Nuclear Accidents: Prevention and Management of an Accidental Crisis 9781786303356, 1786303353

Citation preview

Nuclear Accidents

Radioactive Risk Set coordinated by Jean-Claude Amiard

Volume 3

Nuclear Accidents Prevention and Management of an Accidental Crisis

Jean-Claude Amiard

First published 2019 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, this publication may only be reproduced, stored or transmitted, in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms and licenses issued by the CLA. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms should be sent to the publishers at the undermentioned address: ISTE Ltd 27-37 St George’s Road London SW19 4EU UK

John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street Hoboken, NJ 07030 USA

www.iste.co.uk

www.wiley.com

© ISTE Ltd 2019 The rights of Jean-Claude Amiard to be identified as the author of this work have been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Library of Congress Control Number: 2019948313 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-78630-335-6

Contents

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xi

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xiii

Chapter 1. Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk . . . . . . . .

1

1.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. Danger, exposure, radiotoxicity and risk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1. Identification of radionuclide hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2. Contamination of the environment, including the anthroposphere, by radionuclides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3. Exposure to radiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.4. Collective doses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3. From dose to adverse effect in non-human organisms (flora and fauna) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.1. The harmful effects of ionizing radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.2. The dose–response relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.3. Recommended threshold values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4. From dose to adverse effect in humans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.1. Deterministic and stochastic effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.2. Dose–response relationships for average doses: epidemiological studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.3. Responses to low doses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5. Radiation protection and recommendations for human irradiation 1.6. Risk perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6.1. Probability of a future nuclear accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6.2. Countries using or renouncing the use of nuclear energy . . . 1.6.3. Opinion polls on nuclear power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

1 4 5

. . . . . . . . .

7 11 17

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

17 18 20 22 24 24

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

25 26 32 35 36 37 38

vi

Nuclear Accidents

1.6.4. Estimated risk and perceived risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41 42

Chapter 2. Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

2.1. Early signals and late lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2. Structures for disseminating information on radioactive risk. 2.2.1. Situation from 1945 to 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2. Situation from the Chernobyl accident to the present day 2.2.3. The example of France. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.4. Future change? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3. Feedback (REX) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1. Introduction: what is REX? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2. The overall REX process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3. Causes of REX failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4. Lessons from the past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1. Lessons learned from military nuclear activities and accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.2. Lessons from industrial accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.3. Medical accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5. Crisis exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.1. Transnational exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2. National exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6. Incident and accident reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.1. A common severity scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.2. Management of declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.3. Reporting systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.4. Websites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . .

45 45 46 47 48 50 51 51 52 54 55

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

55 57 72 77 77 78 80 80 81 81 82 83

Chapter 3. Research for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

3.1. Introduction: safety and the main types of accidents. 3.1.1. Safety history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2. The main safety objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3. Defense in depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.4. New research in the field of nuclear safety . . . . 3.1.5. The aging of nuclear installations . . . . . . . . . 3.2. International actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1. Improving the organization of security at the level of each state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2. The IAEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3. The NEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

85 85 86 87 88 90 92

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92 94 95

Contents

3.2.4. The ICRP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.5. UNSCEAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.6. The ICRU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.7. The IRSN at international level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3. European actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1. Euratom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2. Complementary safety assessments (ECS) process . . . . . . . 3.4. French actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5. Advances in nuclear safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.1. Better knowledge of nuclear fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.2. Better preventing the risk of steam and hydrogen explosions . 3.5.3. Controlling radionuclide releases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.4. Consequences of a fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.5. Knowing more about corium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.6. Controlling a water injection into a molten core . . . . . . . . . 3.5.7. Mastering electrical distribution systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.8. Improving modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6. Advances in radioecology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.1. Determination of the source term . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.2. Modeling of radionuclide dispersion in the terrestrial environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.3. Modeling of radionuclide dispersion in aquatic environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.4. Modeling of trophic transfer of radionuclides in organisms . . 3.7. Advances in radiation protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7.1. Improving the radiological protection system . . . . . . . . . . 3.7.2. Improving the management of a nuclear accident . . . . . . . . 3.8. Safety research in other types of nuclear installations . . . . . . . . 3.8.1. Cooling pools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8.2. Spent fuel reprocessing plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8.3. Sodium-cooled fast neutron reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8.4. ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) fusion facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8.5. Better understanding of criticality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9. Advances in the humanities and social sciences . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vii

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98 99 100 100 101 101 102 103 106 107 110 111 112 113 115 115 116 118 118

. . .

119

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

120 121 121 122 125 128 128 129 129

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

129 130 130 131

Chapter 4. Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

133

4.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2. The first actions of the threat and rejection periods . . . . . . . . . . . .

133 134

viii

Nuclear Accidents

4.2.1. Radioactive releases in the event of an accident from a nuclear reactor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2. Radioactivity measurements during a nuclear accident. . 4.3. Population management in the emergency phase. . . . . . . . 4.3.1. Containment or sheltering of the population . . . . . . . . 4.3.2. Mass evacuation or evacuation of part of the population . 4.3.3. Distribution of stable iodine tablets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4. Food supply management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.1. Recommended values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.2. Regulatory values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5. Intervention levels for the protection of populations. . . . . . 4.5.1. International recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.2. The texts of the various states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6. The organization of crisis management in France . . . . . . . 4.6.1. Documentation of the ORSEC plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.2. The subdivisions of the ORSEC plan . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.3. French actors in nuclear crisis management . . . . . . . . 4.6.4. The internal emergency plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.5. The plan particulier d’intervention (PPI, special intervention plans) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.6. Other complementary plans of the PPI . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7. Exiting the emergency phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

135 136 138 140 141 152 156 156 158 160 160 163 164 165 167 167 168

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

170 180 182 183

Chapter 5. Management of the Post-accident Phase . . . . . . . . . . .

185

5.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2. The actions to be taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1. Priority actions to be undertaken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2. Actions during the transitional period . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.3. Long-term actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.4. Radioactivity measurements following a nuclear accident . 5.3. Environmental management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1. Management of aquatic environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2. Management of terrestrial environments . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4. Managing the anthroposphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1. Decontamination of living areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.2. Nuclear waste management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.3. Agricultural management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.4. Managing the economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.5. Food supply management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5. Management of exposed populations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.1. Limiting people’s exposure to radiation . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

185 186 187 188 189 190 191 191 193 195 196 196 197 202 203 204 204

Contents

5.5.2. Radiological monitoring of exposed populations . . . . 5.5.3. Radiological and health monitoring of nuclear workers 5.5.4. Health monitoring of exposed populations . . . . . . . . 5.5.5. The return of evacuated populations . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.6. The experience of local populations in contaminated environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.7. Human dignity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6. The organization of post-accident management . . . . . . . 5.6.1. International and European recommendations . . . . . . 5.6.2. French doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

206 208 208 209

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

211 211 212 212 215 221

Chapter 6. Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security . . . . . . . . . . . .

223

6.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2. Malicious acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1. Attempts at radiation aggression . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2. The assassination of Alexander Litvinenko . . . . 6.2.3. Arafat’s death . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.4. Overflights and intrusions into nuclear facilities . 6.3. Possible terrorist attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.1. The use of a nuclear weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.2. The use of a “dirty” bomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.3. Attack on a nuclear installation or transport . . . . 6.3.4. The release of radioactive material . . . . . . . . . 6.3.5. Cyber-attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4. The consequences of a terrorist act in the nuclear field 6.4.1. The health consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.2. The psychological consequences . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.3. Countermeasures in the event of terrorist attacks . 6.5. Organizational preparation for a terrorist threat . . . . 6.6. Prevention of terrorist risk in the nuclear field . . . . . 6.6.1. Nuclear non-proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6.2. Trafficking in military weapons and radionuclides 6.6.3. The actions to be taken. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6.4. The limitation of nuclear materials . . . . . . . . . 6.7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

223 224 225 225 226 228 228 229 229 231 231 232 233 234 236 237 240 242 242 245 247 248 249

Chapter 7. General Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

253

7.1. The probability of military and civil accidents 7.1.1. Nuclear risks and probabilities . . . . . . . 7.1.2. The causes of accidents . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2. The environmental consequences of accidents

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . .

253 253 254 255

x

Nuclear Accidents

7.3. The health consequences of accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4. The economic consequences of accidents . . . . . . . . . . 7.5. Prevention of nuclear accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6. Management of the emergency and post-accident phases . 7.7. Perception of nuclear risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.8. Public information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

256 260 262 264 264 265

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

269

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

339

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

355

Acknowledgments

Claude Amiard-Triquet (Honorary Research Director, CNRS, France) has taken on the onerous task of re-reading, annotating and casting a critical eye over the French version of this book, and Professor Philip Rainbow (former Keeper of Zoology, Natural History Museum, London, United Kingdom) has done the same for the English version. I warmly thank them both for their time and efforts. A number of colleagues have provided me with documents, and I am grateful to them. They include Pierre-Marie Badot from the University of Besançon, Mariette Gerber from INSERM in Montpellier, Anders Pape Møller from the CNRS at the University of Paris Sud (Orsay), Timothy Mousseau from the University of South Carolina and Jean-Claude Zerbib (radiation protection expert). I hope I have not forgotten anyone. I would also like to thank the members of the ANCCLI Scientific Council who helped me to understand some of the topics. The same goes for all members of the Groupe Radioécologie Nord-Cotentin (GRNC), a pluralist group, for the remarkable work they have kindly done together.

Preface

The first two volumes of the Radioactive Risk series were devoted to accidents, one to military accidents, where the strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are described, and the other to industrial and medical accidents. In each volume, the consequences of nuclear accidents were detailed for the terrestrial, aquatic and marine environments, flora and fauna and human health, as well as sociological, psychological and economic consequences. This volume focuses on the prevention and management of nuclear accidents. The first part is devoted to estimating the radioactive risk to non-human organisms and humans. The danger of radioactivity was discovered only a few days after radioactivity itself was discovered, by the inventor of “uranium salts” himself, Professor Henri Becquerel; after he left a tube of radium in his shirt pocket, his skin reddened and burned within a few days. This did not in any way prevent radioactivity from becoming a hugely popular success, since it was reputed to have surprising virtues and it was recommended to drink radioactive water, consume radioactive food and radium-based medicines, dress with radium-based wool, use radioactive cosmetics and have watches and clocks whose hands were luminous thanks to this radioactive element. This enthusiasm continued until the 1930s [AMI 13]. The dangers of radioactivity were also confirmed in the bodies of researchers themselves, such as Marie Curie, in uranium miners exposed to high levels of radon and its derivatives, and in radiologists accumulating exposure as they used intense irradiation as well as their patients.

xiv

Nuclear Accidents

Although its danger is known, the radioactive risk is nevertheless difficult to estimate because it depends on many parameters. Radiosensitivity is mainly a function of the intensity of exposure (dose), and also of the distribution of this dose over time (dose rate). The effects on biomolecules of various types of ionizing radiation (alpha, beta, gamma, neutron emitters) are quite different. Moreover, the radioactive risk depends on the radionuclide involved, or rather on the mixture of radionuclides present in the living environment. In addition, some cells are more radiosensitive than others. The same applies to plant or animal species, as well as individuals. In the same species, in the majority of cases, the early life stages (embryo, fetus, child) are significantly more radiosensitive than adults and the elderly [AMI 16]. Chapter 2 will detail the lessons of the past. Feedback from the most recent accidents reflects a wealth of management errors and allows us to look to the future with more knowledge. Chapter 3 will focus on research to improve our knowledge of nuclear safety, modeling various types of accidents, radioecology and radiation protection. Chapters 4 and 5 that follow on will present plans for managing a nuclear crisis in both the emergency and post-accident phases. International recommendations will be reported and the French concept of crisis management will be detailed, including internal emergency plans and specific intervention plans. Chapter 6, before the general conclusions, will discuss the risks of terrorist attacks in the nuclear field and the actions taken to minimize these risks. Nuclear accidents and disasters have given rise to an abundant literature. Why new books on this subject? Many works are openly pro- or anti-nuclear. The objective of these books is to provide the reader with a clear, transparent and objective overview of the scientific literature. Jean-Claude AMIARD September 2019

1 Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

1.1. Introduction Nuclear power, whether in the form of military applications, in particular atomic bombs, or civilian use in electricity generation, lacks a positive image. We might say that it has had a bad press, among the public, whatever the country. This is partly a result of the origin in war of the use of nuclear energy and the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bomb disasters. This has been reinforced by accidents, including the two major accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima. It is certainly also a result, at least in France, of the technopolitical regime of the French nuclear power program and strong criticism of it by social movements. Chambru [CHA 15] traces the emergence and deployment of the anti-nuclear phenomenon within the public arena, with the aim of capturing this protest effervescence and reintroducing it into political analysis. He notes that criticism by the anti-nuclear movement has never ceased since its inception more than four decades ago. Today, it is embodied particularly in the refusal of the anti-nuclear movement to participate in the consultation mechanisms set up by public authorities, such as the public debates organized under the aegis of the Commission Nationale du Débat Public (CNDP). For three years, Colmellere [COL 14] conducted a pedagogical device for public debate on a project to install a nuclear reactor as part of a sociology course for second-year engineers at the Ecole Centrale Paris. It

Nuclear Accidents: Prevention and Management of an Accidental Crisis, First Edition. Jean-Claude Amiard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

2

Nuclear Accidents

concerns a group of about 20 students and is inspired by a real situation, albeit an old one, which is the project to build an EPR nuclear reactor at Penly (Seine-Maritime). The system is based on a documentary film, “Nucléaire en alerte” [JOH 10]. This film is in turn based on an observation that French citizens, all of whom are concerned by the risk of a nuclear accident, lack information. Without partisan activism, based on the principle that “zero risk does not exist”, this film raises the question of how to manage a nuclear crisis at health, technological, media, economic and political levels. To simulate public debate, students choose their roles. While places for residents and protesters, operators and industrialists were sought, it is difficult to find places for ASN or IRSN experts. This seems to be down to the fact that the students did not have a clear representation of the ASN’s position on the nuclear issue. Students are convinced that the principled position is pro-nuclear. They also find it difficult to understand IRSN’s role and position. It is clear from this exercise that the risks of nuclear accidents – and therefore safety – are not objective data. They do not reflect the calculation of the product of the severity of the consequences of the accident and its probability of occurrence. Students note that there are “differences in perceptions or representations” of risks and that they are legitimate, logical and well-founded. Some questions remained unanswered, such as life in low-dose contaminated areas where experts are divided. The students also realized that the ASN and IRSN experts had difficulty holding a firm and substantiated position towards citizens and operators because they were torn between their position as representatives of an institution (or at least what they thought it should be) and their position as citizens much closer to that of citizens or representatives of environmental associations. According to them, this difficulty showed that the same person can represent the same risk differently depending on the context in which he or she finds himself or herself, whether professional or personal. Risk perception varies among populations. For example, when a dangerous industry, such as a nuclear power plant providing jobs, imposes a delicate compromise with fear in a region marked by unemployment. Residents and workers then minimize the risks of contamination and hold a different debate position from those who live elsewhere without being economically involved [LEB 12, ZON 89].

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

3

According to sociologist Le Breton [LEB 12], nuclear workers distinguish themselves into two categories: those that were “legalists”, concerned about protective measures and sometimes raising their prices, and “dare devils”, always ready to perform dangerous tasks, without much concern for safety. The “dare devils” want to show that they are men and are not afraid of death. The point of view of engineers or scientists often differs from that of people living in the vicinity, because if the former see the potential dangers of a nuclear power plant in terms of probability and physical risks, for example, the latter assess them in terms of the disorders that affect their health or those that would affect them in the event of an accident. Nuclear safety is essential because in the event of a major accident, the consequences are immense. Thus, huge areas were wiped off the map during the Cold War, particularly during nuclear weapons research. There are many “national sacrificed areas” in the United States (California, Nevada, Utah), Siberia, etc. [BRO 02]. In France, nuclear safety is implemented by two normally independent and transparent authorities, one for civil activities, the Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN), and the other for military activities, the Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire Défense (ASND). They act in a coherent and coordinated manner. They are independent of nuclear operators and also in the technical support they provide. The ASN relies technically, and mainly, on IRSN and the ASND is on the CEA. The Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté (IRSN), a French public institution created in 2001, has a mission of monitoring and research as well as expertise with public authorities. The CEA, a research organization, particularly in the nuclear field, also operates experimental reactors. In addition, the Agence Nationale pour la gestion des Déchets Radioactifs (ANDRA), a public institution created in 1991, is responsible for long-term management, specifically to find, implement and guarantee safe management solutions for all French radioactive waste. In addition to these official bodies, the main actors in nuclear safety are the operators of nuclear installations, who are primarily responsible for the safety of their installations. The French operators are mainly EDF, ORANO (formerly AREVA) and Framatome.

4

Nuclear Accidents

The third pillar of French nuclear security is the public, represented by the Haut-Comité pour la Transparence et l’Information pour la Sécurité Nucléaire (HCTISN) and by the Commissions Locales d’Information (CLI). The HCTISN is in charge of organizing information and structuring consultation at the national level, while the CLIs do so at the local level. This chapter will present methods for assessing the radioactive risk to non-human organisms and humans. These assessments will be detailed later in the fourth and fifth volumes of the Radioactive Risk series. The chapter will also provide some information on public opinion on nuclear energy and public perception of radioactive risk. 1.2. Danger, exposure, radiotoxicity and risk Risk is the crossover between a hazard and an exposure. If the hazard is low, even with intense exposure, the risk will be low. If the hazard is high but the exposure low, the risk will also be low. Risk assessment is carried out in four stages (Figure 1.1 based on [AMI 16]): – hazard identification; – hazard exposure assessment; – hazard characterization or effect assessment (dose–response relationship); – risk characterization. The second step is carried out in three successive phases. The first phase is the quantification of radioactive contamination of the environment in the broad sense. The second phase is the identification of all routes of exposure likely to reach the individual. The third phase is the estimation of the doses suffered by the individual. This phase is much more precise for humans than for all other organisms. The fourth step is to compare the no-effect levels recommended by official agencies with the estimated levels experienced.

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

5

Figure 1.1. The general principle of estimating radioactive risk for humans

1.2.1. Identification of radionuclide hazards By limiting the discussion to radionuclides and ionizing radiation, the first step, hazard identification, is obvious, because radioactivity is dangerous for all life forms. 1.2.1.1. Chemical toxicity and radiotoxicity The danger of radionuclides may be related to their chemical toxicity and/or their radiotoxicity resulting from their radiation properties. For all radionuclides except uranium, radiotoxicity is significantly more dangerous than chemical toxicity. Radiotoxicity is highly variable depending on the radionuclide. 1.2.1.2. Types of ionizing radiation Radioactivity corresponds to an unstable nucleus which spontaneously emits one or more particles to regain its stability. There are three main types of radiation: – α radioactivity, where a helium nucleus is emitted; – β radioactivity, where either an electron and an electronic antineutrino (β−) or a positron and an electronic neutrino (β+) are emitted;

6

Nuclear Accidents

– γ radioactivity by which a nucleus loses its energy through high energy electromagnetic radiation. To these must be added X-rays, of the same photonic nature as γ emitters, but produced by electronic transitions, and neutrons, present during chain reactions in nuclear reactors or during the explosion of atomic bombs. The two main properties of radiation are the power of penetration into a material and the ionizing power. 1.2.1.3. Half-life In a radioactive sample, the number of disintegrations per unit of time is proportional to the number of unstable nuclei of the radionuclide present in the sample. As a result, for a given sample, the number of unstable nuclei gradually decreases over time. The period during which half of the unstable nuclei disappear is called the half-life (Tp) or physical half-life. It is a characteristic and unchanging quantity of each radionuclide. Thus, radionuclides composed of highly unstable nuclei will have a half-life of a few fractions of a second, while those composed of very stable nuclei will have a half-life of thousands of years. Thus, after four half-lives, the radioactivity of a sample is reduced by a factor of sixteen (Figure 1.2). Table 1.1 provides some examples of half-lives for radionuclides frequently found in the environment in their natural state and/or as a result of human activities. Strontium 90 equilibrates with yttrium 90 (2.668 days) and cesium 137 rapidly equilibrates with barium 137m (2.554 min).

Figure 1.2. The physical half-life of radionuclides

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

Isotope

Symbol

Physical half-life

Type of emission

Energy Eα, (Eβmax), Eγ in MeV

12.312 y

β

(0.018)

5.700 y

β

(0.157)

P

14.284 d

β

(1.710)

Co

5.271 y

β and γ

(0.317), 1.173 and 1.333

Tritium

3

Carbon 14

14

Phosphorus 32

32

H C

Cobalt 60

60

Strontium 90

90

28.80 y

β

(0.546)

Iodine 125

125

59.388 d

e, X, γ

0.035

Iodine 131

131

I

8.023 d

β, γ

(0.334 and 0.606) 0.284 0.364 0.637

Cs

Sr I

Cesium 137

137

30.05 y

e, X, γ

(0.514 and 1.175) 0.662

Uranium 235

235

8

7.04 × 10 y

e, X, γ

α 4.215 to 4.596 - γ 0.109 and 0.144

Uranium 238

238

U

4.468 × 109 y

e, X, γ

α 4.151 and 4.198 - γ 0.050 and 0.114

Plutonium 239

239

Pu

24,100 y

e, X, α

α 5.106 to 5.157

U

7

Table 1.1. Half-lives (Tp) or physical half-lives, types of radiation and energies of various radionuclides (y: year; d: day) (adapted from [CEA 14b, CEA 15])

1.2.2. Contamination of the environment, anthroposphere, by radionuclides

including

the

1.2.2.1. Natural contamination There are two categories of natural radionuclides that differ in their origin, either cosmic or telluric. Radiation of cosmic origin, that is, galactic or solar, gives rise either directly to radionuclides in the various compartments of the environment or to atmospheric radionuclides that will be introduced into terrestrial and aquatic environments by simple gas diffusion or with precipitation. Among the radionuclides formed by cosmic rays, those with a relatively long half-lives are 3H (12.3 y), 10Be (1.51 × 106 y), 14C (5.730 y), 32Si (650 y) and 36Cl (3.1 × 105 y).

8

Nuclear Accidents

Originally, the earth was relatively radioactive. By decay, radionuclides with the shortest half-lives disappeared. Only a number of radionuclides remain in the lithosphere, from the four natural radioactive families (232Th, 235U, 237Np and 238U) and a few isolated radionuclides with very long half-lives. The term radioactive family refers to the fact that new nuclides resulting from the decay of a heavy radionuclide are also generally unstable. They disintegrate by releasing fewer and less heavy radionuclides until a stable and therefore non-radioactive nuclide appears following a series of transmutations. The last descendant is often an isotope of lead. Apart from the four radioactive families, other long-lived natural radionuclides exist in the lithosphere, such as potassium 40. Among the main natural radionuclides, radium 226, radon 222 and polonium 210 have a significant influence on the exposure of living organisms to radioactivity. 1.2.2.2. Anthropogenic contamination The discovery of artificial radioactivity by Frédéric Joliot-Curie in 1934 led to the military and civilian use of nuclear energy. This use has led to the creation of various artificial radionuclides, fission products and activation products. Fission products result from the fracture of fissile radionuclides (uranium 235, uranium 233, plutonium 239) and activation products result from the bombardment by neutrons of stable elements present throughout the environment of neutron flows (sheaths, fluids, etc.). Fission into two equal masses is not the most likely modality. In the case of the fission of uranium 235, the masses created have two peaks with a higher probability, one peak approximately 95 (6.545%) and the other at 138 (6.751%). The fission of about 100 uranium 235 atoms produces on average 5.835 90Sr atoms, 2.885 131I atoms and 6.236 137Cs atoms. The main characteristics of these radionuclides are given in Table 1.2. Many other radionuclides are also fission products such as tritium, radioactive isotopes of transition metals (Se, Br, Kr, Kr, Rb, Sr, Y, Nb, Mo, Tc, Ru, Rh, Pd, Ag, Cd, In, Sn, Sb, Te, I, Xe, Cs, Ba) and lanthanides (La, Ce, Pr, Nd, Pm, Sm, Eu, Gd, Tb and Dy).

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

9

To these must be added the noble gas radionuclides, the main ones being Kr (10.72 y) and 133Xe (5.25 d) for most reactors and 41Ar for gas-cooled reactors (GCR). Noble gases do not interact with living matter, so there will be no contamination. However, since their release is significant, radiation doses cannot be neglected for all terrestrial organisms, including humans.

85

90

Sr

131

I

137

Cs

Radioactive period

28.64 y

8.02 d

30.17 y

Decline (MeV)

0.546β-, 2.24β-. (90Y)

0.606β-, 0.364β

0.514-, 0.662 (137mBa)

Stable element

90

Zr

131

Xe

137

Cs/90Sr

137

Ba

Production rate during nuclear tests (per megaton)

3.9 PBq

4,200 PBq

5.9 PBq

1.51

Chernobyl production rate per gigawatt yr-1

38 PBq

640 PBq

45 PBq

1.18

Table 1.2. Characteristics of the three main fission-produced radionuclides [AMI 13]

The elements of the actinide (or transuranic) series often have very long half-lives. This is the case for plutonium 239 (24,360 years), plutonium 240 (6.6 × 103 years), americium 243 (7.6 × 103 years), protactinium 231 (3.28 × 104 years) and technetium 99 (2.1 × 105 years). In addition, most of them are emitters causing intense internal radiation. Health hazards to living organisms are obviously significant for these transuranics. Activation products are generated by neutron capture in the constituent materials of nuclear facilities that undergo prolonged neutron irradiation. The main activation products encountered result from elements present as trace elements, mainly in concrete or steel. The main activation products are iron 55, cobalt 60 and nickel 63 and, to a lesser extent, carbon 14, chlorine 36, manganese 54, cesium 134 and europium 152, 154 and 155, as well as some silver, zirconium and niobium isotopes (Table 1.3).

10

Nuclear Accidents

51

Cr

54

Mn

55

Fe

59

Fe

58

Co

60

Co

65

Zn

110m

Ag

24

25

26

26

27

27

30

47

Radioactive half-life (d)

27.7

312.2

997.1

44.503

70.86

1925.5

244.3

249.9

(MeV)

0.315

0.829

0.475

0.474

0.314

0.327

(keV)

320

835

1.099, 1.292

511, 811

1.173, 1.332

511; 1.115

Reaction producing the activation product

50

56

Protons

Cr (n, γ)

Fe (d, α)

X-rays 54

Fe (n, γ)

58

Fe (n, γ)

55

Mn (α, n)

59

Co (n, γ)

64

Zn (n, γ)

658; 885 109

Ag (n, γ)

Table 1.3. Characteristics of the main radionuclides produced by neutron activation

1.2.2.3. Transfers from radionuclides to living organisms Radionuclides present in one compartment of the environment can, more or less easily and more or less quickly, leave it for another physical compartment or bioaccumulate in a living organism. This is reflected in the biogeochemical cycles of radionuclides. A schematic representation is proposed for the human species (Figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3. Schematic representation of human exposure to radionuclides from the environment [AMI 13]

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

11

Similarly, once incorporated by an organism, the radionuclide can move within that organism. An example of the various internal transfer pathways is presented for a mammal (Figure 1.4).

Figure 1.4. General schema of the fate of radionuclides in a mammal [AMI 13]

1.2.3. Exposure to radiation 1.2.3.1. External and internal routes of exposure Living organisms, including our own species, are exposed to radionuclides through many pathways. When radionuclides are present in the various compartments of the environment (atmosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere and anthroposphere), exposure is external. On the contrary, in the case of ingestion of contaminated food and inhalation of radioactive air, exposure becomes internal. As with radioactive contamination, it is possible to distinguish between natural and artificial exposures, both external and internal. As it is impossible to limit natural exposures, it is therefore necessary to limit artificial external and internal exposures as much as possible.

12

Nuclear Accidents

A concrete example of the various pathways of contamination and exposure to radionuclides is shown in Figure 1.5. This is the case for the population of Beaumont-Hague (France), who suffered from atmospheric and liquid emissions from the La Hague spent fuel reprocessing plant as a result of the GRNC study [GRN 99].

Contamination of the atmosphere

Inhalation and external exposure Contamination of soils

External exposure

Plant contamination Ingestion Contamination of terrestrial animals and derivative products Gaseous emissions Contamination of water and river fish Ingestion

Inhalation

Contamination of fish, crustaceans and molluscs Liquid emissions

External exposure

Contamination of river sediments Contamination of marine sand

Figure 1.5. The various exposure pathways of the population of Beaumont-Hague (adapted from [GRN 99]). For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

1.2.3.2. The absorbed dose The dose absorbed by an organism from ionizing radiation is officially expressed in gray (Gy) which is the standard unit of the International System equivalent to one joule per kilogram (J kg−1).

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

13

For the human species, estimation of the irradiation dose is not limited to the absorbed dose. It is refined to take into account two important factors, radiation energy and the type of biological tissue, which strongly influence radiosensitivity. 1.2.3.3. The equivalent dose The quality factor or weighting factor (Q or WR) is used to take into account the type of radiation and its energy; this factor varies from 1 to 20 (Table 1.4). For neutrons, the ICRP allows the use of a continuous relationship law instead of discrete values (values ranging from 2.5 to 20). The weighting factor is used to calculate the equivalent dose (HT), the unit of which is also the joule per kilogram, but because of the weighting, its name becomes the sievert (Sv). Formerly, the unit was the rem, for Röntgen equivalent man (1 rem = 1 rad × Q), where 1 rad = 0.01 Sv. The “equivalent” terminology comes from the fact that a dose equivalent to the dose delivered by radiation and X (or WR = 1), which serve as a reference, is calculated to produce the same stochastic biological effect. Type of radiation Alpha Beta Gamma and X-ray Neutrons (various energies) Protons (various energies)

Weighting factor (WR) 20 1 1 5–20 1–5

Table 1.4. Weighting factors (WR) (adapted from [ICR 91])

1.2.3.4. The effective dose The relationship between the probability of stochastic effects and the equivalent dose is not the same from one organ or tissue irradiated to another. Rather, it depends on their radiosensitivity. A tissue weighting factor is therefore used. A limited number of dose conversion factors (FCD or WT) are used for regulatory purposes to convert the energy transferred. This tissue weighting factor varies from 0.01 to 0.12 depending on the organ (Table 1.5).

14

Nuclear Accidents

Tissue Colon Stomach Bone marrow Spleen Breast Gonads All other tissues Bladder Liver Esophagus Thyroid Surface bone Skin Salivary gland Brain Or for the whole body a total of:

Weighting factor (WT) 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 (0.05) 0.08 (0.20) 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 (0) 0.01 (0) 0.01 (0) 1.00

Table 1.5. Tissue weighting factor (WT) adapted from [ICR 07a] (values from [ICR 91] in brackets)

After this double weighting, we obtain the effective dose (E) that is also expressed in sieverts (formerly in rem, 1 Sv = 100 rem). The fact that the effective dose has the same unit (sievert) as the equivalent dose is confusing. In addition, the effective dose has its limits because the tissue weighting factors used to define it are not constant and vary more or less for each tissue depending on the absorbed dose, as well as with the dose rate: Effective dose = WR × WT × absorbed dose The summation of all effective doses for each organ provides the effective dose for the whole body (Figure 1.6).

Figure 1.6. The steps for calculating the effective dose (adapted from [AMI 13])

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

15

1.2.3.5. Linear energy transfer Linear energy transfer (LET) is a quantity that describes the energy transferred by an ionizing particle passing through a material, per unit distance. It varies according to the nature and energy of the ionizing radiation. Typically, the LET is used to quantify the effect of ionizing radiation on biological matrices. LET has an important relationship with stopping power (average energy loss of the particle per distance traveled). The smaller the distance traveled, the greater the energy transfer, and consequently the greater the adverse effects. 1.2.3.6. Relative biological effectiveness Relative biological effectiveness (RBE) is a measure that compares the biological effect of two radiations. To characterize the relative biological effectiveness, the generally accepted reference is X-radiation (X-photon) for a linear energy transfer (LET) of 3 KeV μm−1. The RBE varies with many factors, including the organ exposed and the age at which exposure occurs. The choice of the RBE factor chosen is a delicate one, particularly for alpha emitters and some beta emitters. There is currently no consensus on the subject, and this remains a delicate point of controversy for doses delivered by radionuclides with a short linear path such as tritium. In the literature, RBE values are very variable. These depend on the criteria taken into account (cell death, genetic damage, etc.), the tissue examined, the dose delivered (external or internal), the type of exposure (acute or chronic), and the energy of the alpha or beta particle. Generally, it is recommended to use an RBE of 20 for stochastic effects in humans and an RBE of 5 for deterministic effects in non-human populations [UNS 96]. Some RBEs can be very high. Thus, for mouse sperm irradiated with 210Po, an RBE of 245 was obtained by Rao et al. [RAO 91]. For hematopoietic tissue irradiated by 239Pu, an RBE ranging from 150 to 360 is proposed by various authors [JIA 94; LOR 96]. In addition, alpha particles can trigger genomic instability transmissible to offspring [LIT 98, WRI 98, MOR 11]. Similarly, in the case of tritium, a low-energy beta emitter and until recently considered to be of low radiotoxicity, more and more scientists believe that the RBE of 1 is not appropriate and that an RBE of 2 or even 5 should be used [GAZ 10].

16

Nuclear Accidents

1.2.3.7. The committed dose The committed dose for a single absorption of a given radionuclide is the total dose that the individual concerned will receive over his or her lifetime. It will therefore depend on the actual period. Thus, for iodines 131, 123 and 129, whose effective periods are 7.6 days, 13 hours and 16 × 106 years, respectively, the committed dose will be 13, 0.13 and 30 Gy. In the case of internal radioactive contamination, assessment of the irradiation dose is more difficult than in the case of external contamination. Indeed, unlike external irradiation, where the dose is delivered in its entirety at the same time, the internal dose is constituted over time and will vary according to the organs and tissues irradiated. This dose is said to be the committed dose and can only be an estimated and calculated quantity. To estimate this committed dose, numerous studies have been initiated. Biokinetic and biophysical models are used to simulate radionuclide transfers through the individual. In addition, the weighting factors described above to account for the energy of different radiations and the different radiosensitivities of each biological tissue will be used to move from the committed dose to the effective dose. 1.2.3.8. Limits to the estimation of effective doses The limitations of estimating effective doses are that this estimate must be modeled, that the microdistribution of radionuclides is not taken into account, that some radionuclides transmute, changing chemical nature, that interactions may exist between radiotoxicity and chemical toxicity, and that there is a high degree of individual variability. In addition, the fact that in human exposure assessment, the effective dose has the same unit (the sievert) as the equivalent dose is confusing. 1.2.3.9. Dose rates The dose can be delivered to the body in a single dose, or in several doses, or it can be delivered continuously over a long period of time. As with other pollutants, the dose will be referred to as a chronic or acute dose. This will result in significantly different adverse effects. Thus, for an identical total dose, a high single dose generally causes more harmful effects than a summation of low doses. This results from an easier repair by the body of its affected organelles, cells and tissues, when the dose is delivered repeatedly but over a long period of time. It is also often useful to express doses as dose rates (Gy per time unit or Sv per time unit). The time unit is frequently an hour or a day.

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

17

1.2.4. Collective doses All the quantities described above are individual doses and concern only one individual with his or her habits and life history. It may be interesting to know the exposure of a group or human population by calculating the collective equivalent dose and the collective effective dose. The calculation is simple and consists of multiplying the average (equivalent or effective) dose by the number of individuals in the group or population concerned. The unit of these collective quantities is the human-sievert, denoted by h Sv. These quantities are used in particular to manage groups of workers in order to reduce the collective dose. It should be noted that these collective doses do not take into account individual behaviors in lifestyle and eating habits. In the case where the reasoning does not concern a single generation but several generations, the quantity used is then the dose commitment. This quantity is calculated as the integral over an infinite time of the dose rate per head. This quantity will be used, for example, in the estimation of the irradiation dose suffered in the case of long-term waste storage. These two principles are essentially used for radioactive risk management. These are the only values that can be used to judge the implementation of the ALARA optimization principle (“as low as reasonably achievable”). The principle of optimization is a pragmatic approach to be able to act responsibly, consensually and fairly in a context of uncertainty about risk. Apart from the radioactive risk, this principle is also used for some chemical pollutants such as dioxins or biotoxins [AMI 16]. 1.3. From dose to adverse effect in non-human organisms (flora and fauna) For a long time, the protection of the environment from ionizing radiation has been completely ignored. Indeed, the principle was that humans are the most complex animal of all the organisms living on our planet and therefore also the most radiosensitive. Consequently, if humans were protected, a fortiori all other living organisms would be protected. Despite the weakness of this reasoning, and even its falsity, it was not until the 21st Century that international organizations became concerned about environmental protection.

18

Nuclear Accidents

In May 2000, the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) decided to set up a working group to make recommendations on the development of an environmental protection policy and to propose a framework (based on scientific, ethical and philosophical principles) for achieving such protection [ICR 03]. The ICRP recognizes that there is no single or simple definition of “environmental protection”. The commission is currently developing the concept of a representative body, which can be identified from specific legal requirements or more general requirements to protect local habitats or ecosystems. This approach is addressed by Copplestone [COP 12]. To date, biota radiation protection has largely focused on limiting deterministic effects, such as reduced reproductive fitness. However, many other harmful effects are produced by ionizing radiation. Various studies show that the magnitude of a biological effect depends not only on the dose, as well as on other factors, including the rate at which the dose is delivered and the type and energy of the radiation delivering the dose [HIG 12]. The ICRP Publication 91, entitled “Cadre pour l’évaluation de l’impact des rayonnements ionisants sur les espèces non humaines”, was published in 2003 [ICR 03]. The ICRP has chosen to address environmental protection on the basis of biology and to develop the same approach proposed for the human species in its publications 103 [ICR 07a], 108 and 114 [ICR 08, ICR 09a, LAR 12]. Given the intensification of the global debate on the environmental benefits of different forms of energy production, it would seem imperative that the different practices involved in the nuclear fuel cycle can demonstrate, in a clear and independent manner, their actual or potential impact on the environment [PEN 12]. 1.3.1. The harmful effects of ionizing radiation The harmful effects of ionizing radiation can occur at various levels of biological organization from the molecule to the ecosystem [AMI 13]. At the molecular level, all molecules can be affected (Figure 1.7). However, DNA damage will generally have a greater impact when any repair is not sufficiently effective. This will result in effects at the cellular, then the tissue level and ultimately in the development of cancer (Figure 1.8).

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

Figure 1.7. The effects of ionizing radiation at the molecular level (adapted from [AMI 13])

Figure 1.8. Biological effects of ionizing radiation. Possible changes at the cellular level as a function of time (adapted from [HAT 05])

19

20

Nuclear Accidents

1.3.2. The dose–response relationship To estimate the radioactive risk, it is necessary to have a good assessment of the relationship between the dose received and the adverse effect. For all living organisms excluding humans, the dose estimate stops at the absorbed dose and is expressed in grays (Gy). At high doses of radiation, individuals die. The lethal dose is highly variable depending on the systematic group or taxon to which the organism belongs. The first groups to appear on earth are apparently the most radioresistant, such as prokaryotes including bacteria. Conversely, vertebrate groups, and particularly mammals, are the most radiosensitive (Figure 1.9).

Figure 1.9. Lethal dose (LD50) and radioresistance in several taxonomic groups [UNS 96])

Among vertebrates, fish, amphibians and reptiles are more resistant than other groups, and in each group, adults are more resistant than juveniles (Table 1.6 where the LD50 is the death of half the population.). It is generally accepted that for all living organisms, the adverse effect will be greater when the radiation dose is higher. The sub-lethal effects of ionizing radiation generally occur at doses lower than those causing mortality. For example, acute and chronic doses resulting in sterility in invertebrates and vertebrates are provided in Table 1.7, and at Soviet sites, plants and animals chronically exposed to various doses have a wide range of adverse effects (Table 1.8).

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

Taxonomic group LD50 (Gy) Taxonomic group LD50 (Gy) Reptiles

3–17

0.16–5

Birds

5–23

3.75–100

Mammals

Fish Juveniles Adults Amphibians Juveniles Adults

10

Humans

3

Others

1.6–15

7–23

Table 1.6. Lethal dose ranges (Gy) in vertebrates (adapted from [HAR 01]) Taxonomic group

Acute exposure Dose (Gy)

Taxonomic group

Neanthes arenaceodentata (polychaete worm)

50

Neanthes arenaceodentata

20

Artemia salina (brine shrimp, crustacean)

21

Daphnia magna (water flea, crustacean)

1,400

Invertebrates

Chronic exposure Dose (Gy)

Invertebrates

Physa acuta (freshwater 1,000 gastropod mollusk) Fish

Fish

Oryzias latipes

80

Oryzias latipes

140

Ameca splendens

>0.6

Poecilia reticulata

13

Reptiles

Mammals

Crotaphytus wislizenii

0.46–0.57

Cnemidophorus tigris

0.23–0.28

Uta stansburiana

>0.46

Mammals

Mice

1

Rats

8

Monkeys

>20

Humans (males)

2–6

Females

3–10

Dogs

0.17

Humans (males)

0.23

Table 1.7. Induction of sterility in invertebrates and vertebrates after acute and chronic exposure (adapted from [HAR 01])

21

22

Nuclear Accidents

Dose rate (µGy h−1)

Biological effect on representative organisms

< 0.04

No adverse effects

0.04–4

No data available

4–20

Minor cytogenetic effects in sensitive vertebrate species

20–80

Minor morbidity effect threshold for sensitive vertebrate species

80–200

Threshold of minor effect on reproductive organs in vertebrate species; decrease in embryo survival

200–400

Vertebrate lifetime threshold; invertebrate effect threshold; pine growth effect threshold

400–4,000

Chronic radiation diseases in vertebrates; considerable damage to pines

4,000–40,000

Diseases resulting from acute radiation in vertebrates; death of pines; considerable damage to invertebrate eggs and larvae

>40,000

Lethal dose to vertebrates if received over several days; increased mortality of eggs and invertebrate larvae; death of pines; damage to deciduous trees

Table 1.8. Review of dose–response relationships for chronic exposure of wild flora and fauna to low-LET radiation observed in situ at Soviet sites (adapted from [SAZ 05])

1.3.3. Recommended threshold values The evolution of the concepts, doctrines and recommendations of the ICRP was analyzed and detailed by Clarke and Valentin [CLA 09]. UNSCEAR [UNS 08] recommends a dose rate limit of 400 µGy h−1 for terrestrial plants and aquatic organisms and 100 µGy h−1 for terrestrial animals (Table 1.9). As part of the ERICA project on radioactive risk assessment for terrestrial, limnic and marine fauna, Garnier-Laplace et al. [GAR 10] proposes a unique value of 10 µGy h−1 (87.6 mSv y−1).

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

23

ENEV (Gy y−1)

Groups Fishes

0.2

Benthic invertebrates

2

Algae

1

Macrophytes

1

Mammals

1

Terrestrial plants

1

Terrestrial invertebrates

2

Table 1.9. Summary of estimated no-effect values (ENEV) by Health Canada (adapted from [UNS 08])

ICRP Publication 108 ([ICR 08]) introduces the concept of reference animals and plants. It reviews current knowledge on the effects of radiation on these biotic types (or similar organisms for which more precise data are not available) with regard to the effects of mortality, morbidity, reduced reproductive success and chromosomal damage. This publication identifies preliminary reference levels for reference animals (deer, rat, duck, frog, trout, flatfish, bee, crab and earthworm), as well as for reference flora (pine, wild grasses and brown algae) ([ICR 08]). The threshold values are grouped in Table 1.10. Reference body Plants

Pine Wild grass Bee

Animals

Earthworm

Freshwater organisms Marine organisms

Duck Fallow deer Rat Frog Trout Crab Flatfish Brown algae

−1

Initial threshold (µGy h ) 4–40 40–400 400–4,000 400–4,000 4–40 4–40 4–40 40–400 400–4,000 400–4,000 40–400 40–400

Table 1.10. Effect threshold in µGy h−1 for chronic exposure situations (adapted from [ICR 08])

24

Nuclear Accidents

To strengthen the international radiological protection system, the ICRP had to develop dosimetric models for a set of reference animals and plants, representative of flora and fauna in different environments (terrestrial, freshwater, marine), and had to define criteria based on the information on radiation effects [TEL 15]. Through several examples, Garnier-Laplace et al. [GAR 15a] consider it necessary to implement an approach combining laboratory models and field studies to obtain reference doses (or dose rates) based on reliable scientific data. The analysis should be based on a meta-analysis of dose–response relationships covering various scales of exposure time, several species and ecologically relevant endpoints. 1.4. From dose to adverse effect in humans The effects of ionizing radiation on humans result from a transfer of energy to human tissue leading in several successive stages to pathological manifestations. These steps are physical interactions, physic chemical reactions, molecular damage, cellular damage, tissue damage and pathological effects [GAM 07]. 1.4.1. Deterministic and stochastic effects Exposure to ionizing radiation leads to two types of effect: deterministic and stochastic. Deterministic manifestations are generally related to radiation-induced cell death. Stochastic manifestations are generally attributed to mutations. Stochastic effects are the long-term probabilistic consequences, in an individual or in his or her offspring, of the transformation of a cell. Stochastic effects are of two types: carcinogenic (somatic cells) or hereditary (germ cells). The harmful effects of ionizing radiation can occur at the molecular and cellular levels. If germ cells are affected, human fertility may decrease until sterility.

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

25

Deterministic effects are definitely occurring. They usually occur rapidly and increase in severity with dose. These are threshold effects and only appear above a threshold dose. In humans, the generally accepted threshold value is 0.5 Gray (Gy). The risk of death appears at 2 Gy. The LD50 (lethal dose for 50% of the exposed population) is 4.5 Gy. Deterministic effects differ depending on whether the exposure is global (i.e. at the level of an individual) or partial (i.e. affecting only a part of the body). In the case of overall exposure, it is the radiosensitive organs (bone marrow, intestinal mucosa, respiratory system) that will determine the vital prognosis. The most serious disease is acute radiation syndrome (ARS), which includes all pathological manifestations occurring after significant overexposure to ionizing radiation. The ARS is traditionally described as appearing in three phases (see [AMI 13]). 1.4.2. Dose–response epidemiological studies

relationships

for

average

doses:

For high doses, the main data come from effects observed, particularly following accidents or explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This has been detailed in Volume 1 of this series [AMI 18a]. In the case of medium doses, the effects are stochastic and can only be understood by epidemiological studies. In epidemiology, there are mainly three types of studies, aggregate studies, case–control studies and cohort (or prospective) studies. The last two types are analytical studies. Aggregate studies are the most frequent but generally provide less information. Cohort studies are more powerful because the population studied is more homogeneous. More details are provided in [AMI 16]. The power (or resolution) of epidemiological studies depends on many parameters, the most important of which is the size of the populations studied. This is the reason for the appearance of multiple meta-analyses which consist of merging several epidemiological studies with each other. There are also many possible biases for epidemiological studies. One of the most common is the wrong choice of control group or unexposed population compared to the exposed population.

26

Nuclear Accidents

Confounding factors (or co-factors) are also numerous, especially if the study is long-term. For example, the effects of radiation and smoking are linked for a large number of diseases. It is therefore necessary to apply corrective factors to eliminate the influence of confounding factors. The analysis of epidemiological studies uses a large number of statistical tools such as the relative risk (RR), the excess relative risk (ERR) or the odds ratio (OR), the standardized mortality ratio (SMR) or the standardized incidence ratio (SIR). The details are provided in Amiard [AMI 16]. The fact that a correlation is positive does not mean that there is a real causal relationship between these two parameters. This shortcut is too frequently noted, and as the sophism “Cum hoc ergo propter hoc” (Latin, meaning “with this, therefore because of this”) says. It is common to claim that if two events are correlated, then there is a causal relationship between the two. This confusion between correlation and causality is absolutely forbidden. In the nuclear field, the main epidemiological studies have focused on populations of nuclear workers, including uranium miners, populations living in the vicinity of nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities, particularly children, the military and civil populations around atomic test sites, populations living on primary massifs, particularly granitic ones, which are rich in radon, and populations living in areas where natural radioactivity is high. The main results concerning epidemiological studies following military and civil nuclear accidents are provided by the Amiard volumes [AMI 18a, AMI 19]. All epidemiological studies will be detailed in the fifth volume of this series (Radioactive Risk to Humans). 1.4.3. Responses to low doses In the case of low irradiation doses, epidemiological studies generally cannot provide any usable results because they are at the limit of the significance of excess damage resulting from irradiation compared to naturally occurring damage [ANC 12], particularly caused by the problem of co-factors. The effects of low doses can be addressed using results from experimental disease models (animal studies and cell cultures) that provide information on the biological mechanisms concerned. While molecular biological techniques allow DNA damage to be detected, there are repair mechanisms (hormesis and apoptosis), even though there is no 100% guarantee of repair.

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

27

From the morbidity results recorded in populations generally irradiated at moderate to high doses (epidemiological studies), it is possible to extrapolate the dose–effect relationship to low doses according to four curves (Figure 1.10). The four scenarios are (1) linear without threshold, (2) infra-linear, (3) supra-linear or (4) linear with threshold. Scenario 2 involves hormesis and is optimistic. Scenario 3 involves the proximity effect and is pessimistic. Scenario 4 uses a threshold and is also optimistic. Moreover, as a precautionary measure, the agencies responsible (ICRP, WHO, etc.) have chosen to carry out a linear extrapolation of the dose–response relationship.

Figure 1.10. Diagram showing the principle of extrapolating the dose–effect relationship from the data obtained for high doses (adapted from Amiard, 2013). 1. Linear without threshold; 2. Infra-linear (hormesis); 3. Supra-linear (proximity effect); 4. Linear with threshold. For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

The relationship between low doses of radiation and their consequences in terms of morbidity and mortality has been the subject of much controversy as many questions remained unanswered. What is the relationship between the adverse effect and low radiation? Is there a threshold or not? Is the dose versus effect relationship linear or nonlinear? Is the hormesis phenomenon generalizable? What are the consequences of proximity effects (bystander), that is, the stress of cells neighboring the one that has been irradiated, on the appearance of morbidity? These key questions will be discussed in the following sections.

28

Nuclear Accidents

1.4.3.1. Responses with or without threshold, controversy Masse [MAS 00] believes that the choice of non-threshold linearity mainly derives from a weakness in dosimetric estimates and that once this poor quantification of doses is removed, another alternative will be possible. In 2002, Masse [MAS 02] pointed out that there is no known pathogenic effect induced in humans by low dose rates up to 100 mSv per year and that the effects attributed to low exposures are the result of extrapolations. In addition, many adverse effects are attributed to exposure to ionizing radiation, whereas they are likely to be due to real health effects in populations in distress and are attributable to social disorganization, deficiencies and possibly other environmental factors. The ICRP report [ICR 05b] concludes that while the existence of a threshold at a low dose of radiation does not seem unlikely for cancers of certain tissues, the evidence does not support the existence of a universal threshold. The linear no threshold (LNT) relationship hypothesis, associated with an uncertain DDREF (Dose and Dose-Rate Effectiveness Factor) for extrapolation from high doses, remains a conservative basis for radiation protection at low doses and low dose rates. However, three reports on the effects of low radiation doses were published between December 2004 and July 2005 [TUB 06a, TUB 06b]. These are the ICRP report [ICR 05b], the joint report of the French Academies of Science and Medicine [TUB 05] and a report of the American Academies of Science [NRC 05]. Despite the fact that these reports are based on the same studies of the biological effects of low doses, their conclusions differ significantly. The French report concludes that recent biological data show that the effectiveness of defense systems is modulated by dose and dose rate and that the linear non-threshold relationship is implausible. On the contrary, the ICRP and BEIR VII (NRC) reports, while acknowledging that there are biological arguments against the linear no-threshold relationship (LNTR), consider that there is insufficient biological evidence to counter and change the risk assessment methodology and current regulatory policy based on the LNTR. Tubiana et al. [TUB 07] believe that multicellular organisms are more effective in defending against ionizing radiation at low doses (oxidative stress, apoptosis, etc.) than at high doses. However, they acknowledge the lack of mechanistic explanations of phenomena such as hypermortality at low doses or adaptive response (i.e. better tolerance to radiation doses).

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

29

These authors believe that the epidemiological and experimental data challenge the validity of the LNTR hypothesis to assess the carcinogenic effect of low doses, but do not allow its exclusion. Therefore, the main criteria for selecting the most scientifically reliable dose–response relationship should be based on biological data. Their analysis should help an understanding of the current controversy. However, the controversy is becoming increasingly vigorous. Thus, in February 2015, a request was submitted to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to reject the linear no-threshold (LNT) assumption as the basis for regulating radiation protection and to promote the use of threshold and hormesis evidence [GLA 18]. There are many authors who refute the LNT (e.g. [CAR 18]). We should note that this controversy concerns only the occurrence of cancers. However, the effects of irradiation are not limited to this type of morbidity alone. This is particularly the case for cardiovascular diseases, where the relationship between low-dose ionizing radiation and this pathology is not fully understood [DIN 17]. These conflicts demonstrate that our knowledge of the effects of low ionizing radiation is far from complete [BAL 15]. 1.4.3.2. Linear or nonlinear responses? Non-monotonous responses For a long time, toxicology was based on a premise expressed during the Renaissance by Paracelsus: “All things are poison and nothing is without poison, only the dose makes the poison.” This meant that the adverse response was dose-dependent. There had to be a linear relationship. Toxicologists knew of a few exceptions where the toxicant acted at low doses and there were few effects at high doses such as arsenic. Since then, this certainty has been invalidated in several circumstances. This is particularly the case for endocrine disruptors that act at low doses and little at high doses [AMI 17]. Responses are then qualified as non-uniform. Is this non-monotonic relationship also applicable to low radiation doses? As shown in Figure 1.10, at low doses, the dose–response relationship can take four forms. The debate remains very lively on these various solutions [RHO 11]. 1.4.3.3. Hormesis or restorative power The term hormesis is used to describe a stimulation of biological defenses in organisms exposed to low doses of different physical or chemical stressors, which is obviously likely to impact the dose–response curve.

30

Nuclear Accidents

However, it has not been fully established whether hormesis is a common and important phenomenon. Indeed, the idea that the effects of low doses may be zero is otherwise accepted, but the concept that the effect of low doses is positive is doubtful for many authors. One of the areas where hormesis is best studied is the effects of radiation [AGA 18]. Hormesis is based on the concept that a low dose of radiation received previously can protect the victim. This phenomenon would correspond to an “adaptive” response. Radiation adaptation occurs when cells subjected to low prior irradiation and then undergo higher irradiation doses without developing any harmful effects. A low dose (a few tens of mSv), delivered a few hours before a higher dose irradiation, reduces the effect (especially mutagenic) of this second dose, and could therefore reduce the risk of cancer. Rodgers and Holmes [ROD 08] observed this phenomenon of radio-adaptation for mice subjected in situ to various doses of radiation in the Chernobyl exclusion zone. For their part, Møller and Mousseau [MØL 16], analyzing 17 studies, found that only one experimental study met the criteria for evolutionary adaptation. Finally, they concluded that they did not detect any evidence of hormesis. The lack of evidence of adaptation is mainly a result of the lack of replication and rigor in the experimental design. In particular, most studies were based on transplants with organisms from a limited number of sites. The mechanisms responsible for radio-adaptation are complex and involve more intense activation of repair systems, the action of certain cytokines (e.g. interleukins I) and the slowing of the cell cycle. The interpretation would be that the initial low dose led to the initiation of repair processes, making it possible to limit the toxic effects of the high dose delivered at a later stage. To what extent can this phenomenon lead to “protection” in human clinical practice? To date, the answer is not known with any precision. The literature on hormesis is abundant. However, the phenomenon is also controversial. Some authors consider this phenomenon to be important. Under certain conditions, according to Shibamoto and Nakamura [SHI 18], low-dose radiation can have beneficial effects and the LNT theory may be outdated. Kudryashevaa and Rozhkob [KUD 15], who studied the bioluminescent response of microorganisms to irradiation with americium 241 or tritium, observed three successive steps of this response: a first step with no effects (stress recognition); a second step with activation (adaptive

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

31

response); and a third step with inhibition (suppression of physiological function, i.e. toxicity due to irradiation). If the second step can be assimilated to hormesis, it is canceled by the third step. On the contrary, Sugie et al. [SUG 16] consider that they do not have enough data to confirm a hormesis phenomenon in human salivary cells. In addition, the concept of hormesis should be applied with caution, as hormetic stimuli can act without threshold on pre-damaged or atrophic tissues or in synergy with other harmful agents. Experimental evidence in favor of hormesis is considerable, but further studies are needed [JAR 17]. In a recent synthesis, Beyea [BEY 17] considers the linear relationship without threshold to be the most plausible hypothesis. In their opinions, the National Research Council (NRC) of the United States (part of the National Academy of Sciences), the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), a body created by the United States Congress, and the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) consider the assumption to be unjustified that any stimulation of the hormesis phenomenon at low doses of ionizing radiation has a significant health benefit for the population, exceeding the potential harmful effects of the irradiation [NRC 06] and this position remains valid to this day. 1.4.3.4. Non-target effects, proximity effects, genomic and epigenetic instability Recently, studies have shown that living organisms respond to ionizing radiation not only through direct reactions at the DNA level, but also indirectly with non-targeted effects (NTE). Bright and Kadhim [BRI 18] review the different types of NTEs and their potential implications for radiobiology research and applications. The best known NTEs are genomic instability, neighborhood effects and epigenetic phenomena. Non-targeted effects must be considered, and modeling experimental and epidemiological approaches could all be used to determine the impact of non-targeted effects on the linear non-threshold model currently used in radiation protection [MOT 18]. The bystander effect corresponds to responses induced by ionizing radiation in directly irradiated cells and also in neighboring cells that have not been affected by ionizing radiation and the corresponding energy

32

Nuclear Accidents

deposition. These neighboring cells therefore react to a soluble signal secreted by the irradiated cells [COA 04, MOR 07, ERM 11]. The proximity effect is well demonstrated and predominates at low doses (0.2 Gy). At higher doses, the response is overwhelming. This effect is of obvious interest for estimating the risk due to ionizing radiation [PRI 03]. Examples of neighborhood effects have recently been published. Thus, depleted uranium (DU) plays a role in both toxic and neoplastic “neighborhood effects” on human osteoblastic cells (HOS) [MIL 17]. The proximity effect is demonstrated in fish. Moreover, this effect is triggered even though only one parent is irradiated and it persists two generations after the irradiated generation [SMI 16]. The radiation-induced bystander effect (RIBE) presents potential risks for normal tissues in radiotherapy and confers a higher risk of low radiation doses than we previously thought [WAN 15]. The instability of the genome induced by irradiation is well documented for cells and organisms directly exposed [MOT 16]. This instability has also been observed in neighboring but non-irradiated cells. Enigmatically, increased instability is even observed in the offspring of pre-conceptionally exposed animals, as well as in humans [MOR 11]. Twenty years after the Chernobyl accident, the liquidators are highly unstable in genomics. The effects of irradiation are still clear at the cytogenetic and molecular levels [MEL 07]. In recent years, the discovery of epigenetic changes in chromatin, such as DNA methylation, following exposure to very low doses of radiation has been well documented [SCH 18]. Non-targeted effects represent a paradigm shift from the “DNA-centered” vision that ionizing radiation only produces biological effects and health consequences as a result of energy deposition in the cell nucleus [MOR 15]. 1.5. Radiation protection and recommendations for human irradiation Radiation protection or radiological protection is a discipline applied to protect humans from ionizing radiation. This science is based on three

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

33

fundamental principles [MÉT 97, DEL 06, MÉT 06]. The simultaneous application of these three principles is necessary. The first principle is the justification of practices. No practice can be adopted if it does not provide a sufficient benefit to exposed individuals or society. The second principle is the optimization of protection. It led to the precautionary adoption of the linear dose–response relationship without threshold. In this context, since any irradiation is likely to have an effect, for any source associated with a practice, the level of individual doses, the number of persons exposed, and the probability of exposure should be kept as low as reasonably achievable, taking into account economic and social factors. This is the principle of ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) optimization [AMI 16]. The third principle is the limitation of exposure. No individual shall be exposed to a level of risk that is unacceptable under normal practices and circumstances. In humans, a comparison of various natural and artificial exposures can be made (Figure 1.11).

Figure 1.11. Human exposure and health (adapted from [AMI 13]). For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

34

Nuclear Accidents

Following exposure to low-dose or low-dose rate ionizing radiation, the main radiation risk is cancer [WAK 12]. In the 2007 ICRP recommendations, a higher risk coefficient is assigned to the general population compared to the adult population because this group includes children, a sub-population with higher radiosensitivity and a longer lifespan. The argument was whether to set a lower reference level for children only [SAK 12]. Deterministic effects are often referred to as “tissue reactions”. Threshold doses have been defined for practical reasons with an incidence of 1% [HEN 12]. The ICRP [ICR 91] proposed probability coefficients for irradiation of 10 mSV (Table 1.11), and in 2007 [ICR 07a], it proposed new exposure limits for two categories of humans, nuclear workers and the public (Table 1.12). Detriment (10−2 Sv−1) Exposed population

Fatal cancer

Non-fatal cancer

Severe hereditary effects

Total

Nuclear workers

4.0

0.8

0.8

5.6

General population

5.0

1.0

1.3

7.3

Table 1.11. Nominal probability coefficients for stochastic effects (adapted from [ICR 91])

Limit type

Nuclear workers

Public

Effective dose

20 mSv y−1, averaged over 5 years

1 mSv y−1

The eye’s crystalline lens

150 mSv

15 mSv

Skin

500 mSv

50 mSv

Hands and feet

500 mSv

-

Annual equivalent dose

Table 1.12. Recommended dose limits in planned exposure situations (adapted from [ICR 07a])

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

35

The European Directive no. 96/29/Euratom adopted on May 13, 1996 sets out the basic standards for the protection of the health of the population and nuclear workers against the dangers arising from ionizing radiation (OJ C.E.O. no. 159 of June 29, 1996). The annual effective dose limits are 1 mSv for the public and 100 mSv for workers for five consecutive years and at most 50 mSv y−1. The equivalent dose to the skin is 50 mSv for the public and 500 mSv for workers. The Brochure of the Journal Officiel de la République Française (J.O.) no. 1420, Protection contre les rayonnements ionisants, gathers all the legislative and regulatory texts on radiation protection, in particular Decree No. 88-521 of April 18, 1988 amending the Decree of June 20, 1966 on the general principles of radiation protection and Decree No. 86-1103 of October 2, 1986, as amended, on the protection of workers against the dangers of ionizing radiation and its implementing regulations. Revisions of standards The standards are reviewed regularly and more generally in a more drastic way. Thus, the ICRP of April 21, 2011 called for a lowering of the threshold for the appearance of induced cataracts to 0.5 Gy, and the annual dose limit equivalent to 20 mSv for nuclear workers. This was recorded in December 2013 by Euratom. For workers likely to be exposed, the Directive introduces an annual effective dose limit of 20 mSv, replacing the value of 100 mSv over five consecutive years. As early as 2003, this limit was included in the Labor Code (20 mSv over 12 consecutive months). However, the equivalent dose limit of 150 mSv over 12 consecutive months for the lens of the eye should be modified to 20 mSv per year [BEH 14]. 1.6. Risk perception The risk assessment results in a probability of an adverse effect such as death for a number X of individuals. The public has great difficulty grasping the meaning of probabilities that refer to an event whose occurrence is uncertain. It should be noted that substantial risks arising from addiction (to tobacco, alcohol, etc.) or common actions (driving, etc.) are greatly underestimated by the public, while on the contrary, low or unproven risks in

36

Nuclear Accidents

unfamiliar areas (genetically modified organisms, electromagnetic waves from connected electricity meters, etc.) generate great concern. The public is increasingly suspicious of the management of nuclear activities. However, public trust is a prerequisite for effective environmental management of hazardous sites and their rehabilitation. Without trust, it is unlikely that such institutions can effectively convince the public that a site is safe and can be reused. Public confidence depends on its proximity to the hazardous waste site, as well as on economic dependence, directly or indirectly, on the nuclear site. 1.6.1. Probability of a future nuclear accident The probability of an accident follows a binomial probability law. The probability of a severe accident is calculated based on various findings. In 1986, the world total consisted of 450 reactors (143 of which were in Europe). These have undergone four core meltdowns followed by a massive release of radioactive elements (Chernobyl unit 4 and Fukushima Daiichi units 1, 2 and 3) over a cumulative operating life of 14,000 reactor years. The observed accident frequency is therefore 4/14,000 or about 0.0003. The probability that there will be no major accidents in 30 years’ time in Europe is about 0.28 per year per reactor. The probability of an accident within 30 years in Europe is therefore 0.72 [LÉV 13b]. The same calculation of the probability of an accident in Europe for next year gives the result of 0.042, that is, almost four chances (or rather bad luck) per 1,000. However, there are several biases in this calculation. First of all, the number of core meltdown accidents is not four, but varies according to the authors’ more or less complete censuses. Amiard [AMI 19] lists 12 important core mergers. Cochran and McKenzie [COC 11] reported 25 core meltdown accidents, adding 13 additional accidents (Experimental Breeder Reactor-I, Stationary Low-Power Reactor No. 1, Enrico Fermi Reactor-1, Ågesta, Dresden-3, Hatch-1, Surry-1, Arkansas Nuclear One-1, Oyster Creek, Atucha-1, Limerick-1, Pickering A-1 and Hadden Neck), but excluding the Windscale accident in 1957. Nuclear power plants containing several reactors (such as Fukushima) present multiple risks. In addition, the territory available per nuclear reactor is very small in Korea compared to Canada (Table 1.13) [SEO 18].

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

37

Country

Number of reactors

National territory area per reactor (km2)

Korea

28

3,561

Japan

45

8,398

France

59

10,912

United States

104

94,487

China

55

174,490

Canada

19

525,509

Table 1.13. National territory area for each nuclear reactor (adapted from [SEO 18])

1.6.2. Countries using or renouncing the use of nuclear energy The position of countries with regard to the use of nuclear energy is very variable. Some countries do not use nuclear energy and do not intend to do so in the medium term. Thus, in Africa, with the exception of South Africa, no country has nuclear reactors. In South America, only Argentina and Brazil have nuclear power plants. In the Middle East, only Iran and Israel have nuclear electricity, but other countries are considering developing this energy source (Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, etc.). Some countries have even included the non-use of nuclear energy in their national legislation. These are Australia, Denmark, Greece, Ireland and Norway. Several countries have abandoned nuclear energy. Thus, the phaseout of civil nuclear power has been implemented in Austria (1978), Sweden (1980), Italy (1987), Belgium (1999), Germany (2000), Switzerland (2011) and the province of Quebec (2013). It is discussed in other countries such as Spain. However, situations change over time. For example, in February 2009, Sweden lifted its moratorium on the construction of nuclear power plants. It should also be noted that Austria imports about 5% of its nuclear electricity consumption. To date, some countries such as France, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, the United States, South Korea, India and Iran have maintained the use of nuclear energy for electricity generation.

38

Nuclear Accidents

In addition, various countries such as Abu Dhabi, Poland, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are expected to acquire nuclear reactors in the short term. 1.6.3. Opinion polls on nuclear power Among the 10 potential disasters that could impact life on earth, respondents believe that the most likely are nuclear war in the second place and nuclear accidents in the third place [MÖR 15]. The societal impact is not limited to areas directly impacted by the nuclear accident. For example, Visschers and Siegrist [VIS 13] conducted two surveys in Switzerland, one conducted five months before the accident and the other conducted directly after the Fukushima accident, using a longitudinal study (790 people surveyed). They assessed the acceptance, perceived risks, perceived benefits and confidence associated with nuclear power plants. In their model, the perceived benefits and risks determined the acceptance of nuclear power plants before and after Fukushima. Trust has had a strong impact on both perceived benefits and risks. People’s confidence before Fukushima strongly influenced their confidence after the accident. In addition, the benefits received before Fukushima were correlated with the benefits received after the accident. Thus, the nuclear accident did not appear to have changed the relationships between the determinants of acceptance. Even after a serious accident, the public can still consider the benefits to be relevant, and trust remains important in determining their perceptions of risks and benefits. A public debate on the benefits of nuclear energy seems to have an impact on public acceptance of nuclear energy, even after a nuclear accident. The negative opinion of Nevada (United States) residents regarding a radioactive waste disposal site at Yucca Mountain depends on subjective risk factors, in particular the perceived severity of the risk for future generations. Perceived risks depend in part on the trust placed in the Department of Energy to manage the security of deposits. Opposition to this local waste disposal did not decrease significantly when the authorities proposed various compensations paid annually. This opposition did not change regardless of the value of the compensation offered to residents ($1,000, $3,000 or $5,500 per year for 20 years) [KUN 90].

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

39

The nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island and Lucens had no negative global impact on the construction of new nuclear reactors. On the contrary, the Chernobyl accident considerably slowed down the construction of new nuclear power plants. It appears that an accident is likely to have a negative and lasting impact in the country where it occurred, and perhaps in countries affected by the direct consequences, or when governments are under strong public pressure [CSE 13]. On the contrary, the Fukushima accident had a major impact on Japanese public opinion of nuclear energy. Negative feeling began in June 2011, just after the accident, and continued for at least one year (Figure 1.12). 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

2005

2009 In favor of promotion

2011 (June) In favor of keeping the status quo

In favor of abandoning it

2011 (October)

2012 (March)

No opinion

Figure 1.12. Japanese public opinion trends on nuclear energy (adapted from [HAS 13]). For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

In the United States, in 1965, 60% of Americans surveyed were in favor of nuclear energy. After the Three Mile Island accident, the number of Americans in favor of nuclear reactors dropped to 30% in 1983. Many referendum votes were held between 1976 and 1982 in the United States at the state level. Several votes were against nuclear power plants. This was the case in Montana in 1978, Oregon in 1980, Washington in 1981, Idaho and Massachusetts in 1982. In addition, 11 states passed laws to ban new nuclear reactors between 1976 and 1982 [ANO 84].

40

Nuclear Accidents

More recently, substantial majorities of Americans oppose the location of coal, natural gas and nuclear power plants in their region, although a majority support locating wind farms in their vicinity. The first factor in the release of an energy source is related to the environmental damage it produces [ANS 09]. At the OECD level, in countries with nuclear programs, the risks are perceived by their populations to be lower than those of their counterparts in countries without nuclear energy. However, in only six countries, the majority of respondents consider that the benefits of nuclear energy outweigh the risks it poses. These are Sweden, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland and Slovakia. Strangely enough, the score is highest in Sweden (61%), despite their government’s policy of phasing out nuclear energy. Of these six countries, Estonia is the only one that does not have nuclear energy [NEA 10]. The data show that in countries where nuclear energy is already present, the population is generally much more favorable to its use. The temporal trend in public opinion is generally more and more favorable to nuclear energy in the energy mix (this was analyzed before the Fukushima accident). However, nuclear accidents can lead to a rapid reduction in public support for nuclear energy, which recovers only very slowly [NEA 10]. Since 2005 in France, the ASN has set up an opinion barometer to better understand the expectations of the general public, as well as those of an “informed” public made up of professionals. Analyzing this River and Delmestre barometer [RIV 12], they note that despite the fact that 2011 was marked by the Fukushima nuclear accident, public opinion is not changing in its assessments of nuclear power. Thus, 64% of the population is suspicious of nuclear power, 46% say they are powerless in the face of nuclear development and 45% are afraid of it. On the contrary, the Fukushima accident affected the way the French view nuclear safety control in France. At the end of 2010, nearly six out of ten French people (57%) considered the way in which the safety of nuclear power plants was controlled in France to be effective. A few days after the nuclear accident, this confidence dropped by ten points [RIV 12].

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

41

In 2010, cancer was the most feared disease by the French population. Behind the already well-identified behavioral risks (tobacco, alcohol, exposure to the sun and artificial UV rays), environmental concerns are increasing. Living near a nuclear facility is considered a risk by nearly 77% of the population. However, general practitioners are very rarely asked about the risks from radioactivity or specifically the radioactive gas radon [MÉN 14]. Among industrial or technological activities, nuclear power plants (22%) once again appear to the French as having the greatest catastrophic potential. In the IRSN 2018 Barometer, the perception of their potential to cause a serious accident deteriorated in this year and was similar to that observed in the 2012 edition, for which the survey was conducted a few months after the Fukushima accident [IRS 18a]. 1.6.4. Estimated risk and perceived risk The acceptance of nuclear risk by people living near the US Department of Energy’s Savannah River Nuclear Weapons Site (SRS) is influenced by a variety of factors, including personal characteristics, experiences and economic needs. Public confidence is higher among respondents living upstream of the SRS and respondents whose county was economically dependent on the SRS. Similarly, respondents who were predisposed to accept additional hazardous waste or public health risks for economic gain also showed high levels of confidence [WIL 99]. The comparison (in %) of the probability of premature death increases with exposure duration, assuming an average life expectancy at birth of 80 years. Three causes of premature death are examined: tobacco consumption (one pack per day), fine particulate matter PM2.5 for the average concentration currently measured in Paris and radioactivity levels of 20 and 100 mSv y−1 observed in Fukushima. Two calculations were used for the Paris case, one from the InVS [DEC 12] and the other from Beelen et al. [BEE 13]. For Fukushima, the radioactive decay (30 years) of 137Cs has been taken into account (adapted from [NIF 15]). Premature mortality is significantly higher for tobacco and substantially similar for an irradiation dose of 100 mSv and the amount of fine particles in Paris (Figure 1.13).

42

Nuclear Accidents

Increase in risk of premature death

Tobacco, 1 packet a day

Microparticles

2.5

Figure 1.13. Premature deaths (%) over an 80-year lifetime, based on tobacco consumption (one pack per day), the average concentration in Paris of fine -1 particles PM2.5 and the exposure doses at 20 and 100 mSv y observed at Fukushima (adapted from [NIF 15]). For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

1.7. Conclusion Radioactive risk is estimated like all other risks in several steps beginning with the identification of radionuclide hazards, followed by the quantification of environmental contamination and the estimation of exposure to ionizing radiation. The relationship between dose and adverse effects then makes it possible to estimate the probability of the radioactive risk. Unlike non-human organisms, human exposure estimates are more advanced to take into account the different radiosensitivities of the various organs and the highly variable radiotoxicity of the various radiation types. Uncertainties and controversies exist about the real effects of low doses on the onset of cancers and other diseases. The main controversies concern the existence (or not) of a threshold for effects, whether the dose–response relationship is linear or not (depending on the importance given to the

Assessment and Perception of Nuclear Risk

43

hormesis phenomenon) and non-target (or indirect) effects such as the proximity effect (bystander), genomic instability and epigenetic phenomena. It should be recalled that radioactive risk management must necessarily follow certain principles. One of them is the principle of optimization (ALARA, as low as reasonably achievable), which is a responsible, consensual and equitable approach in a context of uncertainty about risk. Another important principle that must be applied in the case of a radioactive risk is the precautionary principle, which states that “when the occurrence of damage, although uncertain according to the state of scientific knowledge, could seriously and irreversibly affect the environment, public authorities shall ensure, by application of the precautionary principle, and within their fields of responsibility, that risk assessment procedures are carried out and that provisional and proportionate measures are adopted to prevent the occurrence of the damage.” Case law has even extended the precautionary principle to an area other than the environment, that of health. It is a principle of positive action and not a plea for inaction and abstention [AMI 16]. Other principles must be implemented in the case of a radioactive risk such as the principle of prevention, the principle of equity and proportionality, and the polluter pays principle. With the exception of uranium, for all radionuclides, radiotoxicity is higher than chemical toxicity. The effects of ionizing radiation are very varied with many pathologies. Some effects are deterministic and occur with certainty, often rapidly and highly dependent on the dose received. They are associated with a threshold of effect. Other effects are stochastic and only appear with a certain probability and in the long term (up to several decades). There are two types of stochastic effects: carcinogenic effects on somatic cells and hereditary effects involving germ cells. The ICRP issues recommendations that are regularly updated. Since the 2000s, this organization has taken the same approach for all non-human organisms based on a certain number of reference species, supposedly representative of all biodiversity.

44

Nuclear Accidents

Risk is a concept that is not well understood by the public. It is a probabilistic relationship between a hazard and an exposure. The public’s perception of radioactive risk is often far from the estimates made by scientists. This is by no means a privilege of radioactivity and this phenomenon is general for all risks. Perception is indeed dependent on many factors. Thus, a familiar risk (road traffic risk, risk from tobacco or alcohol, etc.) is always reduced in the eyes of the public. On the contrary, a little-known, mysterious or invisible risk will be overestimated. Phenomena such as neighborhood or direct or indirect dependence (employment, etc.) will lead to an underestimation of the risk. On the contrary, a recent event, such as an incident or accident, with significant media coverage, will lead to an overestimation of the risk.

2 Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

2.1. Early signals and late lessons The European Environment Agency has published two syntheses [AEE 01, AEE 13] on early signals and late lessons that can be drawn from the knowledge acquired from 1896 to the present, on molecules or groups of molecules that are extremely toxic, persistent and can pose significant health risks. Why, despite this knowledge, did decision-makers ignore these signals and take appropriate management decisions and actions only very late? In the first volume, the molecules identified include PCBs, benzene, asbestos, halocarbons (CFCs), DES, antibiotics, SO2, MTBE, TBT and growth hormones [AEE 01]. The second volume includes, among others, lead in gasoline, perchloroethylene in mains water, methylmercury in Minamata Bay (Japan) in the 1950s, and exposure of American military nuclear workers to beryllium, occupational exposure to vinyl chloride, the effects of DBCP on human fertility, the bisphenol A scandal, the DDT saga and ethinylestradiol (oral contraceptive) in wastewater [AEE 13]. 2.2. Structures for disseminating information on radioactive risk Public information in the nuclear field, and in particular on the specific risk of radioactive radiation, has evolved considerably over time, depending on the country.

Nuclear Accidents: Prevention and Management of an Accidental Crisis, First Edition. Jean-Claude Amiard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

46

Nuclear Accidents

2.2.1. Situation from 1945 to 1990 Information on atomic risk was obviously non-existent throughout the Manhattan Project (American project to manufacture the first atomic bombs) since this project was military and also took place during World War II. It should be noted that this did not prevent Soviet espionage from holding some of the know-how. This situation did not change much during the Cold War because the military on both sides imposed a strict restriction on all information concerning the atomic domain. Systematically, all incidents and accidents were kept secret where possible and minimized when known. The lead layer of information was more impermeable than some barriers in nuclear facilities such as the Kyshtym concrete layer (city in Chelyabinsk Oblast, Russia, where the Mayak nuclear complex is located). In the civil, industrial and medical fields, the situation was not much better. In the minds of those in charge, the public were ignorant and could not understand the risks involved in the use of atomic energy. It was therefore obvious that they should be kept away from all sources of information. In the nuclear power industry, political decisions in the civil nuclear field were taken, as in the military field, by a very limited number of senior government officials. Nuclear research organizations were strongly controlled by state power and remained close to the military. In addition, the market was spread over a very small number of companies. The organization of these companies was based on a strict centralized hierarchy with supervised staff. The initiative of the staff was kept to a minimum. All research on safety, security or radiation protection was programmed only by the heads of state agencies and companies. In addition, all information and the publication of all results were subject to censorship by those responsible. Conflicts of interest are obvious and at a maximum. There are a very limited number of personalities who lead nuclear research organizations and industrial companies and who hold responsibilities in international information, regularization and recommendation bodies such as UNSCEAR,

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

47

IAEA and the ICRP. Experts in these bodies co-opt each other without external supervision. This phenomenon is also called “regulator capture”. This situation will contribute to the birth of two antagonistic chapels: pro-nuclear versus anti-nuclear. In these two chapels, fanatics will be found distorting information. As in all sectors, nuclear power is not free from scientific fraud, allowing the circulation of false information. However, since the end of the 20th Century, efforts to ensure transparency of nuclear information have been made in various countries. For example, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), also known as the US Nuclear Safety Authority, is an independent agency of the US government, founded by the Energy Reorganization Act in 1974 and opened in 1975. It is responsible for regulating and enforcing nuclear safety in the United States. In France, the Prime Minister’s circular of December 15, 1981, known as the Mauroy circular, made it possible to set up Local Information Commissions (CLIs) for basic nuclear installation and all similar structures. There are more than 30 CLIs at nuclear facilities. 2.2.2. Situation from the Chernobyl accident to the present day The Chernobyl accident could not be hidden from public opinion. The result was a renewed awareness among populations of the risk of radiation, which was not limited to atomic weapons but could affect peaceful nuclear applications. This was partly possible because the research communities, independent of the nuclear industry (universities, major research organizations, etc.) in various foreign countries, were able to detect, measure and interpret radioactivity data in the environment and anthroposphere. During this period, several states decided to create structures independent of nuclear energy research and production organizations. In Canada, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), whose areas of expertise are nuclear safety and radiation protection, was created in 2000.

48

Nuclear Accidents

On the contrary, in Japan, it would be necessary to wait until the Fukushima accident in 2011 for a real reorganization of the nuclear regulatory authorities to be carried out with the creation of the NRA (Nuclear Regulation Authority). Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), whose areas of competence are nuclear safety and radiation protection, was only created in 2011. However, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), whose area of expertise includes radiation protection, was created in 1975. 2.2.3. The example of France In France, the IRSN was created in 2002 and the ASN in 2006, as structures totally independent of the CEA. The major change comes from the adoption of the Nuclear Transparency and Security Act (TSN) and the Basic Nuclear Facilities Order (INB). 2.2.3.1. TSN Law The adoption of Act No. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 on transparency and security in nuclear matters, known as the “TSN Act”, established the ASN (Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire), the independent nuclear safety authority. This law strengthens the right to information on nuclear installations, by giving a real legal framework to Local Information Commissions (CLI) and by setting up a High Committee for Transparency and Information on Nuclear Security (HCTISN). It establishes the first comprehensive legal regime for basic nuclear installations (INB) and the transport of radioactive materials. The legal acts applicable to these activities (creation authorizations, controls, criminal sanctions, dismantling) are defined by this law [LOI 06]. 2.2.3.2. INB Decree The decree “laying down the general rules relating to basic nuclear installations,” known as the INB decree, was published six years later in the Journal Officiel of February 7, 2012, amended by the decree of June 26, 2013 [ARR 12]. In this decree, the organization of the INBs, the responsibilities of the operators, the demonstration of nuclear safety, the control of nuisances and their impact on health and the environment, waste management and the preparation and management of emergency

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

49

situations are specified. In addition to this order, there are also technical regulatory decisions ordered by the ASN. 2.2.3.3. ASN On behalf of the State, the ASN ensures the control of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France to protect workers, patients, the public and the environment from the risks associated with the use of nuclear energy. It contributes to informing citizens, particularly in collaboration with the CLIs and the ANCCLI. To carry out its missions, the ASN respects four fundamental values: competence, independence, rigor and transparency. Since 2006, the ASN has been carrying out the tasks previously carried out by the Directorate General of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (DGSNR) and the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Divisions (DSNR), which were under the authority of the Ministry of Industry. 2.2.3.4. IRSN For its part, IRSN has expertise and carries out research missions in several fields. These areas are nuclear safety, the safety of the transport of radioactive and fissile materials, the protection of man and the environment from ionizing radiation, the protection and control of nuclear materials and the protection of nuclear installations and the transport of radioactive and fissile materials against malicious acts. 2.2.3.5. HCTISN The creation of the Haut Comité pour la Transparence et l’Information sur la Sécurité Nucléaire (HCTISN) was established by the TSN law. It is composed of 40 members, including four parliamentarians (two deputies and two senators) and six representatives of each of the following six categories: local information commissions; environmental protection associations; persons responsible for nuclear activities; trade unions of representative employees; persons chosen for their scientific, technical, economic, social, information and communication skills, including three appointed by the Parliamentary Office for the Assessment of Scientific and Technological Choices, one by the Academy of Sciences and one by the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences; and representatives of the ASN, the State services concerned and the IRSN [AMI 13].

50

Nuclear Accidents

2.2.3.6. CLI and ANCCLI In addition to the 30 CLIs at the INBs, there is also the local information and monitoring committee (Comité local d'information et de suivi, CLIS) of the Bure underground laboratory set up under the law of December 30, 1991, on research into radioactive waste management (the corresponding legal provision is now included in Article L.542-13 of the Environment Code). CLIS Bure receives a grant from national budgets. The CLIs are still waiting to receive a share of the INB tax. Some 15 information commissions (CIs) have been set up around nuclear sites of interest to defense, pursuant to Articles 4 and 5 of the Decree of July 5, 2001. The CIs dealing with defense at INBS (secret basic nuclear facilities) do not yet have a budget [AMI 13]. On September 5, 2000, wishing to combine the experiences and expectations of the 30 existing or similar CLIs and make their voices heard by national and international bodies, the Bureau of the Conference of CLI Presidents created the ANCLI, the National Association of Local Information Commissions [NIQ 04]. This association became the Association Nationale des Comités et Commissions Locales d’Information (ANCCLI) on November 26, 2010, to include the new categories of CLIs born of the TSN law and the decree of March 12, 2008 [AMI 13]. 2.2.4. Future change? While Japan recently established an independent nuclear energy regulatory body following the Fukushima accident, there is still a need to organize a dialogue in Fukushima Prefecture between all stakeholders to identify the problems and challenges of restoring long-term living conditions in contaminated territories [ROL 14]. Many other countries now have independent regulatory bodies, but the need to create truly scientific and independent international structures is becoming urgent. Indeed, the IAEA and UNSCEAR depend on the UN and therefore far too much on states and industrialists. Similarly, the recruitment of ICRP members should be less opaque and more open to civil society and academic research. The objectives of certain international bodies should be reviewed to take into account the radioactive risk to humans and all living beings. Thus, the WHO should take over the initiative on radiation protection and UNEP should take radioecology into account.

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

51

2.3. Feedback (REX) 2.3.1. Introduction: what is REX? Review of Experience (feedback) (Retour d’expérience, REX or RETEX or RetEx) is, in a broad sense, an inventory of knowledge in a particular field and its appropriation by an individual, a group or subsequent generations. In the field of prevention, REX links theory and practice. In the more specific area of nuclear accidents, REX aims to capitalize on lessons learned from past failures in order to reduce vulnerability and/or increase the resilience capacity of a nuclear facility. Historically, the nuclear sector (CEA and EDF) has been the first to embark on REX, with the capitalization of knowledge made possible by technological advances in information technology. The CEA, in particular, must keep its knowledge up to date, particularly because of the termination of the Phénix and Superphénix projects and the challenge of long-term waste storage. This need to capitalize on knowledge is reinforced by the obligation to preserve skills imposed by the legislator on the nuclear field [BÈS 98]. Initially, REX focused on operational safety. Subsequently, it gradually extended its field to Organizational and Human Factors (OHF). Thus, it can be seen as a memory of the knowledge acquired within the company. However, it can also be the very source of this knowledge in so far as the analysis of the accident, incident or weak signal can create this knowledge [DEC 07]. REX is now recognized as one of the pillars of risk management [GIG 15]. Risk control involves a series of three successive actions: anticipation, vigilance and management of the unexpected [WYB 04]. First of all, it is necessary to ensure that prevention and protection actions are carried out and to regularly check that these actions are still adequate. In the event of an accident, feedback will make it possible to review prevention and protection actions. Risk management is carried out in three stages, which are anticipation, vigilance and management of unforeseen events.

52

Nuclear Accidents

REXs are essential for keeping track of the progress of an event or crisis, to strengthen links between those involved, to identify areas for progress and to develop knowledge. REXs have evolved over time from simple technical systems, to a study of human behavior, to organizational behavior, and finally to an analysis of crisis situations. The severity of an event can be classified according to the degree of disruption to the organization. The increasing order of severity thus moves from an incident, an accident, a serious accident, a disaster to a major disaster [WYB 09], similar to the INES. 2.3.2. The overall REX process The overall REX process is viewed in different ways by different authors. For Reuss [REU 02], the approach can be summarized by a series of keywords: collect, select, analyze, validate, improve, transmit, memorize and value. For their part, Dechy and Dien [DEC 07] use a nine-step process: – the definition of the REX policy (type of event to be handled, resources allocated, relationships between entities involved in REX, etc.); – detection of the event; – data collection; – analysis of the event(s); – the definition of corrective measures; – the implementation of corrective measures; – the evaluation, in the long term, of the effectiveness of the measures; – archiving of the event, its teachings and processing; – communicating lessons to stakeholders or potential stakeholders. According to Botero-Lopez et al. [BOT 16], the REX process is based on three activities: capitalization, processing and operation (Figure 2.1). Capitalization makes it possible to locate and store relevant data characterizing an experiment. Processing corresponds to the analysis of the stored experiences and their transformation into knowledge. The aim of the operation is to use the experience and knowledge of the base in the business processes in order to improve their performance.

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

53

Figure 2.1. The REX process and its three activities [BOT 16]. For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

The eight steps, according to SPPPI [SPP 08], in the REX process are presented in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2. The different stages of REX (modified from SPPPI [SPP 08]). For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

The first step is the detection and identification of incidents, anomalies and accidents, followed by the second step that carries feedback to the line manager and management. The third step is to classify the anomalies

54

Nuclear Accidents

in order to decide what action to take. The fourth step is to collect the precise history of the facts. The fifth step is the research and analysis of causes, and the sixth step is the definition and planning of corrective actions. The seventh step is devoted to monitoring the implementation of these corrective actions, and the eighth and final step is devoted to communicating lessons learned. This process can be deployed using a computer system or a set of records. REX must be a collective process that implies trust and transparency between all actors. 2.3.3. Causes of REX failure According to Gigout [GIG 15], a single failed step compromises the entire REX. However, the causes of failure in the analysis of a REX are multiple. The first cause is censorship of information following an incident or accident. However, in the nuclear field, secrecy has been a constant for decades, both for military and civilian nuclear power. There are few data available on accidents that occurred before the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. In order to collect data, it is necessary to know precisely what data should be collected and what resources are allocated to this collection. It is also necessary that the actors, i.e. the employees of the incriminated installation involved in the collection, are in a climate of trust and non-punitive reactions, otherwise there will be self-censorship. Externally, communication on incidents may be blocked by the facility’s hierarchy for fear of sanctions from the regulatory authority. Internally, if these incidents form some of the indicators, competitive thinking about career development can lead an individual to avoid sharing information [GIG 15]. There must also be independence between the authorities that supervise the safety of nuclear installations and the operators of these installations. It is essential to avoid a situation where both judges and parties are nuclear safety experts. We have seen earlier that this was only achieved late in France and in other nuclearized countries.

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

55

2.4. Lessons from the past Nuclear accidents, whether military, industrial or medical, were numerous and were detailed in the first two volumes of this series [AMI 18a; AMI 19]. Unfortunately, the older ones were not the subject of detailed analyses of causes and consequences and could not provide lessons. Only relatively recent industrial accidents and indeed medical accidents (Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima) have provided much information. 2.4.1. Lessons learned from military nuclear activities and accidents The main lessons that can be learned from military nuclear activities include the firing of weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, atmospheric tests and accidents involving military installations. 2.4.1.1. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Examination of victims and survivors of the blaze at Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to major advances in our knowledge of the health impacts of ionizing radiation. The first victims, who died for the most part from the mechanical and thermal effects of the bombs, cannot be compared to the victims of accidents at nuclear installations. On the contrary, medical monitoring, rapidly implemented on an impressive number of victims, will make it possible to understand the short-, medium- and long-term health consequences of the radiological effects of the bombs. 2.4.1.2. Atmospheric testing of atomic bombs Atomic tests, in particular atmospheric tests, have been important sources of radioactive contamination. First of all, it was shown that radioactive clouds rise to high altitudes, dispersing radionuclides over long distances. Radioactive fallout, mainly by wet means (rain, snow, hail), spread the contamination of two medium-lived radionuclides, cesium 137 and strontium 90, over the entire hemisphere where the test took place. Since most of them took place in the northern hemisphere, the fallout has been, and still is, the most significant in that hemisphere. Our knowledge of the circulation in the upper atmosphere and the structure of the earth’s atmosphere was thus greatly improved.

56

Nuclear Accidents

For short-lived radionuclides, such as iodine 131, it was the populations around the test site that were strongly impacted. Thus, the case of Nevada is emblematic of a local population exposed to atomic testing. Lapp [LAP 62] was the first in 1962 to report exposure to iodine 131, contained in milk, in the Nevada child population after the Troy trial of April 26, 1953. In the past, several nuclear tests (Bikini Island in the Pacific, Maralinga in South Australia, Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan) have resulted in the contamination of large areas [ICR 09a]. 2.4.1.3. Military accidents For most military accidents, “defense secrecy” has prevented information from being made public. Moreover, often the search for causes and consequences remained very superficial. Examples abound for many countries such as the Windscale accident in 1957 in the United Kingdom, the Mayak accident (USSR) in 1957 or the Marshall Islands accident of the United States in 1953. Each time the consequences were denied or minimized. The accident in the Marshall Islands (Bikini) during the Castle Bravo test on March 1, 1953, revealed the high radiotoxicity of radioactive ash from the radioactive cloud over long distances in the direction of the prevailing winds. Residents of several atolls in the Marshall Islands were contaminated and severely affected, as well as the crew of a Japanese fishing vessel, the Dragon Blessed (Daigo Fukuryū Maru) [CON 84, AMI 19]. The Windscale accident confirmed, as the lessons of the atomic tests in Nevada had shown, the significance of the contamination of milk with of iodine 131. In this accident, one of the first food restrictions in the history of nuclear energy use occurred. Indeed, milk consumption was banned over an area of 518 km2 for eight weeks and three million liters of milk were thrown into the sea [COU 01]. In nuclear accidents, the radioactive cloud travels rapidly over long distances. Thus, during the Windscale accident, the cloud moved southward at 0.1 cm s−1 and northward at 0.3 cm s−1 and reached Norway on October 15 [COU 01].

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

57

The accident at Kyshtym (Mayak) in April 1957 contaminated a vast area (23,000 km2, populated by 270,000 people) with a strontium 90 deposit with activity greater than 3.7 kBq m−2. This territory is now called the “East Urals Radioactive Trace” (EURT) [NRP 07]. During the earliest military use of nuclear energy, many critical accidents occurred as a result of a lack of knowledge of physical phenomena. The fact that they were kept secret delayed the application of security rules in this area. The main lessons learned from military accidents are the need for dietary restrictions on local populations, the dispersion of radioactivity over long distances and the radioactive contamination of large areas for decades to come. 2.4.2. Lessons from industrial accidents As with military accidents, civil accidents have long been denied or largely underestimated. As a result, there is almost no feedback for civil accidents prior to 1979. 2.4.2.1. The Three Mile Island accident The core meltdown accident that occurred on March 28, 1979 in the second unit of the Three Mile Island (TMI) plant, an 800 MWe reactor designed by Babcock and Wilcox near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA, was considered totally improbable by American nuclear experts. This accident had a considerable impact worldwide and caused a sudden realization that the risks associated with the operation of nuclear power reactors needed to be thoroughly reconsidered. The first surprise was how quickly meltdown occurred. As a result, a large amount of physics research on this phenomenon was launched, both experimental and numerical simulations (see Chapter 3). From the point of view of safety, the TMI accident clearly demonstrated that more serious accidents than those previously considered for the design of nuclear reactors were possible. In particular, this accident highlighted the importance of human factors in the safety of nuclear installations.

58

Nuclear Accidents

This has resulted in various safety reflections on the place of humans in the operation of facilities, on the experience gained from the operation of nuclear power plants and on emergency management [CLÉ 13a, CLÉ 13b]. 2.4.2.2. The Chernobyl accident The Chernobyl accident is a reactivity accident. An important synthesis of this type of accident was conducted by McLaughlin et al. [MCL 00]. This accident was very instructive. One of the first lessons concerns the difficulties encountered in the mass evacuation of populations. The second lesson is the high vulnerability of children resulting from high contamination of their thyroid glands by radioactive iodine. With regard to radiation protection, the high contamination of food, in particular wild berries and game, was a major contribution to the radiation dose to populations. In addition, serious psychological problems have emerged in the populations surrounding the site. Environmental contamination following the Chernobyl accident was intense and spread far from the damaged area. Radionuclide deposits (mainly 137 Cs and 90Sr) on soils were distributed very heterogeneously. This was the result of wind and precipitation regimes. This contamination of the land will be present for decades. The weakness of numerical models to predict radionuclide soil deposition was evident under certain meteorological conditions (precipitation) and according to terrain typology (mountains). It was therefore necessary to develop more realistic models [NEA 02b]. The impacts on flora and fauna following the Chernobyl accident were numerous. The main ones will be summarized below. This accident revealed the high radiosensitivity of coniferous forests. Insect biodiversity decreases in radioactive areas [JAC 05]. For example, a study shows that the offspring of grasshoppers from contaminated sites in the exclusion zone show abnormalities in development, survival and reproductive success [BEA 12]. The same is true for soil invertebrates [BEZ 15]. On the contrary, the effect of exposure to ionizing radiation on the assembly of nematode worms is moderate [LEC 14]. Long-term observations of bird communities have been made in the Chernobyl exclusion zone. These include the work of Møller and Mousseau’s teams synthesized by Amiard [AMI 19]. Most of these studies show that, more than 30 years after the accident, the specific richness,

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

59

abundance and density of bird populations in forest environments decrease with increasing exposure to ionizing radiation. These authors also observed physiological or morphological changes. Thus, a high rate of morphological anomalies, such as partial albinism in swallows in the exclusion zone, was observed [MØL 07]. In addition, 48 bird species represented by 546 individuals had significantly smaller brains in the exclusion zone than in the control areas [MØL 11]. In another study conducted by this team, the incidence of cataracts increased with the level of ambient radiation (57 species sampled) [MOU 13]. The question of the influence of the evacuation of human populations from contaminated territories on mammalian diversity and abundance was discussed. In the Chernobyl exclusion zone, the abundance of 12 species has been studied by counting traces in snow and is negatively correlated with ambient dose rate, with very marked effects for some species, such as fox, and much less for other species, such as wolves [MØL 13a]. On the contrary, a second study using multi-year snow trace count campaigns, as well as aerial surveillance counts, giving indications of mammal population dynamics, found no correlation between abundance and irradiation dose for elk, fallow deer, or wild boar, and even a sharp increase in wolf density [DER 15]. However, recently Beaugelin-Seiller et al. [BEA 19] have reconstructed the radiological dose of 12 mammalian species observed at 161 sites. The results of their new analysis are in agreement with the exposure levels reported in the literature, which may induce physiological disorders in mammals that may explain the decrease in their abundance in the exclusion zone. Similarly, the impacts on human populations were varied. The main lessons of the Chernobyl accident concern the management of a post-accident situation in the short and long term. Indeed, the authorities of the most affected countries (Ukraine, Belarus and Russia) deployed impressive resources after the accident to try to limit its effects on humans and the environment. These included controlling fires in highly radioactive environments, evacuating large numbers of people, treating and caring for those who had been most severely irradiated, limiting the spread of radioactivity dispersion, decontaminating large areas, setting up food chain surveillance programs and carrying out medical monitoring of the populations concerned [CLE 13]. Since the Chernobyl accident,

60

Nuclear Accidents

political authorities have been monitoring the social and economic disruptions associated with the accident over the long term. There was also a need for better public information and communication. This transparency effort, which began after the Three Mile Island accident, will be reinforced by international organizations and individual countries, with varying degrees of success [AMI 19]. In this accident, with cases of high exposure, the authorities realized the importance of symptomatic and prophylactic medical and nursing procedures, such as antibiotics, antifungal and antiviral agents, parenteral feeding, air sterilization and sterile room treatment, as well as the disappointing results of bone marrow transplantation. The need to undertake robust epidemiological studies to examine potential health effects, both acute and chronic, was identified as necessary [NEA 02b]. The short-lived radioactive isotopes of iodine (123I, 131I) bioaccumulate strongly in the thyroid glands of children, causing thyroid cancer. The distribution of iodine tablets limiting the bioaccumulation of radioactive iodine was not sufficiently and quickly carried out. UNSCEAR estimated that the fraction of the incidence of thyroid cancer attributable to radiation exposure in children or adolescents who were not evacuated at the time of the accident and who were residents of Belarus, Ukraine and the four most contaminated administration divisions of the Russian Federation was in the order of 0.25 with an uncertainty range of the estimated attributable fraction ranging from 0.07 to 0.5. The details of the number of thyroid cancers are provided in Table 2.1 [UNS 18]. Belarus

Russian Federation (Bryansk, Kaluga, Orel and Tula administration divisions)

Ukraine

Total

Female

4,546

1,504

9,393

15,443

Male

1,360

334

2,096

3,709

Total

5,906

1,838

11,489

19,233

Sex

Table 2.1. Total number of thyroid cancer cases recorded from 1991 to 2015 among the population subject to the Chernobyl accident who were under 18 years of age at the time of the accident (modified from [UNS 18])

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

61

The health impact of Chernobyl has been the subject of much controversy. It is obvious that for a long time, the major international organizations, such as the IAEA or the WHO, have been notorious for playing down impacts, as part of cynical denial of reality [ZER 15]. Fortunately, a more objective view has been provided by the publications of independent nuclear energy researchers and academics [AMI 19]. Food management is a crucial issue after a nuclear accident. The Chernobyl accident highlighted the primacy of the dietary route in the exposure of human populations. Very quickly, limits on food contamination were set. As environmental contamination decreased, these limits were changed to lower values (Table 2.2). Indeed, authorities are confronted with strong radioactive contamination of the environment and therefore of foodstuffs during the emergency phase and must take temporary emergency measures with relatively high limits. These limits will be lowered as soon as possible to better ensure the health of local populations. The ALARA principle must be applied.

Drinking water

1986

1993

1996

1999

370

18.5

18.5

10

370

111

111

100

Butter

7,400

-

185

100

Beef

3,700

600

600

500

Lamb

3,700

-

600

500

Pork and chicken

3,700

370

370

180

Potatoes

3,700

370

100

80

Fruit

-

-

100

40

Wild berries

-

185

185

185

Fresh mushrooms

-

-

370

370

Dried mushrooms

-

3,700

3,700

2,500

Baby food

-

-

-

37

Milk

Table 2.2. Changes in contamination limits in 137Cs (in Bq kg−1 or Bq L−1) in foodstuffs in Belarus from 1986 to 1999 (modified from [ICR 09b])

62

Nuclear Accidents

More than 16 years after the accident, populations’ exposure to radiation continued, mainly resulting from the consumption of agricultural products contaminated with 137Cs [NEA 02b]. Some authors estimated in the 2000s that cesium fixing in soils over the next four to eight years would be sufficient to prevent an increase in food contamination, but other predictions were more pessimistic [SMI 00]. In 30 years, 137Cs activity in agricultural commodities has been divided by a factor of 1.5 to 4 for agricultural products (cereals, potatoes, vegetables) and by a factor of 3 to 7 for livestock products (meat, milk, eggs). Many countermeasures to combat contamination of agricultural products have been applied with varying degrees of success. Nevertheless, within the former USSR, the use of large areas of agricultural land was still prohibited in 2002 [NEA 02b] and is likely to remain so for a long time. In 2002, the NEA estimated that forest products, such as mushrooms, berries and wild game, continue to pose a radiation protection problem and will continue to do so for a long time to come. It also estimated that, similarly, groundwater contamination, particularly by 90Sr, could become a problem in the future in water collection basins downstream of the Chernobyl region and that contaminated fish from lakes may be a long-term problem in some countries [NEA 02b]. These predictions have come true. Most countries need to import at least some food, and governments are aware of the need to assure their citizens that the food they consume is safe. Moreover, following the Chernobyl accident, an international agreement on the contamination of foodstuffs in international trade was concluded under the auspices of the WHO and FAO [NEA 02b]. Radionuclide transfer models need to be seriously improved. An assessment of the models used at 13 sites to predict the transfer of 131I and 137 Cs from the atmosphere to food chains indicated that commonly used models usually lead to overestimation by up to a factor of 10 [NEA 02b]. There is a need to improve information exchange and political decision-making between neighboring countries. Thus, the seriousness of the Chernobyl accident led political authorities to react at European and international levels.

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

63

Two conventions, adopted under the auspices of the IAEA, entered into force in 1987, namely the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. At the European level, Council Decision 87/600/Euratom of December 14, 1987, specifies Community procedures for the rapid exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency. On the basis of this Council decision, the European Commission created the Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE), which requires EU member states to notify the Commission of radiological emergencies and to provide timely and relevant information available to minimize the expected radiological consequences [NEA 02b]. The impact of the accident was felt far from the site of the Chernobyl accident as many countries had to take various measures to restrict the consumption of agricultural products including agricultural crops. For example, breeding restrictions in Europe applied to several hundred thousand sheep in the United Kingdom and a very large number of sheep and reindeer in some Nordic countries [NEA 02b]. This continued in the United Kingdom until 2007 (Table 2.3) [ICR 09b]. Farms

Sheep

8,914

4,224,000

August 1990

757

647,000

May 2000

387

231,500

February 2007

369

196,500

June 1986

Table 2.3. Number of sheep and restricted farms in the United Kingdom in 1986, 1990, 2000 and 2007 (modified from [ICR 09b])

It is essential to have contingency plans in place to effectively respond to a nuclear accident. At the time of the Chernobyl accident, the international recommendations available to the Soviets were those of ICRP Publication 40 [ICR 84]. However, these recommendations for accident response were not well understood at the time they had to be implemented. It has proved necessary to refine and clarify the advice provided at the international level [PAR 88]. In particular, it is essential that emergency plans be flexible. For this reason, the Commission has circulated a revised version in publication 63 [ICR 93].

64

Nuclear Accidents

For its part, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), as a result of the interest shown by its member countries, has actively participated in the establishment of response plans and management procedures in the event of a nuclear accident. To this end, it established the Expert Group on Emergency Response Exercises in 1990, which later became the NEA Standing Working Group on Nuclear Emergencies. To deal with nuclear emergencies, this group proposes innovative ideas and new approaches to improve existing procedures [NEA 02b]. Nuclear accidents have exorbitant costs. Expenditures related to the Chernobyl accident were identified by UNDP [UND 02] for Ukraine annually from 1992 to 2000. These annual expenditures range from US$333 million in 2000 to US$939 million in 1997. 2.4.2.3. The Fukushima accident Like the Chernobyl accident, the Fukushima accident was rich in lessons for nuclear safety, crisis management, the environment and human populations. On this subject, the IAEA has published a detailed report [IAE 15]. The Fukushima accident provides many lessons on the evolution of nuclear safety, the management of the nuclear crisis, the creation of a truly independent regulatory authority, the impacts on the environment, particularly forest environments and wildlife, the impacts on human populations (especially children) and on food shortages, etc. The Fukushima accident had a significant impact on nuclear safety. Thus, MacFarlane [MAC 11] mainly draws two lessons from the Fukushima accident. The first is that the interim storage of spent fuel, before reprocessing or disposal, must be rethought. The second is that a long-term plan for the disposal of nuclear waste is required for any nuclear power program. More generally, the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident from a safety perspective are the choice of an installation site with the lowest risk resulting from natural hazards, the need to prepare and protect against all natural hazards. It is also important to review the power plants’ emergency plans to anticipate the type of disaster that occurred in Fukushima. Emergency cooling systems, particularly low-pressure injection systems, must be reviewed

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

65

and hydrogen risk control must also be addressed to limit the risk of explosion. For example, IRSN has acquired P2REMICS, a new software program designed to assess the risk of explosion in a reactor. This aspect will be discussed in Chapter 3, and consideration should also be given to how to manage the opening of valves remotely when the electrical power is cut off. Finally, it is imperative to review the means of communication between the crisis units and set up a more rigorous organization between the different units in order to facilitate exchanges [SYN 15, PLA 17]. The management of a nuclear crisis must be regularly reviewed in the light of past experience. Following the Fukushima disaster, many countries have had to rethink their emergency management systems. In France, this reflection has led to the completion of the existing system led by the Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN), which is based on various plans (PUI and PPI), described in Chapter 4. One of the actions proposed and validated by the government in the summer of 2016 consists of extending the scope of the MIPs to 20 km (compared to 10 km previously) [GEN 16]. For nuclear reactors located near a border, it is obvious that coordination between cross-border countries must be at a maximum [BOI 16b]. Thus, at the European level, work has been carried out jointly by two associations: HERCA (Heads of the European Radiological protection Competent Authorities) and WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulators Association). Recommendations entitled “HERCAWENRA approach for better cross-border coordination of protective actions during the first phase of a nuclear accident” were published and validated in October 2014 [HER 14, GEN 15]. In particular, this recommends preparing for evacuation up to 5 km around nuclear power plants, and preparing shelters and iodine tablets up to 20 km, as well as defining a general strategy to be able to extend these measures to 20 km and 100 km respectively. Following the Fukushima accident, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) initiated various preventive actions based on the REX of this event. At the state level, all NEA member countries with nuclear power plants took prompt action to ensure and confirm the continued safety of their operating nuclear power plants and the protection of the public. This aspect will be developed in Chapter 3.

66

Nuclear Accidents

The Japanese accident demonstrated that it is imperative that nuclear management be carried out by an independent nuclear regulatory authority. Since the accident, Japan has also created a safety authority that is truly independent of stakeholders and transparent, as already suggested in 2007 by an international mission of the IAEA (IRRS, Integrated Regulatory Review Service). Similarly, in Europe, this accident demonstrated the need for better coordination of safety authorities, hence the creation of a working group bringing together the European safety authorities (WENRA) [JAM 16]. Following the Fukushima accident, radioactive releases to the atmosphere led to heterogeneous deposition over large continental areas including forests, agricultural land and residential areas. The downstream redistribution of radiocesium is governed by various processes such as runoff. This phenomenon will hinder the various decontamination operations of inhabited areas [IRS 16c]. Radioactive cloud dispersion models have been found to be deficient in a number of cases. Thus, on several occasions, hot spots have been detected in areas not declared contaminated by the authorities. This was the case, for example, at Date on June 30, 2011, when the central government designated 113 households as hot spots, with a recommendation to evacuate the inhabitants. Yet, Date is about 80 km from the Fukushima power plant. Similarly, on July 21, 2011, the government designated 59 hot spots in four locations in Minami Soma city with another call for evacuation. In the same city, the number of evacuated homes was increased by 72 on August 3, 2011. Once again, the scheme applied to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which consists of drawing concentric circles around the epicenter of the disaster, proved to be wrong. As in Chernobyl, in Fukushima hot spots may be located at great distances from the center of the accident [BEH 13]. In both Chernobyl and Fukushima, forests occupy a large proportion of the territories contaminated by radioactivity. However, the processes governing the fate of radionuclides in forest ecosystems imply a strong persistence of this contamination in these environments. In the early phase and the first months after the accident, the interception of radioactive deposits by the canopy and the transfer of radionuclides to the undergrowth and soil are the most important processes. It is therefore possible to carry out decontamination by removing the undergrowth. In a later phase, as

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

67

a result of canopy leaching and the fall of above-ground biomass, the soil gradually becomes the predominant reservoir where radiocesium is found, radiocesium being among the most persistent radionuclides in the environment. The management of contaminated forest ecosystems following the Fukushima accident differs from that applied to the forest ecosystem in the Chernobyl exclusion zone. Thus, the risk of fire is high in the Chernobyl exclusion zone where the forest is left to natural change and may be exposed to drought periods whose probability of occurrence increases with climate change. This fire risk is less sensitive in Fukushima. Morphological anomalies in pines have been observed in Chernobyl as in Fukushima [ZEL 05, YOS 11, WAT 15]. As ICRP 108 [ICR 08] notes, dose rates from 4 to 40 μGy h−1 cause few adverse effects and morphological damage appears with dose rates from 40 to 400 μGy h−1. The effects observed on terrestrial invertebrate abundance depend on the species groups studied. For only some of these groups, the change of abundance with ambient exposure level is different at the Chernobyl and Fukushima sites. A decrease in the abundance of insects (bumblebees, grasshoppers, butterflies, dragonflies) and spiders was observed after the Chernobyl accident [MØL 09]. Similarly, in Fukushima, decrease in pollinator abundance in contaminated areas appears to be accompanied by a decrease in fruit production in the same areas [MØL 12a]. On the contrary, an increase in the number of spiders has been observed on the most contaminated sites [MØL 13a]. In the butterfly Zizeeria maha, morphological anomalies have been observed in adults from contaminated sites but no such anomalies in those living in control sites not affected by radioactive fallout. These morphological abnormalities became even more severe over the next two generations obtained under control conditions [HIY 12]. However, within two years (2011–2013), a gradual return to normal was observed [HIY 15].

68

Nuclear Accidents

Severe morphological abnormalities and increased mortality were observed in aphids collected in spring 2012 from contaminated areas near the Fukushima power plant. These anomalies disappeared in the next generation [AKI 14]. Observations on birds in the contaminated territories of Fukushima confirm the harmful effects of ionizing radiation on their reproduction and abundance. This decrease in bird abundance observed for 45 species is correlated with increasing ambient dose rate levels from March to July 2011 [MØL 12b] and this drop increased over time (2011 to 2014, 57 species) [MØL 15]. A dosimetric reconstruction in Fukushima birds showed that the observed effects were consistent with knowledge on the drop in reproductive capacity related to the increase in absorbed doses [GAR 15b]. Extensive surveys of breeding birds continued in Fukushima up to 2017, and a link between the abundance of different species and the level of ambient radiation has been well established. The effects of ionizing radiation are strongly negative on the abundance of 32% of bird species. These effects were considerable and much more important than those of temperature and precipitation. The authors also found significant interaction effects between temperature and ionizing radiation [MØL 15, MØL 19]. The abundance of invertebrate taxa and their colonization in dead branches of 70-year-old Scots pines (Pinus sylvestris) have been quantified. These branches, in the form of four slices about 10 cm thick, were deposited at 20 sites and the abundance of invertebrates was assessed annually between 2014 and 2017. The number of invertebrates was higher in samples where the wood was uncontaminated. In addition, there were more invertebrates in soils in areas with lower ambient radioactivity and there was an interaction effect between wood contamination and ambient radiation. Finally, the abundance of soil invertebrates under wooden slices increased in 2013–2017, implying that the abundance of soil invertebrates increased over time, as radioactivity decreased [MØL 18]. Following the Fukushima accident, radiation doses to non-human populations (flora and fauna) were estimated by UNSCEAR [UNS 14]. These estimates were compared with the threshold values determined

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

69

by the ICRP for non-human organisms (Tables 2.4 and 2.5). The situation is worrying in highly contaminated sites and for sika deer, rats, ducks and pines. 95th percentile of the absorbed dose rate distribution (µGy h−1)

Rate of estimated value to threshold value

Wild boar

2.2

0.55

Sika deer

1.3

0.33

Asian black bear

1.2

0.30

Bird

1.5

0.38

Species

Table 2.4. Estimates of the absorbed dose rate in June 2011 for various terrestrial mammalian wildlife species and birds in Koniyama City approximately 100 km from Fukushima generating station (modified from [UNS 14])

A - Estimated dose rate (µGy h−1)

B - Threshold dose rate (µGy h−1)

Relationship A/B

Bee

18

400

0.04

Deer

71

4

17.8

Duck

21

4

5.3

Earthworm

46

400

0.11

Frog

18

40

0.45

Pine

17

4

4.3

Rat

46

4

11.5

Wild grass

26

40

0.65

Reference body

Table 2.5. Estimates of the absorbed dose rate in June 2011 for reference organisms in an area with relatively high radioactive deposits (Okuma Town) (modified from [UNS 14])

As in other accidents, the evacuations in Fukushima of approximately 130,000 people were problematic for elderly and dependent people (see Chapter 4). According to the recommendations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Americans living in the accident area had to be evacuated up to 50 miles (80 km) [NRC 11]. If the Japanese government had made the same recommendation to its citizens, it would have resulted in the evacuation of about two million people [VON 11].

70

Nuclear Accidents

Cécile Asanuma-Brice, a CNRS researcher and permanent resident in Japan, responding to an interview with Louise Lis [LIS 16], believes that after the Fukushima accident, the protection standards were changed to limit the surface area of the evacuation zone and allow the illusion of a return to normal. Asanuma-Brice [ASA 14] reports that after the accident, evacuees were provided with temporary and free accommodation, although some accommodation was built in contaminated areas. But as early as 2012, the Japanese authorities put pressure on the evacuees to return to their previous place of residence. These pressures were in particular the removal of free temporary housing and a shift in reconstruction from government level to local level, leading to considerable delays in housing construction. In addition, the state is currently transferring responsibility to individuals themselves; these individuals are forced to adapt their lives to a contaminated environment or to exile themselves without compensation. At the same time, the state continues to call for their return, claiming the refugees’ psychological suffering is generated by the distance from their native prefecture and is gradually reopening areas that were previously closed to housing. In addition, evacuating hospitals has been difficult. There were 850 patients in the seven hospitals and clinics located within a 20 km radius of the Fukushima power plant, including 400 seriously ill patients who were bedridden or needed regular care. All were evacuated urgently and this was particularly dramatic in Futaba hospital [BOI 15]. The impacts of the Fukushima accident were significant for the general population, but particularly for children and health workers. The evacuated Japanese showed less internal contamination than expected [BOI 15]. However, in both Japan and Ukraine, unless properly treated, fear of ionizing radiation will have long-term psychological effects on a large part of the population in contaminated areas [VON 11]. More than 100,000 people lost everything because of radiation: their place of life, their work, their social ties, etc. The psychological, social and economic damage on the Japanese population was enormous and this accident created a real social divide. While the elderly wanted to return and spend the rest of their lives in their villages, the younger ones wanted to break with their past and make their lives in places free of pollution [BOI 15, JAM 16].

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

71

Children are particularly sensitive to ionizing radiation. UNSCEAR has carried out a thorough synthesis of the anatomo-physiological characteristics of children and their development as a function of their age and has drawn conclusions about their radiosensitivity, which in some cases may be significantly higher than that of adults. This is particularly true for the onset of breast, brain, thyroid and non-CLL leukemias (different from chronic lymphoid leukemias). This is also true after radiotherapy and affects many organs, such as the brain, endocrine system, heart, breast hypoplasia, thyroid nodules, bladder, testicles, skeletal muscles and bone marrow throughout the body [UNS 13]. After the Fukushima accident, thyroid cancer rates in children were higher than expected [BOI 15]. The impacts of the Japanese accident on health personnel mainly concern job retention, as well as training and information in emergency situations. The resignation of health personnel was significant, as 125 full-time physicians left the province’s 24 hospitals, representing 12% of the physicians working in these institutions. The same is true for nurses, since 407 of them left their positions in 42 hospitals, representing 5% of the nursing staff in these institutions [BEH 13]. In Japan, there is little preparation for practicing medicine in a confined environment, that is, without contact with the outside world during the emergency phase of a nuclear accident; only a few emergency physicians are trained, and GPs not at all. This gap is not peculiar to Japan; it is the same in many countries. General practitioners must be informed that they have two actions to take simultaneously in the event of an accident: protect themselves from external exposure and radio-contamination by air and protect themselves from radioactive contamination by skin and ingestion [BEH 15]. Radioactive contamination of foodstuffs is a serious problem for the authorities in the event of a nuclear accident. During the emergency phase, it was prohibited to eat one’s own home-produced food in both Fukushima and Chernobyl. The standards for placing food on the market and marketing were exceptionally high during this phase (higher than in Chernobyl) and then reduced to more reasonable levels. However, the population quickly lost confidence in the public authorities regarding the quality of food. Citizen controls have therefore been set up with the help of various Japanese and foreign NGOs, such as the support of ACRO (Association pour le Contrôle de la Radio-Activité dans l’Ouest de la France) for local populations to protect themselves [EIK 16].

72

Nuclear Accidents

Keeping the population informed about the nuclear field has always posed problems. Politicians’ lies after the accident, promising a total decontamination of the affected areas, were taken very badly by the Japanese population and have considerably increased mistrust towards the authorities [JAM 16]. In response to this fact, some international organizations such as the ICRP and Japanese organizations such as the Radiation Safety Forum have initiated dialogues with the population. It shows that inhabitants have major difficulty understanding the radiological situation of their daily environment, a strong concern for their health (and in particular for the health of children) and a feeling of helplessness and abandonment, and also of discrimination and exclusion which results in a loss of dignity. All this is linked to a disintegration of family life and the economic and social fabric. It is urgent that in view of a possible nuclear accident, the public acquire a practical culture of radiation protection [LOC 16]. This situation is also true for politicians, and Japan was ill-prepared for emergencies [YAS 16]. Following the Fukushima accident, UNSCEAR made a major communication effort. After its 2013 report [UNS 14], the United Nations Scientific Committee provided new publications on this subject each year [UNS 15, UNS 16, UNS 17]. The analysis is subdivided into headings (releases, dispersion-discharges to air; releases, dispersion-discharges to water; transfers to land and water; doses to the public; health implications; doses and effects on non-human organisms) and new publications have been selected in two categories (publications with a high or medium contribution to research needs). Each reader is obviously not obliged to follow this selection. 2.4.3. Medical accidents Radiological accidents resulting from the use of ionizing radiation in the medical field are many and varied [AMI 19]. Historically, before 1945, the first symptoms of radiological accidents affected health professionals irradiated by X-rays. The first signs that appear are skin burns that can lead to necrosis, as well as radiation-induced skin cancers, especially of the arms. The victims also suffer from leukemia and thyroid cancer. The first victims were producers of electrical radiation generators, doctors, nurses and, in particular, radiologists; then after the 1950s, this list was extended to dentists and veterinarians [ZER 94a].

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

73

Several registers exist (see [ZER 94a]). The oldest, and the only global registry, is the United States Radiation Accident Registry. It was initiated and maintained in Oak Ridge (USA) [LUS 88]. To be included in this register, dosimetric criteria are set. These are the effective dose greater than or equal to 0.25 Sv, the equivalent dose delivered to the skin greater than or equal to 6 Sv and the equivalent dose delivered to other tissues or organs greater than or equal to 0.75 Sv. From 1944 to 1980, there were 296 accidents involving 136,615 people, 24,853 people exceeding radiation criteria and 69 deaths [LUS 88]. Radiological accidents are divided into three origins: criticality, radioisotopes and electrical equipment generating ionizing radiation. The latter category is by far the most extensive. A relatively complete assessment was made by Rodrigues de Oliviera [ROD 87], which includes data on 299 references covering the period 1945–1985. Radiological accidents are mainly the result of three main causes. The first cause is the loss of sealed sources, and the second is the failure or misuse of instruments creating ionizing radiation. The last cause concerns errors in the exposure dose delivered to patients undergoing various forms of radiotherapy. 2.4.3.1. Losses of sealed sources Sealed sources are placed either in fixed or mobile installations. The former are frequently associated with the medical field, while the latter are more related to industrial or military applications. These sources lost in the environment are mostly anonymous and the public is unable to distinguish their harmfulness. This explains why individuals who find them by chance keep them with them or in the middle of their family. In several cases, the facility was abandoned and scrap metal workers stole the equipment to recover the mass of scrap metal, unaware that a radioactive source was still present. This type of radiological accident is relatively frequent. Among the most serious, there were nine fatal accidents (28 fatalities) from 1945 to 2005 and 12 accidents causing serious injuries [AMI 19]. Of these, three (Ciudad Juarez, Goiânia and Bangkok) have turned into a nuclear accident since radioactivity has been dispersed in the environment. For all these accidents, the IAEA has carried out an analysis and published an easily accessible report that provides some feedback. They have been cited in Volume 2 of this series.

74

Nuclear Accidents

First, their number is too high, and even for the periods 1980–1984 and 1985–1989, the number of people involved in accidents involving sealed sources has increased very significantly compared to previous periods. This could easily be corrected by careful monitoring of source use, maintenance and decommissioning. Thus, IRSN manages the national inventory of ionizing radiation sources using the Radioactive Sources Inventory Management Information System (SIGIS). This national inventory centralizes the authorizations issued by the various authorities responsible for radioactive sources (ASN, prefectures, DSND, etc.) and the movement of sources on French territory (acquisition, transfer, export, import, takeover, replacement, etc.). The website of the Radioactive Sources Inventory Management Information System (SIGIS) is available at https://sigis.irsn.fr. 2.4.3.2. Electrical equipment generating ionizing radiation The uses of ionizing radiation are many and varied (non-destructive testing, synthesis reactions, mechanical and chemical transformations, waste treatment, agri-food applications) [AMI 19]. Similarly, the electrical devices that generate this radiation are diverse. The main industrial irradiators are of two types: electron accelerators and cobalt 60 irradiators. Malfunctions of these devices mainly caused the modification of materials by the action of radiation (hardening of oils and fats, weakening of plastics, glues, wood, cardboard, etc.), or to inadequate use of safety devices, up to and including their shutdown, lead to particularly serious radiation. Frequently, workers recently assigned to the accelerator have a profound lack of knowledge of the potential serious risks. They have not been informed of the serious risks associated with exposure to high dose rates from industrial accelerators or irradiators. This explains their violation of safety circuits in order to intervene in the event of a technical failure. However, professionals with several years’ experience may also be involved in serious and sometimes fatal accidents. When a malfunction occurs, it cannot be ruled out that a knowledgeable professional’s vigilance may decrease. Repeated training and information on radiation risks, systematic radiological monitoring (automatic and manual) of source entries into their protective housing before entering the irradiation room, and the technical

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

75

inviolability of the safety chain associated with the irradiator reduce the risk of accidents [ZER 94b]. Efforts are still needed today. 2.4.3.3. Errors in exposure doses The destructive power of ionizing radiation was used to destroy cancer cells proliferating in various human tissues almost as soon as radioactivity was discovered. Historically, the first victims of these rays were radiotherapists who did not protect themselves well enough, as well as some patients for whom the delivered dose was too high. Since then, our knowledge of the harmfulness of ionizing radiation has progressed tremendously. However, this did not prevent a significant number of accidents due to an error in the exposure dose administered to the patient. This dose may be either underestimated and the patient not treated or overestimated and the patient left at risk of developing secondary cancer or dying from the overdose. Unfortunately, there have been too many accidents of both types. The most recent report lists 634 radiological accidents between 1980 and 2013, involving 2,390 overexposed people, 190 of whom died from their overexposure [COE 15]. The causes of these accidents are numerous. Thus, in the case of the Epinal accident, one of the causes was the fact that the guide was not written in French [WAC 07]. The main ones are a lack of perception and vigilance on the part of medical staff, as well as shortcomings in practitioners’ procedures and controls. This results from the staff being insufficiently qualified and trained. In addition, there are gaps and ambiguities in the definition of staff functions and hierarchical responsibilities [HOL 09]. Among the lessons learned from accidents, the main ones are beam calibration errors when commissioning radiotherapy equipment, incorrect use of the system, failure to report an accelerator repair requiring recalibration, overload, errors in calculating the absorbed dose, misunderstood oral requests, use of inadequate filters and loss of computer information resulting from an unexpected computer shutdown [ORT 09]. 2.4.3.4. REX in the medical field In the various fields of activity, REXs take various forms. For the medical field, the organization of REX is based on three pillars:

76

Nuclear Accidents

understanding, sharing and acting (Figure 2.3). Bally and Chevalier [BAL 14] add a fourth step, knowing, which they place before the others. REX is a multi-professional and multidisciplinary approach, which combines collection, in-depth analysis, improvement actions, sharing and communication of lessons learned. To improve patient safety, it is essential to look at why events occur, and to analyze organizations and human factors. This is an approach that leads professionals to question themselves as a team about their practices and to become aware of the risk in order to better control it [BAL 14]. Following a fairly exhaustive study of REX in the medical field, the HCTISN made various recommendations to all stakeholders concerned. It advised them to think carefully about improving transparency in the medical sector, incident reporting and the quality of information provided to patients (pre-treatment information, dosimetry information and incident information) [HCT 09].

Figure 2.3. The three main functions of a REX device (modified from [IRS 14a]). For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

REXs have limitations and can be improved through weak signals. One of the main structural flaws of REX is that the tool shapes the way the problem is approached [BEA 16]. It is important to detect the warning signals of an accident through appropriate analyses. Once this signal

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

77

is recognized, decisions, actions and reactions must be taken to correct this discrepancy so that it does not develop into an accident (Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4. Changes of a significant event from its origin to the occurrence of an accident (modified from [IRS 14a]). For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

2.5. Crisis exercises It is essential to simulate a radiological or nuclear accident in order to test the material resources, but above all the reactivity and coordination of the multiple actors involved at various levels (national, territorial, local). Many countries do so. Thus, in France each year, about 10 national nuclear or radiological emergency exercises are organized, in addition to local, thematic or international exercises. They are organized by IRSN and the Ministry of the Interior. The feedback from these exercises changes the scenarios and makes it possible to improve public information, the involvement of civil society and the coordination of cross-border actors [LOY 16]. 2.5.1. Transnational exercises In order to study the cross-border aspects of nuclear accidents (for the first time in an international context), the NEA took the initiative to develop and conduct the first international exercise on the implementation of nuclear accident contingency plans. This led to the creation of the INEX program (nuclear emergency response plans and management), the first exercise of which, INEX 1, was carried out in 1993. The INEX 2 series of exercises, also initiated by the NEA between 1996 and 1999, was more ambitious than the INEX 1 series, in that it aimed to improve the actual emergency response procedures and existing “equipment” through an

78

Nuclear Accidents

exercise from a truly international command post. In 2001, the INEX 2000 exercise, similar to the four INEX 2 exercises, was organized as a real-time notification and communication exercise from a command post, covering the first hours of a nuclear emergency situation. These response plans and nuclear emergency management have led to significant improvements in national and international procedures, including communication and information exchange between countries and harmonization of response methods [NEA 02b]. The NEA continues this type of exercise. The last one in 2016 (INEX-5) brought together countries and an international organization and simulated a multi-reactor accident on the same site as in Fukushima [NEA 19]. Gaudouen [GAU 14] presents the REX of a cycle of cascade exercises constrained (“3 in 1” concept) in time (June 2012, December 2012 and June 2013) and in a cross-border context, some very ambitious exercises, taking place at the Cattenom Nuclear Power Plant. Each exercise required careful preparation beforehand and each territorial service had to determine its “reference” technical and operational framework. Stakeholders were involved in the planning work. To monitor the population, it is essential to structure the database to know the population, its precise location, and to determine the conditions for its management. The information and consultation network must be structured by keeping it up to date, and it is important to mobilize and inform health professionals. It is also necessary to inform the population to make them truly involved in managing the situation. 2.5.2. National exercises In France, special nuclear and radiological emergency response plan (PPI) exercises are regularly planned. The planning of national exercises takes into account the frequency defined for each nuclear site, as well as the five-year frequency provided for in Article R 741-32 of the Internal Security Code. The SGDSN has published a guide for the preparation and evaluation of radiological emergency exercises in 2015 [SGD 15]. The French policy on territorial exercises, including the redefinition of guidelines and programming, was updated by the Ministry of the Interior in 2016 [MIN 16] for the period 2016–2018. This document reiterates

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

79

the need to prepare all actors for the crisis and to take into account the exit from the emergency and the post-accident situation. An effort must be made in crisis communication. Feedback and the capitalization of lessons learned must be seriously carried out. Among the themes to be given priority by the Ministry of the Interior are the management of the impacts of terrorist attacks and the management of post-accident situations in the field of nuclear accidents. The challenge is to have a known organization, capable of adapting to all types of crisis (nature, evolution, duration). At the departmental level, the Ministry of the Interior requests at least four exercises per year with activation of a Departmental Operations Center (Center Departmental d’Operations – COD) and two annual exercises at the zonal level (i.e. around the nuclear site) implementing the reinforced Zone Operational Centre (COZ) in order to test zonal coordination, with an interministerial and interdepartmental dimension. Particular attention will be paid to cooperation between civilian and military actors [MIN 16]. For example, planned exercises for 2017 involved the EDF nuclear power generation centers (CNPE) in Flamanville (March 14), Cattenom (October 17 and 18), Saint-Alban (November 28 and 29) and Dampierre (December 5 and 6), as well as the FBFC (Franco-Belgian Fuel Fabrication Facility) in Romans (June 29 and 30) and the CEA in Cadarache INBS RES (Scientific Test Reactor) (November). In addition, an exercise was held at a military site, the Ile Longue operational base (December 12 and 13) and a simulation of a civil radioactive material transport accident (Pas-de-Calais) (May 23). In addition, there was a nuclear or radiological (NR) exercise in Lyon (May 18), a zonal territorial exercise (South-East) (June 6) and an exercise of environmental nuclear measurements in the North zone (September 26). For 2018, the exercises in the first half of the year were at CEA Saclay (January/February), EDF Flamanville 3 (March), EDF Saint-Laurent (March/April), EDF Fessenheim (May/June) and Istres Air Base. In the second half of the year, the CEA Bruyères le Châtel exercises (September and October), the AREVA exercise, the EDF CNPE in Nogent-sur-Seine (October and November), the naval base in Cherbourg (November and December) and the CNPE in Chooz [MIN 17] took place.

80

Nuclear Accidents

In this type of exercise, local elected officials are essential but are very poorly trained. In addition, these exercises systematically exclude the population concerned, who are themselves unaware of nuclear risks [BOU 14a]. The six reflexes for good reaction are [ASN 16e]: – I reach safety in a building quickly; – I keep myself informed; – I don’t pick up my children from school; – I limit my telephone communications; – I take iodine as soon as I receive the instruction to do so; – I prepare for a possible evacuation. 2.6. Incident and accident reporting To have the opportunity to provide feedback, the preliminary step is to have a comprehensive inventory of incidents and accidents and to have a common scale of severity of these events. These declarations must also be properly managed and reported in an informative manner. All these data must be computerized and accessible to all. 2.6.1. A common severity scale The INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) has made it possible to establish a common language for evaluating an incident or accident in the nuclear sector. It was established internationally in 1991. This common international reference makes it easier to understand public opinion. Information on an event is communicated via the IAEA to all countries that have adopted INES. In France, the scale applies to all installations controlled by the Nuclear Safety Authority (EDF reactors, COGEMA plants, CEA laboratories, etc.). As detailed in Volume 2 of this series, a particular scale is used in France for radiotherapy accidents. This is the ASN/SFRO scale for taking into account radiation protection events affecting patients as part of a radiotherapy procedure [ASN 13]. The ASN systematically publishes events

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

81

classified from level 1 on the INES [ASN 19]. In 2018, eight reports were recorded. Lecoze et al. [LEC 06] introduced the notion of an “almost accident”. Near misses are minor events, lower than incidents that are therefore precursors or weak signals. These signals are only made obvious once the accident has occurred. Thus, there would be 600 incidents without injury or damage, classified as almost an accident for a single major accident, 10 serious accidents and 30 accidents with material damage. 2.6.2. Management of declarations Feedback from high-risk industries is based on incidents considered significant, that is, events that could, in unfavorable circumstances, have combined with others to generate major accidents. The French nuclear manufacturers (EDF, CEA, etc.) have decided to distinguish two groups of events of different severity relevant to safety (in order not to be overwhelmed by the number of events to be recorded and analyzed) and to apply equally different methods to them. These are Safety Relevant Events (SREs) and Significant Safety Incidents (SSIs). The SREs are entered into a national computerized file managed by EDF and called the “event file”. SSIs must be notified to safety regulatory authorities (such as ASN) and be the subject of a detailed analysis report according to a standard plan. 2.6.3. Reporting systems In the nuclear industry, there are no sanctions associated with incident and accident reporting. The Three Mile Island disaster led to the emergence of a number of standards in the nuclear sector. Thus, the threat of a potential accident and its implications made it possible very quickly to set up a system for reporting incidents and accidents. On the contrary, proactive security methods were established. At an international level, five reporting systems are mainly used. The SOL (Safety through Organizational Learning) system was developed by the Centre for Systems Security Research at the University of Berlin

82

Nuclear Accidents

in collaboration with TÜV Rheinland. SOL is an approach to event analysis based on sociological and technical system concepts and psychological theories of incident genesis (accidents and near accidents) [FAH 11]. The Human Performance Investigation Process (HPIP) is used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to investigate human performance events in nuclear power plants. This standard investigation process used by staff in occurrence investigations was developed by Paradies et al. [PAR 93]. The structure of HPIP 5;29 contains six main human failure modules. The IAEA, for its part, operates three separate international incident reporting systems to collect, analyze, maintain and disseminate reports from participating countries on safety-related events in nuclear power plants (IRS, International Reporting System for Operating Experience), research reactors (FINAS, Fuel Incident Notification and Analysis System) and fuel cycle facilities (IRSRR, Incident Reporting System for Research Reactors). The IRS is used by the IAEA and the NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency), developed by the WANO (World Association of Nuclear Operators). The system was implemented in 1980 and had 33 participating countries in 2018 [IAE 10a]. FINAS, jointly managed by the IAEA and the NEA, was established in 1992 and had 31 participating countries in 2018 [IAE 06a]. IRSRR is an IAEA-managed system established in 1997, with 59 participating countries in 2018 [IAE 15b]. 2.6.4. Websites In 2001, the CEPN and the group Personnes Compétentes de la Société Française de Radioprotection (SFRP), in cooperation with IRSN and INRS, set up the RELIR system [CEP 18a, CEP 18b]. This system brings together the most interesting events for worker training and incident prevention. The selected incidents are presented in the form of descriptive sheets guaranteeing the anonymity of the exposed persons, companies and materials involved. The CEPN provides the secretariat of the RELIR system as well as the management of the website and the preparation of educational sheets, which are then validated by a Committee. An English mirror site is managed by the Health Protection Agency in the United Kingdom [HPA 18], the OTHEA site.

Lessons from the Past in the Field of Nuclear Accidents

83

2.7. Conclusion It is common in the chemical and nuclear industry to observe early signals of future incidents or accidents that are ignored. For a long time, the nuclear industry had developed an immoderate taste for secrecy, denying any incidents and accidents. The reasons were twofold: to keep industrial developments secret and to keep the public unaware of the radioactive risk. A change of attitude occurred in the United States in 1979 with the Three Mile Island accident, which accentuated the structural reforms initiated with the creation of the NRC in 1975. European countries changed little during this period. A second start came in 1986 with the Chernobyl accident. Again, change was slow and insignificant because the accident involved a Soviet-designed nuclear reactor, and Western-designed reactors were considered safe. The latest surge follows the three major nuclear accidents that occurred in Japan in 2011. Europeans then became aware of the possibility of a nuclear disaster and undertook a series of analyses of reactors in service, with France also analyzing its other nuclear installations. Feedback from nuclear accidents is therefore limited to the most recent reactor accidents, as well as to criticality accidents that have been the subject of research and synthesis. Analysis of nuclear accidents has been the subject of numerous publications. Among the international agencies, UNSCEAR, the UN agency, has produced one of the most comprehensive syntheses on nuclear accidents [UNS 11]. Similarly, for the two main and recent accidents, Chernobyl and Fukushima, information recording has been important. UNSCEAR was involved from the beginning in assessing radiation exposure and the health effects of the Chernobyl accident. The literature was reviewed in Volume 2 of this series [AMI 19]. Since then, an analysis of thyroid cancers that occurred after Chernobyl has been published [UNS 18]. For the Fukushima accident, UNSCEAR conducted a knowledge synthesis [UNS 14], supplemented by various updates [UNS 15, UNS 16, UNS 17].

84

Nuclear Accidents

The causes of nuclear accidents are multiple. However, Mukhopadhvav and Hastak [MUK 14] identified the main ones for the five most serious accidents. The first two causes encountered for the five accidents are human error and safety violations. The third cause (three out of five cases) is a defective reactor design. The fourth cause is the lack of training for the personnel working on the plant. The last two causes relate to the material itself (equipment failure and inadequate safety and warning systems) (Table 2.6). Chernobyl

Fukushima

Chalk River 5

INES

7

7

Defective design

X

X

TMI

SL-1

5

4

X

Equipment failure

X

Inadequate security and warning systems

X

Violation of security rules

X

Lack of professional training

X

Operator error

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Table 2.6. Comparative analysis of the main problems encountered during a nuclear accident (modified from [MUK 14]). SL-1: Stationary Low-Power Reactor Number 1; TMI: Three Mile Island

3 Research for the Future

3.1. Introduction: safety and the main types of accidents Safety is divided into two areas: prevention, which consists of avoiding the accident, and mitigation, which aims to reduce the consequences of an accident when it occurs despite prevention efforts. In the nuclear field, safety efforts focus on three areas: on the design of nuclear power plants and other nuclear equipment, on their operation, and on training the people who will control the nuclear installations [REU 02]. This vision is still valid today. In the nuclear field, prevention is based on defense in depth. It requires high quality in the design and construction of the nuclear installation. It is also necessary to have protection systems and backup systems that in the event of failure can restore the installation to normal operation. The installation must be equipped with emergency procedures, i.e. back-up systems that take over from conventional systems in the event of a malfunction. Mitigation is based on crisis command posts, pre-established action plans, the possibility of distributing iodine tablets in the event of a nuclear accident and evacuation plans for populations regularly tested by crisis exercises. The effectiveness of prevention and mitigation depends above all on the operators’ “safety culture” [REU 15]. 3.1.1. Safety history In the United States since 1975, it has been clear that it is imperative to separate the controller from the auditor. As a result, USAEC (United States

Nuclear Accidents: Prevention and Management of an Accidental Crisis, First Edition. Jean-Claude Amiard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

86

Nuclear Accidents

Atomic Energy Commission) is divided into two entities, one responsible for development (DoE, Department of Energy) and the other for control (NRC, Nuclear Regulatory Commission). In France, the Commission de sûreté des installations atomiques (CSIA) was created in January 1960 to examine the safety of current and future CEA installations. In June 1967, the Minister for Industry established a group of experts for safety of reactors, including the Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux power plant. This group was made up of representatives from three entities (CEA, EDF and industry). It became a Permanent Group (GP) in 1972. At the end of the 1970s, unlike in the United States, there was still no split between controller and controlled. Indeed, the SCSIN (Service central de sûreté des installations nucléaires) exercised the decision-making power on behalf of the Minister for Industry and relied on the expertise of its “technical support”, the IPSN, which is an institute of the CEA. The latter also convened permanent expert groups for certain more serious technical safety problems such as the creation, commissioning, operation or shutdown of installations or the management of serious accidents. The SCSIN, at the administrative level, became the Direction de la sûreté des installations nucléaires (DSIN) in 1988, then the Direction générale de la sûreté nucléaire et de la radioprotection (DGSNR) in 2002, with about a hundred engineers at the central level and as many in the regions, with triple supervision by the Ministries of Industry, Ecology and Health [FOA 07]. For its part, the CNRS and its Commission 06 (nuclear and corpuscular physics) set up a working group on nuclear energy in the fall of 1974. A report by this group, unanimously adopted by the committee, highlighted a “significant number of problems that remain to be solved, particularly from the point of view of fundamental research”, such as thermal and radioactive pollution, safety and waste. This review of the problems led the group to advise “the greatest caution” in developing the nuclear industry [GRO 76]. This was the beginning of the involvement of a number of scientists in the nuclear debate, some of whom formed the GSIEN (Groupement de scientifiques pour l’information sur l’énergie nucléaire). 3.1.2. The main safety objectives The main objective of the nuclear safety approach is to protect the environment and people from the release of radioactive substances. To do

Research for the Future

87

this, the first principle is to place at least three barriers between radioactive products and the environment. To implement the safety policy, managers follow a deterministic approach with a probabilistic approach and also rely on unfortunate experiences in the past. The deterministic approach is based on four lines of defense in depth. The first line of defense in accident prevention is the quality of design and installation. The second line is based on the fact that the reactor protection system automatically returns the facility to safe operation in the event of a disturbance. The third line is based on the reactor backup systems, and the final line includes the ultimate emergency procedures in the event of an accident. The probabilistic approach to safety was initiated in 1975 by Norman Rasmussen and his team [RAS 75]. It consists of identifying accidental sequences and quantifying them through reliable studies. For sequences whose probability is considered excessive, studies of relevant design and operating provisions will be carried out. 3.1.3. Defense in depth Defense in depth is defined by five successive levels [IRS 14f]: 1) failure prevention, robust design and high quality construction; 2) periodic inspection and protection devices to keep the installation within the normal operating range; 3) backup systems and accidental driving procedures to detect and control facility failures; 4) additional accidental driving procedures and the internal emergency plan to limit the consequences of a serious accident; 5) off-site emergency response plans to limit radiological consequences for populations. The safety of pressurized water nuclear reactors includes three containment barriers between the fuel and the environment. The first is the sheath that surrounds the fuel rods. This sheath retains the radioactive

88

Nuclear Accidents

products created in the fuel pellets. Poor heat dissipation would cause the sheaths to break, or even the pellets to melt to a greater or lesser extent. The second barrier is the closed primary water circuit, which is located between the core and the steam generator loops. The fuel rods are constantly cooled by this primary water. In the event of the ducts failing, the radioactive products remain confined in this primary circuit. The containment building constituting the third barrier is the concrete building that houses the primary circuit. The two main nuclear accidents that can occur on a pressurized water reactor (PWR) and result in radioactive releases to the environment are aggravated loss of primary coolant accidents (LOCA) and steam generator tube ruptures (SGTR). 3.1.4. New research in the field of nuclear safety In order to better protect the population, new research programs have been launched since the Fukushima accident. Some have already led to a better understanding of the phenomena associated with a serious accident and improved modeling of its consequences for the environment. Feedback (REX) is useful, especially if it is done well and well used, but is not sufficient to ensure nuclear security. Indeed, fortunately, the number of nuclear incidents and accidents is not high enough for all cases to have occurred. It is therefore essential to use research in this area. Research in the field of accident prevention begins with a comprehensive inventory of all possible accidents. Progress in accident prevention can be achieved according to two main principles. The first is the realization of a nuclear accident using a scale model, which collects as much quantitative data as possible on the parameters controlling the accident. The second principle is to digitally simulate the nuclear accident. These experiments and numerical simulations can take place for each type of accident, or even at different stages of the accident. For example, in France, the IRSN’s preferred research instruments for the safety of nuclear power reactors are the CABRI and PHEBUS experimental reactors, as well as the GALAXIE experimental platform [COU 17]. These instruments will be described later.

Research for the Future

89

The main research focuses on accidents involving the loss of coolant, reactivity accidents and core meltdowns. It also includes research on the recirculation of cooling water under accident conditions and dewatering accidents in spent fuel storage pools. The behavior of significant components of nuclear power plants, and in particular their aging, is a subject that requires serious research. The same applies to the impact of fires in nuclear power plants and their consequences. Research in the field of external natural events (earthquakes, floods, etc.) has proved essential. Frequently, REXs find that human factors are critical in triggering an accident or in the subsequent steps for an incident to turn into an accident. Furthermore, studies and research in the field of Organizational and Human Factors, and more broadly in the human and social sciences, are becoming irreplaceable [JAC 13, COU 17]. Safety is a process that evolves as knowledge advances through research and through evaluating operating experience. The implementation of lessons learned from the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi accidents and the continuation of related research activities are long-term actions that will take place in the future, as regulators and the nuclear industry learn from them [NEA 16b]. 3.1.4.1. The main natural causes of nuclear accidents: floods and earthquakes Several French basic nuclear installations (INBs) are likely to be damaged by floods. These are mainly the Blayais and Gravelines nuclear power plants, as well as the Tricastin site [IRS 16b]. In December 1999, storm Martin swept through southern France. Among the extensive damage it caused, it led to the flooding of part of the Blayais nuclear power plant site and caused the failure of systems important for the safe operation of the plant. This event, followed by the exceptional floods of 2013 that affected the Tricastin installations in the Drôme and Vaucluse regions, made it necessary to take better account of flood risks [IRS 16b]. In France, a basic safety rule known as RFS 2001-01 specifies the approach for assessing seismic hazards at nuclear facility sites. RFS 2001-01 provides seven steps for seismic hazard assessment. The first step is to define the geological zones where historically known earthquakes could occur in the future (seismotectonic zones) based on a synthesis of geological and seismological data. In the second step, the selection of earthquakes is

90

Nuclear Accidents

made which, if they were to occur again, would create the strongest effects in the site area and adjacent areas. In the third step, the two main parameters (magnitude and depth) of the historical reference earthquakes are calculated, called the Séismes Maximaux Historiquement Vraisemblables (SMHV). Then, the magnitude of the reference earthquakes thus determined is increased by 0.5. This flat-rate increase, which leads to the definition of one or more Séismes Majorés de Sécurités (SMS) (major earthquakes affecting safety), makes it possible to take into account the uncertainties inherent in estimating the characteristics of the reference earthquakes. The fifth step studies paleoseism indices (strong earthquakes occurring in very remote periods of a few thousand to a few tens of thousands of years), then calculates the ground movements to be taken into account for the design of the main installations causing nuclear accidents. The ultimate step is to consider site effects, such as the type of surface soil or the presence of a sedimentary basin embedded in a rocky environment [IRS 18b]. 3.1.4.2. Fires, the main artificial causes of nuclear accidents In 2014, 73 fires broke out in French nuclear power plants. They meet all definitions of combustion phenomena (heat emissions with flames or fumes) declared by EDF to the ASN. The most important ones were analyzed by the IRSN in order to find ways of improving fire risk management. Fires in nuclear facilities (power reactor, research laboratory, fuel cycle plant, radioactive product transport vehicle or waste storage center) do not develop in the same way as in an ordinary building or outside. The environment is contained and ventilated and designed to prevent the release of radioactive materials into the environment. The consequences of this situation are the need to strengthen the protection provisions of the very high efficiency (VHE) filters that equip the ventilation  circuits (installation of protective flaps, reinforced filter monitoring, adapted ventilation management, etc.) [IRS 15a]. 3.1.5. The aging of nuclear installations Nuclear reactors age and their components are affected by time, the environment and repeated stresses associated with plant operation. Mechanical fatigue, wear, corrosion, thermal or radiation aging may gradually reduce their performance, with consequences for safety [IRS 15b].

Research for the Future

91

Therefore, all nuclear facilities must be reviewed regularly. In France, the frequency is set by law at 10 years. In addition, all INBs undergo 10 yearly visits. At this point, each reactor and its sensitive components are analyzed from the point of view of aging control and, to continue to operate for another 10 years, it must obtain its Dossier d’aptitude à la poursuite de l’exploitation (DAPE). The NEA also questioned this serious problem (see section 3.2.3.3). Five areas are particularly sensitive and critical to aging in a pressurized water nuclear reactor: containment, vessel, electrical cables, primary circuit and steam generator. The first three elements are not replaceable during the life of the reactor. Therefore, they must be designed initially to operate with significant safety margins. The properties of the steel of the vessel change over time under the effect of neutron flux, so samples (specimens) of this vessel are placed during construction within the core and are periodically examined. Similarly, concrete containment structures must be periodically monitored. Another phenomenon, not suspected until the accident at the Civaux reactor (Vienna) in 1998 (level 2 on the INES), is the thermal fatigue of materials in the power plant mixing zones, that is, in areas where hot and cold water meet with a temperature difference of more than 50°C [IRS 15b]. The second generation of 900°MWe reactors (34 reactors) underwent its third 10-year visit between 2009 and 2019. This was an opportunity to carry out a complete safety review of this generation of reactors. On each reactor, this examination required a complete shutdown of about three months. On this occasion, various generic modifications were made to all the reactors since they were built on the same concept [IRS 10a]. Reactor maintenance during unit outages is a difficult operation to organize and the operator must prepare it years in advance. Difficulties arise because the changes to be made during each shutdown increase, methods change rapidly and staff control decreases with retirement [IRS 14g]. This may therefore affect the safety of the reactors.

92

Nuclear Accidents

3.2. International actions International actions aim to improve safety at the level of each state. To this end, four international organizations (IAEA, NEA, ICRP and UNSCEAR) are particularly active. 3.2.1. Improving the organization of security at the level of each state Nuclear safety is the responsibility of each state developing the military or civil use of nuclear energy. This safety is based on the relationships between political authorities, an independent authority, operators and the public (Figure 3.1.).

Figure 3.1. The organization of nuclear safety at the global level (modified from [NEA 01]). For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

The NEA [NEA 01] proposes the construction of a quality system that should lead to the establishment of a fully independent and reliable national security authority (Figure 3.2), as well as the continuous improvement process that should be associated with it (Figure 3.3).

Research for the Future

93

Figure 3.2. Construction of a quality system for a safety authority (amended according to [NEA 01]). For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

Figure 3.3. Continuous improvement process (modified from [NEA 01]). For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

The NEA (OECD) Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CANR) analyzed the functioning of the nuclear safety authorities in three countries (United States, Sweden and Finland). The NEA has made some recommendations to improve the effectiveness of nuclear safety authorities [NEA 01].

94

Nuclear Accidents

The CANR think tank discussed whether it is better to improve safety or to maintain it at the current level. To this end, CANR member countries were invited to share their thoughts. Seven countries replied (Finland, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States). The safety authorities recognized that it was very difficult, in practice, to set up an organization that would only aim to maintain safety, and that improvements will always have to be made to remedy deficiencies or where circumstances justify it [NEA 02a]. Rational safety decisions will continue to be based largely on the experience, wisdom and judgment of the safety authority’s staff. Experience shows that there are clear advantages in establishing a systematic process for collecting and analyzing safety-related information. Some national integrated safety change systems are applied, for example in Switzerland, the United States, Canada or Finland [NEA 08]. In 2016, the safety culture of an effective nuclear regulator was redefined by the NEA [NEA 16b]. The five principles that have been adopted by the NEA are as follows: 1) safety leadership must be applied at all levels of the regulatory body; 2) all staff of the regulatory body shall assume individual responsibility for their conduct with respect to the safety standard; 3) the regulator’s culture promotes safety and facilitates cooperation and communication with the public; 4) the implementation of a holistic approach to security is ensured through systematic work; 5) continuous improvement, learning and self-assessment are encouraged at all levels of the organization. 3.2.2. The IAEA The IAEA (United Nations), thanks to a large panel of experts in the nuclear field, publishes a large number of books of recommendations in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection. These books are published in English, but are also frequently translated into several languages, including French. These include the Safety Standards [IAE 04a] and Safety Guides on Radiation Protection, which includes two sections, covering General Safety

Research for the Future

95

Requirements and Specific Safety Requirements [IAE 16a]. In the field of nuclear medicine, the IAEA has published numerous guides [IAE 04a, IAE 06, IAE 09a, IAE 10, IAE 18], as well as numerous recommendations on the use of radioactive sources [IAE 09a, IAE 11, IAE 12]. There are also publications on the safety of contaminated food [IAE 16a] or the habitability of buildings and houses [IAE 89c]. 3.2.3. The NEA The missions of the NEA (OECD) are to assist member countries in maintaining and developing in the future, through international cooperation, the essential scientific, technical and legal bases in the fields of safety, the environment and the economics of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. To this end, the NEA develops a forum for the exchange of information and promotes international cooperation and a center of excellence. The NEA’s joint projects involve studying the feasibility of Generation IV reactors, that is, the six reactor systems under study since 2011 and expected to come into service around 2030, as well as evaluations of the accidents at Fukushima. 3.2.3.1. Accident prevention and prevention Several projects are oriented towards accident prevention, such as accident simulation using an advanced thermo-hydraulic test loop (ATLAS-2), iodine behavior in accident situations (BIP-3), the Cabri International Project (CIP), fire propagation in elementary and multiroom scenarios (PRISME-2), hydrogen mitigation experiments as part of phase 2 of the reactor safety project (HYMERES-2), forced (i.e. induced) cooling loss (LOFC), primary coolant loop test facility (PKL-4), preparatory studies on fuel debris analysis (PreADES) produced during an accident, phase 2 of the Source Term Evaluation and Mitigation project (STEM-2), the integrity of the Studsvik fuel cladding integrity project (SCIP-3) or phase 3 of the Thermal-hydraulics, Hydrogen, Aerosols and Iodine project (THAI-3). Regarding loss of coolant accidents (LOCA), the NEA issued a very technical opinion. The latter notes that the acceptance criteria for the emergency core cooling system define the temperature and oxidation level not to be exceeded to avoid excessive embrittlement, and therefore failure, of

96

Nuclear Accidents

the fuel cladding, which could affect core cooling in the case of an LOCA [NEA 11]. SP-47 on thermal-hydraulics containment has the main objective of evaluating the capabilities of numerical codes to model fluid dynamics in the field of thermal-hydraulics of nuclear containment. Three experimental facilities, TOSQAN, MISTRA and ThAI, participated in this project. The conclusions of tests with the TOSQAN system were synthesized by Malet et al. [MAL 10]. 3.2.3.2. Operator policy The NEA has issued an opinion on the skills required by nuclear operators. They face a variety of challenges. These are mainly the coordination and development of a skilled workforce to provide programs for the construction of new reactors. There is also a need to manage the aging workforce and provide responses to financial pressures. Finally, they must master the increasing use of suppliers (or subcontractors) and the management of organizational changes. The recent setbacks in the construction of the EPR in Flamanville with the construction of the concrete platform, the manufacture of the tank and the tank welding are a perfect illustration of this. To meet these challenges and understand how they may affect safety, operators must have the capacity and processes in place to assess their organizational structures, resources and skills and to assure themselves and the safety authorities that they are and remain appropriate [NEA 12a]. 3.2.3.3. Aging and prolonged use The aging of nuclear installations is a major problem. Managing aging involves the systematic examination of all time-dependent parameters that can compromise the safety of fuel cycle installations over their lifetime. This is a process that begins with the installation’s design and ends with its dismantling. This is to ensure that appropriate measures are in place to manage the aging mechanisms of structures, systems and components important to safety (SSC). The obsolescence of the latter is due to changes in knowledge, standards, regulations and technological developments. Monitoring of aging is carried out differently in different countries. There is a review every 10 years in France and Japan, and monitoring is ongoing in the United States. In the United Kingdom, supervision is based on two

Research for the Future

97

pillars, the setting of objectives for the nuclear industries and a licensing system prohibiting an operator from performing a task without the agreement of the safety authority [NEA 12b]. The NEA questioned the conditions for agreeing to extend the operation of a nuclear power plant. It seems necessary that the adequacy of the plant for the continued operation and activities of the operator under safety conditions be guaranteed, as well as the safety and reliability of the operation for the entire period considered (i.e. the long term). To ensure this operational safety, it is also necessary for aging management to be effective, for the potential need for safety improvements to be taken into account, for lessons learned from operating experience to be applied, for environmental impact assessments to be carried out, for human resources and performance to be adequate, for the plant safety review to be carried out, for actions to be taken in response to emerging issues and for openness and transparency to be part of the transition to long-term operation. These considerations are already within the regulatory framework that applies to the initial operating period, but additional regulations may be required for long-term reactor operation. A long-term operating license may involve the renewal of the operating license or a periodic safety review, or an approach that combines these two elements [NEA 12c]. 3.2.3.4. The lessons from Fukushima The NEA analyzed the Fukushima accident. This accident clearly illustrated the challenges that operations and emergency response personnel can face during a major nuclear accident, underscoring the importance of reliable human performance under extreme conditions. This accident also emphasizes that defense in depth (DiD) in nuclear power plants remains valid. Research and development efforts to date have already significantly improved understanding of the phenomena associated with the Fukushima accident. Many NEA member countries are involved in two key research projects, the Benchmark Study of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (BSAF) and the study by the NEA Expert Group on Post-Fukushima Safety Research Opportunities (SAREF). The NEA Operating Experience Working Group noted that further efforts were needed to ensure the full and timely implementation of lessons learned from early events. It also stressed that modifications to the plant, effectively reducing risks, were essential.

98

Nuclear Accidents

The NEA notes that the regulator has an important responsibility in ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities [NEA 16b]. 3.2.3.5. Safety after Fukushima Following the Fukushima accident, NEA member countries conducted targeted safety reviews of their operating reactors and determined that they were safe and could continue to operate. Additional safety improvements to better deal with external events and serious accidents have been identified and are being implemented. Full feedback from the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident will take several years. However, general lessons can be drawn, many of which are common sense rules. Thus, there is no room for complacency in the implementation of nuclear safety practices and concepts. Nuclear safety professionals have a responsibility to hold each other accountable for the effective implementation of nuclear safety practices and concepts. The primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the operators of nuclear power plants, while regulatory authorities have the responsibility to ensure the protection of the public and the environment. The Fukushima nuclear power plant accident led to the identification of important human, organizational and cultural challenges, including ensuring the independence, technical capacity and transparency of the regulatory authority. Since an accident can never be completely excluded, the necessary arrangements for dealing with a radiological emergency situation, whether on-site or off-site, must be planned, tested and reviewed regularly. Ensuring safety is a national responsibility, but it is a global concern because of the potentially catastrophic consequences of an accident. A questioning and learning attitude is essential to further improve the high level of safety standards and their effective implementation [NEA 13]. 3.2.4. The ICRP The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) is an independent international organization, supported by many associations and governments, dedicated to protection against ionizing radiation. Its recommendations concern the measurement of radiation exposure and the safety measures to be taken on sensitive installations. These

Research for the Future

99

recommendations do not have the force of law but are taken over and adopted by national legislation [SMI 88]. Originally founded in 1928 for protection in the medical sector, its work today encompasses all aspects of radiation protection, from nuclear workers to the protection of the general population, as well as environmental protection. The ICRP has published more than 100 reports on all aspects of radiological protection. It has more than 200 volunteer experts from about 30 countries on six continents. This organization is not free from criticism. Thus, its independence is challenged by some audiences. The recruitment of experts by co-option is indeed not very transparent and many of these experts have conflicts of interest with industrial operators in the nuclear field [LEN 16]. 3.2.5. UNSCEAR UNSCEAR (United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) was established by the United Nations General Assembly in 1955. Its mandate is to assess and report on the levels and effects of radiation exposure. For governments and organizations around the world, the Committee’s estimates provide the scientific basis for assessing radiation risks and establishing safety measures. The General Assembly has appointed 21 countries to delegate scientists as members of the Committee. Since its inception, UNSCEAR has published only about 20 major studies, but these reports are highly valued as fundamental sources of authoritative information. The Committee’s work program is approved by the General Assembly, and generally covers a period of four to five years. The Secretariat collects relevant data provided by Member States of the United Nations, international organizations and non-governmental organizations, and engages specialists to analyze such data, review relevant scientific publications and conduct scientific analyses. The Secretariat submits these scientific studies to an in-depth review each year at the UNSCEAR session, and at the end of the cycle, the substantive analyses are published. However, this body does not intervene in the prevention of nuclear accidents.

100

Nuclear Accidents

3.2.6. The ICRU The objectives of the ICRU (International Commission on Radiation Units and Measurements) are to develop and promulgate internationally accepted recommendations on quantities and units related to radioactivity, terminology, measurement procedures and reference data for the safe and effective application of ionizing radiation for medical diagnosis and therapy, radiation science and technology and the protection of individuals and populations from radiation. 3.2.7. The IRSN at international level Most national organizations working in the field of nuclear safety conduct research in an international context, collaborating with other organizations. As an example, the case of the IRSN will be presented. Since the Fukushima accident, this institute has strengthened its collaboration in Japan with the NRA (Nuclear Regulatory Authority) and the JAEA (Japan Atomic Energy Agency), and also contributes to the work of the Comité sur la Sûreté des Installations Nucléaires (CSNI) of the Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA). On the subject of accident management, the IRSN contributed to three OECD/NEA reports on the improvement of containment ventilation and filtration systems, the comparison of codes for the rapid calculation of releases into the environment, and accidents involving loss of cooling in spent fuel storage pools. The Institute also participated in the CSNI report on hydrogen risks and its seminar on human performance under extreme conditions, as well as the conditions necessary for a resilient organization. Finally, the IRSN is steering the OECD-STEM experimental program on the long-term behavior of iodine under irradiation in containment and ruthenium in the primary circuit of a reactor in partnership with North American and European organizations. The IRSN also contributes to understanding the Fukushima accident and finding solutions for dismantling damaged reactors. In the first term, the AEN BSAF project (2012–2018) focused on the calculation of accident scenarios for reactors. As part of the AEN SAREF program aimed at improving knowledge upstream of the dismantling of the Fukushima reactors, the IRSN is interested in the degradation of the core of tank reactors.

Research for the Future

101

3.3. European actions Europe has been working in the field of nuclear safety for many years with the creation of Euratom. It also has a policy of assisting the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the nuclear field. Thus, the European Union (EU) sets European standards, laying the foundations for harmonization in terms of nuclear safety. They apply to candidates for entry into the EU whose power plant safety levels may be called into question. To this end, the European PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy) program, created in 1989, helps the countries concerned to improve the safety of their nuclear installations. Following the Fukushima accident, Europe initiated a complementary safety approach to its nuclear reactors. The IRSN managed four projects under the European programs (FP-7 and Horizon 2020) in connection with the Fukushima accident. The PASSAM (Passive and Active Systems on Severe Accident source term Mitigation, 2013–2016) project focused on improving ventilation and filtration systems for fission products that could be released into the environment in the event of a core meltdown accident. The CESAM project (Code for European Severe Accidents Management, 2013–2017) focused on the improvement of some ASTEC software models (see section 3.5.9.1 below) directly related to the Fukushima accident. The ASAMPSA_E project (Advanced Safety Assessment Methodologies: extended Probabilistic Safety Assessment, 2013–2016) has resulted in the publication of guides to good practice and recommendations to address the various extreme events and their combination in probabilistic safety assessments. This project brought together 28 organizations from 18 European countries. The IVMR project (In Vessel Melt Retention, 2015–2019) launched by 23 safety organizations, research institutes and industry, aims to develop the knowledge and tools to assess the effectiveness of corium stabilization and retention measures in the reactor vessel during a core meltdown accident. It should also provide technical elements to optimize the design of new reactors. 3.3.1. Euratom In 1955, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands launched two new European integration projects on the economy and atomic energy at the Messina Conference. The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom)

102

Nuclear Accidents

was signed on March 25, 1957 in Rome and, after ratification by the national parliaments, entered into force on January 1, 1958. The main objective of the Euratom Treaty is to create “the conditions for the development of a powerful nuclear industry” capable of guaranteeing the energy independence of the six founding States. Euratom’s main tasks are to promote research on civil nuclear technologies and the dissemination of knowledge and to manage a common market for nuclear materials in Europe. In addition, Euratom has important powers to protect the population and workers against dangers resulting from ionizing radiation. It also ensures that nuclear materials are not diverted for purposes other than those intended. Since 1967, Euratom has operated on the basis of the “institutional triangle” (Council, Commission and European Parliament), which is responsible for the implementation of the Treaty. The Euratom Community has two internal bodies, the Euratom Supply Agency and the Safeguards Office, which carries out inspections at Member States’ nuclear installations. Euratom also funds a Joint Research Centre (JRC) composed of five national centers (Ispra in Italy, Karlsruhe in Germany, Geel in Belgium, Petten in the Netherlands and Seville in Spain). These laboratories carry out work to improve the safety of nuclear fission and are also involved in the development of thermonuclear energy through the ITER project. Euratom coordinated the construction of five nuclear power plants (Chooz in France, Juliers in Germany and Garigliano, Latina and Trino in Italy). 3.3.2. Complementary safety assessments (ECS) process At the European level, the associations of the various safety authorities (WENRA) took the initiative, following the Fukushima accident in 2011, to question the operators of nuclear installations who had to assess the resistance of their installations to a major earthquake, an extreme flood, a total power failure, the total loss of cooling sources or a combination of all these events. On April 26, 2012, the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSRG), a European structure bringing together national authorities, finished the stress testing of nuclear power plants in the Old World. Fifteen nuclearized European countries, joined by Switzerland and Ukraine, have submitted their reports on the results of stress tests to the

Research for the Future

103

European Commission. A cross-referenced analysis of the dossiers was carried out by safety authorities, with the support of their technical experts. The review reports were sent to each country. A meeting of 17 delegations, with international observers, was held in Luxembourg from February 5–17, 2012, where each delegation responded to the comments it had received. Field visits were carried out to many European nuclear power plants. No safety authority has therefore considered it necessary to immediately close a site. But all considered that the robustness of the installations should be increased. ENSREG, in its 2012 report [ENS 12], and the European Commission adopted on March 28, 2013, a list of actions to be taken following the Fukushima accident. Four recommendations were made: the methods for determining extreme events should be harmonized; containment improvements resulting from the Three Mile Island accident (United States) should be implemented; safety should be periodically reassessed; and sites should be strengthened with mobile equipment and rescue teams. Each member country was required to develop a national action plan. 3.4. French actions In France, the IRSN carries out an annual assessment of the safety and radiation protection of nuclear power plants [IRS 17a], as well as the safety of the transport of radioactive materials [IRS 18c]. This organization has carried out much research on safety organization [IRS 16a]. At the French level, the ECS approach was requested from the ASN by the Prime Minister in his letter of March 23, 2011. This approach was led by ASN with the support of the IRSN. France decided to go further than the European “stress tests” by reviewing all its nuclear installations and interviewing service providers in addition to operators. A prior opinion had been requested from HCTISN. The high committee considered that this audit approach was the first step in the long process of feedback on the Fukushima accident. It issued a favorable opinion on the draft specifications presented by the ASN, noting that it takes into account the technical issues raised by the Fukushima accident. It noted with interest that, in line with the proposals of the members of the HCTISN working group, the specifications cover the conditions for using service providers, as

104

Nuclear Accidents

well as some 15 nuclear installations other than nuclear power plants, including the main INBs at the La Hague site. However, it wished to point out that the scope of the audit could not initially be extended to certain topics proposed by members of the working group (fuel transport, malicious acts, etc.) due to scheduling constraints [HCT 11a]. Some members of the HCTISN working group have participated as observers in post-Fukushima inspections conducted by ASN. The work led to HCTISN Opinion No. 6 of December 8, 2011 [HCT 11c]. The HCTISN working group heard from the three major nuclear operators (EDF, AREVA, now ORANO and CEA) on their industrial policy on subcontracting. These topics were taken up by the Steering Committee on Social, Organizational and Human Factors (CoFSOH) led by the ASN. It was planned to draw up “social specifications”, as drawn up by the working group of the Strategic Committee for the Nuclear Sector (CSFN). The HCTISN noted a local shortage of occupational physicians which could lead to difficulties in carrying out the required regulatory monitoring (medical monitoring, monitoring of working conditions, etc.), as well as a shortage of labor inspectors which could lead to difficulties in fulfilling their missions [HCT 12]. In addition, HCTISN is deeply committed to ensuring that debates related to public inquiries are authentic, and that the public is fully informed about all the elements related to the cases presented. The High Committee considered it essential that the conditions of time, resources and completeness of the available information be met to enable the actors concerned by these public inquiries to participate fully [HCT 11b]. Today, while progress is being made, the problem is not fully resolved. For its part, the ASN believes that French nuclear power plants are robust, but that additional safeguards are essential. In its 2012 opinion, the ASN recommended in particular the establishment of a “hard core” of equipment to ensure safety functions in the event of extreme situations (ultimate rescue diesel, an ultimate water source dedicated to take over if the first is no longer available, etc.) and a nuclear rapid action force (FARN) capable of rescuing an accident site [REU 15]. The IRSN drew several conclusions from the examination of the 85 CSE reports issued. It highlighted the existence of compliance gaps at some sites regarding the measures planned to deal with the extreme situations envisaged. For example, generator ventilation systems in Paluel (Seine-Maritime), Flamanville (Manche) and Saint-Alban (Haute-Garonne)

Research for the Future

105

appeared to be undersized in the event of an earthquake. At the suggestion of the IRSN, supported by the ASN recommendation (see above), each nuclear installation should be equipped with “ultimate” equipment capable of withstanding exceptional events. Four elements constituted the “hard core”, a rapid reaction force (FARN), a secure command bunker, last-resort diesels and ultimate cooling water supply systems. Now in France, four nuclear sites (Civaux, Dampierre, Bugey and Paluel) have a rapid operational action force of 300 men who can be deployed at all sites where there is a nuclear power plant, each group being close to six plants. An exercise of this force took place in January 2019 in Chooz [FRA 19]. One of the first “hard core” projects was launched with the construction of a real bunker (CCL, local crisis center) as close as possible to the existing facilities. This bunker is 24 meters high, 12 meters long and 6 meters wide. Only one bunker currently exists (Flamanville); all the sites will only be equipped in 2024. Each of the 58 French reactors was to receive an Ultimate Diesel Generator before the end of 2018 to reinforce the internal power supply. The deadlines have not been met by EDF and the deadline is now set for December 31, 2020. Similarly, by the end of 2021, a water make-up system should be installed in all reactors. At these horizons, the deployment of the “bunkerized” crisis center specific to each site will have been initiated [IRS 16a]. As with nuclear power plants, complementary safety assessments have identified improvements that can be made to plants, experimental reactors and nuclear laboratories to withstand extreme situations. Thus, some installations must deploy a hard core. This is the case for research reactors with significant hazard potential, such as the high flux reactor (HFR) operated by the Institut Laue-Langevin (ILL) in Grenoble and located in an area of high seismic and flood risk. However, there are four dams upstream of the RHF that are located on the Drac, a tributary of the Isère. As early as 2012, the ILL began building a new bunkerized control and emergency post, an integral part of the RHF’s hard core [IRS 16a]. In France, two organizations, CEA and IRSN, are particularly involved in nuclear safety research. To this end, they have set up experimental reactors

106

Nuclear Accidents

and developed national, European and international programs involving multiple partners. The main experimental reactors dedicated to nuclear accidents are CABRI for the study of reactivity accidents [EST 12a], PHÉBUS for the study of loss of refrigeration accidents [EST 12b], SILENE for the study of criticality accidents [BAR 12] and the Jules Horowitz Reactor (RJH) for cooling defects and overpower situations [GON 12]. Recently, books that summarize these issues have been published. The book by Jacquemain et al. [JAC 13] analyzes in detail a serious core meltdown accident at a pressurized water reactor. For their part, Couturier and Schwartz [COU 17] consider other types of accidents and address new topics such as the reliability of so-called critical software, the resistance of materials in the event of seismic loads, the phenomena of “tank mixes”, air-contamination and passive systems. 3.5. Advances in nuclear safety The Fukushima accident showed the vulnerability of nuclear installations in the event of extreme and multiple natural attacks. It confirmed the interest of research on severe reactor accidents and stressed the importance of those that could occur in spent fuel storage pools. The research topics are not new, only the priorities have changed following international reflections taking into account this latest accident. A “serious” or “core meltdown” accident of a nuclear reactor is an accident in which the reactor fuel is significantly degraded with more or less extensive core meltdown. There are six main modes of nuclear core failure. The α mode corresponds to a steam explosion in the cell or cell shaft, causing the containment to fail in the short term. The β mode is a leakage of the enclosure, initial or quickly induced. The γ mode consists of a hydrogen explosion in the enclosure leading to its failure. The δ mode is slow overpressure in the enclosure leading to its failure. The ε mode corresponds to the crossing of the concrete bottom by the corium leading to its rupture. The sixth mode is the risk of loss of containment tightness due to direct heating of the containment, to which is added mode V, bypass of containment through pipes exiting the containment [IRS 12b].

Research for the Future

107

3.5.1. Better knowledge of nuclear fuel 3.5.1.1. Zirconium alloy sheaths Zircaloy-4, a zirconium alloy, containing uranium oxide pellets, provides the first fuel containment barrier for pressurized water reactors. These ducts are in an atmosphere of nitrogen. In an accident, oxygen will react with nitrogen and cause rapid corrosion of the ducts. This corrosion of zircaloy-4 platelets at 850°C under a mixture of oxygen and nitrogen was studied by Lasserre [LAS 13]. The sheath failure limits of different fuel types and the risk of reactivity accident are essential data for understanding the physical mechanisms involved [SAR 10]. In the event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA, or in French, accident de perte de réfrigérant primaire, APRP) in a nuclear reactor, the degree of resistance of the zircaloy liners containing the fuel would depend directly on their prior oxidation state. The distribution of oxygen in the coating tubes of nuclear fuel rods (Zircaloy-4, Zy-4) in the event of a loss of coolant accident plays a key role in the mechanical properties of fuel rods after quenching (cooling and water immersion). Moreover, a digital tool called DIFFOX to evaluate the oxidation state of the ducts has been developed and in parallel with the development of the code, an experimental program has been launched to provide a validation database [DUR 10]. In addition, during the use of fuel in reactors, the “hydriding” phenomenon degrades the mechanical properties of the sheaths, a phenomenon that is becoming increasingly important with the prolonged maintenance of the fuel in the reactor. Hydrogen, created by the reaction of water with zirconium (secondary hydriding), trapped in the sheaths of nuclear fuel, undergoes successive phases of dissolution and precipitation, which must be well characterized [ZAN 12]. A new model, describing the influence of an applied stress (additional pressure) and a transient temperature (350°C), was developed and compared to experimental data [DES 15]. Similarly, in a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), the mechanical behavior of fuel rods oxidized to steam at high temperatures is a significant problem. Two different failure modes have been identified, the first is associated with linear elastic failure mechanics and the second is associated with sample failure without applied load [DES 16, DES 18]. The mechanical strength of nuclear fuel rods in accident situations is a major problem. Following a failure to control the nuclear reaction, a

108

Nuclear Accidents

reactivity insertion accident (RIA) can occur in a plant. A power peak then occurs in some fuel rods, large enough to cause the surrounding refrigerant to boil. Baudin [BAU 15] has carefully studied and modeled this phenomenon. The metallurgical and mechanical properties of zirconium alloys are highly dependent on temperature and hydrogen content at the time of the accident [TUR 16]. Once the accident has been controlled, how have the mechanical properties of fuel sheaths changed, and what is their resistance to handling? Vo’s thesis [VO 13] attempts to answer these questions and model the mechanical change of these ducts. To estimate the risks of sheath failure, various software has been developed that models fuel behavior. The models are multi-scale and the materials are very heterogeneous. This is the case with the SCANAIR computer code. This software describes in detail the thermal dynamics, structural mechanics up to the prediction of sheath failure and fission gas behavior modeling [MOA 14, GEO 14]. In the event of a rupture of the sheath containing the fuel, it is necessary to determine the quantity of this fuel that would escape from the sheath. To do this, an advanced modeling of the interaction between the ambient fluid and the grains (or particles) is proposed [TOP 11, TOP 12]. 3.5.1.2. Absorption bars Most pressurized water reactor absorption bars are made of an Ag-In-Cd alloy (SIC, Silver Indium Cadmium) inside a stainless steel (SS) coating surrounded by a zirconium sheath (Zircaloy-4). The first alloy melts at 800°C, and the second melts at 1,200°C. The interaction of these two molten alloys has a significant impact on the quantities of aerosols released into the primary circuit and on the chemistry of iodine created during the fission reactions of uranium or plutonium nuclei. It is therefore essential, given the dangerousness of iodine, to know the interactions between silver and zirconium [DEC 15, DEC 16]. In highly irradiated uranium dioxide, which is a two-porous material saturated with a fluid, gas bubbles such as xenon nano-bubbles form, which strongly change the characteristics of nuclear material (pressure, etc.). Various studies have been conducted on this problem. Among the results obtained, it was found that the swelling of UO2 induced by intra-granular

Research for the Future

109

bubbles is proportional to the Xe/U ratio, but independent of temperature [JEL 14, VIN 14a, VIN 14b]. 3.5.1.3. The reactor vessel Using an innovative experimental design, Tardif [TAR 09a] models the initiation and propagation of a crack in a reactor steel vessel, which can occur during a core meltdown accident. Using a model of a reactor vessel subjected to mechanical and thermal loading such as a serious accident, laboratory tests allow the initiation and propagation of cracks to be monitored in real time. The challenge is to predict the time before the tank ruptures, the location and size of the crack. The perspectives are the development of in-tank and out-of-tank accident management strategies [TAR 09b]. Tchitchekova et al. [TCH 13, TCH 14] have developed a new method to simplify atomic-scale simulation of aging processes. 3.5.1.4. The concrete containment building Nguyen [NGU 10] chose a mesoscopic (intermediate) scale to model concrete. This allowed him to study more precisely the phenomena of cracking of this material. The correlation between the microstructure of cemented granular materials, the morphology of cracks that may appear in them and their apparent permeability have been modeled [AFF 12a, AFF 12b]. A quantification of containment losses through cracking is possible. This will make it possible to establish resistance indicators over time and to detect pathologies related to the aging of materials. The internal sulfate reaction (ISR) in concrete structures is a pathology that is likely to develop. This phenomenon is attributed to the delayed formation of ettringite that causes the material to swell and crack in the structure. It occurs in two types of concrete: heat-treated precast concrete and concrete poured in place in solid parts. The latter case is present in nuclear reactors. These concrete pathologies can modify these mechanical performances [ALS 12]. 3.5.1.5. The interaction of corium with concrete The breakthrough of the invert can lead to the release of radiotoxic fission products. The prediction of the kinetics of ablation of reactor bottom concrete by corium, metallic magma resulting from core meltdown, has been the subject of several publications [SPI 08, CRA 10].

110

Nuclear Accidents

A molten mixture of U–Zr–O–O–Fe may form during a nuclear accident. This mixture flows into the invert where it comes into contact with the concrete and reacts with it. Five different axisymmetric corium layers are formed in the head of the bottom of the container. These are from bottom to top: a layer of debris, a thick metal layer, an oxide layer, a layer of light metal and another layer of debris. An important process is the reduction of UO2 fuel to metallic uranium by unoxidized zirconium, which results in the transport of uranium to the dense metal layer [BON 15b]. Post-test analyses of the VULCANO tests show that the corium phase is in two forms, a continuous metal phase separated from the oxide phase and a discontinuous metal phase in emulsion in the oxide phase but in limited quantities [SAN 15]. 3.5.2. Better preventing the risk of steam and hydrogen explosions In the event of a core meltdown accident in a nuclear reactor, hydrogen can be produced in large quantities inside the reactor containment. It can ignite and explode. This phenomenon was observed during the accident at the Fukushima power plant. This can result in serious damage to the REP enclosure. The IRSN is interested in the various phenomena involved in core meltdown accidents in reactors through two programs: ICE (Interaction Corium-Eau, or corium-water interaction) and MITHYGENE (MITigation HYdroGENE, or hydrogen mitigation), which focus on phenomena that could compromise the tightness of the reactor containment, respectively steam or hydrogen explosions. During the Fukushima accident, four hydrogen explosions occurred with major consequences on the plant buildings and reactor containment. To limit this serious problem, passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs) are installed on the reactors. These recombiners are designed to avoid flame acceleration and excessive pressure loads on the enclosure in the event of hydrogen combustion [MEY 14, BEN 15]. Goulier’s theory [GOU 15] made it possible to propose correlations capable of predicting the flame propagation rate as a function of the

Research for the Future

111

parameters characterizing combustion on the one hand and the characteristics of the turbulent flow on the other hand. In addition to hydrogen, carbon monoxide (CO) can be generated inside the enclosure and react with concrete melted by corium (MCCI, Molten Corium–Concrete Interaction). CO may interact with passive auto-catalytic recombiners installed in PWR tanks [KLA 14]. The hydrogen risk on irradiated fuel storage pools is not taken into account in the public safety reports for the Hague pools [DEV 13], and this worrying situation has not changed. 3.5.3. Controlling radionuclide releases A major area of research to reduce the consequences of an accident is the control of radioactive element releases during a nuclear accident, particularly iodine, as well as ruthenium, whose behavior is not well known. The focus is now on studying their retention by more efficient filtration methods, particularly for volatile species. This is the purpose of the MIRE program (MItigation des REjets). This work will enhance the Accident Source Term Evaluation Code (ASTEC), the IRSN’s severe accident simulation software. In a severe nuclear accident, with core meltdown, different radionuclides can be released, including some ruthenium isotopes. However, knowledge of the thermochemistry and reactivity of ruthenium species under accident conditions is limited. In his thesis, Miradji [MIR 16] notes that the gaseous species likely to be significantly present during a core meltdown accident are not oxyhydroxides but the oxides RuO3 and RuO4. A thesis [LAC 10] experimentally showed the important role that molybdenum plays in the amount of iodine released into the containment as a gas in the event of core meltdown in a pressurized water nuclear reactor. In the event of a core meltdown accident in a nuclear reactor, radioactive iodine would be released from the degraded fuel and arrive in the reactor containment. Some of this iodine would react with the paint on the walls to form organic iodides [BOS 08, BOS 10a]. In the event of a severe accident in a light water nuclear reactor (LWR), the high radiation fields reached in the reactor containment as a result of the

112

Nuclear Accidents

release of fission products from the reactor core would induce air radiolysis. Radiolysis products in air (ARP) could, in turn, oxidize gaseous molecular iodine (I2) to aerosolized iodine-oxygen-nitrogen compounds, abbreviated as iodine oxides (IOx). The PARIS project iodine tests were carried out at very low and realistic iodine concentrations. In the presence of painted or silver aerosol surfaces, the radiolytic oxidation of I2 is negligible compared to the adsorption of I2 on these surfaces for the conditions examined. However, radiolytic oxidation of I2 remains very effective if the surfaces are small or if they are made of relatively non-reactive stainless steel [BOS 11]. The EPICUR installation makes it possible to better characterize the molecular iodine and organic iodide produced under the iodine radiation deposited on the surfaces present in the containment [COL 13]. 3.5.4. Consequences of a fire A fire in a nuclear installation can lead to the release of radioactive products into the environment. Between 2006 and 2011, the IRSN piloted the international PRISM experimental program. This program aimed to better understand fires in confined spaces and the propagation of smoke and heat in a set of rooms linked together by mechanical ventilation. The program has led to a better understanding of the physical phenomena involved, and thus to modeling them to improve the predictive capabilities of fire simulation software used in safety studies of nuclear installations. One scenario was a fire involving forklift trucks (especially those powered by electricity). A forklift truck as a source of fire is considered a complex fuel due to the different nature (liquid, solid), material composition (type of polymer, hydraulic fluid, etc.) and complex geometry of a truck. The experimental data obtained provide the thermodynamic and chemical characteristics of a fire of this type of vehicle [AUD 17]. The second scenario involved a fire in a pool with a well confined compartment. It appears that six parameters are important from a safety perspective: gas temperature, oxygen concentration, wall temperature, total heat flow, compartment pressure and ventilation rate throughout the duration of the fire [AUD 11].

Research for the Future

113

The experimental determination of the heat release rate (HRR) of fires in mechanically ventilated compartments based on the calorimetry of oxygen consumption (OC) and carbon dioxide generation (CDG) was performed by Prétel et al. [PRE 13c, PRE 14b]. The change of heat release is a function of time but is not a fundamental property of a fuel. Therefore, a theoretical formulation to determine the burning rate of fuels for sheet fires in a closed compartment is essential. The propagation rate is based on an energy balance on the surface of the pool fire and includes the radiative and convective heat components of the flame on the pool surface [NAS 11]. In fires in confined and ventilated environments, such as a nuclear facility, the effects of wind on the containment of radioactive pollutants are crucial [LER 11]. In case of a glove box fire in a nuclear installation, it is important to quantify the suspension of radioactive particles in the atmosphere of the premises [OUF 13, DEL 14a, DEL 14b]. Pleated VHE filters (very high efficiency) are one of the devices used to ensure the safety of nuclear operations by retaining radioactive particles in suspension. The most likely and penalizing accident for containment systems is a fire that leads to a massive production of soot particles and consequently to clogging of the filters. The change in the pressure drop has been studied [BOU 14a]. Questions remain to be answered, such as the behavior of a clogged filter under temperature and humidity constraints and the chemical aggression of combustion products. 3.5.5. Knowing more about corium The DISCOMS (DIstributed Sensing for COrium Monitoring and Safety) program focuses on the development and qualification of measuring equipment to locate corium in the event of a core meltdown accident. Indeed, in a serious accident, the composition of the corium and its properties determine its behavior and potential interactions with the reactor vessel and subsequent phases with the concrete invert [BAK 14]. At Fukushima, the latest observations of reactor 1 by muon radiography indicate that the corium is no longer located in the tank and would therefore have interacted with the concrete [TAK 15].

114

Nuclear Accidents

3.5.5.1. The PHEBUS program The objective of the PHEBUS experimental program was to study the degradation phenomena and behavior of fission products during the progression of a serious accident in a PWR. Different steam contents were used in the reactor cooling system, from highly oxidizing conditions (FPT0 and FPT1) to more reducing conditions (FPT2 and FPT3). The main results concern the oxidation of fuel rods, fuel degradation, releases of fission products and aerosols of structural materials from the core, transport of these radionuclides in the primary circuit, thermohydraulics and aerosol behavior in the containment [JAC 13]. Let us remember the need to review the modeling of the oxidation of the sheath, which impacts the kinetics of hydrogen production. The collapse of the fuel from a rod-shaped geometry to molten magma occurs at much lower than expected temperatures (2,200 ± 200°C). The program also determines the chemical form of fission products during their transport in the reactor cooling system, particularly for iodine and cesium. It also provides data on iodine containment behavior, in particular reactions between iodine and paints and iodine entrapment by silver under certain conditions [BAR 13, CLÉ 13a, DEL 13, HAS 15b]. 3.5.5.2. Debris beds The structure of unconsolidated porous media called “debris beds” was observed in 1979 in the rugged core of Unit 2 of Three Miles Island in the United States. Does this debris provide effective cooling for this bed? Simulations show that the size and number of these fragments are correlated with the burning rate of the pellets. The porosity of this debris bed varies between 31% (for the least coolable configurations) and 5%. The specific surface area of the beds (water exchange surface) is also an important factor and it is the angular shape of the debris that contributes most to reducing the total exchange surface area of the bed at the level of contacts between the debris [NGU 17]. Using the CALIDE experimental system, a facility built at the IRSN (Cadarache, France), Clavier et al. [CLA 15] were able to estimate the correlations between porosity and debris diameter. The PROGRESS program (PROGression et REfroidissabilité du corium, Stabilisation d’un accident grave) studies the cooling of a debris bed following a core meltdown. To do this, tests reproducing an accident are carried out in the PEARL experimental installation, on the Thema platform, commissioned in 2014 at the Centre d’Etudes Nucléaires de Cadarache. The

Research for the Future

115

PROGRESS program is itself integrated into the European In Vessel Melt Retention (IVMR) project led by the IRSN. 3.5.6. Controlling a water injection into a molten core Fusion of a nuclear reactor core results from a prolonged loss of cooling, and it is essential to restore it by all means and to ensure the proper functioning of the emergency system [REP 13, CHI 15]. IRSN built two experimental facilities, PRELUDE and PEARL, to study physical phenomena during a high-temperature re-flooding process and provide relevant data to improve predictive models [BAC 11]. Since then, four campaigns have followed one another up to 2018. The MC3D model developed by the IRSN and CEA is based on a Eulerian description of the mass, movement and energy balances of multiphase compressible flows. It has allowed the development of two fuel-coolant interaction (FCI) models, one for each step of the interaction, namely the premix (water and corium) and the explosion [MEI 10, MEI 11a]. The model specifically addresses melt fragmentation processes during the cooling fuel interaction that could occur in the event of a severe nuclear power plant accident. The leakage of a spray or jet of hot liquid metal into water (coolant) can trigger a vapor explosion that can cause significant structural damage [CAS 13, CAS 15]. The IRSN’s TOSQAN and CEA’s MISTRA experiments tested the accuracy of several existing software programs around the world to simulate certain spray effects, the effectiveness of which is a key factor in controlling a fusion accident situation in a nuclear reactor [MAL 11]. The analysis was carried out in two parts, one thermo-hydraulic and the other dynamic. All the spray tests were carried out by the European network of excellence SARNET (Severe Accident Research NETwork). 3.5.7. Mastering electrical distribution systems The hypothesis of a total isolation of North Cotentin for a week, following an extreme meteorological event, is not an unlikely scenario. This isolation has already occurred in February 1970 for five days on North Cotentin. However, contrary to the statements made by the operator of the

116

Nuclear Accidents

Hague reprocessing plants (CLI of April 18, 2011), this phenomenon has not been taken into account [DEV 13]. To improve the power systems of nuclear power plants, an international project has been initiated. It was the ROBELSYS (ROBustness of ELectrical SYStems of NPPs in Light of the Fukushima Accident) project that identified research needs on the possibilities of connecting as closely as possible with electrical sources and to the protection provisions of electrical distribution systems. 3.5.8. Improving modeling The main codes for analyzing serious accidents are the ASTEC code (developed by the IRSN and GRS, Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit within the European Community) and the American MELCOR code. This MELCOR code, developed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) for the USNRC (United States), is used in several countries, including Switzerland [BIR 09]. 3.5.8.1. The ASTEC code and its related modules To carry out modeling (code development) describing the course of a serious accident in a pressurized water reactor (PWR), the IRSN uses a two-level approach. The first level uses the full ASTEC code. This code completely analyzes an accident sequence. The second level uses detailed codes for the analysis of each stage of this accident. In particular, the system coupling the ICARE and CATHARE codes has been developed for detailed assessment of the consequences of a severe accident in the primary circuit of a PWR; the ICARE code describes the degradation of the nucleus and CATHARE describes the thermodynamic change within the nuclear core. The CROCO code describes the flow of corium into the invert, the stratification of corium, heat transfers to the surrounding atmosphere, abrasion of concrete at the bottom of the tank and gas flows. The latter code has been validated against the results provided mainly by the CORINE, KATS and VULCANO experiments, specially designed for the new EPR reactor [BAB 06]. The MEDICIS code simulates the interaction between molten corium and concrete. This code is continuously improved by international experiences (OECD-CCI-ACE, etc.). The TONUS code was developed by the IRSN in

Research for the Future

117

collaboration with the CEA for analyzing the risk related to hydrogen (distribution and combustion) in the reactor enclosure. The IODE code predicts the behavior of iodine in the reactor containment. In the PHEBUS FPT-2 test carried out by the IRSN, the comparison of experimental data and modeling show a good general agreement for inorganic iodine, although some differences are highlighted. For organic iodides, modeling is not satisfactory [BOS 10b]. The FPT-3 test, which was the fifth and final test of the program, was specifically dedicated to studying the impact of a boron carbide control rod on fuel degradation and the transport and speciation of fission products in water-cooled reactors [HAS 10]. 3.5.8.2. Numerically simulating a core fusion Research to model the behavior of the molten core (corium) in the event of a fusion accident in a nuclear reactor is being conducted. The results will be used to assess the safety of the corium recovery systems that will be installed in some new reactors [CAR 06]. Efficiency is not yet assured. Chahlafi [CHA 11] performs thermal radiation modeling in a nuclear reactor during a serious accident leading to the degradation of fuel rods. To digitally simulate core fusion, it is necessary to know the thermodynamic properties of the materials constituting the reactor core and those of their mixture after fusion. The IRSN has also created a database, the objective of which is to calculate the thermodynamic balances of the complex chemical systems involved in such an accident [BAK 10]. 3.5.8.3. Better prediction of earthquakes The IRSN contributes to the SINAPS project (Séisme et Installations Nucléaires: Assurer et Pérenniser la Sûreté) led by the CEA, which focuses on the study of earthquakes from seismic hazards to the behavior of structures and equipment. 3.5.8.4. Modeling the explosion The explosion of gas or dust is a major risk to the containment of radioactive materials. To better control the complexity of the modeled phenomena and the relevance of the calculations performed, the IRSN has acquired its own simulation tool: the P2REMICS software [GRA 16, GAS 17].

118

Nuclear Accidents

3.6. Advances in radioecology In a nuclear accident, radioecology makes it possible to determine the source term, that is, the quantity of radionuclides present, and to model the dispersion of radionuclides in the various compartments of the environment and along trophic chains. 3.6.1. Determination of the source term For all nuclear accidents, there are still many uncertainties about the characterization of the source term. A new method for using dose rate measurements in a reverse modeling approach could effectively evaluate the source terms [WIN 12, MAT 13, SAU 13]. This strategy was implemented in 2017 to trace the origin of ruthenium 106 detected in France and elsewhere in Europe. It turned out that the most plausible origin was between the Volga and the Urals [IRS 17b]. Following experiments carried out with an experimental reactor of the flat flame burner type, a database was set up. The latter served as a basis for the development of a detailed kinetic mechanism capable of reporting iodine chemistry under conditions representative of an accident situation. Kinetic modeling was performed using the PREMIX code for flame condition tests and the SOPHAEROS code for reactor tests. These experiments therefore make it possible to estimate fairly accurately the quantities of iodine present in the containment in the event of an accident and therefore likely to be released into the environment if the containment fails [DEL 12]. Similarly, the quantity of iodine trapped by the primary circuit is an important factor to know in the event of an accident. A research program is being conducted to acquire basic thermodynamic and kinetic data on the chemical behavior of iodine in the gas phase at high temperature for reduced reaction systems [GOU 12]. A kinetic model of iodine, oxygen and hydrogen is proposed to simulate the transport of iodine along the cooling system of a pressurized water reactor in the event of a severe accident. This kinetic mechanism uses 33 chemical reactions [XER 12].

Research for the Future

119

3.6.2. Modeling of radionuclide dispersion in the terrestrial environment 3.6.2.1. Atmospheric and terrestrial compartments The model developed by Gonze et al. [GON 16] predicts a decontamination of 137Cs of 45% in the first 12 months in dense urban areas, 15% above evergreen coniferous forests and between 2 and 12% above agricultural land. A new mechanistic model combining two approaches, surface complexation and ion exchange, called the “1-pK DLM/IE” model, was developed by Chérif [CHE 17]. This model is capable of better reporting and predicting radionuclide transfers in the soil/solution system to the soil/plant system. Thus, the results obtained correctly reproduce the tests carried out in Rhizotests coupling soil, solution and plant and ultimately to better characterize the fraction of cesium available for plants. Tritium, along with carbon 14, is one of the most important radionuclides released from nuclear facilities. This radionuclide bioaccumulates in organic form, but doubts remain about its possible biomagnification in food chains in its organic forms [GAZ 10, JAE 13]. In addition, some studies suggest that the relative biological effectiveness of tritium radiation may be underestimated. In addition, the ASN will ask the ICRP to reconsider the value of the tritium weighting factor (WR) in the calculation of effective doses. Without waiting for the ICRP’s response, the DSC will require operators to ensure that the radiological impact studies of their projects are accompanied by a critical study with a variant taking into account a tritium weighting factor (WR) of two [ASN 10]. The VATO project was initiated by the IRSN to reduce uncertainties about the knowledge relating to the transfer of 3H from an atmospheric source (releasing mainly HT and HTO) to a grassland ecosystem. This experiment modeled the concentrations of 3H measured in air and rainwater and determined the biological half-lives of OBT in herbaceous plants [MAR 17]. The results are analyzed using the TOCATTA-c model of a dynamic compartment with high temporal (hourly) resolution [LED 15, LED 17]. In the coverage of a prairie characterized by high tritium activity, tritium evapotranspiration is about 15 mBq m−2 s−1 [CON 15]. A more realistic estimate of the dispersion of iodine in the environment after an accident should be available. Indeed, in the event of a serious accident at a nuclear facility, the radiological consequences are related to the

120

Nuclear Accidents

transport and deposition of radionuclides released into the environment. Following the Fukushima accident, significant differences between measurements and forecasts were observed for iodine. This is probably a result of a change in the chemical speciation of iodine during its transfer to the atmosphere [TRI 15a, TRI 15b]. Similarly, Cartonnet [CAR 13] quantifies the release of radioactive iodine into the environment following an accident involving the rupture of a steam generator tube. 3.6.2.2. Forestry sub-funds A model called TREE4 (Transfer of Radionuclides and External Exposure in FORest systems) simulates radionuclide transfers and external exposures in forest systems. This model quite satisfactorily predicts the interception fraction (20%) and the transfer of vegetation cover to the ground (70% of the total deposit in five months) in the Tochigi forest near Fukushima. However, the model is unable to predict the unexpected high contribution of litter (31% in five months) [CAL 15]. Loffredo et al. [LOF 15] quantify the kinetics of 137Cs to gain ground from the canopy. 3.6.3. Modeling environments

of

radionuclide

dispersion

in

aquatic

One of the first models of radionuclide dispersion in the aquatic environment following a nuclear accident is that of Zheleznyak et al. [ZHE 92]. Since then, studies and syntheses have multiplied. The most recent models consider various situations, such as speciation and chemical transformations [MET 19, SIM 19, WAL 19]. One of the characteristics of the Fukushima accident is the impact on the marine environment compared to other nuclear accidents. Buesseler et al. [BUE 17] therefore believe that five years later, it is necessary to examine what has happened in terms of sources, transport and fate of these radionuclides in the ocean. Duffa et al. [DUF 16], on the contrary, are developing a dedicated simulation tool STERNE (Simulation du transport et des transferts d’éléments radioactifs dans l’environnement marin). This tool is designed to predict the dispersion and contamination of radionuclides in seawater and marine species by incorporating spatio-temporal data. A radioecological model based on dynamic transfer equations is used to evaluate activity

Research for the Future

121

concentrations in aquatic organisms. Essential radioecological parameters (concentration factors and biological half-lives with one or more components) have been compiled for the main radionuclides and marine zoological groups (fish, mollusks, crustaceans and algae). Fiévet et al. [FIE 17] compare the transfer of cesium in demersal fish (living on the continental shelf) with pelagic fish (living offshore). The former are significantly more contaminated by cesium 134 and 137 than the latter. 3.6.4. Modeling of trophic transfer of radionuclides in organisms There are many dynamic models of radionuclide transfer to the environment. Unfortunately, a comparison of eight of them shows great differences [VIV 16]. Belharet [BEL 15] combines a radioecological model, specifically developed, with an ecosystem model composed of an NPZD (Nutrients–Phytoplankton–Zooplankton–Detritus) model and a regional circulation model. This appeared to be the most suitable method for studying the contamination of planktonic populations under post-accident conditions. Alava et al. [ALA 16], meanwhile, model the trophic transfer of cesium 137 around Fukushima in killer whales (marine mammals) feeding on Pacific herring, wild Pacific salmon, sablefish and halibut. They find moderate purification rates in lower trophic level organisms and slow elimination rates in higher trophic level organisms. This leads to an apparent biomagnification of 137Cs. Modeling of the trophic transfer of 137Cs in several marine food chains has been developed, including the benthic food chain with significant contact with sediments. The results obtained indicate a significant contribution of the benthic food chain to the long-term transfer of 137Cs from contaminated bottom sediments to marine organisms. The potential application of this model has been successfully tested in the Baltic Sea [BEZ 16]. 3.7. Advances in radiation protection The protection of mankind against ionizing radiation has been an issue for more than a century. While our knowledge of the adverse effects of high (after an accident) and medium (after an incident) exposure doses is relatively relevant, our understanding of the effects of low doses (such as life

122

Nuclear Accidents

in a contaminated post-accident area) is too fragmented. In addition, estimates of the doses, both external and especially internal, received during an accident are too imprecise. Epidemiological studies need to make further progress. The effect on life over decades in contaminated areas needs to be better understood and managed. 3.7.1. Improving the radiological protection system The Committee on Radiological Protection and Public Health (CRPPH) of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency has carried out a critical analysis of the radiological protection system. A broad consensus was reached that the radiation protection system should be more operational and coherent, both transparent and presented in easily understandable terms [NEA 00]. These efforts still need to be made. 3.7.1.1. Better estimating the external and internal exposures suffered Dose estimation for radiation accidents generally requires a multi-parameter diagnostic approach that includes clinical, biological and physical dosimetry to provide an early phase radiation dose. Several networks exist that bring together various researchers to share their knowledge. For Europe, the dosimetry network in the biological field is RENEB [VOI 15]. For the United States, the Dosimetry and Biodosimetry Network (US-IDBN) increases the surge capacity of civilian and military populations during a major incident [DAI 19]. In the event of external overexposure to ionizing radiation, a retrospective estimate of its genotoxic effects on exposed individuals can be made by measuring radiation-induced chromosomal aberrations on circulating lymphocytes. To estimate the biological dose received in the body after incorporation of radionuclides, it is necessary to adapt this method [ROC 16]. This was done by Pujol-Canadelli et al. [PUJ 19] in a humanized mouse model, which allowed a direct comparison of cell depletion and dicentric frequencies in human T lymphocytes irradiated in vivo and in vitro. For alpha and beta emitters, a new rapid measurement protocol was developed during a thesis that will allow alpha and beta emitting radionuclides to be identified and quantified more quickly in environmental

Research for the Future

123

samples, thus allowing a better estimate of the external dose received [HAB 16]. The electronic paramagnetic resonance spectroscopy or EPR technique allows very fast measurements of the doses received. This dosimetry at the tooth level and cytogenetic dosimetry with blood lymphocytes for 30 victims of radiological accidents are interesting advances [KHY 15]. New protocols have been developed to estimate the dose from nail samples, very small quantities of dental enamel samples or cell phone glasses [TRO 09, TRO 14a, TRO 14b, ROM 14]. This has been developed more recently in post-accident conditions by Swarts et al. [SWA 18], in the event of medical accidents by Gonzales et al. [GON 19]. A synthesis was carried out by Kubiak [KUB 18]. 3.7.1.2. Better understanding the harmful effects of chronic exposures Our knowledge of the effects of low doses of radiation is steadily improving through various international and European research programs. Europeans have created several networks to better coordinate their efforts. These include HLEG (High Level Expert Group on European low dose risk research) created in 2008 and MELODI (Multidisciplinary European Low Dose Initiative) created in 2009. To identify the long-term effects of radiation and chronic contamination at low doses, experts must investigate the fields of epidemiology, as well as experimental and clinical research. It is essential to study the category of nuclear workers, as well as all chronically exposed populations, in particular populations subject to nuclear accidents. Similarly, experimental animal studies are extremely useful approaches. The effects of low doses will be discussed in Volume 5 of this series. For example, many theses were recently defended at the IRSN on this subject, in particular on the risks resulting from chronic exposure to uranium or strontium 90 [LEG 15, MUS 16, FOU 17, HOF 17, GRI 18]. Following a nuclear accident, territories are contaminated by radionuclides that persist at low concentrations in the environment, leading to chronic exposure. The health effects of these exposures are a major concern. A recent thesis provides insight into the effects of strontium 90 [MUS 16].

124

Nuclear Accidents

3.7.1.3. Better control of irradiation doses delivered to patients In the medical field, accurately characterizing the delivered dose is a key point for improving radiation protection, both for patients and practitioners. This is particularly evident for secondary neutron doses delivered in proton therapy centers. Indeed, these doses are not currently estimated during treatment planning [BON 16]. Nevertheless, several centers have developed their own TPS to take into account the neutron dose [COM 18]. A significant proportion (10%) of patients treated with radiotherapy for cancers of the abdominal–pelvic area develop severe intestinal complications about 10 years after the end of their treatment. One of the most promising treatment options is the intravenous injection of mesenchymal stromal cells (MSCs) to repair biological tissues damaged by radiation [MOU 16, MOU 17]. It is becoming urgent to develop a more personalized medicine in the field of radiotherapy as recommended by Reuzé [REU 18]. During either voluntary (radiotherapy) or involuntary (nuclear accident) irradiation, humans are exposed to a high level of radiation. Reactions occurring in healthy but affected tissues can lead to complications and significantly affect the quality of life of irradiated people. The ROSIRIS program aims to understand the main physical and biological mechanisms that cause these complications. The principle is to link, step by step, the initial events of the transfer of radiation energy in molecules to the latest biological effects. 3.7.1.4. Simulation of the early effects of alpha or proton radiation on DNA To better understand the mechanisms involved in the generation of early DNA lesions, a new open platform to simulate physical interactions between particles and the biological environment “Geant4-DNA” has been developed as part of a vast international collaboration, coordinated since 2008 by the iRiBio team at CENBG (Centre Etudes Nucléaires de Bordeaux Gradignan) [INC 18]. Calculations were performed using this tool to simulate the irradiation of the nucleus by primary protons of different energies. The results obtained in terms of double-stranded DNA breaks are consistent with the experimental data found in the literature [MEY 17]. This simulation code “Geant4-DNA” made it possible to characterize DNA damage (single and double strand breaks) induced by protons [MOK 18, CHA 19].

Research for the Future

125

Simulating the biological damage induced by the trajectories of charged particles in the central nervous system (CNS) at different levels of its organization (molecules, cells and tissues) is a challenge for modern radiobiology studies. Initial results are provided for damage to the hippocampus [BAT 19]. In addition, this “Geant4-DNA” simulation toolbox was used to simulate the physical, pre-chemical and chemical steps of the first proton and α-particle-induced DNA damage [LIS 18]. Single, double and total strand failure efficiencies produced by direct, indirect and mixed mechanisms are reported. 3.7.1.5. Improving epidemiological studies A prospective cross-sectional study (EPICE, Evaluation of Pathologies potentially Induced by CEsium) using exposed and unexposed childhood populations conducted in the Bryansk region (Russia) from May 2009 to May 2013 on 18,152 children aged 2–18 years selected on the basis of 137Cs ground deposition was initiated to monitor the occurrence of cardiac arrhythmia. The suspected increase in cardiac arrhythmia in children exposed to Chernobyl fallout is not confirmed [JOU 18]. For epidemiological studies to be truly effective, they must be linked to other scientific fields such as toxicology and genomics. The main limitation of epidemiological studies is sample size. Hence, more and more often, meta-analyses are carried out, which consist of merging several studies together. Cancer case registries must exist over time and over large areas. In France, the absence of a national cancer case register severely limits the possibilities of environmental epidemiological studies at the national level. In addition, epidemiology must take into account the synergistic effects of all kinds of pollutants at low doses. The contributions of epidemiology will be developed in Volume 5 of this series. 3.7.2. Improving the management of a nuclear accident Better management of a nuclear accident requires a better knowledge of soil and food contamination, as well as the organization of local and state services in the care of exposed populations.

126

Nuclear Accidents

3.7.2.1. Improving modeling of atmospheric deposition of accidental releases In a crisis situation, the Fukushima accident demonstrated the responsiveness of French organizations. Indeed, the IRSN was the first to publish contamination maps. The tools developed by the Institute to assess air and sea contamination in the aftermath of an accident are therefore very relevant. However, areas for improvement have also been identified. Thus, a new model has been developed to evaluate releases from simplified data. Collaborations continue with Japan to incorporate all meteorological data into the assessment of deposition (fog and snow). It is also necessary to test different models of rain drawdown. An operational model for the marine sector also remains to be developed. This is the purpose of the STERNE project. In addition, to adapt the iodine intake procedures to an accident with multiple releases, the PRIODAC program is supported by the ANR. Finally, the complexity of the decisions to be taken, and the uncertainties about the thresholds at which evacuation from contaminated areas is necessary for public health, reinforce the need to better understand the effects of chronic exposures to very low doses of radiation. 3.7.2.2. Better control of radioactive contamination of food The observations made in Japan in 2011 after the Fukushima accident and those made in France, Italy, Greece and Austria in 1986 after the fallout from Chernobyl will be very useful for a possible future nuclear accident. Thus, the season in which the accident occurs conditions the contamination of various plants and fruit trees. It was also possible to estimate the effective half-lives, about 200 days, which are useful for predicting the decrease in fruit contamination over time [REN 13, REN 14a, REN 14b]. To facilitate food safety surveillance in New Zealand, it is necessary to estimate the committed dose in the population. To calculate this dose related to radionuclide activities in the food chain, food modeling was undertaken for different age and sex groups of the New Zealand population. Estimated annual doses ranged from a minimum of 48–66 µSv y−1 for adolescent girls to a maximum of 126–152 µSv y−1 for adult men. Polonium 210, a natural radionuclide, was the main contributor to the ingested dose, while anthropogenic radionuclides contributed very little [PEA 18].

Research for the Future

127

3.7.2.3. Crisis management modeling The IRSN is also leading two actions as part of the AGORAS program (Amélioration de la Gouvernance des Organisations et des Réseaux d’Acteurs pour la Sûreté nucléaire) co-ordinated by the Ecole des Mines de Nantes. The first action focuses on design decisions regarding severe accidents and natural events before the Fukushima accident. The second action focuses on how an accident, and the Fukushima accident in particular, transforms the processes of knowledge production and mobilization. On the key issue of Organizational and Human Factors, the IRSN published a first report in 2015 [GIS 11] which serves as a basis for an analysis of risk management and crisis management. In addition, the IRSN contributes to the work of the RESOH Chair (Research in Safety, Organization and Human Resources), one of the main research topics of which is subcontracting. The PRIME project (Projet de Recherche sur les Indicateurs de la sensibilité radioécologique et les méthodes Multicritères appliqués à l’Environnement d’un site industriel) is based on a multi-criteria analysis that classifies municipalities according to their vulnerability. This radiological vulnerability of the environment is estimated using a global approach and a strategy that takes into account local populations, their lifestyles and their environment [PAR 10]. After a nuclear accident, as was the case after the one in Fukushima, decisions concerning the protection of populations, food consumption and living areas are taken by the authorities of the country where the accident takes place. It is therefore essential to have reliable models that evaluate the transfers of radionuclides in the environment and the human food chain. However, these models often contain high uncertainties [GIR 16]. Sy [SY 16] is developing a methodology for taking uncertainties into account in environmental and food risk assessment models in order to improve decision support tools in accident situations. Sy et al. [SY 15] compared four competing models in terms of adjustment performance and predictive capabilities to reproduce data from the interception of dry radionuclide deposition with pasture grass and vegetable leaves.

128

Nuclear Accidents

3.7.2.4. Improving the management of the post-accident phase Beyond the emergency, contaminated areas must be managed as well as the impact they can have on long-term health. In Fukushima, unlike the Chernobyl accident, research programs were launched shortly after the accident in collaboration between the Japanese and other nations. One of the most important programs is AMORAD, supported by the ANR and conducted with 13 partners including the University of Tsukuba in Japan. Its objective is to improve dispersion models and assessment of the impact of radionuclides in the environment, in areas that were not addressed or were only slightly addressed at Chernobyl, namely the forest ecosystem and radionuclide transfers from upstream to downstream. With regard to the forest ecosystem, research programs aim to improve the ability of operational models to predict the change in contamination and dose rates in the medium and long term. Models exist for the case of transfers of radionuclides to rivers then to the sea (including erosion and sediments), as well as the transfer of radionuclides to sediments and marine organisms. These models are used to decide on consumption bans during the crisis. However, they are not precise enough to predict the change in contamination in the medium and long term. In order to build this model, Belharet [BEL 15] carried out quantification work on the transfer of cesium in the organs of certain marine fish. 3.8. Safety research in other types of nuclear installations Pressurized water nuclear reactors are not the only nuclear facilities that could be affected by a nuclear accident. Of all the BNIs, it appears that cooling pools and spent fuel reprocessing plants would benefit from an improvement in safety. The same applies to future generation reactors, nuclear fusion installations and many other installations where criticality accidents are also possible. 3.8.1. Cooling pools In storage pools, recently discharged spent fuel from a reactor could heat relatively quickly to temperatures at which the zircaloy coating could catch fire (see section 3.5.4) and the volatile fission products of the fuel could reach the environment [ALV 02, ALV 03].

Research for the Future

129

At the IRSN, the DENOPI (Dénoyage accidentel de piscined’entreposage de combustible nucléaire, 2013–2019) and PERFROI (Etude de la PERte de reFROIdissement, 2014–2019) programs study the behavior of the fuel in two accident situations. The oxidation mechanism of nuclear fuel cladding is carried out in contact with air. This reaction could occur in the event of an accident affecting a spent fuel storage pool [SAU 13]. 3.8.2. Spent fuel reprocessing plants Accidents in spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plants are a critical issue for the safety of local inhabitants, workers and the environment, as well as for the safety of installations. The objective of this work is to demonstrate the possibility of using a free license code to simulate radiological diffusion after an accident in these particular facilities, in order to obtain a model to identify escape routes for people potentially involved in the fallout [CAR 16a]. 3.8.3. Sodium-cooled fast neutron reactors Within the framework of the “Generation IV” initiative (studies on fourth generation reactors likely to be operational in 2030), the consequences of a serious accident on a sodium-cooled Rapid Neutron Reactor (RNR-Na) are addressed in Mathé’s thesis [MAT 14]. The interaction between the hot core and liquid sodium can cause a steam explosion that could create a breach in the primary system. Contaminated liquid sodium could then be sprayed into the containment. It is therefore important to know the change in the quantity and speciation of radionuclides produced in the enclosure by such an accident, in particular iodine. Calculations show that more than half of the sodium sprayed in the containment (about 60%) is transformed into aerosols [MAT 14, MAT 15]. 3.8.4. ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) fusion facility Accidentology studies concerning this installation have revealed a risk of explosion for hydrogen and dust-based mixtures. This risk was addressed in

130

Nuclear Accidents

a thesis and many parameters were quantified [SAB 12, SAB 13]. The chemical speciation of beryllium under conditions simulating a water ingress accident in the ITER vacuum chamber was addressed by Virot et al. [VIR 14]. 3.8.5. Better understanding of criticality The criticality phenomenon, which is a self-sustaining and uncontrolled chain fission reaction, can occur in a large number of nuclear installations, as well as in nuclear fuel transport packaging. The digital simulation tools available to organizations need to be improved. Two theses have recently conducted research in this area [JIN 12, CHE 13]. The presence of certain materials placed around or between fissile material elements may influence the criticality risk. The international MIRTE experimental program led by the IRSN and involving the US Department of Energy (DoE), AREVA and ANDRA was launched in 2005. The first results are available [LEC 11a, LEC 11b]. 3.9. Advances in the humanities and social sciences For a long time, the impact of human reactions to a nuclear accident has been ignored. After the Chernobyl accident, this gap was partly filled, especially during the post-accident phase. Thus, the ETHOS project is a European project dedicated to the search for new methodologies to sustainably rehabilitate the living conditions of inhabitants of contaminated areas. In a first step (1996–1999), the methodology and practical approach of the ETHOS project were applied in the village of Olmany, located in the district of Stolyn in south-eastern Belarus, 200 km from Chernobyl. Subsequently, in 1999, the Belarusian authorities, in agreement with the European Union, launched a similar project at the level of a district, Stolyn, closing off 90,500 inhabitants. Similar steps were taken after the Fukushima accidents (see Chapter 6). Murphy and Allen [MUR 98] studied the factors that determine the personal parameters that lead individuals to comply or not with regulations on forest use and consumption of forest products. The motivations that determine whether or not people go to the forest and consume forest products depend largely on whether they feel the desire or need to do so and

Research for the Future

131

whether other people they know behave in the same way. Radiation concerns do not seem to play a significant role in these behaviors. In another study, Mays et al. [MAY 98] used the example of contaminated milk consumption in rural areas to demonstrate that radiation safety specialists should extend the scope of the risk and impact study beyond the radiation dose to cover the social and psychological costs of both the nuclear accident and countermeasure programs. These studies clearly show the need to take socio-psychological factors into account if the public is to accept the protective measures adopted by national authorities [NEA 02a]. 3.10. Conclusion Nuclear safety has been put at risk by several serious accidents. This has required action at the international and European levels. Similarly, France, a highly nuclearized nation, has deployed numerous safety research programs, several of which were supported by public funds from the Agence nationale de la recherche (ANR). Research advances are significant both in terms of knowledge of nuclear fuel and its containment (cladding, tank, concrete enclosure) and in the control of hydrogen explosions. In the event of core fusion, the nature of corium and its change begin to reveal their secrets. The behavior of containment systems in various situations has been accurately described. Solutions for managing the various possible nuclear accidents are now available to operators and authorities. Significant progress has been made on software to predict the development of an accident. Advances in radioecological knowledge have been important in characterizing the term source and in modeling radionuclide dispersions in the atmosphere and aquatic environments. Similarly, new radiation protection data make it possible to better understand the radioactive risk to humans. Efforts are also being made to acquire better knowledge in the social sciences and humanities about the consequences of a nuclear accident.

4 Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

4.1. Introduction All nuclear installations must take strong preventive actions to ensure the best possible reactivity in the event of an accident. The prevention phase must consider in detail how to manage the nuclear facility so that it continues to operate as normally as possible. It is also important to ensure that its personnel are efficient and responsive to any deviations from normal procedure in the installation. This phase is also the time when actions to limit radioactive releases in the event of an accident must be considered, as well as solutions to limit radioactive deposits in the soil (Figure 4.1). After the accident, the situation is divided into two main phases, the emergency phase and the post-accident phase. The first phase is acute and lasts a short time. The second phase, on the other hand, is very long. The emergency phase itself consists of three periods: a first period, known as the threat phase, when the accident is foreseeable; a second period when the accident occurs with radioactive releases into the environment; and a third period that marks the end of the state of emergency. The post-accident phase consists of two stages: a transition period and a long-term period. Often, during the management of the accident, rules are flouted and errors of assessment are made. During the crisis, the political authorities must simultaneously take on eight tasks:

Nuclear Accidents: Prevention and Management of an Accidental Crisis, First Edition. Jean-Claude Amiard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

134

Nuclear Accidents

i) ensure the evacuation of populations; ii) distribute iodine tablets; iii) control the accident; iv) manage permanent or temporary nuclear workers (liquidators); v) manage territories (prohibited, restricted, etc.); vi) communicate with the public; vii) procurement and management of contaminated feed; and viii) economic management (agriculture, industry, etc.). The region’s economy will be disrupted for long periods of time due to soil freezing and subsoil wealth, factory closures, abandonment of arable land, etc. Accident

PREVENTION STAGE

Outside the site

EMERGENCY STAGE Threat period

Period of emissions

End of stage period

Management of the building and personnel

Internal emergency plan

Protection against emissions

Particular Intervention Plan Emergency Protection Actions (provision of shelter and support, ingestion of stable iodine, evacuation)

Protection against deposition

Decisions (definition of zoning post-accident)

POST-ACCIDENT STAGE Transition period

Long-term period

Lifting of emergency protection actions

Post-accident actions For managing population and territoires (abandonment, prohibitions, clean-up)

Figure 4.1. The various phases of a nuclear accident (modified from [IRS 14a, PET 14, LHE 14]). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

4.2. The first actions of the threat and rejection periods The emergency phase begins with the threat period. It begins with an abnormal event detected by the operator of the nuclear facility. The operator then tries to bring the installation back to a safe state. Initially, it is the operator at local and national levels who reacts with his or her own resources, as well as notifying the competent authorities of the occurrence of

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

135

a possible accident. In the event of failure, or if the planned backup equipment does not operate satisfactorily, the accident begins and may lead to releases into the environment. These releases can occur after a more or less long period of time, very quickly for some types of accidents (fire, explosion, criticality, etc.) or a few hours for other types of accidents. Moreover, the threat phase may be of a very short duration or not even exist. During the threat phase, decisions are mainly made on the basis of predictive estimates made by modeling, taking into account the state of the facility concerned and local weather forecasts covering the potential release period [IRS 14a]. The authorities, depending on the forecasts of the future accident, are taking various initiatives to protect local populations. If the threat time is estimated to be less than 6 hours, the reflex mode is used, that is, depending on the foreseeable seriousness of the accident, populations will be sheltered and their concerns listened to, or they will be evacuated from within a given radius around the nuclear installation (often 5 km). If the threat period is estimated to be longer than 6 hours, the authorities’ initiatives are carried out in a reasoned mode and will take into account meteorology to protect or evacuate populations. In the latter case, farmers can be warned to take the first steps, such as protecting as many domestic animals as possible, as well as food stores. For crops, some can be covered to limit possible radioactive deposits [IRS 14a]. Communication with the public is of primary interest during the threat period. It must be preceded by preventive information throughout the prevention phase so that the population is able to understand the warning signals and is able to make intelligent decisions. Public alerts are of various types including sirens, telephoning, automatic or not, and media. During the entire emergency phase, the management of nuclear workers, both permanent staff and any “liquidators”, is the responsibility of the operator. 4.2.1. Radioactive releases in the event of an accident from a nuclear reactor In the event of an accident from a nuclear reactor, radioactive releases are of three categories (Table 4.1): fission products, activation and corrosion products, and alpha emitters [IRS 13a]. The importance of the exposure

136

Nuclear Accidents

route is illustrated by a color: very strong in red, strong in orange, significant in yellow, weak in white. Only rare gases have an absolutely zero pathway, that of ingestion, because they do not interact with living matter. So, impact results only from external exposure and inhalation. Iodine penetrates strongly into humans through the inhalation of gaseous forms or by ingestion, especially of dairy products. The main route of exposure for radionuclides of the cesium family is external and results from soil contamination and secondarily through the ingestion of contaminated food products. The main route of exposure of strontium is ingestion. For most other fission products, the external pathway is strong. For tritium, external exposure is very high, and ingestion is secondary. For alpha emitters, the inhalation route is predominant for 241Am and 239Pu, and it is ingestion that is significant for 238Pu. 4.2.2. Radioactivity measurements during a nuclear accident During a nuclear crisis, radioactivity measurements are essential and will be different with different purposes depending on whether you are in the threat phase or the release phase. During the threat period, the number of available radioactivity measurements is generally low (routine measurements) and decisions are based on predictive calculations. These are less about seeking accuracy than a reasonably realistic estimate of the consequences of the release on the environment and people. These estimates should make it possible to define whether or not to implement emergency protection measures for the population. Overall, the measures have dual objectives of expertise and control. For the expert assessment objective, the measurement results are used (1) to better understand the consequences of the accident and compare them with the predictive assessments used to define the zoning, and (2) to determine the doses actually received by exposed persons, as part of the implementation of population health monitoring. For the control objective, the measurement results are used to verify the compliance of the monitored elements with predefined criteria (e.g. maximum permitted levels, MACs, for foodstuffs), the level of exposure of persons or the effectiveness of the cleaning actions put in place. During the threat phase, measurement results make it possible to confirm the reference state of environmental contamination, detect the first signs of rejection and feed the authorities’ communications. During the release phase,

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

137

measurement results verify that the orders of magnitude of the predictive calculations are correct, confirm the area impacted by the radioactive plume, confirm the assumptions related to the spectrum of radionuclides released and provide information for authorities to communicate [IRS 13a]. Radionuclides

External exposure

Inhalation

Ingestion

Fission products 85

Noble gases ( Kr,

133

Plume

Xe)

None

Iodine family (131I, 129I, etc.)

Milk and plants

Cesium family (134Cs, 137Cs, etc.)

Soils

Strontium family (89Sr, 90 Sr/90Y, etc.) Ruthenium family (103Ru, 106 Ru) Other fission products (144Ce, 95 Zr, 140Ba) Activation and corrosion products Tritium (3H) Water

Activation products (110mAg, 58Co, 60Co, 55Fe, 54Mn, 65 Zn) Alpha transmitters 241

Am

Inhalation

239

Pu

Inhalation

238

Pu

240

Pu

238

U

235

U

234

U

Ingestion External Inhalation Ingestion External

Table 4.1. The main radionuclides released into the environment during a nuclear accident affecting a nuclear reactor and the predominant exposure pathways for populations (modified from [IRS 13a]). The darker the color, the greater the importance of the exposure route

138

Nuclear Accidents

4.3. Population management in the emergency phase In the event of a major nuclear accident, the regional authorities have only three possible solutions at their disposal: confinement of the population in their habitat, evacuation of part or all of the population concerned and distribution of stable iodine tablets to part or all of the population. These various options will be selected depending on the accident itself. In the first moments of the accident, the authorities must avoid the onset of panic among the populations concerned. This type of behavior has been observed for natural disasters such as earthquakes or tsunamis, but never for nuclear accidents. However, this cannot be ruled out. The advancement of knowledge in the human sciences makes it possible to know that during a shock, human beings rarely remain frozen in a single type of behavior. Behaviors will vary depending on the area (Table 4.2). Disaster areas

Human behavior

Impact zone

Inhibition, Stupor, Prostration, Panic

Destruction zone

Inhibition, Flight, Agitation, Panic

Marginal zone

Uncertainty, Indecision, Rumor, Exodus

Outer zone

Sympathy, Convergence, Repair

Table 4.2. Human behavior in relation to disaster areas (modified from [CRO 94])

It is difficult to take into account the interactions between individuals. Behaviors are essentially of a non-traditional nature; they do not correspond to the behaviors of everyday life. Moreover, they have a short duration, with ultimately a “return to everyday behavior”. According to Provitolo et al. [PRO 15], there are three types of reactions: instinctive behaviors, panic behaviors and acquired and intelligent behaviors. Modeling tests for human behavior in disasters have been developed [PRO 05], and a mathematical model to study the behavioral responses of individuals in a population in disaster situations has been proposed [CAN 17, CAN 18]. Population density around nuclear power plants can be high, and above all, it varies according to the distance from the reactor. Taking the example of French power plants in 2007, 5 km away, only five sites have more than 50,000 inhabitants. These are Cattenom (75,000), Marcoule (68,000), Malvesi (62,000) and Romans (59,000). 30 km away, another five sites, but

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

139

not the same, have more than 500,000 inhabitants. They are Bugey (1,255,000), Fessenheim (1,036,000), Cattenom (876,000), St Alban (723,000) and Marcoule (553,000). Within 100 km, eight sites exceed 4 million inhabitants. They are Nogent sur Seine (9,130,000), Fessenheim (7,287,000), Chooz (6,743,000), Bugey (5,780,000), Gravelines (5,281,000), St Alban (4,820,000), Cattenom (4,540,000) and Romans (473 000). In contrast, the sites of La Hague and Flamanville are characterized by significantly lower populations than the other sites [PAS 12a] (Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2. French nuclear sites, their production and the populations surrounding them (modified from [PAS 12a]). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

This disparity in population size around a reactor is also found in South Korea (Table 4.3).

140

Nuclear Accidents

Site

Number of inhabitants within a 30 km radius of the reactor 45,377

Hanul

3,434,711

Kori Hanbit Wolseong

126,520 1,265,555

Table 4.3. Number of inhabitants within a 30 km radius of a South Korean nuclear power plant (modified from [SEO 18])

Nuclear accidents are not the only events for which massive population displacements are necessary; natural disasters also trigger them, such as fires, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions. However, in the case of nuclear accidents, some evacuations are final because the soil is contaminated for centuries. 4.3.1. Containment or sheltering of the population In Fukushima, from March 25, 2011, containment, evacuation preparation and voluntary evacuation zones were decided within the 20–30 km perimeter around Fukushima [CAR 12]. 4.3.1.1. The advantages and disadvantages of containment In a nuclear accident, radionuclides released predominantly into the atmosphere are volatile radionuclides. Among the most dangerous are iodine isotopes that can induce thyroid cancer through radiation. The consequences of the presence of radioactive iodines will be discussed in subsection 4.3.3. Therefore, any situation that prevents atmospheric deposition for a few days will significantly reduce the absorbed dose. Containment is an emergency solution, but it should not be prolonged for too long. Indeed, containment has its perverse effects. It involves the total blocking of all air inlets, the total removal of all ventilation in homes and the absolute prohibition of all traffic. Problems become insoluble after 10 days. However, in Fukushima, in some areas, containment was extended for 30 days. This was imposed by the massive and continuous releases of radioactivity into ambient air and water. This situation aggravated the shortage of water and medicines [BEH 13].

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

141

4.3.1.2. The containment protection factor During a nuclear accident, it is important to be able to assess as accurately as possible the radiation doses received by populations, both internal and external, in order to make informed decisions: either containment in buildings or controlled evacuation. It is also essential to know the protection factor of the various buildings (ratio of the dose of an unprotected individual to the dose of an individual confined to a building) (Figure 4.3). Dillon et al. [DIL 16] have compiled extensive data on this subject in the United States. The higher the protection factor, the higher the protection. In a classic American residence, the protection factor is on average 10 in the basement and 2.5 above the ground. In a fairly large building of more solid construction, the average protection factors are 600, 40 and 80 for basements, first floors and upper floors, respectively.

Figure 4.3. The protection factor provided by the containment of a population (modified from [DIL 16]). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

4.3.2. Mass evacuation or evacuation of part of the population Five major nuclear accidents have occurred in the past. They were Kyshtym (USSR, later Russia) in 1957, Windscale (United Kingdom) in 1957, Three Mile Island (United States) in 1979, Chernobyl (USSR, now Ukraine) in 1986 and Fukushima (Japan) in 2011 [HAS 15a]. Each of these accidents, with the exception of Windscale, resulted in the evacuation of populations.

142

Nuclear Accidents

Other evacuations took place previously. For example, in the Marshall Islands, Bikini and Eniwetok, one of the first population displacements for nuclear testing took place. On March 7, 1946, the indigenous population of Bikini Island (167 inhabitants) was evacuated and moved to Rongerik Atoll. These inhabitants were moved in 1948 to the American naval base at Kwajalein. Eight months later, they were again moved to Kili Atoll. After a few months of resettlement on Bikini in the early 1970s, the 139 islanders had to be moved back to Kili where they still live with their descendants [STE 98]. In 1998, the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAE 98] recommended that the atoll islands should not be repopulated, as local products and groundwater are unsuitable for consumption and the exposure dose (15 mSv) is too high. Similarly, the inhabitants of Eniwetok were evacuated against their will to the Meck islet of Kwajalein Atoll in May 1946 and again in December 1947 to the uninhabited atoll of Unjelang. Following the accident at Kyshtym (Mayak), an area of about 1,000 km2 was heavily contaminated, particularly with 90Sr. This area is known as the “radioactive trace of the Eastern Urals”. At the time of the accident, 63% of the area was used for agricultural purposes and 20% was wooded [NRP 07]. A territory of 23,000 km2 populated by 270,000 people was contaminated by a strontium-90 deposit with activity greater than 3.7 kBq m−2. As a result of high external exposures, the 1,100 residents of three localities (Berdyanish, Satlykovo and Galikaeva) located very close to the explosion site were quickly evacuated within 7–14 days of the accident. Then, it was the turn of the population of seven villages (2,280 people in total) who were evacuated 250 days after the accident. A total of 23 rural communities (including Berdyanish, Satlykovo and Galikaeva) were eventually evacuated, or about 10,700 people, for a period of 22 months after the accident. In 2007, approximately 180 km2 near the explosion site were still officially cordoned off [NRP 07]. As a result of the very high initial contamination and reduced mobility of 90Sr in the soil, the soil is still heavily contaminated in 2019. At Three Mile Island (TMI), 28 hours after the accident began (March 28, 1979 at 4:00 am), the situation was more complex than TMI’s operating company, Metropolitan Edison, suggested. There were also many discussions about whether a mass evacuation should be triggered. In particular, contradictory statements were made about the release of radioactivity. Schools were closed, and residents were urged to confine themselves inside their homes. Similarly, farmers had to store food for their animals in safe places and the animals also had to be indoors. Pennsylvania

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

143

State Governor Dick Thornburgh, on the advice of US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) President Joseph Hendrie, advised the evacuation (at 12:30 p.m. on Friday, March 30) of “pregnant women and preschool children … within five miles (8 km) of the Three Mile Island facilities” [USN 79, ROG 80]. The evacuation area was extended to a 20-mile radius the next day [CUT 82]. On April 9, the NRC’s Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Harold Denton, announced that the situation had been restored. It is obvious that the public authorities had to improvise the advice to inhabitants neighboring the reactor, limiting themselves to recommending either containment at home or voluntary evacuation for pregnant women and children. A study conducted for the Ad Hoc Investigation Group estimated that approximately 76,000 people evacuated the area within 15 km of Three Mile Island at the time of the accident, partly as a result of a precautionary warning to pregnant women and preschool children within 8 km of the plant, and partly because of confused reports and fear of the hydrogen bubble. An approximately equal number of people, about 67,000, living between 10 and 15 miles from the plant, were also evacuated, representing about 32% of the people living in this area [ROG 80]. According to a survey conducted in April 1979 (less than a month after the accident), 98% of evacuees had returned home within three weeks [CUT 82]. In Chernobyl, on April 27, 1986, 50,000 inhabitants of the town of Pripyat, 3 km from the damaged reactor, were evacuated. Then, for 10 days until May 7, 1986, all the inhabitants (about 30,000) living in the 30 km zone were displaced. Active evacuations continued until September 1986 and affected approximately 116,000 residents [SAE 11]. In Fukushima, despite the disaster caused by the earthquake and tsunami, the evacuation of areas exposed to radioactive fallout was quickly completed. According to the NISA Security Agency press release of April 4, the declaration of a radiological emergency was decided on March 11 at 19:03, the decision to evacuate the 3 km perimeter around Fukushima was taken at 21:23, the 10 km perimeter at 05:44 on March 12 and the 20 km area at 18:25 on March 12, after transitional containment measures [CAR 12]. During the Fukushima accident, body contamination checks were carried out during evacuation and published levels were low [CAR 12]. The evacuations involved two types of inhabitants. First, those affected by the earthquake and tsunami, and then those affected by the nuclear accident. In the latter case, there were forced and voluntary evacuations. The

144

Nuclear Accidents

total number of evacuees was to increase gradually until June 2012. Thus, the number of evacuees due to the nuclear accident was more than 152,000 in November 2011 and nearly 164,000 in June 2012 [HAS 13]. According to Veron and Golaz [VÉR 15], there is an inconsistency in the estimates of the number of people displaced following the tsunami and nuclear accident of March 2011. According to sources, these are people who have been evacuated or displaced without identification. For example, official 2011 estimates by the Cabinet Office give a maximum of 470,000 evacuees, but the evacuation area was inhabited by 600,000 people. The situation of the other 130,000 is unclear. Another source, the Japanese Reconstruction Agency, provides three different estimates of the number of evacuees, 125,000 in early June, 72,000 in early November and 330,000 in mid-November. This sudden increase in November 2011, eight months after the disaster, seems unlikely. Evacuation destinations are strongly motivated by human networks and the recommendations of local governments and knowledge, and are less influenced by employment issues, radiation protection, housing availability and practical access to social facilities [DO 19]. According to Behar [BEH 13b], evacuations in Fukushima did not go as expected. Indeed, the earthquake destroyed many roads. This resulted in traffic jams that slowed the evacuation. In TMI and Fukushima, self-evacuation by a private vehicle was the most widely used public evacuation method [TAK 18]. In addition, generators transported by truck to troubleshoot the nuclear power plant congested the roads. The evacuation from Futaba hospital proved disastrous because there were patients unable to travel alone, especially those who were bedridden for serious illness. They were abandoned for three days, without care or food. A total of 573 deaths were documented as related to the nuclear disaster in 13 municipalities affected by the nuclear crisis. As of October 2011, there were already 36,000 residents voluntarily evacuated [BEH 13b]. 4.3.2.1. Improvements in future evacuations On November 29, 1979, following the Three Mile Island accident, the US NRC sent a letter to the 52 US nuclear power plants asking them to estimate the evacuation time of 10 geographical areas within a 2-, 5- and 10-mile radius of each plant. Two plants did not respond, 17 had a very poor response and only five plants gave an excellent response [URB 81]. In the

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

145

United States, the 2011 strategies for public protection actions following a nuclear accident have remained virtually unchanged since their implementation in the early 1980s [HAM 15]. Evacuation time estimate (ETE) analyses were conducted to achieve three objectives: (i) to provide emergency decision-makers with data indicating whether evacuation can be implemented in time to significantly reduce radiation exposures; (ii) to determine whether ETEs are significantly affected by uncontrollable events such as adverse weather conditions; and (iii) to indicate whether traffic management measures would significantly reduce evacuation times and provide information useful in developing effective traffic management plans [URB 00]. In theory, mass evacuations are preferably carried out by public transport, usually buses, to avoid the inevitable road congestion. Thus, to evacuate Pripyat to Chernobyl, 1,100 buses were needed. Appropriate bus operating strategies can be implemented to minimize total evacuation time and operational evacuation costs, maximize the number of evacuees and address travel time and demand uncertainty [LAK 19]. In other accidents, such as Three Mile Island and Fukushima, a large proportion of evacuees used private vehicles. With modern technologies, in particular, the geolocation of each individual by their mobile phone GPS, it was possible to qualify and quantify the movements of Japanese people, in the short and long terms, after the earthquake and the ensuing tsunami of March 2011 [HAY 13, SON 13]. 4.3.2.2. Stages of evacuation A mass evacuation usually takes place in three stages [LOP 17]. The first step is to leave the danger zone. The means of transport used can be public (buses) or individual. On average in a given population, a third cannot be evacuated by their own means. In general, they are evacuated by geographical area to avoid infrastructure congestion (Figure 4.4). Each sector leads evacuees to a reception center or CARE (Centre d’Accueil et de Regroupement) (Figure 4.5). The second step is grouping evacuees into one or more locations (CARE). These centers have many functions such as registering and identifying evacuees, comforting them, informing them and directing them to temporary accommodation. CAREs must be installed beyond the disaster area. The third stage includes all material assistance to

146

Nuclear Accidents

emergency accommodation facilities (housing, supplies, care, etc.). These temporary structures, for a few days to a week, are identified a priori. These are hotels, boarding schools, leisure and holiday centers, gyms, etc.

Figure 4.4. Diagram of an evacuation according to the “star” type (modified from [LOP 17]). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

Figure 4.5. Organization of reception and grouping centers (CARE), regrouping points (Pr) and hospital relocation (H) (amended according to [LOP 17]). The scale of the zones is arbitrary. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

147

The four main problems to be solved in an emergency situation, identification of affected populations, solving traffic problems, communication and public information and setting up reception center, are presented in Figure 4.6. With the traffic problem, the two main difficulties to manage are the means of public transport to be mobilized and organized, as well as the circulation of all vehicles (evacuated in one direction and emergency in another). Other issues to be addressed include all services to be requested, the management of livestock and domestic animals, industries whose activities cannot stop immediately and the supervision of certain establishments (pharmacies, arm depots, prisons, dangerous industrial premises, vital points).

Figure 4.6. The implementation of an immediate and massive evacuation (modified from [LOP 17]). CARE: Centre d’Accueil et de Regroupement; CA: Centre d’Accueil (reception center)

After a variable period of time, some evacuated populations are likely to return to their former residential areas. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 4.3.2.3. Medical screening of evacuees One of the greatest medical challenges after a nuclear device explosion or nuclear accident will be to implement a strategy to assess the severity of radiation exposure among survivors and sort them appropriately. Indeed, the population concerned could range from tens to hundreds of thousands of

148

Nuclear Accidents

people who will need large quantities of cytokines, while local infrastructure will be damaged and medical resources scarce. Currently, the most effective and accessible method of triage is to use a complete sequential blood count to assess lymphocyte depletion kinetics correlated with the estimated exposure to ionizing radiation. The EAST (Exposure And Symptom Triage) process appears to be the most appropriate screening tool in crisis situations to prioritize victims according to their exposure history and symptoms, and help save as many lives as possible during a catastrophic event [HIC 18a, HIC 18b]. 4.3.2.4. Management of radioactively contaminated people The NRCP (National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements) proposes an organization of the various activity zones (zone control points, sorting zone, decontamination zone and medical base) to best manage a population exposed to radionuclides following a nuclear accident (Figure 4.7) [NRC 08]. For its part, the IAEA proposes to set up a radioactive decontamination medical base (Figure 4.8) [IAE 05].

Figure 4.7. Example of the creation of various specific activity zones for the management of persons exposed after a nuclear accident with radionuclide releases (modified from [NRC 08]). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

149

Figure 4.8. Configuration of a radioactive decontamination medical base to receive many patients (modified from [IAE 05])

4.3.2.5. The cost of evacuations Nifenecker [NIF 15] estimates the cost of evacuating a population (Table 4.4). To do this, the study estimates the value of abandoned housing and land, as well as the value of the human losses of evacuees. For this purpose, it attributes a value of 3 million euros to human life. In addition to the cost in lives lost, the loss of property is an important element of an evacuation. From Table 4.4, it appears that the optimized irradiation limit is approximately 20 mSv y−1. Indeed, the lower the evacuation limit, the larger the evacuated population, the greater the number of dwellings and the surface area of abandoned land. However, the cost of a nuclear disaster is not limited to the estimates in this table. It must include the cost of the failed

150

Nuclear Accidents

reactor, the cost of replacing electricity produced by the failed reactor, the cost of contaminated agricultural products, etc. Many of these estimates depend on the company’s response to this issue. Initial annual dose (mSv y−1)

Cost of evacuation (G€)

Cost of irradiation (G€)

Total cost (G€)

100

23

18

41

50

28

9

37

20

31.5

3.6

35.1

10

36.2

1.6

37.8

2

50.6

0.4

51

Table 4.4. Total costs of a post-disaster depending on the level of radioactive contamination at which evacuation becomes mandatory (based on [NIF 15])

4.3.2.6. The advantages and disadvantages of an evacuation The main advantage of evacuation is that the population living in the risk area is excluded from radioactive exposure. It is an effective action but can be complex to implement. The main issues to be addressed are evacuation time, resource requirements, overload of emergency services, refusal to evacuate, evacuation of vulnerable populations and certain categories of workers, and ultimately road infrastructure. Evacuation time may be too long, especially in urban areas. The resources needed to evacuate the population, efficiently and safely, are significant, including transport and assistance. In a context of panic and uncertainty, rescue services and law enforcement may be overloaded with requests for assistance. Authorities may be confronted with people who refuse to evacuate. The consequences of evacuations in the medical field are multiple. The Three Mile Island nuclear accident caused serious organizational problems for health-care facilities near the damaged reactor. For example, Dauphin County, just north of TMI, had four hospitals within 9.5–13.5 miles of the reactor. There was no inpatient evacuation plan in place throughout the region. A plan implemented in 48 hours freed half of the patients from these hospitals, while keeping bedridden and seriously ill patients in the risk area [MAX 82].

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

151

In addition, as noted above (section 3.2), evacuations and long-term travel have created serious health-care problems for the most vulnerable people, such as hospitalized patients and the elderly [HAS 15a]. Following the accident in Fukushima, at least 60 elders died during their evacuation from hospitals or retirement homes [AKI 15]. A study evaluating the risk of various types of evacuation was conducted with 191 residents and 184 staff in three nursing homes using the same injury indicator that was the loss of life expectancy (LLE). Four evacuation scenarios were tested (rapid evacuation on March 22, voluntary evacuation on June 20, exposure to 20 mSv and exposure to 100 mSv). Life expectancy losses are considerably different and are, respectively, for the four scenarios of 11,000, 27, 1,100 and 5,800 days per person [MUR 15]. This highlights psychological factors among the elderly and the need to adapt evacuations to the individual. Psychological problems can occur in various evacuated populations. Following the Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear accidents, sociological studies show a significant increase in psychological disorders for nuclear workers, liquidators and displaced populations [BRO 11, YAB 14, SUZ 15]. According to Lucotte [LUC 17], the qualitative assessment of psychological distress is made using the Kessler scale (K6) which uses six criteria (feeling nervous, desperate, agitated, depressed, feeling that any act of daily life requires effort and feeling useless). These psychological disorders have economic consequences that are considered in a long-term perspective as considerably costly. The market psychological costs are estimated for a serious accident between 0.5 and 1 billion euros and for a major accident between 12 and 20 billion euros [LUC 17]. The non-market psychological costs for Chernobyl are $3.3 million for psychological support for children and $2.2 million for the social and socio-psychological rehabilitation of populations [SAM 16]. In Fukushima, evacuees receive about €800 per month for this damage [NEA 12d]. After a nuclear accident, rapid measurements of thyroid radioactivity are required and a standard technique for measuring thyroid activity must be established. Especially at the beginning of the accident, the presence of iodine 132 was too often neglected, as Tokonami and Hosoda [TOK 18] demonstrate. Evacuation times should not be overlooked, as they can be long for certain categories of people. Thus, the evacuation of the vulnerable, including elderly people in hospitals or retirement homes, as well as patients

152

Nuclear Accidents

hospitalized in intensive care, may take a considerable amount of time, but could also further worsen their state of health. Among vulnerable populations, children present in schools at the time of the accident must be added. It seems difficult to prevent parents from picking up their children from school in the event of a nuclear emergency [GAU 19]. Similarly, some categories of workers could not be evacuated without exposing them to other risks associated with the interruption of their current work. Finally, the road infrastructure will not necessarily be adapted and may quickly become saturated, leading to longer evacuation times and accidents [LOP 17]. Finally, public information is a major problem in the event of a nuclear accident. For pre-incident or pre-accident communications to be accepted by the public and recommendations to be followed, the source has to be trustworthy and perceived as credible [GAU 19]. 4.3.3. Distribution of stable iodine tablets The physiology of the thyroid gland, combined with the gaseous release of several radioactive iodine isotopes in the event of a nuclear accident, leads to a significantly increased risk of thyroid cancer. The only way to counter this risk is to take stable iodine in the form of potassium iodide tablets. France has made a major effort to inform the public about this issue (on the ASN website or http://www.distribution-iode.com/). 4.3.3.1. Why administer stable iodine? The thyroid gland produces several hormones (thyroxine, T4, and triiodothyronine, T3) from iodine (normally stable) and tyrosine (an amino acid). The behavior of stable and radioactive isotopes of the same element being identical, if radioactive iodine is present in the environment, it will enter the thyroid instead of stable iodine. However, this radioactive iodine will trigger a variety of thyroid radiation-induced cancers [SCH 07]. Children, then women, are the most sensitive populations to radioactive iodine. To counter this phenomenon, the most effective action is to provide the exposed person with an excess of stable iodine in the form of a potassium iodide tablet [SCH 11]. Iodine has an essential function in the functioning of the thyroid and in the production of thyroid hormones. When a radioactive isotope of iodine replaces a stable isotope, the risk of radiation-induced thyroid cancer is high.

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

153

Also, the provision of stable iodine in tablet form during a nuclear accident protects the thyroid by “diluting” the radioactive iodine. 4.3.3.2. Iodine releases during a nuclear accident There are 32 iodine isotopes [BRO 86], and only one isotope is stable (iodine 127). All radioactive isotopes are of anthropogenic origin, with the exception of iodine 129, which is naturally produced in the upper atmosphere in addition to its industrial origin. Of the radioactive isotopes, only iodines 131, 132 and 133 and tellurium 132 (giving rise to iodine 132) are created in large numbers during the fission of uranium or plutonium. However, their physical half-lives are very short, respectively, 8 days, 2.3 hours, 20.8 hours and 3.2 days. As a result, at the time of the accident, iodine 133 disappeared 1–3 days after the reactors were shut down. Iodine 132, which closely follows the decline in tellurium, disappears in three weeks. The radioactive activity of iodine 131 decreases 14 times over in one month and 2,700 times in one quarter of a year. During normal operation, radioactive iodine releases from nuclear power plants are very low. For example, for a 1,300 MWe pressurized water reactor (PWR), the annual release of iodine 131 is about 1 × 108 Bq in gaseous effluents and slightly lower for liquid effluents. In contrast, in nuclear accidents, due to their presence in the gaseous form, iodine 131 is widely dispersed in the environment in the first hours and days following the accident. Indeed, a PWR of 1,300 MWe produced in 40 months 4 × 1018 Bq of iodine 131 and 7.5.1010 Bq of iodine 129. The total iodine activity (isotopes 129–141) of a reactor core is estimated at about 3 × 1019 Bq [SCH 11]. Significant quantities of iodine 131 were released during accidents at Windscale (United Kingdom) in 1957 (1014 Bq), Three Mile Island (USA) in 1979 (4.81 × 1013 Bq), Chernobyl in 1986 (2.6 × 1017 Bq) and Fukushima in 2011 (between 1 and 1.3 × 1017 Bq) [CAR 12, AMI 19]. 4.3.3.3. International recommendations Stable iodine prophylaxis for children under 18 years of age should be considered as soon as radiological exposure reaches 10 mGy. However, in adults over 40 years of age, stable iodine prophylaxis should not be recommended. The most recent information on the balance of risks and

154

Nuclear Accidents

benefits should also be duly taken into account in plans for any distribution and storage of stable iodine. WHO suggests that stocks should be justified [WHO 99]. 4.3.3.4. Potassium iodide (KI) intake dose To reduce radioactive iodine fixation in adults by more than 90%, the doses required are 40 mg KI in areas where dietary iodine intake is “normal” and 65–130 mg KI in areas where there is a relative deficiency of dietary iodine [VID 18a, VID 18b, VID 19]. The current recommendations for single-dose KI administration are 130 mg KI (2 tablets at 65 mg) for children over 12 years of age and adults under 40 years of age; 65 mg KI (1 tablet) for children 36 months to 12 years of age; 32.5 mg KI (½ tablet) for infants 1–36 months of age and 16 mg KI (¼ tablet) for newborns (< 1 month) [SCH 94]. It is not recommended for subjects over 60 years of age and is cautiously recommended for 45–60 year olds [WAM 08, SME 11]. 4.3.3.5. Timing of administration and protection To be effective, stable iodine administration should take place as close as possible to the propagation of the radioactive cloud (no earlier than 2 hours before). The degree of protection varies according to the time of administration. If the single intake of stable iodine (130 mg) is taken at the time of contamination, the protection is 97% and then decreases to 80% and 40% if taken 2 h or 4 h, respectively, after the accident. Similarly, if the dose was taken before the 3- or 2-day accident, the protection will only be 32% and 75%, respectively [LEG 01]. Administration of KI tablets 2 and 8 hours after taking radioactive iodine (131I) produces protective effects of 80% and 40%, respectively, with adequate iodine diets, but only 65% and 15% with low iodine diets [ZAN 00]. However, in several regions of Europe, people have a diet deficient in iodine [DEL 02]. 4.3.3.6. The duration of protection Thyroid uptake blockage is transient and its duration depends on the dosage administered [GEO 00, ZAN 00]. For a dose of 100–200 mg iodide taken within 2 hours before exposure, the protection is total for 8–9 hours. It is total for 48 hours after taking 200–1,000 mg and partial after taking

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

155

25–100 mg. It is no longer blocked after 72 hours regardless of the dose administered [SCH 97]. For a 130 mg dose, the protection lasts about 36 hours [LEG 01]. As a result, iodine intake will have to be repeated if radioactive iodine releases from the nuclear accident last more than 48–72 hours, in order to maintain effective protection. Repeated administration of iodine tablets is possible. In the event of prolonged exposure beyond several days, there seems to be a consensus on the desirability of repeating stable iodine administration for 10–12 consecutive days, in order to renew the effective blocking of radioactive iodine uptake by the thyroid gland. The daily repetition of iodide intake at a lower dosage (15 mg) then makes it possible to maintain a catchment blockage greater than 90% [GEO 00]. Administration of iodine at 100 mg daily for 15 days would not cause serious hormonal disorder in the normal subject (dictionary [VID 19, ANS 14]). 4.3.3.7. Concrete cases In Chernobyl, among the evacuees, the concentration in the thyroid at 131I was 10 ± 2 kBq for Pripyat residents who took potassium iodine tablets on April 26 and 27, 1986 and 647 ± 8 kBq for those who did not take them [BAL 03]. Unfortunately, few stable iodine tablets were distributed to Chernobyl in April 1986. Failure to provide stable iodine for those in the contaminated territories led to substantial increases in the number of victims [YOB 09]. In Fukushima, the order to distribute the iodine tablets was not taken until five days after March 11, 2011. Only a few cities had distributed these tablets. This is the case in two cities (Kutuba and Tomiaka), where the distribution was anticipated, and in Miharu where people ingested the tablets on time [BEH 13b]. As Boiley [BOI 16a] says, “The administration of iodine tablets essential for the prevention of thyroid cancer has proven to be very complex. The Japanese authorities have not been able to manage their distribution properly. The population no longer knew when to ingest them, which, combined with the breakdown of communications and loss of trust in the authorities, led to a chaotic situation. Prophylaxis based on potassium iodide did not work at all.”

156

Nuclear Accidents

4.3.3.8. How to distribute Feedback from severe accidents (Chernobyl and Fukushima) shows that it is very difficult to distribute iodine tablets properly, both at the right time and to the population concerned. For example, in Fukushima, stable iodine tablets (about 1,500,000) were made available to evacuees from March 15, 2011 by the local authorities, under the control of the local crisis unit, but were probably not distributed until March 21. The number of dwellings in the 20 km zone was about 30,000 [CAR 12]. The distribution was therefore far too late. In France, in 2016, the fifth iodine tablet distribution campaign aimed to renew those distributed in 2009 and to develop a culture of protection for residents of the 19 French nuclear power plants. This represents 425,396 households, 69,582 companies and institutions interacting with the public, 827 schools concerned and 250 pharmacies. At the beginning of February, each outbreak and site manager within a 10 km radius of a nuclear power plant received a letter from the public authorities allowing him/her to pick up his/her iodine tablet box(es) free of charge from the pharmacies participating in the operation. The first uptake results have been positive since on March 2, 2016, the rate stood at 28.16% for individuals and the overall rate at 26.5% [ASN 16a, DEL 16c]. By May 2017, about 50% of individuals had withdrawn their iodine tablets; the rest received them directly at home by mail. 4.4. Food supply management Following the Chernobyl accident and the high level of large-scale environmental contamination, it appeared to the competent authorities that the route of exposure through food was becoming a major public health concern. This has resulted in various recommendations by international organizations, as well as various regulatory values [AMI 18a, AMI 18b]. The human food route includes the intake of solid foods (meat, fish, vegetables, fruit, etc.) and liquids (various beverages including water) [AMI 13]. 4.4.1. Recommended values There are internationally agreed reference levels (GL, Guidelines) for the radionuclide content of food products in international trade following a nuclear or radiological emergency. These levels are published by the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission [WHO 11]. The guideline

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

157

limits for radionuclide concentrations are in the Codex Alimentarius [COD 95], which has been revised several times, the last revision being in 2015 [COD 15]. The methods used by WHO and FAO to recommend guideline levels to the Codex Alimentarius Commission are basically the same. They all start from a reference dose limit (usually 5 mSv), an average total food consumption (generally 550 kg annually, all contaminated), a dose conversion factor for various radionuclides and a food consumption pattern, which allows the limits to be calculated according to the following formula: Limit = RLD / (m x d) where RLD = reference limit dose (Sv); m = amount of food consumed (kg) and d = dose conversion factor (Sv Bq−1). Radionuclides of concern (131I, 137Cs, 134Cs, 90Sr and 239Pu) can be conveniently divided into three categories, applicable to the general population, with the following dose conversion factors: (a) 10−6 Sv Bq−1, for example, for 239Pu and other actinides; (b) 10−7 Sv Bq−1, for example, for 90 Sr, 131I and other gamma emitters; and (c) 10−8 Sv Bq−1, for example, for 134 Cs and 137Cs. For infants, the conversion factor and radionuclide class change slightly (Table 4.5). The values were based on a milk consumption per infant of 275 liters annual consumption. Indicative limit (Bq kg−1)

238 90 35

Pu,

239

Pu,

240

Pu

241

Am,

Sr, 106Ru, 129I, 131I, 235U 59

89

103

S, Co, Sr Ru, Cs, 137Cs, 144Ce, 192Ir

Infant foods

Other foods

1

10

100

100

1,000

1,000

1,000

10,000

134 3

H, 14C, 99Tc

Table 4.5. Guideline limits (in Bq kg−1) for radionuclides in foodstuffs (modified from [COD 15])

In addition, for a number of radionuclides, there are recommendations. For tritium, for example, the WHO [OMS 93] recommended that for daily consumption, the tritium concentration in water should not exceed

158

Nuclear Accidents

7800 Bq L−1 corresponding to a dose of 0.1 mSv. Since then, the European Union has adopted the threshold value of the indicative total dose (TDI) for drinking water (0.1 mSv y−1) in its Council Directive 98/83/EC on the quality of water intended for human consumption in the European Union. Following the publication of the Opinion of the European Parliament on December 12, 1996, the Council’s Common Position on December 19, 1997 and the Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on May 13, 1998, the European Commission did not make the radioactivity thresholds mandatory, but only indicative. For tritium, an indicative threshold value of 100 Bq L−1 has been established, and for the total indicative dose, an indicative threshold value of 0.1 mSv y−1 [IST 00] has been established. The provisional environmental quality standard (EQSp) proposed by the European Union for uranium is 0.3 µg L−1 for inland waters (circular of May 7, 2007 WFD/23). Plutonium isotopes are only regulated for their radiotoxicity, unlike uranium, whose chemical toxicity must be taken into account. The WHO drinking water guidelines for 238Pu and 239Pu are 1 Bq L−1 and for 241Pu 10 Bq L−1. For water, the guide value for 134Cs and 137 Cs is 10 Bq L−1. For iodine, the guide values in water are 1 and 10 Bq L−1, respectively, for 129I and 131I [WHO 11]. 4.4.2. Regulatory values After the Chernobyl accident, the European Commission set the acceptable contamination level for cesium 134 and 137 at 370 Bq kg−1 for dairy products and infant food and 600 Bq kg−1 for other products intended for human consumption for products from the countries affected by this accident. Since 1987, for any future radiological emergency situation the European Union has established maximum permissible levels of radioactive contamination in food for several radionuclides (241Am, 90Sr and 137Cs), and for 137Cs, marketing ban standards have been established for ready-to-eat animal feed. Euratom Regulations 3954/87, 944/89 and 770/90 set these maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination for marketing (NMA) in the event of a future nuclear accident or other radiological emergency. They have recently been replaced by Council Regulation Euratom 2016/52 of January 15, 2016 [EUR 16] (Table 4.6). This regulation consolidates existing rules and makes it possible to relax legislation in emergency situations to allow a rapid and appropriate response. The aim is to avoid panic and shortage phenomena [THO 16].

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

Food Isotopes Group

159

Foodstuffs (Bq kg−1)(a) Infant food(b)

Dairy products(c)

Other foodstuffs (d)

Liquid foods(e)

Minor commodities (g)

Sum of strontium isotopes, including 90Sr

75

125

750

125

7,500

Sum of iodine isotopes, including 131I

150

500

2,000

500

20,000

Sum of plutonium isotopes and alpha-emitting transplutonic elements, including 239Pu and 241Am

1

20

80

20

800

Sum of all other nuclides with a half-life greater than 10 days, including 134Cs and 137Cs(f)

400

1,000

1,250

1,000

12,500

(a) The level applicable to concentrated or dried products shall be calculated on the basis of the reconstituted product ready for consumption. Member States may make recommendations on dilution conditions to ensure compliance with the maximum permitted levels laid down in this Regulation. (b) “Infant food” means food intended for the feeding of infants during the first 12 months of life, which in itself meets the food needs of this category of persons and is presented for retail sale in easily recognizable packaging and labeled as such. (c) “Dairy products” means products falling within the following CN codes, including, where appropriate, any subsequent adaptations which may be made to them: 0401 and 0402 (except 0402 29 11). (d) With the exception of minor foodstuffs and the corresponding levels to be applied to them, (e) “liquids intended for human consumption” means products falling within heading 2009 and Chapter 22 of the Combined Nomenclature. The values are calculated taking into account the consumption of running water, and the same values could be applied to the supply of drinking water as assessed by the competent authorities of the Member States. (f) Carbon 14, tritium, and potassium 40 are not included in this group. (g) The list of minor commodities is long and includes garlic, truffles, capers, manioc roots, mate, pepper, vanilla, caviar, etc.

Table 4.6. Maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs (based on [EUR 16])

160

Nuclear Accidents

In animal feed, the maximum permitted levels for the sum of cesium 134 and 137 are 1,250 Bq kg−1 for pigs, 2,500 Bq kg−1 for poultry, lambs and calves, and 5,000 Bq kg−1 for other animals [AMI 18a, AMI 18b]. At the time of each accident, the states concerned take decisions on standards for placing food on the market. Standards are initially high to avoid food shortages. Then, in the following months, the standards were gradually lowered [AMI 18a, AMI 18b]. 4.5. Intervention levels for the protection of populations Following a nuclear accident, the authorities are faced with a dilemma and do not know when and what action they should take to protect local populations as much as possible. In an attempt to answer these questions, the ICRP has provided recommendations in the form of an emergency preparedness guide. The ICRP has regularly reviewed this guide, because at the beginning, it only considered the emergency phase without mentioning the post-accident phase [ICR 93]. The levels for determining mass and temporary evacuations of residents from highly contaminated areas were provided in publications 103, 109 and 111 [ICR 07b, ICR 09a, ICR 09b]. These recommendations were very useful in deciding what protective measures to take at the beginning of the Fukushima accident. However, some suggestions have been made to improve emergency preparedness and response in the early stages of a major nuclear accident [HOM 15]. 4.5.1. International recommendations The first recommendations of the ICRP were published in Publications 26 and 40 [ICR 77, ICR 84]. In particular, Publication 40 is relatively specific about the thresholds that should trigger population containment or evacuation and distribution of iodine tablets (Table 4.7). These recommendations were reviewed and clarified after the Chernobyl accident (Table 4.8) [ICR 93]. Table 4.8 summarizes the almost always justified intervention levels recommended in ICRP Publication 63, as well as the range within which optimized intervention levels should be found.

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

161

Equivalent dose (mSv) Counter measures

Organ and whole body

Lung, thyroid and single organ

Containment and administration of stable iodine Higher dose level

50

500

Lower dose level

5

50

Evacuation of the population Higher dose level

500

5,000

Lower dose level

50

500

Table 4.7. Equivalent dose levels for initiating counter measures in the emergency phase (modified from [ICR 84])

Intervention level for the dose to be avoided (mSv) Almost always justified

Order of magnitude of the optimized values

Containment

50

Administration of stable iodine if thyroid equivalent dose

500

No value (in mSv) shall be less than the justified value by a factor of 10

Type of intervention

Evacuation (in less than a week) If whole body dose

500

Skin equivalent dose

5,000

Late evacuation

1,000

5–15 mSv per month for prolonged exposure

10 in a year

1,000–10,000 Bq kg 1 for emitters β and γ

Food restriction on a single product

−

10–100 for emitters α

Table 4.8. Summary of recommended intervention levels (modified from [ICR 93])

After an accident, the dose rate resulting from ground activity gradually decreases over time, as illustrated in Figure 4.9. When deciding on a temporary evacuation, the dose avoided is always interesting for the population. In Figure 4.9, temporary evacuation begins at time t1, resulting in a reduction in the dose rate for the population being transferred. At a later time t2, if the authorities decide not to continue the evacuation and the

162

Nuclear Accidents

Dose rate

population is resettled, then they undergo a new dose rate that is lower than the initial one. The dose avoided is the integral dose rate between t1 and t2 [ICR 93].

Avoided dose

t1

t2

Time

Figure 4.9. Effect of an intervention (temporary evacuation) on the dose avoided (modified from [ICR 93])

Population evacuations have a cost, all the more so if the country is developed. Similarly, the cost of detriment per person Sv−1 is higher in developed countries (Table 4.9). Type of country

Cost (US $ per person month−1)

Relaxation (US $ per person Sv−1)

mSv per month

Developed and rich

500

100,000

5

Developed

200

20,000

10

Under development

40

3,000

15 (rounded)

Table 4.9. Costs (in US dollars) of temporary evacuations and detriments based on country development (modified from [ICR 93])

In its report, the ICRP [ICR 07b] recommends that national authorities define, through their regulations, the scope of radiation protection control measures by applying its principles of justification and optimization. The report provides guidance for deciding which radiation exposure situations

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

163

should be covered by the relevant regulations because their regulatory control may be justified, and conversely, which situations may be excluded by regulation because their regulatory control is deemed indefensible and unjustified. The ICRP advises including preparedness for all situations of exposure to radiological emergencies and providing for measures to be taken, in particular, in “situations that may arise during the execution of a planned situation, an act of malicious intent or any other unforeseen situation requiring urgent action to avoid or reduce adverse consequences”. For the purpose of protecting the population, reference levels for emergency exposure situations and effective doses requiring intervention should be defined within the range of 20–100 mSv (acute or per year) [ICR 09a]. These doses are more stringent than those in Publication 63 [ICR 93] (see Table 4.8). With regard to nuclear accident management, the IAEA has developed a series on safety (IAEA Safety Standards for protecting people and the environment) containing numerous reports and guides. Recently, the IAEA launched a new series on Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR), which currently includes many guides, including the guide on public protection [IAE 13], the guide on operational response levels [IAE 17a] and the guide on medical management of contaminated persons [IAE 18a]. 4.5.2. The texts of the various states Each state with nuclear facilities must provide for nuclear emergency plans in the event of accidents at its facilities. These plans follow the recommendations of international bodies, so they are quite similar to each other. The main differences concern the perimeter of the various areas (evacuation, containment, etc.) and the extent of the distribution area for iodine tablets. The number of accident scenarios considered is limited and often does not take into account major accidents. At the European level, the main piece of legislation concerning nuclear accidents is the Council Regulation laying down maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination of food and feed following a nuclear accident or any other case of radiological emergency [EUR 16]. The Member States

164

Nuclear Accidents

of the European Community have subsequently incorporated this text into their legislation, such as France with its 2009 decree [RÉP 09]. At the European level, HERCA and WENRA have drafted recommendations for emergency situations [HER 11]. These associations have also issued various recommendations for BNIs close to the borders of several countries [HER 14]. European countries have enacted emergency plans to protect the environment and populations in the event of a nuclear accident, including Germany [SSK 14], Belgium [AFC 19], the Swiss Confederation [OFP 15] and the United Kingdom [HSE 02]. The same is true in Japan [ITO 13, ONE 19] and India [DDM 18]. In Canada, with the exception of New Brunswick, all nuclear power plants and major nuclear facilities are in the Province of Ontario. Health Canada has published very comprehensive guidelines [SAN 00, SAN 03]. The Province of Ontario published its Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (PNERP) Master Plan in 2017 [CON 17]. In addition, this province provides the public with a wealth of information for residents living in the vicinity of the INBs and in the cities closest to these facilities. In the United States, authorities have assessed the evacuation time for various populations living in the vicinity of BNIs [USN 11a] and the best ways to communicate to the public [USN 11b]. This state published a revised nuclear emergency plan in 2013 [USG 13]. 4.6. The organization of crisis management in France For example, the case of France will be examined because it is one of the most nuclearized nations, both in terms of the percentage of electricity of nuclear origin (78%) and the number of reactors in service (58). The public authorities, in order to deal with a possible nuclear crisis, rely on a planning mechanism. Historically, in 1952, the departmental ORSEC (ORganisation des SECours) plan was created under the authority of the prefect of the department. In 1987, in addition to this general plan, ORSEC zonal plans were created for the seven defense zones that exist in France, as well as emergency plans in each department. These emergency plans included plans particuliers d’intervention (PPIs), special intervention plans for fixed hazardous installations, plans de secours spécialisés (PSSs), specialized emergency plans for other technological hazards, as well as natural and “red

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

165

plans” to assist many victims. In 2004, the Civil Security response organization was reviewed and the ORSEC plan became the single organization responsible for managing all emergency situations. The plan involves the entire organization, under a single authority, which can mobilize many resources thanks to an operational system that takes into account the identified risks and is constantly adapting. The role of the Director of the Opérations de Secours (DOS) is precisely defined. The DOS directs and coordinates the actions of all stakeholders, ensures and coordinates communication, informs senior administrative levels, anticipates consequences and mobilizes public and private resources within its jurisdiction. PPIs are designed to deal with a risk, related to fixed installations, that could have consequences for the population, and the 39 French nuclear installation sites are affected by this provision [DSC 19]. 4.6.1. Documentation of the ORSEC plan The Civil Security has published four guides explaining the ORSEC Plan [DSC 06, DSC 09b, DSC 10, DSC 13]. The first [DSC 06] synthesizes the general method. The aim is to mobilize all stakeholders for the protection of populations. Identification and analysis of the risks and potential effects of threats are carried out. The architecture of the departmental system will depend on the potential risks in the department. The second guide [DSC 09] deals with support to populations. In particular, it details reception and comfort, medical–psychological support, information and administrative assistance, accommodation, supplies, material assistance and assistance with housing. The third guide [DSC 10] describes how a public information cell (CIP–PIC in English) works. The role of this unit is to ensure a personalized response to callers’ and especially victims’ requests. It must disseminate precise and targeted instructions, collect concrete information, help to “take the pulse” and redirect calls. The fourth guide [DSC 13] deals with warning and information for populations affected by a catastrophic event. In particular, it shall assess the events justifying the urgent broadcasting of alert and information messages.

166

Nuclear Accidents

This begins with hazard assessment, predictability, kinetics and intensity. It details the safeguarding behaviors expected of populations (evacuation, protection in a building). It presents the means of warning and information and the criteria for discrimination and complementarity of these means. It presents various contents and compositions of alert messages and provides drafting advice. Messages should be organized in six steps: alert a category of the population, locate the recipients, name the event, characterize the hazard, prescribe the behavior and refer to an information medium. For each ORSEC guide, there is a document repository including a memento on the public information cell (PIC), a dedicated call center memento (CAD), a practical booklet on mass deaths, a DDSC/radio France vade-mecum and interministerial circular no. 2004-70. Each implementation of the operational system must be constantly improved following Deming’s wheel: plan (development of the ORSEC system), run (implementation of the system, exercise in real situations), control (feedback) and improve (action plan). For each nuclear facility, an internal emergency plan (PUI) must be developed. During an emergency phase, the department concerned must alert a large number of administrations involved. For example, in the case of the Hérault department [SID 11], this list is as follows: the Prefecture, the Service Départemental d’Incendie et de Secours (SDIS), the Service d’Aide Médicale d’Urgence (SAMU/Centre15), the Direction Départementale de la Sécurité Publique (DDSP) and the Gendarmerie, the Direction Régionale du Renseignement Intérieur (DRRI), the Agence Régionale de Santé (ARS), the Direction Départementale des Transports et de la Mer (DDTM), the Direction Interdépartementale des Routes (DIR), the Direction Régionale de l’Environnement, de l’Aménagement et du Logement (DREAL), the Direction Départementale de la Protection des Populations (DDPP), the Délégation Militaire Départementale (DMD), the Centre Départemental de Météo France Mauguio and the Services de Prévention des Crues, the Inspection d’Académie (IA), the Conseil Général de l’Hérault, the Maires du Département et les Grands Opérateurs (France Télécom, EDF Gaz de France, SNCF, ASF, BRL, RTE, GRTGaz, TDF, Fermiers et Concessionnaires des réseaux d’eau potable, etc.).

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

167

4.6.2. The subdivisions of the ORSEC plan The ORSEC plan is divided into several plans depending on the event. In particular, there are ORSEC RAD, ORSEC-Iode, ORSEC-Transport of radioactive materials (TMR) or general (ORSEC, extended white plans, etc.). The ORSEC Maritime system is subdivided into three zones: Channel, Atlantic and Mediterranean [PRE 15a, PRE 15b, PRE 16b, PRE 16c]. It is based on an organizational common core called the système de gestion d’incident (SGI). This SGI consists of a flexible and modular organization of people and their resources, the aim of which is to effectively direct action in each of the five possible types of intervention at sea. These are Search and Rescue, including Large Scale Maritime Rescue and Maritime Air Rescue; Maritime Pollution Response; Nuclear and Radiological Incident Response with a Maritime Impact; and Assistance to Ships in Difficulty and Disrupted Traffic. The Plan d’Urgence Interne (PUI) is the responsibility of the operator and is implemented when an incident occurs on site, while the Special Response Plan (PPI) is the responsibility of the Prefect and is implemented when an accident occurs on site with consequences outside the facility. The law on the modernization of civil security, adopted on August 13, 2004, provides for the implementation of Communal Safeguard Plans for municipalities included in the scope of a PPI. These measures will define specific and local measures implemented in the event of an emergency. The role of the ASN is important in the development and monitoring of emergency plans. In addition, the ASN instructs the PUIs, as part of the procedures for authorizing the commissioning of INBs or the possession and use of high activity sealed sources (Article R.1333-33 of the Public Health Code), as well as event management plans related to the transport of radioactive substances [ASN 16b]. 4.6.3. French actors in nuclear crisis management The main French players are the Prefect who coordinates crisis management, assisted by his departments, the operator of the nuclear installation in question and the ASN, assisted by the IRSN.

168

Nuclear Accidents

IRSN is training to manage all scenarios and is preparing to deploy enhanced communication. In the event of a nuclear crisis, IRSN sets up a technical crisis center (Centre Technique de Crise, CTC) comprising seven cells (international relations, communication, management, logistical support, health, environmental monitoring, installation assessment and radiological consequences) and a mobile cell as close as possible to the accident and various representatives to external bodies [IRS 14b]. 4.6.4. The internal emergency plan Each high-risk industrial facility, including nuclear facilities, must develop, internal emergency plans (plans d’urgence interne, PUIs) adapted to each site [ASN 17]. This is the case for EDF, which operates all nuclear reactors in France. When an incident occurs at a nuclear power plant, the site’s crisis organization immediately activates the PUI. This plan mobilizes between 60 and 80 on-call staff at each nuclear site. They must reach their various posts in less than an hour. This system makes it possible to mobilize the material and human resources necessary for the normal restoration of the installations. At the same time, at EDF’s Paris headquarters, the national crisis organization is also immediately mobilized. It is composed of four cells that can be rigged depending on the nature and extent of the crisis, and in total, between 50 and 60 people can be mobilized nationally. This system has evolved over time based on feedback. Thus, following the 1999 storm, EDF’s crisis system was reconsidered and developed to take its current configuration, i.e. with cells having three roles: operational, strategic and communication. After the accident in Fukushima, Japan, EDF also learned lessons. This led, in particular, to the creation of the Force d’action rapide nucléaire (FARN). This intervention force, activated by the decision of the national crisis center, aims to assist one or more accident sites by providing them with electricity, water and air recharge facilities within 24 hours [DEL 16a]. EDF created a first FARN in Civaux (Vienne) in 2012 and three others in Dampierre (Loiret), Paluel (Seine-Maritime) and Bugey in the Ain. Another organizational change was to integrate a financial communicator into the communication unit in order to take into account the impact of press

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

169

releases on the Group’s stock market listing. In addition, crisis exercises also allow EDF to test and improve their crisis organization. This organization is perfectly integrated into the National Response Plan for a major nuclear or radiological accident. This is indeed the sine qua non condition for effective nuclear accident management [DEL 16b]. In the Saclay center, the CEA and the prefecture have defined two emergency plans, triggered one after the other depending on the seriousness of the event and the risks incurred by the site workers and the surrounding populations. All rescue teams and police forces can be mobilized if necessary [CEA 06]. At ORANO (formerly AREVA), intervention resources are dedicated to safety. Thus, ORANO’s dedicated team at the Tricastin site includes 140 employees working in safety, protection and response. They are all trained in fire, chemical and radiological prevention and control techniques. In addition to these, more than 500 people have been trained in safety and security. Several types of exercises are organized each year to test the management of the PUI, some of which are programmed with the essential support of local actors (fire brigade, national gendarmerie, prefecture, etc.). The site has significant material resources such as fire trucks, ambulances, special vehicles adapted to the specific risks of the site and other means related to physical protection. Since September 2016, a new building dedicated to crisis management has been operational in Tricastin. The crisis management building (in compliance with post-Fukushima requirements) allows teams to manage a crisis in total autonomy, regardless of its size or severity. The room is equipped with specific ventilation and autonomous means of power supply in the event of a failure of the main network. This crisis management building has 48 hours of autonomy, allowing teams to manage the crisis [ORA 19]. At the Romans site, AREVA has built a fire station and an operational command post at a cost of €24 million to manage an emergency situation. This building has modern equipment with intervention equipment, personal protective equipment, measuring equipment and equipment for taking care of victims. This building is autonomous in terms of energy and ventilation, and has living and fallback rooms. In addition, AREVA has created an AREVA National Task Force (FINA) [ALA 17]. At its Malvési site, AREVA [ARE 16] has developed a PUI for its new ECRIN installation.

170

Nuclear Accidents

The La Hague site, where the spent fuel reprocessing plant currently managed by Orano Cycle is located, is the site that chronically releases the largest quantities of radionuclides into the environment in France. As fissile material stocks are considerable, a nuclear accident at this site would be catastrophic. The PUI was reviewed and improved in 2017 [ORA 17]. In October 2017, the ASN authorized amendments to the internal emergency plan (PUI), relating, in particular, to the procedures and criteria for triggering the PUI, local crisis organization, reflex sheets, exercises and training for crisis teams and updating accident scenarios. On this site, many emergency exercises take place every year. At ANDRA, each site has its own PUI. For example, at the Centre de Stockage de l’Aube (CSA), in 2003, an exercise called “EMILIE” for which the chosen scenario was that an “anonymous call to the CSA reception desk announces the presence of a parcel bomb at the public reception building”. After the staff had been secured and the presence of a suspicious object confirmed in the audiovisual room of this building, external help was immediately requested and the PUI triggered. The gendarmerie and then the regional demining service moved to neutralize and evacuate the package [AND 13]. 4.6.5. The plan intervention plans)

particulier

d’intervention

(PPI,

special

4.6.5.1. Development and actors of the PPI In France, the preparation and implementation of these PPIs depends on the prefect of the department where the installation at risk is located. Protection measures, mobilization and coordination of all relevant actors (operators, state emergency services, municipalities) are prepared according to the identified risks. The actors of the department who will be mobilized in the event of an accident meet to prepare the measures for alerting, closing the area and setting up deviations, protecting the population, fighting the disaster, providing information and communication, as well as preparing the post-accident phase [DSC 08]. The PPI is established on the basis of accident scenarios identified by the operator and controlled by the State services. Depending on the installation, several scenarios can be selected. The worst-case scenario always defines the area of application of the MIP, i.e. the municipalities and populations concerned.

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

171

The operator, who is the “generator” of the risk, must, in addition to the risk, control measures and organize an internal disaster response system. Its obligations with regard to alerting and informing the authorities, emergency measures to be taken in the event of an accident evolving very rapidly, such as alerting neighboring populations, interrupting traffic on transport infrastructures in the vicinity of the site, etc., are specified in the PPI. All emergency services and the State (fire brigade, S.A.M.U., police forces, prefectures, installation control services, etc.) implement information, protection, safeguard, population relief and disaster response measures. In France, IRSN is a major player in nuclear crisis management. Its mission is to contribute to the control of nuclear risks and their consequences on man and the environment. In this context, the Institute provides expertise and advice to public authorities in nuclear crisis situations. It provides the departmental prefect with an organization and resources adapted to crisis management with a network for detecting radioactivity in the environment, proven environmental monitoring and sanitary means for protecting the population. It carries out a technical and prognostic evaluation in the event of a nuclear crisis [IRS 14e]. The coordination of the various stakeholders is illustrated in Figures 4.10 and 4.11.

Figure 4.10. Crisis organization in the event of an accident affecting a nuclear reactor operated by EDF (modified from [ASN 14]). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

172

Nuclear Accidents

Figure 4.11. Planned safety organization (modified from [ASN 14]). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

4.6.5.2. Subdivisions of a nuclear crisis In France, the National Interministerial Plan for the Response to a Major Nuclear or Radiological Accident [SGD 14] considers three stages in the emergency phase: a period of threatened release, a period of radioactive release into the environment and a period of emergency phase exit that occurs with the return of the facility to a controlled and stable state. Emergency plans, or specific intervention plans, which aim to protect populations, can be activated during these three stages. Three scenarios are considered by the SGDSN [SGD 14]: the installation accident leading to an immediate and short discharge, the installation accident leading to an immediate and long discharge and the accident leading to a delayed and long discharge. 4.6.5.3. The public and its representatives In a summary of its White Paper, the ANCCLI makes 14 recommendations addressed to all stakeholders concerned by this issue. The ANCCLI recommends that the information and preparation of populations

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

173

for radiation protection culture be provided in a territory that includes all the living areas concerned. Municipal safeguarding plans must be made more accessible to the public. Post-accident management planning needs to be improved. In particular, the populations affected by a nuclear crisis must be precisely identified. The conditions and time limits for compensation must be specified by regulation. Essential economic activities must be maintained or relaunched quickly, local public services must be provided, and vulnerable water resources must be identified as soon as the emergency plan is prepared. The management of radioactive waste must be the subject of consultation, in particular, to define a release threshold and possible storage and spreading areas for contaminated products [ANC 17]. CLIs and ANCCLI are increasingly involved in raising awareness of this issue among stakeholders in the territories. In particular, since 2007, the ANCCLI has set up a group, the Groupe Permanent Post-Accident et territoires (GPPA), to share the experiences and questions of CLI members on crisis situations, contingency plans (PPIs), iodine tablet distribution campaigns, urbanization around nuclear sites and post-accident management. 4.6.5.4. The actions to be taken The actions that authorities must take with regard to food and population vary according to the three periods (threat, release and exit) of the emergency phase (Table 4.10). Perimeter Food Emergency phase, threat period Emergency action protection area

No prohibition Rest of the territory affected by emissions No prohibition Territory a priori not affected Emergency phase, period of emissions Prohibition on consuming Emergency

Population Possible implementation of PPI if imminent emissions require preventative actions, reflex mode Reactions if emissions > 6 hours, concerted fashion Sheltering and listening to people Possible evacuation of the population Information for the population Preventative actions in agricultural areas No action envisaged

Shelter and listening to the population

174

Nuclear Accidents

protection action zone

and putting local products on Potential evacuation of the population the market Possible ingestion of iodine tablets Information for the population No action possible in agricultural areas Radiological control and possible decontamination No prohibition Preventative actions in agricultural areas

Rest of the population affected by emissions No prohibition No action envisaged Territory a priori not affected Emergency phase, phaseout period (no further radioactive emissions) No consumption of own Lifting of emergency protection actions Emergency produce (sheltered). protection Information to populations in new action zone zones Table 4.10. Actions taken by the French authorities during the various periods of the emergency phase of a nuclear accident (modified from [IRS 14a])

4.6.5.5. French intervention levels Countermeasures will be implemented by the decision of the Prefect and for projected doses of internal (inhalation) and/or external radiation defined nationally as 10 millisieverts (mSv) received by the whole body for sheltering, 50 millisieverts (mSv) received by the whole body for evacuation and 50 millisieverts (mSv) received by the thyroid gland for taking potassium iodide (Decree of November 20, 2009 [JOR 09]). These estimated doses are called “intervention levels”. They are 5–10 times lower than the levels “justified” by the ICRP [ICR 09b]. Intervention levels are not safety thresholds but risk levels accepted by the public authorities. Thus, in 2007, the ICRP proposed [ICR 07a] a new estimate of the risk after exposure of the whole body at low dose rates (risk of random effects, cancers, hereditary effects and total detriment, per sievert received). The random effects corresponding to the intervention levels selected in the PPIs are shown in Table 4.11.

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

Cancers –4

Inherited effects –4

175

Total detriment

Shelter (10 mSv)

5.5 × 10

0.2 × 10

7.5 × 10–4

Evacuation (50 mSv)

2.76 × 10–3

1.0 × 10–3

3.75 × 10–3

Thyroid (50 mSv)

1.1 × 10–4

4.0 × 10–5

1.5 × 10–4

Table 4.11. Risk of random effects corresponding to the intervention levels selected in the PPIs (exposure to low doses and low dose rates) (modified from [ANC 16])

The intervention level for the administration of potassium iodide recommended by the WHO [WHO 99] differs according to age groups. This issue has been discussed further in section 4.5.3.3. The intervention levels for consumption restrictions recommended by ICRP P40 (1984) and P63 (1993) [ICR 84, ICR 93] do not take into account the notion of consumption restriction in the emergency phase because they were reserved for effects due to external radiation and inhalation. On the other hand, any restrictions on the consumption or marketing of food are regulated at the community level [EUR 16] with a dual objective, relating both to health care and economics. They consist of limits for mass or volume contamination, with prefects having to issue preliminary prohibition orders if necessary. This issue has been discussed further in section 5.4.1. 4.6.5.6. Accidental scenarios likely to lead to the activation of the PPI The scenarios that could lead to the activation of the PPI depend on many parameters. The main ones are the probability of accidents occurring, the nature, physicochemical form and radioactivity of the radionuclides released, the expected time between the beginning of the event and the releases (known as the “kinetics” of the releases), the acute or prolonged nature of the releases and the environmental characteristics (geomorphological characteristics of the site, changes in weather conditions, etc.). All these parameters help to evaluate the dispersion of releases. In the field of nuclear safety, France has adopted the concepts both of defense in depth and of driving procedures. The concept of defense in depth refers to a series of levels of defense aimed at preventing incidents and accidents, and in the event of failure to prevent them, to limit their consequences (see Chapter 3). The operator is required to use a set of

176

Nuclear Accidents

operating procedures that are designed to maintain or restore the nuclear facility to a safe condition. The probability of a core meltdown accident is 5.10−5 per reactor per year [LÉV 13b]. However, the scenario remains plausible, and this type of accident can, under certain conditions, lead to a loss of containment integrity in the more or less short term. Following the Three Mile Island accident, the possibilities of a core meltdown were analyzed and five types of accidents were selected. These are the explosion of steam in the cell or in the cell shaft causing the containment to fail in the short term (mode α), the initial leakage of the containment (mode β), the explosion of hydrogen in the containment, leading to the loss of its tightness (mode γ), the slow overpressure of the containment leading to the loss of its tightness (mode δ) and the corium passing through the concrete floor (mode ε). The kinetics of accidents and the importance of the release in the case of the accident define its severity. These two parameters can be described by the notion of source term. Three source terms (S) of increasing probability and decreasing severity may occur. The first source term (S1) corresponds to a failure of the containment system in the short term, i.e. a few hours at most after the beginning of the accident (modes α, β, γ), and to the dispersion in the atmosphere of a few tens of percent of the core inventory for volatile fission products. The second source term (S2) refers to direct releases to the atmosphere as a result of a loss of containment tightness occurring one or more days later (δ, ε modes), and to the dispersion in the atmosphere of a few percent of the core inventory. The last source term (S3) corresponds to emissions into the atmosphere, both indirect and delayed (more than 24 hours after the beginning of the accident), by routes allowing significant retention of fission products and the dispersion of a few parts per thousand of the core inventory. In the late 1980s, the only failure mode selected was containment and the source term S3. As a result, MIPs were developed on the basis of these assumptions. 4.6.5.7. The relevance of the “zoning” chosen for implementation of the PPI The areas selected for the application of PPIs are traditionally presented as concentric circles of a given radius within which populations are likely to

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

177

be exposed to radiation doses that require countermeasures, i.e. the “intervention levels” of public authorities. Since the only failure mode chosen is containment failure and the source term S3, the resulting accident scenarios will be “reasonably penalizing” in terms of releases to the environment and off-site radiological consequences. In addition, they will correspond to delayed releases, which are compatible with the 12–24-hour period required to implement the countermeasures planned in the 10 km and/or 5 km radii. This will respect the intervention levels recommended by the ICRP [ICR 84]. The 5 km and 10 km radii appear in the interministerial circular of May 30, 1997 as part of the “perimeters” of the PPIs for nuclear power generation centers that distribute iodine tablets. A major change occurred in 2000 with the consideration of accidental situations with rapid kinetics with “minimal consequences compared to the major accident scenario”. It is the triggering of the PPI in reflex mode, and the source term S3 is no longer the only one concerned. 4.6.5.8. National emergency exercises France has a very active policy of territorial exercises for MIPs, which is regularly detailed in circulars from the Ministry of the Interior [MIN 16]. A guide explains how to develop a PPI exercise by providing the different types of exercise, defining their objectives, identifying the various actors, setting up and conducting an exercise, communicating on it and after this exercise, providing feedback [DSC 09]. These exercises complement the internal exercises carried out at each site. A major nuclear emergency exercise simulating an accident at the SaintLaurent-des-Eaux power plant in the Loir-et-Cher region was organized on June 10 and 11, 2013. This type of exercise, involving both the local and national levels of the various stakeholders, takes place every three years under the guidance and at the initiative of the Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN). The first lessons of this exercise were that the dimensioning of the sheltering perimeter was appropriate, but its duration was unrealistic (36 hours of shelter for people). Several questions remained unanswered regarding the supply of sleeping facilities available or the possibility of removing this shelter earlier. The emergency phase enabled the Ministry of National Education to test the effectiveness of special safety plans, plans particuliers de mise en sûreté

178

Nuclear Accidents

(PPMS), for public schools. The communication proved to be dynamic and relevant, but not very focused on the general public. The mass evacuation mentioned only around a table was convincing. The simulation of the exit from the emergency phase and post-accident management appeared to be of little educational value to the general population, and improvements must be made in these areas [ASN 16c]. 4.6.5.9. Limitations and gaps of PPIs; the perspective of associations One of the first limitations of PPIs is the relevance of zoning. Thus, the ANCCLI considers that studies conducted since 2000 on an envelope accident scenario (i.e. covering all accident possibilities) and a failure mode of the reference containment show that the zoning currently used in the MIPs is not justified, regardless of the countermeasures considered and the methods of their implementation (reflex or concerted) [ANC 16]. This association proposes to extend the zoning of PPIs to 80 km (Figure 4.12). The ANCCLI believes that the public must be informed in the event of an accident about what is being done to ensure their safety and how they should behave. In addition, it is the entire population that must be informed, unlike current doctrine, where information is limited to the local population within a radius of 10 or 20 km around the power plants. The ANCCLI also proposes to recruit pharmacy and medical students to distribute the boxes of tablets directly to homes, with explanations. Instead of 50% distribution, 95% is achieved, as in the case of this operation carried out in Gravelines in the early 2000s. It is also important to be aware of the change in scale by extending the scope of information from 10 to 20 km. For example, the population around Bugey has increased from 80,000 to 1.2 million inhabitants and that of Gravelines from 25,000 to 300,000 inhabitants [DEL 16a]. For its part, the Association pour le contrôle de la radioactivité dans l’Ouest [ACR 16b] considers that France is not ready to face a serious nuclear accident. It also notes a lack of coordination between countries for all border nuclear installations, including a glaring lack of homogenization of MIPs. For example, for France, the range was 10 and then increased to 20 km; it is 50 km in Switzerland. ACRO also considers that in the event of an evacuation, vulnerable people, such as patients in hospitals or the elderly, who are most at risk, are not sufficiently taken into account. In North America, emergency plans are scientifically evaluated, evacuation times are

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

179

estimated by models and potentially exposed individuals are surveyed regularly. On the other hand, in France, people are expected to react according to plans they do not know about. A detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the French nuclear emergency plan can be found in the ACRO report [ACR 16] commissioned by the ANCCLI. To date, the development of MIPs has been carried out according to a top-down institutional approach. This must change as local populations and interested civil society organizations should be involved in the development and planning of emergency plans. At the European level, the AtLHET [ATH 14] working group on nuclear emergency, set up by the safety and radiation protection authorities, concluded that evacuation should be prepared up to 5 km and iodine prophylaxis and sheltering up to 20 km. In France, sheltering is much shorter than recommended at the international level, which is positive as sheltering can pose many problems. On the other hand, the trigger threshold is higher than in other countries such as Belgium or Canada. The distribution of iodine tablets is planned in France only within a 10 km radius around nuclear installations, while it is 20 km in Belgium and 50 km in Switzerland. Evacuation is the most complex protective measure, as it requires good coordination between the various actors, the transmission of relevant information to the public and the implementation of heavy logistics. In particular, the evacuation of vulnerable people, including bedridden patients in hospitals, is probably the most dramatic aspect of the emergency phase of the nuclear disaster in Japan. France must therefore initiate a profound reflection on the care of vulnerable people in the event of a nuclear accident. Contrary to what is required in North America, no estimate of evacuation times around nuclear installations has been made in France. For dietary restrictions, the maximum allowable levels defined at the European level are much higher than those set in Japan after the Fukushima disaster. It seems unlikely that the European populations will accept these standards.

180

Nuclear Accidents

Nuclear power plant 10 km: Actual perimeter for special intervention plans (PPIs) 80 km: Special intervention plan perimeter specified by the ANCCLI on the basis of feedback from Fukushima Example of Gravesline power plant Population in the PPI area: 65,000 Population 30 km away: 451,000 Population 75 km away: 2,490,000

Figure 4.12. The scope of the Special Intervention Plans (PPI) recommended by the ANCCLI [ANC 14a]). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

4.6.6. Other complementary plans of the PPI In addition to the PPIs, France has initiated plans for municipalities, individuals and schoolchildren.

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

4.6.6.1. The municipal sauvegarde (PCS)

safeguard

plan,

plan

communal

181

de

Municipalities must draw up a PCS in order to prepare support for the emergency services, alerting, informing and accompanying the population. The media will be mobilized to ensure that the public is informed, as will the first aid associations that will provide assistance, as well as the operators of transport, energy and telecommunications networks. 4.6.6.2. Specific security plans, plans particuliers de mise en sûreté (PPMS) Each public school establishment of the Ministry of National Education in the vicinity of a nuclear facility (as well as any other high-risk facility) must develop a PPMS. The main purpose of this plan is to safeguard the children enrolled in the school. Some academies have published intervention guides for serious accidents [FRO 13a]. 4.6.6.3. Family safety plans, plans familiaux de mise en sûreté (PFMS) Public authorities advise families living in the vicinity of a nuclear facility to establish a PFMS. This plan would allow the family to behave appropriately in the event of a crisis, to wait for help to arrive in better conditions and to know in advance the most appropriate evacuation routes or safe places to take shelter. Also, each family will have to find out about the risks in their community. Each instruction will be adapted to the family, its lifestyle and its environment. This will allow the family to plan evacuation routes and safe places to relocate. Each family will build an emergency kit with the instruction booklet, a portable radio with batteries, flashlight, candles and matches, drinking water bottles, personal papers, emergency medication and survival blankets. 4.6.6.4. Public information on PPIs The PPIs of French nuclear power plants (CNPE), which are easily available on the Internet, are limited in number. A quick survey provided only eight at the prefectures’ sites (Belleville, Blayais, Chooz, Civaux, Cruas, Flamanville, Nogent-sur-Seine and Saint Alban) [PRE 10a, PRE 10b, PRE 11a, PRE 13a, PRE 15c, PRE 16a, PRE 16b, PRE 18a]. Some of these sites are old and have not been regularly updated. Moreover, Internet

182

Nuclear Accidents

addresses change too often, and this does not make it easy to inform the public. Few synthetic brochures are made available to the public by the prefectures concerned by the radioactive risk. Among those that are easily accessible are Paluel, Penly and Nogent-sur-Seine [PRE 11b, PRE 11c, PRE 13b]. For other types of nuclear installations, PPIs are also difficult to access. The Prefecture of La Manche provides access to the various PPIs in its department (ORANO La Hague, Military Port, Flamanville, etc.) [PRE 19]. The Prefecture of the Drôme [PRE 14a] with the neighboring prefectures details the PPI of the Tricastin site. A few brochures intended for the populations concerned are easily available [ARE 14, CEA 14a, CLI 07, EDF 11] for the sites of La Hague, Marcoule, Cadarache and Romans sur Isère. Similarly, few municipalities that may be affected by a nuclear accident make efforts to inform their residents. The Prefecture of Tarn-etGaronne [PRE 12b] has made a significant effort to inform its population about the distribution of iodine tablets. Similarly, the Loiret Regional Authority regularly informed its population about intervention exercises [PRE 12a, PRE 18c]. 4.7. Exiting the emergency phase The exit from the emergency phase begins as the last of the release approaches (or just after). It ends when the installation is returned to a safe state, i.e. when all risk of a new major release is eliminated [IRS 14a]. The exit from the emergency phase will lead to new actions, in particular, management of the territories with the establishment of a first post-accident zoning. Some will be temporarily or permanently banned, others subject to restrictions. This prohibition of the use of the ground and the wealth of the subsoil, factories and agricultural farms will lead to economic upheavals. This phase is also marked by population management after the lifting of emergency protection measures (sheltering populations, etc.) and in the early stages of the post-accident phase (beginning of the transition period) [IRS 14a]. This part will be developed in Chapter 5. During this phase, protection of the population is based on restrictions on the consumption and placing on the market of foodstuffs. Three major axes have been identified for the management of food and agricultural products

Management of the Emergency Phase of a Nuclear Accident

183

during the transitional period of the post-accident phase. Orders should be made prohibiting the consumption of certain foodstuffs and water (the most important sources of exposure after the discharge phase). It is necessary to plan actions for broad and clear communication in order to get these prohibitions accepted. It is important to carry out expert assessments and change the restrictions according to the results of the analyses. It is imperative to prohibit all food and feed produced in the area, harvesting and gathering, hunting of all game, access to the forest area, all food and feed that is not protected (by airtight packaging, packaging or containers) and the movement and transport of animals for human consumption. It is also necessary to implement the strategy for the measurement of radioactivity in the environment after the emergency phase, the management of sensitive establishments located in remote areas (health establishments, industries, etc.) and the establishment of reception and information centers. Health care for populations emerging from the emergency phase must begin, as well as the first actions to reduce contamination, and waste management options in the first days following the nuclear accident [COD 10]. 4.8. Conclusion Emergency management must comply with a few basic rules. Responses to radiological risks must be planned over an entire state [BOL 16]. This should not make us forget that some nuclear installations are close to a border and that it is crucial that convergences in crisis management policies move towards joint or at least cooperative actions [BOI 16, THO 16]. To improve cooperation between countries with neighboring nuclear facilities, various programs have been set up. The two main ones are ECURIE and EURDEP. ECURIE (European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange) is a very rapid alert and information flow system between European countries. EURDEP (European Radiological Data Exchange Platform) is an automatic network between 38 European countries for the exchange of radiological data from national monitoring networks [THO 16]. The first actions to be taken in an emergency situation concern the protection of local populations (sheltering, evacuation and distribution of iodine tablets) [GOD 16]. In the event of a nuclear accident and massive

184

Nuclear Accidents

releases of volatile radioactive isotopes of iodine, the rapid distribution of iodine tablets has been proven to be effective [SCH 16]. But for these iodine tablets to be taken at the right time, it is necessary that the local population be convinced and information campaigns must be regularly scheduled [DEL 16c] and involve all stakeholders [BOU 16b]). A box of iodine tablets must be present in high-risk households, and people must be made aware that this risk exists and that they have a responsibility to mitigate the harmful consequences of an accident [RIV 16]. The information must be provided by neutral and independent scientists, accompanied by personalities representing the state [ALF 16], the municipality [CAT 16] and health professions (doctors, pharmacists) [LEG 16, FER 16]. Among the management rules, the transmission of information to political leaders is crucial in nuclear emergency situations [YAS 16]. Operators must be fully and completely involved in the development and implementation of crisis resolution plans [DEL 16b]. The same applies to all citizens, who must be informed and given a minimum knowledge of radiological risks and the measures to be taken in the event of an accident. For this purpose, the ANCCLI is probably the appropriate structure [DEL 16a]. France is planning to develop its PPI concept, in particular, to extend the scope of evacuation of populations in emergency situations [GEN 16]. The best emergency response plans will not be effective if the competent authorities are not trained to work in coordination and if the plan is not validated through full-scale exercises. National and international crisis exercises are therefore essential tools [LOY 16]. Each exercise needs to be carefully prepared, starting with relatively simple exercises and then making them more complex [DUB 16a, BOU 16a]. These crisis exercises must involve local actors, in particular the operator [CHA 16], as well as national and even international nuclear experts [LAF 16]. When giving feedback on these crisis exercises, external vision is necessary, but must not neglect that of the actors [DEP 16, DUB 16b, MAU 16].

5 Management of the Post-accident Phase

5.1. Introduction The IAEA [IAE 89a] distinguishes three phases following a major nuclear accident. The first one is an early phase, lasting a few hours, in which the main risk is inhaling contaminated air. The second one is an intermediate phase, from a few days to a few weeks, where the risks come from either external irradiation resulting from contaminated soils, internal irradiation as a result of inhalation of resuspended particles, or internal irradiation from the ingestion of contaminated water or food. Finally, the third one is a late phase, lasting several weeks to several years, where the main risk is related to the consumption of contaminated food or water and environmental contamination. Since around the turn of the millennium, the trend has been to retain two phases in an accident: the emergency phase and the post-accident phase. The post-accident phase is generally divided into two periods. The first period is transitional and the second (very long) period corresponds to the post-accident phase itself. In each period, various actions must be taken. For example, in the case of France, the ASN has published elements of the doctrine for the post-accident management of a nuclear accident [ASN 12a]. Several authors introduce an additional initial period in the post-accident period, which is the end of the emergency phase. In this case, each of these three periods (or phases) has its own specificity. The initial phase is the implementation of public policies aimed at protecting populations, defined by health and radiological protection criteria. The second phase includes

Nuclear Accidents: Prevention and Management of an Accidental Crisis, First Edition. Jean-Claude Amiard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

186

Nuclear Accidents

public strategies that aim to rebuild economically viable, humane and meaningful living conditions. It is essential that in this phase, the population and stakeholders are involved. The third phase consists of a transformation of the governance system to take into account the emerging nature of rehabilitation processes. In this phase, policies must not only protect the population but also provide support to citizens and local communities with adequate means for the reconstruction of their own life project [EIK 16]. To manage the post-accident phase, many organizations use the NERIS platform. It is a European platform on the preparation and management of accident and post-accident nuclear and radiological situations. Created in 2010 by the various partners involved in the European EURANOS research program (2004–2009), NERIS is currently composed of 43 organizations of various kinds (local and national authorities, scientific and technical organizations, professional organizations, research institutes, universities and non-governmental organizations). The CEPN is in charge of the secretariat of the NERIS Platform [CEP 18a]. 5.2. The actions to be taken A temporal hierarchy of measures to be implemented according to the phase of the accident (early, intermediate or late) has been proposed by the IAEA following the Chernobyl accident [IAE 89b] (Table 5.1). This corresponds with the terms in current use: emergency, transitional and longterm phases. Only the intermediate and late phases are relevant to this chapter. There are many actions to be carried out in the intermediate (or transitional) phase. There are fewer of them for the late (or long-term) phase. However, in practice, the decisions required for the measures to be implemented are a compromise between measures to protect human health, cost and disruption of daily life. Protective measure

Phase Early

Intermediate

Early

Confinement of the population in shelters

**

*

-

Radio-protective prophylaxis (iodine tablets)

**

*

-

Access and exit controls

**

**

*

Evacuation

**

**

-

Management of the Post-accident Phase

Personal protection methods

*

*

-

Decontamination of persons

*

*

*

Medical care

*

**

*

Diversification of water and food supplies

*

**

**

Use of stored animal feed

**

**

**

Decontamination of areas

-

*

**

187

Table 5.1. Guide on protective measures to be applied following a nuclear accident (modified from [IAE 89b]). ** Main priorities, * Secondary priorities, - No action

5.2.1. Priority actions to be undertaken At the end of the emergency phase (when releases from the accident facility must no longer pose a threat to the population), public authorities must take prompt and complementary action to ensure the protection of persons likely to be exposed to ionizing radiation as a result of deposits of radioactive substances on the ground, and also provide care for those affected [GOD 16]. The first action is to define a first post-accident zoning. The technical basis for determining zoning is based on indicators and guide values. These indicators are generally the effective doses projected over 12 months. Then, early action should be taken to protect and care for the various population groups associated with zoning. Thus, when emergency protection actions are lifted, it will be possible to remove or maintain populations on the ground. Zoning management differs from one country to another. However, this management is generally carried out according to the phases of the nuclear crisis. In France, for example, the first zoning is planned when the emergency phase is over. A second zoning will be carried out during the transition phase, and then regularly adjusted during the long-term phase according to the change in the contamination. This zoning includes three areas (Figure 5.1): the distance perimeter (PE), the population protection zone (ZPP) and the enhanced territorial surveillance zone (ZST).

188

Nuclear Accidents

Figure 5.1. Zoning changes during a nuclear crisis (modified from [PET 14]). For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

The implementation of food consumption and marketing bans is also a priority action, to be undertaken without delay within a potentially very large area [GOD 16]. Thus, it will be necessary to prohibit the consumption and placing on the market of foodstuffs originating in the ZPP, to prohibit the placing on the market of foodstuffs originating in the enhanced ZST and to immobilize materials and products pending an assessment of their contamination. Populations must be cared for, and, in particular, they must be refused access to places where radioactive substances are concentrated. The supply of drinking water to the population must be ensured. They must also be provided with emergency aid and financial assistance. Actions to manage the consequences of the accident must be taken to improve the radiological situation of the environment, with programs of measures meeting either an expert assessment objective or a control objective and programs of measures differentiated according to post-accident zoning. The waste produced in the ZPP and ZST must be managed and the first actions taken with regard to the agricultural environment. It is also important to inform the public when the emergency phase is over. 5.2.2. Actions during the transitional period In a period of transition, it is first necessary to shelter populations, reduce the population’s exposure to deposited radioactivity, and address public health problems. It is then necessary to refine the knowledge of radioactive contamination of the environment and monitor its changes and improve the radiological quality of the environment, both biotic and abiotic. It is essential to take charge of waste and to support and redeploy economic activity.

Management of the Post-accident Phase

189

Significant efforts must be made with the population to develop stakeholder involvement through an appropriate mode of governance. Similarly, these populations must be assisted, compensated and informed to mitigate the rejection of political authorities. According to CODIRPA [ASN 11], at the end of the emergency phase, a first action program must be quickly launched along six strategic axes: responding to the public health challenges of people living and working in the ZPP; improving knowledge of the radiological situation; restoring the radiological quality of the environment and living environments; organizing the maintenance of economic activity; and helping, compensating and communicating on the current situation following the accident. 5.2.3. Long-term actions There are many actions to be implemented for the management of the long-term period. It is necessary to support people who have decided to stay in the vicinity of the damaged site. To this end, updated information on the state of radioactive contamination in the territories must be made available to the populations residing in the contaminated territories. It is also necessary to promote the development and maintenance of a practical culture of radiation protection among the population through health systems and education. Among these populations, the radiological situation should be monitored. It is necessary to involve people in the management of their daily lives in contaminated environments. It is also necessary to facilitate the local population’s access to knowledge of the contamination of their surrounding environment. It is strongly recommended to maintain monitoring of the contamination of aquatic environments and biodiversity. The best way is to provide the population with means of measuring the radiological quality of foodstuffs that are self-produced or produced by gathering, fishing and hunting. The presence of information centers for providing information on the radiological situation in the vicinity of the populations and sheltering centers is indispensable when we consider it long term. Radiological, medical and epidemiological monitoring of people must be ensured, and, in particular, a system for monitoring the internal contamination of people must be maintained. It is essential to involve local health professionals. The radiological quality of food products must be constantly improved. This requires providing production chains with up-to-date information on the state of radioactive contamination and the use of tools to measure the radioactivity

190

Nuclear Accidents

of products. It is also necessary to support the sectors involved in product quality improvement initiatives, or even facing production reorientation. The efforts made by the territorial sectors should be valued by consumers, and, if necessary, solidarity with specific products should be encouraged. The involvement of local populations must be sought, and experimentation and the sharing of experiences must be encouraged. The economic activities of the territory must be maintained and redeployed. Updated information on the radioactive contamination of the territory should be made available to economic operators. It is also necessary to study the viability of the territory’s economic activities and sectors. It is essential to define measures to support economic activities and the conditions for their implementation. It is necessary to reassess working conditions, particularly within sensitive sectors in terms of worker exposure. It is necessary to define the modalities of specific support for professions ensuring the maintenance of services and, in particular, public services. As for local populations, it is necessary to promote the development of a practical culture of radiation protection for economic actors. It is necessary to organize a consultation between the different actors in order to build a territory project. 5.2.4. Radioactivity measurements following a nuclear accident Radioactivity measurements last throughout the post-accident phase. The results of the measures confirm the first actions implemented during the emergency phase. They also make it possible to verify that the territories presumed to have been spared are indeed spared. These measures help state services to put in place actions to ensure adequate protection and monitoring of populations at the end of the emergency phase and at the beginning of the transition phase [IRS 13a]. The role and priorities of radioactivity measurements are not the same in the post-accident areas set up. Within the distance perimeter (PE), sampling shall be minimized and optimized to limit the exposure of measurement teams to doses as low as reasonably achievable. Indeed, expert assessment measures are mainly aimed at clarifying the knowledge of the radiological state of the area and are not a priority. They must be done where the various teams of stakeholders are located. In the ZPP (outside the distance perimeter), measures are used to verify the relevance of the zoning initially set up on the basis of predictive

Management of the Post-accident Phase

191

modeling. Priority measures are located in areas of high impact, living areas and decontamination areas. On the other hand, measuring the contamination of food produced in the ZPP is not a priority at the end of the emergency phase, as it is likely to be moderately contaminated. In the enhanced ZST, the measures are also used to verify the relevance of the initial zoning. Control measures relating to agricultural products whose contamination is likely to exceed the maximum permissible levels for human food or animal feed should be organized with the agri-food sectors concerned as soon as the emergency phase is over. Outside the restricted zones (PE, ZPP and ZST), measurements are carried out during targeted sampling campaigns on sensitive foodstuffs or in potentially more exposed areas. They are supplemented by the creation of observation stations to monitor the temporal changes in persistent contamination. In the vicinity of the SHA, the density and frequency of measurements will be higher [IRS 16a]. 5.3. Environmental management Environmental management is essential. The environmental compartments that are generally most impacted are terrestrial environments, particularly forest ecosystems, and freshwater aquatic environments, with the exception of the Fukushima accident, where the marine environment was severely affected. 5.3.1. Management of aquatic environments River sediments are reservoirs for radionuclides. In Chernobyl, the countermeasures taken from 1986 to 1989 were the construction of several kilometers of dikes along the Pripyat River on the right bank to trap runoff from the cities of Chernobyl and Pripyat, although this operation was not entirely effective. In the same river, the bed was dredged in the summer of 1986 in order to reduce the flow velocity and thus increase the sedimentation of suspended solids. Again, the operation was not successful because the majority of the particles were too fine to sediment quickly. The isolation of the pond containing the cooling water from the Chernobyl reactors of the Pripyat River was a major issue in the early years. It was linked to a drainage

192

Nuclear Accidents

system for the pond’s infiltration water, unfortunately never completed as a result of its construction and maintenance costs. During 1986 and 1987, more than 100 zeolite dikes were built on small rivers to retain radionuclides and thus purify water. They retained only 5–10% of the 90Sr carried by the water. In addition, to temporarily contain radioactive waste, a large number of trenches, without any particular protection from groundwater, were dug. The consequence was groundwater contamination. In a second phase, a new dike was built on the east bank of the Pripyat River. Completed in 1992, it retained a significant fraction of 90Sr during the spring 1994 flood. The countermeasures taken in 1993 were aimed at maintaining an acceptable level of radioactivity in the waters of the Dnieper River Basin, estimated at 2 Bq L−1 of 90Sr. For this criterion to be met, various measures to reduce radioactivity were taken, such as the construction of dikes around the floodplain and operations to clean up sediment from the cooling ponds of the Chernobyl reactors. In addition, several environmental quality monitoring programs around Chernobyl (water, soil, etc.), including transuranic monitoring, were implemented [COU 01]. Several publications have since been published on this topic (e.g. [PAN 14, BON 15a]). Similarly, around Fukushima, freshwater environments are contaminated not only with cesium 137 but also with plutonium. Thus, plutonium was quantified in the Mano River in April 2015 (near the dam), 40 km northwest of the Fukushima power plant (core 37 cm of sediment under 45 m of water) [POI 19]. There is a good correlation as a function of the depth in the sediment of the ratio 241Pu/239Pu and the activity in 137Cs, highlighting their common origins. The maximum is between 10 and 13 cm from the barrier [JAE 19]. Plutonium analysis was carried out in the Niida River floodplains on three dates (November 2011, 2013 and 2014), following typhoons, and at four sites. The results show that between 1% and 39% of the plutonium came from the fallout from the Fukushima accident [JAE 18]. However, several Japanese river basins, such as the Mano and Ota rivers, are equipped with dams on their main watercourses, and their reservoirs are likely to store radioactive particles. During dam releases, as happened after the 2013 typhoons, radionuclides then descend in large quantities downstream [LEP 15]. Management of dams following a nuclear accident is of great importance.

Management of the Post-accident Phase

193

5.3.2. Management of terrestrial environments There are quite a few radioactively contaminated soils on the surface of the globe. The first territories to be contaminated were the atmospheric atomic test sites. The most seriously affected sites were also those used for the greater number of explosions. For the United States, these include the site of Nevada and the Marshall Islands; for the Soviet Union, it is the site of Semipalatinsk; for France, these include the Sahara and the Mururoa and Fangataufa Islands; for the United Kingdom, it is the island of Maralinga. These territories were for a time prohibited to any population and then subject to residence restrictions. Other territories have been contaminated by civil or military industrial activities. These include a number of nuclear study sites in the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom. For example, in France, 43 sites are polluted by radioactivity and have been identified by ANDRA. They are mainly located in Paris, Ile-de-France, in the east and southeast of France [IRS 16d]. Finally, serious and major nuclear accidents have all resulted in significant radioactive contamination. For some, such as in Mayak, Chernobyl or Fukushima, the management of territories with prohibited areas and others subject to restrictions is still relevant. These contaminated areas mean soil freezing (soils abandoned for human activity) and non-exploitable sub-soils for mineral and other resources, factory closures, abandoned farmland and deserted habitats. 5.3.2.1. Remediation of contaminated soil in France The management of contaminated areas is always delicate. The PRIME project led by IRSN from 2007 to 2009 aimed to develop, in consultation with experts, decision-makers and representatives of the territory, a multi-criteria analysis method for characterizing the state of the contaminated territory. The results will be usable by risk managers. This project is both a technical challenge since the analysis focuses on multiple criteria and an organizational challenge since the analysis is multistakeholder. The analysis was carried out over a vast and complex territory of about 500 municipalities. The aim was to identify the specificities and territorial issues, to propose criteria that represent them and to provide information on these criteria. In the end, the project prioritized the criteria

194

Nuclear Accidents

and proposed a scale of the sensitivity of the municipalities [MER 07]. Unfortunately, this project was not implemented during the Tricastin accident (July 2008). In France, the ASN has published a guide to the management of soil polluted by the activities of an INB [ASN 16e, CON 19]. In addition, ASN [ASN 12b] has devoted a Control issue to this subject. ANDRA is responsible for cleaning up radioactively contaminated soil. ANDRA’s geographical inventory lists about 50 polluted sites at the end of 2010, 16 sites that have been remediated or partially remediated since the end of 2007; 11 sites are being remediated and 22 sites are awaiting remediation. 5.3.2.2. Some examples of remediation of polluted soils Contaminated soil remediation work has been carried out in various regions of the world, such as Kazakhstan and Tomsk. The Soviet nuclear tests carried out in Semipalatinsk, in northeastern Kazakhstan during the Cold War, had a serious impact on the environment in an area of 18,500 m2. The explosions contaminated agricultural land, making it unusable as a result of the release of radionuclides. Following a UN call, jointly relayed by scientists from Kazakhstan and Western countries, NATO launched the SEMIRAD project in January 2000, as part of the Semipalatinsk sanitation program, coordinated by UNDP. The first project, in the Tel’kem Valley, an area southwest of the test site near the village of Sarzhal, was completed in December 2002. The SEMIRAD II project, undertaken in autumn 2004, succeeded it. Its purpose was to study, at a new site southwest of Maisk, in the northeast of the test site, radionuclide concentrations that, in some cases, could be high enough to pose a safety threat [OTA 05]. In Chernobyl, in some areas, the surface soil has been stripped away or covered by uncontaminated soil. This was effective, reducing surface contamination by up to a factor of 100. However, in the first case, this has considerably increased the volume of nuclear waste. 5.3.2.3. Forest management In the event of a nuclear accident, forests present three serious problems. The first problem results from the high radiosensitivity of some tree species such as conifers. This was observed during the Chernobyl accident where the pine forests around the power plant died very quickly, creating what has been called the “red forest”. The authorities buried these dead trees in many

Management of the Post-accident Phase

195

hastily dug pits, without always accurately defining their location and without any protection at the bottom of the pits [AMI 19]. This represents a huge reservoir of radioactivity with potential risks of contaminating groundwater or vegetation growing on these pits. The second problem is that some forest ecosystems are highly contaminated. In the medium term, radionuclides are remobilized and migrate to downstream areas. This was particularly true in Japan near Fukushima where some forests are at high altitudes and have contaminated recently decontaminated downstream inhabited areas relatively quickly. In addition, contamination of the forest ecosystem is not homogeneous and accumulates preferentially in wild berries, mushrooms and wildlife such as wild boars that are used as food by local populations. The third problem will be long term and is related to the fact that trees bioaccumulate certain radionuclides such as cesium 137. When the tree dies, these radionuclides are released into the environment. Oak forests intercept 20% of 137Cs deposition and Japanese cedar forests 80%. The availability of 137Cs in forest soils is affected by the nature of the contamination, solid or liquid, with deposits being more available in liquid form than in solid form. Similarly, the stabilization of availability depends on the time elapsed between contamination and measurement [COP 19]. Only the first problem can be solved relatively easily by the creation of genuine watertight and well-reported radioactive repositories. The other two problems are difficult to solve at realistic costs. 5.4. Managing the anthroposphere The immediate environment in which local populations affected by a nuclear accident live must be compatible with normal life. This requires safe food sources and therefore healthy agriculture, restored economic activities and clear and respected zoning of contaminated areas.

196

Nuclear Accidents

5.4.1. Decontamination of living areas Following the Fukushima accident, the Japanese authorities undertook programs to decontaminate living areas (homes, schools, etc.) in moderately contaminated areas where the possibility of population return is conceivable, as well as in slightly contaminated areas where populations remained during the emergency phase. These decontamination operations have both advantages and disadvantages. The benefits are a decrease in exposure for populations living in the decontaminated areas and a possible return of populations. The disadvantages first, are the possibility of recontamination of the area by polluted sites further upstream and second, the volume of nuclear waste generated by decontamination operations [AMI 19]. 5.4.2. Nuclear waste management In Chernobyl, many decontamination works and storage sites have been created, particularly in the exclusion zone. Three large radioactive waste repositories have been created (Pidlinskii, Kompleksnii and Bouriakivka) totaling 3 PBqs of 137Cs and 90Sr, but there are also 800 landfill sites created in 1986 and 1987 in a 10 km zone around the plant representing 1,000,000 m3 and 13×1015 Bq [POI 01]. In Fukushima, the volume of nuclear waste is estimated at between 28 and 55 million cubic meters. This waste is currently divided into a multitude of small temporary landfills, with approximately 1,084 Temporary Storage Sites (TSSs) resulting from the decontamination of two types of areas, including 241 Special Decontamination Areas (SDAs, 80,000 residents, 1,150 km2) and 843 Intensive Contamination Survey Areas (ICSA, 6,000,000 residents, 24,000 km2). One project plans to consolidate this waste into very large interim storage facilities (ISFs), pending the availability of a definitive storage solution. This represents 20 million tonnes (or 14 million m3 of waste with contamination greater than 100,000 Bq kg−1) to be stored in the ISF [MIN 18, AMI 19]. Among the waste, biomass from contaminated plant production could be used as a source of bioenergy if the fumes generated by its combustion are filtered [CHA 12, YOS 16, ZHA 17].

Management of the Post-accident Phase

197

5.4.3. Agricultural management In the post-accident phase, agricultural environment management aims in the longer term to restore or improve the radiological quality of agricultural production systems [IRS 14a]. In the agricultural sector, the countermeasures put in place at Chernobyl are immediate ploughing (allowing the hyper-contaminated surface material to be diluted with the less contaminated underlying soil) of arable land and grasslands, a correction of the calcium deficiency of the land with, in particular, the contribution of mainly potassium and phosphorus fertilizers and the change in agricultural use (outside the exclusion zone) if the two previous measures were insufficient [IAE 94]. In 1990, the FNSEA and IRSN published a book to advise farmers in the event of a nuclear accident [LOY 90]. Eight agricultural productions were envisaged (fruit and vegetables, fodder production and management, on-farm milk production, milk and its use by dairies, meat, cereals, vines and fish farming). In agriculture, preventive measures in the case of crop production are few and far between. These are essentially common sense rules such as hastening the harvest if possible, closing shelters in the case of sheltered crops and tarping outdoor crops if possible. In the case of livestock production, preventive measures are more varied. The main ones are to bring animals under shelter and feed them with healthy feed stored under cover (fodder, silage). It is also possible to provide dietary supplements that will reduce the intestinal absorption of the radionuclide. Curative measures mean the selection of the part of the plant consumed (protected from contamination such as underground parts, seeds, part of the plant protected by natural casing). It is also possible to clean the plant and transform the product in such a way as to reduce its contamination and/or postpone its consumption (canned food, long-ripened cheeses allowing for a decrease in the radioactivity of short-lived radionuclides) or to provide these products as animal feed. In the latter case, the problem may simply be moved, and care must be taken with the chosen option [LOY 90]. In 2007, IRSN published a decision-making guide for managing the agricultural environment in the event of a nuclear accident, updated in 2012

198

Nuclear Accidents

[IRS 07, IRS 12a]. This guide provides a decision support sheet, a “strategy” sheet and management option sheets for seven categories of agricultural activities: dairy herds, suckling herds, pig, poultry and cattle farms, open field and grassland crops, protected crops (greenhouses and tunnels), vines and orchards. Two strategies are generally considered: valuation and non-valuation. Each of the sheets is detailed and written in an educational way. For animal farms (dairy, suckling, pig and poultry farms), in the event of a nuclear accident, the first actions to be taken are to caulk facilities and buildings, protect stocks and equipment, bring in and maintain herds in buildings, and limit stock contamination and external supply of healthy food. In addition, in the case of dairy herds, secondary sources of milk contamination must be cleaned, lactating animals allowed to run dry, and animals moved and eventually destroyed. The management of non-recovered milk must also be considered. In the case of suckling herds and pig, poultry and cattle farms, secondary sources of animal contamination must be cleaned, slaughter of animals delayed (decontamination of short-lived radionuclides) and animals moved and eventually destroyed. In the case of crops (open fields and meadows, under shelter, vines and orchards), the first actions to be taken are to stop irrigation, protect stocks and the interiors of buildings, and temporarily abandon in situ crops in the open. It is also advisable to clean the interiors of buildings, greenhouses and equipment. In the case of field and grassland crops, it is also necessary to redirect the type of crops for alternative use, collect contaminated aerial parts for destruction, spread potash and/or lime, tillage, store contaminated or non-recoverable stocks and spread contaminated or non-recoverable stocks. In the case of protected crops (greenhouses and tunnels), the very first action is to close the shelters. The next step is to clean the outside of the shelters and improve the quality of the outdoor crop shelters. In the case of vineyards and orchards, vines and fruit trees must be thinned out and/or pruned, production waste managed in the short term and lime or potash brought in and the soil tilled. The IAEA has published a guide to agricultural countermeasures [IAE 94], the main considerations of which are to protect human health by

Management of the Post-accident Phase

199

reducing the contamination of agricultural products and to return the land to ordinary use as late as possible. Three methods, physical, chemical and biological, can be used to decontaminate agricultural land. Often, several methods are applied in parallel. The effectiveness of a method depends very much on the time between the accident and its implementation. 5.4.3.1. Physical methods The physical methods of decontamination after an accident are summarized in Table 5.2. Removal of the topsoil layer (with or without vegetation) has proven appropriate in the case of arable or grassland systems, if the remaining soil thickness is sufficient for subsequent use. However, it poses a significant storage problem for contaminated soils and can only be applied for limited areas. Deep ploughing, which dilutes surface radioactive contamination from deep soils, will not be possible if a rocky substrate or groundwater table is present. Deep ploughing (more than 80 cm) requires specialized equipment. Methodology

Reduction factor

Priority

Defoliation and/or pruning of branches

10

1

Digging up gardens and turning over flower beds

6

2

Classic ploughing

15–18

3

Deep ploughing

15–50

4

Surface shaving and burial by ploughing

5

Removal of the contaminated surface layer

6

Diversion of surface water

7

Changing sites by abandonment

8

Change in local hydrology

9

Table 5.2. Physical decontamination methods classified according to their order of implementation (modified from [COU 01])

5.4.3.2. Chemical methods A number of chemical methods for decontaminating the environment have been proposed (Table 5.3). They are based on isotopic dilution using a stable isotope of the radionuclide or a chemically close element,

200

Nuclear Accidents

precipitation and complexation. For example, strontium contamination can be reduced by adding calcium in the form of gypsum or limestone, which will reduce the uptake of radioactive strontium by plants. In the case of contamination by a radioactive isotope of iodine, the supply of stable iodine will limit the absorption of the radionuclide. Chemical methods can also be applied to food before consumption, for example, by passing milk through ion exchange columns, using active coal to purify drinking water. All this necessarily produces radioactive residues that will have to be treated later. Method

Element

Comments

Isotopic dilution

Sr

Apply calcium (limestone or gypsum) Add calcium to the diet

Cs

Apply potassium (potash) Apply potassium to surface waters

I

Add potassium iodate (KIO3) or sodium chloride (NaCl) to the diet

Sr

Apply phosphates to soils Add alginates to the diet

Cs

Add bentonite

Leaching

Actinides Ce, Co, Zn U-Th

EDTA/DTPA complex

Food processing

Varied

Many methods

Precipitation

Table 5.3. Chemical decontamination methods (modified from [COU 01])

5.4.3.3. Biological decontamination methods Biological decontamination methods are diverse (Table 5.4). Great hope had been placed on the use of highly cesium-bioaccumulating plants to extract this radionuclide from the soil, the plants then being destroyed by controlled incineration. It appears that the uptake by these plants was not sufficiently high. Phyto-extraction of metals and radionuclides contaminating soils can be significantly improved by the addition of selected microorganisms that will assist plants. This is a promising method for cleaning ground soil [LEB 08]. Heat treatments have proven to be very effective in removing radionuclides from soils. Microorganisms (bacteria,

Management of the Post-accident Phase

201

yeasts, algae, actinomycetes and other fungi) are one of the most vital components of bioremediation. These microorganisms are isolated from contaminated sites and are evaluated in the laboratory to assess their effectiveness in contaminant degradation. Once they are known to possess the catabolic genes (the radioactive organic molecule) that degrade the target contaminant, they are re-inoculated into truly contaminated sites. Other methods have been used such as in situ vitrification, physical barriers, electrokinetic remediation and phytoremediation. Similarly, biostimulation by adding nutrients (C, N or P) that promotes microorganisms has also been carried out in Oak Ridge [KUP 16]. 5.4.3.4. Agricultural soil decontamination practices Biological decontamination methods require a good knowledge of local agricultural systems and their variations according to seasons, soil, crops and animals raised. Organic methods applied to agriculture are generally used in parallel with physical and chemical methods. Two solutions are possible: changing the type of crop to use either more bioaccumulative plants (thus extracting some of the radioactivity from the soil) or, on the contrary, less bioaccumulative plants (thus providing healthier food for humans or fodder for farm animals). Some strains will be selected as they are more suitable for subsequent physical or chemical decontamination. It is also possible to grow oil-rich plants to collect their oils, which can be used for energy, because the oil concentrates relatively little cesium. Grasslands can also be replaced by forests. Some animals, such as pigs, are more tolerant of radioactive contamination than others. Method

Application

Import of feed for animal consumption

Milk production Meat production

Change in agricultural practices

Alternate harvests with low and high radionuclide accumulation capacities Alternating processed crops in an easier fashion Changing crops for animal fodder

Change in land use

Changing livestock and rotating crops

Table 5.4. Agricultural decontamination methods (modified from [COU 01])

202

Nuclear Accidents

Radioactive contamination of the soil raises two types of concerns, the risk of contamination of agricultural production, as well as the risk of a decline in growth for plants as a result of high irradiation. Thus, the feedback from the Kyshtym accident makes it possible to recommend certain crops in soils more or less contaminated with strontium 90 (Table 5.5). Contamination level in 90Sr (kBq km−2)

Acceptable agriculture

185

Cereals, hay, natural herbs

185–370

Milk, sowing herbs and silage

370–925

Beef, root vegetable crops

925–1 850

Fodder, grain harvesting

1 850–3 700

Pork, potatoes, forage harvest grain, sowing grasses, sowing seeds

Table 5.5. Level of contamination in 90Sr for which various types of agricultural practices are considered acceptable following the Kyshtym accident in 1957 (modified from [COU 01])

5.4.4. Managing the economy After a nuclear accident, the main sectors of the economy are affected by the disaster. Industrial firms become technically unemployed. The resumption of activity depends on the power supply, which can take time. Some infrastructure may be unusable or closed, for example, destroyed or idle ports and airports, while cut-off roads and railways will also lead to a very slow recovery. The shortage of parts, price increases and a delay in production are to be expected in the coming months, which in the short term will lead to a decrease in exports from the country concerned. Domestic consumption would also be expected to decrease. Similarly, GDP is expected to decline. Lacking some of its nuclear power, the country will need to find other sources of energy to compensate for the lack of electricity. Agriculture will also be impacted depending on the surface area of the contaminated area. Some lands will be able to be more or less quickly and more or less completely decontaminated, while others will be unusable for decades.

Management of the Post-accident Phase

203

In Chernobyl, it was considered that when the 137Cs surface activity was between 37 and 185 kBq m−2, industrial activities could be relocated there, while health centers could not [POI 01]. In Fukushima, the Japanese authorities very quickly began to reorganize the nuclear industry. Thus, on August 15, 2011, it was announced that a new agency would be created, the Nuclear Safety and Security Agency (NSSA), which would begin its activities in April 2012, under the supervision of the Ministry of the Environment, and on August 25, 2011, the Office of Response to Contamination by Radioactive Materials, under the supervision of the Ministry for the Restoration from and Prevention of Nuclear Accidents, led by the Minister of the Environment, to ensure the coordination of actions in the field of health safety, decontamination and waste management [AMI 19]. TEPCO quickly paid 32 billion yen to economic actors in the agricultural sector (8 prefectures), to fisheries actors (3 prefectures) and to about 7,300 small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (8.3 billion yen). TEPCO announced compensation for indirect damage to the economy and, in particular, to tourism activities. It also provided for aid to SMEs that had been evacuated and to companies located in the evacuation zone in order to facilitate the return of companies to the area and an agreement on interestfree bridging loans and long-term loans for many activities through economic sectors [GAL 12]. Curtis et al. [CUR 16] consider the economic consequences of a nuclear accident in Ireland. They select four scenarios. The first, without radioactive contamination, would cost 4 billion euros. The second and third, with low and medium contamination, respectively, would cost 18 and 80 billion euros. The last scenario corresponds to severe radioactive contamination with economic repercussions for 60 years and would cost 161 billion euros. The main costs of this accident would be a loss of image for the country with a slowdown in tourism, a decline in exports and, on the contrary, increased food imports. The authors make little mention of the impact on industry. 5.4.5. Food supply management This aspect of management has been developed in Chapter 4, as well as in a chapter of a book on food risks [AMI 18b].

204

Nuclear Accidents

The standards enacted protect local populations, in general, during the emergency phase and during the transition period from the post-accident phase. This situation is generally only prolonged for populations living near the damaged facility. However, in the case of Chernobyl, the impact was felt very far away and for a very long. This is the case for the Sámi (Lapps from Norway). The food contamination limits taken following the Chernobyl accident were 600 Bq kg−1 of 137Cs in reindeer meat. This would have eliminated reindeer husbandry by the Sami and thus Lappish culture. It was also decided that this limit would be increased to 6,000 Bq kg−1 for the general Norwegian population, which eats only 0.5 kg of reindeer meat per year and would be maintained at 600 Bq kg−1 for the Sámi, who consume large quantities of this meat (50 kg per year) [EIK 16]. 5.5. Management of exposed populations The sources of long-term exposure of populations to ionizing radiation are numerous, both natural and artificial radioactive sources resulting from historical (atomic tests, uranium mining) or more recent contamination such as the routine operation of nuclear facilities or the use of contaminated materials in homes. Finally, additional sources of radioactive exposure are nuclear accidents [ICR 00]. The latter source is predominant for populations neighboring a nuclear accident throughout the post-accident phase. 5.5.1. Limiting people’s exposure to radiation In the interim period of the post-accident phase, the ICRP recommends various countermeasures for populations based on the equivalent dose to the whole body or organs (Table 5.6). Projected equivalent dose in the first year (mSv) Individual organ preferentially Whole body irradiated

Countermeasures Food control Higher dose level Lower dose level Subsequent evacuation Higher dose level Lower dose level

50 5

500 50

500 50

Not expected Not expected

Table 5.6. Equivalent dose levels for intermediate phase countermeasures (modified from [ICR 84])

Management of the Post-accident Phase

205

The evacuation, even temporarily, of populations during the post-accident phase, intermediate period or even long-term period, makes it possible to limit the exposure dose received. This is illustrated in Figure 5.2, where the annual dose to the evacuee is lower than the dose remaining in the contaminated area. The dose resulting from an accident can be estimated using Figure 5.3, where each individual is subjected to a certain dose of radiation (natural and artificial) excluding the accident. The accident creates an additional radiation dose that will decrease over time as the radioactive decay occurs.

Figure 5.2. Simplified diagram of the existing annual dose when an evacuation is taken (modified from [ICR 00])

Figure 5.3. Change in the annual dose from radionuclides (natural and artificial) present in the environment (physical environments, foodstuffs) following a nuclear accident (modified from [ICR 00])

206

Nuclear Accidents

5.5.2. Radiological monitoring of exposed populations The external dose estimate for the Japanese in Fukushima Prefecture was based on a survey that asked them about their behavior during the first four months following the accident. By mathematical simulation, the individual external doses of 421,394 residents are distributed as follows: 62.0%, 70

Total

0

10

20

Wish to return

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Percentage of responses Don’t want to return

Don’t know

Figure 5.6. Changes in the willingness to return according to the age of the respondent, Japanese evacuated after the Fukushima accident (modified from [HAS 13]). For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

Management of the Post-accident Phase

211

5.5.6. The experience of local populations in contaminated environments The post-accident situation is the source of many economic, environmental, health, social, personal and family problems that occur simultaneously. Their resolutions cannot be discussed separately. Disaster victims must find their own ways through the irreducible complexity of the situation, even though authorities, experts, NGOs, professionals and other actors have their own roles to play. The inability to resolve complexity endangers the entire system of actors by putting them in a vicious circle of doubt, mistrust, isolation and despair. And when mistrust sets in, controversies are inevitable. The restoration of living conditions after a nuclear disaster is first and foremost a social process, and restoration is first and foremost the responsibility of the people [EIK 16]. A violent controversy has arisen over programs to assist the population to live in contaminated areas. Opponents of these programs see it as a way for authorities and operators to save on evacuee compensation and, in doing so, to subject returning individuals to unwanted exposure. On this subject, it is possible to see Péguin’s blog [PÉG 16]. Pataud Célérier [PAT 18] writes in Le Monde Diplomatique: Other strategies are sneakier. This is reflected in this call for resilience addressed to victims. The Ethos program teaches residents to live in a contaminated environment: school textbooks have been distributed for this purpose; television campaigns have been launched to promote fresh produce from the contaminated area and to promote the effectiveness of decontamination, which has still not been proven. According to the promoters of this campaign, the contaminated environment would be less harmful to the population than ‘radiophobia’ or the stress caused by painful uprooting. 5.5.7. Human dignity Most of the institutions’ recommendations (IAEA, ICPR) for managing the post-accident phase focus on solving the health problems of populations affected by a nuclear accident. Life in a disaster area cannot be reduced to ensuring decent material conditions and good health. It is becoming increasingly clear that people want to take charge of their own future.

212

Nuclear Accidents

Fukushima’s feedback shows that local actors (local authorities, economic actors, civil society organizations, scientists, families, etc.) are active from the first hours after an accident, including during the emergency phase. There are many examples of local actors’ initiatives to protect themselves (voluntary evacuation, decisions concerning food), to decide on the conduct of their personal and professional activities, or to mobilize resources, to qualify and understand the situation, such as measures of radioactivity in the local environment made by citizens. The response of local actors to the post-accident situation is a social process composed of a multitude of decisions taken in a context marked by uncertainty and according to a broad set of issues (protection, human, social, economic, environmental, ethical and symbolic, etc.). However, individuals alone are able to decide their future legitimately. Therefore, it is also important to understand the context in which local actors build their own response and how institutional strategies for managing the emergency and post-emergency periods influence the complex process of building a social response to the accident. The CONFIDENCE research project, as part of the European CONCERT program (2015–2020), aims to answer the question: “Local actors in the face of a nuclear accident and its consequences: what resources are there for understanding and acting in the face of complexity and uncertainty?” 5.6. The organization of post-accident management Post-accident management is the responsibility of each state. However, international organizations make their expertise available to states in the form of recommendations. 5.6.1. International and European recommendations While the IAEA has produced many guides and issued many recommendations for the emergency phase of a nuclear accident, there are fewer publications on long-term phase management [IAE 89a, IAE 89b, IAE 89c]. The same applies to the NEA. The ICRP has issued recommendations to protect human populations. These include publications 60, 109 and 111. However, as they deal mainly

Management of the Post-accident Phase

213

with actions to be taken at the beginning of a nuclear crisis, they have been discussed in Chapter 4. The ICRP only considered the protection of non-human organisms in the 2000s [ICR 08]. The ICRP system for protecting the living elements of the environment is designed to provide a general and practical framework for all exposure situations [PEN 15]. It is based, in particular, on the choice of a limited number of so-called reference organisms (RAPs, Reference Animals and Plants) representative of various environments and levels of classification. Significant research efforts on these organisms have been undertaken in recent years. This is the case, for example, of the voxelized modeling proposed by Higley et al. [HIG 15], which uses an exact three-dimensional replica of an organism with a precise tissue composition and distribution of the radionuclide source. This significantly improves the assessment of exposure doses to organisms. At the European level, Euratom operates only within the legal framework. It makes it possible to meet the demands expressed on nuclear safety with the adoption of Directive 2009/71/Euratom of June 25, 2009, establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations, revised in 2014 [COU 14] and Directive 2011/70/Euratom of July 19, 2011, establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. In addition to the recommendations of official bodies, various research programs were initiated after the Chernobyl accident to improve the living conditions of inhabitants of the radioactively contaminated territories. At the international level, the main programs are CORE and FAIRDO. The CORE (Cooperation for Rehabilitation of Living Conditions in Chernobyl Affected Areas of Belarus) program was operational from 2003 to 2008. It was created to support the efforts and initiatives of the inhabitants of contaminated territories in Belarus in improving their living conditions. CORE included four priority areas for action. First of all, health protection, then the economy and rural development, then the development of a culture of radiation protection and finally education and the memory of the disaster. The governance of the CORE program included local authorities and populations in the affected areas with regional, national and international organizations.

214

Nuclear Accidents

FAIRDO (Fukushima Action Research on Effective Decontamination Operation) is an action research program launched in June 2012 in Japan to provide advice and guidance to national, prefectural and municipal administrations for the effective implementation of life-size decontamination initiatives, undertaken from 2012 onwards in the post-Fukushima context. FAIRDO is made up of a team of Japanese and foreign multidisciplinary experts, including European researchers. At the European level, under the 7th Framework Program of the European Union (FP7), many research projects have been funded by the European Union. Among these, the OPERRA program (Open Project for European Radiation Research Area) and other related programs aim to set up a structure for the coordination and integration of European radiation protection research. The European Commission delegates to this structure the organization of future calls for research projects in radiation protection. Benefiting from the experience acquired by the MELODI (Multidisciplinary European Low Dose Initiative) association, OPERRA also calls on other associations competent in radiation protection, including the Alliance for Radioecology, NERIS (Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response and Recovery) for emergency management and EURADOS (European Radiation Dose Group) for dosimetry. Within the European OPERRA research program, the SHAMISEN project (Nuclear Emergency Situations, Improvement of Medical and Health Surveillance) aims to develop recommendations to improve dosimetric, health and epidemiological surveillance in post-accident situations, based on the experience of Chernobyl and Fukushima. The European SHAMISEN program was launched in 2015. The work resulted in 28 recommendations. These recommendations are aimed at three main objectives aimed at involving the affected population in decision-making alongside experts and authorities. These objectives are to take into account the well-being of the affected population, to promote the participation of the affected population and other actors such as medical personnel and to respect the autonomy and dignity of the affected populations [OUG 18]. Several European research projects have been set up by international or European bodies to study the vast multidisciplinary problem of managing the post-accident phase. This is the case, in particular, for the ETHOS, PREPARE and CO-CHER programs.

Management of the Post-accident Phase

215

The ETHOS project was developed from 1996 to 2001 in Belarus. It aimed to develop a participatory approach for the rehabilitation of living conditions in the contaminated territories of this country. It was based on a cooperative methodology involving local residents and a multidisciplinary group of French researchers. It started in the village of Olmany (located in the voluntary relocation area in the contaminated territories) in Belarus and was then extended to four other villages in the Stolyn district (Brest region). This approach was intended to complement the Belarusian government’s post-Chernobyl program. ETHOS was undertaken as part of the European Commission’s research program on radiological protection, in cooperation with Belarusian local, regional and national authorities. The European research project PREPARE (European research project “Innovation integrative tools and platforms to be prepared for radiological emergencies and post-accident response in Europe”) ran from 2013 to 2016. It brought together 45 partners and dealt with seven themes, the main ones being discharges, modeling of their dispersions, food contamination and public information. The CO-CHER (Cooperation on Chernobyl Health Research) coordinated action has been set up to ensure the sustainability of the studies and improve their quality. It was funded by the European Union (FP7) and coordinated by IARC. It aimed to bring together the main scientific actors and funding agencies to advance the Chernobyl research programs. 5.6.2. French doctrine In 2005, at the request of the French government, the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) set up a steering committee to manage the postaccident phase of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency, with the aim of defining a political framework. Under the supervision of the ASN, this committee, composed of several dozen experts from different backgrounds (competent ministerial offices, expert agencies, local information commissions on nuclear installations, non-governmental organizations, elected officials and international experts), has drawn up a large number of recommendations over a 7-year period [GAL 15]. The results of the first phase of CODIRPA’s work were published in November 2012 and were based on only three types of nuclear accidents,

216

Nuclear Accidents

two pressurized water reactor (PWR) accident scenarios and one plutonium release accident scenario. This first stage met three fundamental objectives: to protect populations against the dangers of ionizing radiation, to provide support to the population affected by the consequences of the accident and to reclaim the economically and socially affected territories [PET 14]. CODIRPA’s work continued after 2012 with three objectives: to test and complete French doctrine, to support preparation for post-accident management and to participate, take into account and share international actions carried out on the post-accident theme. Thus, with regard to the first objective, it was important to diversify the different accident situations taken into account, to analyze the REX of the Fukushima accident and to continue the REX of the Chernobyl accident, to investigate, if necessary, certain subjects that remained outstanding at the end of the first phase of the work and to examine new questions relating to post-accident management. Accompanying post-accident management required advising the various ministries in their preparation for post-accident management, contributing to the preparation of tools to support local implementation and tools to manage the exit from the emergency phase, participating in dialogue with decentralized services as part of ORSEC/PPI planning for the post-accident component and launching and supporting initiatives to transfer doctrine elements to the territorial level [PET 14]. 5.6.2.1. The principle of post-accident zoning in France At the end of the emergency phase, the first post-accident zoning is established on the basis of predictive modeling of the population’s future exposure to ambient radioactivity in inhabited areas and the contamination of the food chain resulting from radioactivity deposition. This zoning defines three zones: the distance perimeter (PE), the population protection zone (ZPP) and the enhanced territorial surveillance zone (ZST). In the remote area, populations will be evacuated when external exposure from radioactive particle deposition in the environment is too high despite food bans. In the ZPP, the population remains in place but is subject to certain restrictions, in particular, on the consumption and marketing of local foodstuffs. This area is defined according to an objective of radiation protection of the population living in the most contaminated areas. The ZST mainly meets the objective of preserving economic activities, by ensuring

Management of the Post-accident Phase

217

that only compliant products are likely to enter distribution channels [IRS 14c]. The first post-accident zoning performed at the time of exit from the emergency phase is based solely on predictive assessments of the consequences resulting from radioactive fallout. Although these assessments are based on reasonably conservative models and assumptions, they can bias the reality on the ground. Therefore, the zoning limits should be updated very early in the transition period of the post-accident phase. They will be updated regularly during the long-term post-accident phase to take into account the actual data on environmental contamination. To define the zones, it is necessary to have an indicator. This indicator is the 12-month forecast effective dose (period from the 2nd to the 13th month after the accident). The indicator for PE is the effective dose excluding ingestion and applies to the territory where this dosimetric indicator exceeds the guide value of 10 mSv. The indicator for the ZPP is the predicted effective dose for all exposure pathways and applies to the area where this dosimetric indicator exceeds the guideline value of 10 mSv. The indicators for the ZST are the foreseeable levels of contamination that could exceed, at least temporarily, the maximum permitted levels (MPLs) set by the Community regulations for foodstuffs. Changes in zoning may lead to stricter requirements or, on the contrary, to a downgrading of the area. 5.6.2.2. The main French actions carried out during the post-accident phase In the PE, the actions to be activated are the temporary evacuation of local populations and possibly domestic animals. In the ZPP, the main actions aim to reduce the contamination of living environments through the implementation of clean-up operations and to manage food risk by systematically prohibiting the consumption and marketing of local agricultural products. In the ZST, the first actions to be implemented are temporary bans on the consumption and marketing of local agricultural products. A second step, after radiological inspection of these foodstuffs, is to authorize the placing on the market of products that would comply with the MPLs.

218

Nuclear Accidents

Outside the ZST, low environmental contamination from the accident may be detectable but at levels that do not warrant systematic monitoring. Only sample measures can be implemented. Their purpose will be to detect possible areas of concentration of radioactivity in the environment induced by specific meteorological conditions (heavy rainfall at the time of the accident), particular features of the relief or the particular sensitivity of the environment (forest areas, in particular) [IRS 14c]. These actions are detailed in Table 5.8. Scope

Food

Population

Post-accident phase, periods of transition and long-term periods

Consumption of homegrown food prohibited (minimum 1 month)

Zone secured Far from the general population and domestic animals Radiological control and potential decontamination of individuals Cleaning access Maintenance of a minimum number of economic activities Care of animals still in place

ZPP zone (outside the population protection zone)

Consumption of homegrown food prohibited (minimum 1 month)

Keeps the population in place but with strict recommendations for food and other authorized activities Creation of Welcome and Information Centers Implementation of bans and restrictions in a regulatory framework Actions to reduce contamination Monitoring of radiation Census and monitoring of the populations in the zone Emergency compensation framework Management of agricultural production

ZST zone

Population kept in place Marketing of fodder and feed temporarily prohibited Consumption of home- Implementation of bans and restrictions in a regulatory framework grown food prohibited until the implementation Monitoring of radiation of a control system Communication to the populations Radioactive management of the environment and food Management of agricultural production

ZPP zone (distance zone from general population)

Management of the Post-accident Phase

Territories initially not impacted

No prohibitions.

219

No restrictions. Radiological monitoring of the environment

ZPP: population protection zone (distance zone); ZST: enhanced territorial surveillance zone

Table 5.8. Actions taken by the French authorities during the various periods of the post-accident phase of a nuclear accident (modified from [IRS 14a])

5.6.2.3. Tools for the management of the post-accident phase In France, IRSN has developed several tools to help various public authorities manage contaminated areas [IRS 19]. Four of these tools will be briefly presented below. The Paz tool makes it possible to define the perimeters for the implementation of sustainable actions to protect populations. The Paz calculation is launched quickly after a disaster to anticipate post-accident management. Then, the zoning is refined as new field information is acquired. Since 2012, atmospheric dispersion tools have evolved to assess the consequences of a nuclear accident on a national or even continental scale. In 2013, the main change for Paz was the adaptation to this large scale. The IRSN developed the mapping tool called OPAL, a tool for raising awareness of post-accident issues among local stakeholders, to prepare elected officials for the management of contaminated areas. Indeed, if a nuclear accident were to occur, local actors would be involved in managing the health, social and economic consequences on their municipalities with four local information commissions (CLIs): tested OPAL, in Golfech (Tarnet-Garonne), Gravelines (Nord), Marcoule (Gard) and Saclay (Essonne). A seminar organized in October 2014 by ANCCLI and IRSN devoted a session to raising awareness of post-accident issues, in particular, the OPAL mapping and simulation tool. According to Lheureux and Charre [LHE 14], the OPAL tool is designed to raise awareness of the consequences and responsibilities of everyone in a post-accident situation and encourage local actors to work together today to be able to react better if a crisis occurs. The OPAL tool only presents information related to the post-accident phase of predefined standard scenarios. OPAL is therefore not intended to be used for expertise in real crisis situations or crisis exercises. The OPAL tool provides, for all civilian nuclear sites, mapping data for the three zonings related to the post-accident phases (PE, ZPP and ZST). The

220

Nuclear Accidents

user is able to choose the wind direction, its intensity, the season of the accident, etc. From these zonings and by comparing them with data concerning the territory, it is possible to extract data such as the number of people to be removed, the agricultural surface for which the productions would become unsustainable, the number of sensitive establishments located in risk zones, etc. [ANC 19]. To help agricultural stakeholders respond to nuclear accidents, the IRSN has published a Decision Support Guide for the Management of the Agricultural Environment (ACTA Guide). This guide is intended to prepare agricultural stakeholders for a possible crisis by supporting them in the actions to be implemented [IRS 07, IRS 12a]. Post-accident predictions are essential to better assess population exposure. Calculation software must also be developed and regularly improved. IRSN researchers tested the Symbiosis calculation code used to predict population exposure to radioactive releases. This code has been enriched with new parameters, particularly for orchard fruits, for which contamination transfers were poorly documented. This tool is used by the Directorate General of Consumer Affairs, Competition and Fraud Control (DGCCRF) to control imports of Japanese food into Europe. 5.6.2.4. Public information The French public authorities are aware that informing the public during a nuclear crisis is the key to the successful management of contaminated areas. From the ANCCLI’s point of view, nuclear safety is based not only on a strong commitment by operators, the regulatory authority, the public expert, etc. but also on the effective involvement of civil society [LHE 14]. This is why, in 2008, the ANCCLI created a pluralist permanent group on emergency and post-accident issues (GPPA, Groupe Permanent Post-Accident et territoires). The GPPA is a forum for debate and expression to bring out the recommendations of civil society. This group shares the experiences and questions of CLI members on crisis situations, contingency plans (PPI), PCS, iodine tablet distribution campaigns, urbanization around nuclear sites, post-accident management, etc.

Management of the Post-accident Phase

221

5.6.2.5. The limits of post-accident management The shortcomings of post-accident management are inevitably numerous. One of the most striking is the fact that it is imposed by the authorities without consulting the population concerned. This is why the role of the CLIs in the event of a nuclear crisis must be better defined because they can act as intermediaries between authorities and populations. The composition of CLIs could be expanded in the event of an accident, in order to increase skills and opinions. CLIs should be consulted when establishing post-accident zoning, a decontamination plan and regulations for food marketing [ANC 17]. 5.7. Conclusion A post-accident situation is characterized by lasting contamination (several years, even several decades) of the environment by radioactive substances released during the emergency phase (radioisotopes of iodine, cesium, strontium, plutonium, etc.). Some short-lived or very short-lived radionuclides with important physiological functions, such as iodine, will have serious health consequences. Other long-lived and very long-lived radionuclides will be present in the environment for centuries. The size of the territories concerned depends mainly on the size of the discharge and weather conditions (wind, rain). This contamination exposes the population to radioactivity, through external exposure, but mainly by the ingestion of contaminated locally produced food. Managing a post-accident phase is therefore a long term and very costly operation, in which the authorities must be able to adapt permanently to situations that are difficult to predict. It is essential that this management is organized before the possible accident. This management must be considered in three main areas: environmental management, anthroposphere management and management of exposed populations. Decontamination operations must be properly planned, and the long-term storage of nuclear waste must be well dimensioned. It is imperative to limit the short- and long-term impacts of this waste on human and the environment.

222

Nuclear Accidents

The change in the various zonings must be anticipated and populations informed in a transparent manner. The management of agricultural products and the implementation of radiological monitoring must be rigorous. Compensation for nuclear damage must comply with specific civil liability rules. Nuclear civil liability makes the operator solely responsible for any nuclear damage. This simplifies the implementation of compensation (a single insurer, a single court and a minimum financial guarantee). Population management is certainly the most difficult objective to achieve properly. The long-term guidelines to be achieved for this management are that people can reside, work and produce in a contaminated environment. These populations need to immerse themselves in a culture of radiation protection for the long term. This culture can be defined as the set of knowledge and skills that enable citizens to behave wisely in situations involving ionizing radiation. To do this, it is necessary to rely on relay actors such as teachers and professionals of scientific culture, associations and CLIs and health professionals. Feedback shows that their involvement is essential. The radiation protection culture must be improved as of today, in particular, by informing these relay actors of the role they would have to play in a post-accident situation. Anticipating post-accident situations is an essential element of management. Accident simulation exercises must be intensified, going beyond the national level so that all neighboring countries react together. In addition to institutional actors, the public must be involved in these exercises. Public information must be sincere, educational and accurate; otherwise, people will doubt the authorities. Communication with the public must be continuous so that the public is fully aware of the concepts of radiation protection and the various attitudes they must adopt in the event of accidents.

6 Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security

6.1. Introduction Nuclear risk remained limited during the 20th Century, with about 500 accidents recorded, resulting in 3,000 casualties [FLE 04]. These accidents are of a very variable nature and scale, ranging from catastrophic accidents (Chernobyl) to limited accidents involving only one or two people. They could also take the form of malicious acts, which have sometimes occurred, or terrorism, of which there are currently no examples. The end of the 20th Century and the beginning of the 21st Century were marked by terrorist actions of a magnitude and form never before seen. The scale is evident with the attack on the World Trade Center towers in 2001; the nature of the means is highly diversified, again including chemical weapons (Tokyo, 1995; Syria 2016) and biological pathogens (United States in 2001). A major omission is the large-scale use of radioactive materials or sources. This absence should not obscure the potential for such action [DEC 06]. Nénot [NÉN 06] considers that the use of radiation for terrorist purposes is a plausible hypothesis. The appalling events of September 11, 2001 call for a major international initiative to strengthen the security of nuclear materials and facilities worldwide and to establish rigorous security standards [BUN 02a]. Two factors have made the use of nuclear energy in terrorism credible since the early 1990s. The first is the rise of Islamist fundamentalism, and the second is the lack of control over Russian nuclear weapons and fissile materials during the fall of the USSR. Thus, in some countries such as Pakistan, the control of weapons or fissile materials by Islamist organizations is a possibility.

Nuclear Accidents: Prevention and Management of an Accidental Crisis, First Edition. Jean-Claude Amiard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

224

Nuclear Accidents

In Russia, the failed coup d’état in August 1991 ousted several KGB members who were hired by the mafia. Seeing the former Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal as a means of earning money, Russia became involved in this international traffic, with Vienna as one of its hubs. The Chechen mafia has also played an important role in the trafficking of weapons of all kinds, especially in Central Asia [VIL 14]. Two terrorist actions are relatively easy to carry out: spreading radionuclides, by whatever means, and the release of intense radioactive sources. There is no limit to the imagination in using these two types of actions in order to terrorize an unprepared population. An attack on a nuclear power plant represents a particular mode of dispersing radioactive material, highly symbolic because of the Chernobyl precedent, but fortunately one of the most difficult to achieve. Fleutot [FLE 04] considers that five scenarios of terrorist acts are possible. The first is the dispersion of radioactive material by explosion or fire. This is the case of the “dirty bomb”. The second is the loss or abandonment of a high activity radioactive source. This is the case with the accident in Goiânia, Brazil, in 1987. The third scenario is the loss or abandonment of a radioactive source, but this time of medium activity. The fourth scenario concerns the dispersion of radioactive material. The fifth scenario would be the unsafe operation of an electrical generator powered by radioactive material. We must add to this several scenarios with the risks associated with the trafficking of military radionuclides, the risks associated with cyber-attacks on nuclear installations and the risks associated with the transport of radioactive material by trains and ships. Nuclear security is the set of measures to prevent, detect and respond to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials or associated facilities. It is therefore the policy to prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons by countries that do not have them [IRS 10b]. 6.2. Malicious acts Malicious acts using irradiation are few and far between and affect only a few individuals who are generally well targeted. To these cases, we can add some suicides using radionuclides. A dissident website reports

Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security

225

two of them [ANO 17]. In the USSR, in 1960, an individual committed suicide by exposing himself to a radioactive source of cesium 137 and received 15 Sv. In 1972, in Bulgaria, another suicide was carried out by exposure to a radioactive source of more than 200 Gy in the chest [ANO 17]. 6.2.1. Attempts at radiation aggression In the United States (Texas) in the 1970s, a father voluntarily exposed his 13-year-old son five times in six months to a radioactive source of 1 Ci of cesium 137. This criminal was divorced and made his child sleep on a pillow or mattress during his bimonthly visits, in which he concealed the source. He was sentenced to a fine of 5000 dollars and 10 years in prison [BAI 77, COL 80]. In the United States, a complaint was filed in 1995 by a scientist, pregnant at the time of the events, for deliberate poisoning with phosphorus 32 [NÉN 07]. Krasniouk [KRA 04] identifies at least four cases in Russia of criminal acts using gamma radiation sources, including three where the source was placed under the victim’s seat. These few cases are, in fact, isolated criminal acts, motivated by a desire for revenge. In France, in March 1965, in the irradiated materials workshop in Chinon, the handle of the boiler room door, a place heavily frequented by staff, was probably contaminated voluntarily. This resulted in the bodily contamination of 51 workers. In June 1978, a worker stole three stainless steel caps from tubes containing uranium from the stripping workshop of the spent fuel reprocessing plant at La Hague. He wrapped them up and placed them under the seat of his supervisor’s car. These three caps, made radioactive by activation, were going to inflict on their victim the rather considerable dose of 10 rad h−1 each time he drove his car for months and without his knowledge. Luckily, the supervisor had a car accident in November 1978, which rendered the vehicle unusable. The irradiation was thus interrupted. 6.2.2. The assassination of Alexander Litvinenko Alexander Litvinenko was a former FSB agent (ex-KGB) refugee in the United Kingdom and became a fierce denouncer of the Russian regime’s mafia-style practices. On November 1, 2006, he was invited by Dmitri Kovtoun and Andrei Lugovoi (both former Russian agents) to a London bar.

226

Nuclear Accidents

A few hours after drinking tea, Alexander Litvinenko felt a violent discomfort and was hospitalized. He died at the age of 43 on November 23, 2006, 22 days after drinking green tea poisoned with polonium 210. Polonium 210 was probably introduced into the teapot by one of these two characters. Doctors at University College Hospital were able to confirm the diagnosis with a urine sample a few hours before his death. Without this analysis, the crime would have been perfect because polonium 210 is difficult to detect. Having detected the offending molecule, British investigators were able to find traces of polonium in locations where Dimitri Kovtoun and Andrei Lugovoi had been. The British government requested a judicial inquiry because the death was suspicious with Sir Robert Owen, a High Court judge acting as a forensic pathologist. This survey was conducted from January to July 2015. In his conclusions, made public on Thursday, January 21, 2016, the judge wrote: “The FSB [former KGB] operation to kill Mr. Litvinenko was probably approved by Mr. Patrouchev [Nikolai Patrouchev, former FSB boss, now Secretary General of the Security Council of the Russian Federation] and also by President Putin.” Polonium 210 is a natural radionuclide present in the environment, as it is a product of uranium decay. It mainly contaminates certain marine organisms such as crustaceans and mollusks. It can be artificially produced by the bombardment of bismuth. Stores of 210Po are concentrated in three states, the United States, Israel and Russia. The majority of the world’s polonium 210 reserves are produced by a nuclear reactor located in central Russia, near the city of Chelyabinsk. Based on the toxicity of polonium 210, Harrison et al. [HAR 07] conclude that a dose of 0.1–0.3 GBq or more absorbed in the blood of an adult male is likely to be fatal after one month. This corresponds to an ingestion of 1–3 GBq or more, assuming the absorption and passage of 10% into the blood. Nathwani et al. [NAT 16] estimated that Litvinenko had ingested several billion becquerels (a few GBq). 6.2.3. Arafat’s death On October 23, 2004, with Israel’s agreement, a team of Tunisian doctors went to Ramallah, in the West Bank, in the evening, to see Yasser Arafat and they diagnosed a very strong flu. After several weeks of negotiations

Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security

227

led by his wife Souha, Arafat was authorized on October 25 by Israel to leave Ramallah where he had been confined since late 2001. On October 29, 2004, Yasser Arafat, who was seriously ill, left Ramallah for Jordan, from where he flew to France in a medical plane to be hospitalized at the Percy Army Training Hospital in Clamart, following a request to that effect from the Palestinian Authorities. On November 4, 2004, press releases announced that Yasser Arafat had been in a coma several times, despite the intensive care he was receiving. Various media sources announced his death prematurely. He officially died in Clamart on November 11, 2004, at 3:30 am, Paris time. Yasser Arafat was buried on November 12 in Muqata’a, his last headquarters in Ramallah in the West Bank, where he lived for three years, after the Israeli government refused to allow him to be buried in Jerusalem. As soon as Yasser Arafat died, there were many rumors about the cause of his death. Some of his supporters accused the Israeli authorities of causing the death of their leader by poisoning, and others said that he was infected with HIV because of his homosexuality. These rumors became more widespread when, in December 2011, journalist Clayton Swisher of the al-Jazeera channel advised Souha Arafat to reopen the case and have her husband’s possessions and belongings appraised in the last days of her life. Abnormally high doses of polonium were found on his clothes, and the widow of the head of the Palestinian Authorities lodged a “complaint against X” (in France, a complaint against a stranger) for murder on July 31, 2012. The exhumation of Arafat’s body on November 27, 2012 was followed by samples analyzed by French, Swiss and Russian experts in laboratories in these three countries. The experts differed in their conclusions. The Russians did not detect polonium 210. On the other hand, Swiss experts alone were less clear-cut in their scientific publications [FRO 13b, FRO 16]. These researchers point out that under the polonium poisoning hypothesis, all their observations were more consistent than under the alternative hypothesis that the person involved was not poisoned with polonium. The three laboratories (Russian, French and Swiss) measured polonium 210 and lead 210 activity in 5 samples for the French, 16 for the Swiss and 25 for the Russians. The results are similar for the three countries and significantly higher than those described in the scientific literature for standard samples. The activity measured in the bones of standard forensic samples was

228

Nuclear Accidents

all below 50 mBq per gram of calcium, while the activities measured in the bones of Yasser Arafat was much higher, reaching even several hundred mBq g−1 Ca. The highest concentrations of polonium were found on his ribs. Froidevaux et al. [FRO 16] found that 210Po activity increased from the inner part (48–56 mBq g−1 Ca) to the outer part of the iliac bone (904 mBq g−1 Ca). This heterogeneity underlines the incorporation of the radionuclide into the bone before the patient’s death. For its part, the French judiciary issued a dismissal in September 2015 at the first request of Arafat’s widow. She had appealed against this first dismissal. On June 24, 2016, the French courts confirmed the dismissal of the magistrates in charge of the investigation for the “murder” opened after the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004. 6.2.4. Overflights and intrusions into nuclear facilities Intrusions by members of the public into nuclear installations to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of safety rules have been carried out in many countries, particularly in France by Greenpeace supporters. However, it seems that no sensitive parts of nuclear installations have been invaded. Similarly, the overflight of INBs by drones is very similar to a threat to plant security. In France, in autumn 2014 and early 2015, several French power plants were overflown by drones. These new events alert us to the risk of a terrorist attack. According to the General Secretariat for Defense and National Security, a direct threat is low as a result of the low weight of drones, their small size and low carrying capacity. On the other hand, an indirect threat, namely, a possible identification of plant equipment for a terrorist act, seems possible [REU 15]. 6.3. Possible terrorist attacks Five main types of nuclear attack can be considered. Terrorists could use a nuclear weapon, a “dirty” bomb, attack a nuclear site, disperse a high or medium activity source or carry out a cyber-attack on a nuclear facility. The website of the US Department of Health and Human Services provides extensive information (https://www.remm.nlm.gov/rdd.htm).

Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security

229

6.3.1. The use of a nuclear weapon This example involves theft from weapon stocks by the nation that owns them or the manufacture of a bomb by amateurs. This latter, however, requires significant technical expertise for the manufacture of a nuclear weapon using plutonium (very delicate) or uranium (more easily affordable). But even an improvised explosive device that explodes only very partially would lead to catastrophic radioactive contamination of the environment. The case of mini atomic bombs called “nuclear briefcases” remains a problem. In the 1960s, the American armed forces developed a miniaturization of the atomic bomb. Two versions have been developed, one for the navy and the other for the army. From 1963 to 1989, the US Navy owned nuclear mines, used by combat swimmers. These explosives (Special Atomic Demolition Munition) were less than 1 kilotonne in power and weighed less than 30 kg. These time-delayed atomic mines were to be placed under the hulls of enemy ships, especially when they were anchored in ports, by divers from the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs). These bombs would have been enough to sink the largest buildings or cause considerable damage to port infrastructure. For its part, the infantry had possessed an individual rocket launcher, similar to a bazooka, called Davy Crockett, since 1964. It fired low-power nuclear ammunition at a distance of up to 9 km. It was quickly withdrawn from the arsenal of American forces in Europe and the Far East. It is likely that the Soviets had developed similar types of miniature bombs. Uncontrolled sources estimate the existence of 100–300 Soviet “nuclear briefcases”. They were all destroyed between 1995 and 1997, but according to Villain [VIL 14], in the mid-2000s, the American secret services reported that of the 132 Soviet briefcases they were aware of, only 48 had been located. There was a rumor that Bin Laden had been in possession of one or three of these suitcases. Presumably with age, these mini-bombs have deteriorated and can no longer be considered as nuclear weapons. On the other hand, radioactive materials could eventually be used to make a “dirty bomb”. 6.3.2. The use of a “dirty” bomb The manufacture of a “dirty” bomb is a more feasible and even relatively easy scenario to implement. On the other hand, logistics remain very difficult because transport is dangerous for the suicide bomber, tracking is

230

Nuclear Accidents

easy using detector portals, and to maximize the effects of the bomb’s impact, it should preferably be in a confined environment [SUT 03]. This bomb consists of any radioactive source and a conventional explosive to disperse it. It was used in 1987 by Iraq against Iran using zirconium. This radionuclide disperses well and has a strong and short duration of action [MAS 04]. In the field, the effect proved to be weak and was abandoned. A bomb containing 30 kg of cesium 137 was placed in Ismailovsky Park in Moscow in 1995 without being detonated. Henry Kelly, President of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), presented three plausible scenarios to the US Senate in 2002 [KEL 02]. The first scenario was a cesium 137 bomb with 5 kg of TNT exploding over Washington and causing urban areas, including the Capitol and the White House, to be abandoned for decades. The second scenario was the explosion over Manhattan of a cobalt 60 pencil usually used for food irradiation; this would result in the contamination of an area of 1,000 km2 for more than 40 years and radiation to the inhabitants of 300 house blocks resulting in 10% excess cancers. The third scenario used the example of the pencil but with americium 241 as a radionuclide used for monitoring oil wells; this would lead to contamination of about 2 km2 and 60 blocks of houses and an excess risk of cancer of 0.1% for the 10 most contaminated blocks. This type of weapon is therefore mainly psychological, leading to panic among the affected population fearing a risk of cancer. In the case of a “dirty” bomb, if the radionuclide used is sufficiently soluble, drinking water will be the preferred target, while in the case of an insoluble radionuclide forming very fine particles, air will be the most dangerous vector. Two scenarios of “dirty bomb” explosions, one with 137Cs and the other with 241Am, were considered during the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympic Games, in which 10,500 athletes from 205 different countries in the Olympic village were welcomed. The effective dose from 241Am is higher, while the ground deposition of 137Cs would be higher [PER 18]. The most formidable impact of a dirty bomb would be its economic (site clean-up, neutralization of a vital facility) and psychological cost. There is no doubt that, given the international trafficking that has existed for almost 20 years, terrorist groups have fissile materials, plutonium or enriched uranium, perhaps even stolen weapons that are ready to be used.

Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security

231

6.3.3. Attack on a nuclear installation or transport It is possible to consider an attack on a nuclear facility, a nuclear power reactor, an industrial facility or a transport of radioactive material (spent fuel). In this case, depending on whether the target is in a densely populated urban area or not, the attack would lead to significant fatalities. For workers, a dose rate of 100 Gy h−1 at 1 m causes total disability. This means that a terrorist attacking a nuclear research reactor would not be spared. A cumulative dose of 25 Gy reduces the worker’s efficiency to 0.6 for at least 2 hours, and this efficiency drops by 0.1 for every additional 5 Gy [COA 05]. There are many types of possible attacks from a nuclear facility. It could be a pedestrian penetration into the compound. It can also be the fall of a civil aircraft diverted from its trajectory, as in New York in September 2001. It is possible that this can be done by flying a drone carrying an explosive charge overhead. Some facilities are more sensitive than others to a terrorist attack. These are all those that contain large quantities of radioactive materials such as production or experimental reactors, as well as cooling pools. The latter are very numerous, and it seems that their protection needs to be reviewed and supplemented. Another sensitive point is all the transport of radioactive material. Indeed, nuclear transport has a very specific configuration where all the traditional nuclear risks must be controlled in a context of mobility in a public space. Transport is an itinerant nuclear facility. This configuration induces an intrinsically different vulnerability from that of the sites, which, given the content of some of these transports, is combined with an extremely high potential for danger. Providing protection for these transports equivalent to that expected for installations is a major challenge [MAR 07]. Significant efforts have been made in many countries to address this issue. In France, for example, the ASN [ASN 18] synthesizes the problem. 6.3.4. The release of radioactive material The spread of sealed sources or spent fuel can provide terrorists with “weapons” [GOU 05]. A potential terrorist attack using a radiological

232

Nuclear Accidents

dispersal device would spread fear and panic on a massive scale, in addition to creating a widespread, severe and lasting economic burden [MAG 07]. The quantities dispersed would be less than the most serious nuclear accidents but would not be negligible (Table 6.1). Year

Activity (Bq)

Spent fuel (2 kg after 24 h)

-

6.3 × 1015

Spent fuel (2 kg after 6 years)

-

4.4 × 1013

Source 60Co (2000 Ci)

-

7.4 × 1013

Chernobyl reactor

1986

1.1 × 1019

Nagasaki fission bomb

1945

7.6 × 1019

Submarine in Vladivostok

1985

1.9 × 1017

Windscale reactor fire

1957

7.4 × 1014

Table 6.1. Comparison of the activity of 2 kg of spent fuel, a 60Co sealed source and large-scale atmospheric releases following accidents (modified from [MAG 07])

The Nuclear Threat Initiative [NTI 99] reports the content of three Russian media sources (ITAR-TASS of September 24, 1999, Rossiyskaya gazeta of September 25, 1999, and Kommersant-daily of October 26, 1999). These involved an attempted robbery at a chemical plant in Grozny with the opening of a container of radioactive materials containing sealed sources of 12 cm-long cobalt 60, each with an initial radioactivity of 27,000 Ci. The flight of September 13, 1999, would have involved 200 g of radioactive elements. According to sources, between one and three suspects were killed by radiation, and there were also three wounded who had requested treatment in Rostov’s hospitals. 6.3.5. Cyber-attacks Spying on computer data circulating in a nuclear installation is entirely feasible. The protection of nuclear power plants is based on a key principle, the absence of communication between its segments, or at the margin, via specific devices, such as diodes. The control networks are accessible in “air gap” mode, that is, not connected to the Internet. But the waterproofing is not always complete, and human error is always possible.

Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security

233

An example was provided in July 2017, from an event the previous month, by US authorities (Department of Homeland Security and the FBI). Cyber-attacks occurred between May and June 2017, including attacks on Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, which manages the operation of a nuclear power plant in the state of Kansas. They were recorded in a report from the US Department of Homeland Security dated June 28. The hackers failed to penetrate the “operational systems”, and Wolf Creek confirms that the attacked network was separate from the nuclear power plant. The report does not indicate whether these cyber-attacks were linked to industrial espionage or an attempt to damage these plants. However, the report concludes that the hackers have shown themselves to be “determined to map the computer networks (of the targeted companies) for future attacks”. Other examples of computer intrusion and hacking can be recalled, such as the “breakdowns” of the Iranian nuclear program’s uranium enrichment centrifuges, the “DuQu” virus that would attack the control systems of industrial tools and the collapse of Estonia’s computer network in autumn 2007. In France, the AREVA group was the victim of a computer attack in September 2011 that forced it to strengthen the security of its networks with the help of government IT specialists, an AREVA spokeswoman said, confirming information published by L’Expansion. According to the L’Expansion website, which cites internal sources, AREVA was the victim of a “large-scale” intrusion, which resulted in three days of increased security measures around September 16, 2011 [DEV 13]. 6.4. The consequences of a terrorist act in the nuclear field The consequences of the accident at Goiânia in Brazil in 1988, which occurred without terrorist involvement, testify to the serious consequences possible, with 4 deaths from spinal cord injury, 249 contaminated people including 54 hospitalized, 112,000 people monitored and 64 km2 of contaminated soil, as well as 159 contaminated houses. In addition, 14 patients were found to have localized exposure lesions and 249 clothing contaminations, including 129 diagnoses of external or internal contamination. This accident created 3,500 m3 of radioactive waste and required the presence of 550 responders [AMI 13]. The specificity of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons is reflected, in part, in their power of mass destruction, as well as in the formidable impact of the threat they pose in the imagination. They affect

234

Nuclear Accidents

intangible and non-representable phenomena even more than conventional weapons. Their effects can be concentrated on a large number of people at the same time, resulting in a massive influx of victims and a marked disorganization in command and rescue structures [PAY 05]. The NWMO circulars [SGD 11, SGD 18] specify the French doctrine of the use of emergency and care resources in the event of a terrorist action involving radioactive materials. 6.4.1. The health consequences A nuclear terrorist attack would necessarily have health consequences. De Revel et al. [DER 05] summarize the best medical interventions to be performed in this hypothesis. The SDGN Circular (2011) discusses a national doctrine on the means of relief and care in the face of terrorist action involving the use of radioactive materials. Sutton and Gould [SUT 03] summarize the estimates made by various authors of the magnitude of health consequences from the use of a nuclear or radiological weapon or radioactive releases by a non-state actor, i.e. a terrorist. They identify six hypotheses of terrorist acts and detail their consequences. The first hypothesis is the introduction into the port of New York of a 12.5 kilotonne nuclear weapon ship. According to Helfand et al. [HEL 02], 52,000 people would be killed immediately by blast and heat, 238,000 people would be directly exposed to radiation from the explosion and 44,000 would suffer from a radiation-related illness, of which 10,000 receive a lethal dose. In addition, 1.5 million people are estimated to be exposed to radioactive fallout with 200,000 deaths from a cumulative dose over 24 hours and 300,000 cases of radiation-related illness. Finally, thousands of people would be reported as suffering from injuries resulting from thermal and mechanical effects. Taking up this hypothesis of the explosion of a 12 kilotonne atomic bomb in central New York, the IPPNW [IPP 04] estimates that within a radius of 5 km, this attack would cause the death of 60,000 inhabitants. The second hypothesis is the takeover of a Russian nuclear submarine containing 48 mid-sized missile warheads. Forrow et al. [FOR 98] estimate that during an unintentional nuclear detonation, there would be about seven million deaths from fire storms in eight cities in the United States and

Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security

235

millions more people would be exposed to potentially lethal doses of radiation from radioactive fallout. The third hypothesis is the use of a dirty bomb with a raw dispersal mechanism, such as an incendiary device, to spread 35 kg of weapon-grade plutonium in London. According to the IPPNW [IPP 96], there would be 2,805–10,337 cases of cancer, with about 80% of overall mortality. The vast majority would be lung cancers; the other cancers would be mainly bone tumors, bone marrow and liver. The fourth hypothesis would be an attack on a nuclear power reactor. This would result in the accidental release of large quantities of radionuclides into the atmosphere depending on the size of the nuclear power plant [LOC 00]. Depending on the size of the plant, there are estimated to be 700–100,000 early deaths, 3,000–40,000 cancer deaths and 4,000–610,000 injuries. The fifth hypothesis relates to a fire in an irradiated fuel pool. According to Alvarez [ALV 02], the consequences would be 28,000 cancer deaths, 59 billion dollars in damages and an uninhabitable area of 487 km2. The sixth hypothesis is the release of radioactive material from a single barrel of spent nuclear fuel during a rail transport accident followed by a fire in a tunnel in Baltimore. Lamb and Resnikoff [LAM 01] estimate that between 4,401 and 28,164 additional deaths from latent cancer would occur. In addition, 173 km2 would have moderate contamination (>1 mrem) and 11 km2 would have high contamination (>10 mrem). The cost of decontamination would be US$13.7 billion. A model of urban evacuation in the surrounding communities of Manhattan, New York, simulating a nuclear device explosion was conducted. The results show that suburban and rural areas could be overwhelmed by evacuees from their downtown areas. They also highlight the urgent need to educate and communicate with the public about the dangers of radiation in order to reduce panic and hysteria [MEI 11b]. The relative excess risk of triggering solid cancer is significant from up to 10 km away from the epicenter of a nuclear explosion. There is an increased risk for children (10 years old) and young adults (20 and 30 years old), and women are more radiosensitive than men, regardless of age [LIM 19].

236

Nuclear Accidents

The consequences of a dirty bomb, particularly in terrorist use in urban areas, are the subject of international studies conducted by many organizations involved in disaster medical management. In the case of the dispersion of transuranics, the health consequences will be catastrophic. However, tens of thousands of kilograms of plutonium are stored throughout the world [DUR 17]. 6.4.2. The psychological consequences The psychological disorders that occur after a nuclear accident have been detailed in Chapters 4 and 5. According to Dodgen et al. [DOD 11], a nuclear detonation in an American city would have profound psychological, social and behavioral effects. Its purpose is based on a review of the scientific literature on human reactions to incidents of ionizing radiation. He believes that in the area directly affected by the explosion, the primary and immediate objective of the behavioral health care provider (BHCP) response is to support rescue activities and prevent further losses due to fallout. It is clear that incidents of even small-scale nuclear or radiological terrorist acts can lead to widespread psychological confusion, fear and stress that permanently affect the health and well-being of human communities [HYA 02]. According to Wessely et al. [WES 01], the psychological implications of chemical and biological weapons are significant and the long-term social and psychological effects can be worse than the acute effects. As early as 1949, Colonel Cooney [COO 49] observed the horrendous fear reactions among the soldiers involved in the two atomic test campaigns of Bikini and Eniwetok who did not know the technical details of nuclear power. This fear was so widespread that it could very well hinder an important military mission in wartime. The reaction for fear of uninitiated civilians was also always obvious. Crocq and Crocq [CRO 85] report only isolated cases of anxious soldiers. Similarly, during the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear disasters, the behavior observed among survivors does not reflect panic. They were gloomy, conscious, but had lost all motivation and initiative. They began to move away from the disaster, almost like robots, in silence and without haste, in long lines that crossed the ruins and headed towards the outskirts of the city. Observers were impressed by the sight of these “ghost processions”, “walking like ducks”, with their arms spread because of the burns. Crocq [CRO 13] considers the consequences of

Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security

237

the various collective panics that have occurred after a disaster, particularly that of Fukushima in 2011. In particular, following a nuclear attack, a large number of people will have to be decontaminated. It appears that effective communication and respect for the needs of the injured are essential for the rapid and effective completion of decontamination. Indeed, the psychosocial aspects of mass decontamination should not be neglected. Moreover, workers must have effective training on psychological problems and public education before the incident [CAR 16b]. Are psychological disorders caused by an attack different from those resulting from a natural disaster? With the help of a literature review, Gouweloos et al. [GOU 14] try to answer this question. The significant differences they highlight are the emphasis on risk communication and specific preparedness needs. Relevant recurring topics include uncertainty about contamination and health effects, how people will overwhelm health-care systems, and the possibility that professionals will be less likely to react. 6.4.3. Countermeasures in the event of terrorist attacks In 2005, the ICRP published a report that responds to a widely perceived need for professional advice on radiation protection measures to be taken in the event of a radiological attack. Many aspects of emergency scenarios that may occur in the event of a radiological attack may be similar to those that, in experience, may result from radiological accidents, but there may also be significant differences. For example, a radiological attack would probably target a public area, possibly in an urban environment, where the presence of radiation is not anticipated and where the dispersion conditions generally assumed for a nuclear or radiological emergency, such as that of a nuclear facility, may not be applicable. Immediate countermeasures to protect the public during the rescue phase consist mainly of caring for and controlling access to traumatized people. Subsequent actions include respiratory protection, personal decontamination, sheltering, iodine prophylaxis (if radioactive iodine is involved) and temporary evacuation [ICR 05a].

238

Nuclear Accidents

The ICRP provides the maximum exposure doses that should be avoided by taking countermeasures (Table 6.2). It also provides the annual effective doses that may or may not warrant intervention. These interventions include restoration and clean-up, safe management of the remaining radioactive waste from these operations, management of bodies containing significant quantities of radioactive substances and dealing with situations of prolonged exposure caused by the remaining radioactive waste. In the latter case, the recommended generic criteria for justifying radiation protection intervention are shown in Table 6.3. The values in Table 6.4 represent the approximate levels of activity concentration in the products consumed (water, food, etc.) above which controls for radiation protection purposes may be considered in the event of a radiological attack. The relationship between exposure pathways, protective actions and reaction phases varies according to the unique circumstances of a specific radiological attack. Figure 6.1 qualitatively presents the various scenarios and the potential links to be expected between the different stages of the response. There is necessarily an overlap between the different phases and the protective actions that can be taken. Countermeasure

Avoidable dose (for which the countermeasure is generally optimized)

Containment

~ 10 mSv in 2 days (effective dose)

Temporary evacuation

~ 50 mSv in a week (effective dose)

Prophylaxis of stable iodine tablets

~ 100 mSv (thyroid equivalent dose)

Population displacement

~ 1,000 mSv or 100 mSv in the first year (effective dose)

Table 6.2. Avoidable doses where countermeasures are recommended (modified from [ICR 05a])

Intervention

Criterion (existing annual effective dose, mSv y−1)

Almost always justifiable

Around 100

Potentially justifiable

≥ 10

Unlikely to be justifiable

≤ 10

Table 6.3. Recommended generic criteria for intervention in prolonged exposure situations (modified from [ICR 05a])

Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security

Radionuclides

Radioactive concentration (Bq g−1)

α artificial emitters

0.01

239

Artificial β and γ emitters 0.1 238

U, 232Th chain leads

1.0

Table 6.4. Exclusion levels for recommended food products (modified from [ICR 05a])

Safeguarding Sauvetage EXPOSURE PATHWAYS

Recuperation Récupération

Restoration Restauration

Directly from sources, fragments anddes installations Direct des sources, des fragments, installations External, from deposited contamination Externe de la contamination déposée External, from contamination skinetand Externe de la peau contaminée desclothing vêtements Various elements and external) Panache (interne (internal et externe) Inhalation material Inhalationof desuspended matériel remis en suspension Ingestion contaminated food and water Ingestion of d’eau et de nourriture contaminées Accidental ingestion of de contaminants Ingestion accidentelle contaminants

ACTIONS Evacuation Evacuation Confinement Confinement Contrôle des accès du public Controlling public access Administration of d’iode stable Administration stable iodine Decontamination individuals Décontamination of des individus Decontamination theterres earthetand Décontamination of des desproperty biens Displacement opulations Déplacementsofdes populations Contrôlesondefood la nourriture Controls Controls Contrôlesondewater l’eau Protection animals Protection of dulivestock bétail et and des animaux Contrôles des déchets Controlling refuse Improving control over access Amélioration du contrôle des accès Releasing Libération personal des bienspossessions personnels Libération land de terrains et de bâtiments Releasing and buildings Reintegrating personnel Réintégration non-urgent du personnel non urgent Retour aux domicilesto their homes Returning individuals

Figure 6.1. Emergency phases, exposure routes and protective actions following a malicious attack (modified from [ICR 05a])

Human exposure to naturally occurring ionizing radiation is highly variable in different parts of the world, ranging from as high as 100 mSv to an overall average of 2.4 mSv. A generic value of 10 mSv can therefore be considered as normally high. Also, above this value, an intervention may be necessary, while above 100 mSv, it is always justifiable (Figure 6.2).

240

Nuclear Accidents

Intervention level Natural background radiation

Annual dose

Intervention almost always justifies

Very high Intervention may be necessary

Typically high

Intervention not fully justifiable

Global average

.

Figure 6.2. Description of the need for intervention in situations of prolonged exposure (modified from [ICR 05a]). For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/nuclear.zip

6.5. Organizational preparation for a terrorist threat The terrorist risk is taken into account by the WHO, the Monterey Non-Proliferation Studies Centre (http://cns.miis.edu) and various journals [HEL 02]. The IAEA [BUN 01a, BUN 01b] sets general objectives to limit these terrorist risks, such as making nuclear facilities secure, combating nuclear smuggling, making these measures transparent so that they can be verified by the international community and reviewing the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPMN). Apikyan et al. [API 08] are devoted to this vast problem, dealing, in particular, with the prevention and detection of ionizing radiation. Since then, countries have spent millions of dollars each year in the fight against terrorism [AGG 16]. In the United States, the organization of relief operations has been the subject of in-depth reflection [PAS 13]. A radiological event has certain general specificities that should facilitate its management in relation to other threats. Radioactive contamination is very easily detected, and measuring devices are widely used and calibrated.

Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security

241

Our scientific knowledge of the effects of ionizing radiation is important. Nevertheless, the very radiological nature of the crisis may pose difficult problems for the organization of emergency services, because the technical culture of the hospital world in the nuclear field is insufficient and very much lower than that concerning biological or even chemical agents [GOU 08]. There is a digital emergency medicine campus (updated 2011) (https://www.urgences-serveur.fr/-nrbc,495-.html). The general practitioner plays an important role in the provision of medical care in radiation incidents and radiological terrorism, but knowledge of the nature of the radiological injury is essential for correct diagnosis and effective treatment. However, such knowledge is insufficient for most doctors [ZAH 18]. Similarly, medical respondents in hospitals need sufficient knowledge and skills to manage the human impact of CBRN events [DJA 17]. In the event of injury following a radioactive attack, evacuation of the radio-contaminated wounded by air is possible [REN 18]. In France, the TSN law of June 13, 2006, on transparency and security in nuclear matters provides the institutional framework for state and local organizations to prevent a terrorist threat. At the institutional level, the response to a threat or the possible use of chemical, radiological or biological materials for malicious purposes has been reflected in the development of specialized plans, the CBRN government plans (Piratox, Piratome, Biotox), which are part of a global system for preventing and combating terrorism [MAL 05]. These government plans to respond to CBRN threats and acts of terrorism are the result of interministerial work: they mainly involve the ministries responsible for defense, the interior and health. As soon as the nature of the act is confirmed, the plan is activated with its Biotox component for the biological threat, Piratox for the chemical threat or Piratome for the nuclear and radiological threat. The ANSM (Agence nationale de sécurité du médicament et des produits de santé) has prepared therapeutic recommendation sheets that guide the prescription and management of persons exposed to a CBRN threat agent. The first sheets, published on the Agency’s website in 2001, are regularly updated; the last ones date from 2012 and 2014 (https://www.ansm.sante.fr/afssaps/Dossiers/Biotox-Piratox-Piratome /Fiches-Piratox-Piratome-de-prise-en-charge-therapeutique/(offset)/4). The ANSM also intervenes as necessary at the request of the Ministry of Health in the event of a crisis.

242

Nuclear Accidents

In France, there is now a single defense plan including all emergency services, civilian and military medical structures, with the establishment of 10 referral hospitals throughout the country spread over seven defense zones [GOU 08]. The information has since been updated [NAH 12, SGD 18]. The emergence of nuclear or radiological risk has led the public authorities to strengthen emergency response measures, including three circulars (circular “white plan” of May 3, 2002; circular SGDSN of 2011 No. 800/SGDN on the national doctrine on the use of emergency measures and care in the face of terrorist action involving radioactive materials; and circular DHOS 277 of May 2, 2002 on the organization of medical care in the event of a nuclear or radiological accident). Similarly, the publication of a national guide on “medical intervention in the event of a nuclear or radiological event” and the implementation of treatment and protection measures was released into the public domain. This action was complemented by a training campaign on CBRN event response, under the aegis of the Directorate General of Health, the part of which devoted to nuclear and radiological activities was organized by the DGSNR (Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nucléaire et de la Radioprotection), the SAMU de Paris and the SPRA (Service de Protection Radiologique des Armées) [FLE 04]. The latest circulars [SGD 11, SGD 18] were published, which dealt with the national doctrine on the use of relief and care measures in the event of terrorist action involving radioactive materials. A major difficulty is that, in most cases, the radioactive risk has no immediate effect of distinguishing between those who are contaminated and those who are not. Moreover, ionizing radiation is not directly perceptible to humans. Finally, some radioactive substances may simultaneously exhibit chemical toxicity. The public must be informed of the risks of a radiological attack before it takes place. Indeed, during a CBRN attack, a well-prepared and informed public is more likely to follow official recommendations for appropriate security measures to be taken [ROG 13]. 6.6. Prevention of terrorist risk in the nuclear field 6.6.1. Nuclear non-proliferation According to various international bodies, such as the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), terrorism is one of the most grave and serious threats to international peace and security.

Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security

243

More than 80% of the world’s nuclear materials are military in nature [WET 16]. The control of nuclear weapons and the disarmament of armies is therefore a priority. Currently, several nuclearized states are not willing to eliminate these weapons. These states will be under increasing pressure from world public opinion and their own public opinion to draw inspiration from the accepted norm that nuclear weapons are too destructive to be used [SAU 14]. Moreover, the situation is changing rapidly, and Sauer [SAU 17] believes that within the Atlantic Alliance (NATO), it is time to consider denuclearization. US President Donald Trump recently withdrew from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). On the other hand, the new START treaty, signed in 2011, would still be in force. Several international treaties have been signed to this effect, as discussed in Chapter 4 of Volume 1 of this series [AMI 19]. The international fight for non-proliferation is based on a set of international instruments and policies that contribute to preventing states from gaining access, in violation of their international commitments, to weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological) and their means of delivery (missiles). The materials used in international regulations are three in number: plutonium, uranium and thorium [IRS 10b]. In Europe, as early as 1957, the treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), provided in Chapter 7, introduced an institution monitoring safety and verifying compliance with declared use. The Euratom Technical Committee (ETC) is responsible for the implementation of controls on nuclear materials. In France, it relies on IRSN to manage the declarations requested by inspection bodies. At the international level, the founding element of non-proliferation is the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on March 5, 1970. However, the NPT has contributed to management but has not prevented further proliferation and is a failure in relation to Article 6 (disarmament clause). The humanitarian initiative and, in particular, a possible ban on nuclear weapons could be the best instrument to stimulate the necessary debate within the nuclear-weapon States on the future of their nuclear arsenals [SAU 15]. For his part, Glenn [GLE 16], through his analysis of global proliferation, was able to determine that the key to counter-proliferation was unity of command. In the United States, this unity of command was not immediate, but the Department of Defense quickly

244

Nuclear Accidents

achieved unity of effort, which mitigated the serious consequences of the multiplication of decision-makers. At the end of the 20th Century, four particularly worrying events led the international community to seek to strengthen measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both nuclear and chemical. These four events are the discovery of a clandestine nuclear and biological weapon development program at the end of the Iraq war in 1991, the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the anomalies discovered in North Korea in a pilot nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in 1992 and nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in 1998. The IAEA will therefore decide to establish an additional protocol to the safeguard agreements in 1997. Since then, North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT on January 10, 2003 and has carried out several nuclear tests. The Iranian situation has also changed with the signing of the Vienna Agreement on Iranian nuclear energy on July 14, 2015, in Austria, an agreement that has since been unilaterally broken by the United States. The applications of the treaties must be checked regularly and seriously. At the international level, controls are intended to detect a possible violation of a State’s commitments to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. They are carried out by the IAEA and Euratom. France has even more stringent legislation. Thus, there are six materials included in French legislation (Table 6.5): plutonium, uranium, thorium, tritium, deuterium and lithium 6 (deuterium and lithium 6 are not radioactive). Their definition is subject to periodic reviews in light of the development of knowledge and techniques. Radionuclide

Reporting threshold

Authorization threshold

Plutonium and uranium 233

1

3

Uranium enriched to more than 20%

1

15

Uranium enriched to less than 20%

1

250

Thorium and natural and depleted uranium

1,000

500,000

Deuterium

1,000

200,000

Tritium

0.01

2

1

1,000

Lithium 6

Table 6.5. Classification of nuclear materials by weight (in grams) for control in France (modified from [IRS 10a])

Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security

245

6.6.2. Trafficking in military weapons and radionuclides The United Nations, through Security Council resolutions and, in particular, Resolution 1540 adopted on April 28, 2004, seeks to limit or even prohibit any “proliferation, in all its aspects, of all weapons of mass destruction”. In 1995, the IAEA set up a database called the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) [IAE 18c]. Since 2016, the ITDB has divided incidents and traffic into three groups. Group I identifies incidents that are or are likely to be related to trafficking or misuse. Group II includes incidents of indeterminate intent and group III includes incidents that are not or are unlikely to be related to trafficking or malicious use. In 2016, 189 incidents were reported to the ITDB by 34 states, indicating the observation that activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive materials, including trafficking and misuse, continue to occur [IAE 17b]. As of December 31, 2016, the ITDB contained a total of 3,068 incidents confirmed by the 134 member states since 1993. Of these 3,068 confirmed incidents, there are 270 incidents involving an act of trafficking or confirmed or probable malicious use (Group I), 904 incidents for which there is insufficient information to determine whether it is related to trafficking or malicious use (Group II) and 1,894 incidents that are not related to trafficking or misuse (Group III). Between 1993 and 2016, the confirmed Group I incidents involved highly enriched uranium (12), plutonium (2) and plutonium–beryllium neutron sources (4). A small number of these incidents involved seizures of several kilograms of nuclear material potentially usable as weapons, but the majority of seizures were of only a few grams. Villain [VIL 14] recounts many facts about the disappearance of nuclear materials in Russia and the trafficking of weapons and fissile materials. In March 1994, two people were arrested in St. Petersburg while in possession of just over 2 kilograms of uranium 235 enriched to 98% (i.e. military grade) from a nuclear center in the Urals. In December 1998, the FSB, the Russian security service, announced that it had arrested a group of employees of one of the Chelyabinsk nuclear centers who had tried to steal just over 18 kilograms of nuclear material that could be used to make weapons. In April 2001, two officers of the Pacific Fleet

246

Nuclear Accidents

were arrested while trying to sell stolen radioactive materials on board a submarine. This was the fifth attempt in a year. In November 2001, two months after the attacks on the World Trade Center, Turkish police arrested two Turks who wanted to sell 1 kilogram of uranium for $750,000. In the previous August, the Istanbul police had dismantled an international network of radioactive products. In 2002, the FSB discovered 2 kilograms of uranium in a car in Izhevsk, 1000 kilometers from Moscow. It was actually an element of a uranium bar from a reactor at a nuclear power plant. In total, between 1991 and 2001, a total of 40 kilograms of plutonium were seized by various European police forces and beyond Europe. For every 40 kilograms seized, how many managed to get through the controls and reach their recipients? While there is great concern about the disappearance of radioactive sources in Russia, on the American side, it did not seem more reassuring. At the end of 2003, the US administration reported that it had identified 1,300 cases of theft and loss of radioactive material in the United States over the past five years as a result of security failures [GAO 03]. Trafficking in radioactive materials covers two separate chapters, the fraudulent and criminal export of fissile materials on the one hand, and threats of terrorist use of nuclear devices on the other hand [BEH 07]. The fraudulent export of radioactive materials began as soon as the USSR dissolved. This concerns significant quantities of “weapons-grade” uranium and plutonium that have been illegally transported across the border. The quantity estimated by the Arms Observatory (cited by [BEH 07]) is about 74 kg. On the other hand, there are few reliable documents on the human damage caused by this traffic. One example is the Tammiku accident in Estonia on October 21, 1994, when a military source of cesium 137 was stolen from a storage facility near Tallinn. The rapid death of the main protagonist, aged 25, had been falsely attributed to traumatic toxemia. It took a 14-year-old boy with burns and aplasia for the etiology to be mentioned. A total of seven people were exposed to doses greater than 100 mGy and five suffered severe damage. Workers and residents of neighboring houses were also irradiated [BEH 07]. Sokolski [SOK 14] organized a symposium on the lessons learned from the disappearance of nuclear weapon materials.

Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security

247

6.6.3. The actions to be taken In a series of articles by Bunn and his colleagues [BUN 02b, BUN 14], they identify priority actions to be taken to improve nuclear safety. Some nuclear materials needed to manufacture nuclear weapons remain dangerously vulnerable and protected by security systems that would not provide an effective defense against the full spectrum of a malicious adversary’s tactics and capabilities. All countries with stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) must ensure that they are well protected. In the past, terrorists have planned attacks on nuclear reactors and have also planned attacks with radiological “dirty bombs”. This was the case, in particular, of the Islamist terrorist organization Al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo (responsible for the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995). Substantial progress in nuclear security has been made since 2010, following the efforts of US President Obama and UN Security Council Resolution 1887 and the first Nuclear Security Summit in 2010. For example, 13 countries eliminated all HEU or plutonium isolated on their soil during this 4-year effort. Many countries have strengthened their rules and procedures for securing nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, nuclear facilities or dangerous radiological sources. States, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) are working together to strengthen the nuclear security culture by publishing guides and organizing workshops. Efforts have also been made on nuclear security practices, information exchanges between states and staff training in this area. It is now the heads of state who are in charge of nuclear security issues. But significant gaps remain. In the United States, for example, individuals, including an 82-year-old nun and two other demonstrators, managed to break into Oak Ridge Y-12’s American facility. To do so, they crossed many barriers and reached a building housing thousands of highly enriched uranium bombs before being arrested. Similarly, Greenpeace supporters have intruded into several French nuclear power plants, as reported above. Many countries still have significant weaknesses in their approaches to nuclear security. There are still countries that do not have armed guards on site to protect nuclear facilities, even those with plutonium or enriched

248

Nuclear Accidents

uranium; no background checks are required before granting access to nuclear facilities and materials; and limited protection against theft. Few countries conduct realistic tests of the ability of their nuclear security systems to defeat determined adversaries; and few have targeted programs to assess and strengthen the security culture at each nuclear site concerned. Pakistan and India have significant nuclear stocks and face considerable terrorist threats. Russia has significantly improved nuclear security and accounting over the past two decades (with substantial support from the United States). But Russia still holds the world’s largest stocks of nuclear material, spread over the largest number of buildings and bunkers in the world, and sophisticated adversaries could exploit security weaknesses, including vulnerability to theft [VIL 14]. More than 120 research and isotope production reactors around the world still use highly enriched uranium and many of them have very modest safety measures. Bunn et al. [BUN 14] make recommendations on urgent actions that need to be taken to strengthen nuclear security. These include combating complacency, improving the protection of facilities and transport, consolidating stocks and, in particular, drastically reducing the number of storage sites, strengthening the safety culture, teaching best practices and upgrading training, strengthening multi-level defense against nuclear terrorism and building a more effective global nuclear security framework. These authors also recommend ratifying and implementing existing treaties, and joining cooperative initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). These steps will not be easy. Complacency, secrecy, sovereignty, politics, costs and bureaucracy will all be formidable obstacles. But the very real successes achieved so far clearly show that these obstacles can be overcome [BUN 14]. 6.6.4. The limitation of nuclear materials According to Kuperman et al. [KUP 14], the IAEA is unable to protect fuel cycle facilities, including MOX enrichment, reprocessing and manufacturing plants in Russia. The danger posed by Russia’s insufficiently secure stocks of nuclear weapons and fissile materials is a major security concern [LEE 06, VIL 14].

Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security

249

The large stockpiles of irradiated HEU fuels scattered in storage sites around the world and the lack of a coherent global policy for handling these materials have created a situation rich in vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit [LYM 02]. To best solve and eliminate the terrorist threat, the radical solution would be to remove nuclear materials. Pending this final solution, it would be advantageous to considerably limit the use of some of the most dangerous nuclear materials. This is particularly the case for HEU, also known as military grade and plutonium. HEU is used to manufacture metastable technetium 99 (Tc 99m). This radionuclide is the most widely used radiopharmaceutical product in the world. It is produced by only four countries (Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands and South Africa), and the reliability of supply is not assured. In addition, these countries use HEU in a form that is relatively easy to convert into the metal needed for a nuclear bomb, and this represents a risk to nuclear terrorism. Furthermore, the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) would be highly preferable to produce technetium [VON 06, HAN 08]. The ultimate objective of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, created in 1978, is to reduce and ultimately eliminate international civilian trade in highly enriched uranium (HEU) for use in nuclear weapons, thereby significantly reducing the risk of theft or the diversion of such material by terrorists or states to produce nuclear weapons [KUP 98]. This conversion reactor program continues. The world now has about 500 tonnes of isolated plutonium, representing 100,000 nuclear weapons. It is time for France and the United Kingdom to abandon the reprocessing of spent fuel in order to recover plutonium. Plutonium recycling is dangerous and expensive [VON 12]. 6.7. Conclusion Nuclear terrorism has so far been a fiction, but may in the not too distant future become a reality. Among the scenarios considered, the use of a nuclear weapon, or at least a nuclear energy release device (NEED), to cause severe and widespread destruction as in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, seems unlikely. Indeed, the manufacture of a rudimentary weapon would

250

Nuclear Accidents

require 4 kg of plutonium or 15 kg of enriched uranium, and these masses are considerably increased, up to 800 kg, if unenriched uranium is available. However, the thefts reported by the IAEA are significantly lower. Moreover, this requires a high level of technicality and necessarily the complicity, and even cooperation, of a state possessing nuclear weapons. Although this scenario cannot be totally excluded, it is still not very credible [TER 11]. In light of the current terrorist threat and after four nuclear security summits, countries with nuclear power plants must improve their game in terms of the physical security of nuclear power plants before it is too late [MAC 16]. On the other hand, the use of an EDIS (dispersion device), such as a cobalt bomb, which aims to contaminate more or less extensive areas and prevent access to them, is the most likely terrorist act because of its ease of implementation [GAY 10]. Such explosions would have significant psychological and social consequences. But this would be disproportionate to the explosion of a nuclear weapon. The attack is less likely to wipe out its target than to make a lasting impression. The deterioration, to a greater or lesser extent, of a nuclear installation through an external attack (aircraft, drone, etc.) is also plausible. Le Guelte [LEG 03] believed that the main danger lies in the nuclear ambitions of an outlaw state. He examined the situation in North Korea, Iraq and Iran, in turn, and showed that none of these three countries has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons in the short term. However, Le Guelte’s analysis has been contradicted fewer than 15 years later now that North Korea has a functional nuclear weapon. In the field of security against terrorist risks, where discretion and secrecy are, according to current doctrine, essential elements of protection, it is difficult to conduct exchanges of pluralist expertise. It seems obvious that voluntary actions designed to cause damage, which no longer have anything to do with a probability calculation, are likely to create conditions significantly exceeding the safety criteria applied. Protection is based above all, by design choice, on devices of a different nature. These are mainly the detection of the preparation of actions by monitoring the territory and the prevention of the implementation of actions

Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Security

251

by deploying security devices and forces [MAR 07]. This author points out that under realistic conditions, the effectiveness of the protective measures implemented remains insufficiently demonstrated. The responses provided by nuclear operators, first and foremost public expert bodies, have enabled progress to be made in the cross-referencing of analyses, at least in the field of safety. However, this crossover remains insufficient to achieve true pluralist expertise on this major issue. For France, the White Paper on Defense and National Security [ANO 08, ANO 13] defines resilience, that is, the ability to overcome traumatic shocks in general. Gayral [GAY 10] presents a method for preparing resilience capabilities in the particular case of operating a radioactive material dispersion device (dirty bomb) in an urban environment. This method could be applied to other situations. Various initiatives exist around the world to try to fight nuclear terrorism. One such initiative is the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism [GIC 15], a voluntary international partnership of 88 countries and five international organizations. These partners are committed to strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect and combat nuclear terrorism. Most countries are developing strategies to combat nuclear terrorism. This is the case, for example, in Canada, where the strategy can be summarized in four terms: prevent, detect, deprive and intervene [GOU 13]. For France, the strategy is divided into five stages: knowledge and anticipation, deterrence, protection, prevention and intervention [ANO 13].

7 General Conclusions

7.1. The probability of military and civil accidents Major accidents in nuclear reactors are rare, but the consequences are catastrophic. There are many causes of nuclear accidents, but their main cause is often human error due to misinterpretation of the warning signals of an accident. 7.1.1. Nuclear risks and probabilities Major nuclear accidents are caused by fusions of the reactor core. Based on past accidents, the core meltdown frequency is 11/14,400, or 7.6 × 10−4, or one accident every 1,300 years per reactor. However, the order of magnitude advanced in probabilistic safety assessments is between 10−4 and 10−5, or one accident per reactor every 10,000–100,000 years. Compared to an accident every 1,300 years, a factor of 10–100 separates the calculated probabilities from the observed probability. Bishop [LÉV 13a] wondered about the reasons for such a gap. He believes that there are four possible reasons, good and bad, trivial and complicated. These four reasons are bad luck, incompleteness, that each event is unique and that bad settings and models are retained. The highest nuclear risks concern the major American cities such as New York, Washington, Atlanta, Toronto, Asian cities such as Shanghai, Hong Kong, Tokyo and Osaka, as well as Western Europe given the proximity of many nuclear reactors.

Nuclear Accidents: Prevention and Management of an Accidental Crisis, First Edition. Jean-Claude Amiard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

254

Nuclear Accidents

Moller and Mousseau [MØL 13c] have drawn up a list of difficult questions that they address to the authorities. Why are nuclear reactors often grouped together, in pairs, quadrupled or even in clusters of six reactors, on the same site? This situation aggravates the consequences in the event of an accident. Why are many reactors built on tectonic fault lines? This makes them very sensitive to the effects of earthquakes. Why were the backup generators at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant located below ground level, and therefore susceptible to direct access by seawater, causing malfunction and preventing cooling of the reactors? Why are spent fuel rods from nuclear reactors stored on the reactor site itself, which prevents them from cooling in an emergency, thus compromising safety? Why were pregnant women and children not evacuated earlier and over longer distances to avoid the problems of radiation effects on early development? Why were the Japanese evacuated from an area of 30 km radius, when authorities were advising French and American citizens to stay more than 50 km away from the plant and Air France, Alitalia and Lufthansa aircraft were redirected from Tokyo to Osaka? Nuclear accidents are not confined to reactors. They can also occur in other installations. Similarly, industrial and medical devices can be the source of accidents. This is particularly the case for lost radioactive sources. Accidents associated with sealed sources, although they have less serious consequences than those of a reactor accident, have a considerably higher probability of occurring. 7.1.2. The causes of accidents Nuclear accidents are caused by failures of the safety systems of nuclear installations, as well as, and above all, by human errors. There are two types of human errors. The first type is a lack of realism in the design of the nuclear installation, with an underestimation of natural risks such as an earthquake, a flood, etc. The second type is related to poor estimation and management of the accident itself. For example, a detailed analysis of the human actions of the operating team during the Fukushima accident was carried out by the IRSN. Because of the near total interruption of communication lines between the control room and the crisis management room, the operating team had to manage the accident relatively

General Conclusions

255

independently while seeking the support of the local crisis team. The management of an accident is always dimensioned on a single reactor. However, in Fukushima, the accident involved several reactors simultaneously. Furthermore, the local crisis unit had to prioritize needs and its attention was focused on one reactor at a time [GIS 15]. In the Three Mile Islands and Chernobyl accidents, the human errors at the time of the accident were also obvious. 7.2. The environmental consequences of accidents The environmental consequences of nuclear accidents are highly dependent on the dispersion of radionuclides. Using a global atmospheric model, on average, in the event of a major accident of a nuclear reactor worldwide, more than 90% of the 137Cs emitted would be transported beyond 50 km and about 50% beyond 1,000 km before being deposited on the ground [LEL 12]. Knowledge of the spatial and vertical distributions of radionuclides has increased following nuclear accidents. Thus, releases of 137Cs, 90Sr and Pu from three nuclear accidents (Mayak, Chernobyl and Fukushima) were examined to elucidate the fate of radionuclides in the soil [NAG 16]. Nuclear accidents result in widespread radioactive contamination of ecosystems and related ecosystem services, with potentially serious consequences for human well-being [GRA 14]. Ionizing radiation has multiple harmful effects on all living organisms, even at doses of natural exposure. Natural levels of radioactivity on Earth vary by an order of magnitude of more than a thousand and this spatial heterogeneity may be sufficient to create heterogeneous effects on the physiology, mutation and selection of species present at these various sites. Moller and Mousseau [MØL 13b] review the literature on the relationship between variation in natural levels of radioactivity and evolution. Their first analysis was based on 46 studies, involving 373 estimates of the importance of natural radiation levels on mutations, DNA repair and genetics. The results reveal a small to medium, but highly significant effect, independent of the adjustment for publication bias.

256

Nuclear Accidents

7.3. The health consequences of accidents The main health consequences of nuclear accidents are death, the occurrence of additional cancers and psychological disorders. A precise assessment of an accident is always delicate. Thus, 30 years after the Chernobyl disaster, the human toll remains uncertain. This is related to the uncertainties of the radiation doses received, the difficulty of monitoring displaced populations and a long list of diseases that may be triggered by ionizing radiation. This does not prevent publications on this subject. The number of nuclear accidents with early health effects in 2007 (before the Fukushima accident) was recorded by UNSCEAR [UNS 11] (Table 7.1). The number of deaths and health effects are summarized in Table 7.2. For the most serious accidents, the resulting collective doses are reported in Table 7.3. For the Fukushima accident, collective doses to the thyroid were estimated at various periods in the lives of Japanese people (Table 7.4). The nature of the accidents is described in Annex C of the 2008 report; UNSCEAR considers that there were 13 military accidents involving the marine environment, five accidents involving the air environment and six accidents involving space vehicles [UNS 11]. There were 18 military criticality accidents causing 15 deaths and 42 early morbidities and four accidents with environmental consequences and potential effects on the population (Mayak, Windscale, Gore and Tomsk). There were six criticality accidents in the nuclear power industry causing six deaths and 12 early morbidities, as well as three accidents affecting the environment and the local population (IMT, Chernobyl, Tokai-Mura) causing 30 deaths and 107 early morbidities. In the nuclear industry, there were 59 nuclear accidents with eight deaths and 74 early morbidities. There were 34 accidents with orphan sources causing 42 deaths and 297 early morbidities. In the medical field, the UN [UNS 11] has declared 32 accidents with 46 deaths and 623 early morbidities. Ilyn et al. [ILY 04] identify the main types of accidents caused by ionizing radiation in the territory of the former USSR up to June 2003. The number of accidents is 349, resulting in 71 immediate deaths and 693 acute radiation syndromes (class I–IV).

General Conclusions

Type of accident

1945–1965

1966–1986

1987–2007

Nuclear facilities

19

12

4

Industries

2

50

28

Orphan sources

3

15

18

Academic and research institutions

3

16

4

Unknown

18

14

Medical use

257

Table 7.1. Number of accidents resulting in early health effects or significant exposure to the population (modified from [UNS 11])

Type of accident

1945–1965

1966–1986

1987–2007

Total

Deaths Effects Deaths Effects Deaths Effects Deaths Effects Nuclear facilities

13

42

34

123

3

2

50

167

Industries

0

8

3

61

0

51

9

119

Orphan sources

7

5

19

88

16

205

42

308

Academic and research institutions

0

2

0

22

0

5

0

29

Medical use

?

?

4

470

42

153

46

623

Table 7.2. Number of deaths and early acute health effects caused by nuclear accidents (modified from [UNS 11])

258

Nuclear Accidents

Date

Accident

Local and region dose (person Sv)

1986

Chernobyl (USSR)

320,000

2011

Fukushima (Japan)

12,000

1957

Windscale (UK)

2,000

1957

Mayak (USSR)

1,200

1983

Ciudad Juarez (Mexico)

150

1987

Goiâna (Brazil)

80

1979

Three Mile Island (USA)

40

1966

Palomares (Spain)

3

1999

Tokai-Mura (Japan)

10 years

80 years

Collective effective dose

18,000

36,000

48,000

Collective absorbed dose to the thyroid

82,000

100,000

112,000

Table 7.4. Estimates of collective effective doses and collective absorbed thyroid doses for the Japanese population (approximately 128 million in 2010) (modified from [UNS 14])

For nuclear workers, exposure doses in the event of nuclear accidents are significantly increased. Many external and internal doses suffered by workers are available for various accidents (Chernobyl, Mayak, IMT, Fukushima, etc.) [BOU 14c]. In the event of a nuclear accident, the risk of human exposure is high around reactors in densely populated areas. This is particularly evident in Western Europe and South Asia, where a major reactor accident can result in the radioactive contamination of approximately 30 million people [LEL 12].

General Conclusions

259

With regard to the number of deaths caused by accidents in nuclear energy, there is a significant controversy. Official bodies such as the IAEA or UNSCEAR consider only a small number of deaths because there must be a direct link and a short time between the nuclear event and death for the causal link to be obvious and retained by these official bodies. Thus, the official toll of the Chernobyl accident at the Chernobyl Forum, with only 4,000 deaths, was perceived by many NGOs and researchers as a cynical denial [ZER 15]. Bertell [BER 99] estimated that there have been 1,200 million casualties since the discovery of radioactivity, most of them (1,156 million) from the production and testing of atomic bombs, 36 million from the use of nuclear energy as a source of electricity and 4 million from the use of radioactivity in the medical field. Similarly, estimates of cancer occurrence are highly distorted according to the authors. This is largely a result of the latency time between irradiation and the onset of cancer, which can be several decades, making it difficult to establish a causal link. In this regard, the case of military veterans and civilian victims of nuclear tests whether they are American or French is a good illustration of the distortions in the interpretation of facts. The recognition of their status as nuclear victims is very different between the two countries. Recent estimates by Busby [BUS 11] show that between about 492,000 and 1.4 million incidents of cancer appeared in the 10 and 50 years following the Chernobyl accident. These results are fairly consistent with Bertell’s previous estimates [BER 06] and epidemiological approaches to deaths using real data [YAB 11], but they are much higher than those published by the World Health Organization and the IAEA or by Fairlie and Sumner [FAI 06]. This should be compared with the uncertainties in the estimation of the radiation doses received since the error can be a factor of 50 for external dose estimates and a factor of 2,000 for internal dose estimates [BUS 11]. The trauma caused by a nuclear accident with all its consequences on the lives of local populations has too often and for too long been ignored, or at the very least underestimated. The feedback from Chernobyl and Fukushima is edifying from this point of view. This trauma has a wide variety of causes, such as anxiety about developing cancer, loss of housing, distance from old

260

Nuclear Accidents

social relationships and economic difficulties. In 2016, the WHO updated its evaluations for Chernobyl, but without figures [WHO 16]. 7.4. The economic consequences of accidents Among the major environmental problems associated with nuclear weapons programs, the high levels of radioactive contamination of groundwater and aquifers in and around nuclear weapons complexes are of primary importance. However, to date, there is still no known method to decontaminate groundwater once radionuclides have infiltrated. The US Department of Energy estimates that it will cost more than $300 billion and more than 75 years to clean up the complexes where American nuclear weapons were manufactured [WIL 03]. Economic estimates of the cost of a nuclear accident are often divergent. Bertel and Naudet [BER 04] calculate the costs of an accident by estimating the cost of a human life at €2.6 million, a lost working day at €65, a permanent disability at €19,000 and a non-fatal cancer at €0.25 million. The reference accident adopted is a core meltdown, with a probability of 10−5 per reactor year and a 1% rejection of core materials. As a result, the total cost is €17,093 million or, in probabilistic terms, €0.032 million per reactor year or €0.0046 million kWh−1. Taking into account the indirect consequences of a serious accident on economic activity, in particular agricultural and industrial activities, the estimated loss is 10% of the gross regional product during the two years following the accident or 0.2% of the gross national product. This translates into a 25% increase in the external cost of an estimated accident, for a total of €0.0057 million kWh−1. Some economic studies incorporating risk aversion have estimated that the direct external cost of the reference nuclear accident should be multiplied by a factor of 20, bringing the estimate to €0.09 million kWh−1 [EEC 00]. In addition to all this, there is the cost of dismantling the nuclear installation after an accident, which varies greatly depending on the type of reactor (Table 7.5).

General Conclusions

Reactor type

Decommissioning costs (dollars per kWe) Average

Standard deviation

PWR

320

195

VVER

330

1,150

BWR

420

100

PHWR/Candu

360

70

>2,500

-

GCR

261

Table 7.5. Average costs of dismantling a nuclear power reactor (modified from [NEA 03])

Pascucci-Cahen and Momal [PAS 12b] consider in detail the costs of a nuclear accident. They consider several categories of costs, on-site costs (decontamination and dismantling, electricity not produced on site), off-site radiological costs (emergency countermeasures, health costs, psychological costs, agricultural losses), image costs (impact on exports of agricultural and food products, impact on tourism, decrease in other exports), costs related to energy production, costs of contaminated territories (exclusion zone and other territories). Their costs obtained are 120 billion euros for a serious accident and 430 billion euros for a major accident. The cost of an accident in a 900 MWe type 6 PWR reactor on the INES is estimated at between 50 and 240 billion euros, and for a type 7 accident such as Chernobyl or Fukushima, the cost is estimated at between 160 and 420 billion euros. The latter sum represents more than 20% of annual French GDP [IRS 13b]. The environmental consequences of a nuclear accident have a cost that is difficult to assess, as it affects the natural resources and ecological services provided by protected areas and species, soils and waters. Recognition and practices for environmental damage assessment are currently under construction in France. The European directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability, transposed into French law, is part of this construction [BAS 13]. Lévêque [LÉV 13a] considers that a single and universal cost of nuclear electricity is an illusion. He notes that nuclear technology has been hit by the “curse of rising costs”. If nothing changes in the future, especially if the

262

Nuclear Accidents

carbon price remains low, the relative competitiveness of nuclear energy compared to other electricity generation technologies is expected to erode. The choice for an electricity producer to invest in the construction of new nuclear power plants or for a state to promote it is an uncertain bet. The continuous increase in the price of nuclear electricity is down to many factors such as increasingly stringent safety rules, taking into account the dismantling and storage of nuclear waste, which were previously ignored. The benefit/cost ratio in the case of a nuclear accident is regularly performed in the United States but rarely performed in France [MAR 13]. The total cost of the triple Fukushima disaster is estimated by the Japanese government at €160 billion, representing 4.8% of GDP. This includes repairs to buildings ($100 billion), infrastructure ($21 billion), water, sewer, electricity and communication networks ($12.4 billion), damage to agriculture, fisheries and forestry ($28.6 billion). In 2013, €2.6 billion was paid to the victims of the disaster, less than 7% of the planned amount [MAR 13]. After each nuclear accident, the nuclear industry has been disrupted, with many countries abandoning the construction of nuclear reactors, either temporarily or permanently. For example, after the Fukushima accident, Germany took the decision to close all its nuclear power plants by 2022. Similarly, the United States abandoned the construction of nuclear reactors after the Three Mile Island accident, and a power plant construction site was shut down in 1981 at the Phipps Bend nuclear site. Several European countries have reduced their nuclear programs, such as France, the most nuclearized country in Europe. The cost of building reactors is constantly rising, particularly in response to increasingly stringent safety rules and the lack of expertise of nuclear workers. All this makes the price of nuclear power less competitive in electricity production. 7.5. Prevention of nuclear accidents Since absolute prevention is the disarmament and abandonment of civil nuclear power, it is clear that it cannot be achieved in the short or medium term. This raises the problem of abandoning the use of nuclear energy and

General Conclusions

263

replacing it. In the short term, the recovery of fossil fuels is very harmful to the fight against climate change. There is the saying, “prevention is better than cure”. This golden rule also applies to nuclear safety. Thus, the French authorities seek to minimize the risks and consequences of a possible nuclear disaster with three objectives, to reduce the probability of a nuclear accident occurring ever further, to minimize the consequences of a possible accident by strengthening development work on the fourth generation reactor and to minimize the consequences of a serious accident by improving crisis management procedures [MAR 13]. Accident prevention requires an exhaustive inventory of all possible nuclear accidents, an analysis of the consequences of each of them and the search for solutions to avoid, or at least minimize, the impacts of these various accidents. Accident modeling and simulation research has developed since the Chernobyl accident, and even more since the Fukushima accident. In particular in Europe, the accident tests imposed on all reactors, and even all nuclear installations in France, have led to the emergence of a new concept, that of a “hard core” for each reactor, imposing redundancies in safety components (steam generators, power supplies, bunker crisis center and rapid reaction force). The prevention of nuclear accidents will only be effective if national regulatory authorities are autonomous and independent of the nuclear industry. The American example of the Three Mile Island accident was enlightening in this regard and forced the American authorities to review their organization in the early 1980s. This situation was followed, more or less quickly, by other nations, such as France in 2006. Since then, the French and American regulations can serve as models, even though they are very different and not free of defects. Thus, safety objectives remain vague in France, and standards are too numerous in the United States. Among those countries lagging behind is Japan, whose regulatory agency was not independent of industry, leading to inconsistencies with the construction of nuclear reactors at the Fukushima site. The safety authority was in the hands of the nuclear operators it was supposed to control and lacked independence from political powers, which were themselves subject to the influence of industry. The immediate cause of the Fukushima Daiichi disaster was of natural origin, an earthquake coupled with a very large tsunami, but its root

264

Nuclear Accidents

cause lay in the absence of transparent, independent and competent safety regulation [LÉV 13a]. 7.6. Management of the emergency and post-accident phases Unfortunately, prevention is not enough. Indeed, since there is no such thing as zero risk, a nuclear accident is always possible. It is also important to prepare in advance to control the accident, and limit its consequences for the environment, non-human and human organisms. To this end, international organizations (IAEA, NEA, etc.) issue recommendations to manage a nuclear crisis. It is at the level of each state that theoretical and concrete measures to combat an accident are taken. This results in differences between countries, even though the general principles are similar. In general, when an event occurs that could lead to a nuclear accident, it is up to the operator of the nuclear facility to initiate an internal plan to control the incident to prevent it from turning into an accident. Local or national authorities must be notified and take the first necessary measures concerning management of the local population (sheltering or temporary evacuations), agricultural resources (sheltering, etc.), infrastructure controls, monitoring of radioactivity in the environment, etc. All these internal facility and local management plans must be clearly laid out in advance, and all stakeholders must be trained to implement them. Generally, the population is neither informed nor trained in these crisis exercises, which are reserved for the personnel of the nuclear establishment, local and national authorities and administrative and technical personnel specialized in security. The preparation of these plans must be carried out in a serious, independent and complete manner. 7.7. Perception of nuclear risk There is a significant gap between the probability of a major accident as calculated by experts and the probability of a nuclear disaster as perceived by the public. Subjectively, individuals tend to overestimate risk when it concerns rare and appalling events [LÉV 13a]. The results showed that experts perceive radiological risks differently from the general public. The experts’ perception of the risks from medical X-rays and natural radiation is significantly higher than that of the general

General Conclusions

265

population, while for nuclear waste and an accident in a nuclear facility, the experts have a lower risk perception than the general population [PER 14]. This is part of the more general issue of acceptable risk because it is integrated into everyday life (tobacco, alcohol, road, mobile phones) and unacceptable risk because it is not familiar (GMO, Linky meter). The notion of familiarity also partly explains why populations close to nuclear installations are less sensitive to risk than populations further away, the other aspect being the economic dependence of populations close to nuclear installations. 7.8. Public information In the nuclear field, the information provided to the public has been biased for a very long time because a large part of it was in the field of military secrecy, and the other part was distilled by the industrial operators themselves. It was the successive major nuclear accidents, from the Three Mile Island accident in the United States to the Fukushima accident in Japan and the Chernobyl accident in the USSR, that caused a change in attitudes towards information. It was clear, first to the Americans and then gradually to other nations, that the information given to the public needed to be more complete and serious. Many international organizations have major conflicts of interest, also known as “regulatory capture”, and therefore present a cruel lack of independence from the nuclear industry. Indeed, a certain number of experts are also employees of nuclear companies. This is the case of the IAEA, whose main objective is to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA is therefore far too dependent on industrial operators. With regard to radiation protection, recommendations are made by the ICRP. However, this international association, which is independent in theory, often with a simple co-option of its members, is cruelly lacking in transparency. Some members have obvious conflicts of interest. The situation is not much better for the UN agencies, UNSCEAR and WHO. The WHO has abandoned all health expertise in the nuclear field in favor of the IAEA, which is deeply regrettable. UNSCEAR, for its part, is the target of criticism from 40 Japanese civil society NGOs and seven other countries that called in 2014 for a review of the United Nations Scientific Committee’s reports on Fukushima [SOC 14].

266

Nuclear Accidents

In many countries, there is a dichotomy of nuclear safety between the military and civilian fields. This is the case in France with ASN and ASND. This results in a limitation of the application of the Nuclear Transparency Act in the case of ASND. The nuclear industry has historically developed a culture of secrecy in most countries. However, more and more, the public is demanding transparency and a right to information in nuclear matters. This goes against the necessary protection of secrets, in particular industrial and commercial secrecy, national defense or medical secrecy, or the discretion of actions against terrorists. The real issue occurs at the moment of the decision to classify information, to distinguish what is secret from what should not be secret. In France, the high committee HCTSIN draws the attention of authorities and experts to the importance of using protected information sparingly and wisely in order not to make certain documents, reports, expert opinions, audits, etc. non-disclosable, even though their main content is not subject to secrecy [HCT 11d]. However, the HCTSIN encourages the preparation of a single document by adopting an approach to identify information hidden from reports and is closely monitoring the SEMIPAR project (SEcret MIlitaire et PARticipation). The HCTSIN notes that it is necessary to have a judicial procedure to obtain the opinion of the Commission Consultative du Secret de la Défense Nationale (CCSDN) on the advisability of declassifying all or part of certain documents and regrets this limitation. It recommends the establishment of procedures and procedures to mandate a third party guarantor to examine information covered by industrial and commercial secrecy, the HCTISN calls for the establishment of information commissions, similar to the information commissions for secret basic nuclear facilities (INBS), around sites and nuclear experimental facilities of interest to defense (SIENID), which currently lack them [HCT 11d]. Shrader-Fréchette [SHR 15] denounces the erroneous information provided by governments, industrialists and the IAEA on the three nuclear accidents in Fukushima (Japan) in 2011, Chernobyl (Ukraine) in 1986 and Three Mile Island (United States) in 1979. It considers that this nuclear misinformation has violated the right to know of nuclear victims and details eight reasons that could explain these violations of citizens’ rights to know. These include the high level of harmfulness of ionizing radiation, the

General Conclusions

267

appearance in large numbers of thyroid and breast cancers, the increase in genomic instability and the contamination of soils for centuries to come. The consequences of nuclear accidents affect many aspects of society and therefore present challenges for multiple actors at various spatial and temporal scales. Gralla et al. [GRA 15] call for transdisciplinary research to improve the study of nuclear accidents and increase the potential for communication, collaboration and co-production of knowledge in this field.

References

[ACR 16a] ACRO, “Le point de vue de l’Association pour le contrôle de la radioactivité dans l’Ouest (ACRO)”, ASN. La gestion des situations d’urgence. Contrôle, no. 201, p. 22, 2016. [ACR 16b] ACRO, Plans d’urgence nucléaire en France. Forces et faiblesses, Report to the ANCCLI, 2016. [AEE 01] AEE, Late Lessons from Early Warnings: The Precautionary Principle 1896–2000, AEE, Copenhagen, 2001. [AEE 13] AEE, Late Lessons from Early Warnings: Science, Precaution, Innovation, available at: http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/latelessons-2, 2013. [AFC 19] AFCN (AGENCE FEDERALE DE CONTROLE NUCLEAIRE), available at: https://afcn.fgov.be/fr/situations-durgence/que-font-les-autorites/plan-durgencenucleaire-et-radiologique, 2019. [AFF 12a] AFFES R., Relations microstructure-fissuration-perméabilité dans les milieux granulaires cimentés, Thesis, Montpellier University II, December 2012. [AFF 12b] AFFES R., DELENNE J.-Y., MONERIE Y. et al., “Tensile strength and fracture of cemented granular aggregates”, European Physical Journal E, vol. 35, no. 11, p. 117, 2012. [AGA 18] AGATHOKLEOUS E., “Environmental hormesis, a fundamental non-monotonic biological phenomenon with implications in ecotoxicology and environmental safety”, Ecotoxicology and Environmental Safety, vol. 148, pp. 1048–1053, 2018. [AGG 16] AGGRAWAL A., “Terrorism: Nuclear and biological terrorism”, in PAYNE-JAMES J.J., BYARD R.W. (eds), Encyclopedia of Forensic and Legal Medicine, 2nd ed., Elsevier Academic Press, London, pp. 533–544, 2016.

Nuclear Accidents: Prevention and Management of an Accidental Crisis, First Edition. Jean-Claude Amiard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

270

Nuclear Accidents

[AKI 14] AKIMOTO S.I., “Morphological abnormalities in gall-forming aphids in a radiation-contaminated area near Fukushima Daiichi: Selective impact of fallout?”, Ecology and Evolution, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 355–369, 2014. [AKI 15] AKIBA S., NANDAKUMAR A., UWATOKO F., “Social and health effects of fukushima nuclear accident”, in MISHRA K.P. (ed.), Biological Responses Monitoring and Protection from Radiation Exposure, Nova Publishers, New York, pp. 91–105, 2015. [AKL 17] AKLEYEV A.V., KRESTININA L.Y., DEGTEVA M.O. et al., “Consequences of the radiation accident at the Mayak production association in 1957 (the ‘Kyshtym Accident’)”, Journal of Radiological Protection, vol. 37, pp. R19–R42, 2017. [ALA 16] ALAVA J.J., GOBAS F.A.P.C., “Modeling 137Cs bioaccumulation in the salmon–resident killer whale food web of the Northeastern Pacific following the Fukushima Nuclear Accident”, Science of the Total Environment, vol. 544, pp. 56–67, 2016. [ALA 17] ALAZARD P.A., Organisation de crise AREVA NP Romans, AREVA NP, site de Romans, 2017. [ALF 16] ALFONSI S., “La présence de l’état créé un climat de confiance pour la population”, Contrôle, no. 201, pp. 33–34, 2016. [ALS 12] AL SHAMAA M., Étude du risque de développement d’une réaction sulfatique interne et de ses conséquences dans les bétons de structure des ouvrages nucléaires, Thesis, Université Paris-Est, December 2012. [ALV 02] ALVAREZ R., “What about the spent fuel?”, Bull Atomic Scientists, vol. 58, pp. 45–47, available at: http://www.efmr.org/Xtra/Spent_fuel.pdf, 2002. [ALV 03] ALVAREZ R., BEYEA J., JANBERG K. et al., “Reducing the hazards from stored spent power-reactor fuel in the United States”, Science and Global Security, vol. 11, pp. 1–51, 2003. [AMI 80] AMIARD-TRIQUET C., AMIARD J.-C., Radioécologie des milieux aquatiques. La pollution radioactive et ses conséquences écologiques, Masson, Paris, 1980. [AMI 13] AMIARD J.-C., Le risque radioactif. Devenir des radionucléides dans l’environnement et impacts sur la santé, Lavoisier, Tec & Doc, Paris, 2013. [AMI 16] AMIARD J.-C., Les risques chimiques environnementaux. Méthodes d’évaluation et impacts sur les organismes, 2nd ed., Lavoisier, Tec & Doc, Paris, 2016.

References

271

[AMI 17] AMIARD J.-C., COUDERC M., XUEREB B., “Perturbations des fonctions endocrines: Causes et conséquences”, in AMIARD J.-C., AMIARD-TRIQUET C. (eds), Biomarqueurs en écotoxicologie aquatique, Lavoisier, Tec & Doc, Paris, pp. 163–204, 2017. [AMI 18a] AMIARD J.-C., Military Nuclear Accidents: Environmental, Ecological, Health and Socio-economic Consequences, ISTE Ltd, London and John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2018. [AMI 18b] AMIARD J.-C., “Radionucléides et aliments”, in CAMEL V., RIVIERE G., LE BIZEC B. (eds), Risques chimiques liés aux aliments: Principes et applications, Lavoisier, Tec & Doc, Paris, 2018. [AMI 19] AMIARD J.-C., Industrial and Medical Nuclear Accidents: Environmental, Ecological, Health and Socio-economic Consequences, ISTE Ltd, London and John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2019. [ANC 12] ANCCLI-INVS-IRSN, Santé publique à proximité des installations nucléaires: Comment aborder les questions posées, January 2012. [ANC 14a] ANCCLI, Sûreté nucléaire. Parce que le risque zéro n’existe pas l’ANCCLI réclame une révision en profondeur des périmètres des Plans Particuliers d’Intervention des Installations Nucléaires de Base, 2014. [ANC 14b] ANCCLI-IRSN, OPAL, un outil au service de la sensibilisation des acteurs locaux à une situation post-accidentelle, available at: http://www.anccli.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Pr%C3%A9sentation-de-la-d %C3%A9marche_OPAL.pdf, 2014. [ANC 16] ANCCLI, Les Plans Particuliers d’Intervention (PPI). Mesures de protection, rayons d’intervention, distribution préventive d’iode stable. Relevé de conclusions et recommandations, PPI Scientific Committee report, ANCCLI, 2016. [ANC 17] ANCCLI, Nucléaire et territoire. Quels rôles des CLI? Quelle implication de la population dans la planification de gestion de crise et de gestion post-accidentelle?, Livre Blanc V de l’ANCCLI, January 2017. [ANC 19] ANCCLI, OPAL, un outil de sensibilisation des acteurs locaux aux enjeux des situations post-accidentelles, available at: http://www.anccli.org/opal, 2019. [AND 13] ANDRA, Centre de stockage de l’Aube, Rapport d’information sur la sûreté nucléaire et la radioprotection, 2013. [ANO 84] ANONYME, “Nuclear power in an age of uncertainty”, in Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty, US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-E-216, Washington, DC, Princeton University, pp. 211–247, February 1984.

272

Nuclear Accidents

[ANO 08] ANONYME, Défense et Sécurité nationale, Le Livre Blanc, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2008. [ANO 13] ANONYME, Livre Blanc, Défense et sécurité nationale, available at: http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/le_livre_blanc_de_la_defens e_2013.pdf, 2013. [ANO 17] ANONYME, Meurtres, empoisonnements ou suicides radioactifs, available at: https://www.dissident-media.org/infonucleaire/bourreau_radioac.html, 2017. [ANS 09] ANSOLABEHERE S., KONISKY D.M., “Public attitudes toward construction of new power plants”, Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 73, pp. 566–577, 2009. [ANS 14] ANSM, Iodure de potassium pharmacie centrale des armées 65 mg, comprimé sécable, available at: http://agence-prd.ansm.sante.fr/php/ecodex/rcp /R0252412.htm, December 23, 2014. [API 08] APIKYAN S., DIAMOND D., WAY R., Prevention, Detection Response to Nuclear and Radiological Threats, Springer, Dordrecht, 2008. [ARE 14] AREVA, “Que faire en cas d’accident sur le site de La Hague?”, Dépliant d’information des populations, available at: http://www.manche.gouv.fr/index .php/content/download/19617/127680/file/plaquette_PPI_09-04-2014.pdf, 2014. [ARE 16] AREVA NC, Site de Malvési, Installation nucléaire de base ECRIN, Dossier de demande d’autorisation de Mise en service, Pièce 4, Plan d’Urgence Interne, 2016. [ARR 12] ARRETE, Arrêté du 7 février 2012 fixant les règles générales relatives aux installations nucléaires de base, available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr /affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000025338573, 2012. [ASA 14] ASANUMA-BRICE C., “De la gestion des flux migratoires par un Etat nucléariste dans un contexte de catastrophe nucléaire”, Les Grands Dossiers de Diplomatie, no. 22, pp. 71–75, August–September 2014. [ASN 10] ASN, Livre Blanc du Tritium, ASN, Paris, 2010. [ASN 11] ASN, “La préparation à la gestion post-accidentelle d’un accident nucléaire: Les avancées du CODIRPA”, Séminaire international post-accidentel nucléaire, Paris, May 5–6, 2011. [ASN 12a] ASN, Éléments de doctrine pour la gestion post-accidentelle d’un accident nucléaire, CODIRPA, final version, October 5, 2012. [ASN 12b] ASN, “La gestion des sites et sols pollués par de la radioactivité”, Contrôle, no. 195, pp. 4–95, 2012.

References

273

[ASN 13] ASN, Les échelles de classement des incidents et accidents nucléaires et des événements en radioprotection, available at: https://www.asn.fr/Controler /Actualites-du-controle/Avis-d-incident-des-installations-nucleaires, 2013. [ASN 14] ASN, “Préparation et gestion des situations d’urgence”, Titre 7 de l’arrêté INB du 7 février 2012, Séminaire réglementation, Préparation et gestion des situations d’urgence, March 21, 2014. [ASN 16a] ASN, “Nouvelle campagne d’information et de distribution préventive de comprimés d’iode autour des centrales nucléaires françaises”, available at: https://www.asn.fr/L-ASN/L-ASN-en-region/Occitanie/Actualites-de-votre-regi on/Nouvelle-campagne-d-information-et-de-distribution-preventive-de-comprim es-d-iode, 2016. [ASN 16b] ASN, Les situations d’urgence radiologiques et post-accidentelles, Report by the ASN on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in 2015, Chapter 5, pp. 164–179, 2016. [ASN 16c] ASN, “Retour sur l’exercice majeur d’urgence nucléaire ‘SECNUC 2013’”, Contrôle, no. 201, pp. 57–58, 2016. [ASN 16d] ASN, “La gestion des situations d’urgence”, Contrôle, no. 201, pp. 12–39, 2016. [ASN 16e] ASN, “Gestion des sols pollués par les activités d’une installation nucléaire de base”, Guide ASN, no. 24, version 2016. [ASN 17] ASN, “Arrêté du 28 août 2017 portant homologation de la décision n° 2017-DC-0592 de l’Autorité de sûreté nucléaire du 13 juin 2017 relative aux obligations des exploitants d’installations nucléaires de base en matière de préparation et de gestion des situations d’urgence et au contenu du plan d’urgence interne”, 2017. J.O.L. & D., 3 September 2017, text no. 12, published December 18, 2017. [ASN 18] ASN, Le transport des substances radioactives en France, available at: https://www.asn.fr/Informer/Dossiers-pedagogiques/Transport-des-substances -radioactives-en-France/, 2018. [ASN 19] ASN, Avis d’incident affectant un patient en radiothérapie, available at: https://www.asn.fr/Controler/Actualites-du-controle/Avis-d-incident-affectant-un -patient-en-radiotherapie, 2019. [ATH 14] ATHLET, “Heads of the European Radiological protection Competent Authorities (HERCA) and Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA), Ad hoc High-Level Task Force on Emergencies (AtHLET)”, Position paper, available at: http://www.wenra.org/media/filer_public/2014/11/21/herca -wenra_approach_for_better_cross-border_coordination_of_protective_actions _during_the_early_phase_of_a_nuclear_accident.pdf, October 22, 2014.

274

Nuclear Accidents

[AUD 11] AUDOUIN L., CHANDRA L., CONSALVI J.L. et al., “Quantifying differences between computational results and measurements in the case of a large-scale well-confined fire scenario”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 241, no. 1, pp. 18–31, 2011. [AUD 17] AUDOUIN L., COUTIN M., “Experimental characterization of a forklift fire”, 24th International Conference on Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology (SMiRT 24), 15th International Post-Conference Seminar on Fire Safety in Nuclear Power Plants and Installations, October 2017. [BAB 06] BABIK F., CRANGA M., LATCHE J.C. et al., Étalement du corium. Modélisation et études de sûreté relatives au récupérateur de corium du réacteur EPR, scientific report, RST-IRSN, available at: https://www.irsn.fr/FR /Larecherche/publications-documentation/Publications_documentation/BDD _publi/DPAM/SEMIC/Pages/Etalement-du-corium-Modelisation-et-etudes-de-su rete-relatives-au-recuperateur-de-corium-du-reacteur-EPR-3314.aspx#.XM8Nr KTgpPY, 2006. [BAC 11] BACHRATA A., FICHOT F., REPETTO G. et al., “Reflooding of a severely damaged reactor core: Experimental analysis and modelling”, Proceedings of ICONE-19 Conference, 19th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering, Chiba, Japan, May 16–19, 2011. [BAI 77] BAILEY E.D., WUKASCH M.C., “A case of felonous use of radioactive materials”, Recueil des communications, IVe Congrès de l’Association Internationale de Radioprotection (IRPA), Paris, no. 3, pp. 987–990, April 24–30, 1977. [BAK 10] BAKARDJIEVA S., BARRACHIN M., BECHTA S. et al., “Improvement of the European thermodynamic database NUCLEA”, Progress in Nuclear Energy, vol. 52, pp. 84–96, 2010. [BAK 14] BAKARDJIEVA S., BARRACHIN M., BECHTA S. et al., “Quality improvements of thermodynamic data applied to corium interactions for severe accident modelling in SARNET2”, Annals of Nuclear Energy, vol. 74, pp. 110–124, 2014. [BAL 03] BALONOV M., KAIDANOVSKY G., ZVONOVA I. et al., “Contributions of short-lived radioiodines to thyroid doses received by evacuees from the Chernobyl area estimated using early in vivo activity measurements”, Radiation Protection Dosimetry, vol. 105, nos 1–4, pp. 593–599, 2003. [BAL 14] BALLY B., CHEVALIER P., Retour d’expérience en santé (REX): Comprendre et mettre en œuvre, Haute Autorité de Santé, Mission Sécurité du patient, December 2014.

References

275

[BAL 15] BALDWIN J., GRANTHAM V., “Radiation hormesis: Historical and current perspectives”, Journal of Nuclear Medicine Technology, vol. 43, pp. 242–246, 2015. [BAR 12] BARBRY F., CHABRE A., FOUILLAUD P., Le réacteur SILENE, pour l’étude des accidents de criticité, available at: http://www.cea.fr/Pages/domaines-rec herche/energies/energie-nucleaire/reacteurs-nucleaires-experimentaux.aspx?Ty pe=Chapitre&numero=4, pp. 127–129, 2012. [BAR 13] BARRACHIN M., DE LUZE O., HASTE T. et al., “Late phase fuel degradation in the Phébus FP tests”, Annals of Nuclear Energy, vol. 61, pp. 36–53, 2013. [BAS 13] BAS A., GASTINEAU P., HAY J. et al., “Méthodes d’équivalence et compensation du dommage environnemental”, Revue d’économie politique, no. 123, pp. 127–157, 2013. [BAT 19] BATMUNKH M., BAYARCHIMEG L., BUGAY A.N. et al., “Monte Carlo track structure simulation in studies of biological effects induced by accelerated charged particles in the central nervous system”, EPJ Web of Conferences, vol. 204, 2019. [BAU 15] BAUDIN N., Étude expérimentale et modélisation de l’ébullition transitoire, Thesis, University of Toulouse, October 2015. [BEA 12] BEASLEY D.E., BONISOLI-ALQUATI A., WELCH S.M. et al., “Effects of parental radiation exposure on developmental instability in grasshoppers”, Journal of Evolutionary Biology, vol. 25, pp. 1149–1162, 2012. [BEA 16] BEAUCHET F., FERNANDEZ C., ROGER M. et al., Le Retour d’Expérience. Un instrument de gouvernance des risques, Master ingénierie des risques, Université Paris Descartes, 2016. [BEA 19] BEAUGELIN-SEILLER K., GARNIER-LAPLACE J., DELLA-VEDOVA C. et al., “Decrease in abundance of mammals in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone confirmed by dose reconstruction”, Personal communication, 2019. [BEE 14] BEELEN R., RAASCHOU O., STAFOGGIA M. et al., “Effects of long-term exposure to air pollution on natural-cause mortality: An analysis of 22 European cohorts within the multicentre ESCAPE project”, The Lancet, vol. 383, no. 9919, pp. 785–795, 2014. [BEH 07] BEHAR A., “Accidents nucléaires militaires: Ce qui émerge de l’iceberg ‘Secret Défense’”, Revue MGN, vol. 22, no. 4, available at: http://amfpgn.org /site/accidents-nucleaires-militaires-ce-qui-emerge-de-liceberg-secret-defense/, 2007.

276

Nuclear Accidents

[BEH 13] BEHAR A., “Quelles leçons faut-il tirer de la catastrophe de Fukushima pour les médecins praticiens?”, Médecine et Guerre Nucléaire, pp. 2–8, March 2013. [BEH 14] BEHAR A., “Un nouveau regard sur la cataracte radio induite”, Santé et Paix, July 2014. [BEH 15] BEHAR A., “Quelles pratiques médicales en zone radio-contaminée?”, Médecine et Guerre Nucléaire, pp. 13–15, March 2015. [BEL 15] BELHARET M., Modélisation numérique du transfert du radiocésium dans les chaînes trophiques pélagiques marines suite à l’accident nucléaire de Fukushima Dai-ichi (Côte Pacifique du Japon), Thesis, Toulouse, October 2015. [BEL 16] BELHARET M., ESTOURNEL C., CHARMASSON S., “Ecosystem model based approach for modeling the dynamics of 137Cs transfer to marine plankton populations: Application to the Western North Pacific Ocean after the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident”, Biogeosciences, vol. 13, pp. 499–516, 2016. [BEN 15] BENTAÏB A. MEYNET N., BLEYER A. et al., “Overview on hydrogen risk research and development activities: Methodology and open issues”, Nuclear Engineering Technology, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 26–32, 2015. [BER 99] BERTELL R., “Victims of the nuclear age”, The Ecologist, vol. 29, no. 7, pp. 408–411, 1999. [BER 04] BERTEL E., NAUDET G., L’économie de l’énergie nucléaire, EDP Sciences, Les Ulis, 2004. [BER 06] BERTELL R., “First assessment of the actual deaths toll attributable to the Chernobyl accident”, in BUSBY C., YABLOKOV A.V. (eds), Chernobyl 20 Years On, ECRR, Brussels, 2006. [BÈS 98] BÈS M.P., “La capitalisation active des connaissances Principes, contextes et obstacles”, Annales des Mines, Gérer et Comprendre, no. 54, pp. 38–51, December 1998. [BEY 17] BEYEA J., “Lessons to be learned from a contentious challenge to mainstream radiobiological science (the linear no-threshold theory of genetic mutations)”, Environmental Research, vol. 154, pp. 362–379, 2017. [BEZ 15] BEZRUKOV V., MØLLER A.P., MILINEVSKY G. et al., “Heterogeneous relationships between abundance of soil surface invertebrates and radiation from Chernobyl”, Ecological Indicators, vol. 52, pp. 128–133, 2015.

References

277

[BEZ 16] BEZHENAR R., JUNG K.T., MADERICH V. et al., “Transfer of radiocaesium from contaminated bottom sediments to marine organisms through benthic food chains in post-Fukushima and post-Chernobyl periods”, Biogeosciences, vol. 13, pp. 3021–3034, 2016. [BIR 09] BIRCHLEY J., LIAO Y., “Development and assessment program for the MELCOR code”, ENSI Erfahrungs- und Forschungsbericht, pp. 117–123, avilable at: https://www.psi.ch/sites/default/files/import/sacre/YearrepEN/ensi _2009_1a.pdf, 2009. [BOI 15] BOILEY D., “L’impact sanitaire de la catastrophe de Fukushima”, Les cahiers de GLOBAL CHANCE, no. 37, pp. 63–71, 2015. [BOI 16a] BOILEY D., Fukushima cinq ans après: Quel impact sanitaire?, ACRO, 2016. [BOI 16b] BOIS P., “La convergence des dispositifs entre pays frontaliers en situation d’urgence est une priorité, ASN. La gestion des situations d’urgence”, Contrôle, no. 201, pp. 24, 2016. [BOL 16] BOLOT P., “Une réponse aux risques radiologiques planifiée sur l’ensemble du territoire”, Contrôle, no. 201, pp. 16–17, 2016. [BON 15a] BONDAR Y.I., NENASHEV R.A., KALINICHENKO S.A., “The distribution of 137Cs, 90Sr, and 241Am in waterbodies of different origins in the Belarusian part of Chernobyl exclusion zone”, Water, Air, and Soil Pollution, vol. 226, no. 23, pp. 1–13, 2015. [BON 15b] BONNEVILLE H., CARÉNINI L., BARRACHIN M., “Fukushima core melt composition simulation with ASTEC”, Nureth-16, Chicago, United States, August 30–September 4 2015. [BON 16] BONFRATE A., Développement d’un modèle analytique dédié au calcul des doses secondaires neutroniques aux organes sains des patients en protonthérapie, Thesis, University of Paris-Saclay, November 2016. [BOS 08] BOSLAND L., FUNKE F., GIRAULT N. et al., “PARIS project: Radiolytic oxidation of molecular iodine in containment during a nuclear reactor severe accident Part 1. Formation and destruction of air radiolysis products—Experimental results and modelling”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 238, pp. 3542–3550, 2008. [BOS 10a] BOSLAND L., CANTREL L., GIRAULT N. et al., “Modelling of iodine radiochemistry in the ASTEC severe accident code: Description and application to FPT-2 Phébus test”, Nuclear Technology, vol. 171, no. 1, pp. 88–107, 2010.

278

Nuclear Accidents

[BOS 10b] BOSLAND L., COLOMBANI J., POWERS D. et al., “Towards a mechanistic interpretation of the iodine – paint interaction”, 4th European Review Meeting on Severe Accident Research (ERMSAR-2010), Bologna, Italy, May 11–12, 2010. [BOS 11] BOSLAND L., FUNKE F., LANGROCK G. et al., “PARIS project: Radiolytic oxidation of molecular iodine in containment during a nuclear reactor severe accident: Part 2. Formation and destruction of iodine oxides compounds under irradiation – Experimental results modelling”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 241, pp. 4026–4044, 2011. [BOT 16] BOTERO-LOPEZ J.D., NOYES D., “Méthodologie RMAP: Un outil d’assistance à la gestion des risques fondé sur le retour d’expérience”, 20e congrès de maîtrise des risques et de sûreté de fonctionnement, Saint-Malo, France, October 11–13, 2016. [BOU 14a] BOURRUS S., Étude du colmatage de filtres THE plans et à petits plis par des agrégats de Nanoparticules simulant un aérosol de combustion, Thesis, École nationale supérieure des industries chimiques (ENSIC) de Nancy, December 2014. [BOU 14b] BOUTIN J.D., “Le PA en question. REX de l’exercice de CATTENOM”, Séminaire IRSN-ANCCLI sur le post-accident, Paris, October 15–16, 2014. [BOU 14c] BOUVILLE A., KRYUCHKOV V., “Increased occupational radiation doses: Nuclear fuel cycle”, Health Physics, vol. 106, pp. 259–271, 2014. [BOU 16a] BOUCHOT E., ROBIN M., “Les exercices de crise avec pression médiatique simulée”, Contrôle, no. 201, pp. 46–47, 2016. [BOU 16b] BOUET P., “Une campagne rationnelle, soucieuse d’impliquer l’ensemble des acteurs”, Contrôle, no. 201, p. 36, 2016. [BRI 18] BRIGHT S., KADHIM M., “The future impacts of non-targeted effects”, International Journal of Radiation Biology, vol. 94, no. 8, pp. 727–736, 2018. [BRO 86] BROWNE E., FIRESTONE R., in SHIRLEY V (ed.), Table of Radioactive Isotopes, Wiley-Interscience Publication, 1986. [BRO 02] BROSWIMMER F.J., Ecocide: A Short History of Mass Extinction of Species, Pluto Press, London, 2002. [BRO 11] BROMET E.J., HAVENAAR J.M., GUEY L.T., “A 25 year retrospective review of the psychological consequences of the Chernobyl accident”, Clinical Oncology, vol. 23, pp. 297–305, 2011. [BUE 17] BUESSELER K., DAI M., AOYAMA M. et al., “Fukushima Daiichi-derived radionuclides in the ocean: Transport, fate, and impacts”, Annual Review of Marine Science, vol. 9, pp. 173–203, 2017.

References

279

[BUN 01a] BUNN M., BUNN G., Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage, IAEA-SM-367/4/08, 2001. [BUN 01b] BUNN M., BUNN G., “Nuclear theft and sabotage. Priorities for reducing new threats”, IAEA Bulletin, vol. 43, pp. 20–29, 2001. [BUN 02a] BUNN M., BUNN G., “Strengthening nuclear security against post-September 11 threats of theft and sabotage”, JNMM, pp. 1–13, Spring 2002. [BUN 02b] BUNN M., HOLDREN J.P., WIER A., Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Nuclear Threat Initiative, available at: http://www.belfercenter.org/publication /securing-nuclear-weaponsand-materials-seven-steps-immediate-action, 2002. [BUN 14] BUNN M.G., MALIN M.B., ROTH N. et al., “Advancing nuclear security: Evaluating progress and setting new goals”, The Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/240 14/advancing_nuclear_security.html, March 2014. [BUS 11] BUSBY C., “Predicting the global health consequences of the Chernobyl accident, methodology of the European Committee on Radiation Risk”, Green Audit, Aberystwyth, April 24, 2011, available at: https://www.sortirdu nucleaire.org/IMG/pdf/ecrr-2011-predicting_the_global_health_consequences _of_the_chernobyl_accident_with_ecrr_methodology.pdf, 2011. [CAL 15] CALMON P., GONZE M.A., MOURLON C., “Modeling the early phase redistribution of radiocesium fallouts in an evergreen coniferous forest after Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents”, Science of the Total Environment, vol. 529, pp. 30–39, 2015. [CAN 17] CANTIN G., AZIZ-ALAOUI M., VERDIÈRE N. et al., “Mathematical modeling of human behaviors during catastrophic events: Stability and bifurcations”, International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, vol. 26, no. 10, p. 1630025, 2017. [CAN 18] CANTIN G., Étude de réseaux complexes de systèmes dynamiques dissipatifs ou conservatifs en dimension finie ou infinie. Application à l’analyse des comportements humains en situation de catastrophe, Thesis, Normandie University, 2018. [CAR 06] CAROLI T., BLEYER A., BENTAÏB A. et al., “The development of severe accidents codes at IRSN and their application to support the safety assessment of EPR 14-89461”, Proceedings of ICONE14, 14th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering, Miami, Florida, USA, DSR 132 report, July 17–20, 2006.

280

Nuclear Accidents

[CAR 12] CARPENTIER A., BAULIEU E.E., BREZIN E. et al., L’accident majeur de Fukushima. Considérations sismiques, nucléaires et médicales, EDP Sciences, Les Ulis, 2012. [CAR 13] CARTONNET A., Contribution à l’étude du rejet à l’environnement de l’iode radioactif lors d’une séquence accidentelle de type RTGV, Thesis, Cadarache (Bouches-du-Rhône), December 2013. [CAR 16a] CARESTIA M., MALIZIA A., BARLASCINI O. et al., “Use of the “hotspot” code for safety and security analysis in nuclear power plants: A case study”, Environmental Engineering and Management Journal, vol. 15, pp. 905–912, 2016. [CAR 16b] CARTER H., AMLÔT R., “Mass casualty decontamination guidance and psychosocial aspects of CBRN incident management: A review and synthesis”, PLoS Currents, 27 Sep 2016; 8. pii: ecurrents.dis.c2d3d652d9d07a2a620ed5429 e017ef5. [CAR 18] CARDARELLI J.J., ULSH B.A., “It is time to move beyond the linear no-threshold theory for low-dose radiation protection”, Dose-Response, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 1–24, July–September 2018. [CAS 13] CASTRILLON ESCOBAR S., MEIGNEN R., RIMBERT N. et al., “Modeling liquid nuclear fuel fragmentation and dispersion during a severe nuclear incident”, 5th International conference on Spray Deposition and Melt Atomization, Bremen, Germany, September 23–25, 2013. [CAS 15] CASTRILLON ESCOBAR S., MEIGNEN R., PICCHI S. et al., “A two-scale approach for modeling the corium melt fragmentation during fuel-coolant interaction”, NURETH-16, Chicago, IL, August 30–September 4, 2015. [CAT 16] CATELINOIS J.M., “Le maire est un relais de proximité essentiel auprès de ses concitoyens”, Contrôle, no. 201, pp. 35, 2016. [CEA 06] CEA, Site de Saclay, “Gestion de crises”, éclairages, no. 6, pp. 8–14, September 2006. [CEA 14a] CEA, “Que faire en cas d’accident sur le site de Marcoule?”, Dépliant d’information des populations “Ayez les bons réflexes”, available at: http://mar coule.cea.fr/Marcoule/Documents/Pdf/CEA-PLAQ-PPI-A5.pdf, 2014. [CEA 14b] CEA, Périodes radioactives, périodes recommandées, CEA, Laboratoire Henri Becquerel, 2014. [CEA 15] CEA, Mini table des radionucléides, CEA, Laboratoire Henri Becquerel, EDP Sciences, Les Ulis, 2015. [CEP 18a] CEPN, NERIS, available at: http://www.eu-neris.net/, 2018.

References

281

[CEP 18b] CEPN, RELIR, système de retour d’expérience sur les incidents radiologiques, available at: http://relir.cepn.asso.fr/, 2018. [CHA 11] CHAHLAFI M., Modélisation du rayonnement thermique dans un cœur de réacteur nucléaire dégradé en présence de vapeur et de gouttes d’eau, Thesis, École Centrale de Paris, January 2011. [CHA 12] CHAGVARDIEFF P., QUEMENEUR E., “Les perspectives de décontamination des territoires”, L’accident de Fukushima: Conséquences radiologiques et premiers enseignements, Journée SFRP, Paris, February 9, 2012. [CHA 15] CHAMBRU M., “La critique du régime technopolitique des sciences par la mouvance antinucléaire: Un éclairage sur le concept d’espace public oppositionnel”, © Les Enjeux de l’information et de la communication, available at: http://lesenjeux.u-grenoble3.fr/, no. 16/3A, pp. 30–38, 2015. Article published online June 30, 2015. [CHA 16] CHANSON D., “Les exercices de crises chez Areva”, Contrôle, no. 201, pp. 52–53, 2016. [CHA 19] CHATZIPAPAS K.P., PAPADIMITROULAS P., OBEIDAT M. et al., “Quantification of DNA double-strand breaks using Geant4-DNA”, Medical Physics, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 405–413, 2019. [CHE 13] CHEVALIER C., Fast uncertainty reduction strategies relying on Gaussian process models, Thesis, University of Berne, Switzerland, September 2013. [CHE 17] CHERIF M.A., Modélisation dynamique de la (bio)disponibilité des radionucléides dans les sols: Approche comparative modèles expériences appliquée au transfert de césium dans la rhizosphère, Thesis, Aix-Marseille University, 2017. [CHI 15] CHIKHI N., GARCIN T., FOUBERT F. et al., “First experimental results of large scale debris bed relood tests in the PEARL facility”, Nureth-16, Chicago, United States, August 30–September 4, 2015. [CLA 09] CLARKE R.H., VALENTIN J., “The history of ICRP and the evolution of its policies”, ICRP Publication 109, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 75–110, 2009. [CLA 15] CLAVIER R., CHIKHI N., FICHOT F. et al., “Experimental investigation on single-phase pressure losses in nuclear debris beds: Identification of flow regimes and effective diameter”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 292, pp. 222–236, 2015.

282

Nuclear Accidents

[CLÉ 13a] CLÉMENT B., ZEYEN R., “The objectives of the Phébus FP experimental programme and main findings”, Annals of Nuclear Energy, vol. 61, pp. 4–10, 2013. [CLÉ 13b] CLÉMENT C., JACQUEMAIN D., “Enseignements tirés des accidents de Three Mile Island et de Tchernobyl et du programme de recherche Phébus-PF”, in JACQUEMAIN D., BENTAÏB A., BONNEVILLE H. et al. (eds), Les accidents de fusion du cœur des réacteurs nucléaires de puissance. État des connaissances, EDP Sciences, Les Ulis, pp. 361–416, 2013. [CLI 07] CLI DE CADARACHE, Les plans particuliers d’intervention, available at: http://cli-cadarache.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Cadarache/CEA/ppi.pdf, 2007. [COA 04] COATES P.J., LORIMORE S.A., WRIGHT E.G., “Damaging and protective cell signalling in the untargeted effects of ionizing radiation”, Mutation Research, vol. 568, pp. 5–20, 2004. [COA 05] COATES C.W., BROADHEAD B.L., KRICHINSKY A.M. et al., “Radiation effects on personnel performance capability and a summary of dose levels for spent research reactor fuels”, ORNL/TM-2005/261, 2005. [COC 11] COCHRAN T.B., MCKINZIE M.G., “Global implications of the Fukushima disaster for nuclear power”, World Federation of Scientists’ International Seminars on Planetary Emergencies, Ettore Majorana Centre, Erice, Sicily, available at: https://assets.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/nuc_11102801a.pdf, August 19–25, 2011. [COD 95] CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, Codex General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and Feed. CODEX STAN 193-1995, available at: http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/livestockgov/documents/1_CXS_193 e.pdf, 1995. [COD 10] CODIRPA, “Guide national de préparation à la sortie de la phase d’urgence à la suite d’un accident nucléaire conduisant à des rejets de moyenne ampleur et de courte durée sur le territoire français”, CODIRPA, ASN, available at: https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/44/026 /44026160.pdf, 2010. [COD 15] CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, General standard for contaminants and toxins in food and feed (CODEX STAN 193-1995), available at: www.fao.org/input /download/standards/17/CXS_193e_2015.pdf, 2015. [COE 15] COEYTAUX K., BEY E., CHRISTENSEN D. et al. “Reported radiation overexposure accidents worldwide, 1980–2013: A systematic review”, PLOS One, 19 March 2015. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0118709.

References

283

[COL 80] COLLINS V.P., GAULDEN M.E., “A case of child abuse by radiation exposure”, in HÜBNER K.F., FRY S.A. (eds), The Medical Basis for Radiation Accident Preparedness, Elsevier/North Holland, New York, pp. 197–203, 1980. [COL 93] COLLINS D., CARVALHO A., “Chronic stress from the Goiania 137 Cs radiation accident”, Behavioral Medicine, vol. 18, pp. 149–157, 1993. [COL 13] COLOMBANI J., PASCAL C., MONCHALIN N. et al., “Experimental study of organic iodide in the containment during a severe accident”, 6th European Review Meeting on Severe Accident Research (ERMSAR-2013), Palais des Papes, Avignon, France, October 2–4, 2013. [COL 14] COLMELLERE C., “Une expérience pédagogique du débat public en école d’ingénieur. Le cas du nucléaire”, SHS Web of Conferences 13, 03001, 2014. doi:10.1051/shsconf/20141303001. [COM 18] COMBE R., Développement d’un télescope à protons de recul pour la spectrométrie neutron: Applications à l’instrumentation de précision et à la protonthérapie, Thesis, University of Strasbourg, 2018. [CON 84] CONARD R.A., “Late radiation effects in Marshall Islanders exposed to fallout 28 years ago”, in BOICE JR J.D., FRAUMENI JR J.F. (eds), Radiation, Thermal, and Other Environmental Pollutant Effects on Living Organisms and Biological Materials (c1500), Raven Press, New York, NY, pp. 57–71, 1984. [CON 15] CONNAN O., MARO D., HÉBERT D. et al., “In situ measurements of tritium evapotranspiration (3H-ET) flux over grass and soil using the gradient and eddy covariance experimental methods and the FAO-56 model”, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, vol. 148, pp. 1–9, 2015. [CON 17] CONSEIL EXECUTIF DE L’ONTARIO, “Plan provincial d’intervention en cas d’urgence nucléaire (PPIUN), Plan directeur 2017”, 2017. [CON 19] CONTE D., MOYA X., “Guide n°24 de l’ASN: Gestion des sols pollués par les activités d’une INB”, Journées techniques de la SFRP “Sols, sédiments séminaire et radioactivité”, January 6–7, 2019. [COO 49] COONEY J.P., “Psychological factors in atomic warfare”, American Journal of Public Health, vol. 19, pp. 969–973, 1949. [COP 12] COPPLESTONE D., “Application of radiological protection measures to meet different environmental protection criteria”, First ICRP Symposium on the International System of Radiological Protection, Bethesda, USA, October 24–26, 2011, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 41, nos 3–4, pp. 263–274, 2012.

284

Nuclear Accidents

[COP 19] COPPIN F., MENGISTU T.T., CARASCO L. et al., “Transfert de radionucléides dans les sols forestiers: Influence de la nature de la contamination”, Journées techniques de la SFRP “Sols, sédiments séminaire et radioactivité”, January 6–7, 2019. [COU 01] COUGHTREY P., “Accidental releases and countermeasures”, in VAN DER STRICHT E., KIRCHMANN R. (eds), Radioecology. Radioactivity and Ecosystems, UIR, Liège, pp. 467–512, 2001. [COU 14] COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2013/59/Euratom of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation, and repealing Directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Euratom, Official Journal of the European Union, L13, January 17, 2014. [COU 17] COUTURIER J., SCHWARZ M., Etat des recherches dans le domaine de la sûreté des réacteurs à eau sous pression, EDP Sciences, Les Ulis, 2017. [CRA 10] CRANGA M., SPINDLER B., DUFOUR E. et al., “Simulation of corium concrete interaction in 2D geometry”, Progress in Nuclear Energy, vol. 52, pp. 76–83, 2010. [CRO 85] CROCQ L., CROCQ M.A., “Panic and catastrophe behavior in modern warfare”, in MANGELSDORFF A.D., KING J.M., O’BRIEN D.E. (eds), Proceedings Fourth Users’ Workshop on Combat Stress; Lessons Learned in Recent Operational Experiences, pp. 247–253, 1985. [CRO 94] CROCQ L., “La psychologie des catastrophes et les blessés psychiques”, in NOTO R., HUGUENARD P., LARCAN A. (eds), Médecine de catastrophe, Masson, Paris, 1994. [CRO 13] CROCQ L., Les paniques collectives, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2013. [CSE 13] CSEREKLYEI Z., Measuring the impacts of nuclear accidents on energy policya, Working paper no. 151, Department of Economics, Wirtschafts University, Wien, 2013. [CUR 16] CURTIS J., MORGENROTH E., COYNE B., “The potential economic impact of a nuclear accident – An Irish case study”, prepared by the Economic and Social Research Institute for the Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government, April 21, 2016, available at: https://www.esri.ie/system /files/media/file-uploads/2016-12/BKMNEXT313.pdf, 2016. [CUT 82] CUTTER S., BARNES K., “Evacuation behaviour and Three Mile Island”, Disasters, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 116–124, 1982.

References

285

[DAI 19] DAINIAK N., ALBANESE J., KAUSHIK M. et al., “Concepts of operations for a us dosimetry and biodosimetry network”, Radiation Protection Dosimetry, ncy294, Volume Advance Article, February 6, 2019, available at: https://doi.org /10.1093/rpd/ncy294, 2019. [DDM 18] DDMP (DISTRICT DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN), Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Manual, Volume II, prepared by the Uttara Kannada District Disaster Management Authority for Kaiga Nuclear Power Plant, available at: http://uttarakannada.nic.in/docs/DisasterManagement/DDMP _Volume_02.pdf, 2018. [DEC 06] DE CARBONNIERES H., LAROCHE P., FOEHRENBACH H., “Terrorisme radiologique: Scénarios, enjeux et principes de prise en charge”, Médecine Nucléaire, no. 30, pp. 447–451, 2006. [DEC 07] DECHY N., DIEN Y., “Les échecs du retour d’expérience dans l’industrie: Problème de verticalité et/ou de transversalité”, Les entretiens du Risques (IMdR) “Maîtrise des malveillances et conception des systèmes d’information face aux risques”, Paris, December 13–14, 2007. [DEC 12] DECLERCQ C., PASCAL M., CHANEL O. et al., Impact sanitaire de la pollution atmosphérique dans neuf villes françaises. Résultats du projet Aphekom, Report, Institut de veille sanitaire, Saint-Maurice, 2012. [DEC 15] DECRETON A., BENIGNI P., ROGEZ J. et al., “Contribution to the description of the absorber rod behavior in severe accident conditions: An experimental investigation of the Ag–Zr phase diagram”, Journal of Nuclear Materials, vol. 465, pp. 849–856, 2015. [DEC 16] DECRETON A., Contribution expérimentale à l’étude thermodynamique des systèmes Ag-Z et Ag-Cd-In, Thesis, University of Aix-Marseille, March 2016. [DEL 02] DELANGE F., “Iodine deficiency in Europe and its consequences: An update”, European Journal of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging, vol. 29, no. Suppl. 2, pp. S404–S416, 2002. [DEL 06] DELACROIX D., GUERRE J.P., LEBLANC P., Guide pratique Radionucléides & Radioprotection. Manuel pour la manipulation de substances radioactives dans les laboratoires de faible et moyenne activité, EDP Sciences, Les Ulis, 2006. [DEL 12] DELICAR Y., Étude de la réactivité de l’iode transporté dans un mélange H2/H2O en conditions de combustion dans des flammes basse pression pré-mélangées, Thesis, University of Lille, June 2012.

286

Nuclear Accidents

[DEL 13] DE LUZE O., HASTE T., BARRACHIN M. et al., “Early phase fuel degradation in Phébus FP: Initiating phenomena of degradation in fuel bundle tests”, Annals of Nuclear Energy, vol. 61, pp. 23–35, 2013. [DEL 14a] DELCOUR S., Étude des mécanismes physico-chimiques de mise en suspension de contaminants particulaires lors de la dégradation thermique de matériaux représentatifs des installations nucléaires, Thesis, Mines ParisTech, November 2014. [DEL 14b] DELCOUR S., HEBERT D., OUF F.X. et al., “Feasibility of particle imaging velocimetry in cone calorimeter experiments”, Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Fire Safety Science, 2014. [DEL 16a] DELALONDE J.C., “Aller vers une culture citoyenne du risque implique d’apporter à tous les citoyens résidant sur le territoire une réelle information sur la conduite à tenir en cas d’accident nucléaire”, Contrôle, vol. 201, pp. 22–23, 2016. [DEL 16b] DELAMARE V., “Dans un monde très électro-centré, le groupe EDF se doit d’avoir une organisation de crise résiliente, robuste et réactive”, Contrôle, vol. 201, pp. 20–21, 2016. [DEL 16c] DELMESTRE A., “Au-delà de la distribution d’iode, développer une culture du risque nucléaire au sein de la population”, Contrôle, no. 201, pp. 28–29, 2016. [DEP 16] DEPROIT L., VIEUBLE J., “Des exercices de crise à la gestion des situations d’urgence, le regard d’une division”, Contrôle, vol. 201, pp. 48–49, 2016. [DER 05] DE REVEL T., GOURMELON P., VIDAL D. et al., Menace terroriste approche médicale, John Libbey Eurotext, Montrouge, 2005. [DER 15] DERYABINA T.G., KUCHMEL S.V., NAGORSKAYA L.L. et al., “Long-term census data reveal abundant wildlife populations at Chernobyl”, Current Biology, vol. 25, 19, pp. R824–R826, 2015. [DES 15] DESQUINES J., DROUAN D., PHILIPPE M., “A new model on radial hydride precipitation in Zircaloy-4 claddings under decaying stress and temperature transient”, International Conference on Management of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactors – An Integrated Approach to the Back-End of the Fuel Cycle, Vienna, Austria, June 2015. [DES 16] DESQUINES J., DROUAN D., GUILBERT S. et al., “Embrittlement of prehydrided Zircaloy-4 by steam oxidation under simulated LOCA transients”, Journal of Nuclear Materials, vol. 469, pp. 20–31, 2016.

References

287

[DES 18] DESQUINES J., GUILBERT S., TAURINES T. et al., “Fracture mechanics analysis of Zircaloy-4 tubular samples after laboratory simulated LOCA transient”, Engineering Fracture Mechanics, vol. 193, pp. 96–107, 2018. [DEV 13] DEVAUX P., COLLIGNON A., Le livre blanc sur la sûreté des installations nucléaires civiles de la Manche “post Fukushima”, Inter-CLI, 2013. [DID 14] DIDIER D., “Principaux enjeux de radioprotection en cas d’accident nucléaire”, Action ANCCLI-IRSN sur le post-accident, Seminar, October 15–16, 2014. [DIL 16] DILLON M., KANE J., NASSTROM J. et al., Summary of Building Protection Factor Studies for External Exposure to Ionizing Radiation, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, LLNL-TR-684121, 2016. [DIN 17] DING C.Y., GAO L., “Low dose radiation exposure and cardiovascular diseases: A review”, International Journal of Cardiovascular Practice, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 76–79, 2017. [DJA 17] DJALALI A., DELLA CORTE F., SEGOND F. et al., “TIER competency-based training course for the first receivers of CBRN casualties: A European perspective”, European Journal of Emergency Medicine, vol. 5, pp. 371–376, 2017. [DO 19] DO X.B., “Fukushima Nuclear Disaster displacement: How far people moved and determinants of evacuation destinations”, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, vol. 33, pp. 235–252, 2019. [DOD 11] DODGEN D., NORWOOD A.E., BECKER S.M. et al., “Social, psychological, and behavioral responses to a nuclear detonation in a US city: Implications for health care planning and delivery”, Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, vol. 5, suppl. 1, pp. S54–S64, 2011. [DSC 06] DSC (DIRECTION DE LA SECURITE CIVILE), Guide ORSEC Départemental. Méthode générale. Tome G1, Direction de la Défense et de la Sécurité Civiles, Ministère de l’intérieur, République française, 2006. [DSC 08] DSC, Face aux risques technologiques Soyez acteur de votre sécurité, Ministère de l’intérieur, République française, 2008. [DSC 09a] DSC, Exercices de sécurité civile. Guide thématique sur les exercices PPI, Ministère de l’intérieur, République française, 2009. [DSC 09b] DSC, Guide ORSEC Départemental. Dispositions générales. Mode d’action “soutien des populations”. Tome G2, Direction de la Défense et de la Sécurité Civiles, Ministère de l’intérieur, République française, 2009.

288

Nuclear Accidents

[DSC 10] DSC, Guide ORSEC Départemental. La cellule d’information du public. Tome G3, Direction de la Défense et de la Sécurité Civiles, Ministère de l’intérieur, République française, 2010. [DSC 13] DSC, Guide ORSEC Départemental. Alerte et information des populations. Tome G4, Direction de la Défense et de la Sécurité Civiles, Ministère de l’intérieur, République française, 2013. [DSC 19] DSC (DIRECTION DE LA SECURITE CIVILE), Organisation de la Réponse de Sécurité Civile pour la protection générale des populations, Ministère de l’intérieur, de l’Outre-mer et des collectivités territoriales, Direction de la Sécurité Civile, Paris, available at: https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/content /download/36239/273767/file/plaquette%20ORSEC.pdf, 2019. [DUB 16a] DUBIAU P., ISNARD O., “Scénariser un accident pour un exercice de crise”, Contrôle, vol. 201, p. 45, 2016. [DUB 16b] DUBIAU P., ISNARD O., “L’intervention de l’IRSN sur le terrain lors des exercices nationaux de crise”, Contrôle, no. 201, pp. 54–55, 2016. [DUF 16] DUFFA C., BAILLY DU BOIS P., CAILLAUD M. et al., “Development of emergency response tools for accidental radiological contamination of French coastal areas”, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, no. 151, pp. 487–494, 2016. [DUR 10] DURIEZ C., GUILBERT S., STERN A. et al., “Characterization of oxygen distribution in LOCA situations”, Proceedings of the 16th International Symposium on the Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry, Chengdu, China, May 9–13, 2010. [DUR 17] DURAKOVIC A., “Medical effects of a transuranic ‘dirty bomb’”, Military Medicine, vol. 182, nos 3–4, pp. e1591–e1595, 2017. [EBN 16] EBNER D.K., OHSAWA M., IGARI K. et al., “Lifestyle-related diseases following the evacuation after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident: A retrospective study of Kawauchi Village with longterm follow-up”, BMJ Open, vol. 6, p. e011641, 2016. [EDF 11] EDF, En cas d’accident nucléaire, à la centrale de Nogent-sur-Seine, ayez les bons réflexes, available at: https://www.edf.fr/sites/default/files/contrib /groupe-edf/producteur-industriel/carte-des-implantations/centrale-nogent-sur-se ine/presentation/ppi2011.pdf, 2011. [EEC 00] EECKHOULT L., SCHEIBER C., SCHNEIDER T., “Risk aversion and the external cost of a nuclear accident”, Journal of Environmental Management, vol. 58, pp. 109–117, 2000.

References

289

[EIK 16] EIKELMANN I.M., HERIARD-DUBREUIL G., MURAYAMA T. et al., “Local Populations Facing Long-Term Consequences of Nuclear Accidents: Lessons Learnt from Fukushima and Chernobyl” in Radioprotection, January 2016. [ENS 12] ENSREG (EUROPEAN NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATORS GROUP), Stress tests performed on European nuclear power plants, Peer review report, v12i-2012 04 25, 2012. [ERM 11] ERMAKOV A.V., KONKOVA M.S., KOSTYUK S.V. et al., “An extracellular DNA mediated bystander effect produced from low dose irradiated endothelial cells”, Mutation Research, vol. 712, pp. 1–10, 2011. [EST 12a] ESTRADE J., “Le réacteur expérimental CABRI, pour l’étude des accidents de réactivité”, pp. 119–122, available at: http://www.cea.fr/Pages /domaines-recherche/energies/energie-nucleaire/reacteurs-nucleaires-experiment aux.aspx?Type=Chapitre&numero=4, 2012. [EST 12b] ESTRADE J., CHABRE A., BONIN B., Le réacteur de recherche PHÉBUS, pour l’étude des accidents de perte de réfrigération, pp. 123–126, available at: http://www.cea.fr/Pages/domaines-recherche/energies/energie-nucleaire/react eurs-nucleaires-experimentaux.aspx?Type=Chapitre&numero=4, 2012. [EUR 16] EURATOM, “Règlement (Euratom) 2016/52 du Conseil du 15 janvier 2016 fixant les niveaux maximaux admissibles de contamination radioactive pour les denrées alimentaires et les aliments pour animaux après un accident nucléaire ou dans toute autre situation d’urgence radiologique, et abrogeant le règlement (Euratom) no 3954/87 et les règlements (Euratom) no 944/89 et (Euratom) no 770/90 de la Commission”, Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, pp. L 13/2–L 13/11, 2016. [FAH 11] FAHLBRUCH B., SCHÖBEL M., “SOL – Safety through organizational learning: A method for event analysis”, Safety Science, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 27–31, 2011. [FAI 06] FAIRLIE I., SUMNER D., The other report on Chernobyl, Green Party Report, 2006. [FER 16] FERLET O., ANTOINE M.P., “Les pharmaciens en première ligne pour répondre aux questions du public”, Contrôle, no. 201, p. 37, 2016. [FIÉ 17] FIÉVET B., BAILLY-DU-BOIS P., LAGUIONIE P. et al., “A dual pathways transfer model to account for changes in the radioactive caesium level in demersal and pelagic fish after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident”, PLoS ONE, vol. 12, no. 3, p. e0172442, 2017.

290

Nuclear Accidents

[FLE 04] FLEUTOT J/B., “Le risque nucléaire”, Congrès de l’Association MAPAR (Mises Au Point en Anesthésie-Réanimation). MAPAR, available at: http://www.mapar.org/article/communications.php?champs=annee&clef=2004, pp. 407–412, 2004. [FOA 07] FOASSO C., “L’expertise de la sûreté nucléaire en France”, La revue pour l’histoire du CNRS, vol. 16, available at: http://histoire-cnrs.revues.org/1549, 2007. [FOR 98] FORROW L., BLAIR B., HELFAND I. et al., “Accidental nuclear war. A post–cold war assessment”, New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 338, pp. 1326–1331, 1998. [FOU 17] FOURNIER L., Effets sanitaires d’une exposition chronique à de faibles doses de rayonnements ionisants: Contribution à l’estimation des risques radio-induits de cancers dans une cohorte française de travailleurs du nucléaire, Thesis, University of Paris-Saclay, September 2017. [FRA 19] FRANCE BLEUE, La force d'action rapide nucléaire en exercice toute la semaine à la centrale de Chooz, available at: https://www.francebleu.fr /infos/climat-environnement/la-force-d-action-rapide-nucleaire-en-exercicetoute-la-semaine-a-la-centrale-de-chooz-1548842588, 2019. [FRO 13a] FROIDEFOND M., BLAVIGNAC I., BOISSAVI-MERCKX M., Guide d’intervention lors d’événement grave à l’usage des directeurs d’école et des chefs d’établissement, Académie de Limoges, October 2013. [FRO 13b] FROIDEVAUX P., BAECHLER S., BAILAT C.J. et al., “Improving forensic investigation for polonium poisoning”, The Lancet, vol. 382, p. 1308, 2013. [FRO 16] FROIDEVAUX P., BOCHUD F., BAECHLER S. et al., “210Po poisoning as possible cause of death: Forensic investigations and toxicological analysis of the remains of Yasser Arafat”, Forensic Science International, vol. 259, pp. 1–9, 2016. [GAL 12] GALLAY F., “Les actions engagées par les autorités japonaises”, L’accident de Fukushima: Conséquences radiologiques et premiers enseignements, Journée SFRP, Paris, February 9, 2012. [GAL 15] GALLAY F., GODET J.L., NIEL J.C., “French policy for managing the post-accident phase of a nuclear accident”, in ICRP (ed.), Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on the System of Radiological Protection, Annals of ICRP, vol. 44, suppl. 1, pp. 172–178, 2015. [GAM 07] GAMBINI D.J., GRANIER R., Manuel pratique de radioprotection, Lavoisier, Tec & Doc, Paris, 2007.

References

291

[GAO 03] GAO, United States General Accounting Office. Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Nuclear Security. Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security of Sealed Radioactive Sources. U.S. Senate, available at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/239624.pdf, August 2003. [GAR 10] GARNIER-LAPLACE J., DELLA-VEDOVA C., ANDERSSON P. et al., “A multi-criteria weight of evidence approach to derive ecological benchmarks for radioactive substances”, Journal of Radiological Protection, vol. 30, pp. 215–233, 2010. [GAR 15a] GARNIER-LAPLACE J., ALONZO F., ADAM-GUILLERMIN C., “Establishing relationships between environmental exposures to radionuclides and the consequences for wildlife: Inferences and weight of evidence”, in ICRP (ed.), Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on the System of Radiological Protection, Annals of ICRP, vol. 44, no. Suppl. 1, pp. 295–303, 2015. [GAR 15b] GARNIER-LAPLACE J., BEAUGELIN-SEILLER K., DELLA-VEDOVA C. et al., “Radiological dose reconstruction for birds reconciles outcomes of Fukushima with knowledge of dose–effect relationships”, Scientific Reports, vol. 5, p. 16594, 2015. [GAS 17] GASTALDO L., BABIK F., DUVAL F. et al., “Simulation of accelerated deflagrations using the P2REMICS software”, 17th International Topic Meeting on Nuclear Reactor Thermalhydraulics, China, 2017. [GAU 14] GAUDOUEN G., “Approche territoriale. Gestion post-accidentelle. Retour d’expérience. Exercice nucléaire transfrontalier”, IRSN-ANCCLI Seminar on the Post-Accident Phase, Paris, October 15–16, 2014. [GAU 19] GAUNTLETT L., AMLÔT R., RUBIN G.J., “How to inform the public about protective actions in a nuclear or radiological incident: A systematic review”, Lancet Psychiatry, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 72–80, 2019. [GAY 10] GAYRAL J.-P., “Terrorisme nucléaire et résilience”, Sécurité globale, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 117–128, available at: http://www.cairn.info/article .php?ID_ARTICLE=SECUG_011_0117, 2010. doi:10.3917/secug.011.0117. [GAZ 10] GAZAL S., AMIARD J.-C. (eds), Le tritium. Actualité d’aujourd’hui et de demain, Lavoisier, Tec & Doc, Paris, 2010. [GEN 15] GENTHON V., “L’approche HERCAWENRA pour une meilleure coordination transfrontalière des actions de protection durant la première phase d’un accident nucléaire”, Contrôle, no. 199, pp. 51–53, 2015.

292

Nuclear Accidents

[GEN 16] GENTHON B., “Gestion des situations d’urgence: Vers une évolution des PPI”, Contrôle, no. 201, pp. 13–14, 2016. [GEO 00] GEOFFROY B., VERGER P., LE GUEN B., “Pharmacocinétique de l’iode: Revue des connaissances utiles en radioprotection accidentelle”, Radioprotection, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 151–174, 2000. [GEO 14] GEORGENTHUM V., MOAL A., MARCHAND O., “SCANAIR, a transient fuel performance code part two: Assessment of modelling capabilities”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 280, pp. 172–180, 2014. [GIC 15] GICNT (GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT NUCLEAR TERRORISM), Statement of principles, available at: http://www.gicnt.org/documents/Statement _of_Principles.pdf, 2015. [GIG 15] GIGOUT E., “Le retour d’expérience: Principes, échecs et perspectives”, Le Libellio d’Aegis, vol. 11, pp. 31–38, 2015. [GIR 16] GIRARD S., MALLET V., KORSAKISSOK I. et al., “Emulation and Sobol’ sensitivity analysis of an atmospheric dispersion model applied to the Fukushima nuclear accident”, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres, vol. 121, pp. 3484–3496, 2016. [GIS 11] GISQUET E., OLDER M., A human and organizational factors perspective on the Fukushima nuclear accident, IRSN report, PSN-SRDS/SFOHREX no. 201501, available at: https://www.irsn.fr/FR/expertise/rapports_expertise/Documents /surete/IRSN-PSN-SRDS-SFOHREX_2015-01_Fukushima-Human-Organizatio nal.pdf, 2011. [GIS 15] GISQUET E., OLDER M., A human and organizational factors perspective on the Fukushima nuclear accident, March 11–15, 2011, IRSN report, PSNSRDS/SFOHREX no. 2015-01, 2015. [GLA 18] GLAIT H.M., SZENKIERMAN J., ECHEGOYEN L.A., “Controversia Hormesis o Modelo Lineal sin Umbral: Revisión o inacción”, Alasbimn Journal, Feb 2018 issue, pp. 1–16, 2018. [GLE 16] GLENN A.S., Avoiding Armageddon: The US Military’s Response to Trans-Regional Nuclear Proliferation in a Post-Soviet World. A Monograph, School of advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2016. [GOD 16] GODET J.L., “Les premières actions à engager à la sortie de la phase d’urgence (doctrine Codirpa, novembre 2011)”, Contrôle, no. 201, p. 15, 2016.

References

293

[GON 12] GONNER C., Perspectives de recherches relatives aux situations accidentelles, avec le réacteur Jules Horowitz, pp. 130–132, available at: http://www.cea.fr/Pages/domaines-recherche/energies/energie-nucleaire/reacteu rs-nucleaires-experimentaux.aspx?Type=Chapitre&numero=4, 2012. [GON 16] GONZE M.A., MOURLON C., CALMON P. et al., “Modelling the dynamics of ambient dose rates induced by radiocaesium in the Fukushima terrestrial environment”, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, vol. 161, pp. 22–34, 2016. [GON 19] GONZALES C.A.B., YASUDA H., HIROTA S. et al., “Investigation of the applicability of the ESR nail dosimetry for assessment of accidental exposure in medical facilities”, Radiation Measurements, vol. 124, pp. 91–97, 2019. [GOU 05] GOURMELON P., “Actualisation du risque radiologique et nucléaire”, in DE REVEL T., GOURMELON P., VIDAL D. et al. (eds), Menace terroriste approche médicale, John Libbey Eurotext, Montrouge, pp. 54–61, 2005. [GOU 07] GOURMELON P., “Stratégies et méthodes d’évaluation des doses en situation post-accidentelle: Premières réflexions du CODIR-PA/GT3”, ASN, Séminaire post-accidentel nucléaire, Programme français CODIRPA et travaux internationaux, Paris, December 6–7, 2007. [GOU 08] GOURMELON P., “Gestion médicale et psychosociale d’un acte de malveillance à caractère radiologique”, SFRP, Session 8 La radioprotection en situation accidentelle, 12 p., 2008. [GOU 12] GOUËLLO M., Chimie de l’iode et composition des aérosols dans le circuit primaire d’un réacteur nucléaire en situation d’accident grave, Thesis, University of Grenoble, November 2012. [GOU 13] GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA, Renforcer la résilience face au terrorisme. Stratégie antiterroriste du Canada, 2nd ed., no. PS4-104/2013F-PDF, 2013. [GOU 14] GOUWELOOS J., DÜCKERS M., TE BRAKE H. et al., “Psychosocial care to affected citizens and communities in case of CBRN incidents: A systematic review”, Environment International, vol. 72, pp. 46–65, 2014. [GOU 15] GOULIER J., Comportements aux limites de flammes de prémélange hydrogène/air/diluants. Étude de la transition flamme laminaire-flamme turbulente, Thesis, University of Orléans, November 2015. [GRA 14] GRALLA F., ABSON D.J., MØLLER A.P. et al., “The impact of nuclear accidents on provisioning ecosystem services”, Ecological Indicators, vol. 41, pp. 1–14, 2014.

294

Nuclear Accidents

[GRA 15] GRALLA F., ABSON D.J., MØLLER A.P. et al., “Nuclear accidents call for transdisciplinary nuclear energy research”, Sustainability Science, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 179–183, 2015. [GRA 16] GRAPSAS D., HERBIN R., KHERIJI W. et al., “An unconditionnaly stable staggered pressure correction scheme for the compressible Navier–Stokes equations”, SMAI Journal of Computational Mathematics, vol. 2, pp. 51–97, 2016. [GRI 18] GRISON S., Étude des effets multigénérationnels d’une exposition chronique à faible dose d’uranium par analyses optiques, Thesis, University of Clermont Auvergne, December 2018. [GRN 99] GRNC (GROUPE RADIOECOLOGIE NORD-COTENTIN), Estimation des niveaux d’exposition aux rayonnements ionisants et des risqué de leucémies associés de populations du Nord-Cotentin, Synthesis report, available at: http://www.gep-nucleaire.org/norcot/gepnc/sections/travauxgep/premiere_missi on5339/rapport_synthese_v1687/downloadFile/file/synthese_francais.pdf?nocac he=1278333280.46, 1999. [GRO 76] GROUPE DE TRAVAIL DE LA COMMISSION 06 DU CNRS, “Le Point. L’énergie nucléaire”, Courrier du CNRS, no. 19, pp. 25–29, January 1976. [HAB 16] HABIBI A., Analyse rapide des actinides par couplage Chromatographie liquide/ICP-MS et de 90Sr par compteur proportionnel à gaz, dans les échantillons de l’environnement, en situation postaccidentelle, Thesis, Université Pierre et Marie Curie, December 2016. [HAE 08a] HAECK W., LECLAIRE N., “Thermal scattering data and criticality safety”, Physor 2008, Interlaken, Switzerland, September 14–19, 2008. [HAE 08b] HAECK W., LECLAIRE N., LÉTANG E. et al., “The plutonium temperature effect experimental program”, Physor 2008, Interlaken, Switzerland, September 14–19, 2008. [HAM 15] HAMMOND G.D., BIER V.M., “Alternative evacuation strategies for nuclear power accidents”, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, no. 135, pp. 9–14, 2015. [HAN 08] HANSELL C., “Nuclear medicine’s double hazard. imperiled treatment and the risk of terrorism”, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 185–208, July 2008. [HAR 01] HARRISON F.L., KNEZOVICH J.P., “Effects of radiation on aquatic and terrestrial organisms”, in VAN DER STRICHT E., KIRCHMANN R. (eds), Radioecology. Radioactivity and Ecosystems, UIR, Liège, pp. 317–375, 2001.

References

295

[HAR 07] HARRISON J., LEGGETT R., LLOYD D. et al., “Polonium-210 as a poison”, Journal of Radiological Protection, vol. 27, pp. 17–40, 2007. [HAS 10] HASTE T., PAVOT F., BOSLAND L. et al., “Main outcomes of fission product behaviour in the Phebus FPT3 test”, 4th European Review Meeting on Severe Accident Research (ERMSAR-2010), Bologna, Italy, May 11–12, 2010. [HAS 13] HASEGAWA R., “Disaster evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident”, Studies, vol. 05, no. 13, 54 p., IDDRI, Paris, France, 2013. [HAS 15a] HASEGAWA A., TANIGAWA K., OHTSURU A. et al., “From Hiroshima and Nagasaki to Fukushima 2. Health effects of radiation and other health problems in the aftermath of nuclear accidents, with an emphasis on Fukushima”, The Lancet, vol. 386, pp. 479–488, 2015. [HAS 15b] HASTE T., STEINBRÜCK M., BARRACHIN M. et al., “A comparison of core degradation phenomena in the CORA, QUENCH, Phébus SFD and Phébus FP experiments”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 283, pp. 8–20, 2015. [HAT 05] HATON C., Effets des rayonnements ionisants sur la structure et la fonction de la cellule épithéliale intestinale, Thesis, Université Pierre et Marie Curie (Paris 6), 2005. [HAY 13] HAYANO R.S., ADACHI R., “Estimation of the total population moving into and out of the 20 km evacuation zone during the Fukushima NPP accident as calculated using ‘Auto-GPS’ mobile phone data”, Proceedings of the Japan Academy, Series B, vol. 89, pp. 196–199, 2013. [HCT 09] HCTISN, Avis n°3 du Haut comité relatif à l’information des populations et des patients associés aux événements intervenant dans le domaine de la radiologie ou de la médecine nucléaire, October 8, 2009. [HCT 11a] HCTISN, Avis n°4 du Haut comité sur le projet de cahier des charges de l’Autorité de sûreté nucléaire relatif à l’audit de sûreté des installations nucléaires françaises, May 3, 2011. [HCT 11b] HCTISN, Avis n°5 du Haut comité relatif aux dossiers d’enquête publique concernant les installations nucléaires de base, September 23, 2011. [HCT 11c] HCTISN, Avis n°6: Relevé d’observations du HCTISN sur le processus d’évaluation complémentaire de sûreté mené en France, December 8, 2011. [HCT 11d] HCTISN, Transparence et secrets dans le domaine nucléaire, Report and recommendations, 2011.

296

Nuclear Accidents

[HCT 12] HCTISN, Rapport du HCTISN du 13 décembre 2012, Contribution du HCTISN à la démarche relative aux évaluations complémentaires de sûreté des installations nucléaires françaises au regard des événements survenus à Fukushima, 2012. [HE 12] HE M., Caractérisation du comportement à rupture des alliages de zirconium de la gaine du crayon combustible des centrales nucléaires dans la phase post-trempe d’un APRP (Accident de Perte de Réfrigérant Primaire), Thesis, Paris-Tech University, 2012. [HEL 02] HELFAND I., FORROW L., TIWARI J., “Nuclear terrorism”, British Medical Journal, vol. 324, pp. 356–359, 2002. [HEN 12] HENDRY J.H., “Radiation biology and radiation protection”, First ICRP Symposium on the International System of Radiological Protection, Bethesda, USA, 24–26 October 2011, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 41, nos 3–4, pp. 64–71, 2012. [HER 11] HERCA, “Heads of the European Radiological protection Competent Authorities, Emergency Preparedness – Practical Guidance – Practicability of Early Protective Actions”, Approved at the Occasion of the 7th HERCA Meeting held in Brussels on 30 June 2011, available at: http://www.herca.org /documents/Practical%20Guidance%20-Practicability%20of%20Early%20Prot ective%20Actions_20110630.pdf, 2011. [HER 14] HERCA-WENRA, “Approach for a better cross-border coordination of protective actions during the early phase of a nuclear accident”, available at: http://www.herca.org/docstats/HERCA-WENRA%20approach%20for%20better %20cross-border%20coordination.pdf, 2014. [HIC 18a] HICK J.L., BADER J.L., COLEMAN C.N. et al., “Proposed ‘Exposure And Symptom Triage’ (EAST) tool to assess radiation exposure after a nuclear detonation”, Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness, vol. 12, pp. 386–395, 2018. [HIC 18b] HICK J.L., COLEMAN C.N., “Population-based triage, treatment, and evacuation functions following a nuclear detonation”, available at: https://asprtracie.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/population-based-triage-treatme nt-and-evacuation-functions-following-a-nuclear-detonation.pdf, 2018. [HIG 12] HIGLEY K.A., KOCHER D.C., REAL A.G. et al., “Relative biological effectiveness and radiation weighting factors in the context of animals and plants”, First ICRP Symposium on the International System of Radiological Protection, Bethesda, USA, 24–26 October 2011, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 41, nos 3–4, pp. 233–245, 2012.

References

297

[HIG 15] HIGLEY K., RUEDIG E., GOMEZ-FERNANDEZ M. et al., “Creation and application of voxelised dosimetric models, and a comparison with the current methodology as used for the International Commission on Radiological Protection’s Reference Animals and Plants”, in ICRP (ed.), Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on the System of Radiological Protection, Annals of ICRP, vol. 44, suppl. 1, pp. 313–330, 2015. [HIY 12] HIYAMA A., NOHARA C., KINJO S. et al., “The biological impacts of the Fukushima nuclear accident on the pale grass blue butterfly”, Scientific Reports, vol. 2, p. 570, 2012. [HIY 15] HIYAMA A., TAIRA W., NOHARA C. et al., “Spatiotemporal abnormality dynamics of the pale grass blue butterfly: Three years of monitoring (2011–2013) after the Fukushima nuclear accident”, BMC Evolutionary Biology, vol. 15, p. 15, 2015. [HOF 17] HOFFMANN S., Approche hiérarchique bayésienne pour la prise en compte d’erreurs de mesure d’exposition chronique et à faibles doses de rayonnements ionisants dans l’estimation du risque de cancers radio-induits. Application à une cohorte de mineurs d’uranium, Thesis, University of Paris-Saclay, December 2017. [HOL 09] HOLMBERG O., “Leçons tirées des accidents survenus dans le cadre de la radiothérapie externe conventionnelle”, Contrôle, no. 185, p. 88, 2009. [HOM 15] HOMMA T., TAKAHARA S., KIMURA M. et al., “Radiation protection issues on preparedness and response for a severe nuclear accident: Experiences of the Fukushima accident”, in ICRP (ed.), Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on the System of Radiological Protection, Annals of ICRP, vol. 44, suppl. 1, pp. 347–356, 2015. [HPA 18] HPA, OTHEA RELIR, available at: http://relir.cepn.asso.fr/index.php /en.html, 2018. [HSE 02] HSE (HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE), A guide to the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001, Guidance on Regulations, available at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/l126.pdf, 2002. [HYA 02] HYAMS K.C., MURPHY F., WESSELY S., “Responding to a terrorist attack with chemical, biological, or nuclear materials: The indirect and long-term health effects may present the greatest challenge”, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, vol. 27, pp. 273–291, 2002. [IAE 89a] IAEA, Cleanup of large areas contaminated as a result of a nuclear accident, Technical Reports Series no. 300, IAEA, Vienna, 1989.

298

Nuclear Accidents

[IAE 89b] IAEA, Principles and techniques for post-accident assessment and recovery in a contaminated environment of a nuclear facility, IAEA Safety Series, no. 97, STI/PUB/818, IAEA, Vienna, 1989. [IAE 89c] IAEA, On-site habitability in the event of an accident at a nuclear facility, IAEA Safety Guides, no. 98, IAEA, Vienna, 1989. [IAE 94] IAEA, Guidelines for agricultural countermeasures following an accidental release of radionuclides, Technical Reports Series no. 363, IAEA, Vienna, 1994. [IAE 98] IAEA, Radiological Conditions at Bikini Atoll: Prospects for Resettlement, STI/PUB/1054, IAEA, Vienna, 1998. [IAE 04a] IAEA, Regulatory Control of Radiation Sources, IAEA Safety Guide, no. GS-G-1.5, IAEA, Vienna, 2004. [IAE 04b] IAEA, “Évaluation de l’exposition professionnelle due aux sources externes de rayonnements”, Guide de sûreté, Collection Normes de sûreté de l’AIEA, no. RS-G-1.3, STI/PUB/1076, IAEA, Vienna, 2004. [IAE 05] IAEA, Generic Procedures for a Medical Response During a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, EPR-Medical-2005, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 2005. [IAE 06a] IAEA, Fuel Incident Notification and Analysis System (FINAS) Guidelines, IAEA/NEA, Services Series, SVS-14, Vienna, 2006. [IAE 06b] IAEA, Applying radiation safety standards in diagnostic radiology and interventional procedures using X rays, Safety Reports Series no. 39, IAEA, Vienna, 2006. [IAE 09a] IAEA, Establishing guidance levels in X ray guided medical interventional procedures: A pilot study, Safety Reports Series, no. 59, IAEA, Vienna, 2009. [IAE 09b] IAEA, “Identification des sources et des dispositifs radioactifs”, Collection sécurité nucléaire de l’AIEA, no. 5, IAEA, Vienna, 2009. [IAE 10a] IAEA, IRS Guidelines, Joint IAEA/NEA International Reporting System for Operating Experience, IAEA/NEA, Services Series, SVS-19, Vienna, 2010. [IAE 10b] IAEA, Radiation Safety of Gamma, Electron and X Ray Irradiation Facilities, Specific Safety Guide, no. SSG-8, IAEA, Vienna, 2010. [IAE 11] IAEA, “Catégorisation des sources radioactives”, Normes de sûreté de l’AIEA, Guide de sûreté, no. RS-G-1.9, IAEA, Vienna, 2011. [IAE 12] IAEA, “Sécurité des sources radioactives, Guide d’application”, Collection Sécurité Nucléaire de l’AIEA, no. 11, IAEA, Vienna, 2012.

References

299

[IAE 13] IAEA, Actions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to Severe Conditions at a Light Water Reactor, EPR-NPP Public Protective Actions, IAEA, Vienna, 2013. [IAE 15a] IAEA, The Fukushima Daiichi Accident. Technical Volume 3. Emergency Preparedness and Response, STI/PUB/1710, IAEA, Vienna, 2015. [IAE 15b] IAEA, Operating Experience from Events Reported to the IAEA Incident Reporting System for Research Reactors, IAEA-TECDOC-1762, IAEA, Vienna, 2015. [IAE 15c] IAEA, L’accident de Fukushima Daiichi, IAEA, Vienna, STI/PUB/1710, 2015. [IAE 16a] IAEA, Radiation Safety for Consumer Products, Specific Safety Guide, no. SSG-36, IAEA, Vienna, 2016. [IAE 16b] IAEA, “Radioprotection et sûreté des sources de rayonnements: Normes fondamentales internationales de sûreté. Prescriptions générales de sûreté, Partie 3”, Collection des Guides de sûreté de l’AIEA, no. GSR Part 3, IAEA, Vienna, 2016. [IAE 17a] IAEA, Operational Intervention Levels for Reactor Emergencies and Methodology for Their Derivation, EPR-NRP-OILs, IAEA, Vienna, 2017. [IAE 17b] IAEA, Incident and trafficking database (ITDB). Incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, 2017 Fact Sheet, 2017. [IAE 18a] IAEA, Medical Management of Persons Internally Contaminated with Radionuclides in a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, A Manual for Medical Personnel, EPR-Internal contamination, IAEA, Vienna, 2018. [IAE 18b] IAEA, Radiation Protection and Safety in Medical Uses of Ionizing Radiation, Specific Safety Guide, no. SSG-46, IAEA, Vienna, 2018. [IAE 18c] IAEA, “Incident and trafficking database (ITDB)”, available at: http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/itdb.asp, 2018. [ICR 77] ICRP, “Recommendations of the ICRP”, ICRP Publication 26, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 1–80, 1977. [ICR 84] ICRP, “Protection of the public in the event of major radiation accidents: Principles for planning”, ICRP Publication 40, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 1–22, 1984. [ICR 91] ICRP, “1990 recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection”, ICRP Publication 60, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 21, nos 1–3, pp. 1–197, 1991.

300

Nuclear Accidents

[ICR 93] ICRP, “Principles for intervention for protection of the public in a radiological emergency”, ICRP Publication 63, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 1–30, 1993. [ICR 00] ICRP, “Protection of the public in situations of prolonged radiation exposure”, ICRP Publication 82, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 29, nos 1–2, pp. 1–109, 2000. [ICR 03] ICRP, “A framework for assessing the impact of ionising radiation on non-human species”, ICRP Publication 91, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 201–266, 2003. [ICR 05a] ICRP, “Protecting people against radiation exposure in the event of a radiological attack”, ICRP Publication 96, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 1–110, 2005. [ICR 05b] ICRP, “Low-dose extrapolation of radiation-related cancer risk”, ICRP Publication 99, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 1–140, 2005. [ICR 07a] ICRP, “The 2007 recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection”, ICRP Publication 103, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 37, nos 2–4, pp. 1–322, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 2007. [ICR 07b] ICRP, “Scope of radiological protection control measures”, ICRP Publication 104, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 1–106, 2007. [ICR 08] ICRP, “Environment protection: The concept and use of reference animals and plants for the purposes of environmental protection”, ICRP Publication 108, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 38, nos 4–6, pp. 1–242, 2008. [ICR 09a] ICRP, “Application of the Commission’s recommendations for the protection of people in emergency exposure situations”, ICRP Publication 109, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 1–74, 2009. [ICR 09b] ICRP, “Application of the Commission’s recommendations to the protection of people living in long-term contaminated areas after a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency”, ICRP Publication 111, Annals of ICRP, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 1–69, 2009. [ICR 09c] ICRP, “Transfer parameters for reference animals and plants. ICRP Publication 114”, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 39, p. 6, 2009. [ILY 04] ILYN L.A., SOLOVIEV V.Y., BARANOV A.E. et al., “Early medical consequences of radiation incidents in the former USSR territory”, The Medical Radiology and Radiation Safety Journal I, no. 49, pp. 37–48, available at: https://www.ipen.br/biblioteca/cd/irpa/2004/files/7c20.pdf, 2004.

References

301

[INC 18] INCERTI S., KYRIAKOU I., BERNAL M.A. et al., “Geant4-DNA example applications for track structure simulations in liquid water: A report from the Geant4-DNA Project”, Medical Physics, vol. 45, no. 8, pp. e722–e739, 2018. [IPP 96] IPPNW, Crude nuclear weapons. proliferation and the terrorist threat, Global Health Watch Report Number 1, Cambridge, MA. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, available at: http://www.ippnw.org/pdf/1996-crude-nuclear-weapons.pdf, 1996. [IPP 04] IPPNW, Nuclear Terrorism. Effects of a Nuclear Explosion in a Populated Area: New York City, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, available at: https://www.ippnw.org/pdf/nuclear-terrorism-nyc.pdf, 2004. [IRS 07] IRSN, Guide d’aide à la décision pour la gestion du milieu agricole en cas d’accident nucléaire, available at: https://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances /Environnement/expertises-incidents-accidents/gestion-territoires-contamines /Pages/Guide-ACTA-gestion-post-accidentelle.aspx#.XFxnDbhCf4E, 2007. [IRS 10a] IRSN, Visites décennales, Le check-up des réacteurs de 900 MWe, available at: https://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/Lescentrales-nucleaires/visites-decennales/Pages/sommaire.aspx#.XHVxmrhCf4E, 2010. [IRS 10b] IRSN, Sécurité des matières nucléaires et non-prolifération, available at: https://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/securite_nucleaire /non-proliferation/Pages/sommaire.aspx#.XH7CW7hCf4E, 2010. [IRS 12a] IRSN, Guide d’aide à la décision pour la gestion du milieu agricole en cas d’accident nucléaire, ACTA guide, IRSN, available at: https://www.irsn.fr /FR/expertise/rapports_expertise/Documents/environnement/IRSN_Guide-ACT A_2012.pdf, 2012. [IRS 12b] IRSN, La gestion des accidents graves, available at: https://www.irsn .fr/FR/connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/Les-centrales-nucleaires/accidents -graves/Pages/sommaire.aspx#.XI9vC7hCdPY, 2012. [IRS 13a] IRSN, Mesures de radioactivité en cas de crise nucléaire, available at: https://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/La_surete_Nuclea ire/risque-nucleaire/mesures-radioactivite-crise/Pages/sommaire.aspx#.XF2L57 hCf4E, 2013. [IRS 13b] IRSN, Coût économique des accidents nucléaires entraînant des rejets radioactifs dans l’environnement, available at: http://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaiss ances/Installations_nucleaires/Les-accidents-nucleaires/cout-economique-accide nt/Pages/sommaire.aspx#.WEVKEH2apnB, 2013.

302

Nuclear Accidents

[IRS 14a] IRSN, Faire du REX aujourd’hui: Pourquoi ? Comment ? Repères pour un retour d’expérience événementiel source d’apprentissages, Report PSN-SRDS/2014-00019, 2014. [IRS 14b] IRSN, Les différentes phases d’un accident nucléaire, available at: https://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/La_surete_Nuclea ire/risque-nucleaire/phases-accident-nucleaire/Pages/sommaire.aspx#.XFcDY7h Cehc, 2014. [IRS 14c] IRSN, La gestion d’une crise nucléaire, available at: https://www.irsn.fr /FR/connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/La_surete_Nucleaire/risque-nuclea ire/IRSN-acteur-crise/Pages/sommaire.aspx#.XFr46LhCf4F, 2014. [IRS 14d] IRSN, Les principes du zonage post-accidentel, available at: https://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/La_surete_Nuclea ire/risque-nucleaire/zonage-post-accidentel/Pages/sommaire.aspx#.XFaoUbh Cehd, 2014. [IRS 14e] IRSN, L’IRSN, un acteur majeur de la gestion d’une crise nucléaire, available at: https://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/La _surete_Nucleaire/risque-nucleaire/IRSN-acteur-crise/Pages/sommaire.aspx#.XI -amLhCdPY, 2014. [IRS 14f] IRSN, Démarche générale de prévention des accidents, 2014. [IRS 14g] IRSN, Maintenance des centrales: Une organisation sous tension, available at: https://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/Les -centrales-nucleaires/maintenance/Pages/sommaire.aspx#.XHV12LhCf4E, 2014. [IRS 15a] IRSN, Incendie: Connaître le risque pour mieux le maîtriser, available at: https://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/incendie-risque/Pa ges/0-Sommaire-risque-incendie.aspx#.XHQtH7hCf4E, 2015. [IRS 15b] IRSN, Vieillissement des centrales nucléaires, available at: https://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/Les-centrales-nucl eaires/vieillissement/Pages/sommaire.aspx#.XHUGJ7hCf4E, 2015. [IRS 16a] IRSN, Evaluations complémentaires de sûreté post-Fukushima, available at: https://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/La_surete_Nu cleaire/evaluations-complementaires-surete/Pages/sommaire.aspx#.XHQp4bhCf 4E, 2016. [IRS 16b] IRSN, La prise en compte du risque inondation pour les sites des installations nucléaires, available at: https://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances /Installations_nucleaires/La_surete_Nucleaire/risque_inondation_installations_n ucleaires/Pages/0-Sommaire-risque-inondation.aspx#.XHQvobhCf4E, 2016.

References

303

[IRS 16c] IRSN, Suites de l’accident nucléaire de Fukushima Daiichi en mars 2011. Point de situation en mars 2016, available at: http://www.irsn.fr/FR /connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/Les-accidents-nucleaires/accident-fukus hima-2011/fukushima-2016/Pages/0-fukushima-daiichi-en-2016-sommaire.aspx #.WS_m_8Y69PY, 2016. [IRS 16d] IRSN, “Radioactivité. Mieux gérer les sites et les sols pollués”, Repères, vol. 31, pp. 10–16, 2016. [IRS 17a] IRSN, Bilan annuel de la sûreté et la radioprotection des centrales nucléaires en France, available at: https://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances/Install ations_nucleaires/La_surete_Nucleaire/surete-parc-nucleaire/Pages/sommaire.as px#.XH7BPbhCf4E, 2017. [IRS 17b] IRSN, Détection de ruthénium-106 en France et en Europe. Résultat des investigations de l’IRSN. Note d’information du 9 novembre 2017, available at: http://www.irsn.fr/FR/Actualites_presse/Actualites/Documents/IRSN_NI_Ruthe nium-106-en-Europe_20171109.pdf, 2017. [IRS 18a] IRSN, Baromètre IRSN. La perception des risques et de la sécurité par les Français, IRSN, 2018. [IRS 18b] IRSN, La prise en compte du risque sismique pour les sites des installations nucléaires, available at: https://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances /Installations_nucleaires/La_surete_Nucleaire/risque_sismique_installations_nuc leaires/Pages/sommaire.aspx#.XHQyQrhCf4E, 2018. [IRS 18c] IRSN, Le transport de matières radioactives, available at: https://www.irsn .fr/FR/connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/transport/transports-matieres-radio actives/Pages/0-transports-matieres-radioactives-sommaire.aspx#.XH7ADLhC f4E, 2018. [IRS 19] IRSN, Gestion des territoires contaminés, available at: https://www.irsn.fr /FR/connaissances/Environnement/expertises-incidents-accidents/gestion-territoi res-contamines/Pages/Gestion-des-territoires-contamines.aspx, 2019. [ISH 15] ISHIKAWA T., YASUMURA S., OZASA K. et al., “The Fukushima Health Management Survey: Estimation of external doses to residents in Fukushima Prefecture”, Scientific Reports, vol. 5, p. 12712, 2015. [IST 00] ISTISAN, ISTITUTO SUPERIORE DI SANITÀ, Council Directive 98/83/EC on the quality of water intended for human consumption: Calculation of derived activity concentrations, Italy, available at: http://dspace.iss.it/dspace/handle /2198/-9271, 2000. [ITO 13] ITOYA S., Nuclear emergency preparedness and response in Japan following Fukushima accident, JNES, available at: https://ansn.iaea.org /Common/topics/OpenTopic.aspx?ID=13148, 2013.

304

Nuclear Accidents

[JAC 05] JACKSON D., COPPLESTONE D., STONE D.M. et al., “Terrestrial invertebrate population studies in the Chernobyl exclusion zone, Ukraine”, Radioprotection, vol. 40, suppl. 1, pp. S857–S863, 2005. [JAC 13] JACQUEMAIN D., BENTAÏB A., BONNEVILLE H. et al., Les accidents de fusion du cœur des réacteurs nucléaires de puissance. État des connaissances, EDP Sciences, Les Ulis, 2013. [JAE 13] JAESCHKE B.C., BRADSHAW C., “Bioaccumulation of tritiated water in phytoplankton and trophic transfer of organically bound tritium to the blue mussel, Mytilus edulis”, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, vol. 115, pp. 28–33, 2013. [JAE 18] JAEGLER H., POINTURIER F., ONDA Y. et al., “Plutonium isotopic signatures in soils and their variation (2011–2014) in sediment transiting a coastal river in the Fukushima Prefecture, Japan”, Environmental Pollution, vol. 240, pp. 167–176, 2018. [JAE 19] JAEGLER H., POINTURIER F., DIEZ-FERNANDEZ S. et al., “Reconstruction of uranium and plutonium isotopic signatures in sediment accumulated in the Mano Dam reservoir, Japan, before and after the Fukushima nuclear accident”, Chemosphere, vol. 225, pp. 849–858, 2019. [JAM 16] JAMET P., “Fukushima: Retour sur les impacts en France et la situation au Japon”, ASN. La gestion des situations d’urgence, Contrôle, vol. 201, pp. 5–7, 2016. [JAR 17] JARGIN S., “Radiation safety standards and hormesis”, SDRP Journal of Earth Sciences & Environmental Studies, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 238–247, 2017. [JEL 14] JELEA A., PELLENQ R.J.M., RIBEIRO F., “An atomistic modeling of the xenon bubble behavior in the UO2 matrix”, Journal of Nuclear Materials, vol. 444, nos 1–3, pp. 153–160, 2014. [JIA 94] JIANG T.N., LORD B.I., HENDRY J.H., “Alpha particles are extremely damaging to developing hemopoiesis compared to gamma irradiation”, Radiation Research, vol. 137, pp. 380–384, 1994. [JIN 12] JINAPHANH A., Études de la convergence d’un calcul Monte Carlo de criticité: Utilisation d’un calcul déterministe et détection automatisée du transitoire, Thesis, University of Grenoble, December 2012. [JOH 10] JOHNSON T., Film Nucléaire en alerte, M Way Films, 2010. [JOR 09] JORF, Arrêté du 20 novembre 2009 portant homologation de la décision n° 2009-DC-0153 de l’Autorité de sûreté nucléaire du 18 août 2009 relative aux niveaux d’intervention en situation d’urgence radiologique, JORF no. 0293 from December 18, 2009, text no. 38, pp. 21851, 2009.

References

305

[JOU 18] JOURDAIN J.-R., LANDON G., CLERO E. et al., “Is exposure to ionising radiation associated with childhood cardiac arrhythmia in the Russian territories contaminated by the Chernobyl fallout? A cross-sectional population based study”, British Medical Journal Open, vol. 8, p. e019031, 2018. [KEL 02] KELLY H., Testimony of Dr. Henry Kelly, President Federation of American Scientists before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, available at: http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/030602-kellytestimony.htm, March 6, 2002. [KHV 15] KHVOSTUNOV I.K., IVANNIKOV A.I., SKVORTSOV V.G. et al., “Review of the correlation between results of cytogenetic dosimetry from blood lymphocytes and EPR dosimetry from tooth enamel for victims of radiation accidents”, Radiation Protection Dosimetry, vol. 163, pp. 399–408, 2015. [KLA 14] KLAUCK M., REINECKE E.A., KELM S. et al., “Passive auto-catalytic recombiners operation in the presence of hydrogen and carbon monoxide: Experimental study and model development”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 266, pp. 137–147, 2014. [KRA 04] KRASNIOUK V.I., “Radiation injuries in man after criminal exposure”, IRPA 11, International Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association, Madrid, May 23–28, 2004. [KUB 18] KUBIAK T., “Advances in EPR dosimetry in terms of retrospective determination of absorbed dose in radiation accidents”, Current Topics in Biophysics, vol. 41, pp. 11–21, 2018. [KUD 15] KUDRYASHEVAA N.S., ROZHKOB T.V., “Effect of low-dose ionizing radiation on luminous marine bacteria: Radiation hormesis and toxicity. Review”, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, vol. 142, pp. 68–77, 2015. [KUN 90] KUNREUTHER H., EASTERLING D., DESVOUGES W. et al., “Public attitudes toward siting a high level nuclear waste repository in Nevada”, Risk Analysis, vol. 10, pp. 469–484, 1990. [KUP 98] KUPERMAN A.J., LEVENTHAL P.L., “HEU core conversion of Russian production reactors: A major threat to the International RERTR Regime”, Presented at the 1998 International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors, Sao Paulo, Brazil, October 18–23, 1998. [KUP 14] KUPERMAN A.J., SOKOLOW D., LYMAN E.S., “Can the IAEA safeguard fuel-cycle facilities? The historical record,” in SOKOLSKI H. (ed.), Nuclear Weapons Materials Gone Missing: What Does History Teach?, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Arlington, VA, pp. 89–123, 2014.

306

Nuclear Accidents

[KUP 16] KUPPUSAMY S., PALANISAMI T., MEGHARAJ M. et al., “In-situ remediation approaches for the management of contaminated sites: A comprehensive overview”, Reviews of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology, vol. 236, pp. 1–115, 2016. [LAC 10] LACOUE-NEGRE M., Chimie de l’iode dans le circuit primaire d’un réacteur nucléaire en situation d’accident grave – Étude de mélanges CsI/MoO3 sous vapeur d’eau, Thesis, Université des Sciences et technologies de Lille, December 2010. [LAF 16] LAFFIN R., DOMENEGHETTI B., “Mettre l’expertise technique du nucléaire au service de la réalité territoriale”, Contrôle, no. 201, pp. 50–51, 2016. [LAK 19] LAKSHAY, BOLIA N.B., “Operating strategies of buses for mass evacuation”, Safety Science, vol. 111, pp. 167–178, 2019. [LAM 01] LAMB M., RESNIKOFF M., Radiological consequences of severe rail accident involving spent nuclear fuel shipments to Yucca Mountain: Hypothetical Baltimore Rail Tunnel Fire Involving SNF, prepared on behalf of Pacific World History Institute, September 2001, available at: http://www.state .nv.us/nucwaste/news2001/nn11459.pdf, 2001. [LAP 62] LAPP R.E., “Nevada test fallout and radioiodine in milk”, Science, vol. 137, pp. 756–758, 1962. [LAR 12] LARSSON C.M., “Biological basis for protection of the environment”, First ICRP Symposium on the International System of Radiological Protection, Bethesda, USA, 24–26 October 2011, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 41, nos 3–4, pp. 208–217, 2012. [LAS 13] LASSERRE M., Modélisation des phénomènes de corrosion du Zircaloy-4 sous mélanges oxygène-azote à haute température, Thesis, École supérieure des Mines de St-Étienne, December 2013. [LEB 08] LEBEAU T., BRAUD A., JEZEQUEL K., “Performance of bioaugmentation-assisted phytoextraction applied to metal contaminated soils: A review”, Environmental Pollution, vol. 153, pp. 497–522, 2008. [LEB 12] LE BRETON D., Sociologie du risque, Presses Universitaires de France, Que sais-je?, 2012. [LEC 04] LECOZE J.C., LIM S., Presque accidents et Risque d’accident majeur. Etat de l’art, Étude et Recherche DRA-37. Retour d’expérience. Final report of operation b. INERIS, 2004.

References

307

[LEC 06] LE COZE J.C., LIM S., DECHY N., “Gestion des presque accidents et accidents majeurs: Premier bilan d’une enquête sur des sites SEVESO”, Colloque de maîtrise des risques et sûreté de fonctionnement “Risques et performances”, Lille, France, October 2006. [LEC 11a] LECLAIRE N., DUHAMEL I., LE DAUPHIN F.X. et al., “MIRTE: An experimental program designed to test the reactivity worth of several structural materials”, Congress ICNC 2011, September 19–22, 2011. [LEC 11b] LECLAIRE N., DUHAMEL I., LE DAUPHIN F.X. et al., MIRTE program – Four 4.738-WT.%-enriched uranium dioxide fuel rod arrays in water separated by a crossshaped screen of titanium (5mm and 10 mm thick), NEA/NSC/DOC/(95)03/IV Report, vol. IV, September 2011. [LEC 14] LECOMTE-PRADINES C., BONZOM J.-M., DELLA-VEDOVA C. et al., “Soil nematode assemblages as bioindicators of radiation impact in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone”, Science of the Total Environment, vol. 490, pp. 161–170, 2014. [LED 15] LE DIZÈS S., RENARD H., VERMOREL F. et al., “Modeling and validating tritium transfer in a grassland ecosystem in response to 3H releases”, WIT Transactions on Ecology and the Environment, vol. 192, pp. 23–32, 2015. [LED 17] LE DIZÈS S., AULAGNIER C., MARO D. et al., “The VATO project: Development and validation of a dynamic transfer model of tritium in grassland ecosystem”, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, vol. 171, pp. 83–92, 2017. [LEE 06] LEE R., “Reappraising nuclear security strategy”, Policy Analysis, vol. 571, pp. 1–13, 2006. [LEG 01] LE GUEN B., HEMIDY P.Y., GONIN M. et al., “Arguments et retour d’expérience sur la distribution d’iode stable autour des centrales nucléaires françaises”, Radioprotection, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 417–430, 2001. [LEG 03] LE GUELTE G., Le terrorisme nucléaire: Risque majeur, fantasme ou épouvantail?, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2003. [LEG 15] LE GALLIC C., Les effets d’une exposition chronique à faibles doses sur la progression de l’athérosclérose, Thesis, University of Paris-Sud, April 2015. [LEG 16] LE GUEN B., “La campagne iode: Travail d’équipe et défis logistique”, Contrôle, vol. 201, pp. 30–31, 2016. [LEL 12] LELIEVELD J., KUNKE D., LAWRENCE M.G., “Global risk of radioactive fallout after major nuclear reactor accidents”, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, vol. 12, pp. 4245–4258, 2012. [LEN 16] LENOIR Y., La comédie atomique, La Découverte, Paris, 2016.

308

Nuclear Accidents

[LEP 15] LEPAGE H., Traçage de la dispersion des sédiments contaminés dans les bassins versants côtiers de Fukushima, Thesis, University of Paris-Sud, 2015. [LER 11] LE ROUX N., Étude par similitude de l’influence du vent sur les transferts de masse dans les bâtiments complexes, Thesis, University of La Rochelle, December 2011. [LÉV 13a] LÉVÊQUE F., Nucléaire On/Off. Analyse économique d’un pari, Dunod, Paris, 2013. [LÉV 13b] LÉVÊQUE F., Le risque d’accident nucléaire majeur: Calcul et perception des probabilités, Interdisciplinary Institute for Innovation, Working paper 13-ME-02, February 27, 2013. [LHE 14] LHEUREUX Y., CHARRE J.P., “Implication de l’ANCCLI dans les démarches d’échanges sur le post-accident”, IRSN-ANCCLI Seminar on the Post-Accident Phase, Paris, October 15–16, 2014. [LIM 19] LIMA S.X., COSTA K.P.S., LIMA Z.R. et al., “Simulated nuclear contamination scenario, solid cancer risk assessment, and support to decision”, Nukleonika, vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 41–48, 2019. [LIS 16] LIS L., “À Fukushima, la population est dans une situation inextricable”, Journal du CNRS, available at: https://lejournal.cnrs.fr/articles/a-fukushima-la -population-est-dans-une-situation-inextricable, 2016. [LIS 18] LISET DE LA FUENTE R., INCERTI S., FRANCIS Z. et al., “Accounting for radiation-induced indirect damage on DNA with the Geant 4-DNA code”, Physica Medica, vol. 51, pp. 108–116, 2018. [LIT 98] LITTLE J.B., “Radiation-induced genomic instality”, International Journal of Radiation Biology, vol. 74, no. 6, pp. 681–687, 1998. [LOC 00] LOCHBAUM D., “Nuclear plant risk studies: Dismal quality”, Science for Democratic Action. Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, vol. 9, 2000. [LOC 16] LOCHARD J., SCHNEIDER T., CHARRON S. et al., “Réhabilitation des conditions de vie après l’accident nucléaire de Fukushima: L’initiative de “dialogues” de la CIPR”, ASN. La gestion des situations d’urgence, Contrôle, vol. 201, pp. 8–10, 2016. [LOF 15] LOFFREDO N., ONDA Y., HURTEVENT P. et al., “Equation to predict the 137 Cs leaching dynamic from evergreen canopies after a radio-cesium deposit”, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, vol. 147, pp. 100–107, 2015.

References

309

[LOI 06] LOI, “Loi n° 2006-686 du 13 juin 2006 relative à la transparence et à la sécurité en matière nucléaire”, available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr /affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006053843&dateTexte=20081107, 2006. [LOP 17] LOPEZ L., SAUREL S., “L’évacuation des populations dans le cadre d’un accident nucléaire: Le rôle des sapeurs-pompiers et des cellules mobiles d’interventions radiologiques, notamment dans le cadre de la phase d’évacuation immédiate établie par la nouvelle doctrine des Plans Particuliers d’Intervention des Centrales Nucléaires de Production d’Electricité”, Mémoire de formations spécialisées, 2017. [LOR 96] LORD B.I., MASON T.M., “On the relative biological effectiveness of alpha-particle irradiation with respect to hemopoietic tissue”, Radiation Research, vol. 145, pp. 510–518, 1996. [LOY 90] LOYAU R., GRIPPERAY G., ROTEREAU J.C. et al., Agriculture, environnement et nucléaire: Comment réagir en cas d’accident, FNSEA, Paris, IPSN, Fontenay-aux-Roses, 1990. [LOY 16] LOYEN J., “Les exercices de crise: Un outil indispensable pour une réponse efficiente en cas d’accident”, ASN. La gestion des situations d’urgence. Contrôle, vol. 201, pp. 42–44, 2016. [LUC 17] LUCOTTE E., Troubles psychologiques liés à un accident nucléaire. Définition d’un protocole de monétarisation et perspectives d’application, PSE-SANTE/SESUC/LERN, 7 December 2017. [LUS 88] LUSBAUGH C.C., RICKS R.C., FRY S.A., “Radiological accidents: A historical review of sealed sources accidents”, International Conference on Radiation Protection in Nuclear Energy, Sydney, April 18–22, 1988, Radiation protection in Nuclear Energy, no. 2/3, pp. 401–409, IAEA Conference STI/PUB/783, IAEA, Vienna, 1988. [LYM 02] LYMAN E., KUPERMAN A., “A reevaluation of Physical protection standards for irradiated HEU fuel”, Presented at the 24th International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR), Bariloche, Argentina, November 5, 2002. [MAC 11] MACFARLANE A.M., “The overlooked back end of the nuclear fuel cycle”, Science, vol. 333, pp. 1225–1226, 2011. [MAC 16] MACFARLANE A., “How to protect nuclear plants from terrorists. Security is weak at many nuclear plants worldwide, says a former top U.S. nuclear regulator”, The Conversation, available at: https://www.usnews .com/news/articles/2016-04-13/how-to-protect-nuclear-plants-from-terrorists, April 13, 2016.

310

Nuclear Accidents

[MAG 07] MAGILL J., HAMILTON D., LÜUTZENKIRCHEN K.L. et al., “Consequences of a radiological dispersal event with nuclear and radioactive sources”, Science & Global Security, vol. 15, pp. 107–132, 2007. [MAL 05] MALGRAS G., “Les plans de défense nationaux”, in DE REVEL T., GOURMELON P., VIDAL D. et al. (eds), Menace terroriste approche médicale, John Libbey Eurotext, Montrouge, pp. 17–22, 2005. [MAL 10] MALET J., PORCHERON E., VENDEL J., “OECD International Standard Problem ISP-47 on containment thermal-hydraulics. Conclusions of the TOSQAN part”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 240, no. 10, pp. 3209–3220, 2010. [MAL 11] MALET J., BLUMENFELD L., ARNDT S. et al., “Sprays in containment: Final results of the Sarnet spray benchmark”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 241, pp. 2162–2217, 2011. [MAR 07] MARIGNAC Y., “Le nucléaire hors les murs: L’équation à haut risque des transports de matières nucléaires”, Contrôle, vol. 174, pp. 81–87, 2007. [MAR 13] MARITON H., “Rapport d’information déposé en application de l’article 146 du Règlement par la commission des finances, de l’économie générale et du contrôle budgétaire relatif à la transition énergétique”, Assemblée Nationale, no. 1463, October 16, 2013. [MAR 17] MARO D., VERMOREL F., ROZET M. et al., “The VATO project: An original methodology to study the transfer of tritium as HT and HTO in grassland ecosystem”, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, no. 167, pp. 235–248, 2017. [MAS 00] MASSE R., “Rayonnements ionisants”, Comptes rendus de l’Académie des Sciences. Série III. Sciences de la vie, vol. 323, pp. 633–640, 2000. [MAS 02] MASSE R., “Pathogenic effects of low dose irradiation: Dose–effect relationships”, Comptes Rendus Physique, vol. 3, pp. 1049–1058, 2002. [MAS 04] MASSE R., Que doit-on craindre d’un accident nucléaire? Les Petites Pommes du Savoir, Le Pommier, Paris, 64 p., 2004. [MAT 13] MATHIEU A. KORSAKISSOK I., QUELO D. et al., “État de la modélisation pour simuler l’accident nucléaire de la centrale Fukushima Daiichi”, Pollution Atmosphérique, no. 217, pp. 1–14, January–March 2013. [MAT 14] MATHÉ E., Comportement des radiocontaminants dans les confinements d’un réacteur à neutrons rapides refroidi au sodium en situation accidentelle, Thesis, Université de Lille, October 2014.

References

311

[MAT 15] MATHÉ E., KISSANE M., PETITPREZ D., “Improved modelling of sodium-spray fires and sodium-combustion aerosol chemical evolution”, ICAPP 2015, Nice, France, May 3–6, 2015. [MAU 16] MAURIN B., “Le SDIS de la Drôme et les exercices de crise”, Contrôle, no. 201, pp. 56, 2016. [MAX 82] MAXWELL C., “Hospital organizational response to the nuclear accident at three mile island: Implications for future-oriented disaster planning”, American Journal of Public Health, vol. 72, pp. 275–279, 1982. [MAY 98] MAYS C., AVETOVA E., MURPHY M. et al., “The weeping cow: Impact of countermeasures on daily life in Chernobyl contaminated regions”, 1998 Annual Conference “Risk Analysis: Opening the Process”, Paris, October 11–14, 1998, SRA Europe, pp. 163–172, 1998. [MCL 00] MCLAUGHLIN T.P., MONAHAN S.P., PRUVOST N.L. et al., A Review of Criticality Accidents, 2000 Revision, LA-1363, 2000. [MEI 10] MEIGNEN R., JANIN T., “On the analysis and evaluation of direct containment heating with the multidimensional multiphase flow code MC3D”, Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations, vol. 2010, Article ID 289792, 13 pages, 2010. doi:10.1155/2010/289792. [MEI 11a] MEIGNEN R., PICCHI S., LAMOME J., “Modelling of fuel coolant interaction with the multiphase flow code MC3D”, 12th International Conference Multiphase Flow in Industrial Plants (MFIP 12), Ischia (Napoli), Italy, September 21–23, 2011. [MEI 11b] MEIT M., REDLENER I., BRIGGS T.W. et al., “Modeling analysis. Rural and suburban population surge. Following detonation of an improvised nuclear device: A new model to estimate impact”, Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, vol. 5, pp. S143–S150, 2011. [MEL 07] MELNOV S., MAROZIK P., DROZD T., “Clastogenic factors bystander effects and genomic instability in vivo”, in MOTHERSILL C., MOSSE I., SEYMOUR C. (eds), Multiple Stressors: A Challenge for the Future, Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 171–182, 2007. [MÉN 14] MÉNARD C., BECK F., PERETTI-WATEL P., “Cancer et environnement: Perceptions de la population à partir des enquêtes de l’Institut national de prévention et d’éducation pour la santé”, Environ Risque Santé, vol. 13, pp. 312–317, 2014. [MER 07] MERCAT-ROMMENS C., CHAMPION M., “PRIME: Un projet de recherche participative pour gérer ensemble des territoires contaminés”, ASN, Séminaire post-accidentel nucléaire, Programme français CODIRPA et travaux internationaux, Paris, December 6–7, 2007.

312

Nuclear Accidents

[MÉT 97] MÉTIVIER H., “Principes et normes de radioprotection”, in TURLAY R. (ed.), Les déchets nucléaires. Un dossier scientifique, EDP Sciences, Les Ulis, pp. 249–271, 1997. [MÉT 06] MÉTIVIER H., Radioprotection et ingénierie nucléaire, EDP Sciences, Les Ulis, 2006. [MET 19] METIAN M., POUIL S., FOWLER S.W., “Radiocesium accumulation in aquatic organisms: A global synthesis from an experimentalist’s perspective”, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, vol. 198, pp. 147–158, 2019. [MEY 14] MEYNET N., BENTAÏB A., GIOVANGIGLI V., “Impact of oxygen starvation on operation and potential gas-phase ignition of passive auto-catalytic recombiners”, Combustion and Flame, vol. 161, pp. 2192–2202, 2014. [MEY 16a] MEYLAN S., Développement d’un outil de simulation multiéchelle adapté au calcul des dommages radioinduits précoces dans des cellules exposées à des irradiations d’ions légers (proton et alpha), Thesis, University of Bordeaux, October 2016. [MEY 16b] MEYLAN S., VIMONT U., INCERTI S. et al., “Geant4-DNA simulations using complex DNA geometries generated by the DnaFabric tool”, Computer Physics Communication, vol. 204, pp. 159–169, 2016. [MEY 17] MEYLAN S., INCERTI S., KARAMITROS M. et al., “Simulation of early DNA damage after the irradiation of a fibroblast cell nucleus using Geant4-DNA”, Scientific Reports, vol. 7, p. 11923, 2017. [MIL 17] MILLER A.C., RIVAS R., TESORO L. et al., “Radiation exposure from depleted uranium: The radiation bystander effect”, Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology, vol. 331, pp. 135–141, 2017. [MIN 16] MINISTERE DE L’INTERIEUR, “Circulaire sur la politique nationale relative aux exercices territoriaux: Orientations et programmations pour la période 2016–2018”, République française, Ministère de l’intérieur, Circular no. NOR INTK 1604555J, March 2016. [MIN 17] MINISTERE DE L’INTERIEUR, “Instruction interministérielle des exercices d’urgence nucléaire et radiologique”, République française, Ministère de l’intérieur, Circular INTE 1700151J, January 2017. [MIN 18] MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, Environmental Remediation in Japan, available at: http://josen.env.go.jp/en/pdf/progressseet_progress_on_cleanup_eff orts.pdf, March 2018. [MIR 16] MIRADJI F., Modélisation du comportement du ruthénium lors de son transport dans le circuit primaire, Thesis, University of Lille 1, December 2016.

References

313

[MOA 14] MOAL A., GEORGENTHUM V., MARCHAND O., “SCANAIR: A transient fuel performance code: Part One: General modelling description”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 280, pp. 150–171, 2014. [MOK 18] MOKARI M., ALAMATSAZ M.H., MOEINI H. et al., “A simulation approach for determining the spectrum of DNA damage induced by protons”, Physics in Medicine Biology, vol. 63, no. 17, p. 175003, 2018. [MØL 07] MØLLER A.P., MOUSSEAU T.A., DE LOPE F. et al., “Elevated frequency of abnormalities in barn swallows from Chernobyl”, Biology Letters of the Royal Society, vol. 3, pp. 414–417, 2007. [MØL 09] MØLLER A.P., MOUSSEAU T.A., “Reduced abundance of insects and spiders linked to radiation at Chernobyl 20 years after the accident”, Biology Letters of the Royal Society, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 356–359, 2009. [MØL 11] MØLLER A.P., BONISOLI-ALQUATI A., RUDOLFSEN G. et al., “Chernobyl birds have smaller brains”, PLoS ONE, vol. 6, no. 2, p. e16862, 2011. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016862. [MØL 12a] MØLLER A.P., HAGIWARA A., MATSUI S. et al., “Abundance of birds in Fukushima as judged from Chernobyl”, Environmental Pollution, vol. 164, pp. 36–39, 2012. [MØL 12b] MØLLER A.P., BONISOLI-ALQUATI A., RUDOLFSEN G. et al., “Elevated mortality among birds in Chernobyl as judged from biased sex and age ratios”, PLoS One, vol. 7, no. 4, p. e35223, 2012. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035223. [MØL 13a] MØLLER A.P., MOUSSEAU T.A., “Assessing effects of radiation on abundance of mammals and predator–prey interactions in Chernobyl using tracks in the snow”, Ecological Indicators, vol. 26, pp. 112–116, 2013. [MØL 13b] MØLLER A.P., MOUSSEAU T.A., “The effects of natural variation in background radioactivity on humans, animals and other organisms”, Biological Reviews, vol. 88, pp. 226–254, 2013. [MØL 13c] MØLLER A.P., MOUSSEAU T.A., “Uncomfortable questions in the wake of nuclear accidents at Fukushima and Chernobyl”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 11, no. 1, p. 13, April 1, 2013. [MØL 13d] MØLLER A.P., NISHIUMI I., SUZUKI H. et al., “Differences in effects of radiation on abundance of animals in Fukushima and Chernobyl”, Ecological Indicators, vol. 24, no. 7, pp. 5–81, 2013. [MØL 15] MØLLER A.P., NISHIUMI I., MOUSSEAU T.A., “Cumulative effects of radioactivity from Fukushima on the abundance and biodiversity of birds”, Journal of Ornithology, 2015. doi:10.1007/s10336-015-1197-2.

314

Nuclear Accidents

[MØL 16] MØLLER A.P., MOUSSEAU T.A., “Are organisms adapting to ionizing radiation at Chernobyl?”, Trends in Ecology & Evolution, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 281–289, 2016. [MØL 18] MØLLER A.P., MOUSSEAU T.M., “Reduced colonization by soil invertebrates to irradiated decomposing wood in Chernobyl”, Science of the Total Environment, vol. 645, pp. 773–779, 2018. [MØL 19] MØLLER A.P., MOUSSEAU T.M., “Interactive effects of ionizing radiation and climate change on the abundance of breeding birds”, Ecological Indicators, vol. 99, pp. 178–182, 2019. [MOR 07] MORGAN W.F., SOWA M.B., “Non-targeted bystander effects induced by ionizing radiation”, Mutation Research, vol. 616, pp. 159–164, 2007. [MOR 11] MORGAN W.F., “Radiation induced genomic instability”, Health Physics, vol. 100, no. 3, pp. 280–281, 2011. [MOR 15] MORGAN W.F., SOWA M.B., “Non-targeted effects induced by ionizing radiation: Mechanisms and potential impact on radiation induced health effects”, Cancer Letters, vol. 356, no. 1, pp. 7–21, 2015. [MÖR 15] MÖRNER N.A., “Threats and disasters on planet earth”, International Journal of Engineering Research & Science, vol. 1, pp. 43–46, 2015. [MOT 16] MOTHERSILL C., SEYMOUR C., “Genomic instability and the spectrum of response to low radiation doses”, in KOVALCHUK I., KOVALCHUK O. (eds), Genome Stability, From Virus to Human Application, Chapter 35, Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 606–614, 2016. [MOT 18] MOTHERSILL C., SEYMOUR C., “Old Data—new concepts: Integrating “indirect effects” into radiation protection”, Health Physics, vol. 115, no. 1, pp. 170–178, 2018. [MOU 13] MOUSSEAU T.A., MØLLER A.P., “Elevated frequency of cataracts in birds from Chernobyl”, PLoS One, vol. 8, no. 7, p. e66939, 2013. [MOU 16] MOUSSA L., USUNIER B., DEMARQUAY C. et al., “Bowel radiation injury: Complexity of the pathophysiology and promises of cell and tissue engineering cell”, Transplantation, vol. 25, pp. 1723–1746, 2016. [MOU 17] MOUSSA L., PATTAPPA G., DOIX B. et al., “A biomaterial-assisted mesenchymal stromal cell therapy alleviates colonic radiation induced damage”, Biomaterials, vol. 115, pp. 40–52, 2017.

References

315

[MUK 14] MUKHOPADHYAY S., HASTAK M., “Compare and contrast major nuclear power plant disasters: Lessons learned from the past”, 10th International Conference of the International Institute for Infrastructure Resilience and Reconstruction (I3R2), Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, USA, May 20–22, 2014. [MUN 14] MUNRO A., MANAGI S., Going back: Radiation and intentions to return amongst households evacuated after the Great Tohoku Earthquake, GRIPS Discussion Paper 14-14, 2014. [MUR 98] MURPHY M., ALLEN P., “The influence of social psychological factors on behaviour, stress and dose in Chernobyl affected areas”, Annual Conference “Risk Analysis: Opening the Process”, SRA Europe, Paris, pp. 405–414, October 11–14, 1998. [MUR 15] MURAKAMI M., ONO K., TSUBOKURA M. et al., “Was the risk from nursing-home evacuation after the Fukushima accident higher than the radiation risk?”, PLoS ONE, vol. 10, no. 9, p. e0137906, 2015. [MUS 16] MUSILLI S., Étude des mécanismes d’action du Strontium 90 sur le système immunitaire à la suite d’une contamination chronique, Thesis, University of Paris-Saclay, March 2016. [NAG 16] NAGAO S., “Radionuclides released from nuclear accidents: Distribution and dynamics in soil”, in HASEGAWA H., RAHMAN I.M.M., RAHMAN M.A. (eds), Environmental Remediation Technologies for Metal-Contaminated Soils, Springer, Tokyo, pp. 43–65, 2016. [NAH 12] NAHON M., “Plan et dispositions spécifiques face aux risques NRBC”, SAMU-75, available at: https://docplayer.fr/31659473-Plans-et-dispositions-spec ifiques-face-aux-risques-nrbc.html, April 3, 2012. [NAS 11] NASR A., SUARD S., EL-RABII H. et al., “Fuel mass-loss rate determination in a confined and mechanically ventilated compartment fire using a global approach”, Combustion Science and Technology, vol. 183, no. 12, pp. 1342–1359, 2011. [NAT 16] NATHWANI A.C., DOWN J.F., GOLDSTONE J. et al., “Polonium-210 poisoning: A first-hand account”, The Lancet, vol. 388, no. 10049, pp. 1075–1080, September 10, 2016. [NCR 08] NCRP, Management of Persons Contaminated with Radionuclides, Recommendations of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, NCRP Report no. 161, Volume I, NCRP, Bethesda, MD, USA, available at: https://ncrponline.org/shop/reports/report-no-161-i-management-ofpersons-contaminated-with-radionuclides-handbook/, 2008.

316

Nuclear Accidents

[NEA 00] NEA, Analyse critique du système de protection radiologique, Réflexions préliminaires du Comité de protection radiologique et de santé publique (CRPPH) de l’Agence de l’OCDE pour l’énergie nucléaire, NEA, Paris, 2000. [NEA 01] NEA, Améliorer l’efficacité des autorités de sûreté nucléaires, NEA, Paris, 2001. [NEA 02a] NEA, Améliorer ou maintenir la sûreté nucléaire, NEA, Paris, 2002. [NEA 02b] NEA, Tchernobyl: Évaluation des incidences radiologiques et sanitaires. Mise à jour 2002, de Tchernobyl; dix ans déjà, NEA, Paris, 2002. [NEA 03] NEA, Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants: Policies, Strategies and Costs, NEA, OCDE, 2003. [NEA 08] NEA, Assurer la sûreté nucléaire: La mission des autorités réglementaires, NEA, Paris, 2008. [NEA 10] NEA, Public Attitudes to Nuclear Power, NEA, no. 6859, OECD, Paris, France, 2010. [NEA 11] NEA, Méthodologies d’essai et bases de calcul des critères APRP, Avis techniques du CSIN no. 13, NEA, Paris, 2011. [NEA 12a] NEA, Déterminer la pertinence des structures organisationnelles, des ressources et des compétences des exploitants nucléaires, Avis techniques du CSIN, no. 14, NEA, Paris, 2012. [NEA 12b] NEA, Gestion du vieillissement des installations du cycle du combustible nucléaire, Avis techniques du CSIN, no. 15, NEA, Paris, 2012. [NEA 12c] NEA, Défis de l’exploitation à long terme des centrales nucléaires. Implications pour les autorités de sûreté, Réglementation nucléaire NEA/CNRA/R(2012)5, 2012. [NEA 12d] NEA, Japan’s Compensation for Nuclear Damage as Related to the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear accident, NEA no. 7089, OECD, Paris, 2012. [NEA 13] NEA, The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident: OECD/NEA Nuclear Safety Response and Lessons Learnt, NEA, Paris, 2013. [NEA 16a] NEA, Five Years after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Nuclear Safety Improvements and Lessons Learnt, NEA, Paris, 2016. [NEA 16b] NEA, The Safety Culture of an Effective Nuclear Regulatory Body, NEA, Paris, 2016. [NEA 19] NEA, International Nuclear Emergency Exercises (INEX), available at: https://www.oecd-nea.org/rp/inex/, 2019.

References

317

[NÉN 06] NÉNOT J.-C., “Terrorisme et radioprotection”, RGN, vol. 3, pp. 74–82, 2006. [NÉN 07] NÉNOT J.-C., GOURMELON P., Les accidents dus aux rayonnements ionisants: Le bilan sur un demi-siècle, IRSN-2007/79-FR Report, Doc.référence, February 15, 2007. [NGU 10] NGUYEN T.D., Support de la modélisation mésoscopique dans la prédiction des écoulements dans les ouvrages en béton fissuré en conditions d’accident grave, Thesis, Université de Pau et des Pays de l’Adour, December 2010. [NGU 17] NGUYEN D.H., FICHOT F., TOPIN V, “Investigation of the structure of debris beds formed from fuel rods fragmentation”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 313, pp. 96–107, 2017. [NIF 15] NIFENECKER H., “A review of post-nuclear-catastrophe management”, Reports on Progress in Physics, vol. 78, 072301, 16 pp., 2015. [NIQ 04] NIQUET G., MOUCHET C., SAUT C., “Les centres nucléaires et le public: Communication, information”, Radioprotection, vol. 39, pp. 475–480, 2004. [NOM 16] NOMURA S., BLANGIARDO M., TSUBOKURA M. et al., “Postnuclear disaster evacuation and chronic health in adults in Fukushima, Japan: A long-term retrospective analysis”, BMJ Open, vol. 6, p. e010080, 2016. [NRC 05] NRC, Health Risk From Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation. Pre-Publication Version, National Research Council of the National Academies of USA, BEIR VII, 2005. [NRC 06] NRC, Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, BEIR VII Phase 2, 2006. [NRC 08] NRCP, Management of Persons Contaminated with Radionuclides: Handbook, Recommendations of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, NCRP Report No. 161, vols I and II, NCRP, Bethesda, MD, 2008. [NRC 11] NRC (NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION), Provides Protective Action Recommendations Based on U.S. Guidelines, Press release 11-050, available at: www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/news/2011/11-050.pdf, March 16, 2011. [NRP 07] NRPA (NORWEGIAN RADIATION PROTECTION AGENCY), “The Kyshtym Accident, 29th September 1957”, August 2007. [NTI 99] NTI (NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE), Criminal dies stealing radioactive material, available at: http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/criminal-dies-stealing -radioactive-material/, 1999.

318

Nuclear Accidents

[OE 16] OE M., FUJII S., MAEDA M. et al., “Three-year trend survey of psychological distress, post-traumatic stress, and problem drinking among residents in the evacuation zone after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident [The Fukushima Health Management Survey]”, Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, vol. 70, pp. 245–252, 2016. [OFP 15] OFPP (OFFICE FEDERAL DE LA PROTECTION DES POPULATIONS), Concept de protection d’urgence en cas d’accident dans une centrale nucléaire en Suisse, available at: https://biblio.parlament.ch/e-docs/382155.pdf, 2015. [OMS 93] OMS, Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality, vol. 1, 2nd ed., WHO, Geneva, 1993. [OMS 11] OMS, Préoccupations liées au nucléaire au Japon – FAQ, available at: http://www.who.int/hac/crises/jpn/faqs/fr/index7.html, 2011. [ONE 19] ONEP (OFFICE FOR THE NUCLEAR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS), Improvement of nuclear emergency preparedness, available at: https://www.cao .go.jp/en/pmf/pmf_16.pdf, 2019. [ORA 17] ORANO CYCLE, Rapport d’information du site Orano la Hague, 2017. [ORA 19] ORANO TRICASTIN, Expertise sur tout le cycle, available at: https://www .orano.group/fr/expertise-sur-tout-le-cycle/tour-des-implantations/transformation -uranium/tricastin/surete-securite, 2019. [ORT 09] ORTIZ LOPEZ P., “Enseignements tirés des expositions accidentelles en radiothérapie externe moderne”, Contrôle, vol. 185, pp. 89–90, 2009. [OTA 05] OTAN, Environnement et sécurité, available at: http://www.nato.int /science/publication/pdf/environment-f.pdf, 2005. [OUF 13] OUF F.-X. DELCOUR S., AZEMA N. et al., “Contribution to the study of particle resuspension kinetics during thermal degradation of polymers”, Journal of Hazardous Materials, vols 250–251, pp. 298–307, 2013. [OUG 18] OUGHTON D., ALBANI V., BARQUINERO F. et al., Recommendations and Procedures for Preparedness and Health Surveillance of Populations Affected by a Radiation Accident, Institute of Global Health, Barcelona, 2018. [PAN 14] PANASYUK M.I., LYTVYN I.A., LIUSHNYA E.P. et al., “Soils and ground water’s radioactive contamination into the local zone of the ‘shelter’ object and industrial site of Chernobyl NPP”, Conference paper Uranium – Past and Future Challenges, pp. 657–664, 2014. [PAR 88] PARETZKE H.G., “The impact of the Chernobyl accident on radiation protection”, Health Physics, vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 139–143, 1988.

References

319

[PAR 93] PARADIES M., UNGER L., HAAS P. et al., Development of the NRC’s human performance investigation process (HPIP), NUREG/CR-5455, SI-92-101, 1993. [PAR 10] PARACHE V., RENAUD P., CHOJNACKI E. et al., Projet de recherche sur les indicateurs de la sensibilité radioécologique et les méthodes multicritères appliqués à l’environnement d’un site industriel, Scientific report, DEI/SESURE/2010-12, 2010. [PAS 12a] PASCAL A., “La population autour des sites nucléaires français: Un paramètre déterminant pour la gestion de crise et l’analyse économique des accidents nucléaires”, Radioprotection, vol. 47, pp. 13–31, 2012. [PAS 12b] PASCUCCI-CAHEN L., MOMAL P., “Les rejets radiologiques massifs diffèrent profondément des rejets contrôlés”, IRSN, available at: http://www.irsn.fr/FR/Actualites_presse/Actualites/Documents/FR_Eurosafe-20 12_Rejets-radioactifs-massifs-vs-rejets-controles_Cout_IRSN-Momal.pdf, 2012. [PAS 13] PASQUALE D.A., HANSEN R.G., “Implications of an improvised nuclear device detonation on command and control for surrounding regions at the local, state, and federal levels”, A white paper prepared for the 23–24 January 2013, Workshop on Nationwide Response to an Improvised Nuclear Device Attack, hosted by the Institute of Medicine’s Forum on Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Catastrophic Events together with the National Association of County and City Health Officials, available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih .gov/books/NBK184338/, 2013. [PAT 18] PATAUD CELERIER P., “À Fukushima, une catastrophe banalisée”, Le Monde diplomatique, pp. 14–15, available at: https://www.monde-diplomatique .fr/2018/04/PATAUD_CELERIER/58553, April 2018. [PAY 05] PAYEN A., “Prise en charge des troubles psychologiques face à une menace NRBC”, in De REVEL T., GOURMELON P., VIDAL D. et al. (eds), Menace terroriste approche médicale, John Libbey Eurotext, Montrouge, pp. 30–38, 2005. [PEA 18] PEARSON A.J., GAW S., HERMANSPAHN N. et al., “Deterministic and semiprobabilistic modeling of the committed dose from radionuclides and the chemical burden from uranium in the New Zealand diet”, Journal of Food Protection, vol. 81, no. 9, pp. 1400–1410, 2018. [PÉG 16] PÉGUIN P., Vivre dans le jardin nucléaire avec Ethos, un crime contre l’humanité, available at: http://www.fukushima-blog.com/2016/11/vivre -dans-le-jardin-nucleaire-avec-ethos-un-crime-contre-l-humanite.html, 2016.

320

Nuclear Accidents

[PEN 12] PENTREATH R.J., “Radiation and protection of the environment: The work of Committee 5”, First ICRP Symposium on the International System of Radiological Protection, Bethesda, USA, October 24–26, 2011, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 41, nos 3–4, pp. 45–56, 2012. [PEN 15] PENTREATH R.J., LARSSON C.M., COPPLESTONE D., “ICRP’s approach to protection of the living environment under different exposure situations”, in ICRP (ed.), Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on the System of Radiological Protection, Annals of ICRP, vol. 44, suppl. 1, pp. 288–294, 2015. [PER 14] PERKO T., “Radiation risk perception: A discrepancy between the experts and the general population”, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, vol. 133, pp. 86–91, 2014. [PER 18] PEREIRA J.F., DEMGADOB J.U., “Dirty bomb simulations: Two explosion scenarios using the Rio 2016 Olympic Games Athletes’ Village as a Model”, Brazilan Journal of Radiation Sciences, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 1–18, 2018. [PET 14] PETITFRERE M., “Eléments de doctrine pour la gestion post-accidentelle d’un accident nucléaire”, Action ANCCLI-IRSN sur le post-accident, Séminaire des 15 et 16 octobre 2014, Paris, 2014. [PLA 17] PLANTARD M.N., L’accident de Fukushima: Analyse, conséquences et état des lieux sur le nucléaire en France, Thesis, University of Montpellier, December 2017. [POÏ 01] POÏARKOV V., ROBEAU D., “L’accident de Tchernobyl”, in ROBEAU D. (ed.), Catastrophes et accidents nucléaires dans l’ex-Union soviétique, EDP Sciences, Les Ulis, pp. 59–99, 2001. [POI 19] POINTURIER F., JAEGLER H., HUBERT A. et al., “Redistribution des isotopes de l’uranium et du plutonium présents à l’état d’ultra-traces dans les sédiments des fleuves côtiers drainant le panache radioactif de Fukushima”, Journées techniques de la SFRP “Sols, sédiments séminaire et radioactivité”, January 6–7, 2019. [PRE 10a] PREFECTURE DE L’ISERE, Plan particulier d’intervention centre nucléaire de production d’électricité Saint Alban Saint Maurice l’Exil, available at: http://www.isere.gouv.fr/content/download/5485/35911/file/PPI%20CNPE%20S T%20ALBAN%202010%20.pdf, 2010. [PRE 10b] PREFECTURE DU NORD, Plan de Prévention des Risques Technologiques, BASF Agri-Production à Gravelines, available at: http://www.nord.gouv.fr /content/download/9529/58557/file/BASF-Note_de_presentation_cle265ab2.pdf, 2010.

References

321

[PRE 11a] PREFECTURE DE L’AUBE, Plan particulier d’intervention du centre nucléaire de production d’Electricité de Nogent-sur-Seine, available at: https://www.cli-nogentsurseine.fr/sites/default/files/upload/Binder1.pdf, 2011. [PRE 11b] PREFECTURE DE SEINE MARITIME, “En cas d’accident nucléaire, ayez les bons réflexes”, Dépliant PPI de Paluel, available at: http://www.seine-maritime.gouv.fr/content/download/4762/31001/file/DEPLIA NT%20PPI%20PALUEL.pdf, 2011. [PRE 11c] PREFECTURE DE SEINE MARITIME, “En cas d’accident nucléaire, ayez les bons réflexes”, Dépliant PPI de Penly, available at: http://www.seinemaritime.gouv.fr/content/download/4763/31005/file/DEPLIANT%20PPI%20PE NLY.pdf, 2011. [PRE 12a] PREFECTURE DU LOIRET, Exercice de sûreté nucléaire, available at: http://www.loiret.gouv.fr/content/download/6459/43660/file/plaquette%20exerci ce%20181212_valide.pdf, 2012. [PRE 12b] PREFECTURE DU TARN-ET GARONNE, Plan départemental de gestion et de distribution des comprimés d’iode stable (Plan Orsec Iode), available at: http://www.tarn-et-garonne.gouv.fr/content/download/1920/11758/file/PLAN_I ODE_Dpt_82_-__Octobre_2012.pdf, October 2012. [PRE 13a] PREFECTURE DE L’ARDECHE, Plan particulier d’intervention, Centre nucléaire de production d’électricité Cruas – Meysse, available at: http://www.ardeche.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/PPI_CNPE_CRUAS_MEYSSE_2013_cle 111e4d.pdf, 2013. [PRE 13b] PREFECTURE DE LA DROME, “Vous habitez dans une zone à risques industriels majeurs. Que faire en cas d’accident?”, Guide d’information et de prévention “les bons réflexes”, available at: http://www.drome.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf /plaquette_d_informations_sur_que_faire_en_cas_d_accident_sur_le_site_de_F BFC_a_Romans-sur-isere.pdf, 2013. [PRE 13c] PRETREL H., LE SAUX W., AUDOUIN L., “Determination of the heat release rate of large scale hydrocarbon pool fires in ventilated compartments”, Fire Safety Journal, vol. 62, pp. 192–205, 2013. [PRE 14a] PREFECTURE DE LA DROME, “Plan particulier d’intervention du site du Tricastin, Disposition spécifique ORSEC”, 2014. [PRE 14b] PRETREL H., LE SAUX W., AUDOUIN L., “Experimental determination of fire heat release rate with OC and CDG calorimetry for closed and ventilated compartments scenario”, Fire and Materials, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 474–506, June 2014. [PRE 15a] PREFECTURE MARITIME, ORSEC Maritime. Préfecture maritime de l’Atlantique, Version 1, September 18, 2015.

322

Nuclear Accidents

[PRE 15b] PREFECTURE MARITIME, ORSEC Maritime Manche et mer du Nord, Version 1, June 9, 2015. [PRE 15c] PREFECTURE DU CHER, Projet du plan particulier d’intervention de Belleville-sur-Loire, January 2015, available at: http://files.sdn-berry -puisaye.webnode.fr/200011370-dec13dfbbb/PPI_BELLEVILLE_07%2001%20 2015.pdf, 2015. [PRE 16a] PREFECTURE DE LA VIENNE, Plan Particulier d’Intervention du Centre Nucléaire de Production d’Electricité de Civaux, available at: http://www.vienne .gouv.fr/content/download/9242/65457/file/PPI%20version%20publique.pdf, May 2016. [PRE 16b] PREFECTURE DE LA MANCHE, Plan particulier d’intervention du centre nucléaire de production d’Electricité de Flamanville, 2016 edition, available at: http://www.manche.gouv.fr/content/download/30030/216143/file/PPI%20CNPE %202016%20Sans%20CF.pdf, 2016. [PRE 16c] PREFECTURE MARITIME, “ORSEC Maritime Méditerranée, Organisation de la réponse de sécurité civile en mer Méditerranée”, May 2016. [PRE 18a] PREFECTURE DES ARDENNES, Plan Particulier d’Intervention du Centre Nucléaire de Production d’Electricité de Chooz, July 2018, available at: http://www.ardennes.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/ppi_projet_2018.pdf, 2018. [PRE 18b] PREFECTURE DE LA CHARENTE, ORSEC, Risque technologique, Plan Particulier d’Intervention, CNPE du Bayais, available at: http://www .charente-maritime.gouv.fr/content/download/35491/225478/file/PPI%20du%20 CNPE%20du%20Blayais%202018%20V9%20Projet.pdf, 2018. [PRE 18c] PREFECTURE DU LOIRET, Centre Nucléaire de Production d’Electricité de Dampierre-en-Burly, Exercice national de sûreté nucléaire et sécurité civile les 5 et 6 décembre 2017, available at: http://www.loiret.gouv.fr/content/download /33478/246777/file/DP_EXERCICE%20DAMP%2005061217vMP1.pdf, 2018. [PRE 19] PREFECTURE DE LA MANCHE, Plan particulier d’intervention, available at: http://www.manche.gouv.fr/Politiques-publiques/Prevention-securite-des-person nes-et-des-biens/Plan-Particulier-d-Intervention, 2019. [PRI 88] PRINCE-EMBURY S., ROONEY J., “Psychological symptoms of residents in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the aftermath of technological disaster”, Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 128, pp. 779–790, 1988. [PRI 03] PRISE K.M., FOLKARD M., MICHAEL B.D., “A review of the bystander effect and its implications for low-dose exposure”, Radiation Protection Dosimetry, vol. 104, no. 4, pp. 347–355, 2003.

References

323

[PRO 05] PROVITOLO D., “Un exemple d’effets de dominos: La panique dans les catastrophes urbaines”, Cybergeo: Revue européenne de géographie / European Journal of Geography, vol. 328, pp. 1–19, 2005. [PRO 15] PROVITOLO D., DUBOS-PAILLARD E., VERDIERE N. et al., “Les comportements humains en situation de catastrophe: Les comprendre pour mieux les prévenir”, Cybergeo: European Journal of Geography [Online], Systèmes, Modélisation, Géostatistiques, document 735, available at: http://journals .openedition.org/cybergeo/27150, 2015. [PUJ 19] PUJOL-CANADELL M., YOUNG E., SMILENOV L., “Use of a humanized mouse model system in the validation of human radiation biodosimetry standards”, Radiation Research, February 25, 2019. doi: 10.1667/RR15283.1. [RAO 91] RAO D.V., NARRA V.R., HOWELL R.W. et al., “Induction of sperm head abnormalities by incorporated radionuclides: Dependence on subcellular distribution, type of radiation, dose rate, and presence of radioprotectors”, Radiation Research, vol. 125, pp. 89–97, 1991. [RAS 75] RASMUSSEN N. et al., Reactor safety study. An assessment of accident risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, WASH- 1400 (NUREG 751014), October 1975. [REN 13] RENAUD P., SIMON-CORNU M., GONZE M.A. et al., “Foodstuff contamination in Japan after the Fukushima accident and related dose assessments; Part 1 Foodstuff contamination”, Radioprotection, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 493–509, 2013. [REN 14a] RENAUD P., SIMON-CORNU M., GONZE M.A. et al., “Foodstuff contamination in Japan after the Fukushima accident and related dose assessments; Part 2 Ingestion dose during the first year”, Radioprotection, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 17–22, 2014. [REN 14b] RENAUD P., GONZE M.A., “Lesson from the Fukushima and Chernobyl accidents concerning the 137Cs contamination of orchard fresh fruits”, Radioprotection, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 169–175, 2014. [REN 18] RENARD A., ENTINE F., BENNER P. et al., “Prise en charge des blessés radio-contaminés en opération extérieure: Peut-on les évacuer par voie aérienne?”, Médecine et armées, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 389–398, 2018. [RÉP 09] RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, Arrêté du 20 novembre 2009 portant homologation de la décision n° 2009-DC-0153 de l’Autorité de sûreté nucléaire du 18 août 2009 relative aux niveaux d’intervention en situation d’urgence radiologique, JORF, no. 0293, December 2009.

324

Nuclear Accidents

[REP 13] REPETTO G., CHIKHI N., FICHOT F., “Main outcomes on debris bed cooling from PRELUDE Experiments”, Proceeding of 6th European Review Meeting on Severe Accident Research (ERMSAR-2013), Avignon, France, October 2–4, 2013. [REU 02] REUSS P., L’épopée de l’énergie nucléaire. Une histoire scientifique et industrielle, EDP Sciences, Les Ulis, 2002. [REU 15] REUSS P., “Parlons nucléaire en 30 questions”, Doc’ en poche, Entrez dans l’actu, La Documentation française, Paris, 2015. [REU 18] REUZE S., Extraction et analyse de biomarqueurs issus des imageries TEP et IRM pour l’amélioration de la planification de traitement en radiothérapie, Thesis, University of Paris-Saclay, available at: http://www.theses.fr/2018 SACLS341, 2018. [RHO 11] RHOMBERG L.R., GOODMAN J.E., HABER L.T. et al., “Linear low-dose extrapolation for noncancer health effects is the exception, not the rule”, Critical Reviews in Toxicology, vol. 41, pp. 1–19, 2011. [RIV 12] RIVIERE E., DELMESTRE A., “La perception du risque nucléaire en France, en 2012: ‘il y a un avant Fukushima et un après Fukushima’”, Réalités Industrielles, pp. 7–12, August 2012. [RIV 16] RIVIERE E., “La fonction de la boîte de comprimés n’est pas de rassurer mais de rappeler l’existence d’un risque”, Contrôle, vol. 201, pp. 38–39, 2016. [ROC 16] ROCH-LEFÈVRE S., MARTIN-BODIOT C., GRÉGOIRE E. et al., “A mouse model of cytogenetic analysis to evaluate caesium 137 radiation dose exposure and contamination level in lymphocytes”, Radiation and Environmental Biophysics, vol. 55, pp. 61–70, 2016. [ROD 87] RODRIGUES DE OLIVIERA A., “Un répertoire des accidents radiologiques 1945–1985”, Radioprotection, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 89–135, 1987. [ROD 08] RODGERS B.E., HOLMES K.M., “Radio-adaptive response to environmental exposures at Chernobyl”, Dose-Response, vol. 6, pp. 209–221, 2008. [ROG 80] ROGOVIN M., FRAMPTON G.T. JR., Three Mile Island, A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public, vol. I, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Special Inquiry Group, NUREG/CR-1250, 1980. [ROG 13] ROGERS M.B., AMLÔT R., RUBIN G.J., “The impact of communication materials on public responses to a radiological dispersal device (RDD) attack”, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 49–58, 2013.

References

325

[ROL 14] ROLLINGER F., GAREL J.C., “Les dialogues de la CIPR avec les parties prenantes à Fukushima: Quelles leçons pour la France et pour les experts de l’IRSN?”, Séminaire IRSN-ANCCLI sur le post-accident, Paris, October 15–16, 2014. [ROM 14] ROMANYUKHA A., TROMPIER F., REYES R.A. et al., “Electron paramagnetic resonance radiation dose assessment in fingernails of the victim exposed to high dose as result of an accident”, Radiation and Environmental Biophysics, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 755–762, 2014. [SAB 12] SABARD J., GOULIER J., CHAUMEIX N. et al., “Determination of explosion combustion parameters of H2/O2/N2 mixtures”, International Symposium on Hazard, Prevention and Mitigation of Industrial Explosions (ISHPMIE), Kraków, Poland, July 2012. [SAB 13] SABARD J., Étude de l’explosion de mélanges diphasiques: Hydrogène et poussières, Thesis, University of Orléans, September 2013. [SAE 11] SAENKO V., IVANOV V., TSYB A. et al., “Overview of the Chernobyl accident and its consequences”, Clinical Oncology, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 234–243, 2011. [SAK 12] SAKAI K., “Reference levels in the context of Fukushima – lessons learned and a challenge for the radiation protection system”, First ICRP Symposium on the International System of Radiological Protection, Bethesda, USA, October 24–26, 2011, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 41, nos 3–4, pp. 282–285, 2012. [SAM 16] SAMET J.M., SEO J., The Financial Costs of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Disaster: A Review of the Literature, Green Cross, available at: https://www.greencross.ch/wp-content/uploads/uploads/media/2016_chernobyl _costs_report.pdf 2016, 2016. [SAN 00] SANTE CANADA, “Lignes directrices canadiennes sur les restrictions concernant les aliments et l’eau contaminés par la radioactivité à la suite d’une urgence nucléaire, Lignes directrices et justification”, 01-SESC-254, available at: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ewh-semt/alt_formats/hecs-sesc/pdf/pubs/contaminants /emergency-urgence/01_254_hecs-sesc-fra.pdf, 2000. [SAN 03] SANTE CANADA, “Lignes directrices canadiennes sur les interventions en situation d’urgence nucléaire”, available at: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ewh -semt/alt_formats/hecs-sesc/pdf/pubs/radiation/guide-03/interventions-fra.pdf, November 2003. [SAN 15] SANCHEZ-BRUSSET M., Mécanismes d’oxydation de l’acier liquide lors de l’Interaction Corium-Béton à haute température en cas d’accident grave de réacteur nucléaire, Thesis, University of Perpignan, 2015.

326

Nuclear Accidents

[SAR 10] SARTORIS C., TAISNE A., PETIT M. et al., “A consistent approach to assess safety criteria for reactivity initiated accidents”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 240, no. 1, pp. 57–70, January 2010. [SAU 09] SAUNIER O., BOCQUET M., MATHIEU A. et al., “Model reduction via principal component truncation for the optimal design of atmospheric monitoring networks”, Atmospheric Environment, vol. 43, pp. 4940–4950, 2009. [SAU 13] SAUNIER O., MATHIEU A., DIDIER D. et al., “An inverse modeling method to assess the source term of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident using gamma dose rate observations”, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, vol. 13, pp. 11403–11421, 2013. [SAU 14] SAUER T., PRETORIUS J., “Nuclear weapons and the humanitarian approach”, Global Change, Peace & Security, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 233–250, 2014. [SAU 15] SAUER T., The NPT and the humanitarian initiative: Towards and beyond the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Deep Cuts Working Paper, no. 5, April 2015. [SAU 17] SAUER T., “How will NATO’s non-nuclear members handle the UN’s ban on nuclear weapons?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 73, no. 3, pp. 177–181, 2017. [SAZ 05] SAZYKINA T.G., “A system of dose-effects relationship for the northern wildlife: Radiation protection criteria”, Radioprotection, vol. 40, no. Suppl. 1, pp. S889–S892, 2005. [SCH 94] SCHLUMBERGER M., “Cancers de la thyroïde après Tchernobyl. Importance de la prophylaxie par le Kl”, Radioprotection, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 397–404, 1994. [SCH 97] SCHLUMBERGER M., PACINI F., Tumeur de la thyroïde, Nucléon, Paris, 1997. [SCH 07] SCHLUMBERGER M., “Cancer papillaire et folliculaire de la thyroïde”, Annales d’Endocrinologie, vol. 68, nos 2–3, pp. 120–128, 2007. [SCH 11] SCHLUMBERGER M., CHEVILLARD S., ORY K. et al., “Cancer de la thyroïde après exposition aux rayonnements ionisants”, Cancer/Radiothérapie, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 394–399, 2011. [SCH 16] SCHLUMBERGER M., “La prise de comprimés d’iode: Une mesure à l’efficacité prouvée”, Contrôle, vol. 201, pp. 32–33, 2016. [SCH 18] SCHOFIELD P.N., KONDRATOWICZ M., “Evolving paradigms for the biological response to low dose ionising radiation; the role of epigenetics”, International Journal of Radiation Biology, vol. 94, no. 8, pp. 769–781, 2018.

References

327

[SEO 18] SEONG C., HEO G., BAEK S. et al., “Analysis of the technical status of multiunit risk assessment in nuclear power plants”, Nuclear Engineering and Technology, vol. 50, pp. 319–326, 2018. [SGD 11] SGDSN (SECRETARIAT GENERAL DE LA DEFENSE ET DE LA SECURITE NATIONALE), “Circulaire relative à la doctrine nationale d’emploi des moyens de secours et de soins face à une action terroriste mettant en œuvre des matières radioactives”, Circular no. 800/SGDSN/PSE/PPS from February 18, 2011 NOR: PRMD1105975C, 30 p., 2011. [SGD 14] SGDSN, “Accident nucléaire ou radiologique majeur. Plan national de réponse. Fiches Mesures”, no. 200/SGDSN/PSE/PSN, available at: http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/uploads/2018/02/plan-national-nucleaire-fevrier201 4-fiches-mesures.pdf, February 2014. [SGD 15] SGDSN, Guide pour la préparation et l’évaluation des exercices d’urgence radiologique, November 25, 2015. [SGD 18] SGDSN, “Circulaire relative à la doctrine nationale d’emploi des moyens de secours et de soins face à une action terroriste mettant en œuvre des matières chimiques”, NOR: PRMD1827673C, no. 700/SGDSN/PSE/PSN from October 2, 2018. [SHI 18] SHIBAMOTO Y., NAKAMURA H., “Overview of biological, epidemiological, and clinical evidence of radiation hormesis”, International Journal of Molecular Sciences, vol. 19, p. 2387, 2018. [SHR 15] SHRADER-FRECHETTE K., “Rights to know and the Fukushima, Chernobyl, and Three Mile Island accidents”, in TAEBI B., ROESER S. (eds), The Ethics of Nuclear Energy. Risk, Justice, and Democracy in the post-Fukushima Era, Cambridge University Press, pp. 53–66, 2015. [SID 11] SIDPC, Plan ORSEC départemental. Dispositions générales, Préfecture de l’Hérault, Service interministériel de défense et de protection civiles, République française, June 2011. [SIM 19] SIMONSEN M., LIND O.C., SAETRA Ø. et al., “Coastal transport of river-discharged radionuclides: Impact of speciation and transformation processes in numerical model simulations”, Science of the Total Environment, vol. 669, pp. 856–871, 2019. [SME 11] SMEESTERS P., VAN BLADEL L., Accidents nucléaires et protection de la thyroïde par l’iode stable, Agence fédérale de contrôle sanitaire, March 2011. [SMI 88] SMITH H., “The International Commission on radiological protection: Historical overview. The ICRP is revising its basic recommendations”, IAEA Bulletin, vol. 3, pp. 42–44, 1988.

328

Nuclear Accidents

[SMI 00] SMITH J.T., COMANS, R.N.J. BERESFORD N.A. et al., “Chernobyl’s legacy in food and water”, Nature, vol. 405, p. 141, 2000. [SMI 16] SMITH R.W., SEYMOUR C.B., MOCCIA R.D. et al., “Irradiation of rainbow trout at early life stages results in trans-generational effects including the induction of a bystander effect in non-irradiated fish”, Environmental Research, vol. 145, pp. 26–38, 2016. [SOC 14] SOCIETE CIVILE JAPONAISE, available at: http://hrn.or.jp/eng/news /2014/10/29/japanese-civil-society-and-that-from-7-other-countries-request-thereports-of-the-united-nations-scientific-committee-on-fukushima-to-be-revised/, 2014. [SOK 14] SOKOLSKI H. (ed.), Nuclear Weapons Materials Gone Missing. What Does History Teach?, NPEC Publication, Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, 2014. [SON 13] SONG X., ZHANG Q., SEKIMOTO Y. et al., Modeling and probabilistic reasoning of population evacuation during large-scale disaster, available at: http://shiba.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp/song/wp-content/uploads/papers/SIGKDD13.pdf, 2013. [SPI 08] SPINDLER B., DUFOUR E., CRANGA M. et al., “Simulation of corium concrete interaction in a 2D geometry: Recent benchmarking activities concerning experiment and reactor cases”, The 3nd European Review Meeting on Severe Accident Research (ERMSAR-2008), Nesseber, Bulgaria, September 23–25, 2008. [SPP 08] SPPPI, Guide de bonnes pratiques. Retour d’expérience. Sécurité industrielle à l’attention des PME/PMI, November 2008. [SSK 14] SSK (STRAHLENSCHUTZKOMMISSION), “Planning areas for emergency response near nuclear power plants Recommendation by the German Commission on Radiological Protection”, Adopted at the 268th Meeting of the German Commission on Radiological Protection, available at: http://www.ssk.de/SharedDocs/Beratungsergebnisse_PDF/2014/Planungsgebiete _e.pdf?__blob=publication, February 13–14, 2014. [STE 98] STEGNAR P., “Evaluation de la situation radiologique de l’atoll de Bikini et perspectives de retour de la population. Etude de l’atoll de bikini”, AIEA Bulletin, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 15–17, 1998. [SUG 16] SUGIE C., SHIBAMOTO Y., HASHIMOTO S. et al., “Biological effects of a radiation hormesis sheet emitting very low-dose-rate γ rays”, International Journal of Radiation Oncology, Biology, Physics, vol. 96, no. 25, Poster Viewing 3376, pp. E561–E562, 2016.

References

329

[SUT 03] SUTTON P.M., GOULD R.M., “Nuclear, radiological, and related weapons”, in LEVY B.S., SIDEL V.W. (eds), Terrorism and Public Health. A Balanced Approach to Strengthening Systems and Protecting People, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 220–242, 2003. [SUZ 15] SUZUKI Y., YABE H., YASUMURA S. et al., “Psychological distress and the perception of radiation risks: The Fukushima health management survey”, Bulletin of the World Health Organization, vol. 93, pp. 598–605, 2015. [SWA 18] SWARTS S.G., SIDABRAS J.W., GRINBERG O. et al., “Developments in biodosimetry methods for triage with a focus on X-band electron paramagnetic resonance in vivo fingernail dosimetry”, Health Physics, vol. 115, no. 1, pp. 140–150, 2018. [SY 15] SY M.M., ANCELET S., HENNER P. et al., “Foliar interception of radionuclides in dry conditions: A meta-analysis using a Bayesian modelling approach”, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, vol. 147, pp. 63–75, 2015. [SY 16] SY M.M., Analyse d’incertitude en situation accidentelle. Transfert de radionucléides dans l’environnement et évaluation de l’exposition humaine par voie alimentaire, Thesis, University of Aix-Marseille, 2016. [SYN 15] SYNOLAKIS C., KÂNOĞLU U., “The Fukushima accident was preventable”, Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society, vol. 373A, p. 20140379, 2015. [TAK 15] TAKAMATSU K., TAKEGAMI H., ITO C. et al., “Cosmic-ray muon radiography for reactor core observation”, Annals of Nuclear Energy, vol. 78, pp. 166–175, 2015. [TAK 18] TAKAHARA S., WATANABE M., HIROUCHI J. et al., “Dose-reduction effects of vehicles against gamma radiation in the case of a nuclear accident”, Health Physics, vol. 114, no. 1, pp. 64–72, 2018. [TAN 18] TANIGAWA K., “Medical and health surveillance in postaccident recovery: Experience after Fukushima”, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 47, nos 3–4, pp. 229–240, 2018. [TAR 09a] TARDIF N., L’étude du comportement à haute température d’une fissuration instable dans l’acier 16MND5 et application au calcul de la rupture d’un fond de cuve en cas d’accident grave, Thesis, Institut national des sciences appliquées de Lyon, December 2009. [TAR 09b] TARDIF N., CORET M., NICAISE G. et al., “Vers la prévision du déchirement d’une cuve de réacteur à eau pressurisée en cas d’accident”, Matériaux Techniques, EDP Sciences, vol. 97, no. 4, pp. 220–223, 2009.

330

Nuclear Accidents

[TCH 13] TCHITCHEKOVA D., MORTHOMAS J., RIBEIRO F. et al., “Energy barriers for carbon diffusion in ferrite under heterogeneous stress”, International Workshop on Multiscale Simulation of the Prediction of Radiation Damage in Reactor Pressure Vessel Steel and Internals up to 60 Years of Operation, Fontainebleau, France, December 10–12, 2013. [TCH 14] TCHITCHEKOVA D.S., MORTHOMAS J., RIBEIRO F. et al., “A novel method for calculating the energy barriers for carbon diffusion in ferrite under heterogeneous stress”, The Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 141, p. 034118, 2014. [TEL 15] TELLERIA D., CABIANCA T., PROEHL G. et al., “Use of the ICRP system for the protection of marine ecosystems”, in ICRP (ed.), Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on the System of Radiological Protection, Annals of ICRP, vol. 44, suppl. 1, pp. 304–312, 2015. [TER 11] TERTRAIS B., L’apocalypse n’est pas pour demain. Pour en finir avec le catastrophisme, Denoël, Paris, 2011. [THO 16] THOMAS G., “Pour une meilleure coopération entre les acteurs en situation d’urgence, au sein mais aussi entre les états membres”, Contrôle, vol. 201, pp. 25–26, 2016. [TOK 18] TOKONAMI S., HOSODA M., “Thyroid equivalent doses for evacuees and radiological impact from the Fukushima nuclear accident”, Radiation Measurements, vol. 119, pp. 74–79, 2018. [TOP 11] TOPIN V., DUBOIS F., MONERIE Y. et al., “Micro-rheology of dense particulate flows: Application to immersed avalanches”, Journal of Non-Newtonian Fluid Mechanics, vol. 166, nos 1–2, pp. 63–72, 2011. [TOP 12] TOPIN V., MONERIE Y., PERALES F. et al., “Collapse dynamics and runout of dense granular materials in a fluid”, Physical Review Letters, vol. 109, p. 188001, 2012. [TRI 15a] TRINCAL J., Modélisation du comportement de l’iode dans l’atmosphère, Thesis, University of Lille 1, October 2015. [TRI 15b] TRINCAL J., CANTREL L., COUSIN F. et al., “Impact of atmospheric species reactivity on radioactive gaseous iodine transport in severe accident conditions”, WIT Transactions on Ecology and the Environment, vol. 198, pp. 77–86, 2015. [TRO 09] TROMPIER F., ROMANYUKHA A., KORNAK L. et al., “Electron paramagnetic resonance radiation dosimetry in fingernails”, Radiation Measurements, vol. 44, pp. 6–10, 2009.

References

331

[TRO 14a] TROMPIER F., ROMANYUKHA A., REYES R. et al., “State of the art in nail dosimetry: Free radicals identification and reaction mechanisms”, Radiation and Environmental Biophysics, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 291–303, 2014. [TRO 14b] TROMPIER F., QUEINNEC F., BEY E. et al., EPR retrospective dosimetry with fingernails: Report on first application cases”, Health Physics, vol. 106, no. 6, pp. 798–805, 2014. [TUB 05] TUBIANA M., AURENGO A., AVERBECK D. et al., “Dose–effect relationships and the estimation of the carcinogenic effects of low doses of ionizing radiation”, Joint Report no 2, Académie Nationale de Médecine, Institut de France–Académie des Sciences, English Transl., Edition Nucleon, Paris, available at: www.academiemedecine.fr/actualites/rapports.asp, March 2005. [TUB 06a] TUBIANA M., AURENGO A., AVERBECK D. et al., “The debate on the use of linear no threshold for assessing the effects of low doses”, Journal of Radiological Protection, vol. 26, pp. 317–324, 2006. [TUB 06b] TUBIANA M., AURENGO A., AVERBECK A. et al., “Recent reports on the effect of low doses of ionizing radiation and its dose–effect relationship”, Radiation and Environmental Biophysics, vol. 44, pp. 245–251, 2006. [TUB 07] TUBIANA M., MASSE R., DE VATHAIRE F. et al., “La controverse sur les effets des faibles doses de rayonnements ionisants et la relation linéaire sans seuil”, Radioprotection, vol. 42, pp. 133–161, 2007. [TUR 16] TURQUE I., Effet de fortes teneurs en hydrogène sur les propriétés métallurgiques et mécaniques des gaines en alliage de zirconium après incursion à haute température, Thesis, University of Paris Sciences et Lettres, 2016. [UND 02] UNDP, The human consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. A strategy for recovery, Report commissioned by UNDP and UNICEF with the support of UN-OCHA and WHO, UNDP, 2002. [UNS 96] UNSCEAR, “Sources and effects of ionizing radiation”, United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, United Nations, New York, 1996. [UNS 08] UNSCEAR, “Sources and effects of ionizing radiation”, vol. II, Annex E. Effects of ionizing radiation on non-human biota, pp. 221–313, 2008. [UNS 11] UNSCEAR, “Sources, effects and risks of ionizing radiation”, UNSCEAR (United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) 2008 Report, vol. I, Report to the General Assembly with Scientific Annex C: Radiation exposure in accidents, United Nations, New York, 2011.

332

Nuclear Accidents

[UNS 13] UNSCEAR, “Sources, effects and risks of ionizing radiation”, UNSCEAR (United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) 2013 Report, vol. II, Report to the General Assembly with Scientific Annex B: Effects of radiation exposure of children, United Nations, New York, 2013. [UNS 14] UNSCEAR, “Sources, effects and risks of ionizing radiation”, UNSCEAR (United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) 2013 Report, Volume I, Report to the General Assembly with Scientific Annex A: Levels and effects of radiation exposure due to the nuclear accident after the 2011 great east-Japan earthquake and tsunami, United Nations, New York, 2014. [UNS 15] UNSCEAR, Developments since the 2013 UNSCEAR report on the levels and effects of radiation exposure due to the nuclear accident following the great east-Japan earthquake and tsunami, A 2015 white paper to guide the Scientific Committee’s future programme of work, United Nations, New York, 2015. [UNS 16] UNSCEAR, Developments since the 2013 UNSCEAR Report on the levels and effects of radiation exposure due to the nuclear accident following the Great East-Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, A 2016 white paper to guide the Scientific Committee’s future programme of work, United Nations, New York, 2016. [UNS 17] UNSCEAR, Developments since the 2013 UNSCEAR Report on the levels and effects of radiation exposure due to the nuclear accident following the Great East-Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, A 2017 white paper to guide the Scientific Committee’s future programme of work, United Nations, New York, 2017. [UNS 18] UNSCEAR, Evaluation of data on thyroid cancer in regions affected by the Chernobyl accident, A white paper to guide the Scientific Committee’s future programme of work, United Nations, New York, 2018. [URB 81] URBANIK T., DESROSIERS A.E., “An analysis of evacuation time estimates around 52 nuclear power plant sites. Analysis and evaluation”, NUREG/CR1856, PNL-3662, vol. 1, 1981. [URB 00] URBANIK T., “Evacuation time estimates for nuclear power plants”, Journal of Hazardous Materials, vol. 75, nos 2–3, pp. 165–180, 2000. [USG 13] USGAO (UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE), “Emergency preparedness: NRC needs to better understand likely public response to radiological incidents at nuclear power plants”, Report to the Congressional Requesters, GAO-13-243, available at: http://www.gao.gov /assets/660/652933.pdf, March 2013. [USN 79] USNRC (U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION), Annual report, NUREG-0690, 1979.

References

333

[USN 11a] USNRC (U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION), “Criteria for development of evacuation time estimate studies”, available at: http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1130/ML113010515.pdf, November 2011. [USN 11b] USNRC, (U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION), “Guidance on developing effective radiological risk communication messages: Effective message mapping and risk communication with the public in nuclear plant emergency planning zones”, available at: http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs /ML1104/ML110490120.pdf, February 2011. [VÉR 15] VÉRON J., GOLAZ V., “Les migrations environnementales sont-elles mesurables ?”, Population & Sociétés, vol. 522, pp. 1–4, 2015. [VID 18a] VIDAL, “Iodure de potassium pharmacie centrale des armées 130 mg cp séc”, available at: https://www.vidal.fr/Medicament/iodure_de_potassium_phar macie_centrale_des_armees_130_mg_cp_sec-9411.htm, 2018. [VID 18b] VIDAL, “Iodure de potassium pharmacie centrale des armées 65 mg cp séc”, available at: https://www.vidal.fr/Medicament/iodure_de_potassium_phar macie_centrale_des_armees_65_mg_cp_sec-92392.htm, 2018. [VID 19] VIDAL, Le dictionnaire, 95th ed., Lavoisier, Paris, 2019. [VIL 14] VILLAIN J., Le livre noir du nucléaire militaire, Fayard, Paris, 2014. [VIN 14a] VINCENT P.G., SUQUET P., MONERIE Y. et al., “Effective flow surface of porous materials with two populations of voids under internal pressure: I. A GTN model”, International Journal of Plasticity, vol. 56, pp. 45–73, 2014. [VIN 14b] VINCENT P.G., SUQUET P., MONERIE Y. et al., “Effective flow surface of porous materials with two populations of voids under internal pressure: II. Fullfield simulations”, International Journal of Plasticity, vol. 56, pp. 74–98, 2014. [VIR 14] VIROT F., BARRACHIN M., SOUVI S. et al., “Theoretical prediction of thermodynamic properties of tritiatedberyllium molecules and application to ITER source term”, Fusion Engineering and Design, vol. 89, pp. 1544–1550, 2014. [VIS 13] VISSCHERS V.H.M., SIEGRIST M., “How a nuclear power plant accident influences acceptance of nuclear power: Results of a longitudinal study before and after the Fukushima disaster”, Risk Analysis, vol. 33, pp. 333–347, 2013. [VIV 16] VIVES I BATLLE J., BERESFORD N.A., BEAUGELIN-SEILLER K. et al., “Inter-comparison of dynamic models for radionuclide transfer to marine biota in a Fukushima accident scenario”, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, vol. 153, pp. 31–50, 2016.

334

Nuclear Accidents

[VO 13] VO Q.T., Imagerie d’essais mécaniques sur des composites à matrice métallique: Contribution expérimentale à la validation de méthodes d’homogénéisation et identification de propriétés mécaniques par phases, Thesis, University of Montpellier, December 2013. [VOI 15] VOISIN P., AINSBURY L., ATKINSON M. et al., “Realising the European network in biological dosimetry: RENEB-status quo”, Radiation Protection Dosimetry, vol. 164, nos 1–2, pp. 42–45, 2015. [VON 06] VON HIPPEL F.N., KAHN L.H., “Feasibility of eliminating the use of highly enriched uranium in the production of medical radioisotopes”, Science and Global Security, vol. 14, pp. 151–162, 2006. [VON 11] VON HIPPEL F.N., “The radiological and psychological consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi accident”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 67, no. 5, pp. 27–36, 2011. [VON 12] VON HIPPEL F., EWING R., GARWIN R. et al., “Time to bury plutonium”, Nature, vol. 485, pp. 167–168, 10 May 2012. [WAK 12] WAKEFORD R., “Radiation effects: Modulating factors and risk assessment – an overview”, First ICRP Symposium on the International System of Radiological Protection, Bethesda, USA, October 24–26, 2011, Annals of the ICRP, vol. 41, nos 3–4, pp. 98–107, 2012. [WAL 19] WALTERS W.J., CHRISTENSEN V., “Ecotracer: Analyzing concentration of contaminants and radioisotopes in an aquatic spatial-dynamic food web model”, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, vol. 181, pp. 118–127, 2019. [WAM 08] WAMBERSIE A., SMEESTERS P., ALEXANDRE L. et al., “Iode radioactif et comprimés d’iode (à propos de l’incident de l’IRE)”, Louvain médical, vol. 127, no. 8, pp. 323–333, 2008. [WAN 15] WANG H., YU K.N., HOU J. et al., “Radiation-induced bystander effect: Early process and rapid assessment. Mini-review”, Cancer Letters, vol. 356, pp. 137–144, 2015. [WAT 15] WATANABE Y., ICHIKAWA S., KUBOTA M. et al., “Morphological defects in native Japanese fir trees around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant”, Scientific Reports, vol. 5, p. 13232, 2015. doi: 10.1038/srep13232. [WES 01] WESSELY S., HYAMS K.C., BARTHOLOMEW R., “Psychological implications of chemical and biological weapons. Long term social and psychological effects may be worse than acute ones”, BMJ, vol. 323, pp. 878–879, 2001.

References

335

[WET 16] WETHERALL A.C., “Strengthening the international legal framework for nuclear security: Better sooner rather than later”, Nuclear Law Bulletin, vol. 98, no. 2, pp. 7–45, 2016. [WHO 99] WHO, Guidelines for iodine prophylaxis following nuclear accidents, update 1999, WHO/SDE/PHE/99.6, World Health Organization, Geneva, 1999. [WHO 04] WHO, Uranium in drinking-water: Background document for development of WHO Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality, WHO, 2004. [WHO 11] WHO, Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality, 4th ed., World Health Organization, Geneva, 2011. [WHO 16] WHO, 1986–2016: Chernobyl at 30. An update, available at: https://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/chernobyl/Chernobyl-update.pdf, 2016. [WIL 99] WILLIAMS B.L., BROWN S., GREENBERG M., “Determinants of trust perceptions among residents surrounding the Savannah River nuclear weapons site”, Environment and Behavior, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 354–371, May 1999. [WIL 03] WILLETT S., “Costs of disarmament. Disarming the costs: Nuclear arms control and nuclear rearmament”, UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research), Geneva, Switzerland, available at: http://unidir.org /files/publications/pdfs/costs-of-disarmament-disarming-the-costs-nuclear-armscontrol-and-nuclear-rearmament-306.pdf, 2003. [WIN 12] WINIAREK V. BOCQUET M., SAUNIER O. et al., “Estimation of errors in the inverse modeling of accidental release of atmospheric pollutant: Application to the reconstruction of the cesium-137 and iodine-131 source terms from the Fukushima Daiichi power plant”, Journal of Geophysical Research, vol. 117, p. D05122, 2012. [WRI 98] WRIGHT E.G., “Radiation-induced genomic instability in haemopoietic cells”, International Journal of Radiation Biology, vol. 74, no. 6, pp. 681–687, 1998. [WYB 04] WYBO J.L., “Le rôle du retour d’expérience dans la maîtrise des risques et des crises”, Qualitique, vol. 158, pp. 27–30, June 2004. [WYB 09] WYBO J.L., “Le retour d’expérience: Un processus d’acquisition de connaissances et d’apprentissage”, Economica, 19 p., available at: https://hal-mi nes-paristech.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00614238/document, 2009. [XER 12] XERRI B. CANNEAUX S., LOUIS F. et al. “Ab initio calculations and iodine kinetic modeling in the reactor coolant system of a pressurized water reactor in case of severe nuclear accident”, Computational and Theoretical Chemistry, vol. 990, pp. 194–208, 2012.

336

Nuclear Accidents

[YAB 09] YABLOKOV A.V., NESTERENKO V.B., NESTERENKO A.V., “Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe for Public Health and the Environment 23 years later”, in YABLOKOV A.V., NESTRENKO V.B., NESTRENKO A.V. (eds), Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment, Ann NY Acad Sci, vol. 1181, pp. 318–326, 2009. [YAB 11] YABLOKOV A.V., “Chernobyl: How many died in 25 years?”, GSS The Chernobyl Catastrophe: Taking Stock of 25 Years or Ecological and Health Damage, Charite Hospital, Berlin, April 6–8, 2011. [YAB 14] YABE H., SUZUKI Y., MASHIKO H. et al., “Psychological distress after the Great East Japan Earthquake and Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident: Results of a mental health and lifestyle survey through the Fukushima Health Management Survey in FY2011 and FY2012”, Fukushima Journal of Medical Science, vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 57–67, 2014. [YAS 16] YASUI M., “La transmission d’informations aux responsables politiques est cruciale dans les situations d’urgence nucléaire”, ASN. La gestion des situations d’urgence. Contrôle, no. 201, pp. 11, 2016. [YOS 11] YOSCHENKO V.I., KASHPAROV V.A., MELNYCHUK M.D. et al., “Chronic irradiation of scots pine trees (Pinus sylvestris) in the Chernobyl exclusion zone: Dosimetry and radiobiological effects”, Health Physics, vol. 101, pp. 393–408, 2011. [YOS 16] YOSHIDA H., OGAWA H., YOKOTA K. et al., “Safety decontamination system for combustion of forestry wastes”, in TAKAHASHI T. (ed.), Radiological Issues for Fukushima’s Revitalized Future, Springer Open, pp. 67–78, 2016. [ZAH 18] ZAHARIEV V., HRISTOV N., “Diagnostic criteria for assessment by general practitioners of patients injured in radiation incidents and cases of radiological terrorism”, Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 507–512, 2018. [ZAN 00] ZANZONICO P.B., BECKER D.V., “Effects of time of administration and dietary iodine levels on potassium iodide (KI) blockade of thyroid irradiation by 131I from radioactive fallout”, Health Physics, vol. 78, no. 6, pp. 660–667, 2000. [ZAN 12] ZANELLATO O., PREUSS M., BUFFIERE J.Y. et al., “Synchrotron diffraction study of dissolution and precipitation kinetics of hydrides in Zircaloy-4”, Journal of Nuclear Materials, vol. 420, pp. 537–547, 2012. [ZEL 05] ZELENA L., SOROCHINSKY B., ARNOLD V.S. et al., “Indications of limited gene expression in Pinus sylvestris trees from the Chernobyl region”, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, vol. 84, pp. 363–373, 2005.

References

337

[ZER 94a] ZERBIB J.C., “Accidents radiologiques: les retours d’expériences”, Annales de l'Association Belge de Radioprotection, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 621–643, 1994. [ZER 94b] ZERBIB J.C., “Accidents sur irradiateurs: les retours d’expériences”, Annales de l'Association Belge de Radioprotection, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 645–663, 1994. [ZER 15] ZERBIB J.C., “Tchernobyl, effets sanitaires et environnementaux”, Les cahiers de GLOBAL CHANCE, vol. 37, pp. 42–62, 2015. [ZHA 17] ZHAO R., HU H., WANG Z. et al., “Economic and environmental assessment of waste biomass recycling system in Aizuwakamatsu city”, The 28th Annual Conference of JSMCWM, FA-4, pp. 503–504, 2017. [ZHE 92] ZHELEZNYAK M.J., DEMCHENKO R., KHURSIN S.L., “Mathematical modeling of radionuclide dispersion in the Pripyat-Dnieper aquatic system after the Chernobyl accident”, The Science of the Total Environment, vol. 112, pp. 89–114, 1992. [ZON 89] ZONABEND F., La Presqu’île au nucléaire, Odile Jacob, Paris, 1989.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

1-pK DLM/IE

Mechanical model for simulating radionuclide transfers in the soil/soil solution/plant system

ACTA

Association de Coordination Technique Agricole [French association for the coordination of farming techniques]

AGORAS

Amélioration de la Gouvernance des Organisations et des Réseaux d’Acteurs pour la Sûreté nucléaire [French association for the improvement of the governance of organizations and networks of actors for nuclear safety]

ALARA

As Low As Reasonably Achievable

AMORAD

Amélioration des MOdèles de prévisions de la dispersion et de l’évaluation de l’impact des RADionucléides au sein de l’environnement [French association for the improvement of dispersion prediction models and evaluation of the impact of radionuclides in the environment]

ANCCLI

Association Nationale des Comités et Commissions Locales d’Information [French national association for local information committees and commissions]

Nuclear Accidents: Prevention and Management of an Accidental Crisis, First Edition. Jean-Claude Amiard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

340

Nuclear Accidents

ANDRA

Agence Nationale pour la gestion des Déchets Radioactifs [French agency for radioactive waste management]

ANR

Agence Nationale de la Recherche [French national research agency]

APRP

Accident de Perte de Réfrigérant Primaire [Loss of primary coolant accident]

ARP

Accident Research Program

ARS

Acute Radiation Syndrome

ASF

Autoroutes du Sud de la France [Motorways in the South of France]

ASN

Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire [French nuclear safety authority]

ASND

Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire Défense [French nuclear safety defense authority]

ASTEC

Accident Source Term Evaluation Code

ATLAS-2

Advanced Thermal-hydraulic Test Accident Simulation project phase 2

BESTAIR

BEryllium Source Term due to an Accident in the ITER experimental reactor

BIP-3

Behavior of Iodine Project Phase 3

BRL

Compagnie d’aménagement du Bas-Rhône et du Languedoc [Bas-Rhône and Languedoc planning company]

BSAF

Benchmark Study of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant

CABRI

Name given to a CEA test reactor used to study accident situations in reactors (REP, RNR)

Loop

for

Acronyms and Abbreviations

341

CALIDE

Experimental device for studying the influence of a debris bed on cooling

CATHARE

Advanced thermal hydraulics code for water reactor accidents

CBRN

Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear

CCI

Corium–Concrete Interaction

CDG

Carbon Dioxide Generation

CEA

Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique et aux énergies alternatives [French atomic energy commission]

CEPN

Centre d’étude sur l’Evaluation de la Protection dans le domaine Nucléaire [French study center on the evaluation of protection in the nuclear field]

CESAM

Code for European Severe Accidents Management

CFD

Computational Fluid Dynamics

CICNR

Comité Interministériel aux Crises Nucléaires ou Radiologiques [French interministerial committee on nuclear or radiological crises]

CIP

Cabri International Project

CLI

Commission Locale d’Information [French local information commission]

CLIS

Comité Local d’Information et de Suivi (Bure) [French local information and monitoring committee (Bure)]

CNDP

Commission Nationale du Débat Public [French national commission for public debate]

CNSC

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

342

Nuclear Accidents

COD

Centre Opérationnel Départemental departmental operational center]

[French

COGIC

Centre Opérationnel de Gestion Interministérielle des Crises [French operational center for interministerial crisis management]

CORINE

CEA program simulating corium modeling

COS

Commandant des Opérations de Secours [French rescue operations commander]

COZ

Centre Opérationnel de Zone [Operational center of a zone]

CROCO

Name given to a corium spreading simulation software

CSNI

NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (part of the OECD)

CTC

Centre Technique de Crise [IRSN technical crisis center]

DDREF

Dose and Dose Rate Effectiveness Factor

DDSC

Direction de la Défense et de la Sécurité Civile [French directorate of defense and civil security]

DENOPI

Dénoyage accidentel de piscine d’entreposage de combustible nucléaire [Accidental dewatering of a nuclear fuel storage pool]

DGPR

Direction Générale de la Prévention des Risques [French general directorate for risk prevention]

DGSNR

Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nucléaire et de Radioprotection [French general directorate for nuclear safety and radiology protection]

Acronyms and Abbreviations

343

DICRIM

Document d’Information Communal sur les RIsques Majeurs [French communal information document on major risks]

DiD

Defense in Depth

DIFFOX

Calculation code for the weakening of the sheath during re-sinking and post-accident phases

DISCOMS

DIstributed Sensing for COrium Monitoring and Safety

DNA

DeoxyriboNucleic Acid

DoE

Department of Energy

DOS

Directeur des Opérations de Secours [French director of emergency operations]

DSI

Directeur Sauvetage Incendie [French director of fire rescue]

DSIN

Direction de la Sûreté des Installations Nucléaires [French directorate for the safety of nuclear installations]

DSM

Directeur des Secours Médicaux [French director of medical rescue]

DSND

Délégué à la Sûreté Nucléaire et à la radioprotection pour les activités et installations intéressant la Défense [French delegate for nuclear safety and radiation protection for defense-related activities and facilities]

DSNR

Division de la Sûreté Nucléaire et de la Radioprotection [French division for nuclear safety and radiation protection]

DU

Depleted Uranium

344

Nuclear Accidents

EC

European Community

ECS

Évaluations complémentaires de sûreté [Additional safety assessments]

ECURIE

European Community Information Exchange

EDF

Electricité de France

EIS

Événements Intéressants la Sûreté [Events of interest for safety]

ENEV

Estimated No-Effects Values

ENSRG

European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group

EPICE

Evaluation of Pathologies potentially Induced by CEsium (prospective cross-sectional study)

EPICUR

Études Physico-chimiques de l’Iodine Confiné sous Rayonnement [Physico-chemical studies of iodine confined under radiation]

EPR

Electron Paramagnetic Resonance

ERR

Excess Relative Risk

EURDEP

European Radiological Data Exchange Platform

EURT

East Urals Radioactive Trace

FARN

Force d’Action Rapide Nucléaire [Nuclear rapid action force]

FBFC

Franco-Belgian Fuel Fabrication

FCD

Facteur de Conversion de Dose [Dose conversion factor]

FCI

Fuel–Coolant Interaction

Urgent

Radiological

Acronyms and Abbreviations

345

FPT

Fission Product Test (acronym associated with the Phébus-PF program tests)

FzK

Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe (Germany)

GCR

Gas Cooled Reactor

GPPA

Groupe Permanent Post-Accident et territoires [French permanent post-accident and territories group]

GRS

Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit [German society for plant and reactor safety]

HCTISN

Haut-Comité pour la Transparence et l’Information sur la Sécurité Nucléaire [French high committee for transparency and information on nuclear safety]

HERCA

Heads of the European Radiological protection Competent Authorities

HOS

Human Osteoblast Cells

HPA

Health Protection Agency

HPIP

Human Performance Investigation Process

HRR

Heat Release Rate

HSE

Health and Safety Executive

HT

Tritium gas

HTO

Tritiated water

HYMERES-2

Hydrogen Mitigation Experiments for Reactor Safety project phase 2

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

ICARE

Mechanical calculation software for simulating core meltdown accidents

346

Nuclear Accidents

ICRP

International Protection

Commission

on

Radiological

ICSA

Intensive Contamination Survey Area

INB

Installation Nucléaire de Base [Basic nuclear installation]

IODE

ASTEC software module

IOx

Iodine Oxides

IPSN

Institut de Protection et de Sûreté Nucléaire [French institute for nuclear protection and safety]

IRMa

Institut des Risques Majeurs [French institute for major risks]

IRRS

Integrated Regulatory Review Service

IRS

Incident Reporting System

IRSN

Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire [French institute for radiation protection and nuclear safety]

ISF

Interim Storage Facility

ISR

Internal Sulfate Reaction

ISS

Incidents Significantifs pour la Sûreté [Incidents of safety significance]

ITER

International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor

IVMR

In Vessel Melt Retention

JAEA

Japanese Atomic Energy Agency

KATS

FzK (Germany) program simulating corium flow

LET

Linear Energy Transfer

Acronyms and Abbreviations

347

LNT

Linear No Threshold

LOCA

Loss of Coolant Accident

LOFC

Loss of Forced Coolant Project

LP

Lumped Parameter

LWR

Light Water Reactor

MC3D

Name given to 3D multiphase thermohydraulics software for simulating the interaction between molten materials and a refrigerant fluid

MCCI

Molten Corium–Concrete Interaction

MD

Mortuary Depot

MELCOR

Name given to integral software (or software system) for simulating physical phenomena occurring during a core meltdown accident in a pressurized water reactor

MIRE

MItigation des REjets [Mitigation of releases]

MISTRA

Name given to an experimental CEA facility for hydrogen risk studies

MITHYGENE

MITigation HYdroGENE [Hydrogen mitigation]

MSNR

Mission Sûreté Nucléaire et Radioprotection [French mission for nuclear safety and radiation protection]

NCRP

National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (US)

NEA

Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD

NPP

Nuclear Power Plant

NPZD

Nutrients–Phytoplankton–Zooplankton–Detritus

348

Nuclear Accidents

NRA

Nuclear Regulatory Authority (Japan)

NRC

National Research Council (US)

NSSA

Nuclear Safety and Security Agency

NUCLEA

French thermal-hydraulic database

OC

Oxygen Consumption

OECD

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OHF

Organizational and Human Factors

ONR

Office for Nuclear Regulation

OPAL

Outil de sensibilisation aux Problématiques Postaccidentelles à destination des Acteurs Locaux [IRSN tool for raising awareness of post-accident issues among local stakeholders]

OPRI

Office de Protection contre les Rayonnements Ionisants [French office for protection against ionizing radiation]

OR

Odds Ratio

P2REMICS

Name given to simulation software dedicated to the study of hydrogen risk

PAR

Passive Auto-catalytic Recombiners

PASSAM

Passive and Active Systems on Severe Accident source term Mitigation

PCC

Poste de Commandement Communal [Communal command post]

PCO

Poste de Commandement Opérationnel [Operational command post]

Acronyms and Abbreviations

de

Sauvegarde

349

PCS

Plan Communal contingency plan]

[Communal

PE

Périmètre d’éloignement [Distance perimeter]

PEARL

Name given to an IRSN experimental facility dedicated to the re-sinking of debris beds

PERFROI

Etude de la PERte de reFROIdissement [French study on the loss of cooling]

PFMS

Plans Familiaux de Mise en Sûreté [French family safety plans]

PHARE

Poland and Hungary Assistance Restructuring of the Economy

PHEBUS

Name given to an experimental reactor of the CEA

PKL-4

Primary Coolant Loop test facility project

PLU

Plan Local d’Urbanisme [French local urban plan]

POI

Plans d’Opération Interne [French operation plans] (classified as “Seveso”)

PPI

Plan Particulier d’Intervention [French special intervention plan]

PPMS

Plan Particulier de Mise en Sûreté [French special safety plan]

PPRN

Plan de Prévention des Risques Naturels prévisibles [French plan for the prevention of predictable natural risks]

PPRT

Plan de Prévention des Risques Technologiques [French technological risk prevention plan]

PreADES

Preparatory Study on Analysis of Fuel Debris Project

for

the

internal

350

Nuclear Accidents

PRELUDE

Préliminaire étude sur le Renoyage Expérimental d’un Lit de DEbris [French preliminary study on the experimental re-flooding of a debris bed]

PREMIX

Name given to a KIT experimental facility for the study of steam explosion in a reactor

PRI

Point de rassemblement impliqué [Designated assembly point]

PRIME

Projet de Recherche sur les Indicateurs de la sensibilité radioécologique et les méthodes Multicritères appliqués à l’Environnement d’un site industriel [French research project on radioecological sensitivity indicators and multicriteria methods applied to the environment of an industrial site]

PRIODAC

Prophylaxie répétée par l’iodine stable en situation accidentelle [Repeated treatment by stable iodine in an accident situation]

PRISME

Propagation d’un incendie pour des scénarios multi locaux élémentaires [Fire propagation for elementary multi-local scenarios]

PRM

Poste médical avancé [Advanced medical post]

PROGRES

PROGression et REfroidissabilité du corium, Stabilisation d’un accident grave [Progression and potential for recooling of corium, stabilization of a serious accident]

PRV

Point de rassemblement des victimes [Victim assembly point]

PSA

Probabilistic Safety Assessment

PSS

Plans de Secours Spécialisés [Specialized rescue plans]

Acronyms and Abbreviations

351

PUI

Plan d’urgence interne [Internal emergency plan]

PUMP

Poste d’Urgence Médico-Psychologique [Medicalpsychological emergency station]

PWR

Pressurized Water Reactor

R&D

Research and Development

RBE

Relative Biological Effectiveness

RBMK

Reactor Bolchoi Molchnasti Kanalny (Russian highpower pressure tube reactor)

Rem

Röntgen equivalent man

RESOH

REcherche en Sûreté Organisation Hommes [French Safety Research Organization Group]

REX

Retour d’expérience [Feedback]

RIBE

Radiation-Induced Bystander Effect

RJH

Jules Horowitz Reactor

RLSS

Relation Linéaire Sans Seuil [Linear relationship without threshold]

RNR-Na

Sodium-cooled Rapid Neutron Reactor

ROBELSYS

ROBustness of ELectrical SYStems

ROSIRIS

Radiobiologie des systèmes intégrés pour l’optimisation des traitements utilisant des rayonnements ionisants et évaluation du risque associé [Radiobiology of integrated systems for the optimization of treatments using ionizing radiation and associated risk assessment]

RR

Risk Ratio

352

Nuclear Accidents

RTE

Réseau de Transport d’Électricité electricity transmission network]

RTGV

Rupture de Tubes de Générateur de Vapeur [Steam generator tube breakage]

SAREF

Safety Research Opportunities Post-Fukushima

SARNET

Severe Accident Research NETwork

SCIP

Studsvik Cladding Integrity Project

SDA

Special Decontamination Area

SHAMISEN

Nuclear Emergency Situations, Improvement of Medical and Health Surveillance (in reverse)

SGDSN

Secrétariat Général de la Défense et la Sécurité Nationales [General Secretariat for French National Defense and Security]

SGI

Système de Gestion management system]

SIC

Silver-indium-cadmium alloy

SINAPS

Séisme et Installations Nucléaires: Assurer et Pérenniser la Sûreté [Earthquake and nuclear installations: ensuring and sustaining security]

SIR

Standardized Incidence Ratio

SMR

Standardized Mortality Ratio

SNCF

Société Nationale des Chemins de fer Français [French national state-owned railway company]

SOL

Safety through Organizational Learning

SOPHAEROS

ASTEC code module

d’Incident

[French

[Incident

Acronyms and Abbreviations

353

STEM-2

Source Term Evaluation and Mitigation project phase 2

STERNE

Simulation du transport et du transfert d’éléments radioactifs en environnement marin [Modeling of the transport and transfer of radioactive elements in the marine environment]

TDF

TéléDiffusion de France [A French broadcaster of digital radio and television]

THAI-3

Thermal-hydraulics, Hydrogen, Aerosols and Iodine Project Phase 3

TMI

Three Mile Island

TMR

Transports de Matières Radioactives [Transport of radioactive materials]

TOCATTA

Transfer of Carbon-14 and Tritium in Terrestrial and Aquatic environments

TONUS

Name given to simulation software for the evaluation of hydrogen risk in the event of a core meltdown accident

TOSQAN

Name given to an experimental IRSN facility to simulate thermohydraulic conditions in a nuclear reactor containment vessel in the event of a core meltdown accident

TREE4

Transfer of Radionuclides and External Exposure in FORest systems

TSN

Transparence et à la Sécurité en matière Nucléaire [French nuclear transparency and security act]

TSS

Temporary Storage Sites

UNSCEAR

United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation

354

Nuclear Accidents

US NRC

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

VATO

Validation of the TOcatta model

VHE

Very High Efficiency

VULCANO

Versatile UO2 Laboratory for Corium ANalysis and Observation

WANO

World Association of Nuclear Operators

WENRA

Western European Nuclear Regulators Association

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction

ZPP

Zone de protection des populations [Population protection zone]

ZST

Zone de Surveillance renforcée des Territoires [Zone of enhanced territorial surveillance]

Index

A, C, D absorbed dose, 12 absorption bars, 108 activation products, 9 aging, 90 ALARA, 17 collective effective dose, 17 equivalent dose, 17 committed dose, 16 containment, 140 core meltdown, 110 corium, 113 countermeasures, 197 crisis exercises, 77 decontamination of living areas, 195 defense in depth, 87 deterministic effects, 25 Directeur des Opérations de Secours, 165 drones, 228 E, F, H early signals, 45 earthquakes, 89 effective dose, 14 environmental management, 191

epistemological studies, 125 equivalent dose, 13 evacuation of populations, 141 fires, 90 floods, 89 food supply, 156 hormesis, 30 L, M, N limitations of estimating, 16 linear energy transfer, 15 no threshold relationship, 28 malicious acts, 224 modeling, 116, 119 non-monotic relationship, 29 O, P, R ORSEC, 164 Plan Communal de Sauvegarde (municipal safeguard plan), 181 plans d’urgence interne (internal emergency plans), 168 de secours spécialisés (specialized emergency plans), 164 particuliers d’intervention (special intervention plans), 164

Nuclear Accidents: Prevention and Management of an Accidental Crisis, First Edition. Jean-Claude Amiard. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

356

Nuclear Accidents

prevention of terrorist risk, 242 radiation adaptation, 30 protection, 32, 121 radioactive element releases, 111 waste, 196 radioactivity measurements, 136, 190 radioecology, 118 radiological accidents, 72 Relative Biological Effectives, 15

review of experience (feedback), 51 risk perception, 35 S, T, W, Z stable iodine tablets, 152 steel vessel, 109 stochastic effects, 24 Technical Crisis Center, 168 weighting factor, 13, 26 zirconium alloy sheaths, 107

Other titles from

in Ecological Science

2019 AMIARD Jean-Claude Industrial and Medical Nuclear Accidents: Environmental, Ecological, Health and Socio-economic Consequences (Radioactive Risk SET – Volume 2) BOULEAU Gabrielle Politicization of Ecological Issues: From Environmental Forms to Environmental Motives GIRAULT Yves UNESCO Global Geoparks: Tension Between Territorial Development and Heritage Enhancement KARA Mohamed Hichem, QUIGNARD Jean-Pierre Fishes in Lagoons and Estuaries in the Mediterranean 2: Sedentary Fish Fishes in Lagoons and Estuaries in the Mediterranean 3A: Migratory Fish Fishes in Lagoons and Estuaries in the Mediterranean 3B: Migratory Fish OUVRARD Benjamin, STENGE Anne Incentives and Environmental Policies: From Theory to Empirical Novelties

2018 AMIARD Jean-Claude Military Nuclear Accidents: Environmental, Ecological, Health and Socioeconomic Consequences (Radioactive Risk SET – Volume 1) FLIPO Fabrice The Coming Authoritarian Ecology GUILLOUX Bleuenn Marine Genetic Resources, R&D and the Law 1: Complex Objects of Use KARA Mohamed Hichem, QUIGNARD Jean-Pierre Fishes in Lagoons and Estuaries in the Mediterranean 1: Diversity, Bioecology and Exploitation

2016 BAGNÈRES Anne-Geneviève, HOSSAERT-MCKEY Martine Chemical Ecology

2014 DE LARMINAT Philippe

Climate Change: Identification and Projections

WILEY END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT Go to www.wiley.com/go/eula to access Wiley’s ebook EULA.