North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Weapons [1 ed.] 9781614704423, 9781608768448

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Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Weapons, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Weapons, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

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NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC WEAPONS

No part of this digital document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means. The publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this digital document, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No North Korea's Nuclear Ballisticfor Weapons, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, ProQuest with Ebookor Central, liability is and assumed incidental or consequential damages in2010. connection arising out of information

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Proliferation Control Regimes Adelfo Gaspari (Editor) 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60741-115-4 Nuclear Weapons' Role in 21st Century U.S Policy Dominick R. Pelligrini (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60741-478-0 China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues Shirley A. Kan 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60741-248-9

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Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials Pietro Egidi (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60741-512-1 North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Weapons Simon R. Holden (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60876-844-8

North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Weapons, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC WEAPONS

SIMON R. HOLDEN EDITOR

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Weapons, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2010 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers‘ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works.

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Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA North Korea's nuclear and ballistic weapons / editor, Simon R. Holden. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN H%RRN 1. Nuclear weapons--Korea (North) 2. Ballistic missiles--Korea (North) 3. Korea (North)--Military policy. 4. Korea (North)--Military relations--United States. 5. United States--Military relations-Korea (North) I. Holden, Simon R. U264.5.K7N695 2009 355.8'25119095193--dc22 2009046471

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

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CONTENTS Preface Chapter 1

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Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

vii North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Steven A. Hildreth

1

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy A. Larry Niksch

9

North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues Mary Beth Nikitin

41

North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications, and U.S. Operations Emma Chanlett-Avery and Sharon Squassoni

Chapter Sources

73 99

Index

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PREFACE Since August 2003, negotiations over North Korea's nuclear weapons have involved six governments: the U.S., North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia. Since the talks began, North Korea has operated nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and apparently has produced weapons-grade plutonium estimated as sufficient for five to eight atomic weapons. U.S. officials have cited evidence that North Korea also operates a secret highly enriched uranium program, which also could produce atomic weapons. This book summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program and assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization. This book consists of public documents which have been located, gathered, combined, reformatted, and enhanced with a subject index, selectively edited and bound to provide easy access. Chapter 1 - This report briefly reviews North Korea‘s ballistic missile program. In summer 2007, North Korea tested modern, short-range missiles. In February 2009, South Korea reported the DPRK had deployed a new intermediate-range missile. This report may be updated periodically. Additional information is provided by CRS Report RL33 590, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by Larry A. Niksch. Chapter 2 - Since August 2003, negotiations over North Korea‘s nuclear weapons programs have involved six governments: the United States, North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. Since the talks began, North Korea has operated nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and apparently has produced weapons-grade plutonium estimated as sufficient for five to eight atomic weapons. North Korea tested a plutonium nuclear device in October 2006. U.S. officials have cited evidence that North Korea also operates a secret highly enriched uranium program, which also could produce atomic

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Simon R. Holden

weapons. There also is substantial information that North Korea has engaged in collaborative programs with Iran and Syria aimed at producing nuclear weapons. On May 25, 2009, North Korea announced that it had conducted a second nuclear test. On April 14, 2009, North Korea terminated its participation in six party talks and said it would not be bound by agreements between it and the Bush Administration, ratified by the six parties, which would have disabled the Yongbyon facilities. North Korea also announced that it would reverse the ongoing disablement process under these agreements and restart the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. Three developments since August 2008 appear to have influenced the situation leading to North Korea‘s announcement: the failure to complete implementation of the Bush Administration-North Korean agreement, including the Yongbyon disablement, because of a dispute over whether inspectors could take samples of nuclear materials at Yongbyon; the stroke suffered by North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, in August 2008, which reportedly brought forth a collective leadership including a more pronounced role for the North Korean military; and the issuance by North Korea after January 1, 2009, of a tough set of negotiating positions, including an assertion that the United States must extend normal diplomatic relations prior to any final denuclearization agreement rather than in such an agreement; and that U.S. reciprocity for North Korean denuclearization must be an end of the ―U.S. nuclear threat,‖ meaning major reductions of and restrictions on U.S. military forces in and around the Korean peninsula. North Korea‘s announcement presents the Obama Administration with two apparent challenges. One is how to restore a negotiating track with North Korea. The Administration appears to face a choice between seeking to bring North Korea back into the six party framework or offering North Korea strictly bilateral U.S.-North Korean negotiations. Responding to North Korea‘s tough negotiating positions would be a second challenge. Would the Administration‘s goal in the next stage of negotiations be the complete dismantlement of Yongbyon, or would it focus on the elimination of North Korea‘s nuclear weapons and plutonium? North Korea‘s assertion of diplomatic normalization prior to denuclearization contradicts the longstanding U.S. position that the two would be reciprocal. North Korea‘s likely demand for light water nuclear reactors (LWRs) as part of a future nuclear agreement would confront the Obama Administration with a decision whether to enter into a second LWR project that could consume ten years or more (the first project began in 1994 under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework and collapsed in 2002). Pyongyang‘s demand that a

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Preface

ix

denuclearization agreement include an end to the ―U.S. nuclear threat‖ directly challenges the position of several U.S. administrations that the United States would not negotiate with North Korea over the status of U.S. military forces in South Korea. Finally, any attempt by the Obama Administration to bring North Korea‘s highly enriched uranium and proliferation activities with Iran and Syria into negotiations would reverse the decision of the Bush Administration that North Korea did not have to admit to these activities in the Bush Administration-North Korean agreements. This report will be updated periodically. Chapter 3 - This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program—including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates—and assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization. Beginning in late 2002, North Korea ended an eight-year freeze on its plutonium production program, expelled international inspectors, and restarted facilities. North Korea may have produced enough additional plutonium for five nuclear warheads between 2002 and 2007. In total, it is estimated that North Korea has up to 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons. While North Korea‘s weapons program has been plutonium-based from the start, in the last decade, intelligence has emerged pointing to a second route to a bomb using highly enriched uranium. However, the scope and success of this program may be limited, and North Korea says it does not have a uranium enrichment program. On February 10, 2005, North Korea announced that it had manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defense and that it would bolster its nuclear weapons arsenal. In September 2005, members of the Six Party Talks (United States, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and North Korea) issued a Joint Statement on the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test, with a yield of less than 1 kiloton. The United States and other countries condemned the test, and the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1718 on October 14, 2006, which requires North Korea to (1) refrain from nuclear or missile tests, (2) rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and (3) abandon its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. On February 13, 2007, North Korea and the other members of the Six-Party Talks agreed on steps for phased implementation of the 2005 denuclearization agreement. Phase 1 included the shut-down of plutonium production at the Yongbyon nuclear complex in exchange for an initial heavy fuel oil shipment to North Korea. Under phase 2, steps include disablement of plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon and

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a ―complete and correct‖ declaration of DPRK nuclear activities, in exchange for delivery of energy assistance and removal of certain U.S. sanctions. The declaration was submitted in June 2008. Thereafter, President Bush removed North Korea from the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) list and notified Congress of his intent to lift the State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) designation after North Korea agreed to verification provisions. North Korea did not accept initial U.S. verification proposals, and in September 2008, threatened to restart reprocessing plutonium. U.S. officials announced a verbal bilateral agreement on verification in October 2008, and the Bush administration removed North Korea from the SST List. North Korea soon after said that it had not agreed to sampling at nuclear sites, a key element for future verification of plutonium production. North Korea‘s failed satellite launch on April 5, 2009, which used ballistic missile-related technology, led to U.N. Security Council condemnation. In response, North Korea said it would abandon the Six-Party Talks and restart its nuclear facilities, and asked international and U.S. inspectors to leave the country. Although progress had been made in disabling North Korea‘s plutonium production, these steps can be reversed. The reprocessing facility at Yongbyon would take months to restart. Other facilities at Yongbyon may take longer to restore. Little detailed open-source information is available about the DPRK‘s nuclear weapons production capabilities and warhead sophistication, or the extent of a uranium enrichment program and proliferation activities. North Korea claimed it tested a nuclear weapon on May 25, 2009, which is estimated as larger than the 2006 blast, but still modest. This report will be updated as events warrant. Chapter 4 - On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced it conducted a nuclear test. After several days of evaluation, U.S. authorities confirmed that the underground explosion was nuclear, but that the test produced a low yield of less than one kiloton. As the United Nations Security Council met and approved a resolution condemning the tests and calling for punitive sanctions, North Korea remained defiant, insisting that any increased pressure on the regime would be regarded as an act of war. China and South Korea, the top aid providers to and trade partners with the North, supported the resolution itself, but have been unwilling to cut off other economic cooperation and aid considered crucial to the regime. The sanction regime depends heavily on individual states‘ compliance with the guidelines. Economists argue that the only definitively effective punishment on North Korea would be the suspension of energy aid from China, which reportedly supplies about 70% of North Korea‘s fuel.

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Determining the motivations of a government as opaque and secretive as North Korea is exceedingly difficult, but analysts have put forth a range of possibilities to explain why the Pyongyang regime decided to test a nuclear weapon. Possible motivations include an attempt to engage the United States in bilateral talks, to ensure the security of the regime, and to satisfy hard-line elements within the Pyongyang government, as well as technical motivations for carrying out a nuclear test. The short-term implications of North Korea‘s nuclear test are clear: whether a technical success or failure, North Korea‘s willingness to carry out a test in the face of significant opposition indicates that it is willing to endure the potential consequences. Analysts fear that the medium and long-term implications could include a more potent nuclear threat from Pyongyang, a nuclear arms race in Asia, and the transfer of nuclear weapons or material to states or groups hostile to the United States. There are also strong concerns about the impact on the global nonproliferation regime, particularly to other states poised to develop their own nuclear weapon programs. The most fundamental U.S. goals of the confrontation with North Korea are to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to prevent an attack — either nuclear or conventional — on the United States or on its allies in the region. The options available to U.S. policymakers to pursue these goals include the acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power, bilateral or multilateral negotiations, heightened legal and economic pressure on North Korea, adoption of a regime change policy through non-military means, military action or threats, and withdrawal from the conflict.

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In: North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Weapons ISBN: 978-1-60876-844-8 Editors: Simon R. Holden © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 1

NORTH KOREAN BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES Steven A. Hildreth

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SUMMARY This report briefly reviews North Korea‘s ballistic missile program. In summer 2007, North Korea tested modern, short-range missiles. In February 2009, South Korea reported the DPRK had deployed a new intermediate-range missile. This report may be updated periodically. Additional information is provided by CRS Report RL33 590, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by Larry A. Niksch.

THE TAEPO DONG PROGRAM The North Korean Taepo Dong program traces its origins to the No Dong medium-range ballistic missile1 program of the late 1980s. In the early 1990s, North Korea initiated the development of two ballistic missile programs known to the West as Taepo Dong 1 and Taepo Dong 2.2 The reported design objectives for the Taepo Dong 1 system were to deliver a 1,000 to 1,500 kg warhead to a range of 1,500 to 2,500 km and for the Taepo Dong 2 to deliver the same warhead to a 4,000 to 8,000 km range.3 Initial prototypes for both

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systems were probably manufactured in 1995 or 1996 with a possible initial production run for the Taepo Dong 1 initiated in early 1997 or 1998.4 Some analysts estimated that North Korea may have produced from one to ten Taepo Dong 1 and one or two Taepo Dong 2 prototypes by the end of 1999.5 These missiles are not believed to be deployed.6 North Korea is believed to have had extensive foreign assistance from China, Russia, Pakistan, and Iran throughout the program.7 Very little was known about the actual program until the August 31, 1998 launch of a Taepo Dong 1 (or Paektusan-1) from the Musudanri Launch Facility in North Hamgyong Province, northeast coast of North Korea.8 The stated objective of this launch was to place North Korea‘s first satellite into orbit. Initial U.S. intelligence reports postulated that the Taepo Dong 1 SLV was only a two-stage rocket. The first stage fell into international waters 300 km east of Musudan-ri and the second stage flew over the Japanese island of Honshu and fell into the water 330 km away from the Japanese port of Hachinohe for a total distance of approximately 1,646 km.9 Further analysis of radar tapes reportedly revealed that the Taepo Dong 1 had a small third solid propellant stage (presumably designed to place the satellite into orbit).10 Some debris from this third stage was believed to have impacted as far as 4,000 km from the launch point.11 Some analysts believe that if the missile had functioned properly, the Taepo Dong 1 space launch vehicle (SLV) could have achieved a 3,800 to 5,900 km range.12 North Korean media claimed the satellite entered earth orbit.

POTENTIAL CONFIGURATIONS AND RANGES In order to strike targets from North Korea, a North Korean missile would need to achieve the following ranges:13

Target

Washington, DC

Chicago

San Francisco

Seattle

Anchorage

Honolulu

Range (km)

10,700

10,000

8,600

7,900

5,600

7,100

Within possible range of the Taepo Dongs are U.S. military facilities in Guam (3,500 km), Okinawa, and Japan. The Taepo Dong 1 missile (as opposed to the SLV) is believed to be a two- stage missile that uses a No Dong missile derivative as its first stage and SCUD C derivative (called the

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North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States

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Hwasong 6) as its second stage. In this configuration, it is estimated that it could deliver a 700 - 1,000 kg warhead to a range of 2,500 km,14 which could put Japan and Okinawa within range. For the Taepo Dong 1 to achieve greater range its payload would have to be decreased. Some analysts speculated that a reduced-payload configuration could deliver a 200 kg warhead into the U.S. center and a 100 kg warhead to Washington D.C., albeit with poor accuracy.15 Until a few years ago, the Taepo Dong 2 had not yet been flight tested. (It has also been called the Moksong 2 and the Pekdosan 2.) The Taepo Dong 2 is believed to be a two-stage missile about 35 meters long. The first stage has been said to bear close resemblance to the Chinese CSS-2 and CSS-3 first stage. The second stage is believed to be based on the No Dong missile. The two- stage variant is assessed by some to have a range potential of as much as 3,750 km with a 700 to 1,000 kg payload and, if a third stage were added, some believe that range could be extended to 4,000 to 4,300 km with a full payload.16 Some analysts further believe that the Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a 700 to 1,000 kg payload as far as 6,700 km.17 Pyongyang has yet to test the guidance system, and so the missile is believed to be inaccurate.18 How it might be deployed (i.e., silo or transportable) also remains undetermined, although some have suggested it is a road mobile system. In order to achieve ranges capable of striking Hawaii and targets on the U.S. mainland, some analysts believe that the Taepo Dong 2‘s payload would need to be reduced to 200 - 300 kg.19 Some believe the Taepo Dong 2 may be exported to other countries in the future.20 In June 2006 the Taepo Dong 2 (or Paektusan-2) was observed being assembled and fueled at the Musudan-ri test site along the northeast coast of North Korea. At that time, some observers believed a test was imminent while others expressed caution because considerable technical uncertainty remained. On July 4, 2006, North Korea launched the Taepo Dong 2. The launch was preceded by three shorter-range ballistic missile launches, and then followed by three more.21 About 40 seconds into the flight, the Taepo Dong 2 failed on its own during the first stage and fell into the Sea of Japan, according to USNORTHCOM (U.S. Northern Command). Causes for the failure were studied, but details were not made public. Japanese sources reported some details of the missile launches, suggesting greater accuracy in their impact areas than other analyses.22 Others have suggested structural failure of the airframe, or failure of the propulsion or guidance system as the causes.23 The report also suggested greater Russian engineering support than indicated elsewhere. Some believe initial production of the Taepo Dong 2 may have started in 2005, and that perhaps 20 missiles were built in 2006.24

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In early February 2009, various reports indicated that North Korea was making test preparations for a Taepodong-2 launch by setting up radar and other monitoring equipment around a missile test site along its northeast coast. Secretary of State Clinton said any such test would ―be very unhelpful in moving our relationship forward‖ and that it would violate a 2006 UN Security Council Resolution (Resolution 1718) demanding that North Korea ―not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile.‖ Similarly, the South Korean government warned any missile test would ―be a serious threat.‖ In late February 2009, North Korea announced that it was preparing to launch a communications satellite, similarly to what it said about the 1998 test.

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NORTH KOREA'S MILITARY SPENDING25 Some experts continue to register some concern over North Korea‘s level of military spending in relation to its missile program. North Korea may spend as much as 40 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on the military.26 In 2004, U.S. Forces Korea commander, General Leon J. LaPorte, reportedly stated that North Korea‘s military investments are primarily in their nuclear, biological, chemical and missile programs in order to gain an ―asymmetrical‖ advantage over U.S and South Korean forces.27 General LaPorte reportedly emphasized his concern over missile development and North Korea‘s continued development of its nuclear weapons program that could eventually lead to ―weaponizing their weapons-grade materials on missiles.‖28 North Korea‘s apparent willingness to devote such a large portion of its GDP to missiles and weapons of mass destruction could be cause for additional concern when viewed in the light of their alleged cooperation with other countries. Evidence suggests that North Korea has had extensive dealings with Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Syria, Yemen, and Libya on ballistic missiles and possibly even nuclear warheads.29 One particular concern is that Chinese warhead designs, sold to Libya by Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. A.Q. Khan, might also be in the hands of North Korea, which could help accelerate its efforts to develop long-ranged nuclear ballistic missiles.30 Some suggest that North Korea‘s access to these countries‘ missile and WMD technologies might enable North Korea to advance its long-range nuclear ballistic missile program at a more accelerated rate without having to conduct extensive testing, particularly if they use proven missile designs from other countries.

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MEDIUM OR INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES Various reports indicate that North Korea may be developing and deploying at least two new medium to intermediate-range ballistic missile systems. The Japanese Defense Ministry reportedly believes North Korea has about 200 Nodong medium-range missiles.31 It is not publicly known if North Korea is continuing development of a reported new version of its Taepo Dong ballistic missile,32 the so-called Taepo Dong X, which might achieve intercontinental ranges. The two new medium to intermediate-range missiles are believed to be based on the decommissioned Soviet R-2733 submarine launched ballistic missile.34 The R-27, which was allegedly acquired from Russia in the 1990s and possibly enhanced with the help of Russian missile specialists, has been called an ―excellent choice‖ on which to base a new missile system.35 Its 40 year-old, liquid-fueled technology is considered within the technological and industrial capabilities of North Korea and versions of its engines are already used in North Korean SCUDs and No Dongs. Perhaps the greatest advantage of this system, according to some observers, is that the R-27 is a proven design meaning that North Korea may be able to develop and deploy these missiles without having to conduct extensive ground and flight tests. In February 2009, South Korea‘s Defense Ministry reported that North Korea had deployed a new type of medium-range ballistic with a range estimated at 1,800 miles. This missile is believed to be the same type seen at a military parade in North Korea in 2007. Additional details, such as the name of this missile and how many are deployed have not yet been made public.

Land-Based Version36 The land-based version called Musadan or No Dong B is a medium to intermediate-range ballistic missile with an estimated range of 2,500-3,200 km. The North Korean version of this missile is 12 m long—2.4m longer than the R-27—and, although smaller than the No Dong and Taepo Dong 1, it has a greater range than these two missiles. This could put most of East Asia within its range, including U.S. military bases at Guam and Okinawa, although experts point out that the North Korean No Dong 2 missile could also reach Japan and Okinawa. Initial prototypes of the land-based version were reportedly first identified in 2000, and pre-production models and a new transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) were believed to have been completed by

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mid-2003. The Musadan has not been flight-tested. Although some remain uncertain whether it is deployed,37 others report that perhaps 15-20 Musadan have been deployed without apparent testing.38 The North Koreans reportedly began constructing two new missile bases to accommodate the Musadan/No Dong B. One base is near Yangdok-gun and the other is at Sangnam-ni, previously reported as a No Dong and Taepo Dong base. North Korea reportedly constructed administrative and maintenance facilities at these two sites as well as fortified underground tunnels for storing the missiles and TELs.

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Sea-Based Version The sea-based version of the R-27 is reportedly either a submarine or shipmounted system with an estimated range of at least 2,500 km. Russian versions of the R-27 reportedly had both a single nuclear reentry vehicle as well as a version with three reentry vehicles, each with a 200 kiloton (KT) nuclear weapon. It is not known if North Korea possesses reentry vehicles for their versions of the R-27. In any such case, they have not been tested by North Korea. There are indications that North Korea may be actively pursuing a sea-based ballistic missile capability, which also could have potential security implications for the United States. In September 1993, the Korean People‘s Navy (KPN) reportedly purchased 12 decommissioned Russian Foxtrot class and Golf-II class submarines for scrap metal from a Japanese company. The Golf-IIs, which are capable of carrying three SS-N-5 SLBMs, did not have their missiles or electronic firing systems when they were sold to the North Koreans, but they did allegedly retain significant missile launch sub-systems including launch tubes and stabilization systems. Some analysts believe that this technology, in conjunction with the R-27‘s well-understood design, gives North Korea the capability to develop either a submarine or ship-mounted ballistic missile. Many experts postulate that North Korea does not have the capability to develop a new SLBM on its own and that none of North Korea‘s other ballistic missiles are easily convertible to SLBMs. North Korea apparently integrated the Golf-IIs missile stabilization and launch technology into a new class of conventionally powered ballistic missile submarines, possibly modified versions of Golf-IIs or Romeo class Russian submarines.39 It is also possible, according to some observers, that North Korea might attempt to incorporate this launch technology into a merchant

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ship. It is not known if North Korea has sold or will sell this new system to other countries. Some analysts suggest that Iran might be an ideal candidate for such a system, as it has allegedly researched a sea-based ballistic missile capability in the past.

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SECURITY IMPLICATIONS DPRK systems potentially increase the missile threat to the United States. If the new missiles are indeed closely modified versions of the R-27, they are likely more accurate in relative terms and have greater range than other DPRK missiles. Some analysts believe that the sea-launched version could pose the greatest threat by threatening the continental United States. These experts suggest that a North Korean sea-launched missile capability could complicate intelligence collection efforts as well as present challenges for South Korean, Japanese, and U.S. ballistic missile defense systems. Others, however, are skeptical that North Korea can reach the continental United States with the new sea-based version. Anonymous U.S. government officials reportedly stated that North Korea does not presently have a submarine that is capable of transporting a missile within striking distance of the continental United States.40 These officials also expressed doubt that North Korea had intentions of developing a missile to hide inside a freighter to be used against targets in the United States.41

End Notes 1

Ballistic missiles are classified by range as follows: Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) = 150 - 799 kms. Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) = 800 - 2,399 kms. Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) = 2,400 - 5,499 kms. Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) = 5,500 kms and greater. 2 Joseph S. Bermudez, ―A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK, Occasional Paper No. 2,‖ Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1999, p. 26. 3 Joseph S. Bermudez, ―North Korea‘s Long-Range Missiles,” Jane’s Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 2000, p. 5. 4 Bermudez, Monterey Institute, p. 29. 5 Ibid. 6 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, WrightPatterson Air Force Base, Ohio. NASIC-1031-0985-06, March 2006, p. 10. 7 Ibid., pp 23 - 29. 8 Bermudez, Janes, p. 6.

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Michael Dutra and Gaurav Kampani, ―North Korea: A Second Taepo Dong Test? ”Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1999, p. 2. 10 Ibid. 11 Bermudez, Janes, p. 6. 12 Michael Dutra and Gaurav Kampani, p. 2. 13 Bermudez, Janes, p. 8. 14 Ibid., p. 5. 15 Bermudez, Monterey Institute, p. 30. 16 ―Taepo Dong 2,‖ The Journal of the Federation of American Scientists, 2002, the above discussion of the Taepo Dong 2 is found on p. 3. 17 See North Korean Missile Could Bring U.S. into Range: Experts, Agence France-Presse, June 20, 2006, and Bermudez, Monterey Institute, p. 30. 18 North Korea: An Impending Missile Launch?, Stratfor, June 16, 2006. 19 Siegel, p. 5. 20 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air and Space Intelligence center, p. 17. 21 The short-range test launches, some combination of SCUDs and No Dong missiles, occurred on July 4 (all EST) at (1) 2:32 p.m.; (2) 3:04 p.m.; (3) 3:59 p.m.; (4) 6:31 p.m.; (5) 7:12 p.m.; and (6) 4:15 a.m. (July 5, 2006). 22 Japan: Analysis of Data on Landing Points of DPRK‘s 5 July Missile Launches, Yomiuri Weekly (Tokyo), Aug, 6, 2006, pp. 22-23. 23 Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, pp. 30-31. 24 MissileThreat.com, [http://www.misslethreat.com] 25 For a more detailed discussion of North Korea‘s economy see CRS Report RL32493, The North Korean Economy: Leverage and Policy Analysis, by Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery. 26 Bill Gertz, ―North Korea Pumps Money into Military,‖ Washington Times, August 3, 2004. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 See CRS Report RL30427, Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected Foreign Countries, by Andrew Feickert. 30 Bill Gertz, Op. Cit. 31 Blaine harden, ―North Korea Says it is Preparing Satellite Launch,‖ Washington Post, February 24, 2009. 32 Bill Gertz, ―North Korea to Display New Missiles,‖ Washington Times, September 9, 2003. 33 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) classification for the R-27 is the SS-N-6. 34 Joseph S. Bermudez, ―North Korea Deploys New Missiles,‖ Jane’s Defense Weekly, August 4, 2004. 35 Information in this section comes from Joseph S. Bermudez, ―North Korea Deploys New Missiles,‖ Jane’s Defense Weekly, August 4, 2004. 36 Ibid. 37 Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), p. vii. 38 See ―Northeast Asian Missile Forces: Defence and Offence,‖ Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 1, 2006. 39 Ibid. 40 Thom Shanker, ―Korean Missile Said to Advance; U.S. is Unworried,‖ New York Times, August 5, 2004. 41 Ibid.

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Chapter 2

NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND DIPLOMACY A. Larry Niksch

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SUMMARY Since August 2003, negotiations over North Korea‘s nuclear weapons programs have involved six governments: the United States, North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. Since the talks began, North Korea has operated nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and apparently has produced weaponsgrade plutonium estimated as sufficient for five to eight atomic weapons. North Korea tested a plutonium nuclear device in October 2006. U.S. officials have cited evidence that North Korea also operates a secret highly enriched uranium program, which also could produce atomic weapons. There also is substantial information that North Korea has engaged in collaborative programs with Iran and Syria aimed at producing nuclear weapons. On May 25, 2009, North Korea announced that it had conducted a second nuclear test. On April 14, 2009, North Korea terminated its participation in six party talks and said it would not be bound by agreements between it and the Bush Administration, ratified by the six parties, which would have disabled the Yongbyon facilities. North Korea also announced that it would reverse the ongoing disablement process under these agreements and restart the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. Three developments since August 2008 appear to have influenced the situation leading to North Korea‘s announcement: the failure to

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complete implementation of the Bush Administration-North Korean agreement, including the Yongbyon disablement, because of a dispute over whether inspectors could take samples of nuclear materials at Yongbyon; the stroke suffered by North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, in August 2008, which reportedly brought forth a collective leadership including a more pronounced role for the North Korean military; and the issuance by North Korea after January 1, 2009, of a tough set of negotiating positions, including an assertion that the United States must extend normal diplomatic relations prior to any final denuclearization agreement rather than in such an agreement; and that U.S. reciprocity for North Korean denuclearization must be an end of the ―U.S. nuclear threat,‖ meaning major reductions of and restrictions on U.S. military forces in and around the Korean peninsula. North Korea‘s announcement presents the Obama Administration with two apparent challenges. One is how to restore a negotiating track with North Korea. The Administration appears to face a choice between seeking to bring North Korea back into the six party framework or offering North Korea strictly bilateral U.S.-North Korean negotiations. Responding to North Korea‘s tough negotiating positions would be a second challenge. Would the Administration‘s goal in the next stage of negotiations be the complete dismantlement of Yongbyon, or would it focus on the elimination of North Korea‘s nuclear weapons and plutonium? North Korea‘s assertion of diplomatic normalization prior to denuclearization contradicts the longstanding U.S. position that the two would be reciprocal. North Korea‘s likely demand for light water nuclear reactors (LWRs) as part of a future nuclear agreement would confront the Obama Administration with a decision whether to enter into a second LWR project that could consume ten years or more (the first project began in 1994 under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework and collapsed in 2002). Pyongyang‘s demand that a denuclearization agreement include an end to the ―U.S. nuclear threat‖ directly challenges the position of several U.S. administrations that the United States would not negotiate with North Korea over the status of U.S. military forces in South Korea. Finally, any attempt by the Obama Administration to bring North Korea‘s highly enriched uranium and proliferation activities with Iran and Syria into negotiations would reverse the decision of the Bush Administration that North Korea did not have to admit to these activities in the Bush Administration-North Korean agreements. This report will be updated periodically.

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NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR TEST AND WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SIX PARTY TALKS On May 25, 2009, North Korea announced that it had conducted a second test of a nuclear bomb. U.S. and foreign officials said afterwards that initial detected soundings indicated that a nuclear test had taken place. U.S. and foreign nuclear experts estimated the explosive power of the bomb at between 1.5 kilotons and 8 kilotons; most estimates were in range of 4 to 5 kilotons. An initial Russian statement gave a much higher estimate of 20 kilotons. By comparison, the first North Korean test of October 2006 had an explosive yield of less than one kiloton.1 North Korean statements indicated that this second test had achieved technical advances over the first test. A North Korean diplomat in Moscow predicted that there would be further tests. The nuclear test followed North Korea‘s announcement on April 14, 2009, that it was withdrawing from the six party talks on North Korea‘s nuclear programs. It cited as the reason for its decision a statement approved by the United Nations Security Council criticizing North Korea‘s test launch of a long-range Taepodong II missile on April 5, 2009. The Security Council statement, issued by the President of the Security Council, said that the missile test violated Security Resolution 1718 of October 2006, which banned tests of long-range North Korean missiles. The statement called on members of the United Nations to enforce sanctions against North Korea adopted in Resolution 1718.2 North Korea claimed that the missile test was a legitimate launching of a satellite into space. North Korea warned prior to the April 5 test that it would withdraw from the six party talks if the Security Council took any action against it over the missile test. North Korea staged boycotts of the six party talks on two previous occasions, in 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, each for nearly one year. North Korea‘s announcement of April 13, 2009, however, contained a more absolute rejection of the six party talks than was the case in the prior boycotts. The announcement said that North Korea ―will never again take part in such talks.‖ It also said that North Korea ―will take steps to restore disabled nuclear facilities‖ and ―revive nuclear facilities and reprocess used nuclear fuel rods.‖ North Korea thus threatened to restore operation of its plutonium nuclear installations at Yongbyon that have been shut down since mid-2007 under agreements between North Korea and the Bush Administration for the disablement of the Yongbyon facilities.3 By early 2009, the disablement process was about 80% completed. Following the announcement, North Korea

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expelled from Yongbyon technicians and monitors from the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency who had been there since 2007. After the April 14 announcement, North Korea threatened to conduct a second test of a nuclear device (the first test was in October 2006). The earliest revival of the Yongbyon facilities that North Korea could implement would be a restarting of the plutonium reprocessing plant, which takes nuclear fuel rods from North Korea‘s nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and converts them into nuclear weapons-grade plutonium. Experts believe that North Korea could restart the reprocessing plant within two months and then reprocess 8,000 fuel rods available from the reactor within four to six months—enough plutonium for one atomic bomb.4 (See CRS Report RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons, for more information on North Korea‘s ability to restart the plutonium reprocessing plant.) U.S. officials and non-government nuclear experts have said that North Korea previously had reprocessed enough plutonium for five to eight atomic bombs. Reassembling the nuclear reactor and a nuclear fuel fabrication plant and restarting them would be a more difficult, time-consuming process, taking possibly up to a year, according to U.S. officials and nuclear experts. Once these facilities were operating, North Korea would be able to produce about six kilograms of plutonium per year, enough for one atomic bomb.5 Besides the April 5, 2009, missile test, three developments since August 2008 appear to have influenced the situation leading up to North Korea‘s announcement. One is the failure of the Bush Administration, North Korea, and the other six party governments to complete implementation of the agreements reached between the Bush Administration and North Korea in 2007 and early 2008, particularly the failure to complete the agreed upon disablement of the Yongbyon facilities. A second was the stroke suffered by North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, in August 2008, and the apparent subsequent emergence of a collective group of leaders including an influential element of the North Korean military. A third development was the issuance by North Korea after January 1, 2009, of a set of tough negotiating demands for future round of nuclear negotiations with the United States.

Bush Administration-North Korean Agreements and Failure of Implementation The Bush Administration negotiated three agreements with North Korea between February 2007 and October 2008; two were issued in February and

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October 2007 as agreements of the parties to the six party talks over North Korea‘s nuclear programs (United States, North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia). The third was negotiated in Singapore in April 2008. The Bush Administration and North Korea began a process of implementation on June 26, 2008. A six party meeting of July 10-12, 2008, set out a timetable to complete implementation by October 31, 2008. The main aim of the Bush Administration in these agreements was to secure the disablement of North Korea‘s plutonium installations at Yongbyon. The agreements, however, were not implemented fully when the Bush Administration left office. This was due partly to the failure of the Bush Administration and North Korea to resolve a dispute over a verification system, especially the right of inspectors to take samples.6 On June 26, 2008, the North Korean government and the Bush Administration took measures to implement the nuclear agreements that they had negotiated in 2007 into 2008. The agreements created two obligations each for North Korea and the Bush Administration to fulfill. North Korea was to allow a process of disablement of its plutonium nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, a site 60 miles from the capital of Pyongyang. The shutting down of Yongbyon was a key provision of the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiated by the Clinton Administration and North Korea. Yongbyon ceased to operate between 1994 and the end of 2002. In late 2002, the Bush Administration suspended U.S. obligations under the Agreed Framework because of U.S. intelligence estimates that North Korea was operating a secret nuclear weapons program based on highly enriched uranium. North Korea responded by re-starting the Yongbyon facilities. Between early 2003 and the summer of 2007, the Yongbyon reactor and the plutonium reprocessing plant produced enough weapons grade plutonium for the production of several atomic bombs. North Korea tested an atomic device in October 2006. The disablement process began in October 2007. The Bush Administration said in June 2008 that eight of eleven components of the disablement process had been completed.7 A major uncompleted task was the removal of spent plutonium fuel rods from the five megawatt reactor. According to informed U.S. sources, as of February 2009, about 6,100 of 8,000 spent fuel rods reportedly had been removed.8 North Korea‘s second obligation was to provide the United States and other members of the six party talks with a ―complete and correct‖ declaration of nuclear programs. The declaration negotiated and reportedly finalized in Singapore and delivered to China on June 26, 2008, contains a declaration of the amount of plutonium that North Korea claims to possess. Reports asserted

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that North Korea declared 30.8 kilograms of plutonium.9 U.S. intelligence estimates reportedly conclude that North Korea has accumulated 50 to 60 kilograms of plutonium.10 However, other components of North Korea‘s nuclear programs reportedly are omitted from the declaration, apparently based on concessions the Bush Administration made to North Korea in the Singapore agreement. These include the number of atomic bombs North Korea possesses, information about the facilities where North Korea produces and tests atomic bombs, and the locations where North Korea stores plutonium and atomic bombs. The declaration also reportedly contains no information about North Korea‘s reported highly enriched uranium program or North Korea‘s reported nuclear collaboration activities with Iran and Syria. According to Bush Administration officials, the uranium enrichment and Syria issues are addressed in a ―confidential minute.‖11 (They said nothing about Iran.) However, in the confidential minute, North Korea reportedly does not admit to uranium enrichment or proliferation activities with Syria. It merely ―acknowledges‖ U.S. concerns that North Korea has engaged in these activities in the past.12 The United States‘ two obligations under the agreements were to remove North Korea from the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act and from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. Removal from the Trading with the Enemy Act allows U.S. companies to import North Korean goods and sell non-strategic goods to North Korea. It opens up possibilities for U.S. companies to invest in North Korea. However, given North Korea‘s communist economic system and its suspicions of foreign intrusions, there appears to be little likelihood of any meaningful trade or investment relations developing between the United States and North Korea.13 Removal from the Trading with the Enemy Act could give North Korea in the future access to $31.7 million in North Korean assets in the United States that have been frozen since the Korean War.14 Removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism will end the requirement that U.S. presidents oppose financial aid to North Korea from international financial agencies like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. An opportunity to secure such financial aid might have been a North Korean objective in seeking removal from the terrorism support list. North Korea may have had three additional motives for its pressure on the Bush Administration to remove it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. One was to reduce U.S. support for Japan on the issue of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea. The Clinton and Bush administrations previously had cited a resolution of the Japanese kidnapping issue as linked to removal of North Korea from the terrorism support list. A second motive apparently was

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to improve the prospects for normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States, which North Korea says it wants.15 A possible third motive may be to remove any U.S. incentive to examine the issue of North Korea‘s activities in the Middle East and deny to the United States a potential negotiating lever over North Korea‘s activities in the Middle East. Numerous reports indicate that North Korea‘s activities include providing training and weapons to Hezbollah and cooperation with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the development of both missiles and nuclear weapons. (See subsequent section on ―Nuclear Collaboration with Iran and Syria.‖ See also CRS Report RL30613, North Korea: Terrorism List Removal The first U.S.-North Korean agreement, issued as a six party statement in February 2007, also set an important obligation to North Korea by the five other parties. The five parties were to provide North Korea with one million tons of heavy fuel oil or the energy equivalent thereof, corresponding with the disablement of Yongbyon.

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Implementation Process On June 26, 2008, North Korea submitted its declaration on nuclear programs to China, the chairman of the six party talks. Simultaneously, President Bush announced that he had removed North Korea from the Trading with the Enemy Act. The President has authority to renew annually Trading with the Enemy sanctions on North Korea or to lift those sanctions from North Korea. President Bush also announced that he had sent to Congress notification of his intent to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism after 45 days, on August 11, 2008. Under U.S. law, the President is required to notify Congress 45 days before removing a country from the list. The White House said that North Korea would be removed on August 11, 2008, unless Congress acted legislatively to block removal. However, the White House also said on June 26, 2008, that removal of North Korea was conditioned on North Korean acceptance of provisions for U.S. verification of the North Korean declaration of nuclear programs. On July 12, 2008, the six parties issued a press communique setting a target date of October 31, 2008, for completion of the disablement of Yongbyon and the completion of the delivery of heavy fuel oil and alternative energy assistance.

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Verification Issue The Bush Administration did not remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism on August 11, 2008. In July, the Bush Administration presented North Korea with a draft protocol on verification of North Korea‘s nuclear programs. The draft protocol would have given U.S. and other six party inspectors the right to conduct inspections at sites throughout North Korea.16 North Korea rejected the U.S. proposal, arguing that inspections should cover only those facilities at Yongbyon that it had listed in its declaration of June 26, 2008. North Korea retaliated by halting the disablement process at Yongbyon and announcing that it would restart the plutonium reprocessing plant at Yongbyon.17 Neither the February 2007 nor the October 2007 six party nuclear agreements mentioned a system of country-wide inspections. There is no evidence that the Singapore agreement of April 2008 detailed any system of verification. However, following the U.S.-North Korean meeting at Singapore, the Bush Administration began to seek supplemental agreements with North Korea regarding the establishment of verification mechanisms to examine North Korea‘s declaration of its plutonium stockpile. In early May 2008, the Bush Administration and North Korea negotiated an accord for North Korea to turn over to the United States over 18,000 documents related to its plutonium program, dating back to 1986. U.S. experts are examining these documents and have disclosed no revealing information from them. The White House announcement of June 26, 2008, stated that removal of North Korea from the terrorism support list after 45 days would be carried out ―only after the six parties reach agreement on acceptable verification principles and an acceptable verification protocol; the six parties have established an acceptable monitoring mechanism; and verification activities have begun.‖ A six party meeting of July 10-12, 2008, reached agreement on verification principles, including ―visits to facilities, review of documents, interviews with technical personnel.‖ ―Other measures‖ would have to be ―unanimously agreed upon among the six parties.‖ Verification would be carried out by experts of the six parties. The International Atomic Energy Agency would have only an advisory role. The Bush Administration reacted to North Korea‘s announcement of a restarting of the plutonium reprocessing by scaling back the scope of its verification proposals. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill went to Pyongyang in early October 2008 and negotiated a verification deal, which would concentrate inspections only on Yongbyon.18 North Korea agreed and

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announced a resumption of disablement. The Bush Administration followed on October 11, 2008, with the announcement of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that North Korea was removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. The State Department‘s description of the verification agreement included the following points. Inspectors would have access only to the sites at Yongbyon described in North Korea‘s June 26, 2008 declaration. Access to non-declared sites would be by ―mutual consent.‖ The inspection organization would be composed of the five non-North Korean members of the six party talks— the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. The organization would make decisions on the basis of unanimous consent. The terms of the verification agreement were contained in a U.S.-North Korean document and in ―certain other understandings.‖19 The Bush Administration and the State Department gave few details on two other aspects of Hill‘s talks in Pyongyang and the verification agreement. One was the issue of inspectors being able to take samples of nuclear materials at the Yongbyon installations for laboratory analysis. A North Korean Foreign Ministry statement of November 11, 2008, and subsequent statements asserted that the written verification agreement said nothing about sampling and that North Korea only had to abide by the written agreement and nothing else. The State Department then acknowledged that Hill‘s discussion with North Koreans about sampling was only a verbal understanding.20 This issue was not resolved in the December 2008 six party meeting. The second aspect of Hill‘s talks was his meeting with North Korean Lt. General Lee Chan-bok. This was the first time that a North Korean military leader had participated in the nuclear talks. General Lee reportedly called for bilateral U.S.-North Korean military talks and may have linked U.S. acceptance of bilateral military talks to further progress on the nuclear issue.21 Hill and the State Department have been silent on the content of this meeting. At the six party meeting in December 2008, an attempt was made to draw up a compromise agreement on the sampling issue, but North Korea reportedly rejected a Chinese draft proposal. The sampling issue, too, resulted in a slowing of the disablement process and the delivery of heavy fuel oil to North Korea.22 Thus, by the time the Bush Administration left office in January 2009, the disablement process remained stalled at about 80% completion, and only about 80% of the heavy fuel oil and alternative energy aid had been delivered.

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Kim Jong-il’s Stroke and Political Changes inside North Korea In August 2008, North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke that apparently was severe and incapacitated him. Kim reportedly has been suffering from several major ailments since 2000, including heart, liver, and kidney problems, and possibly diabetes.23 In the remainder of 2008, there were reports that a small collective leadership group of Communist Party leaders and military commanders had taken over day-to-day decision making. Kim‘s brother-in-law, Chang Song-taek, reportedly was a key figure in this group, possibly in a leadership role.24 If Kim remains partially incapacitated or should die, a collective leadership could remain for some time; none of Kim‘s three sons seems to be in a position within the leadership to succeed him immediately. Reports surfaced that Kim Jong-il had named his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, age 26, as a successor and that Kim Jong-un had been given a low level position on the National Defense Commission.25 In the aftermath of the stroke, the North Korean military took a more visible role in implementing policy and announcing policy positions and decisions. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill negotiated with a North Korean General on the nuclear issue for the first time when he went to Pyongyang in October 2008. South Korean businessmen at the special economic zone of Kaesong inside North Korea found themselves dealing with North Korean military officials rather than civilian officials. A statement of April 18, 2009, by the North Korean military General Staff strongly suggested that the military leadership had played a lead role in the decision to withdraw from the six party talks and that, in the future, the military will control decisions on the nuclear program. 26 In the post-stroke period, the North Korean regime began to restrict further access to North Korea by outsiders and placed new limits on private and quasi-private economic activities. New limits were imposed on Chinese traders operating in North Korea, the quasi-private markets selling food and consumer goods that had emerged in the late 1990s, and transportation between South Korea and the Kaesong economic zone.27 The regime shut down the U.S. food aid program in March 2009. After January 1, 2009, the North Korean Foreign Ministry and the military command issued a number of statements outlining a set of tough, negotiating positions for future nuclear talks with the United States (see section on Issues Facing the Obama Administration).

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Issues Facing the Obama Administration The Obama Administration faces two sets of issues in dealing with North Korea on the nuclear question. North Korea has created the first with its nuclear test and the withdrawal from the six party talks and announced restarting of the Yongbyon installations. The Obama Administration had professed a desire to begin nuclear negotiations with Pyongyang. It now faces the challenge of getting North Korea back into a negotiating framework. It would appear to have several options to move U.S. policy in this direction. One option would aim at quickly persuading North Korea to reverse its April 14 announcement and return to the six party talks. The Obama Administration would have to work with China and coordinate U.S. proposals with China in order to secure maximum Chinese support. One avenue would be to propose U.S. and Chinese steps that might appeal to North Korea to complete the Bush Administration-North Korean agreements and thus restore the six party framework. The Obama Administration could offer to defer the verification-sampling issue, which has blocked final implementation of the Bush Administration-North Korean agreements until a later stage of negotiations. The Obama Administration could work out arrangements with China to provide North Korea with the remaining 200,000 tons of heavy oil. If North Korea accepted these proposals, it would invite the expelled U.S. and IAEA technicians back to Yongbyon and renew the process of completing the disablement of Yongbyon. It would appear that this option would have to be undertaken quickly for it to have a chance to restore the Bush AdministrationNorth Korean agreements. A second option would be to wait out North Korea until North Korea was persuaded to return to the six party talks. North Korea instituted two nearly year long boycotts of the six party talks in 2004-2005 and 2005-2006. Each time, China reportedly provided substantial material incentives (economic aid, investments, financial payments, and trade credits) as inducements to North Korea to return to the talks. Such a scenario is possible again, although North Korea‘s announcement of withdrawal in April 2009 contained stronger rejectionist language than was the case during the prior two boycotts. A third option would have the Obama Administration offer North Korea bilateral negotiations with the United States outside the six party framework. This likely would mean the end of the six party talks as an actual forum for negotiations, although it might continue as a nominal institution to ratify any final U.S.-North Korean denuclearization agreement. This would raise the question of the future roles of the other parties in dealing with the nuclear

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issue and U.S. consultations and coordination with them. On the other hand, securing bilateral talks with Washington may be a key objective of North Korea in its rejection of six party talks.28 If so, it could be receptive to such a U.S. offer. There are indications that this may be the Obama Administration‘s preferred option. Statements from Administration officials suggest that the Obama Administration is not committed to the six party talks framework as strongly as the Bush Administration. In appointing Stephen Bosworth as the chief U.S. envoy dealing with North Korea, the Obama Administration specified that Bosworth would not attend formal six party meetings but would be the chief U.S. negotiator in direct bilateral talks with North Korea.29 Even if implementation of the Bush Administration-North Korea agreements were completed, the Obama Administration undoubtedly would face significant difficulties in the next round of nuclear negotiations if Pyongyang put on the table the negotiating positions, which it has emphasized since January 1, 2009. These negotiating positions have been laid out in official statements by the North Korean Foreign Ministry and, in a new development, statements by the North Korean military. They also came in statements that North Korean officials, including military officials, made to Selig Harrison of the Center for International Policy, who visited Pyongyang in mid-January 2009. Harrison had visited North Korea on numerous occasions since the early 1990s and had met with high-ranking North Korean officials. The negotiating positions taken by North Korea can be summarized as follows: North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons in return for normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States and economic aid from the United States. Normalization of relations must come before denuclearization as a step toward denuclearization.30 North Korean officials rejected Selig Harrison‘s proposal that North Korea turn over its plutonium stockpile to the International Atomic Energy Agency in return for U.S. diplomatic recognition and U.S. economic aid and trade credits. North Korea wants to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state. North Korean officials asserted to Harrison that North Korea wants U.S. recognition of its status as a nuclear weapons state.31 North Korea has cited this goal repeatedly since 2007, which it appears to define as a situation in which the United States and other countries normalize relations with North Korea and provide economic-financial benefits while North Korea retains nuclear weapons. According to Harrison and U.S. nuclear expert, Sigfried

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Hecker, who visited North Korea in February 2009, North Korean officials, including military officials, indicated that a major objective of the nuclear program is to develop nuclear warheads that could be mounted on missiles.32 North Korea‘s view may be that developing nuclear warheads would force the United States, Japan, and other countries to ―recognize‖ North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. Thus, a key purpose of the May 2009 nuclear test may have been to advance North Korean nuclear technology toward a capability to produce nuclear warheads. North Korea no longer has a plutonium stockpile of 31 kilograms that it declared in June 2008 because North Korea has ―weaponized‖ all of its plutonium. This implies a North Korea position that future negotiations on final denuclearization must deal only with North Korea‘s plutonium atomic weapons.33 Denuclearization must include the entire Korean peninsula and must include the elimination of the ―U.S. nuclear threat‖ to North Korea.34 Pyongyang‘s apparent position that a final denuclearization negotiation must deal only with its atomic weapons appears to aim at giving North Korea more negotiating leverage to press its demand that the United States must agree to measures to eliminate the U.S. ―nuclear threat.‖ North Korea repeatedly has defined the ―U.S. nuclear threat‖ to include the composition and major operations of U.S. military forces in South Korea and around the Korean peninsula and the U.S. ―nuclear umbrella‖ over South Korea embodied in the U.S.-South Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. North Korean strategy seems aimed at proposing that a final denuclearization agreement with the United States constitute the document that regulates the future U.S. military presence in and around the Korean peninsula, thus superseding the U.S.-South Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. Any system of verification and inspections must include inspections inside South Korea, including U.S. bases in South Korea. If North Korea holds to that position, negotiating an agreement on verification that would include sampling would pose additional difficulties and likely delays. These negotiating positions, plus earlier positions laid out by Pyongyang, suggest that North Korea might assert that the next round of nuclear negotiations should focus on only an agreement for the complete dismantlement of the Yongbyon installations.35 Pyongyang likely will assert that negotiations over its nuclear weapons should be postponed until a later phase of the six party talks or that the issue be negotiated in separate U.S.North Korean bilateral negotiations. Pyongyang also may take the position that

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verification procedures, especially inspections and sampling, must be dealt with in this later, denuclearization phase of negotiations. North Korea‘s negotiating positions also suggest the demands and conditions that Pyongyang likely would lay out for an agreement of dismantlement. North Korea appears ready to call on the United States to agree to diplomatic relations in a dismantlement agreement. North Korea also is certain to demand that the United States agree to begin a second project to construct light water nuclear reactors inside North Korea;36 the 1994 Agreed Framework initiated the first light water reactor project, which was halted in 2002. North Korea also can be expected to insist that the actual physical dismantlement of Yongbyon would take place only when the construction of light water reactors is completed (a process that would take ten years or more, according to estimates by nuclear experts on the time required to construct a light water reactor). Another North Korean condition likely would be a continuation of heavy oil shipments until light water reactors are completed. North Korea also may raise another condition related to the Bush Administration‘s removal of Pyongyang from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. North Korean negotiators may assert that the Obama Administration must ―complete‖ North Korea‘s removal through a second step of proposing and supporting financial aid to North Korea from the World Bank and/or the International Monetary Fund. The Bush Administration‘s removal of North Korea lifted the requirement in U.S. law that the President must oppose aid to North Korea from international financial agencies because of its inclusion on the terrorism-support list.37 North Korea‘s negotiating agenda presents the Obama Administration with important decisions regarding any future round of nuclear talks. The Administration would have to decide whether to accept a North Korean assertion that the next round of talks focus exclusively on the dismantlement of Yongbyon (a position China could be expected to support) or whether the Administration would counter-propose that the issues of North Korea‘s atomic weapons, plutonium stockpile, and verification be the focus of talks. The Obama Administration could view this as a more attractive negotiating option than negotiating again over shutting down Yongbyon, especially if North Korea restarts operation of the Yongbyon facilities as it did in early 2003.38 In negotiating over the dismantlement of Yongbyon, two of North Korea‘s likely demands would appear to present particular problems for the Obama Administration. North Korea‘s likely call for diplomatic relations in a dismantlement agreement (and/or prior to final denuclearization) runs counter to the longstanding U.S. position, reiterated by Secretary of State Clinton

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during her trip to East Asia, that the United States would normalize relations with North Korea only when North Korea‘s nuclear programs and weapons are eliminated.39 North Korea‘s repeated demand for light water nuclear reactors also would force the Obama Administration to choose whether to go back into another light water reactor project that likely would take ten years or longer, or, alternatively, propose a package of incentives to North Korea, including energy incentives, that would not include light water reactors. The Obama Administration would face a more fundamental decision if it sought early negotiations over North Korea‘s atomic weapons. North Korea has made clear that it will not accept a linkage between giving up its nuclear weapons and normalization of relations with the United States. Its heightened emphasis that the real linkage is with elimination of the ―U.S. nuclear threat‖ would present the Obama Administration with the issue of whether it would be willing to negotiate major military concessions to North Korea regarding the composition and operations of U.S. forces in South Korea and around the Korean peninsula. Past U.S. administrations have refused to negotiate with North Korea over U.S. troops. The roles of South Korea and Japan in any U.S.-North Korean negotiations over U.S. forces also would be an important consideration. Two other issues might be addressed by the Obama Administration in developing its negotiating strategy toward North Korea. One would be whether, in the next round of nuclear talks, to attempt to restore as negotiating issues North Korea‘s alleged highly enriched uranium program and its proliferation activities with Iran and Syria. The Bush Administration-North Korean agreements in effect removed these issues from the negotiating agenda. In its declaration of nuclear programs of June 26, 2008, North Korea did not admit to any uranium enrichment program or nuclear proliferation programs with Iran and Syria.40 Restoring these issues in the negotiations would be difficult. North Korea could be expected to insist that the United States accepted its denials of these programs in 2008. China successfully urged the Bush Administration to remove these issues from the U.S. negotiating agenda with North Korea and concentrate on the plutonium program.41 A second possible issue is whether the United States should continue to give close to 100% priority to the nuclear issue in its North Korean policy or whether it should begin to bring other issues into its North Korea policy. Selig Harrison testified that North Korean officials indicated to him that Pyongyang might be willing to negotiate with the Obama Administration over North Korea‘s missile programs. Another potential issue would be whether to follow through on U.S. and South Korean offers of late 2007 that once significant

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progress had been made on the nuclear issue, the United States and South Korea would be willing to begin a separate negotiation with North Korea over a Korean peace treaty to replace the 1953 armistice agreement.

NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS Plutonium Program

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Most of North Korea‘s plutonium-based nuclear installations are located at Yongbyon, 60 miles from the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. They are the facilities covered by the 1994 U.S.- North Korean Agreed Framework and by the freeze and disablement provisions in Phases One and Two of the February 2007 Six Party Nuclear Agreement. The key installations are as follows:42 An atomic reactor, with a capacity of about 5 electrical megawatts that began operating by 1987. It is capable of expending enough reactor fuel to produce about 6 kilograms of plutonium annually—enough for the manufacture of a single atomic bomb annually. North Korea in 1989 shut down the reactor for about 70 days; U.S. intelligence agencies believe that North Korea removed fuel rods from the reactor at that time for reprocessing into plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons. In May 1994, North Korea shut down the reactor and removed about 8,000 fuel rods, which could be reprocessed into enough plutonium (25-30 kilograms) for 4-6 nuclear weapons. North Korea started operating the reactor again in February 2003, shut it down in April 2005, and said it had removed another 8,000 fuel rods. Under the February 2007 six party agreement, North Korea shut down the reactor in July 2007. As of late 2008, North Korea had completed eight of the eleven steps of the disablement of the reactor, including the removal of equipment from the reactor and the blowing up of reactor‘s cooling tower. Two larger (estimated 50 megawatts and 200 electrical megawatts) reactors under construction at Yongbyon and Taechon since 1984. According to U.S. Ambassador Robert Gallucci, these plants, if completed, would be capable of producing enough spent fuel annually for 200 kilograms of plutonium, sufficient to manufacture nearly 30 atomic bombs per year. However, when North Korea re-opened the plutonium program in early

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2003, reports indicate that construction on the larger reactors was not resumed. A plutonium reprocessing plant about 600 feet long and several stories high. The plant would separate weapons grade plutonium-239 from spent nuclear fuel rods for insertion into the structure of atomic bombs or warheads. U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly detected North Korean preparations to restart the plutonium reprocessing plant in February and March 2003. According to press reports, the CIA estimated in late 2003 that North Korea had reprocessed some of the 8,000 fuel rods. In January 2004, North Korean officials showed a U.S. nuclear expert, Dr. Sigfried Hecker, samples of what they claimed were plutonium oxalate powder and plutonium metal. Dr. Hecker later said in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (January 21, 2004) that, without testing, he could not confirm whether the sample was metallic plutonium ―but all observations I was able to make are consistent with the sample being plutonium metal.‖ IAEA monitors in July 2007 stated that the reprocessing plant was not in operation, and it remained shut down into early 2009. Satellite photographs reportedly also show that the five megawatt reactor has no attached power lines, which it would have if used for electric power generation. Persons interviewed for this study believe that North Korea developed the five megawatt reactor and the reprocessing plant with its own resources and technology. It is believed that Kim Jong-il, the son and successor of President Kim Il-sung who died in July 1994, directs the program, and that the military and the Ministry of Public Security implement it. North Korea reportedly has about 3,000 scientists and research personnel devoted to the Yongbyon program. Many have studied nuclear technology (though not necessarily nuclear weapons production) in the Soviet Union and China and reportedly Pakistan.

Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Program North Korea‘s secret highly enriched uranium (HEU) program appears to date from at least 1996. Hwang Jang-yop, a Communist Party secretary who defected in 1997, has stated that North Korea and Pakistan agreed in the summer of 1996 to trade North Korean long-range missile technology for

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Pakistani HEU technology.43 Other information dates North Korea-Pakistan cooperation to 1993. The Clinton Administration reportedly learned of it in 1998 or 1999, and a Department of Energy report of 1999 cited evidence of the program. In March 2000, President Clinton notified Congress that he was waiving certification that ―North Korea is not seeking to develop or acquire the capability to enrich uranium.‖ The Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun reported on June 9, 2000, the contents of a ―detailed report‖ from Chinese government sources on a secret North Korean uranium enrichment facility inside North Korea‘s Mount Chonma. Reportedly, according to a CIA report to Congress, North Korea attempted in late 2001 to acquire ―centrifuge-related materials in large quantities to support a uranium enrichment program.‖44 The CIA estimated publicly in November 2002 that North Korea could produce two atomic bombs annually through HEU beginning in 2005;45 other intelligence estimates reportedly project a bomb producing capability between 2005 and 2007. Ambassador Robert Gallucci, who negotiated the 1994 U.S.North Korean Agreed Framework, and Mitchell Reiss, head of the State Department‘s Policy Planning Bureau until 2004, have stated that a functioning North Korean HEU infrastructure could produce enough HEU for ―two or more nuclear weapons per year.‖ The Washington Post of April 28, 2004, quoted an U.S. intelligence official saying that a North Korean HEU infrastructure could produce as many as six atomic bombs annually. Administration officials have stated that they do not know the locations of North Korea‘s uranium enrichment program or whether North Korea has assembled the infrastructure to produce uranium-based atomic bombs.46

International Assistance Knowledgeable individuals believe that the Soviet Union did not assist directly in the development of Yongbyon in the 1980s. The U.S.S.R. provided North Korea with a small research reactor in the 1960s, which also is at Yongbyon. However, North Korean nuclear scientists continued to receive training in the U.S.S.R. up to the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991. East German and Russian nuclear and missile scientists reportedly were in North Korea throughout the 1990s. Since 1999, reports have appeared that U.S. intelligence agencies had information that Chinese enterprises were supplying important components and raw materials for North Korea‘s missile program.47

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Nuclear Collaboration with Iran and Syria In April 2008, the Bush Administration disclosed that a facility at Al Kibar in northeast Syria bombed by Israel on September 6, 2007, was a plutonium nuclear reactor under construction with the apparent aim of producing nuclear fuel rods that could be converted into nuclear weaponsgrade plutonium. For months after the Israeli bombing, press reports had cited information and evidence that the facility was a nuclear reactor and that North Korea was assisting Syria in its construction. This nuclear collaboration reportedly was ongoing since 1997.48 U.S. intelligence officials on April 24, 2008, privately briefed Members of Congress on North Korea‘s role, and they provided a background news briefing to the media.49 (See CRS Report RL33487, Syria: Background and U.S. Relations.) U.S. officials presented several forms of evidence for North Korean involvement in the Syrian reactor. A U.S. photograph showed a top North Korean nuclear official visiting Syrian nuclear experts. U.S. intelligence officials released photographs of the outside and inside of the reactor showing marked similarities with the North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. The photos of the interior of the reactor reportedly showed North Koreans inside the reactor.50 A leading South Korean newspaper had reported that U.S. intelligence agencies had obtained a list of North Korean officials involved in the Syrian reactor project and that chief U.S. negotiator, Christopher Hill, had confronted North Korean nuclear negotiators with the list.51 At the time of the Bush Administration‘s disclosures, South Korean intelligence officials stated that they had information that the Israeli bombing had killed ten North Koreans.52 U.S. officials said that the Al Kibar reactor was nearly operational at the time of the Israeli bombing. However, non-government nuclear experts questioned that assertion, asserting that there was no evidence of a plutonium reprocessing plant and a facility to produce nuclear fuel for the reactor in Syria.53 One potential answer to the question of the absence of other reactorrelated plutonium facilities in Syria came in reports later in 2008 that Iran also was involved in the Syrian reactor with North Korea and that a plutonium reprocessing plant was in Iran. The online service of the German news publication Der Spiegel cited ―intelligence reports seen by Der Spiegel‖ that North Korean and Iranian scientists were working together at the reactor site at the time of the Israeli bombing. Some of the plutonium fuel rod production from the reactor was to have gone to Iran, which viewed the reactor as a

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―reserve site‖ to produce weapons-grade plutonium as a supplement to Iran‘s own highly enriched uranium program.54 A similar description of North Korean-Iranian cooperation in the Syrian reactor came in two reports from Washington in the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun. The newspaper reported in September 2008 information from ―a source familiar with the Syrian nuclear issue‖ that ―a secret Iranian Revolutionary Guards base‖ in Iran housed a plutonium reprocessing facility designed to reprocess nuclear fuel rods from the Syrian reactor.55 Sankei Shimbun reported from Washington in July 2008 several visits of Iranian officials to the Syrian reactor in 2005 and 2006.56 Additional information pointing to North Korean-Iranian collaboration in plutonium nuclear development came from European and Israeli defense officials in early 2007. They stated that North Korea and Iran had concluded a new agreement for North Korea to share data from its October 2006 nuclear test with Iran.57 These reports describe a direct collaborative relationship between North Korea and Iran in developing nuclear weapons. Additionally, since the early 1990s, a body of reports has accumulated pointing to a significant collaborative North Korean-Iranian nuclear relationship inside Iran, with North Korea‘s principal interlocutor being the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC). Some of these reports cite the Central Intelligence Agency or Western intelligence sources as sources of information. Other reports seem to be based, at least in part, on Israeli intelligence sources. Specific events or factors in the alleged North Korean-Iranian nuclear collaboration are described in multiple reports. Numerous reports have asserted that the IRGC occupies a leadership role in Iran‘s nuclear program. A State Department‘s 2007 Fact Sheet asserted that ―the IRGC attempted, as recently as 2006, to procure sophisticated and costly equipment that could be used to support Iran‘s ballistic missile and nuclear program.‖58 Nuclear collaboration reportedly began at the same time North Korea negotiated with the IRGC for cooperation in developing and manufacturing Nodong missiles. The first reports, in 1993 and 1994, said that North Korea and Iran had signed an initial agreement for nuclear cooperation. An Economist Foreign Report cited ―CIA sources‖ that Iran was helping to finance North Korea‘s nuclear program and that North Korea would supply Iran with nuclear technology and equipment.59 A report of the U.S. House of Representatives Republican Research Committee claimed that Iran would provide $500 million to North Korea for the joint development of nuclear

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weapons.60 The ―CIA sources‖ cited by the Economist Foreign Report mentioned the development of enriched uranium as a goal of the new North Korean-Iranian agreements. The next reported stage in nuclear collaboration, in 2003 and afterwards, appears to have been connected to the reported joint advancement of the program to produce a model of North Korea‘s Nodong intermediate ballistic missile in Iran. Production of the Nodong in Iran was a main element of the reported North Korean-Iranian agreements of 1993. By 1997, North Korean missile experts were working in Iran with the IRGC to produce the Shahab 3 and Shahab 4 missiles, the Iranian name for the Nodong.61 Success in developing and testing the Shahab missile reportedly led to a North KoreanIranian agreement, probably in 2003, to either initiate or accelerate work to develop nuclear warheads that could be fitted on the Shahab missile. Iran was reported to have offered shipments of oil and natural gas to North Korea to secure this joint development of nuclear warheads.62 North Koreans reportedly were seen at Iranian nuclear facilities in 2003. By this time, a large number of North Korean nuclear and missile specialists reportedly were in Iran.63 Der Spiegel quoted ―western intelligence service circles‖ as describing Iran in 2005 as offering North Korea economic aid if Pyongyang ―continues to cooperate actively in developing nuclear missiles for Tehran.‖64 In 2006 and 2008, U.S. intelligence officials, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other diplomatic sources disclosed that Iran was trying to modify the Shahab missile, especially the nose cone, so that it could carry a nuclear warhead. U.S. intelligence officials described this work as part of an Iranian Project 11 1—―a nuclear research effort that includes work on missile development.‖65 In March 2006, Reuters reported ―an intelligence report given to Reuters by a non-U.S. diplomat‖ that described Iran‘s plans to develop nuclear warheads for the Shahab 3 missile.66 Two years later, the International Atomic Energy Agency confronted Iran at several 2008 meetings with documents and photographs showing Iranian work in redesigning the nose cone of the Shahab-3 missile in order for it to carry a nuclear warhead.67 The National Council of Resistance of Iran is an exiled opposition group that in 2002 had revealed correctly the existence of secret Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz and Irak. It issued a report in February 2008 that gave reputed details of North Korean-Iranian collaboration in nuclear warhead development. It alleged that the Iranian Defense Ministry has a secret facility at Khojir on the edge of Tehran, code-named B 1 -Nori-8500, that is engaged in the development of nuclear warheads for intermediate range ballistic

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missiles. North Korean specialists were at this facility, according to the National Council.68 The Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun reported on March 2, 2009, that North Korean missiles experts had worked with Iranian counterparts in Iran‘s launch of a satellite on February 2, 2009. Iran‘s Safir 2 missile, reportedly based on the North Korean Taepodong missile, was launch vehicle for the February 2 satellite.69 Another form of North Korean-Iranian nuclear collaboration reportedly involved a huge Iranian project to develop underground bunkers and tunnels for elements of Iran‘s nuclear program. The project, estimated to have cost hundreds of millions of dollars, included the construction of 10,000 meters of underground halls for nuclear equipment connected by tunnels measuring hundreds of meters branching off from each hall. Specifications reportedly called for reinforced concrete tunnel ceilings, walls, and doors resistant to explosions and penetrating munitions.70 The IRGC implemented the project. North Korea reportedly participated in the design and construction of the bunkers and tunnels. In early 2005, Myong Lyu-do, a leading North Korean expert on underground facilities, traveled to Tehran to run the program of North Korean assistance.71 North Korea is believed to have extensive underground military installations inside North Korea. Its collaboration with the IRGC reportedly has involved extensive aid to Hezbollah in constructing underground military installations in Lebanon. (See CRS Report RL30613, North Korea: Terrorism List Removal) The Japanese newspaper, Sankei Shimbun, reported two visits of high level Iranian officials to North Korea in February and May 2008. The Iranian delegation included officials of Iran‘s Atomic Energy Organization and National Security Council. The apparent purpose of these visits, according to the reports, was to ensure that North Korea would maintain secrecy about its nuclear collaboration with Iran in its negotiations with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill.72

North Korea’s Delivery Systems North Korea‘s missile program since the early 1990s has developed on four levels. The first three are types of missiles developed for North Korea‘s arsenal. North Korea is estimated to have more than 600 Scud missiles with a range of up to 300 miles. Newer versions tested in July 2006 are solid-fuel

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Scuds, which can be fired quickly, in contrast to liquid-fuel missiles. The range of the Scuds could cover all of South Korea. The second level is the development of intermediate range missiles, where North Korea also has made progress. North Korea is estimated to have deployed approximately 200 intermediate-range Nodong missiles. The Nodongs have an estimated range of 900 miles, which could reach most of Japan. North Korea reportedly has developed since 2003 a more accurate, longer-range intermediate ballistic missile. This new missile, dubbed the Taepodong X or the Musudan, appears to be based on the design of the Soviet SS-N-6 missile. It is believed to have a range of 1,500 to 2,400 miles, sufficient to reach Okinawa and Guam, the site of major U.S. military bases and thousands of U.S. military personnel and their families and Guamanian U.S. citizens.73 South Korea‘s Defense Ministry may have been referring to the Musudan when it states in a report of February 22, 2009, that North Korea had deployed a new medium-range missile with a range of at least 1,800 miles.74 Evaluations of North Korea‘s launches of several Scud and Nodong missiles on July 4, 2006, by intelligence agencies of the United States and other governments reportedly have concluded that North Korea has increased the accuracy of these missiles and that the launches displayed the ability of North Korea‘s command and control apparatus to coordinate multiple launchings of missiles at diverse targets.75 (For additional information, see CRS Report RS2 1473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, by Steven A. Hildreth.) In contrast, North Korea has failed to develop a workable long-range missile that could reach Alaska, Hawaii, or the U.S. west coast. North Korea attempted a test of the Taepodong II on July 4, 2006, but the first stage of the missile crashed into the Sea of Japan after about 40 seconds. On April 5, 2009, North Korea attempted to test launch a three stage Taepodong II, claiming that the third stage apparently consisting of a satellite. This time, the first and second stages separated successfully, and the second stage landed about 1,984 miles from the launch site in the Pacific Ocean.76 This, however, was about 200 miles short of the landing zone that North Korea had designated for the second stage in international notifications it issued prior to the launch. Moreover, the third stage allegedly carrying the satellite either did not separate from the second stage, or if it did separate, it landed nearby in the Pacific Ocean.77 U.S. officials and most independent experts judged the test a failure, concluding that North Korea had not mastered key elements of longrange missile technology.78 If the Taepodong II had been targeted at

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Anchorage, Alaska, the closest major U.S. target in the 50 U.S. states, the second and third stages would have fallen short by over 1,500 miles. The fourth level of North Korea‘s missile program has been the export of missiles to other countries in the Middle East and South Asia and joint collaboration in the development of missiles with Iran and Pakistan. In the 1990s, North Korea exported Scud and Nodong missiles to Pakistan, Iran, Yemen, Syria, and reportedly Egypt. It entered into joint development programs with both Pakistan and Iran. The collaboration with Iran has continued. An Iranian delegation reportedly attended the April 5, 2009, launch. Many experts believe that a key North Korean objective behind the April 5 launch was to bring Iran into another joint development project for the Taepodong II.

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State of Nuclear Weapons Development A CIA statement of August 18, 2003, reportedly estimated that North Korea had produced one or two simple fission-type nuclear weapons and had validated the designs without conducting yield- producing nuclear tests.79 The initial estimate of one or two nuclear weapons is derived primarily from North Korea‘s approximately 70-day shutdown of the five megawatt reactor in 1989, which would have given it the opportunity to remove nuclear fuel rods, from which plutonium is reprocessed. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reportedly estimated in 1993 that North Korea extracted enough fuel rods for about 12 kilograms of plutonium—sufficient for one or two atomic bombs. The CIA and DIA apparently based their estimate on the 1989 shutdown of the five megawatt reactor.80 South Korean and Japanese intelligence estimates reportedly were higher: 16-24 kilograms (Japan) and 7-22 kilograms (South Korea). These estimates reportedly are based on the view that North Korea could have acquired a higher volume of plutonium from the 1989 reactor shutdown and the view of a higher possibility that North Korea removed fuel rods during the 1990 and 1991 reactor slowdowns. Russian Defense Ministry analyses in late 1993 reportedly came to a similar estimate of about 20 kilograms of plutonium, enough for two or three atomic bombs. General Leon LaPorte, former U.S. Commander in Korea, stated in an interview in April 2006 that North Korea possessed three to six nuclear weapons before the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework. 81

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Russian intelligence agencies also reportedly have learned of significant technological advances by North Korea toward nuclear weapons production. On March 10, 1992, the Russian newspaper Argumenty I Fakty (Arguments and Facts) published the text of a 1990 Soviet KGB report to the Soviet Central Committee on North Korea‘s nuclear program. It was published again by Izvestiya on June 24, 1994. The KGB report asserted that ―According to available data, development of the first nuclear device has been completed at the DPRK nuclear research center in Yongbyon.‖ The North Korean government, the report stated, had decided not to test the device in order to avoid international detection. Additionally, a number of reports and evidence point to at least a middlerange likelihood that North Korea may have smuggled plutonium from Russia. In June 1994, the head of Russia‘s Counterintelligence Service (successor to the KGB) said at a press conference that North Korea‘s attempts to smuggle ―components of nuclear arms production‖ from Russia caused his agency ―special anxiety.‖ U.S. executive branch officials have expressed concern in background briefings over the possibility that North Korea has smuggled plutonium from Russia. One U.S. official, quoted in the Washington Times, July 5, 1994, asserted that ―There is the possibility that things having gotten over the [Russia-North Korea] border without anybody being aware of it.‖ The most specific claim came in the German news magazine Stern in March 1993, which cited Russian Counterintelligence Service reports that North Korea had smuggled 56 kilograms of plutonium (enough for 7-9 atomic bombs) from Russia. If, as it claims, North Korea reprocessed the 8,000 nuclear fuel rods in 2003 that it had moved from storage at the beginning of that year, North Korea gained an additional 25-3 0 kilograms of plutonium, according to Dr. Sigfried Hecker in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 21, 2004. Dr. Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos Laboratories, had visited North Korea‘s Yongbyon nuclear complex in January 2004 and since has visited several times. U.S. officials and nuclear experts have stated that this amount of plutonium would give North Korea the potential to produce between four to eight atomic bombs.82 Nuclear expert David Albright estimated in February 2007 that North Korea had a stockpile of reprocessed plutonium of 28-50 kilograms, enough for between 5 and 12 nuclear weapons.83 These estimates appear to be based on projections that a country like North Korea would need 6-8 kilograms of plutonium to produce one atomic bomb. The IAEA has had a standard that a non-nuclear state would need about eight kilograms of plutonium to produce an atomic bomb. As

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stated previously, Dr. Hecker has estimated that if North Korea restarts its plutonium reprocessing plant in 2009, it could reprocess quickly available nuclear fuel rods into enough plutonium to produce one nuclear bomb; and if North Korea restarts the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, the Yongbyon complex could produce enough plutonium for one nuclear bomb annually. The question of whether North Korea produced additional nuclear weapons with the plutonium that it apparently acquired after 2003 may depend on the degree of success/failure of North Korea‘s nuclear test of October 2006 and whether North Korea is able to develop a nuclear warhead that could be fitted onto its missiles. Experts believe that any atomic bombs developed likely are similar to the plutonium bomb dropped by the United States on Nagasaki in August 1945. However, North Korea has few delivery systems that could deliver such a bomb to a U.S. or Japanese target. Thus, Pyongyang probably would not produce additional Nagasaki-type bombs but would retain sufficient weapons-grade plutonium until it could use it to produce a nuclear warhead. A key North Korean objective of the May 2009 nuclear test may have been to make technical progress toward development of a nuclear warhead. Statements by U.S. officials reflect an apparent uncertainty over whether North Korea has achieved a warheading capability,84 and they have not addressed publicly the reports of North Korean-Iranian collaboration in nuclear warhead development. According to press reports in late 2002, the CIA concluded that North Korea accelerated its uranium enrichment program in the 1999, 2000, and 2001. According to U.S. News and World Report, September 1, 2003, the CIA estimated that North Korea could produce a uranium-based atomic weapon by the second half of 2004. Another report, in the Washington Post, April 28, 2004, stated that U.S. intelligence officials had ―broadly concluded‖ that a North Korean uranium enrichment program would be operational by 2007, producing enough material for as many as six atomic bombs.85 However, U.S. officials have stated that they know less about the secret uranium enrichment program (HEU) than they know about the plutonium program. North Korea received designs for uranium enrichment centrifuges from Pakistan nuclear ―czar,‖ A.Q. Khan, and has attempted to purchase overseas key components for uranium enrichment centrifuges; but some of these purchases have been blocked. 86 Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill stated on September 28, 2005, that ―where there is not a consensus is how far they [North Korea] have gone with this [the HEU program].‖87 (See also CRS Report RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons, by Mary Beth Nikitin.)

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SELECT CHRONOLOGY 10/9/06 2/13/07

6/25/07

7/18/07

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10/3/07

4/8/08

6/26/08

8/11/08

10/3/08

North Korea announced that it has carried out an underground nuclear test. The six party governments negotiating over North Korea‘s nuclear programs announced an agreement for a freeze and disablement of North Korea‘s nuclear facilities accompanied by energy and diplomatic benefits to North Korea. A diplomatic deadlock involving $24 million in frozen North Korean funds in a Macau bank, Banco Delta Asia, was ended when U.S.-initiated measures to unfreeze the money and transfer it to North Korea. The International Atomic Energy Agency announced that nuclear facilities at Yongbyon are shut down in accordance with the freeze provisions of the February 2007 six party nuclear agreement. The six parties issued a statement to implement the second phase of the February 2007 nuclear agreement, focusing on the disablement of Yongbyon, a North Korean declaration of its nuclear programs, and a U.S. promise to lift economic sanctions on North Korea and remove North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korea‘s Kim Kye-gwan negotiated an agreement reportedly limiting the information that North Korea would have to provide in a declaration of nuclear programs. North Korea transmitted a declaration of nuclear programs to China, the chairman of the six party talks. President Bush announced a lifting of economic sanctions on North Korea and an intention to remove North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism by August 11, 2008. The Bush Administration announced that it would not remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism because Pyongyang rejected U.S. proposals for a verification system of inspections inside North Korea. Assistant Secretary of State Hill and North Korean officials negotiate an agreement in Pyongyang for a verification system.

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North Korea announces that it was withdrawing from the six party talks, citing the statement of the U.N. Security Council criticizing its missile test of April 5, 2009.

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FOR ADDITIONAL READING CRS Report RL3 1555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues, by Shirley A. Kan. CRS Report RL3 1785, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin. CRS Report RL33567, Korea-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by Larry A. Niksch. CRS Report RL3 1696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack. CRS Report RS2 1473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, by Steven A. Hildreth. CRS Report RL33324, North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency, by Dick K. Nanto. CRS Report RL33709, North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications, and U.S. Options, by Emma Chanlett-Avery and Sharon Squassoni. CRS Report RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons, by Mary Beth Nikitin.

End Notes 1

Sigfried Hecker, From Pyongyang to Tehran, with nukes, The New ForeignPolicy.com, May 26, 2009. 2 ―UN council demands enforcement of N.Korea sanctions,‖ Reuters News, April 13, 2009. 3 Evan Ramstad and David Crawford, ―North Korea leaves six-party talks,‖ Wall Street Journal Asia, April 15, 2009, p. 1. ―North Korea quits nuclear talks, to restart plant,‖ Reuters News, April 14, 2009. 4 Sigfried Hecker, From Pyongyang to Tehran, with nukes, The New ForeignPolicy.com, May 26, 2009. 5 Ibid. 6 Glenn Kessler, ―N. Korea doesn‘t agree to written nuclear pact,‖ Washington Post, December 12, 2008. 7 White House Press Spokesman, ―Press Fact Sheet: Presidential Action on State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA),‖ June 26, 2008. 8 Cited in CRS Report RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons, by Mary Beth Nikitin. In September 2008, about 4,800 fuel rods reportedly had been removed from the reactor. The disablement processes resumed after Christopher Hill negotiated an agreement with North

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Korea on verification, and additional fuel rods were removed before North Korea again slowed removal of fuel rods in early 2009. See Jin Dae-woong, ―North Korea may play cards to press U.S.,‖ Korea Herald (internet), September 24, 2008; and Yi Chong-chin, ―DPRK official at energy aid talks comments on nuclear verification issue,‖ Yonhap News Agency, September 19, 2008. 9 ―North Korea tells China 30.8 kg of plutonium extracted,‖ Agence France Presse, October 24, 2008. 10 Glenn Kessler, ―U.S. increases estimate of N.Korean plutonium,‖ Washington Post, May 14, 2008. 11 Anne Gearan, ―U.S. official: North Korea has agreed to intensive US verification of its plutonium production,‖ Associated Press, June 26, 2008. Helene Cooper, ―Past deals by N.Korea may face less study,‖ New York Times, April 18, 2008. p. A5. 12 Anne Gearan, ―U.S. official: North Korea has agreed to intensive US verification of its plutonium production,‖ Associated Press, June 26, 2008. 13 Missy Ryan, ―Slim trade impact seen in US move on N.Korea sanctions,‖ Reuters, June 26, 2008. 14 U.S. Treasury Department, Calendar Year 2006 Fifteenth Annual Report to the Congress on Assets in the United States of Terrorist Countries and International Terrorism Program Designees, September 2007. 15 ―N Korea wants normalized relations with the US,‖ Dong-A Ilbo (Seoul, internet), June 6, 2008. 16 Glenn Kessler, ―Far reaching U.S. plan impaired N. Korea deal; demands began to undo nuclear accord,‖ Washington Post, September 26, 2008, p. A20. 17 Glenn Kessler, ―Far-reaching U.S. plan impaired N.Korea deal; demands began to undo nuclear accord,‖ Washington Post, September 26, 2008, p. A20. 18 Special briefing by State Department spokesman, Sean McCormack, M2 Presswire, October 11, 2008. 19 Ibid. 20 ―N. Korea rejects contentions it is delaying denuclearization,‖ Kyodo News, November 12, 2008. ―NKorea will not let nuclear samples out of country,‖ Reuters, November 12, 2008. 21 ―N. Korea proposes military talks with U.S.,‖ Kyodo News, October 5, 2008. ―Jin Dae-woong: N.K. delivered U.S. Ultimatum on Nuke Dispute,‖ Korea Herald (internet), October 7, 2008. 22 Naoko Aoki and Kakumi Kobayashi, ―6-way delegates fall short of North Korea nuke verification protocol,‖ Kyodo News, December 11, 2008. Jin Dae-woong, ―Nuke talks zero in on China‘s draft protocol,‖ Korea Herald Online, December 10, 2008. 23 ―Kim Jong Il suffering convulsions,‖ Chosun Ilbo (internet), September 12, 2008. Yi Songchu, ―The truth behind rumors about Kim Jong-il‘s illnesses—health rapidly deteriorated due to bad heart and lungs,‖ Tong-A Ilbo (internet), January 19, 2004. Katsuhiro Kuroda, ―General Secretary Kim Jong-il speculated to have received health checkups in Beijing,‖ Sankei Shimbun (internet), January 2006. 24 ―N.Korea ‗to be led by Kim Jong-il‘s brother-in-law,‘‖ Chosun.com, January 15, 2009. Selig Harrison, ―Living with a nuclear North Korea,‖ Washington Post, February 17, 2009, p. A13. While visiting Pyongyang in January 2009, Harrison cited ―informed sources‖ who told him that Kim Jong-il still made key decisions but that he has turned over day-to-day authority in domestic affairs to Chang Song-taek and control over national security to the National Defense Commission.‖ 25 ―NKorea leader‘s son to join top military body,‖ Dow Jones International News, April 26, 2009. 26 Korean Central Broadcasting Station, April 18, 2009. The General Staff declared that ―our army from the beginning had no expectation for the six-party talks‖ and that the North Korean military now was ―not being confined by the agreement of six-party talks.‖ The military, in the future, ―will advance on a road of reinforcing the country‘s defense power,

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including nuclear deterrent, in every way.‖ The General Staff statement did not mention Kim Jong-il. 27 ―Turning back the clock: attempts to reclaim control in North Korea after 2004,‖ presentation by Andrei Lankov, Korean historian, at the U.S.-Korea Institute At SAIS, February 11, 2009. ―An Yong-hyon, DPRK markets that even Kim Jong Il cannot hold in check,‖ Chosun.com, January 17, 2009. 28 North Korea‘s reservations about the six party talks may have increased in 2008 because Japan and South Korea became more assertive in demanding that North Korea agree to allow inspectors to take samples of nuclear materials at Yongbyon. 29 Colum Lynch and Glenn Kessler, ―U.S. looks to balance response to N. Korea,‖ Washington Post, April 16, 2009, p. A3. Kim Hyun, ―N. Korea forces U.S. to choose between dialogue or collapse of nuclear talks: analysts,‖ Yonhap News Agency, April 14, 2009. 30 ―DPRK Foreign Ministry‘s spokesman dismisses U.S. wrong assertion,‖ Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), January 17, 2009. ―DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman‘s press statement on denuclearization of Korean peninsula,‖ KCNA, February 5, 2009. 31 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Selig S. Harrison reports on his trip to Pyongyang, February 4, 2009. 32 Selig S. Harrison, Living with a nuclear North Korea, Washington Post, February 17, 2009, p. A13. Siegfried S. Hecker, From Pyongyang to Tehran, with nukes, The New ForeignPolicy.com, May 26, 2009. 33 Choe Sang-hun, ―Tensions rise on Korean peninsula,‖ New York Times (internet), January 19, 2009. 34 ―DPRK‘s principled stand on denuclearization of Korean peninsula,‖ KCNA, February 2, 2009. Statement by the General Staff of the Korean People‘s Army, KCNA, February 2, 2009. ―DPRK Foreign Ministry‘s spokesman dismisses U.S. wrong assertion,‖ January 16, 2009. 35 Selig A. Harrison, ―Living with a nuclear North Korea,‖ Washington Post, February 17, 2009, p. A13. According to Harrison, North Korean officials in Pyongyang went into detail with him over future negotiations over a dismantlement of Yongbyon. 36 Ibid. 37 For a hint of this North Korean position, see the January 2, 2009, article in Choson Sinbo, a North Korean newspaper in Japan. Choson Sinbo noted that ―there was no immediate change in the conditions of [North Korean] international economic activities‖ after the removal from the U.S. terrorism support list and that the removal constituted ―a first step toward a [U.S.] policy shift.‖ 38 Jack Prichard, former State Department official who dealt with North Korea issues during the Clinton and Bush Administrations, proposed that the Obama Administration by-pass future negotiations over Yongbyon and focus its negotiating strategy, instead, on North Korea‘s nuclear weapons capabilities, atomic bombs and the plutonium stockpile. See Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard, ―The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Future of North Korea.‖ Presented at the Seoul-Washington Forum conference, April 16-17, 2009. 39 ―Clinton reaffirms pledge for N. Korea‘s nuclear dismantlement,‖ Asia Pulse, February 18, 2009. 40 Helene Cooper, ―Past deals by N.Korea may face less study,‖ New York Times, April 18, 2008, p. A5. Anne Gearan, ―U.S. official: North Korea has agreed to intensive US verification of its plutonium production,‖ Associated Press, June 26, 2008. 41 Nicholas Kralev, ―U.S. urges monitoring flow of nuclear materials,‖ Washington Times, February 26, 2008, p. A1. 42 Albright, David and O‘Neill, Kevin. Solving the North Korean nuclear puzzle. Washington, DC, Institute for Science and International Security Press, 2000. pp. 57-82. 43 Kim Min-cheol. ―Hwang tells of secret nuke program.‖ Choson Ilbo (Seoul, internet version), July 5, 2003.

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39

Pincus, Walter. ―N. Korea‘s nuclear plans were no secret.‖ Washington Post, February 1, 2003. p. A1. 45 CIA unclassified point paper distributed to Congress, November 19, 2002. 46 Kessler, Glenn. ―New doubts on nuclear efforts by North Korea.‖ Washington Post, March 1, 2007. p. A1. 47 ―ROK source views CIA report on DPRK production of plutonium.‖ Chungang Ilbo (internet version), February 25, 2001. Gertz, Bill. ―Pyongyang‘s launch met by indifference.‖ Washington Times, May 16, 1999. p. C1. 48 Sara A. Carter and Bill Gertz, ―Intelligence on Syria delayed to avoid fight,‖ Washington Times, April 25, 2008, p. A1. 49 David E. Sanger, ―Bush Administration released images to bolster its claims about Syrian reactor,‖ New York Times, April 25, 2008, p. A1. 50 Robin Wright, ―N. Koreans taped at Syrian reactor,‖ Washington Post, April 24, 2008, p. A. 1. 51 ―U.S. called N. Korea‘s bluff over Syria,‖ Chosun Ilbo (internet), April 1, 2008. 52 ―N.Koreans killed in Syria during Israeli raid,‖ Chosun Ilbo (internet), April 29, 2008. ―N. Koreans may have died in Israel raid in Syria—NHK,‖ Reuters, April 28, 2008. 53 Nicholas Kralev and Sara A. Carter, ―Syria‘s nuke facility was nearly finished,‖ Washington Times, April 24, 2008, p. A1. Robin Wright, ―N. Koreans taped at Syrian reactor,‖ Washington Post, April 24, 2008, p. A1. 54 ―Asad‘s risky nuclear game,‖ Spiegel Online, June 23, 2008. 55 Takashi Arimoto, ―Reprocessing facility of bombed nuclear base in Iran; intimate ties between Syria and North Korea,‖ Sankei Shimbun (internet), September 12, 2008. 56 Takashi Arimoto, ―Iran involved in nuclear program: trilateral cooperation of Syria, Iran, North Korea,‖ Sankei Shimbun (internet), July 12, 2008. 57 Jin Dae-woong, ―Concerns grow over missile links between N. Korea, Iran,‖ Korea Herald (internet), January 28, 2007. ―UK press: North Korea aids Iran in nuclear testing,‖ Dow Jones International News, January 24, 2007. ―Israel PM to charge NKorea link with Iran, Syria,‖ Agence France Presse, February 26, 2008. 58 U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism, October 25, 2007. 59 ―An Israeli lesson for North Korea?‖ Economist Foreign Report, April 22, 1993, p. 2. See also: ―DPRK reportedly aids Iranian nuclear project,‖ Yonhap News Agency, January 26, 1993. ―DPRK military delegation‘s Iran visit reported,‖ Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network, February 24, 1994. 60 ―U.S. report on DPRK-Iran missile deal cited,‖ Yonhap News Agency, July 16, 1993. The $500 million figure also was cited in: ―Iran funds North Korea‘s drive to build nuclear bombs,‖ U.S. News and World Report, March 29, 1993, p. 18. 61 Con Coughlin, ―China, N. Korea send experts to hone Iran‘s long-range missiles,‖ London Daily Telegraph, November 23, 1997, p. A5. Bill Gertz, ―North Korea send missile parts technology to Iran,‖ Washington Times, April 18, 2001, p. A3. 62 Douglas Frantz, ―Iran closes in on ability to build a nuclear bomb; Tehran‘s reactor program masks strides toward a weapons capability, a Times investigation finds,‖ Los Angeles Times, August 4, 2003, p. A1. ―Military source: DPRK, Iran planning joint development of nuclear warheads,‖ Sankei Shimbun (internet version), August 6, 2003. 63 ―Iranian nuke experts visited N. Korea this year,‖ Kyodo World Service, June 10, 2003. Douglas Frantz, ―Iran closes in on ability to build a nuclear bomb,‖ Los Angeles Times, August 4, 2003, p. A1. ―Military source: DPRK, Iran planning joint development of nuclear warheads,‖ Sankei Shimbun (internet), August 6, 2003. 64 ―Mullahs helping Stalinists,‖ Der Spiegel (internet), November 28, 2005. 65 Dafna Linzer, ―Strong leads and dead ends in nuclear case against Iran,‖ Washington Post, February 8, 2006, p. AO1. 66 Louis Charbonneau, ―Iran said to step up plans for Shahab missiles,‖ Reuters, March 6, 2006.

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David E. Sanger, ―Nuclear agency says Iran has used new technology,‖ New York Times, February 23, 2008, p. A3. Mark Heinrich, ―IAEA shows photos alleging Iran nuclear missile work,‖ Reuters, September 16, 2008. 68 ―Iran still developing nuclear warheads: exiled opposition group,‖ Agence France Presse, February 20, 2008. Marc Champion, ―Iran arms claim is lodged—Tehran is developing nuclear warheads, exile group tells U.N.,‖ Wall Street Journal Asia, February 21, 2008, p. 9. Koki Mirua, ―Anti-Iranian government organ points to ‗DPRK‘s cooperation in Iran‘s nuclear development,‘‖ Tokyo Shimbun (internet), September 24, 2008. 69 Takashi Arimoto, North Korea cooperates in Iran‘s satellite launch, secretly linked to development of long-range ballistic missiles, Sankei Shimbun Online, March 2, 2009. 70 ―Nukes too deep to hit.‖ Newsweek, November 3, 2008, p. 8, 10. 71 Robin Hughes, ―Tehran takes steps to protect nuclear facilities,‖ Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 25, 2006, p. 4-5. 72 Takashi Arimoto, ―Iranian delegation makes top secret visit to North Korea in late February; for discussions on nuclear issue?‖ Sankei Shimbun (internet), March 20, 2008. ―Iran involved in nuclear program: trilateral cooperation of Syria, Iran, North Korea,‖ Sankei Shimbun (internet), July 12, 2008. 73 ―Factbox—a look at North Korea‘s missile arsenal,‖ Reuters News, March 28, 2008. 74 Jae-soon Chang, ―SKorea: NKorea has deployed new ballistic missile,‖ Associated Press, February 23, 2009. 75 ―An expert is amazed by the targeting accuracy: an exclusive report based on complete data on the landing points of North Korean missiles,‖ Yomiuri Weekly (Tokyo) in Japanese, August 6, 2006. p. 22-23. 76 Pamela Hess, ―Pentagon official calls missile test a failure,‖ Washington Times, April 7, 2009, p. A11. 77 Ibid. ―N. Korea satellite launch fails,‖ Chosun Ilbo (online), April 6, 2009. 78 ―NKorea‘s rocket launch was a failure: analysts,‖ Agence France Presse, April 6, 2009. William J. Broad, ―Korean missile was a failure, trackers say,‖ New York Times, April 6, 2009, p. 1. 79 Sanger, David E. ―North Korea‘s bomb: untested but ready, C.I.A. concludes,‖ New York Times, November 9, 2003. p. 4. 80 Edith M. Lederer, ―Fuel for speculation; reactor shutdown seen as N. Korean nuke source,‖ Washington Times, January 10, 1994, p. 1. David Albright, ―North Korean Plutonium Production.‖ ISIS Paper, 1994, p. 10-13. 81 Kang Chan-ho. ―Former USFK commander: transfer of wartime control should not be carried out overnight,‖ Joong Ang Ilbo (Seoul), April 3, 2006. p. 13. 82 Kessler, Glenn. ―N. Korea nuclear estimate to rise,‖ Washington Post, April 28, 2004. p. A1. ―U.S. Expert says N. Korea has plutonium to make 8 bombs,‖ Yonhap News Agency, January 2, 2006. 83 David Albright and Paul Brannan, ―The North Korean Plutonium Stock,‖ Institute for Science and International Security, February 20, 2007. 84 Cloud, David S. and Sanger, David E. ―U.S. aide sees arms advance by North Korea,‖ New York Times, April 29, 2005. p. A1. Morgan, David. ―U.S. not certain North Korea has nuclear weapons,‖ Reuters, February 28, 2005. 85 Kessler, ―N. Korea nuclear estimate to rise,‖ Washington Post, April 28, 2004. p. A1. 86 Albright and Hinderstein, Dismantling the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, pp. 35-3 6. 87 ―Parties concur N.K. has HEU material, but disagree on program‘s progress: Hill,‖ Yonhap News Agency, September 29, 2005.

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Chapter 3

NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS: TECHNICAL ISSUES Mary Beth Nikitin

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SUMMARY This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program—including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates—and assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization. Beginning in late 2002, North Korea ended an eight-year freeze on its plutonium production program, expelled international inspectors, and restarted facilities. North Korea may have produced enough additional plutonium for five nuclear warheads between 2002 and 2007. In total, it is estimated that North Korea has up to 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons. While North Korea‘s weapons program has been plutonium-based from the start, in the last decade, intelligence has emerged pointing to a second route to a bomb using highly enriched uranium. However, the scope and success of this program may be limited, and North Korea says it does not have a uranium enrichment program. On February 10, 2005, North Korea announced that it had manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defense and that it would bolster its nuclear weapons arsenal. In September 2005, members of the Six Party Talks (United States, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and North Korea) issued a Joint Statement

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on the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test, with a yield of less than 1 kiloton. The United States and other countries condemned the test, and the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1718 on October 14, 2006, which requires North Korea to (1) refrain from nuclear or missile tests, (2) rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and (3) abandon its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. On February 13, 2007, North Korea and the other members of the Six-Party Talks agreed on steps for phased implementation of the 2005 denuclearization agreement. Phase 1 included the shut-down of plutonium production at the Yongbyon nuclear complex in exchange for an initial heavy fuel oil shipment to North Korea. Under phase 2, steps include disablement of plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon and a ―complete and correct‖ declaration of DPRK nuclear activities, in exchange for delivery of energy assistance and removal of certain U.S. sanctions. The declaration was submitted in June 2008. Thereafter, President Bush removed North Korea from the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) list and notified Congress of his intent to lift the State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) designation after North Korea agreed to verification provisions. North Korea did not accept initial U.S. verification proposals, and in September 2008, threatened to restart reprocessing plutonium. U.S. officials announced a verbal bilateral agreement on verification in October 2008, and the Bush administration removed North Korea from the SST List. North Korea soon after said that it had not agreed to sampling at nuclear sites, a key element for future verification of plutonium production. North Korea‘s failed satellite launch on April 5, 2009, which used ballistic missile-related technology, led to U.N. Security Council condemnation. In response, North Korea said it would abandon the Six-Party Talks and restart its nuclear facilities, and asked international and U.S. inspectors to leave the country. Although progress had been made in disabling North Korea‘s plutonium production, these steps can be reversed. The reprocessing facility at Yongbyon would take months to restart. Other facilities at Yongbyon may take longer to restore. Little detailed open-source information is available about the DPRK‘s nuclear weapons production capabilities and warhead sophistication, or the extent of a uranium enrichment program and proliferation activities. North Korea claimed it tested a nuclear weapon on May 25, 2009, which is estimated as larger than the 2006 blast, but still modest. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

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As of the end of April 2009, the Obama Administration was undertaking a review of policy toward North Korea, including the Six Party Talks. It is expected that the Obama administration will continue the Six Party format, but may also pursue bilateral discussions to resolve the current stalemate. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her first press conference as Secretary called the Six Party Talks ―essential.‖ In her confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 13, 2009, Secretary Clinton said that while she was reviewing the negotiations record to date, the goal was to end both the plutonium reprocessing program and the highly enriched uranium program if it exists, and to end North Korean proliferation to others. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates offered his assessment in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in late January: On North Korea, the Six-Party Talks have been critical in producing some forward momentum—especially with respect to North Korea‘s plutonium production—although I don‘t think anyone can claim to be completely satisfied with the results so far. These talks do offer a way to curtail and hopefully eliminate its capacity to produce more plutonium or to enrich uranium, and reduce the likelihood of proliferation. Our goal remains denuclearization, but it is still to be seen whether North Korea is willing to give up its nuclear ambitions entirely.1

Speculation continued in early 2009 on Kim Jong Il‘s health, the extent of succession planning, the power of the military and the seriousness with which the DPRK takes its early denuclearization promises. The Chinese media reported in late January that Kim Jong Il had told a Chinese envoy that he was committed to denuclearization and the Six Party process. However, North Korea also announced a break in agreements with the South and that it would never unilaterally disarm.2 Disablement work continued at the Yongbyon complex through early April 2009, and at that time involved the removal of fuel rods from the reactor at Yongbyon. North Korea‘s failed satellite launch on April 5, 2009, which used ballistic missile-related technology, led to U.N. Security Council condemnation. In response, North Korea said it would abandon the Six-Party Talks and restart its nuclear facilities, and asked international and U.S. inspectors to leave the country immediately. The DPRK informed the IAEA that it has ―decided to reactivate all facilities and go ahead with the reprocessing of spent fuel.‖3 North Korean officials have also threatened to conduct another nuclear test, build a light-water reactor, and ―start the technological development for

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ensuring self-production of nuclear fuel,‖ which may be a reference to a uranium enrichment program.4 On May 25, 2009, North Korea announced it had conducted a second nuclear test. U.S. monitors registered an underground blast near the previous nuclear testing site as 4.5 on the Richter scale. Kiloton yield and radiation release (which would confirm it was a nuclear event) are still to be determined.

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BACKGROUND In the early 1980s, U.S. satellites tracked a growing indigenous nuclear program in North Korea. The North Korean nuclear program began in the late 1950s with cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union on a nuclear research program near Yongbyon. Its first research reactor began operation in 1967. North Korea used indigenous expertise and foreign procurements to build a small nuclear reactor at Yongbyon (5MWe). It was capable of producing about 6 kilograms (Kg) of plutonium per year and began operating in 1986.5 Later that year, U.S. satellites detected high explosives testing and a new plant to separate plutonium from the reactor‘s spent fuel. In addition, construction of two larger reactors (50MWe at Yongbyon and 200MWe at Taechon) added evidence of a serious clandestine effort. Although North Korea had joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 under Soviet pressure, safeguards inspections began only in 1992, raising questions about how much plutonium North Korea had produced covertly. In 1994, North Korea pledged, under the Agreed Framework with the United States, to freeze its plutonium programs and eventually dismantle them in return for several kinds of assistance.6 At that time, western intelligence agencies estimated that North Korea had separated enough plutonium for one or two bombs. North Korea complied with the Agreed Framework, allowing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seals—including the ―canning‖ of spent fuel rods at the Yongbyon reactor—and permanent remote monitoring and inspectors at its nuclear facilities. When in 2002, U.S. negotiators reportedly presented North Korean officials with evidence of a clandestine uranium enrichment program, the North Korean officials reportedly at first confirmed this, then denied it publicly. The conflict quickly led to the breakdown of the Agreed Framework. The Bush Administration argued that North Korea was in ―material breach‖ of its obligations and, after agreement with South Korea, Japan, and the EU (the

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other members of the Korean Economic Development Organization, or KEDO), stopped the next shipment of heavy fuel oil.7 In response, North Korea kicked out international monitors, broke the seals at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, and restarted its reactor and reprocessing plant after an eight-year freeze. Members of the Six-Party Talks—the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and North Korea—began meeting in August 2003 to try and resolve the crisis. In September 2005, the Six Parties issued a Joint Statement on how to achieve verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which formed the basis for future agreements.8 Negotiations broke down, and North Korea tested a nuclear device in October 2006. On February 13, 2007, North Korea reached an agreement with other members of the Six-Party Talks to begin the initial phase (60 days) of implementing the Joint Statement from September 2005 on denuclearization. Phase 1 of this agreement included the shut-down of plutonium production at the Yongbyon nuclear complex in exchange for an initial heavy fuel oil shipment to North Korea. Phase 2 steps include the disablement of facilities at Yongbyon and a ―complete and correct‖ declaration of DPRK nuclear activities, in exchange for deliver of heavy fuel oil and equivalent, and removal of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) and State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) designations. Still in the second phase of this plan, the United States is working with North Korea to disable key facilities. The U.S. provides funding and technical assistance for disablement activities, and the energy assistance is divided evenly between the Six Parties. North Korea submitted a declaration of its past plutonium production activities in June 2008 as agreed in an October 3, 2007, joint statement on ―Second-Phase Actions.‖9 Thereafter, President Bush removed North Korea from the TWEA list and notified Congress of his intent to lift the SST designation after North Korea agreed to verification provisions. North Korea did not accept initial U.S. verification proposals, and in September 2008, threatened to restart reprocessing plutonium. U.S. officials announced a bilateral agreement on verification in October 2008, and the Bush administration removed North Korea from the SST List. The agreement was verbal, and North Korea then said that it had not agreed to sampling at nuclear sites, a key element in verifying past plutonium production. The Six Parties met in December 2008, but did not reach agreement on verification measures. Disablement activities at Yongbyon and delivery of energy assistance are still in under way. The February 2007 Denuclearization Action Plan does not address any uranium enrichment- related activities or the dismantlement of warheads and

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instead focuses on shutting down and disabling the key plutonium production facilities. A third phase, to begin after disablement is complete and a declaration is accepted by the Six Parties, is to deal with all aspects of North Korea‘s nuclear program, including weapons, using North Korea‘s declaration as a basis for future action. Understanding the scope of the program and the weapons capability will require transparency and careful verification for the pledged ―complete, verifiable, irreversible‖ disarmament to be achieved.

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WEAPONS PRODUCTION MILESTONES Acquiring fissile material—plutonium-239 or highly enriched uranium (HEU)—is the key hurdle in nuclear weapons development.10 Producing these two materials is technically challenging; in comparison, many experts believe weaponization to be relatively easy.11 North Korea has industrial-scale uranium mining and plants for milling, refining, and converting uranium; it also has a fuel fabrication plant, a nuclear reactor, and a reprocessing plant—in short, everything needed to produce Pu-239. In its nuclear reactor, North Korea uses magnox fuel—natural uranium (>99%U-238) metal, wrapped in magnesium-alloy cladding. About 8,000 fuel rods constitute a fuel core for the reactor. When irradiated in a reactor, natural uranium fuel absorbs a neutron and then decays into plutonium (Pu-239). Fuel that remains in the reactor for a long time becomes contaminated by the isotope Pu-240, which can ―poison‖ the functioning of a nuclear weapon.12 Spent or irradiated fuel, which poses radiological hazards, must cool after removal from the reactor. The cooling phase, estimated by some at five months, is proportional to the fuel burn-up. Reprocessing to separate plutonium from waste products and uranium is the next step. North Korea uses a PUREX separation process, like the United States. After shearing off the fuel cladding, the fuel is dissolved in nitric acid. Components (plutonium, uranium, waste) of the fuel are separated into different streams using organic solvents. In small quantities, separation can be done in hot cells, but larger quantities require significant shielding to prevent deadly exposure to radiation.13 North Korea appears to have mastered the engineering requirements of plutonium production. It has operated its nuclear reactor, is believed to have separated Pu from the spent fuel, and has reportedly taken steps toward weaponization. In January 2004, North Korean officials showed an unofficial U.S. delegation alloyed ―scrap‖ from a plutonium (Pu) casting operation.14 Dr.

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Siegfried Hecker, a delegation member, assessed that the stated density of the material was consistent with plutonium alloyed with gallium or aluminum. If so, this could indicate a degree of sophistication in North Korea‘s handling of Pu metal, necessary for weapons production. But without testing the material, Hecker could not confirm that the metal was plutonium or that it was alloyed, or when it was produced.

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Estimating Nuclear Warheads and Stocks Secretary of State Colin Powell in December 2002 stated, ―We now believe [the North Koreans] have a couple of nuclear weapons and have had them for years.‖15 In February 2005, North Korea officially announced that it had ―manufactured nukes for self-defense.‖16 Although North Korea has tested one device, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan has previously said that North Korea possesses multiple bombs and was building more.17 A key factor in assessing how many weapons North Korea can produce is whether North Korea needs to use more or less material than the IAEA standards of 8kg of Pu and 25kg for HEU per weapon.18 The amount of fissile material used in each weapon is determined by the design sophistication. There is no reliable public information on North Korean nuclear weapons design. In all, estimates of North Korea‘s separated plutonium range between 30 and 50 kg, with an approximate 5 to 6 kg of this figure having been used for the October 2006 test.19 This amounts to enough plutonium for approximately five to eight nuclear weapons, assuming 6 kg per weapon. After the test, North Korean could possess plutonium for four to seven nuclear weapons. An unclassified intelligence report to Congress says that ―prior to the test North Korea could have produced up to 50 kg of plutonium, enough for at least a half dozen nuclear weapons‖ and points out that additional plutonium is in the fuel of the Yongbyon reactor.20 Additional questions arise in determining how much plutonium North Korea has produced since 2002 when the IAEA monitors were kicked out of the country and the seals were broken at Yongbyon. A South Korean Defense Ministry white paper from December 2006 estimated that North Korea had made 30 kg of weapons-grade plutonium in the previous three years, potentially enough for five nuclear bombs. It also concurred with U.S. estimates that North Korea‘s total stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium was 50 kg.21

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The accounting issue was further complicated when North Korea reportedly declared a lower number of 37 kg of separated plutonium in its declaration under the Six Party Talks.22 No agreement has been reached on verifying the amount of plutonium stocks through inspections (see discussions on declaration, verification below). In January 2009, an American scholar who had visited Pyongyang said the North Koreans told him that 30.8 kg amount had been ―weaponized,‖ possibly meaning that the separated plutonium might now be in warheads. The DPRK officials also told him that they would not allow for warheads to be inspected.23

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Plutonium Production Estimates of plutonium production depend on a variety of technical factors, including the average power level of the reactor, days of operation, how much of the fuel is reprocessed and how quickly, and how much plutonium is lost in production processes. North Korean officials claimed to have separated plutonium in hot cells as early as 1975 and tested the reprocessing plant in 1990. North Korea‘s 5MWe nuclear reactor at Yongbyon operated from 1986 to 1994. It is estimated that North Korea produced and separated no more than 10 kg of plutonium prior to 1994.24 Its plutonium production program was then frozen between 1994 and 2003 under the Agreed Framework. When this agreement was abandoned, North Korea restarted plutonium production at Yongbyon. On February 6, 2003, North Korean officials announced that the 5MWe reactor was operating, and commercial satellite photography confirmed activity in March. In January 2004, North Korean officials told an unofficial U.S. delegation that the reactor was operating smoothly at 100% of its rated power. The U.S. visitors noted that the display in the reactor control room and steam plumes from the cooling towers confirmed operation, but that there was no way of knowing how it had operated over the last year.25 The same delegation reported that the reprocessing ―facility appeared in good repair,‖ in contrast to a 1992 IAEA assessment of the reprocessing plant as ―extremely primitive.‖ According to North Korean officials in January 2004, the reprocessing plant‘s annual throughput is 110 tons of spent fuel, about twice the fuel load of the 5MWe reactor. Officials claimed to have reprocessed all 8,000 fuel rods from the 5MWe reactor between January and June 2003.26 Reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods would yield between 25 and 30kg of plutonium, perhaps for four to six weapons, but the exact amount of

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plutonium that might have been reprocessed is unknown. In 2004, North Korean officials stated that the reprocessing campaign was conducted continuously (in four six- hour shifts). In April 2005, the 5MWe reactor was shut down, this time to harvest fuel rods for weapons.27 The reactor resumed operations in June 2005.28 One estimate is that the reactor held between 10 and 15 kg of Pu in April 2005, and that North Korea could have reprocessed all the fuel rods by mid- 2006. From August 2005 to 2006, the reactor could have produced another 6 kg of Pu. In total, North Korea could have reprocessed enough separated plutonium for another three weapons (in addition to the estimated 4-6 bomb-worth from reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods).29 The 5MWe reactor was again shut down in July 2007, when the IAEA installed containment and surveillance measures and radiation monitoring devices.30 The IAEA was asked to remove the equipment and leave the site in April 2009. No construction has occurred at the 50MWe reactor at Yongbyon or at the 200MWe Taechon reactor since 2002.31 They were years from completion when construction was halted. U.S. visitors in January 2004 saw heavy corrosion and cracks in concrete building structures at Yongbyon, reporting that the reactor building ―looks in a terrible state of repair.‖32 The CIA estimated that the two reactors could generate about 275kg of plutonium per year if they were operating.33 Dr. Hecker estimated that if the 50MWe reactor was functioning, it would mean a tenfold increase in North Korea‘s plutonium production.34 North Korea agreed to halt work on reactors as part of the Six Party Talks. From July 2007 to April 2009, when inspectors were asked to leave, the IAEA was monitoring to ensure that no further construction took place at these sites. Significant future growth in North Korea‘s arsenal would be possible only if the two larger reactors were completed and operating, and would depend on progress in the reported uranium enrichment program. However, even when the reprocessing facility was shut down, North Korea could have built additional warheads with existing separated plutonium because North Korea‘s plutonium stocks were not under IAEA safeguards.

A Uranium Enrichment Program? While North Korea‘s weapons program has been plutonium-based from the start, in the last decade, intelligence has emerged pointing to a second route to a bomb using highly enriched uranium. There is some certainty that

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North Korea has parts and plans for such a program, and less certainty over how far this program has developed. The issue has been central to negotiations since October 2002, when the Bush Administration accused North Korea of having a clandestine uranium enrichment program. U.S. lead negotiator James Kelly told North Korean First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok-chu that the United States had evidence of a uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons in violation of the Agreed Framework and other agreements. James Kelly said that Kang acknowledged the existence of such a program at that meeting. However, Kang later denied this, and Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun said that Kang had told Kelly that North Korea is ―entitled‖ to have such a program or ―an even more powerful one‖ to deter a preemptive U.S. attack.35 A 2002 unclassified CIA working paper on North Korea‘s nuclear weapons and uranium enrichment estimated that North Korea ―is constructing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational— which could be as soon as mid-decade.‖ Such a plant would need to produce more than 50kg of HEU per year, requiring cascades of thousands of centrifuges.36 The paper noted that in 2001, North Korea ―began seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities.‖ Pakistani President Musharraf revealed in his September 2006 memoir, In the Line of Fire, that Abdul Qadeer Khan—chief scientist in Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons program who proliferated nuclear weapons technology for profit—‖transferred nearly two dozen P-1 and P-2 centrifuges to North Korea. He also provided North Korea with a flow meter, some special oils for centrifuges, and coaching on centrifuge technology, including visits to top-secret centrifuge plants.‖37 However, the United States has not been able to get direct confirmation from Khan. According to press reports, North Korea said it had imported 150 tons of high-strength aluminum tubes from Russia that could be used in a uranium enrichment program.38 Questions have been raised about whether the 2002 estimates were accurate.39 In a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 27, 2007, Joseph DeTrani, the mission manager for North Korea from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and former chief negotiator for the Six Party Talks, was asked by Senator Jack Reed whether he had ―any further indication of whether that program has progressed in the last six years, one; or two, the evidence—the credibility of the evidence that we had initially, suggesting they had a program rather than aspirations?‖ DeTrani responded that ―the assessment was with high confidence that, indeed, they were making acquisitions necessary for, if you will, a production-scale program. And we still have confidence that the program is in existence—at the

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mid-confidence level.‖ In a clarification of his response, DeTrani issued a DNI press release that said there was a high level of confidence in 2002 that North Korea had a uranium enrichment program, and ―at least moderate confidence that North Korea‘s past efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability continue today.‖40 Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said in February 2007 that the United States is not sure if North Korea has mastered ―some considerable production techniques,‖ although they have acquired some technology for an enrichment program.41 A DNI unclassified report of August 2007 stated,

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We continue to assess with high confidence that North Korea has pursued efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability, which we assess is intended for nuclear weapons. All Intelligence Community agencies judge with at least moderate confidence that this past effort continues. The degree of progress towards producing enriched uranium remains unknown, however.42

In testimony to Congress on February 2008, Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell confirmed this assessment. The confidence level of these assessments may have changed because of a decrease in international procurement by North Korea. Uranium enrichment-related imports would be more easily detected by intelligence agencies than activities inside North Korea itself. Uranium enrichment facilities can be hidden from aerial surveillance more easily than plutonium facilities, making it more difficult for intelligence agencies to even detect—thus, ―degree of progress‖ in turning the equipment into a working enrichment program is ―unknown.‖ Furthermore, there are significant differences between assembling a smallscale centrifuge enrichment program and operating a large-scale production plant, and reportedly little evidence of procurement for a large-scale plant has emerged.43 Dr. Siegfried Hecker has assessed that it is ―highly likely that North Korea had a research and development uranium enrichment effort, but there is little indication that they were able to bring it to industrial scale.‖44 North Korea reportedly continues to deny the existence of a highly enriched uranium program for weapons. In 2007, North Korea gave the United States a sample of the aluminum tubing in an effort to prove that it never intended to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons, and that the imported materials were for conventional weapons or dual-use projects. However, when U.S. scientists analyzed the aluminum tubing provided as sample ―evidence,‖ they found traces of enriched uranium on the tubing. Analysts argue that in addition to the possibility that this is proof of a North

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Korean uranium enrichment program, it is also possible that the uranium traces could have been on the tubing when North Korea received it.45 In 2008, U.S. personnel found traces of highly-enriched uranium on the documents submitted as part of North Korea‘s nuclear declaration, raising new doubts about the extent of North Korea‘s uranium enrichment program.46 Ambassador Hill told Congress that North Korea included as part of its June 2008 ―declaration package‖ a letter that says that ―they do not now and will not in the future have a highly enriched uranium program.‖47 This issue remains unresolved.

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The October 9, 2006, Nuclear Test48 The U.S. Director of National Intelligence confirmed that North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion on October 9, 2006, in the vicinity of P‘unggye.49 However, the sub-kiloton yield of the test suggests that the weapon design or manufacturing process likely needs improvement.50 North Korea reportedly told China before the test that it expected a yield of 4 kilotons (KT), but seismic data confirmed that the yield was less than 1 KT.51 Radioactive debris indicates that the explosion was a nuclear test, and that a plutonium device was used.52 It is widely believed that the warhead design was an implosion device.53 Uncertainties remain about when the plutonium used for the test was produced and how much plutonium was in the device, although a prominent U.S. nuclear scientist has estimated that North Korea likely used approximately 6 kg of plutonium for the test.54 The test‘s low yield may not have been a failure. Another possibility is that the test‘s low yield was intentional—a sophisticated device designed for a Nodong medium range missile. Alternatively, a low yield could have been intended to avoid radioactive leakage from the test site or to limit the amount of plutonium used.55

The May 25, 2009, Test The DPRK announced on May 25, 2009, that it had successfully conducted another underground nuclear test. An official North Korean news release said that this test was ―on a new higher level in terms of its explosive power and technology of its control and the results of the test helped satisfactorily settle the scientific and technological problems arising in further

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increasing the power of nuclear weapons.‖ This may be a reference to design problems associated with the low yield of the 2006 test. A North Korean official statement had threatened on April 29, 2009, that it would conduct ―nuclear tests‖ to bolster its deterrent.56 The U.S. Geologic Survey registered an underground blast on May 25 with a seismic magnitude of the event as 4.7 on the Richter scale.57 International monitoring stations registered the event as 4.52 on the Richter scale.58 The test was near the 2006 site, close to P‘unggye. The kiloton equivalent yield of the test has yet to be determined. Estimates range from four to 20 kilotons, with most analysts predicting a yield of 5 KT or less.59 The nuclear nature of the test can not be determined until monitoring stations measure radioactivity or gases released from the ground at the site. Additional analysis will also be needed to determine the device‘s design and how much nuclear material was used.

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Delivery Systems Although former Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Lowell Jacoby told the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2005 that North Korea had the capability to arm a missile with a nuclear device, Pentagon officials later backtracked from that assessment. A DNI report to Congress says that ―North Korea has short and medium range missiles that could be fitted with nuclear weapons, but we do not know whether it has in fact done so.‖60 North Korea has several hundred short-range Scud-class and medium range No Dong-class ballistic missiles, and is developing an intermediate range ballistic missile. The Taepo-Dong-2 that was tested unsuccessfully in July 2006 would be able to reach the continental United States if it becomes operational. DNI assessed in 2008 that the Taepo-Dong-2 has the potential capability to deliver a nuclear-weapon-sized payload to the United States, but that absent successful testing the likelihood of this is low.61 A launch of a Taepo-Dong 2 missile as part of a failed satellite launch in April 2009 traveled further than earlier unsuccessful launches but still did not achieve a complete test. It is possible that Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan may have provided North Korea the same Chinese-origin nuclear weapon design he provided to Libya and Iran. Even though that design was for an HEU-based device, it would still help North Korea develop a reliable warhead for ballistic missiles—small, light, and robust enough to tolerate the extreme conditions encountered

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through a ballistic trajectory. Learning more about what is needed for miniaturization of warheads for ballistic missiles could have been the goal of North Korea‘s testing a smaller nuclear device.62

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Doctrine and Intent U.S. officials in their threat assessments have described the North Korean nuclear capabilities as being more for deterrence and coercive diplomacy than for war fighting, and assess that Pyongyang most likely would ―not attempt to use nuclear weapons against U.S. forces or territory unless it perceived the regime to be on the verge of military defeat and risked an irretrievable loss of control.‖63 Statements by North Korean officials emphasize that moves to expand their nuclear arsenal are in response to perceived threats by the United States against the North Korean regime.64 Nuclear weapons also give North Korea leverage in diplomatic negotiations, and threatening rhetoric often coincides with times of crisis or transitions in negotiations. In January 2008, a North Korean media report stated that the country ―will further strengthen our war deterrent capabilities in response to U.S. attempts to initiate nuclear war,‖ to express its displeasure that it had not yet been removed from the U.S. terrorism list.65 Statements from Pyongyang in January 2009 may also be part of a strategy to increase leverage in nuclear talks,66 or could indicate an increasing role for the North Korean military in nuclear policy making.67 A spokesman for North Korea‘s General Staff said on April 18 that the revolutionary armed forces ―will opt for increasing the nation‘s defense capability including nuclear deterrent in every way. ‖68

STEPS TOWARD DENUCLEARIZATION In September 2005, North Korea agreed to abandon ―all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs,‖ but implementation of this goal was stalled.69 The October 9, 2006, nuclear test is seen as a catalyst in uniting the other members of the Six Party Talks to toughen their stance towards North Korea, and as a turning point in Pyongyang‘s attitude. UN Security Council Resolution 1718 calls on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons in a ―complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner.‖70 In February 2007, as part of implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement, North Korea

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committed to disable all nuclear facilities and provide a ―complete and correct‖ declaration of all its nuclear programs.71

Disablement

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The October 2007 Six-Party joint statement said the United States would lead disablement activities and provide the initial funding for those activities.72 Disablement indicates a physical measure to make it difficult to restart operation of a facility while terms are being worked out for its eventual dismantlement. U.S. officials have said that they would prefer a disablement process that would require a 12-month time period to start up the facility again.73 The Six Parties have agreed to 11 discrete steps to disable the three main Yongbyon facilities related to North Korea‘s plutonium program (nuclear fuel fabrication plant, plutonium reprocessing plant, and 5-megawatt experimental nuclear power reactor).74 The disablement process began in early November 2007 and continues today. The most time-consuming step is the removal of the irradiated fuel from the reactor to storage in an adjacent cooling pond.75 A reported eight out of eleven steps that have been completed (see Table 1).76 Table 1. Disablement Steps at Yongbyon, DPRK Step Discharge of 8000 spent fuel rods to the spent fuel pool Removal of control rod drive mechanisms Removal of reactor cooling loop and wooden cooling tower interior structure Disablement of fresh fuel rods

Facility 5-megawatt reactor

Removal and storage of 3 uranium ore concentrate dissolver tanks Removal and storage of 7 uranium conversion furnaces, including storage of refractory bricks and mortar sand

Fuel fabrication facility Fuel fabrication facility

Removal and storage of both metal casting furnaces and vacuum system, and removal and storage of 8 machining lathes

Fuel fabrication facility

5-megawatt reactor 5-megawatt reactor

Fuel fabrication facility

Status On-going: 6,400 completed as of April 2009 To be done after spent fuel removal is completed Tower demolished June 26, 2008

Not agreed to by North Korea; consultations held Jan. 2009 with South Korea possibly purchase Completed Completed

Completed

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Cut cable and remove drive mechanism associated with the receiving hot cell door Cut two of four steam lines into reprocessing facility Removal of drive mechanisms for the fuel cladding shearing and slitting machines Removal of crane and door actuators that permit spent fuel rods to enter the reprocessing

Reprocessing facility

Completed

Reprocessing facility Reprocessing facility

Completed

Reprocessing facility

Completed

Completed

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Source: ―North Korean Disablement Actions,‖ Arms Control Today, October 2008; ―Disablement Actions,‖ National Committee on North Korea website; Siegfried Hecker, ―Denuclearizing North Korea,‖ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2008.

North Korea periodically slowed the pace of spent fuel rod removal at Yongbyon.77 For example, in June 2008, Pyongyang said that while 80% of the disablement steps had been completed, only 36% of energy aid had been delivered.78 North Korea again delayed disablement work in August, September, and October 2008, although those instances appear to be linked to disputes over when the U.S. would remove the DPRK from its State Sponsors of Terrorism List and negotiations over verification measures. After the U.S. removed the SST designation, disablement work resumed in October 2008. The remaining steps to accomplish in disabling the Yongbyon facilities in phase 2 of the Six-Party Talks are completing the removal of the spent fuel rods from the 5 megawatt reactor, removing the control rod drive mechanism (after all rods are removed), and disabling or removing from the country the fresh fuel rods at the site. As of early April 2009, approximately 80% or 6,400 of the 8,000 spent fuel rods had been moved from the reactor to the cooling pond.79 North Korea possesses 2,400 5-MWt fresh fuel rods and 12,000 50-MWt fresh fuel rods in storage at Yongbyon. A technical delegation from South Korea visited the facility in January 2009 to consider possibilities for removing the fuel rods. Another option would be to bend them so they could not be readily used in the reactor.80 It is not clear whether North Korea had agreed to disablement or removal of the fresh fuel.

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Reversing Disablement The extent to which the Yongbyon facilities had been disabled was tested in September 2008 when North Korea halted international monitoring at the reprocessing facility, moved some equipment out of storage, and threatened to begin reprocessing again.81 This temporary reversal was corrected and equipment moved back to storage by November 2008. Taking into account the need to test the facility (e.g., for leaks and cracks in the piping) and introduce chemicals, experts estimate that restarting the reprocessing plant could take approximately six to eight weeks, although this timeline may be shorter since some initial work may have been done in September 2008. It would then take approximately three to four months to reprocess the spent fuel rods now in storage at Yongbyon, resulting in 7 kg to 8 kg of plutonium. This would be enough for at least one nuclear weapon.82 According to reports, disablement was limited to the ―front-end,‖ where spent fuel is loaded, at the reprocessing facility for technical reasons related to the safe disposal of the high-level waste in the facility.83 The North Korean Foreign Ministry said on April 25 that it had restarted its reprocessing facility, but there has been no way to independently verify this. In order to produce additional plutonium, the North Koreans would need to restore their 5-MWt reactor or build a new reactor. Timelines for restoring the 5-MWt reactor are uncertain, although experts estimate between six months and one year. Rebuilding the cooling tower, which was destroyed in June 2008, could take approximately six months, but other venting solutions for the reactor could be possible. Additionally, this aging reactor may be in need of additional parts or repair. The fuel fabrication facility would have to be restored to produce additional fuel. Former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratories, Siegfried Hecker, has said that while significant work is needed to do so, North Korea could restore operations at the 5 megawatt reactor and fuel fabrication facility without foreign equipment or materials, and could do so in approximately six months. After the facilities were operating, they could produce approximately 6 kg of plutonium per year.84 Significant future growth in North Korea‘s arsenal would be possible only if larger reactors were completed and operating, and would also depend on any progress in the reported uranium enrichment program. Declaration The required content of a ―complete and correct‖ declaration has evolved over time. Bush administration officials in fall 2007 said they expected the

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declaration to include a full declaration of the separated weapons-grade plutonium that has already been produced, as well as full disclosure of uranium enrichment activities.85 The North Korean Foreign Ministry said on January 4, 2008 that it had notified the United States of the content of its declaration in November 2007. However, Assistant Secretary Hill said that the two sides had discussed what was expected to be in a declaration, and ―it was clearly not a complete and correct declaration.‖86 At that time, North Korea reportedly suggested it would declare 30 kg of separated plutonium in its declaration, a lower number than U.S. officials have alluded to (see above) but in the range of some analyses.87 The United States has said that ―materials, facilities and programs‖ need to be included in a declaration. In addition to plutonium stocks, North Korea agreed to ―address concerns about a uranium enrichment program but denies that it has one‖ (see below). Other outstanding issues are nuclear proliferation activities and warhead information. North Korea has said it would not include warhead information at this stage. Once the original December 31 deadline for submission of the declaration had passed, U.S. officials emphasized that the completeness of the document was more important than its timing. U.S. officials also made statements in early 2008 that removal from sanctions lists would only happen after a complete declaration was submitted to the six parties. According to press reports,88 at a bilateral meeting in Singapore in April 2008, the United States and North Korea agreed to a formulation in which North Korea would include its plutonium production activities in a formal declaration, and the enrichment and proliferation issues would be dealt with separately in a secret side agreement in which North Korea would ―acknowledge‖ the U.S. concerns over North Korean proliferation to Syria without confirming or denying them. This agreement is also supposed to have included a pledge by North Korea that it would not engage in any future nuclear proliferation. Administration officials in spring 2008 emphasized that ending plutonium production and tallying the plutonium stockpile were the highest priorities. However, concerns were raised in the Congress and elsewhere by those skeptical of this approach, with some observers wanting assurance that the North Korean declaration of its plutonium stockpile would be adequately verified before the United States removed them from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List. On May 8, 2008, North Korean officials gave State Department Korean Affairs Director Sung Kim approximately 19,000 pages of documentation related to its nuclear program. According to a State Department fact sheet, the documents consist of operating records for the five-megawatt reactor

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[5-MW(e)] and fuel reprocessing plant at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, dating back to 1986. They reportedly include reactor operations and information on all three reprocessing campaigns undertaken by North Korea.89 As referenced above, press reports indicated that U.S. personnel had found traces of highly-enriched uranium on these documents, raising new doubts about the extent of North Korea‘s uranium enrichment program at a sensitive juncture in the negotiations.90 On June 26, 2008, North Korea submitted a declaration of its nuclear programs to China, the Chair of the Denuclearization Working Group. Ambassador Christopher Hill said in testimony to Congress that the ―declaration package‖ addresses ―its plutonium program, and acknowledged our concerns about the DPRK‘s uranium enrichment and nuclear proliferation activities, specifically with regard to Syria.‖91 Press reports have said that North Korea submitted a list of nuclear sites and declared 37 kg of plutonium in the 60-page document. The confidential message acknowledging U.S. concerns about uranium enrichment and proliferation activities was received days earlier.92 In response, also on June 26, 2008, President Bush announced that the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) would no longer apply to North Korea and notified Congress of his intent to remove North Korea‘s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) after the required 45-day wait period.93 The day after the declaration was submitted the U.S. assisted North Korea in destroying the cooling tower at the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon. Subsequent verification issues are discussed below.

Verification IAEA inspectors returned to North Korea in July 2007 to monitor and verify the shut-down, install seals, and monitor facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, and had a continuous presence there until mid-April 2009.94 In his September 10, 2007, statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, Director General Mohamed ElBaradei stated that the IAEA was able to verify the shutdown of nuclear facilities, including the nuclear fuel fabrication plant, radio-chemical laboratory (reprocessing plant), and the 5MWe experimental nuclear power reactor. Inspectors were also monitoring the halt in construction of the 50-megawatt nuclear power plant at Yongbyon and the 200-megawatt nuclear power plant in Taechon.95 The United States has contributed $1.8 million as the U.S. voluntary contribution and Japan has contributed $500,000 to the IAEA for their work in North Korea.96 In the future, the IAEA may be

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called on to investigate North Korea‘s past nuclear program in addition to monitoring activities; however, to date, its role has been limited to monitoring the shut-down of Yongbyon facilities. The IAEA‘s role in disablement and future dismantlement efforts has yet to be clearly determined. Some analysts recommend an observer role for the IAEA during disablement steps and continued IAEA monitoring to boost international confidence in the process.97 The United States and North Korea reportedly agreed on an ―consultative and support‖ role for the IAEA in future verification in October 2008.98 After IAEA inspectors were expelled from North Korea in 2002, information about North Korea‘s nuclear weapons production depended on remote monitoring and defector information, with mixed results. Satellite images correctly indicated the start-up of the 5MWe reactor, but gave no details about its operations. Satellites also detected trucks at Yongbyon in late January 2003, but could not confirm the movement of spent fuel to the reprocessing plant;99 imagery reportedly detected activity at the reprocessing plant in April 2003, but could not confirm large-scale reprocessing;100 and satellite imagery could not peer into an empty spent fuel pond, which was shown to U.S. visitors in January 2004. North Korean officials stated in 2004 that the reprocessing campaign was conducted continuously (four six-hour shifts). U.S. efforts to detect Krypton-85 (a by-product of reprocessing) reportedly suggested that some reprocessing had taken place, but were largely inconclusive. Even U.S. scientists visiting Pyongyang in January 2004 could not confirm North Korean claims of having reprocessed the spent fuel or that the material shown was in fact plutonium. These are some of the uncertainties verification measures will seek to answer. Verification received increased attention in the Six Party process beginning in spring 2008. Statements made by President Bush and Secretary of State Rice in June 2008 further demonstrated that the U.S. administration was linking SST removal with progress on verification issues.101 U.S. officials have said there have been spoken agreements with the North Koreans saying that the only way the declaration can be deemed ―complete and correct‖ is if it verifiable. The State Department said in a June 26 fact sheet that by submitting the declaration, North Korea had ―begun to fulfill its declaration commitment.‖ The fact sheet also stated that a comprehensive verification regime would include ―short notice access to declared or suspect sites related to the North Korean nuclear program, access to nuclear materials, environmental and bulk sampling of materials and equipment, interviews with personnel in North Korea, as well as access to additional documentation and records for all

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nuclear related facilities and operations.‖ It also said that the actual rescission of North Korea‘s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism will occur only after ―the Six Parties reach agreement on acceptable verification principles and an acceptable verification protocol; the Six Parties have established an acceptable monitoring mechanism; and verification activities have begun.‖102 On July 12, 2008, the Six Parties agreed unanimously to principles for a ―verification mechanism‖ for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, to be detailed by the denuclearization working group.103 Thereafter, U.S. negotiators submitted a proposed verification protocol to North Korea called the ―Verification Measures Discussion Paper‖ which outlined extensive measures to verify all aspects of North Korea‘s nuclear programs, including plutonium production, uranium enrichment, weapons, weapons production and testing, and proliferation activities.104 North Korea reportedly submitted a counter-proposal that objected to provisions related to inspections at undeclared facilities and the taking of samples. The 45-day wait period for the SST List removal ended on August 11, 2008, but the administration did not take action. On August 26, the North Korean news agency announced it had suspended disablement activities at Yongbyon as of August 14 since the United States had not removed it from the terrorism list. The North Korean Foreign Ministry statement said that the agreement had been to delist North Korea once it had submitted a declaration of its nuclear programs, not once verification measures had been agreed upon. It said, ―As far as the verification is concerned, it is a commitment to be fulfilled by the six parties at the final phase of the denuclearization of the whole Korean Peninsula according to the September 19 joint statement.... All that was agreed upon at the present phase was to set up verification and monitoring mechanisms within the framework of the six parties.‖105 The statement also threatened to restore facilities at Yongbyon. On Monday, September 22, 2008, North Korea asked the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) personnel monitoring the shut-down of facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex to remove the seals and surveillance equipment from the plutonium reprocessing plant. North Korea informed the IAEA that inspectors would no longer have access to that facility. IAEA inspectors and U.S. Department of Energy personnel located at Yongbyon were not expelled from the Yongbyon site, and other monitoring and inspection activities related to disablement continued. However, North Korea told the IAEA that it planned to ―introduce nuclear material to the reprocessing plant in one‘s time.‖106

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These actions were reversed when, in early October, the US and North Korea agreed on a verification mechanism to determine the accuracy of the DPRK‘s declaration of its plutonium production. Ambassador Hill traveled to Pyongyang October 2-3 for further bilateral talks on the verification agreement. As a result of these talks, the US and DPRK reached agreement on verification measures. Although the document has not yet been made public, according to State Department officials North Korea has agreed to: the US taking samples out of country for review; visits to all declared sites and to undeclared sites by mutual consent; participation of South Korea and Japan in verification; and a consultative role for the IAEA.107 They also agreed that ―all measures contained in the Verification Protocol will apply to the plutoniumbased program and any uranium enrichment and proliferation activities.‖ According to the State Department‘s fact sheet on the agreement, the measures are ―codified in a joint document between the United States and North Korea and certain other understandings.‖ Many observers interpret ―other understandings‖ as referring to verbal agreements or separate documents, but neither the United Stats nor North Korea have made this clear. The United States removed North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List on October 11. Then-Presidential candidate Barack Obama issued a statement after the October 11, 2008 SST list removal that emphasized strong verification measures: If North Korea refuses to permit robust verification, we should lead all members of the Six Party talks in suspending energy assistance, re-imposing sanctions that have recently been waived, and considering new restrictions. Our objective remains the complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea‘s nuclear weapons programs. This must include getting clarity on North Korea‘s efforts to enrich uranium and its proliferation of nuclear technology abroad.108

Key concerns about the details of the tentative verification agreement as well as whether North Korea had actually agreed to the provisions surfaced soon after the announcement. For example, while State Department officials said that North Korea agreed to removal of samples from the country for analysis, North Korea statements in press reports contradicted this.109 The Six Party were unable to reach agreement on a codified version of the verification measures in their December 2008 meeting. Negotiations continued on the verification protocol, as North Korea appeared to reject inclusion of sampling provisions.

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As described above, verification and monitoring activities in North Korea ended when Pyongyang asked U.S. and international inspectors to leave the country on April 14, 2009.110

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Future Considerations The DPRK committed in 2005 to abandoning ―all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs‖ and to returning to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA safeguards at an early date.111 If the DPRK decides to return to the Six Party talks and uphold these commitments, there will be a number of issues that have not yet been resolved. The next stage, after disablement, was to have been the decommissioning and dismantlement of the weapons production facilities. The terms for this work still need to be negotiated. This stage may include a return of IAEA monitoring of nuclear material stocks (including weapons-usable separated plutonium) and verification of actual weapons dismantlement. The question of dismantling North Korea‘s nuclear warheads has not yet been addressed directly, although the September 2005 joint statement commits North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons. Critics have raised concerns about the lack of clear verification provisions for these steps and the omission of specific references to key issues such as fissile materials, warheads, the reported uranium enrichment program, the nuclear test site, and nuclear proliferation activities and history (such as nuclear transfers to Syria). Some analysts have proposed that the United States should be ready to implement cooperative threat reduction (CTR)-style programs in North Korea, as were created for the former Soviet Union.112 These might include the redirection of North Korean nuclear weapon scientists to peaceful work.113 North Korean officials have said that they are interested in eventually reorienting the Yongbyon workforce to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.114 This could include research, medical and industrial applications, and not necessarily a nuclear power program.

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ISSUES FOR CONGRESS Funding115

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Congress will have a clear role in considering U.S. funding for the disablement and decommissioning of North Korea‘s nuclear facilities, as well as other inducements for cooperation as agreed in the Six Party talks. U.S. assistance to nuclear disablement activities at Yongbyon is funded through the State Department‘s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF). The State Department is paying the North Korean government for the labor costs of disablement activities, and also paying for related equipment and fuel. Approximately $20 million has been approved for this purpose to date. NDF funds may be used ―notwithstanding any other provision of law‖ and therefore may be used to pay North Korea. DOE‘s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has been contributing its personnel as technical advisors to the U.S. Six-Party delegation and as technical teams on the ground at Yongbyon overseeing disablement measures. NNSA has estimated it has spent approximately $15 million in support of Phase Two (Yongbyon disablement) implementation.116 Congress has also provided funding for energy assistance to North Korea under the Six Party Talks through the State Department‘s Economic Support Fund.

Authority Congress also plays a role in establishing legal authority for assistance to nuclear disablement and dismantlement in North Korea. Section 102 (b) (the ―Glenn Amendment‖ U.S.C. 2799aa-1) of the Arms Export Control Act prohibits assistance to a non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT that has detonated a nuclear explosive device. Due to this restriction, DOE funds cannot be spent in North Korea without a waiver. Congress passed language in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252) that would allow the President to waive the Glenn Amendment restrictions and that stipulates that funds may only be used for the purpose of eliminating North Korea‘s WMD and missile-related programs.117 If the President does exercise the Glenn Amendment waiver authority, then DOE ―will be able to procure, ship to North Korea, and use equipment required to support the full range of disablement, dismantlement, verification, and material packaging and removal activities that Phase Three will likely entail.‖118 NNSA has estimated that this

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could cost over $360 million in FY2009 if verification proceeds and North Korea agrees to the packaging and disposition of separated plutonium and spent fuel at Yongbyon. Congress has also expressed its concern that the Department of Energy have enough funds available to support the disablement of North Korea‘s nuclear weapons arsenal and production capability. In the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, the Committees on Appropriations provided DOE‘s NNSA with funding discretion to provide up to $10 million towards its activities in North Korea. It also directs the Department to submit a supplemental budget request if additional resources are required during FY2008.119 Beyond the Glenn amendment restrictions, Department of Defense funds must be specifically appropriated for use in North Korea. Section 8045 of the FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act says that ―None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available in this Act may be obligated or expended for assistance to the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea unless specifically appropriated for that purpose.‖ Section 8044 of the FY2009 Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 110-329) also contains this language. However, authorization was given for CTR funds to be used globally. The FY2008 Defense Authorization Act specifically encourages ―activities relating to the denuclearization of the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea‖ as a potential new initiative for CTR work. Senator Richard Lugar has proposed that the CTR program be granted ―notwithstanding authority ‖120 for this work since the Defense Department‘s experience in the former Soviet Union, expertise and resources could make it well-positioned to conduct threat reduction work in North Korea and elsewhere. Currently, the Department of Defense is not working on disablement efforts, but there may be a future role for DOD is the Six Party process progresses to dismantlement work.

Policy Guidance Congress may choose to influence the course of negotiations with North Korea through legislation that limits or places requirements on U.S. diplomatic actions. For example, the North Korean Counter-Terrorism and NonProliferation Act (H.R. 3650) introduced in the 110th Congress called for certification by the President that North Korea has met a range of nonproliferation and political benchmarks before the administration could lift

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any U.S. sanctions.121 Congress could establish reporting requirements on progress, or condition appropriations or disbursement to North Korea upon verification measures.122 Congress could also be involved in other aspects of potential changes in U.S. relations with Pyongyang, such as the monitoring of human rights issues, funding for further denuclearization steps including verification provisions, and establishment of normalized ties once nuclear dismantlement has been achieved. Congress also plays a role in setting sanctions policies, as in the bill Security through Termination of Proliferation Act of 2009 (H.R. 485).

End Notes

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1

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Submitted statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 27, 2009. http://armed-services 2 ―North Korea Refuses Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament,‖ Reuters, February 2, 2009. http://uk. reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKTRE5111UN20090202. 3 ―IAEA Inspectors Asked to Leave the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea,‖ IAEA Press Release, April 14, 1009, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/ 2009/prn200903. html. 4 Choe Sang-Hun, ―North Korea Issues Threat on Uranium,‖ The New York Times, April 29, 2009. 5 5MWe is a power rating for the reactor, indicating that it produces 5 million watts of electricity per day (very small). Reactors are also described in terms of million watts of heat (MW thermal). 6 See CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by Larry A. Niksch and CRS Report R40095, Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin. 7 ―Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,‖ U.S. Department of State, August 2005. 8 ―Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing,‖ September 19, 2005, at http://www.state.gov/r/ pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm. 9 Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement, October 3, 2007 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93223.htm. 10 Highly enriched uranium (HEU) has 20% or more U-235 isotope; 90% U-235 is weaponsgrade. 11 The physical principles of weaponization are well-known, but producing a weapon with high reliability, effectiveness, and efficiency without testing presents significant challenges. 12 Plutonium that stays in a reactor for a long time (reactor-grade, with high ―burn-up‖) contains about 20% Pu-240; weapons-grade plutonium contains less than 7% Pu-240. 13 Hot cells are heavily shielded rooms with remote handling equipment for working with irradiated materials. For background, see Jared S. Dreicer, ―How Much Plutonium Could Have Been Produced in the DPRK IRT Reactor?‖Science and Global Security, 2000, vol. 8, pp. 273-286, at http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/ pdf/8_3Dreicer.pdf. 14 Alloying plutonium with other materials is ―common in plutonium metallurgy to retain the delta-phase of plutonium, which makes it easier to cast and shape‖ (two steps in weapons production). Hecker, January 21, 2004, testimony before SFRC. 15 Transcript of December 29, 2002, Meet the Press. 16 James Brooke, ―North Korea says it has atom arms It will boycott talks on ending program; arsenal called self- defense against Bush,‖ The New York Times, February 11, 2005.

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―We have enough nuclear bombs to defend against a U.S. attack. As for specifically how many we have, that is a secret.‖ ―North Korea Admits Building More Nuclear Bombs,‖ ABC News, June 8, 2005, at http://abcnews.go.com/ WNT/story?id=831078&page=1. 18 IAEA Safeguards Glossary: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3cd/PDF/NVS3_scr.pdf. 19 Siegfried Hecker estimates 40-50 kg of separated plutonium and 6 kg for the test; David Albright and Paul Brannan‘s study says 3 3-55 kg of separated plutonium and roughly 5 kg for the test. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill cites 50 kg in his comments. Hecker, ibid. David Albright and Paul Brannan, ―The North Korean Plutonium Stock February 2007,‖ Institute for Science and International Security, February 20, 2007. Christopher Hill, ―Interview on PBS NewsHour,‖ October 3, 2007, at http://www.state. gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2007/93274.htm. 20 Unclassified Report to Congress on Nuclear and Missile Programs of North Korea, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, August 8, 2007. 21 ―North Korea ‗serious threat‘ to South,‖ BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/ 6216385.stm. 22 Warren Strobel, ―North Korean nuclear documents challenge CIA assertions,‖ McClatchy Newspapers, May 28, 2008. 23 ―N.K. says plutonium ‗weaponized‘ and off-limits,‖ The Korea Herald, January 19, 2009. 24 David Albright and Paul Brannan, ―The North Korean Plutonium Stock February 2007.‖ 25 Siegfried Hecker, January 21, 2004, testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 26 ―North Korea Says It Has Made Fuel For Atom Bombs,‖ New York Times, July 15, 2003. 27 ―North Koreans Claim to Extract Fuel for Nuclear Weapons,‖ New York Times, May 12, 2005. 28 David Albright and Paul Brannan, ―The North Korean Plutonium Stock February 2007,‖ Institute for Science and International Security, February 20, 2007. 29 Technical difficulties associated with the fuel fabrication facility may have slowed how often the fuel was unloaded from the reactor, limiting production to at most one bomb per year. Siegfried Hecker, ―Report on North Korean Nuclear Program,‖ Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, November 15, 2006. 30 IAEA Team Confirms Shut Down of DPRK Nuclear Facilities, http://www.iaea.org/ NewsCenter/PressReleases/ 2007/prn200712.html. 31 Report by the Director General to the IAEA Board of Governors, ―Applications of Safeguards in the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea (DPRK),‖ GOV/2007/45-GC(51)/19, August 17, 2007. 32 Hecker January 21, 2004, testimony before SRFC. 33 CIA unclassified point paper distributed to congressional staff on November 19, 2002. 34 Siegfried Hecker, ―Report on North Korean Nuclear Program,‖ Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, November 15, 2006. 35 Selig Harrison, ―Did North Korea Cheat?‖ Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 1, January/February 2005. 36 North Korea would first have to convert uranium ―yellowcake‖ into uranium hexafluoride to feed into the centrifuges. The centrifuges would ―enrich‖ the uranium, or increase the portion of U-235. Weapons-grade enriched uranium according to the IAEA needs to have an enrichment level of at least 20%. See CRS Report RL34234, Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power, by Mary Beth Nikitin, Anthony Andrews, and Mark Holt. 37 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, (New York: Free Press, September 2006), p. 296. 38 ―NK Admits to Buying Aluminum Tubes,‖ KBS World News, September 27, 2007, and Takashi Sakamoto, ―DPRK Admits To Importing Aluminum Tubes From Russia for Uranium Enrichment,‖ Yomiuri Shimbun, in Japanese, Translated by BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, October 26, 2007.

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Paul Kerr, ―News Analysis: Doubts Rise on North Korea‘s Uranium-Enrichment Program,‖ Arms Control Today, April 2007, at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/ News Analysis.asp. 40 ―There has been considerable misinterpretation of the Intelligence Community‘s view of North Korean efforts to pursue a uranium enrichment capability. The intelligence in 2002 was high quality information that made possible a high confidence judgment about North Korea‘s efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability. The Intelligence Community had then, and continues to have, high confidence in its assessment that North Korea has pursued that capability. We have continued to assess efforts by North Korea since 2002. All Intelligence Community agencies have at least moderate confidence that North Korea‘s past efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability continue today.‖ ODNI News Release 04-07, March 4, 2007, at http://www.dni.gov/press 41 ―Update on the Six Party Talks,‖ Brookings Institution, February 22, 2007, at http://www brookings.edu/events/ 2007/0222south-korea.aspx. 42 Unclassified Report to Congress on Nuclear and Missile Programs of North Korea, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, August 8, 2007. 43 See David Albright, ―North Korea‘s Alleged Large-Scale Enrichment Plant: Yet Another Questionable Extrapolation Based on Aluminum Tubes,‖ The Institute for Science and Security,Feb.23,2007,http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/DPRKenrichment 2Feb df. 44 Siegfried Hecker, ―Denuclearizing North Korea,‖ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2008. 45 Glenn Kessler, ―Uranium Traces Found on N. Korean Aluminum Tubes,‖ Washington Post, December 21, 2007, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/20/ AR2007122002196_pf.html. 46 Glenn Kessler, ―New Data Found On North Korea‘s Nuclear Capacity; Intelligence on Enriched Uranium Revives Questions About Weapons,‖ The Washington Post, June 21, 2008. 47 Senate Armed Services Hearing on the North Korean Six-Party Talks and Implementation Activities, July 31, 2008. 48 See also CRS Report RL33709, North Korea's Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications, and U.S. Options, by Emma Chanlett-Avery and Sharon Squassoni. 49 ―Analysis of air samples collected on October 11, 2006 detected radioactive debris which confirms that North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P.unggye on October 9, 2006. The explosion yield was less than a kiloton.‖ ODNI News Release No. 19-06, at http://www.dni.gov/announcements/20061016_release.pdf. 50 By comparison, a simple plutonium implosion device normally would produce a larger blast, perhaps 5 to 20 kilotons (KT). The first nuclear tests conducted by other states range from 9 KT (Pakistan) to 60 KT (France), but tests by the United States, China, Britain, and Russia were in the 20 KT range. 51 Mark Mazzetti, ―Preliminary Samples Hint at North Korean Nuclear Test,‖ New York Times, October 14, 2006, at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/14/world/asia/14nuke.html. 52 Thom Shanker and David Sanger, ―North Korean fuel identified as plutonium,‖ New York Times, October 17, 2006, at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/17/world/asia/17diplo.html. A debate on this issue can be found in the November 2006 issue of Arms Control Today, at http://armscontrol.org/act/2006_11/tech.asp#Sidebar1. 53 Implosion devices, which use sophisticated lenses of high explosives to compress fissile material, are generally thought to require testing, although the CIA suggested in 2003 that North Korea could validate a simple fission nuclear weapons design using extensive high explosives testing. CIA response to questions for the record, August 18, 2003, submitted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/ 54 Siegfried Hecker, ―Report on North Korean Nuclear Program,‖ Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, November 15, 2006.

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Ibid. ―UNSC Urged to Retract Anti-DPRK Steps,‖ KCNA, April 29, 2009, http://www.kcna.co. p/item/2009/200904/ news29/20090429-14ee.html. 57 http://earthquake 58 In 2006, the seismic yield of that explosion was 4.1. ―Initial Findings on the DPRK‘s 2009 announced nuclear test,‖ Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization, May 25, 2009, http://www.ctbto.org/pressctbtos-initial-findings-on-the-dprks-2009-announced-nucleartest/ 59 Thom Shanker and William Broad, ―Seismic Readings Point to a Small Nuclear Test,‖ New York Times May 26, 2009; Greg Miller and Julian Barnes, ―U.S. military officials: No Doubt of a North Korean Nuclear Test,‖ Los Angeles Times, May 26, 2009; Richard Ingraham, ―Full confirmation of NKorea blast will take time: scientists,‖ Agence France Presse, May 25, 2009; Bryan Bender, ―Blast by N.Korea tests U.S. policy,‖ Boston Globe, May 26, 2009. 60 Unclassified Report to Congress on Nuclear and Missile Programs of North Korea, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, August 8, 2007. Also see CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, by Steven A. Hildreth. 61 Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 5, 2008, at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/ 0080205 testimony 62 ―Technical Perspective on North Korea‘s Nuclear Test: A Conversation between Dr. Siegfried Hecker and Dr. GiWook Shin,‖ Stanford University website, October 10, 2006, at http://aparc.stanford.edu/news/technical_perspective_ on_north_koreas_nuclear_test_a_conversation_between_dr_siegfried_hecker_and_dr_giwo ok_shin_20061010//. 63 Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 5, 2008, at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/ 0080205_ estimony 64 See, for example, North Korea‘s statement of February 10, 2005, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/ /hi/asia-pacific/ 4252515.stm. 65 ―North Korea says nuclear declaration submitted,‖ Reuters, January 4, 2008. 66 Blaine Harden, ―With Obama in the White House, North Korea Steps Up Big Talk,‖ Washington Post, February 3, 2009. 67 See ―North Korea‖ section of CRS Report R40439, Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations, coordinated by Jonathan Medalia. 68 ―DPRK military warns against sanctions for rocket launch,‖ Xinhua, April 18, 2008. 69 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of Six Party Talks, Beijing, September 19, 2005, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ prs/ps/2005/53490.htm. 70 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, October 14, 2006, at http://daccessdds.un. rg/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N06/572/07/PDF/N0657207.pdf?OpenElement. 71 ―Denuclearization Action Plan,‖ February 13, 2007, at http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/ northkorea/state/80479.pdf. 72 Second Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement, October 3, 2007, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93223.htm. 73 On-the-Record-Briefing, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, October 3, 2007, at http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2007/93234.htm. 74 ―North Korea ‗Agrees to Nuclear Disablement Procedure,‘‖ Chosun Ilbo, October 27, 2007. 75 David Albright and Paul Brannan, ―Disabling DPRK Nuclear Facilities,‖ United States Institute of Peace Working Paper, October 23, 2007. 76 See charts at ―North Korean Disablement Actions,‖ Arms Control Today, October 2008; ―Disablement Actions,‖ National Committee on North Korea website. 77 ―N. Korea ‗Slowing Disablement of Nuclear Facilities,‖ Chosun Ilbo, January 29, 2008. 56

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Lee Chi-dong, ―N Korea Complains About Slow Provision of Energy Aid,‖ Yonhap News, June 5, 2008. 79 ―N. Korea can produce plutonium for 1.5 bombs in 6 months: expert,‖ Kyodo News, April 25, 2009. 80 ―MOFAT Reveals North Korean Fuel Rod Images,‖ Daily North Korea, February 4, 2009. http://www.dailynk.com/ english/read.php?cataId=nk03 100&num=45 16. 81 IAEA Press Release, ―IAEA Removes Seals at Yongbyon,‖ September 24, 2008. 82 Peter Crail, ―North Korea Moves to Restart Key Nuclear Plant,‖ Arms Control Today, October 2008. 83 For a discussion of the pro‘s and con‘s see sidebar ―A Diplomatic and Technological Cocktail,‖ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2008, p.49. 84 ―North Korea can produce plutonium for 1.5 bombs in 6 months,‖ Japan Economic Newswire, April 25, 2009. 85 On-The-Record Briefing: Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Six-Party Talks Christopher R. Hill, October 3, 2007, at http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2007/ 93234.htm. 86 Joint Press Availability, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill, January 7, 2008. http://www.state.gov/p/ eap/rls/rm/2008/01/98756.htm. 87 David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire, ―North Korea‘s Plutonium Declaration: A Starting Point for an Initial Verification Process,‖ The Institute for Science and International Security, January 10, 2008. http://www.isisonline.org/publications/ dprk/ orthKorea eclaration10Jan2008.pdf. 88 See, for example, Helene Cooper, ―Past Deals by N. Korea May Face Less Study,‖ The New York Times, April 18, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/18/washington/ 18diplo. tml?_r=2&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&ref=world&adxnnlx=12085453589gpsLj35wtiPmoT8RHM6mQ and Glenn Kessler, ―U.S. Ready to Lift Sanctions on North Korea,‖ The Washington Post, April 11, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/ 04/10/AR2008041004082.html?nav=emailpage. 89 ―Update on the Six-Party Talks,‖ State Department Fact Sheet, May 10, 2008. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/ may/104558.htm. 90 Glenn Kessler, ―New Data Found On North Korea‘s Nuclear Capacity; Intelligence on Enriched Uranium Revives Questions About Weapons,‖ The Washington Post, June 21, 2008. 91 Statement of Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, July 31, 2008. 92 Glenn Kessler, ―Message to US Preceded North Korean Nuclear Declaration,‖ The Washington Post, July 2, 2008. 93 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/06/20080626-4.html; http://www.state.gov/ r/pa/ rs/ ps/2008/jun/106281 .htm. 94 ―IAEA Team Confirms Shut Down of DPRK Nuclear Facilities,‖ IAEA press release, July 18, 2007, at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2007/prn200712.html. 95 GOV/2007/45-GC(51)/19, August 17, 2007. 96 Statement of Christopher R. Hill Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment and Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, Joint Hearing on the North Korea Six-Party Process, October 25, 2007. 97 North Korea reportedly did not want the IAEA involved and wanted the United States to do the disabling. Albright and Brannan, ibid. 98 ―U.S.-North Korea Understandings on Verification,‖ October 11, 2008. http://20012009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/ oct/1 10924.htm. 99 ―Reactor Restarted, North Korea Says,‖ Washington Post, February 6, 2003.

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―US Suspects North Korea Moved Ahead on Weapons,‖ New York Times, May 6, 2003. ―President Bush Discusses North Korea,‖ White House press release, June 26, 2008; Condoleezza Rice, ―U.S. Policy Toward Asia,‖ Heritage Foundation speech, June 18, 2008. 102 ―North Korea: Presidential Action on State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA),‖ State Department Fact Sheet, June 26, 2008. http://www. tate.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/jun/106281.htm. 103 Press Communique of the Heads of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, July 12, 2008. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/ 6party/ ess0807.html. 104 This paper was made public by the Washington Post. Glenn Kessler, ―Far-Reaching U.S. Plan Impaired North Korea Deal,‖ The Washington Post, September 26, 2008. 105 ―Foreign Ministry‘s Spokesman on DPRK‘s Decision to Suspend Activities to Disable Nuclear Facilities,‖ KCNA, August 27, 2008. http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm. 106 http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2008/prn200813.html. 107 See October 11, 2008 State Department Press Statement http://2001-2009.state.gov/ /pa/prs/ps/ 008/oct/110924.htm and Fact Sheet http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ s/ 008/ ct/110924.htm. 108 Statement of Senator Barack Obama on the Agreement with North Korea, October 11, 2008. 109 ―SKorea to press for sampling at NKorean nuke plants,‖ Agence France Presse, November 14, 2008. http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20081113/wl_asia_afp/nkoreanuclearweaponsskoreaus. 110 ―IAEA Inspectors Asked to Leave the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea,‖ IAEA Press Release, April 14, 1009, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/ 2009/ rn200903. tml. 111 http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm. 112 Joel Wit, Jon Wolfsthal, Choong-suk Oh, ―The Six Party Talks and Beyond: Cooperative Threat Reduction in North Korea,‖ CSIS Press, December 2005. http://www.csis.org/media 113 David Albright, ―Phased International Cooperation with North Korea‘s Civil Nuclear Programs,‖ Institute for Science and International Security, March 19, 2007. http://www.isis-online 114 ―North Korea and Its Nuclear Program—A Reality Check,‖ A Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, October 2008, S. Prt. 110-50. 115 For a detailed discussion, see CRS Report R40095, Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin. 116 Statement of William H. Tobey, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, July 31, 2008. 117 Similar language appeared in the Senate version of the FY2009 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-417), but was not included in the House version. The final act includes it under ―legislative provisions not adopted‖ under Title XII, since the waiver authority was passed earlier in the FY2008 Supplemental http://armedservices. ouse.gov/pdfs/fy09ndaa/FY09conf/ FY2009NDAAJoint Explanatory tatement. df. 118 Tobey testimony, ibid. 119 See p. 50 of http://www.rules.house.gov/110/text/omni/jes/jesdivc.pdf. 120 So that funds may be used ―notwithstanding any other provision of law.‖ Senator Richard Lugar, Remarks to National Defense University, October 2, 2008. http://lugar.senate 121 This bill was introduced and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. H.R. 3650, September 25, 2007. 122 For example, see S.Res. 399. 101

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Chapter 4

NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR TEST: MOTIVATIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND U.S. OPERATIONS

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Emma Chanlett-Avery and Sharon Squasson SUMMARY On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced it conducted a nuclear test. After several days of evaluation, U.S. authorities confirmed that the underground explosion was nuclear, but that the test produced a low yield of less than one kiloton. As the United Nations Security Council met and approved a resolution condemning the tests and calling for punitive sanctions, North Korea remained defiant, insisting that any increased pressure on the regime would be regarded as an act of war. China and South Korea, the top aid providers to and trade partners with the North, supported the resolution itself, but have been unwilling to cut off other economic cooperation and aid considered crucial to the regime. The sanction regime depends heavily on individual states‘ compliance with the guidelines. Economists argue that the only definitively effective punishment on North Korea would be the suspension of energy aid from China, which reportedly supplies about 70% of North Korea‘s fuel. Determining the motivations of a government as opaque and secretive as North Korea is exceedingly difficult, but analysts have put forth a range of

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possibilities to explain why the Pyongyang regime decided to test a nuclear weapon. Possible motivations include an attempt to engage the United States in bilateral talks, to ensure the security of the regime, and to satisfy hard-line elements within the Pyongyang government, as well as technical motivations for carrying out a nuclear test. The short-term implications of North Korea‘s nuclear test are clear: whether a technical success or failure, North Korea‘s willingness to carry out a test in the face of significant opposition indicates that it is willing to endure the potential consequences. Analysts fear that the medium and long-term implications could include a more potent nuclear threat from Pyongyang, a nuclear arms race in Asia, and the transfer of nuclear weapons or material to states or groups hostile to the United States. There are also strong concerns about the impact on the global nonproliferation regime, particularly to other states poised to develop their own nuclear weapon programs. The most fundamental U.S. goals of the confrontation with North Korea are to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to prevent an attack — either nuclear or conventional — on the United States or on its allies in the region. The options available to U.S. policymakers to pursue these goals include the acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power, bilateral or multilateral negotiations, heightened legal and economic pressure on North Korea, adoption of a regime change policy through non-military means, military action or threats, and withdrawal from the conflict. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.

NORTH KOREA CONDUCTS A NUCLEAR TEST On October 9, 2006, North Korea (formally the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea) announced it conducted a nuclear test. After several days of evaluation, U.S. authorities confirmed that the underground explosion was nuclear, but that the test produced a low yield of less than one kiloton. The test followed a pattern of North Korean provocations and escalations, including the launch of several short-, medium-, and long-range missiles in July 2006. Since the United States threatened financial sanctions on banks that do business with North Korea in September 2005, Pyongyang had boycotted the Six-Party Talks (with South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia), the multilateral forum dedicated to eliminating North Korea‘s nuclear weapons program. Since the end of the Agreed Framework1 in 2002, experts estimate that North Korea may

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have added about six to eight more weapons‘ worth of plutonium to a fissile material stockpile. President Bush and other U.S. officials immediately condemned the test and called for a swift response from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). At the U.N., the United States pushed for punitive sanctions and drafted a resolution that was eventually unanimously adopted. In a hastilyarranged trip to the region, Secretary of State Rice reiterated the U.S. security commitment to South Korea and Japan and urged China and South Korea to implement key measures of the U.N. resolution. North Korean officials reportedly told Russian officials the test of the explosive device would have a range of yield between 5 and 15 kilotons; another report suggests that North Korea told Chinese officials they planned to carry out a 4-kiloton test.2 Seismic information available from the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources in South Korea indicates that an explosion equivalent to an earthquake measuring a 3.58 magnitude occurred at 10:35 a.m. on October 9 in the vicinity of Musudan-ri, North Hamgyong Province.3 Most experts have correlated the size of the seismic disturbance with a sub-kiloton explosion, raising doubts about the effectiveness of the North Korean nuclear weapons design. On October 16, 2006, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence issued a statement confirming that a nuclear test was conducted, with a yield under 1 kiloton, in the vicinity of P‘unggye.4 Several experts have suggested that the nuclear test might have fallen short of the anticipated yield because of imprecise manufacturing. According to one account, U.S. intelligence estimates that the blast was in the range of 200 tons of TNT, or 0.2 kt.5 By comparison, a simple plutonium implosion device normally would produce a larger blast, perhaps 5 to 20 kilotons. The first nuclear tests conducted by other states have ranged from 9 kt (Pakistan) to 60 kt, but tests by the United States, China, Britain and Russia were in the 20kt-range.6 On December 8, 2006, President Bush officially determined that North Korea had detonated a nuclear explosive device, as required by section 102(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629).

Return to the Six-Party Talks On December 11, 2006, Chinese officials announced that the multilateral negotiations would resume on December 18, 2006. In the weeks preceding, U.S. negotiators had reportedly offered some specific details on what

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assistance North Korea could expect (although those details were not made public). The United States further agreed to put the financial sanctions on the agenda, while North Korea dropped its demand that the sanctions be lifted as a precondition for the talks. For more details on the Talks, see CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by Larry Niksch.

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OTHER CRS RESOURCES ON NORTH KOREA This report complements several other existing CRS reports. For more information on North Korea‘s nuclear weapons program history, development, and current status, see CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by Larry Niksch and CRS Report RS21391, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Recent Developments, by Sharon Squassoni. For further details on sanctions, see CRS Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack; on missiles, see CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, by Steve Hildreth; on counterfeiting issues, see CRS Report RL33324, North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency, by Dick Nanto and Raphael Perl. Further reports are also available on the North Korean economy, U.S. and international assistance to North Korea, general U.S.-Korean relations, and chronologies of events related to North Korea.

RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON NORTH KOREA In the 109th Congress, Congress became more involved in, and at times critical of, U.S. policy toward North Korea. In late September and early October 2006, Congress enacted two pieces of legislation on North Korea. The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007 (H.R.5122/P.L. 109-364), requires the President to appoint a Policy Coordinator for North Korea within 60 days of enactment and report to the President and Congress within 90 days on recommendations. It also requires the executive branch to report to Congress every 180 days in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 on the status of North Korea‘s nuclear and missile programs. The North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-353) adds North Korea to the IranSyria Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178; P.L. 109-112), authorizing

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sanctions on third party ―persons‖ for weapons-of-mass-destruction-related transfers to and from North Korea. In particular, this could affect North Korea‘s missile trade.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

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United Nations In response to the test, the UNSC unanimously supported a U.S.-drafted resolution, Res. 1718, that calls the test ―a clear threat to international peace and security,‖ bans trade in heavy weapons and luxury goods, authorizes countries to inspect cargo bound to and from North Korea to look for weapons of mass destruction or related materials, and requests that countries freeze funds related to North Korea‘s non-conventional weapons programs. It also calls on North Korea to refrain from conducting additional nuclear or ballistic missile tests, rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), suspend its ballistic missile program and eventually abandon its nuclear weapons in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. Compared to the original U.S. draft, the final resolution was weakened in several key areas at the insistence of China and Russia, both permanent members of the UNSC. China insisted that the language request, but not require, that countries inspect cargo going into and out of North Korea and that the resolution explicitly rule out the use of military force. A more robust military embargo was scaled back to include only heavy military equipment such as tanks and missiles. Following passage of Res. 1718, North Korea declared it considered the imposition of sanctions an act of war. It is unclear how the sanctions will affect North Korea, already among the most isolated and poor countries in the world with limited global trade. Many experts argue that sanctions are ineffective at changing the fundamental political goals of governments. In addition, Res. 1718 bans trade in certain items, rather than a complete embargo, which some say lends itself to circumvention. The sanction regime depends heavily on individual states‘ compliance with the guidelines. For example, each state can determine what items are considered ―luxury goods.‖

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China7 China has sought to balance its wish to send a stern message to Pyongyang with its determination to avoid sparking a destabilizing military conflict. Beijing has made clear its overriding goal of preventing the collapse of the North Korean regime, which it fears would interrupt its surging economic development and bring thousands of North Korean refugees across the border into China. Analysts point out that China is also motivated by a desire to keep North Korea as a ―buffer state‖ between it and the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. Chinese officials maintain that the UNSC resolution should ―create conditions conducive to the peaceful resolution of this issue through dialogue and negotiation.‖8 According to press reports, after the passage of the resolution, Chinese officials began inspecting trucks bound for North Korea more closely.9 Questions have arisen on whether China will enforce the sanctions regime on air or ship trade, and Beijing said it would not stop North Korean-bound ships to conduct inspections for illegal weapons and missiles as the resolution requests. Chinese officials insist that they are implementing the U.N. resolution, but that ―normal trade‖ with North Korea should not be disrupted. Economists argue that the only definitively effective punishment on North Korea would be the suspension of energy aid from China; China reportedly supplies about 70% of North Korea‘s fuel.10 After the test, reports citing Chinese trade statistics showed a marked decline of oil exports to North Korea in September, prompting speculation that Beijing may have been punishing Pyongyang for the July missile tests and/or warning it not to test a nuclear device as threatened. Chinese officials subsequently denied any cutoff, however, and customs data showed a resumption of crude oil to North Korea in October.11 Some analysts suggest that Beijing could be employing a more subtle form of pressure by sending fewer refined oil products, but there is no overwhelming evidence that China has tried to punish North Korea by restricting energy trade.

South Korea12 The South Korean government vowed to support the UNSC resolution and called for Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks, but also said it will not suspend cooperation with North Korea on the Kaesong Industrial Park (where South Korean firms employ North Korean workers at a complex in the North,

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about one hour from Seoul) and the Mt. Kumgang tourism site. The two joint projects are believed to provide Pyongyang with several million dollars a year in hard currency. A spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, ―We will go ahead with the economic cooperation programs in harmony with the resolution,‖13 but would not specify if Seoul planned to expand the Kaesong plant as scheduled. The planned expansion would reportedly provide the North Korean regime with an estimated $500 million annually by 2012.14 Despite pressure from the Bush Administration following the test, South Korea declined to join the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI - see Options section), citing fears of engaging in military action by boarding North Korean ships. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns criticized the South Koreans for not doing more to send a message to North Korea.15

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Japan16 Japan has imposed its own unilateral sanctions — more restrictive than those called for in the UN resolution — that ban all North Korean ships from entering Japanese ports and restrict imports and most North Korean nationals from entering Japan. In addition, Japan adopted a list of items that fall under the ―luxury goods‖ category, including caviar, jewelry, and watches. Officials in Tokyo have also vowed to assist the U.S. military in stopping North Korean cargo ships for inspections, despite the country‘s pacifist constitution. Japan‘s reaction follows a pattern of Tokyo taking increasingly hardline positions on North Korea. Following the July 2006 missile tests by North Korea, Japan led the UNSC to issue a resolution condemning the tests and announced its own unilateral measures that froze bank remittances to North Korea. Japan, which had been North Korea‘s second largest trading partner, now believed to be fifth largest partner (behind China, South Korea, Thailand, and Russia.)

POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN MOTIVATIONS Determining the motivations of a government as opaque and secretive as North Korea is exceedingly difficult, but analysts have put forth a range of possibilities to explain why the Pyongyang regime decided to test a nuclear weapon now. As with many foreign policy decisions, the calculation was probably a combination of factors.

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Attempt to Secure Bilateral Talks Some analysts have argued that the nuclear test was a desperate effort by the North Koreans to secure bilateral negotiations with the United States and, once in negotiations, have more leverage. The Bush Administration has steadfastly refused to engage in direct talks with North Korean negotiators outside of the Six-Party Talks process, although U.S. officials assert that much of the multilateral forum is devoted to speaking directly with the North Koreans. Selig Harrison, an Asian expert with exceptional access to DPRK officials, argues that top North Korean officials want bilateral talks in order to implement the denuclearization agreement concluded at the last round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing in September 2005.17 This argument assumes that North Korea is sincere in its intent to eliminate its nuclear weapons program in exchange for economic and diplomatic incentives, or, if not, the North‘s intent should be tested. The ―Joint Statement of Principles‖ issued at the September 2005 round of the Six-Party Talks was seen as a groundbreaking agreement that outlined a clear path to a negotiated resolution. In the statement, the six parties unanimously agreed to the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and North Korea committed to abandoning its nuclear weapons programs, returning to the NPT, and allowing IAEA safeguards. The other five parties offered energy and humanitarian assistance. The United States and North Korea agreed to take steps toward normalization of relations, which for the United States would include resolution of concerns with the North‘s ballistic missile programs and human rights record.18 According to some analysts, the promise of establishing diplomatic relations with Washington was the key element for the North Korean delegation.

Attempt to Ensure Security of Regime The nuclear test could have been motivated by the regime‘s deep insecurity and fear of an attack by the United States, a fear that has consumed the country for generations since the Korean War. After being labeled as part of the ―axis of evil‖ by President Bush in 2002, North Korea may have drawn a lesson from the invasion of Iraq: that Iraq was targeted because it was believed to be pursuing a nuclear weapons program, but had not yet succeeded. Pyongyang‘s planners may believe that developing and demonstrating a nuclear capability will deter a U.S. attack. North Korea may

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believe that the rest of the world will adjust to it being a nuclear power after the initial rounds of condemnation, similar to the experiences of Pakistan and India after testing nuclear weapons in 1998. An unclassified 2003 CIA assessment provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence offered this analysis: ―A test would demonstrate to the world the North‘s status as a nuclear-capable state and signal (Kim Jong-il‘s) perception that building a nuclear stockpile will strengthen his regime‘s international standing and security posture.‖19

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Domestic Political Factors Although internal pressures are exceedingly difficult to measure in secretive North Korea, the test may have been intended to appease hardliners in the regime. In the wake of the partially failed missile tests in July 2006, the military leadership in North Korea may have pressed for another indication of their resolve. Given the North‘s impoverished state, leader Kim Jong-il needs to maintain the support of the military in order to hold on to power. Another domestic factor could have been the need for North Korea to assert itself as South Korea was winning wide recognition because of the ascension of Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon as UN Secretary General. Since the division of the peninsula in 1945, Pyongyang has competed with Seoul for legitimacy as the government of the Korean people. Many of these dynamics have played out at the UN, where both countries are recognized as sovereign states.

Technical Motivations Most observers believe that nuclear testing is important to validate a design for an implosion device, whether using plutonium or highly-enriched uranium (HEU). However, in 2003, the CIA had assessed that given North Korea‘s long experience in high explosives testing, nuclear tests would not be required to validate simple fission weapons.20 Even if North Korea has also received a copy of Chinese HEU implosion device blueprints apparently provided by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan to Libya, it is likely that technical experts would want to test it. That said, it is not clear that North Korea has any HEU at present. More likely, North Korea desired to test an implosion device using plutonium, whether it was an indigenous or foreign design; several media reports state that U.S. intelligence agencies have concluded the device

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was plutonium.21 Some experts have suggested that the small yield of the test might indicate that North Korea was attempting to test a more sophisticated design (composite pits or boosted fission devices), but more data would be necessary to draw such a conclusion. Even if this were the case, one such nuclear test would not indicate whether North Korea had the capability to place nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles. Given that the device did not appear to produce the desired yield, North Korean scientists may desire to test again to improve the weapon‘s design.

POSSIBLE MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS The short-term implications of North Korea‘s nuclear test are clear: whether a technical success or failure, North Korea‘s willingness to carry out a test in the face of significant opposition indicates that it is willing to endure the potential consequences. The psychological impact of crossing this particular diplomatic ―redline‖ is significant, with ramifications for medium and longterm regional and global stability. Some implications are discussed below.

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Growing Nuclear Threat? Absent information on what nuclear weapons North Korea actually has or what its intentions are, it is difficult to assess the North Korean nuclear threat to the region and to the United States. However, different scenarios of capabilities and intentions may illuminate the kinds of threat that could emerge. Capabilities and intentions may not always match; one may drive the other, or there may be no attempt to seek to match the two. In addition to the threat of its own weapons capabilities, North Korea may pose a threat in terms of its willingness to provide technology, materials or weapons to rogue states, such as Iran or Syria, or terrorist organizations or individuals. As noted above, North Korea may have had several motivations for testing, which may also inform the larger questions of developing its nuclear arsenal. While prestige, leverage in diplomatic negotiations, and domestic political considerations, may only require, for now, a rudimentary or even symbolic nuclear capability, security considerations and technical pride could push North Korea to develop a more sophisticated arsenal. At present, North Korea might now have the capability to deliver a crude nuclear device within the region, using ground transportation, ships, or airplanes.22 North Korea

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undoubtedly has the capability to deliver a radiological dispersal device in the region, although arguably it had this capability before the nuclear test. According to most informed observers, North Korea does not now have the capability to marry nuclear warheads with long-range missiles that would reach the mainland of the United States. If North Korea sought to achieve that capability, it would undoubtedly need to conduct further nuclear tests. There is no reliable information about how North Korea might use nuclear weapons, particularly with respect to potential escalation within a conventional conflict. Most official North Korean statements about a nuclear capability point to the need to provide for a deterrent against the United States. According to the CIA, in April 2003, ―North Korea publicly claimed that the Iraq war shows only tremendous deterrent force can avert war and that failure to resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue would force the North to mobilize all potentials, almost certainly a reference to nuclear weapons.‖ In March 2005, the North Korean Foreign Ministry stated that ―reality proves that our possession of nuclear weapons guarantees balance of power in the region and acts as a strong deterrent against the outbreak of war and for maintaining peace.‖23 In March 2006, the Foreign Ministry stated that ―our strong revolutionary might put in place all measures to counter a possible U.S. preemptive strike,‖ according to the Korean Central News Agency, and that ―preemptive strike is not the monopoly of the United States.‖ The ministry added, ―We made nuclear weapons because of a nuclear threat from the United States.‖24 From a military perspective, North Korea could be seeking either a nuclear deterrent against a potential conventional force attack, or nuclear retaliation either against a nuclear attack (a so-called ―second-strike‖ capability) or against a conventional attack (potentially a ―first-use‖ capability). Perceptions of how nuclear weapons might be used will help shape the development of capabilities, although it may not entirely drive the process. Thus, if North Korea is seeking a capability that requires it to threaten the U.S. mainland, the future development of its forces would focus on developing robust and reliable nuclear warheads small enough to fit in an ICBM nosecone. As some observers have suggested, the threat that North Korea poses may not fit into the traditional contexts of deterrence. Potential scenarios include ―demonstration‖ detonations to deter U.S. intervention, transfers to terrorist groups that would use such weapons against states other than the United States, and transfers to rogue states.25

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Nuclear Arms Race in Asia Many regional experts fear that the nuclear test will stimulate an arms race in the region. Geopolitical instability could prompt Northeast Asian states with the ability to develop nuclear weapons relatively quickly to move forward, creating a cascading effect on other powers in the region. One scenario envisioned would start with a Japanese decision to develop a nuclear weapons program in the face of a clear and present danger from North Korea. South Korea, still wary of Tokyo‘s intentions based on Japan‘s imperial past, could follow suit and develop its own nuclear weapons program. If neighboring states appear to be developing nuclear weapons without drawing punishment from the international community, Taiwan may choose to do the same to counter the threat from mainland China. In turn, this could prompt China to increase its own arsenal, which could have impact on further development of programs in South Asia. Alternatively, South Korea could ―go nuclear‖ first, stimulating a similar chain of reactions. Most nonproliferation experts believe that Japan, using existing but safeguarded stocks of plutonium, could quickly manufacture a nuclear arsenal. South Korea and Taiwan would take longer, although there is evidence of past experiments with plutonium processing for both countries.26 Japan is not likely to move forward precipitously with nuclear weapons development. Japan has abided by the self-imposed ―three non-nuclear principles,‖ which ban the possession, production, or import of nuclear arms. With memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki still vivid, the Japanese public remains largely resistant to arming themselves with nuclear weapons. Many Tokyo strategists may recognize that ―going nuclear‖ could actually undermine their security by further eroding the global nonproliferation regime and reinforcing mistrust in the region. Under the terms of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan and South Korea remain protected under the ―nuclear umbrella.‖ Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated the firm U.S. commitment to defend Japan and South Korea against any threat from North Korea during her trip to the region following the nuclear test. Some observers have suggested that the threat of Japan going nuclear was intentionally emphasized in order to pressure Beijing and Seoul to be more firm on North Korea. However, discussion about nuclear weapons development is more likely to appear in government statements after North Korea‘s defiant move: the week after the test, Foreign Minister Taro Aso and the ruling party policy chief Shoichi Nakagawa suggested that Japan should debate the possibility, adding

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that nuclear weapons would not violate the constitution. Earlier, in September 2006, former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone suggested that Japan should study the possibility of going nuclear given the presence of other nuclear-armed states in the region. After Rice‘s assurances, however, Aso stated that Japan has no intention of developing nuclear weapons, reinforcing many analysts‘ contention that Japan‘s current policy could dissolve if the U.S. commitment to the bilateral alliance wavers. Aside from the nuclear question, new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe‘s agenda of strengthening Japan‘s overall defense posture — a policy that has been encouraged by the United States — may gain further support.

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Proliferation to Other States or Non-State Actors U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that North Korea must not cross the ―red-line‖ of further proliferation of its WMD capabilities, whether to other states or non-state actors. There have been few instances of states sharing their nuclear capabilities or weapons knowingly with other states, if President Musharraf is to be believed that A.Q. Khan acted alone in his nuclear black market activities. The United States considered sharing nuclear missiles with India after China‘s 1964 nuclear test, but it can be argued that by then, the United States had tens of thousands of weapons, and there was no norm established yet of nonproliferation, as embodied in the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In 2002, the CIA told Congress that traditional state recipients of WMD technology ―may follow North Korea‘s practice of supplying specific WMDrelated technology and expertise to other countries or non-state actors.‖ However, the report specifies only that North Korea has provided ballisticmissile-related equipment, components, material, and expertise, rather than nuclear-related items. North Korea is an established exporter of ballistic missiles, and many observers, including in the U.S. government, equate North Korea‘s willingness to supply those items with a willingness to sell nuclear weapons or fissile material. Others argue that nuclear weapons are a special case and confer special prestige; that a state would cheapen its hard-earned prestige by disseminating that capability; that a nonproliferation norm has been in place for over thirty years and that a state like North Korea would likely, in the first few years, conserve its nuclear material and weapons for its own deterrent (or aggressive) purposes. Some observers have suggested that as North Korea‘s arsenal grows, it might be more inclined to ―share the wealth.‖

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At present, the Yongbyon five MWe reactor reportedly produces about six kg of plutonium per year, enough for about one weapon. Should North Korea finish the two reactors under construction, which are not close to completion, it could augment that stockpile considerably.27 Kim Jong-il could see a growing nuclear stockpile as a wasting asset or as a source of hard currency. However, transferring nuclear weapons or fissile material is inherently risky because of the loss of control over the recipient‘s actions, particularly if the material can later be tracked back to a source (such as North Korea). It is not entirely clear that it is possible to positively identify a source of material, although it is possible, with considerable cooperation from nuclear weapon states, to eliminate some sources, thus narrowing the possibilities.28 A Pyongyang official reportedly suggested during talks in April and August 2003 between North Korean negotiator Li Gun and former Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that North Korea would ―demonstrate‖ its nuclear weapons or ―transfer‖ weapons abroad. According to one report, ―Mr. Li told Mr. Kelly that the communist state would ‗export nuclear weapons, add to its current arsenal or test a nuclear device‘.‖ On September 1, 2003, North Korean officials issued a statement that North Korea did not intend to sell nuclear weapons or export nuclear material to terrorists. Nonetheless, this continues to be a U.S. concern. North Korea was added to the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1988 and remains on the list, although it is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since 1987. According to the State Department, North Korea continued to maintain ties to terrorist groups in 2005, has sold conventional weapons to several terrorist groups (in 2000, a State Department report specified that North Korea had sold weapons to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, a militant Islamic group located in the Southern Philippines), and reportedly continues to provide safe haven to terrorists (specifically, four remaining members of the Red Army, an ultra-leftist wing of Japan‘s radical student movement in the 1960s). In 2000, however, North Korea and the United States signed a joint statement in which ―the two sides agreed that international terrorism poses an unacceptable threat to global security and peace, and that terrorism should be opposed in all its forms.‖ In 2001, North Korea also signed the Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism and a party to the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. Nonetheless, North Korea‘s history of officially sanctioned kidnapping, missile sales to the states of concern, and activities in the drug smuggling and the money counterfeiting that is seen by many as indicators that Kim Jong-il

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would be equally open to the selling of nuclear materials, technology, or weapons to many terrorist groups.

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Impact on Other Proliferators In addition to the effect a burgeoning North Korean nuclear weapons capability will have on states in the region as they reassess their security, the North Korean test may hold some lessons for those outside the region that are perhaps inclined to develop the same capabilities. The need for a strong response to the test is not only rooted in the desire to roll back North Korea‘s capabilities, but also in the need to demonstrate political resolve and clear consequences to a state‘s disregard for international norms. However, it can be argued that lessons have already been drawn from North Korea‘s proliferation before the test, and that they are not good ones: that would-be proliferators who participate in multilateral incentive programs will not live up to their commitments (such as the Agreed Framework), that there is equal, if not more, bargaining leverage outside the regime than within it, and that there are no practical consequences to withdrawing from the NPT, as North Korea did in 2003. A key question is how states of concern view the situation as it has unfolded. Is North Korea perceived to have been ―allowed‖ to withdraw from the NPT with no punitive action by the international community until North Korea tested a nuclear device? Or, is North Korea now perceived by states such as Iran and Syria as the ―victim‖ of discriminatory UN Security Council actions that have the potential to collapse its economy? Iranian President Ahmadinejad stated on October 16, 2006 that ―some Western countries have turned the UN Security Council into a weapon to impose their hegemony and issue resolutions against countries that oppose them,‖ but that Iran would not be intimidated. Ultimately, the extent to which the inspections curb Pyongyang‘s ability to export and import WMD-related items, and potential impact on North Korea‘s economic viability, will influence those perceptions.

Fate of Nuclear Arsenal in North Korean Collapse Scenario U.S. concerns with North Korea‘s nuclear weapons program may not be limited to how the current regime uses it. Control over the North‘s nuclear arsenal may be uncertain in the event of a collapse, particularly if there is a chaotic aftermath. If control of the government is unclear, North Korean

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military officials may rashly launch nuclear weapons in one scenario, particularly as a punishing attack on Japan if they perceive to have nothing left to lose. In a more prolonged period of uncertain leadership, nuclear weapons or material could be transferred to other foreign entities. In an eventual reunification of the peninsula under Seoul‘s control, in another scenario more questions arise about whether the Korean government would be willing to relinquish its nuclear weapons, given the uncertain geopolitical conditions that the region would face.

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U.S. GOALS AND POLICY OPTIONS The most fundamental U.S. goals of the confrontation with North Korea are to prevent the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to prevent an attack — either nuclear or conventional — on the United States or on its allies in the region. Both actions would dramatically diminish U.S. security. The Bush Administration appears to be divided on how to best achieve these goals, with one group favoring negotiation to shape North Korea‘s behavior and another group advocating measures that will weaken the regime and ultimately lead to its collapse. Pursuing U.S. objectives through the Six-Party Talks is complicated by the fact that other states have calculated their own national interests with regard to North Korea differently. Japan‘s goals converge most closely with U.S. objectives: to bolster its own security from the threat of a North Korean missile attack and to resolve the issues surrounding the abduction of several Japanese citizens by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. For China and South Korea, the political instability and economic consequences of a collapse of North Korea may represent the worst outcome. Pursuit of U.S. goals is dependent on some degree of cooperation from Beijing and Seoul. The nuclear test by Pyongyang has compelled China and South Korea to agree to harsher measures, but it is unlikely to alter their ultimate objective of preventing the collapse of North Korea. The options outlined below are not intended to be exhaustive, but to provide a spectrum of alternatives. The approach taken by the United States may combine elements of several of the possible strategies.

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Status Quo The current Bush Administration North Korea policy is to work through the Six-Party process to ensure the dismantlement of North Korea‘s nuclear weapons program. The policy involves a combination of diplomatic and economic pressures on the regime. In addition to focusing on the nuclear issue, U.S. officials have increased their criticism of North Korea‘s human rights record and its criminal activities, particularly counterfeiting. Critics of the U.S. policy argue that the Administration appears to be divided between those who favor a negotiated solution and others who favor regime change, and that this division has at times paralyzed the policy-making process toward North Korea. Other observers believe that the division masks an overall weak and passive policy that reflects North Korea‘s low priority in comparison to Middle East conflicts and international terrorism issues.

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Explicitly Accept North Korea as a Nuclear Power Some analysts maintain that North Korea, as a paranoid and isolated regime, will never be willing to give up its nuclear weapons. Some security analysts may argue that accepting North Korea into the ―nuclear club‖ and pressing for it to become a ―responsible‖ nuclear power is in the best interest of the international community. In that scenario, North Korea could be asked to make nonproliferation commitments in exchange for tacit acceptance of its nuclear weapons status, in much the same way that the United States has ―accepted‖ the nuclear status of India, Pakistan, and Israel. However, the language used by U.S. officials — calling a nuclear North Korea ―intolerable‖ and ―unacceptable‖ — indicates that the Administration is unlikely to take this approach. Pakistan and India angered the United States and others after testing nuclear weapons in 1998 and now are U.S. allies for a variety of geopolitical purposes. However, there is widespread belief among U.S. government officials that North Korea, as a major U.S. adversary under an unpredictable and dangerous regime, cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons. Moreover, unlike Pakistan and India, North Korea, like Iran, joined the NPT and then violated it. While this distinction may have no practical value, it appears to have diplomatic significance.

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New Approach through Bilateral Talks with North Korea Pro-engagement advocates argue that the United States should take a new approach by agreeing to the long-standing North Korean request for direct bilateral relations and offering more reciprocity for a nuclear settlement, including the normalization of diplomatic relations. Under this plan, as North Korea suspended all nuclear and missile tests and froze its plutonium production programs, negotiations on normalization of relations between the two countries would commence. As North Korea advanced toward the verifiable dismantlement of its nuclear programs, incentives such as removal of the measures that restrict North Korean access to the international banking system, energy assistance programs, and removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism might be offered. This approach would resemble the implementation of the 2005 Six-Party Talks agreement, but would begin with direct talks between U.S. and North Korean negotiators. Proponents of this option argue that although the United States has limited coercive measures remaining, it has ample positive leverage for pushing forward on an agreement with North Korea. Pursuing this option is based on the belief that either North Korea is willing to give up its nuclear weapons, or that the multilateral coalition will be stronger if the United States tries a bilateral approach first, indicating its good faith to the other parties. Most observers agree that the Bush Administration is unlikely to pursue this path because it believes that bilateral negotiations would reward the North Koreans for bad behavior (although officials maintain that much of the multilateral forum is devoted to speaking directly with the North Koreans), that North Korea would continue its recalcitrant behavior in order to extract more benefits from any deal, and that multilateral talks provide the best leverage. North Korea may wish to maximize the propaganda benefits of the negotiations, including painting the U.S. officials as groveling and pleading for peace before Kim Jong-il.

Continue Diplomacy via Six-Party Talks In the aftermath of the test, some analysts speculated that the Six-Party Talks were dead as a forum for negotiation. However, U.S. and regional officials continue to refer to the multilateral negotiations as the best way forward. If North Korea remains recalcitrant, or institutes another boycott of the Talks, the other parties could meet to pursue a joint strategy forward that

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specifically responds to the tests. Although the United Nations Security Council measures achieve global involvement, the participants in the Six-Party Talks have the most interest and leverage. Meetings of the five parties would likely focus on harmonizing the strategies, including pressing China and South Korea to adopt measures and strengthen sanctions that keep up pressure on the North Korean regime to return to the negotiations. Observers point out that the biggest challenge may be maintaining sustained punitive measures from South Korea and China once the initial crisis has died down. This approach would require the United States and Japan to maintain their pledge to resolve the problem through diplomatic means, as China and South Korea oppose the threat of military action.

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Escalate Economic and Legal Pressure on Regime As diplomatic progress in the Six-Party Talks faltered over the past several years, the Bush Administration has developed several programs designed to increase pressure on the regime. These initiatives target the influx of cash and goods to Pyongyang — particularly those acquired through illicit or illegal activities — that allow the regime to hold on to power and to develop weapons programs. Strengthening these programs may convince the regime to return to negotiations by threatening Kim Jong-il‘s hold on power. Encouraging South Korea and China to participate in these activities would increase the likelihood of changing Pyongyang‘s behavior. On the other hand, squeezing North Korea could push it to proliferate weapons and nuclear material more quickly out of economic desperation. Some experts dispute that illegal activities such as counterfeiting and drug smuggling constitute a major part of the North Korean economy.29

Unilateral Financial and Legal Measures Since September 2005, the United States has pursued unilateral measures to financially isolate North Korea. In September 2005, the Administration identified Banco Delta Asia, a Macao-based bank, as an institution that allowed money laundering and counterfeiting activities with North Korea. As a result of this action and a series of Treasury Department-directed warnings about the risk of doing business with North Korean companies that might be tied to Pyongyang‘s nuclear or other WMD programs, several banks, including many in China, have suspended business with North Korean companies.

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Continuing law enforcement activities and using unilateral U.S. financial leverage on international banks and financial institutions represents one way the United States can squeeze the North Korean regime. To reinforce the message, the U.S. government could identify and impose sanctions on another bank — perhaps one in mainland China — suspected of allowing North Korean firms to maintain accounts that facilitate illegal activities. The United States could also make explicit what some analysts say is the unspoken message of the warnings so far: that the U.S. government may prohibit U.S. banks from dealing with financial institutions that have any links with groups that are tied to terrorism or rogue states.30

Strengthen Proliferation Security Initiative One option that has been widely discussed is strengthening of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). PSI, begun in 2003, is an effort to improve capabilities to interdict WMD-related materials, technology, and equipment, particularly as they are shipped to or from countries of concern such as North Korea and Iran.31 Although many hail PSI as a new initiative, it is, in reality, a slightly more robust version of interdiction efforts that have been carried out for many years. One new feature is the conclusion of bilateral ship-boarding agreements, which can facilitate short-notice inspections of cargo but still require the authorization of the country under whose flag the ship is sailing. Although several observers have suggested that UN Res. 1718 legitimizes PSI, the resolution does not authorize interception or confiscation of cargo and so serves only to focus, not strengthen, efforts. In the region, only Japan is a member of PSI. South Korea announced that it would not join PSI out of fears of engaging in a military skirmish with the North Koreans, but that it may take part in PSI activities on a case-by-case basis. China has expressed reservations about the legal standing of PSI, and Chinese officials remarked at a press conference in December 2004 that ―There are also many concerns in the international community about legitimacy and effectiveness of PSI interdictions, consequences that may arise therefrom. The PSI participants should take this into serious consideration.‖ Some observers have noted that China‘s resistance to PSI may be influenced by its dependence on Middle East oil and gas, making it reluctant to cede interdiction rights to U.S. and allied navies, and by a wariness of how PSI might affect the relative balance of Chinese and U.S. power in the region. Until North Korea‘s nuclear test, it appeared as if China‘s reluctance to join PSI would make it very difficult for other states in the region to join in.

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However, the nuclear test and imposition of sanctions by the UN Security Council may make it politically easier for other states in the region to join.

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Adoption of Regime Change Policy by Non-Military Means The United States could adopt an official policy of regime change in North Korea, which would necessarily mean abandoning the Six-Party Talks and actively working to undermine the ruling government — either directly or through a collapse of the North Korean economy. Current U.S. policy already has elements of this, but declaring a regime change policy, even without threatening military action, would create large divisions with Seoul and Beijing. Because the United States may not have the economic leverage to squeeze North Korea to collapse, it would have to try to coerce China and South Korea to discontinue their aid and economic cooperation programs that serve as a lifeline to Pyongyang. Further legal and financial measures, like those outlined in the above section, to choke off the flow of money and goods treasured by the elite class of North Korea could pinch those who support Kim Jongil. With Chinese and South Korean support, many maintain that the measures could either make the regime fail or convince the leaders to give up nuclear weapons.32 Some commentators have suggested threatening Seoul and Beijing that their overall bilateral relationship with Washington is at risk. For Seoul, this might mean threatening to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea and pulling support for the bilateral Free Trade Agreement currently in negotiation. For Beijing, it may mean a reconsideration of the ―One China‖ policy and a scaling back of the extensive economic relationship. Critics of this approach point to the potentially massive ramifications of hurting relations with China, a major factor in the global economy, and with South Korea, a U.S. treaty ally that hosts over 30,000 U.S. troops. Adopting a more punitive policy toward North Korea would align Washington more closely with Tokyo, possibly exacerbating already tense relations in northeast Asia. With explicit divisions, the somewhat uneasy peace may be disrupted, and the U.S. military may no longer be seen as a stabilizing force in the region. Critics also argue that squeezing the regime too tightly may push them to proliferate nuclear weapons and technology to willing buyers, including terrorist groups that may be targeting the United States or U.S. interests.

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Military Options There is a range of military options that might be considered, either as direct action or as a threat.33 Most analysts rule out the possibility of an all-out invasion to bring down the regime, citing the possibility of devastating North Korean retaliation on either South Korea or Japan, the uncertainty of Chinese reaction, the burden on the U.S. military, and the global costs of war in an economically vibrant region. When the Clinton Administration considered military action on North Korea‘s nuclear facilities in 1993, estimates of human casualties from an invasion totaled 52,000 U.S. military and nearly half a million South Korean soldiers dead or wounded, with an untold number of civilian deaths.34 The possibility of launching a ―surgical‖ strike to take out North Korea‘s known nuclear facilities is also considered unlikely to be completely successful, given North Korean‘s penchant for concealing activities underground, the lack of information about additional nuclear facilities, and the fear of a military response from Pyongyang.35 Similar fears of reprisal argue against a pre-emptive strike on Pyongyang‘s long-range missile capability, as recommended by former Defense Secretary William Perry as North Korea was threatening to test the Taepodong missile in July 2006.36 A number of prominent commentators have suggested using the threat of direct retaliation in the event that North Korea transfers nuclear material.37 These commentators argue that the proliferation of a nuclear weapon or material to a terrorist group may pose the biggest threat to U.S. security. Following North Korea‘s announcement of a test, President Bush stated that ―The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or nonstate entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences of such action.‖ Labeled ―nuclear accountability‖ by Graham Allison and ―expanded deterrence‖ by Robert Galluci, this approach would require expanded U.S. nuclear forensic capability. At present, it is uncertain whether a nuclear event could be attributed to a single source with 100% assurance. Drastic responses (i.e., nuclear retaliation) could be deemed less than credible uncertainties. Limited Withdrawal Some commentators have suggested that the United States should cede leadership of the current diplomatic efforts, arguing that the U.S. military is overstretched and badly needed in other parts of the world, particularly Iraq

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and Afghanistan.38 By concluding a peace agreement with North Korea and withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea, the United States would forfeit resolution of the problem to the regional powers, with China taking the lead. Even if the United States maintained its forces in Japan and elsewhere in Asia, and concentrated on expanding its air and naval power to contain any potential threat from China, the move would substantially alter the geopolitical landscape of the region. Ceding leadership on the North Korean issue would likely also mean giving up dominant stake in deciding how a new regional order may unfold in the event of Korean unification or other geopolitically significant scenarios.

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OTHER CRS REPORTS ON NORTH KOREA CRS Report RL33567, Korea-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by Larry A. Niksch. CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by Larry A. Niksch. CRS Report RS21391, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments, by Sharon A. Squassoni. CRS Report RL31900, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan, by Sharon Squassoni. CRS Report RS21582, North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options, by Edward F. Bruner. CRS Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack. CRS Report RL33324, North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency, by Raphael F. Perl and Dick K. Nanto. CRS Report RS21834, U.S. Assistance to North Korea: Fact Sheet, by Mark E. Manyin. CRS Report RL31785, U.S. Assistance to North Korea: Issues and Options for U.S. Policy, by Mark E. Manyin. CRS Report RL32493, The North Korean Economy: Background and Policy Analysis, by Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery. CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, by Andrew Feickert. CRS Report RL32167, Drug Trafficking and North Korea: Issues for U.S. Policy, by Raphael F. Perl.

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CRS Report RL33389, North Korea: A Chronology of Events in 2005, by Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark E. Manyin, and Hannah Fischer. CRS Report RL32743, North Korea: A Chronology of Events, October 2002December 2004, by Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett-Avery, and Helene Machart.

End Notes

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1

The 1994 Agreed Framework, negotiated between the United States and North Korea, outlined the U.S. commitment to provide North Korea with a package of economic, diplomatic, and energy-related benefits, and North Korea‘s consent to halt its nuclear program. Specifically, the agreement provided for the shutdown of North Korea‘s plutonium facilities, to be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in exchange for the annual delivery to North Korea of 500,000 tons of heavy oil and the construction in North Korea of two light water nuclear reactors. A separate protocol signed in 1995 by the United States, South Korea, and Japan, established the Korean Peninsula Development Organization (KEDO) to implement the Agreed Framework. The European Union later joined. After confronting North Korea about a secret uranium program, the United States suspended shipments of oil, and KEDO suspended work on the reactors in December 2003. 2 ―Korean Test Seen as Only Partial Blast,‖ Washington Times, October 13, 2006. 3 Center for Nonproliferation Studies, ―North Korea Conducts Nuclear Test,‖ October 10, 2006. 4 Text of statement available at [http://www.dni.gov/announcements/20061016_release.pdf]. 5 ―U.S. Finding Indicates Nuclear Test,‖ Washington Times, October 14, 2006. 6 Richard L. Garwin and Frank N. von Hippel, ―A Technical Analysis of North Korea‘s Oct. 9 Nuclear Test,‖ Arms Control Today. November 2006. [http://www.armscontrol. org/act/ 2006_1 1/NKTestAnalysis.asp]. 7 For more on China-North Korea relations, see CRS Report RL32804, China-U.S. Relations: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Kerry Dumbaugh and CRS Report RL3 1555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues, by Shirley Kan. 8 ―U.S. Pressures China on North Korean Arms Traffic,‖ Los Angeles Times. October 16, 2006. 9 ―China Reverses Its Refusal to Search N. Korean Cargo,‖ Los Angeles Times. October 17, 2006. 10 Michael Hirsh, Melinda Liu, and George Wehrfritz, ―Special Report: How North Korea Got the Bomb,‖ Newsweek. October 23, 2006. 11 ―China Resumes Crude Exports to Isolated North Korea,‖ Reuters. November 26, 2006. 12 For more information on South Korea‘s approach to North Korea, see CRS Report RL33567, Korea-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by Larry Niksch. 13 ―China Said to Start Enforcing North Korea Sanctions,‖ New York Times. October 16, 2006. 14 Ihlwan Moon, ―Bridging the Korean Economic Divide,‖ Business Week Online. March 8, 2006. 15 ―Burns Says Seoul Can Do More on NK Sanctions,‖ Yonhap News. November 16, 2006. 16 For further information on Japan-North Korean relations, see CRS Report RL33436, JapanU.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery. 17 Harrison, Selig. ―In a Test, a Reason to Talk,‖ Washington Post op-ed. October 10, 2006. 18 ―Background Note on North Korea,‖ issued by the U.S. Department of State‘s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. November 1, 2005. 19 This unclassified assessment was in response to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questions for the Record, arising from the February 2003 Worldwide Threat Briefing, dated August 18, 2003, p. 144 (or p. 18 of the pdf file); the full text is available at [http://www.fas.org/irp/congress 03qfr-cia.pdf].

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Ibid. Note that the question posed by the Committee was ―Is North Korea capable of developing simple fission weapons without conducting nuclear tests?‖ rather than a more direct formulation of ―Has North Korea developed weapons without nuclear tests?‖ In addition, a classified response was provided to the Committee. 21 See, for example, ―North Korean Fuel Identified as Plutonium,‖ New York Times, October 17, 2006. 22 Although some U.S. officials have suggested that North Korea has had nuclear weapons for several years, official U.S. unclassified estimates have not stated that. Prior to the nuclear test, unclassified U.S. intelligence assessments have focused on the amount of plutonium that North Korea is likely to have. The assumption that North Korea has workable devices seems to rest on the notion that acquisition of fissile material like plutonium is the usually the most difficult hurdle to overcome in the development of nuclear weapons. Experts tend to agree that the weaponization process (shaping the metal, weapons design, and manufacture) can take as few as six months. The observation that the October 2006 test had less than a 1 -kt yield suggests that North Korea may not have a workable design, although the test itself may provide significant technical information about what North Korea has to improve. 23 ―Pyongyang Threatens to Make More Nukes,‖ Washington Times, March 15, 2006 24 ―N. Korea Threatens Pre-emptive Strike Against the U.S.,‖ USA Today, March 22, 2006. 25 ―Paging Dr. Strangelove,‖ Wall Street Journal, October 17, 2006. 26 For a summary of Taiwan‘s clandestine nuclear efforts, see ―National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 19: New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese ―Nuclear Intentions,‖ available at [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB20/.] For information on South Korea‘s efforts, see [http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/ Board/2004/gov2004-84.pdf]. 27 Both reactors are several years from completion, and visitors in 2004 reported that the 50 MWe reactor building at Yongbyon ―looks in a terrible state of repair.‖ Should North Korea desire to increase plutonium production, it is more likely that it would finish construction on the 50MWe reactor, rather than the 200 MWe reactor at Taechon. 28 See a discussion of techniques by William Dunlop and Harold Smith, ―Who Did It? Using International Forensics to Detect and Deter Nuclear Terrorism,‖ Arms Control Today, October 2006, available at [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_10/CVRForensics.asp] 29 See Leon V. Sigal, ―An Instinct for the Capillaries,‖ paper for the Seoul-Washington Forum, Brookings Institution. Available at [http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/ 2006050 1_sigal.pdf]. 30 ―U.S. Pursues Tactic of Financial Isolation,‖ New York Times. October 16, 2006. 31 See CRS Report RS21881, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by Sharon Squassoni. 32 See Aaron L. Friedberg, ―An Offer Kim Can‘t Refuse,‖ Washington Post, Opinion section. October 16, 2006. 33 For a discussion of military options, see CRS Report RS2 1582, North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options, by Edward Bruner. 34 Michael Hirsh, Melinda Liu, and George Wehrfritz, ―Special Report: How North Korea Got the Bomb,‖ Newsweek. October 23, 2006. 35 ―For U.S. Military, Few Options to Defang North Korea,‖ Christian Science Monitor. July 7, 2006. 36 ―If Necessary, Strike and Destroy,‖ Washington Post. June 22, 2006. 37 See William J. Perry, ―In Search of a North Korea Policy,‖ and David Ignatius, ―We Need a New Deterrent,‖ Washington Post, Opinion page. October 11, 2006 and Charles Krauthammer, ―What Will Stop North Korea,‖ Washington Post, Opinion page. October 13, 2006. 38 See Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, ―North Korea Isn‘t Our Problem,‖ Los Angeles Times, Opinion section. October 11, 2006.

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CHAPTER SOURCES

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The following chapters have been previously published: Chapter 1 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RS21473, dated February 24, 2009. Chapter 2 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RL33590, dated May 27, 2009. Chapter 3 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RL34256, dated May 26, 2009. Chapter 4 - This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RL33709, dated December 12, 2006.

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INDEX

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A abduction, 84 accountability, 90 accounting, 47 accuracy, 2, 3, 30, 39, 60 administration, x, 42, 45, 56, 59, 60, 64 AEA, 60, 64, 69 Afghanistan, 90 aid, x, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 28, 29, 35, 37, 38, 42, 47, 49, 54, 59, 71, 75, 89, 92 air, 67, 75, 90 Alaska, 30 allies, xi, 72, 84, 85 alternative, 15, 17 alternative energy, 15, 17 aluminum, 46, 50, 51 Aluminum, 66 analysts, x, 1, 2, 5, 6, 36, 39, 52, 58, 62, 71, 75, 76, 77, 81, 85, 86, 87, 89 ants, 20, 36 Army, 8, 37, 83 Asia, xi, 5, 22, 30, 34, 35, 37, 38, 66, 69, 71, 80, 87, 89, 90 Asian, 8, 9, 35, 68, 69, 71, 77, 80 assessment, 42, 48, 50, 52, 66, 77, 92 atomic weapon, vii, 9, 20, 22, 33 authority, 15, 36, 63, 64, 70 B

ballistic missile, vii, ix, x, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 27, 28, 29, 30, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 52, 53, 74, 77, 78, 82 banks, 72, 87 Barack Obama, 61, 69 behavior, 84, 86, 87 Beijing, 36, 65, 68, 69, 75, 77, 81, 84, 89 benefits, 20, 33, 86, 91 bilateral relations, 86, 89 Board of Governors, 58, 66 bomb, ix, 10, 11, 23, 25, 32, 33, 38, 39, 41, 48, 49, 65 Boston, 67 Britain, 67, 73 burn, 46, 65 Bush Administration, viii, ix, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 26, 34, 37, 44, 49, 76, 77, 84, 85, 86, 87 C cargo, 74, 76, 88 casting, 46, 55 Central Intelligence Agency, 27, 31 certification, 25, 64 chemicals, 56 China, vii, ix, x, 1, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 34, 35, 36, 38, 41, 44, 51, 58, 67, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 80, 82, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92

back, 10, 16, 18, 22, 36, 57, 74, 82, 83, 89

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102

Index

CIA, 24, 25, 27, 31, 33, 37, 48, 49, 65, 66, 67, 77, 78, 79, 82 citizens, 14, 30, 84 civilian, 17, 89 cladding, 46, 55 Clinton Administration, 13, 25, 89 collaboration, 13, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 Committee on Armed Services, 69, 70 Committee on Intelligence, 67, 77, 92 Committees on Appropriations, 63 Communist Party, 17, 25 community, 80, 83, 85, 88 compliance, x, 71, 75 components, 13, 26, 32, 33, 82 composition, 20, 22 concrete, 29, 48 confidence, 50, 59, 66 conflict, xi, 44, 72, 75, 79 confrontation, xi, 72, 84 Congress, 15, 25, 26, 34, 36, 37, 42, 45, 47, 50, 51, 52, 57, 58, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 74, 82, 90, 92 consent, 16, 61, 91 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 63 construction, 21, 24, 26, 29, 44, 48, 58, 82, 91, 92 consumer goods, 18 control, 18, 30, 36, 39, 48, 52, 53, 54, 55, 82, 84 cooling, 24, 46, 48, 54, 55, 56, 58 counterfeiting, 73, 83, 85, 87 CRS, vii, 1, 7, 11, 14, 26, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 41, 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 73, 90, 91, 92, 93 CSS, 2 D danger, 80 deaths, 89 decision making, 17 decisions, 16, 17, 21, 36, 76 defense, ix, 6, 27, 36, 41, 46, 53, 65, 81 Defense Authorization Act, 63, 70 delivery, ix, 15, 17, 33, 42, 45, 91 Department of Defense, 63

Department of Energy, 25, 60, 63, 70 Department of State, 38, 65, 69, 92 destruction, 74 detection, 32 deterrence, 53, 80, 90 Director of National Intelligence, 50, 51, 65, 66, 67, 73 disabled, viii, 9, 11, 56 dismantlement, viii, 10, 21, 22, 37, 45, 54, 58, 62, 63, 64, 85, 86 division, 78, 85 draft, 15, 17, 36, 74 drug smuggling, 83, 87 E earthquake, 67, 72 East Asia, 5, 22, 68, 69 economic cooperation, x, 71, 76, 89 Economic Support Fund, 63 Egypt, 31 embargo, 74, 75 energy, ix, x, 14, 22, 33, 35, 42, 45, 54, 61, 62, 63, 71, 75, 77, 86, 91 engagement, 86 EST, 7 EU, 44 European Union, 91 expertise, 43, 64, 82 explosives, 44, 67, 78 F fabrication, 12, 45, 54, 55, 56, 58, 65 failure, viii, xi, 3, 9, 12, 30, 33, 39, 51, 71, 79 fears, 75, 76, 88, 90 finance, 27 financial aid, 14, 21 fissile material, ix, 41, 45, 46, 62, 67, 72, 82, 92 fission, 31, 67, 78, 92 flight, 2, 3, 4, 5 flow, 37, 49, 89 focusing, 34, 85

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Index food aid, 18 Foreign Relations Committee, 24, 32, 42, 65 France, 7, 35, 38, 39, 67, 69 fuel, ix, x, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 23, 24, 26, 29, 31, 32, 35, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 65, 67, 71, 75 funding, 45, 54, 62, 63, 64 funds, 34, 38, 62, 63, 70, 74 G gallium, 46 gas, 28, 88 gases, 52 GDP, 3, 4 goals, xi, 72, 75, 84 government, 3, 6, 9, 11, 12, 25, 26, 30, 32, 33, 38, 62, 71, 76, 78, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88 greed, 53, 57, 60 groups, xi, 72, 80, 83, 88, 89 growth, 49, 56 Guam, 2, 5, 30

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H handling, 46, 65 hard currency, 76, 82 Hawaii, 3, 30 hearing, 42, 50, 55 heat, 64, 66 heavy oil, 18, 21, 91 hegemony, 84 Hezbollah, 14, 29 high-level, 56 Hiroshima, 81 House, 15, 27, 69, 70 human rights, 64, 77, 85

103

id, x, 15, 25, 60, 65, 71 images, 37, 59 implementation, viii, ix, 9, 12, 18, 19, 41, 53, 62, 86 imports, 50, 76 incentive, 14, 83 incentives, 19, 22, 77, 86 inclusion, 21, 61 India, 77, 82, 85 indication, 50, 51, 78 indigenous, 43, 78 industrial, 4, 45, 51, 62 industrial application, 62 inspections, 15, 16, 21, 34, 44, 47, 60, 75, 76, 84, 88 inspectors, viii, ix, x, 9, 12, 15, 16, 36, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 58, 59, 60, 61 Institute of Peace, 68 intelligence, ix, 1, 6, 13, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 41, 44, 47, 49, 50, 66, 73, 78, 92 Intelligence Community, 50, 66 intelligence estimates, 13, 25, 31, 73 International Atomic Energy Agency, (IAEA, 11, 16, 20, 28, 34, 44, 60, 91 International Monetary Fund, 14, 21 international terrorism, 83, 85 internet, 35, 36, 37, 38 interviews, 16, 59 Iran, viii, ix, 1, 4, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 38, 53, 74, 79, 83, 85, 88 Iraq, 77, 79, 90 Islamic, 83 isotope, 46, 65 Israel, 26, 37, 38, 85 J

I IAEA, 18, 24, 32, 38, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 77, 91 ice, 59, 72

Japan, vii, ix, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 20, 22, 30, 31, 36, 37, 41, 44, 58, 61, 68, 72, 76, 80, 81, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92 Japanese, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 14, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 39, 66, 76, 80, 81, 84 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act, 74

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104

Index K

Korean government, 3, 12, 32, 62, 76, 84 Korean War, 14, 77 L language, 19, 63, 70, 74, 85 large-scale, 50, 59 law, 15, 17, 21, 36, 62, 70, 87 leadership, viii, 9, 17, 27, 78, 84, 90 Lebanon, 29 legislation, 64, 74 Libya, 4, 53, 78 lift, x, 15, 34, 42, 45, 64 likelihood, 14, 32, 43, 52, 87 links, 38, 88 London, 38 Los Angeles, 38, 67, 92, 93 loss of control, 53, 82

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M Macao, 87 Macau, 34 machines, 55 magnesium, 46 manufacturing, 27, 51, 73 markets, 18, 36 measures, 12, 16, 20, 34, 45, 48, 54, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 72, 76, 80, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89 media, 2, 26, 43, 53, 69, 78 megawatt, 13, 24, 31, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 metallurgy, 65 Michael McConnell, 50 Middle East, 14, 30, 85, 88 military, viii, ix, xi, 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 29, 30, 36, 38, 43, 53, 67, 68, 72, 74, 75, 76, 78, 80, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 93 missiles, vii, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 20, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 38, 39, 52, 53, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81, 82 momentum, 43

money, 34, 83, 87, 89 Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 83 Moscow, 10 movement, 59, 83 multilateral, xi, 72, 73, 77, 83, 86 N National Defense Authorization Act, 70, 74 National Security Council, 29 NATO, 7 natural, 28, 45, 46 Navy, 5 negotiating, viii, 9, 10, 12, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 33, 37 negotiation, 20, 23, 75, 84, 86, 89 New York, iii, iv, 8, 35, 37, 38, 39, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 92, 93 New York Times, 8, 35, 37, 38, 39, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 92, 93 nitric acid, 46 non-nuclear, 32, 63, 81 nonproliferation, xi, 64, 72, 80, 81, 82, 85 normalization, viii, 10, 14, 19, 22, 77, 86 North Atlantic, 7 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 7 Northeast Asia, 8, 80 nose, 28, 80 NPT, ix, 41, 44, 63, 74, 77, 83, 85 NSC, 72 nuclear material, viii, 9, 16, 36, 37, 52, 59, 60, 62, 82, 83, 87, 90 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, ix, 41, 44, 74, 82 nuclear power, xi, 54, 58, 62, 72, 77, 85 nuclear program, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 20, 22, 27, 29, 31, 33, 34, 38, 43, 45, 53, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 86, 91 nuclear reactor, viii, 10, 11, 21, 22, 26, 32, 43, 45, 46, 47, 91 nuclear talks, 17, 18, 21, 22, 35, 36, 53 nuclear technology, 20, 24, 27, 61 nuclear threat, 9, 10, 20, 22, 71, 79, 80

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Index O obligation, 13, 14 obligations, 12, 14, 44 oil, ix, 14, 15, 17, 21, 28, 41, 44, 75, 88, 91 online, 26, 39, 66, 69 opposition, xi, 28, 38, 71, 79

105

punishment, x, 71, 75, 80 punitive, x, 71, 72, 83, 87, 89 Pyongyang, viii, x, xi, 2, 10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 28, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 47, 53, 54, 59, 60, 61, 64, 71, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78, 82, 84, 85, 87, 89, 90, 92 R

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P Pacific, 30, 66, 68, 69 Pakistan, 1, 4, 24, 25, 31, 33, 49, 67, 73, 77, 85, 91 Pakistani, 4, 25, 49, 53, 78 Pentagon, 39, 52 permit, 55, 61 Pervez Musharraf, 66 Philippines, 83 photographs, 24, 26, 28 planning, 38, 43 plants, 24, 45, 49, 69 poison, 46 pond, 54, 55, 59 power, xi, 10, 24, 36, 43, 47, 48, 52, 54, 58, 62, 64, 72, 77, 78, 80, 85, 87, 88, 90 President Bush, ix, 15, 34, 42, 45, 58, 59, 69, 72, 73, 77, 90 President Clinton, 25 press, 15, 20, 24, 26, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 42, 49, 50, 57, 58, 61, 66, 67, 69, 75, 88 pressure, x, xi, 14, 44, 71, 72, 75, 76, 81, 87 prestige, 79, 82 production, ix, x, 1, 3, 5, 13, 24, 26, 31, 32, 35, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 81, 86, 92 program, vii, ix, x, 1, 3, 4, 9, 13, 16, 18, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, 50, 51, 54, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62, 64, 65, 72, 73, 74, 77, 80, 84, 85, 91 proliferation, ix, x, xi, 10, 13, 22, 42, 43, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 72, 81, 83, 84, 90 protocol, 15, 16, 36, 59, 60, 61, 91 PSI, 76, 88, 93 public, vii, 3, 5, 46, 60, 69, 73, 81

R&D, 68 radar, 2, 3 radiation, 43, 46, 48 radiological, 46, 79 range, vii, x, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 25, 28, 29, 30, 32, 38, 47, 51, 52, 57, 63, 64, 67, 71, 72, 76, 79, 89 reality, 80, 88 reciprocity, viii, 9, 86 recognition, 20, 78 regional, 79, 80, 86, 90 rejection, 11, 19 relationship, 3, 27, 89 repair, 48, 56, 92 reprocessing, x, 11, 13, 15, 16, 23, 24, 26, 32, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 Republican, 27 resolution, x, 14, 71, 72, 75, 76, 77, 88, 90 resources, 24, 63, 64 retaliation, 80, 89, 90 reunification, 84 rhetoric, 53 rods, 11, 13, 23, 24, 26, 27, 31, 32, 35, 43, 44, 46, 48, 54, 55, 56 Russia, vii, ix, 1, 4, 9, 12, 16, 32, 41, 44, 50, 66, 67, 72, 73, 74, 76 Russian, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 25, 31, 32, 72 S safeguards, 44, 49, 61, 77 sample, 24, 51 sampling, x, 16, 18, 21, 42, 45, 59, 61, 69 sanctions, ix, x, 11, 15, 34, 35, 42, 57, 61, 64, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 87, 88

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106 satellite, x, 1, 3, 11, 29, 30, 38, 39, 42, 43, 48, 52, 59 scaling, 16, 89 seals, 44, 47, 58, 60 Seattle, 2 secret, vii, 9, 13, 25, 27, 28, 33, 37, 38, 49, 57, 65, 91 Secretary General, 78 Secretary of Defense, 42, 64 Secretary of State, 3, 16, 17, 22, 29, 33, 34, 42, 46, 50, 59, 65, 68, 69, 72, 81, 82 security, x, 5, 36, 71, 72, 74, 78, 79, 81, 83, 84, 85, 90 Security Council, ix, x, 3, 11, 29, 34, 41, 42, 43, 53, 68, 71, 72, 83, 86, 88 seismic, 51, 52, 67, 73 Senate, 24, 32, 42, 50, 52, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 77, 92 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 24, 32, 42, 65 shape, 65, 80, 84 short-range, vii, 1, 7, 52 short-term, xi, 71, 79 Singapore, 12, 13, 15, 57 SIS, 69 sites, x, 5, 15, 16, 42, 45, 49, 58, 59, 61 smuggling, 83, 87 South Asia, 30, 80 South Korea, vii, ix, x, 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 29, 31, 36, 41, 44, 47, 54, 55, 61, 71, 72, 75, 76, 78, 80, 81, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92 Soviet Union, 24, 25, 43, 62, 64 speculation, 39, 75 stabilization, 5, 6 State Department, 16, 17, 25, 27, 36, 37, 57, 59, 61, 62, 68, 69, 83 stockpile, 15, 20, 22, 32, 37, 47, 57, 72, 78, 82 storage, 32, 54, 55, 56 strategies, 85, 86 submarines, 5, 6 summer, 1, 13, 25 Sun, 49 supplemental, 15, 63

Index supply, 27, 82 surveillance, 48, 50, 60 Syria, viii, ix, 4, 9, 10, 13, 14, 22, 26, 31, 37, 38, 57, 58, 62, 74, 79, 83 T Taiwan, 80, 92 tanks, 54, 74 targets, 2, 3, 6, 30 technical assistance, 45 technicians, 11, 18 Tehran, 28, 29, 35, 37, 38 terrorism, 14, 15, 16, 21, 34, 37, 53, 60, 83, 85, 86, 88 terrorist, 79, 80, 83, 89, 90 terrorist organization, 79 testimony, 24, 32, 42, 50, 58, 65, 66, 67, 70 Thailand, 76 threat, viii, xi, 3, 6, 9, 10, 20, 22, 53, 62, 64, 65, 71, 74, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 87, 89, 90 threatened, x, 11, 42, 45, 52, 56, 60, 72, 75 threatening, 6, 53, 87, 88, 89, 90 threats, xi, 53, 72 Tokyo, 7, 38, 39, 76, 80, 81, 89 trade, x, 14, 19, 20, 25, 35, 71, 74, 75 Trading with the Enemy Act, x, 14, 15, 35, 42, 45, 58, 69 training, 14, 25 transfer, xi, 34, 39, 71, 82, 90 transportation, 18, 79 Treasury, 36, 87 Treasury Department, 36, 87 trucks, 59, 75 U U.N. Security Council, x, 34, 42, 43 U.S. military, viii, ix, 2, 5, 9, 10, 20, 30, 67, 76, 89, 90 U.S. Treasury, 36 UN, 3, 35, 53, 76, 78, 83, 88 uncertainty, 3, 33, 89 unclassified, 37, 47, 49, 50, 66, 77, 92

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Index United Nations, ix, x, 11, 41, 68, 71, 72, 74, 86 uranium, vii, ix, x, 9, 10, 13, 22, 25, 27, 28, 33, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 78, 91 V vehicles, 5 visible, 17 W

weapons, vii, ix, xi, 4, 9, 13, 14, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27, 31, 33, 38, 41, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 53, 56, 60, 62, 65, 72, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 92 weapons of mass destruction, ix, xi, 4, 41, 72, 74, 84 White House, 15, 16, 35, 68, 69 withdrawal, xi, 18, 19, 72 WMD, 4, 63, 81, 82, 84, 87, 88 World Bank, 14, 21 Y yellowcake, 66 Yemen, 4, 31 yield, ix, x, 10, 31, 41, 43, 48, 51, 52, 67, 71, 72, 78, 92

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Wall Street Journal, 35, 38, 92 war, x, 53, 71, 74, 79, 89 Washington Post, 7, 25, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 66, 68, 69, 92, 93 water, viii, 2, 10, 21, 22, 43, 91 wealth, 82

107

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