Objective Being in Descartes and in Suarez

Citation preview

Analecta Gregoriana Cura Pontlficlae Universitatis Gregorianae edita

Vol. 154. Series Facultatis Philosophicae: sectio A, n. 10

TIMOTHY

J.

CRONIN S.

J.

OBJECTIVE BEING IN DESCARTES AND IN SUAREZ

GREGORIAN L�IVERSITY PRESS PIAZZA DELLA PILOTTA, 4 - ROMA

1966

IMPRIMI POTEST Romae, die 25 Februarii 1966 R.

P.

EDUARDUS

DHANIS,

S.

Rector Universitalis

IMPRll\lATUR E Vicariatu Urbis, die 1 Martii 1966

+

ALOYSIUS

Card. Vicarius

TYPIS PONTIFICIAE UNIVERSITATIS GREGORIANAE - ROMAE

I.

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION

1

.

Chapter I: The Problem .

7

A. - Nature of ideas .

8 10

Meaning of fonn . Use of form in theory of knowledge of St. Thomas Form of ideas in Descartes .

14

B. - Point of departure for proving the actualilu of things other than the thinking substance .

Hi

t.· Relation of sensation to thought . 2. Relation of ideas to things other than the self . a. One way to prove the reality of beings other than the self . b. Another way to prove the reality of beings other than the self . Ideas: their formal or material clement . Ideas: their objective element .

C. - Immediate Scholastic sources for the distinction of ideas into formal and objective . t. Opinions of historians of Philosophy . 2. Scholastic sources on objective being available to Descartes at Le Flechc . 3. Other Scholastic sources known to Descartes . 4. Scholastic texts on the distinction of ideas into formal and objective .

1�

16 18 18 27 28 29 31

31 32 3:J 3:i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VI

Chapter II: Objective being in Divine knowledge: in a source of Descartes and in Descartes' system .

37

A. - Problem of Descartes' .4dversary of eternal truths .

37

1. Texts of Descartes . 2. Source of these texts .

38 39

B. - Doctrine of Descarces Adversary on the objective being of eternal truths .

41

C. - Doctrine of Descartes on eternal truths and their relation to God.

56 57 61

1. Unity of God V2. Incomprehensibility of God V. - Reason for Descartes' position on eternal truths and their relation to God . 1. Gilson's explanation and objections to it . 2. A proposed explanation for Descartes' position

64 64 70

Chapter III: Objective being in human knowledge: in a source of Descartes and in Descartes' system .

75

A. - Objective being in human knowledge: in scholasticism .

76 76 77

1. In the doctrine of St. Thomas. 2. In the doctrine of Suarez . B. - Objective being in human knowledge: in Descartes . 1. Initial description of the nature of objective being. 2. Employment of objective reality . a. First proof for God's actuality . b. Second proof for God's actuality . c. Proof for the actuality of the material world . Resume of relation of objective being in human knowledge: in Descartes and in a source of Descartes

I: Meaning of Descartes' first

principle .

II: The main historical lines of development of the doctrine of objective being .

APPENDIX

89 96 96 127 137 137 151

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

89

157 167

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VO

APPENDIX III: Diverse Positions on the relation between scholasticism and cartesianism on the nature of objective being .

200

APPENDIX IV: Diverse authors on Descartes' doctrine on the relation of the eternal truths to God .

208

NOTES •

226

to to to to to

Introduction Chapter I Chapter II . Chapter III . Conclusio

BIBLIOGRAPHY

.

INDEX OF NAMES

226 227 238 246 270 271

.

275

INTRODUCTION

The objective reality of ideas plays an important role in the cartesian system, for upon it rests the whole force of his demonstration of the existence of God. Ex hoc (idea cntis sumrne perfrcti) cnim uno tota vis demonstrationis meae dep,endct. 1

Not only does the demonstration of God's existence take its point of departure from the objective reality of ideas, but it is an axiom that the knowledge which we have of all things, sensible and insensible, rests on the objective reality of our ideas and on the application to it of the causal axiom. Unde enim sequitur rcalitatcm ohjrctivam idcarum no­ strarum requirere causam in qua cadem realitas non tan­ tum objective sed formaliter contineatur. Notandumque hoc axioma esse admittcnclum ut ab ipso uno omnium rerum tam sensibilium quam insensibilium cognitio dcpendcat. 2

This same doctrine Descartes expresses even more em­ phatically in the third Meditation, wherein he affirms that his sole means of escape from solipsism is by way of the objective reality of his ideas. If among his ideas there is one of such nature that it makes him see clearly that it is not in him formally or eminently and that consequently he cannot him­ self be the cause of it, then it follows of necessity that he is not alone in the world, hut that there is another being which exists and is the cause of this idea. Si rcalitas objcctiva alicuius ex meis idcis sit tanta ut certus sim eandem nee formaUtcr nee eminentcr in me cssc, nee proinde me ipsum eius ideac causam essc posse, hinc neccssario sequi, non me solum esse in mundo sed aliquam aliam rem, quae istius idcac est causa, etiam existere. Si vcro nulla talis in me idea repcr.iatur, nuJlum plane habcbo argumcntum quod me de alicuius rci a me divcrsae cxisten­ tia certum reddat. 3 1

2

INTRODUCTION

For the demonstration of anything other than his own actuality, Descartes adds that, after having considered every­ thing most carefully, he has not been able up to the present time to discover any other ground than that of the objective reality of ideas. Omnia Pnim diligentissime circumspexi, et nullum aliud argumentum potui hactcnus rcperirc. 4

Important as this position is in the cartesian system for the reason that the actual existence of beings other than the thinking substance can be demonstrated only by beginning with the objective reality of ideas, still this doctrine ,vas the cause of surprise and of many objections from his contem­ poraries. Descartes admits that the author of the first set of objec­ tions puts in brief compass his own argument for proving the actual existence of God, and, having indicated his assent to that which he thinks is clearly enough demonstrated, comes to the crux of that which is difficult in the demonstration. 5 That author, Caterus, formulated, first of all, Descartes' posi­ tion on the first principle and on the actual existence of God. Cogito, inquit, ergo sum; imo ipsa cogitatio aut mens sum. Ita. Atqui, cogitando ideas rerum in me habeo, ac im­ primis idcam entis pcrfectissimi et infiniti. Etiam. Illius au­ tern causa ego non sum, qui eius realitatem objectivam non aequo; ergo, aliquid me perf ectius est; aliquis qui non quo­ vis modo ens est, sed simpliciter et incircumscripte totum esse in se pariter complexus ... 6

Caterus, then, expresses his hesitation in regard to the argu­ ment which Descartes has adopted. Hie vcro cogor paululum subsistere, ne fatiger nimium. lam enim ingenium mihi a·estuat in.star fluctuantis Euripi: aio, ncgo, p·robo, ref.ello iterum, dissentire a viro nolo, assen­ ti ri non possum. 7

Finally, he puts his finger on that which causes his hesitation and is the source of his difficulty. Quam enim, quaeso, causam idea requirit? Aut fare quid idea sit? Est ipsa res cogitata, quatenus objective est in in­ tellectu. Sed quid est csse objective in intellectu? 8

INTRODUCTION

3

Again, Descartes' doctrine that the proof for the actual exist­ ence of God must begin with ideas and their objective reality was attacked by diverse philosophers and theologians as is recorded, for example, in the second set of objections to the Meditations. From the idea of a supreme being, they assert, you are bold enough to infer the necessary existence of the supreme being from whom alone can come the idea which your mind possesses. But, they object, an idea is nothing but a being of reason and has no more reality than the mind which thinks it. Therefore, it must be more clearly proven that the idea could not present itself to you unless a supreme being did actually exist. Ex idea summi entis ... audes concludere necessitatem cxistcntiac summi entis, a quo solo poss.it csse illa 'idea quae tuae menti observatur ... Verum illa idea nil est aliud quam ens rationis, quod mente tua cogitante non est nobilius . .. Haque clarius probandum est, istam ideam tibi adessc non posse, si non existat summe ens. 9

The question arises: is this doctrine of the objective reality of ideas a completely original position of Descartes? If it is, this would explain the surprise of Caterus and the diverse attacks made upon this doctrine by objectors. Is it true to affirm that Descartes by this doctrine is instituting a new conception of reality? Descartes does maintain, as shall become evident, that the objective reality of ideas is a reality, but is his position a novel one in this respect? On this point historians of philosophy have taken quite diverse positions. Olgiati, for example, stresses both the novelty and the central role which this doctrine plays in the cartesian system. Questo e un Nuovo concetto di realta, che nulla ha a che fare con l'ens e con l'ens et verum convertmztur della Scholastica, ove ii verum e considerato non logicamente, ma ontologicamente. E ii profondo oppositorc delle prime Obbie­ zioni, ii Rather, subito mise ii dito sulla piaga e imposto le discussioni su questo « reale », chc sarebbe qualcosa rli mezzo tra l'etre c ii neant. Descartes, hen lungi dal deriderlo, come avrcbbe fatto con l'autore citato della settima Obbiezione, non ebbe dubbi a dichiarare: « ii est venu au noeud de la di{fi­ culte, qui est de savoir ce qu'il faut ici entendre par le nom d'idee ». Qucsto nuovo concetto del rcale, come di cio che appare, non ai sensi, ma al pensiero in modo chiaro e distinto, os-

I NTROl> L' C TION

sia - io dico - la concezione dcl rcale, come f enomeno in­ lelligibile, coslituisce appunto la chiave di volta di tutto l'edi­ fido; ed e la nota dominan te, suprattutto, che eclwggia so­ vrana nella metafisica di Descartes a proposito d eJ J ' io, di Dio e de) mondo. Fl

Another historian maintains that the term ' Objective· reality ' is non-equivocal and is perfectly defined ; it is a term which, although not found literally in St. Thomas, is not foreign to the spirit of his writings . ... (etre objectif) un terme non equivoque et parfaitement dc.'· ­ fini ... (une pensee) rnoins etrangere d 'aillcurs a l 'esp rit de saint Thomas, qu'a la lettre de son ecole, a savoir que J 'intui­ tion con fond en une seule realite la representation de l'objet et l'objet represente. C'est a cette realite vivante que Des­ cartes appliquera le traitement causal requis par la metaphy­ sique classique. 1 1

The position has been defended that, although the expres­ sion ' objective reality ' has its origin in scholasticism, the meaning of the doctrine in its sources is not at all that which it has in Descartes. L'origine scholastique de !'expression realilas objecliva est evidente (cf. Occam, / Sent., dist. 2, qu. 8; resume par Gahr. Biel, Colleclorium, I, dist. 2, qu. 8: « esse subj.ectivum, id est esse reale sive actuale ... , esse objectivum in anima, cuius esse non est aliud nisi cogitari vel intelligi ab intel­ lectu »). Est egalement scholastique la distinction entre le concept pris dans sa realite meme comme acte de Ia pensee, et le concept pris dans sa fonction objective, c'est-a-dire re­ presentative de l'objet (cf. Suarez, Disp. Met., 2. 1 . 1 .) . I I ne faut cependant pas s e laisser illusioner par le ca­ ractere scholastique de cette terminologie, car la conception qu'elle rccouvrc ne I'cst pas. Dans la scolastique, l'etre ob­ jective n'cst pas un etrc reel, mais un etre de raison; ii n'y a done pas besoin d'une cause speciale pour en rcndre raison. Dans le cartesianisme, l'etre objective est un etre moindre que l'ctrc actuel de Ia chose, mais ii est cependant un etre reel cl rcquiert, par consequent, une cause de son existence. 1 2

Dalbiez proposes yet another solution for the origin of Descartes' r e alitas object iva. His inquiries lead him, first of all, to the more remote sources of the doctrine of a being which is real and at the same time not-actual. This doctrine he finds in Duns Scotus.

INTRODUCTION

5

Les textes d e Cajetan et d e Scot que nous venons de citer nous paraissent prouver manifestement qu'il y a dans le scotisme plus qu'un ebauche de la theoric cartesiennc d r l'etre objectif. Descartes et Scot accordcnt a l'etre objectif la meme consistancc ind efinissable. 1 3 D albiez n e x t refers t o t h e controversy between Su arez and Vasquez on the nature of truth ; both of these men maintain­ ed a doctrine of obj ective being. Descartes n'a pu ignorer completement cette discussion. Que son professeur de philosophic ait ete partisan de Suarez ou de Va squez, ii ne pouvait negliger d'exposer une contro­ vcrse qui ctivisait d rux des plus celebres docteurs de la Com ­ pagnic. u D al biez concludes by affirming that it seems one may j ustly aver that within scholasticism there i s to be fou nd both the term which Descartes borrowed a n d the root of the cartesian doctrine of obj ective reality. D 'ailleurs, tout le monde accorde que Descartes a em­ prunte aux scholastiques l'expression d'esse objectivum ; com­ me ii est bicn evident qu'il n'a pu reprendrc cette expression sans tenir compte de son sens, ii nous parait legitime d'ad­ mettre que la theorie cartesienne de l'etre objectif plonge scs rac-ines en terre scolastique. 1 5 Even Hamelin seems to al low in the case of the distinction of the formal and the obj ective reality of i deas an exception to his affirmation that Descartes is in continuity with antiquity and it is there that h e finds that which h e wishes to be there o r that against which he wishes to react. 1 6 In the case, how­ ever, of the obj ective reality of ideas, he affirms that this is a borrowing from the schol astics . D 'abord l'id ce est un mode de la pensee, un fail de pen­ see, un exercise de notre faculte d e pensee. A ce titre, comme fail, cllc a une realite formellc ou actuelle, car acte ou fail, c'est la mcme chose. Ensuite, l'idee represente OU est censee representer un obj et; cette acte d e concevoir qu'est I dee, est en mcme temps la conception de quelque chose, ou, si I'on veut encore, l'idec a un contenu. Ce contenu est, a sa m anicre, quclque chose de reel. En tant que l'idec le renfcrme, clle a unc realite objective. Descartes emprunte des termes tres exactcmcnt a l'Ecole ct ils sont fort clairc. 1 7

6

INTRODUCTION

In the light of the manifold opinions expressed by historians, the question raised in this thesis is: what rela­ tion, if any, exists between Descartes� doctrine of obj ective reality of ideas and his immediate scholastic predecessors ? Is Descartes' doctrine of obj ective reality of ideas wholly unique and original ? Is it that Descartes simply borrowed a term from his scholastic sources, whereas its nature and employment are completely original '? Is it that there is both a borrowing of a term and an identity of doctrine in Descartes and in his source ? Or is it that the relation between Descartes and his source in regard to the rloctrine of objective reality of ideas is yet more complicated? In the first chapter it will be seen that Descartes' move­ ment from the first principle to other actual beings is by way of ideas, and, to be more precise, by way of the obj ective reality of ideas. In the sources available to Descartes, there was current a doctrine of obj ective being which prima facie is both like and unlike Descartes' obj ective reality. The ques­ tion is, then, raised: is there any influence of the scholastic doctrine of obj ective being on Descartes' system? If so, how does it influence the thought of Descartes'? If there is any influence of scholastic thought on Des­ cartes, it is certainly not uniform, as shall become evident, in regard to divine knowledge and in regard to human knowledge. Hence, in chapter two the question is : is there any influence, and if so what, of the scholastic doctrine of obj ective being on Descartes' doctrine of God's nature and knowledge? In chapter three the same question is asked in regard to human knowledge.

CH APTER

I

T H .E P R O B L E M

Consequent to the establishment of the actual reality of the thinking substance, 1 Descartes has at hand but one means to move from the first principle to other actual realities . This sole means is by the examination of thought to discover diverse thoughts or ideas whose nature is such that they demand outside the thinking substance the thing which is the cause of that idea. 2 Thus, that there are actual realities other than the thinking substance is known solely by ideas which are found within thought. 3 Because ideas play so central a role in the philosophy of Descartes, Brehier has remarked that. '(

'

I

' I _)

( l .

;"

)

,

'

;' .

' I

'-..

la philosophie modernc ne s'etait fond ee avcc Descartes qu'cn faisant de l'iclee l'objet immediat de la . connaissance. 4 ,, ,

r, .'

:

By the examination of the thoughts or ideas which are found within the thinking substance, Descartes seeks to know whether or not there are other actual beings in the world. 5 I n order to discover this, the nature of thoughts or ideas must be examined in an orderly manner. Hence, Descartes examines, first of all, the nature of ideas ; 6 secondly, he considers the classifications of ideas ; 7 and, lastly, he finds that distinction in ideas of their formal reality and their objective reality. 8 In this analysis we shall follow his procedure ; then, the questions can be raised : is this doctrine of the objective reality of ideas original with Descartes? Was there current among his contemporaries a doctrine of the obj ective heing of ideas? \Vhat do historians of philosophy maintain in regard to the relation of these current doctrines to the doc­ trine of the obj ective reality of ideas in Descartes?

8

CHAPTER I

A . - NATURE OF I DEAS. I deas or thoughts are of two kinds ; they a re fi rst of all, images of things, and solely to this class of thoughts does the title ' idea ' ap ply properly ; such are, for exam ple, the ideas of man, chimera, heaven, angel or God . Q uaedam e x his (cogitationibus) tamquam rerum i m a­ gines sunt, qui bus solis propri c convenit i deac nomen, ut cum hominem , v cl c h imaera m , vel coclum, vel angelum, ,·el Dcum cogito. n

There are, however, other thoughts i n the mind ; for example, when I will, fear, affirm or ueny. I n these cases I always grasp so mething as the subject of my thought, but in addi­ tion I include something more in though t than the likeness of a thing ; of such thoughts some are called volitions or af­ fections whereas others a re cal led j u dgments. Aliae vero (cogitationes) alias quasd am practerea for­ mas habcnt: ut cum volo, cum timeo, cum affirmo, cum ncgo, sempcr qui d em aliquam rem ut subjectum meae cogita­ tionis apprehendo, sed aliquid etiam amplius quam istius rei similitudinem cogi latione amplcctor ; et ex his aliae volun­ tates sive affcctioncs, aliac autcm judicia appellantur. 1 0

Thoughts include both images or ideas of things and affections or volitions and j u dgment. This repeats what Des­ cartes had p reviously discovered when he had isol ated the n ature of the ego. What is, he had asked 1 1 , a thing which thinks ? I t is a thing which doubts, u nderstands, conceives, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. I n another place he h a s affirmed that thought ( cogitatio) in­ clu des acts of u nderstanding, wil ling, imagining. sensing and so forth, all of which belong to and fall under the common character of thought or perception or consciousness. The substance in which these acts are, we call a th inking-thing or a mind or any other name, p rovided only that we do not confuse it with corporeal substance, for thinking acts have no affinity with corporeal action s ; thought which is the com­ mon conception ( ratio comm u n is) of the form er i s totally othe r than extension which is the com mon conception ( rat io com­ m un is) of the l atter. 1 2 After we h ave formed the two distinct

TH E PROB L EM

9

conceptions of those two substances, it will he easy to know after what is said in the sixth Meditation whether they are one and the same or diverse. 1 3 In the third Illeditation, however, Descartes distinguishes between acts which belong solely to the thinking thing or the mind ; thus, he distinguishes between those acts of thought which are images of things and to which alone the term ' idea ' belongs, and those acts of thought which include in addition to the images of things something more, that is, voli­ tions or judgments. 1 4 Eliminating from our consideration these latter acts of thought, let us examine the nature of an idea. What is an idea ? It is, as is already evident, an image of a thing. But what is an image ? Negatively, an idea is not an image depict­ ed in the imagination ; corporeal pictures in the imagination are not called ideas. Car ic n'appellc pas simplemcnt du nom d'id.e e les ima­ ges qui sont depeintes en la fantasie ; au contraire, ic ne l cs appelle point de ce nom en tant qu'elles sont cl ans la fan­ tasic corporelle ... 1 5

Even more forcibly, Descartes insists that images depicted in the corporeal phantasm are ideas in no way. Images arc ideas only in so far as they inform the mind itself which is turned toward that part of the brain wherein such corporeal images are found . ... imo ipsas (imagines) hie nullo mocto voco id eas, qua tenm, sunt in phantasia corporea, hoc est in parte aJi:i qua cerebri depictae, sed tantum quatenus mentem ipsam in illam cerchri partem conversam informant. 1 6

An ideas is, therefore, a non-corporeal image of a thing : an idea's non-corporeal nature is the very reason which led Des­ cartes to adopt the term ' idea ' ; as he says, this term is a commonplace among Philosophers for designating the forms of perception which belong to the Divine Mind wh erein we admit no phantasm ; thus, Descartes affirms that he cou l d find no more suitable term. Ususque sum hoc nomine, quia iam tritum en1t a phiJ o­ sophis ad fonnas p erccptionum m cntis divinae significandas, quamvis nullam in Deo phantasiam agnoscamus ; ac nullum aptius habebam. 1 1

10

CHAPTER I

Positively, an idea is that term which stands for every­ thing which is perceived immediately by thought. 18 In other words, an idea is that which is immediately perceived by the m ind ; by ' immediately ' Descartes distinguished idea from those other thoughts which are consequent upon ideas ; for example, the thought of fear follows upon the idea of some­ thing which occasioned or caused the thought of fear. 19 Thus far, an idea is a non-corporeal, immediately perceived image of a thing. 20 In giving a sketch of the synthetic, geometrical procedure Descartes adds another element in his i n philosophy, 21 description of the nature of an idea. By the term ' idea ', he says, he understands the form of any thought, that is to say, an idea is that form by the immediate perception of which I am conscious of that same thought. ideae nomine intelligo cuiuslibet cogitationis formam illam, per cuius immediatam perceptionem ipsius eiusdem cogita­ tionis conscius sum ... 2 2

Meaning of form . What is the form of thought or the informing of thought by an idea ? In a letter to Father Vatier Descartes admits that at times some of his explanations of this thought have not been clear, partly for the reason that he has assumed that others have adopted as their own the method of thinking which is so familiar and evident to himself. For example, he has presumed that others maintain, as he does, that our ideas, since they cannot receive their form or their being save from external obj ects or from ourselves, cannot represent any reality or perfection except that which is in these obj ects or in ourselves. J'avoue aussi cette obscurite vient en partie ... de ce que l'ay supose que certains notions que l'habitude de penser m'a rendu familiares et evidentes, le devoient etre aussi un cha­ cun comme, par exemple, que nos idees, ne pouvant recevoir leur formes ny leur etre que de quelques objets exterieurs ou de nous-meme, ne peuvent representer aucune realite ou perfection qui ne soit en ces ob jets ou bien en nous . . • 21

a

Interpreting this and similar texts, historians have maintained that there is in thought something which specifies the way in which it is the thought of this or the thought of

TH E PROB L EM

11

that. This something can be called the form of each of our thoughts in accordance with the scholastic doctrine which sees in the form the principle of each distinct reality. For example, Laporte says : II y a done ma pensec quclquc chose qui la specific de ma­ niere qu'elle soit la pensee de ceci ou de cela. Ce quelquc chose peut etre appele la forme de chacune de nos pcnsees, d'apres l'usage scolastique qui voit dans la formc le principe de toute realite (substantielle ou modale) distincte. 24

Another historian of philosophy has maintained that the cartesian · form ' of an idea preserves from its scholastic origin its representative character. Mais I'idee cartesienne conserve cepen dant de la forme scolastique son caractere representatif, en ce qu'elle reste, lorsque d u moins elle est une idee vraie, une similitude re­ presentative de l 'objet et par consequent, le principc sa

OBJECTIVE BEING IN H UMAN KNOW LEDGE

93

This procedure is precisely that which Descartes follows. First of all, he makes very clear that, in order lo know if other beings exist actually outside the self, they can be as­ certained solely by beginning with the ideas of the thinking subject. 84 This starting point is, however, not yet clear. \Ve must carefully distinguish and note that there is a diverse con­ sideration of our ideas. If we consider ideas, as modes, that is to say, as modifications or diversifications of our thinking substance 8 5 , it is evident that there is no inequality in our ideas, for the reason that they all proceed from the thinking substance. 86 \Vere ideas considered solely in this manner, no reality other than that of the thinking subj ect could ever be demonstrated, because the perfection of the idea so con­ sidered is no more than that of the thinking substance. « ad itl quo.j objicis de idea Dei solvendum, notare oportPt non agi de essentia idcae, secundum quod ipsa (idea) est tant um modus quidem in mente humana exislens, qui modm, horn inc non est perfectior ... » 8 7

An idea considered as a mode existing in the mind has no other reality than that which it borrows from thought. « ... talem csse naturam ideae, ut nullam aliam ex se realitatem formalcm cxigat, praeter illam quam mutuatur a cogitatione mea, cuius est modus. » 88

Hence, if one made the idea, as a mode of the human mind or substance, one's point of departure for proving the reality o f other beings, it is clear that no other reality is needed to explain the nature of the idea so considered than the thinking substance, 89 since the perfection of the idea as a mode is wholly derived from the subject of which it is a mode. From the idea so considered nothing outside the self could ever be demonstrated. 90 Apart, however, from the reality which ideas possess as being simply modes or operations of thought and as such deriving all their reality from the reality of the thinking substance and so as not possessing any reference to beings other than the subject, ideas have a quite diverse considera­ tion. It is clear that ideas if considered as representing now one thing and now another are very different from one another.

9 4,

CHAPTER I l l

« (id ea) quatcnus una unam rem, alia aliam rcprescnlat, pall't easdem cssc ab invicem valdc- divcrsas » 01

This representative nature of an idea Descartes calls the objective aspect or reality of an idea. « (idea) sumi cnim potcsl vel matcrialitcr pro operationc in• tcllcctus, quo scnsu me pc-rf cctior clici ncquil, vcl objective, pro re per istam operationem reprcsenlala ... » 9".?

Needless to say, this objective aspect or reality of ideas is not that which itself is not known hut by which the object outside the subject is known. Descartes knows with cer­ tainty at this point in the Meditations only the thinking suh­ stance. Now he is examining the things or objects known in order lo discover if any of these objects known or objec­ tives realities arc such that they exist actually outside the subject. A known object or an ohjective reality Descartes defines as the entity of the thing as it is represented hy �m idea, in so far as it is in the idea. « Per rcalitatcm objectivam ideae intelligo cntitatem rl'i representatae per ideam, quatenus est in idea. » 93

For the idea's objective reality Descartes has selected an extremely exact term. Let us describe it first negatively. The objective reality of an idea is not an existing or actual hcing, for it is neither the idea as it exists in the intellect 0 4, nor the object or thing existing actually outside the subject . u:-, This existentially neutral being which Descartes calls objective reality is, first of all, a reality. In reply to th e first series of objections Descartes affirms explicitly that this consideration of ideas is not anything fictitious, nor is it a being of reason, but it is something real which is distinctly conceived. « Dcindc ail etiam candcm (ideam quac est objc-ctivc in intellectu), non esse fictum quid, sive ens rationis, sed reale aliquid, quod distincte concipitur ; quibus verbis omne id quod assumpsi, admittit. » 00

Although the objective reality of ideas is a real being, it does possess a mode of being which is much more imperfeel than the reality or perfection which things have as they exis t actually outside the intellect. Nevertheless, the being of the objective reality of ideas is not nothing.

OBJECTIVE BEING IN HUMAN KNOW LEDGE

95

« ... eo modo quo objecta in intellectu esset solent; qui sane.' mod us essendi longe imperfectius est quam ille quo res ex­ tra intcllcctum cxistunt, sed non idcirco plane nihil est . . . » oi

Even though the objective reality of our ideas is not an actual and an existing being, it is a real being. This reality or entity, as Descartes sometimes calls it 9 8, has diverse grades, for as a substance has more reality than an accident or mode, and an infinite substance more than a finite, so there is more objective reality in the idea of a substance than i n that of an accident and more objective reality in the idea of an in­ finite substance than in that of a finite one. 9 v The objective reality of ideas is properly termed reality. It is certainly not less true to say that objective reality is rightly named objective. In the very definition of objective reality is the entity of the thing represented through the idea in so far as the thing is in the idea. For whatever we per­ ceive to be in the objects of our ideas, they are in our ideas objectively. « Per realitatem objectivam ideae intelligo entitatem rei repraesentatae per idcam , quatenus est in idea ... Nam qua c­ cumque percipimus tamquam in idearum objectis, ea sunt in ideis objective. » 1 00

For example, if someone asks ' what is the idea of the sun ' and if one would reply that ' it is the thing thought ', in this case the sun is thought in so far as the sun is objec­ tively in the intellect. This means that the sun is in the intellect in the w ay in which objects are wont to he there. The idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect, not, of course, existing formally in the intellect for it exists formally in the heavens. It is in the intellect objectively, as objects are wont to be there. « Si autem de id.ea solis quaeratur quid sit, ct respondca­ tur illam csse rem cogitatam, quatcnus est objective in intcl­ lectu ... significabit ... in intellectu eo modo esse quo solent eius objecta, adeo ut idea solis sit ipse sol in intellcctu exis­ tens, non quidem formaliter, ut in coelo, sed objective, hoc est eo modo quod objecta in intellectu esse solent. » 101

The objective reality of ideas is called objective because such a term points out that the non-actual but yet real per­ fection or entity of that which is known is situated in the

96

CHAPTER III

meeting of subj ect and obj ect within the subject from the side of the obj ect k nown. Hamelin remarks on the meaning of obj ec tive and form al reality : « Descartes empnmte ces termes tres exactement a l'ecolr et ils sont fort clairs. La realite objective de l'idee est bien dans le representatif sans doute, si l'on admet que le repre­ sentatif est le contentant de la representation ; mais, elle est dans le representatif ce qu'il y a en lui du represente, et ain si elle est I 'oppose du sujet et au contraire du cote de l'objet : c c qui fait qu'elle est tres bien nommee objectif. » 102

2 : Employment of objective reality. a)

FI RST P ROOF FOR

Goo's

A CT U A L I TY.

Descartes has fi rst k nown with certainty the subject ; within the thinking subj ect are discovered from the side of that which is known realities of varying perfection. These obj ective realities provide Descartes with what Gouhier 1 0 3 c a l ls « un point d'appui » which is the first condition neces­ sary to discover whether or no outside the subj ect any actual beings exist. The second condition which is necessary i n order to demonstrate the actual ity of beings other than the self i s the p rinciple of causality. This condition is t h e o n e which Descartes describes as the second step i n his procedure in attaining othe r actual realities. 1 04 This step in his procedure begins with the relation be­ tween cause and effect. I n order to u n derstand Descartes ' rather abrupt introduction of the term ' effect ', we must re­ cal l , first of all, that, since Descartes has taken as his first actual principle the Cogito, he must find these effects within thought, or rather within the obj ective realities of thought. ,v e must note, secondly, that the effect which Descartes has primari ly in mind is that of the obj ective reality of ou r idea of God, 1 0 5 for to the demonstration of His actual existence this whol e Meditation and this procedu re which he is now describing are o rdered. 100 The cartesian formulation of the principle of causality is : there i s nothing i n an effect which does not p reexist in its cause either i n a l ike way or i n a more perfect way ; this is a prime notion, and nothing can be u n derstood more clearly

OBJ ECTIVE B EING IN H UMAN KNOW LEDGE

97

than th is. Another statement of the principle and a ve ry com mon one is : ' from no th ing, noth ing comes '. This state­ men t of the p rinciple does not diffe r from the former, for the reason th at, if it be granted that there is something in the efTect which had not been in its cause, one must li kewise g rant th at this something has come from nothing. « Quod enim nihil sit in effcctu, quod non vcl simili vel eminenl iori aliquo modo praeexstiterit in causa, prima no­ tio est, qua nulla clarior habctur ; haccquc vulgaris, a nihilo nihil fit, ab co non differt ; quia, si conce 1 1 i

The movement of thought by ,vhich Descartes reaches act ual, real beings outside the subject through the interme­ di ary of the objective reality of ideas is both di fferent from and similar to the movement by which he established the actual reality of the thinking substance or subject. The two movements d i ffer in their point of departure and in the d irection to which they tend. The point of departure for attaining the actuality of the thinking subject is an activity, an operation, a mode of thought. « Quandoquidem jam corpus non habco, haec (nutriri vcl ince 11 8

If one sets up the relation which is essentially required for Descartes' doctrine of the objective reality of ideas, one can perchance make clear the starting point and the direc­ tion of his thought in the establishment of the cogito. The objective reality of ideas involves these three states of being : ( 1 ) the subject, ( 2) within the subject the object known by which the actual objects shall be ascertained, ( 3) actual ob­ j ects apart from the subject. In Descartes' movement toward the cogito as the first actual principle, all actual objects in themselves and all ob­ jects known are removed from consideration. They can only be known after the first principle is known. The classical expression of the experience by which Descartes finds the

OBJ E C T I V E BEING IN H U M AN KNO W LEDGE

10 1

fi rst i n d u h i tahk t ru t h is : « D u b ito, ergo sum » 1 m, wherei n the whol e consideration is sol ely of the ac tiv i ty and of the mode of th i nking which is doubting. This activity o f t h i n k ­ i n g al l obj ects false or o f rej ecting all obj ects dem a n d s nec­ essarily th at there he that thing or substance which thin k s . « Mais, aussitot apres, je pris garde que, pendant que jc voulais ainsi penser que tout etait faux, ii, fallait necessaire­ ment que moi, qui le pensais, fusse quelque chose. » i zo It is impossible that there be any mode of thinking, any action or accident of thinking without the thinking thing. « . . • cerium est cogitationem non posse sine re cogitante, nee omnino ullum actum, sive ullum accidens sine substantia cui insunt. » ui

If ,:ve assume as datum the bare operation or action of thinking or of doubting, the movement of Desca rtes' thought in the first two Meditations consists n ot only in removing a l l obj ects o r things thought but is directed solely from the dat u m to the actual, substantial subj ec t of ou r acts of thinking or doubting. \Vholly other, however, is the m ovement which involves the obj ective reality of things thought. This movement has a remote point of departu re in the firs t principle, the actual thinking thing or subj ect. Its p roximate starting point is the real ity of that which is k nown within the subj ect, and the aim or direction of this doctrine of obj ective reality is the demonstrated actual obj ect in itself which is other than the thinking subj ect. Although the point of departure and the direction of these two movements are diverse, both are rooted in the same basic principle of procedure and are thu s to this extent similar. This same basic p rocedure is that fundamental prin­ ciple which Descartes has adopted : « a nosse ad esse valet consequentia » u2 • That this p rinciple is basic in the establishment of the cogito, we have tried to make clear earlier. 123 That it is true of the doctrine of obj ective reality is, we think, evident. Gilson expresses this very precisely : « Des lors, la ressemblance entre le concept et l'objet , que la Scolastique trouve deja expliquee par l'objet lui-mcme d es le premier moment ou elle la constate, est encore inex-

102

CHAPTER Ill

pliquec pour Descartes, et ne peut meme ctrc que postulee par lui lorsqu'il la rencontrc. Bien loin, en cffet , de pouvoir en rendre raison par l'objet, c'cst sur elle qu'il doi l nec essa i­ rcment a appuycr pour poser cet objet ; ii affirmera done contrairement a l'Ecole, que du connaitrc a l'etrc la conse­ quence est bonne ', et se placcra dans les conditions requises pour que le passage de l'�dee a l'etre puissc legitimement s'cf­ fectuer: a) Descartes supposera done d'abord que l'etre objec­ tif de l'idee est un etre, inferieur sans doute a celui de la chose dont il n'est qu'un reflet, mais reel cependant. b) Que cet etre, des lors qu'il est reel, requiert une cause suffisante, en vertu du principe de causalile. » 124 I

Omitting from the present consideration that direction of thought which tends simply and solely toward the think­ ing subj ect, we shall first enumerate the various obj ective realities which we find among our ideas, and then we shall apply to them the principle of causality. We shall thu s be able to ascertain whether or no there is outside the subj ect any actual obj ect. 125 In his ideas Descartes finds three cl assifications of ob­ j ective real ities : the obj ective reality of the idea of God, the obj ective reality of corporeal or inanimate things, and lastly the obj ective reality of animate things, such as angels, men, animals and the like. 1 26 Applying the p rinciple of causality to the obJective real­ i ty of the idea of angels, men and animals, Descartes sees that this reality can be adaequately expl ained by the com­ bination of the obj ective reality of the idea of God and of corporeal things . The idea of God certainly contains at least eminently whatever perfection or reality these inferior real­ ities possess. Hence, the obj ective reality of the idea of an­ gels, men and animals does not demand that outside their reality within the subj ect there must be an actual obj ect which is their cause ; such obj ective real ities are sufficiently explained by the ideas which one has of God, of onesel f and of corporeal things. There is no necessity whatever in such objective realities for the actual reality of angels, men or animals. « quantum ad ideas quae alios homines vel animalia vel an­ gelos exhibent, facile intelligo illas ex iis quas habco mei ipsius et rerum corporalium et Dei componi, quamvis nulli practer me homines, nee animalia, nee angeli, in mundo essen t. > 1:2 1

OBJECTIVE BEING IN H U M AN l{NOW LEDGE

103

Nor do any ideas of corporeal thi ngs contain th at per­ fection and obj ective reality that of necessity such beings must be actual outside the subj ect. The obj ective real ity of corporeal things is less than that of the thin king subj ec t ; hence, there is no reason why such obj ective reality shou ld not he derived from my thinking substance. « quantum autem ad ideas rerum corporalium, nihil in illis occurrit, quod sit tantum ut non videatur a me ipso potuisse proficisci. > 128

That this is true is made amply evident from the ex­ amination of those obscu re and confused ideas of corporeal things, as, for example, ligh t, colors, sounds, etc. The nature of these ideas is such that one does not know whether they are true o r false, that is to say, whether such ideas are or are not of things. 1 2 9 For the reason , however, that these ideas contain so little obj ective reality, it really makes very little difference whether they are true or false. If they should happen to be false, that is, not to represent anything, the reason for thei r presence within the thinking subj ect is its imperfect nature. If such ideas should perchance be true, what meager real ity their ideas have can readily be explained by the perfection of the thinking thing. In either case, their real ity or l ack of it does not necessitate any actual obj ect outside the subj ect. 1 30 In regard to the clearly and distinctly perceived obj ective realities of corporeal things, some of these realities se·em to be in me formally, others eminently. 181 That a stone is a substance, for example, is a perfection or obj ective reality which it could very well have borrowed or acquired from the substance which is the thinking thing. < Nam cum cogito lapidem esse substantiam sive esse rem quae per se apt11 est existere, itemque me esse substan­ tiam, quamvis concipiam m e esse rem cogitantem et non extensam, lapidem vero esse rem extensam et non cogitantem, ac perinde maxim e inter utrumque conceptum sit diversitas, in ratione tamen substantiae videntur convenire. > 1 32

Since the actual or formal reality of the thinking think is a substance, there is no necessity to demand outside the subject any actual being which would account for the ob­ j ective reality of the stone as a substance. That perfection

104

CHA PTER I II

is formally present in the thinking substance. This being true of the objective reality of the substance of corporeal things, it is a fortiori likewise true of the objective reality of the modes of corporeal substances. Some of these objec­ tive realities, as duration and number, are formally present in the thinking thing. « itemquc, cum percipio me nunc csse, et prius etiam ali­ quancl'iu fuisse record or, cumque va rias habeo cogitationps quarum numerum intelligo, acquiro ideas durationis et nu­ mcri, quas dcinde ad quascumque alias res possum trans­ fcrre. » 1 3 3

Other objective realities of corporeal modal perfection s , such a s extension, figure, place and movement, are not form­ ally but eminently contained in that which is solely a think­ ing thing. For, since they are but modes of substance and since I am a substance, it seems that they can he in me in �n eminent way. « Caetera autem omnia ex quibus rerum corporalium ideae conflantur, nempe extensio, flgura, situs et motus, in me quidem, cum nihil aliud sim quam res cogitans, formaliter non contincntur ; sed quia sunt tantum mocti quidem suh­ stantiae, ego autem substantia, videntur in me contineri posst· eminenter. » 1 34

Having applied the principle of causality to the first two classifications of the objective realities of ideas, the thinking substance is faced with the conclusion that neither of these objective realities is of such perfection that there need be any actual object outside the subject. There remains, then, solely the objective reality of the idea of God. Does this, too, proceed simply from the actual or formal perfection of the thinking substance 1 3 5 , or perchance is its objective real­ ity 1 36 such that it fulfills Descartes' criterion for demonstrat­ ing an actual reality which is other than the self. His one and sole criterion is : « Si realitas objectiva alicuius ex meis ·ideis sit tanta ut certus sim eandem nee formaliter nee emincnter in me esse ! nee proinde meipsum eius ideae causam esse posse, hinc nc­ ccssario scqui, me non solum esse in mundo secl aliquam aliam rem, quae 'istius ideae est causa, etiam existere. > 1 3 7

Descartes' procedure here is the same as the one which he has been following : first, he describes the objective reality

OBJ E CT I V E BEING IN H l1 M AN l{NO W LEDGE

10S

of his idea, and, secondly, he applies to it the principle of causality. The objective reality of the idea of God is the idea of a substance which is infinite, independent, intelligent and powerful in the highest degree, and by whom is created not only myself but also everything whatever that exists , i f any other thing exists. « Dei nomine intelligo substantiam quandam infinitam, indC'pendentem, summe intelligentcm, summe potentem, et a qua tum ego ipse, tum aliud omne, si quid aliud extat, quod­ cumque ex tat, est creatum . � 1 3 s

At this point one should be most ex act in noting that the objective reality of our ideas i s a real being . Now, as in the case of the objective reality of the idea of man or angels or animals, there must be discovered that actual being from which this objective reality is derived or caused. That is to say, of this real effect there must be discovered the cause. Applying the principle of causality to thi s objective real­ ity within his thought, Descartes finds that the more care­ fully he considers the objective reality of this idea, the less possible does it seem that such a reality can be derived solely from the formal reality of the thinking subject. « Quae sane omnia talia sunt ut, quo diligentius attendo tanto minus a me solo profecta esse posse videantur. » 1 39

Since such a reality does not proceed from me, the sole certainly known reality hitherto, one must conclude that thi s objective perfection i s derived from God who exists actually and necessarily and outside the thinking subject. « ldeoque ex antedictis. Deum necessario existere, est concludendum . » 140

Although we must agree with Descartes that this same demonstration as it i s formulated in the Discours lacks clar­ ity, 1 4 1 nevertheless in regard to this demonstration one must agree with the very exact remark that < aucun texte ne met plus hcurcusement en e,·idence le ca­ ractere intuitif de la metaphysiquc ca rtesienne tout entierc que celui du Discours. » 1412

The Discours describes the starting point for attaining that which Descartes terms in the M editations objective real­ ity, and then he mentions the objective reality attained.

106

CHA PTER III

« ... faisant reflexion sur cc que je doutais, ct quc>, par conse­ quent, mon etrc n'etait pas tout parlait, car jc voyais clai re­ m ent quc c'etait une plus grandc perfection cte connaitre quc d e doutcr ... » u 3

To this reality he applies the causal principle 1 4 4 and finds that, whereas the actual perfection of the thinking subject can account for the objective reality of all other things thought 1 4 \ there must be outside the actual subject that nature wherein the objective reality of an all-perfect being is actual. « ... pourcc qu'il n'y a pas mains de repugnance que le plus parfait soil une suite et une depcndance du mains parfait, qu'il. y en a quc ricn procedc quclquc chose, je ne la (l 'idec d 'un ctrc plus parfait quc lc> m ien) pouva is ten i r non plus de moi-mcme. De facon qu'il restai t qu'clle aut ete misc en moi par unc na ture qui fut veritablement plus parfaite que je n'etais, et mcme qui eut en soi toutes les perfections dont je pouva is avoir quclquc idec, c'cst-a-dire, pour m 'expliquer en un mot, qui fut Dieu. » 146

In the Discours Descartes attains in that mode or action of thinking which is doubting a two-fold intuition. The first is the « Dubito, ergo sum » 1 4 7 , and the second is that which can be expressed in ' Dubito, ergo Deus est ' ; in truth, one could reverse this statement and show that it is by reason of God's actual existence or reality that not only do we have the objective reality of the idea of God, but that we can know that we doubt. For how could one doubt or think that one lacks some perfection and so understand that one is not wholly perfect, unless we had within us the idea of a more perf eel being in comparison with which I recognize my deficiencies. « Qua cnim ratione intelligerem me dubitare, me cupere, hoc est, a l i quid m ihi decsse, et me non essc omni no perfec­ tum, si nulla idea entis perfectioris in me esset, ex cuius com­ paratione defectus mcos agnoscerem. » 1 �

Since the procedure from knowledge to being is a valid procedure 1 4 9 and since the knowability or intelligibility of an infinite substance is more perfect than that of a finite substance, it seems evident that the objective reality of such an idea is a positive perfection. This positive idea or per­ fection of the infinite being of God is somehow p rior to even the perception of myself as doubting and as a substance.

OBJECTIVE BEING IN HUM AN KNOWLEDGE

107

« �ec putare d cbeo me non perc"i pcrc infinitum per ve­ ram ideam, scd tantum per n cga tioncm fi niti, ut pcrcipio quictcm et tencb ras per negationem motus et lucis ; nam contra manifeste intclligo plus rcalitatis esse in substa ntia in­ flnita quam in fi nita, ac proindc priorcm quodammodo i n mc­ pcrccptionem in finiti quam finiti, hoc est Dei quam mei ipsius. > 1 50

I n the actual order, that order which Descartes would call the synthetic order, reality and perfection always precede imperfection, privations and negations. These latte r cannot be known nor can they be unless first the positive actual reality is somehow attained. This is true of both the Discours and the Meditat iones. In the former work, for example, one's own imperfection is known by means of God's perfections . Although this l atter is not known explicitly, it is i mplicitly known prior to the knowledge of one's own imperfection. \Ve can indeed know expl icitly ou r own imperfection fi rst for the reason that we can first tu rn our attention to our­ selves and thus note our own limited nature. Implicitly, however, the knowledge of God and His perfections must always precede th e knowledge of ourselves and of our im­ perfections . This is so because in actuality God's infinite perfection is prior to our own imperfection. Our im perfection is a lack and a negation of God's perfection, and every nega­ tion and lack presuppose that which it lacks and that which is negated . « ... ibi (in Methodo) ergo cognovit suam imperf ectionem per Dei perfectionem. Et quamvis hoc non fecerit explicite, fecit tamen implicite. Nam explicite possumus p rius cogno­ scere nostram imperfectionem, quam Dei perf ectionem, quia possumus prius ad nos attendere quam a d Deum, et p rius concludere nostram finitatem, quam illius infinitatem ; sed tamen implicite semper p ra ecedere dcbet cogni tio Dei et eius pcrfectionum, quam nostri n ostrarum imperfectionum. Nam in re ipsa p rior est Dei i nfin ita perfectio, quam nostra im­ perfectio, quoniam nostra imperfectio est defectus et nega­ tio perf ectionis Dei ; omni s autem def ectus et negatio prae­ supponit earn rem a qua deficit, et quam negat. > 1 51

Descartes here retu rns to a position maintained by m any philosophers and theologians. 152 If all limitation is negation a n d if negation presupposes the actual real ity of the thing negated, one must, then , affirm that nothing can be known unless first of all in some way God is known.

1 08

CHAPTER Ill

« id , quo infinitum differt a finito, est rcale et positivum ; contra autem limitatio, qua finiturn diffcrt ab infinito, est non ens, sive negatio entis. » 1 5 3

This is evident for the reason that what is not cannot aid us in knowing what is. On the other hand. from a knowledge of a thing which is, we can understand negation. « ... non autem palest id quod non est, nos adducerc in cogn i­ tioncm eius quo 1 76

\Vere I thus an all-perfect essence, I would certainly be the causa mei ipsius and would give to mysel f the various attributes, as all-knowing, which such an essence demands. 1 7 7 \Vere I finally such an essence, if there were any perfections which were more difficult to acquire, I would certainly know them, since I would know a l l things. Being such a perfect

OB.J E C T I VE BEING IN H U M AN KNOW LEDGE

1 13

essence, I would be infinite and all-powerful. 1 7 8 No perfec­ tion, therefore, whatever would be lacking to me, were I the cause of myself. But, Descartes implies, I do doubt, and I do wish, and thus perfections are lacking to me. 1 7 9 There are truths which I do not know. 180 l\foreover, Descartes experiences that he cannot accomplish in himself that degree of reality which he has in the objective reality of the idea of God. Therefore, he concludes that he is not the cause of himself. « jam autem experior me illud (the increase in his knowled ge to the point where he is God) facere non posse, et non possl' ita cognitionem meam augere, ut qui dem vellem. Ergo a m e non sum. � 181

Resume : Descartes' point of departure is the thinking subj ect with the obj ective reality of the idea of God. He then identifies with the ego so considered the causal principle and so makes the self the cause of itself and of the reality of its ideas. \Vere this true, the thinking subj ect would be God, that is, all-perfect, causa sui, all-knowing, infinite and all-powerful. It is clear, however, that the thinking subj ect is neither the cause of itself 1 82 , nor of the obj ective reality of its idea of God. It follows, therefore, that the thinking subj ect and the obj ective reality of its ideas are not from itself. The cause of these must be in some other actual being. 1 8 3 Continuing this expose which is directed towards his scholastic readers, D escartes says that perchance some oth er cause or causes less perfect than God are the cause of that effect which is the thinking subj ect possessing the obj ective reality of the idea of God. 1 8 4 In order, however, for this to be true, it is clear that the cause must contain as much per­ fection as the effect 18 5 , or else something is proceeding from nothing. 186 In the case at hand, since the effect or the argument's point of departure is the thinking subj ect having in itself the idea of God, whatever cause be assigned to this effect must be at the very least a thinking thing and have all the perfections which belong to the obj ective reality of God. 187 If the cause which is assigned to this effect is a se, it is obviously God, because, since He has of Himself the power of actual existence, He doubtlessly also has the power

114

CHA PTER

III

of possessing actually all perfections whose idea H e has, that is to say, all those perfections which I possess in the objective reality of God. « Nam si a se, patet ex dictis illam ipsam (causam) Deum esse, quia nempe, cum vim habeat per se cxisten di, habct proculdubio etiam vim possidendi actu om n es perfectiones quarum ideam in se habct, hoc est om nes quas in Deo esse concipio. » 1 8 8

If, however, the cause assigned to the efTect is not a se, but ab al i o, then one must find its cause, and whether it is a se or ab alio . 1 89 In this procedure one cannot object and maintain that this movement can go on ad infin it um, for the reason that the effect is the actual, present existence of the thinking subject with its idea of God. Hence one must reach a cause which conserves me at the present moment, and this first cause will be God. 1 90 Another position which might he adopted in order to explain the efTect in question is that many partial causes, each of which possesses less perfection than God, have con­ curred to cause me and my idea of God. From each of these causes I have received one of the perfections which I find in the objective reality of God. These diverse causes according to this explanation are found somewhere in the univ•erse but never in that one being which is God. 191 Such an explanation is unsatisfactory, at least for this reason that one of the most noteworthy of the perfections which belongs to the objective reality of the idea of God is the perfection of unity and simplicity and the consequent inseparability of all His attributes. It is evident that the idea of this unity and simplicity of all the divine attributes could not be effected in me save ultimately by a simple being which formally and actually possessed all these unified per­ fections. « Nam contra, unitas, simplicitas sive inseparabilitas eo­ rum omnium quae in Deo sunt, una est ex praecipuis perfec­ tionibus quas in eo esse intclligo. Ne certe istius omnium eius perfectionum unitatis idea in me potuit poni ab ulla causa, a qua ctiam aliarum perfectionum ideas non habucrim : ne­ que enim efficere potuit ut illas simul junctas et inseparabiles inteUigerem, nisi simul effecerit ut quaenam illae essent agno­ scerem. » 1 92

OBJECTIVE BEING l'N H l' �l .4.N K..,.__ OW LEDGE

llS

Lastly. it i s e,·ident that the l'tfod . that is. tlw thin king subj ect with its obj ective rt'ality of tlw idt..' a of God is not caused by my parents. The solt' efft'd att rih u t ahlt' to tlwm is a certain disposition in that as yd un know n m a t h ' r in which my mind seems to bt..' . Dt'sc a rtes dot's not ti n d any relation w hatsoever betwren the t'o rpo rt'al adion hy which he was conceived and the produdion of a suhstanet' whkh thinks. 1 93 Since then no oth e r adu al being sntis fndo rily t'xplains the actual existence of the thinking subj t'd with tht' hka of the most perfect being or God. it is most evidt'nt that God Himself actuall�· exist s outside the thinking subj t'd ns its cause. � ... omn i no est concluch•ntlum. t'X lu.w solo quod t'X i s t a m . quaedamque i d ea entis p t'rfretissimi. hoe t'sl lki . i n n w s i t . evid entissim e dt'monstrari Deum l'·t iam t•x iskre. � w-•

The t hird Jleditt1t ion h as. then . two e.rpost;,� o f the saml' proof for God·s existence. Thl' point of depa rtu rt' is thl' obj ective reality of the idea of God, and to this rt'alit�· tlw principle of causality is applied . Such is the p ro> ::+•;

In the two exposes of the proof for God's actual reality. Descartes' procedure is simply this : man recognizes that he is capable of more knowledge than he can explain by reason of his own thinking substance ; both the principle of departure and the principle of causality involve more reality, obj ective though it be, than man possesses of himself. Man is, therefore, forced to admit as the sole explanation for the presence within him of the obj ective reality and the power which is its center that reality outside the thinking subj ect which formally and actually is such perfection. 2 4 7 Using for a moment the synthetic p rocedure of demon­ stration, 2 48 we can understand better a central doctrine in cartesian thought. In order to understand God's actual essence which is present obj ectively within us, it is sufficient to consider in regard to those things of which I have some idea whether it is a perfection to possess them or not. 24 9 To proceed properly in this m anner, however, not only must one attribute to God all perfections without any limitation, but one must understand that at the root and source of these divine perfections there lies the fountain-head and central spring from which all else flows. That source is, of course, the exceedingly great and inexhaustible power of the actual divine essence. Here within God is the root of all else. 2 50 As God's actual essence, so, too, is the work of that workman, for the thinking substance has been made to His image and likeness. 2 5 1 Within the thinking substance or rather the thinking substance itself is marked with the seal of God's workmanship. 252 More precisely, there is within the human substance, as there is within God, a central focal point ; there most especially is man like to His maker ; there the work most resembles the divine workman. This central

1 26

CHA PTER III

poin t within man is tha t power by which he most resembles God, for, if th at power in man is considered simply and solely in itsel f, man's power or will is a positive, unlimited power. « le clcs i r CJ ll l' chacun a d 'avoir tou lPs les perfections qu' i l p cu t conc cvo i r et, p a r consequent, toutcs ccllcs que nous cra y ons clrC' en Di eu vi cnt de cc quc Dicu nous a donne une volontc qu i n'a point de borncs. Et c'est principal cment a cause' d e- c cttc volonte infinie qui est en nous qu'on pl•ut d ire qu'il nous a crees a son image. » :!r,a

As in God, and as in the thinking substance which is God's handiwork, so also within th e obj ective reality of the idea of Cod's essence is there the same fine point of His divinity. This work of God is marked with the l ikeness of God . The obj ective essence is, then, not a static and immobile essence ; it too has the same dynamism in its deepest root, as does the actual essence of God ; within both it is the inex­ haustible and incomp rehensible power to which the other divine perfections are ref erred as to thei r cause. « Q uoniam vero usi sumus idea Dei quae in nobis est ad eius existentiam demonstrandam, atque in hac i dea tam immcnsa potentia continetur, ut intclli gamus rcpugnare, s i Deus exi stat, aLiqu id aliud practcr ipsum cxistcre, nisi quod ab ipso sit crcatum ... » :?r>4

I n the inexhaustible immensity of the divine power, one finds the ul timate root with in God of His positive real ity ; 2 5 5 it is likewise that within God to which al l else is ref erred as to its cause. 250 It is at this core of cartesian thought that one discovers the profound unity of the two proofs for the actual real ity of God. I f one begins from effects, it is evident that the obj ective reality of an infinite substance which is independent, which is intel ligent and powerful in the highest degree is a reality which cannot proceed from my formal reality. For not only does that obj ective reality exceed my own, but I am conscious of not possessing the power of granting to myself all perfections of which I have an idea. But it is clear that the being which is from itself is a being which does not lack perfections and so has that power. Hence, in God Who is causa sui there is that immensity of power which is the root and cause of all other perfections.

OBJECTIVE BEING IN

II U M AN KNO W LEDG E

127

If, however, one begins from God's essence or nature as that which is perfeel in the highest degree, it is clear that His actual reality is not known as necessary, unless the idea of a perfect being which is in itself possible includes in addi­ tion and in its core that same immense power by means of which such a being cannot not be actual in virtue of his inexhaustible fecundity. b)

SECO N U PHOOF FOH

Goo' s

A CT U A L I T Y

It is to this second proof for God's ex istence, whose point of departure is apriori and which is the most perfect means of demonstration that we now turn. 2 5 7 Descartes introduces this second demonstration, which begins from the idea of the essence or nature, 2 58 by asking : ' if simply and solely from this that I am able to derive from my thought the idea of something, ( it follows that) everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive as pertaining to this thing does truly pertain to it, may I not obtain from this an argument by which to demonstrate the actual existence of God ? ' « Jam vcro si ex eo solo quod alicuius rei ideam possim ex cogitatione mea depromere, sequitur ea omnia, quac ad illam rem pertinere clare et distincte percipio, rcvcra ad illam pertinere, numquid inde haberi etiam potest argumen­ tum, quo Dei existentia probetur ? » 259

Although here as in the former proof the point from which the demonstration begins is the objective reality of the idea, 260 still the procedure of the p roof for the actual reality of God which starts from the objective reality of the idea of His essence or nature involves the cartesian solution to the problem of error. In both the Discours and in the Meditationes that proof which proceeds from cause to effect in demonstrating God's actual existence is handled in the same way. In the Discours, for example, after the first proof, Descartes initiates the search for truths other than those of the thinking subject and of God's actual reality ; he thus considers the idea of extension. « Je voulus chercher, apres cela, d'autres verites, ct n'c­ tant proposes l'objet des geometrcs, que jc conccvois com nH ' un corps continu o u u n espace indeflniment etendu en lon­ gueur, largeur et hauteur ou profondcur ... » 2161

1 28

CHAPTER I ll

Although the fifth Meditation follows basically the same procedure as the Discours, Descartes is much more exact in indicating the reason for his method in the handling of this second proof. He makes clear that his most urgent task at the present time is to emerge from the state and resolution of doubt which he has adopted during the previous days. Now he must determine whether anything certain can be known about material things. « ... yamque nihil magis urgerc videtur . . . quam ut ex dubi b. in quae superioribus diebus incidi, caner cmergerc, vidcam­ que an aliquid certi de rebus materialibus haberi possit. » �G:!

In examining the ideas which he has of material things, he finds that he can clearly and distinctly conceive of quantity and its various modes. 26 3 He finds, too, that he can clearly conceive innumerable, individual, extended objects, as, for example, particular figures, movements, and so forth. 26• Of this clearly and distinctly conceived extension in general or of particular modes of extension, as that of a triangular figure, Descartes now affirms that their truth is obvious ; their natures are true and immutable ; they are not fictitious essen­ ces, nor do they depend on me, nor are such ideas adventitious. They are not nothing, and whatever is something is true. « ... particularia innumera de figuris, de numeris, de motu et similibus, attendendo percipio, quorum veritas ... apc>rta est ... suas habent veras et immutabiles naturas ... triangulum ... est tamcn profecto detenninata quaedam eius natura , sive essentia, sive forma, immutab'i lis et acterna, quae a me non cfficta est, nee a mente mea dependet ... nequc ... a rebus ex­ ternis per organa sensuum istam trianguli ideam advenisse ... possum ... varias de iis (aliis innumeris figuris), non minus quam de triangulo, proprietates demonstrare. Quae sane om­ ncs sunt vcrac, quandoquidem a me clare cognoscuntur, idco­ que aliquid sunt, non merum nihil : patet enim iUu d omne quod verum est esse aliquid. » 216 5

We must at this point pause and ask : why is it that whatever is clearly and distinctly conceived is som·ething and is true ? \Vhy is it that clear and distinct conceptions of such objects, as triangles, are true? One should here be mindful of such resolutions as the following which, in so far as we know, are yet operative : « unde autem scio illum ( Deum qui potcst omnia) non frcissr ut nulla plane sit terra, nullum coelum, nulla res extensa,

OBJE CTIVE BEING IN H U M AN KNOW LEDGE

1 29

nulla figura, nulla magnitudo, nul lus locus, et tamen haec omnia non aliter quam nunc mihi videantur existere ? Immo etiam, quemadmodum judico intcrdum al ios e rra re c i rca ea quae se perfectissime scire arbit r:rntur, ita ego ut foli a r quo­ ties duo et tria simul addo ... » X-O « Suppono igitur omnia quae vid eo fa J s a psst· ; c rc d P n i h i l umquam extitisse eorum quae mendax mcmoria rcp resenta t ; nullos plane habeo sensus ; corpus, figura , ex tensio, motus, Io­ cusque sunt chimerae . .. » :!16 7 c: Cum circa res l\Iathematicas veJ Geometric a s aJiquirl Yal d r simplex et facile considerabam, ut duo et tria simul junc ta sint quinque, vel similia, numquid saltem illa satis p erspicue intuebar, ut vera esse affirmarem ? Equidem non aliam ob causam de iis dubitandum esse postea judicavi, quam quod veniebat in mentem forte aliquPm Deum talem mihi naturam indere potuisse, ut etiam circa illa > ( VII. 2'5 . 1 0- 1 3). In this text what meaning has ' is ' or ' exists ' ? At this point we cannot say more than ' is ' or ' exists ' means a something. Note, first of all, the above cited text wherein ' e xists ' is made the equivalent of ' I am not nothing ' and ' I am something ' . < Haud dubie igitur ego etiam sum si m e fallit ; e t fallat quantum potest, numquam tamen efficict, ut nihil sim qu am­ diu me aliqui d csse c ogitabo '> . (VII. 25. 7-10) b)

m e aning of ' is ' in t.h e context of .Meditation II.

That the proposition ' I think, therefore I am ' means and is the equivalent to the proposition ' I think, therefore I am something' is evident, secondly, from the structure of the second .Meditation. The first part of the second .Meditation ( VII. 23. 22-25. 1 3) sets the stage for and includes the discov­ e ry of the first principle, the cogito. Consequent to the ar­ guments leading to this discovery, Descartes undertakes the clarification of the ' what he is '. He begins anew the test of dubitability in examining that aliquid which he is, lest instead of what he is indubitably he mistakenly select some other obj ect ( VII. 25. 1 4-25 ) . Th us, Descartes' question is : ' what more clearly am I ? ' or ' what is man ? ' He rej ects the definition that he is a rational animal. < Qui dnam igitur a ntchac me essc putavi ? Hom incm sc i­ licet. Sed qui d est homo ? Dicamne animal rationale ? Non ... (VI I. 25. 25-27)

Such a description is rej ected for the reason that i t is pro­ posed by that metaphysics which is but a philosophical justi­ fication of our biological needs and so assumes that sensation reveals to us things as they are. ( Prine. Phil. I, 7 1 ; VIII. 35. 5- 36. 6) He rej ects, secondly, body as essentially belong­ ing to man ( VII. 26. 6- 2 7 . 7 ) , for h e has been deceived too long and too often by sensation and imagination ; besides, since all corporeal things are subj ect to doubt, they must be considered as false ( VII. 24. 3-9). Then Descartes asks the

160

A P PENDIX I

question : ' what of thinking ? ' Thought is an attribute of himself which cannot be separated from himself. « Cogitare ? Hie invenio : cogitatio est ; hacc sola a mr d iv c l l i ncquit ... » (VII. 27. 7-8)

Note the procedure of Descartes : he first affirms that he is, that is, that he ·exists as long as he thinks ; then, in ex­ pl aining this and in admitting only and solely that which is necessary he affirms that « sum igitur praecise t antum res cogitans, i d est, mens, sivl' nn imus, sivc in lcllectus, sive ratio, voces mihi prius sign ifl­ cation is ignotac. » (iVll. 27. 1 3- 1 5)

Th en, in a brief sentence Descartes again makes clear the equivalence of ' is ' and ' something ' : « sum igitur res vera, et vere existens ; sed qualis res ? Dixi. cogitans. » (VII. 27 . 1 5-1 7) c) mean ing of ' is ' in the Discourse

That ' is ' is equ ivalent to ' something ' is evident, thirdly, from the argumentation in the Discourse. The argument here although less fully developped th an th at of the M e ditations is identical . I ts first stage is the complete acceptance of the arguments of the sceptics concerning sensation and imagina­ tion. « je me resolus de f eindre que toutes les choses qui m'etaient jama i s entrees en !'esprit, n'etaient non plus vraies que les i llusions de mes songes. » (Disc. 32. 1 2- 1 5)

The second stage is that the very act of doubting every­ thing implies first of all the act of thinking, and this in tu rn necessarily implies that I who think am something. « Mai s, aussitot apres, je pris garde que, pendant que jc voulais ainsi penser que tout etait faux, iI fallait necessaire­ ment que moi, qui le pensais, fusse quelque chose. > (Disc. 32. 1 5- 1 8)

Lastly, Descartes finds that he now has the first prin­ ciple of his philosophy which cannot be shaken even by the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics. For, al though he concedes the utmost to the sceptics or pyrrhonians, it is

M EANI NG OF DE S CARTE S '

F I R ST

PRIN C I P LE

16 1

true th at even in doubti ng everything, the ego which thinks th at everything is false must be someth ing, that is, I thin k, therefore I am. s:: Mais, aussitot apres, je pris garde que, pendant que j c voulais ainsi penser que tout etait faux, i i fal lait necessaire­ ment que moi, qui le pensais, fusse quelque chose. Et rcmar­ quant quc cette verite : je pense, done je suis, etait si fr rm r et si assuree, que toutes les p lus extravagantes sup positions des Sceptiques n'etaient pas capables de l 'ebranler ... »