Norms in Argumentation: Proceedings of the Conference on Norms 1988 9783110877175, 9783110131017

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Norms in Argumentation

Studies of Argumentation in Pragmatics and Discourse Analysis (PDA) This series contains reports on original research in both pragmatics a n d discourse analysis. Contributions from linguists, philosophers, logicians, cognitive psychologists, and researchers in speech communication are brought together to promote interdisciplinary research into a variety of topics in t h e study of language use. In this series several kinds of studies are presented under headings such as 'Argumentation', 'Conversation' a n d 'Interpretation'. Editors Frans H. van Eemeren Rob Grootendorst University of Amsterdam Department of Speech Communication

Norms in Argumentation Proceedings of the Conference on Norms 1 9 8 8

Robert Maier (ed.)

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FORIS PUBLICATIONS Dordrecht - Holland/Providence Rl - U.S.A.

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Maier, Robert (ed.) Norms in Argumentation / Robert Maier (ed.). - Dordrecht [etc.]: Foris. - (Studies of Argumentation in Pragmatics and Discourse Analysis (PDA; 8) ISBN 90-6765-423-X SISO 133 UDC 162 Subject heading: argumentation .

ISBN 90 6765 423 X © 1989 Foris Publications - Dordrecht. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the copyright owner. Printed in The Netherlands by ICG Printing, Dordrecht.

Contents

Robert Maier Introduction. The Problem of Norms

1

Abstracts and Key Terms

9

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

Kuno Lorenz The Obligation to Argue Erik C.W. Krabbe Why Argue? A Note on K. Lorenz Marie-Jeanne Borel Norms in Argumentation and Natural Loge Robert Maier Natural Logic and Norms in Argumentation J. Anthony Blair Premise Relevance Joseph W. Wenzel Relevance—and Other norms ofArgument: A Rhetorical Exploration Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective on Norms Sally Jackson What Can Argumentative Practice Tell Us About Argumentation Norms? Robert Maier Argumentation: a Multiplicity of Regulated Rational Interactions JohnShotter The Unique Nature of Normal Circumstances: Contests and Illusions Charles Arthur Willard Argument as Social Enterprise Chris Sinha Appealing Rhetorics: Ideology and Argumentation Rik Pinxten and S.N. Balagangadhara Comparative Anthropology and Rhetorics in Cultures. Reflections on Argumentation Theories and Forms of Life.

17 27 33 49 67 85 97 '13 123 143 161 179 195

List of Contributors

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Index of Names

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Introduction. The Problem of Norms Robert Maier 1. People argue, don't they? But how, and according to what rules, that is another problem. The importance of argumentation as a rhetorical and dialectical process was immediately recognized by the Greek philosophers. Recently, studies of argumentation constitute an important locus of interest, not only in philosophy but also in linguistics and in the social sciences. In spite of all these various and long-standing theoretical efforts, there is still no unified theory of argumentation nor a generally accepted consensus on a general, basic starting-point of inquiry into the workings of argumentation. However, at present there is an abundance of empirical and theoretical studies on argumentation, realized with diverse methodologies in various conceptual and philosophical frameworks. All these diverse approaches attribute in one way or another a normative component to argumentation. Therefore a comparison and discussion of the different starting-points concerning norms in argumentation seems a fruitful and viable undertaking. The contributions in this volume are revised versions of papers discussed at a workshop held at Utrecht University, in March 1988, which was a very vigorous and spirited affair. Here is the place to thank the KNAW (the Royal Dutch Academy of Science) and the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Utrecht, which both made the realization of this workshop possible.1 The workshop was a risky and spirited enterprise because representatives of quite different approaches to argumentation, ranging from logic and linguistics to sociology and anthropology, had been asked to participate. The gamble turned out rewarding: the discussion among the participants was at moments really exciting and also very vigorous, due to some extent to the personalities of the participants. As organizer of this workshop I would like here to express my satisfaction; such an occasion of discussion in a small group which is well prepared in advance is a unique opportunity of learning. I'm grateful to the participants for their energetic contributions and their tenacity to overcome seemingly unbridgeable conflicts of opinion. In this introduction, I limit myself to presenting the different approaches and to discussing some limitations and consequences of this variety. 2. The problem of norms in argumentation is a central question for a general theory of argumentation. However, the aim of this workshop was not to solve this problem, but to confront the different approaches to norms and to discuss the divergent consequences of these various approaches. Here follows an overview of the various approaches which have been discussed at the workshop:

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(a) To begin with, the problem of norms can be tackled through an examination of the normative assumptions which are implicitly or explicitly posited in the theoretical conceptions of argumentation. For example one could conceive argumentation in a first and very rough approximation as a form of mainly verbal dealings between persons, which does not exclude that non-verbal aspects might also play a role. Even in this vague, cautious, and clearly insufficient characterization of argumentation some norms are presupposed, namely a distinction between verbal from nonverbal aspects and a notion of dealings between constituted persons. And any further specification of argumentation, for example as a rational discussion, or as an interaction which does not involve physical or let uss say economical forms of power, will necessarily point to a fair number of further normative assumptions. R. Pinxten and S.N. Balagangadhara, for example, examine in their contribution the normative assumptions concerning argumentation; they try to point to a strong cultural bias in the main conceptions of argumentation. Also R. Maier, in his discussion of natural logic, tries to make explicit the normative aspects involved in this rather naturalistic approach to argumentation, presented in some detail by M.-J. Borel. (b) A quite different approach to norms in argumentation consists in attempting to establish the conditions under which persons will feel obliged to argue. K Lorenz and E. Krabbe examine in such a way the pre-conditions of argumentation, by a conceptual reconstruction of the necessary conditions which must be fulfilled in order to found such an obligation. (c) Another access to norms in argumentation consists in the formulation of the rules which govern argumentation, given an established rational theory of argumentation. F.H. van Eemeren and R. Grootendorst, taking their well-known pragma-dialectical conception of argumentation as a starting-point, submit a set of necessary rules, which should guarantee the effective occurrence of argumentation. Also J A.. Blair, on the much more specific point of premise relevance, is proceeding with a similar method in order to establish relevant conditions for premise relevance. Such a way of proceeding may be questioned, as/. Wenzel does in the case of premise relevance: is the conception of argumentation which is presupposed in such an analysis really sufficient for supporting a wellfounded discussion of norms? (d) Another way of confronting norms in argumentation is chosen by CL4. Willard and C. Sinha, who both, but each in a different way, conceive argumentation as a social enterprise, with in particular, linguistic or ideological components. Argumentation loses in this approach a clearly defmed boundary; it becomes a social process amidst larger social processes, which will determine in complex and ambiguous ways the various norms of the argumentative happening. In such an approach to norms in argumentation attention is drawn to the functional aspects.

Introduction

3

(e) A step further is taken by S. Jackson, who raises the empirical question: 'What can argumentative practice tell us about argumentation norms?' Indeed, should normative conceptions of argumentation not be confronted with empirical facts on how people argue in various situations? And do those concrete persons not have normative models of their own, which they use implicitly in their argumentative practice, a point, M.-J. Borel also raised in her presentation of natural logic. (f) Still a different approach to the problem of norms in argumentation is taken by R. Maier. Supposing that argumentation is normatively regulated, he examines of what nature these norms could be. He tries to establish that once concrete participants using language are included in the theoretical model, it will be impossible to maintain a unified, general system of norms which could regulate the argumentative process. (g) /. Shotter posits in his contribution that argumentation is always rooted in a live world. As no complete de-contextualization is possible, any choice of norms in argumentation is to some extent arbitrary, but has definite political and epistemic consequences. 3. This enumeration of approaches to norms in argumentation seems impressive enough, but it does not cover the whole range of well-known conceptions. It was a deliberate choice to exclude on the one hand conceptions of argumentation-and their treatment of norms-which derive argumentation directly from classical logic or which conceive argumentation purely within language.2 On the other hand, conceptions of argumentation were excluded which are based on a philosophical anthropology, as for example Jacques (1985), or which are founded, so to speak, on argumentation itself, as is the case with the theories of Apel and Habermas. This does not mean to deny any validity to these approaches, nor to negate the inspiring consequences of these conceptions. However, the organized forum of discussion did not seem adequate to confront these conceptions. These deliberate delimitations still leave a rather impressive range of approaches to norms in argumentation, which cover the pre-conditions of argumentation and the pre-suppositions of various theories of argumentation as well as specific normative aspects such as premise relevance. The different approaches listed previously can be systematized according to various criteria. Without any pretention of completeness, I will indicate some of the possible groupings. (a) First of all, some of the well-known philosophical antagonisms reappear in this discussion, such as a Platonic versus a Nominalist approach, or a spiritualist conception versus a materialist one. Some of the participants, F. van Eemeren and R. Grootendorst for example, take, as a starting-point for their theory of argumentation, a Popperian version of Platonism, whereas others depart from a nominalist conception. Whereas a ver-

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sion of Platonism will support a search for general norms, a Nominalist approach will argue in favor of the particularity of norms. (b) A different grouping of the approaches to norms in argumentation can be based on the conception of the nature of norms. Norms can be conceived as being independent of the acts of argumentation, the norms are then exterior to these acts. In this case the norms appear as (pre-) conditions or as rules or regulations which are applied to the activities of argumentation. On the other hand, norms can be conceived as arising from the activities of argumentation. In this case, the nature of the activities themselves will provide an explanation of the norms regulating these activities. Such a position assumes the so-called naturalistic fallacy, which means that the norms are derived from the factual actions themselves. In this case the norms appear as auto-regulations, which means that some components of the considered activities regulate these same activities. For example natural logic, presented by M.-J. Borel, embodies such a perspective on norms. (c) A further grouping of the approaches to norms is based on the following distinction: Norms can be derived from an ideal model of argumentation, eventually from a multiplicity of such models, or they can be established by an empirical investigation of the most effective procedures used in factual instances of argumentation. For example J A. Blair, F. van Eemeren and R. Grootendorst follow the first route, whereas CA. Willard, C. Sinha and S. Jackson give attention to the second one. (d) Another grouping of the treatment of norms results from the scope and function attributed to norms in argumentation. If argumentation is conceived as a rational, dialectical procedure, which should guarantee a reasonable treatment of conflicts of opinion, then the formulated norms will be primarily of an epistemic nature, making such a reasonable treatment possible. But if argumentation is conceived as a stream-lined process of handling conflicts, a process which is embedded organically in social life, then the streamlining, and the norms which guarantee it, will involve, besides reasonableness, political and economic interests as well. Recalling the enumeration of the different approaches to norms in argumentation, one can see that all the four groupings mentioned can be used for categorizing the contributions of this volume. However, the discussions at the workshop and in the revised versions of the papers intentionally did not concentrate on elaborating fully the divergences mentioned. It might certainly be useful to have these divergences in mind when discussing the issue of norms in argumentation, but to elaborate them systematically seemed a void academic exercise. On the contrary, attention was drawn to the specific points of conflicts between these various approaches, and to the points of contact between these approaches. In effect, it appeared that those various approaches, while presenting definite divergences, do not exclude each other completely; there are many areas of overlap. The aim of this enterprise was not to draw a clear-cut

Introduction

5

framework of the possible differences but to knit a textual carpet which might serve as a ground for further elaborations. 4. It is not my intention to present in this introduction a particular conception of norms in argumentation. Nevertheless I want to suggest a commentary on the various approaches mentioned and on the underlying conceptual divergences. Norms are notoriously complex and slippery entities. This seems the more so as no approach to norms can stand on its own. If one pursues one of the several approaches presented, there always comes a point where one meets one or more of the other approaches. In other words the approaches to norms in argumentation are all to some extent interconnected, which means that there is a network of pathways relating all the different approaches to each other. Such a statement may seem extravagant at a first glance, therefore I will now provide some examples and then mention some consequences of this astonishing state of affairs: (1) Let's consider the approach which analyzes the normative assumptions of a given theoretical conception of argumentation. Such an analysis may have no consequences with regard to the given theory of argumentation, or it may stimulate a reconsideration of this theory. In this case, the theory will be either reformulated conceptually, which will give us another instance of (c)—that is another normative theory of argumentation—or the analysis will promote empirical investigations of a new kind, which will bring us to the approaches (e) or (d). (2) If one starts with the approach (b), considering the pre-conditions of argumentation, several of the other approaches may be activated: first, such an analysis may motivate a reformulation of an established theory of argumentation, and therefore call upon (c); second, reference will be made to the epistemic and political conditions of argumentation, mentioned under (g); moreover, such an analysis may refer to empirical investigations, that is(e). (3) When beginning with (c), that is, with the formulation of norms governing argumentation, given an established rational theory of argumentation, one will either be led to base these formulations on empirical investigations, that is (e), in order to support the established norms, or one will analyze the nature and consistency of the formulated system of norms, that is the approach (f). Similar connections can be indicated for all the other approaches mentioned, but these three examples should be sufficient for the present purpose.3 If the different approaches to norms are interrelated, as are the underlying philosophical conceptions, then no single approach to norms will be sufficient in itself. These inter-connections help to understand the elusive and slippery nature of norms in argumentation. Any identified and fixed

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norm may induce other norms, while the first one can possibly vanish completely, or being transmuted into another one. In other words, when dealing with norms, one will be caught in a conceptual whirlpool, where no stable position can be guaranteed. Any representation of the norms in argumentation, as external or internal to the activities of arguing, as universal or highly contextualized, as purely epistemic or having also—or only—political and social consequences, will eventually point to any of the other ones. External norms will point to internal ones, universal ones to contextual ones, epistemic ones to political ones, and the same holds for the opposite direction. Insofar as norms are central for a general theory of argumentation the preceding remarks suggest that any advance can not be straightforward but will proceed in circles which explore the various interconnections among the different approaches to norms. The present volume attempts to offer elements of such an exploration. How successful such a venture will be remains to be seen.

Notes

1. I would like to thank the SICSAT (Study Center of Argumentation and Speech Communication), the VOS (Institute of Development and Socialization) and the ISOR (Interdisciplinary Research Center of the Faculty of the Social Sciences in Utrecht), which all helped to get the present volume published. Furthermore I would like to thank Lisa Stevens, who did the sub-editing of the contributions of this volume, pointing out many shortcomings in the formulations and reasoning of the different authors. 2. Conceptions which derive argumentation from logic are really out of date. The recent wave of increased interest in studies of argumentation is to some extent based on a definite turn from such a conception. This turn has been extensively analyzed in various publications, such as Meyer (1986), Grize (1982) and F.H. van Eemeren et al (1987), to name a few. Not at all out of date are the studies of argumentation within language, undertaken by French authors, such as Anscombre and Ducrot. Contrary to the conception which derives argumentation from logic, this linguistic analysis is highly interesting. However, as these approaches focus on a quite specific phenomenon, they have been ignored here. 3. The idea that approaches to norms are interconnected was suggested to me by P. Livet (1987), who examines the circulation of norms between different sciences.

Introduction

References

Apel, K.O.: 1973, Tranformation der Philosophie. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. Ducrot, O.: 1980, Les Echelles Argumentatives. Editions de Minuit, Paris. Eemeren, F.H. van, R. Grootendorst, JA. Blair and CA. Willard (eds.): 1987, Argumentation: Across the Lines of Discipline. Foris Pubi. Co., Dordrecht. Grize J.-B.: 1982, De la logique à l'argumentation. Droz, Genève. Habermas, J.: 1982, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt/M. Jacques, F.: 198S, L'espace logique de ¡'interlocution. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. Livet, P.: 1987, 'Normes', in I. Stengers (ed.), D'une science à l'autre. Des concepts nomades. Seuil, Paris, pp. 307-332. Meyer, M.: 1986, From Logic to Rhetoric. J. Benjamins, Amsterdam.

Abstracts and Key Terms The Obligation to Argue Kuno Lorenz University of Saarland Federal Republic of Germany

Norms in argumentations can be judged only by referring to the norm of argumentation. Generalized dialogic language games (interactions) are constructed to serve as a model of the acquisition process of action competence comprising both a pragmatic and a semiotic feature. Turning the semiotic feature into proper sign-actions feature division can be repeated: with the communicative and the significative feature we arrive at predication and articulation. Feature division once more repeated yields mode (=speech act) and kernel with every predication as an action. A further step transforms the two basic modes of stating and ordering respectively into the actions of asserting and commanding which carry obligations: the obligation to argue. Key terms: statement; order, assertion; command; technical and practical norms; pragmatic and semiotic feature of actions; dialogic language game; communication; signfication; sign-action; preaction; preobject; articulation; predication; articulator; conditional obligation

Why Argue? A Note on K. Lorenz: On the Reason for the Obligation to Argue E.C.W. Krabbe State University of Groningnen The Netherlands The obligation to argue can be conceived either a a practical norm (way of life) or as a technical norm (Rule of Burden of Proof). Arguing as a way of life cannot be introduced by argument, yet one may argue for arguing in each particular case. The technical norm (rule) can be argued for in several ways. Any careful formulation of it, within a dialectic system, must take into account at least one exception: the commonly shared starting points of the discussion. Further possible exceptions worth investigating relate to faith, delegation, self-incrimination, and reflection. Key terms: practical norm; technical norm; way of life; burden of proof; dialectic system; preliminary argument; normative argument; empirical argument; (un)accountable imperative; command; dogma; faith; delegation; self-incrimination; reflection

Abstracts Norms in Argumentation and Natural Logic Marie-Jeanne Borel University of Lausanne Switzerland

The study of norms in argumentation may pursue two distinct objectives. The one consists in a critical analysis of the form of a discourse with regard to its internal validity; the other describes factually how speakers assign rules and values to their discourse according to the various circumstances of communication. In the latter instance, a model of "natural logic" enables us to deal with certain normative facts thanks to the concept of "discursive schématisation", with a group of operations associating logical, rhetorical and linguistical aspects of argumentation. In this perspective, the question of norms cannot be reduced solely to a formal approach; it must take into account the historical and anthropological dimensions of the phenomenon. Key terms: dialogical; formal; logic; language; natural logic; norm; normative fact; nonformal; operation; rationality; representation; rhetoric; schématisation; sign; significative function; validity

Natural Logic and Norms in Argumentation Robert Maier State University of Utrecht The Netherlands

This paper explores in what way Natural Lope, as a theory of argumentative discourses, posits norms for argumentation. First, natural logic, as a theory, delimits and elaborates its object—the argumentative discourse—and this very delimitation and elaboration has some normative consequences for the object. Second, natural logic, as a logic of the object of discourse, has introduced a number of logical-discursive operations. These operations are the basic constructive units of argumentative discourses: they have therefore immediate normative consequences. Key terms: natural logic; argumentative discourse; object of discourse; schematization; logical-discursive operations

Abstracts

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Premise-Relevance J. Anthony Blair University of Windsor Canada The paper addresses two questions. (1) What is the meaning of premise relevance? Relevant premises should affect one's inclination to accept the conclusion. This kind of relevance is: narrower than Naess's "proof potential"; a property of premise sets; necessary for argument identification; a prima facie property of offered premises. (2) What is the criterion of premise relevance? Neither logical implication or topic overlap is necessary or sufficient, nor is relevance a function of argument types. Toulmin warrants are sufficient but not necessary, but premise relevance is relative to beliefs about ground claims much like Toulmin warrants. Key terms: relevance of premises; argument; meaning and criteria of relevance; proof potential; justificatory or refutatory potential; sufficiency of premises; argument identification; burden of proof; premise sets; logical implication; topical relevance; Toulmin warrants; argument types

Relevance—and Other Norms of Argument: A Rhetorical Exploration Joseph W. Wenzel University of Illinois USA The normative study of argument requires sensitivity to argument as rhetorical process, as dialectical procedure, and as logical product. Originating in a rhetorical impulse, arguments function as responses to concrete situations that invite utterance as a means of resolving problems. The symbolic means by which arguments are generated may be virtually infinite. Rhetorical criticism complements logical criticism because it is a method uniquely suited for unpacking arguments in natural languages and for evaluating discourses as appropriate (or inappropriate) responses to problematic situations. Key terms: Argument, audience, dialectic, discourse, exigence, logic, norms, perspectives, relevance, rhetoric, situation

Abstracts A Pragma-Dialectical Perpcctive on Norms Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst University of Amsterdam The Netherlands From their pragma-dialectic approach of argumentation, in which argumentation is considered to be a complex speech act the purpose of which is to contribute to the resolution of a difference of opinion or dispute, the authors propose a dialectical argumentative method that can be used to analyze and evaluate argumentative discourse. In making the dialectic idea of having a systematic critical discussion the basic principle of reasonableness, the soundness of argumentation should be measured against the degree to which it agrees with rules which further the resolution of the dispute (problem-solving validity), as well as against the degree to which these rules are acceptable to the discussants who wish to resolve the dispute (intersubjective validity). These rules are based on a pragma-dialectical ideal model for critical and reasonable discussions, developed by the same authors. Key terms: norms; pragma-dialectical; discourse analysis; argumentation: problem-validity; intersubjective validity.

What Can Argumentative Practice Tell Us About Argumentation Norms? Sally Jackson University of Oklahoma USA The author proposes that normative theories can benefit from descriptive theories, just as the descriptive theories have been informed by normative ones. She describes the Pragma-Dialectical model, comparing it to the Common Ground and the Zone of Agreement models in regard to orientation, assumptions, requirements, and goals. The author suggests that descriptive analysis of practice can provide a means for choosing or justifying a particular model. She discusses the application of O'Keefe's theory of message design logics (from communication theory), which suggests the presence of multiple normative ideals. She ends by proposing that descriptive analysis is necessary to learn how and why real-life practitioners of argumentation fall short of the ideal models, and to identify obstacles which these models do not account for. Key terms: normative model, descriptive model, argumentative practice, Pragma-Dialectical, Common Ground Model, Zone of Agreement Model, discourse analysis, message design logics

Abstracts

13 Argumentation: A Multiplicity of Regulated Rational Interactions Robert Maier State University of Utrecht The Netherlands

This paper investigates what kind of normative systems may hold for argumentation, assuming argumentation as a rational procedure handling differences of opinion in a usual way. A distinction is made between constituted norms and constitutive norms. If participants using language are introduced into the model of argumentation, then no general unique system of norms will be sufficient. There will be necessarily a multiplicity of constituted norms. The same holds for constitutive norms: strong arguments are presented which point to a necessary multiplicity of constitutive norms for argumentation. Key terms: constituted norms; constitutive norms

The Unique Nature of Normal Circumstances: Contests and Illusions John Shotter State University of Utrecht The Netherlands The paper explores a turning away from logic towards rhetoric in the study of argumentation. It argues against the need for argumentative norms formulated as a set of prior, independently specificable standards, external to the circumstances of the argument, and argues instead that the norms can always be found within those circumstances. This is because argumentation is a special case of 'joint action', in which one person's actions are informed just as much by being directed 'into' a setting constructed by the past activities of all the interactants, as by individuals acting 'out o r their own intentions. Thus people must make their actions appropriate to circumstances, whose nature is independent of any of the individuals within them. Key terms: bustle; hurly burly (Wittgenstein); entrapment; essentially contested concepts; ex post facto fact fallacy; idioms; intralinguistic; imaginary entitities; intentionality; joint action; natural powers; personal powers; rhetoric; unintended consequences

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Abstracts Argument as a Social Enterprise Charles Arthur Willard University of Louisville USA

This essay lays out the details of one version of the social view of argument - a position contrasted with epistemology, psychology, and the sociology of knowledge. The starting point - which the competing paradigms are said to lack - is a theory of human communication. The organizing unit of analysis is the epistemic community or argument field. Imperfections of the social view are also considered - chief among them the fact that social theorists overvalue consensus and harmony and thereby lack a clear view of the good will necessary to make arguments epistemically successful. Key terms: community; consensus; epistemology; epistemics; message design logics; sociology of knowledge

Appealing Rhetorics: Ideology and Argumentation Chris Sinha State University of Utrecht The Netherlands

This paper analyzes a particular mode of discourse persuasive political discourse - in terms of concepts derived from the theory of ideology and speech act theory. Gramsci's metaphor of a *war of position', and the Althusserian notion of 'imaginary identification', are related to an analysis of the performative and presuppositional aspects of communicative acts. Performance and presupposition are further specified in terms of Karl Buhler's 'Organon-theory" of language functions, and it is suggested that a crucial feature of ideological discourse is the manner in which the 'appeal-function' works to activate a presuppposed discursive 'high ground' with which both speaker and audience are able to identify. The struggle for this 'high ground' is what constitutes the discursive-ideological 'war of position'. Speakers' attempts to *position' audiences (i.e. to subject them to rhetorical strategies) gain effectiveness through their appeal to orienting norms which are themselves describable in terms of the analytic categories of speech act theory; a provisional categorisation of such orienting norms is provided.

Key terms: appeal functions; ideology; performatives; politics; presupposition; rhetoric; speech acts

Abstracts

15 Comparative Anthropology and Rhetorics in Cultures: Reflections on Argumentation Theories and Forms of Life Rik Pinxten and S.N. Balajangadhara Rijksuniversiteit Gent Belgium

This paper investigates the basic concepts used in rhetorics, and in the conversation theory underlying it. We detect that the common ways of conversing that we find with other cultures (i.e. Asian and American Indian cultures) do not fit the supposedly universal theory of conversation (e.g. Grice). The same holds for the presuppositions in argumentation theory. We have to conclude that if we stick to the dominant view on rhetorics and conversation theory, then the other cultures appear unable either to converse or to argue. This oddity can only be overcome by rethinking the presuppositions of the present-day theories in depth.

Key terms: rhetorics; comparative; argumentation; anthropology

Chapter 1

The Obligation to Argue Kuno Lorenz

First of all, I owe you some comments concerning the choice of the title of my contribution. But beware, this very first sentence is by the use of the words 'I owe you' acknowledging the existence of an obligation and at the same time announcing its fulfilment. Hence, rather than beginning with my exposition it seems I can better enter the subject of my talk by asking you why I used this phrase 'I owe you'. You may think of quite a number of reasons why I consider myself to be under an initial obligation: (a) there is a tradition of courtesy I want to comply with, (b) there is a chance of reaching the goal(s) of my contribution more effectively if I first explain its title, (c) there is an explicit norm to this effect which I presume to be acknowledged by the majority of my audience, and (d) the obligation in question is a consequence of what I am going to say, hence a condition to ensure 'self-consistency1: what I do has to obey the qualifications I say such actions have. Apart from possibly still other reasons, there is a very simple alternative related in different ways to each one of the four possibilities explaining why I did in fact acknowledge the initial obligation to comment on the choice of my title. I have already talked with people about earlier versions of my paper, and it is in answer to questions and arguments of theirs turned into anticipated questions and arguments of my audience that I say 'I owe you some comments'. Hence the initial obligation derives as a special case from acknowledging the rule 'you should answer when questioned in case you have asked for questions', which I do as it is part of the results of my exposition. The decision to deal with the norm of argumentation - a phrase which I want to treat as synonymous with 'the obligation to argue' - rather than with norms in argumentation was taken because norms in argumentation, a certain set of them together with internal relations, e.g. of order, of subordination, etc. among them, can obviously be judged with respect to their appropriateness (whether they are 'good' norms or not) only by referring to the aim of argumentation, i.e. by trying to find out whether they serve this aim or not. There might exist equivalent sets of norms such that a choice between them is just a case of convention, like right-

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hand driving instead of left-hand driving, though both are equivalent with respect to the aim of safe driving. Hence, norms in argumentation are technical norms which when appropriate are called rational with respect to purpose; the norm of argumentation itself is a case of practical norms, that is, the actions following it in our case certain sequences of social encounters involving arguments exhibit ways of life of the agents concerned and don't serve further extrinsic ends. Internally they show 'intentions', externally they are "behaviour', which, in traditional terminology, is expressed by saying that such actions are constitutive of the agents. Whoever speaks about argumentations cannot therefore avoid the ambiguity that on the one hand you treat actions like things you are confronted with (observation), whereas on the other hand you may act yourself accordingly, i.e., you are obeying a rule of action (participation). Argumentations, too, are, both certain objects you may investigate and features of subjects insofar as they argue. In the first case, if restricted to normative aspects, you look at them from a 'technical' point of view, i.e. you ask for a rational argumentation. In the second case you treat them 'practically' as 'expressions of Self and Other', with respect to Self as showing intentions, with respect to Other as being behaviour - both ways are open to a descriptive and a normative approach. As long as argumentations are considered to be parts of critical discussions, that is, as discussions with elements of self-reference both constituting and aiming at solutions of conflicts of opinion, the ambiguity of the term 'argumentation' I referred to is deliberately upheld. This is particularly useful for any exposition which rather than merely investigating 'given' or 'constructed' argumentations is also trying to find out about the conditions for argumentations to arise. In their book Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions, Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst do indeed follow both interests when they distinguish at least four indispensable stages within such discussions, of which the first two stages exhibit conditions for argumentation rather than being parts of them: the confrontation stage, the opening stage, the argumentation stage, the concluding stage. For support of my reading I may refer to the fact that the authors take pains in making clear that their analysis bears features of both a normative and a descriptive approach: the normative features derive from a theoretical conception of rational discussion, the descriptive ones from using the differentiations of speech act theory. It is not quite clear, though, whether the descriptive features derive from strictly adhering to a 'theoretical' point of view, argumentations merely as 'objects', or whether the practical point of view exercised by participating in speech acts is present, too, at least with respect to descriptive features and not clearly demarcated from those of the first kind. I refer to the most conspicuous feature within this approach being the substitution of the concept of truth (of a proposition) by the concept

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of acceptability of an expressed opinion in the eyes of a rational judge accompanying a complete critical discussion. This happens mainly on the ground that in colloquial speech being the domain of argumentation theory, notions which belong to the regimented speech required by logic are considered to be inadequate. I take this to be an indication that argumentation theorists want to exchange the concern with the relation between statements and matters of fact leading to well-known epistemological difficulties for the concern with the epistemologically inoffensive relation between persons with respect to the two important functions of language: its significative function and its communicative one. The study of the significative function of language - still the main concern of logicians and other semanticists - is exchanged for the study of its communicative function, the business of the various kinds of pragmaticists. Truth theory, as part of a study of sentence structure, with truth as some kind of correspondence, may be called the paradigm case for semanticism, and argumentation theory, as part of a study of forces appearing with the utterance of sentences, may be called the paradigm case fo pragmaticism. Now, rather than trying to build bridges between both camps by looking closer into truth as consensus, argumentation theory stops at the notion of acceptability in order to evade the age-old vexations connected with the notion of truth. Yet, the chances for getting along in building bridges look even better if one takes into account that, with the notion of proof in both traditional and modern logic, attention to communicative functions by origin was elicited, which mirrors the introduction of significative functions into argumentation theory when truth as consensus, rather than mere acceptability of expressed opinion, is being investigated. The best way to proceed, at least the best I know of, is to look once again into the Platonic invention of the art of argumentation, his SuxX£KTixf| xexvn, and to introduce further distinctions to catch up with modern refinements. The aim of Plato's dialectics is to transform some knowledge which is only presumed, i.e. a mere standpoint or a positive commitment to an expressed opinion, into a real one, a true opinion. The procedure is an exchange of arguments - a philosophical dialogue - by means of which one shall find criteria to distinguish merely pretended knowledge from true knowledge, and merely actual interests or wishes from good ones. It is well known that every argument is characterized as being a reason for or against a previous argument such that each assertion during a dialogue is held open to objections until a consensus, a provisional one, of course, is achieved. Yet here, already, we should observe that the mere intention of two parties to proceed in this way in no way guarantees a consensus of the required kind, i.e. common true opinion rather than shared error. Just because participants in a dialogue are not equal, neither in origin nor in abilities or desires, it is impossible to know in advance if an attempt to

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reach a state of equal knowledge will be successful. And this remains true even if it is taken into account that knowledge in the speech of different persons is given in different perspectives and that the persons involved acknowledge that difference. Therefore, it is obligatory to broaden our perspective. The art of argumentation must not be treated independently from the other human activities among which it occurs, even if these others occur only as the objects of argumentation. Otherwise we would be confronted with the dangers of either replacing other activities by arguing about them, or of treating argumentations as just one activity among others. And furthermore, it is not sufficient to be able to turn claims of validity into argumentations which result in backing or turning down any such claim, it is also essential to be able to produce the conditions under which persons can develop the ability to argue, for example by laying open and bridging these differences among participants which have not been articulated and of which one often is not even aware, i.e. their pre-opinions and their post-desires (a term, coined in correspondence to 'pre-opinion', which may replace 'expectation'). Under the rubric 'unexpressed premisses', part of this second extension is meanwhile treated extensively in argumentation theory. For developing a unified approach which takes into account both the enlarged perspective for argumentations and their double setting in a theoretical and a practical framework, I took advantage of ideas of Wittgenstein and of Peirce (cf. e.g. "Dialogischer Konstruktivismus", in K. Salamun, ed. Was ist Philosophie?, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Sieback) UTB 1000,1986, pp. 335-352). A kind of generalized 'dialogic' languagegame serves as a model, a genetic reconstruction or a 'sign', of the process of acquisition of action-competence which is designed to account for both the constitution of objects until we know how to establish identity and diversity of individuals, and for the awareness of subjects while starting processes of individuation and of socialization which make the participants grow into persons. Congruences among persons hold within limits only, and it is precisely this experience of limits which leads to the growth of different individualities against a background of a shared social practice. Within an elementary dialogue-situation all through its further developed stages, both the equality of participants and at the same time their differences are incorporated. The equality of persons becomes effective by mutually being able to map the different perspectives held by them in a dialogue-situation onto another perspective. To understand each other is, in the last resort, to establish a consensus concerning the limits of Self with respect to Other. The simplest cases of application are on the one hand facts to be established in the future, and on the other hand facts in the past or at some distant place. The verbal articulations of something spatio-temporal-

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ly present are not in need of any argumentation pro or contra. Of course, I have presupposed that, for the verbal articulations of something present, the linguistic means are at common disposal. This extends to those who argue with each other about something: they, too, speak a common language both phonetically and semantically. But how to arrive at a common language for the would-be participants in an arbitrary dialogue, a fortiori in an argumentation? We are bound to deal at least with the follwing questions: How are linguistic expressions learned? In what kind of situation and for what purpose do people use linguistic expressions? Every attempt to answer these questions by empirical investigations into the history of the respective individuals, their education, their natural and social surroundings, etc. uses a common and already well-developed language, maybe even one which is stylized according to scientific methodological norms. But at this point of our considerations we have no reason, whatsoever, to suppose that a common language for the participants in a dialogue (or in a scientific discourse, i.e. an argumentative dialogue plus meta-dialogue) is already available, e.g. as a kind of natural disposition. The only way out I know of is to return once again to the model of generalized language-games, this time more elaborated so as to include as separate features both acquisition of action-competence and acquisisiton of sign-action-competence, i.e. of competence to perform (verbal) articulation of actions (types and tokens). Genetic reconstruction of language acquisition, as I will say for short, is itself a sign of what the participants of a dialogue believe to be already in possession of and not a kind of historical explanation. The starting point is just those features of the dialogue-situation which both parties actually choose to be the starting-point. Nothing beyond the spatio-temporally present will in the initial stage be relevant. But it will of course be essential to pin down explicitly those features, i.e. by paying attention to 'the same characteristics' of the situation. It should be clear, though, that all atatempts to make the different 'points of view* isomorphic will not work unless at least some basic community among the participants already exists. This minimum is always of a practical nature and can never be completely theorized. It is upon this common ground only that different opinions and desires (beliefs and preferences) can be recognized as being different. As long as the situation of sign-acting (of utterance) and the situation of acting (about which there is an utterance) coincide for both participants in the dialogue of reconstruction, i.e. as long as we keep ourselves in the present, no claims can be raised with either statements or orders (being the two basic modes of predication): they are 'valid by definition'. Two decisive steps are needed in the process of language acquisition in order to separate the situation of speech (between two participants in a dialogue) and the situation about which they speak, such that validity claims connected with statements and orders can be raised.

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In order to show that only under the condition that there are individual objects which can be identified independently of the situation of speech as that about which the statement states something, making a statement entails the possibility of raising a truth-claim which implies that the mode of stating can be changed into the mode of asserting. I have to give a short sketch of how genetic reconstruction of a partially common world and a partially common language by the model of dialogic interaction works. A unified account of how we acquire both participation in a common situation and use of a common piece of language comes about by looking carefully at the two points of view exercised by the two participants in an elementary dialogic interaction where the competence to perform an action is acquired through 'teaching' (=repetition) and 'learning' (=imitation). At a given time one of the participants is performing the action and the other one recognizing it, and in the course of the acquisition process the points of view switch again and again. Of course, the two terms 'perform' and 'recognize' are applicable only post hoc, i.e. after the open sequence of role-switching activities has taken place and both agents have acquired the competence in question. The primary objects available with any such competence are actions without any further differentiation as yet, neither with respect to act and agent, nor with respect to act and object of an act, nor otherwise. But all of them are common and are known to be common in the respective situation; even better each one of them is a common situation and both parties know it. You may think of the famous rabbit-situation in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (II:XI), where in the course of discussing 'seeing something' and 'seeing as', he gives the example of an exclamation 'A rabbit!' whereby a landscape with a running rabbit turns into a rabbit-situation; this "flashing of an aspect" he describes as "half visual experience, half thought". Of course, we have here a more advanced dialogue-situation insofar as the speaker exclaiming 'A rabbit!' incorporates both parties of our elementary teach-and-learn situation with some significant further developments: as performing party the speaker performs a perceptual action, as recognizing party he utters 'A rabbit!' and acquisition of 'rabbit-competence' is a sudden one-step affair. In order to keep the different stages in the development of our dialogue-model (the elementary dialogue-situations may also be called 'teachand-learn situations') distinct, it is better to speak of the elementary and rather primitive, though common, world as consisting of pre-actions. Neither things nor persons, nor rabbits in the usual sense, belong to them; looking backward from a later stage you may say that things, persons, animals, etc., are as yet indistinguishable parts of pre-actions. And it is important to be conscious of the fact that pre-actions have neither the status of given data nor of rational constructions. Hence, the traditional alternative in terms of the empiricism-rationalism debate on the primary

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level is not exhaustive as usually presumed. Pre-actions are performed by the acting agent and recognized by the other party, that's all. Realizing now that the performance viewpoint is pragmatic, whereas the recognition viewpoint is semiotic, we may say that our model of elementary dialogic interaction permits us to distinguish a pragmatic and a semiotic aspect with every pre-action. You get a concrete version of the signcharacter of a pre-action if you look at the non-performing party during a particular instant of the dialogue-situation as someone who understands the performance of the other party, e.g., as an invitation to do the same. We take a further step now by turning the recognition viewpoint of a pre-action into an explicit pre-action of its own. What is going to happen: instead of simply recognizing swimming, for example, you perform a separate pre-action, say see-swimming, which qualifies as a perception with respect to the original pre-action. To recognize a pre-action is to perform a perception of a pre-action. Therefore, in the elementary dialogue-situation, the person who performs swimming is at the same time recognizing the perception of his partner; that is, in more colloquial terms, he knows that the one who perceives does himself know what swimming is through performing a perceptual pre-action with respect to swimming, or: he knows that his partner knows how to swim. The next step of identifying the recognition aspect of a pre-action with the performance aspect of a perception of the pre-action, which may be called 'objectification', leads to the stage of object constitution independent from particular teach-and-learn situations. By pragmatic abstraction, as we may say, we define apre-object -1 don't use the term 'object' because there will be no division into individual units, the individuals, as yet - as the invariant out of the open set of relevant perceptions irrespective of the particular teach-and-learn situation of the original pre-action. To recognize a pre-object is nothing but performing a corresponding perception. Pre-objects themselves cannot any more be performed; they are the same for all participants, though with different perceptual access. Even actions as pre-objects are not performed; what you perform, for example, in the case of swimming as a pre-object, is swimming as showing-swimming, that is, you are presenting (in German: vorführen) swimming. Only by presenting actions do they count, like things, persons, events, etc. - though we did not yet develop criteria of classifying pre-objects into kinds - as pre-objects and not merely as pre-actions. We speak of pre-objects as articulated by their perceptions. But it is a contingent anthropological fact that certain perceptual pre-actions out of the manifold of articulations of a pre-object, namely verbal pre-actions, receive canonical status with respect to their being a sign of the pre-object: as a kind of symptom they represent the pre-object pars pro toto. For the next step of turning the verbal pre-actions into pre-objects of their own without thereby cutting off their perceptual, i.e. semiotic function, we return to dialogue-situations of teaching and learning, but now

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of a second order. They are well-known under the label 'predication', or to be a bit more precise, I should say that such dialogue-situations serve as genetic reconstructions of what in the tradition of philosophic logic has been called (situations of) 'predication'. The verbal pre-objects, or rather their spoken or written results made available by pragmatic abstraction with the help of such second order dialogue-situations, I call articulators, and we already know that they cannot be performed in the strict sense, but only presented. To utter an articulator, or to perform an articulation or a predication, say 'swimming' - which is the 'verbal perception' of the pre-object swimming - is at the same time a case of recognizing it. An articulator is, as a pre-object, a full-fledged symbolic sign, and no longer a mere symptomatic one. We may distinguish these two semiotic functions of an articulator by saying: in its symptomatic function an articulator is constitutive of its object; in its symbolic function it describes its object. We have now reached the stage where articulations, being both signs and actions - that is, sign-actions, or better: semiotic actions - can be subjected to the two aspects well known since antiquity which I referred to in the beginning as the two basic functions of language: the aspect of signification and the aspect of communication. To avoid confusion it is advisable to use the term 'articulation' only with respect to its significative aspect, and to switch to the term 'predication' when the communicative aspect of articulation is of concern. Since it generally holds that with respect to its pragmatic character a sign-action is communicative, and with respect to its semiotic character an action is significative, we can say that an articulation in its significative aspect is realized by performing a perception. Hence, the 'meaning' of an articulator splits into the different perspectives of the persons using the articulator and, in this way only, common meanings can be ensured. Likewise, an articulation, in its communicative aspect (that is, a predication as an action), splits into different ways of being given - again the result of an objectivation, here of second order - by turning the recognition of a predication into an independent action, which is called a mode of the predication. The more familiar term nowadays for such a mode is, of course, 'speech act'. Predications always occur in a mode, the speech act between speaker and hearer: the second-order dialogue-situations appear as the systematic equivalents to Wittgenstein's language-games in the strict sense. We now leave our short sketch and proceed with showing when and how the move from making a statement to raising a truth-claim is possible. Let us start with two articulators, 'A' (for: leaving the apartment) and 'B' (for: locking the entrance door of the apartment) of actions A and B respectively; that they are rather special such that no single terms for them exist in English, does not concern us here, nor do I want to go into the problems of my own descriptive account of situations I thereby propose to you to imagine. They must have been made available in a situa-

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tion of predication, therefore we should ask for the modes of it. In any second-order dialogue-situation there are two basic orderings of the performances of an action and of the sign-action, that is of the articulation. More carefully one should note that both are presented rather than performed, and that presentation of the sign-action is not a one-person affair but just the particular common action of both parties, that is, their common though perspectival recognition of the predication which we called the mode. Hence, saying 'A' after the other party has performed A, and before she had done it, yields two basic directional fits, that is, the two basic modes statement'Aand order 'A!'. But, and this is important, no validity claims are raised with these modal propositions: neither '(I) state that this instance of A has occurred' nor '(you) bring about that A will be instantiated', to use a more elaborate rephrasing of 'A.' and 'A!', respectively, can be questioned. These propositions occur simply, as an activity accompanying speech, in the statement case 'about' the token which has been produced already, thereby showing to the other party that it is understood as token of a particular type (this is not a case of saying, since an independent reference to the token is not possible), in the order case 'about' the type, thereby assuming common understanding which will have to be backed by the other party through producing a token (there is no chance to say 'I know what you want but I don't do it', since understanding is not yet available independent of instantiation). Only after you have succeeded in producing referentially stable subdivisions of pre-objects which may count as individual units, is it possible to make statements such that the situation of its utterance is not eo ipso a situation backing the statement. For example, instead of merely being able to state that a particular instance of leaving the apartment (an event-instance, not even an event-individual) has occurred which, wherever you utter it, must hold if it makes sense at all, simply because no invariant reference to such instantiations exists, you must be able to state that the apartment has been left. Only after being able to refer to individual apartments being determined independently of the situation of uttering 'leaving-the-apartment' a statement like 'the apartment has been left', though meaningful, might be wrong. And it is exactly at this stage that the modal action of stating may carry an obligation, that is, may be changed into the modal action of asserting: we may say that asserting is stating with the intention to be veridical, or, equivalently - by essentially switching from the 'internal' characterization by means of intentions to the 'external' characterization by means of a behaviour - asserting is both an invitation to get questioned and a promise to be prepared to defend. In short: An assertion carries the obligation to argue. In our sample case, successful fulfilment of this obligation permits calling 'the apartment has been left' true. The very concept of truth

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cannot be introduced unless raising claims, which is equivalent to fixing obligations, is made possible. Similarly, issuing an order will entail the possibility of raising a validity claim (the mode of ordering can be changed into the mode of commanding) only if there are individual persons who can be addressed independently of a situation of speech as 'that which' is able to act and speak. This means that unless there exists an explicit construction of what it means to speak of persons who are able to act and to use language, it is impossible to have an order connected with a claim. Again an example: If you issue the order 'lock the entrance door of the apartment' ('B!'), a 'why5 by the other party instead of just following the order, makes sense only if you can refer to what we may call 'rules of action' which are accepted, and that means followed by that party. Then, also a 'no'-reply makes sense, because it presupposes understanding together with an implicit indication that the ordered action doesn't fît any of one's accepted rules of action. Some acceptable rule in the case of our example might be 'who leaves the apartment ought to lock the entrance door of the apartment'. I would like to suggest that the much-discussed conditional obligations are just rules of actions constitutive of a subject individually and socially insofar as they indicate the range of possible actions that the subject acknowledges; in colloquial terms: 'that's the way I want to act', a subjective preference. Now, any such accepted conditional obligation A 'B\ From this it follows that the inference from 'the apartment has been left' to 'the entrance door of the apartment is locked' is valid. We may conclude that truth-claims connected with statements are also nothing but conditional obligations: 'who makes a statement with the intention to be veridical ought to argue', which is a special second-order case of rightness-claims connected with orders. Hence, we have established the following meta-rule of action: 'who gets questioned concerning validity of his assertion or command ought to argue'. Somebody who doesn't acknowledge this meta-rule which is constitutive of intersubjectivity, that is, somebody who utters statements or orders without willingness to defend them against objections, does not turn those statements and orders respectively into assertions and commands, thus excluding them from their possible function to be steps in the process of individuation and socialization of the participants in a dialogue. They become mere private affairs in the strict sense and lose any public interest.

Chapter 2

Why Argue? A Note on K. Lorenz: On the Reason for the Obligation to Argue Erik C.W. Krabbe

The question "Why argue?" can be taken in two senses.* First, it may pertain to what Professor Lorenz calls a practical norm: the norm of argumentation. Second, it may pertain to a technical norm: a norm in argumentation. These two senses are closely related. On the one hand, technical norms are to be judged from the perspective of the practical norm (the aim or intention) they sire supposed to implement. Thus a satisfactory answer to the question in its first sense seems required if the question in its second sense is to have a point. On the other hand, one could hardly describe the "way of life" constituted by the practical norm of argumentation (let alone give reasons for it) without hinting at some possible implementations, i.e., at some possible technical norms in argumentation. According to Lorenz, one can ultimately give no reason for the obligation to argue (conceived as a practical norm), at least not in the sense of pointing out some more fundamental principle. Yet we may achieve a better understanding of the practical norm, either by an empirical study of argumentation in a fully developed stage, or by a genetic study. The latter could either go back to early childhood (Piaget) or to a reconstruction (by abstraction) of a possible origin, the "soil where argumentation grows", from which one may then try to rationally reconstruct the argumentative way of life. Following the route of abstraction and rational reconstruction, Lorenz studies the basic presuppositions behind the practical norm of argumentation. Thus, only if the situation of speech and the situation spoken about are separated, can validity claims connected with statements and orders be raised. But this separation of the two situations is only possible after the introduction of individual objects. It therefore occurs at an advanced stage of the (reconstructed) process of language acquisition. Consequently, the potential disputants must have at their disposal a lot of common ground, before one could even speak of a claim or a disagreement. Suppose now that our disputants share enough language to disagree on the validity of a specific statement (or command). The question is whether it can be argued that they should accept the conditional obligation to argue:

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Erik C.W. Krabbe Whoever gets questioned concerning the validity of his assertion or command ought to argue.

Thus formulated, this conditional obligation can be conceived either as a practical norm or as a technical one. If we conceive it as a practical norm (as Lorenz does), we may wonder about the alternatives (other ways of life). What courses of action are available in case of a disagreement? One could start an argumentative discussion (persuasion dialogue) of course, but one could also try to negotiate, with or without a mediator, draw lots, quarrel, fight, or one could just try to ignore the conflict. What do the parties want? If they want to vent emotions and strike the other party, just let them quarrel! If they want to reach a settlement, but as favorable as possible, let them negotiate or bargain! There is a choice to be made, and choosing for argumentative discussion is just one possibility among many. Yet, that is not to say that this choice must be arbitrary or unmotivated. Nor need one opt for one and the same "way of life" in all cases. Why couldn't there be reasons to prefer a quarrel in one particular case and reasons to prefer an argumentative discussion in another? So one could argue (give reasons) for arguing in each particular case. On the other hand, I see no reason why all disagreements should be resolved by argumentative discussion. Perhaps there is no reason for arguing in general. It must be admitted that an argument for arguing cannot precede each argument. That would amount to an objectionable infinite regress. Thus, genetically speaking, the argumentative way of life cannot be introduced by argument. Perhaps this is another sense in which "there is no reason for arguing". But, even in a genetic account, an argument justifying the (practical) choice of adopting the practical norm of argumentation is conceivable after the event. One can also read the norm just quoted (the conditional obligation to argue) as a technical norm, a norm in argumentation. It would, in that case, be a norm intended to bind a party that has already opted for the argumentative way of life. It is a rule to the effect that whosoever has made a claim within dialogue and is challenged with respect to that claim (within the same dialogue), is to present an argument for it (within that dialogue). I shall call it the "Rule of Burden of Proof". The Rule of Burden of Proof is a possible constitutive element of dialectic systems (systems for argumentative discussion). For instance, Rule 2 of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's proposal for a dialectical discussion procedure (this volume) is another formulation of the Rule of Burden of Proof: Whoever advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked to do so.

Suppose that our potential disputants do not only share enough language to make claims and to disagree about them, but that they do in fact have some conflict of (expressed) opinion, and that, moreover, they accept the

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practical norm of argumentation for this case. Thus, they want to resolve their conflict by means of an argumentative discussion. For this they need a suitable instrument (dialectic system). Suppose they turn to us, theorists of argumentation, for advice about the technical norms they should adopt. Would we recommend the Rule of Burden of Proof? Should this rule be part and parcel of any viable system of dialectics? There are two ways to argue for the incorporation of norms or rules into a system: (1) by normative reasoning, e.g., by showing that the rule in question achieves some goal postulated by a deeper or more general norm, or (2) empirically: the argument would then have to show that actual discussions that follow the rule do a better job than those that don't. But whatever way you want to go about it, you can't justify a rule in isolation. Rules interact, and wholly beneficial rules may become disastrous if combined. For instance, in some systems of formal dialectics the Proponent of a thesis has to set a time limit before the actual discussion starts. Also, it would be conceivable to make stipulations to the effect that the Proponent wins (part of) a discussion as soon as he has withstood criticism during the time set for it. But taken together these rules would not do: the Proponent could first set an extremely short time limit, and then easily win. Too easily. Ultimately we must judge each dialectic system as a whole, rather than its rules taken apart. Yet, it is often possible to give a kind of preliminary sketch of the workings of a rule, and thus establish a rule's status as a plausible ingredient of a viable dialectics. No doubt sometimes one can reject rules by a preliminary argument. For instance, a rule to the effect that no one has ever to argue for anything, would not do in an ideal system of dialectic. (By the way there is no reason to suppose either that there is, or that there is not an optimal system of rules of argumentative dialogue.) Let us return to the Burden of Proof Rule. This rule seems plausible, but one has to be aware of its limits. First, let us consider commands. According to Hamblin (198, p. 13), commands are non-accountable: the issuer is not required to give reasons to back them up (even if asked to do so by the addressee). The same holds for demands and requests. So it seems that Hamblin rejects the Burden of Proof Rule for these imperatives (though not for other, accountable, imperatives, like pieces of advice, instructions, etc.). Perhaps this is merely a matter of terms: for "command" we must substitute "accountable imperative" if we want to rephrase the Rule of Burden of Proof in Hamblin's terminology. Anyhow, there are nonaccountable imperatives, such as requests, that clearly have their place in argumentative dialogues, and a careful reformulation of the Rule of Burden of Proof (as applied to imperatives) should not rule them out. On the side of assertions: what corresponds to a command may be called a dogma. Questioning a command or a dogma is tantamount to leaving the language game where they function as a command or as a dogma and moving to some other level. So in argumentative dialogue one would not be allowed

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to question a dogma within the dialogue, though one could of course question the dogma in other ways, e.g., by abandoning the dialogue. Admitting dogmas in dialogue is the same as allowing exceptions to the rule of Burden of Proof (as applied to assertions). Would it be advisable to allow such exceptions to occur? Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, pp. 159 and 160, Rule 5), point out several circumstances in which the rule would not apply: (1) the defendant may already have given his arguments, or (2) he may have retracted his point of view in the meantime, or (3) it may be that his opponent is not willing to abide by certain "commonly shared starting points and rules of discussion". They also (4) discuss the possibility that the rule, though applicable in principle, cannot be applied in practice (lack of time, lack of documentation, etc.). They point out that actually the only exception to the rule would be case (3): the opponent is not willing to abide by certain "commonly shared starting points and rules of discussion". In the other cases mentioned, the obligation to argue is either (1) already fulfilled, or (2) lost by retraction of the underlying assertion, or (4) still in force in principle. But the right to refuse to defend an assertion based upon your opponent's unwillingness to accept the rules of the game is perhaps better viewed, not as an exception to the Rule of Burden of Proof within dialogue, but as a second order rule that tells you when it would be alright to quit the dialogue. How about "commonly shared starting points"? Presumably, these are, according to the rules of dialogue, unassailable. It would be fallacious to question them within the dialogue itself. If they are, nevertheless, questioned one may point out the fallacy, instead of proceeding to defend them. They would constitute exceptions to the Rule of Burden of Proof, or dogmas for short. Nothing need to be laid down about the content of these dogmas: perhaps they are too obvious, or too trivial, to defend, but they may also be the anything but trivial expressions of a shared creed. Are there any other conceivable exceptions to the Rule of Burden of Proof? I think that before we conclude that all further exceptions are out of place in argumentative discussions, we should investigate the credentials of the following types of dialectical move: (i)

faith "I'm not going to defend it: it's my faith". Of course, this move can be very destructive in dialogue, and we can't allow it to occur every time some assertion is challenged. Yet it is not obvious that this move should be outlawed in all circumstances. In some systems of dialectics it might be stipulated that one has to pay a fine if one shrinks away from the Burden of Proof in this way. Yet the dialogue could go on. (A claim that something is too trivial, obvious, etc., to defend, would constitute a special type of faith.)

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delegating "The earth is round, a geophysicist can explain that to you".

I leave the defense of my claim to another party, not involved in the original conflict. Sometimes this seems the right thing to do. Note that this move should not be confused with an Argument from Authority (it does not conform to the usual standards for such arguments). Must we describe this move as "abandoning the discussion"? self-incrimination "I can't say why, for stating my reasons would hurt me more than it would help you".

(iii)

At least the defendant has given an argument why he does not want to take on his obligation to argue in this case. Could he ever get away with it? (iv)

reflection "I'm not going to say more. A moment's reflection will make this clear".

There is a good reason to allow such a move in dialogue (sometimes): It may save a lot of time if we let people think out things for themselves once in a while, instead of bombarding them with our arguments. I'm not going to say more. A moment's reflection will make this clear. Note

* This contribution was prepared during the author's stay at the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences, Wassenaar. The final draft has profited in several ways from the discussions during the workshop. Rob Grootendorst convinced me that "triviality" isn't worth much consideration as an exception to the Rule of Burden of Proof in its own right. Cases of triviality either fall under shared starting points (dogmas) or under faith.

References

Hamblin, C.I., 1987, Imperatives, Basil Blackwell, Oxford and New York. Van Eemeren, F.H. and R. Grootendorst: 1984, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions. A theoretical Model for the Analysis of Discussion Directed towards Solving Conflicts of Opinion, Foris, Dordrecht and Providence.

Chapter 3

Norms in Argumentation and Natural Logic Marie-Jeanne Borel

Without pretending to solve the problem of norms in argumentation, I am going to attempt to ask it from the point of view of research carried out in Neuchâtel (Switzerland) on natural logic and discursive schématisation. I will begin with three remarks: (1) on the objectives of a study on argumentation, (2) on the status of norms in relation to the status of their models in knowledge, and lastly, (3) on the position of this study between two extremes, a "logistic" position and a "rhetorical" position. I will then briefly explain the main concepts pertaining to natural logic, a theoretical setting which associates the communicative function of language normally considered essential to argumentation, with another of its main functions called "representational" or "significative". An application of this setting will be outlined to demonstrate the plurality of levels at which normative facts can appear in the reading of a text. 1. Introductory remarks 1.1 What are our objectives when we conceive a theory of argumentation? I can distinguish two. Neither can be neglected because of the d/a-logical nature of their object, but one must differentiate between them in order to avoid taking an ideology about argumentation for positive knowledge. The first objective is to construct an anthropology, in its widest sense, of discursive significations constructed and exchanged in texts or speeches. A characteristic of such a "naturalist" objective is that is does not prejudge the value of its object; moreover it symetrically treats as facts and in a reflexive way (with the same tools), the "good" and the "bad" arguments [including the very fact that speakers can discern between arguments]. The second objective is to put forward philosophical reasons: it is important to be able to distinguish between the arguments and to dispose of "valid" criteria. A theory of reason will function as a Court, being both critical and normative, and will eliminate those which are not rational and do not concur with certain criteria. One would have, for example, the deductive rules as a norm or, if they appear too restrictive, those of

34 Marie-Jeanne Borei reasonable democratic dialectic. (Woods and Walton, 1982; Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984). The two objectives are inseparable. In fact, if one is interested in argumentation as a science, one is also motivated by the practical role of promoting an "enlightened" or critical conception of rationality. The study of argumentation engages more than a disinterested concern for some language "game" amongst others. However, I feel that we should not confuse these objectives. One cannot both promote a certain type of rationality and furnish empirical knowledge without committing a sort of sophism, i.e. passing from a norm to a fact. The internal analysis of a norm can be a matter for logical methods, but it will not be an empiric description nor an explanation. The first objective will guide me. Three epistemological consequences result from this choice. First, we must distinguish between constructing a model of argumentation to represent certain aspects and furnish a method for criticism or even for modifying one's skills in argumentation. The choice is between the theoretical function of knowledge and its practical function. Secondly, one has to differentiate between the internal value of constraint which a norm possesses for a participating subject and its factual existence for an observer who ascertains, from outside, that the participants respect it. (Rescher, 1969; Borel, 1981). A norm which does not, in its constraint, implicate the reporting agent is a normative fact for the observer. Third consequence: it is important to distinguish between positions: of the agent of an argumentation, and of the witness of a speech activity. Each position has its owns standards of validity. The observer can certainly be a position in the dialectic - this seems to be one of the characteristics of debate (Woods and Walton, 1982), but nevertheless it should not be confounded with the observer who is theoretically studying dialectic. This difficult decentring is, in social sciences, the price to pay for describing phenomena from outside. 1.2 The choice of a naturalist objective and the distinctions arising from it, imply a certain conception of relationship between a theoretical model and the empiric norms. We have to raise the question of who is the agent of the critical decision when one refers to a particular model of argumentation in order to study, for example, a mistake in reasoning. The notion of model can be used in an ambiguous way. This ambiguousness seems to me to have its origin in the very term of "norm", which has two interpretations: 1. a priori, one delimits what should be by providing an ideal or a standard of behaviour, 2. a posteriori, one expresses a natural or habitual state, an average, a regularity (antonyms: l."abnormal"; 2. "anomalous"). One understands that it is easy to slip from the first meaning of the term to the idea of a theoretical model, and then confound them when the observer puts himself in the place of the argumentative agent. The

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second sense suggests that for a regularity to be a norm, an agent must exist for whom it has the signification of "model" or standard; otherwise why use the same word? Hence, not all regularities noted in the world a posteriori are a matter for norms. If there is a norm one must assume that at a given level the regularity of action is reflective, in the conscience and even thematised in the speech of its agents. Every standard model is therefore not a theoretical model. But the fact is that there are standard models which one has to acknowledge when associating, as Piaget wanted, formal internal anaylsis of norms and empiric investigations on the mechanisms of emergence of norms in human actions. A theoretical model of argumentation is therefore only a construction of the observer who has to maintain a relative distance between the model he is building and the constructions which have already been "modelled" by agents of argumentation. Piaget clearly demonstrated that if models obey structuring rules which are already used in active "models", it is not evident that these rules are the same everywhere, nor that they correspond term for term to the model which is an idealisation (Piaget 1967). Lévi-Strauss also claims that the existence of structural and functional constants can be applied as a principle of interpretive theory of cultural phenomena, however the structures are not the formal models represented even if, in practice, one only has access to the former through the intermediary of the latter; and even if the former are also used in the invention of the latter (Lévi-Strauss 1985). 1.3 One does not interpret a text, the heterogeneous entity of speech, in the same way if one is an argumentative agent or if one is a witness. The aims and means are distinct and one does not do the same thing (Ricoeur 1986). Argumentations are presented empirically as texts before any modeling aim and "don't mean a thing" to anyone unless they are read. As with any type of speech, they constitute an unreliable, mobile, object whose nature is defined by the very process of reading. In actual discussions on textual "data" one encounters two extreme tendencies and the question of determining one's position is raised. The first tendency is of logical origin and aims at problems of validity. The languages whose function is communication unsatisfactorily serve conceptual thought and reasoning. If one does not wish to change them, one should know how to extricate significant statements and avoid sources of confusion. Disregarding the linguistic "morals" of analytical movement at its origins, one can nevertheless find a form of "logicism" in these "rational reconstructions" for which the identifying procedures of an argumentation in a text remain a theme outside the phenomena being studied. In order to perceive this "triplet" of prepositional information in argumentation - premise, conclusion and inferential link - one must, in some way, "cross" the text as though it were transparent.

36 Marie-Jeanne Borei The second tendency, rhetoric, brings argumentation back to persuasion, reducing it to a mere effect of language. Everything is justified if it moves the auditor, which makes figures of "elocutio" the very core of argumentation theory. One has even gone as far as calling "argumentation" a semantic conception (Ducrot and Anscombre, 1986) of the functioning of the conjunctions in a language. However, Aristotle had distinguished between the rhetor and the dialectician. (Rhet. 1,1355b 15-20). To persuade or seduce is not to convince, and the difference between "make believe" and knowledge does not consist only of changing the modality of a statement but "prend du temps' (Frege 1971, p. 174). An intermediary position is possible. Before being a series of regulated actions, or a normed chain of information, argumentation is first of all a language comprising all the heterogeneous and polyfunctional facts which can be interpreted from this "data" (Adam, 1987). In order to identify argumentation in a flow of words and then to reconstruct the elements of a logic, one has to determine the linguistic properties of the performance. However, argumentation is not a linguistic phenomena in itself, even if one admits, with the functional linguistic theories of enunciation (Culioli, 1984), that our languages are universally formed for dialogue and interaction.

2. "Natural logic" 2.1 The conception of argumentation labelled "natural logic" articulates three dimensions (Grize, 1982; Grize, Borel, and Mi6ville, 1983; Grize et al., 1984). A language dimension refers in part to linguistic preoccupations: in language, a text indicates a discursive activity, but also a process of communication which implies address and exchange. "Proof", enunciated in discourse, reflects the latter dimension: contrarily, a "derivation" into formalised calculation doesn't. A logical dimension is required as soon as we have to reason, when exchanging statements and linking information in order to handle certain communication and knowledge problems emerging from experience. Justifying one's affirmations means first and foremost to defend oneself in front of others. However, objective justification does exist: Proof, for example, is detached from the circumstances of its enunciation and guided by its object; and it may use reasoning whose function is not only to justify, but also to draw conclusions from certain data, by "passing" from one fact to another to get ahead. Lastly, a representational dimension means that the logic has to deal with our knowledge and experience of a world of objects of thought and is therefore not only concerned with the exchange of statements or speaking agents, expressing will and passion, with which to interact. The rep-

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resentational function of language furnishes the means to construct objects of speech, objective universes of discursive activity. It is significant to us that the activity of exchanging statements in order to collectively check the validity of claims is developed with an objective which is not the exchange itself but the construction, or /«-formation of worldly objects in the symbolic medium of speech. Aristotle identified epidictic discourse, which shows things in order to be seen before they can be judged (Borel et al., 1987,1988), on par with practical judiciary and deliberative argumentations, and claimed its affinity with demonstrative (didactic) theoretical discourse. Besides modern logic, only the propositional calculus can be said to be "pure" or completely formal: for an analysis of statements, in any extension or application of the former, cannot be conveyed without a "theory of objects", without an ontology. A "natural" logic of argumentation cannot therefore dispense with a "subject logic" without taking the risk of digressing from its non-formal proprieties, notably dialectic and intensionality. However, one cannot dispense correlativety with a "logic of object". Indeed, the non-formal aspects of argumentation do not only come from communicational determination but also from its dependence on content. These two aspects need to be thought together. There is (are) no subject(s) without object(s) and therefore research will have to take as its object the relativity of these two inseparable terms as well as the diversity of their relations. 2.2 Why a "natural" logic? This term is used to recall our objective, a naturalistic conception of normative facts in which logic plays the role of an internal methodic analysis of normative forms from a wide anthropological viewpoint. We will borrow from Piaget (Borel, 1987) the theory that, in general, people act by adapting their activities (and thoughts) to available objects, but also to their capabilities and to their environment as well. By "natural logic" Piaget means the more or less conscious "feeling of necessity" that makes people act guided by a compulsion which seems not to depend on their will, discovered by them in their achievements or in the properties of certain objects. For him, however, the logic of professional logicians is as natural as that of anyone else and is therefore both a formal and an empirical object for study (Piaget, 1967, pp. 375-398), except that the analysis and technical explanations of norms of thought and action that logicians are talking about (which are only confusedly understood by people) can be of use in systematising intellectual structures in general. As scientific discipline and as aggregate of theories, logic is therefore a type of human activity which, as does any activity, transforms the contents and the type of knowledge into what it calls: "to know that" adds something to "to know how"; and thereby knowledge, notably logic,

38 Marie-Jeanne Borei can progress like a meta-activity and be relayed to levels of lesser articulated knowledge. The term "natural logic" also serves to distinguish our object from the interpretation ofform in classified elementary deductive logic and formalisation procedures used as an exact method of exposing a demonstrative theory. Indeed, it is evident that logic used in argumentation is not that(those) of deduction only. And we know that a formalised model presupposes, beyond its axiomatisation, its mathematisation. In fact, in the present state of our knowledge on argumentation, empirical understanding about the constants of the process is limited and we have only local certainties on the tools for modeling. Devoted to "naïveté, as logicians say, one can, however, advance concepts which try, at least, to render contextual or linguistic variations less burdensome for us than for the agents whosee discursive performances we are studying. Finally, the term "natural logic" seems to us to be less problematic to use than that of "informal logic". In addition to a contradictio terminorum, the second conceals more than it shows in that people who argue use, thematise and discuss the forms of their speeches, thus confirming the role of traditions in our language activities (for example in styles and in methodologies) and also that they casually make use of the deductive forms. Furthermore, if the object of a logic is by definition more formal than the data being analysed, these are not as such without a form. All degrees are conceivable in abstraction, and all language is, in itself, able to shape matters into a form. 2.3 The object of natural logic is to study discursive schématisation. The concept of schématisation is the first of the concepts which we will apply in an attempt to articulate the three dimensions, language, logic and representation, of the problem of argumentation. Schématisation is defined as a representation (a symbolic construction) which Speaker A presents or submits interactively to Speaker B through a text emitted in a given language, in a given situation and concerning a specific case. A's construction has to be reconstituted by B, helped in his interpretation by textual indications of a discursive intervention made in a specific context and with specificfinality.A and B are therefore positions in a communication process. Those occupying the positions must be mutually identifiable as language agents, the textual medium must have been read and interpreted, and each participant, in order to adapt his construction should know certain characteristics about the speaker, the situation and the norms of the exchange, etc. Several interpretations are therefore possible. The word "schématisation" has the heuristic advantage of being an ambiguous term which means not only the constructed object (the microworld represented) but also the activity of construction itself. For us it has the same dynamic signification as the word "operation". Piaget saw in

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operation the pre-eminent primitive concept of any logic which would want to conceive its own relations with intellectual activity in general. Indeed, he defined it with strict structural properties, such as access criteria, to identify deductive and objective competence in the development of thought. In his mind we can, however, imagine weaker formal conditions for studying the functioning of modes of thought: without being "operative" in the strictest piagetian sense, they nevertheless operate in daily thought. Natural logic opts for an operational point of view. The construction of argumentative schématisation depends as much on the contents as on the conditions of enunciation. One must therefore foresee operations which take this double dependence into account and see them work in all discursive activity indicated in a text (argumentation is only one type). Heuristically speaking, their conception diverges on three points from what is normally presented as being a logic. 1. Configuration operations. Normally, a logic defines a "proof" as a sequence of formulae equipped with combinatory properties. But when one observes discourse in any kind of texts one notes that there are many other cases of figures: descriptions, narratives, argumentations, explanations, inferences, etc., many types of sequences which are furthermore textually heterogeneous. In speaking, one can normally identify them; there is even a history of their shape. To deal with them we define operations called "of configuration" (the operations of proof are a part of them). Marks of textual cohesion and progression, of implicitation or of linguistic changes in level are indicators. An argumentation is a configuration of these operations. 2. Assumption operations. Logics have the habit of eliminating any reference to the "subject" using a language at the language-object level, thus setting down the rules for using the formulae in a meta-language, with useful definitions and a mark that one accepts a formula as proven. However, in speech one notes that the metalanguage is always comprised in the language and therefore discourse schematises both "subjects" and "objects" and their relation, i.e. rules, rights, conventions, etc. In Aristotle's rhetoric, apart from technical proof (reasoning), other proof existed, "extra-technical proof' whose principle was to schematise in speech the images of its own agents, thus ensuring the acceptability of an argument. These phenomena serve argumentation in its functions, but are also an area of predilection for some sophisms from the dialectic objectivity requirement point of view. The complex and intricate operations which we conceive are relevant with facts of "taking over" which have already been theorised under the names of "modalities", "illocutionary acts", "intension", "enunciation", "polyphony", "referential opacity", etc. 3. Operations of determination. The preceding operations concern statements which are, in themselves, the product of operations of predication. But contrary to the analysis of predication in logic, the operations of

40 Mane-Jeanne Borei determination are multiple and complex as they have to represent types (linguistically indicated) of spatio-temporal localisation, aspectual phenomena, of quali-quantitative constructions, modalités de re, etc. In our speech, predication does not have the functional simplicity which Frege dreamt of for arithmetic. 4. Objectual operations. Finally, habitual presentations of logic semantically predetermine the domain of objects on which the formulae will be evaluated, either by listing them in a given application, or by specifying that their domaine is not empty when the logic is "pure". Apart from a few exceptions, some technological instructions or some scientific discourses, we note that none of these conditions is covered in the universes schematised by our discourses. In general, the objects about which we are speaking are modified as we progress in communication. Moreover, they have acquired a kind of permanence before we begin to speak, and aspects or properties which will be modified during the performance. One can also invent objects simply by using a name in discourse, or transform something which is not an object into one: a statement, a predicate, a prepositional attitude, an illocutionary act, a context, a rule. An object is something we talk about; the means of denominating and thematising are rich in our languages. Different types of operations can be undertaken to construct an object. These operations seem to us to function beneath the level of what is normally presented as an object in a logic, and we believe them to be characteristic of the representative dimension of discursive schématisation in its most natural form. Observation demonstrates their existence (Grize, Vergés, and Silem, 1988) and there are therefore empiric reasons for describing them. However, one can give philosophical reasons: how to imagine handling the subjective dimension of argumentation (precisely in that it is non-formal) in conceiving "subjects" which would have no "objects", or subjects whose objects' only form would remain in being a value, in itself without a form and without a name, of a "linked variable". Related to a particular concept, that of "class-object", operations called "anchoring are defined first, followed by operations of "ingredience". We have started with the idea that an object is not a pure entity without qualities, but a complex consisting of a range of qualitative and relational aspects which are both linked and "centred", and in order to deal with this hypothesis, we are using as a tool a notion of class which is not distributive but collective (Miéville 1984). Operations of anchoring place a class-object in a discourse by relating it to its "outside" called "pre-constructed". It comprises two types of elements: on the one hand, pre-linguistic "notions" bound to the lexical meaning of words in a language, but structured in cognition before the linguistic distinction between nominal and predicative forms, and on the other hand, a memory of all sorts of experiences, verbal or not. This knowledge contributes to the signification and to the validation of dis-

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course and can be recalled, for example, by implication devices. Operations of ingredience act on the class-object by transforming them, in particular, by integrating or modifying elements. When postulating these operations we aim to point out two facts concerning the natural activity of discursive schématisation. The first is that the search to attribute a signification to one's environment through the bias of language, is an activity which never ceases to find in it significant elements to use. This is a characteristic of the openness of schématisation. The second is that the schematised universe of discourse acquires an organisation which is partly independent of its discursive construction (predicative, illocutory and configurational), i.e. of its argumentative forms (Borel, 1987). We believe that this fact demonstrates an essential aspect of our object, the representational function of language.

3. "Facets" of discourse. When one reads a text, "packages" of operations are organised into procedures and strategies representing a specific "world" in an interpretation. But they have several simultaneous effects: to show that a person is addressing someone, to make operational that which has to operate, to make credible what is said, and, finally, to inform on the subject matter. Operations of schématisation are defined at discourse level in general (argumentation is one type), and regulations are revealed when observing certain procedures or strategies. The problem of norms arises as soon as the speech digresses to thematisation or evaluation of a procedure, giving an indication of the existence of a logic for a speech agent. However, one finds several levels where the problem may arise in a schématisation which I will try to outline with the help of an example. When analysing a text the reader is led to define diverse "facets" -1 will name three - to localise functionalities in the indication of marked operations. At each stage someone may ask whether a procedure has reached its goal or if it has obeyed a norm. These questions arise daily in pedagogic activity for which it is not always easy to distinguish between "do your best in your sphere of action" and "do as one should". It also happens that one misses his objective in obeying a norm, or that one violates a norm but nevertheless succeeds in reaching its objective. Finally, it is rare that a speech masters its various operational facets and fully controls their articulation. I will refer to a text to describe these facets. Michel Rocard, then potential candidate in the French presidential elections, published four posters ( in Le Monde, September 23,1987). Their author was in an inferior position in the ratings. The four posters show the ex-Minister's (of Agriculture) signature and each has a strip labelled in big letters, on

42 Marie-Jeanne Borei the left, "Convince" and on the right, 'True Speech". The author has properly schematised the "subject" of the speech: 1. 2.

3.

4.

Il parait que je suis trop sérieux. Deux millions et demi de chômeurs, ça vous fait sourire? (It appears that I am too serious. Two and a half millions unemployed-that makes you smile?) J'ai décidé de traverser la période de conquête du pouvoir comme j'ai envie de l'exercer, en reconnaissant la complexité des choses et en faisant appel à la lucidité des gens. (I have decided to pass through the era of the conquest of power as I want to exercise it, recognizing the complexity of things and appealing to the sanity of people.) Certains pensent qu'un sourire peut faire office de politique. Croyezvous qu'on puisse combattre l'inflation en lui faisant du charme? (Some people think a smile can do for political office. Do you think one can fight inflation with charm?) On voudrait limiter le débat politique à une bataille de petites phrases. Peut-on combler 30 milliards de déficit du commerce extérieur avec de bons mots? (One can limit political debate to a battle of little phrases. Can one make up 30 billions in foreign trade deficit with witty sayings?)

The above texts, except for the second, are very short, syntactically economical, even lapidary; three of them are written using the same schema ( an assertion giving an opinion and followed by a question); each has a different theme; only two carry an explicit mark of the signatory. 3.1. At the "rhetoricaF facet, the materialistic form of the text manifests regulations, or even norms. We can also mention the choice of language, of its level, and of a "style". Rocard could have two models, that of a publicist, but with a pascalian echo (for a reader of "Provinciales"), chopped phrases which say the maximum but use the least number of words, and the use of rhetorical questions. Here the concern is the readability of a text (ability to "circulate") and about its receivability in communication (its adaptibility to situations) (Morel, 1987); in other words, the text manifests a schématisation of a type of interaction aimed at involving a specific category of interlocutor into communicating. The effective purpose of these texts of electoral propaganda is to provoke the reader to actually accomplish the act of putting his vote in the ballot-box. Yet none of them explicitly mentions Rocard's candidature nor the awaited gesture. A mediating aim relating to the first objective is proposed through the bias of a schematised image of a communicative link which differs from the propaganda. "Reading instructions" furnished by the schema of the rhetorical question and the labels which dominate the text are clues for the observer.

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The rhetorical question is the arm of the polemist. In operating with it, the reader becomes a potential respondent in a debate where a procedure of refutation is taking place; more, he is made an accomplice to the thesis (which is not without paradox and could be accused of autophagy) of the one asking the question, a thesis which reverts back to an intertext. A rhetorical question, nearly an exclamation and tending to irony, is not a "real" question which gives one a choice: "Two and a half million unemployed makes you laugh? Laugh, and you are either an idiot or as malicious as those who pretend it is a laughing matter". By the form of the question itself, one has denounced an adverse thesis and devaluated anyone supporting it, its effect being to divide parties in the auditoriums, one of the arms (one of the norms?) of persuasion. The logic of the polemic with its illocutionary marks is, at the rhetorical facet, a theatre in which we nevertheless cannot totally reduce the phenomena of argumentation. The labels "Convince" and 'True Speech" have an instructive analogous function whose operation is also to place the agents of communication in a certain relationship (representing a type of interaction) to interpret what is communicated. These labels engage a specified norm, that of dialectic argumentation. As a result, only facts, sincerity of the observer (True Speech), and objectively conducted reasoning ("Convince") will be expressed. This norm is designated and claimed to be valid in opposition with others (amongst which is that of "persuasion" in propaganda or in polemic). We have here yet another device which separates clans amongst the agents of communication. With this paradox, well-known by the critical reader, that the distinction is operated by means of a call to objectivity and to universality although its effect is to take the individual for universal in the representation of the ordinary reader. 3.2. At a second facet, called "argumentative'', the schématisation of procedures for solving problems takes place. Problems treated can be about communication but also about action or knowledge raised by experience. The "subject" which operates their treatment is schematised notably by the expressing of values and decisions, norms or rules, means and ends concerning designated or implicit data. Thus described in the economy of speech, the facet seems to be very clearly distinguished from the procedures for shaping the text as a support for reading instructions or from procedures which engage a certain structure of communication. In the second poster, we find propositional marks of attitude ("decide", "wants", "understands the complexity", "calls for lucidity", "it seems", "some think") from the domain of practical or deontic modalities (dealing with values of action) and of epistemic modalities concerning truth. In the three others, the same schema of problem solving opposes positions in a dialectic incompatibility, with a problematical stake, i.e. the objective evaluation of an attitude or a projected action. Joined to the question of the rhetorical facet, this schema takes a form close to that

44 Marie-Jeanne Borei of an injunction: "being that p, admit q and refuse q, or else you will have to accept non p, that which you don't want"! This is a type of economical reductio ad absurdum founded on a contraposition: if one refuses the conclusion, one has to refuse the premise, and therefore take for false that which is true or for good that which is bad. This schema of argumentation is "quasi-logic" in Perelman's terms; in fact, it is completely logical so long as one adheres to the dialectic norm of cooperation, to the formalities of the principle of non-contradiction and of the law of contraposition, an adhesion which is expressly "induced" by the slogans around the text of the posters. One can then give it a form (others are, of course, possible). In text No. 3 for example, there are two premises of which one is implicit and a conclusion: 1. 2. 3.

Certains pensent que: un sourire (p) suffit pour avoir une politique (q). (chacun admet que: s'il y a inflation á combatiré (m) - et il y a inflation - il faut une politique (q); Croyez-vous que: un sourire (p) suffit pour combattre l'inflation (m)?

A rapid check in classical propositional logic shows that inference is not conclusive. There is no rule for: (if p then q), (if m then q), therefore (if p then m). The conclusion is therefore not logically true. Furthermore, it is materially false. One of the premises should therefore also be false in a case where the rule is valid. The second, which everyone admits, is evident; it is therefore the first (the thesis of the opponents in the dialectic schema) which is false. The correct rule: no (if p then q), (if m then q) therefore no (if p then m) justifies that the admission of (if p then m) leads to a contradiction. Further, an implicit principle for processing data is operating: "It is preferable to accept evidence". Other principles could be found on this level, for example: infer from sign to cause, from conditioned to condition, call on expertise, select the best, use inductions, analogies, etc. Other principles even authorise games with an implicative law, which we can "go up" to prove, justify or explain, or "go down" to deduce or predict. In addition to the classical laws and rules of inference there exist various sorts of non-formal "rights" allowing operations [or "epistemic" common places (topoi)], i.e. elements of methodology which are used or formulated to handle our knowledge. 3.3. Finally, we will call "cognitive" the facet in which schematisation constructs the very information handled in the problematic frame, notably the objects of discourse. In view of their shortness, Rocard's texts are not demonstrative on this point. However, one observes a link between the themes of "unemploy-

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ment", "inflation" and "external debt" and between "smile", "charm", "short phrases" and "witty sayings". The discourse manipulates two "class-objects" and an isotopy between the occurrences of "combatting" one or other evils. Furthermore, each denomination of object refers to preconstructed knowledge which is pregnant in the conjuncture. Amongst these, implicit information intervenes in order to establish non-formal relationships between data (one is that inflation must be knocked out) taking the form of "ontic" commonplaces because, this time, they do not concern the organisation of our knowledge, but the shape attributed to objects and events in the world: laws of being rather than of knowing. The difference between law and rule is indeed relative: a law can serve as a foundation for a rule (for example: ("p implies p" gives the right to infer "p" from "p") and a rule can itself be an object for a rule. Taken as a law at the cognitive facet, a "topos" will serve as a premise for reasoning at the argumentative one. Taken as a rule at the argumentative facet, it will furnish a schema of inference. One can therefore justify an inference both by calling on a methodological right to develop it, or by referring to what things are in themselves. Non-formal laws and rules are extremely variable in their reach, their abstraction, their pertinence and in their permanence because they formulate as a canon for action various factual patterns, or states of our knowledge and our ideologies, and in general, of our representations.

Conclusion In natural logic (a programme in which nothing is definitive) the problem of norms in argumentation, occurs in numerous instances and comprises several questions. What is a norm in argumentation? Temporarily it is the conscious and social aspect appropriated by regulations of discourse when argumentative activity develops reflection about its procedures and effects. This is why it can sometimes develop as an "art" and at other times as a "science". Where are these norms the most evident in empirical research? It seems to me that in polemic discourses even the dialectic norm can be questioned, and consequently be revealed as a fact to the observer to the extent that he can distinguish his position from that of an agent in debate. Where do norms come from and how do we "inherit" them? A hermeneutic and historical dimension cannot be avoided in research. If it has a historic permanence, a non-formal argument "is always an example of intertextuality" (Johnstone, 1988); historically studied, the deductive proof appears notably as "an objective quest of objective understanding of objectivity" whose diverse traditions do not cease to "connect present challenges with past success" (Corcoran, 1988). One must consider different

46 Mane-Jeanne Borei histories, of varying duration (Braudel, 1987), some of which are quite long: the "material implication" and its laws come from the Greeks. One must take into account the different scales in the phenomena being studied: if the "microschemes" of reasoning seem to escape in part to historical variations, their distribution in methodic "macroprocedures" seems to be more submissive to history (Finocchiaro, 1988). And why not also think of the most formal norms, of deeper sources, whose duration corresponds to that of the human race in its neuro-biological relationship with its environment? Gonseth, a Swiss philosopher and mathematician, believed this and saw in propositional logic a "physique de l'objet quelconque", i.e. a computation of simple "presence" and "absence" of anything arising from our primitive experience of material objects (Gonseth, 1926). Piaget took up the idea, but transformed it to his operative point of view (Piaget, 1967, pp. 115124); for no conception about the origin of logic as a form of experience in a concrete environment can, after Frege's criticism of empirism, get rid of the problem of its normative objectivity. The last question: where are argumentation and its theory going, what is(are) its(their) purpose(s)? This question brings me back to my starting point. If one does not wish the purpose to be just that of propaganda equipped with technical knowledge of efficiency, nor just that of a dogmatic "moral" of discussion, one must clearly distinguish regulations and norms. Every action is, in a way, "violent" when intervening in the midst of interactions. Language action cannot avoid violence, not even if it is handled rationally or if it is only symbolically achieved. However, as Perelman said, it can be a protection against violence (this is well known to diplomats and lawyers). This is why the dialectic norm is so interesting for ethico-social action and for philosophy even if we are constrained to observe its emergence in polemic contexts, and even though it is not always efficient or adapted (social workers could talk on the subject). Because it requires the other to listen, to distance himself or herself in relation to his or her own position, in a word to cooperate, it is an Ideal of interaction for communication and an Ideal of rationality for knowledge. But it is difficult to seize the detail of the content of these norms when a question of preference is raised. Locke filed among sophisms "ad ignorantiam" the maxim: "I cannot prove p, therefore p is true". This wellknown scholastic strategy in philosophical analysis consists of delegating the "burden of proof' to one's interlocutor: "I say p and as long as you have not proven that it's impossible, I will continue to claim p and argue no more". From a certain point of view this is eristic violence. At least one feels this as the interlocutor who is persuaded that in a dialectic, the agents of a position must assume and defend their point of view in front of others, and not let the signification of what they believe depend on what another can do with it. Another norm exists which says that one

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must not immediately back down in one's arguments and reasoning to an external point of view. For Kuhn, backing down is a normal procedure in science, there are circumstances when one has to be dogmatic. Are we certain, though, that the maxim is a sophism? Is there not another dialectic norm which says "Act as though your assertion was that of someone else and let him see if it holds up". According to this critical maxim, truth is constructed collectively and a conjecture, as Popper says, is only interesting by default. How to choose between two norms? My opinion is that there is not a norm which imposes itself except, perhaps, for a Kantian type of categorical imperative, which by definition is without content; being a critical criterion of the form of a norm, it does not, ethically, tell us what the norm contains in relation to the circumstances of its applicability. Thus it must be used judiciously according to conjunctures and even, if necessary, admit incompatibility between norms. Unlike technical rules or laws of nature, the intrinsic value of a practical norm, of its formulating rule, or of the outcome of its application is, by constitution, an object of social contestation.

References

Adam, J.M.: 1987, Textualité et séquentialité, l'exemple de la description', Langue Française, 74,51-72. Bloor, D.L.: 1987, 'Sociologie de la logique ou les limites de l'épistémologie', in Pandore, D. Ebnoter, Paris (trans, of Knowledge and Social Imagery, 1976, Routledge and Kegan, London). Borel, MJ.: 1981, 'L'explication dans l'argumentation, approche sémiologique', Langue Française, 50, 20-38. Borel, MJ.: 1984, 'Plans du discours, à propos de l'enseignement de la dissertation philosophique', Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 155 (4), 401-412. Borel, M J.: 1987, 'Piaget's Natural Logic', in B. Inhelder (éd.), Piaget Today, Erlbaum, London, pp. 65-76. Borel, MJ.: 1987, 'Le discours descriptif. Questions d'epistemoligie et de sémiologie', Travaux du Centre de Recherches Sémiologiques, (Université de Neuchâtel), 51-52,152. Borel, M J.: 1988, 'La description en anthropologie 'interpretative", Travaux du Centre de Recherches Sémiologiques, (Université de Neuchâtel), 55,39-70. Borel, M J.: 1987, 'La schématisation, la description et le neveu utérin', Revue européenne des Sciences Sociales, 25, 77,159-177. Braudel, F: 1987, 'Histoire et sciences sociales: la longue durée', Réseaux, 27,7-38. Corcoran, J.: 1988, 'Argumentation and hope', Argumentation (in press).

48 Marie-Jeanne Borei Culioli, A.: 1984, 'En guise d'introduction' in A. Grésillon and J.L. Lebrave (eds.) La langue au ras du texte, Presses Universitaires, Lille, pp. 9-12. Ducrot, O. and J. C. Anscombre: 1986, L'argumentation dans la langue, Mardaga, Bruxelles. Van Eemeren, F. and R. Grootendorst: 1984, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussion, Foris, Dordrecht (Holland) and Providence (USA). Finocchiaro, M.: 1988, 'Empiricism, Judgment and Argument: toward an informal Logic of Science', Argumentation 2 (3), 313-335. Frege, G.: 1971, 'La Pensée' Recherches logiques (Trans, by C Imbert), Seuil, Paris,. Gonseth, F.: 1926, Les fondement des mathématiques, A. Blanchard, Paris. Grize, J.B.: 1982, De la logique à l'argumentation, Droz, Genève. Grize, J.B., M. J. Borei, and D. Miéville: 1983, Essai de logique naturelle, Lang, Berne. Grize, J.B. (ed.): 1984, Sémiologie du raisonnement, Lang, Berne. Grize, J.B., P. Vergés, and A. Silem: 1987 Salariés face aux nouvelles technologies. Vers, une approche socio-logiques des représentations sociales, Ed. du CNRS, Paris. Johnstone, H.W.: 1988, 'Argumentation and Formai Logic in Philosophy", Argumentation 3(1), 5-15. Latour, B.: 1982, 'Comment redistribuer le Grand Partage?', Revue de Synthèse 110 (2), 203-235. Lévi-Strauss, C.: Anthropologie structurale II, Pion, Paris. Miéville, D.: 1984, Un développement des systèmes logiques de S. Lesniewski, Lang, Berne. Motel, MA.: 1987, 'Les marqueurs de la demande d'information dans un corpus de dialogues homme-machine', Cahiers de linguistique française 8,81-%. Piaget, J.: 1967 Logique et connaissance scientifique, Gallimard, Paris. Rescher, N.: 1969, Introduction to Value Theory, Prentice Hall, New York. Ricoeur, P.: 1986, Du texte à l'action, Seuil, Paris. Woods, J., and D. Walton: 1982, Argument: The Logic of Fallacies, McGraw Hill, New York.

Chapter 4

Natural Logic and Norms in Argumentation1 Robert Maier

1. Introduction: Is natural logic normative? Argumentation can be conceived as a highly specified form of verbal exchange between two or more participants. Only the forms of verbal exchange which satisfy an impressive set of conditions can qualify as argumentation. For example, the pragma-dialectical conception of argumentation by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983) defines such a particular set of conditions for argumentation. A quite different approach to argumentation prevails in the work of Ducrot, Anscombre and others, who see in almost any verbal production an argumentative force and tendency. Natural logic, as developed by J.-B. Grize and his collaborators2, is closer to the second approach to argumentation. It attempts to formulate a theory of the procedures at work in everyday discourse. Following Benveniste, any discourse is conceived as dialogical. As such, everyday discourse takes into account the diverse representations of the participants, and also their goals and desires. Therefore everyday discourse has an argumentative stance, by its adaptation to the practical situation of discourse and its participants. Neither well-organized and formalized theories nor strictly streamlined dialogues constitute the paradigmatic reference for natural logic. Rejecting any limitative definition of argumentation, natural logic strives to elucidate the argumentative features of a diversity of common discourses such as advertisements and political speeches. Natural logic appears already as an extremely productive research program, but nevertheless, it presents itself as a starting quest, as a venture which will only in the future formulate a theory of argumentation. Does questioning natural logic about the norms in argumentation have any meaning, if natural logic does not have the status of a full-grown theory, which moreover rejects any normative a priori position concerning argumentation? Certainly not, if we expect a clarification of the dialectical rules in 'rational' discussions, because natural logic refuses in its present state to say anything about such discussions. But if we are satisfied with some answers concerning the possible norms in everyday argumentative

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discourses, then natural logic might be a good hunting ground. Doesn't it claim to formulate a theory of the logic of such discourses? In what follows I will undertake such an examination. To begin with, I will examine how natural logic has constituted its domain of investigation and its instruments of analysis, with the question in mind if such a constitution entails norms for the argumentative features of everyday discussions. In a second part, the specific characterization by natural logic of several aspects of argumentative discourses will be examined, in an attempt to identify the possible normative consequences of such characterizations.

2. Has everyday discourse normative properties by constitution? Natural logic determines everyday - argumentative - discourse as its object. Contrary to well-formed scientific theories, especially the formalized parts, everyday discourse appears as notoriously obscure, ambiguous, puzzling and vague. Logic and formal semantics have treated everyday discourse as a villain, as a scoundrel who has to be disciplined with a strong hand, by re-establishing the missing parts and by rearranging the order of things. Natural logic chooses another approach, which is opposed to such disciplinary interventions. It recognizes the existence and the possible validity of such discourses, and it gambles on the eventual rational instruments - called logical-discursive operations - which make the production of such discourses possible. In other words, natural logic dares to look for an order and a kind of rationality in the renowned obscurity, vagueness, and ambiguity of everyday discourse3. But such a venture is not undertaken lightly, a series of careful precautions preside the investigation. The following remarks delineate the way of proceeding of natural logic: a. A logical demonstration provides usually the ideal against which argumentative discourses are measured. According to Grize, those two cannot be compared at all, because in & formal calculus there are no subjects doing the reasoning, nor is there any particular context. Such a calculus is for nobody in particular, it has a claim of universal validity. The steps of such a calculus are situated in a world of necessity. Everyday discourse on the contrary, supposes interlocutors who are concretely situated in a historical, social and practical context. There is no longer any question of necessity, but only of probability. The basic element of such a discourse can never be a proposition 'p', - like in the calculus without subjects - it will always be something like I tell you 'p'. An analysis of everyday discourse has therefore to take into account the interlocutors, the situation, and should consider only claims of local validity. Moreover, such a discourse is always an action discourse. J.-B. Grize (1982, p. 244) formulates this constitutive property forcefully in the following way:

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Presently we know that the proper of theoretical knowledge is its hypothetical-deductive character. All the same, one cannot act with an if: for acting one needs facts. Everyday discourse is therefore by definition outside of classical logic. (This does not mean that the logical-discursive operations at work in this discourse can't be formalized; such formalization is a future project of J.B. Grize). Natural logic, however, does not examine everyday discourse in its totality, whatever that may be. As we will see, only a particular layer of this discourse will be considered by natural logic. b. J.-B. Grize delimits his enterprise very clearly from the other theories of argumentation, such as Aristotle's and Perelman's. Contrary to these approaches, Grize does not want to engage in a philosophical reflection, he limits himself to an : ...exploration of some processes of logical nature, the study of some types of concatenation of 'ideas'.(Grize, 1982, p. 137)

This means that natural logic engages in a quest of the mechanisms proper to argumentation, in an analysis of how facts, values, audiences and other concepts are handled. However, to begin with, natural logic avoids carefully any strong definitions, and concepts as 'truth' or 'universal audience' will not be employed. The interventions of the participants are explicitly conceived in an action perspective. Any intervention - be it by a proponent or an opponent - strives to reach some goal, which can be a modification of some course of action or at least a transformation of a disposition of action. As no real definition of argumentation is possible at the moment, and therefore no clear discrimination between argumentative discourses and others, natural logic chooses as its empirical material discourses such as advertisements or political speeches, which have without any doubt some argumentative stance. c. But natural logic does not consider globally the chosen discourses; only a very particular facet of the discourse is considered. An example presented by Grize (1982, p. 190) should illustrate clearly the chosen approach. It is an advertisement of some new kind of pocket-torch: Disque-lumière [this is also in French a new word for a pocket-torch, but next to it there is a photo of one] -Neither battery nor bulb to change: it has its own source of electrical energy.

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At a first level of analysis, some of the most apparent aspects of the text can be explicitized. For example, this discourse is anchored in the supposedly familiar world of 'pocket-torches'. Then, some kind of apparent contradiction is produced, by speaking of pocket-torches without bulb and battery. Finally, a kind of coherence is re-established by introducing the new category "pocket-torch with battery or with its own source of energy". At a second level of analysis, the representations of the producer A of the passage can be examined. For example A seems to have a representation of the reader as somebody who does not like changing batteries, who is afraid to find the battery dead. At a third level of analysis, such an advertisement belongs to an economic structure in a certain society of production and consumption. Natural logic limits itself to the first level of analysis, where a logical analysis is possible, independent of the other two levels, which are the domains of particular social sciences. d. Everyday discourse with an argumentative stance is produced for a particular audience with some goal in mind. This production involves language - and possibly other types of signs, such as images - but it is not purely a linguistic phenomenon, because the same effects can be reached through a variety of linguistic means. There are mental activities involved which use natural language in order to produce the argumentative discourse. Such a discourse can be defined as a kind of microcosmos, produced by a subject with the goal to attain some effects on a particular audience. This microcosmos - called schematization by natural logic - is not transmitted to the audience; it is a representative entity with a particular force which will induce, if successful, an appropriate effect on the audience. It is on the one hand a temporarily finished product, but on the other hand it is an ongoing production, and supposes therefore instruments of production. Neither the subject nor the audience are empirical entities for natural logic. The subject is only the place of production of this schematization, is a kind of thinking, planning, and strategic instance. The audience is a posited entity to which the schematization is addressed, for example 'scientists' or 'women', but in reality there are possibly (lay)men present. Contrary to persuasion, natural logic does not study the criteria of success, it limits itself to a study of the general conditions of production of schematizations and of the instruments which are necessary for such a production. e. The subject of natural logic, as thinking and planning instance, is an active agent. It utilizes procedures in order to construct the schematizations. These procedures or instruments of the subject are called logicaldiscursive operations by natural logic. These are the operations of the thinking, strategic instance, which uses natural language in order to produce the schematization.

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In the example of the advertisement of point c., the logical-discursive operations anchor the object of discourse in the culturally familiar world, they construct new objects of discourse; they set up apparent contradictions and resolve them. These are the procedures which weave with the material of natural languages the argumentative carpet. In other words, these operations work between culture and language, they shape the argumentative features of verbal constructions. Natural logic posits these operations as universal, they are the necessary instruments for the construction of everyday argumentative discourses. The principal families of logical-discursive operations have been specified by natural logic, without, however, any claim that a complete list can be presented at the moment. These five points present in short the main properties of the constituted object of natural logic. In this presentation I have intentionally followed closely the characteristic formulation of natural logic itself. This is justified because analyzing the possible normative consequences of a conceptual construction is anyway a delicate problem. As we have seen, natural logic is very careful to avoid normative consequences of concepts imported from other theories. 'Truth', 'universal audience' and many other concepts are for this reason excluded from natural logic. In the same spirit, natural logic is very suspicious of any a priori analysis of the concepts used. Properties of concepts should be elaborated by a quasi naturalistic methodology, through the analysis of the chosen empirical material. Next to these two cautions, natural logic formulates explicitly its own limitations. It will never be able to explain the real force of an argumentative discourse; it can only offer a clarification of the structural logical-discursive elements of this discourse. But evidently, a theoretical undertaking goes beyond sight-seeing; some model will have to be proposed, and conceptual instruments are necessary for the drawing of such a model. In doing so natural logic posits in a realistic move a subject, who constructs with logical-discursive operations the schematization. This schematization is an independent, but constitutive layer of the everyday argumentative discourses - in other words of the empirical material analyzed - in the perspective of natural logic. Hypothetical realism as such is a perfectly honorable scientific attitude, which I do not want do question here. However, how such a realistic move is realized is another problem, and I think several normative consequences on argumentation result from the choices made by natural logic. Above all, such a way of proceeding attributes to everyday argumentative discourse a specific form of rationality and intelligibility. The architecture of this rationality is made up by various styles and backgrounds, it refers to culture and to language, it involves action and representation; but this rationality as such is independent of these aspects, it is a mediation and coordination of these aspects. It is not of the order of the pure,

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but of the mixed and the efficient. This rationality is not founded on any particular intuition or subtlety or other human property, it is based on constructive rational activities and their properties and results, in other words on the logical-discursive operations and the schematization. One is tempted to call this form of rationality a strategic rationality, using the terminology of Habermas, it just resembles so well the picture Habermas has proposed. But that would not be satisfying without a further discussion on the meaning of argumentation; Habermas founds his 'communicative rationality1 on argumentation, and situates the strategic rationality in the opaque, power-infested social interactions. But isn't Grize's subject by definition living in such social interactions? The strategic rationality of natural logic is strictly separated from the rationality of logical necessity. According to natural logic these two exist in separate worlds without any overlap. In one there are no subjects at all, or insofar as there are subjects, they are completely identifiable and exchangeable. Whereas in the world of argumentative discourses, the different subjects can neither be identified nor substituted one for the other. The question arises if it would not be preferable to conceive possible passages from one world to the other, a possibility which is already suggested by the terminology of identification and substitution presented. For example, the introduction of degrees of identification or substitution would open possibilities of transition. In addition, the subject of natural logic is not anchored in biology, and therefore no connection exists between the rationality of the subject of natural logic and the epistemic subject of genetic psychology and epistemology. This is particularly astonishing, not only because J.-B. Grize has been working for years with Piaget, but also because the formulations and definitions of natural logic are frequently - and explicitly - based on Piaget's theory. Already Apostel (1987) has pointed out this problem, and suggested a solution, which I consider as highly problematic. If one accepts the theory of Piaget as such or not is not important for the present discussion. The question is: can the activities of the logical-discursive subject be connected with the rational activities of handling objects in the world4? At the moment this is not the case at all, but J.-B. Grize seems to recognize the problem in a recent publication (1985, p. 66): ... the social subjects we all are, are continuously constrained to actions concerning the world, and denotation, which refers to entities of experience, could not possibly be eliminated, even if - as I recognize it - denotation complicates by its nature the task.

We can conclude that natural logic injects normative properties in argumentation through the constitution of its model of the logical-discursive subject, who produces argumentative discourses. A kind of structural, operational rationality is affirmed for argumentation, a rationality which

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is rather strategic in its quality. This rationality exists in splendid, but problematic isolation; it is of a social nature, without any connections with either logic or biology. Another normative consequence of this elaboration consists in the fact that natural logic situates the rationality characteristic of argumentative discourses in the logical-discursive subject itself, and not in the real interaction occurring in an 'everyday5 argumentation. This is clearly different from other approaches to argumentation, which derive normative aspects from this interaction. The subject of natural logic is not only the operating basis of logical-discursive operations, it is moreover outfitted with a rich set of representations of themes of discussion and of possible audiences. Natural logic, as a theoretical venture, can without any problem affirm such presuppositions, which are moreover supported by Benveniste and Bakhtine. Intuitively, such internalized capabilities of participants of an argumentation seem anyway rather evident. In fact, such a position seems to some extent contradicted by the choice of the empirical material of natural logic. Advertisements, political speeches and so on constitute the primary material of investigation. These are discursive productions of adults, which have been prepared by sales agencies and accepted by journals, or which have been elaborated through discussions in political parties and other institutions; they are therefore results of previous - also argumentative - interactions. These previous interactions are assumed by natural logic, and attributed to the logicaldiscursive subject, which cannot exist in isolation. This subject incorporates consequently a rich sedimentation of previous argumentative interactions. At this point several interesting questions arise. First, aren't there many different forms of argumentative interactions and not just one ideal type? If this is the case (see R. Maier, in this volume), we can expect various types and categories of logical-discursive subjects, a fact which seems confirmed by Vergés et al. (1987). Second, argumentative interactions will either leave the schematizations of the participants unchanged, or provoke some reorganization of these schematizations. In the first case, the schematization can be called equilibrated for the given category of argumentative interaction. In the second case, according to the type of interaction, the schematization will be either rearranged and re-equilibrated, or it will evaporate and disintegrate. As we can see, the status of the schematization and of the logicaldiscursive operations will change when considering argumentative interaction at the level of the model, because they are no longer defined as such, but relative to classes of argumentative interactions. Finally, would not the integration of argumentative interactions in the model of natural logic offer a solution to the unfortunate isolation of the rationality attributed to argumentative discourses? The more or less

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stable character of a schematization across various interactions could establish a bridge towards logical necessity, whereas the transformations of a schematization due to a reformulation of the object of discourse could take into account denotation. At least some links between the estranged types of rationality appear possible. But here is not the place to pursue such matters.

3. Normative aspects in argumentative discourse Natural logic is extremely careful not to inject unwarranted normative characteristics in argumentative discourses, but it cannot avoid attributing specific normative features to argumentation by its conceptual framework itself. These normative features are consequences of the determination and constitution by natural logic of its model and of its object of analysis. Different from this category of normative features is another one. This second category covers the normative features which natural logic attributes explicitly to argumentative discourse. The normative features have explicitly attributed a quite different status to argumentative discourse in the theory worked out. I will turn now to an examination of these normative features; but as before, we will see that natural logic tends to avoid strong normative assertions for argumentation, and when one is made, natural logic will quickly relativize it and apparently dissolve it. Natural logic formulates particular precepts and regulations for argumentative discourses on three levels; on a global level by the characteristics of schematizations, on the level of activities by the properties of the logical-discursive operations, and on a basic level by its conception of the objects of discourse. a. As we have already seen, natural logic conceives an argumentative discourse produced by a subject as a schematization, as a kind of microcosmos which is offered to the audience, with the goal to accomplish a certain effect, concerning a course of action or a disposition of action. This concept of schematization is introduced by natural logic in a metaphorical way, in analogy to Piagetian schemes or as a kind of biological organism. A schematization has the following properties: 1. First of all it is a semiotic entity, which refers to something else. That means that it is a kind of global argumentative action with a certain force, which is different from a material action on objects in the world. 2. A schematization is not communicated or exchanged between the participants of an argumentative discourse. Using an image from physics, Grize attributes to schematization a power, which can induce and provoke in the audience a similar global action. If all goes well, the other participants

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will be provoked to reconstruct a good replica of the initial schematization. Argumentation is not an exchange of speech acts, but a process of resonance between places of production of global argumentative actions. 3. Third, any schematization, as a kind of microcosmos, is in a state of temporary equilibrium, which may be weak and unstable and which can in principle be transformed in various directions. This means that a schematization, however complex or simple it may be, has a status of a product which stands for itself. It is a global argumentative action brought temporarily to completion. 4. But considering a schematization as a product is insufficient. It refers at the same time to the activities of schematization -the logical-discursive operations - which leave traces in the finished product. A schematization can therefore also be analyzed as a production. 5. A schematization is the proper place for shaping meaning, which does not simply reside in words, phrases, or propositions. Meaning is consequently not a purely semantic phenomena, but a pragma-semantical one, because a schematization is at the same time a sign and an action. This property of a schematization opposes natural logic to theories of meaning which work with elementary components. For natural logic, the global level determines to some extent the determination and the meaning of the parts. Two types of constraints follow from these properties, internal ones and external ones, which can be interpreted as rules or regulations for argumentative discourses. The internal constraints point to the necessary relations between parts of a schematization, which are by the way all realized by the work of the logical-discursive operations. As a schematization does in a state of temporary equilibrium, the global meaning will determine in part the meaning of the parts. As a process of production, any new element adduced to a schematization will be assimilated to the elements already present, but which will accommodate to the new element. In a sense, these internal constraints affirm the interdependence of the parts with each other and of the parts with the whole, similar to a living organism. Translated in terms of normative features concerning argumentation, these internal constraints can be formulated as the impossibility of any particular argument to stand on its own, or as the necessary interdependence of different arguments. Moreover the argumentative force of any particular argument will depend on the force of the argumentative stance of the discourse as a whole. To describe the internal constraints of a schematization only in such general terms remains superficial. Natural logic has examined in much detail many particular configurations of argumentative discourses, such as

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explanation, justification, the appearance of contradictions, analogy, example, specific forms of reasoning, valuation and devaluations and particular relations between the objects of discourse5. But here is not the place to analyze in detail these various configurations characteristic of argumentative discourses. It should be sufficient here to mention them and to indicate that these configurations specify the relations of dependence between parts and between parts and whole, and furnish therefore specified normative features of particular argumentative discourses. The external constraints apprehend the adaptation of the schematization to the context of the discourse and to the audience. In order to be more or less adapted and to have an effect on the audience a schematization has to satisfy the criteria of receivability and of acceptability. Receivability points to the possibility of reconstruction of the suggested schematization by the audience, it is therefore a pre-condition for acceptability. First of all, a schematization must be construed in an appropriate language for being received by an audience. An unfamiliar language or a shocking vocabulary will prevent good reception. In addition, two other properties of discourses which assure good reception have been identified by natural logic. First, an argumentative discourse should enable the other participants to recognize the allusions, the presuppositions, and all that which is left implicit. These inferences should be facilitated in the schematization. Second, a schematization should be coherent, which means that the parts of the schematization have to be united in some specified way. Explanations have been identified by natural logic as the most important instruments which assure receivability. One part of a schematization may raise in the presence of another one a "why"-question, which can disturb the reception. Explanations prevent the emergence of such disturbing whyquestions. Acceptability covers all the procedures by which an interlocutor tries to guarantee that his schematization will be accepted by the other participants. Usually one speaks of convincing or seducing an audience, see J.-B. Grize (1981). Natural logic has identified the following three aspects of acceptability: First of all, a schematization must meet the immediate convictions of the audience, it should fit with what is known or seen, what is ordinarily 'true', what can be verified by personal experience or through recognized sources. That is the likelihood of the schematization. Second, a schematization has to be coherent, but in another sense than in the case of the internal constraints. This coherence covers all the relations between the content of the schematization and general laws or ideological principles - which may be more or less explicitly formulated but which are supposed to hold for the given audience. To this category belongs also the logical coherence, or principles of rationality, insofar as they constitute generally accepted principles. Finally, an argumentative discourse must also please in order to be accepted by an audience. According to Grize, the principles of pleasure at work are astonishingly stable;

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they are profoundly attached to social groups and classes. Moreover they have the effect to reduce the standards of likelihood and of coherence. All in all, we see that these three aspects of acceptability do not go together without problems, they form a wicked and uneasy aggregate. These external constraints assign directly normative features to argumentative discourses. But contrary to the internal constraints, all the normative feature here are functional properties of argumentation. The possible and desired efficiency of an argumentative discourse on a given audience will entirely determine these features. But natural logic is not interested in studying the differential efficiency of argumentative discourses, it limits itself to identifying the various aspects which determine efficiency, and to provide the procedures and instruments which can realize these aspects. b. The logical-discursive operations form the hard nucleus of natural logic; they are the working instruments which enable the subject to construct the schematization as argumentative discourse. I will not explore here in detail the normative aspects of the different logical-discursive operations; that would necessitate an enormous amount of detailed study of many examples, which is beyond the present scope. But the general normative repercussions of the logical-discursive operations can be captured globally when analyzing their working method. These operations assure (1) that an argumentative discourse is anchored in a culturally constructed field, (2) that the constituted objects of discourse can be manipulated, determined and valued in various ways, (3) that the object-determinations are assumed by a subject - a process which can once more be realized in many different ways - and directed towards a specific audience and (4) that the parts of a discourse can be combined in various specific ways. These logical-discursive operations are rational instruments of construction which make argumentative discourses intelligible. It is really magic; it seems almost to good to be true. Within the material or medium of natural language, these operations realize thought-activities, which combine and synthetize ingredients of different natures: from culture, representation, thought, and action. In addition, these operations construct entities which have a status of socially situated forces, with a specific origin the logical-discursive subject - and a specific point of appliction - the particular audience. Moreover, these operations leave traces of their mode of operation in the finished product, which is marked in a characteristic way. One could compare these operations with sets of outstanding personal culinary recipes: in many steps with diverse ingredients the cook will prepare a renowned feast, destinated for particular guests, who can hardly avoid being deeply affected - in one way or another - by what is presented.

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However there seems to be one problem. (Here I would like to ask some indulgence of those who are not well familiar with natural logic and with the theory of Piaget. Without such a familiarity, the following remarks may appear somewhat cryptic; but as they seem very important to me, I will offer them here). As we have seen, a schematization, by being in a state of temporary equilibrium, determines to some extent its parts and their meaning. A further elaboration of the schematization may transform the determination of the parts and of their meaning. An element which had the status of a part at the first moment, may lose this status in the second. All this work - of constructing and transforming a schematization - is realized by the logical-discursive operations. Therefore the conclusion is inevitable that one operation may completely transform, and even annihilate, the work of a previously executed operation. Also the traces left of the work of the first operation can be completely transmuted or erased. The logical-discursive operations have consequently a second, hidden power, which can effectuate real magic: immediate transmutations of previouly given entities. In practice we can find illustrations of these magical powers in the discursive procedures which can alter completely previous discourses. Like complex numbers, the logical-discursive operations have a real and an imaginary component, and this imaginary component can bring about the most unexpected consequences. These strange, magical properties of the logical-discursive operations have not been analyzed in detail by natural logic. Their existence however is certified by the fact that schematizations are partly independent of their history of construction, they have emergent properties, and presuppose possible absorptions and transmutations. In this respect, schematizations and logical-discursive operations are clearly different from the cognitive structures and operations of genetic epistemology. According to Piaget (1975), the equilibrium of the cognitive structures combines three forms of equilibrium: first, an equilibrium between the schemes, second, an equilibrium between the parts and the whole and third, an equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation in the interaction with the environment. The equilibrium of a schematization on the contrary, depends to some extent on reciprocal influences between the parts, which is a weaker formulation of the first condition of Piaget. But in the case of a schematization there is no stable equilibrium between the parts and the whole, as in the case of Piaget's structures, a condition which guarantees a permanent status for his logical-mathematical operations. Is there something similar in natural logic to the third condition of Piaget? That question can only be answered when considering the objects of discourse. c. Natural logic is above all a logic of maneuvering an object of discourse. The central importance of the object of discourse for natural logic resides in the fact that an argumentative discourse is presented as the strategic deployment of an object-domain. For example in Apoth61oz

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(1984b), Borel (1984b) and Miéville (1984) the importance of the object of discourse is discussed. Natural logic has posited many logical-discursive operations which create and transform the object of discourse. This object is first anchored in cultural preconstructions, and then it can be enriched, transformed, localized, modalized and predicated in many ways by specific operations. What is usually called the theme of an argumentative discussion, or the level of discourse is roughly equivalent with the concept of 'object of discourse' of natural logic. A schematization is therefore always a specific elaboration of a theme, which is more and more depicted and outlined in the course of its elaboration. This object can be enriched through a comparison with other objects as in analogy. As Vergés has noted, adults who have no knowledge of the 'things' they speak of, will use in their discourse many poorly elaborated objects which remain moreover uncoordinated. There may be various reasons why natural logic has attributed such a central importance to the object of discourse. According to Aqueci, natural logic assumes an Aristotilean ontology, by giving a primary importance to the objects and a secondary one to the predicates. I think that the centrality of the objects of discourse for natural logic originates also from the choice of the material analyzed, which are advertisements, political speeches and so on. Whatever the reasons may be, this choice of natural logic has some definite normative consequences for argumentative discourse. Such a discourse will appear essentially as a skilful portrayal of a theme and much less as an analysis of some situation. A portrayal can underline and accentuate some aspects and abandon others; it can conjure specific perspectives within and on the chosen theme, but it cannot deconstruct a situation and reconstruct it on other levels. Such moves may be observed for example in the treacherous works of Magritte and other painters, but natural logic does not take these possibilities into account. This state of affairs seems to explain the uneasy attitude of natural logic towards scientific discourse. Any scientific discourse proceeds at the same time at several levels, each with its specific objects. First, such a discourse remains attached in many ways to the objects of common experience. On a second level, any science posits by its methods and concepts an object of analysis. On a third level, this object of analysis will be de-constructed and re-constructed, procedures which are after all characteristic for any scientific explanation. Finally, on an epistemological level proper for each discipline, an analysis occurs of the general conditions and limitations of the other levels. These levels of discourse, with their proper objects, are intimately intertwined in any scientific discourse. Therefore, such a discourse cannot be analyzed without problems as a portrayal.

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But here two questions arise. The first one concerns everyday argumentative discourses. Do they really not have any properties similar to scientific discourses? Some doubt seems indicated. If everyday argumentative discourse realizes also some deconstruction and reconstruction of situations, and works consequently with several levels of objects at the same time, one must reconsider the analysis of objects of discourse by natural logic. The second question concerns the relations between the logical-discursive operations and the operations of handling objects in the world. As we have seen previously, the rationality of argumentative discourses has no direct link with practical rationality. There are only indirect links, formulated in the external constraints as conditions of acceptability in terms of likelihood and coherence. As mentioned in the previous point, it might not be unreasonable to multiply the levels of objects of discourse, and one of these levels could re-establish a direct link with the realm of practical rationality. In that case the third condition of equilibrium of Piaget - maybe in some modified form - could be introduced into natural logic. But here is not the place to work out such possibilities.

4. Concluding remark J.-B. Grize (1982, p. 140) has underlined the primary importance of topos of the 'common-place' - for argumentation. Natural logic is then primarily an exploration of the various logical mechanisms which codify the topoi. This exploration was extremely thriving and productive; it has suggested a whole set of logical-discursive operations and an analysis of how these operations construct a number of topoi. A logic of everyday argumentative discourse has been initiated, which provides an insight into the rationality of this discourse. A subject which produces the everyday argumentative discourse has been identified. This subject is a social place, a fabric of construction, where carefully elaborated interventions are set up, using a diversity of resources. However, there is no general social place, on the contrary, there is a multitude of these social places of construction, whose products are destined for particular audiences. We are not necessarily in a situation of monopoly, there may be some dominant tendencies, but in principle, natural logic excludes an overall unification of the places of production and of reception of argumentative discourses. This subject works with the logical-discursive operations, it incorporates therefore definite criteria of rationality, a kind of rationality which can be qualified as strategic. However, this subject, with all its cunning, subtlety and diplomacy, has no possibilities to enter into contact with subjects who handle objects in the world, nor with subjects who elaborate scientific theories. There is no link with practical rationality nor with the

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world of necessity. This isolation may be a necessary condition of growth, but it might also be dangerous in the long run, because an autonomous life of this subject without interactions with these other resources seems impossible.

Notes 1. I would like to thank Denis Apothéloz from the University of Neuchâtel, who read and commented extensively on a preliminary version of this paper. 2.

At the end of 1960, J.-B. Grize founded the 'Centre de Recherches Sémiologiques'

at the University of Neuchâtel in Switzerland. This group, which included J.-M. Borel, D. Miéville and many others, developed under the heading of 'natural logic' a very productive research program. This research center published to date more than fifty publications. After 1980, several books have been published, which present a systematic overview of natural logic, such as J.-B. Grize (1982), where the important preparatory work towards natural logic is collected, and M.-J. Borel, J.-B. Grize, and D. Miéville, D. (1983), which offers a systematic presentation of natural logic. An overview of the work of J.-B. Grize can be found in Busino (1987). 3.

Natural logic is rather doubtful whether scientific discourses should be included or

not in this definition of argumentative discourses. In the early publication, scientific discourses are systematically excluded, with the argument that science constitutes its objects in a systematic way within a well-formed conceptual language, which is not the case in everyday language. This distinction is never completely abandoned, but we find in later work examples of analysis of some scientific discourses, as for example in Borel (1985a) and especially in Borel (1987). This is not astonishing, because if we look at the studies of the sociology of science, we see that scientific discourse always involves subjects and a context. Gardin (1987) discusses some aspects of this problem. 4.

This lack of connection between the rationality characteristic of argumentative

discourses of natural logic and an operative rationality with respect to actions on objects of experience in the world indicates a clear break J.-B. Grize made with his earlier work. In 1967, for example, he elaborated a 'psycho-logic', which can also be found in Grize (1982), in which a logic of the handling of objects of experience is worked out. 5.

The work on explanation can be found in a special issue of the 'Revue européenne

des sciences sociales', one in which Borel (1981) is published. The work on contradictions is mainly published in the book J.-B. Grize and G. Piéraut-Le Bonniec (1983).

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Robert Maier The analysis of 'analogy* and of 'example' can be found in D. Miéville (1983). In J.-B. Grize (éd.), Sémiologie du raisonnement (1984) several forms of reasonings are analyzed.

References Anscombre, J.-C and O. Ducrot: 1976, 'L'argumentation dans la langue', Langages 42, 5-27. Apostel, L.: 1987, 'Le néo-connexionisme et la théorie de l'argumentation', in Pensée naturelle, logique et language. Hommage à Jean-Biaise Grize, Université de Neuchâtel, Faculté des Lettres, Neuchâtel, pp. 31-45. Apothéloz, D., M.-J. Borel, C. Péquegnat,: 1984, 'Discours etraisonnement', in J.-B. Grize (éd.), Sémiologie du raisonnement, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 1-53. Apothéloz, D.: 1984a, 'La hiérarchie des raisonnements', in J.-B. Grize (éd.), Sémiologie du raisonnement, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 57-66. Apothéloz, D.: 1984b, 'Logique naturelle, des objets de discours: Propriétés-Relation d'appartenance' in J.-B. Grize (éd.), Sémiologie du raisonnement. Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 187-207. Apothéloz, D. and J.-B Grize: 1987, 'Langage, processus cognitifs et genèse de la communication', No. 54, Centre de Recherches Sémiologiques, Neuchâtel. Aqueci, F.: 1984, 'La logique naturelle de Jean-Biaise Grize', Revue Européenne des sciences sociales, 22 (67), 179-200. Bakhtin, M.M.: 1981, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, Universityof Texas Press, Austin. Benveniste, E.: 1966, Problèmes de linguistique générale, NRF, Paris. Borel, M.-J.: 1981, 'Donner des raisons. Une genre de discours, l'explication', Revue européenne des sciences sociales et Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto 19 (56), 37-68. Borel, M.-J.: 1983, 'Argumentation et schématisation', in M.-J. Borel, J.-B. Grize, D. Miéville, Essai de logique naturelle, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 1-95. Borel, M.-J.: 1984a, 'Dimensions du raisonnement non formel et logique-calcul', in J.-B. Grize (éd.), Sémiologie du raisonnement, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 113-154. Borel, M.-J.: 1984b, 'Objets, signe, classe-objet', in J.-B. Grize (éd.), Sémiologie du raisonnement, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 157-186. Borel, M.-J.: 1985a, 'De quelques raisonnements en sociobiologie', Revue européenne des sciences sociales 23 (69), 69-78. Borel, M.-J.: 1985b, 'Plans du discours: à propos de l'enseignement de la dissertation de philosophie', Revue internationale de philosophie 1S5,401-412. Borel, M.-J.: 1987, 'La schématisation, la description et le neveu utérin', in Pensée naturelle, logique et language. Hommage à Jean-Biaise Grize, Université de Neuchâtel, Faculté des lettres, Neuchâtel, pp. 159-177. Busino, G.: 1987, 'Lecture de Grize'. in Pensée naturelle, logique et langage. Hommage à Jean-Biaise Grize, Université de Neuchâtel, Faculté des Lettres, Neuchâtel, pp. 1930.

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Ducrot, O.: 1980, Les echelles argumentatives. Editions de Minuit, Paris. Eemeren, F.H. van and R. Grootendoist: 1984, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions. Foris, Dordrecht. Gardin, J.-C.: 1987, 'La logique, naturelle ou autre, dans les constructions des sciences humaines', in Pensée naturelle, logique et langage. Hommage à Jean-Biaise Grize, Université de Neuchâtel, Faculté des Lettres, Neuchâtel, pp. 179-195. Grize, J.-B.: 1978, 'La contradiction dans la pensée quotidienne', Extraits des procèsverbaux et mémoires, Vol. 182, Années 1976-1977, Académie des Sciences, Belles-Lettres et Arts de Besançon, Becançon, pp. 213-221. Grize, J.-B.: 1981, 'L'argumentation: Explication ou séduction', in L'argumentation, P.U. de Lyon, Lyon, pp. 29-40. Grize J.-B.: 1982, De ta logique à l'argumentation. Droz, Genève. Grize, J.-B.: 1983, 'Opérations et logique naturelle', in M.-J. Borel, J.-B. Grize, D. Miéville, D., Essai de logique naturelle, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 97-145. Grize, J.-B. and G. Piéraut-le Bonniec: 1983, La contradiction. Essai sur les opérations de la pensée. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. Grize, J.-B.: 1985a, 'La construction du sens', Quademi di semandca 6 (1), 64-70. Grize, J.-B.: 1985b, 'L'argumentation du dialogue', in P.R. Léon, P. Perron, Marcel Didier, Ottawa, pp. 47-53. Habermas, J.: 1982, Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt. Meyer, M.: 1985, 'Pour une rhétorique de la raison', Revue internationale de philosophie, 155, 289-301. Miéville, D.: 1983, 'Analogie et exemple', in M.-J. Borel, J.-B. Grize, D. Miéville, Essai de logique naturelle, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 147-224. Miéville, D.: 1984, 'Logique naturelle et méréologie', in J.-B. Grize (ed.), Sémiologie du raisonnement, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 209-239. Péquegnat, G: 1984, 'La construction des points de vue dans le raisonnement', J.-B. Grize (ed.), in Sémiologie du raisonnement, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 67-111. Piaget, J.: 1975, L'Equilibration des structures cognitives, Etudes d'Epistémologie Génétique, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. Vergés, P., D. Apothéloz, D. Miéville: 1987, 'Cet objet obscur du discours: Opérations discursives et représentations sociales', in Pensée naturelle, logique et language. Hommage à Jean-Biaise Grize, Université de Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, pp. 209-224.

Chapter 5

Premise Relevance1 J. Anthony Blair

1. Introduction The purpose of this paper is to explore answers to two questions. First, what do we mean when we say that a premise of an argument is relevant or irrelevant to the point of view or conclusion being argued for? Second, how is it to be decided when a premise is relevant to a point of view or conclusion and when it is not? Are there general criteria of premise relevance to which we appropriately appeal when making relevance decisions? If not, then how are judgments of premise relevance to be justified? These questions relate to the theme of this volume - norms in argumentation - in a straightforward way, at least so far as my interest in answering them goes. I pose the above questions from the point of view of the theoretical project of investigating whether there are general grounds (other than deductive validity of implications and truth of premises2) for distinguishing logically good arguments from logically bad ones, and if so, what those grounds are. A logically good or "cogent" argument is one the premises of which justify its audience in accepting its conclusion. My hypothesis is that an argument will be cogent just in case its premises are relevant, tenable, and sufficient (ceteris paribus) to support the conclusion, but here I concentrate just on the relevance aspect of this hypothesis. Clearly, these concepts of cogency, relevance, sufficiency and tenability are all explicitly normative concepts. Before setting out to answer the two questions of this paper, we need a working definition of 'argument'. The term is used to denote different things: not only social processes and practices as well as the products of such practices, but also different kinds of such products. In what follows, I am interested in arguments as products. A slightly amended form of the definition provided by van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Kruiger (1987, p. 12) suits my purposes: Arguments are sets of statements adduced in justification or refutation of an opinion.^

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To "adduce" a statement is to put it forward or present it for consideration. A statement is adduced "in justification or refutation of' a claim when it is adduced as a reason or basis for accepting the claim or for rejecting the claim. Each statement so adduced is a premise of an argument, and an opinion so supported or opposed is a conclusion. The topic of this paper is the relevance of premises of arguments to their conclusions. 2. The meaning of "relevance" What is meant by "relevance" as a property of the premises of arguments? If what we are looking for is a close paraphrase, we can say that a premise is relevant to a conclusion when it has some bearing on or has something to do with whether or not to accept the conclusion. If it is the word "relevant" that is puzzling someone (e.g., "I've heard people saying things like, 'But that's not relevant,' and I don't quite know what they mean. Can you explain please?"), then these paraphrases might be all the help the person needs. We can also wonder just what is implied by a premise's "having a bearing on" or "having something to do with" a conclusion's acceptability. One thing that seems to be implied by a premise's being relevant to a conclusion is this: accepting it either alone or in conjunction with other accepted propositions should cause one to be either more inclined or less inclined to accept the conclusion than one would otherwise be. We can thus distinguish between "positive" and "negative" relevance: a premise is positively relevant to a conclusion just when accepting it makes the conclusion more acceptable, and a premise is negatively relevant to a conclusion just when accepting it makes the conclusion less acceptable. A premise whose acceptance has or would have no bearing either way on the acceptability (plausibility, probability, truth, etc.), of a conclusion is not relevant.4 This account leaves unspecified two things: who makes the decision about whether a premise affects the acceptability of a conclusion, and the grounds for that decision. I believe this feature of the account accurately captures the indeterminacy of the meaning of relevance. In speaking of relevance as a property of premises I do not mean that it is a syntactic or semantic concept, for premise-relevance is clearly a pragmatic concept. A premise is a statement that someone uses in a context of argumentation to accomplish a purpose, and its relevance is a function of whether it contributes to that purpose. Moreover, it is crucial to distinguish between what we mean when we assert that a premise is relevant or irrelevant, and the dialectical standing of such contentions. I would agree entirely, for instance, that relevance claims are always in principle contestable, and are often something to be negotiated dialectically by the parties to an argumentative discussion.

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Still, the present contention is that what is thus contested and negotiated is whether, if one accepts a particular proposition, one should be more disposed to accept or reject a claim in question than one otherwise would be. 3. Another account of relevance The account of premise relevance just sketched is different from that of Arne Naess (1966, pp. 108-109) and Erik Krabbe (1987, pp. 307-316), and also from that of Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1984). Naess takes the relevance of an argument ("argument" understood as a set of one or more premises) for or against a position taken on an issue to be the "proof-potential" of the argument, or, in other words, the strength of the argument for or against the position. Krabbe, in discussing Naess's dichotomy between the tenability and the relevance of an argument, does not disassociate himself from this feature of Naess's analysis. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, although they do not use the word 'relevance' in this connection, also seem to follow Naess - at least they make a distinction similar to his. Their focus is on co-operative argumentative discussions undertaken for the purpose of settling disagreements. In their rules making up a code of conduct for rational discussants in the argumentation stage of such discussions, they refer to an antagonist's being permitted to question either the "propositional content" or the "justificatory or refutatory potential" of an argumentation (p. 16S). I take their questioning of the propositional content of an argumentation to correspond to Naess's evaluation of the tenability of an argument, and their questioning of the justificatory or refutatory potential of an argumentation to correspond to Naess's questioning of the proof potential or relevance of an argument. In my opinion this distinction, between the evaluation of the tenability of an argument's premises and the evaluation of the bearing those premises have on its conclusion, is right-minded. The only respect in which I differ from these authors is that I recommend a further distinction - one that is crucial for a clear exposition of the sense of "relevance" I am discussing in this paper. It seems to me that the Naess/Krabbe "relevance" or "proof-potential" and the van Eemeren and Grootendorst "justificatory or refutatory potential" need to be broken down further. There are, I suggest, two distinct aspects to proof-potential - two distinct respects in which a set of premises can have Naess/Krabbe relevance or proof potential, or van Eemeren and Grootendorst justificatory or refutatory potential. They can have this potential insofar as they can have some bearing rather than none at all on the claim in question, and they can have this potential insofar as, given that they do bear on the conclusion, they can provide more or less support for the claim in question. Johnson and I (1983) call this the difference between the "relevance"

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and the "sufficiency" of the premises.5 Since my sense of 'relevance' is narrower than the notion of proof-potential of Naess/Krabbe, and its analogue in van Eemeren and Grootendorst - theirs embraces both our relevance and our sufficiency - clearly it is important to distinguish the sense in which "relevance" is at issue in this paper (which might be called "narrow relevance") from the one employed by those authors (which might be termed "broad relevance"). Some defence of the narrower focus is needed, for one may well ask whether there is indeed a distinction in kind between narrow relevance and broad relevance. One might contend that there is merely a difference in degree between "narrow" relevance and sufficiency, and so really only one kind of relevance - namely broad relevance. An objection to the distinction between narrow and broad relevance gets support from cases in which it is difficult to see how to apply that distinction. However, our being unable to reach agreement about controversial cases does not undercut the distinction between narrow relevance and sufficiency, for it applies uncontroversially in various types of clear case. I will mention just two of these. One whole class of arguments to which the distinction applies clearly is the class of arguments about actions and policy questions - what might be called "balance of considerations" arguments. Individuals and institutions must often decide on actions or policies in the face of considerations which point in opposite directions. Creating a new position will add to costs, but increase efficiency, hiring Leung will give us needed expertise in Chinese philosophy, but he cannot help with our applied philosophy courses and moreover we wanted to hire a woman; acceding to Aboriginal land claims may prevent the exploitation of natural resources needed to keep the Australian economy afloat; and so on. The point is that in such situations, it would be premature to decide a question solely on the basis of the considerations that support one side, for there are considerations bearing on the opposite side that need to be assessed as well. Deciding on the basis of favorable considerations alone would be deciding on the basis of insufficient evidence. In other words, there are considerations which are (narrowly) relevant to its determination, although individually they are not sufficient to settle it. Another class of arguments in which the distinction between narrow relevance and sufficiency clearly applies is inductive arguments in science, in which the case for a claim gets stronger and stronger as more and more evidence supporting it is amassed. The early studies indicating a positive correlation between cigarette smoking and lung cancer constituted evidence that was relevant to the claim that cigarette smoking is a cause of lung cancer (C2). As more and more studies indicated a significant positive correlation and ruled out alternative hypotheses, the case for the causal claim grew increasingly stronger. Each study taken by itself was relevant as support for C2, but possibly no one of them, considered by

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itself alone, would be sufficient to support C2 as highly probable. However, the conjunction of these studies is sufficient to warrant that conclusion. So we can say that the studies are individually (narrowly) relevant and jointly sufficient to support C2. From these considerations I conclude that it is legitimate to proceed with a discussion of relevance in the sense of narrow relevance, and I shall hereafter use the term in that sense, without the qualifier. Before leaving this section, I should add that part of Naess's account of broad relevance is unsatisfactory on its own terms. Naess says that: If [the "issue-expression"] Fo is normative, the greater the value of pro-argument P [pro-premise P in my terminology], or the more beneficial it is that P be realized, the greater the relevance of P. (p. 109)

By a premise's relevance Naess means the extent to which it "will speak for or against" a conclusion (p. 109). By Naess's account, the great value of some P, say: 'The threat of nuclear war is ended for all time", should make it highly relevant to any Fo, say: "Canada should add frigates to its navy". But P does not speak for or against Fo at all; in fact, it seems just irrelevant to Fo. Granted that if a normative Fo is causally sufficient to effect a P, then the greater the value of that P or the benefit of its realization, the greater the relevance of P to Fo, but that is not the condition Naess lays down here, for he goes on to add: "This rule applies also [my stress] where P is an assertion about what follows from accepting F o . . . " (p. 109). So Naess's attempt to differentiate between relevance in arguments with descriptive conclusions and arguments with normative conclusions needs revision. I should add that neither Krabbe nor van Eemeren and Grootendorst follow Naess in distinguishing descriptive and normative relevance in this way.6

4. Some implications of premise relevance 4.1 Premise relevance and argument identification. Judgments of relevance are needed not only in assessing an argument's cogency, but also in decisions about whether an argument is present in discourse, and furthermore, if one is, in decisions about which statements of the discourse constitute the argument. When an interlocutor - a reader or listener - must interpret the discourse without having its author available to answer questions about it, then the author's intentions must be divined. The interlocutor must decide (1) whether the author intended to be offering an argument, and if so, (2) what statements the author intended to comprise the argument. When, as often occurs, the author or context supply no explicit indication of an intention to argue, the interlocutor must decide whether it is reasonable to interpret the text as containing an argument, and if so, which

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statements constitute the argument - by determining whether there are any statements that may plausibly be understood as relevant support for some other statement. Hence, the interpretation of texts, in order to identify arguments, requires some way of deciding premise relevance. When the author is available to answer the interlocutor's questions, then the statements the author confirms he intends to use as premises must indeed be counted as such, however irrelevant the interlocutor may judge them to be - up to a point. Should the author claim to intend to be arguing, yet every statement he advances as a reason in support of the "conclusion" appear to be irrelevant, then it might be more plausible for the interlocutor to judge that the author does not understand the concept of argument - has not learned the practice of argumentation than to take the statements as all irrelevant premises of an argument. Such judgments should be made only as a last interpretive resort, and with trepidation, since they readily lend themselves to abuse. Since most people learn how to argue at an early age, the most likely explanations of the interlocutor's inability to appreciate the relevance of an author's statements intended as premises are the interlocutor's own failure of imagination, or comprehension-blocking assumptions, or ignorance of the subject matter. 4.2 Premise relevance as a property of premise sets. The relevance of any given premise is not necessarily a property of it as an isolated statement, but can be a function of its relation to a set of premises. Consider the following argument: (1) Among those who it seems could have been the murderer, only the accused is left-handed. So (2) the accused is probably the murderer; The relevance of (1) to (2) is puzzling unless it is paired with: (3) Almost certainly the murderer was left-handed. The relevance relationship between (1) and (3) is one of mutual dependence: neither would be relevant without the other, and each is relevant given the other. This point does not imply that an argument must have two or more premises, unexpressed if not stated. I believe a fully expressed argument can have just one premise, but I will not defend that claim here. My point above is only that in some cases a statement will be relevant as a premise in an argument only when taken in conjunction with one or more other statements. So much for our discussion of what it means to speak of the relevance

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of a premise, and of some of the general features of relevance as it applies to the premises of arguments.

5. The criteria of relevance I turn to the second question of this paper: are there criteria of premise relevance? An argument is the product of a set of moves in dialectical argumentation. In advancing statements as premises in an argumentative exchange an interlocutor takes them to be (or to appear to be) relevant to the conclusion. A challenge to a premise's relevance is always, in principle, permissible. How is one to defend, or defend against, a challenges to a premise's relevance? 5.1 Logical implication as the criterion ofpremise relevance. One possible answer to this question is that a premise can be shown to be relevant just when it belongs to a set of statements which entails the conclusion of the argument. When, and only when, the argument's conclusion is deductively implied by any given set of premises is each member of that set relevant to that conclusion, or so it might be thought. I disagree. An entailment relationship between two statements is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of either one's being relevant as support for the other. 7 An entailment relationship is not necessary for premise relevance, because one statement can provide relevant "inductive" support for another although the former does not entail the latter. There may be disagreement about a definition of induction or of inductive support, but that doesn't affect my argument. What is not problematic is that there can be evidentiary relationships in which the evidence is relevant to the proposition it allegedly supports, although its description does not entail that proposition. For example, the fact that the USSR hockey team defeated all its opponents handily in the round-robin portion of a hockey tournament is relevant as evidence that it will win all its games in the medal round, though the truth of the latter statement is not entailed by the former statement about past victories in the tournament. There are also the "balance of consideration" arguments that we have looked at already in making the distinction between narrow relevance and sufficiency. In these arguments, as we saw, a list of the benefits of a particular policy is clearly relevant to the conclusion that the policy should be adopted, yet it does not entail this conclusion, for the policy might have greater disadvantages, and the appropriate conclusion - that is, the one best supported by all the evidence, duly weighted and balanced - would then be that the policy should not be adopted.

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In addition to not being necessary for premise relevance, a valid entailment relationship between two statements is not sufficient either. One statement can entail another even though the former is irrelevant as support for the latter. An instance is the entailment of: (6) The murderer is left-handed, by: (7) The murderer is left-handed. (7) entails (6), but (7) is not relevant as evidence for (6). Perhaps (7) is relevant to (6) in some other respect. Assuredly (6) may be deduced from (7), for example. But a premise in an argument is supposed to be a consideration which will bring someone who has a doubt or question about the conclusion to accept it, and the very conclusion which is in doubt cannot do that. Someone might object that by my own account of relevance, (7) is relevant to (6), since surely the acceptability of (7) makes (6) more acceptable - what could make a statement more acceptable than itself? However, it seems to me that a statement which is in question cannot make itself acceptable. If these arguments are cogent, then deductive implication is not required for relevance, and we cannot say that a premise is relevant to a conclusion just when it alone, or a set it belongs to, entails the conclusion.8 5.2 Toulmin warrants as criteria of relevance. It might seem that Toulmin's concept of a warrant plays the role of a relevance-supplier. Toulmin does not, to my knowledge, make this suggestion in The Uses of Argument (1958). There (Ch. 3) he introduces "inference warrants" to name the function of answering the following type of challenge to an argument: "But how is one justified in accepting your claim on the basis of the data you supply?". However, that question seems to be simply another form of the question, "But how are the data relevant to the claim?". If so, then what makes any ground-supplying premise set relevant is the warrant or inference ticket that sanctions drawing the conclusion on the basis of that premise set. Indeed, in An Introduction to Reasoning, Toulmin, Rieke and Janik (1979) seem to have relevance in mind when they discuss warrants, and I interpret their various remarks to imply that they do. Noting that "we find different kinds of general statements serving the function of warrants" (p. 53), Toulmin, et al. characterize warrants in general as follows: They all license us to accept specific kinds of claims . . . as following from - or at the very least, as finding support in - an initial collection of information . . . produced as reasons or grounds for the claim. (Ibid.)

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The relevance-bestowing function of warrants is made explicit when they write: Warrants. Knowing on what grounds a claim is found is . . . only the first step towards getting clear about its solidity and reliability. Next we must check whether these grounds really do provide genuine support for this particular claim and are not just irrelevant information having nothing to do with the claim in question . . . . . [My emphasis] (p. 26)

In other words warrants are "general rules, laws or principles . . . [which] make these facts [i.e., grounds] relevant to a claim" (p. 31, my emphasis). There are, unfortunately, other statements in the handbook which appear to undercut the interpretation I give to the above passages. Although I would be prepared to defend my interpretation, for now I will just baldly contend that Toulmin et al. take it as at least one function of warrants to establish that grounds are relevant as support for claims. Do we have the answer to our second question, then? That question was, "How do we tell if a given premise set is relevant to the conclusion?" And the supplementary question was added, "Are there general criteria of relevance?" Are the answers to these questions that, first, a premise set is relevant just in case there is an acceptable warrant stating that (other things being equal) one may draw the conclusion in question on the basis of those premises, and second, that the criteria of relevance will be as general as warrants will be? I believe that some concept of a warrant is useful in an account of how relevance is established, but it is a different concept of warrant from Toulmin's. I also think Toulmin's contention about the field-relativity of warrants is applicable, with appropriate modifications and qualifications, to relevance. So the account I shall give is in certain respects Toulmin-inspired, even if different in important ways from the concept of argument warrant found in Toulmin's writings. I am familiar with the criticisms of Toulmin's model, and the concept of a warrant he introduces, advanced by van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Kruiger (1987, pp. 199-207) and by Johnson (1981). Clearly, in the face of such criticisms, any use of Toulmin's concept of a warrant would require some explanation. I do not want to defend Toulmin's model for argument analysis or his critique of deductive logic. Nonetheless, it seems to me that the notion of a warrant as found in Toulmin helps inspire an understanding of premise relevance. Let me turn to a positive account of that notion.

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Let us begin with the concept of argument. By definition, an argument is a set of statements which someone takes, or believes another might take, to justify or refute an opinion. In making the judgement that a segment of discourse contains an argument, one is ipso facto supposing that someone might take the alleged premise set to be relevant to the alleged conclusion. I think it follows that a relevance-supplier is not something that one needs to add in addition to a set of statements adduced in justification or refutation of another statement in order to complete the argument. If you say, "Here is an argument: there is its conclusion and those are its premises", you are thereby committed to the proposition that you, or the supposed argument's author, or somebody else, do take or might take or has taken the statements identified as premises to be relevant to the statement identified as the conclusion. The judgement that a statement set is an argument and the judgement that there is belief in the relevance of some of its members to another or others are inseparable. That is the first point, and the notion of a warrant is not yet in the picture. Relevance warrants come into play when, but only when, the relevance of premises is challenged. Arguments are the products of moves in the dialectical process/practice of argumentation, involving the roles of proponent or assertor and opponent or questioner. Having acknowledged that one's dialectical partner has advanced what he takes to be an argument, one can in principle always raise certain critical questions about the argument. One of these is the question whether any member(s) of the premise set is (are) relevant to the conclusion. The "question" can ask for clarification ("I do not understand why P is relevant; would you please explain?"), or it can deny the presumed relevance ("But P is irrelevant!"), or it can fall somewhere in between, challenging or questioning the presumed relevance ("P seems irrelevant because of X. Can you show me how, in spite of X, P is relevant?"). Depending on the rules of the dialectical exchange - whether the explicit rules of a formal dialectical game or the implicit rules of informal discussion in one or another context - the interlocutors will have obligations of some sort or another. Perhaps the critic will be obliged to defend an accusation or doubt about the premise's irrelevance; perhaps the opponent's mere puzzlement will count as enough to require the proponent to defend the implicit claim of relevance. Whatever the specifics, at some point the proponent might be required to produce some consideration designed to show that a premise in question is relevant. This consideration I call the relevance warrant of the argument. Relevance warrants do not have to be statements of one particular type. Toulmin et ah say that their warrants are general statements, but I do not see why a relevance warrant must be a general statement. The rele-

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vance of the prosecutor's claim that the accused is the only left-handed suspect, to the charge that the accused committed the murder, might be established by the singular relevance warrant that almost certainly the murderer is left-handed. Relevance warrant is a functional concept. Had the prosecutor first introduced evidence to show that almost certainly the murderer is left-handed, then the relevance of that evidence might be warranted by establishing that the accused is left-handed. So a statement the relevance of which needs warrant in one context can function as relevance warrant for another statement in another context, whether either is particular or general. It can still be true that in many contexts relevance warrants will be general statements, and also true that the general principles of a science or some other identifiable field of knowledge can often serve as warrants for the relevance of particular facts which have been adduced in support of a claim. These latter sorts of contexts seem to be the ones that Toulmin, et al.(1979) had in mind when they discussed their concept of a warrant. Even when statements of particular fact and of general principle work together in a premise set, there seems to be no a priori basis for identifying the latter and not the former as relevance warrants. Normally, an arguer seeking to convince others of a claim will state as extensive an argument as she thinks will be needed (other things being equal). In so doing, she will often supply (among other things) sets of premises which she believes the audience will find relevant, and that frequently will result in her adducing specific factual statements and general principles among the premises. If she believes the audience will not see the relevance of the facts without the principles, then perhaps in her mind the principles are functioning as relevance warrants. But it seems equally possible for an arguer to believe that the audience will not see the relevance of the principles without the facts - and in that case to the arguer the facts are functioning as relevance warrants. A third possibility is that the arguer simply regards the facts and the principles as constituting a set of reasons that together support the claim in question. In such a case, it would be a mistake to designate one or the other kind of premise as functioning as a relevance warrant in the arguer's mind. A relevance warrant is any set of statements adduced to show the relevance of a set of challenged premises. Considering an argument from the point of view of the audience, it seems to be a mistake to regard any of the initially stated premises as a relevance warrant. The initially stated premise set is adduced as support for the claim in question, and as far as the audience goes, it must be taken, as a set, to be supposed by the arguer to be relevant, just insofar as the audience grants that there is an argument. Relevance warrants will be any statements that the arguer adds later which are designed to demonstrate the relevance of some premise(s) whose relevance was challenged by the audience.

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Of course, an arguer will sometimes present his argument in the form of a possible dialogue, supplying the voice of an imaginary or designated interlocutor, as well as his own. So he might himself anticipate allegations of irrelevance, and answer them. (E.g., "I say to you today that we should remove tariff barriers or die a slow death as a nation. The shortsighted critics of my government ask how tariffs will destroy our great nation. 'What has that got to do with it?' they ask. Well, my friends, I say this in reply: without free trade we will lose our competitive edge, and if we lose our competitive edge, we will soon be bypassed economically by other nations, then forced to accept their terms. Gradually our economy will suffocate, and as a result our nation will slowly die".) In this latter sort of case, the arguer's own answers to his questions would count as relevance warrants. 6.1 Types of relevance challenge. Challenges to the relevance of premises can be classified, though I do not know of an exhaustive classification.9 The following three types occur often. One type might be called "adversarial irrelevance". In arguments occurring in contexts in which the interlocutors have conflicting interests such as political disputes, labour-management controversies, or prosecutiondefence relations in courts of law - there is a strong interest-fuelled motive to "defeat" the other side and "win" the argument. Johnson and Blair (1983, Ch. 3) have identified fallacies typically encountered in such contexts, and I here reproduce their chart of four of these (p. 89).

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RED HERRING Irrelevant response in an adversary context that tends to sidetrack the issue. STRAWMAN Irrelevant response in an adversary context consisting specifically of attacking a misrepresentation of the opponent's position.

AD HOMINEM Irrelevant response in an adversary context consisting specifically of attacking the opponent instead of the argument.

GUILT BY ASSOCIATION Attacking the person indirectly by attacking some association of the person, when that is irrelevant or insufficient to discredit the position. Against a charge of irrelevance represented by the accusation of committing one of these fallacies, the respondent's warrant will consist of showing that the attack in question does indeed apply: the opponent's position is in fact equivalent to, or implies, the position attacked (in the case of a reply to a Straw Man charge); the person's character is a basis for judging his credibility (in the case of a reply to one sort of Ad Hominem charge); and so on. A second type of challenge to a premise's relevance is covered by the umbrella term, ignoratio elenchi - which denotes the various ways of missing the point, or being off the topic. The person who rambles on, free associating as much as arguing, will be accused of this flaw. So will the colleague who dozes during meetings, and wakes up to make a comment that applied to an earlier item on the agenda. So will the scholar who fails to distinguish closely related questions, for example normative and empirical ones. To be sure, free association, out-of-context comments, and failures to conform to established distinctions can all be sources of insight, so it cannot be ruled that such apparent cases of ignoratio elenchi are always irrelevant. However, there would appear to be no single way to go about supplying a relevance warrant in all such cases. A third type of dispute about the relevance of a consideration advanced for or against a judgement consists of disagreements about the criteria that ought to be applied in making judgments of a given kind. If I mention the candidate's religion, sex or race as a reason for hiring him and you object that religion, sex or race is irrelevant, we probably disagree because we disagree about whether religion, sex or race should be criteria for the job. To meet a relevance-challenge of this sort, the warrant will consist of an argument in support of a given criterion - reasons why

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considerations of that sort should contribute to determining one's judgement about the matter. 6.2 The relativity of relevance. In general, the kinds of consideration that can warrant the relevance of premises seem as varied as the kinds of topic that can be argued about. In this respect, the relativity that Toulmin attributes to what he calls warrants applies equally to relevance warrants. Where there are specialized subjects or domains of practice in which argumentation plays a role, the laws, rules or principles established therein will be available to serve as relevance warrants should they be needed (keeping in mind that there is no requirement that a relevance warrant must be a generalization). Hence the "type" of relevance warrant will be as varied as these subjects or practices. For similar reasons, the related concept of a community of model interlocutors (Blair and Johnson, 1987) also applies to arguments about relevance warrants. That is, in seeking a warrant to support the relevance of a premise set, it is advisable for arguers to appeal to considerations for which they can cite the precedence or authority of any consensus of a community of well-informed model arguers. In specialized legal argumentation, this would be the leading lawyers and judges dealing with that area of law; in specialized scientific argumentation, it would be the leading researchers in the specialty of the field in question; and so on. If the issue belongs to a special field, but is not esoteric, then the general consensus in the field may be appealed to. Members of a jury in a criminal trial in the English common law system, for example, are advised to some extent by the lawyers pleading the case, and more authoritatively by the presiding judge, about how to interpret the principle of "reasonable doubt" to the case they are deciding. They will not need to read the jurisprudential literature on "reasonable doubt" before using that principle as a relevance warrant in their deliberations: the statements of the lawyers and judge in their courtroom represent the conventional wisdom on the principle for them. Wherever it can, reasoned argumentation that warrants premise relevance will make reference to any background of shared expertise, experience, specialized knowledge or wisdom that might apply to the topic in question. 6.3 Relativity and topical relevance. I take it that the suggestion of those who propose topical overlap as a criterion of premise relevance is that if the premise and the conclusion of an argument are about the same subject or topic, then the premise is relevant to the conclusion. But it would seem to follow from the relativity of relevance that subject matter or topical overlap is not sufficient to guarantee the relevance of premises in an argument. If a consideration is relevant in one circumstance but not in another, or relevant assuming one criterion but not assuming another depending on the beliefs of the reasoners - then the overlap between the

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topic or subject matter of the premise and the conclusion, which does not vary with the circumstances or the criterion used, makes no difference. For instance the premise, "Hetta is a woman", and the conclusion, "Hetta should not get the job" both make reference to the same person, Hetta: the subjects of the two sentences denote the same person. But if the job is that of taxi driver, then if it is located in Saudi Arabia, where women are not allowed to drive cars at all, the premise would be relevant, whereas if the job is located in Canada, where job discrimination against women is illegal, the premise would be irrelevant. While topical overlap is not sufficient to ensure relevance, it does seem necessary. If a premise does not have any subject or topic in common with the conclusion, either directly by itself or via a combination with other premises, then its being adduced would seem to be a case of ignoratio elenchi. 7. Conclusion The meaning of 'relevant,' as it applies to premises of arguments, is not mysterious, though narrow relevance needs to be distinguished from the broader, total evidentiary relationship of the premises to the conclusion which includes the sufficiency of the premise support as well. Synonyms of narrow relevance include, "has a bearing on" and "has something to do with". Asserting that a premise is relevant to a conclusion commits one to holding that accepting the premise should lead one to be either more inclined, or else less inclined, to accept the conclusion than one would be if one didn't accept the premise. There is no neat criterion to be applied to decide whether a premise is relevant. Logical entailment is neither necessary nor sufficient to do the job. Toulmin warrants are suggestive, but they are not neat criteria, nor do all their features match the properties of relevance warrants. Premise relevance seems to be analytically connected to the concept of argument and its premise-conclusion relationship. Premises are presumed relevant until challenged or questioned. A challenge is met by producing a warrant for the relevance claim, and doing that consists simply of citing the reasons which convince one, in the case at hand, that the premise set at issue helps justify or refute the opinion that is in question. In doing so, one is advised to appeal to whatever considerations are generally respected by whatever models of reasoning and expertise there may be in the area, but that is only because these are the sources of standards for argumentation on any matter.

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Notes

1. Numerous people have made enormously helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I should like to thank individually Frans van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, Ralph Johnson, Erik Krabbe, Tjark Kruiger, Harry Nielsen, Robert Pinto, Harvey Siegel, Mark Weinstein, Joseph Wenzel, John Wright, and collectively the discussants at the University of Windsor Dry Run series, at the conference on Norms and Argumentation at the University of Utrecht, and at the conference on Critical Thinking at Christopher Newport College, where these versions were read. 2. The truth of an argument's premises is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of the argument's cogency. Truth is not necessary, since premises are acceptable if it is reasonable to believe they should be granted even if they later turn out to have been false or even if it cannot be ascertained with certainty at the time that they are true. Nor is truth even sufficient, because true premises should not be granted unless the parties to the argument have reason to believe they are true. The validity of an argument's implications similarly is neither necessary nor sufficient for its cogency. There are cogent non-deductive arguments (e.g., arguments from analogy or strong inductive arguments), so deductive validity is not necessary for cogency. It is easy to construct instantiations of valid deductive argument forms, such as Simplification, which are not cogent arguments because they are question-begging, so deductive validity is not sufficient for cogency. (These arguments are discussed more fully in the section on logical implication as a criterion of premise relevance, below.) 3. Their formulation is: "Arguments are statements advanced in justification or refutation of an opinion" (1987, p. 12). 4. Cf. Govier (1988, p. 98): . . . consider... two distinct statements... A and B. The statement A will be relevant to the statement B if A either counts toward establishing B as true, or counts against establishing B as true. If the truth or falsity of A has absolutely nothing to do with the truth or falsity of B, then A is not relevant to B. See also Govier's summary of her account of relevance on pp. 98-99. 5. Govier (1988) makes this distinction also, and I take it that it is this sense of "relevance" Walton (1982 and 1987, Ch. 3, Sections 6ff.) is discussing. 6. I am grateful to Ijark Kruiger for pointing out to me this problem with Naess's account of premise relevance. 7. I take it that Walton (1987), for one, would agree with me. See Ch. 3, Sections 6-9 (pp. 77-93) for his extended discussion of the issue.

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8. Thus I disagree with Trudy Govier (1988) when she says that, "if the conjunction of the premises deductively entails the conclusion, the argument satisfies (R) [i.e., 'the premises are genuinely relevant to the conclusion' (p. 63)]" (p. 64). 9. The types which follow are included in Walton's (1982, pp. 56ff.) list. His account there is not restricted to premise relevance.

References Blair, J. Anthony and Ralph H. Johnson: 1987, 'Argumentation as Dialectical', Argumentation 1, No. 1,41-56. Eemeren, Frans H. van, and Rob Grootendorst: 1984, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions, Foris Publications, Dordrecht (Holland) and Providence (U.S.A.). Eemeren, Frans H. van, Rob Grootendorst and Tjark Kruiger 1987, Handbook of Argumentation Theory, Foris Publications, Dordrecht (Holland) and Providence (U.S.A.). Govier, Trudy: 1988, A Practical Study ofArgument, 2nd ed., Wadsworth, Belmont, California. Johnson, Ralph H.: 1981, Toulmin's Bold Experiment', Informal Lope Newsletter 3, No. 2,16-27 and No. 3,131-19. Johnson, Ralph H. and J. Anthony Blair 1983, Logical Self-Defense, 2nd ed., McGrawHill Ryerson, Toronto. Krabbe, Erik C. W.: 1987, 'Naess's Dichotomy of Tenability and Relevance', in Frans H. van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, J. Anthony Blair and Charles A. Willard, eds., Argumentation: Across the Lines of Discipline, Foris Publications, Dordrecht (Holland) and Providence (USA), pp. 307-316. Naess, Arne: 1966, Communication and Argument, Elements ofApplied Semantics, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo. Trans, by Alastair Hannay from the Norwegian: En del elementare logiske emner, Oslo (1947). Toulmin, Stephen Edelston: 1958, The Uses ofArgument, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Toulmin, Stephen, Richard Rieke and Allan Janik: 1979, An Introduction to Reasoning, 1st ed., Macmillan, New York. Walton, Douglas N.: 1982, Topical Relevance in Argumentation, Benjamins, Amsterdam. Walton, Douglas N.: 1987, Informal Fallacies, Benjamins, Amsterdam.

Chapter 6

Relevance - and Other norms of Argument: A Rhetorical Exploration Joseph W. Wenzel

My thesis is that a full account of the concept of relevance as a norm of argumentation requires an appreciation of the rhetorical and dialectical character of argument as well as its logical character. J A . Blair took up the topic of relevance as a norm, quite naturally, from the perspective of his field of informal logic. Given the interdisciplinary character of the workshop, it seemed appropriate for me, as a respondent trained in a different tradition, to see what could be said about the topic from another angle. So, I first approached the topic of relevance as a norm in argumentation from the perspective of my field of rhetoric, but I found it necessary also to say something about argument as dialectical in order to give a balanced account. It is not my purpose to propose a conception of relevance at odds with the one advanced by Blair. Rather, I would like to supplement his analysis by showing how an appreciation of the rhetorical and dialectical character of argument leads us to additional insights. From those other perspectives, what more can one say about relevance and, by extension, about argumentative norms in general? In order to answer that question it will be necessary, first, to explain what I mean by three perspectives on argument and how I conceive their unique points of view. Second, I will explore some features of argumentation considered rhetorically to see what they lead us to say about the norm of relevance. Third, I will deal briefly with the dialectical perspective as a necessary approach to understanding how criteria of relevance get fashioned and applied. Finally, I will draw a few general conclusions about our mutual interests.

Perspectives on Argumentation In recent years, I have found it convenient to organize my thinking around three perspectives that are necessarily involved in the study of argumentation; they are the perspectives of rhetoric, dialectic, and logic. Certainly, when we think about argumentation normatively, we recognize (at least) three different answers that might be given to the question:

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What is a "good" argument? Presumably, a rhetorician would say that a good argument is one that is effective in persuading an audience; a dialectician would say that it is a well-regulated critical discussion; and a logician would say that it is a sound conjunction of premises and conclusion. We see, at once, that there is more at stake here than definitionsof the word "good" as applied to argumentation. There are, in fact, different conceptions of "argument" assumed by the three sorts of specialists. That point will prove to be important as we consider relevance or, I think, any other norm of argumentation. The three perspectives invoke different conceptions of argument just because they have evolved from different interests: the rhetorical interest in adapting discourse to audiences in order to gain their agreement; the dialectical interest in testing theses through critical discussion; and the logical interest in judging the merits of particular arguments. These, it should be emphasized, are "rough and ready", incomplete descriptions; they reflect the basic interests associated with rhetoric, dialectic and logic at the time of their origin in Classical Greece. The early Greek sophists were concerned with techniques of arguing (e.g. argument from probabilities) as part of the "art of persuasion". Plato developed the idea of dialectic as a method of argumentation with a critical intention. And Aristotle, having provided a logical theory, showed how all three systems were related as machinery for problem-solving and decision-making in different circumstances. (See van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Kruiger, 1984; pp. 55-78.) Unfortunately, the coordinated understanding of the uses of rhetoric, dialectic and logic provided by Aristotle was soon forgotten. The three systems of thought have evolved in modern times to embrace broader and more sophisticated purposes. They still invoke different conceptions of argument, however, and these can be expressed as notions of process, procedure and product. Rhetoric is concerned with a full understanding of all the naturalcommunication processes by which people give and take social influence. Dialectic is concerned with understanding and fostering procedures that promote candid, comprehensive and critical decision-making. Logic-both formal and informal~is concerned with the standards by which to determine the merits of arguments as products abstracted from rhetorical and dialectical encounters (Wenzel, 1980,1987).

Argument as Rhetorical Arguments originate as rhetorical phenomena. Artificial textbook examples aside, all real arguments begin with some person attempting to influence some other person. When one thinks about argument as a rhetorical phenomenon, the first thing to be noticed is that it is purposeful, communicative behavior in a particular context. We find arguments, as Brockriede (1975) explained, in situations where one or more members of a social group

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respond to problems or uncertainties in their environment by advancing and supporting claims in order to facilitate decision or choice among alternatives. In other words, arguments typically originate in a rhetorical impulse, and that impulse is itself grounded in a situation. Although it is something of a commonplace now to insist that arguments must be understood in light of their contexts, a more radical move is required to fully appreciate the controlling influence of the rhetorical situation. One classic modern treatment is an essay by Bitzer (1968) who writes:

Let us regard [a] rhetorical situation as a natural context of persons, events, objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly invites utterance; this invited utterance participates naturally in the situation, is in many instances necessary to the completion of situational activity, and by means of its participation with situation obtains its meaning and its rhetorical character (p. 5).

Among the several important implications Bitzer derives are these: . . . discourse is rhetorical insofar as it functions (or seeks to function) as a fitting response to a situation which needs and invites it the situation controls the rhetorical response in the same sense that the question controls the answer Not the rhetor and not persuasive intent, but the situation is the source and ground of rhetorical activity (p. 6).

Thus, arguments originate in rhetorical situations and are constrained by the specific demands of the situations in which they seek to function as fitting solutions. More than "mere persuasion", rhetorical argument is an important element in the social activities whereby people cope with problems. As Aristotle said, "Rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions" (Rhet., 1377b21). A second feature of argumentation in rhetorical situations is that it is typically concerned with the full development and presentation of a "case", that is with an entire organized body of discourse intended to somehow encompass the situation, to resolve a perceived problem, to remove an exigence. In an earlier (unpublished) draft of his paper, Blair defined the concept with a stress on its logical components: "By a 'case' for a position I mean all the atomic arguments or lines of argument supporting the position and all the arguments or lines of argument adduced against either objections to those arguments or against alternatives to the position". One familiar example of a formalized case, close to Blair's meaning, is a lawyer's brief. Although contemporary logicians, like Blair, may be taking more of an interest in case-level analysis, I think it is fair to say that historically logic has been concerned with atomic arguments. Rhetoric, on the other hand, typically has been concerned with larger units of discourse such as the speech or essay. Moreover, rhetoric extends beyond the organ-

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ization of a set of arguments to include all the verbal artistry by which those arguments are adapted to an audience and a situation. Hence, rhetorical critics may be more attuned to the integration of various discursive materials and their functions as parts of a whole. A third feature of rhetorical argument—one which I presume needs little elaboration—is that arguments are addressed to an audience. The audience may be as small as a single listener or as large its an international forum. They may be casual conversational partners or members of an academic discipline. Whatever the composition of the audience, however, an arguer always has someone in mind for whom the discourse is fashioned (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). A fourth feature of natural arguments considered from a rhetorical perspective is infinite variability in form and substance. Virtually any symbolic construction, addressed by one person to another in response to a percieved exigence, may function as argument. This point has not always been so obvious. When American academicians first offered classes under the title "Argumentation", they took their conception of proof from formal logic. So, an argument was generally understood to be a set of premises in support of a conclusion, and argumentation was often described as a kind of applied logic. A long time passed before scholars and teachers of argumentation in that tradition shook off the model of "applied formalism" (Cox and Willard, 1982; xxii). By now, however, most communication scholars who study argumentation would agree with Willard: "The more holistic view of human nature toward which the communication discipline seems to be moving invites us to regard'argument' as simply any act of conjoining symbolic structures to produce new structures" (1976; p. 317). In the last two decades or so, many writers have addressed the variability of kinds of discourse that may function argumentatively. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's discussion of the argumentative functions of figurative language is one well-known example (1969; pp. 167-79). In that connection, it is interesting to recall some discussion that took place at the workshop on the question whether any and all rhetorical techniques might be said to function argumentatively. In commenting on Blair's example, "(P) The murderer is left-handed. Therefore, (C) the murderer is left-handed", I suggested that mere repetition, while it is often a useful technique, has no probative value. If the basic function of argument is a rhetorical one, i.e. to persuade a doubtful listener, P cannot be considered relevant evidence for C. This is, I think, the same answer Blair gave, although he did not stress the rhetorical reason (this volume, Section 5). As the discussion continued, someone brought up Marc Antony's funeral oration in Julius Caesar with its repetition of the line "Brutus is an honorable man". After some discussion of the argumentative function of irony in that case, John Shotter expressed the point of the discussion rather well: what makes Antony's use of repetition argumentative is that each successive utterance of the line transforms the rhetorical situation; the ironic repetitions

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accomplish successive movements in the speaker's argument each of which redefines the situation. At the First International Conference on Argumentation in Amsterdam (1986), Scriven employed a nice metaphor to capture the idea of the variability of arguments. "A probative inference", he said is more like an iceberg than an oil rig: it is a "polymorphic natural entity", fitted to its particular context, "not a highly structured intrusion" imposed from without (1987; pp. 22-23). I took him to mean that the discourses that make up everyday arguments have to be studied on their own terms, in their particularity; they cannot properly be apprehended by applying some preconceived (formal) argument model. At the same meeting, I sought to explain that one object of rhetorical analysis is to figure out how arguments "get themselves made" in ordinary language (Wenzel, 1987a). Later, I tried to illustrate that function of rhetoric by analyzing a bit of popular discourse in which the making of an argument depended upon uncommon rhetorical artistry. In that case, the writer told a story about the rise and decline of tuberculosis (the ostensible subject of his essay), but was unquestionably making an argument about AIDS (the object of his argument). The logic of his argument could not be fully appreciated without a close textual analysis. The author intended a configuration of thought in the audience that depended more upon subtle moves within the text than upon the obvious argument by analogy (Wenzel, 1987b). From this brief discussion of a few features of argument considered rhetorically, I would like to essay some ideas about the concept of relevance. None of the following points is intended to contradict Blair's analysis. It is the task a logician, after all, to help us understand "what is meant by*relevance' as a property of the premises of arguments" (this volume, Section 2). My observations are based on the supposition that even the logician's narrower interest in norms of atomic arguments may gain something from the broader perspective of rhetoric. Indeed, it may be that in particular cases the logical determination of relevance may be conditioned by the rhetorical dynamics of argumentation. First, from a rhetorical perspective, all norms of argument, including relevance, help to answer the question: is this utterance a fitting response to the situation that invites it? Relevance, therefore, can be interpreted as a pragmatic relationship between the materials of argument and the situation, that is, to the complex of persons, events, objects, relations, exigencies, and constraints that the arguer seeks to encompass. This sense of relevance would appear to embrace both logical and rhetorical concerns. On the one hand, for example, a patently invalid argument would not count as a "fitting response". On the other hand, a perfectly sound argument by an expert might prove to be incomprehensible to a naive audience. A second observation follows from the realization that arguments get made by an infinite variety of discursive means. It seems to follow that

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the test of relevance has potential for being applied to any and all argumentative materials. Obviously, we can speak of a particular argument as relevant or not to the solution of a problem. But I think we can speak with equal confidence of the relevance of a premise to the situation. We can always ask, for example: can this premise (evidence, information,consideration of whatever kind) function in the construction of an argument that contributes to resolving an exigence? Or, we may ask: does this discursive technique contribute to the construction and presentation of a cogent case on the subject at hand? The question of relevance, thus, can apply across a broad range of materials that feature in argumentation, from the most rigorous, explicit atomic argument to a choice of metaphor. The idea of metaphor suggests a general point that I would like to make in passing: rhetorical analysis, in some cases, may prove to be as useful as logical analysis in evaluating significant argumentation. Consider some metaphors used by leaders of Western democracies in our time: "Iron Curtain", "Cancer of Communism", and "Evil Empire". Each of these invokes a complex of arguments based on analogy, arguments calculated to induce attitudes and dispose persons to action on issues of grave importance. A logician might very well explicate the implied arguments, proceed to test premises for relevance, sufficiency and acceptability, and so forth. But such a critique would necessarily be incomplete.What really counts in these cases is the way each metaphor configures thought in audiences, often without awareness of how their consciousness is being shaped. That was the point of an essay by Edwin Black (1970) on the metaphor "cancer of communism" in the rhetoric of the American "Radical Right". His ultimate judgment was a moral one, but it was supported by a sophisticated analysis of metaphorical language use within a particular discourse community. This is the kind of work for which rhetorical critics are trained; and, to the degree that identifying premises and conclusions and their connections depends upon close textual analysis, rhetoric may have much to offer logic as a partner in argument evaluation. My final point follows from observations on which Blair and I agree: first, "that relevance claims are always, in principle, contestable, and are often something to be negotiated dialectically by the parties to an argumentative discussion" (Blair, this volume, Section Two); second, that judgments of relevance are relative to the specific context of an argumentative discussion (this volume, Section 6.2). It follows, therefore, that the relevance of any argumentative material is always, in principle, contestable. Rhetorical situations, their elements, and especially their human participants, are infinitely variable. So, an idea that answers perfectly well to one situation may be challenged on good grounds in another case. What counts as a relevant premise is often emergent from discussion; it may have to be negotiated. This brings us to the harder question: are there criteria by which such negotiation can be rationally grounded?

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Argument as Dialectical Blair's paper considered two general questions: what does it mean to speak of the relevance of premises? and what are the criteria of relevance? Concerning the first, I found no reason to disagree with the main thrust of his answers. It seems appropriate to preserve the conception of "narrow relevance" that he explains. Considered either from the standpoint of an audience (rhetorically) or of the critic (logically) the relevance, strength and sufficiency of premises appear to be distinctive and different norms. That relevance (in the logical sense) is a function of the relation of a premise to a set of premises seems right. In this connection, however, I have argued that the relation, itself, may be contested and that the grounds of the contest are not merely propositional relations, but the rhetorical situation to which the argument answers. My reaction to the second part of Blair's paper is one of surprise that he does not give a more positive account of the criteria of relevance. I am surprised because the work he has recently reported, some of it with his colleague Ralph Johnson, points to a more definite answer. Perhaps they are waiting until they can give a more precise analysis of the concept and its attendant criteria. Nevertheless, I think it would be appropriate to take note of Blair and Johnson's dialectical view of argument in order to suggest, at least, what sort of application might eventually be made to the norm of relevance. Blair and Johnson have been developing a theory of criticism that fits the character of natural argumentation. "As we begin to look at arguments in their natural language settings", they write, "we have to look at their purpose and their function-not simply . . . at their structure (1987, p. 44). This motive moves them from the horizon of logic, with its focus on propositional relations, to the horizon of dialectic, with a focus on interaction. They remark that "an argument understood as product... cannot be properly understood except against the background of the process which produced it" (p. 45). I believe they are using the term "process" here in much the same way that I use the term "procedure" in relation to dialectical interactions. Argument as dialectical envisions purposeful activity, by persons in the roles of questioner and answerer, seeking to resolve doubts about a proposition (pp. 45-46). Within that framework of argument as dialectical, Blair and Johnson go on to analyze the norm of premise acceptability. They recognize that acceptability depends upon an audience, but not just any audience. As a conception of competent audience to ground the notion of acceptability, they posit a "community of model interlocutors", characterized as being knowledgeable, reflective, open, and dialectically astute (pp. 50-53). They conclude:

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Finally, they remark that a dialectical account of relevance is a promising direction for research. Of course, I agree. If the criterion of premise acceptability is grounded in critical procedures employed by model arguers, it seems reasonable to suppose that the criterion of relevance is similarly grounded. Perhaps there are criteria (e.g. of formal validity) that may be applied without fear of contradiction or dispute. (This is a matter for logicians, one on which a rhetorician had better not make positive statements!) Nevertheless, there are other criteria that seem to be~in principle-open to challenge whenever they are applied. Premise relevance and premise acceptability are norms of this kind because both are relative to beliefs of arguers, audiences, interlocutors, and critics. The settlement of issues raised about the application of such norms depends on the pragmatic relations of argumentative materials to problem-situations. The settlement of such issues may, furthermore, require sophisticated rhetorical analysis of how discursive materials and techniques are to be interpreted as functioning to constitute arguments. There is no a priori calculus by which disputes about relevance can be automatically resolved. In the final analysis, therefore, the resolution of issues about relevance—and other norms—is an accomplishment that owes as much to rhetoric and dialectic as to logic. In any dialectical account of argument, there are several major topics that need to be more fully developed. One is the character of the participants, their traits, dispositions, and values. Another is procedures, the rules and regulations thatgovern the interaction. Obviously, Blair and Johnson speak to the first of these elements with their community of model interlocutors. As they would surely agree, there is more to be said about each trait ascribed to the community. Moreover, they point to the domain of procedures in describing the model community as "dialectically astute". The two dimensions of persons and procedures interact, of course. In a sense, one can say that the community of model interlocutors is constituted by their discursive practices. One holds membership by virtue of being able to assist in the construction of, and participate appropriately in, the critical discussions by which the community certifies knowledge and values. Blair and Johnson's dialectical approach is an important move in the continuing development of informal logic and its theory of criticism. The dialectical perspective on argument appears to be central to any consideration of argument norms insofar as all norms are legitimated

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within a community following procedures presumed to yield rational consensus. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, along with their colleagues in the Amsterdam School are in the forefront of this development within argumentation theory. As their paper for this conference indicates, they are well along in a detailed program for establishing a pragma-dialectical theory that will integrate many strands of interest to scholars in argumentation. (See also their references.)

Conclusion In addition to applauding the move to a dialectical understanding of argument in this paper, I have been recommending one further move, namely, to a deeper appreciation of the rhetorical character of argument. At the 1986 Amsterdam conference, Johnson said, "The naturalization of logic is the next important task confronting us. Central to this development will be the reconceptualization of argument so that its dialectical nature is fully appreciated (1987, pp. 54-55). I think it is equally important to fully appreciate the rhetorical nature of argument. Argument is, in the first instance, rhetorical. In its natural state, it consists of symbolic constructions of whatever kind that people produce in situations that invite utterance to resolve problems. In the first instance, argument is directed to removing an exigence in the world. Thus, rhetorical argument to be effective must have a functional connection with the elements of the (real) situation. Incidentally, this suggests a corrective to the common view of rhetoric as mere persuasion, a view that it is all too easy to slip into when trying to characterize a rhetorical perspective. (I confess to having done so.) Rhetorical norms are not concerned merely with effective persuasion of a particular audience on a particular occasion. We can, instead, construe the norms of rhetoric in terms of effectiveness in resolving exigencies in problematic situations. In this way, it appears, the norms of rhetoric become linked to the norms of logic and dialectic. For, in addition to utterance that is intelligible, inspiring, and the like, we want utterance that includes meritorious arguments and that promotes critical discussion. I said that argumentation is rhetorical in its origin. But, in the second instance, argumentation may become dialectical. When the natural processes of rhetorical arguing are brought under some deliberate procedural control by interlocutors who strive to resolve doubts about a proposition, we have a dialectical situation. In fact, the situation is both dialectical and rhetorical, for within the new constraints of rules to regulate the discussion, there is still a demand for creative and effective utterance. What seems to be crucial to the transformation of a rhetorical situation into a dialectical one is that some element of utterance becomes an

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exigence. The focus shifts from problems in the real world to questions about propositions. Logjc enters the scene, then, in the third instance, as arguers (or critics) abstract from the amorphous materials of discourse those statements that can be taken as claims and premises. The logical critic applies norms legitimated by his community of model interlocutors. What I have tried to suggest above is that, in doing so, the logician must be sensitive to both the rhetorical (situational) nature of argument as well as to its dialectical (critical) nature. The progression I have just sketched, from rhetoric to dialectic to logic, seems an apt description of the natural history of argumentation. At least, it has a certain intuitive appeal. If it is at all accurate, then the naturalization of logic requires attention to the rhetorical origins of argument as well as to its dialectical organization. A full theory of argument may, someday, integrate all three perspectives.

References

Bitzer, L. F.: 1968,The Rhetorical Situation', Philosophy & Rhetoric 1,1-14. Black, E.: 1970,The Second Persona', Quarterly Journal of Speech 56,109-119. Blair, J. A.: 1988,'Premise-Relevance', this volume. Blair, J. A. & R. H. Johnson: 1987,'Argumentation as Dialectical', Argumentation 1, 41-56. Brockriede, W.: 197S,'Where is Argument?' Journal of the American Forensic Association 11,179-182. Cox, J. R. and C. A. Willard: 1982,'Introduction: The Field of Argumentation', in Cox and Willard (eds.), Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, pp. xiii-xlvi. Eemeren, F. H. van, R. Grootendorst, and T. Kruigen 1984, The Study of Argumentation, Irvington, New York. Johnson, R. H.: 1987,'Logic Naturalized: Recovering a Tradition', in F. H. van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, J. Anthony Blair, and Charles A. Willard (eds.), Argumentation: Across the Lines of Discipline, Foris, Dordrecht, pp. 47-56. Perelman, C. and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca: 1969, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, University of Notre Dame Press, South Bend (Indiana). Scriven, M.: 1987,'Probative Logic: Review and Preview*, in F. H. van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, J. Anthony Blair, and Charles A. Willard (eds.), Argumentation: Across the Lines of Discipline, Foris, Dordrecht, pp. 7-32. Wenzel, J. W.: 1980,'Perspectives on Argument', in J. Rhodes & S. Newell (eds.), Proceedings of the Summer Conference on Arguentation, Speech Communication Association, Washington, D.C., pp. 112-133.

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Wenzel, J. W.: 1987a,The Rhetorical Perspective on Argument', in F. H. van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, J. Anthony Blair, and Charles A. Willard (ed$.), Argumentation: Across the Lines of Discipline, Foris, Dordrecht., pp. 101-109. Wenzel, J. W.: 1987b,The Rhetorical View of Argumentation: Exploring a Paradigm', Argumentation 1, 73-88. Willard, C. A.: 1976,'On the Utility of Descriptive Diagrams for the Analysis and Criticism of Arguments', Communication Monographs, 43,306-319.

Chapter 7

A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective on Norms Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst

1. The Amsterdam research programme Our approach to argumentative discourse may be characterized as normative pragmatics. It pertains to pragmatics because every kind of discourse is studied as verbal exchanges of speech acts. It is normative because it is aimed at improving communicative practice. In order to do justice to the various aspects of an adequate study of speech communication l, our research programme consists of five components. In the philosophical component (1), where the starting-points are formulated, we take a critical-rationalist stance. In the theoretical component (2), an ideal model of optimal communication and interaction is developed. In our case this is a pragma-dialectical model attuned to resolving a dispute. The reconstructive component (3) aims at interpreting discourse with the help of the ideal model, so that more insight can be gained into the adequacy of the discourse. This means here that we attempt a resolution-oriented reconstruction of the argumentative discourse. In the empirical component (4), factors are identified which influence the recognition and interpretation of argumentation and other speech acts which, according to the ideal model, may contribute to the resolution of a dispute. Pragma-dialectical empirical research is convincingness-centered, i.e. it tries to detect factors affecting the process of convincing. In the practical component (5) of our research programme, methods are put forward for bringing reality closer towards the ideal through development of verbal skills. In doing this we advocate a reflective-minded linguistic practice.2 In Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (1984) and Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies (to be published) we discussed the philosophical and theoretical components of our approach. In other publications we reported on the empirical components.3 In five textbooks on argumentative method, the practical component is represented by developing a comprehensive argumentative method. 4 In the present article we elaborate on the philosophical background of our approach by explaining how we deal with norms.

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2. Argumentation as communication and interaction The study of argumentation is the discipline in which an attempt is made to obtain as much insight as possible into the phenomenon of language use which is called argumentation. 6 What characterizes this study of nonformal arguments? First and foremost, the arguments are examined in the context in which they are used, i.e. as elements in an argumentation the purpose of which is to convince someone of something. Argumentation is part of an explicit or implicit discussion designed to resolve a difference of opinion between two or more people. Thus arguments play a part in a form of language use with a specific function, and it is in that light that they should be studied. In a context of argumentative language use, arguments are integral parts of a specific form of communication and interaction which has specific communicative ('illocutionary*) and interactional ('perlocutionary5) goals. In the 'speech events' in which people characteristically pursue these goals - debates, discussions, letters to newspapers, scientific papers, and so on -they adjust their use of language to the achievement of their goals. To be able to study argumentation properly, we have to take account of the particular function that language fulfils in such speech events. For this to be possible the study of argumentation must be set in the framework of a functional theory of language use.In the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation that we developed we therefor defined argumentation as a complex speech act the purpose of which is to contribute to the resolution of a difference of opinion, or dispute. It typifies our approach that we try to functionalize, externalize, socialize and dialectify argumentation as a subject of study. Summarized in a few key words, this amounts to the following. Functionalization means that argumentation is treated as a goal-oriented verbal activity. Externalization means that argumentation is linked to expressing standpoints, agreements and other verbal commitments. Socialization means that argumentation is linked to one or more interlocutors who have to be convinced. And dialectification means that argumentation is seen in the context of a critical discussion with both pro- and contra-argumentation, so that a systematic interaction of resolution-oriented speech acts can take place. Our pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation gives shape to our ideal of reasonableness in a critical discussion. The dialectical aspect consists in there being two parties who attempt to resolve a difference of opinion by means of a methodical exchange of moves in a discussion. The pragmatic aspect is given its due by conceiving the moves in the discussion as speech acts. In conjunction with each other these two aspects provide an adequate starting point for the development of a dialectical argumentative method that can be used to analyze and evaluate argumentative discourse.

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3. Normative reconstruction of argumentative discourse To be able to analyze and evaluate argumentative discourse methodically, it is first necessary to establish to what extent it is possible to reconstruct part or all of the speech event, as it occurs in practice, to produce a critical discussion. Such normative reconstruction can be made of an ordinary conversation but also of more formal discussions, editorial comments, policy documents, scholarly polemics, and so on. In a normative reconstruction, a conversation is treated as a discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion. Of course, language can serve diverse goals, and the resolution of a difference of opinion is naturally only one of them. Besides, there can be more than one goal at the same time, and resolving a dispute will not always be the most important one. One discourse or text will be closer to the ideal of a critical discussion than another, so that in one case a more comprehensive reconstruction may be more necessary than in another. Normative reconstruction in the dialectical sense does not mean that a text or disourse is automatically regarded in toto as a critical discussion, but that we look to see what happens if the analysis is carried out as if it were a critical discussion. The reconstruction represents a specific angle of approach which can be illuminating as far as the resolution of disputes is concerned. Seen from the dialectical perspective, it is the more relevant approach. Normative reconstruction entails some specific analytic operations. These amount to the performance of a number of dialectical transformations, starting from the language in the discourse or text. The transformations which must be carried out are known as dialectical deletion, addition, permutation, and substitution.7 4. An ideal model of a critical discussion In order to be able to reconstruct a text or discourse normatively in a dialectical sense, a clearly-defined point of orientation is required. Such a frame of reference is provided by our ideal model of a critical discussion. We restrict ourselves here to dialectical permutation. The permutation transformation that must generally be performed in a dialectical analysis of an argumentative discourse or text relates to rearranging the order in which the elements are presented in such a way that the reconstruction follows the steps that, analytically speaking, have to be distinguished in the process of resolving a difference of opinion.

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According to our ideal model, a critical discussion comprises the following stages: the confrontation, opening, argumentation, and concluding stage.8 The identification of the various stages of this ideal model in a real discourse or text demonstrates that we are dealing with analytical distinctions. In order to get an adequate reconstruction, the permutation transformation, for example, usually has to be applied at various points. Otherwise, the discourse or text will make no sense as a systematic resolution process. This is, for instance, the case if the opening stage is partly preceded by the argumentation stage, or the argumentation stage by the concluding stage. The repetitions, sometimes worded slightly differently, that occur in an everyday conversation demonstrate the necessity of the deletion and substitution transformations. And the indirectness of some speech acts performed demonstrates the necessity of the addition transformation, especially with regard to the premisses that are left unexpressed at the argumentation stage. J. Analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse There is much more that can be said about the theoretical background of the pragma-dialectical approach, about the various dialectical transformations that are performed in a normative reconstruction, about the role of the ideal model for critical discussions, about each of the components of an analytical survey and about the various steps in the process of evaluation. But even when all this information is available, analyzing and evaluating an argumentative discourse or text is still a major and in some ways also a hazardous operation. There is no ready-made and watertight method that will always produce the desired result. At every stage of the analyzing and evaluating activities decisions have to be taken. Ideally these will be reasoned decisions. This is where the instruments developed int he pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation can be of help. Analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse is going to be an 'open' matter: it will always be necessary to allow for other possibilities. The basic openness of the results of a dialectical analysis and evaluation can be amplified by turning to the connection between the study of argumentation and logic. There are essential differences between these two disciplines, but that is not to say that logic is quite without significance for the theory of argumentation. In some analytical and evaluative tasks the application of logical insights is indispensable. This is true, for example, of the dialectical addition transformation when unexpressed premisses are to be supplied. Here the guiding principle is that the operation must produce a valid argument - and that is a matter of logic. Checking the consistency of argumentative discourse also calls for logic to detect contradictions

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and to evaluate the validity of the arguments used. Some 'formal' fallacies can be analyzed only by taking refuge in a logical system.9 However, it is also important not to exaggerate the role of logic. The practiced significance of "logical" errors can only be properly assessed if it is first clear what place the argumentation, or other speech act in which the error occurs, occupies in the wider context of the critical discussion. Communicative and interactive factors play a central role here. It is only by bringing pragmatic knowledge into the analysis that we can establish that a certain speech act is a functional component of the verbal interaction, for instance by having the communicative force of an argument and thus playing a "repairing" role by trying to overcome the doubt which one language user has concerning the standpoint of the other. Only a pragmatic approach can make it possible for us to arrive at a proper interpretation and explanation of implicit and indirect language use. It is also necessary to have contextual information of a pragmatic nature in order to replace the logical minimum by a "pragmatic minimum" when supplying unexpressed premisses. In all these cases, however, the absolute certainty that a purely logical approach appears to offer is thereby sacrificed. In fact, pseudo-certainty concerning the solution to a limited range of problems with a restricted scope is thus replaced by well-motivated hypothesizing concerning plausible solutions to all the problems which are at stake. In analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse logic alone will not suffice, but it gives us something to go on. By bringing in pragmatic considerations at the same time, not only is justice done to the functional purposes of language, a sizeable dose of uncertainty is also introduced. In view of the problems which have to be dealt with, a ready-made procedure for analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse is not a realistic possibility. Put briefly, the alternative boils down to an attempt to gain as much insight as possible into the communicative and interactive factors that play a part in argumentative texts and discourses. On the basis of the theoretical insights thus achieved it will then be possible to develop general guidelines which can improve and facilitate the performance of the analytical and evaluative tasks we are faced with.

6. Reasonableness in a critical sense In order to be able to develop proper general guidelines for these analytical and evaluative tasks, argumentation theorists should reflect upon the concept of 'reasonableness' which is involved in the norms which are to be implemented in the performing of these tasks. For a considerable time, logic was dominated by a 'geometrical' conception of reasonableness, and rhetoric by an 'anthropological' conception. In our view, both conceptions

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are inappropriate.10 Instead, we advocate a 'critical' conception of reasonableness. But what does the replacement of the geometrical reasonableness of the logicians and the anthropological reasonableness of the rhetoricians by the critical reasonableness of pragma-dialectical argumentation theorists, mean? If one adopts a critical rationalist viewpoint, one pursues the development of an ideal model of reasonable argumentation that takes the fallibility of human reason explicitly into account. In all areas of human thought and action the concept of systematic critical testing is then elevated to the guiding principle of problem solving. This critical rationalist ideal requires the promotion of dialectics in the (pre-)Socratic sense of the word. By adhering to such a view of being critical, the dialectic idea of having a systematic critical discussion is made the basic principle of reasonableness.11 In contradistinction to the geometrical logical approach, opposed by Toulmin and by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and the anthropological rhetorical approach to which these authors' own main works on argumentation theory can be attributed, protagonists of a critical dialectical approach regard argumentation as part of a discussion procedure for solving problems with regard to the acceptability of viewpoints. In this discussion procedure, elements from the logical and the rhetorical approaches are taken into account. We believe that the the procedure takes its reasonableness from a two-part criterion: problem-solving validity and conventional (or intersubjective) validity.12 This means that the discussion rules which together form the procedure put forward in a dialectical argumentation theory, should on the one hand be checked for their adequacy with regard to the resolution of disputes, and on the other for their intersubjective acceptability for the discussants.13 For argumentation this means that its soundness should be measured against the degree to which it agrees with rules which further the resolution of the dispute, as well as against the degree to which these rules are acceptable to the discussants who wish to resolve the dispute. The purpose of the dialectical approach is to establish how discussions should be carried out systematically in order to critically test standpoints. Wenzel, a supporter of this approach, believes that argumentation in the dialectical sense should be regarded as "a systematic management of discourse for the purpose of achieving critical decisions".14 In a critical discussion, the protagonist and the antagonist of a particular viewpoint try to establish jointly whether this viewpoint is tenable to critical responses. The protagonist advances pro-argumentation or contra-argumentation to defend his positive or negative viewpoint, respectively. In the former, he makes an attempt at justification and in the latter an attempt at falsification. In both cases, the antagonist can respond critically to the argumentation of the protagonist. This may result

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in the protagonist then continuing his justification or falsification attempt with fresh pro- or contra-argumentation. Here again, the antagonist can respond critically, and so on. In this way, an interaction takes place between the speech acts performed in the discussion by the protagonist and those performed by the antagonist. This interaction is characteristic of a dialectical process of convincing. It can lead to the resolution of the dispute which forms the main issue of the discussion only if the discussion is adequately regulated. This means that a dialectical argumentation theory should provide rules for the conduct of an argumentative discussion, and these rules should together constitute a problem-valid and convention- valid discussion procedure, thus guaranteeing the degree of consideredness required for a critical discussion to be carried out. In Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (1984), we introduced a proposal for a dialectical discussion procedure. This proposal can be regarded as a "code of conduct" for people who want to be rational discussants who act reasonably in a critical discussion. Of course, alternative codes of conduct can be proposed. In van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1987), we summarized the most important elements of our proposal in ten basic rules: 1. Parties must not prevent each other from advancing or casting doubt on standpoints. 2. Whoever advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked to do so. 3. An attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has actually been advanced by the protagonist. 4. A standpoint may be defended only be advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint. 5. A person can be held to the premisses he leaves implicit. 6. A standpoint must be regarded as conclusively defended if the defence takes place by means of arguments belonging to the common starting point. 7. A standpoint must be regarded as conclusively defended if the defence takes place by means of arguments in which a commonly accepted scheme of argumentation is correctly applied. 8. The arguments used in an argumentative discourse must be valid or capable of being validated by making one or more unexpressed premisses explicit. 9. A failed defence must result in the protagonist withdrawing his standpoint and a successful defence in the antagonist withdrawing his doubt about the standpoint. 10. Formulations must be neither puzzlingly vague nor confusingly ambiguous, and must be interpreted as accurately as possible.

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7. Problem-validity of the pragma-dialectical norms Critical rationalists place great emphasis on the consequence of the fact that a statement and its negation cannot both be true at the same time: one of these statements must be withdrawn. They equate a dialectical testing of statements with the detection of contradictions. In Barth and Krabbe (1982) a method is proposed which is designed to establish whether a certain viewpoint is tenable in relation to certain concessions: in other words, that there is no contradiction. As in the dialogical logic of the Erlangen School15, in Barth and Krabbe's "formal dialectics" a situation is taken as point of departure that is different from the ordinary starting-point in argumentative practice. The starting point adopted by Barth and Krabbe in "regimenting" dialogues forms a stage in the resolution of a dispute which does not arise until the protagonist has advanced his arguments to defend his viewpoint, and he and the antagonist together decide to establish whether this viewpoint is tenable on the assumption that the arguments are acceptable. This means that the protagonist and the antagonist have then decided to check whether the conclusion contained in the viewpoint indeed "follows" from the premisses contained in the argumentation. The antagonist has then agreed to act as 'opponent' and to do so while having the argumentation of the protagonist as a 'concession' added to his own account of commitments. In ordinary discourse this rather artificial situation could be created later on in the discussion if so desired, but it is highly improbable that it will arise in the initial stage. Therefore, in Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions, we proposed to include a method corresponding with this device in the 'intersubjective reasoning procedure', which can be used in a later stage of the discussion.16 An argumentation theory should first and foremost relate to ordinary discussions in everyday language, which is why we assume that initially one discussant (the protagonist) advances a viewpoint on which doubt is cast by another discussant (the antagonist). Then argumentation is advanced, followed by a possible critical response, and so on. The dispute is resolved when the antagonist, on the basis of the arguments advanced, accepts the protagonist's viewpoint, or when the protagonist, as a result of the critical response of the antagonist, abandons his viewpoint. This means that a systematic regulation of discussions in everyday language in a dialectical procedure which furthers the resolution of disputes, should cover all speech acts performed in attacking and defending the issues at stake, and should not be limited to the (inference) relation between premisses interpreted as 'concessions' and a conclusion representing the viewpoint.

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It should be clear that the problem-validity of a system of dialectical discussion rules does not depend entirely on the adequacy of the adopted reasoning procedure. The resolution of a dispute requires a procedure which follows a number of stages, and in any of these stages things may occur which do not favour the resolution process. The discussion rules quoted earlier relate to these various discussion stages and their different aspects. The problem-validity of the system of discussion rules as a whole can be rendered plausible only by illustrating that each rule fulfils a specific function in connection with furthering the resolution of a dispute. 17 In which way can the various rules assist in the resolution of a dispute? Rule 1 is designed to ensure that viewpoints and doubt regarding viewpoints may be freely advanced. A dispute cannot be resolved if it is not clear to the parties involved that there actually is a dispute and what this involves. The explicitization of the dispute takes place during the confrontation stage, which should offer the parties ample opportunity to express their positions. Both the advancing and doubting of a viewpoint are therefore formulated, without reservation, as a basic right. Rule 2 is intended to ensure that advanced and doubted viewpoints are defended in an argumentative discussion. A dispute cannot be resolved if the party who advanced a viewpoint is not prepared to take on the role of protagonist of this viewpoint. This willingness is vital in preventing the discussion from foundering during the opening stage. A person who advances a viewpoint has automatically acknowledged an obligation to defend the viewpoint, if required. Rules 3 and 4 are designed to see that attacks and defences in the argumentation stage are genuinely linked to the original viewpoint of the protagonist. A dispute cannot be resolved if the antagonist is in fact attacking a different viewpoint, or if the protagonist defends a different viewpoint later on. The true resolution of a dispute is not possible if the central issue is distorted by the antagonist or protagonist. Rule 4 is also meant to ensure that the defence of viewpoints takes place only by means of argumentation. A dispute cannot be truly resolved if the protagonist resorts to rhetorical devices in which pathos or ethos take the place of logos. Rule 5 ensures that implicit elements within the argumentation by the protagonist are also critically examined. A dispute cannot be resolved if a protagonist tries to withdraw from his obligation to defend an unexpressed premiss, nor can it be resolved if the antagonist tries to blow it out of proportion. In order to resolve the dispute, the protagonist must accept his responsibility for implicit elements in his argumentation, and the antagonist, when attempting to reconstruct what is left implicit, should try to establish the exact extent of this responsibility.

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Rule 6 is aimed at ensuring that viewpoints, in principle, can be sufficiently defended by means of argumentation. A dispute can be resolved only if the protagonist and the antagonist are in agreement on at least some points. A protagonist must accept his obligation to defend and must not present something as a common starting-point when in fact it is not, while an antagonist should make it possible for the protagonist to defend his viewpoint ex concessis and should not deny something being part of the common starting-point when in fact it is. Rule 7 is also aimed at ensuring that viewpoints can, in principle, be sufficiently defended by means of argumentation. A dispute can be resolved only if the protagonist and the antagonist agree on a method of testing the soundness of arguments which are not parts of the common starting point. The protagonist must select a suitable argumentation scheme and implement it correctly. Rule 8 is aimed at ensuring that the reasoning in the argumentation advanced by the protagonist is valid. A dispute can be resolved only if the protagonist and the antagonist agree that the viewpoint defended follows logically from the premisses expressed (or left implicit) in the argumentation. Only if all premisses of an argument are actually expressed, is it useful to test its validity. If thi is not the case, the unexpressed premisses which are implicit in the argumentation must be made explicit in a correct way, which implies making the arguments valid.18 Rule 9 is aimed at ensuring that the protagonist and the antagonist sort out together in a correct way what the result of the discussion is. A dispute is truly resolved only if the parties agree in the concluding stage whether or not the attempt at defence on the part of the protagonist succeeded. An apparently smooth-running discussion may still end disappointingly if the protagonist wrongly claims to have successfully defended his viewpoint or even to have proved it true, or if the antagonist wrongly denies that the defence was successful or even claims the opposite viewpoint to have been proven. Rule 10 is aimed at preventing misunderstandings as a result of unclear, vague or ambiguous formulations. A dispute can be resolved only if one party does not misinterpret the speech acts performed by the other party. Misunderstandings can lead to a spurious dispute or result in a pseudosolution. Problems in formulation and interpretation may arise at all stages of a discussion; they are not linked to any particular stage. Having thus roughly explained the dialectical rationale for our claim to problem-validity for these critical discussion rules, we refer to Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (1984) for a more detailed exposition of how the system of rules can be precizated in order to comply with other specific requirements of problem-validity, such as being systematic, effective, efficient, feasible, and so on. It may now be possible to make plausible that the rules are such that they merit a certain degree of

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intersubjective acceptability, which would also lend them some claim to conventional validity. 8. Intersubjective validity of the pragma-dialectical norms The acceptability claim which we attribute to our dialectical rules is not based in any way on metaphysical necessity, but on their suitability to do the job for which they are intended: the resolution of disputes. The rules do not derive their acceptability from some external source of personal authority or sacrosanct origin. Their acceptability should rest on their effectiveness when applied. Because the rules were developed exactly for the purpose of resolving disputes, they should, in principle, be optimally acceptable to those whose first and foremost aim is to resolve a dispute. This means that the rationale for accepting these dialectical rules is, philosophically speaking, 'pragmatic'. Pragmatists judge the acceptability of rules on the extent to which they are successful in solving the problems they wish to solve. In fact, to them a rule is a rule only if it performs a function in the achievement of the objectives set by the pragmatist.19 Our system of pragma-dialectical rules is based on an ideal model of a critical discussion. Such an ideal model does bring with it the danger of its functioning as an unattainable Utopia which is however pursued at all costs. Even so, the model provides language users prepared to act as reasonable discussants with general and vital guidance for their conduct in discussions (which may be partially congruous to the system of norms they have internalized anyway).20 For people whose aim it is to resolve a dispute by means of discussion, the system of dialectical rules laid down in our ideal model of a critical discussion provides a practical code of conduct. But what sort of persons will be willing to adopt the required discussion attitude, thus guaranteeing the conventional validity of the dialectical rules? They should be persons who accept doubt as an integral part of their way of life and use criticism towards themselves and others to solve problems by trial and error. They use argumentative discussions as means to detect weak points in viewpoints regarding knowledge, values and objectives, and eliminate these weaknesses where possible. Such persons are opposed to protectionism with regard to viewpoints and to the immunization of any kind of viewpoint against criticism, and they reject all forms of fundamentalist justificationism (Letztbegriindung) .21 To a certain extent, each individual himself can, if he wishes, fulfil the prerequisites to a reasonable discussion attitude. His freedom to do this, however, is often restricted by factors beyond his control, generally referred to as 'compulsion'. Adhering to Barth and Krabbe, these external

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conditions for a reasonable discussion attitude are elsewhere described by us as conditions of a "higher order" which must be fulfilled in order to be able to satisfy the prerequisites of a reasonable discussion attitude and to get around to complying with the dialectical rules of the discussion itself. The discussion rules are then called 'first order' conditions, the internal characteristics which specify a reasonable discussion attitude are 'second order' conditions, and the external requirements of the circumstances in which the discussion takes place are 'third order' and 'fourth order' conditions.22 For example, in order to fulfil the first order rule which says that parties must not prevent each other from advancing viewpoints or casting doubt on viewpoints (Rule 1), the persons concerned must, among other things, possess a second order discussion attitude which involves their willingness to express their opinions and to listen to the opinions of others. In order to be able to adopt this attitude, the psycho-social reality in which the individuals operate should be such that it fulfils the third order condition that everyone has the right to advance his view to the best of his ability. In order to fulfil the first order rule that a viewpoint may be defended only by advancing argumentation relating to that viewpoint (Rule 4), the second order condition must be fulfilled that a person is actually willing to advance arguments for his viewpoint. Moreover, the third order condition must be fulfilled that he has a real voice on the subject and is not, for example, totally dependent on the compassion of the person whom he is addressing. The first order conditions represent necessary elements of a code of conduct aimed at the resolution of disputes.23 The second order conditions imply a plea for quality education in argumentation which stimulates reflection. The third order conditions make it clear that for argumentation theoreticians there is also an important indirect political responsibility in striving for individual freedom, non-violence, intellectual pluralism, and institutionalized safeguards for rights and means to obtain information and pass criticism. Only insofar as a pragma-dialectical argumentation theory takes these three components into consideration, can it provide a clarification of the concept of reasonableness which is both theoretically and socially interesting.

Notes 1. The term 'speech communication' seems to be the most appropriate translation of the Dutch term 'taalbeheersing'. However, 'taalbeheersing' comprises written as well as oral communication, and is more research-oriented: it includes subjects such as dis-

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course analysis, conversation analysis, speech act theory, psycho- and socio-linguistics, composition, argumentation analysis and argumentation theoiy. On the other hand, subjects such as drama, television, mass communication, et cetera are studied in other departments. 2. For a more elaborate discussion of the Amsterdam research programme and the way it is carried out: van Eemeren (1987b) and Grootendorst (1987). 3. Cf. van Eemeren (1986 and 1987a); van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Meuffels (1988). 4. These textbooks are published in Dutch: van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Kruiger (1983), (1984), (1986), (1988), and van Eemeren, Feteris, Grootendorst and Kruiger (1987). 5. Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1988). 6. See for a survey of the characteristics of this discipline van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Kruiger (1987). 7. Cf. van Eemeren (1986). 8. Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: pp. 85-88,98-100,109,154-175, and 188). 9. In the case of the fallacy of affirming the consequent, for example, this would be propositional logic, since this fallacy is an incorrect use of the modus pottens. 10. Cf. Toulmin (1976). 11. The idea of choosing (pre-)Socratic dialectics as a model for reasonableness is emphatically propagandized by Popper. Meanwhile, it appears that an increasing number of authors are adopting the same viewpoint (although they don't always draw the necessary consequences). Albert (1967) stresses that the dialectical method allows for an "all-embracing critical rationalism" which is not subjected to restrictions. According to him, the methodology of rational testing by critical discussion is applicable to any form of conviction; not only to statements of a factual kind, but also to normative viewpoints and value judgements. In a discussion of values too, reasonableness knows only those boundaries established by the participants themselves. Lakatos (1963-64) believes that the concept of a Socratic dialectic is applicable even to mathematics, which is often thought of as an undertaking in its own right. 12.

Cf. Barth and Krabbe (1982: 21-22).

13. The logical approach to argumentation traditionally concentrates on argumentation as a product, whereby the attention is primarily directed towards the validity of the

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Van Eemeren and Grootendorst arguments in which from one or more premisses a conclusion is derived. The rhetorical approach tends to concentrate on argumentation as a process and restricts its attention to the effectivenesss of the successive steps taken in the argumentation in gaining acceptance for a standpoint. In the dialectical approach, the product-oriented and process-oriented approaches to argumentation are combined. 14. Cf. Wenzel (1979: 84). 15. Cf. Lorenzen and Lorenz (1978). 16. Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984:169). 17. As we showed in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1987), it is possible with each of the formulated discussion rules to indicate precisely which classical fallacies can be covered through these rules. Methodically speaking, this seems to us a clear indication, though no proof, that the dialectical system of rules presented is problem-valid. 18. For practical purposes, we do not differentiate here between deductive validity and other forms of validity, which, of course, should also be taken into account. 19. Whoever wants to resolve disputes and judges resolution procedures primarily on instrumental grounds, with the main purpose being that joint cooperation achieves an optimally satisfactory result for as many individuals as possible (and not, for example, for as much personal gain or enjoyment as possible), can be characterized as a utilitarian. A person with a utilitarian attitude in a discussion strives for a satisfactory resolution of the dispute for both the protagonist and the antagonist, irrespective of whether the solution results in gain for the protagonist or the antagonist. Bearing in mind Popper's plea on behalf of falsification, however, we consider a "negative" variant of the basic principle of utilitarianism to be more effective here than "positive" utilitarianism: a system of argumentation rules which encourages discussants to pronounce their doubts and to work out how far the disagreements ensuing from such expressions of doubt can be resolved, is preferable to a system of argumentation rules which seeks to ensure agreement. This means that instead of the maximization of agreement, the minimization of disagreement should be aimed for, thus altering the perspective by a U-turn. As a matter of fact, this is a good illustration of how philosophical insights of utilitarian pragmatics and critical-rationalist dialectics conjoin in the conception of reasonableness upheld in our argumentation and discussion theory. 20. Surely, the course of a discussion which is meant to be critical cannot be completely planned out in advance any more than the realization of other ideal constructions, but in the piecemeal engineering which is necessary to gradually increase control over widespread discussion faults, such a model is an indispensable reference point.

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21. Whoever shares these profiling characteristics, whether he be an existentialist, realist, or whatever, can be regarded as a member of Popper's Open Society. A member of the Open Society is anti-dogmatic, anti-authoritarian, and aMi-Letztbegriindung; in other words against monopolies of knowledge, pretensions of infallibility, and unfaltering principles. As these are linked, via personification and reification, with essentialism, holism and predestinarian conspiracy theories, a member of the Open Society has prohibitive objections to such forms of "hard determinism" as Marxism and Fundamentalism - bien étonné de se trouver ensemble. 22. Fourth order conditions relate to normal input and output conditions (as John Searle calls them), specifying among other things that for analytical purposes the basic model of a critical discussion situation starts from the assumption that the people taking part in the discussion are not infants, deaf or insane people, and so on. Nonfulfilment of these conditions would affect communication in general, not just argumentation. We do not go into these conditions here. 23. It should be noted that the first ordeT rules corresponding to the first order conditions, are not foolproof algorithmic rules, but informal rules of conduct which can only be used by people who reflect upon the circumstances in which the discussion takes place. This is why we cannot do without second and third order conditions.

References

Albert, Hans, Theorie und Praxis: 1967, 'Max Weber und das Problem der Wertfreiheit und der Rationalität', in Emst Oldemeyer (ed.), Die Philosophie und die Wissenschaften. Simon Moser zum 65. Geburtstag, Hain-Verlag, Meisenheim am Glan. Barth, Else M. and Erik C.W. Krabbe: 1982, From Axiom to Dialogue, De Gruyter, Berlin. Eemeren, Frans H. van: 1986, 'Dialectical analysis as a normative reconstruction of argumentative discourse', Text, 6 (1), pp. 1-16. Eemeren, Frans H. van: 1987a: 'For Reason's Sake', in Frans H. van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, J. Anthony Blair, and Charles A. Willard (eds.), Argumentation: Across the Lines of Discipline, Foris, Dordrecht and Providence. Eemeren, Frans H. van, 1987b: 'Argumentation Studies' Five Estates', in Wenzel (ed.), Argument and Critical Practices, pp. 9-24. Eemeren, Frans H. van and Rob Grootendorst: 1984, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions, PDA 1, Foris, Dordrecht and Providence. Eemeren, Frans H. van and Rob Grootendorst: 1987, 'Fallacies in Pragma-Dialectical Perspective', Argumentation, 1,283-301. Eemeren, Frans H. van and Rob Grootendorst: 1988, 'Rationale for a Pragma-Dialectical Perspective', Argumentation, 2, pp. 271-291.

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Van Eemeren and Grootendorst Eemeren, Frans H. van and Rob Grootendorst: To be published, Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies. Eemeren, Frans H. van, Rob Grootendorst and Tjark Kruiger 1983, Het analyseren van een betoog, Wolters-Noordhoff, Groningen. Eemeren, Frans H. van, Rob Grootendorst and Tjark Kruiger 1984, Argumenteren, Wolters-Noordhoff, Groningen. Eemeren, Frans H. van, Rob Grootendorst and Tjark Kruiger 1986, Drogredenen, Wolters-Noordhoff, Groningen. Eemeren, Frans H. van, Rob Grootendorst and Tjark Kruiger 1987, Handbook of Argumentation Theory, PDA 7, Foris, Dordrecht and Providence. Eemeren, Frans H. van, Rob Grootendorst and Tjark Kruiger 1988, Het beoordelen en schrijven van een betoog, Wolters Noordhoff, Groningen. Eemeren, Frans H. van, E.T. Feteris, Rob Grootendorst and Tjark Kruiger 1987, Argumenteren voor Juristen. Het analyseren en schrijven van juridische belogen en beleidsteksten, Wolters-Noordhoff, Groningen. Eemeren, Frans H. van, Rob Grootendorst and Bert Meuffels: 1988, The skill of identifying argumentation', Journal of the American Forensic Association, in press. Grootendorst, Rob, 1987: 'Everyday Argumentation from a Speech Act Perspective', in: Wenzel (ed.), Argument and Critical Practices, pp. 165-175. Lakatos, Imre: 1963/64, 'Proofs and Refutations', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 14, pp. 1-25,120-139, 221-243,296-342. Lorenzen, Paul and Kuno Lorenz: 1978, Dialogische Logik, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt. Toulmin, Stephen E.: 1976, Knowing and Acting: An Invitation to Philosophy, MacMillan, New York etc. Wenzel, Joseph W.: 1979, 'Jürgen Habermas and the Dialectical Perspective on Argumentation', JAFA, 16 (2), pp. 83-94. Wenzel, Joseph W. (ed.): 1987, Argument and Critical Practices, Proceedings of the Fifth SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, Speech Communication Association, Annandale.

Chapter 8

What Can Argumentative Practice Tell Us About Argumentation Norms? Sally Jackson

My remarks concern the relationship between normative and descriptive theories of argumentation. By normative theory, I mean a systematic set of claims about how argumentation should be conducted. A normative model is an idealized picture of argumentation, a picture of argumentation at its best. The Pragma-Dialectical model offered by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983; and more specifically, van Eemeren, 1987; Grootendorst, 1987) is normative in that it makes distinctive claims about ideally conducted argumentation. By descriptive theory, I mean a systematic set of claims about argumentation practice. A descriptive model pictures argumentation as it occurs, not necessarily as it ought to occur. But it is important to realize that a major part of any description will be a reconstruction of people's own normative ideas. That is, in order to adequately describe argumentative practice, we must realize that people already have ideas about whether and how they are obliged to defend their statements. My specific concern is for what descriptions of argumentative practices can contribute to normative models of argumentation. My empirical work with Scott Jacobs has concerned the organization of argument in ordinary discourse (Jackson & Jacobs, 1980,1981; Jacobs & Jackson, 1981,1982, in press), and over the last two years has focussed on argumentation in a specially structured setting - third party mediation of disputes (Jacobs, Jackson, Hallmark, Hall & Stearns, 1987; Jacobs, Jackson, Hall, & Stearns, 1988). In part, our interest in third party mediation was motivated by the theoretical insights of van Eemeren and Grootendorst, since third party mediation appears to be an effort to "engineer" critical discussion by creating certain conditions within which disputants can more nearly approximate a rational ideal (Jackson, 1987). However, the descriptive study of argumentative practice is not simply an exercise in the application of normative theory, but can also make contributions in return. I hope to show this by making several observations about argumentative practice that seem to me to have implications for normative theory. Our descriptive analyses of various forms of naturally occurring argumentation have been informed by the Pragma-Dialectical perspective, but not, we hope, constrained by it. We believe that this perspective, rather

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than constraining what we can see in argumentative practice, helps to highlight certain matters that have important theoretical implications. The first of these concerns the social context of argumentation. The second concerns the existence of implicit normative models. The third concerns the justification of alternative normative models. The fourth concerns the ways in which normative models contribute to practice. The Social Interactional Contexts of Argumentation Perhaps the most striking regularity to be noticed about argument in ordinary discourse is its social context: Argumentation normally arises from some sort of conflict. The conflict may be between two asserted positions, but it may equally be between two proposed courses of action. In my own empirical work, the vast bulk of argumentation occurs within the context of conflicts over proposed courses of action, rather than within the context of conflict over asserted positions, but of course that is largely a result of the places I have chosen to look for argumentation. Had I chosen to look for argumentation in seminar rooms or on television talk shows, rather than in informal conversations and problem-solving discussions, I'm sure that I would have found conflict over asserted positions much more prevalent. The social context of argumentation is of fundamental importance to a theoretical understanding of good argumentation, as has been forcefully argued by van Eemeren and Grootendorst - as well as by a number of scholars working on 'informal logic.' When we note that the Junction of argumentation is to settle disputes - rather than, say, to find a guarantor of the truth of a proposition - we construct different criteria for the adequacy of argument. For example, when we recognize that the function of argumentation is to repair disagreements on a more-or-less ad hoc basis, we do not expect each opinion put forward to be accompanied by its justifying premises. Indeed, one direction we might take from this basic insight would be to suggest that virtually everything uttered is potentially arguable, and whether argumentation occurs or not depends upon whether there is any opposition to overcome. In informal conversation, people do not always defend everything challenged, but they do observe a set of general contracts which permit various sorts of repair, including clarification and justification. From this point of view, justification serves a situated interactional function rather than a universal epistemic function. For the critic, this means that an arguer is not to be faulted for failing to provide a defense of any claim until the claim has been challenged in some fashion. Jackson and Jacobs (1980), reasoning from this point of view, argued that the ancient concept of enthymeme might be best understood functionally, as referring to argumentation tailored to the objections of an audience -

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in contrast to other modern interpretations which have occasionally taken enthymemes to be formally incomplete syllogisms. Within van Eemeren and Grootendorst's Pragma-Dialectical model, the notion of functionalization is central to the picture of ideal argumentation as a product of critical discussion. Because their model is attentive to the disagreement-management function of argument, the idealization depends upon a procedure for identifying, isolating, and resolving individual points of disagreement rather than upon formal properties of the discourse produced. Thus, the "opening stage" of a critical discussion concerns agreement on a set of rules for the conduct of the discussion and identification of what it is that is in dispute, but not, for example, agreement on some set of foundational premises upon which all subsequent argument is to be built. A normative model must make some assumption about the purpose of the activity in question. In modern argumentation theory, especially those strands most tied to logic, the purpose of the activity has often been taken to be knowledge-related rather than agreement-related. Attention to the practice of argumentation suggests that its characteristic function is to repair disagreement. The consequence for a normative model is to focus on the procedure for handling disagreements, not on the products of this procedure. Descriptive analysis of argumentative practice contributes one cornerstone of any normative model: a fundamental concept of the function of argumentation. Normative Models Implict in Argumentative Practice When we examine argumentative practice, one thing we notice is that argumentation is naturally organized in terms of implicit normative models. People enter into disputation with their own ideas about how it ought to proceed, and variations in the apparent skillfulness of a performance can come about in at least two different ways. First, and most obviously, a person's performance within an argumentative discussion may have any level of correspondence with the implicit normative ideal. For all sorts of reasons, people fall short of what they understand to be "best" practice: They refuse to accept a conclusion even when all reasonable objections have been met - because they don't like the proponent's manner; or they get so caught up in the details of an antagonist's argument that they forget the overall point; or they become so emotionally involved in the discussion that they simply can't construct a coherent line of argument. But second, a person's performance in an argumentative discussion may vary depending upon the sort of normative "theory" implicitly held. Jacobs

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(1987) noted that in third party mediation, there are at least two alternative rational models which visibly inform practice. The first, associated in discussion with the search for Common Ground, shares some, but not all of the normative assumptions of the PragmaDialectical model. The purpose of argumentation is taken to be rational choice among competing claims, based on pro- and contra-argumentation. However, the Common Ground model also assumes that good argumentation must proceed from a set of established premises and that there is one justified conclusion to be drawn from the established premises. In mediation, the Common Ground model leads mediators to search diligently for points on which the disputants agree, whether those be basic goals, specific points of fact, or whatever. Where disputants can agree to nothing, argumentation can find no beginning point. (This contrasts with the Pragma-Dialectical model, which requires only agreement on what each party's position is and on a set of rules for isolating and resolving disagreements as they arise.) The other implicit rational model, associated in discussion with the search for a Zone of Agreement, departs from the Pragma- Dialectical model in at least two important respects. First, it is assumed that rational action on each side involves optimizing one's own interests within the constraints created by one's antagonist. In fact, this is a very widespread understanding of rationality, not only in writing on bargaining and negotiation, but also in certain bodies of economic and sociological theory. Second, although it takes the purpose of the exchange to be resolution of a dispute, it presupposes that this resolution will involve discovery of a mutually acceptable position - which may be simply a matter of compromise requiring no examination of the basis for each disputant's claim. In mediation, the Zone of Agreement model leads mediators to treat argumentation as merely indicative of resistance; faced with a challenge to a proposal, the mediator (at his best) will demand from the antagonist a suggestion for how to repair the challenged proposal, rather than examining the basis for the challenge. Now, I think it is important to notice that these implicit normative models are held in an unreflective fashion by both lay and professional practitioners of argumentation, but are also held reflectively by theoreticians. We might like to say that neither the Common Ground model nor the Zone of Agreement model is a theoretical competitor to the PragmaDialectical model, but this would be wrong, I think, because each of these models offers a systematic account of rationality and rational choice, and each of these models finds expression in the theoretical literature of the social sciences. These alternative normative models function in the same way as does the Pragma-Dialectical model. At a theoretical level, we could take on either of these naive rational models as a basis for empirical work, and our descriptions of argument would vary accordingly. For example, the

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Common Ground model would encourage us to track arguments in terms of their links with the common core of shared belief, so that our principal concern at each point would be whether or not a claim could be seen to have been justified in the peculiar sense of justification suggested by the model. The Zone of Agreement model would encourage us instead to see the argument as an exchange of proposals. Even in the case of a dispute over an assertion, the Zone of Agreement model would see assertion and counterassertion as a series of offers to settle on a particular position. In fact, there is an extremely large body of literature that offers just such a description of discussion. Not only do analytic descriptions based on these two models differ, but also, more importantly, argument practice differs depending upon which model the practitioner employs. As Jacobs has argued, the principal difference between these two conceptions of rational discussion is in whether one elaborates the justification of a proposal, or treats the reasons offered for a proposal as symptomatic of the resistance there will be to any counterproposal. Common Ground strategies involve examination of the bases for competing positions, so as to arrive at a shared method of choice. Zone of Agreement strategies involve search for a sort of compromise position that will satisfy the interests of each party. The identification of implicit normative models can make an important contribution to normative theorizing, though that contribution might be quite indirect. We should certainly not expect to find universal acceptance among practitioners for any particular normative model, nor should we think that the correctness of a normative model depends upon its match with naive conceptions of good communication or good argumentation. However, attention to implicit normative models can increase our reflective awareness of the presuppositions of our own models. We can note, for example, that the Common Ground model assumes that there is some core of common belief or common standard behind any disagreement, and that the discovery of this core is the method by which disagreements are ultimately resolved. That is, what drives this model is the participants' belief that they share some common ground from which it is possible to reason to a shared conclusion. The Zone of Agreement model, by contrast, assumes that around two disputed positions are other acceptable (but less desirable) positions, and that discovery of the overlap between positions acceptable to one disputant and positions acceptable to the other disputant is the method by which disagreements are resolved. What drives this model is each participant's desire to maximize his own outcome, given what the other participant is willing to allow. The Pragma-Dialectical model, finally, assumes that a rational procedure will lead to resolution of a dispute, if resolution is possible. What drives this model is each participant's willingness to defend a position to the limit of an antagonist's objections.

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Likewise, we can compare ideal outcomes suggested by each model. Both the Common Ground model and the Pragma-Dialectical model picture ideal argumentation as an orderly competition between two positions leading to the acceptance of one and the rejection of the other. The Zone of Agreement model pictures ideal argumentation as a cooperative search for that position (possibly between the two starting positions) that optimizes the value of the outcome. The correctness of the position is less important than its acceptability, or perhaps we should say that if both parties act in an ideally rational way, the position arrived at will be the most acceptable position available. The most important point to be made here is that a practical theory based on any one normative model must take into account the possibility that arguers will try to act out the practical strategies suggested by their own implicit normative models. Any practical application of, say, the Pragma-Dialectical model must grapple with the problem of gaining acceptance of the model itself as well as with the problem of bringing behavior into line with the model. This requires, in van Eemeren's terms, a reflection-minded rather than an instruction-minded approach to the improvement of practice. Justification of Alternative Normative Models If people differ one from another in their implicit (or for that matter explicit) normative models, we must take seriously the problem of justifying any particular normative model. A critic or analyst who puts forward a normative model as a standard for the evaluation of practice must be prepared to defend this normative model as preferable to other normative models. Why, for example, should one accept the Pragma-Dialectical ideal over an idealization of argument, associated with Zone of Agreement thinking, as outcome-maximization brought about through offer and counter-offer? Can one justify a critique of argumentative practice from one normative standpoint when it is clear that the practices derive from a different normative standpoint? Unless we are prepared to compare and evaluate normative models, it is not clear what worth they have at all, except as expressions of how some particular individuals structure their own argumentative practices. It is possible that the study of argumentative practice will not only suggest the need for justification, but also offer some of the means by which one normative model may be compared to another. We would certainly not wish to attempt defense of a normative model in terms of its ability to produce agreements or other outcomes, as do bargaining theorists like Fisher and Ury (1981). Agreement can be reached in many ways, but whether a particular discussion outcome counts as a genuine or justified agreement may depend upon prior normative assump-

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tions, so that defense of a normative model in terms of its ability to produce agreements might very well show each of several competitors to be superior. But what other sorts of facts can possibly bear on a question of value, such as which of several normative models is best? Though not concerned specifically with argumentation, O'Keefe's recent work on implicit normative models of communication may prove instructive (O'Keefe, 1988; O'Keefe & McCornack, 1987; O'Keefe & Shepherd, 1987). She has argued that individual differences in communication stem in part from differences in implicit theories of how communication works and what communication is for, and has identified three implicit theories, or in her terms, "message design logics". The least sophisticated of these is the design logic she terms "expressive". Within an expressive design logic, the primary function of communication is taken to be the expression of one's own thoughts, and the hallmarks of good communication are clarity and openness. Understanding is assumed to be tantamount to acceptance. A second design logic, termed "conventional", takes the function of communication to be joint action regulated by rules and conventions. Within such a logic, the rules are taken for granted, as having a reality independent of the circumstances to which they apply. Good communication, from the conventional perspective, is identification and application of an appropriate rule to an objectively given situation. The most sophisticated design logic, termed "rhetorical", takes the function of communication to be the social construction of reality. Good communication, on this view, treats both the situation and the rules applying to it as negotiable. Thus, an apparent disagreement might be reconstructed in terms of a shared problem to be solved jointly. For our purposes, what is important about the idea of message design logics is not merely the suggestion that there may be multiple normative ideals guiding people's communicative choices, but the explicit argument that not all of these norms are equally valid. O'Keefe sees a definite progression from expressive to conventional to rhetorical, and she constructs argumentation in support of this progression based on the relationships between message design logics and a variety of other well-understood communicator and message characteristics. For example, she has shown that higher levels of social cognitive development are associated with the rhetorical design logic, while lower levels of social cognitive development are associated with the expressive design logic. Likewise, she has shown that the effectiveness of messages produced by an individual in response to a standardized situation depends upon the individual's design logic: rhetoricals are most effective, followed by conventional and then by expressives. Importantly, the judgment of message effectiveness does not depend upon the developmental advancement of the judge: presumably,

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even an expressive judge can recognize the superiority of a message generated by a rhetorical design logic. I think it would be possible to construct at least a partial empirical defense of a normative model, along the lines of what O'Keefe has done with message design logics. My research group has given some preliminary thought to the problem of applying message design logic to the underlying normative models employed by mediators, and it seems possible to us that the implicit normative models we have identified bear some relationship, though a complex one, with the three alternative design logics. For example, Zone of Agreement thinking can be accomodated within any of the three design logics, but the view of rationality and communication implied by the Pragma-Dialectical model demands the level of sophistication associated with the rhetorical design logic. From an expressive logic, strategy can be little more than a plan for revealing or concealing the positions one is willing to accept, a constraint that makes critical discussion unthinkable. Now, the relationship between message design logic and argumentation norms is not especially tight, and I would not want to make more of the analogy than is presently justified. But what I am trying to suggest is that there may be methods for defending normative claims empirically, at least in part, following the strategy O'Keefe has used to defend an ordering of her three message design logics. Thus, a third possible contribution of argumentative practice to argumentative norms may be in the justification of one normative model as against another. Translating Normative Theory into Practical Theory A final contribution to normative theory offered by descriptive work on argumentative practice concerns the ways in which normative theory may be used for the improvement of practice. This seems a bit paradoxical but isn't. What I am suggesting is that before normative theory can generate strategies for improving argumentative discourse, we need to know how and why practitioners deviate from the norm. Descriptive analysis contributes to this general aim by identifying and explaining the real-life obstacles to ideal argumentation (Jacobs et al., 1987). Of course, not just any descriptive analysis will make this sort of contribution. In order to identify obstacles to the realization of an ideal model, the description must be informed by the ideal model. And this is why our work on third party mediation depends fundamentally on the Pragma-Dialectical model. In speaking of obstacles to the realization of an ideal, I have in mind a broad class of "practical facts" that must be confronted in any effort to improve practice by any means. For example, van Eemeren and Grootendorst's idealization suggests that when two disputants disagree over a

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matter of fact, the appropriate response would be to try to agree on a method by which the facts can be verified. In third party mediation, such disputes occur frequently, over issues like who said what to whom in what circumstance. Mediators mostly treat these disputes as irresolvable, and try to reason around them instead of trying to find a method of reaching agreement. The obstacle to resolving the disputed claim is that each disputant claims knowledge of the event in question based on direct experience, and most of the time there is no record other than the recollections of the two parties involved. Another sort of obstacle to achievement of the ideal is the concern for "face" exhibited by real arguers in real disputes. Ideally, disputants should enter into critical discussion prepared to focus on the disputed issues to the exclusion of all other tangential concerns. For example, divorcing spouses involved in mediation of custody and visitation should focus on the task of deciding the future of their children, and not on the problem offixingblame for the failure of the marriage. But in actual practice, all arguers have a standing concern for face that leads them to monitor one another's arguments for any implicit or explicit threat (Jacobs et al., 1988). Ideal practice would involve a separation of decidable issues from standing concerns, but actual practice shows these matters to be inextricably intertwined. The importance of identifying obstacles of this sort is in suggesting what must be done in order to approximate the normative ideal. When we find an obstacle to ideal argumentation, that does not mean that the normative model is inapplicable, but it does present an engineering problem to be solved in application. Sometimes the problem can be solved through improvement of people's skills or modification of their attitudes; other times, it may be necessary to alter the social context of disputation. But without a descriptive analysis of the obstacles, the application of a normative model remains aimless and abstract. Conclusion My purpose in these remarks has been to suggest some of the ways in which descriptive and normative theories cooperate. Worthwhile description depends upon a prior normative model, not only as a source of analytic categories, but also as a source of answerable questions. At the same time, normative models can profit from descriptive work, not only because they necessarily incorporate descriptive claims, but also because their application to practice depends upon an appreciation for obstacles presented by practitioners.

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References

Eemeren, F. H. van, and R. Grootendorst: 1983, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions, Foris, Dordrecht (Holland). Eemeren, F. H. van: 1987, 'Argumentation Studies' Five Estates,' in J. W. Wenzel (ed.), Argument and Critical Practice: Proceedings of the Fifth SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, Speech Communication Association, Annandale, VA, pp. 9-24. Fisher, R. A., & W. Ury: 1981, Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA. Grootendorst, R.: 1987, 'Everyday Argumentation from a Speech Act Perspective,' in J. W. Wenzel (ed.), Argument and Critical Practice: Proceedings of the Fifth SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, Speech Communication Association, Annandale, VA, pp. 165-176. Jackson, S.: 1987, 'Engineering Argument,' paper presented at the Northwestern University Conference on Language, Argument, and the Public Sphere (July 28), Evanston, IL. Jackson, S., & S. Jacobs: 1980, 'Structure of Conversational Argument: Pragmatic Bases for the Enthymeme,' Quarterly Journal of Speech 66,2S1-26S. Jackson, S., & S. Jacobs: 1981, The Collaborative Production of Proposals in Conversational Argument and Persuasion: A Study of Disagreement Regulation,' Journal of the American Forensic Association 18, 77-90. Jacobs, S.: 1987, 'Finding "Common Ground" and "Zones of Agreement": Two Roles for Argument in the Resoution of Disputes,' Northwestern University Conference on Language, Argument, and the Public Sphere (July 28), Evanston, IL. Jacobs, S., & S. Jackson: in press, 'Building a Model of Conversational Argument,' In B. Dervin, L. Grossberg, B. O'Keefe, & E. Wartella (eds.), Rethinking Communication: Research Exemplars, Sage, Beverly Hills, CA. Jacobs, S., S. Jackson, J. Hallmark, B. Hall, and S. A. Stearns: 1987, 'Ideal Argument in the Real World: Making Do in Mediation,' in J. W. Wenzel (ed.), Argument and Critical Practice: Proceedings of the Fifth SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, Speech Communication Association, Annandale, VA, pp. 291-298. Jacobs, S., S. Jackson, B. Hall, and S. A. Stearns: 1988, 'Digressions in Mediated Discourse: Multiple Goals or Standing Concerns?' paper presented at the Temple University Ninth Annual Conference on Discourse Analysis, Philadelphia, PA O'Keefe, B. J.: 1988, The Logic of Message Design: Individual Differences in Reasoning about Communication,' Communication Monographs 55, 80-103. O'Keefe, B. J., and S. A. McCornack: 1987, 'Message Design Logic and Message Goal Structure: Effects on Perceptions of Message Quality in Regulative Communication Situations,' Human Communication Research 14, 68-92. O'Keefe, B. J., and G. B. Shepherd: 1987, The Pursuit of Multiple Objectives in Face-to-Face Persuasive Interaction: Effects of Construct Differentiation on Message Organization,' Communication Monographs 54, 396-419.

Chapter 9

Argumentation: a Multiplicity of Regulated Rational Interactions Robert Maier

1. What kinds of norms can be conceived in argumentation? Argumentation is an activity between two or more individuals who try to deal with recognized differences of opinion or perspectives of actions, concerning some specific problem or domain of actions. They do so by engaging in a critical-or rational-discussion, avoiding blows and political or economic sanctions as in fights and power struggles. The aim of an argumentation is to settle the differences by reaching an agreement, or to reach the common conclusion that no agreement is possible. In a first rough approximation, norms in argumentation can be defined as standard criteria which determine (a) the conditions of starting, (b) the conditions of ending, and (c) the conditions of evaluating such a rational discussion, and (d) the composition of the units of such a discussion. A discussion consists of texts produced by the participants. These texts are composed of smaller units; therefore the question of composition has to be formulated on different levels: how are the units composed and how is the global composition organized? Portraying argumentation in such a way raises a number of questions concerning the meaning of the terms used. For example what exactly is a rational discussion, what kind of actions belong to it and how do they differ from blows and sanctions? Intuitively, the situation seems evident, only arguments should be used, preferably only relevant ones. Or, what has to be presupposed of the individuals engaging in an argumentation? Once again it is clear that these individuals should be able to distinguish between arguments and blows and that they should have verbal means to communicate with each other. Again such matters seem intuitively evident. However, when we refer to a conceptual analysis of these notions, the intelligibility vanishes, because there is no general theory of argumentation. On the contrary, various disciplines-logic, linguistics, psychology, etc.--have analyzed the notions involved and formulated incommensurate models. Argumentation, as a domain and object of investigation, may be welldelineated intuitively, but at the present moment we have no unified

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theory of this object. It is therefore not possible to resolve the problem of the norms in argumentation by examining the internal constraints of the theory and the delimitations of its domain as candidates of normative constituents of argumentation as a human interaction. However, even if such an immediate method of treating the problem of norms is not available, we do not start with empty hands. There are the numerous models of argumentation (or aspects of it) of the different disciplines, which can—and should—be used as instruments in the present venture. I will proceed in the following way: As a first step I will introduce a general terminology. Argumentation can be conceived as an inter-individual action system. Such an understanding of argumentation evidently does not provide a general theory, but it offers at least a unified conception, and therefore some guarantee to use the various-partial-models of the different disciplines in an appropriate and comparable way. As a second step I shall examine the possibility of existence of a unique, general system of norms governing all types of argumentation. That would be a system of constituted norms, which means that these norms are directly manifest in at least the four moments indicated above. But as we will see, such a system is possible only under very restrictive circumstances; individuals as speakers would be excluded, for example. Therefore it is necessary to examine in a subsequent step the possibility of existence of a unique and general system of constitutive norms for argumentation. Contrary to constituted norms, which are immediately manifest in the activity of arguing, constitutive norms determine only more or less definite limiting conditions concerning argumentation, for example the exclusion of blows or the definition of a certain attitude for the individuals. However, as before, the conclusion will be that a general system of constitutive norms can be conceived only at the price of excluding many types of argumentation. As a consequence of the preceding points, it seems necessary to define another, more open approach towards norms in argumentation. As a last step I will outline a perspective on argumentation, which does not exclude normativity entirely. Multiplicities of norms will have to be conceived, without however falling into a purely empirical diversity or into a relativistic swamp. 2. Argumentation as (inter)action The numerous studies of argumentation by different disciplines have not provided a general theory of argumentation. Such a disappointing state of affairs is certainly due to many reasons—such as the disciplinary boundaries-but I will consider here only one of these reasons: the rather antagonistic conceptions of argumentation we can find in these studies.

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First, there is a distinction between normative and empirical studies of argumentation. Those two are not completely unrelated, because empirical studies, such as the investigations of efficient persuasion, have sooner or later normative consequences. On the other hand, normative theories of argumentation-even the purely a priori ones-have to confront the test of application, be it only in strongly schematized contexts. However at the moment, in the literature on persuasion there are no references of dialectical logic, and the a priori study of the rules of rational discussion does not consider the results of social psychology. Second, argumentation is either studied globally or some specific local property of argumentation is analyzed. For example, the description of argumentation as rational, heuristic or eristic, as balanced or unbalanced, constitutes a global approach, whereas studies of some particular fallacy or of the pertinence of an argument are local ones. Third, there is a clear disparity between studies of argumentation concentrating on the externally observable utterances and others stressing the internal intentions or beliefs of the participants of the argumentation. Each of these approaches captures some important aspects of argumentation. When analyzing the general problem of norms in argumentation, it is therefore unsuitable to depart from one and only one combination, for example a normative, global approach, concentrating on externally observable utterances. Such a limited starting point would entail an equally~or even more—limited account of norms. For this reason I choose to describe argumentation as an (inter)action, following Apostel (1982), without pretending to offer a general theory. Such a method of description has the advantage of not being tributary to one of the particular perspectives on argumentation mentioned; on the contrary, all of them can be formulated within it. Here is not the place to discuss in detail the state of action theory, and of interaction theory which is evidently part of it. It should be sufficient for the present purpose to indicate how argumentation can be conceived in terms of action theory. An action is a transformation of the environment in order to realize a purpose. This definition supposes that human individuals can be agents effectuating such actions. But it does not entail that all activities of individuals are actions, nor that there is a unique center of actions. In other words, individuals can be agents in many different respects. An action can be analyzed formally, by specifying in particular the properties of the agent, the material, the instruments, the purpose and the resistances; but as I already said I will not go into such details here. Characteristic for actions are (a) the degree of realization of the purpose by the transformation, (b) the degree of anticipation of the transformation by the agent, and (c) the degree of transformation of the agent, the instruments used, and the respective environment of the transforma-

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tion. If these degrees are ordered in some way, one can study the consequences of increasing~or decreasing-these degrees and their interactions. There are actions which prepare only other actions. An action is a preparatory action with respect to another one if (1) this action creates the conditions for the realization of the other one, and if (2) the result of this action is not as such the purpose for its agent. When agents coordinate their actions in such a way that the joint result enables them to realize purposes they would like to obtain but cannot achieve alone, these actions are interactions. It is now possible to define a discussion as an interaction: A discussion is an interaction bringing together preparatory actions of different agents with the purpose of making possible later collective or individual actions. The preparation of a future collective or individual action is seen as one of the main features of discussions, and in particular of argumentation. Such a definition seems rather limited; indeed semantics and pragmatics have not been introduced. As we will see further on, the use of language can be perfectly well captured within action theory. Here it should be sufficient (a) to introduce in this framework the notions of proponent and opponent, and of attack and defense which are important for argumentation, and (b) to suggest a characterization of argumentation in terms of action theory. a. A proponent is an agent who introduces a certain transformation in order to prepare a future action. An opponent will be an agent who strives to suspend and demolish the introduced transformation by the former agent in order to prepare the common action in a different way. In other words, a proponent suggests an initiative, whereas an opponent tries only to eliminate the consequences of such an initiative. An attack is an action which attempts to eliminate a position, a certain preparatory state; an agent executing an attack is therefore a local opponent. The defense of a position is an action which tries to strengthen this position; this can be done either by supporting this position with the help of other transformations or by attacking an attack of this position. In the first case the defending agent is a local proponent and in the second one a local opponent. In summary, proponents and opponents are global roles in a discussion, whereas attack and defense are local performances. b. Hamblin (1970) has characterized an argument as an attempt to defend a conclusion in such a way that (a) the statements used for the defense are at least as well accepted as the other statements accepted by the participants, (b) the relation between the means of defense and the position defended is commonly accepted among the participants, (c) also the presuppositions made are customary, and (d) the conclusion defended by an argument would be less acceptable, if the argument were not used than if it were used. Such a characterization of an argument can be immediately cast in terms of action theory. An action~in the present

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case a preparatory action—can be executed if the agent disposes of the materials and instruments required by this task, if the needed combinations of instruments and materials needed can be realized, if the needed processes, not explicitly created, are realized as unintended side-effects, and if the result would not come into existence without executing the preparatory action. Up to now I have introduced action theory exclusively as a language which can speak about the different aspects of argumentation. No particular theoretical perspective on argumentation has been formulated, which was possible because action theory is not restricted to one of the perspectives on argumentation presented in the beginning. 3. A universal mechanic for argumentation? In the introduction, norms have been presented as standard criteria, determining the start, end, and evaluation of an argumentative discussion, and also the composition of the constitutive elements of this discussion. Having put forward a description of argumentation in terms of actions, a more specific outline of norms is indicated. In a first approximation, norms can now be defined as regulations of actions. Depending on the type of interpretation of the action system, there will be different forms of appearance of these regulations: (a) In a formalized theory of argumentation-be it formulated after some inductive steps or a priori-which defines the roles of proponent and opponent, the regulations will appear asrightsand duties attributed to these roles, with a precise definition of losing and winning. (b) In a normative theory of argumentation, based on induction or not, criteria will be defined in order to discriminate between good or real argumentation, occurring in a rational or critical discussion, and forms of argumentation which are disqualified. The regulations of actions appear in this case as rules or prescriptions, permitting this discrimination to be made. (c) In an interpretation of argumentation as concrete occurrences of preparatory (inter)actions between socio-historically situated individuals, the regulations of actions will appear as normative facts. They are facts on the one hand, because of their empirical regularity, but they are norms on the other hand, because for the concerned individuals they are self-evident obligations, which are observed. In general, these selfevident obligations are not consciously understood nor intentionally applied. For the individuals as agents, these self-evident obligations are properties of the preparatory actions themselves.

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A first problem was the possible existence of a unique system of constituted norms regulating argumentation. That would mean that all the different aspects and moments of the preparatory action system are regulated by one and the same set of regulations. It is rather evident that in formalized theories we will find such a set of regulations, defined in terms of rights and duties, for a condition of existence of formalized theory to present a finite list of clauses, be it in the form of axioms or permitted combinations. Such formalized dialogues have been presented by Lorenzen, Lorenz, Barth, and others. Such a fact seems to settle the problem. But according to me a formalized theory is a calculus, with some precise objects and rules, and nothing else. The main problem for me is to examine which aspects of argumentation are apprehended and defined as objects and rules in such a formal system. Only if the main aspects of argumentation are captured in such a way, can we speak of a formal theory of argumentation; as we will see that is not at all the case. To demonstrate that no such unique set of norms can be conceived for argumentation means to show that at least one of the main aspects of the preparatory action system constituting an argumentation is regulated necessarily by a multiplicity of norms. I will not limit myself to one example, but present several in order to illustrate more fully the present approach and also in order to get more material for later points of discussion. Let's start with some local and global properties of the preparatory action system. In this formulation, an argumentation is a collective action system, with the purpose of preparing other actions, by changing the beliefs-which can be defined as dispositions of actions~of the participants, or by concluding that no further common action is desirable or possible. Actions aiming at certain goals, reach these goals (a) in a more or less specific way, (b) in a more or less economic way and (c) with more or less guarantees of a stable result. These three criteria of evaluation hold for discussions, and in particular for argumentative discussions, as for all other collective action systems. The first, specificity, would mean for discussions that agreement~or the certainty that agreement is impossible-should be reached as soon as possible. An optimalization of a discussion according to this dimension of evaluation would imply that only a minimal number of attacks and defenses are permitted. Let's say the participants can only attack and defend a position once, and any position, which is not attacked immediately, is accepted henceforth. Good examples are discussions at international conferences. In general there is not much time for discussion; that's why it is necessary to concentrate immediately on the main points, to formulate these points sharply, and to leave the philosophical and conceptual context aside. Never more than one repetition is allowed.

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On the other hand, when attempting an optimalization of stability, the participants will engage in many defenses and attacks, or even in all kinds of sub-discussions. A result reached by such a process offers more guarantees to be stable in the future. Considering only the criteria of specificity and stability, we can already conclude that those two cannot be optimalized together. The optimalization of one excludes the optimalization of the other. The same conclusion holds also for economy. That means that the three above-mentioned criteria of evaluation, which apply to all discussions, are multi-dimensional. Therefore there isn't a unique optimal form of discussion, and no universally valid system of constituted norms which would guarantee this optimum. When analyzing a discussion as a collective (inter)action, one can also examine the local properties of the relations between elementary actions. These actions use utterances as instruments, and these actions can be combined. It is extremely easy to show that these combinations will have properties which are quite different from the properties of the classical logical constants by using some results of Apostel (1981), in his attempt to found logic on praxeology. In a first step, one could indicate some similarities. For example, disjunction would correspond to a choice between two actions. Conjunction would correspond to executing two actions simultaneously or in immediate succession, order being irrelevant. Implication would correspond to a conditional action, and negation would correspond to an action reacting to the failure of another action. But this superficial similarity evaporates as soon as one analyzes more in detail the combination of actions. Let's take the conjunction of actions. It is immediately evident that two arbitrary actions may be either relevant to each other or not. Relevance of one action for another means that the first facilitates the successful execution of the other. Only in the first case will a conjunction of actions make any sense. Supposing that a first action is established, and then a second one, does not necessarily give us a conjunction, independently of the relation of these actions to each other, as would be the case in classical logic. The form of disjunction could be related to a problem of choice between two actions. But two actions are either two different means in the pursuit of the same aim, or they correspond to two different aims. In this last case, for choice being to some extent rational, the two actions should be related to a superordinate goal. Anyway, disjunction of two arbitrary actions is not possible~as in classical logic-without further specifications. As a last example, let's consider negation. For actions, that would mean first a failure of some action, and then the execution of another action as a reaction to the failure of the first. A negation introduced in this way will have non-classical properties for three reasons: (1) every action can fail in many different and incompatible ways, (2) many different and even incompatible reactions to a failure may occur, and (3) for actions it

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is not possible to define minimal failures or minimal compensations present in the reaction to a failure. Moreover, an action which failed once may succeed at another moment, in another context. Negations of actions, conceived in this way, have totally different properties from the negation of classical logic. For any action there will be a multiplicity of non-equivalent negations. We can conclude that classical logic is in general not valid in discussions. It holds only in some well-specified contexts, and it would be interesting to analyze why these contexts got such a prominent consideration. More important for us here is the conclusion that the combination of preparatory actions is context- and content-dependent; therefore it is impossible to conceive a general and exhaustive system of constituted norms for argumentative discussions. There are other reasons which would justify the same result. I limit myself here to indicate some of them, without going into any detail. The Russian linguist Mucnik (see Dittmar 1978, p. 221) has presented a number of antinomies which are, according to him, manifest in any conversation, excluding any optimal, stable solution. Mucnik formulates these antinomies—following Jacobson~as linguistic contradictions. As an example, one can mention the antinomy between code and text, that is, the conflict between the tendency to reduce the code and extend the text, or the inverse tendency. Bulow (1972) presented still another category of conflict, which can be found in any discussion. This conflict is based on the following unavoidable, but erroneous, assumptions which any act of communication has to use: no speaker knows sufficiently how this speaker engages in the discussion. But there is more: a speaker never grasps sufficiently his/her own intentions (which may even change all along the discussion) and will therefore not have a precise control of the subject of discussion. And, once the discussion is finished, no participant will have a sufficient grasp of the final state to be able to evaluate exactly the success or failure of the argumentation. But at the same time the participants must do as if they knew perfectly well the initial state, the intended aim, and the final state of the discussion. These fictions are certainly introduced only while trying to realize them. But there will be a continual conflict between (a) the attempts to verify to what degree these fictional hypotheses are satisfied, and (b) the attempts to realize these fictions, supposing them verified. Such a conclusion is after all not astonishing; after some fifty years of domination of syntax and formal semantics, pragmatics and rhetoric have had their vengeance; numerous critical studies have pointed out the limited applications of formal logic. This conclusion entails that the formal models of rational dialogues capture only very reduced and poor aspects of argumentation; individuals as agents, with their preparatory actions, have no place in these models.

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4. Is there a general dynamic for argumentation? There are no fixed, universally determined norms regulating the different aspects of argumentation, but necessarily a multiplicity of norms. But aren't there at least some more general norms, which would insure an articulate, global regulation of argumentation? These would be constitutive norms, which do not determine in detail all the various aspects of argumentation. The possibility of existence of a general system of constituted norms has been rejected, by showing that several essential aspects of argumentative discussions are not regulated exclusively by one general norm. For constitutive norms there is no comparable decisive procedure of analysis, and the conclusion will be less categorical. I will first present different formulations of constitutive norms, and then analyze in detail one particular theory, which posits general constitutive norms. Finally I will offer some general reasons, which point to a diversity of constitutive norms. As in the case of constituted norms, we can distinguish several types of constitutive norms: a. First of all, constitutive norms can appear in the form ofpre