to postpone the kidnapping. HO6ttl informs C. A. M. (personal) that he had the story from the agents themselves. On the other hand, both Horthys, father and son, have denied it absolutely to C. A. M., and it seems quite incredible that the Regent should have driven out of the Var at night at that time. A possibility suggested to the writer by H6ttl is that a preliminary meeting took place in the Var on the 13th. Even that appears to me very doubtful. The other version, from the German side, is that of Skorzeny, who incidentally writes (op. cit., p. 195) as though the emissary

400 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH about the rendezvous: a number of German Gestapo agents had, two days before, taken lodgings in a pension immediately above Bornemissza’s office, and on the morning of the 15th Skorzeny had also sent down a company of

his men, whom he stationed in and around the Eskii-Tér.t. The two Hungarian soldiers and the chauffeur, as they waited, saw German soldiers and SS. men congregating in the square and some of them going into the house. The two guards now tried to go in, but found their way blocked. At the same time, armed men attacked the car with hand grenades, wrecking it, killing the chauffeur and severely wounding one of the guards. The other ran to a public call-box and tried to telephone for help. He was set upon, but knocked down his assailants and ran round the corner, where by good fortune he found a taxi, which he held up with his rifle and commandeered, and in it got up to the Palace and gave the alarm. The officer on duty called up Aggteleki, who, invoking an Army Order which entitled the Army, in case of crisis, to give orders to the para-military forces, told Temesvari to send a

platoon of gendarmes to the spot, sending himself two armoured cars. Another message was sent to the head of the political police, Torma. The rescuers broke into the house. There were still Germans about, and bloodstains on the floor, and on the table an elaborate draft treaty, written in Croat, providing for co-operation between Horthy and Tito,” but no Nikki. Piarist monks in the house opposite said they had seen a body, wrapped in a sack, being carried away.

It transpired afterwards that Bornemissza and the mysterious emissary had been duly waiting for Nikki, but the three men had hardly sat down before Skorzeny’s bandits burst into the room. Nikki was hit on the head and

stunned. He came to to find himself being carried out into the square, his head wrapped in a sack. Feigning continued unconsciousness, he saw that the square was full of Germans. He and Bornemissza were bundled into a lorry, where they were wrapped in rolls of carpet. This device enabled the captors to smuggle them past the guards on the airfield to which they were taken.2 They were put into an aeroplane and carried out of Hungary. Bornemissza eventually found his way back to Hungary. Nothing was ever heard again of the Yugoslav. Such was this remarkable episode, which had considerable after-effects on the remaining events of the day; although the widely circulated rumour that it was responsible for the issue of the surrender Proclamation that day is incorrect, the time-table having, as has been shown, been fixed already the night before. was genuine (he says that the Germans arrested four prisoners, of whom two were Hungarians (N. Horthy and Bornemissza) and two Yugoslavs). His account of an earlier meeting between N. Horthy and the ‘““Yugoslavs’’ seems as unauthentic as Hottl’s; both appear to be distorted reminiscences of the Regent’s meeting with Szakasits and Tildy. 1 Skorzeny, op. cit., pp. 199 ff. We may presumably take Skorzeny’s account of the German

side of the operation as authentic, but he is completely wrong on the Hungarian side. He invents a whole Guard Company of Hungarians who were never there at all, and even describes in vivid words how almost single-handed he held them off in a “lutte inégale.’’ His story of how, afterwards, when the lorry bearing the prisoners was driving off, he bluffed ‘“‘three companies of Honvéds who were advancing to the rescue,” is equally fictitious. There were not three companies of Honvéds in all Budapest. The (much smaller) forces sent down afterwards arrived only long after all was over. ° Torma to C. A. M. 3 G. Kiraly, the officer in charge of the gendarmerie at the Palace, had sent out an order to all frontier guards and to the guards on all airfields saying that the Regent’s son was being abducted and that his kidnappers were to be prevented, if necessary by force of arms, from taking

him out of the country. (G.K.to C. A.M.) The order, however, arrived too late.

HORTHY AGONISTES 401 It must have been half-past nine, or later, when the searchers came back

and reported that Nikki was gone and that there was no further hope of recovering him. They brought back the German cartridge-cases which had

fallen from the guns of the assailants in the square, and a report that practically every person on the scene, when summoned to show his papers, had transpired to belong to the SS. or the Gestapo. The news had now to be broken to the Regent; and of this painful scene no more is to be said than that it naturally put Horthy into a less conciliatory mood than ever for receiving Veesenmayer; probably hardened his heart still further against the German alliance and may, on the other side, either have prevented him from looking at, or have driven clean out of his head, the Antonov ultimatum. All this took time, particularly as the Regent had to receive the report from the police, showing exactly what their investigations had revealed. The Crown Council thus opened only at 10.45 a.m. It was attended by all the

Ministers (including this time Jurcsek and Reményi-Schneller), V6rés, Ambrozy and Vattay (exceptionally) with Barczy to take the minutes.! Horthy had, however, rejected a suggestion from Lakatos that the Archduke Jézsef, Bethlen and others be asked to attend, on the grounds that he did not

wish to burden others with the responsibility.2. The Regent opened the proceedings. He said nothing at all about his negotiations, about the preliminary armistice, or about Antonov’s ultimatum, but he described, in bitter words, the kidnapping of his son, following that of Bakay, and the long series of sins committed by the Germans against Hungary.? The situation was such that Hungary had no choice but to ask for an armistice; for Germany herself was near collapse, and if Hungary fought on, she would find herself alone. He said that Hungary had a prospect of getting “‘acceptable”? armistice terms. Moreover, if Hungary concluded an armistice that day, there was still a hope that British and American missions might come to Budapest simultaneously with the entry of the Russians, or immediately

thereafter. When Lakatos asked whether there were any grounds for this hope, Horthy answered, “‘Yes.”’ #

Voroés described the military situation. Hungary had no reinforcements left. The troops brought back from Russia had already been thrown into the

line. The First and Second Armies were already almost cut off by the Russian armies massing north of Debrecen. Two German armoured divisions were arriving (here he seems to have been relaying Guderian’s message), but

the effect of them could only be to delay the Russians for a short time. He had suggested to the Germans withdrawing to the Tisza-~-Bodrog-Meszes line. They had refused. He then ordered the First and Second Armies to fall back

on the Tisza and Bodrog, and the VI Corps to return to Budapest. The Germans had objected on the ground that they meant to defend Budapest themselves. Finally, at 10.10 a.m. had come the latest German ultimatum, which he described. Lakatos confirmed the hopelessness of the military situation, and Hennyey 1 The following account is based mainly on Barczy’s minutes; but accounts are also given by Lakatos and Vérdés in evidence at the Szalasi trial, V6rdés in A debreceni Feltdmadds, and Nagy, op. cit. The writer has also used Schell’s private account. 2 Affidavit by the Archduke Jozsef at the trial of Veesenmayer. According to the Archduke, Lakatos told him this when they met that afternoon. (See below, p. 423.) 3 Schell and Barczy.

4 The last two sentences of this paragraph are from D. Nemes loc. cit. Barczy’s record has no trace of them.

2C

402 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH said that the foreign political position was desperate. On this, the Crown Council resolved that the Vérés Order, which was issued in the Regent’s name, could not be retracted: the two Armies were to continue their retirement.

Lakatos and some of his colleagues then went over again the old ground

of the position of the Government vis-a-vis their past commitments, and vis-a-vis Parliament. The Regent, however, said that the existing Parliament did not represent public opinion and had been only arump since March. He thought it unnecessary to consult it, and repeated his intention of himself asking for an armistice. He asked that any objections should be raised. Jurcsek was in favour of fighting on, and Reményi-Schneller was tactless

enough to ask what the armistice conditions were; but the Regent said testily that he would talk about that later. He asked who was for him and who against him, and put his decision to the vote. All members of the Cabinet accepted it. Lakatos then tendered the Government’s resignation. Horthy accepted it and asked Lakatos to form a new Government. Speaking very slowly and emphatically, he asked that anyone who was unwilling to join the new Government should stand up. No one did so. The next stage should have consisted of the enlightening of the Ministers by Ambrozy on the state of the negotiations, and on the Proclamation. But 12 o’clock had now arrived, and the Regent said that he must interrupt the Council for his audience with Veesenmayer. He asked the Ministers to wait while he talked to the German, after which the Council could go on; and he went back into the other room, with Lakatos and Hennyey.? May the chronicler permit himself a twinge of sympathy at this point for Edmund Veesenmayer? The Hungarians consistently ascribed to him every possible fell and Machiavellian design. Yet he was certainly speaking no more than the truth when he said afterwards that during the whole time of his mission he had done all he could in the interest of the Hungarian Government (of course, as he understood that phrase). Under the most disconcerting

circumstances and in the face of unremitting hostility and of repeated evidence of disingenuous behaviour, he had yet done his best to jolly Horthy

and his advisers along, and to hold back Szalasi; and had apparently persuaded Hitler to accept this same line. Now he arrived at the famous audience in a final effort in pursuit of the same objective—an effort to make which he had defied the Fiihrer’s explicit orders, sent to him to execute “‘on his life.”’

At first he did not even get a chance to open his mouth. Horthy began by accusing the Germans of having kidnapped his son. Veesenmayer at first denied that Germans had been concerned in the affair, but Horthy drew from

his pocket the German cartridge cases which had been picked up in the Eskii-Tér, and threw them down on the table, saying: “‘Und was ist das?” He then accused Veesenmayer, in bitter words, of having kidnapped his son. He was of a good mind, he said, to keep Veesenmayer hostage for his

son’s release. Veesenmayer “‘went over to the counter-attack.”’ He said that the abduction had been Winkelmann’s doing, not his; but it was fully justified, since Horthy, jnr., had been in communication with the enemy. As to his being kept hostage himself, he had left orders with the Legation to 1 At this point, Farkas writes, Vattay came out and told him that he would not be required to do anything more than defend the bridgehead, since the Government was not resigning.

HORTHY AGONISTES 403 ring up Ribbentrop at | p.m. unless he was back safely by that hour. Horthy then turned to a wider field and, following in his words, more or less closely, the gist of his Proclamation, treated Veesenmayer to the complete indictment of the Germans’ crimes towards Hungary: how they had treated Hungary as enemy-occupied territory, looting it and plundering it; how they had left Hungarian troops in the lurch at Voronezh, in Transylvania, at Debrecen and at Arad, with the result that a large part of the country was now in enemy hands. They had supported the Arrow Cross and had kidnapped General Bakay. All this was really a piéce justificative designed to prove that Germany had broken her various agreements; that reached between Horthy himself and Hitler in the previous March, between Guderian and Lakatos, and later, with Vorés; and that Hungary was justified in drawing the consequences.

He was, he insisted, within his full rights to do so, and he had always maintained that right. But he had also promised Hitler that before exercising

it he would inform his ally. He was doing so now, and he ended his tirade by saying: “‘After all this I have decided not to continue the struggle, but to ask for an armistice.” Veesenmayer “‘was manifestly taken aback and turned pale,” but asked at least for a delay while he communicated with the Fiihrer. If the situation was so desperate, perhaps some more reinforcements could be sent after all. Horthy, without revealing details of his negotiations with the Allies, simply replied that it was too late.

Veesenmayer, nevertheless, stuck to his guns. He said that, as it happened, Rahn had arrived that very morning with a special mission “‘to ease the tension which had become perceptible between the two countries and find a compromise to resolve the serious difficulties which had arisen.” Would Horthy not at least receive him? This was a surprise to Horthy, for somehow or other the official who had taken Veesenmayer’s message on the previous day had failed to grasp the purport of it; none of the Hungarians had known of Rahn’s presence. But Horthy consented, and Veesenmayer went off to fetch Rahn; the time being about 12.40. Horthy’s consent to this interview had, however, been prompted only by his incorrigible politeness, for he fully believed that the arrangements made the night before had been carried out and that the Proclamation was already

going out. In fact, there had been a hitch, in consequence of which the Proclamation was still unspoken, and it hung by a hair whether it would ever

go out at all. So many times in our story things have hung by a hair, and almost invariably the hair snapped if it would have been to Hungary’s advantage for it to hold, or held if she would have been helped by its snapping.

It is refreshing to record that for once, now, things did not turn out that way.

Ilona Horthy had played her part during the interview. She had listened for her cue, and when it was spoken, tiptoed across the room and signalled

to Ambrézy, who was standing with Hlatky. But now Ambrozy, who, although his loyalty to the Regent was complete, had grown old and cautious in his service, had a fit of nerves. He thought the Regent might change his mind after the interview, or at any rate want to make some changes; and he insisted that the Proclamation must not go out until Horthy had given a final O.K. after Veesenmayer left. Two people now acted with energy. One was Ilona Horthy, who urged most vigorously that Hlatky should at least be allowed to go away and get

404 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH everything ready, pending final orders by telephone. Ambrozy agreed to this, and gave Hlatky the precious envelope containing the Proclamation; this being about 12.25 p.m. Hlatky, who, short as the distance was, had, for safety’s sake, provided himself with a car and an escort, went back to his office, and thence to the Minister President’s own set of rooms. Here he opened the envelope. Seeing that it lacked Lakatos’ counter-signature (and Horthy’s own signature was only typed on it), he phoned across again, but was told to go ahead with his preparations. There were two copies of the Proclamation in the envelope; one he handed to his assistant, Harsanyi, and to the administrative head of the Press section, Dulin, and told them to take it across to the State Printing Office near by and have it set up for reproduc-

tion in large placards and as a leaflet, but not run off until the countersignature had been settled. Then he turned to the fulfilment of his own task; and it is an interesting thought that besides the young girl, this poet, this recluse, this shy, dreamy, elderly semi-invalid, proved himself the only

Hungarian in six crowded years of history to wipe the Germans’ eye by acting too fast for them. Stuffing his pockets with borrowed revolvers, Hlatky commandeered a little posse of armoured motor-cyclists who were waiting in the Palace square, placed them before and behind his car, and drove at breakneck speed down the hairpin-bend side of Buda Hill, across the Chain Bridge to the studios. There was a German liaison officer inside the M.T.I. office; him Hlatky drove unceremoniously into a room and locked the door on him. Vattay’s ‘“‘measures for securing the safety of the studios”’ had, it transpired, amounted only to the placing there of a guard amounting

in all to a subaltern and 23 men. MHlatky ordered the officer to telephone round for reinforcements and got a promise that another company should be sent across (as we shall see, it arrived, but did not stay for long). He then telephoned up to Ambrozy to report that he had arrived, and to ask for the final decision regarding Lakatos’ counter-signature. Ambrozy replied at first that the point had been discussed and the counter-signature was not necessary, but Hlatky insisted that he must speak to Lakatos. Pending the arrival of the answer, he set about getting the proclamation translated into as many languages as possible.

The word did not come for some minutes, and very nearly not at all. When Veesenmayer left the audience room, Tost went into it. Ilona Horthy,

standing behind him, saw her father-in-law sitting at his desk over some papers, and Lakatos and Hennyey standing between the Regent and the door.

Tost asked if the Proclamation should now go out. To Ilona Horthy’s horror, the Regent remained bowed over his papers, and Lakatos answered in an agitated voice: *“No; under no circumstances. We must wait now until Rahn comes. There may be a change.”’ Then Ilona Horthy, with the courage of despair, walked across to her father-in-law and said: “Papa, this is the only possible moment. Do you mean the Proclamation to go out?” The Regent looked up in surprise, and said: ““Why, of course. I thought it had gone already.”’ Before Lakatos could intervene, Ilona Horthy was out of the room, and had given Ambrozy the signal. Langsfeld, Ambrdzy’s assistant,! spoke to

Hlatky, who was waiting on the phone. MHlatky again asked about the counter-signature; and Langsfeld replied: “It is in order, there is to be none.”’ ' Langsfeld afterwards became Szalasi’s Chef de Cabinet, but seems to have behaved most loyally up to and on the 15th.

HORTHY AGONISTES 405 He also communicated two modifications to be made in the text, transferring

the tense of the communications to the Germans, and to the Army Commanders, from the present to the past. The Regent meanwhile had come back into the larger room. He told Vo6rods to sign the Code Order to the First and Second Armies, and to have it

sent out immediately.” V6rds did so, giving the Order to Pogany, Vattay’s second in command in the Military Cabinet, to send out. Meanwhile, on receiving his final orders, Hlatky had telephoned up to his office, telling his assistant of the changes in the text and telling them to print off the Proclamation. Now he went across from the M.T.I. office to the studios, in the other wing of the big building, and entered the main studio. The 1 o’clock bulletin on the weather and the Danube water-level had just been read. The item to follow next was a script entitled “Sunday Chronicle,” and its author was standing ready to deliver it. Hlatky pushed the unfortunate young man aside and told the announcer on duty to look at the script of the Proclamation. While the announcer was running his eye over the lines, the signature tune of Radio Budapest—the opening bars of the Rakoczi March—was repeated again and again. At 1.10 p.m. the announcer read, as Hlatky instructed him: ‘‘Hullo, hullo,

attention! We are making an extraordinary announcement. Hungary is seeking an armistice. We read out the Regent’s transcript.” Then followed the texts of the Proclamation and of the Order of the Day, the crucial sentences of which have already been given,? while the full text can be read elsewhere.?

During the first reading a message arrived telling Hlatky that he was wanted back at the Palace. He told the announcer to read both documents through three times, and then to play records until 2.30, when he would return with the message recorded in the Regent’s own voice. The announcer read the two documents through twice, and had begun the third reading (at 2.10 p.m.) when an air-raid warning came. The engineers cut off the transmission and the end of the third repetition was not heard.® After this, the studio went on desperately putting on one gramophone record after the other until interrupted by the events which will be related. Hlatky when he got to the Palace found that the message calling him back

had been a fake, sent by someone (probably Langsfeld) who was in the German conspiracy but personally friendly to Hlatky. Once up on his hill, Hlatky could not get down again, and left it only for prison and exile. The printed Proclamation never came out. Harsanyi got the first proofs from the Press at about 4p.m. He, too, was struck by the absence of Lakatos’ countersignature and rang Hlatky, who told him to ring up Ambrozy. Ambrdézy replied, rather impatiently, ““Never mind that, get on with it.” Harsanyi then corrected and passed the proof, and the Proclamation was in fact run

off, being ready at 7.30 p.m. It was, however, never distributed, for the Director of the ‘‘Hirdetd”’ office, which undertook bill-posting under contract for the Government, telephoned to say that his men were frightened to post

1 See above, pp. 391-2.

2 Vo6roés says that he also signed the Order of the Day, but at least as monitored, this was signed by Horthy and counter-signed only by Csatay. 3 See above, p. 391.

4 Horthy, op. cit., pp. 323-5. . .

6 The warning appears to have been a genuine one, and the engineers to have acted in good faith and in ignorance of what they were interrupting.

406 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH the placards up, since the Arrow Cross was in power, and, anyway, no cars could any longer get up to the Var to fetch the posters. A considerable interval elapsed between Veesenmayer’s departure and Rahn’s arrival, for Lazar—whether acting on his own inspiration or on that of another—had put into practice the suggestion mooted by Horthy, and when Veesenmayer reached the courtyard of the Var, he found his car immobilised and a barrier drawn across the road outside. VWeesenmayer sent a

| message to Lazar repeating his story that Ribbentrop was to be rung if his return was delayed, and sat with his watch in his hand counting the minutes. After a second message the barrier was removed just in time for him to reach the Embassy by 1 p.m. Then he had to give Rahn a hurried account of his experiences before the car could start again, by which time the barrier had been replaced, so that Rahn had to walk the couple of hundred yards of the approach. In fact, the Rakéczi March was still giving out its martial accents while he was doing so, and he reached the Palace just about the moment that the announcer began to read the Proclamation. He was taken up at once to the Regent’s presence. Lakatos and Hennyey waited while he was being presented. Then, Rahn having requested to speak

to the Regent alone, they rejoined their colleagues in the adjacent room. Horthy and Rahn remained alone. The interview which followed lasted for three-quarters of an hour. The Regent began by recapitulating, in an excited tone, a selection of Hungary’s grievances against the Reich; on this occasion making Ribbentrop the chief target for his recriminations, although he also brought up a large number of

other points of varying magnitude. :

Rahn denied that Germany had failed in her obligation to send troops and arms to Hungary; but in any case, he said, the mutual bandying of reproaches took no one any further. Whatever political errors the Reich had committed, the mere listing of them would not solve the present problem. If the Regent saw any practical way out, Rahn would co-operate with him to reach it.

The Regent interrupted to say that he saw only one possibility: the immediate conclusion of an armistice. Rahn replied that if the Regent had arranged for an Anglo-Saxon air-

borne landing, he could do no more than rise, bow, say: ““Your Serene Highness, you have won,” and retire: but for Horthy’s Hungary to surrender to the Russians seemed to him social and national suicide. According to Rahn’s account, both as given at the time to Veesenmayer and reproduced by him in evidence,” and as repeated later,® the Regent was deeply affected by the arguments, and asked Rahn why he had not come

sooner; why he had only been able, for the first time, to hold a serious conversation with a German when it was already too late? But too late it was: the Proclamation had gone out and could no longer be recalled. Indeed,

by that moment the announcer was already well on in the first, if not the second, reading of the decisive document. This announcement must have come to Rahn as a most grievous shock. But he was touched by Horthy’s emotion, which seemed to him to arise from 1 For my account of this interview I am indebted to Herr Rahn, who kindly sent me a minute and convincing account of it. 2 Szalasi Trial, p. 156. > Personal to C. A. M.

HORTHY AGONISTES 407 an entirely honourable conflict of loyalties. Instead, therefore, of breaking off the interview without more ado, he asked him whether he did not see that by his action he had placed himself between three fires: the Russian, the German and that of his own Opposition. It was an intolerable thought that Germans and Hungarians might be shedding one another’s blood. At this, Horthy broke in eagerly to ask whether Rahn could not avert the fratricidal bloodshed and arrange for the Germans to withdraw their troops to the Austrian frontier, leaving Hungary to her fate? It is perhaps surprising that Rahn did not reject out of hand a proposal which had so often been refused, most decidedly, by Hitler. But it must be remembered that he had no special knowledge of the past history of German-

Hungarian negotiations. He had been sent to Budapest hurriedly and against his own wish; he was already at loggerheads with Ribbentrop and had more or less committed himself to the line that earlier German policy had been mistaken. Finally, as he himself has stated, he spoke to some extent hastily, without thorough consideration of the implications of what he said, but obeying an instinctive feeling that the one really urgent and important task was to prevent a clash between German and Hungarian arms. Acting on this impulse, he replied to Horthy that he would be prepared loyally to pass on the latter’s suggestion to his Government, provided that it was ‘“‘Shonourably meant.”” When Horthy asked him exactly what he meant by that, he answered that the withdrawal of the German forces would in any case only be possible if the Hungarian troops refrained from laying down their arms, and a fortiori, from making common cause with the enemy.

Furthermore (this he said with the idea of at least gaining time), the propositions must be conveyed to him in writing.

The conversation thus ended on an unexpectedly conciliatory note although undoubtedly in yet another misunderstanding. Rahn promised to speak to the Fiihrer and to report back, and he understood Horthy to say that he would discuss the matter with Lakatos and get in touch again with Rahn, through the Minister President, whom he expected to bring him Horthy’s proposals in writing. As against this, however, the evidence is quite overwhelming that Horthy expected further proposals to come from Rahn (with whom, as he supposed, the next move lay) and authorised Lakatos to receive them, but that he regarded his own actions as completely irrevoc-

able, and did not propose to make any change in his dispositions: at any rate, until he had heard whatever proposals the Germans had to make.® Rahn drove off at about 1.45 p.m. In the meantime, Hennyey, who had already that morning arranged for a written Note to be compiled, received the Turkish and Swedish Ministers, handed them the Note, and explained what (as he understood it) Hungary was doing, and why. He also ordered the despatch of previously drafted telegrams to the Hungarian Ministers in Stockholm and Ankara asking the Governments in those capitals to intervene with the Allies. The remaining Hungarian Missions were notified of what had happened. 1 Rahn told C. A. M. that Horthy ‘‘promised to send Lakatos to him” (he did not mention

Sey writes (op. cit., p. 227) that ‘tas it was always the example of Finland, not that of Roumania, that I had before my eyes, we discussed how it would be possible to prevent Russian troops from getting in the rear of the German troops.” “But,” he writes, “I could give Herr Rahn no assurance.”

408 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH The remaining Ministers, with V6rés, Ambrézy and Perényi, who had arrived earlier to swear in the new Ministry (betraying by his premature arrival that he had been in the secret of the “‘resignation’’), had meanwhile been listening fascinated to the Proclamation, as wafted in to them through the open windows from a wireless set in the aide-de-camps’ room next door.

This came to them, as we have seen, as a complete surprise, and when Ambrozy came into the room, with Lakatos and Hennyey, they upbraided him for not having shown them the text. Ambrdzy excused himself by saying that there had not been time, since the Crown Council had started late, and the Regent had had to receive Veesenmayer at noon.! He now made good the omission by reading out the text of the Proclamation, but, for whatever reason, said nothing, even now, about the negotiations with the Allies. Thus, not only were the bulk of the Ministers left uninformed, to the last, of even the earlier stages of those negotiations, but Lakatos and Hennyey themselves passed the rest of the day still ignorant of the preliminary armistice and of Antonov’s ultimatum. When Ambrozy had finished, Vérés read out again the reply which he had sent to Guderian. At Lakatos’ and Hennyey’s insistence, he telephoned to the Ministry of Defence, urging that the Code Order should be sent out immediately, and receiving a reassuring (although, as the event proved, a misleading) answer that this had been done.* Then, remarking, to Schell: ‘There is still a very great deal to be done,”’ VGrdés left the Ministers to go across to his own office, a few hundred yards away. Farkas accompanied him.

The ‘new’? Government was now reappointed and sworn in by Barczy

and Baron Perényi, Keeper of the Holy Crown. All present—including Reményi-Schneller and Jurcsek, who had already agreed to accept portfolios

in the Szalasi Government which was plotting with the Germans to overthrow Lakatos, and who, in fact, accepted those portfolios twenty-four

hours later—took the oath of loyalty to Horthy and to the Hungarian Constitution. The Regent apparently did not realise that the Ministers were still in the Palace, for after Rahn had left, he had his lunch, this taking till about 2.15. Then he went back to where the Ministers were waiting. He told them that he had spoken to Rahn, who had wanted him to reverse his decision. Rahn

had asked for another audience later in the afternoon, but he did not feel inclined to receive him again, as he had nothing more to say to him. He asked Lakatos and Hennyey to receive him instead. He was still confident that the Army would obey his orders.* ’ Barczy. * Personal, Hennyey to C. A. M.

3 Personal, Schell to C. A.M. Schell writes specifically that “‘Voros left us before the Regent's return.”’ Farkas actually puts the hour at 12 noon, but it must have been considerably 4 Obviously this was the point at which, if he was ever to do so, Horthy must have mentioned Rahn’s proposals and suggested a way of meeting them; and the evidence is overwhelming that he did not do so. Apart from his own explicit testimony, given to the writer and confirmed by Mme I. Horthy, that he never thought of going back on what he had done, or thought it possible to do so, and never gave any instructions to Lakatos, Vorés or anyone else, the evidence of those present at the meeting is unanimous. Barczy writes that “‘he said he had received Rahn, but

told him that he had come too late. Rahn had asked for another audience, but Horthy asked

Lakatos to receive him as he did not feel inclined to receive him again.”’ In conversation, Barczy has confirmed his written account exactly, only adding that Horthy said that Rahn “‘was a nice gentleman, with whom one could talk reasonably.’’ There was no discussion, and no mention

of any offer. Nagy simply writes, ‘he told the Ministers what he had said to Rahn and with

HORTHY AGONISTES 409 Then the Regent said:

‘"Hard times are coming to us. We shall suffer much, but this step had to be taken. The Germans have disregarded our sovereignty and behaved like scoundrels towards us. A German politician once said that it was Germany’s good fortune that there are only 13 million Magyars in the world. We have been and still are in the way of their eastward

expansion. For myself, I have burned all the bridges behind me. | regret that with my decision of today I have laid up bitter hours and much suffering for the members of the Government.’”!

The Regent then shook the hands of all present and left the room. The time was about 2.45 p.m. Csatay was standing with Barczy in one of the great window recesses. He said to his old friend: ““Now we can go home. The Germans will arrest us today, and they will bomb Budapest.’’ No one contradicted him, and the party broke up. Lakatos, Schell, Rakovszky and Hennyey walked across together to the Minister President’s office.

Jurcsek and Reményi-Schneller took another direction. It transpired afterwards that they had gone straight to the German Legation, where they remained until twenty-four hours later, when they took the oath once again— to Szalasi. Barczy went home—also a short walk, since he lived in the Var. Viadar, Mark6s and Gyulay disappeared, perhaps to their Sunday dinners. No one seems to have bothered about them any more. Doubtless, so long as they lived,” they were glad of it. IX

The Ministers were not the only people surprised by the Proclamation.

For once in the history of Hungary a secret had been well kept. It took friend and foe equally aback. Hitler, as we have seen, had thought it safe to allow Rahn and Veesenmayer to make their “‘last appeal’? on the 15th. Even Guderian’s ultimation had given Hungary another twelve hours. Marshal Malinovsky, on his side, can hardly have been expecting any decisive move before the return of the Hungarian plenipotentiary the following morning. Of the Hungarians, the leaders of the Left had not been expecting zero hour to arrive for another three days. They had not even got their Proclamation drafted, and Lazar had not sent them any further word. Their opposite numbers of the Right were still less prepared. Half their key men were not even in Budapest. Beregffy, for example, who was to take charge of the Army, was away in Sidfok, working in his garden. He missed the Proclamation altogether, and the first that he learnt of the whole business was when his wife ran out to him in the afternoon to tell him that a call was going out for him on the wireless. Another Arrow Cross leader, Gera, went better still; he was off duty that day, and had gone to bed. He knew nothing until the

evening. Horthy’s own commanders of military and police in Pest and what reasoning he had supported his own request for an armistice.” Hennyey (to C. A. M.) says that he was told to speak to Rahn “‘in a negative sense.”’ Schell, like Barczy, never knew until told by the present writer that Rahn had made any proposals. Barczy and Schell confirm that Lakatos was not alone with the Regent either before or after the adjourned meeting. V6rds, as we saw, had already left. 1 Barczy.

2 All of them were alive in 1946.

410 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH outer Buda were in no better case. They had not only received no orders what to do in an emergency, but no warning that an emergency was imminent. Aggteleki had gone out to lunch with friends, leaving no address behind him.

Hardy was just about to do the same, when the Proclamation fell on his startled ears, and he cancelled his appointment. The one man pre-warned was Farkas, but he now had nothing to do; he had no authority over the other local commanders and no troops with which to perform his allotted task of guarding the bridgehead; and for that matter, no one to guard it against. The population as a whole seems to have been stunned and bewildered. Naturally, certain organs of the foreign Press which were selling Hungary’s pro-Allied sympathies put out stories of scenes of wild rejoicing; laughing

and cheering in the streets, strangers embracing, Soviet flags put out in windows, Jews pouring out of the Ghetto houses, tearing from their breasts as they did so the yellow badge, the Star of David. The Press of the other side pictured Budapest rather as a prey to shame and fury. Doubtless scenes of both orders occurred. The Arrow Cross afterwards excused the excesses which took place in the following night by saying that Jews had insulted their men, and even German soldiers, in the street, and that

from one house on the Margit-k6rut shots had been fired. That some shooting—although not only by Jews—took place in the evening is true, for, as we have seen, some members of the Jewish labour battalions and some of the workers had really been armed. ‘“‘Order’’ was, indeed, not fully restored in the working-class quarters for some three days. But for a true picture of the general mood of Budapest I prefer to take the vivid lines of Jézsef Darvas, himself a member of the extreme Left.1. Darvas describes how, walking in the streets of Pest, he suddenly hears the Proclamation, the words of which stream out of the open windows of every house. The streets were thronged, and everyone is standing, listening, gaping “like fish in a pond when you throw in breadcrumbs.”’ ‘“One would expect that after the last words’ (of the Proclamation) ‘‘a liberated shout would come from the men, shrill and powerful as when the compressed steam escapes when the gauge is opened. But no! Here and there one does hear a timid, pseudo-enthusiastic cry of ‘Hurrah for the Regent!’ “Hurrah for the separate peace!’ But the loitering crowds stand on, dumb and motionless. What is reflected on their faces is not even emotion, but a kind of uncertain rumination, as though they were

still weighing the meaning and value of the words. ... As though the words had not yet penetrated to their brains, their hearts. The occasional

movement is rather that of disquiet than of joy. No one moves from under the windows; they wait for something more.” There follows the Order of the Day to the troops; and then:

“I almost rush along the Ring?; I seek the exulting masses, the thousands celebrating their liberty, wandering to and fro and rejoicing.

For it is a day of celebration. Armistice. Peace. ‘Hurrah for the

separate peace,’ I shout into the faces of those I meet, rather in rage and gnashing of teeth, than in the intoxication of enthusiasm. A few shout 1 Varos az Ingovdnyon, pp. 129 ff.

> The Nagykorut, the great semicircular boulevard which divides the inner from the outer part of Pest. It must be remarked that the quarters through which it runs, although not factory districts, are not wealthy or fashionable ones, and at least before 1944, contained a very large Jewish population.

HORTHY AGONISTES 411 with me, with an expression on their faces of ‘who knows whether really... . And this mood of ‘who knows whether really .. .’ is the dominating one; there are very few who dare celebrate openly, happily.

Little groups of these form, begin to chant in chorus—but the great majority, the ‘real’ population of Budapest, is uncertain and mistrustful.’”!

The German sentries outside a German military office—Darvas goes on to tell—**stood quite motionless, as though they knew nothing, or else knew

everything very well. The Hungarian soldiers answered the crowds who surrounded them that they had received no orders.”’ And most of the leaders of both sides showed themselves, in those first hours, as helpless and as passive as the uninstructed masses. It is true that the position of the workers’ leaders was exceptionally difficult: Sunday, when many factories and workshops were closed, was the worst possible day for them. But of any ability to improvise or to take individual initiative, they

showed not a sign. A few of the better-organised “resistance groups” assembled at their pre-arranged rendezvous, where some of them had hoped to be issued with arms or leaflets; but finding neither, most of them melted away (those who applied to the Palace fared no better).2 As to the leaders of the Left, their own historian can find nothing to say of their actions except that “they sat in front of their wirelesses with clenched fists, gnashing their teeth. They knew that an enterprise which might have been successful three days later was inevitably doomed to failure now.’® In other words, their resistance that day consisted of burrowing deeper into their hidey-holes; a course which enabled them, indeed, to survive and later receive (for a while) the plaudits of Democratic Hungary. Many of the leaders of the Right showed little more personal heroism, for it was an interesting feature of the situation that each side believed that

the other was the stronger and was about to attack it. Szdllosi, when he heard the Proclamation, made sure that his movement was “‘destined for the

fate of the Iron Guard.” He raised a car, jumped into it and ran away to West Hungary, whence he returned only two days later, after he had been appointed Deputy Minister President. Rayjniss’ wife rushed in to him in tears, begging him to seek the shelter of the German Legation. He took this advice, and arriving, found Reményi-Schneller, Jurcsek, Szasz and several 1 Op. cit., p. 135. It may be added that a German reporter, whose sympathies were exactly the opposite of Darvas’, gave in the Magyarsdg, 22nd October 1944, a very similar picture. His prevailing impression was one of strange calm (furcsa nyugalom). * Thus the leaders of one party, known as ‘“‘Szentgydrgyi’s Resistance Movement,” duly turned up at a factory in Pest, where their arms were hidden, and one of them, who was supposed to be the liaison officer with the Palace, telephoned to Lazar. Lazar then sent a police car to fetch this man to the Palace, whence he never returned. The remainder were soon arrested by the Arrow Cross (cf. A Regge/, 20th January 1947). Another group of officers, including one who told the writer of this story, gathered in the Ministry of Defence after the Proclamation, but after waiting for an hour, found themselves no more clear than before what they should do. The author’s informant (Col. Szemes) then called Vattay’s office and asked what the position was. Pogany answered that the position was unclear,

he did not know what would happen. After a further wait, the officers decided to go to the Palace themselves. About 4 p.m. they saw Vattay, who confirmed that the Regent’s Proclamation was authentic and that the Germans were to be regarded as enemies. But he complained that the General Staff was ‘‘making difficulties for the Regent,’ and when Szemes suggested that he should be given a company of the Bodyguard and allowed to go and arrest the pro-German officers, Vattay refused the request. Szemes and his friends returned to the Ministry, but found the doors locked against them, and were refused admission. They returned to their homes, and it was only in the evening that they joined in the belated attempt at resistance which will be described. (See below, pp. 428-9.)

3 Szava, op. cit., p. 113.

412 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH others there. Thither, in the course of the afternoon, the Germans brought another score or so of their protégés, including Kemény, Vajna, Ney and

Szalasi himself. They spent the afternoon and evening waiting and wondering what was going to happen. Szalasi was thus speaking the truth when he said at his trial that what was done in the afternoon in Pest, including the broadcasting of his own Proclamation, was done without his knowledge, although he had, of course, given Kovarcz a general authorisation a month earlier.

There was, indeed, nothing else for the Right-wing politicians to do. The Germans were not yet ready to use them, and commando work was not their business but that of Kovarcz, who, to do him justice, had remained at his post. But even he was condemned to idleness for the greater part of the

afternoon. For the Germans had not yet carried out their promise of arming his formations. He and his staff spent the first hours of the afternoon mounting a few machine-guns which were in their possession round their

quarters and preparing to sell their lives dearly, for they too believed the other side to be the stronger. Even Von dem Bach and Skorzeny were not ready to move, for the plans for ““Panzerfaust”’ had not yet been worked out,! so that the vacuum, for a few minutes, was almost complete. But in those minutes action, which may possibly have proved decisive for the whole subsequent course of events, came from the Operational Section of the Honvéd Ministry. It was through this section that orders relating to the movements and action of troops went, and the head of it had authority, in Vor6ds’ absence, to issue orders on matters not on the highest level and not involving questions of principle which nevertheless called for urgent action. The acting head of

the Section was, as we know, Col. Nadas. We have also seen that Col. Nadas’ views were decidedly in favour of the struggle’s being continued. Whether the action which Col. Nadas now took did or did not involve large issues, I leave to others to decide, and will also omit discussion of the question whether he communicated with any German quarters before taking

it. It appears that both Veesenmayer’s and Greiffenberg’s first thoughts when they heard the Proclamation had been to get hold of their friend Vérés and to insist to him that the Hungarian armies at the Front must hold fast; and Greiffenberg had left a message to the effect, “‘in the name of the OK W.’” Nadas may have received this message, or he may not; in any case he would have needed little prompting. His own account of his actions, as given to the writer, is that when he heard Horthy’s Proclamation, which reached him in his office,® it at once filled him with apprehension. He “‘did not know that a military agreement had been reached with the Russians, and regarded the Proclamation as calculated to spread confusion at the Front and to weaken the power of resistance. It might have provoked the Germans into disarming

the Hungarian troops. It might even be a trick of the enemy. The Hungarian troops might misunderstand the text.’”4 Nadas rang up VGrd6s in the Ministry,® to be told that the Chief of Staff 1 Skorzeny, op. cit., pp. 203-4. * Veesenmayer to C. A. M. * The wireless was permanently on, as was customary in Budapest, so that air-raid warnings could be received.

4 Nadas to C. A. M. * The Operational Section was housed in a separate building in the Szinhaz Utca, a few hundred

yards away from the Ministry proper.

HORTHY AGONISTES 413 was at a Crown Council and not available. He does not seem to have tried the Palace, where, had he done so, he would have found Vérés peacefully engaged in the same occupation as himself, viz. listening to the wireless. Nadas therefore decided: “I had to do something to prevent the Front from collapsing, owing to the passivity of the Supreme Command, when the political leadership would have lost that instrument which gave it freedom of action.” He instructed V6rés’ adjutant, Kapitanffy,! to inform him as soon as the Chief of Staff came back, and ordered one of his subordinates to draft an order to the effect that the armistice had not yet been signed, so that the troops were not to lay down their arms. He then tried to call up the Chiefs of Staff of the three Armies in the field. He got his connection with the First and Third Armies, and instructed the Chiefs of Staff in the sense indicated. The Second Army was moving, and with it the connection could not be made,

so Nadas sent down a written instruction to the same effect, to be sent out on the teleprinter. Nadas did not send this order to the commanders of the troops behind the Front, regarding these as unimportant and their conduct, anyway, as none of his business; but Kapitanffy, who was being besieged at the time with queries, seems to have replied to them that there was no information and no orders yet available. Kapitanffy took one other serious step. While the Regent’s Proclamation

was still going out for the second time, thus about 1.30 p.m., Vattay duly rang him up and dictated the Code Order to him, asking him to send it out at once.” Kapitanffy, appealing to the service regulations, said that he must have the message in writing, and some half an hour was spent in telephoning to and fro,? before the written message was brought over, apparently by Vattay’s adjutant, Major Szentpalyi. It was in proper form and duly signed by V6rés, but with no number or other special indication. Kapitanffy writes that “tas he was entering the message and considering how it could be sent out,’’ General Laszl6 came in; Kapitanffy showed him the message and Laszl6 asked him what it meant. Kapitanffy could not answer, and Laszl6 thereupon took the message from him. By this time it was getting on for two o’clock, and Rahn was driving back to the German Legation from his interview with Horthy, a prey to somewhat conflicting thoughts. His own account of his feelings, given after the event,* would even suggest that he had not even been sincere in making the offer

he had made to Horthy; for, as he writes, he now felt that he had at any rate gained time and left the door open for the possibility of getting the Hungarians to go on fighting, or at the least to refrain from attacking the Germans, while he was convinced that there was little hope of Hitler’s accepting the suggestion that the German troops should be withdrawn. It is 1 [ have had to reconstruct the story of this message from personal narratives given to me by Nadas and Kapitanffy, and from the evidence given in the Szalasi Trial (pp. 152-3). My three sources, on the face of them, are not easy to reconcile, but my combination does achieve a result which rejects no statement from any of the three, while assuming that none of them knew the whole story. I indicate by footnotes which detail I take from each source, and where I have had to fill in the gaps by hypothetical statements. 2 The Order, as Kapitanffy informs the writer, included the words: “G.O.C. First Army to pass on also to G.O.C. VI Corps.” 3 Kapitanffy writes that he spoke chiefly with Pogany; cf. Hennyey’s story (above, pp. 407-8), which suggests that appeal was made to Voros. 4 Personal, Rahn to C. A. M.

414 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH fair to suppose that in putting his thoughts this way he does himself an injustice; but at least he felt that he had spoken too hastily and that if he communicated with Ribbentrop, the answer would almost certainly be that he and Veesenmayer had been proved wrong in disregarding the original orders which they had been enjoined ‘‘on their lives” to execute, and that ‘‘Panzerfaust” must be carried through without delay. He consulted with Veesenmayer, and the two men apparently agreed that

it would be hopeless to put the proposals up to Hitler. They seem also to have assumed that Horthy had burnt his personal bridges behind him by his Proclamation. He would have to be replaced by Szalasi. But it ought still to be possible to make the transition a peaceful one, without bringing ‘‘Panzerfaust” into operation; and it should also prove possible to persuade the Hungarian Army to continue the fight, or at least to refrain from turning against the Germans. And achievement of this second and more important result would certainly be facilitated if it could be combined with the first. The two men to be squared immediately were Von dem Bach and VG6r6s. Von dem Bach had rung up the Legation almost as soon as Rahn returned,

announcing that he was going to take “immediate action,” but after a vigorous exchange of words between him and Rahn, and some mediation by Winkelmann, Von dem Bach consented to give the diplomats until 6 a.m. on the following morning to reach such an agreement as would make force unnecessary. If they had not done so, force would be used, as it would also if the Hungarians attacked the Germans before that hour. Pending later developments, however, Von dem Bach sent his empty tanks parading round Pest with the object (in which he was completely successful) of overawing the population. Veesenmayer now went back to look again for V6r6és, who by this time had, indeed, arrived in his office, and had arrived to find himself in a position which, despicable creature as he was, almost excites pity; for seldom can a moral coward have passed through a much more trying ordeal. As soon as he reached his room, Laszl6, General Major and Kapitanffy (joined a few minutes later by Nadas, who had hurried over on hearing that he was back) fell upon him, demanding to know what was going on.” The first question was about the Proclamation, and already at this point, one must have thought, loyalty to his “‘Legfels6bb Hadur,’’ and even the higher truthfulness, should have prompted V6rd6s to say that the Government

had endorsed the Regent’s decision to ask for an armistice, that he himself had contributed to that result by declaring the military situation hopeless, and that the Army’s Job was now to carry the decision into effect. But by all accounts (including his own) he said not a word of this, but sticking to the strict letter of the truth, and answering the exact question put to him,

he protested that he had known nothing of the Proclamation, and had not consented to it; thus leaving his interlocutors with the impression that he

was against the Regent’s action. |

The next moment, Laszl6 took out of his pocket the Code Order, slammed

it down on the table in front of V6rés, and in the very words addressed by ‘ The details here are not clear, particularly as two of the personal sources whom I have consulted contradict one another flatly. I have been unable to ascertain whether anyone outside the persons on the spot was a party to the agreement, but the sentence written above is in any case correct. * For this scene the writer had drawn on five narratives: fromV6rés (who gave his own story twice, once at the Szalasi Trial and again in D. F.), Veesenmayer, Nadas and Kapitanffy.

HORTHY AGONISTES 415 Horthy to Veesenmayer an hour or two before, and probably, much the same

tone, demanded: “And what is that?! The wretched V6réds equivocated again. In his later narrative, given under different circumstances,” he said that he knew that under the preliminary armistice, the Army had to go over to the Russians; and he certainly knew that the Order embodied the arrangements made by Vattay with the Army Commanders. But now he simply said that the Code Order had nothing to do with him. Vattay had given it him to sign, he did not know what it meant. Laszl6 asked: ‘““How can one sign a thing without knowing what it means?’ To this V6rés had, apparently, no reply; but the Order was in fact given back to Nadas, who afterwards handed it back again to Kapitanffy. This formidable quartet were now reinforced by a fifth—Veesenmayer, who came storming in, spouting fire at the nostrils. eesenmayer shooed the others out of the room. Then he demanded that Vor6és issue a counterOrder, revoking or at least nullifying Horthy’s. V6rés, to do him justice, seems to have hesitated; but Veesenmayer “‘appealed to Horthy’s interviews with himself and with Rahn’’? and it may well be that he emphasised rather strongly Horthy’s own hesitations and his anxiety to avoid bloodshed between Germans and Hungarians, and may not have mentioned that Hitler was not, for the moment, being asked to evacuate Hungary. At any rate, V6rdés now

agreed to issue the desired Order, and also give his word of honour that he would not run away.* Accepting this (for strangely, he still had confidence in V6rds), Veesenmayer went away, leaving the General once more to the mercy of his subordinates. Nadas now explained what he had done, but said that he had sent his Order only to the Army Commanders; and, of course, it required confir-

mation. Kapitanffy reported that he had been besieged with calls from commanders, individuals, etc., on the Proclamation, and asked permission to send out to all Commanding Officers and units whom he could reach by any method, a “preliminary information” to the effect that the Regent’s Proclamation, as issued, did not apply to the troops and that they would shortly be getting special instructions how to act. ‘Till then they were to continue the fight. Laszl6 and Nadas agreed. V6rdés authorised the despatch

of this message, and Kapitanffy left the room to get it sent out. The discussion had lasted about half an hour, counting the break caused by the irruption of Veesenmayer. The others then went on “‘discussing what orders should be issued to the troops” (no one remarking that according to Horthy’s and Csatay’s Order

of the Day, orders had already been sent out by the Regent himself),

and in the course of the discussion Nadas left the room to fetch his own Order (of which, apparently, he had not thought to bring a carbon copy with him). WV6rds then had a quite extraordinary idea. Here is his own later account of his actions: ‘“‘“At that time neither the Army nor the general public had been told 1 Kapitanffy. 2 Sc. in 1945.

3 Veesenmayer to C. A. M.

4 This phrase lends colour to a report (the author’s source for which is Col. Szemes, the officer who took Laszlé’s deposition in prison) that Laszlé had threatened V6ros with arrest if he proved recalcitrant. Laszlé6 may well have been transmitting a threat from Greiffenberg. The charge against Laszl6 was that “he misled V6rds, when he returned from the Crown Council, by telling him that the troops refused to lay down their arms” (Kossuth Neépe, 27th April 1946).

416 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH the chief points of the preliminary armistice. Only I knew that the Army had to go over to the Russians and continue the fight against the Germans.

I saw clearly that if the Army was told the fact of the armistice, the soldiers would disperse and go home; we should then be unable to organise

the Army and honour the obligation which we had undertaken in the armistice to continue the fight against the Germans.”’

He therefore proposed to reissue Nadas’ Order, adding, after “‘continue the fight,”’ the words “‘against any attack.”” He gave afterwards the naively ingenious explanation that since the Russians were “behaving very loyally”

and not attacking, while the Germans, after Guderian’s ultimatum, were bound to attack, these words meant, in practice, against attack from the Germans. He now asked Laszlo if an Order in this form would satisfy the Germans;

and Laszl6 agreed for his own part, although saying that he must have confirmation from the Germans before finally guaranteeing VGrés’ safety. Vorés then rang up Vattay and told him that he proposed to issue an Order in the terms described. Nadas, who heard this said, did not hear Vattay’s reply, but on receiving it, VGrds took Nadas’ Order, added to it, in his own hand, the words ‘‘against attack coming from any quarter,” signed it, and told Nadas to send it out. The famous Order now ran: ‘““No one is to interpret the Regent’s broadcast as meaning that the Hungarian Army is laying down its arms. So far it is only a question of negotiations for an armistice. The outcome of these is still uncertain, and thus every Hungarian soldier and unit must continue the fight, as before, and with all its strength, in the face of attack from any quarter.’”

Nadas took the paper back to the Operational Section, where it was written out in clear, given a file number, etc. It was then brought back to Vo6roés for his signature, which he appended. A copy was then sent down to the signals station for transmission to the Army Commands, and it was also transmitted, like Kapitanffy’s “preliminary information,” to all units which could be reached. The time of issue, according to the log-book, was 2.55 p.m.

Immediately before this, at 2.50 p.m., Kapitanffy had logged and sent down the Code Order, but the adventures of that document were not yet over. The officers in the signals station were without exception hostile to surrender, and soon after the Proclamation had gone out, the operator on duty, a man called Balazs Csontos, received an order from his superiors that telegrams

coming from the Regent’s office were not to be transmitted immediately, but first ““submitted”’ (sc. to the officer on duty).2 When, a minute or two ‘ Szemes. Nadas did not hear this exchange, but agrees that it could have taken place while he was out of the room. > This is the English translation, as monitored by the B.B.C. at 5.21, when the Order went

out on the wireless (News Digest, No. 1580, 17th October 1944). The Hungarian original was not kept. According to Csontos, the operator on the teleprinter, the text which went out on the wireless (which he heard at the time) was identical with that which he had transmitted a couple of hours earlier to the Army Commanders. The text given in Adonyi, op. cit., p. 73 (which is that taken down in the signals office of the 25th Division) omits the words ‘‘from any quarter,’’ but even this text gives “‘against attack,’’ and I do not see how or why the B.B.C. monitor should have invented the addition ‘from any quarter’ if he did not hear it. It has also been alleged that the word ‘from quarter’? (dldalrél) dropped out in transmission, leaving only “‘any’’ (minden), but this seems to me unimportant. 3 Csontos’ evidence, Szalasi Trial, p. 152. Csontos said that he received the order ‘‘from his

. superiors’ after the Regent’s Proclamation had gone out and before the arrival of the Code Order. The ultimate source of the instruction cannot be traced.

HORTHY AGONISTES 417 before 3 p.m., the Code Order was brought in, the officer bringing it was told

that there was no telephonic communication and it would have to go by teleprinter. He left itand went away. Some three minutes later, Csontos’ superior, a certain Captain Palffy,t looked in and asked whether the Order had arrived. He then took it away, saying that it was not to be forwarded. Palffy appears to have given the Order to another officer, named Sz6rényi, who, after a time, brought it back to Nadas, saying that it was “unintelligible.” Nadas, who by this time had strong suspicions of what the Order meant, took it back to V6rés and, in his own words, ‘‘explained the circumstances and asked whether it did not contradict V6rés’ Order, which had already gone out,

to continue the fight.” V6rds, Col. Nadas’ account goes on, “rang up Vattay again, and after talking to him, said to me: ‘That is not to go out, it is no longer aktuel.””?

Kapitanffy came into V6rés’ room a little later to clear the out-basket. The Code Order was lying on VorGs’ writing-table. He asked VGrds about it; Voros replied: “File it; it is not to go out.’”

Vor6és’ own Order was treated differently. It was sent out to all Army Commanders’ and telephoned to all Commanders of local units, including Farkas and Aggteleki.®5 Then, at 5.21 (as will be described shortly) it was broadcast on the wireless. This is the true and exact history of how the orders sent out by Horthy in an attempt to carry out the pre-Armistice were in part suppressed, in part turned into the exact opposite. In 1945 and 1946, when the Russians and their friends were all-powerful in Hungary and people were being hanged for not having attacked the Germans on 15th October, V6rés denied his treachery with oaths. He swore that his original Order had been falsified by disloyal subordinates, and a complaisant Court allowed him to get away with

it.° This much is true, that at 9.40 p.m. a variant of the Order was put on the wireless which omitted the words “‘against attack coming from any side”’

and added that anyone disobeying the order to fight on would be shot.’ Taking advantage of this, V6rdés managed to convey the impression that his original Order had been falsified. This 1s not the case: the Order in its original form was as we have given it, and the genesis of it was as we have described. , And in the course of the afternoon, V6ré6s—there is independent evidence for this—confirmed the authenticity of the Order, in this form, more than once.®

The puzzling feature of this story must be, not the conduct of the Germans and their sympathisers, who were acting in accordance with their interests and their convictions; nor that of V6r6s, whose conduct was that of a coward and a double-dealer, but that was what he was; but that of Vattay, regarded by Szalasi as one of the three most dangerous members of the ““Anglo-Judaeo

clique” in all Hungary. The story of his part, again, does not rest solely on 1 Not identical either with the resistance leader, or the National Socialist. Press accounts of the scene, in 1945, also mention the names of Col. G. Porzsesinszky and Captain Bagaméry.

2 Nadas (confirmed by Kapitanffy) to C. A. M. 3 Kapitanffy to C. A. M.

4 Csontos’ evidence, Szalasi Trial, loc. cit. 6 Kapitanffy to C. A. M. 8 Especially in his evidence at the trial of Szalasi, p. 164, and in his article in D.F.; but he appears to have repeated these lies many times, when giving evidence to get various of his subordinates executed for obeying his own orders. 7 See below, p. 428.

8 He confirmed it to Farkas (Farkas to C.A.M.). Kapitanffy writes that V6ros, in his (K.’s) presence, confirmed the Order “to some high commander, he doesn’t know who.”’ Another .

source afterwards saw Vor6s’ Diary, the last entry in which was: “signed order to continue the fight.”

2D

418 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH the unsupported word of Nadas: there is independent evidence that he confirmed and endorsed VGrés’ Order.: It really appears that he swallowed Vorés’ argument that the Order was directed against the Germans, so that it did not alter the situation,? and he may have thought that the suppression of the Code Order made no difference, since Veress and Miklés both knew already what to do: we shall see in a moment that even after the issue of Voérés’ Order, Vattay regarded Horthy’s original programme as holding good.

We can only record that he did in fact endorse V6rés’ actions, without consulting the Regent before doing so, and also without informing him of what he had done; so that Horthy’s first knowledge of V6rés’ Order came to him when he heard it go out on the wireless at 5.20 p.m.® With this, the Germans had won the first round. It is possible, indeed, that even had VGrds not issued his Order, at least a considerable proportion of the officers of the First and Second Armies would have refused to go over

to the Russians. But once the Order had been issued, that was the end of any prospect that there might ever have been of the Hungarian Army’s acting as Horthy had meant it to act. Heszlényi acknowledged V6r6és’ Order with

thanks, and went on fighting—Russians—as before. Later, he notified his adherence to Szalasi. Veress, who had been caught away from his H.Q. (he had started back to Budapest to clear up some points with Horthy), rang up between 5 and 6 p.m. and asked to speak to Vattay. Csontos reported this to Szorényi, who forbade Csontos to connect him, but the operator, after a long time, got a line through to the Regent’s office. Eventually, Pogany came down to the signals office and conducted a conversation with Veress via the teleprinter. Veress asked whether the Regent was safe, then asking “‘why the Regent’s Order was to be interpreted differently”’ (1.e. in the sense of V6rés’ Order). Pogany repeated the substance of the original Code Order and told Veress to get in touch with the Russians immediately; if the Germans tried

to prevent him, he was to fight. Veress then ordered the Second Army to retire, whereupon the German liaison officer told him to rescind the Order. On his refusing, his own Chief of Staff arrested him and the Germans took over command of his forces.° Miklés also had been on the move when the Proclamation went out. His H.Q. was still in Huszt, but he himself had got back to Beregszasz, where he heard the Proclamation on the wireless. It took him completely by surprise, for he, like others, had not expected anything decisive to happen for another

two or three days. According to his own story,° he rang up Budapest and, 1 Hardy rang him in the afternoon and got the answer verbatim: “Yes, that is in order (igen, ez rendben van)”’ (Hardy to C. A. M.). He said the same thing to Lazar (Lazar’s evidence, Szalasi Trial, p. 148), and, apparently, to Miklds (below, p. 418). * What he said to Lazar was that the Order ‘“‘did not alter the situation.”’ * The Regent has most specifically assured me that he gave no orders whatever to V6rGs in

the course of the afternoon, and Mme. Ilona Horthy has described to me how they heard the Order, for the first time, on the wireless, to their ‘‘great astonishment.’’ Even then, Voros told her that the Order had been falsified, and she telegraphed to that effect to Moscow. How and why nobody came to tell the Regent about the Order I cannot explain. * Csontos’ evidence, Szalasi Trial, pp. 152-53, 169. ® According to G. Teleki (loc. cit.) when Horthy decided to appoint Veress homo regius, he sent down a duplicate of the Order appointing him through military channels. This was photographed in Budapest and a copy passed to the Germans, who were thus closely watching the General’s movements. ® The fullest account of Mikldés’ adventures was that given by himself in a deposition which

was reprinted at length in Magyar Nemzet, 25th June 1945. Another account, not wholly consistent with the first, is given in A debreceni Feltamadds, pp. 32 ff. I have supplemented these with personal information, as indicated.

HORTHY AGONISTES 419 after much difficulty, managed to speak to Vattay, who told him that “‘everything” was in order.’’ He deduced what had happened, but gave out orders

that the troops were to remain on the defensive against the Russians and disarm any German troops in the vicinity. The German liaison officers were to be arrested and their signal stations seized, the post office at Munkacs,

which was in German hands, seized, and the bridges at Tokaj and Técs6, over which the First Army would retreat, occupied. Meanwhile they were

to resist if attacked by the Germans. He repeated these orders to all Commanders whom he could reach.

Meanwhile, however, V6r6és’ Order had gone out, and when MajorGeneral Vasvari, commanding the 16th Division, on the right wing, looked in at Miklds’ H.Q. a little later, Miklés’ Chief of Staff, Kéri, showed him a paper on which was typed the text of the Proclamation, or a summary of it, under which were written the words (which someone had underlined in red): **Order by Col.-General Janos Vorés, Chief of the General Staff: ‘No armistice yet, so fight on.’”’? Keéri then told Vasvari that the orders for the Army were coming by plane, and asked him to stand by.*— Miklos himself said that very few of his officers obeyed his orders. His Quartermaster-General, Jolsvay, whom he had ordered to take over the German armoured cars in the vicinity, refused to do so, saying ““Let’s wait until the morning and see.’’? The units nearer to the Front, and further from Miklos, hesitated even less. One officer commanding ‘“‘a shock battalion” (a Major F. Németh) had just reached Huszt at 2 p.m. when his adjutant told him of the Proclamation.® He went

into the Army H.Q., but could find no senior officer there. In the signals station there was a young officer who told him that the Regent’s orders, which all units were to obey, were that the Army was to lay down its arms. Németh then had some guns in the neighbourhood trained on the H.Q., told his subordinates what was the situation and that his own preference was for continuing the fight, and when they concurred (as he said, unanimously)— occupied the telephone exchange and ordered all enquiries to be answered in the same sense. He then went to the local Commander and reported what he had done. At 5 p.m. a German officer came to him, thanked him, and told him that it was now settled that the First Army was continuing the fight. All units seem, in fact, to have decided to do so, invoking, where necessary, Vorés’ Order. Some of the Commanders might have changed their minds if they had received orders in the opposite sense from Budapest which they felt

that they could take as authoritative; but when Vasvari looked in in the evening, Kéri had nothing new to tell him.’ As for Miklés, he had tried again, repeatedly, to get Budapest, and had once even managed to speak to VGrdés, only to get from him the terrified answer: “‘I can’t talk now, there are German officers in my room.’ His last conversation was with Pogany, from whom he learned that the Germans and Arrow Cross were in power in Budapest. 1 According to Csontos, Miklés made repeated efforts during the afternoon to speak to Vattay, as indeed Vattay did to speak to him; but they only once got a connection. 2 I.e. (presumably) the V6rés Order. 3 A vezérkari fondke Janos Vérés vezérezredés parancsa: fegyversziinet még nincsen tehat tovabbharcolni. 4 Vasvari to C. A. M. 5 A debreceni Feltdmadas, p. 38. * Németh to C. A. M. 7 Vasvari to C. A. M. 8 4 debreceni Feltdmadas, \oc. cit.

420 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Meanwhile, the Germans had not only rushed tanks and armoured cars up to the passes, but had succeeded in occupying the vital bridges in the rear.

Naturally, there was no more question of the VI Corps falling back to Budapest. Actually, one battalion and one battery had entrained at Rahovo, but had got only as far as Csap, where they had been held up by a demolished

bridge. They were now sent back to the Front. The officer commanding the Hussars Division rang up at five minutes to three, just after VGrés’ Order had reached the Operational Section,’ and on receiving the Order, he seems to have given up any idea of returning to the capital; soon after, his troops were facing the Russians at Szolnok, as part of Heszlényi’s Army.

In Pécs the population and the military alike were totally unprepared for the Proclamation, which they heard with stupefaction. Then they received a summons from Malinovsky to surrender. Finally—says an informant of mine, ‘‘the British wireless told them to join up with Tito’s partisans, and this was the last straw.”? Then came V6rods’ Order, and “‘they breathed again.” The officer commanding rejected Malinovsky’s summons and posted

up placards repudiating the Regent’s Proclamation and ordering the continuance of the fight, in the sense of V6rds’ Order. Most of the other provincial centres, except, of course, those behind the Russian lines, seem to have taken the German side without resistance. The scattered units about the country—A.A. detachments, etc.—rang Buda, were told to go on as before, and did so; the writer had heard of no exceptions.

Finally, Nadas’ and Vorés’ Orders tipped the scale in Budapest. A minority of the officers in command of local units, including Justhy, the Commander of the A.A. defences, had at once gone over openly to the Germans as soon as Horthy’s Proclamation went out, and a few had sent them privy assurances; thus Mészaros, the Commander of the 9/11, had secretly sent word to the Germans that he was on their side, and most of his officers had purposely absented themselves from their quarters all afternoon, so that if Lazar ordered them to attack, the Order should not reach them.? But most of the units had applied to the Honvéd Ministry for information, and on receiving Nadas’ (later, V6rés’) Order, simply obeyed it, and dissociated themselves from events for the rest of the day. Even Hardy took

up this attitude after Vattay had confirmed to him that V6r6s’ Order was “*in order.”

One man had begun by taking a different line. Aggteleki had gone out

to lunch with friends (leaving no address behind) shortly before the Proclamation went out. He returned to the I Corps about 2 p.m. and made a short-lived attempt to put Bakay’s plans into action on his own responsibility. The only force at his disposal was the “‘duty battalion” at his H.Q., which, in Bakay’s plan, had been assigned the task of capturing a

strongly fortified German A.A. post on the Gellérthegy. As the ‘‘duty battalion” consisted only of 140 men, armed at the most with rifles (and not all of them with so much), and as the situation was quite different from that envisaged when Bakay drew up his plans, Aggteleki’s Chief of Staff, Horvath, 1 Nadas to C. A. M. * Dezsényi, op. cit., p. 132. Weesenmayer in evidence at the trial of Szdlasi mentioned one or two other units from which he had received similar messages. * He also rang up Hardy, whom he asked what his arrangements with Bakay had been. Hardy, suspecting his motives, refused to answer.

HORTHY AGONISTES 421 protested. There was a prolonged altercation, in the course of which the second in command, General Hindy, was called in. During the discussion Vorés’ Order arrived. Hindy and Horvath invoked this as overriding Aggteleki’s personal order. Finally, Hindy asked Aggteleki to consider himself as no longer in command.! He took command himself and cancelled

the order to attack and for the rest of the day the I Corps stood to arms. Hindy seems to have told all enquirers during the day to act in the sense of the Vérés Order, i.e. to resist if attacked, but not themselves to attack.? The I Corps thus gave the Germans no active help, but it soon became known that they would not oppose them unless attacked and not themselves attack, a piece of intelligence which greatly encouraged the Arrow Cross.? Meanwhile, Pest was presenting an astonishing sight—astonishing, above all, in the complete normalcy of 99 per cent. of the picture. As time went on, larger and larger crowds filled the streets, but, as Darvas writes,* ‘““The little enthusiasm which had broken out when the Proclamation went out was quite drowned in the swarming masses.’”’ When the German tanks moved down the K6rut, absolutely no one (fortunately for their unarmed crews) called

their bluff.° It was “the same picture as on 19th March. The clustering crowds watched the soldiers almost indifferently; some even waved to them. And not a soul struck in the face those who waved and cheered.”’ Trams and buses were running as usual, except that they did not cross the bridges. The police, in default of orders to take any sort of action,® carried on with beautiful impartiality, holding up trams for tanks, or vice versa, as the demands of the traffic required. Some enterprising printer had run off copies of the Proclamation, and a newsvendor was crying these at the bridgehead as the tanks went by. The telephone service was functioning as usual. At 4 p.m. the wife of one Resistance leader, unaware of the developments of the previous hour or so, was ringing up friends to arrange for a celebration dinner that evening. About 3.15 p.m. German police and SS. men took up positions on the Pest end of the bridges, sealing off Buda from Pest. Next came the enterprise 1 This is the truth of what really happened at I Corps H.Q. All sorts of fantastic rumours were circulated afterwards—that Hindy violently arrested his superior, cowed the other officers by brandishing revolvers, and so on. In fact, none of the officers at the H.Q. was ready to attack the Germans, and Aggteleki himself seems not to have been too distressed by what happened. Later in the afternoon, Hardy sent over his second in command, Col. Trunkwalter, to find out

what was going on. ‘“‘Trunkwalter,” writes Hardy, ‘came back without any suspicion, only remarking that Aggteleki did not look so eager for battle against the Arrow Cross as he had a week earlier, when he took command.... He had no orders to give, and appeared resigned.” 2 So Lazar said at the Szdlasi Trial that in the afternoon he sent a message across to the Corps “who showed him the V6rds Order and said they were obeying it.” The messenger had not learnt of the ‘“‘arrest.”’ Another officer from a small detachment quartered in Pest told the writer that he received the above answer in reply to an enquiry. His troops never moved out of their barracks all day. When in the dusk some mysterious figures were seen near the building,

they fired on them; that was all. . .

3 So the author of an Arrow Cross broadcast the next week said that as he and his friends were waiting in the Pasaréti Ut, expecting attack, an officer arrived to say that “the I Corps was on their side.’”’ ‘Then a load was lifted off our minds, for we knew that we should win.’’ It is

possible that the officer did not mean his words to be taken quite generally, for according to Dezsényi, op. cit., p. 126, Lazar, having been informed by Dezsenyi of the Arrow Cross movements, sent a detachment from the Cartographical Institute, under a Lieutenant-Colonel, to attack the Arrow Cross. Instead of doing this, the officer ‘‘opened negotiations with them.” This may have been the incident referred to by the broadcaster. 4 Op. cit., p. 130. 5 Allegedly a ‘‘partisan detachment of youthful workers” threw hand-grenades at one tank,

but no one was injured. .

® They received no orders the entire day,

422 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH to the planning of which Kovarcz had devoted especial attention: the seizure of the wireless studios.

It was an almost bloodless operation, for someone had played an ingenious trick: a voice had rung up, purporting to speak from the Maria Theresa Barracks, and ordered the officer in command of the detachment sent

to reinforce the studio guard to report immediately with his men. The company marched off, leaving behind only the 23 men placed there earlier

by Vattay. On top of this, when the air-raid warning came, not only the staff of the M.T.I. and the wireless, but also the subaltern in charge of the defences, with his men, retired to the air-raid shelter,! leaving at the gate only a single policeman and one soldier. At 3.45 this policeman suddenly became aware of a Tiger tank advancing

on him down the street.2, He shouted a warning, and the porter, with an official who happened to be present, shut and bolted the door. The policeman

took the tank on with a revolver (his only weapon) and actually kept it at bay for several minutes (this being about the most vigorous act of resistance shown in Pest that day), while the officer telephoned madly round for reinforcements from the air-raid shelter, in which there was a separate telephone.

After several attempts, he allegedly got a promise, but of course nothing ~ came. The tank had, in fact, been only promenading, and probably did not even know that it was outside the wireless studios. But now a detachment of the Arrow Cross, led by a certain Omelka, arrived, followed soon after by some A.A. troops, commanded by one Deak, who once had been employed

in Horthy’s own military Cabinet,? and broke down the door with hand-grenades. The guard escaped by underground passages into a neighbouring building. By ten minutes past four the wireless studios were in the hands of the Arrow Cross, and a few minutes later, the transmitting station at Lakihegy was seized. The studios had been filling in time meanwhile by playing military marches (although most of these were not heard, owing to the air-raid fade-out).* But

as soon as the studios had been seized, an urgent message was sent out for General Beregffy, Szalasi’s Chief of Staff, to report immediately.® Shortly afterwards the Athenaeum printing-works was seized. Hitherto Von dem Bach had allowed his Hungarian supporters only a minor share in the operations. But at about 5 p.m.°® the vigil of Kovarcz and his men was ended, not by the dreaded spectacle of loyal Hungarian troops

advancing to mete out to them “the fate of the Iron Guard” but by the 1 It is impossible not to be struck by the discipline with which nearly all the Hungarian military, including high officers, dived underground whenever there was an air-raid warning. * From an article, allegedly by an eye-witness, and bearing in other respects the stamp of truth, which appeared in Hungaria, 4th November 1949. * Omelka’s men had been terrified by the appearance of this unit, thinking that they were about to be attacked, and were agreeably surprised to find that the troops were on their side. 4 It looks as though a private putsch had taken place inside the studios. The record based on the B.B.C. monitoring says that Budapest started broadcasting again at 3.20 p.m. with new

announcers, and it was noticed that all announcements were made in both Hungarian and German. This appears to be inaccurate. For a certain time after the station went on the air, chiefly Hungarian military tunes were relayed, but German tunes (e.g. Wir fahren gegen Engelland and Beethoven’s Eroica) were played also before the studios were seized. 5 This was the first message recorded by the B.B.C. (as at 4.15 p.m.). So little did people realise the significance that I was told years after that “‘Horthy so little realised feeling in the Army that at the crucial moment he called Beregffy to come to Buda.” § This, according to all Arrow Cross sources consulted by me, was the earliest hour at which any general distribution took place. Szalasi, too (Trial, p. 139), said that most of his men did not get arms until the late evening.

HORTHY AGONISTES 423 welcome sight of German lorries bringing them loads of arms, these being the stocks which had been arriving from Germany, nominally, and perhaps really,

destined for the Hungarian Army, if it proved reliable, but then left in the keeping of the 22nd SS. Cavalry Division.1 Von dem Bach also placed at the Hungarians’ disposal the local German transport, including armoured cars. Now the skilfully pre-laid plans were set in motion. Messengers were sent to call up the faithful. The boys of the Anti-Bolshevik Youth were sent scurrying round distributing notices and leaflets, which included copies of Szalasi’s Proclamation, further floods whereof poured out fromthe Athenaeum Press. German aircraft flew over Pest dropping more leaflets, which alleged

that Horthy had promised to send two million slave workers to Russia. Detachments went from house to house, arresting the persons whom Kovarez and Vajna had designated for that fate.

At 5.21 p.m. the wireless called listeners’ attention to an “‘important announcement.’’ V6rds’ Order was now read out twice, followed by the

playing of the Hungarian National Anthem. This was repeated every quarter of an hour for some hours. The call for Beregffy was also sent out

repeatedly, as was a code message addressed to the second Hungarian transmitter, in Kassa.?

x As the reports of these various developments came in, Rahn and Veesenmayer felt increasingly confident that their gamble was coming off. The Hungarian Army appeared to be on their side; no danger threatened from the civilian population; and they believed that Horthy himself was wavering,’ particularly since both of them believed that he must have O.K.’d

the V6rés Order before it went out. They felt that time was working for them and that they could safely leave to Lakatos the initiative in opening the promised conversations.®

It was a considerable time before the Hungarians made any move; so unconscionably long had the Ministers been kept hanging about telling each other what they had done and what they ought to have done. And when he got back to his own office, Lakatos had time only to sign one or two Orders in conformity with the Proclamation® when he was interrupted again: he and Hennyey (who was then with him) had to endure a visit from the aged Archduke Jézsef—the man who had bowed the knee successively to his own cousin, 1 So Winkelmann (Szalasi Trial, p. 162). V6r6s accused Beregffy of having distributed 18,000 automatic pistols to the Arrow Cross. Beregffy denied this, probably with justice.

Osszetartas (18th October 1944), describing the triumphant day, wrote: ““The long awaited arms at last appeared from the arsenals which had been closed to the soldiers.” 2 This appears to have been an order to the local Arrow Cross in Kassa to seize the wireless station there (that on which the programme Hungary II used to go out). By about 8 p.m. Kassa replied that the station was in ‘‘our hands,” and thereafter it transmitted continuously and gleefully in the Arrow Cross sense. 8 One young officer who came across in the afternoon with a message from the Palace actually advised the Germans “‘to hang on and everything would be all right.” 4 So both gentlemen have assured me. 5 Veesenmayer himself said to C. A. M. that “che was in no hurry, he wanted to soften the Hungarians up.”’

6 These included the prearranged order to close down the Right-wing Press and restart that of the Left. The date being Sunday, and the staffs of the papers all away, this had little practical effect, although some evening papers in Pest set up the Regent’s Proclamation in leaflet form and had it hawked through the streets. WV6rds’ Order was not included, because Kiralyi, who took charge of the censorship, ordered it not to be printed, as he thought that it reduced the value of the Regent’s Proclamation. (Kiralyi to C. A. M.)

424 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH to Mihaly Karolyi, and to Horthy, and was destined a day or two later to take the salute (accompanied by his wife) from the Horthy Miklos Regiment—wearing Arrow Cross armlets. Already Hlatky, as he returned from the Studios, had met the old man, who complained to him: “There will be bad trouble’’; and now he came trudging round to Lakatos to ask, *“‘Need all this have happened?” and to try to persuade him to go back to the Regent

and get the Proclamation revoked. Lakatos apparently explained to him that this was impossible, but precious time was wasted in the argument. It was half-past three before the old man left.

The exhausted Ministers—Lakatos, Hennyey and Schell—sat down together to a belated lunch, and while they were waiting, a whole series of unfavourable reports came in.! Huindy had “arrested Aggteleki, thus setting the other troops in the capital an example of hostility to the Proclamation.” The Germans were massing tanks and troops in Pest. The wireless station was in enemy hands. Then a messenger brought round V6rés’ Order,” so that even before he approached the Germans, Lakatos was convinced that any idea of a sudden volte-face of the Hungarian Army could already be written off as hopeless. It seems to have been at this time that he learnt (through precisely what channels it is still impossible to say)? just what was the offer which Rahn had

| made to Horthy; an offer which, under the circumstances, must have seemed to him remarkably favourable. For if the German troops retired, it would be possible to avoid bloodshed both at the Front and in Budapest, and even to avert the danger of an Arrow Cross Putsch. His intention was thus not to sabotage Horthy’s decision to seek an armistice (and it must be remembered that he was himself still unaware of the fact, or at least of the full implications, of the preliminary armistice) but to dovetail this decision in with Rahn’s offer

the Army.? |

and with the situation as it had developed, especially with V6r6s’ Order to

At about a quarter to five? he rang the German Legation and suggested that Rahn and Veesenmayer should come across to his office “‘to discuss propositions in the interests of both countries.” The Germans, suspecting a trap—and also not averse from showing the Hungarians who was top dog—refused to come over, although they agreed to open conversations in their own Legation. The Hungarians in their turn were frightened to do this, and agreed only provided that Lakatos were given

a safe-conduct to move backwards and forwards free from molestation by the Arrow Cross.®° The argument lasted for some little while, but eventually Veesenmayer sent over his own car in charge of the Secretary of Legation,

Feine, with a second car as escort. | 1 Lakatos’ evidence at the Szalasi Trial, p. 136.

. ; Nadas informs me that a copy of V6rds’ Order was sent to Lakatos as soon as VG6rés aaa as We have seen (above, p. 408 n. 4) the evidence seems conclusive that Horthy had not explained the offer when he returned to the Ministers in the Palace. But it is equally certain that Lakatos knew of it when he rang the German Legation. Horthy could, of course, have spoken to Lakatos on the telephone, but denied (to C. A. M.) having done so. The point must simply be left unexplained. 4 His own version (in his affidavit at the trial of Veesenmayer, N.G. 1846) is that ‘‘finding

the military situation hopeless, he felt compelled to enter into negotiations with the German Legation on the subject of an armistice, pleading that the two sides should go separate ways and that Hungary should seek out a peaceful course for the liquidation of the war.” 5 Veesenmayer to C. A. M. § Rahn and Schell to C. A. M. The Germans, writes Rahn, ‘‘were very astonished at this’ — but was the suspicion so very unnatural?

HORTHY AGONISTES 425 Lakatos’ own version, which there is some second-hand evidence to support, is that while the argument was going on, he had been consulting Horthy! (although this must have been on the telephone, for he did not leave his office)? Horthy has denied this also, so that the question of the Regent’s sanction for the offer which the Hungarians now proposed to make must again be left open. There is, however, substantial agreement on what the proposals were to be. Lakatos’ version was that the Hungarians,

‘should ask for the return of N. Horthy, jun., and Bakay. In return for this they should offer to issue an Order (which had, indeed, already gone out) that the request for an armistice did not mean that the Army was to

lay down its arms. The troops were to go on fighting until the next answer arrived from Moscow.’

Lakatos and Hennyey, who was to come with the Minister President, were to “divide the roles.”” Hennyey was to talk to Rahn, explaining to him

that the Regent’s decision to ask for an armistice was unalterable; the Proclamation could not be revoked. Lakatos was ‘“‘to discuss details with Veesenmayer.’”*

Rahn’s version of the proposals which Lakatos and Hennyey eventually brought, when they arrived at the Legation shortly before six, was that they consisted of “‘a fixed programme.” The Hungarian request for an armistice with the enemy was “‘a fixed and unalterable decision.” But “‘the Hungarian Army had been ordered to hold the Front until further orders and to resist

all attacks. In order to avoid any conflict between the German and Hungarian forces, they reverted to Rahn’s offer to sponsor to the Government

frontier of Hungary.’ |

! of the Reich the proposal that the German troops should retire to the west

In fact, the Hungarians could now claim that they had fulfilled the conditions which the Germans had themselves laid down, and that the Germans were in honour bound to carry out their part of the bargain. And this undeniable fact put the Germans in an embarrassing position. For by now they had definitely abandoned any idea of putting up the proposal in question to Hitler and Ribbentrop, and although they were still sincerely anxious to prevent an armed clash in Budapest, the terms in which they saw this problem were how to effect the transition from Horthy to Szalasi before 6 am. the next morning. With Horthy’s firework fizzling more peacefully towards extinction with every hour, they still believed that their best tactics were to go on winning time, and therefore, without, of course, revealing their true minds to the Hungarians, they cast about them for a pretext to delay matters further still, until the conversation could be moved on to a different, and for them more advantageous basis.® 1 Szalasi Trial, p. 136. The printed report of the evidence here is confused and full of gaps, but definitely contains the words ‘‘the Regent agreed.’’ Lakatos then said that after receiving the Regent’s O.K. he went across “‘immediately”’ to the German Legation. There had been an hour’s delay between Lakatos’ first call to the Legation and his departure (Schell), and Rahn informs me that when the German car did not return, he rang up to ask the reason for the delay and was told that ‘‘Lakatos had not been able to get in touch with Horthy at once.’ He also writes that ‘“‘before they came the Hungarians had to settle the question whether the Hungarian troops were to be given the order to hold the front until further notice.” The matter was in any case conducted with the utmost secrecy. On his return Lakatos told Schell and Rakovszky that “the negotiations were so secret that he could not discuss them with them.” (Schell to C. A. M.)

® Hennyey to C. A. M. * Lakatos’ evidence, loc. cit.

4 Hennyey to C. A. M. ° Rahn to C. A, M. ° Td,

426 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Fortune, in the person of General Lazar, presented them with such a pretext.

Of all the Hungarians to whom Horthy had assigned important roles for that occasion, Lazar was almost the only one who had retained hope, faith

and determination throughout the afternoon. He still believed that the reinforcements would get back and that he would be able to hold out till they did so, being also of the opinion that the narrow, winding streets leading up

to the Var could be successfully defended, even against Tiger tanks.! Accordingly, as dusk fell, he had taken charge of the situation. A messenger whom he had sent over to I Corps having failed to return, he had rung Hardy

and told him to bring his detachments from Ercsi and Géd to the capital. ‘“Resistance”’ leaders who got in touch with him were told to put themselves

under Hardy’s orders. He reinforced the street barriers in front of the Palace, and finally—interpreting his orders, as he admitted, rather widely7—

he had all the approaches to Buda Hill mined. This was being done about six o’clock, soon after the conversations had begun,? and a German officer came in haste to report the matter to the Legation. The Germans took their chance.* They told the officer to wait in an adjacent room, the door of which was ajar, until they gave him a signal.® Then he was to come in and report, as though for the first time. The Germans spun out the conversations as long as they could. Rahn harangued the Hungarians at some length on German invincibility. They also discussed the return of Bakay and N. Horthy, and Rahn even again declared himself ready to forward the Hungarians’ proposals to his Government. He insisted, however, that they must be put in writing (by this means he calculated that he would save another hour). Something like an hour passed in this way.

At last the topics of conversation were exhausted. Lakatos willingly agreed to go back to the Regent and get the proposals put in writing. There

was no possibility of spinning out the interview any longer. Now the Germans gave the pre-arranged signal. The officer entered and reported the

mining of the roads. Rahn and Veesenmayer then announced that they refused to negotiate as prisoners. The conversations must be broken off and the Hungarians must leave the Legation, not returning until the mines had been cleared. Lakatos “‘at first refused to believe the news’ and protested (quite sincerely) that the measure had been taken without his knowledge; but he telephoned Vattay, who confirmed that the mines had been laid, saying that Lazar was responsible for the whole enterprise.® ' Hardy to C. A. M. In his MS. Hardy writes that Lazar told him on the telephone that ‘‘he was quite confident that if things came to a fight, it would be al] right.”’ > Szalasi Trial, p. 148. 3 In evidence Lazar put the time at “‘about six.” * Following from Rahn. ° This was to be when Rahn took off his horn-rimmed spectacles. The officer could see this In a mirror. § Nagy, pp. 243-4. “ Rahn to C. A.M. Ihave followed Rahn’s account here; but here again there is an absolute conflict of evidence between eye-witnesses. Hennyey, after reading my MS., said I had got the

story wrong. When the Hungarians reached the Legation, Rahn, Veesenmayer and others in the hall told them about the mines, and said that they could not negotiate until these were removed. After this was done, the conversation began. Veesenmayer says I have got the story wrong: the Germans only learned about the mines in the middle of the interview. 8’ Veesenmayer at Szalasi trial, p. 157, said that Lazar said that the measure was carried out ‘‘on higher authority”, i,e. on the Regent’s orders; but the initiative seems to have been purely Lazar's,

HORTHY AGONISTES 427 Csatay, to whom Lakatos telephoned next, told them that he had received an ultimatum from Von dem Bach.1 The German had rung up Lazar and demanded the removal of the mines and had met with a refusal. He now said that unless the mines were removed by 10 p.m. he would attack at that hour. The Hungarians then left the Legation, and continued the negotiations over the wires from their own quarters. Finally, after long argument (since where a car could go out, a tank could come in) the Hungarians agreed to clear the road through the Bécsi Kapu immediately? and the rest of the mines as soon as dawn broke. As Veesenmayer insisted that he personally must be free to move at any time, a special arrangement was made for the benefit of the Legation, Lakatos providing guides to steer any persons designated

by Veesenmayer through the minefields. Von dem Bach revoked his immediate ultimatum, although the position still stood that he was attacking

at 6 a.m. unless Veesenmayer and Rahn had by that time reached such a settlement as to make the use of force unnecessary. It appears, incidentally, that all the fuss was unnecessary, since most of the pioneers who laid the mines were Arrow Cross men and had taken the detonating apparatus out of them. In all, only three or four mines ever went off, and they by accident. One of them was what interrupted the conversation between Horthy, Vé6rés and Nadas described below. The first persons to take advantage of the diplomatic facilities were Rahn and Szalasi. For soon after the Hungarians had left the German Legation,

Ribbentrop rang up, in high indignation. He and Hitler had learned what was happening in Budapest, and Rahn and Veesenmayer were treated to extremely plain speaking for their criminal folly in disregarding their original

instructions. They were threatened with condign punishment, and ordered to leave the Legation at once. No more “‘mediation” was to be attempted. The Palace, said Ribbentrop, ought to have been occupied by force long before.

Rahn replied that there was still every hope of reaching an agreement, as Horthy was showing himself quite amenable to reason, but Ribbentrop broke off the conversation angrily and impatiently.

Nevertheless, Rahn thought it better that any more conversations with G.H.Q. should be conducted from the place to which he had been ordered to go: Greiffenberg’s H.Q. on the Svabhegy. He therefore went out, taking the opportunity of taking Szalasi (disguised as a German consul) with him.?

The two men were guided through the minefields by an unsuspecting Hungarian officer. Veesenmayer, on the other hand, made the excuse that the mining of roads made it impossible for him to leave. He evacuated most

negotiations. }

of his staff,‘ but he himself remained behind to continue the forbidden

Lakatos now put his proposals, consisting of five or six points, in writing and took them over to the Regent, who, meanwhile, had been engaged in 1 According to Rahn (affidavit at Veesenmayer trial) Von dem Bach delivered this ultimatum

on his own authority. Csatay also rang the German Legation, to report the ultimatum and to ask ‘‘whether the diplomats or the SS. were in command?”’ 2 This was done between 11.30 p.m. and 1 a.m. 3 Szalasi was taken for the night to a private flat on the Gellérthegy, whence he was brought back the next morning to the Hatvany Palace. 4 This was one reason why communications were carried on with such difficulty later in the night, for the regular telephonist was evacuated and the wretched girl put on the switchboard could not cope with it.

428 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH activities which illustrate in remarkable fashion his belief that even negotiation with the Germans was not entirely incompatible with his obligations towards the Allies. He had by nowreceived Antonov’s message and Malinovsky’s

Note. About six o’clock, accordingly, he sent across for Vérés to go round and bring Utassy for his return journey. He was to take Nadas with him, as that officer was wanted to accompany Utassy to Szeged. Voérés had succeeded in evading most people, including Lakatos, since four o’clock.2 But he dared not yet refuse a summons from the Palace. He

took Nadas with him, and the two men went across; Nadas on the way expressing to V6roés his personal objections to undertaking the mission, and suggesting that Ivan Szentmikldossy, the secretary of the Supreme Defence Council, should be sent in his place. When the two officers arrived at the Palace, Vorés had first to explain his Order, which the Regent and his family had just heard on the wireless;

and already at that time he had his lie ready: he said that the Order had been ‘“‘falsified’? and was not authentic—a statement which Ilona Horthy considered so important that, believing it, she subsequently telegraphed it to Moscow.? Then came the question of the briefing.* Horthy said that ‘‘he thought the situation was lost and there would be nothing for it but to negotiate with the Germans; but he would go on trying to the last.”” He accepted the suggestion that Szentmikldéssy should be sent,

but the interview had an abrupt and perhaps slightly comic ending. As the men were talking, an aeroplane was heard zooming overhead; then came a loud bang. The adjutants rushed in saying that the Germans were beginning their attack on the Palace, and invited the Regent to go down into the airraid shelter. Horthy obeyed, saying only as he left: ““Do as you think best, but do it as quickly as you can.” Nadas writes that V6r6s and he tried to obey this injunction; but by the time they had located Szentmikléssy, and he had made his way up to the Ministry, it was too late: “‘events had outstripped them.”’ Thus the mission never left; Utassy was arrested next morning. The comic aspect of the incident is that, as afterwards transpired, the Germans were not attacking at all. One of Lazar’s men, laying the mines, had accidentally touched one off, and this was the explosion that was heard. It was after this, about 8.30 p.m., that Lakatos took his written proposals over to Horthy. The Regent said that “in his opinion, everything was lost,”’ but agreed to the text, which Lakatos then took over to the German Legation,

where he handed it in without apparently attempting to discuss it. What happened to this document is a mystery. Even Veesenmayer never saw it nor knew that it had ever arrived—much less were the proposals ever forwarded to Hitler and Ribbentrop. The Hungarians themselves did not press them, later replacing them with other suggestions less favourable to themselves.

The chief sufferer, incidentally, was Bakay, who never got his release. Veesenmayer himself sent Feine over at about 10.30 p.m. with his own 1 It will be remembered that Faragho had asked that Nadas should be sent to Szeged in the

company of whichever senior officer headed the mission. . 2 Numerous people, including Lakatos (who rang his office as soon as he received the famous Order), had tried to get in touch with him, all without success. He appears to have been lurking in concealment for fear the Germans arrested him.

3 Personal, Ilona Horthy to C. A.M. The telegram appears in the Moscow file. In his memoirs, Horthy still describes the Order as spurious. ‘ The following description from Nadas (personal to C, A, M.),

HORTHY AGONISTES 429 “conditions for the resumption of the conversations,” which were, primarily,

that the Hungarians should issue a binding order not to shoot, when he would try to get the same from the Germans. None of the Hungarian documents make any reference to this message, in its turn.

After leaving his proposals with the Germans, Lakatos returned to his colleagues. They dined together and received various reports on the situation. This had been getting steadily worse. After dusk fell, there had been a brief

flare-up of resistance. A certain Col. Latorczay had arrived in Pest with a detachment of gendarmerie which was to form part of the garrison of the bridgehead. Having rung up the I Corps to find out what the situation was, and receiving an ambiguous answer, he appealed to Lazar, who ordered him to retake the wireless station. Three Resistance leaders—the two Marquis Pallavacini and Jozsef Palffy—managed to get up to the Palace to ask Lazar whether he thought it advisable that the workers should proclaim a general strike the next day. Szakasits had signed a chit ordering the strike, and if the plan was approved, the order was to be conveyed to Szakasit’s brother-inlaw, Horvath, in Pest. One little “resistance” band tried themselves to go up to the Palace to reinforce the guard. But all these plans came to nothing. Latorczay’s own officers refused to obey him. There was a fracas, and he was wounded. Lazar, in Horthy’s name, approved the strike, and the Pallavacinis and Palffy applied to Hardy for a boat to send the message over. But one of Hardy’s senior officers, whose sympathies were on the other side, got wind of the affair and the messenger was arrested, as were the two Pallavacinis, and soon after, Palffy, and Hardy

himself. The would-be reinforcements were met with fire from the Bodyguard (who took them for Arrow Cross men), and in the end decided to go home, hide their arms, and pretend that nothing had happened. Most of the remaining troops outside the Varhegy itself had now gone over, OF were in process of going over, to the Germans, and the Arrow Cross

detachments were now firmly in command of Pest; and if there was any shooting in the back streets, this came from gangs of Arrow Cross youths, some of whom broke into several houses and slaughtered their inmates (some 100-200 Jews are said to have perished in this fashion). Then, at 9.21 p.m.,

the Budapest wireless really got into its stride. First it broadcast the enormous Order of the Day which Szalasi had painfully composed in his solitary retirement. This in fact somewhat confused the issue, for—composed in anticipation of events—it assumed a situation which had not yet come into

being, one which Szalasi (and also Veesenmayer) spent much of the next day , trying to obviate and which Szalasi maintained to the last never had occurred:

one in which the Regent refused to give way and Szalasi had to take over the power without his authorisation. ‘Thus it contained the lines which formed one of the chief legal bases for executing their author: “I had to choose between our nation and the Constitution, between justice and right, between life and the law. I chose our nation, justice and life.”” For the rest it carefully put the blame not on the Regent but on a “‘selfish gang”’ round

him; and for obvious reasons moved largely in generalisations. At 9.40 came the following item: “‘In consequence of the Regent’s shameful treason,

the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff has issued an Order of the Day | to the Hungarian Army, which runs: ‘Every Hungarian detachment and unit must continue [sic] the struggle as before and with all its strength: all the

more so because the nation is united in support of the struggle.’”’ |

430 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Then at 9.42 came a fiery “Proclamation to the Nation by the Arrow Cross Party, Hungarist Movement,” a much more drastic document which said that the “‘coalition of interests of the internal enemy’’ had been removed

from the nation’s path, and its satellites too. Ten minutes later came a parallel proclamation from the KABSz, which claimed (with much exaggeration) that the Hungarian gendarmerie and police were on the Arrow Cross side, and that arms would be issued to all Comrades reporting. Both these proclamations indulged in violent diatribes against the Jews, and leaflets were

issued denouncing Horthy as “a hireling of the Jews and traitor to his country.” Meanwhile, Skorzeny and Von dem Bach had worked out their plan for the assault on the Var. The bridges and the approaches to the Varhegy on

the Buda side were to be sealed off by the 22nd SS. Skorzeny’s infantry, with tank and armoured car support, was to make the main assault up the gently sloping northern side of the hill and through the Bécsi Kapu. The cadets were to attack the Palace through the gardens on its south. Another detachment would attack from the west, and yet another was to enter the tunnel which runs under the centre of the hill, force the entrance of the underground labyrinth through the door into the tunnel, and thus enter the Ministries of Defence and the Interior. The Tigers had by now crossed the bridges (unopposed by the 9/11, which had melted away at their approach)! and the 22nd was deploying round the approaches. Behind them, the German assault troops were massing for the final attack, which was still scheduled to begin at 6 a.m. the next morning.

While the Ministers were listening to such echoes of these events as reached them (they heard Szalasi’s Proclamation as they were sitting over their coffee),? Csatay came over, but was almost immediately called back to the Palace. He came back after a short time, but said simply that “‘things were in a mess, and it looked as though Horthy’s attempt was not coming off.”> Then about 10 p.m., Lakatos, Hennyey and Rakovszky were called across to the Regent. Here they were treated to one of the most astonishing

revelations which can ever have been burst on a Prime Minister and a Foreign Minister. The Regent told them briefly that he had received an ultimatum from the Russians which had to be accepted by 8 a.m. the following

morning; otherwise the Allies would have nothing more to say to Hungary. Even so, the Ministers do not seem to have been made aware of the exact facts, for they were left under the impression that Antonov’s ultimatum had arrived only shortly before,* whereas it had been deciphered as early as 4.30 that morning. The situation was entirely new to the Ministers; when, at the Regent’s orders, Ambrozy told them the story of the negotiations, they were ‘‘surprised to learn that the armistice had really already been concluded.’

As they were listening, an adjutant came in and called Vattay to the telephone. On returning, Vattay reported: “‘Your Serene Highness, the Chief of the General Staff refuses to obey.’ ‘“‘The Regent,’’ said Lakatos, telling this at the Szalasi Trial, “‘received the news with much irritation and said, ‘Well, let him resign,’ or something of the sort.’”

1 E. GombGs to C. A. M. * Schell to C. A. M. 3 Id. 4 Nagy (p. 245) writes that ““meanwhile [i.e. while Lakatos and Hennyey were talking to the Germans] Antonov’s answer had arrived.”’

5 Ambrozy’s evidence, Szalasi Trial, p. 145. 6 Szalasi Trial, p. 137.

HORTHY AGONISTES 431 The order which V6rés refused to obey was probably not very important —most likely no more than a summons to come over for consultation!— but the incident increased the depression of those present.

Ambrozy, having said his piece, suggested that Hennyey should now compose the answer to Antonov’s ultimatum; but Hennyey answered that Ambrozy, since he knew the previous history, had better do this himself. It was, however, felt that a special answer was unnecessary, since the request for the armistice had already gone out to the three Allied Powers; and only three more telegrams ever went out from the VAr (all dated 5 a.m. on the 16th, although all had, in fact, been written much earlier?; the delay in transmission

is inexplicable). The first (written when Von dem Bach sent his ultimatum)

said that the German ultimatum expired at 10 p.m., when an attack was expected, and appealed urgently for help. The second said that communications were severed and it was doubtful whether Utassy would get through. The Russians were asked to get in direct touch with the First and Second

Armies and to accept Veress as Minister President and as the person authorised to act in the Regent’s name. The wire ended by saying that the wireless station had been occupied before V6ros’ Order went out, while the third said that the Order had been falsified by the Germans. The Regent asked: ““Well, what do we do now?” Lakatos replied that he would probably ask for another audience in the course of the night. The position, as now revealed, was so different from what the Cabinet had been led to believe that morning, when they had agreed to carry on, as to require re-discussion by a Cabinet Council.

He and his companions went back to the Sandor Palace, where Schell rejoined them. The four Ministers were practically desperate. The army— or at least such of it as was in or within reach of Budapest—was against them;

the radio was in Arrow Cross hands. Rakovszky said that the whole possibility of concluding an armistice had collapsed with VG6rés’ refusal to obey, which meant that the whole army was against the Armistice. Lakatos then rang up Veesenmayer and asked him to do all he could to

stop an attack, which would only cause unnecessary bloodshed. By the

morning decisions would probably have been reached which would make | the use of force unnecessary. Veesenmayer answered “in very reserved fashion,”’ and did more listening than talking.? The Ministers then debated what “‘decision”’ they could take. While they were talking, Vattay came in and said that, in his opinion, the lives of the Regent and his family were in grave danger. The only safety was for them to place themselves under the protection of the German Legation. The Regent was, however, not to resign, nor to nominate a new Minister President, but, as it were, to force the Germans to take him prisoner.* Lakatos said that he would not propose this; it was for Vattay to arrange it with the Regent; but he and his colleagues? seem not to have objected to

the idea in any way. They thought that they were “confronted with accomplished facts, and made only the further proposal that the Regent, rather than appoint a new, collaborationist Hungarian Government, should hand the power over to the Germans and their representatives (exponensek); 1 The Regent cannot remember what the order was. 2 According to Mme IJ. Horthy, all were written between 8 and 10 p.m. 3 Hennyey to C. A. M. 4 Ambroézy’s evidence, Szalasi Trial, p. 146. 5’ That is, Hennyey, Rakovszky, Schell and Fay.

432 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH so that it should be clear to the world that Hungary’s future actions were not those of a free agent.”’!

In no case was there to be an Arrow Cross Cabinet, which Horthy declined absolutely to appoint.’ Vattay® went back to the Palace, where the Regent had at last gone to

sleep in a room on the ground floor. But his rest was short. About halfpast twelve, Tost knocked urgently on his door and called him out. Ilona Horthy, in the adjacent room, heard a brief conversation, and very shortly— the whole thing had lasted barely five minutes—the Regent stalked back to his own room, looking very angry. There was another consultation outside; then Tost came and called her out. He, Ambrozy and Vattay were together. They told her that the Germans [sic] had made the proposal described above. The Regent had answered that it was impossible. Not only would he not accept it, he refused even to listen to it. Could she not talk him over? “You, too, Tost?’ she said; and Tost replied: “I implore you. His life, yours and the life of your son depend on it.”’ But Ilona Horthy refused flatly to talk her father-in-law into surrender.

In her turn, she stalked back into her room, leaving the officers to find another way out of the situation. They found it, by a very simple device. Vattay went back to the Sandor Palace, and told Lakatos that the Regent had accepted the proposal “‘in its entirety,’ subject to two further conditions: that he should be allowed to take his immediate entourage with him under a safe-conduct, ‘‘in order that they should not be exposed to the vengeance of the Arrow Cross,”’ and that the attacks which the German wireless was making on him and his family should cease. Accordingly, at 1 a.m., after he had secured the consent of the other Ministers, Lakatos got in touch with the German Legation, whose secretary, Feine, came over, although not until 2.30 a.m.* and after repeated requests.°

Lakatos then dictated to Feine the following statement: **Your Excellency!

‘T have the honour to inform Your Excellency, in the name of the Royal Hungarian Government, that in view of the situation, in order to 1 Lakatos, op. cit., p. 137. The printed version, however, omits several lines, and makes nonsense. A better version is contained in Kossuth Népe, 20th February 1946. * Schell to C. A. M. * In writing the following paragraphs I have had once again to choose between two stories,

each of which involves calling someone a liar. There is no doubt whatever about Horthy’s rejection of the proposals. I owe the above vivid narrative to Mme I. Horthy, but the Regent himself independently confirmed to me that the proposal was made to him and rejected by him out of hand. Both Lazar and Pogany also testified at the trial of Szalasi that Horthy never entertained the idea of surrender until 5.30 a.m.; Ambrozy, too, on the same occasion, said that it was then, and only then, that Vattay “talked him over” (kapacitalta). Furthermore, his actions between 5.0 and 5.30 a.m., as described below, are only compatible with intention to

resist.

The only question is therefore whether Vattay told the lie, as Lakatos swore in evidence (Vattay was not present) and repeated in a letter to Horthy in answer to an enquiry (Horthy, op. cit., p. 296), or whether it was Lakatos who assumed the Regent’s consent. I have preferred to credit Lakatos, since, according to Hardy, when the various generals were tried by courtmartial (under Szalasi) Vattay was acquitted largely for having saved bloodshed by arranging for the “safe conduct.’’ The court-martial of Lazar was adjourned indefinitely on the same grounds. (Hardy to C.A.M.) If Vattay was innocent of the deception, I apologise to him, assuring him of my readiness to believe that it was the Regent’s life, and not his own, that interested him.

* So Lakatos, loc. cit. Hennyey puts the time rather later.

° Schell.

HORTHY AGONISTES 433 avoid civil war and consequent bloodshed, the Government has decided to resign, the more so since facts have come to the Government’s notice of which it was previously unaware. Similarly, His Serene Highness, the Regent, has also decided to abdicate from the office of Regent and retire into private life (von seinem Amt als Reichsverweser abzudanken und sich in das Privatleben zuriickzuziehen). It is His Serene Highness’ wish to place himself and his family under the protection of the Reich, and he has empowered me to forward to the Government of the Reich the request that he and his family may be granted asylum in the Reich. (Signed) *“LAKATOS, 16th October 1944.’”!

In his verbal account of this communication,? Lakatos said that he also made the conditions that the attacks on the Regent should cease, and that his

entourage should be given a safe-conduct, and that the Germans should prevent violence and bloodshed by the Hungarian Right. According to this version, too, he said that the Government was handing over the power to the “‘representatives” of the Reich. The formal decision was to be taken by a Ministerial Council at 10 a.m.

Feine could not agree to this bargain on his own responsibility, but promised to lay it before Veesenmayer, who then telephoned to Hitler’s H.Q.; incidentally transmitting—if his own later recollection was correct—a version of the proposals which differed in essential points from that which Lakatos had given him: for as he recollected them, and as the printed version gave his

words, they ran that: ““The Regent was inclined to place himself under German protection, was inclined to resign and to appoint a government which enjoyed the confidence of the German Reich.’”* The matter took some time; for according to Veesenmayer’s own version, he was talking on the phone for an hour or an hour and a half. Meanwhile,

at 4 a.m. Lazar® received reports that the Germans were taking up their positions for the attack which was to open, unless Horthy yielded, two hours

later. By a few minutes later, the whole little garrison was on the alert. Horthy came down, fully dressed, with his family. The latter he sent across for safe-keeping to the Nunciature (Mme Horthy, said Lazar, “‘at first did not want to go”). Horthy himself remained in the hall. He told the troops guarding the Palace that their orders were to resist to the last.® Thus there can, as we have seen, be no doubt that up to that moment Horthy had not consented either to abdicate or to yield himself prisoner. He must, indeed, have been in complete ignorance of what Lakatos had been doing. But as the party waited to make their last stand, there came, first, an item of disastrous news. The 9/11 had gone over to the enemy, led by

Mészaros. Lazar then called back the duty battalion to a shorter line, 1 This document was issued by the M.T.I. to the Hungarian Press of 24th October under the heading: ‘‘A document of 15th October,” and described as “the wording of a written communication made by the then Minister President Lakatos to the German Minister in Budapest.” 2 Szalasi Trial, pp. 137-8. 8 Szalasi Trial, p. 157. 4 Ibid. According to Veesenmayer, it took him much of that time to persuade Ribbentrop’s

adjutant to wake him up. 6 The chief source for the following, except where otherwise indicated, is Lazar’s evidence at the trial of Szalasi.

§ Dezsényi, op. cit., p. 135. Lazar too, said (p. 159): “The Regent said nothing about placing himself under German protection. On the contrary, he said ‘resist here, whatever happens.” Pogany gave evidence to the same effect.

2E

434 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH running from the Matydstemplom! to the Bastion.? Soon after, the officer on the south side of the Palace rang up to report that the Germans were preparing to break down the gate. Lazar ordered him to tell the Germans that if anyone entered the garden, they would fire. The officer rang again a little later, apparently to say that the Germans were breaking in. He was told to obey his orders, and shots rang out between the Guards’ barracks and the riding-school. This was 5.15 a.m. But suddenly, just as the firing began, and while the troops were retiring in good order to their new positions, Lazar’s telephone rang. It was Lakatos, speaking in the highest excitement. ‘‘The agreement had been reached, and all firing was, under all circumstances to stop immediately.”’ If it did not, ‘‘a catastrophe might happen.” The duty battalion, in particular, was not to fire as it retired to its new positions. The news of the agreement had, in fact, just been brought to Lakatos by Feine. Hitler had consented, on the telephone, to Veesenmayer’s proposals.°

Lazar at first refused. He had no orders to cease resistance, and it was

technically impossible to give fresh orders to the duty battalion until they had completed their move. Lazar heard his replies being translated into German

at the other end of the line (this was to Feine). Lakatos rang off. Five minutes later, Lazar rang up Lakatos again. The Sandor Palace said that he was at the German Legation. The Legation said he was not there. It was

now 5.30. |

Suddenly the bugler on the great gate blew the General Salute. Lazar looked out of his window, expecting to see the Nuncio. Instead, Veesenmayer and Lakatos had arrived and were waiting in the courtyard.* Two cars were standing in the approach, a few yards away, beyond the frail string of barbed wire and upturned carts which was all that Hungary had been able to muster with which to defend her Regent against the Tiger tanks of the Reich. Vattay, it appears, was then inside the hall with the Regent, and if Ambrdzy’s evidence is correct, it was at this point that Vattay persuaded the old man to give up the idea of resisting.

‘““Vattay himself told me,’ said Ambrozy, “that it was then that he persuaded the Regent to accept this solution. That was when the Regent was talked over.” But talked over to what? It seems quite certain that what was discussed at this moment had nothing to do with abdication, nor with appointing a new Government. Horthy simply regarded himself as being summoned to yield himself as a prisoner; and he decided to do so rather than prolong a resistance which could only cost the lives of his few remaining loyal followers.

Now he came out, and listeners heard what passed. Horthy took Veesenmayer by both arms, turned him round to face the half-light, and said:

‘Oh, it’s you, Minister.” Veesenmayer said: “I have the unpleasant duty of taking you to safety, because the attack will begin in ten minutes.”’ “Less

than that,” interrupted Lakatos. Horthy asked what would happen to his wife; Veesenmayer said she could join him. Horthy asked, “‘Where do you 1 The famous Coronation Church of Buda. * Lazar in evidence said he gave the order himself (p. 150). * A further delay, only of a few minutes’ duration but one which may have cost life, was caused by the fact that Lakatos, after waiting up till 4.30, had at last gone to bed and was asleep when the message came. He had to be called. While he was dressing, Incze, the secretary, came back three times to urge him to hurry. (Schell.) 1 Veesenmayer had gone over on purpose to protect Horthy.

HORTHY AGONISTES 435 propose to take me?’ Veesenmayer: “I suggest the Hatvany Palace.” Veesenmayer took Horthy by the arm and the two men, with Lakatos, walked out past the barbed wire to the car. As they left, Horthy told Lazar

to stop resistance. At the last moment the question of “the Regent's immediate entourage’’ was raised. Yes, they could accompany him. Vattay

got on to the running-board of the Regent’s car. Tost and Brunsvik followed. They disappeared in the half-light. The time was 5.58 a.m. Rahn rang up Ribbentrop, told him that the conflict had ended without loss of blood, and praised Veesenmayer warmly for his good sense and discretion.

Nevertheless, the Germans attacked—wantonly, the Hungarians complained; but it is probable that in those few minutes the order to cease fire, which General Von dem Bach was in any case in no hurry to give,! could

hardly reach all the scattered subordinate commanders. In any case, Skorzeny, in his story of the exploit,” does not record that he received any such order, but describes with relish how he waited, watching the minutes creep by on the dial of his wrist-watch, until the hands reached 6 a.m. He

himself was with the tanks and armoured cars which were making the frontal attack through the Bécsi Kapu, and they began to move up the hill at 5.59 a.m. As the column passed the gate unopposed, split into two, and proceeded, still unopposed, along the two parallel streets, the Orszaghaz Utca, and the Uri-utca, which run from the Gate towards the Palace, they heard three explosions which told Skorzeny that his SS. Commandos were forcing the doors in the tunnel which led into the underground passages and shelters. A minute later the tanks had rolled over Lazar’s little barrier of carts

as though it did not exist, advanced down the hundred yards or so of the main approach to the Palace and reached the great doors of the Palace itself. Here a few shots were really fired at them, while sporadic firing was going on also from the Palace gardens. Skorzeny simply shouldered his way past the Hungarians, marched into the Palace and ordered an officer whom he met to lead him to Lazar, whom he then summoned to surrender.* Lazar ordered the cease fire and the “‘attack’”? was over. The total casualties were four

Germans and three Hungarians killed; twelve Germans and fifteen Hungarians wounded.

Meanwhile the Regent was in the Hatvany Palace, where he had been left in a room with Lakatos, Vattay and Tost. They were under close guard. Poor Veesenmayer now had to follow up his truly dreadful night by a day of grappling with the constitutional problems of a foreign country in consultation with three people, two of them exceptionally obstinate and all three holding entirely different views (which also differed from Veesenmayer's own)

not only of what the position ought to be but what it was. Horthy thought 1 Veesenmayer at his trial (23.7, tr., p. 13428) said that about 5.0 a.m., when he had reached the agreement, he tried to get Von dem Bach on the telephone. ‘‘He was in his morning bath,”’

said Veesenmayer, “‘and his adjutant told me that he had no time, that his bath was more important to him, the matter would go one way or the other, he didn’t care.”

2 Op. cit., pp. 208 ff. 3 | have received a vivid little account of this scene from one present at it. Twelve or fifteen senior Hungarian officers were sitting together in a room in the Palace when Skorzeny stalked in, alone and unarmed, and told them that they were arrested. None of them resisted, and some of them began to take off their arms. Skorzeny stopped them, saying that this was an honourable surrender. They followed him down the corridors, which seemed to them interminable. Some

of them wondered whether they ought not to shoot Skorzeny in the back, but dismissed the thought. He led them out of a side door and handed them over to a German officer who was waiting outside it.

436 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH he was simply a prisoner of war. Lakatos thought that Horthy had voluntarily placed himself under German protection and that the Germans

were now to take over full charge. Szalasi thought that the day of the Hungarist Idea had dawned. Veesenmayer himself, as we have seen, appears to have been under the impression that the Regent had not only agreed to abdicate but had also undertaken, before doing so, to appoint “‘a Government which enjoyed the confidence of the Reich.” This, in Veesenmayer’s view, meant the appointment of Szalasi, who would then take office at the head of a coalition Government, as previously agreed between him and Veesenmayer. The German apparently expected no difficulties, for he turned up at 7 a.m. in full gala uniform to call on Hennyey, who asked him vigorously why he was interned. Veesenmayer replied that this step had been taken for the Hungarian’s own safety; and when Hennyey asked whether the Council would take place at 10 a.m. as arranged, Veesenmayer replied, ‘Of course.” Similarly, Lakatos wanted to go out and collect his fellow-ministers for the Ministerial Council. Weesenmayer advised him not to go into the streets, and said he would come back for him shortly.’ So far the Germans had kept their side of the agreement. The attack, although it had not been stopped in time, had been called off, and the German Press and wireless had changed its tune as from 6 a.m. Up to that hour it had followed Kovarcz’ line. At 5.03 a.m. the DNB issued a long and extra-

ordinary spiteful (but historically valuable) tirade against the Regent, referring to him throughout as “‘Herr von Horthy”’ and qualifying him in no

measured terms as a liar and a traitor. After 6 a.m. it changed its tone. Horthy had now been “‘misled”’ by the traitorous clique around him, but had seen the error of his ways and resigned his powers into younger and stronger hands. After an interval there came one further refutation of the charges in

Horthy’s Proclamation, but this was factual rather than personal in tone. The proclamation was said to have been prepared “against Horthy’s will by someone else, namely, a gang of criminals who tried to undermine the former Regent’s policy.’’ We shall find Veesenmayer and Feine admitting the existence of the Press truce, but saying that it held good only up to 2 p.m.

After 7 a.m., however, Veesenmayer disappeared for some hours® and most probably owing to lack of co-ordination—for the Germans had no reason to interrupt a process which they thought was going smoothly— Hennyey, Schell and Rakovszky were kept cooped up in two rooms until midday, when they were taken by SS. men to the prison in the Fé-utca. No attempt at all was made to find the other Ministers. Thus no Ministerial Council was held.

Later in the morning Veesenmayer sent across for Szalasi with the message—completely unjustified by the facts—that the Regent wished to speak to him. Veesenmayer thus seems to have assumed, without further enquiry, that the Ministerial Council had met and had reached its ‘‘decisions”’ according to plan. Szalasi came over with Kemény.

The interview which now took place was between Horthy and Szalasi * Hennyey to C. A.M. On this visit Veesenmayer also told Rakovszky that the Ministerial Council would take place as arranged. (Hlatky to C. A. M.) * Szalasi Trial, p. 138. ° One place to which he went was the Nunciature to reassure Mme Horthy and her daughterin-law. They turned their backs on him and refused to speak anything but Hungarian.

HORTHY AGONISTES 437 alone. Horthy was called from the room in which he was waiting by an SS. soldier with the remarkable message that: ‘““The new Minister President wants

to speak to you.” He came back after a few minutes, and in answer to Lakatos’ whispered question, replied with soldierly directness: ““That fellow (frater) wanted me to hand over the power to him. | threw him out.’”!

To this version, it may be added, Horthy ever after adhered. He said afterwards that Szalasi had asked him to appoint him Minister President. He replied that history knew of no case when a citizen of a State had asked its

head to appoint him Minister President; that he would appoint anyone in Hungary before Szalasi; and that he requested Szalasi to leave the room. Szalasi, on the other hand, while admitting both at the time to Veesenmayer, Kemény and others, that the Regent had not only not given him anything in writing, but had explicitly refused to do so, yet maintained with the utmost stubbornness that Horthy had given him a verbal “‘authorisation’”’ “to act as Minister President and, pending a final settlement, to exercise the

Regent’s functions also.’”’ According to Kemény he even told him on emerging from the interview, that Horthy had verbally abdicated. The simple explanation of this direct contradiction, and that accepted at the trial, would be, of course, that Szalasi was deliberately lying. As, however, Szalasi possessed to an almost incredible degree the gift of wishful thinking, he may really have believed that the Regent had consented to his appointment, which, in a sense, is borne out by Horthy’s own words, for he writes in his book? that he advised Szalasi to have himself appointed by the Germans if that had not happened already. The Germans, however, were less easily satisfied. The impression of the 1 Lakatos in his evidence was not sure whether Horthy said “threw” or “‘kicked’’ him out. Light is, or ought to be, thrown on what passed by a passage which appeared in the Press of 19th October as part of the record of Szalasi’s first Ministerial Council. Published by mistake, it was hurriedly suppressed and a revised version issued which omitted these intriguing prolegomena. The original issue, however, began by quoting Szalasi’s agreement, or his own version of his agreement, with Veesenmayer, and went on:

‘Fact arising from the internal political situation: (a) The Regent in the early hours of 16th October 1944 placed himself under German protection, together with Minister President Lakatos. (6) The Regent’s verbal declaration and authorisation of the morning of 16th October, on the basis of which it was urgently necessary to create a responsible supreme leadership for the country, in order that the Hungarian nation should not remain even for a moment without leadership in these critical times. (c) The Regent on the morning of 16th October verbally withdraws everything he said earlier in the morning. How he puts it is: he is not free to act as he wishes, so he cannot continue to direct affairs; he regards himself as a Head of the State unable to function.

(d) In the evening of 16th October the Regent withdrew the declaration regarding the suspension of hostilities which he had issued at 1.0 p.m. on the 15th October. (e) In the evening of 16th October the Regent tendered his written resignation, entrusting to the Party Leader the conduct of the Regent’s business. These complicated jottings were read out at Szalasi’s trial, p. 79, by the presiding judge, who not only entirely failed to understand what they were about (and Szalasi was by that time unable to enlighten him) but made their already formidable difficulties far worse by misquoting from

them very seriously. Thus in (5) he read, ‘‘declared an authorisation” instead of the two

nominatives ‘“‘declaration and authorisation,’ while in (c)—much more serious—instead of the words italicised, he read out ‘‘and does not regard himself as Head of the State.”” Szalasi agreed that the text as read out by the judge was the original, but the newspapers still survive to prove both wrong; and, indeed, all Veesenmayer’s and Lakatos’ subsequent Iabours would have been unnecessary had the text been as the judge read it. For precisely the trouble was that the Regent did on the morning of the 16th still regard himself as Head of the State. I can be no wiser than Szalasi, but it appears to be that para. (6) must represent Szalasi’s version of what Horthy said to him at this first interview, and (c) his version of the second interview. 2 Op. cit., p. 292.

438 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH interview which Veesenmayer himself had received, from Szalasi’s account of it, had been that it had been a failure. The Hungarians were now separated.

Tost, Vattay and Lakatos were led away to another room, where, a few minutes later, Tost shot himself: it appeared that he expected to be inter- — rogated by the Gestapo and feared lest under torture he might give away the

secret of the code communications with Moscow. Then, at 1.30—as he afterwards told the story!—Lakatos was taken to the German Legation, where Rahn, Veesenmayer and Feine awaited him. Veesenmayer said he had been talking all morning on the phone to G.H.Q. The Press truce would expire at 2 p.m. Moreover, Hitler’s offer to give Horthy the treatment due to a person of sovereign rank stood only if the Regent fulfilled three conditions. These were: to abdicate in form; to appoint Szalasi Minister President; and to issue a statement repudiating his Proclamation of the previous day by saying that “‘only a misuse of my name could have made possible the appearance of such a proclamation.”

Lakatos—as he said*—rejected this proposal, to which, he said, the Regent would never consent. “‘At the most he would agree to declare the Proclamation null and void.’ But if must be, he would go and ask him. According to his own story, he was taken back under guard between 3 and 3.30 p.m., to the Hatvany Palace, where “‘he told the Regent what the Germans were threatening to do: 1.e. that they would only grant him the promised treatment if he fulfilled these formalities.”” He mentioned all three

points. ‘The Regent,’’ said Lakatos, “‘then said verbatim ‘All right.’ Lakatos went back to the Germans, who asked him to get the Regent’s definite consent to all three points. He objected that he did not know Szalasi, so 1t was arranged that Feine should speak to Horthy about the first two points while Lakatos arranged for the revocation of the Proclamation. Rahn objected that a simple revocation would be too short, and there must also be “‘something addressed to the troops.”’ He went back to the Regent “‘who had two wishes: one to get his son back, the other to be allowed to go to his home and pack before being taken away next day.’’ Lakatos then went back to the Legation, ‘‘where they kept

him waiting a long time, saying that they had to telephone to Hitler or Himmler.’”’ Then Veesenmayer told him that “the highest authority—Hitler or Himmler—had agreed to give back N. Horthy, jun.” ‘‘He went back to Horthy and told him this.” Then, he said, he and Horthy together drafted a

Proclamation to the desired effect, in German. MHorthy only signed it; Lakatos did not counter-sign it. He tookit back and gave it to the Germans— either Veesenmayer or Rahn—about 4 p.m. The document allegedly signed at this hour ran as follows: “IT hereby declare my Proclamation to the Hungarian nation, made on I5th October, null and void and repeat the Order to the troops issued by

the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, calling for the devoted continuation of the fight. The serious military situation demands that the Hungarian Army should defend its country in a manner worthy of

1 Szalasi Trial. p. 130. ;

* I am obliged repeatedly to put in phrases of this kind emphasising that I am writing in oratio obliqua, because the Regent has most categorically denied the accuracy of Lakatos’ story in so far as it concerns himself. The whole of the following paragraphs, so far as they concern the Regent, must therefore be taken as representing the story given by Lakatos in evidence but denied by the Regent. 3 Nem bdanom (literally, I don’t mind).

HORTHY AGONISTES 439 its gallant reputation. May God guide our Army and Hungary on the road towards a better future. (Signed) Hortuy, 16th October 1944.” This alleged document has never been seen again; but a translation into Hungarian of the alleged German original was afterwards in existence in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. The text and the name of Horthy after it are in type; below are written, in hand, the following words:

“I certify that the above text is a true translation of the original German text signed in my presence. LAKATOs.””!

Lakatos was now taken back to his place of detention, but about 5.30 p.m. an SS. General brought him a paper certifying that he was at liberty. He went back to the Minister President’s office, attached to which was the private flat at the disposal of the occupant of that office. Here, however, he was not left long undisturbed. As we said, the Germans had agreed to try to put through the other two points of their programme. As Lakatos went away from the Hatvany Palace at 4 p.m., he saw Szalasi ‘“‘obviously waiting to be received.” So far as can be made out from the very confused and contradictory evidence, this chapter

of the negotiations began with a second interview between Horthy and Szalasi which was just as unfruitful as the first. Then Veesenmayer seems to have had another go, about which we have only his reported words that: ‘““The old man was obstinate and I was rude.” The Regent had refused to abdicate; ‘“‘and as for Minister Presidents, had said he would appoint anyone else, but not Szalasi.’’ Probably the wrangle went on a long time; Rahn also had a long interview, as fruitless as the rest. At last, at 7.30 p.m., Lakatos was sent for to go back to the German Legation. Here he found Rahn, Veesenmayer, Feine and Haller, with Kemény, Rajniss

and Beregffy. This is how Lakatos told the story:

“They said to me: ‘Just fancy! The Regent refuses to sign.’ They showed me a paper three pages long, which they told me was Szalasi’s spiritual production. [This was the draft which Szalasi had prepared for the occasion ten days earlier.] I said: ‘I have nothing to do with the whole business, but if you want him to sign, make it shorter.” Kemény interjected: ‘Szalasi won’t accept that.’ Then I moved to get up, saying: ‘All right, let Szalasi fix it up. I have nothing to do with this, why did you bring me here?’ Rahn now absolutely shooed the Hungarian gentlemen out and I remained alone with the Germans. He said to me: ‘Don’t forget, the position has become very much more critical: the safety of the Regent’s person and the promise to place him under German protection are not yet assured. Wecan’t go on shilly-shallying. The life of the last German soldier fighting in Hungary means more to me than the Regent’s

son.... He ought really to be court-martialled and shot.” I knew how anxious the Regent was about his son...” 1 A photograph of this document is in my possession. 2 Herr Rahn, who otherwise confirms, in substance, the above account, does not remember making this last remark.

440 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Then Rahn sat down and, with Lakatos’ assistance, drafted a short text in which Horthy, addressing the heads of the two Houses of Parliament, declared that he abdicated, at the same time entrusting Szalasi with the formation of a Cabinet of national concentration. Rajniss was called in and given the text to translate into Hungarian. Lakatos refused to ask Horthy to sign the document, but said that he would accompany Veesenmayer, if he made the request. The two men accordingly went across to the Palace, whither the Regent had been allowed to return, still under strict guard, to pack.

The Palace itself was in an indescribable state of confusion. Furniture was smashed, walls defaced, papers lying about the floor, valuables wrenched from their places. SS. men were swarming about gaping, looting and defiling. When Horthy had arrived, he had found one SS. man in his bath and another

peacocking about in his dressing-gown. He had apparently managed to evict this pair, for he was now himself in the bathroom. Here again accounts differ slightly, although not in any very material respect. Lakatos’ version 1s that he “‘explained the matter to the Regent, whose first question was, “What has happened to my son?’” Lakatos beckoned to Veesenmayer, who came into the room and said: ““Your Serene Highness! The order has been given from the highest quarter that he shall be put on the special train tomorrow— either in Vienna orin Linz. That isa detail, not guaranteed; but the essential —yes!” Horthy looked at Lakatos, who said that he had no reason to doubt

Veesenmayer’s word. MHorthy then signed the “paper,” which was the declaration mentioned above, which Rahn and Lakatos had drafted together.

Lakatos took the paper and handed it to Veesenmayer, who put it in his pocket. This was about 8.15 p.m. According to Horthy, Lakatos began by asking him to sign the paper; to which Horthy replied by asking him how he could suppose that a document signed in such circumstances, and under such duress, could have any validity. He had already twice told Szalasi that he would not abdicate. If he thought fit, he might place the office entrusted to him in the hands of the legal representatives of the nation, but not in those of the German Minister. When

Lakatos continued to press him, Horthy asked for his reason; and the General then told him of the promise that his son would be restored to him.

This was the first he had heard of the possibility. Horthy then told of the scene with Veesenmayer, much as Lakatos recounted it, and on getting Veesenmayer’s word of honour, signed the paper, at the same time declaring

that he did so under duress and consequently did not regard it as valid. Veesenmayer took note of this declaration. The text (as afterwards issued) ran: ‘To the Presidents of the two Houses (of the Hungarian Parliament) “(My Regent’s greeting to the Hungarian Parliament!) ‘In a heavy (and difficult) hour of Hungarian history I make known this my decision: in the interest of the successful prosecution of the war

and of the inner unity and coherence of the nation, to abdicate from my office of Regent and to renounce all legal rights accruing from my * One may add here Rahn’s evidence at the trial of Veesenmayer (23rd August 1948): ‘““Horthy

was told: “You have declared your abdication orally [sic] but the instrument is in the German language. You know yourself that this is unconstitutional. If you come to Germany, this will cause much bad blood, and it is unlikely that your son will be able to follow you.’ I do not know whether you would call that blackmail. Others would call it good advice.”

HORTHY AGONISTES 44] authority as Regent. (At the same time), I entrust Ferencz Szdlasi with the formation of a Cabinet of national concentration. ‘Given at Budapest on the 16th day of October 1944. HortTuHy, m.p.’”!

Lakatos was now released again and allowed to go his own ways. As his last act he ordered the Army and police to stop fighting. The Regent, after he had packed, was taken back to his place of imprisonment. The next afternoon Skorzeny escorted him, with Vattay and Brunsvik, who were allowed to rejoin him, to Kelenféld Station, where his wife, daughter-in-law and little grandson awaited him, the Nuncio having given them up when the

conclusion of the arrangements was notified to him. But the Germans committed one crowning breach of faith which embittered the Regent in his

exile far more than any other action of theirs. Neither in Vienna nor in Linz was his son given back to him. In point of fact, Nikki, when his wounds

were healed, was taken to Mauthausen, thence to Dachau, and kept there until the Americans reached the camp in the following spring.” The Regent and his party were taken to “‘Waldbichl’’ (Schloss Hirschberg), near Weilheim, in Bavaria, and lodged there, under close guard. Vattay and Brunsvik were now taken away, the family party remaining alone, except for the Regent’s valet and for the Regent’s brother, an old man like the Regent and possessed of a full measure of the Horthy family feeling, who

obtained leave to join them. He had managed to bring with him, besides a stock of provisions, a wireless set. This was hidden in an inner room of the villa, and in the dark winter evenings and the dim spring the captives crouched over it, listening with rising excitement as the bulletins showed the American

armies to be approaching their prison. The guards had received orders to shoot the whole party rather than let them fall into Allied hands; but they disobeyed the order, and the Americans found the little family group alive. The Germans also carried off, to various prisons in Germany or Hungary (as a general rule, keeping the civilians and retired officers for themselves and handing the serving officers over to the Hungarians), the prisoners whom they had taken in the Palace, the Ministers and Secretaries of State who had remained in contact with Horthy after the Proclamation, and a few senior

officers whom they had arrested on the previous day, or pulled in that morning: Hardy, Utassy, Szentmikldossy, Aggteleki® and a few others. But the number of these victims was small. Farkas, who offered his services to the new Government,? was not touched; neither were Markos, Gyulay or 1 A photostat of the original document, this time with Horthy’s signature, is in my possession. The words enclosed in brackets are not in the original, which also reads “I have entrusted.”’ It has since been suggested that Horthy signed on a blank sheet of paper; but he himself said to C. A. M. verbatim in May 1945: ‘“‘Man legte mir ein schmutziges Fetzen Papier vor, worauf stand geschrieben, dass ich Szalasi ernenne und abdanke.”’ Lakatos did not counter-sign it at the time. Later (on 30th October), Sz6ll6si brought it to him and asked him to counter-sign it.

Finally he did so in a separate document which stated that his signature was posterior to the event.

2 Documents produced at the trial of Veesenmayer show that both he and Rahn made many attempts to get his promise honoured. The guilt of the treachery seems to have been Hitler’s. Later, Rahn wrote to Hitler and received a reply from Dornberg that the promise could not be honoured ‘‘in the interests of the State,’’ since the full measure of Horthy’s treachery had only now become known. Toa further protest, Rahn received noreply. (Personal, Rahn to C. A. M.) Ilona Horthy also received a refusal from Ribbentrop. 3 Ageteleki was released after two days, and even offered a command under Beregffy, which,

however, he refused. . 4 He joined it as Commissioner for Evacuation and later acted as assessor at the court-

martial on Veress and other officers who had taken the Regent’s side.

442 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Vladar. V6r6s, who by his own account had spent the night in his office, not daring to go home (this is probably the only record which we possess of his

movements that night, except for the episode recorded above, when he ‘‘refused to obey’’ Horthy at 10.30 p.m. and for his conversation with Miklés,!

the hour of which is uncertain), was, after all, arrested by the Germans at 6 a.m. on the 16th “‘on account of his uncertain behaviour.’ Fortunately, however, as all Christians must agree, his Calvary was not prolonged. Mme Vorés appealed to the sympathies of Mme Beregffy, and Beregffy and Laszlé (both of whom Vorés subsequently helped to get hanged) secured his release by showing Veesenmayer certain letters which V6r6és had written, “‘full of sympathy for the Germans” and by pleading the Order of the previous day,

the paternity of which Vords, at this stage, was only too ready to acknowledge.” A “‘grand reconciliation” then took place.* The Germans were still not particularly anxious to have VGr6és back in a responsible position, but he himself came to their rescue by pleading that “‘his nerves were all in pieces and he needed rest”’ ;* further, that he had hidden various papers down on the Balaton and must be allowed to go and collect them in peace of mind. He was accordingly released on parole, with results which will appear in due course.

Meanwhile, the new Ministers had been sworn in at 4 p.m., on the strength of Szalasi’s alleged “‘verbal authorisation”’ from the Regent? and at 4.45 three Proclamations were issued. The first, signed by Szalasi with the

remarkable designation: “‘Royal Hungarian Premier, entrusted with the temporary direction of State affairs,’ gave the names of the Cabinet; the second, which began with the words ‘*Re powers granted by the Regent to Ferencz Szalasi,’’ stated that the Regent had retired from the conduct of affairs and had acknowledged the resignation of Lakatos and his Government, further agreeing that Szalasi should form a Council of Regency of three members to solve the question of the Head of the State,® pending which Szalasi would himself temporarily exercise the powers of the Regent. The

third Proclamation gave the names of the Council of Regency: Beregffy, Rajniss and S. Csia. Some little while after this again, the documents representing the fruits of the Veesenmayer-Horthy-Lakatos negotiations were read out: Horthy’s revocation of the Proclamation (over the signature ““Vitéz Miklés Horthy of Nagybanya) at 7.50 p.m. and his abdication and appointment of Szalasi as Minister President (although not as Head of the State, either de facto or de jure) at 8.45 p.m.’ 1 See above, p. 419. ° Beregffy’s evidence at his trial. These passages are not reproduced in the booklet, but were printed at the time in the Kossuth Népe. 5 Kapitanffy to C. A. M. * Voros at the trial of Szalasi (Trial, p. 138). ® There was considerable argument about the hour at the great trial; the question being, of course, whether the defendants had committed treason in taking the oath to Szalasi without the

Regent’s authorisation. The hour is well attested both by the evidence of Kemény and by a statement issued at the time on the Hungarian news service in Slovak. All the defendants (except Beregffy, who seems to have been in a complete muddle over the different documents) agreed that they had seen nothing in writing, but had taken Szalasi’s word. Szalasi himself was, of course, proceeding on his own highly individual interpretation of his earlier interview with the Regent. 8 This statement, at least, seems to have been completely unfounded. ’ The Hungarian Press, which published the whole series of documents on the 17th, made a rough attempt to correct the confusion by putting the revocation first, then the appointment of Szalasi and the abdication, as two documents, with Horthy’s signature under each, and the proclamations bearing Szalasi’s signature after these.

HORTHY AGONISTES 443 Orders to Jews to resume the wearing of the Yellow Star had already been issued, and there now followed a flood of urgent orders and proclamations: one relieving Miklés and Veress of their commands and appointing

Laszlo and J. Major respectively as their successors; and others again appealing for order, enforcing a curfew, placing a ban on the assembly of more than three persons in the street, except at a tram stop, and ordering civil servants and workers to return to their jobs, and shops to reopen. Late at night came a declaration by Rajniss calling on the nation to fight and conveying an assurance from the Reich that “the common struggle would be strengthened,” and later again an Order of the Day to the Army from Beregffy in the same terms.

Finally there came appeals from the leaders of the KABSz and the National Socialist para-military organisations to rally behind the new regime.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

SZALASI TYRANNUS forcible removal of its civilian Regent and War Lord and the - | i: Hungarian population. and Supreme military alike. accepted the

installation of Szalasi in his place with the same unrufiled tranquility

which it had displayed in the preceding March. In Budapest, shops and factories had remained closed on the 16th. although the telephone service had worked as usual and trams and buses had run. On the morning of the 17th the factories were working again with an absentee list hardly above the normal. and the staffs of the Ministries (again with no more than a handful of absentees) Were preparing to welcome their new masters with an alacritv

which astonished those gentlemen themselves. One survivor from the Ministry of Justice has recorded that. on that morning, his rooms were invaded by three armed Arrow Cross men. whose leader shouted:

“Tam taking over authority here! I warn you not to jest with death! We shall soon see who is recalcitrant or disobedient here. We shall shoot him down on the spot!” But not a shot had to be fired in that Ministry. or anv other. The Resistance leaders were all back underground again. and on the admission of one of their own leaders.4 engaged in no more hazardous an occupation than that of forging. for themselves or their fmends, papers of exempuon from military or labour service. There were a few flickers of unorganised revolt. but not on anv serious scale.- So exemplary was the general discipline that the Government soon removed all those special restrictions which had been imposed at first out of fear of a possible counter-

stroke from any quarter. It is true that general securty measures were tightened up. Marnal law was extended to cover a long series of offences, including race-polluuon. bnbery and profiteering. Unrest and the spreading of defeatist rumours were made punishable with death. On 3lst October the military administration hitherto applied to Operational Zones only was extended to cover the whole country. But the theatres were playing on the 17th: the ban on the sale of alcoholic liquor was litted on the 24th; that on sports gatherings on the 25th. The curfew was put back by successive stages

until on the 27th it reached the hour of midnight. Veesenmayer never troubled to take a guard with him when driving about the city or taking his meals in public restaurants.°

At the Front. the evening of the 15th had. apparently, found General Miklos alone dissatished with the decision to fight on. but convinced that. as 1 Darvas. op. cit.. pp. 155 ff. * The pamphlet Champions Hongrois. pp. 14 ff.. lists a few acts of sabotage. which it ascribes

to Communist Youth detachments. acting on their own initiative. Kallai. op. cit., pp. 267 ff. gives a much longer list. but without dates. He admits that the “League of Communist Youth.” which appears to have been given most of the dirty jobs, was reconsututed only on 28th October. after a hibernation which had lasted since 1936.

* T may quote here a remark made to me by Veesenmaver, that “‘a day in Yugoslavia was more dangerous than a vear in Hungary.”

SZALASI TYRANNUS 445 things stood, his Army would not obey any order contradicting that of Vérds.}

On the morning of the 16th he received a message from General Heinritsi, the G.O.C. of the Army Group to which the Hungarian First Army belonged, to come across at once, with Kéri, and “talk things over.”” Convinced that this message presaged his own arrest, Miklds felt that his best course was to follow up his private line to the Russians, from whom he appears to have received another message.2 He sent for Vasvari and made to him a last Suggestion that he should issue a Proclamation calling on the Army to turn round and fight against the Germans. Vasvari refused to agree to this, but consented to let Miklés go across to the Russians and himself to take charge in his absence. Miklés then took Keri, his adjutant (a certain CsukassyHecht), a typist who knew Russian, complete with a typewriter fitted with a Cyrillic keyboard, and also (according to hostile accounts) the box containing the Army pay-fund, and thus equipped for all emergencies, drove up to the _ Front. The officer commanding the sector gave him an escort of seven men (whom he afterwards had great difficulty in retrieving) and passed him across the line. The Russians welcomed him cordially enough, and took him off to their own H.Q. at Lisko, near Premysl, where he arrived early on the 17th. Hence, on their instructions, he first wrote signed letters to all his senior commanders, calling on them to bring their troops over. If this order was obeyed quickly enough, and on a large enough scale, the Russians promised to put into execution the plan bruited a fortnight previously, arm the prisoners of war, and set the Hungarian “Army of Liberation” to march on Budapest. The letters were entrusted to Hungarian officer prisoners of war. Most of the emissaries, however, did not even get through alive. Not one of the Corps or Divisional Commanders answered the appeal affirmatively. One Regimental Commander did so, but his subordinates refused to follow him; he was executed by the Germans. In the first days only a handful of Hungarians responded to the appeal. Meanwhile, the Russians had sent down Nemes and Szentivanyl from Moscow to ‘‘consult” with Miklés on the formation of a Government. The “consultations” lasted for four days, and achieved exactly nothing.

On the 21st Miklés himself went down to Ruthenia to broadcast his_ appeal. By this time, however, the new Army Commanders were firmly in charge, and the Germans had taken the further precaution of breaking up

most of the Hungarian Corps, brigading the Hungarian Divisions with Germans, under German command, and in general shuffling the units

together so thoroughly as to make any large-scale defection quite impracticable. A few Hungarian units killed or otherwise disposed of their officers and left the Front en route for their homes in Hungary,’ but only a trickle came over to the Russians.

It is true that during these days the Russians hooked one more big

military fish, although on a different line. On the 21st the Moscow wireless began to send out calls to V6rés to come over. This summons, and perhaps even more the jovial response which it elicited from the Kassa wireless tha * For the following, see Miklés’ own account in A debreceni Feltémadds. Thave supplemented this from a few other personal sources, including a narrative by General Vasvari. ° Németh, the officer mentioned above (p. 419), had met three Hungarian P.O.W. officers on the 14th, in a village near Huszt where they were looking for Miklés (Németh to C. A. M.). * According to M. Illes in Csilldg, p. 1329, 4 officers and just over 100 men came over. * M. Illes writes that 4 battalions and two independent companies took this course. It must be remembered that by this time a battalion was seldom much over company strength.

446 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH “they had got the traitor safe and were having him hanged,’’? convinced Vorés that he would be safer in Russia than in Hungary; and breaking his parole, he ran away, disguised as a monk, to seek shelter in the East. But he did not find his timorous way across the lines (at Szeged) until the 31st, and the Russians lost a lot of time with him too. It was not until 5th November

that he had ‘“‘finished his consultations’? and was allowed to draw up a remarkable proclamation, in which he declared that Horthy, at their last interview (viz. at 6.30 p.m. on the 15th) had entrusted him, Vérds, with issuing

further orders in his name? and called on the troops to come over with their arms, recruits to disobey calling-up notices and Budapest (which was by that time within range of the Russian guns) to surrender to the Russians. The proclamation ended with the memorable words: ‘“‘Hurrah for free, democratic Hungary under the leadership of Regent Horthy!”’ Even this was not published till 11th November, so that the political effects

of V6rés’ renewed change of sides—such as they were—were not perceptible during the earliest days of the Szalasi regime. Its military effects were nil.

We have carried our story a little forward; but by the morning of the 17th it was already clear that neither the Left nor the Army was going to give the new regime any trouble. Hardly less important, the crisis had at last brought about something approximating to “Right Wing Unity.”’ On that day both Palffy and Ney issued proclamations calling on their followers to rally behind Szalasi; on the 18th the Nemzeti Sz6vetség met, agreed to recognise Szalasi’s assumption of power as a “‘historic act”’ and called down the blessing of God on the new regime. Szalasi now published his Plan of Work and set about the realisation of it.

The new Ministers were, of course, already in office, engaged in the activities presently to be described. The Ministerial changes had also already been followed by the usual changing of the guard in political offices in the gift of the Government. Further, a decree had appeared as early as 17th October which not only exempted the Arrow Cross-Hungarist Movement from the ban on political parties but specifically authorised and enjoined its members to resume their status and organisatory activities in their capacity of ‘‘“embodiment of the political will of the nation.’’ A subsequent decree gave the Party executive and members a status similar to that of the National Socialist Party in Germany. They were to work in collaboration with the organs of the State, and with equal authority with them, for the maintenance of law and order. On the strength of this, the Press and propaganda services and certain other offices had been flooded with Arrow Cross men, but with his usual punctilious regard for constitutional forms, Szalasi left the existing Government services untouched until his own position had been legalised. For this, some negotiation was necessary. His own original plan of abolishing the Regency altogether and having himself appointed to the ancient Hungarian

dignity of Palatine (Nador) appears to have encountered considerable opposition in Conservative circles, some of which were unwilling to recognise

the validity of Horthy’s abdication, while others did not want to see Szalasi 1 The Germans had in fact thought of re-arresting him (Kapitanffy to C. A. M.). * This remarkable claim seems to have been based on Horthy’s hurried instruction to V6rdés

ie oe “ 8) best’ (sc. about sending the emissary to Szeged) “‘but get on with it’’ (see

SZALASI TYRANNUS 447 in so exalted a position. One group proposed to make the Archduke Jozsef acting Head of the State, under some title or other, and when he refused the candidature, pleading his advanced years, his son, the Archduke Jdézsef Ferencz, was suggested. The Arrow Cross, on their side, would not consent to this, and Szalasi himself then suggested a compromise. The final settlement of the succession to the Regency should be left for a later date, pending which the Council of Three whose names he had published on 16th October (alleging, as we have seen, that Horthy had agreed to the institution and the

persons) should remain in being. Meanwhile the duties of Head of State should provisionally be carried out by a National Leader (Nemzetvezets), who should take an oath before Parliament similar to that prescribed for the Regent and enjoy all the rights and immunities conferred on the Regent by the Act of 1920 (including his functions of Supreme War Lord), although not all those conferred on Horthy by subsequent legislation (he could, for example, be called to account by Parliament for breach of the Constitution

or the law). The National Leader might also double the post with that of Minister President, in which case, however, he must appoint a permanent Deputy Minister President. The National Leader was, of course, to be Szalasi himself. On 27th October the Council of Regency created in virtue of Law XIX of 19371 met; those present were Baron Perényi and A. Tasnadi-Nagy, as respective Presidents of the Upper and Lower Houses; the Cardinal Primate

Serédi”; Beregffy (acting Commander in Chief); the President of the Supreme Court, B. Kornel; and the Secretary, M. Jakab. Szalasi took the oath to them, as Minister President designate, and they then turned to the question of the Head of the State. Sz6ll6si had already handed the two Presidents the

original of Horthy’s rescript in which he had abdicated and appointed Szalasi Minister President®; the other participants now inspected the documents and declared the signature authentic. They also (a majority allegedly over-ruling a dissentient minority*) agreed that the abdication was valid and the Regency consequently vacant. The Council then approved a draft Bill presented by Sz6ll6si which recognised the legality of Horthy’s abdication,

declared the Deputy Regency Law of 1942 to have lost its validity, and adopted Szalasi’s proposals for the institution of the National Leader. Parliament was now convoked. It was, perhaps, less enthusiastic than the Nemzeti Szovetség, for when it met on 2nd November only 55 members out of the 370 or so possibles turned up in the Lower House. But on the 3rd, both Houses ‘‘unanimously” adopted Szdéllésis’ Bill. It remained only to carry through the final ceremony. This took place on the next day, amid all the circumstances of pomp which

could be achieved. The venue was the Marble Hall of the Royal Palace. Here were assembled all the members of the two Houses that could be drummed together (they were not numerous, but they included the Archduke Jézsef), various prominent representatives of political and social life, and 1 See above, I. p. 190. 2 Some writers of the Left maintain that Serédi was not present, the official announcement to the contrary being a falsehood. Others, however, say that he was there, and one story goes that Szdlasi bought his consent by promising to abolish the institution of civil marriage and to leave the property of the Church intact; others again that he was present but refused to sign (it has been stated that his signature was not on the document). 3 He had gone down to Tihany and got the document from Lakatos, in whose pocket it had remained since 16th October. 4 It is alleged that Cardinal Serédi dissented, but the evidence for this is not conclusive.

448 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH those members of the Corps Diplomatique who were willing to attend (the

representatives of the Germans and the satellites). The 9/11 Regiment (Horthy’s own) provided Szalasi’s guard of honour. When all was ready, Beregffy, Rajniss and Csia took up their places behind a velvet-covered platform, on which Baron Perényi, the Catholic Keeper of the Crown,} laid the holy symbol. Trumpets sounded a fanfare. Szalasi entered and walked up the hall. Then, before the Crown, he swore, as Horthy, and Francis Joseph

and Maria Theresa had sworn before him, to be faithful to Hungary, to respect, and make others respect, her laws and good ancient customs, and to do everything in his power which conduced to her welfare and glory. So help him God! It was only after this that the Army and the civil servants were required to take the oath to Szalasi as National Leader. It may be said that there were few recusants. Cardinal Serédi advised all Catholic school teachers (who in

that capacity were State servants) to conform; the heads of the other Confessions followed suit. Practically all the Army officers and civil servants

took the oath without ado, except indeed for the staffs of the Missions abroad, almost all of whom, including those who, like Voernle, had continued to serve under Sztdéjay, now resigned en bloc (the military Attache in Stockholm was the sole exception). In mid-November the Arrow Cross set up its

“Office for the Security of the Leader of the Nation,’’ the head of which,

C. Gal, was charged with supervising and controlling all questions of personnel in all offices, public or private, and carrying through the necessary

changes. He was represented in each Ministry by a Party representative, whose authority extended to the organisations and enterprises (down to vocational organisations, factories, etc.) controlled by that Ministry. These officials did not, however, find it necessary to make many changes, except, indeed, in the Courts of Justice. Even Sztdjay had left these untouched, but they were now very largely restaffed. During this time, negotiations had been going on with the object of making “Right Wing Unity”’ still more of a reality. The consummation of them was retarded by the acute mutual hatred which still reigned between Szalasi and

Baky, but agreement was reached at last that any member of either the National Socialist Party or the KABSz might enter the Arrow Cross Party, where he would be welcomed with affection and “regarded no less than the old members of the Party.”” On 16th November Palffy and Ney published this agreement and invited their followers to take immediate advantage of it. All the leading figures of both organisations (including Baky, who was now given a Secretaryship of State without portfolio) made a ceremonial entry into the Party on 4th December. No similar invitation was issued to the other parties as such, and none of the MEP Deputies crossed the floor. The Press

reported a rush of humbler applicants for Party membership, but also reported that the Old Guard of the movement proposed to pick and choose among the would-be recruits. The same Parliament which legitimised Szalasi’s position as acting Head

of the State had also (on the previous day) approved his programme as Minister President (the “‘Plan of National Reconstruction’’) and granted retrospective validity to all measures enacted by the Government during the * His Protestant colleague, Baron Radvanszky, was absent owing to illness (he died a few days ater).

SZALASI TYRANNUS 449 preceding fortnight.1_ Taking themselves, as they did, seriously in every respect, the new Ministers neglected no aspect of the Plan, however longterm. Thus on 9th November the first blueprint of the future “Corporate

Order of the Working Nation’ was issued. The “Order,” which was to start working on Ist March 1945, was to be a public body, with official status, embracing compulsorily all working members of the nation, whose moral,

spiritual and material interests it was its duty to protect. It was to be in charge of a “Grand Master,” a ‘““Deputy Grand Master” and a Secretary General, whose names were announced.* A later Order enumerated the 14 categories into which the Working Nation was to be divided.’ The leaders of some of these were appointed, and one “‘Corporation”’—that of the workers —was called into being by the simple process of taking over Szdsz’ creation, the MIMOSz, entire and putting it under an Arrow Cross leader.® Later still,

a few more Corporations came into some sort of ghost-life. Most of the Ministers however, were either entirely occupied with coping with tasks arising out of the immediate situation, or so fettered by that situation as to have little or nothing to do. Into the latter category fell Rajniss, who found nothing to do except to announce that schools would not reopen that autumn,

and Palffy, whose only contribution was an exhortation to farmers not to neglect preparing for next year’s harvest—a piece of advice which was sardonically endorsed by the Soviet wireless.

The busiest of all the ministers was Vajna, who began by creating a tangle which he then had to unpick. He had started, on 18th October, with a declaration repeating the programme of the Plan as it related to the Jews and especially emphasising that he would not recognise the validity of any safeconducts or foreign passports issued to Hungarian Jews. The next day he issued an Order extending the scope of the existing Hungarian anti-Jewish

legislation to all Jews in the country. The foreign missions promptly protested and Vajna rescinded his order. He and Kemény then worked out a scheme which divided the Jews in Hungary into five categories: Jews under

foreign protection, baptised Jews, Ministers of religion, Jews possessing

certificates of distinction (including those issued by Horthy) and the remainder; all but the last category were to enjoy total or partial exemption. This was an important concession, even more so in practice than in theory; for although the authorities scrutinised the lists for forged safe-conducts or certificates of exemption, and struck the holders of recognised forgeries off the lists, they were quite unable to keep pace with the flood of new certificates and safe-conducts either really issued by the remaining Missions, or forged, with the effect that the number of Jews carrying such papers and living in Red Cross houses rose within a few weeks from 15,000 to 33,000.’ There remained 1 It then rejected a private Bill by an Arrow Cross member that it should dissolve itself and hand over its functions to a ‘‘national institution”; resolved, on the contrary, to prolong its own life for a further six months; and after carrying through a few formalities, adjourned indefinitely on 6th November. > A dolgoz6 nemzet hivatasrendje (DNHR). 8 K. Kiss, I. Szerdahelyi, S. Baranyal. 4 These were: (1) soldiers; (2) clergy; (3) mothers; (4) teachers; (5) medical services; (6) civil

servants; (7) free professions; (8) peasants; (9) miners; (10) factory workers; (11) artisans;

(12) transport workers; (13) traders; (14) bankers. .

6 K. Wirth. This gentleman, an Arrow Cross Deputy with a notable prison record behind

him (see above, I. p. 427), was killed by shell-fire during the siege of Budapest.

6 He said at his trial that when issuing the Order he had been unaware of the existence of international agreements on the subject. 7 Black Book, pp. 364 ff. This work freely admits that protective papers were forged on a grand scale.

2F

450 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH about 125,000 Jews, of whom some 60,000 of the two sexes were classified

as able-bodied and thus liable to national service. These were put at the disposal of the Minister for Total Mobilisation, Kovarcz, who had been

given a blanket instruction by Szalasi to “‘mobilise’ all able-bodied Hungarians, of either sex, between the ages of 12 and 70, for national service.

As things turned out, the Jews proved to be the only category of the population to which this instruction was at all fully applied, and that not in the way originally intended by the Hungarians. Kovarcz began by cancelling the orders given by the Lakatos Government to evacuate the Jews to the provinces, and on 23rd October all male Jews in the 5th category, between the ages of 16 and 60 and physically fit, were enrolled in labour formations, most of which were set to digging trenches round Budapest. A few days later, Jewesses between the ages of 14 and 40 were called up and set to

washing and mending soldiers’ clothes. , The original plan was altered because Hitler had meanwhile ordered the construction of an “‘East Wall,”’ to run down the Vag valley and thence to Styria, approximately along the line of the Austro-Hungarian frontier, and! Jury came to Budapest to ask for a labour force of 50,000 to help in this work.

It appears that Szalasi at first (while declaring that he had no non-Jewish labour available) consented to send 25,000 Jews, although only on condition that they were employed on the Hungarian side of the frontier, and under

Hungarian supervision. Jury, however, appealed to Bormann, and he to Hitler, who sent Veesenmayer a most peremptory letter ordering him to get the labour force out of Hungary at all costs. Veesenmayer, on his own evidence, was anxious to get the Jews out of Budapest, which was now directly threatened by the Russian advance, as he feared that they would constitute a disaffected element dangerous to the security of the garrison. Agreement was therefore reached between Jury and Kovarcz that a total of 50,000 Jews, male and female,” should be sent west ‘“‘on loan’; the males to work on the West Wall, the females in war-production factories. The move was effected during the next few days. Some 20,000 Jews were

sent by rail, but, unhappily, transport facilities for the whole force were not available (it must be said that of the non-Jewish refugees who were streaming westward at the time, only young children, expectant or nursing mothers and the sick and aged were being carried) and another 20,000 Jews, of both sexes, were compelled to make the journey on foot. The conditions would in any case have been deplorable, but the operation was also carried out with great brutality, and a number of the victims perished on the way, while others were done to death after reaching their place of work. The remaining 10,000 who had been promised were not, in the event, sent. This was arranged at the beginning of November; and on 4th November

an Order appeared confiscating, for the benefit of the State, all Jewish property of any kind except a fortnight’s supply of food, fuel and light, a

few articles of personal use and a nominal supply of cash. The new 1 An account of this (but so confusedly written as to be practically incomprehensible) is given in the Black Book, pp. 371 ff. The subject was also discussed exhaustively at Nuremberg

(Trial, III, 286-7), at the trials of Szalasi and his colleagues, and at the Ministries Trial: see especially Prosecution Exhibit 1828, N.G. 3167, Doc. Book 62A, and the evidence given by Veesenmayer (p. 13450) and Winkelmann (p. 26169). ? The order relating to Jewesses was amended: it now applied to skilled needlewomen between 16 and 50 or other persons between 16 and 40. Expectant mothers and mothers of young children were exempted.

SZALASI TYRANNUS 45] Commissioner for Jewish Affairs was authorised to remove all other property from Jewish houses, and also to take over, for distribution, goods inventoried

and stored by previous Governments, and frozen bank balances. This was the prelude to the final enactment, which appeared on 2nd December. All Yellow Star Jews still left in the capital (a number put by themselves at 70,000) were moved into a small ghetto in central Pest and “‘protected’’ but not exempted Hungarian Jews, estimated at another 33,000, into a smaller

“international” ghetto. Here they passed the remaining weeks of their Calvary undergoing sufferings some of which were peculiar to themselves (several hundreds were butchered by Germans or Arrow Cross hooligans)

and others shared with the rest of the population. When the Red Army finally occupied Pest, it found 124,000 Jews still alive. This number included several thousands who had been hidden by Christians.? Following the removal of the Jews into the ghettoes, their former houses

were opened (including those apartments which had been sealed under previous Governments) and the contents distributed by the Arrow Cross. Simultaneously, the sale and distribution of the stocks and fittings of former Jewish shops and other businesses was carried through. It was by no means intended to confine the obligation of national service to Jews. Szalasi had hoped to raise no less than 14 new army divisions, not counting labour formations; and a flood of Orders poured out during the latter half of October, calling up this or that category of the population either

for military or for auxiliary service. The result was very soon complete chaos. There were, indeed, by now a considerable number of refugees who were not needed in the factories or on the land and could not even be fitted in there, but they could not be turned into soldiers, since there were no arms, nor even uniforms, for them. In the end Beregffy had to give up the idea of raising and arming new formations in Hungary, cancel a number of calling-up orders, and simply carry on with the two projects on which Csatay had already agreed with the Germans: for the formation of one division, to be known as

the Szent-Laszl6, out of “‘élite’’ fragments of existing units already under arms, whom the Germans offered to train and re-equip*®; and one entirely new Panzer grenadier division, the Hunyadi, to be composed of volunteers; this formation again the Germans agreed to fit out and to train in Germany. They were not, however, willing at this stage to arm more Hungarian units, nor any at all raised by conscription, as they regarded the bulk of Hungarians as politically untrustworthy. They did, indeed, continue to accept Hungarian volunteers for German Waffen SS. units, but this recruiting was forbidden by Szalasi, who, in fact, dismissed Ney, a little later, for conniving at it.

The Government had one further urgent task to carry through: the evacuation of population and material from areas east of the line on which 1 These included about 5,000 who had been rescued from the “Death March” and brought | back to the capital.

2 General Pfeiffer-Wildenbruch, the German Commander of the force which defended

Budapest, is said to have wished to exterminate the inhabitants of the ghettoes, but his Hungarian colleague, General Hindy, prevented him. 3 The core of the Szent-Ldszlé Division consisted of parachute units which had already been employed with the First Army. This was expanded by taking in volunteers, many of them very young, from the Levente. One battalion, of whose doings there is an account in Adonyi, op. cit., pp. 175 ff., was then in fact given equipment by the German Feldherrenhalle Division, and, after two days training (!) went into the line under the command of the G.O.C. of that division to replace exhausted troops withdrawn from the line.

452 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH the German Army meant to stand; which, as they now confirmed, was that which they had indicated to V6r6s on 9th October. A considerable movement of population was, of course, already taking place, including both the officials on whom evacuation had already been made compulsory, and voluntary refugees. Compulsion was now extended to Arrow Cross members and their families, as well as to persons lable for

military or national service under the new Orders being issued, and to certain other groups, including University teachers and scientific workers.

A few groups whose services were thought necessary to the population remaining behind were officially forbidden to leave, and the clergy of all denominations received from their superiors orders (which were obeyed with

exemplary fortitude) in the same sense. Most of the rest of the population was left the freedom of choice, although some categories of tradesmen (including cobblers) were urgently invited to move. A special agreement was made for Volksdeutsche, on whom evacuation

was made compulsory and whom the German Government offered to accommodate in Bohemia and Moravia. The Volksbund was put in charge of the operation, and it appears that a large number of Germans from the

Bacska were successfully evacuated, with their portable belongings. Germany was not, at this stage, yet willing to receive Magyars, who had to be settled in West Hungary, where their numbers—even although few peasants

or workers left—were by now so considerable as seriously to burden the resources of the authorities.’ But if the Germans did not want Hungarian men and women, they were less reluctant to receive Hungarian material. A blanket agreement on this point was signed between Veesenmayer, Szalasi and Hellebronth on 17th October, and this was afterwards supplemented by various special agreements, including one signed by Szakvari as Minister of Industry.

The official agreements related only to certain specific quantities of material: 4,000 tons of aluminium and certain other important raw materials and industrial objects. These objects were to be moved behind the new line of defence. What could be more safely stored, or more profitably used, in

Germany, was to be taken there, for safe-keeping (to be returned later to Hungary) or use in the common war effort, as the case might be. It remained, however, the property of the Hungarian State, and the value of it was credited

to Hungary in the accounts. The rest was to be kept in West Hungary, for the use of the population and of the German and Hungarian forces. Apart from this, however, the German military made their own dispositions, taking with them, roughly, anything they wanted and could carry. It was too late to salvage much from beyond the Tisza, where the Germans were often reduced to destroying what they could not carry away and would be useful to the enemy. Even west of the river they had no time to spare for 1 A newspaper of the day described the train of carts carrying the effects of ‘30,000 Volksgenossen.”’ If this figure refers to heads of families, most of the German population of the

Schwdbische Turkei must have been got away. The arrangements were made too late to save the Germans of Transylvania and the Banat, and the half-assimilated Swabians of West Hungary seem in most cases to have refused to move. * No statistics were, to my knowledge, ever published of the internal movement of Hungarian refugees. The Mayor of Budapest said on 12th December that there were 12,000 refugee public employees in the city, from which one might guess that about 200,000 persons had by that time sought refuge in the capital or further west. The civilian deaths among non-residents of Budapest from September 1944 to February 1945 inclusive were 2,013 out of a total of 29,652, or say 1 in 15. This would give about 60,000 “‘non-residents” in Budapest.

SZALASI TYRANNUS 453 the small peasants (who, in spite of all orders, hid their stocks) and were forced by the resistance of the workers to leave behind a fair proportion of factory equipment. But they managed to move some of this, and to strip the big estates of the Alféld fairly clean, and vast convoys were reported moving westward by road, rail and water. The areas in question being mainly

agricultural, these convoys consisted chiefly of agricultural materials, including live animals driven on the hoof; but machinery, both agricultural and industrial, was taken also, and also industrial raw materials, the contents of shops, and the scientific material of the Universities and High Schools.

Most of this material was, as the Hungarians of the Democratic regime complained very bitterly, carried straight into Austria or Bohemia before being unloaded; it was reported that from 3 to 8 100-axle trains were crossing

the frontier daily, while large quantities were also being taken out by land and water. It would, however, be unfair to describe the whole operation as ‘German looting,” for Hungarians often pressed the Germans to evacuate their property for them. Herr Veesenmayer informs me that the manager of the Archduke Jézsef Ferencz’s vineyards besought him for transport to take away 4,000,000 bottles of Tokaj. That the austere German refused this request is not the least tragic fact registered in this history.

Meanwhile, the German and Hungarian armies in the field had been retreating steadily, day after day. By the end of October they were back ona line which ran, roughly, from the Dukla pass southward to the bridge over the Tisza at Tokaj; down the Tisza to a point south of Szolnok and thence obliquely across the Alf6ld, south-east of Kecskemét, to the Danube at Baja.

_ Thus all Ruthenia, all Transylvania, all the Tiszantil and nearly half the Alféld were already in Russian hands. Then, on 31st October, the Soviets opened a heavy attack on the weakly defended sector south of Kecskemét. The defenders were driven back so swiftly that on 2nd November the Soviet forces were in sight of Pest; some motorised columns even entered the outer suburbs of the city, from which they were barely repelled by the German SS. divisions from Buda and scratch Hungarian detachments largely made up of police and gendarmerie. The Red Army did not press the frontal attack on the capital, but its Left wing now cleared the entire Right bank of the Danube

below Pest (except for a bridgehead at Dunafoldvar which German and Hungarian troops held for another fortnight) while its Right pushed up to the outskirts of the Biikk-Matra hills, beyond the Miskolcz-Gyéngy6s-Hatvan

line, all these centres being in their hands by the end of the month. Meanwhile, Soviet and Yugoslav units had gained a foothold west of the Danube by crossing the Drave. In this sector, in which neither side had many troops at the beginning of the month, the line remained stationary on the hills south of Pécs until 29th November; but on that day Marshal Tolbukhin, who had

been bringing up his troops from the Balkans, attacked in force with spectacular results. In a single day his troops entered Pécs (which surrendered without a shot fired), Mohacs, Bataszék and 330 other “inhabited localities,” establishing a bridgehead across the Danube which was 40 km. deep and 150 km. wide. On 2nd December Székszard and Kaposvar fell and a detach-

ment pushing up the river took Dunaféldvar. By 7th December the line ran from Barcs, on the Drave, north to the south-western tip of the Balaton, and from the north-eastern extremity of the lake, along a line just south of the Buda-Székesfehérvar road and railway, to the Danube at Ercsi.

454 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH This had not been a defeat for the Germans; if anything, the contrary. In places they had, as they admitted, retired faster than they had expected, especially in the south, but they had extricated practically all their troops from the exceedingly dangerous positions of mid-October, had probably inflicted more casualties than they had suffered, and had not at any point been driven behind the line on which they had proposed to make their next , stand. Theynowconfidently informed the Hungarians that the withdrawal was completed, according to plan. They both could and would hold the line now established until the following spring, when the lost ground would be recovered.

But the rapid retreat had brought about another great change in public opinion. The minority of Hungarians, including Szalasi, who had accepted

as axiomatic that Hungary’s only salvation lay in her partnership with Germany, and drew the logical consequences, perforce accepted the Germans’ assurances; held unshaken to their own determination to continue the struggle to the last, and called on the people of Hungary to do likewise. But the bulk

of the population was quickly losing the will to respond to these appeals. German domination over Hungary might be better than Russian domination —on that point opinions were, perhaps, divided—but Russian domination was preferable to exile. The great majority of the civilian population had stayed in their homes during the retreat, and this urgent and instinctive feeling that anything was better than leaving home had extended also to the Army. So few units had found simultaneously the will and the opportunity to go over to the Russians and continue fighting against the Germans that after ten days the Russians had dropped the Miklds experiment altogether, and with it the idea of utilising the Hungarian prisoners of war as an “Army of

Liberation.”?> They had taken the General himself off to Moscow (for negotiations which will be described shortly) and now treated such units as

did surrender to them as ordinary prisoners of war, or, in some cases, contemptuously let them go free. But a very considerable proportion of the Hungarian troops, including particularly the Transylvanians, the Ruthenians and the units from the Nyirség, had simply melted away when the fighting

reached their homes or seemed likely to move westward of it. Thus the Hungarian army in the field emerged from the great retreat in a sadly diminished condition. The once mighty First Army (now on the Slovak frontier) was left with four divisions (the Ist Mountain, 6th, 16th and 24th) in the line; the rest! had been “‘withdrawn,”’ which meant that the fragments of them which survived were parked out of harm’s way on the Moravian frontier. The old Second Army had disappeared altogether, its surviving

units having been either transferred to the Third Army or placed under German command. The Third Army had been left in charge of Heszlényi, and had for a while become the largest Hungarian command, for besides two

divisions from the Second Army, it had been given also the 10th and the Cavalry. But this force, too, had suffered heavily during the retreat, after which the 10th was sent to Budapest, where it was joined by the 12th Division

from the German Army, and the remnants of the Ist Armoured. The 20th, 23rd, 25th, 7th and 8th Depot, 2nd Armoured and Cavalry, with the newly raised Szent-Laszl6, continued to figure in the battle-order of the German Ninth Army Group in S.W. Hungary as the “Hungarian Third Army,”’ but it was a Skeleton army consisting of skeleton components. 1 J.e. the 7th and 13th Reserve, and the Frontier Chasseurs. The 2nd Mountain Brigade had gone over bodily to the Russians, by agreement between its commander and Miklds.

SZALASI TYRANNUS 455 In Budapest feeling grew very uncertain as the armies approached its outskirts. The city had so far escaped damage other than that caused by the Allied bombing, with the single important qualification that the famous Margaret Bridge had been destroyed on 4th November by an explosion (probably an accidental one) which had caused heavy loss of life.t But with

the loss of two-thirds of the city’s hinterland, the influx of refugees, and the | general confusion, conditions had become exceedingly difficult. Official rations had been cut drastically during November, and even the nominal quotas, small as they were, had often not been available. The peasants who still brought supplies to the market refused to part with them except for clothes or cigarettes. The fuel position was even worse than that of food supplies. Domestic consumers were shivering in unheated rooms and the authorities announced that the supply of power for the factories and trams was in danger.

At best (from the point of view of those who thought that way at all), these conditions would, on the Government’s own showing, have to be endured for another six months. And feeling was growing rapidly that the promised liberation would not come then; resistance would only prolong the agony before the arrival of inevitable defeat. Thus a large proportion of the

population dropped into an attitude of sheer passivity, which both sides described as defeatism; while a few were spurred into an activity which produced the only recorded movement to overthrow the Szalasi regime from inside.

Although they had, as we have said,” retired into a prudent seclusion as soon as it became evident that Horthy’s attempt was going to fail, the oldestablished Resistance leaders were naturally still in touch with one another,

and were soon able to come together and to tell each other that the Hungarian | Front (Communists, Socialists, Smallholders, National Peasants) was in being again. While the driving force was provided by the Communists,

Tildy, the Smallholder, was still recognised as President of the Front. Other groups still recognisably in existence were the MFN and the Army officers who regarded General Kiss? as their leader. Finally, both Kiss and Tildy succeeded in establishing contact with Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, whose friends had smuggled him into hiding after his release on 15th October. Even such members of these various groups as were really anxious to take action were, however, long hampered by inability to get any word of Moscow’s intentions and wishes. On 23rd October, the MFN had received

a message by wireless which purported to come from Faragho and Szentivanyi in Moscow, that “‘all necessary contacts had been made”’ and no precipitate action was to be taken in Budapest, which “it was not wanted to make into a second Warsaw.’ Ifa general rising was wanted, a code signal (‘People of Budapest, sleep well’) was to be given on the wireless. 1 The cause of this catastrophe has never been certainly ascertained. It was officially attributed

at the time to ‘‘a lighted cigarette igniting a leaking gas-main,”’ but more probably what exploded . was the demolition charges which German engineers had placed under the bridge against later eventualities. Three heavily laden trams, besides other traffic and many foot-passengers, were on the bridge at the time, and probably not less than 300 persons lost their lives, many of them by drowning in the Danube. 2 The following is pieced together from Kovacs’ book D’une Occupation 4 l'autre; G. Kallat, op. cit., pp. 270-1; an article by Simonffy-Toth in A debreceni Feltdmadds, pp. 137 ff.; and a number of personal accounts, from Sods and others. My sources disagree on many points of detail and I cannot guarantee the complete accuracy of my own account. 3 See above, p. 231 n. 1. 4 [ cannot trace any such message in the files of the Armistice Delegation; but Szentivanyi had been in Lisko with Miklos, and the message may have come from there,

456 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH It appears, in fact, that Moscow was still afraid to frighten off the nonCommunists in the Resistance (and perhaps, to endanger the safety of 1ts own

agents) by showing its hand prematurely: indeed, on M. Kallai’s own evidence, he was occupied at this time rather in repressing extremist activity,

than in fomenting it. Thus no signal ever came, and various messages sent through secret channels elicited no response whatever. At last, when the Red Army had been within gunshot of Pest for a week, the Front decided to send one of its military members, an officer named Simonffy-Toth, by plane (they had found a pilot willing to fly him) to Szeged to ask for instructions and to describe the situation. On second thoughts it was decided to send also a delegation of politicians: Tildy’s son, a Social Democrat (possibly Szakasits)

and a Communist, and thirdly, V6rés’ call to action having in the interval been read out over the Moscow wireless, V6r6s’ son was included in the party to sweeten the ex-Chief of Staff, with whom the Front possessed the contacts described in a previous chapter, whereas Faraghé and Miklé6s were unknown

to them. The politicians were to take with them a memorandum on their own organisation and wishes; Simdnffy-Toth was to take a plan of the defences of Budapest. Toth got safely away on the 13th, with V6r6s, jun., although without the

political delegation, which failed to arrive at the rendezvous in time, their car having broken down en route. But although, as we shall see, he eventually

reached Moscow in safety, the Russians then applied to Toth their usual technique of first keeping him incommunicado for some days,” so that the Resistance leaders in Budapest were still left without contact with the outer world. While waiting for news of their emissary, they continued to develop their own plans. On 14th November Bajcsy-Zsilinszky and his principal lieutenant,

Lt.-Col. Jenéd Nagy, signed an agreement with Rajk, representing the Communists, under which the latter undertook (a) to defend the national interests of Hungary in Moscow and (0) not to interfere with the Army. On 20th November the Zsilinszky-military group joined with the Front to form a “Committee of Liberation” (Felszabaditasi Bizottsag) under Bajesy-

Zsilinszky’s Presidency. In it the Front was represented by Tildy and Csorba for the Smallholders, Kovacs for the National Peasants, Szakasits (nominally) for the Social Democrats, and Kallai for the Communists?; the soldiers by Kiss, Nagy and a third officer named Tarcsay; and it was reinforced by several other groups: the MFM, represented by Sods; the National Communists (now known as the “Patriotic Alliance of Liberty’’)* (Dudas,

Aczél, Faust); the KISz (Federation of Communist Youth); and a body which styled itself the “Friends of the Soviet Union,”? whose leader, a man called Penzes-Fekete, introduced a certain Vary, represented to them as a Hungarian-born officer in the Soviet Army. 1 In his description of this period (op, cit., pp. 268 f.) M. Kallai complains with acrimony of the “provocative activity” of ‘‘factions,”’ the most dangerous of which, the ‘“‘Demény faction,” was trying to stir the proletariat into immediate revolution. ‘“‘The Communist Party,’’ he writes,

“waged an inexorable war against this provocative attempt, destructive of the ranks of the

workers and of the whole independence movement.”’ * This was, it seems, an inviolable convention. On their own initiative, the Russians had invited I. Tarnay, Councillor of the Hungarian Legation in Bucharest, to join the Moscow Delegation,

and then had thrown him for some days into the Lyublyanka prison. * Rajk had meanwhile been arrested by the Arrow Cross, who, however, spared his life; he survived to become Minister of the Interior under the Communists and to be hanged by his own colleagues. * Hazafiak Szabadsagszovetsége.

SZALASI TYRANNUS 457 The result was prompt disaster, for Vary had been an agent provocateur. On 23rd November the three leaders of the military party and some 30 other officers were arrested at a conference. This was to have been a full meeting of the entire Committee, all the civilian leaders of which had been invited

to it; but it looks as though the soldiers had met early for some private discussion between themselves! and the Gestapo had moved prematurely, for none of the civilians had arrived at the rendezvous when the swoop was made. Bajcsy-Zsilinszky was, indeed, arrested subsequently, an officer having given away his address under torture; but all the other civilian participants escaped

the net. But this was the end of any attempt at organised resistance from behind the lines. The would-be resisters were left largely leaderless, and— what perplexed them even more—still entirely without indication of the wishes

of the Allies. Aczél volunteered to go over to the Russian lines and reestablish contact, and duly left; but he was never heard of again. Then Sods was flown down to Italy, in another stolen plane, to make a last appeal to

the Western Allies. He made the journey safely, but it was fruitless. No further message coming from any side, the surviving participants in the conspiracy returned to their respective jobs. There was no more suggestion of military revolt or even of organised civilian resistance.

M. Kallai writes, indeed, that after the arrest of the soldiers, the Communist Party “‘redoubled”’ [sic] “‘its efforts to organise an armed rising among the workers’’*——-a phrase which suggests that it now abandoned its policy of passivity. Passive resistance, and even active sabotage, were now indubitably spreading, but most of this seems to have been spontaneous, and it was even now not on a scale comparable to what had occurred, for example, in Warsaw.

The arrival of Simonffy-Toth in Moscow did, however, constitute one episode in a different story, to which we must now turn. For the military operations described above had, after all, left a full two-thirds of Hungary behind the fighting front of the Red Army, and the Soviet authorities now felt the time come to take positive action on the basis of this fact.

The story of the formation of the first Government of Democratic Hungary is long and complex, and will be given here only in outline. The first move seems to have been made by the armistice Delegation in Moscow, which as early as 23rd October had addressed a Note to the Allies in which

it argued that since Horthy had been abducted, and his designated homo regius, Veress, had disappeared, the Delegation was itself “‘the only representative of Horthy’s constitutional will, and also the depository of constitutional continuity.”’ It therefore asked to be entrusted with the formation, in Debrecen, of a Government which, while the constitutional successor of that of Lakatos and acknowledging the authority of the Regent (whose abdication it did not recognise as legally valid), should be composed of anti-Fascist elements and should co-operate with the Allies in the spirit of the interrupted negotiations. The Russians appear at the time not to have been in any great hurry to 1 It had been hoped to organise a force of suitably minded soldiers and armed partisans, who were to cut their way out of Pest, attacking the German and Hungarian defences in the rear, and

thus ‘open a corridor” for the Red Army to enter the capital (Kallai, op. cit., p. 271). The organisation of this enterprise was, of course, in the hands of the soldiers. 2 Kallai, op. cit., p. 272. 3 The following account is based partly on the archives of the Delegation and partly on various articles in A debreceni Feltdmadas.

458 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH make any political move. They were more interested in Miklés’ efforts to bring the First Army across. But by the first week in November they had, as we have said, dropped this experiment as useless, and on the 7th they brought

Miklés (at his own wish) to Moscow. The party seems to have spent the next three days exclusively in squabbling over questions of precedence; Faraghé maintaining that he had been entrusted with the conduct of the armistice negotiations, while Miklds argued that he was the senior General and also the rightful successor to Veress (arrested) as Horthy’s homo regius, a G.O.C. First Army being the closest available approximation to a G.O.C.

Second Army. And hardly had agreement been reached to the effect that Miklés should be co-opted on to the Delegation without formal settlement of the question of precedence, when V6r6s arrived and claimed the leadership

for himself as Horthy’s plenipotentiary (on the strength of the famous communication of 6.30 p.m., 15th October) and accredited representative of the Hungarian Front. The Delegation (under which term we may now include Miklos) spent a further couple of days in doing little else but object to the claims of Vérdés. Then, on the 13th, the whole company (and henceforward we include V6rés when speaking of the ‘‘Delegation’’) were summoned into the presence of Molotov, who agreed in principle that a new, democratic Government should be formed on Hungarian soil. Miklds, who, it was specifically stated, would represent the principle of legal continuity, should be in charge. He would form a Government out of local representatives of the democratic Parties; these would make place for the Party leaders when the latter were liberated. A second meeting took place on 16th November. Here M. Molotov made the disconcerting suggestion that there was no need to look in Hungary at all for members of the new Government; there were enough Hungarians in Moscow to form (with representatives of the Delegation) a ““super-democratic

Government.” But he did not insist, and accepted some of the names suggested by the Delegation. The Delegation kept themselves occupied during the next few days (just like Szalasi) in drawing up lists of proposed Govern-

ments. In these Miklds usually figured as coupling the Minister Presidency with the Ministry of Defence. The other lists were made up, in the main, of leading democratic politicians stillin Hungary. His colleagues began by giving V6rdés the Ministry of Nationalities, and ended by dropping him altogether.

On 18th November Simonffy-Toth arrived in Moscow. The messages which he brought seemed to strengthen V6rés’ hand, and on the 23rd, at a grand meeting of all concerned, Faragho and the rest of the original Delegation agreed to throw over Miklés. V6r6s was to act as Commissioner for the Regency, which all parties agreed to consider as still legally existent (Simonffy-Toth had brought a message to this effect from the Front in Budapest). Tildy was to be Minister President. The rest of the Government was to be composed of representatives of the Liberation Front in Budapest, the collapse of which was not yet knownin Moscow. The Delegation notified the Soviet authorities of this their latest decision on 26th November. Meanwhile, unknown to the émigrés, political life had begun to burgeon

anew in Hungary itself. In the towns and villages over which the fighting had passed, the surviving representatives of the municipal councils, etc., had emerged, each, owing to the breakdown of communications, working independently, and had taken provisional charge of local affairs, under the

SZALASI TYRANNUS 459 more or less benevolent eye of the Soviet authorities. In most places more or

less impromptu councils—municipal or rural—had formed themselves, usually consisting of “‘democratic elements’”—representatives of the political

parties of the Left, with a stiffening of workers, peasants, etc. In the larger towns, of which Debrecen and Szeged were by far the most important, affairs had been regularly taken over by coalition Councils representing the Smallholders, Social Democrats, Communists and in some cases National Peasants and representatives of one or another “‘progressive bourgeois”’ party.

Although this process had been very largely spontaneous, the Soviet authorities had naturally wished to control and guide it; and as soon as their troops reached the Tisza line, had sent down a little delegation of Hungarian Communists from Moscow, led by Erné Gerd (Z. Vas, J. Révai, M. Farkas

and I. Nagy were among his more prominent lieutenants). Gerd had got in touch, in particular, with the leaders in Debrecen and Szeged, of which two cities Szeged, having been liberated a month the earlier, was considerably

ahead in its arrangements. Under the guidance of the ‘“‘Muscovites’’ the **Hungarian Independence Front” was re-created in all form in Szeged, under

the name of “National Committee,’ as the kernel of a future Hungarian Government, to be based on a coalition between the parties of the Front. A programme embodying the intentions of these parties (as approved by Ger6) was drafted by a certain Pater Balogh, a priest of Jewish origin, the Antal of the New Hungary. This programme (of which we shall say no more here

than that it envisaged drastic social and political reforms, in particular, a far-reaching agrarian reform, but assumed further government through a coalition in which the Communists were only one element, and the nonCommunists workers, the peasants and farm labourers and the bourgeoisie were also to be represented) was accepted by the Debrecen Council when this

was formed, and that Council then adhered to the National Committee. When this was done, Gero and Vas returned to Moscow, bringing with them the programme and also a list of their own candidates for the new Government. This was an “immediate action” list, and thus contained none of the Independence leaders who were still at the time beyond the fighting line. It consisted of the most representative and suitable figures which had risen to

the surface in Szeged and Debrecen. , It seems likely that, although the more conservative members of the new National Council stood on the ground of historic continuity and recognised the Regency as still in existence, and Horthy as still the legitimate Head of the State, they expected the new Government to be entirely in their own

hands. Whether that had been Ger6o’s idea also, we cannot say; but he presumably had to consult his superiors when he returned to Moscow. Whatever may have happened at these consultations, the Delegation was called on 5th December into the presence of Kuznyecov, who presented them to Geré and Nagy, who “‘had just returned from the Tiszantul and would be

able to give them valuable help in solving their problem.” In fact, Gero, who now took complete charge of affairs, made short work of most of what had been done hitherto, particularly in the preceding ten days. It was to be a mixed Government. The Generals and other members of the Delegation were to receive four portfolios: Mikl6s—reinstated for what reasons we do not know—Minister President; V6r6és, Defence; Faragho, Supply; Teleki, Cults and Education. The Muscovite Communists took two for themselves:

Nagy, Agriculture, and J. Gabor, Trade and Communications. The other

460 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH six Were given to members of the National Committee in the persons of J.

Gyongyéssy, Foreign Affairs; F. Erdei, Interior; I. Vasary, Finance; F. Takacs, Industry; A. Valentini, Justice; E. Molnar, Social Welfare. Of these,

it may be remarked that Gydngydssy and Vasary then figured as Smallholders, Valentini and Molnar as Social Democrats, Takacs as a bourgeois politician and Erdei as a National Peasant; although Molnar afterwards became a confessed Communist and Erdei a Communist in all but name, while Gydngyoéssy figured on the extreme Left of his party. In the small hours of the next morning the members of the Delegation were called to the presence

of Molotov, who asked them if they had any remarks to make on the list. Teleki asked, “‘What would be the relationship of the new Government to Horthy?” to which Molotov replied: “Soviet Russia was at war with Horthy Hungary for four years, so we wish to hear no more of Horthy Hungary.” He does not appear to have entered into further details, but it is a fact that the name of Horthy was not mentioned in the armistice concluded in January, and that the Provisional National Assembly formed thereafter claimed to be

‘the only legal representative organ of the Hungarian people.’? On the other hand, the Soviets themselves took pains to preserve the principle of legal continuity, presumably in order to maintain one justification for their claim to reparations. For the rest, the three Generals agreed without hesitation to figure on the list, and Teleki let his initial scruples be overruled in return for certain concessions.

The Delegation was then told to pack; they would be starting the next afternoon (.e. the 7th) for Debrecen, where elections were to be held for a National Assembly, which would then elect “the new democratic Government.” The fact that this statement should have been made by the man who had himself just read out the names of the said Government, accepted without surprise by his auditors, and recorded without comment by the historian of the meeting, will not seem bizarre to the reader of this work if he has digested its third chapter. The party, which was accompanied by the Soviet Minister designate to

Hungary, M. Pushkin, and his staff, as well as Gerd and Nagy, started on the journey (remarkably enough) at the hour indicated; but travelling by train, it took no less than five days before arriving at Debrecen. Here its members were introduced to the representatives of the National Committee, and instructed by Gerd to arrange for the convocation of a new Provisional National Assembly on the 2Ist. As this meant another week of preparatory

work, it will be convenient to return at this point to the fortunes of the Szalas1 Government.

When the German armies came to rest on their new line, the Hungarian Government continued to plan its policy on the assumption that the retreat would go no further. Nevertheless, for precaution’s sake, and also to ease the supply difficulties of Budapest, the H.Q.s of the Ministries were moved down to West Hungary—in most cases, to Szombathely, Sopron, which was now designated as the provisional seat of the Government and of Parliament, or Kd6szeg. Enough presses to print four big dailies and a few minor newspapers went with the Government. Some of the archives, the reserves 1 Miklos earnestly begged members of the Assembly not to raise the question of the Head of the State.

SZALASI TYRANNUS 461 of the National Bank in gold and devisen, and the most precious national relics, including the Holy Crown, were also taken out of the capital. A few categories of the population, besides the Ministerial staffs, were

evacuated compulsorily: chief among these, the families of Arrow Cross Party members and Staff officers. The male employees of the Municipality of Budapest, workers in certain professions (including doctors) and some trades, mainly connected with the food industry, and the surviving Jews (who were now being herded into the ghettoes) were forbidden to leave.

It had also been intended to evacuate the plant of such factories in Budapest as could be of use to the war effort. The workers were ordered to report, with their families, at collecting centres, whence they would be marched to reception areas. The plant was to be dismantled by the military. A few factories were in fact dismantled, and the workers marched off. The workers of the great factories in Csepel, however, who were being strongly exhorted by the Radio Kossuth, in Moscow, to stay put, refused to move. The Hungarian police and soldiers sent down took their side and the attempt had to be abandoned after three days. The Government did not dare move the machines without the workers. Making a virtue of necessity, it added ‘“‘workers in the essential war factories’”’ to the list of categories forbidden to move and thereafter kept the workers appeased by double rations and other concessions.

Incidentally, by far the greater part of the machines had by now been wrecked by the Allied bombing, and the remainder was hardly worth moving.

The rest of the population was given its choice of moving or staying. The great majority remained in their homes, even though conditions were now approximating to those of siege. The bread ration was down to 150 gr. daily; milk, meat and fats practically non-existent and prices on the black market fantastic; matches were selling at 10 peng6 a box and buns at 9 peng6é

each. Gas was down to a trickle and electricity cut off for all but two or three hours of the twenty-four. On 4th December, Szalasi, accompanied by Beregffy and Kemény, visited

Hitler and held conversations at which Keitel and Guderian also were

present, with Mecsér (now Hungarian Minister in Germany)’ and Veesenmayer in attendance. Szalasi said afterwards that he had, on this occasion, proposed abandoning Budapest in order to spare it the sufferings of a siege.

The Germans refused permission (General Wohler, who had replaced Friesner, told Szalasi that there could be no question of abandoning the capital: he had received specific personal orders from Hitler that Budapest was to be held at all costs), and Hitler, while admitting that owing to the - Allied offensive in the west he had not been able to send as many troops to Hungary as he had wished, and would not be able to drive the Russians back until the following spring, yet assured his visitors that he could and would carry through the operation at that time, when, with the help of the “‘secret weapon” (of which he gave details) he would win the war. Pending this, he could and would hold Budapest, and his present line in general, and he repeated that he was as interested in the fate of Hungary, as of Germany.”

Nevertheless, since the liberation could not be carried out for some 1 According to a private report, Hitler had at first refused to see the Hungarians, saying that

he was too busy. Szalasi, very angry, had retorted that in that case he would give no more Hungarian soldiers.

2 Another remark which he made to Beregffy was that after the defection of Roumania he had decided to restore all Transylvania to Hungary. Horthy had spoilt this by his own defection.

462 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH months, and in view of the difficulty of supplying Budapest and the congestion in West Hungary, he made the concession that he would receive on German

territory not only Hungarian military formations, institutions and schools? but also all persons from the “‘temporarily evacuated areas of Hungary” who were willing to fight on loyally by the side of Germany, with their families. Thus the dependants of serving soldiers and of the workers whose plants had been removed to Germany and of Arrow Cross Party members* mights inter Germany at will. A “‘Royal Hungarian Commissioner in Germany®*” was now appointed to administer, under the Minister of Defence, the affairs of all authorities, military formations and institutions evacuated to Germany. A few Hungarian refugees left their country voluntarily when the agreement was announced; although extremely few, since most Hungarians regarded exile in Germany as the last extremity. The scientific equipment

of the Universities was moved to Halle and Breslau, with a handful of teachers, and, allegedly, even a few pupils. The immediate practical impor-

tance of the agreement, however, lay in the military field: it meant that Germany took complete charge of the Hungarian Army at every stage. She now agreed to train and arm four more Waffen SS. divisions, after the model of the Hunyadi; these were to be called after heroes of the 1849 war—the Kossuth, the Petofi, the Klapka and the Gérgey. They were to be Hungarianofficered, but they were required to take the oath of obedience to Hitler. Like the Hunyadi Division, these new formations were to consist of volunteers

only. It may be remarked that although a few volunteers reported for these regiments, and their training began, none of them ever saw action. At the same time, the Germans withdrew all that was left of the First Army, with the single exception of the 24th Division, to refit in Moravia, whence it never reappeared.* No more regular formations were raised in Hungary until the end of the war, although a ‘‘Hungarist Legion,” an ‘“‘Armed National Service” and a *‘Field Security Service” were formed successively in a few days—largely out of boys and youths, some of them only 12 years old—and given the status of auxiliary military forces. Some of these boys helped in the defence of Budapest.

After leaving Budapest, the Government, Parliament and the leading figures of the Arrow Cross settled down in West Hungary; and he would be doing these men an injustice who supposed that any of them regarded themselves as out of employment. The day before he left the capital, Vajna had found time to order that all street-names in the capital which were called after Jews should be renamed. A military court in Sopron executed Nagy,

Kiss and Tarcsay, and also (after Parliament had consented in due form) Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, who died on Christmas Eve, saying, as bravely as Teleki and as mistakenly: “‘I shall be present at the Peace negotiations.”’ The same Court executed Prince Odescalchi, whom the Germans had sent back from Italy, and further tried a number of officers whose conduct on 15th October had given exception to the regime. Most of these, including Lazar, Vattay

(who had returned from Germany), Utassy and the smaller fry were 1 Vajna made a parallel agreement with Himmler for the police and gendarmerie. 2 This appears to be the sense of the oral report which Beregffy made on the meeting (9th November) although his words relating to the workers were not very clear. 3 Col. General S. Magyarossy. 4 According to Hadak Utjdn, December 1952, these units were ordered back to the Front in March 1945, but they do not appear ever to have reached it. Other sources would have it that they had been disarmed and put on fortification work in Moravia.

SZALASI TYRANNUS 463 : acquitted. Only Hardy was condemned to death and Veress to 15 years’ Imprisonment—sentences of which subsequent events made rather nonsense. A tribunal also condemned the “‘dissident diplomats” to death and confisca-

tion of their property; sentences of equal futility, since the diplomats were abroad and any property which they had ever possessed in Hungary had gone, or was about to go, up in smoke.

The National Leader of the DNHR was appointed a Minister of State, and Leaders appointed for the Corporations of Clergy and Peasants. It was announced that all the other Leaders would be appointed shortly and the plan come into operation on Ist May 1945. Parliament enacted the regular Indemnity Bill, approved a provisional Budget, and authorised itself to fill the vacancies in its own numbers (now nearly 90 per cent.) by nomination. But even those few Deputies who enacted these measures showed a flagging interest in affairs; when the Indemnity Bill was brought in, the unprecedented situation arose that no Deputy wanted to speak on it, and Sz6llési filled in the time by giving the House a lecture on Hungarism. In fact, the conduct of affairs was, by this stage, out of the hands of the Government. Where the military did not govern directly, they did so through the Commissioner of the Operational Zone (all Szalasi-Hungary had now been united in a single zone, under Endre), who was himself, owing to the breakdown of communications, obliged to delegate most of his powers to local authorities: West Hungary had disintegrated into small units almost as completely as East Hungary. Meanwhile, the Germans had been unable, after all, to hold the Friesner Line. On 9th December the Red Army suddenly broke through the defences north of Budapest, reaching the Danube at Vac and cutting off a number of German and Hungarian units. The Germans brought up reinforcements and established a new defensive line behind the Ipoly. But less than a fortnight later came something much worse. On 22nd December Tolbukhin attacked in force between the Balaton and the Danube. The next day Székesfehervar

and Bicske fell, after bitter fighting. On the 24th the Russians, pressing forward at utmost speed, had reached the outer suburbs of Buda; their arrival had been so sudden that cases were reported afterwards of parents who had gone innocently into the capital to buy Christmas toys for their children, and found themselves unable to return to their homes. On the 26th only two roads out of Buda—those to Esztergom and Szent Endre—were still open. The next day the capital, with its 800,000 civilians and its garrison of 70,00080,000 Hungarians and Germans? was completely encircled. 1 The execution of the sentence on Hardy was deferred, but the Arrow Cross carried him away with them to Austria. There the American troops liberated him and he eventually reached the U.S.A., safety, and a modest comfort. Veress was left behind, liberated by the Russians and “‘placed at the disposal of the Debrecen Government,” but he was later re-arrested and sentenced

to life imprisonment by that same Government. Of the other figures mentioned, Csatay had committed suicide in prison, with his wife. Kudar was shot by the Germans. Lakatos, rearrested by the Arrow Cross, was released on the intervention of Veesenmayer. He was still free in 1952, as was Vor6s, although the latter was, allegedly, under “house arrest.”” The Germans had kept the civilian V.I.P.s, including Hennyey, in Germany. All of these were safely liberated by the Americans in the spring of 1945. 2 The garrison consisted of one German armoured division, the Feldherrenhalle, two Waffen

SS. cavalry divisions (now long since dismounted: these were the 8th and 22nd) and some fragments, under the command of SS. General Pfeiffer-Wildenbruch, who was also in general command of the garrison. The Hungarian troops (commander, General I. Hindy), which constituted about 55 per cent. of the whole, consisted of the 10th and 12th Mixed Divisions, with fragments of the Ist Armoured and the Hussars, the Bodyguard, some militarised units of police and gendarmerie, and the A.A. defences.

464 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Thus began the struggle for a city which two Hungarian Governments were now claiming as their lawful capital. For on 23rd December the Soviet Government had at last lifted the veil of secrecy with which it had hitherto shrouded from the entire world (the British and American Governments not

excepted) its preparations in Moscow and Debrecen, and announced the formation in the latter city of a Hungarian Provisional National Assembly and Government. The members of the Assembly, 230 in number, had been ‘elected’? during the previous week—‘‘election”’ usually, and necessarily, meaning nomination by local Committees, assisted and controlled, to a

greater or lesser degree, by the Soviet authorities and the Hungarian ‘“Muscovite’? Communists. They were said to represent “all democratic Parties, Trade Unions, National Committees, Peasant Unions, artisans’ associations and other public bodies”’; the official list showed 72 Communists,

57 Independent Smallholders, 35 Social Democrats, 12 National Peasants,

8 members of minor bourgeois Parties, 19 representatives of the Trade Unions, one of the Peasant Union and 26 non-Party or representatives of miscellaneous Parties or organisations. The 230 had held a preliminary meeting on the 21st, at which they elected their President and other officers.

The next day, on the proposal of the officers, they “elected”? Miklos as Minister President, and, on his proposal, the rest of the Ministers as arranged in Moscow. Miklos then read out a declaration of policy, which consisted in effect of two parts. First, Miklés said that Hungary would seek the earliest opportunity to conclude an armistice with the U.S.S.R. and “with all the peace-loving countries with which Hungary was at war’ and undertook to pay reparation for the damage which Hungary had caused to the U.S.S.R. and her neighbours; to break off relations with Germany and to utilise all her forces to participate actively in the struggle against her (this constituted, in effect, acceptance of the outstanding conditions presented to the pre-armistice delegation in Moscow two months earlier, the other condition of withdrawing

inside the Trianon frontiers having already been fulfilled). Secondly, she would carry out a drastic programme of internal reform. This included: repeal of all anti-democratic laws, including the anti-Jewish laws; guarantee of democratic rights and freedom; introduction of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage; disbandment of the Arrow Cross and similar parties and organisations; a comprehensive land reform; punishment of “‘traitors and war criminals” and reprisals against the Volksbund. Private property was

guaranteed and private initiative would be fostered in trade and small industry. After Miklés had made his speech, and speakers from the main political parties represented in the Assembly and from the Trade Unions had expressed

approval of it, the Provisional National Assembly adjourned; and all that need be said at this point of the further work of the Debrecen Government is that, M. Molotov having given a somewhat grudging consent,! a delegation composed of V6rés, Gyéngydssy and Balogh went to Moscow and on 20th January signed an armistice under which inter alia the “‘Provisional National Government of Hungary,” recognising the defeat of Hungary, agreed to regard the two Vienna Awards as null and void and to repeal all measures incorporating territory recovered, not only from Czechoslovakia and Yugoke When first asked (on 26th December), he had said there was no hurry until Budapest was taken.

SZALASI TYRANNUS 465 slavia, but also Roumania; undertook to declare war on Germany and to participate in the struggle against her with 8 divisions; and accepted the obligation of paying reparations in commodities to the assessed value of 300 million American dollars—these terms being in fact simply those of the pre-armistice revised to bring them up to date.

Meanwhile, all eyes were fixed on Budapest. The garrison had been promised supplies by air, and received orders to hold out at all costs until

it could be relieved, and on the 29th rejected an offer made to it to surrender on acceptable terms. An unhappy alleged feature of this episode was that both parties of parliamentarians sent (under a white flag and after previous notification by loud-speaker) to transmit the offer were shot and

killedt The siege then began in earnest. The Soviets abstained from attacking the capital in force, and it was not, at first, either bombed or shelled heavily; but Russian and Roumanian detachments nosed their way into Pest, and into the suburbs of Buda, driving the defenders back, house by house, with tommy-guns and hand grenades. At the same time, the Red Army was reinforcing the western part of the ring, completing the clearance of north-

eastern Hungary (where isolated rearguards had, up to this date, still been holding out)? and pushing forward into Western Slovakia, where they reached the Garam and, for a time, even penetrated for some distance beyond it.3

The garrison of the capital resisted stubbornly, and not, at first, without hope of success; for the Germans had meant their promise to relieve the city perfectly seriously. They brought up strong reinforcements, which included three Hungarian divisions (the 2nd Armoured, Ist Cavalry and 23rd Mixed), and at the beginning of January opened a strong counter-offensive. They

retook Esztergom and penetrated as far as Szent Endre (it was an extraordinary situation, for while Soviet forces were moving westward along the north bank of the swollen and ice-bound river, Germans were advancing east along its south bank). Bitter fighting also went on round Székesfehérvar. The relief forces got within a few miles of Buda, but heavy snow-falls, hampering the movement of the armour, combined with the Russian resistance to bring

the advance to a standstill. The Russians regained a few vital miles, and meanwhile, the force attacking Pest had completed its task. The defenders retired to Buda, blowing up all the bridges behind them. On 18th January all Pest was in Soviet hands. The Red Army had, as we have said, conducted its operations in Pest mainly by hand-to-hand fighting, partly out of regard for the civilian popula-

tion, which had been, on the whole, rather neutral or on the side of the attackers than the reverse. The Jews in the ghettoes had, of course, only waited for the hour of their liberation, as had the non-Jewish members of the extreme Left. The news of the formation of the Debrecen Government had 1 The Germans denied this altogether when the Russians broadcast the allegation, and it is a fact that when General Hindy was tried, no evidence could be produced that the incident—with the responsibility for which he was charged—had ever occurred, much less that he was guilty of

it. If it happened, the shooting was certainly the unauthorised act of some subordinate. But the Russians appear to have believed it, and after it they were inclined (according to some informants of mine) to adopt a much less friendly attitude towards the population under their see cnssa and Presov, for instance, did not fall until 20th January, and fighting went on near those cities until the end of the month. 8 The crossing of the river was at the expense of the Szent-Laszld Division, part of which surrendered here.

2G

466 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH also exercised a very strong effect. Members of the Left were delighted, and even the non-Socialists were reassured by the appearance in the Government list of the names of Miklés, Faraghé and Teleki and by the moderate nature of the Government programme as they heard it on the wireless. In any case, they took the news as final proof that the issue of the war was decided, and

were only too anxious to end their tortured existence spent crouching in unheated and unlighted cellars, living on scraps of hoarded food and creeping

out at dire peril to the Danube to draw a bucket of water, or to scoop up snow from the streets for melting down. Often civilians had helped the attackers by signalling a weak point in the defences. As a rule, once the fighting had passed over them, their one thought was to make their peace with the new regime. While it was true that the workers in the surviving Csepel factories continued producing munitions for the defence almost up to the hour when the Red Army reached their factories, they worked for their

new masters with equal readiness from that hour onward; production was hardly interrupted. Although the defenders invited any civilians who wished to do so to accompany them when they evacuated Pest, only 30,000, perhaps

5 per cent. of the total population, did so. Even some of the military defenders proved unreliable; the crews of the A.A. guns cheerfully turned their barrels the other way, and a certain number of infantrymen went over. One result of this was that both the city and the population of Pest escaped relatively lightly. Civilian deaths recorded in the capital were only 11,995 in January and 7,723 in February, or about 14,000 above the normal figure: many of these were due to exhaustion and disease. The only districts seriously

damaged were those round the railway stations and along the water-front, opposite the Var, and much of this damage was done after the city had fallen. In several districts, over 80 per cent. of the buildings were classified afterwards as entirely undamaged (broken glass and spattering with shrapnel not counted).

The siege of Buda was a different story. Here, too, defections occurred: amongst others, the entire command and nearly half the rank and file of the

10th Hungarian Division went over, and some of them—as also some detachments from other Hungarian units—actually helped the Red Army. But, in the main, the surviving defenders were now composed of fanatics, of men who knew that there was no hope for them in surrender, or of soldiers

who could not reconcile the thought of surrender with their honour. The civilians, too, were of a different metal from the inhabitants of Pest. Finally, the position on which the garrison was now standing—unlike the streets of Pest—constituted a natural fortress of great strength. The fighting took on a new bitterness. The Russians employed artillery

and dive-bombers and the defenders retaliated as they stood. The stately and beautiful buildings of the Var were reduced to rubble, while the onceluxurious river frontage of Pest suffered only less severely.1 The garrison held on firmly and the Germans outside renewed their effort to break through

the ring. On 23rd January they retook Székesfehérvar and soon after 1 It was stated afterwards that in the Ist district of the capital (the Varhegy) only 4 buildings (out of 789) were entirely undamaged, and 160 slightly damaged; the remainder were severely damaged or totally wrecked, these including the Palace and 8 out of the 12 Ministries, as well as

most of the beautiful old houses in the Uri Utca, Werb6czi Utca, Szentharomsagtér, etc. In the 4th district (the fashionable shopping and hotel quarter of Pest), 35 buildings out of 528 were

undamaged. All the fashionable hotels and cafés along the Corso were still in ruins in January 1946, except one, which had been roughly patched up.

, SZALASI TYRANNUS 467 claimed to have reached the Danube south of Buda. But the last vital few miles were again beyond their strength, and on 3rd February the Russians once more regained most of the lost ground. Meanwhile, the position of the defenders had grown increasingly difficult. The supplies by air, which had been regular and ample while Pest was still held, fell to a trickle thereafter, and ceased altogether when the one remaining open space—the Vérmezd,} close under the west slope of the Varhegy, was lost. On 11th February the

supplies of the garrison were practically exhausted. General PfeifferWildenbruch ordered his men to break out and fight their way back. Some Hungarians joined them; others changed into civilian clothing and tried to melt into the population. Pfeiffer-Wildenbruch himself, with his staff, and

remained behind. | Hindy, with his adjutant and batman (who had refused to leave him),

A very small minority of those who attempted the sortie reached safety. Many were so exhausted that after a few hundred yards they lay down by the roadside, and the Russians came up and butchered them as they lay. On

13th February the Soviets claimed the capture of Buda with 110,000 prisoners taken during the siege, 30,000 of them on the 11th and 12th. This enormously exaggerated the figure at least of prisoners taken alive, and left alive (for the Russians slaughtered many of the wounded, including all the bed-cases in the hospital on the Var, which they simply set on fire and burned its inmates alive). The discrepancy between the claim and the reality was, indeed, so yawning that the Soviet Commander, whose sense of fitness this offended, arrested some 30,000 individuals in the streets, indiscriminately,

and converted them retrospectively into the garrison of Buda; this fact, together with the wholesale orgy of rape, looting and violence in which the Russians soldiers indulged, bringing about a very radical change in the minds of 90 per cent. of the population about the blessings of liberation. But even if the losses of the defenders were exaggerated, the fall of Buda

marked the beginning of the end. The Germans did not, indeed, admit the

loss to be final. They brought up further forces, until these amounted, nominally, to 21 infantry, 6 armoured and 3 cavalry divisions, of which 6

infantry (20th, 22nd, 24th and 25th, and the 7th and 8th Depot), one armoured (the 2nd) and one cavalry were Hungarian.” With these they held

the line for three weeks, and then on 6th March even undertook a strong local offensive. Prisoners taken said that they had been ordered to reach the Danube at all costs, and in fact they made some progress and actually

reached the river at Dunapentele on 9th March. But nearly everyone regarded the effort as hopeless. The Russians declared roundly that it was undertaken only in order to give the Germans time to complete the gutting of Hungary, which was, in fact, proceeding intensively during the period, with results which, whatever the exact figures, were in any case impressive.? 1 The Field of Blood. 2 The 24th (now the sole survivor of the First Army) was north of the Danube, the remainder in or south of the Balaton area. 3 The total figures given by different authorities vary substantially. According to one later account (Demokrdcia, 10th February 1946), the Germans took out of Hungary, by rail or boat (what was taken by lorry or on Army limbers was not counted), between October 1944 and 3lst

March 1945, 45,383 tons of breadgrains, 11,203 tons of lubricating oil, 7,905 tons of sugar, 3045 tons of chemicals and medicines, 953 tons of edible oils, 189,753 tons of machinery, 100,000

head of live-stock, unspecified quantities of other stocks. Other figures gave 900 100-axle trainloads of material, not counting what went by road or boat; others again, about 1,150 trains (which,

however, included some troop trains) and 314 tug-loads. Besides this, there were the transport vehicles themselves: 43°6 of Hungary’s total park of locomotives; 37-4 of her Diesel trains,

468 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH This may have been doing the Germans an injustice, for according to all indications they still hoped to recover Budapest and the Danube line at least in the spring and then to advance beyond it. And the Szalasi Government, and still more the Arrow Cross Party, still regarded itself as real. The Arrow Cross had held its annual meeting on 2nd February, when it was addressed by Sz6llési on its own merits. On 13th March Csia made a speech commemo-

rating the tenth birthday of the Hungarist movement. On 22nd March a speaker was still explaining to civil servants their position in the DNHR. Parliament met again, the Lower House on 6th and 13th March, and the Upper House on 22nd March. It passed an Act authorising Christians married to Jews to divorce their partners, and another commemorating the heroic defence of Budapest. Kemény visited Zagreb, reached an agreement with Paveli¢ on “the conception of the fight waged by the two countries under the leadership of Greater Germany’ and signed a Convention regulating the

status of the minorities concerned. He discussed Hungaro-Roumanian relations with Sturdza in Vienna, and even, according to himself, discovered ‘“‘a just and satisfactory settlement of the Transylvanian problem”’ (it is a pity that he never divulged what this was). He actually started a new news-

paper for the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. The usual administrative enactments were going out; on 23rd March Jurcsek introduced a new brand of unscented soap. But the atmosphere of unreality which now invested all the doings of the

Szalasi Government was thickening daily. Szalasi himself had retired completely into the clouds. On one occasion, when a deputation of high administrative officials waited on him with important problems, he dismissed them before they had finished their presentations because his secretary was waiting for him to dictate a further instalment of his memoirs. On another, he commandeered all the newspaper presses for four days to run off Arrow Cross theoretical literature. He was believed to be spending most of his time at spiritualistic seances, at which the most popular figure was a Scottish ghost named John Campbell, who prophesied the downfall of the Western Powers.

Among the population, shadow National Committees were springing up

everywhere, in preparation for the further Russian advance with which nearly everyone now reckoned. The Army itself was melting away, wherever opportunity offered. One calculation reckoned that one soldier in three was a deserter; another (made as early as 2nd February) had shown only 211,000 Hungarians then under arms (i.e. serving the Szalasi Government), of whom 54,000 were auxiliary labour troops. This number was certainly much smaller after the fighting in March.

The Germans themselves had now largely eliminated the Hungarians from their equation. They had dropped even the pretence that the evacuated material was being saved “‘for Hungary and Europe.” Frank, the Governor of Bohemia and Moravia, issued an order that the evacuated material was

“to be unloaded and utilised, regardless whether it was State or private property.” The Hungarian guards were to be taken under guard to Pilsen. There they were to be put in concentration camps and employed, regardless 4,000 (61-9 per cent.) of her passenger coaches, 74 per cent. of her goods trucks and 487 out of the 489 units of her river and lake fleet. Of what was left behind, incidentally, the greater part was damaged; the Debrecen Government afterwards stated that it found intact only 10 per cent. of the former locomotive park and 18 per cent. of the passenger coaches.

SZALASI TYRANNUS 469 of sex, on digging trenches! Most of the Hungarian troops in Moravia

suffered the same fate. Most of the material, it is true, did not get as far as Bohemia. The trains were shunted into sidings in Austria, where the foodstuffs were used for a while for the benefit of the Hungarian forces, but afterwards quietly looted by the local population. The livestock went the same way; some of it was actually distributed to the local peasants by the British and American armies

when they arrived. The Russians took for themselves what they found in their zone. Meanwhile the Russians had allowed Budapest to form its own National Committee as soon as Buda fell. By March a semblance of life was already

creeping back into the shattered capital. A pontoon bridge had been run across the Danube; the public services were operating again, although on a very reduced scale; most of the dead had been cleared from the streets. Supplies of food were coming in. Budapest was still almost without touch with Debrecen, but the Govern-

ment announced that it would shortly be moving to the capital, where the next session of the National Assembly would be held. Meanwhile, many items of the Government’s programme, including the Land Reform, were being enacted by Order in Council and immediately put into effect. The Germans’ last offensive came to a standstill after a few days. They had to withdraw such units as had made deep penetrations, and by the 13th were back on roughly the line from which they had started. On the 16th the Red Army opened a counter-offensive, which at first made relatively slow progress, at the cost of heavy fighting. Nevertheless, they retook Mor on the 18th, and Székesfehérvar on the 23rd. On the loss of this key position, the German Command decided to withdraw to its next defensive line, which lay west of the Hungarian frontier. The troops in Hungary, German and Hungarian alike, were ordered to fight their way back as best they could. In the next two or three days, a number of the Ministry staffs and administrative officers, the gold reserves and certain

other objects which the Government had kept with it to the last, were sent

westward into Austria. A considerable number of unofficial refugees

accompanied them. The officer commanding the guard of the Holy Crown,” Colonel Pajtas, took the precious relic out of the country (which it now left for the fourth time in its history) on the night of 27th March, together with

the other Coronation insignia (the sceptre, orb and sword) and the most sacred ecclesiastical relics, the Holy Dexter and the Pallium of St. Stephen.®

Veesenmayer left with the German troops on 28th March; the Hungarian

Government on the 29th. For the Army, meanwhile, after the German Command’s order, the only remaining question was how fast men and vehicles could move. On the 24th the centre of the Red Army made a spectacular advance of nearly 70 km. on a 100-km. front, which carried it past Veszprém. The same day the defenders abandoned their bridgehead

on the Garam. On the 25th the advance reached Esztergom, Tata and Felsdgalla; on the 26th, Papa and Devecser; on the 27th, Tapolca; on the 28th, Komarom, Gyér and Sarvar; on the 29th, Kapuvar, Szombathely and

12 ForPethd-Csebe, p. 58. . the story of the adventures of these relics, see Hungaria, 20th June and 7th July 1950.

3 The Holy Crown and other Coronation insignia were eventually handed over to the keeping of the American authorities. The Pallium was entrusted to the Prince-Archbishop of Salzburg; the Holy Dexter was returned to Hungary.

470 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH K6szeg. The Right wing of the Red Army entered Sopron on Ist April, completing the clearance of north-western Hungary except for a small garrison in Magyarovar, which held out until 3rd April. Other Red troops entered Zalaegerszeg on 30th March, Vasvar on the 31st and K6érmend on 2nd April. This advance made the position on the defenders’ right flank untenable. They evacuated Nagykanizsa on 2nd April. The last German and Hungarian fighting troops left Hungarian soil at Szentgotthard on 4th April. Rejoicings were ordered in Budapest.

APPENDIX While this book was in the Press I received a copy of Tanulmdnyok a magyar népi demokrdcia térténetébél (Studies on the History of Hungarian Popular Democracy), published in Budapest in 1955. One of these Studies (by Mme. E. G. Fazékas) purports to be an account of the part played by

the Hungarian Communist Party in “liberating” Hungary. While by no means accepting the bulk of what this lady writes, I present the following additions or corrections to my own text, for which her work is my authority: Page 47.

On 28th June and Ist September the Central Committee of the K.M.P. resolved “‘to subordinate all its other activities to the supreme necessity of freeing Hungary from the German yoke, forcing the German Army to leave

the country and stopping the purposeless war against the U.S.S.R.” (Fazékas, p. 23.) It was in September 1941 that the ‘“‘Radio Kossuth” began work. (This transmission, which was always made out to be a secret station operating in Hungary itself, was, of course, worked from Russia whence, via M. Rakosi,

it transmitted to the Hungarian Communists the orders of the Comintern. C. A. M.) Page 129.

At this juncture, which Mme. Fazékas dates as “‘the real birthday of the Hungarian Independence Front,” the Communist Party worked out a tenpoint Programme for the Front, which consisted of land reform, improved conditions for the workers, and various political and social reforms (Fazékas,

p. 24). (The programme seems to have been approximately that presented to and adopted by the Debrecen Government in December 1944; see p. 458. Another writer in the collection, p. 164, writes as if the text was composed in Moscow and transmitted to Hungary via the Radio Kossuth. C. A. M.) The extracts given by Fazékas from the Radio Kossuth’s effusions of the time show that Moscow, too, was nervous lest the “national unity’’ should set in the wrong shape. Page 135, note 4. Fazékas quotes (p. 29) a confidential military circular, issued a few days

after the battle, which said frankly that “‘a considerable proportion of the men do not yet know why the Hungarian Army should be taking part in the wat against the Soviet Union. In their view no Hungarian interests whatever are involved in the war. They regard it as purely a concern of Germany’s.”’ Page 158.

According to Fazékas (p. 31) it was not until the autumn of 1944 that Moscow learned that the Communist Party in Hungary had been dissolved. The move must have been not entirely eyewash, for she writes that ‘““Moscow

472 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH thought that the Peace Party had been brought into being as a cover organisation under Party direction, in order to make more mass contacts; not that the Party had been dissolved into a loose organisation which for that reason was unable to build up mass contacts” (id. pp. 41-2). According to her, the dissolution of the Party had real and important effects in weakening

the Communist movement in Hungary; although most individual Communists did their best to follow out the instructions given out by the Radio Kossuth (which cannot always have been very easy for them: it seems rather hopeless to tell a factory worker or miner to ‘“‘break with Hitler,” which was what the R.K. was urging—C. A. M.). Page 245.

This although the Radio Kossuth was pouring out frantic adjurations to the workers to rise. Page 313.

This was followed by many more leaflets in a similar vein. An underground newspaper, ‘‘Peace and Liberty’ was also being published. Fazékas, however, apparently herself regards the propaganda being made at the time in Hungary as insufficiently vigorous, and her own account of the “resistance”’

of the time consists chiefly of quotations from the exhortations of Radio Kossuth. Page 333.

Fazékas (pp. 68-9, 73) makes interesting admissions on the absence of mass activity during this period. She ascribes it to the impotence to which the dissolution of the Party had reduced the Communists, and to the unwillingness of the Smallholder and Social Democrat leaders to take decisive

action. According to her, Lakatos had thrown out hints that he would revoke the order dissolving the Parties of the Left. Page 339.

From the account given by Fazékas (pp. 68-9, 73), who has been able to

use the recently discovered full record of the Ministerial Councils of the period (to which I have not had access) the Crown Council of the 7th was followed by a Ministerial Council on the 8th. It was while the latter was actually in progress that the messages from Greiffenberg and Veesenmayer, mentioned in the text, arrived, Lakatos being twice called out of the Council to receive them on the telephone. When they received these, the Ministerial Council decided to go on fighting “‘to gain time.” If they received guarantees that the troops would arrive and that the Germans would, in general, keep their promises, they were “‘prepared to go on fighting and not to be precipitate in asking for an armistice from the Allies.”’ Page 373, para. 4, and note 2.

Fazékas (pp. 62-3) writes that the deputation crossed the line on the 23rd and spoke to Mikldés on the 25th. Mikldés told them to wait for the answer while he consulted Horthy. The latter at first proposed to arrest the emissaries, but this order was cancelled, and one of them was sent back with the message that Horthy “‘was thinking over the question of an armistice.”

NOTE ON THE USE OF PLACE-NAMES Most places situated up to 1918 in Historic Hungary, but thereafter assigned to Successor States, and even some left inside Trianon Hungary, possess at least two names, and strong political and sentimental implications attach to the use of the respective alternatives. I began this book with the intention of preserving strict official correctness and impartiality, and of using only the official name of each place, changing my usage appropriately if the official name changed (as it did in the areas recovered by Hungary after 1938). But I found myself in difficulties. Even the official position which a Briton ought to adopt was not always clear. It was really rather absurd to

describe, for instance, a Hungarian ministerial council as talking about places under names which none of the speakers had ever used in their lives,

and where I was quoting verbatim from documents it would have been incorrect to do so. Besides this, much the greater part of this book is based on Hungarian sources, written or oral; and on reading through the proofs I found that J had very often, out of sheer human negligence, put down the name which I had read, or heard. I see nothing for it but to plead guilty to frequent violations of my own rule, begging my readers to read no political implications into these lapses, and to append the following table of equivalents of the more important names to which this complication attaches.

The name used in the text is put first, the equivalent in the other language

or languages after. Where I have used more than one name for a place, I have given all versions in the final column:

Cz.=Czech or Slovak. G.=German. H.=Hungarian. R.=Roumanian. Y.= Yugoslav (Serbo-Croat or Slovene).

Aluta (river) R.; Olt H. Backa H.; Batka Y. Beregszasz H.; Berehovo Cz. Besztercze (Transylvania) H.; Bistrita R. Bestercze Banya (Slovakia) H.; Banska Bistritsa Cz. _ Brasov R.; Brassé H.; Kronstadt G. Brasso, see Brasov Bratislava Cz.; Pressburg G.; Pozsony H. Bihar H.; Bihor R. Burzenland, German name for the plain of Brasov. Cernauti R.; Czernowitz G.

Cluj, see Kolozsvar

Crisana R., corresponds roughly to the historic Hungarian Partium. Csaktornya H.; Cakovec Y. Csall6kéz H.; Zitna Orava Cz.; Grosse Schiittinsel G. Csap H.; Cop Cz.

Csurog H.; Curug Y.

Darda Triangle, is the corner of the County of Baranya allotted to Yugoslavia under the Treaty of Trianon.

474 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Délvidék, the collective name for the areas recovered by Hungary from Yugoslavia in 1941... Devény H.; Devinska Novo Ves Cz.; Theben, G. Eperjes H.; PreSov Cz. Ersék-Ujvar H.; Novy Zamky Cz. Eszék H.; Osjek Y. Felvidék, that part of Slovakia recovered by Hungary in 1938. Gacs H.; Hali¢ Cz. Huszt H.; Hust Cz. Ipolysag H.; Sahy Cz. Jolsva H.; JelSava Cz. Kaschau, see Kassa. Kassa H.; KoSice Cz.; Kaschau G.

Kis Sarmas (Kis Szamos) H.; Somesul Micu R. Kolozsvar, see Cluj.

Komarno Cz.; Komarom H. Komarom, see Komarno. K6r6ésmezo H.; Jablonica Cz. KoSice, see Kassa. Lemberg, G.; Lwow, Polish.

Leva H.; Levice Cz. Losoncz H.; Lucéenec Cz. Lwow, see Lemberg.

Maramaros H.; Maramures R. Marmaros Sziget H.; Sighetul Maramuresului R. Maros (River) H.; Mures R. Marosvasarhely H.; Targu Mures R. Medias R.; Megyes H. Medjumuryje, see Murak6z

Mosorin H.; Mokrin Y. Mukaéevo Cz.; Munkacs H. Munkacs, see Mukaéevo. Murakoéz H.; Medjumurje Cz.

Muravidék H.; Prekomurje Y. Nagybecskerek H.; Veliki Betkerek Y. Nagyszollés H.; Sevlyus Cz. Nagyszalonta H.; Salonta R. Nagyvarad H.; Oradea Mare R. Novi-Sad, see Ujvideék.

Nyitra H.; Nitra Cz.; Neutra G. O-Becse H.; Becsej Stari Y. Osjek, see Eszék. Partium, see Crisana. Petervaradin H.; Petrovaradin Y. Pozsony, see Bratislava. Poszonyligetfalu H.; Petrzalka Cz.; Griinau G. Prekomurje, see Muravidék. Presov, see Eperjes. Pressburg, see Bratislava.

Rahovo, H.; Raho, Cz. Salank H.; Slanky Cz.

NOTE ON THE USE OF PLACE-NAMES 475 Slanky, see Salank. Sopron H.; Oedenburg G. SpiS Cz.; Szepes H.; Zips G. Subotica Y.; Szabadka H. ‘Szabadka, see Subotica. Szaszrégen H.;Reghinul R. Szatmar-Németi H.; Satu Mare R. Szegesvar H.; Sigisoara R. Szent Tamas H.; Srbobran Y. Szepes, see Spis. Tatarhag6 (Tatar Pass), Jablonica Pass Cz. Temesvar H.; Timisoara R. Topolya H.; Topola Y. Torda H.; Turda R. Ujvidék H.; Novi Sad Cz. Ung (River) H.; UZ Cz. Ungvar H.; Uzhorod Cz. Uj Verbasz H.; Novi Vrbas Y. Uz, see Ung. Uzhorod, see Ungvar. Vag (River) H.; Vah Cz.; Waag G. Vah, see Vag. Vatra Dorna H.; Vatra Dornei R. Waag, see Vag.

INDEX

INDEX Note.—H.= Hungary or Hungarian. 1=Part 1; 1=Part u. inf. indicates information supplied to the author personally. ref. signifies a casual reference to persons or subjects. Figures in bold type, I 106-7, indicate leading references to persons.

ABI (Anti-Bolshevik Youth), m1 293, 358 Altgayer, H., Volksgruppenfiihrer of Abraham, D, Leader of H. Counter-revolu- Croatian Germans, 1 479

tionary Government, 1 23 Ambro, F., H. Minister in Madrid, 1

Abshagen, Canaris, cit. 1 194n 145

Aczél, Baron Ede, II 202n, 202, 218, 349, Ambrozy, Gyula, Head of Regent’s civi-

350, 353, 354, 456, 457 lian Chancellery, 1 244, 246, 303n, 314,

Adam, Professor, the Regent’s physician, 320, 325, 330, 337, 349n, 354, 364n, 366,

nt 255 378, 379, 381, 391, 392, 393, 394, 396,

A Dolgozok Lapja, 1 156 398, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 408, 430, Adonyi, V., A Magyar Katona a Mdsodik 431, 432, 432n, 434

Viladghaboruban, cit.1119n, 52n, 56n, 93n, Andele, Ondrej, Russian army officer, 1 32

165n, 166, 300n, 451n Andorka, Colonel, Head of H. Military

Aggteleki, H. General, 0 376, 393, 400, 410, Intelligence, 1 230n, 265n, 266n, 335n:

417, 420, 421, 424, 441 nt 107, 129n, 255

Agrarian conditions: in Historic H., 1 8-10, Andrassy, Count Gyula, first H. Minister

12; in Reconstruction Era, I 66-8; in President, 1 49n, 228n

1932, 1 98; in 1940, 1 378 Andrassy, Count Mihaly, m 217

Agrarian Group, I 92, 99-100, 101, 130 Andrassy ut 60, 1 187, 230 Agrarian legislation. See Land Reform Andreanszky, Colonel, H. staff officer, 1

Agrarian scissors: 1920, I 41n; 1929-30, 1 326n

90; 1931-2, 199; 1933-4,1118 Andrejka, O., H. Deputy, m 386n

Agricultural indebtedness, 1 64, 90n, 99,101, Anfuso, F., Italian Minister in Budapest, 1

128, 133, 306 313: 0 112, 149, 149n, 154n, 156n

Agricultural labourers: number of, I 6, 7, cit. 1 134n, 182n 64, 67; in Historic H., 1 9-10, 12; in Anghelescu, Dr., Roumanian Crown Bethlen-Social Democrat Agreement, I Councillor, 1 422n 44: conditions in 1930-5, 1 66-8; passivity Angi, I., H. Deputy, m 159n in Bethlen Era, 170; in world economic Antal, Istvan: I 112-3; Chief of Press, 1 102,

crisis, 1 90-1; Social Democrats resume 118, 119, 127; Secretary of State for agitation among, I 98-9; shortage of, I Justice, 1 129, 133, 176; Minister without 378, 460; political organisation, m 208; Portfolio, m 91, 179, 184, 214n; Minister part in Popular Front, nm 130, 159, 332 of Education and Cults, m 251, 327 Agricultural prices, 1 31, 64, 90, 113, 192: ref. 1 174n, 279n, 433n

m 51, 5in, 168 Anti-Bolshevik Youth. See ABI

Agricultural programmes: Bethlen-Szab6,1 Anti-Comintern Pact, 1 196, 202, 205, 234, 41; Szdlasi’s, 1 164; Development Act, 235n, 288, 290, 312, 317, 318, 319, 321,

m1 101n 322, 396, 439: o 23,

Agriculture: in Historic H., 1 6, 7, 9; in Antonescu, Marshal I., Conducatore of Reconstruction Era, 1 64; in 1940s, 1 108 Roumania, I 441n, 444, 481n: n 13, 36, 56, Air raids on Hungary, m 116, 262-3, 328-9, 219, 223, 224n, 233, 241, 253, 259

346, 375 Antonescu, Mihai, Roumanian Foreign

Alba Julia Resolutions, 1 423 Minister 1940-44, m 58n, 95, 146, 147,

Albania, 1 86, 447 178, 179n

Albrecht, Archduke, 1 168n, 455n, 456, Antonescu, V., Roumanian Foreign 456n: m1 42, 43, 45, 76, 103, 112, 202 Minister 1937-38, 1 201, 388, 422n Alexander, King of Yugoslavia, 1146, 147. Antonov, General, Chief of Soviet General

Algyay-Papp, H. General, m 374 Staff, 0 373, 397, 401, 408, 428, 431

Alispan, definition of, 1 48n Aosta, Duke of, 1 361 German Foreign Office, 1 336 tary in H. Foreign Ministry, later H.

Altenburg, G., Head of Division 4B of the Apor, Baron G., Permanent Under-Secre-

480 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Minister to the Vatican, 1 316, 410n, for German occupation, 0 232; negotia-

417n: o 186n, 216, 319 tions with Germans, 0 248, 331-2, 356-62; inf. 1 84n, 85n, 86n, 94n, 110n, 125n, policy toward Sztdjay Government, 0 131n, 136n, 139n, 177n, 193n, 195n, 200n, 289, 292; strength in 1944, m 289-90, 203n, 206n, 211n, 232n, 233n, 239n, 240n, 306n; Right-wing Unity policy, m 292, 245n, 285n, 286n, 287n, 311n, 314n, 334n, 294-5, 310, 446, 448; policy toward 335n, 342n, 393n, 432n, 475n, 486n: Lakatos Government, 0 330; accept the

O 21n, 31n, 61n, 342n National Alliance, m 368; putsch of m 115, 130n, 277 tion of Government, 0 442-3; legislation,

Apor, Baron Vilmés, Bishop of Gy6r, 1354: October 15th, m 422-3, 429-30; forma-

Apponyi, Count Albert, H. statesman, 1 44, m 449-53, 462-3, 468; disbanded by

122? Debrecen Government, m1 464

Apponyi, Count Gyula, H. Resistance ref. 1 28n, 80, 131: 0 14. See also Szalasi

leader, m1 255, 348n Aschner, L., H. industrialist, m 255 U.S.S.R. and Western Powers Trianon H., 1 70

Armistice negotiations. See Contacts with Assimilation: in Historic H., 114, 15, 16; in

Army: in post-1920 H., 1 15, 16, 87; Association for Territorial Defence, 1 29, 31 Bethlen’s plans for expansion, I 75; Association of Comrades of the Eastern G6mb6s’s reforms, 1 16, 75, 120, 139, 143; Front. See KABSz strength in 1938, 1 262-3, 265n; mobilisa- Association of Holders of the Cross of tion in Czechoslovak crisis, 1 265, 270, National Defence, m 102 279; compulsory military service bill, Associations, Patriotic and Paramulitary: I 306, 324, 330; mobilisation in Ruthene origins and heyday, 1 29-33; inactivity

crisis, I 334-5, 336-7, 339-40; strength under Bethlen, 1 72, 75; revived by

of in 1939-40, 1 383; mobilisation in Gomboés, 1 100, 116, 118-9, 127; renewed Roumanian crisis, I 407, 418; mobilisa- revival under Daranyi, 1 155, 181-3; retion in Yugoslav crisis, 1 482; manpower orientation under Kallay, m 101-2, 202, question in war-time, mo 52, 100n, 119; 222; purged by Sztdjay, 0 271-2. See also

First Army re-equipped by Germany, 0 Association for Territorial Defence, 55; demand for return of troops, 1 55-6, Christian National League, EKSz, Irre137-8; numbers serving, 0 68; formation dentist Association, MOVE, TESz, of Home Force, m 118-20, 149, 164-5; Vitézi Rend, GOmb6os, Szalasi, Bardossy Second Army becomes Army of Occupa- Atlantic Charter, Kallay and, m 143, 206

tion, m 153; question of withdrawal of, Attolico, B., Italian Minister in Berlin, 1 11 173-4, 183-4, 189, 218-20, 345; mobilisa- 234n, 313, 336n, 347 tion for defence of H., m 221; position of | Auer, P., cir., 1 195n

armed forces during occupation, m0 253; Austria: area acquired from H. after formation of Third Army, uo 340, 345; Trianon, I 4; Magyar minority in, 1 4; state of after Russian advance, n 454-5; refugees from, I 27n; relations with H. Germans take over command of, m 462. 1920-30, 1 82; the H.-Italian secret conSee also Military Operations, War, vention and, 1 86; economic relations with

Rearmament H., 190, 96, 97-8, 137, 145, 145n; Customs

Arnothy-Jungerth, M., H. Minister in Union with Germany, I 96; in world Moscow, later Deputy Foreign Minister, economic crisis, I 96-7; secret agreement 1 322, 369, 450n: om 269, 302, 321n, 322 with H., 1 97; relations with Germany, Arrow Cross: origin of symbol, 1 158; used I 138, 144-5, 147; internal crisis, 1 145-6; by early Right-Radical movements, rapprochement with H., and Italy, 1 144-5,

1 158, 159, 229 146, 149; Pact with Germany, 1 J48-50;

Arrow Cross Party—Hungarist Movement: Danubian relations, 1 194-6, 201, 204-6; foundation of, 1 184ff; sponsored by Anschluss, 1 206; reception of Anschluss Army, I 212-5; reconstituted with Parlia- = in H.,1 206-7, 216-7. See also Burgenmentary representation, I 218-9; repres- land, Brocchi Agreements, Rome Proto-

sive measures against, I 226-7; re- cols, Dollfuss, Schuschnigg

organisation, I 229-30; dissolved by Awakening Hungarians, 1 29, 30, 85, 456

Teleki, I 331; reconstituted, 1 350; Axis: Gémbés’ idea of, 1 76-7, 115, 136; German support and electoral successes, Mussolini and the formation of, 1 193-4 1 350-1; in Phoney War period, 1 381, Az Est, 1248 400-1, 445, 455; plot to liberate Szalasi,

1 427-8; reorganised by Szalasi on his Baar-Baerenfels, E. von., Vice-Chancellor release, I 434-5; discontent with Szdalasi, of Austria, 1 150, 194n, 206n mt 41-2; state of in 1942, m 78, 104, 130-1; Babos, H. General, n 74 state of in 1943, m 199-200; preparations Bach Hussars, 1 13

INDEX 481 Bach-Zalewski, von dem, German General, Balla, P., H. Ministry of Interior official, 11 359n, 389, 390, 391, 412, 414, 423, 427, u 146

430, 431, 435 Balogh, I., H. Right-wing politician, 1 159, 1 286, 295 Balogh, Pater, H. ‘democratic’ leader, 1 459,

Bacinsky, M.,Carpatho-Ukrainian Minister, 187, 188, 229n

Bacska: allocated to Yugoslavia, 1 4; in 464

H.-Croat negotiations, 1 86; in negotia- Bandt, Roumanian, 1 396, 490: u 340, 345 tions for H.-Yugoslav Pact, 1 409, 447, Banat, Yugoslav: H. claims on, 1 143, 151; 452; in Yugoslav crisis, 1474, 479-80, 481; Hitler invites H. to enter, 1 474: 0 6; H.

allocated to H. by Hitler, u 6, 13; troops ordered not to enter, 1 481: u 12;

occupied by H. troops, mu 11-12, 13; re- debated allocation to H., m 13, 57, 66, 69, constructed as county, m1 39; H. rule in, 138n; administration of, 1 57; entered by i 39-40, 69, 159, 259, 315, 333; German- Soviet forces, m1 375

H. agreement on, 1 66n, 189; partial ref. 1 25

evacuation of, 1 347; entered by Soviet Bdanffy, BaronD.,H. Minister of Agriculture,

forces, 1 378 1 458, 468n: um 27, 80, 182; part in Tranref. x 25. See also Voivodina, sylvanian peace negotiations, 11 342, 349, Délvidék, Prinz Eugen Gau, Serbs in 355

Hungary; Ujvidék Massacres Banffy, Count Miklos, Transylvanian Bacs6, M., H. publicist, 1 427n leader, 11 178, 179

Badoglio, Marshal P., Head of Italian Banking, 1 8, 62

Government, 11 171, 182 Bank of Issue, I 63

Bagaméry, Captain, H. staff officer, 11417n Barabas, H. General, 1 43

Bagos, H. General, m 39n Barankovics, I., H. Deputy, 0 79n, 106n

Bajcsy-Zsilinsky, A., H. Secretary of Baranya: H. claims on, 1 409, 447, 452; Legation in London, m1 120, 121 occupied by H. troops, u 10, 11; allotted Bajcsy-Zsilinsky, Endre, H. Smallholder by Hitler to H., m 13; incorporated in leader, 1 72n, 92, 122, 155, 445: m 12, 46, county of Baranya, m 39 71, 73, 78, 79, 79n, 104, 107, 107n, 115, Baranyai, Lipot, President of National 116n, 128, 129, 140, 169, 171, 176, 180n, Bank, 1 216: m 118; economic exchange

197n, 198, 200, 208, 212, 231, 254, 270, policy, 1 372-3, 460: mu 51, 52, 118;

348n, 455, 456, 457, 462 arranges émigré government fund, 1 377, Bajnéczy, H. General, m 229, 240, 242, 243, 469, 485; visits Rome, 1 396-7; Western

267n mission, I 141, 162n, 163, 172n; arrest,

Bajor, General, m 39n Tt 255

Bakach-Bessenyey, G., H. diplomatist: ref. m 113, 309n Little Entente negotiations, 1 234, 239-40; inf. 1 93n, 124n, 372n, 377n, 397n, 460n, Yugoslav negotiations, 1 446, 447, 449, 469n, 485n: m 64n 45in, 452, 453, 454, 475n, 478, 486; Swiss Baranyai, $., Arrow Cross official, m 449n mission,.1 163, 172, 174-5, 180n, 190n, Barcsay, Ferencz, leader of Agrarian Group, 191, 204, 213-4, 334-5, 336, 338, 339, 1 130, 331, 394: 1 305 349, 352: formation of Committee of | Barcza, G., H. Minister to the Court of St.

Dissident Diplomats, 0 264 James’s: Czechoslovak negotiations, I ref. 1 206n, 386n: 0 216 236, 251n, 252, 253, 257, 259, 260, 264,

inf. 1 110n, 239n, 240n, 241n, 334n, 266, 267, 277, 281n, 287n, 303; Ruthene 335n, 339n, 446n, 447n, 451n, 452n, 466n negotiations, 1 334, 342; Roumanian Bakay, Szilard, H. General u 98, 243, 305, negotiations, 1 355, 375, 376, 391, 400, 306n, 324, 363, 365n, 366, 376, 425, 426, 400n, 408, 409, 426, 427; Yugoslav

428 negotiations, 1 453, 464, 465, 169, 470,

Baky, Laszlo: I 187-8; early career, 1 215; 478, 486, 488, 489; recall of ur 3, 7; National Socialist leader, 1 350, 428: L 7, Western mission, 1 123, 126-7, 132, 133,

44, 45n, 102; liaison with Nazis, 141, 142-3, 160-1, 170, 172-3, 174-5, 183, 76n, 148, 229n, 245, 250, 254; German 190n, 204, 209-10, 213-4, 215, 216, 319

support, m 154, 225, 295; Secretary of inf. 1 331, 469n_ State under Sztdjay, m 251, 269; Anti- Barczy, I., attempted assassination, I Jewish activities, m 279, 280, 281, 285, 303-4 302, 304, 304n; founds Order Force, I ref. 1 248, 488, 490: 1 320, 401n, 408, 409 293: dismissal, 11 303, 305, 307, 308, 309, inf. 1 94n, 103n, 220n, 221n, 240n, 242, 326; negotiations with Winkelmann, 1 276n, 288n, 306n, 317n, 325n, 347n, 360n, 359: Secretary of State in Szalasi Govern- 361n, 362n, 366n, 387n, 396n, 397n, 401n,

ment n 448 405, 409: 11 324n ref. u 249, 293n, 330, 386n Bardossy, Ldaszl6: I 465-8; appointed 2H

482 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Foreign Minister, 1 465; attempts to 268n, 269, 272, 277, 282, 293, 313n, 320, establish a neutral bloc, 1 468; Yugoslav 323, 333, 339, 344; Roumanian policy, negotiations, 1470-1, 477, 480-2, 483: 13; 1 293, 295, 333-4, 355; rejects German

visit to Munich, 1, 471-2; appointed offer to Poland, 1 347; accepts Anglo-

Minister President, 1 490, n 3; declaration French guarantee, I 347; attempts to of war on Russia, mu 4-30; anti-Semitic create neutral bloc, 1 355 legislation, m 14, 36-8, 81; visit to Rome, ref. 1 362 ul 15-16; negotiates withdrawal of troops Dernier Rapport, cit. 1 209n, 231n, 271n, from Front, m 55-7, 58n; resists British 282n, 295n, 344n, 355, 356n declaration of war, 1 60-61; declares war Bede, I., Chief of Press in H. Foreign

on U.S.A., 0 62-4; negotiations on Ministry, 0 164

German-H. co-operation, 11 65-6; pilots | Beerhouse Putsch, 1 72 Regency Bill, u 77; fall of, 1 80-2, 88-9; Bek, Kassim, 1 35n President of Christian National League, Beldi, M., H. Deputy, 1 229n il 140; appeals for Right-wing Unity, m1 Beldy, M., H. Deputy, 1 133

292; declines foreign Ministry, 11 324 Benes, Edward, President of Czechoref. 1 32, 32n, 52, 119, 265n, 316, 369, slovakia: relations with H., 1 63, 149,

413n, 416, 419n, 452n, 454n: nm 183, 196, 153, 195, 206, 206n; advocates acceptance

294n, 362, 386n of M. Tardieu’s plan, 1 97; and Munich Magvar Politika a Mohdcsi Wész Utan, crisis, I 232, 258, 260, 264n, 268, 269,

1 467n 277n; resignation, 1 279; appointed head

Baross, G., H. Right-wing politician, I 113, of émigré government in London, I 427; 72n, 101n, 102, 117, 119, 181, 182 political activities 1940-2, 1 464, 467, 485: inf. 1 85n, 94n, 101n, 109n, 117n, 121n, 1 59, 65, 179, 207-8; negotiates Soviet125n, 126n, 137n, 139n, 144n, 147n, 174n, Czechoslovak treaty (1943), m1 205

175n, 181n, 187n, 215n, 220n, 221n, 284n, ref. 1 83, 195n

289n, 310n, 313n, 328n, 369n: u 88n Memoirs, cit. 1 193n, 194n Bartha, Albert, H. Deputy, 1 181 Berber, F., Eur. Politik 1933-38, 1 207n Bartha, K., H. General: 1 309; Minister of | Bereczky, Pastor, 1 333, 364n Defence, 1 309, 314, 334n, 345; attends Beregffy, H. General, 1 243, 266n, 269, 317, Berlin arms conference, 1 460, 461n; and 322n, 357, 362, 370, 388n, 409, 422, 439, Yugoslav crisis, 1 483, 484n, 486: 1 4, 5; 442, 443, 447, 448, 451, 461 Russian campaign, ll 22, 24,27; dismissal, Berliner Borsenzeitung, cit. 1 444

114 Berliner Tageblatt, cit. 1 204 ref. 1 32, 367, 387, 433 Bernath, A., H. Deputy, 1 79n inf. 1 481n, 486n: 1 4n, Sn Béry, L., inf. 1 389n: n 81n

Bartheldy, M., H. Foreign Ministry official, Bessarabia, 1391, 396, 402, 404

1472n: u 265n Bethlen, Count Istvan: I 36-40; Pact with

Barthou, L., French politician, 1 146 Szabo, 1 40-41, 44; appointed Minister Bartok, L., H. Consul-General in Zagreb, President, 1 42; agreement with Social

1 385, 479: ui 9 Democrats, I 43-4; introduces Franchise

Basch, A., The Danube Basin and the Bill, 1 44; founds Unitary Party, 1 44-5, German Economic Sphere, 1 140n 61-2; the ““Bethlen system,” 1 46-9, 62; Basch, Franz, H. Volksdeutsch leader, 1 negotiates Hungary’s admission to 170, 171, 172, 178, 179, 326, 457: u 41, League of Nations, 1« 63; negotiates

108n, 229n League Loans, 1 63-4, 89; reconstruction

Bastianini, G., Italian Secretary of State for policy, 1 63-6; Protocols of 1924, 1 64;

Foreign Affairs, 1 149n, 154n land reform, I 66-8; social legislation,

Batthyany, Count L., H. Minister President, 1 68-9; minorities policy, 1 69-70, 168,

11 49 232n; negotiations with Right Radicals,

Bauer, Colonel, 1 35n 1 74-5; Danubian policy, 1 81-8; visit to Bauxite, 1 141, 353: 1m 53, 117, 166, 166n, Rome, I 85-6; Treaty with Italy, 1 85,

167, 181 136n; concludes secret military conven-

Becher, Kurt, German S.S. Colonel, m1 288 tion with Italy, 1 86; in world economic

Beck, Colonel Joseph, Polish Foreign crisis, 1 89-94; dissolves Parliament and Minister: Danubian policy, 1 208n, 209; orders elections, 1 91-2; measures to Kanya and, 1 209, 269, 276, 277; visit to combat economic crisis, I 92-3; resignaRome, 1 209; Ciano and, 1 209n; and tion, 1 93-4; retains leadership of GovernCzechoslovak negotiations, 1 209, 210, ment Party, 1 94, 118; leads opposition 230-1, 249, 253, 255, 259, 267, 268n, 269, to Gémbés, 1 124, 125, 127, 130-1, 133,

272, 276, 278; and Slovak-Ruthene 134, 153; leaves Government Party, 1

question, 1 230, 231, 232, 249, 253, 260, 128; elected as Independent (1935), 1

INDEX 483

129; supports Dardnyi, 1 179-80, 183; Bossy, R., Roumanian Minister in Buda-

visit to Rome (1938), 1 209; supports pest, 1 416

appointment of Imrédy, 1 221; opposes Bészérményi, Zoltan, H. Right-wing poliImrédy’s programme, 1 307, 310; anti- tician, 1 157, 158, 159, 187 German policy, 1 319, 322; patronage of | Bothmer, Baron, H. Consul-General in Independence Front, 1 380, 394: m 198-9: Vienna, 11 230, 339 attacks Tripartite Pact, 1 445; suggested Brand, J., Jewish negotiator, 1 275, 287,

as head of émigré mission, I 469: uo 3; 301

Western contacts, 1 122-3, 163; revives Bratianu, C., Roumanian politician, 1 422n

idea of Independent Transylvania, 1 Brauchitsch, F.-M. Walter von, German 179n; and surrender of Italy, 1 183; goes Commander-in-Chief, 1 245, 481: m 65 into hiding, m1 245, 255, 256, 256n; and _— Braun, Otto, 1 195

surrender to U.S.S.R., um 341, 342; Braunthal, The Tragedy of Austria, cit.197n

arrested by Russians, 11 256n Brausch, G., inf. 1 246n

_ ref. 1 32, 82n, 103n, 126, 127n, 155, British Commercial Corporation, 1 373n 173n, 181, 220n, 288, 356n: 1 6, 46, 75n, |Brocchi Agreements, 1 97, 137, 196

148n, 196, 231, 244, 401 Brody, M., Ruthene politician, 1 286, 287,

Bethlen, Countess, 1 488: 1 3 296n, 299, 299n, 311 Biatorbagy Outrage, 1 99 Bruce, H. J., British diplomatist, 1 251n

Administrative Court, 1 32n 1 427 ,

Bieber, Gyula, President of H. Supreme — Bruce Lockhart, R. H., British diplomatist, Bled Agreements, 1 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, Brunsvik, H. General, mo 435, 441

243, 244, 248, 289, 294, 320 Buchinger, M., H. Deputy, m 255, 256

Bleyer, Jakob, H. Minister of Nationalities, | Budavari, E., H. Deputy, 1 155

I 26, 69, 70, 168, 169, 170 Buday, K., 1 298n

Blomberg, F.M. W. von, German Minister Budgets: 1924-9, 1 63-5; 1931, 1 91; 1932,

of War, 1 207 I 96; 1933-4, 1 118; 1935, 1 133; 1937,

Blue Cross Society, 1 181 1 192; 1943, m1 200; 1945, 1 462

Bocsary, K., H. Deputy, 1 305, 386n Budinsky, L., H. deputy, 1 455n: 1 370

Bocskay, Mlle, 1 456n Bukovina: Soviet claims on, I 404; occupaBoden, M., German economic expert, I tion of, 1 404; Magyar population settled

258n, 297 in Bacska, mt 39, 347

Bohle, E. W., German Secretary of State, Bulgaria: friendship with Italy, 1 86; Pact

1 206, 209 with Yugoslavia, 1 198, 451; in Ruthene

Bohm, V., H. Minister of War, 1 29; in crisis, I 340; and Balkan Conference, emigration, 1121, 127, 128, 141, 164 1 390; in Roumanian crisis, 1 406, 412,

Bohm, M., 1 40 413, 414, 416, 418, 419, 426; negotiations

Boletta, 1 89 with Germany, I 442, 450; and H-.Bolony, Professor, 11 64 Yugoslav negotiations, 1 446, 447, 450n;

Bonczos, N., H. Minister of the Interior, u signs Tripartite Pact, 1 449n, 470, 472n; 309, 312, 316, 320, 324, 331, 343, 347, 362, and Yugoslav crisis, 1 474, 475, 478:

387 relations with H., m 58, 180; declares war

Bonitz, H., Director of UDV, 1 170 on U.S.A., 0 63; surrender, m 323n, 345

Bonnet, Georges, French diplomatist, I 287n, ref. 1 96n, 344, 346, 360, 389, 391, 405: 300n, 313n, 342; De Washington au Quay i 225, 337n, 352

d’ Orsay, cit. 1 232n, 259, Bunyevci, 1 86: 1 39

Borbély, Dr., 1 288 Bunzler, H., German economic expert, Borbély-Matzky, M., Foéispan of Mezécsat, WI 228, 258, 296

1 102n Burgenland: assigned to Austria, 1 4; area i 229, 450 Austria and H., 1 15n, 30, 82, 145; H.-

Bormann, M., Head of Reich Chancellery, and population, 1 4; disputed between Bornemissza, G., H. Minister of Commerce, German understanding, 1 77, 148, 206,

1127, 133, 176, 231, 309: m 140 206n, 217

Bornemissza, Felix, H. industrialist, m 355, ref. 1 281n

399, 400 Birkel, J.. German Civil Commissioner for

Borovicsény, A., Der K6nig und sein Moravia, I 335n, 336n

Reichsverweser, cit. 1 42n, 56n, 81n Burzenland, 1 387, 417, 422

cit. 1 82n . M1 193n '

Borsody, I., A Magyar-Szlovadk Kiegyezés, Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, cit.

Bosnyak, Z., Director of H. Jewish Institute, Butler, R. A., British Under-Secretary for ,

nt 277 Foreign Affairs, 1 333n, 376

Bosnjakovié, Yugoslav officer, 180 Buzas, A. Hunyadi, H. Deputy, m 305

484 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Cadogan, Sir Alexander, Permanent Under- 317; Czechoslovak negotiations, 1 266, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 268n, 278, 281, 283, 288-9, 291, 295-302; 1 257, 303, 333n, 342, 376, 400, 408, 427, in Slovak-H. dispute, 1 295-302; in Ruth-

453, 464, 465, 469, 470: 0 7 ene dispute, I 311-3, 333; negotiations on

Caisse commune, 1 65, 192n Second Vienna Award, I 388-9, 396-7, Caminada, J., My) Purpose Holds, m 217n 410-2, 419-24; Tripartite Pact negotiaCampbell, Sir Ronald, British Minister in tions, 1 441, 441n; Bardossy and, m1 15-16;

Lisbon, 0 186 visit to Budapest, 0 51, 76; Hungarian

Canaris, Wilhelm, German Admiral, 1 policy (1941-2), m 58n, 67; negotiations

245 on Hungaro-Italian Union, u 112, 113-4

Capital: H. resources, 1 39n; need of, 1 39; Diary, 1 110n, 151, 195n, 196n, 201n,

importation of, I 63 205n, 209n, 211n, 233n, 234n, 240n, 252n,

Carol, King of Roumania, 1 149, 199, 211, 261n, 271pn, 273n, 278n, 281n, 283n, 286n, 232n, 280, 295, 340, 388, 411, 412, 413, 288n, 292n, 294n, 295n, 297n, 298n, 299n,

414, 417n, 419, 421, 422n, 432, 472 300n, 302n, 311n, 312n, 313n, 317n, 320n, Catholic policy, m 130, 140, 158-9, 197-8, 333n, 335n, 344n, 345n, 346n, 347n, 357n,

208, 209. See also Christian Parties 358n, 359n, 360n, 361n, 366n, 367n, 370, Cavallero, General, Italian Chief of Staff, 388n, 391n, 393n, 396n, 397n, 399n, 410n,

Oo 94n 415n, 419n, 420n, 421n, 425n, 439n, 441n,

Cekmek, Central European officer, m 32n 444n, 448n: 0 14n, 18n, 67n, 112n, 113n, Cermak, M., Czechoslovak Minister desig- 114n, 137n, 147n

nate in Budapest, 1 259n Papers, 1148n, 150n, 151n, 152n, 194n,

Chamberlain, Mr. Neville, British Prime 197n, 198n, 200n, 201n, 202n, 205n, 209n, Minister, 1 252, 254, 256, 257, 258, 261, 211n, 253n, 262n, 263n, 268n, 270n, 271n, 262, 264n, 268, 273n, 277, 303, 342, 376, 273n, 276n, 297n, 300n, 333n, 344n, 345n,

465 360n, 370, 385n, 388n, 389n, 410n, 412n,

Charanov, M., Russian Minister in Buda- 413n, 414n, 415n, 417, 419, 430n: o 45n,

pest, m 23 Sin, 58n, 67n

Charles, King, 1 41, 42, 56, 61, 73 Civil Service: in Historic H., 1 7, 8, 13, 14, Charles Louis, Archduke, m 192, 205, 265, 15; non-Magyar elements in, I 15, 70;

334 refugees received into, I 73-4; salary cuts Chile, o 139 and dismissals, I 96, 98, 118; under

Chorin, Dr. F., member of H. Upper House, Sztojay, 0 269; under Szalasi, 0 447

U 148n, 255, 283n, 287, 288 Clarke, Sir George, British diplomatist, Chorin family, m 287 I 23

Christian (Catholic and Protestant) Small- Clodius, Dr. C., official of German Foreign holders’, Agricultural Labourers’ and Ministry, 1 372, 406, 422n, 460: o 52, 117,

Bourgeois Party, 1 41 181

Christian Communal Party, 1 331 Codreanu, M., Roumanian Iron Guard Christian National League, 1 30, 32, 164: leader, I 211

uo 140, 181 Committee of Dissident Diplomats, u 264,

Christian National Union: in 1920 elections, 266, 319, 448 I 24, 26, 41; in 1931 elections,192;in 1935 Committee of Liberation, 0 456-7

elections, I 129; join Smallholders,1183; Commeéene, N., Roumanian Foreign

in 1939 elections, 1 350 Minister, 1 211, 237, 240, 260, 269, 271,

tef. I 27, 36, 46, 128, 166, 180, 315 280, 281, 282, 293, 294, 295, 298, 299, 311,

Christian Party, 0 76, 77, 78, 101, 107 333 Christian Party of 1920s, 1 24 I Responsabili, cit. 1 148n, 178n, 193n, Christian People’s Party, 0 197, 271, 289, 196n, 202n, 207n

306n Preludi, cit. 1 230, 240n, 256n, 259n,

Churchill, Mr. W. S., British Prime 260n, 266n, 268n, 269n, 270n, 271n, 272n,

Minister, 1 426, 470: n 8, 34, 144n, 191, 276n, 280n, 282n, 283n, 284n, 291n, 293n,

206, 276, 379 294n, 295n, 298n, 299n, 300n, 302n, 311n,

Chvalkovsky, F., Czechoslovak Foreign 314n

Minister, 1 279, 286, 288, 290, 291, 293, Communism: Communists in H.: establish

295, 297, 302 Soviet Republic (1919), 1 22; in 1920’s,

Ciano, Count Galeazzo, Italian Foreign 1 70-1; return to illegality, 1 99; ordered Minister: Horthy and, 1 59n; Csaky and, to work for Popular Front, 1 155-6; take 1110; Kanya and, 1194, 196, 200, 234-5; refuge in Social Democrat and Arrow Yugoslav policy, 1 196, 197, 240, 281, Cross parties, 1 184; vote for Atrow Cross 344-5, 385-6, 448; Anti-Comintern Pact candidates, 1 350; passive policy on outnegotiations, 1 205; visit to Budapest, 1 break of war, 1 370; crypto-Cs. expelled

INDEX 485

from Arrow Cross party, u 42; reacti- ment in, 1 151; H.-Italian negotiations, vated, 0 46-8; and Popular Front, m 46-8, I 385-6; Hitler offers to H., 1 474; H. 78-9, 105; cautious policy in 1942, 1 115; attitude towards, 1 478, 483, 485

party dissolves itself under misappre- Republic of: proclaims independence, hension, 11 158; reconstituted as Peace ir 9; recognised by H., 1 12; recognised Party (qg.v.), 1 182; policy in 1943-4, uo by Germany and Italy, 1 13; relations 207, 208n; policy under German occupa- with H. (1941-4), 1 57-8, 95, 103, 146, tion, 11 289; renewed activities, m1 313-4, 468; Germany invites H. to garrison, 332-3, 444n, 455-7, 459, 464. See also it 174-5, 183; and occupation of H. (1944),

Debrecen Government mt 224, 230, 248n, 257 | Hungarian dislike of, 1 23, 28-9, 56-7, See also Ustasi, Tito

81, 361-2, 364-5: u 34-5 Croat Peasant Party: H. contacts with, 1

Compromise Era, 1 6-24, 25, 27, 29 85-6, 146, 151, 197, 355, 385; contacts Contacts with the U.S.S.R.: Honti’s with Italy, 1 86, 197, 344-5, 385-6, 448:

contact, 11 176-8; Ullein-Reviczky’s nego- Wl 7; contacts with Germany, 1 344-5: tiations, 1 215; Aczél’s mission, 1 349-50, 11 7; welcomes H.-Yugoslav Pact, 1 454;

353-4; Count Zichy’s mission, m 349- favours signature of Tripartite Pact, 350, 354; Voroshilov mission, 1 349n; 1472. See also Radié, Maéek Faragho’s mission, 0 353-5, 372-3, 375, Crown, H.: in Compromise Era, 1 10-11;

377-81, 384-5, 397-8, 455-6; Col. relations with ruling classes, 1 12-13;

Gyulai’s mission, 0 373-4; Transylvanian powers of, 1 25, 48; legal position of after Committee’s mission, 11 374-5; Utassy’s 1920, 1 42n

mission, 11 382n, 385, 393, 397-8, 427 Crutescu, R., Roumanian Minister in Contacts with Western Powers: Eckhardt’s Budapest, 1 407 American mission, m 120-1, 191-2, 204, Cs Group, 1 130, 134, 380-1, 394 205; London Hungarians, wu 120-1; Csdaklydas, defined, 1 175

Gellért’s Swedish mission, m1 121, 127, Csaky, Count Istvan: I 110-1; Austrian

143, 164; Hungarian Foreign Office policy, 1 206; visit to Poland, 1 209;

contacts, 1 121-2, 126, 127; Uvllein- visit to Rome, I 234; visit to Kiel, 1 238-

Reviczky’s Portuguese mission, lt 122; 248; Czechoslovak negotiations, 1 255, |

Bethlen party’s contact, 1 122-3; Barcza’s 265, 270, 273, 288-91, 303, 317, 384-5; mission, 11 123, 126-7, 132-3, 141, 142-3, Slovak negotiations, I 263n, 276n, 295, 160-1, 170-3, 174, 175, 183, 190, 204, 209- 320, 322-3, 333, 336, 347, 348, 384, 396n;

210, 213-4; Lisbon legation contacts, 1 Ruthene negotiations, 1 278, 288-9, 321, 123, 126, 143, 160, 170, 172, 173, 191-3, 322-3, 332-3, 336, 337-8, 339-40, 341, 204-5, 214, 265; Frey’s mission, u 122, 342-3: collaboration with Poland, I 278, 126, 132, 141, 143, 144; Archduke Otto’s 322, 333, 347-8, 356-7, 358, 366, 367-8; mission, 1 128, 132, 160, 191-2, 204-5, second visit to Rome, 1 288-91; appointed

216, 334, 352-3; Baron Antal Foreign Minister, 1 303, 306, 315-7;

Radvanszky’s mission, 1 141, 142, 162, Anti-Comintern Pact negotiations, 1 318, 163, 214; Szegedi-Maszak’s mission, 1 322; Yugoslav negotiations, 1 318, 321, 141-2; Laszlo Veress’ mission, u 142- 333, 355, 385-6, 442, 449-52, 453; visit 143, 144, 175-6, 185-6, 216; Professor to Berlin, 1 319-23; Roumanian negotiaMészaéros’ mission, 0 142; Professor tions, 1 321, 333, 339-40, 341, 344, 348, Szentgyorgyi’s mission, 11 142; Gusztav 355-6, 360, 361n, 366, 368, 386-92, 396, K6évér’s mission, 1 142n, 154n; Baranyai’s 404-27, 442; third visit to Rome, 1 346-7; mission, 0 163, 172n; Bakach-Bessenyey’s second visit to Berlin, 1 348-9; visit to mission, 1 163, 172, 174, 175, 190-1, 213-4, Venice, 1 389-90; Tripartite Pact negotia334-5, 352; Ullein-Revickzy’s Swedish tions, I 439-45; death of, 1 465

mission, 0 172, 214; Francis Dedak’s ref. 1 225, 247n, 432-3n mission, 11 204-5, 214; Naday’s mission, inf. 1 320n

w 351-2 Csaky, Count Karoly, H. Minister of

Cordell Hull, Mr., m 303 Defence, 1 75

Cost of Living: 1929-32, 1 98; 1939-40, 1 Csall6k6z, 1 195, 206n, 287 378: 1939, 1 383; 1939-41, m 51n; 1940, Csanthy, D., H. Deputy, m 278

1460; 1941, 1 51; 1942, m 109 Csatay, General L., 1 156, 166, 167n, 170,

Credit Bank, 1 91 174, 193, 232, 233, 236, 237, 247, 251,

Creditanstalt (Austrian), failure of, 1 91 252, 264, 268, 283, 306n, 322, 323, 324, Croatia-Slavonia: in Yugoslavia: detached 325, 326, 331, 337, 338, 341, 343, 378, 386, from H., 1 4; area and population, 1 4; 387, 388, 392, 409, 427, 430, 451, 463n

Magyar minority in, 1 4; H. policy Csekonics, Count Ivdn, H. Legitimist

towards (1920-30), 1 84; separatist move- leader, 1 115, 254

486 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Csia, S., H. Deputy, 1 166, 186, 434: o 77, negotiations, I 294-9; requests Axis

130, 331n, 442, 448, 468 arbitration, 1 300; accepts First Vienna

Csicséry-Ronai, H. Deputy, t 130n | Award, 1 302. See also Germany, Italy, Csilléry, Dr., H. Deputy, 1 123, 181, 331 Poland, Great Britain and France Csirics, Mgr., Bishop of Ujvidék, 1m 146 Dismemberment of: Hitler’s plans to

Csizik, B., H. civil servant, m 324 dismember, 1 320-1; invasion and dis-

Csodaszarvas, I 326 memberment of, 1 337, 344

Csomos, M., H. Deputy, 1 155 Czechoslovak question: March 1939Csontos, Balazs, H. soldier, m 416, 418 June 1940, 1 344, 376-7, 384-5; 1944-5,

Csoor, L., H. deputy, 1 167, 350 um 464-5; Provisional Government, I 427, Csopey, M., Head of the Political Depart- 464-5: 11 60, 92, 94; Treaty with U.S.S.R., ment of the H. Foreign Ministry, 1 265n 205. See also Slovakia, Ruthenia, Bencs Csorba, S., H. Smallholder leader, 1 456

Culen, K., Slovak Deputy, 1 280n, 281n Daily Herald, 163n - .

Currency: stabilised, 1 63; in G6mb6ds’ Daily Telegraph, 1 248, 304n, 340: o 163

programme, 1 116; devaluations (1939, Daladier, Edouard, French politician,

1940), 1 372-3, 460: 1 51 I 256, 273n

Cuza, Professor A. C., Roumanian Nation- Danube Flotilla, 1 87, 383, 482: mu 55, 227,

alist leader, 1 422n 316

Cvetkovic, D., Yugoslav Minister, 1 449, Danzig, 1 298

450, 472, 475 Daranyi, Kalman: I 105-6; Minister of

Czebe, E., Hungary in World War II, cit. u Agriculture, 1 125, 216; Deputy Minister

98n, 228n, 322n President, 1 134, 173-4; leader of Govern-

Czechoslovakia, Czecho-Slovakia: to June ment Party, I 174; appointed Minister 1938: area and population acquired from President, 1 176-7; visit to Berlin, 1 179; H.,14; Magyar minority in (1910 census), programme, I 179-80; revives patriotic 1 4; (1930 census), 1 143; invades H., 1 22; associations, 1 181-3; constitutional rerefugees from (1918-20), 1 27n; 1924 forms, I 189-91; social legislation, 1 191, Protocols, 1 63; negotiations with H. 226; Austrian policy, 1195, 205; rearma-

| (1921), 1 82-3; H. attitude towards, 1 83; ment policy, 1 199, 215; visit to Berlin, economic relations with H., 190, 90n, 200; and negotiations with Hitler, 1 201-4; in world economic crisis, 190, 97; Hitler’s revision policy, I 204-5; Gy6r programme, policy towards, 1 139, 148-9, 193, 202; I 214-6, 218; reconstructs Cabinet, 1 216;

Treaty with U.S.S.R., 1 147, 149, 193; introduces First Jewish Law, 1 218-9; H.-German co-operation against, 1 148, negotiations with Szalasi, 1 218, 219, 220; 150, 150n, 194, 202, 210-1; negotiations resignation, I 219-20; Munich mission, with Austria, Italy and H. (1936-7), 1 I 288, 295, 310n; death of, 1 314

194-5, 198, 200; Danubian policy, 1 193, ref. 1 347 194-5, 198-200. See also Little Entente Darda Triangle. See Baranya Crisis in: I 230-3; nature of Hungarian Darré, R. W., German Ministry of Agriclaims, 1 210, 250, 253, 255, 267-8, 271, culture official, 1 373n 273; attitude to national claims, I 233; Darvas, Jozsef, mu 46n, 48, 79n; Vadros az Runciman Mission, 1 235-7; opposes /ngovanyon, cit. 1 184n: 0 47n, 208n, 245, plebiscite, 1 257; accepts Anglo-French 313n, 319n, 365n, 410-11, 421, 444n proposals, 1258; interpretation of,1258-9; Davidson, Mr. Basil, correspondent, u 106 suffening of attitude to Polish and H. Davidson Letter, u 128, 200, 365 claims, I 259; negotiations with Slovaks, Deak, Captain, H. Army officer, nm 422 1 264, 269; receives Note from H., 1266; Deak, Colonel, H. Army officer, m 71, 72n,

in communication with U.S.S.R., 1 268; 201 opens negotiations with Poland, 1 268, Deak, F.: Portuguese Mission, u 204, 205, 269, 271; refuses territorial settlement to 210, 214; Hungary at the Peace ConH., 1 269, 276; further exchanges with H., ference, cit. 81n 1 269-72; accepts Munich Agreement, Deak, Féispan, m 72 1274; accepts Polish demand,1276; opens Debrecen Government: formation, 11 457-

negotiations with H., 1 277, 280; re- 460; composition, 0 464; programme, I construction of Cabinet, 1 279; resigna- 464-5 tion of Benes, 1 279; constitutional Decleva, H. General, 0 324 settlement with Slovaks and Ruthenes, Dekanazov, M., Russian diplomatist, 1 418,

I 282; Komarom negotiations, I 284-7; 421: 1 380

new policy towards Germany, I 288; Delbos, Yvon, French politician, 1 208n appeals to Germany, I 290; pre- Délvidék: occupation of, mn 11, 12; military cautionary measures, 1 293-4; further regime in, 11 13; reorganisation of, m 38-

INDEX 487 40; introduction of civilian administra- under Kallay, u 212, 212n; taken over by tion, 1 39; reannexation, 1 77; parlia- Imrédy, 11 294; its difficulties, m1 295 mentary representation, 11 78; settlement Economist, cit. 1 326

of, 1 159; renounced, 1 464-5 Eden, Mr., British Foreign Minister, 1 200n,

ref. 1 479n, 484, 489 376, 469, 470: 11 8, 94, 185, 205, 353n, 379, See also Backsa, Baranya, Murakéz, 380n

Muravidék Education, 1 26, 69, 70, 77, 78

Demko, M., Ruthene politician, 1 338n Egyed, J., A Mi Alkotmdnyunk, 1 50n

Dessewffy, Countess, 11 365n Egyke, 1 128

Dessewffy, Count Gyula, H. Resistance Eichmann, Adolf,German S.S. Commander, leader, 0 104, 107n, 116n, 313, 314, 319, WT 224, 228, 261, 274, 280, 281, 282, 285,

365, 395 301, 304, 304n, 305, 308, 309, 318, 321 inf. 11 319n 8-Orai Ujsdg, 1 380, 394: 1 103

Dessewffy, E., 1 383n Eisenhower, D., American General, 11 193n,

Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, cit.1 168, 440n 204 Deutscher Volksbote, 1 171, 178n, 326 EKSz, 1 31-2, 33, 34, 75, 104, 113, 119, 124,

Deutsches Volksblatt, 1 273 185, 221, 329

Deutsche Zeitung, 1 457: am 44, 268 Elections, 1 23, 25-6, 45, 92, 102, 129-30, de Vienne, M., French diplomatist, 1 377 166, 167, 349-51, 437 Dezsényi, M., cit. u 420n, 421n, 433n Elharcosok, 1 119n, 127, 133

Dezs6, I., H. General, n 153 Eliassy, M., Director of Budapest Police, Diamandi, I., Roumanian politician, 1 422n I 218n

“Dissidents,” 1 48, 314, 315, 316, 330, 331, Emergency Legislation and Enactments:

351: 0 46, 198, 306n Political: Sept. 1939, 1 364; June 1940,

Dollfuss, Engelbert, Austrian Chancellor, I 402-3; Sept. 1944, 1 329

197n, 137, 145, 146 Economic and financial: 1931, 1 92,

Donosti, cit. Mussolini e l Europa, 1 288n 92n; Sept. 1939, 1 364; June 1940, 1 403, Dornberg, Baron von A., Hitler’s chef de Aug. 1940, 1 428, autumn 1940, 1 459;

protocol, 1 245n: m 235, 240 May 1941, m 16; autumn 1941, m 50;

Doussingue, S., Spanish Foreign Office summer 1942, m1 108; spring 1944, 1 295-

official, m 145 296; Oct. 1944, m 444 cillor, 1 422n Emigration, 1 67, 70, 70n

Dragonin, S., Roumanian Crown Coun- For Labour, see Social Legislation Dudas, J., H. Communist, 1 333, 350, 353, Emigré organisations, 1 215-6, 264-6

456 Employment, Unemployment: in Historic

Dulin, M., H. Civil Servant, m1 404 H., 1 9; in 1920s, 1 69; during world Dulles, Alan, m 141, 161, 163, 186n, 190, economic crisis, 1 89n, 91, 98, 142n; in

204, 213, 214 1936, 1 133; in 1937, 1 192; in 1939-40,

Duréansky, F., Slovak politician, 1 295 I 378, 382-3

Dvorak, M., Slovak politician, 1 278, 11 40n Endre, Laszlo: I 186-7n: Alispan of Pest County, 1 187; joins Arrow Cross, I 187; Easterman, A. L., King Carol, Hitler and joins Government Party, 1 229; Secretary

Lupescu, cit. 1 340n, 415, 422n of State under Sztdojay, m 251, 269; anti-

Eckhardt, F., H. deputy, 1 72n Jewish activities, m1 277, 279, 280, 282,

Eckhardt, Tibor: I 121-2; G6mb6s and, 283n, 285, 302, 303, 304n; dismissal, I 1 102n, 122-3, 126, 129, 131, 133, 174; 303, 305, 307, 308, 309, 326; Himmler’s elected to Parliament, 1 192; elected support of, 11 310, 324; Commissioner of President of Independent Smalholders’ Operational Zone, u 463 Party, 1 121; H. delegate to League of ref. 1 104: mn 37, 250 Nations, 1 122, 126; proposes Franchise Entails Reform Act, 1 128, 132 Reform, 1 123; attack on Bethlen, 1124; Edtvés, J., H. thinker, 1 161, 162 joins opposition, I 131; advocates change Erdei, F., H. Left-wing politician, m 332n,

in minority policy, 1 168; suggested as 460

Minister President, 1 175; land reform Erdmannsdorff, Otto von, German Minister policy, 1 179; supports Legitimists, 1 183, in Budapest, 1110n, 183, 195n, 205n, 206n, 350n; American mission, 1 469: 1 4, 106, 244, 246, 252n, 254, 255, 269, 270, 280,

113, 120-1, 191-2, 204, 353n 291n, 295, 296, 297, 311, 312, 313, 314n, ref. 1 133, 180, 181, 186, 445 315n, 325, 335n, 336, 337, 363, 405, 407, inf. 1 122n, 148n, 173n, 176n, 179n, 408, 409, 418, 422n, 450n, 453, 462n, 471,

220n, 304n 489, 494: 1 6, 9, 20, 21, 22, 55n

Economic Co-ordination, Ministry of: inf. 1 243n, 247n, 359n, 420n: 1 21n, created, 1 216; revived after lapse, 1 459; 22n, 23

488 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Erdédy, J., cit. m 48n, 49, 79n, 104n, 107n, parliamentary representation, 1 308, 308n; 129n Teleki’s programme, 1 352; Felvidék Ernszt. S., H. Minister of Cults, 1 95, 99, problem, 1 381-2; Felvidék party, 1 382,

220n 394: elections cancelled, 1 430: feeling in, Esti Kurir, 0 46 o 40 Esti Ujsadg, 1 302n, 374: o 273, 312 ref. 1 111n Esterhazy, Count Janos, 1 236, 285, 301, See also Slovaks, Slovjaks

308n Fencsik, I., Ruthene politician, 1 286n, 299 75, 163, 302, 341 ll 277, 281, 304n

Esterhazy, Count Maurice, 1 475, 482: m Ferenczy, Col. L., H. Gendarmerie officer,

Esterhazy, Princess, 1 205 Ferenczy, H. Chief of Police, 1 182 Eucharistic Congress, 1 220-1, 228, 230, 305 | Fernbach, Foispan, uo 70

Evacuation of Hungary, 0 452ff, 460-2, Festetics, Count Sandor, H. Right-wing

468-70 politician, 1 158, 159, 187, 227, 229, 229n

Exports and Imports: 1920-8, 1 64-5; in Festetics, Count Tassilo, 1 158

world economic crisis, I 89; 1931, 196; Fidei commissa: in Historic H., I 9; in 1933,1118; 1936-7, 1192; 1937-40, 1374n; Trianon H., 1 26, 41, 67 1941, 58n. For Trade by countries s.v. Filov, B., Bulgarian statesman, u 58 Finance: in Historic H., 1 8; in Trianon H., Fabian, B., H. Liberal Deputy, 1 128, 366n T 62 Fabinyi, T.: H. Minister of Commerce,1 First Vienna Award, 1 301-2, 303 103, 127; Minister of Finance,1 124,192, Fleischmann, General Moritz von, 0 167n,

211, 212, 215, 216; concludes London 223n

Agreements, I 192: President of Hitel Floods, 1 383, 428, 459-60

Bank, 1 216 Foispan: definition, I 48n; relations with inf. 1 137n, 140n, 211n, 212n, 215n, Government Party, 1 119, 180

221n Foldessy, G., Ruthene politician, 1 338n

Fabricius, W. German Minister in Food supply and rationing, 0 50, 108, 115, Bucharest, 1 201, 333, 411n, 414, 421, 168, 181, 346, 461

422n, 494 Foreign Policy. See countries concerned

Falukutatok. See Village Explorers and G6mbés, Bethlen, Kanya, Csaky, Faragho, S., H. General: 1 386n: o 285, Teleki, Kallay

303n, 304, 305, 350n; Moscow mission, m Forgach, Count, m 354 353 354, 355, 372, 375, 377, 378, 379, Forged Francs Affair, 1 81, 82n, 93, 113 380, 381, 384, 385, 393, 397, 398, 428n, Forster, M., H. Sous-chef de Protocole, 455, 456; formation of Debrecen Govern- 1 475n

ment, m 458, 459, 466 Foti, Colonel, H. army officer, m 70

Farkas, F., H. General, 0 245, 324, 364n, Fotic, K., Yugoslav Minister in Washing376, 382, 393, 402n, 408, 410, 417, 441 ton, I 453

inf. 0 393n, 417n The War We Lost, cit. 1 453n

Farkas, M., m 459 France: Danubian policy in 1919, 122; signs

Fascism: demand for Fascist regime (1931), 1924 Protocol, 1 63; relations with H. 1 100-3; measures introduced, 1 101, 102, 1920-30, 1 81-2, 85; in world economic 116-9, 120-1, 213-20. See also Right crisis, I 93, 96, 97-8, 115; negotiations

Radicalism with Italy, 1 146-7; Franco-Soviet Mutual UDV, 1 172 slovak crisis, I 232, 243, 244, 257, 258,

Faul-Farkas, M., Secretary- General of Assistance Pact, 1 147, 149; in CzechoFaust, M., H. Communist, m 333, 350, 456 262, 266, 268, 269, 271, 281-2, 283, 287, Fay, I., H. Secretary of State, n 368, 431n 292n, 297-300; reception of First Vienna

Fazekas, Mme E. G., u 471, 472 Award, 1 303; gives guarantee to RouFederation of Social Associations. See TESz mania, I 340-1; reception of annexation, Feine, H., German Secretary of Legation in 1 342; gives guarantee to Poland, 1 347, Budapest, 0 424, 428, 432, 433, 434, 436, relations with H. Sept. 1939-May 1940,

438, 439 1 377; surrender of, 1 402, 404

Fejt6, F., H. Communist, 1 99 ref. 1 259, 270

Feketehalmi-Czeydner, H. General, m 70, Franchise: in Historic H., 1 11; Friedrich

71, 72, 73, 74n, 188n, 201, 254, 267n Franchise, 1 23, 23n; 1913 Act, 1 42-3;

Felkai, M., H. journalist, m0 365 in 1922, 1 44, 46; Eckhardt’s proposals, Feltamadas Society, 1 32, 109n 1123, 174; G6mb6s’ draft, 1 125, 128, 174; Felvidék: awarded to H. under First Vienna 1937 Act, 1 190-1, 218 Award, 1 302; area and population,1302; Francois-Poncet, A., French Ambassador reincorporated in H., 1 305; accorded in Berlin, 1 289, .292n

INDEX 489 Frank, K. H., German Sudeten leader, intention of invading Roumania, 1 390-1,

I 208, 296 399, 400; concludes armistice with

Frank, Hans, German Governor of France, 1 404; accedes to Russian de-

Bohemia, 1 468, mands in Bessarabia, 1 404; policy in

Frey, A., H. journalist, m 122, 126, 132, 141, Transylvanian crisis, 1 404-27; plans for

143, 144 reorganising Europe, 1 435, 435n; floats . inf. 1m 122n Tripartite Pact, 1 438-445; agreement with

Frick, W., Reichsleiter, 1 359, 477 Roumania, 1 440, 444; negotiations with Friedrich, Istvan, H. Minister President, Yugoslavia, 1 448-50; attack on Russia,

1 23 1 460: nm 17-18 breakdown of Yugoslav

Friesner, General, u 359n, 389, 461 negotiations, 1 474, 475, 477, 481-2, 486,

Fritsche, H., m1 295, 311, 312 490; attack on Yugoslavia, u 7; declares Fuchs, Un Pacte avec Hitler, cit.1 139n, 150n war on U.S.A., 11 62; occupies Italy, m

Fiiggetlen Kisgazda, 1 123n 183; occupies Hungary, 1 222ff

Fiiggetlenség, 1 119, 181n, 218n, 374: 1 209, German-Hungarian Relations:

2/3 Political: Gémbés’ idea of relations

Funk, W., German Minister of Economics, with Germany, 1 35, 75-7, 136-7; Horthy’s

wm 118 I 58-9; Daranyi’s, 1 105-6; Kanya’s, II

Furst, H. Communist, 1 99n 108-9; Csaky’s, 1 110-1; Sztdjay’s, 1 112; Futterer, Colonel, German Air Attaché in Mecsér’s, I 112; Szalasi’s, 1 160; Teleki’s,

Budapest, 1m 229 I 223-4; Bardossy’s, | 466-7; Kallay’s, 1 85-6; unofficial contacts in 1920s, 1 34, 72,

Gaal, Colonel, H. army officer, 1 71n 81; 1929-31, 1 81; 1932-6, 1 138-44, 148, Gaal, Gaszton, H. Deputy, 1 44n, 90, 90n, 150, 152-3, 154, 168-70; G6mb6s-Goring

99, 121 political agreement, 1 148, 177; hostile

Gabor, J., H. Minister of Trade, 1 459 reception of Daranyi, 1 177-9; visit of Gafencu, G., Roumanian Foreign Minister, Daranyi to Berlin, 1 202-4; Anschluss of

I 333, 339n, 340, 355, 390, 418, 421 Austria, I 206-7, 216-8; and CzechoPrelude, cit. 1 368n, 388n, 398n, 418n, slovakia, 1 205, 211, 233-7, 238-48, 249-77

421n: it 10n (Munich crisis); during H.-Czechoslovak

Gal, Csaba, H. Arrow Cross leader, 11 104, negotiations Oct. 1939, 1 277-304; H.

448 offers agreement, 1 288, 290; strained

Galicia, Germans offer to H., 1 366 relations in Nov.-Dec. 1938, 1 310-6; H.

Gaspar, Z., H. Deputy, m 79n overtures, I 317-8; Csaky’s visit, 1 319-

Gayda, V., Italian publicist, cit. 1 147n, 195, 323; hostility to appointment of Teleki,

318n I 349; negotiations over Ruthenia, 1 332, |

Gedye, G. E. R., Fallen Bastions, cit. 1 194n 335, 336, 338, 342; H. attitude over Gellért, A., H. Revision League official, Polish question, 1 347-8; visit of Teleki

m 121, 127, 128, 143 and Csaky to Berlin, April-May 1939, 1

Gentry, H. 1 13, 14 348-9; political understanding reached,

Gera, Jozsef, H. Arrow Cross leader, m 130, 1 349; increased German pressure and H.

409 resentment, summer 1939, 1 350ff; H. asks

Germany: uninterested in Danube 1920-8, to join Commission under “Pact of

181; in world economic crisis, I 90, 91, Steel,’ 1 357-8; Teleki’s letters, 1 358-60; 92n, 96, 97; new Danubian policy, I 138- German invasion of Poland, 1363; requests 140; relations with Danube states 1934-6, for transit of troops, I 366-7; autumn

I 147-8; occupies Rhineland, 1 149; 1939, 1 371-4; more active policy, spring further strengthening of position in 1940, 1 395; German troop transit quesSouth East Europe, 1 149-52, 193-4, 196, tion, I 396-7, 399-400; H. request for 198, 202-11; annexes Austria, 1 206; conversations, 1 397-8, 399; and TranDanubian policy in spring 1938, 1 207-8; sylvanian crisis, I 405ff; further demands

and Czechoslovakia (Munich crisis), I of H., autumn 1940, 1 431, 437-8; Tri237, 249-79; policy toward H.-Czecho- partite Pact, 1 438-45; and Yugoslav-H. slovak dispute, autumn 1938, 1 281, 283, Treaty, 1 448, 450-1, 453-4; renewed 289-91, 292-3, 294, 296, 298-9, 301, 302, economic requests, 1 460; H. excluded 311ff; overtures to Poland, 1 298, 335, from German plans to attack U.S.S.R., 335n; Hitler’s intentions in Czecho- 1 461-2; Yugoslav negotiations, 1 471-2; slovakia, 1 320-2; dismemberment, I 335- offer of Banat to H., 1 474-5; and Yugo-

342: increased influence on Danubian slav crisis, I 475-86: 4-10; allocation of affairs, 1345-6; prepares to attack Poland, Yugoslav territory, m1 13; German attack 1 347, 348; agreement with U.S.S.R., I on U.S.S.R., 0 17-18, 19-20, 21; policy of 357, 358, 361; invades Poland, £ 363-4; non-interference, m 35-6, 57; increased

490 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH popularity of Germany in H., m 36; and 217-8, 227-30, 350, 434-5, 436, 455-6: I war with U.S.A., 0 62; alleged complicity 41, 42, 154-6, 195-6, 290, 310-11, 323-4, in Ujvidék massacre, 1 69, 69n; and 330, 360-2, 369-71, 423-43 election of Deputy Regent, mn 76, 76n; Germans in Hungary: in Historic H., 1 7, hostile reception of Kallay, m 92-3; 14-17; number in 1920,14; number in 1930, meeting between Kallay and Hitler, u 170; number in 1941, 0 153n; character of 95-6; growing tension, @ 116-8, 126, 131- minority, I 25-6; unrest among, I 26; 138, 139, 149-50, 156; demands re Jewish agreement with Bethlen, 1 69-70, 71; question, m 116-7, 126, 131, 132, 139, 150; erowth of radicalism among, 1 139, 144, situation in autumn 1943, n 183, 194-5; 168-72, 230; German interestin,1 139, 144, German decision to occupy H., m 222; 170, 172, 178-9, 206n, 321, 322, 349; arrangements for occupation, mn 222-30; alleged agreement, 1 203; and Anschluss, Hitler-Horthy interview, 0 232-41; occu- 1 217; concessions to, I 325-6, 352; pation effected, m 242-4; agreement on ‘spontaneous loyalty movement,”’ 1 352n, occupation, m1 252; formation of Sztdjay 381n; right of Germany to recruit from, Government, 0 246-53; army settlement, 1 108, 151, 153; in Army of Occupation, m 253-4; Germans arrest politicians, I 228. See also Volksbund, Volksgruppe, 254-7; occupation authorities, 1 257-62; Volksdeutsch forces remaining, nm 258; Operational Germans: in Bacska, 1 I5n, 25: m1 39, Zones established, m 259; Gestapo activi- 41; in Roumania, I 199n 423; in Yugo-

ties, 11 260-2, 270; release of political slavia, I 15n 478-9, 489; in Yugoslav prisoners, 0 270; negotiations for de- Banat, wu 57 portation of Jews, 0 273-89, 301-3, 308-9, Gerd, Ernd, H. Communist leader, m 459, 321; full occupation threatened, 11 307-8; 460 Germans decide to fight in H., 1 321,339; | Gerstenberger, Baroness Miske, m 106 plans for capture of Horthy, m 359-60; Geschke, Colonel], German Gestapo officer,

Veesenmayer-Szalasi agreement, m 385; u 260 Winkelmann’s plan, 0 388-9; Guderian’s Ghika, G., H. Minister in Washington, ultimatum, m 399, 408; German forces u 7, 216 occupy Budapest, n 419-20; seizure of the Ghyczy, Jen6,1110n, 472n: 1 29n, 127, 141,

Var, 0 430, 435; negotiations on Horthy’s 163: H. Foreign Minister, 1 164, 170, abdication, m 432-3, 438, 440: Horthy 172n, 179n, 183, 185, 190n, 201, 210n, taken prisoner, 0 434-5; Szalasi Govern- 218n, 229, 232, 233, 236, 237, 240, 242,

ment established, u 446-8; Germans 247

leave Hungary, uo 469-70. See also Gibson, Mr., u 163, 164 Veesenmayer, Sztdjay, Szalasi Gigurtu, I., Roumanian Minister President, Commercial and financial: 1931, 1 96; 1 407, 414, 415, 422n 1932, 1 137; 1933, 1 141; 1934,1 141; H. Goczan, Private, 1 304

offer in 1938, 1 288, 290, 312, 317; Goebbels, Dr. Joseph, German Minister of refused by Germany, 1 353; German Propaganda, I 238: m 92, 93 request for closer relations, 1 372-3, 437-8; Goga, O., Roumanian Minister President,

agreements of autumn 1940, 1 438, 460; 1 205, 211 1941, o 52-3; 1942, mn 117-8, 126, 149; Goldberger, L., H. financier, m 148n, 255, 1943, 1 181; April-June 1944, 11 296-7; in 291n, 304

evacuation of H., 1 452, 461-2 Gombos, E., H. officer, m 326n

Trading: 1931, 1 96; 1933-7, 1 140-2; inf. 1 139n, 144n, 148n, 227n: m 430n 1939-40, 1 373-4, 428; 1941, m 52, 53n, G6mb6s, Gyula: I 33-5; elected President 66; 1941-3, m 118n, 166n; 1944, 1 296n of MOVE, 1 29; founds EKSz, 1 31; birth Military: armaments agreements and and early career, 1 33; at Szeged, 1 29, 33; understandings, 1 140-1, 142-3, 290, 321, connections with Horthy, 1 29, 33, 56; 358, 363, 373, 460-1, 462, 463: 1 68, 93-4, with German Underground, 1 34, 72-3, 98n, 120, 126, 166-8, 387, 451; military 81; enters Parliament, 1 34; organises agreements and understandings, 1 68-9, resistance to King,1 42,56; Vice-President, 96-7, 15In, 153, 245, 267-8, 312n, 387, Unitary Party (1922), 1 72; leaves Party

462-3; Yugoslav crisis, 481-2, m 4; Sept. (1923), 1 72; implicated in counter1941, mo 55; Jan. 1942, o 65, 67-8; Jan.- revolutionary plot, 1 72-3; founds Party Feb. 1943, m1 137-9; April 1943, m 153; of Racial Defence, 1 72, 75, 155; rejoins Sept. 1943, mn 173-4; Oct. 1943, 1m 184-5, Government Party and becomes Secre189; March 1944, n 218-20, 238, 253-4, tary of State for Defence, 1 75; Minister 258-9, 266-8; Sztdjay, 0 267-8; August- of Defence, 1 75, 95; conceives theory of Sept. 1944, n 335-6; Hitler-VG6r6s, m 344-5 Axis, I 75-7, 132; promotes himself to Right Radical Party, 1 140, 157, 182, General, 1 100n; invited to head opposi-

INDEX 49] |

tion to Karolyi, 1 100; secures financial 259-60, 266-7, 273-4; October, 1 277, support, 1 103; places himself at head of 281-2, 283, 287, 292, 292n, 297, 300; opposition, 1 102; appointed Minister attitude to First Vienna Award, 1 303; President, 1 103; Horthy’s conditions, I and H.’s Axis policy, 1 318-9, 327n; 103, 114; difficulties of his position, 1 114; Teleki’s message to, 1 331; and Ruthene

visits Italy, 1 115; official programme, | question, I 333n, 342; guarantee to 116-7; compromises with Jews, 1 117; Poland and Roumania, 1 344; relations ““Immediacy Programme,” 1 117-8, 138; with H. in summer 1939, 1 353, 355-6, consolidates his position, 1 118-21; plans 362-3, 375; declares war on Germany, for reorganising Army, 1 120, 136, 139; 1 366; relations with H. Sept. 1939 to negotiations with Eckhardt, 1 121, 126-9, June 1940, 1 372, 374, 375-6, 390, 396-7,

131; conflict with Bethlen, 1 124-7; 400; in Roumanian crisis, 1 408, 409;

resignation and reappointment, I 127-8; attitude to Second Vienna Award, I 426; new legislative programme, I 128; makes and H.-Yugoslav Treaty, 1 453; and H. elections, 1 129; domestic policy 1935-6, signature of Tripartite Pact, 1 464; and 1 125, 132-5, 173; visits Rome, 1 136; transit of German troops to Roumania,

revises ‘Axis’? programme, I 136-7; I 463-4; recants acquiescence in First

visits Hitler, 1 138-40; trade agreement Vienna Award, I 464-5; plans for receivwith Germany, 1 140-2; in Ankara and ing émigré H. Government, 1 468-9: 1 3;

Warsaw, I 144; and Danubian negotia- warnings to H., 1 469-70; breaks off tions, 1 145-7, 152-4; secret agreement diplomatic relations with Roumania, I with Goring, 1 132, 148, 177; relations 470; H. appeals in Yugoslav crisis, I 479with Right-wing extremists, 1 159, 161, 480, 481, 485-6: m 7, 8; unfavourable 166, 175; with Swabian minority, 1 76, replies, 1 486-7; breaks off diplomatic 168-70; estrangement from Horthy, 1 relations with H., 1 8; declares solidarity 135, 173; illness, 1 134, 174; resigns with U.S.S.R., 0 39; abuse of in H. Press, Ministry of Defence, 1 173; last weeks of mW 59, 65, 92, 199; declares war on H., life, and death, 1 174-5, 177n; incident at i 60-1; British P.O.W.s in, m 61n, 217,

his funeral, 1 177 270; Kallay’s policy, 1 86ff; alliance with

ref. 1 16, 110n, 179, 206, 402 U.S.S.R., mu 92; declares First Vienna

Goode, Sir William, 1 327n Award null and void, m 94; war-time Gorgey, Vinceze, H. adventurer, u 195n, 293, propaganda and requests for sabotage,

303, 304 mH 105n, 106, 132-3, 161, 173, 179, 186,

Goring, Hermann, head of German Luft- ‘187-8; attitude to Habsburg restoration, waffe: at Kiel, 1 110n; and Sztdjay, 1112n; w 112; Free Hungarian Movement in, secret agreement with Godmbés, 1 132, i 120, 265-6; H. changing attitude to, 148, 177; Yugoslav negotiations, 1 147, 11 125; war-time contacts with H., m 120148, 202n, 204n, 245, 255, 271, 272; 127, 131-3, 141-6, 159-64, 169-76, 183, 185 Czechoslovak negotiations, 1 233, 245, 270, (Istanbul Agreement), 186-9, 204, 209271, 272; co-operation with H., 1 244n, 210, 213, 216, 217; supports Tito, m 206;

245: 1 98n, 126; and Horthy, 1 261n abandoned offer to occupy H., m 264-5; ref. 1136n, 150n, 176n, 193n, 203n, 272n, renewed contacts, 1 314-5, 334-5, 337, 339, 356n 351-2; attitude to Sztdjay Government,

Government Party, 1 46-8. See also Party i 265

of Unity, Unitary Party, Party of ref. 1 173

National Unity, Movement of Hungarian Greece, 1 96n, 442, 447

Life, MEP Gregori¢, D., Serbian politician, 1 450, Graf, Benno, 1 172n 453n: m1 4n Grassy, Major, H. army officer, 1 71, 72n, Greiffenberg, German General, m 224, 228,

901 229, 230, 243, 253, 258, 338, 344, 357,

Gratz, Gusztav, President of UDV, 1 69, 361, 386, 412, 427

82n, 83, 84n, 169, 170, 172: m 255, 348n Greman, Private, 1 304

A forradalmak kora, cit. 1 36n Gruber, L., H. Deputy, 1 381 Great Britain: signs Reconstruction Guderian, Heinz, German General, 1 318, Protocol, 1 63; relations with H. 1920-30, 335, 336, 338, 343, 344, 408, 461 1 82,85; in world economic crisis,1 97, 114; Erinnerungen eines Soldatens, cit. 1 H. hopes of, 1 154, 201, 231; “Platonic 241n: 1 335n, 337n, 399 attitude’ to Danubian question,1151,199- Gydngydssy, J.,H. Foreign Minister, 1 460,

200, 200n, 226, 231; communications 464

with H. and attitude towards her claims Gy6r Programme, I 218, 232, 247, 345 in Czechoslovak crisis, March-August Gydrffy-Bengyel, General, H. Minister of 1938, 1 232, 235-7; Sept., 1 254-6, 257-8, Supply, mu 24, 50, 50n, 101

492? OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Gyulay, Tibor, H. Minister of Industry, u 358n, 378, 381, 386, 387, 388n, 392, 395,

218n, 325, 409, 441 398, 402, 406, 407, 408, 409, 423, 424, 425, 430, 431, 436

Hacha, E., President of Czechoslavakia, 1 inf. 1 112n, 146n: 0 337n, 340n, 345n,

335n: nm 233 378n, 392n, 394n, 398n, 408n, 409n, 425n, 1 168n: o 257n Hess, R., German Minister without Port-

Hacke, Frl. B., Veesenmayer’s secretary, 431n, 436n

Haeffler, L., H. Chief of Press, m 164 folio, 1 217n Hagen. See Hottl, Dr. Willy Heszlényi, H. General, m 340, 341, 364n, 381, Hahn, A. von, German DNB representa- 385, 395, 418, 454

tive, 1 183 Hevesy, P. de, World Wheat Planning and

Hain, Péter, Horthy’s personal detective, Economic Planning in General, cit. 1 65n,

Ww 229, 246, 294 89n, 98n

Hajkovics, J., Ruthene politician, 1 338n Hewel, W., German chancellery official, Halder, Franz von, German general, 1 246, Ow 226

461n: 0 17, 20, 23n, 31, 32n Hillgruber, A., Hitler, Kénig Carol und

inf. o 18n, 20n Antonescu, cit. 1 404n, 411n, 419n, 422n,

Halifax, Viscount, British Foreign Minister, I 13n, 219n, 224n, 253n 1 235, 256, 257, 260, 264, 266, 268, 272, Himer, General, o 21, 24 273, 277, 281, 287n, 292n, 303, 340, 342, Himmler, H., German SS Reichsfihrer,

375, 376, 398, 426 148n, 224, 226, 229, 246, 248, 249, 250,

Haller, H., Veesenmayer’s political adviser, 251, 255, 259, 260, 261, 288, 294, 310, 321, om 261, 323, 330, 356, 357, 358, 361, 439 344, 369

Hamm, F., H. deputy, 1 386 Hindy, I., H. General, m 421, 424, 451n, 465n,

Hamvas, Bishop, u 277 467

Hardy, K., H. General, 1 333: o 230, 316, Hur, G., H. Deputy, 1 72n 318n, 323n, 324, 342n, 350n, 360n, 362n, Historical Monuments Committee, nm 79, 376, 377, 393, 410, 418n, 420, 426, 432n, 104, 107

441, 463 Hitler, Adolf: Horthy and, 1 59, 59n;

inf. o 324n, 397n, 418n, 426n Mecsér and, 1 112, 138; GombéGs visits, Harrison, L., American Minister in Berne, 1 138-40; South-East European pro-

335 gramme, I 138-41, 148; plans for Austria,

Harsanyi, D., H. Radio officer, m 381n, 404, I 138-9, 202, 203; plans for Czecho-

405 slovakia, I 138-9, 150, 202, 203; views

Hartman, A., m 155 on Volksdeutsch question, 1 140, 170; Harvests: 1923-32, 1 98; 1933, 1 118; 1936, offers Slovakia-Ruthenia to H., 1 138-9, 1192; 1939, 1 353, 383; 1940, 1 459; 1941, 148, 202, 203; Yugoslav policy, 1 139, 148, 50, 50n; 1942, mn 114, 114n; 1943, 0 181, 203-4, 207; Roumanian policy, 1 139, 148;

181n GoOmbos and Kanya visit (Sept. 1935),

Hassell, Ulrich von, German Minister in 1 148; offers H. Burgenland, 1 148; Rome, Von anderen Deutschland, cit. occupies Rhineland, 1 149; Horthy visits

I 456n, 483n, 486n at Berchtesgaden, 1 150; offers Czecho-

Hategianu, Professor, Roumanian poli- slovakia non-aggression pact, 1 193, 194;

tician, I 429n Daranyi and Kanya visit, 1 201, 202-4 Sofia, 0 175n assurance on Austro-H. frontier, 1 206;

Hatz, Colonel O., H. Military Attaché in holds Hossbach conference, 1 202; gives

Heeren, Viktor von, German Miunister in Anschluss of Austria, 1 206, 216-17; visits

Belgrade, 1 211, 280 Rome, 1 211; Horthy visits at Kiel, 1 238-

Hehs, Aladar, H. deputy, 1 158 — 247; invites H. to participate in Operation

Heinritsi, German General, 0 445 Grin, I 242; recants, 1 243, 245; anger Hejjas, Ivan, Ragged Guard leader, 1 238 over Bled Agreements, 1 243-4, 289;

Hellebronth, V., H. General, m 324, 370, 452 Nuremberg speech, 1 252; Godesberg

Henderson, Arthur, British Minister, 1361n, meeting, I 254; asks H. to provoke

362n Czechoslovak crisis, 1 254-5; Imrédy,

Henderson, A., Evewitness in Czecho- Kanya and Lipski visit, 1 261-3; Munich slovakia, 1 279n, 287n, 294n, 302n Agreement, 1 268; presents H. claims, Henderson, Sir Neville, British Ambassador I 268; urges H. to greater activity in in Berlin, 1 251, 292n, 304n, 334n Slovakia, 1 270; Daranyi visits, 1 289-91; Hennyey, Arpad, Arrow Cross leader, supports H.’s ethnic claims in Slovakia,

m 130 1 292-3; sanctions First Vienna Award,

Hennyey, Gusztav, H. General 0 323n, 324, I 301; on H.’s Ruthene claims, 1 312; 325, 336, 337, 338, 341, 343, 349n, 356, Csdky visits, 1 319-21; plans for dis-

INDEX 493 memberment of Czechoslovakia, 1 320-1, Homicsko, V., H. Deputy, o 129 332, 336; attack on Bethlen, 1 320, 322; Homlok, H. General, 1 238

message of 12th March 1939, 1 332; MHomonnay, A., cif. 0 322n, 337n favours Slovak independence, 1 335-6; Honti, F., H. Consul in Geneva, pu 176, 177 protects Slovak State, 1 341-2; Dardanyi- Honvéd, definition of, 1 15 Imrédy visit, 1 347; Teleki and Csdky Horstenau, General Glaise von, German visit, 1 348-9; demands transit facilities, commander in Croatia, m 23

1 359-60; pact with U.S.S.R., 1 363; Horthy, Istvan: IT 75; President of the Danubian policy, 1939-40, 1 399, 401; Hungarian State Railways, 1 462n;

Teleki and Csaky visit and the partition elected Deputy Regent, m1 74-77; death,

of Transylvania, 1 410-15, 419, 444; uw 110-111; services to the State comdecides to garrison Roumania, 1 440-1; memorated, u 112, 124, 181 on Tripartite Pact, 1 442-3; negotiates Horthy, Istvan, Jnr., m 111 with Yugoslavia, 1 449, 450; Bartha Horthy, Mme,1 52, 238, 360: 0 232, 398n,

visits, I 460-2; Russian policy, 1 461; 433, 436n )

Bardossy visits, 1 471-3; attacks Yugo- Horthy, Mme Ilona, u 355, 396, 397, 403,

slavia, I 474; offers H. revision in 404, 428, 432, 441n Yugoslavia in return for co-operation, inf. 1 209n, 365n, 386n, 396n, 408n,

I 474-80; Bardossy visits, m 5-6; plans 428n, 431n, 432n attack on U.S.S.R., 0 17-18; assigns H. Horthy, Miklés, Regent of Hungary: I 52role, m 17-18, 23-4, 31; policy towards 60; leader of Szeged Army, I 23, 33; satellite states, 1 57; assumes command elected Regent, 1 25; resists return of of German Army, 0 65; Kallay visits, King, 1 42; Supreme War Lord, 1 49; u 95-6; promises to mediate between H. exercise of constitutional powers, I 51-2; and Roumania, 1 96; Volksdeutsche friendship with G6mbd6s, 1 56, 57, 73; recruiting question, 0 96-7, 151; on f. becomes dissatisfied with Bethlen, 1 94; Horthy’s death, m I1llln; changing asks G. Karolyi to form government, I 94; attitude to Jewish question, m 116-7, 150; influences ministerial appointments, I 94-

complains of H. war effort, m 137-8; 95, 103, 125; appoints Gémbés Minister Horthy visits at Klessheim, mu 149-52; President, 1 103; limits his powers, I 103; refuses to withdraw H. army of occupa- discourages G6Omb6s’ army reforms, I tion, 0 219-20; dissatisfied with H., m 222- 120; loses confidence in G6émbGs, 1 125,

224; decides to occupy, mM 225; plans 135, 173; accepts Gdmbés’ resignation—

occupation, 0 226-30; interview with reappoints him, 1 127, 129; authorises .

Horthy, m 233-41; appoints Veesenmayer dissolution of Parliament and holding of Minister ist class and Plenipotentiary of new elections, I 126; meeting with Hitler Reich in H., 0 257; Sztdjay visits, m1 288, (August 1935), 1 150; advises Hitler to 301; VGr6és visits, 1 343-5; plans capture make friendship with Britain, 1 150; of Horthy, m 359-60; supports Veesen- attitude to H.-German friendship, I 153;

mayer’s policy, m 369, 402; demands Szalasi’s plans for, 1 165-6; dismisses Horthy’s abdication and withdrawal of Goémbés, 1 173-4; rejects Szalasi’s Proclamation, 0 438; Szalasi visits, m 461 suggested putsch, 1 175, 185; appoints ref. 1 110n, 111, 152, 161, 217, 256, 354, Daranyi Minister President, 1 176; 364, 365, 374, 397, 398, 463, 471: m 19, hostility to Szdlasi, 1 188; powers ex21, 66, 94, 147, 173, 260, 261, 264, 316, tended, 1 189-90; on Austrian indepen-

390, 425 dence, 1 195; visit to Italy, 1 195; visit to

Hlatky, Endre, H. Secretary of State, 1 286n, Poland, 1 209; rejects Sods’ memorandum

430, 432n, 489n: uo 327, 381n, 392, 396, 1 214; refuses to meet Szalasi, 1 214;

403, 404, 405, 424 speech after Anschluss, 1 219-20; appoints

inf. o 381n, 436n Imrédy Minister President, 1 220; Kiel

Hoarding, o 36, 51, 114, 168, 189, 338 visit, I 238-48; disagreements with Hitler, Hoare, Sir Reginald, British Minister in 1 242, 245; increased popularity of, 1 247;

Bucharest, 1 340 visits G6ring, I 261n; and negotiations

Hodza, Milan, Czechoslovak politician, on Ruthene question, 1 296; ceremonial 1195, 195n, 198, 199, 200, 264n, 280 entry into Kassa, 1 305; dissatisfaction Federation in Central Europe, cit.1 198n, with Imrédy, 1 306; refuses to accept

199n Imrédy’s resignation, I 315-6; consents to

Hold, definition of, 1 7n H.’s withdrawal from League of Nations, Homan, B., H. Minister of Cults and 1 319; grievances against Imrédy, 1 328;

Education, 1 102, 103, 185n, 221, 326, 330, appoints Teleki Minister President, 1 328;

484: nm 27, 101, 140, 209, 250n, 386n authorises Teleki to hold elections, 1 329;

ref. 176n correspondence with Hitler on Ruthene

494 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH question, I 336, 337; and German-Polish 338: but insists on giving Germany dispute, 1 347, 356, 360; dislike of Ger- notice, 11 338; letter to Hitler, m 339; many and hopes of Western Allies, 1 364-6; consults Privy Councillors, m 340-1, 342; rejects request by Germany for transit of defers to Government’s objection, m 343; troops against Poland, 1 367; plans for his decision to send mission to U.S.S.R., reception in England, 1 377, 400, 468-9: m 349ff; and to Italy, m 350-1; instructs m3; refuses to accept Teleki’s resignation, mission to Moscow, 0 353; organises 1401 ; ceremonial entryin receded territory home defence forces, m0 363; authorises in Transylvania, 1 429; supports Teleki contact with Resistance leaders, m1 364-6; and Keresztes-Fischer against Right Wing negotiations with U.S.S.R., wu 373ff; pressure, I 432-3; and attack on Yugo- accepts preliminary armistice conditions, Slavia, 1 474=7, 481, 482, 484, 486: n 4-5, 11 379; his interpretation of agreement,

9, 10; and Teleki, 1 487, 488, 488n; a 380; composes final surrender pro-

Teleki’s letter to, 1489; appoints Bardossy gramme, 0 381-4; interview with ResisMinister President, 1 490; interview with tance leaders, m0 383; advances date of O’Malley, m 3; visit to Hitler, m 13; and Proclamation, mo 391; last preparations, declaration of war on U.S.S.R., 0 21, 24, It 391-3, 395-6; presides over final Crown 25-6, 27, 29, 30, 31; refuses to modify Council, m 401-2; interview with VGrds, internal policy, m 36-7; visit to Hitler, um 405; interview with Rahn, nm 406-7; O 55; requests withdrawal of H. troops, and H.-German negotiations, 1 424, 428,

tm 55; decides to replace Werth by 430-1; rejects German proposals, 0 431; Szombathelyi, m 54; and declaration of is talked over, m1 434; taken into custody

war on U.S.A., 0 62, 64n; Ribbentrop by Germans, 434; fruitless interviews visits, 1 67; and the Ujvidék massacres, with Szalasi, 0 436-7; revokes Proclamawm 70, 74; illness and recovery, 1 74; and tion, U1 438; abdicates, 1 438; appoints the question of a Deputy Regency, m 74-7; Szalasi Minister President, m 440; taken

dissatisfaction with Bardossy, n 80-2; to Bavaria, 0 441; imprisonment and appoints Kallay Minister President, m 82, release, 1 441. See also Regency 85-6; his conditions, 1 87-8; and death ref. 1 60, 136, 166n, 174n, 180, 183, 189, of Istvan Horthy, m 110-2, 124; rejects 190, 203, 227, 233, 249, 261n, 273, 274, dynastic proposals u, 111-2; further 275, 314n, 315, 318, 320, 321, 334n, 352, increased popularity, m 113, 124; and 360, 361, 363, 374, 374n, 376, 379, 394,

secret negotiations with West, u 123; 397, 435, 441n, 448n, 452n, 458, 463n: supports refusal to occupy Balkans, 1 6, 6n, 7, 14, 23, 24, 43, 70n, 79, 88n, 89, 138; visit to Hitler in April 1943, nm 149- 93, 93n, 94, 102, 106, 116, 120, 123, 126n,

52; adjourns Parliament, uo 153; and 127, 133, 144, 148n, 149, 156, 156n, 167n, surrender of Italy, m 170, 183; Hitler 182n, 192, 196, 197n, 200, 202, 202n, 203, presents yacht to, mn 194; requests with- 218, 223n, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, drawal of troops, m 219-20; von Papen 243, 244n, 265, 268, 270, 289, 290, 310, visits, 1 225; visit to Klessheim, m 232- 311, 320, 345, 349n, 356, 361, 368, 374, 241; agreement with Hitler, 1 237-9; and 375n, 376, 386, 397n, 398, 413, 414, 422n, formation of Sztojay Government, 1 246, 423, 424, 425, 426, 429, 430, 442, 444, 458 247, 249-52: and army question, i 253-4: Ein Leben fiir Ungarn, cit.1 150n, 195n,

initial passivity under German occupa- 209n, 240n, 361n: u 21n, 26n, 55n, 111n, tion, 0 264, 266, 267; on Jewish labour 219n, 224n, 225n, 234n, 235n, 239n, 240n, service, 0 280; and the Jewish deporta- 250n, 268n, 320n, 354n, 391n, 392n, 405n, tions, 0 281, 282, 283, 284, 285; interview 407n, 437n with Szalasi, m1 291-2; stops deportations, inf. 1 150n, 173n, 241n, 242n, 245n,

302, 304, 305, 306, 309, 318; demands 261n, 274n, 367n, 421n, 475n: o 13n, dismissal of Baky and Endre, m 303, 309; 194n, 233n, 234n, 235n, 249n, 320n, 339n,

decides to appoint Lakatos, u 306-7; 342n, 351n, 366n, 396, 424n accepts Hitler’s veto, m1 308; renewed Horthy, Miklos, Jnr.: and Deputy Regency contact with West, tu 314-5; first prepara- question, m 111; in charge of undertions for surrender, 1 317; and surrender ground office, 1 203; contact with Howie, of Roumania, u 319ff; reopens communi- W 217, 314-5; contact with H. undercations with West, 0 321, 334; formation ground, 11 333, 349, 365-6; contact with of Lakatos Government, II 323-7; second Tito, m 355, 360, 399-401; kidnapped,

interview with Szalasi, m 330-1; Ht 391n, 399-401; negotiations for return

approached by Popular Front, 1 333-4; of, m 425, 426, 438, 441

Guderian’s interview with, nu 335; ref. 1 484n

decides to sue for armistice, m 337-8; inf. m 351n regards himself as entitled to do so, 1m Horvath, G., inf. 1 212n, 330n: 0 249n

INDEX 495 Horvath, F., Military Commandant of Hungarist Movement. See Arrow Cross,

Szekel District, 1 218n Szalasi

Horvath, Lt.-Col., H. staff officer, 1 420 Huss, Professor Richard, 1 171 Horvath, Z., H. Left-wing leader, 11 429 Huszar, A., H. Deputy, 11 79n Hory, A., H. Minister in Warsaw, 1 208, 293, Huszdr, Barati Aladar, mu 104

295n, 301, 323n, 416, 417 Huszar, K., H. Minister President, 1 23, 24,

Hory, L., H. diplomatist, 11 265 25

inf, uw 355n Huszovszky, L., H. Deputy, 1 386n

Hossbach Conference, 1 202

Hottl, Dr. Willy, German Volksdeutsche Igmandy-Hegyessy, G., H. General, 1 272n Mittelstelle official, 1 217, 227: m1 223n, Ignotus, P., H. journalist, 1 188n 225, 226, 256, 260, 290, 294, 295, 361, Illes, B., H. novelist, 11 373n

386, 400n Illes, G., H. diarist, 1 373, 374n

Hagen, Die Geheime Front, cit. i 4n, Illes, Professor M. J., 1 338: 11 445n 7n, 223n, 225n, 226n, 255n, 256n, 355n, _—‘lyés, G., H. writer, 1 79n, 129

360n, 399n Imports, 1 64, 65, 89, 118, 141, 145, 192, inf. 1 399n 374, 374n: m1 58n, 118n, 181, 296-7n. See

Howie, Colonel C. T., 1 217, 218, 256, 264, also Exports, Trade

314, 315, 321, 334, 351, 352 Imrédist Party (Party of Hungarian Re-

op cit. 1 321n, 35in newal, Magyar Megujulas Partja,

Hrabar, M., Governor of Ruthenia, 1 264n MMP): founded, I 436; policy, 1 436-7;

Hubay, Kalman: Arrow Cross journalist, inactivity in 1940, 1 457; fusion with I 181n, 229; elected to Parliament, 1 218; Arrow Cross suggested, 1 43-4, and with Arrow Cross Party leadership, 1 218, 226, Hungarian National Socialist Party, m1 45; 331, 350, 381, 434; refuses to co-operate representation in 1942 Parliament, It 78;

with Imrédy, 1 394; Nationalities Bull, increase in, 11 102; oppose Kallay, 1 1401, 427; loses mandate, 1 437; imprison- 155-6, 199; join MEP, 1 181; programme,

ment, I 455; expelled from Arrow Cross, wt 208-9; and occupation of Hungary, 1 11 78; joins Palffy-Baky Group, 1 102 250-2 269, 271; Cabinet posts in Sztdjay

ref. 1 219n, 433, 455n: m1 195 Government, 1 251, 294; disagreement

Hubay, Sandor, H. Ministry of Supply with National Socialists, 1 289, 292, 311-2;

official, 1 115n Right-wing Unity question, m 292, 310;

Huber, Domherr Johannes, Volksdeutsch independent programme, 11 293; number

leader, 1 170 of deputies in July 1944, 1 306n; defeat

Hubert, German General, 11 246n of, u 312; agree to non-political govern-

Hungarian Associationof National Defence. ment, 326; dissolution of parties and,

See MOVE mt 329; accept National Alliance, m 368

Hungarian Communist Party, 1 349, 455 ref. 1 81, 104, 200, 359

Hungarian Economic Resistance against Imrédy, Béla: 1 106-7; Minister of Finance,

German Penetration, 1 373n: i 53 1 103, 124, 214; President of National Hungarian Front, uw 456-7. See also Bank, 1 124, 214; concludes London

Popular Front Agreements, 1 192; rearmament policy, 1

Hungarian Independence Movement. See 214-6; Minister of Economic Coordina-

MEM tion, I 216; Minister President, 1 220-1;

Hungarian National Independence Party, changes Cabinet, 1221; programme, I 226,

1 72, 73, 75, 155 230; social legislation, 1 226, 234; 1m-

Hungarian National Radical Party, 1 92, prisons Szalasi, 1 226-7; efforts to stimu-

155 late trade with Britain, 1 231; takes over

Hungarian National Socialist Agricultural Ministry of Commerce, 1 231; Little Labourers’ and Workers’ Party, 1 157-8, Entente relations, 1 232, 235; visit to

350 Rome, 1 234-5; Mussolini and, 1 234; the

Hungarian National Socialist Party. See Kaposvar programme, I 234, 248, 249, National Socialist Party (Hungarian) 306, 324; visit to Germany, I 238-49; Hungarian National Socialist People’s Hitler and, 1 243, 247, 247n; on Czecho-

Party, 1 158 slovak question, I 242-3, 244, 248, 249-50, iety. See EKSz porary popularity of, 1 247; Daily Tele-

Hungarian Scientific Race-protecting Soc- 262-3, 264, 273-4, 276, 288, 291; tem-

Hungarian Social Circle, 1 113 graph and, 1 248; visit to Berchtesgaden, Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. See 1261-3; Slovak policy, 1 262-3, 264, 273-

MSzMP 274, 284n, 295-302; orders mobilisation 433, 434 requests aircraft from Italy, 1 270, 281;

Hungarist Idea, 1 161-3, 175, 227, 228, 229, against Czechoslovakia, 1 270, 281, 288;

496 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH breaks off Czechoslovak-H. negotiations, Eckhardt and,1 102, 121, 123; composition

1 287; accepts Hitler’s mediation in of 1 122; policy, 1 122, 124, 131-2; agreeCzechoslovak-H. dispute, 1 291; calls off ment with Gombdos, 1 122, 124; joins Four Power Conference, 1 291-2; con- Bethlen in opposition, 1 131; suggested version to pro-German policy, 1 304, coalition, 1 175; oppose wide suffrage, 1 304n; difficulties with colleagues, 1 305-6; 191; secessions from, I 217; opposition Horthy’s dislike of, 1 306; growth of to Imrédy, 1 315; in Teleki period, 1 379; opposition to, 1 306-7; founds 1938 Club, inactivity in 1941, un 79; strength of party 1 307; announces new programme, I 307- in 1942, mn 78; Popular Front policy, 308; friendship with Jaross, 1 308-9; re- mn 106, 115-6, 128-9, 332, 364-5; resigns and is reappointed, 1 309; remodels organisation in 1943, nm 157-8; appeal to Cabinet, 1 309; and reform of the Consti- intellectuals and bourgeoisie, m1 159, 181, tution, 1 310; Parliamentary defeat and 207; relations with Social Democrats, resignation, I 314-6; reappointed, 1 316; m 159, 180-1, 207-8; surrender policy, announces closer co-operation with Axis, mt 169, 182; support Legitimism, u 197-8;

I 318-9; and Anti-Comintern Pact, support Bethlen Front, 0 198-9; arrest of 1 319; introduces compulsory military leaders, m1 255; party dissolved, uo 271; service Bill, 1 324-5; Land Reform Bill, action in 1944, m 455-7, 459; representa1 325; Movement of Hungarian Life, tion in Debrecen Government, m1 464 1 326-7; Jewish ancestry alleged, 1 327; ref. 1 46n, 100, 133, 182, 183, 314, 378. resigns, 1 328; political passivity of in See Popular Front, Resistance 1939, 1 381; pleas for closer H.-German Industrial Conditions: in Historic H., 1 10, co-operation, 1 394, 401; and Roumanian 12; in Reconstruction Era, 1 68-9; in crisis, 1 427; meeting with Szalasi, 1 434, world economic crisis, I 89, 98; in 437; founds Party of Hungarian Renewal, 1939-40, 1 378 1 436; supports Tripartite Pact, 1 445; Industrial Legislation, 1 133, 191 attacks H.-Yugoslav Treaty, 1 454; Industrial Production: 1929-30, 1 89; 1929Yugoslav policy, 0 6-7; opposes Bardossy 1932, 1 98, 99n; 1933-4, 1 118; 1936, uw 14; in touch with Archduke Albrecht, I 141-2; 1937, 1 192; 1942, m 108-9 ir 43; relations with Hungarian National Industrial Workers: number of, 1 8, 29, 64,

Socialist Party, 45; opposes Deputy 67, 68, 89, 98, 142n, 192; political re-

Regency Bill, u 77; leads opposition to presentation of, 1 12, 68

Kallay, m 102-3, 130, 199; urges increased Industry, Ministry of, created, 1 129 war effort after Voronezh, 137; German Industry and Industrialisation: in Historic support of, m 148n, 149, 154-5, 156; H.,17, 8, 10; in Reconstruction Era, 1 20,

meeting with Veesenmayer, u 195-6; 26, 63-4, 67, 68

refuses office under Szt6éjay Government, Inflation, 1 64

11 249; appeals for Right-wing Unity, Ingram, Peter, Head of Southern Departtm 292; Minister of Economic Coordina- ment of British Foreign Office, 1 252, 253,

tion, 0 294; concludes agreement with 256

Germans, If 297; attitude to Jewish de- Inskip, Sir Thomas, British Minister of portations, u 302; disclaims subversive Defence, 1 281 intentions, 0 305; ancestry question re- Inter-Allied Control Commission, 1 5, 87 vived, m 294, 295, 311-2; resigns and Irredentist Association, 1 29 withdraws resignation, 0 308; resignation, Irredentist Camp, I 187 tt 312; retires to West Hungary, m 329 Isabella, Archduchess, 1 456

ref. 1 48, 456: m 22, 44, 183, 225 Italy: area and population acquired from

Imrédy, Kalman, 1 327 H., 1 4; refugees from, 1 27n; signs ReImrédy, Mme, 1 107, 305-6 construction Protocol (1924), 1 63;

Incompatibility, Parliamentary: defined, Danubian policy 1920-30, 1 84-7; in 1 100; extension to Upper House pro- world economic crisis, I 97; rapprocheposed, 1 100, 101; proposal dropped, 1 117 ment with Austria and formation of

ref. 1 401: m 305 Rome Triangle, 1 136-8, 144-6; negotia1 488, 490: 0 45n, 392 ment with Germany and formation of

Incze, Péter, Minister President’s Secretary, tions with France, 1 146-8; rapproche-

Independence Front. See Popular Front Axis, 1 150-1, 193; overtures to YugoIndependence Movement in Historic H., slavia and Roumania, I 193-4, 196, 197;

1 10-11 retreat from Danube, 1 195-6; adheres to

Independent Bourgeois Party, 1 158n, 181 Anti-Comintern Pact, 1 202; and CzechoIndependent Smallholders Party: founda- slovak crisis, 1 253, 256-74; policy totion of, 1 66n, 90; in elections, 1 92, 128, wards H.-Czechoslovak dispute, 1 268, 350, 350n; increasing strength of, 1 99; 273, 274, 281, 289, 291, 297, 299, 301, 302;

INDEX 497 and Ruthenia, 1 312-3, 333; agreement Magyar Party, 1 236, 308; appointed with Germany and Yugoslavia, 1 344-5, Minister for the Felvidék, 1 308, 309; co346, 368; signs Pact of Steel, 1 357; and founder of Movement of Hungarian Life,

outbreak of European war, 1 360-1; 1 326-7; negotiates fusion with MEP, 1 forced inactivity in autumn 1939, 1 368; 382; secedes from MEP and _ joins supports German policy in South-East Imrédists, 1 436; on H. attack on YugoEurope, I 388; enters war, 1 401; and slavia, mm 7; union with Hungarian partition of Transylvania, 1 406, 408, 412, National Socialist Party, 11 45n; opposes 414-8, 419-24; and Tripartite Pact, 1 439; Deputy Regency Bill, 77; Vice-President

attack on Greece, 1 442, 447, 450; of Christian National League, um 140;

negotiations with Yugoslavia, 1 448-450; German support of, m 154, 249n; attacks invited to join in attack on Yugoslavia, Kallay’s domestic policy, m 155; attacks 1 474; recognises independent Croatia, Kallay’s foreign policy, 1 199; Minister u 7; declares war on U.S.S.R., m 25, 28; of Interior in Sztéjay Government, 1 251, fall of Mussolini, m 169; further resis- 264, 269, 282, 293, 302, 308, 312; place tance to Allies, 1 171; surrender, 1 182, in Szdlasi Government, 11 362; officer of 183; proclaimed Republic, 1 194. See the National Alliance, 1 386n, 387 also Mussolini, Ciano, Croat Peasant Jaszi, O., H. sociologist, 1 161

Party, and Usta8i Jehli¢éka, Father, Slovak politician, 1 278

Italo-Hungarian Relations: Jews: alleged association with Marxism, 1 12, Political: 1920-30, 1 84-8; Treaty of 28: numbers, in Historic H., 1 18; in Friendship 1922, 1 85; secret convention, Trianon H., 1 19; in Felvidék, 1 308n; in 186: 1934-8, 1 115-6, 136, 144-5, 146, 194, Transylvania, 1 423; occupational distri-

195-6, 205, 233, 234-5; Rome Protocols, bution of, 1 19-20, 219n, 325; under 1 144, 149; during Czechoslovak crisis, Bethlen, 1 72, 73, 78-9, 124; accommoda-

1 256, 263, 270, 271, 273-4; during H.- tion with G6mboés, 1 117; numbers

Czechoslovak negotiations, 1 276, 281, evacuated from Poland, 1 369n. See also 283, 287, 288-9, 291, 292-3, 297-303; Jewish question urges H. to join Axis,1317-8; on Ruthene Jewish question: Attitudes to, Szeged question, I 333-5; visit of Teleki and officers, 1 17, 28, 212, 215; refugees of Csaky to Rome, 1 346-7; Csaky in Rome, 1918,128; EKSz, 132; Gdmbés, 1 34, 117; August 1939, 1 360; question of H.- Bethlen, 1 38, 39, 72, 78-9; Horthy, 1 57, Italian Union, 1 361, 393: 1 112-4; winter 173, 328: H. youth, 1 78-9, 134; Magyar1939-40 1 370, 388, 389; Teleki in Rome, ised Swabians, 1 79; Eckhardt, 1121, 122n; 1 393; L. Baranyai in Rome, 1 367-9; and Right Radicals, 1 124, 127, 152, 157, 213, partition of Transylvania, 1 406, 408, 412, 217; Szalasi, 1165; Imrédy, 1 214-5, 305-6,

414-5, 419-24; and H.’s signature of 310, 324-5; Daranyi, 1 215, 218-9; Jaross, Tripartite Pact, 1 441; in Yugoslav crisis, 1 308; Teleki, 1 329; Bardossy, 1 467: 1 14;

1 476, 478; Bardossy’s visit to, m 15-16; Kallay, m 89, 91, 98-107, 126, 131; and H.’s declaration of war on U.S.S.R., Lakatos, 11 327; H. people, 1t 36-8, 209,

i 25; autumn 1941, nm 58, 58n; and 262-3, 275; H. churches, 1 283

declaration of war on U.S.A., I 63; Legislation relating to: Numerus Kallay and, nm 91, 94, 112, 147-8, 154, Clausus Act, 172, 218, 219n; First Jewish

154n, 194 Law, I 218-9, 351-2; Second Jewish Law,

Commercial: 1930, 1 90; 1931-2, 1 97; 1 324-5, 330, 351-2; Third Jewish Law, 1933, 1 137; 1934, 1 144-5; 1936, 1 196; 1 436, 458, 1 14, 15, 37; Law on Status trading: 1932-4, 1 145n; 1940-2, m 58n of Israelite Confession, 11 37; minor Ivady, B., H. Minister of Agriculture, 1 95, enactments, 1941, um 37; 1942, m 91, 98-

180| tions, 3 101; under Sztdjay, 275, 277-9; m 309; undermLakatos, mualtera348;

Jagow, H. von, German Minister in Buda- Szalasi Government enactments, nm 449, pest, 1155, 76n, 149n, 154, 228, 229, 232, 449-451; repeal of all anti-semitic legisla-

241, 246 tion by Debrecen Government, 1 464 1 447 1 432; service in Labour Battalions, Il 68,

Jakab, M., Secretary of Council of Regency, ‘Settlement’? of: German demands for,

Jany, General, u 119, 134, 135, 153 114; further German demands for action

Japan: and Anti-Comintern Pact, I 318, 332; against, m 116-7, 126, 131, 132, 139, 308; and Tripartite Pact, 1 439, 441; attack on Kallay resists, 1 117, 126, 131; ameliora-

Pearl Harbour, m 61-2; presses H. to tion of conditions, 1 130n, 139; during declare war on U.S.A., 1 63, alleged German occupation: 11 226, 228, 238-40,

secret negotiations, 1 344n 260, 261-2; deportations (1941) m 37-8;

Jaross, A.: I 308; Secretary of United (1944) 1 239, 255, 256-7; Horthy-Hitler 21

498 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH agreement, 238-9; Kastner-Brand nego- Treaty with Austria, 1 137; conversation tiations, 0 274-5, 287, 301; segregation, with Ribbentrop, 1 65-6, 67n; appointed it 279-80; further deportations, m 280-7, Minister President, 1 86; policy, m1 86-8,

301-3, 308-9, 318; S.S.-Labor Trust 90-1, 125-6, 131-3; treatment of Jewish negotiations, 1 287-9, 294, 309n; diplo- question, u 89, 91, 99-101; launches matic representations on deportations, propaganda campaign, I 92-3, 116, 125m1 301-4; Horthy prevents further deporta- 126; retains Foreign Ministry, 0 93, visit tions, 0 301-9; H.-German agreement of to Hitler, m 95-6; domestic policy, m 98-9; Aug. 1944, 1 321, 327-8; further deporta- relations with Right Radicals, m 102-4,

tions, m1 449-51 131, 200; relations with Left Wing, nm 104-

Jocsik, A., German Economic Penetration in 105, 113, 140, 201, 209; minority policy, the Danube Valley, cit. 11 119n; Hungarian fl 107-8: resists German demands on

Economic Resistance, cit. % 119n Jewish question, m 116-7, 126, 131, 132, Jodl, Alfred, German General, 1 244n, 246: 139, 148, 150; resists German economic

m 360 and political demands, m 117-8, 126, 139,

Joint Aircraft Production Programmes, 149; contacts with the West, m 120-3,

I 462: m1 118, 119-20, 166-7, 296-8, 300n 126-8, 132-3, 140-6, 159-61, 190-93; in-

Jolsvay, H. General, m 419 dependence policy, m 125-6, 140-8;

Joo, T., H. historian, mm 79n conversation with Szalasi, 1 131; negotiaJordana, Count, Spanish Foreign Minister, tions on Serbian occupation force, u

wu 145 138-9, 149-50, 174-5, 183-4; relations

Jozsef, Archduke, 11 368, 401, 423, 447 with Roumania, 1 146-7, 178-9; visit to Jozsef Ferencz, Archduke, 1 72n: 1 447, 453 Rome (1943), mu 147-8; German disJurcsek, Béla: Cs group deputy, 1 130n, 394: satisfaction with, 1 150, 154, 194; Horthy

m 73; Deputy Secretary of State for refuses to dismiss, m 150; adjourns

Supply, m 114, 115, 168 (Jurcsek Plan), Parliament, tm 155-6; announces in184, 194, 249n; Minister of Supply in dependent policy, am 156-7; further

Sztojay Government, 1 251, 296, 307, negotiations with West, 1 162, 170-3, 175312, 313, 322; Minister of Supply and 176, 183-4, 209-10; Yugoslav relations, uo Agriculture in Lakatos Government, 324, 172, 180, 196-7; restricts German use of 325n, 338, 343, 359, 362, 370, 387, 392, railways, 1 172, 184; negotiates with395, 401, 402, 408, 409; Minister of drawal of army of occupation, nm 173-4, Supply in Szalasi Government, m 411, 468 183-4; modifies revision programme, 0

ref. 1 298 178-9; Slovak relations, 1 179-80; agree-

Jurcsek Plan, m 115, 168 ment with Allies, m 185-6, 188; further

Jurcsek-Moritz Agreement, 1 438 resistance to Germany, 1 187-8, 189:

Jury, H., Gauleiter of Western Austria, refuses to order sabotage, u 190; refuses

mo 229, 369, 450 to recognise Italian Republic, no 194;

Justhy, Colonel, H. army officer, 1 363, 420 Carpathian plan, mu 211-9; agrees to receive U.S. Military Mission, u 216-7; Kabok, L., H. Social Democrat deputy, 0 agrees to receive British transmitter, uo

46, 256, 299, 314, 333 217-8; threatens withdrawal of army of

KABSz (Association of Comrades of the occupation, m 219-20; given vote of Eastern Front), 0 208, 209, 293, 29Sn, 305, confidence by MEP, ut 222; in occupation

310n, 312, 329, 371, 387, 430, 443, 448 negotiations, m 230; Germans demand

Kadar, Colonel, Head of Intelligence dismissal, m 238, 241; action during Section of H. Army, vu 162, 175, 217, invasion, 11 242-5; resignation, 1 247;

230n, 255, 270 escape, 11 256

Kahr, Dr. von, Bavarian politician, 1 35n ref. 152: 1 267n, 271 Kalinin, M. I., President of the Central Hungarian Premier, cit. 1 125n: w 26n, Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., 69n, 71n, 80n, 81n, 85n, 91n, 94n, 95n,

1 369 l1in, 112n, 113n, 115n, 122n, 125n, 126n,

Kallai, G.,1156: 1 46n, 48, 79, 106, 314, 332, 131n, 138n, 142n, 144n, 145n, 147n, 148n,

333n, 456, 457 149n, 151n, 157n, 169n, 170n, 171n, 175n,

A Magyar Fiiggetlenségi Mozgalom, 176n, 182n, 185n, 186n, 188n, 190n, 194n, cit. 1 156n, 370n: m 47n, 48n, 49n, 79n, 196n, 205n, 209n, 211n, 218n, 224n, 229n, 106n, 129n, 158, 198n, 208n, 333n, 374n, 230n, 231n, 234n, 27]

444n, 455n, 456n, 457n inf.197n, 106n, 137n, 145n, 206n, 335n, Kallay, Kristof, m 244 393n: 11 14n, 76n, 81n, 85n, 87n,94n, 101n, Kallay, Miklos: If 82-5; Minister of Agri- 106n, 108n, 112n, 114n, 116n, 141n, 144n, culture, 1 103, 124-5; leaves Government 148n, 171n, 173n, 179n, 190n, 192n, 211n,

Party, 1 128; negotiates commercial 220n, 222n, 238n, 267n

INDEX 499 Kallay, Tibor, H. Minister of Finance,1 74 Kaszakereszt, 1 157n Kaltenbrunner, Dr. E., German S:S. leader, Katchbull-Hugesson, Sir Hugh, British

Il 226, 227n, 228, 241, 246, 248, 249, diplomatist, 1 185

257, 260, 318, 369 Katona, Janos, H. publicist, 1 79n

Kamninsky, J., Ruthene politician, 1 338n Katona, Jen6é, H. publicist, m 79n

Kanya, Kalman: I 107-10; H. Foreign Keitel, Wilhelm, German General, 1 233, Minister, 1 107, 306; revision policy, 1 145, 335n, 363, 461n, 462: 11 5, 6, 66, 67, 150n,

146-7; visits Hitler, 1 148-9: Yugoslav 174n, 184, 218, 219, 234, 236, 253, 344,

relations, 1 151; visits Berlin, 201-4; 461

intervention in Austro-German dispute, Kelemen, B., Féispan of Szeged, 1 23 I 194-5; Czechoslovak negotiations, 1 Kelemen, K., H. lawyer, I 22In 195, 196-7, 200, 203-4, 206, 208, 210, 231, Kelemen, Mer., Arch-Abbot of Panno234, 235, 236, 237, 241, 244, 246, 249-50, halma, 1 488 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 265n, 267, 270, Kellogg Pact, 1 199, 232, 234 271-2, 272n, 276-7, 277, 278, 281n, 284-7, _Kemény, Baron G., H. Arrow Cross leader, 288, 295-302; Little Entente policy, 1 196- 1 330, 332, 356, 357, 358, 361, 370, 412, 197, 200, 203-5, 232-3, 249, 295-302; and 436, 437, 439, 449, 461, 468

rearmament question, 1 199, 200, 211, Kémeri-Nagy, M., H. Arrow Cross poli232, 236; minorities policy, 1 199, 208, tician, 1 188n 232, 249-50, 255, 257, 270-2, 278; refuses | Kenesséy, Pongracz, H. FOéispan, mu 365

to join Anti-Cominttrn Pact, 1 205; Kennard, Sir Howard, British Minister in recognises Franco’s Government, 1 205; Warsaw, I 251 bargains for better treatment for Magyar _ Keppler, W., German agent, 1 206n, 335n minority in Transylvania, 1 205; negotia- | Kerekes, B., H. Arrow Cross Deputy, 0 77n

tions with Poland, 1 208-9, 249, 250, 276, | Keresztes-Fischer, Ferencz: I 104-5: 277, 288, 295-6; Slovak negotiations, Minister of the Interior, 1 49, 55n, 95, 103, I 231, 232, 236, 249-50, 253, 271-2, 277, 105, 125, 127, 128, 182n, 221, 225, 314, 278, 283-5, 293, 295-302; Ruthene nego- 315, 319, 328, 351, 364, 379, 389, 401: tiations, 1 271-2, 277, 278, 283-4, 286, 310: nt 80, 172; ONCSA Bill, 1378; resignation

visits Rome, 1 234; refuses to leave refused, 1 432-3; Teleki and, 1 468n; on League of Nations, I 234; visits Germany war with Russia, m 22, 27; alleviates (Kiel), 1238-48; offends Ribbentrop, 1241; Jewish suffering, m 37, 38, 130, 131; on visit to Berchtesgaden, 1 261; Komdrom war with U.S.A., 1 62; Kallay and, nm 85; discussions, 1 284-7; dismissal, 1 315, 316; Popular Front policy, 1 79; Bill extending

negotiations on Regency succession, I powers of central authority, m 124; 112, 113-4; on occupation question, 1 action during invasion, u 242-7; arrest, 244; surrender policy, m0 316, 341 u 254, 270

ref. 1 32, 150n ref. 1 28, 81, 105n, 138, 159, 163, 170,

inf. 1 150n, 206n 183, 186, 271

Kapitanffy, Captain, H. staff officer, 1 413, | Keresztes-Fischer, Lajos: head of Horthy’s

414, 416, 417, 446n Military Cabinet, 1 125, 174; interview

inf. m 417n, 442n, 446n with Szalasi, 1 175, 186, 186n; Chief of

Karolyi, Count Gyula: 1 95; leads Counter- General Staff, 1 221, 274, 309; staff talks Revolutionary Government, I 23, 33; with Germany, 1 238, 245, 246-7, 248, 261:

appointed Foreign Miinister, I 94; on Hungarian defence forces, 1 265: appointed Minister President, 1 95; 230; arrest, 11 254

economic policy, I 96-8; Compatibility Keri, Colonel, H. staff officer, 1 217, 419,

Bill, 1 101; resignation, 1 102-3, 103n 445

ref. 1 36, 48, 221: m 75n, 76n, 244,341 Kertész, I., 1 94n, 103n, 106n

Karolyi, Count Gyula, Jnr., 0 111 Diplomacy in a Whirlpool, cit. 1 421n:

K4rolyi, Count Mihaly: Minister President, i 60n, 189n I 21-2, 25, 26, 29, 30, 69; activities in Kéthly, Mme Anna, H. Social Democrat exile, 1 161: 11 121, 127, 206, 208, 266 leader, 1 98n: 1 106, 129, 133, 171, 201,

Karpathy, H. General, 1 125 255

Karpati, A., H. writer, 1 79n Kettoskereszt-Sz6vetség (Society of the Karvas, I., Slovak politician, 1 280 Double Cross), 1 32, 75, 119

Kassa (Kosiée): 1 291, 291n, 295, 296, 301, Khuen-Hédervary, A., H. Minister in Paris, 302, 305; the bombing of, 11 25, 27, 28-9, 1 244n, 260, 260n, 266, 335n, 375n, 391

31-2 Kienast, H., Director of Reichstag bureau,

Kassai, F., H. Arrow Cross Deputy, 1 370 i 225, 238n, 260 Kastner, Dr. R., H. Jewish leader, 1 275, KIMSz (Hungarian Federation of Com-

287, 301 , munist Youth Workers), 1 99n

500 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Kinzel, Colonel, German staff officer, 1 477 63, 68, 74n, 94n, 104n, 107n, 223n, 310n,

Kiralyi, Colonel G., Head of H. Security 378n, 400n, 440n

Police, 11 303, 395n, 400n inf. 192n, 228n, 307n, 325n, 327n, 480n inf. 1 227n: uo 304n, 351n, 360n, 395n, Kowalewski, Colonel J., Polish resistance

423n leader, 11 13, 123, 126, 143, 145, 161n, 193

Kiss, I., H. General, o 153 K6zi-Horvath, J.. H. Deputy, m 247

Kiss, Janos, H. General, n 231, 455, 462 Kozma, Miklés: I 105; administration Kiss, K., H. Arrow Cross leader, 1 449n policy,1 49n, 133-4; appointed Minister of

Kis Ujsag, 1 107n, 129 the Interior, 1 127; attacks Swabian KISz (Federation of Communist Youth), candidates, 1 171; dismissal, 1 180; re-

uw 456 organises Ragged Guards, I 238, 34;

Klebelsberg, Count B., H. Minister of Commissioner for Ruthenia, 40; death,

Education, I 26, 77, 93 n 40n

Knox, Sir Geoffrey, British Munister in ref. 1 128, 176, 334n Budapest, 1 251, 252n, 253, 256, 257, 265n, Krenner, M., H. writer, 1 79n

266, 267, 270, 281, 282n, 335n, 339n Kristoffy, J., H. Minister in Moscow, I 369, Kobr, Milos, Czechoslovak Minister in 404, 409, 418: nm 10, 23, 27, 31, 354

Budapest, I 277, 337 Krno, Ivan, Head of the Political Depart-

Kollontay, Polish General, 1 255 ment of the Czechoslovak Foreign

Kolos, L., 1 230 Ministry, 1 280

Kolosvary-Borcsa, M., Government Com- Krnyevic, J., Croat leader, 1 385 missioner of the H. Press, 11 272, 273, 279, | Krofta, Dr. Kamil, Czechoslovak Foreign

322, 327, Minister, 1 239n, 240, 246, 266, 269, 270, Geneva, I 261n Krudy, F., H. Deputy, 1 102

Komarnicki, J., Polish representative at 272, 277, 279

Konek, Admiral, m 255 Krudy, Lt.-Col., H. staff officer, m 28, 31

Koranyi, Baron Frigyes, H. Minister of Krumey, Obersturmbannfiihrer, m 228n, 274

Finance, I 27n, 95n, 101 Krumpholz, Major, German S.S. officer,

Kordt, Erich, Ribbentrop’s Chef de vu 357, 370n

Cabinet, 1 244n; Nicht aus den Akten, cit. Kudar, Colonel, H. Ministry of Interior

1 313n official, 1 187: 0 378, 354, 463

Kornel, B., President of the Supreme Court, Kuhl, L., H. Minister in Bratislava, 0 230

uo 447 Kultsar, I., H. Government Commissioner

Kornfield, Baroness George, 0 287 for Intellectual Unemployment, 11 277

Kornfeld, Baron Moritz, H. industrialist, Kun, Béla, H. Bolshevik leader, 1 22, 23,

1 93n, 380: 1 46, 255, 287, 288 25, 26, 28, 30, 34, 69, 70, 155, 156 Kornhuber, J., German publicist, 1 216: Kunder, A: I 120, 120n; Minister of

u 218n, 242 Commerce, 1 309, 351n, 381: um 196;

Kornis, Professor G., President of H. Lower Minister of Trade and Communications,

House, I 307, 315n nm 251, 276, 293, 308; resignation, 0 312

222, 247 263, 264

Kossuth, L., H. patriot, 1161, 380:1 47,49, Kundt, E.,Czech (German) politician, 1 261, Kossuth Népe, cit.1274n, 275n, 481n:0129n, Kunzel, Sudeten German leader, 1 208

175n, 324n, 365n, 415n, 432n, 442n Kussbach, Dr. Franz, Chairman of UDV,

Kovacs, A., A Zsidésdg Teérfoglalasa 1170, 171

Magyarorszagon, cit. 1 18; A Csonka- Kuthy, Colonel, Head of H. Deuxiéme

° magyarorszagi Zsiddsdg a Sztatisztika Bureau, um 314 Tiikrében, cit. 1 219n Kuznyecov, Russian General, 1m 372, 373, Kovacs, Bela, H. Smallholder Deputy, 1354: 380, 459

nr 129 Kvaternik, S., Head of Croatian Republic,

Kovacs, Imre, H. publicist, 1 184: 1 46, 48, nm 7n, 9 49, 79n, 106, 130, 159, 314, 332, 353n,

365, 366, 456 Labour Party, Hungarian, 1 12, 20

A Néma Forradalom, cit. 1 184; Im Labour Service, Law on Military, 1 306, 324

Schatten der Sowiets, cit. 1 455n Lacroix, V. L. de, French Minister in

Kovacs, S., H. journalist, 1 415n Prague, 1 258

Kovarcs, Emil, H. Arrow Cross leader, 1 Lajos, Dr. Ivan, H. writer, 1 353: u 255 427, 427n, 428, 455: 0 357, 358, 359, 370, Lakatos, G., H. General: Army Comman370n, 376n, 412, 422, 423, 436, 450 der, 11 254, 266, 266n, 269; suggested as Kovér, Gusztav, H. Deputy, 0 142n, 154n Minister President, 11 306, 307, 308, 318, Kovrig, B.,1 479, 7n; A Magvar tarsadalmi 320; Minister President, m 323, 324, 325, Politika és Torvényvhozds, cit. 1 39n, 42n, 326, 330; programme, 11 326; Arrow Cross

INDEX 501 Leaders interview, 1 331-2; negotiations Lazar, A., H. Minister of Justice, 1 103, 129,

with Guderian and question of armistice, 176, 182, 215, 216 Wm 335, 337, 338, 341, 343, 344, 356; League of Nations: admission of H. to, 1 63; addresses Parliament, m 347-8; negotia- Reconstruction Loan for, 1 63-4, 89; tions with Moscow, tt 378, 379, 381, 382, Finance Committee investigates H. 398, 429, 431; negotiations with Veesen- affairs, 1 95-6; and Marseilles murders, mayer, 11 386, 423, 432, 434, 435, 436, 437; 1125, 146; H. delegates to, 1 122, 192, 212;

and the Proclamation, 1 394, 395, 401, H. presents minorities question to, 1 143404, 409; tenders Government’s resigna- 144; pressure on H. to leave, 1 205, 234, tion and is reappointed, 1 402; negoti- 262n; H. leaves, 1 290, 317-8, 320 346,

ations with Rahn and Veesenmayer, 349; Roumania leaves, I 409n

m 407, 408, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429; Lebedev, S., Russian diplomatist, 1 4n negotiations on Szalasi’s appointment, Leber, L., Secretary of UDV, 1 172 Ir 437, 438; negotiations on abdication, Legitimism: in Historic H., 1 10-11; in

1 439, 440, 441 Trianon H., 1 26, 34, 42, 44-5, 124, 129, ref. 1155, 349n, 368, 406, 424, 457, 463n 130, 158, 183, 190, 217, 350n, 380; cit. WU 432n Horthy’s attitude to, 1 56; G6mb6s’s atti-

Laky, D., H. Minister of Supply, 1 459: n tude to, 1 76, 116; Kormend rally, 1 183;

26, 28n, 50n, 255, 271, 348n in 1941, mu 46; revival of, m 112-3, 197-8;

Lammers, H., Head of German Chancellery and Popular Front, m 113, 145-6, 313;

1 270 foundation of Hungarian Social Circle,

Land Distribution: in Historic H., 1 8-10; wm 133; revival of Christian People’s in Trianon H., 1 26, 67, 98; Jewish Party, mo 197; leaders arrested, m 254;

holders, 1 19, 325: 0 37n clubs banned, mt 272

Land Reform: 1848, 1 9; Karolyi’s, 1 22; See also Otto, Charles Kun’s, 1 22n; 1920-1, 1 41, 66-7; promised Lehar, Colonel, H. Legitimist leader, 1 28n

by Right Radicals, 1 101, 122; Land lLennkhe, H., 1 206n Settlement Act of 1935, 1 125, 128, 132; Le Temps, cit. 1 182n, 303

Eckhardt’s demands, 1179; promised by Lévai, J., Horogkereszt, Kaszakereszt, Daranyi, 1179; in Kaposvar Programme, Nyilkereszt, cit. 1 72n; Fekete Kényv 1 306, 308, 310; Act of 1939-40, 1325, 352, (Black Book), cit. 1 37n, 68n, 100n, 114n, 378; German demands for further, 1 431, 257n, 273n, 276n, 279n, 282n, 283n, 286n,

436; draft prepared by Kallay, n 157; 287n, 301n, 303n, 449n, 450n promised by Debrecen Government, Levente: formation of, 1 87: made com-

lt 463 pulsory, 1 324, 383; Swabians allowed Attitudes to: Bethlen, 1 41, 61, 66-7; separate formations, 1 457; Jews excluded Goémbos, 1 34; Horthy, 1 55n, 57: nm 291n, from, mM 15; employed in emergency

383n; G. Karolyi, 195; Teleki, 1 224 tasks, m 108, 298, 347; employed in Lang, T., H. airforce officer, m 304 fighting, u 451n, Langsfeld, M., H. chef de cabinet, n 404, ref. 1 130, 131, 190, 379

405 Ley, R., Director of German Labour Front,

Laszlo, H. Colonel (later General), 1 460, wm 359

481:1.54, 326, 413, 414,415, 416, 442,443 Liberal Party: gains in elections, 1 24, 92, Latorczay, Colonel, H. Gendarmerie officer, 129, 350; French policy, 1 116; support

il 429 Bethlen, 1 124; anti-Nazi policy, 1 152;

Laval, P., Prime Minister of France, 1 146, oppose Imrédy, 1 315; Parliamentary

147 representation in 1942, m 78; Popular

Law I of 1920, 1 25, 36 Front policy, m 181; party dissolved,

Law II of 1939, 1 364 1271. See Rassay

Law III of 1921, 1 48n Lill, J., Arrow Cross deputy, m 44, 45n Law IV of 1939, 11 277 Lipski, Joseph, Polish Ambassador in Law VII of 1942, m1 99n Berlin, 1 253, 261, 263, 289n, 298, 299, Law VIII of 1942, un 37n 335n, 341, 342 Law XIII of 1920, um 30n Listowel, Countess of, Crusader in the Law XV of 1941, u 37n, 277 Secret War, cit. 0 123n, 173n, 179n, 183n Law XIX of 1937, m 447 Little Entente: and Habsburg question,

Law XIX of 1938, 1 190n 1 42; and reconstruction of H., 1 63;

Law XXVII of 1937, 1 190n relations with H. 1920-32, 1 75, 82, 83, 84,

Law XXX of 1937, 1 189n 115, 137, 138; Danubian negotiations in

Lazar, H. General, nm 305, 306n, 314, 319, 1933, 1 143, 146-7, 149; negotiations with 325, 366, 372n, 383, 384, 393, 395, 396, H. 1936-8, 1 151, 153-4, 196, 198-201, 409, 426, 429, 432n, 433, 434, 435, 462 211-2, 216, 231-3, 237-40; legal liquida21*

502 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH

1179 273, 293n ref. 1 30, 193 cit. 1 215n, 276n: u 140, 199, 206

tion of, 1 344, 345; question of revival, Magyarsdg, 1 228, 371, 428: 1 42, 44, 45,

Litvinov, M. M., Russian Foreign Minister, Magyar Szemle, cit. 1 169n: 1 287

I 232, 292n, 319, 322 Mai Nap, u 129

Loans, foreign: 1920-9, 1 63, 65; 1930,1 89; Major, H. General, m 414, 443 position on 1931, 1 91; standstill agree- Majoros, H. Pilot Officer, o 351

ments 1932, 1 96; 1933, 1118; London Makarov, Colonel, Russian army officer,

Agreements, I 192 349, 350, 374, 377, 378

Lohr, German General, I 461n: m 226 Makarov Letters, m1 350, 377, 379

London Agreements, 1 192 Makkai, S., H. Deputy, 1 348n

Lorencz, German General, 1 15in, 219n Malasits, G., H. Deputy, m 140, 255, 299 Lossonezy, G., H. Minister of Supply, m © Malcomes, Baron, 1 206n

101, 114 Malinovsky, Soviet Marshal, 0 378, 380, 385,

Lubiensky, Count, Chef de Cabinet in 397, 428

Polish Foreign Ministry, 1 260, 293, Malletke, H., German agent in Yugoslavia,

295, 296, 301, 323 Oi 7n inf. 1 150n, 208n, 209n, 249n, 253n, Malnasi-Metzler, Z.,H. Arrow Cross leader, 260n, 272n, 282n, 295n 1 228n: 0 103

Ludendorff, Erich von, German General, Manchester Guardian, cit. 1 340n: u 344n

1 35n Mandl, Major, German agent, 11 104

112n, 184, 209 294

Lukacs, B., H. Right Wing deputy, m 91n, Manfred Weiss Works, 1 87: m 262, 288n,

Lukacs, J. A., The Great Powers in Eastern Manoilescu, M., Roumanian Foreign Furope, cit. 1 304n: u 112n, 192n, 193n, Minister, 1 414, 415, 415n, 421, 422, 424

353n Maniu, J., Roumanian politician, 415n,

Lukacsiewisz, Juliusz, Polish Ambassador 422n: 1 179n, 205

in Prague, 1 259 Mannstein, F., German General, m 266

Luther, Hans, German politician, 117,139 © March Front, 1 184

Marecki, Colonel, Polish army officer, MABI, m 272, 298 1 230n Macedonia: promised by Hitler to Bulgaria, Mariassy, Z., H. Minister in Rome, 0 58n,

I 475; Ribbentrop orders cries of help 62, 63, 135n, 142n, 144n

from, 1 487n Marina, G., Ruthene politician, 1 338n 1 355n, 450n Markos, O., H. Minister of Trade, m 325,

Macedonian émigrés: H. contacts with, Markham, R. W., 1 42In Macek, V., Croat leader, 1 85, 86, 146, 151, 343, 409, 441

157, 355, 385, 454, 483, 485: 0 7n Markovic, Cinéar, Yugoslav Prime

Mackenzie, Sir Compton, Dr. Benes, cit. Minister, 1 345, 355, 407, 447, 449, 450,

1 149n 452, 453, 472, 475, 494

Mackensen, H. G. von, German Secretary Marosan, H. Socialist, 1 256n of State for Foreign Affairs,1144n,177n, Marosy, F., H. Charge d’Affaire in London, 182,183, 183n, 210, 234n, 235, 302: 1 154n 125], 252, 253, 273n: 1 23, 264, 324, 388n

McCormick, Anne, American journalist, Marothy, K., H. Deputy, 1 350

I 226, 362 Marschalko, L., Gyula Gombos, cit. 1 73n,

Madarassy-Beck, M., H. financier, m 255 76n, 136n

Magistrati, Count M., Italian Minister in} Marseilles murders, 1 125, 146

Budapest, 1 263 Marschall, M. F., H. Permanent Secretary Magnates, in Historic H.,1 13 216, 221

Magltone, Cardinal, 1m 6In of the Ministry of Agriculture, 1 203n,

Magyarisation: in schools, 1 14, 69-70, 77; | Marshall, General, m 122n in Universities, 1 78; of administration, | Marton, Aron, Bishop of Transylvania, u 277

1 70; of names, 1 76, 168-9, 170-1 Marton, Béla: I 113; Secretary-General of Magyar minorities. See Czechoslovakia, Gombé6s party, 1 113, 118, 119, 130, 133,

Roumania, Yugoslavia 174, 180; establishes Fascist organisa-

Magyar Nemzet, 1 228n, 374, 380, 385, 454: tions, 1 119, 121, 127, 180, 181; compiles

m1 48, 107, 129, 208, 221, 287, 293n black list, 1 134, 180; co-President of cit. 1 451n, 452n, 467n: u 103n, 104n, Government Party, 1 180, 331; alleged

181, 207n, 418n subversive activities, 1 181, 182, 185;

Magvarorsag, 1 374, 416n, 464: 11 31, 273,313 leaves inner Government circles, 1 182;

cit. 1 400, 425, 444n, 457n: n 55n, 56, organises NMK, 1 182; role in Imrédy’s

65, 92, 201 Government, 1 310; Government Com.

INDEX 503 missioner in charge of Labour under Michael, King of Roumania, u 316, 319, 351 Sztdjay, m 272; on MEP committee, Michaelis, A., German journalist, 1 182n,

305; Vice-President of National 433n, 434, 435n: 1 66n, 76n, 81n, 89n,

Alliance, 11 386n 314n, 344n, 370n

inf. 1 103n, 174n Middle classes: in Historic H., 1 13; in

Marty, Janos, H. police officer, 1 196, 196n, Trianon H., 1 27, 77-80

197, 197n, 355, 360n Migration: from Historic H., 1 10; from

Massigli, R., Director of Political Depart- Trianon H., 1 67, 70n; internal, 1 67 ment of French Foreign Ministry, 1260n Mihailovi¢é, General D., Yugoslav leader, Matolcsy, Matyas, H. economist, 1 164, 217, it 145, 147, 180, 265, 355, 355n

229, 394: m1 44n, 73 Mihailovics, Megr., 1 228n 11 128, 160, 164 Mikecz, Dr., Minister of Justice, 1 216, 309 Matyas, F., H. financier, 1 255 Miklos, General Béla: Head of Horthy’s Mauthner family, 11 287 Military Chancellery, m 243; during

Matuska, P., H. Minister in Stockholm, Mihalyfi, E., H. Socialist, 1m 79n

Maxwell-Fyfe, Sir D., 1 240n invasion, It 244, 246; mission to Germany, Mayer, J., H. Minister without Portfolio, 1 307; Commander of First Army, 1 317,

195, 98n, 331 320, 364n; negotiations with U.S.S.R.,

Mechlis, Soviet General, n 374 t1 374; in armistice negotiations, mu 381,

Mecsér, Andras: I 112; liaison between H. 382, 383n, 384n, 391, 418, 419; relieved Right Wing and Hitler, 1 112, 138, 177, of his command, mum 443; continues 182, 247, 367n: m 22; alleged subversive negotiations with U.S.S.R., o 444, 445,

activities, 1 181, 185; suggested as 454, 455, 458; “‘elected’’ Minister Minister President, m 307; Hungarian President, 11 459, 464

Minister in Germany, 11 461 ref. 11 266n, 323n, 466 ref. 1 206n: 1 196, 296n Milch, German F.-M., 1 280n

Medjumurje. See Murakéz Military Service Law, 1 324: 1 15, 99, 100 Meissner, Otto, German chef de cabinet, Millok, K., H. Socialist, m 256n

1 203: m1 194 Military operations: First campaign, 11 5J-2,

Meizler, Z., H. Deputy, 1 229n casualties, m1 52, 98, 100n; 1942 campaign, Melocco, J., H. journalist, 1 122 11 119, 135; the Voronezhdisaster, 1 134-6, MEM (Magyar Elet Mozgalma: Movement 137, 345-6; casualties, 0 135n; Russian

of Hungarian Life), 1 326-7, 330 advances, uf 315-6, 337, 340, 376; defence

MEP (Magyar Elet Partja: Party of of Transylvania, mu 321-2; Germans

Hungarian Life): creation, 1 330-1, 400, decide to fight in H., m 415-7; Russian 401, 402; in 1939 elections, 1 351; Press, advance on Budapest, m1 453-4; evacua-

1 374; reorganisation, I 394; secessions tion and defence of Budapest, un 461; from, I 435-6; support Deputy Regency Russians enter Budapest, 0 463-5; fall of Bill, u 76; strength in 1942, m 78; anti- Budapest, 1m 465-8; German and H. Semitism, m 209; give Kallay vote of troops leave Hungary, 11 469-70 confidence, m 222; position under Milotay,I.,H. publicist, 199n, 168, 394, 395: Sztojay, mn 251; purge of, m 271; Right 11199, 201, 262, 265, 386

Wing unity question, m 292, 310; re- inf. 1 144n, 148n, 289n, 290n, 352n: organisation, 1 305-6; strength in July Wt 265n

1944, 11 305-6, 306n; positions in Cabinet, MIMOSz (National Organisation of Hun11 313; agree to non-political government, garian Industrial Workers), 11 299, 449

11 316; under Lakatos, m 329 Mindszenthy, Cardinal (Jozsef Pehm), 1 354 ref. 1 350n, 382, 458n: nm 101 Minister President in Hungarian constituMesko, Zoltan: I 157-8; founds National tion, I 48, 50, 51, 173-4 Socialist Agricultural Labourers and Minorities: H. in Successor States, 1 4, Workers’ Party, 1 157; founds Arrow 143—and see Little Enténte, Czecho-

Cross, 1 158; expelled, 1 159; rejoins, slovakia, Roumania, Yugoslavia;

I 187; excluded from Party alliance, German in H.—see Germans in Hungary; I 229; in 1939 elections, 1 350; becomes National—see Nationalities anti-German Nationalist, 1 381; attitude | Minorities legislation, 1 69

to Regency question, m 111 MMP. See Imredists

ref. 1 452n Molnar, E., H. Minister of Social Welfare

Mester, M., H. Secretary of State, m 302 11 460 Mészaros, Professor, 0 142, 420, 433 Molotov, V., Russian Foreign Minister, MFM (Hungarian Independence Move- I 395, 404, 409, 418, 419n, 442, 472n:

ment), m 313, 313n, 134, 456 nt 4n, 23, 31, 354, 372, 377, 379, 380, 458, MEN, 11 455 460, 464

504 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Moltke, H., German Ambassador, I 283 Nadas, Col. Lajos, H. staff officer, 1 345, Montgomery, The Unwilling Satellite, cit. 357, 360: n 54n, 344, 355n, 394, 398, I 56n, 60n, 86n, 139n, 144n, 404n, 414n, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 428

419n, 463n: o 64n inf. 1 86n, 345n, 360n: o 230n, 242n,

; Monus, M., H. Deputy, m 255, 256 394n, 412n, 414n, 416n, 417n, 420n, Moscicki, I., President of Poland, 1 282 428n

Moss, G., Standing up to Hitler, 1 334, 335n Naday, H. General, mo 243, 254, 266, 267n,

MOVE (Magyar Orszagos Véderd 319, 320, 323n, 341; Rome Mission, 342, Egyesulete—Hungarian Association of 351-2, 382, 393 National Defence), 1 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, inf. oO 228n, 319n, 351n

42, 75, 124, 181-2 Nagy, F., H. Smallholder leader, 1 122:

Movement of Hungarian Life. See MEM mw 79n, 107, 129, 159, 200, 207, 255, 348n

Movement of National Unity, 1 119 Nagy, V., H. General, 1402, 407: 1 98n, 120: MSzMP (Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Minister of Defence, m 114, 116, 126, 131,

Party), 1 71 135, 138, 155, 156, 366n

Munich Agreement, 1 249, 273, 276, 277 Végzetes Esztendék, cit. 1 240n, 265n, Munkacs, I 286, 291, 295, 296, 301, 302, 321 274n, 360, 407n, 418n, 461n, 475n: o Sn,

Nurak6z (Medjumurje): in H.-Croat un- 98n, 114n, 116n, 119n, 126n, 131n, 135n, official negotiations, 1 86, 385; in Yugo- 138n, 155n, 156n, 174n, 175n, 184n, 193n, Slav crisis, 1 452; occupied by H., 1 12-13: 218n, 219n, 230n, 234n, 322n, 336n, 337n,

annexation, of 57-8 339n, 386n, 387n, 392n, 394n, 401n, 408n,

ref. 0 146, 224 426n, 430n

Muravidék (Prekomurje): H. claims on, Nagy, Imre, H. Communist leader, mn 459, 1 447, 452: occupied by H., uo 12-13: in- 460

corporation, 0 39 Nagy, Ivan, H. Deputy, 1 478, 479: 386n

Mussolini, Benito: Horthy and, 1 59, 59n; Nagy, Lt.-Col. Jend, H. officer, m 455

Gombés and, 1 76, 115, 136, 136n; Namier, Sir L. B., Diplomatic Prelude, cit. supports H. revisionism, I 76, 115, 193, 1 269n 209; Bethlen and, 1 85, 136n; Treaty of | Naray, A., H. General, 1 87n, 484n: m 11n,

Friendship with H., 1 85; Danubian 267n

policy, 1 85, 136, 146, 151, 193, 198; National Alliance, m 368-9, 386, 394, 446, Csaky and, 1 110, 346; Austrian policy, 447 1 136, 136n, 195, 202; agreement with National Committee, 0 459 Laval, 1146, 147; Yugoslav policy,1151; National Communists, m 455 announces forging of Axis, 1 193; Axis National Debt. 1 91

policy, I 203, 235n; interest in Arrow National Democratic Party, 1 92n: o 181 Cross, I 228; Imrédy and Kanya visit, National Democrats, 1 23 1 234-5; supports H. claims in Czecho- National income: 1924-30, 1 64: 1932,1118 Slovakia, 1 252, 253, 256, 273-4, 291-2; National Peasants’ and Workers’ Party,

open letter to Lord Runciman, 1 253; 1 217

in Czechoslovak crisis, I 256, 273-4; in Nationalities: in Historic H.,1 8, 11, 14, 15; H.-Czechoslovak dispute, I 288-9, 291, in November 1918, 1 21; in Trianon H., 292, 293, 294, 297; and Ruthene question, 1 26; Act of 1921, 1 26; Ministry of, 1 69;

1 311, 312, 313, 320; Yugoslav policy, Hubay-Vago Bill, 1 401. See also

1 345; Csaky and Teleki visit, 1 346-7; Germans in Hungary, Slovaks,

Teleki’s letters to, 1 358-9; German- Roumanians, Serbs, Ruthenes

Polish war, 1 361; and Transylvanian National Organisation of Hungarian Induscrisis, I 388, 389n, 397; decides to enter trial Workers. See MIMOSz war, 1 393, 401, 410, 411, 412, 419; Teleki National Peasant Party (Nemzeti Paraszt Visits, 1 393; his prophecies, 1 397n; Part), m 332, 332n, 455, 456, 459, 464 Tripartite Pact, 1 440, 441; attacks National Radical Party, 1 155 Greece, 1442, 447; Yugoslav negotiations, National Socialist Party, Hungarian, of 1 448, 450, 478; Bardossy’s visit to, m 15- 1920s, 1 129, 155 16; and H.-Italianunion of crowns, 112; National Socialist Party, Palffy’s, 1159, 187,

agrees to settle Jewish question in Italy, 428 u 117; Kallay’s visit to, a 147-8; supports National Socialist Party (Hungarian): Tito, 0 147; Kallay asks to intercede with founded, 1 428; reconstituted, m 44-5; Germany, um 154; fall of, m 169; con- under Sztdjay, m 271; disagreement with sequences for H., m 171, 182; proclaims Imrédists, m 289, 292, 294-5, 311-2;

Italy a Republic, mn 194 Right-wing Unity question, m 292, 294-5,

ref. 1318, 354, 444, 463: 1 5, 67n, 138n, 310; independent programme, 0 293; 178 under Lakatos, nm 330; join National

INDEX 505 Alliance, 1 368; fuse with Arrow Cross, Olt, K., H. Communist, 1 99

i 448 O’Malley, Sir Owen, British Minister in ref. m 208, 293 Budapest, 1 390, 393, 398, 400, 427, 463,

National Socialist Hungarian Party— 464, 468, 469, 485: u 3, 8

Hungarist Movement. See Arrow Cross Omelka, H. Arrow Cross Deputy, m1 77n, National Socialist Party of Hungary, 1 159 103, 432 National Social Party of Work (Scythe ONCSA,1 104, 378

Cross), 1 157 Operation Barbarossa, 1 461

Nation und Staat, cit. 1 170n, 178n Operation Griin, 1 242 Nazism and H. public opinion, 1 152-3 Operation Margarethe: I, m 226, 257: II, Nedié, General, Serb leader, 11 145 It 226, 316, 320 Nemes, D., H. emissary, m1 321n, 378, 380, Operation Maritsa, 1 444, 462, 474 382, 384, 445; A debreceni Feltdmadds, Operational areas, German, 11 253, 259, 328n,

cit. 1 339n, 378n, 401n 389n

Nemes, J., 1 373 Operational zones, m1 259, 280, 315, 328, Németh, Major F., H. army officer, m 419 328n, 444, 463; and Jewish deportations, inf. m 419n, 445n ii 280, 281, 282, 284. 285 Nemzeti Osszetartas Kére, mu 272 Osborne, Mr. D’arcy, British Minister to

Nemzeti Ujsag, 1 140, 158, 273 the Vatican, 1 127, 143

Nemzetér, uw 273 Oshima, H., Japanese Ambassador in GerNépszava, 1 156, 374, 385, 454: m 48, 49, many, It 344n

207n 1 207n

78, 104, 106, 107, 129, 158, 206, 207, 208, Osszetartds, 1 273 273n: cit. uw 14n, 48n, 116n, 124n, 158n, Osusky, S., Czechoslovak Minister in Paris,

Neutral Bloc: plans for formation of,1468: OTI, m 272, 298

i 125, 144, 147, 196, 205 Ottlik, G., H. publicist, 1 374n, 468n, 489:

Nemzeti Szévetség. See National Alliance ut 28n, 85n, 88n, 122n, 123n, 269n, 271 Neurath, Freiherr K. von, German Foreign Otto, Archduke: Legitimist candidate, Minister, 1 139, 172, 193n, 198, 203, 272n 1183, 190; Allied support of, u 112-3, 143,

News Chronicle, cit. 1 375 191-2; American Mission, i 128, 143, 160,

Newton, Sir Basil, British Minister in 191-2, 197, 204-5, 216, 352-3 Prague, I 232, 236, 246n, 258, 269, 287n, inf. m 143n, 192n, 197n, 204n, 216n,

290n, 291n, 334n, 335n, 336n 265n, 334n, 353n

New York Times, 1 226, 362n: m1 176

Ney, K., Right-wing organiser, m 208, 293, Pacelli, Cardinal, 1 230

312, 329, 371, 412, 446, 448, 451 Pact of Steel, 1 357, 358

463n Palffy, Captain, 1 417

Nickl, A., H. Foreign Office official,1141n, Pajtas, Col., H. army officer, 1 469

Ninéi¢é, M., Yugoslav Minister, 1 180 Palffy, Count Fidél, H. National Socialist

1938 Club, 1 307 leader, 1 159, 181n, 187, 218, 227, 229,

Nives, Henrik, H. Foreign Ministry official, 381, 394, 428: m1 44, 45n, 78, 102, 294,

i 381n 295, 311, 330, 359, 362, 370, 446, 448, 449

NMK (Nemzeti Munkokdspont—National Palffy, Count Jozsef, H. Resistance leader, Labour Centre), 1 181, 182: 1 272, 299 Ww 384, 429

Nobility, 1 7, 8, 13-14, 33n, 49, 61 Palffy-Daun, Count, H. politician, 1 187, Noél, Leon, French Ambassador in War- 229n

saw, 1 259, 296n Pallavacini, Marquess Gyorgy, H. Small-

Nuit des Cerfs, 1 42: 11 182n holder leader, 1 27n, 36

Nuncio, Papal. See Vatican Pallavacini, Marquis Alfons, H. Resistance

Nyiré, J., H. Deputy, 386n leader, 1 197n, 384, 429

Nyitra, 1 291, 291n, 295, 296, 301, 302, 310 Pallavacini, Marquis Gyorgy, H. Resist-

Nyugati Magyarsdg, 1 43n ance leader, 0 314, 429 :

Paléczy-Horvath, G., H. publicist, m 3, 144,

Observer, 11 326 160, 161, 162

Odescalchi, Prince M., 1 314n, 462 Papen, Franz von, German Minister in

Odescalchi, Princess, 1 3 Vienna, I 146n, 149, 194n: m 116, 225, Oil, 1 353, 372: u 53, 117, 166, 166n, 167, 226, 344n

181 Memoirs, cit. 0 116n, 225n

Olah, G., H. publicist, 1 68 Pavel, P.. Why Roumania Failed, cit. 1 422n Olbrecht, German General, u 344n Papée, C., Polish diplomatist, 1 272

Oldenburg, G., m1 18n Papp-Almas, H. officer, 1 355

Olgyay, H. General, 1 93n, 98 Parliament in H. constitution, 1 50

506 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Parliamentary compatibility, 1 100-1 Petehazy, A., H. ‘‘Immediacy Boy”, 1 120 Parragi, G., H. publicist, 1 79n, 255 Peter, King of Yugoslavia, I 446

Party of Hungarian Life. See MEP A King’s Heritage, cit. 1 70

Party of Hungarian Renewal. See Imrédists Peth6d, S., H. publicist, 1 228n, 380: 0 47

Party of National Concentration, m 292 Petho, T., cit. u 373n Party of National Unity: Government Petdofi, S., H. poet, u 47, 104, 131, 140 Party renamed, 1 118; reorganised by Petrovac, M., H. Deputy, 1 182n Goémbés, I 118; gains in elections,1 129; ~Peric, Lt.-Col., Yugoslav emigré Govern-

composition and character of, 1 129-30: ment official, m 180 reorganised by Daranyi, I 180: revolt Peyer, C., 1 71n against Imrédy, 1 309-10, 314-6; name Peyer, K., H. Social Democrat leader, 1 181, changed to Party of Hungarian Life, 18iIn, 182n, 183, 445: 1 6, 46, 106, 107n,

1 330-1 121, 129n, 133, 140, 159n, 169, 171, 198,

Party of National Will, 1 166-7, 175, 186, 350 201, 207, 212, 255, 256

Party of Racial Defence (Fajvéd6 Part), Pfahlstein, von, German General, 0 227

1 72, 73, 75, 155 Pfeiffer, K., H. Resistance leader, u 314

Party of Unity, 1 44n, 315 Pfeiffer-Wildenbruch, German General, 0

Pataky, L., H. civil servant, m 200, 207 362n, 451n, 463n, 467

Pataky, T.. Head of Minorities Section of | Picker, AHirlers Tischgesprdche, cit. 1 95n

H. Minister Presidency, 1 203n, 261, 278 — Pilsudsk1, Marshal Joseph, Polish Patriotic associations. See Associations, commander-in-chief, 1 144

patriotic and paramilitary Pintér, J., H. Deputy, 1 170, 172 Patzay, P., H. writer, m 79n Pittsburgh Agreement, I 264

Paul, Prince of Yugoslavia, 1 110n, 255n, ~~ Piukevics, J.. H. Deputy, m1 155, 269n

Oo 6 235n

386n, 446n, 449, 450n, 451, 452n, 453 Plessen, Baron Johann von, German

Paulus, German, F.-M.,1 460, 477, 481, 482: Counsel of Legation in Rome, I 234n, Paveli¢, A., Croat leader, 1 7n, 58n, 468 Pogany, Col., H. staff officer, 1 405, 418,

Payments, balance of, 1 65, 118 419, 432n

Peace Party, m 182, 207n, 313, 314, 319, Poland: area and population acquired from

332-3, 364 H., 1 4; relations with H. 1920-36, 1 82,

Pearl Harbour, Japanese attack on, m1 61 144,150n; Danubian policy 1936-7, 1 149, Peasant Union, uo 107, 129, 130, 159, 200, 151; increased activity, I 208-9; visit of

207, 208, 271, 464 Horthy and Kanya to, 1 209-10; prelim-

Pechy, Henrik, H. astrologer, 1 189 inary understandings with H. on Czecho-

Pechy, L., H. Deputy, 1 134 slovak question, I 210, 230-1; policy in

Pehm, Mer. Jozsef. See Miuindszenthy, Czechoslovak crisis May-August 1938,

Cardinal 1 232, 236; September, 1 249, 253, 255,

Pejagevic, Count, 1 216n, 355, 399 257-8, 260, 261, 264, 266-7, 268-9, 272, Pelényi, J., H. Minister in Washington, 273-4; October, I 276, 276n, 278, 282,

216 282n, 283, 293, 295-6, 298-9; November,

Pell, Mr., American Minister in Budapest, I 310-11, 313, 314n; relations with

11 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 Germany, November 1938 to March

Penal formations of Labour Service, 1 68n 1939, 1 298-9, 320, 321; and Ruthene Penzes-Fekete, J., H. agent provocateur, crisis, 1 31], 323, 333-4, 339; conflict with

it 456 Germany and H. attitude, 1 347-9, 356-7,

Perényi, Baron, Commissioner of Ruthenia 358-9; attacked by Germany, 1 363-4; and Keeper of the Holy Crown, 1 343, attacked by Russia, 1 367; H. treatment

382n: 1 40, 319, 341, 408, 447, 448 of Polish refugees, 1 367, 368-9: n 244, Perth, Lord, British Minister in Rome, “71, 314, 334n; H. recognises Polish

I 268n, 291n, 300 Government in exile, 1 368; H. contacts

Pester Lloyd, 1 48, 178, 178n, 239n, 244, 249, with, 1 123, 126, 145, 161, 170

264, 269, 362, 374, 376: u 120, 152, 273 ref. 1 27n cit. 1 48n, 118n, 127n, 131, 141n, 169n, ~~ Political parties: in H. political life, 1 46f;

188, 205, 239n, 285n, 296n, 307n, 318n, dissolution of, 11 320 332n, 339n, 377n, 399, 400, 401, 412, Pop, P. V., cit. 1 417n, 421 416, 444n, 449, 451n, 454, 473: m 25n, Popolo di Roma, cit. 1 399 35n, 36n, 51n, 59, 61, 94n, 118n, 143, Popolo d’Italia, cit. 1 318

143n, 306 Popovic, M., Roumanian politician, 1 422n

Pesti Hirlap, cit. 1 377n: 0 32n, 56 Popovics M., Serb leader, 1 108, 146,

Pesti Naplo, cit. 1 319, 356 Popovics, S., President of National Bank,

Pesti Ujsag, 1 140 I 124

INDEX 507 Popular Front: Communists orderedtowork Radvanszky, Baron Antal, 1 127n, 469: for, 1 155-6; t 47; origins of, 1 379-80: uw 141, 142, 162, 163, 214 it 47-9, 78-9; activities in 1942, nm 104-7; inf. u 141n, 162n, 214n Legitimists enter, 1 113; revival, 1 115-6, Radvdnszky, Baron Albert, Keeper of the 128-30, 131, 139, 158-9, 313-4, 332-3; Holy Crown, 11 448n union of parties, 1 455-7; contact with Raeder, Erich, German Admiral, 1 238:

Russia, 1 456-7. See Resistance and mn 194

Political Parties concerned Raffay, A., Lutheran Bishop of Budapest,

Population: size of, 1 4; growth in 19th C, 132

17, 9; occupational distribution of, 1 7-8, Ragged Guard, 1 30, 238, 266, 279, 286, 294,

64, 64n; agrarian, I 67, receded to 311, 314, 323n, 337, 339n, 367, 370n

Hungary, 1 423 Rahn, R., German Minister with Mussolini, Por, M., cit. 138n 11 389, 390, 391, 403, 404, 406, 407, 408,

Portugal, 1 468 413, 414, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 435, Porzsesinsky, Colone] G., H. staff officer, 438, 439, 440

1 417n inf. 1 360n, 388n, 406n, 407n, 413n,

Pozsony. See Pressburg 424n, 425n, 426n, 439n

Prager Presse, \ 134n, 174 Raics, I., H. writer, u 79n

Prchala, General, Czechoslovak Army Rajk, L., H. Communist, 1 99, 156: m 314,

commander, 1 267n, 337 332, 365, 366, 456

Preliminary sanction, 1 49, 189 Rajniss, F., H. Right-Radical politician, Press: freedom of in 1921, 1 43; Govern- 178n, 187, 229: 0 45n, 154, 155, 227n, 242, ment control of, 1 119, 191; new Press 249n, 275, 312, 329, 358, 359, 362, 368,

Law, 1 128; Teleki’s policy, 1 353-4; 370, 386n, 387, 411, 439, 440, 442, 443, German influence and demands, 1 353, 448, 449 354, 366, 371, 374, 394-5, 431; sub- Rakolczay, Colonel, H. Military Attaché in servience of, 1 366, 374, 394, 394-5; Berne, 01 334, 335, 339 Kallay’s policy, m1 91-2; purge of, 1 272-3 Rakosi, Matyas, H. Communist, 1 71, 107,

Pressburg (Poszony, Bratislava), 1 77, 202, 370, 468: 46, 47, 205, 266, 353 203, 203n, 243, 243n, 256, 281, 283, 290, Rakovsky, Tibor, H. Minister of Cults and

291, 295, 296, 298, 301, 302, 310, 336 Education, 1 168: m 306, 324, 343, 409, :

Prices: general, 1 460: 11 36, 50, 109, 168, 430, 431, 436 328; agricultural, 1 31; 1920-9,1 64; 1930 Rassay, K., H. Liberal leader: supports 1 90; 1933-4, 1 118; 1936-7, 1 192; 1940s, Daranyi’s programme, 1 180; supports

m 51, Sin, 168 Legitimists, I 183; in opposition to

Pridavoc, P., inf. 1 264n, 302n Imrédy, 1 327, 480, 482-3: m 6; policy in

Prince Eugen, launching of, I 238, 238n 1941, 1 45, 49, 73; Popular Front policy, Prinz Eugen Gau, I 478, 479: 1 6, 39, 224, w 107, 115, 159, 171, 198, 198n, 207n;

224n arrested, 11 255

Procsak, M., Ruthene Under-Secretary, ref. 1 296n: m1 7n, 140, 213

I 286n Rationing, I 373, 383, 459: o 16, 50, 108,

Prohaszka, Bishop, 1 32 115, 168, 328

Pronay, Colonel, H. Deputy, 1 155 Ratz, Jeno: I 167; Deputy Chief of Staff,

Puky, M., H. Foreign Minister, 1 103, 1125; friendship with Szalasi, 1 167, 186;

107n Chief of General Staff, 1 174, 221; re-

Purgly, E., H. Minister of Agriculture, 1 98, armament policy, 1 212-3, 214, 243;

102, 128 Minister of Defence, 1 221, 233, 309; o 460 1 242, 243, 244; co-founder of Movement

Pushkin, M., Soviet Minister in Budapest, visits Germany, I 238-48; Hitler and,

PV. See Szalasi of Hungarian Life, 1 326-7; founds Party

of Hungarian Renewal, t 436; association

Race Defence National Socialist Party, with Archduke Albrecht, 1 456; and

1 229n . Imrédists, mo 41, 45n, 102; German

Race-protecting Socialist Party, 1 187 report on, 1m 148n; German contacts, Raczinsky, Count E., Polish Ambassador ir 195, 225; place in Szto6jay Government,

in London, 1 259, 264 1 249n, 250, 251, 264, 308; on Jewish Deputy, 1 27n, 36 negotiations, 1 292; resignation, 1 311

Raday, Count Gedeon, H. Smallholder question, 11 276; on Right Wing Unity

Rademacher, H., German agent, 11 36 ref. 1 125: 1 293n

Radic, Stjepan, Croat leader, 1 84, 85 inf. 1 4n

Radocsay, L., H. Minister of Justice,1 381, Ratz, K., H. politician, 1 350, 468n: m1 4,

401, 409: 1 27n, 251n 353

508 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Rauschning, Herr, Conversations with Hitler, tt 313-4, 338; in October 1944, 364-6,

cit. 1170 383-4, 393, 404-6, 410-11, 428-9, 444,

Ravasz, L., Protestant Bishop of Budapest, 455-7. See also Popular Front

1 32: 0 276, 283n Responsibility, Ministerial, 1 50

Rearmament: provisions of Treaty of Rettlinger, G., The Final Solution, cit. 01 273n Trianon, I 5, 75, 87, 143n; German Révai, A., H. foreign correspondent, m 120, supply of arms to H., 1 139, 142-3, 143n, 121 242, 243, 245, 245n, 290, 373, 460-1: Révai, Jozsef, H. Communist, m 459 1 119, 135, 166-7, 266-9; H.-German Révai, Julian, Ruthene politician, 1 264n, armaments industries, 1 141-2, 345, 357- 286n 360, 383-4, 462: m 166-7; Little Entente Revisionism: nation-wide character, 1 5; policy, 1 198-200, 211-2, 216, 232, 234; place in H. politics, 15, 146-7, 151-3, 158, Daranyis policy, 1 199, 212-5: Sods’ 168, 196, 204-5; Italian support of, 1 85, Memorandum, 1 212-4: Imrédy’s Bill, 193, 193n; German attitude to, 1 152-3, 1 215, 352; Reménvyi-Schneller’s policy, 194n, 196, 203; Teleki’s policy, 1 362,

1 218-9; Csaky and, 1 360; Kallay’s 365-6. See also Czechoslovakia, policy, 1 166-7; joint aircraft production, Roumania, Ruthenia, Yugoslavia programmes s.v., 0 118; situation in Revision League,1 201, 256, 265n, 304n, 305

September 1944, 0 364n Rhineland, occupied by Hitler, 1 149-50

Keconstruction of Hungary: Bethlen’s view Ribbentrop, Joachim von, German Foreign

of need for, 1 39-40; factors delaying, Minister: Horthy and, 1 59; in Czecho-

I 62-3; progress, 1 63-4; comparison with slovak negotiations, 1 207, 240, 241, 270,

Compromise Era, 1 65-6: and State 276n, 283, 290, 291; First Vienna Award,

employees, 1 74 I 295-302; Kanya and, 1 240-2; in

Reform Generation, 1 127, 127n, 128, 129, Ruthene negotiations, 1 312-3, 335n,

187, 216 336n; Treaty with Slovakia, 1 341-2;

Refugees: after Trianon, I 27-8, 74; in Csaky and, 1 359-60, 368; in Polish crisis,

autumn 1944, un 315, 346-7, 451 1 359, 360, 362, 363; requests H. for

Regency: established, 1 25; powers of, 1 49- passage of German troops, I 366-7, 462; 51; extension of powers, 1 118n, 128, 174, in H.-Roumanian dispute, 1 406, 407, 408, 189-90: Szalasi’s proposals for, 1 165, 175, 419-24: Second Vienna Award, I 419-24; 188; succession to, I 189-90: no 74-5, 111-2; Tripartite Pact negotiations, 1 439, 441; Deputy Regency Bill, o 75-7, 111, 113; Russian policy, 1 461; in Yugoslav crisis,

future of, 0 446-7 I 471-2; military co-operation with H.,

Rekowski, German Consul Budapest, om 55: complains of H.’s war effort, 0 65-

o 361 66, 126n, 156n, 194; on Volksdeutsch

Religions, “received’’ and ‘“‘recognised,”’ question, 0 96; memorandum on H.’s

I 164n behaviour, 0 144n, 148-9, 148n; on joint

Réemenyi-Schneller, Lajos: I 216; pro- communique, m 151-2: sends VeesenGerman policy, 1 142, 216, 334n, 345, mayer to report on H., uo 195-6; and 423n, 312: Minister of Finance in Imrédv occupation of H., 0 224, 226; Klessheim

Government, I 216: policy, 1 218: negotiations, 0 234-41; control of H. Minister of Economic Co-ordination, affairs during occupation, o 248, 253,

1 459: 1 50, 51, 212; on Yugoslav crisis, 307-8, 318, 361n, 369, 389-90, 427, 435

1 483; on Russian war, 0 27; accedes to ref. 1 193n, 206n, 239n, 474n German demands for credit, 1 97n, 118, Memoirs, cit. 0 223n 296n; price policy, 1 168; Mlunister of | Ricsov-Uhlarik, B., H. Commissioner in Finance in Sztojay Government, u 251, Transylvania, 0 259n 295; acting Minister President, m 313: Right Radicalism: definition, 1 28n; aims, on Jewish question, 0 318, 321; on South I 28, 157, 308; anti-Semitism, I 28, 72, Transylvanian question, 0 322; Minister 152-3, 157, 212, 213, 215, 217; appeal of, of Finance in Lakatos Government, I 28, 78-9, 100, 121, 176, 308; organisai 323, 324, 334, 338, 343, 359, 360, 370, tions, r 29-33, 72, 75, 100, 155, 181-2; 392, 395, 401. 402, 408; Minister of policy, 1 73, 79-80, 92, 181-2, 212-4, 308; Finance in Szalasi Government, u 409, leadership of, 1 75, 100, 212; political

41] parties, I 156-60, 455, 456n; March Plot,

ref. 0 325n 1 181-3, 185; German contacts, I 217-8:

Reparations: under Treaty of Trianon, 1 5, m 154; Press, 1 228; Kallay’s relations 62, 63; settlement of, 1 89: Moscow with, mo 102-4, 131, 200. See also Arrow

Armistice, 1 464 Cross, Imrédists, National Socialists, etc.

Resistance in H., nature of, 1 379 Rintelen, Erinnerungen an Oesterreichs Weg, Resistance Movement: in summer 1944, cit. 1 137n, 138n

INDEX 509 Ripka, M., Munich Before and After, cit. 409n; requests German guarantee and

1 252, 252n, 287n, 299 military mission, 1411, 411n; negotiations

Ritter, K., Reichsleiter, 1m 223n, 234n, 237, on Second Vienna Award, 1 418-24;

238, 241: cit. m1 246n accepts Award, 1 424; German guarantee

Rdder, General G., H. Minister of Defence, to, 1 424; evacuation of Transylvania, 1 120, 125, 176, 182, 194, 212, 221, 274: I 429; relations with H., 1 429-31; entry

0 341 of German troops into, 1 440; signs

Rome Protocols, 1 144-5, 149, 150, 194, 196, Tripartite Pact, 1 444; renounces local

204, 234, 345 treaties, 1 446; German occupation force

Rome Triangle, 1 154, 194n, 195, 205 enlarged, 1 462; claims Banat, nm 13; Ronai, A., Head of Institute of State declares war on U.S.S.R., nm 22, 25;

Statistics, 1 479 possible H. attack, m 34-5; disputes with

Rongyos Garda. See Ragged Guard H., 1 57, 95, 96, 137-8, 146-7, 178-9, 323;

Roosevelt, F. D., President of U.S.A., m 10, Great Britain declares war on, 0 61, 61n; 112, 123n, 137, 143, 191, 192n, 216, 276, declares war on U.S.A., m 63; promises

303, 352, 353n Germany full mobilisation, 11 66; troops

Rodsz, G., H. Deputy, 1 164 driven back, m 134, 146; refuses further Rosenberg, Alfred, Director of NSDAP, reinforcements, 219n; and occupation

I 178, 477 of H., m 224, 230, 253, 257, 259; contacts

Rosso, A., Italian Ambassador in Moscow, with Western Allies, m 316, 318-9; sur-

1 404 render, 0 318-9; Roumanian troops in H.,

Rothen, Franz, H. Volksdeutsch leader, Wt 339, 345, 465; declares war on H.,

1171, 171n, 229, 230, 434, 455 340; H. obligations towards, in pre-

Rothermere, Lord, I 82, 147n, 304n, 305 armistice, 11 377, in armistice, u 464-5;

Roumania: area and population acquired H. returns receded territory, m 465. from H.,14; Magyar minority in, 1 4, 143, See also Antonescus, Carol, Little 197, 199, 199n, 232, 237, 239, 355; Entente, Michael, Transylvania invades and occupies H., 1 22, 23; Roumanians: in Historic H., 1 8, 14, 14n, refugees from (1918-20), 1 27, 27n; signs 15n; in Trianon H., 1 70n Reconstruction Protocol, 163; H. attitude Rdsza, S., Private, mn 304 towards, I 83-4; in world economic Rozsa, Ferencz, H. Communist, 1 47, 105, crisis, 197; Hitler’s policy towards, 1 139; 115 relations with Germany, 1934-8, 1 148-9, Rudolph, Archduke, m 265 153, 177-8, 196; relations with Italy,1194, Ruhle, G., German economic expert, i 228 196, 205; relations with H., 1 197-8, 200, Runciman, Lord, 1 236, 237, 251, 253 205, 232, 232n (see also Little Entente); Runciman Mission, 1 235-7 political changes in, 1 204, 241; issues Rundstedt, G. von, German Field-Marshal, minorities statute, 1 237; in Czechoslovak n 31, 65 crisis, summer-autumn 1938, 1 235, 237, Rupert, R., H. Deputy, u 71 239-40, 243, 246, 260-1, 270-2, 280, 282, Rupprecht, Virtsologi Olivér, H. Right283, 293, 295, 298, 299, 314n; H. attitude wing publicist, 1 228, 229, 437: n 44, 45n towards, December 1938 to January 1940, Rust, German General, 1 477 1 318, 321; in Ruthene crisis, 1 333-4, 339- Rusziczkay-Riidiger, H. General, 0 267n 341, 342; German economic mission to, Ruszkay, Jen6: I 167-8; Szalasi and, 1 161, 1 340; alleged German ultimatum, 1 340; 168, 186, 433: 1 41, 43; Leader of Right Anglo-French guarantee to, I 344; rela- Radicals, 1 212; Arrow Cross activities, tions with H., 1 345, 360, 362; Csakvy’s I 428, 434, 436n, 455, 456: m1 78; opposes

invasion plan, 1 348, 386; assurances to Deputy Regency Bill, um 76-7; joins Germany, I 348; in Axis calculations Palffy-Baky Group, m 102; German August 1939, 1 360, 363, 366; declares report on, 1 148n; German contacts, neutrality in German-Polish war, I 368; mn 195, 225, 310, 324; suggested as Russian assurances to, I 368; technical Minister of Defence in Sztdjay Governnormalisation of relations with H., 1 368; ment, 1 250, 251 doubts of validity of Anglo-French ref. 1 168n, 174: 11 249n, 293n, 362 guarantee, I 388; further concessions to Ruthene crisis: attitudes to—Germany, Germany, I 388; Italian and German I 281, 283, 290, 291, 291n, 296, 332, 342; mediation, 1 389-90; German plans for Roumania, I 280, 282, 283, 295, 299, occupation of, 390-1, 395, 399; decides 333-4, 339-40, 342; Great Britain, 1 283, to fight in event of aggression, I 398; 292, 297, 300, 333, 342; France, 1 283, 292, Russian ultimatum to, 1 404; crisis with 297, 300, 333, 342; Italy, 1 283, 292, 301,

Russia, H. and Bulgaria, 1 404-28; 333; Poland, 1 278, 282, 283, 293, 295-6, |

renounces Anglo-French guarantee, 1 407, 299, 301, 333, 334, 339; U.S.A., 1 333;

510 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH U.S.S.R., 1 292, 292n; Yugoslavia, 1289, Schdnherz, Zoltan, H. Communist, 0 47;

292. For Hungary, Czechoslovakia and 105, 115

Slovakia, see Ruthenia Schopflin, G., Az illegalis Kommunista

Ruthene Rada, I 279, 285-6, 299, 338 Péaért Magyarorzsdgon, cit. I 70, 71n,

Ruthenes: in Historic H., 1 14, 15n; in 99n

Czechoslovakia, 1 83, 264, 264n, 279, 283, © Schramm, Professor Percy, m 227n

285-6, 287, 293, 295, 296-9; in H. after Schubert, General, m 18n

Award, 0 68, 159n Schulenburg, Count F. W. von der, German Ruthenia: population, 14; Magyar minority Ambassador in Moscow, I 404

in, 1 4; H. activities in, 1 83; Hitler offers Schuschnigg, Kurt von, Austrian

to H., 1 138, 148; H. claims in, 1 210, 250, Chancellor, 1 136n, 146, 149, 150n, 151,

267-8, 271, 273, 276, 277, 278, 282n, 195, 203, 206: m 233 283-4, 287-8, 290-1, 296-7, 298; in Austrian Requiem, cit. 1 147n, 149n Munich crisis, 1 264, 267, 271-3, 296-304; ref. mo 233 Czechoslovak policy, 1 284, 295, 299; H. Schw&abische Tiirkei, 1 478. See also discontent with Award, I 310-1; putsch Bacska, Prinz Eugen Gau planned, 1 311-2; vetoed by Germany, Schweinitzer, Sombor, H. Political Police I 313; H. renews preparations, I 322-3; officer, 1 227n: 0 217, 255 claim redefined, 1 322; Volksdeutsch in, Scythe Cross Party, 1 157, 187 1 332; Germany lifts veto, 1 336; declares Second Vienna Award, 1 419-24, 430-1: independence, 1 337-8; H. ultimatum, mn 464 1 337; invaded by H., 1 338-9; Slovak Selig, I., H. Socialist, m 256n policy, 1 342; provisional administration, Serbia, question of occupation of, mn 138-9,

1 342-3; autonomy promised, 1 342-3, 352, 149-50, 174-5, 183-4 : 382, 382n; refused, 1351; conditions in,I Serbia (“Independent’’), m 138, 145 382: 0 40-1, 107, 333; Ruthene deputies, Serbs: in Historic H., 1 8, 14, 14n, 15, 16;

I 351, 382, 394: m 78, 305, 306n in Trianon H., 1 70n; in Délvidék, o 39,

69; in Bacska, u 107-8; H. efforts to

Sabotage: early instances of, 0 35, 35n, 47, conciliate, m0 107, 138-9, 145-6; modus 105, 105n; Kallay refuses Allied demands vivendi reached, 0 159; passive attitude for, 0 170, 186; Social Democrats refuse, of, m 159n

um 187-8; revival of, m 315, 333 Serédi, Cardinal, Primate of H., 1 22I1n, Saldanha, Dom Jose de, 0 143, 160 325n, 354: 0 61n, 75n, 85, 130, 145, 276,

Sallai, H. Communist, 1 99n 292n, 301, 302, 447, 447n, 448 Sall6, J.. H. Right-wing politician, 1 126n, Shvoy, General, 1 125

181n, 206n Sié Guards, 1 323n, 332, 337, 338, 339

Sapieha, Prince, m 217, 314, 315 Sidor, K., 1 296n, 335; Slovenska Politika,

uw 205 inf. 1 335n

Sarajoglou, M., Prime Minister of Turkey, cit. 1 263n, 282n, 335 Sargent, Mr. Orme, Assistant Secretary of Sigescu, Dr. N., Agricultural Exports from State of British Foreign Office, 1 236, 251, Hungary 1923-7, cit. 1 65n

252, 259, 266, 375, 400 Sigray, Count A., H. Legitimist leader,

197 197, 200, 231, 254

Sarkotié, General, Croat Legitimist, 1 151, 1 36, 183, 327, 327n, 353n: o 115, 192n,

Sauckel, F., German politician, 0 296 Sikorski, H. General, u 145 Schell, Baron Péter, F6ispan of Kassa,m 32, Sikray, H. General, m0 93n 325n, 327, 387, 408, 409, 424, 431, 436 Simonffy-Toth, A., H. emissary to Moscow, inf. m 393n, 401n, 408n, 424n, 425n, wm 455n, 456, 457, 458

430n, 432n Simoni, L., Berlino, cit. m 154n

Scheubner-Richter, M. E. von, 1 35n Simonyi-Semadam, S., H. Minister

Schill, H. General, 1 100n President, 1 24, 26, 36

Schmidt, Guido, Austrian Foreign Minister, Sipos, H. General, 1 125 1 139n, 148n, 149, 150n, 194n, 203, 206n, Sirovy, General Jan, President of Czecho-

207n slovakia, 1 279, 299

Schmidt, Herr, German economic expert, Six, H., German economic expert, m 228

O 228 Skladowski, General F. S., Minister

Schmidt, Paul Otto, German Foreign Office President of Poland, 1 256

Interpreter, m0 234, 241 Skoropatsky, Hetman, 1 35n

Statist auf diplomatischer Biihne, cit. |Skorzeny, Major: Budapest Mission, m 359I 313n 360, 400, 412, 430, 435, 441 Schober, B., Director of H. National Bank, Missions Secrétes, cit. 1% 355n, 359n, ) 124 389n, 399n, 400n, 412n, 435n

INDEX 511 Slavik, J., Czechoslovak Minister of the I 22-3; persecution of in 1919-20, 1 23-4;

Interior, 1 232: m1 206, 208 abstain from 1920 elections, 1 245; agita-

Slovakia (in Czechoslovakia): population, tion outside H., 1 27, 41; Pact with

14; Magyar minority in, 1 4, 230, 249-50, Bethlen, 1 43-4; in elections, 1 45, 92, 129,

251, 260, 262, 264, 267, 302; relations 350; Horthy and, 1 58; in Bethlen Era, with H., 1 83, 84; Hitler’s offer to H., 1 71; denounce pact with Bethlen, 1 98-9; 1 138, 148, 202-3, 242-3: German GombGs appeals to, 1 116, 121, 122n, 132; minority in, 1 144, 223, 263; H.-German hostility to Gombés, 1 124; connections conversation on, 1 208; H.-Polish con- with Prager Presse, 1 134n; anti-German versations on, I 210; Polish attitude to, attitude, 1 154; Communist infiltration of, 1 230, 263, 264, 269, 278, 282, 283, 293, 1 155, 156, 184; Szdlasi and, 1 166; 295-6, 297; H. policy, 1 231, 235-7, 238, attitude to Daranyi Government, 1 180, 249-50, 253, 256, 260, 262-4, 266, 271-2, 191; and K6rmend Rally, 1 183; join 273-4, 276-7, 278, 283, 284, 285, 287, 290, opposition to Imrédy, 1 315; under 294, 321, 322, 333, 336; claim for self- Teleki, 1 378-9; under Bardossy, u 14, 38, determination, 1 256, 267, 268, 271-2, 273, 45-6; parliamentary representation in 274, 277, 278, 298n; in Munich crisis, 1941, m 78; and Popular Front, u 106-7, 1 256, 261, 263-4; H. claims in, 1 263, 267, 115-6, 128-9, 158-9, 332-3, 364-5; Kallay

273-4, 278, 284-6, 290; Polish claims in, and, m 107; reorganisation in 1943, n

1 263, 272, 273-4, 296n; demands in- 157-8; appeal to intellectuals and

dependence, 1 263-4; opens negotiations bourgeoisie, 1 159, 181, 208; relations with Bene’, 1 264; Italian attitude to, 1 with Smallholders, m 159, 180-1, 207-8: 266, 268n, 281, 283, 293, 295-302; German surrender policy, m 182, 187, 198; reattitude to, 1 268, 281, 283, 290, 293, 295- construction policy, wu 206-7, 231-2; 302; Yugoslav attitude to, 1 280-1, 283, arrest of leaders, 255; dissolution of, 289; Roumanian attitude to, 1 280, 283, 11 271; offer to rescind dissolution, m 299; 294; proclaim independence, 1 282, 285; agreement with Communists, m 332-3;

French policy to, 1 283, 297; request Resistance activity, 11 455-7, 459; re-

negotiations with Germans, 1 293-4, 295, presentation in Debrecen Government, 299; First Vienna Award, 1 301-2; parti- i 464

tion, 1 302 (for area allotted to H., see ref. 1 130, 131, 133, 152: u 77 Felvidék); further discussions with Social Insurance,1 69: u 298. See also OTI, Germany, I 335-6; independence, 1 337: MABI protectorate, 1 341; Republic, 1 34] Social Legislation: in Historic H., 1 10; Slovakia, Republic of: Treaty with under Bethlen, 1 66, 69; under Gémbds, Germany, I 341; fighting with H., 1 341, 1 133; under Daranyi, 1 179, 191, 226; 342; treaty, I 342; H.-Slovak relations, in Kaposvar programme, 1 306; military summer 1939, 1 344, 346, 348, 355, 384; service law, I 324; Government takes

and German-Polish War, 1 363, 367; powers to suspend, I 364; in 1934-40,

requests transit facilities for troops, 1 367; 1 378, 436; German demands for further,

Allied policy towards, 1 376-7; Magyar I 431; programme completed, 1 459; minority in, 1384; anti-Semitism in, I 402; emergency restrictions and suspensions, sign Tripartite Pact, 1 440, 444; H.-Slovak 11 38, 50; extension of promised by relations in 1940, 1 442: m 40, 57, 57n, Kallay, m 131; further restrictions and 95, 146, 179-80; declares war on U.S.S.R.., alterations, 1 296, 298-9, 300; under Wm 25, 28; and occupation of H., u 223-4, Lakatos, m 329; under Szalasi, 1 448; in

230, 257 programme of Debrecen Government,

Slovaks: in Historic H., 1 4, 8, 14, 15, 15n; ll 464 in Trianon H., 1 4, 70, 237, 285, 302n: Social Welfare, Ministry of, 1 46n, 68, ir 153n; in Felvidék, 1 302, 308, 381: m 40, 104

107, 153n, 159n Society of the Double Cross (kettd6skereszt-

Slovenes, I 472 Szovetség), 1 32, 155

Slovjaks, m 40n ‘“‘Sofort Programm,” 1 117

Smallholders Party, Szab6’s: 1 12, 23, 24, Solf, W., German diplomatist, 1 144

26, 27, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 66 Solymossy, H. General, 1 166n

Smiljani¢é, M., Director of Yugoslav Foreign Somkuthy, H. General, 1 125, 174, 176

Office, 1 447, 452 Somogyi, Bela, H. lawyer, 1 238, 427n:

Smuts, General, m1 205 nm 79n

Smyeli-Rydz, E., Marshal of Poland, 1282 Somogyvary, G., Ragged Guard leader, Social Democrat Party: in Historic H.,1 12; I 286n: m 255, 271 Jewish leadership of, 1 20, 78; in Karolyi Sonyi, General H., Commander-in-Chief of Government, 1 22; in Béla Kun regime, H. army, 1 174: u 341

312 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Sods, G. H. Foreis Mimisiy officiel Sviatek, BH. General, 1 286

u 203n, 314, 456 Sweden, Kine of, a 304

mY, i 3i4+m, 353m, 4350 Szabadsag, 1 T0n, 373n, F740

Sods, KL. H. General, r 73, 120, 212, 213, Szabad Szé. a 46, 107m, 208, 234m, 374: ch.

Zit, 219n, 22 7n H 130

Sopf-Sree, H. Mejor, m 37in Szabo, General, H. Miktary artaché m Spem: edkeres to Triparde Pact, 1 442; Rome, 1 708n, 209. 210, 228, 238m, 286n, Suggests Formeiion of nemrrel bloc, w 145, 297, 312, 313n, 338

146 S7abdé, Naegvarad: Istvan, H. Smaltholder

Speak, L, Ruthene politicien, 1 338n leader, 112, 24, 26, 27, 40, 41, 44, 46, 66, Stalin, Jostt, 1 194n, 39in, 404m: 205, 330, 66n, é7n, 7S

334, 312 Szakasts, A.. H. Social Democrat leader,

Sterhembere, Prince, 1 137 mr 48, 79m, 106, 113, 129, 129m, 158, 201,

Berweer Hitler and Musseflint, cit. 1 231, 255, 256, 313, 314, 333, 363, 385n, i37n, 1462 384, 429, 456 Stemacker, Hem, Director of the VDA, Szakvari, E.. H. Mimister of Industry, 1120:

7169 m 370, 452

Stepmec, Archbishop, @ 13 Szalasi, Ferencz: I 160-8: Humegarist idea, Stern, S.. President of H. Jewish Neolog i 1614, 174, 226; consitmmmionalism, t 1635,

Community, I 117 175, 188; founds Party of National WH,

Stemdale-Bennen, Miz., British Councilor I 166-7: launches Hungarist Movement,

of Legetion im Ismanbul, w 176 1 167, 173n, 186, 434: meeting with Lajos Stovadinowié, Milan, Yugoslay Premier, Keresvies-Fischer, m 173; sudden popu-

1 148: rapprochement with Germany, larity of, I 183: foods Budapest with rt 148: Limle Enrente policy, 1 151-2: leafless, I 183; imnocence of March Plot,

relations with H., 1 151-2: Treety with 1 185-6: publishes New Hungarian

Traly, 1 196-7; Kanye onmers Noz- Worker, 1 184: imprisoned, r 186;

Aggression Pact, 1 197; refuses proposal released, 1 186; vistis Germany, I 186¢:

ro extend Linie Entente Alliance, 1 198: elecred to Committee of Netonal

in Crechoslove’ crisis, 1 202, 204, 207, Socialist Movement, 1 187; Horthy and, 234, 237, 244n, 245, 253, 253; visti to L188, 213, 214, 219n, 227: arrested, 1 188; Germeny, 1 202, 202n, 207; H. policy, consuls an astrologer, 1 189; myited to

1 207, 210-1; rejects H. offer, 1 211; jom Daranyi Government, I 218, 221n; negotiations with H., 1 233-3, 237; Bled secures Parliamentary representation, Agreements, I 237, 239, 239n, 240; m H.- i 218: becomes National Party Leader of Czech dispute, 1 271, 272, 277, 280, 281n, Nevdonsl Socialist Hungarian Pariv-

289n: Ciano offers to mediate with, Hungarist Movement, 1 218; Imredy’s

1318: fall of r 3-4, tS treatment of, I 226-7; Imprisonment of,

Streng, Si Wiliam, Briush diplomatst, I 227, 230; German mterest m, 1 227-8,

1 264n 432: Vatican interest m, 1228; Mussolin

Srresa Plan, 1 OF refuses to support, I 228; rejects MdasyvarSuses, 1 $9-90, 98, 378 ség’s policy, 1 229: Ciano and, § 317; Sturdza, Prince ML, Roumanian pohtician, atrempt to rescue, I 331; plot to berate,

Tr 468 1 427; released, 1 453; leads Arrow Cross

Sudezen Germans, I 208, 236, 239n, 248, Party, 1 43-4; antagonises Germans, 1 434232, 233, 234, 236, D9, 203, 208, 274, 277 435; meeting with Imrédy, 1 434, 437;

Suhaj, Colonel, cfr. 1 286: 0 133n, 167n analysis of Right Wing parties, 1 455, Sulvek, D., 4 Magvar Tragédia, ciz.1 107n, 456, rejects Volkseruppe theory, I 457: 18-4, 30-4n, 310n, 350n, 331: 1 25n, 46, 1800 n 41-2; conracts with Genmans, um 36, 104;

Sulzberger, Mr., civ. 0 1lvén negotiations with Imrédists, m 41, 104; Supply, Minisury of, w 30, 114 on Deputy Regency Bul, m 76-7; Party

Supply position: general: 1939, 1 383; strength in 1942, n 78: expels Hubay and soring 1940, I 428; autumn 1940, 1 +59: Ruszkay, © 78; opmion of Kallay, m 92: summer 19-41, a 16, 36; aumamn 1941, reorganises Party, m 103, 130-1; imiterB30: summer 1942, 108; 1943, 0 168, View with Kallay, m 131, 131n; Germans 18l, 328; autumn 1944, 1 346; winter ignore, 1 154, 195: state of party, m 199-

1944-5, o 460 200: negotiations with Veesenmayer,

Sid, J, H. Arrow Cross Deputy, a 77, 103 WH 238n, 290-2; 323, 330, 385-6; mterview Svrarko, M.. BH. Government journalist, 0 36, with Horthy, 0 264, 291-2, 330-1; com-

65, 201, 235, 255 plains of depletion of manpower, u 268;

Svenska Dagodlader, 1 178n, 210 rejects National Socialist offer, m 295;

Svenska DagGlatr, @ 326 rejects offer of Union, mo 310-1; nego-

INDEX 513 tiates for taking over power, 11 356-62, Szent Istvén Society, 1 32 366-8; reconciliation with Rajniss, 11358- | Szentgydrgy, Professor, 11 129n, 142, 235,

359; reconciliation with Palffy, m 359; 256n =

brought to Budapest, m 412; interview Szentimrei, J., H. publicist, 1 79n with Horthy, u 436-7, 439; takes over Szentirmay, Félix, H. industrialist, u 195 Government, 11 442-3; Minister President, | Szentivanyi, Bishop, m 217, 314, 334n

W 442-3; appointed National Leader, Szentivanyi, Domokos, Head of Teleki’s 11 446-8; Right-wing Unity negotiations, private Cabinet, 1 440n: 1 203n, 314, 353, 11 446, 448; anti-Jewish legislation, 1 449- 445, 455 450; deportation of Jews, 11 450-1; evacu- Szentivanyi, L., H. Deputy, m 255

ation of population, m 451-3; interview Szentmikléssy, Ivan, H. Foreign Office with Hitler, 11 461; passes Indemnity Bill, official, m 55, 127, 146, 149, 164, 167n, Il 462-3; action in spring 1945, m 468; 182n, 190, 190n, 191n, 233, 255, 264, 428,

withdraws to clouds, u 468 441

ref. 1 103n, 136n Sszentpalyi, Major, H. officer, 1 344n, 413

Szamuély, Tibor, H. Bolshevik terrorist,144 | Szerdahelyi, I., H. Arrow Cross Deputy,

Szanto, J., Vice-President of H. Jewish W 449n Neolog Community, 1 117 Szinyei-Merse, J., H. Deputy, 1 180: m 101, Szapary, Count A., H. Legitimist Jeader, u 108n

254, 270n Szollési, J., H. Arrow Cross Deputy, 1 350,

Szasz, B., H. National Socialist, 1 155, 158 428, 445: 1 131, 311, 368, 370, 386n, §zasz, Lajos: H. Minister of Supply, u 114, 411, 441n, 447, 463, 468 115; Minister of Industry in Sztdjay Szombathelyi, Béla, H. General, 1 23 Government, 11 251, 252, 272, 283, 298, Szombathelyi, F., H. General: If 54; ap312, 322, 327, 359, 386; part in Szalasi pointed Chief of General Staff, mn 54 Government, 1 362, 370, 386n, 387, 411, negotiations with Germany, 11 67-8; on

449 Ujvidék massacre, 1 73; visit to Italy, 0

Szatmar Swabians, 1 144 94n; establishes home force, 11 118-9, 120,

Szava, H. Socialist, cit. 11 365n, 384n, 411n 137-8; on Serbian occupation force,

Széchényi, B., President of H. Upper House, Ww 138-9, 174-5; on Allied co-operation,

1 307 1 141; visit to Hitler 1943, m 148-52: 488 193, 212; visit to Germany, 1 184, 189; Széchényi, Count Lajos, H. National and Howie’s mission, 1 217, 218; negotiaSzechényi, Count Istvan, H. reformer, 1 6, surrender policy, 1 170, 175, 186n, 189, Socialist leader, 1 187n, 218, 228n, 229, tions for release of Dead Army, 1 218-9;

229n, 331, 434 and German occupation of H., mu 230,

szeder, F., H. Deputy, u 115, 129n, 256, 246, 247, 250n

299, 314 ref. 1 184, 188n, 224, 233

Szeder, J., H. Deputy, 1 181 Szonyl, I., H. Deputy, m 79n

Szeged Idea, 1 28-9, 33, 34, 35-6, 78-80, 100, Szdrcsey, J., National Socialist Deputy,

130, 155, 365: 11 209 1117, 181n, 229n

Szegedi- Maszak, Aladar, H. Foreign Szo6rényi, Captain, H. staff officer, m 417, Ministry official, m 121, 127, 141, 143n, 418 162, 164, 216, 230, 255, 264, 265n Sztankovics, V., H. journalist, 1 3 inf. 1 138n, 139n, 241n, 245n, 249n, Sztdjay, Dome: I 112; Hungarian Minister 266n, 269n, 278n, 287n: 1 143n, 239n, in Berlin, 1 112; negotiations preparatory

250n to Munich crisis, 1 193n, 203, 204n, 206n,

Szekel Division, 1 28n 207, 210-1, 233; at Kiel, 1 238; and

Szekels, 1 4, 16, 197, 199n, 387, 388, 408, Munich crisis, 1 253, 254-5, 267n; H.-

421n, 420n, 422, 425 Czechoslovak negotiations, 1 270, 271n,

Szekfii, Professor G., 1 13, 380: m1 78, 79, 272, 281n, 295, 298n, 301; and Ruthene

79n, 107, 115, 116n, 129, 256n question, 1 312, 313, 314, 317, 332, 342, Hdrom Nemdezék és ami utana kéyet- 366; and German-Polish dispute, 1 356n,

kezik, cit. 1 78n 363; and Teleki’s letters, 1 358-9: and Magyar Térténet, cit. 1 13n German-Polish dispute, 1 356n, 363; and

Széll, Janos, inf. 1 226n: wm 28n, 325n, Transylvanian question, 1 390, 391, 394,

340n 398, 399, 405-6, 408, 409n, 410, 419n; on

Széll, Jézsef, H. Minister of the Interior, H.-German co-operaton, I 431-2, 432n,

1 180, 324n: 1 340n 443, 444; and Tripartite Pact negotiations,

Szemere, B., H. Deputy, 1 72n, 155, 158, 381, 1 439, 440, 441; Yugoslav negotiations

395 and crisis, 1 448n, 453, 454, 471, 474, 475,

Szemes, Colonel, 1 382n, 411n, 416 476, 477: 1 5, 57; and Russian war, 1

514 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH 18, 20, 24, 28; and declaration of war Teleki, Count Mihaly, H. Minister of Agrion U.S.A., m0 62-3; urges H.-German culture, 1 309, 458: m1 305, 313, 368, 386n co-operation, 0 67, 194: urges settlement inf. 0 340n, 368n, 410n

of Jewish question, 0 117, 126, pre- Teleki, Count Pal: I 221-6; early career, occupation negotiations, 11 223n, 246 1 221-2; Minister President (1920), 1 41; Minister President, m 250; Cabinet, resigns, I 42; activities 1920-38, 1 32, 72n, Wi 251-2; treatment of the Jewish question, 82n, 144, 222: Minister of Cults and HW 261, 287, 301, 302. 303: difficulties of Instruction, 1 221; and Hungary’s claims government, 0 262-3, 289-95: domestic at Munich, 1 250; and negotiations with policy, 1m 269-71; treatment of Poles and Czechoslovakia, Oct. 1938, 1 276, 284, P.O.W.’s, 1 270-1; the purges, m 271-3; 287, 296: joins revolt against Imrédy. Jewish deportations, m 273-89, 301-3, I 310; refuses Minister Presidency, 1 315; 308-9; Szalasi and. 0 291; appeals for Minister President, 1 328; difficulties of Right Wing unity, 1 292-3, 310: economic his position, 1 329; opening moves, I 330agreements with Germany, uO 295-7: 331: and Ruthene crisis, 1 322, 330-43: financial agreements with Germany, u visits to Rome and Berlin, 1 346-9; holds 297-8: appeals to workers, 1 298-300; elections, 1 349-51; programme, I 352; Horthy's dissatisfaction with, m 307-8, Press policy, 1 353; organises “‘national

318; resignation of. m 313, 320 political service,’ 1 354; letters to Hitler

ref. 152, 150n, 322: 11 69, 94, 293n, 324, and Mussolini, 1 358-9; reactions to 448 German-Soviet Pact, 1 361-2; Yugoslav

Sztranyavszki, Sandor: 1 113: President of negotiations, 1 362, 403; policy in light of Government Party, 1 118, 119, 127, 180; European War, 364-6, 369, 370, 371-2:

manages electoral committees, 1 129; assurances to Great Britain, 375-6; role in G6mb6s party, 1 130, 133: founds émigré government fund, 1 377; President of Lower House, I 180, 307, internal policy, 1 378, 379, 402, 432;

309; Minister of Agriculture, 1 221; elaborates claims on Roumania, I 366-8, leader of opposition, 1 310, 314, 316 391: and question of transit for German ref. 1 101n, 102, 123, 174. 176, 306 troops, I 390, 398-9, 400: visits Rome, Szull6, G., Slovak Magyar leader, 1 236, I 393; increasing internal difficulties,

308n, 384: 0 70n, 74, 201 1 393-4; opposes alliance with Germany, I 396-7: but suggests consultations, 1

Tabian, Captain, o 71n 398; attacked by Right, 1 400; verbal Taby, A., Major of Regent's Bodyguard, concessions, I 401; and Transylvanian

1 166, 215 crisis, July-August 1940, 1 404-24; visits

Takacs, F.. H. Minister of Industry, 1 460 Germany, 1 410-11, 420-4: depression and Talamo, Marquis G., Italian Minister in Wish to resign, J 432; withdraws request,

Budapest, 1 405, 408: m 25 I 433: consolidates Parliamentary posi-

Tamas, Aladar, 1 71 tion, I 435-6, 437; signs Tripartite Pact,

Tancsics, M., H. revolutionary, u 49, 140 I 442-3; signs Pact with Yugoslavia, Tarcsay, Captain, Popular Front leader, I 452; announces further programme,

it 456, 462 1 458; overtures to U.S.S.R., 1 468:

Tardieu, A., French diplomatist, 1 97 further assurances to Great Britain,

Tardieu Plan, 1 97, 137 I 469-70: and Yugoslav crisis, 1 475-7, Tariff, Autonomous, 1 63 479-86: last hours and suicide, 1 486-90

Tasnadi-Nagy, A., H. Minister of Justice, ref. 1 36, 153, 161: 0 14, 240, 294n 1.179, 180n, 309, 381: m 247, 310, 386, inf. 1 250n, 274n, 322n

386n, 447 Teleki, Laszlo, 1 488

Tatarescu, G., Roumanian Minister Temesvari, H. General, a 363, 377, 393, 400

President, 1 198n, 199 Teschen, 1 253, 255, 259

Taxation: in Historic H.,1 37; 1931,191; TESz (Tarsadalmi Egyesiiletek Szdvetsége

1932, 1 96: suggested reform, I 101: —Federation of Social Associations),

1939-40, 1 118; war-time, mu 51, Sin, 1 31, 72, 72n, 119, 181, 182, 182n

168 Thomas, Albert, ILO official, 1 68

Teleki, Count B., Chairman of Tran- Tildy, Zoltan, H. Smallholder leader, 1 122, svlvanian Party, 11 294n, 342, 375 457: 1 46, 79n, 107n, 115, 129, 129n, 140,

inf. 1 404n: o 3745n 169, 171, 197n, 198, 207n, 255, 313, 314,

Teleki, Count Géza: 1 411n, 440n: m 342, 332, 365, 383, 384, 455, 456, 458

349, 353, 459, 460 Tilea, V.. Roumanian diplomatist, 1 232n, inf. 1 110n, 335n, 341n, 404n, 405n, 340, 355n, 396n

475n, 479n, 485n, 489n: 1 341n. 350n, The Times.1 226, 249, 340, 347n, 391, 417n,

355n, 374n, 378n, 380n, 382n, 418n 418n, 464: 1 45n, 144n

INDEX 515

Tiso, N. J., Czechoslovak Minister for from, 1 281; establishment of National

Slovak Affairs, 1282, 284, 295, 299n, 302n, Committee, 1 341-2; military operations

335n, 336n: 0 179n, 223, 224n, 230, 233 in, 1 339-40, 345; evacuation ordered, Die Wahrheit uber die Slovakei, cit. 1 It 346; military evacuation, 0 346, 374-5,

(341n 378. See also Transylvanian Party

Tisza, Count Istvan, 1 118n Transylvania, Southern, 1941-4: conditions Tito, Marshal: Ujvidék Massacres and, in, 1 429: m1 95, 96; expulsion of Magyars i 71n, 72n; Mussolini on, 1 147; British from, 1 430, 430n, 472n; H. plan to re-

transfer support to, m 180, 206; H. occupy, Wm 213, 219, 219n; question of contacts with, m 196-7, 223, 233, 355, entering, m 321, 322, 336, 338, 340;

399-400 military operations in, m 337, 339-40,

Tolbukhin, Marshal, 1 453, 463 345

Tomesanyi, G., H. Commissioner for Transylvanian National Committee, 1 341-2

Ruthenia, 0 40n, 259n Transylvanian Optants, 1 25, 85, 89 Tom6si, Colonel, 1m 175n Transylvanian Party: parliamentary re-

Torok, A., Szdlasi Alarc Neélkiil, cit. 1 42n presentation, 1 430: mm 78; support Torzs6k6s Magyarok (True-Blue Magyars), Teleki, 1 435, 437; independent political

1181n programme, 1 458, 458n: 11 14-15, 41, 293;

Tost, G., Commander of Regent’s Body- support Regency Bill, m1 76, 77; support guard, m 325, 354, 378, 396, 398, 404, 432, Kallay, 1m 101; under Sztdjay Govern-

435, 438 ment, 1 271, 289; on Right Wing Unity

Toussaint, General, 1 54 question, 1 292, 310, 313; strength of

Towns: in Historic H., 1 7, 8; growth of, party in 1944, n 306; agree to non-

1 30, 67 political government, m 310; formation of

Trade: nature of foreign, 1 65; global figures National Committee, m 341; request

and data 1921-8, 164-5; 1930, 189; 1931-2, armistice, 0 341-2, 349; Russian mission, 196; 1933-4,1 118; 1935, 1 133; 1936-7, Wt 349-50, 374-5; sign National Alliance, 1192; 1937, 1373; 1937-40, 1374n; 1941, Il 368 HW 52, 53n; 1941-3, mn 118n, 166n, 181; ref. m 329 1944, 1 296-7n. Fortrade withindividual Transylvanian Problem, 1941-4: importance

countries s.v. to H., and Roumanian policy, 1 431;

Trade, Balance of, 1 64-5, 118, 133, 192 German promises to restore’ to

Trade Unions: in Historic H., 1 11, 12; in Roumania, 1 444: 0 224, 253; H. demands Bethlen-Social Democrat agreement, 1 43; and negotiations, 0 116, 146, 179, 179n, Communist infiltration of, 1 156; 1939-40, 192n, 205, 216; Roumanian demands and

1 378; 1941, um 46; Right demands negotiations, 0 179, 205-6, 319, 342; repression of, 11 101; expansion of, 1 208; Russian policy, m 177-8, 206; Allied turned over to Marton, m 272; agreement policy, 1 191-2, 192n, 204-5, 216; prospects

with Sztdjay, m1 299; adhere to Com- held out to H., 1 350n, 354, 374; German munist-Social Democrat agreement, 1 promises to restore to H., 11 461n; solution

332-3; in Debrecen Government, 1 464 of, 1 468

ref. 0 156 Transylvanian Saxons, 1 15, 25, 430

Transylvania: transferred to Roumania, Travers, Mr. H. K., American Secretary of I 4; population of, 1 4; Magyar minority Legation in Budapest, m 64n, 218n in 1910, 1 4; 1930, 1 143; in Historic H., Trianon, Treaty of: H. signature of, 14, 24; 1 8; Roumanian population of, 1 14n; losses under, 1 4-5; economic effects of, Germans in, I 15n, 25; refugees from, 1 4-5, 26; armaments provisions, I 5, 63, I 27n; negotiations for independent, 1 84; 75, 87, 120; reparations clause, 1 5, 63; conditions in, I 143, 197-8; H. proposals, fulfilment of, 1 40, 63 I 321, 355, 375, 391, 404, 405, 406, 409; ‘Tripartite Pact: origin, 1 439; H. negotia-

Roumanian understanding, 1 356-7; tions, 1 349, 439, 440, 440n, 442; H.

Communism in, I 370n, 405n; H. claims in, adheres to, 1 443-4, 464; Spain adheres to,

I 387-8; conditions of action, 1 388-9; 1 442; Slovakia and Roumania adhere to,

partition of, 1 418-24 1 444; H. opposition to, 1 444-5; Bulgaria

Transylvania, Northern, in Hungary 1941-4: refuses to adhere to, 1 449n; Yugoslav’s area and population, 1 423; occupied adherence, 1 450, 451, 471, 472; Russian by H., 1 429; incorporation proclaimed, attitude to, 1 468; consequences of, 11 35; 1 430; reorganisation of administration, renewal of, m 56-7 1 430; Parliamentary representation, 1 Trumbi¢ Colonel, Yugoslav staff officer, m

430; conditions in, m 41, 107; Social 180

Democrats in, 1 158; proclaimed occupa- Trunkwalter, Colonel, H. staff officer, m

tional zone, m1 259; evacuation of Jews 421n

516 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Tuka, Mer., Slovak politician, 1 83n, 335, Unitary Party: constitution by Bethlen,

341: 1m 58n 144, 46, 72; seats gained in elections, I 45,

Tully, Miss, 1 352 92; discontent with Karolyi’s leadership, I Turanian Hunters (Turani Vadaszok), 99; name changed to Party of Unity, g.v. 118in: 0 102, 202, 272 United Agrarian Labourers’ and SmallTurani Vadaszok. See Turanian Hunters holders’ Party, 1 24

Turkey: GOmb6s’ visit to, 1 144; in Balkan United Hungarian National Socialist Move-

Conference, 1 390; German negotiations ment, I 187, 350. See Arrow Cross with, 1 442; in Yugoslav crisis,1478; plans United Hungarian Party in Czechoslovakia,

for neutral bloc under Turkish leadership, I 256, 308

1 125, 144, 147, 154n, 196, 205 Universities, 1 77, 78, 78n, 100, 150

Turul, 1 30, 126n, 127 Upper House: Bill extending powers of,

Turvolgyi, A., 0 278n 1 174, 190, representation increased, U0 77Tuzharcosok Szévetsége, m 102, 272 78, 124

Tyler, Mr. Royall, League of Nations U.S.A.: and H.-Yugoslav crisis, 1 481: 0 7, Financial Adviser in H., 1 74, 212, 377, 9, 10-11; Germany declares war on, I 62; 460: 1 122n, 123n, 141, 160, 163, 174, 175, H. declares war on, 61-4; registers state

191, 204, 213, 214 of war with satellites, m 94, 94n, and ques-

inf. 1 460n tion of Habsburg restoration, 1 112-3; Free H. movement in, 1 120-1; war-

UDV_ (Ungarlandisch-Deutscher Volks- time contacts with H., mn 122, 126-8, 131-3, bildungsverein): foundation of, 1 69, 70; 141-6, 162-3, 172, 174, 175, 191-3, 204concession made to, 1 169; reorganisation 205, 210, 216, 265; attitude to Sztdjay of, 1 170-2; function of, 1 169-72, 178-9, Government, 11 205; contacts abandoned,

229; disintegration, I 326 i 265; renewed contacts in September

Ugro-Rusins, 40 1944, 1 334-5, 337, 339, 352 Uj Magvarsdg, 1 119, 394, 395: u 26n, 199, ref. 1 85

209, 265n, 273, 373n Usborne, Admiral, British Council official,

Uj Nemzedék, 208, 273 1 335n

Ujszaszy, H. Colonel (later General),1 416, UstaSi, 1 86, 146, 151, 197: m 7n, 248n

460, 477n: m 180n, 217, 255, 270, 365, U.S.S.R.: and H.-Soviet Republic, 1 22;

366 disinterest in Danubian affairs 1926-30,

Ujvary, D., H. Consul in Istanbul, m 160, 1 22; and World Economic Crisis, 1 97;

176, 180, 185n, 186n Pacts with France and Czechoslovakia,

Ujvidék Massacres: m1 69-74; in H. Parlia- 1 147, 149; in Czechoslovak crisis, I 223,

ment, m1 107-8, 128; in Serbian negotia- 243, 268, 269n, 271, 292; Pact with tions, 0 145-6; enquiry reopened, m 201-2; Germany, I 363; invades Poland, I 367;

reinstatement of criminals, u 254, 267 claims on Roumania, 1 387-8, 395;

Ukrainian Rada, 1 279, 285-6, 299 annexes Bessarabia, 1 404; threatens

Ulain, F., H. Deputy, 1 72n further attack, 1 421-2; and Tripartite

Ullein-Reviczky, M. A.: I 316-7; Chief of Pact, 1 442; and Yugoslav crisis, u 4; and Press Bureau, 1 316: 1 26, 90; Polish war with Germany, 0m 17, 19, 21; recogaffairs, 1 356-7; Yugoslav affairs, 1 385; nises 1938 frontiers of Czechoslovakia, m 12-13; Minister Plenipotentiary, nm 91, 1 94; Soviet Czechoslovak Treaty, un 205 164; Allied mission, m 122, 127, 141, 172, ref. 1 196, 198 214, 216, 321; H. Minister in Sweden, U.S.S.R.-Hungarian Relations: 1920-30, u 164; Soviet contacts, 1 215, 388n; and 1 81; and H. signature of Anti-Comintern Committee of Dissident Diplomats, m 264 Pact, 1 319-22; resumption of diplomatic

Guerre Allemande, Paix Russe: cit. relations, 1 369-70; during Roumanian 1 320n, 416n, 424, 443, 449, 458n, 466, crisis, 1 404-5, 418, 422; exchange of 471n, 472n, 484, 487: 7 5n, 6n, 22, 24n, courtesies 1941, 1 468; Teleki sends 26n, 28n, 29n, 60n, 61n, 62n, 85n, 141n, emissary to, 1 468; mission unsuccessful,

214n, 388n il, 4; rebukes H., 1 10; alleged bombing ref. 1 85, 148n, 272 of Kassa, 0 25, 31-2; H. breaks off diplo-

inf. 1 146n, 151n, 197n, 341n, 385n, matic relations with, 1 23; M. Molotov’s 395n, 421n, 475n: 1 7n, 10n, 13n, 215n message, 0 23; H. declares existence of

Ullman, Baron Gyorgy, o 141 state of war, 1 28, 29-30; H. opinion on Umberto, King of Italy, m1 147, 171 war, Il 33-5; Kallay’s attitude, m 86; H.

Unconditional surrender, 1 137 endorsement of war, m1 91-2; war-time

Unghvari, S., inf. 1 108n contacts, 0 176-8, 215; H. missions to,

Unegvar, I 286, 291, 295, 296, 301, 302 m 349-50, 349n, 353-5, 354n, 362, 365, Unified Government Party, I 41 372-5, 377-81, 382n, 384-5, 393, 397-8, 427,

INDEX 517 455-6; organises Debrecen Government, Schneller, 1 297-8; negotiations on the i 457-9, 463-4. See also Communism, formation of the Lakatos Government,

Military operations 1 307-8, 310, 318, 323-4; on defence of

Utassy, Colonel, H. officer, 1 382n, 385, H., m 320, 338-9; armistice question, 393, 397, 398, 428, 431, 441, 462 1 343; negotiations with Arrow Cross, II

356-62; Hitler approves policy, mu 369;

Vagi Party, 1 71 ultimatum to Lakatos, m 386; interviews

Vago, P., H. Deputy, 1 401, 427, 437, 437n with Horthy, mu 388-91, 402-7; on Vajna, G., H. Arrow Cross Deputy, m 104, rescinding of Order of the Day, u 412-6; 154, 154n, 292, 305, 331, 332, 357, 358, on constitutional appointment of Szalasi 361, 370, 386, 386n, 387, 412, 423, 449, Government, 11 423-43; sends Jews out of

462 Budapest, 11 450; leaves H., 11 469 Vajta, F., H. publicist, 1 262, 275 ref. 1 228: 11 239n, 241

Valentini, A., H. Minister of Justice, u 460 inf. 1 196n, 297, 318n, 412n, 415n,

Vannay Putsch, 1 100n 423n, 424n

Vansittart, Sir R. (later Lord), Chief Végvary, J., H. Deputy, 1 126n Diplomatic Adviser of British Foreign Velics, H., H. Minister in Athens, 1 163

Office, 1 236, 251, 252, 266 Veres, P., H. writer, 11 79n

Varga, Béla, H. Deputy, 1 79n, 197n, 255 Veress, H. Generai, 11 244, 254, 336,342, 355,

Varga, Mer., 1 122, 354 364n, 375, 381, 382, 418, 431, 443, 457,

Varga, S., H. Minister of Industry, 1 381, 458, 463 401; Minister of Trade and Communi- Veress, lLaszl6, H. Foreign Ministry

140 216, 256

cations, I 381, 401, 403, 451: 1 27, 46, 80, official, m 142, 143, 144, 176, 185, 186,

Vary, K., 1 456, 457 inf. m 216n, 233n

Vas, Zoltan, H. Communist, 171,370:1459 Veress, S., H. writer, 1 79n Vasarhelyi, B., Foispan of Kolosvar, 1 375n Vertessy, S., Head of H. Chancellery, 1 94 Vasary, I., H. Minister of Finance, 1 419n, Vészi, J.. H. editor, 1118

460 Veverka, F., Czechoslovak Minister in

Vass, Mer., H. Minister of Social Welfare, Bucharest, 1 256n, 259n, 266n, 300n

1 68 Viatoianu, Roumanian General, 1 422n

Vasvari, H. General, m1 419, 445 Vida, E., H. industrialist, m 255, 283

Vatican: interest in H., 1 228, 230; H. Village Explorers,1 156, 184, 380: 11 46, 107n, appeals, 1 356: m 61, 125, 145, 147-8; visit 130, 208, 256, 332 by Teleki, 1 393; visit by Szombathelyi, Villani, Baron F., H. Minister in Rome, nt 94-5n, visit by Kallay, m 147-8; protests 1 150n, 266n, 278, 295, 301, 311, 312, 347, at treatment of H. Jews, 0 277, 301, 302 366, 397, 405, 406, 440: o 25n, 58n Vattay, H. General, m 268, 317, 323n, 325, Vincze, General, m 259n 337, 349n, 350, 355, 372n, 374, 378, 382, Virradat, 1 457: 0 273 393, 395, 396, 401, 402n, 404, 413, 417, Vitézi Rend: foundation, 1 30-1; function, 418, 426, 430, 431, 432, 432n, 434, 438, I 32; allocation of land to, 1 66: m1 39, 40n,

441, 462 101n, 202; revival of 1 181n

Vay, Baron Laszl6, H. Deputy, 1 330, 331, ref. m 102, 272

394: m 292, 305 Vladar, G., H. Minister of Justice, m 216n,

Vazsonyi, J.. H. Left-wing Deputy, m 181, 325, 343, 383, 395, 409, 435, 442

255 Voce a’ Italia,.cit. 1 318n

VDA, 1 172, 217 Voernle, J.. H. Minister in Ankara, 1 280,

Ungarn 448

VDU. See Volksbund der Deutschen in 344, 407: m 23, 25, 126, 264, 319, 388, Veesenmayer, Dr. Edmund: negotiates Vogt, General, 1 125 German-Slovak agreement, 1341; reports Voivodina: 1 84, 197, 198, 200, 386, 452, on H., m 148-9, 179n, 195-6; German 474n, 478, 479, 483, 487: m1 7, 58 Minister and Reich Plenipotentiary in H., Volkgruber, J., Austrian Minister in Paris,

ml 229, 234n, 257; formation of Sztdjay 1 208n Ministry, 1 246, 247-53; on army com- V6lkischer Beobachter, 1 177

mand question, 0 253-4; powers defined, Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn iW 257-8, 260-1; negotiations on the (VDU): formation, 1 326; programme, Jewish question, m 274-89, 301-3, 305; 1 326, 326n; statutes sanctioned, 1 352; support of Government parties, 1 289, and Volksgruppe Agreement of August 290, 293; negotiations with Szalasi, 1 290, 1940, 1 424: nf 41 310-1, 323-4, 330, 360-2, 369-71, 385- Volksdeutsche Kameradschaft, 1 170, 171, 386; financial agreement with Remenyi- 178, 179, 326

518 OCTOBER FIFTEENTH Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, 1 217, 228-9, 436, | Warlimont, German General, inf. a 17n,

438, 438n, 478, 479: o 41 23n, 24n

Volksdeutsch Question, 1 140, 169-70, 171, | Webb, Industrial Democracy, 1 68

172, 178-9, 217, 349, 381, 423-4, 457: Weichs, Freiherr von, German Field-

i 96, 268, 452 Marshal, 0 134, 226, 246, 253, 257, 258

Volksgruppe: H. Right Radicals and Weiss Family, 0 287-8

controversy over, I 228-9, 394, 428, 434-5: | Weiss, Baron Jené, H. industrialist, m 287, 141, 44-5, 103; agreement, 1 423-4; formal 288 constitution, 1 457; reinforcement after Weiss, Baroness Alfred, m 287 April 1941, m 41, 96; recruiting question, Weiss, Baroness Jeno, I 287

w 96-7, 139, 151, 153, 267; German Weizsdcker, Ernst Freiherr von, German control, m 268; representation in H. Foreign Office official, 1 110n, 203n, 206n,

Parliament, m 305, 306n 210, 233, 234n, 240n, 241, 242, 244n, 245,

Volosin, Mgr. A., Ruthene leader, 1 286, 246, 253, 263n, 271n, 272n, 281n, 283 299, 302n, 323, 336, 337, 338, 339, 339n 293, 295, 297, 298, 299, 300, 314, 335n Voros, Janos, H. General: IT 54-5; appointed 336n, 346, 346n, 356n, 357n, 358, 359 Chief of Operational Section, m1 54; pro- 363, 408, 4lin, 414n, 440, 441, 448n German policy, m1 139n; visits Hitler, 451n, 454, 461n, 463n: 117, 18, 28, 57, 62 W 261n; contact with Yugoslavia, u 265; Wends, i 39 appointed Chief of General Staff, m1 267; Werkmeister, K., German Councillor of alleges contact with West, nw 314-5; Legation in Budapest, 1 211n, 234n, 235,

refuses to place H. airforce under 463n: u 29

German command, of 317; negotiations Werth, General H.: Il 274-5; Chief of with Guderian, 1 318, 321, 335; com- H. General Staff, 1 274, 309; in Ruthene munications to Germans, 0 320n, 325, crisis, I 311, 314, 336; Staff talks with

326, 341, 344; on defence of Southern Germany, I 358; urges invasion of

Transylvania, m 322, 337, 338, 341, 342; Roumania I 386n, 388, 397, 420n; Russian member of Horthy’s inner circle, 0 323n; war, 1 462: 1 18-19, 24, 137; on Yugoslav on armistice negotiations, 0 343, 378, 394, crisis, I 477, 481-2, 483, 484, 486, 489: 396, 398-9, 401, 405, 408; interview with u 4, 6, 11; fall of, m 53-4 Hitler, m1 344-5; acts as intermediary with ref. 1 l6n, 367n, 384, 387, 433 Resistance leaders, m 365; orders retreat Wettstein, J.,H. Minister in Prague, 1 259n, of First and Second armies, m1 382; counter- 266, 269, 270, 272, 277, 278: uo 126,

mands Order of the Day, m 414-17, 419, 163 428; capture and release, 11 442; escapes Wheat: importance in H. economy, I 64, 65;

to U.S.S.R., 0 445-6, 456; part in forma- fall in price, 1 89-91; export figures and

tion of Debrecen Government, m 458, data, 1 96, 118, 144, 145n, 192, 353:

459, 464 W 50n; harvests, 1 98n, 118, 192: mo 50n, ref. 11 423n, 431 114, 114n, 181; prices, 1 118n, 192

Voroshilov, Soviet Marshal, u 349n White Terrorists, 1 25, 28, 29, 41, 155 Vyshinski, A. V., Soviet diplomatist, 1 4n, Wilhelm, Archduke, 1 35n

10 Wilson, Lord, British F.-M., m 352

Vyx, Colonel, French diplomatist, 1 22 inf. m 353n

Wimmer, Lothar G. F., Austrian Minister Wages: in Historic H., 1 9; in Reconstruc- in Belgrade, 1 207n tion Era, 1 69; in world economic crisis, Winch, Republic for a Day, cit. 1 338n 1 98, 118, 133; 1933, 1192; in war,1378, Winchkler, I., H. Minister of Trade, 1 119,

460: 1 51, 109, 168 176

Waldeck, R. G., Athene Palace, cit. 1 417n Windischgratz, Prince Lajos, m 195 Walko, L., H. Foreign Minister, 194,95,128 | Winkelmann, General, German S.S. Com-

Walton, A., H. lawyer, u 195 mander, 1 238, 239n, 241, 245, 249, 25],

War, European: German attack on Poland, 254, 259, 260, 261, 269, 281, 286n, 288, 1 363-4; British declaration of war on 289, 290, 293n, 305, 310, 311, 318, 329,

Germany, I 366; Russian attack on 330, 331, 357, 359, 360, 361, 366, 369,

Poland, 1 367; Allied campaigns and their 370, 371, 376n, 386, 388, 389, 390, 391, effect on H., El Alamein, 11 124; landing 402, 414 in N. Africa, m 124-30; landing in Winkler, Die Diktatur in Oesterreich, cit. 1

Normandy, o 315 137n

War, H.-Russo: declaration, wu 29-30; Winterton, Lord, 1 268 initial popularity of, m 33-5; conditions Wirth, K., H. Deputy, 1 427, 428, 455: during early stages of, n 50-1. See also tl 449n

Army, Military Operations Witz, Father, 1 486

INDEX 519 Wodianer, A., H. Minister in Lisbon: 1939, 1 355, 362; Sept. 1939 to June 1940, Western contacts, 1 123, 128, 132, 143, I 385, 386, 403; Axis attitude towards, 145, 160, 161, 170, 172, 173, 179n, 183, I 360, 363, 368, 371; and Transylvanian 186n, 191, 192, 193, 204, 214, 216; crisis, 1 406, 407, 409; H. claims in, 1 406, Committee of Dissident Diplomats, m 264 442, 447, 451, 452, 471-2; negotiations

Woermann, E., German Foreign Ministry for Pact of Friendship with H., 1 446, official, 1 211, 234n, 253, 255, 261, 263, 449-50; negotiations with Germany and 267n, 281n, 283, 298, 302, 311, 312n, 314, Italy, 1 447-50, 471, 472; signature of

425n, 454, 494 Pact with H., 1 451-2; ratification of Pact

Wohler, German General, 1 461 with H., 1 470; signature of Tripartite Wolff, Dr. Karoly, H. politician, 1 30, 32n, Pact, 1 472; fall of Markovicé Govern-

124, 126, 164 ment, 1 473; Simovic putsch, 1 473, 474;

Wysliceny, Baron von, German S.S. Com- Hitler prepares to invade, 1 474; critical mander, It 228n, 238n, 274, 275, 281, 282 situation in, 1 475-7, 478-86; British policy towards, 1 477, 487; Russian

X. See EKSz policy towards, 11 4; invaded by Germany,

Wm 7; invaded by H., nu 9, 11-12; dis- , Yalcin, M., Turkish publicist, 1m 221 memberment of, lt 12-13; H. contacts Yeftic¢é, V., Minister President of Yugo- with, um 145-6, 180, 196-7, 265; H.

slavia, I 148 obligations to in pre-armistice, m 377;

Yolland, Professor A., 1 486 in armistice, m 464-5. See also Croatia-

“Young Turks,” 1 130, 134, 174, 177, 180 Slavonia, Croat Peasant Party, Bacska, Youth, H.: political ideology, 1 78-9, 100, Banat, Baranya, Murak6z, Muravidék, 124; organisations, r 87, 99n, 119, 127, Serbia, Mihailovic¢, Tito

159 Yukic, A., inf. 1 386n, 451n, 471n

Yugoslavia: area and population acquired from H.,14; Magyar minority in,14, 143, | Zadravec, Bishop, President of TESz, 1 182 151, 197, 199, 200, 203-4, 207, 234, 239, Zak6, General A., 1 358 318, 386, 478, 479; invades H. (1918), Zankay, Mme, Minister President’s Secre-

1 22; refugees from, 1 27n; signs Re- tary, 0 292n, 348n, 392n construction Protocol, 1 63; H. attitude Zichy, Count Janos, Legitimist leader, 1 36, towards, 1 84; in H.-Italian politics (1920- 181: m1 73, 197 1931), 1 84-6; in world economic crisis, Zichy, Countess, 1 238n, 250n

1 97; Hitler’s policy towards, 1 139; H.- Zichy, Count Vladimir, H. emissary to Italian hostility to, 1144n, 146; rapproche- Slovakia, 11 349, 350, 354

ment with Germany, 1 147-9, 153; Zhukov, Soviet Marshal, 1 353 rapprochement with Italy, 1151, 193,196, Zimdanyi, P., Piarist Father, 1 107 197; rapprochement with H.,1151, 154, Zipser, 1 144 197, 199, 200; Little Entente policy,1197, Z6ldi, Major, H. staff officer, m 71, 72n,

198-9, 201; negotiations with Germany, 201, 282 Italy and H. in 1938, 1 203-4, 207, 210-1, Zsellers, 19, 11 233-5: Bled Agreements, 1 237, 239, 240, Zsindely, F., H. Deputy, 1 180: 11 26, 140 241, 243n; in Czechoslovak crisis, 1 253, Zsirkay, J.. H. Deputy, 1 72n 255, 271, 272, 280-1, 289, 289n, 292; Zsitvay, T., H. Minister of the Interior, 195,

relations with H. in November 1938- 101, 117

March 1939, 1 318, 321, 333; Axis policy, inf. 1 4In, 42n, 67n, 93n, 94n, 100n,

1 344-8; relations with H. in summer 101n, 102n

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