North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: The Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria 9780814765364

Before widescale emigration in the early 1960s, North Africa's Jewish communities were among the largest in the wor

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North Africa n Jewr y i n the Twentiet h Centur y

More Advanc e Prais e fo r th e Boo k "There hav e bee n usefu l work s o n Nort h Africa n Jewr y before , bu t non e so meticulousl y an d imaginativel y open s th e fascinatin g vei n o f con temporary Zionis t activities , an d th e cloak-and-dagge r Israel i relationship , among th e Jew s o f Maghreb . I n on e fel l swoop , Professo r Laskie r ha s brought th e histor y o f th e Jew s o f Nort h Afric a u p t o date , an d h e ha s done s o bot h i n th e originalit y o f hi s scholarshi p an d th e richnes s o f hi s human interes t material. " —Howard M . Sacha r Professor o f History an d Internationa l AiFair s The Georg e Washingto n Universit y "An eye-openin g an d compellin g examinatio n o f th e Nort h Africa n Jewis h communities—of thre e ver y distinc t communities—durin g thi s century . I a m impresse d wit h th e free-flowing narration , whos e almos t casua l ton e belies th e effor t o f documentin g virtuall y ever y assertio n i n th e book . The dat a fro m Dr . Laskier' s persona l interview s wil l becom e invaluabl e as th e year s pas s an d thos e source s ar e n o longe r available . An d th e author ha s use d tha t informatio n wel l an d skillfully , t o flesh ou t an d give huma n dimensio n t o archiva l document. " —George K . Zucke r Professor o f Spanis h University o f Northern Iow a "An importan t overvie w o f Nort h Africa n Jewry' s final decad e befor e it s dissolution a s a resul t o f mas s emigration s afte r Worl d Wa r II . Michae l Laskier's insightfu l boo k wil l b e o f grea t interes t t o scholar s an d student s alike." —Aron Rodrigu e Stanford Universit y Author o f Sephardi and Eastern Jewries in Transition

North Africa n Jewr y i n the Twentiet h Centur y The Jew s o f Morocco , Tunisia , and Algeri a Michael M. Laskier

New York University Press NEW YOR K AN D LONDO N

NEW YOR K UNIVERSIT Y PRES S New York and Londo n Copyright © 199 4 by Ne w York Universit y All rights reserve d Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publicatio n Dat a Laskier, Michae l M . North Africa n Jewr y i n the twentiet h centur y : the Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, an d Algeria / Michae l M . Laskie r p. cm . Includes bibliographica l reference s (p . ) and index . ISBN 0-8147-5072- 9 (aci d free ) 1. Jews—Africa , North—History—20t h century . 2 . Africa , North — Ethnic relations . I . Title . DS135.A25L36 199 3 961'. 004924—dc20 93-2937 7 CIP New York University Pres s books are printed o n acid-free paper , and thei r bindin g materials ar e chosen fo r strengt h an d durability . Manufactured i n the Unite d State s of America 10

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To my wife, Anat, and to my children, Ron and Sheer

Contents

Illustrations i x Tables x i Acknowledgments xii i Introduction 1 Part One Politica l Development s durin g th e Years 1900-1948/4 9 1. Nort h Africa n Jewr y i n the Twentieth Century : A Sociopolitical Analysis 2 3 2. Unde r Vich y and th e Nazi-Germa n Menace : The Jews of North Afric a durin g th e 1930 s and 1940 s 5 5 3. Zionism , Clandestin e Emigratio n t o Israel, an d It s Impact o n Muslim-Jewis h Relations : The Cas e of Morocco, 1947-March 194 9 8 4

Part Two Politica l Development s fro m th e Lat e 1940s to the Earl y 1990 s 4. Emigratio n t o Israel i n the Shado w of Morocco's Struggl e for Independence , 1949-195 6 11 7 vii

viii Contents 5. Internationa l Jewis h Organization s an d th e c Allya fro m Morocco: The Earl y an d Mid-1950 s 15 8 6. Th e Self-Liquidatio n Process : Political Development s amon g Moroccan Jewry an d th e Emigratio n Facto r 18 6 7. Th e Israeli-Directe d Self-Defens e Undergroun d an d "Operation Yakhin " 21 8 8. Tunisia' s Nationa l Struggl e an d Tunisian Jewry : Jewish Anxieties, Muslim-Jewis h Coexistence , an d Emigratio n 25 4 9. Fro m Interna l Autonom y t o Full Independence : The Post Independence, Decolonizatio n Er a i n Tunisia 28 7 10. Algeria' s Politica l and Socia l Struggle: Algerian Jewry' s Dilemmas 31 0 Conclusions 34 5 Notes 35 1 Bibliography 38 5 Index 39 1

Illustrations

Chief Rabb i Serer o 1 7 Ouezzan 2 9 The Sarfat i Synagogu e 3 1 Alfred Valens i 3 3 Sultan Muhamma d V 6 9 Moroccan Jewis h Emigrant s i n 194 7 10 3 Jewish Schoolchildre n an d Their Rabbi-Teacher s 11 2 The Grand e Arena s Transit Cam p 13 6 Egyptian Presiden t Gama l Abdel Nasse r 20 6 The Gul f of Alhucemas 22 9 The Pisces 230 The Victims i n the Servic e o f the Clandestin e Zionis t Operation s 23 2 Alex Gatmon 23 6 Alex and Carmi t Gatmo n 23 8 Former Activist s an d Emissarie s o f the Undergroun d 23 9 Moroccan Jew s during "Operatio n Yakhin " 24 4 The Allf s Ecole Normal e Hebraiqu e 25 2 ix

x Illustrations The Victims o f the Osl o Tragedy, wit h a Photo of Yitshak Allal 27 6 Tragedy i n Osl o 27 7 The Cit y of Constantine 320

Tables

1. Jew s Remove d fro m Administrativ e Dutie s 6 2 2. Monthl y Rationin g of Foodstuffs an d Essentia l Product s 6 5 3. Th e Jewish Populatio n o f French Morocc o 6 7 4. Th e Populatio n o f Tangier, 1940-194 1 7 0 5. Algeria n Primar y an d Secondar y Schools , 1941-194 3 8 0 6. Jewis h an d Genera l Allianc e Schoo l Populatio n i n Morocca n Cities 8 9 7. Th e Bled Communitie s o f French Morocc o 9 0 8. Dat a on Yerida 12

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9. Officia l Frenc h Statistic s o n c Aliya fro m Morocc o 12 6 10. c Aliyat ha-No c ar in Morocc o 14 1 11. Yout h < Allya fro m Nort h Afric a 14 4 12. Financia l Assistance from N o car ve-he-Haluts 15 0 13. Ecol e Normal e Hebrai'que , Genera l Educatio n 15 9 14. Ecol e Normal e Hebrai'que , Jewis h Educatio n 16 0 15. Change s i n th e Jewish Ma p of Morocco 24 1 16. c Aliya fro m Tunisi a 26 6 17. Th e Jewish Populatio n o f Southern Tunisia , 195 4 27 2 xi

xii Tables 18. Yout h and General c Allya from Tunisi a 27 8 19. Th e Jewish Populatio n o f Southern Tunisia , 195 7 29 5 20. Th e Jewish Populatio n o f Tunisia, 1964-196 7 30 3 21. c Ally afrom Tunisia , 196 2 and 196 4 30 4 22. Tunisia n Jewis h Schoo l Enrollment , Decembe r 196 7 30 8 23. Th e Jewish Populatio n o f Algeria, 195 6 31 1 24. c Aliya fro m Algeri a 31 5 25. Th e Jewish Populatio n o f Algeria, Novembe r 196 2 and Januar y 1963 34 0

Acknowledgments

This boo k wa s writte n betwee n 199 0 an d 199 2 i n Chicag o durin g m y association wit h Spertu s Colleg e o f Judaica, a s the Loui s Susma n Profes sor o f Jewish/Middle Easter n Histor y an d directo r o f th e Susma n Com munal Studie s Program . I t wa s revised durin g th e cours e o f 1992 when I resettled i n Lo s Angeles an d became th e executiv e directo r o f the Worl d Sephardic Educationa l Center . Th e bul k of the researc h fo r th e book was carried ou t durin g th e 1980 s whe n I taugh t a t Tel-Avi v Universit y an d served a s a research schola r a t tha t university' s Diaspor a Researc h Insti tute. Th e Diaspor a Researc h Institute , i n conjunction wit h th e Memoria l Foundation fo r Jewis h Culture , provide d m e wit h a majo r gran t t o re search an d writ e thi s book . Th e Rosalin d Coh n Fun d o f Chicago enable d me during 1990-9 2 t o complete it . I would lik e to expres s m y sinceres t gratitud e t o the man y individual s and institution s wh o playe d direc t an d indirec t role s i n thi s project . Special thank s ar e owe d to : Yoram Miore k an d Dr . Michae l Heyman n o f the Jerusalem-base d Centra l Zionis t Archives ; Sara h Cados h o f the Jew ish Joint Distributio n Committe e archive s i n Jerusalem , a s well a s Den ise B . Gluc k an d he r wonderfu l staf f a t th e Jewis h Join t Distributio n Committee i n Ne w Yor k City ; th e Tabenki n Institut e fo r Zionis t Re search (Israel) ; th e staf f a t th e Hagan a Archiv e an d th e Israe l Lavo n Archive/Lavon Institut e (bot h i n Tel-Aviv) ; th e staf f a t th e Israe l Stat e Archives a s wel l a s th e Centra l Archive s fo r th e Histor y o f th e Jewis h People (bot h i n Jerusalem) ; th e staf f a t th e Qua i d'Orsa y (Nante s an d Paris) an d th e Publi c Recor d Offic e (London) ; th e staf f a t th e Allianc e Israelite Universell e Archives (Paris); Dr. Yo 3 el Raba of Tel-Aviv Univer Xlll

xiv Acknowledgments sity's Diaspor a Researc h Institut e archives ; Rober t Atta l o f th e Ben-Zv i Institute i n Jerusale m fo r th e us e o f th e extensiv e Jewis h communities ' newspapers an d periodical s collections ; an d th e lat e Zv i Shnei r o f th e Ghetto Fighter s Museu m fo r th e us e of oral testimonies . Of considerabl e assistanc e i n th e researc h an d writin g stage s o f th e book were Hai m S a c adon an d Dr . Yaro n Tsu r o f Everyman's Universit y in Israel ; Professo r Yo 3 av Gelbe r o f Haif a University ; Professo r Steve n Lowenstein o f th e Universit y o f Judaism (Lo s Angeles) ; Professo r Hai m Zafrani (Universit y o f Paris); Professor Danie l J. Schroete r o f the Univer sity of Florida, Gainesville ; Professo r Rache l Simo n o f Princeton Univer sity; Meir Knafo , a former Zionis t undergroun d activis t i n Morocco; Jules Braunschvig, forme r presiden t o f the Allianc e Israelit e Universelle ; Naf tali Bar-Giora , a former emissar y t o North Afric a o n behalf of the Mossa d Le-cAliya Be t an d th e Jewis h Agency ; Dr . Yitsha k Avraham i o f Ya d Tabenkin; Ga d Shahar , formerl y o f th e Mossad i n Morocco ; Sa m Avita l (Abotbol), a former Zionis t activis t i n Morocco ; the lat e Marce l Franc o of the Allianc e Israelit e Universelle ; Elia s Harrus , th e delegat e o f the Alli ance Israelit e Universell e i n Morocco ; Rabb i Yitsha k Rouche , Avraha m Albert Hazan , Leo n Benaroya , Issacha r Ben-Ami , an d Davi d Sarfati , former educator s o f th e Allianc e Israelit e i n Morocco ; th e lat e Eugen e Weill, forme r secretary-genera l o f the Alliance Israelit e Universelle , an d the late Zachariah Shuster , formerl y o f the American Jewish Committee' s European Offic e i n Paris ; Da n Kariv , a n Israel i emissar y wh o operate d out o f Tunisia an d Morocco ; Carmi t Gatmon , th e wido w o f the lat e Ale x Gatmon, th e Mossads ma n i n Morocco ; and Gid e c on Raphael , a forme r senior official o f Israel's Ministr y fo r Foreig n Affairs . Special interviews were granted by former Israel i emissaries who were active i n Morocco , Tunisia , an d Algeri a fro m th e 1940 s t o th e 1960s , among them Yai r Douer, Shlom o Havili o of the Mossad, Eliyah u Brakha , Zvi Har-Zahav, an d Sam y Halevy—all three of the Mossa d Le- cAliya Bet . I am equally grateful t o professor Rober t M . Seltze r of Hunter Colleg e of the City Universit y of New York and to Colin Jones, Nik o Pfund, Jaso n Renker, Despin a Papazoglo u Gimbel , an d Jennife r Hamme r o f the Ne w York University Pres s for thei r effort s t o publish th e book . Finally, I a m thankfu l t o my wife, Anat , an d t o my children, Ro n an d Sheer, fo r endurin g with m e patiently throug h th e difficul t proces s o f the research an d writing .

North Africa n Jewr y i n the Twentiet h Centur y

Introduction

General Remarks about the Book Few in-dept h historica l studie s hav e bee n writte n heretofor e o n Nort h African (Maghribi ) Jewr y which , a t mid-century , numbere d approxi mately five hundre d thousan d i n Morocco , Tunisia , an d Algeri a com bined. Th e recen t excellen t studie s tha t surve y aspect s o f North Africa n and Middl e Easter n Jewis h heritag e includ e Norma n A . Stillman' s fol lowing two books, publishe d b y The Jewish Publicatio n Societ y of America: The Jews of Arab Lands (1979 ) an d The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times (1991) . Othe r importan t survey s includ e th e voluminou s work edited b y Shmue l Ettinger , i n Hebrew , entitle d The History of the Jews in the Muslim Countries (Jerusalem : Zalma n Shaza r Center , 1981 86), whic h concentrate s o n th e pre-194 8 period . It s mai n contributor s are Ya cakov Barnai, Yose f Tubi, Shalo m Bar-Asher , an d Miche l Abitbol . North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: The Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria i s a politica l history . I t i s a resul t o f exhaustiv e research o f archival materials i n Israel, Europe , an d the Unite d States ; of personal interview s wit h forme r communit y leaders , Maghrib i Zionists , and Jewis h outsider s wh o live d an d worke d amon g Nort h Africa' s Jews ; of non-Jewis h manuscrip t material s availabl e i n Morocco , Tunisia , an d France; an d o f my previou s writing s tha t wer e update d throug h furthe r research. Th e boo k doe s no t cove r Liby a an d Egypt . Egyptia n Jewr y i n the twentiet h centur y ha s bee n treate d b y thi s autho r separatel y i n The Jews of Egypt, 1920-1970: In the Midst of Zionism, Anti-Semitism and the Middle East Conflict (Ne w York : Ne w Yor k Universit y Press , 1992 , in hardcover an d paperback) . 1

2 Introduction The archiva l material s researche d fo r thi s boo k ar e diverse . First , th e archives o f th e Allianc e Israelit e Universell e (Paris ) an d th e Allianc e Israelite Universell e microfil m collectio n (Jerusalem , Centra l Archive s for th e Histor y o f th e Jewis h People) , provid e ampl e dat a o n bot h th e educational an d politica l function s o f tha t French-Jewis h educationa l organization o n behal f o f North Africa n Jewr y fro m it s inceptio n i n 186 0 until th e mid-twentiet h century . Second, communa l archive s an d th e Worl d Jewis h Congres s corre spondence abou t th e socia l an d politica l welfar e issue s relevan t t o th e Jews befor e an d afte r Worl d Wa r II , includin g th e Jacque s Lazaru s collection, als o availabl e a t th e Centra l Archive s fo r th e Histor y o f th e Jewish People , presen t "insid e story " informatio n concernin g th e fear s and instability , hope s an d inspirations , o f the Nort h Africa n communitie s at th e tim e o f th e Musli m struggl e fo r independenc e agains t Europea n colonialism. Third, th e Publi c Recor d Office/Foreig n Offic e archives , London , a s well a s th e Diaspor a Researc h Institut e archives , Tel-Aviv , presen t vita l perspectives o n th e politica l statu s o f Morocca n an d Algeria n Jewr y before, during , an d following Worl d Wa r II . Fourth, th e achive s o f the Qua i d'Orsa y (Frenc h Ministr y fo r Foreig n Affairs), i n Pari s and Nantes , contai n th e bulk o f the Frenc h Protectorat e archives fo r Tunisi a an d Morocco , includin g dat a on : Frenc h colonia l policies vis-a-vi s th e loca l Zionism s an d th e applicatio n o f Vichy' s anti Jewish laws ; large-scal e emigratio n t o Europ e an d c allya (emigratio n t o Israel); European an d indigenous anti-Semitism ; Judeo-Muslim relations ; and th e Jew s i n th e mids t o f the struggl e betwee n th e colonize d an d th e French colonizers . Fifth, th e archives o f the American Jewis h Joint Distributio n Commit tee (Ne w Yor k an d Jerusalem ) contai n invaluabl e material s o n ever y aspect o f Nort h Africa n Jewis h cultural , social , economic , educational , and politica l life , fro m th e earl y 1940 s an d t o th e present . Create d i n 1914 b y America n Jew s o f Germa n origins , th e function s o f th e Join t Distribution Committe e include d th e subsidizatio n o f Jewish communa l institutions throughou t th e world , financing Jewis h emigration , an d pro viding assistance, food , an d clothing for the impoverished—refugees an d nonrefugees alike . Fro m th e 1940 s thi s organizatio n maintaine d office s and programs i n Nort h Afric a an d Europe . It s funds wer e largel y derive d

Introduction 3 from th e Unite d Jewis h Appeal , th e America n Jewis h Federations , an d the Jewish Claim s Conferenc e agains t Germany . From 1947-48 , th e Joint Distributio n Committe e assiste d man y orga nizations operatin g o n Nort h Africa n Jewry' s behalf . Amon g thes e wer e the OR T (Organizatio n fo r Rehabilitatio n throug h Training ) vocationa l school network , activ e i n th e Thir d Worl d sinc e 1946 ; th e Oeuvr e d e Secours au x Enfant s (o r OSE ) whic h establishe d clinic s i n Morocc o an d Tunisia; th e American-sponsore d religiou s school s o f Osa r ha-Tor a an d Lubavitch; th e Frenc h Allianc e Israelit e Universell e schools ; an d th e Mossad Le- cAliya Be t (Mossa d Le- cAliya hereafter) , th e organizatio n o f the Yishu v (Jewis h communit y o f Palestine) an d late r Israe l responsibl e for organizin g illega l emigratio n fro m Europ e afte r 1939 . Startin g i n 1947, the Mossa d Le- cAliya engaged i n promoting callya fro m th e Musli m world. Sixth, th e Hagan a Archive, th e Israel Labor Archive, bot h in Tel-Aviv; the Ghett o Fighter s Museu m archives ; th e Centra l Zionis t Archive s an d Israel Stat e Archive s (Jerusalem)—al l provid e th e bes t sourc e materia l on th e Yishuv' s involvemen t withi n th e Nort h Africa n communitie s an d on Zionist activity . The purpose o f this book is fourfold. I t aim s to: 1. Provid e a political textboo k o n Nort h Africa' s Jewis h communitie s that, unti l th e earl y 1960s , containe d on e o f th e larges t Jewis h popula tions in the world and , today , influenc e Israel i society and politics as well as Jewis h lif e i n Franc e an d Quebec . Israel s dynami c demographi c growth sinc e th e 1950 s would no t hav e bee n realize d withou t th e Nort h African c aliya. Th e ne w emigrant s strengthene d Israe l b y settlin g i n th e northern an d souther n borde r regions , an d i n developmen t towns , ofte n becoming th e victims of Arab-Israeli conflict s an d terroris t activity . Thei r contribution an d struggle s resembl e th e challeng e emigrant s fro m th e former Sovie t Unio n encounte r i n th e Israe l o f th e 1990s . I n France , Jewish lif e wa s considerabl y enhance d b y Nort h Africa n Jewis h emigra tion—mainly o f Algerians—from th e mid-1950s to the 1990s . As a result, French Jewr y gre w fro m 235,00 0 i n 195 7 (composed o f Jews originatin g from Alsace/Lorrain e an d Easter n Europe ) t o over 500,00 0 by 1970 . No t only did th e newcomer s injec t ne w stimulae int o Frenc h Jewry , bu t the y helped transfor m thi s no w heterogeneou s communit y int o th e secon d largest i n the Wester n world .

4 Introduction 2. Presen t a n in-dept h analysi s o f three Thir d Worl d Jewis h commu nities, thei r exposur e t o modernization , an d thei r relation s wit h th e Muslims an d th e Europea n settlers , playin g th e rol e mode l o f minoritie s caught between th e colonizer s an d colonized . 3. Accentuat e tw o centra l themes : political judicial status ; and officia l political attitude s i n Frenc h Nort h Afric a an d Spanis h Morocc o before , during, an d afte r th e decolonizatio n phase . 4. Documen t th e histor y o f the Nort h Africa n c aliya an d Zionis t activ ity fro m th e beginnin g o f the twentiet h centur y onward , a task hithert o not undertake n b y any professional historian . In thi s study , th e twentiet h centur y consist s o f tw o mai n periods : 1900-48/49 an d 1949-92 . Retrospectively , th e 1900-4 8 period marke d a crucial turnin g poin t i n Jewish Nort h Afric a wit h th e formatio n o f Zionist clubs and association s across the urba n milieu , organization s out of which there emerge d a Zionis t leadershi p elite . Culminatin g i n th e birt h o f Israel, thi s perio d als o witnessed politica l an d socioeconomi c transforma tions that lai d th e foundation s fo r th e eventua l Jewish exodu s from Nort h Africa. Ye t a s lat e a s 1947-48 , an d despit e th e emergenc e o f radica l nationalism amon g th e Muslims , th e struggl e fo r independenc e ha d no t yet gaine d momentum . Thoug h Jewis h emigratio n t o Israel , especiall y from Morocco , intensifie d durin g 1948 , important segment s o f the urba n Jewish population s i n Tunisi a an d Algeri a stil l entertaine d hope s tha t France woul d no t relinquis h contro l o f he r colonia l possession s an d would neutraliz e Musli m nationalis t ferment . The perio d 1949-9 2 dampene d hope s tha t larg e Jewis h communitie s would surviv e i n th e region . Politica l instabilit y durin g th e 1950 s a s th e nationalist struggl e fo r independenc e gaine d support ; th e declin e o f colonialism fro m th e lat e 1940 s onwar d leadin g Jew s t o ponde r th e pros pects o f livin g amon g th e Muslim s sans France; th e birt h o f Israe l an d North Africa n Musli m solidarit y wit h th e Middl e Easter n Ara b states , placing the Jews in a delicate balance; and the emergence o f independent North Afric a betwee n 195 6 an d 1962—al l contribute d t o th e desir e t o emigrate. Althoug h emigratio n wa s no t automatic , th e post-194 8 perio d witnessed a transitio n t o a proces s o f communa l self-liquidation . Fo r those wh o mad e c ally a—legally, semilegally , o r illegally—th e tas k o f organizing it was entrusted t o Israeli bodies suc h as the Mossa d Le- cAliya Bet, Mossad (Israel' s secre t servic e apparatus) , an d th e Immigratio n Department o f th e Jewis h Agency . Ne w ligh t i s she d especiall y o n th e

Introduction 5 role o f th e Mossad insid e th e Jewis h communitie s o f Morocc o an d Al geria.

Historical Background on The Non-Jewish Milieu

North Africa:

The recorde d histor y o f Nort h Afric a begin s wit h th e foundin g o f Car thage i n 81 3 B.C.E . Fo r 66 7 year s unti l it s fal l t o th e Roman s i n 14 6 B.C.E., Carthag e cam e unde r th e influenc e o f the Jew s an d Pheonician s of Palestine. 1 Th e Roman s wer e succeede d b y th e Vandals , th e Vandal s by the Byzantines , an d th e Byzantine s b y the Arabs in A.D . 642 . The oldes t populatio n grou p i n Nort h Africa , predatin g th e arriva l o f the Jew s an d Pheonicians , wa s th e Berbers— a Mediterranea n people , pagans whos e exac t origin s ar e ye t t o b e investigated . Embracin g Isla m following th e Ara b conques t o f 642 , an d undergoin g linguisti c an d cul tural Arabization , the y remai n a majo r demographi c componen t t o th e present. Severa l Islami c dynasties , Ara b an d Berber , controlle d Nort h Africa betwee n th e sevent h an d th e sixteent h centuries . Afte r th e 1550s , however, present-da y Algeri a an d Tunisi a cam e unde r th e influenc e o f Ottoman/Turkish domination , whil e Morocc o was controlled by the Shar ifian dynasty , stil l i n powe r durin g th e earl y 1990s . Whe n Algeri a wa s conquered b y th e Frenc h (1830) , Arabi c ha d lon g sinc e replace d o r supplemented th e Berbe r dialect s a s th e commo n languag e fo r mos t o f the inhabitants . I n Algeria , a s i n Morocco , th e Frenc h colonist s at tempted, ultimatel y i n vain , t o se t Berbe r agains t Arab , favorin g th e former. The Arab s o f modern an d contemporar y Nort h Afric a ar e descendant s of the earl y Arab invader s o f the sevent h t o the elevent h centuries . Lik e the Islamize d Berber s the y ar e Sunnis . O f the Berbe r tribe s i n Algeria , the Kabyle s of the Kabyl e mountains o f northern Algeri a form th e larges t group. The y wer e th e leas t expose d t o France . Becaus e o f th e isolate d and relativel y barre n are a i n whic h the y live , the y ha d mad e th e leas t contact wit h th e Europea n settler s (colons an d pieds noirs) an d ha d experienced th e minimu m o f th e Frenc h administration . O n th e othe r hand, i n the twentiet h centur y the y form th e larges t grou p of migrants t o France—migration i n searc h o f work. Othe r importan t Algeria n Berbe r groups includ e th e Chaouia s o f the Aures mountain s i n northern Algeria ,

6 Introduction and th e Mzabite s who live in enclosed bastion citie s in the Sahar a desert . The majorit y o f th e country' s Muslim s ar e th e Arabs ; a s man y a s 3 0 percent ar e Berbers . After th e Frenc h conques t o f Algeria fro m th e Turks , rea l wealt h an d power la y i n th e hand s o f th e Europea n settlers , especiall y fro m 187 1 when the y wer e abl e t o supplant Frenc h metropolita n an d militar y influ ence t o muc h o f the administratio n i n th e country . Th e colons, bot h th e powerful an d rich , an d th e "small " an d poo r (th e urbanit e pieds noirs) formed, i n effect , a superio r clas s whic h wa s "mor e Frenc h tha n th e French" (althoug h th e settler s wer e sometime s o f Spanis h o r Italia n rather tha n Frenc h origin) . Thi s clas s condemned th e native s (indigenes) and feare d tha t an y concessio n t o the m coul d onl y lea d t o th e eventua l disruption o f a structure o f which they , th e colons, intende d t o remain i n control.2 The Frenc h carrie d o n a policy , initiate d b y thei r Turkis h predeces sors, o f makin g Algeri a th e bas e o f thei r rul e i n Nort h Afric a an d o f increasing thei r territor y b y bringin g unde r Algeria n contro l area s tha t had hithert o looke d rathe r t o th e older-establishe d regime s o f Tunisi a and Morocco . A large-scale confiscatio n o f cultivabl e lan d followin g th e crushing o f Musli m resistanc e mad e Frenc h colonizatio n possible . B y 1880, th e coasta l area s ha d becom e predominantl y Christia n area s o f mixed Europea n origin : Spanis h i n an d aroun d Oran ; French , Italian , and Maltes e i n th e cente r an d th e east . Eac h weakening , eve n tempo rary, o f the Frenc h governmenta l authorit y led to the increased influenc e of th e settler s an d t o a renewe d risin g an d suppressio n o f the Muslims . On th e overthro w o f Loui s Philippe' s regim e i n 1848 , th e settler s i n Algeria succeede d i n havin g th e territor y declare d Frenc h an d th e thre e former Turkis h province s o f Algiers , Oran , an d Con s tan tine converte d into departements (Frenc h regiona l administrativ e units) , while coloniza tion wa s develope d wit h renewe d vigor . Betwee n th e 1870 s an d th e 1920s, th e European s fel t free t o establish political , economic , an d socia l domination ove r Algeria. 3 For a lon g time , th e Frenc h believe d tha t th e Algeria n Muslim s di d not wan t independenc e bu t rathe r t o merg e themselve s wit h France . I n thinking thus , th e Frenc h wer e fixing thei r gaz e o n th e tin y minorit y who receive d a Frenc h educatio n an d sa w th e salvatio n o f th e mas s o f their compatriot s i n th e extensio n t o the m o f a simila r assimilation . Bu t

Introduction 7 the Frenc h ignore d tw o othe r groups . Algeria n worker s an d student s mainly i n France , unde r th e leadershi p o f Ahma d Messal i Hadj , ha d formed th e Algeria n nationalis t movemen t that , fro m 1936 , too k th e titl e of the Part i d u Peupl e Algerien . I n Algeri a itsel f ther e cam e int o bein g another movement , le d b y a ma n o f religiou s leaning , Shayk h Ab d al Hamid be n Badis ; thi s wa s th e Associatio n o f Algerian c Ulama° (learne d scholars of Islam). Followin g the politica l eclips e o f Messali's movement , his part y wa s supersede d b y th e Comit e Revolutionnair e pou r TUnit e e t l'Action (CRUA) , late r forme d int o th e Fron t fo r Nationa l Liberatio n (FLN), whic h calle d for a break with France. 4 At th e tim e o f the Frenc h invasio n o f Algeria, Tunisi a wa s a provinc e of the Ottoma n Empir e but , i n effect , autonomou s unde r th e Husayni d dynasty. Thi s dynasty , consistin g o f Mamlu k (Caucasia n o r Orienta l slave s in Musli m countries ) an d Turkis h official s know n a s beys , controlle d Tunisia beginnin g i n 1705 , pledgin g allegianc e t o th e Ottoma n Sultan . The Husaynid s becam e a n integra l par t o f th e Tunisia n milie u throug h intermarriage an d acculturation . O f th e variou s bey s betwee n 170 5 an d 1957 (the latte r yea r markin g th e en d o f the dynast y an d th e creatio n o f the Tunisia n Republic) , Ahma d Be y wh o reigne d i n 1837-5 5 wa s a n avowed Westernizer . Unlik e th e ruthles s Turkis h dey s o f precolonia l Algeria o r th e conservativ e Sharifia n sultan s o f Morocco , Ahma d Be y brought Wester n advisers , mainl y French , t o help create a modern arm y and navy and related industries . Conscriptio n was introduced t o the grea t dismay o f the peasantry . Mor e acceptabl e wer e Ahmad' s step s t o bette r integrate Arabic-speakin g nativ e Tunisian s int o th e governmen t whic h had lon g been dominate d b y Mamhik s an d Turks. Influenced b y th e Frenc h Revolution , Ahma d abolishe d slaver y an d took step s intende d t o brin g Tunisi a mor e i n lin e wit h Europe , bu t h e also expose d hi s countr y t o Europe' s infinitel y greate r economi c an d political power. Tunisi a was bankrupt i n 1869 , and an international financial commission—with British , French , an d Italia n representation—wa s imposed o n th e country . On e las t importan t attemp t t o strengthe n Tuni sia internall y an d thu s preven t Europea n dominatio n wa s mad e durin g the reformist ministr y of Khayr al-Dln (1873-77) , one of the most impressive statesme n o f th e nineteenth-centur y Musli m world . Al l tha t wa s needed fo r Franc e t o establish contro l over Tunisia was the acquiescenc e of France' s principa l rival , Britain , an d thi s wa s obtaine d i n 188 1 whe n

8 Introduction the French , o n the pretext tha t som e Tunisian tribesme n ha d move d int o Algerian territory , lande d troop s i n Tunisi a an d establishe d a Protecto rate ove r th e country. 5 The Conventio n o f Mars a (1881 ) di d no t cal l fo r outrigh t conques t a s was th e cas e i n Algeria . Th e be y remaine d i n theor y a n absolut e mon arch, tw o minister s wer e stil l appointed , an d th e framewor k o f th e ol d government machiner y was preserved. Ther e was no confiscation o f land; mosques wer e no t converte d int o churches ; an d Arabi c remaine d a n official language . Nevertheless , th e suprem e authorit y passe d i n fact int o the hand s o f the Frenc h resident-genera l an d his functionaries . Although, i n retrospect , non e o f the Nort h Africa n countrie s ha d th e structural capacitie s t o withstand foreig n domination , nineteenth-centur y Tunisia offere d somewha t mor e favorabl e prospect s fo r self-sustaine d reformation tha n di d it s neighbors . Wit h abou t on e an d a hal f millio n inhabitants i n 188 1 (over thre e millio n i n 1956) , i n contras t t o Morocco' s four millio n i n 191 2 (11,626,00 0 i n 1960) , an d Algeria' s thre e millio n i n 1830 (9,500,00 0 i n 1962)—Tunisi a wa s th e weakest , mos t "colonizable, " and th e least pluralistic of the three countries . Why ? Tunisia enjoyed on e asset which distinguishe d i t sharpl y fro m th e res t o f the Maghrib . Hal f of its populatio n wa s sedentary , clustere d i n th e ancien t cities , towns , an d villages o f the sdhil, th e Tunisia n littoral— a populatio n easil y exploite d like th e peasantr y o f th e Egyptia n Nil e an d henc e a stabl e suppor t fo r any government . Wit h th e exceptio n o f th e Krumi r tribesme n o f th e northwest an d a few Sahara n tribes , triba l dissidenc e i n Tunisi a wa s no t as intens e a s i n Algeri a an d Morocco . Th e Tunisia n be y di d no t nee d t o organize militar y expedition s t o collect taxe s as did the Morocca n author ities. Th e peopl e o f Tunisi a wer e linguisticall y homogeneous , Arabic speaking wit h th e exceptio n o f a multilingua l Turkis h rulin g class , th e Jews, and , sinc e th e 1870s , a European settle r community . Th e Berber s of Tunisia constituted les s than 2 percent o f the population. 6 In lin e wit h th e homogeneit y o f th e Musli m population , a dynami c nationalist movemen t emerge d i n th e 1930 s unde r th e banne r o f th e Neo-Destour party . Similar t o Algeria , th e Musli m populatio n o f Morocc o wa s compose d of Arabs an d Islamize d Berbers , thoug h th e distinctio n betwee n th e tw o groups toda y i s mor e linguisti c tha n racial . Albei t greatl y influence d b y Arabic, th e Berbe r languag e ha s bee n preserve d i n th e mountainou s regions. Berber-speakin g inhabitant s ar e divided int o three ethnolinguis -

Introduction 9 tic groups : th e Riffian s o f th e Ri f mountain s i n norther n Morocco ; th e Imazighen, Tamazight-speaker s o f the Middl e Atla s mountains ; an d th e Shluh o f the Hig h an d Ante Atlas. Arabic-Berber bilingualis m amon g th e Berbers ha s becom e common , an d th e proportio n o f monolingua l Ber bers doe s no t excee d 2 5 percent. Europea n colonizatio n brough t a Frenc h and Spanis h minority , afte r 1912 , whos e number s ha d reache d som e 400,000-500,000 i n 1956 . Th e Frenc h an d Spanis h languages , whic h spread amon g th e urba n population s durin g th e Protectorate , ar e stil l spoken today. 7 From th e sixteent h centur y unti l th e present , Morocc o ha d bee n governed b y th e hereditar y Sharifia n dynasty . Th e dynasty' s govern ment, know n a s th e makhzan, wa s devote d t o th e extractio n o f taxe s i n specie an d i n kind , especiall y i n remot e region s wher e centra l authorit y was weak—area s referre d t o a s bled al-siba a s distinc t fro m bled almakhzan unde r complet e governmen t control . Th e principal justificatio n of the sulta n for collectin g taxes was his role as "defender o f the faith." I n order t o carr y ou t hi s dut y effectivel y h e neede d th e wherewitha l t o equip an d maintai n a n arm y fo r excursion s int o th e bled —a ter m use d by th e Frenc h t o describ e th e countrysid e an d mountainou s regions , applied i n this book merely for conciseness—campaigns know n as harkas and mahallas. Seldom , however , wa s hi s righ t t o collec t taxe s accepte d without a contest . Alliance s o f Arabo-Berber tribes , Shurafa 0 (plura l fo r Sharif o r descendant s o f th e Prophet) , an d Murabiti n (triba l mediators ) would ofte n for m i n varyin g combination s t o den y th e sulta n hi s reve nues, or , occasionally , t o pu t fort h a contende r fo r hi s titl e o f Ami r al Mu'minm (Commande r o f the Faithful). 8 The division , i n 1912 , o f Morocc o int o a larg e Frenc h an d a smal l Spanish Protectorat e followe d th e Franco-Morocca n Treat y o f Fe z (3 0 March 1912) , an d th e Franco-Spanis h agreemen t o f Novembe r 1912 . I t prompted th e tw o Europea n power s t o embark o n a military pacificatio n campaign betwee n 191 2 and 193 4 to ensure th e stabilit y o f the makhzan, which survive d alongsid e th e colonia l apparatus , an d t o consolidat e th e economic an d strategi c statu s o f thei r newl y acquire d influence . Th e campaign wa s successful , particularl y unde r th e comman d o f the Frenc h resident-general Field-Marsha l Lyautey . I t le d t o the demis e o f the bled al-siba. Area s formerl y i n th e siba wer e no w subordinat e t o bot h th e traditional qa ° ids (rural/triba l governors ) an d a French militar y adminis tration (Bureau x de s Affaire s Indigenes) . I n th e urba n milie u th e author -

10 Introduction ity o f th e makhzans pasha s (governors ) wa s supplemented , a t time s superseded, b y th e top-leve l Frenc h officials : th e controleurs civils an d chefs du cercle. 9 Unlike th e violen t takeove r o f Algeria , i n establishin g thei r Protecto rate i n Morocc o th e Frenc h ha d alread y gaine d th e expertis e o f formin g the Tunisia n Protectorate . Moreover , Lyaute y a s th e first Resident-Gen eral betwee n 191 2 an d 1925 , wa s a soldie r o f aristocrati c outloo k an d possessed a d e e p aestheti c appreciatio n o f th e artisti c qualitie s o f Moroc can civilization . Th e characte r h e gav e th e administratio n exerte d a n influence throughou t th e Frenc h Protectorat e unti l independenc e i n 1956. Lyaute y carrie d farthe r i n Morocc o th e concep t whic h ha d b e e n applied i n Tunisia , tha t autonomou s institution s wer e t o b e preserve d while, simultaneously , th e superimpositio n o f a paralle l Europea n ad ministration ha d t o b e designe d t o serv e th e interest s o f th e Europea n settlers. Earl y i n th e Protectorat e year s h e recommended : Use th e ancien t rulin g cadre s instea d o f dissolvin g them . Gover n wit h th e mandarin, no t agains t him . W e mus t procee d fro m this : being always destined t o be a tin y minority , w e canno t preten d t o substitut e ourselve s fo r them , bu t a t the mos t t o direct an d t o control. Thus , w e mus t no t offen d a tradition o r chang e a singl e custom ; w e mus t sa y t o ourselve s tha t ther e i s i n eac h societ y a rulin g class, bor n t o rule , withou t whic h nothin g ca n b e done , an d an d ther e i s a class to be governed . W e mus t us e the rulin g class in our interests. 10 It wa s stil l th e resident-general , however , wh o wa s empowere d t o sig n in th e nam e o f th e Sharifia n governmen t al l roya l decree s (zahirs). Henceforth Lyaute y an d hi s successor s wer e abl e t o influence , eve n dictate, th e content s o f the decrees , whic h wa s definitel y th e cas e durin g the Vich y period . Further , th e resident-genera l wa s grante d ful l polic e and militar y powe r fo r th e restoratio n o f publi c orde r an d fo r Morocco' s air an d lan d defenses . Whereas th e Atla s mountain s an d centra l Morocco , includin g th e major citie s an d regions—Casablanca , Marrakesh , Oudjda , Fez , Meknes , Rabat, Sale , Sefrou , Mazagan , Essaouir a (Mogador) , an d Agadir—wer e under th e Frenc h Protectorate , norther n Morocc o wit h th e exceptio n o f Tangier becam e Spain' s spher e o f influence . Thi s included , amon g oth ers, th e citie s o f Tetuan , Larache , Elksar , Nador , Arcila , an d th e Ri f mountains. Spai n appointe d a khalifa, o r viceroy , chose n fro m th e Mo roccan roya l family , a s nomina l hea d o f stat e an d provide d hi m wit h a

Introduction 1

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puppet Morocca n government . Thi s enable d th e Spaniard s t o conduc t affairs independentl y o f th e powerfu l Frenc h Zone , whil e nominall y preserving Morocca n unity . A s i n Frenc h Morocco , European-staffe d departments o r region s wer e created , administere d b y interventores, corresponding t o the Frenc h controleurs civils. Though i t ha d a larg e Spanish-speakin g populatio n Tangie r di d no t become par t o f th e Spanis h Protectorate . Th e cit y an d it s surroundin g region ha d bee n successivel y occupie d b y th e Pheonicians , Romans , Visigoths, Arabs , Portuguese , an d British . Th e strategi c situatio n o f thi s seaport ha d playe d a part i n it s relation s wit h th e Europea n powers . I n 1787 th e Unite d State s establishe d ther e it s first consulat e i n Morocco , and b y th e Anglo-Morocca n agreemen t o f 1856 , th e cit y o f Tangie r received th e statu s o f "diplomati c capita l o f Morocco. " I n Decembe r 1923 the representative s o f France, Spain , an d Britai n prepared a special status fo r Tangier . Whil e remainin g par t o f th e Sharifia n Empire , i t became th e capita l o f a n internationa l zon e o f som e 450 kilometers . I t was governe d b y a legislativ e assembl y an d th e sultan' s representative , the mandub, wa s actuall y appointe d b y th e French . I n Jun e 194 0 Spai n took advantage o f the collapse of France to occupy Tangier, bu t withdre w in 194 5 after th e Allied victory . The challeng e t o colonialis m i n Morocc o emerge d graduall y afte r 1930. Youn g intellectual s fro m Fe z an d Raba t commence d thei r protest , organizing first th e Blo c d'Action Nationale , the n th e Part i Nationa l and , finally, i n 1944 , Istiqlal , o r the Part y of Independence .

Jewish Society The numbe r o f Jew s wh o lef t Palestin e wit h th e Pheonician s afte r 58 6 B.C.E., whe n th e destructio n o f th e Templ e occurred , i s difficul t t o ascertain. I t i s known, however , tha t th e Jewish population i n the Magh rib—alongside th e Berbers—wa s numericall y strengthene d i n A.D . 70 , the dat e o f the secon d destructio n o f the Temple . The y wer e reinforce d in 149 2 by the megordshim (th e ones expelled) from Spai n an d Portugal . The penetratio n an d consolidatio n o f Isla m i n Nort h Afric a brough t about a comprehensiv e overhaulin g o f th e societa l structure . A s i n al l territories whic h cam e unde r Islami c jurisdiction, th e Jew s wer e classi fied a s a "protecte d people " o r dhimmis. Th e ter m dhimmi, applie d i n

12 Introduction the Sacre d La w o f th e Shar i c a an d an d i n th e Quran , designate s th e Christian an d Jewis h subject s o f an y Musli m ruler . Lik e mos t o f th e Sacred Law , th e principle s upo n whic h th e non-Muslim s ar e t o be deal t with b y Musli m ruler s evolve d i n th e earl y centurie s o f Islam . Th e Prophet Muhamma d an d th e first Caliph s wer e acquainte d wit h five religions: th e Jews , th e Christians , th e Sabaians , th e Zoroastrians , an d the polytheisti c cult s o f Arabia; but th e Jews and Christian s ha d a special place i n th e Prophet' s concep t o f the world . Unlik e th e polytheists , the y at leas t ha d book s o f their ow n t o excuse the m fo r no t receivin g hi m an d were thu s th e "Peopl e o f th e Scripture. " Therefore , i t wa s establishe d that whereas o n the conques t o f new territory b y Muslims , suc h as Nort h Africa, polytheist s an d pagan s (i.e. , Berbers ) mus t accep t Isla m o r die , the "Peopl e o f the Scripture " woul d b e permitte d t o practic e thei r reli gion.11 What di d thi s mean ? I t outline d th e basi c tenet s unde r whic h Jew s and Christian s woul d becom e tolerate d infidels . B y th e ter m o f hi s contract wit h th e dhimmis, th e Musli m rule r wa s suppose d t o guarante e their lives , liberty , an d property , an d wa s responsibl e fo r thei r freedo m of religious practice . Th e Shar i c a laid dow n th e condition s b y whic h th e Muslim rule r woul d b e willin g t o protect thes e minorities . I n contras t t o the Muslim s th e dhimmis undertoo k t o pay th e specia l pol l ta x known a s jizya an d th e lan d ta x calle d khardj. Generall y speaking , i n compariso n with th e Muslims , th e dhimmis wer e a t a disadvantage legall y an d judi cially. Fo r instance , thei r evidenc e wa s no t accepte d agains t tha t o f a Muslim i n a n Islami c court . Th e Musli m wh o kille d a dhimmi di d no t suffer th e deat h penalt y an d a dhimmi coul d no t marr y a Muslim woman , whereas a Muslim coul d marr y a dhimmi woman . Thoug h i n Tunisia an d Algeria th e jizya/khardj practic e wa s eliminate d durin g th e nineteent h century, Morocca n Jewr y stil l pai d thes e taxe s a s late a s th e first decad e of the twentiet h century . The Jewis h communa l organizationa l apparatu s underwen t profoun d changes i n th e perio d followin g Musli m rul e i n Nort h Africa . Th e Jew s were grante d administrativ e autonom y ove r institutions , includin g th e rabbinic tribunal s tha t deliberate d ove r crucia l judicial matters , wit h th e exception o f case s involvin g lega l dispute s betwee n Jew s an d Muslims , in whic h cas e th e Shar i c a court s too k charge . I n Nort h Afric a mos t communities ha d rabbi s who served a s spiritual guides and presided ove r

Introduction 1

3

the synagogue s an d rabbini c courts . I n som e case s th e rabbinat e wa s hereditary. Th e prominen t la y notables , whos e powe r wa s partl y deter mined b y th e degre e o f thei r wealth , wer e assemble d i n council s com posed o f seven t o fifteen member s electe d b y the communities . Delving into the communa l structur e i n th e colonia l era , i t is essentia l to examin e eac h country . Sinc e th e mid-1840 s ever y majo r Algeria n community wa s directe d b y a consistor y (consistoire), a s wa s th e cas e with the Jewish communitie s o f metropolitan Franc e afte r 1808 . The ne w system helpe d th e poor , organize d publi c worship , se t u p synagogues , named th e rabbis , provide d religiou s instruction , an d administere d th e Jewish cemeteries . Unlik e th e preconsistoria l period , th e communa l leadership no w encouraged Jewis h youth s t o enter th e productiv e trade s and accep t aspect s o f Europea n life-styles . I n orde r t o mak e thei r wor k more effective , th e consistorie s o f Algeria organize d themselves , i n Apri l 1947, int o a Federatio n de s Communaute s Israelite s d'Algeri e (FCIA) . Benyamin Hele r wa s electe d president , Arman d Atal i secretary-general , Joseph Charbi t treasurer , an d Pau l Barkatz , Gasto n Saffar , an d Josep h Bensadoun vice-presidents . Th e boar d wa s chosen fro m th e electe d rep resentatives o f the consistorie s o f the thre e departements: Algiers , Oran , and Constantine . On e o f the principa l decision s o f the FCI A wa s to urg e the extensio n o f th e wor k o f th e America n Jewis h Join t Distributio n Committee int o Algeria , s o a s t o strengthe n th e feebl e lif e o f th e com munities; t o fight agains t th e indifferenc e o f the Algeria n Jewis h middl e socioeconomic stratu m t o th e Jewis h question ; an d t o remed y th e ab sence o f a networ k o f socia l agencies , an d thu s resis t th e tren d towar d assimilation noticeabl e i n th e growin g numbe r o f mixed marriages . Onl y in 1957 , however , di d th e America n Join t exten d it s service s t o Algeria . Since Algeri a wa s par t o f France , an d th e consistorie s subordinat e t o their counterpart s i n th e metropole, th e communitie s wer e represente d in th e Consistoir e Centra l de s Israelite s d e France , headquartere d i n Paris.12 In Tunisi a communa l leadershi p friction s wer e age-old . Althoug h a federation o f Jewish communitie s ha d existe d sinc e 194 8 under th e pres idency o f Charles Sa cada, presiden t o f the communit y o f Sfax , a second , rival federation wa s create d i n Ma y 195 3 under th e sponsorshi p o f Charle s Haddad, presiden t o f the Tuni s community . Th e country' s Jewis h com munities wer e the n spli t int o tw o hostil e camps : eightee n communitie s

14 Introduction remained wit h th e federatio n heade d b y Sa cada, eigh t communitie s joine d the newl y forme d federation , an d th e affiliatio n o f four other s remaine d in dispute . The Sfa x federatio n ha d no t bee n abl e t o obtai n lega l recognition , because th e larges t community , Tunis , refused—unti l formin g th e sepa rate federation—t o becom e a member . Confronte d b y personalit y an d political conflict s amon g Jewis h leaders , th e Frenc h too k th e positio n that the y coul d no t favo r on e agains t th e other , thereb y retainin g a neutral statu s vis-a-vis demands mad e upo n the m fo r financial aid . Whe n the tw o federation s di d merg e o n 4 August 1955 , Isaa c Hayat , leade r o f the communit y o f Sousse , wa s chose n a s first president . O n 2 2 Apri l 1956, i n a n alread y independen t Tunisia , Charle s Hadda d o f Tunis suc ceeded Haya t a s president. 13 The Jewis h communitie s o f Tunisi a wer e financed wit h ta x monie s collected b y th e governmen t fro m koshe r mea t an d Jewis h sacramenta l wine. I n 1955 , fo r th e first time , th e Frenc h Protectorat e agree d t o th e repeated request s o f th e Jewis h communitie s fo r th e inclusio n o f thei r welfare an d religiou s need s i n th e annua l budge t alon g with thos e o f th e Muslims. Th e su m o f 250 millio n franc s ($71,40 0 i n 1955 ) was provide d in tha t budge t fo r Muslim s an d Jews . Th e communitie s als o receive d funds fro m contribution s mad e i n th e synagogues , fro m religiou s rite s i n the cemeteries , an d fro m specia l appeal s mad e durin g Passove r an d th e High Hol y Days. 14 The statu s o f th e Morocca n Jewis h communit y council s unde r th e Protectorate syste m wa s first establishe d i n Ma y 1918 , an d late r give n various welfare, taxation , an d representatio n function s an d powers i n th e edicts o f January 193 1 an d 7 Ma y 1945 . A s wa s th e cas e wit h Tunisia n Jewry, th e Morocca n Jew s wer e denie d moder n consistories . Whil e no t fragmented lik e th e Tunisia n council s an d federations , th e Consei l de s Communautes Israelite s d u Maro c (CCIM) , create d i n 194 7 t o for m a n umbrella ove r mos t o f th e Jewis h communitie s aroun d th e country , received littl e governmen t support . A s elsewher e i n Nort h Africa , thi s organizational structur e supporte d itsel f b y levyin g taxe s o n th e sal e o f wine an d meat , an d b y contributions fro m th e better-of f member s o f the communities. Als o simila r t o Algeri a an d Tunisia , communit y counci l members wer e electe d b y th e peopl e or , mor e precisely , b y thos e wh o paid th e fee s t o maintai n Jewis h services . Rabbi s continue d t o wiel d

Introduction 1

5

strong influenc e o n th e Morocca n communities . Fo r instance , th e edic t of 7 May 194 5 declared tha t the y be include d i n the councils. 15 Concerning th e compositio n o f the socioethni c hierarchie s o f the Nort h African Jewis h communitie s i n th e nineteent h an d twentiet h centuries , highly complex and stratifie d phenomen a emerge . 1. Jews Whose Mother Tongue Is Spanish and/or Judeo-Spanish. Thos e were th e Sephardim , descendant s o f the megordshim wh o retaine d thei r Spanish languag e an d cultur e an d transmitte d t o thei r childre n th e cul ture o f medieva l Spain . I n Algeri a the y mainl y settle d i n th e regio n o f Oran, segment s o f whic h migrate d ther e fro m norther n Morocco . I n Morocco, wher e th e Sephardi m emerge d a s a large r grou p tha n i n Al geria, the y live d mostl y i n th e nort h (Tangier , Tetuan , Larache , Elksar , Arcila); thei r presenc e wa s als o quit e visibl e i n th e coasta l seaport s o f Casablanca, Essaouira , Mazagan , an d Safi . Th e Sephardi m were the mos t receptive t o Europea n idea s an d thei r manner s an d custom s differe d from thos e o f the res t o f th e Jewis h population . The y practice d monog amy, thei r segmen t o f th e populac e presente d th e prim e candidate s fo r banking an d trade , an d thei r famil y name s include d Nahon , Pinto , El maleh, Pariente , Benchimol , Laredo , an d Toledano . Whe n speakin g Judeo-Spanish instea d o f th e pure r Spanish , th e languag e include d a variety o f Hebrew word s an d biblica l verses. 16 In Tunisi a th e Sephardi m who arrived afte r 149 2 were a relatively smal l force whic h integrate d int o the olde r Jewis h community , know n a s the Touansa . O n th e othe r hand , an emigratio n wav e o f Jewish Sephardi/Portugues e element s t o Tunisi a after th e latte r hal f o f th e seventeent h centur y fro m Livorno , know n a s the Gran a ("Th e Peopl e o f Leghorn") cause d communa l frictio n betwee n the indigenou s Touans a an d th e quasi-European , Italian-speakin g Gran a Livornese, especiall y i n th e cit y o f Tunis. Unit y an d coexistenc e amon g them di d no t develo p unti l th e twentiet h century . Fo r generation s thes e two Jewis h sector s ha d bee n represente d b y tw o separat e communitie s in Tunis. 17 2. The Judeo-Arab Group. Thi s segment, th e most important an d larges t Maghribi Jewis h population , wa s divide d int o tw o categories . First , th e descendants o f the Jew s who settle d i n Nort h Afric a afte r 58 6 B.C.E . an d A.D. 70 . Thus, i n Tunisia, fo r example , thi s group constituted th e bulk of

16 Introduction the Touansa . The y spok e Judeo-Arabi c an d th e loca l Arabi c spoke n b y the Muslims . Judeo-Arabi c amon g the m wa s a s widesprea d a s Judeo Spanish an d Europea n language s amon g th e Sephardim . Th e homil y a t their synagogues , bot h ora l an d written , wa s i n tha t language . I t wa s studded wit h saying s an d passage s fro m sacre d writings , whic h wer e translated int o Arabi c an d allowe d t o b e briefl y rendere d i n Aramai c b y the homilists . Thes e usage s le d t o the emergenc e o f a special language, a melange o f Arabic , Hebrew , an d Aramaic . Whe n writin g Arabic , th e Jews use d Hebre w script. 18 I n Tunisi a thi s elemen t coul d b e foun d fro m the souther n communitie s o f Jerba (th e ghettos o f Hara Saghir a and Har a Kabira) and Gabe s t o the norther n citie s of Tunis, Sfax , an d Sousse . The y often live d i n Jewis h district s know n a s harat al-Yahud. I n Algeri a the y were concentrate d i n th e coasta l citie s o f Bone , Algiers , an d Oran , an d in Constantine . I n th e departement o f Algiers the y live d i n Orleanville , Djelfa, Laghouat , Cherchell , an d Medea ; i n th e Oranai s the y populate d Mostaganem, Sidi-Bel-Abbes , Tlemcen , Colom b Bechar , Geryville , La monciere, an d Montagnac ; i n th e Constantinoi s the y live d i n Batna , Setif, Philipville , Bordj-Bou-Arreridj , El-Oued , Biskra , M'Sila , an d Touggourt. I n th e Sahara , the y settle d withi n th e M c zab region , th e Mzabite Berbe r stronghold . A s fo r Morocco , thi s Judeo-Ara b segmen t populated th e coasta l citie s o f Mazagan , Casablanca , Essaouir a (Moga dor), a s wel l a s th e inlan d communitie s o f the bled, Fez , Meknes , Mar rakesh, Oudjda , an d Midelt—amon g othe r places . I t i s noteworthy tha t the Judeo-Arabs i n th e urba n area s wer e t o a large degre e migrant s fro m the bled. Man y Jew s throughou t Morocc o live d i n specia l ghetto s an d districts known a s melldhs. The secon d categor y wa s mad e u p o f the Sephardi m o f Morocc o wh o did no t settl e i n th e norther n par t o f th e countr y o r wh o ha d migrate d from ther e t o th e inlan d a s wel l a s t o th e citie s o f Morocco' s Atlanti c coast. The y mingle d wit h th e Judeo-Arab s and , ove r time , ha d forgotte n their Spanis h language , assimilatin g th e Judeo-Arabi c vernacular . The y did retai n suc h Sephard i famil y name s a s Toledano, Serero , Monsonego , Sarfati, an d Berdugo . Tabulated dat a o n th e variou s urba n an d rura l Maghrib i Jewis h popu lations are presented throughou t th e book . As for th e socia l stratificatio n amon g th e Jews , alread y i n precolonia l times th e smal l upper an d middle strat a include d bankers , businessmen , urban rea l estate investors , an d large-scale merchants . Consistin g largel y

Introduction 1

7

Chief Rabbi Serero of the Ville Nouvelle at Fez in the Serer o Synagogue (author' s personal collection).

18 Introduction of th e Sephardi/Livornes e groups , albei t b y n o mean s exclusively , th e Jewish merchant s engage d i n bus y trad e activit y i n th e Mediterranea n and Atlanti c Maghrib i seaports . On e categor y o f merchant s serve d th e authorities. I n Morocc o the y wer e know n a s th e tujjdr al-sultdn ("Th e Sultan's Merchants") , engagin g i n trad e wit h Europe , wit h th e Sultan' s blessings an d financial backing . The y an d th e Musli m tujjdr al-sultdn controlled al l the majo r imports—sugar , coffee , tea , metals , gunpowder , and tobacco—an d suc h vita l export s a s wheat, hides , cereals , an d wool , items which became governmen t monopolies . Essaouira , Morocco s mos t important Atlanti c seapor t unti l th e 1890s , develope d owin g t o thei r initiatives. Ver y affluent , th e tujjdr wer e sometime s envie d an d dislike d by th e Jewis h masse s an d b y wid e segment s o f th e Muslims . Wit h th e passage o f time an d th e grantin g o f commercial treatie s b y th e makhzan to Europeans , th e tujjdr privilege s wer e declining . I n Tunisi a affluen t Livornese Gran a emerged a s the equivalen t o f the tujjdr durin g the reig n of the Husayni d beys . I n Algeria , member s o f the Bacri , Bushnach , an d Duran familie s fulfille d simila r functions i n the pre-1830 period o n behalf of the Turkish deys . Another categor y o f merchant s wer e businessme n no t affiliate d wit h the rulin g elite . I n Morocco , fo r instance , thi s grou p expande d durin g the latte r hal f o f th e nineteent h centur y du e t o precolonia l Europea n economic, cultural , an d politica l penetration . I t als o develope d a t th e expense o f the tujjdr decline . Th e grou p was composed o f both owner s of trade firms an d distinguishe d representative s o f European busines s firms in Europ e whos e branche s extende d t o th e Sharifia n ports . A s talente d commercial intermediarie s betwee n Europ e an d Morocc o the y wer e granted consula r protectio n throug h th e intercessio n o f th e Europea n consuls o r th e owner s o f the trad e firms. Thi s privileg e enable d a smal l elite o f Jews to escape th e makhzan s political jurisdiction. Referre d t o as proteges, an d base d o n specia l agreement s betwee n th e makhzan an d several Europea n power s (no t alway s t o th e sultan' s advantage) , thes e elements wer e exemp t fro m th e paymen t o f the jizya, wer e no t trie d i n Islamic court s ove r crimina l matters , an d wer e exemp t fro m militar y duty. Henc e th e proteges enjoye d th e benefit s o f alien s residin g i n Morocco, whil e a t th e sam e time , the y di d no t posses s foreig n national ity.19 A fe w eve n serve d a s vice-consul s an d interpreter s fo r th e Euro pean consula r networ k befor e th e consulate s expande d an d recruite d career diplomati c servants . Wit h th e inauguratio n o f th e Protectorat e

Introduction 1

9

era, th e consula r protectio n fo r th e fe w wa s lifted , wit h th e uniqu e exception o f Tangier. The lower-middle stratu m wa s mad e u p o f artisans, grocers , peddlers , and other small-scal e merchants locate d in the inland and coastal regions, as wel l a s goldsmith s an d fruit an d vegetabl e merchants . Man y o f th e artisans acquire d thei r professio n o n a hereditar y basis . Thi s stratu m included a segmen t o f th e Morocca n bled stratu m whic h applie d t o th e Maghrib a s a whole. I n part s o f Morocco's bled Jew s actuall y engage d i n agricultural pursuits . Th e lower-middl e stratu m forme d th e dominan t socioeconomic grou p o f employe d Jew s i n Nort h Africa . Owin g t o th e efforts o f the Allianc e Israelit e Universelle , o r AIU , fro m th e lat e 1920 s onward an d o f th e OR T vocationa l school s afte r 1946 , thi s categor y o f Jews underwent professiona l modernization—wit h man y enterin g trade s such a s mechanics, electronics , an d television/radi o repair . The poor and unemployed strat a wer e sizabl e i n th e precolonia l an d colonial periods . Thes e include d settle d population s an d migrant s fro m the bled t o the urba n centers , livin g off communal charity . Chapter 1 investigate s deepe r Maghrib i Jewis h societ y durin g th e colonial period , highlightin g sociopolitica l modernizatio n an d othe r de velopments.

Chapter 1

North Africa n Jewr y i n th e Twentiet h Century: A Sociopolitica l Analysi s

In orde r t o understan d th e sociopolitica l factor s an d concern s o f twen tieth-century Nort h Africa n Jewry , severa l component s ar e explored , th e most importan t being : th e politica l statu s o f the Jews i n th e ne w colonia l setting; the politic s o f education wit h emphasi s o n Morocco ; the penetra tion o f Zionism ; an d th e conflic t betwee n loca l Zionist s an d thei r oppo nents.

Political Status under the Colonial System Colonial policie s affectin g Jews , particularl y Frenc h policies , differe d from on e countr y t o another. Thi s was mainl y tru e regardin g th e Frenc h citizenship question . O n 2 4 Octobe r 1870 , b y virtu e o f th e Cremieu x Decree, th e Frenc h governmen t grante d Frenc h citizenshi p statu s t o Algerian Jewry , collectively , irrespectiv e o f th e Jews ' leve l o f Frenc h assimilation, an d i n spit e o f the fac t tha t mos t o f them ha d neve r befor e rendered vita l services t o France. Hencefort h the y were subjecte d t o th e French courts . Onl y the Jews of the Sahara n region s di d no t benefit fro m this status , sinc e th e territorie s wher e the y live d di d no t com e unde r French contro l unti l 1882 . Protecte d ther e b y a Frenc h militar y admin istration, th e citizenshi p matte r wa s not pursued . In Tunisi a th e Jewis h populatio n fel l int o thre e categories : Tunisian , French, an d foreign . Unti l 1956 , three-quarter s o f the Jew s belonge d t o the firs t category ; mos t o f the remainde r wer e French . Tunisia n nation 23

24 North

African Jewry in the Twentieth Century

ality ha d bee n define d i n th e basi c treat y o f 1 0 Septembe r 1857 , an d i n the Tunisia n constitutio n o f 26 April 1861 . The treat y provide d i n Articl e 4 tha t Tunisia n subject s o f th e Beylicat e (th e Husayni d dynasty ) b e permitted t o practice thei r religiou s rites, an d in Article 8 that no distinction b e mad e betwee n Tunisia n Muslim s an d Tunisia n Jews . Th e consti tution als o provide d fo r permanen t allegianc e t o th e Regency . I t state d that al l Tunisian s wh o lef t th e country , fo r whateve r reason , whethe r o r not the y ha d bee n naturalize d i n anothe r country , woul d becom e Tu nisian subject s wheneve r the y returne d t o Tunisia . Al l Jew s bor n i n Tunisia an d unabl e t o establis h a foreig n nationalit y wer e considere d Tunisian unde r th e law. The only exception t o the principle of permanent allegiance wa s th e provisio n tha t a Tunisia n coul d becom e a citize n o f France upo n individua l application. 1 I t wa s i n 1923 , unde r th e Frenc h Protectorate, tha t th e Morinau d La w enabled Jew s to get Frenc h citizen ship on an individual basi s only . Moroccan Jews , th e overwhelmin g majorit y o f whom remaine d dhimmis, wer e wors e of f politicall y tha n eithe r thei r Algeria n o r Tunisia n counterparts. Thei r statu s warrants a more in-dept h analysis . Already i n 1880 , a t th e Madri d Conference , convene d b y Morocc o and th e Europea n power s t o deliberat e ove r Europe' s dangerou s viola tions o f Morocca n sovereignty , issue s o f consular protectio n an d foreig n nationality wer e raised . Regardin g th e latter, a rather complicate d polic y was formulated: "Ever y Morocca n naturalize d abroa d wh o shal l return t o Morocco must , afte r a perio d o f residenc e equa l i n tim e t o tha t whic h was lega l t o obtai n naturalization , choos e betwee n hi s complet e sub mission t o th e law s o f th e [Sharifian ] Empir e an d th e obligatio n t o leave Morocco/ ' Nevertheless , a qualificatio n wa s attache d t o this : "un less i t wa s prove d tha t th e foreig n naturalizatio n wa s obtaine d wit h the consen t o f the Sultan.' 2 Th e sultan , however , wa s no t abou t t o con sent. During th e Protectorat e perio d whe n segment s o f th e Jew s sough t French citizenship , the y encountere d stif f oppositio n fro m th e Frenc h Residency. Alber t Sagues , th e Allianc e Israelit e Universell e schoo l prin cipal fro m Casablanca , ha d me t wit h Field-Marsha l Lyautey , th e resi dent-general, t o discus s thi s matter . Lyaute y asserte d bluntl y tha t h e opposed th e Cremieu x Decre e grantin g Algeria n Jewr y Frenc h citizen ship i n larg e numbers ; a t th e sam e time , however , h e di d no t rul e ou t the possibilit y o f a carefu l selectio n process , whereb y th e ne w Frenc h

North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century 2

5

Protectorate woul d scree n individua l candidate s fo r Frenc h citizenshi p once the y prove d t o be thoroughl y assimilate d t o French culture. 3 The teacher s o f th e Allianc e Israelit e Universelle—man y o f who m were Sephardi m fro m th e Balkan s an d th e Ottoma n Empire—an d edu cated Morocca n Jews , di d no t relen t o n the issue . The y me t with Frenc h officials t o emphasiz e th e nee d fo r eithe r a slo w proces s o f Frenc h naturalization o f Morocca n Jewr y whereb y withi n twent y t o thirt y year s all Jew s i n Frenc h Morocc o (excludin g th e Spanis h Protectorate ) woul d become Frenc h citizens ; o r a large-scal e rapi d proces s o f naturalizatio n commencing immediately . Thes e Jewis h element s pleade d thi s cas e i n Jewish journal s i n France , amon g the m Paix et Droit, th e Archives Israelites, an d L'Univers Israelite. The y als o spoke in front o f French an d European audience s a s well as intellectual circle s throughout Morocc o t o stress th e importanc e o f th e service s tha t woul d b e rendere d t o th e French Protectorat e b y French-educate d Jewis h allies . Therefore , t o reward the m fo r thei r services , th e Protectorat e ha d t o consider grantin g French citizenshi p t o a s man y educate d French-speakin g Jew s a s pos sible. The pro-naturalizatio n campaig n wa s particularl y pronounce d durin g the mid - an d lat e 1920s , thoug h i t continued unti l th e outbrea k o f World War II . Fain t hope s wer e entertaine d tha t th e Spanis h Protectorat e would offe r Spanis h citizenshi p t o the Jews in their zone , an d hence onl y scattered effort s wer e mounte d o n th e par t o f the Jews ther e t o see k thi s privilege. I n th e Internationa l Zon e o f Tangier man y Jews were subject s of foreign countrie s an d therefor e th e issu e o f foreign naturalizatio n wa s less pressing . However , Tangier' s Jewis h communit y wa s bu t a smal l segment o f Moroccan Jewry . What wer e th e naturalizatio n proponent s implying ? Wer e the y prod ding the Frenc h t o convince th e the n Sulta n Muhamma d V (who reigne d from 192 7 until 1961 ) that h e consen t t o the naturalization o f segments of his Jewish population , thu s freein g the m completel y fro m th e makhzans jurisdiction? The y mus t hav e bee n awar e o f th e Madri d Convention' s concession t o Sulta n Mawla y al-Hasa n i n 1880 , tha t an y naturalizatio n procedure require d th e consen t o f th e sultanate , fo r Muslim s an d Jew s had to maintain perpetual allegianc e to him. I t is certain tha t Muhamma d V, wh o emerge d i n th e 1930 s an d 1940 s a s a nationalis t symbo l an d a n advocate o f Arab-Berber-Jewish solidarity , woul d hav e neve r gon e alon g with suc h a scheme.

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There was , i n effect , partia l suppor t amon g th e Frenc h Protectorate' s European populatio n fo r a t leas t limite d naturalizatio n o f th e mos t edu cated Jews . Fo r example , Victo r d e Stahl , a n influentia l figure i n Protec torate politica l circles , observe d i n 192 7 abou t th e Jews : Here i s a rac e whic h was hermeticall y seale d i n th e melldhs withou t darin g t o leave it s gates , a race persecute d b y the res t o f the indigenou s population , a race attached t o it s ancien t tradition s an d customs . An d her e w e se e tha t sam e rac e today, perfectl y assimilated , havin g bee n liberate d recentl y afte r centurie s o f setbacks, i n a n advance d intellectua l level , workin g an d dressin g i n th e sam e manner a s w e do . . . . Ther e ar e thos e amon g the m wh o qualif y fo r becomin g French citizens , base d o n thei r intellectua l level . W e ca n therefor e sa y that the hour has come to give Moroccan Jews the opportunity to become French. 4 This approac h wa s onl y o f benefi t t o th e "liberated, " th e mos t edu cated. Besides , th e descriptio n o f Morocca n Jewr y i n d e Stanl' s assess ment i s o n th e on e han d misleading , an d ros y o n th e other . D e Stahl , like th e Frenc h Protectorate , di d no t wis h t o se e large-scal e naturaliza tion an d consequentl y mak e enemie s fo r th e Protectorat e amon g th e Muslims. A s Lyaute y woul d argue , large-scal e naturalizatio n o r a Cre mieux-style decre e woul d sti r politica l animosit y amon g Morocco' s Mus lims a s i t has , ove r th e years , i n Algeria . Lyaute y an d hi s successor s t o the Residenc y i n Raba t als o feare d tha t onc e th e Jew s o f Morocc o ob tained Frenc h citizenship , the y woul d b e o n equa l footin g wit h th e European settle r community . Th e latte r di d no t muc h car e fo r th e Jews , whereas th e Cremieu x Decre e i n Algeri a helpe d fue l th e flames o f Euro pean disconten t an d anti-Semitism . Th e Frenc h contende d tha t Mo rocco, moreover , wa s no t a n integra l par t o f Metropolita n France , a s wa s Algeria, bu t a Protectorate , an d therefor e the y lacke d th e authorit y t o promote large-scal e naturalizatio n policies . An d the y wer e doubtles s reluctant t o challeng e th e rabbini c court s ove r judicial matters . If th e Frenc h wer e anxiou s abou t thes e problems , the y wer e equall y apprehensive abou t advers e reaction s from th e politicall y motivate d Musli m intellectuals wh o eventuall y emerge d a s Morocco' s nationalist s advocat ing independence . An y polic y o f divide et impera wa s challenge d b y these group s fro m th e outset . Par t o f th e oppositio n t o judicia l policie s was attribute d t o Frenc h effort s i n th e post-Lyaute y perio d t o temporar ily deviat e fro m certai n aspect s o f the statu s qu o an d remov e th e Berber s from th e influenc e o f th e Shar i c a courts . I n Ma y 193 0 a zahir wa s

North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century 2

7

published unde r Frenc h pressure , interpretin g Frenc h polic y fo r th e placement o f Berbe r tribe s unde r Frenc h crimina l law , an d recognizin g the judicia l competenc e o f the triba l jema c a o r Berbe r customar y cour t of appeal. Thi s policy was clearly intende d t o reduce th e influenc e o f the Shari c a courts amon g the Berber s an d thus , i f implemented, woul d hav e created dee p division s between Ara b and Berbe r communities . The zahir wa s neve r implemented , fo r th e oppositio n amon g th e Muslims t o thi s polic y wa s overwhelming . Th e Frenc h wer e no w mor e cautious tha n eve r abou t grantin g legislativ e benefit s t o Moroccan s o r recommending suc h reform s t o Paris . The y eve n appeare d indifferen t t o selective naturalizatio n i n Frenc h Morocco , eve n thoug h i n Tunisia the y had reluctantly adopte d th e aforementioned 192 3 French citizenshi p law. Conceding defeat , on e pro-naturalizatio n Jewis h activis t lamente d i n 1936: "W e hav e faile d t o scor e a succes s o n th e naturalizatio n question ; it is now impossible t o obtain an y concessions o n this point." 5

The Politics of Education in the Colonial Era: Until 1945 French cultura l an d educationa l influenc e i n Nort h Afric a intensifie d following th e Frenc h conques t o f Algeria an d th e establishmen t o f Frenc h Protectorates i n Tunisi a an d Morocco . Alongsid e th e Frenc h publi c schoo l system whic h was , i n th e cas e o f Algeri a an d Tunisia , increasingl y at tended b y Jewish youths, th e school s of the Alliance Israelite Universell e (AIU hereafter ) mad e seriou s inroad s int o severa l importan t communi ties. Th e AI U ha d bee n create d b y Frenc h Jew s i n Pari s i n Ma y 186 0 to struggle fo r Jewis h politica l right s an d wor k towar d Jewis h educationa l modernization worldwide , especiall y i n th e Ottoma n Empire , th e Bal kans, an d Morocco . Addin g t o it s agend a th e formatio n o f schoo l net works, it s educationa l institutions—bot h primar y an d secondar y school s —offered French/Europea n alongsid e traditiona l Jewis h curricula . It s schools i n Tunisi a predate d th e Protectorat e era , fo r the y ha d existe d i n Tunis since 1878 . However, th e penetration o f AIU educational influenc e there wa s mad e possibl e b y th e effort s o f loca l Frenc h consul s an d charges d'affaires . B y 1910 the AI U networ k i n Tunisia extended int o th e cities o f Sfa x an d Sousse , bu t no t t o Jerb a an d othe r smal l communitie s of the sout h where oppositio n t o modernization wa s strongly manifested .

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The situatio n wa s simila r i n Morocc o wher e th e AI U establishe d schools beginning i n 1862 , fifty years preceding th e Protectorate . There , too, Frenc h consul s an d ministers-plenipotentiar y no t onl y assiste d th e Paris AI U i n reinforcin g th e existin g schools , bu t negotiate d wit h th e Jewish communitie s t o establis h ne w ones . Th e Frenc h an d othe r Euro pean diplomati c emissarie s i n Tunisi a an d Morocc o sa w th e AI U a s a n instrument fo r modernizin g th e Jews . Thes e European s considere d th e Jews, mor e tha n th e Muslims , a s a potentially progressiv e elemen t i n th e population wh o could serv e Europea n interest s i n the precolonial period . Over th e year s numerou s Jew s benefited fro m thes e schools , whic h afte r 1945-46 were supplemente d b y American/Jewish-sponsored modernize d Sephardi religiou s school s know n a s Osa r ha-Tor a (O H hereafter) , th e vocational school s o f th e OR T network , th e Lubavitc h institutions , an d Protectorate-sponsored schools . Thoug h man y remaine d poo r a s lat e a s the 1960s , a n elit e o f white-collar professionals , a modernized stratu m o f artisans, and , i n general , educate d an d semi-educate d element s wh o spoke, read , an d wrot e French—emerge d i n Tunisi a an d Morocco . Man y had lef t th e Morocca n melldhs an d Tunisia n harat al-Yahud Jewis h resi dential district s fo r th e moder n Europea n quarter s buil t b y the Protecto rates. How do the Algerian Jews and thei r elite s fit into our analysis? Algeria represented a specia l situatio n withou t an y doubt . W e hav e see n that , unlike th e Protectorates , Algeri a becam e a n integra l par t o f France . A s Algeria dre w close r t o Franc e politically , militarily , an d culturally , th e Jews—with th e suppor t o f Frenc h Jewry—inevitabl y als o becam e par t of France . Th e Algeria n an d Frenc h consistories , dominate d b y rabbi s and la y leaders , worke d togethe r i n accentuatin g th e nee d fo r Frenc h education whil e simultaneousl y encouragin g th e preservation o f the Jew ish heritage . Give n thei r statu s a s Frenc h citizen s sinc e 1870 , Algeria n Jews thereafte r benefite d fro m th e righ t t o atten d th e Frenc h public , purely secula r an d integrated , schools , create d b y th e colonia l adminis tration. Consequently, th e AI U playe d a margina l rol e i n educatin g Algeria n Jewry, wherea s i t played th e major formativ e educationa l an d intellectua l role fo r Morocca n Jewry , whil e Tunisia n Jew s coul d choos e betwee n both AI U an d Protectorat e schools . Hence , Algeria n Jewr y le d th e wa y both i n regar d t o th e pac e o f Frenc h cultura l assimilatio n an d i n th e attainment o f civil an d politica l rights . The y wer e fa r ahea d o f Morocca n

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9

Ouezzan: A n Importan t Pilgrimag e Sit e fo r Musli m an d Jewis h Religiou s an d Cultural Celebrations (author's personal collection). Jewry, wh o wer e no t particularl y encourage d b y th e Protectorat e t o attend Frenc h publi c school s other tha n th e AIU's . This last point about Morocc o deserves specia l attention i n my analysis concerning the politic s of education. Wherea s i n the pre-Protectorate er a the Frenc h consul s went ou t o f their wa y to welcome Jewis h youth s int o their consula r school s (a s well a s t o hel p th e AI U expan d it s networ k i n Morocco), Frenc h Protectorat e official s afte r 191 2 exercise d cautio n i n their policies . I n fact, jus t a s the Frenc h i n Morocc o did no t recommen d granting political/judicia l privilege s t o th e Jews , a s late a s the mid-1940 s at least th e Residenc y was equally hesitan t t o enroll Jewish youth s i n th e schools intende d fo r th e Europea n population—th e ecoles europeennes. Its official s i n Morocc o though t tha t mos t Jew s woul d remai n loya l t o France i n an y case , wit h o r withou t receivin g specia l educationa l an d political privileges . Afte r all , th e ver y existenc e o f th e Protectorat e of fered the m th e kin d o f security the y had longe d for. Wantin g th e Jews t o progress i n th e pat h o f Frenc h culture , th e Frenc h nonetheles s argue d that th e proces s shoul d tak e plac e outsid e th e framewor k o f th e ecoles europeennes: throug h th e AIU an d othe r specia l institutions .

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In essence , th e Frenc h i n Morocc o adhere d t o Lyautey' s genera l formulae, discusse d previously . The y studiousl y avoide d anythin g tha t might unnecessaril y antagoniz e European s an d di d no t wis h t o appea r a s being mor e generou s t o th e Jew s tha n t o th e Muslims , thu s upsettin g th e very delicat e "socia l equilibrium " o f indigenou s society . Th e majorit y o f the Jew s continue d t o frequen t th e AI U and , t o a lesse r extent , th e ver y few specia l schools , almos t exclusivel y fo r Jews , know n a s th e ecoles franco-israelites. A s Roge r Gaudefroy-Demombynes , a Protectorat e offi cial, remarke d i n 1927 : It i s perhap s regrettabl e tha t th e Jew s ar e no t assimilatin g t o th e Europea n population. W e hav e n o interes t i n isolatin g o r removin g them . But , thei r acceptance int o th e primary-leve l ecoles europeennes wil l no t b e looke d upo n favorably i n th e eye s o f the Europea n familie s an d i t would arous e th e Muslims . . . . [Moreover] , th e Jew s o f Morocco , subject s o f th e Sultan , ar e unde r ou r protection a s ar e th e Morocca n Muslims . W e canno t enabl e thes e Jew s t o reac h a respectabl e statu s i n th e countr y a t th e expens e o f their forme r masters . I f we will b e regarde d a s thos e wh o prefe r t o develo p th e educatio n o f the Jew s o r i f we will be i n a situation whereb y th e educatio n o f the Muslim s would la g behin d it, w e wil l caus e hars h demoralizatio n amon g th e Muslim s an d unrest . . . . Sooner o r late r socia l an d economi c disequilibriu m wil l occu r betwee n th e Je w and th e Muslim , an d thi s we would lik e to delay as much a s possible. 6 Despite thi s policy , th e Jew s manage d t o underg o socia l mobilit y t o a greater degre e tha n th e Muslim s owin g t o thei r avidit y fo r educationa l progress. Th e mos t affluen t an d privilege d amon g the m succeede d i n enrolling thei r childre n i n th e ecoles europeennes. O n th e othe r hand , by mostl y frequentin g th e AI U schools , the y avoide d becomin g "ove r assimilated" t o Frenc h culture , give n th e Jewis h characte r o f thes e insti tutions—and muc h t o th e deligh t o f the Frenc h Residency . Interestingly, Muslim s frequente d specia l moder n Protectorat e schools — ecoles franco-musulmanes —which wer e subdivide d int o school s fo r youth s from prominen t familie s (ecoles des fils de notables); urba n school s fo r artisan youth s (ecoles urbaines); an d rural/agricultura l school s fo r Arabo Berber youth s (ecoles rurales) i n th e countryside . Thi s belle hierarchie as par t o f a pla n o f preservin g th e sociopolitica l statu s qu o i n indigenou s society, ye t promotin g Frenc h education , produce d a syste m tha t woul d correspond t o th e existin g hierarchies . Consequently , th e graduate s o f the Frenc h "nativ e schools " wen t differen t way s afterwards . Th e urba n

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The Sarfati Synagogue in the Melldh of Fez (author's personal collection). schools' graduate s entere d th e famil y trad e o r a vocationa l hig h school ; the rura l schools ' graduates wen t int o their parents ' profession o f agriculture an d farming ; whil e th e youth s fro m prominen t familie s enrolle d i n the colleges musulmans: hig h school s fo r Muslim s establishe d i n Fez , Casablanca, Rabat , an d eve n Azro u i n th e bled. Th e component s o f th e Muslim intellectua l elit e were eventuall y integrate d fro m th e colleges for bureaucratic employment . Therefore , socia l mobilit y coul d b e realize d within eac h framework : a n artisa n remaine d a n artisan , a peasan t re mained a peasant, an d th e middl e an d upper-middl e strat a retained thei r status also. 7 It remain s t o be studie d i f similar model s applie d i n Spanis h Morocco and the Internationa l Zon e of Tangier. Whereas i n th e 1950 s th e majorit y o f urban Jewis h youth s an d youn g adults bega n t o maste r th e Frenc h languag e i n significan t numbers , a t the expens e o f Judeo-Arabic , whil e bot h Spanis h an d Frenc h becam e widespread amon g thei r counterpart s i n th e Internationa l Zon e o f Tan gier an d Spanis h Morocco , simila r result s wer e no t apparen t amon g th e Muslims. Thi s wa s partl y attributabl e t o th e continue d indifferenc e t o

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modern educatio n b y th e Arab-Berbe r masse s an d partl y owin g t o th e failure o f the colonial authorities to expand th e franco-musulmans school s in proportion t o Musli m demographi c growth . I n 1951-52 , 67,72 2 Euro peans wer e enrolle d i n school s (a t leas t 9 0 percen t o f thei r school-ag e children), a s compare d t o 32,96 7 Jews , man y o f these a t th e AI U (6 0 t o 70 percen t o f school-ag e children) , whil e onl y 137,17 0 Muslim s fre quented moder n school s ou t o f 1,360,00 0 childre n o f schoo l ag e (1 0 percent). 8

The Evolution of Zionist Activity: The Interwar Years In Nort h Afric a a s i n othe r part s o f the Diaspora , hop e fo r th e retur n t o Zion, th e Lan d o f Israel (als o known a s Eretz Yisrael) , has always existed , a hop e tha t reste d o n messiani c an d religiou s concept s rathe r tha n o n political ones ; an d Nort h Africa n Jewr y maintaine d line s o f communica tion—through correspondence , emissaries , an d emigration—wit h Pal estine. Th e evolutio n towar d moder n Zionis m i n the region begins i n th e years 1900-191 4 wit h th e formatio n o f Zionist associations , sometime s i n conjunction wit h Europea n Zionist s who visited or settled amon g them . Beginning wit h Morocc o i n 1900 , thre e year s afte r th e first interna tional Zionis t Congres s tha t convene d i n Basle , Dr . Ya cakov Berliawski , a Russia n physician , settle d i n Tetua n an d establishe d ther e th e Shivat Zion associatio n togethe r wit h loca l supporters . A t th e tim e a secon d association, know n a s Sh a c are-Zion, wa s create d i n Essaouira—perhap s the first grou p t o populariz e th e sheqel (Zionis t membershi p car d ob tained b y paymen t o f fees ) i n Nort h Afric a an d t o sen d th e Zionis t Federation i n Cologn e ove r tw o hundre d sheqalim, entitlin g th e Essa ouira associatio n t o tw o representative s a t th e Zionis t Congress ; but thi s opportunity wa s no t exploited . A thir d association , Ahavat-Zion , wa s founded i n Safi. 9 In 190 8 the Hibbat-Zio n societ y was established i n Fez . I t engage d i n correspondence wit h th e importan t Zionis t cente r i n Cologne , popular ized th e sheqel, an d expande d it s activities t o include neighboring Sefro u and Meknes . Durin g th e earl y perio d o f the Protectorat e som e o f thes e associations were dorman t o r no longer in existence. Yet new ones spran g up durin g th e 1930 s and 1940s . Th e Balfou r Declaratio n o f 1917 and th e

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Alfred Valens i (1878-1944), A Leader o f Tunisian Zionis m (courtes y of La Gazette d'Israel, 2 0 June 1951) .

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San Rem o Conferenc e o f 1920—whic h supporte d th e caus e o f Jew s building a national homelan d i n Palestine—wer e haile d i n Morocc o an d encouraged loca l Zionist s t o strengthe n tie s wit h Europea n Zionism . Ashkenazi Zionist s o f Easter n Europea n backgroun d suc h a s Wolf f Hil perine, Anshe l Perl , Zeimi g Spivacoff , Zeid e Schulmann , an d Solomo n Cagan, eithe r visitin g o r livin g in Morocco , assiste d loca l Zionists i n thi s endeavor. 10 An importan t segmen t o f Zionis t sympathizer s consiste d o f eithe r rabbis o r graduate s o f the AI U schools . Thei r enthusias m wa s reinforce d by th e envoy s o f the Jewis h Nationa l Fun d (JNF ) an d th e Jewis h Foun dation Fun d (JFF) , wh o raised fund s fo r Jewish settlement s i n Palestine . Of specia l importanc e wa s th e arriva l i n th e earl y 1920 s o f Dr . Natha n Halpern an d Arie l Bensio n o f th e JFF . The y informe d thei r Jewis h audiences i n th e majo r center s o f Tangier , Tetuan , Casablanca , Rabat , and Fe z abou t event s i n th e Yishu v an d i n th e Zionis t world . Thoug h frequently hampere d b y th e Frenc h Protectorat e fro m publicl y politiciz ing i n favo r o f Palestine, the y face d les s challenge s i n Spanis h Morocco , Tangier, Tunisia , an d Algeria from th e authorities . Th e Frenc h Protecto rate i n Morocco , particularl y unde r Lyautey , wa s toug h o n Zionism , considering an y "nationalist " effort—Musli m o r Jewish—a s a n attemp t to undermine Frenc h influence. 11 Zionist federation s spran g u p i n th e thre e Maghrib i countries . Th e one i n Frenc h Morocc o wa s tolerate d b y th e authoritie s s o lon g a s i t remained subordinat e t o th e Zionis t Federatio n o f France . Indeed , th e Federation Sionist e d e France/Sectio n d u Maroc—a s th e Zionis t federa tion in Frenc h Morocc o came t o known a t its inception i n 1923-24—wa s no mor e tha n a n offshoo t o f the metropolita n Frenc h Zionis t federation . It wa s neve r recognize d officiall y a s wa s th e cas e i n Tunisi a wit h th e Federation Sionist e d e Tunisie . Supplementin g th e wor k o f th e federa tions i n th e Frenc h an d Spanis h Protectorate s wer e unofficia l pro-Zionis t newspapers an d bulletins , notabl y th e Renacimiento de Israel (fo r th e Spanish an d Internationa l zones) , edite d b y Anshe l Perl , an d L'Avenir Illustre i n Casablanca , publishe d betwee n 192 6 and 194 0 by th e Polish born Jonathan Thursz. 12 In assessin g Zionis t progres s i n Morocc o unti l th e outbrea k o f Worl d War II , i t shoul d b e note d tha t th e presenc e o f local Zionists an d envoy s from Palestin e an d Europ e stil l ha d a limite d effec t o n th e Jew s a s a whole. Morocca n Zionis m a t thi s tim e wa s not c a/ft/a-oriented; i t was stil l

North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century 3

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philanthropic i n nature , emphasizin g th e nee d t o fund-raise o n behal f of Eastern an d Centra l Europea n settler s alread y livin g in Palestine . None theless, i t did constitute a framework fo r post-1939 expansion which cam e in th e wak e o f certain events . Durin g th e 1940 s the movemen t graduall y attracted a following , an d no t merel y fro m th e rank s o f th e secularl y educated leadership . Zionism' s subsequen t developmen t coul d be trace d to circumstances alread y eviden t befor e Worl d Wa r II : 1. Th e failur e o n th e par t o f th e colonia l authoritie s i n Frenc h Mo rocco t o enac t legislatio n t o detac h th e Jew s completel y fro m th e makhzans jurisdictio n an d fro m thei r statu s a s a "protecte d people " unde r Islam ha d positiv e consequence s fo r Morocca n Zionism . Th e refusa l o f the Frenc h Protectorat e t o consider grantin g the Jews French citizenshi p or othe r lega l privileges , an d a simila r polic y i n th e Spanis h Zone , disillusioned a t leas t som e o f those wh o obtaine d a Frenc h educatio n a t the elementar y an d postelementar y levels , an d encourage d the m t o see k alternatives t o emancipation a Veuropeenne. 2. Politica l trends i n the Yishuv , includin g the Arab Revolt (1936-39) , and th e cal l fo r th e increas e o f Jewis h emigratio n t o Palestin e fro m various part s o f th e Diaspora , encourage d segment s o f Morocca n Jewr y to becom e mor e involve d i n supportin g Zionis t enterprises , includin g those whos e bran d o f Zionism wa s apolitica l an d traditional . Manifestin g solidarity wit h th e Yishuv , Morocca n Zionist s complaine d durin g th e 1930s that the Jews of Palestine were victims of injustice, wit h the Britis h Mandate abou t t o restric t emigratio n t o th e Yishu v i n connectio n wit h the Passfiel d Whit e Paper . Th e British , the y argued , wer e givin g i n t o Arab claims and playing Arab against Jew. The Arabs should have learne d by no w tha t th e Britis h ough t no t t o b e trusted . Wha t ha d eve r com e o f British promise s fo r independenc e t o th e Hashimite s an d th e Shari f Husayn i n Arabia and Ira q durin g World Wa r I ? The Britis h were simpl y launching strategie s o f divid e an d rule . O n th e othe r hand , th e Jewis h colonizers ha d prove n t o th e Arab s o f Palestin e thei r sincer e intention s of coexistence an d brough t wit h the m industria l ingenuit y an d prosper ity.13 3. Povert y wa s stil l rampan t i n part s o f Morocc o wher e th e AI U an d the Frenc h a s wel l a s Spanis h Protectorate s faile d t o exten d thei r influ ence, o r where , despit e thei r efforts , th e leve l o f destitutio n remaine d high. Povert y eventuall y becam e a weapon i n th e hand s o f the envoy s of the Mossa d Le- cAliya an d th e Jewis h Agency , fo r the y coul d pla y o n th e

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frustrations o f the poor who sought alternatives t o ameliorate their status . Yet a s lat e a s 193 2 Lucie n Saint , the n th e resident-general , coul d asser t confidently i n hi s lette r t o th e regiona l hea d a t Raba t tha t th e economi c situation i n Palestin e wa s s o precariou s tha t th e Morocca n Jew s wh o intended t o settle ther e would be condemne d t o misery, unles s of course they possesse d sufficien t capital . A s thi s wa s rarel y th e case , h e noted , they would becom e candidate s fo r repatriation. 14 4. Wherea s th e Frenc h Protectorat e i n particular close d dow n certai n Zionist club s an d neve r reall y tolerate d an y sor t o f intensiv e politica l activity, i t wa s mor e toleran t o f Zionis m fro m th e mid-1930 s onward , owing t o th e mor e accommodatin g attitud e o f th e post-Lyaute y Resi dency. Furthermore , th e envoy s o f the JF F an d JNF manage d someho w to enter Frenc h Morocc o and over the years fortified tie s with th e Jewis h population. Tunisian Jewry's identificatio n wit h thei r faith wa s extended t o includ e solidarity with , an d interes t in , th e res t o f the Diaspor a an d th e Yishuv . During th e middl e an d lat e nineteent h centur y ther e wa s sufficien t evidence o f cultura l identificatio n wit h th e Jewis h world . Jewis h news papers an d periodical s publishe d i n Hebre w i n Poland , Russia , Prussia , and Austro-Hungar y reache d Tunisi a an d Morocco . The y include d arti cles by Peret z Smolenskin , Aharo n Davi d Gordon , an d Nahu m Sokolow , and caugh t th e attentio n o f th e earl y Zionis t protagonist s a s wel l a s th e small bu t dynami c circle s o f th e loca l Hebre w maskilim (advocate s o f Jewish cultura l renaissanc e an d o f enlivening th e Hebre w language). 15 Similar to Morocco where Zionis t association s were first created i n th e coastal an d seapor t communitie s befor e spreadin g t o th e inland , Tunis , the mos t importan t Jewis h coasta l community , wa s th e startin g poin t fo r Zionist activity . I n additio n t o Agudat-Zion, founde d i n 191 0 or 1911 , the most significan t association s create d betwee n 191 3 an d 192 0 included : Ohave-Zion i n Sfax ; Bne-Zio n i n Beja ; Terahem-Zion i n Sousse ; Atereth Zion i n Jerba ; Tifadeh-Zio n i n Nabeul ; Hibbat-Zio n i n Tunis ; an d Ba hure-Zion i n Tunis . I n compariso n wit h th e pionee r Morocca n Zionists , by th e en d o f Worl d Wa r I th e Tunisian s comprise d a smal l bu t no t necessarily cohesiv e grou p o f rabbi s an d secularl y oriente d youn g me n whose aim s wer e confine d t o th e popularizatio n o f the sheqel, th e cele bration o f Zionis t diplomati c victorie s suc h a s th e Balfou r Declaration , and th e expansio n o f th e membershi p o f bot h activist s an d affiliates . There wer e hardl y an y effort s t o stimulat e c aliya, fo r thes e association s

North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century 3

7

were fa r fro m constitutin g mas s movement s an d wer e sometime s dor mant. Thi s wa s partl y attribute d t o th e fac t tha t mos t French-educate d Zionists dwel t i n th e suburb s o f Tunis (Ariana , L a Goulette , L a Marsa ) where European s (Frenchmen , Spaniards , Italians ) resided . Thes e Zion ist activists were therefore detache d from th e harat al-Yahud —the hom e of the Jewish masses . Of th e activ e Zionist s i t wa s Alfre d Valens i an d hi s wife , Marcelle , together wit h Josep h Bram i an d Henr i Maare k wh o strengthene d tie s t o European Zionism , participate d i n Zionis t congresses , an d kept th e mos t remote Tunisia n communitie s i n th e inlan d informe d abou t event s i n th e Yishuv. Despite Valensi' s intellectua l brilliance—h e wa s a graduate o f Frenc h primary an d secondar y school s an d ha d pursue d la w studies a t Montpel lier—and Brami' s excellenc e a s a n orato r an d organizer , the y faile d t o attract larg e number s o f supporters . Valens i di d succeed , however , i n forming th e Federatio n Sionist e d e Tunisi e i n 192 0 which receive d offi cial recognition fro m th e Frenc h Protectorat e administration . A s was th e case in Morocco , th e FS T was created wit h th e clea r ai m o f serving as an umbrella organizatio n tha t woul d unif y al l existin g o r newl y founde d associations scattere d i n th e coastal , seaport , an d inlan d communities . But problem s emerge d fro m th e outse t tha t wer e destine d t o plague th e FST, spli t it s membership , an d strengthe n competin g neo-Zionis t groups , several o f which espouse d mor e radica l ideologies . What wer e th e mai n problem s tha t retarde d an d virtuall y neutralize d the FST s effort s fo r som e time to come? Most importantly, th e departur e in 192 6 of Valensi from th e Zionis t scene , followin g hi s decisio n t o settl e in France , wa s a majo r setbac k fo r th e movement . Equall y significan t was th e sudde n deat h o f Bram i i n 1924 . Th e movemen t i n Tunis , th e FST, an d Agudat-Zio n thu s los t two key figures wh o had bee n consisten t in promotin g unit y amon g th e faction s an d i n coordinatin g channel s o f communications betwee n th e FS T in Tunis an d th e association s through out th e country . Secondly, whil e th e mainstrea m Zionis t FS T was i n shambles , Ze 5 ev Jabotinsky's Zionis t Revisionis t movemen t bega n t o penetrat e it s rank s during th e lat e 1920 s i n a n attemp t t o fill th e leadershi p vacuum . B y 1932-33, th e Revisionist s se t u p thei r ow n Zionis t federation , separat e from th e alread y weakene d FST , the n heade d b y tw o ke y mainstrea m Zionists: Victo r Catta n an d Simo n Bellahsen . Th e mai n leader s o f th e

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Revisionist federatio n wer e Eli e Luzu n o f Sfa x an d Alfre d Ross i a s wel l as Rober t Brunschvi g o f Tunis. Th e latter , a n Alsatia n Jew , ha d bee n a professeur a t th e prestigiou s Tuni s lycee. H e subsequentl y taugh t a t th e Universite d'Alger , becomin g on e o f the mos t renowne d Orientalists . B y 1939, Revisionis m becam e th e predominan t Zionis t politica l tren d i n Tunisia with severa l thousan d member s supportin g it s endeavors . Indeed, Tunisia n Jewry' s Zionis m an d politica l lif e o f th e lat e 1920 s and earl y 1930 s wer e diverse , a cente r o f Maghrib i Jewis h factionalism . The Revisionis t tren d i s on e aspec t tha t need s furthe r elaboration . S o is the growt h o f the youth/youn g adul t movemen t Unio n Universell e d e l a Jeunesse Juiv e (UUJJ) , an d th e appearanc e o f ha-Shomer ha-Ts a c ir an d the JNF Force . Returning to Revisionism, no t only did a Revisionist Zionist federatio n come int o being, bu t i n 193 2 its world yout h movement , Betar , wa s als o introduced i n Tunisia . It s promoter s wer e Alfre d Rossi , Feli x Allouche , Yosef Ankri , an d Ephrai m Luzun . The y create d branche s o f Beta r i n Tunis, Sousse , Sfax , an d Gabes ; th e leade r o f Betar wa s Ephrai m Luzu n from Tunis . Togethe r the y buil t Beta r int o a viabl e force , accentuatin g its lines o f policy an d attractin g th e Worl d Zionis t Organization . I n Tuni s a politica l clu b wa s founde d b y th e Betari m wher e the y organize d lec tures an d exchange d hars h word s wit h Jabotinsky' s leftis t opponents . Betar an d th e Revisionis t movemen t i n Tunisia were reinforce d b y Zion ist newspapers , notabl y Feli x Allouche' s he Reveil Juif (1924-1934/35) , La Voix Juive, Les Cahiers du Betar (1930s) , an d La Gazette d'lsrael (1938-51). Les Cahiers du Betar wa s o f short duration . However , i t wa s quite extrem e i n it s method s o f attracting th e loca l mainstrea m Zionist s as wel l a s th e Musli m nationalist s o f Habi b Bourguiba s Neo-Destou r movement. 16 The Unio n Universell e d e l a Jeuness e Juiv e (UUJJ ) wa s anothe r im portant startin g poin t i n th e histor y o f the Zionis t an d pro-Zionis t yout h and scoutin g movemen t o f Tunisia . A t th e beginnin g o f th e twentiet h century, yout h an d scoutin g movement s graduall y gaine d worldwid e popularity amon g youth s age d nin e t o twent y an d youn g adult s i n thei r twenties. I n Franc e ther e emerge d i n 192 0 a scouting movemen t withi n which th e Eclaireur s Israelite s d e Franc e (EIF ) wa s created . Fo r youn g people i n thei r twentie s Frenc h Jewr y establishe d th e UUJJ , recruitin g students an d maintainin g cordia l contact s wit h yout h center s globally . I t accentuated Jewis h value s an d th e necessit y fo r Jewis h colonization .

North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century 3

9

Interestingly, whil e i n Paris , Tunisia n Jewis h student s joine d th e UUJ J and, i n 1924 , founde d a branc h o f th e movemen t i n Tunis . I n 192 7 i t became a scouting force, affiliate d wit h th e EI F i n France . Confronting Beta r an d othe r Revisionist s wa s ha-Shome r ha-Ts a c ir which ha d emerge d i n Palestin e durin g the 1920 s as a youth organizatio n promoting th e kibbutz . It , too , evolve d i n Tunisia i n th e lat e 1920 s afte r two Belgia n members , o n thei r wa y to Palestine , stoppe d i n Tunis. Firs t they infiltrate d th e UUJ J and , havin g succeede d i n gainin g members , created a branch o f ha-Shomer ha-Ts a c ir in Tunis, calle d Eclaireur s Juif s de Tunisie . The movement , however , di d no t mak e rea l inroad s i n Tunisi a o r elsewhere i n Nort h Afric a befor e th e mid - o r lat e 1940s . Fro m th e lat e 1920s until 1935 , when it s activities wer e temporaril y halted , ha-Shome r ha-Tsacir wa s no t welcome . Oppositio n stemme d fro m assimilationists , traditionalists, mainstrea m Zionists , an d Revisionists . Activ e mostl y i n Tunis, i t wa s th e first movemen t t o advocat e massiv e yout h c aliya, a n appeal equally supporte d sinc e the early 1930 s by Betar. Bu t few enliste d their suppor t fo r th e kibbutz movement . Th e traditionalist s oppose d i t because o f the repercussion s i t would hav e o n th e traditionall y close-kni t family unit . Th e Revisionists , o n th e othe r hand , accuse d th e movemen t of activ e involvemen t i n communis t activit y an d denounce d it s advoca tion o f a collectiv e communisti c life-style . Nearl y al l segment s o f th e Jewish populatio n wer e the n critica l o f the movement' s suppor t o f equality amon g th e sexe s an d thei r integratio n i n join t socia l activity. 17 Th e only genuine allie s of ha-Shomer ha-Ts a c ir were th e loca l socialists (Jew s and Europeans) , wh o actuall y ensure d th e movement s continue d sur vival. The y opene d thei r intellectua l cercles t o it s members , enablin g them t o pursu e thei r aims . The y furthermor e wrot e article s i n th e loca l press supportin g their cause . Several envoy s fro m ha-Shome r ha-Ts a c ir i n Palestin e arrive d i n Tunisia i n 193 1 t o strengthe n tie s wit h loca l activist s an d t o encourag e c aliya. Bu t a s Raphae l Ben-Ashe r (Journo) , a former activist , suggested , the ris e o f fascism i n Europ e focuse d members ' attentio n o n th e triump h of socialis m ove r Hitle r an d Mussolin i rathe r tha n o n emigration . Th e handful o f youn g Tunisia n Jew s wh o di d visi t Palestin e returne d frus trated, claimin g tha t b y colonizin g the y wer e deprivin g th e Bedoui n an d Arab populatio n o f their lan d (i n th e Wad i Hawarith/ c Emeq Hefe r area ) and livelihood ; other s lef t th e movemen t an d joine d eithe r th e illega l

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Communist part y or—a t th e other politica l extreme—Betar. 18 I t may b e added tha t th e worl d economi c crisi s a t th e tim e drov e th e movemen t t o adopt a n increasingly leftis t orientation , leadin g to continuous ideologica l confrontations wit h Beta r an d th e Revisionists , th e force s tha t wer e gaining popularity amon g Zionist-inspired youths . A few youn g Zionist s loya l t o ha-Shome r ha-Ts a c ir, joine d b y others , among the m th e no w famou s write r Alber t Memmi , Yitsha k Avraham i (the so n o f Josep h Brami) , an d Raphae l Ben-Asher , founde d th e JN F Force, which , togethe r wit h th e UUJJ , supplemente d th e wor k o f th e JNF i n Tunis. They were inspire d b y leftist trend s i n France, particularl y the emergenc e o f Leon Blu m an d hi s Popula r Front . Mos t o f the efforts , however, centere d o n th e propagatio n o f Hebrew . Avrahami , a ke y activist, describe d th e Forc e a s compose d o f Jews fro m traditiona l back grounds a s wel l a s fro m th e developin g French-educate d middl e clas s and th e mor e affluen t bourgeoisi e wh o ha d deserte d th e UUJJ. 19 Whe n the wa r brok e ou t an d th e Vichyite s impose d politica l restrictions , fol lowed b y th e Germa n occupation , Zionis t activity , includin g tha t o f th e Force, wa s in seriou s jeopardy . Unlike Tunisi a an d Morocco , th e Zionis t movemen t i n Algeri a wa s almost completely dorman t i n the interwar years. I t was the least colorfu l and leas t dynami c i n Nort h Afric a becaus e o f th e stron g assimilationis t currents o f the loca l Jewish communities . Th e Algerian Jewis h scen e was totally differen t fro m eithe r tha t i n Morocc o o r Tunisia. Th e earlies t sig n of limited activit y ma y be trace d t o September 1897 , when member s o f a small circle o f Algerian Zionist s i n th e cit y o f Constantine sen t a letter t o the Zionist Federatio n o f Vienna heartily endorsin g the idea of Zionism. 20 At about the time of the Fourt h Zionis t Congress, however , onl y about 150 peopl e ha d bee n recruite d fo r th e Zionis t cause . Languag e wa s a n additional obstacl e t o th e sprea d o f the Zionis t idea . Th e Algeria n Jew s were ignoran t o f modern Hebrew ; Spanis h an d Judeo-Spanish wer e mostl y prevalent i n norther n Morocc o an d i n Oran , wher e Jew s o f Spanis h ancestry dwelt ; Judeo-Arabic , th e languag e spoke n b y mos t Nort h Afri can Jews , wa s no t efficientl y use d fo r promotin g politica l Zionis t theme s at the time . Frenc h ha d t o be th e mediu m fo r th e propagation o f modern Zionism. Whe n i t was understood tha t Zionis t committee s i n Vienna an d Cologne wer e willin g t o correspond wit h Algeria n Zionist s i n German , a leading Zionis t wrot e t o Vienna i n 1900 , assertin g quit e bluntly : "Inutil e

North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century 4

1

de rie n envoye r e n langu e allemande : j e n e comprend , helas ! qu e l e frangais."21 I n othe r words : d o no t wast e ou r tim e i f you pla n t o pursu e correspondence i n German . Indeed , ther e wa s ver y littl e activit y fro m 1900 unti l 1920 ; n o loca l federatio n cam e int o being ; fe w o r n o associa tions flourished; an d th e Zionis t pres s wa s virtuall y nonexistent . Onl y after 192 0 wer e ther e som e development s i n Constantine , th e mos t "Jewish" cit y i n Algeria , an d t o a smalle r degre e i n Algiers , Oran , an d Tlemcen. The Unio n Sionist e Algerienne , create d i n 1920 , intende d t o serv e a s one o f th e unifyin g force s fo r loca l associations . I t wa s mad e u p o f 270 members, mos t o f whom wer e inactive. 22 This attitude o f indifference o n the par t o f Zionist s an d non-Zionist s wa s als o reflecte d i n th e lac k o f concern fo r th e developmen t o f a Jewis h an d Zionis t press . Th e onl y effective pro-Zionis t newspape r wa s Eli e Gozlan' s Bulletin de la Federation des Societes Juives d'Algerie (BFSJA), th e mos t seriou s French language newspape r i n Jewis h Algeria . Ye t i t di d no t begi n t o appea r until 1934 , an d i t neve r becam e a n official orga n fo r Zionis t activity . I n the followin g year s th e BFSJ A remaine d th e majo r orga n o f Algeria n Jewry unti l 1948 . I t attacke d anti-Semiti c manifestation s i n Europ e an d somehow continued publicatio n int o the Vich y and post-Vichy periods . Irrespective o f anti-Semiti c outburst s o n th e par t o f th e Europea n settlers o f Algeria before, during , an d afte r th e Dreyfu s Affai r i n France , Algerian Jew s wer e ostensibl y o f th e opinio n tha t th e Jewis h pres s wa s intended t o serv e a s a defense agains t prejudic e an d oppressio n i n othe r countries, no t thei r own . The y considere d themselve s liberated , eman cipated, an d a s enjoyin g equa l right s wit h th e Europeans . Therefore , they sa w no nee d fo r Zionism . I n fact , i n 192 1 Lucien Smadja , a Zionis t leader fro m Algiers , ha d complaine d tha t th e sheqel driv e coul d no t b e launched i n vie w o f th e attack s directe d a t Zionis t cultura l an d fund raising effort s b y man y o f th e French-educate d Jews . Ther e wer e n o more tha n thre e hundre d dues-payin g member s i n Algiers ; only th e les s educated an d economicall y disadvantage d wer e willin g t o offe r som e assistance. Th e affluen t Jew s wer e to o prou d a t th e tim e o f thei r privi leges a la Cremieux t o eve n conside r Zionis m a s a n emancipator y alter native. 23 I n 1927 , a n editoria l i n Tunisia' s pro-Revisionis t newspape r Le Reveil Juif castigate d assimilatio n i n Algeria . Th e Jew s wer e accuse d o f living outside th e Jewis h world , o f bein g ashame d o f thei r heritage . I n

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Oran, wher e accordin g t o the editoria l 30,00 0 Jews dwelt, onl y 12 0 were members o f th e UUJJ ; intermarriage , too , wa s a widespread phenome non. 24

Jews in Political Conflict: The AIU and the Zionists of the Interwar Years Despite broa d suppor t fo r th e AIU' s educationa l endeavor s amon g Mo roccan an d Tunisia n Jewry , th e oppositio n to , an d misgiving s about , th e AIU amon g French-educate d Zionists , includin g AIU alumni , shoul d no t be underestimated . Thi s wa s especiall y th e cas e i n Tunisia , ou r mai n focus here . To begin with, i t is noteworthy tha t though mos t Tunisians and Moroc can Zionist s o f th e interwa r year s wer e no t conductin g c aliya, thi s ide a was th e ultimat e goa l o f all Zionists . O n th e on e hand , th e AI U throug h its numerou s school s i n th e Mediterranea n basi n aspire d t o transfor m and liberat e Jews i n their respectiv e countries , an d t o fight for legislativ e reform, bringin g th e Jew s close r t o France . Th e Zionists , o n th e othe r hand, calle d fo r a greate r Zionis t cultura l educatio n an d stresse d th e centrality o f Palestine a s well as the nee d fo r th e Jew s in th e Diaspor a t o manifest solidarit y wit h th e Yishuv—financially , politically , an d morally . This was unacceptable t o the AIU for quit e som e time . Until the 1930s , and perhaps later , French-educate d Tunisia n Zionist s viewed th e AIU , especiall y i n Tunis , a s thei r chie f adversary . Alfre d Valensi, Josep h Brami , an d Henr i Maare k al l sharply criticize d th e AIU . The thre e me n wer e particularl y incense d wit h Alber t Sagues , the n AI U school principa l fo r Tunis , accusin g hi m o f fomentin g anti-Zionis m an d falsely depictin g Tunisia n Zionist s a s disloyal , anti-French , an d Britis h agents. The y wer e als o angr y wit h Sylvai n Levi , the n presiden t o f th e AIU i n Paris , a distinguishe d schola r a t th e Colleg e d e Franc e an d a skeptic abou t th e futur e o f th e Yishuv . Lev i ha d mad e hi s view s quit e clear to the Zionists during the Versailles Peac e Conference , muc h t o th e anger an d disma y o f Dr . Chai m Weizmann , presiden t o f th e Worl d Zionist Organization . Th e Tunisia n Zionist s coul d no t stomac h this ; the y considered Levi s opinion s treacherou s an d associate d the m wit h th e overall AI U polic y vis-a-vi s Zionism. 25 I n fact , whe n tw o pro-Zionis t societies i n Tunis—Yoshevet-Zio n an d Bahure-Zion—refuse d t o re -

North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century

4

3

proach Lev i fo r treason , th e mor e militan t Agudat-Zion , heade d b y Valensi an d Brami , attacke d t h e m i n Jul y 191 9 fo r disloyalt y t o Zionism . Valensi als o attacke d Josep h Cohe n Ganouna , th e respectabl e Jewis h editor-director o f L'Egalite, fo r defendin g Lev i an d fo r portrayin g thi s main traito r agains t Zionis m a s "plu s sionist e qu e certain s sionistes " (more Zionis t tha n som e Zionists). 26 As note d previously , i n 192 0 th e Frenc h Protectorat e i n Tunisi a al lowed th e Agudat-Zio n leader s t o establis h th e Federatio n Sionist e d e Tunisie. Th e purpos e o f th e federatio n wa s no t onl y t o for m a n umbrell a organization t o brin g th e variou s Zionis t societie s together . I t wa s als o aimed a t unifyin g th e oppositio n t o th e AIU , a s Valens i indicated. 2 7 Valensi an d Maare k i n particula r encourage d th e Zionist s i n E u r o p e an d the Protectorat e authoritie s t o pus h th e AI U ou t o f Tunisia. The y di d thi s through th e Jewis h pres s an d throug h correspondenc e wit h th e Worl d Zionist Organization' s ne w headquarter s i n London . Thei r principa l ar gument wa s tha t th e AI U school s destroye d Jewis h dignit y an d le d Jewish youth s o n th e pat h o f irresponsibl e assimilatio n t o Europea n culture. O n e o f th e method s fo r gettin g ri d o f th e AI U schools , the y suggested, wa s t o replac e the m wit h ecoles franco-israelites, modele d o n the fe w French-Jewis h school s establishe d b y th e Frenc h Protectorat e i n Morocco alongsid e o f th e AI U school s there. 2 8 Thi s development , i f i t proved successful , the y said , woul d enabl e Tunisia n Jew s t o b e ri d o f all tutelag e ove r ou r community , enablin g i t t o tak e destin y int o it s ow n hands , giving i t a sens e o f responsibility , an d grantin g i t th e powe r t o exercis e certai n liberties whic h otherwis e woul d see m impossibl e i n th e futur e becaus e o f th e iniquitous intrusio n o f the Alliance Israelite Universell e i n communal affairs. Thi s is ho w w e hop e t o achiev e th e conques t o f th e communitie s whic h i s th e first important stag e towar d th e Zionizatio n o f the Jewish populations. 29 Maarek, Allouche , an d othe r adherent s o f eithe r mainstrea m o r Revi sionist Zionis m intensifie d thei r anti-AI U driv e throug h he Reveil Juif. Maarek, fo r hi s part , cautiousl y criticize d th e Frenc h educationa l pro grams establishe d b y th e Protectorate , bu t di d no t spar e th e AIU . Thus , in Novembe r 1924 , h e expresse d respec t fo r Franc e an d Frenc h effort s to promot e th e principle s o f democrac y an d socia l progres s amon g Tu nisian Jewry . H e ha d th e highes t regar d fo r th e post-178 9 Frenc h revo lutionary philosopher s an d th e inspiratio n tha t Jew s derive d fro m thei r

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works. Althoug h thes e philosophers ' sacre d principle s wer e taugh t i n most Frenc h schools , Maare k argued , thi s was not the cas e with th e AI U schools. Moreover , th e AI U no t onl y neglecte d Hebre w an d religiou s education, bu t it s schools' principals an d teacher s mad e a mockery o f the Jewish heritag e an d strov e t o violat e ever y tene t o f Frenc h education . Instead o f educating Jewis h youth s abou t huma n solidarity , th e idea s o f equality, an d th e nee d t o hel p th e poor , th e AI U taugh t the m t o disre gard an y typ e o f solidarity , Jewis h o r universal , t o b e selfish , an d t o become successfu l individual s attendin g t o thei r specifi c needs . Al l o f this, h e added , wa s communicate d throug h th e Frenc h language , th e medium o f instructio n i n Tunisi a an d th e res t o f Nort h Africa. 30 Thes e allegations were untru e fo r th e mos t part . Maarek feare d a continuin g AI U rol e i n Tunisia . Therefore , h e regu larly pleaded wit h the Frenc h t o replace the AIU institutions wit h specia l Protectorate-sponsored schools . H e suggeste d tha t anti-AI U sentimen t was n o longe r confine d t o Tunis , bu t ha d sprea d elsewhere . Fo r a lon g time, h e indicated , Franc e ha d bee n persuade d b y th e AI U leader s tha t Zionism serve d Britis h an d anti-Frenc h interest s i n Palestin e an d th e rest o f th e Middl e East . Franc e ha d no t onl y turne d it s bac k o n th e Zionist movement , bu t ha d faile d t o demonstrat e sensitivit y t o Jewis h cultural needs , suc h a s instructio n i n moder n Hebrew . I t wa s hig h tim e for Tunisia n Zionist s t o convinc e th e Frenc h tha t jus t a s Arabi c wa s taught i n th e Protectorate' s ecoles franco-arabes, moder n Hebre w mus t take it s natura l plac e i n th e Jewis h schoo l program . Th e Frenc h ha d th e power t o overrul e th e AI U o n thi s an d othe r pertinen t issue s o f Jewis h concern. 31 Indeed, fro m 192 5 to 1930 , Zionist s i n Tunis an d Sfa x had gon e ou t of their way to win Frenc h politica l suppor t and , i n fact, surpasse d th e AI U in pressurin g th e French , directl y an d indirectly , t o gran t Tunisia n Jew s French citizenshi p i n significan t numbers . The y wante d mor e tha n wha t the 192 3 law for Tunisia provided, tha t is , that local Jews could onl y ver y gradually obtai n thi s privilege . Further , startin g i n 192 6 the y wrot e articles i n th e Jewis h pres s praisin g th e Frenc h fo r n o longe r bein g victims o f AIU deceptio n an d misinformatio n an d fo r beginnin g t o sho w greater understandin g fo r Jewish cultura l needs . How di d th e Zionist s i n Tunisi a vie w thei r seemingl y contradictor y claims? Firstly, th e Tunisia n Zionists , lik e the AIU, di d no t find i t too difficul t

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5

to urge tha t Jews be naturalize d a s French citizens . A t the time , the y di d not thin k tha t large-scal e emigratio n t o Palestin e woul d tak e plac e fro m North Africa . An d unti l suc h a developmen t too k place , the y neede d greater politica l right s a s part o f their socia l evolution an d i n recognitio n of their attachmen t t o France . I n Morocco , too , loca l Zionist s supporte d the possibilit y o f Moroccan Jew s takin g Frenc h citizenship . However , i n Morocco th e Zionist s supporte d a modes t naturalizatio n proces s whil e the AI U schoo l director s calle d fo r larger-scal e naturalization . Mean while, Tunisia n Zionist s wer e critica l o f th e 192 3 la w an d calle d fo r a major refor m o f it. A s Felix Allouche asserted i n 192 5 about the law: "this law onl y applie s t o certai n element s o f th e population . Th e immens e masses ar e stil l sacrificed. . . . If France ha d th e intentio n o f formulatin g a [new ] Cremieu x Decree , t o naturaliz e en bloc ou r brethre n (a s i n Algeria), w e woul d hav e nothin g mor e t o say . Th e Jewis h questio n i n Tunisia would b e regulated . Bu t thi s does no t appear t o be th e case." 32 On th e issue s o f Jewish cultur e an d tie s wit h France , i t wa s Maare k who suggeste d i n 192 6 tha t i t woul d b e a fairl y shor t tim e befor e th e Protectorate cease d t o be totall y misle d b y th e AIU . H e praise d Franc e for takin g steps , a t home , i n suppor t o f revivin g th e Hebre w language , for teachin g Hebre w a t certai n Frenc h school s i n Egypt , an d fo r th e decision t o creat e a Hebre w Studie s Chai r a t th e Ecol e National e de s Langues Orientate s Vivantes . Maare k the n conclude d happil y that : France is coming around to discover the Jewish people. Sh e has ignored them as such. . . . She was the first to grant them rights as individuals. . . . A s a people, as a national entity, Franc e has always ignored that the Jews have conserved, fo r centuries, th e characteristic s o f a nation an d a great civilization . . . . Onc e sh e made the discovery, she was astonished.33 Did thes e effort s bea r fruit ? Th e Frenc h di d no t abrogat e o r signifi cantly modif y th e 192 3 naturalizatio n law . Tunisia n Jew s continue d t o obtain Frenc h citizenshi p onl y throug h a selective , rathe r tha n en bloc, approach. Insofa r a s the Frenc h attitud e towar d Hebre w i s concerned, i t would requir e a special stud y t o asses s progres s i n France . Bu t i n Tuni sia, wit h certai n exceptions , moder n Hebre w di d no t emerg e a s a mai n language i n Protectorat e schools . I n th e AI U schools , o n th e othe r hand , we have n o concrete evidenc e a t thi s stag e t o show that moder n Hebre w was not taugh t i n them i n som e form befor e an d afte r 1920 .

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How di d th e AI U i n Franc e an d Nort h Afric a reac t t o Zionis t activit y and t o th e criticis m o f it s school s an d leaders ? Generall y speaking , th e position o f the AIU was not uniform . AIU teacher s an d schoo l principal s i n Morocc o an d Tunisi a ofte n sharply criticize d Zionis t politica l aim s regardin g Palestine . However , they sometime s supporte d Zionis t cultura l policies , suc h as the reviva l of Hebrew, simpl y because , i t wa s argued , suc h a developmen t woul d b e beneficial t o Jewish interest s worldwide . Certai n AI U official s wer e clearl y anti-Zionist, other s wer e non-Zionist , merel y indifferen t t o th e move ment's goals . I n fact , durin g th e middl e an d lat e 1930s , ther e wer e pro Zionist AI U teacher s i n Tunisi a an d Morocc o wh o ha d los t fait h i n th e idea of emancipation a lafrangaise i n the wake of the anti-Semiti c event s in Europe . Nevertheless , th e leader s o f th e AI U i n Franc e an d it s delegates o n the loca l level often warne d th e communitie s o f the danger s Zionism pose d fo r al l Jews. In France , AI U personalitie s suc h a s Alfre d Berl , edito r o f th e AI U journal Paix et Droit, an d th e renowne d French-Jewis h scholar , Theo dore Reinach , publishe d article s i n 1926-2 7 highly critical of the Zionist s and thei r activitie s i n th e Diaspora . Thes e angere d Zionist s i n Nort h Africa a s i n th e day s o f Sylvai n Levi . Reinac h an d Ber l argue d tha t Zionism presente d a doubl e danger : i t woul d leav e th e Jew s vulnerabl e whether i t succeede d i n achievin g it s goal s or not . I f the Zionist s di d no t succeed i n creatin g a Jewish nationa l hom e i n Palestine , th e disillusion ment migh t b e s o overwhelming tha t th e Jewish world coul d face seriou s ideological disorder . Tunisia n Zionist s interprete d thi s t o mea n tha t po groms migh t b e organize d agains t th e Yishuv . An d wh y migh t th e Zion ists fail? Reinach and Ber l stated tha t Palestin e was not a "no man's land. " In additio n t o 80,00 0 Christian s livin g there , ther e wer e som e 700,00 0 Arab Muslims , an d ther e wa s n o hop e tha t thes e Arab s coul d someho w be persuaded t o tolerate expropriatio n o f tracts of land. 34 On th e othe r hand , i f the Zionist s di d succee d i n thei r program , the n —as Tunisian an d Morocca n Zionist s interpreted Reinac h an d Berl—no t only would a Jewish stat e emerge , bu t s o would a Jewish embass y i n th e heart o f Paris , a developmen t tha t migh t lea d t o anti-Semiti c outburst s like those at the height o f the Dreyfu s Affair. 35 Yet, whil e Reinac h an d Bed' s statement s o n Zionis m wer e no t alway s coherent, an d thei r idea s suffere d fro m inconsistencies , th e positio n o f Jacques Bigar t wa s clea r an d consistent . Bigar t wa s AI U secretar y fro m

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4

7

1892 unti l hi s deat h i n 1934 . Shortl y befor e h e died , h e receive d a lette r from Leo n Pinhas , a n AI U teache r i n Saf i i n souther n Morocco . Pinha s informed hi m o f th e activitie s o f Elieze r Turek , a J N F emissary . Th e latter ha d tol d audience s a t Saf i abou t ho w Easter n an d Centra l Euro pean Jew s ha d transforme d th e deser t int o a n oasi s i n Palestine ; tha t H e b r e w wa s spoke n there , wa s a n officia l languag e o f th e Mandat e alon g with Arabi c an d English , an d wa s n o longe r merel y th e languag e o f th e Bible; an d tha t Jew s i n Romania , Poland , Russia , an d German y ha d become zealou s convert s t o Jewis h nationalis m an d wer e emigratin g t o Palestine. 3 6 Pinhas reporte d t o Bigar t hi s unhappines s wit h Turek' s activity . Al though w e hav e n o evidenc e t o sugges t tha t Ture k wen t beyon d th e collection o f contributions fo r settlin g Europea n Jew s i n Palestine , Pinha s deplored wha t h e calle d a n increas e i n sympath y fo r Zionis t concepts ; h e knew o f som e defection s fro m th e AIU , an d h e argue d tha t clusterin g large number s o f Jewish emigrant s i n Palestin e woul d no t b e productive . In th e Diaspora , Jew s ha d b e e n u n d e r constan t pressur e t o produce , since just b y virtu e o f being Jewis h the y ha d t o wor k harde r an d compet e more fiercely t o succee d i n th e socioeconomi c sphere . I n Palestine , however, a Jewish entit y woul d eliminat e suc h pressur e an d competition . Given tha t th e Jew s woul d b e "on e happ y family " there , Jewis h produc tivity woul d inevitabl y stagnate. 3 7 Responding t o thi s report , Bigar t justifie d th e A I U s indifferenc e t o the Zionis t idea : Can we , wh o hav e fough t fo r lon g year s t o wi n th e peopl e ove r t o th e ide a o f complete emancipatio n fo r th e Jews , adher e t o a movemen t whic h denie s ou r efforts? Th e emancipatio n fro m ou r point of view has been th e absolute, complet e adaptation o f th e Je w t o hi s newl y adopte d natio n [France] ; Zionis m unde r it s insincere guise , condemn s thi s adaptation . Thi s i s the profoun d reaso n whic h le d the Allianc e t o remai n unfriendl y t o Zionism , no t t o mentio n othe r objections , notably th e impossibilit y o f establishing i n Palestine , on e tent h o f the Jew s wh o wish t o settl e there , th e presenc e o f a hostil e Musli m population , an d th e necessity for Englan d t o appease th e latter. 38 The AI U clearl y stresse d th e vita l importanc e o f a continue d Jewis h presence i n th e Diaspor a an d th e nee d fo r internationa l Jewis h organiza tions t o hel p Jew s becom e bette r integrate d i n thei r sol natal. A t th e same time , th e AI U di d creat e school s i n Palestine , recognizin g tha t

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there woul d alway s b e a certai n numbe r o f Jew s there . Nevertheless , despite th e dominan t polic y o f th e AI U Centra l Committe e i n Paris , more an d mor e AI U teacher s i n Morocc o and elsewher e bega n t o recon sider thei r ow n indifferenc e an d hostilit y t o th e Zionis t idea . Fo r ex ample, Davi d Behar , a n AI U teache r i n a smal l communit y o n th e southern coas t o f Morocco , expresse d enthusias m i n 193 8 abou t th e recent gains made by Zionists in the Diaspora . Behar , a native of Turkey, related tha t h e fel t n o allegianc e t o a countr y (Turkey ) wher e h e wa s merely despised . I n hi s opinion , th e AI U ha d aimed , sinc e it s inceptio n in 1860 , a t th e emancipatio n o f the Jew s i n th e Diaspora . Further , usin g its school s i n Franc e an d throughou t th e Mediterranea n basi n as * a means, it worke d t o achiev e thei r assimilatio n i n societ y a t large . Th e first ai m had bee n achieved . Middl e Easter n an d Nort h Africa n Jewr y ha d bene fited fro m th e AI U educationall y an d economically . Bu t th e Jew s ha d failed t o integrate, a n anomal y tha t becam e a serious stumblin g bloc k fo r the AIU. Th e Jews were constantly reminde d o f their religious origi n an d their lac k of patriotism. 39 Sylvain Halff , the n secretar y o f the AIU , responde d t o Behar's assess ment o f the problem s involve d i n assimilatio n a s a goal . H e understoo d Behar's concern , particularl y i n ligh t o f th e resurgen t anti-Semitis m i n Europe a t th e time . Bu t h e rejecte d an y recognitio n o f th e Zionis t alternative. H e urge d o n th e teache r th e vie w tha t anti-Semitis m i n Europe, Franc e included , an d th e lac k o f assimilatio n o f Morocca n an d Tunisian Jews , particularl y give n th e Frenc h desir e no t t o alienat e th e Muslims, wer e temporary . Half f added , "i t i s justified tha t w e as k our selves, i f the solutio n o f desperation whic h fo r yo u i n th e final analysis is Zionism, i s nothin g mor e tha n a distorte d historica l perspective . Yo u forgot tha t al l th e difficultie s whic h Judais m ha d know n ove r th e cours e of time an d ove r whic h i t triumphed , an d eve n th e curren t problem s d o not constitut e bu t anothe r phas e i n the struggl e for emancipation/ 40 The AI U schoo l principal s an d delegate s wer e no t a s compromisin g vis-a-vis Zionis m a s wa s a n increasin g numbe r o f th e teachers . Alber t Sagues, th e leadin g AI U representativ e i n Tuni s fro m 191 2 unti l th e 1920s, an d Yomto v Davi d Semach , th e AI U delegat e i n Morocc o fro m 1924 t o 1940 , firmly oppose d politica l Zionis m (thoug h the y favore d th e Hebrew renaissance) . The y engage d i n organize d propagand a agains t it . In 1920 , Sague s publishe d a controversia l pamphle t o n th e conflic t be tween th e AI U an d th e Zionis t movement . Hi s centra l them e wa s tha t

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the Jews o f Metropolitan Franc e an d Frenc h Nort h Africa , a s well as th e United States , England , an d Italy, preferre d thei r pays natal an d nothin g motivated the m t o settl e i n Palestine . Consequently , a Jewis h stat e established i n Palestin e woul d b e populate d b y a margina l segmen t o f the Jewis h people . Hence , Palestin e woul d no t suppl y a solutio n t o th e Jewish question . Quit e t o th e contrary , suc h a state woul d aggravat e th e Jewish position : b y formin g a separate, distinct , an d autonomou s entity , the Jewis h inhabitant s o f th e Yishu v woul d furthe r encourag e th e anti Semites i n thei r clai m tha t Jew s wer e oppose d t o integratio n int o th e societies i n which the y lived , unwillin g and unabl e t o assimilate. 41 Turning t o th e Britis h role , Sague s contende d tha t England' s leader ship used th e Zionist cause to effectively reinforc e it s imperialist interest s in th e Nea r an d Middl e East . Thus , whe n Tunisia n Zionist s reproache d Sagues fo r fomentin g anti-Zionis m b y misrepresentin g the m a s disloya l to Franc e an d a s Britis h agents, 42 thei r accusation s may no t hav e bee n far-fetched. H e the n suggeste d tha t i n th e struggl e fo r Jewis h emancipa tion, th e AI U an d othe r non-Zionis t Jewis h organization s ha d mad e partial progres s throug h politica l lobbyin g a s well a s throug h th e sprea d of modern education . Nevertheless , sinc e the battl e for a comprehensiv e solution t o the man y problems the n facin g differen t part s o f the Diaspor a was fa r fro m won , th e Zionist s ha d seize d th e opportunit y t o exploi t desperate situation s i n orde r t o augment thei r influence . Ough t th e AI U to collaborate wit h French , Tunisian , an d Morocca n Zionist s i n confront ing th e challenge ? Sague s di d no t thin k so . H e bluntl y asserted , "1/Alli ance n e pouvai t s' y affilier . Y adherer eu t [ete ] pou r elle , u n veritabl e suicide." (Th e Allianc e coul d no t becom e affiliate d wit h them . Joinin g them woul d hav e been shee r suicid e for it.) 43 In Morocco , Semach' s positio n wa s just a s explicit . H e wa s i n fac t fa r more aggressiv e i n confrontin g th e Zionist s fac e t o fac e an d ofte n sa t i n on the meeting s organize d b y th e JNF an d JF F emissaries , s o as to lear n about thei r strategies . Prio r t o 1914 , when h e wa s active on behalf o f the AIU i n Beiru t an d Baghdad , Semach' s view s o n Zionis m ha d bee n mod erate an d realisti c in th e sens e tha t he though t th e AI U shoul d no t rejec t the optio n o f Zionist-AIU coexistence . However , b y 1919 , whe n h e wa s in charge o f the AIU school s in Tangier, hi s attitude towar d loca l Zionists was les s sympathetic , though , a t th e time , h e wa s no t deepl y concerne d with Zionis t influenc e o n th e Morocca n communities . I t ha d ver y littl e appeal the n an d wa s fa r fro m constitutin g a seriou s politica l current ; i t

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was a voic e i n th e deser t withou t a n echo . Semac h thu s conclude d tha t "Moroccan Zionis m doe s no t enjo y . . . today an y [leve l of ] importance . It ma y becom e activ e onl y i f it finds a propagandist capabl e o f placing i t in contact wit h Europea n Zionism." 44 Semach di d chang e hi s position severa l year s later, whe n h e serve d a s AIU delegat e fo r Frenc h an d Spanis h Morocc o as well as for th e Interna tional Zon e o f Tangier. Fro m hi s headquarter s i n Rabat , als o th e sea t o f the Frenc h Protectorate' s administration , Semac h visite d th e Jewis h communities throughou t Morocco , bot h urba n an d rural. Hi s fear of what he sa w a s th e ever-increasin g strengt h o f Morocca n Zionis m wa s greatl y exaggerated. Befor e w e delv e int o hi s fear s i n orde r t o presen t hi s position o n thi s issue , w e mus t compar e th e approac h o f th e Morocca n Zionists wit h tha t o f thei r Tunisia n counterparts . Unlik e th e Tunisia n Zionists, thos e i n Morocc o refraine d fro m attackin g th e AI U fro m th e mid-1920s on , afte r havin g criticize d i t previously . The y no w sough t t o improve thei r relations with the AIU. The y believed tha t by collaboratin g with i t in communal reforms , Zionis t goal s would b e bette r serve d i n th e long run . First o f all, i t wa s quit e apparen t t o th e loca l Zionist s tha t th e AI U i n Morocco wielde d considerabl e influence , mor e tha n i n Tunisia . I t ha d strong link s wit h th e Frenc h Residenc y i n Raba t a s wel l a s wit h th e Jewish communities . Sinc e th e Zionis t organizatio n i n Morocco , unlik e its Tunisia n counterpart , di d no t obtai n officia l recognitio n fro m th e French authorities , i t wa s merel y tolerate d durin g th e interwa r years . Therefore, i t seeme d pruden t t o see k a rapprochemen t wit h th e AIU . Following thi s approach , th e Morocca n Zionists , lik e the AI U principals , supported th e ide a of granting Frenc h citizenshi p t o Moroccan Jews. Th e Zionists als o di d no t rais e th e issu e o f emigration t o Palestin e befor e th e 1930s, partl y becaus e the y wen t ou t o f thei r wa y t o appeas e th e Resi dency an d it s trustworth y ally , th e AIU . The y declare d themselve s loya l to th e caus e o f assisting Morocca n Jew s t o becom e Frenchmen . This , o f course, wa s a tactic i n a long-term strateg y t o accomplish Zionis t aims , i f and whe n th e loca l Jew s cam e t o adop t Zionis t goal s i n increasin g num bers. Th e tacti c wa s a wa y ou t o f th e Zionists ' politica l isolatio n i n th e 1920s. Yet th e lul l i n th e hostilit y betwee n th e AI U an d th e Morocca n Zionists, fro m th e mid-1920 s t o th e earl y 1930s , wa s a one-wa y street . The AIU delegate s i n Frenc h Morocc o simply did no t recogniz e o r honor

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such a truce before 1930 ; it seem s tha t durin g th e 1930 s the AIU an d th e Zionists wer e i n a two-wa y conflic t onc e again . Th e Zionist s wer e no w emphasizing Jewish politica l aims mor e freely a s more and mor e French educated Jew s embrace d Zionis m an d understoo d it s ideological implica tions, an d a s the Frenc h becam e mor e toleran t o f Zionism. Looking bac k a t AI U displeasur e wit h Morocca n Zionist s fro m th e mid-1920s t o th e earl y 1930s , w e se e tha t despit e th e Zionis t searc h fo r an understandin g wit h th e AIU , th e AI U schoo l principal s continue d t o be suspiciou s o f Zionis t intention s throughou t th e period . The y ofte n accused th e Zionist s o f usin g fund-raisin g activities , th e Zionis t press , and speeche s delivere d b y JN F an d JF F emissarie s fro m Europ e a s a facade fo r th e ultimat e goa l o f laying a basis fo r emigratio n t o Palestine . Thus w e retur n t o Semach . I n Decembe r 1926 , h e reporte d t o Pari s about the activitie s of the JFF's Dr . Natha n Halpern . Halpern s function s included fund-raisin g an d lectur e tour s i n Frenc h Morocco . Accordin g t o Semach, Halper n ha d recentl y spen t thre e month s i n Morocc o where, i n Casablanca alone , h e organize d a doze n lecture s befor e larg e audience s of young, French-educate d Jews , man y of them AI U alumni. 45 On on e occasion , Semac h decide d t o participat e i n on e o f these gath erings wit h th e clea r ai m o f challenging Halper n i n orde r t o expos e th e destructive ai m o f "Zionis t agitation " t o th e audience . Th e sit e wa s th e Casablanca Jewish communit y center , th e Cercle dUnion. Semac h hear d Halpern compar e th e policie s o f tw o resident-general s o f Frenc h Mo rocco, Field-Marsha l Lyautey , wh o had serve d unti l 1925 , and Theodor e Steeg, hi s successor . Halper n depicte d th e first as anti-Zionist an d insen sitive t o loca l Jewis h needs , whil e praisin g th e latte r a s a political mod erate. A t this point, Semac h intervened . H e asserte d tha t both men , lik e the Frenc h government , ha d don e everythin g conceivabl e t o affor d th e Jews political freedom an d improve thei r socioeconomi c conditions. Hav ing returned fro m a n inspection tou r o f the Jewish communitie s o f southern Morocco , Semac h tol d th e audienc e an d Halper n tha t eve n i n th e bled o f the Atla s mountains , h e ha d com e upo n zealou s Frenc h official s willingly assistin g th e Jews , seein g the m a s a trustworthy , pro-Frenc h element. Zionism , h e wen t on , woul d onl y prov e a poo r substitut e fo r French goodwill , bu t coul d lea d th e Frenc h t o doub t Morocca n Jewis h loyalty. Th e Morocca n Jew , Semac h warned th e audience , "mus t evolve , elevate himsel f t o th e Frenc h mentalit y an d on e da y becom e French . This i s th e long-rang e aim . An d t o deman d o f hi m t o b e abov e al l a

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Zionist, wil l dete r hi m fro m hi s path ; politica l Zionis m i s a dange r an d we will oppose it." 46 Halpern denie d tha t h e wa s encouragin g Nort h Africa n Jew s t o dis tance themselve s fro m France . H e claimed , quit e t o th e contrary , t o b e encouraging the m t o become French , but , simultaneously , t o contribut e their mora l an d financial suppor t t o thei r les s fortunat e brethre n i n Eastern Europe. 47 Still , Semach' s intentio n wa s quit e clear , a s reveale d in hi s report s fro m th e pre-193 0 period: t o combat Zionis t politica l influ ence, otherwis e th e prestig e enjoye d b y th e AI U i n Morocc o sinc e 186 2 would declin e sharply , eve n amon g educate d AI U alumni . On e o f th e strategies Semac h though t u p i n orde r t o counte r Zionis t propagand a among th e Jew s wa s t o disseminat e Reinach' s an d Bed' s article s i n Paix et Droit. 48 It i s conceivabl e tha t i n Tunisi a afte r 193 0 an d unti l th e outbrea k o f World Wa r II , th e Zionists , mainl y th e Revisionis t trend , whic h b y the n dwarfed mainstrea m Zionis m i n Tunisia , moderate d thei r stanc e towar d the AI U an d may hav e collaborate d wit h it s teacher s i n th e educationa l sphere, notabl y a s regard s Hebre w studies . I n Morocco , o n th e othe r hand, Zionist s afte r 193 0 accused th e AI U delegatio n i n Raba t o f insensitivity. I n thi s vein , Abraha m Laredo , a leadin g Zionist , declare d a t th e 1936 Zionis t Conferenc e i n Frenc h Morocc o tha t th e AI U ough t t o b e praised fo r it s social and philanthropi c role . Nevertheless , h e argue d tha t it wa s indifferen t t o Jewis h need s an d considere d an y criticis m o f it s activities a s a sig n o f ingratitude . No t so , claime d Laredo ; th e Zionist s and othe r Jew s critica l o f the AI U shoul d no t b e viewe d a s th e organiza tion's enemies , an d the y shoul d pus h fo r educationa l reform s i n it s schools.49 It appear s obviou s tha t th e AI U school s an d educationa l personne l found themselve s i n a difficul t positio n insofa r a s th e French-educate d elite wa s concerned . Man y o f th e educate d Jew s wh o wer e challengin g the raiso n d'etr e o f the AIU wer e it s own graduates, it s alumni. Wherea s the majorit y o f th e Jew s i n bot h Frenc h Protectorate s supporte d th e AIU, whethe r passivel y o r enthusiastically , th e elit e wa s voca l an d fa r from constitutin g a monolithi c pro-AI U voice . I n fact , oppositio n t o th e AIU in Tunisia neither cam e exclusively from Zionist s nor did it originat e with them . W e find th e La Justice newspape r representin g th e opposit e trend, tha t o f assimilationism an d ultra-Jewis h secularists . Lik e the Zion ists, th e La Justice grou p portrayed th e AIU a s an anachronism, bu t the y

North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century 5

3

considered it s schools' curriculum o f dual Jewish/French programmin g as a violation o f the principles o f secular education. I n other words: the AIU was cornered b y thos e wh o believe d i t was not Jewis h enoug h a s well as by those who regarded it s schools and educational doctrin e a s too Jewish, no longe r meetin g th e need s o f th e times . Th e impac t o f th e secularis t opposition t o th e AI U i n Tunisi a wa s blunte r an d mor e aggressiv e tha n in Morocco , wher e ultrasecularist s wer e stil l a relatively margina l grou p in the 1920 s and earl y 1930s . Eventually, th e AI U move d close r t o th e idea s o f the Zionist s tha n t o those o f the ultrasecularists . Thoug h neve r embracin g Zionis m a s a guiding ideology , th e AI U i n th e post-Worl d Wa r I I epoch , i n th e wak e o f the Holocaust , introduce d educationa l an d pedagogica l reform s i n it s Moroccan an d Tunisia n school s whic h contributed , albei t modestly , t o preparing th e youth s for emigratio n an d integratio n int o Israeli society . Did th e fac t tha t Zionis m i n pre-193 9 Algeri a wa s margina l a t bes t signify tha t conflict s di d no t loo m betwee n AI U representative s ther e and th e Zionists ? Actually , bot h th e AI U an d th e Zionist s hardl y repre sented majo r communa l interest s i n Frenc h Algeria . Nevertheless , cer tain problem s di d exist . Th e Zionist s o f Algier s di d mak e certai n criti cisms o f the AIU , accordin g t o reports submitte d b y Albert Confino , th e AIU representative . Fo r instance , Confin o reporte d o n 1 7 Novembe r 1922 tha t th e Zionist s wer e attackin g th e Jewis h educationa l progra m o f the AIU . H e compare d th e frictio n i n Algiers with tha t betwee n Zionist s and th e AI U i n Tunisia , reachin g th e conclusio n tha t "Th e Allianc e ha s also its detractors [here] ; it would b e puerile t o deny it. Becaus e Zionis m emerged i n Algier s no t throug h th e gat e a s i n Tunis , bu t throug h th e back porch , i t aim s a t exercisin g it s influenc e [b y attacking th e AIU ] an d capitalizing [o n this strategy]. Its action [here ] is not less dangerous [tha n elsewhere]." 50 Like Semac h i n Morocc o an d Sague s i n Tunisia, Confin o too k step s t o confront th e Zionist s an d explai n th e aim s o f th e AI U a t variou s com munal forums , i n orde r t o safeguar d th e influenc e o f th e AIU . Onc e again, althoug h i t seem s tha t th e conflict s i n Algeri a wer e milde r tha n those i n Morocc o and certainl y a far cry from th e struggl e i n Tunisia, th e Zionists o f th e thre e Nort h Africa n countrie s di d no t attac k th e AI U o n ideological an d Jewis h educationa l matter s alone . Th e Algeria n Zionist s attacked th e AI U a s such because o f their exaggerate d presumptio n o f its influence amon g Algeria n Jewry . Despit e th e AIU' s limite d positio n i n

54 North

African Jewry in the Twentieth Century

Algeria and it s efforts t o emphasize Jewis h religiou s educatio n there , th e Algerian Zionist s sa w th e AI U activist s an d thei r educationa l a s wel l a s extra-educational endeavor s a s a n obstacl e t o th e Zionists ' ques t fo r influence i n the Jewish milieu . These interna l communa l conflict s o f th e interwa r year s whic h ha d occurred i n th e shado w o f risin g anti-Semitis m i n Europ e an d amon g both Nort h Africa n Europea n settler s a s wel l a s Musli m nationalists , doubtless evoke d concer n amon g the politically informe d Maghrib i Jews. However, few , i f any, o f them expecte d moder n anti-Semitis m t o influ ence thei r live s directl y quit e th e sam e wa y a s i t di d thei r Europea n counterparts. Th e outbrea k o f World Wa r II , a s th e nex t chapte r dem onstrates, wa s to change thi s outlook .

Chapter 2

Under Vich y an d th e Nazi-Germa n Menace: Th e Jew s o f North Afric a during th e 1930 s an d 1940 s

In Jun e 1940 , th e German s conquere d France . The y occupie d mos t o f the countr y an d lef t th e "unoccupie d zone " to be administere d b y Field Marshal Philipp e Petai n a t Vichy ; th e Vich y regim e retaine d France' s overseas possessions. O n 3 October 1940 , the Vichy government enacte d its firs t anti-Jewis h law . A t th e en d o f Marc h 1941 , a special commissio n headed b y Xavie r Vallat , wa s create d t o dea l wit h Jewis h affairs . Thes e developments seriousl y affecte d th e situatio n o f th e Jew s i n Frenc h Algeria, Morocco , an d Tunisia. 1 Of th e thre e importan t Nort h Africa n Jewis h communities , th e Alge rian ha d th e mos t t o lose , i n politica l statu s a t least . Th e Vich y anti Jewish legislation would deprive the Algerian communities of their rights. In Tunisia , too , th e Jewis h communitie s ha d bee n grante d certai n rights, som e o f whic h wer e remove d durin g Vich y rul e (1940-43) . Tu nisian Jew s continue d t o obtai n Frenc h citizenshi p b y virtu e o f th e Morinaud Law , thoug h th e majorit y remaine d subject s o f the Husayni d Beylicate. Thi s left the m i n a position inferio r t o that of the Algerian Jew s (who wer e automaticall y Frenc h citizens) , bu t i n a mor e advantageou s situation tha n thei r Morocca n coreligionists . As late a s 1939-40 , th e Frenc h Morocca n Protectorat e di d no t inten d to revers e th e basi c lega l syste m o f the countr y whic h wa s base d o n th e Quran an d it s interpretatio n a s wel l a s th e will o f th e Sharifia n sultan . The Frenc h continue d t o adjus t thei r politica l interes t t o th e law s an d 55

56 Under

Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace

customs adhere d t o b y th e Islami c courts . O f th e four socia l strat a i n Morocco—the French , th e citizen s o f foreig n countries , th e Muslims , and th e Jews—th e Jew s wer e a t th e botto m o f the politica l scale . The y enjoyed on e important benefit : persona l status, suc h as birth registration , divorce, an d inheritance , wa s regulate d b y Jewis h la w an d adjudicate d by rabbini c tribunals . However , excep t fo r suc h persona l matters , th e great mass of civil and criminal litigation involving Morocca n Jews continued t o be i n Islami c tribunals preside d ove r b y officials appointe d b y th e sultan: thes e wer e th e Sharifia n court s o r th e Chrda. Despit e th e fac t that Frenc h dominatio n ha d don e les s fo r Morocca n Jew s tha n fo r othe r North Africa n Jewis h communities , th e Morocca n Jews ' position , too , was impaired b y the Vichy regime . Anti-Jewish attitude s ha d bee n eviden t i n Nort h Afric a fo r man y year s before th e establishmen t o f th e Vich y regime . I n th e latte r hal f o f th e nineteenth centur y i n Algeria , th e Europea n populatio n proteste d vio lently agains t th e right s whic h Franc e grante d th e Jews , an d wa s espe cially voca l durin g th e Dreyfu s Affair . Durin g th e first decad e o f th e twentieth century , thes e hostilitie s subside d somewhat , onl y to resurfac e in the earl y 1930s . There was one difference betwee n nineteenth-centur y anti-Semitism an d th e agitatio n o f the 1930s . Wherea s earlie r Europea n anti-Semitism ha d enliste d suppor t fro m fello w Europeans , durin g th e 1930s they sough t t o enlist Musli m support .

Muslim-Jewish Relations in the Prewar Years, 1933-1939 French an d othe r anti-Semiti c element s seize d upo n th e Palestin e prob lem an d th e Ara b Revol t o f 1936-3 9 t o portra y internationa l Jewry , including th e Jew s o f Nort h Africa , i n a negativ e wa y t o th e Muslims , many o f who m expresse d solidarit y wit h th e Palestinia n Arab s agains t Zionism an d th e Britis h authoritie s i n th e Mandate . Naz i propagand a broadcasts fro m Berli n an d Stuttgart , a s wel l a s broadcast s fro m fascis t Italy, adde d fue l t o the ongoin g anti-Jewish campaign. 2 One succes s i n th e attemp t t o incit e Muslim s agains t Jew s too k plac e in Algeria . I n th e cit y o f Constantine , Muslim s organize d a pogro m against Jew s o n 3- 5 Augus t 1934 . Althoug h w e stil l d o no t hav e al l information o n th e cause s o f this event , i t appear s tha t th e anti-Semiti c

Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace 5

7

campaign i n Algeria, inspire d b y Europea n Algerians , contribute d t o th e hostility betwee n Muslim s an d Jew s i n th e Constantin e region . I n thi s pogrom, twenty-thre e Jew s as well as three Muslim s were killed. Eighty one persons were wounded. 3 Unrest cam e t o th e surfac e i n Tunisia , too , wher e anti-Jewis h riot s took plac e i n Sfa x i n 1932 . Whil e i t ha s bee n allege d tha t Palestinia n Arabs instigate d loca l Muslim s agains t Jews, 4 we were unabl e t o confir m this claim . Mor e seriou s Muslim-Jewis h tension s aros e i n Frenc h Mo rocco (Casablanca , Rabat) , i n Spanis h Morocc o (Tetuan) , an d i n Tangie r during th e sprin g an d earl y summe r o f 1933 . Thoug h othe r motive s should no t b e rule d ou t i n th e Morocca n case , th e edito r o f th e usuall y reliable Survey of International Affairs conclude d tha t thes e incident s emerged fro m militan t anti-Semitis m encourage d b y Europea n ele ments. 5 It i s noteworth y tha t Europea n anti-Semiti c activit y i n Frenc h Nort h Africa gaine d suppor t mainl y amon g th e Europea n populatio n an d throug h the effort s o f th e Part i Socia l Francai s (PSF ) an d th e Part i Populair e Francais (PPF) . I n th e final analysis , thei r propagand a endeavors , aug mented b y th e loca l Europea n pres s an d th e Italian-Germa n broadcasts , did no t muc h influenc e th e Musli m populatio n a s a whole. Despit e th e above-mentioned events , th e Musli m majorit y continue d t o coexis t wit h their Jewish neighbors . Th e numerou s incident s o f Muslims intimidatin g Jews o r assaulting the m physicall y wer e a n integra l par t o f North Africa n life. Th e Frenc h archive s o n Nort h Africa , availabl e a t Nantes , poin t t o this phenomenon . However , majo r pogrom s o n th e scal e o f the even t i n Constantine di d no t take place . Whereas th e Europea n anti-Jewis h propagand a di d no t gai n suppor t among th e Musli m masses , i t di d influenc e segment s o f th e embryoni c North African nationalis t movements . Th e Algerian nationalist supporter s of Messal i Hadj' s Etoil e Nord-Africain e an d th e Part i d u Peupl e Alger ien, i n bot h Algeri a an d France , organize d activitie s tha t include d th e publication o f th e newspaper s El Ouma an d Ech Chaab, whic h wer e occasionally partiall y finance d b y th e Pan-Islami c activis t 3 AmTr Shaki b Arslan. A t the wars outbreak , Messali' s supporter s spli t into two factions: one supporte d Germany , seekin g t o secur e he r ai d i n th e struggl e fo r independence; th e other , mor e moderate , considere d supportin g th e France o f the pre-Vichy era . What wa s th e positio n o f Algeria n nationalist s regardin g th e Jews ?

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Messali an d mos t o f hi s supporter s argue d tha t th e Jew s weakene d France internall y an d contribute d t o he r politica l an d mora l corruption . On th e othe r hand , the y contradicte d themselve s b y sayin g tha t Frenc h Algeria was dominated b y the Jews who ruled th e countr y i n the nam e of France. Th e Cremieu x Decre e o f 1870 , i n Messali' s opinion , ha d trans formed th e Jew s int o a n overprivilege d elemen t hostil e t o th e Arabo Berber population . Messali' s Part i d u Peupl e Algerien , operatin g under ground afte r 1939 , include d activist s wh o late r supporte d th e Petai n government i n part becaus e o f its anti-Jewish policy. 6 In Tunisia, th e nationalist s were not quite s o extreme. True , th e Vieux Destour an d th e orthodo x Islami c Zeitun a circle s hel d anti-Jewis h atti tudes, bu t thei r hostilit y wa s most ofte n passive . However , th e secularl y oriented Neo-Destou r movemen t whic h graduall y becam e th e mos t popular politica l forc e i n th e country , demonstrate d greate r understandin g toward th e Jews. 7 As in the rest o f North Africa, th e Morocca n nationalis t movemen t wa s divided int o moderate s an d radicals . Generall y speaking , Spanis h Zon e nationalists enjoye d greate r freedo m t o express politica l views tha n thei r counterparts i n Frenc h Morocco , particularl y afte r 193 7 whe n Frenc h Morocco's nationalis t leader s suffere d a stron g wav e o f repression . Th e most moderat e nationalist s o f French Morocco , amon g them Muhamma d al-Kholti, encourage d a Judeo-Musli m entente i n orde r t o enlis t Jewis h support fo r th e reform s the y mean t t o reques t fro m th e French . Al Kholtl advocate d "un e actio n commun e e n vu e d e reforme s urgente s a introduire pa r l a Franc e dan s l e domain e d e l a justice, comm e dan s tou s les autre s domaines " (join t actio n t o encourag e Franc e t o introduc e urgent reform s i n th e field o f justice, a s in al l other fields). Bu t he adde d that Judeo-Muslim solidarit y "n e pourrai t etr e durabl e qu e s i une egalit e complete englobai t israelite s e t musulmans " (could no t las t without com plete equalit y betwee n Jew s and Muslims). 8 Were thes e view s promote d followin g Muslim-Jewis h tension s be tween Apri l an d Jul y 193 3 aime d a t reducin g hostilities , especiall y i n view o f th e larg e urba n Jewis h populatio n concentrations ? Wa s thi s a plea to French-educated Jew s to support nationalis t reformis t claims ? Or , did th e earl y nationalist s genuinel y see k a friendly entente? W e hav e no t been abl e t o reach definit e conclusions , althoug h i t is noteworthy tha t alKholti represente d th e French-educate d stratu m i n th e movement . Thos e

Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace

5

9

more traditionall y e d u c a t e d — a t th e Qarawiyin e Universit y i n F e z — were les s moderat e i n thei r approac h towar d th e Jews . As i n Algeri a an d Tunisia , Morocca n Jewry—includin g educate d Jew s who graduate d fro m th e A I U 9 — d i d no t revea l an y enthusias m for Ara b nationalist cause s and , i n th e Spanis h Zone , the y wer e profoundl y dis turbed b y anti-Jewis h declaration s mad e b y loca l nationalists . Thi s i s ho w an AI U schoo l principa l i n Larach e describe d th e attitud e o f Spanis h Zone nationalist s i n th e wak e o f th e Ara b Revol t i n Palestine , o n th e ev e ofWorldWarll: What appear s seriou s to us is the anti-Jewis h manifestation s i n Arab circles: ther e are severa l day s now , tha t th e secretar y o f th e Gran d Muft i o f Jerusale m [Ha j Amln al-Husayni] is in town to propagandize i n Spanis h Morocc o in order to rais e funds destine d fo r the Arabs of Palestine. Th e ke y nationalist i n Morocc o c Abd alKhaliq Torre s ha s spoke n vehementl y a t conference s organize d i n El-Ksar , Lar ache, Tetua n an d Arcil a agains t th e Jew s a s wel l a s agains t th e British . Crie s o f "Death t o th e Jews! " "Deat h t o th e British " hav e bee n promote d b y Ara b propaganda.10 Another threa t facin g th e Jew s o f Morocc o durin g th e perio d immedi ately precedin g th e wa r wa s tie d t o th e Civi l Wa r i n Spai n an d it s impac t on Spanis h Morocco . Th e Spanis h Zon e wa s unde r martia l la w beginnin g on 1 9 Jul y 1936 . Th e Jew s wer e no t harasse d b y th e Z o n e s militar y authorities throughou t th e crisis , bu t the y wer e pressure d t o donat e funds an d othe r form s o f wealt h i n suppor t o f Franco , a s wer e th e loca l Spaniards. Alber t Sagues , the n AI U principa l i n Tangie r an d a kee n observer o f politica l development s i n norther n Morocco , clearl y indi cated tha t th e Spanis h authoritie s wen t ou t o f thei r wa y t o maintai n cordial contact s wit h th e Jewis h communities . This , however , wa s no t the cas e wit h variou s politica l movement s an d thei r adherent s wh o ag gressively pressure d th e Jew s t o adop t politica l positions . Accordin g t o Sagues: Indeed i t seem s tha t th e responsibl e authoritie s ar e applyin g a fai r approac h toward ou r coreligionists , bu t thing s ar e no t s o on th e par t o f organizations wit h fascist tendencies , whic h recrui t thei r member s amon g th e Spanis h youths . . . . These organization s ar e mor e activ e i n smal l settlement s lik e Arcil a o r Chaoue n than i n th e bi g centers . I kno w tha t Jewis h youth s fel l victim s t o thes e organiza tions i n Larache . . . . I n an y case , th e militar y authoritie s intervene d i n man y

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cases i n orde r t o restrai n excessiv e outburst s o f enthusiasm . Ou r coreligionist s suffer, i n tha t case, los s of their property: merchandise , foreig n currency , jewelr y —it i s al l stole n b y th e militar y government ; th e Spanis h civi l wa r wil l totall y impoverish them ; however , ther e i s in all this som e consolation i n the knowledg e that unti l now they haven' t suffere d los s of life. 11 Some o f thi s politicall y motivate d h a r a s s m e n t — w h e t h e r perpetrate d by th e authoritie s o r b y pro-fascis t m o v e m e n t s — s e e m s t o hav e influ enced th e Jew s o f Larach e t o th e exten t tha t the y expresse d profoun d anxiety abou t a rumo r tha t th e Tangie r Jewis h communit y counci l ha d made a declaratio n agains t Franco . Th e Larach e Jew s wer e relieve d when assure d b y Tangier' s Jewis h leader s o f thei r neutralit y i n regar d t o the Spanis h Civi l War. 1 2

Morocco under Vichy Influence During th e month s whic h precede d th e Germa n occupatio n o f France , Moroccan Jews , lik e thei r coreligionist s i n Tunisi a an d Algeria , expresse d solidarity wit h France . The y donate d fund s t o a specia l wa r chest , dona tions whic h ofte n reache d 50,00 0 franc s pe r donor—considerabl e sum s for thos e days. 1 3 W h e n Franc e recruite d volunteer s (durin g th e perio d 1939-40), hundred s o f Jew s signe d up . I n orde r t o facilitat e thei r regis tration, Jewis h recruitmen t center s wer e se t u p i n Raba t an d Casablanca . After severa l days ' efforts , a lis t containin g 1,30 0 name s wa s presente d t o the Frenc h Protectorat e administration . A . Cohen , a n AI U schoo l prin cipal i n Safl , describe d th e pro-Frenc h sentiment s o f the Jew s durin g th e early month s o f th e war . However , th e Jew s soo n realize d tha t Franc e did no t wan t thei r support : "Th e regulation s i n forc e o r consideration s which ar e ignore d b y th e public , hav e not , heretofore , enable d [us ] t o present a favorabl e respons e t o ou r arden t volunteers . An d the y wait . Several o f t h e m o n th e verg e o f impatience , hav e attempte d t o joi n th e Foreign Legion." 1 4 The Protectorat e administratio n politel y expresse d gratitud e t o th e Jewish volunteer s bu t rejecte d them , ostensibl y t o avoi d alienatin g th e Muslims o r anti-Semite s amon g th e Europea n population . Despit e thei r warm loyalt y t o France , thes e youn g Jew s wer e tol d the y ha d t o wai t indefinitely unti l the y woul d b e needed . Bu t i t wa s i n th e summe r o f 1940, wit h th e ris e o f Vichy , tha t anti-Semitis m becam e officia l polic y i n

Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace

6

1

France an d he r possessions . Beginnin g i n th e secon d hal f o f 1940 , anti Jewish law s wer e promulgate d whic h inevitabl y stirre d anxiet y amon g North Africa n Jews . Articl e 9 o f th e La w o f 3 Octobe r 1940 , concernin g the statu s o f th e Jews , provide d tha t th e La w shoul d b e introduce d i n Morocco, Algeria , an d Tunisi a an d i n F r a n c e s othe r colonies , protecto rates, an d mandate d territories . Th e La w wa s introduce d int o Morocc o through th e zahlr o f 3 1 Octobe r 1940 . I t applie d t o al l Jew s b y "race, " which wa s define d a s thre e Jewis h grandparents , a s wel l a s al l member s of th e Jewis h faith . Despit e it s discriminator y passages , th e La w ex pressly authorize d th e exercis e o f rabbini c jurisdiction , th e practic e o f calling i n H e b r e w cour t interpreters , an d allowe d Jew s t o continue teach ing a t institution s intende d solel y fo r Jews . It s provision s wer e no t t o prejudice Jewis h institutions , tha t is , communities. 1 5 The Vich y La w o f 2 June 194 1 increase d th e hardship s inflicte d b y th e Law o f 3 Octobe r 194 0 i n man y respects . I t wa s followe d b y th e zahlrs o f 5 Augus t 1941 , introducin g i t int o Morocco . Thes e decree s (issue d sepa rately fo r Morocca n Jew s an d fo r Europea n Jew s livin g i n th e Frenc h Zone) enlarge d th e lis t o f occupation s prohibite d t o Jews , includin g money lending i n an y for m an d th e rea l estat e business . The y did , how ever, permi t handicraft s an d wholesal e trading . A penalty wa s prescribe d for violation s o f th e zahlr regardin g persona l status . Al l Jew s wer e re quired t o appea r fo r registratio n o f their person s an d occupations , an d fo r declarations o f their property . Th e Vich y La w o f 22 July 1941 , concernin g the "Aryanization " o f th e Frenc h economy , wa s no t introduce d i n Mo rocco. According t o Articl e 4 o f th e 5 Augus t 194 1 zahlr, th e followin g professions wer e prohibite d t o Morocca n Jews : Banker, money-changer , peddler , broke r o f an agency for stock s or loans; invest ments i n businesse s an d i n distributing merchandise ; agent ; lessee o f woodlands; sports commissioner ; editor , director , administrator , journalis t wit h th e pres s o r a periodical (excep t fo r scientifi c o r religiou s periodicals) ; concessionaire; theatri cal director ; movi e produce r o r directo r o f a n agenc y fo r movi e distribution ; director o r administrator o f movie theaters; impresario for entertainmen t presen tations; director o r administrator i n broadcasting enterprises. 16 W e d o no t ye t posses s adequat e dat a t o full y asses s th e impac t o f thes e restrictions. Whic h o f th e zahlrs —and th e regulation s fo r thei r imple m e n t a t i o n — w e r e adhere d t o partially , an d whic h fully , b y th e resident -

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Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace Table 1 . Jew s Remove d fro m Administrativ e Duties i n Fe z an d Oudjda , 194 1 Population Registratio n Tax Burea u Public Work s Civil Inspectio n Urban Service s Hospitals Military Administratio n Teaching Electric Compan y Posts & Telegraph Railroad Bus Transportatio n Courts Banks Total

Fez 1 1 to t o

Employment

Oudjda 1

— —

5 2 3 2 7 3 6 4 4

3 8 7 2 10 3 1 2 2

42

39

Source: M.Y. , R.S. , R.B . (Raphae l Benazeraf) , Rapport confidentiel: L application du statut des juifs et des dispositions raciales a la population juive du Maroc (Fond s Institu t Ben-Zvi) , 14 .

general, Genera l Charle s Nogues ? I t appear s that , i n additio n t o th e aforementioned restriction s outline d i n Articl e 4 of the edic t o f 5 August 1941, ther e were certai n restriction s whic h were harshl y implemente d i n the citie s bu t no t enforce d fo r th e Jewis h communitie s o f th e rura l countryside. W e als o cannot alway s ascertain t o what extent decrees , an d the regulation s fo r implementin g them , wer e enforce d i n al l urban com munities. O n th e basi s o f availabl e data , ther e i s n o doub t tha t th e restrictions wer e a t leas t partiall y implemented . W e se e thi s fro m th e data i n tabl e 1 abou t th e remova l o f Jew s fro m administrativ e employ ment i n Fe z an d Oudjda . The regulation s fo r puttin g th e decree s int o effec t containe d detaile d provisions limitin g th e numbe r o f Jewis h lawyer s an d physician s t o 2 percent o f the tota l o f these profession s an d providin g compensatio n fo r officials dismisse d unde r th e zahirs. Most o f th e lawyer s affecte d b y thes e measure s wer e probabl y non Moroccan Europea n Jews . A s for physicians, thei r statu s require s furthe r investigation. Th e ne w La w fo r Morocc o (1941 ) severel y limite d th e number o f Jew s allowe d t o practic e medicine . Jewis h physician s wer e

Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace 6

3

not eve n permitte d t o car e fo r Jewis h patients . However , the y wer e authorized t o do so by the Protectorat e administratio n i n Tunisia. O n th e other hand , ne w findings i n th e archive s o f th e Qua i d'Orsa y see m t o suggest tha t a regio n b y regio n surve y o f th e applicatio n o f th e restric tions woul d b e necessary . Sinc e th e numbe r o f non-Jewis h physician s was limite d durin g th e wa r an d sinc e Jews , mainl y amon g th e Europea n emigrants, wer e relativel y wel l represente d i n tha t profession , Jewis h physicians wer e ofte n indispensable . I n Casablanca , fo r example , 1 7 percent o f th e physician s wer e Jews . Removin g the m fro m th e practic e of medicine woul d hav e endangere d healt h service s fo r th e genera l pop ulation. Therefore , apparently , th e restriction s wer e no t implemented i n Casablanca.17 Another restriction , date d 2 2 August 1941 , prohibited Jewis h subject s of the sulta n from residin g outside th e melldhs, an d especiall y from livin g in th e Europea n residentia l quarter s constructe d b y th e Frenc h fo r European settler s an d als o inhabite d b y th e mor e affluen t Muslim s an d Jews. Onl y specifi c categorie s o f Jews , essentiall y wa r veterans , wer e permitted t o sta y outsid e th e mellahs. Moreover , i f unable t o prove tha t their residenc e i n th e Europea n residentia l district s predate d 1 September 1939 , thes e Jew s to o wer e compelle d t o retur n t o th e mellah b y 2 2 September 1941 . Articl e 4 o f th e regulatio n indicate d tha t a ne w ordi nance woul d b e published , callin g fo r th e evacuatio n o f Jew s wh o ha d lived i n th e Europea n district s prio r t o 1 Septembe r 1939 . Thos e wh o resisted th e ne w la w wer e t o b e expelle d an d require d t o pa y a fine o f between 500 an d 10,00 0 francs . Onc e again , whil e w e d o no t hav e accurate record s a s t o wha t exten t thi s polic y wa s implemented , severa l hundred Jewis h familie s i n th e urba n center s lef t o r were expelled . Th e return o f well-to-do Jews back to the mellah cause d further overcrowdin g and hastened th e sprea d o f typhoid. 18 In a countr y wher e Jew s ha d lon g suffere d fro m a highe r rat e o f illiteracy tha n th e Jewis h communitie s o f Algeria an d Tunisia , the y wer e now further restricted . Th e number o f Jews in the Protectorate' s elemen tary an d secondar y school s wa s limite d t o 1 0 percen t o f th e numbe r o f non-Jews, an d i n institution s o f highe r learnin g t o 3 percent . Ther e i s clear evidenc e tha t a quota (numerus clausus) i n educatio n wa s enforce d at leas t t o som e extent . Whil e th e communa l religiou s school s continue d to function, th e heavies t responsibilit y fo r providin g secula r educatio n t o Jewish childre n throughou t Morocc o fel l o n th e AI U institutions . Wherea s

64 Under

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French Protectorate-sponsore d school s ha d opene d thei r door s t o out standing Musli m an d Jewis h student s an d t o th e privilege d indigenou s socioeconomic stratum , th e majorit y o f the Jew s ha d obtaine d a moder n education withi n th e AI U framework . I n 1940-41 , 15,00 0 Jewish youth s attended th e AI U schools , bu t onl y a bi t ove r 1,00 0 studie d a t th e Protectorate schools . Thi s alread y smal l numbe r wa s reduce d a s a resul t of the new measure, particularl y i n Casablanca, Rabat , Meknes , an d Fez ; Jewish teacher s employe d b y the Protectorat e als o suffered. 19 What wa s Vichy's policy vis-a-vis the AIU ? There i s no doubt tha t thi s school syste m continue d t o functio n unde r Vichy . Th e AI U school s ha d been receivin g financial assistanc e fro m Franc e o n a regula r basi s sinc e 1928. O n th e ev e o f Worl d Wa r II , th e Frenc h wer e subsidizin g 8 0 percent o f the schools ' maintenance costs , eithe r wit h thei r ow n funds o r using makhzan monies . Withou t thi s support , th e AI U syste m coul d no t have survived . Th e suppor t continue d int o th e Vich y era . W e canno t clearly identif y th e motive s a s t o wh y th e Vichyite s maintaine d th e AI U in Morocco , thoug h on e can mak e som e inferences . Resident-general Nogue s probabl y believe d tha t i t woul d b e prefera ble t o stabiliz e th e educationa l syste m o f Frenc h Morocc o an d no t t o curtail th e wor k o f the AIU , a move tha t woul d sen d Jewis h youth s int o the streets . Afte r all , th e anti-Jewis h legislatio n limite d thei r educationa l opportunities t o begi n with. 20 Roge r Thabaul t (unti l 194 1 inspector general o f Europea n primar y educatio n fo r th e Protectorate ) relate d years late r tha t Nogue s ha d enable d hi m t o trave l t o Vich y an d reques t that th e authoritie s publis h a n edic t legitimizin g th e continuatio n o f th e AIU's subsidy . Thabaul t claim s t o hav e com e t o th e AIU' s rescue , be cause h e suspecte d tha t certai n hig h official s a t th e Residenc y wer e determined t o eithe r neutraliz e th e school s o f thi s networ k or , a t th e very least, restric t th e scop e of their activity. 21 Whereas Vich y and it s senio r officials i n Nort h Afric a wer e reactionar ies an d old-styl e anti-Semites , the y wer e no t a s viciou s a s th e Nazis . Vichy ma y have appreciate d th e pro-Frenc h rol e of the AI U an d felt tha t it woul d b e bette r t o le t it s school s survive . I n fact , Admira l Frangoi s Darlan wa s concerne d abou t th e possibl e disappearanc e o f th e AI U schools whe n h e wrot e t o Xavie r Vallat , urgin g hi m t o preven t th e collapse o f "un importan t resea u d'expansio n d e l a langue francaise " (a n important networ k fo r th e disseminatio n o f th e Frenc h language). 22 I t seems tha t i n th e final analysis , an d despit e oppositio n t o th e AI U

Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace 6

5

Table 2 . Monthl y Rationin g o f Foodstuff s an d Essentia l Product s i n Morocco, Lat e 194 2 Product Sugar (i n grams ) Cooking Oi l (in Centiliters ) Coffee (i n grams) Green Te a (in grams ) Hand Sao p Wine (liters ) Kerosene (liters ) Meat (i n grams )

Europeans 500

Muslims 700

Jews 350-450

250 200

330

230 50



200 10 3 200-250

— 40 70

— — —



70 2V2

— —

Source: La situation desjuifs en znefrangais de l-empire cherifien, fin 1943 , CZA, Z4/10.266 .

emanating fro m Vallat' s men , Darla n an d hi s colleague s ma y wel l hav e shared th e opinion of their adversary Genera l Charles de Gaulle concern ing the cultura l significanc e o f the AI U i n Nort h Africa. 23 As for othe r restriction s an d hardships , bot h Muslim s an d Jew s wer e disadvantaged i n th e distributio n o f rationed food s an d mos t other essen tial consume r products . Availabl e dat a presente d i n tabl e 2 giv e a n accurate indicatio n o f monthl y ration s durin g th e final month s o f 1942 . Among othe r examples : Jew s wer e entitle d t o a 2 lA lite r win e ratio n whereas th e European s go t te n liters . Jew s consume d larg e quantitie s o f wine i n religiou s observance s an d neede d mor e win e tha n others . Sinc e sugar wa s consume d mor e heavil y b y Muslim s an d gree n te a onl y b y Muslims, Jew s an d European s wer e no t disadvantage d i n thes e catego ries. However , wherea s th e European s wer e provide d wit h thre e liter s of kerosene , Muslim s an d Jew s ha d t o bu y i t o n th e fre e marke t a t exaggerated prices , th e sam e holding true fo r meat . In Frenc h Morocco , a final aspec t o f persecutio n wa s detentio n an d labor camps . Thes e camp s hel d Jewis h inmates , amon g others . A Vichy Law of 4 October 194 0 had provide d fo r dententio n o f "foreign national s of th e Jewis h race " i n specia l concentratio n camps . Thi s La w wa s no t introduced i n Morocco , becaus e a zahir ha d alread y bee n promulgate d on 2 Januar y 1940 . I t provide d fo r detention s i n designate d place s o f persons endangerin g nationa l defens e o r publi c security , o r unabl e t o emigrate afte r havin g receive d expulsio n orders , o r i n th e countr y ille gally. Th e detainee s coul d b e force d t o perfor m labo r o f us e t o th e community an d fo r tha t purpos e t o b e organize d i n specia l units . Thi s

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zahlr wa s directed agains t communists , anti-Frenc h element s amon g th e Muslims, an d foreigners , especiall y foreig n Jew s seekin g refug e i n Mo rocco. Twelv e detentio n an d labor camps with a partly Jewish populatio n were se t u p i n Morocc o durin g th e war . Ther e ar e report s an d testimon ies o f harsh condition s prevailin g i n th e camps . I t seems , however , tha t the pligh t o f the detainee s wa s generall y les s sever e i n Morocc o tha n i n Algeria and Tunisia. 24 These camps were not intended fo r Morocca n Jew s but onl y fo r Europea n Jews . (O n th e Jewis h populatio n o f Frenc h Mo rocco in the earl y 1940s , se e tabl e 3. ) In th e Spanis h Zone , n o drastic changes occurre d tha t endangere d th e Jews followin g Franco' s ris e t o power . No t a singl e discriminator y la w was issue d agains t them . Eve n thei r foo d ration s wer e identica l t o thos e of th e Spanis h an d foreig n population , contrar y t o th e situatio n i n th e French Zone. 25 O n th e othe r hand , Spanis h radi o an d pres s engage d i n anti-Semitic propaganda durin g 1940-41. 26 Following the outbreak o f the war, Richter , th e Germa n consu l i n Tetuan , sough t t o pressur e th e Spanish authoritie s t o adop t anti-Jewis h measure s i n th e city . H e als o attempted t o incit e th e Muslim s agains t th e Jews . Thes e effort s failed . Ashash Pasha , th e governor , an d othe r makhzan official s assiste d th e Jews and foiled an y effort b y Muslim s an d German s t o harm them. 27 Economically, divers e socioeconomi c strat a i n th e Jewis h communit y of Tetua n suffere d fro m poverty , bu t th e condition s o f Jewis h artisan s there an d i n othe r part s o f the Zon e wer e relativel y bette r tha n thos e o f their coreligionists i n French Morocco . According to French Protectorat e sources analyzin g the positio n o f the Jews in Tetuan: Much o f the trad e i n Tetuan i s monopolized b y the Jews. Eve n thos e Jews not living i n th e cit y are , fo r th e mos t part , merchants . Th e Ara b merchant s o f Tetuan's Musli m quarte r are deeply involved in black marketeering to the point where their reputation has been dreadfully disgrace d while the reputation of the Jewish merchants is far better. They operate more prudently. 28 In area s a s El-Ksa r an d Larache , th e Spanis h authoritie s prevente d attacks agains t Jews , perhaps , a s Frenc h source s claim , becaus e Jewis h communal leader s bribe d Spanis h securit y official s an d makhzan digni taries. Whe n new s reache d El-Ksa r an d Larach e tha t th e Allie s ha d achieved significan t militar y victorie s ove r the Axi s powers, affluen t Jew ish notable s feare d tha t Spanis h soldier s an d officer s loya l t o German y

Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace 6 Table 3 . Th e Jewis h Populatio n o f French Morocc o i n Accordanc e wit h a French Protectorat e Censu s o f 1 Januar y 1943 * A. Jews According to Region (Atla s Mountains Included) Casablanca 68,336 Fez 21,260 Marrakesh 52,439 Meknes 20,237 Oudjda 9,807 Rabat 17,255 5,220 Agadir 194,554 Total: B. Jews According to Cities Casablanca 55,817 Fedala 297 Oudjda 5,804 Azemmour 420 Sefrou 5,460 3,750 Mazagan 1,720 Settat 10,257 Rabat 320 Taza 3,181 Sale Port Lyaute y 1,028 2,102 Ouezzan Marrakesh 17,043 4,076 Safi 5,702 Essaouira Agadir 850 Meknes 12,000 Fez 13,352 Source: AAE-Nantes , DI/809 . * According t o th e census , ou t of 194,55 4 Jew s i n Frenc h Morocco, 178,50 0 wer e Morocca n subjects , 12,00 0 wer e French nationals , an d 4,000 wer e foreigner s (42 0 Englishmen, 31 5 Russians, 7 6 German s an d Austrians, whil e th e rest were stateless) .

7

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might haras s th e Jews. Th e latter wer e accuse d b y anti-Semitic element s in th e Spanis h Zon e of manifesting pro-Britis h an d pro-America n sympa thies. Bu t n o majo r problem s surfaced , eithe r du e t o th e bribe s offere d to officials o r in line with official polic y to protect th e Jews. I n fact, effort s by extremis t Morocca n nationalist s t o attac k th e mellah o f El-Ksa r wer e prevented b y the Spanis h an d Musli m authorities. 29 Tangier as an international zon e posed specia l problems, som e of them involving Jewis h refugees . Durin g 1942-43 , ther e wer e betwee n 1,50 0 and 2,00 0 Jewish refugee s i n Tangier, man y o f whom ha d arrive d durin g the prewa r era . Approximatel y hal f wer e Sephardim ; th e remainder , Central Europeans . Th e Sephardi m originate d fro m th e Dodecanes e Islands (the n unde r Italy) ; som e ha d lef t Rhode s fo r Ital y an d Franc e even befor e Ital y introduce d anti-Jewis h law s i n 1938 . Mos t o f thes e families ha d thre e o r mor e children . Th e me n wer e craftsmen , shoe makers, drivers , o r smal l businessmen . The y spok e Italian , Spanish , Turkish, an d French . Th e Centra l European s ha d com e mainl y fro m Hungary an d Polan d vi a Italy , wher e a numbe r o f the m live d fo r tw o years befor e th e enactmen t o f th e 193 8 anti-Jewis h laws . A s lon g a s Tangier remaine d a n international zone , refugee s wer e admitte d withou t difficulty. No r wer e ther e an y regulation s t o preven t the m fro m earnin g their living . Afte r th e fal l o f France an d Spain' s occupatio n o f Tangier i n June 1940 , thes e peopl e wer e deprive d o f th e righ t t o work . Thei r standard o f living fel l rapidl y fro m tha t tim e on . Th e interventio n o f th e World Jewis h Congress , th e America n Jewis h Join t Distributio n Com mittee (AJDC) , an d th e AI U helpe d reliev e som e o f thei r misery ; afte r April 1944 , AJD C spen t $12,00 0 monthl y o n behal f o f these r e f u g e e s funds tha t wer e allocate d throug h a local relief committee . Thi s su m wa s separate fro m fund s earmarke d fo r schoo l meal s a t th e AIU. 30 (Se e tabl e 4 on th e Jewish/non-Jewish populace. ) During th e 1939-4 0 period, th e Jewish populatio n o f Tangier reache d 12,000, refugee s included . Mos t o f the Jew s were craftsmen , ban k clerk s and ban k officials , a s well a s merchants an d agent s o f trading companies . Despite variou s restriction s an d th e Spanis h occupatio n (unti l 1945) , their politica l an d economi c condition s wer e bette r tha n thos e i n Frenc h Morocco unde r Vichy . Th e Jews continued t o engage i n certain lucrativ e trades. Wherea s Jew s i n Frenc h Morocc o wer e no w discriminate d agains t in th e textil e trades , Tangie r Jewr y wa s stil l represente d i n tha t sector . Blandin, wh o conducte d a thoroug h investigatio n o f th e situatio n i n

Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace 6

Sultan (Late r King ) Muhammad V (1909-1961) (author' s persona l collection).

9

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Table 4 . Th e Populatio n o f Tangier, 1940-194 1 Refugees

Permanently Settled Population Muslims Jews Spaniards Frenchmen Italians English Portuguese Others Total

37,000 12--13,000 14,000 2,500 1,150 800 350 300

Central Europ e Gibraltar France Portuguese Fisherman

2,000 1,000 250

Total

3,500

250

68,100--69,100 Overall Total 71,600 --72,600

Source: Blandin , "L a population d e Tanger e n 1940, " Revue Africaine, 88 (1944), 114-115 .

Tangier durin g th e war , observe d rathe r optimisticall y tha t th e Jewis h elite, whos e member s ha d tie s wit h th e ne w Spanis h administration , enjoyed a stable economi c situation. I n fact, h e added : The Je w control s th e export s t o Englan d an d th e Unite d State s o f America of leather goods, eggs, skins and the imports of all the indispensable manufacture d products t o Tangie r an d fro m th e Spanis h Protectorate : textiles , automobiles , furniture, flour, spices—wholesal e an d retail . . . . Bu t i t i s largely i n bankin g that the Tangier Jew specializes and [where he makes the greatest] profit. 31 It i s possibl e tha t thi s wa s tru e insofa r a s th e elit e wa s concerned . I t was certainl y no t th e cas e fo r th e lowe r middl e class . Thei r positio n under th e ne w administratio n wa s precarious . Thei r businesse s wer e heavily taxe d an d ne w licenses were ofte n refuse d b y the authorities. 32 Politically, th e Jew s faced certai n anxietie s unde r th e Spanis h occupa tion. Th e Spaniard s dissolve d th e Legislativ e Assembly , encourage d th e departure o f th e las t vestig e o f Sharifia n authorit y i n Tangier , th e mandub (th e Sultan' s representativ e i n th e Internationa l Zone) , an d enacte d legislation fo r administrativ e reform . Th e zahir o f 1 5 Februar y 1925 , which ha d legalize d th e Jewis h community' s council , wa s abrogated . Al l communal activit y cam e unde r Spanis h supervision. 33 Th e Jewis h com munity los t th e subsidie s previousl y allocated , a s wel l a s th e righ t t o elect it s communa l leader s wh o woul d no w b e directl y appointe d b y Spain from a list submitte d b y the community . Th e autonomous rabbini c

Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace

7

1

tribunal an d it s constitution s wer e als o dissolved. 3 4 Interestingly , simila r measures wer e no t adopte d i n th e Frenc h Zon e wher e th e authoritie s preferred no t t o upse t th e Jewis h organizationa l structure . Nevertheless, th e situatio n i n Tangie r remaine d relativel y secur e de spite th e fac t tha t th e Jew s wer e victim s o f Naz i propagand a promote d by Germa n merchant s (wh o p r e t e n d e d befor e 194 0 t o b e Swis s an d Dutch national s an d afterwar d carrie d ou t ope n politica l action) . Politi cally speaking , th e Jew s o f Tangie r enjoye d th e highes t leve l o f freedo m attainable u n d e r a n authoritaria n regime . The y wer e fre e o f racia l an d legal discrimination. 3 5 Returning t o th e situatio n i n Frenc h Morocco , eve n afte r th e Ameri can landin g o n 8 Novembe r 1942 , th e positio n o f th e Jew s remaine d precarious. Th e American s di d no t interfer e i n Frenc h interna l affair s and Vich y sympathizer s stil l dominate d th e administration . O n 9 Januar y 1943, M . Poussier , th e hea d o f th e civi l administratio n i n th e Casablanc a district, summone d th e loca l Jewis h notable s an d warne d the m tha t th e Jews woul d b e hel d responsibl e i f th e demonstration s o f Genera l d e Gaulle's Nationa l Fron t an d th e Veterans ' Union , schedule d fo r th e nex t day, di d i n fac t tak e place. 3 6 Thi s wa s onl y on e o f a n u m b e r o f oppressiv e acts, whic h wer e al l th e mor e distressin g a s the y occurre d afte r th e Allie d landing. T h e r e wer e als o attack s o n Jew s i n th e mellah o f Casablanca , anti-Jewish riot s i n Raba t an d Sale , discriminator y measure s i n Mekne s and Fez , an d harassmen t o f Jews a t Beni-Mellal . O n e officia l sourc e clos e to th e Residency' s Direction de Vlnterieur describe d Jewis h enthusias m at th e Vichyites ' defeat , no t withou t som e exaggeration , a s containin g anti-French an d pro-America n tendencies : The Jew s ar e assemble d o n th e terrace s o f the melldhs o f Casablanca an d Raba t to follow th e events . Ther e ar e thos e who curse th e French , eve n thos e wounded . . . . Jewis h enthusias m increase s a s th e American s advance . . . . Severa l day s later th e Jews join demonstrator s fro m whos e rank s emanate th e cr y "Down wit h France!" Europea n wome n ha d thei r face s slappe d b y Jewis h women . I n Rabat , a Je w spit s i n th e fac e o f a decorate d Musli m mokhazni [policeman] . . . . I n Casablanca, Jew s caugh t th e Secretar y o f the makhzans Gran d Vizie r and force d him t o cry out "Lon g live America, Dow n wit h France! " This provoking behavio r could lea d t o serious confrontations betwee n th e Musli m masse s and th e Jews. 37 At Beni-Mellal , th e loca l Musli m governo r an d th e Frenc h civi l con troller (wh o wa s know n fo r hi s hostilit y t o th e Jews ) announce d tha t an y

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European desirin g to settle in town could choose a home from th e house s or apartments occupie d b y Jewish tenants . Onc e a residence wa s chosen , the famil y woul d hav e t o evacuat e withi n forty-eigh t hours . Severa l Jewish familie s wer e force d ou t of their home s durin g th e difficul t winte r of 1942-43 . The y foun d temporar y refug e i n loca l synagogue s an d com munity centers . The Jews' situation bega n t o gradually improv e onl y after 3 June 1943. On tha t date , Genera l d e Gaull e an d Genera l Henr i Giraud , i n charge of those Frenc h territorie s i n Nort h Afric a no t unde r Germa n occupation , reached a n agreement fo r th e creation o f a French Committe e o f National Liberation. Th e agreemen t als o marke d th e en d o f Vich y influenc e i n Morocco. O n th e following day , Genera l Nogue s fled to Portugal .

Tunisia—The Dual Challenge: Vichy Influence and German Occupation The La w of 3 October 194 0 was extended t o Tunisia throug h th e edic t o f 30 Novembe r 1940 , just a s it ha d bee n applie d t o Morocco . I t containe d twelve article s outlinin g th e measure s i n th e nam e o f the be y an d signe d by th e resident-general , Admira l Esteva . Th e edic t restricte d Jewis h representation i n th e publi c servic e (Article s 3 and 9) , and i n educationa l institutions an d journalis m (Articl e 7) . Articl e 5 stipulate d tha t certai n public function s woul d b e ope n t o Jew s provide d the y coul d prov e th e following: tha t the y ha d bee n decorate d b y Franc e fo r militar y servic e during Worl d Wa r I ; ha d receive d Vordre du jour (arm y servic e medal ) in th e 1939-4 0 War ; ha d receive d th e Medaille militaire; wer e descen dants o f soldier s wh o ha d die d fo r Franc e betwee n 1914-18 ; o r wer e widows of men wh o had die d i n war and ha d receive d a pension fro m th e French government. 38 On 9 Octobe r 1941 , measures wer e adopte d regardin g lawyer s o f th e Jewish fait h (avocats defenseurs). Articl e 3 stipulate d tha t a dat e woul d be announced afte r whic h lawyers who were blacklisted would be prohib ited fro m providin g services. 39 Measure s wer e als o take n agains t Jewis h physicians. Accordin g t o Articl e 1 6 o f th e 6 Novembe r 194 1 decree , however, the y were stil l authorized t o provide medica l care to the Jewis h population an d thei r credential s wer e suppose d t o indicate this. 40 Some o f the measure s remaine d purel y theoretical . The y wer e eithe r

Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace

7

3

not applie d a t al l o r wer e implemente d ver y slowl y an d partially . Th e Germans, wh o occupie d Tunisi a i n Novembe r 1942 , attribute d thi s t o the libera l policie s o f Admiral Esteva . B y th e summe r o f 1941 , Morocca n and Algeria n Jewr y ha d begu n t o fee l th e effec t o f th e anti-Jewis h mea sures, bu t Esteva' s Tunisi a wa s considerabl y les s oppressive . A s Nahu m Yerushalmi, a H e b r e w educato r fro m Palestin e activ e i n th e Jewis h community o f Tunis, observe d i n Jun e 1941 : Tunisian Jewr y wa s no t muc h harme d b y th e war . Onl y a fe w ric h me n an d members o f the libera l professions , wh o wer e harme d b y th e ne w Frenc h legis lation, wer e lowere d i n thei r situation . O n th e othe r hand , religiou s an d Zionis t enthusiasm increase d an d contribution s fo r th e communit y an d it s institutions , especially for Hebre w education , wer e give n generously. 41 The situation , however , worsene d drasticall y followin g th e America n landing i n Nort h Afric a i n Novembe r 1942 , whic h soo n precipitate d th e invasion o f Tunisia b y th e German s an d Italians . Contro l o f Jewish affair s now passe d t o th e German-Italia n Kommandatura, heade d b y a Germa n general. Still , becaus e o f their Italia n partners , th e German s wer e unabl e to ven t thei r hatre d upo n th e Jew s i n th e sam e manne r a s i n occupie d Europe. Difficultie s o f communicatio n wit h Europ e an d a certai n slack ening o f disciplin e als o mad e i t harde r fo r th e Kommandatura t o displa y the sam e brutalit y a s th e Nazi s di d i n Europe. 4 2 Bu t condition s fo r th e Jews di d deteriorate . Harassment bega n wit h th e arres t o f notables, includin g th e presiden t of th e Jewis h communit y o f Tunis , Mois e Borgel . Th e notable s wer e released a week late r afte r a forceful protes t b y Estev a whos e administra tion continue d alongsid e th e Germans' , albei t wit h considerabl y reduce d authority. O n 6 D e c e m b e r 1942 , Borge l an d th e chie f rabb i o f Tunis , Hayyim Belaiche , wer e summone d t o Germa n headquarters . The y wer e told tha t i n vie w o f th e prevailin g shortag e o f manpower , Genera l vo n Nehring, i n charg e o f Axi s force s i n Nort h Africa , ha d ordere d th e drafting o f Jewis h laborers . Th e German s forme d a labo r recruitmen t commission (L e Comit e d e Recrutemen t d e l a Mai n d'CEuvre ) wit h func tions strikingl y simila r t o thos e o f th e Judenrat i n occupie d Europe . Pau l Ghez, a leadin g m e m b e r o f th e Jewis h community , wa s appointe d chair man o f the commission . To ensur e th e implementatio n o f Germa n instructions , severa l doze n

74 Under

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Jewish notable s wer e detaine d a s hostages . Som e o f them , accuse d o f supporting Genera l d e Gaull e o r socialis t an d communis t causes , wer e sent t o concentratio n camp s i n Germany , fro m whic h the y di d no t re turn. Th e commissio n an d simila r bodie s manage d t o recrui t severa l thousand poore r Jew s fro m throughou t th e country . Bitte r complaint s were hear d tha t th e well-to-d o manage d t o avoi d th e dangerou s labo r i n camps, airfields , an d o n fortification s whic h th e Allie s bombe d relent lessly. Th e wor k wa s mostl y carrie d ou t unde r Germa n comman d i n strategic place s suc h a s Bizerte , Mateur , an d th e E l Aouin a aerodrom e near Tunis . Th e Italia n labo r camps were remot e fro m th e mai n strategi c points an d therefor e les s expose d t o bombing . Furthermore , th e condi tions i n thes e camp s wer e fa r bette r tha n i n thos e unde r Germa n com mand. The German s intende d t o have th e Jew s wear th e Yello w Sta r a s the y had don e i n occupie d Europe . But , a s fa r a s w e wer e abl e t o ascertain , this badg e wa s introduce d i n Sfax , bu t onl y partially , i f at all, i n Tunis . On th e othe r hand , durin g thei r six-mont h occupation , th e German s required th e Jew s t o pa y heav y fines an d provid e fund s t o maintai n th e Jewish labo r force . I n Tunis , th e communit y leadershi p levie d payment s from 1,39 7 affluen t member s amon g th e 40,00 0 Jew s i n th e city ; durin g the six-mont h occupation , th e Jew s o f Tuni s provide d 35,748,898.8 5 francs fo r communit y expenses . O f this, 31,022,311.5 0 wer e allocate d t o maintain th e labo r force . Anti-Semitic accusation s were use d a s pretexts for demands for mone y from th e Jews . I n 1943 , fo r example , th e German s i n Tunisi a accuse d "international Jewry " o f helping th e Allie s prepar e fo r wa r agains t Ger many. Thi s charg e becam e a pretex t fo r imposin g fines o n Tuni s Jewr y amounting to twenty millio n francs. I n order t o meet th e various Germa n damands, th e Jewis h leadershi p wa s compelle d t o mortgag e rea l estat e and us e th e propert y o f affluen t Jew s a s a guarante e fo r ban k loans. 43 Thus, th e terro r organize d agains t th e Jew s ha d a significan t financial aspect. This form o f terror wa s intricately boun d u p with othe r outrages , suc h as German s bargin g int o synagogues , belittlin g rabbis , an d intimidatin g ordinary Jews . Th e intimidatio n originate d i n th e uppe r echelon s o f th e German command . Fo r instance, earl y in 194 3 the Ortskommandant (th e local Germa n commande r fo r Tunis) , wrot e t o George s Sarfati , a repre sentative o f the Jews of Ariana, a suburb o f Tunis, warning :

Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace

7

5

I hav e recentl y [becom e awar e of ] severa l act s o f sabotag e whic h wer e carrie d out especially on military telephon e line s in Ariana. Moreover , I received report s that man y amon g th e Jewis h populatio n wer e spreadin g accusation s an d propa ganda agains t th e Axi s states , a situation tha t disturb s publi c peac e an d security . I a m incline d t o believ e tha t th e polic y o f restraint implemente d i n thi s connec tion towar d th e Jewis h populatio n ha s no t a t al l bee n properl y understood— I order yo u t o announc e t o th e Jewis h populatio n tha t an y attemp t t o distur b th e public peac e an d securit y wil l lea d t o sever e punishment . Thes e punishment s will includ e th e deat h penalty . I f I receiv e on e repor t abou t activit y agains t th e interests o f th e Axi s state s originatin g withi n th e Jewis h population , I wil l hav e several me n arreste d a s hostages i n order t o have peace prevail. 44 W e ca n conclud e o n th e basi s o f persona l account s o f individual s involved tha t loca l Jew s w e r e profoundl y concerne d wit h th e threa t t o their existence . Althoug h th e n u m b e r o f Jew s wh o die d i n force d labo r camps unde r th e German s wa s small , an d man y other s die d a s a resul t o f Allied aeria l bombardments , i t i s vita l t o stres s th e fac t tha t th e ver y presence o f th e German s cause d th e deaths . Durin g th e earl y month s o f 1943, Jew s bega n t o deser t fortificatio n work s an d labo r camps ; n o mor e than si x h u n d r e d o f the m wer e stil l obeyin g force d labo r orders . O n e o f the mos t dangerou s strategi c point s a t th e tim e wa s th e E l Aouin a aerodrome nea r Tunis . Accordin g t o Avraha m Sarfat i fro m Tuni s wh o worked there : There was something specia l abou t ou r group . I n th e community [i n Tunis], the y called u s a groupe volant, tha t is , a mobil e group . Fo r th e mos t part , al l th e groups wer e i n camp s o r o n th e borde r wit h . . th e front . I was not a t the front , but . . I worke d a t unloadin g th e airplanes . . . . I wil l giv e a n exampl e o f ou r relationship t o th e Germans . . . . We ar e workin g a t th e airfiel d an d ther e wer e Allied bombing s o f th e airfield . The n w e woul d flee i n car s togethe r wit h th e Germans. W e use d t o immediatel y leav e th e airfiel d an d g o of f som e distance . But sinc e th e bomb s als o fel l outsid e th e airfiel d . . . ther e wer e als o Jews, no t from m y grou p but fro m thos e working outside th e airfield , wh o were killed. Ou r group continue d t o trave l t o thi s airfiel d ever y da y unti l on e da y ther e wa s a British bombin g b y planes tha t flew in low and destroye d al l the plane s tha t wer e landing a t tha t tim e a s wel l a s thos e tha t wer e o n th e airfield . . . . W e sa w a frightening sight : Th e pilot s wer e burn t insid e thei r cockpits . Th e German s tol d us that ther e was nothing to unload but tha t we mus t gather u p the corpses . Also , several Jews working outside th e airfiel d wer e kille d i n that bombing. 45 A final issu e o f central importanc e i n connectio n wit h th e Holocaus t i n E u r o p e ha s b e e n raise d b y researcher s regardin g Tunisia n Jewry : W e r e

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the German s movin g t o exterminat e them ? Yitsha k Avrahami' s persona l account claim s "[th e Germans ] di d no t hav e enoug h tim e t o carr y ou t their pla n for mas s expulsio n an d extermination . I kno w tha t the y planne d to carry ou t act s o f burning peopl e an d I know tha t nea r Tuni s ther e wa s a bric k kil n an d the y planne d t o us e thi s bric k kil n t o carr y ou t thei r plan." 46 A simila r versio n wa s provide d b y Naftal i Bar-Giora , on e o f th e firs t emissaries o f the Jewish Agency an d th e Mossa d Le- cAliya in Palestin e t o arrive i n Tunisi a durin g th e latte r hal f o f 1943 , followin g th e country' s liberation b y th e Allies : " I kno w tha t a n S.S . uni t wa s preparin g ga s chambers nea r Kairoua n i n a plan t fo r producin g cemen t an d plaster . These installation s wer e no t complete d befor e th e withdrawa l o f Rom mel's arm y fro m Afric a an d wer e dismantled . Ther e wer e Frenchme n and Arabs who sa w the place and tol d abou t it s existence/ 4 7 There ar e countles s othe r theorie s an d accounts—abou t plan s whic h were foiled , o r o n th e creatio n o f facilities t o carry ou t plan s whic h wer e not complete d du e t o lac k o f tim e befor e Tunisia' s liberatio n o n 7 Ma y 1943. A t this stag e of research, however , i t is widely agreed b y historian s that th e German s wer e i n pani c an d frustrate d b y th e bombing s an d other militar y operation s an d thu s di d no t dea l wit h thi s issue ; the y ha d little fait h i n th e Musli m populatio n an d i t i s doubtfu l tha t th e latte r would hav e rendere d suppor t fo r suc h an endeavor; th e German s di d no t succeed i n organizin g a n effectiv e propagand a apparatus ; thei r channel s of communicatio n wit h Europ e wer e wea k a t best ; an d th e presenc e o f the Italian s ma y hav e bee n a moderating facto r o n th e German s vis-a-vi s the Jews.

Algeria: Regression in the Jews' Economic and Political Status The statu s o f Algeria n Jewr y deteriorate d significantly—juridicall y an d politically—with th e ris e o f Vichy . No t onl y di d th e 1940-4 1 laws , discussed above , appl y t o the m but , o n 7 October 1940 , Philipp e Petai n signed a n edic t abrogatin g th e Cremieu x Decre e o f 2 4 Octobe r 1870 . This decre e ha d grante d Algeria n Jew s Frenc h citizenship . Thu s al l Algerian Jew s los t thei r Frenc h citizenship , wit h th e exceptio n o f Jew s who ha d fough t i n th e Frenc h arm y an d wer e decorated . However , personal propert y right s remaine d i n effect fo r al l Jews.

Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace 7

7

Serious confusio n aros e a s a result o f the La w o f 7 October 1940 . Fo r instance, ther e wer e Jew s wh o argue d the y wer e entitle d t o conserv e their ful l citizenshi p right s becaus e the y ha d fough t fo r Franc e i n 1939 40; the y claime d t o hav e bee n take n prisoner s o f wa r bu t manage d t o escape an d consequentl y wer e candidate s fo r militar y decoration . Yet , i f they were unabl e t o prove thi s claim o n the basis of official documents ; if they presente d onl y writte n evidenc e fro m thei r divisions ' commandin g officers; i f there wa s n o consistenc y betwee n thei r declaration s an d writ ten evidence—the y coul d no t receiv e th e Medaille militaire. Conse quently, the y coul d no t enjo y th e benefits o f Article 4 of the la w abrogat ing th e Cremieu x Decre e whic h entitle d combattant s fro m 1914-1 8 an d 1939-40 who had been decorate d t o remain citizen s o f France. 48 But retainin g Frenc h citizenshi p wa s no t simpl e eve n fo r arm y veter ans; a n Algeria n Je w wh o ha d fough t fo r Franc e bu t no t durin g Worl d War I o r i n 1939-40 , wa s no t entitle d t o kee p hi s politica l right s a s a French citizen , fo r Sectio n 4 o f th e La w o f 7 Octobe r 1940 , stipulate d that th e citizenshi p right s o f Algeria n Jew s woul d b e preserve d onl y i f they fough t durin g thes e war s an d wer e decorated . Hence , thos e wh o were decorated , fo r example , durin g th e Frenc h militar y pacificatio n campaign i n Morocc o i n 1926 , wer e no t eligibl e t o kee p thei r citizen ship. 49 Among th e mos t crucia l governmen t agencie s dealin g wit h Jewis h matters i n Franc e an d Algeri a wa s th e Commissariat General aux Questions Juives—a bod y advisin g the Vichy regime o n laws affecting Jew s as such and on applying such laws, as well as on confiscating o r sequesterin g Jewish propert y an d overseein g Jewis h economi c activity . Xavie r Vallat , the hea d o f the Commissariat, visite d Algeri a i n August 1941 . He aime d to investigat e variou s possibilitie s o f applyin g th e newl y adopte d laws . Vallat me t wit h Chie f Rabb i Mauric e Eisenbet h t o discus s th e ne w educational polic y an d hel d discussion s wit h Jewis h wa r veterans . Th e latter ha d hope d tha t n o furthe r discriminator y measure s woul d b e en acted an d implemented . Despit e hi s outwardly friendl y disposition , Val lat ha d n o intention s o f recommendin g polic y revisions. 50 Thus , fo r ex ample, i n th e spiri t o f the 1940-4 1 laws, th e decre e o f 5 November 194 1 called fo r enforcin g th e numerus clausus o n Jews i n th e lega l profession : only 2 percen t o f th e eigh t hundre d registere d lawyer s coul d b e Jews . Therefore, onl y sixteen Jew s remained a s lawyers. 51 As fo r Jewis h midwives , th e decre e stipulatin g restriction s o n the m

78 Under

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was publishe d i n Algeria' s Journal Officiel o n 2 9 Novembe r 1941 , predat ing th e decree' s publicatio n i n Franc e (2 6 December) . Th e n u m b e r o f Jewish midwives , i n th e spiri t o f th e La w o f 2 Jun e 1941 , coul d not , u n d e r an y circumstances , surpas s th e 2 percen t restriction . Ye t eve n fo r those wh o wer e amon g th e fortunat e few , th e bureaucrati c proces s o f proving eligibilit y wa s lon g an d draw n out. 5 2 More demoralizing , however , wa s th e extensio n t o Algeri a o f th e French La w o f 2 1 Novembe r 1941 , stipulatin g tha t th e Jew s wer e t o b e deprived o f th e righ t t o posses s rea l estat e (Journal Officiel, 2 5 Novem ber 1941) . Th e Jews ' rea l propert y woul d b e turne d ove r t o administrateurs provisoires. Accordin g t o Articl e 1 of the Law : (Art. I ) L a lo i es t applicabl e a l'Algerie , dan s le s condition s ci-apres : E n vu e d'eliminer tout e influenc e juiv e dan s l'economi e algerienne , l e gouverneu r gen eral de l'Algerie peut nomme r u n administrateur provisoir e a: 1. Toute entrepris e industrielle, commerciale , immobilier e o u artisanale ; 2 . Tou t immeuble , droi t immobilier o u droi t a u bai l quelconque ; 3 . Tou t bie n meuble , valeu r mobilier e ou droi t mobilie r quelconque , lorsqu e ceu x a qu i il s appartiennen t o u qu i le s dirigent, o u certain s d'entr e eu x son t Juifs. Toutefois , ce s disposition s n e s'appli quent pa s au x valeur s emise s pa r l'Eta t francai s e t l e gouvernemen t genera l e t aux obligation s emise s pa r le s societe s o u collectivite s publique s francaise s o u algeriennes. Et , sau f exceptio n motivee—au x immeuble s o u locau x servan t a l'habitation personnell e de s interesses , d e leur s ascendant s o u descendants , n i aux meubles meublant s qu i garnissen t le s dits immeuble s o u locaux . ((Art.I } The laws applies t o Algeria, unde r th e followin g conditions : With th e ai m of eliminating all Jewish influenc e i n the Algeria n economy , th e governor-general o f Algeria can appoin t a provisiona l administrato r to : 1 . Al l industrial , commercial , rea l estate, o r trad e enterprises ; 2 . Al l rea l estate , freehol d o r leasehol d o f any kind ; 3. Al l persona l goods , stock s an d shares , o r bond s o f an y kind , whe n thos e t o whom the y belon g o r wh o manag e them , o r som e amon g them , ar e Jews . However, thes e arrangement s d o no t appl y t o securitie s issue d b y th e Frenc h state an d th e genera l government , no r t o bond s issue d b y Frenc h o r Algeria n societies o r publi c bodie s i n collectiv e ownership . And , excep t wit h justifiabl e exceptions—to rea l estat e o r premise s providin g persona l habitatio n fo r th e interested parties , o r fo r thei r forebear s o r descendents , no r t o personal belong ings that furnish th e sai d real estate o r premises.) 53 In othe r words : the y wer e entitle d t o hol d o n t o bond s an d govern m e n t securitie s a s wel l a s t o thei r privat e home s an d thei r contents . Th e administrateurs wer e require d t o prepar e list s o f th e propertie s an d t o assess thei r value ; the y wer e veste d wit h th e authorit y t o manag e Jewish owned properties. 5 4

Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace 7

9

In th e are a o f education , th e numerus clausus (quota ) i n Algeri a wa s enforced wit h greate r severit y tha n i n th e Protectorates . Wherea s i n Morocco an d Tunisia , th e Jew s wer e somewha t les s represente d i n th e Protectorate-sponsored school s an d kep t man y traditiona l religiou s schools , not t o mentio n th e AI U schools , Algeria n Jewr y ha d fewe r religiou s schools. A s w e hav e seen , th e AI U i n Algeri a playe d a margina l educa tional role , wit h mos t Jewis h youth s attendin g stat e schools . Hence , when Vich y extende d it s educationa l restriction s t o Algeri a i n 1941-42 , leaders o f the Jewis h consistor y face d a serious problem : creatin g schoo l places fo r man y thousand s o f youths t o be ouste d fro m th e stat e schools , practically overnight . In institution s fo r highe r learning , especiall y th e Universite dAlger, Jews were limite d t o 3 percent o f the tota l enrollment. Jewis h professors , who wer e als o ousted , raise d th e ide a o f organizin g course s i n privat e forums fo r th e ouste d student s an d thos e no t admitte d t o th e university . But th e authoritie s woul d no t hea r o f thi s an d forbad e th e initiativ e through th e La w o f 31 Decembe r 1941 . Simultaneously , i n th e primar y and secondar y schools , th e Jewis h quot a wa s se t a t 1 4 percen t o f th e total. T o enabl e youn g peopl e t o pursu e thei r education , th e authoritie s postponed th e implementatio n o f th e restriction s fo r severa l months . During thi s interval , th e consistorie s o f Algiers, Oran , an d Constantine , in conjunction wit h Jewish intellectua l circles , create d classe s throughou t Algeria. Th e one advantage o f the ne w laws, the authorizatio n fo r Jews t o take the stat e examinations, demonstrate d tha t the new institutions main tained hig h educationa l standards , a s th e student s performe d wel l o n these examinations . Bu t durin g th e latte r hal f o f Octobe r 1942 , a ne w policy restricte d Jewis h representatio n i n primar y an d secondar y school s from 1 4 to 7 percent. (Se e table 5 on educationa l statistics.) 55 As earl y a s Ma y 1941 , Jewis h universit y students , alarme d b y th e possibility o f quotas, wrot e t o the Frenc h Ministr y o f Education, empha sizing that : "l a pense e mem e d u n numerus clausus nou s sembl e sacri lege. Commen t concevoi r l'ide e d'un e cultur e parcimonieusemen t accor dee au x un s e t refuse e au x autres , e t qu i impos e u n choix , auss i crue l a ceux qu i seron t appele s qu' a ceu x qu i seron t exclus? " (the ver y ide a o f a numerus clausus seem s sacrileg e t o us . Ho w ca n on e imagin e a cultur e parcimoniously bestowe d o n som e an d refuse d others , an d whic h com pels a choice tha t i s just a s cruel fo r thos e wh o will be calle d a s for thos e who will be excluded?). 56

10,000 13,693 764 223,282 238 118 70 3,600 251,765

Lycees & College s Cours complementaire s Technical Ed . Elementary Ed . Agricultural Ed . Commercial Ed . Naval Ed . Artistic Ed . Total 1,000 1,100 71 10,658 7 6 2 225 13,069 414 11,962

765 530 8 10,234 4 7

549 550 35 5,529 3 3 1 112 6,782

43

16,583 7 10 1 526 19,484

1,314 1,000

Academic Ye ar 1942-1943 Quota: 7% Jewish Students Accepted Removed

Source; Rober t Brunschvig, "Le s mesure s antijuive s dans l'enseignement , e n Algerie sous le regime d e Vichy," Revue dAlger, 1 , no . 2 (1944), 65 .

Non-Jewish Students Nov. 5, 1940

1 ype of School

Academic Year 1941-1942 Quota'.: 14% Jewish S \tudents Accepted Removed

Table 5 . Jewis h Representatio n i n Algeria n Primar y an d Secondar y School s

Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace 8

1

However, th e pleas and demand s di d no t change policy. Affluen t Jew s subsidized th e ne w communit y schools . Nevertheless , a s tim e elapsed , funds wer e becomin g scarce , fo r th e La w o f 21 November 194 1 pertain ing t o th e transfe r o f Jewis h rea l estat e t o th e administrateurs mad e i t exceedingly difficul t fo r th e elit e t o provid e sufficien t financial support . As Elie Gozla n o f the Jewish leadershi p observe d followin g th e America n landing: i f th e liberatio n o f Algeri a ha d bee n postponed , i t i s doubtfu l that a proper educationa l apparatu s coul d have been maintained. 57 Following th e liberation , Rabb i Eisenbet h demande d tha t Governor General Yve s Chatel totall y abolis h al l anti-Jewish laws . Ye t his pleas fel l on dea f ear s a t th e time . Moreover , a s i n Morocco , no t onl y di d th e Americans no t interfer e i n interna l Frenc h affair s bu t agree d t o th e appointment o f Admiral Darlan , on e o f Petain' s closes t collaborators , a s the hea d o f th e Frenc h natio n i n Frenc h territorie s no t unde r Germa n occupation. In Decembe r 1942 , Darla n wa s assassinate d an d Henr i Giraud , Dar lan's appointee a s French militar y commander fo r Nort h Africa, inherite d his position . Followin g Chatel' s departure , Marce l Peyrouton , a partici pant i n th e formulatio n o f the 7 October 194 0 decree, becam e governor general o f Algeria. Onl y i n th e wak e o f protests mad e b y Jewis h organi zations i n Algeri a an d th e Unite d States , i n th e America n pres s an d b y Gaullist supporters , di d Girau d publish , o n 1 8 Marc h 1943 , a decre e calling fo r th e eliminatio n o f discriminator y policies . Bu t no t al l anti Jewish measure s wer e abrogate d immediately . Significantly , moreover , Giraud simultaneousl y issue d anothe r edic t abrogatin g th e Cremieu x Decree fo r th e secon d time . If , followin g th e publicatio n o f the La w of 7 October 1940 , Algeria n Jew s ha d los t thei r citizenshi p an d politica l rights , their situatio n i n 194 3 was fa r worse . Giraud' s step s aime d a t deprivin g the Jews no t onl y of their politica l rights but als o at regression i n matter s of personal status , requirin g a retur n t o th e jurisdictio n o f th e rabbini c courts which ha d prevaile d prio r t o the 187 0 decree. General d e Gaull e arrive d i n Algier s a t th e en d o f May 1943 . H e me t with Rabb i Eisenbet h an d tol d hi m i n th e nam e o f the Frenc h Commit tee o f National Liberatio n tha t th e Committe e ha d decide d t o nullify th e Giraud Decre e whic h abrogate d th e Cremieu x Decree . Indeed , o n 2 0 October 1943 , th e Committe e mad e a n officia l declaratio n callin g fo r total abolitio n o f al l th e discriminator y laws , includin g th e Girau d Decree.

82 Under

Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace

The Jews and the Underground in Algiers, 1940-1942 During th e year s 1940-42 , man y Jew s joined th e Resistance . A segment of Jewish yout h i n Algier s wa s determine d t o organiz e self-defens e an d underground activity . Accordin g t o th e persona l accoun t o f Pau l Se baoun, a n undergroun d activist , a group o f Jewish youn g me n began , a s early a s 1940 , t o organiz e clandestinel y a t th e Ge o Gra s sport s clu b i n Algiers whos e owne r wa s a non-Jew . Unde r th e guis e o f sports activity , the clu b serve d a s a facade fo r self-defens e training . Thes e me n wen t ou t at nigh t t o pain t th e symbo l o f Fre e Franc e an d th e lette r V for victor y on the walls of buildings throughou t Algiers . They eve n purchased weap ons (pistol s an d rifles ) fro m Spanis h smugglers , whic h the y store d a t th e Club Ge o Gras . A s Sebaou n relates : "Nou s utilision s de s cache s amena gees dan s le s murs , le s planchers, sou s le rin g d e boxe , tou t cel a a Tinsu de notr e am i Ge o Gras " (We mad e us e o f hidin g place s foun d i n th e walls, i n the floors, unde r th e boxin g ring, an d al l that without ou r frien d Geo Gra s knowin g abou t it). 58 These activist s sa w as their mai n enemie s the militan t supporter s o f th e Servic e d'Ordr e Legionnair e (SOL , th e French versio n o f the Naz i SS ) and th e Part i Populaire Francais . On 2 2 October 1942 , American genera l Mar k Clark arrive d secretl y a t Cherchell o n th e coas t wes t o f Algiers an d negotiate d wit h senio r repre sentatives o f th e Resistanc e i n orde r t o coordinat e thei r militar y opera tions with th e America n landin g in Nort h Africa . Th e clandestin e negoti ations a t Cherchel l revolve d aroun d tw o critical , complementar y efforts : (1) the Resistanc e woul d b e responsible , wit h th e ai d o f volunteers, fo r cutting Vich y communication s a t zer o hour , fo r arrestin g pro-Vich y se nior officials , an d fo r takin g ove r th e headquarter s o f the Vich y chie f o f staff fo r Nort h Africa ; (2 ) th e Allie d force s woul d lan d command o unit s before th e arriva l o f regula r America n troop s i n orde r t o reliev e th e Resistance whos e numerica l inferiorit y vis-a-vi s th e Vich y arme d force s would preclud e it s holding the position s take n indefinitely. 59 In orde r t o accomplish th e plans negotiate d a t Cherchell , eigh t hundre d volunteers woul d b e needed , Sebaou n observed . Thi s emphasize d th e importance o f loca l undergroun d movements , suc h a s th e Ge o Gra s group wh o ha d direc t an d indirec t contac t wit h th e Resistanc e leader ship. Onl y si x hundre d me n an d youth s agree d t o cooperat e wit h th e

Under Vichy and the Nazi-German Menace 8

3

Resistance operation . An d only 377 actually turne d u p for action. Mos t of them wer e Jew s (othe r source s indicat e tha t o f th e 37 7 volunteers , 31 5 were Jews). 60 O f thi s Jewis h majority , 13 2 wer e Ge o Gra s activists , known a s Grou p B . The y constitute d th e larges t an d mos t dynami c uni t of volunteers. 61 On th e afternoo n o f 7 Novembe r 1942 , Britis h radi o broadcas t th e code phrase : "Hell o Robert , Frankli n i s arriving " (Rober t wa s Rober t Murphy, th e specia l American representativ e a t Algiers; Franklin was , of course, Presiden t Frankli n D . Roosevelt) . Th e volunteer s an d th e Resis tance leadershi p worke d ou t th e final detail s o f thei r cou p d'eta t a t th e home of a local Jewish professor, Henr i Aboulker. Weapon s were distrib uted t o the volunteers. Th e operation bega n o n the mornin g of 8 November. Th e source s agre e tha t du e t o th e activ e participatio n o f th e 37 7 men o f the Resistance , th e missio n t o neutraliz e th e administrativ e cen ter of Algiers was accomplished. 62 Despit e th e presence of 11,000 (unprepared) pro-Vich y soldier s an d thousand s o f SO L legionnaires , th e cit y was take n ove r befor e th e American s arrived . Th e activist s themselve s were surprise d a t their success , a s Sebaoun indicates : "That 377 men ha d been abl e durin g nearly on e da y t o hold o n t o all the strategi c points o f a major cit y like Algiers migh t see m unbelievable." 63 Did th e event s o f 1940-4 3 an d thos e immediatel y precedin g th e wa r convince th e Jew s tha t Franc e in particular ha d disappointe d them , th e same Franc e tha t the y ha d learne d t o respec t sinc e 1830 ? Thes e issue s are deal t with i n chapter 3.

Chapter 3

Zionism, Clandestin e Emigratio n t o Israel, an d It s Impac t o n Muslim Jewish Relations : Th e Cas e o f Morocco, 1947-Marc h 194 9

The politica l event s tha t precede d Worl d Wa r I I intensifie d Maghrib i Jewish politica l awareness , amon g Zionists an d non-Zionist s alike . Whe n in Ma y 193 9 th e Britis h governmen t publishe d th e Whit e Paper , stipu lating the restrictio n o f Jewish emigration t o Mandatory Palestin e (mainl y from Europe ) t o 10,00 0 per yea r fo r five years , Jewis h educate d opinio n in Morocc o an d Tunisi a expresse d stron g disapproval—regardin g thi s move a s th e final betraya l o f Britain' s obligation s t o th e Jewis h peopl e under th e Balfou r Declaratio n an d th e Mandate . I n Morocco , fo r in stance, L'Avenir Illustre warne d i n thi s connection , "[There ] i s no hop e without Zionism . . . . Th e fas t pac e o f anti-Jewis h persecution s [i n Eu rope] i s suc h tha t w e d o no t hav e tim e t o find multipl e solution s t o th e Jewish problem. Th e hous e i s burning." 1 Yet ver y littl e coul d b e accomplishe d i n th e Maghrib i Diaspor a t o challenge Britis h policymaker s wh o wer e pressure d b y th e Palestin e Arab Revol t o f 1936-3 9 an d t o revers e th e decision . Th e Vich y er a rendered Nort h Africa n activist s mor e powerles s unde r th e yok e o f th e restrictive laws . Afte r th e liberatio n o f North Afric a i n 1942-43 , genera l communal an d Zionis t activitie s wer e reorganized . Th e Frenc h Protecto rate authorities , especiall y i n Morocco , wer e no w concerne d abou t th e Jews turnin g thei r back s o n them . Roge r L e Tourneau , a Frenc h officia l and educato r wh o wa s intimatel y acquainte d wit h Jewis h intellectual s i n 84

Zionism, Clandestine Emigration 8

5

Fez, worrie d tha t a s a resul t o f th e Vich y experience , the y seeme d t o fraternize wit h th e American liberators. 2 Did th e Vich y period , a s L e Tournea u suggested , alienat e th e Jew s from France ? Di d the y tur n t o the Americans ? Th e refusa l t o gran t Jew s French citizenship , an d Vichy , certainl y irritate d segment s o f Maghrib i Jewry, a s di d th e persistenc e o f povert y amon g wid e segment s o f thei r population. I t seem s tha t th e post-1942-4 3 period—i n vie w o f th e ris e of militan t Maghrib i nationalis m amon g Muslim s o n th e on e hand , an d the creatio n o f Israel , o n th e other—encourage d som e educate d an d many noneducate d Jew s (thoug h certainl y no t all ) to consider th e Zionis t and othe r option s othe r tha n th e colonia l system . Th e Israel/Maghrib i Muslim nationalis m factor s serve d a s a driving force i n this regard, a s did poverty. Thes e fa r outweighe d th e temporar y bitte r experienc e o f 1940 42. Le Tourneau s observation s o n Morocco , however , concernin g th e Jews' contacts wit h th e American s followin g th e landin g i n Nort h Africa , should no t b e take n lightly . Amon g th e American s wh o lande d i n Mo rocco, a no t insignifican t numbe r o f militar y personne l wer e Jew s wh o developed amicabl e tie s wit h thei r brethren . Numerou s Morocca n Jew ish women marrie d American Jewish soldiers and moved into the militar y bases created throughou t Frenc h Morocco. 3 The Vich y perio d did stimulat e a growin g segmen t o f pro-Zionis t youths an d youn g adult s i n Morocc o an d th e res t o f th e Maghri b t o engage i n active Zionis m (tsiyonut magshlma) leadin g t o c aliya. Th e aforementioned JN F Forc e i n Tunisi a create d i n 194 3 the dynami c Tseire Tsiyon o f Tuni s tha t wa s a n outgrowt h o f th e ol d ha-Shome r ha-Ts a c ir and th e UUJJ . Th e Tseire-Tsiyon subsequentl y branche d of f into the res t of Nort h Africa . I t becam e th e mos t vita l loca l pionee r an d kibbutz oriented movement . I n Morocco , th e Charle s Nette r Associatio n whic h had existe d sinc e th e lat e 1920 s wa s transforme d int o a n importan t Zionist youth/youn g adul t organizatio n durin g th e earl y an d mid-1940s . It, too , was strongly pro- caliya. Beginning i n th e latte r hal f o f 1943 , whe n emissarie s o f th e Unite d Kibbutz Movemen t (ha-Kibbut z ha-Meuhad) , ha-Shome r ha-Tsa cir, an d of the religious Zionist movement arrive d i n Tunisia and later in Morocc o and Algeria—affiliate d wit h th e Yishuv' s Hagana , Mossa d Le- cAliya, an d the Jewish Agency—their encounte r wit h Zionist-oriente d youth s was to have long-rang e consequences . Operatin g illegall y fo r th e mos t part ,

86 Zionism,

Clandestine Emigration

these Yishu v emissaries , particularl y Yig 3 al Cohe n an d Ephrai m Fried man (Ben-Hayyim) , member s o f the Unite d Kibbut z Movement , brough t Tseire-Zion unde r th e influenc e o f th e kibbutz-affiliate d an d socialis t DROR yout h organization . Bot h Tseire-Zio n an d Charle s Nette r empha sized Q aliya i n th e 1940s . Th e Charle s Nette r movemen t i n Frenc h Morocco wa s mor e ideologicall y diverse . I t catere d t o bot h secula r an d socialist element s an d t o religiou s Zionis t youths . Durin g th e 1950s , th e Charles Nette r leadershi p tende d t o identif y mor e wit h th e religiou s Mizrahi/ha-Po c el ha-Mizrah i Zionis t brand . Th e Tseire-Zion , o n th e other hand , wer e plague d b y division s i n 1947 , wit h a large segmen t o f the membershi p embracin g th e ultrasocialis t ha-Shome r ha-Ts a c ir van guard ideology , whil e th e res t constitute d th e separat e DRO R group . This developmen t applie d mor e t o Tunisia tha n t o Morocco . DRO R an d ha-Shomer ha-Ts a c ir mad e inroad s int o Morocc o an d Algeri a durin g th e late 1940s . Needless t o say , give n th e Frenc h colonia l polic y unti l 1948-4 9 o f opposing c aliya, thoug h tolerating , i f no t overlooking , othe r aspect s o f Zionism, thes e an d simila r movement s wer e watche d closel y b y th e authorities. Th e mos t discipline d amon g th e youth s handpicke d b y th e emissaries wer e traine d i n self-defense : jud o an d th e handlin g o f weapons. Cohe n an d Friedma n arrange d fo r thes e youth s t o swea r allegianc e to the Hagan a (a s late a s 194 8 still the majo r Jewis h militar y organizatio n in Palestin e unde r th e Mandate) . Subsequently,branche s o f the Hagan a developed i n Morocc o an d Tunisia , eventuall y extendin g int o Algeria, a s had bee n th e cas e i n part s o f Europe . Severa l vetera n Zionist s an d communal leader s i n th e thre e communities—mainl y Pau l Ghez , Dr . Leopold Baretvas , an d Pau l Calamaro—assiste d th e illega l operations , knowing full wel l the y riske d bein g arrested . Th e decisio n i n th e Yishu v to dispatc h th e specia l emissarie s t o Nort h Afric a an d t o othe r Arabic speaking countries fro m 194 3 onward i n order t o organize yout h c aliya as well a s self-defense, wa s supporte d b y thes e an d severa l othe r leader s i n the Maghrib . Th e latte r fel t tha t th e experienc e o f 1940-42, th e Germa n occupation o f Tunisia , th e farhud (pogrom ) i n Ira q o f Jun e 1941—i n which 17 9 Jews were slaughtere d b y pro-Naz i Musli m groups—necessi tated th e formation o f self-defense unit s to guard th e communities . It i s noteworth y tha t religiou s Zionist s o n th e islan d o f Jerba , th e Atereth-Zion movement , als o organized divers e trainin g t o prepare would -

Zionism, Clandestine Emigration 8

7

be emigran t youths . Othe r forces , suc h a s th e religiou s Zionist s o f th e urban area s (magen dati), an d th e Zionis t Revisionis t supporter s o f th e Yishuv's Irgu n Tsva * i Le 3 um i (IZL) , organize d self-defens e effort s i n Tunisia. In fact, th e IZ L in Tunisia was an offshoo t o f its overseas headquarter s in Paris , activ e i n 1947-49 . On e o f it s emissarie s t o Tunisia , Itzha k Tuviana, purchase d weapon s an d traine d th e IZL' s loca l youth s i n th e use o f firearms . H e wa s succeede d b y Yehud a Sade h i n Januar y 1948 , David Danon , an d Mosh e "Misha " Arens. Th e latter became well know n after 197 7 a s on e o f Israel' s leadin g politica l figure s durin g th e LIKU D rule. Muc h o f IZL' s effort s i n Tunisi a too k plac e betwee n Januar y 194 8 and earl y 1949 . Th e IZ L o f the 1940 s was les s effectiv e tha n th e Hagan a in Tunisia . It s emissarie s an d loca l commander s feare d tha t the y woul d be targeted b y the Europea n colonist s and feared th e potential radicalis m of the Tunisia n Musli m nationalists . Thei r activity , then , wa s effectivel y paralyzed.4 Starting i n 1946 , th e Hagan a self-defens e apparatu s concentrate d it s training facilitie s i n Algeri a a t a cam p nea r Rovig o no t fa r fro m Algiers . More advance d trainin g was provided fo r th e activist s i n Franc e a t Cam p Sathonay nea r Lyon . A s the syste m gre w it s leadershi p becam e diverse . The commande r o f th e Hagan a i n France , becomin g responsibl e fo r North Africa , wa s Avraha m Polonsk i ("Paul" ) wh o appointe d Jacque s Lazarus a s commander o f operations i n Algiers : the cente r fo r coordinat ing self-defens e fo r th e thre e communities . Friedma n replace d Lazaru s as commander a t the en d o f 1946. 5 Toward th e en d o f 194 7 mor e reorganizatio n procedure s wer e intro duced. Th e desir e o f man y Morocca n an d som e Tunisia n Jew s t o mak e c aliya, an d th e effort s b y th e Frenc h t o preven t thei r departure , com pelled th e Mossa d Le- cAliya leader s i n Israe l an d Europ e t o organiz e emigration illegally . Entruste d wit h th e tas k o f organizing it , Friedma n could n o longe r involv e himsel f wit h th e Hagan a command . Th e titl e "Hagana Commande r fo r Nort h Africa, " enjoye d b y Lazaru s an d Fried man, wa s eliminate d an d instea d eac h countr y no w ha d it s ow n com mander, recruite d amon g loca l activists . Th e Hagan a i n Nort h Afric a survived int o th e latte r hal f o f 194 8 an d the n fade d i n th e wak e o f th e c aliya o f it s ke y members . Whil e i t existed , it s activist s assiste d i n th e illegal c aliya o f 1947-4 8 a s describe d below . Accordin g t o Friedman , b y

88 Zionism,

Clandestine Emigration

mid-1948 th e Nort h Africa n Hagan a ha d 65 0 member s an d twenty-si x branches divide d thus : Country Branches Algeria 1 Tunisia 6 Morocco 6

Members 4 20 25 20

0 0 0

By the tim e Morocca n Jewry were facing physical dangers (mid-1948 ) th e self-defense apparatu s cease d t o exis t o r emerge d weakene d du e t o th e lack o f leadership. B e tha t a s it may , i n 194 8 North Africa n Zionism—i n the federations , yout h movements , an d politica l parties—seeme d lik e a microcosm o f th e Yishuv . Durin g th e 1950s , a s subsequen t chapter s reveal, al l Zionist/Israel i politica l partie s an d movements , fro m Mapa i and ha-Boni m t o Mapa m an d ha-N o c ar ha-Tsiyoni, wer e represente d i n the communa l spectrum . As fo r th e illega l c aliya itself , w e note d tha t th e emissarie s o f th e Mossad Le- cAliya an d Jewish Agenc y organized i t clandestinely i n 1947 48 fro m th e Algeria n coast . The y wer e assiste d insid e Morocc o an d Tunisia by a local Zionist youth undergroun d an d by smugglers, Jew s an d non-Jews, wh o helpe d th e emigrants . Concentratin g i n thi s chapte r o n Morocco, th e undergroun d assiste d Morocca n Jew s t o reac h a secre t transit cam p i n Algeri a vi a th e northeaster n Morocca n frontie r are a o f Oudjda. I n Algeria , Morocca n Jew s bordere d ship s whos e destinatio n was Palestine . Th e Mossa d Le- cAliya sen t thre e ship s betwee n Ma y an d December 1947 . Jews successfully boarde d th e first two but, upo n reach ing th e shore s o f Palestine , wer e seize d b y th e Britis h authoritie s an d held i n Cypru s unti l afte r Israe l attaine d independence . Th e thir d shi p barely escape d bein g caugh t b y th e Frenc h Algeria n authorities . Instea d of leaving wit h severa l hundre d emigrant s a s originally planned , i t man aged t o escap e wit h onl y forty-four . Thes e succeede d i n reachin g Pales tine. (O n th e Jewis h populatio n i n Morocc o i n 193 6 and 1951 , see table s 6 and 7. ) From tha t point o n until th e beginning o f 1949 Moroccan Jews contin ued t o flee clandestinely an d semi-clandestinely—bot h wit h an d withou t the guidanc e o f the Morocca n Zionis t underground—acros s th e Moroc can-Algerian borde r a t Oudjda . Thos e caugh t b y th e Frenc h authoritie s

Zionism, Clandestine Emigration 8

9

Table 6 . Jewis h an d Genera l Allianc e Schoo l Populatio n i n Morocca n Cities, 193 6 and 1951 a

Town

Jewish Population: 1936h

AIU Schools: Boys and Girlsc

Jewish Population: 1951d

Agadir Azemmour Casablanca Elksar Fez Larache Marrakesh Mazagan Meknes Mogador Oudjda Rabat Safi Sale Sefrou Tangier Tetuan

503 459 38,806 1,500 10,507 1,200 25,646 3,525 9,521 6,151 2,048 6,698 3,634 2,600 4,382 10,000 6,000

61 99 3,853 188 1,646 285 1,107 696 1,428 888 40 1,030 787 502 296 1,072 488

1,500 300 75,000 1,600 16,050 1,300 18,500 3,800 15,000 6,500 2,000 13,000 4,500 3,300 5,500 10,000 6,000

AIU School Boys and Girls6 202 89 7,683 204 2,028 101 2,569 670 2,384 906 No data 1,392 673 536 548 1,088 419

a

For statistica l dat a on the bled communities , se e tabl e 7 . Based o n th e 193 6 population census , analyze d by Y. D . Semach : "Le recensemen t d e 193 6 au Maroc, " Paix et Droit, 19 , no. 6 (June 1939) , 8-10 . c "Tableau de s ecoles de l'Allianc e Israelite, " Paix et Droit, 16 , no. 4 , monthl y (Jun e 1936) , 16. d "Etat comparati f de s tau x d e scolarisatio n a u Maroc : Annee s 1950-1951, " Les Cahiers de VAlliance Israelite Universelle, nos . 50-5 1 (February-Marc h 1951) , 8. e Ibid. Not e tha t m y populatio n estimate s fo r Tetuan , Elksar , an d Larach e (i n 1936 ) are mine , base d o n archival information . Thi s i s als o th e cas e fo r Tangie r (1936 ) an d Oudjd a (1951) . Th e Spanis h Zon e di d not hav e a n official censu s unti l 1942 . In Tangier, th e Internationa l Zon e authoritie s neve r conducte d a n official census . b

and makhzan polic e a t th e borde r o r o n th e wa y t o Oudjda , wer e force d to return t o their homes. Those successfull y reachin g Algeria (Algiers and Oran) wer e assiste d b y Israel i emissarie s ther e t o depar t illegall y fo r Marseilles where , afte r th e birt h o f Israel , the y wer e care d fo r b y th e Jewish Agenc y representative s an d th e AJD C tha t helpe d th e Jewis h Agency manage the Marseille s transi t camps. Ther e were stil l others wh o managed t o obtai n passport s an d visa s legall y o r b y bribin g Morocca n and Frenc h officials . I t i s no t completel y clea r i f clandestin e Zionis t forces amon g Morocca n Jew s assiste d i n th e bribin g procedure . Thes e

90 Zionism,

Clandestine Emigration

Table 7 . Comparativ e Statistic s o n th e Bled Communitie s o f Frenc h Morocco Wher e th e AI U Operate d Schools , 193 6 and 195 1

Town Amizmiz Ben-Ahmed Beni-Mellal Ber-Rechid Boujad Demnat El-Kelaa Gourrama Imintanout Inezgane Kasba-Tadla Khenitra Kasr al-Suq Kerrando Midelt Oued-Zem Ouezzan Rich Rissani Sidi Raha l Talsint Taourirt Taroudant Taza Tinehrir Tiznit Tounza a

Jewish Population: 1936*

AIU Schools: Boys and Girlsh

Jewish Population: 1951c

AIU Schools: Boys and Girlsd

601 201 1,914 171 753 1,691 380 410 256 ? 541 ? 832

— 69 31 43 131 99 — — — — 93 6 — — 91 — 208 — — — — 45 162 — — 76 —

593 475 — 350 800 1,800 620 450 360 450 750 171 1,100 200 1,700 400 2,350 578 500 600 270 450 950 520 600 450 317

57 126 — 86 194 155 70 53 75 43 148 41 54 44 246 82 366 101 51 50 62 104 133 56 61 101 40

?

832 207 1,668 405 ? 721 269 550 926 194 ? 357 624

Y. D . Semach, "L e Recensement d e 1936 au Maroc," Paix et Droit, 19 , no. 6, monthly (Jun e 1939) , 810. b "Tableau de s ecoles de 1'Alliance Israelite," Paix et Droit, 16 , no. 4 (June 1936) , 16. c "Etat comparati f de s tau x d e scolarisatio n a u Maroc : Annee s 1950-1951, " Les Cahiers de IAlliance Israelite Universelle, nos . 50-5 1 (February-Marc h 1951) , 8. d Ibid., 8 . Not e tha t thes e wer e onl y bled communitie s wher e th e Alliance maintaine d schools . Ther e were numerou s town s an d hamlets wit h extremel y smal l communitie s stil l not affected b y the AIU bu t rather by the Otsar ha-Tora h network .

Zionism, Clandestine Emigration 9

1

emigrants saile d t o Marseilles from Casablanc a or flew directly t o parts of France i n the firs t phas e o f their c aliya.6 In Septembe r 1948 , whil e th e Frenc h authoritie s i n Morocc o contin ued t o ba n bot h unorganize d an d organize d emigration , thei r counter parts i n Algeri a agree d t o allo w Jewis h refugee s wh o ha d fled ther e vi a Oudjda t o b e transferre d legall y fro m Algier s t o Marseilles. 7 Betwee n May 194 7 an d Apri l 194 8 onl y 1,50 0 person s fro m al l o f Nort h Afric a made c aliya. Ye t betwee n Apri l an d Decembe r 1948 , a s man y a s 9,00 0 Jews, th e majorit y o f who m wer e Moroccans , reache d Franc e o n thei r way to Israel. 8 This sketch y outlin e concernin g clandestin e c aliya i s base d o n my original findings durin g th e earl y 1980s . I t i s insufficien t t o understan d the proces s an d th e socio-politica l motive s behin d it . Havin g ha d acces s recently t o the Frenc h Protectorat e archive s a t Nantes , I may now delv e into thi s subjec t i n greate r detai l an d analysis , accentuatin g th e pogrom s of Oudjda an d Djerada , Judeo-Musli m relations , an d th e socioeconomi c factors tha t ar e relevan t t o emigration , a s wel l a s th e positio n o f th e French authorities .

The Pogroms of Oudjda and Djerada: Their Connection to Zionism, c Aliya, and Judeo-Muslim Relations, June 1948 It ha s bee n writte n tha t illega l c aliya fro m Morocc o vi a Algeria , th e creation o f Israel, and , perhaps , anti-Semiti c agitatio n b y Frenc h Protec torate officials , wer e catalyti c factors contributin g t o the pogrom s carrie d out agains t th e Jew s o f Oudjd a an d th e nearb y hamle t o f Djerad a o n 7 June 1948 . O n tha t da y loca l Muslim s kille d forty-seve n Jew s i n bot h places, als o causin g considerabl e propert y damage . I t ha s als o bee n suggested tha t th e pogrom s cam e i n th e wak e o f a speec h delivere d b y Sultan Muhamma d V th e previou s mont h i n whic h h e proclaime d tha t the Arab world ha d t o struggle agains t Zionis m becaus e o f the creatio n o f Israel. Thoug h h e insiste d tha t hi s Jewis h subject s wer e loya l an d no t t o be identifie d i n any way with thei r "brethre n i n occupied Palestine, " th e sultan di d no t succee d i n calmin g temper s amon g extremist s affiliate d directly o r indirectl y wit h th e Istiqlal , the n th e leadin g nationalis t part y that advocate d th e nee d fo r full independenc e fro m France .

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Were th e nationalist s o r local Musli m element s th e mai n instigator s of the pogroms ? Ther e i s n o doub t abou t Muslim s havin g carrie d ou t th e atrocities. Nevertheless , Y a c akov Kraus e (Karoz) , a Mossa d Le- cAliya official thoroughl y familia r wit h interna l Morocca n politica l affairs , pointe d at th e Frenc h a s the mai n culprits . Th e Residenc y official s a t all levels of the administrativ e hierarch y ha d no t onl y refraine d fro m combatin g th e social an d economi c hardship s o f th e Jewis h communities , bu t the y prevented c aliya. Moreover , thei r representative s a t Oudjda an d Djerad a either organize d th e pogrom s o r allowe d the m t o occur . The y openl y ignored th e upheavals , s o tha t i n th e futur e the y coul d exploi t the m t o carry out sever e measure s agains t th e Muslims. 9 The archive s a t Nantes , thoug h fa r fro m indicatin g tha t thes e assess ments ar e inaccurate , nevertheles s she d ne w light , providin g mor e com prehensive dimension s o n thi s comple x situatio n an d o n clandestin e emigration o r Zionism . Accordin g t o Genera l Alphons e Juin , Frenc h Morocco's resident-genera l betwee n 194 7 and 1951 , Morocca n Jew s feare d that pogrom s an d othe r form s o f violence were inevitabl e with th e emer gence o f Morocca n nationalis m i n th e post-Worl d Wa r I I era . Franc e had become a weak world power after 1944-45 , while Morocca n Muslim s living i n th e colonia l spher e o f influence seize d th e opportunit y t o chal lenge th e Frenc h an d thei r allies : the Europea n settler s and the religiou s or ethni c minorities . I n orde r t o eas e Muslim-Jewis h tensions , severa l French-educated Jew s contacted leader s o f the Istiqla l (founded i n 1944), to discus s th e futur e o f th e Jews . The y wer e convince d tha t Morocca n independence wa s imminent . Fo r thei r part , th e Istiqlalist s initiall y sough t to wi n adherent s t o th e nationalis t caus e i n th e Jewis h communities . I n 1944-46, th e nationalist s an d Sulta n Muhamma d V , thei r mos t powerfu l supporter, considere d th e Jews as an important elemen t that , onc e sidin g with them , woul d strengthe n thei r anticolonia l goals. 10 The educate d Jew s who contacte d th e Istiqla l were als o shrewd. The y played th e Muslim s agains t th e French , wantin g assurance s tha t onc e Moroccan independenc e wa s realized , th e Jew s woul d benefi t fro m ful l political right s a s citizen s o n a n equa l footin g wit h th e Muslims . A t th e same time,Jui n argued , b y contactin g th e Istiqla l thes e Jew s sough t t o arouse concer n amon g th e Frenc h tha t th e Jewis h communitie s migh t "go astray " an d ceas e t o suppor t th e Protectorate . The y expecte d th e Residency t o offe r th e Jew s lon g overdu e politica l an d economi c privi leges. Thi s i s what Jui n describe d a s "une politiqu e d'equilibr e entr e le s

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3

nationalistes e t le s Francais " ( a politics o f balance betwee n th e national ists and th e French). 11 Needless t o say , th e Jew s wh o embrace d thi s strateg y hardl y repre sented th e mainstrea m o f Morocca n Jewr y o r eve n larg e segment s o f its educated elite . Furthermore , thei r earl y contact with the nationalist s was an exercis e i n futility , fo r i t becam e quit e apparen t t o th e latte r tha t Zionism wa s makin g seriou s inroad s amon g th e Jews . Followin g th e twenty-second Zionis t Congress at Basel, th e Morocca n delegate s attend ing it returne d hom e t o undertake intensiv e Zionis t campaignin g aroun d the country . Thi s development , o f course , wa s accompanie d b y th e clandestine c aliya, organize d fro m th e earl y par t o f 194 7 throug h a net work o f Zionist recruiters . Jui n suspecte d tha t muc h o f the Zionis t activ ity includin g c aliya centere d mainl y i n Casablanc a an d wa s financed b y the AJDC. Ye t he presented n o evidence t o substantiate thi s claim. 12 From 194 7 onward , bot h th e Morocca n nationalist s an d th e Frenc h complained abou t th e collusio n betwee n Morocca n Zionist s an d th e Worl d Zionist Organization/AJDC . Th e Muslim s wer e particularl y adaman t al though th e Frenc h Residenc y als o questione d th e reason s fo r outsid e meddlings in Morocco s affairs, suggestin g that this intrusion b y an Amer ican Jewis h organizatio n an d Zionis t circle s i n Franc e an d Palestin e b e confronted head-o n fo r Morocca n Jewry' s sake . Why ? B y the Frenc h no t checking Zionis t an d pro-Zionis t activit y periodically , th e Morocca n na tionalists coul d the n castigat e th e Jews for bein g disloyal. 13 An earl y indicatio n tha t certai n nationalis t circle s questione d Moroc can Jewry' s loyalt y t o thei r countr y i s illustrate d i n a n articl e writte n b y 3 Abu Khali l i n Le Jeune Maghrebin. Entitle d "Th e Zionis t Poiso n i n Morocco," th e articl e note d tha t thoug h Morocca n Muslim s treate d th e Jews respectfully , th e latte r wer e becomin g remot e fro m everythin g Moroccan, refusin g t o adap t t o th e nationa l will . Durin g Worl d Wa r I I when Morocc o was under Vichy' s influence, Sulta n Muhamma d V fought against Frenc h anti-Semiti c effort s t o promulgat e racia l legislation . Ye t the Jews , lackin g gratitude , preferre d t o engag e i n profitmakin g an d i n amassing grea t wealt h rathe r tha n manifes t patrioti c sentiments . The y were, accordin g t o 'Ab u Khalil , coward s b y nature , diabolica l Zionist s who organize d reunion s an d fund-raisin g benefit s o n behal f o f thei r brethren i n Palestine. 14 Jewish leader s i n Morocc o reacte d promptl y t o 3 Abu KhahT s article . Isaac Dahan , presiden t o f the Federatio n o f AIU alumni , state d emphat -

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ically that 3 Abu Khali l was a dishonest rabble-rouse r an d maintaine d tha t Zionism i n Morocc o wa s exploite d b y nationalis t extremist s t o driv e a wedge betwee n Muslim s an d Jews . H e urge d th e Frenc h authoritie s t o censure futur e article s wit h thi s orientatio n s o as t o aver t a campaign o f hatred tha t would resul t i n bloodshed. 15 Jewish-Muslim tension s i n 194 7 an d durin g th e firs t hal f o f 194 8 increased, however . Earl y i n Jun e 1948 , Franci s Lacoste , th e Frenc h minister plenipotentiar y i n Rabat , alerte d Jui n tha t th e nationalist s ha d for severa l month s searche d fo r opportunitie s t o sti r publi c opinio n agains t the Jew s i n connectio n wit h clandestin e c aliya vi a Algeri a a s well a s th e Palestine war. B y turning th e Jews into the scapegoat s of the Arab-Israel i war, th e nationalist s ha d hope d t o enlis t greate r numerica l suppor t amon g the Musli m peopl e whic h woul d subsequentl y b e directe d agains t th e French presenc e i n Morocco. 16 I n othe r words : th e whol e campaig n against Zionis m an d c aliya wa s par t an d parce l o f th e goa l t o fortif y th e ranks of the nationalis t movemen t fo r th e eventua l anticolonia l struggle . Several day s prio r t o th e pogrom s a t Oudjd a an d Djerada , nationalis t elements conducte d a n economi c boycot t agains t Europea n an d Jewis h merchants throughou t Frenc h Morocco . Th e boycott rapidl y extende d t o movie theatres , pharmacies , an d transportatio n companies . I n Fez , th e wife o f c Alal al-Fasi, a n influentia l Istiqlal i leader , an d th e wive s o f other Muslim notables , organize d demonstration s i n suppor t o f th e Ara b ar mies' war with Israel . Simila r activit y was reported i n Casablanca, wher e affluent Musli m women donate d thei r jewelry for th e war effort. 17 On Monday , 7 June 1948 , Jui n receive d a telegra m fro m M . Brunei , the regiona l hea d o f Oudjda , informin g hi m tha t a pogro m ha d take n place i n Oudjd a Cit y afte r a Jew attacke d a Musli m wit h scissors . Base d on thi s version , th e inciden t occurre d whe n th e tw o me n entere d int o a heated discussio n concernin g th e Palestin e war . Onc e th e inciden t be came know n i n th e Musli m madina (th e Musli m sectio n o f th e city) , violence brok e ou t agains t th e Jews . Adde d t o th e looting , bodil y inju ries, an d killing s wa s damag e t o Jewish-owne d store s an d home s i n several integrate d neighborhoods . I t wa s also stressed tha t "th e majorit y of Oudjda's Muslim s assiste d effectivel y i n restoring order." 18 This repor t doe s no t sugges t tha t th e pogrom s an d othe r form s o f violence wer e preplanned . I t doe s indicate , however , tha t tension s ove r Zionism an d th e Palestin e wa r serve d a s catalysts t o the pogrom . O n th e other hand , a repor t submitte d t o th e Directio n d e l'lnterieu r o f th e

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5

Protectorate immediatel y afte r th e event s emphasize d tha t th e pogrom s were carefully planned in advance b y nationalis t forces . I n additio n t o launching th e above-mentione d economi c boycott , anti-Jewis h slogan s were painte d o n buildings throughou t th e city . Jus t prio r t o the pogrom s Muslim schoo l principal s wer e urge d no t t o conduc t classe s o n 7 June , an unusua l reques t fo r a Monda y morning . Furthermore , peasant s fro m Oudjda's countrysid e entere d th e cit y on tha t da y carrying their reaping hooks an d othe r utensils ; the y seeme d t o hav e bee n organize d i n ad vance. Swellin g thei r rank s wer e Algeria n Muslim s wh o arrive d b y trai n from Marnia . Finally , home s inhabite d b y Muslim s ha d butterflie s painte d on their walls as if to single them ou t from thos e o f the Jews. 19 The sam e repor t describe d th e attack s o n th e Jew s a s bein g carrie d out i n severa l section s o f th e cit y simultaneously . Th e assailant s brok e down doors , gates , an d windows . The y burne d an d destroye d whateve r they coul d no t tak e wit h them . Women , children , infants , an d th e el derly wer e attacke d indiscriminately . Whe n th e pogro m wa s over , eigh t Jews wer e dead , five hundre d wer e seriousl y wounded , an d a t leas t on e hundred slightl y wounded. Propert y damag e was estimated by the repor t at five hundred millio n francs (doubtles s a n exaggerate d figure) whil e th e estimate fo r homeles s Jew s reache d nin e hundred , man y o f whom wer e housed temporaril y i n the local Jewish schools. 20 In ye t anothe r repor t b y Eugen e Weill , AI U secretary-general , i t was stated tha t o n 7 June a n Oudjda n Jew , a barber, wa s abou t t o trave l t o Marnia i n Algeria . A t th e borde r betwee n Oudjd a an d Algeri a h e wa s stopped b y a tol l collector , a Morocca n Musli m wh o confiscate d certai n chemical product s foun d i n hi s possession . Assiste d b y severa l persons , the official bea t u p the Jew and allegedl y shouted : "her e i s a Jew carryin g explosives t o kill us." The peopl e wh o arrived o n the scen e proceede d t o different part s o f Oudjda Cit y an d sprea d th e new s o f the accusation . I n no tim e a crow d o f angry Muslim s assembled . Arme d wit h sticks , axes , and daggers , the y attacke d ever y Je w the y knew , killin g an d burnin g homes an d store s owne d b y Jews , usin g gasolin e whic h accordin g t o Weill wa s store d fo r tha t purpos e " a l'avance " (i n advance) . A truck an d other vehicle s wer e brough t t o differen t area s t o gathe r stole n goods . Even th e goums an d mokhaznis —indigenous policemen—wh o arrive d one hou r afte r th e event s occurred , "participate d i n th e pillage " instea d of assisting th e Frenc h police . Weil l maintaine d tha t i n orde r t o restor e order th e Frenc h calle d i n th e army . Bu t i t wa s to o late . Wherea s th e

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unrest an d pogrom s commence d betwee n 8:0 0 an d 8:2 5 A.M. , th e arm y did no t arriv e unti l 11:0 0 A.M . Durin g thi s tim e spa n th e assailant s dominated th e street s o f Oudjda. 21 Though base d o n a thoroug h surve y o f th e event s followin g a fact finding mission , Weil l seem s t o have contradicted himsel f by, o n th e on e hand, notin g tha t th e pogrom s wer e directl y relate d t o th e specifi c incident a t th e Moroccan-Algeria n borde r an d then , o n th e othe r hands , hinting that th e event s were planne d in advance. The pogro m di d no t en d wit h Oudjda . Base d o n Frenc h Protectorat e data, o n th e sam e day , a t 7:0 0 P.M. , rioter s fro m Oudjd a drov e sixt y kilometers t o th e phosphat e tow n o f Djerada . Upo n arriva l the y sprea d false rumor s tha t Jew s ha d attacke d Oudjda n Muslim s an d tha t Sulta n Muhammad V ordered al l good Moroccan s t o seek vengeance agains t th e attackers. The y the n assemble d loca l miner s and , accompanie d b y Djer ada's khalifa (makhzans to p official) , entere d th e Jewis h neighborhoo d —inhabited b y 15 0 people. A systematic massacre took place, with whol e families butchere d o r severel y beaten , fo r a total o f thirty-nine dea d an d forty-four wounded . Th e survivor s wer e evacuate d t o Oudjda an d place d in temporary housing. 22 A simila r accoun t abou t Djerad a wa s presente d b y Eugen e Weill . Oudjdan nationalist s arrive d a t Djerad a an d tol d loca l miner s tha t Oudj da's Jew s ha d se t fire t o th e city' s Gran d Mosque . Accordin g t o Weill , once the riots in Djerad a began , th e police either ignored th e early phas e of th e unres t o r di d no t believ e i t woul d develo p int o a pogrom . The y were als o shor t o n manpower : onl y fou r gendarmes , five polic e inspec tors, an d severa l mokhaznis wer e presen t o n th e scene . I t wa s no t unti l the nex t day , o n th e evenin g o f 8 June, tha t th e authoritie s decide d t o evacuate Djerada' s Jewr y t o Oudjda. 23 What wa s th e reactio n o f the Jew s t o th e pogroms ? Jewis h leader s i n Oudjda complaine d tha t the y ha d n o mean s o f defendin g themselve s throughout easter n Morocco . The y live d i n constan t fea r o f potentia l anti-Jewish violenc e emanatin g fro m Muslim s eve r sinc e 1 5 Ma y 1948 , the da y th e armie s o f Egypt , Syria , Jordan , an d Ira q launche d th e wa r against Israel . Thei r anxiet y wa s partly attribute d t o th e fac t tha t indige nous Moroccan policemen, man y of whom were nationalist sympathizers , patrolled integrate d neighborhood s an d di d no t demonstrat e a friendl y disposition towar d them. 24 Oudjdan an d Djerada n Jew s als o though t tha t th e Frenc h authoritie s

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7

failed t o follo w th e event s leadin g t o th e pogrom s wit h grea t scrutiny . Brunei was described a s one o f the mai n culprit s becaus e a t the time , o n 6 an d 7 June, h e wa s awa y i n Tafilal t attendin g a weddin g celebration . There wer e thos e wh o suspecte d tha t h e wa s intentionall y absen t fro m the scene , knowin g tha t a n outbrea k o f violenc e wa s imminent . H e probably fel t tha t i t ma y hav e bee n wise r t o sta y awa y an d no t b e burdened wit h th e responsibilit y fo r th e los s o f contro l ove r a chaoti c situation.25 Other s considere d th e possibilit y tha t Brune i an d th e Resi dency welcome d Musli m anti-Jewis h attack s an d i n fac t encourage d them , the sol e aim being to pit Jews against Muslim s s o as to prove to the worl d that th e latte r wer e irresponsibl e an d unworth y o f their politica l aspira tions. 26 What wa s th e reactio n o f the Muslim s t o th e result s o f the pogroms ? One reliabl e sourc e reporte d tha t "l a populatio n arab e dan s s a majorit e approuve c e pogrom " (th e majorit y o f th e Ara b populatio n approve s o f this pogrom). 27 However , makhzan official s i n the regio n o f Oudjda wer e astonished an d genuinel y embarrasse d b y th e conduc t o f the assailants . This i s bes t illustrate d b y thei r effort s t o consol e th e victims ' families t o the exten t tha t the y surpasse d th e gesture s mad e b y Frenc h functionar ies. Especiall y noteworth y wa s th e attitud e o f S i Muhamma d al-HajawT , the pash a o f Oudjda , th e Musli m governo r wh o wa s Brunei' s subordi nate. Know n fo r his pro-French an d libera l attitudes , al-Hajaw i me t wit h every singl e famil y victimized . Hi s behavio r irritate d segment s o f th e Muslim population. O n 1 1 June, when al-Hajaw i attende d Frida y prayer s at Oudjda' s Gran d Mosque , a n attemp t wa s mad e o n hi s life . Sufferin g stab wounds h e barely survived. 28 The nationalist s an d th e communist s denie d havin g played an y role i n the events. The y disclaime d Frenc h accusation s that their cadres agitate d the miner s o f Djerad a an d nearb y Khouribga , o r tha t thei r pres s ex ploited anti-Jewis h passion s durin g th e Palestin e war . Whe n th e Protec torate suggeste d tha t Morocca n nationalist s i n collusio n wit h thei r coun terparts i n th e Algeria n Mouvemen t pou r l e Triomph e de s Liberte s Democratiques (MTLD ) masterminde d th e event s o n 7 June , severa l nationalist group s wen t s o far a s t o blame th e Frenc h fo r th e pogroms. 29 The Istiqla l pointe d ou t wit h som e accuracy , however , tha t ther e wer e Muslims wh o protecte d Jew s durin g th e pogrom s b y shelterin g the m i n their homes. 30 Al-cAlam, IstiqlaT s Arabic-languag e organ , expresse d sadnes s abou t

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the pogrom s a s wel l a s th e attemp t o n al-Hajawi' s life , describin g thes e as "odiou s acts. " Nevertheless , th e editoria l als o declare d tha t th e Jew s contributed t o th e unres t becaus e o f growing suppor t i n thei r communi ties fo r Zionis m an d Israel. 31 Th e indirec t blam e o n th e Jew s fo r th e troubles di d indee d originat e fro m to p Istiqlal i leaders . Ahma d Balafrej , the party' s secretary-general , sai d tha t th e movemen t demande d th e French t o conduc t lega l investigation s t o unrave l th e mysterie s behin d the pogroms , bu t wa s als o quic k t o not e tha t "Zionis t propagandist s ha d to b e awar e o f th e fata l consequence s o f thei r action s jus t a s w e mus t warn ou r Musli m brethre n agains t troublesom e maneuvers/ 3 2 What wer e som e o f the Frenc h reaction s i n th e wak e o f the pogroms ? In a n extensiv e repor t date d 1 9 June, Brune i stresse d tha t ther e wa s n o doubt abou t th e Palestin e wa r bein g a centra l facto r i n th e events . Muslim prid e wa s hur t b y th e effectiv e militar y performanc e o f th e Israelis; th e creatio n o f a Jewish stat e i n th e mids t o f Arab Isla m humili ated th e Moroccan s despit e th e geographica l distanc e o f Frenc h Nort h Africa fro m th e Middl e East . I t wa s logica l fo r Morocca n Muslim s tha t the Frenc h o r the Moroccan s ha d thei r ow n flags, but i t was unthinkabl e that th e Jews shoul d have one. 33 Brunei wrote tha t thoug h Muslim-Jewis h tension s ha d been escalatin g in 1947-4 8 an d outburst s o f violence wer e foreseen , h e wa s particularl y perturbed b y th e fac t tha t Oudjd a Cit y wa s th e scen e o f a pogrom. Fo r many years the two peoples coexisted i n a most cordial environment unti l the Morocca n pres s bega n t o ceaselessly accentuat e thei r difference s an d to sprea d disinformatio n suc h a s abou t th e Jew s sellin g Muslim s poison ous meat s an d bread . Moreover , ther e wa s no doubt i n his mind tha t th e "passage clandestin " (secre t crossing ) o f youn g Zionist s t o Algeri a vi a Oudjda exacerbate d a n already perilou s situation. 34 Having gathere d ampl e evidenc e surroundin g th e pogroms , Brune i pointed o n 1 9 Jun e t o th e differen t element s wh o wer e involved . H e mentioned, firs t an d foremost , th e Musli m inhabitant s o f the duwars — small rura l agglomeration s an d shant y town s aroun d Oudjda—mostl y impoverished Moroccan s havin g fled fro m economi c misery , an d Alge rian Muslim s wh o crosse d th e borde r int o Oudjd a an d engage d i n th e trafficking o f smuggle d good s betwee n th e tw o countries . Thes e tw o elements emerge d a s the mai n force i n the looting and killings on 7 June. Together wit h phosphat e miner s i n Djerad a an d Khouribga , som e o f

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these element s wer e als o involve d i n th e massacr e a t Djerada . Ther e they di d no t onl y kill but mutilate d thei r victims ' bodies. 35 According t o Brunei , th e drivin g forc e behin d th e assailant s wa s th e nationalist movements , notabl y the Istiqlal . Hi s assessment i n this regar d was identica l t o conclusion s reache d b y th e Protectorate s Directio n d e llnterieur. Brune i contende d tha t sinc e th e en d o f Ma y 194 8 Morocca n labor unionists , representin g Djerada' s miners , an d certai n nationalis t leaders, combine d force s wit h Messal i Hadj' s MTL D t o fomen t anti Jewish agitation . Messali' s supporter s visite d Oudjd a frequently , begin ning in 1945 , to solidify Moroccan-Algeria n solidarit y against the French . The Algeria n emissarie s woul d trave l i n cab s fro m Marni a an d Tlemce n until the y reache d th e Morocca n border . Managin g t o evade th e Frenc h police b y crossin g int o Morocc o o n foot , thes e activist s als o participate d in th e event s o f 7 June. 36 I n thi s repor t w e find a clea r contradictio n o f the informatio n containe d i n Brunei' s cabl e t o Juin , date d 7 June , i n which he suppose d tha t th e pogrom s gre w out of an isolated incident . Under pressur e fro m Morocca n Jewish communa l leaders, th e Frenc h conducted investigation s int o th e pogroms , arreste d th e mai n assailants , and organized trial s in military tribunals . Thirty-fiv e me n faced tria l earl y in 194 9 over th e event s i n Oudjda . O n 1 1 February 1949 , th e followin g verdicts wer e hande d down : Muhamma d c Abd al-Sala m Zerkaw i an d hi s brother Rahal i Be n Muhamma d wer e sentence d t o death; Be n Yunis Ben Ahmad wa s sentenced t o twenty years ' imprisonment i n hard labo r whil e Muhammad Be n c Abd 'Allah , c Alal Be n Hajj , Muhamma d Be n c Amara, and Muhamma d Wali d Mawla y Ahma d eac h receive d te n years ' impris onment i n har d labor , an d fines o f 12,00 0 franc s each . Other s receive d prison sentence s rangin g fro m thre e t o five year s i n har d labor , an d paying fines o f 1,000-12,000 francs. Amon g them wer e Muhamma d Be n Harafi, c Abd 'Alla h Be n c Abd 'Allah , Mubara k Be n Hamid , S a c dl Mu hammad, an d Ahma d Be n Muhamma d Be n Yahia . Twenty-tw o defen dants were acquitted. 37 The Istiqlal' s disavowa l o f any wrongdoin g notwithstanding , th e Frenc h authorities reporte d o n 23 February 194 9 that, fro m th e beginning o f the trial, th e Istiqla l raised mone y o n behalf of the defendant s i n Casablanca , Rabat, Sale , Fez , Meknes , an d Oudjda . Mor e tha n tw o millio n franc s were collecte d fro m th e star t o f the ne w year. 38 Par t o f this amoun t wa s allocated fo r a separat e tria l fo r th e accuse d fro m Djerada , althoug h i t

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should be remembere d tha t severa l of the assailants facing tria l related t o the pogroms i n Oudjd a wer e als o active in the event s at Djerada . Regarding th e tria l fo r th e Djerad a affair , th e sentence s pronounce d by th e militar y tribuna l o f Casablanc a wer e surprisingl y mild . No t onl y were short-ter m priso n sentence s hande d down , bu t th e deat h penalt y was no t imposed . Considerin g tha t th e Djerad a pogro m wa s th e harshe r of th e tw o pogroms , wit h thirty-nin e deaths , th e indignatio n o f th e Jewish an d Europea n population s ove r th e result s o f that trial was aroused . Their representative s complaine d t o th e Residenc y tha t th e Protectorat e had no t conducted sufficientl y in-dept h investigation s int o the events. 39 We hav e been unsuccessfu l i n ascertainin g i f the verdict s wer e imple mented an d i f thos e sen t t o priso n serve d thei r sentenc e t o th e fullest . On th e othe r hand , w e hav e partia l dat a abou t th e financia l assistanc e accorded t o th e victims . B y October 194 8 the Jewis h communit y counci l of Oudjda ha d allocate d 6,664,901.5 5 franc s fo r thi s purpose. Th e Frenc h municipal service s undertoo k th e tas k o f rebuilding damage d home s an d other propertie s i n the amoun t o f 1,000,000 francs. Th e Protectorat e als o allocated t o Oudjda' s Jewis h communit y th e su m o f 4,681,300 franc s a s a special subsidy (ou t o f thi s amoun t th e Residenc y provide d 1,400,00 0 francs wherea s th e municipa l service s an d other Frenc h agencie s grante d 3,281,300 francs) . A fund-raisin g campaig n wa s organize d i n Morocco' s major citie s b y th e Frenc h authoritie s i n whic h 1,809,07 9 franc s wer e collected.40 Furthermore , b y September-Octobe r 1948 , th e Jewis h com munities o f Casablanca , Meknes , Marrakesh , Rabat , Sale , Fez , Safi , Sefrou, Mazagan , Settat , Fedala , Essaouira , an d Agadi r collecte d fo r Oudjdan an d Djerada n Jewr y th e tota l sum o f 875,000 francs. 41 It seem s tha t th e combine d effor t o f th e authoritie s an d th e Jewis h communities fel l fa r shor t o f th e fund s needed . B y th e en d o f 194 8 Oudjda's communit y leadershi p submitte d t o the Frenc h Protectorat e a n additional reques t fo r financia l support , exceedin g previous donations . I t was estimate d b y Oudjda' s Jew s tha t damag e t o place s o f business , including los s o f stock an d goods , reache d 34,566,73 6 francs ; damag e t o homes stoo d a t 37,856,77 5 francs , includin g furniture , persona l effects , and valuables. Al l in all, the y requeste d 72,423,51 1 francs . Brunei challenge d thes e "exaggerate d estimates " and conclude d that , if any additiona l monie s wer e t o b e disbursed , thes e shoul d no t excee d 20,000,000 francs. 42 Ou r dat a d o no t indicat e whethe r o r no t th e Frenc h

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also allocate d t o th e Jew s sum s o f mone y rangin g fro m 20,000,00 0 t o 72,423,511 francs . The evidenc e presente d reveal s tha t politica l motives , particularl y Zionism, th e Palestin e war , an d clandestin e c aliya, contribute d t o th e tragedy. I d o no t believ e tha t w e ca n stat e definitivel y whethe r th e events erupted spontaneously , emerge d ou t of isolated incidents, o r were planned i n advance . However , whil e th e source s availabl e provid e con tradictory an d inconclusiv e information , i t doe s see m tha t i n Oudjda , a t least, divers e nationalis t forces , Istiqlal i sympathizers included , eithe r provoked th e pogrom s an d eve n helpe d organiz e them , o r they escalate d tensions among the Muslims—i n th e period immediatel y prio r to 7 June. It doe s no t appea r tha t to p Istiqlal i leaders wer e directl y involve d o r were th e behind-the-scene s perpetrator s o n 7 June. Ye t having launche d anti-Zionist and , occasionally , anti-Semiti c attack s o n th e Jew s i n thei r press sinc e 1947 , the y to o shar e i n th e responsibilit y fo r wha t eventuall y happened. Th e possibilit y tha t Algerian nationalists , essentiall y Messali' s supporters, wer e involve d i s likely, fo r hi s nationalist ideolog y wa s notoriously anti-Semiti c an d ferventl y supportiv e o f th e Ara b struggl e i n Palestine sinc e the lat e 1920s . It i s impossible t o determine wha t role, i f any, Frenc h official s o r antiSemitic Europea n resident s o f Morocc o playe d i n encouragin g anti-Jew ish activit y durin g 1947-48 . Ou r source s d o no t provid e a trac e o f evi dence tha t th e Frenc h intentionally welcome d Muslim-Jewis h animosit y in orde r t o demonstrate tha t th e Muslim s were irresponsibl e an d unwor thy o f self-rule . O n th e othe r hand , i t doe s no t appea r tha t th e Frenc h considered contingenc y plans to confront potentia l pogroms and to lessen tensions. The y di d no t affor d ampl e protectio n t o the Jews i n 1948 , eve n though Juin , Brunei , th e regiona l hea d o f Fez Genera l Laparra , an d th e officials a t th e politica l sectio n o f the Directio n d e l'lnterieu r monitore d very closel y th e ris e o f tensions. A s one Frenc h repor t suggeste d afte r 7 June: i n Apri l 194 8 th e authoritie s kne w tha t Morocca n Muslim s calle d for revenge agains t local Jews in the aftermath o f the "Deir Yassin Affair. " At tha t time , th e D Irgun (th e Yishuv s 3 Irgun Tsva^ e Le 3umi o f Zionism s Revisionist movement ) attacke d th e Ara b villag e o f Dei r Yassi n nea r Jerusalem, killin g many women an d children .

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Illegal c Aliya in the Pogroms Aftermath As we mentione d previously , fro m mid-Jun e 194 8 until th e beginnin g o f 1949, th e c aliya continued . Man y sough t visa s fo r Algeri a o r Franc e although thei r final destinatio n wa s Israel . Thos e wh o wer e wel l con nected wit h th e Frenc h an d makhzan administrations , o r wer e well-to do, usuall y encountere d littl e resistanc e fro m th e authoritie s i n gettin g the necessar y document s legally . The y ha d th e mean s t o travel an d wer e able t o provide ampl e informatio n a s to their place s o f "final destination " in Algeria o r France . Quit e frequentl y the y supplie d th e authoritie s wit h work permit s o r employmen t contract s issue d i n Franc e a s wel l a s de tailed medica l records . Accordin g t o Genera l Laparra , thei r medica l records sometime s indicate d tha t the y require d th e kin d o f medica l treatment availabl e onl y i n France . Laparr a an d hi s subordinate s wer e unable t o questio n thes e data , fo r th e physician s treatin g thes e person s were apparentl y bribe d t o confir m everythin g whe n calle d upo n b y th e authorities. 43 The majorit y o f the Jews , however , attempte d t o leav e b y optin g fo r the following : bribin g Frenc h an d Morocca n officials ; obtainin g fake doc uments throug h th e Zionis t underground , th e Mossa d Le cAliya,44 an d perhaps othe r sources ; an d tryin g t o flee Morocc o withou t documents . As alread y noted , the y usuall y fled th e countr y wit h th e hel p o f th e Zionist underground , o r o n thei r own , o r b y enlistin g th e service s o f experienced smugglers . The y departe d throug h Casablanca , th e Interna tional Zon e o f Tangier, an d b y attemptin g t o reac h Oudjd a t o cros s int o Algeria. Ha d th e Frenc h in Algeria no t allowe d th e Morocca n Jewis h emigrants to be transferred legall y to Marseilles, beginning in Septembe r 1948, a ver y seriou s refuge e proble m woul d hav e developed . A s Karo z remarked, onc e th e thousand s o f Jew s arrive d i n Marseille s the y wer e organized fo r departur e t o Israel. 45 Conversely , th e Frenc h i n Morocc o continued t o resist Jewish infiltratio n int o Algeria. 46 The Jew s wishin g t o leav e include d numerou s tailors , watchmakers , shoemakers, carpenters , an d goldsmiths . I n 1947-4 9 the y wer e eithe r unemployed o r partiall y employe d and , consequently , determine d t o leave fo r Israe l i n orde r t o escap e th e economi c crisi s plaguin g th e country. 47 Afte r th e pogrom s i t wa s n o longe r necessar y fo r clandestin e Zionist organization s insid e Morocc o t o stimulat e th e exodus . A s th e

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Moroccan Jewis h Emigrant s i n 1947—Escapee s vi a Algeri a (courtes y o f th e Organization of the Former North African Undergroun d Activists in Israel). French authoritie s i n Rabat observed, durin g the latter half of 1948 Israel and th e Zionis t organization s wer e n o longe r eage r t o hasten emigratio n from Morocc o o n a larg e scal e becaus e o f Israel' s emigran t absorptio n problems. Th e Jewis h Agenc y preferre d t o cur b th e c aliya o f entir e families includin g infant s an d th e elderly . However , th e emigratio n ha d its ow n dynamics , goin g beyond th e wishe s o f the Worl d Zionis t Organi zation, th e Mossa d Le cAliya, an d the Jewish Agency. 48 Those emigrant s wh o wer e stoppe d b y th e authoritie s justifie d thei r action by giving family, health , an d economic reasons for their departure . Some wer e age d seventee n t o twenty , i n excellen t physica l condition ,

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ready fo r militar y servic e i n Israel . Eac h grou p o f emigrant s wa s mad e up o f si x t o seve n person s heade d b y a leade r carryin g wit h hi m larg e sums o f money. I n on e specifi c case , a group leade r fro m somewher e i n central Morocc o ha d 42,00 0 franc s i n hi s possession . Th e mone y may have bee n provide d b y th e underground . Thes e emigrant s originall y boarded a trai n t o Fez . T o evad e th e surveillanc e o f th e train s the y proceeded i n cab s fro m Fe z t o Oudjda befor e bein g caught . Th e Frenc h gendarmerie an d agent s o f th e Controle Civil establishe d checkpoint s and erecte d barricade s a t Saidia , Martimprey , Taza , Moulouya , an d Guercif—the mos t commo n route s use d b y th e emigrant s fro m centra l Morocco to reach Oudjda. 49 The emigrant s wh o successfull y reache d Oudjd a frequentl y contacte d members o f th e loca l Jewis h community . Accordin g t o Frenc h sources , Oudjdan Jew s assiste d b y placin g the m temporaril y wit h Jewis h familie s until thei r departure . Whil e there , th e emigrant s face d dangerou s chal lenges hitherto unforeseen . Fo r example , i f they di d no t cros s the borde r independently o r wit h th e assistanc e o f differen t Zionis t groups , bu t relied o n Musli m smugglers , th e risk s the y too k wer e immense . Alge rians fo r th e mos t part , th e smuggler s wh o live d clos e t o th e Morocca n border, woul d sli p int o Morocc o wit h fak e Morocca n passport s an d lais sez-passer document s t o b e sol d t o th e emigrants . The y the n assiste d i n smuggling the m int o Algeria for 2,50 0 francs pe r individual . I f misunder standings develope d betwee n th e tw o partie s ove r mone y matters , an d such situation s wer e no t uncommon , th e smuggler s could , an d some times did , tur n the m ove r t o the Frenc h Morocca n authorities , emergin g as heroes i n the eye s o f the Muslims. 50 The Frenc h i n Morocc o relie d o n a networ k o f informant s i n th e Jewish communitie s abou t would-b e clandestin e emigrants . Protectorat e sources sugges t tha t Jew s o f the mor e affluen t stratu m an d unidentifie d communal leader s sometime s informe d the m concernin g plan s for c aliya. The informant s wer e hostil e towar d emigration , fearin g tha t th e proces s would no t onl y depopulat e th e communities , bu t coul d rende r the m politically vulnerable befor e th e Muslims. 51 As clandestin e c aliya gaine d momentu m th e Muslim s continue d t o register thei r complaint s befor e th e Residency . S i M'Bare k Bekkai , th e pasha o f Sefrou , regarde d th e emigratio n a s ope n provocation . I n th e past, Bekka i argued, th e Muslim s o f Sefrou coul d count o n the Frenc h t o apprehend a t leas t severa l o f th e emigrant s an d impos e a one-mont h

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prison sentenc e o n them . Thi s policy , however , ha d bee n inconsisten t and th e Jew s continue d t o attemp t thei r escap e int o Algeria. 52 Bot h Bekka'i an d Dessaigne , th e loca l Frenc h chef du cercle, concurre d tha t the situatio n o f Sefrou' s Jewr y wa s becomin g perilous , fo r unlik e othe r areas wher e th e Jew s wer e a smal l minority , i n Sefro u the y constitute d one-third o f the tota l population. I n view of the Sefro u community' s size , even th e mer e procedur e o f organizing clandestin e c aliya wa s boun d t o become publi c knowledge an d t o unleash Musli m hatred. 53 Nonetheless, b y th e en d o f Decembe r 1948 , th e Frenc h wer e begin ning t o sens e a declin e i n Musli m oppositio n t o c aliya. Som e official s attributed thi s development t o the defea t o f the Arab armies a t the hand s of Israel an d t o rumors tha t a peaceful settlemen t i n the Middl e Eas t wa s forthcoming. Brune i wen t s o far a s to remark tha t "Th e Muslim s are no w demonstrating almos t complet e indifferenc e [t o emigration ] an d ar e happ y to repeat tha t the departure o f the Jews from Morocc o will not contribut e much t o th e Jewis h state , an d quit e t o th e contrary , Morocc o woul d b e rid o f quantities o f undesirables." 54 Moreover, a t th e beginnin g o f 1949 , th e Frenc h claime d tha t emigra tion wa s diminishing . On e sourc e indicate d tha t Morocca n Jew s wh o reached Israe l encountere d seriou s socioeconomi c hardship s an d ethni c discrimination. Thei r familie s i n Morocc o learned o f their condition s an d the enthusias m fo r c aliya wa s dissipating. 55 A mor e substantiv e sourc e revealed tha t th e emigran t receptio n center s i n Franc e an d Italy , jointl y administered b y th e AJD C an d th e Jewis h Agency , wer e congeste d an d could n o longe r absor b man y mor e people . Mor e tha n a t an y previou s time, th e Jewis h Agenc y wa s no w determine d t o hal t additiona l tide s o f uncontrollable emigratio n fro m aroun d th e world an d t o select emigrant s in accordance wit h socia l and health criteria. 56 The sourc e adde d tha t th e Prefecture i n Marseille s warne d th e Frenc h governmen t tha t a s th e Israelis wer e apparentl y incapabl e o f handling th e integratio n int o thei r young natio n o f person s strande d a t th e transi t camp s i n France , th e prolonged sta y o f man y emigrant s o n Frenc h soi l woul d pos e seriou s problems fo r Frenc h society. 57 B e that a s it may , thoug h c aliya may hav e declined i n intensit y towar d th e beginnin g o f 1949 , i t wa s probabl y a brief respit e befor e additiona l emigratio n movement s woul d commence . For, al l i n all, Morocca n Jew s though t a t th e tim e tha t thei r futur e i n Morocco was most uncertain .

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A New French Policy toward c Aliya: The Opening of the Gates, December 1948-July 1949 Francis Lacost e wa s perhap s th e fiercest opponen t o f th e c aliya fro m Morocco. I n a repor t t o Rober t Schuman , Frenc h ministe r fo r foreig n affairs, Lacost e relate d tha t man y Jewis h youth s ha d clandestinel y fled via Oudjd a t o Algeri a an d thei r mai n objectiv e wa s t o joi n th e Israe l Defense Force s i n th e fight agains t th e Arabs . Accordin g t o him , thi s emigration wa s partl y militar y i n nature ; thes e youn g me n wer e usuall y physically fit an d suite d fo r militar y servic e i n Israel ; moreover , the y were instructe d b y loca l undergroun d Zionis t organizer s an d smuggler s as to what t o say if captured a t the border b y the police and interrogated . This movement ha d t o be stopped. 58 By Decembe r 1948 , however , th e Frenc h i n Morocc o realize d that , despite th e numerica l fluctuations i n th e c aliya, th e illega l activit y coul d not b e completel y stopped . A s a result, th e Residenc y wa s searchin g fo r a way t o establis h contact s wit h Jewis h organization s i n orde r t o en d th e underground activitie s an d find a suitabl e formul a fo r lega l o r semilega l emigration unde r Frenc h supervision . Indeed , i n Decembe r 1948 , Mar c Jarblum, a leadin g Frenc h Zionist , visite d Morocco . H e wa s affiliate d with th e Jewis h Agency , th e Federatio n Sionist e d e France , an d th e French sectio n o f th e Worl d Jewis h Congress . Th e purpos e o f hi s tri p was twofold : t o discus s wit h th e Frenc h authoritie s th e prohibitio n o n Jews leavin g Morocco , an d t o investigat e th e situatio n o f Moroccan Jewry . Was Jarblu m speakin g o n behal f o f th e Jewis h Agenc y i n Jerusale m o r the Jewis h Agency' s offic e i n Paris ? H e apparentl y spok e o n behal f o f both sinc e h e state d tha t h e represente d tha t bod y an d th e Mossa d LecAliya. Di d h e als o inten d t o spea k wit h th e Frenc h o n behal f o f th e World Jewis h Congres s o r th e Zionis t Federatio n o f France ? Ther e ar e no answers available . Late i n Decembe r 194 8 Jarblum me t i n Raba t with Juin . H e tol d hi m that h e wa s speakin g o n behal f o f the Jewis h Agenc y an d the n broache d the issu e o f the prohibitio n o n Jew s leavin g Morocc o o n th e assumptio n that they were going to Israel. Juin explained that the decision to prohibit Jewish emigratio n ha d bee n implemente d afte r th e sultan' s insisten t requests o n th e basi s o f th e followin g argument : Morocca n Jew s wer e eager t o leav e Morocc o i n orde r t o enlis t i n th e Israe l Defens e Force s

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and fight th e Arabs . Thes e Jews , accordin g t o Juin s assessmen t o f th e sultan's position , di d no t attemp t t o concea l thei r intentions , s o that th e Moroccan Muslim s fel t deepl y aggrieve d an d refuse d t o accep t allowin g Jews t o leav e th e countr y fo r th e purpos e o f fighting th e Muslim s i n th e Middle East . Moreover , thi s emigratio n cause d seriou s incident s an d i t was in th e bes t interes t o f the Jews , th e sulta n claimed , t o keep i t quiet . Consequently, Pari s an d th e Residency , anxiou s t o aver t incidents , sa w fit t o prohibi t Jew s fro m leavin g Morocco . Bu t thi s polic y ha d prove d inoperative. 59 Juins explanatio n t o Jarblu m a s t o wh y Jew s suddenl y sough t t o flee Morocco i n 1947-4 8 centere d o n bot h emotiona l an d socioeconomi c causes. I t wa s a mystica l movemen t a s well a s panic tha t impelle d the m to escape thei r melldhs; o f the 250,00 0 Jews throughou t Morocco , h e di d not think that he was exaggerating when he suggested tha t 200,000 would leave for Israe l i f given th e opportunit y t o do so. 60 Jarblum indicate d tha t Jui n understoo d th e aspiration s o f the Jews . I n Morocco the y regarde d themselve s a s pariahs , despise d and , no t infre quently, mistreated , whil e i n Israe l the y envisage d th e possibilit y o f freedom. Furthermore , ther e seeme d t o b e n o long-rang e futur e fo r them i n Morocco . A small minority o f Moroccan Jews had left th e melldhs and dwel t i n th e Europea n district s o f Fez, Meknes , Rabat , Marrakesh , and Casablanca , wher e the y engage d i n th e libera l profession s o r large scale commerce . Ye t th e bul k o f the m live d i n crowde d melldhs, i n a state o f utter physical , material , an d mora l destitution . Th e mysti c urg e to g o to Israe l an d th e desir e t o escap e socia l and economi c miser y wer e therefore quit e understandable. 61 Jarblum pointe d ou t t o Jui n tha t th e ba n o n leavin g Morocc o mad e matters worse . If thes e peopl e kne w the y coul d leav e wheneve r the y wished, ther e woul d b e n o wild rush , n o sellin g of property a t an y price , no clandestine activity . Eac h individua l o r family woul d wai t its tur n an d it woul d b e possibl e fo r th e Jewis h Agenc y t o organiz e th e emigratio n process, selec t emigrant s base d o n health an d socia l criteria, an d arrang e the necessar y preliminarie s fo r th e journe y t o Marseille s an d the n t o Israel. 62 Juin admitte d thes e difficultie s t o Jarblu m an d suggeste d tha t i n De cember 194 8 the Morocca n Muslim s wer e manifestin g considerabl y les s interest i n emigratio n tha n earlier , fo r peac e i n th e Middl e Eas t wa s i n sight an d i t no longer seeme d reasonabl e t o claim tha t Jew s were leavin g

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in orde r t o fight th e Arabs . Furthermore , th e Ara b defea t i n Palestine , apparent a t the time , wa s a devastating blow t o the Ara b League , a s well as a victory fo r Israe l an d France . Th e makhzan, too , Jui n asserted , ha d begun t o adop t a mor e realisti c vie w o f th e situatio n a s a result , an d feared les s th e influenc e an d possibl e politica l pressur e o f th e Leagu e over suc h matter s a s Jewish emigration . Therefore , th e resident-genera l said h e woul d b e prepare d t o conside r th e deliver y o f a certain numbe r of regular exis t visas and aske d Jarblum whethe r h e could stat e a numbe r for Morocc o tha t woul d see m reasonabl e t o th e Residenc y an d th e Frenc h government. Jarblu m observe d tha t Israe l hope d t o receiv e 300,00 0 emigrants i n 194 9 an d i t wa s reasonabl e tha t 30,00 0 emigrant s pe r yea r (2,500 pe r month ) fro m Morocc o alon e woul d no t b e to o hig h a figure. To this Juin replie d tha t 1 0 percent wa s not a very high ratio , bu t 30,00 0 people seeme d rathe r unreasonable . H e would , however , conside r th e matter. 63 It i s interesting tha t Jarblu m ha d a long discussion wit h Lacost e who , in additio n t o hi s function s mentione d earlier , wa s th e delegat e fo r Moroccan affair s a t th e Residency . Hi s views o f emigration, accordin g t o Jarblum, wa s simila r t o Juin's . Lacost e to o ha d note d tha t tensio n ha d eased i n Morocc o a s a resul t o f "th e defea t o f th e Ara b League. " Th e consummation o f thi s defea t wa s t o hav e a n extremel y beneficia l effec t on Jewish emigration. 64 We hav e n o wa y o f ascertainin g whethe r al l Juin' s concern s wer e expressed i n hi s conversation wit h Jarblum. Wa s fear o f adverse reactio n emanating fro m makhzan an d nationalis t circle s th e main reaso n fo r banning emigratio n i n 1947-48 ? O r did th e Frenc h als o see the Jews as a positive pro-Frenc h elemen t t o b e relie d upo n t o strengthe n th e Resi dency i f and when a nationalist struggl e too k place ? In an y case , tw o point s see m clear . First , th e Residenc y realize d tha t the illega l outflo w o f Jew s coul d no t b e stopped . Second , Lacost e ap peared t o hav e change d hi s basi c positio n o n emigratio n betwee n Au gust-September an d Decembe r 1948 . O n 3 June 1949 , Lacost e receive d a letter fro m Foreig n Ministe r Schuman , wh o brought t o Lacoste's atten tion tha t Jewis h emigratio n t o Israe l vi a Marseille s wa s causin g grea t problems. However , i n contrast t o his position less than on e year earlier , he trie d t o convinc e Schuma n tha t i t woul d no t b e pruden t t o hal t th e emigration. H e pu t th e following argument :

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9

It would not be just to prevent young and healthy Morocca n Jews from emigrat ing and to confine the m t o profound socia l and economic misery in the melldhs. The only future they would have for improving their lot would be in Israel, which we are going to recognize as having the right to become a member of the family of nations.65 Besides, Lacost e reminde d Schuma n tha t Franc e ha d adhere d t o Articl e fifty-five of the Unite d Nation s Charte r a s to Article thirteen , Paragrap h two, o f the Universa l Declaratio n o f Human Right s adopted a t the en d of 1948 by th e Unite d Nation s Genera l Assembly . Therefore , whil e Franc e and th e Residenc y a t Raba t coul d contro l th e flow o f emigration an d g o so far a s to limit and restric t it , bannin g i t altogether wa s inadvisable. 66 In additio n t o demonstratin g a n inclinatio n durin g th e Jarblu m visit , toward th e en d o f 1948 , t o suppor t a polic y chang e o n emigration , Jui n went furthe r stil l in an interview with Ralp h Spanien , on e of the head s of the Hebre w Immigran t Ai d Societ y (HIAS ) i n France . Spanie n ha d cultivated intimat e tie s wit h th e Residenc y durin g th e mid-1940 s whe n emigration agencie s wer e engage d i n transportin g Jewis h refugee s fro m Central Europ e vi a Casablanca . I n Januar y 1949 , h e trie d t o develo p a modus vivend i wit h Jui n t o legaliz e emigration , includin g tha t o f specia l youth c aliya. Th e Frenc h declare d themselve s prepare d t o conside r Spaniens suggestio n tha t the y gran t Jew s passports . Whil e yout h c aliya via Franc e ha d t o b e carrie d ou t gradually , wit h thre e hundre d youth s leaving periodically, discretio n als o had t o be exercize d regardin g futur e emigration o f adults . Th e French , accordin g t o Spanien , believe d tha t semi-official emigratio n unde r thei r contro l would enabl e the m t o releas e an arm y o f policeme n whos e assignmen t ha d bee n t o sto p clandestin e emigration. O f course, thi s wa s a sensitive projec t involvin g stric t selec tion of emigrants t o be handled b y representatives o f Zionist movements . But Spanie n indicate d tha t th e Frenc h wer e read y t o facilitat e th e emi gration o f 1,50 0 t o 2,00 0 Jew s pe r mont h t o Israe l vi a France . Thi s wa s on conditio n tha t ther e b e absolut e discretion , n o official contac t be tween th e Zionis t movement s an d th e Residency , an d tha t th e handlin g of th e operatio n b e entruste d t o HIAS , whos e technique s an d prestig e were well known t o them. 67 It appears tha t Spanie n wa s acting on his own without forma l approva l from th e Mossa d L e c Aliya or th e Jewis h Agency . Thi s resulte d i n majo r quarrels an d misunderstanding s betwee n thes e organization s an d HIAS ,

110 Zionism,

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with th e Jewis h Agenc y increasingl y leanin g towar d grantin g an y futur e role i n organizin g emigratio n fro m Morocc o t o Israe l t o th e Mossa d L e c Aliya. I t i s also quite obviou s tha t th e Residenc y preferred a non-Zionis t Jewish bod y t o conduc t th e emigratio n process . A t th e sam e time , th e Residency di d no t rul e out granting the Jewish Agency this role, whethe r directly throug h it s ow n personne l o r throug h it s functiona l agency , th e Mossad L e c Aliya. Additional contact s between th e local Zionist Organization , wit h head quarters i n Casablanca , an d th e Residency , reveale d tha t th e Frenc h were o n th e verg e o f reaching a n agreement . Commentin g o n Jarblum s request t o Jui n t o allo w 30,00 0 Jew s a yea r t o leav e Morocco , Spanie n did no t thin k Jui n woul d consen t t o the departur e o f more tha n 18,00 0 a year. Furthermore , i t seeme d likel y tha t th e Frenc h woul d no t favo r th e departure o f th e "bes t elements, " th e educate d an d th e affluent. 68 I n fact, bot h Jarblu m an d Spanien' s propose d figures fo r futur e emigratio n were unrealistic . I n th e final analysis , th e Frenc h i n 1949-5 0 woul d no t agree i n an y circumstance s t o c aliya runnin g betwee n 18,00 0 and 30,00 0 per year . The turnin g poin t occurre d o n 7 Marc h 1949 , i n th e cours e o f a meeting betwee n Jui n an d Jacque s Gershun i wh o introduce d himsel f a s a representativ e o f th e Jewis h Agenc y i n France . Th e source s describ e him a s a personality clos e to the Mossa d L e c Aliya in Franc e an d it s chie f director, Yose f Barpal ; a n activis t withi n th e Federatio n Sionist e d e France; an d a militan t membe r o f th e left-win g labor-oriente d B o c ale Tsiyon/Mapai. Durin g th e meeting , Jui n an d Gershun i lai d th e ground work fo r a progra m tha t woul d onc e an d fo r al l pu t a n en d t o illega l emigration.69 Wa s ther e a direc t lin k betwee n th e Jarblum/Spanie n ini tiative an d Gershuni' s visit ? I t certainl y appear s tha t th e previou s con tacts constitute d a stimulu s fo r enterin g int o seriou s negotiation s i n March 1949 . Yet it is not at all certain tha t eithe r Jarblum o r Spanie n was directly responsibl e fo r th e final achievement o f semi-official o r tolerate d c aliya from Morocco . In an y case , followin g th e Juin-Gershun i meeting , th e latte r dis patched a letter 70 t o th e resident-genera l whic h containe d th e followin g stipulations: 1. Disorganize d emigratio n woul d end . Th e Jewis h Agenc y woul d con duct orderl y emigratio n t o Israel with eve n monthl y quotas .

Zionism, Clandestine Emigration 11

1

2. Franc e woul d profi t fro m Jewis h emigratio n fro m Morocc o t o Israel , for French-speakin g Jew s settlin g i n th e Middl e Eas t coul d assis t France i n spreadin g it s cultural an d politica l influence there . 3. Th e Jewis h Agenc y woul d introduc e effectiv e selectio n measure s in sofar a s social and healt h criteri a were concerned . 4. A specia l emigratio n burea u woul d b e create d i n Casablanc a t o pro cess th e emigrants . I t woul d functio n unde r th e guis e o f a socia l welfare societ y and would be administere d b y emigration expert s wh o would b e capabl e o f operating with th e utmos t discretion . 5. Th e emigratio n burea u woul d cooperat e ver y closel y wit h th e Resi dency i n Rabat . 6. Th e request s fo r visa s woul d b e forwarde d t o Raba t an d th e emigra tion bureau woul d b e responsibl e fo r thei r prope r distribution . Gershuni emphasize d tha t th e ide a o f semi-officia l o r tolerate d c aliya activity wa s no t t o "liquidate " Morocca n Jewr y i n a tim e spa n o f tw o t o three year s bu t t o la y th e foundatio n fo r continuin g c aliya tha t woul d depend o n a variety o f circumstances an d financial resources . Shoul d th e French fee l tha t thi s proces s woul d caus e the m embarrassmen t vis-a-vi s the Muslims , o r othe r inconveniences , the n Jewis h emigratio n would , o f course, stop . Gershun i too k i t upo n himsel f t o transfer th e emigrant s vi a Casablanca to Marseilles. 71 Subsequent contact s betwee n Marc h an d Jul y 1949 , carrie d ou t wit h the utmost discretio n and possibly but not necessarily with the makhzans approval, resulte d i n tw o majo r development s o f historic significance . I n the first place, i n April the Frenc h permitte d Gershun i to create Cadima , an c aliya organizatio n whos e lif e spa n extende d wel l int o 1956 , severa l months afte r Morocc o wa s grante d independence . Ten s o f thousand s o f Jews emigrate d throug h Cadim a durin g it s existence . Secondly , wherea s Gershuni ha d requeste d a starting monthl y emigratio n quot a o f between 1,500 an d 2,000 , th e Frenc h approve d onl y si x hundred; an d onl y Jew s living i n th e majo r urba n citie s wer e authorize d t o emigrat e whil e Jew s in the bled apparentl y coul d no t depart i n the earl y phases of caliya "unti l further notice." 72 With rar e exception, illega l emigration wa s over by th e middle o f 1949. Cadima's headquarter s wer e situate d unti l 195 5 a t 13 , Ru e d u Lieu tenant-Berge an d afte r tha t a t Ru e Lieutenant-de-Vaisseau-Yves-Gay , i n the Europea n sectio n o f Casablanca . Loca l c aliya committee s and/o r

112 Zionism,

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Jewish Schoolchildre n an d thei r Rabbi-Teacher s i n th e Atla s Mountains : Th e Community of Tazenakht (author's personal collection). office branche s wer e the n establishe d b y th e earl y 1950 s i n th e majo r Jewish communitie s (Rabat , Sale , Meknes , Marrakesh , Fez , Essaouira , and Safi) , compose d o f local Zionists who assisted th e centra l Casablanc a office i n registering potential emigrants. Betwee n 194 9 and 195 6 management o f th e Casablanc a offic e wa s entruste d t o Gershun i (1949) , Sam y Halevy (1949-51 ) wh o wa s sen t b y th e Mossa d L e c Aliya whic h ha d become responsibl e fo r Cadima , Shau l Guett a (1951) , Ze 3 e v Khakla i (1952-55), an d Amos Rab l (1955-56)—all bu t th e first being Israelis. 73 Gershuni an d Halev y wer e instructe d t o presen t themselve s publicl y as delegate s o f the Jewis h Agenc y an d no t th e Mossa d L e c Aliya, whil e Cadima was registered wit h th e Frenc h i n Raba t no t onl y as an organiza tion providin g socia l services , bu t a s a company fo r distributin g books. 74 Doubtless, Cadima , unde r th e supervisio n o f the Mossa d L e c Aliya em issary, wa s subordinat e t o the Jewis h Agency' s Immigratio n Departmen t in Jerusalem an d t o it s emissarie s i n France . Afte r th e Mossa d L e c Aliya was officially dismantle d i n Israe l (Marc h 1952) , th e loca l Cadim a opera tion wa s directl y administere d b y th e Jewis h Agenc y emissarie s (Khakla i and Rabl ) unti l 1956. 75 Alongside th e Casablanc a an d othe r branche s o f Cadima, thi s apparatu s include d a transi t cam p twenty-si x kilometer s outside th e cit y o n th e Mazaga n Road , whic h wa s mean t t o provid e

Zionism, Clandestine Emigration 11

3

temporary residenc e fo r emigrant s comin g fro m remot e part s o f th e country wh o wer e registere d fo r c aliya an d passe d th e selectio n criteria . Between 194 9 an d 1951 , th e Cadim a operatio n an d th e trave l expense s to Marseilles , an d the n t o Israel , wer e covere d b y th e AJDC , althoug h in subsequen t year s this became th e responsibilit y o f the Jewish Agency . Between 194 9 an d 1956 , then , emigrant s wer e sen t fro m Casablanc a t o Marseilles a s well as, 76 between 194 9 and 1950 , via Algeria where transit / medical treatmen t camp s ha d existe d o n a semi-official basis. 77

Chapter 4

Emigration t o Israe l i n th e Shado w of Morocco' s Struggl e fo r Independence, 1949-195 6

As noted, beginnin g i n 1948-49 , Franc e wa s one o f the mai n center s fo r processing c aliya; Ital y wa s another . A t th e tim e th e Jewis h Agency' s Immigration Departmen t als o opene d on e o f it s mos t importan t opera tions i n Marseilles . Eve n prio r t o 1948-49 , severa l majo r Jewis h Agenc y and he-Halut s (a n apparatu s responsibl e fo r trainin g Zionis t pionee r youths fo r lif e i n Israel ) branche s wer e create d i n Pari s o r Marseilles , o r in both regions . Franc e serve d a s a convenient cente r fo r th e Mossa d L e c Aliya and th e Jewish Agency in Jerusalem t o maintain contac t with c aliya organizations i n Morocco , Tunisia , an d Algeria . Wha t i s more, th e emis saries dispatche d t o thes e countrie s o n behal f o f thei r movement s i n Israel o r th e Mossa d Le cAliya an d Jewis h Agency , usuall y arrive d i n France first i n orde r t o obtai n th e necessar y lega l documentatio n an d visas to operate i n the Frenc h Nort h Africa n colonia l sphere . Between Ma y an d 3 1 December , 1948 , 39,13 7 Jew s emigrate d t o Israel throug h Marseilles ; durin g 1 January-31 December , 1949 , 64,16 0 emigrated; an d betwee n 1 January an d 3 1 Decembe r 1950 , 17,32 7 emi grated—for a total o f 120,62 4 persons, man y o f them fro m Nort h Africa . The Immigratio n Departmen t o f th e Jewis h Agenc y i n Marseille s in tended t o functio n a s th e c aliya gat e t o Israe l o f Nort h Africa n an d Egyptian Jewry , bu t als o of European Jews , notabl y from Sweden, France , Norway, Switzerland , Holland , England , an d Belgium . Specia l c aliya transit an d medica l treatmen t camp s wer e establishe d i n Marseille s fol 117

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lowing th e en d o f World Wa r II . I n 1949 , ther e wer e ninetee n camps ; i n March 1951 , onl y fou r o f the camp s wer e stil l operating : Grand e Arenas , David, Sain t Jerome , an d Eilat . Grand e Arena s becam e th e mos t impor tant transit/medica l cam p wherea s Eila t an d Davi d wer e abou t t o clos e down. Unti l 195 1 th e AJD C supporte d th e camp s financially an d admin istered the m i n partnershi p wit h th e Jewis h Agency . Afte r Januar y 195 1 the AJD C surrendere d it s financial contro l o f th e camp s t o th e Jewis h Agency. Th e staf f a t th e camp s wa s largel y compose d o f th e emigrant s while th e camps ' officers , physicians , an d teacher s wer e Israelis . Th e reduction i n th e n u m b e r o f transi t camp s wa s du e t o th e declin e i n th e c allya fro m th e Europea n continen t an d th e concentratio n o n Nort h Africa. x

Cadima: The

c

Aliya Process

and

French Policy

Cadima's operationa l headquarter s i n Casablanc a no t onl y maintaine d contacts wit h it s branche s an d c aliya commission s o f Morocco' s majo r cities. I t als o cooperate d closel y wit h th e Sirta m Trave l Agenc y i n Casa blanca, owne d b y on e Madam e Tordjman , a Zionis t activist . Sirta m wa s connected wit h maritim e companies , amon g the m Ocean a an d Paquet . Paquet, a Frenc h firm headquartere d i n Marseilles , ha d a long-standin g arrangement wit h Cadim a fro m th e lat e 1940 s onward . A s th e AJD C assumed muc h o f th e financial responsibilit y fo r th e c aliya throug h Cad i m a — i n 1949-5 0 an d the n agai n i n 1955-56—it s dat a o n th e cos t o f emigration per emigrant i n U.S . dollar s i s th e mos t reliabl e fo r thes e critical times . Fo r example , i n Novembe r 1955 , th e expense s pe r emigrant 2 were a s follows : 1. Overlan d Transpor t i n Morocc o fro m Differen t Region s t o Cadi ma's Camp nea r Casablanc a $2.5 2. Maintenanc e Cost s in Cadima's Transit Camp s $5.0 3. Se a Transport b y Paquet' s Ship s to Marseille s $19.5 4. Maintenanc e Cost s in Marseilles/Grand e Arena s $13.7 5. Transpor t fro m Marseille s to the Por t o f Haifa, includin g luggage $69.1 Total $110.0

7 2 9 0 9 7

How di d th e recruitmen t an d screenin g proces s o f th e would-b e emi grants functio n i n Morocco ? Accordin g t o Ze 3 ev Khaklai , Cadima' s direc -

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tor i n 1952-55 , a s lat e a s 195 3 Cadima' s assistants—loca l Morocca n Zionists—were eithe r approache d b y c aliya candidate s o r approache d them throug h th e organization' s loca l branches . Cadima' s personne l woul d then determin e which individuals or families were suitable for emigration based o n social criteria: age , numbe r o f able-bodied breadwinners , an d number o f dependents . Th e candidate s woul d arriv e late r a t on e o f a dozen center s wher e loca l physicians , mainl y Europea n resident s re cruited b y Cadima , conducte d medica l examinations. 3 In th e earl y 1950s , whe n Cadim a ha d alread y extende d it s wor k int o parts o f th e bled, mos t smal l town s an d village s ha d neithe r physician s at han d no r X-ra y equipment . Cadim a arrange d fo r th e transpor t o f th e villagers t o th e examinatio n centers , a mos t cumbersom e an d incon venient proces s fo r thes e candidates , considerin g tha t the y sometime s traveled a s man y a s tw o hundre d kilometer s i n eac h direction . Th e candidates' healt h record s wer e sen t t o Casablanc a wher e a n Israel i physician, workin g wit h Cadim a bu t representin g Israel' s Ministr y o f Health, determine d whic h candidate s wer e eligibl e health-wis e fo r c aliya.4 The screenin g policy , know n a s social/medica l selection , becam e offi cial o n 2 7 Novembe r 1951 , whe n th e Coordinatin g Commissio n (ha Mossad le-Te 3 um)—create d i n 195 0 i n Jerusalem , compose d o f Jewis h Agency departmen t head s an d Israel i cabine t ministers , responsibl e fo r formulating directive s o n c aliya an d emigran t absorption—adopte d i t fo r the followin g countries : Morocco , Tunisia , Algeria , Turkey , India , Iran , Central an d Wester n Europe . Th e stipulation s i n thi s polic y provide d that: (1 ) 80 percent o f the emigrant s woul d b e chosen amon g youth c aliya (cAliyat ha-No c ar), members o f Zionist pioneer youth movement s intend ing to settle i n agricultura l areas , member s o f the vocationa l trade s u p t o age thirty-fiv e (late r revise d t o forty-five), an d families whic h ha d a t leas t one breadwinne r no t younge r tha n eightee n an d no t olde r tha n forty five; (2 ) excep t fo r professional s an d businessmen , o r thos e wh o coul d provide housin g fo r thei r families , potentia l emigrant s ha d t o agre e i n writing t o work withi n th e agricultura l secto r durin g thei r first tw o year s in Israel ; (3 ) c aliya woul d b e possibl e onl y followin g a thorough medica l examination; (4 ) 2 0 percen t o f al l emigrant s coul d b e ove r thirty-fiv e years ol d provide d the y belonge d t o familie s tha t ha d a youn g an d a n employable breadwinner. 5 I f within a family handicappe d person s wer e discovered, th e whol e famil y wa s able t o depart a s long as they wer e no t

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afflicted b y contagiou s o r incurabl e diseases . Th e mentall y il l wer e re jected automatically . Once approve d fo r emigration , th e candidate s wer e transporte d t o Cadima's C a m p Eliah u nea r Casablanca . I n 195 3 th e cam p ha d a n ab sorption capacit y o f eigh t h u n d r e d persons . Th e emigrant s wer e inte grated int o th e cam p w h e r e the y underwen t additiona l medica l test s an d treatment fo r ailment s suc h a s trachoma— a chroni c an d sometime s con tagious conjunctiviti s marke d b y inflammator y granulation s o n th e con junctival surface , an d commonl y resultin g i n blindness—o r fo r ring worm, a commo n conditio n amon g Nort h Africa n youths . Th e c aliya wa s often delaye d an d th e emigrant s ha d t o sta y i n th e cam p fo r weeks , eve n months. Frequently , whe n th e medica l examiner s i n th e variou s regiona l centers faile d t o diagnos e incurabl e disease s o r tuberculosis , th e emi grants, alread y i n th e camp , wer e rejecte d fo r c aliya. Becaus e man y families wer e close-kni t an d refuse d t o b e spli t u p i n th e las t momen t between eligibl e an d ineligibl e emigrants , whol e familie s proteste d an d stayed i n Morocco . I f th e c aliya proces s wa s relativel y smooth , the n Cadima woul d assis t i n distributin g passport s t o th e emigrants . Th e nex t phase consiste d o f sailin g fro m Casablanc a t o Marseille s t o complet e th e c ally a. 6 Maurice Carr , a journalis t wh o witnesse d th e selectio n screenin g procedure i n th e earlies t stages , recounte d i n 1951 : The screenin g proces s i s a nerve-wrecking business . . . . The men , wome n an d children arriv e well-washe d an d i n thei r Sabbat h finery fo r thi s occasion . . . . Since birt h certificate s wer e a thin g unknow n unti l a coupl e o f year s ago , n o family hea d admit s t o bein g abov e forty-fiv e an d n o yout h t o bein g unde r eigh teen. . . . Som e o f th e rowdies t an d mos t patheti c scene s occu r whe n a n age d and widowe d mother , o r elderl y parent s whos e son s an d daughter s hav e pre ceded the m t o Israel , ar e turne d awa y becaus e th e thoughtlessl y drafte d regula tions require tha t a family breadwinne r b e o n hand i n th e Diaspor a a t the tim e of application. Th e ol d fol k wee p an d shout , demandin g wh y they , wh o ma y hav e sons i n Israel , i n th e army , b e penalize d a s against othe r peopl e whos e childre n are stil l i n Morocco . . . . When aske d t o stat e hi s trade, th e breadwinne r almos t invariably replies , " I can d o anything," and when furthe r pressed , add s that he is a cobbler o r a tailor o r a peddler, o r confesses tha t h e ha s no trade. T o ingratiat e himself, h e wil l giv e th e Israeli s behin d th e tabl e a militar y salut e o r thro w himself forwar d t o kis s thei r hands . . . . And the n come s th e mos t awesom e da y of judgement; th e final decision i s taken b y a panel heade d b y a doctor sen t ove r from th e Israe l Ministr y o f Health . . . . Th e familie s ar e no t tol d immediatel y what th e outcom e o f th e selectio n is ; bu t the y alway s guess , infallibly . Th e

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1

rejected one s ofte n dissolv e i n tears , fly int o fits of rage . A s I watche d thes e scenes, and I attended a dozen suc h selections, I was moved as never before. I t needs supreme callousness to remain dry-eyed. 7 Of course , Israel' s absorptio n struggle s i n 1948-54 , includin g seriou s economic and housin g problems, require d tha t irrespective o f the La w of Return (1950) , whereb y ever y Je w ha d th e righ t t o settl e i n Israel , th e policies o f fixed monthly o r yearly c aliya quotas an d medicosocia l screen ing policie s b e enforced . Moreover , Israe l o f th e pre-195 4 perio d coul d not conten d effectivel y wit h th e integratio n o f emigrant s wh o wer e af flicted b y contagiou s o r incurabl e diseases , fo r th e country' s medica l resources an d hospitalizatio n facilitie s wer e limite d a t best . Th e excep tion t o th e rul e relate d t o Yemeni , Iraqi , an d Romania n Jewr y wh o benefited fro m large r emigratio n quotas . Th e authoritie s i n thes e coun tries agree d t o le t th e Jew s leav e an d thu s th e Jewis h Agenc y an d th e Mossad L e c Aliya realize d tha t c aliya fro m Yemen , Iraq , an d Romani a was a "no w o r never' ' situation— a rescu e operation . I f th e Jew s wer e suddenly prevente d fro m leavin g the y coul d fac e horribl e pogroms . O n the othe r hand , unti l th e nationalis t struggl e fo r independenc e fro m French colonialis m gaine d momentu m i n Nort h Africa , an d thi s began i n 1954, i t was felt i n Israel that policies of emigrant screening/selectio n an d lower quota s wer e th e mos t efficien t measure s t o adop t fo r a n orderly departure. Frenc h colonialis m wa s stil l ver y muc h i n contro l an d th e Mossad L e c Aliya/Jewish Agenc y coul d functio n semilegall y o r discreetl y in Morocco , Tunisia , an d Algeria. Consequentl y ther e wa s no rush fo r a n immediate evacuatio n o r a rescue policy . When surveyin g th e Morocca n Jewis h population , th e screenin g per sonnel an d Israel' s Ministr y o f Healt h ha d bot h positiv e an d negativ e assessments. I n 1953 , fo r instance , Dr . S . Batish , th e directo r o f th e Israel Ministr y o f Health , accumulate d vita l dat a o n potentia l emigrant s and o n th e medicosocia l condition s i n th e communities . O f th e 250,00 0 Jews throughou t Morocco , abou t 40,00 0 live d i n 120-13 0 village s an d small town s i n th e bled. Morocca n Jewr y wer e young : thos e fourtee n years ol d an d unde r constitute d 4 3 percen t o f th e populatio n wherea s those i n th e ag e categor y o f fifteen t o forty-fiv e comprise d anothe r 4 2 percent. Onl y 1 5 percent o f the Jewis h populatio n wer e ove r forty-five . However, th e healt h condition s i n th e melldhs wer e poo r an d thoug h many Jew s durin g th e Protectorat e er a abandone d th e ghetto s fo r th e

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Struggle

for Independence

new Europea n residentia l districts , th e majorit y stil l dwel t i n th e mellahs. I n Taroudan t o f the Ante-Atla s mountains , 19. 4 percen t o f the c aliya candidates durin g 1952-5 3 wer e rejecte d o n th e basi s o f th e selectio n criteria. 8 As tim e elapsed , th e Coordinatin g Commissio n i n Jerusale m an d th e Israel Ministr y o f H e a l t h s physicia n i n Morocc o trie d t o moderat e as pects o f th e screening/selectio n policies . Fo r example , severel y handi capped person s withi n a famil y o r larg e number s o f th e elderl y coul d make c aliya i f the y wer e accompanie d b y mor e tha n on e employabl e young person. 9 However , enablin g th e severel y handicappe d o r person s afflicted b y mil d case s o f trachom a t o leav e fo r Israe l wa s no t muc h o f a compromise, accordin g t o Ze 3 ev Khaklai . Adde d t o th e selectio n policies , h e said , wer e Frenc h Protectorat e policie s o f no t toleratin g large-scal e c aliya a s wel l a s Israel' s lo w monthl y emigratio n quotas . Urgin g th e Jewish Agenc y t o hasten c aliya fro m Morocco , especiall y fro m th e village s of the bled, Khakla i observe d i n 1953 : [The condition s o f the Jew s i n th e villages ] ar e quit e precarious . . . . Today la w and orde r stil l prevails , ye t n o on e ca n predic t wha t tomorro w wil l bring . [The ] Jews liv e i n a stat e o f uncertaint y an d i n fea r an d the y ar e dependen t o n th e goodwill o f senior an d mino r Frenc h officials . The y ar e bein g squeeze d ou t fro m their profession s a s the Muslim s ar e learning th e trade s of [bled] Jewr y [suc h as ] shoemaking, harness-making , tailoring , goldsmithy , etc. , an d the y ar e encroach ing upon th e monopol y enjoye d b y the Jews in trade. 10 Khaklai reiterate d hi s warning s severa l month s later , thi s tim e speakin g about bot h rura l an d urba n Jewry . A t a meetin g o f Jewish Agenc y emis saries i n Tel-Avi v o n 1 0 Januar y 1954 , h e state d tha t large-scal e c aliya and drasti c reform s i n th e emigran t screenin g proces s ha d t o b e imple m e n t e d becaus e tim e wa s runnin g ou t fo r Morocco s Jews : "Ara b nation alism i s no t th e sam e a s Europea n nationalism . I f th e Ara b nationalist s will gai n powe r an d I sa y the y wil l reac h thi s goal , the n th e fat e o f th e Jews shoul d b e eviden t [t o u s ] . " 1 1 Khaklai's plea s di d no t completel y fal l o n dea f ears . Th e Coordinatin g Commission's member s di d suppor t th e ide a o f givin g preferenc e i n c aliya t o th e Jewis h villager s o f southern Morocc o an d wer e no w incline d to conside r Khaklai' s recommendatio n o f evacuatin g whole villages i n remote areas . Onl y "har d socia l cases"—criminal s an d th e unemployabl e —would b e lef t behind . Regardin g medica l selection , eve n th e very sick

Morocco's Struggle for Independence 12

3

among th e villager s woul d b e take n ou t a s long as they wer e no t afflicte d by contagiou s diseases . Th e purpos e behin d th e evacuatio n o f village s was not limite d t o potential politica l an d economi c problems challengin g the Jew s o f th e bled. I t wa s als o becaus e Khakla i convince d th e Jewis h Agency tha t th e villager s wer e "th e bes t element s fo r Israel i society. " They wer e healthie r an d mor e robus t tha n thei r urba n counterparts , productive, an d physicall y capabl e o f engagin g i n th e vocationa l trade s and agriculture. 12 During th e summe r o f 1954, Shlom o Zalman Shragai , th e ne w head of the Jewish Agency's Immigratio n Department , visite d Morocc o and Tun isia. Thoug h h e though t tha t th e condition s o f th e Jew s i n Tunisia , especially th e rura l inhabitants , wer e fa r wors e tha n i n Morocco , du e t o the ver y intensiv e struggl e fo r nationhoo d le d b y supporter s o f Habi b Bourguiba's Neo-Destou r party , h e di d no t underestimat e Khaklai' s as sessment abou t Morocco . Furthermore , Mosh e Kol , hea d o f c Aliyat ha No c ar an d Mosh e Sharett , the n Israel' s prim e minister , who , lik e Shra gai, wer e member s o f the Coordinatin g Commission , argue d strongl y fo r large-scale evacuatio n fro m th e Morocca n bled an d fel t tha t Morocc o i n this case deserved priorit y ove r Tunisia. 13 As w e shal l se e i n chapte r 8 , Shragai' s assessmen t wa s accurate . Although th e Jew s i n Morocco' s bled wer e i n a n unstabl e atmosphere , until th e en d o f July 195 4 the situatio n i n Tunisia was far worse . Nation alist versu s Frenc h tension s i n Tunisi a wer e reduce d onl y followin g th e visit ther e b y Frenc h prim e ministe r Pierr e Mendes-Franc e o n 3 1 July and hi s announcemen t o f Tunisian interna l autonomy . Accordingly , th e Jews o f Tunisia from tha t poin t o n were i n les s danger. 14 I t wa s not unti l the firs t wee k o f Augus t tha t th e anti-Frenc h nationalis t struggl e i n Morocco becam e dangerou s fo r th e Jew s o f the rura l an d urba n regions , surpassing th e challeng e faced b y their Tunisian brethren . Whether th e member s o f the Coordinatin g Commissio n favore d evac uating a s man y Jew s a s possibl e fro m th e rura l area s o f Morocc o an d Tunisia (th e majorit y favore d it ) o r fro m th e urba n agglomeration s ( a minority supporte d thi s suggestion) , a s late a s the en d o f July/beginnin g of August 195 4 no practica l step s ha d unti l the n bee n adopte d t o imple ment evacuation . Interestingly , whil e th e Jew s o f th e Morocca n bled were eage r t o leave for Israel , unti l August 195 4 their urba n counterpart s were losin g thei r enthusias m fo r c ally a.Afte r 1952 , i n ligh t o f the hars h screening/selection policies , emigratio n quotas , housin g shortages , an d

124 Morocco's

Struggle for Independence

unemployment i n Israel , man y Morocca n Jew s o f th e majo r citie s pre ferred t o postpone c ally a indefinitely. Moreover , economically , th e majo r cities witnesse d economi c growt h i n 1952-5 4 a s th e Unite d State s buil t bases o n thei r outskirts . Th e American s employe d numerou s Jew s fo r that purpose an d offere d the m excellen t salaries . Hence , Jew s who in th e past may hav e bee n boycotte d economicall y coul d find refug e wit h th e Americans an d sa w n o nee d t o accelerat e thei r c aliya process . Finally , Jews who desired t o leave Morocc o encountered obstacle s in selling thei r immovable asset s whic h furthe r hindere d th e process . O f course , thi s problem wa s les s acut e i n th e bled, considerin g tha t propert y ther e o f any significan t valu e was virtually nil . Onl y durin g th e latte r half of 1954, following th e intensificatio n o f nationalist fermen t an d onc e the construc tion of the American base s had been completed , wer e urban Jews vulner able. The y feare d th e repetitio n o f pogrom s reminiscen t o f Oudjd a an d Djerada. 15 A phenomeno n eviden t amon g urba n Morocca n Jewr y i n th e earl y 1950s was yerida: th e departur e fro m Israe l of recent emigrant s (yordim) who wandere d t o othe r countrie s o r returne d t o Morocco . Accordin g t o French Protectorat e sources , i n 1949-5 3 2,46 6 Jew s cam e back . Bitte r and disenchante d abou t Israel' s housin g an d unemploymen t problems , they were equall y unhapp y wit h what the y regarde d a s the Jewish state s discriminatory attitude s towar d Mediterranea n basi n Jews. 16 Tabl e 8 provides th e statistica l breakdow n o f the yerida durin g thi s period . As noted , th e attitud e towar d greate r c allya fro m Morocc o gaine d considerable momentu m beginnin g in August 195 4 when no t only Jewish villagers wer e i n genuin e pani c bu t thei r urbanit e counterpart s pleade d with Cadim a t o evacuat e the m (se e tabl e 9 o n c aliya betwee n 194 9 an d 1956). Eve n th e yordim wer e no w eager t o give the Jewish stat e a second chance. To better understan d th e intensit y o f the anti-Frenc h conflic t i n rela tion t o the Jews th e following backgroun d informatio n i s needed. Durin g the anti-French struggle , i n August 1954 , which marked th e first anniver sary o f Sultan Muhamma d V' s exile b y th e Frenc h t o Madagasca r fo r hi s pro-nationalist inclinations , terroris m becam e widespread . A t th e tim e a patchwork o f urban terroris t group s ha d develope d i n som e o f the majo r cities, no t alway s unde r th e contro l o f the Istiqla l party . Likewise , rura l bands unde r th e nomina l contro l o f the Istiqla l bega n t o struggl e i n th e north, eventuall y showin g a clea r purpos e o f pressin g th e Frenc h t o

100 33 53 39

225

1949 1950 1951 1952 1953

Total

19 30 23 72

Feb.

189

30 20 44 95

Mar.

126

11 29 55 31

Apr.

128

13 46 54 15

May

187

17 24 40 37 69

June

247

69 12 31 55 80

Jul.

246

99 5 36 53 53

Aug. 10 48 60 40 43 201

Sept.

314

63 12 18 104 117

Oct.

291

88 21 45 48 89

Nov.

240

33 31 53 32 91

Dec.

Source: Not e au sujet des emigrant s israelites marocain s revenu s au Maro c apres un sejou r en Israel , Rabat , 2 1 decembre 1954 , AAE-Nantes , Dl/Sectio n Politique .

Jan.

Year

Table 8 . Dat a o n Yerida, Jun e 1949-3 1 Decembe r 195 3

2,466

379 307 430 605 745

Yearly Total

13

395 529 864 320 406 2,707

117

41 35

1949 1951 180 547 368 495 197 588 831 1,171 1,515 405 119 261 6,677

1950

414 225 240 200 229 314 206 491 127 493 244 259 3,442 4,632

470 210

157 219 38 350 591 571 925 526 575

1952

2,361

217 130 181

302 289 159

160 288 442 193

1953

9,977

136 75 149 176 475 1,167 1,757 1,276 2,430 2,190

146

1954 1,469 1,910 2,320 1,092 718 2,008 2,329 2,527 2,748 3,990 3,144 2,299 26,554

1955

12,880

2,544 3,359 2,904 4,073

1956*

a

Source: AAE-Nantes, DI/809 , 811 , 813 ; CZA,S42/256. According to Jewis h Agenc y sources , betwee n Ma y an d Decembe r 1956 , anothe r 23,427 Morocca n Jew s emigrate d t o Israel . Thi s woul d sugges t tha t a s man y a s 92,65 7 Moroccan Jews came to Israel in 1949-56. b The data published by the Jewish Agency diffe r to an extent from th e French figures. (It is not altogether impossible that the Frenc h authorities kept an inaccurate accoun t on emigration) . Th e figures in parenthesis are those of the Jewish Agency: 2,70 7 French for 1949 (no specific data for 194 9 in Jewish Agency figures, but 8,000 for 1948-49); 3,442 Frenc h fo r 195 0 (4,98 0 Jewish Agency) ; 6,67 7 Frenc h fo r 195 1 (7,77 0 Jewis h Agency) ; 4,63 2 Frenc h fo r 195 2 (5,03 1 Jewis h Agency) ; 2,36 1 Frenc h fo r 195 3 (2,99 6 Jewish Agency) ; 9,97 7 Frenc h fo r 195 4 (8,17 1 Jewis h Agency) ; 26,55 4 Frenc h fo r 195 5 (24,99 4 Jewish Agency) ; th e Frenc h dat a for 195 6 ar e incomplet e an d sto p i n April 1956, on e month after France granted Morocc o independence. The y amount to 12,88 0 (Jewish Agency data for 1956 are estimated at 36,301) .

All in all 69,230 emigrants.

Total

January February March April May June July August September October November December

Month

Table 9 . Officia l Frenc h Statistic s o n c Aliya fro m Morocc o vi a Casablanc a an d France , 1 7 Marc h 1949-Apri l 195 6

Morocco's Struggle for Independence 12

7

bring bac k Muhamma d V and gran t th e countr y autonom y (a s was don e in Tunisi a i n 1955 ) o r complet e independence. 1T A t first th e Frenc h di d not succum b t o th e pressur e o f the divers e nationalis t force s an d place d the pro-Frenc h Muhamma d Be n Mawla y c Arafa o f the Alawit e famil y o n the throne . On 3 August 1954 , i n th e tow n o f Petitjean , seve n Jew s wer e massa cred. Unti l then , an d apar t fro m th e June 194 8 pogroms, th e urba n Jew s had no t bee n single d out , no r ha d ther e bee n an y actio n o f a specificall y anti-Jewish characte r countrywid e i n scope . Moreover , th e nationalist s in genera l an d th e Istiqla l i n particula r ha d seeme d anxiou s t o avoi d maltreating the Jews. I n August 195 4 and throughout 1955 , however, th e urban an d rura l fighters o r thei r adherents , thoug h directin g mos t o f their ir e agains t th e French , di d no t spar e th e Jews . Seriou s incident s took plac e i n th e mellah o f Casablanca , resultin g i n th e injur y o f man y Jews. I t wa s generall y believe d tha t a mass attac k o n th e Jewis h quarte r of Casablanca woul d hav e take n plac e ha d i t no t bee n fo r th e protectio n given b y th e Frenc h authorities . Subsequentl y ther e wer e attacks , ha rassments, an d propert y damag e i n th e Jewis h section s o f Safi , Boujad , Ouezzan, Mazagan , Ourika , an d Tiznit . I n Saf i an d Mazagan , thes e attacks showe d sign s o f bein g deliberat e an d premeditated. 18 Severa l Jewish communit y leader s contende d tha t th e Jew s wer e victimize d b y the struggl e between th e supporter s o f the exiled sultan and the c Arafists, the followers o f Muhammad Be n Mawla y c Arafa. Thi s struggl e continue d even afte r Muhamma d V returned triumphantl y t o the thron e i n Novem ber 1955. 19 In view of these development s an d unconfirme d rumor s tha t th e Ara b League sen t it s agent s fro m Liby a t o Morocc o t o sti r anti-Jewis h senti ments, th e Coordinatin g Commissio n an d th e Jewis h Agenc y debate d the nee d fo r muc h large r emigratio n quotas . Whethe r o r no t Morocca n c aliya shoul d receiv e priorit y ove r th e res t o f North Afric a wa s no longe r the issue , fo r no t onl y Tunisi a quiete d dow n politicall y i n 1954-55 , bu t in Algeria, th e Jew s faced n o danger s befor e 1 November 1954 , th e dat e when th e FL N launche d it s revolutio n agains t th e French . Thoug h n o radical change s wer e introduce d int o th e screening/selectio n criteri a i n 1954-55, th e fact tha t larger emigration quotas wer e agreed upon helpe d expedite th e departur e o f Moroccan Jewry . Several technica l modification s wer e introduce d int o th e selectio n process, however . First , i n 195 4 specia l screenin g team s representin g

128 Morocco's

Struggle for Independence

the Absorptio n an d Immigratio n department s o f th e Jewis h Agenc y ar rived i n Morocc o an d Tunisi a t o assum e charg e o f screenin g candidate s according to social criteria. Operatin g within Cadima , thes e expert s wer e sent b y thei r politica l movement s i n Israel , usuall y th e leftis t labo r parties. Supplementin g thei r wor k wa s th e Israel i physicia n wh o contin ued t o mak e th e final decisio n i n accordanc e wit h medica l criteri a a s t o which person s coul d mak e c aliya. Nevertheless , earl y in 1955 , it was said that individua l doctor s wh o di d no t represen t a known medica l organiza tion woul d n o longe r b e responsibl e fo r conductin g healt h examinations , or fo r forwardin g th e emigrants ' record s t o Casablanca . Actually , a n agreement amon g th e Jewis h Agency , th e AJDC , an d OS E (Oeuvr e d e Secours au x Enfants ) suggeste d tha t OS E woul d tak e ove r thes e tasks. 20 We coul d no t determin e i f Cadima an d th e Israel i physician continue d t o depend solel y o n OSE' s doctors , althoug h th e evidenc e doe s indicat e thart i n severa l majo r citie s OS E di d indee d tak e charge . Second , fro m 1954 unti l th e fal l o f 1955 , familie s eligibl e fo r emigratio n coul d no t include more than si x or seven member s i f they had only one able-bodie d breadwinner t o suppor t them . However , familie s tha t ha d severa l em ployable member s wer e no t restricte d i n this sense. 21 After Augus t 1954 , th e Jewis h Agenc y an d th e Coordinatin g Com mission ha d t o confron t th e dua l challeng e o f increasin g c aliya quota s from urba n Morocc o an d adherin g t o it s decisio n o f evacuating th e var ious village s i n th e Atla s mountains . T o realiz e th e latte r decision , th e Jewish Agenc y an d Tnu cat ha-Moshavi m (th e Moshavi m Movement , whic h promoted th e integratio n o f Jew s int o rura l o r semirura l smallholders ' agricultural settlements ) sen t t o th e scen e Yehud a Grinker , thei r emis sary, t o fortif y Cadima' s effort s i n thi s domain . Accompanie d b y hi s brother Yitshak , Yehud a Grinke r visite d a t leas t eighty-seve n village s and town s i n th e souther n bled betwee n th e en d o f Augus t 195 4 an d January 1956 . H e ofte n travele d alone , ridin g a donke y o r a cow , o r climbing narro w passage s i n th e Atla s mountain s i n orde r t o reac h th e would-be emigrants . Whethe r i n integrated villag e neighborhoods wher e Muslims an d Jew s live d together , o r i n th e villages ' mellahs, Grinke r organized th e c aliya o f a s man y a s 2,94 1 familie s comprisin g 13,55 3 22

persons. As long a s Grinke r wa s i n Morocc o (he also helped registe r emigrant s on hi s free tim e amon g th e urbanites) , h e frequentl y succeede d i n con vincing th e Israel i screenin g team' s emissarie s an d Dr . Elieze r Mattan ,

Morocco's Struggle for Independence 12

9

the Israel i physician , t o softe n a s muc h a s possible th e selectio n criteri a for whol e villages. 23 Familie s o r individual s wh o wer e totall y ineligibl e medically/socially fo r c allya wer e t o b e lef t behin d i n th e villages . The y were resettle d temporaril y i n th e majo r urba n Jewis h communitie s wher e communal institutions , workin g in conjunction wit h th e AJDC, promise d them housing , welfar e assistance , an d medica l care. Grinker woul d mee t wit h th e Jewis h villager s an d small-tow n fol k t o inform the m abou t life i n Israel. H e refraine d fro m makin g false promise s and tol d the m exactl y what wa s awaiting them : a young strugglin g natio n with comple x problems . Hi s policy wa s to choose a s many candidate s fo r Israel's moshavim (cooperativ e farms ) a s instructe d b y th e Moshavi m Movement an d th e Mapa i labo r part y o f which h e wa s a representative . However, a s he wa s als o recruite d b y th e Jewis h Agency/Cadima , i t was expected o f hi m t o recrui t fo r c aliya Jew s i n th e bled wh o wer e eithe r ineligible fo r th e moshav o r unwillin g t o confor m t o th e life-styl e i n th e cooperative farm . Upon finding familie s o r whol e rura l communitie s tha t wer e read y t o leave, Grinke r registere d an d screene d them . A dat e fo r th e medica l examinations wa s the n fixed an d th e candidate s woul d procee d t o thei r assigned examinatio n center . I n severa l instance s th e medica l checku p process wa s waived , particularl y a s Morocco' s nationalis t struggl e inten sified i n 1955 , fo r i t wa s though t tha t th e inhabitant s o f severa l remot e villages coul d b e harme d b y terrorist s whil e tryin g t o reac h thes e cen ters. 24 Th e res t o f th e procedur e i s known : th e one s eligibl e fo r c aliya were transporte d t o Cadima' s cam p wher e thei r exi t document s woul d be processed . Sometime s whol e village s o r thei r spokesme n arrive d i n Casablanca o r Marrakes h t o plea d wit h Cadim a t o be take n immediatel y to Israel . Here , too , ther e wer e exception s t o th e rule . Dr . Mattan , Ze 3 ev Khaklai , an d othe r Israel i emissarie s approve d the m fo r c aliya despit e the unsatisfactor y stat e o f health and/o r physica l handicap s o f persons i n their ranks . In 1954-5 5 Grinke r corroborate d Khaklai' s findings severa l year s ear lier: tha t i n certai n villages , albei t certainl y no t i n al l o f them , Jew s engaged i n agricultura l pursuits . Th e Muslim s usuall y owne d th e land , with th e Jew s employe d b y the m a s laborers , enjoyin g th e usufruc t o f the lan d produce . Give n th e Jews ' poor socia l origins an d thei r potentia l service fo r Israel i natio n building , thei r presenc e constitute d th e bes t element fo r c aliya:

130 Morocco's

Struggle

for Independence

The mor e I visite d i n thes e [Berber ] village s an d becam e acquainte d wit h thei r Jewish inhabitants , th e mor e I was convinced tha t thes e Jew s constitut e th e bes t and mos t suitabl e human element s fo r settlemen t i n [Israel's ] absorption centers . There were man y positive aspect s which I found amon g them: first and foremost , they al l kno w [thei r agricultural ] tas k an d thei r transfe r t o agricultura l wor k i n Israel will not involv e physica l an d menta l hardships . The y ar e satisfie d wit h fe w [material needs ] whic h wil l enabl e the m t o confron t thei r earl y economi c prob lems. I t i s possibl e t o settl e the m i n a mountainou s region , i n th e Nege v an d elsewhere. Ther e wil l be othe r problems , however : ho w t o trai n the m t o utiliz e various moder n tool s which ar e so vital nowadays. 25 After Grinker' s departur e earl y i n 1956 , C a d i m a s socia l criteri a selec tion tea m wa s i n complet e contro l o f the pla n t o evacuat e th e endangere d and remot e communitie s o f th e bled. Accordin g t o Chai m Toltshinski , the hea d o f th e team , th e Jewis h villager s wer e first evacuate d t o th e major cities , amon g the m Mekne s an d Marrakesh . Th e majorit y wer e approved fo r emigration , th e res t t o b e care d fo r b y th e AJD C an d th e urban communities . W e hav e no t b e e n abl e t o determin e i f th e AJD C and th e communitie s di d i n fac t assum e ful l an d prope r responsibilit y fo r the rejecte d cases . W e d o know , however , tha t som e o f thos e wh o wer e disqualified turne d t o th e Morocca n authorities , and , ou t o f desperation , requested tha t the y pressur e Cadim a t o revers e th e decisio n o f leavin g them behind . Considerin g tha t th e Morocca n an d th e Frenc h authoritie s placed Cadim a i n th e limeligh t followin g severa l suc h unfortunat e devel opments, th e Jewis h Agenc y wa s compelle d t o suspen d temporaril y th e evacuation o f village s unti l temper s coole d off . B y J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y 1956 man y Jewis h villager s mad e < allya an d wer e sen t vi a Marseille s t o Israels T e c enah agricultura l region. 2 6 The polic y t o absor b a s man y Morocca n Jew s a s possible , bot h urban ites an d villagers , int o Israel s agricultura l district s wa s adopte d i n 1954 . Until the n th e issu e o f resettlemen t i n Israel , thoug h a matte r o f grea t concern, wa s no t deal t wit h ver y effectively . Ye t wit h th e substantia l increase i n c aliya fro m Nort h Afric a fro m 1954 , Israe l adopte d th e sloga n of "min ha- 3 onia el ha-kfar" (fro m th e shi p t o th e settlement) . Th e pla n was t o transfe r 4 0 percen t o f th e emigran t familie s t o agricultura l settle ments an d 6 0 percen t t o developmen t towns . Th e agricultural settlers were t o b e place d i n thre e districts : Te c enah, betwee n Aful a an d th e border lin e o f Jenin ; th e Bei t Jubri n distric t i n th e northeaster n Negev ; and th e Falluj a distric t i n th e nort h centra l Negev . I n addition , nonagri-

Morocco's Struggle for Independence 13

1

cultural settlers a t th e developmen t town s wer e t o settl e i n th e Galile e (Safed, Hatzor , Halsa , an d Tarshisha) ; Bei t She'a n (Migda l ha - c Emeq district); th e Jerusale m corrido r (Har-Tuv , Kolonia, Castel) ; th e are a between Be 3 er Tuvia and Migda l 3 Ashkelon; Be'er Sheva ; and i n smalle r districts o r towns , amon g the m Eilat , Dimona , Acre , an d Tiberias. 27 I t was th e screenin g tea m i n Morocc o and/o r Grinke r wh o predetermined , before c ally a, th e typ e of suitable absorptio n center s for th e emigrants . Increased tension s i n Morocc o wer e no t th e onl y reason s fo r th e decision b y Israe l to hasten c aliya. Accordin g to Shragai, whe n th e yearl y quota o f 40,000 wa s fixed fo r Nort h Africa , wit h Morocc o i n th e lead , i t was partly du e t o the sudde n nee d fo r human resources . Israel s Defens e Forces were shor t o n manpowe r an d th e infiltratio n o f terrorists from th e Egyptian-occupied Gaz a Stri p int o Israel i settlement s i n th e south , wit h Gamal Abde l Nasser' s blessings , cause d muc h bloodshed . Shraga i dis closed tha t "th e soone r we settl e emigrant s o n the lan d i n the Nege v an d the Galilee , th e soone r Arab terrorist infiltratio n woul d stop . Thi s canno t be achieve d withou t c aliya."28 Late i n 195 5 on th e ev e o f Moroccan independence , th e the n hea d o f the Jewis h Agency' s Immigratio n Departmen t Pari s offic e urge d tha t c ally afro m Morocc o b e increase d ove r an d beyon d th e larg e quota s decided upon , notin g i n despair , " A Morocca n governmen t i s abou t t o be formed . . . . N o on e imagine d tha t suc h a politica l developmen t would emerg e s o soon ; an d i n th e Jewis h publi c ther e ar e sign s o f desperation. Th e feelin g i s tha t w e misse d th e boa t i n evacuatin g th e Jews from Morocc o and th e continuatio n of c ally afrom her e i s a questio n of limited time . Th e pessimist s spea k o f three t o fou r months , th e opti mists of one to two years." 29 Cadima wa s the n activ e throughou t Frenc h Morocc o (w e hav e scan t data abou t c aliya operation s an d arrangement s fro m Tangie r an d th e Spanish Zone) . Adde d t o th e loca l Morocca n Zionis t worker s an d th e c aliya commissions , th e numbe r o f th e Israel i emissarie s affiliate d wit h Cadima ha d grow n considerabl y sinc e 1954, 30 t o includ e thre e type s o f functionaries: 1. Thos e i n charg e of callya an d o f overseeing it s differen t phases . The y included Amo s Rab l from Kibbut z Dovra t (Khaklai' s succeso r a s hea d of Cadima) ; Ary e Avraham i (Rabl' s deputy) ; Menache m Wilner ; Y a c akov Liberma n (directo r o f Cadima' s Cam p Eliahu) ; Y a c akov Hasa n

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(director of Cadima's importan t Marrakes h office); Yitsha k and Yehud a Grinker (Tn u c at ha-Moshavim/Mapai) ; Yehoshu a Cohe n (Tn u c at ha Moshavim/Religious Zionists) ; an d Yitsha k Annije r (ha- cOved ha-Tsi yoni, a nonsocialis t movemen t tha t se t u p educationa l institutions , kibbutzim an d moshavi m fo r youth/young adult emigrants) . 2. Thos e i n charg e o f screenin g th e candidate s o n th e basi s o f socia l criteria, representin g th e Jewis h Agency' s Immigratio n an d Absorp tion departments . The y include d Chai m Toltshinski , c Ovadia Bijou , Asher Eisenberg , Shlom o Menuhin , an d Yitshak Be 3 eri. 3. Th e physician , o r physicians representin g Israel' s Ministr y o f Health , involved wit h th e medica l selectio n procedures . Dr . Elieze r Matta n was replaced i n 195 5 by Dr . Y . Rapp and Dr . A . Kassel . During Cadima' s nearl y seve n year s o f existence , whe n th e Frenc h still dominated muc h o f Morocco, Protectorat e polic y vis-a-vis c aliya was generally positive . Thi s di d no t signify , however , tha t th e Protectorat e would no t plac e obstacle s i n th e wa y o f emigratio n i f th e proces s wer e not administere d discreetly . Althoug h th e Residenc y realize d tha t i t could no t oppos e emigration , i t woul d nevertheles s cur b an y mod e o f emigration whic h migh t shak e th e loca l balance o f forces, provokin g th e makhzan an d th e nationalists . It i s importan t t o not e tha t ther e wa s n o uniformit y o f thinkin g o n Jewish emigratio n withi n th e Protectorat e administration . Certai n offi cials favore d large-scal e emigration , other s supporte d a mor e limite d c aliya, eve n belo w th e si x hundre d emigrant s pe r mont h quot a agree d upon i n 1949 . Ther e wer e eve n thos e wh o oppose d i t altogether . Ther e were thos e who favored a liberal emigratio n polic y fo r th e humbl e socio economic strat a amon g th e Jews , fo r bot h th e urba n an d rura l mellahs, but di d no t wis h th e educate d middl e clas s an d affluen t Jew s t o leave . Secondly, w e d o not hav e sufficien t dat a t o determine th e precis e politi cal nuance s prevalen t amon g th e variou s civilia n an d militar y official s involved wit h emigration . Consequently , ou r focu s i s o n th e resident generals an d thei r closes t assistants , particularl y o n thos e resident-gen erals activ e o n th e c allya issue . Thes e wer e Alphons e Jui n (1947-51) , Robert Guillaum e (1951-54) , an d Franci s Lacost e (1954-55) . Despite reservation s abou t c aliya, Jui n di d no t plac e man y obstacle s in th e wa y o f Cadima, s o long a s the latte r di d it s work discreetl y an d i n the spiri t o f th e Juin-Gershun i accords , an d a s lon g a s ther e wa s n o

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opposition from th e Muslim s or Paris; Guillaume continued hi s predecessor's policy . However , i n thi s period , th e position s o n thi s issu e o f th e various section s o f the Protectorate s hierarch y wer e eve n mor e divers e than i n previou s years . Unde r Lacoste , c aliya gaine d momentu m an d reached 2,00 0 pe r mont h (i n 1955) . Yet , a s shal l b e seen , Lacost e an nounced a plan limitin g emigration . Looking int o specifi c examples , a s lat e a s 1953 , Mauric e Fischer , Israels ambassado r t o France , emphasize d tha t Pari s an d force s withi n the Residenc y wer e stil l opposed t o an immediat e an d tota l rescu e oper ation, i f Israel were t o consider one. 31 Shmuel Divon , the n a diplomat a t the Israel i embassy i n Paris , arrive d a t a similar conclusion an d mad e th e point tha t difference s existe d o n th e variou s level s o f th e Protectorate s administration a s t o emigration . Man y o f th e Frenc h expert s o n nativ e affairs wer e hostile to Israel and c allya, whereas Guillaum e and his closest confidants indicate d t o Divo n tha t i f th e Jewis h Agency' s emissarie s would avoi d Zionis t campaignin g an d refrai n fro m makin g sensitiv e pub lic declarations , ther e woul d b e n o inclinatio n t o plac e unnecessar y obstacles i n their way. 32 Still, thoug h th e Frenc h sai d the y woul d no t place unnecessar y obsta cles, thi s di d no t mea n tha t problem s woul d no t aris e late r on . Alread y in Jul y 1952 , Pessa h Shinar , the n th e leadin g exper t o n Nort h Afric a i n the Researc h Departmen t o f the Israe l Ministr y fo r Foreig n Affairs , me t in Raba t with hig h officials—amon g the m M . Pequin , deputy-directo r o f the Departmen t fo r Sharifia n Affairs , an d Dr . M . Sicauld , directo r o f the Health Department . Pequi n wa s rathe r blun t i n relatin g t o Shina r th e French dissatisfactio n wit h th e wa y Jewis h Agenc y c aliya emmisarie s noisily promote d emigratio n an d simultaneousl y wer e active , togethe r with envoy s o f other Jewis h Agenc y departments , amon g Jewis h youth s who wave d Israel i flags an d organize d publi c meetings , muc h t o th e anger and dismay of the Muslims . Accordin g to Pequin's information , th e sultan an d th e makhzan ha d begu n probin g int o th e cause s o f Jewis h emigration a s wel l a s focusing attentio n o n Zionis t activity . Pequi n di d his utmos t t o convinc e Shina r tha t Morocca n Jewr y di d no t constitut e a suitable elemen t fo r Israel' s needs , particularl y sinc e man y o f the m shunned agricultura l pursuit s an d generall y di d no t engag e i n physica l work. A t th e sam e time , Pequi n assure d Shina r tha t th e Frenc h di d no t and woul d no t oppos e emigratio n a s lon g a s i t di d no t ge t numericall y out o f proportion . Dr . Sicaul d raise d simila r issue s an d wondere d wh y

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the Stat e o f Israe l sough t t o absor b larg e number s o f emigrant s fro m North Africa , a n obvious burden o n the youn g states frai l economy. 33 Ze3 ev Khakla i provide d hi s assessmen t base d o n hi s persona l experi ence a t th e loca l level . I n tw o thoroug h reports , on e sen t t o th e the n Israeli prime minister , Davi d Ben-Gurion, 34 th e other to foreign ministe r Moshe Sharett, 35 Khaklai describe d a certai n degre e o f deterioratio n i n the otherwis e generall y positiv e attitud e o f the Frenc h t o the emigratio n process. Followin g clashe s wit h Morocca n nationalist s i n Decembe r 1952 , the Frenc h militar y an d civilia n authoritie s i n Morocc o becam e con cerned abou t th e future o f the Protectorate mor e than in any other perio d in the recen t past . The y thu s considere d placin g difficulties i n the way of the wor k conducte d b y th e Jewis h Agency . Fro m thei r poin t o f view , Khaklai argued , th e Frenc h sa w i n th e Jew s a positiv e pro-Frenc h ele ment t o be relie d upo n i n the impendin g Morocca n struggl e for indepen dence. Perhap s th e Residenc y an d th e administratio n woul d no t hal t future emigration , bu t the y migh t conside r reducin g i t t o a bar e mini mum. 36 We nee d t o prob e furthe r i n orde r t o ascertai n ho w muc h o f a policy factor, i f a t all , wa s th e Frenc h desir e periodicall y t o hal t o r restric t emigration i n a n effor t t o enlis t Jewis h suppor t fo r th e preservatio n o f colonial interests . Yet , a s appear s fro m previousl y cite d evidenc e ther e existed fear s amon g th e French , rea l o r imaginary , tha t i f emigratio n were no t periodicall y restricted , nationalist s o r othe r Musli m pressur e groups suc h a s Radi o Cair o o r th e Ara b Leagu e migh t plac e th e Protec torate i n a difficult situation . Thoug h Khakla i di d no t thin k tha t pressur e from Musli m circle s throughou t th e Ara b worl d t o restric t o r halt c allya was especially pronounced i n that period, thi s was nonetheless th e expla nation offere d hi m by Robert Baudouy , directo r of the diplomati c cabine t of th e Residency . Baudou y warne d tha t shoul d ther e b e pressur e ema nating from th e sulta n an d hi s viziers, th e Frenc h woul d hav e t o respec t their feeling s and , thoug h c aliya would no t ceas e completely , th e Jewis h Agency migh t face certai n restriction s o n its work. 37 Having rea d Khaklai' s reports , Mauric e Fische r sense d tha t Khakla i underestimated Frenc h fear s ove r Musli m pressure s an d reaction s re lated t o emigration. Therefore , h e urged Shar e t t o approach th e Frenc h government wit h a view to getting the Residenc y a t Rabat to refrain fro m implementing drasti c measures. 38 Thoug h w e hav e foun d n o concret e evidence o f suc h intervention , Khakla i di d indicat e a yea r late r that ,

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despite th e generall y positiv e attitude o f the Frenc h t o c aliya activities i n most o f th e urba n area s durin g 1953 , the y prevente d suc h activit y i n certain village s an d smal l communities i n th e countryside . B y May 1954 , however, h e confidentl y state d that , followin g hi s discussion s wit h a variety o f Frenc h officials , Cadima s wor k i n rura l area s ha d bee n ap proved. 39 The shar p increas e i n c aliya i n 1954-5 5 too k plac e durin g Lacoste' s tenure a t the Residency . Thi s sudden increas e in emigration fro m severa l hundred pe r mont h befor e Augus t 195 4 t o ove r 1,00 0 an d quit e often , over 2,00 0 pe r month , particularl y a s 195 4 wa s drawin g t o a n en d an d during the earl y part of 1955, prompted Lacost e to consider taking sever e measures. A t a time whe n th e Jewis h Agenc y an d th e Stat e o f Israel ha d agreed t o haste n c ally a,ther e wer e clea r signal s fro m th e Residency , i n early Marc h 1955 , tha t Lacost e intende d t o restric t it . Lacost e invite d Amos Rab l t o se e hi m an d tol d hi m point-blank : "Yo u ar e sendin g to o many peopl e t o Israel . Accordin g t o th e dat a i n ou r possession , nearl y 2,000 Jew s leav e Morocc o eac h month . W e wil l no t tolerat e large-scal e c ally aof such proportions . Yo u must limi t th e rat e t o seve n hundre d pe r month." 40 On instruction s fro m th e Israel i governmen t a s wel l fro m th e Jewis h Agency, Israel s ambassado r t o France, Ya cakov Tsur, sen t Ya cakov Karo z (formerly Ya cakov Kraus e o f th e Mossa d Le cAliya Bet ) t o Raba t t o per suade th e Residenc y t o softe n it s restrictions . Karo z held a series o f talks with Protectorat e officials , amon g the m Rober t Baudouy , th e hea d o f Lacoste's diplomati c cabine t and , o f course, Lacost e himself . A s he ha d told Khakla i two years previously, Baudou y informe d Karo z that th e only reason fo r th e sever e restriction s o n emigratio n wa s the oppositio n mani fested b y th e loca l Muslim s wh o sa w in th e Jew s a n importan t sourc e o f profits an d taxe s (matiere imposable). I n hi s opinion , th e Muslim s wer e not justified i n thi s feelin g fo r i t was n o secre t tha t th e Jew s wh o sough t to emigrat e wer e predominantl y poor . Baudou y adde d tha t h e ha d trie d to convinc e bot h hi s superior s an d th e makhzan o f the absurdit y o f th e argument, bu t t o n o avail . Baudou y expresse d th e vie w tha t thos e wh o claimed tha t th e Jew s constitute d a vital forc e i n th e politica l balanc e i n Morocco (element d'equilibre) an d that , a s a consequence , th e Frenc h were reluctan t t o le t the m emigrate , wer e greatl y mistaken . True , th e Jews ha d bee n a reliabl y pro-Frenc h element , bu t thei r preferenc e fo r the Frenc h presenc e i n Morocc o di d no t mea n tha t th e Jew s woul d no t

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The Grand e Arenas Transit Cam p in the Marseille s Area (courtesy of the Organization of the Former North African Undergroun d Activists in Israel). side wit h th e Muslim s onc e th e Muslim s woul d see m t o have th e uppe r hand i n th e struggl e fo r independence . Baudou y ha d n o doub t th e Jew s would the n chang e sides. 41 The meetin g wit h Lacost e o n 7 Ma y wa s lengthy . H e explaine d t o Karoz tha t i t wa s du e t o hi s initiativ e i n 194 9 tha t th e Gershuni-Jui n accord ha d brough t abou t th e openin g o f the gate s fo r c aliya; and tha t i t was hi s effort s tha t ha d convince d Foreig n Ministe r Schuma n an d hi s superiors a t th e Residenc y a t th e tim e tha t c aliya coul d no t b e legall y prevented an d thu s si x hundre d Jew s wer e abl e t o leav e monthl y i n 1949-50. 42 Thoug h h e an d hi s superior s i n Franc e ha d no t intende d t o dismantle Cadima , th e ne w politica l climat e compelle d hi m t o reduc e emigration from ove r 2,000 to seven hundred; he could not be indifferen t to th e makhzans demands . Large-scal e emigratio n woul d contribut e t o the already bloody and chaoti c situation. 43 Like hi s lin e o f argumen t i n 1949 , a s expresse d i n hi s letter s t o Schuman, Lacost e reiterate d i n Ma y 195 5 tha t despit e th e difficultie s encountered b y Jewis h emigrant s fro m Morocc o i n Israel , th e Jew s pre ferred thi s alternativ e t o thei r growin g politica l an d economi c insecurit y

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in Morocco . Ye t th e Jewis h Agenc y throug h Cadim a wa s contributin g t o their lac k o f security b y promotin g a process o f ecremage (skimmin g th e cream), tha t is , takin g the able-bodie d an d th e breadwinner s an d leavin g behind th e elderl y an d sick . Despit e Karoz' s effort s t o convinc e Lacost e that th e selectio n o f c aliya candidate s wa s conducte d o n a family an d no t an individual basis, th e latter wa s not persuaded. 44 Lacoste mad e a poin t o f explainin g t o Karo z tha t th e numbe r seve n hundred wa s no t absolute ; h e alread y ha d instruction s t o gran t 2,50 0 departure visa s fo r emigrant s chose n b y Cadima . I n th e future , h e di d not se e himsel f boun d t o seve n hundred . I t wa s possibl e tha t i n a give n month onl y on e hundre d woul d b e abl e t o leav e whil e subsequentl y 3,000 migh t leave—everythin g wa s linked t o circumstances. 45 Karoz insiste d tha t publi c respons e i n Israel , no t t o mentio n politica l reactions in the Jewish communitie s o f the Western world , coul d becom e quite intense . Excep t fo r th e Iro n Curtai n nation s an d Libya , n o govern ment prevente d Jew s fro m leavin g fo r Israel . Eve n th e Middl e Easter n Arab states , whic h wer e i n confrontatio n wit h Israel , ha d opene d thei r gates fo r Jewis h emigration . Thi s wa s th e classi c cas e o f Ira q (1950-51 ) and Yeme n (1950) . I n th e wak e o f the Holocaus t i n Europe , Israe l woul d not tolerat e an y emigratio n restrictions . c Ally a wa s th e raiso n d'etr e o f Israel. 46 The meetin g ende d inconclusively . I t wa s neve r mad e clea r i n late r French an d Israel i report s whethe r o r no t th e c aliya restriction s decide d on earl y i n 195 5 wer e actuall y enforce d o r remaine d a dea d letter . Nevertheless, subsequen t diplomati c effort s b y th e Israel i governmen t and th e assistanc e o f Ambassado r Tsu r i n Pari s throughou t th e secon d half of 1955 prevented hars h restriction s fro m bein g implemente d b y th e Residency. It seem s tha t Baudouy' s an d Lacoste' s assertion s regardin g th e makhzans displeasur e o r th e Muslim masses' disconten t wit h increase d c aliya prompting the harsh measures—ar e misleading . Lacost e state d o n differ ent occasion s i n hi s correspondenc e tha t th e masse s wer e indifferen t t o the Jewis h exodus . H e di d expres s fear s abou t th e Ara b Leagu e an d wa s concerned abou t Nasser s reaction s t o Morocca n Jew s leavin g a n Arab Muslim countr y fo r Israel . I n fact , Radi o Cair o accuse d th e Frenc h o f financing th e c aliya. I t woul d als o appea r tha t Lacoste' s decisio n wa s meant t o appeas e Morocca n Musli m nationalist s a t a tim e o f politica l turmoil. Doubtles s ther e wer e accurat e report s abou t certai n Cadim a

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officials an d emissarie s wh o deviate d fro m th e policy of discretion, some thing Lacost e woul d no t tolerate . Furthermore , Frenc h source s confir m that affluen t an d influentia l Jewis h notables , disturbe d b y both ecremage and Frenc h reactions , encourage d th e Residenc y t o restric t c aliya (i n 1952 an d 1955) . Thi s developmen t dovetaile d wit h th e reservation s o f the Frenc h themselve s a s to Zionist activit y durin g those periods . Did th e Frenc h unde r Lacost e reall y se e th e Jew s a s a n element d'equilibre reliabl y fortifying thei r position, a source of information abou t Muslim nationalis t activity ? Frenc h source s revea l difference s o f opinion over thi s matte r amon g officials. Severa l official s di d indee d se e th e Jew s in 1954-55 , particularl y th e urba n population , a s a vital asset fo r Frenc h interests wh o had t o sta y i n Morocco . Other s pointe d t o th e Europea n population, no t th e Jews , a s the onl y reliabl e element . I have conclude d that th e main reaso n behin d Lacoste' s temporar y restrictiv e measure s was t o preven t Cadim a an d Israe l fro m makin g th e Protectorat e appea r vulnerable a t th e heigh t o f th e Franco-Morocca n confrontation . Th e departure o f too man y person s fo r Israe l when th e Frenc h wer e fighting for colonia l preservatio n i n th e mids t o f terroris m an d sabotag e coul d only demonstrate t o Moroccan nationalist s an d the world tha t Franc e was no longer i n control ; tha t segment s o f the populatio n ha d los t confidenc e in Frenc h protection . Wha t i s more , a s Karo z concluded , Lacost e wa s apparently worrie d abou t a massiv e departur e o f Jew s triggerin g th e flight of Moroccos Europea n residents . Finally, i f the Frenc h governmen t wa s a t first supportiv e o f Lacoste' s measures i t n o doub t ha d somethin g t o d o wit h th e ever-growin g pres ence o f Moroccan Jewish emigrant s i n transit a t Marseilles . Th e questio n sometimes raise d was : Wh y di d Israe l undertak e large-scal e emigratio n in 195 5 whe n i t coul d no t immediatel y an d systematicall y transfe r th e emigrants from Franc e t o Israel? If Israel could not cope with the absorp tion o f th e emigrants , the n i t ma y hav e bee n irresponsibl e t o organiz e large-scale departures . c

Aliyat ha-No c ar—Youth c Allya

c

Aliyat ha-No c ar, o r youth emigratio n t o Israel, wa s undertaken sinc e th e early 1930 s by th e Jewis h Agenc y an d th e pre-194 8 Yishuv . It s purpos e was t o bring youth s t o Palestin e withou t thei r parent s an d settl e the m i n

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kibbutzim an d moshavlm a s well as to prepare the m fo r productiv e work . As a departmen t withi n th e Jewis h Agency , c Aliyat ha-N o c ar rescue d Jewish childre n fro m Nazi-occupie d Austri a and Czechoslovakia . Numer ous children wer e take n ou t of Germany without thei r families a s early as November 1938 . Durin g th e 1930 s c Aliyat ha-N o c ar wa s heade d b y th e well-known activist , Henriett a Szold . I n late r year s i t functione d unde r the guidanc e o f Mosh e Kol , a politica l figure havin g serve d i n severa l Israeli governments . Durin g th e 1940s , on e o f c Aliyat ha-N o c ar's mai n offices wa s located i n Paris , administere d b y Israel i emissarie s an d Euro pean Jews. Amon g them wer e Frit z Lichtenstei n an d Mosh e Bejski . Just a s the variou s Jewish Agency departments an d th e Mossa d Le cAliya regarded thei r presence i n Franc e a s vitally important fo r Zionist work in North Africa , s o to o c Aliyat ha-N o c ar espouse d simila r goals . Morocc o and Tunisi a emerge d a s th e tw o mos t sought-afte r region s fo r thi s orga nization. Thi s wa s partl y becaus e i t becam e feasibl e fo r it s representa tives t o se t u p c Aliyat ha-N o c ar's apparatu s ther e unde r colonia l protec tion, an d partl y du e t o th e hig h percentag e o f childre n an d youth s i n these communities , th e very elements essentia l t o Israeli society . Until November 194 9 the Mossa d L e c Aliya/Cadima in Casablanca was entrusted wit h th e tas k o f recruiting youth s an d sendin g the m t o c Aliyat ha-Nocar's home s i n Franc e an d Norway . O n 4 Novembe r 1949 , Gdali a Paz, a Frenchman , wa s sen t t o Frenc h Morocc o t o administe r a ne w embryonic structur e o f c Aliyat ha-N o c ar. H e operate d ou t o f Cadima t o extend yout h recruitmen t operation s int o th e Jewis h communitie s o f the interior. Ther e h e se t up local committees an d enlisted volunteers amon g Moroccan Jew s t o assis t i n c aliya registration . I n Apri l 195 0 Paz con ducted a n extensiv e fact-findin g missio n i n th e interior . H e me t wit h local delegate s o f th e Mossa d L e c Aliya an d th e c aliya commissions , representing ha-P o c el ha-Mizrahi/Mizrah i (Religiou s Zionists) , P o c ale Tsiyon/Mapai a s wel l a s representative s o f th e Israeli-oriente d yout h movements suc h a s ha-Boni m (affiliate d wit h Mapai ) an d Bne- cAkiva (connected wit h ha-P o c el ha-Mizrah i an d othe r Religiou s Zionists) . Th e Religious Zionist s raise d th e issu e o f admittin g religiou s youth s int o Mizrahi/ha-Po c el ha-Mizrah i home s i n Franc e t o underg o agricultura l training an d advance d Zionis t indoctrinatio n ( a process define d a s hachshara) prio r t o c allya. The y sough t assurance s tha t kashrut woul d b e observed strictl y i n al l of c Aliyat ha-N o c ar's homes. I n Fez , Paz encoun tered fierce oppositio n fro m religiou s communa l leader s wh o demande d

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that i n th e futur e youth s wh o wer e separate d fro m thei r parent s woul d not remai n a s suc h indefinitely . Man y economicall y disadvantage d par ents initiall y agree d t o entrus t thei r childre n t o Aliya t ha-N o c ar o n th e assumption, an d o n th e basi s of promises mad e b y the Mossa d L e c Aliya, that the y woul d follo w thei r childre n t o Israe l vi a th e genera l apparatu s of Cadima. Suc h plans often di d not materialize because the parents wer e rejected b y Cadim a i n accordanc e wit h th e screenin g policies . Paz wa s now pressured t o inform hi s superiors in Paris and Jerusalem tha t priorit y in c aliya be grante d t o parents whose children ha d eithe r been i n Europ e for hachshara, o r were livin g in Israel. 47 It i s mentione d i n chapte r 8 o n Tunisi a tha t segment s o f th e yout h c aliya, sen t t o Israe l vi a Europe , staye d i n c Aliyat ha-No c ar's facilities i n Norway. However , mos t o f them wen t t o Franc e where , nea r Montpel lier, tw o hundre d kilometer s fro m Marseilles , the y wer e absorbe d int o Cambous,—an are a resemblin g Israel s Galilee . Withi n Cambous , o n over thre e hundre d acres , c Aliyat ha-N o c ar maintaine d a mansio n sur rounded b y five buildings . Th e mansio n include d sportin g grounds , a school, a synagogue , vocationa l trainin g facilities , a clinic , an d a movi e theatre. Capabl e o f integratin g thre e hundre d childre n a t once , c Aliyat ha-No c ar's comple x a t Cambou s als o had severa l homes , o r sections , fo r religious youths , Dror , ha-Shome r ha-Ts a c ir, ha-Bonim , ha-N o c ar ha Tsiyoni, an d Gordonia . Theoretically , th e comple x a t Cambou s wa s de signed t o hous e youth s wh o opte d t o settl e i n thes e movements ' kibbutzim. I n reality , man y youth s arrivin g i n Cambou s fro m Morocc o di d no t belong t o Ha-Shome r ha-Ts a c ir or Dro r i n Casablanca , Fez , Meknes , o r Marrakesh. The y include d element s wh o lef t trouble d homes , a s well a s orphans. Impoverishe d familie s fel t tha t b y handin g ove r thei r childre n to c Aliyat ha-No c ar it would eas e their economi c hardships. Durin g thei r stay in Cambous th e youth s mad e th e transitio n fro m Morocca n t o Israel i society. Th e AJD C covere d two-third s o f th e expense s wherea s th e Jewish Agenc y covere d th e rest . I t wa s not uncommo n fo r th e personne l at Cambous t o discover tha t certai n youth s were ineligible for emigratio n under th e aegi s o f c Aliyat ha-N o c ar, fo r the y wer e unsuitabl e fo r hachshara an d fo r lif e o n th e kibbutz o r moshav. Th e latte r wer e the n sen t back t o Morocc o o r the y joine d thos e parent s wh o wer e approve d fo r c aliya by Cadima an d awaite d the m a t the Grand e Arena s transit camp. 48 Back in Morocco , upo n recruitin g childre n fo r c aliya, Pa z would enlis t local physicians o r OSE' s employee s t o administer th e medica l examina -

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1

Table 10 . c Aliyat ha-N o c ar i n Morocco , 2 5 Septembe r 1949-28 Februar y 195 0 City Casablanca Fez and Sefro u Meknes Marrakesh Essaouira Rabat an d Sal e San Total

Boys

Girls

Total

144 60 9 14 13 7 2 249

82 23 1 16 2 6 2 132

226 83 10 30 15 13 4 381

Source: c Aliyat ha-No c ar, in French , CZA , L58/98 .

tions. Simila r t o Cadima' s procedure s fo r regula r c aliya, a date woul d b e fixed fo r th e youth s t o b e transporte d t o Casablanca . O n thei r arriva l they underwen t additiona l medica l test s befor e thei r admittanc e t o th e youth emigratio n sectio n i n the Cadim a camp. 49 Between 195 0 and 195 6 cAliyat ha-No c ar in Morocc o was administere d intermittently b y Minn a Blumenfeld. 50 Unti l Blumenfel d arrived , yout h c aliya di d no t procee d smoothl y partly because, contrar y t o c Aliyat ha-N o c ar's policy , Pa z sen t t o Franc e youth s wh o ha d no t complete d thei r elementary schoo l education . Secondly , OSE' s physician s an d loca l doc tors failed t o show up regularl y i n the Jewish communitie s o f the interio r and henc e mos t o f the childre n wer e selecte d amon g Casablanca's Jewis h community wher e medica l service s operate d efficiently. 51 Thirdly , be tween th e en d o f September 194 9 and th e end o f February 195 0 only 381 youths mad e c aliya throug h c Aliyat ha-N o c ar, thei r age s rangin g fro m nine t o sixteen . A s tabl e 1 0 indicates, th e larges t numbe r o f these emi grants originate d fro m Casablanc a whil e a n averag e o f 76.2 childre n lef t French Morocc o eac h mont h i n this period . Dynamic an d determined , Blumenfel d reduce d c Aliyat ha-N o c ar's dependence o n the Mossa d L e c Aliya/Cadima whose head, Sam y Halevy , had seriou s reservation s abou t th e raiso n d'etr e o f he r departmen t an d was concerne d abou t effort s t o encroac h int o wha t h e regarde d a s hi s sphere o f influence. A s long as c Aliyat ha-No c ar depended completel y o n Cadima's personne l i t wa s unthinkabl e fo r Blumenfel d t o includ e i n he r work th e smal l town s an d village s o f the bled. Th e physician s represent ing Cadima wer e reluctan t t o become involve d o n her behal f i n th e rura l

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areas. c Aliyat ha-N o c ar wa s therefor e deprive d i n 1950-5 1 o f an impor tant segmen t o f emigrant youth s from th e countryside. 52 With th e passin g o f tim e c Aliyat ha-N o c ar succeede d i n augmentin g its influenc e i n th e urba n mellahs. Thi s di d no t mean , however , tha t th e sort o f opposition encountere d b y Pa z i n 1949-5 0 bypasse d Blumenfel d and he r staff . Quit e t o th e contrary , th e oppositio n intensified . Blumen feld complaine d tha t unlik e th e orphane d youths , thos e wh o lef t thei r parents behin d place d a majo r burde n o n th e yout h c aliya apparatus . Some parents continued t o be rejected fo r emigration an d their economi c survival withou t th e children' s assistanc e becam e a sourc e o f genuin e concern. Considerin g tha t i n 1950-5 1 numerou s youth s departin g wer e over thirteen year s old, the y were indispensable for the Morocca n Jewis h household a s a sourc e o f supplementa l income . Thi s developmen t an d the fac t tha t th e Morocca n Jewis h famil y wa s close-kni t resulte d i n th e escalation o f tensions betwee n th e communitie s an d th e Jewis h Agency . Demoralized parents , claimin g the y ha d bee n deceived , demande d tha t their childre n b e returne d t o them a t once . Othe r parent s threatene d t o go t o th e authoritie s o r t o leav e fo r Israe l o n thei r ow n initiative . Afte r all, the y argued , woul d th e Israel i authoritie s shoo t the m upo n arriva l i n Haifa o r preven t thei r entranc e int o th e countr y a s th e Britis h Mandat e in Palestin e ha d don e i n previous years ? Virtually al l of them crie d tha t a bunch o f Ashkenaz i emissarie s representin g Cadim a an d c Aliyat ha-N o c ar di d no t reall y wis h t o se e Morocca n Jew s liv e i n Israel. 53 I n he r correspondence wit h Pari s an d Jerusalem , Blumenfel d reporte d tha t several familie s wen t a s far a s to withdraw thei r childre n fro m c Aliyat haNo c ar's sectio n a t th e Cadim a cam p onc e i t becam e apparen t tha t thei r own c ally aprospects were limited. 54 By th e latte r hal f o f 195 1 Blumenfeld ha d als o organize d yout h c ally a from severa l villages . He r concer n centere d mainl y o n th e childre n o f southeastern Morocc o wher e Morocca n nationalist s wer e drawin g nu merous supporters . Loca l Jews complained o f a rumor abou t th e resettle ment of 150,000 Palestinian Arabs in their midst, a false alarm tha t stirre d panic amon g th e Jewis h communitie s o f the entir e area . Th e latte r sen t representatives t o Casablanc a urgin g Cadim a an d c Aliyat ha-N o c ar t o rescue them. 55 Aliyat ha-N o c ar refuse d a t th e tim e t o consider mas s evacuatio n fro m villages an d urge d Blumenfel d no t t o clin g t o rumors . It s chief s i n Europe an d Israe l argue d convincingl y tha t bot h yout h c aliya homes an d

Morocco's Struggle for Independence 14

3

the regula r emigratio n camp s i n Franc e wer e filled t o capacit y wit h North Africa n transients. 56 Israe l wa s simpl y unabl e t o absor b additiona l people. Actually , i n 195 2 Blumenfeld wa s instructe d fro m Pari s t o dela y departure fo r youth s affecte d b y mil d case s o f ringworm . c Aliyat ha-N o c ar's homes i n France , i t was said, neede d th e spac e for healthy youths. 57 The yea r 195 2 marked a renewed offensiv e b y religious circle s agains t c Aliyat ha-N o c ar. Previou s criticism , somewha t milder , ha d bee n di rected agains t Pa z thre e year s earlier . Blumenfel d an d he r assistant s were accuse d o f spreadin g secula r idea s amon g th e children , an d o f deJudaizing an d brainwashin g the m wit h notion s o f Israel i socialism . O n several occasion s loca l rabbi s proteste d agains t th e integratio n o f emi grants int o c Aliyat ha-N o c ar's home s belongin g t o secula r an d socialis t kibbutz yout h movement s suc h a s ha-Shomer ha-Ts a c ir and Dror , insist ing tha t the y b e place d a t Cambou s wit h Bne- cAkiva. T o placat e thes e elements Blumenfel d encourage d th e Pari s office t o place youths, notabl y from th e villages , i n eithe r th e Bne- cAkiva sectio n o r th e mor e mildl y socialist hom e o f ha-Bonim . Sh e mad e a specia l reques t o n behal f o f youths comin g fro m Kas r al-Suq— a hamle t o n th e Algerian-Morocca n border, si x hundre d kilometer s fro m Casablanca—wh o wer e ferventl y religious an d whos e parent s an d rabbi-teacher s ha d contemp t fo r Dro r and ha-Shome r ha-Ts a c ir.58 By fa r th e staunches t opponen t wa s Isaa c Elmaleh , a n Orthodo x Je w and on e o f th e mos t enthusiasti c promoter s o f th e O H (Osa r ha-Tora ) educational network . Throughou t th e earl y an d mid-1950 s Elmale h de livered countles s lecture s i n publi c forum s tha t wer e directe d agains t c Aliyat ha-N o c ar. H e pleade d wit h parent s no t t o confin e thei r childre n to th e "maison s d'enfants " i n Cambous , fo r thes e belonge d t o irreligiou s movements tha t sprea d "a n immora l education. " H e wen t s o fa r a s t o suggest tha t severa l Morocca n youth s wer e confuse d b y th e immora l behavior o f c Aliyat ha-No c ar to the exten t tha t the y committe d suicide. 59 His antiyout h c aliya campaig n wa s s o intensiv e tha t i t include d th e dissemination o f tracts i n Judeo-Arabic . In 195 5 c Aliyat ha-No c ar had extende d it s influence throughou t Frenc h Morocco despite th e oppositio n emanatin g from divers e circles . Wherea s in th e pas t th e overwhelmin g majorit y o f yout h c aliya wer e th e melldh children, b y 195 5 youths comin g from middle-clas s families wh o dwelt i n the urba n Europea n residentia l district s registere d wit h c Aliyat ha-N o c ar. Th e numbe r o f illiterat e youth s wa s reduce d significantl y b y the n

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Table 11 . Yout h c Aliya fro m Nort h Africa , Octobe r 1955-Marc h 195 6 Month

Morocco

Tunisia

Algeria

Total

October 195 5 November 195 5 December 195 5 January 195 6 February 195 6 March 195 6

31 100 67 43 110 60 411

34 55 30 1 14 5 139

4 2 2 1 4 _2

69 157 99 45 128 67

15

565

Total

Source: N . Menlso n t o Moshe Kol , Marseilles , 6 April 1956 , CZA , L58/409, Hebrew .

and thei r healt h condition s ha d improved . Accordin g t o Blumenfeld , th e intensified effort s o f the AJDC , AIU , OSE , an d O H contribute d t o thes e developments an d facilitate d th e task s o f c Aliyat ha-N o c ar.60 Also , b y 1955, ther e were severa l types of youth c aliya: those who completed thei r training a t Cambous ; thos e wh o arrive d i n France , abou t t o ente r Cam bous; childre n rejecte d a t Cambous , foun d unfi t fo r c allya i n thi s frame work; childre n wh o mad e c aliya togethe r wit h thei r parent s throug h Cadima. Th e majorit y o f the youths stil l left Morocc o via Cadima, accom panied b y their families. 61 The one s who left Morocc o with c Aliyat ha-N o c ar an d experience d lif e a t Cambou s late r arrive d i n Rama t Hadassa : th e main temporar y absorptio n cente r i n Israel . Th e nex t ste p wa s t o settl e in moshavim an d kibbutzim which , i n 1955-56 , include d Sedjera , Kfa r ha-No c ar ha-Dati, Kibbut z Nitzanim , Kibbut z Bror-Khayil , an d Kibbut z Rohama.62 Of th e Nort h Africa n countries , th e c Aliyat ha-N o c ar operatio n i n Morocco wa s th e larges t an d mos t successful . A s i s note d i n chapte r 8 , youth c aliya experience s i n Tunisi a wer e tragi c while c aliya fro m Algeri a in general wa s minimal . Tabl e 1 1 fo r th e perio d Octobe r 1955-Marc h 1956, durin g th e heigh t o f th e Nort h Africa n yout h an d genera l c aliya> illustrates thi s point . During th e sam e period , th e AJD C assiste d c Aliyat ha-N o c ar in Franc e with $12 5 pe r chil d fo r a tota l o f $70,625. 63 The AJD C als o covere d 9 1 percent o f the expense s t o maintain th e youth s a t Cambou s befor e ^aliya. 64 All i n all , accordin g t o Mosh e Kol , hea d o f c Aliyat ha-N o c ar, betwee n 1949 and Jul y 195 6 6,236 Morocca n youth s arrive d i n Israe l throug h hi s department. 65

Morocco's Struggle for Independence 14

Zionist Education and

c

5

Aliya

The Zionis t Federatio n o f Morocco (FSM ) an d th e Zionis t pionee r yout h movements cooperate d wit h Cadim a an d c Aliyat ha-N o c ar. Moreover , following th e creation o f these two emigration organizations , othe r Jewis h Agency department s wer e establishe d i n Frenc h Morocc o betwee n 194 9 and 1955 . Thi s constellatio n include d th e Departmen t fo r Middl e East ern Jewr y (DM O hereafter) , th e Departmen t o f Pionee r Yout h Move ments (N o c ar ve-he-Halut s hereafter) , an d th e Departmen t o f Tora h Education i n th e Diaspor a (discusse d i n chapte r 5) . Ou r discussio n her e delves int o their activities . Beginning wit h th e FSM , w e hav e alread y note d tha t i t wa s no t granted lega l an d officia l recognitio n b y th e Frenc h Protectorate . A s was the cas e i n 1943-47 , th e FS M continue d t o collaborat e i n a highl y discreet fashio n wit h th e Jewish Agency from th e sprin g of 1949. It s mai n leadership was still composed o f veteran Zionist s under th e chairmanshi p of Paul Calamaro , amon g the m J . R . Toledano , Raphae l Benazeraf , Solo mon Cagan , Shmue l Elmaleh , M . Marciano , S . D . Levy , S . Ohana , an d Zeide Schulman . The y periodicall y plunge d int o disagreement s ove r pressing issue s suc h a s selectiv e c aliya an d th e method s fo r hachshara. Their rank s wer e als o spli t b y ideologica l conflicts , fo r th e leadershi p represented th e divers e spectru m o f Zionist/Israel i politica l movement s ranging fro m P o c ale Tsiyon/Mapa i an d th e Genera l Zionists , t o Heru t (Revisionists) an d Mizrahi/ha-P o c el ha-Mizrahi. Paul Calamar o echoe d th e positio n o f severa l importan t Zionist s i n Morocco whe n h e advocate d "qualit y c aliya." I n a lette r t o th e Worl d Zionist Organizatio n earl y i n 1949 , Calamar o argued tha t segment s o f the Moroccan emigrant s arrivin g i n Israe l durin g th e illega l phas e o f 1947 49 wer e educationall y an d sociall y unprepare d fo r thei r ne w surround ings. Althoug h i t was understandable tha t a Jew sought to leave Morocco , a countr y wher e h e wa s mistreated , th e escap e t o Israe l withou t prio r Zionist educationa l trainin g le d t o despair , frustration , an d lac k o f adaptation. Calamar o believed tha t unles s thi s anomaly was challenged, man y Moroccan emigrant s i n Israe l would retur n t o their countr y o f origin. H e called upo n th e Worl d Zionis t Organizatio n an d th e Jewis h Agenc y t o supervise c aliya, organiz e efficien t fcachshara, defin e specifi c healt h cri teria fo r would-b e emigrants , an d provid e Hebre w an d Israel i cultura l

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education fo r th e youths , s o a s t o minimiz e th e shoc k o f thei r absorptio n process: We d o no t pla n fo r on e momen t t o hal t thi s c aliya whic h i s th e onl y hop e fo r Morocco's Jews , bu t i t i s ou r dut y t o first an d foremos t tak e int o consideratio n the stat e o f Israe l whic h need s th e hel p an d ai d o f builders an d thos e read y t o serve her . Ou r negotiation s wit h th e authoritie s i n Raba t ove r thi s matte r leave s room fo r hop e tha t emigratio n wil l becom e legal . . . . A s for hachshara w e hav e important task s befor e us , fo r i t i s imperativ e tha t ou r would-b e emigrant s wil l be effectivel y prepare d morall y an d physically . Fo r thi s purpos e w e nee d emis saries. . . . We kno w that i n view of the [1948 ] war our concerns see m secondar y in nature , bu t w e nevertheles s hop e tha t onc e th e hostilitie s en d an d peac e prevails seriou s step s will be take n t o . . . dispatch suitabl e emissaries. 66 Shlomo Nahon , a delegat e o f th e Worl d Zionis t Organizatio n wh visited Morocc o i n 1948 , share d Calamaro' s positio n tha t i t wa s vita l t lay th e foundation s fo r large-scal e socioeducationa l activit y a s soo n a possible. Eve n prio r t o th e Gershuni-Jui n accords , Naho n raise d th following suggestion s tha t wer e implemente d afte r Marc h 1949 :

o o s e

The Jewis h Agenc y an d th e Worl d Zionis t Organizatio n mus t b e th e pivo t o f large-scale activit y i n th e are a o f socia l work , educatio n an d hachshara, th e ai m being to rescue an d transfe r o f the Jewis h masse s o f North Afric a [t o Israel]. This goal necessitates th e cooperatio n o f the internationa l Jewis h organizations : first of all, th e Allianc e Israelit e Universelle , an d the n th e agencie s whic h commence d their operation s i n Nort h Afric a afte r Worl d Wa r II—th e America n Jewis h Join t Distribution Committee , ORT , OSE , th e America n Jewis h Committe e an d th e World Jewis h Congress ; al l o f these [organizations ] hav e take n th e initia l prepa ratory steps , an d othe r organization s evinc e interes t i n the matter. 67 It i s no t know n precisel y whe n th e FSM' s leadershi p appeale d unani mously t o th e Jewis h Agenc y an d th e Stat e o f Israe l t o liberaliz e c aliya i n the contex t o f large r emigratio n quota s a s wel l a s flexible selectio n crite ria. However , ther e i s n o doub t tha t th e deterioratin g sociopolitica l conditions o f Morocca n Jewr y fro m Augus t 195 4 o n th e ev e o f Morocco s independence, increase d th e demand s t o accelerat e c aliya. A classi c example o f thi s developmen t i s foun d i n th e plea s mad e b y Alphons o Sabbah, vice-chairma n o f the F S M . I n Augus t 1955 , durin g hi s speec h a t the Genera l Executiv e Counci l o f th e Worl d Zionis t Organizatio n i n Jerusalem, Sabba h state d bluntly :

Morocco's Struggle

for Independence 14

7

Moroccan Jewr y turn s it s eye s with fervo r an d hop e towar d Israel . Fro m ther e i t expects th e salvation . I t utter s only two words which are terrible i n their simplic ity: Make haste! Takin g int o accoun t th e difficultie s o f absorption i n Israe l whic h we d o no t underestimat e an d whic h necessaril y limi t th e possibilitie s o f c aliya, we d o not reques t a "flying carpet " [a s was the cas e with Yemen i and Iraq i Jewr y in 1950-51 ] betwee n Morocc o and Israel , bu t w e conside r i t ou r tas k t o ask for a monthly quot a o f 5,00 0 person s . . . [and ] t o alleviat e th e rule s o f selectio n limiting the m t o contagiou s disease s an d incurabl e illnesses . . . . Yo u ar e o f course entitle d t o wish tha t emigratio n fro m Morocc o shoul d b e carrie d throug h gradually an d distribute d ove r severa l years . Bu t the n yo u forge t th e ris k tha t i t may stop. 68

As we hav e seen , th e Jewis h Agenc y di d recogniz e th e nee d fo r large r quotas. However , th e F S M s reques t o f 5,00 0 emigrant s pe r mont h wa s unacceptable t o Israe l whos e official s als o dismisse d an y ple a fo r th e immediate an d complete evacuatio n o f Morocco' s Jewry. 6 9 Turning t o Zionis t youth s amon g th e movement s operatin g i n Morocc o that wer e affiliate d directl y o r indirectl y wit h th e Jewis h Agenc y an d th e Mossad L e c Aliya, th e followin g wer e th e mos t noted : ha-Boni m (Mapai / Ihud ha-Kvutso t ve-ha-Kibbutzim) ; Dro r (unti l th e earl y 1950 s affiliate d with Mapam , Miflege t P o c alim Meuhedet , an d th e Unite d Kibbut z Movement know n a s ha-Kibbut z ha-Meuhad) ; ha-Shome r ha-Ts a c ir (th e ultra left-win g Israel i vanguar d movemen t affiliate d wit h th e Mapa m party an d th e Kibbut z ha- 3 Artsi) ; ha-N o c ar ha-Tsiyon i (Libera l Progres sives); Bne- c Akiva (ha-P o c el ha-Mizrahi) ; an d Beta r (Revisionists) . Along side th e pro-Israel i Zionis t yout h movement s wer e th e non-Zionis t coun terparts. Severa l o f their member s cooperate d wit h th e Israel i emissarie s as individuals o n matter s relatin g t o hachshara an d c aliya. Thes e wer e the Eclaireur s Israelite s d e Franc e (EIF ) an d th e D e p a r t e m e n t Educati f de l a Jeuness e Juiv e (DEJJ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , on e o f th e mos t importan t Zionist yout h movement s attractin g youth s fro m bot h secula r an d reli gious upbringing , functionin g mainl y i n Casablanca , include d th e afore mentioned Charle s Nette r Associatio n whos e member s collaborate d wit h the Yishuv' s emissarie s i n 1944-4 5 an d th e Israeli s wh o supervise d th e illegal c aliya i n 1947-49 . It s activist s constitute d th e backbon e o f th e clandestine organizatio n tha t smuggle d Jew s t o Palestin e vi a Algeria . From th e 1940 s th e wor k o f th e Zionis t yout h movement s wa s stimu lated b y Israel i emissaries . Th e movement s an d thei r emissarie s wer e tolerated b y th e Residenc y i n th e wak e o f th e Gershuni-Jui n agreement ,

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yet th e Frenc h showe d littl e enthusias m for thei r aim s an d refuse d t o accord the m officia l recognition . Thes e movement s di d no t attrac t Jewis h youths en masse, wer e elitist , an d sough t t o escap e mellah culture . Fo r example, i n Septembe r 195 0 ther e wer e four h u n d r e d organize d Zionis t youths i n Tangier ; the y wer e m e m b e r s o f ha-Bonim , Dror , Bne- c Akiva, and ha-Shome r ha-Ts a c ir. 70 Accordin g t o Eli e Mouyal , Mapai' s an d ha Bonim's Israel i emissar y fo r Frenc h Morocco , ha-Bonim' s branc h i n Ca sablanca wa s th e larges t whil e anothe r importan t branc h functione d i n Fez. Th e branc h i n Casablanc a ha d n o mor e tha n 15 0 member s bu t succeeded nonetheles s i n sendin g twenty-eigh t youth s t o Franc e fo r hachshara. A s th e n u m b e r o f emissarie s amon g ha-Boni m an d othe r movements wa s limite d befor e th e mid-1950s , Mouya l an d hi s counter parts traine d assistants , know n a s madrihim. Th e madrihim assiste d i n promoting Zionis t educatio n an d yout h cam p activitie s i n th e Atla s moun tains. 7 1 Mouyal argue d tha t th e Jewis h Agency , notabl y th e No c ar ve-he Haluts D e p a r t m e n t wit h whic h ha-Boni m i n Morocc o wa s affiliated , ha d to devot e greate r attentio n towar d th e initia l absorptio n o f Nort h Africa n youth emigrant s in North Africa rathe r tha n i n France . I n 1949 , whe n ha-Bonim wa s i n it s earl y organizationa l phase , Mouya l complaine d tha t the majorit y o f Morocco's urba n Jewis h youth s neithe r belonge d t o move ments no r ha d a clear-cu t perceptio n o f modern Zionism . H e maintaine d that i t wa s stil l no t to o lat e t o grappl e wit h th e problem , bu t tim e wa s running out , especiall y i n ligh t o f th e growin g tide s o f Morocca n nation alism. H e warne d Mapa i an d th e Jewis h Agenc y tha t Nort h Africa n hachshara ha d t o assum e seriou s dimensions : If, a s [our ] colleagu e Davi d Ben-Gurio n said , tha t th e situatio n toda y i s differen t from wha t i t was twent y year s ag o whe n th e yout h movement s underwen t hachshara o f several years prior t o c aliya, an d tha t toda y we do not have the tim e just a s th e emigrant s hav e no t th e time , i t behoove s u s mor e tha n eve r t o wor k quickly an d o n a large-scale. W e mus t therefor e accelerat e th e pac e o f educatio n and hachshara i n Morocc o and lay the foundation fo r the implementation o f these tasks.72 In orde r t o fortif y it s positio n i n th e Morocca n Jewis h communities , ha-Bonim an d it s Israel i emissarie s launche d differen t project s t o wi n adherents. Fo r instance , i n D e c e m b e r 194 9 ha-Bonim' s activist s orga -

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nized i n Casablanc a a n exhibition wher e th e map s of Israel from th e tim e of th e twelv e tribe s unti l th e 2 9 Novembe r 194 7 Partitio n Pla n wer e displayed; als o in th e exhibitio n wer e photo s o f the Britis h evacuatio n o f Palestine, o f Davi d Ben-Gurio n announcin g th e creatio n o f th e Jewis h state, o f kibbutzim an d th e Israe l Defens e Forces , an d o f Israel s majo r cities a s well a s th e Nege v desert ; Israel i flags were hoiste d i n public. 73 Based o n ha-Bonim' s reporting , th e exhibitio n wa s a success, it s organiz ers facin g n o oppositio n fro m th e Frenc h authoritie s o r th e makhzan. I n all likelihoo d thi s i s attribute d t o th e fac t tha t eve n i f such event s wer e politically motivated , the y wer e tolerate d b y th e Frenc h onc e define d a s "cultural events. " Who wer e th e member s o f ha-Boni m i n Morocco ? I n Fez , Meknes , and Sefro u the y were mostl y high schoo l students enrolle d a t the Frenc h Protectorate institutions . I n othe r words : youths comin g fro m well-to-d o families whos e member s alway s benefited fro m th e finest educatio n avail able i n Morocco . Th e les s privilege d childre n frequented th e AI U schools . Notwithstanding, b y th e earl y 1950 s ha-Boni m an d othe r movement s began t o attract int o their rank s youths from les s privileged backgrounds , including AIU students. 74 Like othe r Zionis t pionee r movements , Dro r promote d project s tha t included summe r an d winte r camp s i n th e Atla s mountains , seminar s fo r madrihim, an d aspect s o f hachshara fo r lif e i n th e kibbutz . However , Dror (lik e ha-Shomer ha-Tsa cir) wa s more ideologicall y oriente d tha n ha Bonim an d committe d t o attractin g youth s t o th e idea s o f socialist Zion ism. Dro r wa s accused o f singing th e Internationale i n thei r club s an d o f waving th e Sovie t flag—intimidating feature s tha t stirre d resentmen t i n rabbinic circles , amon g adherent s o f ha-P o c el ha-Mizrahi/Bne- cAkiva, and a t th e Frenc h Residency . Ha-Boni m maneuvere d mor e prudentl y and, t o aver t alienatin g th e traditionalists , it s emissarie s conceale d thei r socialist principle s an d politica l goals . Moreover , member s o f Dro r an d ha-Shomer ha-Ts a c ir contributed t o thei r unfavorabl e imag e b y smokin g in publi c o n th e Sabbat h an d conductin g debate s ove r Marxis m an d Leninism, eve n i n synagogue s o r communit y centers . Interestingly , th e opposition t o Dro r an d ha-Shome r ha-Ts a c ir emanate d als o fro m ha Bonim an d it s emissaries . Fro m 1949-5 0 onward , ha-Boni m fomente d opposition t o thes e movement s a s par t o f Mapai' s competitio n wit h Ma pam, seekin g t o diver t thei r membershi p int o it s movemen t an d furthe r

150 Morocco's

Struggle for Independence Table 12 . Financia l Assistanc e fro m N o c ar ve-he-Haluts t o Zionis t Yout h Movement s in Morocco , 195 4 Movement French Ha-Bonim 313,60 Dror 313,60 Ha-Nocar ha-Tsiyoni 171,50 Ha-Shomer ha-Tsa cir 98,00 Total 896,70

Francs 0 0 0 0 0

Source: Dr . Benzio n Benchalo m t o Pessa h Rodnik , 2 3 Ma y 1954, CZA,S32/N o c ar ve-he-Haluts Files .

tarnish thei r imag e i n th e communities . I n fact , Dror s emissarie s an d youth member s reproache d ha-Boni m fo r resortin g t o unethica l propa ganda tactics. 75 Whereas Dror , ha-Shome r ha-Ts a c ir, an d eve n ha-Boni m neve r mad e significant inroad s befor e 195 2 amon g th e youths, 76 Bne- cAkiva o f th e Religious Zionist s dre w considerabl e suppor t a s earl y a s 1946 . Ha-P o c el ha-Mizrahi's chie f emissary in Frenc h Morocc o claimed i n 195 0 that afte r several years o f activity, th e movemen t ha d sixtee n madrihim, seventee n branches i n the urban centers,an d a s many as 1,937 member s an d forme r members. Severa l madrihim wer e dispatche d t o Israel , France , an d England fo r specia l trainin g and , betwee n 194 8 an d 1950 , 10 6 youth s were sen t t o France vi a c Aliyat ha-No c ar for hachshara. 77 The Zionis t yout h movement s throughou t Nort h Afric a wer e depen dent financially o n th e N o c ar ve-he-Halut s Departmen t a s wel l a s o n their paren t movement s i n Israel . I t appear s tha t th e AJDC , too , allo cated fund s fo r th e movements , althoug h w e lac k precis e dat a o n th e extent o f th e support . Th e N o c ar ve-he-Halut s Departmen t fund s i n Jerusalem wer e usuall y sen t t o N o c ar ve-he-Halut s i n Pari s an d the n disbursed i n Morocco . Fo r example , i n sprin g 195 4 Pessah Rodnik , chie f emissary o f No c ar ve-he-Haluts i n Paris , transferre d approximatel y 900,00 0 francs t o th e Zionis t yout h movement s an d t o thei r emissaries , wit h th e exception o f Bne- cAkiva an d Beta r (se e tabl e 12). 78 Wer e thes e Jewis h Agency fund s onl y o r di d thi s includ e monie s mad e availabl e b y th e AJDC an d th e movement s i n Israel ? We hav e bee n unabl e t o determin e the financial breakdown . Though elitis t fo r th e mos t part , wer e th e movement s revolutionary ?

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Did the y succee d i n securin g ideologica l commitment s fro m th e youths ? Is it justified t o compare the m i n one fashion o r another t o their counter parts i n th e Diaspor a an d Israel ? The prevailin g opinio n durin g th e mid 1950s amon g th e emissarie s wa s tha t despit e certai n radica l tendencie s among Dror an d ha-Shomer ha-Ts a c ir—marginal movement s a t the tim e —the movement s a s a whol e wer e hardl y revolutionary . A n emissar y active wit h ha-Boni m observe d i n 195 4 tha t whil e th e movement s wer e intended t o becom e revolutionar y an d t o encourag e free thinking , thi s did not see m t o occur in Morocco . H e explaine d tha t ha-Bonim preferre d to recrui t youth s wh o frequente d th e Frenc h Protectorat e schools , as suming tha t i f the y wer e thoroughl y immerse d i n Frenc h cultur e the y would naturall y b e ope n t o liberal ideas . I t soo n becam e quit e apparent , however, tha t despit e thei r libera l Frenc h education , thes e youth s wer e remote fro m liberalism . I n 1954 , th e famil y uni t wa s stil l th e mos t authoritative aspec t i n thei r live s a s i n previou s years . Eve n a t ag e twenty-one th e youngster s wer e no t free d o f th e attachmen t t o thei r parents, a phenomenon tha t stoo d i n complet e contradictio n t o th e cen tral ideologica l them e o f th e yout h movement—independence . Sec ondly, thoug h a French-educate d intellectua l elit e di d emerg e i n th e urban communities , it s ai m wa s t o exploi t th e educationa l gain s onl y fo r social mobility . Further , th e parents , particularl y amon g th e economi cally disadvantaged , refraine d a s muc h a s possibl e fro m havin g thei r children participat e i n th e movements . I t i s equally noteworth y tha t th e lack o f majo r succes s wa s als o attribute d t o th e previousl y mentione d French Protectorat e polic y o f toleratin g th e movement s ye t refusin g t o grant the m officia l recognition. 79 The sam e emissar y painte d a rosie r pictur e o f th e EI F an d DEJJ . These group s wer e no t onl y accorde d lega l statu s b y th e authoritie s an d a licens e t o operate , bu t thei r member s wer e permitte d t o parad e i n their movements ' uniforms . Th e parents , too , di d th e utmos t t o sen d their childre n t o th e DEJ J an d EI F becaus e th e tw o movement s wer e regarded a s ideologicall y neutra l an d apolitical . Th e emissar y note d tha t the EI F ha d graduall y place d som e emphasi s o n moder n an d contempo rary Jewish values. 80 We lear n abou t th e growin g interes t o f Jewis h Agenc y personne l i n the officiall y non-Zionis t EI F an d DEJ J fro m ha-P o c el ha-Mizrahi' s emissary. Th e latte r wa s impresse d wit h DEJJ' s units , it s vocationa l an d Hebrew educationa l trainin g fo r indigen t melldh youths , th e summe r

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programs, an d th e foo d an d clothin g distributio n services . I n 1955 , DEJ J had branche s throughou t Morocco , i t receive d subsidie s fro m th e AJDC , while it s membershi p fa r outnumbere d an y combinatio n o f th e Zionis t youth organizations . Th e E I F wa s mor e elitis t bu t th e youth s obtaine d i n their club s a systemati c H e b r e w education . The y san g Israel i song s and , individually, mad e c allya vi a c Aliyat ha-N o c ar. Th e ag e categorie s o f E I F membership w e r e a s follows : nin e t o thirteen , thirtee n t o seventeen , an d eighteen t o twenty-two . Th e emissar y wa s abl e t o contac t thes e youths , entered thei r clubs , an d attempte d t o d e e p e n thei r Jewis h educatio n b y accentuating religiou s value s an d discussin g wit h the m th e histor y o f th e Jewish colonizatio n o f Palestine. 8 1 Ironically, a t th e ver y m o m e n t whe n tie s betwee n th e Zionis t an d non-Zionist yout h movement s wer e solidifying , politica l development s that woul d onc e an d fo r al l contribut e t o th e demis e o f tolerate d Israeli inspired activit y loome d o n th e horizon . Samue l L . Haber , AJD C direc tor fo r Morocco , reporte d that , i n Marc h 1956 , immediatel y afte r th e country achieve d independence , th e Zionis t yout h movement s cease d t o function i n th e ope n an d resorte d t o undergroun d conditions. 8 2 Avraha m Israeli, wh o wa s activ e wit h ha-Boni m an d ranke d amon g th e mos t important emissarie s i n Morocco , predicte d th e outcom e a t th e en d o f 1955. H e cautione d agains t pani c bu t informe d N o c ar ve-he-Halut s i n Jerusalem that , a s th e countr y wa s o n th e verg e o f independence , i t wa s inescapable fo r all Zionis t actio n t o b e reorganize d clandestinely : There i s serious concern tha t som e of the emissarie s will be force d t o leave and i t is possibl e tha t th e wor k carrie d ou t hithert o i n th e open , wil l hav e t o pas s t o different rails . Th e change s ma y no t b e immediate , fo r th e [Franco-Moroccan ] negotiations ar e no t final, an d henc e i t woul d b e feasibl e t o wor k fo r a t leas t several month s longer . Bu t ther e i s [ a state o f alert] fo r th e futur e an d thi s i s fel t in al l aspects o f Zionist work . Th e aliya i s gaining strengt h an d Israe l i s of majo r concern i n [Jewis h circles]. 83 In th e latte r hal f o f 1956 , th e member s o f th e yout h movement s operating i n th e undergroun d represente d al l th e above-mentione d groups . Most importantly , however , a specia l clandestin e apparatu s compose d o f young Zionists , includin g forme r yout h movemen t m e m b e r s , wa s forme d by th e Mossad, Israel' s secre t servic e agency . I t existe d i n Morocc o fro m August 1955 , whe n th e yout h movement s wer e stil l tolerated , an d func tioned alongsid e o f them. Th e Israeli-inspire d secre t apparatu s promote d

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self-defense trainin g amon g communitie s i n cas e o f physical harassmen t at th e heigh t o f th e Musli m struggl e fo r independence . Eventually , i n the post-195 6 period , i n conjunctio n wit h th e yout h movements—no w underground—the apparatu s assiste d i n organizin g illega l c aliya. I t fol lowed th e decisio n b y th e Morocca n authoritie s t o hal t Cadima' s work . The topi c is analyzed i n chapter 7 . Concerning th e Jewis h Agency' s Departmen t fo r Middl e Easter n Jewr y (DMO), th e Zionis t Genera l Counci l a t it s sessio n i n August-Septembe r 1948 decide d t o establis h a specia l departmen t fo r Jewis h affair s i n th e Middle Easter n an d Nort h Africa n Jewis h communities . Y a c akov Zeru bavel, a membe r o f th e Zionis t Executive , wa s appointe d a s it s head . Although man y o f the DMO' s emissarie s belonge d t o ha-Shome r ha-Ts a c ir's kibbutzim, an d wer e affiliate d wit h Mapam , severa l additiona l emis saries involve d wit h i t wer e member s o f othe r Israel i politica l move ments. Th e DM O wa s short-live d i n th e organizationa l constellatio n o f the Jewish Agency , havin g been dissolve d i n Septembe r 1951. The DM O wa s establishe d whe n Syria , Iraq , Jordan , an d Egyp t wer e already a t war wit h Israel . I t wa s observed i n Jerusalem tha t Israel' s wa r of independence serve d t o aggravat e th e hostilit y o f the Musli m popula tions towar d th e Jewis h minoritie s i n thei r midst . I n vie w of the militar y setbacks o f th e Ara b armie s i n th e Palestin e war , ne w trend s o f anti Jewish an d anti-Zionis t backlas h wer e evident , t o th e poin t wher e th e Zionist movemen t wa s faced wit h th e tas k o f mobilizing th e resource s a t the Worl d Zionis t Organizations ^ disposa l i n orde r t o rescu e th e Jew s "from tota l demoralization." 84 During it s first yea r o f existence, th e DM O regarde d it s principal rol e as consisting o f creating a n organizationa l apparatu s tha t woul d promot e channels o f communication throug h emissarie s wit h th e Jewis h commu nities o f th e Mediterranea n basin . Onc e trained , th e emissarie s wer e sent t o th e variou s Musli m countries . Severa l o f the m wer e operatin g illegally, other s semilegally—dependin g o n politica l condition s i n a give n country. Th e illega l emissarie s wer e traine d an d briefe d b y th e Mossa d Le c Aliya office s i n Paris . Simila r t o th e organizationa l prioritie s o f th e Mossad L e c Aliya i n establishin g i n Pari s th e mos t importan t offic e fo r dealing wit h emigratio n fro m th e Musli m countries , th e DM O followe d suit. It s offic e fo r oversea s operation s i n Pari s was directed b y Eli e Pele g who was active as an illegal emissary i n Egyp t betwee n 194 6 and 194 8 on behalf o f ha-Shomer ha-Ts a c ir. Throug h Pari s an d Jerusalem , th e DM O

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was activ e i n Morocco , Tunisia , Algeria , an d Egypt . I t als o opene d a n office i n Tehra n t o serv e a s a vita l lin k wit h Irania n an d Afghan i Jewry . The centra l offic e i n Jerusale m wa s largel y responsibl e fo r Libyan , Ye meni, an d Burmes e Jews. 8 5 In countrie s wher e th e D M O ' s wor k wa s tolerated—Morocco , Tu nisian, Algeria , an d Iran—socia l servic e center s wer e establishe d i n th e Jewish ghetto s t o provid e a n educationa l framewor k an d t o offe r socia l welfare benefit s geare d towar d preparin g th e youth s fo r c allya. I n thes e countries, th e D M O cooperate d wit h internationa l Jewis h organization s active o n th e scene , amon g the m th e AJDC , th e ORT , th e O S E , an d th e AIU. Th e D M O emissarie s sprea d Zionis t educatio n amon g melldh youth s in Morocc o an d imparte d knowledg e o f modern H e b r e w t o th e emigrant s and thei r childre n onc e the y entere d th e transi t camp s i n Marseilles. 8 6 The proces s o f rescuin g Jews , then , wa s no t automatic . Lik e othe r Israeli bodies , th e D M O aime d a t preparin g the m culturall y t o adjus t t o Israeli societ y whil e stil l livin g i n th e Diaspora . Referrin g t o Morocco , Elie Pele g note d i n Januar y 1950 : The liquidatio n throug h c ally aof Moroccan Jewr y wa s never intende d t o becom e an immediat e process . . . . Thei r transfe r t o Israe l i s th e onl y solutio n t o thei r problems. However , thi s proces s i s continuous an d wil l tak e plac e ove r a perio d of many years . . . . A s social work an d educationa l endeavor s ar e th e bes t mean s to prepar e th e Jew s fo r c aliya, thei r immediat e transfe r t o Israel , unprepare d fo r life i n the ne w surroundings[, ] wil l result i n disillusionment. 87 Beginning i n 1949 , th e D M O i n Morocc o commence d a n aggressiv e social wor k campaign . Le d b y Mas c ud Bitton , formerl y a socia l worke r i n Jerusalem's impoverishe d neighborhoods , th e emissarie s establishe d th e Centre Social i n th e melldh o f Casablanc a t o serv e a s a launchin g pa d fo r educational an d socia l activities , a s wel l a s t o hel p counterac t unemploy ment b y offerin g vocationa l training . I n 1950 , thi s cente r provide d ser vices t o abou t fou r h u n d r e d youn g persons . I t wa s visite d b y th e youths ' families, wh o wer e give n informatio n abou t c aliya. H e b r e w wa s taugh t only t o thos e wh o wer e no t absorbe d int o th e AI U an d O H schools . Th e center ha d a sport s sectio n tha t catere d t o youth s age d fourtee n t o eighteen, th e purpos e bein g t o promot e physica l educatio n an d "buil d the muscle s o f melldh children, " preparin g the m fo r th e rugge d lif e i n Israel. Th e emissarie s a t th e cente r taugh t Israel i singin g an d th e histor y

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of th e Yishuv . A s th e Zionis t pionee r movement s durin g thi s perio d attracted mostl y educate d youths , an d DEJ J ha d barel y com e int o exis tence, th e DM O sough t t o care for th e ghett o children . I t als o extende d activities t o th e tow n o f Taroudant i n th e Ante-Atla s whil e severa l emis saries manage d t o penetrate th e AI U school s i n Tangier an d th e Spanis h Zone, t o teach aspect s o f modern Hebrew. 88 In fact , th e DM O wa s th e firs t departmen t o f the Jewis h Agenc y tha t penetrated th e melldh o f Casablanc a successfully . I t collaborate d wit h OSE whic h provide d treatmen t t o th e youth s fo r ringwor m an d tra choma; wit h OR T t o populariz e vocationa l education ; an d wit h th e AI U teachers fo r Frenc h education . Th e cente r becam e a comprehensiv e elementary schoo l for unwante d o r deserted children . Despite initia l successe s i n th e Zionis t educationa l an d socia l wor k arenas, th e effort s o f the DM O wer e challenged . Sinc e mos t o f its emis saries wer e left-win g secularists , the y manage d t o irritat e th e rabbini c establishment i n Casablanc a an d Taroudan t fro m th e outset . Th e Reli gious Zionists' circles and th e supporter s o f Agudat Yisrael were unhapp y with th e lac k o f Jewish spiri t amon g th e envoys ; an d th e leader s o f th e youth sportin g sectio n withi n th e Charle s Nette r Associatio n resente d the fac t tha t th e Socia l Cente r i n Casablanc a compete d wit h the m i n attracting melldh youths , thu s testin g thei r popularity . Shortl y afte r th e DMO extende d it s wor k t o Morocco , emissarie s o f ha-Po c el ha-Mizrah i and ha-Boni m exploite d th e dislik e i n th e communitie s fo r ha-Shome r ha-Tsa c ir an d Mapam , t o whic h mos t DM O emissarie s belonged . The y accused th e latte r o f pressurin g melldh youth s unde r thei r influenc e t o join Mapam-dominate d kibbutzim afte r c aliya, an d o f furthering th e aim s of communism i n Frenc h Morocco . The crucia l turnin g poin t occurre d i n th e aftermat h o f th e "Esthe r Zaltz Affair. " O n 2 5 Novembe r 1950 , Esthe r Zaltz , a n emissar y o f th e DMO, wa s arreste d b y th e French , accuse d o f carrying a fake Tunisia n passport an d o f involvemen t i n communis t activity . Othe r emissarie s were subsequentl y detaine d fo r interrogations , amon g the m Ma s c ud Bitton, Evly n Gordon , an d Mirya m Ben-Dov . Th e Frenc h polic e in formed the m tha t th e informatio n leadin g t o thei r interrogatio n wa s provided b y "an importan t Jewis h dignitary." 89 Shortly befor e he r arrest , Zalt z was sen t t o Taroudant. He r behavior , according t o Jewis h communit y sources , wa s antagonisti c an d arouse d negative sentiment s towar d th e DMO . I n a highl y traditiona l Jewis h

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community suc h a s Taroudant, on e of the mos t orthodo x i n Nort h Africa , Zaltz woul d smok e i n publi c durin g th e Sabbat h an d sh e affixe d t o he r shirts lape l th e pi n o f th e Palmach—Israel' s elitis t pre-194 8 militar y unit. Sh e wa s als o criticize d fo r wearin g shor t pant s an d invitin g Israel i emissaries t o her apartment. 90 Zaltz' s attitude hastene d th e demise o f the DMO's influence , fo r i t appear s tha t certai n Jewis h notable s informe d the authoritie s abou t he r "irregular " activities . O n th e othe r hand , i t i s not clear i f the informant s kne w about th e illega l passport . The French , too , hardl y welcome d th e presenc e o f the departmen t i n their midst . The y suspecte d tha t i t wa s secretl y involve d i n magen: self defense trainin g o f Jewis h youth s i n cas e th e Jun e 194 8 pogrom s wer e repeated; bu t apparentl y thi s coul d no t b e proven . The y believe d tha t other aspect s o f DM O wor k wer e illega l an d feare d advers e reaction s from th e makhzan. Hence , th e Residenc y an d Frenc h securit y personne l searched fo r a motiv e t o accus e th e DM O o f using educatio n an d socia l work as a facade fo r a political conspiracy. Th e "Zaltz Affair" offere d the m the very motive neede d t o act. Followin g a meeting o f Marc Jarblum an d Helene Cazes-Benata r (the n th e AJD C representativ e fo r Nort h Africa ) with th e hea d o f th e resident-general' s diplomati c cabinet , th e Frenc h released Zalt z but insiste d tha t i n the future al l Jewish Agency emissarie s enter Morocc o wit h thei r prio r knowledge . Th e DM O emissarie s wer e expelled fro m Morocco. 91 The DM O dispatche d ne w emissarie s t o Morocc o i n 1951 . However , they enjoye d ver y limite d freedo m o f movement, wit h th e Frenc h secu rity service s an d th e Directio n d e llnterieu r monitorin g thei r pursuits . Their rol e wa s als o limited no w because th e Socia l Center i n Casablanc a could functio n onl y unde r th e auspice s o f a committee compose d o f local Jewish notables. 92 Whe n th e DM O wa s completel y dismantle d i n Sep tember 1951 , th e responsibilit y fo r it s enterprise s i n Morocc o an d else where wa s entruste d t o emissarie s o f th e Departmen t o f N o c ar ve-he Haluts. 93 Did th e dissolutio n o f the DM O com e abou t a s a result o f dissatisfac tion i n Mediterranea n basi n communitie s wit h it s ultrasecula r emissar ies? Wa s a decisio n adopte d i n th e Jewis h Agenc y becaus e it s head s thought tha t th e typ e o f activity exercise d b y th e DM O coul d b e carrie d out throug h th e Departmen t o f N o c ar ve-he-Haluts ? Perhap s certai n budgetary consideration s prevaile d i n thi s case . Wa s i t du e t o interna l political conflict s withi n th e Jewis h Agenc y betwee n th e DMO' s Mapa m

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7

proponents an d th e Mapa i an d ha-Po cel ha-Mizrah i elements ? Whateve r the motives , N o c ar ve-he-Halut s an d th e Casablanc a Jewis h leadershi p committee declare d tha t th e ai m o f maintainin g th e Socia l Cente r wa s "to prepare . . . young peopl e fo r c aliya, an d thu s i t becam e essentia l t o provide the m wit h Israel i education." 94 Indeed , betwee n 195 0 and 195 6 the Socia l Cente r i n th e melldh prepare d severa l thousan d youth s fo r c aliya. To what exten t wer e internationa l Jewis h organization s involve d wit h c aliya? This important aspec t i s the subjec t o f our analysis in chapter 5 .

Chapter 5

International Jewis h Organization s and th e c Aliya fro m Morocco : The Earl y an d Mid-1950 s

We noted i n chapter 1 that despite its generally anti-Zionis t attitud e unti l 1939, th e outbrea k o f Worl d Wa r II , th e Germa n occupatio n o f Franc e in June 1940 , an d th e ris e o f Vichy had a devastating impac t o n the AIU . It coul d n o longe r remai n indifferen t t o Zionis t goals . Unde r th e presi dency o f Ren e Cassin , a distinguishe d juris t an d membe r o f Charles d e Gaulle's government-in-exile , an d th e vice-presidency o f Jules Braunsch vig, th e organizatio n too k a ne w position . Thoug h i t di d no t becom e Zionist-oriented, afte r th e wa r th e AI U spok e o f th e nee d fo r Jewis h emigration t o Palestine , an d particularl y o f settlin g th e victim s o f Naz i Germany there . Did thi s chang e manifes t itsel f i n Morocco , th e bastio n o f th e AI U international schoo l network ? On e o f th e project s undertake n b y Braunschvig an d Reube n Tajour i (the n AI U Morocc o delegate ) wa s t o expand it s Jewis h educationa l programs , sometime s i n conjunctio n wit h the Jewis h Agenc y an d th e Stat e o f Israel . Thi s expansio n cam e abou t after 194 6 wit h th e creatio n i n th e Casablanca n subur b o f Oasi s o f th e Ecole Normal e Hebrai'qu e (ENH) , unde r th e leadershi p o f the Algeria n rabbi Yitsha k Rouch e an d hi s disciple s fro m Oran : Avraha m Hazan , Moi'se Amsellem, Emil e Sebban , an d Joseph (Jo ) Medioni . The EN H no w traine d th e futur e Hebrew/Judai c studie s teacher s fo r the AI U school s i n Morocco , an d late r fo r thos e i n Tunisi a an d Algeria . The purpos e wa s t o replac e th e rabbi-teacher s (responsibl e i n th e AI U 158

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9

Table 13 . Ecol e Normal e Hebrai'que , Genera l Educatio n (Hours pe r Week ) Courses Offered in the Area of General Education French Mathematics Physical sciences Natural sciences History Geography Music Design Physical education Classical Arabic Moroccan Arabic

Classes Sixth

Fifth

Fourth

Third

Pedagogical Year

6 5

6 5

5 5

6 5

2 —





2

2



1 2 1 — 1

1 2 1 1 —

1 2 1 1 —

2 2 1 1 —

— — — 1 —

2

2

2

2

2

4

4

5

4

6





1

1



Source: Horaires Hebdomadaires des Matieres Enseignees avant 1956: E.N.H. Fo r providin g m e wit h the norma l school' s program , I woul d lik e t o expres s m y gratitud e t o th e AI U delegat e i n Casablanca , Elias Harms .

schools for Jewis h education ) who applied outdate d pedagogica l method s with th e typ e o f teacher s wh o woul d b e o n th e sam e leve l a s th e AI U general educatio n teachers , traine d i n France . Th e EN H buildin g in cluded dormitor y facilitie s fo r student s comin g fro m communitie s othe r than Casablanca , a dining hall , an d a synagogue. Educatio n wa s tuition free. I n 199 2 th e EN H stil l functione d a t th e sam e sit e althoug h mor e buildings an d facilitie s ha d bee n adde d sinc e th e 1960s , an d th e schoo l had bee n transforme d int o a Jewis h hig h school . Althoug h th e EN H today offer s th e hig h schoo l degree, know n a s the baccalaureat, unti l th e early 1960 s i t offere d th e Breve t d'Etude s d u Premie r Cycl e Secondair e (BEPCS) afte r fou r year s o f intensive Jewis h an d secula r education , plu s a fifth yea r designe d fo r pedagogica l trainin g (se e table s 1 3 and 14) . I n the decad e beginnin g i n 1951 , the EN H traine d 12 6 teachers: 8 6 taugh t at the AI U school s i n Morocco ; 1 3 pursued studie s a t the AIU s teachers ' college i n Pari s (probabl y t o be abl e to teach advance d secula r studies) ; 6

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Table 14 . Ecol e Normal e Hebrai'que , Jewis h Educatio n (Hours pe r Week ) Courses Offered in the Area of Jewish Education Talmud The written Tora h The ora l Torah Jewish histor y Jewish ethic s Hebrew compositio n Liturgy Hebrew penmanshi p and gramma r Psychology Pedagogical theor y Probation (stage )

Classes Pedagogical Year

Sixth

Fifth

Fourth

Third

3 5 4 2 1 — 1

3 4 5 1 1 — 1

3 4 3 2 — 1 1

3 2 2 1 — 1 1

12 4 2 2 — 1 1

— — — —

1 — — —

1 — — —

— — — —

1 2 1 2-4

Source: Horaires Hebdomadaires des Matieres Enseignees avant 1956: E.N.H. Fo r providin g m e wit h the norma l school' s program , I woul d lik e t o expres s m y gratitud e t o th e AI U delegat e i n Casablanca , Elias Harrus .

taught outsid e Morocco , mainl y in Tunisia and Algeria; and 21 apparently ceased teaching. * The institutionalizatio n o f Hebre w an d Jewis h educatio n a t th e AI U schools as planned sinc e 195 1 was by no means a n easy task. Whil e ther e were AI U genera l educatio n teacher s wh o welcome d th e reforms , ther e were als o teachers , som e o f who m wer e francophile s an d communists , who wer e determine d t o sabotag e al l effort s fo r increasin g Hebre w edu cation. Therefore , th e struggl e t o giv e th e AI U school s a greater Jewis h character, particularl y durin g th e earl y 1950s , wa s a protracted one . Ye t the pressur e tha t wa s pu t o n th e AI U t o continu e th e reform s an d improve th e pedagogical leve l of the Hebre w teachers , directe d fro m th e ENH an d th e AJDC, graduall y le d t o positive results . Furthermore, no t al l EN H graduate s teachin g a t th e AI U school s fel t that the y wer e carryin g ou t effectiv e reforms . The y wer e self-critica l an d expressed thei r view s to the educationa l inspector s who supervise d thei r work. The y sough t constantl y t o improve , an d th e teachin g o f Hebre w studies fiv e t o seven hour s weekly was seen a s a handicap. Nevertheless , even i f the EN H cadre s wer e mor e pedagogicall y qualifie d i n th e 1960 s

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than the y ha d bee n i n th e 1950s , th e beginning s o f reform wer e alread y felt a t the AI U school s in the earl y o r mid-1950s . By 195 6 whe n Morocc o achieve d it s independence , th e EN H ha d gradually replace d man y underqualifie d rabbi-teacher s o f Judai c an d Hebrew studie s wit h it s ow n graduates , institute d reform s i n Jewis h education, an d slowl y raise d th e standard s o f tha t educatio n wit h th e assistance o f th e AJD C an d th e Jewis h Agency' s emissarie s wh o wer e active in Morocc o from th e lat e 1940s . From th e earl y 1950 s ther e wer e Jewis h Agenc y emissarie s teachin g at th e EN H itself . Th e Departmen t o f Torah Educatio n i n th e Diaspor a of th e Jewis h Agenc y organize d shor t seminar s fo r educators , helpe d principals o f religiou s school s improv e thei r curriculum , an d provide d pedagogical guidanc e fo r teachers . The y contribute d significantl y t o th e work o f the Osa r ha-Tora h schools , th e teachers ' seminaries , th e kinder gartens, th e Hebre w Commission s courses (organize d i n 194 9 by Rouche , the communities , an d th e AJD C durin g evenings , weekends , an d vaca tion), an d t o the program s o f the ENH . At the en d o f 1955, a s Morocco was moving toward independence , th e Israelis sen t b y th e Jewis h Agenc y t o teac h i n th e variou s school s bega n to anticipate difficulties . Ther e were two reasons to justify thei r concerns . First, th e AI U wa s anxiou s t o introduc e Arabi c int o th e EN H an d th e other school s eve n befor e bein g forced t o do so by th e Morocca n author ities. Second , th e AI U wa s determine d t o disassociat e itsel f fro m th e Israelis i n th e publi c eye . c Akiva Kostenbaum , chie f emissar y o f th e Jewish Agency' s Departmen t o f Tora h Educatio n i n th e Diaspora , wa s informed tha t Tajouri , chie f delegat e o f th e AI U sinc e 1940 , ha d com plained tha t th e Israeli s wer e givin g to o man y lesson s a t th e EN H an d Moroccan Jewish teacher s ha d t o replace them . W e hav e been unabl e t o determine i f suc h pressur e resulte d i n th e withdrawa l o f Kostenbaum' s staff from th e ENH , or , i f so, th e precis e perio d o f such a withdrawal. There wer e othe r ENH/Israe l connections . Sinc e 1950 , th e Jewis h Agency an d th e Hebre w Universit y o f Jerusale m showe d considerabl e interest i n th e EN H and , throug h thes e institutions , th e EN H institute d a special certificate , administere d b y examinatio n fro m th e Hebre w Uni versity o f Jerusalem, know n a s "the Jerusale m Certificate. " Thoug h cer tainly no t a cart e blanch e fo r admissio n t o a n Israel i university , th e certificate examination , whic h teste d knowledg e o f th e fundamental s o f Hebrew languag e an d culture , wa s recognize d b y th e Hebre w Univer -

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sity. I t exempte d applicant s wh o hel d th e certificat e fro m certai n en trance examination s i n Hebrew . Th e certificat e aime d a t attractin g edu cated emigrant s fro m Morocc o t o stud y i n Israel . In addition , fo r severa l year s th e Departmen t o f Tora h Educatio n i n the Diaspor a conducte d a specia l summe r semina r i n Israe l fo r graduate s and student s o f th e E N H o f Casablanca . I t wa s du e partl y t o politica l factors an d t o Morocca n independenc e tha t th e AI U decide d t o shif t th e seminar t o th e Orsa y schoo l nea r Pari s durin g th e summe r o f 1956 . Thi s was don e i n collaboratio n wit h th e above-mentione d departmen t o f th e Jewish Agenc y an d th e Eclaireur s Israelite s d e Franc e (EIF) . I n subse q u e n t year s suc h seminar s wer e conducte d b y th e E N H i n Laversine , France. The E N H curriculu m i n th e 1950 s wa s bot h demandin g an d challeng ing. Fo r example , th e histor y o f th e Jewis h peopl e wa s taugh t throug h the moder n period . Accordin g t o Rouche : We taugh t th e futur e facult y o f the AI U school s th e histor y o f the Jewis h peopl e until 1860 , with th e grea t renaissanc e o f the Allianc e Israelit e Universelle . Fro m time t o tim e w e taugh t the m abou t Jewis h historica l event s sinc e 1860 , a s s o much ha d happene d i n th e Jewis h worl d b y th e tim e Worl d Wa r I brok e out . However, w e deemphasized Zionis t history. Th e reason s were tha t th e EN H was not an ideologica l cente r fo r Zionism , an d w e did no t wish t o alienate th e Frenc h and Morocca n authorities. 2 It i s obvious , however , tha t th e E N H teachin g staff , an d th e Israeli s wh o gave H e b r e w lessons , coul d no t avoi d altogethe r discussin g matter s relat ing t o politica l Zionism . Eve n th e apolitica l bulleti n o f th e E N H studen t body, Bikkurim, occasionall y include d informatio n regardin g Zionis t po litical leader s an d events . Jewish ethic s (musar), H e b r e w literature , an d H e b r e w wer e taught ; as Rouch e remarked : We taugh t [th e students ] abou t th e Haskal a movemen t . . . and th e literatur e o f Y. L . Gordon , Tshernichovsky , D Ahad H a c am an d Chai m Nahma n Bialik . Th e opponents o f the AI U wer e n o longer justified i n accusin g u s of dejudaization. A complete educatio n o f both traditiona l an d moder n Judais m wa s provided i n th e school. Th e suppor t fo r th e EN H an d th e AI U school s i n Morocc o was graduall y enhanced becaus e o f th e teachers ' trainin g program . Childre n fro m th e mos t remote communitie s o f th e Atla s mountain s enrolle d a t th e EN H and , i n fact ,

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3

one o f th e mos t vociferousl y anti-AI U rabbis , th e grea t Baruc h Toledan o o f Meknes, sen t hi s grandchild t o study a t the ENH. 3 The E N H progra m sometime s deviate d fro m th e prescribe d theoreti cal structur e outline d i n table s 1 3 an d 14 , lastin g fro m 8:0 0 A.M . t o 8:0 0 P.M. dail y wit h smal l break s an d tim e of f fo r sport s activities . Issacha r Ben-Ami, a graduat e o f the first clas s o f 1951 , recalled : We woul d g o t o ou r teachers ' home s an d spen d considerabl e tim e wit h them . They wer e extremel y encouraging . Th e wor k loa d fo r u s a t th e schoo l wa s enormous, fo r i t mean t attendin g tw o cours complementaires a t th e sam e time : one secula r an d on e Jewish . I wa s abl e afte r graduatin g fro m th e EN H t o spea k fluent Hebrew . Yo u canno t imagin e th e jo y an d satisfactio n w e ha d whe n m y students a t th e advance d classe s o f th e Narciss e Leve n schoo l i n Casablanc a could, afte r som e time , convers e wit h m e in Hebrew. 4 Until 195 5 i t wa s Rouch e wh o guide d th e E N H program s an d Jewis h educational reforms , influencin g th e AI U primar y school s an d cours complementaires. Davi d Sarfati , presentl y th e directo r o f the A l l f s Pari s teachers' trainin g college , an d a graduat e o f th e 195 1 clas s o f th e E N H , noted tha t Rouch e develope d a t th e schoo l a trainin g progra m fo r teach ers tha t combine d traditiona l Jewis h educatio n an d modernity . Followin g Rouche's deat h i n 1983 , Sarfat i spok e i n hi s honor , sayin g tha t owin g t o his efforts , H e b r e w a s earl y a s th e 1950 s becam e a language fo r conveyin g ideas, a langue vehiculaire, utilize d a t th e E N H a s i n an y Israel i school . While moder n Jewish/Hebre w literatur e ha d becom e familia r t o edu cated Morocca n Jew s befor e th e 1940s , i t wa s Rouch e who , i n onl y several years , integrate d thi s componen t systematicall y int o hi s school . Rouche's knowledg e wa s a mode l fo r th e E N H studen t t o emulate : Torah, Mishna , Talmud , an d Maimonide s cohabitate d a t th e E N H wit h H e b r e w gramma r an d languag e a s wel l a s wit h moder n an d contempo rary Jewis h literature . Jewis h traditiona l liturg y wa s taugh t alongsid e modern Israel i p o e m s . 5 In th e latte r hal f o f 195 5 Rouch e wa s replace d a s E N H directo r b y Emile Sebban . Th e exac t reason s fo r hi s departur e ar e disputed . Accord ing t o on e source , a t least , thoug h a n energeti c personality , Rouch e wa s disliked b y som e o f Morocco' s mos t powerfu l rabbi s an d notable s fo r hi s rationalist tendencies , ofte n relyin g o n reaso n a s th e basi s fo r establishin g religious truth . Whil e i n hi s nativ e lan d o f Algeria, o r i n France , suc h a n

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approach woul d hardl y hav e b e e n questioned , thi s wa s no t th e cas e i n Jewish M o r o c c o — t h e cradl e o f Jewish traditionalism . Th e AI U wa s thu s pressured t o remov e hi m fro m hi s post. 6 The toughes t componen t whic h thi s researche r encountere d whe n dealing wit h th e rol e o f th e E N H teacher s i n th e A l l f s school s concern s the metho d o f teachin g Hebrew . Wa s th e languag e taugh t i n th e sam e way a s i n Israel— c Ivrit be- cIvrit (Hebre w taugh t i n Hebrew) ? Durin g interviews I ha d conducte d wit h AI U alumn i wh o studie d unde r E N H teachers a s wel l a s wit h th e E N H educator s themselves , th e informatio n obtained wa s varied , confusing , an d inconclusive . Severa l alumn i an d E N H teacher s (Issacha r Ben-Am i an d Alber t Hazan , fo r instance ) insiste d that spoke n H e b r e w wa s applie d i n th e classroom . Others , lik e Davi d Sarfati, note d that , whil e H e b r e w wa s utilize d a s a livin g languag e at the ENH, thi s wa s no t necessaril y th e cas e i n othe r AI U schools , a s som e teachers di d no t conduc t classe s i n Hebrew . It seem s tha t c Ivrit be- cIvrit ma y hav e bee n propagate d i n certai n schools b y E N H teacher s bu t certainl y no t i n al l o f them . Moreover , b y 1956 a s wel l a s beyond , th e AI U wa s stil l unabl e t o replac e al l th e outmoded Judai c studie s teacher s wit h thei r E N H counterparts . Ther e were hundred s o f old-styl e rabbi-teachers , o r semiqualifie d n o n - E N H personnel, wh o continue d t o tak e charg e o f Jewish educatio n a t th e AIU . Though a significan t den t ha d bee n mad e i n th e struggl e agains t educa tional mediocrity , th e tas k wa s fa r fro m completio n an d th e qualit y o f th e Judaic/Hebrew educatio n a s lat e a s 1959-6 0 wa s uneven . W h e t h e r o r no t spoke n o r moder n H e b r e w wa s use d extensivel y outside th e E N H ther e ca n b e n o doub t tha t E N H graduate s taugh t H e b r e w literatur e an d Israel i song s a s lat e a s 195 6 an d perhap s later , thus familiarizin g Jewis h youth s a t th e AI U wit h aspect s o f th e livin g language, a s wel l a s layin g th e groundwor k fo r c ally a an d integratio n int o Israeli society . A s Sarfat i observed : The Program s include d course s o n Jewis h traditio n an d Israel i literatur e fo r th e advanced classes , a s wel l a s Hebre w language . However , i t woul d b e wron g t o think tha t complete Hebre w literatur e course s wer e taught . O n th e othe r hand , short poem s an d text s i n pros e wer e taught , representin g th e wor k o f the mos t renowned Israel i poets . Israel i song s were a n integral par t o f our Jewish progra m at th e AI U primar y schools . Thes e song s familiarize d th e youth s wit h aspect s o f the contemporar y Hebre w languag e an d culture . An d I thin k i t i s accurat e t o assert that , th e elementar y knowledg e acquire d b y our Morocca n student s a t th e

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5

end of the BEPC S degree level, enable d the m t o easily manage, onc e in Israel, to adjust to spoken Israeli Hebrew. 7 Educationally, then , th e AI U asiste d th e c ally a process. Politically, it s position durin g th e mid-1950 s wa s carefull y formulated bu t nevertheles s quite clear . O n th e on e hand , Cassi n hel d th e positio n tha t Franc e and , after 1956 , th e Moroccan s shoul d respec t th e desir e o f th e Jew s t o emigrate. O n th e othe r hand , Braunschvi g an d Tajour i too k th e positio n that aliya, conducte d b y Cadima , ha d t o b e selectiv e an d orderly . Eve n if the Frenc h intende d t o impose occasiona l restriction s o n Zionis t activ ity, Morocca n Jewis h leader s an d Jewish organization s i n America ha d t o avoid attackin g th e Residenc y o r th e Frenc h government . Braunschvi g did no t thin k tha t criticis m levele d agains t th e Frenc h woul d necessaril y lift restrictions , or , fo r tha t matter , persuad e the m t o increase c aliya. Th e French, h e argued , tolerate d Cadim a a s lon g a s i t carrie d ou t it s pro grams discreetly . When Lacost e too k initia l step s t o reduc e emigratio n t o seve n hundre d per month , Braunschvig , wh o had know n th e resident-general , wa s deepl y concerned that , i n vie w o f the nationalis t struggl e fo r independenc e an d the prevalenc e o f genera l insecurity , c aliya migh t becom e a n earl y vic tim. Ye t he urge d th e Israel i Ministr y fo r Foreig n Affair s no t t o pressur e the Frenc h b y way of American publi c opinion . H e propose d tha t exten sive negotiation s ove r thi s issu e b e hel d i n th e futur e betwee n th e French an d Israel i governments . I f additiona l pressur e wer e t o b e ap plied o n th e French , i t woul d hav e t o b e o n th e initiativ e o f Frenc h Jewry. Th e French , bot h Braunschvi g an d Cassi n believed , wer e ex tremely sensitiv e abou t America n pressur e an d th e continue d U.S . mili tary presenc e i n Morocc o a s factor s tha t migh t threate n Frenc h hege mony. Besides , sinc e th e Frenc h subsidize d th e AI U schools , AI U representatives i n Morocc o an d Franc e ha d t o b e carefu l no t t o antago nize the Residency. 8 Tajouri wa s equall y blunt—i f no t mor e so . Emigratio n t o Israel , h e said, wa s a desirabl e phenomenon . I t ha d t o b e orderly , wit h Cadim a making ever y effor t t o preven t "l a psychos e daffolement " (th e psychosi s of panic) among the Jews. 9 The AIU had indeed adapte d t o the new post 1945 political climat e i n th e Jewish world . However , doe s thi s mea n tha t all the Pari s leaders or , fo r tha t matter , th e teacher s an d schoo l director s in Morocc o supporte d th e Braunschvig-Cassin-Tajour i position ? I n fact ,

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a portion o f the staf f in Morocc o opposed or , a t best reluctantl y accepted , post-1945 Jewis h educationa l reform s an d ha d stron g anti-Zionis t lean ings. Ye t amon g th e staf f w e find activist s wh o ha d bee n assistin g c allya since 1949 . Accordin g t o Gdali a Paz o f c Aliyat ha-N o c ar, AI U teacher s assisted hi m i n organizin g emigration , particularl y i n th e communitie s o f Ouezzan, Sefrou , Safi , an d Fez. 10 Far mor e activ e o n th e c aliya issu e was the AJDC . W e hav e see n tha t in Morocco , Israel , an d Europe , th e AJD C collaborate d wit h th e Jewis h Agency an d th e Mossa d L e c Aliya. Certainly , th e AJD C sough t t o im prove th e socioeconomi c standard s o f Morocca n Jewry . Bu t i t simulta neously assiste d Israe l i n bette r organizin g emigration . Doubtless , th e AJDC's presenc e i n Morocc o was further prompte d b y Israel' s existence . One o f th e mai n reason s fo r th e increas e i n th e AJDC' s progra m i n Morocco afte r 194 8 wa s becaus e Morocca n Jew s wer e streamin g acros s the Mediterranea n t o th e jointl y ru n Jewis h Agenc y transi t camp s i n Marseilles, an d man y o f them ha d t o b e care d fo r sociall y an d medicall y before emigration . A s w e hav e seen , durin g th e perio d tha t Cadim a functioned unde r th e auspice s o f th e Mossa d L e c Aliya, th e apparatu s was initiate d wit h AJD C financia l assistance ; th e c aliya, too , woul d no t have been possibl e without AJD C funds. 11 AJDC collaboration wit h the Mossa d L e c Aliya and the Jewish Agency , though b y n o mean s continuousl y harmonious , suggest s tha t it s official s in Morocc o an d Europ e di d no t believ e tha t th e Jews had, economically , any kin d o f future i n th e countr y an d tha t emigratio n wa s a majo r long term objective . Alread y i n Decembe r 1948 , Juda h J . Shapiro , the n th e AJDC directo r o f educatio n fo r Europe , ha d travele d t o Morocc o t o survey emigration . Durin g a meeting with th e Protectorate s educationa l authorities, Shapir o was told tha t th e sulta n wa s disturbed b y th e knowl edge tha t a sizabl e portio n o f th e Jewis h populatio n wishe d t o leav e Morocco an d wa s departin g illegally . Th e America n consu l a t Raba t explained t o hi m tha t th e sulta n feare d disruptio n o f hi s econom y a s a result o f emigration en masse. 12 Shapiro dismissed th e argumen t tha t th e Jews were a n economic asse t to the sultan . The y simpl y had n o place in the economy , whic h was a real reason fo r thei r desir e t o leav e fo r Israel . H e pu t th e blam e squarel y o n the AIU whic h h e suspecte d o f promoting thes e fals e theorie s amon g th e sultan's minister s an d concluded :

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We ca n an d mus t quit e properl y discus s wit h th e Frenc h governmen t o n th e highest level , wha t thei r ow n plan s ar e fo r th e Jew s o f Morocco . I n thi s respec t the AI U ha s bee n th e spokesma n befor e governmen t official s an d I obtaine d th e impression reluctantl y an d sadl y tha t i t i s mor e eage r t o revea l itsel f a s a loya l and understandin g Frenc h organizatio n tha n as an aggressive and militan t protec tor o f th e Jewis h position . Th e inabilit y o f th e Jewis h populatio n t o emigrat e despite lac k o f economi c opportunitie s i n Morocc o i s somethin g tha t mus t b e discussed boldly . Ther e i s nothin g wron g i n a n America n organizatio n suc h a s ours i n raisin g th e questio n abou t emigratio n opportunitie s fo r downtrodde n Jews. 13 This positio n o n th e AI U an d emigratio n wa s no t th e commonl y accepted polic y o f th e AJDC . Durin g th e 1950s , th e tie s betwee n th e AJDC an d th e AI U wer e fortified , i f onl y t o collaborat e i n promotin g educational policie s tha t woul d prepar e Jewis h youth s fo r eventua l ab sorption int o Israel i society . Eve n it s positio n o n c allya i n genera l was , after 1949 , expresse d i n moderat e tone s i n orde r t o avoi d antagonizin g the F r e n c h wh o ha d unethusiasticall y permitte d th e AJDC , a n America n organization, t o functio n withi n th e confine s o f the Protectorate . Added t o it s effort s befor e 195 1 t o finance th e emigratio n proces s conducted b y th e Mossa d L e c Aliya an d th e Jewis h Agency , th e AJD C continuously subsidize d an d promote d H e b r e w cultura l educatio n an d assisted loca l Zionist s wit h th e obviou s goa l o f preparin g th e Jew s fo r c ally a. 14 The positio n o f the AJD C o n c aliya wa s strikingl y simila r t o th e policie s of th e Jewis h Agenc y an d th e Stat e o f Israel . B y 1954-55 , al l agree d tha t the economi c condition s o f th e Jew s ha d begu n t o deteriorate , and , i n the wak e o f th e spreadin g struggl e fo r independence , th e Frenc h migh t attempt t o cemen t th e crack s i n th e Morocca n edific e b y offerin g eco nomic an d politica l palliative s detrimenta l t o th e statu s o f th e Jews . A t the en d o f Ma y 1955 , te n month s befor e Morocc o becam e formall y independent, Mose s W . Becklema n an d Samue l L . Habe r (the n AJD C — Morocco director ) share d th e positio n tha t healt h an d socia l criteri a should continu e t o b e applie d i n screenin g candidate s fo r £ allya. This , o f course, di d not mea n that : (1 ) i n bot h AJD C an d Jewis h Agenc y circle s there wa s no t a definite inclinatio n t o increas e th e yearl y quot a o f emigra tion whil e maintainin g selectivity ; an d (2 ) i f and whe n th e Jew s migh t b e in physica l dange r a rescu e operatio n shoul d b e rule d out . A s Habe r succinctly pu t i t i n 1954 :

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We hop e we will be allowe d a longer perio d bu t five years is enough fo r plannin g —a pla n whic h woul d involv e constructive wor k i n th e village s s o that th e youn g who, today , canno t b e accepte d fo r emigratio n becaus e o f the infirmitie s o r socia l conditions o f th e elders , wil l b e eligibl e i n a few years ' tim e an d wil l b e bette r prepared fo r life i n Israel. . . . Israel represents fo r the vast majority o f Moroccan Jewry, th e onl y have n i f the politica l an d economi c climat e continue s t o deterio rate. Unde r suc h condition s the y wil l be unabl e t o remai n i n Morocco , an d the y have n o other plac e t o go . Whil e tim e ma y be runnin g ou t fo r Morocca n Jews , i t is reasonabl e t o assum e an d t o hop e tha t w e shal l no t b e face d wit h a rescue o r disaster operation , an d tha t th e governmen t o f Israel an d th e Jewis h Agenc y wil l have tim e t o plan a n orderly evacuatio n ove r a reasonable lon g period o f time. 15

In othe r words : a disciplined , selective , orderl y emigratio n t o enabl e Israel t o absor b th e emigrant s effectively . The Worl d Jewis h Congres s (WJC ) ha d existe d sinc e 1936 , strugglin g for th e right s o f ma n an d th e improvemen t o f th e politica l statu s o f th e Jews worldwide . I n th e lat e 1940s , it s mai n section s wer e i n London , Paris, an d Ne w Yor k whe n i t bega n t o focus it s attentio n o n Nort h Africa , particularly o n th e Jewis h communitie s o f Morocc o an d Tunisia . I n 1949 , a sectio n o f th e WJ C wa s create d i n Morocc o throug h th e initiativ e o f influential loca l Jews , notabl y Zeid e Schulman , a Zionis t activis t an d businessman o f Ashkenaz i origin , J . R . Toledano , Mei r Toledano , an d Vitalis Altun . Th e sectio n wa s comprise d o f branche s i n severa l commu nities—Casablanca, Meknes , Fez , Por t Lyautey , an d Oudjda . Al l thes e were subordinat e t o a central committe e i n Casablanc a an d t o th e centra l WJC offic e fo r Nort h Africa , ru n b y Jacque s Lazarus , a former activis t in bot h th e Frenc h Resistanc e an d th e Hagana . Throug h th e loca l activ ists an d Lazarus , th e Politica l Burea u o f the WJ C i n London , directe d b y Alexander L . Easterman , an d th e Frenc h section , le d b y Pierr e Dreyfus Schmidt, receive d ampl e dat a o n th e conditio n o f Nort h Africa n Jewr y i n the postwa r period . Thi s importan t sourc e o f informatio n existe d unti l the summe r o f 195 9 whe n th e governmen t o f independen t Morocc o closed th e W J C branches . The WJ C positio n amon g it s loca l activist s a s wel l a s i n E u r o p e an d the Unite d State s wa s tha t a s lon g a s th e politica l situatio n i n Morocc o was stable , th e struggl e for independenc e impendin g bu t stil l dormant , and a s lon g a s Jewis h emigratio n fro m Morocc o t o Israe l o r elsewher e had no t reache d majo r proportions , ever y effor t ha d t o b e mad e t o fight for improve d Jewis h right s i n Morocco ; tha t is , t o persuad e th e Frenc h

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to enhanc e Jewis h participatio n i n th e administrativ e apparatus , i n gov ernmental bodies , an d i n th e moder n economi c sector , i n vie w o f th e education tha t th e Jews were increasingl y acquirin g through th e AIU an d Protectorate schools , primar y a s well as secondary. 16 In a report submitte d b y th e WJ C Morocca n sectio n t o the WJC thir d plenary session , meetin g i n Genev a i n Augus t 1953 , it was state d explic itly that , give n th e enormou s challenge s o f emigrant absorptio n i n Israe l and the lack of economic means on the part o f most emigrants who could , therefore, no t becom e absorbe d immediatel y int o Israel i society , th e WJC leadershi p i n Morocc o though t i t pruden t t o encourag e c ally a b y quality rathe r tha n i n quantity . Israe l neede d th e physicall y strong , th e educated, an d thos e wh o coul d easil y find thei r plac e i n th e economy . The repor t emphasize d tha t thi s polic y ha d bee n almos t unanimousl y adopted b y th e WJ C Casablanc a Centra l Committe e i n vie w o f th e political realitie s o f the times : i n 1953 , as in th e previou s fou r years , th e Jewish population confronte d n o dangers. 17 In th e effor t t o obtai n politica l concession s o n th e Jews ' behalf , th e WJC durin g th e year s 1955-5 6 di d no t rul e ou t th e possibilit y tha t France might grant Morocco independence. Easterma n an d Joseph Gouldi n (Golan), political secretary of the WJC president, Dr . Nahu m Goldmann , had establishe d tie s wit h Morocca n nationalists , especiall y wit h th e pro gressive win g o f th e Istiqla l part y le d b y Mehd i Be n Barka . A s Gola n revealed i n Apri l 195 6 whe n Morocc o ha d alread y obtaine d indepen dence, th e WJ C had bee n i n contact fo r tw o years with th e leader s o f the Istiqlal an d othe r semiclandestin e movements . Gola n an d Easterman , according t o thi s version , agree d t o suppor t th e nationalis t caus e i n international forum s provide d th e nationalist s would , o n th e prope r oc casion (independence) , hono r Jewis h rights , provid e th e Jew s wit h citi zenship i n th e ne w Morocco , an d gran t the m freedo m o f movement . Ben-Barka, i n particular, praise d th e WJ C an d promised t o cooperate. 18 Actually, eve n followin g th e outbrea k o f violence an d th e struggl e fo r independence, th e WJ C i n Morocco , Europe , an d th e Unite d State s went ou t o f its wa y t o avoi d publicl y antagonizin g eithe r th e Frenc h o r the nationalist s ove r th e emigratio n issue . Followin g th e statement , lat e in Augus t 195 4 i n Ne w York , b y Mosh e Kol , hea d o f c Aliyat ha-N o c ar, that a "plan" existed for transferring 450,00 0 North African Jew s to Israel, a statement regarde d a s totally irresponsible, eve n by the highest govern ment official s i n Israel , Easterma n wa s perturbed . I n a not e sen t t o

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Moshe Sharett , Israel s premie r an d ministe r fo r foreig n affairs , h e indi cated tha t thi s statement , thoug h obviousl y no t reflectin g eithe r Israe l o r the Jewish Agency' s position , an d servin g merely a s a gimmick for enlist ing financial suppor t fro m America n Jews , ha d been widel y publicized i n the Morocca n press . I t ha d cause d extrem e consternatio n i n th e Jewis h community an d disquie t i n Frenc h an d Musli m circles. 19 This di d no t mean , however , tha t behin d th e scene s th e WJ C was no t reconsidering som e of its policies. Followin g the series of events in which the nationalist s calle d fo r returnin g Muhamma d V t o th e thron e fro m exile a s wel l a s independence , Easterma n cam e t o believ e tha t emigra tion o n a larger scal e wa s inevitable . Comparin g th e nationalis t move ment i n Morocco , th e Istiqla l included , t o th e secula r Neo-Destou r movement i n Tunisia , Easterma n di d no t think , give n th e conservativ e nature o f Morocca n nationalism , tha t th e Jews , a s a larg e community , could hop e fo r genuin e coexistenc e wit h th e Muslims. 20 Still , h e argue d that a reduce d Jewis h communit y woul d alway s exis t ther e and , there fore, contact s wit h th e nationalist s wer e essential . Goldmann , too , no w favored increase d c aliya but , lik e Easterman , di d no t thin k i t ha d t o b e accomplished a s a n evacuatio n operation . Durin g th e Augus t 195 5 ses sion i n Jerusale m o f the Genera l Counci l o f the Worl d Zionis t Organiza tion, h e state d that : "I t i s perfectly correc t tha t th e emigratio n o f Nort h African Jewr y mus t tak e plac e i n Israel . Bu t n o Zionist progra m provide s that i t must b e i n 1955!" 21 The WJC Morocca n Executiv e supporte d th e position o f the Morocca n Zionist organizatio n whic h i n 195 5 calle d fo r a n c aliya o f a t leas t 5,00 0 persons pe r mont h a s oppose d t o th e Jewis h Agency' s quot a o f approxi mately 2,000 . I n thi s sense , the y share d Easterman' s positio n bu t too k i t further. I n contras t t o thei r polic y o f 195 3 callin g fo r "qualit y emigra tion," the y submitte d a repor t o n 2 4 Januar y 195 5 t o th e WJ C i n Pari s suggesting that : whil e th e possibilit y tha t th e Petitjea n massacr e wa s a n isolated even t shoul d no t b e rule d out , th e Jew s i n th e village s o f southern Morocc o wer e expose d t o arbitrar y measure s adopte d b y loca l Mus lim officials . Althoug h th e sam e wa s not th e cas e i n Casablanca , Marrak esh, Essaouira , o r Fez , sinc e polic e protectio n wa s regularl y afforde d t o the Jew s an d Europea n residents , th e escalatio n o f violence wa s boun d to ge t worse . True , th e Jew s claime d t o b e neutra l i n th e Moroccan French struggle , bu t everyon e kne w tha t i n realit y the y wer e pro-French . Economically, too , th e futur e wa s no t promising . Jewis h businessme n

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were bein g boycotte d b y Muslim s i n bot h smal l town s an d majo r cities . Without substantiatin g it s claim, th e WJC Morocca n leadershi p observe d that Musli m merchant s an d artisan s wer e bein g encourage d b y th e na tionalists t o boycot t Jewis h merchant s i n orde r t o eliminat e "l a concur rence juive " (Jewis h competition) . Moreover , seriou s unemploymen t prevailed amon g th e Jews : a s mentione d earlier , th e American s ha d employed man y o f them i n construction, bu t the y n o longer needed thei r services.22 Hence , i n vie w o f th e economi c an d politica l crises , emigra tion seeme d th e mos t viable alternative. 23 The rapi d pac e o f events i n Morocc o cause d furthe r confusio n i n th e ranks o f the WJC . I n Augus t 1955 , a top-level French-Morocca n confer ence too k plac e a t Aix-les-Bains . I t resulte d i n a compromis e providin g for th e remova l o f Sulta n Be n c Arafa an d th e formatio n o f a Morocca n government heade d b y S i M'Bare k Bekka'i , a close confidan t o f Muham mad V , a politica l independent , an d th e governo r o f Sefrou . O n 1 6 November 1955 , the sulta n returne d t o Morocc o from Madagascar , whil e further negotiation s led , o n 3 Marc h 1956 , t o th e abrogatio n o f th e Protectorate Treat y o f 191 2 an d th e recognitio n o f Morocco' s indepen dence. Althoug h th e majorit y o f the WJ C representative s i n Nort h Afric a and Europ e supporte d large-scal e c aliya, some , especiall y younge r rep resentatives i n Morocco , no w tended t o oppose it. Thi s was the cas e with Meir Toledano , wh o ranke d amon g thos e advocatin g Jewis h integratio n and assimilatio n int o the ne w Morocco . In Septembe r 195 5 Toledan o publishe d a n articl e i n he Monde, i n which h e describe d th e Morocca n nationalis t movemen t a s "natura l an d irresistible." If , h e wrote , instea d o f thwartin g a natura l an d irresistibl e movement, Franc e woul d facilitat e th e politica l developmen t o f Mo rocco, th e gratefu l Morocca n peopl e woul d neve r b e abl e t o contes t th e established right s of France i n Morocco , th e exercis e of which was essen tial to France' s rol e a s a great worl d power . Morocca n Jewry , too , ha d t o rally behind th e ide a of a free Morocco. 24 What wa s th e actua l positio n o f th e WJ C as an organization o n th e eve o f independence ? Th e olde r Morocca n representative s an d thos e representing th e Algier s an d Europea n sections , thoug h satisfie d tha t during th e negotiation s a t Aix-les-Bain s Istiqlal i leader s broache d th e matter o f includin g a Jewis h ministe r i n th e first Morocca n cabine t (a n offer mad e goo d whe n Dr . Leo n Benzaque n wa s appointe d i n 195 6 a s minister o f posts an d telegraphs), 25 articulate d thei r argument s throug h

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Jacques Lazarus . Th e latte r asserte d i n Octobe r 195 5 tha t hencefort h Moroccan Jewry' s futur e neede d t o b e conditione d b y tw o necessities . First, c aliya, whic h implie d tha t thos e Jew s wh o wer e determine d t o settle i n Israe l shoul d hav e th e opportunit y t o do so. This major proble m could not be avoided, mos t particularly a t a time when economi c burden s pressed heavil y o n th e Jews . An d besides , Morocco' s Muslim s ha d t o understand wha t th e Stat e o f Israel represente d t o every Jew ; the y mus t not attemp t t o restric t th e passio n o f those who , move d b y centuries-ol d sentiments, turne d thei r hope s t o th e secon d fatherland . Second , integration becaus e c aliya alon e woul d no t solv e th e Jewis h problem . Th e poor an d disinherite d ha d departed . Onl y a small fractio n o f the middl e class wa s contemplatin g c aliya. Furthermore , th e numbe r o f emigrant s was balanced b y the natura l birt h rate. 26 Continuing to support large-scal e c aliya but opposin g mass evacuation , Easterman expresse d extrem e disma y i n Novembe r 195 5 about Shraga i who ha d stated : "100,00 0 Nort h Africa n Jew s ar e knockin g a t th e Jewis h Agency's door s demandin g immediat e emigratio n befor e i t is too late." 27 Not onl y di d Easterma n doub t tha t s o man y Jew s wer e determine d t o leave a t onc e bu t adde d tha t th e tendenc y o f certain Israel i an d Jewis h Agency official s t o cry "liar " when Morocca n nationalist s gav e assurance s of Jewish right s (a s the y ha d don e a t Aix-les-Bains ) wa s counterproduc tive. Th e aim , i n hi s opinion , ha d t o be th e adoptio n o f a friendly polic y toward th e futur e leader s o f Nort h Afric a s o a s t o safeguar d th e flow o f no

emigration. Finally, th e America n Jewis h Committe e (AJC) , founde d i n 190 6 t o fight fo r Jewis h right s i n way s simila r t o th e WJC , ha d establishe d clos e ties wit h th e Morocca n Jewis h leadershi p i n 1949—although , unlik e th e WJC, i t di d no t hav e representative s a t th e loca l level . A s an America n organization eage r t o cooperate wit h Europea n an d Nort h Africa n Jewry , the AJ C ha d establishe d a liaiso n offic e i n Paris . It s representatives , notably Zacharia h Shuster , Ma x Isenbergh, an d Ab e Karlikow , ha d bee n dispatched regularl y o n fact-findin g mission s t o Morocc o an d Tunisi a since 195 0 t o pres s fo r politica l reform s an d mee t Jewis h leader s an d French officials . Unlike th e WJC , whic h wa s headed b y both Zionist s and non-Zionist s alike, th e AJ C was purely a n America n organizatio n le d b y non-Zionists . While no t rejectin g c aliya outrigh t an d eve n understandin g Morocca n Jewish aspiration s t o settl e i n Israel , th e AJ C di d no t enthusiasticall y

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support it . Mor e tha n th e WJ C an d th e AJDC , i t stresse d th e nee d fo r a struggle for political rights on the Jews' behalf, sinc e the majorit y o f them would no t settl e i n Israel for quit e som e time . From th e outset , th e AJ C painte d a negative portrai t o f the makhzan and th e Frenc h Protectorate . Shuste r an d Isenbergh , i n fact , grossl y distorted th e attitud e o f the sulta n towar d hi s Jewis h subjects , althoug h there wer e certai n element s o f trut h i n thei r overal l assessment . Th e sultans of Morocco, the y claimed, considere d th e Jews as guests, individ uals who , no t bein g national s o f th e country , could , however , benefi t from th e protectio n give n a guest . Suc h protectio n neve r attaine d th e level o f a righ t o r a lega l obligation . I t wa s a favor , a mora l obligation , but no t a legal one . Moreover , th e Jew s were alway s a t th e merc y o f the sultan: hi s whim s an d will wer e th e onl y law , an d ther e wa s n o othe r legal consideratio n tha t woul d interven e t o limi t th e arbitrarines s o r cupidity o f the suzerain. 29 The French , too , were responsibl e fo r th e politicall y unstabl e positio n of th e Jews , accordin g t o th e AJC . Th e establishmen t o f th e Frenc h Protectorate di d not bring with it French principle s concerning the right s of ma n o r th e Frenc h civi l code . Th e right s o f th e Jew s wer e no t men tioned a t al l i n th e Franco-Morocca n Protectorat e Treat y o f 3 0 Marc h 1912. Rather , a slo w proces s o f socia l an d politica l evolutio n ha d begu n which, i n th e post-194 5 period, wa s very fa r fro m completion . Th e mai n contribution o f th e Frenc h wa s thei r guarante e an d protectio n o f th e Jews' basic physical security. 30 Pointing with grea t accurac y t o the Frenc h a s the force responsibl e fo r maintaining a polic y o f "equilibre social" (socia l balance ) amon g bot h Muslims an d Jews , Shuste r an d Isenberg h argue d tha t th e Frenc h ha d no intentio n o f undoin g th e basi c lega l syste m prevailin g i n Morocc o which wa s base d o n Qurani c interpretations . Th e Frenc h showe d defer ence t o the customs , mores , an d law s practiced throug h th e centurie s b y the Sharifia n sultanate . The y alway s emphasize d tha t thei r ai m wa s t o respect th e belief s an d tradition s o f the indigenou s population , whethe r they were Muslim s o r Jews. Th e Frenc h recognize d that , fo r thi s reason , Jews coul d no t b e chose n t o exercis e th e function s o f governor s o r administrators withi n th e makhzan, an d owin g t o th e perpetua l alle giance that both Muslim s and Jews were require d t o pledge t o the sultan , the Jew s coul d no t acquir e Frenc h o r an y othe r citizenship . Neverthe less, th e Frenc h refraine d fro m puttin g pressur e o n th e Morocca n au -

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thorities t o introduc e reform s i n th e statu s o f th e Jews . A s w e note d before, the y di d defin e way s i n whic h Frenc h citizenshi p coul d b e ac quired i n Morocco , bu t th e Jew s were virtuall y ineligible , fo r the y coul d become Frenc h onl y i f thei r mother s wer e livin g i n Franc e a t th e tim e they applied fo r citizenship, o r if they had performed exceptiona l service s in the Frenc h arm y for a considerable perio d o f time. 31 Economically, Shuste r an d Isenberg h observe d tha t th e Jew s i n th e melldhs earne d a living as small traders an d merchants . Thei r shop s wer e tiny stall s wher e th e Jewis h entrepreneu r "squatte d wit h hi s wares. " Other Jew s were artisan s an d craftsmen . I t i s noteworthy tha t an increasing numbe r o f inhabitant s o f th e melldhs manage d t o rais e themselve s out o f these quarter s t o live in the Europea n section s o f the cities . I n th e bled, th e Jew s wer e actuall y peddler s makin g a livin g b y travelin g fro m village t o villag e wit h a stac k o f goods , a t th e sam e tim e buyin g th e agricultural product s o f the Muslim s for resale. A n unfavorable tren d wa s that Muslim s ha d begu n encroachin g sinc e 194 5 o n trade s an d occupa tions, suc h a s tailoring an d shoemaking , hithert o lef t t o th e Jews . I n th e interior, th e road s buil t b y th e Frenc h an d th e accessibilit y o f buses an d trains were cuttin g into the busines s o f the Jewis h peddlers, wh o had no t successfully develope d alternativ e occupation s o n a sufficient scale. 32 When th e AJD C reache d simila r conclusions , i t encouraged it s repre sentatives t o conside r th e c allya option . Thi s wa s no t th e cas e wit h Shuster an d Isenbergh . True , the y argued , th e tangibl e Frenc h assis tance t o th e Jew s ha d bee n disappointingl y insignificant , sinc e the y ha d studiously avoide d implementin g reform s the y fel t woul d unnecessaril y antagonize th e Muslim s an d di d no t wish t o appear mor e generou s t o th e Jews tha n t o th e Muslims . Ye t thes e an d othe r unfortunat e realitie s di d not legitimiz e c aliya, als o seein g tha t afte r th e grea t initia l wave of illegal emigration betwee n Jun e 194 8 an d Decembe r 1949 , ther e ha d com e a slower pac e whic h ha d continue d since . Shuste r an d Isenberg h raise d two reason s fo r thi s chang e o f pace: first, Morocca n Jew s ha d th e feelin g of bein g somewha t les s welcom e i n Israe l tha n Europeans , an d face d great difficultie s i n establishin g themselve s economically , a fact tha t ha d become know n t o Jew s i n Morocco ; an d second , th e strai n o n Israel' s absorption capabilitie s ha d cause d th e establishmen t o f a system o f priorities suc h a s healt h selectio n o f c aliya candidate s whereb y man y wer e

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rejected b y th e Mossa d L e c Aliya. Besides , becaus e Morocca n Jew s ha d gone t o Israe l i n 1947-4 9 untraine d an d unprepared , hundred s o f the m had returne d t o Morocc o b y 1950. 33 Even i f a ros y futur e di d no t awai t th e Jew s o f Morocco , th e AJ C Pari s office representative s argued , th e battl e fo r th e politica l an d socia l ame lioration o f the Jew s i n Frenc h Morocc o ha d t o b e fought . First , eve n th e most catastrophi c futur e development s coul d no t lea d t o al l Jew s leavin g Morocco. Second , tota l emigratio n t o Israe l fo r almos t a quarte r o f a million people , eve n i f i t coul d b e accomplished , woul d tak e a ver y lon g time. Therefore , a politica l battl e ha d t o b e fough t i n Morocc o first an d foremost, i n orde r t o pressur e th e Frenc h t o appoin t Jewis h lega l asses sors t o dea l wit h litigatio n i n th e Sharifia n court s involvin g Jew s who , whatever reform s migh t b e implemented , woul d remai n subjec t t o Qur anic la w i n domesti c an d pena l matter s wher e th e Muslim s wer e als o involved. Further , ther e wa s nee d t o pressur e th e Frenc h t o supervis e the Musli m court s closel y t o se e tha t lega l decision s affectin g Jew s wer e not discriminatory. 3 4 The majo r challeng e wa s t o encourag e th e Residenc y an d th e Frenc h government t o persuad e th e makhzan t o g o alon g wit h thes e an d othe r suggestions fo r improvin g th e Jews ' status . Th e AJ C Pari s offic e under stood tha t th e Frenc h governmen t wa s extremel y sensitiv e towar d an y American initiativ e regardin g Morocco . A s a consequence , direc t politi cal interventio n b y th e AJ C wa s imprudent , especiall y i n vie w o f Wash ington's desir e no t t o worr y th e French . Th e foca l poin t fo r politica l intervention ha d t o b e Paris , w h e r e th e majo r line s o f policy fo r Morocc o were drawn , despit e th e wid e power s lef t t o th e sulta n an d th e shadow y areas o f Morocca n sovereignt y wher e i t wa s no t certai n whethe r th e French o r th e sulta n mad e th e effectiv e decisions . Mor e important , perhaps, th e AJ C coul d enlis t th e goo d office s o f th e French AI U whos e representatives ha d clos e tie s wit h th e Qua i d'Orsay . A s Shuste r an d Isenbergh noted : The Allianc e Israelit e i s persona grata wit h th e Ministr y o f Foreign Affairs . I t i s highly sophisticate d an d experience d i n Morocca n problems . An d i t maintain s continuous contac t i n th e field . Therefore , ou r ever y effor t regardin g Morocc o should b e mad e i n clos e cooperatio n wit h th e Alliance . Th e AJ C ca n contribut e

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its international skill , and—in thos e situations where i t is deemed necessar y afte r due deliberations—it s contact s with th e U.S . authorities . We believe i t is advisable, therefore , tha t a committee o n Morocca n affair s b e formed i n Paris , consistin g o f th e Allianc e an d ourselves , t o serv e a s a centra l planning an d coordinatio n boar d fo r politica l action . W e fee l th e Allianc e some times ha s a tendenc y t o exaggerat e Frenc h sensitivit y regardin g Morocc o an d thus doe s no t ac t a s ofte n a s i t shoul d fo r fea r o f possibl e Frenc h governmen t repercussions. Suc h a committe e moreover , shoul d kee p clos e contac t wit h th e efforts o f the othe r Jewis h agencie s workin g i n Morocco , lik e th e AJDC , becaus e political, welfar e an d relie f program s interpla y s o closely i n dealin g wit h Moroc can Jewish affairs. 35

c

Aliya, then , wa s a n issu e o f secondary importanc e a t bes t fo r AJC , th e least salien t issu e fo r the m o f al l th e organization s activ e o n Morocca n Jewry's behalf . W e hav e bee n unabl e t o determin e i f th e AI U an d AJ C formed a committe e o n Morocca n affair s followin g Shuster' s an d Isen bergh's suggestions . I t i s known , however , tha t th e AI U an d AJC , to gether wit h th e London-base d Anglo-Jewis h Association , becam e par t o f the Consultativ e Counci l o f Jewis h Organization s (CCJO ) whic h fough t for Jewis h right s throughou t th e worl d an d wa s represente d a t th e Unite d Nations a s a nongovernmenta l organization . Th e AI U als o joine d wit h the WJ C i n th e earl y o r mid-1950 s t o champio n th e politica l right s o f North Africa n Jewry. 3 6 In Augus t 1954 , followin g th e Petitjea n incident , Shuste r me t Y a c akov Tsur a t th e Israel i Embass y i n Pari s followin g conversation s h e ha d i n Morocco wit h th e authorities . Tsu r reporte d t o Sharet t tha t durin g thei r conversation Shuste r seeme d convince d tha t if Morocc o (an d Tunisia ) were t o obtai n independenc e fro m France , partiall y o r fully , emigratio n might becom e a suitabl e option . Yet , a s independenc e wa s no t aroun d the corne r fo r Morocco , c aliya ha d t o b e orderly ; furthermore , i f indepen dence wer e granted , th e Istiqlal , sensitiv e t o publi c opinio n i n th e West , would no t immediatel y adop t th e Ara b L e a g u e s anti-Israe l policie s in cluding a ba n o r restrictio n o n Jewis h emigration . Th e interva l o f severa l years ha d t o b e exploite d b y th e Jewis h organization s t o foste r tie s wit h the nationalist s without , o f course , th e organization s becomin g obliviou s to th e Jews ' bes t interests. 3 7 B y Octobe r o f tha t year , th e AJ C ha d onc e again reverte d t o it s ol d policy : Frenc h colonialis m woul d no t endur e much longer , bu t i t woul d b e bette r t o encourag e th e Jew s t o remai n i n Morocco an d t o encourag e th e AI U t o teac h Arabic , whil e AJ C woul d b e

The c Aliya from Morocco 111 prepared t o assis t loca l communitie s i n buildin g mor e school s an d syn agogues.38

Shutting the Gates: The Moroccan Government and the WJC During th e first hal f o f 1956 , i t becam e increasingl y eviden t tha t th e Cadima operatio n woul d hav e t o overcom e enormou s difficultie s i n orde r to survive . Already , followin g th e Augus t 195 5 Aix-les-Bains Conference , Amos Rabl , wh o ha d knowledg e abou t nationalis t activities , reporte d tha t the futur e leader s o f Morocc o were , i n part , youn g intellectual s wh o sought t o improv e th e lo t o f al l Moroccans . Severa l o f them , however , were pro-Egyptia n an d encourage d cooperatio n wit h th e Ara b League . Rabl no w seeme d les s worrie d abou t politica l problem s facin g th e Jews , a feelin g no t share d b y hi s othe r colleagues . H e wa s incline d t o believ e that th e rea l issu e wa s no t i f th e nationalist s woul d o r woul d no t gran t the Jew s equa l rights ; th e issu e wa s tha t the y intende d t o deman d o f them equa l dedicatio n t o th e nationa l interest , a deman d mos t Jew s preferred t o ignore . Fo r instance , th e proposal , i n D e c e m b e r 1955 , t o create a Morocca n nationa l arm y cause d concer n amon g Jewis h youths . They feare d bein g force d t o joi n i t plu s th e possibilit y o f bein g sen t t o remote part s o f Morocc o w h e r e n o on e coul d guarante e thei r safet y among h u n d r e d s o r thousand s o f Morocca n Muslims. 3 9 Regarding c aliya, Rab l di d no t thin k i t wa s realisti c t o assum e tha t S i M'Barek Bekka'i , c Allal al-Fasi , o r Mehd i Be n Barka , amon g others , would continu e t o tolerat e Cadima . Th e provisiona l governmen t tha t wa s taking ove r fro m th e Frenc h oppose d c aliya o n th e ground s tha t youn g Jews woul d joi n th e Israe l Defens e Force s an d fight th e Egyptians . Onl y with America n an d Frenc h diplomati c interventio n coul d c aliya con tinue. 4 0 Indeed, eve n th e moderat e Arabic-languag e orga n o f th e Part i D e m o cratique d'Independance , al-Ra? y al- cAmm, suggeste d i n a n editoria l several day s befor e independenc e tha t Rab l b e expelle d an d th e Cadim a transit cam p shu t down : The peopl e o f this institution s an d it s directo r shoul d b e considere d enemie s o f Morocco; an d i t i s th e dut y o f Morocca n Jewr y t o deman d energeticall y th e

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closure o f thi s institutio n an d th e expulsio n o f al l foreig n [emissaries ] bac k t o their country of origin. It is our duty to announce this demand from th e columns of this paper. 41 At th e beginnin g o f May 1956 , th e Cadim a representative s i n Midelt , Arfud, an d Qas r al-Su q i n th e Atla s mountain s are a wer e requeste d t o present themselve s t o th e loca l Morocca n authoritie s an d wer e give n direct instruction s no t t o encourag e Jew s t o underg o medica l examina tions o r leav e fo r Casablanca . I n Meknes , Oudjda , Sefrou , an d Ouezza n the loca l Cadim a employee s fel t threatene d an d fled, whil e i n Beni Mellal, Oued-Zem , an d Taroudan t th e c aliya screenin g tea m wa s pre vented b y th e Musli m populatio n fro m conductin g thei r work . Dr . Leo n Benzaquen, th e Jewis h ministe r o f posts an d telegraphs , requeste d tha t local Jewis h physicians , OS E personne l included , ceas e t o assis t th e Jewish Agenc y i n conductin g medica l examinations , otherwis e thei r ca reers i n independen t Morocc o woul d b e i n jeopardy . Th e reques t wa s not honored b y all of these physicians. 42 Sometime towar d mid-Ma y Rab l wen t t o Rabat . Followin g conversa tions with a French officia l workin g i n th e ne w administration , a s well as with Morocca n officials , h e wa s informe d tha t i n th e futur e ther e woul d be n o obstacle s i n th e wa y o f individual emigratio n anywhere . Ye t th e authorities would n o longer tolerate the presence o f foreigners organizin g large-scale emigratio n fro m thei r country . Rab l wa s tol d i t was pointles s on hi s par t t o negotiat e concession s o r see k a politica l compromise , fo r this decision originate d fro m hig h cabine t level. 43 As events unfolde d afte r th e beginning of May, Jewish Agency official s in Jerusalem an d Pari s entertaine d th e possibilit y tha t Cadim a migh t no t survive i n it s presen t status , an d tha t organize d large-scal e emigratio n would thu s b e stopped . Hop e stil l remained , though , tha t negotiation s with th e Moroccan s might , afte r all , resul t i n a compromise. Shraga i als o considered a n option whereby " a French associatio n would open an offic e in Casablanc a an d othe r majo r citie s an d (unde r it s guise ) Jewish Agenc y personnel coul d wor k ther e a s officials , firs t alongsid e Cadim a an d late r in place of it." H e contende d tha t t o accomplish th e pla n th e ne w envoy s to be dispatche d t o Morocc o should hav e nothin g to do with Cadim a an d would b e verse d i n Arabi c an d Frenc h s o the y coul d blen d mor e effec tively int o th e loca l scen e tha n thei r predecessors. 44 Shraga i did no t giv e up.

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There wa s als o th e optio n t o brib e Morocca n officials , includin g Mu hammad Laghzaoui , th e director-genera l o f national security , an d a fer vent opponen t o f c aliya. N . Ben-Menachem , a representativ e o f th e Jewish Agency' s Immigratio n Department , believe d tha t Laghzaou i coul d be bribe d i n whic h cas e h e woul d influenc e th e Morocca n cabine t t o permit organize d emigratio n t o continue . I t seem s tha t th e governor s o f Qasr al-Su q an d Midel t wer e willin g t o moderat e thei r oppositio n t o c aliya i n retur n fo r 300,00 0 franc s each , payabl e b y Cadima . Ben-Mena chem an d Cadima' s Rabl , Wilner , an d Avrahami though t tha t thi s oppor tunity ough t no t t o be missed. 45 As we noted , durin g thi s perio d Israel s Mossad ha d develope d a selfdefense apparatu s insid e Morocc o tha t ha d nothin g t o d o wit h c aliya. I t was subordinate t o Isser Harel , hea d o f Mossad i n Israel, an d t o a special operational headquarter s fo r Nort h Africa , situate d i n Pari s an d directe d by Shlom o Havilio , a former Israel i army officer . Th e Mossad 's operatio n for Morocc o an d th e res t o f North Afric a wa s called Misgeret (o r Frame work). I n ligh t o f the problem s encountere d wit h th e c aliyay th e Mossad considered steppin g int o thi s domain , too , b y layin g th e foundatio n fo r clandestine emigration . A meetin g too k plac e betwee n Isse r Hare l an d Shragai. I n accordanc e wit h a secre t agreemen t betwee n them , i t wa s decided tha t th e Mossad an d th e Jewis h Agency' s Immigratio n Depart ment woul d conduc t secre t c aliya onc e Cadim a coul d n o longe r functio n inside Morocco . Th e specia l c aliya apparatus o f Misgeret, supplementin g the apparatu s dealin g wit h self-defense , wa s t o hav e thre e centers : i n Jerusalem, Paris , an d Casablanca . Th e Mossad wa s entruste d wit h th e operational aspect s o f th e c aliya whil e th e Jewis h Agenc y an d it s Immi gration Departmen t wer e t o atten d t o th e politica l an d diplomati c as pects. Tha t is , a s th e Mossad attende d t o organizin g emigration , th e Jewish Agency would resor t t o diverse ways and means of influencing th e Moroccan governmen t t o permit freedo m o f movement. 46 Our investigatio n indicate s tha t th e agreemen t wa s theoretica l i n na ture, fo r as the Mossad/Jewish Agenc y Immigratio n Departmen t partner ship solidified , th e define d role s for eac h organizatio n overlapped . Thus , the Immigratio n Departmen t sen t emissarie s t o assis t th e Misgeret i n c aliya wherea s th e Mossad undertoo k intricat e diplomati c an d politica l missions t o diversify th e Jewish Agency' s effort s i n influencin g Morocca n policies. In Septembe r 195 6 Shraga i an d Hare l agree d tha t th e specia l appa -

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ratus woul d functio n i n th e former Frenc h an d Spanis h Zones , i n Tan gier, Gibraltar , an d othe r operationa l stations . Th e apparatu s woul d b e responsible for al l phase s o f th e secre t c aliya, includin g th e transfe r o f the emigrant s t o saf e shore s suc h a s Marseille s an d Naples. 47 I t appear s that i n Septembe r 195 6 som e emigrant s ha d lef t fo r Israe l vi a th e ne w underground apparatus , althoug h th e importan t operation s wer e orga nized beginnin g i n Octobe r tha t year , wit h specia l emissarie s represent ing the differen t politica l movement s i n Israel . We no w retur n t o lat e sprin g 1956 . Durin g th e mont h o f May, 48 th e Moroccan authoritie s announce d thei r intention s t o clos e th e Cadim a transit camp. Muhamma d Laghzaoui , wh o either refuse d t o accept bribe s or was not offered any , explaine d th e move as necessary o n the basis that : (1) Cadima wa s a foreign organizatio n recruitin g Morocca n citizen s fo r a foreign country ; (2 ) Morocca n citizen s wer e thu s reinforcin g th e arme d forces o f Israel i n th e conflic t wit h th e Middl e Easter n state s with who m Morocco had tie s of religion an d kinship; (3) Morocco was under pressur e from th e Middl e Easter n Ara b state s t o preven t thi s reinforcement ; (4 ) Morocco coul d no t affor d t o loos e th e Jew s a s a n importan t an d skille d element o f it s populatio n essentia l i n th e economi c difficultie s whic h confronted th e ne w State ; (5 ) having accorde d ful l freedo m an d equalit y to th e Jew s sinc e Marc h 1956 , Morocc o expecte d the m t o fulfil l thei r obligations t o the Stat e and t o assist in its regeneration an d upbuilding. 49 There wer e unsuccessfu l effort s b y Baruc h Duvdevani , Shragai' s dep uty, t o negotiate with th e Morocca n authorities—startin g i n Ma y or June —the departur e o f some 60,000 emigrants who could leav e immediately . But h e ha d hope d that , a t th e ver y least , th e Jew s a t th e Cadim a cam p would b e allowe d t o go . Duvdevan i wa s a highly experience d officia l i n the servic e o f the Jewis h Agency' s Immigratio n Department . A religious man, workin g wit h Yitsha k Raphael , hea d o f the departmen t unti l 1954 , and wit h Shragai , Duvdevan i devote d a n importan t par t o f his life t o th e North Africa n c aliya. H e wa s instrumental i n supervisin g th e th e emigra tion agencie s i n Algeria, Tunisia , an d Morocc o during the earl y an d mid 1950s whil e headin g th e Immigratio n Department' s Pari s office . I t wa s partly du e t o hi s intercessio n befor e Shraga i an d othe r Jewis h Agenc y chiefs, tha t emigratio n fro m Morocc o gaine d strengt h durin g th e final two years of French colonia l rule . Whilst i n Morocc o for th e negotiation s ove r the camp, Duvdevan i als o

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encouraged hi s colleagues i n Jerusalem t o exploit th e optio n tha t Tangie r was still an international zon e (Tangie r wa s integrated int o the Morocca n state onl y i n Octobe r 1956) , an d smuggl e throug h i t severa l thousan d people wishin g t o leav e th e forme r Spanis h Zone . I n hi s opinion , th e latter ha d t o be take n ou t o f the countr y withou t selectio n o r they woul d be "los t forever." 50 What th e Jewis h Agenc y di d t o satisfy Duvdevan i i s not know n a t thi s stage o f th e research . Ye t w e find i n Israel i archiva l source s indication s that durin g Jun e o r Jul y 195 6 Cadim a manage d t o evacuat e severa l hundred Jew s pe r mont h vi a Tangier an d Gibraltar. 51 I t shoul d b e note d that a s lat e a s Septembe r o r Octobe r 1956 , severa l c aliya emissarie s stil l remained i n th e country . Notwithstandin g thi s initiative , th e mai n issu e concerned th e Cadim a office s an d transi t cam p an d thei r continue d survival, fo r without thes e organize d emigratio n woul d b e terminated . Indeed, betwee n 1 1 an d 2 0 June , Cadima s office s throughou t Mo rocco wer e officiall y close d dow n thoug h thei r staf f wa s permitte d t o enter th e premise s an d conduc t th e paperwork . Th e cam p wa s sur rounded b y policeme n o n horseback . Prio r t o thes e developments , an d expecting troubles , Cadima s emissaries , especiall y Ary e Avraham i an d Ya c akov Hasan , wen t t o severa l village s i n th e sout h an d brough t t o Casablanca a few thousand emigrant s who were integrated int o the camp . Moroccan Jew s manage d o n thei r ow n initiativ e t o infiltrat e th e cam p before an d afte r it s encirclemen t b y th e authorities . Th e figures o n ho w many Jew s wer e concentrate d i n th e camp , whic h theoreticall y coul d hold 1,00 0 people , var y between 6,300 52 an d 9,000. 53 Duvdevani's effort s wer e reinforce d b y the Israel i government, partic ularly following Sharett s departur e fro m th e Ministr y for Foreig n Affair s and hi s replacemen t b y Gold a Meir . Gola n an d Easterma n o f th e WJ C supplemented thes e efforts . Havin g acquire d th e reputatio n amon g Mo roccan nationalist s a s th e "ambassado r o f th e Jews, " Easterman , lik e Golda Meir , di d no t hesitat e t o appl y pressur e o n th e Moroccan s ove r emigration b y hintin g tha t publi c opinio n i n th e Unite d States , wher e Morocco sough t t o enlis t economi c an d politica l support , woul d tur n against them . Easterman arrive d i n Casablanc a o n 2 4 May , tw o week s befor e th e Cadima apparatu s wa s formall y close d down , bu t a t a tim e whe n orga nized c aliya had , fo r al l intent s an d purposes , bee n severel y curtailed .

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Determined t o conve y th e messag e tha t an y effort s t o cur b freedo m o f movement i n th e futur e woul d hav e dir e consequences , Easterma n me t first with Dr . Leo n Benzaquen. 54 Easterman tol d hi m tha t throughou t th e man y conversation s h e ha d had wit h nationalis t leaders , th e genera l questio n o f Jewish emigratio n had bee n full y an d frequentl y discussed . Th e WJ C ha d explaine d t o th e nationalists tw o years earlier th e reasons and necessity for Jewish emigra tion and , o n these , th e Moroccan s ha d expresse d thei r complet e under standing. The y had recognized , bot h i n these conversations an d in publi c declarations, tha t emigratio n wa s a natura l impuls e an d a democrati c right, an d tha t th e futur e Morocca n stat e would implemen t th e principl e of emigration i n accordanc e wit h th e provision s o f the Universa l Decla ration o f Huma n Rights . I f Morocc o wer e t o repudiat e thes e rights , no t only would th e reputatio n o f the natio n gravel y deteriorat e i n th e eye s of Western government s an d publi c opinion , bu t thi s would seriousl y dam age th e politica l an d materia l interest s o f Morocco, especiall y i n connec tion wit h it s applicatio n fo r admissio n t o th e Unite d Nations . Further more, th e Jewis h worl d woul d b e s o incense d b y an y prohibitio n o f emigration tha t suc h agitatio n woul d invariabl y creat e bot h politica l an d economic difficulties fo r Morocco , notabl y i n the Unite d States. 55 Benzaquen interjecte d tha t there was no question o f a change in policy on the par t o f the governmen t o f which h e was a member, bu t reiterate d the familia r argumen t that , i n th e eye s o f Moroccans , th e Jew s wer e a n important economi c factor an d therefore , large-scal e emigratio n wa s contrary t o Morocco s bes t interests. 56 Easterman di d no t accep t thi s argument . Th e Jews , assiste d b y Cad ima sinc e 1949 , ha d chose n emigratio n o f thei r ow n volition , an d fo r reasons importan t t o the m a s individuals . H e informe d Benzaque n tha t c Abd al-Qadi r Benjalloun , ministe r o f th e treasury , ha d tol d him , inte r alia, tha t " J e w s desire d t o go to Israel for reason s o f nostalgia." Bu t apar t from this , Easterma n suggeste d tha t th e Jew s wh o ha d decide d t o emi grate t o Israe l wer e miserable , poverty-stricken , an d o f n o economi c consequence whatsoeve r t o Morocco . A n extremel y importan t fac t wa s that wealthie r an d middle-clas s Jews , th e merchants , th e industrialists , and th e financiers, wer e no t leavin g th e country , an d wer e no t likel y t o do so, unles s an d unti l ther e wer e a violent deterioration. 57 On 3 1 Ma y 1956 , Easterma n addresse d a lette r t o Premie r Bekka'i , expressing th e greates t regret s tha t th e WJC' s attentio n ha d t o be draw n

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to certai n measure s o f a n administrativ e characte r whic h appeare d de signed t o restric t an d eve n preven t Jew s fro m emigrating . Mentionin g the sam e grievanc e expresse d i n hi s discussion s wit h Benzaque n an d playing dow n th e Morocca n "economi c argument " a s a facto r arguin g against organize d emigration , Easterma n warne d tha t restriction s woul d be fough t relentlessl y b y th e WJC : The Worl d Jewis h Congres s ha s give n th e fulles t suppor t a t it s comman d t o th e Moroccan governmen t befor e an d afte r it s establishment . W e hav e th e sinceres t intention t o continue tha t support i n every way available to us. We are convince d that thi s suppor t ca n b e o f the greates t assistanc e t o th e Morocca n State , an d w e would, therefore , addres s a mos t earnes t appea l decisio n i n respec t o f Jewis h emigration whic h migh t adversel y affec t ou r faith, ou r cordia l goodwill , an d ou r desire t o se e th e progres s an d consolidatio n o f the Morocca n Stat e a s a membe r of the Unite d Nations. 58 Between Jun e an d September , length y discussion s continue d wit h members o f the Morocca n government , a n initiativ e undertake n b y East erman an d Golan . Accordin g t o Easterman , th e Morocca n governmen t adhered t o th e righ t t o emigratio n a s expresse d i n th e Universa l Decla ration o f H u m a n Right s bu t interprete d it s declaratio n an d tha t o f Mu hammad V (referre d t o a s kin g sinc e 1957 ) a s applyin g t o individuals an d not t o organize d emigration , especiall y a s encourage d b y Cadima. 5 9 I t seems tha t th e W J C , lik e Duvdevani , hope d a t leas t t o obtai n fro m Laghzaoui concession s o f havin g th e severa l thousan d Jew s a t th e cam p leave. Easterma n outline d t o Bekka i th e step s an d phase s o f th e negotia tions tha t anticipate d th e liquidatio n o f th e transi t cam p thre e month s from Jun e an d th e departur e o f al l th e peopl e i n it , an d onc e th e cam p closed, Jew s woul d b e permitte d t o leav e Morocc o o n a n individua l basis. 6 0 H e als o wen t t o Raba t t o se e t o i t tha t a n interministeria l com mission unde r Bekkai' s chairmanshi p approv e th e principl e o f th e Jews ' departure fro m th e camp , base d o n th e followin g conditions : tha t eac h individual prov e h e ha d n o desir e t o maintai n hi s Morocca n passport ; an d that th e emigratio n o f thos e i n th e cam p b e carrie d ou t almos t clandes tinely s o a s no t t o brin g th e issu e int o th e limelight. 6 1 The WJC' s rol e o f negotiatin g wit h th e Morocca n authoritie s wa s no t an eas y one . Cabine t m e m b e r s wh o belonge d t o th e Part i Democratiqu e d l n d e p e n d a n c e leane d towar d permittin g th e Jew s alread y i n th e cam p to leave . Istiqla l cabine t m e m b e r s oppose d thei r departur e wit h th e

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exception o f Mahd i Ben-Bark a wh o favore d th e move . Premie r Bekkai , who was an independent, als o supported th e camp' s evacuation , an d tol d his cabine t tha t i t woul d b e unwis e t o preven t th e departur e o f th e camp's occupant s a t a tim e whe n Morocc o ha d submitte d a reques t t o the Unite d Nation s fo r membership , an d t o th e U.S . governmen t fo r financial aid . Th e mos t moderat e an d human e positio n wa s presented b y the ministe r o f habous (religiou s endowments) . H e coul d no t understan d why the Morocca n governmen t an d securit y service s had to interfere an d obstruct peopl e fro m leavin g fo r a country tha t mean t s o muc h t o the m from th e religiou s poin t o f view . Benzaque n responde d b y supportin g the argument. 62 In spit e o f hi s meeting s wit h th e WJ C official s an d th e promise s h e made abou t th e camp' s evacuation , Laghzaou i emerge d durin g th e cabi net meeting s a s th e toughes t opponen t o f lettin g th e Jew s go . A t on e meeting h e warne d th e cabine t tha t th e implementatio n o f th e camp' s evacuation woul d hav e t o b e achieve d "ove r hi s dea d body. " Unmove d by Laghzaoui' s emotions , th e cabine t agree d i n principl e o n 2 8 Jul y t o approve th e evacuatio n i n smal l groups o f two hundred t o three hundre d people a t a time. 63 Reacting t o th e decision , Ben-Menache m cable d Shraga i fro m Paris : "The government' s decisio n t o permit th e departur e o f the camp' s occu pants i s a victor y o f goo d ove r evil . Still , w e mus t b e prepare d fo r wa r with th e evi l Hama n [Laghzaoui ] who , surely , will place man y obstacle s in th e wa y o f executing th e decision." 64 Duvdevan i wa s blunter . O n 2 9 July he observed: "I t is possible tha t the Morocca n government' s positio n is different fro m Laghzaoui's , bu t i t is obvious tha t he carries ou t his plan without fea r an d withou t takin g int o accoun t th e government' s wishes . He appear s t o b e quit e powerful." 65 Then , o n 3 0 Jul y th e Morocca n cabinet me t agai n t o approv e th e decision , thi s tim e i n Muhamma d V' s presence. Laghzaou i seize d th e occasio n t o challeng e an d appea l th e decision, bu t t o n o avail . Afte r Benzaque n threatene d t o resig n fro m hi s ministerial pos t an d Ahma d Balafrej , th e Istiqlal' s secretary-general , modified hi s stanc e i n favo r o f evacuation , th e decisio n wa s adopted . Muhammad V gav e th e cabine t hi s blessin g an d requeste d tha t th e evacuation b e accomplishe d efficientl y an d i n an orderly fashion. 66 Yet ther e wer e setback s betwee n Augus t an d September . Thes e re quired th e interventio n o f prominen t Europea n statesme n t o urg e th e Moroccans t o adher e t o agreed-upo n principles . On e suc h obstacl e wa s

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raised o n 9 August , whe n Easterma n an d Gola n me t wit h Laghzaou i regarding th e departur e pla n fro m th e cam p i n accordanc e wit h a lis t given t o him comprisin g 6,30 0 persons. 67 Laghzaou i state d tha t he woul d allow th e Jew s t o leav e th e cam p provide d that , i n additio n t o th e payment o f debts b y emigrants , eac h perso n sign a declaration renounc ing his Morocca n citizenship. 68 This sensitiv e measure , implemente d fo r Egyptian Jew s as a result o f the Arab-Israeli wars of 1956 and 1967, 69 was finally no t applie d i n Morocco . Actually , th e emigrant s wer e no t eve n required t o surrende r thei r passports . Bu t i t cause d unfortunat e delay s in th e departure . A s fo r debts , Easterma n an d Gola n provide d guaran tees tha t fo r thos e peopl e leavin g withou t payin g them , th e WJ C woul d reimburse th e partie s concerned. 70 Whil e w e d o no t hav e th e exact departure schedul e o f th e ship s sailin g fro m Casablanc a o r th e flight schedules, Laghzaou i permitte d th e Jew s i n question t o leave by the en d of September o r mid-October , followin g th e remova l o f additional obsta cles. Cadima s emissarie s the n fled Morocco . Severa l Israel i emissarie s argued tha t th e Misgeret wa s the forc e tha t organize d th e emigratio n o f the Jew s i n th e camp , without waitin g fo r final officia l approva l o f th e authorities i n the uppe r echelons . Thi s issue awaits further research . The WJ C an d th e governmen t o f Israe l raise d hope s o f negotiating a future agreemen t wit h th e Moroccan s ove r th e additiona l 60,00 0 peopl e ready t o leave. 71 But i t was now up t o the Misgeret t o replace Cadim a i n organizing th e process .

Chapter 6

The Self-Liquidatio n Process : Political Development s amon g Moroccan Jewr y an d th e Emigration Facto r

Early Phases of Independence, March 1956October 1958 The inauguratio n o f th e ne w er a o f Morocca n independenc e wa s i n th e midst o f politica l uncertainties . Still , fo r al l that , an d highlightin g th e instability an d fluidity o f th e times , whe n Muhamma d V returne d t o Morocco, th e Istiqla l an d th e Part i Democratiqu e d'Independanc e (PDI ) invited th e Jew s t o demonstrat e togethe r wit h them . Ther e wa s a n exchange o f reception s an d speeches , an d th e Jew s wer e addresse d a s Moroccan brother s an d calle d upo n t o buil d th e ne w Morocc o togethe r with th e Muslims . I n severa l cities , Jewis h leader s wer e invite d b y th e Istiqlal or the PD I t o officially joi n thei r ranks. 1 Politically, th e situatio n o f th e Jew s improve d i n th e year s 1956-58 . Jews were grante d Morocca n citizenship , an d the fears o f harassment an d pogroms, prevalen t i n 1954-55 , faile d t o materialize . Ye t th e Jew s re mained suspiciou s fo r th e mos t part , an d divided . Numerou s Jew s ac cused thei r leader s o f being intereste d i n only one thing: being member s of th e futur e independen t governmen t o f Morocco . Th e Consei l de s Communautes Israelite s d u Maro c (CCIM)—th e umbrell a organizatio n for th e divers e Jewis h communitie s scattere d throughou t th e country — and it s secretary-general , Jacque s Dahan , appeale d t o th e Jew s t o dem 186

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onstrate complet e solidarit y wit h th e Muslims . Bu t thi s appea l mad e n o impression o n man y Jews , o r cause d negativ e reactions . Th e latte r ex pressed fea r o f their futur e conscriptio n int o th e arm y an d sai d tha t the y did no t wish to be oblige d on e da y to fight Israel. 2 Various segment s o f Morocca n Jewr y informe d th e loca l representa tives o f Jewish organization s tha t fo r som e tim e th e Muslim s would nee d them, bu t a s soo n a s the y wer e abl e t o stan d o n thei r feet , the y woul d dispose o f the Jews . Other s di d no t believ e the y would b e grante d equa l rights i n a n independen t Morocco . The y wer e incline d t o believ e i n th e sincerity o f Muhamma d V and severa l o f th e politica l leaders , ye t the y feared th e hostil e attitud e o f th e mas s o f Muslims : onc e the y ha d th e upper hand , the y would destro y an y kind o f equality. 3 One o f th e pressin g issue s i n 1956-5 8 ha d t o d o wit h communa l reforms. Th e mos t activ e proponent s o f communa l discussion s an d re forms, a s wel l a s socia l an d politica l integratio n int o Morocca n society , were youn g peopl e wh o intende d t o neutraliz e th e authorit y o f th e ol d leadership. I n fact , th e modernized elit e wa s the n divide d int o thre e main school s o f thought. Th e first, influence d b y Frenc h an d Europea n schooling whic h i n som e case s include d highe r educatio n i n France , emphasized th e centra l importanc e o f Europea n cultur e i n genera l an d French cultur e i n particular. I n general , th e member s o f this group wer e not attracte d t o Zionism, an d the y eventuall y settle d i n France , Canada , Latin America , an d Belgium . Th e secon d grou p include d graduate s o f the moder n school s who, despite th e educatio n the y received a t the AIU , were influence d b y moder n secula r an d religiou s Zionism . Althoug h some o f it s member s wer e physicall y an d culturall y remot e fro m th e mellah, mos t o f the m contribute d t o th e emergenc e o f a smal l bu t dy namic Zionis t movemen t i n Morocco—alongsid e th e traditiona l Zionis m of the Jewis h masses . Ironically , som e o f the notabl e activist s within thi s elite grou p neve r settle d i n Israel . Th e thir d trend , whic h favore d a Judeo-Muslim entente, emerge d durin g th e earl y and mid-1950s . The pro-entente Jewis h grou p wa s b y n o mean s homogeneous . I t included radical s with strong leftist tendencie s a s well as moderate leftist s and conservatives . Davi d Berdugo , fo r instance , advocate d Judeo-Mus lim integration , wit h Jew s frequentin g th e sam e club s a s Muslim s an d attending th e sam e schools , i n orde r t o bridg e th e politica l an d intellec tual ga p betwee n th e tw o peoples . Others , thoug h i n favo r o f entente, were nevertheles s mor e cautiou s ragardin g a "fusion sacree" (sacre d

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fusion). O n e o f the m wa s Charle s Bensimhon , a n AI U teacher , whos e family ha d produce d a lon g lin e o f teacher s an d principal s traine d b y E N I O (Ecol e Normal e Israelit e Orientale , th e genera l AI U teachers ' training schoo l i n Paris) . Bor n i n Marrakesh , educate d i n Morocc o an d France, Bensimhon , a t a speec h t o a n AI U audienc e i n Pari s (1957) , maintained tha t th e Morocca n Jewis h elit e m e m b e r wa s caugh t i n a complex we b o f conflictin g interests . First , ther e wa s Morocco , hi s patrie. Second , ther e wa s th e newl y establishe d Stat e o f Israel , th e cradle of his religion. Finall y ther e wa s France , th e sourc e o f hi s cultur e an d emancipation. Regardin g th e patrie, h e said : Settled i n ou r countr y fo r mor e tha n 2,00 0 years , w e hav e witnesse d grea t historical transformations , a s did ou r father s an d ancestors . Th e Jews , b e the y o f Berber origi n o r thos e wh o cam e t o [Morocco ] i n searc h o f refuge , al l conside r this countr y a s theirs . Ther e ar e severa l stron g bond s whic h attac h u s t o thi s land: th e mothe r country , th e fertil e soil , ou r familie s an d friends , th e climat e and th e familiar horizons. 4 Bensimhon wa s convince d tha t th e relation s betwee n Jew s an d Muslim s were boun d t o improv e i n th e ne w Morocc o wher e th e line s o f rapprochement woul d b e lai d o n foundation s o f democrac y an d freedom . And h e place d grea t confidenc e fo r th e realizatio n o f thi s drea m i n Muhammad V , saying : More tha n th e nativ e soi l . . . on e singl e sentimen t whic h w e cheris h i n ou r hearts i s th e dee p lov e fo r Muhamma d V . Th e Jew s o f Morocc o ar e eternall y grateful fo r wha t thei r monarc h ha d don e fo r them . Sinc e hi s ascendanc e t o th e Throne [1927] , Hi s Majest y ha s not fo r on e moment cease d t o reveal his paterna l sympathy fo r u s a s wel l a s hi s vigilan t protection . A t th e darkes t hour s o f th e Jewish peopl e whe n Europ e wa s occupie d b y th e Nazi s an d Franc e issue d it s racial laws at Vichy, i t was he an d h e alon e who came t o our defens e an d bravel y resisted th e anti-Jewis h manifestation s i n Morocco . Sinc e hi s retur n fro m exile , Muhammad V had proclaime d tota l equalit y betwee n Moroccans , promisin g th e Jews full liberatio n fro m humiliation. 5 Concerning Israel , h e affirmed : Even i f we ar e strongl y attache d t o notre patrie, i t i s impossible t o ignore Israel , the cradl e o f ou r religion . Neithe r th e Catholic s o f France , no r th e Muslim s o f Morocco, no r th e Jew s o f England ca n remai n indifferen t i n th e fac e o f the thre e great spiritua l centers o f the world: th e Vatican, Mecca , an d Jerusalem. 6

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In othe r words , whil e th e Jew s ha d t o expres s loyalt y t o thei r nativ e soil , they wer e nevertheles s entitle d t o a Jewis h Vatican , a spiritua l center , a philosophy tha t ha d t o b e inculcate d i n th e mind s o f the pupils : An intransigen t patriotis m an d ful l loyalt y towar d Morocc o doe s no t exclud e faithfulness towar d th e Hol y Land . I f we are separated fro m Israe l by citizenship , Moroccan Jewry is united wit h world Jewry by a common religiou s doctrine. Yes , we ar e Moroccans , bu t w e ar e als o Jewish . Thi s i s somethin g ou r Musli m com patriots understan d ful l well . Whe n w e spea k o f integration , thi s wor d i s a l a mode. . . . I n th e Larouss e dictionar y th e wor d integer signifie s t o ente r int o a whole. I f on e define s th e wor d a s integratin g th e Jew s int o a nation, hav e the m participate i n al l aspect s o f nationa l life , an d respectin g thei r spiritua l values , then w e ar e wholeheartedl y fo r suc h a n integration . O n th e othe r hand , i f on e defines integratio n a s the disaggregatio n o f our communities , th e scuttlin g of our cultural an d socia l institutions , th e abandonmen t o f ou r identit y an d tradition , then th e answe r i s no . N o on e ca n as k u s t o relinquis h ou r identity . W e believ e in assimilation int o the ne w Morocc o but a n assimilation wit h dignit y and honor. 7 Bensimhon, then , wa s representin g th e ne w thinkin g o f the ne w elite . If th e Musli m nationalist s expecte d straigh t answer s fro m th e Jew s con cerning loyalt y an d patriotism , th e Jews , too , n e e d e d assurances . Th e above statemen t containe d a n implici t warning : th e Muslim s woul d hav e to tolerat e Jewis h sympathie s towar d Israel , an d Jewis h institution s mus t not b e tampere d wit h a s par t o f the pric e o f the Judeo-Musli m entente. Other prominen t supporter s o f entente include d Mar c Sabbah , Alber t Aflalo, Arman d Asoulin , Meye r c Ovadia, an d Davi d Azoulay . Thes e an d other radica l proponent s o f integratio n wer e activ e i n th e Istiqla l part y and, togethe r wit h severa l Musli m colleagues , founde d a pro-entente movement withi n Istiqla l know n a s al-Wifdq (Unity ) i n Januar y 1956 . AlWifdq's opponent s describe d th e societ y an d it s mos t prominen t leader , Marc Sabbah , a s exclusivis t an d havin g bee n cu t of f fro m th e melldh fo r years. Sabba h i n fac t wa s portraye d a s a slavis h acolyt e o f Mehd i Be n Barka, th e note d leade r o f Istiqlal . Sabbah an d th e voca l integrationist s wer e extremel y critica l o f th e C C I M , a s wel l a s o f th e separat e communit y counci l leadershi p o f urba n Morocco. I n a majo r editoria l i n th e French-languag e orga n o f Istiqlal , al-Istiqlal, edite d b y Ben-Barka , Sabba h openl y attacke d th e Jewis h leadership. Ther e wa s a Jewis h mass , h e claimed , restless , bewildered , and misinforme d abou t it s ow n problem s becaus e thos e wh o retaine d th e name an d privileg e o f leader s wer e courageou s onl y whe n thei r ol d

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positions were a t stake , an d energeti c onl y i n clingin g to those positions . Not havin g had a sense o f the futur e an d no t havin g foreseen th e ineluc table progres s o f th e Morocca n peopl e towar d nationa l independence , and consequently , havin g failed t o prepare thei r ow n peopl e fo r th e ne w conditions—they ha d guide d them , o n the contrary , i n a different direc tion—they wer e unabl e t o answe r th e question s pose d b y th e Jewis h masses.8 And now , Sabba h elaborated , thoug h thi s anxiou s Jewis h mas s shoul d have bee n tol d tha t non e o f it s freedom s wer e impaire d an d tha t Jews , like Muslims , ha d freedo m o f movement, ther e wa s n o competen t lead ership t o d o so . Onl y th e integrationists , i n Sabbah' s opinion , wer e a suitable leadershi p fo r th e Jew s o f Morocco. H e relate d tha t i n 195 5 and early 1956 , h e an d hi s supporter s wer e merel y a scor e o f people deter mined t o chang e thi s stat e o f affairs . However , i n th e summe r o f 195 6 they wer e severa l hundre d throughou t th e countr y an d the y intende d t o struggle agains t th e existin g Jewish leadership , th e partisan s o f the colo nial past, th e promoter s o f maintaining mora l melldhs o f separatism. 9 Sabbah warne d tha t th e situatio n coul d no t last . H e urge d th e Moroc can governmen t t o assis t i n reorganizin g th e Jewis h communitie s en tirely, emulatin g th e patter n o f consistoires tha t existe d i n Franc e an d French Algeria . Ne w communit y organization s ha d t o b e established , particularly i n the majo r centers , wit h th e purpos e of : 1. Administerin g communa l an d religiou s affair s i n accordanc e wit h tra ditional Jewish customs ; 2. Maintainin g goo d relation s wit h th e whol e community , especiall y with th e Rabbinate , whic h shoul d b e th e objec t o f th e greates t re spect; 3. Tryin g ever y mean s t o awake n th e nationa l consciousnes s o f the Mo roccan Jew s s o tha t the y woul d participat e mor e activel y i n nationa l life; 4. Makin g clear t o the Jews tha t the y ar e citizen s o f their countr y o n th e same terms a s their Musli m compatriots ; 5. Bringin g t o th e government' s knowledg e al l facts whic h migh t reflec t on th e exercis e o f it s function s an d th e accomplishmen t o f it s tasks , and proposin g appropriate solutions ; 6. I t shoul d b e understoo d tha t suc h activit y must not be carried out in a sectarian spirit hut for the exclusive benefit of the Moroccan nation,

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under th e aegi s o f th e belove d Sulta n Muhamma d V . (M y emphasis , M.M.L.)10 Indeed, durin g th e mid - an d lat e 1950s , leader s sharin g Sabbah s political orientatio n di d emerg e withi n th e communit y councils , althoug h in th e cours e o f th e tim e the y eithe r moderate d thei r stanc e (Sabba h i n fact change d som e o f hi s view s a s earl y a s 195 7 o r 195 8 i n th e wak e o f emigration restriction s impose d b y th e authoritie s o n th e Jews ) an d remained i n position s o f authority, o r mor e moderat e element s prevaile d (as wit h th e effectiv e emergenc e o f Davi d c Amar). Still , a s earl y a s 1956 , even amon g th e integrationist s an d superpatriots , ther e wa s increasin g fear o f certai n dynami c Istiqla l politica l leaders . Wherea s Ben-Bark a an d Abd al-Rahi m B u c abid wer e acceptabl e t o th e integrationists , th e latte r were increasingl y fearfu l o f c Alal al-Fasi , th e conservativ e leade r o f th e Istiqlal wh o ha d stron g orthodo x Islami c leanings . Abraha m Laredo , wh o succeeded J o Hasa n a s Tangier' s communit y leade r an d wa s activ e i n alWifdq, though t tha t th e futur e o f the Jew s i n Morocc o wa s uncertai n an d intricately boun d u p wit h event s i n th e Middl e East , particularl y follow ing th e Octobe r 195 6 Suez/Sina i war . Lared o wa s essentiall y worrie d about al-Fasi , wh o ha d a larg e followin g an d migh t ascen d t o power . Al Fasi, Lared o indicated , wa s deepl y identifie d wit h Cair o an d Nasse r t o whom h e fel t gratitud e fo r assistanc e rendere d t o th e Moroccan s durin g their struggl e fo r independence . I n Laredo' s opinion , i f al-Fas i becam e premier, th e Jew s woul d b e i n danger. 1 1 In 1958 , Arnol d Mande l interviewe d al-Fas i concernin g th e futur e o f Moroccan Jews . Al-Fas i optimisticall y claime d tha t th e Jew s welcome d Arabization an d tha t th e artificia l separatio n whic h ha d develope d be tween Muslim s an d Jew s durin g th e Protectorat e perio d wa s givin g wa y to a health y symbiosis . However , wherea s i n th e pas t colonialis m consti tuted a n obstacl e t o thi s symbiosis , Zionis m wa s th e majo r proble m i n independent Morocco . Th e Zionists , al-Fas i contended , wer e recruitin g citizens o f on e stat e i n favo r o f another . Th e Jew s ha d t o remai n Moroc cans an d thu s Zionis t influence s ha d t o b e suppressed . H e observed : My positio n regardin g Zionis m i s no t exclusivel y agains t [th e Zionists ] alone . I n the ne w Morocc o al l formation s o r an y politica l movement s tha t receiv e instruc tions fro m th e outsid e ar e eliminate d o r prohibited . D o yo u kno w tha t th e zawaya [Islami c religiou s orders ] ar e prohibite d i n Morocco ? Thi s i s despite th e

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very important rol e they have played in our history. Ar e we, then, anti-Musli m because w e d o no t authoriz e th e existenc e o f "Muslim brotherhoods" ? I n thi s sense we are as . . . "anti-Jewish" as we are "anti-Muslim." 12 Al-Fasi argue d tha t h e wa s no t oppose d t o th e teachin g o f Hebre w language an d culture , o r Jewis h folklor e an d music . Th e Judeo-Ara b idiom wa s part o f the spiritua l patrimony o f the Morocca n natio n an d ha d to be maintaine d an d encouraged . Hebrew , too , ha d t o be taught , an d i f certain element s wer e oppose d t o this education, a s they were t o Frenc h culture, the n the y were stupi d an d insensitive. 13 But Abraha m Laredo' s fear s wer e genuine . Despit e al-Fasi' s assur ances, th e future o f the Jews was uncertain a t the time. Eve n th e entente was essentiall y ove r befor e th e 1960s . Th e indifferenc e o f th e Musli m elite an d th e hesitatio n an d apprehensio n o n th e par t o f the bul k o f th e Jewish communit y brough t th e plans o f al-Wifdq t o nought. 14 What wa s th e basi s fo r th e fear s an d reservation s concernin g th e entente? I n th e first place , al-Wifdq, an d simila r groups , wer e elitist . It s members ma y hav e use d i t a s a foru m t o advanc e thei r ow n politica l ambitions. Th e visio n o f a n entente simpl y di d no t attrac t th e Jewis h masses. Secondly , th e desir e o f ten s o f thousand s o f Jew s t o emigrat e after 1954 , mainl y t o Israel , foreclose d an y chance s o f a Judeo-Musli m entente o n a larg e scale . Th e effort s o f th e authoritie s durin g th e year s 1956-57 t o affor d th e Jew s politica l securit y an d representatio n an d a feeling o f belonging t o the ne w Morocco—includin g th e appointmen t o f a Jewis h ministe r o f posts an d telegraphs , Dr . Leo n Benzaquen—wer e perhaps sincere . Thes e efforts , however , wer e probabl y to o limite d i n scope and certainly to o late. The WJC though t tha t Benzaquen s appoint ment wa s made , i n part , t o win th e suppor t o f influential America n Jew s so that Morocc o could ge t the m t o obtain economi c ai d concession s fro m the Eisenhowe r administration. 15 Further , th e mor e promisin g tren d o f 1956-58 wa s no t permanent , a s i s see n below . Afte r th e secon d hal f o f 1958 ther e wer e clea r indication s tha t Morocc o wa s rapidl y movin g int o the radica l Ara b cam p o f President Nasse r o f Egypt. Morocc o joined th e Arab Leagu e an d bega n issuin g virulen t anti-Israe l statements . Thes e factors cause d grea t alar m amon g th e Jews , man y o f whom ha d alread y decided t o leave, an d convince d the m tha t a n entente wa s impossible . If politicall y ther e wer e n o majo r obstacle s fo r th e Jew s unti l 1958 , their mai n concer n an d fear s centere d aroun d th e authorities ' decision t o

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3

curtail thei r freedo m o f movement . Betwee n 195 6 an d mid-1958 , Jew s managed t o leav e individually i n smal l numbers , som e withou t delays , others wit h grea t difficulty . Ye t larg e group s o r familie s wer e prevente d from leaving . Pressure d b y U.S . policymaker s an d internationa l Jewis h organizations t o rela x restriction s o n individua l an d grou p departures , Muhammad Laghzaoui , stil l th e chie f o f Morocca n nationa l security , forwarded th e followin g instruction s t o cit y an d regiona l governor s o n 2 8 November 1957 : Until no w i t wa s forbidde n fo r Jew s t o emigrat e t o Palestin e an d retur n t o Morocco [afterwards ] (Orde r #424/27/9/1956) . Th e Morocca n governmen t de cided recentl y no t t o discriminat e betwee n Jew s an d Muslim s i n th e issuanc e o f passports, whereb y i t is the righ t o f every citize n t o move freely a t his will insid e and outsid e th e countr y an d t o obtai n passport s an d identificatio n card s fo r thi s purpose ever y tim e he ask s for it . . . . This decisio n doe s no t sugges t tha t Zionis m woul d b e allowe d t o resum e it s activity an d t o enhanc e [political ] propagand a i n Jewis h circles . Quit e t o th e contrary. I t i s imperative t o expose th e leader s o f the Zionis t movemen t i n ever y situation i n which it s activity harms th e interes t o f the Stat e and t o bring the m t o justice. . . . But i t shoul d b e permitte d t o [all ] other [Jews ] to move freely insid e and outsid e Morocco. 16 The instruction s wer e disregarde d b y th e regiona l authoritie s through out 1958 , and , sinc e Morocc o joine d th e Ara b Leagu e i n Octobe r tha t year, th e governmen t an d cabine t urge d thes e official s t o clam p dow n harder o n an y Jewis h emigration . Thus , whe n Jew s applie d fo r passport s they wer e no w aske d t o presen t a certificat e attestin g tha t the y wer e given leav e o f absenc e fro m thei r jobs . I n certai n region s Jew s wantin g to leav e ha d t o provid e letter s fro m th e municipalitie s confirmin g the y owed n o debt s t o Morocca n citizens . Eac h ste p wa s accompanie d b y bureaucratic re d tape . I n som e place s Jew s wer e tol d tha t th e office s ha d run ou t o f passpor t questionnaires . Ofte n the y wer e sen t t o variou s government agencie s t o obtai n form s befor e filling ou t th e question naires. Suc h form s wer e no t i n existenc e an d thes e agencie s di d no t handle emigratio n matters . Thi s wa s par t o f a n effor t t o confus e th e applicants fo r passport s an d discourag e the m fro m pursuin g th e proce dure i n th e future. 1 7 Accordin g t o Dr . Gerhar d Riegner , a politica l director o f th e W J C , durin g hi s visi t t o Morocc o i n 195 8 h e an d hi s delegation "gaine d th e impressio n tha t n o considerabl e deman d fo r pass -

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ports has been made . Mos t of these people ar e afraid t o ask for passports, or are discouraged b y the loca l officials wh o are turning them away . The y are afraid t o appear fo r a second o r a third time." 18 What mad e matter s wors e wer e effort s b y th e emigratio n official s t o find inconsistencie s betwee n th e stor y o f the trave l plans related t o the m by th e passpor t applican t an d th e informatio n tha t famil y an d relative s might provide . Th e applicant s usuall y sai d tha t thei r destinatio n wa s Europe o r Algeria—fo r busines s purpose s o r othe r necessities . B y com ing to the applicants ' homes an d conductin g a n investigatio n th e authori ties hoped t o prove tha t Israe l was the final destination. 19

Difficulties: December 1958-December 1961 Already i n Ma y 1958 , th e moderat e governmen t o f S i M'Bare k Bekka'i , the first governmen t o f independen t Morocco , wa s replace d b y th e Is tiqlal, heade d b y Ahma d Balafrej . Dr . Leo n Benzaquen , th e Jewis h cabinet member , di d no t participat e i n th e ne w government . I n Decem ber 1958 , th e lef t win g o f the Istiqla l formed a new government , heade d by c Abd 5 Allah Ibrahim , whic h remaine d i n powe r unti l Ma y 1960 . Th e Jews wer e particularl y fearfu l o f the Ibrahi m governmen t an d the y con veyed thes e fear s t o th e leader s o f the majo r worl d Jewis h organization s active on their behalf—th e WJC , th e AJC, an d th e AJDC . When Riegne r visite d Morocc o lat e i n 1958 , h e foun d th e genera l situation i n th e countr y rathe r confused . Th e conflic t withi n th e Istiqla l party betwee n leftist s an d conservatives , th e struggl e fo r powe r betwee n the Istiqla l an d th e monarchy , th e unres t i n som e part s o f th e country , especially th e Ri f mountains—create d a conflict-lade n situatio n whic h did no t foste r a n appropriat e climat e fo r concret e negotiation s betwee n the WJ C an d th e authoritie s a s to th e renewa l o f emigration. Internally , the struggl e fo r Jewis h communa l leadershi p calme d down . Th e youn g Jewish Istiqla l integrationist s wer e no w mor e realisti c an d understoo d they coul d expec t ver y littl e fro m th e authorities . Th e old-styl e com munal leader s wh o survive d th e post-195 6 perio d als o showe d mor e understanding o f the ne w condition s an d need s o f the Jew s i n th e newl y independent country. 20 The WJC' s Easterman , lik e Riegner , believe d tha t th e CCIM' s lead ership i n 195 8 wa s beginnin g t o revea l greate r sensitivit y t o th e Jews '

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needs and rights. H e reported tha t Ahmad Hamiani , th e political directo r of the Ministr y o f th e Interior , ha d receive d a Jewish delegatio n repre senting th e CCIM . Th e latte r proteste d i n th e stronges t term s agains t the anti-Jewis h discriminatio n i n issuin g passports , a s a violatio n o f th e kings an d th e government s repeate d declaration s tha t th e Jew s wer e equal citizens , an d a s a breach o f the Unite d Nations-sponsore d Univer sal Declaratio n o f Human Rights . Th e delegatio n requeste d th e immedi ate removal of the ban, statin g that they were not concerned with emigra tion t o Israe l a s such , bu t wit h th e democrati c righ t o f freedo m o f emigration.21 According t o Easterman , Hamian i state d tha t th e ministe r o f th e interior ha d issue d a directive t o all local authorities instructin g them no t to gran t passport s t o Jew s travelin g o r intendin g t o trave l t o Israel , an d to refuse readmissio n t o Morocc o t o Jews who had bee n t o Israel. Hami ani, moreover , tol d th e delegatio n tha t Morocc o would no t allo w Moroc cans to be exploite d b y Israe l against th e Middl e Easter n Ara b states an d implied tha t th e Morocca n governmen t preferre d 250,00 0 Jew s insid e Morocco to seventy millio n Muslim s breathing dow n it s neck over libera l emigration policies. 22 The Jewis h delegatio n reacte d t o thi s statement , b y declarin g tha t they woul d no t accep t thi s position . Th e CCIM , i t was said , woul d take , officially, stron g publi c actio n i n defens e o f th e Jews ' liberties . There upon, Hamian i sough t t o mollif y th e delegatio n an d promise d t o com municate thei r view s to the ministe r o f the interior. 23 Easterman wa s delighte d b y th e vigo r demonstrate d b y th e delega tion. I n hi s judgment, thi s marke d a new an d highl y encouragin g tur n o f events, no t merel y i n referenc e t o emigration , bu t als o i n respec t o f general Jewis h affairs . Th e WJC' s majo r difficult y hitherto , Easterma n added, ha d bee n th e reluctanc e an d timidit y o f th e leadin g Morocca n Jews and thei r organization s t o assist by approaching th e authorities. 24 However, thi s bol d stanc e an d th e WJC' s initiativ e t o convinc e th e authorities t o rela x emigratio n restriction s bor e n o fruit. 25 A s thes e re strictions wer e tightened , th e WJC , an d th e Jewis h Agenc y intensifie d their contact s wit h th e Moroccan s t o reviv e th e emigration. 26 Bu t afte r a long conversatio n i n Morocc o betwee n Easterman , Bi i c abld, an d Lagh zaoui (Apri l 1959) , Easterma n wa s totall y discouraged . H e ha d propose d to the m a plan whereb y Jewis h applicatio n fo r passport s woul d g o throug h the loca l Jewis h communit y council s first an d th e council s woul d the n

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present thes e t o th e relevan t officials ; unde r suc h a system , t o b e orga nized discreetly , 500-60 0 Jew s woul d leav e o n a monthl y basis. 2 7 Bu c abid sai d tha t Morocc o ha d t o sho w regar d t o it s "internationa l obligations" an d "th e othe r states. " Thus , th e governmen t coul d no t countenance collectiv e emigration . Laghzaoui , however , hinte d tha t h e would no t objec t t o th e propose d emigratio n scheme , bu t Easterma n ha d doubts a s t o hi s sincerit y an d conclude d tha t the whol e atmospher e ha s deteriorate d an d Morocc o i s more unde r th e pressur e of th e Ara b League . Th e Arabs ' pressur e o n th e Romania n c aliya is , I imagine , another facto r agains t us . B u c abid also referred t o the fact that th e [new ] Ibrahi m government ha s to face "othe r opposition," obviously referring t o the c Alal al-Fasi group o f th e Istiqla l an d others , an d tha t th e governmen t ar e no t likel y t o giv e them th e weapon o f Jewish emigratio n wit h which t o attack them. 28 Did Easterma n spea k o n behal f o f Goldmann , th e Jewis h Agency , o r the governmen t o f Israel? Wa s h e thei r intermediar y ove r th e emigratio n question? Ther e ca n b e n o doub t abou t hi s mediatio n rol e o n thei r behalf. Sinc e Nahu m Goldmann , i n additio n t o hi s positio n a s WJ C president, wa s a leadin g figure i n th e Zionis t movement , an d sinc e h e was presen t a t th e session s hel d jointl y i n Jerusale m b y th e Israel i government, th e Mossad, an d th e Jewis h Agenc y o n emigration , th e State o f Israe l ha d use d th e goo d office s o f th e WJ C t o reac h th e Moroc can authorities . Easterman , Golan , an d Riegne r emerge d a s th e chie f emissaries i n thi s task , mainl y becaus e the y ha d establishe d link s wit h the Morocca n politica l leadershi p fro m th e mid-1950 s onward . O n th e other hand , w e nee d t o conduc t furthe r researc h int o th e possibilit y tha t Easterman ofte n acte d o n behal f o f the WJ C alone . Active t o a significan t exten t i n favo r o f Morocca n Jewr y a t th e tim e was th e America n Jewis h Committbe e (AJC) , throug h it s offices i n France . According t o a detaile d repor t o f 195 9 draw n u p b y th e AJ C delegatio n headed b y Zacharia h Shuster , th e genera l situatio n o f th e Jew s deterio rated drasticall y fro m th e summe r o f 1959 . Shuste r an d hi s mai n assis tant, Abraha m S . Karlikow , hel d intensiv e coversation s o n 13-1 5 D e cember wit h leader s o f different element s o f the Jewis h community , wit h representatives o f worl d Jewis h organization s operatin g insid e Morocco , and wit h Charle s W . Yost , th e America n ambassado r i n Rabat. 2 9 The AJ C repor t pointe d t o severa l factor s whic h ha d cause d a marke d

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depression i n th e spiri t o f the Jews . First , the y feare d tha t th e recentl y formed Syrian-Egyptia n Unio n (Unite d Ara b Republic ) an d Morocco s support for Nasser' s Arab unity schemes would undermine thei r position . Second, th e Morocca n governmen t unde r c Abd 3 Allah Ibrahi m an nounced economi c policies involvin g stat e direction , thu s implyin g eve n greater economic controls. Third, th e hardening of government measure s restricting emigratio n include d th e establishmen t i n 195 9 o f a specia l section o f th e polic e t o dea l wit h thi s matter . Ther e wer e increase d numbers o f Jew s arreste d o n mer e suspicio n o f desirin g t o emigrate . Fourth, tension s an d indecisio n resulte d fro m th e fac t tha t al l organiza tions, Jewis h an d non-Jewish , ha d t o registe r thei r statutes , wit h som e groups no t bein g accepte d an d other s finding thei r statute s i n doub t a s late a s Decembe r 1959 . The WJ C section s an d th e Unite d HIA S Servic e offices i n Morocc o (whic h ha d bee n activ e i n th e countr y fo r som e time ) were force d t o clos e dow n thei r operations . Finally , anti-Zionis t expres sion was intensifie d b y th e politica l partie s a s well a s the press . Les s o f a sharp distinctio n wa s mad e betwee n Zionis m an d loca l Jew s tha n previ ously. On e governmenta l measur e wa s cuttin g of f posta l relation s wit h Israel.30 In 195 9 cam e anothe r politica l turnin g point , o f whic h Jewis h com munity leader s and the AJC were aware. Durin g the premiership o f cAbd 3 Allah Ibrahim , a split occurre d withi n th e Istiqlal . Th e leftist s seceded , led by Mehd i Be n Barka , supporte d b y B u c abld and Ibrahim . Be n Bark a then founde d th e Unio n National e de s Force s Populaire s (UNFP) . H e enlisted, temporaril y a t least , th e suppor t o f th e Unio n Marocain e d e Travail (UMT) , th e leftis t labo r union . Ther e wer e no w tw o majo r politi cal blocs i n th e country : th e conservativ e Istiqla l le d b y c Alal al-Fasi an d the UNF P le d b y Be n Barka . Challengin g th e Istiqla l newspapers , th e UNFP activist s publishe d al-Tahrir (Liberation) . Th e UNF P launche d attacks agains t th e Palac e an d agains t th e Istiqlal , backed , thoug h no t blindly, b y th e UMT . A t th e en d o f 1959 , th e editor s o f al-Tahrir wer e arrested o n suspicio n o f plotting t o assassinat e th e crow n prince , Hasa n II. Th e pape r wa s temporaril y suspended . Earl y i n 1963 , Be n Barka , known fo r lac k o f enthusiasm fo r th e monarchy , lef t Morocco . Two year s later h e wa s apparentl y assassinate d i n Franc e b y envoy s o f th e mon archy. In thes e tumultuou s times , th e Jews had littl e to gain from th e spli t i n the Istiqlal , fro m th e Palace-UNF P tensions , o r fro m Kin g Muhamma d

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V's growin g disenchantmen t wit h th e Ibrahi m government . Mos t Jews , save activ e member s an d supporter s o f the UNF P o r th e Istiqlal , shunne d political involvement . No t onl y di d the y find th e policie s o f the parties , whether leftis t o r conservative, distasteful , bu t th e various political force s did no t appea r particularl y eage r t o enlis t Jewis h support . Th e AJ C report correctl y explaine d tha t ther e wer e reason s fo r thi s phenomenon . In th e day s o f the struggl e fo r independence , th e Jew s eithe r claime d t o be neutra l o r evinced sympath y fo r th e French , an d thi s had unfavorabl e consequences fo r th e positio n o f the Jews . I n 1959 , Jewish prid e an d th e quest fo r right s notwithstanding , n o Jewis h leade r wante d t o b e pu t i n the positio n o f having picke d th e "wrong " side . Furthermore , ther e wa s little o r n o plac e o n th e politica l scen e fo r Jew s t o turn , fo r th e politica l parties vie d wit h eac h othe r i n showin g thei r loyalt y t o Ara b unit y an d Pan-Arab causes . Mos t significant , however , wa s th e prevailin g feelin g among differen t segment s o f th e Jewis h populatio n o f force d estrange ment fro m vita l area s o f Morocca n life . Thi s sharpene d th e distrus t tha t had alread y bee n widespread—befor e an d afte r 1956—a s t o th e poten tial for genuin e integration. 31 The distrus t an d estrangemen t wer e exemplifie d b y th e AJ C repor t concerning th e 195 9 registratio n fo r th e Ma y 196 0 elections , th e first elections sinc e independence. Jew s in Casablanca simpl y did not registe r to vote, t o the quie t despai r o f the officia l Jewis h leadership . Jew s i n Fe z asked th e governo r i f they would be provided wit h thei r ow n registratio n booths inside th e Jewis h neighborhood s becaus e th e Jewis h populatio n did no t wan t t o g o an d registe r a t th e regula r booths . Th e CCI M the n undertook a campaig n t o ge t Jewis h registration , wit h som e success. 32 The leadership' s reaso n fo r havin g Jews register was doubtless t o provid e a good showing so that the authorities would no t become mor e confirme d in thei r existin g distrus t o f the Jews ; th e hop e wa s that , eventually , th e Jews woul d registe r i n substantia l numbers , wit h increasin g attentio n paid t o vote r registratio n havin g favorabl e consequence s fo r thei r posi tion. Whereas th e Jewis h masse s avoide d takin g an y politica l stance , thei r sympathies la y primaril y wit h Muhamma d V , i n whom the y sa w a figure of last resor t wh o migh t chec k th e seriou s deterioratio n o f their position . For a t n o time sinc e 195 6 had thei r situatio n worsened a s much a s unde r the Ibrahi m government . Economically, th e Jewis h member s o f the middl e clas s wer e har d hi t

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under Ibrahim . They , lik e Musli m businessmen , fel t tha t any declaratio n of assets outsid e Morocc o (a s required i n order t o register t o vote) woul d mean, i n th e future , los s o f contro l o f thos e asset s t o th e Morocca n government an d possibl y th e los s o f th e asset s themselves . Whethe r t o accept this possibility an d register, o r attempt t o hide the assets and hav e the swor d o f Damocles hangin g ove r thei r heads , wa s thei r dilemma . A s the AJ C report indicated , man y o f the Jew s quietl y sough t arrangement s to move t o Franc e o r Spai n or , whe n possible , t o other countries . Othe r businessmen imagine d tha t the y would hav e to become employee s o f the state o r simpl y los e thei r businesse s shoul d th e governmen t tak e ove r certain economi c activities . Hence , the y to o were discourage d an d wante d to leave. 33 At th e lowe r economi c levels , th e polic y o f th e governmen t wa s fel t through th e placemen t service . Jew s sai d the y wer e bein g discriminate d through th e placement service , althoug h tha t was difficult t o prove. Wha t happened wa s that a Jewish mechani c or electrician wh o wanted employ ment registere d fo r a position . Hi s nam e wa s place d o n th e placemen t bureaus lists . Whe n a position di d become availabl e (unemployment wa s a seriou s proble m durin g th e lat e 1950s) , th e Je w foun d literall y hundred s of Muslims ahea d o f him o n the waiting lists. I t was also quite logica l tha t there woul d b e score s o f Musli m applicant s fo r ever y Jewis h applicant , given th e populatio n ratio . Henc e th e positio n o f th e Je w seeme d bad . Curiously, employer s tende d t o favo r Jewis h employee s becaus e the y were bette r workers . O n numerou s occasion s th e employer s notifie d particular Jewis h mechanic s tha t a job wa s availabl e an d aske d fo r them , but wer e sen t Muslim s b y the placemen t burea u instead. 34 It wa s rumore d tha t Muslim s wer e favore d ove r Jew s i n governmen t administration. Certainl y th e Jew s believe d this , an d the y complaine d about case s o f Jews havin g been passe d ove r fo r promotio n o r for hiring , even thoug h mor e qualifie d tha n Muslims . O n th e othe r hand , Jew s themselves indicate d ho w difficul t i t wa s t o mak e a cas e i n thi s regard , for thank s t o thei r education , the y wer e wel l represente d i n certai n branches o f the administration—suc h a s the posta l servic e an d banking . In severa l region s posta l activitie s stoppe d o n Yo m Kippur . Ther e wer e cases wher e governmen t post s wer e offere d t o Jew s wh o turne d the m down because o f low salaries. 35 When th e AJ C delegatio n me t wit h th e America n ambassado r a t Rabat, t o discus s th e issu e o f Jewish organization s suc h a s th e WJ C an d

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the Unite d HIA S Servic e n o longe r bein g allowe d t o functio n i n Mo rocco, Yos t wa s reassurin g abou t th e futur e o f th e othe r organizations . H e state d tha t whil e problem s existed , th e positio n o f th e AIU , fo r instance, wa s bette r tha n i n othe r Ara b countries. 3 6 However , th e AI U leadership i n Pari s wa s hardl y optimistic . Morocca n Jews , too , wer e surprised tha t th e AI U ha d laste d i n Morocc o a s lat e a s 1959 , fo r i t wa s anomalous fo r th e Stat e t o permi t a foreign , Frenc h organizatio n t o pla y a preponderan t rol e i n th e field o f primar y an d secondar y education . After all , thi s functio n i s confine d t o governmen t i n almos t ever y na tion. 3 7 O n th e surfac e i t looke d a s i f the Morocca n governmen t tolerate d the AI U an d eve n provide d th e networ k wit h financial subsidies . I n reality, governmen t pressure s beneat h th e surfac e mounte d fro m 1956 57 t o alte r th e statu s o f the AIU . In D e c e m b e r 1958 , a s Ibrahi m wa s abou t t o for m hi s government , Jules Braunschvi g feare d tha t Be n Bark a woul d b e appointe d educatio n minister ( cAbd al-Kari m Benjellou n wa s th e final choice) , a developmen t that coul d u n d e r m i n e th e AIU : A logical an d mentall y perceptiv e perso n mus t quickl y conclud e tha t w e repre sent a n anomal y i n a nationalist state . Becaus e [Be n Barka] i s a progressive ma n the religious argument [tha t without th e AIU in Morocc o Jewish education woul d be neglected ] wil l have les s of an influenc e o n him. Ye t no one can predict i f this government wil l be stable. 38 Fears turne d int o realit y i n Octobe r 1960 , whe n th e authoritie s na tionalized one-thir d o f th e AI U schools . Th e remainin g two-third s func tioned u n d e r th e aegi s o f th e AI U delegatio n i n Casablanca . Referre d t o from 196 1 a s th e Ittiha d schools , th e AI U i n Morocc o coul d b e adminis tered onl y b y loca l Jews , eve n thoug h th e school s continue d t o b e par t o f the Frenc h AI U worl d schoo l network. 3 9 Though n o longe r a cabine t m e m b e r i n 1959 , Dr . Leo n Benzaque n appeared t o b e a s concerne d a s Braunschvi g wit h th e shapin g o f events . Having returne d t o communa l service , h e observe d tha t 9 5 percen t o f Jewish youth s wer e attendin g schoo l a t th e tim e whil e scarcel y 1 0 per cent o f Musli m youth s di d so . Ninet y percen t o f Jewis h youth s receive d medical car e (throug h OSE-Maro c o r othe r sources ) agains t 1 0 percent o f their Musli m counterparts . An y Jewis h chil d wa s abl e t o atten d th e OR T

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vocational schools , whil e Musli m youth s ha d littl e educational/vocationa l training available. Whe n stil l a cabinet membe r h e had heard c Abd 3 Allah Ibrahim (labo r ministe r unti l Novembe r 1958 ) argue a t a cabinet sessio n that OR T wa s a n impressiv e phenomeno n bu t tha t it s school s shoul d have bee n wid e ope n t o Musli m youth s an d no t exclusively , o r almos t exclusively, t o Jews. 40 Ibrahim, accordin g t o Benzaquen , ofte n state d a t meeting s tha t h e admired Jewis h communa l initiative s whic h provide d socia l an d cultura l services. Ye t bein g i n constan t touc h wit h Muslim s a s labo r minister , Ibrahim conclude d tha t Muslim s envie d th e Jew s fo r havin g develope d such high-qualit y institution s whil e the y di d no t hav e them . Th e Jew s had thu s draw n to o muc h attentio n t o themselve s and , consequently , were potentia l victim s o f tha t excellence . Ibrahi m himself , Benzaque n added, resente d thes e organization s (although , simultaneously , admirin g their work) because mos t o f them wer e administere d b y foreign Jews. 41 To avoid problems in the future Benzaque n encourage d Jewish leader s increasingly t o involv e Muslim s i n certai n Jewis h communa l an d organi zational institutions . No w tha t Morocc o ha d bee n independen t fo r thre e years, ther e wa s n o reaso n fo r th e Jew s themselve s t o discriminat e an d that integratio n ha d t o b e carrie d ou t startin g wit h thes e institutions . Benzaquen insiste d tha t h e woul d d o hi s utmos t t o integrat e Musli m physicians int o OS E an d tha t th e proportio n o f Muslim youth s treate d a t OSE woul d b e increased. 42 Benzaquen wa s als o disturbe d b y th e fac t tha t Jewis h institution s i n Morocco wer e subsidize d fro m abroad . Thi s wa s a dangerou s situatio n and h e wa s convince d tha t i n th e futur e severa l deputie s i n th e Consul tative Assembl y woul d launc h attack s agains t attempt s b y foreign minor ities t o creat e an d maintai n institution s i n Morocc o wit h outsid e fund ing. 43 The firs t election s sinc e independenc e wer e hel d o n 8 Ma y 1960 , fo r thirteen loca l chamber s o f commerc e an d industry , an d o n 2 9 Ma y fo r municipal councils . O n both occasion s the UNF P mad e impressive gains . In th e municipa l election s th e UNF P wo n 2 3 percen t o f th e vote s a s compared wit h 4 0 percent fo r th e Istiqla l an d 7 percent fo r th e Mouve ment Populair e ( a conservativ e movement)— a significan t showin g fo r the UNF P whic h wa s no t ye t on e yea r old. 44 Amon g th e Jew s electe d was Mei r Toledano o f Casablanca who, a s the UNF P candidate, defeate d

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the Jewis h candidat e o f th e Istiqlal , Mei r c Ovadia, th e presiden t o f th e Casablanca community. 45 Ye t thi s achievemen t wa s o f little significanc e for th e overwhelmin g majorit y o f the Jews. Six days prior t o the loca l elections, Kin g Muhammad V formed a new government whic h h e le d personall y an d i n whic h Hasan , th e crow n prince, wa s veste d wit h rea l authority . Mos t Jew s welcome d th e ne w government, bu t th e Jewis h communit y a s a whole remaine d vulnerabl e to the whims o f its anti-Zionism . In agreemen t wit h th e WJ C an d th e Jewis h Agency , Easterma n wen t to Raba t i n Augus t 196 0 to discus s wit h th e ne w governmen t th e poten tial fo r liberalizin g Jewis h emigration . I n Jul y whe n th e Easterma n visi t was bein g planned , Shraga i requeste d tha t Easterma n spea k wit h S i M'barek Bekka'i , the n ministe r o f th e interior , an d wit h Crow n Princ e Hasan. H e indicate d tha t ther e wa s n o nee d t o g o int o intricat e detail s but tha t Easterma n shoul d clearl y stat e that , sinc e Morocc o ha d becom e independent, Jew s ha d no t bee n allowe d t o emigrate t o Israel i n spit e of the promise s an d statement s whic h Morocc o had made. 46 The meetin g betwee n Hasa n an d Easterma n wa s hel d o n 1 1 August. Hasan wa s deepl y seriou s i n insistin g o n secrecy . Thi s i s attested b y th e fact tha t th e meetin g too k plac e lat e a t night , outsid e Rabat , i n th e private residenc e o f on e o f hi s closes t friends . Hasan' s friendl y manne r encouraged Easterma n t o be ope n wit h him . H e spok e t o him abou t th e WJC's disappointment regardin g emigration, th e general stat e of disquiet in th e Morocca n Jewis h community , an d th e positio n o f th e WJ C i n Morocco whos e section s ha d bee n close d dow n th e yea r before . Easter man di d no t rais e th e questio n o f Israe l a s such , no r di d h e fee l i n a position t o refe r specificall y t o th e embarg o o n posta l relation s wit h Israel, thoug h h e di d comment , i n genera l terms , an d a s a human prob lem, o n th e restriction s o n communicatio n betwee n Morocca n Jew s an d their relatives and friends i n Israel: portraying them a s part of the traged y of separated families. 47 Hasan di d no t provid e Easterma n wit h any concrete answers , bu t onl y the promis e o f future contac t an d discussio n o f thes e problems . Never theless, h e suggeste d tha t durin g hi s projected visi t t o the Unite d State s to lead th e Moroccoa n delegatio n a t the UN , i t would be unwise t o upse t him b y an y hostil e Jewis h demonstratio n o r b y pressur e o n th e par t o f American Jewis h organizations. 48 Easterman late r observe d tha t h e wa s wel l awar e o f the unreliabilit y

The Self-Liquidation Process 20 3 of Morocca n declaration s o f goodwil l an d goo d intentions . A t th e sam e time h e wel l understoo d tha t Hasa n heade d a ne w governmen t whic h had onl y jus t assume d authority , an d wa s balancin g o n a ver y slende r political tightrope stretche d betwee n fiercely hostil e partisans o n the on e hand, an d th e suspiciou s force s o f the Middl e Easter n Ara b state s on th e other. Easterma n wa s convinced tha t Hasa n an d his father ha d littl e lov e for Nasser , an d vic e versa , bu t the y di d no t fee l a s sure o f themselves a s did Bourguib a o f Tunisia. Easterma n conclude d tha t afte r th e WJ C ha d had s o man y disappointment s wit h th e previou s Morocca n government s of Si Bekka'i, Balafrej , and , wors t o f all, Ibrahim , i n the latte r half of 1960 it ha d a t las t reache d th e ea r o f th e rea l hea d o f government , an d established direc t relation s wit h him . Easterma n believe d h e ha d suc ceeded i n dispellin g th e widel y sprea d rumo r i n Morocc o tha t th e WJ C actively supporte d Be n Bark a an d simila r leftis t group s an d that , there fore, i t was taking sides in Morocco' s interna l political conflicts. 49 Less tha n tw o week s later , Easterma n ha d a length y discussio n wit h Sam Benazeraf , a Morocca n Jewis h financier clos e t o th e Palace . Bena zeraf informed hi m tha t ther e appeare d t o be a relaxation o f rules regard ing application s fo r passports , particularl y i n Casablanca . Benazera f sai d that instruction s ha d bee n give n t o the Casablanc a passport office s t o th e following effect : application s wer e no t t o b e rejecte d withou t givin g a reason; i n dealin g wit h passports , precis e question s ha d t o be pu t t o th e applicant; i f there wer e objection s t o grantin g a passport, the y ha d t o b e clearly stated ; an d i f ther e wer e n o objection s o n lega l ground s o r o n account o f officia l instructions , passport s ha d t o b e granted . Benazera f claimed tha t thes e instruction s ha d bee n give n b y th e Ministr y o f th e Interior t o the governo r o f Casablanca, bu t h e di d no t kno w i f they wer e written o r oral . H e adde d tha t th e Ministr y o f the Interio r ha d t o hav e acted o n orders from th e crow n prince , an d tha t i t was most unlikel y tha t the Ministr y woul d hav e acte d o n it s ow n initiativ e o n a matte r o f thi s importance. "I f thi s wa s accurate, " Easterma n boasted , " I thin k w e ca n assume tha t my meeting with Mawla y Hasa n i s having fruitful results/' 5 0 It seem s tha t fo r reason s unknown , Easterman' s optimisti c forecast s were premature , althoug h ther e wa s a n apparen t inclinatio n o n th e par t of Hasa n o r hi s fathe r t o conside r changes . Nevertheless , i n Januar y 1961, i n respons e t o tw o events , th e intensificatio n o f official anti-Zion ism, rathe r tha n libera l policies , prevailed . O n 3 January, Muhamma d V organized th e Casablanc a Conferenc e whic h wa s attende d b y represen -

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tatives o f th e Unite d Ara b Republi c (includin g Nasser) , Ghana , Mali , Guinea, an d the Algerian FLN . Althoug h a wide variety of topics pertain ing to the "Thir d World " were discussed , Israel , portraye d a s an agent of imperialism an d colonialism, wa s the focus o f some attention. Th e secon d event too k plac e o n th e nigh t o f 10-1 1 January whe n th e Pisces, a sixty five-foot boa t carryin g forty-thre e Jew s fro m th e Gul f o f Alhucema s t o Gibraltar, foundere d an d al l but th e Spanis h captai n an d hi s brother-in law met thei r death . Thes e Jews were bein g smuggle d ou t o f Morocco as part of the clandestine emigratio n proces s after severa l such attempts ha d been mad e i n the past . Both event s focused publi c attentio n o n th e Morocca n Jewis h com munity, wit h dire results. Jews suffered polic e abuse, arrests , and imprisonment a s wel l a s sever e beatings . Thos e wh o happene d t o b e wearin g any combinatio n o f blu e an d whit e clothin g wer e arreste d a s "secre t Zionists," while Jew s wearin g blac k skullcap s o r garment s wer e accuse d of "displayin g sign s o f mourning " a t Nasser' s visit . Th e Egyptia n presi dent's presenc e i n Morocc o wa s thu s a stimulu s fo r anti-Zionist , anti Jewish sentiments . Similarly, th e sinkin g o f th e Pisces resulte d i n furthe r outburst s o f anti-Zionism. Towar d th e en d o f January , th e ministe r o f informatio n Mawlay Ahma d c Alawi blame d th e traged y o n th e Zionis t organization s that "incited " Jew s t o leav e Morocco . Bu t b y the n th e Europea n an d American pres s ha d identifie d th e difficul t condition s o f Moroccan Jewr y as th e mai n caus e o f thei r desir e t o emigrate . Th e Israel i government , too, seize d thi s opportunit y t o plac e muc h o f th e responsibilit y o n th e Moroccan government . At th e sam e time , variou s pro-Israe l group s workin g insid e Morocc o —Israelis associate d wit h th e Jewis h Agenc y an d th e Mossad (th e latte r represented b y th e lat e Ale x Gatmon) ; th e Zionis t yout h movement s working undergroun d (Dror , ha-Bonim , Bn e c Akiva, ha-N o c ar ha-Tsi yoni, ha-Shomer ha-Ts a c ir), and other elements—decide d t o take advan tage o f the Pisces affair an d th e unfortunat e repercussion s o f the Nasse r visit in order t o urge Jews to emigrate. O n 9 February 1961 , in commem oration o f th e Jew s wh o ha d me t thei r deat h a t sea , thousand s upo n thousands o f copie s o f a trac t wer e distribute d b y loca l activists , urgin g the Jew s no t t o dispair . Th e tex t o f thi s tract , writte n i n Frenc h an d bordered b y heavy black mournin g bars , wa s very strongl y worded :

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5

To ou r Jewis h brethre n i n Morocco . Forty-thre e o f our brethren , drive n b y a n intense desir e t o liv e i n th e Hol y Lan d an d ful l o f hop e fo r th e future , hav e disappeared a t sea . Onl y a few o f them wer e burie d i n accordance with ou r rites . The others were swallowe d u p by the depths o f the sea ; their families, th e peopl e of Israel and we ourselve s weep a t their loss. A 2,000-year hop e pushe s Jew s t o leave b y ever y mean s an d b y all roads leadin g to Zion and Jerusalem . Any certaint y o f finding a place i n a n independen t Morocc o ha s disappeared . I t might b e tha t th e Palac e i s no t involve d i n th e anti-Jewis h wav e tha t ha s bee n unleashed a t thi s time . W e kno w tha t anti-Semitis m i s i n contradictio n t o th e principles o f Islam, bu t ther e exis t elements who have secretly decide d t o pursu e us and humiliate us . Le t thos e element s kno w that thei r en d wil l be bitter. Fro m Amalek an d Hama n t o Hitle r an d Eichman n th e lis t o f those who m destin y ha s struck i s a long one. We ar e no t alone . Al l the communitie s o f Israel an d th e world wee p fo r th e dea d and struggl e fo r ou r right s an d ou r liberties . . . . D o no t los e courage . Remai n strong and steadfast ! The struggl e fo r ou r rights and libertie s continues ! The trac t le d t o a publi c outcry , an d arrest s soo n followed , mainl y i n Fez, bu t als o i n Meknes , Sefrou , Tangier , an d Casablanca—th e majo r Jewish centers . W e d o no t kno w ho w widesprea d thes e arrest s were , ye t it i s certai n tha t amon g thos e detaine d wer e peopl e suspecte d o f dissem inating th e tract . Th e reactio n amon g Jew s t o th e publicatio n wa s mixed . There wer e thos e wh o wer e impresse d b y it . However , th e suspicious ness o f a communit y tha t live d i n fea r le d som e t o questio n it s authentic ity. Man y argue d tha t i t wa s th e wor k o f provocateurs , tha t i t coul d no t have bee n don e b y Jews . Som e believe d i t mus t hav e bee n th e wor k o f the Frenc h Deuxiem e Burea u psychologica l warfar e unit , fo r reason s o f its own . Som e claime d i t ha d bee n encourage d b y th e adherent s o f th e U N F P , th e oppositio n party , whic h sough t t o provok e th e Muhamma d V/Hasan governmen t and , thus , unfavorabl e pres s reactio n i n th e outsid e world agains t th e regime. 5 1 Jewish communit y leader s wer e place d i n a mos t embarrassin g an d difficult position . Th e C C I M hel d a specia l meetin g o n 1 2 Februar y an d issued a communiqu e denouncin g "th e diffusio n o f tract s o f unknow n origin whos e purpos e i s t o divid e an d so w discor d amon g Musli m an d Jewish populations/ ' Ye t th e C C I M als o seize d th e occasio n t o denounc e

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Egyptian Presiden t Gama l Abdel Nasser at the Casablanca Conference, Januar y 1961 (courtesy o f Michael M . Laskier , "Th e Jew s o f Morocco under Kin g Muhammad V," Skira Hodshit, 9 [30 November 1986], Hebrew). the persistenc e o f a press campaig n hostil e t o th e Jewis h populatio n an d expressed "th e wil l o f Morocca n Jewr y t o continu e t o wor k fo r accom plishing the tas k of reconstruction o f the country." 52 Distribution o f th e trac t als o gav e ris e t o dangers . Th e da y afte r it s distribution ther e was one report that Muslim s in Marrakesh had decide d to descen d upo n th e mellah, ou t o f ange r a t thi s provocation . I n Casa blanca, Jewis h communit y leader s were worried enoug h t o have five cars touring th e Musli m distric t fo r a day o r tw o t o se e whether th e Muslim s would reac t violently . On e perso n associate d wit h th e UNF P asserte d that Muslim s ha d com e t o tha t party' s headquarter s t o as k wha t actio n should b e take n agains t thi s Jewis h provocation , an d ha d ha d t o b e assuaged an d calmed . I n th e Istiqlal , ther e wa s a feelin g tha t actio n should b e take n agains t Jew s and , stil l accordin g t o thi s sam e source , these advocate s o f physica l actio n wer e calme d dow n onl y b y th e to p party leaders . I n th e Morocca n situation , therefore , th e trac t wa s a dangerous weapon t o use. 53 Among those who correctly attributed th e trac t to Zionist groups ther e were als o unfavorabl e reactions . Th e basi c criticis m wa s twofold : tha t i t was dangerou s and , eve n more , unnecessary . Fo r neve r ha d Jewis h

The Self-Liquidation Process 20 7 opinion i n Morocc o bee n s o favorable t o emigration , an d t o understand ing o f th e Zionis t viewpoint , eve n amon g thos e Jew s wh o presse d mos t actively for integration . Polic e brutality, th e anti-Zionis t pres s campaign , and othe r factor s had , i n fact , provide d th e bes t pro-Zionis t propaganda . And th e sinkin g o f the Pisces had reinforced , no t lowered , sentiment s i n this regard. 54 If th e serie s o f event s i n Morocc o ha d brough t depressio n an d shoc k they had , also , brough t a ne w sens e o f dignit y an d determinatio n t o Jewish leadership . I n th e week s followin g th e Casablanc a beatings , per sonal conflict s an d quarrel s amon g Jewish leaders , thoug h no t forgotten , became subordinat e t o the need for cooperation i n the face of the danger s to th e community . Th e arrest s followin g th e distributio n o f th e tract , which again serve d t o underline Jewish insecurity, als o served to reaffir m and harde n th e expressio n o f Jewish dignity , almos t ou t o f desperation , as i t were . Ther e wa s reinforcement , too , o f the growin g sentimen t tha t the situatio n coul d no t becom e worse , an d th e Jew s ha d t o stan d u p an d demand freedo m o f movement. Sai d on e communa l leader : "I t migh t b e that som e day , w e will come t o a Warsaw ghett o situation . Bu t i f we do , let i t be for rea l things, no t for somethin g like a tract." 55 Mounting criticis m fro m abroad—Europe , th e Unite d States , an d Israel—following th e Pisces affair, place d th e Morocca n governmen t i n a negative light , an d th e latte r was now willing to implement polic y changes. Jewish leader s me t S i M'Bare k Bekkai , th e ministe r o f the interior , wh o informed the m tha t instructions were being given to local authorities tha t no obstacle s shoul d b e place d i n th e wa y o f Jews seekin g passports . H e promised the m a n audience wit h th e king. 56 On 1 8 February 1961 , King Muhammad V gave audience i n his thron e room t o th e sam e Jewis h delegation—compose d o f David c Amar (secre tary-general o f the CCIM) , Dr . Leo n Benzaquen , Sa m Benazeraf , Davi d Azoulay, Jewis h leader s o f Fe z an d Meknes , an d Mar c Sabbah . Th e audience laste d a littl e mor e tha n hal f a n hour . T o thi s audienc e th e delegation brough t a memorandu m i n French , fou r page s long , whic h consisted o f the following : 1. A dignified pledg e o f allegiance t o the kin g of Morocco describin g th e desire o f th e Jewis h communitie s t o liv e i n harmon y an d wor k fo r building th e country ; 2. A reques t fo r unconditiona l an d unrestricte d freedo m o f movement ,

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with a description o f some of the difficultie s tha t ha d bee n me t i n thi s regard. Th e delegatio n wa s carefu l t o includ e th e term s o f the state ment mad e by Bekkai , i n order t o get the m o n record ; 3. A reques t tha t actio n b e take n t o sto p th e forcibl e abductio n an d conversion o f Jewish girl s to Islam ; 4. A reques t tha t th e Jewis h communitie s an d th e CCI M b e give n a new, full y lega l status , suitabl e t o independent Morocco. 57 Muhammad V said tha t Bekkai' s order s wit h regar d t o unconditiona l and unrestricte d emigratio n wer e hi s orders, an d tha t he was responsibl e for the m an d guarantee d them . H e sai d tha t i f Jew s me t wit h an y difficulties the y shoul d immediatel y g o t o him . Indeed , h e reproache d them fo r no t havin g com e t o hi m wit h thei r problem s earlier . H e sai d that i f somebod y wer e t o tak e a passpor t an d the n no t com e bac k t o Morocco after fou r o r five months, i t would mea n tha t h e di d no t wish t o stay i n Morocc o an d tha t wa s th e en d o f that. Regardin g persona l safety , Muhammad V sai d tha t h e ha d no t know n o f th e jailin g an d beatin g o f Jews, an d that , ha d h e known , h e personall y woul d hav e gon e t o th e prison t o tak e the m out . I n thi s connection , h e als o asserte d tha t what ever migh t b e Morocco s externa l relations , i t wa s mor e importan t that , internally, th e peopl e o f Morocc o shoul d no t b e divide d an d tha t i t wa s not Nasse r wh o decide d Morocca n interna l affairs . Whe n th e kin g wa s told tha t Morocca n Jew s i n othe r countrie s ha d difficultie s i n gettin g their passport s renewed , h e state d tha t i t wa s th e busines s o f Morocca n consuls t o help his citizens an d no t t o create problem s fo r them. 58 On 2 4 Februar y 1961 , Bekka i announce d tha t th e Jew s wer e free t o settle i n an y countr y i n th e worl d excep t Israel . Morocc o di d no t recog nize Israe l an d Morocca n passport s wer e thu s no t availabl e fo r tha t country. Moroccan s wh o wen t t o Israel woul d los e thei r citizenship. 59 I t was, o f course, quit e clear that, onc e in Europe, th e Jews would probabl y choose Israe l as their final destination . During the sam e week tha t Jewish leader s me t with the kin g and wit h Bekkai, th e Coordinatin g Commission , th e Israel i bod y comprisin g rep resentatives o f th e Jewis h Agenc y an d th e Israel i government , me t t o discuss development s i n Morocco . Isse r Harel , th e hea d o f the Mossad, was presen t a t th e meeting . Gold a Meir , th e foreig n minister , opene d the sessio n an d pointe d ou t tha t discussion s wit h Morocc o ha d bee n carried ou t fo r severa l year s throug h divers e channels , vi a the WJC , an d

The Self-Liquidation Process 20 9 with th e assistanc e o f th e America n ambassado r i n Rabat . Th e Israel i government, sh e said , ha d fo r som e tim e unti l th e Pisces traged y be lieved that , throug h quie t diplomacy , solution s woul d ensue . Bu t thi s was no longer possible : international publi c opinion ha d t o awaken t o th e reality o f Morocca n Jewry . O f course , ther e aros e th e issu e o f whethe r Israel shoul d continu e clandestin e c aliya o r hal t it . Mei r wa s strongl y i n favor o f taking risks and engagin g in undergroun d operations. 60 Meir expresse d th e opinion tha t everythin g possible had t o be don e t o avert tragedie s i n th e future . Th e Pisces wa s certainl y a fa r cr y fro m a suitable boa t bu t i t ha d transporte d Jew s clandestinel y ou t o f Morocc o twelve time s before . Still , fund s ha d t o b e mad e availabl e fo r th e pur chase of better boats. 61 Isser Hare l wa s very pessimistic abou t th e intention s o f the Morocca n government. Th e Ibrahi m government , h e observed , ha d suppresse d c aliya mor e brutall y tha n th e Bekka' i and Balafre j government s ha d pre viously. Th e Muhamma d V/Hasa n governmen t wa s no t a s libera l a s ha d been expected . No t onl y had th e kin g joined th e pro-Nasser bandwagon , but th e restrictio n o n Jewis h right s remaine d intact . Muhamma d V had realized lat e i n 196 0 or earl y 196 1 that h e ha d mad e a mistake i n closel y identifying wit h th e Nasse r regime , bu t h e di d no t know how to go about distancing himsel f fro m Egypt . Consequently , i n 1961 , Nasserism , th e Arab League , an d anti-Jewis h action s dominate d th e street s o f urba n Morocco.62 Harel furthe r note d tha t severa l Jewis h Istiqlalist s an d forme r arden t integrationists wer e no w disillusione d wit h th e Morocca n government . In th e pas t the y ha d been enemie s o f c aliya an d Israel , wherea s i n 1960 61 the y wer e contributin g substantiall y t o pro-Zionis t activity . Th e syn agogues an d Jewis h communit y center s wer e becomin g center s fo r Zion ist action, thoug h carrie d ou t with th e utmos t discretion . Even i f the anti-Zionis t atmospher e wa s eviden t i n th e hig h echelon s of governmen t an d th e cabinet , an d th e polic y restrictin g emigratio n originated there , th e implementatio n o f th e polic y wa s i n th e hand s o f officials a t lowe r level s o f government , a s wel l a s th e police . Th e Jews , therefore, fel t mos t vulnerable whe n facin g thes e forces. Hare l describe d their pligh t a t the hand s o f a branch o f the Morocca n police : One of the means of persecuting the Jews is the highway police. There is a special police force that patrols the roads. If they find Jews traveling on a bus, they force

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them of f an d sen d the m home . I f they find a Jewish famil y o n th e road , thi s i s a sign tha t the y ar e o n thei r wa y t o a departure point . Ther e i s n o protectio n fo r these Jews . . . . Ou r unit s fro m Casablanc a mov e ou t [t o th e homes ] a t tw o o'clock i n th e morning , ente r th e houses , an d immediatel y leave . Th e whol e procedure—beginning wit h registerin g candidates , gettin g the m i n shape , set ting a date, deliverin g a passport, transportin g the m suddenly , becaus e the y ar e to com e a t th e las t moment—i s carrie d ou t i n stric t conspiratoria l fashion . Afterwards, ther e i s a proble m o f coordinatin g th e mean s o f departure . Bot h problems ar e a s one—taking peopl e ou t o f the cities : from Casablanca , Meknes , or Fez , an d bringin g the m t o a certain destinatio n poin t a t th e ver y momen t tha t a shi p o r fishing boa t i s t o arrive . Thi s i s a n involve d an d ver y complicate d activity. Ver y many have been arrested. 63 Harel accorde d muc h o f th e credi t t o loca l Morocca n Zionists . True , the elit e o f th e undergroun d an d c aliya organizer s wer e Israelis . Ye t th e main b u r d e n fel l o n loca l youn g Zionists . The y wer e th e backbon e o f activities. Hare l di d no t underestimat e th e authorities ' effort s aime d a t neutralizing undergroun d Zionis t efforts : At first w e looke d fo r th e easie r routes . Th e lan d rout e wa s les s dangerous , no t from th e Morocca n vantag e point , bu t fro m th e standpoin t o f ris k t o life . W e exhausted almos t ever y possibility . W e transporte d man y thousand s o f Jews ove r the lan d rout e wit h counterfei t passports . The y understoo d ou r evasions , issue d additional decrees , cancelle d exi t permits , an d place d arm y guar d unit s o n th e land routes . I woul d lik e yo u t o kno w tha t onc e Tangie r wa s annexe d t o th e Moroccan stat e [i n Octobe r 1956 ] . . . ther e wa s almos t n o lan d borde r lef t tha t we coul d cross . O n th e sout h wa s the desert . I t was impossible t o get from ther e to anywhere. Th e Spanis h enclave s wer e left . Bu t the y wer e smal l enclave s wit h short borders . Thes e border s wer e close d b y th e army . Everythin g was directe d against our activity . Wha t wa s left wa s mainly maritim e actio n which was divide d into two : one wa s takin g Jews ou t ove r th e Morocca n borde r an d bringin g the m over t o Gibraltar , tha t is , crossin g th e Mediterranean ; th e secon d wa y wa s smuggling the m ou t i n fishing boat s an d smugglers ' boat s from th e Morocca n coast near a n enclave o r on the sea. 64 Harel reveale d tha t th e Spaniard s a t th e Spanis h enclave s o f Ceut a an d Melilla (annexe d b y Spai n fro m Morocc o i n th e sixteent h century ) wer e very helpful , particularl y th e Catholi c religiou s functionaries , bu t als o the politica l an d administrativ e authorities . W h e n aske d a t th e sessio n b y Moshe Sharet t i f thi s wa s don e wit h th e knowledg e o f th e Spanis h government, Hare l responde d tha t thi s wa s definitel y th e case , eve n

The Self-Liquidation Process 21 1 though Spanish-Israel i relation s durin g th e Franc o er a wer e officiall y strained. 65 Shragai, wh o togethe r wit h Hare l wa s th e prim e initiato r o f thi s clandestine c aliya, pointe d ou t tha t a certai n membe r o f th e Morocca n cabinet receive d $600,00 0 a t on e tim e s o tha t Jew s coul d leav e i n larg e numbers. Althoug h i t is not clear exactly when thi s transaction—referre d to a t th e sessio n a s Doron, o r gif t i n Hebrew—wa s made , Shraga i suggested that , i n accordanc e wit h thi s "understanding, " severa l thou sand Jew s departe d fo r Israe l vi a Casablanc a an d Marseilles . The y lef t quietly, th e polic e wer e no t there , an d n o on e bothere d t o chec k thei r passports. 66 Interestingly , Shraga i considere d th e Hasan-Easterma n meeting o f 1 1 Augus t 196 0 a s a positiv e ste p towar d th e relaxatio n o f measures agains t c aliya. No t totall y discouraged , h e argue d befor e th e Coordinating Commissio n tha t "meanwhile , wha t happene d happene d and th e talk s hav e bee n interrupted . I don' t mea n tha t the y hav e bee n cancelled; the y hav e bee n interrupted . I n an y case , w e ar e tryin g t o g o in thi s path . Nowadays , i t i s especiall y wit h th e pett y official s tha t i t i s hard t o deal." 67 If we g o back t o th e meeting s betwee n Muhamma d V and Bekka i o n the on e hand , an d th e Morocca n Jewis h delegatio n o n th e other , a s well as th e willingnes s o n th e par t o f th e authoritie s t o rela x emigratio n restrictions i n February-Marc h 1961 , w e ma y as k wha t th e primar y factors wer e which , eventually , resulte d i n a change o f policy? First , th e vigorous pres s campaig n whic h ha d place d th e countr y i n a negativ e light, an d was followed b y demarches mad e by man y differen t countries . Second, Muhamma d V himself may—as Hare l suggested—hav e desire d to chec k wha t h e migh t hav e considere d growin g pro-Nasse r influence . It wa s n o secre t tha t amon g th e policeme n wh o bea t u p Jew s i n Casa blanca in January 1961 , there wer e man y expressing strong pro-Nasser a s well a s anti-Jewis h sentiments ; an d tha t th e Casablanc a actio n seem s t o have been take n withou t th e knowledg e o f the centra l authorities . Ther e were report s fro m Morocc o tha t pro-Nasse r feelin g wa s no t jus t some thing vagu e an d general , bu t organized , wit h th e pro-Nasserite s havin g their ow n cadres , i n a movemen t cuttin g acros s part y lines . Hence , th e king's action s aime d t o demonstrate , a s he tol d th e Jewis h delegatio n o n 18 February , tha t i t wa s no t Nasse r wh o decide d Morocca n interna l policies. Finally, th e Morocca n governmen t desire d t o ge t ri d o f a proble m

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which, fo r it , wa s becomin g secondar y i n compariso n wit h th e man y other difficult , fundamenta l problem s facin g it . Thi s wa s definitel y a consideration followin g th e sudde n deat h o f Muhammad V on 2 6 Febru ary 1961 ; and th e emergenc e o f Hasan I I a s his successor . Th e latte r fel t he ha d muc h t o gai n b y th e departur e o f th e discontente d elements . Those peopl e wh o di d no t conside r themselve s a t home i n Morocco , an d hence were a source of friction, ha d t o leave. 68 Further, wit h th e collaps e of the Syrian-Egyptia n Unio n in Septembe r 1961 , the new king exploite d Arab disunit y an d Nasser s declin e i n prestige , t o le t th e Jew s leav e without facin g Ara b disapprobation . However, lettin g th e Jew s go , i n lin e wit h th e lat e Muhamma d V' s promise t o th e Jewis h delegation , wa s hardl y a simpl e matter . Th e process o f organizin g emigratio n require d politica l negotiations . A n agreement t o thi s effec t wa s reache d i n th e latte r hal f o f 1961 , worke d out betwee n th e Palace , Ale x Gatmo n (th e Mossads ma n i n Morocco) , and th e Unite d HIA S Service . Workin g unde r th e cove r o f th e Unite d HIAS Service , fro m Novembe r 196 1 Israe l wa s abl e t o organiz e large scale and tolerate d c aliya via Europe. Thi s process, mainl y between 196 1 and 1964 , wa s know n a s "Operatio n Yakhin, " name d fo r on e o f the tw o pillars in the Temple. 69 The nature o f the negotiations and the magnitud e of this operatio n ar e analyze d i n th e nex t chapte r dealin g with th e c aliya and self-defens e underground .

The Arabic-Language Moroccan Press and the Jews: 1961 Throughout 1961 , Morocca n nationalist s concentrate d thei r effort s o n criticizing th e illega l c aliya, Morocca n Jewis h leaders , an d th e renewe d emigration unde r th e auspice s o f th e Unite d HIA S Service . Nowher e was thi s heightene d significanc e o f the Zionis t issu e an d it s exploitatio n more i n evidence , o r th e exten t o f Jewish insecurit y mor e clearl y con veyed, tha n i n th e Arabic-languag e Morocca n press . Th e journal s tha t carried mos t o f the nationalis t oppositio n wer e al- cAlam, th e dail y o f th e Istiqlal; al-Tahrir, th e dail y o f th e UNFP ; al-Fajr (Th e Dawn) , a dail y with a circulatio n o f 2,00 0 t o 3,000 ; al-Kifdh al-Watanl (Th e Nationa l Struggle), th e orga n o f the Morocca n Communis t party ; an d Akhbdr alDunyd (Worl d News) , a weekly whic h reache d a circulation o f 30,000 t o

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35,000. Mustaf a c Alawi, th e edito r o f Akhbdr al-Dunyd, ha d edite d alFajr until i t closed dow n i n th e first hal f of 1961. In lin e with th e attack s o n Zionism, o n 30 August 1961 , an editoria l i n al-cAlam focuse d criticis m o n thre e Jewis h leaders : Mar c Sabbah , Davi d Azoulay, an d Davi d c Amar. Th e pape r castigate d the m fo r havin g at tended th e twenty-fift h anniversar y celebration s an d meeting o f the WJ C in Genev a o n 20-23 August. Thi s meeting , state d al-^Alam, di d no t limi t its progra m merel y t o th e stud y o f th e socia l condition s o f Jews aroun d the world ; bu t unde r th e chairmanshi p o f tha t "avowe d Zionist, " Dr . Nahum Goldmann , delegate s an d guest s wer e urge d t o suppor t Israe l and defen d it s existenc e agains t externa l an d interna l dangers . B y thei r very presenc e a t th e meeting , Sabbah , Azoulay , an d c Amar ha d mani fested suppor t fo r th e WJ C progra m fo r Israel . And , sinc e Morocc o di d not recogniz e th e existenc e o f Israel an d th e WJ C meetin g wa s Zionist inspired, sanction s ha d t o be impose d o n thos e wh o turne d agains t stat e policy, whic h wa s t o uphol d politica l an d mora l obligation s towar d th e Arab world an d specificall y Palestine : "soil usurped b y the Zionists." The editorial adde d tha t th e Jew s ha d place d a barrie r betwee n themselve s and al l othe r Moroccan s throug h Zionism , an d that , furthermore , the y were guilt y o f makin g n o sacrifice s sinc e 195 6 fo r th e sak e o f Morocca n growth an d development. 70 Al-Tahrir mad e simila r observation s regardin g Sabbah , Azoulay , an d c Amar i n connectio n wit h th e WJ C meeting . I t suggeste d that , wit h fe w exceptions, th e Jew s o f Morocc o ha d no t trie d t o integrat e int o th e Muslim majority . I n vie w o f th e emigratio n t o Israel , i t wa s clea r tha t Zionism in Morocco was active and well financed—even thoug h Morocc o was a prominen t membe r o f th e Ara b League . Th e Jew s coul d no t b e citizens o f tw o countrie s a t th e sam e time , particularl y whe n Morocc o considered th e foreig n polic y o f Israe l t o b e i n tota l contradictio n t o it s own. I t was thus essentia l for th e Morocca n authoritie s t o observe closel y activities undertake n b y Jewish communa l leaders. 71 The Morocca n Communis t part y orga n state d tha t i t wa s pointles s t o debate whethe r Jew s attende d a s delegate s o r observers . Th e mer e fac t that the y attended a pro-Zionist meetin g wa s ba d enough . Th e editoria l attributed th e creatio n o f Israel to the WJC, an d accused the organizatio n of supporting th e combine d Israeli , British , an d Frenc h attac k o n Egyp t in Octobe r an d Novembe r 1956. 72 The pres s campaig n agains t th e WJ C an d Morocca n Jewis h leader s

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placed Sabba h an d Azoula y o n th e defensive . Upo n thei r retur n fro m Geneva, the y responde d t o th e accusation s i n a lette r t o al- cAlam, em phasizing tha t the y ha d participate d i n th e meetin g a s observer s only ; that Davi d c Amar ha d no t attende d th e meeting , contrar y t o pres s re ports; an d tha t thei r presenc e i n Genev a wa s vital , fo r the y ha d worke d hard t o ensur e tha t onl y accurat e informatio n abou t th e politica l system , policies, an d development s withi n th e Jewis h communitie s o f Morocc o was disseminated . Sabba h an d Azoula y als o wrote tha t durin g thei r meet ings wit h delegate s fro m twenty-si x nations , the y ha d correcte d miscon ceptions abou t Morocca n Jewr y an d supporte d th e progressiv e regim e o f the "beloved " Kin g Hasa n I I . 7 3 Mor e significantly , Sabba h an d Azoula y argued tha t th e Jew s o f Morocc o coul d no t remai n indifferen t an d abstai n from meeting s organize d b y internationa l Jewis h organizations . N o na tion, regardles s o f it s regime , coul d compe l th e Jew s t o remai n close d within it s physica l borders , an d depriv e the m o f spiritua l an d cultura l contacts wit h thei r brethren. 7 4 Al-cAlam responde d swiftl y i n a n editoria l stressin g th e inevitabilit y o f Jews manifestin g solidarit y wit h thei r coreligionists . I t wa s nevertheles s irksome tha t Sabba h an d Azoula y ha d participate d i n a meetin g a t whic h Dr. Goldman n ha d declare d tha t Morocca n Jew s wer e facin g difficul t times an d th e violatio n o f thei r huma n rights . Why , moreover , ha d th e meeting no t adopte d a singl e motio n o n behal f o f th e struggl e o f th e Algerian peopl e fo r independence ? Wh y ha d i t remaine d silen t abou t North Africa n interest s i n general ? Indeed , apar t fro m Sabba h an d Azou lay, Josep h Bitto n an d Jacque s Lazaru s o f the Algeria n Jewis h communit y were als o presen t a t Geneva. 7 5 Howeve r th e bitteres t pil l for Sabba h an d Azoulay, bot h formerl y zealou s supporter s o f al-Wifaq, wa s th e followin g statement: When w e revie w th e name s o f thos e throw n int o jails [durin g th e Protectorat e era], th e heroe s o f Morocco' s struggl e fo r independenc e . . . w e canno t find a single Jewish name . Eve n thoug h seve n year s hav e passed sinc e the inceptio n o f the Algeria n Revolutio n . . . the Worl d Jewis h Congres s di d no t publis h a single motion revealin g sympath y [fo r tha t struggle] . O n th e contrar y Presiden t Gold mann declare d tha t certain Algeria n Jews sought to preserve thei r Frenc h citizen ship, an d thi s at a time when th e FL N ha d declare d tha t th e Jews were member s of the Algerian nation. 76 Commenting o n th e arres t o f the Spanis h captai n o f the Pisces, an d o n the revelation s concernin g th e clandestin e emigratio n t o Israel , al-Fajr

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expressed indignatio n tha t th e Spanis h authoritie s a t Ceut a an d Melill a allowed "Zionis t agents " t o us e thes e region s a s base s fo r smugglin g Jew s out o f Morocco . Ho w coul d thi s b e done , i n vie w o f th e friendshi p demonstrated b y th e Franc o regim e fo r th e Arabs? 7 7 Thi s editoria l als o protested tha t large-scal e clandestin e emigratio n ha d b e e n organize d b y agents wh o ha d entere d Morocc o o n th e pretex t o f encouragin g com merce an d trade . Comin g fro m countrie s friendl y t o Morocc o an d carry ing thei r passports , thes e agent s ha d no t eve n b e e n require d t o obtai n visas fro m Morocca n consulates. 7 8 Al-Tahrir focuse d o n th e Pisces affai r an d o n th e trac t publishe d b y the undergroun d Zionist s o n 9 Februar y encouragin g Jews , i n th e wak e of the affair , t o emigrat e an d struggl e fo r thei r dignity . Instea d o f publish ing a direc t blast , however , th e pape r als o sough t t o sti r u p interna l dissension b y reprintin g a devastatin g communique , writte n an d signe d by thirt y Jewis h supporter s o f th e U N F P an d th e Morocca n Communis t party, attackin g Zionis m an d clandestin e emigration . Thes e thirt y Jew s represented a cross-sectio n o f intellectual s an d professionals : lycee edu cators, lawyers , engineers , physicians , an d administrators . Mos t notabl e among the m wer e Abraha m Sarfati , a n enginee r an d opponen t o f th e monarchy (fo r whic h a s lat e a s 198 6 h e serve d a lon g priso n sentence) , and voca l criti c o f Israel ; Roge r Cohen , a distinguishe d officia l o f Moroc co's Nationa l Bank ; Ralp h Benarrosh , a n influentia l lawyer ; an d Ren e Ohana an d Simo n Levy , left-win g supporter s o f th e Morocca n struggl e for independence : Numerous leaflet s [the y wrote ] hav e bee n distribute d whos e languag e contain s an all-ou t attac k o n Morocco . Th e purpos e o f this provocatio n i s t o increas e th e restlessness cause d b y th e activit y o f th e clandestin e Zionis t organization s an d then heightene d b y th e racis t offensiv e recentl y undertake n b y newspaper s lik e al-Fajr an d th e reckles s action s o f the polic e agains t Morocca n Jews . Therefore , we th e undersigne d Jews , wh o ar e completel y awar e o f ou r dut y t o serv e th e supreme interest s o f Morocco . . . , hereby denounc e Zionis t propaganda, whic h is a n instrumen t i n th e hand s o f colonialis m an d separatis m use d agains t th e people o f Morocco. W e protes t agains t th e policie s o f the Zionis t troublemakers , who exploit the emotions o f Moroccan Jews and thei r wish for a happy and secur e life, an d wh o incit e the m t o emigrat e t o Israel . We , Muslim s an d Jews , mus t unite i n ou r commo n effor t t o creat e th e prope r condition s fo r a happ y life , t o ensure ou r democrati c institutions , prosperit y an d securit y fo r al l citizens. Inas much a s our first an d foremos t concer n i s to defend Morocc o agains t slander , w e denounce th e full-scal e campaig n launche d b y colonialist s agains t Morocco , fo r

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their purpos e i s to sti r u p a n atmosphere o f racial discrimination , t o lower th e reputation o f our nation , an d t o sow discord betwee n Jewis h an d Musli m communities. Our attitude is not meant to be in harmony with any one person or group, nor is it presente d a s a challenge . I t stem s fro m ou r feelin g a s loya l citizen s wh o recognize Morocco as their only home.79 The positio n take n her e certainl y di d no t reflec t th e feeling s o f th e majority o f the Jews , includin g th e integrationists . I n addition , i t i s clear that i n disassociatin g themselve s fro m Zionism , Morocca n intellectual s were als o motivate d b y a desire t o protect thei r ow n interest s an d privi leged socia l status. The y undoubtedl y fel t tha t large-scal e Jewish emigra tion woul d rende r the m eve n mor e vulnerabl e an d powerles s tha n the y had alread y become . In additio n t o attacking th e attitude s an d activitie s o f Moroccan Jews , the Morocca n pres s was hostile towar d Israe l and it s officials. I n Septem ber 1961 , fo r instance , al- cAlam reporte d tha t th e Israel i consu l t o Gi braltar ha d visite d norther n Morocc o (Tetuan , Larache , Nador ) t o trans mit informatio n an d instruction s t o th e leader s o f the Zionis t network. 80 The rol e o f Israe l i n promotin g clandestin e operation s insid e Morocc o was thu s a n ope n and , i n th e opinio n o f al- cAlam, a n irritatin g page . Moreover, i n th e aftermat h o f the Pisces affair, Israel i Foreig n Ministe r Meir ha d publicl y denounce d th e Morocca n governmen t fo r curbin g Jewish freedom s an d hel d i t responsibl e fo r th e tragedy . O n 1 9 January 1961, Mei r declare d i n th e Knesse t tha t "th e Jew s ar e drive n int o th e corner o f despair, give n th e discriminator y atmospher e an d persecutio n which presentl y reign s i n Morocco." 81 The Morocca n pres s counterattacked . Al-Fajr accuse d Mei r of making slanderous comment s an d misrepresentin g th e facts , an d i t denie d he r claims tha t Jew s wer e expose d t o constan t terror , detentions , an d th e nationalization o f thei r schools . I t eve n suggeste d tha t Morocca n Jew s lived i n a healthie r atmospher e i n Morocc o tha n di d thei r counterpart s who emigrated an d settle d i n Israel. 82 During th e secon d hal f of 1961 , whe n rumor s sprea d tha t th e authori ties would conside r easin g emigration restrictions , th e UNFP' s al-Tahrir was as critical of such change s a s the res t o f the radica l press , i f not mor e so. Th e UNF P (unlik e th e Istiqlal ) di d no t participat e i n the governmen t formed b y Hasa n durin g th e summe r o f 196 1 (jus t a s i t ha d no t joine d the Muhamma d V/Hasa n governmen t i n Ma y o f 1960) . I t use d it s pres s

The Self-Liquidation Process

21

7

organ an d th e emigratio n questio n t o discredi t th e ne w regim e an d it s supporters. I n a majo r editoria l o n 1 6 D e c e m b e r 1961 , al-Tahrir re proached th e governmen t fo r authorizin g emigratio n t o Israel , an d pointe d to storie s revealin g a larg e exodu s b y ship s an d planes . I n Casablanca , Meknes, Essaouira , an d El-Jadid a (Mazagan) , Jew s wer e sellin g thei r belongings an d plannin g thei r exi t t o Israel , a developmen t tha t woul d inevitably reinforc e th e Zionis t stat e an d furthe r weake n th e positio n o f the Palestinia n Arabs . Th e editoria l wondered : Has th e Morocca n governmen t modifie d it s positio n wit h respec t t o Palestinia n refugees? Wha t mus t on e conclud e whe n seekin g th e government' s attitud e toward authorizin g th e Jew s t o leav e Morocc o t o g o t o a countr y considere d a s the enem y o f th e Arab s an d Arabism ? Th e government' s attitud e ca n onl y b e considered a s treaso n b y th e popula r masses . . . . On e wonder s whethe r th e Moroccan governmen t i s not being forced b y pressure fro m a foreign stat e whos e interest i t woul d b e t o se e Morocco' s door s ope n wid e t o le t Zionis t aim s b e achieved.83 On 2 0 D e c e m b e r 1961 , al-Tahrir onc e agai n attacke d th e government . Emigration, i t declared , ha d becom e a mas s exodus , an d wa s bein g approved b y th e authorities . How , th e pape r asked , wer e th e Jew s fro m humble socioeconomi c strat a abl e t o leave , an d wh o wa s financing thei r passage? Onl y a powerful , well-organize d Zionis t organizatio n within Morocco coul d hav e b e e n responsibl e fo r this. 8 4

Chapter 7

The Israeli-Directe d Self-Defens e Underground an d "Operatio n Yakhin "

From 1955 to 1964 Thus far , th e discussio n ha s focused o n th e behind-the-scene s politica l and tactica l maneuver s exercise d b y Israel , th e Jewis h Agency , an d th e WJC t o pressur e Morocc o t o rela x emigratio n restrictions . Thes e wer e high-level talk s tha t di d no t pertai n t o th e Israel i emissaries , a t leas t no t until Ale x Gatmo n negotiate d wit h th e Moroccan s ove r "Operatio n Yak hin," o r t o th e loca l Jewis h activist s involve d wit h illega l actions . More over, "Operatio n Yakhin " of 1961-6 4 ha s been mentione d onl y to o briefly . This chapter focuse s o n these aspects . We hav e alread y note d previousl y tha t th e Israeli-directe d Nort h African underground—th e Misgeret —was a n elaborat e an d comple x or ganization engage d i n self-defens e an d c ally a. Sinc e 1955 , th e Mossads Misgeret branche d int o Pari s (central command headquarters , heade d b y Shlomo Havili o and later by Ephrai m Ronel , an d their staf f of caliya, self defense, intelligence , an d administrativ e officers) , Marseilles , Gibraltar , the Spanis h enclave s o f Ceut a an d Melilla , Algeciras , an d th e majo r urban agglomeration s o f Morocco, Tunisia, an d Algeria. Morocc o was th e Misgeret's mai n aren a o f operations, especiall y i n th e contex t o f emigra tion. While i n Tunisi a an d Algeri a th e Mossad emerge d a s th e exclusiv e force behin d th e Misgeret, dealin g onl y i n self-defens e matters , i n Mo rocco, give n th e urgenc y t o conduct illega l emigration, a partnership ha d evolved betwee n th e Mossads Hare l an d th e Jewis h Agency' s Shragai . 218

The Underground and "Operation Yakhin" 21

9

As w e hav e see n before , th e Misgeret deal t wit h self-defens e an d th e execution o f c aliya, wherea s th e Jewis h Agenc y a s wel l a s th e WJ C handled th e diplomati c tasks . Wit h tim e passing , Jewis h Agenc y emigra tion envoy s entere d th e scen e t o assis t th e Mossad-recruited elements , just as , i n 1961 , Gatmon o f the Mossad assiste d th e Jewish Agency in th e diplomatic arena . Structurally an d hierarchically , th e Misgeret i n Morocc o consiste d o f five forces: Lav? (o r Gonen), i n charg e o f self-defense trainin g an d oper ations withi n th e communities ; Makhela (Choir) , conductin g th e c aliya; Ballet, o r th e Zionis t yout h movement s operatin g clandestinely , unifie d under a singl e command ; Modi c m, intelligenc e gathering ; an d c Oref Tsiburi—the nonoperationa l force . Eac h o f the five force s wa s directe d by Israel i coordinator s (rakazim) an d deputy-coordinators , als o Israelis . Supplementing th e comman d o f coordinator s th e Lav? force , a t least , was subordinat e t o Israel i regiona l commander s (mefakdim o r mefakde snifim). Th e mai n regiona l branche s wer e Tangier , Casablanca , Fez / Meknes, Oudjda , Marrakesh , an d Essaouira. 1 Casablanca emerged a s the center o f th e Misgeret an d ha d th e larges t reservoi r o f activist s an d emissaries. Th e Lav? an d Makhela i n th e variou s region s wer e divide d into secre t cell s an d unit s o f local activists , whereb y on e cel l functione d independently o f th e other . Th e cell s wer e overwhelmingl y dominate d by Morocca n Jews , usuall y youn g me n an d wome n age d eightee n an d older, man y o f who m wer e forme r yout h movemen t activists . Quit e frequently, thes e activist s wer e dispatche d b y th e Misgeret fro m thei r native citie s an d communitie s t o othe r communitie s i n orde r t o plan t them i n place s where thei r identit y woul d b e les s well known. Member s of one cel l kne w eac h othe r but , theoreticall y a t least , di d no t kno w th e members o f othe r cells . Th e Israel i coordinator s an d regiona l com manders wer e determine d t o prevent arrest s an d thu s th e concep t o f the autonomous cel l (to* memudar i n Hebrew ) becam e a n essentia l compo nent o f undergroun d life . Thes e cell s wer e le d b y Morocca n Jewis h mefakdim an d madrihim (assistants) . Onl y the y ha d link s wit h Israel i emissaries an d the y kne w eac h other . A t th e ver y to p o f th e hierarch y were th e head s o f th e Misgeret (mefakde ha-Misgeret) wh o too k charg e of the whol e operatio n an d were accountabl e onl y t o Havilio and Ronel. 2 Most o f th e mai n Israel i emissarie s wer e high-rankin g officer s i n th e Israel Defens e Forces , Israe l Militar y Intelligenc e (Aman), Israel' s Se curity Service s (Shabak), o r members o f kibbutzim an d moshavim.

220 The

Underground and "Operation Yakhin"

The Israeli s usuall y stoo d behin d a dar k curtai n whe n the y swor e i n new recruits . I t i s noteworthy tha t th e Morocca n Jewis h activist s di d no t know tha t th e Mossad organize d th e underground . Al l the y knew , ac cording t o Havilio , i s that th e Misgeret, an d possibl y th e Jewis h Agency , guided them . Afte r all , durin g th e lat e 1940 s and earl y 1950s , th e Jewis h Agency's DM O attempte d t o organize simila r activities. 3 The mos t promisin g an d talente d youn g person s recruite d int o th e Misgeret receive d initia l self-defense trainin g in Morocco , includin g rifle / pistol rang e practice , an d wer e the n dispatche d t o Europ e o r even Israe l (into arm y camps ) fo r advance d training . Unlik e th e previou s under ground procedures , th e trainin g an d operation s wer e no w quasi-militar y in character , wit h differen t rank s o f commander s give n t o th e loca l activists. Th e formatio n o f to p cadre s o f Morocca n Jew s i n Europ e wa s not necessaril y inferio r t o the trainin g i n Israel . Th e trainer s i n th e latte r were usually Israel i officers sen t to complete thei r education i n Europea n universities upo n thei r discharg e o r retiremen t fro m th e Israe l Defens e Forces. 4 The courses and field training in Europe an d Israel comprised subject s like topography , photography , th e us e o f wireless radios , Zionist/Israel i history, hand-to-han d combat , an d handling grenades, submachin e guns , rifles, an d pistols . Fiel d trip s i n Israe l were organize d fo r th e trainee s i n order t o strengthen thei r admiratio n fo r the country an d to instill in the m Zionist convictions . Th e mor e determine d thes e youn g would-be mefakdim wer e abou t assistin g Israel , th e bette r the y woul d functio n i n th e underground upo n thei r retur n t o Morocco. 5 Looking int o th e operation s o f th e Lav?, whe n Isse r Hare l visite d Morocco i n 195 8 he foun d self-defens e regiona l branche s i n Casablanca , Rabat, Tangier , Meknes , Fez , Marrakesh , Essaouira , an d Agadir . No t only wer e effectiv e cache s establishe d b y th e activists , bu t thes e wer e well stocke d wit h weapon s an d explosives . Th e weapon s wer e smuggle d to Morocc o b y th e Mossad i n hollo w toys an d othe r devices . Numerou s new recruit s joined th e Lav? b y 1958 . O f the 1,20 0 self-defens e activist s throughout Nort h Africa , 60 0 operate d i n Morocco ; o f these , 470 me n and women receive d trainin g outside Morocco. 6 Despite th e well-organize d wor k of Lav? i n Morocco , th e self-defens e apparatus ther e wa s no t a s activ e a s i n Algeri a wher e a n eight-year-ol d struggle fo r independenc e agains t th e Frenc h ha d claime d th e live s o f many Jews . I n fact , i t wa s inactiv e muc h o f th e tim e sinc e 1959 , an d

The Underground and "Operation Yakhin" 22

1

hence Lav? i n Morocc o deal t increasingl y i n c aliya, supplementin g th e role o f Makhela b y guardin g th e convoy s o f emigrant s a s thes e wer e about t o b e smuggle d ou t o f th e country . Th e onl y occasion s whe n th e Moroccan Lav? wa s place d o n aler t occurre d durin g th e Suez/Sina i wa r of 1956 ; a t th e tim e Frenc h presiden t Charle s d e Gaull e calle d fo r a referendum ove r th e futur e o f Algeri a (1959) ; an d whe n Nasse r visite d Casablanca, a s wel l a s followin g th e Pisces traged y (January-Februar y 1961). According t o a n activis t affiliate d wit h Lav?, durin g th e Sue z wa r when th e Israe l Defens e Force s crosse d th e Sina i desert , th e Misgeret's Israeli commanders though t tha t in solidarity with the Egyptians , Moroc can Muslim s woul d attac k th e Jews . Thi s activist , fro m Casablanca , re called: "W e receive d instruction s . . . tha t al l th e mai n activist s i n Casa blanca ha d t o arriv e earl y on e mornin g a t th e hom e o f 3 Ora Aflalo [ a key member]. . . . Upo n ou r arriva l w e foun d ther e th e madrihim o f th e Zionist yout h movemen t an d thos e involve d i n dangerou s missions . W e were tol d . . . tha t w e migh t hav e t o defen d th e mellah i n cas e o f a n attack.7 But nothin g occurred . Then , i n 1959 , whe n d e Gaull e calle d fo r th e referendum ove r Algeria , th e Misgeret's intelligenc e apparatu s learne d that Algerian s statione d o n Morocca n soi l intende d t o seiz e th e occasio n and kil l Jew s i n th e Casablanc a region . Th e Misgeret's commande r con tended tha t th e Morocca n polic e ha d obtaine d simila r informatio n an d adopted emergenc y measure s t o protec t th e Jews . However , h e di d no t believe th e authoritie s coul d b e relie d upo n and , consequently , alerte d the Lav? t o post it s units o n aler t b y patrolling th e mellah o f Casablanca. Meir Knaf o was one of Lav? 's main activist s recruite d fo r thi s purpose : We took the weapons out of the caches: pistols, submachine guns, hand grenades. . . . With [Menachem] Rak-cOz's [one of Misgeret's commanders] instructions we prepared several "Molotov" cocktails. We patrolled the mellah's streets using the Misgeret's vehicles. T o ou r grea t relief , nothin g occurred . Ha d th e Algerian s attempted t o harass Jews we would hav e been able , throug h rapi d recruitmen t [of more reservists] to repulse them. 8 Then, i n Januar y 1961 , o n th e ev e o f th e Casablanc a Conferenc e around th e tim e o f th e Pisces affair , an d befor e th e distributio n o f th e tract, disseminate d b y Lav? an d th e undergroun d yout h movements , th e

222 The

Underground and "Operation Yakhiri

Lav? wa s once agai n placed o n alert—eve n considerin g the possibility of assassinating Nasser . Prior t o Nasser' s arriva l i n Casablanca , fo r securit y precautions , Kin g Muhammad V decide d t o provid e th e Egyptia n leade r wit h a n elegan t villa outside the city at a remote yet well-guarded beach . Th e other Thir d World dignitarie s wer e t o b e accommodate d i n th e city' s finest hotels . To hav e th e vill a appea r presidential , th e municipa l authoritie s o f Casa blanca were instructe d t o renovate it . I n charge o f this task was Shi m c on Keren ("Arsin") , a Jew, wh o serve d a s th e directo r o f the municipality' s maintenance department . Curiously , Kere n wa s affiliate d wit h th e Misgeret. H e propose d a pla n whereb y Nasser' s bedroo m o r severa l o f th e villa's flowerpots woul d b e booby-trapped . Th e pla n wa s submitte d t o the Misgeret an d rejecte d b y th e Mossad i n Israel . I t wa s argue d tha t Nasser's assassinatio n coul d imperi l th e securit y o f Morocca n Jewry , a heavy price tha t Israe l was unwilling to pay. 9 Among th e leadin g Israel i coordinator s an d deputy-coordinator s o f Lav? i n Morocc o wer e c Ezra Ayalon , Yose f Regev , Hasda i Doro n (wh o was als o th e hea d o f the Misgeret i n Tangier), 10 Itzi k Baer , Hagga i Lev , Yona Zabin , Richar d Hadjes , an d Mosh e Kadosh . Th e Lav? activist s o n the loca l leve l wer e give n specifi c instruction s regardin g safet y rule s o n storing explosive s i n cache s an d th e prope r handlin g o f plasti c explo sives.11 The Makhela wa s directe d b y th e followin g Israel i coordinator s ove r the years : Shi m c on an d Yehudi t Hame l fro m Kibbut z c Ain ha-Natsiv ; Yehudit Friedman-Nesiah u (Efrai m Friedman' s sister) ; Mosh e Arno n (Hababo) from Kibbut z Regavi m (on e of the ke y coordinator s o f Makhela and a former self-defens e envo y with th e DM O i n Tunisia); Zonia Gore n from Kibbut z Sh a c ar ha- cAmaqim; Ze 3 e v Amit ; Ga d Shaha r fro m Kib butz Regavim ; an d Ga d Ore n ("Steve") . Shaha r an d Ore n wer e late r involved i n "Operation Yakhin." 12 What procedur e di d Makhela follo w whe n organizin g c aliya? Rein forced b y th e Zionis t yout h movements ' members , th e activist s entere d the village s o f the sout h an d th e urba n mellahs t o searc h fo r an d registe r would-be emigrants . Thi s action wa s executed wit h utmos t caution . Peo ple wer e contacte d afte r a thorough chec k o n thei r backgroun d an d tha t of thei r neighbors . Onc e th e registratio n proces s wa s accomplishe d an d lists had bee n prepared , a second grou p o f activists arrived t o inform th e people abou t thei r departure , th e typ e o f baggage the y coul d tak e along ,

The Underground and "Operation Yakhin" 22

3

the rendez-vou s poin t wher e the y woul d b e picke d up , an d th e typ e o f vehicles t o look for. I n mos t case s th e emigrant s wer e no t tol d abou t th e final statio n fro m wher e the y wer e expecte d t o escape . Sometime s the y were eve n kep t uninforme d abou t th e variou s station s o n wa y t o th e border. 13 As Isse r Hare l observe d durin g hi s visi t t o Morocc o i n 1958 , th e activists organize d th e emigrant s fo r th e final departur e a t night . Whol e families lef t quietly , packe d int o the Misgeret's cab s and trucks . Th e first stop wa s usuall y Casablanca , althoug h Marrakes h an d Mekne s als o serve d as initia l restin g points . Upo n arriva l a t thes e locations , th e emigrant s stayed for severa l hours, befor e proceedin g an y further. I f the plan calle d for th e lan d route , th e emigrant s wer e escorte d b y smuggler s fro m Tangier o r Tetuan acros s the norther n borde r int o the Spanis h enclav e of Ceuta. A n alternativ e mai n lan d rout e include d th e borde r crossin g a t Nador (als o i n norther n Morocco ) int o th e Spanis h enclav e o f Melilla . The se a route s i n th e nort h involve d th e crossin g o f the Mediterranea n from a certai n point , usuall y fro m th e Gul f o f Rinco n nea r Tetuan , o n small fishing o r smugglers ' boat s int o Ceuta ; transportin g peopl e fro m Tangier t o Gibralta r usin g th e ferryboat s service ; o r smugglin g the m from th e seashor e nea r Nador , als o on ferryboats, t o Melilla . Those wh o lef t vi a th e lan d an d se a routes , arrivin g a t th e enclaves , were transporte d b y th e Misgeret's loca l representatives o n ferryboats t o the Spanis h port s o f Algeciras an d Malaga . Fro m thes e place s the y wer e brought o n buse s t o th e Jewis h Agency' s transi t cam p a t Gibraltar . Afte r a brie f perio d i n transi t th e emigrant s wer e take n t o Marseille s o n thei r way to Israel. 14 As suggested , th e poin t fro m whic h th e emigrant s crosse d th e lan d borders o r ha d take n th e se a rout e ofte n require d th e assistanc e o f smugglers, employe d b y th e Misgeret. Ye t th e proces s o f guidin g th e emigrants (Makhela) an d protectin g th e convoy s (Lav?) wer e dutie s confined t o the Misgeret's cadres . There were othe r route s use d b y the underground . On e optio n wa s t o take th e emigrant s fro m thei r home s an d brin g the m t o th e por t o f Casablanca o r tha t city' s airpor t wit h counterfei t Morocca n passports . They were dresse d i n fashionable Europea n attire . Accordin g t o Havilio , these emigrant s wer e carefull y selecte d fo r thei r abilit y t o pas s throug h the por t authorities , fo r thei r fluency i n French , an d fo r talen t i n posin g as affluen t element s intendin g t o leav e fo r Europ e o n business . Thi s

224 The

Underground and "Operation Yakhin"

tactic had it s drawbacks, fo r despit e th e talent s demonstrated , man y ha d been stopped , expose d a s ordinar y people , an d arreste d fo r carryin g falsified trave l documents. 15 Other options , applie d i n th e lat e 1950 s o r earl y 1960s , wer e lan d routes fro m Oudjd a t o Ora n o r fro m Oudjd a t o Colomb-Bechar—i n Algeria. Th e emigrants were t o reach Algeria by train, a n option tha t ha d been carrie d ou t b y th e undergroun d o f 1947-49 . Owin g t o contact s established wit h th e pro-Israel i Frenc h prefec t o f Oran , th e Frenc h consul i n Oudjd a wa s instructe d t o permi t th e Misgeret t o smuggl e people int o Algeria . Yehudi t Friedman-Nesiah u o f the Makhela recalle d that th e consu l provided he r with Frenc h entranc e visa s for that country . She woul d visi t th e consu l onc e ever y te n days , carryin g wit h he r on e hundred counterfei t Morocca n passports . Th e consu l kne w sh e wa s a n Israeli an d entruste d he r wit h th e officia l vis a stamp . Friedman-Nesiah u stamped th e passport s an d the n th e consu l signe d th e visas . H e als o alerted he r periodicall y abou t instruction s th e Morocca n authoritie s gav e the polic e o n ho w t o confron t illega l emigrants . Th e consul s contact s with th e Moroccan s an d hi s suppor t fo r th e c aliya prove d advantageou s to th e Misgeret. Th e cooperatio n betwee n th e undergroun d an d th e French wa s partl y possibl e du e t o th e specia l relation s betwee n Franc e and Israe l a t the time , an d t o the fac t tha t Algeri a was still under Frenc h rule. Moreover , o n Morocco s sid e o f the border , a t Oudjda , Friedman Nesiahu wo n ove r th e Frenc h consu l becaus e bot h ha d mutua l admira tion for Marti n Buber , whos e course s a t the Hebre w Universit y sh e onc e attended regularly. 16 The Makhela als o resorted t o "Operation Hiloula. " Jews from differen t parts o f the countr y woul d arriv e a t Nado r "t o celebrate " thi s Morocca n Jewish festival . Simultaneously , Misgeret-chartere d buse s brough t Jew s from Melill a t o Nado r t o participat e i n th e event . Seizin g upo n th e confusion o f th e celebration , an d seein g tha t borde r patrol s o n th e Mo roccan sid e wer e the n no t watchful , th e activist s use d th e buse s tha t transported th e Melillian s t o cros s ove r wit h th e Morocca n emigrant s into Melilla , a s i f the y wer e Melillian s returnin g home . Th e authenti c Melillians, wh o willingl y collaborate d wit h th e underground , wer e late r picked u p by the sam e buses. 17 Finally, Ifni , anothe r smal l Spanis h enclav e alon g the Atlanti c coast of Morocco, wa s used fo r a few limite d operations . Ifn i wa s the leas t attrac tive optio n t o smuggl e emigrants . Surrounde d b y se a an d desert , i t wa s

The Underground and

"Operation Yakhin"

"22

5

virtually impenetrabl e du e t o th e presenc e o f armed gang s tha t terrorize d passers-by. Many o f th e operation s prove d successful . Betwee n 195 7 an d mid 1961 17,99 4 emigrant s lef t Morocco , mos t o f the m unde r th e auspice s o f the underground . Thi s wa s possibl e fo r tw o essentia l reasons . First , i n October 195 6 th e Misgeret se t u p a la b i n Franc e t o prepar e counterfei t Moroccan an d Europea n passports , especiall y fo r person s crossin g ove r the lan d routes ; headin g directl y t o Gibralta r o n th e ferryboats ; o r seek ing t o leav e fo r E u r o p e vi a Casablanca . Th e l a b s expert s "washed " use d passport page s fo r additiona l u s e 1 8 o r obtaine d empt y passport s produce d in Israe l b y th e Mossad. Havili o remarked : We receive d i n Franc e empt y Morocca n passport s an d laissez-passe r document s from th e Mossad. Th e passport s wer e o f hig h qualit y whereb y th e pape r an d passport cover s wer e identica l t o wha t wa s produce d i n Morocco . A t th e sam e time w e receive d fro m th e Misgeret i n Morocc o complete d questionnaires , pre pared fo r th e emigrants , a s wel l a s th e latters ' photos , take n b y loca l activists . Based o n th e filled questionnaires , th e la b printe d th e passports . W e neede d t o know the serial/identificatio n number s use d by th e Morocca n authoritie s fo r eac h region o r provinc e s o that n o problems woul d aris e fo r th e emigrant s whe n thei r travel document s wer e checked . I n orde r t o know which seria l numbers applied , the Mossad i n Israe l collecte d ol d passport s from Jew s wh o mad e c aliya wit h Cadima until 1956 . Henc e w e knew what we were doing . O f course, th e Misgeret inside Morocc o too k specia l car e t o chec k fo r u s i f th e regiona l seria l number s had bee n changed . . . . Onc e th e passport s wer e prepare d i n Franc e the y wer e smuggled int o Morocc o in stuffed animal s o r false bottom s i n suitcases. 19 Needless t o say , a s man y emigrant s wer e smuggle d ou t withou t pass ports, th e d e p e n d e n c e o n th e professiona l smuggler s wa s critical , fo r th e latter woul d brib e borde r official s whe n i t becam e necessar y o r resorte d to othe r tactic s no t requirin g th e presentatio n o f passports . Second, i n additio n t o relianc e o n counterfei t passport s an d smug glers, Isse r Hare l credite d th e Spanis h authoritie s i n th e enclaves , Mal aga, an d Algeciras , a s wel l a s th e Britis h i n Gibralta r (i n contro l o f th e area sinc e 1704) , fo r accommodatin g th e emigrants . Th e Spaniard s i n their zone s o f influenc e hardl y bothere d wit h rigorou s inspectio n proce dures o f travel documents . Jew s smuggle d fro m Tangie r o r othe r part s o f northern Morocc o arrivin g i n Algecira s wer e grante d entr y visa s owin g to Spain' s cooperatio n wit h th e undergroun d an d th e assistanc e o f loca l Catholic priests . I n Gibraltar , no t onl y di d th e Britis h tur n ove r th e

226 The

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transit cam p t o th e Jewis h Agency , bu t the y assiste d th e Misgeret's representatives i n Gibralta r i n processin g th e passport s an d preparin g the emigrant s for departur e t o Marseilles. 20 Why did the Spaniard s and the Britis h collaborate with Israel? According to Havilio , despit e thei r pro-Ara b policies , th e Spaniard s wer e upse t with th e Moroccan s for having compelled the m t o relinquish th e Spanis h Zone i n Morocc o an d fo r th e incessan t demand s b y Raba t o n Franc o t o withdraw fro m th e mineral-ric h wester n Sahara n desert . T o som e de gree, helpin g th e c aliya wa s Spain' s modes t wa y o f gettin g eve n wit h Morocco. Th e British , o n th e othe r hand , collaborate d wit h th e Frenc h and Israeli s t o attack Egyp t i n 1956 . Havin g lost their influenc e i n Egyp t during th e 1950 s an d considerin g Nasse r a s thei r chie f opponen t i n th e Arab world, th e Britis h were willing to support Israel i c aliya initiatives. 21 There ca n b e n o doubt tha t th e Makhela an d it s assistants encourage d the Jew s t o leav e Morocco . W e hav e see n i t t o b e th e cas e i n Februar y 1961, followin g th e Pisces affai r an d th e disseminatio n o f th e tract . Ye t even earlier , i n 1959 , whe n emigratio n becam e impossible , despit e th e denial o f thi s fac t b y th e authoritie s befor e Wester n diplomats , th e Makhela distribute d a trac t i n th e synagogues . I t urge d th e Jew s no t t o despair an d t o continu e thei r demand s fo r passports . Havili o disclose d that "W e wante d t o expos e th e misinformatio n o f the Morocca n govern ment whic h tol d th e Eisenhowe r administratio n tha t passport s wer e available fo r th e asking , an d t o revea l t o th e worl d th e proble m o f a people denie d freedo m o f movement . Bu t th e Moroccan s woul d no t relent." 22 Inevitably, successe s wer e matche d b y failure s an d setbacks . Thoug h unsuccessful i n destroyin g th e Zionis t underground, 23 th e Morocca n se curity service s followe d it s activitie s wit h scrutiny . No t onl y wer e Makhela an d Lavv* activists detained , bu t numerou s emigrants , too , wer e caught, brough t t o trial, an d forced t o return t o their communities a s had been th e cas e i n 1947-49 . Thi s situatio n pose d seriou s challenge s t o th e underground. Fo r no t onl y were th e emigrant s compelle d t o travel onc e again hundred s o f kilometer s i n crampe d buses , bu t upo n thei r retur n they foun d Muslim s livin g i n thei r apartments . The y becam e homeless , placed a t th e merc y o f Jewish communa l institution s an d th e AJDC . I t was u p t o th e Misgeret t o attemp t t o smuggl e the m ou t o f Morocco o n a second occasion. 24 Th e activist s wh o wer e "burned " (identified ) b y th e

The Underground and "Operation Yakhin" 22

7

authorities ha d t o be smuggle d ou t of the country , fo r by retaining them , the Misgeret riske d exposur e an d mor e arrest s within it s ranks. In orde r t o prepare th e activist s fo r th e eventualit y o f being arrested , interrogated, an d eve n tortured , th e undergroun d instructe d member s of Makhela an d hav? t o demonstrat e courag e unde r duress . The y wer e encouraged no t t o carry photo s o f friends, addres s books , an d telephon e numbers. An y incriminatin g document s ha d t o b e dispose d o f b y swal lowing th e paper . Durin g interrogation s the y ha d t o fabricat e answers . Even i f the interrogator s detecte d certai n flaws in thei r explanation s thi s did no t necessaril y signif y tha t th e authoritie s though t the y conceale d the truth . Pani c ha d t o b e averte d an d th e activist s ha d t o stic k t o thei r story.25 According t o th e Morocca n pena l code , th e authoritie s coul d detai n people fo r questionin g fo r no t mor e tha n seventy-tw o hours . I f hel d i n custody longer , a tria l woul d tak e place , i n whic h cas e th e defendant s had t o b e presen t i n th e cour t wit h thei r lawyers . Havin g memorize d their lawyers ' phon e numbers , the y wer e t o cal l the m a t th e tim e o f need. A passwor d woul d b e exchange d t o ascertai n tha t th e lawyers , affiliated wit h th e underground , wer e stil l workin g wit h th e Misgeret. 26 Further, whils t imprisone d fo r a n extende d perio d o f time , afte r bein g found guilty , th e activist s wer e told't o fight fo r prope r medica l car e an d time fo r religiou s duties . I f denied suc h privilege s the y wer e t o organiz e hunger strikes. 27 It wa s no t uncommo n fo r th e prisoner s t o b e accompanie d b y th e police t o thei r home s wher e a thoroug h searc h fo r evidenc e woul d b e conducted, o r to cafe houses in their neighborhoods. Th e police expecte d the prisoner s t o poin t ou t othe r activist s fo r them . However , th e Misgeret ha d warne d th e cadre s i n advanc e t o mislea d th e authoritie s b y leading the m t o thos e cafe s an d othe r place s wher e thei r friend s coul d not be found. 28 In th e lat e 1950 s Isser Hare l calle d fo r improvement s i n th e maritim e smuggling operations . H e wa s dissatisfie d wit h th e continue d emphasi s on smal l smugglers ' boats tha t wer e to o small t o carry th e larg e number s of people neede d t o b e evacuated . H e the n recommende d tha t i t woul d be bette r t o operat e large r boat s o r smal l ship s i n whic h fort y o r mor e Jews could be smuggle d ou t in a single operation. 29 It wa s no t unti l fal l 1960 , however , tha t th e Misgeret finally supple -

228 The

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merited th e action s o f th e smal l boat s wit h th e introductio n o f a mid sized one . I n Septembe r tha t yea r th e Misgeret rente d th e Pisces fro m a certain Thoma s Scot t i n Gibraltar . Thi s boa t wa s renovate d an d improve d to includ e ne w navigationa l equipmen t an d wireles s radi o devices . Wherea s the boat' s captain , Francesc o Morrilla , an d hi s cre w wer e Spaniards , th e radio operato r wa s a n Israeli . Th e Pisces woul d com e withi n severa l h u n d r e d meter s o f th e Morocca n shor e nea r Melill a a t th e Gul f o f Alhu cemas. There , th e cre w woul d lowe r a smal l boa t o n whic h th e emigrant s were transferre d t o th e Pisces. Th e Pisces woul d the n leav e Alhucemas , cross th e Mediterranean , an d hea d fo r Gibraltar . Unti l th e en d o f 196 0 the Pisces brough t hundred s o f peopl e t o Gibralta r o n twelv e missions . Meir Knafo , wh o i n 1960-6 1 serve d a s th e c aliya shor e uni t commande r (mefaked huliat ha-hof), recounte d th e event s leadin g t o th e thirteent h and final journe y o f th e Pisces. Th e Misgeret's vehicle s first brough t th e emigrants fro m Casablanc a t o a n are a si x kilometer s fro m Alhucemas , a journey o f severa l h u n d r e d kilometers . Eac h vehicl e lef t Casablanc a a t fifteen-minute interval s t o aver t suspicions . Th e emigrant s wer e abou t t o commence thei r six-kilomete r marc h t o th e gul f area . Th e perso n i n charge o f th e operation , a s always , wa s a n Israel i wh o maintaine d radi o contact wit h th e Pisces. I n Knafo' s words : Several o f the familie s involve d i n th e thirteent h journe y ha d alread y mad e thei r way t o th e gul f onc e befor e bu t wer e unabl e t o depar t du e t o ba d weathe r conditions: snow, blocke d roads , an d a stormy sea . Th e Misgeret als o sensed tha t security problem s migh t aris e an d decide d t o postpon e th e operatio n unti l th e night o f 9-1 0 January . [I n th e pas t th e Misgeret ha d cancelle d o r postpone d operations owin g to a variety o f circumstances. ] The uni t tha t guide d th e emigrant s reache d th e shor e afte r precaution s wer e taken an d th e shor e uni t patrolle d th e are a fo r safet y purposes . The n th e emi grants with their belongings waited. Thei r grou p included infant s an d the elderly ; one woma n was eight y year s old . . . . [Suddenly ] th e Pisces could b e spotte d a t sea severa l hundre d meter s away . Usin g flashlights, signal s wer e exchange d between th e Israel i i n charg e an d th e ship' s crew . Th e latte r sen t a smal l boa t ashore. I entere d th e wate r an d me t tw o cre w member s . . . wh o the n helpe d load th e emigrants . Withi n a shor t tim e th e boa t reache d th e Pisces. Th e forty two people cam e aboar d an d receive d lif e belts , befor e hidin g inside . Th e Pisces began t o sai l fro m Alhucema s i n th e directio n o f Gibraltar. . . . I receive d wor d later . . . that th e Pisces foundered a t sea due t o bad weather conditions. 30 In additio n t o th e forty-tw o emigrant s wh o drowned , on e Spanis h cre w m e m b e r an d Hai' m Sarfati , th e Israel i radi o operator , me t thei r death ,

The Underground and "Operation Yakhin" 22

9

The Gul f of Alhucemas: A Strategic Departur e Poin t for Gibraltar in the Clandestine c Aliya Proces s (courtes y o f Shmuel Segev , "Operation Yakhin," Tel-Aviv , 1984).

230 The

Underground and "Operation Yakhiri

"

The Pisces (courtesy of Shmuel Segev, "Operation Yakhin," Tel-Aviv, 1984). too. Morrill a and anothe r cre w member survived , onl y to be detaine d b y the Moroccan s fo r questioning . Twenty-tw o bodie s wer e washe d ashor e and brough t fo r buria l i n th e Jewis h sectio n o f the Alhucema s cemetery . The remainin g bodie s were neve r recovered . Haim Sarfati , th e radi o operator , wa s bor n i n Fe z i n 193 2 an d edu cated a t th e AIU . I n 194 9 h e wen t t o Marseille s t o pursu e vocationa l training a t one o f ORTs mos t advance d technica l schools . Then , i n 1951, Sarfati an d his brother mad e c aliya and joined th e Israe l Defens e Forces . While i n th e arm y h e traine d a s a radi o operator , an d durin g th e 195 6 Suez/Sinai war , participate d i n th e campaig n agains t Egypt . Give n hi s Moroccan backgroun d an d talent s a s a first-rate radi o operator , Sarfat i was recruite d int o th e Misgeret's Marseille s branc h an d late r sen t t o Morocco, wher e h e operate d th e radi o equipmen t o f th e Pisces. Th e thirteenth journey fro m Alhucema s t o Gibralta r wa s to be hi s last, fo r h e was eage r t o retur n t o Israel , marry , an d settl e down. 31 Othe r Israel i radio operator s i n differen t capacitie s include d Carmel a Zabin , Nata n Shemer, Shalo m Dani , Shlom o Arukh, Shimsho n Lotan , Shlom o Menu hin, an d Ya cakov Boker. 32 Those arreste d followin g th e traged y an d th e distributio n o f the trac t were bot h activist s an d one s suspecte d o f assistin g them . Amon g th e detained activist s wer e Mei r Knaf o an d th e lat e Raf i Waknin . Knaf o wa s

The Underground and "Operation Yakhin" 23

1

later release d an d manage d t o flee th e country . Wakni n wa s t o pay wit h his life . Born i n Casablanc a i n 1927 , Wakni n emigrate d t o Israe l befor e 1948 . Recruited int o th e Israe l Defens e Forces , h e fough t i n Jerusalem durin g the wa r o f independence , onl y t o retur n t o Casablanc a les s tha n tw o years later . A t th e heigh t o f Morocco' s struggl e fo r independence , Wak nin joined th e Misgeret an d traine d i n Europe . H e wa s regarde d a s on e of th e mos t valuabl e mefakdim wh o participate d i n severa l ke y opera tions. Hi s arres t occurre d i n th e wak e o f th e tract s distributio n an d i t appears tha t th e polic e gathere d ampl e imformatio n abou t hi s where abouts an d eve n hi s deteriorating stat e o f health. Once apprehended , Wakni n wa s interrogate d an d tortured . Despit e his failing healt h an d th e intensit y o f the torture , h e refuse d t o cooperat e with th e interrogators . Concludin g tha t Wakni n woul d no t divulg e se crets abou t Zionis t endeavors , th e polic e place d hi m i n a loca l hospital . Following King Muhammad V's death, Kin g Hasan II approved Dr . Leo n Benzaquen's plea s t o transfe r Wakni n t o a privat e hospita l i n Paris . I t was there , fou r month s later , tha t h e died . O n 1 1 July 196 1 Waknin' s body wa s brough t t o Israe l fo r buria l i n Gi v c at Sh a *u\, Jerusalem . Sixteen year s late r th e Stat e o f Israel recognize d hi m a s harug malkhut: one who died i n the servic e of Israel and th e Jewish people. 33 Those suspecte d o f assistin g i n th e distributio n o f th e trac t include d innocent victims . Fo r instance , Yose f Assayag , a residen t o f Fez , wa s picked u p by the police on 1 3 February 1961 , accused o f carrying incrim inating documents . Actually , thes e document s wer e communa l record s on ai d t o th e elderly . Whe n aske d abou t th e content s o f th e records , written i n Judeo-Arabic, Assaya g told th e trut h bu t failed t o convince th e interrogators. Afte r bein g roughe d up , h e wa s placed i n solitar y confine ment fo r severa l hour s an d the n beate n u p som e mor e fo r ove r a n hour . Assayag related tha t late r on , at 6:00 p.m. the y requested tha t I provide the location of meeting places where Jews assemble d fo r th e * allya. . . . After I faile d t o provide th e respons e the y took me to the Troisieme Brigade Criminel [and] dragged me to a basement. . . . When I had nothing to say, twelve policemen picked me up and threw me on the floor. On e of them stuffed m y mouth with a sweater while another placed his foot on m y throa t an d presse d unti l m y eye s wer e abou t t o pop . . . . The n the y whipped me. . . . Another policeman warned that if I did not cooperate he would

232 The

Underground and

"Operation Yakhin

"

The Victims i n the Servic e of the Clan destine Zionis t Operation s

Hai'm Sarfati , a n Israel i Emissar y an d the Radi o Operato r o f the Pisces (courtesy of Shmuel Segev , "Operation Yakhin," Tel - Aviv 1984).

Rafi Waknin , On e o f th e To p Com manders o f the Misgeret i n Casablanc a (courtesy of Shmuel Segev , "Operation Yakhin" Tel-Avi v 1984) . shoot me . T o demonstrat e thi s h e pulle d hi s revolve r an d aime d i t t o m y head . . . . I had n o answers t o offer an d al l I coul d d o is to tell him tha t h e ma y as well shoot me . The y resume d th e beating s directin g thei r fists a t m y ches t an d face . One o f them brok e tw o o f my teeth . Thre e hour s late r the y transferre d m e . . . to the polic e statio n an d wen t o n with th e interrogation s unti l mid-night . . . . A t 3:00 a.m . th e followin g da y th e investigatio n resumed . Amon g th e question s posed: "Wha t d o w e d o a t ou r synagogue? " Wha t doe s th e rabb i sa y whe n h e addresses hi s audience? " I pleade d wit h the m t o le t m e rest . Bu t the y wouldn' t listen. . . . Then the y flashed a lamp int o m y eyes. I felt dizz y [an d fainted]. . . . I was not release d unti l 8:3 0 p.m. 34

The Underground and "Operation Yakhin" 23

3

Following arrest s o f severa l activist s o f Lav?, th e c aliya continue d nonetheless—through divers e channels , amon g the m th e us e o f th e smugglers' boats. Then , i n sprin g 1961 , the Misgeret chartere d a ship i n Italy: th e Kokos. Th e ship' s hom e por t wa s Cadiz , a coasta l are a i n southwestern Spain . Mor e spaciou s tha n th e Pisces, th e Kokos weighe d five hundre d tons ; it s cre w wa s Italia n bu t th e captai n wa s a n Israeli , a former nava l officer. 35 Though th e smugglers ' boats , lik e th e Pisces, operate d alon g Moroc co's Mediterranea n coast , th e Kokos saile d alon g tha t country' s Atlanti c coast. Considerin g tha t i n 196 1 most Jew s who sough t t o emigrat e dwel t in th e Casablanc a regio n an d southward , alon g th e Atlanti c o r it s prox imity, i t wa s advantageou s t o shorte n th e lan d rout e t o th e sea. 36 Afte r conducting a thoroug h survey , th e Misgeret foun d tw o relativel y saf e beach area s i n th e vicinit y o f Rabat—i n Por t Lyaute y an d th e "Smug glers Beach " (fo r contraband) . Wherea s th e Pisces transported betwee n forty an d forty-fiv e passenger s i n a singl e operation , th e Kokos accom modated 100-120 . Th e emigrant s departe d wit h counterfei t passport s i n their possession. 37 Regarding th e Zionis t yout h movement s i n th e underground , thei r counterparts i n Israel' s kibbutz movement s dispatche d emissarie s t o guid e them. Unlik e the pre-1956 period when youths of different ag e categorie s became active , th e ne w circumstance s mad e i t clea r tha t onl y mal e an d female member s age d seventee n an d olde r would b e suitabl e for recruit ment. A s noted , th e mos t dedicate d an d talente d o f thes e youth s wer e gradually integrate d int o th e Lav? an d Makhela. 38 Furthermore , i f dur ing th e pre-independenc e er a th e Israel i emissarie s ha d direc t contac t with th e movements , thereafte r th e no w illega l envoy s maintaine d link s only with th e ke y madrihim. I t wa s assumed tha t th e fewe r th e contacts , the safe r th e emissarie s an d th e movement s woul d be. 39 Accordin g t o Menachem Rechtma n ("Rodi" ) fro m Kibbut z Mishma r ha-Negev , on e o f the first yout h emissarie s t o arriv e i n Morocc o i n 1956-57 , i n Ma y 195 7 Dror ha d eighty-eigh t madrihim i n fou r branches : Casablanca , Rabat , Meknes, an d Fez . Mos t activist s ha d jobs a s post offic e an d ban k clerks . By th e lat e 1950 s man y madrihim ha d emigrate d t o Israe l o r joined th e Lav? IMakhela, thu s causin g a leadership crisi s within th e movements. 40 Just a s self-defens e an d c aliya wer e organize d withi n th e Lav? an d Makhela, respectively , th e Dror , ha-Shome r ha-Ts a c ir, ha-Bonim , Bn e c Akiva, an d ha-N o c ar ha-Tsiyoni , too , wer e brough t int o a singl e Mis-

234 The

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geret force—th e Ballet. On e o f Ballet's mos t importan t coordinator s wa s Menachem Gi l c ad from Kibbut z Kfar-Ruppin . H e late r became involve d on a separat e missio n wit h "Operatio n Yakhin. " Durin g hi s tenur e a s Ballet's coordinato r (1957-59) , dozen s o f madrihlm wer e trained i n Israe l at arm y an d yout h (Gadna c) camps . The y als o spen t severa l week s i n their movements ' kibbutzim. 41 As the yout h movemen t club s n o longer operate d i n th e open , under ground club s wer e forme d a t privat e home s an d rente d apartments . Meetings wer e organize d carefully , behin d th e facad e o f car d games , educational tutoring , an d Bible sessions. I n reality, Zionis t educatio n an d Hebrew lesson s occupie d muc h o f th e tim e a t th e meetings . I n 1959 , Dror ha d eigh t clubs , ha-Shome r ha-Ts a c ir two , ha-Boni m two , ha-N o c ar ha-Tsiyon i two , an d Bne- cAkiva none . Assistin g Makhela wer e forty five Ballet members : thirt y fro m Dror , si x fro m ha-Bonim , thre e fro m ha-Shomer ha-Ts a c ir, an d si x fro m Bn e c Akiva.42 I n Jun e 1961 , a t th e end o f the illega l c aliya era, th e movement s ha d a combined membershi p of 850; fifty from thes e movement s wer e affiliate d wit h c aliya43 Though heapin g prais e o n thes e movements , th e Mossad an d th e Misgeret emissarie s i n Morocc o wer e fa r mor e impresse d wit h th e offi cially non-Zionist DEJJ . Havili o had instructed Shlom o Yekhezkeli, hea d of the Misgeret i n the formative years , to recruit as many individual DEJ J members a s possible . Th e Mossad ignore d th e rumor s circulatin g i n Morocco that DEJ J member s were anti-Israe l and pro-Wifaq integration is ts. Quit e t o th e contrary , i t wa s argued , the y wer e par t o f mainstrea m Jewish life , functione d legally , an d wer e guide d b y a leadershi p that , intellectually, wa s superio r t o it s counterpar t amon g th e Zionis t move ments. I n fact, severa l leading members o f DEJJ joined th e Misgeret. 44 The Modi c in, o r Misgeret's intelligenc e force , wa s forme d i n 1956 57. I t wa s coordinate d b y experience d envoys , notabl y Mosh e Taranto , who i n th e pas t helpe d shap e undergroun d intelligenc e effort s i n othe r countries. Th e intelligenc e apparatu s ha d multipl e function s t o perform : bribing polic e official s wh o coul d offe r informatio n o n governmen t poli cies o r strategie s towar d th e Jewis h communit y an d th e c aliya; obtainin g data abou t ne w an d safe r borde r route s wher e th e convoy s coul d pas s without encounterin g resistance ; probin g int o th e reliabilit y o f the back ground informatio n presente d t o the Misgeret b y new would-be recruits ; and furnishin g th e Makhela wit h up-to-dat e weathe r forecast s prio r t o maritime operations. 45

"

The Underground and "Operation Yakhin" 23

5

Five t o si x Israeli s assiste d th e intelligenc e coordinators . Havili o re lated tha t severa l o f the coordinator s wer e subsequentl y appointe d com manders o f th e Misgeret i n Morocc o o r regiona l branc h commanders . Moshe Taranto i s a case in point. 46 The c Oref Tsiburi, o r nonoperationa l force , wa s th e leas t know n o f the five, compose d o f olde r activists . I n 195 7 i t wa s coordinate d b y Dr. Benyami n Reise l ("Bertrand") , a Romanian-bor n physicia n wh o was als o a Frenc h national . Give n hi s fluency i n French , th e Mossad found hi m useful . I n orde r t o aver t suspicions , Reise l wa s provide d with a cove r a s a loca l physician . H e opene d a clini c i n Casablanc a an d soon befriended official s a t th e Ministr y o f Health. Th e clini c served a s a front fo r th e c Oref Tsiburi wher e loca l Jews , includin g lawyers , physi cians, merchants , an d eve n industrialists , becam e th e force' s volunteers . When th e Misgeret neede d warehouses , ranches , o r factorie s t o concea l weapons, wireles s radi o parts , an d empt y counterfei t passports , o r vehicles t o transpor t emigrants , th e c Oref Tsiburi wa s entruste d wit h these arrangements . Further , Reise l emerge d a s th e vita l intermediar y between th e Misgeret an d certai n trustworth y Jewis h communit y leaders. H e appeare d i n th e publi c ey e a s a benevolent , refined , and sophisticate d European . Outsid e th e undergroun d n o on e seeme d to kno w tha t th e friendl y docto r wa s a n Israel i involve d i n undercove r activity.47 But Reisel's cover was exposed afte r a few months . I n Septembe r 195 7 he an d hi s wife , togethe r wit h anothe r activist , wer e stoppe d b y th e authorities on e hundre d kilometer s outsid e Tangier . Afte r conductin g a thorough searc h o f thei r car , th e polic e discovere d a cach e containin g 146 counterfei t passport s bearin g th e name s o f Jew s fro m Casablanca , Fez, Meknes , an d Marrakesh . Reise l wa s escorte d t o priso n i n Tetua n and interrogate d abou t th e c aliya.48 Informed o f his arrest , th e Misgeret contacte d th e Israel i ambassado r in Pari s who , i n turn , requeste d th e Frenc h governmen t t o assis t i n R e i s e l release . H e was , afte r all, a French national , an d th e Moroccan s were unfamilia r wit h hi s backgroun d o r Israel i connections . Also , a lawyer fro m Tetua n wa s hire d t o arrang e bail , a t whic h tim e th e under ground ha d hope d t o hel p hi m escap e t o on e o f th e Spanis h enclaves . However, th e authoritie s di d no t gran t bail . Reise l wa s first trie d o n 2 8 November. Si x month s later , durin g a retrial , h e too k advantag e o f th e laxity of his guards and fled to the Frenc h Consulate . Th e consul supplie d

236 The

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"

Alex Gatmon in Casablanca, 196 0 (courtesy of Carmit Gatmon). Reisel wit h fak e trave l paper s bearin g a ne w identit y an d drov e hi m i n the officia l consula r car to Ceuta. 49 As the to p commander s o f the Misgeret too k charg e o f the operation s and, a t times, playe d a preponderant rol e i n influencing events , the y ar e worthy o f brief mention . The y wer e Shlom o Yekhezkeli , Yashke h Eliav , Benyamin Rotem , an d Alex Gatmon (n e Guttman). A s already intimated , Gatmon becam e th e mos t importan t an d successfu l o f the four . Bor n i n Poland i n 1926 , Gatmo n joine d th e Polis h undergroun d a t ag e fourtee n to fight th e Nazis . H e late r fle d t o Hungar y wher e h e wa s arreste d b y the Germans . Havin g been torture d i n prison an d abou t t o be executed ,

The Underground and "Operation Yakhin" 23

7

Gatmon's lif e wa s spare d i n th e wak e o f th e Sovie t incursio n int o Hun gary. I n 194 4 he reache d Austri a where h e joined th e Hagan a which wa s then activ e i n th e Brikhah: helpin g Jew s escap e fro m Europ e an d reac h Palestine illegally . Durin g th e lat e 1940s , Gatmo n lef t th e Hagan a an d joined Menache m Begin' s IZL . I n 195 0 he wa s recruite d int o th e Israe l air forc e bu t als o becam e activel y involve d i n huntin g Naz i wa r crimi nals. 50 Discharged fro m th e ai r forc e i n th e summe r o f 1960 , Gatmo n volun teered t o head th e Misgeret an d arrive d i n Casablanc a a t th e en d o f that year togethe r wit h hi s wife , Carmit . Th e cove r arrange d fo r hi m b y th e Mossad wa s on e o f a Europea n businessma n specializin g i n industria l machinery. A s par t o f Gatmon' s ne w identity , Carmi t wa s t o becom e known a s hi s mistres s whil e hi s "real " wif e live d abroad . Th e Gatmon s succeeded i n achievin g socia l acceptabilit y an d penetrate d Morocco' s "haute societe. " The y wer e welcom e guest s a t event s organize d b y th e regime, affluen t Muslims , an d th e Jewis h elite . A luxurious vill a o n th e outskirts o f Casablanca was provided fo r the m b y th e Mossad t o enhanc e their status. 51 Gatmon heade d th e Misgeret a t its most crucial and challenging phase: from th e tim e o f Nasser' s visi t an d th e Pisces affair , unti l 1963 , whe n "Operation Yakhin " wa s i n hig h gear . I t ha s bee n suggeste d that , afte r the hars h event s o f earl y 1961 , Gatmo n initiate d an d carrie d ou t th e negotiations wit h a Morocca n governmen t representative , leadin g t o th e resumption o f tolerated emigration . Accordin g t o Shmue l Segev , havin g contacted tw o influentia l Jewis h notables , Sa m Benazera f an d Alfre d Cohen, Gatmo n prodde d the m t o raise the c aliya issue before th e Moroc can governmen t an d t o tel l the m tha t a person, representin g th e Jewis h underground i n Morocc o an d th e Jewis h Agency , woul d lik e t o debat e this issue with thei r representatives . I t was hinted tha t the Jewish peopl e in th e Wes t woul d indemnif y Morocc o fo r lettin g it s Jews g o and fo r th e damage thi s exodus migh t caus e to the Morocca n economy. 52 Based o n Segev' s account , Benazera f an d Cohe n carried , separately , Gatmon's messag e t o Rabat . Th e Morocca n respons e wa s surprisingl y positive. Afte r som e delay , th e critica l serie s o f discussions wer e unde r way i n Europe—beginnin g i n summe r 1961—betwee n a senior Moroc can officia l an d Gatmon . Th e latte r presente d himsel f a s Alexander Ben David an d wa s disguise d wit h a mustach e an d beard . Followin g si x meetings a formul a wa s agree d upon : "th e Jew s woul d officially b e

238 The

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Alex and Carmit Gatmon in Tangier with a Moroccan Friend (courtesy of Carmit Gatmon). allowed t o emigrat e t o the Unite d State s an d Canada , bu t no t t o Israel. " The proces s o f organizin g th e emigratio n woul d b e entruste d t o a n American Jewis h organizatio n (Unite d H I AS Service) , an d no t t o th e Jewish Agency . Gatmo n agree d tha t th e clandestin e c ally a ha d t o sto p although h e mad e i t clea r that , shoul d Morocc o reneg e o n it s commit ment, th e illega l activitie s woul d resume. 53 Morocc o wa s als o promise d financial indemnities , a subjec t tha t canno t b e elaborate d upo n a t thi s stage.54 As noted, "Operatio n Yakhin"— a complex plan involving the Mossad, the Jewis h Agency , th e Unite d HIA S Service , an d Kin g Hasa n II — began i n 1961 . The Unite d HIA S Servic e reopene d it s offices an d serve d as a cover for the Misgeret's an d the Jewish Agency's personnel to process the c aliya. I n 1961-66 , th e Israel i emissarie s conductin g th e operatio n included Yose f Regev , Naftal i Bar-Giora , Menache m Gi l c ad, Ga d Sha har, th e lat e Mosh e Yuval , Yose f Ronen, Hai' m Bokboza , Mosh e Antebi ,

"

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9

Former Activists and Emissaries of the Undergroun d i n North Africa a t a Gathering in Dimona , Israe l (1980): Sitting, The Late Mosh e Arnon (Hababo); From Left to Right, Standing, the Late Alex Gatmon, Mei r Knafo, Jacques 3Amir, Sam Avital (Abotbol), and Gilbert Dukkan (courtesy of the Organization of the Former North African Undergroun d Activists in Israel). Moshe Shuavi , Ary e Uriel , Hayi m Halahmi , Ga d Oren , Yon a Zabin , Michael Gal , George s Barbie , Davi d Izwotzki , Shmue l Sharon , an d Da n Kariv.55 They were assiste d b y local activists. The Morocca n Ministr y o f the Interio r provide d collective/famil y rathe r than individua l passports. I n this regard, the y followed th e policies of the French Protectorat e durin g th e Cadim a era . Thi s arrangemen t save d considerable paperwor k an d speede d th e departur e process . Th e first operation bega n o n 2 7 November 196 1 and continue d unti l sprin g 1964 . It require d registerin g th e emigrants , takin g passport photos , evacuatin g villages an d transferin g thei r Jewis h population s t o Casablanc a (togethe r with thei r belongings) , an d organizin g th e transportatio n t o Europ e b y planes an d ships . Menachem Gi l c ad, wh o i n January 196 2 returned t o Morocc o t o hel p coordinate "Operatio n Yakhin, " relate d tha t th e hea d o f th e polic e an d security services , Colone l Ahma d Oufqir , signe d man y o f th e exi t per mits. Thoug h i t i s no t certai n tha t Oufqi r receive d bribe s fro m th e

240 The

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"Zionists" for hi s services , othe r official s did . Paquet , th e maritim e com pany tha t i n th e pas t transporte d Jew s fro m Casablanc a t o Marseilles , resumed service s with it s five ships—Lyautey, Koutoubia, Azrou, Azemmour, an d Djenne. Alternatively , othe r ship s wer e chartere d tha t saile d from Morocc o t o Naples . Emigrant s wer e evacuate d b y chartered plane s from Morocc o t o France . Th e journe y t o Israe l wa s organize d throug h Israel's navigatio n company , Zim , o r El-Al , th e nationa l airline . A s w e shall see , Morocc o di d hal t th e departur e o f Jews o n severa l occasions . To challeng e th e restrictions , th e Israeli s ma y hav e conducte d c aliya i n the nort h throug h th e Strait s o f Gibraltar , o r fro m Oudjd a t o t o Algeri a using the trains. 56 The emigratio n selection/screenin g policie s wer e revive d durin g "Op eration Yakhin, " althoug h ou r source s d o no t indicat e conclusivel y tha t this applie d consistentl y fo r th e whol e period . Base d o n th e criteri a decided upo n i n Israel , preferenc e i n c aliya wa s give n t o smal l commu nities o f three-hundred o r fewer families . Secon d preference wa s grante d to families fro m rura l an d inlan d communitie s wh o migrated t o the majo r centers i n 1956-61 , awaitin g th e c allya t o resume . Fift y percen t o f th e emigrants were chosen among urbanites. Th e selection/screening proces s was based o n families rathe r tha n individuals . A family neede d t o have a provider age d eighteen t o forty-five. A widow whose children were unde r ten year s ol d coul d no t b e considere d a breadwinner. Whil e healt h an d social screenin g criteri a i n th e smal l an d remot e communitie s wher e Jews coul d b e vulnerabl e t o Musli m attack s wer e hardl y rigorous , wit h the sick , elderly , an d disable d approve d fo r c aliya, stric t policie s di d apply to families i n the majo r centers. 57 The emigratio n o f individual me n an d wome n di d becom e a n accept able procedure , provide d tha t thes e emigrant s indicate d the y coul d cop e physically an d emotionall y i n Israel i societ y without thei r families . I f th e head o f a famil y wa s unemployable , ye t th e famil y ha d unmarrie d son s aged eightee n an d older , capabl e o f working and physically fit, th e famil y was allowe d t o depart . Familie s tha t wante d t o leave thei r elderl y mem bers behind wer e denie d c allya. Israe l could no longer tolerate a situation whereby th e elderl y an d communa l leader s woul d blam e he r represen tatives for splittin g up families. 58 Of course , a n operatio n tha t evacuate d eight y thousan d peopl e fro m Morocco i n 1961-6 4 (se e tabl e 1 5 on th e change s i n th e Jewis h ma p o f Morocco), coul d not be kept secret . Ara b landlords in the mellahs, seein g

The Underground and "Operation Yakhin" 24

1

Table 15 . Change s i n th e Jewis h Ma p o f Morocco , 2 6 Novembe r 1961-31 June 196 3

Region Ksar Es Sou k Agadir Quarzazate Marrakesh Rabat Tetuan Oudjda Meknes Tangier Nador Fez Casablanca Taza Alhucemas Ceuta Total

Number of Jews 27.11.61

Number of Jews 31.6.63

4,859 2,810 4,007 16,818 11,008 5,674 2,655 10,692 6,246 72 12,194 86,149 713 49 —

1,340 1,147 2,360 8,542 6,410 5,202 2,069 6,708 5,402 72 7,976 56,794 647 49 —

3,519 1,663 1,647 8,276 4,598 472 586 4,265 844 — 4,227 29,355 66 — 510

12 A 59.2 41.1 49.2 41.8 8.3 22.1 38.9 13.5 — 34.7 34.1 9.3 — 0.3

163,946

104,718

60,028

36.6%

Emig\ rants Number of %of Emigrants Emigran

Source: The File s of the Jewish Agenc y Offic e i n Paris , CZA , L10 .

their bes t an d mos t reliabl e tenant s suddenl y departing , wen t runnin g t o the authoritie s o r thei r politica l partie s t o as k wha t wa s happening . So , too, di d th e printe r wh o sa w thre e o r fou r o f hi s bes t Jewis h worker s suddenly disappea r fro m on e da y t o th e next . Whe n a Jewish housewife , haggling ove r th e pric e o f fruit, ha d troubl e wit h th e Musli m frui t ven dor, sh e woul d sa y "Kee p you r oranges . I won t nee d yo u wher e I a m going." Al l o f a sudde n ther e wa s a rus h fo r suitcases , cartons , crates . Unable t o tak e ou t mor e tha n sixt y Morocca n dirhams , ther e wa s a rus h on silver bracelets an d othe r easil y transported valuables. 59 The lac k o f discretion b y certai n activist s an d would-b e emigrants , i n addition t o the alread y mentione d politica l pressure fro m Cair o and loca l nationalists, prompte d th e Palac e t o temporaril y hal t emigration . Th e longest paus e occurre d o n 2 0 June 1962 . Kin g Hasa n ha d returne d fro m a visi t t o Cair o th e da y before . I t wa s intimate d tha t th e Cair o visi t an d Arab Leagu e pressure s ha d bee n behin d th e restriction. 60 However , i t soon becam e clea r tha t orthodo x America n Jews , le d b y a certain Rabb i Abramsky, bribe d governmen t official s t o allow Jews to leave outside th e

242 The

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framework o f the Unite d HIA S Servic e an d contrary t o the secre t under standing worke d ou t i n May-Octobe r 1961 . Th e polic e detaine d five Moroccan official s fo r acceptin g th e bribe s an d th e Unite d HIA S office s were close d down . Onc e Gatmo n informe d Abramsk y tha t hi s privat e operations hur t th e emigration , an d subsequen t t o furthe r negotiation s with th e authorities , th e operatio n resume d i n the latte r half of 1962. 61 Whereas Kin g Hasa n tolerate d emigratio n muc h o f th e time , an d customs an d emigratio n official s cultivate d amicabl e workin g tie s wit h the "representative s o f HIAS," there was mounting concern i n Jerusale m that th e secre t understandin g migh t b e violated . O n 2 2 July 1963 , Shra gai raise d thi s issu e wit h Lev i Eshkol , Ben-Gurion s successo r a s pre mier. H e disclose d tha t th e politica l opponent s t o th e king , seekin g t o overthrow hi m b y usin g diverse tactics , als o accused Hasa n o f deliverin g to Israe l th e gif t o f young Morocca n Jew s whil e keepin g behin d th e sic k and elderly . Shraga i wondere d i f Hasa n coul d withstan d th e pressur e from al l directions , an d i f the c allya ha d a long-range future. 62 Th e gri m speculations di d no t materialize , however . It i s tru e tha t certai n Jewis h communit y leader s stil l oppose d c aliya, particularly o f suc h magnitude , whereb y thousand s o f peopl e lef t eac h month. Bu t man y supporte d th e departur e an d agree d t o assis t th e process. A s i t turne d out , Davi d c Amar, th e secretary-genera l o f th e CCIM, di d i n fact cooperat e ver y closel y with th e Misgeret. Hi s suppor t for "Operatio n Yakhin " wa s unquestionabl e an d h e wen t t o Israe l t o discuss majo r issue s relate d t o it . Indeed , o n 2 1 February 1964 , a meet ing too k plac e i n Jerusale m betwee n c Amar an d representative s o f "Operation Yakhin. " c Amar wa s prepare d t o activel y assis t th e c ally aof ten s of thousands o f Jews provided tha t he could know in advance if Israel was truly capabl e o f absorbin g them . H e sai d tha t rumor s abou t ineffectiv e absorption an d integratio n policie s reached Morocc o and made it difficul t to continue th e operation. 63 The Israeli s whom c Amar met i n Jerusalem, especiall y Baruc h Duvde vani, wer e impresse d wit h him . Duvdevan i observe d tha t c Amar wa s a courageous person , serious , an d prepare d t o confron t challenges . Hi s position o n c aliya an d Israe l ha d change d ove r th e years . Whil e i n 195 7 he heade d a delegatio n t o Pari s callin g o n Israel' s ambassado r t o ceas e illegal Zionis t activit y immediately, 64 h e ha d altere d thi s stanc e sinc e 1958 whe n Morocc o joined th e Ara b Leagu e an d cracke d dow n harde r on freedom o f movement. Betwee n 195 9 and 196 1 he befriended severa l

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3

members o f the Misgeret, amon g the m Gatmon , an d assiste d th e clandes tine efforts. 65 What wer e th e impression s o f th e Israel i emissarie s connecte d wit h either th e Mossad o r th e Jewis h Agenc y abou t Morocco , it s Jews , an d the politica l climate ? Wha t directio n di d th e c ally a take—particularl y i n 1 9 6 5 - 6 7 — o n c e "Operatio n Yakhin " wa s essentiall y over ? Moshe Yuva l observe d tha t th e politica l climat e i n 196 2 an d 196 3 wa s more relaxe d fo r th e Jews , despit e th e borde r disput e betwee n Morocc o and Algeria . However , thi s di d no t mea n ther e wer e n o dangers : Although nowadays , annihilatio n i s not anticipate d fo r th e Jews in Morocco , Go d forbid, thi s countr y remain s Musli m an d basicall y anti-Semitic . . . . A Jew migh t very easil y ge t stabbe d fo r an y reaso n whatsoever . A n inciden t tha t too k plac e a month an d a hal f ag o [beginnin g o f July 1963 ] i s characteristic . . . . Th e whol e port [o f Casablanca] wa s sayin g that no t onl y were th e Jew s leavin g with al l thei r baggage, bu t the y wer e als o smugglin g weapons. Th e nex t da y the notoriou s [alTahrtr] wrot e abou t it on the front page. 66

From 1965 to 1967 Though ther e wa s a majo r c aliya wav e i n 1961-63 , th e number s droppe d considerably betwee n th e latte r hal f o f 196 4 an d th e Jun e 196 7 Arab Israeli war . I n Februar y 1965 , durin g hi s visi t t o Morocco , Yehud a Dominitz o f th e Jewis h Agenc y note d tha t man y Jew s sa w thei r futur e i n Morocco. Give n th e ne w realities , h e recommende d tha t th e emissarie s " concentrate o n encouragin g "qualit y c aliya" tha t include d hig h schoo l an d " university student s an d yout h c aliya wh o coul d constitut e a "pul l factor " for brothers , sisters , parents , an d relatives ; a s well a s teachers wh o woul d take thei r familie s wit h them. 6 7 Dominitz the n calle d fo r reducin g th e n u m b e r o f emissarie s fro m te n (1 Februar y 1965 ) t o si x (effectiv e Septembe r 1965 ) i n accordanc e wit h the reduce d c aliya.68 I n Septembe r 196 6 ther e wer e fou r emissarie s inside Morocco : Shmue l Sharon , George s Barbi e (responsibl e fo r c aliya from Casablanca , Rabat , an d th e south) , Davi d Izwotzk i (responsibl e fo r c aliya fro m Fez , Meknes , an d Tangier) , an d Da n Kari v (responsibl e fo r special missions). 69 The HIA S office s stil l functione d i n 1965-66 , althoug h thei r loca l personnel wa s considerabl y reduced . Th e onl y othe r temporar y hal t i n

244 The

Underground and "Operation Yakhiri

"

On Thei r Wa y to Israel: Morocca n Jew s durin g "Operatio n Yakhin " (courtes y of the Organizatio n o f the Forme r Nort h Africa n Undergroun d Activist s in Israel).

The Underground and

"Operation Yakhin"

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5

emigration occurre d earl y i n Februar y 1965 , durin g th e visi t t o Morocc o of c Abd al-Hakl m D Amir, chie f o f Egypt' s arme d forces . Onc e h e lef t th e country, th e operation s resumed . I t appeare d tha t eve n th e U N F P an d its pres s wer e n o longe r overtl y oppose d t o th e c aliya, perhap s becaus e i t had becom e small-scale . Bu t i t oppose d th e presenc e o f HIAS , regarde d as a foreig n organization. 7 0 Ye t th e moral e o f th e Israeli s i n Morocc o wa s at a lo w eb b fo r th e followin g reasons . First , c aliya wa s unpopular , no t because o f governmenta l oppositio n (whic h di d no t the n exist) , bu t du e to th e new s sprea d withi n th e Jewis h communitie s abou t th e sever e economic recessio n plaguin g Israel . Second , th e economi c situatio n fo r the Morocca n Jew s wa s favorable , eve n thoug h thi s wa s no t th e cas e fo r their Musli m compatriots . Third , ther e wa s a certai n n u m b e r o f yordlm, as wel l a s Jewis h "tourists " encourage d b y th e emigratio n organizer s t o visit Israe l befor e settlin g there , wh o ha d returne d t o Morocc o discour aged an d highl y critica l o f Israel i society . A s Hayi m Halahmi , on e o f th e main coordinator s o f Israel i activit y i n Morocco , throug h Paris , assesse d the post-196 4 developments : Despite th e dimension s o f correspondenc e wit h Israel , thi s canno t chang e any thing. W e have already been acquainte d wit h a number o f social cases that refus e to emigrate t o Israel, thoug h we have emigration permit s for them i n hand. Eve n parents who have been requeste d b y their children [i n Israel], refuse t o emigrate. A new, eve n mor e worrisome phenomenon, i s the application b y family member s to ou r office , offerin g t o pa y th e expense s fo r retur n o f parents o r children . Th e question ma y b e aske d whethe r everythin g possibl e ha s bee n don e i n Israe l t o avoid havin g Jews leav e th e country . I n th e presen t economi c situation , w e wil l never b e abl e t o withstan d th e argument s o f thos e wh o leave , an d eve n less — the argument s o f the tourists . . . . The goo d reputatio n whic h w e had i n the pas t among th e Jew s n o longe r exists . I t woul d see m tha t w e mus t no t appea r her e with a negative image , an d tha t i t woul d b e bes t fo r us , therefore , t o shu t dow n and withdra w wit h dignit y whil e w e ca n stil l d o so . . . . Th e presen t situatio n reinforces th e affinit y o f man y fo r emigratio n t o Canada , an d thi s withou t th e hesitations tha t existe d i n th e past. 71 Several month s late r Halahm i suggeste d tha t wherea s th e majorit y o f the Jew s (som e 200,000 ) ha d lef t fo r Israe l sinc e 1948 , ther e wer e never theless stil l 60,00 0 Jew s i n Morocc o who , i n 1966 , eithe r considere d Europe o r Canad a a s thei r destination , o r eve n worse , preferre d t o deepen thei r root s i n Morocco : " W e ar e witnessin g Jewis h resettlement .

246 The

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In th e bi g citie s ne w businesse s hav e bee n opened , fine restaurants , al l owned b y Jews." 72 This situation continue d unti l June 1967 , but change d drastically following th e 196 7 war.

From 1967 to 1980 When th e June 196 7 war broke out , Morocca n Jews were on the verge of panic. Thi s situatio n continue d fo r severa l weeks . Tha t tota l pani c wa s averted, tha t ther e wer e n o majo r disaster s fo r th e Jews , ca n b e at tributed t o the governmen t an d th e Palac e who protected them . Political force s bot h o n th e lef t (supporte d b y th e UNF P an d th e UMT) an d th e conservativ e righ t (Istiqlal ) activel y sough t t o exploi t th e fact tha t th e kin g protecte d th e Jews . Externally , th e Morocca n politica l establishment coul d no t affor d an y Jewis h praise , les t i t see m tha t the y were turnin g thei r back s o n th e Ara b cause . Th e attack s o n Israe l wer e especially stron g i n neighborin g Algeria , whos e radi o an d pres s wer e quite vehementl y anti-Israel i i n tone , a s muc h a s Radi o Cairo . Sinc e Moroccan-Algerian relation s a t th e tim e wer e quit e straine d ove r a host of political issues , an d a s th e kin g was bein g subjecte d t o attack s b y th e Boumedienne regim e o f Algeria, an y over t sympath y o n th e par t o f th e Palace an d th e governmen t towar d th e Jew s migh t hav e cause d seriou s problems fo r Hasa n wit h both Algier s and Cairo. 73 As w e hav e see n i n th e las t sectio n an d a s wa s confirme d b y othe r reports durin g an d afte r th e 196 7 war, i t appeare d befor e Ma y 196 7 that the Jew s wer e secur e i n Morocco . No t onl y wer e th e day s o f mas s emigration t o Israe l ove r an d fe w wer e attracte d there , bu t Morocca n Jews wer e als o reluctant , temporaril y a t least , t o settl e i n France , Can ada, an d th e Unite d States . Earl y i n 196 7 the Jewis h communitie s wer e not onl y numericall y stabl e bu t wer e i n fac t slightl y augmente d a s a result o f th e traditionall y hig h Morocca n Jewis h birt h rates . Further more, unlik e th e time s whe n restrictiv e measure s wer e imposed , eco nomically, an d o n emigration , th e Jew s durin g th e mid-1960 s enjoye d freedom o f movemen t whil e economi c condition s wer e mor e promisin g in Morocc o tha n i n Franc e o r Israe l wher e th e economie s coul d no t provide ampl e employmen t o r busines s opportunities . Thi s combine d t o make lif e i n Morocc o temporaril y active , s o tha t Jew s di d no t wis h t o uproot themselve s an d commenc e ane w elsewhere. 74

The Underground and

"Operation Yakhin"

"

24

7

The 196 7 wa r an d it s aftermat h introduced , temporarily , a ne w per spective. A n increasin g n u m b e r o f Jew s seriousl y considere d leavin g Morocco onc e again . Thei r concer n wa s arouse d b y severa l phenomena . There wa s th e Istiqlal , emphasizin g quasi-religiou s concepts , drawin g much o f it s politica l strengt h fro m th e rura l Musli m populatio n tha t traditionally supporte d anti-Zionis t campaigns . I n Jun e 1967 , i t seize d upon N a s s e r s defea t an d Israel s territoria l gain s t o intensif y anti-Jewis h activity. I t utilize d classi c anti-Semiti c literatur e suc h a s the allege d lette r by Benjami n Frankli n denouncin g th e Jews . Th e Istiqla l French-lan guage organ , L'Opinion, encourage d th e Musli m populatio n t o publiciz e blacklists o f Jewish-owne d businesse s an d i n fac t enjoye d partia l succes s in tha t campaign . Then, ther e wer e th e mor e leftis t an d intellectua l force s who , i n addition t o thei r anti-Zionis t an d anti-Wester n campaign , wer e als o op posed t o th e king . Represente d b y th e U N F P an d UMT , an d dominan t in certai n professiona l an d white-colla r circles , the y organize d a mas s meeting i n Casablanc a durin g th e first wee k o f the 196 7 war an d engage d in precisel y th e sam e sor t o f crowd-inciting theme s a s th e Istiqlal , agains t both Israe l an d th e Unite d States . Th e leadershi p o f the U N F P an d U M T quietly sough t t o wres t statement s fro m th e Casablanc a Jewis h commu nity leader s denouncin g Israe l an d Zionism , an d expresse d displeasur e when thes e wer e no t forthcoming. 7 5 Jewish fear s wer e als o heightene d a s a resul t o f statement s mad e i n the Morocca n press , particularl y b y extremis t conservativ e newspaper s such a s al-Masd*, tha t expresse d virulen t hatre d agains t them . Fo r in stance, followin g th e Jun e war , al-Masd? claimed , i n a n editoria l entitle d "From th e Peopl e t o th e Authorities" : There ar e n o Zionists , onl y Jews , n o mor e n o less . . . . W e d o no t wis h th e authorities t o harm th e Jews . The y ar e o n th e sam e footin g wit h th e Muslim s b y the term s o f the constitution . Bu t w e wan t th e head s o f th e Jew s i f they betra y the Muslims . . . . We d o not wan t th e authoritie s t o carry o n a war o f destroyin g everything a s di d Hitler , fo r th e Islami c religio n forbid s this ; but i n th e nam e o f this religio n w e deman d tha t the y punis h severel y thos e who betray thi s religio n that protect s them , thi s countr y tha t give s the m abod e an d food , an d shelter s them fro m al l fears. . . . W e onl y wan t t o sa y thi s commo n trut h tha t al l me n i n Morocco know . Th e feeling s o f the Jew s d o no t change . The y ar e upholdin g th e little stat e [Israel ] wit h mone y an d non e o f the m fai l i n this . W e def y anybod y among them t o prove th e contrary . Th e emigratio n fro m Morocc o is very eviden t . . . t o all. We deman d o f the authorities that , o n this occasion, the y protect thei r

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citizens from th e provocation an d defiance o f the Jews and that they shoul d not guard the Jews when the latter organize receptions and festivals t o express their joy [at Israel's victory] under the guard of the police protecting them. 76 The majo r proble m face d b y th e Jew s o f Morocco a t th e tim e wa s th e economic boycott. Otherwise , despit e th e work of the extremist s an d th e political parties , ther e wer e fe w problem s i n Jewish-Musli m relations . True, Muslim s often avoide d Jews they knew in daily contacts, bu t i n th e schools Jewis h an d Musli m youth s continue d t o stud y together. 77 Eve n insofar a s the boycott was concerned, whil e Jewish merchants found thei r wares rejected , th e boycot t wa s only partia l an d i n certai n region s stronge r and mor e effectiv e tha n i n others. 78 Jewis h textil e sho p owner s face d extremist Musli m youth s wh o encourage d would-b e customer s no t t o buy fro m them, 79 bu t usually , ordinar y Muslim s di d no t tak e th e initia tive i n organizin g th e boycott . Quit e frequently , however , Muslim s boy cotted Jewis h products becaus e o f pressure impose d b y the extremists . Jewish school s wer e kep t ope n an d Jewis h institution s functione d normally, albei t ofte n unde r polic e guard . Th e Shavu c6t holida y fel l o n 14 Jun e a s knowledg e o f th e Israel i victor y filtered in . Th e Morocca n government no w encountere d a seriou s dilemma . I n th e first place , i t could not , an d di d not , permi t an y bu t th e mos t innocuou s publication s from th e Arab world t o come into the country , and , i t has been rumored , jammed outsid e Ara b radi o station s tha t expresse d violen t propagand a against Jew s i n general . Secondly , althoug h placin g certai n Jewis h insti tutions an d residentia l quarter s unde r guard , th e governmen t als o sought , for th e sak e o f normalcy , t o le t Jewis h lif e g o o n despit e th e problems . Consequently, synagogue s an d Jewis h club s staye d open . Finally , whil e maintaining a precarious balanc e betwee n protectio n o f Jews an d allow ing the m t o enjo y freedo m o f movement, th e authoritie s simultaneousl y had t o ac t i n a wa y tha t woul d no t b e construe d b y segment s o f th e Muslim populatio n a s i f the governmen t wer e friendl y towar d th e Jews . Therefore, th e Jew s wer e discreetl y urge d no t t o organiz e celebration s that migh t b e interprete d a s rejoicin g a t Nasser' s defeat . Wedding s an d circumcisions wer e limite d o r postponed . Jew s wer e adjure d no t t o sin g too loudly during normal Sabbat h service s in the synagogues. 80 But, wit h severa l exceptions , Jew s wer e free t o leav e Morocco . Thi s did no t mean , however , tha t the y di d no t encounte r difficultie s a t th e hands o f official s whe n seekin g th e necessar y document s t o emigrate .

The Underground and "Operation Yakhin" 24

9

Even thoug h order s wer e issue d b y th e governmen t t o hel p o r a t leas t permit Jew s t o obtai n th e documents , th e bureaucrat s wer e frequentl y resentful an d i n n o particula r hurr y t o respon d favorably . A t th e time , moreover, i t was a n ope n secre t tha t th e Unite d HIA S Servic e ha d bee n working i n Morocc o for severa l years i n connection wit h emigratio n bot h to Israe l an d t o othe r countries , suc h a s Canada . Withou t preventin g emigration o f Jews, th e Morocca n governmen t suggeste d t o th e Unite d HIAS, i n Ma y 1967 , a s th e prewa r crisi s wa s brewing , tha t i t woul d b e prudent t o shut dow n operation s insid e Morocco , temporaril y a t least. 81 Although w e kno w toda y tha t betwee n 196 7 an d 197 1 th e Jewis h population i n Morocc o wa s reduce d fro m 60,00 0 t o 35,000, i n June 196 7 individual an d unorganize d movemen t fro m Morocc o wa s no t ye t o n a very larg e scale , eve n i f i t wa s greate r tha n a t th e sam e perio d i n 196 5 and 1966 . There wer e numerou s Jew s who prepared t o travel t o France , Spain, an d othe r countrie s fo r "a n earl y vacation. " Sometime s th e hea d of the famil y sen t hi s wif e an d childre n abroa d an d staye d behin d alon e to maintain hi s business. Ther e wer e "scouts " who went abroa d t o prob e opportunities i n variou s countries . I n bot h Marseille s an d Paris , Jewis h welfare organization s reporte d tha t the y ha d thre e t o four time s a s man y people a s usua l fro m Morocc o approachin g them , man y o f who m wer e "scouts." Ceut a an d Melill a wer e filled wit h Jews , a s wer e Madri d an d Malaga. Morocca n Jew s did no t nee d visa s for Spain. 82 Emigration t o Israe l i n 196 8 an d 196 9 reache d approximatel y 5,00 0 per year , bu t droppe d t o 200-250 pe r mont h i n 1970 . The Unite d HIA S was stil l operatin g insid e Morocc o and , accordin g t o Ab e Laskov e th e AJDC-Morocco director , whil e th e closin g dow n o f it s office s appeare d imminent i n 1967 , thi s wa s no t carrie d out. 83 Moreover , b y 196 8 ther e was relativ e cal m i n th e country . I n spit e o f the anti-Israe l campaig n b y the press , radio , an d television , ther e wer e fe w overtl y anti-Jewis h inci dents. A bruta l exceptio n wa s a knif e attack , no t fatal , o n tw o elderl y Jews i n norther n Morocco , whil e th e chie f rabbi o f Tangier als o receive d nonfatal sta b wounds. Th e boycott o f Jewish businesses institute d i n 196 7 had drie d up . Unemploymen t i n th e countr y remaine d hig h i n 1968-6 9 as i n previou s years , an d bot h governmen t an d privat e employer s wer e reluctant t o take on Jewish staff . Thi s attitude wa s largely du e t o justifie d fears tha t Jewis h employee s wer e likel y t o leav e Morocc o an d thei r job s before the y had bee n trained. 84 The Israel i rai d o n th e Beiru t airpor t (Decembe r 1968) , th e shootin g

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down b y Israe l o f Egyptia n fighter jet s durin g th e 196 9 Wa r o f Attrition , and th e El-Aqs a Mosqu e affai r (El-Aqs a Mosqu e wa s on e o f two mosque s sacred t o Isla m i n Jerusale m damage d i n 196 9 b y a n explosio n se t of f b y a derange d individual ) wer e reported , distorted , an d exaggerate d i n th e Moroccan press . Th e Ara b Summi t meetin g o n th e El-Aqs a fire too k place i n Rabat . Televisio n provide d propagand a coverag e o f Israeli s tor turing Ara b men , women , an d children , causin g som e pani c amon g th e Jews. However , th e governmen t too k precautionar y measure s an d sta tioned polic e guard s i n fron t o f th e larg e synagogues , thu s preventin g incidents. 8 5 Jewish observer s mak e th e poin t that , give n th e authorities ' alertnes s on th e Jews ' behal f a t time s o f crisis , th e Jews , afte r 1970 , reconsidere d staying an d postpone d emigratio n t o othe r lands . Th e leader s o f th e AI U and Frenc h Jewr y attempte d t o emphasiz e th e importanc e o f som e Jew ish presenc e i n Morocco . The y indicate d tha t th e Morocca n governmen t provided subsidie s fo r th e AI U school s an d thu s wer e encouragin g th e Jews t o remai n i n Morocco . Th e leader s o f th e AI U pointe d ou t i n 197 0 that, wit h 40,00 0 Jew s remainin g i n th e country , emigratio n "n e s e fer a pas overnight " (won' t happe n "overnight"). 8 6 Ren e Cassin , stil l presiden t of th e AI U i n 1970 , wen t a s fa r a s t o sugges t tha t th e presenc e o f Jews i n Morocco wa s vita l fo r futur e rapprochemen t betwee n Israe l an d Mo rocco: It i s importan t t o remembe r tha t Israe l woul d b e intereste d t o receiv e ne w populations, bu t i t i s no t i n he r interes t tha t th e [Morocca n Jewis h Diaspora ] disappears completely . Fo r onc e thi s occurs , an d whe n sh e wil l nee d t o benefi t [from a Jewis h presenc e i n Morocco] , i n orde r t o establis h tie s betwee n Israe l and Morocco , thi s will become mor e difficul t t o accomplish. A s long as there i s a [Jewish presenc e there] , an d thoug h w e mus t no t forcibl y kee p th e Jew s i n Morocco, w e shoul d refrai n fro m endangerin g it. 87 Indeed, c aliya o r emigratio n t o countrie s othe r tha n Israe l coul d no t b e carrie d ou t overnight . Cassin' s reason s fo r th e nee d fo r continuatio n of a Jewis h communit y i n Morocc o migh t hav e provoke d argument s an d disagreements, bu t i t wa s unrealisti c t o expec t tha t communit y t o disap pear abruptl y followin g th e event s o f th e lat e 1960s . Besides , th e hig h natural birt h rat e o f th e Jewis h communit y prevente d tota l self-liquida tion. Until 1 0 Jun e 1971 , th e countr y enjoye d relativ e tranquillit y an d th e

The Underground and

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25

1

Palace provide d ampl e protectio n t o th e Jews . Massiv e unemployment , corruption, abjec t poverty , an d th e d e e p frustratio n o f th e risin g genera tion o f Muslim s seeme d t o evok e littl e anxiet y amon g th e Jew s s o lon g a s the governmen t demonstrate d strengt h an d determinatio n t o suppres s expressions o f discontent . On 1 0 June 1971 , however , force s hostil e t o Hasa n withi n th e militar y attempted a n unsuccessfu l cou p d'etat . Fo r th e Jews , popularl y identifie d with th e Palace , thi s wa s a difficul t period . Th e presiden t o f th e C C I M , David c Amar, hurriedl y lef t th e country , alon g with th e secretary-genera l of th e Casablanc a communit y an d severa l othe r notables. 8 8 I t appear s that th e 35,00 0 Jew s remainin g weathere d man y crise s an d maintaine d their fait h i n th e king . N o on e expecte d a sudde n mas s emigratio n bu t merely a gradua l self-liquidation . Interestingly , th e las t o f th e Mossads emissaries involve d i n c ally a, wit h th e Zionis t yout h movements , an d self-defense, lef t Morocc o onl y i n th e summe r o f 1973 , du e t o securit y risks. During th e s u m m e r o f 1972 , a secon d attemp t wa s mad e t o overthro w Hasan, bu t despit e som e anxiet y ther e wa s n o majo r pani c i n th e Jewis h community. 8 9 Th e sam e applie d durin g an d afte r th e 197 3 Middl e Eas t war i n whic h Morocca n Musli m volunteer s participated . I n fact , Dr . Nahum Goldmann , wh o i n 197 3 stil l serve d a s th e presiden t o f bot h th e WJC an d Worl d Zionis t Organization , intervene d befor e th e kin g o n behalf o f th e Jew s i n th e w a r s immediat e aftermath . O n 1 4 Novembe r he receive d a respons e fro m c Abbas al-Kissi , th e hea d o f th e roya l cabi net, statin g amon g othe r thing s tha t no ac t o f violenc e o r persecutio n ha s bee n carrie d ou t i n th e Kingdo m agains t Moroccan Jews . Wha t i s more , althoug h Morocc o wa s directl y engage d i n th e war [dispatchin g t o th e conflict ] som e o f it s bes t sons , knowin g th e ineluctabl e risks o f suc h a [decision] , th e dail y relation s betwee n Morocca n Muslim s an d their Jewis h compatriot s [a t home ] hav e no t bee n subjecte d t o th e slightes t alteration.90 By 1974 , th e majorit y o f Jew s leavin g Morocc o wer e headin g towar d Canada, E u r o p e , Lati n America , an d th e Unite d States. 9 1 On e majo r obstacle i n th e communa l self-liquidatio n proces s ha d t o d o wit h com munity ownershi p o f larg e piece s o f property . Al l thi s property , wort h many million s o f dollars, wa s registere d wit h th e Ministr y o f the Interior .

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"

The AIlT s Ecol e Normal e Hebrai'qu e i n th e Oasi s Subur b outsid e Casablanc a (author's personal collection). The proceed s o f a sal e ha d t o be kep t i n cas h i n a bank o r reinveste d i n other communa l property . The y coul d no t b e use d for any other purpos e or transferred t o banking establishments abroad. 92 Two development s i n th e mid - an d lat e 1970 s enhance d Jewis h trus t in th e Palace : Kin g Hasan' s suppor t i n Novembe r 197 7 fo r Egyptia n president D Anwar al-Sadat' s peac e initiative ; an d hi s invitatio n i n 1975 78 of Moroccan Jews living in Israel t o visit Morocc o or resettle there . Reacting t o th e king s invitation , onl y a few Morocca n Jew s returned . Upon thei r arriva l the y wer e give n boar d an d lodgin g a t governmen t expense an d wer e helpe d t o find jobs ; severa l wer e enrolle d i n a hote l school t o provid e futur e executive s i n th e touris t industry. 93 Hai' m Shiran , who lef t Morocc o i n 195 9 for Franc e an d late r fo r Israel , visite d i n Jul y 1978. H e entere d th e mellah o f hi s hom e town , Meknes , an d notice d that Jews and Muslim s were no w integrated int o what was once a Jewish quarter; tha t Jewis h quarte r street s continue d t o bea r suc h name s a s Berdugo, Toledano, Jerusalem, an d Zion. Man y Jews had left th e mellahs in th e 1960 s and 1970 s for bette r neighborhoods . Mekne s wa s n o excep tion. 94 Other Jew s wh o returne d t o Morocc o t o visi t o r settl e usuall y ha d

The Underground and "Operation Yakhin" 25

3

positive impression s o f thei r ancien t homeland . Rober t Asseraf an d hi s family lef t i n 196 7 to settl e i n Paris , bu t i n 197 9 the Asseraf s returne d t o live i n Casablanc a wher e Rober t entere d int o busines s partnershi p wit h a Musli m an d sai d relation s wer e "ver y goo d a t ever y level. " However , Jewish source s i n Morocc o emphasize d tha t a basi c reaso n fo r thi s im provement i n th e atmospher e wa s th e decreas e i n th e numbe r o f Jewish inhabitants. 95 Despite thei r secur e feelin g politically , i n 1975-7 9 th e Jew s face d declining economi c prospects . Fo r example , salarie s ha d no t bee n ad justed t o mee t th e risin g cost s o f rent , clothing , meat , oil , an d vegeta bles. A s a segment o f the Jewish population wa s still salaried an d not self employed, they , lik e man y Muslims , face d difficultie s i n thei r buyin g power an d i n payin g th e ren t increases . Youn g couple s ofte n coul d no t get marrie d becaus e eve n one-roo m apartment s i n Casablanc a o r Fe z were to o expensive. 96 Thi s situatio n wa s i n shar p contras t t o th e mor e promising economi c trend s o f 1965-73 . I t i s eviden t tha t i n post-195 6 Morocco th e Jew s suffere d fro m instability , an d fro m constan t fluctuations i n th e economi c an d politica l situation . Th e instabilit y wa s stil l th e case i n th e 1980 s an d earl y 1990s , whe n a s man y a s 8,00 0 o f the m remained. O f course, shoul d th e 199 3 peace proces s i n th e Middl e Eas t gain strength , Jewis h communa l self-liquidatio n may b e halted , an d re settlement o f some significanc e coul d tak e place . Conversely , th e ris e o f Islamic fundamentalism coul d haste n self-liquidation .

Chapter 8

Tunisia's Nationa l Struggl e an d Tunisian Jewry : Jewis h Anxieties , Muslim-Jewish Coexistence , and Emigratio n

The Political Background As in othe r societie s i n th e Middl e Eas t an d Nort h Africa , th e expandin g colonial presenc e i n Tunisi a alienate d a growin g segmen t o f the indige nous elite . Thi s include d graduate s o f the orthodo x Zitoun a Colleg e an d the privilege d element s traine d a t Sadiq i College . Stron g sign s o f dissatisfaction wer e eviden t durin g th e 1920 s an d 1930s , wit h th e emergenc e of the Destou r part y (1920 ) which sough t a greater participator y rol e fo r Tunisian Muslim s i n th e colonia l administrativ e apparatu s a s wel l a s increased civi l liberties ; th e Tunisia n labo r movemen t (CGTT) , estab lished i n 1924 , whic h advocate d improve d socia l condition s fo r workers ; and th e secularl y oriente d Neo-Destou r part y (founde d i n 1934 ) whic h split away from th e Destour, 1 an d was led by French-educate d elements . Of these Habi b Bourguiba , presiden t o f Tunisia from th e lat e 1950 s unti l November 1987 , was the mos t outspoken an d dynami c figure. The Neo-Destour , whic h becam e th e leadin g movemen t seekin g t o wrest vita l politica l concession s fro m France , adopte d a n ambitiou s plat form encompassin g socia l an d educationa l reforms . I t foun d a powerfu l ally i n th e Unio n Generat e de s Travailleur s Tunisien s (UGTT) , estab lished i n th e 1940 s an d destine d t o pla y a preponderan t rol e alongsid e the Neo-Destou r i n the struggl e for independence . 254

Tunisia s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry 25

5

Due t o th e popula r suppor t fo r th e Neo-Destou r alon g th e easter n sahil (coas t o r littoral) , essentiall y i n Tunis , Sousse , an d th e Ca p Bo n province, th e movemen t wa s driven undergroun d b y th e Frenc h i n 193 8 and it s leader s arrested . Durin g th e Germa n occupatio n o f Tunisi a th e Neo-Destour enjoye d a semilega l status ; supporte d b y Munsi f Bey , i t maintained friendl y relation s with th e Axis powers. 2 Following th e liberatio n o f Tunisi a b y th e Allie s i n Ma y 1943 , th e movement's activitie s wer e onc e agai n temporaril y halted . Bourguib a spent som e tim e i n Rom e an d late r i n Egyp t wher e h e establishe d tie s with th e Ara b Leagu e a s wel l a s Nort h Africa n politica l exiles , befor e returning t o Tunisia in Septembe r 1949. 3 Meanwhile, th e Neo-Destour , alon g wit h th e UGT T le d b y Ferha t Hached, 4 wa s permitte d graduall y t o reasser t it s authority . Th e move ment demande d th e retur n o f nationalist exile s and a host of reforms, bu t did no t ye t resor t t o a violen t struggle . I n 195 0 it s relation s wit h th e Residency actuall y improve d temporaril y t o th e exten t tha t th e Frenc h considered grantin g Tunisian s a variet y o f representational reform s tha t could hav e le d t o eventua l interna l autonomy , an d th e Qua i d'Orsa y dispatched Loui s Perillie r t o Tuni s a s resident-genera l wit h th e tas k o f overseeing th e reforms . However, i n Augus t 1950 , whe n a ne w coalitio n government , com posed o f Tunisians (includin g member s o f the Neo-Destour ) an d Frenc h directors appeare d t o indicat e tha t th e Frenc h wer e conciliatory , th e Neo-Destour insiste d o n furthe r concessions . The y no w demande d th e formation o f a homogeneou s all-Tunisia n cabinet . I n response , th e Frenc h dismissed Perillie r an d sen t th e hard-line r Jea n d e Hauteclocqu e t o fill the pos t o f resident-general. I t no w seeme d tha t a Franco-Tunisian com promise wa s a s remot e a s ever , an d th e inevitabl e outcom e wa s th e outbreak o f a protracted , violen t struggl e fo r hom e rul e endorse d b y various faction s o f th e Tunisia n politica l spectrum , althoug h the y ofte n denied thei r participation . The nationalis t struggl e fo r interna l autonom y commence d i n mid January 1952 , gaine d momentu m durin g th e summe r o f tha t year , an d continued int o 1954 . I t was joined b y pro-nationalist forces , mos t notabl y the fellaghas—guerrilla fighters activ e in the sout h (nea r the border wit h Libya) and i n the northwest . Th e confrontation wit h the Frenc h include d bombings, urba n an d rural sabotage, an d the enlisting of political suppor t

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abroad. Th e Frenc h colonists , i n return , organize d activis t group s tha t engaged i n counterterrorism. 5 The Neo-Destou r wa s t o fac e repressiv e measure s adopte d i n 1952 . Bourguiba wa s first exile d t o L a Galet e i n th e norther n Tunisia n sdhil and the n t o th e H e d e Croi x of f th e coas t o f Brittany . Ye t supporter s o f the movemen t remaine d activ e i n Tunisia , an d it s leaders abroa d sough t to induc e Franc e t o negotiat e a n autonom y agreemen t o n favorabl e terms. Fro m 195 2 the supporter s o f the Neo-Destou r continuousl y presse d for complet e interna l autonomy , excludin g foreig n affairs , police , an d military control , whic h wer e t o b e retaine d b y th e French , an d th e election o f a Tunisian legislatur e withou t delay . On e o f the majo r tactic s employed b y th e Neo-Destou r wa s t o wi n th e suppor t o f American an d European labo r unions , America n publi c opinion—whic h wa s fo r th e most par t hostil e t o Frenc h colonia l design s i n Nort h Africa— , an d o f the Unite d Nations . These efforts , undertake n i n 1952-54 , wer e resiste d b y th e Frenc h who, moreover , sough t t o play the bey, Muhamma d al-Amin , agains t th e Neo-Destour. Nevertheless , throughou t thi s perio d th e Qua i d'Orsa y and th e Residenc y di d propos e a series o f reforms tha t wer e rejecte d b y Neo-Destour supporter s an d th e fellaghas. The replacemen t o f d e Hauteclocqu e b y Pierr e Voizar d i n Augus t 1953 represented a n attemp t t o pu t a n en d t o th e violenc e an d turmoil . Voizard lifte d pres s censorship , release d severa l politica l prisoners , an d in Marc h 195 4 announced th e formatio n o f a new governmen t compose d of eigh t Tunisia n minister s an d fou r Frenc h director s unde r th e presi dency of Salah M 3 zall, thus grantin g majority representatio n t o Tunisians for th e first time . Unde r pressur e fro m it s supporters , th e Neo-Destou r opposed thes e reform s an d emphasize d it s determinatio n t o achiev e genuine Tunisia n sovereignty . Th e crisi s di d no t abat e and , followin g a n unsuccessful assassinatio n attemp t o n M D zall, th e latte r was prompted t o tender hi s resignation . The electio n o f Pierre Mendes-Franc e a s premier durin g th e summe r of 195 4 signale d th e decisiv e turnin g point . Hi s resolutio n t o appoin t Pierre Boye r d e l a Tou r a s resident-general , an d hi s visi t t o Tunisi a o n 31 July 195 4 t o announc e tha t Tunisi a woul d b e grante d interna l auton omy, arreste d th e outbrea k o f a full-scal e civi l war . Th e nex t step , i n August 1954 , wa s t o allo w th e be y t o form a government heade d b y th e

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politically independen t an d moderat e Taha r Ben-Ammar , i n orde r t o negotiate th e term s fo r home rule . Although Mendes-Franc e wa s removed fro m offic e i n Februar y 1955 , Edgar Faure , hi s successor , resume d negotiation s wit h Ben-Ammar . O n 3 Jun e 195 5 th e Franco-Tunisia n conventio n wa s signed . I t grante d internal autonom y t o Tunisia an d me t mos t o f the nationalists ' demands . In Ma y 195 5 Bourguiba returne d hom e permanentl y afte r year s o f intermittent imprisonment . Wherea s hi s supporter s accepte d th e ne w terms , the mor e extremis t win g o f the Neo-Destour , le d b y Sala h Ben-Youssef , demanded ful l an d immediat e independence . Durin g th e inne r part y struggle tha t ensue d th e Bourguibist s triumphe d ove r th e Youssefites , whose leade r fled t o Cairo. On 3 Marc h 195 6 th e statehoo d o f Morocc o wa s proclaimed , an d th e French coul d n o longe r refus e Tunisi a a simila r status . Thi s cam e int o effect o n 20 March 1956 , when th e governmen t o f Guy Molle t abrogate d the 188 1 Protectorate Treaty .

The Jewish Communities during 1948-1956

the Years

Of the 95,00 0 Jews livin g i n Tunisi a durin g th e earl y 1950 s (2. 8 percen t of the tota l population) , approximatel y 72,00 0 wer e subject s o f the bey , the res t bein g Frenc h o r Italia n subjects . Durin g thi s perio d th e Euro pean settle r communit y numbere d som e 150,000 . Befor e an d afte r 1947 , legal authority for Tunisian Jews in matters of personal status—marriage , divorce, inheritance—ha d bee n expressl y veste d i n th e rabbini c courts , composed o f rabbi s appointe d b y th e state . Thes e court s administere d justice accordin g t o mosai c la w an d wer e empowere d t o han d dow n rulings whic h wer e enforce d b y the Tunisia n government . Case s beyon d the jurisdictio n o f thes e court s wer e trie d i n Islami c court s i f the y in volved Jewish subject s o f the bey . The bul k o f the Jewis h populatio n wa s concentrated i n Tunis (65,000) , Sfax (4,500), an d Souss e (4,000) . Othe r importan t Jewis h center s wer e i n Gabes, Nabeul , Medenine , an d Jerba . Th e res t o f Tunisia n Jewr y wa s scattered i n smalle r communities—town s an d villages—i n th e souther n

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and norther n regions . Th e majorit y wer e artisans , shopkeepers , large and small-scal e merchants , an d member s o f the libera l professions . Naphtali Bar-Giora , a representative o f the Jewis h Agency' s Immigra tion Department , wh o i n 195 0 conducted a two-month-long fact-findin g mission i n Tunisia , analyze d th e bul k o f th e labo r forc e i n th e urba n Jewish communities . Accordin g t o Bar-Giora , 1 0 to 1 5 percent o f urba n Jewry wer e affluen t propert y owner s an d businessme n wh o investe d their capita l i n immovabl e assets ; 2 0 percen t wer e stor e owners , smal l businessmen, an d trad e intermediarie s wh o investe d thei r mone y i n savings; anothe r 2 0 percen t wer e artisan s whos e incom e derive d fro m the sal e o f thei r products . Mos t o f the m wer e unabl e t o inves t thei r money i n immovabl e assets . Amon g the m wer e shoemakers , tinsmiths , and tailor s wh o usuall y owne d thei r workshops . I t wa s easie r fo r th e latter t o liquidat e thei r asset s an d emigrat e t o Israe l o r France . Anothe r important an d expandin g segmen t o f the urban wor k force wa s compose d of th e French-educated , includin g physicians , lawyers , professiona l ad ministrators, an d teachers. 6 However , Bar-Gior a di d no t provid e ade quate data on the percentage o f this category of the white-collar/educate d stratum compare d wit h th e res t o f th e employe d Jewis h population . There i s als o scan t evidenc e i n hi s findings abou t th e poo r stratu m an d its situation vis-a-vi s the others . Financial ai d an d socia l welfare assistanc e wer e provide d b y th e com munities followin g Worl d Wa r II , whe n tie s wer e establishe d wit h sev eral organizations wit h who m contac t had been haphazar d o r nonexisten t previously. Asid e fro m th e AIU , th e organization s activ e i n th e Jewis h milieu include d th e following : th e Mossa d L e c Aliya (from 194 9 to 1952) ; the Jewis h Agenc y fo r Palestine , vi a emissarie s o f th e variou s depart ments; the AJDC (throug h it s Paris office); th e ORT; the OSE; the Zionis t Women's Internationa l Organizatio n (WIZO) ; an d section s o f th e WJC . One o f the result s o f these contact s ha d bee n increase d effort s t o protec t human right s and improv e socia l services. Educationally, i n additio n t o th e man y elementar y rabbini c school s dotting th e urba n an d rura l communities , especiall y i n Jerb a an d Gabe s of th e south—th e center s o f Jewish learning—Jewis h lif e wa s enriche d by th e proliferatio n o f yeshivot. Th e yeshivot's teachin g staff , togethe r with numerou s othe r rabbi s i n leadership positions , wer e ofte n alumn i of Jerba's center s o f intellect . Despit e th e financial problem s encountere d by th e communities , th e leadershi p o f th e latte r occupie d itsel f wit h

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diverse educationa l undertakings , includin g Frenc h educatio n an d mod ern Hebrew . I n Tunis , fo r example , a specia l departmen t o f educatio n functioned, heade d b y Victo r Hauzi . I n 195 2 this departmen t organize d and supervise d da y school s fo r childre n wh o di d no t atten d Frenc h schools, o r wh o attende d Frenc h school s fo r half-day s an d learne d He brew th e othe r half; evening courses i n Hebre w for adults ; schools in th e Tunis suburb s wher e ne w Jewis h communitie s ha d emerge d i n recen t years; assistanc e t o student s i n Tuni s an d Paris ; an d ai d t o th e rabbini c schools. Fo r quit e som e tim e Israel i educator s wer e presen t i n Tunis , among them Eliah u Bohbot , whos e functions include d th e supervisio n o f modern Hebrew. 7 Of a tota l Jewis h schoo l populatio n o f som e 12,50 0 i n Tuni s (1952) , about 4,50 0 frequented Jewis h educationa l center s an d receive d Hebre w education. Afte r Worl d Wa r I I Jewis h student s enrolle d i n Protectorat e schools in great numbers. Th e vast majority o f them receive d n o religiou s education. O f the Jewis h communa l schools , 3 Or Torah i n Tunis wa s th e most important , wit h thre e hundre d student s i n 1952 . Th e AI U person nel provide d secula r educatio n i n thi s particula r schoo l twelv e hour s weekly fo r eac h class . Te n hour s o f Hebre w wer e provided , whil e te n additional hour s wer e allotte d fo r religiou s education . Th e schoo l ha d two principals—on e fo r Frenc h studie s an d anothe r fo r Hebre w an d Judaica.8 Although th e AI U i n Tuni s an d th e res t o f th e countr y wa s no t a s influential a s its Morocca n an d Irania n networks , i n 195 2 it did represen t the onl y Jewis h organizatio n providin g schoolin g fo r ove r 3,00 0 pupils . The AI U receive d a toke n contributio n fro m th e Tuni s communit y o f 100,000 francs, bu t th e larges t subsid y was allocated b y the Protectorate , with man y o f the teacher s bein g recruite d fro m th e Protectorat e admin istration. Th e budge t fo r Hebre w educatio n a t th e AI U wa s covere d i n its entiret y b y th e AJDC . Ther e wer e thre e AI U school s i n Sfa x an d Sousse, non e i n the countryside. 9 Whereas al l Jewish communitie s too k care of their poor through hilluk (the weekly financial aid), the AJDC, i n addition t o its efforts t o subsidiz e major communa l socia l an d educationa l enterprises , offere d loan s a t lo w interest t o Jewis h artisan s an d smal l businessme n fro m 1953 . Sinc e a joint, countrywid e fund-raisin g campaig n wa s blocked b y the federations ' rivalries, th e OSE , ORT , an d No s Petits—th e larges t community-in spired socia l an d educationa l apparatu s fo r youths—justl y initiate d thei r

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own fund-raisin g drives . No s Petits , whic h wa s subsidize d t o a larg e extent b y th e AJDC , fe d 7,00 0 youth s dail y lunche s i n thirt y canteen s throughout Tunisia . Furthermore , abou t 2,50 0 youth s age d eigh t t o fifteen wer e sen t t o summe r camp s b y th e loca l Zionist Yout h Federation , Nos Petits , an d th e Unio n Universell e d e la Jeunesse Juive. 10 Until mid-195 2 the Jews were no t seriousl y affecte d b y political devel opments arisin g fro m th e nationalis t struggl e agains t th e French . I t i s true, a s Bar-Gior a note d i n 1950 , tha t i n severa l souther n village s th e Jews wer e coerce d t o atten d mas s rallie s wher e nationalis t spokesme n attacked Frenc h colonialism , whil e th e Frenc h warne d th e Jew s no t t o collaborate wit h th e nationalists. 11 Yet as late a s January 1952 , ther e ha d only bee n small-scal e pillagin g o f Jewis h store s i n Medenin e an d Kai rouan, an d individua l shop s ha d bee n bombed . However , o n 14 , 15 , an d 16 June group s o f young Muslim s carried ou t a series of attacks on Jewish homes an d propert y i n Tunis . W e hav e n o acces s t o Frenc h officia l archives coverin g thes e specifi c events , bu t a report prepare d b y G . M . Riegner, WJ C politica l representativ e fo r Europe , an d eyewitnes s ac counts she d considerabl e ligh t o n these developments . According t o Riegner , o n 1 4 June Musli m youth s entere d th e Hafsi a section o f the harat al-Yahud i n the vicinit y of the Musli m quarter . The y hurled stone s a t the houses but wer e repulse d b y Jewish youth s who had self-defense trainin g ( a topi c discusse d below) . No t discouraged , the y returned th e sam e da y wit h reinforcement s an d thi s tim e a rio t brok e out. Gendarme s o f the service d'ordre wer e dispatched b y the authoritie s to separat e Musli m an d Jewis h adversaries , fo r i t wa s feared tha t shoul d the Muslim s b e furthe r roused , th e situatio n woul d hav e disastrou s consequences. 12 However, i t wa s precisel y a t tha t stag e tha t a traged y occurred . Th e gendarmes escorte d a group o f Jews fro m th e Hafsi a sectio n t o th e mai n harat al-Yahud, bu t on e youth , Samue l Journo, wh o remained behin d t o rest or fasten hi s sandals, was attacked by a gendarme whose identity wa s not reported b y Riegner. 13 According to eyewitness accounts , Journo was beaten an d the n sho t by the gendarme ; he die d o n his way to hospital. 14 This inciden t cause d considerabl e consternatio n i n th e Jewis h com munity. Jewis h leader s demande d tha t the gendarme b e brought t o trial, and the y requeste d polic e protectio n fo r th e Tuni s community , withi n and beyon d th e harat al-Yahud. Interestingly , th e loca l press , whil e

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1

providing accounts of developments, omitte d an y reference t o the Journ o killing.15 On 1 5 and 1 6 June, Musli m youth s resume d thei r assault s o n Jewis h homes. I n th e ensuin g clashes man y young Jews were wounded. Riegne r noted tha t th e attack s o n thi s occasion , an d perhap s als o thos e o n th e preceding day , wer e sparke d of f b y th e refusa l o f Jewish merchant s t o support a strik e calle d b y divers e nationalis t factions , allegedl y i n re sponse t o a rumo r tha t th e Frenc h ha d attempte d t o poiso n th e bey . Jewish store s remaine d open , an d Ara b youth s first sough t t o pressur e their owners to close them. Unsuccessfu l i n their endeavor, the y resorte d to violence. 16 If, indeed , Riegner' s descriptio n an d assessmen t o f th e event s ar e true, the y reflec t th e basi c positio n o f th e Jew s vis-a-vi s th e French , which differe d entirel y fro m th e Muslims ' attitude . Th e Jew s simpl y di d not participate automaticall y in national protests, a situation no t exclusiv e to Tunisia but equally , i f not more , apparen t i n Morocc o and Algeria . On 1 7 June th e Vieu x Destou r publishe d a communique condemnin g the incident s an d placin g th e blam e o n th e French . Mei r Bellity , a n influential Zionis t leade r an d supporte r o f th e Neo-Destour , receive d visits fro m nationalist s wh o als o held th e Frenc h responsible . Neverthe less, th e attitud e o f both Tunisia n nationalist s an d Frenc h official s wor ried th e Jewis h leadership , particularl y i n vie w o f th e absenc e o f bot h during th e Journo funeral. 17 Were thes e incident s preplanned, organize d attacks ? Were th e nation alists—the Vieu x Destour , an d supporter s o f th e Neo-Destou r an d Zi touna (Islami c institut e fo r highe r learning)—behin d them ? Afte r all, they occurre d a t a tim e whe n full-scale , violen t nationalis t oppositio n erupted throughou t th e country , an d th e Jew s wer e ofte n accuse d o f collaborating wit h th e French . O r wer e th e assault s spontaneou s an d apolitical? A s i n th e cas e o f the Jun e 194 8 pogroms i n Frenc h Morocco , there ar e n o read y answers . Th e WJC , whic h cultivate d tie s with Jewis h leaders, Tunisia n nationalists , an d th e Residency , believe d tha t th e mor e responsible supporter s o f th e Neo-Destou r wer e attemptin g t o cal m tempers an d dissociat e themselve s fro m thos e who migh t hav e organize d the attacks . Th e WJ C positio n wa s tha t 8 0 t o 8 5 percent o f th e Musli m urban an d rura l population supporte d th e Neo-Destour ; th e latte r sough t to enlist internationa l publi c opinion , includin g th e suppor t o f influentia l

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American Jews , an d consequentl y coul d no t hav e encourage d o r orga nized action s tha t woul d b e detrimenta l t o thei r cause. 18 I t i s no t clea r whether th e sam e coul d b e sai d for th e Vieu x Destou r o r th e Zitounists . We hav e no evidence t o support th e Neo-Destour' s clai m that "extremis t nationalist elements " incite d b y th e ^ulama* (religiou s elite ) an d Zitoun ists wer e probabl y responsibl e fo r th e events . Th e pro-Frenc h cultura l inclination o f a growing portion o f urban Jewr y was doubtless a contributing facto r t o increase d Musli m disenchantmen t wit h th e Jews . Thi s atti tude wa s also , i n som e cases , accompanie d b y a t leas t a theoretica l inclination t o suppor t Zionis m b y segment s o f the Jewish populatio n an d by severa l o f their leaders . Prior t o the event s o f 14-16 June, th e first Nort h Africa n WJ C confer ence convene d i n Algier s o n 7-1 0 June , an d Maitr e Charle s Haddad , president o f th e Jewis h communit y o f Tunis , asserte d tha t bot h th e French Residenc y an d th e nationalist s sough t t o wi n th e suppor t o f th e Jews. This , h e added , pose d a dilemma , fo r th e Jew s wer e strongl y attached t o France , th e sourc e o f thei r cultura l inspiratio n an d politica l emancipation, an d ye t the y wer e oblige d t o emerg e a s mediator s an d encourage a trait d'union (comin g together , literally hyphen ) betwee n Muslims an d Frenchme n i n th e wak e o f th e ensuin g conflict . Thi s lin e was i n th e bes t interes t o f Tunisian Jewr y becaus e th e nationalist s sus pected the m o f collaboratio n wit h th e French , an d Musli m boycott s o f French firms sometime s als o include d Jewis h businesses . O n th e othe r hand, Hadda d criticize d th e Jewis h Agenc y fo r no t doin g enough , throug h its Tuni s office , t o organiz e th e emigratio n t o Israe l o f Jew s fro m th e towns an d village s o f souther n Tunisia . H e commente d tha t mos t Jew s had decide d t o leav e Tunisia , Israe l bein g thei r mai n destination . Som e wished t o leav e immediatel y whil e other s preferre d th e "wai t an d see " alternative. 19 During th e WJ C conference , Andr e Narboni , th e WJ C Algerian dele gate, pose d th e Tunisia n delegatio n a delicat e questio n regardin g th e Jewish leadership s positio n o n continue d Frenc h sovereignt y ove r Tuni sia. Hadda d observe d tha t th e Frenc h presenc e wa s imperativ e bu t emphasized tha t thi s view , share d b y mos t Tunisian Jews , ha d t o remai n confidential. Mathie u Ganem , o f the Tunisian WJ C delegation, wa s mor e blunt. H e feare d tha t France' s positio n i n Nort h Afric a ha d bee n weak ened i n recen t years . Frenc h politica l concession s t o th e nationalist s

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would b e harmfu l t o Tunisia n Jewry . Th e onl y solutio n wa s emigration , which would be stimulate d b y the WJC. 20 Elie Nataf , forme r presiden t o f th e Tuni s Jewis h communit y an d a member o f th e WJ C delegation , describe d th e dilemm a o f Tunisia n Jewry i n term s tha t coul d b e applie d t o othe r Nort h Africa n Jewis h communities i n th e transitio n fro m Frenc h colonialis m t o Arab indepen dence. H e explaine d tha t th e Jews, onc e recognize d b y the Muslim s an d the European s a s a n element dequilibre i n trad e an d commerce , wer e losing their importance . Thoug h the y wer e no t i n physical danger , Nata f mentioned tha t th e Jewis h leadershi p ha d foun d i t necessar y t o creat e a vigilance committee , maintainin g contact s wit h th e communitie s i n th e interior an d th e south . Moreover , h e added , th e Jew s wer e comin g under increasin g pressur e fro m th e Muslim s an d th e Frenc h t o tak e sides. Whe n th e Jew s i n th e smalle r communitie s wer e compelle d t o close thei r businesse s a s a n expressio n o f solidarit y agains t th e French , the latte r would orde r the m t o keep thei r store s open. 21 In hi s closin g remarks , Nata f expresse d specia l concer n abou t th e increase i n anti-Semiti c propagand a relatin g t o Tunisia , whic h ha d bee n attributed t o metropolita n journal s suc h a s France, Reelle, Rivarol, an d Aspects de la France, a s well as to Europea n colonist s i n Tunisia. Wherea s Muslim element s accuse d th e Jew s o f collaborating wit h th e Residency , Frenchmen an d othe r European s describe d the m a s deserter s wh o in creasingly backe d th e Neo-Destour. 22 A challeng e t o th e Jews ' neutrality , questionin g thei r loyalty , wa s presented o n 1 2 August 1952 . O n tha t da y the be y aske d fort y represen tatives o f various politica l partie s an d interes t groups , amon g the m Maitr e Albert Bessi s an d Maitr e Charle s Haddad , t o submi t recommendation s concerning th e amende d refor m pla n propose d b y Resident-Genera l d e Hauteclocque. Th e plan called for a gradual transfer t o Tunisian minister s of al l portfolio s asid e fro m foreig n affairs , police , military , an d finance; the holdin g of municipal election s an d th e creatio n o f an electe d nationa l legislature followin g a five-year transition ; an d reductio n i n th e powe r o f the Residency. 23 The Frenc h insiste d o n its immediate acceptance. 24 The fort y representative s electe d a committe e o f twelv e includin g Bessis an d Haddad . Th e bey , doubtles s unde r nationalis t pressure , sug gested t o th e committe e tha t th e Frenc h refor m pla n woul d imped e progress towar d greate r Tunisia n sovereignty . Thi s suggestio n place d

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Haddad especiall y i n a delicat e position , sinc e hi s view s woul d suppos edly reflect th e position o f the entir e Jewish community . Haddad brough t th e issu e befor e th e ten-membe r Jewis h communit y council o f Tunis and , accordin g t o Mauric e Fischer , Israel s ambassado r to France , h e submitte d th e followin g respons e t o th e bey : wherea s th e Jews o f Tunisi a pledge d ful l suppor t fo r th e multipl e demand s o f th e Tunisian people , th e proposal s offere d b y th e Frenc h ha d t o serv e a s a basis fo r Franco-Tunisia n negotiations. 25 Onc e again , an y stan d adopte d by th e Jew s placed the m i n a precarious position . I f they backe d th e be y and the nationalists, th e latter would probably have publicized thi s stanc e for propagand a purposes , an d th e Frenc h woul d b e alienated . O n th e other hand , thei r suppor t fo r Frenc h proposals , a t leas t a s a basi s fo r negotiations, woul d antagoniz e th e nationalists . As politica l unres t becam e widesprea d i n 1953-54 , particularl y pre ceding Mendes-France s autonom y declaratio n i n Tunis o n 3 1 July 1954 , what wer e th e reaction s amon g th e Jews ? Di d the y seriousl y conside r large-scale departur e fo r Israe l or France ? Was there genera l panic ? Despite certai n fears, 26 and increased emigratio n t o Israel in 1955-56 , a genuin e psychose d'affolement (psychosi s o f panic ) wa s no t evident . Furthermore, th e efflu x o f Jews graduall y abate d followin g th e grantin g of full independence . Th e Tunisian authorities , fo r thei r part , attempte d to dispe l an y notion s regardin g futur e discriminator y policies , an d Pre mier Taha r Ben-Amma r informe d Mauric e Perlzwei g o f th e WJ C tha t "we hav e alway s maintaine d th e bes t relation s wit h th e Jews , an d ther e will b e n o roo m fo r an y sor t o f socia l discriminatio n i n autonomou s Tunisia. Th e Jew s will enjo y al l right s lik e an y othe r citizen." 27 Ben Ammar pledge d tha t a Je w woul d b e include d i n th e ne w cabinet , a promise whic h wa s kep t followin g th e Franco-Tunisia n autonom y accor d of 3 Jun e 1955 , whe n Maitr e Alber t Bessi s wa s appointe d ministe r o f reconstruction an d planning . Bessi s considere d hi s appointmen t a s "a n affirmation o f th e permanen t friendshi p o f al l autochtonou s element s i n the country , whic h shoul d eliminat e th e fear s o f thos e wh o expresse d some apprehension abou t Tunisian Jewry' s future." 28 Maitre Bessis' s observation reflecte d th e view of other member s o f the French-educated elit e concernin g th e futur e o f th e Tunisia n communi ties during the interval between autonom y an d full independence . Alber t Memmi's opinion s ar e especiall y revealin g and , t o a n extent , retrospec tively accurate. I n Decembe r 195 5 he wrote :

Tunisia s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry 26

5

The moderat e nationalist s ar e makin g a rea l effor t towar d a rapprochemen t [between Muslim s an d Jews ] fo r th e followin g ver y goo d reasons : (1 ) the y nee d the suppor t o f worl d publi c opinion ; (2 ) wit h 500,00 0 t o 600,00 0 unemployed , Tunisia finds itsel f i n a difficult positio n economicall y an d need s th e presenc e o f the Jew s i n th e libera l profession s a t leas t fo r decades ; (3 ) Jews ca n suppl y th e skeleton staf f for the new administration; (4 ) despite interna l difficulties, th e Neo Destour i s sincerel y tryin g t o establis h a lay democrati c state . I n suc h a setting , Jews normall y hav e a place. Unti l no w ther e wa s n o la y Ara b stat e i n existence . Tunisia would becom e a pilot experiment. 29 However, Jewis h integratio n i n a n independen t Tunisi a woul d no t b e so simple . Educate d a t AI U an d Protectorat e schools , Jewis h profession als largel y lacke d adequat e knowledg e o f Arabi c which , sinc e 1955 , b e came th e officia l languag e o f th e court s an d administration . No t al l Jew s adapted t o Arabizatio n and , wit h th e passag e o f time , durin g th e 1960 s and 1970s , wer e replace d b y Muslim s i n th e libera l profession s an d civi l service. Most source s corroborat e tha t man y Jew s los t thei r position s a s busi ness an d trad e intermediaries , commerc e havin g becom e increasingl y the privileg e o f a Musli m caste . Consequently , the y directe d thei r effort s toward th e creativ e profession s an d scientifi c careers, 3 0 whil e segment s of th e Jewis h populatio n continue d t o d e p a r t — t h o u g h o n a smalle r scal e than i n 1955-56—fo r Israe l an d France. 3 1

The Jewish Agency, the State of Israel, and Tunisian Jewry, 1948-1956 Emigration t o Israe l fro m 1947-48 , a highl y comple x issue , wa s a n increasingly relevan t optio n fo r th e Jew s o f Tunisi a a s th e struggl e fo r independence gaine d m o m e n t u m an d th e Jewis h predicamen t becam e more acute . Base d o n availabl e data , som e Tunisia n Jews—lik e thei r Moroccan counterparts—emigrate d t o Israe l illegall y i n 1947-4 8 vi a Algeria an d France . Fro m th e en d o f 194 8 o r th e beginnin g o f 1949 , th e Mossad L e c Aliya was allowe d b y th e Frenc h authoritie s t o operat e ou t o f Tunisia i n organizin g emigratio n discreetly , b u t no t altogethe r legally . I n 1948-49, 6,20 0 Tunisia n Jew s lef t fo r Israe l (doubtles s a n exaggerate d figure); i n 1950 , 3,72 5 emigrate d whil e i n 1951 , 3,41 4 departed ; i n 195 2 and 1953 , th e emigratio n figure s wer e 2,54 8 an d 606 , respectively. 3 2 I n

266 Tunisia's

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Table 16 . c Aliya fro m Tunisia , Januar y 1954-Octobe r 195 7 January February March April May June July August September October November December Total

1954

J955

1956

1957

64 52 83 93 7 65 122 231 287 487 606 555

317 219 145 317 452 523 307 671 841 782 536 994

57 115 333 136 304 502 260 205 260 190 — —

2,651

6,104

366 329 313 291 442 552 408 1,332 762 1,273 378 99 6,545

2,362

Source: CZA , S6/235 , Hebrew.

1954, 2,65 1 Jew s lef t fo r Israe l wherea s th e figures fo r 1955 , 1956 , an d 1957 were : 6,104 , 6,545 , an d 2,36 2 (se e tabl e 1 6 for th e precis e break down durin g 1954-57) . When the y fled Tunisi a i n 1947-48 , th e Jew s were assiste d locall y b y a Zionis t underground . Wherea s i n Morocc o th e head s o f th e under ground wer e Sa m Abotbo l an d Eli e Ohayon , affiliate d wit h th e Charle s Netter Association , i n Tunisi a th e leader s o f Tseire-Tsiyon/Dro r orga nized th e escape . Amon g the m wer e Nadi a Cohen-Franco , 3 Ilan Hajaj , Moshe c Amar, 3 Ilan Baranes , an d Shoshan a an d Mei r c Idan. Th e latte r also operated i n Algeria to assist th e Israel i emissarie s i n maintainin g th e transit center s an d attendin g t o the emigrants . With c aliya tolerate d b y th e Frenc h durin g th e secon d hal f of 1948, a special offic e t o proces s emigrant s wa s opene d i n Tuni s o n 1 2 Rue Sid i Sifiane. I t wa s manage d initiall y b y Dr . Leopol d Baretvas , a dermatolo gist o f Hungaria n origi n who , durin g th e Germa n occupatio n o f Tunis , served a s a n interprete r fro m Germa n t o Frenc h o n matter s pertainin g to Jewis h affairs . H e late r acte d a s th e chie f physicia n authorize d b y Israel to administer th e medica l examinations for th e emigrants . Anothe r important personalit y responsibl e fo r th e creatio n an d maintenanc e o f the ne w c aliya offic e wa s Elie-Eugen e Guetta , a n attorne y fro m Tunis . He replace d Baretva s a s th e c aliya representative , enjoyin g th e titl e o f Chief c Aliya Office r (ktsin c aliya). H e served in this capacity until 1951. 33

Tunisia's Struggle and Tunisian Jewry 26

7

By 1949 , however , Guetta' s titl e becam e meaningless . I n fact , th e Mossad L e c Aliya, i n whos e nam e Baretva s an d Guett a manage d th e c aliya office , decide d t o dispatc h a t th e tim e a n Israel i emissar y t o over see emigration . Thi s diminishe d significantl y th e statu s o f thes e com munal Zionis t personalities . Thus , whe n Nahu m Dwinge r arrive d fro m Israel t o hea d th e office , Guetta' s function s becam e superfluou s an d honorific. Dwinge r consolidate d hi s authorit y ove r th e c aliya, develope d several emigratio n branche s i n other communities , an d injecte d stimulu s to the existin g c aliya commissions . H e remaine d i n hi s post unti l 1953 — first a s representativ e o f th e Mossa d L e c Aliya (1949-50) , the n a s chie f emissary o f th e Jewis h Agency' s Immigratio n Departmen t (1950-53 ) onc e the Mossa d L e c Aliya was n o longe r responsibl e fo r Tunisia. 34 Hi s mai n assistants i n Tuni s wer e prominen t communit y leader s an d Zionist s suc h as Elie Nataf , Alber t Bessis , Serg e Moatti , Pau l Ghez , Dr . Leo n Moatti , Rene Cohen-Hadria , an d Sauveu r Baranes , the n th e loca l JN F presi dent. 35 Added t o hi s rol e a s JNF presiden t i n charg e o f Zionist fund-raising , Sauveur Barane s heade d Tunisia' s centra l c aliya commission . Jus t a s similar organization s i n Frenc h Morocc o assiste d Cadima , i n Tunisia th e commission—representing delegate s fro m differen t communities — emerged a s indispensabl e auxiliarie s fo r th e emissaries . Th e Tunisia n commission wa s compose d o f delegates fro m th e Zionis t bodies : Tseire Tsiyon, Atereth-Tsiyo n (Jerba) , th e Revisionists, Tora h ve- cAvoda (linke d to ha-P o c el ha-Mizrahi) , an d 'Ohave-Tsiyon . Th e commissio n helpe d i n predetermining whic h emigrant s wer e eligibl e fo r emigratio n an d int o which type s of settlements the y shoul d b e absorbed. 36 In 1949-50 , th e c aliya apparatu s wa s prepared t o dea l efficientl y wit h the emigratio n proces s o f urbanit e Jews . However , a s i n Morocco , th e obstacles wit h emigratio n existe d mostl y i n th e south . Sinc e the facilitie s for screenin g th e emigrant s wer e unavailabl e there , c aliya candidate s from th e smal l town s an d village s woul d b e instructe d t o underg o th e medical examination s i n Tunis . Th e distributio n o f passport s fo r south erners an d northerner s alik e wa s carrie d ou t i n Tunis . Th e Mossa d L e c Aliya worke d ou t a n unofficia l arrangemen t wit h th e Protectorat e i n order t o facilitat e th e issuanc e o f passports an d visas . Eventually , whe n these document s were issued i n other locations where Arab officials wer e in charge, Dwinge r and his successors encountered fe w difficulties, workin g out mutuall y agreeabl e arrangement s wit h them . Onc e th e emigrant s

268 Tunisia's

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arrived i n Marseilles , the y underwen t furthe r medica l test s whil e i n transit. 37 Political conflict s betwee n Dwinge r an d loca l Zionists , includin g th e Federation Sionist e d e Tunisie , flared u p ove r thos e emigrant s specifi cally chosen for resettlement i n Israel's moshavim an d kibbutzim. Severa l local Zionist s affiliate d wit h Tora h ve- cAvoda, amon g the m Guetta , in sisted tha t preferenc e b e give n t o religiou s settlements . O n th e othe r hand, Dwinger , wh o belonge d t o Mapai , wa s determine d t o enlis t a s many youn g emigrant s fo r hi s movement' s moshavim an d kibbutzim a s possible.38 As the numbe r o f Israeli emissarie s increase d an d the y repre sented divers e partie s an d movements , th e conflic t wa s n o longe r con fined t o Dwinger an d local Zionists, but t o quarrels amon g the emissarie s themselves. According t o Dwinger , o f th e nearl y 8,00 0 Tunisian Jew s wh o mad e c aliya betwee n 194 8 and Marc h 1950 , mos t wer e poor , wit h 3,00 0 arriv ing fro m th e south. 39 Whil e th e emigrant s fro m acros s th e countr y wer e brought t o Tunis from wher e the y saile d t o Marseilles , th e Jewis h Agen cy's Immigratio n Departmen t i n Pari s informe d Dwinge r i n Jun e 195 0 about a pla n t o transpor t emigrant s fro m Tunisi a vi a Tripoli , Libya , t o Italy. Wherea s emigrant s from th e majo r urba n communitie s o f the nort h would continue t o depart from Tuni s and reach Israe l through Marseilles , Jews fro m remot e souther n communitie s clos e t o th e Libya n borde r could leav e by crossing into Libya. Considerin g that a British administra tion wa s stil l i n charg e ove r Libya , Dwinge r receive d instruction s t o make every effor t i n accomplishing this task with the assistance of Helen e Cazes-Benatar, th e AJD C directo r fo r Nort h Afric a an d Dr . Vardi , th e head o f the c aliya offic e i n Tripoli. 40 Dwinger wa s skeptica l abou t adoptin g a second c aliya route. H e quote d Vardi wh o sai d tha t Liby a unde r th e Britis h woul d no t allo w Tunisia n emigrants t o pas s throug h thei r territory . Besides , Dwinge r argued , Libya wa s o n th e brin k o f nationa l independence , a developmen t tha t would automaticall y pu t a n en d t o thi s option . H e di d no t think , more over, tha t Tunisia's Frenc h resident-genera l an d th e Protectorat e admin istration coul d suppor t th e plan . The y alread y tolerate d c aliya vi a Tunis, much t o th e dissatisfactio n o f th e Muslims . Approvin g a ne w optio n would further alienat e anti-Frenc h force s o n both side s of the border. 41 The pla n wa s neve r initiated . Furthermore , Liby a becam e a n inde pendent stat e i n 1951 . Ironically , Israe l vote d a t th e Unite d Nation s i n

Tunisia s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry 26

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favor o f Libya n sovereignty ; i t wa s thi s vot e tha t mad e th e difference . The Libyan s responde d i n kin d b y closin g th e c aliya offic e i n Tripoli. 4 2 Similar t o Khaklai s argumen t ove r Morocco , Dwinge r urge d th e Mos sad L e c Aliya an d th e Jewis h Agenc y t o evacuat e a s man y Jew s fro m th e south a s possible. H e disclose d tha t severa l thousan d Jew s wer e scattere d in Ara b villages , sometime s onl y a fe w dozens , i n area s wher e ten s o f thousands o f Muslim s dwelt . I n isolate d an d remot e region s securit y wa s confined t o on e Frenc h arm y office r an d a reduce d forc e o f Tunisia n policemen. Wha t mad e matter s worse , th e loca l Frenc h official s wer e hardly wel l dispose d towar d th e Jew s an d Tunisia n nationalis t sentiment s were rising . Dwinge r di d no t thin k tha t th e Neo-Destour' s Bourguiba , having recentl y returne d t o Tunisia , wa s particularl y sympatheti c t o Jewish aspiration s an d sensitivities . H e note d tha t Jewis h wome n i n th e south wer e rape d an d youn g girl s kidnappe d b y Muslims . I f th e Jewis h Agency faile d t o rescu e th e souther n Jews , th e latte r migh t b e massa cred. I t wa s therefor e logica l fo r Israe l t o impos e stringen t healt h criteri a for emigratio n candidate s i n th e safe r urba n areas ; bu t th e sam e coul d n o longer appl y t o th e villages. 4 3 Like Halev y an d Khakla i i n Morocc o o r Eliah u Brakh a o f th e Mossa d Le Aliya i n Egypt , Dwinge r ofte n oppose d th e limite d monthl y c aliya quotas. Writin g i n Marc h 195 1 t o Chai m 3 Ofek, th e representativ e o f th e Jewish Agency' s Immigratio n D e p a r t m e n t i n Paris , h e wa s bot h adaman t and cynica l abou t th e policie s tha t originate d i n Jerusalem : c

I a m lik e tha t Je w wh o laugh s becaus e h e ca n n o longe r cry . M y dea r Chaim , i t is enough i f I tell you tha t i n Tunis an d othe r urba n area s alone I have mor e tha n 3,000 familie s registere d fo r immediat e * allya. I n orde r t o satisf y thos e fro m Tunis wh o wis h t o emigrat e I nee d a quot a o f 1,00 0 person s pe r month . O f course, I a m no t askin g th e impossible . O n th e othe r hand , yo u als o canno t as k for the impossible . Yo u instructed m e to maintain a monthly quot a of 150 persons including fifty wit h Yout h c Aliya an d fift y fo r th e moshavim. . . . S o what's left fo r the c aliya o f ordinar y Jew s wh o hav e bee n registere d severa l month s t o a year ? And wha t abou t th e preferenc e give n t o Jews i n th e sout h whos e live s ar e trul y in danger? 44 Rarely di d th e Jewis h Agenc y o r th e Coordinatin g Commissio n i n Israe l reverse it s policie s o n quota s befor e 1954 . Dwinger woul d periodicall y visi t th e village s i n th e sout h fo r severa l weeks a t a time . I n 1952 , h e trie d t o convinc e hi s superior s i n Israe l an d

270 Tunisia's

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France t o embrac e a n evacuatio n pla n o f eigh t hundre d souther n Jew s on a monthly basis. Ye t all pleas were i n vain. A t the sam e time, i n shar p contrast t o th e perio d 1947-51 , th e urba n Jew s o f the earl y 1950 s wer e less enthusiastic abou t c aliya.45 Small-scale achievement s i n th e sout h wer e registere d i n Dwinger s favor, however . Fo r example , i n Jun e 195 2 he evacuate d Jew s fro m tw o tiny village s nea r Gabes . Instea d o f administering th e medica l an d socia l criteria examination s i n Tunis , h e brough t th e villager s t o Gabes . Th e medical/social criteria were quit e stringen t a t the time , an d the screenin g policies adopted i n Jerusalem o n 27 November 195 1 (discussed in chapte r 4) ha d t o b e enforced . Severa l familie s wer e rejecte d fo r c aliya an d remained i n Gabes . Th e eligibl e familie s wen t t o Tuni s where , prio r t o departure fo r Marseilles , the y underwen t furthe r medica l examina tions. 46 It becomes apparent , however , tha t certain inconsistencie s dominate d Dwinger's outloo k o n c aliya. Thoug h h e consistentl y favore d givin g pref erence t o emigratio n fro m th e sout h an d di d no t thin k urba n Jew s wer e particularly vulnerable , hi s justifications fo r th e souther n emigratio n ar e confusing. Wherea s i n 1950-5 1 h e spok e o f th e physical dangers con fronting th e Jew s i n connectio n wit h th e nationalis t struggle , i n 195 2 h e asserted tha t ther e wer e n o physica l danger s s o lon g a s th e Frenc h dominated Tunisia . Dwinge r no w maintaine d tha t Jewis h existenc e i n the sout h wa s threatene d economically. Thus , i n orde r t o avoi d havin g the Jew s becom e impoverished , i t woul d b e bette r t o evacuat e a s man y Jewish familie s a s possibl e wit h th e sol e exceptio n o f hard-cor e "socia l "47

cases. In 1953 , Dwinge r ende d hi s missio n t o Tunisia. Th e yea r wa s unpro ductive, a s c aliya di d no t excee d 60 6 people . Seriou s evacuatio n pro cesses fro m th e sout h wer e onl y contemplate d i n Israe l durin g th e mid 1950s. An d urba n emigratio n wa s limited du e t o the decisio n o f the Jew s —as wa s th e cas e i n Morocc o o f 1952-53—t o dela y departure s indefi nitely. Tha t yea r Dwinge r wa s replace d b y Shmue l Markuse , a n em ployee o f Israel' s Ministr y fo r Foreig n Affair s an d a forme r consu l t o Prague, wh o directe d th e emigratio n unti l th e summe r o f 1957 . I t wa s also i n 195 3 tha t th e mai n apparatu s wa s transferre d withi n Tuni s fro m 12 Rue Sid i Sifiane t o 1 8 Rue d e Metz . During Markuse s tenure , al l Jewish Agenc y program s wer e pursue d

Tunisia's Struggle and Tunisian Jewry 27

1

in conjunctio n wit h hi s offic e an d unde r hi s supervision . Wherea s i n Morocco o f th e pre-195 6 perio d eac h Jewis h Agenc y departmen t func tioned independentl y withi n a decentralized system , an d a similar polic y existed unde r Dwinger , Markuse s determinatio n t o centraliz e receive d the blessing s o f Jerusale m an d minimize d th e conflict s betwee n th e various department s whic h i n th e pas t hindere d Zionis t efforts . Th e number o f c aliya emissarie s increased , includin g fo r th e south , an d th e c aliya facilities i n Sfa x and Souss e were expanded . In orde r t o asses s th e exten t o f the competitio n o f the Israel i politica l parties ove r c aliya, i t i s noteworth y tha t unti l 195 6 o r 1957 , souther n Tunisia an d Jerb a wer e considere d sphere s o f influence o f envoys repre senting the religious currents o f Mizrahi, ha-P o c el ha-Mizrahi, an d Tora h ve-cAvoda; th e cente r (fo r exampl e Sfa x an d Enfidaville ) fel l unde r th e influence o f Mapa i a s wel l a s th e representative s o f th e moshavim; th e north wa s th e domai n o f the Progressiv e Zionis t party , whil e Tunis , th e capital, was open territor y to the various political movements an d parties, although th e c aliya offic e o n th e Ru e d e Met z wa s dominate d b y mem bers o f Mapai. 48 In 1953-54 , th e averag e numbe r o f childre n pe r famil y varie d be tween fou r an d six , onl y rarely ther e bein g larg e families o f ten t o twelv e children. A s i n Morocco , th e Jewis h populatio n i n Tunisi a wa s young : infants an d youn g peopl e u p t o ag e ninetee n mad e u p 4 4 percent o f th e population; person s age d twent y t o forty-nine constitute d 40. 8 percent o f the total ; an d thos e fifty year s o f ag e an d olde r amounte d t o 14. 9 per cent. 49 Th e Jewis h populatio n i n th e south , th e mos t sough t afte r b y Markuse fo r c aliya, surpasse d 10,00 0 a t th e beginnin g o f 1954 . Th e statistical breakdown b y communities i s shown i n table 17 . As already note d i n chapter 4 , Shraga i visited Tunisi a an d Morocc o i n May-June 1954 . Thoug h convince d tha t th e Jew s o f Tunis , Sfax , an d Sousse were saf e i n spit e o f the nationalis t struggle , Shraga i though t tha t the situatio n i n th e Tunisia n village s was worse tha n i n thos e o f Morocc o or Algeria. H e claimed tha t one of the reason s for the danger i n the sout h was becaus e Ara b Leagu e agents , a s man y a s 3,000 , ha d bee n activ e there durin g th e first hal f o f 1954 . Whe n Sharet t challenge d thi s "exag gerated figure" a t a Coordinating Commissio n meeting , Shraga i retorte d that th e Frenc h ha d informe d hi m abou t thi s problem , recommendin g that th e Jewis h Agenc y evacuat e mos t o f th e souther n Jews—firs t t o

272 Tunisia

s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry Table 17 . Th e Jewis h Populatio n o f Southern Tunisia , 195 4 Town or Village Jewish Gabes Gafsa Talmat Sidi Kuzi r Timzert Metlaoui Gafta Tozeur Moknine Al-Hamma Kebili Mongerraran Tatouine Zarzis

Jerba:

Hara Kabir a Hara Saghir a Total

Population 3,500 500 50 70 60 40 30 50 450 150 350 450 500 1,150 2,000 950 10,300

Source: S . Batish , Repor t o n M y Visi t t o Nort h Afric a [beginning of 1954], ISA , F M 2388/13 , Hebrew .

Tunis an d the n Israel . The y expresse d thei r willingnes s t o assis t i n th e process, especiall y i n villages where four t o five hundred vulnerabl e Jew s dwelt amon g 40,000 Muslims. 50 Shragai was not the only influential perso n t o advocate increased c aliya from souther n Tunisia . Jewis h leader s an d th e Israel i emissarie s ha d urged th e Coordinatin g Commissio n t o do s o since th e earl y 1950s . On e should no t forge t tha t mos t o f thes e pleas , includin g Shragai's , wer e made prio r t o Mendes-France' s announcemen t i n Jul y 195 4 concernin g autonomy. Th e ceaseles s demand s b y Tunisia n Jewis h leaders , Zionist s and non-Zionists , fo r swifte r actio n i n thi s matte r wer e ofte n du e t o reasons beyon d Zionis t o r mora l convictions . Som e di d no t envisag e th e possibility o f settling i n Israel , bu t sough t t o have th e Jew s o f the south , the poore r socioeconomi c strata , emigrat e t o Israel , i n orde r t o reliev e themselves o f th e responsibilitie s o f attendin g t o thes e communities . According t o Markuse , an d simila r t o Shragai' s findings, official s o f th e French Residenc y als o indicate d tha t th e continue d presenc e o f Jews i n

Tunisia s Struggle and Tunisian Jewry 27

3

the village s constitute d a securit y burde n fo r them , an d the y suggeste d that th e Jewis h Agenc y shoul d d o th e utmos t t o evacuat e them . O n th e other hand , Markus e (unlik e Shragai ) adde d tha t th e positio n o f th e French securit y official s wa s completel y differen t fro m tha t hel d b y th e Residency whic h sa w the situatio n i n anothe r light . Th e latte r urge d th e Jewish Agenc y no t t o engag e i n immediat e large-scal e evacuation. 51 W e did no t fin d evidenc e i n th e Frenc h Protectorat e archive s corroboratin g Markuse's argument , an d ar e unabl e t o determine it s accuracy . In a repor t date d thre e week s befor e Mendes-Franc e mad e hi s deci sive announcement , Markus e expresse d th e belie f tha t physica l dange r was imminen t i n th e town s an d village s o f the south , mainl y thos e nea r the borde r wit h Libya . I n vie w o f th e increase d activit y o f th e rura l fighters, Charle s Hadda d an d Mei r Bellit y i n Tunis were pressin g him t o evacuate thes e communitie s immediately. 52 Indeed , eve n i f b y 195 4 violence ha d sprea d t o the street s o f Tunis, i t was in the sout h tha t Jews, like Muslims , wer e vulnerabl e t o th e whim s o f these rura l fighters wh o pressured the m t o demonstrat e solidarit y agains t th e Frenc h an d ex torted mone y from man y artisans t o finance thei r struggle. 53 Given thes e trends , Markus e prevaile d o n Y a c akov Tsur , Israel s ambassador t o France , eve n t o consider a daring rescu e operatio n i n th e south. Wherea s th e severel y handicappe d an d sic k would b e lef t behin d to be care d fo r b y th e communa l federation s an d th e AJD C i n th e majo r cities, th e majorit y ha d t o leav e immediately : " I believ e w e ar e con fronted wit h th e proble m o f an immediat e rescu e operatio n an d w e mus t find ways of bringing [th e Jews of the south ] to Israel before i t is too late. The fac t tha t th e Jew s i n th e sout h hav e no t ye t bee n slaughtere d doe s not mea n tha t emigratio n i s not urgent ; w e have t o learn fro m th e error s of the past an d no t t o repeat them." 54 However, i n tun e wit h th e Coordinatin g Commission s findings an d his predecessor s views , whe n surveyin g th e urba n Jewis h populatio n Markuse favore d th e applicatio n o f mor e o r les s stric t selectio n criteria , medical an d social , t o avert th e possibilit y o f emigration trend s involvin g only th e lowe r socioeconomi c strata . Sinc e th e securit y problem s o f th e Jews i n area s lik e Tuni s wer e no t a s acute a s thos e i n th e villages , ther e was no need a s yet t o speak o f large-scale o r rescue emigration. 55 Undoubtedly, ther e ar e man y ambiguitie s surroundin g Markuse . Wa s he consisten t i n hi s suppor t o f priority t o souther n Jew s after Jul y 1954 , once autonom y fo r Tunisi a wa s o n th e agenda ? Afte r all , h e note d tha t

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during the firs t hal f of 1955, 7 0 percent o f the Jews registered fo r emigra tion wer e urbanites, 56 a statement i n contradictio n t o his letter s t o Tsur . We d o kno w tha t hi s (an d Shragai's ) recommendatio n fo r evacuatio n i n the sout h i n 195 4 was seriousl y considere d i n Israe l an d partiall y imple mented. Bu t i t doe s no t appea r tha t a vast rescu e operatio n emerge d a s the outcome. 57 Di d th e shar p increas e i n urban emigratio n continu e throughout 195 5 an d 1956 ? Wer e familie s tha t migrate d t o Tuni s fro m the sout h an d othe r region s classifie d a s urbanites ? We lac k answer s t o thes e questions . Yet , b e tha t a s it may , th e majo r development i s clear: durin g 1955-5 6 Jewish emigratio n in general fro m Tunisia increased thoug h no t o n a very larg e scal e and , a s noted , no t i n an atmospher e o f panic. Wherea s 16,49 3 emigrate d t o Israe l durin g th e six-year period betwee n 194 8 and 1953 , 15,30 0 arrived durin g th e three year perio d betwee n 195 4 and 1956 . Th e increas e wa s partl y du e t o th e cooperation o f the French. 58 I n additio n t o the Tunisia-Marseille s route , Markuse supervise d th e departur e vi a Naples, a n alternate route , begin ning in Novembe r 1955. 59 However sporadi c an d inefficientl y managed , c Aliyat ha-N o c ar i n Tunisia i s nonetheles s partiall y consequentia l an d worth y o f attention — particularly give n certai n tragi c developments . c Aliyat ha-N o c ar bega n it s wor k i n Tunisi a i n mid-1947 , whe n thre e hundred Tunisia n Jew s lef t illegall y fo r Israe l vi a Algeri a an d saile d i n the ship s Yehuda Halevy an d Shivat Tsiyon. Amon g the ships ' passengers were numerou s youth s wh o were place d unde r th e car e o f c Aliyat ha-N o c ar. Towar d th e en d o f 194 8 o r beginnin g i n 1949 , c Aliyat ha-N o c ar opened a n offic e i n Tuni s heade d b y Lydi e Gozlan—a n Algeria n Jewis h woman carrying a French passport . Togethe r with local assistants, Gozla n organized branche s o f th e organizatio n i n severa l ke y citie s a s wel l a s transportation facilities , wit h Dwinger' s help , t o c Aliyat ha-No c ar's hachshara an d medica l treatmen t center s i n Europe . Betwee n th e en d o f 1948 and Apri l 1950 , 250 youths wer e sen t t o these center s prio r t o thei r resettlement i n Israel. 60 As i n Morocco , larg e Tunisia n Jewis h families , tha t wer e financially desperate, expresse d willingnes s t o confin e thei r childre n t o c Aliyat ha No c ar. I n man y instance s th e parents were separate d fro m thei r childre n for tw o year s unti l the y themselve s mad e c aliya. Orphan s als o swelle d the rank s o f youth c aliya. Gozla n preferre d t o sen d t o c Aliyat ha-No c ar's homes i n Europ e youth s wh o ha d reache d th e ag e o f thirteen . N o on e

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over fifteen coul d b e recruited . Othe r youth s lef t Tunisi a wit h thei r parents throug h th e regula r c aliya apparatus , o r wit h th e ai d o f th e Zionist pioneer movements. 61 Starting i n 1949-50 , c Aliyat ha-N o c ar sen t it s childre n fo r medica l treatment and/o r hachshara t o France , mainl y t o Cambou s an d Vill a Gaby. Thei r sta y i n Franc e usuall y laste d si x months . Bu t unti l th e beginning o f 1950 , childre n fro m Tunisia , especiall y unhealth y ones , were als o sen t t o Oslo , Norway , fo r pre- caliya treatment . c Aliyat ha-N o c ar's wor k i n Osl o becam e possibl e followin g a n agreemen t reache d be tween th e AJD C an d Norway' s Ministr y o f Welfare . Th e agreemen t stipulated tha t tw o hundre d place s woul d b e reserve d fo r Nort h Africa n Jewish childre n i n a special healt h cente r t o be manage d b y Europahjel fen—an affiliat e o f th e Norwegia n Re d Cross . I n Apri l 1949 , th e first group o f youth c aliya arrive d a t th e center , als o know n a s Barnekoloni . They were care d fo r by nine Israel i emissaries an d teachers. 62 A second grou p compose d o f youths fro m Tunis , Sousse , Nabeu l an d Moknine, wa s t o arriv e i n Novembe r 1949 . O n th e mornin g o f 2 0 No vember, tw o Dakot a planes , chartere d b y th e AJD C an d th e Jewis h Agency, lef t Tuni s wit h c Aliyat ha-N o c ar fo r Oslo . Fifty-eigh t childre n were involve d i n thi s operation . Amon g th e yout h c aliya personne l es corting th e childre n wa s Suzett e Cohen-Coudar , Gozlan' s truste d assis tant. On e o f th e plane s lande d safel y i n Oslo . Th e othe r plan e crashe d thirty kilometer s outsid e Osl o sixtee n hour s int o th e flight. O f the twenty eight youth s o n th e plan e onl y on e eleven-year-ol d child , Yitsha k Alla l from Moknine , survived. 63 Amon g th e dea d victim s wer e th e pilo t an d crew members, a s well as Suzette Cohen-Coudar . The traged y sen t shoc k wave s throughou t th e Tunisia n Jewis h com munities an d brough t th e yout h c aliya issu e t o th e attentio n o f th e Muslims. Pau l Ghe z an d Eli e Nata f secure d th e victims ' bodies fro m th e Norwegian authoritie s while , withi n on e year, th e Norwegian s publishe d their investigation' s repor t o n th e crash . The y conclude d tha t th e flight crew was insufficiently informe d abou t weather condition s an d physicall y exhausted, havin g flown lon g hour s th e da y befor e t o brin g Morocca n Jewish youth s fro m Osl o t o Israel. 64 T o commemorat e th e Osl o traged y the Labo r party in Norwa y raised funds tha t were subsequentl y allocate d for youth c aliya homes. 65 As for Yitsha k Allal , th e sol e survivor , h e recovere d fro m hi s wound s and returne d t o Tunisia . I n Septembe r 1950 , h e an d hi s parent s settle d

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The Victim s o f the Osl o Tragedy , 2 0 November 1949 , wit h a Phot o o f Yitshak Allal, below, a s the Only Survivor (courtesy of La Gazette dlsrael, 2 4 November 1949).

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Tragedy in Oslo : The Remain s of the Dakot a Plan e after th e Cras h (courtes y of La Gazette d Israel, 24 November 1949). at Mosha v Yanu v i n Israel , situate d betwee n Tel-Avi v an d Haif a nea r Netanya. Yitsha k remaine d i n Yanuv , wa s married , an d raise d si x chil dren. H e die d o n 1 4 Februar y 198 7 following a prolonged illnes s a t th e age of forty-eight. 66 Whatever littl e prestig e c Aliyat ha-N o c ar enjoye d i n Tunisi a unti l November 1949 , it was lost in the aftermat h o f the tragedy . Parent s wer e now mor e reluctan t t o han d ove r thei r childre n t o Lydi e Gozlan . I n addition t o th e psychologica l trauma , c aliya i n genera l ha d decline d during th e earl y 1950 s an d certai n Tunisia n Jew s wh o settle d i n Israe l returned t o Tunisia, a s did thei r Morocca n counterparts . Gozlan continue d t o direc t th e ver y margina l yout h c aliya operatio n that survived . I n orde r t o buttres s th e program , th e Jewis h Agenc y decided i n 195 2 t o dispatc h Yai' r Doue r t o Tunis . A Syrian-bor n Israel i who, a s see n below , ha d bee n activ e i n Tunisi a durin g 1949-5 0 o n Mapai's behalf , Doue r ranke d amon g th e mos t experience d envoy s i n Israel's earl y year s o f statehood. H e wa s instrumenta l i n forming Zionis t youth movement s i n Libya , Egypt , an d Morocco , an d i n indoctrinatin g their member s ideologically . Ther e wa s littl e doub t i n Israe l tha t Doue r was the best individual to contend with Tunisia's youth c aliya challenge. 67 According t o Douer , hi s wor k wit h c Aliyat ha-N o c ar i n Tunisi a wa s brief an d filled wit h aggravation . I t bega n i n Augus t 195 2 an d ende d i n October 1953 . At first Gozla n refuse d t o collaborate wit h him ; an d whe n she agree d t o tolerat e hi s presence , afte r bein g pressure d b y th e Jewis h Agency, h e wa s unabl e t o und o th e damag e cause d i n th e communitie s

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Table 18 . Yout h an d Genera l c Aliya fro m Tunisia , September 1952-Augus t 195 3 Month

General c Aliya

Youth £ Allya

September 195 2 October November December January 195 3 February March April May June July August Total

136 113 69 43 223 23 21 15 61 53 78 64 899

19 22 — 10 — — 1 3 6 3 4 _4 72

Source: Y . Doue r t o cAliyat ha-No car, Tunis, 2 1 Octobe r 195 3i, CZA , S32/926 , Hebrew.

by th e Osl o tragedy. Th e fact tha t people remembere d hi m i n Tunis a s a popular an d admire d emissar y fro m th e lat e 1940s , an d bein g marrie d t o a Tunisia n Jewis h woman , wa s o f n o consequence . Admittin g failur e i n December 1952 , Doue r wrot e t o Davi d Umansk y o f c Aliyat ha-N o c ar i n Israel, tha t eve n th e poo r familie s n o longe r sen t thei r childre n throug h his office . No t onl y wa s c aliya unattractiv e a t th e time , bu t Jewis h orga nizations suc h a s th e AJD C an d OR T were helpin g th e poor , providin g their childre n wit h meal s an d tuition-fre e vocationa l training . Henc e urbanite Jews , howeve r poor , wer e i n no hurry t o leave. 68 In Augus t 195 3 Douer wa s informed tha t c Aliyat ha-No c ar would shu t down it s operation s i n Tunisi a effectiv e Octobe r th e sam e year . Al l matters pertainin g t o yout h c aliya wer e t o b e handle d b y th e genera l emigration office , heade d b y Markuse . Effort s t o revive c Aliyat ha-No c ar were onl y attempte d onc e mor e i n th e lat e 1950s . O f th e 40 2 childre n that Doue r cultivate d fo r c aliya, onl y seventy-tw o emigrate d t o Israe l (see table 1 8 for th e numerica l breakdown) . A pre-195 6 Israel i presenc e connecte d wit h th e Jewis h Agenc y wa s also fel t i n Tunisi a throug h th e activitie s o f th e Zionis t politica l partie s and th e DMO . Politically, severa l o f th e emissarie s i n Tunisi a representin g yout h

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movements were responsibl e for laying the groundwor k fo r active Israeli / Zionist partie s b y 1949-50 . Thus , th e envoy s o f Dror an d ha-Shome r ha Tsa c ir represente d Mapam , wherea s thei r counterpart s involve d wit h Bne-cAkiva/Bahad/Torah ve- cAvoda emerge d a s th e spokesme n o f ha-P o c el ha-Mizrahi. Curiously , th e onl y movement—bot h yout h organizatio n and politica l party—absen t fro m th e scen e wa s th e dominan t forc e i n Israeli society , namel y Mapai . Reflecting abou t hi s first missio n t o Tunisi a i n 1949-5 0 (Jul y 1949 September 1950 ) on behalf o f Mapai and Gordoni a (it s youth movement , also know n a s ha-Bonim), Yai' r Doue r realize d tha t no t a singl e dynami c spokesmen fo r Mapa i an d Gordoni a coul d b e found . Thoug h Dwinge r was a member o f Mapai , hi s wor k wit h th e administrativ e aspect s o f th e c aliya prevente d hi m fro m plungin g int o politica l activity . Moreover , Dwinger di d no t regar d himsel f a s a n ideologu e an d ha d n o experienc e with yout h movements . I n orde r t o enlis t suppor t fo r Mapa i an d intro duce Gordoni a int o Tunisia , Doue r los t n o tim e i n establishin g clos e contacts with progressive Jewish communa l leaders. 69 Beginning in summer 1949 , Doue r spok e to young audiences in Tunis, Sfax, an d Souss e about Davi d Ben-Gurion , Israel' s premier an d leade r of Mapai; wha t Mapa i ha d accomplishe d i n c aliya, emigran t absorption , economic development , an d housing ; an d Gordonia/ha-Bonim—thei r flourishing kibbutzim an d moshavim. Amon g th e communit y leader s assisting Doue r wer e Maitr e Sauveu r Baranes , Mei r Bellity , an d Ren e Cohen-Hadria. Togethe r the y forme d Mapa i i n Tunisi a a s a n indepen dent entity . Unlik e Mapa i i n Morocc o whic h wa s subordinat e t o th e P o c ale Tsiyo n movemen t i n Franc e an d it s Yiddish-speakin g Ashkenaz i leadership, Mapa i i n Tunisi a wa s remot e fro m th e P o c ale Tsiyon, main taining channel s o f communicatio n directl y wit h Mapai s Israel i leader ship. 70 Douer an d his supporters, avowe d socialist s for the mos t part, reache d many communities . The y the n lai d th e foundation s whereve r th e oppor tunities availe d themselves , fo r Mapa i an d Gordonia . Considerin g tha t Baranes an d Cohen-Hadri a wer e member s o f th e SFI O (th e Frenc h Socialist part y an d it s Tunisia n branch) , the y coul d assis t Doue r i n at tracting man y o f SFIO' s Jewis h follower s t o Mapai . An d wherea s i n 1948-49 Mapam , too , sough t t o wi n adherent s amon g SFI O members , the latte r foun d Mapa i t o b e les s ideologicall y confusin g tha n Mapam , and mor e politically pragmatic .

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Reacting to the gains made by Mapai/Gordonia i n the summe r o f 1950, Mapam an d it s yout h movements—ha-Shome r ha-Ts a c ir an d Dror — attempted t o confront th e challeng e b y questionin g th e nee d fo r anothe r Zionist socialis t movemen t i n Tunisia . Thes e attempt s wer e fruitless . Mapam i n Tunisia, a s in Israel , wa s plagued b y ideologica l quarrel s fro m within. Th e sam e coul d b e sai d fo r th e Revisionist s wh o the n debate d whether o r no t t o suppor t Menache m Begin' s ne w Heru t party . Severa l veteran Tunisia n Revisionist s di d no t wis h t o alte r th e ol d Revisionis t party structure . Mapai , therefore , di d no t fac e seriou s oppositio n t o it s expansion an d eve n manage d t o cooperate wit h th e religiou s Zionists. 71 Our dat a revea l tha t i n June 195 0 Gordoni a ha d a s man y member s a s the othe r secula r yout h movements, 72 a significan t achievemen t i n ligh t of the fact tha t i t was barely a year old : Youth Movement Membership Gordonia 300-40 Dror 350-40 Ha-Shomer ha-Tsa cir 300-35 Ha-No car ha-Tsiyoni 300-40 Bahad/Bne c Akiva 500-60

0 0 0 0 0

In 1950-5 1 Gordonia assemble d member s i n Tunis, Sousse , Sfax , Gabes , and eve n Jerba . Man y o f its bogrim (graduates ) underwen t hachshara i n France durin g th e 1950 s an d settle d i n Mapai-dominate d kibbutzim an d moshavim, includin g Kibbut z Ramat-Yohana n (Douer' s home) , Mosha v Yanuv, an d Mosha v c Azrikam whic h i s situate d betwee n Tel-Avi v an d Be3er Shev a near Kirya t Malahi . When h e left Tunisi a in Septembe r 1950 , Doue r describe d Zionis t lif e there a s excitin g an d diverse . Th e Federatio n Sionist e d e Franc e wa s active i n promotin g th e sheqel an d th e JN F drives . I t wa s compose d o f representatives fro m al l th e Zionis t parties , severa l o f who m wer e als o the president s an d activ e leader s i n thei r communities . A s lat e a s 195 1 the pro-Revisionis t newspaper , La Gazette d'Israel, continue d t o appea r throughout Nort h Africa , considere d b y far th e bes t Zionis t orga n i n th e Mediterranean basi n communities . As i n Morocco , th e DM O entere d th e Tunisia n Jewis h communa l centers beginnin g i n 1949-50 . I t i s pointless t o probe int o it s social work

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program again , fo r wha t i t di d i n Tunisi a hardl y differe d fro m th e wor k accomplished i n Morocco . O n th e othe r hand , i n the are a of self-defense , or magen, th e DM O i n Tunisia mad e a n important contribution . Self-defense trainin g i n Tunisi a wa s attempte d a s earl y a s 1943-4 4 when Ephrai m Friedma n (Ben-Hayyim) , Yiga l Cohen, an d Naphtal i Bar Giora—the Mossa d L e c Aliya/Jewish Agenc y emissaries—reache d Tuni sia an d collaborate d wit h Tseire-Tsiyo n an d othe r Zionis t yout h groups . However, th e tota l illegalit y o f thei r statu s i n Tunisi a a t th e time , th e lack o f a n officia l o r semi-officia l cove r i n th e for m o f a Jewis h Agenc y setting fro m within , an d lac k o f tim e rendere d th e emissaries ' wor k incomplete. Still , severa l Zionis t youth s swor e allegianc e i n th e emissar ies' presenc e t o th e Yishuv' s Hagan a organization , an d partia l trainin g was provided i n the us e of knives, firearms, sticks , an d in Judo. 73 Severa l Jewish leaders , amon g the m Maitr e Alber t Bessis , wh o man y year s late r became a cabine t ministe r i n Bourguiba' s government , Pau l Ghez , an d Dr. Leopol d Baretvas , assiste d th e emissarie s i n th e process . Whe n rumors circulate d a t th e en d o f Worl d Wa r I I tha t a pogro m woul d b e organized i n Tuniss harat al-Yahud, th e young persons traine d i n magen were organized t o defend th e ghetto. I n the end, a pogrom di d not occur . Magen continue d int o th e lat e 1940s . However , a s Friedma n recalls , in 194 7 the self-defens e i n Nort h Afric a a s inspire d b y th e mode l o f th e Hagana i n Palestin e wa s n o longe r cohesive . Unlik e th e pre-194 7 perio d when magen i n Morocco , Tunisia , an d Algeri a existe d unde r a unifie d command, afte r 194 7 eac h countr y ha d a separat e command . Magen i n Morocco was entrusted t o Sa m Abotbol whereas i n Algeria it was heade d by Pau l Sebaoun . Th e comman d i n Tunisi a wa s i n th e hand s o f Hanani a *El-cAl. Durin g 194 7 North Africa n magen activist s underwen t advance d training i n Algeri a an d France . Also , th e Religiou s Zionist s organize d i n Tunisia thei r ow n self-defens e organization , know n a s ha-magen ha-dati, about whic h w e hav e n o information . B y 1949 , magen hardl y functione d in Nort h Africa , a s severa l o f its ke y leader s emigrate d t o Israe l leavin g behind th e burde n o f self-defense t o th e smal l nucleu s o f ha-magen hadatt.74 The effort s t o reviv e th e secula r magen wer e attempte d b y th e DM O in 1949-50 . I n Tunisia, th e trainin g was conducted b y Israeli emissaries , the most important bein g Mosh e Hababo (Arnon) from Kibbut z Regavim . Hababos responsibilitie s extende d beyon d Tunisi a int o th e Jewis h com munity o f Constantin e i n Algeria . Towar d th e en d o f 1950 , fort y youn g

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persons wer e traine d i n Tuni s b y eigh t o f Hababo s assistant s an d sixt y additional ne w recruit s wer e read y t o underg o training . Th e Tuni s nu cleus ha d i n it s possessio n nin e revolvers , thre e submachin e guns , an d two rifle s "o f th e bes t quality. " Thi s grou p ha d collaborate d wit h a local chemist wh o manufactured han d grenades. 75 The DM O self-defens e effort s i n Sousse , Sfax , Gabes , an d Jerb a ar e noteworthy, too . I n Sousse , on e non-Israel i wa s i n charg e o f the opera tion, assiste d b y seve n trainers . Th e numbe r o f trainees reache d twent y in Novembe r 1950 . The y ha d tw o revolver s an d a ne w submachin e gu n at thei r disposal . Th e magen i n Sfa x wa s quit e modest—on e traine r overseeing sixtee n me n usin g thre e revolvers . Th e situatio n i n Gabe s was somewha t bette r organized . Fo r a souther n community , wher e th e Jews wer e mor e vulnerabl e t o pogrom s tha n i n th e norther n cities , magen ha d five trainer s wh o wer e loca l recruits , an d eightee n activist s possessing sixtee n revolver s an d on e submachin e gun . Gabe s emerge d from th e lat e 1940 s onwar d a s a n importan t cente r fo r bot h youn g Zion ists and the nationalists . Ye t the largest DMO-sponsore d operatio n i n th e south existed i n Jerba. Jerba n magen consiste d o f fifty youths who traine d for twenty-fou r hour s ever y week . Thei r trainer s wer e als o loca l me n who receive d instruction s fro m th e DM O emissaries . Whe n tension s between Muslim s an d Jew s reache d boilin g poin t i n Septembe r 1950 , magen activist s too k u p position s i n th e Jewis h communit y t o defen d against pogroms. Thoug h n o riots occurred, i t seems that the self-defens e effort woul d hav e bee n ineffectiv e considerin g tha t th e activist s ha d onl y three revolver s available. 76 Doubtless, Tuni s ha d th e mos t efficien t magen i n Nort h Afric a i n 1950. I t als o serve d a s th e "nerv e center " tha t maintaine d tie s wit h th e other cells . Printe d "guidance " material s wer e produce d i n Tuni s an d distributed a s "instructions" in Sousse , Sfax , Gabes , an d Jerba. Hababo' s second-in-command wa s a certain "Zvi. " Alongside shootin g practice s i n remote an d deserted area s outside the city, thirty-si x hours were devote d each mont h t o training in the us e of knives, sticks , an d in Judo. Weapon s were inspecte d regularl y whil e contac t wit h weapo n merchant s wa s con tinuously maintained b y "Zvi." The AJDC funded th e activities. A special underground newspape r wa s publishe d tha t include d code d message s and passwords for th e activist s in the aforementione d communities . Afte r the newspape r wa s decoded th e reader s destroye d th e evidence. 77 Each recrui t i n Tuni s an d elsewher e wa s swor n i n b y submittin g a

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written pledg e o f allegianc e t o magen. Th e documen t wa s the n de stroyed, ye t without th e knowledge o f the new recruit. A special commit tee wa s forme d i n th e communitie s consistin g o f people whos e functio n included punishin g member s wh o violated th e code s of honor, especiall y for informin g th e authoritie s o n othe r activists. 78 I n Apri l 1951 , severa l key trainer s ha d mad e c aliya. Further , a s noted , th e DM O wa s disman tled i n Septembe r o f tha t year . Consequentl y i t i s doubtfu l tha t an y serious magen program s were preserved afterwards . Onl y in 1955-5 6 di d Israeli envoy s o f Mossad reviv e self-defens e i n Tunisia , Algeria , an d Morocco, a subject analyze d i n chapter 9 . Nevertheless , th e work accom plished unde r th e auspice s o f th e DM O prove d it s usefulnes s i n Jun e 1952, durin g th e unres t a t Hafsia . Magen s activists face d th e assailant s and temporaril y repulse d them . Thus fa r w e hav e analyze d Jewis h Agency-relate d strategies , policies , and activity . W e nee d t o prob e furthe r ho w Israel i diplomat s i n Europ e and th e Unite d State s assessed th e evolutio n o f Tunisian Jewry . Israeli diplomat s wh o wer e approache d b y spokesme n o f th e Neo Destour i n th e Wes t share d th e opinio n o f Tunisian Jewry i n considerin g that part y a s th e preferabl e politica l alternative , shoul d Tunisi a b e grante d home rul e o r ful l independence . Interestingly , th e strateg y o f the Neo Destour include d gainin g Jewis h suppor t i n th e Unite d States ; (fo r ex ample, i n Ne w Yor k the y approache d Senato r Herber t H . Lehma n an d Congressman Emanue l Celle r a s wel l a s Jewis h labo r leaders) . Amon g the Neo-Destou r representative s seekin g Israel i an d America n Jewis h support was Bahi Ladgham, a member o f the party's political bureau and , during th e 1950s , deput y prim e ministe r i n Bourguiba' s first cabine t following th e grantin g o f full independence . H e me t th e mos t influentia l Jews an d wa s introduce d i n Ne w Yor k t o Mordecha i Namir , the n th e secretary-general o f the Histadrut , Israel s labo r federation, conveyin g t o him tha t th e positio n o f Tunisian Jewr y woul d no t deteriorat e onc e th e French grante d Tunisi a political concessions. 79 On 2 5 June 1952 , a t abou t th e tim e tha t Asian s an d Lati n American s were tryin g t o bring th e issu e o f Tunisian sovereignt y befor e th e Unite d Nations Securit y Council, Ladgha m me t with Gide con Rafae l of the Israe l mission t o th e Unite d Nations . Rafae l use d th e occasio n L C raise th e Tunisian Jewis h problem , particularl y i n ligh t o f the incident s o f 14-1 6 June i n Hafsia . H e was assured tha t Neo-Destou r supporter s encourage d a Judeo-Musli m entente an d wer e ferventl y oppose d t o th e greates t

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enemies o f all Tunisians: the "reactionar y ^ulamtf an d the Zitounists. Th e Neo-Destour, Ladgha m claimed , wa s secularly-oriented , reformist , an d unique i n the sens e tha t i t was friendly t o both th e Jews of Tunisia and t o the Stat e of Israel. 80 Ladgham's objectives , i t appears , wer e twofold : first, t o secur e indi rectly Israel' s vot e a t th e Unite d Nation s i n favo r o f Frenc h concession s to Tunisia; an d second , t o presen t th e Israeli s an d America n Jewr y wit h a positiv e image , perhap s wit h th e ai m o f utilizin g thei r influenc e i n Washington. However , th e Israeli s a t th e Unite d Nation s wer e con cerned abou t th e Hafsi a crisis . Rafae l informe d Ladgha m tha t thes e events ha d damage d th e otherwis e positiv e imag e of the Tunisian nation alists, an d tha t i n th e futur e th e Neo-Destou r supporter s withi n Tunisia , along with the other movements , woul d have to restrain various follower s or apolitica l group s fro m intimidatin g th e Jews . Ladgham' s respons e wa s that th e Frenc h wer e th e culprits . Fo r years the y adhere d t o the colonia l policy o f divide et impera wit h regar d t o Muslim s an d Jews, appearin g a s the protecto r o f th e latter . H e adde d tha t th e Neo-Destou r considere d the Ara b Leagu e a s a reactionary , divisive , an d powerles s organizatio n and, withou t raisin g th e issu e o f bringin g th e Tunisia n questio n befor e the Unite d Nations , Ladgha m explaine d th e aim s of home rule. 81 Israel's votin g recor d show s tha t i t favored a moderate Unite d Nation s draft proposa l submitte d b y th e Lati n America n blo c t o th e Genera l Assembly, supportin g th e pursuanc e o f Franco-Tunisia n negotiations . However, i n a later roun d o f voting, Israe l rejecte d a mor e radica l draf t proposal submitte d b y thirtee n Ara b an d Asia n nation s callin g upo n France t o uphol d Tunisia' s righ t t o self-determination. 82 I n additio n t o stressing th e Hafsi a incidents , Rafae l hinte d t o Ladgha m durin g th e meeting tha t i t wa s Israel' s decisiv e suppor t a t th e Unite d Nation s th e year befor e whic h ha d determine d th e grantin g o f independenc e t o Libya. Liby a ha d alread y reveale d it s ingratitud e t o Israel . Woul d Tuni sia really behave differently? 83 Finally, whe n aske d b y Rafae l i f an autonomou s Tunisi a would permi t Jewish emigratio n t o Israel , Ladgha m observe d tha t th e Neo-Destou r appreciated Tunisia n Jewis h identificatio n wit h tha t country' s nationa l struggle. Yet , i n view of the persecutio n o f the Jew s throughou t history , it understood tha t man y Tunisians would wish to settle i n Israel, an d thi s the Neo-Destou r woul d no t oppose. 84 Israeli diplomat s ofte n raise d th e issu e o f whethe r link s wit h Nort h

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African nationalist s i n genera l woul d i n th e lon g ru n benefi t bot h Israe l and Nort h Africa n Jewry . Shmue l Divon , first secretar y t o th e Israel i embassy i n Pari s durin g th e earl y 1950s , favore d establishin g secre t tie s with th e nationalist s throug h nonofficia l channels , wit h Marseille s serv ing as the rendez-vous. Th e fate o f French colonialis m ha d been decided , he contended , an d independenc e fo r Nort h Afric a wa s drawin g close . Such contact s behin d th e bac k o f th e Frenc h governmen t migh t hel p safeguard th e positio n o f nearly 500,000 North Africa n Jews. 85 On th e othe r hand , Emil e Najar , a leadin g Israel i diploma t involve d with th e question s o f Middl e Easter n an d Nort h Africa n Jewry , too k a different vie w i n respons e t o Divon' s suggestion . H e hel d tha t behind the-scenes talk s wit h th e nationalist s coul d ver y wel l damag e Franco Israeli relations , a s Franc e wa s i n a constan t stat e o f aler t regardin g it s colonial interests . Moreover , suc h contact s woul d probabl y b e exploite d by th e nationalist s fo r publi c relations purpose s an d Israe l would receiv e nothing i n return . I t woul d b e preferabl e t o maintai n ope n link s wit h some of these forces, a s demonstrated b y the Ladgham-Rafae l meeting. 86 While w e hav e n o wa y o f determinin g i f secre t talk s too k plac e be tween 195 2 and 1956 , Najar' s view s wer e supporte d b y prominen t Frenc h Jewish leaders clos e to the Qua i d'Orsay wh o were probably pressure d t o discourage Israel , an d Tunisia n Jewis h intellectual s wh o supporte d th e Neo-Destour financially an d morally . No t onl y di d the y oppos e th e pos sibility o f secre t contact s bu t severa l o f the m criticize d Israel i effort s t o meet nationalist s i n th e open , warnin g th e Israel i governmen t tha t suc h a policy would endange r th e positio n o f North Africa n Jewry . An illustrative exampl e i s to be found i n an urgent messag e bearing on the Tunisia n questio n a t th e Unite d Nation s sen t b y Ren e Cassin , th e president o f th e AIU , t o Foreig n Ministe r Mosh e Sharet t o n 1 3 Jun e 1952. Accordin g t o Cassin , rumor s wer e circulatin g tha t th e Ara b state s boasted the y coul d gai n Israel s suppor t fo r th e convocatio n o f a specia l session o n Tunisia in the Genera l Assembly. 87 Cassin warned Sharet t tha t Nort h Africa n Jewr y would be i n a difficul t position i f Israe l endorse d nationalis t claim s a t th e Unite d Nation s o r some othe r internationa l forum . Th e AIU , h e said , havin g acquire d vas t field experienc e i n thos e communitie s ove r man y decades—i n th e edu cational, social , an d politica l spheres—wa s thei r guardian . Cassi n criti cized wha t h e terme d th e lac k o f realis m prevalen t amon g American s who supported Tunisia n nationalis t claim s (he was particularly concerne d

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with th e supporter s o f th e Vieu x Destou r wh o i n hi s opinio n wer e extremists), a n exampl e Israe l shoul d no t follow . I f th e Frenc h wer e forced t o evacuat e part s o f Nort h Africa , th e positio n o f th e Jew s coul d become impossible . Give n th e risk s involved an d the dange r o f pogroms, it was th e dut y o f the AI U t o soun d th e alar m an d convinc e Israe l no t t o back Tunisia n claims ; otherwis e Israel' s suppor t woul d b e lik e "un e operation meurtriere " ( a murderous operation ) agains t Tunisian Jewry. 88

Chapter 9

From Interna l Autonom y t o Ful l Independence: Th e Post Independence, Decolonizatio n Era i n Tunisi a

The Immediate Post-Independence Era —Until Fall 1957 Following the Mendes-Franc e visi t to Tunis, th e general opinion prevail ing at the Israel i embassy i n Paris was that th e Jews in Tunisia might no w be compelle d t o yield thei r position s i n th e libera l profession s an d trad e to Muslims . Furthermore , althoug h th e violenc e wa s hithert o largel y directed agains t th e French , th e Jew s coul d becom e victims. 1 Woul d segments o f th e populatio n refrai n fro m harmin g th e Jews ? Woul d th e nationalists succee d i n restraining thei r followers ? As events unfolded, thes e speculation s proved t o be largely unfounde d for th e first tw o o r thre e year s o f the decolonizatio n process . Autonom y in 195 5 le d t o ful l independenc e i n Marc h 1956 . Election s t o th e first National Assembl y wer e hel d o n 2 5 Marc h 1956 . Approximatel y 12,00 0 Jewish voter s wer e eligibl e fo r th e electora l lists . Originall y i t wa s as sumed tha t four seat s would be assigned to Jewish representatives. Later , however, i t was decided t o establish a special Jewish representation , bu t reserve tw o seat s fo r Jew s o n th e lis t o f candidate s o f th e Tunisia n National Front , whos e kernel was the Neo-Destour . Maitr e Albert Bessi s and Andre Barouc h wer e elected . Habib Bourguib a becam e premie r o n 1 0 April 1956 . O n 2 5 July 195 7 287

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Full Independence

the Nationa l Assembl y depose d Muhamma d al-Amf n Be y an d nominate d Bourguiba th e first hea d o f stat e o f th e Tunisia n republic . I n Novembe r 1959 h e wa s electe d t o th e presidency , a n offic e h e hel d unti l hi s over throw i n Novembe r 1987 . Bourguib a the n se t ou t t o implemen t hi s well known secula r reforms , breakin g wit h th e theocrati c past . His attitud e towar d th e Jew s wa s positive . Andr e Barouc h wa s ap pointed t o th e positio n o f ministe r o f publi c work s an d housing , an d Bourguiba visite d Jewis h institution s o n severa l occasions . O n on e suc h visit i n Februar y 195 7 Bourguib a addresse d a larg e Jewis h audienc e a t the No s Petits ' cente r i n Tunis : It i s a pleasur e fo r m e . . . t o visi t thi s organizatio n whos e tas k i s t o educat e Jewish childre n sociall y an d morally , i n thi s hous e whic h belonge d t o Nissi m Semama, wh o was th e genera l treasure r o f the Tunisia n governmen t lon g befor e the Protectorate . Thi s proves tha t th e Tunisian governmen t ha s never know n an y racial discriminatio n an d tha t w e hav e alway s considere d th e Tunisia n natio n a s including Muslim s an d Jew s a s well a s Christians. Thi s attitude date s bac k t o th e persecution o f whic h w e bot h wer e victim s i n Spain , an d whic h create d thi s brotherly friendshi p betwee n us . I d o admi t tha t i n som e unfortunat e periods , marke d b y th e ignoranc e tha t always produce d fanaticism— a comple x o f prid e whic h canno t allo w other s t o hold a differen t opinion , eve n i n politics—ther e ha s bee n a regression , a n unfriendly relationshi p whic h ha s resulte d i n a rif t betwee n Muslim s an d Jews . We hav e alway s struggle d agains t thi s fanaticism , tryin g t o enlighte n th e mind s of our countrymen , who m w e endeavore d t o induce t o shar e ou r views ; we trie d to brin g bot h side s close r an d w e hop e tha t w e hav e bee n successfu l t o a grea t extent. In thi s trouble d worl d Tunisi a stand s out , differen t an d sympathetic , no t onl y because o f the governin g elite , bu t als o because o f the populatio n whic h imitate s it, respectin g th e huma n being , whic h lead s t o a brotherly relationshi p betwee n this natio n an d foreigners . I t i s thi s equilibrium , s o rar e i n th e world , tha t w e have trie d t o achiev e an d tha t w e ar e goin g t o achieve , i n spit e o f th e presen t instability.2 Bourguiba explaine d hi s policie s clearl y t o bot h loca l Jewis h leader s and representative s o f th e majo r Jewis h organizations , wh o continue d t o arrive i n Tunisi a afte r 195 6 i n orde r t o secur e dat a o n th e Jewis h popula tion's politica l an d socia l status . On 2 9 Jun e 1957 , a n America n Jewis h Committe e delegatio n com posed o f American leader s an d th e Paris-base d representative s arrive d i n Tunisia an d me t wit h Bourguib a a s wel l a s th e deput y prim e minister ,

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who wa s non e othe r tha n Bah i Ladgham . The y informe d th e delegatio n that emigratio n woul d no t b e forbidden . However , thos e Jew s wh o de cided t o remai n wer e expecte d t o demonstrat e thei r loyalt y a s goo d citizens. Bourguib a explaine d t o hi s visitor s tha t th e structur e o f th e Jewish communitie s ha d t o b e reorganize d an d directe d exclusivel y b y Jews o f Tunisian nationality . H e adde d tha t representativ e bodie s o f th e communities woul d b e abl e t o arrang e religious , cultural , an d philan thropic events , an d th e Jewis h organizations—AIU , AJDC , ORT , OSE , WJC—would maintai n thei r influence . O n th e othe r had , th e govern ment woul d no t provid e th e twent y millio n franc s subventio n t o th e community federation s a s th e Frenc h Protectorat e ha d done , becaus e these bodie s wer e stil l dominate d b y non-Tunisia n national s wh o coul d receive assistanc e from foreig n sources. 3 In 1956-5 7 Bourguib a wa s quit e popula r amon g th e Jewis h masses . He reache d th e zenit h o f hi s popularit y afte r callin g o n th e Egyptia n ambassador an d protestin g agains t Nasser' s polic y o f expelling Jews fro m Egypt i n th e wak e o f th e October-Novembe r Sinai/Sue z Middl e Eas t war. Bourguib a wa s particularly adaman t abou t th e expulsio n o f Tunisian Jewish national s livin g i n Egyp t fo r decade s wh o no w becam e refugees . Even thos e Jew s wh o though t tha t thei r economi c situatio n i n a n inde pendent Tunisi a wa s uncertai n stil l argue d that , a s lon g a s Bourguib a remained i n power, the y had littl e t o be concerne d with. 4 Continuing t o serv e a s c ally a directo r i n 1956-57 , Markus e di d no t believe tha t Bourguiba' s positiv e gesture s o n Egyptia n Jewry' s behalf , o r his cordia l relation s wit h Tunisia' s Jews , coul d b e trace d merel y t o hu manitarian an d libera l traditions . Reportin g t o Shraga i o n 1 0 Januar y 1957, Markus e remarke d tha t whe n Bourguib a visite d th e Unite d State s several month s earlier , h e sough t t o procur e loan s fo r Tunisia n nationa l development fro m internationa l bank s an d th e Eisenhowe r administra tion. Presiden t Eisenhowe r an d Secretar y o f Stat e Joh n Foste r Dulle s appeared undecide d ove r this issue and Bourguiba' s aides contended tha t the reluctanc e migh t hav e bee n par t o f a "wai t an d see " strategy . Th e Eisenhower administratio n wante d t o se e i f Bourguib a woul d institut e genuine democrac y i n hi s countr y a s promised ; an d whethe r o r no t hi s domestic oppositio n a s wel l a s exile d opponent s i n Egypt , amon g the m Salah Ben-Youssef , coul d succee d i n underminin g th e regime . More over, Eisenhowe r wa s not abou t t o alienate th e Frenc h governmen t wit h which Bourguib a was on bad term s a t the time. 5

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It was therefore imperativ e for Bourguiba to demonstrate t o the Amer icans an d thei r Europea n allie s tha t Tunisi a wa s politicall y stable , sensi tive t o human right s issues , an d toleran t towar d th e Jewish minority . H e was als o eage r t o mak e a goo d impressio n o n America n Jewr y whos e leaders, h e felt , wielde d considerabl e influenc e i n cit y an d stat e govern ment, no t t o mentio n th e Eisenhowe r administratio n an d th e Senate . Would the y displa y gratitud e b y assistin g i n th e lobbyin g effort s fo r th e loans? Even i f Bourguiba displaye d opportunisti c tendencies , hi s pro-Jewis h attitude carrie d a n elemen t o f risk, fo r i t wa s formulated a t a time whe n Nasser o f Egyp t ha d mounte d a campaig n agains t pro-Wester n regime s in th e Ara b worl d a s wel l a s agains t Western-oriente d religio-ethni c minorities. I n fact , al-Istiqldl, th e orga n o f the Vieu x Destour , attacke d Bourguiba for criticizing Nasse r ove r th e expulsio n o f Egyptian Jews. 6 One o f Bourguiba's mos t importan t gesture s vis-a-vi s th e Jew s wa s t o tolerate c ally aan d emigratio n t o France . However , thoug h h e seeme d eager t o portra y a positiv e imag e o f a democrati c an d libera l Tunisi a before th e Wester n world , an d ther e i s littl e doub t a s t o hi s flexibility concerning fre e emigratio n muc h o f th e time , Tunisia n officials—ofte n without hi s consent—occasionall y adopte d measure s tha t contradicte d the declare d promises . A t th e tim e o f th e 195 6 Sinai/Sue z war , th e Tunisian regim e halte d c aliya temporarily . Markus e wa s informe d tha t Bahi Ladgha m wa s pressure d b y th e Egyptia n ambassado r i n Tuni s t o stop grantin g passport s t o Jews , fo r th e youn g element s amon g the m arrived i n Israe l an d joine d th e army . I t wa s particularl y disturbin g t o the Egyptian s tha t Tunisian passport s were valid for thre e year s and thu s it turne d ou t tha t citizen s o f Arab Tunisi a wer e fightin g o n Israel' s sid e against them . Ladgha m wa s urge d t o view th e Sinai/Sue z wa r an d c aliya as all-Arab problems. 7 Several day s pursuan t t o th e meetin g betwee n Ladgha m an d th e Egyptian ambassador , th e commissione r an d inspector-genera l o f th e Tunis polic e informe d Markus e tha t passport s woul d no t b e issue d t o emigrants. Th e latte r wer e als o prevente d fro m boardin g on e o f th e emigrant ships . Followin g Markuse' s demarch e befor e th e authorities , the shi p wa s allowe d t o leave . Hi s angr y protests , directe d a t th e por t authorities, an d th e influenc e h e enjoye d amon g official s o f the Ministr y of th e Interior—quickl y produce d th e desire d results . Th e passpor t distribution resumed , althoug h Markus e wa s aske d t o provid e signe d

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guarantees fo r ever y passpor t bearer . Th e guarante e procedur e wa s mean t to ensure tha t th e Jewis h Agenc y b e hel d responsibl e fo r th e emigrants . Should th e latte r choos e t o retur n t o Tunisia, Israe l o r th e Jewis h Agency , not th e Tunisia n government , woul d bea r th e brun t o f the financial an d welfare matter s o n their behalf. 8 Once i t resumed , th e c aliya declined . Th e number s droppe d fro m 6,545 i n 195 6 t o 2,61 8 i n 1957 . Thi s shar p declin e wa s partl y attribute d to th e increase d emigratio n t o France . I n Apri l 195 6 th e Unite d H I AS Service opene d it s office s i n Tuni s t o assis t 1,20 0 Jew s t o emigrat e t o countries othe r tha n Israel. 9 Th e declin e i n emigratio n wa s als o du e t o the feelin g amon g Jew s tha t Bourguib a ha d succeede d i n consolidatin g his powe r an d i n neutralizin g th e Youssefite s (Sala h Ben-Yousse f s sup porters) whom the y considere d a s their enemies. 10 The fact tha t Bourguib a tolerate d th e presenc e o f the c aliya emissarie s and permitte d th e Jewis h Agenc y apparatu s i n Tuni s an d othe r region s to function, wa s a unique phenomeno n i n the Arab world o f the 1950s . I t was also suggested tha t Bourguib a understoo d that , ha d h e emulate d th e Moroccan exampl e o f bannin g Cadima , th e proces s woul d hav e bee n organized clandestinely. 11 As Markuse remarked : [The] approac h [o f the authorities ] i s pragmatic. Th e fac t o f the matte r i s tha t they continu e t o supply u s with passports. I n th e passport Franc e is entered as the country of emigration, bu t they know very well that the passport bearers are making c aliya [vi a France]. . . . They are compelled t o give satisfaction t o Arab pressure in the Middle East and consequently they refrain from stipulating in the passports that Israel is the emigrants' country of destination.12 Two unfortunat e incident s i n 195 7 had nearl y shake n th e foundation s of the Jewis h Agency' s operations . First , o n 2 4 Ma y policeme n entere d the premises a t 1 8 Rue d e Metz , confiscate d funds , gathere d documents , and too k Markus e an d hi s assistant , Mei r Heimon , fo r questioning . Another emissary , Da n Kariv , an d M . Herzberg , a perso n i n charg e o f fund-raising fo r th e JNF , wer e arrested . Althoug h th e attitud e o f th e authorities wa s friendly, the y wanted t o find out i f the c aliya office wa s in any way involved wit h th e fund-raisin g campaign s conducte d illegall y b y the JNF . Accordin g t o Jewis h Agenc y source s i n France , th e Tunisian s would hav e tolerate d fund-raisin g effort s i n favor o f Israel. However , th e process wa s carrie d ou t i n a n indiscree t manne r an d cause d uneasines s

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among th e Muslims. 13 After thei r interrogation s wer e ove r Markus e an d Heimon returne d t o thei r offic e t o conduc t busines s a s usual ; th e mate rials confiscated fro m them , includin g the funds, wer e handed back . Da n Kariv wa s expelle d fro m Tunisi a whil e Herzber g an d hi s loca l assistant s were trie d an d the n imprisone d fo r on e mont h befor e bein g expelle d from th e country. 14 The secon d inciden t occurre d i n August 1957 . Two Israel i emissaries , Ya c akov Hefe r representin g th e Jewis h Agency' s Departmen t o f Tora h Education i n the Diaspora , an d Gersho n Har-To v of No c ar ve-he-Haluts, were summone d b y th e Tuni s polic e fo r interrogations . The y were beaten , threatened a t gunpoint , an d coerce d t o sig n a documen t attestin g the y were no t "Frenc h spies. " The onl y perso n wh o coul d rende r som e assis tance t o them wa s Zvi Heitner , Markuse' s successo r a s head o f the c aliya office. No t a s wel l connecte d wit h th e authoritie s a s hi s predecessor , Heitner, a n Israel i who carrie d a Belgian passport , nevertheles s tol d th e police commissione r tha t hi s me n behave d towar d th e emissarie s i n a manner contrar y t o Bourguiba' s polic y statements . H e sai d that , shoul d the emissarie s b e detaine d longe r o r harassed , th e Israel i governmen t would publis h article s i n th e majo r Wester n Europea n an d America n newspapers t o enlighte n th e publi c abou t huma n right s violation s i n Tunisia. Th e commissione r release d th e emissarie s an d promise d tha t such incident s woul d no t recur. 15 How were th e emissarie s o f No c ar ve-he-Haluts an d th e Departmen t of Torah Educatio n i n th e Diaspor a abl e t o organiz e Zionis t yout h edu cational activities ? Afte r th e Federatio n Sionist e d e Tunisi e cease d t o function i n 1956 , Zionis t yout h movement s an d thei r Israel i guide s car ried ou t thei r program s unde r th e auspice s o f th e Federatio n o f Jewis h Youth i n Tunis . Officiall y non-Zionist , thi s federatio n serve d a s a cove r for Zionis t actio n becaus e th e authoritie s recognize d it s legitimacy i n th e Jewish cultura l domain. 16 Curiously , th e federatio n wa s administered b y several o f th e emissaries , amon g the m th e aforementione d Da n Kari v and Do v Fode r fro m Kibbut z Hazo r who , lik e Heitner , wa s a Belgia n national. Accordin g t o Kariv , th e authoritie s wer e awar e o f th e Zionis t orientation o f program s unde r th e guis e o f th e federation , bu t chos e t o tolerate thi s a s lon g a s th e emissarie s an d madrihim conducte d thei r affairs wit h th e utmos t discretion. 17 Thi s freedo m o f actio n extende d t o other communities . Atereth-Tsiyo n i n Jerba, founde d i n 1919 , continue d to function wel l into the lat e 1950s ; it was dissolved by the community. 18

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A confidentia l repor t submitte d t o th e Jewis h Agenc y i n Decembe r 1959 reveale d that , despit e th e official ba n o n Zionism , activit y contin ued i n Tunis . A t th e tim e 35 0 member s wer e affiliate d wit h Dror , ha Shomer ha-Ts a c ir, Gordonia , an d Bne- cAkiva a s compare d wit h 670 i n May 1957. 19 The semilega l o r tolerate d Zionis t activit y wa s supplemente d wit h underground program s i n the contex t o f self-defense. A s in Morocco , th e Mossad-sponsored Misgeret sprea d it s influence int o Tunisia and Algeria . As for Tunisia, Shlom o Havili o visited ther e towar d th e end o f November 1954. Whe n h e returne d t o Israel , h e submitte d a detailed repor t o n hi s findings. Despit e th e declin e i n terroris t activit y sinc e th e en d o f Jul y 1954, th e Jew s coul d no t b e guarantee d safet y onc e Frenc h colonialis m disappeared. Therefore , h e mad e th e followin g recommendations . First , self-defense guidanc e neede d t o be revive d amon g the youn g to confron t potential pogromists . T o realiz e thi s goal , Israe l ha d t o dispatc h arm y officers o r forme r officer s t o Tunisia . Second , i t woul d b e th e officers ' task to select local youths with exceptional leadershi p qualities for furthe r advanced trainin g i n Israel . Third , th e Israeli s functionin g o n th e loca l level woul d contac t reliabl e communit y leader s wh o coul d wor k i n con cert with them. 20 Havilio's recommendation s wer e no t welcome d unanimousl y i n al l political circle s activ e o n behal f o f Tunisian Jewry . Josep h Gola n o f th e WJC attempte d t o dissuade Havili o from providin g Tunisian youth s wit h self-defense lesson s an d encourage d hi m t o concentrat e instea d o n "Zi onist an d physical education' : I tol d Havili o tha t I conside r hi s pla n t o b e fa r to o darin g fo r th e moment . I suggested to him to have Israeli officers traine d as educators for Hebre w culture and physical education, s o they may provide the youths with moral and physical training which is indispensable for understanding the [conceptual] significance of self-defense. Bu t they mus t desis t from it s actual application, postponin g it to a later period. 21 Golan adde d tha t thi s problem ha d t o be discusse d i n the uppe r echelon s of the Israel i government, preferabl y betwee n Pinha s Lavon , th e defens e chief, an d Dr . Nahu m Goldmann , th e presiden t o f the WJC. 22 In th e final analysis, Havilio' s recommendation s wer e approved . I n a n interview wit h thi s author , h e admitte d tha t hi s fears o f Tunisian nation -

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alists wer e unfounded . Th e Tunisian s ha d definitel y bee n sincere . Th e main proble m wa s th e Algeria n facto r i n Tunisia n society , particularl y after Tunisi a became independent : We neede d Misgeret's self-defens e syste m i n Tunisia becaus e sinc e Novembe r 1954, Algeria n terroris m an d nationalis t ferment , markin g th e star t o f Algeria's Revolution agains t th e French , ha d not been confine d t o Algeria. I n the face of French repression , th e Algerian Fron t for Nationa l Liberation wa s compelled to transfer severa l o f its militar y unit s fro m Constantin e an d th e Aure s regio n t o Tunisia. Fro m Tunisi a thes e unit s infiltrate d bac k int o Algeri a t o engag e i n terrorism. Tha t i s wh y w e justifie d th e presenc e o f Misgeret: t o defen d th e communities against the possibility of these elements attacking Jews.23 During Havilio' s tenur e a s hea d o f Misgeret (1955-60) , Mossad-recruited individual s wer e entruste d wit h th e tas k o f guiding youn g Jews . Among the m wer e "Henri " (whos e rea l nam e mus t remai n anonymous) , Yehuda Greenbrrg , an d Ra m Journo . On e o f th e trainee s i n Tuni s wa s Henri Semama , toda y a resident o f Haifa . Semama wa s recruite d int o th e Misgeret i n 1956 . A s i n Morocc o an d Algeria, eac h new recruit swor e allegiance in a dark room t o the Misgeret by placin g hi s hand s ove r Israel s flag, th e Bible , an d a revolver . Th e main effort s wer e directe d a t th e harat al-Yahud i n Tunis , wher e thou sands of Jews dwelt. Severa l apartment s wer e rente d i n the city's divers e residential district s wit h fund s allocate d b y th e Misgeret's headquarter s in Paris . Th e activist s woul d infor m th e apartmen t manager s tha t the y were bachelor s lookin g for smal l apartments. I n reality , onc e rented , th e apartments serve d a s weapons cache s an d place s t o conduc t self-defens e training as well as to assemble an d dismantl e firearms. 24 In 195 7 Semam a wa s sen t t o Franc e fo r advance d training . There , h e and severa l othe r me n wer e taugh t th e ar t o f transmittin g secre t mes sages an d codes , an d ho w t o confron t differen t type s o f assailants. Upo n returning t o Tunis, Semam a became on e oi Misgeret's uni t commanders . The Misgeret consiste d o f several suc h units , eac h functionin g indepen dently of the other, wit h contacts between the m maintaine d onl y throug h the units ' commanders. T o the bes t o f Semama's knowledge, th e conduc t of Misgeret's member s wa s exemplary ; the y demonstrate d loyalt y an d refrained fro m informin g o n eac h othe r t o friends o r t o the authorities. 25 Until 1961 , the Misgeret coul d hardl y justify it s existence o r boast of selfdefense accomplishment s i n Tunisia . Thoug h constantl y o n th e alert , n o

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Full Independence 29

5

Table 19 . Th e Jewis h Populatio n of Souther n Tunisia , 195 7 Town or Village Population Hara Kablr a 1,39 Hara Saghir a 54 Zarzis 50 Ben-Gardane 26 Tatouine 31 Medenine 24 Gabes 1,30 Al-Hamma 3 Jabll 18 Gafsa 20 Total 4,99

6 6 6 7 2 5 5 9 1 0 7

Source: CZA , S6/235 , Hebrew .

major challenge s cam e t o th e fore, Algeria.

26

a s wa s ver y muc h th e cas e i n

The Post-1957 Period After replacin g Markus e a s c aliya directo r i n Augus t 1957 , Zv i Heitne r remain i n hi s pos t unti l Jul y 1960 . Lik e hi s predecessor , Heitne r an d hi s emissaries complaine d tha t th e Jew s w e r e no t a t al l anxiou s t o g o t o Israel. Th e sout h stil l provide d would-b e emigrant s wh o wer e willin g t o undergo th e medical/socia l screenin g procedures . Ye t eve n ther e th e enthusiasm o f th e pre-independenc e perio d wa s gone . Mosh e Farajo n and M . c Aidan, th e c aliya envoy s fo r th e south , foun d a limite d clientel e in Jerba' s Hara Kablra an d i n Zarzis . The y fare d bette r i n Gabes , w h e r e out o f a communit y o f 1,300 , five h u n d r e d ha d planne d c ally a.27 Ye t o n the whol e th e situatio n wa s no t promisin g (se e tabl e 1 9 o n th e Jewis h population i n th e sout h durin g 1957) . Heitner usuall y obtaine d th e passport s fo r th e emigrant s throug h hi s office an d arrange d fo r th e baggag e t o b e loade d ont o th e ships . How ever, i t wa s als o possibl e afte r 195 7 for th e emigrant s t o appl y directl y fo r the passports . Th e mor e affluen t Jew s ofte n emigrate d t o Israe l o n thei r own initiativ e an d di d no t tur n t o th e * allya office. 28 A s tim e elapse d th e

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status o f th e emigratio n offic e underwen t certai n modifications . I t wa s registered a s a Swis s agenc y t o cove r u p it s functions . Th e Ministr y o f the Interio r an d th e polic e informe d Jewis h Agenc y official s i n Genev a that i t woul d b e bette r t o presen t th e c aliya offic e a s a Swis s associatio n for Hebre w studies , providin g ai d t o need y families . Thi s developmen t occurred i n 1958 , afte r Tunisi a (lik e Morocco ) wa s pressure d t o join th e Arab League . Despit e thei r relativel y flexible policie s ove r emigration , the authoritie s coul d n o longer affor d t o alienate Nasse r of Egypt, the n a t the heigh t o f hi s popularit y i n th e Ara b world , or , fo r tha t matter , segments o f the population i n North Africa who were opposed t o c aliya.29 The sig n outsid e th e mai n c aliya offic e o n Ru e d e Met z no w rea d L'Ag ence Associatio n Juiv e Suisse , instea d o f L'Agenc e Juiv e (Th e Jewis h Agency).30 Until th e latte r hal f o f 1959 , emigratio n continue d unhampered . Thi s did no t signif y tha t th e authoritie s wer e completel y happ y wit h Jewis h Agency policies. I n July 195 8 Maurice Perlzwei g and Joseph Gola n of the WJC me t wit h Ahma d Mestiri , Tunisia n secretar y o f stat e fo r justice . Mestiri raise d thre e complaints . First , Israel' s attitud e towar d Nort h African emigrants , regardin g the m a s inferio r citizens , wa s disturbing . He sai d tha t settlin g the m i n th e Negev , wher e livin g condition s "wer e horrible," wa s a virtua l crime . Second , hundred s o f disillusione d Tu nisian Jew s wer e returnin g t o Tunisia . Third , base d o n polic e reports , the Jewis h Agenc y i n Tuni s conducte d publi c propagand a campaign s i n favor o f c aliya, especiall y i n th e south . Th e WJ C delegate s wer e encour aged t o infor m th e Jewis h Agenc y i n Jerusale m abou t thes e problems . Mestiri hinte d tha t emigratio n fro m souther n Tunisi a shoul d b e slowe d down, fo r th e Jews in that part o f the country wer e importan t t o the loca l economy. Nonetheless , h e rule d ou t th e possibilit y tha t Tunisi a woul d follow Morocco' s ban o n emigration. 31 While Heitne r reporte d a t the en d o f 1958 that his office an d emissar ies wer e occasionall y overcom e b y Tunisia n bureaucrati c re d tape , wit h emigrants havin g t o prove the y ha d pai d al l taxes and outstandin g debts , some o f which wer e invente d b y officials , th e authoritie s showe d consis tency i n grantin g freedo m o f movement . Heitne r confirme d tha t th e small-scale c ally a i n 195 8 had nothin g t o d o wit h th e regime : "th e mai n difficulty wa s with th e unwillingnes s o f the majorit y o f the Jew s t o mak e c aliya. . . . Thousands ar e postponing emigration , eve n i n the south . "3 2 It was in th e latte r hal f of 1959, however, tha t thos e Jews i n the sout h

From Internal Autonomy to Full Independence 29

7

who sough t t o emigrate t o Israel wer e refuse d passport s fo r a t least eigh t months. 33 It seem s tha t th e authorities , a s Mestir l told th e WJ C th e yea r before, wante d souther n Jew s t o remai n fo r economi c reasons . Jewis h Agency sources also claimed that , a s the regimes fiercest opponent s wer e concentrated i n th e south , an d considerin g tha t th e Jew s constitute d a loyal pro-governmen t element , eve n thoug h onl y 5,00 0 o f the m dwel t there, thei r continue d presenc e wa s encouraged. 34 O n th e othe r hand , Jews fro m Tunis , Sfax , an d Souss e easil y obtaine d passports . I n orde r t o circumvent th e restriction s fo r th e south , Heitne r transporte d souther n Jews t o Tunis . Afte r severa l week s the y receive d thei r passport s a s i f they wer e resident s o f that city . Thes e operation s wen t unnoticed , fo r s o few emigrant s from th e sout h opted fo r c allya.35 Special insight s int o politica l an d socia l lif e i n Tunisi a i n genera l an d in the Jewish communitie s i n particular ar e evident i n a special report b y Yitshak Yeger , a senior Jewis h Agenc y officia l wh o visited th e countr y i n December 1959 . Despit e Bourguiba' s optimisti c forecasts abou t Tunisia' s political future , Youssefites ' oppositio n i n th e sout h le d hi s regim e t o adopt repressiv e measure s agains t them . Th e jail s o f th e sout h an d th e north wer e filled t o capacit y wit h politica l opponents , includin g th e former governo r o f Jerba. Th e opposition , moreover , intensifie d acros s the Arab world following Bourguiba' s decisio n t o challenge Nasser' s lead ership and t o boycott th e Arab League , on e year after Tunisi a joined it. 36 Regarding Israel , Yege r wa s pleasantl y surprise d b y th e regime' s be havior. Th e government' s semi-officia l organ , La Presse, publishe d infor mation abou t Israel i societ y regularly , whic h include d th e result s o f th e 1959 election s t o th e Knesset . O n Unite d Nation s Day , flags wer e dis played i n th e windo w o f th e America n Cultura l Center , amon g the m Israel's flag wit h th e country' s nam e i n bot h Arabi c an d English. 37 N o other Ara b countr y i n th e Middl e Eas t an d Nort h Afric a woul d hav e permitted a display o f the Jewis h state' s nationa l symbol s i n it s midst . I t was als o commonplac e fo r Tunisia n cabine t minister s t o discus s wit h admiration Israel i nationa l an d economi c developments , notabl y i n th e agricultural sector . These attitude s wer e welcome d b y Tunisia' s Jewis h masses , althoug h their suppor t o f the regim e wa s confine d t o Bourguib a an d hi s personal ity. The y di d no t adher e t o th e Neo-Destou r part y wit h an y specia l enthusiasm. Whe n top-rankin g party and governmen t official s visite d th e harat al-Yahud i n Tuni s sometim e i n 1959 , onl y fou r peopl e showe d u p

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for a receptio n i n thei r honor . Jewis h leader s panicked . The y wen t int o the cafe s an d roame d th e street s t o gathe r a n audience . Onl y a fe w people actuall y agree d t o cooperate . Then , o n 1 Novembe r 1959 , th e date markin g th e fifth anniversar y o f Algeria's revol t agains t th e French , the chie f rabb i o f Tuni s wa s invite d t o a receptio n honorin g Algeria n leader Ferha t c Abbas. According to Yeger, th e only reason the chief rabbi accepted th e invitatio n fro m th e Neo-Destou r wa s out of concern tha t hi s absence coul d hav e cause d a rif t betwee n th e communit y an d th e re gime. 38 Whereas th e ordinar y Jew s supporte d Bourguiba , eve n i f the y wer e indifferent t o th e Neo-Destou r party , th e Jewis h leadershi p o f th e lat e 1950s becam e suspiciou s o f hi s intention s concernin g thei r statu s a s communal heads. 39 This attitud e o n thei r par t wa s no t altogethe r unjus tified, give n th e fac t tha t th e governmen t wa s determine d t o reorganiz e the Jewis h communitie s i n 1958-61 . Alread y i n Apri l 1958 , Ahma d Mestiri submitte d a draf t la w proposin g certai n reform s t o Tunisia n Jewish leaders . Th e la w calle d fo r th e establishmen t o f temporary man agement committee s (Comite s Provisoire s d e Gestion ) t o becom e effec tive—beginning wit h Tunis—durin g th e secon d hal f of that year . Whe n the la w was promulgate d i n Tuni s (1958 ) and th e res t o f the countr y (b y the earl y 1960s) , i t dissolve d th e communit y council s a s wel l a s th e welfare funds . I t als o restricted th e competenc e o f the communa l organi zations t o religiou s matters , religiou s service s an d concomitan t philan thropic activities , a s wel l a s religiou s educatio n fo r th e youths . On e o f the reason s fo r th e disbandmen t o f th e council s wa s th e government' s contention tha t thei r leadership , compose d o f personalities suc h a s Charle s Haddad, wa s no t sufficientl y Tunisia n i n cultur e an d outlook. 40 Surpris ingly, th e ne w managemen t committees , controlle d b y th e mor e politi cally acceptabl e leaders , retaine d th e temporary statu s an d remaine d unaltered unti l th e 1970s . Without underestimatin g Bourguiba s reforms , th e possibilit y o f absolute loyalt y o f Jewis h leader s t o a n independen t Tunisi a wa s place d i n doubt b y certai n politica l force s withi n th e country . N o longe r wa s i t a matter o f choic e betwee n loyalt y t o colonia l rul e o r t o th e nationalis t movement. Th e decisio n o f th e Jewis h leadershi p ha d t o b e a one-wa y street. Though th e newl y appointe d leadership , willingl y o r unwillingly , en dorsed th e governments decision , official s o f international Jewish welfar e

From Internal Autonomy to Full Independence 29

9

organizations (AJD C an d OS E i n particular ) wer e initiall y somewha t anxious abou t th e 195 8 law . Thes e bodie s wer e no t subjec t t o th e mea sures, bu t thei r delegate s wondere d a t th e tim e wha t positio n th e gov ernment intende d t o take with regar d t o their activities. 41 Jewish anxietie s resurface d durin g th e summe r o f 196 1 in th e wak e of the Bizert e crisis . I n Jul y Bourguib a demande d tha t Frenc h presiden t Charles d e Gaull e evacuat e th e Frenc h base s a t Bizerte , a por t cit y i n northern Tunisia , som e o f th e las t vestige s o f th e colonia l past . Th e situation develope d int o full-scal e fighting an d resulte d i n a needles s massacre o f Tunisia n civilian s an d militar y defea t fo r Tunisia , bu t n o evacuation unti l d e Gaulle' s unilatera l decision , whic h woul d probabl y have been take n i n any event, mor e than tw o years later . For th e Jew s th e crisi s precipitate d emigration . I f in 196 0 only 1,80 0 left fo r Israe l and France , fro m th e end o f July until late Septembe r 1961, 3,500 Jew s arrive d i n France . Thi s figure di d no t includ e som e 500-60 0 in transi t i n Marseille s o n thei r wa y t o Israel. Approximatel y 2,00 0 wer e French citizen s an d th e remainde r Tunisia n nationals , man y o f who m were evacuee s from Bizert e an d nearb y Menzil. 42 From thes e dat a it is not clea r i f 250 Jews from Bizerte , rescue d b y a n Israeli-French operation , wer e include d i n th e statistics . I n Augus t 196 1 the Mossad an d th e Jewis h Agenc y receive d informatio n tha t th e condi tions o f the Jew s i n Bizert e ha d becom e perilous . Th e Misgeret in France , headed sinc e 196 0 by Ephrai m Ronel , th e Jewis h Agency' s Immigratio n Department, an d Davi d Izwotzki , th e ne w c aliya directo r fo r Tunisia , decided t o evacuate as many Jews as possible. I t is estimated tha t in 196 1 between 1,00 0 an d 1,20 0 Jew s dwelt in Bizerte. Man y of them, especiall y French nationals , di d manag e t o obtai n passports . Other s drifte d t o nearby communitie s an d di d no t retur n t o Bizert e unti l th e crisi s ended . However, approximatel y 25 0 Jew s remained , mainl y peopl e wh o wer e not grante d Tunisia n passports. 43 Assisting th e Misgeret wa s Mauric e Metuk , a nativ e o f Bizert e an d Izwotzki's c ally a representative there . Metu k no t onl y provided th e Jew ish Agenc y i n Pari s wit h a lis t o f peopl e wh o ha d n o passports , h e als o contacted M . Jeanot , th e Frenc h consul-genera l a t Bizerte . Independen t of the Misgeret's evacuatio n plans , Metu k collaborate d wit h th e consul general i n sendin g t o Franc e smal l group s o f Jews who later were settle d in Israel . As fo r th e Misgeret' s efforts , thes e wer e inextricabl y boun d u p wit h

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Metuk's connections . O n 8 Septembe r 1961 , 13 0 Jew s i n Bizert e wer e organized fo r departur e b y th e Misgeret activists . Thi s procedur e wa s realized onl y after Metu k enliste d Jeanot' s help in convincing the Frenc h naval authorities t o transport th e evacuees . Th e latter were then escorte d to th e town s nava l bas e b y Frenc h paratrooper s an d boarde d th e vesse l Ville d'Oran. The y reache d Marseille s b y wa y o f Bone, a n Algeria n por t city, an d afterward s arrive d safel y i n Israel . O n 1 3 September , th e Misgeret organize d "Operatio n Har-Sinai " wit h th e hel p o f the French , in whic h te n Jew s boarde d a vesse l fo r Marseilles . Two day s late r th e Misgeret sen t an additional fifteen Jews to France in "Operation Jericho. " There wer e a s man y a s on e hundre d Jew s ye t t o b e rescued . Bu t th e French showe d sign s of reluctance t o continue th e evacuation operations . In orde r t o obtai n th e suppor t fo r a final rescu e mission , Metu k flew t o Paris t o discus s th e matte r wit h Ephrai m Rone l an d Y a c el Vered . Th e latter wa s a n experience d diplomat , a n advise r t o Walte r Eytan , Israel' s ambassador t o France , an d wel l connecte d wit h th e Mossad. Rone l an d Vered decide d t o cal l upo n c Uzi Narkiss , th e Israel i militar y attach e i n Paris, t o utiliz e hi s tie s wit h th e leadin g general s wh o wer e clos e t o d e Gaulle. Perhap s the y would provid e th e desire d approva l for th e evacua tion. Soon afte r Narkis s contacte d severa l generals , h e realize d tha t th e main obstacl e t o th e evacuatio n coul d b e trace d t o th e Qua i d'Orsa y whose official s argue d agains t th e rescu e o f Jews wh o wer e no t Frenc h nationals. T o spee d u p matters , Vere d an d Ambassado r Eyta n supple mented Narkiss' s effort s b y attemptin g t o reac h th e mos t influentia l French politica l personalitie s wh o migh t broach th e issu e with d e Gaull e or his premier, Miche l Debre. 44 On 2 1 September ther e wer e indication s tha t th e evacuatio n would b e approved. Metu k returne d t o Bizert e t o assis t i n organizin g th e depar ture o f th e Jews . Th e initia l phase , know n a s "Operatio n Moshe, " wa s smoothly executed . Twenty-on e peopl e boarde d a shi p fo r Algeri a wit h the Frenc h consul-general s blessings . Followin g furthe r delay s at tributed t o Frenc h politica l calculations , th e tas k o f removin g th e addi tional peopl e wa s unde r way . O n 3 0 Septembe r the y wer e assiste d aboard a Frenc h landin g craf t b y Frenc h soldier s an d th e Misgerefs activists. Afte r a brief transi t perio d i n Algeria an d France , th e evacuee s arrived i n Haifa. Bizert e remained without Jews until October or Novem ber 1962 , whe n abou t tw o hundre d o f them returne d t o thei r homes. 45

From Internal Autonomy to Full Independence 30

1

These c aliya operation s wer e th e onl y deviation s fro m th e Misgeret's functions i n Tunisi a tha t wer e i n th e framewor k o f self-defense. Regard ing Metuk , h e late r settle d i n Israe l wher e h e wa s presente d wit h a special awar d fo r hi s rol e i n th e rescu e missio n b y Yitsha k Ben-Zvi , Israel's president . Many Jew s throughou t th e countr y believe d tha t thei r communa l lif e had draw n t o a n en d i n 1961 . According t o Jewis h sources , ther e wer e further politica l development s whic h encourage d Jew s t o leav e i n in creasing numbers . First , Bizert e ha d accentuate d th e Jewis h proble m because th e Tunisian s accuse d th e Jew s o f havin g bee n identifie d wit h the Frenc h fro m th e start . Thi s had shake n th e faith o f Tunisian Jewr y i n the attitud e o f thei r Musli m compatriots . Second , th e clashe s i n Ora n (Algeria) betwee n Jew s an d Muslim s i n 1961 , at th e heigh t o f the Alge rian Revolution , ha d receive d ampl e coverag e i n th e Tunisia n press , showing Nort h Africa n Jewr y a s a whol e i n th e mos t unfavorabl e light . Consequently, man y Jew s ha d reache d th e conclusio n that , sinc e th e press wa s partially government-controlled , thes e article s reflecte d Bour guiba's attitude . Third , followin g Bizerte , ther e wer e indication s tha t during th e earl y autum n o f 1961 Bourguiba adopte d a closer approac h t o the Ara b Leagu e an d Nasser , afte r havin g kept hi s distance fro m the m i n 1959.46 There wa s som e concer n ove r th e unfoldin g o f political event s amon g AJDC an d Unite d HIA S Servic e officials . Th e positio n o f th e Unite d HIAS wa s tha t Tunisia' s Jewr y ha d suffere d a seriou s setbac k resultin g from th e crisis . Ye t Frenc h national s (mostl y non-Jews ) wer e th e mai n target o f the authorities . Th e latte r were expelle d i n significant numbers , picked u p b y th e polic e a t thei r homes , an d escorte d straigh t t o th e airport o r boats , ofte n withou t a chanc e t o chang e thei r clothes . Thi s measure, however , wa s never applie d t o whole familie s bu t onl y t o me n who wer e eithe r professional s o r well-know n Frenc h activists . A s fo r emigration, a Unite d HIA S repor t note d that , excep t fo r th e restriction s imposed i n Bizerte , many Tunisia n Jew s (wit h thei r families ) hav e take n advantag e o f the vacatio n season and left fo r Franc e with touris t visas. Sinc e the Bizert e crisis emigration to Israe l ha s gaine d a ne w impetus . Man y Jewis h familie s eage r t o leav e th e country hav e already left , o r will be leavin g soon, fo r Israel . Thi s movemen t is working out smoothly and without any interference from th e government authorities. I t was said that restriction s were established fo r th e issuanc e of passports.

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However, th e great rush of applications has created a slow-down in the processing.47 The AJDC s assessmen t o f th e factor s tha t inhibite d a n eve n greate r movement ou t o f Tunisi a included : (1 ) th e prohibitio n o n th e expor t o f possessions an d money . Jew s with Frenc h citizenshi p were abl e t o register thei r propert y wit h th e Frenc h consu l an d thu s a t leas t dra w u p a n inventory. I n som e case s the y opene d ban k account s abroa d o r ha d families i n France , bu t Jew s o f Tunisia n nationalit y ha d n o consu l t o whom the y migh t tur n an d wer e constraine d fro m takin g immediat e action; (2 ) Tunisia n Jew s wer e concerne d abou t th e educatio n o f thei r youths. Tunisi a offere d th e advantag e o f a vas t educationa l networ k sponsored b y the Missio n Universitair e e t Culturell e Franchis e (MUCF) , temporarily paralyze d followin g th e crisis. Give n th e limitation s impose d on currenc y withdrawa l an d transfe r abroad , th e Jew s wer e unabl e t o register thei r childre n i n school s of metropolitan Franc e an d waited unti l Franco-Tunisian negotiation s resolve d th e crisis. 48 The situatio n graduall y returne d t o normal . B y 1962-6 3 most , i f no t all, o f th e Zionis t an d yout h activit y ha d com e t o a n end . Emigratio n continued i n 1962 , whe n ove r 2,00 0 Jews—includin g numerou s youn g people—departed. Durin g 1962-6 7 emigratio n t o Israe l decline d i n favor o f France , onl y t o increas e temporaril y followin g th e Jun e 196 7 war. (Se e table 20 on th e Jewish populatio n durin g 1964-6 7 and tabl e 2 1 for comparativ e dat a o n Jewis h emigratio n i n 196 2 and 1964 , assiste d b y the Unite d HIA S Servic e an d th e Jewish Agency. ) Ivore Svarc , a forme r Unite d HIA S Servic e delegat e t o Tunisia , vis ited th e countr y i n Augus t 196 1 after a three-yea r absence . Durin g hi s stay h e me t hi s persona l friend , Maitr e Bessis . Praisin g Bourguib a fo r suppressing activitie s an d utterance s directe d agains t th e Jew s durin g the Bizert e crisis, Bessi s nevertheless expresse d th e conviction tha t ther e was no future fo r th e Jew s i n Tunisia. Bessis , Svar c concluded, appeare d like on e wh o fel t tha t al l h e ha d hope d an d worke d fo r ha d bee n de stroyed. 49 The fac t tha t Jewis h lif e i n Tunisi a continue d an d tha t 2,00 0 Jews , mainly ol d people , stil l remaine d i n th e countr y i n 1991 , confirm s tha t the communitie s di d no t totall y ceas e t o exis t i n th e 1960s , 1970s , an d 1980s. Nevertheless , th e departur e o f young peopl e weakene d th e com munities, whos e synagogue s an d cultura l centers were deserted .

90 1,000 600 1,350 460 85 184 280 160 448

97 1,220 685 1,450 535 95 196 296 150 466 1,250 500 7,163

1,300 500

8,365

6,557

1,300 420

55 45 80

88 45 90

April 1966

200 40 90 11 55 97 1,700 750 55 1,700 560 90 190 350 207 470

April 1965

1,200 420 6,031

1,300 400 65 136 213 120 445

80 950 533

59 40 70

April 1967

5,335

1,195 392

130 205 143 445

1,200 289

752 457

46 22 59

September 1967

Source: Populatio n israelit e en Tunisie—a l'exception de Tunis et banlieue—Nombre de personnes, Arch . AJDC/Jerusalem , 242B/56.601B . *Tunis had approximately 20,000 Jews on the eve of the June 196 7 Middl e Eas t war.

Bizerte Mateur Beja Suq el-Khemis Testour Gafsa Sousse Nabeul Mahdia Sfax Gabes Kebili Medenine Tatouine Ben-Gardane Zarzis Jerba: Hara Kabira Hara Saghlr a Total

April 1964

Table 20 . Th e Jewis h Populatio n o f Tunisia with th e Exceptio n o f Tunis an d It s Environs : 1964-1967 *

Jt8

1,112

122 79 81 125 120 115 113 103 110 88 8

53 34 72 34 107 112 246 312 448 113 98 86 1,715 20

5

8 7

13

4

4 5

15

1

6 7 1

Source for 1962: AJDC Annual Report—Tunisia (1962), Arch . AJDC/Jerusalem, 242B . Source for 1964: AJDC Annual Report—Tunisia (1964), Arch . AJDC/Jerusalem, 242B .

January February March April May June July August September October November December Total

France 1964 1962

38

18 5 5

5 5

United HIAS Service U.S.A. Canada 1964 1962 1964 1962

7

7

1962

Italy

0

1964 122 85 88 133 128 122 114 103 115 88 8 48 1,154

1962

53 34 72 43 117 112 246 330 453 122 98 86 1,766

1964

Monthly Totals

132 81 213 97 264 112 226 188 246 101 77 51 1,788

1962

646

3 7 41 42 29 51 82 91 90 79 112 19

1964

Jewish Agency

Table 21 . Comparativ e Dat a o n Unite d HIA S Service-Assiste d Emigratio n and Jewis h Agency-Supervise d c Aliya fro m Tunisia, 196 2 an d 196 4

From Internal Autonomy to Full Independence 30

5

In 196 4 the authoritie s onc e agai n place d obstacle s i n th e wa y of Jews wishing to emigrate t o Israel. T o lift th e restrictions , Easterma n me t wit h Bourguiba i n Switzerlan d o n 2 Septembe r 1964 . Bourguib a denie d tha t his offic e instructe d th e Ministr y o f th e Interio r t o cur b emigration , adding: You know that I have never stoo d in the way of Jews leaving Tunisia for Israel ; departures ar e stil l continuing . I a m th e onl y Hea d o f State i n th e Ara b world who has voluntarily not prevented Jews fromemigrating to Israel. I have followed this practice consistently over the years, sometimes in the face of pressures upon me to reverse my attitude, and I have not changed. 50 Despite th e denials , th e problem s di d exist . Durin g th e Bourguiba Easterman meetin g th e forme r contradicte d himsel f an d suggeste d tha t if certai n obstacle s wer e encountere d b y Tunisia n Jew s i t wa s becaus e "you mus t realiz e tha t i t is impossible fo r m e t o ignore and detach mysel f from event s which , i n th e Ara b world , ar e passionatel y regarde d a s o f major importanc e t o the Ara b states/' 5 1 It appear s tha t th e mai n opponen t o f Jewis h emigratio n i n 196 4 wa s Mongi Slim , Tunisia' s foreig n minister , wh o emerge d a s a firm advocat e of improve d relation s wit h Egypt' s Nasse r an d th e Syrians . Bourguib a apparently succumbe d t o Slim s influenc e ove r the emigratio n issue . Th e restrictions wer e lifted , however . I n Novembe r 196 4 Bourguib a wa s reelected presiden t b y 96.43 percent o f the voting population, whic h was generally regarde d a s strengthenin g hi s authority . H e dismisse d Sli m and appointe d hi s son , Habi b Bourguiba , Jr. , a s foreign minister . B y th e end o f November th e temporar y restriction s o n the issuanc e o f passports were withdrawn . Thes e development s serve d t o encourag e Tunisia n Jew s in th e hop e tha t n o further discriminator y measure s agains t the m woul d likely be take n b y the ne w government. 52 Until th e Jun e 196 7 war , Bourguiba' s governmen t di d no t hee d th e warnings fro m Cair o o r Damascu s t o hal t Jewis h emigration . I n Marc h 1965, Bourguib a Jr . informe d Easterma n tha t Nasse r ha d bee n tol d i n categorical term s tha t an y attemp t o n hi s part t o exercis e pressure s o r t o influence Tunisi a i n an y directio n woul d no t b e tolerated. 53 Therefore , Shragai coul d stil l boas t i n 196 5 tha t "despit e th e hardship s confronte d by th e Jewis h Agency' s offic e i n Tunis , i t stil l functione d an d remaine d the las t Israel i an d Zionis t addres s i n th e Tunisia n diaspora . "5 4 Bu t h e

306 From

Internal Autonomy to Full Independence

added tha t on e o f the reason s fo r th e limite d c allya, an d increase d emi gration t o Franc e i n recen t years , ha d t o d o wit h th e descriptio n i n th e Tunisian medi a abou t Israel s socioeconomi c difficultie s an d it s uncon trollable securit y problems. 55 On 2 8 Novembe r 1966 , Bourguiba , speakin g i n a n ol d synagogu e i n Jerba, declared , "Ou r Stat e belong s t o al l Tunisian s withou t distinctio n of rac e o r religion . I t i s concerne d wit h helpin g al l it s Tunisia n sons , whatever thei r faith . I n return , i t ask s o f the m onl y sincerit y i n thei r words an d devotio n i n thei r deeds." 56 This declaration wa s welcomed b y the Jewis h communitie s whic h ha d bee n reduce d b y the n t o approxi mately 25,000 , becaus e i t assure d the m tha t th e hea d o f state remaine d the guaranto r o f thei r rights . However , th e cloud s o f dange r hovere d over th e Jew s nearl y si x months late r with th e outbrea k o f the June 196 7 war. On 5 June , a crow d o f Tunisia n Muslims , shoutin g suc h slogan s a s "Down wit h th e Jews, " "Int o th e Se a wit h th e Jews, " "Let' s Bur n th e Jews," burn t th e monumenta l Sta r o f Davi d adornin g th e fron t o f th e Great Synagogu e o f Tunis. Dozen s o f vehicles wer e damaged . Th e dem onstrators eve n trie d t o se t fire t o th e building s i n whic h th e franti c Jewish populatio n ha d sough t refuge . Jewis h stores , includin g th e Bock boza koshe r winer y i n th e suburb s o f Tunis , wer e looted . Man y youn g Jews were attacke d an d beaten. 57 Bourguiba di d no t lear n o f the inciden t unti l lat e i n th e evening . I n a televised speec h th e next day, h e called the demonstrator s "irresponsibl e fanatics wh o deserve th e gallows. " Eighty o f them wer e arrested , an d th e government promise d sever e punishment fo r them. 58 After th e demonstrations , a large-scal e polemi c bega n i n th e Frenc h press. Numerou s witnesse s asserte d tha t th e demonstration s wer e no t spontaneous, bu t ha d bee n thoroughl y organized . Other s adde d tha t th e police eve n len t a hand. On e Tunisian Jewish observer sai d privately tha t it wa s " a concerte d action , planne d i n detai l i n hig h quarters, " an d added: "Thi s veritabl e pogro m ha s lef t a permanen t mar k o n us. " I n answer t o th e polemic , th e Tunisia n governmen t publishe d a commu nique, denyin g tha t th e demonstration s ha d bee n organized . Two week s later th e hea d o f Tunisia's nationa l polic e wa s replace d i n recognitio n o f the fac t tha t interventio n b y th e polic e ha d no t bee n rapi d an d efficien t enough. 59 In Augus t 196 7 a rumo r circulate d amon g Jewis h leader s tha t Bour -

From Internal Autonomy to Full Independence 30

7

guiba faced oppositio n fro m Plannin g Ministe r Ahmad Be n Salah , a hardliner i n hi s government . A s a resul t man y familie s lef t th e countr y i n haste—and thi s despit e Bourguiba' s declarations ; th e imprisonmen t o f some o f th e demonstrators ; th e officia l apologie s t o th e Chie f Rabb i Nessim Cohen ; th e manifest o signe d b y a numbe r o f Tunisian intellec tuals expressin g "solidarit y wit h thei r Jewis h fello w citizens" ; an d th e appointment o f a commission tha t wa s t o apprais e th e damag e t o Jewis h merchants s o tha t the y coul d b e indemnified . Mos t o f the m wen t t o France. 60 After th e lat e 1960 s th e remainin g communitie s live d i n peace . Unti l 1982 no majo r conflict s emerge d betwee n Muslim s an d Jews , eve n dur ing th e 197 3 Middl e Eas t war . I t wa s afte r 1982 , however , whe n th e Palestine Liberatio n Organizatio n (PLO ) move d it s headquarters t o Tun isia, tha t Judeo-Musli m relation s deteriorated , particularl y a t time s o f Israeli militar y operation s insid e Tunisi a agains t thi s force . Still , a s lon g as Bourguiba seeme d i n charge , Jewis h lif e was somehow preserved. Hi s removal fro m powe r o n 7 Novembe r 198 7 may hav e place d th e Jew s i n danger. Moreover , th e growin g threa t o f the Musli m fundamentalist s i n North Africa—thei r gain s i n Algeria n municipa l election s i n 199 0 unde r the banne r o f the Islami c Salvatio n Front , le d b y c AbassI al-Madani an d Ahmad Belhaj ; th e attemp t b y simila r movement s i n Morocc o t o muste r support agains t the Sharifia n monarchy ; and their ability to win adherent s in th e challeng e agains t secula r authorit y i n Tunisi a eve n prio r t o Bour guiba's downfall—can onl y hasten th e ongoing communal self-liquidatio n process. Onl y the curren t peac e process may halt it . Economically, th e educationa l syste m o f th e communities—Frenc h mission school s (MUCF) , a s well as Rabbinic schools , AIU , ORT—coul d not provid e a brigh t futur e fo r youn g Jew s afte r th e mid-1960s . Severa l factors accoun t fo r thi s situation . I n th e first place , economi c condition s in th e countr y ha d becom e increasingl y unstabl e sinc e th e Bizert e crisi s for Muslim s an d Jew s alike . Secondly , Jewis h craftsme n wer e systemati cally an d progressivel y eliminate d i n mos t fields o f endeavor , wit h th e exception o f the jewelers who had entered int o the jewelers' cooperative . Practically al l Jewish artisans , unwillin g t o becom e employee s o r t o join the ne w socialist-inspire d cooperatives , intende d t o leav e th e countr y sooner o r later . Thirdly , graduall y bu t evidently , th e numbe r o f smal l Jewish busines s enterprise s wa s als o decreasing , a s Jew s sol d ou t t o Muslims o r simpl y abandone d thei r shop s whos e position , economically ,

308 From

Internal Autonomy to Full Independence

Table 22 . Tunisia n Jewis h Schoo l Enrollment , Decembe r 1967 Location or School Or Torah-—Tuni s Lubavitch—Tunis ORT—Tunis AIU—Tunis Jerba: Hara Kabira/O r Torah & Daber Tvri t Hara Saghir a Zarzis Medenine Tatouine Ben-Gardane Gabes Total

Number of Pupils 360 240 304 28 (+3,000 Muslims ) 295 100 100 35 66 17 48 1,593

Source: Stanle y Abramovitch , Repor t o n Visi t t o Tunisia , 6-1 4 Decembe r 1967 , Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem, 403 .

had becom e marginal . Lastly , increasin g governmen t regulator y activi ties, a s well a s the introductio n o f high taxes , wer e development s whic h prompted th e departur e o f Jews to France. 61 The mid-1960 s an d subsequen t year s als o witnessed populatio n shifts . Jews fro m th e sout h move d t o th e north , mainl y t o Tunis , eithe r fo r resettlement o r a s transient s seekin g t o emigrate . Wherea s unti l 195 6 Jews withi n Tuni s move d fro m Hafsi a t o th e Europeanize d suburb s o f Ariana and L a Goulette, th e movemen t i n 1964-6 7 was from th e suburb s to the cente r o f the city. 62 On th e ev e o f th e 196 7 Middl e Eas t war , th e communitie s ha d los t most o f thei r dynami c leader s t o emigration . Thi s developmen t ha d a devastating impac t o n Jewis h education , fo r ther e wer e hardl y enoug h competent person s t o supervis e communit y institutions. 63 Afte r 196 7 school enrollmen t decline d sharply . A s in Morocco , enrollmen t wa s th e best yardstic k t o gaug e communa l self-liquidation . Wherea s i n 1964 , 3,284 youth s frequente d Tunisia' s Jewish schools , onl y 1,59 3 attende d i n December 1967 . Du e t o reduce d enrollment , communit y school s i n Tunis were combined, thu s creating enormous problems for the teachers . The latte r wer e no w contendin g wit h varie d level s o f knowledge amon g

From Internal Autonomy to Full Independence 30

9

different group s o f integrate d children . Combinin g school s als o pose d a problem i n relatio n t o the socioeconomi c differenc e o f the youths . I n th e past, youth s i n Tuni s attende d Jewis h community-sponsore d school s i n accordance wit h socia l status. 64 (Se e tabl e 2 2 fo r dat a o n Jewis h enroll ment throughou t Tunisi a at the en d o f 1967.) Only a few Jewish school s still functioned i n Tunisia after 1967 . In th e late 1960 s th e AI U an d OR T i n Tuni s wer e combine d int o on e school . During th e 1972-7 3 schoo l year , AI U pupil s performe d exceptionall y well o n th e stat e examinations . Bu t th e realit y o f th e passin g o f a com munity wa s eviden t whe n onl y fifty-one childre n attende d th e AIU/OR T school.65 I n 197 4 th e AI U pu t a n en d t o it s Tunisia n operatio n afte r ninety-six year s o f service . Othe r school s followe d i n it s steps , a s Tu nisian Jewry o f the 1970 s and 1980 s became a n aging population .

Chapter 10

Algeria's Politica l an d Socia l Struggle : Algerian Jewry' s Dilemma s

Jewish Society and Politics until 1958 As in Morocco , Jewis h populatio n growt h i n Algeria wa s significan t afte r the conques t o f th e countr y b y th e French . I n 183 0 ther e wer e onl y between 30,00 0 an d 35,00 0 Jews wherea s i n 188 1 the Jewish populatio n climbed t o 35,563 , a s compare d t o a Europea n settle r populatio n o f 432,252 an d a Musli m communit y o f 2,842,497 . I n 1931 , however , th e Jewish populatio n reache d 110,12 7 a s compare d t o 850,27 9 European s and 5,593,04 5 Muslims . Base d o n th e data , i t i s eviden t tha t betwee n 1881 and 1931 , the Europea n populatio n ha d augmente d b y 9 7 percen t while th e Musli m an d Jewis h population s ha d increase d b y 9 7 an d 21 0 percent, respectively. * These statistic s make it abundantly clea r that during a fifty-year period Algeria wa s transforme d fro m a n underpopulate d t o a demographicall y expanding population ; an d fro m a societ y compose d o f indigenous Mus lim an d Jewis h communitie s t o a heterogeneous , multiculture d one , including European s (French , Italian , Spaniards) . Th e impressive Jewis h demographic growt h wa s attributabl e t o improve d hygieni c conditions , emigration o f Jews fro m Morocc o an d othe r Mediterranea n basi n areas , the expansio n o f medica l facilities , a s wel l a s economi c an d politica l stability unde r Frenc h domination . Interestingly , simila r factor s con tributed t o th e populatio n increas e i n th e Jewis h communitie s o f Egyp t following th e Britis h occupatio n i n 1882 . In 194 1 the populatio n i n Algeri a wa s a s follows : seve n millio n Mus 310

Algeria's Political and Social Struggle 31

1

Table 23 . Th e Jewis h Populatio n o f Algeria, 195 6 Town or City

Population

Algiers Oran Constantine Ghardai'a (The M czab Saharan Region ) Bone Setif Philipville Sidi-Bel-Abbes Tlemcen Mostaganem Blida Ain Tamouchen t Mascara Saida Orleanville Suq Aram Relizane Frigo La-Guette (Sahara n area ) Afarville Touggourt Vargla (Saharan area )

35,000 35,000 25,000 6,000 5,000 5,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 2,000 1,400 1,200 800 800 600 500 450 400 350 240 150 120 132,010

Total Source: "Algeria, " Netivot, 6 April 1956 , 62, Hebrew . These dat a are incomplete , a s several communitie s ar e omitted .

lims; 800,00 0 Frenc h naturalize d citizens—mostl y Spaniard s an d Ital ians; 150,00 0 Frenc h wh o originate d fro m Metropolita n France ; 150,00 0 Europeans no t possessin g Frenc h citizenship ; an d 130,00 0 Jews, mos t of whom wer e Frenc h citizens. 2 O n th e ev e o f Algeria n independenc e nearly nin e millio n Muslim s an d on e millio n European s dwel t i n Algeri a while th e Jewis h populatio n increase d t o approximatel y 140,00 0 (se e table 23 for Jewish populatio n dat a for 1956) . The Jewis h communitie s i n Algeri a adhere d t o th e la w o f separatio n between churc h an d stat e an d coul d onl y b e considere d a s private agen cies. Thus , afte r Worl d Wa r I I th e communitie s wer e stil l organize d i n consistoires a t th e majo r centers ; the y continue d t o subsidiz e Jewis h communal activities . Thei r budge t depende d o n membershi p fees , reve nues fro m goods , propertie s an d synagogues , taxe s o n koshe r win e a s

312 Algeria's

Political and Social Struggle

well as meat sales , gifts , an d retribution s fo r religiou s ceremonies suc h as marriages an d circumcisions . Th e expense s include d salarie s fo r th e rab bis. A s in previous years, th e consistoires wer e composed o f lay member s from amon g th e peopl e i n th e communities . The y ha d t o be twenty-on e years ol d o r olde r an d resident s o f thei r communit y fo r no t les s tha n twelve months . Th e suprem e consistoria l counci l member s whos e rank s included th e chie f rabbis , la y presidents an d vice-presidents , wer e electe d by a secret ballot . T o become eligible , the y had t o be a t least twenty-fiv e years ol d an d Frenc h nationals . Th e term s t o whic h the y wer e electe d could no t excee d eigh t years . As w e hav e seen , i n 194 7 th e communitie s an d thei r consistorie s created th e FCI A whic h serve d a s an umbrell a organizatio n t o unit e th e consistories an d othe r communa l bodies . Th e FCI A wa s administere d during th e lat e 1940 s an d earl y 1950 s b y a counci l i n whic h th e chie f rabbi o f Algeria, th e chie f rabbi s o f Algiers, Oran , an d Constantine , an d the consistoria l president s represente d th e suprem e leadershi p o f Algerian Jewry . Thes e leaders , too , wer e electe d officials , usuall y fo r a twoyear term , althoug h i n practic e the y serve d fo r longe r terms . Thei r wor k was supplemented i n th e mid-1950 s by sixty-one community member s of whom twenty-on e represente d th e departement o f Algiers , twenty-tw o the departement o f Oran, an d eightee n th e departement o f Constantine. 3 The FCIA s budge t depende d o n th e ver y sam e financial resource s a s the consistoires' budget . A substantial portio n o f the allocation s wen t t o subsidize th e Ecol e Rabbinique—create d i n 194 8 at Algier s an d admin istered b y Rabb i M . Fingerhut , Algeria' s chie f rabbi—which traine d th e future rabbini c elite o f teachers an d spiritua l leaders. The student s a t th e Ecole Rabbiniqu e receive d th e secon d cycl e o f secondar y educatio n leading t o th e baccalaureat examinations . Fo r th e first tim e i n 1954-55 , three rabbi s complete d thei r si x year s o f trainin g an d receive d thei r diplomas. The y late r performe d importan t religiou s function s i n th e smaller communitie s wher e the y were needed. 4 Educationally, progres s i n developin g Jewis h studie s wa s modest , albeit evident , i n th e post-Worl d Wa r I I period . Thoug h man y youth s continued t o atten d Frenc h governmen t schools , includin g th e Univer sity of Algiers, Jewish religiou s school s on the primary leve l also enjoye d partial growt h owin g t o th e intensifie d effort s o f th e FCIA , th e AJDC , and the Jewish Agency. However , a s late as April 1954, only 2,500 youths frequented talmude torah throughou t th e country , severa l of which wer e

Algeria's Political and Social Struggle 31

3

affiliated wit h th e AIU . Th e larges t o f these institution s wa s i n Constan tine wit h 1,00 0 children . Algier s ha d 25 0 childre n i n talmude tor ah, whereas Ora n an d Tlemce n ha d 350 an d 150 , respectively . I t wa s th e FCIA's goa l t o enrol l a t leas t 15,00 0 childre n i n suc h school s a s part- o r full-time pupils , a challenge tha t coul d no t be me t i n modern-da y Jewis h Algeria. I t wa s feare d tha t th e absenc e o f Jewis h youth s fro m suc h institutions woul d pos e seriou s problems , fo r a new generatio n emerge d that was completely deprive d o f any Jewish education. 5 The majo r obstacl e rendering comprehensiv e Jewis h education incom plete wa s attribute d t o th e fac t tha t educatio n a t Frenc h governmen t schools i n Algeria , a s i n France , wa s obligatory ; an d i n principle , al l Jewish childre n wer e admitte d int o thes e schools . No t onl y were Jewis h youths i n th e majo r citie s expose d t o secular influences , bu t th e majorit y could atten d talmude tor ahonl y durin g reces s periods . Th e Frenc h educational syste m consiste d o f five days o f class an d tw o day s o f recess: Thursday an d Sunday . Thes e tw o day s o f recess enable d th e childre n t o rest, fo r th e program s a t th e French-typ e governmen t school s wer e generally "plu s charges" (more demanding) than thos e of other countries . As n o course s i n religiou s educatio n wer e give n i n th e secula r govern ment schools , th e consistoires supporte d th e talmude tor aht o bridge th e gap b y offerin g Jewis h studie s durin g th e two-da y reces s perio d an d during summe r vacations. 6 Other educationa l initiative s include d th e effort s o f the DM O an d th e Department o f Torah Educatio n i n th e Diaspor a (DT E hereafter) . A s i n Morocco an d Tunisia , th e DMO' s endeavor s wer e short-lived . Ary e Lie berman, on e o f its representative s wh o serve d a s a school principal a t a n AlU-affiliated talmud torah i n Constantine , introduce d partia l curricula r reforms b y addin g th e teachin g o f modern Hebrew , Jewis h history , an d aspects o f Zionism . However , h e di d no t alte r th e religiou s curriculu m itself s o as t o avert a conflict wit h th e rabbis . Lieberma n als o traine d hi s Algerian-Jewish staf f an d prepare d the m t o mee t th e challeng e o f teaching Israeli-oriented subjects . Lik e their counterparts i n Oran and Algiers, Jewish pupil s i n Constantin e frequente d th e Frenc h publi c school s an d came t o th e AlU-affiliate d talmud torah o n Sundays , Thursdays , Chris tian holidays , an d durin g summe r vacations . Still , Constantin e Jewr y made certai n tha t mos t Jewis h businesse s wer e close d o n Saturday s an d Jewish holidays . Mixe d marriage s (betwee n Jew s an d Europeans ) i n tha t community wer e fewe r tha n i n Ora n an d Algiers , whil e thei r suppor t fo r

314 Algeria's

Political and Social Struggle

Israel wa s quit e intense . Th e synagogue s i n Constantin e wer e bette r attended tha n th e one s i n th e othe r majo r cities . Accordin g t o Lieber man, a s th e attachmen t t o religio n wa s stronge r i n Constantin e tha n i n other larg e communities , th e parent s insiste d tha t thei r childre n absor b as muc h Jewis h educatio n a s possible , especiall y i n th e summertime . Consequently, Jewis h studie s surpasse d i n qualit y th e educatio n offere d in other communities. 7 Replacing th e DMO' s rol e i n Jewish/Hebre w education , durin g th e early 1950s , wer e th e emissarie s o f the Jewis h Agency' s DTE . B y 1954 55 th e variou s consistorie s wer e enthusiasti c abou t th e DTE' s religiou s emissaries operatin g i n thei r communities . I t becam e clea r tha t th e Jewish leadershi p o f th e 1950 s sough t greate r contact s wit h th e res t o f the Diaspor a and Israe l than a t any time heretofore. Event s i n the Jewis h world i n genera l an d th e upheaval s i n Algeri a i n particula r followin g th e outbreak o f th e Algeria n Revolutio n ha d profoun d influence s o n th e leadership, promptin g i t to stress Jewish values. 8 Of specia l importanc e wa s th e AJDC' s position . Unti l 1957 , th e Jew s in th e departements o f Constantine an d i n Bon e depende d o n th e AJD C office i n Tunis ; th e departements o f Algiers an d Ora n depende d o n th e AJDC bureau i n Casablanc a an d were represente d b y Eli e Gozla n whos e headquarters wer e i n Algiers . Onl y i n 195 7 di d th e AJD C creat e a n Algerian bureau. 9 I t provide d subsidie s an d othe r form s o f assistance t o communal institution s an d initiatives . Thi s include d financial ai d t o Zi onist yout h movements , amon g the m Bne- cAkiva an d Gordonia . Th e money wa s allocate d t o th e movements ' educationa l summe r program s held i n Algeri a an d France . Moreover , fo r som e tim e a plo t o f lan d a t Bouzarea, situate d eleve n kilometer s fro m Algiers , wa s utilize d t o assis t the influ x o f emigrant s i n transi t befor e departur e t o Marseille s an d Israel. Th e AJD C purchase d th e terrai n an d turne d i t over t o the Algier s consistoire. Thi s gestur e enable d th e communit y o f Algier s t o organiz e summer program s fo r need y children. 10 What rol e di d th e Zionist s pla y i n Algeria a s French rul e wa s drawin g to an end? A Zionist federation—Federation Sionist e Algerienne, o r FSA —continued t o functio n i n Algiers , wit h branche s i n th e othe r majo r communities. Thes e organization s wer e no t challenge d b y th e Frenc h authorities. Durin g th e mid-1950 s th e FSA' s presiden t wa s Andr e Nar boni, a leading Nort h Africa n Zionist , activ e mostly in Algiers. Othe r ke y Zionists wer e Eli e Gozla n an d Dr . Ang e Zaffra n o f Algiers, an d Charle s

Algeria's Political and Social Struggle 31

5

Table 24 . c Aliya fro m Algeria—Octobe r 1949-Novembe r 195 5 Year 1949 (Oct.-Dec.) 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955

Moroccans

Algerians

273 745 57 21 — — —

78 339 254 65 95 323 575

Total

351 1,084

311 86 95 323 575

Sources: Henr y Laufe r o f AJD C i n Pari s t o Samue l L. Haber , Rapport sur VAlgerie, 6 decembre 1955 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem, 49B/56.208 ; Ya cakov Hasan t o Shlomo Zalman Shra gai, Algiers , 6 January 1958 , CZA, S6/235 , Hebrew .

Bouchara of Constantine. The y raised funds fo r the JNF and other Zionis t enterprises, organize d Zionis t cultura l programs , an d helpe d promot e c aliya. The Mossa d L e c Aliya an d th e Jewis h Agenc y playe d a predominan t role insid e Algeri a betwee n 194 7 an d 1950 . Firs t an d foremost , durin g the clandestin e c aliya phas e o f 1947-48 , the y assiste d i n transportin g t o Israel Morocca n an d Tunisia n Jew s wh o entere d Algeria n territor y a s transients. Loca l Zionist leaders suc h as Elie Gozlan , Eize r Sharqui , Pau l Sebaoun, Davi d an d Raphae l Zaga , an d M . Dado n participate d i n th e process. Then , i n 1949-50 , whe n c aliya from Nort h Africa wa s semilegal , those Morocca n Jew s lef t behin d fo r medica l reason s wer e place d a t special camp s i n Algeria . Ther e the y receive d treatmen t an d wer e reha bilitated fo r eventua l emigration . Israel i operation s fro m 195 0 include d an c aliya apparatu s an d a small c Aliyat ha-N o c ar bureau. Th e emissarie s entrusted wit h th e c aliya in the mid - and late 1950 s had often riske d thei r lives. I n 1956-5 8 th e leadin g emissarie s wer e Y a c akov Hasa n (hea d o f the emigratio n agenc y an d forme r envo y with Morocco' s Cadima) , Yo 3 el Arikha, Gabrie l Azoulay, c Ovadia Bijou (i n charge of the screenin g team), Raphael Ben-Guera , Mosh e Gaba y (hea d o f th e c aliya offic e branc h i n Oran), an d Avraham Hove l (responsibl e fo r c Aliyat ha-No c ar). n Considering tha t c aliya fro m Algeri a include d bot h Algeria n an d Mo roccan elements , th e dat a i n tabl e 2 4 sho w ho w fe w Algerian s regarde d emigration a s a serious option. Wit h th e exceptio n o f Jews from Constan tine an d th e M c zab, tha t is , th e mor e traditiona l o r economicall y disad vantaged, departur e o f any significanc e wa s directed towar d France . Thi s is explained by the strong attachment o f Algeria's Jews to French culture .

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From th e tim e Y a c akov Hasa n wa s entrusted wit h th e c aliya (Novem ber 1956 ) until Novembe r 1957 , 1,09 2 Jew s left fo r Israel . Th e emigrant s in 1956-5 7 were mostl y Morocca n Jew s who lived i n th e departement o f Oran for man y years, an d Algerian Jews from th e M czab. 12 Turning t o political an d economi c factors, a t th e en d o f World Wa r I I prewar Algerian-Muslim/Frenc h tensions , obscure d o r rendere d laten t in wartime, wer e t o reappear. Th e world war had shake n th e foundation s of the Frenc h colonia l empire and opened the way for Algerians to appear as a forc e i n history . Franc e ha d bee n beaten , an d onc e liberate d i n August 194 4 was n o longer i n a moral o r physical positio n t o behave a s a major power . Indo-Chin a an d th e Levan t ha d rejecte d o r were challeng ing France' s tutelage . Algeria , althoug h considere d par t o f Metropolita n France, wa s as vulnerable a s any Arab state t o the sire n call s of independence. 13 Muslim Algerians , afte r th e war, foun d themselve s betwee n tw o worlds: the moder n Wester n worl d an d th e worl d o f thei r historica l Arabo Berber past . A s Davi d C . Gordo n noted , th e Muslims , alienate d fro m both, wer e no w t o tak e th e initiativ e i n comin g t o term s wit h both . Th e Revolution wa s to be a struggle both for entr y into the moder n worl d an d for th e revitalizatio n o f Islamic values. I t was to be a rejection o f both th e deadening han d o f a corrupte d pas t an d o f France . Al l colonia l revolu tions ar e characterize d b y thi s duality , bu t i n th e cas e o f Algeri a th e duality, o r dichotomy , wa s especiall y marked—becaus e o f the lengt h o f the conques t (sinc e 1830) , becaus e o f the unusua l exposur e o f its elit e t o French acculturation , an d becaus e i t ha d live d s o lon g o n th e edge s o f the moder n an d Wester n economi c an d socia l world o f the colons. O f all the Musli m Arab states, Algeria was the most cut off from it s past becaus e it had gone , eve n i f superficially, s o far int o the twentieth-centur y worl d of th e West . An d becaus e th e masse s o f it s populatio n ha d live d i n th e traditional worl d i n a stat e o f abjec t povert y an d illiteracy , Algeri a ha d the furthes t t o g o towar d bridgin g th e ga p betwee n th e pas t an d th e present. Th e leader s o f the Revolutio n wer e t o call themselves crusader s (mujahidun—from jihad o r holy war) and to consider alcoho l and tobacc o as symbol s o f betrayal . Simultaneously , the y wer e t o conceiv e o f th e Revolution a s progressivist—a s a revolutio n t o ope n t o th e Musli m masses th e modernit y th e colons ha d denie d them . And , unlik e th e French Protectorat e syste m i n Tunisia or Morocco , th e ver y fact tha t th e European Algeria n colons presenc e wa s deepl y roote d an d pervasiv e

Algeria's Political and Social Struggle 31

7

meant tha t Algeri a woul d experienc e mor e tha n an y Ara b an d Berbe r people th e brutalitie s an d th e disruption s o f a lon g an d crue l colonia l 14

war.x* The objectiv e situatio n o f th e Muslim s wa s clea r enough . Algeria n nationalists ha d littl e nee d t o falsify th e dat a the y gathere d t o revea l th e inequalities o f the Algeria n co/on-dominate d economi c an d politica l sys tem. I n 195 4 onl y 1 1 percen t o f th e activ e workin g population , th e colons, hel d 4 2 percent o f all industrial jobs; 90 percent o f industrial an d commercial activit y wa s i n Europea n hand s (onl y 1 9 percen t o f thos e employed i n th e nationalize d economi c secto r wer e Muslims) ; on e Mus lim chil d ou t o f te n wen t t o school—almos t al l Algeria n Jewis h an d European childre n did ; 9 4 percent o f the me n an d 9 8 percent o f Musli m women wer e illiterate . Onl y about 7,00 0 Muslim s were i n secondar y an d 685 in higher education. 15 Whereas th e Jew s obtaine d Frenc h citizenshi p i n 187 0 and non-Frenc h European settler s coul d d o s o by virtu e o f the Frenc h naturalizatio n la w of 1889 , i t was onl y afte r Worl d Wa r II , b y th e Organi c Statut e o f 1947, that lega l Frenc h citizenshi p wa s extended t o Muslims . Ye t the mode s of its applicatio n continue d t o kee p the m subordinat e t o th e colons, an d Muslim representatio n i n th e Algeria n Assembl y wa s limite d t o th e second colleg e o f this bicameral body. 16 The mont h o f May 194 5 was a crucial turning point in French-Algeria n relations an d i s considere d a s a prelud e t o th e 195 4 Revolution . O n 8 May, clashe s betwee n th e polic e an d 7,000-8,00 0 demonstrator s i n Seti f (departement o f Cons tan tine), callin g for th e releas e fro m priso n o f Messali Hadj , incite d th e polic e t o ope n fire . Th e demonstrator s disperse d and the n bega n t o attack Europea n settler s an d pillag e property . Fright ened an d indignant , th e polic e an d militi a unit s o f arme d Europea n civilians, supporte d b y th e communists , struc k back . Fo r severa l day s the regio n o f Constantin e live d i n a stat e o f terror , jail s wer e opened , and prisoner s shot ; helples s civilian s wer e massacre d an d home s raze d by aeria l an d nava l bombardment . Th e numbe r o f Muslim s kille d re mains a matte r o f dispute, wit h th e mos t conservativ e estimat e a t 1,50 0 and th e mos t extravagan t a t 80,000. 17 The Muslim s wer e no w determined t o break wit h Franc e a t an y pric e and wer e prepare d t o resor t t o violenc e t o achiev e thei r goal . Thi s wa s bound t o spel l troubl e fo r th e Jews , accordin g t o communal spokesmen , because i n order t o maintain thei r colonia l grip, th e Frenc h woul d finally

318 Algeria's

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have t o appeas e th e Muslims , eve n a t th e Jews ' expense . Whil e Jew s were no t victimize d b y th e Seti f massacre , Josep h Fischer , th e JN F French delegat e t o North Africa , expresse d pessimis m an d sai d that, a s a result o f th e immediat e post-Worl d Wa r I I developments , Muslim s would hav e acces s t o administrativ e post s an d schools ; position s usuall y held b y Jews would b e take n ove r by the m a s part o f Frances attemp t t o cement th e crack s in the colonia l edifice. 1S The effort s b y the Frenc h t o suppress over t expression s o f nationalism and arres t Musli m leader s drov e Algerian s t o clandestin e activity . Th e frustrations o f 8 May 194 5 could not be contained, however . A t 1:0 0 A.M . on 1 Novembe r 1954 , th e Algeria n Revolutio n agains t Franc e com menced wit h sporadi c attacks upo n Frenc h installation s i n different part s of Algeria . Th e uprising , whic h caugh t th e Frenc h unaware , wa s the n the work o f comparatively fe w people who formed th e Fron t fo r Nationa l Liberation (FL N hereafter). 19 The y calle d fo r Algeria n sovereignty . Amon g its leader s wer e Muhamma d Boudiaf , Hocin e Ai t Ahmad , Ahma d Ben Bella, an d Lakhda r Be n Tobbal . Wherea s Ben-Bell a an d othe r ke y FL N leaders wer e arreste d b y th e Frenc h i n Octobe r 1956 , th e Revolutio n that the y bega n i n Novembe r 195 4 continued unti l th e summe r o f 1962, and ende d wit h Presiden t d e Gaulle' s willingnes s t o gran t Algeri a inde pendence. The event s i n th e wak e o f th e Revolution , an d th e climat e o f terro r and insecurit y whic h i t had produced , le d t o the disintegratio n o f several small Jewis h communitie s i n th e interio r an d th e south , whos e inhabi tants migrate d t o th e large r citie s o r t o France . Unti l 1956-5 7 th e stat e of wa r wa s mor e intens e i n th e interio r tha n i n Algiers , insofa r a s th e Jews were concerned . I n th e cit y of Algiers th e post-195 6 period inaugu rated th e impositio n o f curfew regulation s fro m midnigh t unti l 5:0 0 A.M. In severa l citie s th e curfe w bega n a t 9:0 0 P.M . Despit e thei r fears , th e Jewish masse s supporte d i n a discreet manne r th e firm action adopte d b y the Frenc h agains t th e rebels. 20 It was during thi s time tha t FLN-inspire d terroris m an d Frenc h coun terterrorism als o affected th e live s o f the Jews . Severa l unfortunat e inci dents occurre d tha t include d a n attac k o n th e Jew s o f Constantin e (discussed i n thi s chapter) , th e burnin g o f the synagogue s o f Orleanville an d Batna, an d th e harassmen t o f rabbi s an d notable s a t Batn a an d else where. 21 Thes e wer e partl y attribute d t o th e neutra l stanc e o f Jewis h leaders an d intellectual s ove r th e conflic t an d thei r reluctanc e t o suppor t

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9

nationalist causes . Thei r positio n wa s quit e understandable . A s Frenc h citizens the y coul d no t suppor t o r join th e rebels , fo r thi s woul d surel y have bee n regarde d b y th e Frenc h a s treasonous . Therefore , Frenc h intervention o n thei r behalf , i f an d whe n Franco-Algeria n negotiation s over Algeria were t o take place, coul d b e forfeited . Responding to certain allegation s b y nationalists o f Jewish noninvolve ment in the struggle, th e Comite Juif Algerien d'Etude s Sociale s (CJAES) —representing divers e current s o f Jewis h intellectua l lif e i n Algeria — declared i n Novembe r 195 6 that Algeria n Jewr y wa s composed o f differ ent religiou s an d cultura l organization s tha t di d no t constitut e a single , unified politica l entity . Th e consistoires, i t was also said, wer e singularl y concerned wit h religiou s practice s an d th e administratio n o f religiou s affairs. Thu s i t wa s erroneou s t o assum e the y could , o r should , desir e t o express th e opinio n o f th e genera l Jewis h public . A s fo r th e Jew s a s a whole, th e CJAE S argue d tha t the y wer e sufficientl y matur e politically , holding conflictin g views , t o th e exten t tha t i t was inconceivabl e t o hav e any give n ideolog y impose d upo n them . Th e Jew s wer e a peace-lovin g people, supportin g a just solutio n t o th e Franco-Algeria n crisis . Thoug h the CJAE S supporte d "certai n concession s t o be mad e t o the Muslim s b y France," i t rule d ou t th e possibilit y o f Jews distancin g themselve s com pletely from France : During the dramatic hour throug h which we are now passing, whe n th e breach is steadily growin g wider between th e differen t element s o f the population, th e Jews of this country—where the y lived for over two thousand years, profoundl y grateful t o France, to whom they owe so much—intend t o remain faithful t o the commandments tha t bind the m t o the two other religiou s communities, Musli m and Christian . Thei r firm hop e i s t o continu e t o liv e i n clos e friendshi p wit h both.22 As the violenc e escalate d throughou t 1956 , th e mos t seriou s incident s from th e Jewis h perspectiv e occurre d i n Constantin e durin g th e mont h of May . Accordin g t o Samue l Levy , a communit y leader , th e Jew s re acted b y organizin g counterterroris m agains t th e FL N an d othe r nation alist forces . Thi s development , h e observed , prompte d th e Frenc h t o conclude tha t throughou t Algeri a ther e existe d a Jewis h terroris t net work, wel l arme d an d efficientl y organized . Thus , Genera l Noiret , th e security commande r o f th e Constantin e region , conducte d a thoroug h search o f Jewis h institution s t o loo k fo r weapons. 23 O f course , thi s de -

320 Algeria's

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The City of Constantine in the 1950s (courtesy of the Organization of the Former North African Undergroun d Activists in Israel). scription i s partia l an d unclear ; th e event s o f Ma y 195 6 warrant a fulle r investigation. There are , i n fact , a fe w account s an d conflictin g date s abou t th e events. Th e Londo n Jewish Chronicle reporte d tha t o n 1 2 o r 1 3 Ma y a hand grenad e wa s throw n int o a Jewish-owne d caf e i n th e ol d Jewis h quarter o f Constantine , injurin g thirtee n people . Then , o n 1 4 May , a group o f Muslim s entere d anothe r Jewis h cafe . Suspectin g a secon d attack, severa l o f the Jewis h client s pulle d ou t revolver s an d kille d the m on the spot. 24 Another accoun t wa s published i n La Depeche de Constantine. O n 1 3 May a grenad e explode d i n th e afternoo n a t a smal l Jewis h caf e o n Ru e Sidi-Lakhdar, injurin g twelv e people . Accordin g t o thi s version , th e attack wa s planne d i n advance . Th e authoritie s steppe d in , cleare d th e streets, an d apprehende d severa l suspect s who were later take n t o Mosqu e Sidi al-Kettani fo r interrogations . A t the sam e time , th e Frenc h securit y services claimed tha t the Muslim s involved i n the cafe bombing were no t residents o f th e city . The y arrive d ther e withou t weapon s bu t wer e subsequently supplie d wit h grenade s an d revolver s b y wome n affiliate d with th e FLN. 25

Algeria's Political and Social Struggle 32

1

Analyzing th e events , Le Journal d Alger note d tha t organize d Jewis h resistance playe d a prominent rol e in self-defense . I n a version simila r t o the on e publishe d i n th e Jewish Chronicle, i t wa s conclude d tha t th e Jews wer e wel l prepared , an d trained , t o defen d th e community . The y retaliated ove r th e Sidi-Lakhda r caf e bombin g b y shootin g Muslim s the y suspected o f having engaged i n terrorism , o r simpl y opene d fire i n orde r to war n al l Muslim s tha t Jewis h bloo d coul d neve r agai n b e spilled. 26 Whereas th e Jewish Chronicle reporte d tha t mos t Jews , lik e Europeans , were armed , i t nonetheless i s true tha t self-defens e unit s were organize d in Constantine, Oran , an d Algiers . Wer e thes e unit s formed locall y as an Algerian-Jewish initiative ? O r wa s th e resistanc e inspire d b y externa l forces? Th e loca l pres s an d Jewis h newspaper s i n Europe , thoug h in formed abou t th e events , coul d no t possibl y hav e know n the n tha t th e Misgeret wa s behind it . Active i n Algeri a i n self-defens e endeavor s only , th e Misgeret inher ited th e rol e o f defendin g th e communitie s fro m Zionis t youth s wh o carried ou t suc h actio n i n th e lat e 1940 s bu t ha d sinc e mad e c aliya. Th e Misgeret i n Constantin e consiste d o f about on e hundred youn g member s whose unit s commander s underwen t trainin g i n Franc e o r Israel . Pos sessing Frenc h citizenship , the y were als o reservists i n th e Frenc h arm y stationed i n Algeri a an d thu s experience d i n th e handlin g o f weapons . Several o f them serve d i n th e loca l army' s headquarter s a s interrogator s of FLN sympathizers , give n thei r knowledg e o f both Frenc h an d spoke n Arabic. Thi s i s how the y ha d acces s t o informatio n o n th e FL N tha t wa s sometimes valuabl e t o th e Misgeret. Th e latte r create d weapon s cache s and onl y it s Algeria n uni t commander s coul d hav e acces s t o th e Israel i emissaries. Betwee n 195 7 and 196 2 three emissarie s subordinat e t o Hav ilio and Rone l in Paris succeeded eac h other i n Constantine—"Ibrahim, " whose nam e mus t remai n anonymous , an d wh o guide d Algeria n Jewis h youths onc e before a s a DMO envoy ; Yosef Regev; and Itzi k Baer. 27 Prior t o th e event s o f May 1956 , th e Misgeret dispatche d guard s o n a regular basi s t o th e synagogue s o n Saturday s an d holidays . The y woul d stand a t stree t corners—tw o me n i n differen t place s a t a site—an d communicated throug h ey e contac t an d han d signals . Eac h membe r o f the Misgeret involve d i n guar d dutie s wa s arme d wit h a revolve r an d carried tw o munition clips. 28 Based o n a recen t accoun t o f the event s b y a former Israel i emissar y who heade d th e Misgeret i n Constantine , th e attac k o n th e Jew s too k

322 Algeria

s Political and Social Struggle

place o n Saturday , 1 2 May . I t wa s betwee n 11:0 0 A.M . an d noo n tha t most o f th e worshipper s steppe d ou t o f th e synagoguge s t o drin k th e Shabbat aperitif at th e Jewish-owne d cafe s o n th e Ru e d e France—th e city's commercia l avenu e strategicall y locate d betwee n th e Jewis h an d Muslim residentia l districts . A grenad e explode d a t on e o f th e cafe s owned b y Ferdinan d Sabba h bu t ther e wer e n o casualties. A s the terror ists wh o carrie d ou t th e ac t bega n t o flee, severa l o f the Misgeret mem bers confronte d the m an d opene d fire. A s many a s thirty Muslim s wer e killed an d man y other s wounded . Th e retaliator y measur e cause d fea r among th e Musli m populatio n an d disma y i n Frenc h politica l circles . I t appears tha t th e FL N realize d tha t th e Jew s intende d t o defen d them selves and , a s a result, anti-Jewis h action s becam e infrequen t durin g th e ensuing months. 29 Neither th e Muslim s nor the Frenc h authoritie s kne w about th e Misgeret, althoug h i t wa s obviou s t o the m tha t youn g Jew s were organize d i n som e sor t o f self-defens e apparatus. 30 Demonstratin g caution, th e Misgeret smuggle d ou t o f the countr y severa l o f its activist s who might hav e been identifie d b y Muslim s durin g the confrontation. 31 Given th e tens e atmospher e i n th e country , th e Misgeret member s were mor e radica l than thei r counterparts i n Morocco and Tunisia. Whe n Havilio arrive d i n Constantin e afte r th e Ma y 195 6 event s an d spok e t o the Israel i envoy , h e wa s tol d tha t th e activist s wer e edg y an d eage r t o place explosive s i n Muslim-owne d shops . Havili o refuse d t o authoriz e such action s o n th e ground s tha t innocen t Muslim s coul d b e hur t whil e the Jewis h communit y woul d surel y b e victimize d b y pogroms . More over, th e raiso n d'etr e o f th e Misgeret wa s t o engag e i n self-defens e rather tha n vengeance . Instead , h e suggeste d tha t th e Misgeret prepar e a lis t o f names an d addresse s o f key FL N activist s i n th e city , an d the n send the m a trac t emphasizin g tha t th e Jew s wer e no t sidin g wit h th e French. However , shoul d Jewis h bloo d b e shed , shoul d ther e b e po groms, Jew s woul d no t si t idle . Accordin g t o Havilio , a trac t outlinin g these points was sent out. 32 The continue d violen t atmospher e provoke d heate d debate s amon g Jewish leader s abou t th e communities ' future . Certai n leader s referre d to political turmoi l a s the mai n challeng e t o Jewish existenc e i n 1956-57 . Others wer e mor e concerne d wit h th e economic factor . Th e latte r main tained tha t a n unofficia l boycot t o f Jewish businesse s wa s encouraged b y the FL N i n different part s of the country, i n solidarity against the Frenc h as wel l a s thos e suspecte d o f collaboratin g wit h them . Thes e leader s

Algeria s Political and Social Struggle 32

3

further suggeste d tha t fo r a lon g tim e th e wholesal e clot h an d line n industry wa s a Jewis h monopoly . B y 1956-5 7 tha t wa s n o longe r th e case. I f until th e en d o f World Wa r I I th e Jew s played a powerful rol e as trade intermediarie s betwee n European s an d th e Muslims , thi s wa s altered a s Muslim s entere d busines s positions . Th e sam e wa s true , the y said, o f th e smal l deale r an d shopkeepe r whos e Musli m clientel e wa s dwindling. 33 Fears base d o n economic s wer e downplaye d b y Henr y L . Levy , ap pointed i n Februar y 195 7 a s th e directo r o f AJDC-Algeria. H e though t that, contrar y t o th e gri m assessments , th e Frenc h poure d enormou s sums o f mone y int o th e countr y t o bolste r th e econom y t o everyone' s benefit. Th e presenc e o f hundred s o f thousand s o f Frenc h troop s an d their families, an d oil diggings in the Algerian Sahara , was helping Jewish businessmen. I n fact, ther e was an increase i n the amount o f money Jews deposited i n savin g accounts. 34 A simila r positio n wa s describe d b y Jacque s Lazarus , th e directo r o f the WJ C Nort h Africa n centra l burea u headquartere d i n Algiers . I n hi s opinion, th e Musli m boycot t eviden t i n 195 6 ha d virtuall y ende d b y 1958. No t onl y di d Jew s ceas e t o leav e Algeri a i n larg e numbers , bu t several familie s ha d returne d fro m France . Lazaru s attribute d thi s phe nomenon t o increase d securit y i n th e urba n centers , Algeria' s apparen t economic stability , an d th e difficult challenge s Algerian Jewish emigrant s encountered i n Franc e an d Israel . Ye t h e wa s somewha t les s optimisti c than Henr y L . Lev y when assessin g long-rang e developments . H e warne d that th e shar p increas e i n th e Musli m labo r force—60,000 t o 80,000 ne w workers pe r year—no t t o mentio n tha t a s man y a s 300,00 0 Musli m youths wer e o f school age , woul d eventuall y pus h th e Jew s ou t o f lucrative jobs.35 Differences i n forecasts notwithstanding , i t seems that, a s late as 1958, nearly fou r year s afte r th e star t o f th e Revolution , th e Jew s wer e rela tively well represented i n th e privat e an d publi c economi c sectors . The y were fa r bette r of f tha n Morocca n Jewr y an d probabl y i n a bette r eco nomic situatio n tha n thei r Tunisia n coreligionists . O f th e fou r mai n em ployment categorie s i n th e urba n economy, 36 Algeria' s Jew s wer e thu s represented: Commerce and Small Businesses Skilled and Unskilled Workers

—30 percent —40 percent

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Civil Service/Clerks —2 The Liberal Professions —1

0 percent 0 percent

The Jews and the Passing of French Algeria, 1958-1962 As Davi d C . Gordo n observed , th e yea r 195 8 was t o b e a watershed for both Franc e an d th e FLN . Militarily , th e FL N los t heavily . Th e Moric e electrified "line, " built b y th e Frenc h t o cu t of f th e externa l FL N rebe l army i n Tunisia from Algeria , prove d effective . I t was guarded b y 40,00 0 troops an d mos t attempt s t o lea d me n fro m Tunisi a t o Algeri a failed . A t the en d o f the yea r Genera l Mauric e Challe , th e mos t successfu l genera l yet agains t th e rebels , wa s appointe d militar y commander . Throug h th e use o f forcefu l an d imaginativ e tactic s h e manage d t o eras e numerou s open pocket s o f resistance. Bu t internationall y Franc e los t ground . Th e Algerian Provisiona l Governmen t (GPRA ) wa s establishe d i n Cair o wit h Nasser's blessing s o n 1 9 Septembe r 195 8 an d bega n t o receiv e som e diplomatic support. 37 The year s mos t dramati c event , whic h encourage d bot h rebel s an d colons, wa s th e overthro w o f the Fourt h Republi c i n Franc e o n Ma y 13, followed b y d e Gaulle' s accessio n t o power . Insistin g tha t Algeri a wa s French, bu t concedin g tha t thoroughgoin g reform s wer e essential , th e new governmen t declare d tha t al l Algerian s wer e equa l i n al l respects . On 2 3 October th e "peac e o f the brave " was offered t o the rebels . Bu t i t was muc h to o lat e fo r "integration, " howeve r enlightened . Th e FL N refused an y compromis e eve n afte r d e Gaull e referre d t o a n "Algeria n personality" (authenti c Algeria n entity) . T o th e rebel s th e "peac e o f th e brave" could onl y signify surrender , irrespectiv e o f the terms. 38 Despite growin g criticis m o f French Algeria n policie s internationally , Frances militar y gri p ove r th e countr y encourage d th e Jew s t o dismis s any notio n o f large-scale emigration . I t therefor e appear s tha t fo r c aliya emissaries coul d mainl y focus o n the poo r and traditiona l communitie s o f the M c zab and th e departement o f Oran. Active i n th e effor t t o organiz e c aliya i n communitie s suc h a s Aflou , Tiaret, Laghouat , Djelfa , Bo u S a c ada, an d Ghardai'a—Y a c akov Hasa n and Raphae l Ben-Guer a visite d thes e area s i n the nam e o f the Moshavi m Movement. 39 Hasa n represente d th e relgiou s moshavim an d Ben-Guer a

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their secular counterparts. Accordin g to Alex Doron, a n Israeli journalist, on 1 7 February 195 8 Hasan an d Ben-Guer a hire d a cab in Algiers to take them t o Aflou i n western Algeria , wher e tw o groups of emigrants neede d to b e briefe d abou t th e moshavim. Afte r reachin g Aflo u an d makin g th e initial arrangement s fo r th e emigrants ' departure , the y decide d t o pro ceed t o Tiaret , som e thirt y kilometer s away , despit e warning s b y com munity leader s a t Aflo u agains t enterin g wha t wa s regarde d a s a n FL N stronghold. O n 1 8 Februar y thei r burnt-ou t ca b wa s foun d twelv e kilo meters fro m Aflou . N o trace s wer e foun d o f th e emissarie s an d th e driver. 40 Jewish Agenc y official s i n Franc e provide d a somewha t differen t ac count. Baruc h Duvdevan i an d Davi d Assa 3 el tol d Josep h Gola n tha t th e two emissarie s hire d a ca b i n Algier s t o tak e the m t o Tiare t (an d no t t o Aflou first, a s Doro n related) . Afte r a brief respit e there , an d despit e th e local authorities ' request s tha t the y retur n t o Algiers , Hasa n an d Ben Guera proceede d t o Aflou b y cab (i t is not clea r i n thi s accoun t i f the ca b that brought the m fro m Algier s to Tiaret was also hired fo r Aflou). Befor e leaving Tiaret the y placed thei r Israel i passports with th e police commis sioner a s a safety measure . Th e following da y th e ca b was found burn t a t a distanc e o f twelv e kilometer s fro m Aflou . Th e drive r an d hi s tw o passengers ha d disappeared . I t wa s quickl y suspecte d tha t Hasa n an d Ben-Guera wer e kidnappe d b y th e FLN . Afte r relatin g th e stor y t o Golan, Duvdevan i an d Assa 3 el aske d hi m t o us e th e WJC' s connection s with FL N representative s i n Europ e an d th e Unite d State s t o find ou t what migh t hav e happened. 41 The WJ C wa s no t alon e i n th e investigation . Th e Mossad an d th e Jewish Agenc y joined in . Tw o Mossad agent s wen t t o Algeria t o inquir e if th e emissarie s wer e stil l aliv e an d hel d i n captivity . The y conclude d that Hasa n an d Ben-Guer a wer e abducte d before th e ca b wa s se t o n fire.42 A s fo r Golan' s efforts , upo n learnin g tha t th e emissarie s wer e abducted, h e contacte d Muhamma d Yazi d an d c Abd al-Qadi r Chanderli , the FL N representative s a t th e Unite d Nations , an d requeste d tha t the y be release d a t once. H e the n me t wit h Chanderl i who informed hi m tha t the FL N ha d instructe d th e abductor s t o trea t th e tw o Israeli s i n a friendly fashion. 43 On 1 7 Marc h Yazi d an d Chanderl i reporte d t o th e WJ C tha t th e Israelis would be release d i n exchange for tw o million dollars . The Israel i government agree d to provide the money but the deal did not go through. 44

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On 22 March Gola n wrote t o Yazid that he was personally convinced tha t the FL N ha d n o reason t o keep the Israeli s as prisoners. Thei r missio n i n Algeria wa s limite d t o Jewis h affairs , withou t an y connectio n t o th e FLNs struggl e agains t France . H e though t tha t thei r releas e "woul d constitute i n th e Jewis h worl d a n importan t gesture , whic h migh t in crease world Jewish sympath y t o the FLN' s cause." 45 The FL N di d no t cooperate , an d it s representative s i n th e Wes t resorted t o delaying tactics. O n 2 June th e first indication tha t Hasa n an d Ben-Guera ha d bee n kille d wa s provide d b y Pierr e Gaillard , on e o f th e directors o f th e Internationa l Committe e o f th e Re d Cros s i n Geneva . Gaillard claime d t o have contacted a senior FL N representativ e wh o told him o f their death . Ye t the Algerians insiste d the y were stil l alive. 46 On 8 Jul y th e Israel i consu l i n Pari s forwarde d t o Jerusale m th e contents o f a repor t prepare d b y Frenc h intelligenc e services . I t sug gested tha t Hasa n an d Ben-Guer a wer e kep t i n captivit y somewher e i n the departement o f Oran , nea r th e Morocca n border . O n 1 4 Apri l th e rebels were abou t t o take the emissarie s acros s the Atlas mountain chain s connecting th e tw o countries . O n th e wa y the y encountere d a larg e French militar y forc e an d fighting ensued . I n orde r t o facilitat e thei r retreat, th e rebel s decide d t o shoot th e Israelis. 47 No bodies wer e recovered . Israel' s Foreig n Ministr y wa s dismayed a s to why th e Frenc h di d no t releas e thei r findings soone r tha n earl y July . Presented wit h th e data , Yazi d an d Chanderl i persiste d i n denyin g tha t the emissarie s wer e dead . Onl y i n Augus t di d the y finally acknowledg e this. 48 After Ale x Doron publishe d hi s lengthy article in Ma c ariv o n 8 August 1984, h e receive d a telephone cal l from a man who introduced himsel f as "Joseph," claimin g tha t h e kne w wha t ha d happene d twenty-si x year s earlier. Doro n the n me t "Joseph " a t hi s hom e somewher e i n Israel . "Joseph" neve r me t Hasa n o r Ben-Guer a personally . Bu t durin g th e 1950s h e serve d a s a n interrogato r o f FL N prisoner s an d translate d written material s fro m Arabi c int o Frenc h a t th e Frenc h Deuxiem e Bureau intelligenc e statio n i n th e departement o f Oran. Thi s is where h e obtained informatio n abou t th e mysteriou s disappearanc e o f the emissar ies. H e aske d tha t Doro n no t revea l his identity . "Joseph" relate d tha t onc e Hasa n an d Ben-Guera' s abductio n becam e known, th e tw o Mossad agent s wh o cam e t o Algeri a ha d spoke n t o hi m and aske d ver y detaile d an d delicat e questions . I t seem s tha t "Joseph "

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spoke th e truth , fo r h e kne w the nam e o f one of the agent s who was late r killed i n th e Sina i durin g th e Octobe r 197 3 war . On e o f Ben-Guera s sons, Yo 3 av, als o serve d i n th e Sina i durin g tha t wa r an d me t wit h th e former agent . Th e latte r tol d him abou t hi s involvement i n the searc h fo r his father ; hi s nam e matche d th e on e give n b y "Joseph. " B e t n a t a s i t may, "Joseph " could no t help th e Israeli s at the time. 49 However, i n 195 9 an FL N officer , referre d t o by "Joseph" as al- cArabi, surrendered t o th e Frenc h i n Oran . Amon g othe r things , durin g hi s interrogation i n whic h "Joseph " participated , al- cArabi sai d tha t h e an d his men ambushe d an d kille d th e Israeli s when the y travele d fro m Tiare t to Aflou i n a cab drive n b y a n FL N activist . Th e FL N kne w i n advanc e about th e emissaries ' goals , fo r Hasa n an d Ben-Guer a wer e apparentl y indiscreet, havin g discussed thei r plans with the desk clerk at their hotel . An FLN sympathizer , th e latte r informe d hi s friends abou t them . The ambus h o f the ca b too k plac e o n 1 8 February 1958 , a t a deserte d road twelv e kilometers outsid e Aflou. I n orde r t o confuse th e Frenc h an d obliterate th e evidence , anothe r ca r wa s se t o n fire . Th e Israeli s an d a French Jewis h soldier , abducte d o n another occasion , wer e late r taken t o a spo t nea r th e Morocca n border . I t wa s thei r captors ' ai m t o leav e Algeria. O n thei r wa y t o Morocc o th e rebel s riske d th e possibilit y o f running int o Frenc h troop s an d thus , t o mak e th e passag e smoother , they decide d t o murde r th e thre e me n b y shootin g the m a t clos e range . Afterwards th e bodie s wer e burned. 50 "Joseph " di d no t provid e date s covering the tim e perio d fro m th e abductio n t o the killing . Hasan's an d Ben-Guera s disappearanc e di d no t preven t th e Jewis h Agency from dispatchin g Shmue l Markus e t o Algeria in order t o conduc t business a s usual . Markuse' s experienc e i n Tunisi a an d hi s abilit y t o establish cordia l relations with Frenc h officials , wer e essentia l necessitie s for th e c aliya.51 In 1959 , but mor e s o in 1960 , Jewish leaders in Algeria were becomin g quite concerne d abou t d e Gaulle' s intentions . Outwardl y neutral , the y quietly supporte d a n Algerie Frangaise. Thi s tim e thei r fear s wer e no t completely unfounded . T o th e consternatio n o f th e Frenc h army , d e Gaulle move d increasingl y towar d comin g t o term s wit h th e FLN ; an d after hi s speec h o f 1 6 September 1959 , th e independenc e o f Algeria wa s only a question o f time. H e offere d th e Algerian s thre e choices : integra tion, absolut e independence , o r independenc e i n cooperatio n wit h France . The Frenc h bia s was obviously towar d th e thir d choice. 52

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Jewish leaders , amon g the m Hai m Cherqui , Jacque s Lazarus , an d Andre Narbon i o f Algiers, wh o were als o active member s o f the CJAES , feared tha t onc e seriou s Franco-Algeria n negotiation s commenced , d e Gaulle migh t suppor t grantin g Algerian Jewry the statu s of "communaut e minoritaire," tha t is , a minorit y community , separate d fro m bot h th e European an d Musli m communities . Suc h a policy , the y said , coul d result i n the abrogatio n o f the Cremieu x Decree. 53 These leader s base d thei r contentio n o n a n articl e appearin g i n Democratic 60, writte n b y Gu y Mollet , a forme r Frenc h premie r i n th e Fourth Republic . Regarde d a s a n all y o f th e Jew s an d Israel , Molle t wrote tha t d e Gaull e informe d hi m o f hi s intention s t o abrogat e th e Cremieux Decree . Algeria n Jewis h leader s als o spok e abou t th e skepti cism expresse d b y Mendes-France , wh o thought tha t policies formulate d by th e Elyse e palac e concernin g Algeria n Jewr y woul d no t b e favorable . This pose d a dilemma , fo r mos t Algeria n Jew s wer e eage r t o remai n French. A s they believe d tha t d e Gaull e migh t alte r thei r politica l statu s during negotiation s wit h th e FLN , Jewis h leader s ha d hope d tha t influ ential Frenc h Jew s an d internationa l Jewis h organization s woul d suppor t them i n the fight for th e preservation o f their rights. 54 The Jew s o f Algeria wer e no t th e onl y element s evincin g skepticism . The dissatisfactio n wit h d e Gaull e emerge d i n Frenc h militar y circles . On 1 5 January 1960 , th e Algeria n Frenc h genera l Jacque s Massau , wel l known fo r crushin g FL N rebellions , expresse d i n a n intervie w hi s un equivocal oppositio n t o d e Gaulle' s ne w outloo k ove r Algeria n affairs . Nine day s later , o n 2 4 January, a n insurrectio n wa s stirre d u p i n Algeri a by th e pro-fascis t Frenc h Nationa l Fron t le d b y Josep h Orti z an d sup ported b y the army . I t lasted unti l 1 February an d intended t o lead to d e Gaulle's remova l from power . D e Gaull e manage d t o counter Ortiz' s plo t and, i n a nationally televised speec h o n 29 January which had the backin g of the grea t majorit y o f the people i n Metropolita n France , h e reaffirme d his policy of self-determination a s the best alternativ e available. 55 Of course, th e suppor t d e Gaull e enjoyed i n Franc e was hardly matche d among Algeria' s Europea n colons. A secon d insurrectio n aime d a t over throwing d e Gaull e wa s organize d withi n th e arm y betwee n 2 2 an d 2 5 April 1960. It was led by Generals Mauric e Challe, Raoul Salan, Edmon d Jouhaud, an d Marie-Andr e Zeller . Thi s effort als o failed. Needles s to say, though th e Jew s i n 196 0 hope d fo r a continue d Frenc h presence , the y were nevertheles s unhapp y wit h th e Frenc h Nationa l Front' s emble m o f

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the Celti c cros s tha t wa s ominousl y reminiscen t o f the Naz i swastika . Th e CJAES monthly , Information Juive, wrot e abou t th e 2 4 Januar y 196 0 insurrection: We mus t sa y her e tha t fo r th e Jew s th e commandmen t "Remember " shoul d b e imperative. W e canno t accep t th e flaunting, unde r th e pretex t o f patriotism, o f emblems whic h evok e fo r u s a pas t whos e meanin g w e understan d al l to o well . . . . Remembe r tha t whe n th e Frenc h Republi c an d it s principle s o f liberty ar e threatened, th e securit y o f the Jews i s threatened too . Histor y ha s demonstrate d that. I t i s for th e Republi c an d fo r democrac y an d also—faithfu l t o our law—fo r justice an d brotherhoo d tha t w e shal l alway s fight. Thi s w e shal l d o becaus e w e are French , an d n o disclaimer , n o omissio n ca n eras e mor e tha n a centur y o f history an d of loyalty. 56 By 1960 , however , th e CJAE S an d othe r Jewis h communa l organiza tions coul d n o longe r ge t awa y wit h suc h statement s withou t a response . The European s insiste d tha t the y tak e par t i n th e preservatio n o f Frenc h Algeria; th e Muslim s pressure d the m t o struggl e fo r a Musli m Algeria . At th e beginnin g o f 196 0 th e F L N publishe d a n "appea l t o th e Jew s o f Algeria" whic h stressed : You ar e a n integra l par t o f th e Algeria n people ; yo u ar e no t aske d t o choos e between Franc e an d Algeria , bu t t o becom e effectiv e citizen s o f you r tru e country. Eithe r yo u choos e t o function full y i n this country wher e th e futur e wil l inaugurate freedo m an d democrati c principle s t o b e enjoye d b y al l th e nation' s children; or else you accep t t o live under th e reign o f contempt an d to be conten t with a citizenshi p grante d b y you r oppressor s withi n a contex t whic h i s i n contradiction eve n wit h th e mos t elementar y huma n rights . Suc h ar e th e term s of th e choice . Th e so-calle d economi c option , th e gambl e o n a pretentiou s prosperous futur e i s n o longe r th e case : th e idea l fo r whic h numerou s Algeria n patriots hav e died i s in no way linked with materia l facilities. 57 For th e Jews , overwhelmingl y Frenc h citizens , suc h a statemen t pose d a serious problem . Nonetheless , th e CJAE S reaffirme d it s traditiona l posi tion i n a declaratio n whic h wa s distribute d b y th e Frenc h pres s agenc y on 2 1 Februar y 1960 , an d publishe d b y almos t al l th e Algeria n dailie s and a few i n France : The Comit e Jui f Algerien d'Etude s Sociale s . . . points ou t agai n tha t th e Jewis h community o f Algeria i s no t a political , judicial , o r eve n geographi c entity , an d that ther e exist s n o Jewish part y o r politica l organizatio n entitle d t o spea k i n th e

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name o f al l th e Jew s o f Algeria. Th e Jewis h communit y i s compose d o f Frenc h citizens who , a t th e prope r time , wil l in commo n wit h othe r Frenc h citizen s us e the right s inheren t i n tha t status . Nothin g an d n o on e ca n cal l int o questio n th e obviousness o f this factua l an d lega l situation . I n stressin g ane w tha t th e Jew s of Algeria, faithfu l t o their mora l and spiritua l traditions an d t o their passionate lov e for peace , hav e alway s supporte d respec t an d justic e fo r th e mos t complet e equality amon g th e variou s element s o f this country , th e Comit e think s tha t th e Jewish communit y woul d "liv e i n humiliation " i f i t renounce d a citizenshi p fo r the preservatio n o f which i t alway s fought , t o whic h i t remain s attache d wit h a faithfulness tha t deserve s respect , an d whic h inspire d i t wit h it s dignit y an d honor.58 This wa s no t wha t th e F L N wante d t o hea r a t tha t crucia l junctur e o f the civi l war . O n 2 4 Jul y 1960 , a n F L N representativ e i n Genev a issue d a warnin g t o Algeria n Jewis h leaders : eithe r tak e a n activ e par t i n th e struggle o r ris k th e deterioratio n o f Muslim-Jewis h coexistence. 5 9 Fur ther, a t th e en d o f 196 0 th e Grand e Synagogu e o f Algiers wa s sacke d b y supporters o f th e F L N . Th e situatio n di d no t improv e i n 1961 . I n Janu ary, Arman d Kapla n o f th e WJC-Franc e i n Pari s me t wit h Benjami n Heler wh o stil l serve d a s FCI A chairman . Th e meetin g wa s attende d b y several influentia l French-Jewis h leaders , suc h a s Dr . Vita l Modiano , Leon Meiss , Jacque s Orfus , Solomo n Schweizer , an d Andr e Dreyfuss . The issu e o f Algerian Jewry' s Frenc h nationalit y surface d onc e agai n a s a source o f concern , fo r n o on e doubte d tha t Franco-Algeria n negotiation s were inevitable . Th e participant s o f th e meetin g wer e urge d t o infor m the Elyse e an d Premie r D e b r e abou t th e nee d t o mak e th e Cremieu x Decree a n essentia l componen t o f th e negotiations . Hele r sai d that , jus t as d e Gaull e wa s instrumenta l i n re-enactin g th e Cremieu x Decre e i n 1943, afte r Vich y abrogate d i t i n 1940 , i t wa s inconceivabl e now , durin g his tenur e a s presiden t o f th e Fift h Republic , t o adop t a differen t stanc e and jeopardiz e Algeria n Jewis h rights. 6 0 Heler estimate d tha t o f the 140,00 0 Jews i n Algeria , onl y 70,00 0 woul d stay shoul d th e passin g o f Frenc h Algeri a becom e a reality . H e tol d French-Jewish leader s tha t Andr e Narboni , th e hea d o f th e Algeria n Zionist Union , an d th e Jewis h Agency , lai d dow n a contingenc y pla n fo r large-scale evacuatio n t o Israel—i f an d whe n th e situatio n shoul d war rant it . H e als o warne d thes e leader s tha t a massiv e exodu s o f Jew s t o France wa s no t unlikely , a developmen t leadin g t o socia l problem s fo r the French-Jewis h communities . The y ha d t o b e prepare d fo r suc h a n eventuality. 6 1

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Indeed, i n 196 1 many Jew s wer e grapplin g wit h th e issu e o f whethe r or not the y ough t t o remain i n Algeria. Ye t as Gaston Saffar , presiden t o f the Algiers consistoire explained , salarie d employee s coul d leave withou t any commitments . The y wer e Frenc h citizen s and , onc e i n France , would benefi t fro m governmen t assistance . O n th e othe r hand , approxi mately one-hal f o f Algiers' s rea l estat e asset s wer e owne d b y Jews—a n exaggeration n o doubt—an d th e owner s coul d neithe r liquidat e thes e assets quickl y no r mak e an y profi t b y selling . Therefore , the y wer e unable t o leave immediately. 62 Similar fear s wer e echoe d b y othe r leader s i n 1961 . George s Fahl , treasurer o f th e consistoire i n Con s tan tine, though t tha t onc e Algeria n independence wa s obtained , nothin g coul d sto p th e Muslim s fro m ha rassing Jewis h women , girls , an d th e elderly ; an d ther e woul d b e "n o valid economi c prospect s fo r u s here. " Everythin g depende d o n th e results o f th e Franco-Algeria n negotiation s and , mor e importantly , o n how long it would tak e for th e parties t o reach a n agreement. 63 These fears , borderin g a t times o n panic, resulte d i n the developmen t of political alignment s amon g th e Jews . Unti l 196 1 they eithe r remaine d politically neutra l o r ha d supporte d libera l group s amon g bot h Muslim s and Europeans . No w the y wer e confronte d wit h a n immediat e proble m which seeme d t o promis e mor e hars h consequence s fo r the m tha n fo r the Europea n Christians . The y feare d tha t th e reveng e o f th e formerl y subject Musli m populac e woul d b e directe d agains t them , no t onl y a s Europeans bu t als o a s Jews an d a s friend s o f Israel. Henc e man y youn g Jews slippe d bi t b y bit int o the cam p of the Europea n ultras —especially that o f the Organisatio n d e l'Arme e Secret e (OAS) , an organization mad e up o f desperat e Europea n civilian s inten t o n savin g French Algeri a an d of bitter arm y officer s ben t o n overthrowin g d e Gaull e a t an y price, wit h Algeria a s a mean s rathe r tha n a n end . Th e OA S wa s neve r a unite d organization, eithe r i n fundamenta l tendenc y o r i n leadership . I t ha d n o clear ideolog y beyon d a vague , proto-fascis t antirepublicanism. 64 Bu t i n 1961 i t emerge d a s a popula r forc e amon g th e non-Musli m population , opposing bot h th e FL N an d d e Gaulle . Th e numerou s youn g Jew s wh o became pro-OA S an d sympathize d wit h it s leader , Genera l Raou l Salan , were full y awar e tha t on e o f th e mos t importan t element s i n th e OA S was th e Jeune Nation group , influentia l amon g th e student s an d youn g Europeans, an d ardentl y anti-Semitic . However , thes e Jew s remarke d that the y an d th e OA S ha d a commo n goal : th e preservatio n o f Frenc h

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Algeria. A s one pro-OA S Jewis h activis t noted : "Jeune Nation ma y hav e wanted t o impose its will on the entir e OAS , but i t has been brough t int o line." 65 "Certainly Jeune Nation an d other anti-Semite s represen t a problem. Bu t we have a bigger battle t o wage which mus t com e first. W e will settle with anti-Semite s later, " said another. 66 To prevent d e Gaull e fro m "givin g Algeria away" during negotiations , the preliminar y meeting s o f which wer e hel d a t Melu n an d Evia n (Swit zerland) i n 1960-61 , th e OA S reig n o f armed terro r bega n i n th e sprin g of 1961 . I t wa s intensifie d an d extende d wit h catastrophi c consequence s for Algerian Jews. As in other parts of North Africa, th e Jewish residentia l districts ofte n straddle d th e Musli m an d Europea n districts , an d ther e were man y Jewish enclave s i n the Arab quarters an d the reverse . Attack s by OA S terrorist s evoke d promp t Musli m reprisals , an d i t wa s naturall y the non-Muslim s o f th e "frontier " areas , th e resident s o f th e Jewis h districts, wh o sustaine d th e first an d frequentl y th e onl y shock . Thi s resulted i n a mutual antagonis m betwee n Musli m an d Jewish youths. O n the secon d da y of Rosh ha-Shana 1961 , in reprisal for th e assassinatio n b y some Muslim s o f a Je w i n a Jewis h distric t o f Oran , Jewis h youth s launched a counterattac k whic h quickl y develope d int o a massacr e o f every Musli m withi n revolve r range . Wer e thes e act s committed b y proOAS Jewish elements ? Wa s thi s a repeat performanc e b y th e Misgeret's youths? We hav e n o answers. 67 After thes e incidents , th e FL N issue d severa l directive s warnin g th e Muslim populatio n agains t letting itself be diverte d int o a war against th e Jews. Al l th e evidenc e indicate s tha t th e FL N sough t t o preven t th e development o f a fata l chai n o f pogrom s an d counterpogroms . I t als o sought t o influence internationa l publi c opinion, an d especially America n public opinion , i n thi s direction . Unfortunately , th e FL N instruction s i n this respect , a s i n others , wer e no t alway s followe d b y th e impulsiv e rebels an d masse s wh o supporte d th e struggle . Particularl y i n Constan tine i n 1961 , whe n th e wa r betwee n th e OA S an d FL N reache d it s height, th e larg e Jewis h quarte r wa s subjecte d t o repeate d Musli m at tacks. Th e complet e insecurit y o f the Jew s o f Constantine cause d large scale departures , amountin g almos t t o a n evacuation , eve n befor e th e exodus o f th e Jew s fro m othe r region s began . Th e OA S exploite d th e distress o f th e Jew s o f Constantin e an d eve n appeale d fo r th e ai d o f Israeli arm y officers . Th e OA S terro r ha d pu t smal l Jewish merchant s i n the cit y ou t o f business , whil e substantia l medium-size d Jewish-owne d

Algeria's Political and Social Struggle 33

3

enterprises collapse d unde r th e impac t o f the continua l bombin g an d th e enormous "taxes " and "retributions " exacted b y the OA S terrorists. 68 Frightened abou t th e prospec t o f Constantin e Jewr y bein g slaugh tered, Lazaru s alerte d th e WJ C i n Europ e an d warne d that , unles s thi s wave o f violence wer e halted , Algeria n Jewis h organization s woul d pub lish a communiqu e incitin g Jew s t o evacuat e Algeria . Thi s wa s a veile d threat directe d a t French-Jewis h leaders . I f a n evacuatio n wer e t o tak e place, thei r communitie s an d governmen t woul d b e saddle d wit h th e responsibility o f absorbin g ten s o f thousand s o f Jewis h refugees . Re sponding t o th e threat , Easterman , Arman d Kaplan , an d Dr . Nahu m Goldmann contacte d th e FLN-dominate d provisiona l governmen t (GPRA ) agents i n Ne w Yor k an d Tunis , fo r the m t o conve y t o th e rebel s th e message t o ceas e al l forms o f violence agains t Jews . Moreover , th e WJ C requested Habi b Bourguiba , Jr. , t o discus s thi s matte r wit h Muhamma d Yazld who , i n 1961 , serve d a s th e GPRA s ministe r o f information. 69 I t appears tha t outsid e Jewish interventio n helpe d eas e the situation . The relentles s terro r an d senseles s killing s organize d b y th e ultras, and th e fact s tha t mos t o f th e arm y general s wer e beginnin g t o suppor t de Gaulle , an d tha t Algerian independenc e wa s in sight—were t o dimin ish th e OAS' s influence . A t the beginnin g o f 1962 it became eviden t tha t the apoge e o f th e OA S wa s past . Fro m tha t tim e o n Europea n settler s and th e Jew s wer e mor e hesitan t t o demonstrat e solidarit y wit h thi s organization. The y feare d bein g single d ou t b y th e legitimat e Frenc h authorities. Perhap s th e bes t indicatio n o f th e growin g tren d towar d caution amon g th e non-Musli m populatio n wa s th e fac t that , whateve r may have been thei r sympathies , peopl e were leaving for France , despit e OAS threats agains t an y who were going . Thi s was done a s unobtrusivel y as possible . A dentist woul d boo k appointment s fo r hi s patient s a s i f h e intended t o trea t the m a s usual, bu t no t sho w up . A woman woul d han g out he r washin g a s a sig n o f presence, bu t th e washin g wa s neve r take n in. A businessma n woul d mak e a brav e sho w o f keepin g hi s busines s open, bu t hi s family wa s already packed of f quietly t o France. 70 After nearl y tw o year s o f periodic contact s an d negotiations , a cease fire an d peac e agreemen t wer e conclude d betwee n th e Frenc h an d th e FLN a t Evia n o n 1 9 Marc h 1962 . Th e agreement s wer e neve r actuall y signed b y eithe r part y becaus e th e Frenc h refuse d t o giv e formal recog nition t o th e FLN . Th e Frenc h di d no t han d ove r contro l o f the countr y directly t o th e FL N bu t t o a mixed French-Algeria n "provisiona l execu -

334 Algeria's

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tive" tha t wa s t o supervis e a referendu m for independenc e o n 1 Jul y 1962, an d ru n th e countr y unti l election s for a Nationa l Assembl y coul d be held . Ye t th e FL N wa s t o emerg e a s th e dominan t force leadin g Algeria fro m th e secon d hal f o f 1962 . Th e OA S coul d n o longe r hop e t o intimidate th e Frenc h government . It s terro r tactics , eve n a n attemp t t o assassinate d e Gaulle , faile d t o swa y th e Frenc h o r t o provok e th e FL N into retaliation. 71 Algeria's independence wa s proclaimed o n 3 July 1962 .

Jewish Life in Independent Algeria, 1962-1970 The Evia n agreemen t an d th e transitio n fro m Frenc h t o Musli m rul e hastened th e departur e o f th e Jews . Althoug h th e Muslim s agree d tha t the Jew s could , afte r all , preserv e thei r Frenc h citizenshi p rights— a breakthrough tha t wa s achieve d unde r pressur e o f Frenc h Jewry' s AI U and th e WJC—th e majorit y o f the Jews , lik e th e Europea n settlers , di d not wis h t o remai n i n Algeria . B y th e fal l o f 196 2 onl y a n eight h o f th e 800,000 t o on e millio n European s remaine d i n Algeria . O f th e 140,00 0 Jews, som e 10,00 0 remained b y the summe r o f 1962. 72 It i s true tha t Franc e wa s the mai n countr y o f emigration fo r Algeria n Jewry. Onl y 10,00 0 o f the m emigrate d t o Israe l betwee n 194 8 an d th e early 1960s . Whil e ther e wer e ver y fe w successe s i n attractin g c aliya, several rescu e operation s di d tak e plac e i n 1962 , on e o f whic h wa s organized i n th e summe r o f 1962 . A s the c aliya emissarie s wer e abou t t o leave Algeria n soi l following th e recen t developments , a cable arrive d a t the c aliya offic e i n Algiers from th e Jewis h Agency . I t instructe d the m t o remain ther e fo r th e tim e bein g because , base d o n reliabl e information , FLN rebel s i n th e sout h intende d t o har m th e Jew s o f th e Sahara n community o f Ghardai'a. 73 On 1 2 June 1962 , Duvdevan i requested Ben-Tsiyo n Cohen , on e of the emissaries i n Algiers , t o fly to Ghardai' a an d war n tha t communit y abou t the potentia l dangers . Duvdevan i the n contacte d th e Frenc h authoritie s in th e sout h t o infor m the m abou t Cohen' s arrival . Upo n hi s arriva l Cohen me t wit h Y a c akov Blocca , Ghardaia' s communit y president . Blocc a then convene d a n emergenc y meetin g o f th e communit y counci l mem bers i n whic h Cohe n prodde d the m t o permi t th e Jewis h Agenc y t o

Algeria's Political and Social Struggle 33

5

evacuate th e Jews before i t was too late. Th e communit y leadershi p gav e its approval. 74 Already b y mid-Jun e Cohe n bega n t o register th e familie s a t th e loca l talmud torah building . O f th e 3,00 0 Jew s i n Ghardai'a , 2,70 0 agree d t o leave immediately . Meanwhile , th e Jewis h Agenc y i n Europ e receive d from Cohe n precis e dat a on the siz e of the emigratio n an d the numbe r o f planes neede d fo r th e operation . Th e Grand e Arena s cam p i n Marseille s was prepare d t o accommodat e th e transients . However , th e FL N foun d out abou t th e operatio n an d was determined t o prevent th e departures. 75 Not wantin g t o ris k lives , especiall y i n ligh t o f wha t happene d t o Hasan an d Ben-Guer a thre e year s earlier , Cohe n telephone d th e Frenc h governor wh o himsel f wa s abou t t o leav e Algeria . Th e latte r sen t a military vehicl e wit h severa l arme d paratrooper s t o guar d Cohe n an d accompany hi m t o th e loca l militar y bas e fo r hi s own protection . Towar d the en d o f Jun e th e Frenc h plane s chartere d b y th e Jewis h Agenc y reached Ghardaia s militar y airport . Th e emigrant s coul d no w tak e th e twelve-kilometer rid e t o th e airpor t o n buses , guarde d b y militar y jeep s and a helicopter . Algeri a wa s a sovereig n natio n whe n th e evacuatio n process ende d successfull y i n July 1962. 76 After th e declaratio n o f independenc e th e consistoires i n Algiers , Oran, an d Constantin e continue d t o function. Th e communit y leader s o f the post-independenc e perio d wer e no t draw n fro m th e rank s o f thos e who had been activ e in the FLN . The y were those who kept thei r Frenc h citizenship an d maintaine d contac t wit h th e Frenc h consula r authorities . Contrary t o what ha d bee n feared , n o "parachutist " pro-FL N leadershi p imposed itsel f on th e Jewis h community. Ther e wa s no longer an y signif icant pressur e o n th e Jewis h leadershi p t o "coordinate " itsel f politically , and n o demonstration s o r declaration s o f pro-government orthodox y wer e required. Whe n th e communitie s pledge d thei r loyalt y i n Decembe r 1962, thei r statemen t mad e n o referenc e t o th e ideolog y o f the Algeria n Revolution.77 Jewish cultura l activity , suc h a s ha d existe d i n th e pre-independenc e era, wa s practically nonexistent . Whe n a visitor from Franc e remarke d t o some o f th e communit y leader s tha t i t woul d b e impossibl e t o discus s French-Jewish literatur e i n thei r club s becaus e i t was to o closel y linke d to Zionism and Israel , h e was told: "Oh well, we shall talk about Maimon ides." Bu t i n fac t ther e wa s no t muc h discussio n o f hi m either ; th e

336 Algeria's

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communities wer e conten t t o arrang e fo r a bar e minimu m o f religiou s life, whethe r i n respect t o the conduct o f services, th e practice of circumcision, o r ritua l slaughter . I t wa s necessar y t o brin g shohatlm fro m Mo rocco in order t o preserve kashrut. 78 Almost al l th e Tora h scroll s wer e i n Franc e b y th e en d o f 1962 . Mos t synagogues wer e closed , an d wher e a Jewis h communit y n o longe r ex isted, the y constitute d heirles s property , wit h a n unclea r lega l status . Some ha d bee n pu t t o othe r use . Thu s on e i n Constantin e ha d becom e an FL N headquarter s an d a t Milian a th e synagogu e wa s mad e int o a municipal gymnasium . Unlik e th e situatio n i n France , wher e synagogue s —like Catholi c an d Protestan t churches—wer e regarde d a s "publi c monuments" an d henc e stat e property , th e Algeria n synagogue s wer e the property o f the communities. 79 Delving int o specifi c account s an d testimonie s w e ar e abl e t o analyz e conditions b y going beyond genera l descriptions . On 2 Jul y 1962 , severa l hour s befor e Algeri a becam e independent , Inge Gottfarb , a n AJD C delegat e fro m Europe , arrive d i n Algier s fo r a fact-finding mission . Althoug h Jewis h leader s wer e availabl e t o tal k to , they wer e fe w i n compariso n t o previou s years , becaus e man y ha d lef t for France . Th e numerou s an d varie d Jewis h organization s wer e eithe r ineffective o r existe d onl y o n paper . Thei r presidents , secretaries , an d treasurers ha d practicall y al l emigrated . Th e nee d t o tak e car e o f Jew s who remaine d a s well a s of those leavin g becam e a n urgen t task . Whol e families fled thei r home s whil e other s wer e to o poo r o r to o ol d t o fen d for themselves , especiall y a t a tim e whe n Algeri a wa s i n turmoil , undergoing a n abrup t transformatio n fro m a colonia l t o a n independen t entity. Accordin g t o Gottfarb, 80 i n Jul y 1962 , need y person s i n Algier s among the European s an d th e Jew s usuall y calle d o n th e followin g agen cies and individuals : The Bureau dAction Sociale de la Ville dAlger whic h provide d te n t o twenty ne w francs pe r person o n a monthly basis as well as fifteen ne w francs t o Jews towar d th e koshe r tax , pai d t o the cit y for th e purchas e of koshe r meat . Thes e monie s wer e subsequentl y refunde d t o th e Jewish communit y i n th e for m o f relie f t o th e needy , partl y a s a contribution fo r cultura l programs . Moreover , foo d parcel s wer e dis tributed t o needy recipient s o n a monthly basi s long before Jul y 1962 ;

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7

The Pension Agency wher e numerou s need y recipient s obtaine d gov ernment pension s becaus e the y wer e handicapped , blind , o r aged . These payment s varie d fro m sixt y t o tw o hundre d ne w francs quar terly. However , i n 196 2 there wer e pensioner s wh o were deprive d o f this for m o f support, fo r th e centra l office s i n Algier s ha d bee n blow n up by the OA S and thei r record s were destroyed ; Local Jewish Organizations whic h assiste d th e indigen t wit h specia l needs suc h a s th e birt h o f children , dowries , illness , o r death . Th e most importan t wa s th e Societ e d e l a Bienfaisanc e tha t distribute d matzoth fo r Passover , sen t youth s t o summe r camps , provide d cloth ing for thes e youths , an d pai d thei r medica l costs . Th e Bikku r Holi m was anothe r agenc y o f some value . It s representative s visite d th e sic k and the age d a t local hospitals an d a t their homes ; Private Benefactors and Help by Relatives becam e vita l du e t o th e insufficient relie f grant s an d pensions . Thu s need y Jew s frequentl y turned t o privat e benefactor s wh o helpe d the m o n a regula r basis . Yet, a s b y th e secon d hal f o f 196 2 th e mos t affluen t "patrons " lef t Algeria, thi s alternativ e sourc e o f incom e wa s dryin g up . Th e sam e could b e sai d o f relatives , sinc e man y lef t fo r Franc e an d Israel , an d were unabl e t o continu e thei r assistanc e owin g t o decrease d incom e or loss of work, business , o r due t o resettlement problems . There wer e othe r humiliatin g alternative s fo r th e need y i n Algiers . Many relie f client s wer e b y forc e o r b y choic e reduce d t o beggar y afte r their relative s lef t th e country . The y appeare d i n th e synagogue s an d th e cemetery askin g fo r hel p fro m th e mor e fortunate . O f course , severa l relief client s ha d som e incom e fro m work , particularl y elderl y wome n who serve d a s maid s an d cleanin g women , earnin g betwee n fort y an d 150 ne w franc s pe r month . Thei r employers , alway s European s bu t mostly Jewish, wer e leavin g o r had lef t Algeri a and thi s sourc e o f income was disappearing, too. 81 Early i n Jul y 1962 , Gottfar b visite d a cente r wher e homeles s an d displaced person s coul d b e found . The y wer e mostl y evacuee s fro m th e Casba residentia l distric t o f Algiers, force d t o leav e durin g th e ongoin g violence o f French Algeria' s final months. Situate d a t Rue Bretonnet , th e center was once an army clothing factory take n ove r i n Ma y 196 2 from it s European owner . Th e buildin g wa s no t physicall y suitable . I t ha d stee p

338 Algeria's

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stairs leadin g t o th e firs t an d secon d floors wher e peopl e wer e no w housed. Gottfarb s descriptio n o f thei r lamentabl e condition s i s rathe r shocking: When I sa w th e center , I fel t i t wa s a living illustratio n t o [Maksim ] Gorky' s "Night Asylum " an d [Charles ] Dickens ' "Workhouse"—al l huma n wreck s an d derelicts, alcoholics , beggars , invalids , blind , paralyze d . . . an d menta l an d cardiac cases , an d elderl y peopl e livin g unde r th e mos t degradin g conditions : without water, ankle-deep in filth and garbage with accompanying smells.82 Irrespective o f the wretche d condition s o f the needy , Muslim-Jewis h relations wer e no t particularl y bad . Maitr e I . Chouraqui , presiden t o f the consistoire i n Oran , observe d i n Novembe r 196 2 that th e Jew s wer e treated respectfully , i n shar p contras t t o th e situatio n i n 196 1 and earl y 1962. H e claime d tha t if , durin g th e 1950s , Constantin e Jewr y emerge d as th e mos t vulnerabl e t o violence , thei r coreligionist s i n Ora n ha d suffered th e mos t i n 196 1 an d eve n afte r th e cease-fir e accor d o f 1 9 March 1962 . Chouraqu i adde d tha t whil e ther e wer e n o over t discrimi natory policie s directe d agains t Oran' s Jew s sinc e independence , th e latter wer e mor e afrai d tha n th e European s or , fo r tha t matter , Muslim s who wer e targete d b y th e FL N fo r collaboratin g wit h th e French . Th e fears stemme d fro m th e continuou s infiltratio n b y Muslim s int o thei r residential quarte r o r th e Europea n districts . Jew s bega n t o deser t th e European district s o f Oran an d Algier s a s a result o f this infiltratio n an d owing t o th e difficultie s encountere d i n findin g foo d an d medica l sup plies. 83 Referring specificall y t o Oran , Chouraqu i sai d tha t fro m mid-196 2 thousands o f Jew s heade d t o airport s an d seaport s t o see k passag e t o France. The y left with little luggage and often abandone d thei r valuables. Whereas i n 196 1 a s man y a s 22,00 0 Jew s live d i n Oran , durin g th e summer o f 196 2 onl y 1,000-1,50 0 remained. 84 Mos t distresse d b y thi s development, th e Algeria n authorities , apparentl y unabl e t o cop e wit h the politica l situation , launche d incessan t appeal s t o th e Jew s an d Euro peans, askin g the m t o remain . Chouraqu i conclude d confidentl y tha t "I t should b e stresse d . . . tha t eve n throughou t thi s perio d o f disorder an d looting, ther e wa s n o indicatio n whatsoeve r o f a discriminator y attitud e toward th e Jews , an d ou r relation s wit h th e authoritie s wer e alway s correct." 85

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9

The declin e i n Jewis h populatio n an d th e exten t o f assistanc e t o th e needy i s bes t illustrate d i n th e dat a presente d b y Dr . Franc o Levi , director o f AJDC-Algeria. A n Italia n national , Lev i followe d Jewis h de mographic change s ver y closely betwee n 196 2 and 1964 . Table 2 5 covers the periods o f November 196 2 and January 1963. From thes e limite d dat a i t i s eviden t tha t b y Januar y 196 3 no t les s than 5,00 0 Jews stil l live d i n Algeria. Tabl e 2 5 does no t actuall y indicat e if the location s fo r whic h n o dat a (ND ) i s inserte d mean s tha t th e com munities cease d t o exist . I t i s feasible tha t n o informatio n wa s available . Some communitie s di d exist , amon g the m Djelfa , Touggourt , an d Lagh ouat. Moreover , th e statistic s for Novembe r 196 2 did no t includ e Algier s and it s neighborin g town s an d villages , whic h explain s wh y th e dat a fo r January 196 3 show that considerably mor e Jews still remained i n Algiers, as compare d wit h Novembe r 1962 . I t doe s seem , however , tha t numer ous smal l communitie s cease d t o exist , a s n o informatio n i s availabl e i n the divers e source s w e consulte d regardin g Ghardaia , Ai'n-Beida , an d Suq al-Akhras. From 1962-6 3 onwar d differen t organization s wen t t o work o n behal f of Algerian Jewry. Amon g these was the Comite d'Actio n Social e Israelit e d'Alger (CASI) , establishe d i n 1962 . Th e CAS I becam e th e welfar e de partment i n Algiers , affiliate d wit h th e consistoire. Supplementin g thi s effort wer e th e Frenc h consulate s acros s th e country . Thre e majo r en deavors wer e carrie d ou t b y CAS I an d th e Frenc h consulat e i n Algiers : cash relie f distributio n t o need y families ; assistanc e t o th e homeless , lodged a t th e cente r o n Ru e Bretonne t an d th e Maimonide s religiou s school; meal s distributio n an d maintenanc e a t thi s schoo l whic h als o sheltered transient s comin g from th e interio r an d th e hinterland. 86 Those Jew s i n th e interio r communitie s wh o staye d behin d a whil e longer mad e ever y conceivabl e effor t t o conduc t Jewis h religiou s affair s and rituals . Whe n Willia m Shapir o o f th e AJDC-Pari s offic e visite d th e interior i n Februar y 196 4 h e foun d severa l synagogue s open . Suc h wa s the cas e i n Laghouat , wher e th e synagogu e wa s situate d i n a buildin g owned b y community members . A minyan wa s occasionally gathere d an d regular religiou s service s wer e held . Koshe r mea t wa s available , pur chased i n Algiers. A small amount o f assistance was rendered b y the loca l French consulat e an d consequentl y ther e wa s n o nee d fo r th e AJD C t o subsidize this community. I n Djelfa , Shapir o learned tha t the communit y owned a buildin g containin g a synagogu e an d tw o apartments . A ver y

Nov. 1962 (Approx.) ND 500 350 140 20 50 50 50 ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 35 ND ND 350 1,200 100

Location

Algiers Constantine Bone Setif Philipville Nemours Batna Beni-Saf Biskra Bougie (2-3 families ) Tizi-Ouzou Ghardai'a Touggourt Laghouat Blida Relizane Bou Sa cada Orleanville Tlemcen Oran Mostaganem 2,000-3,000 200-250 200-250 100-120 12-15 ND 20 ND 10 8-10 20 ND ND 40 20-30 ND 9 9 200 1,200 70

Jan. 1963 (Approx.)

Population

ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 70 350 ND

Nov. 1962 (Precise) 400 15 12-13 ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 8 ND 50 170 12-15

Jan. 1963 (Precise)

Assisted Indigents (Included in Population Data)

Table 25 . Th e Jewish Populatio n o f Algeria, Novembe r 196 2 an d January 196 3

70 200 25 100 15 100 3,355 60-70 50 ND ND ND ND 4,228-5,373 25 12 ND ND ND ND 457 ND ND ND ND ND ND 667-671

Source for November 1962: Franc o Levi a Herbert Katzki, 2 3 novembre 1962 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem , 50A/56.200 . Source for January 1963: Confidentia l Memorandu m o n Dr . Franc o Levi' s Visi t t o Algeria , 28-3 1 Januar y 1963 , Arch.AJDC / Jerusalem, 50A/56.200 .

Ai'n Tamouchen t Sidi-Bel-Abbes Tiaret Mascara La Moricier e Sa'ida Total

342 Algeria's

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large synagogu e belongin g t o th e no w defunc t Ghardai' a communit y wa s taken ove r by the loca l authorities. Th e seat s were remove d an d installe d in a movie theatre. 87 Everyone Shapir o spok e wit h indicate d tha t th e departur e o f th e Europeans an d th e Jew s ha d deal t a serious blo w t o th e econom y o f th e interior an d the south . Busines s declined sharpl y and unemployment wa s on th e rise . Bot h Musli m an d Jewis h merchant s complaine d tha t good s of all kinds wer e i n shor t suppl y les s tha n tw o year s sinc e th e proclama tion o f independence . On e individua l i n Djelf a tol d Shapir o tha t thes e disadvantages wer e t o som e degre e compensate d b y th e fac t tha t Jewis h merchants wh o di d remai n i n th e sout h an d th e interio r ha d ver y littl e economic competition . O n th e othe r hand , th e condition s o f lif e there , psychologically, wer e hardl y encouraging . Th e Jew s Shapir o ha d me t declared the y were isolate d an d detached . Th e departure o f their Frenc h compatriots, friends , an d relative s affecte d thei r morale . The y state d nonetheless tha t thei r relation s wit h th e Muslim s wer e quit e friendly , the latte r havin g encourage d the m t o sta y an d contribut e t o economi c growth. 88 At th e en d o f Jul y 196 4 onl y 4,00 0 Jew s remained . O f thi s figure, approximately 1 0 percen t wer e need y persons , mos t o f who m live d i n Algiers an d Oran . Al l need y recipient s receive d assistanc e fro m th e AJDC an d awaite d ai d fro m th e Frenc h consula r officials . Th e assistanc e rendered b y th e AJD C i n Algier s wa s largel y accomplishe d throug h th e CASI, whic h continue d t o oversee al l Jewish welfare organization s i n th e city.89 Assisting th e emigratio n t o Franc e wa s th e Unite d HIA S Service . Joseph G . Hazan , it s Algeri a delegate , remarke d tha t th e authoritie s dealt realisticall y wit h Jewis h emigration . Mos t helpfu l i n thi s proces s were th e senio r administrativ e heads . Hazan' s staf f encountere d mos t o f the problem s onl y wit h severa l subordinat e clerk s a t th e lowe r echelon s of th e Ministr y o f th e Interior . Excellen t relation s als o develope d between th e Unite d HIA S an d th e Frenc h consuls , particularl y wit h M. Herdy , th e consu l i n Algiers , wh o place d hi s consula r ca r a t Hazan' s disposal to evacuate Jewish cul t objects. 90 One o f the reason s fo r continue d emigratio n afte r 196 4 was th e insti tutionalization o f a socialis t econom y unde r Ahma d Ben-Bella' s regim e and, afte r 1965 , unde r Houar i Boumedienne , hi s successo r a s presiden t of the republic . Socialis m becam e th e dominan t philosophy , largel y de -

Algeria's Political and Social Struggle 34

3

fined a s autogestion —or self-management—b y worker s o f th e agricul tural an d industria l sectors . Th e FL N encourage d thi s polic y b y imple menting decrees makin g it the basis of the economy. Th e vacant land an d the remainin g Frenc h lan d seize d later , wer e t o b e manage d b y th e people, wit h governmen t support . Wha t actuall y develope d unti l 196 5 was simila r t o th e Yugoslavia n experiment . Th e governmen t aide d th e self-management farmer s an d workers t o cope with marketin g an d creat e management committees . One-thir d o f th e profit s o f the harves t an d o f the industria l secto r wa s pai d t o th e worker s a s premium s whil e two thirds were kep t b y the stat e t o invest i n industrialization. 91 How di d thi s polic y affec t th e Jews ? Th e AJD C representativ e ob served tha t th e Jew s an d th e 60,000-70,00 0 European s wer e thoroughl y unhappy with socialism . Bu t he pointed ou t that their attitude was share d by segment s o f the Musli m population . Wholesal e merchant s an d opera tors o f food impor t enterprise s amon g th e Muslim s wer e equall y discon tented. Th e Musli m masse s approve d o f state economi c policies but the y did no t reall y understan d th e socialis t ideolog y behin d autogestion. I t was assume d i n th e Jewis h communitie s that , wit h th e las t vestige s o f a liberal econom y i n Algeri a witherin g away , ther e wa s n o alternativ e except t o depart. 92 Small busines s enterprise s continue d t o survive , however . Accordin g to Samuel Levi s of the AJDC, 3,00 0 Jews lived i n Algeria of 1966. O f this figure, 1,50 0 reside d i n Algiers , 1,00 0 i n Oran , an d five hundre d i n Constantine an d th e south . Som e o f the m wer e merchant s an d smal l businessmen, other s wer e member s o f the fre e professions—physicians , pharmacists, lawyers . O n th e othe r hand , man y wer e age d an d depen dent o n th e AJDC , o r well-to-d o pensioners , seekin g t o liv e th e res t o f their live s i n Algeria . I n th e cas e o f smal l businessmen , th e majorit y o f them wer e famil y head s i n Algier s an d Ora n wh o sen t thei r wive s an d children t o France , attemptin g i n th e meantim e t o liquidate thei r assets . Another Jewis h element , considere d t o b e par t o f th e remainin g Euro pean population , cam e from France . The y worked i n Algeria on behalf of their government. 93 The yea r 196 7 proved t o be les s challengin g fo r Algeria' s 2,000-2,50 0 Jews tha n fo r thei r Tunisia n counterparts . Th e Jun e 196 7 Middl e Eas t war di d no t see m t o traumatiz e the m despit e Algeria' s pronounce d rol e in th e crisi s an d th e violenc e o f some o f the officia l pronouncements . N o anti-Jewish riot s too k plac e i n th e country , mainl y becaus e th e Jewis h

344 Algeria's

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quarters o f Ora n an d Algier s n o longe r existe d an d th e Jew s wer e scat tered amon g th e genera l population . Anothe r plausibl e explanatio n i s that th e Frenc h governmen t may hav e tol d Houar i Boumedienne s gov ernment tha t i t di d no t differentiat e betwee n Frenchme n an d woul d no t stand fo r an y injur y t o Jewis h Frenchme n i n Algeria. 94 Th e fe w act s o f harassment include d insults , th e mistreatment o f Chief Rabbi Simo n Zin i of Oran, an d th e expulsio n b y th e authoritie s o f six Jews. Morocca n Jew s living in Algeria felt somewha t insecur e a s they were no t Frenc h citizen s like the Algerian Jew s and coul d no t coun t o n France t o protect them. 95 Visiting Algeri a i n Decembe r 1967 , Samue l Levi s foun d a partiall y structured communa l apparatu s i n Algier s an d Oran . Th e consistoire o f Algiers face d majo r financial difficulties , wit h it s leader s pleadin g befor e the centra l consistoire o f Pari s fo r assistance . I t wa s suggeste d b y on e leader tha t i t woul d b e necessar y t o agai n reduc e th e administrativ e expenses. Onl y on e rabbi , i t wa s said , shoul d b e employe d b y th e community i n Algiers . Afte r th e consistoire o f Ora n organize d a fund raising campaig n t o cop e wit h expenses , th e leader s i n Algier s wer e encouraged t o follow thi s example. 96 In Marc h 197 0 there wer e fewer tha n 1,00 0 Jew s in the country—35 0 in Oran , 300 i n Algiers , an d severa l dozen s eac h i n Constantine , Bone , Blida, Tlemcen , an d Mostaganem . The y wer e largel y elderl y people . The onl y remainin g talmud torah, i n Oran , wa s frequente d b y severa l youths an d administere d b y th e consistoire. Othe r communitie s ha d n o rabbis, religiou s schools , o r ritua l slaughterers . I t wa s Rabb i Simo n Zin i of Ora n who , upo n reques t o f th e differen t communities , travele d t o perform circumcisio n an d othe r religiou s duties. 97 Fo r al l intent s an d purposes, organize d Jewis h lif e i n Algeria ended durin g the 1970s .

Conclusions

This wor k ha s highlighte d th e majo r development s i n th e Maghrib i Jewish communities o f this century. Thes e conclusions may suggest som e directions fo r future research . 1. Ther e ca n b e n o doub t tha t moder n an d secula r educatio n an d th e influence o f European precolonia l an d colonia l encroachment constitute d major reformis t agent s i n thes e communities . Thoug h fel t stronge r i n Algeria an d Tunisi a throug h th e state , Protectorate , an d othe r Europea n schools t o a greater exten t tha n i n Morocco , wher e th e AI U emerge d a s the prim e force , th e thre e Jewis h communitie s benefite d fro m th e typ e of Euro/French educatio n tha t influence d thei r milie u from th e latter half of th e nineteent h century . Adde d t o th e modernizatio n o f th e profes sional structure , th e communa l leadershi p ha d changed . B y th e en d o f World Wa r I , graduate s o f th e moder n school s tende d t o replac e th e more traditiona l president s an d treasurer s o f the communities . Whethe r Zionists, supporter s o f Zionism, anti-Zionists , o r al-Wifdq integrationist s —these leader s becam e essentia l intermediarie s betwee n th e colonia l establishment an d (later ) the independen t regimes , o n the on e hand, an d the Jewis h populations , o n th e other . Remot e fro m th e Jewis h ghetto s they wer e nevertheles s proponent s o f reform . Ofte n portraye d a s th e docile servant s o f the Frenc h b y th e post-1956/6 2 regimes , ou r findings indicate thi s wa s certainl y no t th e cas e whe n Jewis h freedo m o f move ment becam e a thorn y issue , o r whe n i t cam e t o reformin g educationa l and communal institutions . 2. Th e Zionis t oppositio n t o th e AIU , a s analyze d i n chapte r 1 , i s noteworthy. I t certainl y wa s no t al l ideological , no t simpl y abou t de 345

346 Conclusions Judaization an d neglec t o f H e b r e w culture . For , afte r all , wh y di d th e Zionists i n Tunisi a refrai n fro m attackin g th e Protectorat e schools , w h e r e the Jew s wer e wel l represented , an d wher e classe s wer e ofte n conducte d on Saturday ? Thei r suggestio n o f replacin g th e AI U completely b y a Protectorate-sponsored ecoles franco-israelites networ k woul d indicat e that oppositio n t o th e AI U stemme d from th e Tunisia n Zionists ' inabilit y to neutraliz e th e influenc e traditionall y enjoye d b y th e AI U i n communa l service. Thi s impede d somewha t th e pre-193 9 Zionis t struggl e fo r influ ence i n th e Jewis h milieu . I t appear s tha t th e Tunisia n Zionist s wante d the AI U ou t owin g t o th e competitio n i t pose d i n th e struggl e fo r Jewis h leadership an d reform . 3. Maghrib i nationalis t forces , too , expresse d displeasur e wit h th e AIU an d othe r internationa l Jewis h organizations . I n Morocco , national ist resentmen t o f th e AI U wa s stil l ver y muc h aliv e i n th e 1970s . I t coul d be foun d i n th e writing s o f c Abd al-Qadi r Be n c Abd Allah , a n editorialis t for th e Istiqla l party' s L Opinion. Portrayin g th e AI U a s a n instrumen t o f both Europea n colonialis m an d Zionism , h e note d i n 1976 : Numerous ar e th e Jew s wh o wer e victim s o f the operation s o f this organizatio n and hav e consequentl y fel t lik e foreigners rathe r tha n Moroccans . Havin g lost al l contact wit h thei r Musli m compatriots , thes e Westernize d Jew s wer e i n fac t overwhelmed b y a genuine persecutio n complex , seein g in the Morocca n Musli m a potentia l enemy . B y cultivatin g thi s feelin g o f insecurity amon g th e Jews , th e Alliance Israelit e pave d th e wa y for th e exodu s o f these Jew s t o Israel . . . . Th e departure of . . . Jews t o Israe l wa s planned b y the Zionist s sinc e th e nineteent h century, th e epoc h whe n th e school s o f th e Allianc e Israelit e bega n t o sprea d their influenc e acros s Morocco. * These accusation s w e r e partl y justifie d bu t fo r th e mos t par t inaccur ate. Eve n i f on e accept s th e premis e tha t th e Jew s wer e victimize d b y the AIU , on e mus t loo k closel y a t th e Jews ' ques t fo r outsid e help . Feelings o f insecurity an d persecutio n complexe s i n pre-183 0 Algeri a an d in th e cours e o f Morocca n histor y wer e neithe r figments o f Jewish imagi nation no r wer e thes e implante d i n Jewis h mind s b y th e AI U o r th e colonists. I t woul d b e difficult , however , t o den y tha t th e AI U guide d the Jew s i n th e pat h o f Frenc h cultur e and , fro m th e lat e 1940s , i n th e direction o f H e b r e w culture , henc e aggravatin g th e alread y existing Ju deo-Muslim tensions , cultivatin g a French-educated elite , an d facilitatin g c aliya. Th e AIU , then , sharpene d division s culturally , bu t wa s no t a t th e

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root o f th e conflict , fo r th e Jew s were separate d fro m th e Muslim s i n melldhs an d harat al-Yahiid lon g predatin g th e arriva l o f th e AI U an d European colonialism , an d i n accordanc e wit h legislation . Onl y unde r European presenc e an d th e oeuvre o f th e AI U di d th e Jew s begi n t o leave th e ghetto s fo r th e new , integrate d urba n neighborhoods , buil t i n the earl y twentieth century . 4. Som e may argu e that , wit h th e exceptio n o f Algerian Jews , mos t of whom emigrate d t o Franc e rathe r tha n Israel , French-typ e acculturatio n for th e res t los t it s vitalit y durin g decolonizatio n an d Arabization , an d perhaps eve n earlier ; wit h th e creatio n o f Israe l cam e th e wis h t o mak e c aliya an d t o stres s Jewish/Hebre w education . I n th e Tunisia n cas e th e argument i s certainl y unconvincing , a s nearl y hal f of the Jew s settle d i n France. Adequat e knowledg e o f Frenc h thu s becam e indispensabl e a t the crucia l stag e o f adapting t o th e ne w geography . Moreover , i n Israel , many Tunisia n emigrant s playe d th e rol e o f intermediaries i n trad e an d cultural exchange s betwee n Israe l an d France . Thei r contributio n i n these domain s wa s vital , fo r durin g th e 1950 s an d 1960 s Franco-Israel i relations wer e a s favorabl e a s American-Israel i relation s becam e i n th e 1970s and 1980s . The sam e applied t o Morocca n emigrants , thoug h thei r exposure t o Frenc h languag e an d cultur e wa s no t a s comprehensiv e a s among the Tunisians . 5. Essentia l component s o f modernization include d social/huma n ser vices rendere d b y th e internationa l Jewis h organization s an d th e colonia l authorities. No t onl y di d thes e initiative s improv e th e livin g standard s among th e Jew s a t th e tim e th e decolonizatio n proces s commenced , bu t in al l likelihoo d contribute d t o Jewis h populatio n growth . Thoug h th e struggle agains t diseas e an d overcrowde d condition s i n th e ghetto s wa s far fro m over , considerabl e progres s ha d bee n achieve d b y mid-century . In surveyin g th e demographi c change s i n th e Jewis h world , certai n historians remar k tha t th e nineteent h centur y wa s a perio d o f rapi d increase i n population i n al l Europea n countries . Th e numbe r o f Jews i n the worl d i n 180 0 was estimate d a t tw o an d a quarte r million , o f who m some tw o millio n live d i n Europe . I n th e 1880 s ther e wer e abou t seve n million Jew s i n Europe . Th e Jewis h rat e o f increase wa s twic e a s fast a s that o f th e non-Jewis h population . Th e mai n reason s fo r thi s rapi d in crease o f population i n Europ e wer e th e amelioratio n o f sanitar y condi tions an d improve d medica l treatmen t fo r th e sick . Th e situatio n i n th e towns, whic h i n previou s centurie s ha d bee n center s o f diseas e an d

348 Conclusions epidemics, improve d a s a result o f these changes , du e t o improvement s in water supply , i n sewage , an d i n garbage disposal. 2 It woul d appea r tha t thes e change s als o applied t o North Afric a i n th e mid-twentieth century . Afflicte d b y certai n ailments , Jew s an d Muslim s could no w find a cur e fo r chroni c healt h problems , whic h i n th e pas t were neithe r attende d t o no r properl y diagnosed . Wha t i s more , deat h rates from diseas e declined steadily . Wherea s n o more than 100,00 0 Jews lived i n Morocc o i n 1912 , 50,00 0 i n Tunisi a i n 1881 , and 30,000-35,00 0 in Algeri a i n 1830 , th e Jewis h population s i n th e mid-1950 s ros e t o 250,000, 95,000 , an d 140,000 , respectively . 6. A final aspect o n th e influenc e o f modernity i s the consequenc e o f assimilation i n Algeria. Regardles s o f how modernized an d influence d b y French culture , Algeria n Jewis h identity , i t appears, wa s not completel y lost. Thi s wa s no t onl y evidence d b y post-Worl d Wa r I I communa l reforms, undertake n b y th e FCIA , bu t followin g emigratio n t o France . No longer i n Algeria , facin g th e pain s o f resettlement, the y searche d fo r a mor e intens e religiou s lif e a t thei r tim e o f crisis. The y graduall y con tributed t o th e regeneratio n o f Frenc h Jewr y b y settlin g i n smal l pro vincial citie s wher e n o Jewis h communitie s ha d previousl y existe d o r where thes e had been ver y small . For instance , befor e th e arrival of the Algerians there was little Jewish community lif e i n th e northeaster n an d souther n portion s o f France . Orleans, L e Havre , an d Amiens had synagogue s but the y were only ope n for th e Hig h Hol y Days . I n othe r communitie s wher e ther e wer e n o synagogues, temporar y facilitie s wer e rented . Wit h th e arriva l o f th e Algerians, Jewis h lif e i n thes e tin y communitie s wa s revitalized . Syn agogues wer e n o longe r closed , religiou s service s wer e conducte d ever y week, an d rabbi s wer e appointe d i n Orlean s an d L e Man s fo r th e first time in many years. There was kosher mea t at Caen and L e Havre , whil e in Amien s th e communitie s fo r th e first tim e i n severa l decade s orga nized, an d financed, a rabbinic school . 7. Th e Vichy period an d th e Germa n occupatio n o f Tunisia, a s well as data o n th e anti-Semiti c legislation , clearl y refut e th e theor y tha t Medi terranean basi n Jewry , wit h th e exceptio n o f th e Gree k communities , were spare d th e danger s face d b y thei r coreligionist s i n Nazi-occupie d Europe. Whil e th e "fina l solution " di d no t appl y t o Tunisian Jewry , an d the applicatio n o f racial law s i n bot h Morocc o an d Tunisi a may no t hav e been particularl y harsh , th e anxietie s o f th e earl y 1940 s wer e real . Th e

Conclusions 34

9

underground resistanc e i n th e ghetto s o f Polan d an d i n Franc e ha d it s modest ye t effectiv e counterpar t i n Algeria . 8. Anothe r factor , durin g th e decolonizatio n phase , ha s t o d o wit h governmental policies . No t underestimatin g th e intensit y o f the interro gation method s applie d t o Zionis t activist s b y th e authorities , an d th e virtual ba n o n emigratio n (Morocco) ; o r th e arres t an d interrogatio n o f Israeli emissarie s an d loca l Zionist s (Tunisia)—th e policie s adopte d b y Nasser's Egyp t o r Syri a suc h a s internmen t i n priso n camps , sequestra tion, o r even outrigh t confiscation o f assets, an d large-scale expulsion s (as was th e cas e wit h Egyptia n Jew s i n 1956-57) , wer e neve r implemente d by Muhamma d V , Hasa n II , Bourguiba , o r th e FLN . Th e freedo m o f action grante d i n Algeria , Morocc o (sinc e 1961) , an d Tunisi a t o Jewis h emigration societies—includin g th e Jewis h Agency' s operation s insid e Tunisia, th e Unite d HIA S Servic e facad e fo r th e Mossad/Jewish Agenc y in connectio n wit h "Operatio n Yakhin, " and th e Unite d HIA S i n Algeri a for departure t o countries othe r tha n Israel—wa s unparallele d elsewher e in th e Ara b world . Thes e organization s enjoye d greate r legalit y tha n government opponent s wh o were Muslim s (Youssefite s i n Tunisia, oppo nents o f the FLN , undergroun d politica l movement s i n Morocco) , albei t managed b y foreigners an d financed fro m abroad . Th e authorities learne d that suc h Jewis h initiatives , doubtles s a sourc e o f occasional embarrass ment, wer e no t intende d t o undermin e thei r powe r base , a s thei r Mus lim adversaries would have liked to . Besides , ther e was the consideratio n in Morocc o an d Tunisi a tha t curbin g thi s freedo m o f action woul d inevi tably trigge r reaction s amon g Jew s an d government s i n th e West , reac tions Bourguib a an d Hasa n I I i n particular sough t t o avoid.

Notes

Introduction 1. Andr e Chouraqui , Between East and West: A History of the Jews of North Africa, Philadelphia : Th e Jewish Publicatio n Societ y of America, 1968 , 7. 2. Davi d C . Gordon , The Passing of French Algeria, Oxford : Oxfor d Universit y Press, 1966 , 6-10 . 3. Se e not e 2 an d Clemen t Moore , Politics in North Africa, Boston : Little , Brown, 1970 . 4. Moore , Politics in North Africa, 23 . 5. Se e especiall y L . Car l Brown , The Tunisia of Ahmad Bey, 1837-1855, Princeton: Princeto n Universit y Press , 1974 . 6. Se e note 4 (pp. 22-23) . 7. Joh n Waterbury , The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite, Ne w York: Columbia Universit y Press , 1970 , 10-11 . 8. Ibid. , 10-11 . 9. Ibid. , 34-35,40-41 . 10. Quote d i n Elbak i Hermassi , Leadership and National Development in North Africa—A Comparative Study, Berkele y an d Lo s Angeles : Universit y o f California Press , 1972 , 70. 11. Hamilto n A . R . Gib b an d Harol d Bowen , Islamic Society and the West, Oxford: Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1957 , vol. I , pt . II , 207-208 . 12. Andr e Chouraqui , "Algeria, " American Jewish Year Book, (AJYB hereafter ) 56 (1955), 431-432. 13. Andr e Zaoui, "Tunisia, " AJYB, 5 8 (1957), 348. 14. Henr y L . Levy , "Tunisia, " AJYB, 5 6 (1955), 441. 15. Z . Schuste r an d Ma x Isenberg h t o Joh n Slawson , Paris , 2 8 Marc h 1950 , Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem , 10B/56.308 . 16. Manue l L . Ortega , Los Hebreos en Marruecos, Madri d 1934 , 197 . 17. Fo r a les s rigi d analysi s o f the compositio n o f Maghrib i communities , espe cially Morocco , se e Shlom o Deshen' s importan t work : The Mellah Society: Jewish Community Life in Sharifian Morocco, Chicago : Chicag o Universit y 351

352 Notes

to Chapter 1

Press, 1989 . Se e also Yaron Tsur, France and the Jews of Tunisia: The Policy of the French Authorities toward the Jews and the Activities of the Jewish Elites during the Period of Transition from Muslim Independent State to Colonial Rule, 1873-1888 x-xii . Ph. D dissertation , Th e Hebre w Universit y of Jerusalem, 1988 , Hebrew . 18. H . Z . Hirschberg , A History of the Jews in North Africa, vol . I : From Antiquity to the Sixteenth Century, Leiden : E . J . Brill , 1974 , 155. 19. O n thi s topi c see : Michae l Abitbol , Temoins et acteurs: Les Corcos et Vhistoire du Maroc contemporain, Jerusalem : Ben-Zv i Institute , 1977 ; Michae l M. Laskier , The Alliance Israelite Universelle and the Jewish Communities of Morocco: 1862-1962, Albany : Stat e Universit y o f Ne w Yor k Press , 1983 ; Daniel J. Schroeter , Merchants of Essaouira: Urban Society and Imperialism in Southwestern Morocco, 1844-1886, Cambridge : Cambridg e Universit y Press, 1988 ; Lelan d Loui s Bowie , The Protege System in Morocco: 18801904, 12 . Ph.D dissertation , Ohi o Stat e University , 1970 . 1. Nort h Africa n Jewr y i n th e Twentiet h Centur y 1. Se e especiall y Norma n A . Stillman , The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times, Philadelphia : Th e Jewis h Publicatio n Societ y o f America , 1991 ; and Michael M . Laskier , Maghribi Jewry in the Shadow of Vichy and the Swastika, Tel-Aviv : Tel-Aviv Universit y Press , 1992 , Hebrew . 2. Michae l M . Laskier , The Alliance Israelite Universelle and the Jewish Communities of Morocco: 1862-1962, Albany : Stat e Universit y o f Ne w Yor k Press, 1983 , 53. 3. Ibid. , 164-165 . 4. Victo r d e Stahl , "L a naturalisatio n de s israelite s marocains, " La Depeche Marocaine, 2 Novembe r 1927 , emphasi s i n original ; se e als o o n politica l status not e 2 and Stillman' s The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times. 5. Y . D . Semac h a l'AIU, Rabat , 1 0 octobre 1936 , Arch.AIU.MAROC.XLV.E . 717(j). 6. R . Gaudefroy-Demombynes , Vceuvre frangaise en matiere d'enseignement au Maroc, Paris : Paul Geuthner , 1928 , 206-208. 7. Michae l M . Laskier , "Muslim s an d Jew s i n Morocco : Similaritie s an d Con trasts i n th e Influenc e o f Frenc h Educatio n an d Culture , 1912-1956 " i n M. A . Friedma n an d M . Gil l (eds.) , Te c uda: Studies in Judaica, Tel-Aviv : Tel-Aviv Universit y Press , 1986 , 244-258, Hebrew . 8. Willia m Bei n a t th e America n Jewis h Join t Distributio n Committe e (AJDC ) Country Director s Conference , Paris , Octobe r 1952 , Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem, 330B. 9. Se e Zv i Yehuda , The Zionist Organization in Morocco: 1900-1948, Ph.D . dissertation, Th e Hebre w Universit y o f Jerusalem, 1981 , Hebrew . Michae l M. Laskier , "Th e Evolutio n o f Zionist Activity i n the Jewish Communitie s o f Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria: 1897-1947, " Studies in Zionism, 8 (Fall 1983), 205-236.

Notes to Chapter 1 35 3 10. Se e note 2 (pp. 198 , 200-201). 11. Se e especially , Davi d Cohen , "Lyaute y an d Zionis m i n Morocc o (1912 1925)," Kivunim, 1 8 (February 1983) , 105-154 , Hebrew . 12. Se e note 2 (pp. 203 , 207). 13. "Un e politique nefaste, " L'Avenir Illustre, 18 , no. 107 , 22 May 1930. 14. Lucie n Sain t a Monsieur l e Chef de Regio n (Rabat) , 2 9 juillet 1932 , Archive s des Affaires Etrangeres , Nantes , Directio n d e l'Interieur/810A . 15. Se e especially : Josep h Chetrit , "L a Haskal a hebraiqu e a u Maro c a la fin d u XIXe siecl e e t s a contributio n a l'apparitio n d u mouvemen t sioniste, " i n Issachar Ben-Am i (ed.) , Recherches sur la culture des Juives d'Afrique du Nord, Jerusalem : Communaut e Israelit e Nord-Africaine , 1991 , 313-332, He brew; idem., "Ne w Consciousness an d Language : The Beginning s of a Movement o f Enlightenment i n Morocc o a t th e En d o f the Nineteent h Century, " in J . Chetri t (ed.) , Miqqedem Umiyyam II: Studies in the Jewry of Islamic Countries, Haifa : Haif a University , 1986 , 129-168 , Hebrew . 16. Se e Laskier , "Th e Evolutio n o f Zionist Activity," 205-236. 17. Ibid . 18. Raphae l Ben-Asher , The History of Hashomer Hatzair in Tunisia, Kibbut z Giv c at Havlva , 1980 , 19 , Hebrew . 19. Se e especiall y Yitsha k Avrahami , "Way s o f Emancipation: 'Gdu d HA-KKL' , A Circl e o f Zionist-Socialis t Student s i n Tunis , 1937-1942 " Hebrew , i n J . Chetrit (ed.) , Miqqedem Umiyyam HI: Tradition and Modernity in the North African and Oriental Jewry. Haifa : Haif a Universit y Press , 1990 , 171-186 , Hebrew. 20. Se e note 1 6 (pp. 229-232) . 21. Ibid. , 231. 22. Ibid . 23. Ibid . 24. Le Reveiljuif, 9 December 1927 . 25. Alfre d Valens i a l'Organisatio n Sionist e (Londres) , Tunis , 2 7 juille t 1919 , Central Zionis t Archives (CZ A hereafter), Z4/1905 . 26. Ibid . 27. Henr i Maare k e t Alfre d Valens i a l'Organisatio n Sioniste , 2 1 fevrie r 1921 , CZA, Z4/1882 . 28. Ibid . 29. Ibid . 30. H . Maarek , "E n guis e d e preface, " Le Reveiljuif, 1 , no . 12 , 2 8 Novembe r 1924. 31. Ibid . 32. F . Allouche , "Notr e entretie n ave c M . Morinaud : naturalisatio n . . . droit s . . . , " Le Reveiljuif no . 39, 5 June 1925 . 33. H . Maarek , " A propos d'un e motion, " Le Reveiljuif 3 , no. 107 , 24 Septem ber 1926 . 34. "Nationalism e o u assimilation, " Paix et Droit, 1 , no. 4 , monthl y (Apri l 1921) , P. i .

354 Notes

to Chapter 2

35. H . Maarek , "L e dange r d u sionisme, " Le Reveil Juif, 4 , no . 137 , 2 2 Apri l 1927. 36. Leo n Pinha s a l'AIU, Safi , 1 3 mars 1934 , Arch.AIU.MAROC, L.E.784 . 37. Ibid . 38. Jacque s Bigar t a Leo n Pinhas , Paris , 5 avril 1934 , Arch.AIU.MAROC , L.E . 784. 39. Davi d Beha r a l'AIU , Safi , 1 2 decembr e 1938 , Arch . AIU.MAROC , XLVIII.E.371. 40. Sylvai n Half f a Davi d Behar , Paris , 5 Janvie r 1939 , Arch.AIU.MAROC , XLVIII.E.371. 41. A . Sagues , Deux organisations de defense du judaisme: le sionisme et Valliance israelite, Tunis , 1920 , 10. 42. Henr i Maare k e t Alfre d Valens i a l'Organisatio n Sioniste , Tunis , 2 1 fevrie r 1921, CZA , Z4/1882 . 43. Se e note 41 (p. 21). 44. Y . D . Semac h a l'AIU , Tanger , 1 9 octobr e 1919 , Arch.AIU.MAROC , LXI.E.946(c). 45. Y . D . Semac h a l'AIU , Rabat , 2 9 decembr e 1926 , Arch.AIU.MAROC , XLII.E. 717(a). 46. Ibid . 47. Ibid . 48. Y . D. Semac h a l'AIU,Rabat, 2 1 mars 1927, Arch.AIU.MAROC, XLII.E.717(a) . 49. A . Laredo , "L a cultur e juiv e a u Maroc, " L'Avenir lllustre, no . 243 , 2 7 February 1936 , 9-10 . 50. Alber t Confin o a l'AIU, Talmu d Tora h Alger, Rappor t Annuel , 1 7 novembr e 1922, Arch.AIU. FRANCE, VI I 13-14 .

2. U n d e r Vich y an d th e Nazi-Germa n Menac e 1. Thi s chapte r i s a n expande d versio n o f a n articl e publishe d i n Modern Judaism, 11 , no . 3 (Octobe r 1991) , 84-114 . Th e materia l i s publishe d wit h the permission o f the Johns Hopkin s Universit y Press . 2. O n thes e developments , se e Miche l Abitbol , The Jews of North Africa during the Second World War, Jerusalem : Th e Ben-Zv i Institute , 1986 , 3 133, Hebrew . 3. O n th e pogro m o f August 1934 , se e Charle s Ageron , "Un e emeut e antijuiv e a Constantin e (aou t 1934), " Revue de VOccident Musulman et de la Mediterranee, (1973) , 23-40 ; Abitbol , The Jews of North Africa during the Second World War, 22-24 ; Josep h Fischer , Pogrome de Constantine: Rapport presents a la Conference juive mondiale de Geneve (20-23 aout 1934), Centra l Zionist Archives i n Jerusalem (CZA) , S25/5217. 4. J . D . Mosseri , "Le s desordre s antisemite s d e Sfa x a l'instar d'Aden, " Israel, 13, no . 3 3 (12 August 1932) , 1-2 . 5. J . P . Halstead , Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan

Notes to Chapter 2 35 5 Nationalism: 1912-1944, Cambridge , Mass. : Harvar d Universit y Press , 1967 , 153, 155 . 6. Michae l M . Laskier , Maghribi Jewry in the Shadow of Vichy and the Swastika, Tel-Aviv : Tel-Aviv Universit y Press , 1992 , 384. 7. Eli e Cohen-Hadria , "Le s juif s francophone s dan s l a vi e intellectuell e e t politique e n Tunisi e entr e le s deu x guerres, " i n M . Abitbo l (ed.) , Judaisme d'Afrique du Nord aux XIX e et XX e siecles, Jerusalem : Ben-Zv i Institute, 4 9 66; Michael M . Laskier , "Fro m Hafsi a t o Bizerte: Tunisia's Nationalis t Strug gle an d Tunisia n Jewry , 1952-61, " Mediterranean Historical Review, 1 , no . 4 (1987), 188-222 . 8. Muhamma d al-Kholti , "Le s israelite s e t nous, " L Action du Peuple (1 8 Au gust 1933) , 1 . 9. O n th e wor k o f th e AIU , se e Michae l M . Laskier , The Alliance Israelite Universelle and the Jewish Communities of Morocco: 1862-1962, Albany : State Universit y o f New York Press, 1983 . 10. Leo n Arania s a l'Alliance , Larache , 2 7 juille t 1939 , Arch.AIU . MAROC, LXXIII, E . N o file number. 11. Alber t Sague s a l'Alliance , Tanger , 8 septembr e 1936 , Arch.AIU.MAROC , LX. E . 94 3 (e). 12. Ibid . 13. La situation des Juifs en Zonefrangais de l'empire cherifien: fin 1943, CZ A Z 4/10.266. 14. A . Cohe n a l'Alliance, Safi , 1 8 decembre 1939 , Arch.AIU. MAROC, XLVIII . E. 743 . 15. Bulletin Officiel du Maroc (BOM), 3 1 Octobe r 1940 ; "L e statu t officie l de s Juifs a u Maroc : l e dahi r d u 3 1 octobre 1940, " Bulletin de la Federation des Societes Juives dAlgerie (BFSJA), 8 , no . 6 7 (February-March 1941) , 14-15 . 16. BOM, 8 August 1941 ; "Statut de s Juif s Marocains, " BFSJA, 8 , no . 7 3 (October 1941) , 18. 17. Davi d Cohen , "Th e Natur e o f the Implementatio n o f the Anti-Jewis h Legis lation i n Morocc o under Vich y in Accordance with Ne w Documents fro m th e Quai d'Orsay, " Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies, division B , vol. II , Jerusalem , 1986 , 227, Hebrew . 18. M . Y. , R . S. , R . B . (Rober t Benazeraf) , Rapport Confidentiel: L'application du statut des juifs et des dispositions raciales a la population juive du Maroc (Jerusalem): Ben-Zv i Institute , 16-18 . Unpublishe d ms . 19. Ibid. , pp . 13 , 23-24 . Th e repor t provide s ampl e statistica l dat a o n th e expulsion o f Jewish student s an d educators . 20. Laskier , The Alliance Israelite Universelle and Morocco, 183 . 21. Roge r Thabault, "L e Maro c a l'heure d u Vichysme, " Les Nouveaux Cahiers, 43 (Winter 1975-76) , 17 . 22. Lettr e d e Darla n a Vallat , Documents : Centr e d e Documentatio n Juive , Paris, LXX11-1 2 et XXV1112-41 et 330. 23. Claud e Singer , "Servi r l a France—l e journa l d e Ren e Cassi n a Londres, " Les Nouveaux Cahiers, 8 1 (Summer 1985) , 63.

356 Notes

to Chapter 2

24. H . Z . (J . W. ) Hirschberg , A History of the Jews in North Africa, Leiden : E. J . Brill , 1974 , vol. II , 324-325 . 25. Pas t and Presen t Condition s of the Jews in Morocco : From the Origins to the Advent of the French and Spanish Protectorates in 1912 (Repor t fro m No vember 1944)—submitte d t o th e America n Jewis h Join t Distributio n Com mittee (AJDC) , AJDC Archives, Jerusalem , Nort h Africa File/327 . 26. Note : A/S La situation de s israelites a u Maroc , Tetuan, 6 aout 1945 , Archives des Affaires Etrangere s (AA E hereafter)-Nantes, DI/809 . 27. Ibid . 28. Ibid . 29. Ibid . 30. Frit z Lichtenstei n t o the Jewish Agency, Tangier , 3-1 7 Ma y 1944 , CZ A S26/ 1937. 31. Blandin , "L a population d e Tanger e n 1940, " Revue Africaine, 8 8 (1944), 97. 32. Se e note 30. 33. Charle s Hamet , La communaute israelite de Tanger, Tange r 1951 , unpub lished ms . CHEA M (Centr e d e Haute s Etude s Administative s su r l'Afriqu e et l'Asie Moderne , Paris) , 74. 34. Se e note 25. 35. Se e note 2. 36. Hirschberg , A History of the Jews in North Africa, vol . II , 326. 37. Not e sur la question juive au Maroc, confidentiel. 1 7 juin 1943 , AAE-Nantes, DI/809. 38. "Decre t d u 3 0 novembr e 194 0 portan t statu t de s Juif s e n Tunisie : L a nou velle legislation su r le statut de s Juifs," BFSJA, 8 , no. 6 6 (January 1941) , 12 14. 39. "Mesure s concernan t l a Tunisie : avocat s defenseurs, " BFSJA, 8 , no . 7 4 (November 1941) , 12. 40. Journal Officiel de Tunisie (JOT), 6 Novembe r 1941 ; "Mesures concernan t la Tunisie: medecins," BFSJA, 9 , no . 7 6 (January 1942) , 16. 41. Nahu m Yerushalmi , Tunis , t o th e Zionis t Federatio n Organizatio n Depart ment i n Jerusalem, 1 5 June 1941 , CZA S5/795. 42. O n importan t studie s regardin g Tunisia n Jewr y unde r th e Germa n occupa tion, se e Yitsha k Avrahami , "Tunisia n Jewr y unde r Germa n Occupation : Financial Matters, " Pe c amim, 2 8 (1986) , 107-125 , Hebrew . Abitbol , The Jews of North Africa during the Second World War, 115-124 ; R . Borgel , Etoile jaune et Croix gammee: recit dune servitude, Tunis , 1944 ; Danie l Carpi, "Th e Italian Governmen t an d the Jews of Tunisia in the Second Worl d War (Jun e 1940-Ma y 1943 , Zion, 52 , no . 1 (1987), 57-106 , Hebrew . Pau l Ghez, Six mois sous la hotte, Tunis , 1943 ; Hirschberg, A History of the Jews in North Africa, vol . II , 140-143 ; Yaron Tsur, "Th e Jewis h Communitie s o f Tunisia during th e Naz i Occupation," Annual for the Study and Research on Contemporary Jewry, 2 (1985), 153-173 , Hebrew . 43. Se e especially Avrahami, "Tunisia n Jewry under Germa n Occupation : Finan cial Matters," Pe camim, 2 8 (1986), 114-115 , Hebrew .

Notes to Chapter 3 35 7 44. Davi d Chemla , "Quan d l'alleman d occupai t l a Tunisie," La Voix Juive, 7 July 1944, 1 . 45. Intervie w wit h Avraha m Sarfat I conducte d b y th e Ghett o Fighter s Museu m Staff, Jun e 24 , 1968 , Ghetto Fighter s Museu m Archive s (GFMA)/50/01. 46. Intervie w with Yitshak Avrahami, 2 4 June 1968 , GFMA/50/01. 47. Naftal i Bar-Gior a to this author, 3 March 1982 . 48. "Revu e d e la jurisprudence: conservatio n de s droit s politique s d u citoyen, " BFSJA, 8 , no . 6 7 (February-March 1941) , 11. 49. Ibid. , 11-12 . 50. Miche l Ansky , Lesjuifs d' Algerie du decret Cremieux a la liberation, Paris : Centre d e Documentatio n Juiv e Contemporaine, 1950 , 166 . 51. Ibid . 52. "Mesure s concernan t l'Algeri e sage s femmes, " BFSJA, 8 , no . 7 5 (Decembe r 1941), 16 . 53. Journal Ojficiel d Algerie (JOA), 2 5 Novembe r 1941 ; "Mesures concernan t les biens, decre t du 2 1 novembre 194 1 etendant a l'Algerie l a loi du 22 juillet 1941 relative aux entreprises, bien s et valeurs appartenant au x juifs," BFSJA, 8, no . 7 5 (December 1941) , 17-20 . 54. Ibid . 55. "L'applicatio n d u numerus clausus e n Algeri e (documentatio n ofBcielle) : instruction pou r l'admissio n de s eleve s juifs, " BFSJA, 8 , no . 8 3 (Octobe r 1942), 1 . 56. "Su r le numerus clausus," BFSJA, 9 , no . 8 6 (March 1943) , 10-11 . 57. Eli e Gozlan , "De s ecoles , de s colleges, de s lycees! " BFSJA, 9 , no . 8 3 (October 1942) , 1 . 58. Pau l Sebaoun , La resistance juive algerienne. Unpublishe d account , Th e Tabenkin Institut e fo r th e Stud y o f th e Zionis t Movement s i n th e Middl e East an d Nort h Africa . I than k Yitsha k Avraham i fo r th e us e o f thi s docu ment. 59. Ibid . 60. Abitbol , The Jews of North Africa during the Second World War, 106 . 61. Se e note 58. 62. Ibid ; Abitbol , The Jews of North Africa during the Second World War, 106 ; see especiall y Gitt a Amipaz-Silber , La resistance juive en Algerie: 19401942, Jerusalem: Rubi n Mass , 1986 , 77-79 . 63. Se e note 58. 3. Zionism , Clandestin e Emigratio n 1. Samue l Danie l Lev y a t "L e IV e conferenc e regiona l d e collaborateur s d u KKL et d u Chekel, " L'Avenir Illustre, 1 4 (284), 30 June-15 July 1939 . 2. Roge r L e Tourneau, Jeunesse europeenne, juive et musulmane en Afrique du Nord (Fe z 1947) , unpublished ms . CH E AM. 3. Intervie w wit h Morocca n Jew s livin g i n Lo s Angeles , member s o f Em Habanim Congregation , 2 9 November 1992 .

358 Notes

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4. Hai m S a c adon, "Ideolog y an d Reality : The Etze l an d th e Hagan a in Tunisia , 1945-1948," in Benjami n Pinku s an d Dori s Bensimo n (eds.) , French Jewry, Zionism and the State of Israel, Sdeh-Boke r an d Be 3 er-Sheva, Ben-Gurio n University an d th e Pari s Institu t Nationa l d e Langue s e t Civilisation s Orien tates, 1992 , 322-340, Hebrew . 5. Ephrai m Friedma n a t Symposium on the North African Jewish Underground, i n pamphle t b y th e Organizatio n o f th e Forme r Nort h Africa n Underground Activists , Jul y 1987 , 9-11. 6. Y a c akov Kraus e (Karoz) , ha-Mossa d L e c Aliya t o th e DMO , Tel-Aviv , 3 February 1949 , Hagan a Archive s (H A hereafter), 14/ 5 [Hebrew] ; The c Aliya Situation i n Morocco , Confidentia l Repor t o f th e Mossa d L e c Aliya, Marc h 1949, n o specifi c date , H A 14/ 5 [Hebrew] ; Mar c Jarblum , "Repor t o n M y Visit to Nort h Africa, " Paris , 1 7 January 1949 , Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem , 149B ; Ephraim Ben-Hayyim , "Illega l Emigratio n fro m Nort h Africa : Th e Thre e Ships," i n Y . Avraham i (ed.) , Shorashim ba-Mizrah, I , Ramat-E f c al, Yad Tabenkin an d ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuhad , 1986 , 241-320, Hebrew . 7. Y . Kraus e (Karoz) , ha-Mossa d L e c Aliya t o th e DMO , Tel-Aviv , 3 Februar y 1949, H A 14/5 , Hebrew . 8. Ibid . 9. Ibid . Se e anothe r stud y o n th e Jew s o f Oudjd a b y Yvett e Katan , Oudjda: Une ville frontiere du Maroc (1907-1956), Paris : L'Harmattan, 1990 . 10. Alphons e Juin a Georges Bidault , Rabat , 2 0 juillet 1947 , AAE-Nantes, Direc tion de llnterieur (D I hereafter)/809 . 11. Ibid . 12. Ibid . 13. Ibid . 14. Ab u Khalil , "Th e Zionis t Poiso n in Morocco, " Lejeune Moghrebin, no . 1 , 20 July 1947 , Arabic. 15. Se e note 10 . 16. Franci s Lacost e a Juin, Rabat , 3 juin 1948 , AAE-Nantes, DI/CAR . 3 , DOSS . 1. 17. Ibid . 18. Brune i a Juin, Telegram , Oudjda , 7 juin 1948 , 7:2 5 P.M. , AAE-Nantes , DI / CAR. 3 , DOSS . 1 . 19. J . L. , "Le s trouble s antisemite s d u Maro c Oriental, " AAE-Nantes, DI/CAR . 3, DOSS . 1 , no date. 20. Ibid . 21. Eugen e Weill , "Evenement s d u 7 juin 194 8 et jours consecutif s a Oudjda e t Djerada," 3 0 juin 1948 , AAE-Nantes, Cabinet/251. 22. Se e note 19 . 23. Se e note 21. 24. Se e note 19 . 25. Se e note 21. 26. Efrai m Be n Hayyi m [sic] (Friedman) , "Th e Erets-Yisrae l Missio n t o Nort h

Notes to Chapter 3 35 9 Africa—The Firs t Phase : 1943-1948/49, " Symposium of the Organization of Former Underground Activists in North Africa, Jul y 1987 , 13 , Hebrew . 27. Se e note 19 . 28. Se e notes 1 9 and 21. 29. al- cAlam, 1 6 July 1948 , Arabic. 30. Se e note 21. 31. Se e note 29. 32. al- cAlam, 2 4 June 1948 , Arabic. 33. Brune i to Juin, Oudjda , 1 9 June 1948 , AAE-Nantes, DI/CAR . 3 , DOSS . 1 . 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Proce s de s marocain s inculpe s a l a suit e de s evenement s d'Oudjda , AAE Nantes, DI/CAR . 3 , DOSS . 1 . 38. M . Blanchier , Che f d e l'Annexe , Djerada , a Brunei, 2 3 fevrier 1949 , Confi dentiel, AAE-Nantes , DI/CAR . 3 , DOSS . 2 . 39. L e proce s de s emeute s d e Djerada , 1 3 fevrier 1949 , AAE-Nantes , DI/CAR . 3, DOSS . 2. 40. Not e su r le s secour s attribue s au x israelites d e l a region d'Oudjda , 6 octobr e 1948, AAE-Nantes , 183-1 . 41. Varl e a Rabat, 8 septembre 1948 , AAE-Nantes, DI/CAR . 3 , DOSS . 2 . 42. Brune i a Juin, 1 8 decembr e 1948 , Oudjda , Confidentiel , AAE-Nantes , DI / CAR. 3 , DOSS . 2 . 43. Laparr a a l e Directeu r d e llnterieur , Fez , 2 7 aou t 1948 , AAE-Nantes , DI / 810A. 44. Accordin g t o Efrai m Ben-Hayyim , on e o f th e mai n Israel i c aliya organizer s stationed i n Algeria, i n 1948-4 9 th e Mossa d L e c Aliya in Marseille s se t u p a laboratory fo r falsifying passport s an d visas. These were i n turn sen t t o Nort h Africa i n larg e quantitie s an d provide d t o would-b e emigrant s eithe r i n Morocco or once they reache d Algeria . Efrai m Ben-Hayyim , se e note 26. 45. Se e note 6 . 46. Directio n d e llnterieur/Sectio n Politique : not e a l'attentio n d e Franci s La coste, n o date , bu t probabl y fro m Februar y o r earl y Marc h 1949 , AAE Nantes, 183-1 . 47. Moin s a le Directeu r d e llnterieur , confidentiel , Rabat , 2 9 aout 1948 , AAENantes, DI/810A . 48. Moin s a le Directeu r d e llnterieur , Rabat , 9 decembr e 1948 , AAE-Nantes , DI/810A. 49. Directio n d e llnterieur , confidentiel , not e su r Immigratio n juiv e ver s la Palestine, Oudjda , 2 6 aout 1948 , AAE-Nantes, DI/810A . 50. Directio n d e llnterieur , not e su r l a situatio n a Oudjda , secret , Rabat , 2 9 octobre 1948 , AAE-Nantes, DI/810A . 51. Se e not e 42 . Accordin g t o Moin s th e majorit y o f th e Jewis h communit y councils "son t composee s d e personnage s generalemen t fortunes , ayan t de s

360 Notes

to Chapter 3

situations acquise s qu i craignen t le s repercussion s e t le s mesure s d e retor sion qu e pourraien t amene r de s depart s massif s d'israelites " (ar e compose d of the generall y well-to-do, wh o have establishe d themselve s i n life an d wh o fear th e repercussion s an d retaliator y measure s tha t massiv e Jewis h depar tures migh t bring) . 52. Dessaign e a Che f d e l a Regio n d e Fez , Sefrou , 1 9 novembr e 1948 , AAE Nantes, DI/810A . 53. Ibid . 54. Brune i a Juin , not e d e renseignement , Oudjda , 2 1 decembr e 1948 , AAE Nantes, DI/810A . 55. Not e a u suje t emigratio n israelite , AAE-Nantes , Dl/Sectio n Politique , 810A , no date. 56. Directio n d e llnterieur/Sectio n Politique : not e a l'attentio n d e Franci s La coste, n o date, AAE-Nantes , 183-1 . 57. Ibid . 58. Lacost e a R. Schuman , Rabat , 9 septembre 1948 , AAE-Nantes, DI/811 . 59. M . Jarblum , Repor t o n M y Visi t i n Nort h Africa , Paris , 1 7 Januar y 1949 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem, 149B-12 . 60. Ibid . 61. Ibid . 62. Ibid . Th e genera l ide a behin d Jarblum' s argumen t wa s that , base d o n a n agreement mad e b y th e Residency , th e Jewis h Agenc y woul d conduc t a n orderly, slow-pace d emigratio n ou t o f Morocco base d o n quotas . Therefore , fewer peopl e woul d leav e eac h mont h tha n ha d don e i n 1947-48 , whic h ha d caused th e Residenc y considerabl e embarrassmen t and , fo r Israel , grea t problems o f absorbing th e fresh wave s of emigrants. 63. Ibid . 64. Ibid . 65. Lacost e a Schuman, Rabat , 3 juin 1949 , AAE-Nantes, DI/811 . 66. Ibid . Accordin g t o Lacoste : "I I restai t u n autr e probleme : celu i d'evite r le s reactions eventuelle s d e l a coler e populair e musulman e e t d e menage r le s susceptibilites d u Palai s tre s vive s e n l a matiere " (Ther e remaine d anothe r problem: tha t o f avoiding possibl e reaction s o f popular Musli m ange r an d o f dealing tactfully wit h th e great sensitivit y o f the Palac e on the subject) . 67. Ralp h Spanien , HIAS-France , "Repor t o n M y Tri p t o Morocco, " confiden tial, Februar y 1949 , no specific date , CZA , S20/561 . 68. Ibid . 69. J . Gershun i a General Alphons e Juin, Casablanca , 9 mars 1949 , confidentiel , AAE-Nantes, DI/811 . 70. Ibid . 71. Ibid . 72. AAE-Nantes , DI/813 : note san s date d e la Direction d e llnterieur . 73. Intervie w wit h Sam y Halevy , Busta n ha-Galil , Israel , 2 2 Septembe r 1986 , Hebrew. 74. Ibid .

Notes to Chapter 4 36

1

75. A s long as the Mossa d L e c Aliya directed Cadima , it s central emissaries wer e Samy Halevy an d Shau l Guetta . 76. Michae l M . Laskier , "Jewis h Emigratio n fro m Morocc o t o Israel : Govern ment Policie s an d th e Positio n o f International Jewis h Organizations , 1949 56," Middle Eastern Studies, 25 , no. 3 (July 1989) , 331. 77. Intervie w wit h Eliah u Brakha , Mossa d L e c Aliya emissar y t o Egyp t (1949 50) and Algeria (1950), Haifa , 1 8 November 1986 , Hebrew . 4. Morocco s Struggl e fo r I n d e p e n d e n c e 1. Repor t b y th e Immigratio n Departmen t i n Marseilles , 1 March 1951 , CZA, S6/6074, Hebrew . 2. Gior a Josephtha l t o Mose s W . Beckleman , Jerusalem , 3 0 Novembe r 1955 , Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem , 20A . 3. Ze 3 ev Khaklai to David Ben-Gurio n (Israel s Premier) , Casablanca , 1 5 March 1953, Israe l Stat e Archives (IS A hereafter), Foreig n Ministr y (F M hereafter) , 2398/1A Hebrew . 4. Ibid . 5. I t i s noteworth y tha t unti l 195 4 familie s heade d b y widow s wer e usuall y rejected fo r c aliya. A s late a s 195 3 Cadima ha d spli t u p man y familie s i n th e c aliya process. Thi s was less often th e case subsequently . 6. Se e note 3. 7. Mauric e Carr , "Th e Huma n Side, " Israel Youth Horizon, Jerusalem , De cember 1951 ; cited fro m Josep h B . Schechtman , On Wings of Eagles, Ne w York: Thomas Yosselof, 1961 , 289-290. 8. S . Batish , "Repor t o n M y Visit to Morocco," no specific date , 1953 , ISA, F M 2388/13, Hebrew . 9. Coordinatin g Commissio n Sessio n o f 9 March 1953 , CZA, S42/253 , Hebrew . 10. Se e note 3. 11. Protoco l o f Meetin g o n Nort h Africa , Tel-Aviv , 1 0 January 1954 , ISA , F M 2398/1A, Hebrew . 12. Amo s Eilon, "Ptih a be-Casablanca," ha-^Arets, 4 May 1953. 13. Meetin g o f th e Coordinatin g Commissio n Chaire d b y Mosh e Sharet t an d Attended b y Mosh e Kol , Shlom o Zalma n Shragai , Dr . A . Granot , Ber l Locker, Gior a Josephthal , Lev y Eshkol , Y . Rokeach , CZA , S42/253 , Th e Josephthal Papers , Hebrew . 14. Protoco l o f the Coordinatin g Commission , Meetin g o f 20 July 1954 , Jerusa lem, CZA , S42/253 , Hebrew . 15. Michae l M . Laskier , "Politica l an d Organizationa l Aspect s o f Immigration t o Israel fro m Morocco : 1949-1956, " Zionism, vol . XII , Tel-Aviv : Hakibbut z Ha-Meuhad Publishin g House , 1987 , 342-343, Hebrew . 16. Ze > ev Khakla i t o Eliachar , Casablanca , 1 8 Novembe r 1952 , CZA , S6/6008 , Hebrew. 17. O n thi s developmen t se e Joh n Waterbury , The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite, Ne w York : Columbi a Universit y Press , 1970 ,

362 Notes

to Chapter 4

51-55; Michae l M . Laskier , The Alliance Israelite Universelle and the Jewish Communities of Morocco: 1862-1962, Albany : Stat e Universit y o f New Yor k Press, 1983 , 215-216. 18. Michae l M . Laskier , "Th e Instabilit y o f Morocc o Jewr y an d th e Morocca n Press i n th e Firs t Decad e afte r Independence, " Jewish History, 1 , no . 1 (Spring 1986) , 39-40 . 19. Yitsha k Kleinbau m t o Samue l L . Haber , Casablanca , 2 9 Novembe r 1955 , Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem , 10B/C56.308"A. " 20. Dr . Alexande r Goni k t o Samue l L . Haber , Casablanca , 2 2 February-3 Marc h 1955, Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem , 20A . Accordin g to the AJDC, i n October 195 5 only betwee n 8 an d 1 0 percen t o f th e Morocca n c aliya candidate s wer e rejected o n th e basi s o f medical criteri a whereas betwee n 2 0 and 2 5 percen t were rejecte d o n th e basi s o f social criteria . (AJD C Countr y Director s Con ference, Paris , 1 7 October 1955. ) 21. Se e CZA, S42/228 , Directive s fo r Morocco , March-Apri l 1955 , Hebrew . 22. O n thi s subjec t se e Yehud a Grinker , The Aliya of Atlas Jewry to Israel, Tel Aviv: Bri t Yots a c e Marokko , 1973 , Hebrew . Laskier , The Alliance Israelite Universelle and Morocco, 214-217 ; Shmue l Segev , "Operation Yakhin" — The Clandestine Emigration of Moroccan Jewry to Israel, Tel-Aviv : Defens e Ministry Press , 1984 , 64-73 , Hebrew . 23. Segev , "Operation Yakhin," 64-65 ; Grinker , The Aliya of Atlas Jewry, 74 75. 24. Grinker , The Aliya of Atlas Jewry, 75 . 25. Ibid . 26 ; Laskier, The Alliance Israelite Universelle and Morocco, 214-215 . 26. Chai m Toltshinsk i t o Avraha m Tziegel , Casablanca , 1 5 January 1956 , CZA , S6/256, Hebrew . 27. Dr . Gior a Josephthal , The Jewish Aspects of the Situation in North Africa, Jerusalem, 1 0 August 1954 , CZA , S42/253 , Hebrew . Whil e theoreticall y i t was planne d i n 195 4 tha t 4 0 percen t o f th e emigrant s woul d settl e i n th e agricultural secto r an d 60 percent i n development towns , thi s was not alway s the case . Fo r example , betwee n Augus t 195 4 an d Januar y 1955 , th e break down o f resettlemen t o f Nort h Africans—Moroccan s included—i n Israe l was a s follows : 60. 7 percen t i n moshavlm, 5 percen t i n kibbutzim, 14. 7 percent i n developmen t towns , an d 19. 6 percen t wit h relative s i n othe r places. Se e CZA, S42/228 , [Hebrew] . 28. Shraga i to Mosh e Da n Shenkop , Jerusalem, 1 8 February 1955 , CZA, S6/856 , Hebrew. 29. Baruc h Duvdevan i t o Shragai , Casablanca , 1 3 September 1955 , CZA, S6/49 , Hebrew. 30. Se e CZA, S6/264 , Hebrew . 31. Mauric e Fische r t o Mosh e Sharett , Paris , 2 6 March 1953 , ISA, F M 2398/ 1 A, Hebrew. 32. Shmue l Divo n t o Sharett , Paris , 2 7 Decembe r 1953 , ISA , F M 268/11 , He brew.

Notes to Chapter 4 36 3 33. Pessa h Shina r t o Ur i Lubrani , Confidential , 2 2 Jun e 1953 , ISA , F M 2398 / 1A, Hebrew . 34. Khakla i t o Ben-Gurion , Casablanca , 1 5 Marc h 1953 , ISA , F M 2398/1A , Hebrew. 35. Khakla i to Sharett, Casablanca , 1 7 March 1953 , ISA, F M 2398/1A , Hebrew . 36. Ibid . 37. Ibid . 38. Se e note 31. 39. Khakla i to Sharett, Casablanca , 2 5 May 1954 , ISA , F M 2398/1A , Hebrew . 40. Amo s Rab l t o Shragai , Casablanca , 1 0 Marc h 1955 , ISA , F M 2398/1A , He brew. 41. Y a cakov Karo z t o Researc h Department , Israe l Ministr y fo r Foreig n Affairs , Paris, 2 0 May 1955 , ISA, F M 2398/1A , Hebrew . 42. W e canno t confir m Lacoste' s assertio n tha t h e alon e wa s responsibl e fo r Cadima's origina l functioning . Yet , a s discussed i n chapte r 3 , he di d attemp t to convinc e Schuma n tha t curbin g c aliya severel y o r haltin g i t was impracti cal.

43. 44. 45. 46.

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

47. Gdali a Paz a Fritz Lichtenstein , Casablanca , 2 6 avril 1950 , CZA , L58/98 . 48. Minn a Blumenfeld' s Report : Protocol s o f th e Jewis h Agenc y Emissaries ' Meeting i n Paris , 11-1 2 Decembe r 1955 , CZA , S6/333 , Hebrew ; se e als o ISA, F M 191/16 . 49. Pa z a Lichtenstein, Casablanca , 5 mars 1950 , CZA, L58/99 . 50. Lichtenstei n a Paz, Paris , 2 9 decembre 1949 , CZA, L58/99 . 51. Blumenfel d t o Mosh e Bejsk i i n Paris , Casablanca , 2 9 June 1950 , CZA , L58 / 98, Hebrew . 52. Blumenfel d t o Mosh e Kol , Casablanca , 7 May 1950 , CZA, L58/98 , Hebrew . 53. Ibid . 54. Se e fo r example : Blumenfel d t o Bejski , 7 Februar y 1952 , CZA , L58/44 , Hebrew. 55. Blumenfel d t o Bejski , Casablanca , 1 0 Septembe r 1951 , CZA, L58/205 , He brew. 56. Bejsk i t o Blumenfeld, Paris , 2 0 September 1951 , CZA, L58/205 , Hebrew . 57. Bejsk i t o Blumenfeld, Urgent , Paris , 2 5 July 1952 , CZA, L58/44 , Hebrew . 58. Blumenfel d t o Bejski, Casablanca , 1 1 July 1951 , CZA, L58/205 , Hebrew . 59. Mei r Harboune , on e o f Cadima' s representative s i n Marrakesh , t o Minn a Blumenfeld, 4 July 1952 , CZA, L58/44 , French . 60. Protoco l o f the Jewis h Agency' s Emissarie s Meetin g i n Paris , 11-1 2 Decem ber 1955 , CZA, S6/333 , Hebrew . 61. Davi d Reichman , Geneva , 2 1 Augus t 1955— Survey on Youth Aliya, CZA , L58/407, Hebrew .

364 Notes

to Chapter 4

62. Ibid . 63. I n 1955-56 , 1 dollar was the equivalen t o f 400 francs . 64. N . Menlso n t o Kol, Marseilles , 6 April 1956 , CZA, L58/409 , Hebrew . 65. Mosh e Kol , Youth Ally a, Present and Future, Jerusalem , 1957 , 119. 66. Pau l Calamar o t o Shlom o Nahon , en d o f 194 8 or beginnin g o f 1949 , transla tion from Frenc h int o Hebrew , CZA , S20/DM O Files . 67. Dr . Shlom o Nahon , "Judais m an d Zionis m i n Nort h Africa, " Repor t o n visi t to Morocco, Tunisia, an d Tripoli in behalf of the World Zionist Organization' s Executive, Jun e 1948 , CZA, S20/DM O Files , Hebrew . 68. Sessio n o f th e Zionis t Genera l Council , 23-3 1 Augus t 1955 , Addresses , Debates, Resolutions , Jerusalem , 1957 , cite d fro m Schechtman , On Wings of Eagles, 291-293 . 69. I t is noteworthy tha t among Cadima's emissarie s at the time there were thos e who though t tha t th e danger s confrontin g th e Jew s wer e purel y economi c (Muslim nationalist s urgin g th e boycot t o f Jewish merchant s an d th e gener ally unfavorabl e economi c condition s a t time s o f politica l upheavals ) whil e other envoy s maintaine d tha t th e Jews were i n physical and politica l danger . See for exampl e Shabta i Tevet i n ha-Arets, 2 6 August 1955 . 70. Eli e Pele g t o th e DMO , Paris , 4 Septembe r 1950 , CZA , S20/DM O Files , Hebrew. 71. Eli e Mouya l t o Mapai in Tel-Aviv, 3 September 1949 , Israel Labo r Archives, The Pinha s Lavo n Institut e (IL A hereafter), 208IV/4969A , Hebrew . 72. Ibid . 73. "Ha-Bonim " in Casablanc a t o Ze> ev Khaklai , 2 9 December 1949 , CZA , S20 / DMO Files , Hebrew . 74. "Ha-Bonim " t o Jerusalem , Casablanca , 2 3 Januar y 1951 , CZA , S20/DM O Files, Hebrew . 75. Ibid . Se e als o "Dror " t o Avraha m Nadad , 2 3 Marc h 1951 , CZA , S20/DM O Files, Hebrew . 76. Shlom o Cohen , ha-Bonim' s emissar y i n th e interior , t o Jerusalem , Fez , 3 1 October 1949 , IL A 208IV/4969A, Hebrew . 77. Hapoe l Hamizrah i d u Maro c (Bahad , Bne i c Akiva, Hapoe l Hamizrahi) , Rap port de s activites pour l'annee 5710 , 1949-50 , CZA , S32/N o c ar ve-he-Halut s Files. 78. Dr . Benzio n Benchalo m t o Pessa h Rodnik , 2 3 Ma y 1954 , CZA , S32/N o c ar ve-he-Haluts Files , Hebrew . 79. "Ha-Bonim " t o "Ihu d ha-N o c ar ha-Kibbutsi " i n Tel-Aviv , 2 0 Jun e 1954 , CZA, S32/N o c ar ve-he-Haluts Files , Hebrew . 80. Ibid . 81. Bn e c Akiva/ha-Po c el ha-Mizrah i t o Dr . Benchalom , Casablanca , 3 Januar y 1955, CZA , S32/N o c ar ve-he-Halut s Files , Hebrew ; se e als o Willia m Bein , AJDC directo r fo r Morocco . Accordin g t o Bein , alread y i n Octobe r 195 2 th e EIF ha d a membershi p o f 2,30 0 whil e DEJ J ha d 3,250 . AJDC Directors Conference: Minutes, Pari s 1952 , 16. 82. AJDC Country Directors Conference, Paris , Octobe r 1956 , 31.

Notes to Chapter 5 36 5 83. Avraha m Israel i t o Dr . Benchalom , 1 9 December 1955 , CZA, S32/N o c ar vehe-Haluts Files , Hebrew . 84. The Department for Middle Eastern Jewry —Reprint From the Report to the Twenty-Third Zionist Congress, Jerusalem , 1951 . 85. Intervie w wit h Eliah u Brakha , Haifa , 1 8 Novembe r 1986 , Hebrew ; se e report o f Mossa d L e c Aliya/DMO collaboratio n an d tension s i n Eli e Peleg' s letter fro m 2 8 Februar y 195 1 t o Y a c akov Zerubavel , IL A 104IV/101H , Hebrew. 86. Se e note 84. 87. Eli e Pele g t o Dr . Avraha m Nadad , Paris , 1 1 January 1950 , CZA , S20/561 , Hebrew. 88. Laskier , The Alliance Israelite Universelle and Morocco, 216-217 . 89. Engleberg , Bitton , Gordon , Zaltz , an d Ben-Davi d t o Y a c akov Zerubavel , Paris, 1 8 December 1950 , CZA, S20/575-I , Hebrew . 90. Eli e Pele g t o Ya cakov Zerubavel, Paris , 7 February 1951 , ILA, 104IV/101H , Hebrew. 91. Ibid . 92. Proce s verba l d e l a reunion d u comit e d u centr e socia l du mellah, 2 2 fevrie r 1951, CZA , S20/DM O Files . 93. Ibid . 94. Ibid . 5. Th e c Aliya fro m Morocc o 1. Th e Proble m o f North Africa n Jewr y a t the AJD C Country Director s Confer ence, Paris , 8 Novembe r 1954 , Repor t b y Z . Bar-Zakai , ISA , F M 163/14 , Hebrew. 2. Intervie w with Rabbi Yitshak Rouche, Jerusalem, 9 February 1976 , Hebrew . 3. Ibid . 4. Intervie w wit h Professo r Issacha r Ben-Ami , Jerusalem , 8 Marc h 1976 , He brew. 5. Davi d Sarfat i an d Alber t Hazan , "L e rabbi n Isaa c Rouche, " Les Cahiers de VAlliance Israelite Universelle, no . 20 8 (mars 1984) , 1-4 . 6. Confidentia l information . 7. Intervie w with Davi d Sarfati , Paris , 6 May 1985 , French . 8. Y . Karo z to Researc h Department , Israe l Ministr y fo r Foreig n Affairs , Paris , 20 May 1955 , ISA, F M 2398/1A , Hebrew . 9. R . Tajour i a R . Cassin , Casablanca , Delegatio n d e l'AIU , 1 5 mar s 1955 , Arch.AIU MAROC , N o File Number . 10. Pa z a Lichtenstein, Casablanca , 2 6 avril 1950 , CZA , L58/98 . 11. Willia m Bei n t o Morri s Laub , Casablanca , 2 Februar y 1951 , Hagan a Ar chives, Tel-Aviv (H A hereafter), 14/5A . 12. Juda h J . Shapir o t o Dr . J . J . Schwartz , 2 4 January 1949 , Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem, 149B/No.l2 . Morocc o Reports, Jul y 1947/Decembe r 1955 . 13. Ibid .

366 Notes

to Chapter 5

14. Zv i Yehieli to Yosef Bayrak, Paris , 1 8 March 1952 , HA , 14/5A , Hebrew . 15. AJD C Countr y Director s Conference , 3 1 October- 4 Novembe r 1954 , 6 8 69. 16. Durin g th e first WJ C Nort h Afric a conferenc e hel d i n Algiers, o n 7-1 0 Jun e 1952, the Morocca n delegation , thoug h i n support oi caliya, though t i t essen tial t o educat e th e would-b e emigrant s an d t o creat e a specia l Morocca n office i n Israe l t o lobby for thei r interest s an d assis t them i n becoming bette r integrated an d absorbe d int o Israel i society . However , th e delegatio n ex plained tha t c aliya was jus t on e alternativ e an d di d no t provid e a total solution t o th e proble m o f Morocca n Jewry . Se e ler e conferenc e nord africaine d u Congre s Jui f Mondial/Jacque s Lazaru s Paper s (Arch.CJM/Laza rus hereafter), P164/27 . 17. Proje t d u rappor t a presenter a la conference d u Geneve , Arch.CJM/Lazaru s P164/5. 18. Assemble e general e d u comit e centra l marocain , 1 5 avril 1956 , Arch.CJM / Lazarus PI64/5 . 19. A . L . Easterma n t o Sharett , London , 3 September 1954 , ISA , F M 43/8. 20. Ibid . 21. Session of the Zionist General Council, 23-31 August 1955, Addresses, Debates, Resolutions, Jerusalem , 1957 , 282-283. 22. Rappor t d u comit e centra l marocai n d u CJ M su r l a situatio n de s juif s a u Maroc present e pa r so n presiden t a Paris , l e 2 7 Janvier 1955 , Arch.CJM / Lazarus P164/5 . I t i s noteworth y tha t severa l WJ C activist s suc h a s Mei r Toledano wer e arden t integrationist s an d supporter s o f Morocca n indepen dence, anticipatin g leadership positions once the Frenc h ha d left. The y ofte n criticized th e post-1954 modified positio n o f the Morocca n WJ C executive o n increased emigration . 23. Ibid . 24. Le Monde, 8 September 1955 . 25. O n th e contact s betwee n th e Morocca n nationalist s an d th e WJ C ove r Dr . Benzaquen's ministeria l appointment , se e A . L . Easterma n t o Zeid e Schul man, London , 2 1 December 1955 , Arch.CJM/Lazarus P164/5-5603 . 26. Perspective s i n Morocco , b y Jacque s Lazarus , hea d o f WJ C Centra l Nort h African Office , Algiers , 1 7 October 1955 , Arch.CJM/Lazarus P164/119-120 . 27. A . L . Easterma n t o Walter Eyta n (director-genera l o f the Israe l Ministr y fo r Foreign Affairs) , 2 9 November 1955 , ISA, F M 2398/1A . 28. Ibid . 29. Z . Shuste r an d Ma x Isenberg h t o Joh n Slawson , Paris , 2 8 Marc h 1950 , Report o n Morocco , Arch . AJDC/Jerusalem, 10B/56.308 . 30. O n Frenc h polic y towar d th e lega l statu s o f th e Jews , se e Michae l M . Laskier, The Alliance Israelite Universelle and the Jewish Communities of Morocco: 1862-1962, Albany : Stat e Universit y o f Ne w Yor k Press , 1983 , chapter 5 ; Andre Chouraqui , La condition juridique de Xisraelite marocain, Paris: Presses d u Livr e Francais , 1950 . 31. Repor t b y Shuste r an d Isenbergh , se e not e 29 . O n th e Jew s i n Frenc h

Notes to Chapter 5 36 7 Morocco an d th e controvers y ove r Frenc h naturalization , se e Laskier , The Alliance Israelite Universelle and Morocco, 163-171 . 32. Se e note 29. 33. Ibid . 34. Ibid . Th e AJC sough t t o cooperate wit h th e Counci l o f Jewish Communities , the umbrell a organizatio n representin g th e variou s communitie s throughou t Morocco, t o hav e th e Frenc h gran t wide r power s t o it , thu s minimizin g French interventio n i n loca l Jewis h communa l affairs . Thi s issu e was no t sufficiently clarifie d b y the AJC. 35. Ibid . 36. Intervie w wit h Zacharia h Shuster , Ne w York , 3 Marc h 1985 ; se e als o m y Alliance Israelite Universelle and Morocco, 187-188 . 37. Y . Tsur t o M . Sharett , Paris , 2 0 August 1954 , ISA , F M 163/13B , Hebrew . 38. Shmue l Segev , "Operation Yakhin" —The Clandestine Emigration of Moroccan Jewry to Israel, Tel-Aviv : Defens e Ministr y Press , 1984 , Hebrew , 80 81. 39. Protoco l o f Meetin g o f Jewis h Agenc y Emissarie s i n Europ e an d Nort h Africa, 11-1 2 Decembe r 1955 , Paris, ISA , F M 191/6 , Hebrew . 40. Ibid . Habe r o f th e AJD C i n Morocc o relate d tha t ever y singl e responsibl e Jewish leade r believe d tha t a n earl y victi m woul d b e emigratio n t o Israe l and, a s a corollar y o f this , th e dissolutio n o f th e operation s o f Cadima . I n December 195 5 th e mos t optimisti c di d no t giv e mor e tha n si x month s fo r these development s t o tak e place . Samue l L . Habe r t o M . W . Beckleman , Casablanca, 6 December 1955 , Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem , 9C/10A/C56.300A . 41. "Cadima, " al-Ra* y al- cAmm, 2 2 February 1956 , Arabic. 42. Baruc h Duvdevani , directo r of the Jewish Agency's Immigration Departmen t in Paris , t o Shragai, 1 0 May 1956 , ISA , F M 2388/6B , Hebrew . 43. S . Z . Shragai , interna l report , confidential , 2 0 May 1956 , ISA , F M 2569/3B , Hebrew. 44. Ibid . 45. N . Ben-Menache m t o Shragai , Paris , 2 6 Ma y 1956 , CZA , S59/Shraga i Pa pers, Hebrew . 46. Se e tw o letter s fro m Shraga i t o Isse r Hare l date d 1 6 an d 1 7 Augus t 1956 , CZA, S59/Shraga i Papers ; m y intervie w wit h Shlom o Havilio , Jerusalem , 2 1 July 1988 , i n Hebrew ; an d Eya l Erlich , "Th e Wounde d Prid e o f th e Silen t Agents," ha-^Arets (Weekl y Supplement) , 2 9 May 1987 , 6-7, Hebrew . 47. Shraga i to Harel, letter s date d 1 6 and 1 7 August 1956 , se e note 46. 48. Accordin g t o Segev , th e governmen t o f Morocc o announce d plan s t o clos e the Cadim a cam p a t th e en d o f Ma y (Segev , "Operation Yakhin," 95) . Easterman contende d tha t emigratio n wa s suddenl y stoppe d o n 1 3 Ma y (World Jewish Congress: Fourth Plenary Assembly —Report of the Political Affairs Department, Stockholm , Augus t 1959 , 19). 49. Ibid . 50. Duvdevan i t o Shragai , Casablanca , 7 June 1956 , CZA , S59/Shraga i Papers , Hebrew.

368 Notes

to Chapter 6

51. Isse r Hare l t o Shragai , 3 0 Septembe r 1956 , CZA , S59/Shraga i Papers , He brew. 52. S . Z . Shraga i t o Z . Shazar , Jerusalem , 1 4 Augus t 1956 , ISA , F M 2398/1B , Hebrew. 53. Segev , "Operation Yakhin," 97 . 54. N . Krofsof f (Easterman' s Secretary ) t o Sharett , London , 2 9 Ma y 1956 , ISA , FM 2398/1B , Strictl y Confidential . Sharet t wa s replace d tw o weeks late r b y Golda Mei r a s minister fo r foreign affairs .

55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid.

58. World Jewish Congress, Fourth Plenary Assembly, Report of the Political Affairs Department, Stockholm , Augus t 1959 , 19. 59. J . Gouldi n a c Abderrrahim Bt i c abld (the n Morocca n ambassado r t o France) , Paris, 1 0 juille t 1956 , ISA, F M 2398/1B . 60. Ibid . 61. Accordin g t o Sege v (p . 104) , while th e authoritie s wer e incline d t o allow th e departure o f 6,300 Jew s o f the 9,00 0 wh o ha d manage d t o reac h th e camp , by Septembe r ther e wer e a s man y a s 13,00 0 there . I hav e bee n unabl e t o confirm whethe r th e numbe r exceede d 6,300 , sinc e Sege v cite s n o source s for thi s information , no r hav e th e availabl e archive s confirme d thes e esti mates. 62. Duvdevan i t o Shragai , 6 Augus t 1956 , CZA , S59/Shraga i Papers , confiden tial, Hebrew . 63. Ibid . 64. Ben-Menache m t o Shragai , Paris , 3 0 Jul y 1956 , CZA , S59/Shraga i Papers , Hebrew. 65. Duvdevan i t o Shragai , 2 9 July 1956 , CZA, S59/Shraga i Files , Hebrew . 66. Se e note 62. 67. Shraga i t o Z . Shazar , Jerusalem , 1 4 Augus t 1956 , ISA , F M 2398/1B , He brew. 68. Ibid . 69. O n Egypt , se e m y boo k The Jews of Egypt, 1920-1970: In the Midst of Zionism, Anti-Semitism and the Middle East Conflict, Ne w York : Ne w Yor k University Press , 1992 ; idem , "Fro m Wa r t o War : Th e Jew s o f Egyp t be tween 194 8 and 1970, " Studies in Zionism, 17 , no. 1 (1986), 111-147 . 70. Se e note 67. 71. Se e S . Z . Shraga i t o Dr . N . Goldmann , Paris , 2 7 Augus t 1956 , ISA , F M 2398/1B; and A . Harma n t o S . Bendor , Jerusalem , 1 0 September 1956 , ISA , FM 2398/1 B (both in Hebrew) . 6. Th e Self-Liquidatio n Proces s 1. Y . Kleinbau m t o Samue l L . Haber , Casablanca , 2 9 Novembe r 1955 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem, 10B/56.308A .

Notes to Chapter 6 36 9 2. Michae l M . Laskier , "Jewis h Emigratio n fro m Morocc o t o Israel : Govern ment Policie s an d th e Positio n o f International Jewis h Organizations , 1949 1956," Middle Eastern Studies, 25 , no. 3 (July 1989) , 351. 3. Se e note 1 . 4. Charle s Bensimhon , "L a missio n d e l'instituteu r marocai n d e l'Allianc e Isra elite Universelle, " Les Cahiers de l'Alliance Israelite Universelle, no . I l l (September-October 1957) , 59-60 ; Michae l M . Laskier , The Alliance Israelite Universelle and the Jewish Communities of Morocco: 1862-1962, Al bany: Stat e Universit y o f New York Press, 1983 , 335. 5. Bensimhon , "L a mission," 60; Laskier, The Alliance Israelite Universelle and Morocco, 336 . 6. Bensimhon , "L a mission, " 61 ; Laskier , The Alliance Israelite Universelle and Morocco, 336 . 7. Bensimhon , "L a mission," 61. 8. Mar c Sabbah , "L a responsabilite de s notables," al-Istiqlal, 1 3 July 1956 . 9. Ibid . 10. Ibid . 11. Samue l L . Habe r t o Herber t Katzki , Casablanca , 1 8 Decembe r 1956 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem, 11A/56.700 . 12. Arnol d Mandel , "Un e intervie w exclusiv e d' cAlal al-FasI, " L'Arche, 2 2 October 1958 , 8. 13. Ibid . 14. Joh n Waterbury , The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite, Ne w York: Columbia Universit y Press , 1970 , 127 . 15. Easterma n t o Zeid e Schulman , London , 2 1 December 1955 ; see als o Schul man a Nahu m Goldmann , Paris , 2 3 novembr e 1955 , Arch.CJM/Lazaru s P164/5603. 16. Elieze r Shoshani , Nine Years Out of Two Thousand. Secre t report submitte d to th e Mossad an d th e Jewis h Agenc y o n th e Misgeret i n Morocco , Sprin g 1964, Hebrew . 17. Unsigne d memorandu m fro m mid-1958 , CZA , S6/333 , Hebrew . 18. Dr . G . Riegne r t o Dr . Nahu m Goldmann , Geneva , 1 2 Novembe r 1958 , CZA, Z6/Nahu m Goldman n Files . 19. Se e note 17 . 20. Se e note 18. 21. Easterman , Casablanca , 6 July 1958 , Repor t o n Morocca n Jewry , CZA , Z6 / Nahum Goldman n Files . 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Easterma n t o Goldmann , Casablanca , 2 0 April 1959 , CZA , Z6/Nahu m Gold mann Files . 28. Ibid .

370 Notes

to Chapter 6

29. Z . Shuste r an d A . Karlikow , Morocc o Report , Paris , th e AJC Foreig n Affair s Department i n Ne w York , 1 9 Decembe r 1959 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem , 48B / 56.316. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Jule s Braunschvi g a Eugen e Weill , 1 6 decembre 1958 , fro m th e files o f th e AIU. 39. Se e note 29. 40. Speec h b y Dr . Leo n Benzaque n a t OSE-Maro c i n Casablanca , 1 9 fevrie r 1959, Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem , 48B/56.310D . 41. Ibid . 42. Ibid . 43. Ibid . 44. Se e note 1 4 (p. 219). 45. "Morocco, " American Jewish Year Book, 61(1962) , p . 354. 46. Shraga i t o Easterman , b y diplomati c pouch , 2 2 July 1960 , CZA , Z6/Nahu m Goldmann Files . 47. Easterma n t o Gold a Meir , London , 6 Septembe r 1960 , CZA , Z6/Nahu m Goldmann Files . 48. Ibid . 49. Ibid . 50. Easterma n t o Goldmann , London , 1 9 Septembe r 1960 , CZA , Z6/Nahu m Goldmann Files . 51. America n Jewis h Committee , Pari s Office , Ab e Karlikow , t o Foreig n Affair s Department, Ne w York , 2 1 Februar y 1961 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusale m 48B / C56.316. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. "Le s juifs d u Maro c son t libre s d e s e rendr e dan s n'import e que l pay s sau f Israel," La Vigie Marocaine, 2 4 February 1961. 60. Minute s o f the Mossa d le-Te 3 um, Jerusalem , 1 3 February 1961 ; Hebrew. 61. Ibid . 62. Ibid . 63. Ibid .

Notes to Chapter 7 37 1 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid. 68. AJD C Morocc o Reports, 1961 , Arch. AJDC/New York, 58. 69. Easterma n t o Shragai, 9 October 1961 , CZA, Z6/Nahu m Goldman n Files . 70. "Th e Danger s o f Zionism," al- cAlam, 3 0 August 1961 , Arabic. 71. c Abd al-Sala m al-HijjI , "Th e Proble m o f the Jewis h Minority, " al-Tahrir, 1 5 September 1961 , Arabic. 72. "I n th e Aftermat h o f th e Worl d Jewis h Congres s Reunion, " al-Kifah alWatani, 2 4 September 1961 , Arabic. 73. Mar c Sabba h an d Davi d Azoulay , "Regardin g th e Worl d Jewis h Congres s Reunion," al- cAlam, 1 5 September 1961 , Arabic. 74. Ibid . 75. K . H. , "Th e Worl d Jewis h Congres s an d th e Jewis h Communitie s o f Mo rocco," al-cAlam, 17-1 8 Septembe r 1961 , Arabic. 76. Ibid . Goldman n argue d i n Genev a tha t Algeria n Jews , wh o for th e mos t par t had bee n Frenc h citizen s sinc e 1870 , b e give n th e opportunit y t o choos e between Algeria n an d Frenc h citizenship . Se e he Monde, 2 5 August 1961. 77. c Abd al-Rahma n Saih , "Spanis h Ai d t o Zionism, " al-Fajr, 1 3 January 1961 , Arabic. 78. Ibid . 79. "Communiqu e b y Patriotic Jews," al-Tahrir, 1 7 February 1961 , Arabic. 80. "Th e Israel i Consu l i n Gibralta r Visit s the Norther n Regio n of the Country, " al-cAlam, 6 September 1961 , Arabic. 81. Andr e Scemama , "A u Maro c le s juifs son t accule s a u desespoir, " Le Monde, 20 January 1961. 82. Mustaf a c Alawi, "Gold a Mei r Speak s with Malice, " al-Fajr, 2 0 January 1961 , Arabic. 83. "Exodu s of Jews to Palestine, " al-Tahrir, 1 6 December 1961 , Arabic. 84. Se e al-Tahrir, 2 0 December 1961 , Arabic. 7. Th e Undergroun d an d "Operatio n Yakhin " 1. Intervie w wit h Shlom o Havilio , Jerusalem , 2 1 Jul y 1988 , Hebrew ; Elieze r Shoshani, Nine Years out of Two Thousand, Jerusalem , 1964 , 41-42. 2. Intervie w with Shlom o Havilio . 3. Ibid . 4. Se e Shoshan i (not e 1). 5. Se e note 2. 6. Shmue l Segev , "Operation Yakhin" —The Clandestine Emigration of Moroccan Jewry to Israel Tel-Aviv , Defens e Ministr y Press , 1984 , 132 , Hebrew . 7. Dali a Bengio , The "Dror" Movement in Morocco, 1945-1960. Unpublishe d M.A. Thesi s submitte d t o th e Histor y Departmen t a t Ben-Gurio n Univer sity, 1986 , 71.

372 Notes

to Chapter 7

8. Testimon y b y Mei r Knaf o i n Symposium on the North African Jewish Underground, Tel-Aviv , Jul y 1987 , Hebrew . 9. Ibid . 10. Av i Katzman, "Th e Cache Was in the Daughter' s Tedd y Bear, " ha-^Arets, 1 3 October 1991 , Hebrew . 11. Se e note 1 . 12. Se e note 2. 13. Se e note 1 . 14. Se e not e 1 an d Dr . G . Riegne r t o Dr . Nahu m Goldmann , Geneva , 1 2 November 1958 , CZA, Z6/Nahu m Goldman n Files . 15. Se e note 2. 16. Testimon y b y Yehudi t Friedman-Nesiah u i n Symposium on the North African Jewish Underground, Tel-Aviv , Jul y 1987 , Hebrew . 17. Se e note 1 . 18. Ibid . 19. Se e note 2. 20. Se e note 6 (pp. 113-114) . 21. Se e note 2. 22. Ibid . 23. Specia l Meetin g i n Jerusale m o n th e c Aliya fro m Morocc o ( 4 Novembe r 1959), attended b y Israel Foreig n Ministe r Gold a Meir , Shlom o Havilio, Dr . Nahum Goldmann , Isse r Harel , Shlom o Zalman Shragai , Baruc h Duvdevani , Yehuda Dominitz , an d Mosh e Rivlin , CZA , Z6/Nahu m Goldman n Files . 24. Se e note 1 . 25. Ibid . 26. Ibid . 27. Ibid . 28. Ibid . 29. Se e note 6 (pp. 130-131) . 30. Cite d fro m Dali a Bengio (see note 7 pp. 75-77) . 31. Se e note 7 . 32. Se e note 2. 33. Se e note 6 (pp. 193-198) . 34. Documen t #68 9 i n Davi d Ovadia , The Jewish Community of Sefrou (Morocco), Jerusalem : Th e Cente r fo r Researc h o n Morocca n Jewry , 1975-76 , vol. II , 293-294 , Hebrew . 35. Se e note 1 . 36. Se e note 6 (pp. 209-210) . 37. Ibid. , 211-215 . 38. Se e note 7 (p. 57). 39. O n thi s point see Katzman, "Th e Cache Was in the Daughter' s Teddy Bear. " 40. Se e note 7 (pp. 61-64) . 41. Menache m Gi l c ad, The Zionist Youth Movements in the Moroccan Underground, Hebrew . Unpublishe d repor t brough t t o m y attentio n b y Shlom o Havilio.

Notes to Chapter 7 37 3 42. Se e note 1 . 43. Ibid . 44. Se e notes 2 and 41. 45. Se e note 1 . 46. Se e note 2. 47. Ibid . 48. Se e note 6 (pp. 122-125) . 49. Ibid . 50. Ibid. , pp . 159-160 ; Do v Goldstein , "Th e Exploit s o f Alex the Mossad's Ma n in Morocco, " Ma c ariv, 2 1 August 1981 , Hebrew . 51. Se e note 6 (p. 160) . 52. Ibid. , 237-238 . 53. Ibid. , 238 . 54. Ibid. , 241 . Thi s subjec t canno t b e elaborate d upo n give n th e sensitivit y o f Moroccan-Israeli relation s a s well as due t o the intricacie s o f Arab politics. 55. Emissarie s i n Morocco , Octobe r 1962-Apri l 1963 , CZA , L10/849 , Hebrew ; Hayim Halahm i t o Yehuda Dominitz , Paris , 2 1 September 1966 , Hebrew . 56. Testimon y b y Menache m Gi l c ad, in : Symposium on the North African Jewish Underground, Tel-Aviv , Jul y 1987 , Hebrew . 57. Principle s i n the Selectiv e c Aliya, no date [1963] , CZA, S65/204 , Hebrew . 58. Se e note 1 . 59. Morocc o Reports, 1961 , Arch. AJDC/New York , #58 . 60. Goldstein , "Th e Exploit s of Alex the Mossad's Ma n i n Morocco. " 61. Se e note 6 (pp. 249-250) . 62. Shraga i to Eshkol, Jerusalem , 2 2 July 1963 , CZA, S65/204 , Hebrew . 63. Duvdevan i t o Shragai , Jerusalem , 2 2 Februar y 1964 , CZA , S65/204 , He brew. 64. Havili o had overhear d th e discussio n betwee n Ambassado r Tsu r by hiding in the next room (intervie w with Havilio) . 65. Ibid . 66. Mosh e Yuva l t o Yehud a Dominit z i n Paris , 1 9 Augus t 1963 , CZA , L10 / Operation Yakhin , Hebrew . 67. Dominit z t o Shraga i an d Duvdevani , Jerusalem , 1 1 March 1965 , CZA , S65 / 113, Hebrew . 68. Ibid . 69. Hayi m Halahm i t o Dominit z i n Paris , 2 1 Septembe r 1966 , CZA , LlO/Pari s Office. 70. Shraga i to Sharett, Jerusalem , 2 2 February 1965 , CZA, S65/112 , Hebrew . 71. Se e note 69. 72. Ibid. , lette r date d 2 1 December 1966 . 73. American Jewish Committee Report on the Position of the Jews, b y Abraha m Karlikow, 2 9 June 1967 . 74. Ibid . 75. Ibid . 76. al-Masa\ 2 2 June 1967 , Arabic.

374 Notes

to Chapter 8

77. See note 73. 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid. 82. Ibid. 83. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 1970 , Overseas Program Conference, New York, 12-13 October 1970, Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem, 430B . 84. Th e Jew s o f Morocco i n 1968 : Annual AJD C Report , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem , Mor.I/23B. 85. Stanle y Abramovitch : Repor t o n Visi t t o Morocco , 7-1 7 Octobe r 1969 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem, 402B/AI U File s 1968/70 . 86. Allianc e Israelit e Universelle , Paris : Reunion d u 3 fevrier 1970 , Arch. AJDC/ Jerusalem, 401A/AI U Files . 87. Ibid . 88. Annua l AJDC Report , 1970-71 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem , Mor.I/23B . 89. Jacque s Khalifi , AJDC-Casablanca , t o Theodore Fede r i n Geneva, 2 2 August 1972, Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem , Mor.I/23B . 90. c Abbas al-Kiss I a Dr . Nahu m Goldmann , Rabat , 1 4 novembr e 1973 , CZA , Z6/2441. 91. Stanle y Abramovitch , Repor t o n Visi t t o Morocco , 18-2 5 Marc h 1974 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem, 247B/43.720 . 92. Ibid . 93. The Washington Post, 2 5 Novembe r 1976 ; se e als o "L e Maro c reiter e so n appel pour l e retour de s juifs marocains, " L Opinion, 2 4 November 1976 . 94. Yedi c 6t Ahronot, Weeken d Supplement , 2 9 September 1978 , Hebrew . 95. The New York Times, 1 8 April 1979 . 96. Stanle y Abramovitch , Repor t o n Visi t t o Morocco , 2 8 November- 8 Decem ber 1977 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem, 258B . 8. Tunisia' s Struggl e an d Tunisia n Jewr y 1. Th e Destour , know n sinc e th e 1930 s a s th e Vieu x Destour , collaborate d i n subsequent year s wit h conservativ e Islami c circle s includin g th e Zeituna — the rough equivalen t o f the Qarawlyl n i n Fe z and Al-Azhar in Cairo. 2. Pessa h Shinar , "Th e Nationalis t Struggl e i n Tunisia, " Hamizrah he-Hadash, 4, no . 2 (1952-53), 70-71 , Hebrew . 3. Ibid. , 73 . 4. Hache d wa s assassinated b y Frenc h terrorist s i n Decembe r 1952 . 5. Shinar , "Th e Nationalis t Struggl e i n Tunisia, " 76-79 ; Clemen t Moore , Politics in North Africa, Boston : Little, Brown , 1970 , 70-71 . 6. N . Bar-Giora , Visi t t o Tunisia , Sprin g 1950 , t o Immigratio n Department , Jerusaslem, CZA , S6/6006 , Hebrew . 7. Stanle y Abramovitc h o n Educatio n i n Tunis , Visi t o f 6-13 Novembe r 1952 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem, IOC .

Notes to Chapter 8 37 5 8. Ibid . 9. Ibid . 10. H e n r y L . Levy , "Tunisia, " A]YB, 5 6 (1955) , 4 4 0 - 4 4 1 . 11. Se e not e 6 . 12. G . M . Riegner , Rapport sur la situation en Tunisie: 14-16 juin 1952, strictement confidentielle, Paris , 2 0 juin 1952 , ISA , F M 268/11 . Riegne r suggeste d that t h e g e n d a r m e ma y hav e b e e n a Tunisian . O t h e r eyewitnes s account s and th e nationalist s indicat e h e wa s a F r e n c h m a n . 13. Ibid . 14. See , fo r instance , A . Ayalon , Marseilles , t o Foreig n Ministry , 2 0 J u n e 1952 , ISA, F M 268/11 , H e b r e w . Mos t report s an d account s note d th e rol e o f th e Jewish youth s i n defendin g th e Jewis h communit y b y repulsin g th e attackers . 15. Riegner , Rapport sur la situation en Tunisie. 16. Ibid . 17. Ibid . 18. Ibid . 19. P r e m i e r e conferenc e nord-africain e d u congre s juif mondia l ( 7 - 1 0 juin 1952) , Alger, Arch.CJM/Lazaru s P164/27 . 20. Ibid . 21. Ibid . 22. Ibid . Accordin g t o Charle s Sa c ada, on e o f th e leadin g Jewis h personalitie s i n Tunisia an d presiden t o f th e riva l Sfa x federation , hi s positio n o n reform s i n Tunisia was : Nous somme s absolumen t oppose s au x reforme s telle s qu'elle s on t et e presentee s pa r les Tunisiens, ca r le jour ou la souverainete francais e viendrai t a disparaitre, l a position des israelite s e n Tunisi e deviendrai t intenable . 1 1 y a bie n quelque s personalite s israelites tunisien s qu i fon t d e l a surencher e e n faveu r de s reforme s mai s i l sembl e qu'elles jouent l a un jeu dangereu x pou r l a collectivite. (W e are absolutely oppose d t o the reform s suc h a s the y hav e bee n presente d b y th e Tunisians , fo r th e da y tha t French sovereignt y disappears , th e position o f the Jews in Tunisia will become unten able. Ther e are , o f course, som e well-know n Tunisia n Jew s wh o ar e makin g a highe r bid i n favo r o f reforms, bu t i t seem s the y ar e playin g a dangerous gam e ther e fo r th e community a s a whole.) Charles S a c ada a Jacque s Lazarus , Sfax , 8 Janvie r 1952 , Arch.CJM/Lazaru s P164/117. 23. Rapport , confidentielle, Marseilles , 2 2 aou t 1952 , ISA , F M 163/13 . 24. T h e be y refuse d t o accep t t h e proposal s b u t finally agree d t o affi x hi s sea l t o them i n D e c e m b e r 1952 . 25. Mauric e Fischer , Rapport , 2 5 s e p t e m b r e 1952 , ISA , F M 163/13 . Fische r noted tha t h e coul d no t pinpoin t Haddad' s persona l views , an d th e latte r claimed t o b e describin g th e positio n o f th e Tuni s Jewis h communit y leader ship: "le s Juifs , tou t e n s e solidarisan t ave c le s Tunisien s on t conseill e l a poursuivre de s entretien s bilateraux. " (Th e Jews , whil e sidin g wit h th e Tunisians, hav e r e c o m m e n d e d pursuin g bilatera l talks) .

376 Notes

to Chapter 8

26. Charle s S a c ada a Jacque s Lazarus , Sfax , 4 aou t 1954 , Arch.CJM/Lazaru s P164/117. 27. Mauric e Perlzweig , Nort h Africa—Development s i n Morocc o an d Tunisi a (restricted), 2 5 September 1955 , Archives of the Diaspor a Researc h Institut e of Tel-Aviv Universit y (ADR I hereafter), Al/104 . 28. Ibid . 29. Nouvellesjuives mondiales de Paris, 3 0 December 1955 , 3. 30. he Monde Economique, 1 2 April 1955 , 51. 31. Betwee n 1947-4 8 an d 1970 , o f the 95,00 0 Jew s wh o onc e live d i n Tunisia , 50,182 settle d i n Israe l whil e th e res t emigrate d t o Franc e o r remaine d i n Tunisia. Se e Shlom o Barad , he mouvement sioniste en Tunisie, Ramat-E f c al: Yad Tabenkin an d ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuhad , 1980 , 6-61. 32. Yehud a Dominit z t o Weingarten , Jerusalem , 9 Decembe r 1957 , CZA , S6 / 235 (2226/732), Hebrew . 33. Elie-Eugen e Guett a a Yitshak Raphael , Tunis , 1 5 decembre 1949 , CZA , S6 / 232. 34. A . Baslavsk y an d A . ^Ofi r t o th e Jewis h Agency' s Immigratio n Departmen t in Jerusalem, n o date, CZA , S6/232 , Hebrew . 35. Ephrai m Shil o (Shultz) , t o Yitsha k Raphael , Mossa d Le cAliya/Paris, 2 3 Ma y 1949, CZA , S6/232 , Hebrew . 36. Ibid . 37. Ibid . 38. Ibid . 39. Nahu m Dwinge r t o Lutek, Tunis , 1 6 March 1950 , CZA, S6/232 , Hebrew . 40. Chai m >Ofe k to Dwinger , Paris , 1 3 June 1950 , CZA, L10/503 , Hebrew . 41. Dwinge r t o Raphael, Tunis , 2 3 June 1950 , CZA, L10/503 , Hebrew . 42. Intervie w with Gi d c eon Rafael, Jerusalem , 1 0 March 1986 , Hebrew . 43. Se e note 41. 44. Dwinge r t o 'Ofek, Paris , 1 8 March 1951 , CZA, L10/633 , Hebrew . 45. Dwinge r t o Ungar, Tunis , 2 4 June 1952 , CZA, S6/6008 , Hebrew . 46. Ibid . 47. Protoco l o f th e Meetin g o f th e Jewis h Agenc y Director s an d Physicians , Paris, 23-2 5 Decembe r 1952 , CZA, S6/47 , Hebrew . 48. O n thi s poin t se e Hayyi m Sa cadon, Organizing Aliya from Central Tunisia, 1954-1957, Tel-Aviv : Everyman's University , 1986 , 5, 11-12 , Hebrew . 49. Repor t b y Dr . S . Betis h o n Visi t t o Nort h Afric a [lat e 195 3 or earl y 1954] , ISA, F M 2388/13 , Hebrew . 50. Protocol s o f th e Mossa d le-Te>um , Jerusalem , 2 0 July 1954 , CZA , S42/253 , Hebrew. 51. Markus e t o Tsur, Tunis , 8 July 1954 , ISA, F M 168/11 , Hebrew . 52. Ibid . 53. Ibid . 54. Markus e t o Tsur, Tunis , 2 7 July 1954 , ISA , F M 168/11 , Hebrew . 55. Ibid . 56. Markus e t o a n emissar y i n Sfax , 1 5 April 1955 . I a m gratefu l t o Hayyi m S a

Notes to Chapter 8 37 7 c

adon, researche r o n Nort h Africa n Jewry , fo r th e us e o f this lette r fro m hi s personal archive . 57. Levy , "Tunisia, " 461-462. 58. c Akiva Levinski , Repor t o n Morocc o an d Tunisia , Israel i Embassy , Paris , 8 August 1954 , ISA , F M 103/13B , English . 59. Henr y L . Lev y t o Herber t Katzki , Tunis , 7 Decembe r 1955 , Arch.AJDC / Jerusalem, 20A/0-1022"C. " 60. Intervie w with Yai' r Douer, Ramat-Efal , Israel , 2 5 January 1987 , Hebrew . 61. Les enfants d'Oslo, publishe d b y Yad-Tabenkin , th e Histadrut , an d th e Union de s Juifs Originaire s d e Tunisie e n Israel , 1989 , 5-6 . 62. Ibid. , 5-6 . 63. Ibid . 64. Ibid. , 33 . 65. Ibid . 66. Ibid. , 47 . 67. O n Yai' r Douer's wor k i n Egypt , se e Michae l M . Laskier , The Jews of Egypt, 1920-1970: In the Midst of Zionism, Anti-Semitism and the Middle East Conflict, Ne w York: New York Universit y Press , 1992 , chapter 4 . 68. Yai' r Doue r t o Davi d Umansky , Tunis , 9 Decembe r 1952 , CZA , L58/44 , Hebrew. 69. Intervie w with Yai' r Douer . 70. Ibid . 71. Ibid . 72. Mordecha i Beitan , Repor t o n Visi t t o Tunis, 1 2 June 1950 , ILA , 104IV/101 , Hebrew. 73. Ephrai m Ben-Hayyi m (Friedman) , "Th e Erets-Yisrae l Missio n t o Nort h Af rica: Th e Firs t Phase—1943-1948/49, " Symposium on the North African Jewish Underground, Tel-Aviv , Jul y 1987 , 5, Hebrew . 74. Ibid. , 11-13 . 75. Israe l Geshu r t o Dr . Avraha m Nadad , Paris , 1 3 November 1950 , ILA , 104V / 101H.

76. Ibid. 77. Ibid. 78. Ibid.

79. Gid e c on Rafae l t o Mosh e Sharett , Ne w York , 2 7 June 1952 , ISA , F M 2424 / 13, Hebrew . 80. Ibid . 81. Ibid . I t i s interesting tha t Charle s Hadda d ha d suggeste d t o Mauric e Fische r how Israel shoul d dea l with th e Tunisian questio n a t the UN : Nous devrions donner notr e voix a la France dans la mesure ou cette voix s'inscrirait dans un e majorit e e t nou s absenti r s i l a thes e francais e d'incompetenc e s e revelai t perdante. Dan s ce dernier cas, M. Haddad pense qu'Israel devrait agir en faveur d'u n projet d e resolution qui inviterait la France (1) a affermir so n intention d'accorder a la Tunisie so n autonomi c interieur e dan s l e bu t d'aide r so n evolutio n ver s l'independ ance; (2 ) a constitute r un e commissio n franco-tunisienn e paritair e don t l a fonctio n

378 Notes

to Chapter 9

serait d'assure r l'executio n d u programm e affirm e pa r l a Franc e (W e shoul d giv e ou r voice to France t o the extent tha t thi s voice will be registere d i n a majority an d abstai n if the Frenc h thesi s of incompetence prove s t o be on the losing side. I n the latter case , M. Hadda d think s tha t Israe l shoul d ac t i n favo r o f a draf t resolutio n whic h woul d invite Franc e (1 ) to affirm it s intention o f granting Tunisia interna l autonom y wit h th e aim o f helpin g it s evolutio n towar d independence ; (2 ) t o se t u p a Franco-Tunisia n commission o n whic h bot h side s woul d b e equall y represente d an d whos e functio n would be t o ensure tha t th e progra m affirme d b y Franc e was carried out. ) M. Fische r a E . Najar , Paris , 2 5 s e p t e m b r e 1952 , ISA , F M 177/6 . 82. United Nations Bulletin, 14 , no . 1 (1 January 1953) , 23 ; 15 , no . 5 (1 5 Novem b e r 1953) , 468 . 83. Se e not e 79 . 84. Ibid . 85. Shmue l Divo n t o A . Levavl , Paris , 3 July 1952 , ISA , F M 163/13 , H e b r e w . 86. Emil e Naja r t o S . Divon , Tel-Aviv , 2 1 July 1952 , ISA , F M 163/13 , H e b r e w . 87. Ren e Cassi n a Sharett , 1 3 juin 1952 , urgente et personnelle, ISA , F M 2424 / 13. 88. Ibid . 9. F r o m I n t e r n a l A u t o n o m y t o F u l l I n d e p e n d e n c e 1. c Akiva Levinski , Repor t o n Morocc o an d Tunisia , Israel i Embassy , Paris , 8 August 1954 , ISA , F M 103/13B , English . 2. "L e presiden t Bourguib a a affirm e q u e l e gouvernemen t Tunisie n fer a pou r les enfant s israelite s c e qu'i l fai t pou r le s enfant s musulman s ca r il s son t tou s freres" (Presiden t Bourguib a ha s asserte d tha t th e Tunisia n governmen t wil l do th e sam e fo r Jewis h childre n a s i t i s doin g fo r Musli m children , fo r the y are al l brothers) , Le Petit Matin, 1 3 Februar y 1957 , 1 . 3. Z . Shuste r t o Maitr e A . Bessis , Paris , 1 8 July 1957 , ADRI , Al/969 . 4. Markus e t o Shragai , Tunis , 1 0 January 1957 , CZA , S6/235 , H e b r e w . 5. Ibid . 6. Adde d t o hi s Egyptia n an d Tunisia n opponent s an d hi s critic s a t h o m e , Bourguiba face d problem s wit h Algeria n refugees , man y o f who m w e r e armed. The y crosse d th e Algerian-Tunisia n borde r t o escap e F r e n c h repres sion durin g t h e Algeria n struggl e fo r independence . Mos t o f th e Algerian s were concentrate d i n norther n Tunisi a an d the y w e r e a securit y risk , attack ing French-owne d farm s an d Frenc h militar y installations . Also , tension s developed b e t w e e n Bourguib a an d representative s o f th e Algeria n Fron t fo r National Liberatio n statione d i n Tunisia . T h e ai d tha t Algerian s livin g i n Tunisia receive d fro m Egypt , includin g weapons , arouse d suspicion s i n Tu nisian governmen t circles , considerin g tha t Nasse r supporte d Ben-Youssef , Bourguiba's arch-rival . Bourguib a coul d no t b e ri d o f th e Algerians , fo r an y expulsion policie s woul d intensif y th e oppositio n agains t hi m i n t h e Ara b world. H e ha d t o demonstrat e som e for m o f solidarit y wit h Musli m Algeria' s struggle agains t colonialism . O n th e othe r hand , on e o f th e reason s fo r

Notes to Chapter 9 37 9 Bourguiba's deterioratin g relation s wit h Franc e wa s du e t o hi s decisio n t o tolerate th e presenc e o f Algeria n rebel s o n Tunisia n soil . Se e Markus e t o Shragai, Tunis , 1 8 June 1957 , CZA, S6/6009 , Hebrew . 7. Markus e t o Shragai, Tunis, 1 9 November 1956 , CZA, S6/235 , Hebrew . 8. Ibid . 9. Henr y L . Levy , "Tunisia, " A/YB, 58 (1957), 351. 10. Markus e t o Shragai, Paris , 1 2 August 1957 , CZA, S6/6009 , Hebrew . 11. Ibid . 12. Ibid . 13. Davi d Assa D el to Duvdevani, Paris , 2 8 May 1957 , CZA, S6/6009 , Hebrew . 14. "Viv e inquietude e n Tunisie a u sein d e la colonie israelite," Echo d'Oran, 2 7 May 1957. 15. Markus e t o Shragai, Paris , 2 8 August 1957 , CZA, S6/6009 , Hebrew . 16. H . Milstein , Visi t t o Tunis , Repor t o f 20-27 Ma y 1957 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusa lem, IOC . 17. Intervie w with Da n Kariv , Netanya , Israel , 1 5 September 1986 , Hebrew . 18. Raphae l Ben-Ashe r (Journo) , The Shomer ha-Tsa Hr Movement in Tunisia, Kibbutz Gi v c at Havlva, 1980 , 70-71 , Hebrew . 19. Mouvement de la Jeunesse Haloutsique Dror, Paris , 1 2 decembr e 1959 , CZA, S32/N o c ar ve-he-Haluts. 20. Intervie w wit h Shlom o Havilio , Jerusalem , 2 1 July 1988 , Hebrew ; se e als o Joe Gola n a Dr. G . Riegner , Secret , Paris , 2 3 decembre 1954 , CZA, Z6/940 . 21. Jo e Gola n a Dr. G . Riegner , Secret , Paris , 2 3 decembre 1954 , CZA, Z6/940 . 22. Ibid . 23. Intervie w with Shlom o Havilio . 24. Henr i Semama , "Th e Jewis h Undergroun d i n Tunisia, " Symposium on the North African Jewish Underground, Tel-Aviv , Jul y 1987 , 33-34, Hebrew . 25. Ibid . 26. Yitsha k Yeger , Immigratio n Department , Offic e fo r Europ e an d Nort h Af rica, Geneva , Repor t o n Visi t t o Tunisia , 1 0 November 1959 , CZA , S6/243 , Hebrew. 27. Zv i Heitner t o Shragai, Tunis , 9 September 1957 , CZA, S6/235 , Hebrew . 28. Heitne r t o Eran Laor , Tunis , 2 3 September 1958 , CZA, S6/243 , Hebrew . 29. Era n Lao r to Shragai, Geneva , 4 September 1958 , CZA, S6/235 , Hebrew . 30. Davi d Izwotzki , "Impression s o f an Emissar y i n Tunisia," Symposium on the North African Jewish Underground, Tel-Aviv , Jul y 1987 , 35, Hebrew . 31. Heitne r t o Shragai , Tunis , 2 5 July 1958 , CZA, S6/243 , Hebrew . 32. Heitne r t o th e Jewis h Agency , Tunis , 2 Decembe r 1958 , CZA , S6/243 , Hebrew. 33. Yitsha k Yeger , Immigratio n Department , Offic e fo r Europ e an d Nort h Af rica, Geneva , Repor t o n Visi t t o Tunisia , 1 0 November 1959 , CZA , S6/243 , Hebrew. I n 195 8 the Jewish Agency's office fo r Europ e an d Nort h Afric a was moved fro m Pari s t o Geneva . O f course, Jewis h Agenc y office s dealin g wit h North Afric a a s wel l a s th e Misgeret's operations , continue d t o functio n i n Paris and Marseilles .

380 Notes

to Chapter 9

34. Heitne r t o Shragai , Tunis , 7 October 1958 , CZA, S6/243 , Hebrew . 35. Heitner , Repor t o n Meetin g with Muhamma d Masmudi , Secret , 1 9 Septem ber 1959 , CZA , S6/243 , Hebrew . 36. Se e note 33. 37. Ibid . 38. Ibid . 39. Henr y L . Levy , "Tunisia, " A]YB, 6 0 (1959), 260. 40. O n thes e reform s se e especiall y Rober t Attal , "Tunisia n Jewr y Durin g th e Last Twenty Year s (1940-1960)," Jewish Journal of Sociology, 2 (June 1960) , 4-15. 41. Memorandum on Tunisia: The American Jewish Committee European Office, Paris, 1 8 July 1958 , including official governmen t documents . 42. AJD C Countr y Director s Conference , Geneva , Meetin g o f 1 8 Septembe r 1961. 43. Avraha m Tirosh , "Ho w th e Mossad Rescue d th e Jew s o f Bizerte," Ma cariv, 19 February 1988 , 3, Hebrew . 44. Ibid . 45. Ibid . 46. Se e note 42. 47. Ivor e Svar c t o Ralp h Spanien , Fiel d Tri p t o Tunisia , 1 8 Augus t 1961 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem. 48. Se e note 42. 49. Se e note 47. 50. Talk s betwee n Easterma n an d Presiden t Bourguiba , 2 Septembe r 1964 , Switzerland, confidential , CZA , S65/113 , The Mosh e Sharet t Files . 51. Ibid . 52. Easterma n t o Sharett, London , 2 7 November 1964 , CZA , S65/113. 53. Easterma n t o Sharett , London , 1 7 Marc h 1965 , strictl y confidential , CZA , S65/112. 54. Shraga i to Sharett, Jerusalem , 2 8 February 1965 , CZA, S65/112 , Hebrew . 55. Ibid . 56. "Tunisia, " A/YB, 69 (1968), 527. 57. Ibid . 58. Ibid . 59. Ibid . 60. Ibid . 61. AJD C Tunisia Annual Repor t for 1964 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem, 403 . 62. Stanle y Abramovitch, Repor t o n Tunis, Visi t of 14-18 June 1965 , Arch. AJDC/ Jerusalem, 242B/56.606C . 63. Stanle y Abramovitch, Repor t on Visit to Tunisia, 6-15 March 1967, Arch. AJDC/ Jerusalem, 403 . 64. Stanle y Abramovitch , Repor t o n Visi t t o Tunisia , 6-1 4 Decembe r 1967 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem, 403 . 65. Eugen e Weill , "Rappor t moral : oeuvr e scolaire, " Les Cahiers de I Alliance Israelite Universelle, 18 6 (October 1973) , 27.

Notes to Chapter 10

38

1

10. Algeria' s Politica l an d Socia l Struggl e 1. Henr y Laufe r o f AJDC i n Paris , t o Samue l L . Haber , Rapport sur I'Algerie, 6 december 1955 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem, 49B/56.208 . 2. Ibid . 3. Ibid . 4. Ibid . 5. Stanle y Abramovitch , Meetin g o n Thursday, 8 April 1954 , wit h FCI A chair man Benjami n Heler , Arch . AJDC/New York , 30 . According to the American Jewish Year Book, i n 195 7 approximatel y 8,00 0 youth s attende d talmude torah i n Algeria . W e hav e bee n unabl e t o corroborat e o r disprov e thi s estimate, althoug h i t i s doubtfu l tha t s o man y pupil s wer e enrolle d i n 195 7 as compared wit h 1954 . Se e Henr y L . Levy , "Algeria, " A/YB, 58 (1957), 341. 6. Se e note 1 . 7. Ary e Lieberma n t o Jerusalem , 1 Novembe r 1951 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem , 149B/Algeria Files , 1948-54 . 8. Stanle y Abramovitch, Repor t on Visit to Algeria, 18-2 6 May 1955, Arch. AJDC/ Jerusalem, 149B/Algeri a Files , 1955-56 . 9. Ibid . 10. Henr y L . Levy , "Algeria, " A/YB, 58 (1957), 341. 11. CZA , S6/264 , Hebrew . 12. Y a cakov Hasan t o Shragai , Algiers , 6 January 1958 , CZA, S6/236 , Hebrew . 13. Davi d C . Gordon , The Passing of French Algeria, Oxford : Oxfor d Universit y Press, 1966 , 49-50 . Wherea s Algeri a becam e a virtua l colon y o f Franc e through conques t an d direc t Frenc h centra l rule , th e Frenc h protectorate s of Morocc o an d Tunisi a continue d t o b e le d b y indigenou s ruler s an d insti tutions, albei t unde r Frenc h supervision . 14. Ibid. , 50-51 . 15. Ibid. , 51-52 . 16. Ibid. , 52 . 17. Ibid. , 53-54 ; se e also , Michae l M . Laskier , "Th e Evolutio n o f Zionist Activ ity in the Jewish Communitie s o f Morocco, Tunisi a and Algeria: 1897-1947, " Studies in Zionism, 8 (Autumn 1983) , 235. 18. Josep h Fische r a KKL-Jerusalem, Paris , 2 6 fevrier 1947 , CZA, S25/5220 . 19. Se e note 1 3 (pp. 55-59) . 20. Stanle y Abramovitch t o Charles H . Jordan , Repor t on Algeria, Paris , 1 1 June 1956, Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem, 149 B Algeria Files . 21. Ibid . 22. Henr y L . Levy , "Algeria, " A/YB, 60 (1959), 277-278. 23. Samue l Lev y a Henr y L . Levy , Constantine , 8 jui n 1956 , Arch.AJDC / Jerusalem, 149B . 24. The Jewish Chronicle, 1 8 May 1956. 25. La Depeche de Constantine, 1 5 May 1956. 26. Le Journal d Alger, 1 6 May 1956. 27. Testimon y b y Itzi k Baer , a forme r Israel i i n charg e o f th e Misgeret i n

382 Notes

to Chapter 10

Constantine betwee n 195 7 an d 1962 , in : Symposiums on the North African Jewish Underground, 1 9 November 198 7 and 1 3 June 1988 , 22-23, Hebrew . 28. Ibid. , 23. 29. Ibid . 30. Intervie w with Shlom o Havilio , Jerusalem, 2 1 July 1988 , Hebrew . 31. Se e note 27. 32. Intervie w with Shlom o Havilio . 33. Ibid . 34. AJD C Countr y Director s Conference , Twentiet h Annua l Meeting , Hote l d u Rhone, Geneva , 27-3 0 Octobe r 1958 . 35. Jacque s Lazarus , "Algeria, " A/YB, 61 (1960), 332-333. 36. Henr y L . Levy , "Algeria, " A/YB, 60 (1959), 275. 37. Se e note 1 3 (pp. 59-61) . 38. O n Y a cakov Hasan , se e Shmue l Segev , "Operation Yakhin" —The Clandestine Emigration of Moroccan Jewry to Israel, Tel-Aviv , Defens e Ministr y Press, 1984 , 96-97, 104 , Hebrew . 39. Ibid . 40. Ale x Doron , "Th e Myster y o f the Israeli s i n th e Atla s Mountains, " Ma cariv, Weekend Supplement , no . 207 , 8 August 1984 , Hebrew . 41. Gola n to Easterman, Rome , 2 March 1958 , CZA, Z6/2211 . 42. Se e note 40. 43. Gola n t o Easterman, Rome , 2 March 1958 , CZA, Z6/2211 . 44. Se e note 40. 45. Gola n a Muhammad Yazld , Rome , 2 2 mars 1958 , CZA, Z6/2211 . 46. Se e note 40. 47. Ibid . 48. Ibid . 49. Ale x Doron , "Th e Myster y o f the Israeli s i n th e Atla s Mountains, " Ma c ariv, Weekend Supplement , no . 208 , 1 5 August 1984 , Hebrew . 50. Ibid . 51. O n Markus e i n Algeria, se e Markus e t o Shragai, Algiers , 25 November 1958 , S6/1808, Hebrew . 52. Se e note 1 3 (p. 61). 53. Arman d Kapla n a Dr. Nahu m Goldmann , Paris , 5 avril 1960 , CZA , Z6/1756 . 54. Ibid . 55. Jacque s Lazarus , "Algeria, " A/YB, 62 (1961), 357. 56. Information Juive, 4 February 1960 . 57. FL N Document : Les juifs dAlgerie dans le combat pour Vindependance nationale, edit e par la Federation d e Franc e d u FLN , fevrie r 1960 , Arch.CJM/ Lazarus P164/79 . 58. Se e note 55. 59. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, no . 194 , 25 July 1960 . 60. Arman d Kapla n a Dr . Nahu m Goldmann , Paris , 2 4 Janvier 1961 , CZA, Z6 / 1558. 61. Ibid .

Notes to Chapter 10 38 3 62. Report—A n Algeria n Odyssey , confidential , 3 Ma y 1961 , AJDC/New Yor k (Algeria-General), 1945-61 , Fil e 28. 63. Ibid . 64. Se e note 1 3 (pp. 68-69) . 65. Nort h Africa n Jew s o n th e Move : Prepare d b y th e Europea n Offic e o f th e AJC, Paris , January 1962 , Arch. AJDC/New York , Fil e 28. 66. Ibid . 67. Arnol d Mandel , "Algeria, " A/YB, 64 (1963), 404. 68. Ibid. , 405-406 . 69. Arman d Kapla n a u departemen t politique , CJM/Sectio n Francaise , not e strictement confidentielle , objet—Algerie , Paris , 6 decembr e 1961 , CZA , Z6/1588. 70. Se e note 65. 71. Se e note 1 3 (p. 68). 72. he Monde, 9 January 1963 ; The New York Times, 2 6 May 1962. 73. Baruc h Meiri , " A Ticke t t o Freedom, " Mcfariv, Weeken d Supplement , 6 July 1984 , Hebrew .

74. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid.

77. Arnol d Mandel , "Algeria, " A/YB, 65 (1964), 329. 78. Ibid. , 329-330 . 79. Ibid. , 330 . 80. Ing e Gottfarb , Repor t o n Algiers , 2-3 1 Jul y 1962 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem , 50A/56.200. 81. Ibid . 82. Ibid . 83. Seventeent h Annua l AJD C Oversea s Conference , Geneva , 4- 6 Novembe r 1962—Report b y Maitr e I . Chouraqui . 84. Ibid . 85. Ibid . 86. Confidentia l Memorandu m o n Dr . Franc o Levi' s Visi t t o Algeria , 28-3 1 January 1963 , by Herber t Katzki , AJDC/Jerusalem, 50A/56.200 . 87. Willia m Shapir o t o Herber t Katzki , 2 1 Februar y 1964 , Visi t t o Ghar daia, Laghouat , Djelfa , 13-1 6 Februar y 1964 , Arch.AJDC/Jerusalem , 50A / 56.200. 88. Ibid . 89. Josep h G . Hazan , Situation en Algerie, rappor t d u 3 1 juillet 1964 , Arch. AJDC/ Jerusalem, 50A/56.200 . 90. Ibid . 91. O n autogestion, se e i n particula r Gordon , The Passing of French Algeria, 153-159; Daniel Guerin , VAlgerie qui se cherche, Paris , 1964 ; Gerard Chal iand, L Algerie, est-elle socialiste? Paris , 1964 ; Mahfou d Bennoune , The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1962, Cambridge : Cambridg e Uni versity Press , 1988 .

384 Notes

to Conclusions

92. Franc o Levi , Rapport sur VAlgerie, 2 1 octobre 1964 , Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem, 50A/56.200. 93. Ibid . 94. Victo r Malka , "Algeria, " A]YB, 6 9 (1968), 523. 95. Ibid. , 524 . 96. Samue l Levi s t o Theodor e Feder , Paris , 1 9 Decembe r 1967 , Arch.AJDC / Jerusalem, 50A/56.200 . 97. Victo r Malka , "Algeria, " A/YB, 71 (1970), 514. Conclusions 1. c Abd al-Qadi r Be n c Abd Allah , "L a politiqu e francais e a l'egar d de s juif s marocains," VOpinion, 2 9 August 1976 . 2. See , fo r instance , H . H . Bensasson , (ed.) , A History of the Jewish People, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard Universit y Press , 1976 , 790.

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386 Bibliography 16. Hagan a Archives , Th e Golom b House , Tel-Avi v The File s o f the Mossa d L e c Aliya Be t 17. Th e Israe l Stat e Archives Israe l Foreig n Ministr y and Othe r Paper s 18. Th e Publi c Record Office , Foreig n Offic e Materials , Londo n Taped an d Nontape d Interview s Abramovitch, Stanley , 1 9 January 1985 , Jerusale m Bar-Giora, Naftali , 3 March 1982 , Zurich (letter ) Ben-Ami, Issachar , 8 March 1976 , Jerusale m Benaroya, Leon , 5 March 1984 , Pari s Brakha, Eliahu , 1 8 November 1986 , Haif a Braunschvig, Jules , 8 February 1976 , Jerusale m Douer, Yair , 2 5 January 1987 , Ramat-Ef cal Franco, Marcel , 1 0 November 1979 , Ne w York Cit y Halevy, Samy , 2 2 September 1986 , Busta n ha-Gali l Harrus, Elias , 2 3 March 1980 , Ne w York Cit y Havilio, Shlomo , 2 1 July 1988 , Jerusale m Hazan, Albert , 8 February 1976 , Jerusale m Kariv, Dan , 1 5 September 1986 , Netany a c Ovadia, David , 1 6 February 1976 , Jerusale m Rafael, Gi d c eon, 1 0 March 1986 , Jerusale m Rouche, Yitshak , 9 February 1976 , Jerusale m SarfatI, David , 6 May 1985 , Pari s Shuster, Zachariah , 3 March 1985 , New York City Weill, Eugene , 1 3 November 1978 , Pari s Zafrani, Hai'm , 1 7 May and 2 0 September 1976 , Pari s Books an d Article s Abitbol, Michel . The Jews of North Africa during the Second World War. Jerusalem: Th e Ben-Zv i Institute , 198 6 [i n French , Hebrew , an d English] . Important. . "Zionis t Activit y i n Nort h Afric a u p t o th e En d o f Worl d Wa r II. " Pe c amim, 2 (1979) [Hebrew]. Abitbol, Michel , ed . Judaisme d'Afrique de Nord aux xix 6 et xx e siecles. Jerusa lem: The Ben-Zv i Institute , 1980 . Amipaz-Silber, Gita . Jewish Resistance in Algeria: 1940-1942. Jerusalem : Rubi n Mass, 1986 . Important . Attal, Robert . The Jews of North Africa: A Bibliography. Jerusalem : Th e Ben Zvi Institute, 197 3 [Multilingual]. Avrahami, Yitsha k "Th e Jewis h Communit y o f Tunisia durin g th e Naz i Conques t — Financial Matters, " Pe camim, 2 8 (1986) [Hebrew]. Important . . "Th e Jew s o f Tunisia from Liberatio n t o the Suppressio n o f the Commu -

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388 Bibliography Years, 1919-1939. " I n Y . Avrahami , ed. , Shorashim ba-Mizrah II . Ramat-E f al: Yad Tabenkin an d ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuhad , 198 9 [Hebrew]. Deshen, Shlomo . The Mellah Society: Jewish Community Life in Sharifian Morocco. Chicago : University o f Chicago Press , 1989 . Important . Donath, Doris . Evolution du juddisme marocain sous le protectorat frangais: 1912-1956. Paris : Mouton, 1968 . Excellent . Ettinger, Shmuel , ed . The History of the Jews in the Muslim Countries. Wit h chapters/sections contribute d b y Miche l Abitbol , Yose f Tubi , Shalo m Bar Asher, an d Y a c akov Barnai . Jerusalem : Zalma n Shaza r Center , 1981-86 , Three volume s [Hebrew] . Important . Ghez, Paul . Six mois sous la botte. Tunis , 1943 . Grinker, Yehuda . The Aliya of Atlas Jewry to Israel. Tel-Aviv : Bri t Yotsa' e Marokko, 197 3 [Hebrew]. Guershon, Yitshak . "Th e Ai d t o Jewis h Refugees i n Morocc o durin g th e Secon d World War. " In Y. Avrahami, ed. , Shorashim ba-Mizrah II . Ramat-E f c al: Yad Tabenkin an d ha-Kibbut z ha-Meuhad , 198 9 [Hebrew]. Important . Halstead, J . P . Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism: 1912-1944. Cambridge , Mass. : Harvard Universit y Press , 1967 . Hirschberg, H . Z . A History of the Jews in North Africa. Leiden , E . J . Brill , 1974, Two Volumes. Important . Kadosh, Avi . "Th e Pat h o f Youth c Aliya in Morocco : An Obstacl e Course , 1949 1961." I n Y . Avrahami , ed. , Shorashim ba-Mizrah III . Ramat-E f c al: Ya d Tabenkin an d ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuhad , 199 1 [Hebrew]. Laskier, Michae l M . The Alliance Israelite Universelle and the Jewish Communities of Morocco: 1862-1962. Albany : Stat e Universit y o f Ne w Yor k Press , 1983. . "Betwee n Vich y Anti-Semitis m an d Germa n Harassment : Th e Jew s o f North Afric a durin g th e Earl y 1940s. " Modern Judaism, 11 , no . 3 (Octobe r 1991). . The Jews of Egypt, 1920-1970: In the Midst of Zionism, Anti-Semitism and the Middle East Conflict. Ne w York: New York University Press , 1992 . . Maghribi Jewry in the Shadow of Vichy and the Swastika. Tel-Aviv : TelAviv University Press , 199 2 [Hebrew]. . "Muslim s an d Jew s i n Morocco : Similaritie s an d Contrast s i n th e Influ ence o f French Educatio n an d Culture , 1912-1956. " In M . A . Friedma n an d M. Gil , eds. , Te cuda: Studies injudaica. Tel-Aviv : Tel-Aviv University Press , 1986 [Hebrew]. Marrus, Michae l R. , an d Paxton , R . O . Vichy et lesjuifs. Paris : Calmann-Levy , 1985. Rodrigue, Aron . De I'instruction a Vemancipation: les enseignants de VAlliance Israelite Universelle et les juifs d'Orient, 1860-1939. Paris : Calmann-Levy , 1989. Excellent . Sa c adon, Haim . "Th e Aliy a from Tunisi a durin g Tunisia' s Struggl e fo r Indepen dence." Pe camim, 3 9 (1989) [Hebrew]. . "Ideolog y an d Reality : Th e Etze l an d th e Hagan a i n Tunisia , 1945 c

Bibliography 38

9

1948." In Benjami n Pinku s an d Dori s Bensimon , eds. , French Jewry, Zionism and the State of Israel. Sdeh-Boke r an d Be D er-Sheva: Ben-Gurio n Universit y and th e Pari s Institu t Nationa l d e Langue s e t Civilisation s Orientales , 199 2 [Hebrew]. Important . . "Th e Revisionis t Movemen t an d Beta r i n Tunisia : 1926-1939. " Unpub lished M.A . Thesis . Jerusalem : Th e Hebre w Universit y o f Jerusalem , 197 3 [Hebrew]. Schroeter, Danie l J . Merchants of Essaouira: Urban Society and Imperialism in Southwestern Morocco, 1844-1886. Cambridge : Cambridge Universit y Press , 1988. Important . Segev, Shmuel . "Operation Yakhin" —The Clandestine Emigration of Moroccan Jewry to Israel. Tel-Aviv : Defense Ministr y Press , 198 4 [Hebrew]. Stillman, Norma n A . The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publicatio n Societ y of America, 1979 . Important . . The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times. Philadelphia : Th e Jewis h Publication Societ y of America, 1991 . Excellent . Tsur, Yaron . "H a c apala an d th e Formatio n o f a National Society : Th e Influenc e of Clandestin e Aliy a fro m Morocc o o n th e Longin g fo r Israe l o f Morocca n Jewry." Zionism, 1 6 (1990) [Hebrew]. . "Th e Incident s o f Augus t 191 7 i n Tunisia : Anatom y o f Musli m Riot s under Colonia l Rule. " M.A . Thesis , Hebre w Universit y o f Jerusalem . Sep tember 198 1 [Hebrew]. Excellent . . "Th e Jew s o f Tunis unde r th e Naz i Occupation : A Divided Communit y in Time s o f Crisis. " Institute of Contemporary Jewry Year Book, 2 (1985 ) [Hebrew]. Excellent . Waterbury, John . The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite. New York: Columbia Universit y Press , 1970 . Excellent . Yehuda, Zvi . The Zionist Organization in Morocco: 1900-1948. Ph. D Disserta tion, Hebre w Universit y o f Jerusalem, 198 1 [Hebrew]. Important .

Index

c Abbas, Ferhat , 29 8 Abitbol, 1 Abotbol (Avital) , Sam , 266 , 28 1 Aflalo, Albert , 18 9 Aflalo, Ora , 22 1 Agence Associatio n Juiv e Suisse , 29 6 Agudat-Tsiyon (Zionis t associatio n i n Tuni sia), 36-37 , 4 3 Agudat Yisrael , 15 5 Ahavat-Tsiyon (Zionis t associatio n i n Mo rocco), 3 2 Ahmad Be y (d . 1855) , 7 c Aidan, M. , 29 5 Ait Ahma d (Mohand) , Hocine , 31 8 Aix-les-Bains Conferenc e (Augus t 1955) , 171-72, 17 7 Akhbdr al-Dunyd, 212-1 3 Al-cAlam, 97 , 212-13 , 21 6 Al-Amin Bey , Muhammad , 28 8 Al-cArabi, 32 7 c Alawi, Mawla y Ahmad , 20 4 c Alawi, Mustafa , 21 3 Al-Fajr, 212 , 214-1 5 Al-FasI, c Alal (d . 1974) , 94 , 177 , 191-92 , 197 Algerian Provisiona l Governmen t (GPRA) , 324, 33 3 Al-HajawT, S i Muhammad , 97-9 8 Aliyat ha-No car. See Yout h c aliya Al-Kifah al-Watant, 21 2 Al-Kissi, c Abbas, 25 1 Allal, Yitsha k (d . 1987) , 275-7 7 Alliance Israelit e Universell e (AIU) , 2 , 19 ,

25, 27-32 , 59-60 , 89-90 , 93 , 144 , 149 , 154-55, 159-67 , 169 , 175-77 , 187-88 , 200, 230 , 250 , 258-59 , 265 , 285-86 , 289, 307-9 , 313-14 , 334 , 345-47 ; an d Zionism, 42-54 ; an d Ecol e Normal e Hebraique (ENH) , 158-65 , 253 ; unde r Vichy, 63-65 , 68 , 7 9 Allouche, Feli x (d . 1978) , 38 , 43 , 4 5 Al-Tahrtr, 2 , 12 , 197 , 216-17 , 24 3 Altun, Vitalis , 16 8 c Amar, David , 191 , 207, 242-43 , 25 1 c Amar, Moshe , 26 6 American Jewis h Committe e (AJC) , 146 , 172-77, 194 , 196-20 0 American Jewis h Congress , 14 6 American Jewis h Join t Distributio n Com mittee (AJDC) , i n Morocco , 1-3 , 68 , 89, 93 , 105 , 113 , 118 , 128-30 , 140 , 144 , 146, 150 , 152 , 154 , 160-61 , 166-67 , 173-76, 194 , 226 , 249 ; in Tunisia , 258 60, 268 , 273 , 275 , 278 , 282 , 289 , 299 , 301-4; i n Algeria , 312 , 314 , 323 , 336-4 3 5 Amir, c Abd al-Hakl m (d . 1967) , 24 5 Amit, Ze'ev , 22 2 Amsellem, Moi'se , 15 8 Anglo-Moroccan agreemen t (1856) , 1 1 Ankri, Yosef , 3 8 Annijer, Yitshak , 13 2 Antebi, Moshe , 23 8 Arab League , 108 , 137 , 176-77 , 193 , 196 , 209, 213 , 241-42 , 296-97 , 30 1 c Arafa, Mawla y Muhamma d Ben , 127 , 17 1 Arens, Mosh e ("Misha") , 8 7

391

392 Index Arikha, Yo 3el, 31 5 Arslan, Ami r Shakib , 5 7 Arukh, Shlomo , 23 0 Assa'el, David , 32 5 Assayag, Yosef , 231-3 2 Asseraf, Robert , 25 3 Asulin, Armand , 18 9 Atali, Armand , 1 3 Atereth Tsiyo n (Zionis t associatio n i n Tuni sia), 36 , 267 , 29 2 Avenir Illustre, V (Casablanca) , 34 , 8 4 Avrahami, Arye , 131 , 179 , 18 1 Avrahami, Yitshak , 40 , 7 6 Ayalon, c Ezra, 22 2 Azoulay, David , 189 , 20 7 Baer, Itzik , 222 , 32 1 Bahure-Tsiyon (Zionis t associatio n i n Tuni sia), 36 , 4 2 Balafrej, Ahmad , 98 , 184 , 194 , 203 , 20 9 Balfour Declaration , 32 , 36 , 8 4 Baranes, 5 Ilan, 26 6 Baranes, Sauveur , 27 9 Bar-Asher, Shalom , 1 Barbie, Georges , 23 9 Baretvas, Dr . Leopol d (d . 1978) , 86 , 266 , 281 Bar-Giora, Naftali , 76 , 238 , 258 , 28 1 Barkatz, Paul , 1 3 Barnai, Ya cakov, 1 Barouch, Andre , 287-8 8 Barpal, Yosef , 11 0 Batish, S. , 12 1 Baudouy, Robert , 134-3 7 Beckleman, Mose s W . (d . 1955) , 16 7 Be'eri, Yitshak , 13 2 Begin, Menache m (d . 1992) , 237 , 28 0 Behar, David , 4 8 Bejski, Moshe , 13 9 Bekkai, S i M'Bare k (d . 1961) : Pash a o f Sef rou, 104-5 ; close confidan t o f Sulta n Muhammad V , 171 ; nationalist leader , 177; prime ministe r o f Morocco , 182 84, 194 , 202-3 ; ministe r o f the interior , 207-9, 21 1 Bellahsen, Simon , 3 7 Bellity, Mei r (d . 1975) , 273 , 27 9 Ben c Abd Allah , c Abd al-Qadir , 346-4 7 Ben-Ami, Issachar , 16 4

Ben-Ammar, Tahar , 257 , 26 4 Benarrosh, Ralph , 21 5 Ben-Asher (Journo) , Raphael , 3 9 Benazeraf, Raphael , 14 5 Benazeraf, Sam , 203 , 207 , 23 7 Ben Badis , c Abd al-Hami d (Shaykh) , 7 Ben-Barka, Mehd i (d . 1965) , 169 , 177 , 184, 189 , 191 , 197 , 20 0 Ben-Bella, Ahmad , 318 , 34 2 Ben-David, Alexander . See Gatmon , Ale x Ben-Dov, Miriyam , 15 5 Ben-Guera, Raphae l (d . 1958) , 315 , 324 27 Ben-Gurion, Davi d (d . 1973) , 148-49 , 242, 27 9 Benjelloun, c Abd al-Qadir , 182 , 20 0 Ben-Menachem, N. , 179 , 18 4 Bensadoun, Joseph , 1 3 Ben-Salah, Ahmad , 30 7 Bension, Dr . Ariel , 3 4 Ben-Tobbal, Lakhdar , 31 8 Ben-Youssef, Salah , 257 , 28 9 Benzaquen, Dr . Leo n (d . 1977) , 171 , 178, 182-83, 192 , 194 , 200-201 , 207 , 23 1 Berber Zahtr (1930) , 26-2 7 Berdugo, David , 18 7 Berl, Alfred , 46 , 5 2 Berliawski, Dr . Ya cakov, 3 2 Bessis, Alber t (d . 1973) , 263-64 , 267 , 281, 287, 30 2 Betar (Revisionis t yout h movement) , 38 , 147 Bialik, Chai m Nahma n (d . 1934) , 16 2 Bigart, Jacque s (d . 1934) , 46-4 7 Bijou, c Ovadia, 132 , 31 5 Bitton, Mas cud, 15 5 Bizerte crisi s (1961) , 299-30 2 Bled al-Makhzan, 9 Bled al-Siba, 9 Blocca, Ya cakov, 33 4 Bloc d'Action Nationale , 1 1 Blum, Leo n (d . 1950) , 4 0 Blumenfeld, Minna , 141-4 4 Bne Akiv a (Religiou s Zionis t movement) , 143, 147-50 , 204 , 233-34 , 279-80 , 31 4 Bne-Tsiyon (Zionis t associatio n i n Tunisia) , 36 Bohbot, Eliyah u (d . 1952) , 25 9 Bokboza, Hai'm , 23 8

Index 39 Boker, Ya cakov, 23 0 Borgel, Moise , 7 3 Bouchara, Charles , 314-1 5 Boudiaf, Muhamma d (d . 1992) , 31 8 Boumedienne, Houar i (d . 1978) , 342 , 34 4 Bourguiba, Habib , 38 , 203 , 254 , 256 , 283 , 287-91, 297-99 , 301-2 , 305-7 , 34 9 Bourguiba, Habib , Jr. , 305 , 33 3 Bourguibists, 25 7 Boyer d e l a Tour, Pierre , 256-5 7 Brakha, Eliyahu , 26 9 Brami, Josep h (d . 1924) , 37 , 42-4 3 Braunschvig, Jule s (d . 1993) , 158 , 165-66 , 200 Brunei, M. , 94 , 97-101 , 10 5 Brunschvig, Robert , 3 8 BucAbid, c Abd al-Rahman , 191 , 195-9 7 Bulletin de la Federation des Societes Juives d'Algerie (BFSJA , Algiers) , 4 1 Bureau d'Actio n Social e d e l a Vill e d'Alger, 336-3 7 Cadima (Mossa d Le cAliya Bet , Jewis h Agency Immigratio n Departmen t appa ratus i n Morocco) , 111-13 , 118-20 , 128-44, 145 , 165 , 177-85 , 239 , 267 , 291, 31 5 Cagan, Solomon , 34 , 14 5 Cahiers du Betar, Les (Tunis) , 3 8 Calamaro, Paul , 86 , 145-4 6 Cambous (yout h c aliya facilit y i n France) , 140, 27 5 Carr, Maurice , 12 0 Casablanca Conference , 203- 6 Cassin, Ren e (d . 1976) , 158 , 165-66 , 250 , 285-86 Cattan, Victo r (d . 1944) , 3 7 Cazes-Benatar, Helene , 156 , 26 8 Celler, Emanuel , 28 3 Challe, Genera l Maurice , 324 , 32 8 Chanderli, c Abd al-Qadir , 32 5 Charbit, Joseph , 1 3 Charles Nette r Associatio n (i n Morocco) , 85-86, 147 , 155 , 26 6 Chatel, Yves , 8 1 Chefs du cercle, 1 0 Cherqui, Hai'm , 32 8 Chouraqui, I. , 33 8 Clark, Genera l Mark , 8 2

3

Club Ge o Gras , 82-8 3 Cohen, Alfred , 23 7 Cohen, Ben-Tsiyon , 334-3 5 Cohen, Nessim , 30 7 Cohen, Roger , 21 5 Cohen, Yehoshua , 13 2 Cohen, Yigal , 86 , 28 1 Cohen-Coudar, Suzette , 275-7 6 Cohen-Franco, Nadia , 26 1 Cohen-Hadria, Rene , 27 9 Comite d'Actio n Social e Israelit e d'Alge r (CASI), 339 , 34 2 Comite d e Recrutemen t d e l a Mai n d'Oeuvre, 73-7 4 Comite Jui f Algerien d'Etude s Sociale s (CJAES), 319 , 328-3 0 Comite Revolutionnair e pou r l'Unit e e t l'Action (CRUA) , 7 Confino, Alber t (d . 1958) , 5 3 Conseil de s Communaute s Israelite s d u Maroc (CCIM) , 14 , 186 , 189 , 194-95 , 198, 205-8 , 25 1 Consistoires, 13 , 312, 335 , 339 , 34 4 Consultative Counci l o f Jewish Organiza tions (CCJO) , 17 6 Controleurs civils, 10-11 ; an d anti-Semi tism, 71-7 2 Convention o f Mars a (1881) , 8 Coordinating Commissio n (Mossa d le Te'um): i n Morocco , 119 , 122-23 , 127 28; i n Tunisia , 269-70 , 273-7 4 Cremieux Decre e (2 4 October 1870) , 2 3 24, 26 , 28 , 41 , 45, 58 , 76-77 , 328 , 330 ; temporary abrogatio n of , unde r Vichy , 76-81 Dadon, 31 5 Dahan, Jacques , 18 6 Dani, Shalom , 23 0 Danon, David , 8 7 Darlan, Admiral , 65 , 8 1 Debre, Michel , 300 , 33 0 De Gaulle , Charle s (d . 1970) , 65 , 71-72 , 74, 81 , 158 , 221 , 299-300, 318 , 324 , 327-28, 332-3 4 De Hauteclocque , Jean , 255-56 , 26 3 Departement Educati f d e l a Jeuness e Juive (DEJJ) , 147 , 151-52 , 155 , 234

394 Index Department o f Middl e Easter n Jewr y (DMO): i n Morocco , 145 , 153-57 ; i n Tunisia, 278-83 ; in Algeria , 313-14 , 32 1 Department o f Pioneer Movement s (No car ve-he-Haluts), 145 , 150 ; in Morocco , 156-57 Department o f Torah Educatio n i n th e Diaspora (DTE) , 145 , 161 , 292, 313-1 4 Dessaigne, 10 5 Destour part y (founde d i n 1920) , 58 , 254 , 261-62, 286 , 29 0 Dhimmis (protecte d minoritie s unde r Is lam), 11-1 2 Divon, Shmuel , 133 , 28 5 Doron, Alex , 325-2 6 Doron, Hasda i (d . 1991) , 22 2 Douer, Yair , 277-7 9 Dreyfus Affair , 46 , 5 6 Dreyfus-Schmidt, Pierre , 16 8 Dror (Zionis t movement) : i n Morocco , 86 , 140, 204 , 233-34 ; i n Tunisia , 279-8 0 Dulles, Joh n Foste r (d . 1959) , 28 9 Duvdevani, Baruch , 180-81 , 183 , 242, 325, 33 4 Dwinger, Nahum , 267-71 , 274 , 27 9 Easterman, Alexande r L. , 168-70 , 172 73, 181-83 , 195-96 , 202-3 , 211 , 305-6, 333 Eclaireurs Israelite s d e Franc e (EIF , French-Jewish Scoutin g Movement) , 38-39, 147 , 151-52 , 16 2 Egalite, V (Tunis) , 4 3 Eisenbeth, Rabb i Maurice , 77 , 8 1 Eisenhower administration , 192 , 226 , 28 9 >E1-CA1, Hanania , 28 1 El-Aqsa Mosqu e affair , 25 0 Eliav, Yashkeh , 23 6 Elmaleh, Isaac , 14 3 Elmaleh, Shmuel , 14 5 Eshkol, Lev i (d . 1969) , 24 2 Esteva, Admiral , 72-7 3 "Esther Zalt z Affair, " 155-5 7 Etoile Nord-Africaine , 5 7 Ettinger, Shmue l (d . 1988) , 1 Eytan, Walter , 30 0 Fahl, Georges , 33 1 Farajon, Moshe , 29 5

Federation d e Communaute s Israelite s d'Algerie (FCIA) , 13 , 312-13, 34 8 Federation o f Jewish Yout h i n Tunisia , 292-93 Federation Sionist e Algerienn e (FSA) , 314-15 Federation Sionist e d e France , 106 , 110 , 280 Federation Sionist e d e Tunisi e (FST) , 34 , 37, 268 , 29 2 Federation Sionist e d u Maro c (FSM) , 34 , 145-47 Fellaghas, 255-5 6 Fingerhut, Rabb i M. , 31 2 Fischer, Joseph , 31 8 Fischer, Maurice , 133-34 , 26 4 Foder, Dov , 29 2 Franco, Francisc o (d . 1975) , 60 , 10 6 Friedman (Ben-Hayyim) , Ephraim , 86-87 , 281 Friedman-Nesiyahu, Yehudit , 222 , 23 4 French Nationa l Front , 32 8 French Protectorat e (Morocco) , 26 , 29 , 34 , 50, 66 , 10 6 French Residency . See Frenc h Protecto rate French Socialis t part y (SFIO) , 27 9 Front fo r Nationa l Liberatio n (FLN) , 7 , 127, 204 , 214 , 294 , 318-22 , 324-38 , 343, 34 9 Gabay, Moshe , 31 5 Gaillard, Pierre , 32 6 Gal, Michel , 23 9 Ganem, Mathieu , 262-6 3 Ganouna, Joseph , 4 3 Gatmon (Gattmon/Guttman) , Ale x (d . 1981), 204 , 212 , 219 , 236-38 , 242-4 3 Gatmon, Carmit , 237-3 8 Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Roger , 3 0 Gazette d'Israel (Tunis) , 38 , 28 0 Gershuni, Jacques , 110-12 , 146-4 7 Ghez, Pau l (d . 1972) , 73 , 86 , 275 , 28 1 Gilcad, Menachem , 238-3 9 Giraud, Henri , 72 , 8 1 Golan, Josep h (Gouldin) , 169 , 181-83 , 185, 19 6 Goldmann, Dr . Nahu m (d . 1982) , 169-70 , 196, 213-14 , 251 , 293, 33 3

Index 39 5 Gordon, Aharo n David , 3 6 Gordon, Davi d C , 316-17 , 32 4 Gordon, Evlyn , 15 5 Gordon, Y . L. , 16 2 Gordonia: i n Tunisia , 279-80 ; i n Algeria , 314 Goren, Zonia , 22 2 Gozlan, Elie , 40 , 31 5 Gozlan, Lydie , 274-7 7 Grana ("Th e Peopl e o f Leghorn") , 1 5 Greenberg, Yehuda , 29 4 Grinker, Yitshak , 128 , 13 2 Guetta, Elie-Eugene , 266-6 7 Guetta, Shaul , 11 2 Guillaume, Robert , 132-3 3 Hacam, Aha d (d . 1927) , 16 2 Hababo (Arnon) , Moshe , 222 , 281-8 2 Haber, Samue l L. , 152 , 167-6 8 Ha-Bonim (pro-labo r Zionis t yout h move ment): i n Morocco , 88 , 139-40 , 147-52 , 204, 233-34 ; i n Tunisia , 27 9 Hached, Ferha t (d . 1952) , 25 5 Haddad, Charles , 12 , 262-64 , 273 , 29 8 Hadj, Messali , 57-5 8 Hadjes, Richard , 22 2 Hafsia Affai r (Tunis) , 260-63 , 283-8 4 Hagana, 85-87 , 168 , 237 , 28 1 Hajjaj, 5 Ilan, 26 6 Ha-Kibbutz ha- 5Artsi, 147 , 15 0 Ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuhad . See Unite d Kib butz Movemen t Halahmi, Hayim , 239 , 24 5 Halff, Sylvai n (d . 1941) , 4 7 Halpern, Natha n (d . 1933) , 34 , 51-5 2 Har-Tov, Gershon , 29 2 Hebrew Immigran t Ai d Societ y (HIAS , also know n a s Unite d HIA S Service , o r UHS), 109 , 197-200 , 212 , 238-45 , 249 , 291, 301-4 , 342 , 347 , 34 9 He-Haluts, 11 7 Heitner, Zvi , 292 , 295-9 8 Halevy, Samy , 112 , 26 9 Ha-Magen ha-Datl , 28 1 Hamel, Shim'on , 22 2 Hamel, Yehudit , 22 2 Hamiani, Ahmad , 19 5 Ha-Nocar ha-Tsiyon i (Zionis t yout h move ment), 88 , 140 , 147 , 204 , 233-3 4

Ha-Pocel ha-Mizrahi , 139 , 145 , 157 , 267 , 271, 27 9 Harat al-Yahiid (Jewis h residentia l quarte r in Tunisia) , 16 , 28 , 37 , 260 , 281 , 294, 297-98, 342 , 347 , 34 9 Harel, Isser , 179 , 208-11 , 218 , 223 , 225, 227 Hasan I , Sulta n Mawla y (d . 1894) , 2 5 Hasan II : crow n princ e unti l 1961 , 203-5, 209-12; kin g o f Morocc o sinc e 1961 , 212-16, 231 , 241-42, 246 , 252 , 34 9 Hasan, Jo , 19 1 Hasan, Ya cakov (d . 1958) , 131 , 181 , 31516; and disappearanc e o f emissaries i n Algeria, 324-2 7 Ha-Shomer ha-Tsa cir (kibbut z movement) , 38-40, 85-86 , 140 , 147-51 , 153 , 204, 233-34, 279-8 0 Hauzi, Victor , 25 9 Havilio, Shlomo , 179 , 218-20 , 223 , 225 26, 235 , 293-94 , 321-2 2 Hayat, Isaac , 1 4 Hazan, Avraha m (Albert) , 158 , 16 4 Hazan, Josep h G. , 34 2 Hefer, Ya cakov, 29 2 Heimon, Meir , 291-9 2 Heler, Benjamin , 13 , 33 0 Herdy, M. , 34 2 Herut (Israel i politica l party) , 145 , 28 0 Herzberg, M. , 291-9 2 Hibbat Tsiyo n (Zionis t association) : i n Tun isia, 36 ; in Morocco , 3 2 Hilperine, Wolff , 3 4 Hovel, Avraham , 31 5 Husaynl, Ha j Arni n al - (d . 1974) , 5 9 Husaynid beys , 18 , 2 4 "Ibrahim," 32 1 Ibrahim, c Abd Allah , 194 , 196-201 , 203 , 209, 212 , 21 6 3 Idan, Mei r an d Shoshana , 26 6 International Committe e o f the Re d Cros s (ICRC), 32 6 International Zon e o f Tangier. See Tan gier, Internationa l Zon e o f Interventores, 1 1 Irgun Tsva' i Le'um i (IZL) , 87 , 237 Isenbergh, Max , 172-7 6 Israel Defens e Force s (IDF) , 177 , 230-3 1

396 Index Israeli, Avraham , 15 2 Istiqlal (Morocca n Part y o f Independence , created i n 1944) , 11 , 92, 97-99 , 101 , 124, 127 , 169-71 , 183-84 , 186 , 189 , 191, 194 , 196-99 , 201 , 206, 212 , 216 , 246-47, 34 6 Ittihad schools . See Allianc e Israelit e Universelle Izwotski, David , 239 , 243 , 29 9 Jabotinsky, Vladimi r Ze'e v (d . 1940) , 3 7 38 Jarblum, Mar c (d . 1972)