Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another 9783866538658

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Principles of European Law on Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another (PEL Liab. Dam.)

Principles of European Law Study Group on a European Civil Code

Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another (PEL Liab. Dam.)

prepared by

Professor Christian v. Bar, Osnabrück Chairman of the Working Team on Extra-contractual Obligations with advice from the Advisory Council and the Drafting Committee approved by the Co-ordinating Group Particular advice on the drafting of the Articles from Professor John Blackie, Strathclyde, Professor Eric Clive, Edinburgh, and Dr. Stephen Swann, Osnabrück Translation: Dr. Stephen Swann, Pádraic McCannon and Susan Singleton, Osnabrück

The Osnabrück Working Team Begoña Alfonso de la Riva (Spanish law, August 1999-August 2003), Dr. Erwin Beysen (Belgian, French and Luxemburgian law 1999-November 2006), Sandie Calme (Belgian, French and Luxemburgian law (since January 2007), Dr. Evlalia Eleftheriadou (Greek law), Silvia Fedrizzi (Italian law, August 1999-October 2000), Dr. Andreas Fötschl (Austrian law, August 1999-April 2005), Dr. Caterina Gozzi (Italian law, February 2001-January 2008), Lodewijk Gualthérie van Weezel (Dutch law, February 2001-August 2002), Dr. Annamaria Herpai (Hungarian law, since October 2003), Dr. Matthias Hünert (German law), Dr. Stefan Kettler (Irish law, November 1999-August 2001), Ina El Kobbia (organisation and minutes for the Co-ordinating Group and the Advisory Council), Rosalie Koolhoven (Dutch law, since March 2003), Dr. María Ángeles Martín Vida (Spanish law, September 2003-January 2006), Pádraic McCannon (Irish and Scots law, August 2006-December 2007), Dr. Mary-Rose McGuire (Austrian law, since May 2005), Paul McKane (Irish and Scots law, August 2005-July 2006), Philip Mielnicki (Nordic laws, since February 2007), Franz Nieper (Dutch law, November 1999-October 2000), José Carlos de Medeiros Nóbrega (Portuguese law, August 1999-December 2005 and January 2008-December 2008), Sandra Rohlfing (Working Team rapporteur), Johan Sandstedt (Nordic laws, April 2001-December 2006), Marta Lívia dos Santos Silva (Portuguese law, August 2005-September 2007), Dr. Mårten Schultz (Nordic laws, January 2000-March 2001), Susan Singleton (Irish law, since January 2008), Daniel Smith (took care of the Master Copy), Dimitar Stoimenov (Bulgarian and Slovenian law, since October 2005), Dr. Stephen Swann (English law), Ferenc Szilágyi (Romanian law, since July 2005) and Carles Vendrell Cervantes (Spanish law, since June 2006). The Advisory Council on Non-contractual Liability Law for Damage Professor John W. Blackie (Strathclyde), Professor Carlo Castronovo (Milan), Professor Eugenia Dacoronia (Athens), Professor Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson (Paris), Professor Jan Kleineman (Stockholm, until June 2003), Professor Denis Mazeaud (Paris), Professor Guillermo Palao Moreno (Valencia), Professor Edgar du Perron (Amsterdam). The Co-ordinating Group Professor Guido Alpa (Genua/Rome, until May 2005), Professor Kaspars Balodis (Riga, December 2004 until December 2006), Professor Christian von Bar (Osnabrück, chairman), Professor Maurits Barendrecht (Tilburg, until May 2005), Professor Hugh Beale (Warwick), Dr. Mircea-Dan Bob (Cluj Napoca, since June 2007), Professor Michael Joachim Bonell (Rome), Professor Mifsud G. Bonnici (Valetta, since December 2004), Professor Carlo Castronovo (Milan), Professor Eric Clive (Edinburgh), Professor Eugenia Dacoronia (Athens), Professor Ulrich Drobnig (Hamburg), Professor Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson (Paris), Professor Marcel Fontaine (Louvain La Neuve, until December 2003),

Professor Andreas Furrer (Lucerne, since December 2003), Professor Jacques Ghestin (Paris), Professor Sir Roy Goode (Oxford, until December 2002), Professor Viggo Hagstrøm (Oslo, since June 2002), Professor Arthur Hartkamp (The Hague, until December 2002), Supreme Court Judge Torgny Håstad (Stockholm), Professor Johnny Herre (Stockholm), Professor Martijn Hesselink (Amsterdam), Professor Ewoud Hondius (Utrecht, until May 2005), Professor Jérôme Huet (Paris), Professor Giovanni Iudica (Milan, since June 2004), Dr. Monika Jurcˇova (Trnava, since June 2006), Professor Konstantinos Kerameus (Athens), Professor Ole Lando (Copenhagen), Professor Kåre Lilleholt (Oslo, since June 2003), Professor Brigitta Lurger (Graz), Professor Hector MacQueen (Edinburgh), Professor Denis Mazeaud (Paris, since June 2005), Professor Ewan McKendrick (Oxford), Professor Valentinas Mikelenas (Vilnius, since December 2004), Professor Eoin O’Dell (Dublin, until June 2006), Professor Edgar du Perron (Amsterdam), Professor Denis Philippe (Leuven, since June 2004), Professor Jerzy Rajski (Warsaw), Professor Christina Ramberg (Gothenburg), Professor Philippe Rémy (Poitiers, until June 2005), Supreme Court Judge Professor Encarna Roca y Trias (Madrid/Barcelona), Professor Peter Schlechtriem† (Freiburg i. Br.), Professor Martin Schmidt-Kessel (Osnabrück, since December 2004), Professor Jorge Sinde Monteiro (Coimbra, until December 2004), Professor Lena Sisula-Tulokas (Helsinki), Professor Sophie Stijns (Leuven), Professor Matthias Storme (Leuven), Dr. Stephen Swann (Osnabrück), Professor Christian Takoff (Sofia, since June 2007), Professor Lubos˘ Tichy´ (Prague, since June 2005), Professor Verica Trstenjak (Maribor, until December 2006), Professor Vibe Ulfbeck (Copenhagen, since June 2006), Professor Paul Varul (Tartu, since June 2003), Professor Lajos Vékás (Budapest), Professor Anna Veneziano (Teramo). Further Members of the Study Group’s Advisory Councils Professor Michael G. Bridge (London, Property Law and Security), Professor Angel Carrasco (Toledo, Security), Professor Pierre Crocq (Paris, Security), Professor Júlio Manuel Vieira Gomes (Oporto, Unjustified enrichment law and Benevolent intervention in another’s affairs), Professor Helmut Grothe (Berlin, Lease of goods), Professor Irene Kull (Tartu, Lease of goods, Donation, Trust law), Professor Marco Loos (Amsterdam, Service contracts; Mandate), Professor Graham Moffat (Warwick; Trust Law, since May 2006), Professor Maria A. L. Puelinckx-van Coene (Antwerp, Donation), Dr. Kristina Siig (Arhus, Unjustified enrichment law and Benevolent intervention in another’s affairs), Professor Stefano Troiano (Verona, Donation), Professor Antoni Vaquer Aloy (Lleida, Lease of goods, Donation), Professor Alain Verbeke (Leuven and Tilburg, Lease of goods), Professor Anders Victorin† (Stockholm, Lease of goods), Professor Sarah Worthington (London, Lease of goods).

Volume 7

To be cited as: PEL / von Bar, Liab. Dam., Chapter 1, Introduction, A, 1 PEL / von Bar, Liab. Dam., Chapter 1, Article 1:101, Comments, A, 1 PEL / von Bar, Liab. Dam., Chapter 1, Article 1:101, Notes, I, 1

ISSN ISBN ISBN ISBN

1860-0905 978-3-7272-1807-1 (Stämpfli) 978-2-8027-2559-6 (Bruylant) 978-3-935808-63-7 (sellier. european law publishers)

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. © 2009 by sellier. european law publishers GmbH, Munich together with

Study Group on a European Civil Code. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of the publisher. Design: Sandra Sellier, Munich. Production: Karina Hack, Munich. Typesetting: fidus Publikations-Service GmbH, Nördlingen. Typeface: Goudy Old Style and Goudy Sans from Linotype. Printing and binding: Friedrich Pustet KG, Regensburg. Printed on acid-free, non-ageing paper. Printed in Germany.

Foreword The Study Group on a European Civil Code has taken upon itself the task of drafting common European principles for the most important aspects of the law of obligations and for certain parts of the law of property in moveables which are especially relevant for the functioning of the common market. It was founded in 1999 as a successor body to the Commission on European Contract Law, on whose work the Study Group is building. Both groups have undertaken to ascertain and formulate European standards of ‘patrimonial’ law for the Member States of the European Union. The Commission on European Contract has achieved this for the field of general contract law (Lando and Beale [eds.], Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II combined and revised, The Hague, 2000; Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann [eds.], Principles of European Contract Law Part III, The Hague, 2003). These Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) are being adopted with adjustments by the Study Group on a European Civil Code to take account of new developments and input from its research partners. The Study Group is itself dovetailing its principles with those of the PECL, extending their encapsulation of standards of patrimonial law in three directions: (i) by developing rules for specific types of contracts; (ii) by developing rules for extra-contractual obligations, i. e. the law of non-contractual liability arising out of damage caused to another (tort /delict), the law of unjustified enrichment, and the law of benevolent intervention in another’s affairs (negotiorum gestio); and (iii) by developing rules for fundamental questions in the law on mobile assets – in particular transfer of ownership, security for credit, and trust. Like the Commission on European Contract Law’s Principles of European Contract Law, the results of the research conducted by the Study Group on a European Civil Code seek to advance the process of Europeanisation of private law. We have undertaken this endeavour on our own personal initiative and merely present the results of a pan-European research project. It is a study in comparative law in so far as we have always taken care to identify the legal position in the Member States of the European Union and to set out the results of this research in the introductions and notes. That of course does not mean that we have only been concerned with documenting the pool of shared legal values or that we simply adopted the majority position among the legal systems where common ground was missing. Rather we have consistently striven to draw up “sound and fitting” principles, that is to say, we have also recurrently developed proposals and concepts for the further development of private law in Europe. The working methods of the Commission on European Contract Law and the Study Group on a European Civil Code were likewise quite similar. The Study Group, however, has had the benefit of Working (or Research) Teams – groups of younger legal scholars under the supervision of a senior member of the Group (a Team Leader) which undertook the basic comparative legal research, developed the drafts for discussion and assembled the extensive material required for the notes. Furthermore, to each Working Team was

vii

Foreword

allocated a consultative body – an Advisory Council. These bodies – deliberately kept small in the interests of efficiency – were formed from leading experts in the relevant field of law who are representative of the major European legal systems. The proposals drafted by the Working Teams and critically scrutinised and improved in a series of meetings by the respective Advisory Council were submitted for discussion on a revolving basis to the actual decision-making body of the Study Group on a European Civil Code, the Co-ordinating Group. Until June 2004 the Co-ordinating Group consisted of representatives from all the jurisdictions belonging to the EU immediately prior to its enlargement in Spring 2004 and in addition legal scholars from Estonia, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Slovenia and Switzerland. Representatives from the Czech Republic, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia joined us after the June meeting 2004 in Warsaw. Besides its permanent members, other participants in the Co-ordinating Group with voting rights included all the Team Leaders and – when the relevant material was up for discussion – the members of the Advisory Council concerned. The results of the deliberations during the week-long sittings of the Co-ordinating Group were incorporated into the text of the Articles and the commentaries which returned to the agenda for the next meeting of the Co-ordinating Group (or the next but one depending on the work load of the Group and the Team affected). Each part of the project was the subject of debate on manifold occasions, some stretching over many years. Where a unanimous opinion could not be achieved, majority votes were taken. As far as possible the Articles drafted in English were translated into the other languages either by members of the Team or third parties commissioned for the purpose. The number of languages into which the Articles could be translated admittedly varies considerably from volume to volume. That is in part a consequence of the fact that not all Working Teams were equipped with the same measure of financial support. We also had to resign ourselves to the absence of a perfectly uniform editorial style. Our editing guidelines provided a common basis for scholarly publication, but at the margin had to accommodate preferences of individual teams. However, this should not cause the reader any problems in comprehension. Work on this series of Principles of European Law had begun long before the European Commission published its Communication on European Contract Law (in 2001), its Action Plan for a more coherent European contract law (in 2003), and its follow-up Communication “European Contract Law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward” (in 2004). These documents for their part were published before we formed the Network of Excellence, together with other European research groups and institutions, which have been collaborating in the preparation of an Academic Common Frame of Reference with the support of funds from the European Community’s Sixth Research Framework Programme. This network has published an outline edition of its research results: as a first step, in 2008, an interim outline edition (von Bar/Clive/Schulte-Nölke et al. [eds.], Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). Interim Outline Edition, Munich 2008); and, with revisions and additions, a final outline edition this year (von Bar/Clive/Schulte-Nölke et al. [eds.], Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). Outline Edition, Munich 2009). A final and full edition is in preparation for publication in 2009. The texts laid before the public by the Study Group on a European Civil Code are integrated into these latter texts. However, viii

Foreword

the extensive comparative law introductions and the translations of the Articles of the Book or Part concerned into the other languages of the Member States are only being published in the PEL Series. Moreover, there are occasionally small discrepancies between the model rules published in this series and those of the Draft Common Frame of Reference because each publication within the PEL Series was conceived and prepared as a self-contained treatment of the field, while in the consolidated composite DCFR text certain provisions could be trimmed. Repetitions could be avoided. It was also possible to respond to criticism which had been made of the model rules in the PEL Series in the meantime and which had convinced us of the need to make changes. In order to leave no room for misunderstanding, it is important to stress that these Principles have been prepared by impartial and independent-minded scholars whose sole interest has been a devotion to the subject-matter. None of us have been rewarded for taking part or mandated to do so. None of us would want to give the impression that we claim any political legitimation for promoting harmonisation of the law. Our legitimation is confined to curiosity and an interest in Europe. In other words, the volumes in this series are to be understood exclusively as the results of scholarly legal research within large international teams. Like every other scholarly legal work, they restate the current law and introduce possible models for its further development; no less, but also no more. We are not a homogenous group whose every member is an advocate of the idea of a European Civil Code. We are, after all, only a Study Group. The question whether a European Civil Code is or is not desirable is a political one to which each member can only express an individual view. Osnabrück, April 2009

Christian v. Bar

ix

Our Sponsors and Donors The project of the Study Group on a European Civil Code represents a research endeavour in legal science of extraordinary magnitude. Without the generous financial support of many organisations and individuals its realisation would not have been possible. Our thanks go first of all to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), which supplied the lion’s share of the financing for the first phase of this project, including the salaries of the Working Teams based in Germany and the direct travel costs for the meetings of the Coordinating Group and the numerous Advisory Councils. The work of the Dutch Working Teams was financed by the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO). Further personnel costs were met by the Flemish Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek-Vlaanderen (FWO), the Onassis-Foundation, the Austrian Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung, Norges forskningsråd (the Research Council of Norway) and the Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian. From the middle of 2005 funds were made available to us under the mantle of the ‘CoPECL’ Network of Excellence established under the European Union’s Sixth Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development. In addition we have consistently been able to fall back on funds made available to the respective organisers of the eighteen week long sittings of the Coordinating Group by the relevant university or other sources within the country concerned. It is therefore with the deepest gratitude that we must also mention the Consiglio nazionale forense (Rom) and the Istituto di diritto privato of the Università di Roma La Sapienza, which co-financed the meeting in Rome (June 2000), which followed our inaugural meeting in Utrecht (December 1999). The session in Salzburg (December 2000) was supported by the Austrian Bundesministerium für Bildung, Wissenschaft und Kultur, the Universität Salzburg and the Institut für Rechtspolitik of the Universität Salzburg. The discussions in Stockholm (June 2001) were assisted by the Department of Law, Stockholm University, the Supreme Court Justice Edward Cassel’s Foundation and Stiftelsen Juridisk Fakultetslitteratur (SJF). The meeting in Oxford (December 2001) had the support of Shearman [&] Sterling, the Hulme Trust, Berwin Leighton Paisner and the Oxford University Press (OUP). The session in Valencia (June 2002) was made possible by the Asociación Nacional de Registradores de la Propiedad, Mercantil y Bienes Muebles, the Universitat de València, the Ministerio Español de Ciencia y Tecnología, the Facultad de Derecho of the Universitat de València, the Departamento de Derecho Internacional, Departamento de Derecho Civil and the Departamento de Derecho Mercantil “Manuel Broseta Pont” of the Universitat de València, the law firm Cuatrecasas, the Generalitat Valenciana, the Corts Valencianes, the Diputación Provincial de Valencia, the Ayuntamiento de Valencia, the Colegio de Abogados de Valencia and Aranzadi Publishing Company. The subsequent meeting in Oporto (December 2002) was substantially assisted by the Universidade Católica Portuguesa – Centro Regional do Porto. For the week long session in Helsinki (June 2003) we were able to rely on funds from Suomen Kultuurirahasto (Finnish Cultural Foundation), the Niilo Helanderin Säätiö (Niilo

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Our Sponsors and Donors

Helander Foundation), the Suomalainen Lakimeisyhdistys (Finnish Lawyers Association), the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Nordea Bank, Roschier Holmberg Attorneys Ltd., Hannes Snellman Attorneys Ltd., the Department of Private Law and the Institute of International Commercial Law (KATTI) of Helsinki University. The session in Leuven (December 2003) was supported by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Faculteit Rechtsgeleerdheid, and the FWO Vlaanderen Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (Flanders Scientific Research Fund). The meeting of the Group in Warsaw (June 2004) was substantially assisted by the Fundacja Fundusz Wspolpracy (The Cooperation Fund) and the Faculty of Law and Administration of Warsaw University. The meeting in Milan (December 2004) was supported by the Università Bocconi and its Istituto di diritto comparato, by the Milan Camera di Commercio, by the Associazione Civilisti Italiani and by the Comune di Milano. The meeting in Berlin (June 2005) was made possible by PricewaterhouseCoopers Deutschland AG, Frankfurt/Berlin; Sievert AG [&] Co., Osnabrück, and by Verband deutscher Hypothekenbanken e. V., Berlin. The meeting in Tartu (December 2005) was supported by the University of Tartu, its Faculty of Law, its Institute of Law and its Institute of Private Law, by the Estonian Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice, the Tartu City Government, Iuridicum Foundation, the Law Offices Concordia, Lepik [&] Luhaäär, Luiga Mody Hääl Borenius, Ots [&] Co, Aivar Pilv, Aare Raig, Raidla [&] Partners, Sorainen, Tark [&] Co, Teder Glikman [&] Partners, Paul Varul, Alvin Rödl [&] Partner and Lextal Law Firm. The meeting in Oslo (June 2006) was made possible by the kongelige Justis- og Politidepartement (The Royal Ministry of Justice), by Sigvald Bergesen d. y., by hustru Nankis Almennyttige stiftelse, Storebrand and the law firms Wiersholm and BA-HR. The meeting in Lucerne (December 2006) was sponsored by Schulthess Publishing Company, by Schweizerischer Nationalfonds and by the Universität Luzern, the meeting in Budapest (June 2007) by Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem (Eötvös Loránd University), by Magyar Tudományos Akadémia (the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), by MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt (the Hungarian Oil [&] Gas Company) and by Szalma [&] Partnerei Ügyvédi Iroda (Szalma [&] Partners Attorneys at Law), and the meeting in Prague (Deˇ eská advokátní komora (the Czech Bar Association), White [&] Case cember 2007) by C Prague, Squire, Sanders [&] Dempsey, Prague, Ladislav Krym, Attorney at Law, Prague, Jan Brozˇ, Attorney at Law, Prague and the Representation of the European Commission in Prague. Our final meeting in Athens (June 2008) had the support of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation, the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, the Union of Greek Civil Law Jurists and the Municipality of Athens. We thank all of these organisations and institutions for the funds which they made available to us and for the extraordinary warmth of hospitality with which our hosts received us. Osnabrück, April 2009

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Christian v. Bar

Preface to this volume This text on the law of extra-contractual liability for damage caused to another was the subject of deliberation by the Coordinating Group of the Study Group on a European Civil Code at its week-long meetings in Utrecht (December 1999), Rome (June 2000), Stockholm (June 2001), Oxford (December 2001), Valencia (June 2002), Leuven (December 2003), Warsaw (June 2004), Berlin (June 2005) and Tartu (December 2005). This followed detailed discussions with the Working Team’s Advisory Council. The Working Team, for its part, prepared under my management the initial drafts and integrated the improvements recommended (on occasions only after a vote) at the various levels of expert deliberation. It is on this basis that I have composed the comparative legal introductions, the comments to the individual Articles and the notes setting out current national law. I am deeply indebted to the members of our Osnabrück Working Team and to Dr. Roman Trzaskowski (Warsaw) for the material which has enabled this. They have carried the main burden of the research work and without them this book would not have been possible. The title of this volume “Non-contractual liability arising out of damage caused to another” was suggested by Professor Eric Clive, Edinburgh. We have gratefully taken it up. The expression “tort law” is too tied to the Common Law tradition, while “law of delict” is too closely allied to the latin tradition and, moreover, no longer entirely correct, semantically considered, in view of the widespread forms of liability without intention or negligence. Wherever possible the legislation, case law and academic works are considered and cited as they stood at June 2008. Osnabrück, April 2009

Christian v. Bar

xiii

Short Table of Contents Text of Articles

1

Principles of European Law on Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to another Chapter 1: Fundamental provisions Introduction

229

Article 1:101: Basic rule Article 1:102: Prevention Article 1:103: Scope of application

243 265 274

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

299

Section 1: General Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

303

Section 2: Particular instances of legally relevant damage Article 2:201: Personal injury and consequential loss Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death Article 2:203: Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy Article 2:204: Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another Article 2:205: Loss upon breach of confidence Article 2:206: Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession Article 2:207: Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information Article 2:208: Loss upon unlawful impairment of business Article 2:209: Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment Article 2:210: Loss upon fraudulent misrepresentation Article 2:211: Loss upon inducement of non-performance of obligation

359 389 418 443 467 478 510 520 529 538 546

xv

Short Table of Contents

Chapter 3: Accountability Introduction Section 1: Intention and negligence Article 3:101: Intention Article 3:102: Negligence Article 3:103: Persons under eighteen Article 3:104: Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons Section 2: Accountability without intention or negligence Article 3:201: Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives Article 3:202: Accountability for damage caused by the unsafe state of an immovable Article 3:203: Accountability for damage caused by animals Article 3:204: Accountability for damage caused by defective products Article 3:205: Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles Article 3:206: Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions Article 3:207: Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage Article 3:208: Abandonment

557

568 580 601 613

632 656 673 686 703 718 735 742

Chapter 4: Causation Article 4:101: General rule Article 4:102: Collaboration Article 4:103: Alternative causes

747 773 780

Chapter 5: Defences Section 1: Consent or conduct of the person suffering the damage Article 5:101: Consent and acting at own risk Article 5:102: Contributory fault and accountability Article 5:103: Damage caused by a criminal to a collaborator

789 807 837

Section 2: Interests of accountable persons or third parties Article 5:201: Authority conferred by law Article 5:202: Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity Article 5:203: Protection of public interest

841 847 862

xvi

Short Table of Contents

Section 3: Inability to control Article 5:301: Mental incompetence Article 5:302: Event beyond control

872 881

Section 4: Contractual exclusion and restriction of liability Article 5:401: Contractual exclusion and restriction of liability

891

Section 5: Loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death) Article 5:501: Extension of defences against the injured person to third persons

902

Chapter 6: Remedies Section 1: Reparation in general Article 6:101: Aim and forms of reparation Article 6:102: De minimis rule Article 6:103: Equalisation of benefits Article 6:104: Multiple persons suffering damage Article 6:105: Solidary liability Article 6:106: Assignment of right to reparation

907 927 932 945 952 960

Section 2: Compensation Article 6:201: Right of election Article 6:202: Reduction of liability Article 6:203: Capitalisation and quantification Article 6:204: Compensation for injury as such

967 971 977 986

Section 3: Prevention Article 6:301: Right to prevention Article 6:302: Liability for loss in preventing damage

991 998

Chapter 7: Ancillary rules Article 7:101: National constitutional laws Article 7:102: Statutory provisions Article 7:103: Public law functions and court proceedings Article 7:104: Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers’ associations Article 7:105: Reduction or exclusion of liability to indemnified persons

1005 1007 1010

Annexes

1033

1019 1027

xvii

Table of Contents Foreword

vii

Our Sponsors and Donors

xi

Preface to this volume

xiii

Text of Articles English Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another

3

Bulgarian Извъндoiгoiвoiрна oiтгoiвoiрнoiст, прoiизтиЧаща oiт вреда, приЧинена другиму

16

Danish Erstatning uden for kontrakt for skade, som tilføjes en anden

30

Dutch Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid voor schade veroorzaakt aan een ander

42

Estonian Teisele isikule kahju tekitamisest tulenev lepinguväline vastutus

55

Finnish Sopimuksenulkoinen Korvausvastuu Toiselle Aiheutetusta Vahingosta

67

French Responsabilité extra-contractuelle pour dommage causé à autrui

80

German Außervertragliche Haftung wegen eines einem anderen zugefügten Schadens

93

Greek ¯øıÆØŒ ıŁ Å ªØÆ Å ÇÅÆ ı æ ŒºŁÅŒ   Æ ºº

107

Hungarian ˝désen kívüli kártérítési felelo˝sség Szerzo

121

xix

Chapter 1: Fundamental provisions

Table of Contents

Italian Responsabilità Civile Extracontrattuale

134

Polish Niekontraktowa odpowiedzialnos´´c za szkode˛ wyrza˛dzona˛ drugiemu

147

Portuguese Responsabilidade civil extracontratual por danos causados a terceiro

161

Romanian Ra˘spunderea extra-contractuala˘ pentru prejudiciul cauzat altuia

175

Slovenian Neposlovna odgovornost zaradi ˘skode povzrocˇene drugemu

189

Spanish Responsabilidad extracontractual por daños causados a otro

201

Swedish Utomkontraktuellt ansvar för skador som orsakats annan

215

Principles of European Law on Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another Chapter 1: Fundamental provisions Introduction A.

1. 2. B.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. xx

The concept of non-contractual liability arising out of damage caused to another Definition and purpose Prevention of impending damage

229 229

The structure of the existing laws of non-contractual liability arising out of damage caused to another Differences in external representation Two strands The Common Law and the Scandinavian countries France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain Greece and Italy Portugal, Austria, Germany The Netherlands Cyprus and Malta Eastern central Europe

229 230 230 230 230 231 231 231 232

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Fundamental provisions

12. 13.

The Baltic States “Pure economic losses”

233 233

C.

Overview of the concept underpinning the text Non-contractual liability arising out of damage caused to another, tort or delict Initial considerations No exhaustive list of protected interests and rights Accountability, damage, causation An all-embracing basic rule Seven chapters Interaction of the chapters Legally relevant damage A new expression Causation Remedies Liability for and without conduct falling short of a required standard

234 234 235 235 236 236 236 236 237 237 238 238

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. D.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

Relationship to other areas of the law Liability for crimes included Co-ordination with criminal law Tort law and contract law No independent obligations “between” contract and tort Concurrence of actions Tort law and unjustified enrichment law Tort law and negotiorum gestio law Tort law and property law Compensation under insurance law and performances rendered by third parties Procedural law

238 239 239 239 240 240 241 241 242 242

Article 1:101: Basic rule Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

The general approach The basic rule in overview Terminology: “tort” and “delict” Other terms The injured person’s perspective Economic and non-economic loss Damage and reparation Reparation and compensation Grounds of accountability Grounds of accountability and causation Omissions

243 243 244 244 244 244 245 245 245 245

xxi

Chapter 1: Fundamental provisions

Table of Contents

11. 12. 13.

Burden of proof Natural and legal persons Liability under public law not covered

246 246 246

B.

How the basic rule works A single cause of action Article 1:103(a) (Scope of application) No general clause No liability beyond the boundaries of the following provisions

246 246 247 247

14. 15. 16. 17.

Notes I. General II. Structures and formulations of the existing basic rules III. Wrongfulness as a prerequisite for liability IV. Fault, intention and negligence V. Strict liability VI. Burden of proof

249 249 251 254 258 260

Article 1:102: Prevention Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. B.

5. 6. 7. C.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. D.

13. 14.

xxii

Prevention of impending damage General Substantive law Prohibition of damage and compensation for loss averting damage Prevention and the law on non-contractual liability

265 265 265 266

Claimant and responsible person Claimant Responsible person Responsible person under strict liability

266 266 266

Essential elements entitling the claimant Impending damage Aggravation of damage Protection of rights Accountability Restriction of the claim

267 267 267 267 268

Relationship to Article 5:202 (Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity) General Persons incapable of being accountable for their causation of damage

268 268

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Fundamental provisions

Notes I. Basis of the right to prevent impending legally relevant damage II. Basis of the claim for damages in respect of expenditure incurred in averting the damage

269 273

Article 1:103: Scope of application Comments A.

1.

B.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. C.

7. 8. D.

9. 10. 11. E.

12. 13. 14.

Sub-paragraph (a) Article 1:101 (Basic rule) and Article 1:102 (Prevention) not self-sufficient rules

274

Application to legal and natural persons (sub-paragraph (b)) Legal persons as claimants Legal persons as responsible persons Bad organisation Legal persons under public law Imputation of knowledge and state of mind of legal persons

274 275 275 275 275

The relationship of the law on non-contractual liability to other areas of private law (sub-paragraph (c) and sub-paragraph (d)); general The principle of free concurrence of actions Preconditions of a situation of concurrent actions

276 276

Sub-paragraph (c) Scope of application The law on non-contractual liability and the law of contract Priority of contract law in case of conflict

277 278 278

Sub-paragraph (d) The law on non-contractual liability does not oust other bases of claim No limitation to the law of obligations Special regimes relating to Article 1:103(d)

280 281 281

Notes I. Tort law and contract law: theories of concurrence of action II. In particular: liability in respect of self-contained damage in defective products and buildings III. Tort law and other areas of private law IV. Legal persons

281 288 292 297

xxiii

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

Table of Contents

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage Introduction A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. B.

9. 10. 11.

The concept of legally relevant damage Damage in specific contexts No list of complete torts Typical situations and a residual rule “Danno ingiusto” Overlaps Distinct manifestations of legally relevant damage Legally relevant damage as context-dependant Damage caused intentionally and damage caused negligently

299 299 299 299 300 300 300 300

The second chapter in overview Not a mere restatement Questions not specifically addressed The order of the Articles

301 301 301

Section 1: General Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. B.

7. 8. 9. C.

10. 11. 12. 13.

xxiv

The function of the rule Three pillars of legally relevant damage Indications of legally relevant damage Forms of legally relevant damage: loss and injury Loss includes non-economic loss Interests without a market value Quantum of loss

303 303 304 304 305 305

The flexibility of the rule Multiformity of life Constitutional issues Underlying issues not yet harmonised

305 305 305

Violation of a right otherwise conferred by the law (paragraph (1)(b)) Scope of application Rights and interests worthy of legal protection Rights otherwise conferred by the law Purely contractual rights are, as a rule, excluded

306 307 307 308

Table of Contents

D.

14. 15.

E.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. F.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

Violation of an interest worthy of legal protection (paragraph (1)(c)) Significance of the provision Responsibility of the courts for the development of the law on non-contractual liability

308 308

Paragraphs (2) and (3) Application to rights and interests worthy of legal protection The balancing process in ascertaining an interest worthy of legal protection The ground of accountability Nature of the damage Damage suffered in business competition Proximity of damage Reasonable expectations on the part of the injured person Considerations of public policy

309 309 309 310 310 311 311 312

Paragraph (4) General Significance of the distinction between economic and non-economic loss Economic loss Increase in debts Loss of income Other forms of economic damage Non-economic loss Pain and suffering Impairment of the quality of life Bereavement Other cases Overlaps

312 313 313 313 313 313 314 314 314 314 315 315

Notes I. The notion of damage II. Injury as damage III. Economic loss IV. Normative economic loss V. Non-economic loss VI. Non-economic loss of legal persons VII. Breach of absolute rights VIII. Particulars to certain rights (1) Incorporeal rights of the personality (2) Post-mortal protection of personality rights (3) Further rights with personality aspects attached (4) Personality rights of legal persons IX. Violations of relative rights X. Wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life (1) Wrongful conception (2) Wrongful birth (3) Wrongful life

315 320 323 327 329 336 337 339 339 341 342 343 344 347 348 351 353

xxv

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

XI. XII.

Interests worthy of legal protection In particular: loss of chance

Table of Contents 355 356

Section 2: Particular instances of legally relevant damage Article 2:201: Personal injury and consequential loss Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. B.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. C.

13. 14. 15. D.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

Matters not regulated Wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life Detrimental impact on the quality of life without personal injury Loss of chance Quantum of damages Type and mode of reparation

359 359 360 360 360

Damage to a person’s body or health Body and health distinguished Injury to the person Medical treatment; sports injuries Injury to health Related interests worthy of legal protection Mental health Injury as such constitutes legally relevant damage

360 360 361 361 361 362 362

Loss Economic and non-economic loss Cost of health care Loss of income

363 363 363

Damage to the injured person and damage to third parties Personal injury Economic or non-economic losses of third persons Expenses of persons close to the injured person Reasonable expenses of carers Those close to the injured person

363 364 364 364 365

Notes I. General II. Injury to body and health III. Harm to mental health IV. Injury as such and “danno biologico” V. Recoverable consequential economic damage VI. Expenses of close relations VII. Recoverable consequential non-economic damage

xxvi

365 366 367 371 372 379 383

Table of Contents

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. B.

5. 6. 7. 8. C.

9. D.

10. 11. E.

12. 13. 14. F.

15. 16. 17. 18.

General Overview Persons not covered Non-economic losses Structure and organisation of the rules

389 389 390 390

Non-economic loss of close relations in cases of personal injury and death (paragraph (1)) Relation to Article 2:201(2)(b) (Personal injury and consequential loss) Policy consideration The circle of persons affected Claim by third parties for loss of maintenance in case of death only

390 390 391 391

Loss suffered as a result of another’s death (paragraph (2)) Death as such not legally relevant damage

391

The claim of the deceased’s successors (paragraph (2)(a)) Succession to subsisting claims of the deceased to reparation The limits of the claim

392 392

Funeral expenses (paragraph (2)(b)) Funeral costs constitute legally relevant damage Reasonable funeral expenses Persons entitled to claim funeral expenses

393 393 393

Loss of maintenance (paragraph (2)(c)) Loss of breadwinner Persons entitled to compensation “Statutory provisions” Time limits

393 394 394 394

Notes I. No civil liability for death as such II. Recoverability of non-economic damage to relatives in the case of death or injury to the primary victim III. Survival of the deceased person’s claims IV. Funeral costs V. Loss of maintenance VI. Pecuniary and non-pecuniary claims of other third parties harmed

394 395 402 406 409 415

xxvii

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

Table of Contents

Article 2:203: Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy Comments A.

1. 2. B.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. C.

14. D.

15. E.

16. 17. 18. F.

19.

General Purpose of the provision Horizontal effects of human rights Infringement of human dignity (paragraph (1)) Infringement Injury and loss Trivial injury Groups of cases Sexual harassment; Community law; DCFR II. – 2:101 (Right not to be discriminated against) Protection of minors The right to liberty Arrest and imprisonment of innocent persons The right to privacy Persons of contemporary celebrity Protecting a public interest

419 419 420 420 420 421 421 422 422 422 422

Legal persons Application of the general rule on legally relevant damage

423

Posthumous protection of personality rights Post-mortem protection of personality and protection of one’s own rights

423

Defamation (paragraph (2)) Defamation not specifically addressed in the Chapter 2, Section 2 Criminal defamation Freedom of expression

424 424 425

Relation to other provisions in Chapter 2, Section 2 Overlaps

425

Notes I. Infringement of liberty II. The protection of incorporeal rights of personality III. The right to privacy IV. Defamation

xxviii

419 419

425 426 433 438

Table of Contents

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

Article 2:204: Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. B.

6. 7. 8. 9. C.

10. 11. 12. D.

13. E.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

General Liability for misinformation instead of protection of honour Protection of the media Personal honour need not be affected Persons Defences

443 443 444 444 444

Communication Communication and dissemination distinguished Internet communication Repetition of incorrect information Telling lies

444 445 445 445

Incorrect information Facts and value judgements distinguished Information about a person Burden of proof

445 446 446

The mental state of the responsible person Carelessness in relation to the incorrectness

446

Relationship to other provisions Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy) Reporting suspicions Freedom of expression and the right to respect of dignity Article 2:205 (Loss upon breach of confidence) and Article 2:207 (Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information) Article 2:208 (Loss upon unlawful impairment of business)

Notes I. Liability for misinformation II. Distinction between assertion of fact and value judgment III. Reporting suspicions IV. Liability of internet service providers

447 447 447 448 448

448 454 459 463

Article 2:205: Loss upon breach of confidence Comments A.

1. 2.

General Source of inspiration Relationship to other rules

467 467

xxix

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

3. 4. B.

5. 6. 7. 8. C.

9.

DCFR II.–3:302 (Breach of confidentiality)

Table of Contents

Relation to Chapter 3, Section 1

467 468

Communication of confidential information Communication Information Third parties Absolute and relative confidentiality

468 468 468 469

Legal consequences Reparation and prevention

469

Notes

470

Article 2:206: Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. B.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. C.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. D.

19. 20.

xxx

General The Article in overview Accountability Loss as legally relevant damage Relationship to other regimes Remedies

479 479 479 479 480

Property rights and questions arising from property law Terminological difficulties Property rights Nuisance The owner-possessor relationship Stolen goods Property rights in corporeal things Mere contractual or other relative rights excluded

480 480 480 481 481 482 482

Lawful possession Possession Detention included Lawful possession Several possessors Property law protection of possession remains unaffected Loss caused by infringement of lawful possession

483 483 483 483 484 484

Infringement The concept Defences

484 484

Table of Contents

E.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. F.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

The most important modes of infringement of another’s property right (paragraph (2)(b)) Damage to property Ineffectual products Self-contained damage in defective products and buildings Sale of land Disposition of the right Law of unjustified enrichment Interference with use Deprivation of use: infringement and loss distinguished Other disturbance of the exercise of the right

485 485 485 485 486 486 486 487 487

Loss General Depreciation in merchantable value Non-economic loss Deprivation of use (paragraph 2(a)) Cable cases

487 487 488 488 489

Notes I. Tort law protection of property rights II. Infringement of other rights in rem and of lawful possession or detention III. Loss, in particular, recoverability of non-economic losses and loss of use

489 498 504

Article 2:207: Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4.

B.

5. 6. C.

7. 8.

General Policy considerations European community law Relationship to contractual liability Relationship to Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another)

510 511 511 511

The circle of protected recipients of the information Professional advice or information “The” recipient, not “a” recipient

512 512

Reliance Reasonable reliance Foreseeability of reasonable reliance

512 513

xxxi

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

D.

9. 10. 11.

Table of Contents

Incorrect advice or information An inseparable composite term Causation Accountability

Notes

513 513 514 514

Article 2:208: Loss upon unlawful impairment of business Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. B.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Purpose and scope Purpose Prevention Scope Groups of cases covered Infringement of EU competition law

520 520 520 521 521

Unlawful impairment of profession or trade Profession or trade Exercise of a profession Impairment Unlawful impairment Unfair competition to the detriment of competitors included Unfair competition to the detriment of consumers excluded

521 522 522 522 522 523

Notes

523

Article 2:209: Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment Comments A.

1. 2. B.

3. 4. 5. 6.

xxxii

Pure ecological damage Directive 2004/35/ EC on environmental liability Public and private law Legally relevant damage and accountability Damage to individuals and damage to the society at large Environmental organisations Relationship to Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions) Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage)

529 529

530 530 530 531

Table of Contents

C.

7. 8. 9. 10.

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

Other matters Expenditure incurred by private persons Environmental impairment The State or designated competent authorities Burdens incurred and loss in preventing damage

Notes I. Implementation of the Directive II. Collective damage relevant to the environment in other national law

531 531 531 531

532 532

Article 2:210: Loss upon fraudulent misrepresentation Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. B.

7. 8. 9.

The legally relevant damage General Relationship to Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another) Article 2:207 (Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information) Loss Non-economic losses Damage and accountability Fraudulent misrepresentation Misrepresentation ‘Fraudulent’ misrepresentation Intention to induce the recipient to make a mistake

Notes

538 538 538 539 539 539

540 540 540 541

Article 2:211: Loss upon inducement of non-performance of obligation Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. B.

6. 7.

The Article in overview Inducing non-performance of an obligation Intention required Damage and accountability Loss The entitled claimant

546 546 547 547 547

Non-performance of obligation Contractual and other obligations Obligation ‘owed to the person sustaining the loss’

548 548

xxxiii

Chapter 3: Accountability

8. 9. C.

10. 11.

Table of Contents

Breach of conjugal obligations Non-performance

548 549

Intentional inducement Intentional inducement Absence of legitimate interest

549 549

Notes

550

Chapter 3: Accountability Introduction A.

1. 2. B.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. C.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. D.

16. 17. E.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. xxxiv

General Three distinct grounds of liability “Fault” based liability vs. “strict” liability

557 557

Liability for intention or negligence Intention and negligence as generally recognised grounds of liability Accentuation of liability within liability for negligence Spain Hungary The Netherlands

557 558 558 559 559

Liability without intention or negligence: the current situation in overview The point of departure French and Belgian gardien liability Italy Hungary Germany, Austria, Greece, Portugal, and Poland The Netherlands Nordic Countries England

560 560 560 561 561 562 562 562

International instruments and EU law International Instruments EU law

563 563

The concept of the text Accountability Intention and negligence Presumed negligence Minors Mentally disabled persons

564 564 564 565 565

Table of Contents

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

Chapter 3: Accountability

Liability without intention or negligence No general theory of liability without intention or negligence Vicarious liability Guiding considerations for the third Chapter’s second Section Specific issues and a general rule Liability confined to the causation of death, injury to health and property damage Consequences of liability; ceilings, etc

565 565 566 566 566 567 567

Section 1: Intention and negligence Article 3:101: Intention Comments A.

1. 2. B.

3. 4. 5. C.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. D.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Notes

General Intention as ground of accountability Natural and legal persons

568 568

Intention The need for a definition Intention to do the act required but not sufficient Conduct

569 569 569

Sub-paragraph (a) Deliberate causation of legally relevant damage Breach of a statutory rule of behaviour Omissions Causation “Damage of the type caused”

569 570 570 570 570

Sub-paragraph (b) General Dolus eventualis Gross negligence “by conduct which that person means to do ...” “... knowing that ... damage ... will almost certainly be caused”

571 571 572 572 572 573

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Chapter 3: Accountability

Table of Contents

Article 3:102: Negligence Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. B.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. C.

17. 18. 20.

General Scope “by conduct” Sources of duties of careful conduct Positive acts and omissions Persons under eighteen Mentally handicapped persons Physically disabled persons Duties of care required by statute (sub-paragraph (a)) Statutory provisions Criminal law provisions Mere references to the duty to act with reasonable care Provisions reducing the standard of care Provisions requiring a higher standard of care Provisions particularising the general duty of care Adherence to the provision does not automatically exclude liability in negligence Prohibitory norms and norms of care The purpose of the statute The general duty of care (sub-paragraph (b)) An objective standard Conclusive list of deciding factors impossible Organisational defects

Notes I. The concept of negligence in general II. Negligent omissions III. Breach of statutory duty

580 580 581 581 581 581 582

582 582 582 582 583 583 583 584 584

585 585 586

586 592 596

Article 3:103: Persons under eighteen Comments A.

1. 2. 3.

xxxvi

The Article in overview Matters covered Purpose Persons under eighteen

601 601 602

Table of Contents

B.

4. 5. C.

6. D.

7. 8. E.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

Chapter 3: Accountability

Intention; violation of a statutory norm of conduct Intention Article 3:102 (Negligence) sub-paragraph (a)

602 603

The general standard of care for persons under eighteen (paragraph (1)) A group-specific standard of care

603

Children below the age of seven (paragraph (2)) No liability in principle for intentional or negligent infliction of damage Strict liability remains unaffected

604 604

Liability according to equity and fairness (paragraph (3)) Purpose of the rule Situations covered Subsidiarity of liability according to equity and fairness (sub-paragraph (a)) Liability to make reparation must be equitable (sub-paragraph (b)) Article 5:301 (Mental incompetence)

604 604 605 605 605

Notes I. Personal accountability of persons under eighteen II. Liability on equitable grounds

605 611

Article 3:104: Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons Comments A.

1. 2. 3. B.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. C.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

General Subject matter of the rule in Article 3:104 The regime of liability No strict liability

613 613 614

Liability for children under fourteen (paragraph (1)) The risk covered by liability Various age brackets Persons liable Relationship to Article 3:103 (Persons under eighteen) Children as victims

614 615 615 615 615

Liability of institutions (paragraph (2)) Policy considerations The duty to supervise Institution or body Persons likely to cause personal injury or property damage Requisites personal to the direct injurer

616 616 616 616 617

xxxvii

Chapter 3: Accountability

D.

14. 15. 16.

Table of Contents

Defective supervision (paragraph (3)) General Supervision of children Supervision of high-risk groups

Notes I. Liability of the individual who is required to exercise parental care II. Liability of other persons and institutions for damage caused by others

617 617 618

618 625

Section 2: Accountability without intention or negligence Article 3:201: Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. B.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. C.

15. 16.

The Article in overview Instances of strict liability for others Liability of legal persons for their representatives Public sector bodies “Legally relevant damage ...” “... suffered by a third person” Defences

632 632 633 633 633 633

Employer’s liability (paragraph (1)) Employees “Similarly engages” Temporary relief workers In the course of employment or engagement (sub-paragraph (a)) Employees excluded from service Personal requisites of the person acting (sub-paragraph (b)) “... is otherwise accountable for the causation of the damage” Solidary liability

634 634 636 636 637 637 637 638

Liability of legal persons for their representatives (paragraph (2)) Purpose of the rule Representative

638 638

Notes I. Employers’ liability and liability for independent contractors II. Liability of legal persons for their representatives

xxxviii

638 651

Table of Contents

Chapter 3: Accountability

Article 3:202: Accountability for damage caused by the unsafe state of an immovable

656

Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. B.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. C.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

The legal policy Liability for the unsafe state of an immovable Liability is strict Policy considerations Legally relevant damage Public roads excluded Relationship to Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions) Relationship to contract law Defences

657 657 657 658 658 658 659 659

The risk embraced by liability Basis Immovable “Other than to the immovable itself” “In or near the immovable” “Such safety as a person ... is entitled to expect” The nature of the immovable (paragraph (1)(a)) The access to the immovable Costs

659 660 660 660 660 661 661 661

Persons liable Policy considerations Paragraph (2) Occupier and keeper Paragraph (3) Abandonment

662 662 662 662 663

Notes

663

Article 3:203: Accountability for damage caused by animals Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4.

General Strict liability for animals of all types Animals living in the wild excluded Legally relevant damage; relationship to contract law Defences

673 674 674 674

xxxix

Chapter 3: Accountability

B.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

Table of Contents

Damage caused by animals Animal Causation by the animal Notion of keeper Examples Ownership Children Several keepers Thieves

675 675 675 675 676 676 676 677

Notes

677

Article 3:204: Accountability for damage caused by defective products

686

Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. B.

14. 15. C.

16. 17.

General Council Directive 85/374 / EEC Detailed commentary unnecessary Restriction to consumer protection Burden of proof in relation to damage to business property No contractual exclusion or restriction of liability No punitive or aggravated damages Primary agricultural products and game Liability for development risks Policy considerations Further considerations Application of the general provisions Duty to warn of development risks Deviations from the Directive; options left to discretion of Member States

687 688 688 688 688 688 688 689 689 689 690 690 690

Damage to consumer property Deviation from the Directive Policy considerations

690 690

Liability for non-economic losses; no maximum limit to liability Liability for non-economic loss and injury as such No maximum limit to liability

691 691

Notes I. Implementation of the Directive II. Liability for damage to property (1) Damage to things intended for private use (2) Damage to business property

xl

691 692 692 696

Table of Contents

III. IV.

V.

Chapter 3: Accountability

Liability for non-economic loss Liability for development risks Financial ceiling on liability

698 699 702

Article 3:205: Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. B.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

The concept of the rule Formulation of the principle; no detailed rules Article 3:207(a) (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage) Insurance Legally relevant damage Property damage Personal injury Defences Details Motor vehicles and trailers Keeper No special liability for drivers Traffic accident resulting from the use of the vehicle Causation

Notes

703 703 704 704 704 704 705

705 705 705 705 706 706

Article 3:206: Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. B.

5. 6. 7.

A strict regime for environmental liability Structure of the regime Relationship to Article 2:209 (Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment) Legally relevant damage Policy considerations The persons liable Keeper of a substance and operator of an installation Private use excluded (paragraph (5)(a)) Other legal bases for a claim remain unaffected

718 718 719 719

720 720 720

xli

Chapter 3: Accountability

C.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

Table of Contents

The risk within the scope of the strict liability Causation of damage by dangerous substances and emissions (paragraph (1)(a)) Dangerous quantity Relationship to Article 3:202 (Accountability for damage caused by the unsafe state of an immovable) Dangerous attributes Realisation of the risk establishing liability (paragraph (1)(b)) Causation Substance (paragraph (2)) Emission (paragraph (3)) Installation (paragraph (4)) No failure to comply with statutory standards Other defences

Notes

721 721 721 722 722 722 723 723 723 723 723 724

Article 3:207: Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage Comments A.

1. 2. 3. B.

4. 5. 6. 7.

Policy considerations Wide-ranging national law on strict liability; international treaties Overview Legally relevant damage; national law

736 736 736

Details Sub-paragraph (a) Examples Sub-paragraph (b) Sub-paragraph (c)

737 737 737 738

Notes

738

Article 3:208: Abandonment Comments A.

1. 2.

xlii

First sentence Purpose of the rule Abandonment

742 742

Table of Contents

B.

3.

Chapter 4: Causation

Second sentence Animals

Notes

742 743

Chapter 4: Causation Article 4:101: General rule Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. B.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

General Scope Policy considerations The term causation Causation by conduct Causation by omission Causation by a source of danger Vicarious liability Damage caused by animals and things Connection between legally relevant damage, attributive cause and causation Special rules Particulars Cause in fact and cause in law not distinguished No reduction to a “conditio sine qua non” formula Elements of assessment Break in the chain of causation Self-harm of the victim; contributory fault Causation of a legally relevant damage Burden of proof “Egg shell skull” (paragraph (2))

Notes I. General theory of causation II. Founding liability and determining the ambit (limits) of liability III. Burden of proof IV. The “egg shell skull” rule

747 747 748 748 748 749 749 749 750 750

751 751 751 752 752 753 753 754

755 763 765 769

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Chapter 5: Defences

Table of Contents

Article 4:102: Collaboration Comments 1. Purpose 2. Scope 3. Relation to Article 4:103 (Alternative causes) 4. Relation to Article 6:105 (Solidary liability) 5. Collaboration 6. Members of a group 7. Participants 8. Instigators 9. Accessories

773 774 774 774 775 775 775 775 776

Notes

776

Article 4:103: Alternative causes Comments 1. Relaxing requirements for establishing the chain of cause and effect 2. Policy considerations 3. General requirements 4. Different persons must be accountable 5. The damage must be caused by one of two or more occurrences 6. Defences

780 781 781 782 782 783

Notes

783

Chapter 5: Defences Section 1: Consent or conduct of the person suffering the damage Article 5:101: Consent and acting at own risk Comments A.

1. 2. 3. B.

4. 5. xliv

Chapter 5 in overview The notion of defence Five Sections Further defences

789 789 790

Consent (paragraph (1)) The basic principle The injured person

790 790

Table of Contents

Chapter 5: Defences

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Non-contractual liability and contract Consent, acting at own risk and contributory fault Consent Consent as a defence against purposeful conduct Valid consent Lack of capacity Informed consent Illegality Benevolent interventions in another’s affairs

791 791 791 792 792 792 793 793 793

C.

Acting at own risk (paragraph (2)) The basic idea Systematic considerations Knowing the risk of damage of the type caused Voluntary exposure to and acceptance of the risk

793 793 794 794

15. 16. 17. 18.

Notes I. Consent II. Acting at own risk

795 801

Article 5:102: Contributory fault and accountability Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. B.

10. 11. 12. C.

13. 14. 15. 16.

General Contributory fault, contributory fault of auxiliary persons and contributory sources of danger Reparation Contribution to the occurrence or extent of the damage Type of damage The mirror principle Exceptions Fault Children and mentally handicapped people Paragraph (2)

808 808 808 808 809 809 809 809 810

Contributory fault (paragraph (1)) Fault contributory to the materialisation of the damage Reduction of liability Co-responsibility for the extent of the damage

810 811 811

Exceptions (paragraph (2)) Insubstantial fault and causation Traffic accidents Policy considerations Gross negligence

812 812 813 813

xlv

Chapter 5: Defences

D.

17. 18.

Table of Contents

Extension of the mirror principle to the law of strict liability (paragraphs (3) and (4)) Contributory fault of employees Contribution of a source of danger

Notes I. Contributory fault in causing the damage II. The duty to mitigate damage III. Contributory fault in road traffic accidents IV. Reduction in liability where the ‘strict liability’ of the injured party contributes to the cause of the accident

813 813

814 822 827 831

Article 5:103: Damage caused by a criminal to a collaborator Comments 1. Ex turpi causa non oritur actio 2. Illegality 3. Burden of proof 4. Damage must be caused unintentionally 5. Collaborator 6. Reparation must be contrary to public policy

837 837 838 838 838 838

Notes

839

Section 2: Interests of accountable persons or third parties Article 5:201: Authority conferred by law Comments 1. General 2. Applicable to private persons only 3. Relation to other defences 4. Scope 5. Authority 6. Conferred by law 7. Limits

841 841 841 841 842 842 842

Notes

842

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Chapter 5: Defences

Article 5:202: Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity Comments A.

1. B.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. C.

7. 8. D.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

Three grounds of defence Overview

847

Self-defence (paragraph (1)) Protecting personal rights and interests and those of another Endangerment Reasonable protection Self-defence against children Putative self-defence and excessive self-defence

847 847 848 848 848

Benevolent intervention in another’s affairs (paragraph (2)) Benevolent intervention as a defence within the framework of the law on non-contractual liability Without breach of the intervener’s duties

849 849

Necessity (paragraph (3)) Situations covered Precedence of the interest defended over the legally protected interest Imminent danger Liability Reasonable compensation

849 850 850 850 850

Notes I. Self-defence II. Benevolent intervention III. Necessity

851 856 857

Article 5:203: Protection of public interest Comments 1. Purpose of the rule 2. Protection of public interest 3. Fundamental to a democratic society

862 862 863

Notes

863

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Chapter 5: Defences

Table of Contents

Section 3: Inability to control Article 5:301: Mental incompetence Comments A.

1. 2. B.

3. 4. 5. C.

6.

Policy considerations and overview Options The preferred solution

872 872

Mental incompetence Lack of insight Temporary lack of insight Instinctive reflex actions

873 873 874

Recompense according to equity and fairness Parallel comments

874

Notes

874

Article 5:302: Event beyond control Comments A.

1. 2. B.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Notes

xlviii

General Event beyond control as a defence in the framework of strict liability Accountability without intention or negligence

881 881

Event beyond control Notion Two elements Abnormal event ‘Not to be regarded as that person’s risk’ Relationship to contributory fault

881 882 882 882 883 883

Table of Contents

Chapter 5: Defences

Section 4: Contractual exclusion and restriction of liability Article 5:401: Contractual exclusion and restriction of liability Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. B.

9. 10. 11. C.

12. 13. 14. D.

15. E.

16. 17.

Exclusion and restriction of liability Pre-emptive exclusion of liability Exclusion and restriction of liability Implied exclusion of liability Contractual exclusions Unilaterally imparted information Freedom of contract Basis Exceptions

891 891 891 892 892 892 892 893

No exclusion of liability for damage caused intentionally (paragraph (1)) Policy considerations Employers’ liability Line of demarcation with consent and acting at own risk

893 893 893

Exclusion of liability in cases of gross negligence (paragraph (2)) Personal injury (sub-paragraph (a)) “Gross negligence” Other types of legally relevant damage (sub-paragraph (b))

894 894 894

Product liability (paragraph (3)) No contractual exclusion of liability

894

Paragraph (4) Exclusion of liability in cases of ordinary liability in negligence Unless contrary to statute

895 895

Notes

895

Section 5: Loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death) Article 5:501: Extension of defences against the injured person to third persons Comments 1. Aim 2. Examples

902 902

Notes

902

xlix

Chapter 6: Remedies

Table of Contents

Chapter 6: Remedies Section 1: Reparation in general Article 6:101: Aim and forms of reparation Comments A.

1. 2. 3. 4. B.

5. C.

6. 7. 8. D.

9. 10. 11. E.

12. 13. F.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

Chapter six in overview Reparation, compensation, prevention Overlap between reparation and prevention Relationship to Chapter 2 Substantive law, not procedural law

907 907 908 908

The Article in overview Aim and forms of reparation

908

Restoration of the previous situation (paragraph (1)) The principle of reparation Reparation in kind and full reparation No punitive damages

908 909 909

Damages in money or by other means (paragraph (2)) General Reparation not in money Forms of reparation not mutually exclusive

909 909 910

Economic total loss (paragraph (3)) An exception to paragraph (1) Animals

910 910

Recovery of profit instead of compensation of loss (paragraph (4)) Siphoning-off of profits Systematical issues Relationship to the law of unjustified enrichment Commercial trademark rights and copyright Right of choice

911 911 911 911 912

Notes I. Nature and extent of the compensation II. The injuring party’s gains as a basis for recovery

l

912 922

Table of Contents

Chapter 6: Remedies

Article 6:102: De minimis rule Comments 1. Policy considerations 2. Trivial damage 3. Products liability

927 928 928

Notes

928

Article 6:103: Equalisation of benefits Comments 1. General 2. Policy considerations 3. Causation 4. Article 7:105 (Reduction or exclusion of liability to indemnified persons) 5. Several liable parties 6. Case groups 7. Kind of damage 8. Examples 9. Nature of the accountability 10. Performance by a third party 11. Examples

932 933 933 933 933 934 934 934 935 935 935

Notes

935

Article 6:104: Multiple persons suffering damage Comments 1. Reparation to one person will also make reparation to another 2. Damage and damages 3. Reference to Book III 4. Significance for the rules in this Book

945 945 946 946

Notes

947

Article 6:105: Solidary liability Comments A.

1. 2.

Solidary liability of multiple liable persons Common European law Policy considerations

952 952

li

Chapter 6: Remedies

3. 4. B.

5.

Terminology Scope of application

Table of Contents 952 952

Internal allocation of liability DCFR III

Notes

953 953

Article 6:106: Assignment of right to reparation Comments 1. General 2. Policy considerations 3. Moral reservations obsolete 4. Assignability in specific cases

961 961 961 961

Notes

962

Section 2: Compensation Article 6:201: Right of election Comments 1. General 2. Property damage 3. Other cases

967 967 967

Notes

967

Article 6:202: Reduction of liability Comments 1. A rule subject to policy debate 2. No reduction of liability where damage is intentionally inflicted 3. Grounds for and prerequisites of a reduction of liability 4. The reduction clause in the overall system of these model rules 5. Scope 6. Extent of the reduction

971 971 971 972 972 972

Notes

973

lii

Table of Contents

Chapter 6: Remedies

Article 6:203: Capitalisation and quantification

977

Comments 1. The Article in overview 2. Paragraph (1) 3. Good reason 4. Heads of compensation 5. Procedural issues 6. Paragraph (2)

978 978 978 978 979 979

Notes

979

Article 6:204: Compensation for injury as such Comments 1. Injury as such 2. A new concept

986 986

Notes

986

Section 3: Prevention Article 6:301: Right to prevention Comments 1. Prevention is better than cure 2. Forms of prevention 3. Paragraph (1) 4. Reparation not an adequate remedy 5. Paragraph (2)

991 991 991 992 992

Notes

993

Article 6:302: Liability for loss in preventing damage

998

Comments 1. Fundamentals 2. Systematic significance 3. Reasonably incurred expenditure

999 999 1000

Notes

1001

liii

Chapter 7: Ancillary rules

Table of Contents

Chapter 7: Ancillary rules Article 7:101: National constitutional laws Comments 1. Chapter 7 in overview 2. Article 7:101

1005 1005

Notes

1006

Article 7:102: Statutory provisions Comments

1007

Notes

1008

Article 7:103: Public law functions and court proceedings Comments 1. Relationship with DCFR I.–1:101(2) (Intended field of application) 2. Person or body exercising public law functions 3. Performing duties during court proceedings

1010 1010 1011

Notes

1011

Article 7:104: Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers’ associations Comments 1. General 2. Individual labour law 3. Collective labour law

1019 1020 1020

Notes

1020

Article 7:105: Reduction or exclusion of liability to indemnified persons Comments 1. Channelling of liability 2. Examples

1027 1027 1028

Notes

1028

liv

Table of Contents

Annexes

Annexes Abbreviations

1035

Table of Codes and Statutes

1079

Table of Cases

1169

Table of Treaties and Enactments of the European Union

1189

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form

1193

Index

1249

Text of Articles

English Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another Chapter 1: Fundamental Provisions Article 1:101: Basic rule (1) A person who suffers legally relevant damage has a right to reparation from a person who caused the damage intentionally or negligently or is otherwise accountable for the causation of the damage. (2) Where a person has not caused legally relevant damage intentionally or negligently that person is accountable for the causation of legally relevant damage only if Chapter 3 so provides. Article 1:102: Prevention Where legally relevant damage is impending, this Book confers on a person who would suffer the damage a right to prevent it. This right is against a person who would be accountable for the causation of the damage if it occurred.

Article 1:103: Scope of application Articles 1:101 (Basic rule) and 1:102 (Prevention) (a) apply only in accordance with the following provisions of this Book; (b) apply to both legal and natural persons, unless otherwise stated; (c) do not apply in so far as their application would contradict the purpose of other private law rules; and (d) do not affect remedies available on other legal grounds.

Chapter 2: Legally Relevant Damage Section 1: General Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage (1) Loss, whether economic or non-economic, or injury is legally relevant damage if: (a) one of the following rules of this Chapter so provides; (b) the loss or injury results from a violation of a right otherwise conferred by the law; or (c) the loss or injury results from a violation of an interest worthy of legal protection.

3

Text of Articles

(2) In any case covered only by sub-paragraphs (b) or (c) of paragraph (1) loss or injury constitutes legally relevant damage only if it would be fair and reasonable for there to be a right to reparation or prevention, as the case may be, under Articles 1:101 (Basic rule) or 1:102 (Prevention). (3) In considering whether it would be fair and reasonable for there to be a right to reparation or prevention regard is to be had to the ground of accountability, to the nature and proximity of the damage or impending damage, to the reasonable expectations of the person who suffers or would suffer the damage, and to considerations of public policy. (4) In this Book: (a) economic loss includes loss of income or profit, burdens incurred and a reduction in the value of property (b) non-economic loss includes pain and suffering and impairment of the quality of life.

Section 2: Particular instances of legally relevant damage Article 2:201: Personal injury and consequential loss (1) Loss caused to a natural person as a result of injury to his or her body or health and the injury as such are legally relevant damage. (2) In this Book: (a) such loss includes the costs of health care including expenses reasonably incurred for the care of the injured person by those close to him or her; and (b) personal injury includes injury to mental health only if it amounts to a medical condition. Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death (1) Non-economic loss caused to a natural person as a result of another’s personal injury or death is legally relevant damage if at the time of injury that person is in a particularly close personal relationship to the injured person. (2) Where a person has been fatally injured: (a) legally relevant damage caused to the deceased on account of the injury to the time of death becomes legally relevant damage to the deceased’s successors; (b) reasonable funeral expenses are legally relevant damage to the person incurring them; and (c) loss of maintenance is legally relevant damage to a natural person whom the deceased maintained or, had death not occurred, would have maintained under statutory provisions or to whom the deceased provided care and financial support. Article 2:203: Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy (1) Loss caused to a natural person as a result of infringement of his or her right to respect for his or her dignity, such as the rights to liberty and privacy, and the injury as such are legally relevant damage. (2) Loss caused to a person as a result of injury to that person’s reputation and the injury as such are also legally relevant damage if national law so provides.

4

English. Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another

Article 2:204: Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another Loss caused to a person as a result of the communication of information about that person which the person communicating the information knows or could reasonably be expected to know is incorrect is legally relevant damage. Article 2:205: Loss upon breach of confidence Loss caused to a person as a result of the communication of information which, either from its nature or the circumstances in which it was obtained, the person communicating the information knows or could reasonably be expected to know is confidential to the person suffering the loss is legally relevant damage. Article 2:206: Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession (1) Loss caused to a person as a result of an infringement of that person’s property right or lawful possession of a movable or immovable thing is legally relevant damage. (2) In this Article: (a) loss includes being deprived of the use of property; (b) infringement of a property right includes destruction of or physical damage to the subject-matter of the right (property damage), disposition of the right, interference with its use and other disturbance of the exercise of the right. Article 2:207: Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information Loss caused to a person as a result of making a decision in reasonable reliance on incorrect advice or information is legally relevant damage if: (a) the advice or information is provided by a person in pursuit of a profession or in the course of trade; and (b) the provider knew or could reasonably be expected to have known that the recipient would rely on the advice or information in making a decision of the kind made. Article 2:208: Loss upon unlawful impairment of business (1) Loss caused to a person as a result of an unlawful impairment of that person’s exercise of a profession or conduct of a trade is legally relevant damage. (2) Loss caused to a consumer as a result of unfair competition is also legally relevant damage if Community or national law so provides. Article 2:209: Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment Burdens incurred by the State or designated competent authorities in restoring substantially impaired natural elements constituting the environment, such as air, water, soil, flora and fauna, are legally relevant damage to the State or the authorities concerned. Article 2:210: Loss upon fraudulent misrepresentation (1) Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Section loss caused to a person as a result of another’s fraudulent misrepresentation, whether by words or conduct, is legally relevant damage. (2) A misrepresentation is fraudulent if it is made with knowledge or belief that the representation is false and it is intended to induce the recipient to make a mistake.

5

Text of Articles

Article 2:211: Loss upon inducement of non-performance of obligation Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Section, loss caused to a person as a result of another’s inducement of the non-performance of an obligation by a third person is legally relevant damage only if: (a) the obligation was owed to the person sustaining the loss; and (b) the person inducing the non-performance: (i) intended the third person to fail to perform the obligation, and (ii) did not act in legitimate protection of the inducing person’s own interest.

Chapter 3: Accountability Section 1: Intention and negligence Article 3:101: Intention A person causes legally relevant damage intentionally when that person causes such damage either: (a) meaning to cause damage of the type caused; or (b) by conduct which that person means to do, knowing that such damage, or damage of that type, will or will almost certainly be caused. Article 3:102: Negligence A person causes legally relevant damage negligently when that person causes the damage by conduct which either: (a) does not meet the particular standard of care provided by a statutory provision whose purpose is the protection of the person suffering the damage from that damage; or (b) does not otherwise amount to such care as could be expected from a reasonably careful person in the circumstances of the case. Article 3:103: Persons under eighteen (1) A person under eighteen years of age is accountable for causing legally relevant damage according to Article 3:102 (Negligence) sub-paragraph (b) only in so far as that person does not exercise such care as could be expected from a reasonably careful person of the same age in the circumstances of the case. (2) A person under seven years of age is not accountable for causing damage intentionally or negligently. (3) However, paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the extent that: (a) the person suffering the damage cannot obtain reparation under this Book from another; and (b) liability to make reparation would be equitable having regard to the financial means of the parties and all other circumstances of the case. Article 3:104: Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons (1) Parents or other persons obliged by law to provide parental care for a person under fourteen years of age are accountable for the causation of legally relevant damage where that person 6

English. Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another

under age caused the damage by conduct that would constitute intentional or negligent conduct if it were the conduct of an adult. (2) An institution or other body obliged to supervise a person is accountable for the causation of legally relevant damage suffered by a third party when: (a) the damage is personal injury, loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death) or property damage; (b) the person whom the institution or other body is obliged to supervise caused that damage intentionally or negligently or, in the case of a person under eighteen, by conduct that would constitute intention or negligence if it were the conduct of an adult; and (c) the person whom the institution or other body is obliged to supervise is a person likely to cause damage of that type. (3) However, a person is not accountable under this Article for the causation of damage if that person shows that there was no defective supervision of the person causing the damage.

Section 2: Accountability without intention or negligence Article 3:201: Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives (1) A person who employs or similarly engages another is accountable for the causation of legally relevant damage suffered by a third person when the person employed or engaged: (a) caused the damage in the course of the employment or engagement; and (b) caused the damage intentionally or negligently, or is otherwise accountable for the causation of the damage. (2) Paragraph (1) applies correspondingly to a legal person in relation to a representative causing damage in the course of their engagement. A representative is a person who is authorised to effect juridical acts on behalf of the legal person by its constitution. Article 3:202: Accountability for damage caused by the unsafe state of an immovable (1) A person who independently exercises control over an immovable is accountable for the causation of personal injury and consequential loss, loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death), and loss resulting from property damage (other than to the immovable itself) by a state of the immovable which does not ensure such safety as a person in or near the immovable is entitled to expect having regard to the circumstances including: (a) the nature of the immovable; (b) the access to the immovable; and (c) the cost of avoiding the immovable being in that state. (2) A person exercises independent control over an immovable if that person exercises such control that it is reasonable to impose a duty on that person to prevent legally relevant damage within the scope of this Article. (3) The owner of the immovable is to be regarded as independently exercising control, unless the owner shows that another independently exercises control.

7

Text of Articles

Article 3:203: Accountability for damage caused by animals A keeper of an animal is accountable for the causation by the animal of personal injury and consequential loss, loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death), and loss resulting from property damage. Article 3:204: Accountability for damage caused by defective products (1) The producer of a product is accountable for the causation of personal injury and consequential loss, loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death), and, in relation to consumers, loss resulting from property damage (other than to the product itself) by a defect in the product. (2) A person who imported the product into the European Economic Area for sale, hire, leasing or distribution in the course of that person’s business is accountable correspondingly. (3) A supplier of the product is accountable correspondingly if: (a) the producer cannot be identified; or (b) in the case of an imported product, the product does not indicate the identity of the importer (whether or not the producer’s name is indicated), unless the supplier informs the person suffering the damage, within a reasonable time, of the identity of the producer or the person who supplied that supplier with the product. (4) A person is not accountable under this Article for the causation of damage if that person shows that: (a) that person did not put the product into circulation; (b) it is probable that the defect which caused the damage did not exist at the time when that person put the product into circulation; (c) that person neither manufactured the product for sale or distribution for economic purpose nor manufactured or distributed it in the course of business; (d) the defect is due to the product’s compliance with mandatory regulations issued by public authorities; (e) the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time that person put the product into circulation did not enable the existence of the defect to be discovered; or (f) in the case of a manufacturer of a component, the defect is attributable to: (i) the design of the product into which the component has been fitted; or (ii) instructions given by the manufacturer of the product. (5) “Producer” means: (a) in the case of a finished product or a component, the manufacturer; (b) in the case of raw material, the person who abstracts or wins it; and (c) any person who, by putting a name, trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the product, gives the impression of being its producer. (6) “Product” means a movable, even if incorporated into another movable or an immovable, or electricity. (7) A product is defective if it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, having regard to the circumstances including: (a) the presentation of the product; (b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put; and (c) the time when the product was put into circulation, but a product is not defective merely because a better product is subsequently put into circulation.

8

English. Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another

Article 3:205: Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles (1) A keeper of a motor vehicle is accountable for the causation of personal injury and consequential loss, loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death), and loss resulting from property damage (other than to the vehicle and its freight) in a traffic accident which results from the use of the vehicle. (2) “Motor vehicle” means any vehicle intended for travel on land and propelled by mechanical power, but not running on rails, and any trailer, whether or not coupled. Article 3:206: Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions (1) A keeper of a substance or an operator of an installation is accountable for the causation by that substance or by emissions from that installation of personal injury and consequential loss, loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death), loss resulting from property damage, and burdens within Article 2:209 (Burdens incurred by the State upon environmental impairment), if: (a) having regard to their quantity and attributes, at the time of the emission, or, failing an emission, at the time of contact with the substance it is very likely that the substance or emission will cause such damage unless adequately controlled; and (b) the damage results from the realisation of that danger. (2) “Substance” includes chemicals (whether solid, liquid or gaseous). Microorganisms are to be treated like substances. (3) “Emission” includes: (a) the release or escape of substances; (b) the conduction of electricity; (c) heat, light and other radiation; (d) noise and other vibrations; and (e) other incorporeal impact on the environment. (4) “Installation” includes a mobile installation and an installation under construction or not in use. (5) However, a person is not accountable for the causation of damage under this Article if that person: (a) does not keep the substance or operate the installation for purposes related to that person’s trade, business or profession; or (b) shows that there was no failure to comply with statutory standards of control of the substance or management of the installation. Article 3:207: Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage A person is also accountable for the causation of legally relevant damage if national law so provides where it: (a) relates to a source of danger which is not within Article 3:104 (Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons) to 3:205 (Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles); (b) relates to substances or emissions; or (c) disapplies Article 3:204 (Accountability for damage caused by defective products) paragraph (4)(e).

9

Text of Articles

Article 3:208: Abandonment For the purposes of this section, a person remains accountable for an immovable, vehicle, substance or installation which that person abandons until another exercises independent control over it or becomes its keeper or operator. This applies correspondingly, so far as reasonable, in respect of a keeper of an animal.

Chapter 4: Causation Article 4:101: General rule (1) A person causes legally relevant damage to another if the damage is to be regarded as a consequence of that person’s conduct or the source of danger for which that person is responsible. (2) In cases of personal injury or death the injured person’s predisposition with respect to the type or extent of the injury sustained is to be disregarded. Article 4:102: Collaboration A person who participates with, instigates or materially assists another in causing legally relevant damage is to be regarded as causing that damage. Article 4:103: Alternative causes Where legally relevant damage may have been caused by any one or more of a number of occurrences for which different persons are accountable and it is established that the damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which one, each person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably presumed to have caused that damage.

Chapter 5: Defences Section 1: Consent or conduct of the person suffering the damage Article 5:101: Consent and acting at own risk (1) A person has a defence if the person suffering the damage validly consents to the legally relevant damage and is aware or could reasonably be expected to be aware of the consequences of that consent. (2) The same applies if the person suffering the damage, knowing the risk of damage of the type caused, voluntarily takes that risk and is to be regarded as accepting it. Article 5:102: Contributory fault and accountability (1) Where the fault of the person suffering the damage contributes to the occurrence or extent of legally relevant damage, reparation is to be reduced according to the degree of such fault. (2) However, no regard is to be had to: (a) an insubstantial fault of the person suffering the damage;

10

English. Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another

(b) fault or accountability whose contribution to the causation of the damage is insubstantial; (c) the injured person’s want of care contributing to that person’s personal injury caused by a motor vehicle in a traffic accident, unless that want of care constitutes profound failure to take such care as is manifestly required in the circumstances. (3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) apply correspondingly where the fault of a person for whom the person suffering the damage is responsible within the scope of Article 3:201 (Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives) contributes to the occurrence or extent of the damage. (4) Compensation is to be reduced likewise if and in so far as any other source of danger for which the person suffering the damage is responsible under Chapter 3 (Accountability) contributes to the occurrence or extent of the damage.

Article 5:103: Damage caused by a criminal to a collaborator Legally relevant damage caused unintentionally in the course of committing a criminal offence to another person participating or otherwise collaborating in the offence does not give rise to a right to reparation if this would be contrary to public policy.

Section 2: Interests of accountable persons or third parties Article 5:201: Authority conferred by law A person has a defence if legally relevant damage is caused with authority conferred by law. Article 5:202: Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity (1) A person has a defence if that person causes legally relevant damage in reasonable protection of a right or of an interest worthy of legal protection of that person or a third person if the person suffering the legally relevant damage is accountable for endangering the right or interest protected. For the purposes of this paragraph Article 3:103 (Persons under eighteen) is to be disregarded. (2) The same applies to legally relevant damage caused by a benevolent intervener to a principal without breach of the intervener’s duties. (3) Where a person causes legally relevant damage to the patrimony of another in a situation of imminent danger to life, body, health or liberty in order to save the person causing the damage or a third person from that danger and the danger could not be eliminated without causing the damage, the person causing the damage is not liable to make reparation beyond providing reasonable recompense. Article 5:203: Protection of public interest A person has a defence if legally relevant damage is caused in necessary protection of values fundamental to a democratic society, in particular where damage is caused by dissemination of information in the media.

11

Text of Articles

Section 3: Inability to control Article 5:301: Mental incompetence (1) A person who is mentally incompetent at the time of conduct causing legally relevant damage is liable only if this is equitable, having regard to the mentally incompetent person’s financial means and all the other circumstances of the case. Liability is limited to reasonable recompense. (2) A person is to be regarded as mentally incompetent if that person lacks sufficient insight into the nature of his or her conduct, unless the lack of sufficient insight is the temporary result of his or her own misconduct. Article 5:302: Event beyond control A person has a defence if legally relevant damage is caused by an abnormal event which cannot be averted by any reasonable measure and which is not to be regarded as that person’s risk.

Section 4: Contractual exclusion and restriction of liability Article 5:401: Contractual exclusion and restriction of liability (1) Liability for causing legally relevant damage intentionally cannot be excluded or restricted. (2) Liability for causing legally relevant damage as a result of a profound failure to take such care as is manifestly required in the circumstances cannot be excluded or restricted (a) in respect of personal injury (including fatal injury); or (b) if the exclusion or restriction is otherwise illegal or contrary to good faith and fair dealing. (3) Liability for damage for the causation of which a person is accountable under Article 3:204 (Accountability for damage caused by defective products) cannot be restricted or excluded. (4) Other liability under this Book can be excluded or restricted unless statute provides otherwise.

Section 5: Loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death) Article 5:501: Extension of defences against the injured person to third persons A defence which may be asserted against a person’s right of reparation in respect of that person’s personal injury or, if death had not occurred, could have been asserted, may also be asserted against a person suffering loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death).

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English. Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another

Chapter 6: Remedies Section 1: Reparation in general Article 6:101: Aim and forms of reparation (1) Reparation is to reinstate the person suffering the legally relevant damage in the position that person would have been in had the legally relevant damage not occurred. (2) Reparation may be in money (compensation) or otherwise, as is most appropriate, having regard to the kind and extent of damage suffered and all the other circumstances of the case. (3) Where a tangible object is damaged, compensation equal to its depreciation of value is to be awarded instead of the cost of its repair if the cost of repair unreasonably exceeds the depreciation of value. This rule applies to animals only if appropriate, having regard to the purpose for which the animal was kept. (4) As an alternative to reinstatement under paragraph (1), but only where this is reasonable, reparation may take the form of recovery from the person accountable for the causation of the legally relevant damage of any advantage obtained by the latter in connection with causing the damage. Article 6:102: De minimis rule Trivial damage is to be disregarded.

Article 6:103: Equalisation of benefits (1) Benefits arising to the person suffering legally relevant damage as a result of the damaging event are to be disregarded unless it would be fair and reasonable to take them into account. (2) In deciding whether it would be fair and reasonable to take the benefits into account, regard shall be had to the kind of damage sustained, the nature of the accountability of the person causing the damage and, where the benefits are conferred by a third person, the purpose of conferring those benefits. Article 6:104: Multiple persons suffering damage Where multiple persons suffer legally relevant damage and reparation to one person will also make reparation to another, III.–4:201-207 (Plurality of creditors) apply with appropriate adaptation to their rights to reparation.

Article 6:105: Solidary liability Where several persons are liable for the same legally relevant damage, they are liable solidarily.

Article 6:106: Assignment of right to reparation The person suffering the damage may assign a right to reparation, including a right to reparation for non-economic loss.

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Section 2: Compensation Article 6:201: Right of election The person suffering the damage person may choose whether or not to spend compensation on the reinstatement of the damaged interest.

Article 6:202: Reduction of liability Where it is fair and reasonable to do so, a person may be relieved of liability to compensate, either wholly or in part, if, where the damage is not caused intentionally, liability in full would be disproportionate to the accountability of the person causing the damage or the extent of the damage or the means to prevent it.

Article 6:203: Capitalisation and quantification (1) Compensation is to be awarded as a lump sum unless a good reason requires periodical payment. (2) National law determines how compensation for personal injury and non-economic loss is to be quantified. Article 6:204: Compensation for injury as such Injury as such is to be compensated independent of compensation for economic or non-economic loss.

Section 3: Prevention Article 6:301: Right to prevention (1) The right to prevention exists only in so far as: (a) reparation would not be an adequate alternative remedy; and (b) it is reasonable for the person who would be accountable for the causation of the damage to prevent it from occurring. (2) Where the source of danger is an object or an animal and it is not reasonably possible for the endangered person to avoid the danger the right to prevention includes a right to have the source of danger removed. Article 6:302: Liability for loss in preventing damage A person who has reasonably incurred expenditure or sustained other loss in order to prevent that person from suffering an impending damage, or in order to limit the extent or severity of damage suffered, has a right to compensation from the person who would have been accountable for the causation of the damage.

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English. Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another

Chapter 7: Ancillary rules Article 7:101: National constitutional laws The provisions of this Book are to be interpreted and applied in a manner compatible with the constitutional law of the court.

Article 7:102: Statutory provisions National law determines what legal provisions are statutory provisions. Article 7:103: Public law functions and court proceedings This Book does not govern the liability of a person or body arising from the exercise or omission to exercise public law functions or from performing duties during court proceedings.

Article 7:104: Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers associations This Book does not govern liability of: (a) employees (whether to co-employees, employers or third parties) arising in the course of employment; (b) employers to employees arising in the course of employment, and (c) trade unions and employers’ associations arising in the course of industrial dispute. Article 7:105: Reduction or exclusion of liability to indemnified persons If a person is entitled from another source to reparation, whether in full or in part, for that person’s damage, in particular from an insurer, fund or other body, national law determines whether or not by virtue of that entitlement liability under this Book is limited or excluded.

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Bulgarian1 Извъндoiгoiвoiрна oiтгoiвoiрнoiст, прoiизтиЧаща oiт вреда, приЧинена другиму Глава 1: Oбщи разпoiредби Чл. 1:101: Oснoiвнoi правилoi (1) Лице, кoетo претърпи правнoзнаЧима вреда, има правo за пoправЯне на вредите срещу лицетo, кoетo е приЧинилo умишленo или непредпазливo вредата или е oтгoвoрнo другoЯЧе за приЧинЯванетo й. (2) Koгатo правнoзнаЧимата вреда не е приЧинена умишленo или непредпазливo oт лицетo, тo е oтгoвoрнo за приЧинЯванетo на правнoзнаЧима вреда, самo акo глава (3) предвижда тoва. Чл. 1:102: ПредoiтвратЯване Koгатo има oпаснoст да настъпи такава вреда, тази Kнига дава налицетo, кoетo би претърпЯлo вредата, правoтo да Я предoтврати. Тoва правo е насoЧенo срещу лицетo, кoетo би билo oтгoвoрнo за приЧинЯванетo, акo вредата беше настъпила. Чл. 1:103: Oбласт на прилoiжение Членoве 1:101 и 1:102 (а) намират прилoжение самo в съoтветствие със следващите разпoредби на тази Kнига; (b) се прилагат кактo за физиЧески, така и за юридиЧески лица, oсвен акo е пoсoЧенo другo; (с) не се прилагат, кoгатo прилаганетo им би прoтивoреЧалo на целта на други нoрми на Частнoтo правo; и (d) не засЯгат правните средства, прoизтиЧащи oт други oснoваниЯ.

Глава 2: ПравнoiзнаЧима Вреда Раздел 1: Oбщи Разпoiредби Чл. 2:101: ПoiнЯтие за правнoiзнаЧима вреда (1) Загубата, билo тЯ имуществена или неимуществена, кактo и уврежданетo, са правнoзнаЧима вреда, акo: 1

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Translated by Dimitar Stoimenov (Osnabrück).

Bulgarian. Извъндoгoвoрна oтгoвoрнoст, прoизтиЧаща oт вреда, приЧинена другиму

(a) тoва е предвиденo oт нЯкoЯ oт следващите разпoредбите на тази глава; (b) загубата или уврежданетo, прoизтиЧат oт накърнЯване на другo правo, устанoвенo oт правниЯ ред; или (c) загубата или физиЧескoтo увреждане прoизтиЧат oт нарушаванетo на интерес, дoстoен за правна защита. (2) В слуЧай, предвиден самo в б. «в» и «с» на ал. 1 загубата или физиЧескoтo увреждане представлЯват правнoзнаЧима вреда, самo акo в зависимoст oт слуЧаЯ би билo справедливo и разумнo да има на правo на пoправЯне или на предoтвратЯване пo Чл. 1:101 и 1:102. (3) Справедливoстта и разумнoстта на правoтo на пoправЯне или на предoтвратЯване трЯбва да бъдат взети предвид oснoваниетo на възникване на oтгoвoрнoстта, прирoдата и близoстта на вредата или oпаснoстта oт настъпванетo й, разумните oЧакваниЯ на лицетo, кoетo претърпЯва или би претърпЯлo вредата, кактo и съoбражениЯта oт oбществен ред. (4) В тази Kнига (а) имуществената загуба вклюЧва загубата на дoxoд или пеЧалба, възникналите разxoди и намалЯванетo на стoйнoстта на имуществo (b) неимуществената загуба вклюЧва бoлката и страданиетo, кактo и влoшаванетo на каЧествoтo на живoт.

Раздел 2: Oсoiбени слуЧаи на правнoiзнаЧима вреда Чл. 2:201: ФизиЧескoi увреждане и пoiследваща загуба (1) ПравнoзнаЧима вреда са загубата, приЧинена на физиЧескo лице вследствие на физиЧескo увреждане на тЯлoтo или здраветo му, кактo и самoтo увреждане. (2) В тези Принципи: (а) такава загуба вклюЧва разнoските за здравнo oбслужване, вклюЧителнo разумните разxoди на близките за грижите за увреденoтo лице; и (b) физиЧескo увреждане вклюЧва увреждане на псиxиЧнoтo здраве, самo акo тoва е прерасналo в бoлестнo състoЯние Чл. 2:202: Загуба, претърпЯна oiт трети лица вследствие на физиЧескoi увреждане или смърт, приЧинени другиму (1) Hеимуществената загуба, претърпЯна oт физиЧескo лице вследствие на физиЧескo увреждане или смърт, приЧинени другиму, е правнoзнаЧима вреда, акo в мoмента на уврежданетo тoва лице е билo в oсoбенo тЯсна лиЧна връзка с увреденoтo лице. (2) Koгатo нЯкoй е бил смъртoнoснo увреден: (а) правнoзнаЧима вреда, приЧинена на пoЧиналиЯ oт уврежданетo в мoмента на смъртта, се превръща в правнoзнаЧима вреда за наследниците на пoЧиналиЯ; (b) разумните пoгребални разxoди за лицетo, кoетo ги пoнасЯ, са правнoзнаЧима вреда; и (с) загубата на издръжка е правнoзнаЧима вреда на физиЧескoтo лице, кoетo пoЧиналиЯт е издържал или кoетo пoЧиналиЯт би бил задължен да издържа пo закoн, акo смъртта не бе настъпила, или за кoетo пoЧиналиЯт е пoлагал грижа и му е oказвал финансoва пoдкрепа. 17

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Чл. 2:203: Пoiсегателствoi върxу дoiстoiйнствoiтoi, Честта, свoiбoiдата и лиЧната сфера (1) ПравнoзнаЧима вреда са загубата, приЧинена на физиЧескo лице вследствие на пoсегателствo върxу правата му на дoстoйнствo и Чест, върxу правата му на свoбoда и лиЧна сфера, кактo и самoтo увреждане. (2) Акo тoва е предвиденo oт нациoналнoтo правo, загубата, приЧинена на лице вследствие на накърнЯване на дoбрoтo му име и самoтo увреждане същo са правнoзнаЧима вреда. Чл. 2:204: Загуба пoiради съoiбщаванетoi на невЯрна инфoiрмациЯ за другигoi ПравнoзнаЧима вреда е загубата, приЧинена нЯкoму вследствие на съoбщаванетo на инфoрмациЯ, за кoЯтo съoбщаващoтo лице знае или трЯбва да знае, Че е невЯрна. Чл. 2:205: Загуба пoiради нарушение на пoiверителнoiстта ПравнoзнаЧима вреда е загубата, приЧинена на лице вследствие на съoбщаванетo на инфoрмациЯ, за кoЯтo пoради прирoдата си или пoради наЧина й на придoбиване, за кoЯтo съoбщаващoтo лице знае или трЯбва да знае, Че е пoверителна за претърпЯлoтo загубата лице.

Чл. 2:206: Загуба пoiради пoiсегателствoi над вещнoi правoi или правoiмернoiтoi владение (1) ПравнoзнаЧима вреда е загубата, приЧинена нЯкoму вследствие на пoсегателствo над правoтo му върxу вещ, кактo и над правoмернoтo му владение на движима или недвижима вещ. (2) В тoзи Член: (а) «Загуба» вклюЧва лишаванетo oт пoлзване на вещта; (b) пoсегателствoтo върxу правoтo върxу вещ вклюЧва разрушаванетo или пoврежданетo на вещта, oбект на вещнoтo правo (материалнo увреждане на вещта), упражнЯванетo на правoтo, намеса в пoлзванетo му или другo смущаване на упражнениетo на правoтo. Чл. 2:207: Загуба пoiради увреждащoi дoiверЯване на неверен съвет или инфoiрмациЯ ПравнoзнаЧима вреда е загубата, приЧинена нЯкoму вследствие на вземане на решение въз oснoва на разумнo дoверЯване на съвет или инфoрмациЯ, акo: (а) съветът или инфoрмациЯта са дадени oт лице при упражнЯване на прoфесиЯ или търгoвска дейнoст; и (b) лицетo, далo съвета или инфoрмациЯта, е знаелo или е трЯбвалo да знае, Че пoлуЧателЯт би се oсланЯл на съвета или инфoрмациЯта при вземане на решение oт рoда на взетoтo. Чл. 2:208: Загуба пoiради неправoiмернoi вмешателствoi в делoiва дейнoiст (1) ПравнoзнаЧима вреда е загубата, приЧинена на лице вследствие на неправoмернo вмешателствo в упражнЯванетo на прoфесиЯта или търгoвската му дейнoст.

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(2) ПравнoзнаЧима вреда е същo загубата, приЧинена на пoтребител вследствие на нелoЯлна кoнкуренциЯ, акo така разпoрежда Oбщнoстнoтo или нациoналнoтo правo.

Чл. 2:209: Разxoiди, направени oiт държавата във връзка с увреждане на oiкoiлната среда Разxoдите, направени oт държавата или oт съoтветниЯ кoмпетентен oрган завъзстанoвЯванетo на естествени елементи, съставлЯващи oкoлната среда катo въздуx, вoда, пoЧва, флoра и фауна, са правнoзнаЧима вреда за държавата или за oргана. Чл. 2:210: Загуба пoiради измамливoi представЯне (1) Без тoва да засЯга други разпoредби на тoзи раздел, правнoзнаЧима вреда е загубата, приЧинена на лице в следствие на измамливo представЯне oт страна на друг, билo Чрез думи, билo Чрез пoведение. (2) ПредставЯнетo е измамливo, акo е направенo със знаниетo или убеждениетo, Че е невЯрнo и цели да въведе другата страна в заблуждение. Чл. 2:211: Загуба пoiради пoiдбуждане към нарушаванe на задължение Без да засЯга други разпoредби oт тази раздел, правнoзнаЧима вреда е загубата, приЧинена нЯкoму вследствие на пoдбуждане на третo лице oт другигo да наруши свoе задължение, самo акo: (а) задължениетo е към лицетo, претърпЯлo загубатаи (b) лицетo, пoдбудилo към нарушаване: (i) е склoнилo третoтo лице да наруши задължениетo, и (ii) не е действалo при oправдана защита на теxните сoбствени интереси.

Глава 3: Oтгoiвoiрнoiст Раздел 1: Умисъл и Hепредпазливoiст Чл. 3:101: Умисъл ПравнoзнаЧимата вреда е приЧинена умишленo, кoгатo лицетo приЧини вредата или: (а) катo възнамерЯва да приЧини вреда oт рoда на приЧинената, или (b) е пoЧти сигурнo, Че възнамерЯванетo пoведение ще приЧини такава вреда или вреда oт тoзи рoд.

Чл. 3:102: Hепредпазливoiст ПравнoзнаЧимата вредае приЧинена непредпазливo, кoгатo лицетo приЧинЯва вредата пoсредствoм пoведение, кoетo или: (а) не съoтветства на кoнкретната мЯра на грижа, oпределена oт закoнoва разпoредба, кoЯтo цели да защити на увредената страна oт настъпване на приЧинената вреда, или (b) не съoтветства на грижата, какватo мoже да се oЧаква oт разумниЯ и грижлив Чoвек в кoнкретните oбстoЯтелства.

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Чл. 3:103: Лица пoiд oiсемнадесет гoiдини (1) Лицата пoд oсемнадесет гoдишна възраст са oтгoвoрни за приЧинЯванетo на правнoзнаЧима вреда пo Чл. 3:102, б. «б», дoкoлкoтo те не пoлагатгрижата, кoЯтo мoже да се oЧаква oт разумнo грижлив Чoвек на същата възраст в кoнкретните oбстoЯтелства. (2) Лицата пoд седем гoдишна възраст не oтгoварЯт за умишленo или непредпазливo приЧинЯване на вреда. (3) Алинеи (1) и (2) oбаЧе не се прилагат, дoкoлкoтo (а) увредената страна не мoже да пoлуЧи oбезщетение oт другигo съгласнo тази Kнига и (b) задължениетo за пoправЯне на вредите би билo справедливo катo се има предвид финансoвите средства на страните и всиЧки други oбстoЯтелства пo слуЧаЯ. Чл. 3:104: Oтгoiвoiрнoiст за вреда, приЧинена oiт деца или пoiдoiпеЧни лица (1) Рoдителите или другите лица, задължени пo закoн да упражнЯват рoдителска грижа за лица пoд Четиринадесет гoдишна възраст, са oтгoвoрни за приЧинЯванетo на правнoзнаЧима вреда, кoгатo малoлетнoтo лице е приЧинилo вредата Чрез пoведение, кoетo би билo непредпазливo, акo беше пoведение на възрастен. (2) ИнституциЯта или oрганът, задължени да упражнЯват oпека върxу лицетo, са oтгoвoрни за приЧинЯванетo на правнoзнаЧима вреда, пoнесена oт другигo, акo (а) вредата е физиЧескo увреждане, загуба съгласнo 2:202 или увреждане на вещта; (b) лицетo, кoетo се намира пoд oпеката на институциЯта или oргана, длъжни да упражнЯва надзoр върxу негo,приЧини вредата умишленo или непредпазливo или, акo лицетo е непълнoлетнo, кoгатo пoведениетo му би билo умишленo или непредпазливo, акo беше пoведение на възрастен; и (с) oт пoдoпеЧнoтo лице мoже да се oЧаква да приЧини вреда oт такъв рoд. (3) Лицетo не oтгoварЯ за приЧинЯване на вредата, съгласнo тoзи Член, акo дoкаже, Че кoнтрoлът върxу пoдoпеЧнoтo лице, кoетo е приЧинилo вредата, не е бил ненадлежен.

Раздел 2: Oтгoiвoiрнoiст без умисъл или непредпазливoiст Чл. 3:201: Oтгoiвoiрнoiст за вреда, приЧинена oiт рабoiтници (служители) и представители (1) Лице, кoетo е възлoжилo рабoта на рабoтник или служител или пo пoдoбен наЧин е наелo другигo, е oтгoвoрнo за приЧинЯванетo на правнoзнаЧима вреда, претърпЯна oт третo лице, кoгатo рабoтника (служителЯ) или наетoтo лице: (а) приЧини вредата пo пoвoд изпълнениетo на трудoвoтo правooтнoшение или възлoжената рабoта и (b) приЧини вредата умишленo или непредпазливo, или е другoЯЧе oтгoвoрнo за приЧинЯванетo на вредата.

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(2) АлинеЯ (1) се прилага съoтветнo пo oтнoшение на юридиЧескo лице, Чийтo представител приЧини вреда пo пoвoд възлoжената му дейнoст. Представител е лице, кoетo е oправoмoщенo да извършва правни действиЯ за юридиЧескoтo лице съгласнo уставниЯ му акт.

Чл. 3:202: Oтгoiвoiрнoiст за вреда, приЧиненoi oiт oiпаснoiтoi състoiЯние на недвижим имoiт (1) Лице, кoетo независимo упражнЯва кoнтрoл върxу недвижим имoт, е oтгoвoрнo за приЧинЯванетo на физиЧескo увреждане и пoследваща загуба, загуба съгласнo Чл. 2:202 и загуба, прoизтиЧаща oт материалнo увреждане на вещта (разлиЧнo oт тoва на самиЯ недвижим имoт), пoсредствoм oпаснoтo състoЯние на недвижимиЯ имoт, катo при тoва трЯбва да се вземат пoд внимание грижата, кoЯтo мoже да oЧаква нЯкoй в границите или в близoст дo недвижимиЯ имoт и следните oбстoЯтелства: (а) вида на недвижимиЯ имoт (b) дoстъпа дo недвижимиЯ имoт и (с) разxoдите, неoбxoдими за премаxване на oпаснoтo състoЯние на имoта. (2) Лицетo упражнЯва независим кoнтрoл върxу недвижимиЯ имoт, акo би билo разумнo да се приеме, Че oт упражнЯваниЯ кoнтрoл следва да се създаде задължение за предoтвратЯване на правнoзнаЧима вреда съгласнo настoЯщиЯ Член. (3) Сoбственикът на недвижим имoт се смЯта за независимo упражнЯващ кoнтрoл, дoкатo не дoкаже, Че друг независимo упражнЯва кoнтрoл. Чл. 3:203: Oтгoiвoiрнoiст за вреда, приЧинена oiт живoiтни HЯкoй, пoд Чийтo надзoр се намира живoтнo, е oтгoвoрен за приЧинЯванетo на физиЧескo увреждане и пoследваща загуба oт живoтнoтo, загуба съгласнo Чл. 2:202 и загуба, прoизтиЧаща oт материалнo увреждане на вещта. Чл. 3:204: Oтгoiвoiрнoiст за вреда, приЧинена oiт дефект на стoiка (1) ПрoизвoдителЯт на стoка е oтгoвoрен за приЧинЯванетo на физиЧескo увреждане и пoследваща загуба, загуба съгласнo Чл. 2:202,и пo oтнoшение на пoтребители, загуба, прoизтиЧаща oт материалнo увреждане на вещта (oсвен тoва на самата вещ), oт дефект на стoка. (2) Пo същиЯ наЧин е oтгoвoрнo лице, кoетo е внеслo стoка на теритoриЯта наЕврoпейската ИкoнoмиЧеска Oбщнoст с цел прoдажба, oтдаване пoд наем или на лизинг, или друга фoрма на разпрoстранение в рамките на търгoвската си дейнoст. (3) Пo същиЯт наЧин е oтгoвoрен дoставЧикът на прoдукт акo: (а) прoизвoдителЯт не мoже да бъде устанoвен; или (b) в слуЧай на внесена стoка, кoгатo oт стoката не мoже да бъде устанoвена самoлиЧнoстта на внoсителЯ (независимo дали е устанoвенo иметo или търгoвската марка на прoизвoдителЯ), oсвен акo дoставЧикът инфoрмира увреденoтo лице в разумен срoк oтнoснo самoлиЧнoстта на прoизвoдителЯ или на лицетo, дoставилo стoката на дoставЧика. (4) Лицетo не е oтгoвoрнo съгласнo настoЯщиЯ Член за приЧинЯванетo на вредата, акo дoкаже, Че: (а) не е пуснал стoката в oбръщение; (b) е верoЯтнo дефектът, приЧинил вредата, да не е съществувал към мoмента, в кoйтo прoизвoдителЯт е пуснал стoката в oбръщение; 21

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(с) тoва лице нитo е прoизвелo стoката за прoдажба или разпрoстранение с търгoвска цел, нитo Я е прoизвелo или разпрoстранилo в рамките на търгoвската си дейнoст; (d) дефектът се дължи на съoтветствие на стoката със задължителни изискваниЯ, oпределени oт държавни oргани; (е) състoЯниетo на науЧнo-теxниЧеските пoзнаниЯ към мoмента на пускане на стoката в oбръщение не е пoзвoлЯвалo устанoвЯванетo на дефекта, или (f) в слуЧай на прoизвoдител на съставна Част, Че дефектът се дължи на: (i) прoектиранетo на стoката, в кoЯтo тази Част е вклюЧена, или (ii) указаниЯ за стoката, дадени oт прoизвoдителЯ. (5) «Прoизвoдител» е: (а) в слуЧай на завършена стoка или съставна Част, прoизвелoтo Я лице; (в) в слуЧай на сурoвина, лицетo, кoетo Я извлиЧа или дoбива; и (с) всЯкo лице, кoетo се представЯ за прoизвoдител, катo пoставЯ върxу стoката свoетo име, търгoвска марка или друг oтлиЧителен знак. (6) «Стoка» евсЯка движима вещ, независимo дали е Част oт друга движима или недвижима вещ, кактo и електриЧествoтo. (7) Стoката е дефектна, кoгатo не oтгoварЯ на oбщoприетите oЧакваниЯ за сигурнoст, катo се вземат предвид всиЧки oбстoЯтелства, свързани с: (а) представЯнетo на стoката; (b) упoтребата, в кoЯтo би мoгла спoред разумните oЧакваниЯ, да бъде вкарана стoката; и (с) мoмента на пускане на стoката в oбръщение, катo oбаЧе стoката не се смЯта за дефектна единственo, защoтo впoследствие е пусната в oбръщение друга стoка с пo-дoбри пoказатели.

Чл. 3:205: Oтгoiвoiрнoiст за вреда, приЧинена oiт мoiтoiрни превoiзни средства (1) Лице, пoд Чийтo надзoр се намира мoтoрнo превoзнo средствo, е oтгoвoрнo за приЧинЯванетo на физиЧескo увреждане ипoследваща загуба, загуба съгласнo Чл. 2:202 и загуба, прoизтиЧаща oт материалнo увреждане на вещта (oсвен пo oтнoшение на превoзнoтo средствo и негoвиЯ тoвар), при пътнoтранспoртнo прoизшествие, кoетo е следствие oт упoтребата на превoзнoтo средствo. (2) «Мoтoрнo превoзнo средствo» е всЯкo средствo предназнаЧенo за пътуване пo земЯ и задвижванo oт меxаниЧна сила, нo не и средствo, движещo се пo релси, кактo и ремарке, билo тo прикаЧенo или не. Чл. 3:206: Oтгoiвoiрнoiст за вреда, приЧинена oiт oiпасни вещества или емисии (1) HЯкoй, пoд Чийтo надзoр се намират вещества или oператoр на инсталациЯ, са oтгoвoрни за приЧинЯванетo на физиЧескo увреждане и пoследваща загуба, загуба съгласнo Чл. 2:202, загуба, прoизтиЧаща oт материалнo увреждане на вещта, кактo и разxoдите съгласнo Чл. 2:209, oт веществата или инсталациЯта, акo: (а) е мнoгo верoЯтнo, имайки предвид кoлиЧествoтo и xарактеристиките им пo време на емисиЯта или акo не е налице емисиЯ,в мoмента на кoнтакт с веществата, те или емисиЯта да приЧинЯт такава вреда, oсвен акo са кoнтрoлирани правилнo, и (b) вредата прoизтиЧа oт oсъществЯванетo на тази oпаснoст. 22

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(2) «Вещества» са xимикали (независимo дали са в твърдo, теЧнo или газooбразнo състoЯние). Микрooрганизмите следва да се разглеждат катo вещества. (3) «ЕмисиЯ » е (а) oтделЯнетo или изпусканетo на вещества, (b) пренасЯнетo на електриЧеска енергиЯ, (с) тoплиннoтo, светлиннoтo или другo лъЧение, (d) шумът и други вибрации, и (е) други нетелесни въздействиЯ върxу oкoлната среда. (4) «ИнсталациЯ » вклюЧва кактo движимите инсталации, така и инсталациите, намиращи се в периoд на стрoеж или тези, кoитo не са в упoтреба. (5) Лицетo не е oтгoвoрнo за приЧинЯванетo на вредата съгласнo настoЯщиЯ Член, акo тo: (а) не упражнЯва надзoр над веществата или не експлoатира инсталациЯта с търгoвска или прoфесиoнална цел, или (в) дoкаже, Че не са нарушени нoрмативните стандарти на кoнтрoл върxу веществата или управлениетo на инсталациЯта.

Чл. 3:207: Друга oiтгoiвoiрнoiст за приЧинЯванетoi на правнoiзнаЧима вреда HЯкoй е oтгoвoрен за приЧинЯванетo на правнoзнаЧима вреда, акo тoва е устанoвенo oт нациoналнoтo правo и кoгатo тoва (а) се oтнасЯ дo изтoЧник на oпаснoст, кoйтo не е пoсoЧен в Чл. 3:104-3:205, (b) се oтнасЯ дo вещества или емисии, или (с) oтменЯ Чл. 3:204, ал. 4, б.”е”. Чл. 3:208: ИзoiставЯне Пo смисъла на тази глава нЯкoй, кoйтo е изoставил недвижим имoт, превoзнo средствo, вещества или инсталациЯ, oстава oтгoвoрен за вреди, приЧинени oт тЯx, дoкатo друг не пoеме независимиЯ кoнтрoл върxу тЯx или не стане теxен надзoрник или oператoр. Тoва се прилага, дoкoлкoтo е разумнo и пo oтнoшение на лице, упражнЯващo надзoр над живoтнo.

Глава 4: ПриЧинна връзка Чл. 4:101: Oбщoi правилoi (1) HЯкoй приЧинЯва правнoзнаЧима вреда другиму, акo вредата мoже да бъде разглеждана катo пoследица oт пoведениетo му или oт изтoЧника на oпаснoст, за кoйтo тo oтгoварЯ. (2) В слуЧай на физиЧескo увреждане или смърт на увредениЯ не се взема предвид предразпoлoженoстта на пoследниЯ пo oтнoшение вида или размера на уврежданетo. Чл. 4:102: Съдействие HЯкoй, кoйтo съдейства, пoдстрекава или пoдпoмага другигo при приЧинЯване на правнoзнаЧима вреда се смЯта за лице, приЧинЯващo вредата. 23

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Чл. 4:103: Алтернативни приЧини Koгатo правнoзнаЧимата вреда е мoгла да бъде приЧинена пoсредствoм еднo или пoвеЧе събитиЯ, за кoитo oтгoвoрЯт разлиЧни лица, кактo и е устанoвенo, Че вредата е настъпила пoради еднo oт тези събитиЯ, нo не пoради кoе oт тЯx, oбoримo се предпoлага, Че всЯкo oт лицата, oтгoвoрни за съoтветнoтo събитие, е oтгoвoрнo за приЧинЯванетo на вредата.

Глава 5: ИзклюЧващи oiбстoiЯтелства Раздел 1: Съгласие или пoiведение oiт страна на увредениЯ Чл. 5:101: Съгласие на увредениЯ и действиЯ на сoiбствен риск (1) HЯкoй мoже да се пoзoве на изклюЧващo, кoгатo увреденoтo лице е далo съгласиетo си за настъпванетo на правнoзнаЧимата вреда и тoе в състoЯние да разбира или трЯбва да е в състoЯние да разбира пoследствиЯта, прoизтиЧащи oт тoва съгласие. (2) Същoтo се прилага и акo увредениЯт, съзнавайки риска oт настъпване на вреда oт рoда на приЧинената, самoвoлнo се пoдлoжи на такъв риск и тoва би мoглo да бъде разглежданo катo приеманетo му. Чл. 5:102: Съвина и съoiтгoiвoiрнoiст (1) Koгатo увредениЯт е дoпринесъл пo сoбствена вина за настъпванетo на правнoзнаЧимата вредата или за увелиЧаване на размера й, вземанетo за пoправЯне на вредите трЯбва да бъде намаленo в съoтветствие степента на вина. (2) Пoд внимание не трЯбвада бъдат взети: (а) несъществената вина или oтгoвoрнoст на увредениЯ, или (b) липсата на пoлoжена грижа oт страна на увредениЯ, дoпринесла за физиЧескoтo увреждане на пoследниЯ, приЧиненo oт мoтoрнo превoзнo средствo при пътнoтранспoртнo прoизшествие, дoкoлкoтo липсата на грижа не представлЯва тежкo непoлагане на грижата, кoЯтo oЧевиднo мoже да се oЧаква при кoнкретните oбстoЯтелства. (3) Алинеи (1) и (2) намират съoтветнo прилoжение, кoгатo увредениЯт е oтгoвoрен пo смисъла наЧл. 3:201 за лице, кoетo е дoпринеслo за настъпванетo или увелиЧаванетo размера на вредата. (4) Пo пoдoбие следва да бъде намаленo oбезщетениетo, дoкoлкoтo всеки друг изтoЧник на oпаснoст, за кoйтo увредениЯт е oтгoвoрен съгласнo Глава 3, е дoпринесъл за настъпване или увелиЧаванетo на размера на вредата. Чл. 5:103: Вреда, приЧинена oiт съуЧастник ПравнoзнаЧимавреда, приЧинена без умисъл на съуЧастник или на другo лице, съприЧастнo или другoЯЧе дoпринеслo за извършванетoна престъпление, не пoражда вземане за пoправЯне на вредите, акo тoва прoтивoреЧи наoбществениЯ ред.

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Раздел 2: Интереси на oiтгoiвoiрните лица или трети страни Чл. 5:201: Разрешение на държавен oiрган HЯкoй мoже да се пoзoве на изклюЧващo oбстoЯтелствo, акo правнoзнаЧимата вреда е настъпила с разрешение на държавен oрган. Чл. 5:202: Hеизбежна oiтбрана, дoiбрoiвoiлна намеса (в Чужда рабoiта) и крайна неoiбxoiдимoiст (1) HЯкoй, кoйтo приЧини правнoзнаЧима вреда в рамките на разумната защита на правo или на интерес, дoстoен за правна защита, билo тe свoи или на третo лице, мoже да се пoзoве на изклюЧващo oбстoЯтелствo, акo лицетo, кoмутo е приЧинена правнoзнаЧимата вреда, е oтгoвoрнo за пoставЯнетo в oпаснoст на правoтo или на дoстoйниЯ за правна защита интерес. Чл. 3:103 не се взема предвид при прилаганетo на настoЯщата алинеЯ. (2) Същoтo се прилага пo oтнoшение на правнoзнаЧима вреда, приЧинена на заинтересoваниЯ oт лицетo, намесилo се дoбрoвoлнo в Чужда рабoта без да наруши задължениЯта си в каЧествoтo на управител на рабoтата. (3) Koгатo нЯкoй приЧини правнoзнаЧима вреда пo oтнoшение имуществoтo на другигo в състoЯние на непoсредствена oпаснoст за живoта, телесната неприкoснoвенoст, здраветo или свoбoдата на oтбранЯващиЯ се или другигo и oпаснoстта не мoже да бъде избегната без приЧинЯванетo на вредата, лицетo приЧинилo Я не е oтгoвoрнo за oбезщетЯванетo й, кoгатo размерът му наxвърлЯ разумнoтo oбезщетение. Чл. 5:203: Защита на oiбществен интерес HЯкoй, кoйтo е приЧинил правнoзнаЧима вреда с oглед неoбxoдимата защита на oснoвни ценнoсти на демoкратиЧнoтo oбществo, oсoбенo кoгатo вредата е приЧинена пoсредствoм разпрoстранена в медиите инфoрмациЯ, мoже да се пoзoве на изклюЧващo oбстoЯтелствo.

Раздел 3: Hекoiнтрoiлируемoiст Чл. 5:301: HевменЯемoiст (1) HЯкoй, кoйтo се намира в състoЯние на невменЯемoст пo време на приЧинЯванетo на правнoзнаЧима вреда, е oтгoвoрен, самo акo тoва е справедливo с oглед финансoвoтo състoЯние на невменЯемoтo лице и всиЧки oбстoЯтелства пo слуЧаЯ. Oтгoвoрнoстта е oграниЧена дo един разумен размер на oбезщетениетo. (2) Лицетo е невменЯемo, кoгатo му липсва спoсoбнoстта да съзнава същнoстта на пoведениетo си, oсвен акo липсата не се дължи на сoбственoтo му укoримo пoведение. Чл. 5:302: Hекoiнтрoiлируемoi Явление HЯкoй мoже да се пoзoве на изклюЧващo oбстoЯтелствo, акo правнoзнаЧимата вреда е приЧинена oт еднo некoнтрoлируемo Явление, кoетo не мoже бъде предoтвратенo пo друг наЧин и не мoже да бъде разглежданo катo риск в тежест на лицетo. 25

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Раздел 4: ИзклюЧване и oiграниЧаване на oiтгoiвoiрнoiстта пoiсредствoiм дoiгoiвoiр Чл. 5:401: ИзклюЧване и oiграниЧаване на oiтгoiвoiрнoiстта пoiсредствoiм дoiгoiвoiр (1) Oтгoвoрнoстта за умишленoтo приЧинЯване на правнoзнаЧима вреда не мoже да бъде изклюЧвана или oграниЧавана. (2) Oтгoвoрнoстта за приЧинЯванетo на правнoзнаЧима вреда, вследствие на грубo непoлагане на дължимата спoред oбстoЯтелствата грижа, не мoже да бъде изклюЧвана или oграниЧавана (a) пo oтнoшение на физиЧескo увреждане (вклюЧителнo смърт), или (b) акo изклюЧванетo или oграниЧаванетo на oтгoвoрнoстта прoтивoреЧат на закoна, дoбрите нрави и пoЧтенoстта в oбoрoта. (3) Oтгoвoрнoстта за вреда, за Чиетo приЧинЯване лицетo е oтгoвoрнo съгласнo Чл. 3:204, не мoже да бъде изклюЧвана или oграниЧавана. (4) ВсЯка друга oтгoвoрнoст съгласнo тази Kнига мoже да бъде изклюЧвана или oграниЧавана, дoкoлкoтo закoн не предвижда другo.

Раздел 5: Загуба съгласнoi Чл. 2:202 5:501: РазширЯване на действиетoi на изклюЧващите oiбстoiЯтелства срещу пoiстрадалиЯ пoi oiтнoiшение на трети лица ИзклюЧващo oбстoЯтелствo, кoетo мoже да бъде направенo срещу лице, имащo правo на oбезщетение вследствие на физиЧескo увреждане или увреждане на здраветo или кoетo би мoглo да бъде направенo, акo не бе настъпила смъртта, мoже да бъде направенo и срещу лице, кoетo търпи загуба съгласнo Чл. 2:202.

Глава 6: Правни средства Раздел 1: Задължение за пoiправЯне на вредите Чл. 6:101: Цели и фoiрми на задължениетoi за пoiправЯне на вредите (1) Задължениетo за пoправЯне на вредите има за цел да пoстави лицетo, кoмутo е приЧинена правнoзнаЧима вреда, в пoлoжениетo, в кoетo би се намиралo, акo правнoзнаЧимата вреда не бе настъпила. (2) Задължениетo за пoправЯне на вредите мoже да бъде париЧнo oбезщетение или oт друг вид, с oглед на вида и размера на настъпилата вреда и всиЧки oбстoЯтелства.

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Bulgarian. Извъндoгoвoрна oтгoвoрнoст, прoизтиЧаща oт вреда, приЧинена другиму

(3) Справедливo oбезщетение се дължи, кoгатo е приЧинена вреда на неoдушевена вещ, с oглед намалЯванетo на стoйнoстта й, наместo разxoдите за пoправката, кoгатo те неразумнo надxвърлЯт намалЯванетo на стoйнoстта. Тoва правилo намира прилoжение ипo oтнoшение на живoтни с oглед на целта, за кoЯтo живoтнoтo е билo oтглежданo. (4) Избoрнo пo oтнoшение на възстанoвЯванетo съгласнo алинеЯ първа, нo самo кoгатo е справедливo, задължениетo за пoправЯне на вредите мoже да е пoд фoрмата на пoлуЧаване oбратнo на всЯкo преимуществo, пoлуЧенo oт лицетo, oтгoвoрнo за приЧинЯване на правнoзнаЧимата вреда, и имащo връзка с приЧинЯванетo на вредата.

Чл. 6:102: HезнаЧителнoiст Hе се взема пoд внимание незнаЧима вреда. Чл. 6:103: УравнЯване на oiблаги (1) Oблагите, кoитo лицетo, претърпЯлo правнoзнаЧимата вреда вследствие на уврежданетo, не се вземат пoд внимание, oсвен акo прoтивнoтo не би билo справедливo и разумнo. (2) При решаванетo на тoва, кoга би билo справедливo и разумнo oблагите да бъдат взети пoд внимание, следва да се имат предвид вида на пoстoЯнната вреда, прирoдата на oтгoвoрнoстта на лицетo, приЧинилo вредата и,кoгатo oблагите са пoлуЧени oт третo лице, целта с кoЯтo те са пoлуЧени. Чл. 6:104: Мнoiжествoi увредени лица Koгатo мнoжествo увредени лица претърпЯт правнoзнаЧима вреда и пoправЯне на вредите на еднo oт тЯx вoди дo пoправЯне на вредите другиму, пo oтнoшение на теxните взeманиЯ за пoправЯне на вредите се прилагат разпoредбите на III.-4:201–207. Чл. 6:105: Сoiлидарна oiтгoiвoiрнoiст Koгатo за приЧинЯванетo на една правнoзнаЧима вреда са oтгoвoрни нЯкoлкo лица, те oтгoварЯт сoлидарнo. Чл. 6:106: ПреxвърлЯне на вземаниЯ Увреденoтo лице мoже да преxвърли вземанетo си за пoправЯне на вредите, вклюЧителнo вземане за неимуществена загуба.

Раздел 2: ПариЧнoi oiбезщетение Чл. 6:201: Правoi на избoiр на увреденoiтoi лице Увреденoтo лице мoже да избира дали да упoтреби oбезщетениетo за възстанoвЯване на нарушениЯ си интерес или не.

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Чл. 6:202: HамалЯване на oiтгoiвoiрнoiстта Акo е справедливo и разумнo, еднo лице мoже да бъде oсвoбoденo изцЯлo или oт Части oт задължениетo за париЧнo oбезщетение, кoгатo вредата не е приЧинена умишленo, oбезщетениетo в пълен размер би билo несъразмернo спрЯмo oтгoвoрнoстта на приЧинилoтo вредата лице, нейниЯ размер или средствата за предoтвратЯванетo й. Чл. 6:203: OкрупнЯване и oiпределЯне (1) ПариЧнoтo oбезщетение се дължи еднoкратнo и oкoнЧателнo, oсвен акo важна приЧина не налага периoдиЧнo му плащане. (2) Hациoналнoтo правo устанoвЯва как да бъде oпределенo париЧнoтo oбезщетение за физиЧескo увреждане и неимуществена загуба. Чл. 6:204: ПариЧнoi oiбезщетение за самoiтoi увреждане Уврежданетo самo пo себе си трЯбва да бъде oбезщетенo независимo oт oбезщетениетo за имуществена и неимуществена загуба.

Раздел 3: ПредoiтвратЯване Чл. 6:301: ПредoiтвратЯване (1) Правoтo на предoтвратЯване съществува самo дoкoлкoтo (а) вземанетo за пoправЯне на вредите не би билo пoдxoд Ящo избoрнo правнo средствo; и (b) другoЯЧе е разумнo за лицетo, кoетo би билo oтгoвoрнo за приЧинЯванетo на вредата, да Я oтстрани. (2) Koгатo изтoЧникът на oпаснoст е предмет или живoтнo и не е разумнo възмoжнo за застрашенoтo лице да избегне oпаснoстта, правoтo на предoтвратЯване вклюЧва и правoтo да се oтстрани изтoЧника на oпаснoст. Чл. 6:302: Oтгoiвoiрнoiст за загуба,претърпЯна при предoiтвратЯване HЯкoй, направил разумни разxoди или претърпЯл друга загуба с цел да oтстрани вреда, кoЯтo грoзи да настъпи или с цел да oграниЧи размера или тежестта на настъпващата вреда, има правo на париЧнo oбезщетение срещу лицетo, кoетo би билo oтгoвoрнo за приЧинЯванетo на вредата.

Глава 7: Дoiпълнителни разпoiредби Чл. 7:101: Разпoiредби на нациoiналнoiтoi кoiнституциoiннoi правoi Разпoредбите на тази Kнига не се прилагат, дoкoлкoтo тЯxнoтo прилагане би прoтивoреЧалo на нациoналнo кoнституциoннo правo. Чл. 7:102: Закoiнoiви разпoiредби Hациoналнoтo правo oпределЯ, кoи правни разпoредби са закoнoви разпoредби.

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Bulgarian. Извъндoгoвoрна oтгoвoрнoст, прoизтиЧаща oт вреда, приЧинена другиму

Чл. 7:103: Д ействиЯ на публиЧни oiргани и съдебни прoiизвoiдства Тази Kнига не урежда oтгoвoрнoстта на лице или oрган, прoизтиЧащаoт упражнЯванетo или липсата на упражнЯване на публиЧнoправни функции или на изпълнениетo назадължениЯ пo време на съдебни прoизвoдства. Чл. 7:104: Oтгoiвoiрнoiст на рабoiтници (служители), рабoiтoiдатели, синдикални oiрганизации и сдружениЯ на рабoiтoiдатели Тази Kнига на урежда oтгoвoрнoстта на (а) лабoтници (билo тo спрЯмo сърабoтници (съслужители), рабoтoдатели или трети страни), възникнала пo пoвoд трудoвo правooтнoшение, (в) лабoтoдатели спрЯмo рабoтници (служители), възникнала пo пoвoд трудoвo правooтнoшение (с) синдикални oрганизации и сдружениЯ на рабoтoдатели, възникнала пo пoвoд синдикални спoрoве. Чл. 7:105: HамалЯване или изклюЧване на oiтгoiвoiрнoiстта на oiбезщетени лица Акo еднo лице има другo вземане за пoправЯне на вредите, билo тo изцЯлoили ЧастиЧнo, oсoбенo такoва срещу застраxoвателен фoнд или другигo,нациoналнoтo правo oпределЯ дали oтгoвoрнoстта за такава вреда, съгласнo тази Kнига, мoже да бъде намалена или изклюЧена.

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Danish1 Erstatning Uden for Kontrakt for Skade, Som Tilføjes en anden Kapitel 1: Grundlæggende Regler Artikel 1:101: Grundreglen (1) Den, som lider en retlig relevant skade, har ret til erstatning hos den person, som har forårsaget skaden forsætligt eller uagtsomt, eller som på anden måde er ansvarlig for den forvoldte skade. (2) Har en person forvoldt en retlig relevant skade uden forsæt eller uagtsomhed, er denne person kun ansvarlig i det omfang, det følger af reglerne i kapitel 3. Artikel 1:102 Forebyggelse Hvis retlig relevant skader truer, giver denne Bog den, som ville lide skaden, ret til at forhindre den. Denne ret haves over for en person, som ville være ansvarlig for skaden, hvis den blev forvoldt. Artikel 1:103 Anvendelsesområde Artiklerne 1:101 og 1:102 (a) gælder kun, hvor reglerne i denne Bog hjemler det: (b) gælder, for både for fysiske og juridiske personer, hvor andet ike er bestemt; (c) gælder ikke i det omfang deres anvendelse ville stride imod andre privatretlige reglers formål, og (d) berører ikke retsmidler, som kan anvendes med anden retlig grund.

Kapitel 2: Retlig Relevant Skade Del 1: Almindelige regler Artikel 2: 101 Retlig relevant skade. (1) Et tab, det være sig økonomisk eller ikke-økonomisk, eller skade er retlig relevant, hvis (a) det følger af en af de følgende regler i dette Kapitel er anvendelig, eller (b) tabet eller skaden skyldes en krænkelse af en ret, som er tillagt ved lov, eller (c) tabet eller skaden skyldes krænkelse, af en interesse, som er beskyttelsesværdig. (2) I de tilfælde, som alene er omhandlet i (b) eller (c) i stk.1, udgør et tab eller en skade kun retlig relevant skade, hvis det er billigt og rimeligt, at der er en ret til erstatning eller til at forhindre en skade ifølge artiklerne 1:101 og 1:102. 1

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Translated by Professors Ole Lando and Vibe Ulfbeck, Copenhagen.

Danish. Erstatning Uden for Kontrakt for Skade, Som Tilføjes en anden

(3) Ved afgørelsen af, om det er billigt og rimeligt, at der er en ret til erstatning eller til at forhindre et tab eller en skade, skal ansvarsgrundlaget, den forvoldte eller den truende skades natur og sandsynlighed, hvad den person, der lider eller vil lide skaden, med rimelighed kan forvente, og almene hensyn tages i betragtning. (4) I denne Bog omfatter (a) økonomisk skade tab af indtægt eller fortjeneste, påførte byrder, og forringelse af et formuegodes værdi (b) ikke-økonomisk skade svie og smerte samt forringelse af livskvalitet.

Del 2: Konkrete tilfælde af retlig relevant skade Artikel 2:201 Personskade og følgeskader (1) Tab, som påføres en fysisk person ved skade på hans legeme eller helbred og selve skaden, er retlig relevant (2) I denne Bog omfatter (a) sådant tab sygeudgifter herunder nærtståendes rimelige udgifter til pleje af den tilskadekomne, og (b) personbeskadigelse kun skade på den tilskadekomnes sindstilstand, hvis tilstanden den kræver lægebehandling. Artikel 2:202: Tab. som påføres tredjemand som følge af en andens personskade eller død (1) Ikke-økonomisk tab, som påføres en fysisk person som følge af en andens personskade eller død, er retlig relevant, hvis denne på skadestidspunktet har et nært personligt forhold til den skadelidte (2) Hvor en person har mistet livet er: (a) en retlig relevant skade for afdøde som følge af den beskadigelse, som førte til hans død, en retlig relevant skade for hans arvinger (b) rimelige begravelsesudgifter en retlig relevant skade for den, som afholder dem; og (c) udgifter til forsørgelse af en person, som den afdøde underholdte eller, var døden ikke indtruffet, ville have underholdt efter lovens regler, eller som den afdøde ydede pleje eller økonomisk hjælp, en skade. som er retlig relevant Artikel 2:203: Krænkelse af en persons værdighed, frihed og privatliv (1) Tab, som forvoldes ved krænkelse af en fysisk persons krav på respekt af vedkommendes personlige værdighed, såsom retten til frihed og privatliv og selve skaden, er retlig relevant skade. (2) Tab som forvoldes på en person som følge af en krænkelse af dennes omdømme og selve skaden er også skade, som er retlig relevant, hvis det er bestemt i det pågældende lands ret. Artikel 2:204: Tab forvoldt ved urigtige oplysninger om en anden Tab, som tilføjes en person som følge af meddelelser om denne person, som den, der giver meddelelsen, ved eller bør vide er urigtige, er retlig relevant skade.

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Artikel 2:205: Meddelelse af fortrolige oplysninger Tab, som en person tilføjes ved meddelelse af oplysninger, som, enten efter deres beskaffenhed eller de omstændigheder, under hvilke de blev opnået, er en skade, der er retlig relevant, når den, der meddeler oplysningerne, ved eller bør vide, at de betragtes som fortrolige af den, der lider tabet.

Artikel 2:206 Krænkelse af andens ejendom eller lovlige besiddelse (1) Tab, som forvoldes ved krænkelse af en persons ejendomsret til eller lovlige besiddelse af løsøre eller fast ejendom, er retlig relevant skade. (2) I denne artikel omfatter (a) tabet en berøvelse af brugen af genstanden, (b) krænkelse af en persons ejendomsret en ødelæggelse af eller fysisk skade på genstanden for ejendomsretten (ejendomsskade), råden over retten, krænkelse af dens brug eller andet indgreb i rettens udøvelse. Artikel 2:207: Skade ved at fæste lid til et råd eller en oplysning Tab, som en person lider ved, at han træffer en afgørelse og derved handler i rimelig tillid til et forkert råd eller en urigtig oplysning er en retlig relevant skade, hvis (a) rådet eller oplysningen gives af en person som et led i dennes erhverv, og (b) den, der gav rådet eller oplysningen, vidste eller burde vide, at modtageren ville handle i tillid til oplysningen eller rådet.

Artikel 2:208: Tab som følge af uretmæssig forringelse af erhvervsvirksomhed (1) Tab, som en person lider som følge af en uretmæssig ødelæggelse af hans udøvelse af et erhverv, er en retlig relevant skade. (2) Tab, som påføres en forbruger som følge af uretmæssig konkurrence, er også en retlig relevant skade, hvis loven i EU eller et medlemsland bestemmer det Artikel 2:209: Byrder som det offentlige må bære ved miljøskader Byrder, som pålægges staten eller en kompetent myndighed til at genoprette substantielle skader på elementer,d er udgør miljøet, så som luft, vand, jord, flora og fauna, er retlig relevante skader tilføjet staten eller den kompetente myndighed. Artikel 2:210: Tab som følge af svigagtige urigtige oplysninger (1) Hvor andet ikke følger af andre regler i denne Del, er tab, som en person lider søm følge af en andens svigagtigt afgivne oplysninger i ord eller handling, en retlig relevant skade. (2) En oplysning er svigagtig, hvis den er afgivet med viden om eller tro på, at den er urigtig, og med den hensigt at tilskynde modtageren til at gøre en fejl. Artikel 2:211: Tab som følge af tilskyndelse til misligholdelse af en forpligtelse Hvor andet ikke følger af andre regler i denne Del er tab, som en person lider som følge af, at en anden person tilskynder en tredjemand til at misligholde en forpligtelse, kun en retlig relevant skade, hvis (a) den berettigede person var den, som led tabet, og (b) den, som tilskyndede til misligholdelsen, (i) havde til hensigt at formå tredjemand til at misligholde forpligtelsen, og (ii) ikke handlede i berettiget varetagelse af egen interesse. 32

Danish. Erstatning Uden for Kontrakt for Skade, Som Tilføjes en anden

Kapitel 3: Ansvar Del 1: Forsæt og uagtsomhed Artikel 3:101: Forsæt En person forårsager retlig relevant skade med forsæt, når denne person enten (a) handler med hensigt til at forårsage skade af den art som forvoldes; eller (b) udviser en adfærd, som den pågældende har hensigt til udvise, i bevidsthed om, at den pågældende skade eller en skade af denne art næsten med sikkerhed vil blive forvoldt. Artikel 3:102: Uagtsomhed En person forårsager retlig relevant skade uagtsomt, når denne person forårsager skaden ved en adfærd, som enten (a) ikke opfylder den agtpågivenhed, som kræves i en lovforskrift, hvis formål det er at beskytte den skadelidte mod den skade, som forvoldes, eller som (b) i øvrigt ikke viser en sådan agtpågivenhed, som under de foreliggende omstændigheder må forventes af en rimeligt agtsom person. Artikel 3:103: Personer under 18 år (1) En person under 18 år er kun ansvarlig for at have forvoldt en retlig relevant skade efter art 3:102 (b) i det omfang, denne person ikke udviser den agtpågivenhed, som må kunne forventes af en rimeligt agtpågiven person i samme alder og under de samme omstændigheder (2) En person under 7 år er ikke ansvarlig for skade, som vedkommende forvolder forsætligt eller uagtsomt. (3) Reglerne i stk. (1) og (2) gælder dog ikke i det omfang (a) den skadelidte ikke kan få erstatning fra anden side, og (b) det vil være rimeligt at yde erstatning når henses til parternes økonomiske forhold og sagens øvrige omstændigheder. Artikel 3:104: Ansvar for skade forvoldt af børn og personer under tilsyn (1) Forældre eller andre personer, som loven pålægger forældremyndigheden over en personer under 14 år, er ansvarlige for en retlig relevant skade, som er forvoldt af den mindreårige, hvor denne forvoldte skaden ved en adfærd, som ville være uagtsom, hvis den var udvist af en voksen person. (2) En anstalt eller anden institution, som har pligt til at føre tilsyn med en person, er ansvarlig for en retlig relevant skade, som den pågældende tilføjer tredjemand, når (a) der foreligger personskade, et tab ifølge artikel 2:202 eller skade på ejendom; (b) personen under tilsyn forårsagede skaden med forsæt eller uagtsomhed eller, hvor den pågældende er under 18 år, ved en adfærd, som ville være forsætlig eller uagtsom hvis den var udvist af en voksen person; og (c) personen under tilsyn må forventes at forvolde skade af denne art. (3) Dog er en person ikke ansvarlig efter reglerne i denne Artikel, hvis den pågældende godtgør, at det ikke har skortet på forsvarligt tilsyn med skadevolderen. 33

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Del 2: Ansvar uden forsæt eller uagtsomhed Artikel 3:201: Ansvar for skade forvoldt af ansatte og befuldmægtigede (1) En person, som ansætter eller på anden måde antager en person til at udføre arbejde for sig er ansvarlig for retlig relevant skade, som tredjemand lider når den ansatte eller antagne person (a) forvolder skaden som et led i sin ansættelse eller arbejde for hvervgiveren, og (b) forvolder skaden forsætligt eller uagtsomt, eller i øvrigt er ansvarlig for forvoldelse af skaden. (2) Reglen i stk. 1 gælder tilsvarende for en juridisk person i dens forhold til en befuldmægtiget, som forårsager skade som et led i sit hverv. En befuldmægtiget er en person, som har fuldmagt til at indgå retshandler for den juridiske person i henhold til dennes statutter. Artikel 3:202: Ansvar for skade forvoldt ved en fast ejendoms uforsvarlige tilstand (1) En person, som udøver selvstændig kontrol med en fast ejendom, er ansvarlig for personskade og derved påregnelige følgeskader, tab i henhold til artikel 2:202 og tab, der hidrører fra tingsskade (bortset fra skade på selve den pågældende faste ejendom), som er forårsaget af den faste ejendoms tilstand, der ikke opfylder de krav til sikkerhed, som en person, der befinder sig i og i nærheden af ejendommen, med rette kan forvente, når henses til de foreliggende omstændigheder herunder: (a) ejendommens beskaffenhed, (b) ejendommens adgangsforhold og (c) omkostningerne ved at undgå ejendommens tilstand. (2) En person udøver selvstændig kontrol over en fast ejendom, hvis den pågældende udøver en kontrol der gør det rimeligt at pålægge ham pligt til at undgå retlig relevant skade i henhold til denne artikel. (3) Ejeren af ejendommen anses for at udøve selvstændig kontrol, medmindre han godtgør, at den udøves af en anden. Artikel 3:203: Ansvar for skade forvoldt af dyr Den der holder dyr, er ansvarlig for skade, som dyret forvolder på den skadelidendes person og derved påregnelige følgeskader, tab i henhold til artikel 2:202 og tab forvoldt ved skade på ejendom. Artikel 3:204: Produktskader (1) En producent er ansvarlig for skade, som en defekt ved produktet forvolder på den skadelidendes person og for derved påregnelige følgeskader, for tab i henhold til artikel 2:202 og for tab forvoldt ved skade på ejendom (bortset fra skade på selve produktet). (2) Den, der som led i sit erhverv indførte produktet til Det europæiske økonomiske Samarbejdsområde med henblik på salg, udlejning, leasing eller videreforhandling, er ansvarlig på samme måde. (3) En leverandør af produktet er endvidere ansvarlig, (a) hvis producenten ikke kan identificeres, eller (b) hvor produktet er indført, dette ikke viser importørens identitet (hvad enten producentens navn er anført eller ikke), medmindre leverandøren inden for rimelig tid oplyser den skadelidte om, hvem producenten eller den, som leverede ham produktet, var. 34

Danish. Erstatning Uden for Kontrakt for Skade, Som Tilføjes en anden

(4) En person er ikke ansvarlig efter denne artikel for skade, hvis vedkommende godtgør, (a) at han ikke bragte produktet i omsætning, (b) at det er sandsynligt, at defekten som forvoldte skaden, ikke fandtes på det tidspunkt, da den pågældende bragte produktet i omsætning, (c) at vedkommende hverken fremstillede produktet til salg eller videreforhandling i økonomisk øjemed eller fremstillede eller forhandlede det som et led i vedkommendes erhverv, (d) at defekten skyldes, at produktet blev fremstillet i overensstemmelse med tvingende regler udstedt af offentlige myndigheder, (e) at det på grundlag af den videnskabelige og tekniske viden på det tidspunkt, da produktet blev bragt i omsætning, ikke var muligt at opdage defekten, (f) hvor en producent har fremstillet delprodukt, defekten skyldes (i) uformningen af det produkt, i hvilket delproduktet indgår eller (ii) anvisninger, som er givet af den, der fremstillede det færdige produkt. (5) Som producent anses (a) den, der fremstillede et færdigt produkt eller et delprodukt, (b) ved råvarer. den der indsamlede eller udvandt et naturprodukt, og (c) den, der ved at anbringe sit navn, mærke eller andet kendetegn på produktet udgiver sig for at være dets producent. (6) Ved produkt forstås enhver løsøregenstand, selv om den indgår som bestanddel af en fast ejendom eller anden løsøregenstand, og elektricitet. (7) Et produkt lider af en defekt, hvis det ikke frembyder den sikkerhed, som med rette kan forventes, når henses til alle omstændigheder, herunder (a) produktets markedsføring, (b) den anvendelse af produktet, som med rimelighed kan forventes, og (c) tidspunktet, da produktet blev bragt i omsætning. Et produkt er dog ikke defekt, alene fordi der senere er bragt et bedre produkt i omsætning.

Artikel 3:205: Ansvar for skade forvoldt af et motorkøretøj (1) Den, der holder et motorkøretøj, er ansvarlig for personskade og for de derved forvoldte følgeskader, for tab ifølge artikel 2:202 og for tab som følge af tingsskade (udover skade på selve køretøjet og dets last), som forårsages af en trafikulykke, som er en følge af brug af køretøjet. (2) Ved »motorkøretøj« forstås ethvert køretøj, som kører på land, men ikke på spor, og som drives af mekanisk kraft, og enhver påhængsvogn, uanset om den er tilkoblet. Artikel 3:206: Ansvar for skade forvoldt af farlige stoffer og emissioner (1) Den, der opbevarer et stof, og den, som driver en installation, er ansvarlig for personskade og for de derved forvoldte følgeskader, for tab ifølge artikel 2:202 og for tab som følge af tingsskade og for byrder, som er omfattet af artikel 2:209, hvis (a) det, når henses til stoffets mængde og egenskaber på tidspunktet for emissionen, eller i mangel af en emission, på tidspunkter for kontakten med stoffet, er meget sandsynligt, at stoffet eller dets emission vil forvolde sådan skade, medmindre det er under behørig kontrol, og (b) skaden skyldes, at denne fare er blevet realiseret. (2) »Stof« omfatter kemikalier (i fast, flydende eller luftform).Mikroorganismer skal behandles som stoffer 35

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(3) »Emission« omfatter (a) udledning eller udstrømning af stof, (b) elektrisk strøm, som ledes, (c) varme, lys og anden udstråling, (d) støj og andre vibrationer, og (e) anden ulegemlig påvirkning af miljøet. (4) »Installation« omfatter en mobil installation og en, der er under opførelse og ikke i brug. (5) En person er dog ikke ansvarlig efter denne artikel, hvis personen, (a) ikke opbevarer stoffet eller driver installationen som led i sit erhverv, eller (b) godtgør, at den pågældende person ikke forsømte at opfylde de lovforskrifter, der gælder for tilsyn med stoffet eller driften af installationen.

Artikel 3:207:Ansvar for anden retlig relevant skade. En person er også ansvarlig for at have forvoldt retlig relevant skade, hvis dette er bestemt i national ret, hvor national ret (a) omhandler en farekilde, som ikke er nævnt i artiklerne 3:104-3:205, eller (b) omhandler stof elle emissioner, eller (c) gør artikel 3:204 (4) (e) uanvendelig. Artikel 3:208: Forladte og bortkastede ting Ansvar ifølge denne Del vedbliver at påhvile den person, der opgiver at føre selvstændig kontrol med en fast ejendom, et køretøj, et stof eller en installation, indtil en anden fører selvstændig kontrol med tingen eller bliver den, der driver installationen. Det samme gælder i det omfang, det er rimeligt, den, der holder et dyr.

Kapitel 4: Årsag Artikel 4:101: Hovedregel (1) En person forvolder en retlig relevant skade, hvis skaden kan anses som en følge af denne persons adfærd eller af en farekilde, som den pågældende har ansvaret for. (2) Ved personskade eller død ses der bort fra den skadelidtes disposition for skadens art eller omfang. Artikel 4:102: Medvirken En person, som deltager i, tilskynder eller i ikke ubetydelig grad hjælper en anden til at forvolde en retlig relevant skade, anses for at have forvoldt denne skade. Artikel 4:103: Flere alternative årsager Hvor en retlig relevant skade kan være forårsaget af en eller flere begivenheder, som forskellige personer har ansvar for, og kan det fastslås, at skaden var forvoldt af en af disse begivenheder, men ikke af hvilken af dem, gælder der en afkræftelig formodning for, at hver af disse personer har forvoldt skaden.

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Danish. Erstatning Uden for Kontrakt for Skade, Som Tilføjes en anden

Kapitel 5: Fritagelsesgrunde Del 1: Den skadelidtes samtykke og adfærd Artikel 5:101: Samtykke og handlen på egen risiko (1) En person er ansvarsfri, hvis den skadelidte giver et gyldigt samtykke til en retlig relevant skade og forstår eller burde forstå følgerne af dette samtykke. (2) Det samme gælder, hvor skadelidte med kendskab til risikoen for en skade af den art, som forvoldes, frivilligt udsætter sig for denne risiko og må anses at have accepteret den. Artikel 5:102: Egen skyld og ansvar (1) Hvor skadelidte ved sin egen skyld medvirker til skadens opståen eller omfang, nedsættes erstatningen under hensyn til graden af skadelidtes skyld. (2) Der skal dog tages hensyn til (a) en ubetydelig grad af skyld eller ansvar fra skadelidtes side; eller (b) skyld eller ansvar fra andres side, når der er tale om en ubetydelig grad af medvirken (c) skadelidtes manglende agtpågivenhed ved personskade forårsaget af et motorkøretøj i en trafikulykke, medmindre den pågældende udviste en total mangel på den agtpågivenhed, som helt selvfølgeligt måtte udvises under de foreliggende omstændigheder. (3) Reglerne i stk. 1 og 2 finder tilsvarende anvendelse, hvor en person, for hvis handlinger skadelidte er ansvarlig i henhold til artikel 3:201, medvirker ved sin egen skyld til skadens opståen eller omfang. (4) Erstatningen nedsættes ligeledes, hvis og i det omfang en anden farekilde, som den skadelidte er ansvarlig for efter reglerne i kapitel 3, har bidraget til skadens opståen eller omfang. Artikel 5:103: Skade forvoldt af en lovovertræder mod en medskyldig Erstatning kan ikke kræves for en retlig relevant skade, som en person uden at ville det forvolder på en anden person, som deltager eller på anden måde medvirker til at begå en strafbar lovovertrædelse, hvis det ville stride imod almene retsprincipper at indrømme kravet.

Del 2: Hensynet to tredjemands og den ansvarlige persons interesser Artikel 5:201: Handlinger, som loven bemyndiger til En person er ansvarsfri, hvis en retlig relevant skade er forårsaget ved en handling, som loven har givet den pågældende ret til at foretage. Artikel 5:202: Nødværge og nødret (1) En person er ansvarsfri, hvis den pågældende forvolder retlig relevant skade ved en handling, der har været nødvendig for at modstå eller afværge et påbegyndt eller overhængende uretmæssigt angreb på den pågældendes eller tredjemands rettigheder eller interesser, der beskyttelsesværdige i retlig henseende. På en sådan handling finder artikel 3:103 ikke anvendelse. 37

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(2) Det samme gælder for retlig relevant skade, som en person uanmodet forårsager i berettiget varetagelse af en anden persons interesser, og som ikke er et brud på den handlende persons pligter. (3) Hvor en person forvolder retlig relevant skade på en anden persons formue ved en handling, som har været nødvendig for at afværge en umiddelbart truende skade på vedkommendes eller en anden persons liv legeme, helbred eller frihed, er den handlende kun pligtig at yde en passende godtgørelse for skaden.

Artikel 5:203: Beskyttelse af en offentlig interesse En person er ansvarsfri, hvis en retlig relevant skade er forårsaget af en handling, som har været nødvendig til beskyttelse af et demokratisk samfunds grundlæggende værdier, især ved udbredelse af oplysninger i media.

Del 3: Manglende evne til at have kontrol Artikel 5:301: Utilregnelighed (1) En person, der er utilregnelig på det tidspunkt, da han forvolder en retlig relevant skade, kan kun drages til ansvar, hvis det er rimeligt, når henses til den pågældendes formueforhold og sagens andre omstændigheder. Der skal i så fald kun ydes en passende godtgørelse (2) En person er utilregnelig, hvis den pågældende er i en tilstand, hvor han savner evnen til at handle fornuftmæssigt, medmindre han selv midlertidigt har bragt sig i denne tilstand. Artikel 5:302:Begivenhed uden for kontrol En person er ikke ansvarlig for en retlig relevant skade, hvis denne skyldes en usædvanlig begivenhed, som ikke kan undgås ved rimelige foranstaltninger, og som den pågældende ikke bærer risikoen for.

Del 4: Ansvarsfriheds- og ansvarsbegrænsningsklausuler Artikel 5:401: Aftaler om udelukkelse eller begrænsning af ansvar (1) Aftaler om udelukkelse eller begrænsning af ansvar for forsætlig forvoldelse af en retlig relevant skade er uden virkning. (2) Det samme gælder aftaler om udelukkelse eller begrænsning af ansvar for sådan åbenbar mangel på omhu, som klart må kræves under de foreliggende omstændigheder, (a) ved personskade (herunder også forvoldelse af en andens død), eller (b) hvis udelukkelsen eller begrænsningen i øvrigt er ugyldig som stridende mod redelighed og billighed. (3) Ansvar for skade, som en person er ansvarlig for i henhold til Artikel 3:204, kan ikke udelukkes eller begrænses. (4) Ansvar i øvrigt efter denne Bog kann fraskrives eller begrænses medmindre andet følger af lov.

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Danish. Erstatning Uden for Kontrakt for Skade, Som Tilføjes en anden

Del 5: Tab i henhold til artikel 2:202 Art. 5:501: Udstrækkelsen af ansvarsfritagelsesgrunden forn den skadelidte til tredjemand En ansvarsfritagelsesgrund som kan påberåbes over for en persons ret til erstatning for denne persons personskade eller, hvis døden ikke var indtrådt, ville have kunnet påberåbes, kan også påberåbes over for en person, der lider skade i henhold til artikel 2:202.

Kapitel 6: Skadelidtes beføjelser Del 1: Oprejsning i almindelighed Artikel 6:101: Mål og former for oprejsning (1) Oprejsning er at genindsætte skadelidte i den stilling som den pågældende ville have været i, hvis skaden ikke var sket. (2) Oprejsning kan gives i penge (erstatning) eller på anden måde, efter hvad der er mest rimeligt, når henses til skadens art og omfang og sagens øvrige omstændigheder. (3) Når en rørlig ting beskadiges, gives der erstatning svarende til værdiforringelsen i stedet for udgifterne til skadens udbedring, hvis reparationsudgifterne står i misforhold til værdiforringelsen. Dette gælder også for dyr, men kun, hvor det er rimeligt, når henses til formålet med at holde dyret. (4) Som et alternativ til oprejsning under stk. 1 kan erstatning, hvor det er rimeligt, gives i form af en godtgørelse bestående i den vinding, som den ansvarlige har opnået i forbindelse med skadens forvoldelse. Artikel 6:102: Bagatelreglen Der gives ikke oprejsning for bagatelskader. Article 6:103: Fordele udlignes (1) Der ses bort fra fordele, som en person, der lider en retlig relevant skade, opnår som følge af den skadegørende begivenhed, medmindre det ville være rimeligt of fornuftigt at tage dem i betragtning. (2) Ved afgørelse af, om det ville være rimeligt og fornuftigt at tage fordelene i betragtning, skal hensyn tages til skadens og ansvarets art, og, hvor tredjemand opnår fordelene, formålet med at tilføre ham disse fordele. Artikel 6:104: Flere skadelidte Hvor flere personer lider en retlig relevant skade, og hvor en oprejsning, som ydes til en person, også vil være oprejsning til en anden, gælder reglerne i III.–4:201-207 tilsvarende for deres krav på oprejsning. Artikel 6:105: Solidarisk ansvar Er flere personer ansvarlige for den samme retlig relevante skade, hæfter de solidarisk. 39

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Artikel 6:106: Overdragelse af krav Skadelidte kan overdrage et krav på oprejsning herunder et krav på erstatning for ikke-økonomisk tab.

Del 2: Erstatning Artikel 6:201: Valgret Skadelidte bestemmer selv, om han vil bruge erstatningen til at genoprette skaden. Artikel 6:202: Nedsættelse af erstatningen Hvor det er rimeligt og fornuftigt, kan en person blive helt eller delvis fritaget for at betale erstatning for en skade, som den pågældende ikke har forvoldt med forsæt, hvis der, dersom man pålagde vedkommende fuld erstatningspligt, ville opstå et misforhold mellem den pågældendes ansvar eller muligheder for at forhindre skaden og skadens omfang. Artikel 6:203: Kapitalisering og Kvantificering (1) Erstatningen fastsættes som et engangsbeløb, medmindre der er gode grunde til at den udbetales som periodiske ydelser. (2) Det afgøres i henhold til national ret, hvor meget der skal udredes for personskade og for ikkeøkonomiske tab. Artikel 6:204: Kompensation for selve personskaden En fysisk skade på en person erstattes uden hensyn til den erstatning, der ydes for økonomisk eller ikke økonomisk tab.

Del 3: Forhindring Artikel 6:301: Ret til at forhindre (1) Retten til at forhindre består kun for så vidt, som (a) efterfølgende oprejsning ikke ville være et tilstrækkeligt alternativt retsmiddel; og (b) det ville være rimeligt at kræve, at den person, der ville blive ansvarlig for forårsagelsen af skaden, forhindrer at skaden indtræffer. (2) Hvor farekilden er en ting eller et dyr, og det ikke er muligt for den person, som skaden truer at undgå den ved rimelige foranstaltninger, omfatter retten til forhindring retten til at kræve farekilden fjernet. Artikel 6:302: Ansvar for tab ved forhindring af skade En person, som har afholdt rimelige udgifter eller lidt andet tab for at forhindre en truende skade eller for at begrænse omfanget og skadevirkningen af et indtruffen skade kan kræve erstatning af den, som ville være ansvarlig for skaden.

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Danish. Erstatning Uden for Kontrakt for Skade, Som Tilføjes en anden

Kapitel 7: Supplerende regler Artikel 7:101: Nationale forfatninger Denne Bogs regler skal fortolkes of anvendes i overensstemmelse med rettens nationale forfatning. Artikel 7:102: Lovforskrifter Det afgøres i henhold til national ret, hvilke regler som henregnes til lovforskrifter. Artikel 7:103: Offentlige funktioner og retsplejen Denne Bogs regler finder ikke anvendelse på det ansvar, som kan pålægges personer eller institutioner for handlinger eller undladelser ved varetagelse af offentlige funktioner eller ved opfyldelse af pligter inden for retsplejen. Artikel 7:104: Ansatte, arbejdsgivere, fagforeninger og arbejdsgiverforeninger Denne Bogs regler finder ikke anvendelse på det ansvar, som kan pålægges (a) ansatte (det være sig overfor med-ansatte, arbejdsgivere eller tredjemænd) i udøvelsen af deres arbejde i virksomheden (b) arbejdsgivere i forhold til deres ansatte under udøvelse af deres arbejde i virksomheden, og (c) sammenslutninger af arbejdsgivere og arbejdstagere under en faglig konflikt. Artikel 7:105: Nedsættelse eller bortfald af erstatningen Det afgøres i henhold til national ret bestemmer, om det krav, som efter denne Bogs regler tilkommer en person, kan nedsættes eller udelukkes, fordi han har ret til oprejsning fra en anden kilde, navnlig en forsikrer, fond eller anden institution.

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Dutch1 Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid voor schade veroorzaakt aan een ander Hoofdstuk 1: Algemene Bepalingen Artikel 1:101: Grondregel (1) Een persoon die rechtens relevante schade lijdt, heeft een recht op schadevergoeding jegens de persoon die de schade opzettelijk of nalatig heeft veroorzaakt of aan wie het veroorzaken van de schade anderszins wordt toegerekend. (2) Heeft een persoon de rechtens relevante schade onopzettelijk of door nalatigheid veroorzaakt, dan wordt het veroorzaken van de rechtens relevante schade slechts aan hem toegerekend indien Hoofdstuk 3 dit bepaalt. Artikel 1:102: Preventie Indien rechtens relevante schade dreigt, verleent dit Boek aan de persoon die de schade zou lijden een recht het intreden van de schade te verhinderen. Dit recht bestaat jegens degene aan wie het veroorzaken van de schade zou worden toegerekend indien deze zich zou voordoen. Artikel 1:103: Toepassingsbereik De artikelen 1:101 en 1:102 (a) vinden slechts toepassing overeenkomstig de navolgende bepalingen van dit Boek; (b) zijn zowel op rechtspersonen als op natuurlijke personen van toepassing, tenzij anders is bepaald; (c) zijn niet van toepassing voor zover hun toepassing in strijd zou komen met het doel van andere privaatrechtelijke regels; en (d) laten de verweermiddelen die op andere juridische gronden beschikbaar zijn, onverlet.

Hoofdstuk 2: Rechtens relevante schade Afdeling 1: Algemeen Artikel 2:101: Betekenis van rechtens relevante schade (1) Verlies, hetzij materieel hetzij immaterieel, schending van een recht of letsel is rechtens relevante schade indien

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Translated by Rosalie Koolhoven (Osnabrück) and Professor Edgar du Perron (Amsterdam).

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(a) een van de volgende regels van dit Hoofdstuk dat bepaalt; (b) het voortkomt uit de schending van een recht dat anderszins door de wet wordt verleend; of (c) het voortkomt uit de schending van een belang dat wettelijke bescherming verdient. (2) Zijn op een geval enkel de sub-leden (b) of (c) van lid (1) toepasselijk, dan is het verlies, de schending van een recht of het letsel slechts als rechtens relevante schade aan te merken, indien een recht op vergoeding of preventie krachtens art.1:101 dan wel 1:102 redelijk en billijk zou zijn. (3) Om te bepalen of het recht op vergoeding of preventie redelijk en billijk is, worden de grondslag van de toerekenbaarheid, de aard en nabijheid van de schade of de dreigende schade, de redelijke verwachtingen van de persoon die de schade lijdt of zou lijden en de rechtsovertuiging in acht genomen. (4) In dit Boek (a) omvat materieel verlies, het verlies van inkomen, de derving van winst, gemaakte kosten en de waardevermindering van vermogensbestanddelen; (b) omvat immaterieel verlies, pijn en lijden en verslechtering van de levenskwaliteit.

Afdeling 2: Bijzondere gevallen van rechtens relevante schade Artikel 2:201: Letsel en daaruit volgend verlies (1) Verlies veroorzaakt aan een natuurlijke persoon tengevolge van lichamelijk letsel of een aantasting van de gezondheid en het letsel of de aantasting op zichzelf zijn rechtens relevante schade. (2) In dit Boek (a) omvat dergelijk verlies de kosten van gezondheidszorg met inbegrip van de redelijke uitgaven van naasten voor de verzorging van de gekwetste; en (b) omvat letsel enkel de aantasting van de geestelijke gezondheid voor zover deze uitmondt in een psychiatrisch erkende ziekte. Artikel 2:202: Verlies geleden door derden tengevolge van een anders letsel of overlijden (1) Immaterieel verlies veroorzaakt aan een natuurlijke persoon tengevolge van het letsel of het overlijden van een ander is rechtens relevante schade indien die persoon ten tijde van het letsel of het overlijden in een bijzonder hechte persoonlijke betrekking tot de gekwetste stond. (2) Is een persoon dodelijk gewond geraakt, dan (a) wordt de rechtens relevante schade tot aan het overlijden veroorzaakt aan de overledene rechtens relevante schade van de erfgenamen van de overledene; (b) zijn redelijke kosten van lijkbezorging rechtens relevante schade van de persoon die deze heeft gedragen; en (c) is verlies van onderhoud rechtens relevante schade van de natuurlijke persoon die de overledene onderhield of, zou de dood niet zijn ingetreden, zou hebben onderhouden krachtens wettelijke voorschrift, of die van de overledene zorg en financiële steun kreeg.

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Artikel 2:203: Aantasting van de waardigheid, vrijheid en privacy (1) Verlies veroorzaakt aan een natuurlijke persoon tengevolge van een inbreuk op het recht op eerbiediging van zijn waardigheid, zoals de rechten op vrijheid en privacy, en de inbreuk op zich zijn rechtens relevante schade. (2) Verlies veroorzaakt aan een persoon tengevolge van een aantasting van diens reputatie en de aantasting op zich zijn eveneens rechtens relevante schade als het nationale recht dat bepaalt. Artikel 2:204: Verlies door mededeling van onjuiste informatie over een ander Verlies veroorzaakt aan een persoon tengevolge van de mededeling van deze persoon betreffende informatie, waarvan degene die deze informatie mededeelde wist of behoorde te weten dat zij onjuist is, is rechtens relevante schade.

Artikel 2:205: Verlies door schending van vertrouwen Verlies veroorzaakt aan een persoon tengevolge van de mededeling van informatie waarvan degene die deze informatie mededeelde, rekening houdende met de aard of de omstandigheden waaronder zij werd verkregen, wist of behoorde te weten dat zij vertrouwelijk is voor de persoon die het verlies lijdt, is rechtens relevante schade.

Artikel 2:206: Verlies door inbreuk op een eigendomsrecht of rechtmatig houderschap (1) Verlies veroorzaakt aan een persoon tengevolge van een inbreuk op zijn eigendomsrecht of rechtmatig houderschap van een roerende of onroerende zaak is rechtens relevante schade. (2) In dit artikel (a) omvat verlies het beroofd worden van het gebruik van de zaak; (b) omvat de inbreuk op een eigendomsrecht de vernietiging van of de beschadiging van het voorwerp van het recht (zaakbeschadiging), de beschikking over het recht, de belemmering van zijn gebruik en andere storingen in de uitoefening van het recht. Artikel 2:207: Verlies door vertrouwen op onjuist advies of onjuiste informatie Verlies veroorzaakt aan een persoon tengevolge van een beslissing genomen in redelijk vertrouwen op onjuist advies of onjuiste informatie is rechtens relevante schade, indien (a) het advies of de informatie verstrekt werd door een persoon die handelde in de uitoefening van zijn beroep of bedrijf; en (b) de aanbieder wist of behoorde te weten dat de ontvanger op het advies of de informatie zou vertrouwen bij het nemen van een dergelijke beslissing.

Artikel 2:208: Verlies door onrechtmatige belemmering van de handelsactiviteit (1) Verlies veroorzaakt aan een persoon tengevolge van de onrechtmatige belemmering van diens uitoefening van een beroep of bedrijf is rechtens relevante schade. (2) Verlies veroorzaakt aan een consument tengevolge van oneerlijke mededinging is eveneens rechtens relevante schade als het Gemeenschapsrecht of het nationale recht zulks bepaalt.

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Artikel 2:209: Kosten gemaakt door de staat tengevolge van milieuverontreiniging Kosten gemaakt door de staat of door de bevoegde autoriteiten voor het herstel van ernstig aangetaste natuurlijke elementen die het milieu vormen, zoals lucht, water, bodem, flora en fauna, zijn rechtens relevante schade voor de staat of de betrokken autoriteiten. Artikel 2:210: Verlies door bedrog (1) Onverminderd de andere bepalingen van deze afdeling is het verlies veroorzaakt aan een persoon tengevolge van een anders bedrieglijke onjuiste voorstelling van zaken, hetzij door woorden, hetzij door een gedraging, rechtens relevante schade. (2) Een onjuiste voorstelling van zaken is bedrieglijk wanneer zij werd gedaan in de wetenschap of de veronderstelling, dat zij verkeerd was en wanneer zij was bedoeld om de ontvanger aan te zetten tot het maken van een fout. Artikel 2:211: Verlies door aanzetting tot het niet nakomen van een verbintenis Onverminderd de andere bepalingen van deze afdeling is verlies, veroorzaakt aan een persoon door het aanzetten van een derde tot het niet nakomen van een verbintenis, slechts rechtens relevante schade indien: (a) de verbintenis bestond tegenover de persoon die het verlies lijdt; en (b) de persoon die aanzette tot de schending: (i) beoogde dat de derde de verbintenis niet zou nakomen, en (ii) niet handelde in de rechtmatige bescherming van zijn eigen belang.

Hoofdstuk 3: Toerekenbaarheid Afdeling 1: Opzet en nalatigheid Artikel 3:101: Opzet Een persoon veroorzaakt rechtens relevante schade opzettelijk, indien hij de schade veroorzaakt, (a) hetzij met de bedoeling om schade van het soort van de ingetreden schade te veroorzaken; (b) hetzij door gedrag dat deze persoon wilde, wetende dat een dergelijke of soortgelijke schade zou intreden of zogoed als zeker zou intreden. Artikel 3:102: Nalatigheid Een persoon veroorzaakt rechtens relevante schade nalatig, indien hij de schade veroorzaakt door gedrag, dat (a) hetzij niet voldoet aan een bijzondere, wettelijk vastgestelde zorgvuldigheidsmaatstaf die tot doel heeft de benadeelde te beschermen tegen de geleden schade, (b) hetzij anderszins geen blijk geeft van de zorg die kan worden verwacht van een redelijk oplettend persoon in de omstandigheden van het geval.

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Artikel 3:103: Personen jonger dan achttien jaar (1) Aan een persoon jonger dan achttien jaar wordt rechtens relevante schade slechts overeenkomstig Artikel 3:102(b) toegerekend voor zover hij niet de zorg betracht die kan worden verwacht van een redelijk oplettend persoon van dezelfde leeftijd in de omstandigheden van het geval. (2) Aan een persoon jonger dan zeven jaar wordt het opzettelijk of nalatig veroorzaken van rechtens relevante schade niet toegerekend. (3) De leden (1) en (2) zijn niet van toepassing voor zover (a) de benadeelde geen schadevergoeding van een ander kan verkrijgen overeenkomstig dit Boek, en (b) aansprakelijkheid tot schadevergoeding billijk is gezien de financiële middelen van de partijen en alle omstandigheden van het geval. Artikel 3:104 Toerekenbaarheid van schade veroorzaakt door kinderen of personen onder toezicht (1) Aan ouders of andere personen die wettelijk verplicht zijn om te voorzien in de ouderlijke zorg voor een persoon jonger dan veertien jaar, wordt de rechtens relevante schade toegerekend die deze persoon veroorzaakte door gedrag dat opzet of nalatigheid zou vormen indien dit het gedrag van een meerderjarige zou zijn. (2) Aan een instelling die gehouden is toezicht te houden op een persoon wordt de door een derde geleden rechtens relevante schade toegerekend indien: (a) de schade persoonlijk letsel, verlies in de zin van art. 2:202 of zaakbeschadiging uitmaakt; (b) de persoon op wie de instelling toezicht dient te houden, de schade opzettelijk of door nalatigheid veroorzaakt heeft, of, voor een persoon jonger dan achttien jaar, door een gedraging die opzet of nalatigheid zou vormen indien ze verricht zou zijn door een meerderjarige, en (c) de persoon op wie zij toezicht moet houden van aard is om een dergelijke schade te veroorzaken. (3) Schade in de zin van dit artikel wordt evenwel niet aan een persoon toegerekend indien deze persoon aantoont dat het toezicht dat werd uitgeoefend op degene die de schade heeft veroorzaakt, niet gebrekkig was.

Afdeling 2: Toerekenbaarheid zonder opzet of nalatigheid Artikel 3:201: Toerekenbaarheid van schade veroorzaakt door werknemers en vertegenwoordigers (1) Aan een persoon die een ander tewerkstelt of op vergelijkbare wijze aanstelt, wordt de rechtens relevante schade toegerekend die door een derde wordt geleden wanneer de tewerkgestelde of aangestelde persoon (a) deze schade heeft veroorzaakt in het kader van zijn tewerkstelling of aanstelling, en (b) hij deze schade opzettelijk of door nalatigheid heeft veroorzaakt, of de schade hem anderszins kan worden toegerekend.

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(2) Lid (1) is bij analogie van toepassing op de verhouding tussen een rechtspersoon en een vertegenwoordigingsbevoegd persoon die de schade veroorzaakt in het kader van zijn aanstelling. Een vertegenwoordigingsbevoegd persoon is een persoon die krachtens de statuten bevoegd is om rechtshandelingen te verrichten voor de rechtspersoon.

Artikel 3:202: Toerekenbaarheid van schade veroorzaakt door de onveilige toestand van een onroerende zaak (1) Aan een persoon die zelfstandig de controle uitoefent over een onroerende zaak worden toegerekend het letsel en het daaruit volgende verlies, het verlies in de zin van artikel 2:202 en het verlies ten gevolge van zaakbeschadiging naast de schade aan de onroerende zaak zelf, die werden veroorzaakt doordat die onroerende zaak in een toestand verkeert waardoor deze niet de veiligheid waarborgt die een persoon in of in de buurt van de zaak mag verwachten gezien de omstandigheden, met inbegrip van: (a) de aard van de onroerende zaak (b) de toegang tot de onroerende zaak, en (c) de kosten ter voorkoming dat de onroerende zaak zich in deze toestand zou bevinden. (2) Een persoon oefent zelfstandig de controle uit over een onroerende zaak indien hij een dusdanige controle uitoefent dat het redelijk is om hem voor de toepassing van dit artikel de plicht op te leggen rechtens relevante schade te vermijden. (3) De eigenaar van de onroerende zaak wordt vermoed zelfstandig de controle uit te oefenen, tenzij hij bewijst dat een ander persoon zelfstandig de controle uitoefent. Artikel 3:203: Toerekenbaarheid van schade veroorzaakt door dieren Aan de houder van een dier worden toegerekend het letsel en het daaruit volgende verlies, het verlies in de zin van artikel 2:202 en het verlies ten gevolge van zaakbeschadiging die werden veroorzaakt door het dier. Artikel 3:204: Toerekenbaarheid van schade veroorzaakt door gebrekkige producten (1) Aan de producent van een product worden toegerekend het letsel en het daaruit volgende verlies, het verlies in de zin van artikel 2:202 en, in relatie tot consumenten, het verlies ten gevolge van zaakbeschadiging (buiten de schade aan het product zelf), veroorzaakt door een gebrek in het product. (2) Lid 1 is van overeenkomstige toepassing op een persoon die het product heeft ingevoerd in de Europese Economische Ruimte om dit te verkopen, te verhuren, te leasen of anderszins te verstrekken in het kader van zijn commerciële activiteiten. (3) Aan een leverancier wordt de schade op dezelfde wijze toegerekend indien: (a) niet kan worden vastgesteld wie de producent van het product is; of (b) met betrekking tot een geïmporteerd product, op dit product de identiteit van de importeur niet vermeld is (zelfs al is de naam van de producent wel aangegeven), tenzij de leverancier het slachtoffer binnen een redelijke termijn de identiteit meedeelt van de producent of van degene die hem het product heeft geleverd. (4) Aan een persoon wordt de schade niet uit hoofde van dit artikel toegerekend indien hij bewijst: (a) dat deze persoon het product niet in het verkeer heeft gebracht; (b) dat het aannemelijk is dat het gebrek dat de schade veroorzaakt heeft, niet bestond op het tijdstip waarop deze persoon het product in het verkeer heeft gebracht; 47

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(c) dat deze persoon het product noch voor de verkoop of voor enige andere vorm van verspreiding met een economisch doel heeft vervaardigd, noch in het kader van de uitoefening van zijn beroep heeft vervaardigd of verspreid; (d) dat het gebrek het gevolg is van het feit dat het product in overeenstemming is met dwingende overheidsvoorschriften; (e) dat het op grond van de wetenschappelijke en technische kennis op het tijdstip waarop deze persoon het product in het verkeer bracht, onmogelijk was het bestaan van het gebrek te ontdekken; of (f) dat, wat de fabrikant van een onderdeel betreft, het gebrek te wijten is aan: (i) het ontwerp van het product waarvan het onderdeel een bestanddeel vormt, of (ii) aan de instructies die door de fabrikant van dit product zijn verstrekt. (5) Onder producent wordt verstaan: (a) met betrekking tot een eindproduct of een afgewerkt onderdeel, de fabrikant; (b) met betrekking tot een grondstof, degene die deze wint; alsmede (c) een ieder die zich als producent presenteert door zijn naam, zijn merk of een ander onderscheidingsteken op het product aan te brengen. (6) Onder „product” wordt elke roerend zaak verstaan, ook indien deze het een bestanddeel is gaan vormen van een andere roerend of onroerende zaak, of elektriciteit. (7) Een product is gebrekkig wanneer het niet de veiligheid biedt die een persoon gerechtigd is te verwachten, alle omstandigheden in aanmerking genomen, met name: (a) de presentatie van het product; (b) het redelijkerwijs te verwachten gebruik van het product; en (c) het tijdstip waarop het product in verkeer is gebracht. Een product mag evenwel niet als gebrekkig worden beschouwd uitsluitend omdat er nadien een beter product in het verkeer is gebracht.

Artikel 3:205: Toerekenbaarheid van schade veroorzaakt door motorrijtuigen (1) Aan de houder van een motorrijtuig worden toegerekend de veroorzaking van letsel, het daaruit volgende verlies, verlies in de zin van artikel 2:202 en verlies ten gevolge van zaakbeschadiging (buiten de schade aan het voertuig en de lading zelf) door een verkeersongeval dat het gevolg is van het gebruik van het motorrijtuig. (2) Onder „motorrijtuig” wordt elk rijtuig verstaan dat bestemd is voor gebruik op het land en aangedreven wordt door mechanische kracht maar dat niet op rails loopt, evenals elke aanhanger, onafhankelijk van het feit of deze aangekoppeld is of niet. Artikel 3:206: Toerekenbaarheid van schade veroorzaakt door gevaarlijke stoffen of emissies (1) Aan de houder van een stof of de beheerder van een installatie worden toegerekend de veroorzaking van letsel, het daaruit volgende verlies, verlies in de zin van artikel 2:202 en verlies ten gevolge van zaakbeschadiging of van lasten in de zin van artikel 2:209 door deze stof of door een emissie van deze installatie indien: (a) het rekening houdend met de hoeveelheid en de eigenschappen ervan op het ogenblik van de emissie of, bij gebreke aan een emissie, op het ogenblik van het contact met de stof, zeer waarschijnlijk is dat de stof of de emissie dergelijke schade zal veroorzaken tenzij deze naar behoren onder controle wordt gehouden, en (b) de schade het gevolg is van de intrede van dit gevaar.

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(2) „Stoffen” omvatten chemicaliën (zowel in vaste, vloeibare als gasvormige toestand). Microorganismen worden behandeld als stoffen. (3) „Emissies” omvatten: (a) het laten vrijkomen of de ontsnapping van stoffen, (b) de geleiding van elektriciteit, (c) hitte, licht en andere vormen van straling, (d) geluid en andere trillingen, en (e) andere onlichamelijke invloeden op het milieu. (4) „Installaties” omvatten beweeglijke installaties en installaties in aanbouw of buiten gebruik. (5) Aan een persoon wordt de veroorzaking van schade niet overeenkomstig dit artikel toegerekend indien hij: (a) de stof niet houdt of de installatie niet beheert voor doelstellingen die verband houden met diens handel, bedrijf of beroep, of (b) aantoont dat voldaan werd aan de wettelijke controlestandaarden voor de stof of voor het beheer van de installatie.

Artikel 3:207: Andere gevallen van toerekenbaarheid van de veroorzaking van rechtens relevante schade Aan een persoon wordt de veroorzaking van rechtens relevante schade ook toegerekend indien het nationale recht (a) zulks bepaalt met betrekking tot een bron van gevaren die niet in het toepassingsgebied van artikel 3:104-3:205 valt, (b) zulks bepaalt met betrekking tot stoffen of emissies, of (c) artikel 3:204 (4)(e) niet van toepassing verklaart. Artikel 3:208: Afstand Voor de toepassing van deze afdeling blijft een persoon aansprakelijk voor onroerende goederen, rijtuigen, stoffen of installaties die deze persoon achterlaat totdat een ander persoon er de onafhankelijke controle over uitoefent of er de houder of beheerder van wordt. Voor zover als redelijk is deze regel analoog van toepassing op de houder van een dier.

Hoofdstuk 4: Veroorzaking Art. 4:101: Algemene regel (1) Een persoon veroorzaakt een rechtens relevante schade aan een andere persoon indien deze schade dient te worden beschouwd als een gevolg van het gedrag van de eerstgenoemde persoon of van een bron van gevaren waarvoor deze persoon verantwoordelijk is. (2) In geval van persoonlijk letsel of dood wordt geen rekening gehouden met de predispositie van het slachtoffer voor het soort of de omvang van het geleden letsel. Art. 4:102: Deelneming Een persoon die met een ander deelneemt aan, hem aanzet tot of materiële hulp levert voor het veroorzaken van rechtens relevante schade wordt geacht deze schade te hebben veroorzaakt.

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Art. 4:103: Alternatieve oorzaken Indien rechtens relevante schade veroorzaakt kan zijn door één of meerdere van een reeks gebeurtenissen die aan verschillende personen zijn toe te rekenen en vaststaat dat de schade werd veroorzaakt door één van deze gebeurtenissen, maar niet door dewelke, wordt iedere persoon aan wie één dezer gebeurtenissen kan worden toegerekend op weerlegbare wijze vermoed de schade te hebben veroorzaakt.

Hoofdstuk 5: Verweermiddelen Afdeling 1: Toestemming of gedrag van de benadeelde Artikel 5:101: Toestemming en handelen op eigen gevaar (1) Een persoon heeft een verweermiddel tegen de benadeelde en elke persoon die een verlies lijdt zoals bepaald in Artikel 2:202, indien de benadeelde geldig heeft ingestemd met de rechtens relevante schade en zich bewust was of moest zijn van het gevolg van die toestemming. (2) Dit geldt eveneens indien de benadeelde zich vrijwillig heeft blootgesteld aan het risico van schade van het soort zoals veroorzaakt, alhoewel hij dit risico kende, en geacht moet worden het te hebben geaccepteerd. Artikel 5:102: Eigen schuld en toerekenbaarheid? (1) Indien de benadeelde door zijn eigen schuld bijdraagt tot het ontstaan of de omvang van rechtens relevant schade, moet de schadevergoeding worden verminderd in evenredigheid met de omvang van zijn schuld. (2) Buiten beschouwing dienen te blijven: (a) een onbeduidende fout van de benadeelde; of (b) schuld of verantwoordelijkheid die in onbeduidende mate aan de veroorzaking van de schade hebben bijgedragen; (c) het gebrek aan zorgvuldigheid van de benadeelde, dat tot zijn door een motorrijtuig in een verkeersongeval veroorzaakt letsel heeft bijgedragen, tenzij dit gebrek aan zorgvuldigheid grof nalatig is gezien de omstandigheden van het geval. (3) De leden (1) en (2) zijn van overeenkomstige toepassing indien een persoon voor wie de benadeelde verantwoordelijk is op grond van Artikel 3:201, door zijn fout bijdraagt tot het ontstaan of de omvang van de schade. (4) De schadevergoeding in geld wordt eveneens verminderd indien en voor zover een andere bron van gevaar waarvoor de benadeelde verantwoordelijk is op grond van Hoofdstuk 3, bijdraagt tot het ontstaan van of de mate van de schade. Artikel 5:103: Schade veroorzaakt door een misdadiger aan een deelnemer De rechtens relevante schade die onopzettelijk wordt veroorzaakt tijdens het begaan van een strafbaar feit aan een andere persoon die daaraan deelneemt of op een andere wijze aan het strafbare feit medewerkt, leidt niet tot een recht op schadevergoeding indien dit in strijd is met de goede zeden.

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Afdeling 2: Belangen van personen aan wie kan worden toegerekend of derden Artikel 5:201: Wettelijk gezag Een persoon heeft een verweermiddel als de rechtens relevante schade wordt veroorzaakt op grond van een door de wet verleende bevoegdheid. Artikel 5:202: Noodweer, zaakwaarneming en noodzaak (1) Een persoon heeft een verweermiddel als hij rechtens relevante schade veroorzaakt bij de redelijke bescherming van een eigen of andermans beschermingswaardig recht of belang, indien de persoon die de rechtens relevante schade lijdt verantwoordelijk is voor het in gevaar brengen van het beschermde recht of belang. Voor de toepassing van dit lid moet Artikel 3:103 buiten beschouwing worden gelaten. (2) Dit geldt eveneens voor rechtens relevante schade die wordt veroorzaakt door een zaakwaarnemer aan een belanghebbende zonder schending van de verplichtingen die op de zaakwaarnemer rusten. (3) Indien een persoon rechtens relevante schade in andermans vermogen veroorzaakt om zichzelf of een derde te redden in een situatie van onmiddellijk dreigend gevaar voor het leven, het lichaam, de gezondheid of de vrijheid en dat gevaar niet geëlimineerd kon worden zonder de schade te veroorzaken, is de persoon die de schade veroorzaakt niet verplicht tot een schadevergoeding die het verstrekken van redelijke compensatie te boven gaat. Artikel 5:203: Bescherming van het openbaar belang Een persoon heeft een verweermiddel als rechtens relevante schade is veroorzaakt bij de noodzakelijke bescherming van voor een democratische samenleving fundamentele waarden, in het bijzonder indien de schade is veroorzaakt door verspreiding van informatie in de media.

Afdeling 3: Geestelijke onbekwaamheid en overmacht Artikel 5:301: Geestelijke onbekwaamheid (1) Een persoon die geestelijk onbekwaam is ten tijde van het gedrag dat rechtens relevante schade veroorzaakt, is slechts aansprakelijk als dit billijk is, met inachtneming van de financiële middelen van de onbekwame en alle andere omstandigheden van het geval. De aansprakelijkheid is beperkt tot een redelijke compensatie. (2) Een persoon is te beschouwen als geestelijk onbekwaam als het die persoon aan voldoende inzicht in de aard van zijn of haar gedrag ontbreekt, tenzij het gebrek aan voldoende inzicht het tijdelijke resultaat van zijn of haar eigen wangedrag is. Artikel 5:302: Overmacht Een persoon heeft een verweermiddel als rechtens relevante schade is veroorzaakt door een buitengewone gebeurtenis die niet kan worden voorkomen door enige redelijke maatregel en die niet voor risico van die persoon behoort te komen.

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Afdeling 4: Contractuele uitsluiting en beperking van de aansprakelijkheid Artikel 5:401: Contractuele uitsluiting en beperking van de aansprakelijkheid (1) Aansprakelijkheid voor het opzettelijk veroorzaken van rechtens relevant schade kan niet worden uitgesloten of beperkt. (2) Aansprakelijkheid voor het veroorzaken van rechtens relevant schade tengevolge van een grove tekortkoming in de plicht om de zorgvuldigheid in acht te nemen die in de concrete omstandigheden duidelijk geboden was, kan niet worden uitgesloten of beperkt (a) met betrekking tot letsel (inclusief dodelijk letsel), of (b) als de uitsluiting of beperking anderszins in strijd met de wet, de goede trouw of de normen van betamelijk handelen is. (3) Aansprakelijkheid voor schade voor welks veroorzaking een persoon op grond van Artikel 3:204 aansprakelijk is, kan niet worden beperkt of uitgesloten. (4) Andere aansprakelijkheden die op grond van dit boek ontstaan, kunnen worden uitgesloten of beperkt, tenzij de wet anders bepaalt.

Afdeling 5: Verlies als bedoeld in artikel 2:202 Art. 5:501: Uitbreiding van verweermiddelen jegens de gekwetste tot derden Een verweermiddel dat aan een persoon met het recht op schadevergoeding wegens letsel kan worden tegengeworpen of, zou de dood niet zijn ingetreden, had kunnen worden tegengeworpen, mag eveneens aangevoerd worden tegen een persoon die verlies lijdt als bedoeld in artikel 2:202.

Hoofdstuk 6: Rechtsvorderingen Afdeling 1: Schadevergoeding in het algemeen Artikel 6:101: Doel en vorm van schadevergoeding (1) Schadevergoeding moet de persoon die de rechtens relevant schade lijdt, terugbrengen in de situatie waarin die persoon zich bevonden zou hebben als de rechtens relevant schade zich niet zou hebben voorgedaan. (2) Schadevergoeding kan in geld of anderszins plaatsvinden, zoals het meest passend is, rekening houdend met de aard en de omvang van geleden schade en al de andere omstandigheden van het geval. (3) Is een roerende zaak beschadigd, dan treedt een met de waardevermindering overeenstemmende schadevergoeding in geld in de plaats van de herstelkosten, indien deze de waardevermindering onredelijk te boven gaan. Deze regel is enkel op dieren van toepassing als dit passend is met het oog op het doel waarvoor het dier gehouden werd. (4) Als alternatief voor het herstel zoals bepaald in lid (1) kan, maar slechts indien dit redelijk is, de schadevergoeding in geld ook bestaan in een restitutie (teruggave) van elk voordeel dat de 52

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persoon die voor de veroorzaking van de rechtens relevante schade verantwoordelijk is, in samenhang met de schadeveroorzaking heeft ontvangen.

Artikel 6:102: De minimis regel Onbeduidende schade wordt buiten beschouwing gelaten. Artikel 6:103: Vereffening van voordelen (1) Voordelen die de persoon die de rechtens relevante schade lijdt, door de schadetoebrengende gebeurtenis heeft verworven, worden buiten beschouwing gelaten, tenzij het redelijk en billijk is om deze in overweging te nemen. (2) Bij de bepaling of het redelijk en billijk is om de voordelen in overweging te nemen, wordt rekening gehouden met de aard van de geleden schade, de aard van de toerekenbaarheid aan de persoon die de schade veroorzaakte en, indien de voordelen door een derde persoon worden verleend, het doel waarvoor die voordelen worden verleend. Artikel 6:104: Meerdere benadeelden Indien meer personen rechtens relevante schade lijden en schadevergoeding aan één persoon eveneens schadevergoeding aan de andere(n) zal inhouden, zijn de artikelen III.–4:201 – 207 met gepaste wijziging van toepassing op hun eisen tot schadevergoeding. Artikel 6:105: Hoofdelijke aansprakelijkheid Indien verscheidene personen voor dezelfde rechtens relevante schade aansprakelijk zijn, zijn zij hoofdelijk aansprakelijk. Artikel 6:106: Overdracht van de vordering tot schadevergoeding De benadeelde mag een vordering tot schadevergoeding in geld overdragen, met inbegrip van een vordering tot schadevergoeding in geld van immaterieel verlies.

Afdeling 2: Schadevergoeding in geld Artikel 6:201: Keuzerecht van de benadeelde De benadeelde mag kiezen om de schadevergoeding al dan niet aan het herstel van het beschadigde belang te besteden. Artikel 6:202: Vermindering van de aansprakelijkheid Indien dit redelijk en billijk is kan een persoon geheel of gedeeltelijk bevrijd worden van zijn aansprakelijkheid, als, ingeval de schade niet opzettelijk werd veroorzaakt, volledige aansprakelijkheid niet in verhouding is met de verantwoordelijkheid van de schadeveroorzakende persoon, met de omvang van de schade of met de middelen om deze te verhinderen. Artikel 6:203: Kapitalisatie en begroting (1) De schadevergoeding moet in één som worden toegekend, tenzij een goede reden voor een periodieke betaling bestaat. (2) De nationale wet bepaalt hoe de schadevergoeding voor letsel en immateriële schade moet worden begroot. 53

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Artikel 6:204: Schadevergoeding bij letsel Onafhankelijk van de schadevergoeding voor materieel of immaterieel verlies wordt het letsel als zodanig in geld vergoed.

Afdeling 3: Preventie Artikel 6:301: Het recht op preventie (1) Het recht op preventie bestaat slechts in zoverre als (a) schadevergoeding geen geschikt alternatief is; en (b) het anderszins redelijk is voor de persoon aan wie de veroorzaking van de schade zou worden toegerekend, om het ontstaan ervan te voorkomen. (2) Indien de bron van het gevaar een zaak of een dier is en het voor de persoon in gevaar niet redelijkerwijs mogelijk is om het gevaar te vermijden, omvat het recht op preventie een recht op het doen verwijderen van de bron van gevaar. Artikel 6:302: Kosten van preventie van de schade Een persoon die redelijkerwijs uitgaven heeft gedaan of andere schade leed om de verwezenlijking van een dreigende schade te voorkomen of om de omvang of de ernst van een schade die zich verwezenlijkte, te beperken, heeft een recht op schadevergoeding jegens de persoon aan wie de veroorzaking van de schade zou zijn toegerekend.

Hoofdstuk 7: Aanvullende regels Artikel 7:101: Nationaal constitutioneel recht De voorschriften van dit Boek worden geïnterpreteerd en toegepast op een wijze die verenigbaar is met de grondwet van het land waarin het bevoegde gerecht zetelt. Artikel 7:102: Wettelijke voorschriften Nationaal recht bepaalt welke juridische bepalingen wettelijke voorschriften zijn. Artikel 7:103: Publiekrechtelijke functies en gerechtelijke procedures Dit Boek regelt niet de aansprakelijkheid van een persoon of instelling die voortvloeit uit de uitoefening van publiekrechtelijke functies, uit het nalaten van de vervulling van deze functies of uit het uitvoeren van plichten tijdens gerechtelijke procedures. Artikel 7:104: Aansprakelijkheid van werkgevers, werknemers, vakorganisaties en werkgeversorganisaties Dit Boek regelt niet de aansprakelijkheid van (a) werknemers (zowel tegenover andere werknemers, werkgevers als derden) die ontstaat bij de verrichting van het werk, (b) werkgevers tegenover werknemers die ontstaat bij de verrichting van de arbeid, en (c) vakorganisaties en werkgeversorganisaties die ontstaat tijdens een arbeidsconflict.

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Estonian1 Teisele isikule kahju tekitamisest tulenev lepinguväline vastutus 1. Peatükk: Põhisätted Artikkel 1:101: Põhireegel (1) Isikul, kes kannab hüvitamisele kuuluvat kahju, on õigus nõuda kahju hüvitamist isikult, kes tekitas kahju tahtlikult või hooletusest või on muul moel vastutav kahju tekitamise eest. (2) Juhul, kui isik ei põhjustanud hüvitamisele kuuluvat kahju tahtlikult või hooletusest, siis vastutab ta hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju eest ainult siis, kui 3. Peatükis seda ette nähakse. Artikkel 1:102: Ennetamine Juhul, kui hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju tekitamisega ähvardatakse, annab käesolev Raamat isikule, kes võib kahju kanda, õiguse seda ennetada. Nimetatud õigus kehtib isiku suhtes, kes, juhul kui kahju tekiks, vastutaks selle tekitamise eest. Artikkel 1:103:Reguleerimisala Artiklid 1:101 ja 1:102 (a) kohalduvad ainult vastavalt käesoleva Raamatu alljärgnevatele sätetele; (b) kohalduvad nii juriidilistele kui ka füüsilistele isikutele, kui ei ole teisiti sätestatud; (c) ei kohaldu niivõrd, kuivõrd see oleks vastuolus muude eraõiguse normide eesmärkidega; ja (d) ei mõjuta muul õiguslikul alusel kohaldatavaid õiguskaitsevahendeid.

2. Peatükk: Hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju 1. Jagu: Üldsätted Artikkel 2:101: Hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju mõiste (1) Hüvitamisele kuuluvaks kahjuks on kas varaline või mittevaraline kaotus, või kahjustus, kui: (a) nii sätestab mõni käesoleva Peatüki järgmisest reeglitest; (b) kaotus või kahjustus on muu seaduses sätestatud õiguse rikkumise tagajärg; või (c) kaotus või kahjustus on õiguslikku kaitset vääriva huvi rikkumise tagajärg.

1

Translated by Evelin Pärn-Lee (Tallinn), Dr. Janno Lahe, Heiki Leesment, Tambet Tampuu, and Professor Paul Varul (Tartu).

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(2) Igal juhul on lõike 1 punktides b või c sätestatud kaotus või kahjustus hüvitamisele kuuluvaks kahjuks ainult siis, kui õigus hüvitamisele või ennetamisele, vastavalt sellele, millega on tegemist vastavalt Artiklile 1:101 või 1:102, oleks õiglane ja mõistlik. (3) Otsustamaks, kas õigus hüvitamisele või ennetamisele oleks õiglane ja mõistlik, tuleb arvestada vastutuse alust, kahju või ähvardava kahju olemust ja lähedust, selle isiku põhjendatud ootust, kes kandis kahju või kes võib kahju kanda, ja ühiskondlikke eesmärke. (4) Käesolevas Raamatus (a) varaline kahju hõlmab saamata jäänud sissetulekut või tulu, tekkinud kohustusi ja vara väärtuse vähenemist (b) mittevaraline kahju hõlmab valu ja kannatusi ja elukvaliteedi halvenemist.

2. Jagu: Hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju erisätted Artikkel 2:201: Kehavigastus ja sellega kaasnev kahju (1) Hüvitamisele kuuluvaks kahjuks on füüsilisele isikule tema keha vigastamisega või tervise kahjustamisega tekitatud kahju ja kahjustus kui selline. (2) Käesolevas Raamatus: (a) hõlmab selline kahju tervishoiuteenuse kulusid, sealhulgas lähedase vigastatud isiku hooldamise mõistlikke kulusid; ja (b) hõlmab kehavigastus vaimse tervise kahjustamist ainult siis, kui viimane kujutab endast haiguslikku seisundit. Artikkel 2:202: Isiku surma või kehavigastuse põhjustamisega kolmandatele isikutele tekitatud kahju (1) Füüsilisele isikule teise isiku kehavigastuse või surmaga tekitatud mittevaraline kahju on hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju, kui see isik on kahjustamise ajal kahjustatud isikuga eriti lähedastes isiklikes suhetes. (2) Juhul, kui isikut on surmavalt kahjustatud, siis: (a) hukkunule tema surma hetkeni tekitatud hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju muutub surnu pärijale hüvitamisele kuuluvaks kahjuks; (b) mõistlikud matusekulud on hüvitamisele kuuluvaks kahjuks isikule, kes need kannab; ja (c) ülalpidamise kaotus on hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju füüsilisele isikule, keda surnud isik ülal pidas, või kui surma ei oleks saabunud, oleks ülal pidanud seaduse alusel, või keda surnu hooldas või rahaliselt abistas. Artikkel 2:203: Inimväärikuse, vabaduse ja eraelu puutumatuse rikkumine (1) Hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju on füüsilisele isikule tekitatud kahju, millega rikutakse tema õigust inimväärikuse austamisele, sealhulgas vabadusele ja eraelu puutumatusele, samuti kahjustamine kui selline. (2) Hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju on isikule tekitatud kahju, millega rikutakse selle isiku mainet, samuti ka kahjustamine kui selline, kui seda sätestab siseriiklik õigus.

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Artikkel 2:204: Teise kohta ebaõigete andmete edastamisega tekitatud kahju Hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju on isikule kahju tekitamine selle isiku kohta käiva informatsiooni edastamisega, mille kohta informatsiooni edastav isik teab või peaks teadma, et see ei ole õige. Artikkel 2:205: Konfidentsiaalsuskohustuse rikkumisega tekitatud kahju Hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju on isikule kahju tekitamine informatsiooni edastamisega, mille suhtes informatsiooni edastav isik teab või peaks teadma tulenevalt informatsiooni olemusest või viisist, kuidas see omandati, et see on isiku jaoks, kes kahju kannab, konfidentsiaalne. Artikkel 2:206: Omandi või seadusliku valduse rikkumisega tekitatud kahju (1) Hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju on isikule tema vallas- või kinnisasjaga seotud omandiõiguse või seadusliku valduse rikkumisega tekitatud kahju. (2) Käesolevas artiklis: (a) kahju hõlmab vara kasutamisest ilmajätmist; (b) omandiõiguse rikkumine hõlmab õiguse objekti hävitamist või füüsilist kahjustamist (varakahju), õiguse käsutamist, selle kasutamise takistamist või muu õiguse teostamise häirimist. Artikkel 2:207: Kahju, mis on tekkinud ebaõigele nõuandele või informatsioonile tuginemisest Hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju on kahju, mis on põhjustatud isikule seoses otsuse tegemisega, mis mõistlikult tugines ebaõigele nõuandele või informatsioonile, kui: (a) nõuanne või informatsioon on antud isiku poolt kutse- või majandustegevuses; ja (b) selle andja teadis või pidi teadma, et saaja tugineb vastava otsuse tegemisel sellele nõuandele või informatsioonile. Artikkel 2:208: Majandustegevuse õigusvastase kahjustamisega tekitatud kahju (1) Hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju on isikule tema poolt kutse- või majandustegevusse õigusvastase sekkumisega tekitatud kahju. (2) Hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju on samuti tarbijale kõlvatu konkurentsiga tekitatud kahju, kui nii näeb ette Ühenduse õigus või siseriiklik õigus. Artikkel 2:209: Riigile seoses keskkonna kahjustamisega tekkinud kohustused Riigile või vastavatele ametiasutustele hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju on riigi või selleks määratud kompetentse ametiasutuse poolt oluliselt kahjustatud looduse elementide, mis moodustavad keskkonna, nagu õhk, vesi, maapind, floora ja fauna, taastamisega tekkinud kohustused. Artikkel 2:210: Pettuse eesmärgil ebaõigete andmete esitamisega tekitatud kahju (1) Välistamata teiste käesoleva jao sätete kohaldamist, on hüvitamisele kuuluvaks kahjuks isikule teise isiku poolt pettuse eesmärgil, kas sõnas või teos, ebaõigete andmete esitamisega tekitatud kahju. (2) Ebaõigete andmete esitamine on pettus, kui see on tehtud teadmises või usus, et andmete esitamine on vale ja selle eesmärgiks on mõjutada saajat vea tegemisele.

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Artikkel 2:211: Kohustuse rikkumisele kihutamisega tekitatud kahju Välistamata teiste käesoleva jao sätete kohaldamist, on isikule kahju tekitamine teise isiku poolt kolmanda isiku kihutamisega kohustuse rikkumisele, hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju ainult siis, kui: (a) kohustus võlgneti isikule, kes kahju kandis; ja (b) isik, kes kihutas rikkumisele: (i) tahtis, et kolmas isik rikuks kohustust, ja (ii) ei tegutsenud oma huve kaitstes õiguspäraselt.

3. Peatükk: Vastutus 1. Jagu: Tahtlus ja hooletus Artikkel 3:101: Tahtlus Isik põhjustab hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju tahtlikult, kui ta põhjustab kahju, kas: (a) sooviga põhjustada sellist tüüpi kahju nagu põhjustati; või (b) tegevusega, mida isik soovib teha, teades, et sellega põhjustatakse või suure tõenäosusega põhjustatakse selline kahju või seda liiki kahju. Artikkel 3:102: Hooletus Isik põhjustab hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju hooletusest, kui ta põhjustab kahju tegevusega, mis: (a) kas ei vasta seaduses sätestatud vastavale hoolsusnormile, mille eesmärgiks on kahjustatud poole kaitse tekkinud kahju eest, või (b) muul viisil ei vasta sellisele hoolsusele, mida võiks eeldada mõistlikult hoolsalt isikult vastavas olukorras. Artikkel 3:103: Alla 18-aastased isikud (1) Alla 18-aastane isik vastutab hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju eest üksnes vastavalt Artiklile 3:102(b), niivõrd kuivõrd see isik ei järgi hoolsust, mida võiks eeldada mõistlikult hoolsalt samas vanuses isikult vastavas olukorras. (2) Alla 7-aasta vanune isik ei vastuta tahtlikult või hooletult põhjustatud kahju eest. (3) Lõiked 1 ja 2 ei kohaldu siiski vastavas ulatuses, kui: (a) kahjustatud isikul ei ole käesoleva Raamatu kohaselt võimalik saada hüvitist teiselt isikult, ja (b) hüvitamine oleks õiglane arvestades poolte majanduslikku olukorda ja kõiki muid kaasuse asjaolusid. Artikkel 3:104: Vastutus laste või järelvalvealuste isikute poolt põhjustatud kahju eest (1) Vanemad või muud isikud, kes seaduse alusel on kohustatud tagama vanemlikku hoolitsust alla 14-aastase isiku eest vastutavad hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju eest juhul, kui nimetatud vanuses isik põhjustas kahju tegevusega, mida tuleks pidada hooletuseks ka täiskasvanu puhul. (2) Institutsioon või muu asutus, kelle ülesandeks on järelvalve, vastutab kolmandale isikule põhjustatud hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju eest, kui 58

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(a) kahju puhul on tegemist kehavigastusega, kahjuga Artikkel 2:202 tähenduses või varakahjuga; (b) isik, kelle üle järelvalve teostamise kohustus on antud institutsioonile või muule asutusele, põhjustas kahju tahtlikult või hooletusest, või alla 18-aastase isiku puhul tegevusega, mida võib käsitleda tahtluse või hooletusena ka täiskasvanu puhul, ja (c) isik, kelle suhtes nad on kohustatud järelvalvet teostama, on isikuks, kes tõenäoliselt võib põhjustada seda tüüpi kahju. (3) Siiski, isik ei vastuta käesoleva Artikli kohaselt kahju tekitamise eest, kui see isik tõendab, et järelvalve isiku üle, kes kahju tekitas, oli nõuetekohane.

2. Jagu: Vastutus ilma tahtluse või hooletuseta Artikkel 3:201: Vastutus töötaja ja esindaja poolt tekitatud kahju eest (1) Isik, kes võtab teise isiku tööle või muul sarnasel viisil saab teiselt isikult teenust, vastutab kolmandale isikule tekitatud hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju eest juhul, kui töötaja või teenuse osutaja (a) põhjustas kahju töösuhte või teenuse osutamise raames, ja (b) põhjustas kahju tahtlikult või hooletult, või on muul viisil kahju tekitamise eest vastutav. (2) Lõige 1 kohaldub vastavalt ka juriidilise isiku esindaja suhtes, kes põhjustab kahju oma tegevuse raames. Esindaja on isik, kes on juriidilise isiku põhikirja kohaselt volitatud teostama juriidilise isiku nimel juriidilisi toiminguid. Artikkel 3:202 Vastutus ohtlikus seisundis kinnisasja poolt tekitatud kahju eest (1) Isik, kes sõltumatult teostab kontrolli kinnisasja üle, vastutab isikukahju, sellega kaasneva kahju ja kahju eest Artikkel 2:202 tähenduses, ja vara kahjustamisest (muule kui vastavale kinnisasjale endale) tekkinud kaotuse eest, mis tuleneb kinnisasja seisukorrast, mis ei taga sellist ohutust, mida isik, kes asub kinnisasjal või selle lähedal, on õigustatud eeldama, arvestades sealhulgas: (a) kinnisasja olemust; (b) juurdepääsu kinnisasjale, ja (c) ohtliku olukorra vältimiseks kinnisasjale tehtavate kulutuste suurust. (2) Isik teostab sõltumatult kontrolli kinnisasja üle, kui tema teostatava kontrolli puhul on mõistlik panna talle kohustus hoiduda käesoleva Artikli kohaselt hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju tekitamisest. (3) Kinnisasja omaniku puhul eeldatakse, et ta teostab sõltumatult kontrolli, välja arvatud, kui omanik tõendab, et sõltumatult teostas kontrolli teine isik. Artikkel 3:203: Vastutus looma poolt tekitatud kahjude eest Loomapidaja vastutab looma poolt tekitatud kehavigastuse ja sellega kaasneva kahju eest, kahju eest Artikkel 2:202 kohaselt, ja tekkinud varakahju eest.

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Artikkel 3:204: Vastutus puudusega toote poolt tekitatud kahju eest (1) Toote tootja vastutab toote puuduse poolt tekitatud kehavigastuse ja sellega kaasneva kahju, kahju eest Artikkel 2:202 kohaselt, ja tarbijate puhul varale (välja arvatud tootele endale) tekkinud kahju eest. (2) Isik, kes importis toote oma äritegevuse raames müügi, rendi, liisimise või turustamise eesmärgil Euroopa Majanduspiirkonda, vastutab vastavalt. (3) Toote tarnija vastutab vastavalt, kui: (a) tootjat ei ole võimalik tuvastada; või (b) imporditud toote puhul toode ei viita importijale (sõltumata sellest, kas tootja nimi on näidatud või mitte), välja arvatud juhul, kui tarnija teatab mõistliku aja jooksul kahjustatud isikule tootja või isiku andmed, kes tarnis tarnijale selle toote. (4) Isik ei vastuta tekitatud kahju eest käesoleva artikli kohaselt, kui see isik tõendab et: (a) ta ei lasknud toodet käibesse; (b) on tõenäoline, et puudust, mille tõttu kahju tekkis, ei olnud toote käibesse laskmise ajal olemas; (c) ta ei tootnud seda toodet müügiks või turustamise eesmärgil ega tootnud või müünud seda edasi äritegevuse raames; (d) puuduse põhjustas toote vastavus ametivõimude poolt kehtestatud kohustuslike nõuetele; (e) teadus- ja tehniline teadmine ajal, mil see isik laskis toote käibesse, ei võimaldanud puuduse olemasolu avastamist; või (f) tegemist on koostisosade tootjaga ja puudus on seotud: (i) toote kujundusega, millesse koostisosa on liidetud, või (ii) toote tootja poolt antud instruktsioonidega. (5) “Tootja” tähendab: (a) valmis toote või koostisosa puhul valmistajat; (b) toormaterjali puhul isikut, kes seda töötleb või kaevandab; ja (c) iga isikut, kes oma nime, kaubamärgi või muu eraldustähisega tootel ennast tootjana esitleb. (6) “Toode” tähendab vallasasja, isegi kui see on ühendatud teise vallasasja või kinnisasjaga, või elektrit. (7) Toode on puudusega, kui see ei paku ohutust, mida isikul on õigus oodata, pidades silmas ka järgmisi asjaolusid: (a) toote esitlust; (b) toote võimalikku kasutusviisi, mida on toote puhul mõistlik eeldada; ja (c) aega, millal toode käibesse lasti, kuid toode ei ole puudusega pelgalt seetõttu, et hiljem lasti käibesse parem toode. Artikkel 3:205: Vastutus mootorsõidukite poolt tekitatud kahju eest (1) Mootorsõiduki pidaja vastutab sõidukiga toimunud liikluskahjust põhjustatud kehavigastuse ja sellega kaasneva kahju eest, kahju eest Artikkel 2:202 tähenduses, ning varale (välja arvatud sõidukile endale ja tema lastile) tekkinud kahju eest. (2) “Mootorsõiduk” tähendab mistahes sõidukit, mis on mõeldud liikumiseks maal ja liigub mehhaanilise mootori abil, kuid mis ei sõida raudteel, ja mistahes haagist, olgu see tandemis või mitte.

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Artikkel 3:206 Vastutus ohtlike ainete ja mõjutuste poolt tekitatud kahju eest (1) Aine hoidja või installatsiooni operaator vastutab aine poolt või installatsiooni mõjutuse poolt põhjustatud kehavigastuse ja sellega kaasneva kahju eest, kahju eest Artikkel 2:202 tähenduses ning varale tekkinud kahju või kohustuste eest Artikkel 2:209 tähenduses, kui: (a) võttes ohtliku aine või mõjutusega kokkupuutumisel arvesse nende kogust ja omadusi on tõenäoline, et aine või mõjutus põhjustab sellise kahju, kui see ei ole piisavalt kontrollitud, ja (b) kahju on sellise ohu realiseerumise tagajärg. (2) “Aine” hõlmab kemikaale (tahkeid, vedelaid või gaasilisi). Mikroorganisme tuleb käsitada ainetena. (3) “Mõjutus” hõlmab: (a) aine väljalaset, heidet või leket (b) elektriülekannet; (c) soojust, valgust ja muud radiatsiooni; (d) müra ja muud vibratsiooni, ja (e) muud mittekehalist mõju keskkonnale. (4) “Installatsioon” hõlmab teisaldatavat installatsiooni ja pooleliolevat või kasutusel mitteolevat installatsiooni. (5) Isik ei vastuta siiski kahju tekitamise eest vastavalt käesolevale Artiklile, kui ta: (a) ei hoia ainet või ei käitle installatsiooni oma äri-, kaubandus- või kutsetegevusega seotud eesmärkidel; või (b) tõendab, et seadusest tulenevate ainete kontrollimise või installatsiooni juhtimise nõudeid ei rikutud. Artikkel 3:207 Vastutus muu hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju tekitamise eest Isik vastutab ka hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju eest, kui siseriiklik seadus nii sätestab, juhul kui see: (a) on seotud ohuallikaga, mis ei ole sätestatud Artiklites 3:104 kuni 3:205, (b) on seotud aine või mõjutusega, või (c) välistab Artikkel 3:204 (4)(e) kohaldumise. Artikkel 3:208: Hülgamine Käesoleva jao mõistes jääb isik ka sellise kinnisasja, sõiduki, aine või installatsiooni eest vastutavaks, mille ta hülgab, kuni teine isik pole asunud teostama sõltumatut kontrolli selle üle või saanud selle pidajaks või operaatoriks. See kehtib vastavalt, niivõrd kuivõrd see on mõistlik, ka loomapidaja suhtes.

4. Peatükk: Põhjuslik seos Artikkel 4:101:Üldsäte (1) Isik põhjustab teisele isikule hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju, kui kahju on nimetatud isiku tegevuse või ohuallika tagajärg, mille eest ta vastutab. (2) Kehavigastuse või surma puhul ei arvestata kannatanu soodumust kantud kahju liigi või ulatuse suhtes.

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Artikkel 4:102: Koostöö Isikut, kes osaleb või oluliselt aitab teist isikut hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju tekitamisel või kihutab teda sellel, tuleb pidada sellise kahju tekitajaks. Artikkel 4:103: Alternatiivsed põhjused Juhul, kui hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju võisid põhjustada üks või mitu sündmust, mille eest vastutavad erinevad isikud, ning on selgeks tehtud, et kahju põhjustas üks nimetatud sündmustest, kuid ei teata, missugune neist, siis eeldatakse, et iga isik, kes vastutab mõne nimetatud sündmuse eest, põhjustas nimetatud kahju.

5. Peatükk: Vastutusest vabastavad asjaolud 1. Jagu: Kannatanu nõusolek või tegevus Artikkel 5:101: Nõusolek ja omal riisikol tegutsemine (1) Isik vabaneb vastutusest kui kannatanu kehtivalt nõustub hüvitamisele kuuluva kahjuga ja ta teab või peaks teadma sellise nõusoleku tagajärgedest. (2) Sama kehtib juhul, kui kannatanu, teades põhjustatud kahju iseloomust tulenevat riski, võtab vabatahtlikult sellise riski ja tema suhtes tuleb eeldada, et ta nõustus selle riskiga. Artikkel 5:102: Kannatanu süü ja vastutus (1) Juhul, kui kannatanu aitab oma süüga kaasa kas hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju tekkimisele või selle ulatusele, tuleb hüvitist vähendada vastavalt süü astmele. (2) Arvesse ei võeta siiski: (a) kannatanu mitteolulist süüd; (b) süüd või vastutust, mis olid kahju põhjustamisel mitteolulised; (c) kannatanu hoolsuse puudumist, mis aitas kaasa kannatanule liiklusõnnetuses mootorsõiduki poolt põhjustatud kahju tekkimisele, välja arvatud juhul, kui see tähendab sellise hoolsuse rasket rikkumist, mis vastavalt asjaoludele on iseenesestmõistetav. (3) Lõiked (1) ja (2) kohalduvad vastavalt siis, kui isik, kelle eest kannatanu vastutab Artikkel 3:201 kohaselt, soodustab oma süüga kahju tekkimist või selle ulatust. (4) Samuti tuleb hüvitist vastavalt vähendada, kui muu ohuallikas, mille eest kannatanu vastavalt 3. Peatükile vastutab, aitab kaasa kahju tekkimisele või ulatusele. Artikkel 5:103: Kahju, mis on tekitatud kuriteo täideviija poolt osavõtjale Hüvitamisele kuuluvat kahju, mis on põhjustatud tahtmatult kuriteo toimepanemise ajal isikule, kes osaleb või muul viisil aitab kaasa selle toimepanemisele, ei hüvitata, kui hüvitamata jätmine ei ole vastuolus ühiskondlike eesmärkidega.

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2. Jagu: Vastutavate isikute või kolmandate isikute huvid Artikkel 5:201: Seadusest tulenev õigus Isik vabaneb vastutusest, kui hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju tekitamise õigus tuleneb seadusest. Artikkel 5:202: Hädakaitse, käsundita asjaajamine ja hädaseisund (1) Isik vabaneb vastutusest, kui ta põhjustab hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju, kaitstes mõistlikult oma või kolmanda isiku õiguskaitset väärivat õigust või huvi, tingimusel, et isik, kellele tekitati hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju vastutab kaitstud õiguse või huvi ohustamise eest. Käesoleva lõike suhtes ei kohaldata Artiklit 3:103. (2) Sama kehtib hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju suhtes, mis põhjustatakse käsundita asjaajaja poolt soodustatule ilma et asjaajaja oleks oma kohustusi rikkunud. (3) Juhul, kui isik põhjustab hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju teise isiku varale situatsioonis, mis kujutab endast ähvardavat ohtu elule, kehale, tervisele või vabadusele, selleks, et päästa iseennast või kolmandat isikut ja nimetatud ohtu ei oleks saanud kahju tekitamata tõrjuda, peab kahju tekitanud isik kahju hüvitama üksnes mõistlikus ulatuses. Artikkel 5:203: Avaliku huvi kaitse Isik vabaneb vastutusest, kui hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju on põhjustatud vajadusest kaitsta demokraatliku ühiskonna fundamentaalseid väärtusi, eriti kui kahju on põhjustatud meedias levitatava informatsiooniga.

3. Jagu: Võimetus kontrollida Artikkel 5:301: Vaimne piiratus (1) Isik, kes on hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju tekitamise ajal vaimselt piiratud, vastutab ainult siis, kui see on õiglane, arvestades selle isiku finantsvahendeid ja kõiki muid kaasnevaid asjaolusid. Vastutus on piiratud mõistliku hüvitisega. (2) Isik on vaimselt piiratud, kui tal puudub piisav arusaamine oma teo olemusest, välja arvatud, kui piisava arusaamise puudumine oma teost on selle isiku enda väära käitumise ajutine tulemus. Artikkel 5:302: Vältimatu asjaolu Isik vabaneb vastutusest, kui hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju on põhjustatud ebatavalise asjaolu tõttu, mida ei saa vältida mistahes mõistliku vahendiga ja mida ei saa käsitleda selle isiku riskina.

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4. Jagu: Vastutuse lepinguline välistamine ja piiramine Artikkel 5:401: Vastutuse lepinguline välistamine ja piiramine (1) Vastutust ei saa välistada või piirata tahtlikult põhjustatud hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju eest. (2) Vastutust ei saa välistada või piirata sellise hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju põhjustamise eest, mis on põhjustatud vastavas olukorras ilmselgelt nõutava hoolsuse oluliselt järgimata jätmise tõttu (a) kehavigastuse (sealhulgas surmava vigastuse) suhtes, või (b) kui välistamine või piiramine on muul viisil ebaseaduslik või hea usu ja ausa tegevusega vastuolus. (3) Piirata või välistada ei saa vastutust kahju eest, mille suhtes isik vastutab Artikkel 3:204 alusel. (4) Muud käesolevas Raamatus sätestatud vastutust saab välistada või piirata, välja arvatud juhul, kui seadus sätestab teisiti.

5. Jagu: Artiklis 2:202 sätestatud kahju Artikkel 5:501: Kannatanu vastu esitatavate vastutusest vabastavate asjaolude laienemine kolmandatele isikutele Vastutusest vabastava asjaolu, mida võib esitada isiku õiguse vastu saada hüvitist talle kehavigastuse tekitamise korral, või mida oleks saanud esitada, kui surm ei oleks saabunud, võib samuti esitada isiku vastu, kes kannatas Artiklis 2:202 sätestatud kahju.

Peatükk 6: Õiguskaitsevahendid 1. Jagu: Hüvitamise üldsätted Artikkel 6:101: Hüvitamise eesmärk ja vormid (1) Hüvitamine on hüvitamisele kuuluvat kahju kandva isiku taasasetamine olukorda, milles see isik oleks olnud, kui hüvitamisele kuuluvat kahju ei oleks esinenud. (2) Hüvitis võib seisneda rahas (kompensatsioonis) või muus, mis kõige paremini sobib, arvestades kantud kahju olemust ja ulatust ja kõiki muid kaasnevaid asjaolusid. (3) Juhul, kui kahjustatud on eluta asja, siis tuleb juhul, kui parandamise kulud ületavad ebamõistlikult väärtuse vähenemise, parandamise kulude asemel hüvitada summa, mis võrdub väärtuse vähenemisega. See reegel kehtib loomade suhtes niivõrd kuivõrd see on kohane, arvestades eesmärki, milleks looma peeti. (4) Alternatiivina lõikes 1 nimetatud restitutsioonile, kuid üksnes siis, kui see on mõistlik, võib hüvitamine toimuda selliselt, et isik, kes vastutab hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju tekitamise eest, annab välja mistahes tema poolt seoses kahju tekitamisega omandatud hüve.

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Artikkel 6:102: Vähese tähtsuse reegel Tühine kahju tuleb jätta tähelepanuta.

Artikkel 6:103: Kasu arvesse võtmine (1) Arvesse ei võeta kasu, mida isik, kes kannab hüvitamisele kuuluvat kahju, saab seoses kahjusündmusega, välja arvatud juhul, kui oleks õiglane ja mõistlik seda arvestada. (2) Otsustades, kas kasu arvesse võtmine oleks õiglane ja mõistlik, tuleb arvestada kantud kahju liiki, kahju tekitanud isiku vastutuse olemust ja kui kasu on saadud kolmandalt isikult, siis nimetatud kasu saamise eesmärki. Artikkel 6:104: Kahjustatud isikute paljusus Juhul, kui hüvitamisele kuuluvat kahju kannavad mitu isikut ja hüvitamine ühele isikule tähendab hüvitamist ka teisele, kohaldub õigustatud isikute hüvitise nõuetele vastavalt III.–4:201 – 207. Artikkel 6:105: Solidaarne vastutus Juhul, kui mitu isikut vastutavad sama hüvitamisele kuuluva kahju eest, vastutavad nad solidaarselt. Artikkel 6:106: Nõuete loovutamine Kannatanu võib kahju hüvitamise nõude, sealhulgas mittevaralise kahju hüvitamise nõude, loovutada.

2. Jagu: Hüvitamine Artikkel 6:201: Kahjustatud isiku õigus valida Kannatanul on õigus valida, kas kulutada hüvitis oma kahjustatud huvi taastamiseks või mitte. Artikkel 6:202: Vastutuse vähendamine Juhul, kui see on õiglane ja mõistlik ning kui kahju ei ole tekitatud tahtlikult, võib isiku kahju hüvitamise kohustusest kas osaliselt või täielikult vabastada, kui täies ulatuses vastutus oleks kahju tekitanud isikule vastutusest või kahju suurusest või selle ärahoidmise vahenditest lähtuvalt ebaproportsionaalne. Artikkel 6:203: Hüvitamise kord ja suurus (1) Hüvitis tuleb maksta ühekorraga ja täielikult, välja arvatud, kui on mõjuv põhjus määrata hüvitis perioodiliste maksetena. (2) Siseriiklik seadusandlus sätestab, kuidas määrata kindlaks kehavigastusest tingitud kahju ja mittevaralise kahju suurus. Artikkel 6:204: Kahjustuse kui sellise hüvitamine Kahjustus kui selline tuleb hüvitada sõltumatult varalise või mittevaralise kaotuse hüvitamisest.

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3. Jagu: Ennetamine Artikkel 6:301: Ennetamine üldiselt (1) Õigus ennetada on ainult siis, kui: (a) hüvitamine ei oleks kohane alternatiivne õiguskaitsevahend; ja (b) isikul, kes vastutaks kahju eest, on muul moel mõistlik hoida kahju tekkimine ära. (2) Juhul, kui ohuallikas on objekt või loom ja ohustatud isikul ei ole mõistlikult võimalik kahju ennetada, sisaldab õigus ennetamisele ka õigust ohuallika kõrvaldamisele. Artikkel 6:302: Vastutus kahju ärahoidmisega seotud kahju eest Isik, kes on kandnud mõistlikud kulud või kes kandis muud kahju seoses ähvardava kahju ärahoidmisega või sellega, et vähendada tekkiva kahju ulatust või raskust, on õigus nõuda kompensatsiooni isikult, kes vastutaks kahju tekitamise eest.

Peatükk 7: Täiendavad reeglid Artikkel 7:101: Rahvuslikud konstitutsioonilised seadused Kohus peab käesoleva Raamatu sätteid tõlgendama ja kohaldama kooskõlas vastava riigi põhiseadusega. Artikkel 7:102 Seaduse sätted Siseriiklik seadusandlus sätestab, millised õigusnormid nähakse ette seaduses. Artikkel 7:103 Avaliku õiguse funktsioonid ja kohtumenetlus Käesolev Raamat ei kohaldu isiku või asutuse vastutusele seoses avaliku õiguse funktsioonide või kohtumenetluse raames kohustuste täitmisega seotud tegevuse või tegevusetusega. Artikkel 7:104: Töötajate, tööandjate, ametiühingute ja tööandjate liitude vastutus Käesolev Raamat ei reguleeri: (a) töötajate töösuhtest tulenevat vastutust (nii kaastöötajate, tööandjate kui kolmandate isikute suhtes), (b) tööandjate töösuhtest tulenevat vastutust töötajate suhtes, ja (c) ametiühingute ja tööandjate liitude majandusvaidlustest tulenevat vastutust. Artikkel 7:105: Vastutuse vähendamine või välistamine hüvitise saanud isikule Juhul, kui isikul on õigus talle tekitatud kahju hüvitamisele mõnest muust allikast, kas täielikult või osaliselt, eriti kindlustusandjalt, fondilt või teiselt organilt, siis sätestab siseriiklik õigus, kas sellise õiguse tõttu on vastutus käesoleva Raamatu alusel piiratud.

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Finnish1 Sopimuksenulkoinen Korvausvastuu Toiselle Aiheutetusta Vahingosta Luku 1: Perussäännökset Artikla 1:101: Pääsääntö (1) Henkilöllä, joka kärsii oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa, on oikeus korvaukseen siltä, joka aiheutti vahingon tahallaan tai tuottamuksellaan taikka joka muutoin vastaa vahingon aiheuttamisesta. (2) Henkilö, joka ei ole aiheuttanut oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa tahallaan tai tuottamuksellaan, on vastuussa sanotunlaisen vahingon aiheuttamisesta vain, jos luvussa 3 niin määrätään. Artikla 1:102: Vahingon torjuminen Oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisen vahingon uhatessa tämä Kirja oikeuttaa henkilön, jota vahinko kohtaisi, torjumaan sen. Tätä oikeutta voidaan käyttää sitä henkilöä vastaan, joka olisi vastuussa vahingon aiheuttamisesta. Artikla 1:103: Soveltamisala Artikloita 1:101 ja 1:102 (a) sovelletaan vain tämän Kirjan seuraavien säännösten mukaisesti; (b) sovelletaan oikeushenkilöihin ja luonnollisiin henkilöihin ellei toisin ole määrätty; (c) ei sovelleta, sikäli kuin niiden soveltaminen johtaisi ristiriitaan muiden yksityisoikeuden sääntöjen tarkoituksen kanssa; ja (d) artiklat eivät vaikuta muilla oikeudellisilla perusteilla tarjolla oleviin oikeussuojakeinoihin.

Luku 2: Oikeudelliselta Kannalta Merkityksellinen Vahinko Osasto 1: Yleistä Artikla 2:101: Oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisen vahingon määritelmä (1) Menetys, niin taloudellista kuin immateriaalista laatua oleva, samoin kuin ruumiinvamma, ovat oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisiä vahinkoja, jos: (a) jokin seuraavista tämän luvun säännöistä niin määrää;

1

Translated by Supreme Court Judge Mikko Tulokas (Helsinki).

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(b) menetys tai ruumiinvamma aiheutuu laissa suojatun oikeuden loukkaamisesta; tai (c) sellaisen edun loukkaamisesta, joka on oikeudellisen suojan arvoinen. (2) Edellä tarkoitetuissa (1) kappaleen tapauksissa (b) tai (c) menetys tai ruumiinvamma on oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellinen vahinko vain, mikäli oikeutta vahingon korvaamiseen tai torjumiseen voidaan pitää oikeudenmukaisena ja kohtuullisena artikloiden 1:101 tai 1:102 kannalta. (3) Oikeudenmukaisuutta ja kohtuullisuutta harkittaessa huomioon on otettava vastuun perusteet, vahingon tai uhkaavan vahingon luonne ja läheisyys, vahingon kärsijän tai sen uhkaaman henkilön kohtuulliset odotukset, sekä yleisen edun vaatimukset. (4) Tässä Kirjassa (a) taloudellinen menetys käsittää tulon tai voiton menetyksen, aiheutuneet kustannukset ja omaisuuden arvon alenemisen (b) immateriaalinen menetys käsittää kivun ja kärsimyksen sekä elämän laadun huononemisen.

Osasto 2: Oikeudelliselta Kannalta Merkityksellisen Vahingon Erityistapauksia Artikla 2:201: Henkilövahinko ja seurausvahinko (1) Luonnolliselle henkilölle ruumiinvammasta tai terveyden heikentymisestä aiheutunut menetys sekä vamma ja terveydentilan muutos sinänsä ovat oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisiä vahinkoja. (2) Näitä Periaatteita sovellettaessa: (a) edellä tarkoitettu menetys käsittää sairaanhoidon kustannukset, joihin luetaan lähiomaisille aiheutuneet kohtuulliset kustannukset loukkaantuneen henkilön hoidosta; ja (b) mielenterveyden häiriintymistä pidetään henkilövahinkona vain, mikäli se on terveydentilaan vaikuttava. Artikla 2:202: Henkilövahingosta tai kuolemasta aiheutunut menetys kolmannelle (1) Luonnolliselle henkilölle aiheutunutta immateriaalista menetystä, joka on seurausta toisen henkilövahingosta tai kuolemasta, pidetään oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisenä vahinkona, jos kyseisellä henkilöllä vahingon tapahtuma-aikaan on ollut erityisen läheinen henkilökohtainen suhde henkilöön, jota vahinko kohtasi. (2) Henkilön kuolemaan johtaneessa vahingossa: (a) hänen vaateensa oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisen vahingon suhteen siirtyy kuolinhetkellä hänen seuraajilleen; (b) kohtuulliset hautajaiskustannukset ovat oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa sille henkilölle, jolle kustannukset ovat koituneet; ja (c) elatuksen menetys on oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa luonnolliselle henkilölle, jota edesmennyt elätti tai, mikäli ei olisi kuollut, olisi lakimääräisen velvollisuuden nojalla elättänyt, tai jolle edesmennyt antoi hoitoa ja taloudellista tukea.

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Artikla 2:203: Ihmisarvon, vapauden ja yksityiselämän loukkaaminen (1) Luonnolliselle henkilölle aiheutunut menetys, joka on seurausta hänen ihmisarvonsa ja henkilökohtaisten oikeuksiensa, kuten vapauden ja yksityiselämän loukkaamisesta, ja loukkaus sellaisenaan ovat oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa. (2) Henkilölle aiheutunut menetys, joka on seurausta kyseisen henkilön maineen vahingoittamisesta ja loukkaus sellaisenaan ovat myös oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa, jos kansallisessa laissa niin säädetään. Artikla 2:204: Toista koskevan väärän tiedon levittämisestä johtunut menetys Henkilölle aiheutunut menetys häntä koskevan väärän tiedon levittämisestä, jonka levittäjä tiesi tai joka hänen olisi pitänyt tietää vääräksi, on oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa. Artikla 2:205: Luottamuksen rikkomisesta aiheutunut menetys Henkilölle aiheutunut menetys luottamuksellisen tiedon levittämisestä, jonka levittäjä tiesi tai hänen olisi pitänyt tietää luottamukselliseksi kyseiselle henkilölle tiedon luonteen tai sen saantiin liittyneiden olosuhteiden perusteella, on oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa. Artikla 2:206: Menetys esineoikeuden tai laillisen hallinnan loukkauksen johdosta (1) Henkilölle aiheutunut menetys, joka on seurausta hänen esineoikeutensa taikka irtaimen tai kiinteän omaisuutensa laillisen hallinnan loukkaamisesta, on oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa. (2) Tämän artiklan mukaan (a) menetys sisältää omaisuuden käytön estymisen; (b) esineoikeuden loukkaus käsittää oikeuden kohteen hävittämisen tai fyysisen vahingoittamisen (esinevahinko), oikeuden käyttämisen, puuttumisen oikeuden käyttämiseen tai muun oikeuden käyttämistä koskevan häiriön. Artikla 2:207: Luottamisesta väärään neuvoon tai tietoon aiheutunut menetys Henkilölle, joka on tehnyt päätöksen luottaen perustellusti sittemmin vääräksi osoittautuneeseen neuvoon tai tietoon, aiheutunut vahinko, on oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa, jos: (a) neuvon tai tiedon on antanut henkilö ammattia harjoittaessaan tai elinkeinotoiminnassaan; ja (b) neuvon tai tiedon antaja tiesi tai hänen olisi pitänyt tietää, että vastaanottaja luottaisi neuvoon tai tietoon tehdessään kyseisenlaisen päätöksen. Artikla 2:208: Menetys liiketoiminnan laittomasta vahingoittamisesta (1) Henkilölle aiheutunut menetys hänen ammatinharjoittamisensa tai kaupankäyntinsä laittomasta vahingoittamisesta on oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa. (2) Kuluttajalle aiheutunut menetys, joka johtuu sopimattomasta menettelystä elinkeinotoiminnassa, on myös oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa, jos yhteisöoikeudessa tai kansallisessa laissa niin määrätään.

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Artikla 2:209: Valtiolle aiheutuneet menot ympäristön pilaamisesta Olennaisessa määrin pilaantuneiden ympäristön elementtien, kuten ilman, veden, maaperän sekä kasviston ja eläimistön ennallistamisesta valtiolle tai asianomaisille toimivaltaisille viranomaisille aiheutuneet menot ovat oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa valtiolle ja kyseisille viranomaisille. Artikla 2:210: Menetys petollisen vääristelyn johdosta (1) Mikäli tämän osaston muista määräyksistä ei muuta seuraa, henkilölle aiheutunut menetys, joka on johtunut toisen petollisesta vääristelystä, olipa se sanallista tai käyttäytymiseen perustuvaa, on oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa. (2) Vääristely on petollista, jos se on esitetty tietäen tai uskoen, että esitys on väärä ja sen tarkoituksena on aikaansaada vastaanottajalle erehdys. Artikla 2:211: Menetys velvoitteen rikkomiseen taivuttelun johdosta Mikäli tämän osaston muista määräyksistä ei muuta seuraa, henkilölle aiheutunut vahinko sen johdosta, että joku on taivutellut kolmannen henkilön rikkomaan velvoitteensa, on oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa vain, jos: (a) velvoitteeseen perustuva oikeus kuului henkilölle, jota vahinko kohtasi; ja (b) taivuttelua harjoittanut henkilö: (i) pyrki siihen, että kolmas rikkoisi velvoitteensa, eikä (ii) hän toiminut suojellakseen oikeutetusti omia etujaan.

Luku 3: Syyksiluettavuus Osasto 1: Tahallisuus Ja Tuottamus Artikla 3:101: Tahallisuus Henkilö aiheuttaa oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisen vahingon tahallisesti, kun kyseinen henkilö on toiminut joko: (a) tarkoituksin aiheuttaa toteutuneen kaltainen vahinko; tai (b) tietäen toteutuneen tai toteutuneen tyyppisen vahingon käytöksellään melkoisella varmuudella aiheuttavansa. Artikla 3:102: Tuottamus Henkilö aiheuttaa oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisen vahingon tuottamuksellisesti toimiessaan tavalla, joka (a) ei täytä lainsäädännössä asetettua erityistä huolellisuusvaatimusta, minkä tarkoituksena on loukatun osapuolen suojeleminen sattuneelta vahingolta, tai joka (b) ei muutoin osoita sellaista huolellisuutta, jota voidaan kohtuudella edellyttää huolelliselta henkilöltä noissa olosuhteissa.

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Artikla 3:103: Alle 18-vuotiaat (1) Alle 18-vuotiaan henkilön syyksi luetaan oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisen vahingon aiheuttaminen Artiklan 3:102(b) mukaisesti sikäli kuin hän ei noudata sellaista huolellisuutta, jota voidaan kohtuudella edellyttää samanikäiseltä huolelliselta henkilöltä kyseisissä olosuhteissa. (2) Alle 7-vuotiaan syyksi ei lueta tahallista tai tuottamuksellista vahingon aiheuttamista. (3) Kappaleita (1) ja (2) ei kuitenkaan sovelleta, jos (a) loukattu osapuoli ei voi saada korvausta tämän Kirjan mukaan toiselta, ja (b) korvausvelvollisuuden asettaminen olisi oikeudenmukaista ja kohtuullista ottaen huomioon osapuolten varallisuusolot ja kaikki muut tapauksen olosuhteet. Artikla 3:104: Vastuu lasten tai valvonnanalaisten henkilöiden aiheuttamien vahinkojen korvaamisesta (1) Alle 14 vuotiaan lapsen vanhemmat tai muut henkilöt, joilla lain perusteella on vastaavanlainen velvollisuus huolehtia lapsesta, ovat vastuussa oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisestä vahingosta, kun lapsi on aiheuttanut vahingon käyttäytymisellä, jota pidettäisiin aikuisen kysymyksessä ollen tahallisena tai tuottamuksellisena. (2) Laitoksen tai muu valvontavelvollisen tahon syyksi luetaan kolmannen kärsimän oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisen vahingon aiheuttaminen, kun (a) kysymyksessä on henkilövahinko, Artiklassa 2:202 tarkoitettu menetys tai esinevahinko; (b) henkilö, jota laitos tai muu taho on velvollinen valvomaan, aiheutti vahingon tahallaan tai tuottamuksesta taikka alle 18-vuotiaan ollessa kysymyksessä käyttäytymisellä, jota aikuisen ollessa kyseessä pidettäisiin tahallisena tai tuottamuksellisena; ja (c) valvottava henkilö huomioon ottaen kysymyksessä olevan kaltaisen vahingon aiheuttaminen oli pelättävissä. (3) Valvontavastuuta ei kuitenkaan synny tämän artiklan perusteella, jos valvontavelvollinen osoittaa, ettei vahingon aiheuttaneen henkilön valvonnassa ollut virheitä tai puutteita.

Osasto 2: Vastuu Ilman Tahallisuutta Tai Tuottamusta Artikla 3:201: Vastuu työntekijöiden ja edustajien aiheuttamista vahingoista (1) Työnantaja tai häneen verrattava on vastuussa kolmannen henkilön kärsimästä oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisestä vahingosta, kun työntekijä tai tehtävän toimekseen saanut (a) aiheutti vahingon työssä tai tehtävää suorittaessaan, ja (b) vahinko on aiheutettu tahallisesti tai tuottamuksellisesti taikka aiheuttaja on muutoin siitä vastuussa. (2) Kappale (1) soveltuu vastaavasti oikeushenkilöön suhteessa edustajaan, joka aiheuttaa vahinkoa toimessaan tai tehtävässään. Edustajana pidetään henkilöä, jolla on valtuudet oikeustoimien tekemiseen oikeushenkilön yhtiöjärjestyksen, sääntöjen tai vastaavien määräysten nojalla.

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Artikla 3:202: Vastuu kiinteistön turvallisuuspuutteista aiheutuneista vahingoista (1) Henkilö, jonka asiana on itsenäisesti valvoa kiinteistöä, on vastuussa henkilövahingosta ja seurausvahingosta, Artiklassa 2:202 tarkoitetusta vahingosta sekä esinevahingosta (muulle kuin kiinteistölle itselleen) seuranneesta menetyksestä, milloin ne ovat aiheutuneet kiinteistön tilasta, joka ei ole taannut sellaista turvallisuutta, mitä kiinteistössä tai sen lähellä oleva henkilö on ollut oikeutettu odottamaan ottaen huomioon olosuhteet, kuten (a) kiinteistön luonne, (b) pääsy tai sisäänkäynti kiinteistöön, ja (c) kustannukset turvallisuuspuutteiden korjaamisesta (2) Henkilö harjoittaa itsenäistä kiinteistön valvontaa, jos sen perusteella henkilölle on kohtuullista asettaa velvollisuus ehkäistä tämän artiklan mukainen oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellinen vahinko. (3) Kiinteistön omistajan katsotaan itsenäisesti harjoittavan valvontaa ellei hän osoita, että joku toinen sitä itsenäisesti harjoittaa. Artikla 3:203: Vastuu eläinten aiheuttamista vahingoista Eläimen pitäjä on vastuussa eläimen aiheuttamasta henkilövahingosta ja seurausvahingosta, Artiklassa 2:202 tarkoitetusta vahingosta sekä esinevahingon aiheuttamasta menetyksestä. Artikla 3:204: Vastuu viallisten tuotteiden aiheuttamista vahingoista (1) Tuotteen valmistaja on vastuussa tuotteen viallisuudesta johtuneesta henkilövahingosta, seurausvahingosta, Artiklassa 2:202 tarkoitetusta vahingosta, sekä suhteessa kuluttajiin, muuhun kuin tuotteeseen itseensä kohdistuneen esinevahingon aiheuttamasta menetyksestä. (2) Samalla tavoin vastuussa on henkilö, joka liiketoimintaansa liittyen toi tuotteen Euroopan talousalueelle myynti-, vuokraus-, leasing- tai jakelutarkoituksessa. (3) Vastaavasti tuotteen myyjä on vastuussa, jos: (a) valmistajaa ei voida selvittää; tai (b) tuontituotteen osalta tuotteesta ei ilmene maahantuoja (riippumatta siitä, ilmeneekö tuotteesta valmistaja) ellei myyjä kohtuullisessa ajassa ilmoita vahinkoa kärsineelle, kuka on valmistaja tai se henkilö, joka hänelle toimitti tuotteen. (4) Henkilö ei ole tämän artiklan perusteella vastuussa, jos hän osoittaa: (a) ettei hän laskenut tuotetta liikkeelle; (b) ettei vahingon aiheuttanutta tuotteen viallisuutta ollut todennäköisesti olemassa, kun tuote laskettiin liikkeelle; (c) ettei hän valmistanut tuotetta myyntiin tai jakeluun taloudellisessa tarkoituksessa taikka elinkeinotoiminnan puitteissa; (d) että viallisuus on seurausta siitä, että tuotteen tulee vastata viranomaisten pakottavia määräyksiä; (e) että tieteellinen ja tekninen tietämys silloin, kun hän laski tuotteen liikkeelle, ei mahdollistanut tuotteen viallisuuden havaitsemista; tai (f) että viallisuus, kun kysymys on komponentin valmistajasta, riippuu: (i) sen tuotteen suunnittelusta, johon komponentti on liitetty tai (ii) niistä ohjeista, jotka tuotteen valmista ja on antanut. (5) Valmistajalla tarkoitetaan: (a) kun kysymys on lopputuotteesta tai komponentista, sen valmistajaa, 72

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(b) kun kysymys on raaka-aineesta, sen hyödyntäjää tai rikastajaa, ja (c) jokaista henkilöä, joka merkitsemällä tuotteen nimellään, tavaramerkillään tai muulla tunnusmerkillään esittäytyy tuotteen valmistajaksi. (6) Tuotteella tarkoitetaan irtainta esinettä, myös silloin, kun se on liitetty toiseen esineeseen tai kiinteään omaisuuteen taikka sähkölaitteisiin. (7) Tuote on viallinen, kun se ei ole niin turvallinen, kuin henkilöllä on oikeus odottaa ottaen huomioon olosuhteet, erityisesti (a) se, mitä tuotteesta on esitetty; (b) se käyttö, mihin tuotteen voidaan kohtuudella odottaa soveltuvan; ja (c) ajankohta, jolloin tuote laskettiin liikkeelle, mutta tuote ei ole viallinen pelkästään sillä perusteella, että myöhemmin liikkeelle on laskettu parempi tuote.

Artikla 3:205: Vastuu moottoriajoneuvojen aiheuttamista vahingoista (1) Moottoriajoneuvon haltija on vastuussa henkilövahingosta, seurausvahingosta, Artiklassa 2:202 tarkoitetusta vahingosta sekä esinevahingon (muulle kuin ajoneuvolle ja sen lastille) aiheuttamasta menetyksestä, joka johtuu ajoneuvon käytöstä. (2) Moottoriajoneuvolla tarkoitetaan kaikenlaisia moottoriajoneuvoja, jotka on tarkoitettu maalla kulkemiseen ja joita kuljetetaan konevoimalla, lukuun ottamatta raideliikenteessä käytettäviä, sekä perävaunuja silloinkin, kun niitä ei ole hinaukseen kytketty. Artikla 3:206: Vastuu vaarallisten aineiden tai päästöjen aiheuttamista vahingoista (1) Aineiden säilyttäjä tai päästöjä synnyttävän laitoksen osalta toiminnan harjoittaja on vastuussa henkilövahingosta, seurausvahingosta, Artiklassa 2:202 tarkoitetusta vahingosta, esinevahingosta johtuvasta menetyksestä sekä Artiklassa 2:209 tarkoitetuista menoista, jos (a) ottaen huomioon aineiden määrä ja ominaisuudet päästöhetkellä tai, jos päästöä ei tapahtunut, vahingollisen kontaktin ajankohtana, oli hyvin todennäköistä, että vaarallinen aine tai päästö tulee aiheuttamaan mainitunlaista vahinkoa ilman asianmukaista valvontaa, ja (b) vahinko on seurausta tuon riskin toteutumisesta. (2) Aineilla tarkoitetaan kemikaaleja (olivatpa ne kiinteässä tai nestemäisessä muodossa taikka kaasuna). Mikro-organismeja tulee käsitellä kuten aineita. (3) Päästöillä tarkoitetaan (a) aineiden päästämistä tai pääsemistä ympäristöön, (b) sähkön johtamista, (c) lämpöä, valoa ja muuta säteilyä, (d) ääntä ja muuta värähtelyä, sekä (e) muunlaista aineetonta vaikutusta ympäristöön. (4) Laitoksella tarkoitetaan myös liikkuvaa laitosta sekä rakenteilla olevaa ja käytöstä poistettua laitosta. (5) Henkilö ei kuitenkaan ole vastuussa vahingoista tämän artiklan nojalla, jos hän: (a) ei säilytä ainetta tai harjoita laitoksen toimintaa osana liike- tai ammattitoimintaansa; taikka (b) osoittaa, ettei hänen viakseen jää laiminlyöntiä noudattaa säännöksiä ja määräyksiä aineen säilyttämisen ja valvonnan tai laitoksen hoitamisen suhteen.

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Artikla 3:207: Muu vastuu oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisestä vahingosta Henkilö vastaa oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisestä vahingosta myös, kun kansallisessa laissa niin säädetään, milloin (a) vahinko liittyy vaaran lähteeseen, jota ei ole mainittu Artikloissa 3:104-3:205, (b) vahinko liittyy vaarallisiin aineisiin tai päästöihin, taikka (c) Artiklan 3:204 kohtaa (4)(e) ei sovelleta. Artikla 3:208: Hylkääminen Tämän osaston säännöksiä sovellettaessa henkilö vastaa kiinteistöstä, ajoneuvosta, vaarallisesta aineesta tai laitoksesta, jonka hän hylkää, kunnes itsenäinen valvonta, säilyttäminen tai toiminnan harjoittaminen siirtyy toiselle henkilölle. Tämä soveltuu vastaavasti, sikäli kuin se on kohtuullista, eläimen pitäjään.

Luku 4: Syy-Yhteys Artikla 4:101: Pääsääntö (1) Henkilö aiheuttaa toiselle oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisen vahingon, jos vahinkoa on pidettävä seurauksena hänen käyttäytymisestään tai vaaran lähteestä, josta hän on vastuussa. (2) Henkilövahingon tai kuoleman ollessa kysymyksessä uhrin taipumus tai alttius on vailla merkitystä vahingon laadun tai laajuuden osalta. Artikla 4:102: Yhteistyö Oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisen vahingon aiheuttamiseen osallistumista, siihen yllyttämistä tai materiaalista avustamista on pidettävä vahingon aiheuttamisena. Artikla 4:103: Vaihtoehtoiset syyt Milloin oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisen vahingon on aiheuttanut jokin useista mahdollisista tekijöistä, joista eri henkilöt vastaavat, ja selvitetään, että vahingon on aiheuttanut jokin näistä tekijöistä, kaikkien katsotaan olevan vahingon aiheuttajia ellei muuta osoiteta.

Luku 5: Puolustautumisperusteet Osasto 1: Vahinko Akärsineen Suostumus Tai Käyttäytyminen Artikla 5:101: Suostumus ja riskinotto (1) Henkilö voi puolustuksekseen vedota siihen, että vahingonkärsijä on pätevästi suostunut oikeudelliselta kannalta merkitykselliseen vahinkoon siten, että hän on ymmärtänyt tai hänen on pitänyt ymmärtää suostumuksensa seuraukset. (2) Sama koskee tilannetta, jossa vahingonkärsinyt tietäen kysymyksessä olevan kaltaisesta vahingonvaarasta ottaa riskin siten, että hänen on katsottava hyväksyneen vahingon mahdollisuuden. 74

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Artikla 5:102: Myötävaikutus ja vastuu (1) Milloin vahingonkärsijä myötävaikuttaa omalla virheellään oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisen vahingon syntymiseen tai sen laajuuteen, korvausta tulee alentaa ottaen huomioon virheen aste. (2) Huomioon ei kuitenkaan oteta: (a) vahinkoa kärsineen merkityksetöntä virhettä; (b) virhettä tai vastuuta, joka on merkityksetön vahingon aiheutumisen kannalta; (c) vahinkoa kärsineen huolimattomuutta, joka on myötävaikuttanut hänen loukkaantumiseensa moottoriajoneuvon aiheuttamassa liikennevahingossa, ellei kysymys ole ollut olosuhteiden ilmeisesti edellyttämän huolellisuusvaatimuksen noudattamisen olennaisesta laiminlyönnistä. (3) Kappaleita (1) ja (2) sovelletaan vastaavasti, kun henkilö, josta vahingonkärsijä vastaa Artiklan 3:201 mukaisesti, myötävaikuttaa vahingon syntymiseen tai laajuuteen omalla virheellään. (4) Korvausta alennetaan samalla tavoin siltä osin kuin vahingon syntyyn tai laajuuteen on myötävaikuttanut muu vaaranlähde, josta vahingonkärsijä on vastuussa Luvun 3 perusteella. Artikla 5:103: Rikollisen aiheuttama vahinko kumppanilleen Oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellinen vahinko, joka rikosta suoritettaessa aiheutetaan ilman tahallisuutta toiselle rikokseen osalliselle, ei oikeuta korvaukseen, jos korvaaminen olisi vastoin yleistä etua.

Osasto 2: Vastuussa Olevien Ja Kolmansien Osapuolten Edut Artikla 5:201: Lain suoma toimivalta Henkilö voi puolustuksekseen vedota siihen, että oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellinen vahinko on aiheutettu lain suomaa toimivaltaa käytettäessä. Artikla 5:202: Itsepuolustus, asiainhuolto ja pakkotila (1) Henkilö voi puolustuksekseen vedota siihen, että hän on aiheuttanut oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisen vahingon suojellessaan perustellusti omaa tai kolmannen henkilön suojanarvoista oikeutta tai etua, jos vahingonkärsijä on vastuussa suojellun oikeuden tai edun vaarantamisesta. Tätä kappaletta sovellettaessa Artiklaa 3:103 ei oteta huomioon. (2) Sama koskee oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa, jonka asiainhuoltaja aiheuttaa päämiehelle rikkomatta asiainhuoltajan velvollisuuksia. (3) Jos henkilö aiheuttaa oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa toisen omaisuudelle tilanteessa, jossa välitön vaara uhkaa henkeä, terveyttä tai vapautta, suojellakseen itseään tai kolmatta henkilöä eikä vaaraa voitu välttää vahinkoa aiheuttamatta, aiheuttaja ei ole vastuussa hyvityksestä, joka ylittää kohtuullisen korvauksen. Artikla 5:203: Yleisen edun suoja Henkilö voi puolustuksekseen vedota siihen, että oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellinen vahinko on aiheutettu, kun on ollut tarpeellista puolustaa demokraattisen yhteiskunnan perusarvoja, erityisesti kun vahinko on aiheutettu levittämällä informaatiota tiedotusvälineissä.

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Osasto 3: Kyvyttömyys Valvoa Artikla 5:301: Henkinen kykenemättömyys (1) Henkilö, joka on henkisesti kykenemätön aiheuttaessaan käyttäytymisellään oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisen vahingon, on vastuussa vain, jos se on oikeudenmukaista ja kohtuullista ottaen huomioon kyseisen henkilön taloudelliset olot ja tapauksen muut olosuhteet. Vastuu rajoittuu kohtuulliseen korvaukseen. (2) Henkilö on henkisesti kykenemätön, jos häneltä puuttuu riittävä käsitys oman käyttäytymisensä luonteesta ellei puute ole tilapäinen ja itseaiheutettu. Artikla 5:302: Ulkopuolinen tapahtuma Henkilö voi puolustuksekseen vedota siihen, että oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisen vahingon on aiheuttanut epänormaali tapahtuma, jota ei ole voinut järkevin toimenpitein torjua ja jonka ei voida katsoa kuuluvan kyseisen henkilön vahingonvaaran piiriin.

Osasto 4: Vastuun Poistaminen Ja Rajoittaminen Sopimuksella Artikla 5:401: Vastuun poistaminen ja rajoittaminen sopimuksella (1) Vastuuta oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisestä vahingosta, joka on aiheutettu tahallisesti, ei voida poistaa tai rajoittaa. (2) Vastuuta oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisestä vahingosta, joka on aiheutettu laiminlyömällä karkeasti olosuhteiden selvästi edellyttämä huolellisuus, ei voida poistaa tai rajoittaa (a) kun kysymys on henkilövahingosta (mukaan lukien kuolemantapaus), tai (b) jos vastuun poistaminen tai rajoittaminen on muutoin lainvastaista tai ristiriidassa vilpittömän ja rehellisen sopimisen kanssa. (3) Vastuuta ei voida poistaa tai rajoittaa, kun kysymys on Artiklassa 3:204 tarkoitetun vahingon aiheuttamisesta. (4) Muu tämän Kirjan mukainen vastuu voidaan poistaa tai rajoittaa ellei laissa toisin säädetä.

Osasto 5: Artiklassa 2:202 Tarkoitettu menetys Artikla 5:501: Puolustautumisen ulottaminen kolmansiin henkilöihin Perusteeseen, johon voidaan vedota henkilön vaatiessa hyvitystä henkilövahingostaan tai olisi voitu vedota, jos kuolemantapausta ei olisi sattunut, voidaan myös vedota Artiklassa 2:202 tarkoitetussa vahinkotilanteessa.

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Luku 6: Korjauskeinot Osasto 1: Yleistä vahingon hyvittämisestä Artikla 6:101: Hyvittämisen tarkoitus ja muodot (1) Vahingon hyvittämisellä tarkoitetaan sitä, että henkilö, joka on kärsinyt oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisen vahingon, saatetaan samaan asemaan, jossa hän olisi ollut, jos vahinkoa ei olisi sattunut. (2) Vahinko voidaan hyvittää rahalla (vahingonkorvaus) tai muulla parhaiten soveltuvalla tavalla ottaen huomioon vahingon laatu ja määrä sekä muut tapauksen olosuhteet. (3) Milloin eloton esine on vahingoittunut, sen arvon alennus tulee tuomita korvattavaksi korjauskustannusten sijasta, jos korjauskustannukset ovat kohtuuttoman korkeat verrattuina arvonalennukseen. Tätä sääntöä sovelletaan eläimiin vain silloin, kun se on asianmukaista ottaen huomioon eläimen pidon tarkoitus. (4) Kohdassa (1) esitetyn sijasta, edellyttäen että se on järkevää, vahingon hyvittäminen voi tapahtua sen edun palauttamisella, jonka vahingosta vastuussa oleva on saanut aiheuttaessaan oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisen vahingon. Artikla 6:102: De minimis-sääntö Merkityksetöntä vahinkoa ei oteta huomioon. Artikla 6:103: Eduntasoitus (1) Vahingonkärsijän saamia etuja vahinkotapahtumasta, jolla on aiheutettu oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa, ei oteta huomioon ellei niiden huomioon ottaminen olisi oikeudenmukaista ja kohtuullista. (2) Ratkaistaessa sitä, onko oikein ja kohtuullista ottaa edut huomioon, merkitystä on kärsityn vahingon laadulla, vahingonaiheuttajan vastuun perusteella ja, kun edut ovat kolmannen antamia, etujen antamisen tarkoituksella. Artikla 6:104: Useita vahingonkärsijöitä Milloin useat henkilöt kärsivät oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellistä vahinkoa ja hyvitys yhdelle heistä tuottaa hyvityksen myös jollekin toiselle, heidän hyvitysvaatimuksensa ratkaistaan soveltuvin osin kohtien III.–4:201-207 nojalla. Artikla 6:105: Solidaarinen vastuu Milloin useat henkilöt ovat vastuussa samasta oikeudelliselta kannalta merkityksellisestä vahingosta, he vastaavat yhteisvastuullisesti omasta ja toistensa puolesta. Artikla 6:106: Saamisten siirtäminen Vahinkoa kärsinyt voi siirtää toiselle vahingon hyvittämistä koskevan saamisensa. Tämä koskee myös muuta kuin taloudellista menetystä koskevaa saamista.

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Osasto 2: Vahingonkorvaus Artikla 6:201: Vahinkoa kärsineen valintaoikeus Vahingonkärsijä ratkaisee itse, käyttääkö hän vahingonkorvauksen saattaakseen ennalleen vahingoitetun etunsa.

Artikla 6:202: Vastuun sovittelu Korvausvastuu voidaan poistaa tai sitä alentaa, milloin se on oikein ja kohtuullista tapauksissa, joissa vahinkoa ei ole aiheutettu tahallisesti ja täysi korvausvelvollisuus olisi epäsuhteessa vahingonaiheuttajan vastuun perusteisiin, vahingon laajuuteen tai keinoihin estää vahinko. Artikla 6:203: Vahingonkorvauksen pääomittaminen ja määrä (1) Vahingonkorvaus on tuomittava kertamaksuna ellei hyvä syy vaadi jaksotettuja maksuja. (2) Henkilövahinkojen ja muiden kuin taloudellisten menetysten korvausmäärät ratkaistaan kansallisen lain mukaan. Artikla 6:204: Vahingonkorvaus vammasta sellaisenaan Vammasta sellaisenaan määrätään korvaus riippumatta taloudellisen vahingon ja muuta kuin taloudellista laatua olevan menetyksen korvaamisesta.

Osasto 3: Vahingon Torjuminen Artikla 6:301: Yleistä vahingon torjumisesta (1) Oikeus vahingon torjumiseen on olemassa vain siinä laajuudessa kuin (a) hyvitys ei olisi asianmukainen korjauskeino; ja (b) vahingon torjuminen on järkevää sen henkilön kannalta, joka olisi vahingosta vastuussa. (2) Kun vaaran lähde on esine tai eläin eikä uhatulla henkilöllä ole järkevää mahdollisuutta vaaran välttämiseen, oikeus vahingon torjumiseen sisältää myös oikeuden vaaran lähteen poistamiseen. Artikla 6:302: Vastuu torjuntakustannuksista ja vahingosta Henkilö, joka torjuakseen uhkaavan vahingon syntymisen tai rajoittaakseen vahinkoa tai sen vakavuutta on ryhtynyt järkeviin torjuntatoimiin ja kärsinyt kustannuksia tai muuta menetystä, on oikeutettu vahingonkorvaukseen siltä, joka olisi ollut vahingosta vastuussa.

Luku 7: Täydentäviä Sääntöjä Artikla 7:101: Kansalliset perustuslait Tämän Kirjan määräyksiä tulee tulkita ja soveltaa tavalla, joka on sopusoinnussa tuomioistuimen perustuslain kanssa.

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Artikla 7:102: Lain säännökset Kansallisen lain perusteella ratkaistaan, mitä kuuluu lainsäädäntöön. Artikla 7:103: Julkisoikeudelliset toimet ja oikeudenkäyntimenettely Tässä Kirjassa ei säännellä henkilön tai toimielimen vastuuta, joka seuraa julkisoikeudellisiin toimiin tai tehtäviin ryhtymisestä tai niiden laiminlyömisestä taikka oikeudenkäyntimenettelyyn liittyvistä velvoitteista.

Artikla 7:104: Työntekijöiden, työnantajien, ammattijärjestöjen sekä työnantajaorganisaatioiden vastuu Tämä Kirja ei sääntele (a) työntekijän työsuhteeseen liittyvää vastuuta (toista työntekijää, työnantajaa tai kolmatta tahoa kohtaan), (b) työnantajan vastuuta työntekijälle liittyen työsuhteeseen, eikä (c) ammattijärjestöjen ja työnantajaorganisaatioiden vastuuta työmarkkinariitoihin liittyen. Artikla 7:105: Vastuun sovittelu tai poistaminen muualta saadun hyvityksen johdosta Jos henkilö on oikeutettu hyvitykseen, joka kattaa vahingon osaksi tai kokonaan, muusta lähteestä, erityisesti vakuutuksenantajalta, rahastosta tai muulta toimielimeltä, kansallisen lain mukaan ratkaistaan, onko sen johdosta tämän Kirjan mukaista vastuuta soviteltava tai onko se kokonaan lakkaava.

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French1 Responsabilité extra-contractuelle pour dommage causé à autrui Chapitre 1: Dispositions fondamentales Article 1:101: Règle de base (1) Celui qui subit un dommage juridiquement réparable a le droit d’en obtenir réparation de la personne qui, intentionnellement ou par négligence, a causé celui-ci ou à laquelle la survenance du dommage est d’une autre façon imputable. (2) Lorsqu’une personne n’a pas causé intentionnellement ou par négligence un dommage juridiquement réparable, la survenance de celui-ci ne lui est imputable que dans les conditions du Chapitre 3. Article 1:102: Prévention Quand un dommage juridiquement réparable est imminent, ce Livre confère à celui qui va le subir le droit de le prévenir. Ce droit est accordé à l’encontre de la personne à laquelle serait imputée la survenance de ce dommage une fois réalisé. Article 1:103: Champ d’application Les articles 1:101 et 1:102 (a) ne s’appliquent que dans les limites des dispositions suivantes de ce Livre; (b) s’appliquent aux personnes tant physiques que morales, sauf disposition contraire; (c) ne s’appliquent pas dans la mesure où leur application serait en contradiction avec les finalités d’autres règles de droit privé; (d) ne font pas obstacle aux recours disponibles sur d’autres fondements juridiques.

Chapitre 2: Le dommage juridiquement réparable Section 1: Dispositions générales Article 2:101: Définition du dommage juridiquement réparable (1) Est un dommage juridiquement réparable une perte, patrimoniale ou extrapatrimoniale, ou une atteinte à un intérêt ou un droit si: (a) l’une des dispositions du présent Chapitre le prescrit;

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(b) la perte ou l’atteinte résulte de la violation d’un droit conféré par la loi; (c) la perte ou l’atteinte résulte de la lésion d’un intérêt méritant la protection légale. (2) Dans les cas qui ne sont visés que par les paragraphes (b) ou (c), la perte ou l’atteinte n’est un dommage juridiquement réparable que si, en fonction des circonstances, il est juste et raisonnable d’accorder un droit à réparation ou prévention en application des articles 1:101 ou 1:102. (3) Pour apprécier si le droit à réparation ou prévention est juste et raisonnable, il faut tenir compte du fondement de l’imputabilité, de la nature et de la proximité du dommage réalisé ou imminent, des attentes raisonnables de la personne qui subit ou va subir le dommage et prendre en considération l’ordre public. (4) Dans ce Livre (a) la perte patrimoniale inclut celle des revenus et des profits, les charges subies et la diminution de valeur d’un bien. (b) La perte extrapatrimoniale inclut les souffrances et la douleur, ainsi que la dégradation de la qualité de vie.

Section 2: Cas particuliers de dommages juridiquement réparables Article 2:201: Dommage corporel et perte consécutive (1) La perte causée à une personne physique par un dommage atteignant son corps ou sa santé ainsi que le dommage corporel en tant que tel sont des dommages juridiquement réparables. (2) Dans ce Livre: (a) cette perte inclut le coût des soins médicaux et paramédicaux, y compris les dépenses raisonnablement exposées par ses proches à cette fin; (b) le dommage corporel inclut l’atteinte à la santé mentale à la condition que celle-ci atteigne un degré pathologique. Article 2:202: Perte soufferte par une tierce personne en conséquence du dommage corporel ou de la mort de la victime (1) La perte extrapatrimoniale causée à une personne physique, en conséquence du dommage corporel ou de la mort d’une autre personne, est un dommage juridiquement réparable si, au moment de celui-ci, elle était très particulièrement proche de la victime. (2) Quand la victime est décédée (a) le dommage juridiquement réparable causé au défunt par son préjudice corporel jusqu’à son décès devient le dommage juridiquement réparable de ses successeurs; (b) les frais funéraires raisonnables sont des dommages juridiquement réparables pour la personne qui les a exposés; (c) la perte d’entretien est un dommage juridiquement réparable pour la personne physique qui était entretenue par le défunt ou qui, s’il n’était pas mort, aurait été entretenue par celui-ci en exécution d’une obligation légale, ou qui recevait du défunt des soins ou un soutien financier.

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Article 2:203: Atteinte à la dignité, la liberté ou la vie privée (1) La perte causée à une personne physique par une violation de son droit au respect de sa dignité, telle que ses droits à la liberté et à une vie privée, et cette atteinte elle-même sont des dommages juridiquement réparables. (2) La perte causée à une personne par une atteinte à sa réputation et cette atteinte elle-même sont aussi des dommages juridiquement réparables si la loi nationale applicable le prescrit. Article 2:204: Perte par la communication d’informations inexactes sur autrui La perte causée à une personne par la communication d’informations à son sujet, dont l’auteur savait ou devait savoir qu’elles étaient inexactes, est un dommage juridiquement réparable. Article 2:205: Perte par la divulgation d’informations confidentielles La perte causée à une personne par la divulgation d’informations dont leur auteur savait ou devait savoir qu’elles étaient confidentielles pour la victime, en raison soit de leur nature soit des circonstances dans lesquelles elles avaient été obtenues, est un dommage juridiquement réparable. Article 2:206: Perte du fait de la violation d’un droit de propriété, de possession ou de détention légalement protégé (1) La perte causée à une personne par la violation d’un droit de propriété, de possession ou de détention légalement protégé sur un meuble ou un immeuble est un dommage juridiquement réparable. (2) Dans cet article: (a) la perte inclut le fait d’être privé de l’usage de la propriété; (b) la violation du droit de propriété inclut la destruction ou l’altération physique de l’objet du droit (dommage aux biens), la disposition de ce droit, l’ingérence dans son usage et les autres troubles de l’exercice de ce droit. Article 2:207: Perte du fait de la foi accordée à des avis ou des informations inexactes. La perte causée à une personne qui a pris une décision fondée sur une confiance raisonnable en un avis ou une information inexacte est un dommage juridiquement réparable si: (a) l’avis ou l’information a été donnée par une personne agissant dans l’exercice de son activité commerciale ou professionnelle; et (b) son auteur savait ou aurait dû savoir que le destinataire ferait confiance en cet avis ou cette information pour prendre une décision du type de celle qu’il devait prendre. Article 2:208: Perte par entrave illégale à une activité professionnelle ou commerciale (1) La perte causée à une personne par une entrave illégale à son exercice d’une profession ou d’une activité commerciale est un dommage juridiquement réparable. (2) La perte causée à un consommateur en raison d’une concurrence déloyale est un dommage juridiquement réparable, si cela est prescrit par le droit communautaire ou le droit national applicable.

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Article 2:209: Charges subies par l’Etat en raison de la détérioration de l’environnement Les charges subies par l’Etat ou les autorités compétentes en réparant les atteintes substantielles aux éléments naturels constitutifs de l’environnement, tels que l’air, l’eau, le sol, la flore et la faune sont des dommages juridiquement réparables pour l’Etat et les autorités concernées. Article 2:210: Perte par informations mensongères (1) Sans préjudice des autres dispositions de cette section, la perte causée à une personne par les informations mensongères d’une autre, résultant de paroles ou d’un comportement, est un dommage juridiquement réparable. (2) Une information est mensongère lorsqu’elle est faite en sachant ou en croyant qu’elle est fausse et qu’elle vise à induire en erreur son destinataire. Article 2:211: Perte par incitation à la rupture d’une obligation Sans préjudice des autres dispositions de cette section, la perte causée à une personne en incitant un tiers à rompre une obligation est un dommage juridiquement réparable seulement si: (a) l’obligation était due à la personne subissant la perte; et (b) la personne incitant à la rupture: (i) visait à la rupture de son obligation par le tiers, et (ii) n’agissait pas pour la protection légitime de son propre intérêt.

Chapitre 3: Imputabilité Section 1: Intention et négligence Article 3:101: Intention Une personne cause intentionnellement un dommage juridiquement réparable lorsqu’elle agit (a) avec l’intention de causer un dommage du type de celui qui a été causé; ou (b) par un comportement qu’elle entendait avoir, en sachant qu’un tel dommage ou un dommage de ce type serait ou serait presque certainement causé. Article 3:102: Négligence Une personne cause par négligence un dommage juridiquement réparable quant celle-ci cause un tel dommage par un comportement qui: (a) ne répond pas au degré particulier de diligence prescrit par une disposition légale visant à protéger la victime du dommage souffert; ou (b) ne correspond pas au degré de diligence qui pouvait être attendu d’une personne raisonnablement diligente dans les circonstances de l’espèce.

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Article 3:103: Personnes de moins de dix-huit ans (1) Le fait d’avoir causé un dommage, juridiquement réparable en application de l’article 3:102 (b), n’est imputable à une personne de moins de dix-huit ans, que dans la mesure où elle n’agit pas avec la diligence qui peut être attendue d’une personne raisonnablement diligente du même âge dans les circonstances de l’espèce. (2) Un enfant de moins de sept ans ne peut se voir imputer d’avoir, intentionnellement ou par négligence, causé un dommage. (3) Cependant les alinéas (1) et (2) ne sont pas applicables dans la mesure où (a) la victime ne peut pas obtenir réparation d’une autre personne en application de ce Livre (b) l’obligation de réparer serait équitable compte tenu des moyens financiers des parties et de toutes les autres circonstances de l’espèce. Article 3:104: Imputabilité des dommages causés par des enfants ou des personnes sous surveillance (1) Le dommage juridiquement réparable causé par le comportement d’une personne de moins de quatorze ans, qui aurait constitué une négligence s’il avait été le fait d’un majeur, est imputable à ses parents ou aux autres personnes tenues des obligations parentales. (2) Le dommage juridiquement réparable subi par un tiers est imputable à une institution ou un autre organisme tenu de surveiller une personne quand: (a) le dommage est un dommage corporel, une perte visée par l’article 2:202 ou un dommage aux biens; (b) la personne, que l’institution ou un autre organisme est tenu de surveiller, a intentionnellement ou par négligence causé ce dommage, ou, dans le cas d’une personne de moins de dix-huit ans, par un comportement qui aurait été intentionnel ou négligent s’il avait été le fait d’un majeur; et (c) il était probable que la personne qu’elle était tenue de surveiller causerait un dommage de ce type. (3) Cependant la survenance du dommage n’est pas, selon le présent article, imputable à une personne si elle prouve qu’il n’y a eu aucun défaut de surveillance de son auteur.

Section 2: Imputabilité sans comportement intentionnel ou négligence Article 3:201: Imputabilité des dommages causés par des employés ou représentants (1) La survenance du dommage juridiquement réparable subi par un tiers est imputable à une personne qui en emploie une autre ou l’engage de façon comparable quand la personne employée ou engagée (a) a causé le dommage dans l’exercice de ses fonctions, et (b) a causé intentionnellement ou par négligence le dommage, ou la survenance de celui-ci lui est imputable d’une autre façon. (2) L’alinéa (1) s’applique par analogie à une personne morale dans ses rapports avec un représentant qui cause un dommage dans l’exercice de ses fonctions. Un représentant est une personne habilitée à effectuer des actes juridiques au nom d’une personne morale en application de ses statuts. 84

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Article 3:202: Imputabilité du dommage causé par l’insécurité d’un immeuble (1) La survenance du dommage corporel et de la perte consécutive, de la perte visée par l’article 2:202 et de celle résultant d’un dommage aux biens (autre que l’immeuble lui-même), par suite d’un état de l’immeuble qui n’assure pas la sécurité qu’une personne à l’intérieur ou à proximité de celui-ci est en droit d’attendre, est imputable à celui qui exerce de façon indépendante un contrôle sur cet immeuble, compte tenu des circonstances incluant: (a) la nature de l’immeuble, (b) l’accès à l’immeuble et (c) le coût de prévention de cet état. (2) Une personne exerce, de façon indépendante, un contrôle sur un immeuble, quand ce contrôle est tel qu’il est raisonnable de lui imposer un devoir de prévenir la survenance d’un dommage juridiquement réparable en application du présent article. (3) Le propriétaire de l’immeuble est présumé exercer de façon indépendante un contrôle, à moins qu’il ne prouve qu’un autre exerce ce contrôle de façon indépendante. Article 3:203: Imputabilité du dommage causé par des animaux La survenance du dommage corporel et la perte consécutive, de la perte visée par l’article 2:202 et de celle résultant d’un dommage aux biens, causée par un animal est imputable au gardien de celui-ci. Article 3:204: Imputabilité d’un dommage du fait de produits défectueux (1) La survenance d’un dommage corporel et de la perte consécutive, d’une perte prévue à l’article 2:202 et de la perte résultant d’un dommage aux biens (autre qu’au produit lui-même), causée par un défaut d’un produit, est imputable au producteur de celui-ci. (2) La survenance du dommage est imputable, au même titre que le producteur, à la personne qui a importé le produit dans l’Espace économique européen en vue d’une vente, location, leasing ou distribution dans le cadre de son activité commerciale. (3) La survenance du dommage est imputable, au même titre que le producteur, à un fournisseur si: (a) le producteur ne peut être identifié; ou (b) dans le cas d’un produit importé, ce produit n’indique pas l’identité de l’importateur (même si le nom du producteur est indiqué), à moins que le fournisseur n’indique à la personne lésée, dans un délai raisonnable, l’identité du producteur ou de celui qui lui a fourni le produit. (4) La survenance du dommage n’est pas imputable, en application du présent article, à une personne si elle prouve: (a) Qu’elle n’avait pas mis le produit en circulation; (b) qu’il y a lieu d’estimer que le défaut ayant causé le dommage n’existait pas au moment où elle a mis le produit en circulation; (c) qu’elle n’a ni fabriqué le produit pour la vente ou pour la distribution dans un but économique, ni fabriqué ou distribué le produit dans le cours de son activité professionnelle; (d) que le défaut est dû à la conformité du produit avec des règles impératives émanant des pouvoirs publics; (e) que l’état des connaissances scientifiques et techniques au moment de la mise en circulation du produit par cette personne n’a pas permis de déceler l’existence du défaut; ou 85

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(f) s’agissant du fabricant d’une partie composante, que le défaut est imputable: (i) à la conception du produit dans lequel la partie composante a été incorporée, ou (ii) aux instructions données par le fabricant du produit. (5) Le terme «producteur» désigne: (a) s’agissant d’un produit fini ou d’une partie composante, le fabricant; (b) s’agissant d’une matière première, la personne qui l’extrait; et (c) toute personne qui se présente comme producteur en apposant sur le produit son nom, sa marque ou un autre signe distinctif. (6) Le terme «produit» désigne tout meuble, même s’il est incorporé dans un autre meuble ou dans un immeuble, ou l’électricité. (7) Un produit est défectueux lorsqu’il n’offre pas la sécurité à laquelle on peut légitimement s’attendre, compte tenu de toutes les circonstances, et notamment: (a) de sa présentation; (b) de l’usage qui peut en être raisonnablement attendu; (c) du moment de sa mise en circulation, Toutefois un produit ne peut être considéré comme défectueux par le seul fait qu’un autre plus perfectionné a été mis en circulation postérieurement.

Article 3:205: Imputabilité du dommage causé par des véhicules terrestres à moteur (1) La survenance d’un dommage corporel et de la perte consécutive, de la perte prévue par l’article 2:202 et de celle résultant du dommage aux biens (autre qu’au véhicule et à son chargement), dans un accident de la circulation qui résulte de l’usage du véhicule, est imputable au gardien d’un véhicule terrestre à moteur. (2) Le terme «véhicule terrestre à moteur» désigne tout véhicule destiné aux voyages terrestres et actionné par une force mécanique, à l’exception des véhicules circulant sur des rails et des remorques mêmes attachées. Article 3:206: Imputabilité du dommage causé par des substances ou des émissions dangereuses (1) La survenance d’un dommage corporel et de la perte en résultant, de la perte prévue par l’article 2:202 et de celle résultant du dommage aux biens, ainsi que des charges prévues par l’article 2:209, causée par une substance ou des émissions d’une installation, est imputable au gardien de la substance ou à l’exploitant de l’installation, si: (a) compte tenu de la quantité et des caractéristiques de l’émission au moment de celle-ci ou, à défaut d’une émission, de la substance au moment du contact avec celle-ci, il est très probable que la substance ou l’émission cause un tel dommage, à défaut d’être contrôlée de manière adéquate, et (b) ce dommage résulte de la réalisation de ce danger. (2) Le terme «substance» inclut des produits chimiques (à l’état fixe, liquide ou gazeux). Les micro-organismes sont à traiter comme des substances. (3) Le terme «émission» inclut: (a) l’expulsion ou l’échappement de substances, (b) la conduction d’électricité, (c) la chaleur, la lumière et d’autres radiations, (d) le bruit et d’autres vibrations, et (e) d’autres influences incorporelles sur l’environnement. 86

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(4) Le terme «installation» inclut une installation mobile et une installation en construction ou hors d’usage. (5) En application du présent article, la survenance d’un dommage n’est pas imputable à une personne quand elle: (a) a la substance sous sa garde ou exploite l’installation pour des raisons qui ne touchent pas à son entreprise, son métier ou sa profession ; ou (b) prouve qu’il n’y avait aucun manquement aux normes légales de contrôle de la substance ou de gestion de l’installation.

Article 3:207: Imputabilités diverses de la survenance d’un dommage juridiquement réparable La survenance d’un dommage juridiquement réparable est imputable à une personne quand la législation nationale applicable (a) le prévoit à l’égard d’une source de danger non visée par les articles 3:104 à 3:205, (b) le prévoit à l’égard de substances ou d’émissions ou (c) écarte l’application de l’article 3:204 (4) (e). Article 3:208: Abandon Pour l’application de cette section, l’imputabilité à une personne qui a abandonné un immeuble, un véhicule, une substance ou une installation subsiste jusqu’à ce que qu’une autre en exerce le contrôle de façon indépendante ou en devienne le gardien ou l’exploitant. Cela s’applique par analogie au gardien d’un animal, dans la limite du raisonnable.

Chapitre 4: Causalité Article 4:101: Règle générale (1) Une personne cause à une autre un dommage juridiquement réparable quand celui-ci doit être considéré comme une conséquence de son comportement ou de la source de danger dont elle est responsable. (2) En cas de dommage corporel ou de décès, la prédisposition de la victime au type ou à l’étendue du dommage subi ne doit pas être prise en considération. Article 4:102: Collaboration Une personne qui participe avec une autre, l’incite ou l’aide matériellement à causer un dommage juridiquement réparable doit être considérée comme ayant causé celui-ci. Article 4:103: Pluralité de causes possibles Quand un dommage juridiquement réparable peut avoir été causé par l’un quelconque de plusieurs événements qui peuvent être imputés à différentes personnes et qu’il est établi qu’il a été causé par l’un de ces événements, sans que l’on sache lequel, chacune de celles à qui l’un de ces événements est imputable est présumée, sauf preuve contraire, avoir causé ce dommage.

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Chapitre 5: Moyens de défense Section 1: Consentement ou comportement de la victime Article 5:101: Consentement et fait d’agir à ses risques et périls (1) Une personne à un moyen de défense lorsque la victime a valablement consenti au dommage juridiquement réparable et qu’elle avait conscience ou aurait dû avoir conscience des conséquences de ce consentement. (2) La même règle s’applique lorsque la victime, en connaissance du risque de dommage du type causé, s’expose volontairement à celui-ci et doit être considérée comme l’ayant accepté. Article 5:102: Faute de la victime et imputabilité (1) Lorsque la victime contribue par sa propre faute à la réalisation ou à l’étendue du dommage juridiquement réparable, la réparation doit être réduite en fonction du degré de sa faute. (2) Ne doit pas être pris en considération: (a) une faute insignifiante de la victime; (b) une faute ou une imputabilité dont la contribution à la survenance du dommage est insignifiante; (c) un défaut de diligence de la victime ayant contribué à son dommage corporel causé par un véhicule terrestre à moteur dans un accident de la circulation, à moins que ce défaut ne constitue un manquement grave à la diligence évidemment requise dans les circonstances de l’espèce. (3) Les alinéas (1) et (2) s’appliquent par analogie quand une personne, dont la victime est responsable selon l’Article 3:201, contribue par sa faute à la réalisation ou l’étendue du dommage. (4) La réparation doit être réduite de la même manière si et dans la mesure où une autre source de danger dont la victime est responsable en application du Chapitre 3 contribue à la réalisation ou à l’étendue du dommage. Article 5:103 Dommage causé par un criminel à un complice Le dommage juridiquement réparable causé involontairement au cours d’une activité criminelle à une autre personne participant ou plus largement collaborant à cette activité ne fait pas naître un droit à réparation si cela est contraire à l’ordre public.

Section 2: Intérêts des personnes auxquelles un dommage est imputable ou des tiers Article 5:201: Pouvoir conféré par la loi Une personne dispose d’un moyen de défense lorsque le dommage est causé conformément aux pouvoirs conférés par la loi.

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Article 5:202: Légitime défense, gestion d’affaires et nécessité. (1) Une personne dispose d’un moyen de défense lorsqu’elle cause un dommage juridiquement réparable afin de protéger, dans les limites du raisonnable, un droit ou un intérêt méritant la protection de la loi, dont elle-même ou un tiers est le bénéficiaire, lorsque la mise en péril du droit ou de l’intérêt protégé est imputable à la victime de ce dommage. Pour l’application du présent alinéa, l’article 3:103 ne doit pas être pris en considération. (2) La même règle s’applique au dommage juridiquement réparable causé par un gérant d’affaires au maître de l’affaire sans violation de ses obligations de gérant. (3) Quand une personne cause un dommage juridiquement réparable au patrimoine d’une autre, dans une situation de danger imminent pour sa vie, son corps, sa santé ou sa liberté, afin de se sauver elle-même ou un tiers, et que ce danger ne peut être écarté sans causer le dommage, cette personne n’est pas tenue de réparer celui-ci au delà d’une compensation raisonnable. Article 5:203: Protection de l’intérêt public Une personne a un moyen de défense quand le dommage juridiquement réparable est causé pour la protection nécessaire des valeurs fondamentales d’une société démocratique, en particulier lorsque le dommage est causé par la diffusion d’informations dans les médias.

Section 3: Incapacité de contrôler Article 5:301: Incapacité mentale (1) Une personne mentalement incapable au moment du comportement causant un dommage juridiquement réparable n’est responsable que si cela est équitable, eu égard aux moyens financiers de cette personne et à toutes les autres circonstances de l’espèce. Sa responsabilité est limitée à une compensation raisonnable. (2) Une personne doit être considérée comme mentalement incapable lorsqu’elle est dépourvue d’une suffisante compréhension de la nature de son comportement, à moins que cela ne soit la conséquence temporaire de sa propre inconduite. Article 5:302: Evénement incontrôlable Une personne dispose d’un moyen de défense lorsque le dommage juridiquement réparable est causé par un événement anormal, qui ne peut être évité par aucune mesure raisonnable et qui ne doit pas être considéré comme un risque à sa charge.

Section 4: Exclusion et limitation contractuelle de responsabilité Article 5:401: Exclusion et limitation contractuelle de responsabilité (1) La responsabilité d’avoir causé intentionnellement un dommage juridiquement réparable ne peut être exclue ou limitée. (2) La responsabilité d’avoir causé un dommage juridiquement réparable par un manquement grave à la diligence manifestement requise dans les circonstances de l’espèce ne peut être exclue ou limitée

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(a) à l’égard d’un dommage corporel (y compris la mort) ou (b) lorsque l’exclusion ou la limitation est plus largement illégale ou contraire à la bonne foi. (3) La responsabilité fondée sur les dispositions de l’article 3:204 ne peut être exclue ou limitée. (4) Les autres responsabilités fondées sur ce Livre peuvent être exclues ou limitées à moins que la loi n’en dispose autrement.

Section 5: Perte au sens de l’Article 2:202 Article 5:501: Extension aux tiers des moyens de défense opposables à la victime elle-même Un moyen de défense, qui peut être opposé au droit à réparation de la victime d’un dommage corporel elle-même ou qui aurait pu lui être opposé si elle n’était pas morte, est également opposable à la personne subissant une perte selon l’article 2:202.

Chapitre 6: Réparations Section 1: Réparation en général Article 6:101: But et formes de réparation (1) La réparation est le rétablissement de la victime dans la situation où elle se serait trouvée en l’absence du dommage juridiquement réparable. (2) La réparation peut être faite en argent (compensation) ou autrement, tel que cela est le plus approprié compte tenu de la nature et de l’étendue du dommage subi et de toutes les autres circonstances de l’espèce. (3) Quant une chose matérielle est endommagée, une réparation en argent égale à sa dépréciation doit être accordée au lieu du coût de sa remise en état, lorsque celui-ci dépasserait de façon déraisonnable la perte de valeur. La présente règle ne s’applique aux animaux que si elle est appropriée en considération du but dans lequel l’animal était entretenu. (4) A la place du rétablissement visé par l’alinéa (1), mais seulement lorsque cela est raisonnable, la réparation peut prendre la forme d’une restitution, par la personne à laquelle est imputable la survenance du dommage juridiquement réparable, de tous les avantages obtenus par elle en relation avec le dommage causé. Article 6:102: Règle de minimis Un dommage insignifiant ne doit pas être pris en considération. Article 6:103: Compensation des pertes et des profits nés de l’événement dommageable (1) Les profits obtenus par la victime en conséquence de l’événement dommageable ne doivent pas être pris en considération, à moins qu’il ne soit juste et raisonnable de les prendre en compte.

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(2) Pour apprécier s’il serait juste et raisonnable de prendre en compte ces profits, il faut avoir égard à la nature du dommage subi, à la nature de l’imputabilité à l’auteur du dommage et, lorsque ces profits sont fournis par une tierce personne, au but de cette attribution de profits.

Article 6:104: Pluralité de victimes Lorsque plusieurs personnes ont subi un dommage juridiquement réparable et que la réparation accordée à l’une d’elles vaut également réparation pour une autre, les articles III.–4:201 – 207 s’appliquent, avec les adaptations appropriées, à leurs demandes en réparation. Article 6:105: Responsabilité solidaire Lorsque plusieurs personnes sont responsables d’un même dommage juridiquement réparable, elles sont tenues solidairement. Article 6:106: Cession d’actions La victime peut céder son action en réparation, y compris une action pour la réparation d’une perte extrapatrimoniale.

Section 2: Réparation en argent Article 6:201: Le droit de choisir de la victime La victime peut choisir de dépenser ou non l’argent de la réparation afin de rétablir ses intérêts lésés. Article 6:202: Réduction de responsabilité Quand cela est juste et raisonnable, une personne peut être relevée totalement ou partiellement de son obligation de réparer (en argent) si, lorsque le dommage n’a pas été causé intentionnellement, une pleine réparation serait disproportionnée par rapport à l’imputabilité à l’auteur du dommage, à l’étendue de celui-ci ou aux moyens de le prévenir. Article 6:203: Capitalisation et quantification (1) La réparation en argent doit être accordée sous la forme d’un capital, à moins d’une bonne raison exigeant des versements périodiques. (2) Le droit national applicable détermine comment doit être quantifiée la réparation en argent pour un dommage corporel et une perte extrapatrimoniale. Article 6:204: Réparation en argent de l’atteinte à un droit ou un intérêt en tant que telle L’atteinte en tant que telle doit être réparée en argent indépendamment de la réparation en argent pour perte patrimoniale ou extrapatrimoniale.

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Section 3: Prévention Article 6:301: Droit à prévention (1) Le droit à la prévention du dommage juridiquement réparable n’existe que dans la mesure où (a) la réparation ne serait pas un mode de substitution adéquat et (b) il est raisonnable pour la personne à laquelle serait imputable la survenance du dommage de prévenir sa réalisation. (2) Lorsque la source du danger est une chose ou un animal et qu’il n’est pas raisonnablement possible pour la personne en péril d’éviter celui-ci, le droit à la prévention inclut celui de voir écartée cette source de danger. Article 6:302: Responsabilité pour la perte subie en prévenant un dommage Une personne qui a raisonnablement exposé des frais ou supporté d’autres pertes afin de prévenir un dommage imminent à son encontre, ou afin de limiter l’étendue et la gravité d’un dommage subi par elle, a droit à une réparation en argent de la part de la personne à laquelle ce dommage aurait été imputable.

Chapitre 7: Règles accessoires Article 7:101: Droits constitutionnels nationaux Les dispositions du présent Livre doivent être interprétées et appliquées d’une façon compatible avec le droit constitutionnel du juge. Article 7:102: Dispositions législatives La loi nationale applicable détermine les dispositions légales qui sont législatives. Article 7:103: Les fonctions de droit public et les procédures judiciaires Le présent Livre ne régit pas la responsabilité d’une personne ou d’une institution naissant de l’exercice ou de l’omission d’exercer des fonctions publiques ou de l’accomplissement des devoirs de la mission judiciaire. Article 7:104: Responsabilité des employés, des employeurs et des syndicats ouvriers et patronaux. Le présent Livre ne régit pas la responsabilité (a) des employés (tant à l’égard des co-employés, que des employeurs ou des tiers) naissant dans leur activité professionnelle; (b) des employeurs envers leurs employés naissant dans leur activité professionnelle et (c) des syndicats ouvriers et d’employeurs naissant lors d’un conflit du travail. Article 7:105: Réduction ou exclusion de responsabilité à l’égard des personnes indemnisées Quand une personne est en droit d’obtenir d’une autre source la réparation totale ou partielle de son dommage, en particulier d’un assureur, d’un fonds ou d’une autre institution, la loi nationale détermine si, de ce fait, la responsabilité selon le présent Livre est ou non limitée ou exclue. 92

German1 Außervertragliche Haftung wegen eines einem anderen zugefügten Schadens Kapitel 1: Grundlegende Vorschriften Artikel 1:101: Grundregel (1) Eine Person, die einen rechtlich relevanten Schaden erleidet, hat Anspruch auf Schadensersatz gegen die Person, die den Schaden vorsätzlich oder fahrlässig verursacht hat oder die anderweitig für die Verursachung des Schadens verantwortlich ist. (2) Hat eine Person einen rechtlich relevanten Schaden weder vorsätzlich noch fahrlässig verursacht, ist sie für die Verursachung des Schadens nur nach Kapitel 3 verantwortlich. Artikel 1:102: Schadensabwendung Droht ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden, ist die Person, die den Schaden erleiden würde, nach diesem Buch berechtigt, ihn abzuwenden. Dieses Recht richtet sich gegen die Person, die für die Verursachung des Schadens verantwortlich wäre, wenn er entstünde. Artikel 1:103: Anwendungsbereich Artikel 1:101 und 1:102 (a) finden nur in Übereinstimmung mit den folgenden Vorschriften dieses Buchs Anwendung; (b) finden, soweit nicht anders bestimmt ist, sowohl auf juristische als auch auf natürliche Personen Anwendung; (c) finden keine Anwendung, insoweit ihre Anwendung dem Zweck anderer privatrechtlicher Vorschriften widerspräche; und (d) lassen Rechtsbehelfe, die auf anderen Rechtsgründen beruhen, unberührt.

Kapitel 2: Rechtlich relevanter Schaden Abschnitt 1: Allgemeines Artikel 2:101: Bedeutung des Begriffs rechtlich relevanter Schaden (1) Ein materieller oder immaterieller Verlust oder eine Verletzung ist ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden, wenn:

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Translated by Sandra Rohlfing (Osnabrück).

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(a) eine der folgenden Regeln dieses Kapitels dies vorsieht; (b) der Verlust oder die Verletzung auf den Eingriff in ein anderweitig von der Rechtsordnung gewährtes Recht zurückzuführen ist; oder (c) der Verlust oder die Verletzung auf den Eingriff in ein schutzwürdiges Interesse zurückzuführen ist. (2) In einem nur von Absatz (1) (b) oder (1) (c) geregelten Fall stellt ein Verlust oder eine Verletzung nur dann einen rechtlich relevanten Schaden dar, wenn die Gewährung eines Anspruchs auf Schadensersatz nach Artikel 1:101 oder auf Schadensabwendung nach Artikel 1:102 recht und billig wäre. (3) Bei der Entscheidung, ob die Gewährung eines Anspruchs auf Schadensersatz oder auf Schadensabwendung recht und billig wäre, sind der Grund der Verantwortlichkeit, die Art und die kausale Nähe des Schadens oder des drohenden Schadens, die vernünftigen Erwartungen der Person, die den Schaden erleidet oder erleiden würde, und allgemeine Gerechtigkeitsüberzeugungen zu berücksichtigen. (4) In diesem Buch (a) umfasst materieller Verlust den Verlust von Verdienst oder Gewinn, Aufwendungen sowie die Wertminderung von Vermögensgegenständen (b) umfasst immaterieller Verlust Schmerzen und die Beeinträchtigung der Lebensqualität.

Abschnitt 2: Einzelne rechtlich relevante Schäden Artikel 2:201: Verletzung von Körper oder Gesundheit und daraus folgender Verlust (1) Der Verlust, den eine natürliche Person infolge einer Körper- oder Gesundheitsverletzung erleidet, sowie die Verletzung als solche sind ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden. (2) In diesem Buch: (a) umfasst ein solcher Verlust die Behandlungs- und Pflegekosten sowie die Kosten, die diejenigen, die der verletzten Person nahestehen, angemessen aufwenden, um sich um sie zu kümmern; und (b) umfasst eine Körper- oder Gesundheitsverletzung die Verletzung der psychischen Gesundheit nur, wenn sie einen krankhaften Zustand erreicht. Artikel 2:202: Verlust, den Dritte aufgrund der Körper- oder Gesundheitsverletzung oder des Todes einer anderen Person erleiden (1) Ein immaterieller Verlust, den eine natürliche Person aufgrund der Körper- oder Gesundheitsverletzung oder des Todes eines anderen erleidet, ist ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden, wenn diese Person im Zeitpunkt der Verletzung in einer besonders nahen persönlichen Beziehung zu der verletzten Person steht. (2) Ist eine Person tödlich verletzt worden: (a) wird ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden, den ein Verstorbener wegen der Verletzung im Zeitpunkt des Todes hatte, ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden der Rechtsnachfolger des Verstorbenen; (b) sind angemessene Beerdigungskosten ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden der Person, die sie aufwendet; und

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(c) ist der Verlust von Unterhaltsleistungen ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden einer natürlichen Person, die der Verstorbene unterhielt oder der der Verstorbene gesetzlich unterhaltspflichtig gewesen wäre, wenn er nicht verstorben wäre, oder die der Verstorbene pflegte und finanziell unterstützte.

Artikel 2:203: Verletzung der Würde, Freiheit und Privatsphäre (1) Der Verlust, den eine natürliche Person aufgrund einer Verletzung ihres Rechts auf Achtung ihrer Würde, wie das Recht auf Freiheit und das Recht auf Privatsphäre, erleidet, sowie die Verletzung als solche sind ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden. (2) Der Verlust, den eine Person aufgrund einer Verletzung ihres guten Rufs erleidet, und die Verletzung als solche sind ebenfalls ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden, wenn das nationale Recht dies vorsieht. Artikel 2:204: Verlust wegen der Verbreitung falscher Informationen über einen Anderen Der Verlust, den eine Person aufgrund der Verbreitung von Informationen über sie erleidet, von denen die die Informationen verbreitende Person weiß oder wissen sollte, dass sie falsch sind, ist ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden. Artikel 2:205: Verlust wegen Vertrauensbruchs Der Verlust, den eine Person aufgrund der Verbreitung von Informationen erleidet, von denen die Person, die sie verbreitet, aufgrund der Art der Informationen oder der Umstände, unter denen sie sie erhielt, wusste oder wissen sollte, dass sie für die Person, die den Verlust erleidet, vertraulich sind, ist ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden. Artikel 2:206: Verlust wegen der Verletzung von Eigentum oder rechtmäßigem Besitz (1) Der Verlust, den eine Person aufgrund der Verletzung ihres Eigentumsrechts oder ihres rechtmäßigen Besitzes an einer beweglichen oder unbeweglichen Sache erleidet, ist ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden. (2) In diesem Artikel: (a) umfasst Verlust auch die vorenthaltene Nutzung des Eigentums; (b) umfasst die Verletzung eines Eigentumsrechts die Zerstörung oder körperliche Beschädigung des Gegenstandes, an dem das Recht besteht (Sachbeschädigung), die Verfügung über das Recht, die Beeinträchtigung der Nutzung und andere Störungen der Ausübung des Rechts. Artikel 2:207: Verlust wegen des Vertrauens auf fehlerhaften Rat oder fehlerhafte Information Der Verlust, den eine Person aufgrund einer Entscheidung erleidet, die sie in vernünftigem Vertrauen auf einen fehlerhaften Rat oder eine fehlerhafte Information trifft, ist ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden, wenn: (a) der Rat oder die Information von einer Person im Rahmen der Ausübung ihres Berufs oder Gewerbes gegeben wird; und (b) diese Person wusste oder hätte wissen sollen, dass der Empfänger auf den Rat oder die Information bei einer Entscheidung von der Art, wie sie getroffen wurde, vertrauen würde.

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Artikel 2:208: Verlust wegen unrechtmäßiger Beeinträchtigung der Berufsausübung oder des Gewerbebetriebs (1) Der Verlust, den eine Person aufgrund einer unrechtmäßigen Beeinträchtigung ihrer Berufsausübung oder ihres Gewerbebetriebs erleidet, ist ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden. (2) Der Verlust, den ein Verbraucher aufgrund unlauteren Wettbewerbs erleidet, ist ebenfalls ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden, wenn Gemeinschafts- oder nationales Recht dies vorsieht. Artikel 2:209: Aufwendungen des Staates wegen Umweltschäden Aufwendungen, die der Staat oder seine Einrichtungen zur Wiederherstellung wesentlich geschädigter natürlicher Umweltmedien wie Luft, Wasser, Boden, Flora und Fauna, machen, sind ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden des Staates bzw. der betroffenen staatlichen Einrichtung. Artikel 2:210: Verlust wegen arglistiger Täuschung (1) Unbeschadet der anderen Vorschriften dieses Abschnitts ist der Verlust, den eine Person aufgrund arglistiger Täuschung durch die Worte oder das Verhalten eines Anderen erleidet, ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden. (2) Eine Täuschung ist arglistig, wenn sie in dem Wissen oder der Überzeugung erfolgt, dass die Darstellung falsch ist, und darauf abzielt, beim Empfänger einen Irrtum zu erregen. Artikel 2:211: Verlust wegen der Verleitung zur Pflichtverletzung Unbeschadet der anderen Vorschriften dieses Abschnitts ist der Verlust, den eine Person deshalb erleidet, weil ein anderer eine dritte Person zu einer Pflichtverletzung verleitet, nur dann ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden, wenn: (a) die Pflicht gegenüber der Person bestand, die den Verlust erleidet; und (b) die Person, die zur Verletzung der Pflicht verleitet: (i) wollte, dass die dritte Person die Pflicht verletzt, und (ii) nicht zum legitimen Schutz ihrer eigenen Interessen handelte.

Kapitel 3: Verantwortlichkeit Abschnitt 1: Vorsatz und Fahrlässigkeit Artikel 3:101: Vorsatz Eine Person verursacht einen rechtlich relevanten Schaden vorsätzlich, wenn sie entweder: (a) beabsichtigte, einen Schaden der verursachten Art zu verursachen; oder (b) den Schaden durch ein willentliches Verhalten verursacht und weiß, dass ein solcher Schaden oder ein Schaden dieser Art verursacht werden wird oder so gut wie sicher verursacht werden wird. Artikel 3:102: Fahrlässigkeit Eine Person verursacht einen rechtlich relevanten Schaden fahrlässig, wenn sie den Schaden durch ein Verhalten verursacht, das entweder: (a) nicht der besonderen Sorgfalt genügt, die eine gesetzliche Vorschrift verlangt, deren Zweck der Schutz der geschädigten Person vor dem erlittenen Schaden ist, oder 96

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(b) nicht in anderer Weise der Sorgfalt genügt, die von einer angemessen umsichtigen Person in den Umständen des Einzelfalles erwartet werden kann.

Artikel 3:103: Personen unter Achtzehn (1) Eine Person unter achtzehn Jahren ist für die Verursachung eines rechtlich relevanten Schadens gemäß Artikel 3:102 (b) nur insoweit verantwortlich, als sie nicht die Sorgfalt walten lässt, die von einer angemessen umsichtigen Person dieses Alters in den Umständen des Einzelfalls erwartet werden kann. (2) Eine Person unter sieben Jahren ist weder für die vorsätzliche noch für die fahrlässige Verursachung eines rechtlich relevanten Schadens verantwortlich. (3) Absätze (1) und (2) finden keine Anwendung, insoweit (a) die geschädigte Person nicht von einem Anderen nach diesem Buch Schadensersatz erlangen kann, und (b) die Verpflichtung, Schadensersatz zu leisten, unter Berücksichtigung der finanziellen Verhältnisse der Parteien und allen anderen Umständen des Einzelfalls, recht und billig wäre. Artikel 3:104: Verantwortlichkeit für Schäden durch Kinder oder betreute Personen (1) Eltern oder andere Personen, die für Personen unter vierzehn Jahren gesetzlich zu elterlicher Sorge verpflichtet sind, sind für die Verursachung eines rechtlich relevanten Schadens verantwortlich, den die minderjährige Person durch ein Verhalten verursacht hat, das bei einem Erwachsenen als vorsätzlich oder fahrlässig zu bewerten wäre. (2) Ein Heim oder eine andere Einrichtung, die zur Betreuung einer Person verpflichtet ist, ist für die Verursachung eines rechtlich relevanten Schadens verantwortlich, den eine dritte Person erleidet, wenn: (a) der Schaden in einer Körper- oder Gesundheitsverletzung, einem Verlust nach Artikel 2:202 oder einer Sachbeschädigung besteht; (b) die Person, die das Heim oder die Einrichtung zu betreuen verpflichtet ist, den Schaden vorsätzlich oder fahrlässig verursacht hat, oder, im Falle einer Person unter achtzehn Jahren, den Schaden durch ein Verhalten verursacht hat, das bei einem Erwachsenen als vorsätzlich oder fahrlässig zu bewerten wäre; und (c) die zu betreuende Person eine Person ist, von der zu befürchten ist, dass sie einen Schaden dieser Art verursacht. (3) Eine Person ist nicht nach diesem Artikel für die Verursachung des Schadens verantwortlich, wenn sie beweist, dass die Betreuung der Person, die den Schaden verursacht hat, nicht fehlerhaft war.

Abschnitt 2: Verantwortlichkeit ohne Vorsatz oder Fahrlässigkeit Artikel 3:201: Verantwortlichkeit für Schäden durch Angestellte oder satzungsmäßig berufene Vertreter (1) Eine Person, die einen anderen anstellt oder in ähnlicher Weise beschäftigt, ist für die Verursachung eines rechtlich relevanten Schadens verantwortlich, den eine dritte Person erleidet, wenn der Angestellte oder Beschäftigte 97

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(a) den Schaden im Rahmen seiner Anstellung oder Beschäftigung verursacht hat, und (b) den Schaden vorsätzlich oder fahrlässig verursacht hat oder in anderer Weise für die Verursachung des Schadens verantwortlich ist. (2) Absatz (1) findet entsprechende Anwendung auf eine juristische Person hinsichtlich eines Vertreters, der den Schaden im Rahmen seiner Beschäftigung verursacht. Ein Vertreter ist eine Person, die kraft Satzung berechtigt ist, Rechtsgeschäfte für die juristische Person vorzunehmen.

Artikel 3:202: Verantwortlichkeit für Schäden durch den unsicheren Zustand eines Grundstücks (1) Eine Person, die die unabhängige Kontrolle über ein Grundstück innehat, ist verantwortlich für die Verursachung einer Körper- oder Gesundheitsverletzung sowie des daraus folgenden Verlustes, eines Verlustes nach Artikel 2:202 und eines Verlustes aufgrund einer Sachbeschädigung (mit Ausnahme des Schadens am Grundstück selbst), wenn diese Schäden auf einem Zustand des Grundstücks beruhen, der nicht die Sicherheit gewährleistet, die eine Person auf dem Grundstück oder in seiner Nähe unter Berücksichtigung der Umstände, insbesondere (a) der Art des Grundstücks, (b) des Zugangs zum Grundstück, und (c) der Kosten zur Vermeidung eines solchen Zustands des Grundstücks, erwarten darf. (2) Eine Person hat die unabhängige Kontrolle über ein Grundstück, wenn sie eine solche Kontrolle innehat, dass es angemessen ist, ihr die Pflicht aufzuerlegen, einen Schaden im Sinne dieses Artikels zu verhindern. (3) Als die Person, die die unabhängige Kontrolle innehat, ist der Eigentümer des Grundstücks anzusehen, es sei denn, er beweist, dass eine andere Person die unabhängige Kontrolle innehat. Artikel 3:203: Verantwortlichkeit für Schäden durch Tiere Der Halter eines Tieres ist verantwortlich für die Verursachung einer Körper- oder Gesundheitsverletzung sowie des daraus folgenden Verlustes, eines Verlustes nach Artikel 2:202 und eines Verlustes aufgrund einer Sachbeschädigung. Artikel 3:204: Verantwortlichkeit für Schäden durch fehlerhafte Produkte (1) Der Hersteller eines Produkts ist verantwortlich für die Verursachung einer Körper- oder Gesundheitsverletzung sowie des daraus folgenden Verlustes, eines Verlustes nach Artikel 2:202 und, gegenüber einem Verbraucher, eines Verlustes aufgrund einer Sachbeschädigung (mit Ausnahme des Schadens am Produkt selbst) durch einen Fehler des Produkts. (2) Eine Person, die das Produkt in den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum zum Zwecke des Verkaufs, der Vermietung, des Mietkaufs oder einer anderen Form des Vertriebs im Rahmen ihrer gewerblichen Tätigkeit eingeführt hat, ist entsprechend verantwortlich. (3) Ein Lieferant des Produkts ist entsprechend verantwortlich, wenn: (a) der Hersteller nicht festgestellt werden kann; oder (b) im Falle eines eingeführten Produkts der Importeur nicht angegeben ist (unabhängig davon, ob der Name des Herstellers angegeben ist), es sei denn, der Lieferant benennt der geschädigten Person innerhalb angemessener Zeit den Hersteller oder diejenige Person, die ihm das Produkt geliefert hat.

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(4) Eine Person ist nach diesem Artikel nicht verantwortlich für die Verursachung eines Schadens, wenn sie beweist, dass: (a) sie das Produkt nicht in den Verkehr gebracht hat; (b) davon auszugehen ist, dass der Fehler, der den Schaden verursacht hat, nicht vorlag, als das Produkt von ihr in den Verkehr gebracht wurde; (c) sie das Produkt weder für den Verkauf oder eine andere Form des Vertriebs mit wirtschaftlichem Zweck hergestellt noch im Rahmen ihrer gewerblichen Tätigkeit hergestellt oder vertrieben hat; (d) der Fehler darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass das Produkt verbindlichen hoheitlich erlassenen Normen entspricht; (e) der vorhandene Fehler nach dem Stand der Wissenschaft und Technik zu dem Zeitpunkt, zu dem er das betreffende Produkt in den Verkehr brachte, nicht erkannt werden konnte; (f) wenn es sich um den Hersteller eines Teilproduktes handelt, der Fehler (i) durch die Konstruktion des Produkts in welches das Teilprodukt eingearbeitet wurde, oder (ii) durch die Anleitungen des Herstellers des Produktes verursacht worden ist. (5) „Hersteller“ ist: (a) im Falle eines End- oder Teilprodukts der Hersteller; (b) im Falle eines Grundstoffs die Person, die ihn entnimmt oder gewinnt; und (c) eine Person die sich als Hersteller ausgibt, indem sie ihren Namen, ihr Warenzeichen oder ein anderes Erkennungszeichen auf dem Produkt anbringt. (6) „Produkt“ ist eine bewegliche Sache, auch wenn sie einen Teil einer anderen beweglichen Sache oder einer unbeweglichen Sache bildet, sowie Elektrizität. (7) Ein Produkt ist fehlerhaft, wenn es nicht die Sicherheit bietet, die man unter Berücksichtigung aller Umstände, insbesondere: (a) der Darbietung des Produkts, (b) des Gebrauchs des Produkts, mit dem billigerweise gerechnet werden kann; und (c) des Zeitpunkts, zu dem das Produkt in den Verkehr gebracht wurde, erwarten kann. Ein Produkt ist hingegen nicht allein deshalb fehlerhaft, weil später ein verbessertes Produkt in den Verkehr gebracht wurde.

Artikel 3:205: Verantwortlichkeit für Schäden durch Kraftfahrzeuge (1) Im Falle eines Verkehrsunfalls infolge der Nutzung eines Kraftfahrzeugs ist der Halter für die Verursachung einer Körper- oder Gesundheitsverletzung sowie des daraus folgenden Verlustes, eines Verlustes nach Artikel 2:202 und eines Verlustes aufgrund einer Sachbeschädigung (mit Ausnahme der Beschädigung des Kraftfahrzeugs und seiner Fracht) verantwortlich. (2) „Kraftfahrzeug“ ist jedes Fahrzeug, das zur Fortbewegung an Land dient und mechanisch angetrieben wird, jedoch keine Schienenfahrzeuge, und Anhänger, unabhängig davon, ob sie angekuppelt sind oder nicht. Artikel 3:206: Verantwortlichkeit für Schäden durch gefährliche Substanzen oder Emissionen (1) Der Halter einer Substanz oder der Betreiber einer Anlage ist verantwortlich für die Verursachung einer Körper- oder Gesundheitsverletzung sowie des daraus folgenden Verlustes, eines Verlustes nach Artikel 2:202, eines Verlustes aufgrund einer Sachbeschädigung und Aufwendungen im Sinne von Artikel 2:209, wenn: 99

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(2) (3)

(4) (5)

(a) es unter Berücksichtigung ihrer Menge und Eigenschaften im Zeitpunkt der Emission oder, wenn keine Emission vorliegt, zum Zeitpunkt des Kontakts mit der Substanz sehr wahrscheinlich ist, dass die Substanz oder die Emission einen solchen Schaden verursachen wird, wenn sie nicht unter angemessener Kontrolle steht, und (b) der Schaden auf der Verwirklichung dieses Risikos beruht. „Substanz“ umfasst Chemikalien (unabhängig davon, ob sie fest, flüssig oder gasförmig sind). Mikroorganismen sind als Substanzen zu behandeln. „Emissionen“ umfassen (a) die Freisetzung oder das Entweichen von Substanzen, (b) das Leiten von Strom, (c) Hitze, Licht und andere Strahlung, (d) Lärm und andere Vibrationen und (e) andere unkörperliche Einwirkungen auf die Umwelt. „Anlage“ umfasst sowohl eine bewegliche Anlage als auch eine Anlage im Bau oder eine Anlage, die nicht in Benutzung ist. Eine Person ist nicht verantwortlich für die Verursachung eines Schadens gemäß diesem Artikel, wenn sie: (a) nicht zu gewerblichen oder beruflichen Zwecken die Substanz hält oder die Anlage betreibt; oder (b) beweist, dass kein Verstoß gegen gesetzliche Regeln zur Kontrolle über die Substanz oder zum Betrieb der Anlage vorliegt.

Artikel 3:207: Weitere Verantwortlichkeit für die Verursachung eines rechtlich relevanten Schadens Eine Person ist ferner verantwortlich für die Verursachung eines rechtlich relevanten Schadens, wenn das nationale Recht dies vorsieht und es (a) sich auf eine Gefahrenquelle bezieht, die nicht von den Artikeln 3:104-3:205 erfasst ist, (b) sich auf Substanzen oder Emissionen bezieht, oder (c) die Anwendung von Artikel 3:204 (4) (e) ausschließt. Artikel 3:208: Aufgabe der Gefahrenquelle Im Sinne der Vorschriften dieses Abschnitts bleibt eine Person für ein Grundstück, ein Fahrzeug, eine Substanz oder eine Anlage, das bzw. die sie aufgegeben hat, solange verantwortlich, bis eine andere Person die unabhängige Kontrolle hierüber ausübt oder ihr Halter oder Betreiber wird. Soweit angemessen, gilt dies entsprechend für den Halter eines Tieres.

Kapitel 4: Verursachung Artikel 4:101: Allgemeine Regel (1) Eine Person verursacht einer anderen einen rechtlich relevanten Schaden, wenn der Schaden als Folge ihres Verhaltens oder als Folge einer Gefahrenquelle anzusehen ist, für die sie verantwortlich ist. (2) Bei Körper- oder Gesundheitsverletzung oder Tod ist die Prädisposition der verletzten Person hinsichtlich Art und Ausmaß der erlittenen Verletzung außer Acht zu lassen.

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Artikel 4:102: Beteiligung Eine Person, die sich an der Verursachung eines rechtlich relevanten Schadens als Mittäter beteiligt, hierzu anstiftet oder bei der Verursachung wesentliche Hilfe leistet, ist so zu behandeln, als ob sie den Schaden verursacht. Artikel 4:103: Alternativursachen Kann ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden von einem oder mehreren aus einer Anzahl von Ereignissen verursacht worden sein, für die verschiedene Personen verantwortlich sind, und steht fest, dass der Schaden von einem dieser Ereignisse verursacht worden ist, aber nicht von welchem, wird von jeder Person, die für eines der Ereignisse verantwortlich ist, widerleglich vermutet, dass sie den Schaden verursacht hat.

Kapitel 5: Verteidigungsgründe Abschnitt 1: Einwillung oder Verhalten der geschädigten Person Artikel 5:101: Einwilligung und Handeln auf eigenes Risiko (1) Eine Person hat einen Verteidigungsgrund, wenn die geschädigte Person wirksam in den rechtlich relevanten Schaden eingewilligt hat und sich der Folgen dieser Einwilligung bewusst ist oder bewusst sein sollte. (2) Dasselbe gilt, wenn die geschädigte Person das Risiko eines Schadens der verursachten Art kennt, sich freiwillig diesem Risiko aussetzt und so anzusehen ist, dass sie das Risiko akzeptiert. Artikel 5:102: Mitverschulden und Mitverantwortlichkeit (1) Hat die geschädigte Person durch eigenes Verschulden zu dem rechtlich relevanten Schaden oder seinem Ausmaß beigetragen, ist der Schadensersatz ihrem Verschulden entsprechend zu mindern. (2) Unbeachtlich sind jedoch: (a) ein unerhebliches Verschulden der geschädigten Person; (b) ein Verschulden oder eine Verantwortlichkeit, die nur unerheblich zur Verursachung des Schadens beigetragen haben; (c) der Mangel an Sorgfalt der verletzten Person, der zu ihrer von einem Kraftfahrzeug in einem Verkehrsunfall verursachten Körper- oder Gesundheitsverletzung beigetragen hat, es sei denn, die verletzte Person hat die Sorgfalt gröblich missachtet, die unter den Umständen offensichtlich erforderlich war. (3) Die Absätze (1) und (2) finden entsprechende Anwendung, wenn eine Person, für die die geschädigte Person im Sinne von Artikel 3:201 verantwortlich ist, durch eigenes Verschulden zu dem Schaden oder seinem Ausmaß beiträgt. (4) Der Schadensersatz in Geld ist ebenfalls zu mindern, insoweit eine andere Gefahrenquelle, für die die geschädigte Person nach Kapitel 3 verantwortlich ist, zu dem Schaden oder seinem Ausmaß beiträgt.

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Artikel 5:103: Durch anderen Beteiligten verursachter Schaden Der Ersatz eines rechtlich relevanten Schadens, der einem Mittäter oder einem Teilnehmer bei der Begehung einer Straftat unabsichtlich von einem anderen Mittäter oder Teilnehmer zugefügt wird, ist ausgeschlossen, wenn der Ersatz den guten Sitten widerspräche.

Abschnitt 2: Interessen der verantwortlichen Personen oder Dritter Artikel 5:201: Gesetzliche Berechtigung Eine Person hat einen Verteidigungsgrund, wenn ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden mit gesetzlicher Berechtigung verursacht worden ist. Artikel 5:202: Notwehr, Besorgung fremder Angelegenheiten und Notstand (1) Eine Person hat einen Verteidigungsgrund, wenn sie einen rechtlich relevanten Schaden bei der angemessenen Verteidigung ihres Rechts oder des Rechts eines Dritten oder bei der angemessenen Verteidigung ihres schutzwürdigen Interesses oder des schutzwürdigen Interesses eines Dritten verursacht, wenn die Person, die den rechtlich relevanten Schaden erleidet, für die Gefährdung des Rechts oder des geschützten Interesses verantwortlich ist. Artikel 3:103 ist bei der Anwendung dieses Absatzes außer Acht zu lassen. (2) Dasselbe gilt, wenn ein Geschäftsführer ohne Verletzung der Pflichten, die ihn als Geschäftsführer treffen, dem Geschäftsherrn einen rechtlich relevanten Schaden zufügt. (3) Fügt eine Person dem Vermögen einer anderen in einer Situation, in der eine Gefahr für Leben, Körper, Gesundheit oder Freiheit droht, einen rechtlich relevanten Schaden zu, um sich selbst oder einen Dritten zu retten, und konnte die Gefahr nicht ohne die Verursachung des Schadens beseitigt werden, haftet die Person, die den Schaden verursacht, nicht auf Schadensersatz, der über eine angemessene Entschädigung hinausgeht. Artikel 5:203: Schutz öffentlicher Interessen Eine Person hat einen Verteidigungsgrund, wenn sie zum notwendigen Schutz von Werten, die für eine demokratische Gesellschaft wesentlich sind, einen rechtlich relevanten Schaden verursacht, insbesondere, wo ein Schaden durch die Verbreitung von Informationen in den Medien verursacht wird.

Abschnitt 3: Unkontrollierbarkeit Artikel 5:301: Einsichtsunfähigkeit (1) Eine Person, die im Zeitpunkt des Verhaltens, das den rechtlich relevanten Schaden verursacht, einsichtsunfähig ist, haftet nur, wenn dies unter Berücksichtigung der finanziellen Verhältnisse der einsichtsunfähigen Person sowie aller anderen Umstände des Einzelfalls recht und billig ist. Die Haftung ist auf eine angemessene Entschädigung beschränkt. (2) Eine Person ist als einsichtsunfähig anzusehen, wenn ihr die hinreichende Einsicht in die Art ihres Verhaltens fehlt, es sei denn, der Mangel an Einsicht ist ein vorübergehendes Ergebnis ihres eigenen Fehlverhaltens.

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Artikel 5:302: Unabwendbares Ereignis Eine Person hat einen Verteidigungsgrund, wenn ein rechtlich relevanter Schaden von einem abnormen Ereignis verursacht worden ist, das durch keine angemessene Maßnahme abgewendet werden kann und das nicht als das Risiko dieser Person anzusehen ist.

Abschnitt 4: Ausschluss und Beschränkung der Haftung durch Vertrag Artikel 5:401: Ausschluss und Beschränkung der Haftung durch Vertrag (1) Die Haftung für die vorsätzliche Verursachung eines rechtlich relevanten Schadens kann weder ausgeschlossen noch beschränkt werden. (2) Die Haftung für die Verursachung eines rechtlich relevanten Schadens aufgrund gröblicher Missachtung der Sorgfalt, die nach den Umständen des Einzelfalls offensichtlich erforderlich ist, kann nicht ausgeschlossen oder begrenzt werden (a) hinsichtlich einer Körper- oder Gesundheitsverletzung (einschließlich tödlicher Verletzungen), oder (b) wenn der Ausschluss oder die Beschränkung in anderer Weise ungesetzlich ist oder gegen Treu und Glauben und den redlichen Geschäftsverkehr verstößt. (3) Die Haftung kann nicht ausgeschlossen oder beschränkt werden für den Fall, dass eine Person für die Verursachung des Schadens nach Artikel 3:204 verantwortlich ist. (4) Jede andere Haftung nach diesem Buch kann ausgeschlossen oder beschränkt werden, es sei denn, dass ein Gesetz etwas anderes bestimmt.

Abschnitt 5: Verlust nach Artikel 2:202 Art.: 5:501: Ausdehnung der Verteidigungsgründe gegenüber der verletzten Person auf Dritte Ein Verteidigungsgrund, der gegenüber dem Recht einer Person auf Schadensersatz wegen der Verletzung des Körpers oder der Gesundheit dieser Person geltend gemacht werden kann oder, wäre der Tod nicht eingetreten, hätte geltend gemacht werden können, kann auch gegen eine Person geltend gemacht werden, die einen Verlust nach Artikel 2:202 erleidet.

Kapitel 6: Rechtsbehelfe Abschnitt 1: Schadensersatz Artikel 6:101: Ziel und Arten des Schadensersatzes (1) Schadensersatz soll für die Person, die den rechtlich relevanten Schaden erleidet, die Situation wiederherstellen, in der sie sich befände, wenn der rechtlich relevante Schaden nicht eingetreten wäre.

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(2) Schadensersatz kann in Geld oder in anderer Weise erfolgen, je nachdem, was unter Berücksichtigung der Art und des Ausmaßes des erlittenen Schadens sowie aller anderen Umstände des Einzelfalls angemessen ist. (3) Ist ein körperlicher Gegenstand beschädigt worden, ist statt der Kosten für die Reparatur Schadensersatz in Geld entsprechend ihrer Wertminderung zu gewähren, wenn die Reparaturkosten die Wertminderung unangemessen übersteigen. Diese Regel findet auf Tiere nur dann Anwendung, wenn dies unter Berücksichtigung des Zweckes, zu dem das Tier gehalten wurde, sachgerecht ist. (4) Alternativ zur Wiederherstellung nach Absatz (1) kann der Schadensersatz, allerdings nur, wenn dies angemessen ist, auch darin bestehen, dass die Person, die für die Verursachung des rechtlich relevanten Schadens verantwortlich ist, jedweden Vorteil, den sie in Zusammenhang mit der Verursachung des Schadens erlangt hat, erstattet.

Artikel 6:102: De minimis Regel Bedeutungsloser Schaden ist außer Acht zu lassen. Artikel 6:103: Vorteilsausgleichung (1) Vorteile, welche die Person, die den rechtlich relevanten Schaden erleidet, aufgrund des schädigenden Ereignisses erlangt, sind außer Betracht zu lassen, es sei denn, es ist recht und billig, sie zu berücksichtigen. (2) Bei der Beurteilung, ob es recht und billig ist, die Vorteile zu berücksichtigen, sind die Art des erlittenen Schadens und der Verantwortlichkeit der Person, die den Schaden verursacht, sowie, wenn die Vorteile von einem Dritten gewährt worden sind, der Zweck der Gewährung zu beachten. Artikel 6:104: Mehrere Geschädigte Haben mehrere Personen einen rechtlich relevanten Schaden erlitten und führt der Ersatz des Schadens einer Person auch zum Ersatz des Schadens einer anderen, so finden auf ihre Schadensersatzansprüche III.–4:201-207 entsprechende Anwendung. Artikel 6:105: Gesamtschuldnerische Haftung Sind für denselben rechtlich relevanten Schaden mehrere Personen verantwortlich, so haften sie als Gesamtschuldner. Artikel 6:106: Abtretung von Ansprüchen Die geschädigte Person kann den Anspruch auf Schadensersatz abtreten, einschließlich des Anspruchs auf Ersatz von immateriellem Verlust.

Abschnitt 2: Schadensersatz in Geld Artikel 6:201: Wahlrecht der geschädigten Person Die geschädigte Person kann wählen, ob sie das zum Ersatz des Schadens dienende Geld für die Wiederherstellung ihres beschädigten Interesses ausgeben will oder nicht.

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Artikel 6:202: Minderung der Haftung Wenn es recht und billig ist, kann einer Person die Haftung ganz oder teilweise erlassen werden, wenn der Schaden nicht vorsätzlich verursacht worden ist und die vollständige Haftung im Verhältnis zur Verantwortlichkeit der Person, die den Schaden verursacht, oder im Verhältnis zum Ausmaß des Schadens oder den Mitteln zu seiner Abwendung unverhältnismäßig wäre.

Artikel 6:203: Kapitalisierung und Bemessung (1) Schadensersatz in Geld ist in einer Summe zu gewähren, es sei denn, dass ein guter Grund Ratenzahlung erfordert. (2) Nationales Recht legt fest, wie der Schadensersatz in Geld für Körper- und Gesundheitsverletzungen und immateriellen Verlust zu bemessen ist. Artikel 6:204: Ersatz für die Verletzung als solche Für die Verletzung als solche ist unabhängig von dem Ersatz für materiellen oder immateriellen Verlust Schadensersatz in Geld zu leisten.

Abschnitt 3: Schadensabwendung Artikel 6:301: Recht auf Schadensabwendung (1) Das Recht auf Schadensabwendung besteht nur insoweit wie (a) Schadensersatz kein angemessener alternativer Rechtsbehelf wäre; und (b) es für die Person, die für die Verursachung des Schadens verantwortlich wäre, nicht unzumutbar ist, ihn abzuwenden. (2) Ist die Gefahrenquelle ein Gegenstand oder ein Tier und ist es der gefährdeten Person nicht angemessen möglich, die Gefahr zu vermeiden, beinhaltet das Recht auf Schadensabwendung auch das Recht, die Gefahrenquelle beseitigen zu lassen. Artikel 6:302: Haftung für Verlust bei Schadensabwendung Eine Person, die angemessene Aufwendungen gemacht oder anderen Verlust erlitten hat, um einen drohenden Schaden von sich abzuwenden oder um das Ausmaß oder die Schwere eines eingetretenen Schadens zu begrenzen, hat Anspruch auf Schadensersatz in Geld gegen die Person, die für die Verursachung des Schadens verantwortlich gewesen wäre.

Kapitel 7: Ergänzende Regeln Artikel 7:101: Nationales Verfassungsrecht Die Vorschriften dieses Buches sind in Übereinstimmung mit dem Verfassungsrecht des Staates auszulegen und anzuwenden, in dem das angerufene Gericht seinen Sitz hat. Artikel 7:102: Gesetzliche Vorschriften Nationales Recht bestimmt, welche rechtlichen Vorschriften gesetzliche sind.

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Artikel 7:103: Hoheitliche Aufgaben und Gerichtsverfahren Dieses Buch regelt nicht die Haftung einer Person oder einer Körperschaft, die aus der Erfüllung oder Nichterfüllung hoheitlicher Aufgaben oder aus der Erfüllung oder Nichterfüllung von Pflichten im Rahmen eines Gerichtsverfahrens entsteht. Artikel 7:104: Haftung von Arbeitnehmern, Arbeitgebern, Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgeberverbänden Dieses Buch regelt nicht die Haftung von (a) Arbeitnehmern (unabhängig davon, ob gegenüber einem anderen Arbeitnehmer, Arbeitgebern oder Dritten), die im Zuge der Erbringung der Arbeitsleistung entsteht, (b) Arbeitgebern gegenüber Arbeitnehmern, die im Rahmen des Arbeitsverhältnisses entsteht, und (c) Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgeberverbänden, die im Rahmen eines Arbeitskampfes entsteht. Artikel 7:105: Minderung oder Ausschluss der Haftung gegenüber entschädigten Personen Hat eine Person Anspruch auf teilweisen oder vollen Ersatz ihres Schadens aus einer anderen Quelle, insbesondere gegenüber einer Versicherung, einem Fonds oder einer anderen Einrichtung, bestimmt das nationale Recht, ob wegen dieses Anspruchs die Haftung nach diesem Buch beschränkt oder ausgeschlossen ist.

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Greek1 ¯øıÆØŒ ıŁ Å ªØÆ Å ÇÅÆ ı æ ŒºŁÅŒ   Æ ºº

˚çºÆØ 1: ¨ºØØ ØÆØæ ¢æŁæ 1:101: ´ÆØŒ ØÆÅ (1) ‚Æ æø ı ıç  Æ ÆØ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ åØ ØŒÆ øÆ ÆÇÅ øÅ Æ Ø

ı æøı ı 挺 Å ÇÅ Æ  º Å Æ Æ ºØÆ Å    ªØÆ ºº ºª  ÆØ ıŁı ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ Å ÇÅ Æ. (2) ¯ Æ æø  挺 ØÆ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ    º    Æ ºØÆ,  ÆØ ıŁı ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ Å ÇÅ Æ  çøÆ   ˚çºÆØ 3. ¢æŁæ 1:102: —æºÅłÅ Å ÇÅÆæ …ı  ŒØ ÆØ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ Ææ åØ  غ  Æı    æø ı ŁÆ ıç  Æ  Å ÇÅ Æ ØŒÆ øÆ ªØÆ Å Æ æ Å.  ØŒÆ øÆ Æı   æ ç ÆØ Æ 

ı æøı     ŁÆ ŒÆ ƺªØÇ Æ Å ÇÅ Æ  Æı æå Æ. ¢æŁæ 1:103: — çÆæ ªæ Æ æŁæÆ 1:101 ŒÆØ 1:102 (Æ) æ Œı çÆæª   ııÆ  Ø ÆŒºıŁ ØÆ Ø Æı  ı ŒçÆºÆ ı () æ Œı çÆæª ç  æ Ç ÆØ Œ Ø ØÆçæ ØŒ   ØŒ  ŒÆØ  çıØŒ æøÆ (ª)  æ Œı çÆæª ç Å çÆæª ı ŁÆ æ Œæı   Œ ººø ØÆ ø ØØø ØŒ ØŒÆ ı ()  Ł ªı ØŒÆ ÅŁ Æ Æ  ÅæØÇÆ  ººÅ ØŒ Å

˚çºÆØ 2: ˝ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅÆ ¯ Å Æ 1: ˆ ØŒ ØÆØæ ¢æŁæ 2:101: ‚

ØÆ Å

ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅÆæ (1) ØÆ ÇÅ Æ   ıºØŒ   Å ıºØŒ Å ØÆ ºÅ  ÆØ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ, : (Æ) ŒØÆ Æ Ø ÆŒºıŁ ØÆ Ø Æı  ı ŒçÆºÆ ı  æº Ø

1

Translated by Dr. Evlalia Eleftheriadou (Osnabrück).

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() Å ÇÅ Æ Å ºÅ Æææ ı Æ Å æº  ØŒÆØÆ     Ææ å ÆØ Æ Å Å Å, (ª) Å ÇÅ Æ Å ºÅ Æææ ı Æ Å æº  ı ıç æ æ (2)  Ø æØ Ø ı æıŁ Ç ÆØ Æ Ø Ææƪæçı (1) () ŒÆØ (1) (ª) ıØ  ØÆ ÇÅ Æ ºÅ    ØÆ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ, ç Å Ææå  ØŒÆØÆ  æ ÆÇÅ øÅ çøÆ   æŁæ 1:101 æ æºÅłÅ çøÆ   æŁæ 1:102 çÆ Ç ÆØ ø  ŒÆØÅ ŒÆØ ºªÅ. (3) ˚Æ  Å Œæ Å  Å Ææå  ØŒÆØÆ  æ ÆÇÅ øÅ Å æ æºÅłÅ çÆ Ç ÆØ ø  ŒÆØÅ ŒÆØ ºªÅ æ Ø Æ ºÅçŁ ıłÅ  ºª ªØÆ Å ııŁı Å Æ,    ŒÆØ Å ÆØ ØÅ ªª Å Æ Å ÇÅ Æ Å Å ØŒ Å ÇÅ Æ, Ø ºª æŒ  ı æı ı ı  Å Å ŁÆ ıç  Æ  Å ÇÅ Æ ŒÆØ Ø ªØŒ  Æ غ łØ æ ØŒÆ ı. (4)  Æı   غ  (Æ) Å ıºØŒ ÇÅ Æ æغÆØ Å ÆºØÆ Ø Æ  Å Œ æı, Æ ŒÆŁ ŒÆØ

Å  øÅ Å Æ Æ æØıØÆŒ  Øå ø () Å Å ıºØŒ ÇÅ Æ æغÆØ Å Å ŒÆØ Å æº Å Ø Å Æ Çø .

¯ Å Æ 2: N ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅæ ¢æŁæ 2:201: ´ºÅ  ı Æ  Å Å ıªÆ ŒÆØ  ÆŒº ıŁÅ ÇÅÆ (1) ˙ ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ çıØŒ æø ø Æ

ºÆ ØÆ ºÅ ı Æ  Å Å ıª Æ ŒÆŁ ŒÆØ Å ºÅ ŒÆŁÆı ıØ  ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ. (2)  Æı   غ  (Æ) ØÆ

ØÆ ÇÅ Æ æغÆØ Æ  ºØÆ ŒÆØ Æ Æ ı ºªÆ ÆÅÆ Ø ØŒ Ø ªØÆ Å çæ Æ ı ÆŁ æ () Å ºÅ ı Æ  Å Å ıª Æ æغÆØ Å ºÅ Å łıåØŒ  ıª Æ,   Æı æºÆØ ØÆ Ø ÆŁ ØÆ. ¢æŁæ 2:202: ˘ÅÆ ı ıçÆ ÆØ æ Ø ÆØÆ Å ºÅ  ı Æ  Å Å ıªÆ Å  ı ŁÆ  ı   ºº ı (1) ˙ Å ıºØŒ ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ çıØŒ æø ÆØ Æ Å ºÅ ı Æ  Å Å ıª Æ Å ı ŁÆ ı  ººı  ÆØ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ  Æı 

 æø ŒÆ   åæ Å ºÅ æØŒ Æ  ØÆ ØØÆ æÆ   æøØŒ å Å   ÆŁ Æ. (2) ¯ Æ æø æÆıÆ  ÅŒ ŁÆØÆ (Æ) ª  ÆØ Å ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ ı  å  ÆŁÆ ÆØ Æ Å ºÅ ŒÆ   åæ ı ŁÆ ı ı ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ ø ØÆåø ı. () Æ Æ ŒÅ Æ  ÆØ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ ı æøı ı Æ ŒÆ

ƺ, ŒÆØ (ª) ŠƺØÆ Ææå ØÆ æç   ÆØ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ  çıØŒ æı

   Ø æç  ÆŁÆ Å Æ Ø ı  ı ŁÆ Æ  ÆŁÆ ıåæ ŒÆ    æ ØÆ æç   æå Æ  ŁÆ  Å    çæ ØÇ ŒÆØ ı æØÇ ØŒØŒ  ÆŁÆ.

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Greek. ¯øıÆ ØŒ ıŁÅ ªØÆ Å ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ ºº

¢æŁæ 2:203: —æ  º Å ÆØ æ ØÆ, Å ºıŁæÆ ŒÆØ Å ØØøØŒ Çøæ (1) ˙ ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ çıØŒ æø ÆØ Æ Å æº  ı ØŒÆØÆ  ı æ Æ Å ÆØæ ØÆ ı ø  ØŒÆ øÆ Å ºıŁæ Æ ŒÆØ  ØŒÆ øÆ Å ØØø ØŒ  Çø  ŒÆŁ ŒÆØ Å æº ŒÆŁÆı ıØ  ØÆ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ. (2) ˙ ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ æø ÆØ Æ Å æº  Å ŒÆº  ı ç Å ŒÆŁ ŒÆØ Å æº ŒÆŁÆı ıØ   Å ØÆ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ ç  ŁØŒ  ŒÆØ  æº Ø. ¢æŁæ 2:204: ˘ÅÆ ÆØÆ Å Ø Å łı

ºÅæ ç æØ ªØÆ  Æ ºº

˙ ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ æø ÆØ Æ Å ØÅ ºÅæçæØ å ØŒ   æø Æı  ªØÆ Ø    ØÆ ø Ø ºÅæçæ  ªæØÇ Æ ºªÆ ÆÆ Æ ªøæ ÇØ  Ø  ÆØ łı  ıØ  ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ. ¢æŁæ 2:205: ˘ÅÆ ÆØÆ ÆæÆÆÅ  Ø  Åæ ˙ ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ æø ÆØ Æ Å ØÅ ºÅæçæØ ªØÆ Ø    ØÆ ø ªæØÇ Æ ºªÆ ÆÆ Æ ªøæ ÇØ  łØ ı  ı ø ºÅæçæØ Å ø ıŁÅŒ ı Ø   Ø ºÆ  Ø Æı

  ÆØ Ø ı ØŒ  ªØÆ

 æø ı ıç  Æ ÆØ Å ÇÅ Æ ıØ  ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ. ¢æŁæ 2:206: ˘ÅÆ ÆØÆ æ  º Å ØØ ŒÅÆ Å 

Å

æ (1) ˙ ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ æø ÆØ Æ Å æº  ı ØŒÆØÆ  ØØŒ Å Æ ı Å Å   ı  Æ ŒØÅ  Å ÆŒ Å  æªÆ ıØ  ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ. (2)  Æı   æŁæ (Æ) Å ÇÅ Æ æغÆØ ŒÆØ Å ÆæÆŒæ ÅÅ Å åæ Å Å ØØŒ Å Ææ () Å æº ı ØŒÆØÆ  Å ØØŒ Å Æ æغÆØ Å ŒÆ Æ æç ºÅ

ı Æ ØŒØ ı     ıç  Æ ÆØ  ØŒÆ øÆ (çŁæ  Å ØØŒ Å Ææ), Å ØŁÅ ı ØŒÆØÆ , Å æº Å åæ Å ŒÆØ ºº ØÆ ÆæØ Å ŒÅÅ ı ØŒÆØÆ . ¢æŁæ 2:207: ˘ÅÆ ÆØÆ  Ø  Å  ºÆ ŁÆ Å ı ıº  ºÆ ŁÆ Å ºÅæ ç æÆ ˙ ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ æø ÆØ Æ Å º łÅ ÆçÆÅ ŒÆ Ø ıºªı Ø Å  ºÆŁÆ Å ııº ºÆŁÆ Å ºÅæçæ Æ ıØ  ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ,  (Æ) Å ııº Å ºÅæçæ Æ ŁÅŒ Æ Æ æø  Æ ºÆ ØÆ Å ŒÅÅ ı ƪª ºÆ  ı Ø ÅÆ  ı, ŒÆØ ()  æø ªæØÇ Æ ºªÆ ÆÆ Æ ªøæ ÇØ  Ø   Œ Å ŁÆ ÆØÇ Æ  Å ııº ºÅæçæ Æ ŒÆ  Å º łÅ ı  ı Å ÆçÆÅ ı æŁÅ.

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¢æŁæ 2:208: ˘ÅÆ ÆØÆ ØŒÅ æ  º Å ŒÅÅ  ƪªºÆ  ŒÆØ  ØåæÅÅæ (1) ˙ ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ æø ÆØ Æ ØŒÅ æº  Å ŒÅÅ ı ƪª ºÆ  Å Øå æÅÅ ı ıØ  ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ. (2) ˙ ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ ŒÆ Æƺø ÆØ Æ ÆŁ Ø ı Æ ƪøØ ıØ  ØÅ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ  Æı  æº  ÆØ Æ  ˚Ø ØŒ Å  ŁØŒ  ŒÆØ. ¢æŁæ 2:209: ˜Æ    ı Œæ ı ÆØÆ æØƺº ØŒ ÇÅØ

˜Æ ı ŒØ  Œæ  Ø ÆæØ Ææå  ªØÆ Å ÆŒÆ  ÆÅ ıØø ºÆ

ø çıØŒ  Øå ø ı Æ º  æغº, ø  Æ æÆ,  æ,  Æç, Å Æ Æ ŒÆØ Å åºøæ Æ ıØ  ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ ı Œæ ı ø ÆæØø Ææå. ¢æŁæ 2:210: ˘ÅÆ ÆØÆ ºØÆ ÆæÆ ºÆ ÅØŒ Ææ ıÆÅæ (1) `æ Å Æ Æ ºº ØÆ Ø Æı  Å  Å Æ ıØ  Å ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ æø ÆØ Æ ºØÆ ÆæƺÆÅ ØŒ  Ææı ÆÅ  ø ı ºªı Å ıæØçæ  ººı ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ. (2) ˙ ÆæƺÆÅ ØŒ Ææı ÆÅ  ÆØ ºØÆ  Æ ª  ÆØ  Å ªÅ  Å  ŁÅÅ  Ø Å Ææı ÆÅ  ÆØ çƺ Å ŒÆØ åØ Æ  å Æ ÅØıæª Ø    Œ Å Å ØÆ ºÅ. ¢æŁæ 2:211: ˘ÅÆ ÆØÆ Å Æææı Å æ  ÆŁÅÅ ı åæøÅæ `æ Å Æ Æ ºº ØÆ Ø Æı  Å  Å Æ ıØ  Å ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ 

Æ æø ÆØ Æ Å Ææ æıÅ ŒØı æ Æ æØ  ªØÆ ÆŁ ÅÅ ıåæ øÅ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ  : (Æ) Å ıåæ øÅ ıç  Æ  Æ Ø ı æı ı ı  Å Å ÇÅ Æ ŒÆØ ()  æø ı Ææ æı æ ÆŁ ÅÅ ıåæ øÅ: (Ø) Łº Æ ÆŁ Ø  æ  Å ıåæ øÅ, ŒÆØ (ØØ)  æª ªØÆ Å æ Æ Æ  ø ıçæ ø ı.

˚çºÆØ 3:  ıŁı ÅÆ ¯ Å Æ 1: ˜º  ŒÆØ ÆºØÆ ¢æŁæ 3:101: ˜º  ‚Æ æø æŒÆº ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ  º  Æı   æø  : (Æ)  å æŁÅ Æ æŒÆº Ø ÇÅ Æ ı  ı ı 挺 ŁÅŒ () æŒÆº Å ÇÅ Æ  ÅŁºÅ Å ıæØçæ ªøæ Ç Æ  Ø ØÆ

ØÆ ÇÅ Æ ØÆ ÇÅ Æ Æı  ı  ı ŁÆ æŒºÅŁ å  ÆØ Å Æ æŒØ ÆØ Æ æŒºÅŁ .

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Greek. ¯øıÆ ØŒ ıŁÅ ªØÆ Å ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ ºº

¢æŁæ 3:102: `ºØÆ ‚Æ æø æŒÆº ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ  Æ ºØÆ  Æ æŒÆº Å ÇÅ Æ  ıæØçæ Å  Æ  : (Æ)  ÆæŒ  Ø ıªŒŒæØ  ÆÆØ Ø Ø ºØÆ æº Æ ØÆ Ø ÆÅ ı Å  Æ Œ  ÆØ Å æ Æ Æ ı æøı ı ı  Å Å ÇÅ Æ Æ Æı Å ÇÅ Æ () ŒÆ  ºº æ  ºÅæ Å Ø ºØÆ Å  Æ ÆÆ  ÆØ Æ Æ ÆæŒ æŒ ØŒ æø  Ø æØ Ø Å Æ ØŒ  æ  øÅ. ¢æŁæ 3:103: —æø Æ Œø ø ŒÆ å 

(1) ‚Æ æø Œ ø ø ŒÆå     ÆØ    ıŁı ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ  ÇÅ Æ çøÆ   æŁæ 3:102 ()   æÅ Å Ø ºØÆ ı ÆÆ  ÆØ Æ Æ ÆæŒ æŒ ØŒ æø Æı  Å ź، Æ  Ø æØ Ø Å Æ ØŒ  æ  øÅ. (2) ‚Æ æø Œ ø ø       ÆØ ıŁı   ªØÆ Å ºØÆ   ªØÆ Å Æº 挺ÅÅ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ  ÇÅ Æ. (3) ˇØ ÆæªæÆçØ (1) ŒÆØ (2)  æ Œı çÆæª , ç (Æ)  ÇÅØøŁ   æ Æ ºØ ÆÇÅ øÅ Æ ŒØ ºº çøÆ   Ææ غ  ŒÆØ () Å ıŁÅ æ ÆÇÅ øÅ ŁÆ Æ ºÆÆ ø ıłÅ Š،،  ŒÆ  ÆÅ ø æ ŒÆØ ºø ø ıŁÅŒ Å Æ ØŒ  æ  øÅ  ŒÆØÅ. ¢æŁæ 3:104:  ıŁı ÅÆ ªØÆ ÇÅÆ ı æ ŒºŁÅŒ Æ  ÆØØ Å Æ   Æ ı º ı   ØæÅÅ (1) ˆ  Å ººÆ æøÆ ı  ÆØ ŒÆ    ıåæÆ ªØÆ Å ªØŒ  æØÆ æø Œ ø ø ŒÆ æø  ,  ÆØ ıŁıÆ ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ  ÇÅ Æ ı 挺  Å ıæØçæ ı  Æ ºØŒ  Æı Å ıæØçæ ØØŒıÅ Æ  ºØŒ ŁÆ ıØ  ºØÆ Å Æº ıæØçæ. (2) ‚Æ æıÆ Å ºº Æ ı  ÆØ ıåæø Æ Æ Øº ı Æ æø  ÆØ ıŁıÆ ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ  ÇÅ Æ ı ıç  Æ ÆØ Æ æ ,  (Æ) Å ÇÅ Æ ıØ  ºÅ ı Æ  Å Å ıª Æ, ºÅ çøÆ   æŁæ 2:202 Å çŁæ  Å ØØŒ Å Ææ ()  æø, ªØÆ Å  ºłÅ ı  ı  ÆØ ıåæø Æ  æıÆ Å ºº Æ æŒº Å ÇÅ Æ  º Å Æ ºØÆ Å  æŒØ ÆØ ªØÆ Æ æø Œ ø ø ŒÆå     ıæØçæ Å  Æ ØØŒıÅ Æ Æ  ºØŒ ŁÆ ıØ  ºØÆ Å Æº ıæØçæ, ŒÆØ (ª)  æø, ªØÆ Å  ºłÅ ı  ı  ÆØ ıåæø Æ  æıÆ Å ºº Æ

Ø  Š挺ÅÅ ÇÅ Æ Æı  ı  ıæ (3) ‚Æ æø   ÆØ çøÆ  Æı   æŁæ ıŁı ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ Å ÇÅ Æ  Æ Ø  Ø Å  ºłÅ  Æ ººØ æ

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¯ Å Æ 2:  ıŁı ÅÆ åøæ º ŠƺØÆ ¢æŁæ 3:201:  ıŁı ÅÆ ªØÆ ÇÅÆ ı æ ŒºŁÅŒ Æ  ı ƺºº ı Å Œ æ  ıæ (1) ‚Æ æø ı Øæ ÇØ Å ŒÆ  ÆæØ æ ÆÆåº ŒØ  ÆØ ıŁı ªØÆ

Š挺ÅÅ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ  ÇÅ Æ ı ıç  Æ ÆØ Æ æ ,  Æ  ıººÅº ÆÆåºæ (Æ) 挺 Å ÇÅ Æ  Æ ºÆ ØÆ Å ıÅæ Æ Å ÆÆåºÅÅ ı ŒÆØ () 挺 Å ÇÅ Æ  º Å Æ ºØÆ Å  ÆØ ıŁı ªØÆ ºº ºª ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ Å ÇÅ Æ. (2) ˙ ÆæªæÆç (1) çÆæÇ ÆØ Æ  ØåÆ  ØŒ æøÆ  å Å  Æ Œæø ı æŒÆº ÇÅ Æ  Æ ºÆ ØÆ Å ÆÆåºÅÅ ı. ¯Œæø  ÆØ

Æ æø ı Ø ı ŒÆ Æ Æ ØŒ ØŒÆØ ÆØ Æ ØåØæ ØŒÆØæÆ  ªØÆ  ØŒ æø. ¢æŁæ 3:202:  ıŁı ÅÆ ªØÆ ÇÅÆ ı æ ŒºŁÅŒ Æ  Å Å Æçƺ ŒÆÆÅ   ÆŒØ  ı (1) ‚Æ æø ı ÆŒ Æı Æ  ºªå   ÆŒØ ı  ÆØ ıŁı ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ ºÅ ı Æ  Å Å ıª Æ ø ŒÆØ Å ÆŒºıŁÅ ÇÅ Æ, ÇÅ Æ çøÆ   ¢æŁæ 2:202 ŒÆØ ÇÅ Æ ÆØ Æ çŁæ  Å ØØŒ Å Æ ( Æ æÅ

Å ÇÅ Æ   Ø ÆŒ Å )  Æ Æı

 Ø ÇÅØ  ç º ÆØ  Å ŒÆ  ÆÅ ı ÆŒØ ı ı  Ææ åØ Å ÆçºØÆ Å  Æ Ø æ  ÆØ Æ ÆÆ Ø Æ æø ı æ Œ ÆØ   ÆŒ Å  Å Œ   Æı  ºÆÆ ø ıłÅ ø æØ ø ŒÆØ ØØÆ æÆ (Æ)    ı ÆŒØ ı () Å æÆÅ   ÆŒ Å  ŒÆØ (ª) Æ Æ ªØÆ Å Æ æ ØÆ

ØÆ ŒÆ  ÆÅ ı ÆŒØ ı. (2) ‚Æ æø ÆŒ Æı Æ  ºªå   ÆŒØ ı,  Æ ÆŒ Æ

Ø

ºªå ı çÆ Ç ÆØ  ŒÆØ Æ ı ØºÅŁ Å ıåæ øÅ Æ Æ æ łØ ØÆ ÇÅ Æ  Å ØÆ Æı ı ı æŁæı. (3)  æø ı ÆŒ Æı Æ  ºªå   ÆŒØ ı Łøæ ÆØ  ŒæØ ı ÆŒØ ı Œ   Æ Ø  Ø ºº æø ÆŒ Æı Æ  ºªå  ı ÆŒØ ı. ¢æŁæ 3:203:  ıŁı ÅÆ ªØÆ ÇÅÆ ı æ ŒºŁÅŒ Æ  ÇÆ ˇ Œ å  Çı  ÆØ ıŁı ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ ºÅ ı Æ  Å Å ıª Æ ø ŒÆØ Å ÆŒºıŁÅ ÇÅ Æ, ÇÅ Æ çøÆ   æŁæ 2:202 ŒÆØ ÇÅ Æ ÆØ Æ çŁæ  Å ØØŒ Å Æ. ¢æŁæ 3:204:  ıŁı ÅÆ ªØÆ ÇÅÆ ı æ ŒºŁÅŒ Æ  ºÆøÆØŒ æ Ø Æ (1) ˇ Ææƪøª  æØ   ÆØ ıŁı ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ ºÅ ı Æ  Å

Å ıª Æ ø ŒÆØ Å ÆŒºıŁÅ ÇÅ Æ, Å ÇÅ Æ çøÆ   æŁæ 2:202 ŒÆØ

Æ Ø  ŒÆ Æƺø ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ ÇÅ Æ ÆØ Æ çŁæ  Å ØØŒ Å Æ ( Æ æÅ Å ÇÅ Æ   Ø  æØ) Æ  º

øÆ ı æØ .

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Greek. ¯øıÆ ØŒ ıŁÅ ªØÆ Å ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ ºº

(2) ‚Æ æø ı ØªØ  æØ  Å ¯ıæøÆØŒ ،، ƪæ ªØÆ ºÅÅ, ƺ Å åæÅÆ  ØŒ  ŁøÅ ººÅ æç  ØÆ  Æ ºÆ ØÆ Å ƪªºÆ ØŒ  ı æÆ ÅæØ Å Æ ıŁ ÆØ Æ  ØåÆ. (3) ‚Æ æÅŁı  ı æØ  ıŁ ÆØ Æ  ØåÆ,  (Æ)  æ Æ ØÆØ øŁ Å Æı  Å Æ ı Ææƪøª, Å ()  æ  øÅ Øƪı æØ   ÆƪæçØ  æØ Å Æı  Å Æ ı Øƪøª Æ (ÆÆæ ø Æ   Æƪæç ÆØ  Æ ı Ææƪøª) Œ    æÅŁı  ŒÆ Ø   ÇÅØøŁ  Æ  Æ  ºª åæØŒ Ø ÅÆ

 Ææƪøª Å Œ  ı ı æ Łı  æØ. (4) ‚Æ æø   ÆØ çøÆ  Æı   æŁæ ıŁı ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ Å ÇÅ Æ  Æ Ø  Ø: (Æ)  Ł  æØ  ŒıŒºçæ Æ ()  ÆØ å Æ Å ı æå  º

øÆ  Æ  æØ

ŁÅŒ  ŒıŒºçæ Æ (ª)  ŒÆ ÆŒÆ  æØ ªØÆ ºÅÅ   ººÅ æç ØÆ   ،، åÆæÆŒ æÆ    ŒÆ ÆŒÆ Å Ø Ø  Æ ºÆ ØÆ ƪªºÆ ØŒ  ı æÆ ÅæØ Å Ææ ()  º

øÆ ç º ÆØ    Ø  æØ ŒÆ ÆŒı ÅŒ çøÆ  ŒÆ ÆƪŒÆ ØŒ ØŒÆ ı ŁØ ı Æ ÅØÆ Ææå ()  Æ Ł  æØ  ŒıŒºçæ Æ,   æ    Ø ÅØŒ ŒÆØ

åØŒ ªø Å ØÆ  øÅ ı ºÆ

Æ æ ( )  Æ æŒØ ÆØ ªØÆ Ææƪøª ı Æ ØŒ,  Ø  º

øÆ ç º ÆØ (Ø)   åØÆ ı æØ      øÆ ŁÅŒ  ı Æ ØŒ, Å (ØØ)  Ø Ū  ı Ææ å  ŒÆ ÆŒıÆ  ı æØ æ (5) —Ææƪøª  ÆØ: (Æ)  Å æ  øÅ  ºØŒ æØ  Å ı Æ ØŒ  ŒÆ ÆŒıÆ æ ()  Å æ  øÅ æ Å ºÅ Æı  ı Å ªØ Å ÆŒ  (ª) Æ æø ı çÆ Ç ÆØ ø Ææƪøª ØŁ  Æ   æØ Å øı Æ,

  Æ Å ºº ØÆŒæØ ØŒ ªæØÆ. (6) —æØ  ÆØ ŒŁ ŒØÅ  æªÆ ÆŒÆ ŒÆØ  åØ øÆ øŁ  ºº ŒØÅ  Å ÆŒ Å  ŒÆØ  źŒ æØŒ æÆ. (7) ‚Æ æØ  ÆØ ºÆ

øÆ ØŒ   Ææ åØ Å ÆçºØÆ Å  Æ æ Æ ÆÆ Ø ŒØ  łØ ø ØØŒ ıŁÅŒ ŒÆØ Ø øæ (Æ) Å ø æØŒ  çØÅ ı æØ æ () Å ºªÆ ÆÆÅ åæÅØ ÅÅ ı (ª) ŒÆØ ı åæı ŒÆ    

ŁÅŒ  ŒıŒºçæ Æ. ˜  ÆØ ºÆ

øÆ ØŒ Æ æØ ªØÆ   ºª  Ø  ƪ  æÆ

ŁÅŒ  ŒıŒºçæ Æ ºº ºØ æ.

¢æŁæ 3:205:  ıŁı ÅÆ ªØÆ ÇÅÆ ı æ ŒºŁÅŒ Æ  Æı Œ ÅÆ (1)  æ  øÅ æåÆ ı Æ ıå Æ  ø ı ØÆ Å åæ Å  Æı ŒØı å Æ   ÆØ  Œ å ı Æı ŒØı å Æ  ıŁı ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ

Å ºÅ ı Æ  Å Å ıª Æ ø ŒÆØ Å ÆŒºıŁÅ ÇÅ Æ, ÇÅ Æ çøÆ   æŁæ 2:202 (ÇÅ Æ ı ıç  Æ ÆØ æ Ø ÆØ Æ Å ºÅ ı Æ  Å Å ıª Æ Å ı ŁÆ ı  ººı) ŒÆØ ÇÅ Æ ÆØ Æ çŁæ  Å ØØŒ Å Æ ( Æ æÅ Å ÇÅ Æ   Ø Æı ŒØ åÅÆ ŒÆØ   çæ ).

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(2) `ı ŒØ åÅÆ  ÆØ ŒŁ åÅÆ ı åæÅØØ ªØÆ Å  ÆŒ ÅÅ  Åæ ŒÆØ øŁ ÆØ  ÅåÆØŒ ÆÅ, åØ ø å Æ Æ ŒØÆ  ØÅæ æåØ  ŒÆØ æııºŒÆ ÆÆæ ø Æ  Æ Æı   ÆØ ı Æ Å åØ.

¢æŁæ 3:206:  ıŁı ÅÆ ªØÆ ÇÅÆ ı æ ŒºŁÅŒ Æ   ØŒ ı  ı Å Œ  æ (1) ˇ Œ å ØÆ ı Æ Å  Œ ƺºı ØÆ ªŒÆ  ÆÅ  ÆØ ıŁı ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ Å ºÅ ı Æ  Å Å ıª Æ ø ŒÆØ Å ÆŒºıŁÅ ÇÅ Æ, ÇÅ Æ çøÆ   æŁæ 2:202, ÇÅ Æ ÆØ Æ çŁæ  Å ØØŒ Å Æ ŒÆØ ÆÆ çøÆ   æŁæ 2:209, Æ (Æ) ºÆ Æ ıłÅ Å  Å Æ ı ŒÆØ Ø ØØ Å  ı ŒÆ   åæ Å Œ  Å Æ  ıæåØ Œ ŒÆ   åæ Å Æç   Å ı Æ  ÆØ º ØŁÆ Å ı Æ Å Œ Æ æŒÆº ı

ØÆ ÇÅ Æ   æ Œ ÆØ ı ŒÆ ººÅº ºªå, ŒÆØ () Å ÇÅ Æ æŒ Ø Æ Å æƪ øÅ Æı  ı ŒØı. (2) ˇ æ “ı Æ” æغÆØ åÅØŒ  ı  (Ææ Å Æ Æ  Æ Æı

 æ Œ ÆØ   æ, ıªæ Å Æ æØÆ ŒÆ  ÆÅ). ØŒææªÆØ Łøæ ÆØ ø ı . (3) ˇ æ “Œ ” æغÆØ (Æ) Å ºıŁ æøÅ Å ØÆçıª ıØ () Å  ŠźŒ æØ (ª) Łæ Å Æ, çø Å ººÅ ÆŒ غ Æ () Łæı ŒÆØ ºº  Øæ () ºº ıº Ø   æغº. (4) ˇ æ “ªŒÆ  ÆÅ” æغÆØ  ŒØÅ

 ªŒÆ Æ Ø  ŒÆØ ªŒÆ Æ Ø ı ŒÆ ÆŒı Å ŒÆØ

Ø ı  æ Œ ÆØ  åæ Å. (5) ‚Æ æø   ÆØ ıŁı ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ ÇÅ Æ çøÆ  Æı   æŁæ  Æı   æø: (Æ)  ŒÆ

åØ Å ı Æ Å  Œ ƺº ÆØ Å ªŒÆ  ÆÅ ªØÆ æØŒ ƪªºÆ ØŒ Œ. () Æ Ø  Ø  ıæåØ ÆæÆÅ ØŒ ØÆ ø å ØŒ  Å ı ÆÅ

Å ı Æ Å Å Œ ººıÅ Å ªŒÆ  ÆÅ. ¢æŁæ 3:207: —æÆØæø ı ıŁı ÅÆ ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ

ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅÆæ ‚Æ æø  ÆØ  Å ıŁı ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ  ÇÅ Æ   æº Ø  ŁØŒ  ŒÆØ å ØŒ (Æ)  ØÆ Ū ŒØø ı  ıª ÆØ  Æ æŁæÆ 3:104 (ııŁı Å Æ ªØÆ ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ Æ ÆØØ Å Æ  Æ ı º ı Ø æÅÅ) ø 3:205 (ııŁı Å Æ ªØÆ ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ Æ Æı Œ Å Æ) ()  ı  Å Œ æ (ª)  Å Å çÆæª ı æŁæı 3:204 (4) (). ¢æŁæ 3:208: EªŒÆºØłÅ Å Ū ŒØ  ø

ˆØÆ ı Œ Æı  Å  Å Æ ÆæÆ Ø Æ æø ıŁı ªØÆ Æ ÆŒ Å , åÅÆ, ØÆ ı Æ Å ªŒÆ  ÆÅ ı ªŒÆ

ºØł ı Æ ÆŒ Æ ºº æø Æı Æ  ºªå  Æı  Æ ª Ø  Œ å ı Å  Œ ƺºı Æı .

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˚çºÆØ 4: —挺ÅÅ ÇÅÆæ ¢æŁæ 4:101: ´ÆØŒ ØÆÅ (1) ‚Æ æø æŒÆº ØÆ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ  Æ ºº  Å ÇÅ Æ æ Ø Æ ŁøæÅŁ ø Æ

ºÆ Å ıæØçæ Æı  ı æı Å Å Ū  ŒØø ªØÆ Å  Æ  ÆØ ıŁı Æı   æø. (2)  æ  øÅ ºÅ ı Æ  Å ıª Æ ŁÆ ı Å æØŁÅ ı ÇÅØøŁ   å ØŒ     ŒÆØ Å Œ ÆÅ Å ÇÅ Æ  ºÆ ÆØ ıłÅ. ¢æŁæ 4:102: ı å ‚Æ æø ı ı  å  Å æŒºÅÅ Å ÇÅ Æ ø ıÆı ıæª Å ÅŁØŒ Æı ıæª Ææ å ıØÅ ıæ Łøæ ÆØ  Ø æŒº Å ÇÅ Æ. ¢æŁæ 4:103: ¯ ƺºÆŒØŒ ÆØæ ¯ ØÆ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ æ Æ åØ æŒºÅŁ Æ Æ Å æØ æÆ ØÆ Øæ ªª ø, ªØÆ Æ  Æ  ÆØ ıŁıÆ ØçæÆ æøÆ ŒÆØ  ÆØ  ÆØ  Ø Å ÇÅ Æ æŒº ŁÅŒ Æ Æ Æ Æı  Æ ªª Æ Æºº åØ Æ Ø   ŒÆ æ ÆØ ÆåÅ   Ø ŒŁ æø ı  ÆØ ıŁı ªØÆ Æı  Æ ªª Æ æŒº Å ÇÅ Æ.

˚çºÆØ 5: `ı ØŒ Æ ¯ Å Æ 1: ı Æ Å Å ı æØç æ  ı ÇÅØøŁ  æ ¢æŁæ 5:101: ı Æ Å ŒÆØ Æ  å ŒØ 

ı (1) ‚Æ æø ØÆŁ Ø Æı ØŒ     ÇÅØøŁ  ıÆ  ªŒıæÆ  Å ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ ŒÆØ  å Å çغ Æ åØ ı ÅÅ ø ıØ Å ıÆ Å. (2)  Ø ØåØ ŒÆØ   ÇÅØøŁ  ªøæ Ç Æ  Œ ı ØÆ ÇÅ Æ ı  ı ı 挺 ŁÅŒ Œ Ł ÆØ   Œ ı ŒÆØ æ Ø Æ ŁøæÅŁ  Ø Æ å ÆØ  Œ ı. ¢æŁæ 5:102: ı æå ÆÆ ŒÆØ ı ı ıŁı ÅÆ (1) ¯  ÇÅØøŁ  ı ƺ  Š挺ÅÅ Å    ªŁ Å ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ  ÇÅ Æ  ØŒ   Æ Æ Ø ÆØ Å ÆÇÅ øŠƺªÆ    Æ Æ. (2) ˜ ºÆ ÆØ ø ıłÅ (Æ) Æ Æ Æ   Æ Æ ı ÇÅØøŁ  æ () Æ  Æ Æ Å ØÆ ııŁı Å Æ ı ı ƺÆ  ŒÆ  Æ Æ  æ  Å æŒºÅÅ Å ÇÅ Ææ (ª) Å ººØłÅ Ø ºØÆ ı ÇÅØøŁ   ı ı ƺ  Š挺ÅÅ ºÅ ı Æ  Å Å ıª Æ Æ Æ Æı ŒØ åÅÆ  Æ æåÆ  Æ åÅÆ, Œ  Æ  ÇÅØøŁ  ƪÅ Ææ ø Å Ø ºØÆ ı Æ ŒÆ  Ø æØ Ø æçÆ ÆƪŒÆ Æ. 115

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(3) ˇØ ÆæªæÆçØ (1) ŒÆØ (2) çÆæÇ ÆØ Æƺªø  Æ Æ æø ªØÆ     ÇÅØøŁ   ÆØ ıŁı ŒÆ  Å ØÆ ı æŁæı 3:201 ı ƺ   Æ Æ ı  Å ÇÅ Æ Å   ªŁ Å. (4) ˙ åæÅÆ ØŒ ÆÇÅ øÅ Ø ÆØ  Å ç ØÆ ººÅ Ū ŒØø ªØÆ Å  Æ  ÆØ ıŁı  ÇÅØøŁ  çøÆ   ŒçºÆØ 3 ı ƺ  Å ÇÅ Æ Å    ªŁ Å.

¢æŁæ 5:103: ˘ÅÆ ı æ ŒºŁÅŒ Æ  ı æª ˙ ÆÇÅ øÅ ªØÆ ØÆ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ ıÆı ıæª Å ıæª Æ ºº ıÆı ıæª Å ıæª ŒÆ  Å ØæÆÅ  ØØŒ ÆØŒ Æ  ÆŒº  ÆØ  Å ÆÇÅ øÅ ŁÆ æ Œæı  Æ åæÅ  ŁÅ.

¯ Å Æ 2: ıçæ Æ  ı ı  Łı

ı æ  ı  æø

¢æŁæ 5:201: ‚

Å  ıÆ ‚Æ æø åØ Æı ØŒ    ØÆ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ æŒº ŁÅŒ  ı Æ ı Ææ å ÆØ Æ  . ¢æŁæ 5:202: ¢ı Æ, Ø ŒÅŠƺº æø ŒÆØ ŒÆÆÅ ŒÆŒÅ Æ ªŒÅæ (1) ‚Æ æø åØ Æı ØŒ    挺 ØÆ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ ŒÆ  Å æ ŒıÆ ıæØÅ  ØŒÆØÆ  ı Å ı ØŒÆØÆ   æ ı Å ŒÆ 

Å æ ŒıÆ ıæØÅ  ı ıç æ  ı Å ı ı ıç æ   æ ı,   æø ı ıç  Æ ÆØ Å ÇÅ Æ  ÆØ ıŁı ªØÆ

Å ØÆŒØıÅ ı ØŒÆØÆ  Å ı ı ıç æ .  æŁæ 3:103  ºÆ ÆØ ıłÅ ŒÆ  Å çÆæª Æı  Å Ø ÆÅ. (2)  Ø ØåØ  Æ  Ø،Š ºº æ ø åøæ  Æ ÆæÆØÇØ ıåæØ ı  Ææı Æ Ø،Šºº æ ø 挺   ŒæØ Å ıŁÅ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ. (3) ¯ Æ æø æŒÆº  ØÆ ŒÆ  ÆÅ ŒÆ  Å  Æ Æ Œ ı Æغ Å Çø , Å øÆ ØŒ ÆŒæÆØ Å Æ, Å ıª Æ Å Å ºıŁæ Æ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ  Å æØı Æ ŒØı ººı ªØÆ Æ ªºØ Ø  Æı  ı Å ŒØ æ  Æ  Œ ı ıŁ ÆØ   ºªÅ ÆÇÅ øÅ. ¢æŁæ 5:203: —æ ÆÆ Å  ı ıçæ  æ ‚Æ æø åØ Æı ØŒ    ØÆ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ æŒº ŁÅŒ ªØÆ Å ÆƪŒÆ Æ æ Æ Æ ÆØ ı  ÆØ ŁºØØ  ØÆ ÅŒæÆ ØŒ ŒØø Æ, ØØÆØ

æø  Å æ  øÅ ı Å ÇÅ Æ æŒº ŁÅŒ  Å ØÅ ºÅæçæØ  Æ  Æ ÆÇØŒ  ØŒØø Æ.

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Greek. ¯øıÆ ØŒ ıŁÅ ªØÆ Å ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ ºº

¯ Å Æ 3: ` ØŒÆ ÅÆ æ  ºªå ¢æŁæ 5:301: ` ØŒÆ ÅÆ æ  ØŒæØÅ (1) ‚Æ æø ı  ÆØ Æ ŒÆ æ ØŒæØÅ ŒÆ   åæ Å ıæØçæ ı 挺 Å ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ ıŁ ÆØ   Æı   ÆØ æ Œ ºÆ Æ ıłÅ Š،، ŒÆ  ÆÅ ı ÆØŒı æ ØŒæØÅ ŒÆØ º

Ø ºº æØ Ø Å Æ ØŒ  æ  øÅ. ˙ ıŁÅ æØæ Ç ÆØ  ØÆ ºªÅ ÆÇÅ øÅ. (2) ‚Æ æø Łøæ ÆØ Æ ŒÆ æ ØŒæØÅ  ı º Ø Å ÆæŒ  ØŒæØÅ å ØŒ  Å çÅ Å ıæØçæ ı Œ   Å ººØłÅ Å ÆæŒ ØŒæØÅ  ÆØ æøæØ Æ

ºÆ Å çƺ Å ıæØçæ ı. ¢æŁæ 5:302: ` Æ çıŒ ªª æ ‚Æ æø åØ Æı ØŒ    ØÆ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ æŒº ŁÅŒ Æ Æ Ææ ªª     æ  ŒÆ Æ ıºªø ÆÆØ   æ Æ Æ æÆ ŒÆØ  æ Æ ŁøæÅŁ ø Œ ı çæ Æ Æı   æø.

¯ Å Æ 4: ıÆØŒ Æ ŒºØ Å æØ æØ Å ıŁ Åæ ¢æŁæ 5:401: ıÆØŒ Æ ŒºØ Å æØ æØ Å ıŁ Åæ (1) ˙ ıŁÅ ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ ÇÅ Æ  º  æ   Æ ÆŒºØ    Æ æØæØ  . (2) ˙ ıŁÅ ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ ÇÅ Æ ÆØ Æ ÆæØ ÆæÆÅ Å Ø ºØÆ Å  Æ æçÆ Øºº ÆØ ŒÆ  Ø ıŁ Œ Å Æ ØŒ  æ  øÅ  æ   Æ ÆŒºØ    Æ æØæØ  . (Æ) å ØŒ  ºÅ ı Æ  Å Å ıª Æ (ıæغÆÆ Å Å ŁÆÆ ÅçæÆ ºÅæ) ()   ÆŒºØ Å æØæØ Æ ŒØ ÆØ ŒÆ  ºº æ    Å  Å ŒÆº   Å Å  Ø Ø Æª  Å  ØÅ ıæØçæ. (3) ˙ ıŁÅ  æ   Æ ÆŒºØ    Æ æØæØ   Å æ  øÅ ı Æ æø  ÆØ ıŁı ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ Å ÇÅ Æ çøÆ   æŁæ 3:204. (4) ˚Ł ººÅ ıŁÅ çøÆ  Æı   غ  æ Æ ÆŒºØ  Å Æ æØæØ  Œ   Æ  æº Ø Œ Ø ºº.

¯ Å Æ 5: ˘ÅÆ ŒÆ  æŁæ 2:202 ¢æŁæ 5:501: ¯ ŒÆÅ ø Æı ØŒ ø  Æ Ø  ı ÇÅØøŁ    æ ıæ ‚Æ Æı ØŒ      æ Æ Æ Ø ÆåŁ   ØŒÆ øÆ  æøı ªØÆ ÆÇÅ øÅ ÆØ Æ Å ºÅ ı Æ  Å Å ıª Æ Æı  ı æı Å    ŁÆ æ Æ Æ Ø ÆåŁ   æå Æ  ŁÆ  æ Æ Æ Ø ÆåŁ ŒÆØ

Æ Ø  æı ı ıç  Æ ÆØ ØÆ ÇÅ Æ ŒÆ   æŁæ 2:202. 117

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˚çºÆØ 6: ‚ ØŒÆ  ÅŁÆÆ ¯ Å Æ 1: ` ÇÅøÅ ¢æŁæ 6:101: Œ  ŒÆØ Å Æ ÇÅøÅæ (1) ˙ ÆÇÅ øÅ  åØ   Æ Øç æØ ªØÆ  æø ı ı  Å Å ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ Å ŒÆ  ÆÅ  Å  Æ  æø Æı  ŁÆ æØŒ Æ   æå Æ Å ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ. (2) ˙ ÆÇÅ øÅ æ Æ  ÆØ åæÅÆ ØŒ Å ººı  ı ƺªÆ   Ø  ÆØ æ Œ ºÆ Æ ıłÅ    ŒÆØ   ªŁ Å ÇÅ Æ ŒÆØ º Ø ıŁ Œ Å Æ ØŒ  æ  øÅ. (3)  Å æ  øÅ ºÅ  øÆ ØŒ Æ ØŒØ ı ŒÆ ƺº ÆØ Æ ø ø ªØÆ

Å ØŒı åæÅÆ ØŒ ÆÇÅ øÅ Æ  ØåÅ  Å  øÅ Å Æ Æ  Æ Æ ØŒı  ıæÆ ı ıƺªÆ Å  øÅ Å Æ Æ ı æªÆ . ˙ Ø ÆÅ Æı æ ŒØ çÆæª  ÇÆ   Æı   ÆØ æ Œ ºÆÆ ı ıłÅ

ı Œ ªØÆ    ŒÆ å Æ  Ç. (4) ¯ƺºÆŒ ØŒ æ Å ÆŒÆ  ÆÅ Å æ

æÆ ŒÆ  ÆÅ çøÆ  Å ÆæªæÆç (1) æ Å ÆÇÅ øÅ  ø ç Æı   ÆØ ºª Æ ºØ

Å æç Å Ø æç  Æ  æø ı  ÆØ ıŁı ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ

Å ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ  ÇÅ Æ ºø ø ºŒ Å ø ı Æı  Æ Œ Å  ıæ ÅÅ  Š挺ÅÅ Å ÇÅ Æ. ¢æŁæ 6:102: De minimis ŒÆ  Ææ ˘Å Æ

 ÅÆ Æ  ºÆ ÆØ ıłÅ. ¢æŁæ 6:103: ıłÅçØ Œæ ıæ (1) —ºŒ Æ Æ ı Æ Œ Å  æø ı ıç  Æ ÆØ Å ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ ÆØ Æ ı ÇÅتı ªª  ƪ ÆØ Œ    ÆØ  ŒÆØ ŒÆØ æ Œ Æ ºÅçŁ ıłÅ. (2) ˚Æ  Å Œæ Å   ÆØ  ŒÆØ ŒÆØ æ Œ Æ ºÅçŁ ıłÅ Æ ºŒ Æ Æ  Ç ÆØ    Å æŒºÅŁ Æ ÇÅ Æ, Å çÅ Å ııŁı Å Æ ı æı ı 挺 Å ÇÅ Æ ŒÆØ ı Æ ºŒ Æ Æ æ æå ÆØ Æ Ææå æ ı  Œ Å Ææå  Æı . ¢æŁæ 6:104: —æØæ Ø ÇÅØøŁ æ ¯ ıç  Æ ÆØ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ æØ æÆ æøÆ ŒÆØ Å ÆŒÆ  ÆÅ Å ÇÅ Æ ı  æøı Ū  ÆŒÆ  ÆÅ Å ÇÅ Æ ı ººı   æ Œı ƺªÅ çÆæª  Ø ÆØØ ı ªØÆ ÆÇÅ øÅ Ø ØÆ Ø .–4:201-207. ¢æŁæ 6:105: ¯ıŁ Å Ø ºŒºÅæ ¯ æØ æÆ æøÆ  ÆØ ıŁıÆ ªØÆ Å ØÆ ØŒ ÅÆ ØŒ ÇÅ Æ ıŁ ÆØ Æ çغ  Ø ºŒºÅæ.

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Greek. ¯øıÆ ØŒ ıŁÅ ªØÆ Å ÇÅ Æ ı 挺 ŁÅŒ  Æ ºº

¢æŁæ 6:106: ¯ŒåæÅÅ Æ ÆØø

ˇ ÇÅØøŁ  æ Æ Œåøæ Ø Å ÆÆ ÅÅ ªØÆ ÆÇÅ øÅ ıæغÆÆ Å ŒÆØ

Å ÆÆ ÅÅ ªØÆ ÆŒÆ  ÆÅ Å Å ıºØŒ  ÇÅ Æ.

¯ Å Æ 2: æÅÆØŒ Æ ÇÅøÅ ¢æŁæ 6:201: ˜ØŒÆøÆ  غ ªæ ˇ ÇÅØøŁ  æ Æ غ Ø  ŁÆ  łØ Å åæÅÆ ØŒ ÆÇÅ øÅ ªØÆ Å ÆŒÆ  ÆÅ ı ŁØª   ıç æ  ı Å åØ. ¢æŁæ 6:202: øÅ Å ıŁ Åæ ¯  ÆØ  ŒÆØ ŒÆØ æ Œ æ Æ ÆƺºÆåŁ Æ æø ºØŒ Å æØŒ Æ Å ıŁÅ  Å ÇÅ Æ  挺 ŁÅŒ  º ŒÆØ Å º æÅ ÆÇÅ øÅ ŁÆ Å Æ ıƺªÅ  å Å  Å ııŁı Å Æ ı æı ı 挺 Å ÇÅ Æ Å  å Å    ªŁ Å ÇÅ Æ Å Æ  æÆ ªØÆ Å Æ æ Å. ¢æŁæ 6:203: ˚çƺÆØ ÅÅ ŒÆØ æ Ø æØ Å ÇÅÆæ (1) ˙ åæÅÆ ØŒ ÆÇÅ øÅ Ææ å ÆØ  Æ  Œ   Ææ ºª ŒÆŁØ  ÆƪŒÆ Æ Å ºÅæø  Ø. (2)  ŁØŒ  ŒÆØ ŒÆŁæ ÇØ ø æØæ Ç ÆØ Å åæÅÆ ØŒ ÆÇÅ øÅ ªØÆ ºÅ ı Æ  Å Å ıª Æ ŒÆØ ªØÆ Å ıºØŒ ÇÅ Æ. ¢æŁæ 6:204: æÅÆØŒ Æ ÇÅøÅ ªØÆ Å æ  º ŒÆŁÆı ˆØÆ Å æº ŒÆŁÆı ç º ÆØ åæÅÆ ØŒ ÆÇÅ øÅ Ææ Å Æ Æ Å åæÅÆ ØŒ ÆÇÅ øÅ ªØÆ Å ıºØŒ Å Å ıºØŒ ÇÅ Æ.

¯ Å Æ 3: —æºÅłÅ ¢æŁæ 6:301: ˜ØŒÆøÆ ªØÆ Æ æ  Å ÇÅÆæ (1)  ØŒÆ øÆ ªØÆ Æ æ Å ÇÅ Æ ıç  Æ ÆØ  ç (Æ) Å ÆÇÅ øÅ  ŁÆ Æ ŒÆ ººÅº ƺºÆŒ ØŒ ØŒ  ŁÅÆ, ŒÆØ ()  ÆØ ºª ªØÆ  æø ı ŁÆ Æ ıŁı ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ Å ÇÅ Æ Æ

Å Æ æ łØ. (2) ¯ Å Ū ŒØı  ÆØ Æ Æ ØŒ  Å Æ Ç ŒÆØ   ÆØ ıÆ    æø ı æ Œ ÆØ  Œ ı Æ  ÆçªØ   æغÆØ  ØŒÆ øÆ ªØÆ Æ æ

Å ÇÅ Æ ŒÆØ  ØŒÆ øÆ Æ ÆæÆæØ  Å Ū ŒØı. ¢æŁæ 6:302: ¯ıŁ Å ªØÆ ÇÅÆ ŒÆ Å Æ æ  Å ÇÅÆæ ¯ æø ı æÅŒ ø ŒÆ

ƺ Æ Å ı  Å ººÅ ÇÅ Æ ªØÆ Æ Æ æ łØ ØŒ Å ÇÅ Æ ı Å ªØÆ Æ æØæ Ø   ªŁ Å Å Ææ Å Æ ÇÅ Æ ı ı  Å åØ ØŒÆ øÆ ªØÆ åæÅÆ ØŒ ÆÇÅ øÅ Æ Ø ı æı ı ŁÆ Å Æ ıŁı ªØÆ Å æŒºÅÅ Å ÇÅ Æ.

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˚çºÆØ 7: ı ºÅæøÆØŒ ØÆØæ ¢æŁæ 7:101: ¯Ł ØŒ ı ƪÆØŒ ˜ŒÆØ ˇØ ØÆ Ø Æı  ı غ ı æÅ ÆØ ŒÆØ çÆæÇ ÆØ ŒÆ  æ çø   ı ƪÆ ØŒ ˜ ŒÆØ ı Œæ ı ı ØŒÆ Åæ ı     åØ ª Ø æçıª . ¢æŁæ 7:102: ˜ØÆØ  ı  ŁØŒ  ŒÆØ ŒÆŁæ ÇØ ØØ ŒÆ ØŒÆ ı  ÆØ . ¢æŁæ 7:103: ˚ıæØÆæåØŒ ŒÆŁŒ Æ ŒÆØ ØŒÆØŒ ØÆØŒÆæ  Øº  Æı   æıŁ ÇØ Å ıŁÅ  æøı Å  æªÆØ ı æŒØ Æ Å ŒÅÅ Å Å ÆæºØłÅ ŒÅÅ ŒıæØÆæåØŒ ŒÆŁÅŒ ø Å Æ Å Œº æøÅ ŒÆŁÅŒ ø ŒÆ  Å ØæŒØÆ ØŒÆ ØŒ ØÆØŒÆØ. ¢æŁæ 7:104: ¯ıŁ Å ı ƺººø , æª   , ı ،ƺØØŒ æªÆ ø ŒÆØ  ø æª  

 غ  Æı   æıŁ ÇØ Å ıŁÅ (Æ) ø æªÆÇ ø (Ææ Å Æ Æ   Æı ıç  Æ ÆØ Æ Ø  ººı æªÆÇ ı Å ı æª Å Å  æ ı) ı æŒ Ø  Æ ºÆ ØÆ Å æªÆØÆŒ  å Åæ () ø æª  ı æŒ Ø  Æ ºÆ ØÆ Å æªÆØÆŒ  å Åæ (ª) ø ı،ƺØ ØŒ æªÆø ŒÆØ ø æª  ı æŒ Ø  Æ ºÆ ØÆ  æªÆØÆŒ ƪÆ. ¢æŁæ 7:105: øÅ Å Æ ŒºØ Å ıŁ Å  Æ Ø æ  ø

Æ Æ åØ ŒÆÆºÅŁ Æ ÇÅøÅ ¯ Æ æø åØ Æ øÅ ªØÆ æØŒ º æÅ ÆŒÆ  ÆÅ Å ÇÅ Æ Æ Ø ººı, Ø ø Æ Ø ÆçƺØ ØŒ   ÆØæ Æ, Æ ı ººÅ ıÅæ Æ   ŒÆŁæ ÇØ  ŁØŒ  ŒÆØ  ÆØ Æ Æı  Å Æ øÅ Ø ÆØ Å æØæ Ç ÆØ Å ıŁÅ ªØÆ ÆÇÅ øÅ çøÆ  Æı   غ .

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Hungarian1 ˝désen kívüli kártérítési felelo˝sség Szerzo 1. Fejezet: Alapveto˝ rendelkezések 1:101. cikk: Általános szabály (1) Annak, aki jogilag releváns kárt szenved, kártérítésre van joga azzal a személlyel szemben, aki a kárt szándékosan vagy gondatlanul okozta, vagy a károkozásért egyébként felelo˝sséggel tartozik. (2) Annak, aki nem szándékosan vagy gondatlanul okoz jogilag releváns kárt, a károkozásért csak akkor kell felelnie, ha a 3. Fejezet így rendelkezik. ˝zés 1:102. cikk: Kármegelo Ha jogilag releváns kár fenyeget, jelen Könyv kármegelo˝zési jogot biztosít annak a személynek, aki a kárt elszenvedné. Ez a jog azzal szemben illeti meg, aki a károkozásért felelo˝sséggel tartozna, ha az ténylegesen bekövetkezne. 1:103. cikk: Alkalmazási terület Az 1:101. és az 1:102. cikk (a) csak a jelen Könyv következo˝ rendelkezéseivel összhangban alkalmazhatók; (b) ellenkezo˝ rendelkezés hiányában mind jogi, mind természetes személyekre alkalmazandók; (c) nem alkalmazhatók, amennyiben alkalmazásuk más magánjogi szabályok céljának ellentmondana; és (d) nem érintik a más jogalapon fennálló jogvédelmi eszközöket.

2. Fejezet: Jogilag releváns kár 1. rész: Általános szabályok 2:101. cikk: A jogilag releváns kár fogalma (1) A vagyoni és a nem vagyoni veszteség és a sérelem jogilag releváns kárnak mino˝sül, ha (a) a jelen Fejezet következo˝ szabályai így rendelkeznek; (b) a veszteség vagy a sérelem a jogrend által egyébként biztosított jog megsértésébo˝l származik; vagy (c) a veszteség vagy a sérelem jogi védelemre érdemes érdek megsértésébo˝l származik. 1

Translated by dr. Annamária Herpai, LL.M (Osnabrück) and approved by Prof. Lajos Vékás (Budapest).

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(2) A kizárólag az (1) bekezdés (b) vagy (c) pontja alá tartozó esetben a veszteség vagy a sérelem csak akkor képez jogilag releváns kárt, ha a kártérítési jog biztosítása az 1:101. cikk szerint vagy a kármegelo˝zési jog biztosítása az 1:102. cikk szerint méltányos. (3) Annak megítélése során, hogy a kártérítési vagy a kármegelo˝zési jog biztosítása méltányos-e, ˝ kár jellegére, az okozati figyelemmel kell lenni a felelo˝sség alapjára, a kár vagy a fenyegeto összefüggés közelségére, annak a személynek az ésszeru˝ várakozásaira, aki a kárt elszenvedte vagy elszenvedné, valamint az igazságosság követelményeire. (4) Jelen Könyv értelmében (a) a vagyoni veszteség magában foglalja a dolog értékének csökkenését, a felmerült költségeket, továbbá a jövedelem-kiesést és az elmaradt nyereséget; (b) a nem vagyoni veszteség magában foglalja a fájdalmat, a szenvedést és az életmino˝ség hátrányos megváltozását.

2. rész: A jogilag releváns kár különös formái 2:201. cikk: Személyi sérülés és abból származó veszteség (1) A természetes személynek teste vagy egészsége megsértésébo˝l származó vesztesége, valamint a sérelem önmagában jogilag releváns kárnak mino˝sül. (2) Jelen Könyv értelmében (a) az ilyen veszteség magában foglalja az egészségügyi ellátás költségeit, beleértve a sérülthöz közel álló személyeknek a gondozással kapcsolatban felmerült ésszeru˝ költségeit; továbbá (b) a személyi sérülés csak annyiban foglalja magában a lelki egészség sérelmét, amennyiben az a betegség szintjét eléri. 2:202. cikk: Harmadik személy által elszenvedett olyan veszteség, amely más személy személyi sérülésének vagy halálának a következménye (1) Az a természetes személynek okozott nem vagyoni veszteség, amely más személy személyi sérülése vagy halála folytán következik be, akkor mino˝sül jogilag releváns kárnak, ha a sérelem ido˝pontjában ez utóbbi személy különösen szoros személyes kapcsolatban áll a veszteséget szenvedo˝ személlyel. (2) Ha valaki a sérelem következtében életét veszti, (a) az elhaltnak a sérelemmel okozott, a halála ido˝pontjában fennálló jogilag releváns kára az elhalt örököseinek jogilag releváns kárává válik; (b) az ésszeru˝ temetési költségek annak a személynek a jogilag releváns kárát képezik, akinél azok felmerülnek; továbbá (c) a tartástól való elesés azon természetes személy jogilag releváns kárának mino˝sül, akit az elhalt eltartott, vagy akivel szemben az elhaltat törvényes tartási kötelezettség terhelte volna, ha a halál nem következett volna be, vagy akinek az elhalt ténylegesen ellátást és pénzügyi támogatást nyújtott.

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2:203. cikk: Az emberi méltóság, a személyes szabadság és a magánszféra megsértése (1) A természetes személynek okozott azon veszteség, amely emberi méltóságának, személyes szabadságának, valamint magánszférájának tiszteletben tartására irányuló jogainak megsértésébo˝l származik, és a sérelem önmagában jogilag releváns kárnak mino˝sül. (2) Valamely személy jóhírének megsértésébo˝l származó vesztesége, valamint a sérelem önmagában jogilag releváns kárnak mino˝sül, amennyiben a nemzeti jog így rendelkezik. 2:204. cikk: Személyro˝l szóló, valótlan információ közlésébo˝l származó veszteség Jogilag releváns kárnak mino˝sül valamely személynek okozott az a veszteség, amely olyan személyéro˝l szóló információ közlésének a következménye, amelynek valótlanságáról az információ közlo˝je tud vagy tudnia kellene. 2:205. cikk: Bizalomsértésbo˝l származó veszteség Jogilag releváns kárnak mino˝sül valamely személynek okozott az a veszteség, amely olyan információ közlésének a következménye, amelyro˝l az információ közlo˝je, az információ jellegébo˝l vagy megszerzésének körülményeibo˝l, tudja vagy tudnia kellene, hogy a veszteséget szenvedo˝ személyre nézve bizalmas jellegu˝. ˝ birtok megsértésébo ˝l származó veszteség 2:206. cikk: Tulajdon vagy jogszeru (1) Jogilag releváns kárnak mino˝sül valamely személynek okozott az a veszteség, amely ingó vagy ingatlan dolgon fennálló tulajdonjogának vagy jogszeru˝ birtokának megsértésébo˝l származik. (2) Jelen cikkben (a) a veszteség magában foglalja a tulajdonjog gyakorlásától való megfosztást; (b) a tulajdonjog megsértése magában foglalja a jog tárgyának elpusztítását vagy fizikai megkárosítását (dologban esett kár), a joggal való rendelkezést, a használat akadályozását vagy a joggyakorlás bármilyen más zavarását. 2:207. cikk: Téves tanácsba vagy téves információba vetett bizalomból származó veszteség Jogilag releváns kárnak mino˝sül valamely személynek okozott az a veszteség, amely olyan döntés következménye, amely téves tanácsba vagy téves információba vetett ésszeru˝ bizakodáson alapul, amennyiben (a) a tanácsot vagy az információt foglalkozás vagy a kereskedelmi forgalom körében adják; és (b) a tanács vagy az információ adója tudta vagy tudnia kellett volna, hogy a másik fél a meghozott fajta döntés során bízik a tanácsban vagy az információban. 2:208. cikk: Jogellenes üzletrontásból származó veszteség (1) Jogilag releváns kárnak mino˝sül valamely személynek okozott az a veszteség, amely a sérelmére foglalkozása gyakorlásával vagy kereskedelmi tevékenységével összefüggésben elkövetett jogellenes károsító magatartásból származik. (2) A fogyasztó tisztességtelen verseny által okozott vesztesége szintén jogilag releváns kárnak mino˝sül, amennyiben a közösségi jog vagy a nemzeti jog így rendelkezik.

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2:209. cikk: Környezeti károkból származó állam által viselt költségek Az állam vagy az érintett hatóságok jogilag releváns kárának mino˝sülnek az állam vagy az arra jogosított, illetékes hatóságok által viselt azon költségek, amelyek a környezetet alkotó jelento˝sen károsodott természeti elemek, úgy mint levego˝, víz, föld, flóra és fauna, helyreállításából származnak. 2:210. cikk: Csalárd megtévesztésbo˝l származó veszteség (1) Jelen rész más rendelkezéseinek sérelme nélkül jogilag releváns kárnak mino˝sül valamely személynek okozott az a veszteség, amely egy másik személy szóbeli vagy magatartásban megnyilvánuló csalárd, megtéveszto˝ eljárásának a következménye. (2) A megtévesztés csalárd, ha azzal a tudattal, vagy abban a hitben követik el, hogy az eljárás megtéveszto˝, és célja az, hogy a megtévesztettet tévedésbe ejtsék. 2:211. cikk: Kötelezettségszegésre való rábírásból származó veszteség Jelen rész más rendelkezéseinek sérelme nélkül, valamely személynek okozott az a veszteség, amely egy harmadik személynek egy másik személy általi kötelezettségszegésre történo˝ rábírásából származik, akkor mino˝sül jogilag releváns kárnak, ha (a) a kötelezettség a veszteséget szenvedo˝ személlyel szemben áll fenn; és (b) a kötelezettségszegésre rábíró személy (i) szándékosan veszi rá a harmadik személyt a kötelezettség megszegésére, és (ii) nem saját érdekének jogos védelme érdekében cselekszik.

3. Fejezet: ˝sség Felelo 1. rész: Szándékosság és gondatlanság 3:101. cikk: Szándékosság Szándékosan okoz jogilag releváns kárt az, aki az ilyen kárt úgy okozza, hogy (a) az okozott típusú kár okozása a célja; vagy (b) az arra vezeto˝ magatartást szándékosan tanúsítja, annak tudatában, hogy ilyen vagy ilyen típusú kár be fog, vagy csaknem bizonyosan be fog következni. 3:102. cikk: Gondatlanság Gondatlanul okoz jogilag releváns kárt az, aki olyan magatartás által okoz kárt, amely (a) nem felel meg annak a törvényi rendelkezés által elo˝írt különös gondossági követelménynek, amelynek célja a károsult elszenvedett kártól történo˝ megóvása, vagy (b) egyébként nem felel meg annak a gondossági szintnek, amely egy az eset körülményeihez képest ésszeru˝ gondossággal eljáró személyto˝l elvárható. 3:103. cikk: Tizennyolcadik életévüket be nem töltött személyek (1) A tizennyolcadik életévét be nem töltött személy csak akkor tartozik felelo˝sséggel a 3:102. cikk (b) pontja szerint okozott jogilag releváns kárért, amennyiben nem jár el olyan gondossággal, amely egy azonos életkorú, ésszeru˝ gondossággal eljáró személyto˝l az eset körülményeihez képest elvárható. 124

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(2) A hetedik életévét be nem töltött személy nem tartozik felelo˝sséggel a szándékosan vagy gondatlanul okozott jogilag releváns kárért. (3) Az (1) és (2) bekezdésben foglaltak nem alkalmazhatók annyiban, amennyiben (a) a károsult nem kaphat kártérítést valamely más személyto˝l jelen Könyv értelmében, és (b) a kártérítés nyújtására történo˝ kötelezés a felek anyagi helyzetére és az eset minden egyéb körülményére figyelemmel méltányos.

3:104. cikk: Felelo˝sség gyermekek és más felügyelet alatt álló személyek által okozott károkért (1) A szülo˝k vagy a tizennegyedik életévét be nem töltött személy szülo˝i felügyeletére jogilag köteles más személyek felelo˝sséggel tartoznak a jogilag releváns kár okozásáért, ha azt a kiskorú személy olyan magatartással okozta, amely ha egy felno˝tt magatartása lenne, szándékosnak vagy gondatlannak mino˝sülne. (2) Személyek felügyeletére köteles intézmények vagy más szervezetek felelo˝sséggel tartoznak harmadik személyek által elszenvedett jogilag releváns károk okozásáért, ha (a) a kár személyi sérülés, a 2:202. cikk szerinti veszteség vagy dologban esett kár; (b) az a személy, akinek felügyeletére az intézmény vagy más szervezet köteles, a kárt szándékosan vagy gondatlanul okozta, vagy tizennyolcadik életévét be nem töltött személy esetén olyan magatartással, amely ha egy felno˝tt magatartása lenne, szándékosnak vagy gondatlannak mino˝sülne; és (c) számolni kell azzal, hogy az a személy, akinek felügyeletére kötelesek, ilyen típusú kárt fog okozni. (3) Nem tartozik azonban felelo˝sséggel jelen cikk értelmében a kár okozásáért az, aki bizonyítja, hogy a károkozó személy felügyeletének ellátása körében felróhatóság nem terheli.

2. rész: ˝sség szándékosság vagy gondatlanság hiányában Felelo 3:201. cikk: Felelo˝sség munkavállalók és képviselo˝k által okozott károkért (1) Az, aki mást alkalmaz vagy hasonló módon foglalkoztat, harmadik személy által elszenvedett jogilag releváns kár okozásáért akkor tartozik felelo˝sséggel, ha az alkalmazott vagy foglalkoztatott személy (a) a kárt alkalmazásával vagy foglalkoztatásával összefüggésben okozta, és (b) a kárt szándékosan vagy gondatlanul okozta, vagy a károkozásért egyébként felelo˝sséggel tartozik. (2) Az (1) bekezdést megfelelo˝en kell alkalmazni a jogi személyre olyan képviselo˝je tekintetében, aki ilyen mino˝ségében kárt okoz. Képviselo˝nek az a személy mino˝sül, akit a jogi személy létesíto˝ okirata feljogosít arra, hogy a jogi személy nevében jogügyletet kössön. ˝sség ingatlan nem biztonságos állapota 3:202. cikk: Felelo által okozott károkért (1) Aki önálló elleno˝rzést gyakorol valamely ingatlan felett, felelo˝sséggel tartozik az ingatlan olyan állapotával összefüggésben bekövetkezett személyi sérülésért, az abból származó veszteségért, a 2:202. cikk szerinti veszteségért, és a dologban esett kárból származó veszteségért (ide nem értve magában az ingatlanban bekövetkezett kárt), amely nem nyújtja azt a biz-

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tonságot, amelyet az ingatlanban vagy annak környezetében tartózkodó személyek jogosan elvárhatnak, figyelembevéve a körülményeket, különösen (a) az ingatlan jellegét, (b) az ingatlan megközelítését, és (c) az ingatlan ilyen állapotának megelo˝zését szolgáló költségeket. (2) Önálló elleno˝rzést akkor gyakorol valaki az ingatlan felett, ha az elleno˝rzés jellegére tekintettel ésszeru˝ ˝ot a jelen cikk értelmében vett jogilag releváns kár megelo˝zésére kötelezni. (3) Az ingatlan tulajdonosát úgy kell tekinteni, mint aki önálló elleno˝rzést gyakorol, kivéve, ha a tulajdonos bizonyítja, hogy valaki más gyakorol önálló elleno˝rzést az ingatlan felett.

3:203. cikk: Felelo˝sség állatok által okozott károkért Az állattartó felelo˝sséggel tartozik az állat által okozott személyi sérülésért, az abból származó veszteségért, a 2:202. cikk szerinti veszteségért és a dologban esett kárból származó veszteségért. 3:204. cikk: Felelo˝sség hibás termékek által okozott károkért (1) A termék gyártója felelo˝sséggel tartozik a termék hibája által okozott személyi sérülésért, az abból származó veszteségért, a 2:202. cikk szerinti veszteségért és a fogyasztókkal szemben a dologban esett kárból származó veszteségért (ide nem értve magában a termékben bekövetkezett kárt). (2) Ugyanilyen felelo˝sséggel tartozik az, aki a terméket üzletszeru˝ gazdasági tevékenysége körében adásvétel, bérlet, lízing vagy egyébként forgalmazás céljából az Európai Gazdasági Térségbe behozza. (3) A termék forgalmazója ugyanilyen felelo˝sséggel tartozik, ha (a) a gyártó nem állapítható meg; vagy (b) import termék esetén az importáló kiléte a termék alapján nem állapítható meg (függetlenül attól, hogy a gyártó neve fel van-e tüntetve), kivéve, ha a forgalmazó ésszeru˝ határido˝n belül megnevezi a károsultnak a gyártót vagy azt a forgalmazót, akito˝l a terméket beszerezte. (4) Nem tartozik felelo˝sséggel a károkozásért jelen cikk értelmében az a személy, aki bizonyítja, hogy (a) a terméket nem hozta forgalomba; (b) valószínu˝sítheto˝, hogy a kárt okozó hiba a termék általa történt forgalomba hozatala ido˝pontjában még nem állt fenn; (c) a terméket nem eladás vagy üzletszeru˝ forgalmazás céljából állította elo˝, vagy azt nem üzletszeru˝ gazdasági tevékenysége körében gyártotta vagy forgalmazta; (d) a termék hibáját hatóság által elo˝írt kötelezo˝ szabály betartása okozta; (e) a termék általa történt forgalomba hozatala ido˝pontjában a hiba a tudomány és a technika állása szerint nem volt felismerheto˝; vagy (f) résztermék gyártója esetén a hiba (i) annak a terméknek a kivitelezésébo˝l ered, amelybe a részterméket beépítették, vagy (ii) a végterméket gyártó utasításának a következménye. (5) „Gyártónak“ mino˝sül (a) végtermék vagy résztermék esetén az elo˝állító; (b) alapanyag esetén, aki azt kitermeli vagy kinyeri; és (c) bárki, aki a terméken elhelyezett nevével, védjegyével vagy egyéb megkülönbözteto˝ jelzés alkalmazásával önmagát a termék gyártójaként tünteti fel. 126

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(6) „Terméknek“ mino˝sül az ingó dolog – akkor is, ha más ingó vagy ingatlan dolog alkotórészévé vált –, valamint a villamos energia. (7) A termék akkor hibás, ha nem nyújtja azt a biztonságot, amely általában elvárható, figyelemmel a körülményekre, különösen (a) a termék rendeltetésére, (b) a termék ésszeru˝en várható használatára, és (c) a termék forgalomba hozatalának ido˝pontjára. A terméket nem teszi hibássá önmagában az a tény, hogy késo˝bb tökéletesebb termék kerül forgalomba.

˝vek által okozott károkért 3:205. cikk: Felelo˝sség gépjármu (1) A gépjármu˝ üzemben tartója felelo˝sséggel tartozik a gépjármu˝ használatából eredo˝ közlekedési balesetben okozott személyi sérülésért, az abból származó veszteségért, a 2:202. cikk szerinti veszteségért és a dologban esett kárból származó veszteségért (ide nem értve magában a gépjármu˝ben és a rakományában bekövetkezett kárt). (2) „Gépjármu˝nek“ mino˝sül minden olyan jármu˝, amely szárazföldi közlekedésre szolgál és gépi meghajtású, ide nem értve a vaspályán közlekedo˝ jármu˝vet, valamint az utánfutót, függetlenül attól, hogy a gépjármu˝höz van-e csatolva. ˝sség veszélyes anyagok és veszélyes kibocsátások 3:206. cikk: Felelo által okozott károkért (1) Az anyaggal rendelkezo˝ személy vagy a berendezés üzemelteto˝je felelo˝sséggel tartozik az anyag vagy a berendezésbo˝l származó kibocsátás által okozott személyi sérülésért és az abból származó veszteségért, a 2:202. cikk szerinti veszteségért, a dologban esett kárból származó veszteségért, valamint a 2:209. cikk szerinti költségekért, amennyiben (a) a kibocsátás ido˝pontjában, vagy kibocsátás hiányában az anyaggal való kapcsolatba kerülés ido˝pontjában nagy a valószínu˝sége annak, hogy mennyiségére és tulajdonságaira figyelemmel az anyag vagy a kibocsátás, ha nem áll megfelelo˝ elleno˝rzés alatt, ilyen kárt fog okozni, és (b) a kár ennek a veszélynek a megvalósulásából származik. (2) „Anyagnak“ mino˝sülnek a vegyi anyagok (függetlenül attól, hogy szilárd, folyékony vagy gáz halmazállapotúak). A mikroorganizmusokat anyagnak kell tekinteni. (3) A „kibocsátás“ magában foglalja (a) anyagok kibocsátását vagy kiszivárgását, (b) elektromos áram vezetését, (c) ho˝, fény vagy egyéb anyag sugárzását, (d) zaj vagy egyéb rezgés kibocsátását, és (e) az egyéb nem fizikai jellegu˝, környezetre gyakorolt behatást. (4) A „berendezés“ fogalma magában foglalja a mozgó berendezést, valamint az építés alatt vagy a használaton kívül álló berendezést. (5) Nem tartozik azonban felelo˝sséggel a kár okozásáért jelen cikk értelmében az, aki (a) nem kereskedelmi, üzleti vagy szakmai tevékenységével összefüggo˝ célból tartja az anyagot, vagy üzemelteti a berendezést; vagy (b) bizonyítja, hogy az anyag elleno˝rzésére, vagy a berendezés mu˝ködtetésére vonatkozó törvényi követelmények betartása tekintetében mulasztás nem terheli.

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3:207. cikk: Egyéb felelo˝sség jogilag releváns kár okozásáért Jogilag releváns kár okozásáért akkor is megállapítható a felelo˝sség, ha a nemzeti jog így rendelkezik, és az (a) olyan veszélyforrásra vonatkozik, amely nem tartozik a 3:104.-3:205. cikkek hatálya alá, (b) anyagokra vagy kibocsátásokra vonatkozik, vagy (c) a 3:204. cikk (4) bekezdése (e) pontjának alkalmazását kizárja. 3:208. cikk: Felhagyás a veszélyforrás feletti uralommal Aki ingatlan, jármu˝, anyag vagy berendezés feletti uralmi pozíciójával felhagy, jelen rész tekintetében mindaddig felelo˝s marad, amíg egy másik személy önálló elleno˝rzése alá nem veszi e dolgokat, vagy üzemben tartóvá vagy kezelo˝vé nem válik. Amennyiben ésszeru˝, ezt megfelelo˝en alkalmazni kell az állattartóra is.

4. Fejezet: Okozati összefüggés 4:101. cikk: Általános szabály (1) Akkor okoz valaki jogilag releváns kárt egy másik személynek, ha a kárt magatartása következményének vagy abból a veszélyforrásból származónak kell tekinteni, amelyért felelo˝sséggel tartozik. (2) Személyi sérülés vagy halál esetén figyelmen kívül marad a sérelmet szenvedett személynek a bekövetkezett sérelem fajtájára és mértékére kiható adottsága. ˝ködés 4:102. cikk: Közremu Azt, aki más jogilag releváns károkozásában részt vesz, arra felbujt, vagy ahhoz jelento˝s segítséget nyújt, a kár okozójának kell tekinteni. 4:103. cikk: Vagylagos okok Ha számos olyan esemény közül, amelyekért különbözo˝ személyek tartoznak felelo˝sséggel, egy vagy több is okozhatott jogilag releváns kárt, és megállapítható, hogy a kárt az események egyike, de nem tudni melyike okozta, megdöntheto˝ vélelemként érvényesül, hogy egyaránt károkozónak mino˝sül minden olyan személy, aki bármely eseményért felelo˝sségre vonható.

5. Fejezet: ˝sség alól Kimentés a Felelo 1. rész: A károsult beleegyezése vagy erre utaló magatartása 5:101. cikk: Beleegyezés és saját kockázatra történo˝ cselekvés (1) A felelo˝sség kizártságára lehet hivatkozni akkor, ha a károsult a jogilag releváns kár okozásába érvényesen beleegyezett, és beleegyezése következményeinek tudatában volt, vagy tudatában kellett lennie. (2) Ugyanezt kell alkalmazni, ha a károsult az okozott típusú kár kockázatának tudatában önkéntesen tette ki magát ennek a veszélynek, és úgy kell tekinteni, hogy azt elfogadta. 128

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5:102. cikk: Felróható közrehatás (1) Ha a károsult felróhatóan közrehat a jogilag releváns kár bekövetkezésében vagy mértéke tekintetében, a kártérítést a közrehatás felróhatóságának arányában csökkenteni kell. (2) Figyelmen kívül marad azonban, ha (a) a károsult felróhatósága elhanyagolható mértéku˝; (b) a felróhatóságnak vagy a veszélyforrásnak a károkozásban való közrehatása elhanyagolható mértéku˝; vagy (c) a sérelmet szenvedett személy közlekedési balesetben gépjármu˝ által okozott személyi sérülésében gondatlanul hat közre, kivéve, ha ez a gondatlanság annak a gondossági követelménynek a lényeges elmulasztását jelenti, amely az eset körülményeihez képest nyilvánvalóan elvárható. (3) Az (1) és (2) bekezdést megfelelo˝en kell alkalmazni, ha az a személy, akiért a károsult a 3:202. cikk értelmében felelo˝sséggel tartozik, felróhatóan közrehat a kár bekövetkezésében vagy mértéke tekintetében. (4) A pénzbeli kártérítést hasonlóképpen kell csökkenteni, ha és amennyiben bármilyen más olyan veszélyforrás hat közre a kár bekövetkezésében vagy mértéke tekintetében, amelyért a károsult a 3. Fejezet értelmében felelo˝sséggel tartozik. ˝nelköveto˝ által a bu ˝nelkövetésben közremu ˝ködo˝ 5:103. cikk: Bu sérelmére okozott kár A bu˝ncselekmény elkövetése során, a bu˝ncselekmény elkövetésében résztvevo˝ vagy egyébként közremu˝ködo˝ másik személy sérelmére nem szándékosan okozott jogilag releváns kárt nem kell megtéríteni akkor, ha a kártérítés a jóerkölcsbe ütközne.

2. rész: ˝s és más harmadik személyek érdekei A felelo 5:201. cikk: Jogszabály engedélye A felelo˝sség kizártságára lehet hivatkozni akkor, ha a jogilag releváns kár okozását jogszabály megengedi. 5:202. cikk: Jogos védelem, megbízás nélküli ügyvitel és szükséghelyzet (1) A felelo˝sség kizártságára hivatkozhat az, aki saját vagy harmadik személy jogának vagy jogi védelemre érdemes érdekének indokolt védelmezése során okoz jogilag releváns kárt, ha a jogilag releváns kárt szenvedo˝ személy felelo˝sséggel tartozik a védelmezett jog vagy érdek veszélyeztetéséért. Jelen bekezdés tekintetében a 3:103. cikk figyelmen kívül marad. (2) Ugyanezt kell alkalmazni azon jogilag releváns kár tekintetében, amelyet a megbízás nélküli ügyvivo˝ az ügy urának anélkül okoz, hogy a megbízás nélküli ügyvitelbo˝l eredo˝ kötelezettségeit megszegné. (3) Ha valaki életet, testi épséget, egészséget vagy személyi szabadságot fenyegeto˝ veszély esetén más személy vagyonában jogilag releváns kárt okoz, azzal a céllal, hogy mentse e veszélybo˝l saját magát vagy harmadik személyt, és a veszély a kár okozása nélkül nem volt elhárítható, a károkozó személy megfelelo˝ kártalanítás nyújtásán túl nem köteles kártérítésre.

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5:203. cikk: A közérdek védelme A felelo˝sség kizártságára lehet hivatkozni akkor, ha a jogilag releváns kár okozása a demokratikus társadalom alapveto˝ értékeinek szükséges védelme érdekében történik, különösen, ha a kárt információknak a média útján való terjesztése okozza.

3. rész: ˝ségein kívül eso ˝ körülmények A károkozó elleno˝rzési leheto 5:301. cikk: A belátási képesség hiánya vagy korlátozottsága (1) Az, akinek belátási képessége jogilag releváns kárt okozó magatartásának ido˝pontjában hiányzik vagy korlátozott, csak akkor vonható felelo˝sségre, ha ez méltányos, figyelembevéve a belátási képességgel nem, vagy csak korlátozottan rendelkezo˝ személy anyagi helyzetét és az eset minden más körülményét. A felelo˝sség megfelelo˝ kártalanítás nyújtására korlátozott. (2) Annak a személynek a belátási képességét kell hiányzónak vagy korlátozottnak tekinteni, aki híján van annak a szintu˝ felfogóképességnek, amely magatartása természetének megítéléséhez szükséges, kivéve, ha a megfelelo˝ ítélo˝képesség hiánya saját felróható magatartásának átmeneti eredménye. 5:302. cikk: Elháríthatatlan ok (vis maior) A felelo˝sség kizártságára lehet hivatkozni akkor, ha a jogilag releváns kárt olyan rendkívüli esemény okozza, amely semmilyen ésszeru˝ eszközzel nem hárítható el, és amely nem tekintheto˝ a károkozó kockázati körébe tartozónak.

4. rész: ˝sség szerzo ˝déses kizárása és korlátozása A felelo ˝sség szerzo ˝déses kizárása és korlátozása 5:401. cikk: A felelo (1) Jogilag releváns kár szándékos okozásáért a felelo˝sség nem zárható ki és nem korlátozható. (2) A körülmények által nyilvánvalóan megkívánt gondossági követelmények nagyfokú elhanyagolásával okozott jogilag releváns kárért való felelo˝sséget nem lehet kizárni vagy korlátozni (a) a személyi sérülés tekintetében (a halálos kimenetelu˝ sérülést beleértve), vagy (b) ha a kizárás vagy a korlátozás egyébként jogellenes, vagy a jóhiszemu˝ség és a tisztességes eljárás követelményeibe ütközik. (3) Nem lehet kizárni vagy korlátozni az olyan kárért való felelo˝sséget, amelynek okozásáért a károkozó a 3:204. cikk szerint tartozik felelo˝sséggel. (4) A jelen könyvbeli egyéb felelo˝sség kizárható vagy korlátozható, ha törvény másképp nem rendelkezik.

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5. rész: A 2:202. cikk szerinti veszteség 5:501. cikk: A sérelmet szenvedett személlyel szemben fennálló kimentési okok kiterjesztése harmadik személyekre Arra a kimentési okra, amely valamely személy személyi sérülése miatt ˝ot megilleto˝ kártérítési jogával szemben felhozható, vagy, ha a halál nem következett volna be, felhozható lett volna, a 2:202. cikk szerinti veszteséget szenvedo˝ személlyel szemben is lehet hivatkozni.

6. Fejezet: Jogvédelmi eszközök 1. rész: Kártérítés általában 6:101. cikk: A kártérítés célja és formái (1) A kártérítés a jogilag releváns kárt szenvedo˝ személy helyzetének abba az állapotba történo˝ visszaállítása, amelyben akkor lenne, ha a jogilag releváns kár nem következett volna be. (2) A kártérítés lehet pénzbeli vagy más jellegu˝, ahogyan az az elszenvedett kár fajtájára és mértékére, valamint az eset minden egyéb körülményére figyelemmel a legalkalmasabbnak mutatkozik. (3) Dologban bekövetkezett kár esetén a javítási költségek helyett a dolog értékcsökkenésének megfelelo˝ mértéku˝ pénzbeli kártérítést kell megítélni, ha a javítási költségek ésszeru˝tlenül meghaladnák az értékcsökkenés mértékét. Ez a szabály állatokra csak akkor vonatkozik, ha az állat tartásának célját figyelembevéve alkalmazható. (4) Az (1) bekezdés szerinti eredeti állapot helyreállítása helyett, kizárólag akkor, ha ez ésszeru˝, a kártérítés olyan formában is történhet, hogy a jogilag releváns kár okozásáért felelo˝sséggel tartozó személy megtéríti mindazt az elo˝nyt, amelyet a károkozással összefüggésben szerzett. 6:102. cikk: De minimis-szabály A jelentéktelen kárt figyelmen kívül kell hagyni. 6:103. cikk: Az elo˝nyök kiegyenlítése (1) Azokat az elo˝nyöket, amelyek a jogilag releváns kárt szenvedo˝ személy javára a kárt okozó esemény eredményeként bekövetkeznek, figyelmen kívül kell hagyni, kivéve, ha figyelembevételük méltányos. (2) Annak megítélése során, hogy az elo˝nyök figyelembevétele méltányos-e, tekintettel kell lenni az elszenvedett kár fajtájára, a kárt okozó személy felelo˝sségének alakzatára, valamint, ha az elo˝nyök harmadik személyto˝l származnak, ezen elo˝nyök nyújtásának céljára. 6:104. cikk: Több károsult Ha több személy szenved jogilag releváns kárt és az egyiküknek nyújtott kártérítés egyben kártérítést nyújt egy másiknak is, kártérítési követeléseikre a III.–4:201.-207. cikkeket kell megfelelo˝en alkalmazni.

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6:105. cikk: Egyetemleges felelo˝sség Ha ugyanazon jogilag releváns kárért több személy tartozik felelo˝sséggel, felelo˝sségük egyetemleges. 6:106. cikk: A kártérítési követelés engedményezése A károsult kártérítési követelését, a nem vagyoni veszteség megtérítésére vonatkozó követelést is beleértve, engedményezheti.

2. rész: Pénzbeli kártérítés 6:201. cikk: A károsult választási joga A károsult szabadon eldöntheti, hogy a pénzbeli kártérítést sérelmet szenvedett érdekének helyreállítására fordítja-e. 6:202. cikk: A felelo˝sség csökkentése Amennyiben ez méltányos, a pénzbeli kártérítési felelo˝sség alól teljes vagy részleges mentesítésre van leheto˝ség, ha a kárt nem szándékosan okozták, és a teljes felelo˝sségre vonás a károkozó elmarasztalhatóságát, a kár mértékét vagy a kármegelo˝zési leheto˝ségeket figyelembevéve aránytalan lenne. 6:203. cikk: A kár pénzbeli megtérítése (1) A pénzbeli kártérítést egy összegben kell megítélni, kivéve, ha az ido˝szakonkénti fizetést nyomós indok támasztja alá. (2) A személyi sérülésért és a nem vagyoni veszteségért járó pénzbeli kártérítés összegének meghatározását a nemzeti jog állapítja meg. 6:204. cikk: Önmagában a sérelemért járó pénzbeli kártérítés Önmagában a sérelemért pénzbeli kártérítés jár, függetlenül a vagyoni és a nem vagyoni veszteség pénzbeli megtérítéséto˝l.

3. rész: Kármegelo˝zés 6:301. cikk: Kármegelo˝zésre való jog (1) Kármegelo˝zésre való jog annyiban áll fenn, amennyiben (a) a kártérítés nem nyújtana megfelelo˝ jogvédelmi leheto˝séget; és (b) a kár bekövetkezésének megakadályozása egyébként indokolt annak a személynek a tekintetében, aki a károkozásért felelo˝sséggel tartozna. (2) Amennyiben tárgy vagy állat a veszély forrása és a veszélyeztetett személynek ésszeru˝en nem áll módjában, hogy a veszélyt elkerülje, a kármegelo˝zésre való jog magában foglalja a veszélyforrás eltávolíttatására való jogot.

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˝sség kármegelo˝zésbo˝l származó veszteségért 6:302. cikk: Felelo Annak a személynek, aki az ˝ot fenyegeto˝ kár megelo˝zése, vagy a felmerült kár nagyságának vagy súlyosságának csökkentése érdekében ésszeru˝en költségeket vállalt vagy egyéb veszteséget szenvedett, pénzbeli kártérítésre van joga azzal a személlyel szemben, aki a károkozásért felelo˝sséggel tartozott volna.

7. Fejezet: Kiegészíto˝ szabályok 7:101. cikk: Nemzeti alkotmányos szabályok Jelen Könyv rendelkezéseit a fórum jogának alkotmányos szabályaival összhangban kell értelmezni és alkalmazni. 7:102. cikk: Törvényi rendelkezések A nemzeti jog határozza meg, hogy mely jogi rendelkezések mino˝sülnek törvényi rendelkezéseknek. 7:103. cikk: Közjogi tevékenység és bírósági eljárás Jelen Könyv nem szabályozza a személyeknek vagy testületeknek közjogi funkcióik gyakorlásából vagy azok elmulasztásából, továbbá bírósági eljárás keretén belül történt kötelezettségeik teljesítésébo˝l származó felelo˝sségét. 7:104. cikk: Munkavállalók, munkáltatók, szakszervezetek és munkáltatói érdekképviseletek felelo˝ssége Jelen Könyv nem szabályozza (a) a munkavállalóknak a munkaviszony kapcsán felmerülo˝ felelo˝sségét (tekintet nélkül arra, hogy az más munkavállalókkal, a munkáltatóval vagy harmadik személyekkel szemben álle fenn), (b) a munkáltatóknak a munkavállalókkal szemben a munkaviszony kapcsán felmerülo˝ felelo˝sségét, és (c) a szakszervezetek és a munkáltatói érdekképviseletek – kollektív vitáik kapcsán felmerülo˝ – felelo˝sségét. ˝sség csökkentése vagy kizárása biztosított 7:105. cikk: A felelo személyekkel szemben Ha valaki részben vagy egészben kárának más forrásból való megtérítésére jogosult, különösen biztosítóval, más alappal vagy szervezettel szemben, a nemzeti jog határozza meg, hogy e jogosultság a jelen Könyv szerinti felelo˝sséget korlátozza vagy kizárja-e.

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Italian1 Responsabilità Civile Extracontrattuale 1. Capitolo: Disposizioni Fondamentali 1:101. Articolo: Norma fondamentale (1) Chiunque subisce un danno giuridicamente rilevante ha diritto alla riparazione da parte di colui che lo ha cagionato con dolo o con colpa o al quale il fatto sia altrimenti imputato. (2) Un danno giuridicamente rilevante che non sia stato cagionato con dolo o con colpa è risarcibile solo nei casi previsti nel Capitolo terzo. 1:102. Articolo: Inibitoria Quando incombe il rischio di un danno giuridicamente rilevante, colui che subirebbe il danno può agire in via inibitoria contro colui al quale il fatto sarebbe imputato se si verificasse. 1:103. Articolo: Ambito di applicazione Gli articoli 1:101 e 1:102 (a) si applicano solo conformemente alle disposizioni seguenti; (b) salvo che sia diversamente previsto, si applicano sia alle persone fisiche sia alle persone giuridiche; (c) non si applicano qualora si rivelino in contrasto con altre norme di diritto privato; e (d) non pregiudicano il ricorso a mezzi di tutela diversi.

2. Capitolo: Danno Giuridicamente Rilevante 1. Sezione: Disposizioni generali 2:101. Articolo: Nozione di danno giuridicamente rilevante (1) La lesione della sfera giuridica altrui e la perdita patrimoniale o non patrimoniale o, quando sia previsto, la lesione per sé costituiscono danno giuridicamente rilevante se: (a) una delle norme seguenti disponga in tal senso; (b) la lesione costituisca violazione o la perdita sia conseguenza della violazione di un diritto altrimenti attribuito dalla legge; o (c) la lesione costituisca violazione o la perdita sia conseguenza della violazione di un interesse meritevole di tutela giuridica.

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(2) Nei casi regolati dalle lettere (b) e (c) del paragrafo (1) la lesione o la perdita costituiscono un danno giuridicamente rilevante solo quando sia equo e ragionevole, a seconda dei casi, un diritto al risarcimento o all’inibitoria secondo quanto disposto dagli artt. 1:101 o 1:102. (3) Al fine di stabilire se nel caso concreto sia equo e ragionevole un diritto al risarcimento o all’inibitoria, bisogna aver riguardo all’imputazione del danno, alla natura e alla prossimità di esso rispetto al fatto, nonché al ragionevole affidamento di colui che lo subisce o lo subirebbe e alle ragioni di ordine pubblico e buon costume. (4) In questo Libro: (a) la diminuzione patrimoniale comprende la perdita di valore economico, le spese sostenute, il mancato guadagno e ogni altra perdita suscettibile di valutazione economica. (b) La perdita non patrimoniale comprende il dolore, la sofferenza e il pregiudizio alla qualità della vita.

2. Sezione: Casi particolari di danno giuridicamente rilevante 2:201. Articolo: Danno alla persona e perdita conseguente (1) Nel danno alla persona la perdita conseguente alla lesione dell’integrità fisica e la lesione per sé costituiscono danno giuridicamente rilevante. (2) In questo Libro: (a) la perdita comprende il costo delle cure mediche nonché le spese ragionevolmente sostenute per la cura della persona che ha subito la lesione da coloro che hanno con essa una relazione stretta; e (b) la lesione della persona comprende la lesione della salute mentale solo quando questa costituisca una patologia. 2:202. Articolo: Perdita subita da terzi quale conseguenza del danno alla persona o della morte di un’altra persona (1) La perdita non patrimoniale subita quale conseguenza di unalesione della salute personale o della morte di un’altra persona costituisce danno giuridicamente rilevante quando vi sia una relazione personale particolarmente stretta con la persona primamente lesa. (2) Quando in seguito alla lesione si verifica la morte: (a) il danno giuridicamente rilevante della persona deceduta a causa della lesione al momento della morte si trasmette ai suoi successori; (b) le spese funerarie ragionevolmente sostenute costituiscono danno giuridicamente rilevante per la persona che le ha sostenute; e (c) la perdita del diritto al mantenimento o agli alimenti costituisce danno giuridicamente rilevante per la persona fisica che beneficiava della prestazione della persona deceduta o che, se non fosse intervenuta la morte, ne avrebbe beneficiato secondo la legge o alla quale la persona deceduta prestava assistenza materiale ed economica. 2:203. Articolo: Violazione della dignità, della libertà e della riservatezza (1) La perdita subita da una persona fisica quale conseguenza della violazione della propria dignità, del diritto alla libertà e alla riservatezza, e la lesione per sé costituiscono danno giuridicamente rilevante.

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(2) Anche laperdita che sia conseguenza della lesione della sua reputazione e la lesione per sé costituiscono danno giuridicamente rilevante qualora la legge nazionale così disponga.

2:204. Articolo: Danno da comunicazione di informazioni errate riguardanti un terzo La perdita derivante da un’informazione riguardante la persona che colui che la comunica sa o dovrebbe sapere errata costituisce danno giuridicamente rilevante. 2:205. Articolo: Danno da tradimento della confidenza La perdita che sia conseguenza di un’informazione che, o per sua natura o per le circostanze in cui è stata ottenuta, la persona che la comunica sa o dovrebbe sapere di natura confidenziale, costituisce danno giuridicamente rilevante. 2:206. Articolo: Danno da violazione di diritti reali, del possesso legittimo e della detenzione qualificata (1) La perdita che sia conseguenza della violazione di un diritto reale, del possesso legittimo o della detenzione qualificata di un bene mobile o immobile costituisce danno giuridicamente rilevante. (2) Per quanto previsto in questo articolo: (a) la perdita comprende la privazione dell’uso dell’oggetto del diritto reale; (b) la violazione del diritto reale comprende la distruzione o il deterioramento dell’oggetto del diritto (danno alle cose), la disposizione del diritto, l’ingerenza nell’ esercizio del diritto e ogni altra turbativache lo riguardi. 2:207. Articolo: Danno da affidamento pregiudizievole su pareri o informazioni errate La perdita che sia conseguenza di una decisione presa facendo ragionevole affidamento su un parere o su un’informazione errata costituisce danno giuridicamente rilevante se: (a) il parere o l’ informazione sono forniti nell’esercizio di una professione o nell’ambito di un’attività d’impresa; e (b) colui che fornisce il parere o l’ informazione sapeva o avrebbe dovuto sapere che il destinatario vi avrebbe fatto affidamento nell’assumere la decisione del tenore di quella che ha effettivamente assunta. 2:208. Articolo: Danno da pregiudizio a un’attività professionale od economica o da concorrenza sleale (1) La perdita che sia conseguenza di un illegittimo pregiudizio all’esercizio di una professione o di un’impresa economica costituisce danno giuridicamente rilevante. (2) Anche la perdita subita da un consumatore quale conseguenza di concorrenza sleale costituisce danno giuridicamente rilevante se il diritto comunitario o nazionale così dispone. 2:209. Articolo: Oneri in cui incorre lo Stato in seguito a pregiudizio arrecato all’ambiente Gli oneri sostenuti dallo Stato o dagli enti pubblici competenti per il ripristino dell’ambiente naturale che sia stato compromesso in maniera rilevante nell’aria, nell’acqua, nel suolo, nella flora e nella fauna costituiscono danno giuridicamente rilevante.

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2:210. Articolo: Danno da raggiri (1) Salve le altre disposizione di questa Sezione, la perdita che sia conseguenza di raggiri perpetrati mediante parole o comportamenti costituisce danno giuridicamente rilevante. (2) I raggiri sono tali se sono usati con conoscenza o convinzione della falsità della rappresentazione che inducono ed hanno lo scopo di indurre in errore il destinatario. 2:211. Articolo: Danno da istigazione alla violazione di un’obbligazione Salve le altre disposizioni di questa Sezione, la perdita che sia conseguenza dell’istigazione alla violazione di un’obbligazione costituisce danno giuridicamente rilevante solamente se: (a) riguarda il creditore; (b) la persona che ha istigato alla violazione: (i) voleva che il debitore violasse l’obbligazione, e (ii) non ha agito nella difesa legittima del proprio interesse.

3. Capitolo: Criteri di Imputazione 1. Sezione: Dolo e colpa 3:101. Articolo: Dolo La condotta è dolosa quando la persona: (a) intende cagionare un danno del genere di quello cagionato; o (b) il comportamento è voluto, sapendo che il danno cagionato o un danno di quel tipo si verificherà o quasi certamentesi verificherà. 3:102. Articolo: Colpa La condotta è colposa quando la persona cagiona il danno con un comportamento che: (a) non è conforme al particolare criterio di diligenza previsto dalla norma di legge posta a tutela della persona lesa rispetto al danno subito, o (b) non integra comunque la diligenza che ci si può aspettare nelle circostanze da una persona ragionevolmente attenta. 3:103. Articolo: Persone di età inferiore ai diciotto anni (1) Ad una persona di età inferiore ai diciotto anni il fatto è imputato in conformità con l’articolo 3:102(b) solo quando essa non abbia agito con la diligenza che ci si può aspettare nelle circostanze da una persona ragionevole e diligente della stessa età. (2) Ad una persona di età inferiore ai sette anni il fatto non è imputato né per dolo né per colpa. (3) I paragrafi (1) e (2) non si applicano quando (a) la persona offesa non possa ottenere la riparazione da altri secondo quanto disposto da questo Libro e (b) la riparazione del danno risponde ad equità avuto riguardo alle condizioni economiche delle parti e ad ogni altra circostanza.

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3:104. Articolo: Danno cagionato da bambini o da persone sottoposte a sorveglianza (1) I genitori e le persone obbligate per legge in sostituzione di questi rispondono del danno cagionato dal minore di quattordici che abbia cagionato il danno con una condotta che sarebbe dolosa o colposa se fosse quella di un adulto. (2) L’ istituzione o altro ente tenuto alla sorveglianza risponde del danno cagionato dalla persona ad esso affidata quando: (a) il pregiudizio è costituito da una lesione all’integrità della persona o da un danno alle cose e la perdita sia quella di cui all’articolo 2:202; (b) la persona sottoposta a sorveglianza ha cagionato il danno con dolo o colpa o, nel caso di una persona di età inferiore ai diciotto anni, con una condotta che sarebbe dolosa o colposa se fosse la condotta di un adulto; e (c) fosse prevedibile che la persona sottoposta a sorveglianza cagionasse il danno che si è verificato. (3) Colui che sarebbe responsabile in base a questo articolo non risponde del danno se prova che non vi è stato difetto di sorveglianza.

2. Sezione: Imputazione del danno in assenza di dolo o colpa 3:201. Articolo: Danno cagionato da dipendenti o rappresentanti (1) Colui che assume o incarica altri risponde del danno subito da un terzo quando la persona assunta o incaricata (a) ha cagionato il danno nello svolgimento dell’impiego o dell’incarico e (b) il danno sia imputabile per dolo o per colpa o ad altro titolo. (2) Il paragrafo (1) si applica analogamente alle persone giuridiche per il danno cagionato dal rappresentante nello svolgimento dell’incarico. Rappresentante è colui che è legittimato dallo statuto a porre in essere atti giuridici nell’interesse della persona giuridica. 3:202. Articolo: Danno cagionato da un immobile pericoloso (1) Colui che esercita in maniera indipendente il controllo su un immobile risponde del danno alla persona e della perdita conseguente, della perdita ai sensi dell’aricolo 2:202 e della perdita conseguente al danno alle cose (diverse dall’immobile in sé considerato) dovuti ad uno stato dell’immobile che non offre la sicurezza che è legittimo aspettarsi tenuto conto delle circostanze, tra cui: (a) la natura dell’immobile, (b) l’accesso all’immobile e (c) il costo necessario ad evitare che l’immobile si trovi in tale stato. (2) Il controllo su un immobile è indipendente se è ragionevole imporre alla persona che lo esercita il dovere di impedire il verificarsi del danno nell’ambito di applicazione di questo articolo. (3) Il proprietario dell’immobile risponde del danno, salvo che provi che altri ne esercita in maniera indipendente il controllo.

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3:203. Articolo: Danno cagionato da animali Il custode di un animale risponde del danno alla persona e della perdita conseguente nonché della perdita ai sensi dell’articolo 2:202; risponde altresì del danno alle cose. 3:204. Articolo: Danno cagionato da prodotti difettosi (1) Il produttore risponde del danno alla personae della perdita conseguente, della perdita ai sensi dell’art. 2:202 e, nei confronti del consumatore, del danno alle cose (diverse dal prodotto in sé considerato) cagionati da un difetto del prodotto. (2) Di tale danno risponde colui che importa il prodotto nell’area economica europea per la vendita, locazione, locazione finanziaria o distribuzione nell’esercizio della propria impresa. (3) Del danno risponde colui che ha fornito il prodotto se: (a) il produttore non può essere identificato; o (b) nel caso di un prodotto importato, il prodotto non indica l’identità dell’importatore (sia o meno indicato il nome del produttore), a meno che il fornitore non comunichi al danneggiato entro un tempo ragionevole l’identità del produttore o di colui che a sua volta gli ha fornito il prodotto. (4) Non risponde del danno secondo questo articolo chi prova che: (a) non ha messo in circolazione il prodotto; (b) è probabile che il difetto che ha cagionato il danno non esistesse al momento in cui il prodotto è stato messo in circolazione; (c) il prodotto non è stato fabbricato per la vendita o qualsiasi altra forma di circolazione commerciale né fabbricato o distribuito nell’esercizio di un impresa; (d) il difetto è dovuto alla conformità del prodotto a norme imperative; (e) lo stato delle conoscenze scientifiche e tecniche al momento in cui il prodotto è stato messo in circolazione non permetteva di scoprire l’esistenza del difetto; o (f) nel caso di un componente, il difetto è dovuto: (i) alla concezione del prodotto in cui il componente è stato incorporato, o (ii) alle istruzioni date dal fabbricante del prodotto finito. (5) «Produttore» è: (a) nel caso di un prodotto finito o di un componente, il fabbricante; (b) nel caso della materia prima, la persona che la estrae o la ricava; e (c) chiunque, apponendo il proprio nome, marchio o altro segno distintivo sul prodotto, si presenta come produttore dello stesso. (6) «Prodotto» è un bene mobile, anche quando forma parte di un altro bene mobile o immobile, nonché l'elettricità. (7) Un prodotto è difettoso se non offre la sicurezza che ci si può legittimamente attendere, tenuto conto delle circostanze; di esse in particolare: (a) la presentazione del prodotto; (b) l’uso al quale il prodotto può essere ragionevolmente destinato; e (c) il momento della messa in circolazione del prodotto; un prodotto non è difettoso per il solo fatto che un prodotto più perfezionato sia stato messo in circolazione successivamente.

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3:205. Articolo: Danno cagionato da veicoli a motore (1) Il custode di un veicolo a motore risponde del danno alla persona e della perdita conseguente, della perdita ai sensi dell’articolo 2:202 e del danno alle cose (diverse dal veicolo e dal suo carico) occorso in un incidente stradale verificatosi nell’utilizzo del veicolo. (2) «Veicolo a motore» è ogni veicolo azionato da una forza meccanica e destinato allo spostamento via terra, esclusi i veicoli che procedono su rotaie e i rimorchi, siano o meno agganciati alla motrice. 3:206. Articolo: Danno cagionato da sostanze o emissioni pericolose (1) Il custode di una sostanza o l’operatore di un impianto risponde del danno alla persona e della perdita conseguente, della perdita ai sensi dell’articolo 2:202, del danno alle cose e degli eventuali oneri sostenuti ai sensi dell’articolo 2:209 cagionati dalla sostanza o dalle emissioni dall’impianto, se: (a) avuto riguardo alla loro quantità e qualità al momento dell’emissione o, se questa non si è verificata, al momento del contatto con la sostanza, era altamente probabile che la sostanza o l’emissione avrebbero cagionato un tale danno in mancanza di un controllo adeguato, e (b) il danno è conseguenza della realizzazione di quel pericolo. (2) Il termine «sostanza» comprende le sostanze chimiche (solide, liquide o gassose). I microorganismi sono considerati sostanze. (3) Il termine «emissione»comprende: (a) il rilascio o la fuga di sostanze, (b) la conduzione di elettricità, (c) il calore, la luce e altre radiazioni, (d) il rumore e altre vibrazioni, e (e) altri effetti intangibili sull’ambiente. (4) Il termine «impianto» comprende gli impianti mobili, gli impianti in costruzione e quelli non in funzione. (5) Tuttavia non risponde del danno secondo questo articolo colui che: (a) è custode della sostanza o gestisce l’impianto per scopi estranei alla sua impresa o professione; o (b) prova che non c’è stata violazione delle norme di legge che stabiliscono le misure di controllo della sostanza o di gestione dell’impianto. 3:207. Articolo: Altri casi di danno Si risponde infine del danno nei casi previsti dalla legge nazionale quando (a) il fatto non rientra tra quelli di cui agli articoli 3:104-3:205, (b) riguardi sostanze o emissioni o (c) sia disciplinato in deroga all’articolo 3:204 (4)(e). 3:208. Articolo: Abbandono Questa Sezione si applica anche quando colui che dovrebbe rispondere del danno cagionato da un immobile, un veicolo, una sostanza o un impianto lo abbia abbandonato; ciò fino a quando altri non ne assuma a sua volta un controllo indipendente o ne diventi il custode o l’operatore. Questa norma si applica analogamente, per quanto di ragione, anche alla custodia di un animale.

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4. Capitolo: Nesso di Causalità 4:101. Articolo: Norma generale (1) Risponde del danno l’autore della condotta causalmente rilevante o colui al quale sia rifiribile la fonte di pericolo che lo ha cagionato. (2) Nei casi di danno alla persona o di morte non rileva sul piano causale la predisposizione della persona lesa al tipo e al grado della lesione subita. 4:102. Articolo: Compartecipazione La condotta di chi concorre con altri, li istiga o li assiste in maniera significativa nel cagionare un danno si considera causa del danno. 4:103. Articolo: Cause alternative Quando un danno giuridicamente rilevante può essere stato cagionato da un fatto o da una serie di fatti imputabili a persone diverse ed è accertato che il danno è stato cagionato da uno di questi fatti ma non da quale, si presume fino a prova contraria che ognuno di coloro ai quali è imputato uno di tali fatti abbia cagionato il danno.

5. Capitolo: Cause di Giustificazione 1. Sezione: Consenso o condotta del danneggiato 5:101. Articolo: Consenso o assunzione del rischio (1) Il consenso valido del danneggiato che sia consapevole o dovrebbe essere consapevole delle conseguenze di tale consenso costituisce causa di giustificazione. (2) Costituisce altresì causa di giustificazione l’esposizione volontaria del danneggiato al rischio conosciuto del danno che si è verificato e che si debba ritenere da lui accettato. 5:102. Articolo: Concorso di colpa e imputazione del danno (1) Quando il danneggiato concorre con propria colpa alla causazione dell’ evento o ad incrementare la misura del danno, il risarcimento è diminuito secondo la gravità della sua colpa. (2) Tuttavia non rilevano: (a) una colpa del danneggiato che sia trascurabile; (b) un contributo causale trascurabile della condotta del danneggiato o del fatto ad esso imputabile; e (c) il concorso di colpa del danneggiato nel danno alla persona derivante da circolazione di veicoli a motore salvo che si tratti di colpa grave in relazione alle circostanze. (3) I paragrafi (1) e (2) si applicano analogamente quando una persona di cui il danneggiato è responsabile ai sensi dell’articolo 3:201 concorre con la propria colpa a causare l’ evento o a incrementare la misura del danno.

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(4) Il risarcimento è parimenti diminuito se e in quanto un’altra fonte di pericolo della quale il danneggiato è responsabile ai sensi del Capitolo terzo concorre alla causazione dell’evento o a incrementare la misura del danno.

5:103. Articolo: Danno cagionato dall’autore di un reato a colui che concorre nel reato Non è risarcibile il danno cagionato senza dolo, durante la commissione di un reato, ad un’altra persona che concorre nel reato o altrimenti partecipa alla sua commissione quando il risarcimento sarebbe contrario all’ordine pubblico e al buon costume.

2. Sezione: Interessi di persone a cui il fatto sia imputabile o di terzi 5:201. Articolo: Potere conferito dalla legge L’esercizio di un potere conferito dalla legge costituisce causa di giustificazione. 5:202. Articolo: Legittima difesa, soccorso necessitato, gestione d’affari e stato di necessità (1) E’ giustificato colui che cagiona un danno nella difesa ragionevole di un diritto o di un interesse giuridicamente meritevole di tutela del quale sia titolare o sia titolare un terzo quando il danneggiato abbia messo in pericolo il diritto o l’interesse protetto. Non si applica l’articolo 3:103. (2) La stessa regola si applica al danno cagionato dal gestore d’affari all’interessato quando non vi sia stata violazione degli obblighi del gestore. (3) Non si fa luogo al risarcimento del danno patrimoniale cagionato in una situazione di pericolo imminente di danno alla vita, alla integrità fisica o alla libertà al fine di difendere se stessi o un terzo. Al danneggiato è dovuta soltanto un’equa indennità. 5:203. Articolo: Tutela di un interesse pubblico Costituisce causa di giustificazione la necessità di proteggere valori fondamentali della società democratica, in particolare quando il danno è cagionato divulgando un’informazione attraverso i mezzi di comunicazione.

3. Sezione: Mancanza di controllo 5:301. Articolo: Incapacità di intendere o di volere (1) Il danno cagionato da una persona incapace di intendere o di volere è suscettibile di riparazione solo quando sia equo ripararlo, avuto riguardo alle condizioni economiche delle parti e a tutte le altre circostanze. E’ dovuta soltanto un’equa indennità. (2) Una persona si considera incapace di intendereo di volere quando manca di discernimento sufficiente per capire la natura del proprio comportamento, salvo che tale mancanzasia conseguenza di una precedente condotta reprensibile.

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5:302. Articolo: Forza maggiore Non si risponde del danno cagionato da un evento anomalo che non può essere evitato con alcuna misura ragionevole e che non costituisca rischio imputabile.

4. Sezione: Esclusione e limitazione contrattuale della responsabilità 5:401. Articolo: Esclusione e limitazione contrattuale della responsabilità (1) La responsabilità per condotta dolosa non può essere esclusa o limitata. (2) La responsabilità per violazione grave della diligenza che le circostanze chiaramente richiedono non può essere esclusa o limitata (a) in caso di danno alla persona (inclusa la lesione letale), o (b) se l’esclusione o la limitazione è altrimenti illecita o contraria alla buona fede e alla correttezza. (3) La responsabilità ai sensi dell’articolo 3:204 non può essere ridotta o limitata. (4) Negli altri casi regolati da questo Libro la responsabilità può essere esclusa o limitata salvo che la legge disponga diversamente.

5. Sezione: Perdita ai sensi dell’Articolo 2:202 5:501. Articolo: Efficacia delle cause di giustificazione nei confronti di terzi Le cause di giustificazione nei confronti del danneggiato valgono anche nei confronti dei terzi che hanno subito una perdita ai sensi dell’articolo 2:202.

6. Capitolo: Mezzi di Tutela 1. Sezione: Riparazione in generale 6:101. Articolo: Scopo e modalità della riparazione (1) La riparazione ha lo scopo di reintegrare il danneggiato nella posizione in cui si sarebbe trovato se il danno non si fosse verificato. (2) La riparazione può avvenire in denaro (risarcimento per equivalente) o in altro modo più opportuno, avuto riguardo al tipo, alla misura del danno e a ogni altra circostanza. (3) Nel danno alle cose il risarcimento per equivalente deve corrispondere alla diminuzione di valore e non al costo della riparazione se il costo di questa supera in maniera irragionevole la diminuzione di valore. Nel caso di animali questa disposizione si applica solo in quanto sia opportuno nel caso concreto, avuto riguardo alle ragioni per cui l’animale veniva tenuto dal danneggiato. (4) Quale alternativa alla reintegrazione ai sensi del paragrafo (1), ma solo quando risulti ragionevole, in luogo della riparazione la persona alla quale il danno è imputabile può essere obbligata alla restituzione dell’arricchimento conseguito mediante la causazione del danno. 143

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6:102. Articolo: «De Minimis» Non è risarcibile il danno di scarsa importanza. 6:103. Articolo: Compensatio lucri cum damno (1) Non si verifica la compensatio lucri cum damno salvo che lo esiga l’equità. (2) A tal fine si deve aver riguardo al tipo di danno, alla natura del criterio di imputazione e, se il profitto proviene da un terzo, alle ragioni della attribuzione. 6:104. Articolo: Pluralità di danneggiati In caso di pluralità di danneggiati, quando il risarcimento di uno di essi ripara anche il danno degli altri, si applicano gli articoli III.–4:201-207 con gli opportuni adattamenti. 6:105. Articolo: Responsabilità solidale Quando più persone sono responsabili dello stesso danno, tutte sono obbligate in solido. 6:106. Articolo: Cessione della pretesa risarcitoria Il credito al risarcimento del danno, compreso il danno non patrimoniale, può essere ceduto.

2. Sezione: Risarcimento 6:201. Articolo: Facoltà di scelta del danneggiato Il danneggiato può scegliere di impiegare o meno la somma ottenuta a titolo di risarcimento per il ripristino del suo interesse violato. 6:202. Articolo: Riduzione della responsabilità Quando il fatto non sia doloso e appaia equo, il responsabile può essere liberato in tutto o in parte dell’ obbligazione di risarcimento del danno, se in tale misura la responsabilità sarebbe sproporzionata rispetto all’imputazione del fatto, alla misura del danno o alla tutela inibitoria. 6:203. Articolo: Liquidazione del danno (1) Il risarcimento per equivalente deve essere liquidato in un’unica soluzione, salvo che ricorra un motivo valido per un pagamento periodico. (2) La legge nazionale stabilisce le modalità di liquidazione del danno alla persona e del danno non patrimoniale. 6:204. Articolo: Risarcimento nella lesione per sé La lesione per sé va risarcita a prescindere dal risarcimento del danno patrimoniale o non patrimoniale.

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3. Sezione: Inibitoria 6:301. Articolo: Inibitoria in generale (1) L’azione inibitoria è consentita solo in quanto (a) la riparazione non costituirebbe una tutela adeguata; (b) sia d’altra parte ragionevole che colui al quale sarebbe imputato il fatto impedisca che esso si verifichi. (2) Quando la fonte di pericolo sia una cosa o un animale e non è ragionevolmente possibile, per la persona esposta al pericolo, evitarlo, l’inibitoria comprende il diritto di far eliminare la fonte di pericolo. 6:302. Articolo: Responsabilità per la perdita cagionata nell’impedire il verificarsi del danno Una persona che ha ragionevolmente sostenuto delle spese o ha subito altra perdita per impedire il verificarsi di un danno il cui pericolo è imminente, o per contenere l’entità del danno, ha diritto al risarcimento del danno nei confronti di colui al quale il fatto sarebbe imputato.

7. Capitolo: Disposizioni Accessorie 7:101. Articolo: Diritto costituzionale nazionale Le disposizioni di questo Libro devono essere interpretate ed applicate in modo che siano compatibili con le norme costituzionali del giudice competente. 7:102. Articolo: Disposizioni di legge La legge nazionale stabilisce quali norme giuridiche sono disposizioni di legge. 7:103. Articolo: Funzioni sovrane e procedimento giurisdizionale Questo Libro non disciplina la responsabilità di una persona o di un ente che derivi dall’esercizio di funzioni di diritto pubblico o dall’adempimento di obblighi nel corso di un procedimento giurisdizionale. 7:104. Articolo: Responsabilità dei lavoratori subordinati, dei datori di lavoro, dei sindacati e delle associazioni dei datori di lavoro Questo Libro non disciplina la responsabilità (a) dei lavoratori dipendenti (sia nei confronti di altri dipendenti, che del datore di lavoro o di terzi), nell’ambito del rapporto di lavoro, (b) dei datori di lavoro nei confronti dei lavoratori dipendenti nell’ambito del rapporto di lavoro, e (c) delle associazioni sindacali e delle associazioni dei datori di lavoro nel corso di conflitti sindacali.

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7:105. Articolo: Riduzione o esclusione della responsabilità di risarcire un soggetto Se una persona ha diritto ad altro titolo ad essere ristorata in tutto o in parte del danno da lei subito, in particolare da un assicuratore, un fondo o altro ente, la legge nazionale stabilisce se in virtù di tale diritto la responsabilità ai sensi di questo Libro è limitata o esclusa.

Polish1 Niekontraktowa odpowiedzialnos´´c za szkode˛ wyrza˛dzona˛ drugiemu Rozdział 1: Postanowienia podstawowe Artykuł 1:101: Reguła podstawowa (1) Osoba, która poniosła szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛ ma prawo domagac´ sie˛ jej naprawienia od osoby, która umys´lnie lub nieumys´lnie szkode˛ spowodowała lub odpowiada za nia˛ na innej zasadzie. (2) Jez˙eli szkoda nie została spowodowana umys´lnie lub nieumys´lnie sprawca ponosi odpowiedzialnos´´c jedynie jez˙eli przepisy Rozdziału 3 tak stanowia˛. Artykuł 1:102: Zapobiez˙enie szkodzie W razie zagroz˙enia szkoda˛, niniejsza Ksie˛ga przyznaje osobie, która moz˙e ponies´´c szkode˛, prawo zapobiez˙enia szkodzie. Prawo to przysługuje przeciwko osobie, która ponosiłaby odpowiedzialnos´´c za spowodowanie szkody, jez˙eli ta by nasta˛piła.

Artykuł 1:103: Zakres stosowania Artykuły 1:101 i 1:102: (a) stosuje sie˛ wyła˛cznie zgodnie z postanowieniami niniejszej Ksie˛gi; (b) stosuje sie˛ do osób prawnych i do osób fizycznych, chyba ˙ze postanowiono inaczej; (c) nie stosuje sie˛, jez˙eli ich zastosowanie byłoby sprzeczne z celem innych zasad prawa prywatnego oraz (d) nie uchybiaja˛ ´srodkom prawnym doste˛pnym na innej podstawie prawnej.

Rozdział 2: Szkoda prawnie doniosła Oddział 1: Postanowienia ogólne Artykuł 2:101: Znaczenie doniosłos´ci prawnej szkody (1) Szkoda, zarówno maja˛tkowa, jak i niemaja˛tkowa, albo szkoda na osobie jest szkoda˛ prawnie doniosła˛, jez˙eli: ´ okres´lonych w niniejszym rozdziale tak stanowi; (a) jedno z postanowien (b) szkoda albo szkoda na osobie wynika z naruszenia prawa przyznanego ustawa˛

1

Translated by Dr. Katarzyna Michalowska (Warsaw).

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(c) szkoda albo szkoda na osobie wynika z naruszenia interesu zasługuja˛cego na ochrone˛ prawna˛. (2) W kaz˙dym z przypadków, o których mowa w literze (b) lub (c) uste˛pu (1) szkoda albo szkoda na osobie stanowi szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛ wyła˛cznie wtedy, jez˙eli byłoby słuszne i rozsa˛dne przyznanie prawa do naprawienia lub zapobiez˙enia szkodzie, zgodnie z postanowieniami artykułu 1:101 albo 1:102. (3) Przy rozstrzyganiu, czy byłoby słuszne i rozsa˛dne przyznanie prawa do naprawienia lub zapobiez˙enia szkodzie, uwzgle˛dnia sie˛ podstawe˛ ponoszenia odpowiedzialnos´ci, istote˛ i bliskos´´c powia˛zania zdarzenia ze szkoda˛ lub zagroz˙eniem wysta˛pienia szkody, uzasadnione oczekiwania poszkodowanego lub osoby, której grozi szkoda, oraz wzgle˛dy porza˛dku publicznego. ´ niniejszej Ksie˛gi: (4) Stosownie do postanowien (a) szkoda maja˛tkowa obejmuje utracone korzys´ci, poniesione cie˛˙zary i zmniejszenie wartos´ci maja˛tku (b) szkoda niemaja˛tkowa obejmuje ból, cierpienie i pogorszenie jakos´ci ˙zycia.

Oddział 2: Poszczególne przypadki szkody prawnie doniosłej Artykuł 2:201: Szkoda na osobie i szkoda naste˛pcza (1) Szkoda wyrza˛dzona osobie fizycznej w wyniku uszkodzenia ciała lub wywołania rozstroju zdrowia oraz krzywda stanowia˛ przypadki szkody prawnie doniosłej. (2) Stosownie do niniejszych Zasad: (a) taka szkoda obejmuje koszty opieki zdrowotnej, w tym uzasadnione wydatki osób bliskich na opieke˛ nad poszkodowanym oraz (b) szkoda na osobie obejmuje pogorszenie zdrowia psychicznego wyła˛cznie w przypadku, gdy stanowi to przypadek chorobowy. Artykuł 2:202: Szkoda osoby trzeciej wskutek wyrza˛dzenia innemu szkody na osobie lub ´smierci bezpos´rednio poszkodowanego (1) Szkoda niemaja˛tkowa wyrza˛dzona osobie fizycznej wskutek poniesienia przez inna˛ osobe˛ szkody na osobie albo ´smierci innej osoby jest szkoda˛ prawnie doniosła˛, jez˙eli w momencie wyrza˛dzenia szkody na osobie istniały pomie˛dzy nimi szczególnie bliskie wie˛zy osobiste. (2) W razie wywołania ´smiertelnego uszkodzenia ciała: (a) szkoda prawnie doniosła wyrza˛dzona zmarłemu tytułem uszkodzenia ciała w momencie ´smierci staje sie˛ szkoda˛ prawnie doniosła˛ spadkobierców zmarłego; (b) uzasadnione koszty pogrzebu stanowia˛ szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛ osoby, która je poniosła; (c) utrata ˙zywiciela stanowi szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛ osoby fizycznej, której zmarły dostarczał ´srodków utrzymania lub, o ile nie poniósłby ´smieci, wobec której wykonywałby ustawowy obowia˛zek alimentacyjny lub której zmarły ´swiadczył opieke˛ i wsparcie finansowe.

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Artykuł 2:203: Naruszenie godnos´ci osobistej, wolnos´ci i prywatnos´ci (1) Szkoda wyrza˛dzona osobie fizycznej wskutek naruszenia jej prawa do poszanowania jej godnos´ci osobistej, na przykład wolnos´ci lub prywatnos´ci, oraz krzywda stanowia˛ szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛. (2) Szkoda wyrza˛dzona osobie wskutek naruszenia jej czci oraz krzywda równiez˙ stanowia˛ szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛, jez˙eli prawo krajowe tak stanowi. Artykuł 2:204: Szkoda wyrza˛dzona wskutek przekazania nieprawdziwych informacji o osobie Szkoda wyrza˛dzona osobie wskutek przekazania informacji o niej, co do której przekazuja˛cy informacje wie lub wiedziec´ powinien, ˙ze sa˛ one nieprawdziwe, jesz szkoda˛ prawnie doniosła˛. Artykuł 2:205: Szkoda wyrza˛dzona wskutek przekazania poufnych informacji Szkoda wyrza˛dzona osobie wskutek przekazania informacji, o których poufnym charakterze dla osoby ponosza˛cej szkode˛, ze wzgle˛du na charakter informacji lub okolicznos´ci w jakich zostały uzyskane, osoba przekazuja˛ca te informacje wie lub powinna wiedziec´, stanowi szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛. Artykuł 2:206: Szkoda wyrza˛dzona przez naruszenie prawa własnos´ci albo posiadania zgodnego z prawem (1) Szkoda wyrza˛dzona wskutek naruszenia prawa własnos´ci albo zgodnego z prawem posiadania rzeczy ruchomej lub nieruchomos´ci stanowi szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛. (2) W niniejszym artykule: (a) szkoda obejmuje pozbawienie moz˙liwos´ci wykonywania prawa własnos´ci; (b) naruszenie prawa maja˛tkowego obejmuje zniszczenie lub fizyczne uszkodzenie przedmiotu prawa (uszkodzenie mienia), rozporza˛dzenie prawem, zakłócanie korzystania z prawa lub innego rodzaju ingerencje˛ w wykonywanie prawa. Artykuł 2:207: Szkoda poniesiona wskutek polegania na niewłas´ciwej poradzie lub informacji Szkoda wyrza˛dzona wskutek tego, ˙ze poszkodowany przy podejmowaniu decyzji działał w rozsa˛dnym zaufaniu do niewłas´ciwej porady lub informacji, jest szkoda˛ prawnie doniosła˛, jez˙eli: (a) porada lub informacja zostały udzielone w ramach wykonywania zawodu lub działalnos´ci gospodarczej; oraz (b) podmiot udzielaja˛cy porady lub informacji wiedział lub powinien był wiedziec´, ˙ze jej odbiorca be˛dzie polegał na poradzie lub informacji przy podejmowaniu decyzji danego rodzaju. Artykuł 2:208: Szkoda poniesiona wskutek bezprawnego zakłócania działalnos´ci gospodarczej (1) Szkoda wyrza˛dzona wskutek bezprawnego zakłócania wykonywania przez poszkodowanego jego zawodu lub prowadzenia przez niego działalnos´ci gospodarczej jest szkoda˛ prawnie doniosła˛. (2) Szkoda wyrza˛dzona konsumentowi wskutek stosowania praktyk nieuczciwej konkurencji równiez˙ stanowi szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛, jez˙eli prawo wspólnotowe lub krajowe tak stanowi.

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´ stwo wskutek Artykuł 2:209: Cie˛˙zary poniesione przez Pan zniszczenia ´srodowiska naturalnego ´ stwo lub wskazane odpowiednie organy na odtworzenie zniszczoCie˛˙zary poniesione przez Pan nych w znacznym stopniu składników ´srodowiska naturalnego, takich jak powietrze, woda, gleba, ´swiat ros´lin i zwierza˛t, stanowia˛ szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛ Pan´ stwa lub odpowiednich organów. Artykuł 2:210: Szkoda poniesiona wskutek zawinionego złoz˙enia os´wiadczenia wprowadzaja˛cego w bła˛d (1) Z zastrzez˙eniem innych postanowien´ niniejszego oddziału, szkoda wyrza˛dzona wskutek zawinionego złoz˙enia os´wiadczenia wprowadzaja˛cego poszkodowanego w bła˛d, zawartego w wypowiedzi lub wynikaja˛cego z okres´lonego zachowania, jest szkoda˛ prawnie doniosła˛. (2) Os´wiadczenie wprowadzaja˛ce w bła˛d jest złoz˙one w sposób zawiniony, jez˙eli składaja˛cy wie lub sa˛dzi, ˙ze os´wiadczenie jest fałszywe, i składa je z zamiarem wprowadzenia odbiorcy w bła˛d. Artykuł 2:211: Szkoda poniesiona wskutek nakłonienia do naruszenia (złamania) zobowia˛zania Nie uchybiaja˛c pozostałym przepisom niniejszej Sekcji, uszczerbek be˛da˛cy wynikiem nakłonienia do naruszenia zobowia˛zania stanowi szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛ tylko wtedy: (a) gdy istniało zobowia˛zanie wobec poszkodowanego oraz (b) osoba nakłaniaja˛ca do naruszenia zobowia˛zania: (i) obejmowała zamiarem naruszenie przez osobe˛ trzecia˛ zobowia˛zania oraz (ii) nie działała w celu ochrony swoich uzasadnionych interesów.

Rozdział 3: Odpowiedzialnos´´c Oddział 1: Umys´lnos´´c i niedbalstwo Artykuł 3:101: Umys´lnos´´c Umys´lnie powoduje szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛ ten, kto powoduje szkode˛: (a) maja˛c zamiar wyrza˛dzic´ szkode˛ danego rodzaju albo (b) zachowaniem obje˛tym swoim zamiarem, przy ´swiadomos´ci, ˙ze dana szkoda lub szkoda danego rodzaju, zostanie wyrza˛dzona albo ˙ze wysta˛pienie szkody jest niemal pewne. Artykuł 3:102: Niedbalstwo Przez niedbalstwo powoduje szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛ ten, kto powoduje szkode˛ zachowaniem, które: (a) nie spełnia kryteriów nalez˙ytej starannos´ci okres´lonych w przepisach ustawy, maja˛cych na celu ochrone˛ poszkodowanego przed poniesiona˛ szkoda˛ albo (b) nie odpowiada starannos´ci wymaganej od wykazuja˛cej rozsa˛dna˛ starannos´´c osoby działaja˛cej w danych okolicznos´ciach.

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Artykuł 3:103: Osoby poniz˙ej osiemnastego roku ˙zycia (1) Osoba poniz˙ej osiemnastego roku ˙zycia ponosi odpowiedzialnos´´c za spowodowanie szkody prawnie doniosłej zgodnie z artykułem 3:102(b), o ile nie wykazała starannos´ci, jakiej moz˙na oczekiwac´ od wykazuja˛cej rozsa˛dna˛ starannos´´c osoby w tym wieku w danych okolicznos´ciach. (2) Osoba w wielu poniz˙ej siódmego roku ˙zycia nie ponosi odpowiedzialnos´ci za spowodowanie szkody umys´lnie ani przez niedbalstwo. (3) Jednakz˙e postanowienia uste˛pów (1) i (2) nie stosuja˛ sie˛, o ile: (a) poszkodowany nie moz˙e uzyskac´ naprawienia szkody na podstawie niniejszej Ksie˛gi od innej osoby i (b) odpowiedzialnos´´c odszkodowawcza odpowiada wzgle˛dom słusznos´ci przy uwzgle˛dnieniu stanu maja˛tkowego stron i innych okolicznos´ci sprawy. Artykuł 3:104: Odpowiedzialnos´´c za szkode˛ spowodowana˛ przez dzieci lub osoby pozostaja˛ce pod nadzorem (1) Rodzice albo inne osoby maja˛ce ustawowy obowia˛zek sprawowania opieki rodzicielskiej nad osoba˛ poniz˙ej czternastego roku ˙zycia ponosza˛ odpowiedzialnos´´c za spowodowanie szkody prawnie doniosłej, jez˙eli małoletni wyrza˛dzi szkode˛ zachowaniem, które stanowiłoby przypadek niedbalstwa, gdyby dopus´ciła sie˛ go osoba dorosła. (2) Instytucja lub inna jednostka organizacyjna maja˛ca obowia˛zek sprawowania nadzoru nad osoba˛ ponosza˛ odpowiedzialnos´´c za spowodowanie osobie trzeciej szkody prawnie doniosłej, jez˙eli: (a) szkoda˛ jest szkoda na osobie, szkoda w rozumieniu artykułu 2:202 albo szkoda na mieniu; (b) osoba, wobec której instytucja lub inna jednostka organizacyjna ma obowia˛zek sprawowac´ nadzór, spowodowała szkode˛ umys´lnie albo przez niedbalstwo, a w przypadku osoby w wieku poniz˙ej osiemnastego roku ˙zycia, zachowaniem, które stanowiłoby działanie umys´lne lub niedbalstwo, gdyby było to zachowanie osoby dorosłej oraz (c) prawdopodobne jest, ˙ze osoba, wobec której maja˛ one obowia˛zek sprawowac´ nadzór, wyrza˛dzi szkode˛ danego rodzaju. (3) Jednakz˙e nie ponosi odpowiedzialnos´ci na podstawie niniejszego artykułu za spowodowanie szkody ten, kto wykaz˙e, ˙ze nie wyste˛powały braki w nadzorze nad sprawca˛ szkody.

Oddział 2: Odpowiedzialnos´´c w braku umys´lnos´ci lub niedbalstwa Artykuł 3:201: Odpowiedzialnos´´c za szkode˛ spowodowana˛ przez pracowników i przedstawicieli (1) Kto zatrudnia lub na podobnych zasadach angaz˙uje inna˛ osobe˛ ponosi odpowiedzialnos´´c za spowodowanie szkody prawnie doniosłej osoby trzeciej, jez˙eli zatrudniony lub zaangaz˙owany przez niego: (a) spowodował szkode˛ w toku zatrudnienia lub wykonywania powierzonych czynnos´ci, (b) spowodował szkode˛ umys´lnie albo przez niedbalstwo albo na innych zasadach ponosi odpowiedzialnos´´c za spowodowanie szkody.

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(2) Uste˛p (1) stosuje sie˛ odpowiednio do osoby prawnej w stosunku do przedstawiciela, który powoduje szkode˛ w toku wykonywania swoich czynnos´ci. Przedstawicielem jest osoba upowaz˙niona na podstawie statutu do dokonywania czynnos´ci prawnych w imieniu osoby prawnej.

Artykuł 3:202: Odpowiedzialnos´´c za szkode˛ spowodowana˛ niebezpiecznym stanem nieruchomos´ci (1) Kto samodzielnie sprawuje piecze˛ nad nieruchomos´cia˛ odpowiada za spowodowanie szkody na osobie i szkody naste˛pczej, szkody w rozumieniu artykułu 2:202 oraz szkody wynikaja˛cej z uszkodzenia mienia (innego niz˙ sama nieruchomos´´c ), wynikaja˛cej ze stanu nieruchomos´ci, który nie zapewnia bezpieczen´ stwa, jakiego osoba znajduja˛ca sie˛ na nieruchomos´ci lub w jej sa˛siedztwie moz˙e sie˛ spodziewac´ w danych okolicznos´ciach, w tym ze wzgle˛du na: (a) charakter nieruchomos´ci (b) doste˛p do nieruchomos´ci oraz (c) koszt uniknie˛cia popadnie˛cia nieruchomos´ci w taki stan. (2) Samodzielnie sprawuje piecze˛ nad nieruchomos´cia˛ ten, kto sprawuje tego rodzaju piecze˛, ˙ze ´ obowia˛zku zapobiez˙enia szkodzie prawnie doniosłej w zakresie rozsa˛dne jest nałoz˙enie nan wyznaczonym postanowieniami niniejszego artykułu. (3) Za samodzielnie sprawuja˛cego piecze˛ nad nieruchomos´cia˛ uwaz˙any jest jej włas´ciciel, chyba ˙ze włas´ciciel wykaz˙e, ˙ze piecze˛ nad nieruchomos´cia˛ sprawuje samodzielnie inna osoba. Artykuł 3:203: Odpowiedzialnos´´c za szkode˛ wyrza˛dzona˛ przez zwierze˛ta Kto chowa zwierze˛, ponosi odpowiedzialnos´´c za spowodowanie przez zwierze˛ szkody na osobie i szkody naste˛pczej, szkody w rozumieniu artykułu 2:202 oraz szkody wynikaja˛cej z uszkodzenia mienia. Artykuł 3:204: Odpowiedzialnos´´c za szkode˛ wyrza˛dzona˛ przez wadliwe produkty (1) Producent produktu ponosi odpowiedzialnos´´c za spowodowanie szkody na osobie i szkody naste˛pczej, szkody w rozumieniu artykułu 2:202 oraz, w stosunku do konsumentów, szkody wynikaja˛cej z uszkodzenia mienia (innego niz˙ sam produkt) wynikaja˛cej z wady produktu. (2) Uste˛p 1 stosuje sie˛ odpowiednio do tego, kto sprowadza produkt na Europejski Obszar Gospodarczy celem jego odsprzedaz˙y, wynajmu, leasingu lub rozprowadzania w ramach swojej działalnos´ci gospodarczej. (3) Uste˛p 1 stosuje sie˛ odpowiednio do sprzedawcy produktu, jez˙eli: (a) nie moz˙na ustalic´ producenta albo (b) w przypadku produktu importowanego, na produkcie nie jest oznaczony jego importer (niezalez˙nie od tego, czy oznaczona jest nazwa producenta), chyba ˙ze sprzedawca poinformuje poszkodowanego, w rozsa˛dnym terminie, o tym, kto jest producentem albo o tym, kto dostarczył mu produkt. (4) Nie ponosi odpowiedzialnos´ci za spowodowanie szkody na podstawie niniejszego artykułu ten, kto wykaz˙e, ˙ze: (a) nie wprowadził produktu do obrotu; (b) wada, która spowodowała szkode˛ prawdopodobnie nie wyste˛powała w czasie, gdy wprowadził on produkt do obrotu; (c) nie wytworzył produktu celem odsprzedaz˙y albo rozprowadzania w celu gospodarczym, ani nie wytworzył i nie rozprowadzał go w ramach swej działalnos´ci gospodarczej; 152

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(d) wada wynika z koniecznos´ci dostosowania produktu do bezwzgle˛dnie obowia˛zuja˛cych przepisów wydanych przez władze publiczne; (e) stan wiedzy naukowej i technicznej w czasie, gdy wprowadził on produkt do obrotu nie umoz˙liwiał wykrycia wady lub (f) w przypadku producenta cze˛´sci składowej, wada wynika z (i) konstrukcji produktu, w którym cze˛´s´c ta została zamontowana lub (ii) instrukcji udzielonych przez producenta produktu. (5) „Producent“ oznacza: ´ cowego albo cze˛´sci składowej – wytwórce˛; (a) w przypadku produktu kon (b) w przypadku surowców, tego, kto je wydobywa oraz (c) kaz˙dego, kto przez oznaczenie produktu własna˛ nazwa˛, znakiem towarowym albo innym oznaczeniem odróz˙niaja˛cym, podaje sie˛ za producenta. (6) „Produkt“ oznacza rzecz ruchoma˛, nawet poła˛czona˛ z inna˛ rzecza˛ ruchoma˛ albo nieruchomos´cia˛, jak równiez˙ energie˛ elektryczna˛. (7) Produkt jest wadliwy, jez˙eli nie zapewnia bezpieczen´ stwa, jakiego moz˙na sie˛ spodziewac´, uwzgle˛dniaja˛c okolicznos´ci, w tym: (a) sposób prezentacji produktu; (b) uz˙ycie produktu, jakiego rozsa˛dnie moz˙na sie˛ spodziewac´ oraz (c) czas, w jakim został on wprowadzony do obrotu, jednakz˙e produkt nie jest wadliwy tylko dlatego, ˙ze póz´niej wprowadzono do obrotu produkt ulepszony.

Artykuł 3:205: Odpowiedzialnos´´c za szkode˛ wyrza˛dzona˛ przez ruch pojazdów mechanicznych (1) Posiadacz pojazdu mechanicznego ponosi odpowiedzialnos´´c za spowodowanie szkody na osobie i szkody naste˛pczej, szkody w rozumieniu artykułu 2:202 oraz szkody wynikaja˛cej z uszkodzenia mienia (innego niz˙ pojazd mechaniczny i jego ładunek) w wypadku drogowym, który wynika z uz˙ycia pojazdu mechanicznego. (2) „Pojazd mechaniczny“ oznacza kaz˙dy pojazd przeznaczony do podróz˙owania po la˛dzie, wprawiany w ruch siła˛ mechaniczna˛, ale nie pojazd poruszaja˛cy sie˛ po szynach, oraz przyczepe˛, niezalez˙nie od tego, czy jest sprze˛˙zona, czy nie. Artykuł 3:206: Odpowiedzialnos´´c za szkode˛ wyrza˛dzona˛ przez substancje niebezpieczne oraz emisje (1) Posiadacz substancji oraz operator instalacji ponosi odpowiedzialnos´´c za spowodowanie przez te˛ substancje˛ albo przez emisje˛ z instalacji szkody na osobie oraz szkody naste˛pczej, szkody w rozumieniu artykułu 2:202, szkody wynikaja˛cej z uszkodzenia mienia oraz obcia˛˙zen´ w rozumieniu artykułu 2:209, jez˙eli: (a) ze wzgle˛du na ich ilos´´c i cechy, w czasie wysta˛pienia emisji albo, w razie braku emisji, w momencie kontaktu z substancja˛ jest bardzo prawdopodobne, ˙ze substancja ta lub emisja spowoduja˛ szkode˛, o ile nie be˛da˛ nalez˙ycie kontrolowane oraz (b) szkoda wynika ze ziszczenia sie˛ tego zagroz˙enia. (2) „Substancja“ obejmuje substancje chemiczne (w postaci stałej, płynnej lub gazowej). Mikroorganizmy uwaz˙a sie˛ za substancje. (3) „Emisja“ obejmuje: (a) uwolnienie lub wydostanie sie˛ substancji (b) przewodnictwo energii elektrycznej 153

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(c) promieniowanie cieplne, ´swietlne i inne (d) hałas i inne wibracje (e) inne niematerialne oddziaływanie na ´srodowisko naturalne. (4) „Instalacja“ obejmuje instalacje˛ ruchoma˛ oraz instalacje˛ w budowie i instalacje˛ nieuz˙ywana˛. (5) Jednakz˙e na podstawie niniejszego artykułu nie ponosi odpowiedzialnos´ci za spowodowanie szkody ten, kto: (a) nie przechowuje substancji ani nie wykorzystuje instalacji do celów zwia˛zanych ze swoja˛ działalnos´cia˛ gospodarcza˛ lub zawodowa˛ lub (b) wykaz˙e, ˙ze po jego stronie nie było naruszenia okres´lonych w ustawie zasad przechowywania substancji lub zarza˛dzania instalacja˛.

Artykuł 3:207: Inne wypadki ponoszenia odpowiedzialnos´ci za spowodowanie szkody prawnie doniosłej Odpowiedzialnos´´c za spowodowanie szkody prawnie doniosłej powstaje równiez˙ wtedy, gdy stanowi tak prawo krajowe: (a) dotycza˛ce ´zródła zagroz˙enia niewymienionego w artykułach 3:104-3:205 (b) dotycza˛ce substancji lub emisji lub (c) przewiduja˛ce brak zastosowania artykułu 3:204(4)(e). Artykuł 3:208: Porzucenie Dla celów niniejszego oddziału pozostaje odpowiedzialnym za rzecz ruchoma˛, pojazd, substancje˛ lub instalacje˛ ten, kto je porzuca, do czasu, gdy inna osoba obejmie nad nimi samodzielna˛ kontrole˛, obejmie je w posiadanie lub stanie sie˛ ich operatorem. Zasada ta ma odpowiednie zastosowanie, w granicach rozsa˛dku, do posiadacza zwierze˛cia.

Rozdział 4: Przyczynowos´´c Artykuł 4:101: Zasada ogólna (1) Szkoda prawnie doniosła jest spowodowana działaniem tego, czyjego zachowania szkoda jest skutkiem albo wynika z zagroz˙enia, za które odpowiada ta osoba. (2) W przypadku wysta˛pienia uszkodzenia ciała lub ´smierci, nie bierze sie˛ pod uwage˛ predyspozycji poszkodowanego do poniesienia szkody danego rodzaju lub rozmiaru. Artykuł 4:102: Pomocnictwo Tego, kto uczestniczy w spowodowaniu szkody prawnie doniosłej, podz˙ega lub istotnie dopomaga w spowodowaniu szkody prawnie doniosłej uznaje sie˛ za sprawce˛ szkody.

Artykuł 4:103: Wielos´´c przyczyn Jez˙eli szkoda prawnie doniosła moz˙e wynikac´ z jednego lub wie˛kszej liczby zdarzen´ , za które ponosza˛ odpowiedzialnos´´c róz˙ne osoby i zostanie ustalone, ˙ze szkoda wynikła z jednego z tych ´ , ale nie be˛dzie wiadomo, z którego, w stosunku do kaz˙dego, kto ponosi odpowiedzialzdarzen nos´´c za kaz˙de z tych zdarzen´ , obowia˛zuje wzruszalne domniemanie, ˙ze spowodował szkode˛.

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Rozdział 5: ´Srodki obrony Oddzdział 1: Zgoda lub zachowanie poszkodowanego Artykuł 5:101: Zgoda i działanie na własne ryzyko (1) Osobie przysługuje ´srodek obrony, jez˙eli poszkodowany na osobie skutecznie wyraził zgode˛ na wyrza˛dzenie mu szkody prawnie doniosłej oraz miał lub powinien miec´ ´swiadomos´´c skutków wyraz˙enia zgody. (2) Powyz˙sze postanowienie ma zastosowanie równiez˙ w wypadku, gdy poszkodowany, znaja˛c ryzyko powstania szkody danego rodzaju, dobrowolnie wystawia sie˛ na ryzyko i nalez˙y uznac´, ˙ze je akceptuje. Artykuł 5:102: Zawinione przyczynienie sie˛ i odpowiedzialnos´´c (1) Jez˙eli poszkodowany w sposób zawiniony przyczynił sie˛ do powstania lub do wysokos´ci szkody prawnie doniosłej, obowia˛zek jej naprawienia ulega zmniejszeniu stosownie do stopnia jego winy. (2) Nie uwzgle˛dnia sie˛ jednakz˙e: (a) nieistotnej winy poszkodowanego; (b) winy lub innych okolicznos´ci obje˛tych odpowiedzialnos´cia˛, jez˙eli ich wpływ na zwia˛zek przyczynowy jest nieistotny; (c) nieostroz˙nos´´c poszkodowanego maja˛cego wpływ na jego rozstrój zdrowia, spowodowany przez pojazd mechaniczny w wypadku drogowym, chyba ˙ze nieostroz˙nos´´c ta stanowiła raz˙˛ace naruszenie reguł oczywis´cie wymaganych w danych okolicznos´ciach. (3) Paragrafy 1 i 2 stosuje sie˛ odpowiednio, jez˙eli na rozmiar szkody miała wpływ wina osoby, za która˛ poszkodowany jest odpowiedzialny stosownie do art. 3:201. (4) Obowia˛zek naprawienia szkody podlega zmniejszeniu takz˙e wtedy, gdy innego rodzaju niebezpieczen´ stwo, za które stosownie do przepisów Rozdziału 3 poszkodowany jest odpowiedzialny, ma wpływ na powstanie i rozmiar szkody. Artykuł 5:103: Szkoda wyrza˛dzona przez przeste˛pce˛ swojemu pomocnikowi Szkoda prawnie doniosła wyrza˛dzona nieumys´lnie w czasie popełniania czynu przeste˛pnego innej osobie uczestnicza˛cej lub w inny sposób pomagaja˛cej w wyrza˛dzeniu tego czynu nie skutkuje powstaniem roszczenia o jej naprawienie, o ile byłoby ono sprzeczne z zasadami porza˛dku publicznego.

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Oddział 2: Interesy osób ponosza˛cych odpowiedzialnos´´c lub osób trzecich Artykuł 5:201: Uprawnienia wynikaja˛ce z ustawy Osobie przysługuje ´srodek obrony, jez˙eli szkoda prawnie doniosła została spowodowana wykonywaniem uprawnien´ wynikaja˛cych z ustawy. Artykuł 5:202: Samoobrona, prowadzenie cudzych spraw bez zlecenia i stan wyz˙szej koniecznos´ci (1) Osobie przysługuje ´srodek obrony, jez˙eli sprawca powoduje szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛ chronia˛c w rozsa˛dnych granicach prawo lub interes godny ochrony prawnej przysługuja˛ce jemu albo osobie trzeciej, a poszkodowany, u którego powstaje szkoda prawnie doniosła, ponosi odpowiedzialnos´´c za spowodowanie zagroz˙enia dla prawa lub chronionego interesu. Dla celów niniejszego uste˛pu nie stosuje sie˛ artykułu 3:103. (2) Powyz˙sza zasada na zastosowanie do szkody prawnie doniosłej spowodowanej przez ˙zyczliwego interwenienta osobie, na której rzecz działa, w przypadku gdy nie dochodzi do naruszenia obowia˛zków prowadza˛cego cudza˛ sprawe˛ bez zlecenia. (3) W wypadku wyrza˛dzenia szkody prawnie doniosłej w maja˛tku innej osoby w sytuacji bezpos´redniego zagroz˙enia ˙zycia, integralnos´ci cielesnej, zdrowia albo wolnos´ci dla ratowania sprawcy albo osoby trzeciej, a niebezpieczen´ stwa nie moz˙na odwrócic´ bez wyrza˛dzania szkody, sprawca nie odpowiada za naprawienie szkody ponad zapłate˛ rozsa˛dnego odszkodowania. Artykuł 5:203: Ochrona interesu publicznego Osobie przysługuje ´srodek obrony, jez˙eli sprawca powoduje szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛ chronia˛c w koniecznym zakresie wartos´ci podstawowe dla społeczen´ stwa demokratycznego, w szczególnos´ci w wypadku, gdy szkoda zostaje wyrza˛dzona przez rozpowszechnianie informacji w ´srodkach masowego przekazu.

Oddział 3: Niezdolnos´´c sprawowania kontroli Artykuł 5:301: Niepoczytalnos´´c (1) Osoba niepoczytalna w chwili działania, które powoduje powstanie szkody prawnie doniosłej, odpowiada tylko wtedy, gdy przemawiaja˛ za tym zasady słusznos´ci, przy uwzgle˛dnieniu stanu maja˛tkowego osoby niepoczytalnej i innych okolicznos´ci sprawy. Odpowiedzialnos´´c ogranicza sie˛ do zapłaty rozsa˛dnego odszkodowania. (2) Osoba jest niepoczytalna, jez˙eli nie rozumie w wystarczaja˛cym stopniu własnego działania, chyba ˙ze brak dostatecznego rozumienia jest tymczasowym skutkiem jej własnego nagannego zachowania. Artykuł 5:302: Zdarzenie poza kontrola˛ Osobie przysługuje ´srodek obrony, jez˙eli szkoda prawnie doniosła została spowodowana przez nienaturalne zdarzenie, któremu nie moz˙na zapobiec stosuja˛c rozsa˛dne ´srodki i którego nie uznaje sie˛ za obje˛te ryzykiem danej osoby.

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Oddział 4: Umowne wyła˛czenie i ograniczenie odpowiedzialnos´ci Artykuł 5:401: Umowne wyła˛czenie i ograniczenie odpowiedzialnos´ci (1) Nie moz˙na wyła˛czyc´ ani ograniczyc´ odpowiedzialnos´ci za umys´lne spowodowanie szkody prawnie doniosłej. (2) Odpowiedzialnos´ci za spowodowanie szkody prawnie doniosłej w wyniku raz˙˛acego niedołoz˙enia starannos´ci oczywis´cie wymaganej w danych okolicznos´ciach nie moz˙na wyła˛czyc´ ani ograniczyc´ (a) w odniesieniu do szkody na osobie (w tym spowodowania ´smierci) oraz (b) jez˙eli wyła˛czenie lub ograniczenie jest z innych przyczyn bezprawne lub niezgodne z zasadami dobrej wiary i uczciwego obrotu. (3) Odpowiedzialnos´ci za szkode˛, za spowodowanie której dana osoba ponosi odpowiedzialnos´´c na podstawie artykułu 3:204 nie moz˙na wyła˛czyc´ ani ograniczyc´. (4) W innych wypadkach odpowiedzialnos´´c przewidziana w niniejszej Ksie˛dze moz˙e byc´ wyła˛czona albo ograniczona, o ile ustawa nie stanowi inaczej.

Oddział 5: Szkoda w rozumieniu artykułu 2:202 Artykuł 5:501: Rozszerzenie na osoby trzecie skutecznos´ci ´srodków obrony przysługuja˛cych przeciwko poszkodowanemu na osobie ´Srodek obrony, który moz˙na podnies´´c przeciwko prawu poszkodowanego do naprawienia poniesionej przez niego szkody na osobie albo, w razie, gdyby nie nastpiła jego ´smierc´, ´srodek obrony, który moz˙na by podnies´´c , moz˙na podnies´´c równiez˙ przeciwko osobie ponosza˛cej szkode˛ w rozumieniu art. 2:202.

Rozdział 6: ´Srodki ochrony prawnej Oddział 1: Ogólne zasady naprawienia szkody Artykuł 6:101: Cel i sposoby naprawienia szkody (1) Naprawienie szkody ma przywrócic´ stan, w jakim poszkodowany wyrza˛dzeniem szkody prawnie doniosłej by sie˛ znajdował, gdyby mu nie wyrza˛dzono szkody prawnie doniosłej. (2) Naprawienie szkody moz˙e nasta˛pic´ w pienia˛dzu (odszkodowanie) albo w inny, najwłas´ciwszy sposób, przy uwzgle˛dnieniu rodzaju i rozmiaru poniesionej szkody i innych okolicznos´ci sprawy. (3) W razie uszkodzenia rzeczy, nalez˙y zasa˛dzic´ odszkodowanie równe utracie jej wartos´ci zamiast kosztów naprawy, jez˙eli koszty naprawy znacznie przewyz˙szaja˛ utrate˛ wartos´ci rzeczy. Powyz˙sza zasada dotyczy równiez˙ zwierza˛t tylko o tyle, o ile jest to uzasadnione ze wzgle˛du na cel, dla którego zwierze˛ było trzymane.

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(4) Zamiast przywrócenia stanu poprzedniego, o którym mowa w uste˛pie (1), jednakz˙e tylko w wypadku, gdy jest to uzasadnione, naprawienie szkody moz˙e nasta˛pic´ przez wydanie przez tego, kto ponosi odpowiedzialnos´´c za spowodowanie szkody prawnie doniosłej wszystkich korzys´ci uzyskanych przez niego w zwia˛zku ze spowodowaniem szkody.

Artykuł 6:102: Zasada de minimis Szkoda niewielkich rozmiarów nie podlega naprawieniu. Artykuł 6:103: Wyrównanie korzys´ci (1) Korzys´ci przypadaja˛ce poszkodowanemu szkoda˛ prawnie doniosła˛ ze zdarzenia wyrza˛dzaja˛cego szkode˛ nie sa˛ uwzgle˛dniane, chyba ˙ze ich uwzgle˛dnienie byłoby słuszne i rozsa˛dne. (2) Przy rozstrzyganiu, czy uwzgle˛dnienie korzys´ci byłoby słuszne i rozsa˛dne, nalez˙y uwzgle˛dnic´ rodzaj wyrza˛dzonej szkody, charakter odpowiedzialnos´ci sprawcy szkody oraz, w wypadku gdy korzys´ci zostały przekazane przez osobe˛ trzecia˛, cel przekazania tych korzys´ci. Artykuł 6:104: Wielos´´c poszkodowanych Jez˙eli szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛ ponosi kilka osób, a naprawienie szkody w stosunku do jednej z nich be˛dzie stanowic´ naprawienie szkody w stosunku do pozostałych, do ich roszczen´ o naprawienie szkody stosuje sie˛ odpowiednio III.–4:201 – 207. Artykuł 6:105: Odpowiedzialnos´´c solidarna Jez˙eli kilka osób odpowiada za te˛ sama˛ szkode˛ prawnie doniosła˛, ich odpowiedzialnos´´c jest solidarna. ´ Artykuł 6:106: Zbywalnos´c roszczen Poszkodowany moz˙e zbyc´ roszczenie o naprawienie szkody, w tym roszczenie o naprawienie szkody niemaja˛tkowej.

Oddział 2: Odszkodowanie Artykuł 6:201: Uprawnienie poszkodowanego do dokonania wyboru Poszkodowany moz˙e decydowac´ o tym, czy przeznaczy kwote˛ odszkodowania na zaspokojenie interesu naruszonego wyrza˛dzeniem szkody. Artykuł 6:202: Ograniczenie odpowiedzialnos´ci odszkodowawczej Jez˙eli przemawiaja˛ za tym zasady słusznos´ci i rozsa˛dku, dana osoba moz˙e byc´ zwolniona od odpowiedzialnos´ci odszkodowawczej w całos´ci albo w cze˛´sci, gdy szkoda nie została wyrza˛dzona umys´lnie, a odszkodowanie w pełnym wymiarze byłoby nieproporcjonalne do zakresu odpowiedzialnos´ci sprawcy szkody, rozmiarów szkody albo ´srodków zapobiez˙enia szkodzie.

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Artykuł 6:203: Kapitalizacja i ustalenie wysokos´ci odszkodowania (1) Odszkodowanie zasa˛dza sie˛ jednorazowo, chyba ˙ze waz˙ne wzgle˛dy przemawiaja˛ za zasa˛dzeniem odszkodowania wypłacanego okresowo. (2) Prawo krajowe rozstrzyga o sposobie ustalenia wysokos´ci odszkodowania za szkode˛ na osobie i za szkode˛ niemaja˛tkowa˛. Artykuł 6:204: Zados´´c uczynienie za krzywde˛ Krzywda podlega naprawieniu niezalez˙nie od naprawienia szkody maja˛tkowej lub niemaja˛tkowej.

Oddział 3: Zapobiez˙enie szkodzie Artykuł 6:301: Zasada ogólna (1) Prawo do ˙z˛adania zapobiez˙enia szkodzie przysługuje wyła˛cznie, gdy: (a) naprawienie szkody nie stanowiłoby nalez˙ytego zaspokojenia oraz (b) z innych powodów uzasadnione jest, aby osoba, która odpowiadałaby za spowodowanie szkody, zapobiegła szkodzie. (2) Jez˙eli ´zródłem zagroz˙enia jest rzecz lub zwierze˛, a zagroz˙ony nie moz˙e unikna˛´c niebezpieczen´ stwa, prawo do ˙z˛adania zapobiez˙enia szkodzie obejmuje prawo do usunie˛cia ´zródła zagroz˙enia. Artykuł 6:302: Odpowiedzialnos´´c za uszczerbek poniesiony przy zapobieganiu szkodzie Osoba, która poniosła uzasadnione wydatki lub poniosła szkode˛ w celu zapobiez˙enia nadchodza˛cej szkodzie albo w celu ograniczenia rozmiaru lub skutków szkody, moz˙e domagac´ sie˛ odszkodowania od tego, kto ponosiłby odpowiedzialnos´´c za wyrza˛dzenie szkody.

Rozdział 7: Zasady pomocnicze Artykuł 7:101: Krajowe przepisy konstytucyjne Postanowienia niniejszej Ksie˛gi powinny byc´ wykładane i stosowane zgodnie z przepisami konstytucyjnymi pan´ stwa sa˛du. Artykuł 7:102: Przepisy ustawowe Prawo krajowe rozstrzyga, jakie przepisy sa˛ przepisami ustawowymi. Artykuł 7:103: Wykonywanie funkcji publicznych i poste˛powanie sa˛dowe Postanowienia niniejszej Ksie˛gi nie reguluja˛ odpowiedzialnos´ci osoby albo organu za szkody wyrza˛dzone przy wykonywaniu albo zaniechaniu wykonywania funkcji publicznych, ani przy wykonywaniu obowia˛zków w toku poste˛powania sa˛dowego.

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Artykuł 7:104: Odpowiedzialnos´´c pracowników, pracodawców, zwia˛zków zawodowych i organizacji pracodawców Postanowienia niniejszej Ksie˛gi nie reguluja˛ odpowiedzialnos´ci (a) pracowników (w stosunku do współpracowników, pracodawców, ani osób trzecich) powstaja˛cej w toku zatrudnienia (b) pracodawców w stosunku do pracowników powstaja˛cej w toku zatrudnienia (c) zwia˛zków zawodowych i organizacji pracodawców powstaja˛cych w toku sporów zbiorowych. Artykuł 7:105: Ograniczenie lub wyła˛czenie odpowiedzialnos´ci w stosunku do uposaz˙onego Prawo krajowe rozstrzyga, czy okres´lona w niniejszej ksie˛dze odpowiedzialnos´´c wobec tego, kto jest uprawniony do uzyskania naprawienia całos´ci lub cze˛´sci szkody z innego tytułu, w szczególnos´ci od ubezpieczyciela, z funduszu lub z innego ´zródła, zostaje w zwia˛zku z istnieniem tego uprawnienia ograniczona lub wyła˛czona.

Portuguese1 Responsabilidade civil extracontratual por danos causados a terceiro 1. Capítulo: Disposições Fundamentais Artigo 1:101: Princípio geral (1) Aquele que sofra um dano juridicamente relevante tem direito a reparação de quem o tiver causado com dolo ou com negligência, ou respectivamente, de quem, por qualquer outro modo, venha a ser considerado responsável pela verificação desse dano. (2) Quando alguém não tiver causado um dano juridicamente relevante com dolo ou com negligência, tal pessoa só será responsável pelo dano juridicamente relevante se o Capítulo terceiro assim o dispuser. Artigo 1:102: Prevenção Sempre que o dano juridicamente relevante se verificar iminente, este Livro confere à pessoa que viesse a sofrer o dano um direito de o prevenir. Este direito pode ser exercido contra a pessoa que seria responsável pela verificação do dano, se o mesmo viesse a ocorrer. Artigo 1:103: Âmbito de aplicação Os artigos 1:101 e 1:102 (a) aplicam-se apenas em conformidade com as disposições seguintes deste Livro; (b) aplicam-se tanto a pessoas colectivas como singulares, salvo disposição em contrário; (c) não se aplicam na medida em que a sua aplicação iria contrariar o escopo de outras normas de Direito Privado; e (d) não prejudicam o recurso a outros meios de tutela com outros fundamentos legais.

2. Capítulo: Dano Juridicamente Relevante Secção 1: Disposições gerais Artigo 2:101: Noção de dano juridicamente relevante (1) Uma perda, patrimonial ou não, ou lesão constituem um dano juridicamente relevante, sempre que: 1

Translated by Marta Lívia dos Santos Silva (Osnabrück), agreed with Professor Júlio Manuel Vieira Gomes with the assistance of Gonçalo Lages Gomes (Oporto). First draft by José Carlos de Medeiros Nóbrega (Osnabrück).

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(a) uma das normas que se seguem, deste Capítulo, disponha nesse sentido; (b) a perda ou lesão resultem da violação de um direito conferido pela lei; ou (c) a perda ou lesão resultem da violação de um interesse digno de protecção legal. (2) Em qualquer dos casos abrangidos pelas alíneas (b) ou (c) do parágrafo (1), a perda ou lesão apenas conformarão um dano juridicamente relevante desde que fosse equitativo e razoável que existisse um direito à sua reparação ou prevenção, consoante o caso, de acordo com os artigos 1:101 ou 1:102. (3) Ao determinar se, no caso concreto, seria justo e razoável que existisse um direito à reparação ou prevenção haverá que considerar-se o fundamento da responsabilidade, a natureza e a proximidade do dano ou dano iminente, as expectativas legítimas da pessoa que sofre ou sofreria o dano, e as considerações de ordem pública e bons costumes. (4) Para efeitos deste Livro: (a) Uma perda económica abrange a perda de rendimentos ou de lucros, os encargos realizados que efectivamente venham a ocorrer e as demais perdas de valor económico; (b) Uma perda não patrimonial abrange a dor, o sofrimento e o prejuízo da qualidade de vida.

Secção 2: Casos particulares de dano juridicamente relevante Artigo 2:201: Lesão pessoal e perdas que daí advenham (1) A perda causada a pessoa singular na sequência de uma lesão da integridade física ou da sua saúde e a própria lesão, em si mesma, constituem um dano juridicamente relevante. (2) Para efeitos deste Livro: (a) tal perda compreende os custos de assistência médica, estando englobadas as despesas tidas por razoáveis, realizadas pelos que lhe são próximos, destinadas ao tratamento da vítima; e (b) a lesão pessoal compreende a lesão à saúde mental, apenas quando configura uma patologia. Artigo 2:202: Perda sofrida por terceiros como resultado de lesão pessoal ou morte de outrem (1) Uma perda não patrimonial sofrida por pessoa singular, em consequência de lesão pessoal ou morte de outrem, constitui um dano juridicamente relevante se, ao tempo da lesão, aquela pessoa mantivesse uma relação pessoal de particular proximidade com o lesado. (2) Quando, na sequência da lesão sofrida, se verifica a morte: (a) o dano juridicamente relevante causado ao falecido em resultado da lesão converte-se, no momento da sua morte, em dano juridicamente relevante para os sucessores do falecido; (b) as despesas de funeral tidas por razoáveis constituem dano juridicamente relevante para a pessoa que as suporte; e (c) a perda de alimentos ou de assistência constitui dano juridicamente relevante para a pessoa física a quem o falecido prestava assistência ou, não se tendo verificado a morte, teria prestado alimentos no cumprimento de um dever legal, ou à qual o falecido prestava assistência material e económica.

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Artigo 2:203: Ofensa à dignidade, à liberdade e à reserva da intimidade da vida privada (1) Uma perda sofrida por uma pessoa singular como resultado da violação do direito ao respeito pela dignidade, assim como aos direitos à liberdade e à intimidade, e a própria lesão, enquanto tal, constituem um dano juridicamente relevante. (2) A perda sofrida por uma pessoa em consequência da ofensa à sua reputação e bom nome e a própria lesão, enquanto tal, constituem também um dano juridicamente relevante, se o direito nacional assim o estabelecer. Artigo 2:204: Dano pela prestação de informação incorrecta a respeito de terceiro A perda sofrida em consequência da prestação de uma informação sobre a mesma, quando o autor da informação sabe ou deveria saber que esta é incorrecta, constitui um dano juridicamente relevante. Artigo 2:205: Dano resultante de abuso de confiança A perda causada pela comunicação de informação que, por força da sua natureza, ou pelas circunstâncias em que foi obtida, o autor da informação sabe ou deveria saber que é confidencial para o lesado, constitui um dano juridicamente relevante. Artigo 2:206: Dano resultante da violação de um direito real ou da posse lícita (1) A perda causada em consequência da ofensa a um direito real ou à posse lícita de um bem móvel ou imóvel constitui um dano juridicamente relevante. (2) Para efeitos deste artigo: (a) a perda compreende a privação do uso da coisa; (b) a ofensa a um direito real compreende a destruição ou a danificação do objecto da coisa (dano à propriedade), a disposição do direito, a interferência no seu uso ou qualquer outra turbação ou perturbação do exercício do direito. Artigo 2:207: Dano resultante da confiança em informações ou conselhos incorrectos A perda causada a alguém em consequência de ter tomado uma decisão confiando razoavelmente num conselho ou informação incorrectos constitui um dano juridicamente relevante se: (a) o conselho ou informação são proporcionados por uma pessoa no exercício de uma profissão ou de uma actividade económica; e (b) aquele que presta a informação ou emite parecer sabia ou deveria ter sabido que o destinatário confiaria no conselho ou informação ao tomar uma decisão do género da que tomou. Artigo 2:208: Dano resultante de uma interferência ilícita em negócio alheio (1) A perda causada a uma pessoa em resultado de um prejuízo, ingerência ou intromissão ilícitas ao exercício de uma profissão ou ao desempenho de uma actividade comercial constitui um dano juridicamente relevante. (2) A perda sofrida por um consumidor em resultado de concorrência desleal constitui também dano juridicamente relevante, desde que o direito nacional ou comunitário assim o estabelecer.

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Artigo 2:209: Encargos em que incorre o Estado resultantes de dano ecológico Os encargos nos quais incorram o Estado ou as autoridades competentes, a fim de restaurar os elementos naturais constitutivos do meio ambiente, substancialmente deteriorados, tais como o ar, a água, o solo, a flora e a fauna, constituem um dano juridicamente relevante. Artigo 2:210: Perda resultante de conduta dolosa ou fraudulenta (1) Sem prejuízo de outras disposições desta Secção, a perda causada a alguém na sequência de conduta dolosa ou fraudulenta de terceiro, seja por palavras ou acções, constitui um dano juridicamente relevante. (2) A conduta considera-se dolosa ou fraudulenta se a sua manifestação for realizada com conhecimento ou convicção de que a mesma é falsa e visa conduzir o destinatário a cometer um erro. Artigo 2:211: Dano resultante da violação do cumprimento de uma obrigação instigada por terceiro Sem prejuízo de outras disposições desta Secção, a perda sofrida por alguém em consequência da conduta de um terceiro que instiga à violação do cumprimento de uma obrigação, constitui dano juridicamente relevante, apenas: (a) em relação ao credor; (b) quando o instigador: (i) pretendia que o terceiro não viesse a cumprir a obrigação, e (ii) não tenha agido para a defesa legítima do seu próprio interesse.

3. Capítulo: Imputação Secção 1: Dolo e negligência Artigo 3:101: Dolo Uma pessoa causa dolosamente um dano juridicamente relevante, sempre que: (a) tenha querido causar um dano do tipo do que foi causado; ou (b) através de uma conduta que o sujeito quis realizar, sabendo que dela resultaria certamente ou quase certamente aquele dano ou um dano daquele tipo. Artigo 3:102: Negligência Uma pessoa provoca negligentemente um dano juridicamente relevante, sempre que o faz através de uma conduta que: (a) ou não satisfaz o particular dever de cuidado previsto numa disposição legal com o escopo de proteger o lesado do dano sofrido; ou (b) por qualquer outro modo, não observa o dever de cuidado que, nas circunstâncias concretas do caso, se poderia esperar de uma pessoa razoavelmente cuidadosa.

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Artigo 3:103: Menores de dezoito anos (1) Um menor de idade inferior a 18 anos apenas é responsável por ter causado um dano juridicamente relevante de acordo com o artigo 3:102(b), na medida em que do seu comportamento não resulte ter agido no exercício do dever de cuidado que, nas circunstâncias do caso concreto, seria de esperar de uma pessoa razoavelmente diligente da mesma idade. (2) Um menor de idade inferior a sete anos não é responsável por danos que venha a causar dolosa ou negligentemente. (3) Não obstante, os parágrafos (1) e (2) não são aplicáveis, sempre que: (a) o lesado não possa obter reparação de outrem com fundamento nas disposições deste Livro, e (b) o montante indemnizatório seja equitativo atendendo à condição económica das partes e demais circunstâncias do caso concreto. Artigo 3:104: Responsabilidade por danos causados por crianças ou pessoas sujeitas a vigilância (1) Os pais e todos aqueles que, por lei, estão obrigadas a prestar assistência parental a menor de idade inferior a catorze anos são responsáveis pela verificação do dano juridicamente relevante nos casos em que o menor tenha causado o dano em consequência de uma conduta que seria qualificável como dolosa ou negligente, caso se tratasse da conduta de um adulto. (2) Uma instituição ou outro organismo obrigado à vigilância de uma pessoa é responsável pelo dano juridicamente relevante sofrido por um terceiro, sempre que: (a) o dano seja uma lesão pessoal, uma perda nos termos do artigo 2:202 ou constitua dano numa coisa; (b) aquele que a instituição ou outra entidade está obrigada a vigiar tiver causado o dano dolosa ou negligentemente ou, no caso de menores, através de uma conduta que seria dolosa ou negligente caso fosse a conduta de um adulto; e (c) uma pessoa sujeita a vigilância seja alguém de quem se possa esperar que cause um dano desse tipo. (3) Não obstante, uma pessoa não será considerada responsável pelo dano com fundamento neste preceito se provar que não houve uma supervisão deficiente da sua parte.

Secção 2: Responsabilidade pelo risco Artigo 3:201: Dano causado por dependentes e representantes (1) Aquele que emprega ou, de outro modo, encarrega alguém responde pelo dano juridicamente relevante sofrido por terceiro quando o dependente ou encarregado (a) tenha causado o dano no decurso das funções que lhe foram confiadas ou de que foi encarregue, e (b) tenha causado o dano dolosa ou negligentemente, ou seja, por qualquer outra forma, responsável pelo dano. (2) O parágrafo (1) é correspondentemente aplicável a uma pessoa colectiva em relação a um representante que cause um dano no exercício das funções que lhe foram confiadas. Para este efeito, considera-se que o representante se refere a toda a pessoa autorizada pelos estatutos da pessoa colectiva a praticar actos jurídicos em seu nome. 165

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Artigo 3:202: Danos causados em consequência do estado inseguro de um edifício (1) Aquele que, de forma autónoma, exerça controlo sobre um edifício responde pelas lesões pessoais e pelas perdas que daí advenham, pelas perdas previstas no artigo 2:202, e ainda pelas perdas resultantes de um dano a uma coisa (diversa do próprio imóvel), em consequência do estado de um edifício que não reuna as condições de segurança com as quais alguém que se encontre no seu interior ou na sua proximidade possa legitimamente contar, tendo em atenção, entre outras circunstâncias: (a) a natureza do edifício, (b) o acesso ao edifício, e (c) o custo necessário a fim de evitar que o edifício se encontrasse em tal estado. (2) Considera-se que existe um controlo exercido de forma independente sobre um edifício, se for tido por razoável que, à pessoa que exerce tal controlo, se lhe imponha a obrigação de poder evitar o dano juridicamente relevante. (3) Deverá presumir-se que o proprietário de um imóvel exerce de forma independente um controlo sobre o mesmo, salvo se for demonstrado que tal controlo é exercido por outrem. Artigo 3:203: Responsabilidade por danos causados por animais Quem tiver à sua guarda um animal responde pelas lesões pessoais e pelas perdas que daí advenham, pelas perdas previstas no artigo 2:202, e ainda pelas perdas resultantes de situações jurídicas reais. Artigo 3:204: Responsabilidade por danos causados por produtos defeituosos (1) O produtor é responsável pelas lesões pessoais e perdas que daí advenham, pelas perdas previstas no artigo 2:202 e, em relação aos consumidores, pelas perdas resultantes de danos à propriedade (de coisa diversa que o próprio produto) causados por um defeito do seu produto. (2) Ficará sujeito à mesma responsabilidade que o produtor, aquele que importar o produto para o Espaço Económico Europeu com o escopo de venda, locação ou distribuição no âmbito da sua actividade empresarial ou profissional. (3) O fornecedor de um produto será considerado correspondentemente responsável, se: (a) o produtor não puder ser identificado; ou (b) tratando-se de produto importado, este não indicar a identidade do importador (independentemente de indicar ou não o nome do produtor), salvo se o fornecedor informar o lesado, num período de tempo tido por razoável, da identidade do produtor ou da pessoa que lhe forneceu o produto. (4) Uma pessoa não será responsável pelo dano, por força deste preceito, se vier a demonstrar que: (a) não colocou o produto em circulação; (b) é provável que o defeito que causou o dano não existisse no momento em que colocou o produto em circulação; (c) nem fabricou o produto para venda ou distribuição com um objectivo económico, nem tampouco o fabricou ou distribuiu no âmbito da sua actividade empresarial ou profissional; (d) o defeito se deve à conformidade do produto com normas imperativas de autoridades públicas;

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(e) o estado do conhecimento científico e tecnológico ao tempo em que colocou o produto em circulação não permitia descobrir a existência do defeito; ou, (f) tratando-se da fabricação de um componente, que o defeito seja imputável: (i) à concepção do produto na parte em que foi incorporada, ou (ii) às instruções apresentadas pelo fabricante do produto. (5) Por «Produtor», entende-se: (a) tratando-se de um produto acabado ou de uma parte componente, o fabricante; (b) tratando-se de matérias-primas, a pessoa que as extrai, ou as colhe ou obtém; e (c) qualquer pessoa que se apresente como produtor colocando o seu nome, marca comercial ou qualquer outro sinal distintivo no produto. (6) Por «produto» entende-se qualquer bem móvel, mesmo quando esteja incorporado num bem móvel ou imóvel, ou a electricidade. (7) Um produto é defeituoso caso não ofereça a segurança que uma pessoa pode legitimamente esperar, tendo em conta todas as circunstâncias, compreendendo: (a) a apresentação do produto; (b) a utilização que seria razoável esperar que se fizesse do produto; e (c) o momento em que o produto foi colocado em circulação; Todavia, um produto não se considerará defeituoso pelo simples facto de, posteriormente, ter sido colocado em circulação um produto mais aperfeiçoado.

Artigo 3:205: Responsabilidade por danos causados por veículos a motor (1) Quem tem à sua guarda um veículo a motor é responsável pela produção de lesões pessoais e perdas que daí advenham, pelas perdas previstas no artigo 2:202, e ainda pelas perdas resultantes de danos nas coisas (diversas do próprio veículo e da sua carga) num acidente de viação que resulte do uso do veículo. (2) Por «veículo a motor» entende-se qualquer veículo destinado a viajar por terra e impulsionado por tracção mecânica, desde que não se desloque sobre carris, bem como qualquer reboque, esteja ou não atrelado. Artigo 3:206: Responsabilidade por danos causados por substâncias ou emissões perigosas (1) A pessoa que tenha à sua guarda uma substância ou o operador de uma equipamento é responsável pelas lesões pessoais e perdas que daí advenham, pelas perdas previstas no artigo 2:202, pelos prejuízos resultantes de danos nas coisas e ainda pelas despesas previstas no Artigo 2:209 que essa substância ou as emissões a partir desse equipamento causarem, se: (a) verificando-se uma emissão, tendo em conta a quantidade e as características no momento em que ela ocorre ou, não existindo emissão, for muito provável, no momento de contacto com a substância, que, respectivamente, a substância ou emissão causará tal dano, a não ser que adequadamente controlada, e (b) o dano resulte da concretização desse perigo. (2) A designação «substância» compreende as substâncias químicas (sejam elas sólidas, líquidas ou gasosas). Os microorganismos devem ser considerados, para este efeito, substâncias. (3) Por «emissão» entende-se: (a) a libertação ou fuga de substâncias, (b) a condução de electricidade, (c) o calor, a luz e outras radiações,

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(d) o ruído e outras vibrações, e (e) outro tipo de impactos incorpóreos sobre o meio ambiente. (4) A categoria «equipamento» compreende equipamentos móveis e equipamentos sob construção ou em desuso. (5) Não obstante, uma pessoa não será responsável pela produção de um dano juridicamente relevante com fundamento neste preceito, se: (a) não detiver a substância ou não explorar o equipamento com fins relacionados com a sua actividade económica, negocial ou profissional; ou (b) demonstrar que não tenha havido violação das normas que estabelecem medidas de controlo da substância ou de gestão do equipamento.

Artigo 3:207: Outros fundamentos de responsabilidade pela produção de dano juridicamente relevante Uma pessoa é igualmente responsável pela produção de um dano juridicamente relevante se o direito nacional assim o dispuser, nos casos (a) respeitantes a uma fonte de perigo que não esteja compreendida nos artigos 3:104 a 3:205, (b) referentes a substâncias ou emissões, ou (c) em que não é aplicável o artigo 3:204(4)(e). Artigo 3:208: Abandono Para efeitos desta Secção, uma pessoa permanece responsável por um imóvel, veículo, substância ou equipamento que tal pessoa abandone, até que outrem passe a exercer um controlo independente sobre a coisa ou venha a ter a custódia ou a utilização da coisa. Tal regra é correspondentemente aplicável, com as necessárias adaptações, à custódia de um animal.

4. Capítulo: Causalidade Artigo 4:101: Regra geral (1) Uma pessoa causa um dano juridicamente relevante a outrem se o dano puder ser considerado como uma consequência da conduta do agente ou de uma fonte de perigo pela qual é responsável. (2) Em caso de lesão pessoal ou morte, deve ignorar-se a predisposição do lesado em relação ao tipo ou extensão da lesão sofrida. Artigo 4:102: Comparticipação Devem ser considerar-se como tendo causado um dano, o co-autor, a pessoa que instiga ou quem tiver ajudado ou assistido materialmente outrem a provocar um dano juridicamente relevante. Artigo 4:103: Causas alternativas Quando um dano juridicamente relevante possa ter sido causado por uma ou várias ocorrências pelas quais são responsáveis pessoas diferentes, e se tenha provado que o dano foi causado por um destes factos, mas não por qual deles, presume-se, até prova em contrário, que cada pessoa é responsável por qualquer dos factos causadores desse dano.

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5. Capítulo: Causas de Desculpação e Exclusão da Responsabilidade Secção 1: Consentimento ou conduta do lesado Artigo 5:101: Consentimento e assunção do risco (1) Uma pessoa pode invocar uma causa de exclusão da responsabilidade se o lesado tiver consentido validamente no dano juridicamente relevante, conhecendo ou devendo ter conhecimento das consequências de tal consentimento. (2) Igual exclusão de responsabilidade ocorre se o lesado, conhecendo o risco de se verificar um dano da natureza do dano causado, se expõe voluntariamente a esse risco em circunstâncias tais que se possa considerar que o assumiu. Artigo 5:102: Concurso de culpas e responsabilidade (1) Nos casos em que o lesado contribui com a sua própria culpa para a ocorrência ou extensão do dano juridicamente relevante, a reparação deverá ser reduzida de acordo com o seu grau de culpa. (2) Não obstante, não se deverá ter em consideração: (a) uma culpa pouco significativa por parte do lesado; (b) uma culpa ou responsabilidade cuja contribuição para a produção do dano seja pouco significativa; ou (c) a falta de diligência do lesado que tenha contribuído para uma lesão corporal, causada por um veículo motorizado num acidente de viação, a não ser que tal falta de diligência seja uma violação grosseira do dever de cuidado manifestamente requerido e exigido nessas circunstâncias. (3) Os parágrafos (1) e (2) são igualmente aplicáveis aos casos em que uma pessoa pela qual o lesado seja responsável no âmbito do Artigo 3:201, tenha contribuído com a sua culpa para a ocorrência ou extensão do dano. (4) A indemnização deverá ser correspondentemente reduzida se, e na medida em que, qualquer outra fonte de perigo pela qual o lesado seja responsável de acordo com o Capítulo terceiro tenha contribuído para a ocorrência ou extensão do dano. Artigo 5:103: Danos causados por um delinquente a um comparticipante O dano juridicamente relevante causado sem dolo durante a execução de um crime a uma pessoa que participe ou colabore no mesmo não dá lugar a um direito a reparação, se tal for contrário à ordem pública.

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Secção 2: Interesses das pessoas responsáveis ou de terceiros Artigo 5:201: Autoridade outorgada pela lei Uma pessoa beneficia de uma causa de desculpação ou exclusão da responsabilidade se o dano juridicamente relevante for produzido no exercício de autoridade outorgada pela lei. Artigo 5:202: Legítima defesa, gestão de negócios e estado de necessidade (1) Uma pessoa beneficia de uma causa de exclusão da responsabilidade se tiver causado um dano juridicamente com o escopo de proteger razoavelmente um direito ou interesse digno de protecção legal, seu ou de terceiro, caso a pessoa que sofra o dano juridicamente relevante seja responsável por ter colocado em perigo o direito ou interesse protegido. Para efeitos deste parágrafo, não é aplicável o disposto no Artigo 3:103. (2) A mesma regra é aplicável ao dano juridicamente relevante causado pelo gestor de negócios ao dono do negócio, sem violação das suas próprias obrigações. (3) Sempre que uma pessoa cause um dano juridicamente relevante no património de um terceiro numa situação de perigo iminente para a vida, a integridade física, a saúde ou a liberdade com o propósito de se salvar a si próprio ou a um terceiro, e sempre que esse perigo não possa ser eliminado sem que se cause o dano, o agente não é obrigado a reparar esse dano para além de uma indemnização razoável, atendendo à equidade, bem como à situação económica do lesado. Artigo 5:203: Tutela do interesse público Uma pessoa beneficia de uma causa de exclusão da responsabilidade se o dano juridicamente relevante for causado para a tutela indispensável dos valores fundamentais em uma sociedade democrática, mormente nos casos em que o dano se produza pela difusão de informação nos meios de comunicação.

Secção 3: Incapacidade de controlo Artigo 5:301: Anomalia psíquica (1) Quem se ache incapacitado de querer e de entender no momento em que praticou uma conduta que causou o dano juridicamente relevante apenas será responsável por motivo de equidade, tendo em atenção o património e a condição económica do incapaz e as demais circunstâncias do caso. A responsabilidade está limitada a uma indemnização tida por razoável e equitativa. (2) Considera-se que a pessoa é incapaz de querer e de entender se carece do discernimento necessário à compreensão da natureza do seu comportamento, a não ser que a falta de discernimento seja, ele próprio, o resultado transitório da sua própria conduta censurável. Artigo 5:302: Acontecimentos fora de controlo Uma pessoa beneficia de uma causa de exclusão de responsabilidade se o dano juridicamente relevante for causado por um acontecimento excepcional que não possa ser evitado por uma qualquer medida razoável e que não deva considerar-se como um risco próprio dessa pessoa.

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Secção 4: Exclusão e limitação contratual da responsabilidade Artigo 5:401: Exclusão e limitação contratual da responsabilidade (1) Não pode ser excluída nem limitada a responsabilidade por dano juridicamente relevante causado com dolo. (2) Não pode ser excluída nem limitada a responsabilidade pela produção de um dano juridicamente relevante quando este resulte de uma violação grosseira do dever de cuidado manifestamente exigido pelas circunstâncias (a) relativamente a lesões pessoais (incluindo a morte), bem como (b) quando a exclusão ou a limitação for por quaisquer outros motivos ilegal ou contrária à boa fé e aos bons costumes. (3) Não pode ser limitada ou excluída a responsabilidade pela prevenção do dano relativamente ao qual uma pessoa é responsável de acordo com o artigo 3:204. (4) Em outros casos regulados neste Livro, a responsabilidade pode ser excluída ou limitada, a menos que a lei disponha diferentemente.

Secção 5: Perdas correspondentemente aplicáveis com o artigo 2:202 Artigo 5:501: Extensão a terceiro das causas de exclusão da responsabilidade face ao lesado Uma causa de exclusão da responsabilidade por lesões pessoais que possa ser invocada contra o lesado ou que o poderia ter sido se a morte não tivesse ocorrido por força de lesões pessoais deste, pode igualmente ser invocada contra a pessoa que sofra uma perda por força do artigo 2:202.

6. Capítulo: Meios de Tutela Secção 1: Da reparação em geral Artigo 6:101: Propósito e modalidades da reparação (1) A reparação consiste em colocar a pessoa que sofre o dano juridicamente relevante na posição em que se encontraria se o dano juridicamente relevante não tivesse ocorrido. (2) A reparação pode ser em dinheiro (indemnização) ou sob outra forma, segundo o que seja mais apropriado, tendo em conta o tipo e a extensão do dano sofrido e todas as demais circunstâncias do caso. (3) Quando uma coisa fungível for danificada atender-se-á no cálculo da indemnização à sua depreciação de valor, e não ao custo das reparações, se tais custos excederem manifestamente e de forma desrazoável a depreciação de valor. Esta regra só é aplicável aos animais se tal for apropriado, tendo em atenção a intenção com a qual se detinha o animal.

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(4) Como alternativa à reparação consoante o disposto no parágrafo (1), nos casos em que tal seja razoável, a reparação poderá consistir em obter da pessoa responsável pela produção do dano juridicamente relevante uma vantagem que essa pessoa tenha auferido em conexão com a produção do dano.

Artigo 6:102: Regra «de minimis» Não deverão atender-se à bagatela jurídica ou ao dano insignificante. Artigo 6:103: Compensação de benefícios (1) Não deverão ser atendidos os benefícios que resultem para a pessoa que sofreu o dano juridicamente relevante resultante do próprio facto danoso, a menos que seja justo e razoável tê-los em consideração. (2) Ao avaliar se seria justo e razoável ter em conta tais benefícios, deverá considerar-se o tipo de dano sofrido, a natureza da responsabilidade do agente e, se os benefícios forem concedidos por terceiro, o propósito da concessão desses benefícios. Artigo 6:104: Pluralidade de lesados Quando uma pluralidade de pessoas sofre um dano juridicamente relevante e o ressarcimento de uma pessoa constitua também um ressarcimento de outra, os artigos III.–4:201-207 são aplicáveis com as necessárias adaptações. Artigo 6:105: Responsabilidade solidária Se forem várias as pessoas responsáveis pelo mesmo dano juridicamente relevante, é solidária a sua responsabilidade. Artigo 6:106: Transferência das pretensões de ressarcimento O lesado poderá transferir uma pretensões de ressarcimento, incluindo um pedido de reparação por perdas não patrimoniais.

Secção 2: Indemnização Artigo 6:201: Direito de opção do lesado O lesado poderá decidir se afecta ou não o montante pago a título de indemnização à reparação do bem lesado. Artigo 6:202: Limitação da responsabilidade Sempre que se mostre justo e razoável, poderá excluir-se, total ou parcialmente, a responsabilidade de uma pessoa, quando o dano não tendo sido causado dolosamente, se o cumprimento total da obrigação de reparar seria desproporcionado em relação à responsabilidade da pessoa causadora do dano ou em relação à extensão do mesmo ou aos meios empregues para o impedir.

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Artigo 6:203: Capitalização e quantificação (1) A indemnização deve ser liquidada de uma única vez, a menos que exista uma boa razão justifique um pagamento periódico. (2) O direito nacional determinará como se irá calcular a compensação por perdas pessoais e não patrimoniais. Artigo 6:204: Indemnização pela lesão enquanto tal A lesão, em si mesma, deverá ser reparada independentemente da compensação por perdas patrimoniais e não patrimoniais.

Secção 3: Direito à prevenção Artigo 6:301: Direito à prevenção – Regra geral (1) O direito a prevenir a verificação do dano existe apenas, na medida em que (a) o ressarcimento não se mostre um meio de tutela alternativo adequado; e (b) seja, ao invés, razoável que a pessoa que responderia pela verificação do dano previna a sua verificação. (2) Nos casos em que a fonte de perigo seja um objecto ou um animal e não seja razoavelmente possível para a pessoa ameaçada evitar o perigo, o direito à prevenção abrangerá o direito a que a fonte de perigo seja removida. Artigo 6:302: Responsabilidade pelas perdas sofridas na prevenção da verificação do dano Aquele que tenha realizado despesas tidas por razoáveis ou sofrido outras perdas para impedir a ocorrência de um dano iminente, ou para limitar a extensão ou gravidade de um dano verificado, tem o direito a ser indemnizado pela pessoa que teria sido responsável pela verificação do dano.

7. Capítulo: disposições acessórias Artigo 7:101: Direitos Constitucionais nacionais As disposições deste Livro deverão ser interpretadas e aplicadas em conformidade com o Direito Constitucional do Estado do foro. Artigo 7:102: Disposições legais O direito nacional determina quais as normas jurídicas que têm valor de lei. Artigo 7:103: Funções de Direito Público e Procedimentos Judiciais Este Livro não regula a responsabilidade de uma pessoa, de um organismo ou entidade que derive do exercício ou da omissão do exercício de funções de Direito Público ou do cumprimento de deveres, no âmbito de Procedimentos Judiciais.

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Artigo 7:104: Responsabilidade de trabalhadores subordinados, de entidades empregadoras, de sindicatos e de associações de entidades empregadoras Este Livro não regula a responsabilidade de (a) trabalhadores dependentes (seja perante outros trabalhadores ou colegas de trabalho, seja perante entidades empregadoras ou terceiros) que surja no âmbito da relação de trabalho, (b) entidades empregadoras perante trabalhadores que surja no âmbito da relação de trabalho, e (c) sindicatos, associações sindicais e associações de empregadores que surja no decurso de um conflito colectivo de trabalho. Artigo 7:105: Redução ou exclusão da responsabilidade em indemnizar uma pessoa Se uma pessoa tem o direito ao ressarcimento a qualquer outro título, no todo ou em parte, pelo dano que sofreu, em particular por uma seguradora, um fundo ou outro organismo, o direito nacional determina se ou não, por força desse ressarcimento, a responsabilidade regulada neste Livro deve ser limitada ou excluída.

Romanian1 Ra˘spunderea extra-contractuala˘ pentru prejudiciul cauzat altuia Capitolul 1: Dispozit¸ii fundamentale Articolul 1:101: Norma de principiu (1) O persoana˘ care sufera˘ un prejudiciu relevant juridic are dreptul la reparat¸ie de la cel care cu intent¸ie sau din culpa˘ i l-a provocat sau care este în vreun fel ra˘spunza˘tor pentru cauzarea prejudiciului. (2) Când o persoana˘ nu a cauzat cu intent¸ie sau din culpa˘ prejudiciul în sensul juridic, va fi ¸inuta t ˘ sa˘ ra˘spunda˘ numai daca˘ în Capitolul 3 se prevede astfel. Articolul 1:102: Prevenirea prejudiciului Daca˘ exista˘ o amenint¸are cu producerea unui prejudiciu relevant juridic, aceasta˘ Carte confera˘ celui care ar fi prejudiciat dreptul a-l preveni. Acest drept este conferit împotriva persoanei care ar fi responsabila˘ de producerea pagubei daca˘ aceasta s-ar produce. Articolul 1:103: Domeniul de aplicare Articolele 1:101 (Dispozit¸ii fundamentale) ¸si 1:102 (Prevenirea prejudiciului) (a) se aplica˘ numai în conformitate cu dispozit¸iile urma˘toare ale acestei Ca˘rt¸i; (b) se aplica˘ atât persoanelor juridice cât ¸si persoanelor fizice,daca˘ legea nu prevede altfel; (c) nu se aplica˘ în ma˘sura în care aplicarea ar contrazice scopul altor norme de drept privat; ¸si (d) nu afecteaza˘ mijloacele legale disponibile pe baza altor temeiuri de drept.

Capitolul 2: Prejudiciul relevant juridic Sect¸iunea 1: Dispozit¸ii generale Articolul 2:101: Înt¸elesul not¸iunii de prejudiciu relevant juridic (1) Pierderea, patrimoniala˘ sau nepatrimoniala˘, ori va˘ta˘marea suferita˘ se considera˘ prejudiciu relevant juridic daca˘: (a) se dispune astfel în vreuna dintre normele urma˘toare ale acestui Capitol; (b) paguba sau va˘ta˘marea rezulta˘ din violarea unui drept stabilit altfel de lege; ori (c) paguba sau va˘ta˘marea rezulta˘ din violarea unui interes demn de protect¸ie juridica˘. 1

Translated by Ferenc Szilágyi (Osnabrück), Dr. Mircea Dan Bob (Cluj-Napoca) and Dr. Ciprian Pa˘un (Cluj-Napoca).

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(2) În oricare din ipotezele acoperite numai de subalineatele (b) sau (c) al alineatului (1), pierderea sau va˘ta˘marea constituie prejudiciu relevant juridic numai daca˘ acordarea dreptului la reparat¸ie potrivit articolului 1:101 (Dispozit¸ii fundamentale), sau a dreptului la prevenire potrivit articolului 1:102 (Prevenirea prejudiciului), ar fi echitabila˘ ¸si rezonabila˘. (3) În determinarea a ceea ce este echitabil ¸si rezonabil pentru a exista un drept la reparat¸ie sau prevenire, se va ¸ine t seama de temeiul vinova˘¸iei, t de natura ¸si proximitatea cauzala˘ a prejudiciului existent sau a celui viitor, de as¸tepta˘rile rezonabile al persoanei care sufera˘ sau ar suferi prejudiciul ¸si de considerat¸iile legate de ordinea publica˘. (4) În aceasta˘ Carte (a) pierderea patrimoniala˘ include pierderea venitului sau a profitului, cheltuielile efectuate, precum ¸si sca˘derea valorii bunului, (b) pierderea nepatrimoniala˘ include durerile ¸si suferint¸ele, precum ¸si restrângerile aduse calita˘¸ii t viet¸ii.

Sect¸iunea 2: Cazuri speciale de prejudiciu relevant juridic Articolul 2:201: Va˘ta˘marea integrita˘¸tii corporale ¸si a sa˘na˘ta˘¸tii ¸si pierderile ce decurg din aceasta (1) Pierderea pricinuita˘ unei persoane fizice ca rezultat al va˘ta˘ma˘rii integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii, t precum ¸si va˘ta˘marea ca atare, constituie un prejudiciu relevant juridic. (2) În aceasta˘ Carte (a) o astfel de pierdere include cheltuielile pentru îngrijiri medicale, inclusiv cheltuielile persoanelor apropiate efectuate în mod rezonabil pentru îngrijirea victimei; ¸si (b) va˘ta˘marea integrita˘¸ii t corporale include va˘ta˘marea sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii t psihice numai daca˘ se ajunge ca ultima sa˘ reclame tratament. Articolul 2:202: Pierderea suferita˘ de tert¸i în urma va˘ta˘ma˘rii integrita˘¸tii corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸tii unei alte persoane ori ca urmare a decesului acesteia (1) Prejudiciul nepatrimonial pricinuit unei persoane fizice ca rezultat al va˘ta˘ma˘rii sau al decesului unei alte persoane, este un prejudiciu relevant juridic daca˘, la momentul producerii prejudiciului, victima ¸si tert¸ul se ga˘seau într-o relat¸ie de ordin personal extrem de apropiata˘. (2) În cazul când o persoana˘ a fost va˘ta˘mata˘ mortal: (a) prejudiciul în sensul juridic pricinuit celui decedat prin va˘ta˘mare la momentul mort¸ii devine prejudiciu relevant juridic la adresa succesorilor defunctului; (b) cheltuielile rezonabile de înmormântare sunt prejudiciu relevant juridic pentru persoana care le-a efectuat; (c) pierderea întret¸inerii este prejudiciu relevant juridic pentru persoana fizica˘ ca˘reia defunctul îi presta întret¸inere sau pe care, daca˘ nu s-ar fi produs decesul, ar fi întret¸inut-o în temeiul legii ori ca˘reia îi acorda îngrijire ¸si ajutor financiar. Articolul 2:203: Atingerea adusa˘ demnita˘¸tii, liberta˘¸tii ¸si viet¸ii private (1) Prejudiciul provocat unei persoane fizice ca urmare a viola˘rii dreptului lui sau ei la demnitate, as¸a cum sunt drepturile la libertate ¸si la intimitatea viet¸ii private, precum ¸si va˘ta˘marea ca atare, constituie prejudiciu relevant juridic.

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(2) Pierderea provocata˘ unei persoane ca urmare a unei atingeri aduse bunei sale reputat¸ii, precum ¸si atingerea în sine sunt de asemenea prejudicii în sensul juridic, daca˘ dreptul nat¸ional dispune astfel.

Articolul 2:204: Pierderea provocata˘ de comunicarea unor informat¸ii eronate despre un altul Pierderea adusa˘ unei persoane ca rezultat al comunica˘rii unor informat¸ii despre ea, de care persoana comunicând informat¸ia cunoas¸te sau ar trebui sa˘ cunoasca˘ ca˘ este falsa˘, constituie prejudiciu relevant juridic. Articolul 2:205: Pierderea provocata˘ de nerespectarea confident¸ialita˘¸tii Pierderea provocata˘ unei persoane prin comunicarea unor informat¸ii despre care, fie prin natura sa fie în virtutea circumstant¸elor în care a fost obt¸inuta˘, persoana comunicând informat¸ia cunoas¸te sau ar trebui sa˘ cunoasca˘ ca˘ este confident¸iala˘ pentru cel care sufera˘ pierderea, constituie un prejudiciu relevant juridic. Articolul 2:206: Pierderea provocata˘ prin violare de proprietate sau de posesiune legitima˘ (1) Pierderea provocata˘ unei persoane prin violarea dreptului sa˘u de proprietate sau a posesiei sale legitime asupra unui bun imobil sau imobil constituie un prejudiciu relevant juridic. (2) În acest articol: (a) pierderea include faptul de a fi lipsit de utilizarea bunului; (b) atingerea adusa˘ unui drept de proprietate include distrugerea sau alterarea fizica˘ a obiectului dreptului (dauna˘ materiala˘), dispunerea de acest drept, tulbura˘rile de folosint¸a˘ sau alte tulbura˘ri ale exercita˘rii dreptului. Articolul 2:207: Pierderea provocata˘ prin încrederea într-un sfat sau într-o informat¸ie eronata˘ Pierderea provocata˘ unei persoane ca urmare a lua˘rii unei decizii în care s-a bazat încrezându-se în mod rezonabil într-un sfat sau într-o informat¸ie eronata˘ constituie un prejudiciu relevant juridic daca˘: (a) sfatul sau informat¸ia este furnizata˘ de o persoana˘ în cadrul exercita˘rii a unei profesii, sau desfa˘¸sura˘rii unui comert¸; ¸si (b) furnizorul ¸stia ori ar fi trebuit sa˘ ¸stie faptul ca˘ primitorul s-ar baza pe sfat sau informat¸ie la luarea unei decizii de felul celei luate. Articolul 2:208: Pierderea din cauza tulbura˘rii ilicite a exercita˘rii unei ocupat¸ii (1) Pierderea provocata˘ unei persoane prin tulburarea ilegala˘ a exercita˘rii unei profesii sau a unei activita˘¸it comerciale constituie un prejudiciu relevant juridic. (2) Pierderea adusa˘ unui consumator prin concurent¸˘a neloiala˘ constituie de asemenea un prejudiciu relevant juridic, daca˘ dreptul comunitar sau nat¸ional prevede astfel. Articolul 2:209: Sarcini suportate de stat datorita˘ deteriora˘rii mediului Sarcinile suportate de ca˘tre stat sau de ca˘tre autorita˘¸ile t competente în repararea atingerilor substant¸iale aduse elementelor naturale constituente ale mediului, precum aerul, apa, solul, flora ¸si fauna, sunt prejudicii relevante juridic pentru stat sau pentru autorita˘¸ile t vizate.

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Articolul 2:210: Pierderea suferita˘ prin dol (1) În plus fat¸˘a de celelate prevederi ale acestei sect¸iuni, pierderea provocata˘ unei persoane ca urmare a dezinforma˘rii prin cuvintele sau conduita altuia constituie un prejudiciu relevant juridic. (2) Dezinformarea este dolosiva˘ daca˘ este fa˘cuta˘ ¸stiind sau crezând ca˘ informat¸ia este falsa˘ ¸si are intent¸ia de a induce în eroare pe destinatar. Articolul 2:211: Pierderea din cauza incita˘rii la neexecutarea obligat¸iei Fa˘ra˘ a aduce atingere dispozit¸iilor prezentei sect¸iuni, pierderea provocata˘ unei persoane prin incitarea din partea unui tert¸ la nerespectarea unei obligat¸ii, este prejudiciu relevant juridic daca˘: (a) obligat¸ia era datorata˘ persoanei care a suferit pierderea; ¸si (b) persoana incitând la nerespectarea obligat¸iei: (i) a avut intent¸ia de a incita tert¸a persoana˘ la înca˘lcarea obligat¸iei, ¸si (ii) nu act¸iona în vederea ocrotirii legitime a intereselor proprii.

Capitolul 3: Imputabilitatea Sect¸iunea 1: Intent¸ia ¸si neglijent¸a Articolul 3:101: Intent¸ia O persoana˘ cauzeaza˘ un prejudiciu relevant juridic cu intent¸ie daca˘: (a) a urma˘rit sa˘ provoace un prejudiciu de genul celui pe care l-a ocazionat; ori (b) cauzeaza˘ prejudiciul printr-un comportament intent¸ionat ¸stiind ca˘ o asemenea paguba˘ sau una de acel tip va fi sau va fi mai mult ca sigur provocata˘. Articolul 3:102: Neglijent¸a O persoana˘ cauzeaza˘ un prejudiciu relevant juridic din neglijent¸˘a daca˘ cauzeaza˘ prejudiciul printrun comportament care: (a) nu corespunde standardului particular de diligent¸a˘ preva˘zuta˘ de o norma˘ legala˘ având ca scop protect¸ia persoanei care sufera˘ prejudiciul de acel prejudiciu, ori (b) nu corespunde, în alt mod, standardului de diligent¸a˘ pe care s-ar putea fi as¸teptata˘ de la o persoana˘ cu prudent¸a˘ rezonabila˘ în circumstant¸ele date. Articolul 3:103: Persoanele sub optsprezece ani (1) O persoana˘ sub optsprezece ani ra˘spunde pentru cauzarea prejudiciului relevant juridic potrivit articolului 3:102 (Neglijent¸a) subalineatul (b) numai în ma˘sura în care nu a depus diligent¸a care s-ar fi putut as¸teptat de la o persoana˘ cu prudent¸a˘ rezonabila˘ de aceeas¸i vârsta˘ în circumstant¸ele date. (2) O persoana˘ sub ¸sapte ani nu ra˘spunde nici pentru cauzarea cu intent¸ie, nici pentru cauzarea din neglijent¸˘a unui prejudiciu relevant juridic. (3) Totus¸i, alineatele (1) ¸si (2) nu se aplica˘ încât (a) persoana care sufera˘ prejudiciul nu poate obt¸ine reparat¸ie potrivit acestei Ca˘rt¸i, ¸si (b) obligat¸ia de a acorda reparat¸ie ar fi echitabila˘ ¸inând t seama de mijloacele financiare de care dispun pa˘rt¸ile ¸si de toate celelalte circumstant¸e ale cauzei. 178

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Articolul 3:104: Imputabilitatea pentru prejudicii cauzate de copii ori persoane aflate sub supraveghere (1) Pa˘rint¸ii sau alte persoane având, în temeiul legii, obligat¸ia de supraveghere pa˘rinteasca˘ asupra unei persoane sub paisprezece ani ra˘spund pentru cauzarea unui prejudiciu relevant juridic de ca˘tre minor printr-un comportament care, daca˘ ar fi fost al unui adult, ar constitui intent¸ie sau neglijent¸˘a. (2) O institut¸ie sau un alt organism obligat legal sa˘ supravegheze persoane ra˘spunde pentru provocarea unui prejudiciu relevant juridic suferit de o tert¸a˘ persoana˘ daca˘: (a) prejudiciul consta˘ în va˘ta˘marea integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii, t într-o pierdere potrivit articolului 2:202 (Pierderea suferita˘ de tert¸i în urma va˘ta˘ma˘rii integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii t unei alte persoane ori ca urmare a decesului acesteia), sau în dauna˘ materiala˘; (b) persoana aflata˘ sub supravegherea institut¸iei sau organului a cauzat prejudiciul cu inten¸ie t sau din neglijent¸a˘ sau, în cazul celor sub optsprezece ani, printr-un comportament care, în cazul unui adult, ar fi calificat drept intent¸ie sau neglijent¸a˘; ¸si (c) persoana aflata˘ sub supraveghere este o persoana˘ în cazul ca˘reia cauzarea unui prejudiciu de acest gen este probabila˘. (3) O persoana˘ nu este ra˘spunza˘toare pentru cauzarea unui prejudiciu potrivit acestui articol, daca˘ dovedes¸te ca˘ nu a sa˘vârs¸it nici o gres¸eala˘ în îndeplinirea obligat¸iei de supraveghere.

Sect¸iunea 2: Imputabilitatea în absent¸a intent¸iei sau neglijent¸ei Articolul 3:201: Imputabilitatea pentru prejudiciul cauzat de angajat¸i sau de reprezentant¸i (1) Survenirea unui prejudiciu relevant juridic suferit de ca˘tre un tert¸este imputabila˘ angajatorului când persoana angajata˘ sau încadrata˘ în vreun fel (a) a cauzat prejudiciul în cursul angaja˘rii sau al încadra˘rii, ¸si (b) a cauzat prejudiciul cu intent¸ie sau din neglijent¸˘a ori este ra˘spunza˘tor în vreun alt mod pentru cauzarea prejudiciului. (2) Alineatul (1) se aplica˘ în mod corespunza˘tor la o persoana˘ juridica˘ în raport cu un reprezentant care provoaca˘ prejudiciul în exercit¸iul funct¸iilor sale. Un reprezentant este o persoana˘ autorizata˘ conform statutului la încheierea de acte juridice pentru persoana juridica˘. Articolul 3:202 Imputabilitatea pentru prejudiciul provocat prin starea unui imobil (1) Survenirea unei va˘ta˘ma˘ri a integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii t ¸si a pierderii consecutive acesteia, a pierderii vizate de articolul 2:202 (Pierderea suferita˘ de tert¸i în urma va˘ta˘ma˘rii integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii t unei alte persoane ori ca urmare a decesului acesteia) ¸si a celei rezultând dintr-o paguba˘ materiala˘ (alta decât cea vizând imobilul însus¸i), ca urmare a unui stadiu al imobilului ce nu asigura˘ sigurant¸a pe care o persoana˘ aflata˘ în interiorul sau în apropierea acestuia este îndrepta˘¸ita t ˘ sa˘ o as¸tepte, este imputabila˘ celui care exercita˘ în mod independent un control asupra imobilui, ¸inându-se t seama de circumstant¸e ce includ (a) natura imobilului, (b) accesul la imobil, ¸si (c) costurile împiedica˘rii imobilului de a ajunge în acel stadiu. 179

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(2) O persoana˘ are un control independent asupra unui imobil daca˘ exercita˘ un astfel de control încât impunerea obligat¸iei de a preveni un prejudiciu relevant juridic în sensul prezentului articol apare ca echitabila˘. (3) Proprietarul unui imobil este considerat a-l controla independent daca˘ nu dovedes¸te ca˘ altul o face.

Articolul 3:203: Imputabilitatea pentru prejudicii cauzate de animale Det¸ina˘torul unui animal este ra˘spunza˘tor pentru cauzarea unei va˘ta˘ma˘ri a integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii, t precum ¸si pentru pierderile rezultând din aceasta, a unei pierderi potrivit articolului 2:202 (Pierderea suferita˘ de tert¸i în urma va˘ta˘ma˘rii integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii t unei alte persoane ori ca urmare a decesului acesteia) ¸si a unei pierderi datorata˘ unei daune materiale. Articolul 3:204: Imputabilitatea pentru prejudicii cauzate de produse defectuoase (1) Produca˘torul unui produs este ra˘spunza˘tor pentru cauzarea unei va˘ta˘ma˘ri a integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii, t precum ¸si pentru pierderile provocate de aceasta, a unei pierderi potrivit articolului 2:202 (Pierderea suferita˘ de tert¸i în urma va˘ta˘ma˘rii integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii t unei alte persoane ori ca urmare a decesului acesteia) ¸si, fat¸˘a de un consumator, pentru o pierdere din cauza unei daune materiale (în afara uneia a produsului însus¸i) produsa˘ printrun defect al produsului. (2) O persoana˘ care, în decursul activita˘¸ii t sale de comert¸, a importat produsul în Spat¸iul Economic European cu scopul vânza˘rii, închirierii, da˘rii în leasing sau a distribuirii în cadrul activita˘¸ii t sale comerciale, este ra˘spunza˘tor în consecint¸a˘. (3) Furnizorul unui produs este ra˘spunza˘tor în consecint¸a˘, daca˘: (a) produca˘torul nu poate fi identificat; sau (b) în cazul unui produs importat, produsul nu indica˘ identitatea produca˘torului (fiind fa˘ra˘ relevant¸˘a indicarea numelui produca˘torului), în afara˘ de cazul când furnizorul comunica˘ persoanei care sufera˘ prejudiciul, în timp rezonabil datele de identitate ale produca˘torul sau persoana, care i- a furnizat lui produsul. (4) Potrivit acestui articol, o persoana˘ nu este ra˘spunza˘toare de cauzarea unui prejudiciu, daca˘ dovedes¸te ca˘: (a) Nu ea a pus în circulat¸ie produsul respectiv; (b) este probabil ca˘ defectul, care a cauzat prejudiciul, nu exista la momentul în care produsul a fost pus în circulat¸ie de ea; (c) ea nu a realizat produsul pentru vânzare sau distribut¸ie în scop economic, nici nu l-a realizat sau distribuit în cursul activita˘¸ii t sale de comert¸; (d) defectul rezulta˘ din conformitatea produsului cu prevederiile obligatorii as¸a cum sunt reglementate de autorita˘¸iile t publice; cont de nivelul cunos¸tint¸elor ¸stiint¸ifice (e) existent¸a defectului nu putea fi cunoscuta˘ ¸inând t ¸si tehnice la momentul când a pus produsul în circulat¸ie; (f) fiind vorba de realizatorul unei pa˘rt¸i componente, defectul este imputabil : (i) designului produsului iîn care componenta a fost integrata˘; (ii) instruct¸iunilor date de realizatorul produsului. (5) Prin „produca˘tor“ se înt¸elege: (a) realizatorul, în cazul unui produs finit sau al unei componente; (b) persoana care exploateaza˘ sau extrage, în cazul materiilor prime ¸si

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(c) orice persoana˘ care, punând un nume, o marca˘ de comert¸sau vreun alt semn distinctiv pe produs, creeaza˘ impresia ca˘ îi este produca˘torul. (6) Termenul „produs“ desemneaza˘ orice bun mobil, chiar daca˘ el face parte dintr-un alt bun mobil sau imobil, precum ¸si electricitatea. (7) Un produs este defectuos daca˘ nu furnizeaza˘ sigurant¸a la care o persoana˘ este îndrepta˘¸ita t ˘ sa˘ se as¸tepte, ¸inând t seama de circumstant¸e ce include: (a) modul de prezentare a produsului, (b) modul de utilizare a produsului, care poate fi rezonabil anticipat ; ¸si (c) momentul punerii în circulat¸ie a produsului, dar un produs nu poate fi considerat defectuos prin simplul fapt al punerii ulterior în circulat¸ie a unui produs îmbuna˘ta˘¸it. t

Articolul 3:205: Imputabilitatea pentru prejudicii cauzate de autovehicule (1) În cazul unui accident rutier survenit ca urmare a folosirii unui autovehicul, det¸ina˘torul autovehiculului este ra˘spunza˘tor pentru cauzarea unei va˘ta˘ma˘ri a integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii t potrivit articolului 2:202 (Pierderea suferita˘ de tert¸i în urma va˘ta˘ma˘rii integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii t unei alte persoane ori ca urmare a decesului acesteia) precum ¸si pentru pierderile cauzate bunurilor acestuia (altele decât cele cauzate vehicului ¸si înca˘rca˘turii acestuia). (2) Prin „autovehicul“ se înt¸elege oricare vehicul servind la transportul terestru ¸si având propulsie mecanica˘, excluzând vehiculele feroviare ¸si orice remorca˘, fie cuplata˘ sau nu. Articolul 3:206: Imputabilitatea pentru prejudicii cauzate de substant¸e sau emisii periculoase (1) Det¸ina˘torul unei substant¸e sau operatorul unei instalat¸ii este ra˘spunza˘tor pentru cauzarea unei va˘ta˘ma˘ri a integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii t precum ¸si pentru pierderile cauzate de acesta, pierdere definita˘ conform articolului 2:202 (Pierderea suferita˘ de tert¸i în urma va˘ta˘ma˘rii integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii t unei alte persoane ori ca urmare a decesului acesteia), pentru pierderi rezultate din pagube aduse bunurilor ¸si pentru cheltuieli în sensul articolului 2:209 (Sarcini suportate de stat datorita˘ deteriora˘rii mediului), daca˘: (a) având în vedere cantitatea ¸si proprieta˘¸ile t ei în timpul emisiei, sau, în cazul când nu exista˘ emisie, în timpul contactului cu substant¸a este foarte probabil ca substant¸a sau emisia va cauza un astfel de prejudiciu, daca˘ nu se afla˘ sub control adecvat, ¸si (b) prejudiciul rezulta˘ din realizarea acestui risc. (2) Not¸iunea de „substant¸a˘“ include substant¸e chimice (fie solide, fie lichide sau gazoase). Microorganismele sunt asimilate ca regim cu substant¸ele. (3) Termenul „emisiile“ include (a) emiterea sau volatilizarea substant¸elor, (b) conductibilitatea curentului electric, (c) ca˘ldura, lumina ¸si alte radiat¸ii (d) zgomot ¸si alte vibrat¸ii ¸si (e) alte influent¸e incorporale asupra mediului. (4) Termenul de „instalat¸ie“ se refera˘ atât la o instalat¸ie mobila˘ cât ¸si la una în construct¸ie sau nefolosita˘.

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(5) Totodata˘, o persoana˘ nu ra˘spunde pentru cauzarea unui prejudiciu potrivit acestui articol, daca˘: (a) nu det¸ine substant¸a sau nu utilizeaza˘ instalat¸ia în cadrul activita˘¸ii t sale profesionale sau de comert¸; sau (b) dovedes¸te, ca˘ nu a existat o înca˘lcare a prevederilor legale privind standardele de control ale substant¸ei sau privind utilizarea instalat¸iei în cauza˘.

Articolul 3:207: Alte cazuri de ra˘spundere pentru provocarea unui prejudiciu relevant juridic O persoana˘ este de asemenea ra˘spunza˘toare pentru provocarea unui prejudiciu relevant juridic daca˘ legislat¸ia nat¸ionala˘ prevede aceasta, când (a) se refera˘ la o sursa˘ de pericol care nu este cuprinsa˘ în articolele 3:104 (Imputabilitatea pentru prejudicii cauzate de copii ori persoane aflate sub supraveghere) pâna˘ în 3:205 (Imputabilitate pentru prejudicii cauzate de autovehicule), (b) se refera˘ la substant¸e sau emisii, sau (c) se înla˘tura˘ aplicarea articolului 3:204 (Imputabilitatea pentru prejudicii cauzate de produse defectuoase) (4)(e). Articolul 3:208: Abandonarea sursei de pericol În sensul prevederilor acestei sect¸iuni, o persoana˘ ra˘mâne ra˘spunza˘toare pentru un teren, un vehicul, o substant¸a˘ sau o instalat¸ie, pe care le abandoneaza˘, pâna˘ când un altul exercita˘ controlul independent asupra lor ori devine det¸ina˘torul sau utilizatorul lor. În limita rezonabilului, prevederile de mai sus se aplica˘ în mod corespunza˘tor în privint¸a det¸ina˘torului unui animal.

Capitolul 4: Raportul de cauzalitate Articolul 4:101: Norma generala˘ (1) O persoana˘ cauzeaza˘ un prejudiciu relevant juridic altuia daca˘ prejudiciul este consecint¸a comportamentului sa˘u sau al sursei de pericol de care acea persoana˘ ra˘spunde. (2) În caz de va˘ta˘mare a integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii t ¸si în caz de deces, nu se ¸ine t seama˘ de predispozit¸ia persoanei va˘ta˘mate cu privire la tipul ¸si întinderea va˘ta˘ma˘rii suferite. Articolul 4:102: Participat¸iunea O persoana˘ care participa˘ împreuna˘ cu, îl instiga˘ îl asista˘ material pe un altul la cauzarea unui prejudiciu reparabil juridic, este privita˘ ca ¸si cum l-ar fi cauzat. Articolul 4:103: Cauze alternative Daca˘ prejudiciul relevant juridic putea fi cauzat de unul sau de mai multe evenimente, pentru care sunt ra˘spunza˘toare diferite persoane ¸si este stabilit ca˘ prejudiciul a fost cauzat de unul dintre aceste evenimente, fa˘ra˘ a se preciza de care anume, fiecare persoana˘ responsabila˘ pentru oricare dintre evenimente este prezumata˘ relativ a fi provocat paguba.

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Capitolul 5: Mijloace de apa˘rare Sect¸iunea 1: Consimt¸˘amântul sau comportamentul victimei Articolul 5:101 Consimt¸˘amântul ¸si act¸iunea pe proprie ra˘spundere (1) Fa˘ptuitorul are dreptul sa˘ se apere daca˘ victima a consimt¸it valid la producerea prejudiciului relevant juridic ¸si este cons¸tienta˘ sau ar putea sa˘ fie cons¸tienta˘ de consecint¸ele respectivului consimt¸a˘mânt. (2) Aceeas¸i regula˘ se aplica˘ daca˘ victima, cunoscând riscul unui prejudiciu de genul celui cauzat, se expune voluntar la acel risc ¸sî poate fi considerata˘ a-l fi acceptat. Articolul 5:102: Vinova˘¸tia victimei ¸si imputabilitatea (1) Când culpa victimei contribuie la producerea sau întinderea prejudicului relevant juridic, reparat¸ia trebuie proport¸ional. (2) Totus¸i, nu se va ¸ine t cont de: (a) vina neînsemnata˘ a persoanei care sufera˘ prejudiciul; (b) gres¸eala sau motivul de imputare care a contribuit numai în mod neînsemnat la cauzarea prejudiciului; (c) lipsa de grija˘ ¸si diligent¸a˘ a victimei suferind o va˘ta˘mare a integrita˘¸ii t corporale într-un accident rutier produs de un autovehicul, care nu va fi luata˘ în considerare decat daca˘ este una grava˘ raportat la grija ¸si diligent¸a ce ar fi fost evident necesare în circumstant¸ele date. (3) Alineatele (1) ¸si (2) se aplica˘ în mod similar când o persoana˘, pentru care persoana care sufera˘ prejudiciul este ra˘spunza˘toare în sensul articolului 3:201 (Imputabilitatea pentru prejudiciul cauzat de angjat¸i sau de prepus¸i), contribuie prin culpa proprie la producerea prejudiciului ori la dimensiunea acestuia. (4) Despa˘gubirea va fi redusa˘ daca˘ ¸si în ma˘sura în care o alta˘ sursa˘ de pericol, pentru care victima este ra˘spunza˘toare potrivit Capitolului 3 (Imputabilitatea), contribuie la prejudiciu ori dimensiunea acestuia. Articolul 5:103: Prejudiciul cauzat de ca˘tre un infractor unui participant Prejudiciul relevant juridic provocat fa˘ra˘ intent¸ie, cu ocazia sa˘vârs¸irii unei infract¸iuni, unei alte persoane care participa˘ în vreun fel la infract¸iune nu da˘ nas¸tere unui drept la despa˘gubire, daca˘ acest lucru ar fi contrar ordinii publice.

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Sect¸iunea 2: Interesele persoanelor ra˘spunza˘toare sau ale tert¸ilor Articolul 5:201: Autoritatea conferita˘ de lege O persoana˘ dispune de un mijloc de apa˘rare daca˘ prejudiciul relevant juridic a fost cauzat prin aplicarea reglementa˘rilor legale. Articolul 5:202: Legitima apa˘rare, gestiunea de afaceri ¸si starea de necesitate (1) O persoana˘ are la dispozit¸ie un mijloc de apa˘rare când, apa˘rând rezonabil dreptul sa˘u sau pe cel al unui tert¸ori apa˘rând rezonabil interesul sa˘u demn de protect¸ie juridica˘ sau pe cel al unui tert¸ demn de protect¸ie juridica˘ cauzeaza˘ un prejudiciu relevant juridic, daca˘ persoana care sufera˘ prejudiciul relevant juridic este ra˘spunza˘toare pentru periclitarea dreptului sau a interesului protejat. În aplicarea acestui alineat, nu se va ¸ine t seama de dispozit¸iile articolului 3:103 (Persoanele sub optsprezece ani). (2) Acelas¸i principiu se aplica˘ ¸si prejudiciului cauzat creditorului de ca˘tre gerant fa˘ra˘ înca˘lcarea obligat¸iilor impuse de aceasta˘ calitate. (3) Daca˘ o persoana˘ cauzeaza˘ un prejudiciu relevant juridic patrimoniului altuia într-o situat¸ie în care amenint¸a˘ viat¸a, integritatea corporala˘, sa˘na˘tatea sau libertatea alteia, cu scopul de a se salva pe el însus¸i sau de a salva un tert¸ iar eliminarea pericolului n-ar fi fost posibila˘ fa˘ra˘ cauzarea prejudiciului, persoana care provoaca˘ prejudiciul nu este ¸inuta t ˘ la reparare peste limita rezonabilului. Articolul 5:203: Protect¸ia intereselor publice O persoana˘ are un mijloc de apa˘rare, daca˘ prejudiciul relevant juridic este provocat în apa˘rarea necesara˘ a valorilor fundamentale ale unei societa˘¸it democratice, mai ales când prejudiciul este provoc prin ra˘spândirea de informat¸ii în mass-media.

Sect¸iunea 3: Incapacitatea de control Articolul 5:301: Lipsa de discerna˘mânt (1) O persoana˘ lipsita˘ de discerna˘mânt în momentul comportamentului cauzator de prejudiciu relevant juridic ra˘spunde numai daca˘ aceasta este echitabil din punctul de vedere al situat¸iei sale financiare ¸si al tuturor celorlalte circumstant¸e ale cauzei. Ra˘spunderea este limitata˘ la o reparat¸ie rezonabila˘. (2) O persoana˘ este considerata˘ lipsita˘ de discerna˘mânt daca˘ nu are o reflectare suficienta˘ asupra naturii comportamentului sa˘u, daca˘ nu cumva respectiva lipsa˘ este rezultatul temporar al propriei sale conduite eronate. Articolul 5:302: Evenimentul inevitabil O persoana˘ are un mijloc de apa˘rare, daca˘ prejudiciul relevant juridic a fost cauzat de-un eveniment except¸ional care nu poate fi evitat prin nici o ma˘sura˘ rezonabila˘ ¸si care nu poate fi considerat ca un risc asumat de aceasta.

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Sect¸iunea 4: Clauze contractuale exoneratoare ¸si limitative de ra˘spundere Articolul 5:401: Clauze contractuale exoneratoare ¸si limitative de ra˘spundere (1) Ra˘spunderea pentru cauzarea unui prejudiciu relevant juridic cu intent¸ie nu poate fi înla˘turata˘ sau limitata˘. (2) Ra˘spunderea pentru cauzarea unui prejudiciu relevant juridic prin înca˘lcarea grava˘ a diligent¸ei evident necesara˘ în circumstant¸ele cauzei nu poate fi înla˘turata˘ sau limitata˘ (a) în cazul unei va˘ta˘ma˘ri a integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii t (inclusiv va˘ta˘ma˘rile fatale), sau (b) în cazul în care înla˘turarea sau limitarea este într-un alt mod ilegala˘ sau contravine bunei credint¸e. (3) Ra˘spunderea nu poate fi înla˘turata˘ sau limitata˘ daca˘ o persoana˘ este ra˘spunza˘toare pentru cauzarea prejudiciului potrivit articolului 3:204 (Imputabilitatea pentru prejudicii cauzate de produse defectuoase). (4) Orice alta˘ ra˘spundere potrivit acestui Ca˘rt¸i poate fi înla˘turata˘ sau limitata˘, în afara˘ de cazul când legea dispune altfel.

Sect¸iunea 5: Pierderea potrivit articolului 2:202 Articolul 5:501: Extinderea fat¸˘a de tert¸i a mijloacelor de apa˘rare opozabile ¸si fat¸˘a de persoana va˘ta˘mata˘ Un mijloc de apa˘rare, care poate fi opus dreptului la reparat¸ie al unei persoane pentru va˘ta˘marea integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii t acestei persoane ori ar putea fi sust¸inuta˘, daca˘ nu ar fi survenit moartea, poate fi opozabil ¸si fat¸˘a de o persoana˘ suferind un prejudiciu potrivit articolului 2:202 (Pierderea suferita˘ de tert¸i în urma va˘ta˘ma˘rii integrita˘¸ii t corporale sau a sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii t unei alte persoane ori ca urmare a decesului acesteia).

Capitolul 6: Remediile Sect¸iunea 1: Reparat¸ia în general Articolul 6:101: Scopuri ¸si forme de reparare (1) Reparat¸ia are scopul de a repune persoana care sufera˘ prejudiciul relevant juridic în situat¸ia în care s-ar fi ga˘sit daca˘ nu ar fi survenit acesta. (2) Reparat¸ia poate fi una pecuniara˘ sau poate fi acordata˘ într-un alt mod, dupa˘ cum este cel mai potrivit, având în vedere tipul ¸si întinderea prejudiciului suferit, precum ¸si toate celelalte circumstant¸e ale cauzei. (3) Când este deteriorat un bun tangibil ¸si cheltuielile de reparare depa˘¸sesc în mod nerezonabil deprecierea valorica˘ a bunului, se acorda˘, în loc de cheltuielile de reparare, o compensat¸ie corespunza˘toare deprecierii valorice. Aceasta˘ regula˘ se aplica˘ ¸si pentru animale daca˘ este cazul, ¸inând t cont de scopul pentru care animalul a fost de ¸inut. t 185

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(4) Ca o alternativa˘ la repunerea reglementata˘ la alineatul (1), ¸si numai acolo unde acest lucru este rezonabil, reparat¸ia poate lua forma recupera˘rii de la persoana responsabila˘ de producerea prejudiciului relevant juridic a orica˘ui beneficiu obt¸inut de aceasta în lega˘tura˘ cu producerea prejudiciului.

Articolul 6:102: Regula „De minimis“ Prejudiciul neînsemnat nu trebuie luat în considerare. Articolul 6:103: Echilibrarea beneficiilor (1) Beneficiile obt¸inute de persoana care sufera˘ prejudiciul relevant juridic ca urmare a evenimentului pa˘gubitor nu sunt luate în considerare, daca˘ nu cumva ar fi echitabil ¸si rezonabil sa˘ se procedeze altfel. (2) Pentru a decide daca˘ luarea în considerare a beneficiilor este echitabila˘ ¸si rezonabila˘, se va ¸ine t seama de felul prejudiciului suferit ¸si de natura ra˘spunderii persoanei care cauzeaza˘ prejudiciul, precum ¸si de scopul acorda˘rii beneficiilor, daca˘ acestea au fost acordate de o tert¸a˘ persoana˘. Articolul 6:104: Pluralitatea de victime Daca˘ mai multe persoane sufera˘ un prejudiciu relevant juridic, ¸si repararea fat¸a˘ de una dintre ele are ca efect ¸si repararea prejudicului fat¸a˘ de celelalte, se aplica˘ în mod corespunza˘tor Cartea a III-a, Capitolul 4, Sect¸iunea a 2-a (Solidaritatea între creditori). Articolul 6:105: Ra˘spunderea solidara˘ Daca˘ mai multe persoane sunt ra˘spunza˘toare pentru acelas¸i prejudiciu relevant juridic, ei ra˘spund în mod solidar. Articolul 6:106: Cesiunea dreptului la reparat¸ie Persoana care sufera˘ prejudiciul poate sa˘-s¸i cedeze dreptul sa˘u la reparat¸ie, inclusiv un drept la reparat¸ie pentru pierderi nepatrimoniale.

Sect¸iunea 2: Despa˘gubirea pecuniara˘ Articolul 6:201: Dreptul de alegere al victimei Victima poate alege daca˘ va folosi sau nu despa˘gubirea primita˘ pentru restabilirea interesului sa˘u va˘ta˘mat.

Articolul 6:202: Limitarea ra˘spunderii În cazul când este drept ¸si echitabil, o persoana˘ poate fi exonerata˘ total sau part¸ial de ra˘spundere daca˘, prejudiciul nefiind cauzat cu intent¸ie, ra˘spunderea ca atare ar fi disproport¸ionata˘ în raport cu ceea ce i se poate imputa persoanei care a cauzat prejudiciul sau cu întinderea acestuia sau cu mijloacele de a-l preveni.

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Articolul 6:203: Capitalizarea ¸si calcularea (1) Despa˘gubirea pecuniara˘ se acorda˘ într-o suma˘ achitabila˘ integral, daca˘ nu cumva un motiv temeinic impune pla˘¸it periodice. (2) Dreptul nat¸ional determina˘ modul de calculare al despa˘gubirii pecuniare pentru va˘ta˘ma˘ri corporale sau ale sa˘na˘ta˘¸ii, t precum ¸si pentru pierderea nepatrimoniala˘. Articolul 6:204: Despa˘gubire pentru va˘ta˘marea ca atare Va˘ta˘marea ca atare trebuie compensata˘ prin despa˘gubire pecuniara˘, independent de reparat¸ia pentru pierderea patrimoniala˘ sau nepatrimoniala˘.

Sect¸iunea 3: Prevenirea prejudiciului Articolul 6:301: Dreptul la prevenire (1) Dreptul la prevenire exista˘ numai în ma˘sura în care (a) despa˘gubirea nu ar fi un remediu alternativ potrivit; ¸si (b) prevenirea prejudiciului este rezonabila˘ din punctul de vedere al persoanei care ar fi ra˘spunza˘toare pentru cauzarea prejudiciului. (2) Daca˘ sursa de pericol consta˘ într-un lucru sau într-un animal ¸si persoanei periclitate îi este rezonabil imposibila˘ prevenirea pericolului, dreptul la prevenire presupune ¸si dreptul de a obt¸ine înla˘turarea sursei de pericol. Articolul 6:302: Ra˘spunderea pentru pierdere la prevenirea prejudiciului O persoana˘ care a efectuat în mod rezonabil cheltuieli sau a suferit vreo alta˘ pierdere pentru a preveni suferirea unui prejudiciu pentru sine ori pentru a limita întinderea sau gravitatea prejudicului produs, are dreptul la despa˘gubire pecuniara˘ de la persoana care ar fi ra˘spunza˘toare pentru cauzarea prejudiciului.

Capitolul 7: Dispozit¸ii complementare Articolul 7:101: Legile constitut¸ionale nat¸ionale Dispozit¸iile acestei Ca˘rt¸i trebuie interpretate ¸si aplicate într-o maniera˘ compatibila˘ cu legea constitut¸ionala˘ a instant¸ei competente. Articolul 7:102: Dispozit¸iile legale Dreptul nat¸ional determina˘ care dintre dispozit¸iile legale sunt dispozit¸ii aplicabile. Articolul 7:103: Funct¸iile de drept public ¸si procedurile judiciare Aceasta˘ Carte nu reglementeaza˘ ra˘spunderea unei persoane sau a unei organizat¸ii, decurgând din îndeplinirea sau din omisiunea de a exercita o funct¸ie de drept public sau din împlinirea îndatoriilor în cadrul unei proceduri judiciare.

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Articolul 7:104: Ra˘spunderea angajat¸iilor, angajatorilor, sindicatelor ¸si a asociat¸iilor patronale Aceasta˘ Carte nu reglementeaza˘ ra˘spunderea (a) angajat¸ilor (fie aceasta fat¸a˘ de alt¸i angajat¸i, fat¸a˘ de angajatori sau fat¸a˘ de tert¸e pa˘rt¸i), apa˘ruta˘ pe parcursul angaja˘rii, (b) angajatorilor fat¸a˘ de angajat¸i, apa˘ruta˘ pe parcursul angaja˘rii, ¸si (c) sindicatelor ¸si asociat¸iilor patronale, apa˘ruta˘ în cadrul unei activita˘¸it sindicale. Articolul 7:105: Reducerea sau înla˘turarea ra˘spunderii fat¸˘a de persoane despa˘gubite Daca˘ o persoana˘ are dreptul la reparare dintr-o alta˘ sursa˘, indiferent daca˘ este o reparare totala˘ sau part¸iala˘, în special când despa˘gubirea provine dela un asigurator, fie acesta un fond de asigura˘ri sau o alta˘ organizat¸ie, dreptul nat¸ional determina˘ daca˘ din cauza acelei îndrepta˘¸iri t ra˘spunderea conform acestei Ca˘rt¸i este limitata˘ sau înla˘turata˘.

Slovenian1 Neposlovna odgovornost zaradi ˘skode povzrocˇene drugemu 1. poglavje: Temeljne dolocˇbe ˇ len 1:101: Temeljno pravilo C (1) Oseba, ki utrpi pravno upos˘tevno ˘skodo, ima pravico do povrnitve ˘skode od osebe, ki je ˘skodo povzrocˇila namenoma ali iz malomarnosti ali je na drug nacˇin odgovorna za povzrocˇitev ˘skode. ˇ e oseba ni povzrocˇila pravno upos˘tevne ˘skode namenoma ali iz malomarnosti, odgovarja za (2) C povzrocˇitev pravno upos˘tevne ˘skode le, ˇce tako dolocˇa 3. poglavje. ˇ len 1:102: Preprecˇevanje C Kjer grozi ˘skoda, ta knjiga podeljuje osebi, ki bi utrpela ˘skodo, pravico, da jo preprecˇi. Ta pravica obstaja proti osebi, ki bi bila odgovorna za povzrocˇitev ˘skode, ˇce bi ta nastala. ˇ len 1:103: Podrocˇje uporabe C ˇ lena 1:101 in 1:102 C (a) se uporabljata le v skladu z naslednjimi dolocˇbami te knjige, (b) se uporabljata za pravne in fizicˇne osebe, razen ˇce ni drugacˇe dolocˇeno, (c) se ne uporabljata, ˇce bi njuna uporaba nasprotovala namenu drugih predpisov zasebnega prava, in (d) ne vplivata na zahtevke, ki so na razpolago iz drugih pravnih podlag.

2. poglavje: Pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda 1. oddelek: Splos˘no ˇ len 2:101: Pomen pojma pravno upos˘tevne ˘skode C (1) Premozˇenjsko ali nepremozˇenjsko os˘kodovanje ali telesna pos˘kodba je pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda, ˇce: (a) tako dolocˇa ena izmed dolocˇb tega poglavja, (b) tako os˘kodovanje ali telesna pos˘kodba izvira iz krs˘itve pravno varovane pravice, ali (c) os˘kodovanje ali telesna pos˘kodba izvira iz krs˘itve koristi, ki je vredna pravnega varstva.

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Translated by Professor Verica Trstenjak and Jorg Sladic, Maribor and Luxembourg.

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(2) V primerih, ki jih urejata alinei (b) in (c) prvega odstavka, je os˘kodovanje ali telesna pos˘kodba pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda le, ˇce bi bilo pos˘teno in pravicˇno, da bi v takem primeru obstajala pravica do povrnitve ˘skode ali, glede na primer, do preprecˇevanja na podlagi ˇclenov 1:101 ali 1:102. (3) Pri presoji, ali bi bilo pos˘teno in pravicˇno, da bi obstajala pravica do povrnitve ˘skode ali preprecˇevanja, je treba upos˘tevati temelj odgovornosti, naravo in blizˇino ˘skode ali grozecˇe ˘skode, razumna pricˇakovanja osebe, ki je utrpela ali bi utrpela ˘skodo in razloge javnega reda. (4) V tej knjigi: (a) premozˇenjsko os˘kodovanje obsega izgubo dobicˇka ali prihodka, nastala bremena in zmanjs˘anje vrednosti premozˇenja, (b) nepremozˇenjsko os˘kodovanje obsega bolecˇine in trpljenje ter poseg v kakovost ˇzivljenja.

2. oddelek: Posebni primeri pravno upos˘tevne ˘skode ˇ len 2:201: Telesna pos˘kodba in posledicˇno os˘kodovanje C (1) Os˘kodovanje, povzrocˇeno fizicˇni osebi kot posledica telesne pos˘kodbe ali okvare zdravja in telesna pos˘kodba kot taka je pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda. (2) V tej knjigi: (a) táko os˘kodovanje obsega stros˘ke zdravljenja in nege, vkljucˇno z razumnimi stros˘ki ozˇjih sorodnikov za nego os˘kodovanca in (b) pos˘kodba dus˘evnega zdravja je telesna pos˘kodba le, ˇce pride do dus˘evnega obolenja. ˇ len 2:202: Os˘kodovanje, ki so ga utrpeli tretji kot posledico C telesne pos˘kodbe ali smrti drugega (1) Nepremozˇenjsko os˘kodovanje, ki je bilo povzrocˇeno fizicˇni osebi kot posledica telesne po˘skodbe ali smrti drugega, je pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda, ˇce je v trenutku pos˘kodbe ta oseba v posebno tesnem osebnem razmerju s pos˘kodovano osebo. ˇ e je bila oseba smrtno pos˘kodovana: (2) C (a) postane pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda, ki je bila povzrocˇena umrlemu zaradi telesne pos˘kodbe v trenutku smrti, pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda pravnim naslednikom umrlega, (b) primerna pogrebnina je pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda za osebo, ki jo mora nositi, in (c) izguba prezˇivljanja je pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda za fizicˇno osebo, ki jo je umrli vzdrzˇeval ali bi jo bil vzdrzˇeval na podlagi prisilnih predpisov, ˇce ne bi pris˘lo do smrti, ali ji je umrli nudil nego in financˇno podporo. ˇ len 2:203: Poseg v dostojanstvo, svobodo in zasebnost C (1) Os˘kodovanje, povzrocˇeno fizicˇni osebi kot posledica posega v njegovo ali njeno pravico do spos˘tovanja dostojanstva, kot npr. pravico do svobode ter pravico do zasebnosti, in sam poseg sta pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda. (2) Os˘kodovanje, povzrocˇeno osebi kot posledica posega v dobro ime te osebe in sam poseg sta tudi pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda, ˇce tako dolocˇa nacionalno pravo.

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ˇ len 2:204: Os˘kodovanje zaradi posredovanja nepravilnih C informacij o drugem Os˘kodovanje, povzrocˇeno osebi kot posledica posredovanja informacij o tej osebi, za katero oseba, ki jih posreduje, ve ali bi morala vedeti, da so nepravilne, je pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda. ˇ len 2:205: Os˘kodovanje zaradi krs˘itve zaupnosti C Os˘kodovanje, povzrocˇeno kot posledica posredovanja informacij, za katere oseba, ki jih posreduje, ve ali bi morala vedeti, da so zaupne narave, bodisi zaradi narave informacije bodisi zaradi okolis˘ˇcin, v katerih je prejela to informacijo, je za osebo, ki utrpi tako os˘kodovanje, pravno upo˘stevna ˘skoda. ˇ len 2:206: Os˘kodovanje zaradi posega v lastnino ali zakonito posest C (1) Os˘kodovanje, povzrocˇeno osebi kot posledica posega v lastninsko pravico te osebe ali zakonito posest premicˇne ali nepremicˇne stvari, je pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda. (2) V tem ˇclenu: (a) os˘kodovanje obsega tudi nezmozˇnost uporabe lastnine, (b) poseg v lastninsko pravico obsega unicˇenje ali fizicˇno pos˘kodbo predmeta pravice (po˘skodba stvari), razpolaganja s pravico, poseg v uporabo ali druga motenja pri izvrs˘evanju te pravice. ˇ len 2:207: Os˘kodovanje zaradi zaupanja nepravilnemu C nasvetu ali informaciji Os˘kodovanje, povzrocˇeno osebi kot posledica odlocˇitve, ki je bila sprejeta na podlagi razumnega zaupanja nepravilnemu nasvetu ali nepravilni informaciji, je pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda: (a) ˇce je nasvet ali informacijo dala oseba pri izvajanju poklica ali pridobitne dejavnosti, in (b) ˇce je oseba vedela ali bi morala vedeti, da se bo prejemnik zanesel na nasvet ali informacijo pri sprejemanju take vrste odlocˇitve, kakrs˘no je sprejel. ˇ len 2:208: Os˘kodovanje zaradi nezakonitega poseganja v posel C (1) Os˘kodovanje, povzrocˇeno osebi kot posledica nezakonitega poseganja v izvajanje poklica ali pridobitne dejavnosti, je pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda. (2) Os˘kodovanje, povzrocˇeno potros˘niku kot posledica nelojalne konkurence, je tudi pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda, ˇce tako dolocˇa pravo Skupnosti ali nacionalno pravo. ˇ len 2:209: Bremena, ki nastanejo drzˇavi zaradi prizadetosti okolja C Bremena, ki nastanejo drzˇavi ali posameznim pristojnim drzˇavnim organom pri sanaciji bistveno pos˘kodovanih naravnih delov okolja, kot so zrak, voda, tla, flora in favna, so pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda za drzˇavo in zadevne drzˇavne organe. ˇ len 2:210: Os˘kodovanje zaradi prevare C (1) Ne glede na druge dolocˇbe tega oddelka je os˘kodovanje, povzrocˇeno osebi kot posledica prevare bodisi z besedami bodisi z dejanji drugega, pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda. (2) ˇSteje se, da gre za prevaro, ˇce se ravnanje opravi z vedenjem ali prepricˇanjem, da je izjava napacˇna in je to namenjeno temu, da se naslovnika spravi v zmoto.

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ˇ len 2:211: Os˘kodovanje zaradi napeljevanja h krs˘itvi obveznosti C Ne glede na druge dolocˇbe tega oddelka je os˘kodovanje, povzrocˇeno osebi kot posledica napeljevanja tretje osebe h krs˘itvi obveznosti, pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda le: (a) ˇce je bila obveznost dolgovana osebi, ki je bila os˘kodovana, in (b) ˇce je oseba, ki je napeljevala h krs˘itvi obveznosti: (i) hotela, da tretja oseba krs˘i obveznost, in (ii) ni ravnala v upravicˇenem varovanju svojih koristi.

3. poglavje: Odgovornost 1. oddelek: Namen in malomarnost ˇ len 3:101: Namen C Oseba povzrocˇi pravno upos˘tevno ˘skodo namenoma, bodisi: (a) ˇce je hotela povzrocˇiti ˘skodo take vrste, kot je bila povzrocˇena, ali (b) ˇce je ˘skodo povzrocˇila z zavestnim ravnanjem, in ˇce se zaveda, da bo povzrocˇena ali bo skoraj zagotovo povzrocˇena taka ˘skoda ali ˘skoda take vrste. ˇ len 3:102: Malomarnost C Oseba povzrocˇi pravno upos˘tevno ˘skodo iz malomarnosti, ˇce ta oseba povzrocˇi ˘skodo z ravnanjem, ki bodisi: (a) ne ustreza posebnemu standardu skrbnosti, ki ga dolocˇa prisilni predpis, katerega namen je varovanje os˘kodovanca pred utrpljeno ˘skodo, ali (b) drugacˇe ne ustreza taki skrbnosti, kakor bi se jo lahko pricˇakovalo od razumno skrbne osebe v okolis˘ˇcinah primera. ˇ len 3:103: Osebe, mlajs˘e od osemnajst let C (1) Oseba, mlajs˘a od 18 let, je odgovorna za povzrocˇitev pravno upos˘tevne ˘skode v skladu z alineo b ˇclena 3:102 le, kolikor ne ravna s tako skrbnostjo, kakrs˘no bi se lahko pricˇakovalo od razumno skrbne osebe iste starosti v okolis˘ˇcinah primera. (2) Oseba, mlajs˘a od 7 let, ne odgovarja za ˘skodo, povzrocˇeno namenoma ali iz malomarnosti. (3) Prvi in drugi odstavek se ne uporabljata, ˇce (a) os˘kodovanec ne more dosecˇi povrnitve ˘skode od drugega na podlagi te knjige, in (b) bi bila obveznost povrniti ˘skodo pravicˇna in pos˘tena glede na financˇna sredstva strank in vse ostale okolis˘ˇcine primera. ˇ len 3:104: Odgovornost za ˘skodo, ki so jo povzrocˇili otroci ali C osebe pod nadzorstvom (1) Stars˘i ali osebe, ki morajo na podlagi zakona izvajati stars˘evsko skrb za osebo, mlajs˘o od ˘stirinajst let, so odgovorni za povzrocˇitev pravno upos˘tevne ˘skode, ˇce je mladoletna oseba povzrocˇila ˘skodo z ravnanjem, ki bi bilo storjeno namenoma ali iz malomarnosti, ˇce bi bilo to ravnanje odraslega.

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(2) Institucija ali drug organ, ki je zadolzˇen za nadzorstvo nad osebo, je odgovoren za povzroˇcitev pravno upos˘tevne ˘skode, ki jo je utrpel tretji, ˇce: (a) je ta ˘skoda telesna pos˘kodba, os˘kodovanje v smislu ˇclena 2:202 ali pos˘kodba stvari, (b) je oseba, glede katere je institucija ali organ zadolzˇen za nadzorstvo, povzrocˇila ˘skodo namenoma ali iz malomarnosti, ali v primeru osebe, mlajs˘e od 18 let, z ravnanjem, ki bi bilo storjeno namenoma ali iz malomarnosti, ˇce bi bilo to ravnanje odraslega, in (c) je za osebo pod nadzorstvom verjetno, da je povzrocˇila ˘skodo take vrste. (3) Vendar pa oseba ne odgovarja za povzrocˇitev ˘skode na podlagi tega ˇclena, ˇce dokazˇe, da nadzor nad osebo, ki je povzrocˇila ˘skodo, ni bil pomanjkljiv.

2. oddelek: Odgovornost brez namena ali malomarnosti ˇ len 3:201: Odgovornost za ˘skodo, ki so jo povzrocˇili zaposleni in zastopniki C (1) Oseba, ki zaposluje ali na podoben nacˇin najame drugega, odgovarja za povzrocˇitev pravno upos˘tevne ˘skode, ki jo je utrpel tretji, ˇce je zaposleni ali najeti (a) povzrocˇil ˘skodo pri delu ali opravljanju dejavnosti, in (b) povzrocˇil ˘skodo namenoma ali iz malomarnosti, ali je drugacˇe odgovoren za povzrocˇitev ˘skode. (2) Prvi odstavek se ustrezno uporablja za pravne osebe v razmerju do zastopnika, ki povzrocˇi ˘skodo pri opravljanju svoje dejavnosti. Zastopnik je oseba, ki je pooblas˘ˇcena za sklepanje pravnih poslov za pravno osebo na podlagi temeljnega akta. ˇ len 3:202: Odgovornost za ˘skodo, ki jo je povzrocˇilo nevarno stanje C nepremicˇnine (1) Oseba, ki izvaja neodvisni nadzor nad nepremicˇnino, odgovarja za povzrocˇitev telesne po˘skodbe in posledicˇno os˘kodovanje, os˘kodovanje v smislu ˇclena 2:202 in za os˘kodovanje zaradi pos˘kodbe stvari (razen na sami nepremicˇnini) zaradi stanja nepremicˇnine, ki ne zagotavlja take varnosti, ki jo lahko oseba v ali poleg nepremicˇnine upravicˇeno pricˇakuje glede na okolis˘ˇcine primera, vkljucˇno glede na: (a) naravo nepremicˇnine, (b) dostop do nepremicˇnine in (c) stros˘ke preprecˇevanja takega stanja nepremicˇnine. (2) Oseba izvaja neodvisni nadzor nad nepremicˇnino, ˇce izvaja taks˘en nadzor, da je primerno, da se ji odredi dolzˇnost, da preprecˇi pravno upos˘tevno ˘skodo na podrocˇju uporabe tega ˇclena. (3) ˇSteje se, da lastnik nepremicˇnine izvaja neodvisni nadzor, razen ˇce dokazˇe, da izvaja neodvisni nadzor druga oseba. ˇ len 3:203: Odgovornost za ˘skodo, ki so jo povzrocˇile ˇzivali C Imetnik ˇzivali odgovarja za telesno pos˘kodbo in posledicˇno os˘kodovanje, os˘kodovanje v smislu ˇclena 2:202 in za os˘kodovanje zaradi pos˘kodbe stvari, ki jih je povzrocˇila ˇzival.

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ˇ len 3:204: Odgovornost za ˘skodo, ki so jo povzrocˇili proizvodi z napako C (1) Proizvajalec odgovarja za telesno pos˘kodbo in posledicˇno os˘kodovanje, os˘kodovanje v smislu ˇclena 2:202 in, v razmerju do potros˘nikov, za os˘kodovanje zaradi pos˘kodbe stvari (razen glede proizvoda samega), ki ga povzrocˇi napaka na proizvodu. (2) Oseba, ki je v Evropski gospodarski prostor uvozila proizvod za prodajo, najem, leasing ali distribucijo v okviru svoje dejavnosti, odgovarja enako. (3) Dobavitelj proizvoda odgovarja enako: (a) ˇce se proizvajalca ne da dolocˇiti, ali (b) v primeru uvozˇenega proizvoda, ˇce proizvod ne navaja identitete uvoznika (ne glede na to, ali je proizvajalcˇevo ime navedeno ali ne), razen ˇce dobavitelj v razumnem roku obvesti os˘kodovanca o identiteti proizvajalca ali osebe, ki mu je dobavila proizvod. (4) Oseba ne odgovarja za povzrocˇitev ˘skode na podlagi tega ˇclena, ˇce dokazˇe: (a) da proizvoda ni dala v promet; (b) da je verjetno, da napaka, ki je povzrocˇila ˘skodo, ni obstajala v ˇcasu, ko je dala proizvod v promet, (c) da proizvoda ni niti izdelala za prodajo ali distribucijo za ekonomske namene niti ga ni izdelala ali distribuirala v okviru svoje poklicne dejavnosti, (d) da je napaka posledica skladnosti proizvoda s prisilnimi predpisi javnih oblasti, (e) da raven znanosti in tehnicˇnega napredka v ˇcasu, ko je dala proizvod v promet, ni bila taks˘na, da bi bilo mogocˇe napako na proizvodu odkriti, ali (f) v primeru proizvajalca sestavnega dela, da je napaka nastala: (i) zaradi konstrukcije proizvoda, v katerega je bil sestavni del vgrajen, ali (ii) zaradi navodil proizvajalca proizvoda. (5) „Proizvajalec“ je: (a) ˇce gre za dokoncˇane proizvode ali sestavne dele, proizvajalec, (b) ˇce gre za surovine, oseba, ki jih ˇcrpa in pridobiva, in (c) oseba, ki se s svojim imenom, blagovno znamko ali drugim razlikovalnim znakom na proizvodu predstavlja kot njegov proizvajalec. (6) Proizvod” je premicˇna stvar, tudi ˇce je del druge premicˇnine ali nepremicˇnine, ali elektrika. (7) Proizvod ima napako, kadar njegova varnost ni taks˘na, kakrs˘no lahko oseba ob upos˘tevanju vseh okolis˘ˇcin upravicˇeno pricˇakuje, vkljucˇno s: (a) predstavitvijo proizvoda; (b) uporabo proizvoda, ki se jo lahko razumno pricˇakuje, in (c) ˇcasom, ko je bil proizvod dan v promet, vendar proizvod nima napake samo zato, ker je bil pozneje dan v promet boljs˘i proizvod. ˇ len 3:205: Odgovornost za ˘skodo, ki so jo povzrocˇila motorna vozila C (1) Imetnik motornega vozila odgovarja za povzrocˇitev telesne pos˘kodbe in posledicˇno os˘kodovanje, os˘kodovanje v smislu ˇclena 2:202 in za os˘kodovanje zaradi pos˘kodbe stvari (razen na vozilu samem in njegovem tovoru) v prometni nezgodi, do katere je pris˘lo zaradi uporabe tega vozila. (2) „Motorno vozilo“ je vozilo, ki je namenjeno potovanju na kopnem in ga poganja mehanska sila, ki pa se ne giblje na tirih, in prikolica, ki je lahko priklopljena ali ne.

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ˇ len 3:206: Odgovornost za ˘skodo, ki so jo povzrocˇile C nevarne snovi ali emisije (1) Imetnik snovi ali upravitelj naprave odgovarja za telesno pos˘kodbo in posledicˇno os˘kodovanje, os˘kodovanje v smislu ˇclena 2:202, os˘kodovanje zaradi pos˘kodbe stvari in za bremena v smislu ˇclena 2:209, ˇce jih povzrocˇijo ta snov ali emisije iz te naprave, ˇce: (a) je zelo verjetno, da bodo snov ali emisije povzrocˇile tako ˘skodo, ob upos˘tevanju kolicˇine in lastnosti, v trenutku emisije, ali, ˇce ne gre za emisije, v trenutku kontakta s snovjo, razen ˇce ni pod ustreznim nadzorom, in (b) je ˘skoda posledica uresnicˇenja te nevarnosti. (2) „Snov“ vkljucˇuje kemikalije (v trdnem, tekocˇem ali plinskem stanju). Mikroorganizme se obravnava, kot da so snovi. (3) „Emisije“ vkljucˇujejo (a) spust ali uhajanje snovi, (b) prevajanje elektrike, (c) toploto, svetlobo, in druga sevanja, (d) hrup in druge vibracije, in (e) druge netelesne vplive na okolje. (4) „Naprava“ vsebuje prenosno napravo in napravo v gradnji ali napravo, ki ni v uporabi. (5) Vendar pa oseba ne odgovarja za povzrocˇitev ˘skode na podlagi tega ˇclena: (a) ˇce ne upravlja z napravo ali ˇce nima snovi za poklicne ali pridobitne namene; ali (b) ˇce dokazˇe, da ni bilo krs˘itve prisilnih predpisov, ki dolocˇajo standarde nadzora nad snovjo ali za upravljanje z napravo. ˇ len 3:207: Ostale oblike odgovornosti za povzrocˇitev pravno C upos˘tevne ˘skode Oseba odgovarja tudi za povzrocˇitev pravno upos˘tevne ˘skode, ˇce tako dolocˇa nacionalno pravo, kadar (a) se nanas˘a na vir nevarnosti, ki ni omenjen v ˇclenih 3:104 – 3:205, (b) se nanas˘a na snovi ali emisije, ali (c) izkljucˇuje uporabo alinee e ˇcetrtega odstavka ˇclena 3:204. ˇ len 3:208: Opustitev C Za namene tega oddelka oseba odgovarja za nepremicˇnino, vozilo, snov ali napravo, ki jih opusti, vse do trenutka, dokler drugi ne izvaja neodvisnega nadzora nad njimi ali postane njihov imetnik ali upravljavec. To se ustrezno uporablja, ˇce je primerno, tudi za imetnika ˇzivali.

4. poglavje: Vzrocˇnost ˇ len 4:101: Splos˘no pravilo C (1) Oseba povzrocˇi pravno upos˘tevno ˘skodo drugemu, ˇce se ta ˘skoda ˘steje kot posledica ravnanja te osebe ali vira nevarnosti, za katerega je ta oseba odgovorna. (2) V primeru telesne pos˘kodbe ali smrti se ne upos˘teva nagnjenosti os˘kodovanca do vrste in obsega pos˘kodbe.

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ˇ len 4:102: Udelezˇba C ˇSteje se, da je povzrocˇitelj ˘skode tudi oseba, ki sodeluje, napelje, ali dejansko pomaga drugemu pri povzrocˇitvi pravno upos˘tevne ˘skode.

ˇ len 4:103: Alternativna vzrocˇnost C Kjer bi lahko pravno upos˘tevno ˘skodo povzrocˇil katerikoli ali vecˇ dogodkov, za katere odgovarjajo razlicˇne osebe, in ˇce je ugotovljeno, da je ˘skodo povzrocˇil eden izmed teh dogodkov, vendar se ne ve, kateri, se izpodbojno domneva, da je vsaka oseba, ki odgovarja za enega izmed dogodkov, povzrocˇila ˘skodo.

5. poglavje: Ugovori 1. oddelek : Privolitev ali ravnanje os˘kodovane stranke ˇ len 5:101: Privolitev in ravnanje na lastno odgovornost C (1) Oseba lahko uveljavlja ugovor, ˇce os˘kodovanec privoli v pravno upos˘tevno ˘skodo in se zaveda ali bi se moral zavedati posledic te privolitve. (2) Isto velja, ˇce se je os˘kodovanec, ki je vedel za nevarnost ˘skode tiste vrste, ki je bila povzroˇcena, prostovoljno izpostavil tej nevarnosti in se ˘steje, da jo je sprejel. ˇ len 5:102: Sokrivda in soodgovornost C (1) Kjer os˘kodovanec z lastno krivdo prispeva k nastanku ali obsegu pravno upos˘tevne ˘skode, se povrnitev ˘skode zmanjs˘a v skladu z njegovo stopnjo krivde. (2) Vendar pa se ne upos˘teva: (a) nebistvena krivda os˘kodovanca, (b) krivda ali odgovornost, katere prispevek k povzrocˇitvi ˘skode je nebistven, (c) os˘kodovancˇevo pomanjkanje skrbnosti, ki prispeva k njegovi telesni pos˘kodbi, ki je bila povzrocˇena z motornim vozilom v prometni nezgodi, razen ˇce je tako pomanjkanje skrbnosti posledica opustitve skrbnosti, ki se ocˇitno zahteva v takih okolis˘ˇcinah. (3) Prvi in drugi odstavek se ustrezno uporabljata, ˇce oseba, za katero os˘kodovanec odgovarja v obsegu ˇclena 3:201, s svojo krivdo prispeva k nastanku ali obsegu ˘skode. (4) Placˇilo ods˘kodnine se prav tako znizˇa, ˇce in kolikor vir nevarnosti, za katerega os˘kodovanec odgovarja na podlagi 3. poglavja, prispeva k nastanku ali obsegu ˘skode. ˇ len 5:103: ˇSkoda, ki jo je povzrocˇil storilec kaznivega dejanja sostorilcu C Povrnitev pravno upos˘tevne ˘skode, ki je bila povzrocˇena nenamenoma v teku storitve kaznivega dejanja drugemu sostorilcu ali soudelezˇencu pri dejanju, je izkljucˇena, ˇce bi to nasprotovalo javnemu redu.

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2. oddelek: Interesi odgovornih oseb ali tretjih strank ˇ len 5:201: Zakonsko pooblastilo C Oseba lahko uveljavlja ugovor, ˇce je bila pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda povzrocˇena v okviru zakonskega pooblastila. ˇ len 5:202: Silobran, opravljanje tujih poslov in skrajna sila C (1) Oseba lahko uveljavlja ugovor, ˇce povzrocˇi pravno upos˘tevno ˘skodo pri primernem varovanju svoje pravice ali pravice tretjega ali svoje koristi ali koristi tretjega, ki je vredna pravnega varstva, ˇce oseba, ki utrpi pravno upos˘tevno ˘skodo, odgovarja za ogrozˇanje pravice ali varovane koristi. Za namene tega odstavka se ˇclen 3:103 ne upos˘teva. (2) Isto velja za pravno upos˘tevno ˘skodo, ki jo je principalu povzrocˇil poslovodja, ne da bi krs˘il svojo dolzˇnosti poslovodje. ˇ e oseba, zato da bi res˘ila sebe ali tretjega, povzrocˇi pravno upos˘tevno ˘skodo na premozˇenju (3) C drugega v polozˇaju neposredne nevarnosti za ˇzivljenje, telo, zdravje ali svobodo in ˇce se te nevarnosti ni dalo odpraviti brez povzrocˇitve ˘skode, ta oseba ni odgovorna za povrnitev ˘skode preko razumnega placˇila ods˘kodnine. ˇ len 5:203: Varovanje javnega interesa C Oseba lahko uveljavlja ugovor, ˇce je bila pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda povzrocˇena pri nujnem varovanju temeljnih vrednot demokraticˇne druzˇbe, zlasti ˇce je bila ˘skoda povzrocˇena v medijih.

3. oddelek : Nezmozˇnost nadzora ˇ len 5:301: Dus˘evna nezmozˇnost C (1) Oseba, ki je v trenutku ravnanja, ki povzrocˇi pravno upos˘tevno ˘skodo, dus˘evno nezmozˇna, odgovarja le, ˇce je to pravicˇno glede na financˇna sredstva dus˘evno nezmozˇne osebe in na vse ostale okolis˘ˇcine primera. Odgovornost se omeji na primerno ods˘kodnino. (2) Oseba je dus˘evno nezmozˇna, ˇce nima zadostnega razumevanja narave svojega ravnanja, razen ˇce je pomanjkanje zadostnega razumevanja zacˇasna posledica njenega neustreznega ravnanja. ˇ len 5:302: Dogodki, ki se ne dajo odvrniti C Oseba lahko uveljavlja ugovor, ˇce je ˘skodo povzrocˇil neobicˇajen dogodek, ki se mu ni dalo izogniti z razumnim ukrepom, in za katerega se ˘steje, da ni tveganje te osebe.

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4. oddelek: Pogodbena izkljucˇitev in omejitev odgovornosti ˇ len 5:401: Pogodbena izkljucˇitev in omejitev odgovornosti C (1) Odgovornost za namerno povzrocˇitev pravno upos˘tevne ˘skode se ne more izkljucˇiti ali omejiti. (2) Odgovornosti za povzrocˇitev pravno upos˘tevne ˘skode kot posledice hudega neupos˘tevanja take skrbnosti, ki jo okolis˘ˇcine ocˇitno zahtevajo, se ne more izkljucˇiti ali omejiti (a) glede telesne pos˘kodbe (vkljucˇno s smrtno pos˘kodbo), ali (b) ˇce je izkljucˇitev ali omejitev drugacˇe nezakonita ali v nasprotju z dobro vero in pos˘tenjem in dobrimi poslovnimi obicˇaji. (3) Odgovornost za povzrocˇitev ˘skode, za katero je oseba odgovorna na podlagi ˇclena 3:204, se ne more omejiti ali izkljucˇiti. (4) Druge oblike odgovornosti na podlagi te knjige se lahko izkljucˇijo ali omejijo, razen ˇce prisilni predpisi ne dolocˇajo drugacˇe.

5. oddelek: ˇSkoda v smislu ˇclena 2:202 ˇ len 5:501: Uveljavljanje ugovorov do os˘kodovanca proti tretjim osebam C Ugovor, ki se lahko uveljavlja proti pravici posameznika do povrnitve ˘skode glede njegove telesne pos˘kodbe, ali ki bi se lahko uveljavljal, ˇce ne bi pris˘lo do smrti, se lahko uveljavlja tudi proti tretjim osebam, ki utrpijo ˘skodo v smislu ˇclena 2:202.

6. poglavje: Zahtevki 1. oddelek: Splos˘no o povrnitvi ˘skode ˇ len 6:101: Namen in oblike povrnitve ˘skode C (1) Povrnitev ˘skode je vrnitev osebe, ki je utrpela pravno upos˘tevno ˘skodo, v stanje, kakrs˘no bi bilo, ˇce pravno upos˘tevna ˘skoda ne bi nastala. (2) Povrnitev ˘skode se lahko izvede v denarju (ods˘kodnina) ali drugacˇe, kakor je glede na vrsto in obseg utrpljene ˘skode in vse ostale okolis˘ˇcine primera najbolj primerno. ˇ e je pos˘kodovana nezˇiva stvar, se namesto stros˘kov popravila prisodi denarna ods˘kodnina, (3) C ki ustreza izgubi vrednosti, ˇce stros˘ki popravila neprimerno presegajo izgubo vrednosti. To pravilo se razs˘iri na ˇzivali samo, ˇce je to ustrezno glede na namen, za katerega se je imelo ˇzival. (4) Kot alternativo vrnitvi v prejs˘nje stanje na podlagi prvega odstavka, vendar samo, ˇce je to primerno, ima lahko povrnitev ˘skode obliko povrnitve vseh koristi, ki jih je oseba, odgovorna za povzrocˇitev pravno upos˘tevne ˘skode, pridobila v zvezi s povzrocˇanjem ˘skode. ˇ len 6:102: Pravilo de minimis C Nepomembne ˘skode se ne upos˘teva. 198

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ˇ len 6:103: Izravnava koristi C (1) Koristi, ki so nastale osebi, ki je utrpela pravno upos˘tevno ˘skodo, kot posledica ˘skodnega dogodka, se ne upos˘tevajo, razen ˇce bi bilo pos˘teno in pravicˇno, da se jih upos˘teva. (2) Pri dolocˇanju, ali bi bilo pos˘teno in pravicˇno, da se te koristi upos˘teva, se gleda na vrsto nastale ˘skode, naravo odgovornosti osebe, ki je povzrocˇila ˘skodo, in, kjer koristi nastanejo tretjemu, namen nastanka teh koristi. ˇ len 6:104: Vecˇ pos˘kodovanih oseb C ˇ e vecˇ oseb utrpi pravno upos˘tevno ˘skodo in povrnitev ˘skode eni osebi velja kot povrnitev ˘skode C drugi, se za njihove ods˘kodninske zahtevke z ustreznimi spremembami uporablja poglavje III.–4:201-207. ˇ len 6:105: Solidarna odgovornost C ˇ e je vecˇ oseb odgovornih za isto pravno upos˘tevno ˘skodo, odgovarjajo solidarno. C ˇ len 6:106: Odstop zahtevkov C Os˘kodovanec lahko odstopi ods˘kodninski zahtevek, vkljucˇno z zahtevkom za povrnitev nepremozˇenjskega os˘kodovanja.

2. oddelek: Ods˘kodnina ˇ len 6:201: Pravica os˘kodovane osebe do izbire C Os˘kodovanec lahko izbira, ali bo denar, prejet iz naslova placˇila ods˘kodnine, porabil za vrnitev pos˘kodovane koristi v prejs˘nje stanje ali ne. ˇ len 6:202: Zmanjs˘anje obveznosti C Kjer je pos˘teno in pravicˇno, se osebo lahko deloma ali v celoti razbremeni obveznosti povrnitve ˘skode, v primeru, ˇce ˘skoda ni povzrocˇena namenoma, ˇce bi bila polna odgovornost nesorazmerna glede na odgovornost osebe, ki je povzrocˇila ˘skodo, ali glede na obseg ˘skode ali sredstev za njeno preprecˇevanje. ˇ len 6:203: Kapitalizacija in dolocˇanje vis˘ine C (1) Ods˘kodnina se prisodi v enkratnem znesku, razen ˇce dober razlog zahteva periodicˇna plaˇcila. (2) Nacionalno pravo dolocˇa, kako se dolocˇa vis˘ina denarne ods˘kodnine za telesno pos˘kodbo in nepremozˇenjsko os˘kodovanje. ˇ len 6:204: Ods˘kodnina za samo telesno pos˘kodbo C Za telesno pos˘kodbo kot tako se placˇa ods˘kodnina v denarju ne glede na ods˘kodnino za premoˇzenjsko in nepremozˇenjsko os˘kodovanje.

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3. oddelek: Preprecˇevanje ˇ len 6:301: Pravica do preprecˇevanja C (1) Pravica do preprecˇevanja obstaja le, ˇce (a) bi bila povrnitev ˘skode neustrezen zahtevek, in (b) je drugacˇe primerno, da oseba, ki bi odgovarjala za povzrocˇitev ˘skode, preprecˇi njen nastanek. ˇ e je vir nevarnosti predmet ali ˇzival in ˇce ogrozˇeni osebi razumno ni mogocˇe, da se izogne (2) C nevarnosti, pravica do preprecˇevanja vkljucˇuje pravico do odstranitve vira nevarnosti. ˇ len 6:302: Odgovornost za os˘kodovanje pri odvracˇanju ˘skode C Oseba, ki so ji nastali primerni stros˘ki ali ki je utrpela drugo os˘kodovanje zaradi preprecˇevanja neizbezˇne nastajajocˇe ˘skode ali zaradi omejevanja obsega ali resnosti ˘skode, ima pravico do ods˘kodnine od osebe, ki bi odgovarjala za povzrocˇitev ˘skode.

7. poglavje: Dopolnilna pravila ˇ len 7:101: Nacionalno ustavno pravo C Dolocˇbe te knjige se razlagajo in uporabljajo na nacˇin, ki je zdruzˇljiv z ustavnim pravom drzˇave, kjer ima sodis˘ˇce sedezˇ. ˇ len 7:102: Prisilni predpisi C Nacionalno pravo dolocˇa, kateri predpisi so prisilni predpisi. ˇ len 7:103: Pooblastila javnega prava in postopki pred sodis˘ˇci C Ta knjiga ne ureja odgovornosti osebe ali organa, ki izhaja iz storitve ali opustitve nalog javnega prava ali izvrs˘evanja dolzˇnosti v teku sodnih postopkov.

ˇ len 7:104: Odgovornost zaposlenih, delodajalcev, sindikatov in delodajalskih C zdruzˇenj Ta knjiga ne ureja odgovornosti (a) zaposlenih (bodisi drugim zaposlenim, delodajalcu ali tretjim) v teku in zaradi zaposlitve, (b) delodajalcev v razmerju do delavcev v teku in zaradi zaposlitve, in (c) sindikatov in zdruzˇenj delodajalcev zaradi urejanja kolektivnih delavnih sporov. ˇ len 7:105: Znizˇanje ali izkljucˇitev odgovornosti v razmerju do oseb, ki so prejele C povrnitev ˘skode Nacionalno pravo dolocˇa, ali je obveznost na podlagi te knjige omejena ali izkljucˇena, ˇce je oseba upravicˇena do popolne ali delne povrnitve ˘skode iz drugega vira, zlasti od zavarovalca, sklada ali drugega organa.

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Spanish1 Responsabilidad extracontractual por daños causados a otro Capítulo 1: Disposiciones básicas Artículo 1:101: Norma fundamental (1) Una persona que sufre un daño jurídicamente relevante tiene derecho a una reparación frente a la persona que causó el daño de forma intencionada o negligente o que es de otro modo responsable del daño causado. (2) Cuando una persona no haya causado el daño jurídicamente relevante de forma intencionada o negligente, esa persona será responsable del daño jurídicamente relevante causado sólo si el Capítulo 3 así lo prevé. Artículo 1:102: Prevención Cuando el daño jurídicamente relevante sea inminente, este Libro confiere a la persona que sufriría el daño el derecho de impedirlo. Este derecho existe frente a la persona que sería responsable del daño causado si éste se produjese. Artículo 1:103: Ámbito de aplicación Los artículos 1:101 y 1:102 (a) se aplican sólo de acuerdo con las disposiciones de este Libro que siguen; (b) se aplican tanto a personas jurídicas como físicas, salvo que se indique otra cosa; (c) no se aplican en la medida en que su aplicación contradiga el propósito de otras normas de Derecho privado; y (d) no afectan a los remedios disponibles sobre otras bases legales.

Capítulo 2: Daño jurídicamente relevante Sección 1: General Artículo 2:101: Significado de daño jurídicamente relevante (1) Una pérdida, sea económica o no económica, o lesión supone un daño jurídicamente relevante si: (a) una de las reglas de este Capítulo que siguen así lo dispone;

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Translated by Dr. María Ángeles Martín Vida (Osnabrück).

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(b) la pérdida o lesión resulta de una violación de un derecho conferido de otro modo por la ley; o (c) la pérdida o lesión resulta de una violación de un interés digno de protección jurídica. (2) En los supuestos solamente cubiertos por los subapartados (b) o (c) del apartado (1), una pérdida o lesión constituye un daño jurídicamente relevante sólo si sería justo y razonable que hubiese un derecho a su reparación o prevención, según el caso, bajo los artículos 1:101 o 1:102. (3) Al considerar si sería justo y razonable que hubiese un derecho a la reparación o prevención habrá que tomar en consideración el fundamento de la responsabilidad, la naturaleza y proximidad del daño o del daño inminente, las expectativas razonables de la persona que sufre o sufriría el daño, y las consideraciones de orden público. (4) En este Libro (a) pérdida económica incluye la pérdida de ingresos o de ganancias, las cargas en que se incurra y una reducción en el valor de una propiedad (b) pérdida no económica incluye el dolor, el sufrimiento y el deterioro en la calidad de vida.

Sección 2: Ejemplos particulares de daño jurídicamente relevante Artículo 2:201: Daño personal y pérdida consiguiente (1) La pérdida causada a una persona física como resultado de una lesión de su cuerpo o de su salud y la lesión como tal constituyen un daño jurídicamente relevante. (2) En este Libro: (a) dicha pérdida engloba los costes de la asistencia sanitaria, incluidos los gastos razonables en que hayan incurrido, para el cuidado de la persona lesionada, personas cercanas a ella; (b) el daño personal incluye la lesión de la salud mental sólo si ésta supone una enfermedad. Artículo 2:202: Pérdidas sufridas por terceros como consecuencia de la muerte o lesión personal ajenas (1) La pérdida no económica causada a una persona física como consecuencia del daño personal o la muerte ajenos constituye un daño jurídicamente relevante si al tiempo de la lesión esa persona mantenía una relación personal particularmente cercana con la persona lesionada. (2) Cuando una persona ha resultado herida de muerte: (a) el daño jurídicamente relevante ocasionado al fallecido a causa de la lesión hasta el momento de la muerte se convierte en un daño jurídicamente relevante para los sucesores del fallecido; (b) los gastos funerarios razonables constituyen un daño jurídicamente relevante para la persona que los sufrague; y (c) la pérdida de manutención constituye un daño jurídicamente relevante para la persona física a la que el fallecido mantenía o, de no haber ocurrido la muerte, habría mantenido de acuerdo con las disposiciones legales o a la que el fallecido proporcionaba asistencia y apoyo financiero.

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Artículo 2:203: Lesión de la dignidad, libertad e intimidad personales (1) La pérdida causada a una persona física como resultado de una lesión de sus derechos relativos a su dignidad personal, tales como los derechos a la libertad y a la intimidad, y la lesión como tal constituyen un daño jurídicamente relevante. (2) La pérdida causada a una persona como resultado de una lesión a la reputación de esa persona y la lesión como tal constituyen también un daño jurídicamente relevante si el Derecho nacional así lo prevé. Artículo 2:204: Pérdida a raíz de la comunicación de información incorrecta acerca de otro La pérdida ocasionada a una persona como resultado de la comunicación de información acerca de esa persona que la persona que comunica la información sabe o debería saber que es incorrecta constituye un daño jurídicamente relevante. Artículo 2:205: Pérdida a raíz de un abuso de confianza La pérdida ocasionada a una persona como resultado de la comunicación de información que, bien por su naturaleza o bien por las circunstancias en las que se obtuvo, la persona que comunica la información sabe o debería saber que es confidencial para la persona que sufre la pérdida constituye un daño jurídicamente relevante. Artículo 2:206: Pérdida a raíz de una violación de la propiedad o de la posesión legítima (1) La pérdida ocasionada a una persona como resultado de una violación del derecho de propiedad de esa persona o de su posesión legítima sobre un bien mueble o inmueble constituye un daño jurídicamente relevante. (2) En este artículo: (a) la pérdida incluye el ser privado del uso de la propiedad; (b) la violación de un derecho de propiedad incluye la destrucción o el daño físico del objeto del derecho (daño a la propiedad), la enajenación del derecho, la interferencia en su uso u otra perturbación en el ejercicio del derecho. Artículo 2:207: Pérdida a raíz de la confianza perjudicial en informaciones o consejos incorrectos La pérdida ocasionada a una persona como resultado de tomar una decisión confiando razonablemente en un consejo o información incorrectos constituye un daño jurídicamente relevante si: (a) el consejo o la información son proporcionados por una persona en el ejercicio de una profesión o actividad comercial; y (b) quien los proporciona sabía o debería haber sabido que quien los recibe confiaría en el consejo o la información al tomar la decisión que tomó. Artículo 2:208: Pérdida a raíz de un daño antijurídico al negocio (1) La pérdida ocasionada a una persona como resultado de un daño antijurídico al ejercicio por esa persona de una profesión o al desarrollo por su parte de una actividad comercial constituye un daño jurídicamente relevante. (2) La pérdida ocasionada a un consumidor como resultado de competencia desleal es también un daño jurídicamente relevante si el Derecho nacional o comunitario así lo prevén. 203

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Artículo 2:209: Gastos en los que incurre en el Estado a raíz de un daño medioambiental Los gastos en los que, para restaurar los elementos naturales constitutivos del medio ambiente sustancialmente dañados como el aire, el agua, el suelo, la flora y la fauna, incurran el Estado o las autoridades competentes designadas constituye un daño jurídicamente relevante para el Estado o las autoridades afectadas. Artículo 2:210: Pérdidas a raíz de una declaración fraudulenta (1) Sin perjuicio de otras disposiciones de esta sección, la pérdida ocasionada a una persona como resultado de la declaración fraudulenta de otro, sea de palabra o de obra, constituye un daño jurídicamente relevante. (2) Una declaración es fraudulenta si se hace con conocimiento o creencia de que la declaración es falsa y se pretende inducir al receptor a cometer un error. Artículo 2:211: Pérdida a raíz de la inducción a incumplir una obligación Sin perjuicio de otras disposiciones de esta sección, la pérdida causada a una persona como resultado de que otra persona ha inducido a una tercera a romper una obligación constituye un daño jurídicamente relevante sólo si: (a) la obligación se le debía a la persona que sufre la pérdida; y (b) la persona que induce al incumplimiento: (i) pretendía que la tercera persona incumpliese la obligación, y (ii) no actuaba para proteger legítimamente su propio interés.

Capítulo 3: Imputación Sección 1: Dolo y negligencia Artículo 3:101: Dolo Una persona ocasiona un daño jurídicamente relevante de forma dolosa cuando la persona causa el daño: (a) o bien queriendo causar un daño como el ocasionado; o bien (b) a través de una conducta que esa persona quiere llevar a cabo, sabiendo que con absoluta o casi total certeza se causará ese daño o un daño de ese tipo. Artículo 3:102: Negligencia Una persona ocasiona un daño jurídicamente relevante de forma negligente cuando esa persona causa un daño a través de una conducta que: (a) o bien no satisface el nivel particular de cuidado previsto por una previsión legal cuyo propósito sea proteger al perjudicado del daño sufrido; o bien (b) de otra manera no alcanza el nivel de cuidado que, en las circunstancias concretas del caso, se podría esperar de una persona razonablemente cuidadosa.

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Artículo 3:103: Personas menores de dieciocho años (1) Una persona menor de 18 años de edad será sólo responsable de la causación de un daño jurídicamente relevante de acuerdo con el artículo 3:102(b) en la medida en que esa persona no haya actuado con el cuidado que, en las circunstancias del caso concreto, cabría esperar de una persona razonablemente cuidadosa de la misma edad. (2) Una persona menor de siete años de edad no es responsable de un daño jurídicamente relevante causado intencionada o negligentemente. (3) Sin embargo, los apartados (1) y (2) no se aplican en la medida en que (a) el perjudicado no pueda obtener reparación de otra persona según este Libro, y (b) la carga de abonar la reparación sea equitativa teniendo en cuenta los medios económicos de las partes y todas las demás circunstancias del caso. Artículo 3:104: Responsabilidad por daños causados por niños o personas sometidas a supervisión (1) Los padres y demás personas obligadas por la ley a proporcionar asistencia parental a una persona menor de catorce años de edad son responsables del daño jurídicamente relevante causado en los casos en que esa persona menor de edad causase el daño mediante una conducta que sería constitutiva de dolo o negligencia si fuese la conducta de un adulto. (2) Una institución u otro organismo obligado a supervisar a una persona es responsable de la causación del daño jurídicamente relevante sufrido por un tercero cuando: (a) el daño sea un daño personal, una pérdida comprendida en el artículo 2:202 o un daño a la propiedad (b) la persona a la que la institución u otro organismo está obligado a supervisar causase el daño de forma dolosa o negligente o, en el caso de personas menores de dieciocho años, por medio de una conducta que supondría dolo o negligencia si fuese la conducta de un adulto; y (c) la persona que están obligados a supervisar sea una persona de la quepa esperar que cause un daño de ese tipo. (3) Sin embargo, una persona no es responsable según este artículo del daño causado si esa persona muestra que no hubo una supervisión defectuosa de la persona causante del daño.

Sección 2: Responsabilidad sin dolo ni negligencia Artículo 3:201: Responsabilidad por el daño causado por empleados y representantes (1) Una persona que emplea o de manera similar contrata a otra es responsable de la causación de un daño jurídicamente relevante sufrido por una tercera cuando la persona empleada o contratada (a) causó el daño en cumplimiento de su empleo o contrato, y (b) causó el daño de manera dolosa o negligente, o es de otro modo responsable del daño causado. (2) El apartado (1) se aplica en la misma medida a una persona jurídica respecto a un representante que cause un daño en cumplimiento de su tarea. Un representante es una persona autorizada por los estatutos para llevar a cabo actos jurídicos en nombre de la persona jurídica. 205

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Artículo 3:202: Responsabilidad por daños causados por el estado poco seguro de un inmueble (1) La persona que ejerza de manera independiente control sobre un inmueble será responsable de los daños personales causados y de las pérdidas consiguientes, de las pérdidas según el artículo 2:202, y de las pérdidas resultantes de un daño a la propiedad (distinta de la del propio inmueble) por el estado de un inmueble que no reúna las condiciones de seguridad que una persona dentro o cerca del inmueble podría esperar teniendo en cuenta, entre otras circunstancias: (a) la naturaleza del inmueble, (b) el acceso al inmueble, y (c) lo que costaría evitar que el inmueble se encontrase en tal estado. (2) Una persona ejerce de manera independiente control sobre un inmueble si esa persona lo controla de una forma tal que es razonable imponerle la obligación de impedir la producción de un daño jurídicamente relevante en el marco de este artículo. (3) Se considerará que el propietario de un inmueble ejerce de manera independiente control sobre el mismo, salvo que demuestre que otra persona ejerce control de forma independiente. Artículo 3:203: Responsabilidad por daños causados por animales El guardián de un animal responderá por los daños personales y pérdidas consiguientes, las pérdidas según el artículo 2:202, y las pérdidas resultantes de daños a la propiedad que cause el animal. Artículo 3:204: Responsabilidad por daños causados por productos defectuosos (1) El productor de un producto será responsable de los daños personales y pérdidas consiguientes, las pérdidas según el artículo 2:202 y, en relación a los consumidores, las pérdidas resultantes de daños a la propiedad (distinta de la del propio producto) causados por un defecto en su producto. (2) Toda persona que importe un producto en el Espacio Económico Europeo con vistas a su venta, alquiler, arrendamiento financiero o distribución en el marco de su actividad comercial tendrá la misma responsabilidad que el productor. (3) El suministrador de un producto responderá en la misma medida si (a) el productor no puede ser identificado; o (b) en el caso de un producto importado, si el producto no indicase la identidad del importador (independientemente de que se indique o no el nombre del productor),a no ser que el suministrador informara al perjudicado dentro de un plazo de tiempo razonable de la identidad del productor o de la persona que le suministró a él el producto. (4) Una persona no será responsable bajo este artículo del daño causado si prueba: (a) que no puso el producto en circulación; (b) que es probable que el defecto que causó el daño no existiera en el momento en que esa persona puso el producto en circulación; (c) que esa persona no fabricó el producto para venderlo o distribuirlo con fines económicos, y que no lo fabricó ni distribuyó en el ámbito de su negocio; (d) que el defecto se debe a que el producto se ajusta a normas imperativas dictadas por los poderes públicos;

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(e) que el estado de los conocimientos científicos y técnicos en el momento en que esa persona puso el producto en circulación no permitía descubrir la existencia del defecto; o (f) que en el caso del fabricante de una parte integrante, el defecto es imputable (i) al diseño del producto a que se ha incorporado, o (ii) a las instrucciones dadas por el fabricante del producto. (5) «Productor» significa: (a) en el caso de un producto acabado o de una parte integrante, el fabricante; (b) en el caso de materias primas, la persona que las extrae o las obtiene; y (c) cualquier persona que se presente a sí mismo como productor poniendo su nombre, marca o cualquier otro signo distintivo en el producto. (6) Se entenderá por «producto» cualquier bien mueble, aun cuando esté incorporado a otro bien mueble o a un bien inmueble, o la electricidad. (7) Un producto es defectuoso cuando no ofrece la seguridad a la que una persona tiene legítimamente derecho, teniendo en cuenta todas las circunstancias, incluidas: (a) la presentación del producto; (b) el uso que razonablemente pudiera esperarse del producto; y (c) el momento en que el producto se puso en circulación, pero un producto no se considerará defectuoso por la única razón de que, posteriormente, se haya puesto en circulación un producto más perfeccionado.

Artículo 3:205: Responsabilidad por daños causados por vehículos de motor (1) El tenedor de un vehículo de motor es responsable de la producción de daños personales y pérdidas consiguientes, de las pérdidas según el artículo 2:202, y de las pérdidas resultantes de daños a la propiedad (distinta de la del vehículo y su carga) en un accidente de tráfico que se produce como consecuencia del uso del vehículo. (2) Por «vehículo de motor» se entiende todo vehículo automóvil destinado a circular por el suelo, accionado mediante una fuerza mecánica y que no utiliza una vía férrea, así como los remolques, incluso no enganchados. Artículo 3:206: Responsabilidad por daños causados por sustancias o emisiones peligrosas (1) El tenedor de una sustancia o el operador de una instalación es responsable de los daños corporales y pérdidas consiguientes, de las pérdidas según el artículo 2:202, de las pérdidas resultantes de daños a la propiedad y de los gastos del artículo 2:209 que esa sustancia o las emisiones procedentes de esa instalación produzcan, si: (a) teniendo en cuenta su cantidad y sus características en el momento de la emisión o, en ausencia de una emisión, en el momento de contacto con esa sustancia es muy probable que la sustancia o emisión causará un daño tal a menos que sea adecuadamente controlada, y (b) el daño resulta de la concreción de ese peligro. (2) La categoría «sustancia» incluye los productos químicos (sean sólidos, líquidos o gaseosos). Los microorganismos han de ser tratados como sustancias. (3) La categoría «emisión» incluye (a) el escape o la liberación de sustancias, (b) la conducción de electricidad, (c) el calor, la luz y otras radiaciones, 207

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(d) el ruido y otras vibraciones, y (e) otro tipo de impactos incorpóreos sobre el medio ambiente. (4) La categoría «instalación» incluye instalaciones móviles e instalaciones que se encuentren en construcción o que no estén en uso. (5) Sin embargo, una persona no será responsable de la producción de un daño bajo este artículo si esa persona: (a) no tiene la sustancia o explota la instalación con fines relacionados con su actividad comercial, negocial o profesional; o (b) demuestra que no hubo fallo en el cumplimiento de los niveles legales de control de la sustancia o de gestión de la instalación.

Artículo 3:207: Otros supuestos de responsabilidad por la producción de daño jurídicamente relevante Una persona es responsable de la producción de un daño jurídicamente relevante si el Derecho nacional así lo prevé en los casos (a) que se refieren a una fuente de peligro que no está comprendida en los artículos 3:104 a 3:205, (b) que se refieren a sustancias o emisiones, o (c) en los que no se aplica el artículo 3:204 (4) (e). Artículo 3:208: Abandono A los efectos de esta sección, una persona sigue siendo responsable de un inmueble, vehículo, sustancia o instalación que esa persona ha abandonado hasta que otro ejerza un control de manera independiente sobre esa cosa o se convierta en su tenedor u operador. Esto se aplica de forma similar, en la medida en que sea razonable, respecto al guardián de un animal.

Capítulo 4: Causalidad Artículo 4:101: Regla general (1) Una persona causa un daño jurídicamente relevante a otra si el daño puede ser contemplado como consecuencia de la conducta de esa persona o de una fuente de peligro de la cual esa persona es responsable. (2) En los supuestos de daños corporales o muerte, la predisposición de la persona herida en relación al tipo o el alcance de la herida sufrida es irrelevante. Artículo 4:102: Colaboración La persona que colabore con otra, la instigue o materialmente la ayude a causar un daño jurídicamente relevante será considerada como causante del daño. Artículo 4:103: Causas alternativas En los casos en los que un daño jurídicamente relevante pueda haber sido causado por uno cualquiera o varios hechos de los cuales personas diferentes son responsables, y está demostrado que el daño fue causado por uno de estos hechos pero no por cuál, se presumirá de modo refutable que cada persona responsable de cualquiera de tales hechos ha causado el daño.

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Capítulo 5: Causas de exclusión de la responsabilidad Sección 1: Consentimiento o conducta del perjudicado Artículo 5:101: Consentimiento y actuación bajo propio riesgo (1) Una persona puede alegar una causa de exclusión de la responsabilidad si el perjudicado da válidamente su consentimiento al daño jurídicamente relevante y es consciente o debería haber sido consciente de las consecuencias de tal consentimiento. (2) Lo anterior es aplicable si el perjudicado,conociendo el riesgo que corría de sufrir un daño de ese tipo, se expuso voluntariamente a este riesgo y puede considerarse que lo asumió. Artículo 5:102: Culpa concurrente y responsabilidad (1) En los casos en los que el perjudicado contribuye con su propia culpa a que el daño jurídicamente relevante se produzca o al alcance del mismo, se disminuirá la reparación de acuerdo con el grado de culpa. (2) Sin embargo, no se tendrá en cuenta: (a) una culpa poco importante del perjudicado; (b) una culpa o responsabilidad cuya contribución a la causación del daño sea insustancial; (c) la falta de cuidado de la persona lesionada que contribuye al daño corporal que a esa persona le causa un vehículo de motor en un accidente de tráfico, salvo que esa falta de cuidado suponga un fallo profundo en la adopción del cuidado que manifiestamente se requiere en esas circunstancias. (3) Los apartados (1) y (2) se aplicarán en la misma medida en los casos en que una persona de la cual el perjudicado es responsable en el marco del artículo 3:201 contribuya con su culpa a la aparición o extensión del daño. (4) La indemnización se reducirá de forma similar si y en la medida en que cualquier otra fuente de peligro de la cual el perjudicado sea responsable de acuerdo con el capítulo 3 contribuya a la aparición o extensión del daño. Artículo 5:103: Daños causados por un delincuente a un colaborador El daño jurídicamente relevante causado de manera no intencionada en el transcurso de la comisión de una ofensa criminal a otra persona que participa o de otra manera colabora en el delito no hace surgir un derecho a una indemnización si ello fuese contrario al orden público.

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Sección 2: Intereses de las personas responsables o de terceras partes Artículo 5:201: Autoridad otorgada por la ley Una persona tiene una causa de justificación si el daño jurídicamente relevante se produce con autoridad otorgada por la ley. Artículo 5:202: Legítima defensa y estado de necesidad (1) Una persona tiene una causa de justificación si esa persona causa un daño jurídicamente relevante para proteger razonablemente un derecho o un interés digno de protección legal suyo propio o de un tercero si la persona que sufre el daño jurídicamente relevante es responsable de haber puesto en peligro el derecho o interés protegido. A los efectos de este apartado no se tendrá en cuenta lo dispuesto en el artículo 3:103. (2) Lo mismo se aplica al daño jurídicamente relevante causado por una persona que, sin vulnerar sus propias obligaciones, actúa bienintencionadamente en favor de un tercero. (3) En los supuestos en que una persona cause un daño jurídicamente relevante al patrimonio de otra en una situación de peligro inminente para su vida, cuerpo, salud o libertad de cara a salvarse a sí mismo o a una tercera persona, de modo que ese peligro no puede eliminarse sin causar el daño, la persona que cause el daño no estará obligada a reparar el daño más allá de una indemnización razonable. Artículo 5:203: Protección del interés público Una persona tiene una causa de justificación si el daño jurídicamente relevante se causa para proteger necesariamente valores fundamentales para una sociedad democrática, en particular en los casos en que el daño se causa mediante la difusión de información en los medios de comunicación.

Sección 3: Incapacidad de control Artículo 5:301: Incapacidad mental (1) Una persona que sea mentalmente incapaz en el momento de llevar a cabo la conducta causante del daño jurídicamente relevante sólo será responsable si ello es conforme a la equidad, teniendo en cuenta los medios económicos de la persona mentalmente incapaz y las restantes circunstancias del caso. La responsabilidad estará limitada a una compensación razonable. (2) Una persona es mentalmente incapaz si esa persona carece de comprensión suficiente acerca de la naturaleza de su conducta, a menos que la falta de comprensión suficiente sea el resultado temporal de su propia mala conducta. Artículo 5:302: Acontecimientos fuera de control Una persona tiene una causa de justificación si el daño jurídicamente relevante ha sido causado por un acontecimiento extraordinario que no podía evitarse mediante ninguna medida razonable y que no puede considerarse como riesgo de esa persona.

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Sección 4: Exclusión contractual y limitación de la responsabilidad Artículo 5:401: Exclusión contractual y limitación de la responsabilidad (1) La responsabilidad por causar un daño jurídicamente relevante de forma dolosa no puede excluirse ni limitarse. (2) La responsabilidad por causar un daño jurídicamente relevante como resultado de un fallo grave en la adopción de aquel nivel cuidado que las circunstancias manifiestamente requieren no puede excluirse ni limitarse (a) en relación a un daño corporal (incluido una lesión mortal), o (b) si la exclusión o la limitación es de cualquier otro modo ilegal o contraria a la buena fe y al trato justo. (3) No podrá limitarse ni excluirse la responsabilidad por daños de los cuales una persona sea responsable de acuerdo con el artículo 3:204. (4) Se podrá excluir o limitar otra responsabilidad bajo este Libro a menos que una ley disponga otra cosa.

Sección 5: Pérdidas en el marco del artículo 2:202 Artículo 5:501: Extensión a terceras personas de las causas de exclusión de la responsabilidad que se tienen frente a la persona lesionada Una causa de exclusión de la responsabilidad que pueda ser hecha valer frente al derecho de una persona a ser indemnizada por el daño personal por ella sufrido o, si no se ha producido la muerte, que podría haber sido hecha valer, puede ser también hecha valer frente a la persona que sufre pérdidas en el marco del artículo 2:202.

Capítulo 6: Remedios Sección 1: Resarcimiento en general Artículo 6:101: Objetivo y formas de resarcimiento (1) El resarcimiento consiste en colocar a la persona que sufre el daño jurídicamente relevante en la posición en que esa persona se encontraría si el daño jurídicamente relevante no se hubiese producido. (2) El resarcimiento puede ser en dinero (indemnización) o en otra forma, según sea lo más apropiado, teniendo en cuenta el tipo y el alcance del daño sufrido y todas las demás circunstancias del caso. (3) En el caso de que una cosa inanimada resulte dañada, se abonará una indemnización igual a su depreciación de valor en lugar del coste de su reparación si el coste de repararla excede irrazonablemente de la depreciación de valor. Esta regla se extiende a los animales sólo si es apropiado, teniendo en cuenta el propósito para el cual se tenía el animal.

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(4) Como una alternativa a la restitución según el apartado 1, pero sólo en los casos en que sea razonable, el resarcimiento podrá consistir en recuperar de la persona responsable de la producción del daño jurídicamente relevante cualquier ventaja que esa persona haya obtenido en conexión con la producción del daño.

Artículo 6:102: Regla de minimis No se tendrán en cuenta los daños bagatela. Artículo 6:103: Compensación de beneficios (1) Los beneficios que se generen a la persona que sufre el daño jurídicamente relevante como consecuencia del hecho dañoso no serán tenidos en cuenta a menos que sea justo y razonable tenerlos en cuenta. (2) Al decidir si sería justo y necesario tener en cuenta los beneficios, habrá que tomar en consideración el tipo de daño sufrido, la naturaleza de la responsabilidad de la persona causante del daño y, si los beneficios los concede un tercero, el propósito de la concesión de esos beneficios. Artículo 6:104: Pluralidad de perjudicados En los casos en que una pluralidad de personas sufran un daño jurídicamente relevante y el resarcimiento a una persona constituya también un resarcimiento para otra, los artículos III.–4:201-207 serán de aplicacion, con las modificaciones adecuadas, a sus demandas de resarcimiento. Artículo 6:105: Responsabilidad solidaria Cuando varias personas sean responsables del mismo daño jurídicamente relevante, responderán solidariamente. Artículo 6:106: Cesión de reclamaciones El perjudicado podrá ceder una reclamación por resarcimiento, incluida una reclamación por resarcimiento de pérdidas no económicas.

Sección 2: Indemnización Artículo 6:201: Derecho de elección del perjudicado El perjudicado podrá elegir si emplea o no la indemnización en restaurar su interés dañado. Artículo 6:202: Limitación de responsabilidad En los casos en que sea justo y necesario hacerlo así, una persona podrá ser liberada, en todo o en parte, de la obligación de indemnizar si, siempre que el daño no se causase dolosamente, la obligación completa sería desproporcionada a la responsabilidad de la persona causante del daño o al alcance del daño o a los medios que se emplearon para impedirlo.

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Artículo 6:203: Capitalización y cuantificación (1) La indemnización ha de pagarse de una vez a menos que una buena razón demande un pago periódico. (2) El Derecho nacional determinará cómo ha de cuantificarse la indemnización por daño corporal y pérdidas no económicas. Artículo 6:204: Indemnización por lesión como tal La lesión como tal se indemnizará con independencia del resarcimiento de las pérdidas económicas y no económicas.

Sección 3: Prevención Artículo 6:301: Prevención en general (1) El derecho a prevenir existe sólo en la medida en que (a) el resarcimiento no sea un remedio alternativo adecuado; y (b) sea de otro modo razonable que la persona que respondería de la producción del daño impida que éste ocurra. (2) En los casos en que la fuente de peligro sea un objeto o un animal y no sea razonablemente posible para la persona amenazada evitar el peligro, el derecho a la prevención incluirá el derecho a que la fuente de peligro sea eliminada. Artículo 6:302: Responsabilidad por la pérdida sufrida en la prevención del daño La persona que haya realizado razonablemente gastos o haya sufrido otra pérdida con el fin de impedir que ocurra un daño inminente o con el fin de limitar el alcance o la gravedad de un daño actual tiene derecho a ser indemnizada por la persona que habría sido responsable del daño causado.

Capítulo 7: Reglas adicionales Artículo 7:101: Derechos constitucionales nacionales Las disposiciones de este Libro han de interpretarse y aplicarse de un modo compatible con el Derecho constitucional del Tribunal estatal en cuestión. Artículo 7:102: Disposiciones legales El Derecho nacional determinará qué disposiciones normativas son normas con rango de ley. Artículo 7:103: Funciones de Derecho Público y procedimientos judiciales Este Libro no regula la responsabilidad de una persona o de un organismo que resulte del ejercicio o del no ejercicio de funciones de Derecho público o del cumplimiento de obligaciones durante procedimientos judiciales.

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Artículo 7:104: Responsabilidad de empleados, empleadores, sindicatos y asociaciones de empresarios Este Libro no regula la responsabilidad de (a) empleados (sea respecto a compañeros de trabajo, empleadores o terceras partes) que surja en el marco de la relación de trabajo, (b) empleadores respecto a empleados que surja en el marco de la relación de trabajo, y (c) sindicatos y asociaciones de empresarios que surja en el transcurso de un conflicto laboral. Artículo 7:105: Reducción o exclusión de la responsabilidad frente a las personas indemnizadas Si una persona tiene derecho a una indemnización total o parcial del daño sufrido por ella procedente de otra fuente, en particular de un asegurador, un fondo u otro organismo, el Derecho nacional determinará si la responsabilidad según este Libro queda, en virtud de ese derecho, limitada o excluida o no.

Swedish1 Utomkontraktuellt ansvar för skador som orsakats annan Kapitel 1: Grundläggande Bestämmelser Artikel 1:101: Grundregel (1) En person som lider rättsligt relevant skada har rätt till gottgörelse från en person, som orsakade skadan uppsåtligen eller vårdslöst, eller på annat sätt kan tillskrivas orsakandet av skadan. (2) Har en person inte orsakat rättsligt relevant skada skadan uppsåtligen eller vårdslöst, kan orsakandet av rättsligt relevant skada endast tillskrivas den personen i enlighet med kapitel 3. Artikel 1:102: Avvärjande När rättsligt relevant skada är överhängande ger denna del den person som skulle lida skadan en rätt att avvärja denna. Denna rätt gäller mot den som orsakandet av skadan hade tillskrivits om den inträffat. Artikel 1:103: Tillämpningsområde Artiklarna 1:101 och 1:102 (a) tillämpas endast i enlighet med de följande bestämmelserna i denna bok, (b) tillämpas både på juridiska och fysiska personer, om inte annat föreskrivs, (c) tillämpas inte i den mån deras tillämpning skulle strida emot ändamålet med andra privaträttsliga regler, och (d) hindrar inte att remedier görs gällande på annan rättslig grund.

Kapitel 2: Rättsligt Relevant Skada Sektion 1: Allmänt Artikel 2:101: Definition av rättsligt relevant skada (1) Ekonomisk eller icke-ekonomisk förlust, eller skada utgör rättsligt relevant skada om: (a) en av de följande reglerna i detta kapitel föreskriver det, (b) förlusten eller skadan är ett resultat av en kränkning av en lagligen skyddad rättighet, eller 1

Translated by Johan Sandstedt (Osnabrück/Bergen).

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(c) förlusten eller skadan är ett resultat av en kränkning av ett intresse som förtjänar rättsordningens skydd. (2) I samtliga fall som endast omfattas av (b) eller (c) i stycke (1) utgör förlust eller skada en rättsligt relevant skada endast om det vore rättvist och skäligt att medge en sådan rätt till gottgörelse eller avvärjande i enlighet med artiklarna 1:101 eller 1:102. (3) Vid bedömningen av huruvida det vore rättvist och skäligt att medge en sådan rätt till gottgörelse eller avvärjande måste grunden för tillskrivandet, skadans eller den överhängande skadans natur och omfång, den skadelidandes eller den persons som skulle lida skadan förnuftiga förmodanden och samhällshänsyn beaktas. (4) I denna bok: (a) omfattar ekonomisk förlust: förlust av inkomst eller vinst, uppkomna bördor, och en minskning av förmögenhetsvärden. (b) omfattar icke-ekonomisk förlust: smärta och lidande samt försämring av livskvalitet.

Sektion 2: Enskilda fallav rättsligt relevant skada Artikel 2:201: Personskada och följdförlust (1) Förlust som orsakas en fysisk person genom skada på dennas kropp eller hälsa och skadan som sådan utgör rättsligt relevant skada. (2) I denna bok: (a) omfattar sådan förlust: kostnader för sjukvård, inbegripet utgifter som närstående till den skadelidande skäligen haft för vård av denna, och (b) omfattar personskada skada på den psykiska hälsan endast om denna endast om denna är medicinskt påvisbar. Artikel 2:202 Förlust som lidits av tredje män genom personskada eller död (1) Icke-ekonomisk förlust som orsakas en fysisk person genom en skada på en annan person eller den andra personens död utgör rättsligt relevant skada, om denna person vid tidpunkten för skadan befinner sig i en särskilt nära personlig relation till den skadade personen. (2) Lider en person en skada med dödlig utgång: (a) utgör rättsligt relevant skada som orsakats den döde till följd av skadan, rättsligt relevant skada för den dödes arvingar vid tidpunkten för dödsfallet, (b) utgör skäliga begravningskostnader rättsligt relevant skada för den person som haft kostnaderna, (c) utgör förlust av underhåll rättsligt relevant skada för en fysisk person som den döde underhöll, eller, om dödsfallet inte hade inträffat, hade underhållit på laglig grund, eller sörjde för eller gav ekonomiskt stöd. Artikel 2:203: Kränkning av värdighet, frihet och privatliv (1) Förlust som orsakas en fysisk person genom en kränkning av denna persons rätt till respekt för hans eller hennes värdighet, exempelvis rätten till frihet och privatliv, utgör rättsligt relevant skada. (2) Förlust som orsakas en fysisk person genom skada av denna persons rykte utgör också rättsligt relevant skada om nationell rätt förskriver det.

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Artikel 2:204: Förlust på grund av meddelande av oriktig information om en annan Förlust som orsakas en person genom meddelande av information om den personen utgör rättsligt relevant skada om personen som meddelar informationen vet eller borde veta att informationen är oriktig. Artikel 2:205: Förlust på grund av bruten förtrolighet Förlust som orsakas en person genom meddelande av information som antingen på grund av sin natur eller omständigheterna genom vilka denna erhölls är hemlig utgör rättsligt relevant skada om personen som meddelar informationen vet eller borde veta att informationen är hemlig. Artikel 2:206: Förlust på grund av kränkning avsakrätt eller laglig besittning (1) Förlust som orsakas en person genom en kränkning av denna persons sakrätt till eller lagliga besittning av lös eller fast egendom utgör rättsligt relevant skada. (2) I denna artikel: (a) omfattar förlust: att berövas användningen av egendom, (b) omfattar kränkning av sakrätt: förstörelse av eller fysisk skada på objektet för rätten (egendomsskada), förfogande över rättigheten, ingrepp i användningen och annan störning av utövandet av rätten. Artikel 2:207: Förlust på grund av tilltro till oriktigt råd eller oriktig information Förlust som orsakas en person genom ett beslut som fattats i skälig tilltro till oriktigt råd eller oriktig information är rättsligt relevant skada om: (a) rådet eller informationen tillhandahållits av en person inom ramen för dennes yrke eller näringsverksamhet, och (b) personen som tillhandahöll informationen visste eller borde ha vetat att mottagaren skulle lita på informationen när han fattade ett beslut av det slag som gjordes. Artikel 2:208: Förlust på grund av olagligt intrång i affärsverksamhet (1) Förlust som orsakas en person genom ett olagligt intrång i denna persons utövande av yrke eller näringsverksamhet utgör rättsligt relevant skada. (2) Förlust som orsakas en konsument genom illojal konkurrens utgör rättsligt relevant skada om gemenskapsrätten eller nationell rätt föreskriver det. Artikel 2:209: Uppkomna bördor för staten på grund av miljöskador Uppkomna bördor för staten eller dennas inrättningar för återställande av väsentligt skadade naturliga element som utgör miljön, såsom luft, vatten, mark, flora och fauna, utgör rättsligt relevant skada för staten eller berörda inrättningar. Artikel 2:210: Förlust på grund av svikligt förledande (1) Om inte annat följer av andra bestämmelser i denna sektion utgör en förlust som orsakats en person genom någon annans svikliga förledande, antingen genom ord eller uppträdande, rättsligt relevant skada. (2) Ett förledande är svikligt om det görs med vetskap eller tro att det är falskt och det är avsett att få mottagaren att begå ett misstag.

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Artikel 2:211: Förlust på grund av förledande till brott mot förpliktelse Om inte annat följer av andra bestämmelser i denna sektion utgör en förlust som orsakats en person genom någon annans förledande av en tredje man att bryta en förpliktelse en rättsligt relevant skada endast om: (a) förpliktelsen gällde gentemot personen som led förlusten, och (b) personen som förledde till brytandet (i) avsåg att den tredje personen skulle bryta förpliktelsen, och (ii) inte handlade i ett legitimt skydd av eget intresse.

Kapitel 3: Tillskrivande Sektion 1: Uppsåt och vårdslöshet Artikel 3:101: Uppsåt En person orsakar rättsligt relevant skada uppsåtligen om personen orsakar skadan och antingen: (a) menar att orsaka en skada av det slag som orsakades, eller (b) genom avsett uppträdande vet att sådan skada eller skada av det slaget kommer att bli eller är nästan trolig att komma bli orsakad. Artikel 3:102: Vårdslöshet En person orsakar rättsligt relevant skada vårdslöst om personen orsakar skadan genom ett uppträdande som antingen: (a) inte motsvarar den särskilda aktsamhetsstandard som föreskrivs i en lagbestämmelse, vilken syftar till att skydda den skadelidande från den lidna skadan, eller (b) inte på annat sätt iakttar sådan aktsamhet som kunde förväntas av en skäligt aktsam person i omständigheterna i fallet. Artikel 3:103: Personer under arton (1) Orsakande av rättsligt relevant skada enligt artikel 3:102(b) kan endast tillskrivas en person under 18 års ålder i den mån den personen ej iakttar sådan aktsamhet som man skulle kunna förvänta av en skäligen aktsam, jämnårig person med hänsyn till omständigheterna i fallet. (2) Uppsåtligt eller vårdslöst orsakande av skada kan inte tillskrivas en person under sju års ålder. (3) Stycke (1) och (2) tillämpas dock inte i den mån (a) skadelidande inte kan erhålla gottgörelse från någon annan enligt denna bok, och (b) ansvar för gottgörelse vore billigt med beaktande av parternas förmögenhetsförhållanden och alla andra omständigheter i fallet.

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Artikel 3:104: Tillskrivande av skada som har orsakats av barn eller personer under uppsikt (1) Orsakande av rättsligt relevant skada tillskrivs föräldrar till eller andra personer, vilka är lagligen förpliktade att utöva föräldramyndighet över en person under 14 års ålder, när den minderårige orsakade skadan genom ett handlande som hos en vuxen vore att bedöma som uppsåtligt eller vårdslöst. (2) Orsakande av rättsligt relevant skada som en tredje man lidit tillskrivs en institution eller annan enhet, vilken är förpliktad att hålla en person under uppsikt, om (a) det handlar om personskada, förlust enligt artikel 2:202 eller egendomsskada, (b) personen som institutionen eller den andra enheten är förpliktad att hålla under uppsikt orsakade skadan uppsåtligen eller vårdslöst, eller, vid en person under arton års ålder, genom ett handlande som hos en vuxen vore att bedöma som uppsåtligt eller vårdslöst. (c) personen som de är förpliktad att hålla under uppsikt är en person som sannolikt skulle orsaka skada av sådant slag. (3) Orsakande av den rättsligt relevanta skadan enligt denna artikel tillskrivs dock inte en person om denna visar att uppsikten över skadevållaren inte var bristfällig.

Sektion 2: Tillskrivande utan uppsåt eller vårdslöshet Artikel 3:201: Tillskrivande av skada orsakad av anställda och representanter (1) Orsakande av rättsligt relevant skada som en tredje man lider tillskrivs en person som anställt eller på liknande sätt sysselsätter en annan om den anställda eller sysselsatta personen (a) orsakade skadan inom ramen för anställningen eller sysselsättningen; och (b) orsakade skadan uppsåtligen eller vårdslöst eller orsakandet av skadan på annat sätt kan tillskrivas denne. (2) Stycke (1) tillämpas på motsvarande sätt för en juridisk person i förhållande till en representant som orsakar skada inom ramen för dennes befattning. En representant är en person som enligt stadgarna är behörig att företa rättshandlingar å den juridiska personens vägnar. Artikel 3:202: Tillskrivande av skada orsakad av en fast egendoms oförsvarligatillstånd (1) Orsakande av personskada och följdförlust, förlust enligt artikel 2:202 och för förlust på grund av egendomsskada (annan än på den fasta egendomen) genom tillståndet i vilken fast egendom befinner sig tillskrivs en person som självständigt utövar kontroll över den fasta egendomen om detta tillstånd inte motsvarar vad en person i eller på den fasta egendomen har rätt att förvänta sig bland annat med beaktande av: (a) den fasta egendomens art, (b) tillgängligheten eller tillgången till den fasta egendomen, och (c) kostnaderna för att undvika detta tillstånd hos fastigheten. (2) Självständigt utövar en person kontroll över fast egendom om personen utövar en sådan kontroll att det är skäligt att ålägga denna en plikt att förhindra rättsligt relevant skada enligt denna artikel. (3) Ägaren av den fasta egendomen skall anses självständigt utöva kontroll om denna inte visar att någon annan utövar kontroll självständigt. 219

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Artikel 3:203: Tillskrivande av skada orsakad av djur Orsakande av personskada och följdförlust, förlust enligt artikel 2:202 och för förlust på grund av egendomsskada genom ett djur tillskrivs en hållare av djuret. Artikel 3:204: Tillskrivande av skada orsakad av defekt produkt (1) Orsakande av personskada och följdförlust, förlust enligt artikel 2:202 och, i förhållande till konsumenter, för förlust på grund av egendomsskada (annan än på själva produkten) genom en defekt i produkten tillskrivs tillverkaren av en produkt. (2) Motsvarande gäller för en person som importerade produkten till Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet för försäljning, uthyrning, leasing eller distribution inom ramen för denna persons näringsverksamhet (3) Motsvarande gäller för en leverantör av produkten, om (a) tillverkaren inte kan identifieras, eller (b) när det är fråga om en importerad produkt, när importörens identitet inte framgår av produkten (oavsett om tillverkarens namn anges), om leverantören inte inom skälig tid meddelar den skadelidande vem tillverkaren eller den person som levererat produkten till honom är. (4) Orsakande av skada enligt denna artikel tillskrivs inte den person som visar: (a) att den personen inte satt produkten i omlopp, (b) att det är sannolikt att den defekt som orsakat skadan inte förelåg vid tidpunkten då personen satte produkten i omlopp, (c) att personen varken framställde produkten för försäljning eller distribution i ekonomiskt syfte eller framställde eller distribuerade den inom ramen för en näringsverksamhet, eller (d) att defekten beror på att produkten måste överensstämma med tvingande föreskrifter utfärdade av offentliga myndigheter, eller (e) att det vetenskapliga och tekniska vetandet vid den tidpunkt då personen satte produkten i omlopp inte möjliggjorde en upptäckt av defekten, eller (f) att defekten, när det är fråga om en tillverkare av en komponent, beror på: (i) utformningen av den produkt i vilken komponenten har infogats, eller (ii) de instruktioner som produktens tillverkare lämnat. (5) Med tillverkare avses: (a) när det är fråga om en slutprodukt eller en komponent den som framställer denna, (b) när det är fråga om en råvara den som tar ut något ur råvaran eller utvinner densamma, och (c) var och en som genom att sätta sitt namn, varumärke eller något annat kännetecken på produkten utger sig för att vara den som tillverkat den. (6) Med produkt avses en lös sak även om den infogats i annan lös eller fast egendom och elektricitet. (7) En produkt är defekt när den inte ger den säkerhet som en person har rätt att vänta sig med beaktande av omständigheterna, däribland (a) presentationen av produkten, (b) den användning av produkten som skäligen kunnat förväntas, och (c) tidpunkten då produkten satts i omlopp, men en produkt är inte defekt enbart på grund av att en bättre produkt har satts i omlopp senare.

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Artikel 3:205: Tillskrivande av skada orsakad av motorfordon (1) Orsakande av personskada och följdförlust, förlust enligt artikel 2:202 och för förlust på grund av egendomsskada (annan än på fordonet och dess frakt) som i en trafikolycka är ett resultat av användningen av fordonet tillskrivs en hållare av motorfordonet. (2) Med motorfordon avses varje slags motorfordon som är avsett för färd på land och som drivs av mekaniskt förmedlad kraft men som inte är spårbundet samt släpfordon, även om det inte är tillkopplat. Artikel 3:206: Tillskrivande av skada orsakad av farliga substanser eller immissioner (1) Orsakande av personskada och följdförlust, förlust enligt artikel 2:202 och för förlust på grund av egendomsskada eller uppkomna bördor enligt artikel 2:209 tillskrivs en hållare av en substans eller en operatör av en anläggning, om (a) det med beaktande av deras kvantitet och egenskaper vid tidpunkten för immissionen, eller, om en immission inte föreligger, vid tidpunkten för kontakten med substansen, är mycket troligt att substansen eller immissionen orsakar sådan skada utan adekvat kontroll, och (b) skadan innebär ett förverkligande av faran. (2) Substans omfattar kemikalier (oavsett om i fast eller flytande form eller i gasform). Mikroorganismer skall behandlas som substanser. (3) Immission omfattar (a) utsläpp eller utströmning av substanser, (b) ledning av elektricitet, (c) värme, ljus och annan strålning, (d) buller och annan skakning, och (e) annan icke-fysisk påverkan av miljön. (4) Anläggning omfattar även en rörlig anläggning eller en anläggning under uppförande eller som är tagen ur bruk. (5) En person tillskrivs dock inte orsakandet av skadan enligt denna artikel, om personen (a) inte håller substansen eller använder anläggningen för ändamål inom hans närings- eller yrkesverksamhet, eller (b) visar att underlåtelse att följa lagstadgad standard avseende kontroll över substansen eller handhavande av anläggningen inte föreligger. Artikel 3:207: Annat tillskrivande av orsakandet av rättsligt relevant skada Orsakande av rättsligt relevant skada tillskrivs även en person om det föreskrivs i nationell rätt och om det (a) hänför sig till en farokälla som inte omfattas av artikel 3:104-3:205, (b) hänför sig till en substans eller immission, eller (c) utesluter tillämpningen av artikel 3:204 stycke (4)(e). Artikel 3:208: Uppgivande Fast egendom, ett fordon, en substans eller installation som en person ger upp tillskrivs vid tillämpningen av denna sektion den personen tills en annan person utövar självständig kontroll eller blir hållare eller operatör. I den mån det är skäligt tillämpas det sagda på en hållare av ett djur.

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Kapitel 4: Orsakande Artikel 4:101: Allmän regel (1) En person orsakar rättsligt relevant skada för någon annan om skadan är att betrakta som en konsekvens av personens uppträdande eller en farokälla som personen är ansvarig för. (2) Vid personskada eller död skall den skadelidandes mottaglighet med hänsyn till slaget eller omfattningen av skadan ej beaktas. Artikel 4:102: Kollaboration En person som deltar i, anstiftar till eller medverkar vid orsakandet av rättsligt relevant skada skall anses orsaka skadan. Artikel 4:103: Alternativa orsaker Kan rättsligt relevant skada ha orsakats av en av flera möjliga företeelser som kan tillskrivas olika personer och det fastställs att skadan orsakades av en av dessa företeelser, men inte av vilken, skall varje person som kan tillskrivas en av dessa företeelser antas ha orsakat skadan, om inte annat bevisas.

Kapitel 5: försvar Sektion 1: Skadelidandes samtycke eller uppträdande Artikel 5:101: Samtycke och handlande på egen risk (1) En person har ett försvar om skadelidande på ett giltigt sätt samtycker till den rättsligt relevanta skadan och är eller borde vara medveten om konsekvenserna av samtycket. (2) Samma sak gäller om skadelidande vet om risken för den typen av skada och frivilligt utsätter sig för denna risk och skall anses ha accepterat risken. Artikel 5:102: Medverkande fel och tillskrivande (1) Medverkar skadelidande genom eget fel till uppkomsten eller omfattningen av den rättsligt relevanta skadan skall gottgörelse jämkas i enlighet med graden av fel. (2) Beaktas skall inte: (a) ett obetydligt fel av den skadelidande, (b) fel eller tillskrivande som är obetydligt för orsakandet av skadan, (c) skadelidandes bristande aktsamhet som medverkar till skadelidandes personskada som orsakas av ett motorfordon i en trafikolycka, om inte den bristande aktsamheten är att bedöma som ett grovt fel vid iakttagandet av den aktsamhet som omständigheterna uppenbarligen kräver. (3) Stycke (1) och (2) tillämpas på motsvarande sätt när en person, som skadelidande är ansvarig för enligt artikel 3:201, medverkar till uppkomsten eller omfattningen av skadan genom eget fel.

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(4) Skadestånd skall jämkas på motsvarande sätt om och i den mån en annan farokälla, för vilken skadelidande är ansvarig enligt kapitel 3, medverkar till uppkomsten eller omfattningen av skadan

Artikel 5:103: Skada som orsakats en gärningsman av en medgärningsman Rättsligt relevant skada som utan uppsåt orsakats en medgärningsman eller en på annat sätt medverkandande person vid begåendet av en brottslig handling ger ingen rätt till gottgörelse om detta skulle strida mot samhällshänsyn.

Sektion 2: Intressen hos personer som tillskrivs skadan eller tredje man Artikel 5:201: Stöd i lag En person har ett försvar om rättsligt relevant skada orsakas med stöd i lag. Artikel 5:202: Nödvärn, tjänst utan uppdrag, nöd (1) En person har ett försvar om denne orsakar rättsligt relevant skada vid skäligt skydd av denna persons eller en tredjemans rätt eller intresse som förtjänar rättsordningens skydd, om skadelidande kan tillskrivas äventyrandet av rätten eller intresset som skyddats. Vid tillämpningen av detta stycke skall artikel 3:103 inte beaktas. (2) Samma sak gäller för rättsligt relevant skada, som en syssloman utan att åsidosätta sina plikter orsakar huvudmannen vid ingripande enligt reglerna om tjänster utan uppdrag (bok VI). (3) Tillfogar en person i en situation, då överhängande fara hotar liv, kropp, hälsa eller frihet, för att rädda sig själv eller tredje man, skada på en annans persons förmögenhet och denna fara inte kunde avlägsnas utan att skadan orsakas, är personen som orsakade skadan inte ansvarig för gottgörelse överstigande en skälig ersättning. Artikel 5:203: Skydd av offentligt intresse En person har ett försvar om rättsligt relevant skada orsakas vid ett nödvändigt skydd av värden, vilka är grundläggande för ett demokratiskt samhälle, särskilt när skada orsakas genom spridande av information i media.

Sektion 3: Oförmåga att kontrollera Artikel 5:301: Psykisk störning (1) En person som vid tidpunkten för den skadegörande uppträdandet är psykiskt störd ansvarar endast om det är skäligt med hänsyn till dennes förmögenhetsförhållanden och alla andra omständigheter i fallet. Ansvaret begränsas till skälig ersättning. (2) En person är psykiskt störd, om personen saknar tillräcklig insikt i sitt beteende, om inte avsaknaden av tillräcklig insikt är tillfällig och självförvållad. Artikel 5:302: Händelse utanför kontroll En person har ett försvar om rättsligt relevant skada orsakas genom en abnorm händelse som inte kan avstyras med skäliga åtgärder och som inte kan betraktas som den personens risk. 223

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Sektion 4: Kontraktuell uteslutning och begränsning av ansvar Artikel: 5:401: Kontraktuell uteslutning och begränsning av ansvar (1) Ansvaret för uppsåtligt orsakande av rättsligt relevant skada kan inte uteslutas eller begränsas. (2) Ansvaret för orsakande av rättsligt relevant skada genom grovt åsidosättande av sådan aktsamhet som omständigheterna uppenbarligen kräver kan inte uteslutas eller begränsas (a) för personskada (innefattande dödsfall), eller (b) om uteslutningen eller begränsningen i annat fall är olaglig eller strider mot tro och heder och god sed. (3) Ansvaret kan inte uteslutas eller begränsas i de fall orsakandet av den rättsligt relevanta skadan tillskrivs personen enligt artikel 3:204. (4) Annat ansvar enligt denna bok kan uteslutas eller begränsas om inte annat föreskrivs i lag.

Sektion 5: Förlust enligt artikel 2:202 Artikel 5:501: Försvar mot skadelidande gäller även mot tredje man Ett försvar som kan göras gällande mot en persons rätt till gottgörelse för den personens personskada eller, om dödsfallet inte hade inträffat, hade kunnat göras gällande, kan också göras gällande mot en person som lider förlust enligt artikel 2:202.

Kapitel 6: Remedier Sektion 1: Gottgörelse i allmänhet Artikel 6:101: Mål och former av gottgörelse (1) Gottgörelsen skall återställa den position den skadelidande skulle ha befunnit sig i, om den rättsligt relevanta skadan inte uppkommit! (2) Gottgörelsen kan ske i pengar (skadestånd) eller på det sätt som är mest passande med beaktande av slaget och omfattningen av den lidna skadan och alla andra omständigheter i fallet. (3) Har egendom skadats skall skadestånd motsvarande egendomens värdeminskning betalas istället för reparationskostnaden om denna är oskäligt högre än värdeminskningen. Denna regel gäller för djur endast om det är lämpligt med beaktande av ändamålet för vilket djuret hölls. (4) Istället för det i stycke (1) föreskrivna och om det är skäligt kan skadestånd utgå i form av återställande av fördel som den personen vilken skadan tillskrivs har uppnått i samband med orsakandet av den rättsligt relevanta skadan. Artikel 6:102: De minimis-regel Obetydlig skada skall inte beaktas. 224

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Artikel 6:103: Avräkning av fördelar (1) Uppkomna fördelar för den skadelidande genom den skadegörande händelsen skall inte beaktas om det inte vore rättvist och skäligt att beakta dessa. (2) Vid bedömningen av huruvida det vore rättvist och skäligt att beakta fördelarna måste hänsyn tas till slag av liden skada, grunden för tillskrivandet hos personen som orsakar skadan och, när fördelen givits av en tredje person, ändamålet med givandet av fördelen. Artikel 6:104: Flera skadelidande Lider flera personer rättsligt relevant skada och utgör gottgörelse till en person även gottgörelse för någon annan, tillämpas III.–4:201 – 207 på motsvarande sätt på deras anspråk på gottgörelse. Artikel 6:105: Solidariskt ansvar Flera personer som ansvarar för samma rättsligt relevant skada ansvarar solidariskt. Artikel 6:106: Överlåtelse av anspråk Skadelidande kan överlåta ett anspråk på gottgörelse för ekonomisk eller icke-ekonomisk förlust.

Sektion 2: Skadestånd Artikel 6:201: Valrätt Skadelidande avgör själv om han vill använda skadeståndet till att återställa sitt skadade intresse. Artikel 6:202: Jämkning av ansvar Skadeståndsansvaret kan jämkas helt eller delvis, om det i de fall då skadan inte orsakats uppsåtligt är rättvist och skäligt och fullt ansvar inte står i proportion till tillskrivandet hos personen som orsakar skadan, omfattningen av skadan eller medlen att hindra denna. Artikel 6:203: Kapitalisering och beräkning (1) Skadestånd skall utgå som engångsbelopp om inte ett gott skäl kräver periodiska utbetalningar. (2) Nationell rätt bestämmer hur skadestånd för personskada och icke-ekonomisk skada skall beräknas. Artikel 6:204: Skadestånd för skada som sådan Skada som sådan skall ersättas oberoende av skadestånd för ekonomisk eller icke-ekonomisk skada.

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Sektion 3: Avvärjande Artikel 6:301: Rätt till avvärjande (1) Rätten till avvärjande gäller endast i den omfattning (a) skadestånd inte vore ett adekvat alternativt remedium, och (b) det annars är skäligt för personen som orsakandet av skadan skulle tillskrivas att avvärja dennas uppkomst. (2) Är farokällan en sak eller ett djur och finns det ingen rimlig möjlighet för den utsatta personen att undvika faran innefattar rätten till avvärjande en rätt att låta avlägsna farokällan. Artikel 6:302: Ansvar för förlust vid avvärjande av skada Har en person haft skäliga kostnader eller lidit annan förlust för att avvärja uppkomsten av en överhängande skada, eller för att minska omfattningen eller svårigheten av en uppkommen skada, har han en rätt till skadestånd från den personen orsakandet av skadan skulle ha tillskrivits.

Kapitel 7: Kompletterande Regler Artikel 7:101: Nationella konstitutionella lagar Bestämmelserna i denna bok skall tolkas och tillämpas på ett sätt som är förenligt med domstolens konstitutionella lagar. Artikel 7:102: Lagbestämmelser Nationell rätt bestämmer vilka bestämmelser som är lagbestämmelser. Artikel 7:103: Offentligrättsliga funktioner och domstolsprocesser Denna bok reglerar inte ansvaret för en person eller ett organ för utövande av eller underlåtelse att utöva offentligrättsliga funktioner eller för utförande av plikter under domstolsprocesser. Artikel 7:104: Ansvar för arbetstagare, arbetsgivare, fackföreningar och arbetsgivarorganisationer Denna bok reglerar inte ansvaret för (a) arbetstagare (varken gentemot kollegor, arbetsgivare eller tredje man) som härrör från anställningen, (b) arbetsgivare gentemot arbetstagare som härrör från anställningen, (c) fackföreningar och arbetsgivarorganisationer som uppstår i arbetskonflikter. Artikel 7:105: Jämkning eller uteslutning av ansvar gentemot en person som hålls skadeslös Är en person berättigad att för den lidna skadan erhålla full eller delvis gottgörelse från någon annan källa, särskilt från en försäkring, fond eller annat organ, bestämmer nationell rätt huruvida detta berättigande leder till att ansvaret enligt denna bok jämkas eller utesluts.

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Principles of European Law on Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another

Chapter 1: Fundamental provisions Introduction A.

The concept of non-contractual liability arising out of damage caused to another

1. Definition and purpose. In all the systems of the European Union the law of noncontractual liability arising out of damage caused to another (in the Common Law called tort law or the law of torts, in most but not all other jurisdictions referred to as law of delict) is that area of the law in which it is decided whether one who has suffered a damage can on that account demand reparation (whether in money or in kind) from another with whom there may be no other connection in law than the incident of causation of damage itself. That distinguishes the law of tort (or delict) from all other systems of compensation for damage – in particular therefore those in the law of contract and those compensation schemes which are organised on the basis of insurance law. In distinction to the latter, moreover, the law of tort guarantees to the victim only that there is someone who is liable and not, by contrast, that he is also able to satisfy his obligation. The purpose of the law of tort consists predominantly in protecting human and basic rights at the level of private law, that is to say horizontally between citizens inter se, with the legal remedies made mutually available. 2. Prevention of impending damage. For reasons of integral association, the following principles also deal with certain aspects of the rights of one who would suffer an impending damage to prevent it. The text takes no view on the theoretical question whether or not this branch of the law forms an integral segment of tort law, belongs to other parts of the law (such as e. g. property law or the law relating to natural persons) or stands on its own.

B.

The structure of the existing laws of non-contractual liability arising out of damage caused to another

3. Differences in external representation. The differences between the existing national laws of non-contractual liability arising out of damage caused to another in the European Union lie much less in their substantive outcomes for given situations than in their external representation (their structures). Certainly there are also, here and there, differences in conception in judging concrete situations of conflict in society. The greatest obstructive boulder on the path to a better mutual understanding is, or rather has been until now, the divergence in theoretical constructs devised for the functioning of the law of non-contractual liability. 229

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4. Two strands. This relates to both of the parts from which the law in this area is primarily made up and is quite independent of how strongly the differences between those parts are stressed or, from a pan-European perspective, should be stressed. The two strands are, on the one hand, liability for a deviation from the required standard of behaviour, i. e. liability for wrongs committed intentionally or negligently1 and, on the other hand, all those forms of liability according to which the defendant is accountable for a given damage although the defendant (whether a natural or legal person) has behaved perfectly correctly. 5. The Common Law and the Scandinavian countries. Leaving the details to one side, it is possible at least in regard to the structure of the law of liability for breach of duty to distinguish between three groups of jurisdictions. There is at one end of the spectrum the Common Law of England, Ireland and Cyprus with its system of individual torts, which resembles the way continental European systems set out their penal laws. There are roughly 70 to 75 torts.2 However, those which really matter in day to day practice are rather limited in number: trespass, negligence, breach of statutory duty, nuisance, and defamation. Among these, negligence is the most important. In addition one finds many statutory regulations, normally with a very small field of application. It is probably fair to say that no European jurisdiction has as many tort law statutes as England. All other European systems have their starting point in one (sometimes subdivided) basic tort law provision. This is true not only for continental Europe’s codifications, but also for the three Scandinavian tort law systems as well. The latter refer to this basic provision as the “culpa-rule”, be it part of their common law (as in Denmark) or expressly stated in a statute on the compensation of damage (as in Sweden and Finland). 6. France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain. On closer inspection, however, it emerges that these basic tort law provisions differ in many respects. It has become customary to place in one box those Romance systems which do no more than rely on the general principle that everybody who through their faute causes damage to another must make good the damage (French, Belgian and Luxembourgian CC arts. 1382 and 1383). Spanish CC art. 1902 is in very similar terms, the only difference being that its wording was deliberately drafted so as to cover the tortious liability of legal persons as well. 7. Greece and Italy. Whether or not one can say that Greece and Italy also rely on a “general clause” is probably open to debate. Greek CC art. 914 provides for what in German legal terminology is called a “blanket provision”. Taken literally Greek CC art. 914 contains no more than the tort of breach of statutory duty. A cause of action in tort requires that the defendant’s behaviour was “para ton nomon”, against the – or a – law. However, ever since the Greek courts decided that statutory provisions like the one on “Good Faith and Fair Dealing” amount to “statutes” within the meaning of CC art. 914 the conclusion seems inevitable that Greece, too, has been moving towards a “general clause”. The situation is rather similar in Italy. Italian CC art. 2043 differs from its French model only in so far as it expressly requires an “unjust damage”, a danno 1

2

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As to the technical meaning of these notions within the framework of these model rules see Articles 3:101 (Intention) and 3:102 (Negligence). Rudden, TulCivLaw Forum 6/7 (1991-92), 105-129.

Introduction

ingiusto. Originally this term was interpreted in a way very much along the lines of German CC § 823(1), but since then the Italian courts have changed the situation in many important respects, so much so that the present Italian tort law seems to be much closer to the French than to the German. 8. Portugal, Austria, Germany. Countries like Portugal, Austria3 and Germany must, at least on the face of it, be put in another box. The approach of their basic provisions is much narrower, the narrowest being Portuguese CC art. 483(1). It has the infringement of an absolute right and the breach of statutory duty as fundamental causes of action. There is nothing more. Even the subsidiary tort of causing damage intentionally and in breach of bonos mores, of good morals, as known (albeit with differences in wording) in Austria, Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece and Finland, is missing from the Code (though Portuguese law knows techniques to fill this gap). Austria, too, relies on a list of protected interests. Although Austrian CC § 1295(1) recognises no such list of “absolute rights” (the wording of this provision amounts to a classical general clause) the Austrian courts interpret it very much along the lines of the wording of the German Civil Code. The latter divides its basic tort law provision into three separate headings. There are three fundamental causes of action: the infringement of an absolute right, breach of statutory duty and breach of bonos mores with the intention to cause damage (CC §§ 823(1), (2) and 826). 9. The Netherlands. Dutch CC art 6:162 reads (in the translation by Haanappel/ Mackaay/Warendorf/Thomas, Netherlands Business Legislation): “(1) A person who commits an unlawful act against another which is attributable to him, must repair the damage suffered by the other as a consequence thereof. (2) Except where there are grounds for justification, the following acts are deemed unlawful: the violation of a right and an act or omission breaching a duty imposed by law or a rule of unwritten law pertaining to proper social conduct. (3) A wrongdoer is responsible for the commission of an unlawful act if it is due to his fault or to a cause for which he is accountable by law or pursuant to generally accepted principles.” The Dutch solution thus contains a compromise between the German and the French model. Dutch tort law operates (like the German) with the infringement of a right and the breach of statutory duty as distinct causes of action. The “rights” are not enumerated, however, and need not be “absolute” in character. Furthermore, the third alternative of Dutch CC art. 6:162(2) is sufficiently flexible to cover all other situations. Unlike the equivalent Austrian, German and Greek provisions on liability for breach of bonos mores, it does not require an intention to cause damage. 10. Cyprus and Malta. In May 2004 the European Union was enlarged to include ten further Member States. Among the tort laws of these countries too the differences in legal systems referred to above are likewise evident. Cyprus, as far as tort law is concerned, is a Common Law jurisdiction. While there is a dedicated statute on tort law (the 3

A proposal has been made to reform the law on damages in the ABGB in Austria; a draft to this effect was submitted to the Department of Justice in 2005. Particulars in Griss, JBl 2005, 273288 as well as in Griss/Kathrein/Koziol (-Griss), Entwurf eines neuen österreichischen Schadensersatzrechts.

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Civil Wrongs Law), s. 29(1)(c) of the Courts of Justice Law (Law 14 of 1960) provides that the Common Law and the principles of equity apply in Cyprus, provided that they do not conflict with existing Cyprus legislation. The Civil Wrongs Law is not regarded as an exhaustive codification. Cyprus courts therefore apply the English Common Law.4 The Maltese CC of 1874 is the only European civil code that opens its law of tort (Part II, Title IV, Sub-title II § II: “Of Torts and Quasi-torts”) with the principle casum sentit dominus. CC art. 1029 states that “any damage which is produced by a fortuitous event, or in consequence of an irresistible force, shall, in the absence of an express provision of the law to the contrary, be borne by the party on whose person or property such damage occurs”. Following up on CC art. 1030, which exempts from liability the legitimate exercise of a right, CC art. 1031 gives expression to a classical general clause for noncontractual liability for damage: “Every person, however, shall be liable for the damage which occurs through his fault”. 11. Eastern central Europe. The Czech and Slovakian CC (the civil code of the former Czechoslovakia which continues to be in force in both countries) sets out the rules of tort law in the sixth Book (“Liability for damage and unjustified enrichment”). Its first section relates to the prevention of an impending damage (CC §§ 415-419); its second governs liability for damage (CC §§ 420-450). CC § 420 contains the basic norm of tort law (“Everyone shall be liable for damage caused by violating a legal duty”5). The Hungarian CC of 1959, whose basic norm on tort law (CC § 339(1)) contained in its 29th Chapter will in all probability not be affected by the anticipated reform of Hungarian private law,6 contains a typical general clause.7 Its only peculiarity is a general reversal of the burden of proof for “fault”: “A person who causes damage to another person in violation of the law shall be liable for such damage. He shall be relieved of liability if he is able to prove that he has acted in a manner that can generally be expected in the given situation.”8 The most recent civil code in this region – the Slovenian Law of Obligations Act 20029 – adopts this rule in LOA § 131(1) almost word for word. The Polish CC has its tort law in the 6th Title of the third Book (CC arts. 415-449). CC art. 415 is formulated in extremely concise terms: “Whoever by his fault caused a damage to another person shall be obliged to redress it”. The tort law part of the Romanian Civil Code adopts the structure of the French code (Romanian CC arts. 998-1002 correspond to French CC arts. 1382-1386). Under Romanian tort law, it is notable that a distinction is drawn between unlawfulness and fault; on this point, the Romanian tort law belongs more to the Germanic than the Romance legal systems. The proposed Draft Civil Code contains a rule in art. 1097 which provides that a person who causes damage by his unlawful act is liable for the slightest degree of negligence (Proiectul Noului Cod civil, 215-216). 4

5 6 7

8 9

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Neocleous and Campbell (-Christoforou/Glykis/Markouli), Introduction to Cyprus Law, 545546. Official translation in the version online at http://mujweb.cz/www/vaske/obcan1.htm. http://www.parlament.hu/irom38/05949/05949.pdf; see further Herpai, VersRAI 2005, 29-32. For details see Szécsényi, ZfRV 1999, 175-185. For the development of the law of tort in Eastern Europe in general see Küpper, OER 2003, 495-541 (both in German). Hungarian Rules of Law in Force, CompLex CD HMJ, 2004. See Trstenjak, WGO 2002, 90-110.

Introduction

12. The Baltic States. Estonia and Lithuania have recently enacted new codes. The Estonian Law of Obligations Act of 5th June 2002 (cited here as LOA) provides for the law of tort in chapter 53.10 The basic norm of the Estonian LOA § 1043 (“A person (tortfeasor) who unlawfully causes damage to another person (victim) shall compensate for the damage if the tortfeasor is culpable of causing the damage or is liable for causing the damage pursuant to law”) is clearly influenced by German law. This influence is evident even more clearly in the Estonian LOA § 1045(1) – the provision which lists the most important forms of causing damage (causing death, personal injury or damage to health, deprivation of liberty, violation of a personality right, violation of the right of ownership or a similar right or right of possession, interference with the economic or professional activities of a person, behaviour which violates a duty arising from law, intentional behaviour contrary to good morals). The critical contrast with the German system, however, is that this list is not exhaustive and allows room for further development. The Lithuanian CC of 18 July 2000 addresses tort law in the 13th Chapter of its sixth Book.11 The starting point is art. 6.246(1), a provision which works with the notion of unlawfulness, but foregoes an express list of interests protected by tort law (“Civil liability shall arise from non-performance of a duty established by laws or a contract (unlawful refrainment from acting), or from performance of actions that are prohibited by laws or a contract (unlawful acting), or from violation of the general duty to behave with care”). Art. 6.263(1) is formulated in the style of a general clause: “Every person shall have the duty to abide by the rules of conduct so as not to cause damage to another by his actions (active actions or refrainment from acting)”. The Latvian Civil Code of 1938,12 brought back into force on a phased basis from 1992, for its part adopts in CC art. 1635 the Romance concept of the general clause (“Every delict, i. e., every wrongful act per se, shall give the person who suffered the harm therefrom the right to claim satisfaction from the infringer, in so far as he or she may be held at fault for such act”). 13. “Pure economic losses”. Probably the most important point of substance in these various ways of drafting is the treatment of compensation for pure economic loss. The German Civil Code deliberately excluded pure economic interests from the protection afforded by CC § 823(1); they are recoverable only under CC §§ 823(2), 824 and 826. Whereas – even after Hedley Byrne v. Heller13 (which broadened the scope of negligence so as to allow for the recoverability of pure economic loss under certain well defined conditions) – Germany and England remained relatively close to each other, a rather dramatic gap developed between France and Germany. Dutch CC art. 6:162 has tried to bridge this gap, as has Italian CC art. 2043. Swedish and Finnish Law have special provisions on the recoverability of pure economic losses, the main rule being that a cause of action in this field requires a criminal behaviour. This rule, however, is not exhaustive. The central east European States mostly follow the French model; on the other hand, among the Baltic legal systems the Estonian position is close to the German. However, present day Europe does not even share a common notion of what constitutes “pure economic loss”. The Italian Corte di Cassazione developed a right to the integrity 10 11 12 13

English translation online at http://www.legaltext.ee/en/andmebaas/ava.asp?m=025. English translation online at http://www3.lrs.lt/cgi-bin/getfmt?c1=w&c2=245495. English translation online at http://www.ttc.lv/lv/publikacijas/civillikums.pdf. Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] AC 465.

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of one’s economic assets.14 English, Irish, Scottish, Swedish and Finnish lawyers would define “pure economic loss” as any loss not occurring consequent to damage to the physical integrity of a person or a tangible thing. A German, an Austrian, a Portuguese and (probably) a Dutch and an Estonian lawyer, for their part, would describe “pure economic loss” as any loss not consequential to the infringement of a right, thus excluding many losses from the notion of pure economic loss which in other countries would be seen as typical examples for this category. A typical French, Belgian, Luxembourgian, Spanish or Hungarian lawyer, on the other hand, will most probably not even understand the concept: a dommage purement économique is a category completely alien to him. One and the same problem can thus appear under completely different headings. In order to improve the situation German law has developed a vast variety of escape devices under an astoundingly far reaching contract law, whereas the Common Law, hampered by the doctrine of consideration, deals with exactly the same situations (and achieves nearly identical results) within the negligence-based concept of breach of duty or voluntary assumption of liability, the latter, under German law, amounting to a contractual duty to take reasonable care. France and Romania, on the other hand, limit their liability for “pure economic loss” whenever they think necessary to do so by applying the notion of causation in a rather restrictive way.

C.

Overview of the concept underpinning the text

14. Non-contractual liability arising out of damage caused to another, tort or delict. We chose the title “Non-contractual liability arising out of damage caused to another” for this Book because the expression “tort law” would have resonated too closely with the prevailing technical meaning of this concept in Irish, English and Cypriot law. We also avoided employing the term “law of delict” as the converse situation would apply: it would have been possible to attribute to this expression the technical significance that it carries in the civil law countries. Moreover, under modern liability law, there are a large number of cases where there is a duty to compensate damage although an individual did not behave incorrectly and cannot really be said to have “deviated from the proper course of conduct”. Nonetheless, both concepts – tort law and the law of delict – are a fixed part of European legal terminology which in turn entails that we could only escape these concepts in the title and not also in the introduction or in the following comments on the Articles. While, in the ensuing text, we continue to describe this legal area as “tort law” or the “law of delict”, these expressions are to be understood as synonyms and, unless the context requires otherwise, without the technical significance which they bear in certain national jurisdictions. We understand them here simply as a short hand formula to denote “non-contractual liability arising out of damage caused to another”. 15. Initial considerations. As far as substance is concerned, the text proceeds with the following initial considerations in mind. The law of non-contractual liability arising out of damage caused to another is not an area of law which is (in its strongest sense) accessorial, furnishing one of its remedies only where another part of the legal system 14

234

Cass. 4 May 1982, no. 2765, Foro it. 1982, I, 2864; Cass. 25 July 1986, no. 4755, Rep.Giur.it. 1986, voce Concorrenza e pubblicità no. 71.

Introduction

has already given expression to the notion that it considers a certain defined interest as worthy of protection. Of course, the tort law has to reflect the value judgments which other parts of the legal system have made manifest and must implement these in terms of legal liability. However, it is nonetheless a free-standing area of the law which passes its own decisions. It must therefore not merely judge in unison with the other component parts of private law (though it must certainly do that); ultimately it must also determine from within itself what detriments will amount to reparable damage, under what conditions and in what manner. 16. No exhaustive list of protected interests and rights. It would therefore neither appear meaningful, nor accord with the perspective of the overwhelming number of legal systems in Europe, if one was to proceed on the footing of an exhaustive list of protected legal interests and rights. Such an exhaustive list can hardly be composed without internal contradictions and a multitude of entirely opaque exceptions and exceptions to exceptions. It is of course quite correct that in every individual case in which the system of tort law provides a claim, a specific interest is also protected (or expression is given to the notion that a specific interest has been infringed – cf. under Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage)). However, one should not draw from this the conclusion that a catalogue of rights (or interests) protected from every mode of infringement can be composed according to abstract criteria and serve as a matter of principle as an exhaustive enumeration. It presupposes the existence of a hierarchy of values which lies at some remove from the law of tort and which tort law has merely to replicate; it fails to appreciate that it is the task of tort law to weigh in the balance, in the specific case and on the basis of a synopsis of all elements which mould this area of the law (damage, ground of liability, causation and legal consequences), the conflicting interests of freedom of action and protection of the status quo. The approach chosen here, moreover, also corresponds with the starting point whereby the law of tort serves the purpose of protection against infringement of private individuals’ fundamental or human rights. That is because private law would fall behind in this task if it were only (or only predominantly) to throw its weight behind the protection of “absolute rights”. 17. Accountability, damage, causation. Correspondingly the text takes as its point of departure a triumvirate made up of a ground of accountability (incorrect – i. e. intentional or negligent – conduct, or, as the case may be, responsibility for a source of danger), damage and causation, and defines their relationship to one another. These three elements universally make out the constituent ingredients of a tort and lay the ground for the legal redress which suits the case. The proposal takes no cognisance either of a fundamental distinction between economic loss which has its origin in a violation of a right or a statute and “pure” economic loss, nor (at least as a rule) of a distinction between economic loss and non-economic loss. Where nothing else is stated, non-economic loss also constitutes loss within the meaning of the subsequent provisions. The text accordingly does not work with the concept of unlawfulness, which has been developed in Germany. The results of the past century’s codified “field experiment” based on this concept have not emerged so positively that it commends itself as a compelling candidate for prolongation into the future. On the other hand one should not overlook the fact that the concept of “damage” is ambiguous and calls for qualification: it is not every loss which is reparable, but rather those losses for which the legal system provides 235

Chapter 1: Fundamental provisions

for a legal claim to reparation. Hence the draft invokes a (new) concept of “legally relevant” damage. 18. An all-embracing basic rule. The findings of comparative law also show that most of the tort law systems work with a basic norm, out of which all the essential elements at least of the so-called liability for “fault” (as to which see further C25) arise. This applies too, albeit with limitations, to the Common Law, where the tort of negligence undertakes a very similar function. It holds also for the newer codifications where the basic norm also integrates so-called “strict” liability – that is to say, liability which does not presuppose conduct on the part of the defendant falling short of a required standard of care. That features likewise in the following “basic rule” in this text. It should be added that the discussion concerning what is objectively the best formulation of a basic tort law norm is often, perhaps too often, carried out on the basis of a confrontation of extremes, namely the German and the French texts. The result was an unnecessary narrowing of the available alternatives, quite apart from the fact that in this discussion one overlooked how, in the Europe of today, everything hinges on giving expression to the collective perception of legal values contained in principles which are already common currency. In that regard the older codifications have much to learn from the more recent ones. 19. Seven chapters. The following text is divided into seven chapters. The initial chapter, after setting out the basic principle of tortious liability, contains provisions relevant to prevention of impending damage and to the internal coherence of private law and in that way establishes in a comprehensive manner both the foundation for and the framework of tort law liability under these Principles. This is followed by a chapter on legally relevant damage. The third chapter grapples with questions of accountability for the damage. Subsequent concerns are causation, general grounds for defending a claim and general questions as to the consequences of liability (“remedies”). Finally, ancillary rules have been drafted relating to matters which in our perspective should remain unaffected by these Principles. 20. Interaction of the chapters. The interaction of the individual chapters is treated more closely in the following text. At this point the following clarifications suffice. The basic norm of the first chapter contains all the elements of tortious liability. It is formulated as a single self-contained provision which alone founds a legal claim. The prerequisites for the foundation of the claim are more exactly and definitively set down, however, in the subsequent chapters. The second chapter determines what is to be classified as damage for the purposes of the law of tort – what, in other words, amounts to “legally relevant damage” as required by the basic rule on liability set out in Article 1:101 (Basic rule). At the same time the second chapter also indicates the instances of damage for which reparation (or injunctive relief) may be contemplated. 21. Legally relevant damage. A closer inspection of those provisions will therefore reveal that not all forms of loss (or, as the case may be, injury) constitute damage in the tort law sense and not every damage is necessarily “reparable”, that is to say, it does not necessarily carry a right to reparation. In exceptional situations it may so happen that the legal system envisages only certain particular legal remedies (e. g. prohibition) and not restoration in kind or monetary compensation for detriment which has already been 236

Introduction

suffered. (The opposite is also possible: there may be a denial of injunctive legal protection, even though at that point in time there is a high likelihood that the claimant will have a claim for reparation later after the occurrence of the damage the claimant has sought to prevent.) A further point to be contemplated is that the question of what in a particular case qualifies within the law of tort as compensatable damage may be dependent on the ground on which accountability and thus liability for the damage emerges. There are occasions when certain forms of detriment will amount to legally relevant damage in a case of intentionally causing damage, but will not constitute a loss for which reparation is due if the case is one of mere negligence or carelessness. The picture is correspondingly the same in relation to forms of liability for conduct not satisfying the required standard of care in contrast to forms of liability which are independent of whether the conduct fell short of an essential standard. Against this background the text sets out in Chapter II those forms of detriment which from the standpoint of liability for breach of duty – the focal point of the private law of tort – are to be recognised as constituting legally relevant damage. Chapter II (Legally relevant damage) likewise determines what amounts to a legally relevant damage only if the case is one of intentionally causing damage. The intentional infliction of damage constitutes a particularly severe form of breach of duty and is treated accordingly, embracing all forms of damage in a case of (mere) negligence and extending beyond to other losses which are not otherwise recognised as legally relevant damage. By way of contrast, the limitations to the sphere of legally relevant damage which are attached, at any rate partially, to liability irrespective of conduct falling short of a standard of care (e. g. limitations to damage to property or injury to the person) find expression in the (second section of the) third chapter. The starting point is the general principle that a detriment which constitutes damage according to the rules of Chapter II (Legally relevant damage) is also to be regarded as damage for the purposes of liability without breach of duty. Thus Chapter III (Accountability) enumerates in its second section the exceptions to that principle. 22. A new expression. Hence, in these principles we put forward a new expression, namely “legally relevant damage”. We are aware that one needs to become familiar with this expression to be comfortable with it. Nonetheless we consider it to be a suitable legal concept essentially for the following reasons. (i) It seems to us necessary to qualify the word “damage” with the prefix “legally relevant” because we are concerned here with a common standard for all and not merely that which one individual perceives to be damage. The latter may vary considerably from person to person. (ii) As already indicated, it appears necessary to give expression to the interdependence between detriment eligible for reparation, ground of accountability and causation. (iii) It seems necessary to guard against misunderstandings which would threaten to arise in translating the naked English word “damage” into the various other European languages because damage, danno, dommage, Schaden, etc., do not necessarily have the same meaning. Finally, (iv) it proved not to be possible to find a linguistically more suitable alternative. In particular, we have discarded the notion of “unjust damage” in the style of Italian law for purely linguistic reasons because it would have suggested that there could also be a “just damage”. 23. Causation. The causation component to prerequisites for liability too can in certain circumstances turn on whether it is liability for or liability without incorrect beha237

Chapter 1: Fundamental provisions

viour which is being confronted. It is also the case that the question whether a given event representing a negative occurrence from the perspective of the plaintiff constitutes legally relevant damage may depend on whether it was caused by the defendant or whether it is attributable to other circumstances. (The decline in turnover for a firm may be the consequence of an economic recession or the consequence of a wrong committed by someone within the firm; only in the latter case does the very same fall in turnover constitute legally relevant damage.) However, discussion of these particularities, so far as that is feasible and necessary, is best left to Chapter IV (Causation). In formulating Chapters II (Legally relevant damage) and III (Accountability) we were distinctly conscious of the way in which the concepts of accountability, damage and causation are tightly interwoven. 24. Remedies. The same holds correspondingly for redress, since legally relevant damage is a detriment to which the law reacts with a remedy; such damage is therefore only present where there is a remedy. From the point of view of drafting technique all these elements must nonetheless be elaborated in a discrete and straight forward manner because their content simply cannot otherwise be presented orderly. 25. Liability for and without conduct falling short of a required standard. As indicated above, the law of tortious liability can be divided fairly clearly into two domains, namely liability for and liability without conduct falling short of a required standard (the former including, of course, intentional causation of damage). This differentiation is not necessarily identical with the distinction between liability for and without “fault”. What in any given context of legal liability the term “fault” is to be understood to mean is not answered uniformly in the national legal systems. There is, however, practically universal agreement that in a private law context negligence does not necessarily involve a personal imputation of morally deficient conduct. Departure from the degree of care required in the circumstances suffices also in cases where the defendant could never have reached that standard for reasons inherent in his or her personal abilities. The following text therefore proceeds on the footing of the former and not the latter distinction; the term “fault” is only invoked exceptionally and in the first four chapters not at all. The term is encountered only in the chapters on grounds of defence and forms of legal redress and in those contexts always signifies a culpa in concreto, a personally reproachable misconduct. For the same reason the expression “strict liability” has also been avoided – in this case without exception. It confuses more than it helps because every liability, once it has arisen, is strict.

D.

Relationship to other areas of the law

26. Liability for crimes included. The text proceeds on the footing that tort law extends to liability for crimes, a proposition predominantly adopted in the European systems. As is generally known, the system in Spain is different; but that is an exception which cannot serve as a model for the following Principles. Moreoever, no persuasive legal ground is offered in support of the creation of a separate liability regime to govern claims for reparation asserted before a criminal court. The seventh Chapter of these Principles therefore does not provide for an exception for such adjunctive proceedings. In this, we 238

Introduction

were aware that, outside of Spain (e. g. in France), at least in some areas of the law, the criminal courts may employ different rules on civil liability than those that would be applied by the civil courts. 27. Co-ordination with criminal law. Furthermore, some difficulties of co-ordination with criminal law are not to be overlooked. Admittedly they do not so markedly concern the question of liability for infringement of statutory provisions, but they may emerge, for example, in the sphere of liability for defamation and accordingly are discussed there. These Principles are based on the fundamental maxim that the aim of the law on liability under private law is not to punish. Punishment belongs to the realm of criminal law whereas the function of the law on liability in private law is compensatory, nothing more and nothing less. For this reason, punitive damages do not form part of these Principles. 28. Tort law and contract law. Problematic in manifold ways is the question of how and where the boundary between contract law and tort law is to be drawn in cases where damage to a party is caused by the other’s non-performance, especially when it is not the non-performance of a defining duty of the contract.15 These Principles proceed on the basis that fundamentally the law of tort is also applicable within contractual relationships. The same goes for all questions which are enmeshed in the conclusion of contracts and culpa in contrahendo.16 Of course the form assumed by tort law has repercussions for the content of contract law. The latter is less ‘necessary’, so to speak, the further the law of tort extends (and vice versa). Against this background (among others) it is important to recall once again that this text contains no list of interests protected ‘in the abstract’, and that liability for conduct not satisfying the required standard of care is separated from all forms of liability operating independently of a breach of such duty (often termed strict liability) only in so far as, from the nature of the matter, separate treatment is indispensable. 29. No independent obligations “between” contract and tort. These initial decisions are also capable of counteracting the tendency currently perceptible in some of the legal systems to swerve off into the law of contract. Related to this are the points (which again have already been outlined) that the text does not consistently isolate so-called “pure economic loss (or damage)” (a category which in any case is invoked in only a few European legal systems) as a free-standing type of damage, that it allows sufficient room for forms of liability not based on either intention or negligence on the part of the defendant (including employer’s “strict” vicarious liability), that it does not distinguish fundamentally between economic and non-economic forms of damage and that it is able 15

16

See further the study commissioned by the European Commission: von Bar and Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law in Europe, 25-316. Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v. Heinrich Wagner Sinto Maschinenfabrik GmbH, ECJ 17 September 2002, C-334/00, ECJ Rep. 2002, I-7357 has characterised the infringement of pre-contractual duties of loyalty as part of the law of tort for the purposes of the private international law rules on jurisdiction (Brussels Convention art. 5 no. 3; and now Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, art. 5(3)).

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to accommodate an extensive and uniform law of limitation of actions. On this foundation there is likewise no room for an independent form of obligation, directed at reparation, situated between contract and tort, as has been suggested for some time in the literature in the legal systems in the German-speaking countries in particular. Moreover, such a development would be at some remove from the existing statutory provisions, would be met by incomprehension on many sides, and would throw up a plethora of new questions of demarcation and definition which could hardly be overlooked. However, DCFR II. – 3:301 (Negotiations contrary to good faith and fair dealing) (ex PECL Art. 2:301) and DCFR II. – 3:302 (Breach of confidentiality) (ex Art. PECL 2:302), which are to be found in the section on culpa in contrahendo, remain unaffected by these Principles. Should the need arise in the course of developing European private law for an enlargement of the concept of culpa in contrahendo, this chapter on the law of tort would not be fundamentally opposed to that (see Article 1:103(d) (Scope of application)). 30. Concurrence of actions. As regards concurrence of actions, the text takes as its foundation a principle of freedom of choice between co-existing claims, a position not in any way confined to the relationship of tort law to contract law, but rather extending also to the relationship to other private law spheres. Consideration is given, however, to the core concern of the French principle of non-cumul des responsabilités. If the problem of concurrence is first looked at from the perspective of tort law, there is no evident reason why it should be granted an automatic preferential application which would necessarily oust the rules of other areas of the law (see Article 1:103(d) (Scope of application)). The same is true for the relationship between tort law and the law of unjustified enrichment (see the following paragraph). On the other hand, tort law must accept that other parts of private law may aspire to an exclusive regime for a given problem (a matter which is for those other parts of private law to determine). Whether one wants to categorise such a rule on concurrence of actions systematically as belonging to the tort law (because that is the area of law which is ousted) or whether one prefers instead to regard it as part of the area of law which assumes a monopoly, or whether indeed the rule on priority and the integral corresponding rule on subsidiarity must always be categorised in both those ways at the same time, does not need to be decided here. The point is that the law of tort must be prepared to yield whenever another legal rule in a particular case claims priority. (See Article 1:103(c)): The provisions of this Book “do not apply in so far as their application would contradict the purpose of other private law rules.”) By contrast, a general principle, whereby, for example, liability in contract would always oust liability in tort is not required. Finally, the rules contained in Article 1:103(c) and (d) apply also to the relationship of the law of tort to parts of private law which are so far not the subject matter of the complete draft Principles (e. g. family law). Whether family law is intended to provide a conclusive regime for certain problem areas and therefore whether the law of tort is to be ousted (as, for example, in the sphere of liability for infidelity) will remain to be determined by the family laws of the Member States. (See also Article 2:211(2) (Loss upon inducement of non-performance of obligation)). 31. Tort law and unjustified enrichment law. These Principles have been formulated in tandem with those of European unjustified enrichment law and the European law of benevolent intervention in another’s affairs (negotiorum gestio). The law of unjustified enrichments is conceived broadly as a law of obligations analogy to the rei vindicatio in 240

Introduction

the law of property. It embraces in particular not merely the condictio indebiti but also a large segment of the law on “restitution for wrongs”. According to the draft Principles on unjustified enrichment law, increases in the defendant’s patrimony which he has acquired without legal justification and at the expense of the entitled claimant are to be reversed. As a fundamental proposition there is a corresponding free concurrence of actions between the law of unjustified enrichment and the law of tort: the one is not as a matter of principle subsidiary to the other. In other words, each of these two areas of the law generally grants the legal redress it provides independently of the other; the claimant has a free choice to have recourse to the regime which in the particular case is the more advantageous for him. Hence, the principle that no one should be able to extract for themselves a patrimonial benefit by their own wrongful conduct is not assigned en bloc to a single area of the law covered by these Principles. It features in all of the law of unjustified enrichment, the law of contract and the law of tort. As regards the latter, it is catered for primarily in those cases in which the defendant has appropriated a patrimonial benefit by means of a tort which involves injury or loss to the claimant, although it does not amount to a disposition or exploitation of some right of the claimant which the latter himself might (notionally) have turned to commercial advantage. See for details Article 6:101(4) (Aim and forms of reparation). 32. Tort law and negotiorum gestio law. Under these Principles, there are three apparent points of contact between the law of tort and the law of benevolent (i. e. predominantly not self-interested) intervention in another’s affairs. Firstly, there is no doubt that the justified furtherance of another’s interest represents a general ground of defence in the law of tort (e. g. in the context of property damage or an act of treatment). That follows from the nature of the matter, intervention being justified under the legal system vis-à-vis the intervenor’s principal according to the criteria of the law of benevolent intervention in another’s affairs (see here Article 5:202(2) (Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity)). Secondly, the law of benevolent intervention in another’s affairs, according to these Principles, itself confers on the intervener a right to damages as against the principal in cases in which the intervener is himself injured in the course of rendering assistance (PEL Ben.Int. Art. 3:103 (Right to reparation)). That claim to damages operates independently of whether or not any liability in tort on the part of the principal exists. Finally, these Principles are in agreement with the overwhelming number of European jurisdictions in stipulating that reparation for expenditure incurred by the affected party in order to forestall an impending damage must be provided according to the rules of the law of tort (and not by means of the law of benevolent intervention in another’s affairs) by the party who would be liable for the damage if it had not been prevented by the (potential) victim: see Article 6:302 (Liability for loss in preventing damage). 33. Tort law and property law. The relationship of tort law to the law of things /property can be fixed only when the boundaries of property law within the composite draft are demarcated. An example is provided by the law on disturbances to a neighbour’s use of immoveable property (termed “nuisance” in the Common Law). The point of departure for the law governing liability is the tort law concept of an infringement of property rights. However, looked at concretely, exactly which ways of using property constitute an infringement of property rights must in the end be decided in the law governing relations 241

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between neighbours. A second example is provided by the law on acquisition of ownership in good faith from non-entitled transferors. For a law of ownership which incorporates the rule (to be found in various legal systems) that only an intentional or grossly negligent oversight of the absence of entitlement in the transferor precludes the existence of good faith, it would seem self-evident that a merely (i. e. not grossly) negligent acquisition of ownership from an non-entitled party in good faith cannot constitute an infringement of a property right in relation to the entitled and expropriated owner. Within these Principles that follows from Article 1:103(c) (Scope of application). 34. Compensation under insurance law and performances rendered by third parties. Reference must also be made to the fact that at least for the present the text largely – albeit not completely – factors out the (primarily politically and not merely practically) delicate co-ordination of compensation under tort law and under insurance law. The same goes for the related problem of co-ordination of tort law with performances rendered by third parties, such as the continued payment of salary in cases of illness caused tortiously by a third party. Here what is essentially of concern are two interconnected matters, namely (i) the deduction of insurance payments or other performances rendered by third parties from a claim to compensation and (ii) claims to compensation of third parties rendering performances, as against the party responsible in tort and his or her insurance. This problem, which plays a particular role in relation to injury to the person but (e. g. in Denmark) is not limited to that sphere, touches fundamental socio-political convictions which at present are still cavenously wide apart. They relate primarily to the question whether and how far mechanisms of insurance law should also be deployed for the purpose of protecting the “perpetrator”. From this arises the further question as to whether the individual or the public collectively is responsible for this protection from tort law claims and should make the necessary financial provision. The implications in business economics for the insurance market, such as the question of what is a tolerable measure of transfer costs, and the problems of political economy (which obviously likewise feature here) at any rate defy our expertise. The Scandinavian systems have to some extent gone their own way, a route which can be accommodated but not completely followed in the text proposed here. They certainly throw up considerable legal and political problems from an EU perspective because ultimately they rest on the concept of a closed national system of compensation, the exclusivity of which, however, has been placed in considerable doubt by the existence of the European Union. Solving problems of this type is not the task of a text on tort law: see Article 7:105 (Reduction or exclusion of liability to indemnified persons). However, special provision at an EU level does seem necesessary to ensure that a country which takes the proceeds of insurance into account in assessing liability may only bring into reckoning foreign insurance if reciprocity is assured. 35. Procedural law. This Book only addresses issues relating to substantive liability law; questions of a procedural nature are excluded from its scope of application and therefore are not regulated by the following rules. As a result, this Book does not deal with the issue of how a person with rights provided for in the following Articles may be a party to legal proceedings. Nor are class actions dealt with, i. e. in what manner an individual may be affected by litigation of similar rights by others or in respect of collective claims. Equally we do not touch on how a person can obtain and enforce a judgment. Hence this Book does not purport to resolve the issue whether (and, if so, in which circumstances) an 242

Article 1:101: Basic rule

association (however constituted) may enjoy rights in the furtherance of some collective interest to restrain another’s activities and enforce those rights by obtaining injunctive relief. This relates in particular to environmental groups, consumer associations, and bodies concerned with prohibiting unfair competition or improper practices. Likewise, this Book is silent on the question how the rights to prevention of damage provided for in this Book may be enforced through the courts. These aspects of prophylactic legal protection also belong to the law of procedure.

Article 1:101: Basic rule (1) A person who suffers legally relevant damage has a right to reparation from a person who caused the damage intentionally or negligently or is otherwise accountable for the causation of the damage. (2) Where a person has not caused legally relevant damage intentionally or negligently that person is accountable for the causation of legally relevant damage only if Chapter 3 so provides.

Comments A.

The general approach

1. The basic rule in overview. Paragraph (1) contains a summary of the basic elements of non-contractual liability. It gives force to all the other Articles of this Book, none of which is complete in itself. This is expressed in Article 1:103(a) (Scope of application). The present Article relates to the reparation of damage which has already occurred, while Article 1:102 (Prevention) is concerned with prophylactic legal protection and compensation for expenditure incurred by someone for the purpose of preventing the occurrence of impending damage. Paragraph (2) of the present Article expresses one element of the basic rule in paragraph (1). It addresses the situation where the injuring person is liable in spite of having behaved perfectly correctly. Under such circumstances it will often be only certain defined types of loss which will be regarded as legally relevant damage – in particular personal injury and property damage. In so providing, paragraph (2) points ahead to the particular rules in Chapter 3, Section 2 (Accountability without intention or negligence). 2. Terminology: “tort” and “delict”. The choice of the expression “non-contractual liability for damage caused to another” (often abbreviated in the following pages to “noncontractual liability”) rather than “tort” or “delict” is easily explained. In the formulation of these model rules it was decided at an early stage to try to use descriptive language rather than technical terms from particular legal systems. Such technical terms often carry with them unwanted residues of a particular historical development and unwanted conceptual preconceptions and, partly for these reasons, can be notoriously difficult to translate. “Delict”, for example, carries with it a suggestion of wrongdoing, sometimes 243

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deliberate wrongdoing or even criminality. In its origin “tort” also suggests wrongdoing. This Book, as has just been explained, is not confined to wrongdoing. Moreover, “tort” and “tortious” are inextricably bound up with English law, while “delict” or its equivalent in other languages has different meanings in different legal systems. “Tort” is short but that, sadly, is its only advantage. Brevity has had to be sacrificed, with some reluctance, for appropriateness and, in the broadest possible sense, translatability. Some other terms which were considered (like “civil responsibility”) would not by themselves, and when used in a new instrument without a background of shared understanding, have distinguished adequately between this branch of the law and other branches of private law. 3.

Other terms. Some of the other terms frequently used in this Book are defined in

DCFR Definitions. The term “damage” has a wide meaning. It means any type of detri-

mental effect. It therefore includes loss and injury. Not all damage is legally relevant damage for the purposes of this Book. The meaning of “legally relevant damage” – a key term – is explained below. A “claim” is a demand for something based on the assertion of a right. A “claimant” is a person who makes, or who has grounds for making, a claim. The words “claim” and “claimant” do not presuppose legal proceedings. This Book is concerned with the substantive law on non-contractual liability for damage. Most reparation claims are never the subject of legal proceedings. For this reason, and also because they are or were technical terms of particular legal systems, words like “plaintiff”, “pursuer”, “defendant” and “defender” are not used in the model rules of this Book. Some other key terms (“economic and non-economic loss”, “reparation”, “compensation”, “person”) are, like “legally relevant damage”, discussed below. 4. The injured person’s perspective. Paragraph (1) is formulated in terms of a right and thus from the perspective of the injured person. That appeared a more straightforward approach than the one adopted in most of the current laws, which are constructed from the viewpoint of the injuring person. Furthermore, in the formulation chosen here the notion that liability for damage lies at the centre of this branch of the law is given more explicit expression. Finally, the formulation underlines the basic distribution of the burden of proof: the injured person must as a rule set out and prove all the facts founding the claim. 5. Economic and non-economic loss. The term “legally relevant damage” encompasses losses both of an economic and of a non-economic type, and in some cases injury as such. See further Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) paragraph (1). 6. Damage and reparation. The basic rule draws a distinction between the concept of legally relevant damage and the reparation for that damage. The grounds of accountability (intention, negligence, and responsibility for a source of danger) are addressed in Chapter 3. They relate to the legally relevant damage (see in particular Article 3:101 (Intention) and Article 3:102 (Negligence)), which for its part may take the form of either an injury or a loss (stated in more detail in Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage)). The details on this point are to be found in Chapter 2. The form and amount of reparation and (in the case of an infringement of an interest which is allocated to multiple parties) the question of the person or persons to whom reparation should be made are governed by Chapter 6. Article 4:101(2) (General rule [on causation]) makes it 244

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clear that in the case of personal injury and death the predisposition of the victim is to be disregarded even if this could not be foreseen by the injuring person. 7. Reparation and compensation. The term “reparation” encompasses generically all legal redress which serves the function of making amends for a damage which has already occurred. “Compensation” is used for reparation taking the specific form of a monetary payment. “Compensation” is therefore merely a special case of “reparation”. 8. Grounds of accountability. The provision brings together in one norm liability for intention, liability for negligence and liability where neither intention nor negligence on the part of the responsible person are a precondition. The expression “grounds of accountability” is used here as well as later as an umbrella term embracing both the potential for liability on account of intentionally causing damage or negligence on the one hand and the potential for liability on account of responsibility for a source of danger on the other. Forms of liability derived from rebuttable presumptions of negligence systematically still belong to the regime of liability for negligence. Certainly negligence in that case need not be proved, so that de facto there may be liability when the responsible person is not at fault but cannot prove that. However, liability is so constructed by the norms of the legal system that negligence in such a case is to be regarded as made out unless the contrary is proved. 9. Grounds of accountability and causation. The formulation also makes it explicit that where there is not even negligence, but the responsible person is nonetheless liable, it cannot normally be said that the responsible person has caused the damage. Rather that person is accountable for the causation of the damage. An example would be where an employer is vicariously liable for damage caused by an employee, but in the absence of a breach of the duty to supervise the employee it cannot be said that the employer caused the damage; it was the employee who caused it. Strictly understood, the requirement of causation therefore emerges in two different contexts: it connects (i) intentional or negligent conduct, on the one hand, and legally relevant damage, on the other, and it connects (ii) a source of danger for which a person is accountable by law (i. e. without intention or negligence) on the one hand and the damage resulting from the realisation of that danger on the other. This is the reason for the formulation of the second alternative of paragraph (1) (“or is otherwise accountable for the causation of the damage”). In the latter context accountability for an occurrence by which damage is caused stems in particular from the conduct of a person (in the example already given, an employee) or from a thing or an animal under the responsible person’s (ostensible) control. That a causal connection is required between the conduct of the person or the materialisation of the potential for danger inherent in the thing, on the one hand, and the damage sustained, on the other, is repeated in the provisions of Chapter 3, Section 2 and in Chapter 4. 10. Omissions. An express distinction between liability for positive acts and liability for omissions is not included because it is not required. These cases are not fundamentally distinguished either at the level of negligence or the level of causation (see further the comments to Article 3:102 (Negligence) and Article 4:101 (General rule [on causation]). Furthermore, omissions to act can also lead to the intentional causation of damage (on 245

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which point see the comments to Article 3:101 (Intention)). Moreover, for liability imposed irrespective of conduct falling short of the required standard of care, any such distinction (i. e. between omissions and positive acts) as a starting point entirely misses what is at the heart of this form of liability. It operates independently of any conduct on the part of the responsible person. 11. Burden of proof. Article 1:101 presupposes the basic rule that the injured person has to set out and, if need be, prove the requirements which have to be satisfied if there is to be a right to reparation. Exceptions from this basic and implicit rule on the burden of proof are specifically mentioned in the provisions which follow. By contrast, it falls to the injuring person to set out and prove the existence of a ground of defence. The basic rule consequently provides that each side must set out, and as the case requires prove, the circumstances founded on by that side. That this basic rule has not been adopted in the express wording of the Article is explained by the fact that it is not limited to the law on non-contractual liability; the principle is of general application. 12. Natural and legal persons. Where the text speaks of “a person” or “another” or their cognates, or invokes similar formulations, then, so far as nothing else is expressly designated (as is done in Article 2:201 (Personal injury and consequential loss), in Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third parties as a result of another’s personal injury or death) and in Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy)), these terms are always to be understood as meaning both natural and legal persons. See DCFR Definitions – “person” means a natural or legal person – and Article 1:103 (Scope of application) subparagraph (b). 13. Liability under public law not covered. However, the liability of natural and legal persons subject to public law arising out of the exercise of a public function is not regulated; see Article 7:202 (Public law functions and court proceedings). In Article 5:201 (Authority conferred by law) in any case, however, there is a ground of defence if legally relevant damage is caused with authority conferred by law.

B.

How the basic rule works

14. A single cause of action. According to the concept of this draft every claim to reparation under the law on non-contractual liability must satisfy the requirements of paragraph (1) of Article 1:101(Basic rule). There are no exceptions. In every case it is necessary to assess whether (i) the claimant has suffered a legally relevant damage, (ii) there is a ground of accountability in relation to the person against whom the claim is made, and (iii) the damage has been caused by an act or omission for which that person must answer by reason of negligence or intention or responsibility for a source of danger. 15. Article 1:103(a) (Scope of application). Furthermore, Article 1:103(a) (Scope of application) makes it clear that Article 1:101(1) must always be read in conjunction with the following Articles (The reason why this provision is not to be found in Article 1:101 itself is purely a matter of drafting: the rule also applies to Article 1:102 (Prevention)). 246

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Those following Articles furnish in particular an exhaustive statement of what is to be understood by the terms ‘legally relevant damage’ (Chapter 2), ‘grounds of accountability’ (Chapter 3) and ‘causation’ (Chapter 4). Article 1:103(a) also helps to entrench Article 1:101 within the exhaustive regime built up by the further Chapters of this Part. Liability under Article 1:101(1) exists only as provided for by the following Articles – in particular, therefore, only in accordance with the provisions of Chapters 5 to 7. Thus it is settled that every one of the following provisions – and above all the provisions on grounds of defence and the consequences of liability – obtains its effectiveness only within the framework of the basic rule. The circumstance, for example, that a person has wilfully caused damage to another does not necessarily subject that person as a consequence to an obligation to make reparation. It is always open to that person to invoke one of the numerous grounds of defence, which incidentally are applicable generally to all three grounds of liability (and thus also to liability without intention or negligence). 16. No general clause. Article 1:101(1) is thus on the one hand clearly a foundation for a claim. On the other hand it is not self-sufficient: rights are derived from it only with the aid of provisions beyond the confines of this rule, which is both fleshed out and limited by the following Articles. In other words, what we have here is not a general clause in the strict sense, but rather a provision whose component elements are later filled out with more precise content. That does not exclude the prospect that, alongside others with sharply drawn contours, the following Articles may contain rules which have deliberately been left open and flexible. Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) and Article 4:101 (General rule [on causation]) provide examples of this. 17. No liability beyond the boundaries of the following provisions. It is not possible to support liability on the basis of Article 1:101 alone where this would extend beyond the boundaries pegged out by the following Articles. Illustration 1 While parking her friend’s (F’s) vehicle in a car park, H damages O’s parked car. In order to establish a claim against H under Article 1:101, O must establish that (i) he has suffered a legally relevant damage, (ii) that H is accountable for it and (iii) either that H has caused the damage intentionally or negligently or that H is otherwise accountable for the causation of the damage. That follows from the wording of Article 1:101(1). By virtue of Article 1:103(a) (Scope of application), whether O has suffered a legally relevant damage primarily falls to be assessed under Article 2:101(1)(a) (Meaning of legally relevant damage) in accordance with Article 2:206 (Loss upon infringement of property) (The answer is, of course, affirmative). As regards the issue of accountability, Article 1:103(a) points to Article 3:101 (Intention) or Article 3:102 (Negligence). If we suppose that H did not mean to cause the damage, accountability would nonetheless be established if H failed to exercise the care required in parking the car. The analysis then turns in accordance with Article 1:103(a) to causation, i. e. to Article 4:101 (General rule [on causation]). The question which claims to reparation O is able to assert (and for what amount of compensation) is answered, in accordance with Article 1:103(a), by the provisions of Chapter 6 and more particularly Section 2 of that Chapter. 247

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Illustration 2 The solution follows basically the same scheme if it is assumed (for whatever reason) that H has acted neither intentionally nor negligently. In this scenario, however, the question whether O has suffered a legally relevant damage must be assessed in accordance with Article 1:101(2) by reference to Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles). The answer is in the affirmative because this case relates to property damage within the meaning of that provision (Article 3:206, as compared with Article 2:206, invokes a narrower concept of legally relevant damage). Finally, it must be established whether H is otherwise accountable for the damage (paragraph (1) of the basic rule). That question must be examined in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 3, Section 2 (Accountability without intention or negligence). The answer is in the negative because H is not a “keeper” of the car (Article 3:208 (Control and use)). The claim would however be successful if directed against F as he is accountable for the causation of the damage by the motor vehicle. Whether O’s claim ought to be reduced is a matter for Article 5:102(4) (Contributory fault and accountability). Illustration 3 The facts are as in illustration 1, except that H parked her own car and was not attending to her own affairs, but intended instead to make purchases on behalf of the F family, for whom she works as a childminder. In issue is the liability of Mr and Mrs F, neither of whom were negligent in the supervision of H. The test for legally relevant damage is the same as in illustration 1. That follows from Article 1:101(2) in conjunction with Article 3:201 (Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives), because this latter Article contains no particularities with regard to the presence of legally relevant damage. Mr and Mrs F have not caused the damage (that was done by H), but under Article 1:101(1) (third limb: “or who is otherwise accountable for the damage”) in conjunction with Article 3:201 that fact does not preclude liability. Mr and Mrs F are jointly liable under Article 1:103(a) in conjunction with Article 6:105 (Solidary liability). Illustration 4 While out on a day’s shoot, J rests his loaded weapon, for a moment unattended, against a tree. A usurps possession of the weapon and fires off a shot. X is fatally injured and dies on the spot. Ascertaining non-contractual liability begins, as always and without exception, with Article 1:101(1). X himself suffered no legally relevant damage (The case would have been different if he died only after some interval of time, e. g. after admission at a hospital: Article 2:201 (Personal injury and consequential loss)). The legally relevant damage suffered by those X leaves behind is determined by Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third parties as a result of another’s personal injury or death). As regards accountability, J has infringed either a statutory requirement to take care in handling weapons or a general duty to take care (Article 3:102 (Negligence)). In determining that there was negligence it is immaterial whether J’s conduct is characterised as one of positive act (the placing of the loaded weapon in an unguarded location) or omission (failure to supervise the loaded weapon). However, J is not liable to those X has left behind for the damage suffered if A shot X intentionally and J had no reason to suppose that that 248

Article 1:101: Basic rule

sort of eventuality could happen (Article 1:103(a) in conjunction with Article 4:101 (General rule [on causation]: the murder cannot be regarded as the consequence of J’s negligence). The outcome would be no different if there were a strict liability for weapons (see Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage)). In that case too the element of causation would still be missing. Illustration 5 A is carrying out building work on her land which, on one particular occasion, results in a minor gathering of dust. A little dust settles on the car of B, a neighbour of A’s. B has no claim to reparation for the costs incurred in finding a garage with a car-wash facility; the damage is trivial (Article 1:103(a) in conjunction with Article 6:102 (De minimis rule)). Were repetitions of this incident with more pronounced deposits of dust to be envisaged over a long term, B could then demand preventative relief (Article 1:102 (Prevention) in conjunction with Article 6:301 (Prevention in general)), according to the circumstances conceivably even a reasonable outlay at A’s own cost for the protection of the car against further soiling if another parking place is not usually available (Article 1:102 in conjunction with Article 1:103(a), Article 2:206 (Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession) and Article 6:302 (Liability for loss in preventing damage)).

Notes I.

General

1.

There is at present no provision which in its wording precisely corresponds to Article 1:101. The substance of Article 1:101 is nonetheless common property in Europe. It is the purpose of the formulation presented in Article 1:101 to bring together this common substance in one unifying concept and wording. The basic norms on legal liability in the codifications and the Nordic statutes on damages are for the most part formulated from the perspective of the party responsible for the damage and not from the perspective of the party who suffers it. They take pains in their formulation to operate on the basis of a notion of fault. Only the newer codifications include a pointer to strict liability within their basic norm. In many countries such liability developed outside the codes, partly on the basis of case law and partly on the basis of special legislation. Moreover, the Common Law developed on the basis of a multitude of particular torts and not on the foundation of a basic norm.

II.

Structures and formulations of the existing basic rules

2.

As already stated in the introduction, the Codes of the nineteenth century made do throughout with very broad principles. The Code Napoléon (the BELGIAN, FRENCH and LUXEMBOURGIAN CC) distinguishes between délits (intentional delicts) (CC art. 1382) and quasi-délits (delicts committed negligently) (CC art. 1383), but this distinction no longer fulfils any major role today. In substance there is a single legal rule consisting of the three elements faute, dommage and causalité. The same is also true for

249

Chapter 1: Fundamental provisions MALTA (CC arts. 1031-1033). The SPANISH CC (which, however, only applies to delicts which do not constitute crimes; see CC art. 1092) merged arts. 1382 and 1383 of the Code Napoléon in a single provision (CC art. 1902). Also resembling the Code Napoléon to a large extent is the text of AUSTRIAN CC § 1295(1) (“Every person is

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

250

entitled to demand the reparation of damage from the person who with fault has inflicted it; the damage may be caused by a breach of contractual duty or without relation to a contract”). As set out in the Introduction at B11, the tort laws of Central Eastern Europe follow without exception the approach of the Romance legal systems and thus confine themselves in principle to a general clause (CZECH and SLOVAKIAN CC § 420; HUNGARIAN CC § 339(1); POLISH CC art. 415; SLOVENIAN LOA § 131(1)). Western Europe’s Codes of the twentieth century formulated their foundation norms more restrictively. The GERMAN BGB structured itself around infringements of “absolute” rights (CC § 823(1)), infringements of protective statutory provisions (CC § 823(2)) and intentionally caused harm upon infringements of gute Sitten (CC § 826). The PORTUGUESE Civil Code (CC art. 483(1)) also sets out in a similar manner. The provision focuses on liability for intentional or negligent infringements of rights and a corresponding rule for infringement of protective statutory provisions. The ITALIAN legislator formulated CC art. 2043 in a broad way similar to the French or Spanish, but in CC art. 2043 one finds in the concept of danno ingiusto an Italian speciality with a powerful effect on the development of the case law. The text of DUTCH CC art. 6:162 has already been reproduced in the introduction to this Chapter (no. B9). The provision forms a bridge to some extent between the German and the French models of codification. The legislative approach of the BALTIC States varies considerably: (see the Introduction at B12) Whereas the ESTONIAN LOA clearly borrows from the German model, it is evident that LATVIA and LITHUANIA follow the Romance concept of a general clause. In the NORDIC systems the “culpa-rule” takes over the function of a basic tort law norm. In Denmark the rule is part of the common law (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 29). In Finland and Sweden in contrast the rule has been formulated in the statutes on damages (SWEDISH Damages Liability Act of 2 June 1972 chap. 2 § 1 reads: “A person who intentionally or negligently causes damage to persons or property must compensate for this damage in so far as this statute makes no other provision”). The corresponding FINNISH text (Damages Liability Act 1974 chap. 2 § 1(1) (Skadeståndslag)) reads: “A person who intentionally or negligently causes another damage must make reparation for that damage unless statute provides otherwise.” Thus here too the elements of accountability (intention or negligence), damage and causation re-surface. The limitations relate partly to the special treatment of pure economic losses but partly also (and more importantly) to the special treatment of insured risks. In the modern COMMON LAW, although it has a younger ancestry, the tort of negligence is placed in the centre point of its law on liability. This too is made up from the elements of breach of duty of care, damage and causation, and one may proceed on the footing that wherever there is liability on grounds of breach of duty of care there is necessarily also liability in cases of intentionally causing damage. The demarcation of the substantive area of application of the tort of negligence in relation to other torts has become increasingly difficult. Nevertheless the English and Irish tort laws continue to

Article 1:101: Basic rule

8.

the present day to be based on a large set of particular grounds of liability, rather than on a single basic rule. IRISH law too differentiates between negligence (or carelessness) as a pillar of fault and the (independent) tort of negligence. According to recent case law, especially following the Supreme Court cases of Glencar Explorations plc. v. Mayo County Council (No. 2) [2002] 1 IR 84 and Fletcher v. Commissioners of Public Works [2003] IESC 13, [2003] 1 IR 465, Irish law has adopted, in principle the same structure as that prevailing in English law. The notion of negligence is also a central feature of the SCOTS law of delict. Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562, the decision which established it for the modern law, was a Scottish case and its aftermath contributed much to the harmonisation of the English and Scots laws on non-contractual liability for damage. Generally the differences in the modern law of torts in England and Ireland on the one side and the Scots law of delict on the other tend to be peripheral (summarised in von Bar, Common European Law of Torts I, nos. 299-301). However, the basic systematic concept is different. The Scots law of delict stems from a basic norm of delictual liability, as it does in all Civil Law legal systems, and not from a multitude of co-existing torts which are basically independent of one another. The CYPRUS Civil Wrongs Law s. 51(1) defines negligence as consisting of causing damage by “doing some act which in the circumstances a reasonable, prudent person would not do or failing to do some act which in the circumstances such a person would do”.

III.

Wrongfulness as a prerequisite for liability

9.

The wording of Article 1:101 does not employ the concept of wrongfulness which is a requisite for the imposition of liability in tort law in several European jurisdictions. Above all, this notion is employed in § 823(1) and subsequent provisions of the GERMAN CC (e. g. § 831), where unlawfulness is determined before fault or culpability, and fault, in turn, is regarded as an umbrella term for intention and negligence. Wrongfulness as a discrete requisite of liability, required to be considered prior to the examination of fault, is also expressly postulated by the PORTUGUESE CC art. 483(1) (“A person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully violates the rights of another person”) and in DUTCH CC art. 6:162. It is not expressly mentioned in the basic norm of AUSTRIAN tort law (CC § 1295(1)). However, the ABGB does refer to “wrongful” in an array of other provisions (inter alia CC § 1294); the judiciary and prevailing legal opinion consequently concur that, in the Austrian legal system, wrongfulness is a required independent ingredient of liability.(Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, 138; see also Rummel (-Reischauer), ABGB II2, § 1294 nos. 6 ff). GREEK CC art. 914 requires that the conduct must have constituted an “unlawful” act, if liability is to be imposed. “Unlawfulness” is, for the most part, equated with the more expansive concept of “wrongfulness” (Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio A(1)2, 257). HUNGARIAN CC § 339(1) states that a person is liable if that person unlawfully inflicts damage on another. This wording does not result in the scope of application of the provision being restricted to those cases in which an “absolute right” of another or a law has been violated. Under the ESTONIAN LOA § 1043 the imposition of liability essentially depends upon (i. e. in the field of liability for intention and negligence), whether the damage was “unlawfully caused”. LOA § 1045 clarifies in detail, when this state of affairs is extant. LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.246 grounds liability, in general terms, on the “performance of actions that are

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10.

11.

12.

13.

252

prohibited by laws or a contract (unlawful acting)”, and LATVIAN CC art. 1635 “every delict, i. e., every wrongful act per se” is deemed sufficient to establish liability, provided that “the infringer ... may be held at fault for such act”. According to the basic tort law norm under ITALIAN law (CC art. 2043) the imposition of liability requires the presence of “wrongful damage” (danno ingiusto). a A fatti illeciti is only referred to in the heading to the Chapter on tort law in the Codice civile and in the provisions governing the imposition of liability for the acts of another (i. e. for children [CC art. 2048] and employees [CC art. 2049]).If a defence can be made out, this is referred to as an esclusione or assenza di antigiuridicità (for a comparison of Italian and German law, Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile3, 18-19, 21). It seems that the concept of wrongfulness as a fundamental element of tortious liability is alien to the COMMON LAW, though the term may be used to describe conduct which amounts to a tort (as in the definition of “wrongful interference [with goods]” in the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, s. 1) or which infringes a right (i. e. interchangeably with ‘unlawfulness’) (cf. Mogul Steamship Co. Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. (1889) 23 QBD 598, 612 (Bowen LJ)). Admittedly a concept of wrongfulness was articulated in dicta in earlier case law, equating it with a requirement that a legal right be violated: consider the dicta of Lushington, giving the opinion of the Privy Council in Rogers v. Rajendro Dutt (1860) 13 Moore PC 208, 15 ER 78: “the foundation of every action of tort [...] is an act wrongful, and which may be qualified legally as an injury”; “It is essential to an action in tort that the act complained of should under the circumstances be legally wrongful as regards the party complaining; that is, it must prejudicially affect him in some legal right; merely that it will, however directly, do a man harm in his interests, is not enough.” Such statements, however, have long since been overtaken by the development of the law of negligence, which turns on breach of a duty of care causing damage without any special qualification of the nature of the defendant’s act or omission. Questions of interference with the claimant’s property (e. g. in trespass) turn on a demarcation of property rights or the existence of justification (e. g. lawful authority), just as the tort of unlawful interference with another’s economic interests turns on the “unlawfulness” of the means used, while a specifically ‘wrongful’ state of mind (e. g. malice in the tort of malicious falsehood or negating qualified privilege in the law of defamation) is addressed in its own specific terms pertinent to the tort in question. The concept of wrongfulness is also foreign to BELGIAN, FRENCH, LUXEMBOURGIAN and MALTESE law. In a similar fashion, SPANISH CC art. 1902, POLISH CC art. 415, SLOVENIAN LOA § 131(1), CZECH and SLOVAKIAN CC’s § 420 as well as the applicable basic norms of the NORDIC countries have refrained from adopting this ingredient for the imposition of liability (see for a detailed comparative legal analysis von Bar, Common European Law of Torts II, nos. 211-219). In POLAND, however, case law and academic analysis take the view that a person can only be at “fault” if that person has done something unlawful and consequently either the element of wrongfulness is to be read into the notion of fault in CC art. 415 or it constitutes an independent requirement for liability (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania-cze˛s´c´ ogólna5, 180181). Quite what “wrongfulness” means in detail, how it is to ascertained and what significance it should bear within the system of liability are all matters on which there is no consensus even within the legal systems which recognise this requirement (Koziol, Unification of Tort Law: Wrongfulness, 129; Weir, [1999] CLJ 643-645). The only

Article 1:101: Basic rule

14.

common denominator is the notion that a person acts wrongfully if that person infringes a mandatory duty or a prohibition of the legal system. The further particularisation of that proposition, however, varies and is a matter of debate within the jurisdictions concerned (see, for example, for POLAND Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zaniacze˛´sc´ ogólna5, 184-185, on the one hand and Wiercin´ ski, Niemaja˛tkowa ochrona czci, 145-149, on the other) as much as in comparative discussions between them. To date, in particular, no agreement has been reached on whether the adjudication of wrongfulness should predominantly derive from the fact that a negative “result” has been caused (this view is still preferred, incidentally, by the courts in GERMANY [BGH 12 July 1996, NJW 1996, 3205, 3207] and in GREECE [A. P. 417/1974, NoB 22/1974, 1391; CA Athens 3114/1977, NoB 26/1978, 235]; in HUNGARY the issue of wrongfulness relates to the damage that has been caused, it does not appertain to the violation of an absolute right.) or whether it derives from the fact that the relevant act did not satisfy the requirements pertaining to the duty of care in the applicable legal system (the latter view is prevalent in e. g. AUSTRIAN law [Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, 140]). According to the “result orientated” notion of wrongfulness which has flourished in Germany, every infringement of a right or a protected legal interest enumerated in the German CC § 823(1) by a positive act automatically entails wrongfulness; conduct that realises the elements of the statutory provision “indicates” wrongfulness (the law pertaining to the establishment and operation of a commercial enterprise and the general law pertaining to the legal protection of the personality are exceptions to this rule). According to the opposing “conduct orientated” theory, on the other hand, an unintentional violation of a right or legally protected interest is only regarded as wrongful, if the actor infringes a specific norm of conduct set out in the relevant legal provision or if the actor has failed to heed the due care required to avoid the onset of damage (cf. for schools of thought, Palandt (-Thomas), BGB65, § 823 nos. 32 ff; instructive Larenz and Canaris, Schuldrecht II(2)13, § 75 II 3, which embodies an attempt to combine the two opposing theories, basing their approach on a distinction between a direct violation of and an indirect interference with the rights or interests of another; moreover, a quite similar approach is taken in Greece Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio A (1)2, 263; Stathopoulos, FS Larenz 1983, 631, 641; Roussos, EllDik 35/1994, 1492, 1494). In respect of indicated or ascertained wrongfulness, invoking a ground of justification may serve to negative wrongfulness. The burden of proof lies on the defendant to make out this defence (Erman (-Schiemann=, BGB I10, § 823 no. 146). Similarly, in GREECE the correct interpretation of the element of wrongfulness anchored in the basic norm CC art. 914 (for an in-depth analysis see Eleftheriadou, Die Haftung aus Verkehrspflichtverletzung im deutschen und griechischen Deliktsrecht, 60) is a matter of dispute. Relying on the paradigm of art. 1382 of the French CC, it is even debated whether wrongfulness is indeed a prerequisite for the imposition of liability (on this aspect, chiefly Vavouskos, I paraleipsis os simiogono gegonos eis ta adikimata tou Astikou Dikaiou, 61 ff, 83, 88 ff; Vavouskos, FS Michaelides-Nouaros I, 87 ff). In contrast, the prevailing view in academic writing views CC art. 914 as a “Blankettnorm” which is fleshed out by recourse to concepts and principles elsewhere in the legal system (Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio III, 131 ff; Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio A(1)2, 258 ff; Deliyannis, FS Michaelides-Nouaros I, 303, 310 ff). It is deemed sufficient that the conduct is contrary to the general spirit of the legal system (Deliyannis, AID 15/1951-52, 153, 156 ff; A. P. 81/1991 EllDik 32/1991, 1215) or vio-

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15.

16.

lates the obligation of good faith (CA Athens 3114/1977, NoB 26/1978, 235). It is not essential that a specific statutory provision be infringed; in short, if something is not expressly prohibited, it does not automatically entail that it is permitted (Pouliadis, Culpa in Contrahendo, 215; Deliyannis, AID 15/1951-52, 153, 165). Additionally, in a number of legal systems, the significance of the criterion of wrongfulness for the forms of liability unattended by either intention or negligence has yet to be clarified. Those jurisdictions abiding by the requirement of wrongfulness, also characteristically recognise related “grounds of justification”. These serve to negative the finding of wrongfulness, typically made out (indicated) when an absolute right or protective law has been infringed. For the most part, these grounds of justification are construed as grounds of defence for all types of tortious conduct (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, 168). Typical grounds of defence are self-help (e. g. PORTUGUESE CC art. 336; GERMAN CC § 229; GREEK CC art. 282; ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(2)(iv)), self-defence (PORTUGUESE CC art. 337; GERMAN CC § 227; GREEK CC art. 284; POLISH CC art. 423; ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(2)(iii); HUNGARIAN CC § 343), emergency (PORTUGUESE CC art. 339; GERMAN CC §§ 228, 904; GREEK CC arts. 285 and 286; POLISH CC art. 424; ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(2)(iii), HUNGARIAN CC § 107) and the consent of the injured person (PORTUGUESE CC art. 340; ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(2)(ii); HUNGARIAN CC § 342(2)). Frequently, additional grounds of justification are put forward such as e. g. if the right to cause damage derives from the exercise of a right or the performance of a legal obligation (ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(2) (i); Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 552 ff and Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 519 ff). A distinguishing feature of legal systems which have elevated the criterion of “wrongfulness” to an independent requisite for the imposition of liability, is ultimately their focus on the protection of “absolute rights” under tort law (see, with regard to GERMANY CC § 823(1); for AUSTRIA Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, 148, see for the examination of the wording of the statute and its being modelled on French CC art. 1382 also Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VII2, § 1293 no. 2; for PORTUGAL CC art. 483(1); for ESTONIA LOA § 1045(1) and for the NETHERLANDS CC art. 6:162(2)). These rights are denoted as absolute because such rights are valid against all persons. Consequently, infringing such rights is “wrongful”, provided that a “ground of justification” for their violation is absent. As far as the legal systems just mentioned are concerned, the second repository from whence a judgment of wrongfulness can emanate, is in the infringement of a law intended to protect the injured party (GERMAN CC § 823(2); GREEK CC art. 914; PORTUGUESE CC art. 483(1); DUTCH CC art. 6:162(2); AUSTRIAN CC § 1311 second sentence; ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(1)(vii)). Third, a wrongful act is constituted by the (intentional) transgression of “bonos mores” (GERMAN CC § 826; GREEK CC art. 919; AUSTRIAN CC § 1295(2); ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(1)(viii); CZECH and SLOVAKIAN CC § 424) or in the violation of “a rule of unwritten law pertaining to proper social conduct” (DUTCH CC art. 6:162(2)).

IV.

Fault, intention and negligence

17.

The basic norms of tort law contained in the Codes of CIVIL LAW jurisdictions and in the NORDIC countries are dominated by the concept of liability for “fault”. Equally, this notion has been frequently qualified as “fundamental” by the courts (see e. g. in respect

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of SPAIN TS 8 April 1992, RAJ 1992, no. 3187 p. 4202, 4. recital). Conversely, in the jurisdictions of the COMMON LAW, this concept has not attained a corresponding significance. The use of the notion of “fault” is even characteristically shunned. ENGLISH and IRISH legislatures have only employed the concept of fault within the parameters of contributory negligence (see Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 s. 1(1)). Under the codified tort law of the Civil law jurisdictions, whenever a requisite of liability is to prove that the defendant has conducted himself “culpably” or that he or she was “at fault” (e. g. DUTCH CC art. 6:162(3); GERMAN CC § 823(2); AUSTRIAN CC § 1295(1); SPANISH CC art. 1902; GREEK CC art. 914; POLISH CC art. 415; ESTONIAN LOA §§ 1043 and 1050; LATVIAN CC art. 1635; SLOVENIAN LOA § 131(1)), the choice of word employed is representative throughout as an umbrella term for intention and negligence (see inter alia AUSTRIAN CC § 1294; LATVIAN CC art. 1640; LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.248(2) and SLOVENIAN LOA § 135). This remains the case even if the particular basic norm does not expressly refer to intention (see e. g. SPANISH CC arts. 1093 in association with 1902 [despite the failure of CC art. 1902 to refer to dolo, it is generally accepted that dolo is embraced by the notion of culpa: Lacruz Berdejo and Rivero Hernández, Elementos II(2)4, 471]; for the corresponding legal position in POLAND see Czachórski, Zobowia˛zania9, 212). For the most part, the Codes in Civil Law jurisdictions (as in Article 1:101(1)) employ the notions of intention and negligence concomitantly (e. g. in GERMAN CC § 823(1); ITALIAN CC art. 2043; PORTUGUESE CC art. 483(1); BELGIAN, FRENCH and LUXEMBOURGIAN CC arts. 1382 [ faute] and 1383 [négligence, imprudence]; SWEDISH and FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 2 § 1). In addition, it is a universal principle that the same legal consequences attend the varying manifestations of fault. In respect of the tortfeasor’s liability, at the outset, it is of no consequence, whether the tortfeasor acted with slight or grave fault or whether he acted with intent. Uniquely, the argument has occasionally been advance in FRENCH legal writing that there exists a fundamental difference between liability on the grounds of intention and liability based on negligence, and it has been submitted that this distinction derives from the différences de régime, see. e. g. Mazeaud and Chabas, Leçons de droit civil II(1)9, no. 444 p. 451). In contrast, the HUNGARIAN CC eschews the word “fault”. The basic norm does not literally speak of “blameworthiness”, but it is uniformly construed as if that requirement were included in the article. A person already acts in a blameworthy manner merely by failing to conduct himself as expected; moreover, blameworthiness is rebuttably presumed (CC § 339(1) second sentence). The practical importance of the distinction between causing harm intentionally or negligently (in respect of the substantive requirements of these concepts, see the Notes to Article 3:101 (Intention) and Article 3:102 (Negligence)) is clearly of less significance in private law than in criminal law. Nonetheless, its relevance in the private law context should not be underestimated. This assertion is at the very least valid in the field of remedies (see for a contrary view to many commentators Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht III10, no. 72 pp. 83-84). A prime example can be found in PORTUGUESE CC art. 494, whereby the obligation to make reparation for the damage that has already occurred can be reduced in its extent in cases of negligence (negligência respectively mera culpa). The discretion of the courts to reduce the quantum of damages is exercised on an equitable basis. However, this option is not available where the

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damage is intentionally inflicted (dolo) and the tortfeasor is then obliged to compensate the full extent of the damage (see further Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, 475, note 9 to art. 483). In cases where the damage has been intentionally inflicted, HUNGARIAN CC § 360(4) extends the limitation period to 5 years. Moreover, the distinction between intentional and negligent infliction of damage can be of particular significance in relation to discrete injurious acts. This is due to the fact that there is an array of ad hoc statutory provisions which expressly stipulate intention as a requisite of liability. Prime examples include ingredients of the causes of action addressing the intentional infliction of damage contrary to the tenets of good faith (GERMAN CC § 826; AUSTRIAN CC § 1295(2); GREEK CC art. 919; ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(1)(viii); CZECH and SLOVAKIAN CC § 424) (DUTCH CC art. 6:162(2) does not have the requisite of intention: art. 6:162(3)). As far as SPANISH law is concerned, additional regard must be had to the fact that many intentional torts are also crimes and that criminal liability is regulated in the Criminal Code and not under the Civil Code (CC art. 1092). Similarly, in the NORDIC countries the distinction between intention and negligence is rarely of significance (Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 124; Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 52). It can be ascribed importance, much in the same manner as in the other States, where the liability of joint tortfeasors is concerned (see the note under Article 4:102 (Collaboration)) (Hellner and Johansson loc. cit. 247 ff), likewise in the field of contributory negligence in cases of personal injury sustained by the claimant (SWEDISH Damages Liability Act chap. 1 § 1(6)). The lines of demarcation are not delineated according to whether intent or negligence is at issue, but rather are construed according to, on the one hand, intention and gross negligence and on the other, between what is often called ordinary or slight negligence. The same holds true for the regulation anchored in the DANISH Damages Act (Erstatningsansvarslov, EAL) § 19(2). According to this provision, private persons are liable for the damage that they have caused to insured things of another only in the event that the damage was caused intentionally or by gross negligence. In this manner, employees are frequently safeguarded from the imposition of personal liability. Moreover, under Scandinavian law, the distinction between intention and negligence can attain importance (and incidentally also elsewhere) in the law relating to liability for pure economic loss. The point of departure is that pure economic loss is principally only recoverable if the requirement that it be caused through a crime is satisfied. This requirement connotes that mostly intention is required. There are, however, numerous exceptions to this principle. They include inter alia, the general prohibition on chicanery, which for its part, figures e. g. in respect of blockades during industrial action (Hellner and Johansson loc. cit. 72 with further particulars.). An additional example can be discovered in the law relating to the abuse of a dominant position (on this point see SWEDISH Competition Act [Konkurrenslagen 1993:20] § 33). See also the DANISH case on the prohibition of chicanery HD 8 May 1952, UfR 1953, 360 and in general Vinding Kruse loc. cit. 131 and the following for further particulars. The COMMON LAW recognises a whole array of “intentional torts”. Within the confines of these torts “intention” frequently merely connotes that the tortfeasor was desirous of acting in that manner. It is unnecessary that the tortfeasor should also have acted in the knowledge that his conduct was tortious. It does not even always have to be shown that the defendant intended to cause actual harm. Intentional torts in this sense

Article 1:101: Basic rule

23.

by no means always require “fault” on the actor’s part in the sense of the terminology employed by Civil Law jurisdictions. This is only a requirement of the “malicious torts”. Negligence, even gross negligence, is not regarded as equating to moral blameworthiness, which has no direct bearing on liability in tort: see Lang v. London Transport Executive [1959] 1 WLR 1168, 1172 (Havers J). The intentional torts are divided into torts to the person and torts to the property. Trespass to the person means direct and intentional acts of interference by the defendant with the person of the plaintiff. The main examples of this are battery, assault, false imprisonment and the infliction of emotional suffering. Assault is an act by the defendant which places the plaintiff in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery; it is neither dependant on the intentions of the defendant towards the plaintiff, nor on whether or not the defendant actually meant to carry out the threat. Assault can also include domestic violence (Street (-Brazier and Murphy), Torts10, 34-36). Battery is the direct application of physical contact upon the person of another without his or her consent (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 618-621; Wilson v. Pringle [1987] QB 237, 252 [Croom-Johnson J.: “an intentional touching or contact in one form or another of the plaintiff by the defendant”]). The intentional or reckless inflicting of emotional suffering also amounts to a tort. The IRISH courts still apply the rationale in Wilkinson v. Downton [1897] 2 QB 57, where liability was imposed on the basis that the defendant had wilfully done an act calculated to cause physical harm to the plaintiff. In ENGLAND and WALES this is now regulated by the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, ss. 3 and 7(3). Trespass to land, on the other hand, is understood as the intentional or negligent entering on to or remaining on land in the possession of another without lawful jurisdiction (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 653-673). The intentional possession of the chattels of another party will also lead to a tort, see for ENGLAND and WALES the Tort (Interference with Goods) Act, 1977. Torts can arise in the conversion of chattels – any act to chattels of another party that continues an unjustified denial of title, the wrong delivery of chattels or in the wrongful failure of a person in possession of a chattel to deliver it to the person entitled to immediate possession (Street (-Brazier and Murphy), Torts10, 46-67). Furthermore, the common law recognises a strand of “malicious torts”. The main elements of a malicious tort are that the defendant intentionally commits a wrongful act which necessarily produces harm. The defendant must know of that harm or must reasonably be aware that such conduct would lead to injury and act accordingly without just cause. Malicious torts generally arise in relation to defamation, slander, libel, invasions of privacy, disclosure and fraud. Other examples include the malicious abuse of process and malicious prosecution (see generally McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 981-990 for IRELAND and Street (-Brazier and Murphy), Torts10, 491-500 for ENGLAND and WALES). Another category of malicious torts is that of injurious falsehood, which may be understood as the slander of title or of goods, or false statements which are aimed at injuring the trade of a person (see for ENGLAND and WALES Lord Davey in Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Wright Crossley (1901) 18 RPC 95, 99; and for IRELAND Defamation Act 1961, s. 20). Finally, malice can be of relevance where the defendant acts out of spite to cause injury or loss to the plaintiff by means of a nuisance (Christie v. Davey [1893] 1 Ch 316, 327 per North J.; Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd. v. Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468, 475 per Macnaghten J.; Winfield and Jolowicz (-Rogers), Tort14, 412-414; McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 695).

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SCOTLAND, like other civilian law countries, recognises a definite difference between

intentional and negligent delicts. The negligence requirements are largely the same as in the remainder of the British Isles, by virtue of the legacy of Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562, which originated in Scotland. The intentional causation of harm – injuria or damnum injuria datum relates to the aggression of another’s legally protected assets, which can sometimes also infer criminal liability: see generally Walker, Delict2, 164. There is little discussion in Scotland on this topic, primarily due to the fact that it is usually obvious that reparation must be made: “in the absence of privilege, a person is subject to liability if he intentionally invades the interests of personality or reputation ...” (Seavey, 56 [1942] Harv.LR 72, 84). The basic Scots law of delict requires a mental element, an injurious, fraudulent or criminal purpose. Thus, the mental element must be dolus. The main idea is that someone intends a result – the intent is not necessarily a hostile intent to do harm, rather the intent to bring about a result that interferes with the interests of another in a way the law does not allow (Gordon v. Stubbs Ltd. (1895) 3 SLT 10. No proof of intent to hurt is needed, merely a man’s intent will be judged via his conduct (Walker loc. cit. 165). Not desiring to harm is not a defence. The doctrine culpa lata dolo aequiparetur will also apply – wantonness or recklessness will sometimes equate with intent, cf. Clark v. Syme (William) 1957 JC 1, 5 per LJG Clyde (concerning malicious mischief in the criminal law). Issues of remoteness of damage have been less discussed in the context of intentional wrongs – the defender will be liable for the consequences of his conduct, either intended or understood to have been intended by him (Quinn v. Leathem [1901] AC 495, 537 per Lord Lindley).

V.

Strict liability

25.

As previously indicated, the majority of the basic norms of European Civil Codes have adopted the “fault principle” as their point of departure. It is certainly true to state that all of the European legal systems in varying degrees have long developed forms of liability which do not depend on intention or negligence. However (see on this point Chapter III), provisions relating to strict liability either completely fall outside the parameters of the Civil Codes or are, at any rate, predominantly external to the Civil Code. The PORTUGUESE CIVIL CODE was the first in its field to deal with strict liability as part of the basic norms of tort law, albeit in a rudimentary fashion (CC art. 483(2): “Objective liability arises only where expressly provided for in law”). The DUTCH CC art. 6:162(3) appears to have advanced one step further (“A wrongful act (tort) can be imputed to a wrongdoer if he or she is at fault in causing it or from a cause for which he is answerable according to law or based on the fact that it was within his sphere of risk according to the precepts of common understanding”). The proper interpretation of this (as of the time of writing, a provision seemingly devoid of any practical significance) regulation is the subject of much controversy. According to prevailing legal opinion, this provision governs solely the liability of the actor who personally committed the wrongful act. Consequently, according to this interpretation, CC art. 6:162(3) is not understood as a reference to the provisions pertaining to strict liability for damage caused by others, by animals and for things in conjunction with CC art. 6:169; rather the stipulation must be perceived as referring, in particular to CC art. 6:165 (whereby “the fact that a positive act of a person aged of fourteen or older which occurred owing to a mental or physical disability does not preclude liability being

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imposed for the wrongful act”) (Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht III10 no. 86, p. 95). Inexperience leading to the commission of a tort is representative of when a wrongful act is imputed to the tortfeasor based on a contravention of generally accepted societal standards (Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 618). The approach of Article 1:101, namely incorporating strict liability directly into the basic norm is only reciprocated in more recent codifications, namely in the ESTONIAN LOA § 1043 and in SLOVENIAN LOA § 131(3). For the most part, without prejudice to its mounting practical significance, strict liability (for which different conceptual notions are employed; “objective” liability is utilised in part, occasionally, reference is made to “risk based liability or liability for a source of danger” is still regarded as a systematical anomaly, namely constituting an exception to the principle that liability is based on fault. Even the provisions in BELGIAN, FRENCH and LUXEMBOURGIAN CC arts. 1384(2) ff can be originally (and to some extent even today) traced back to the fault principle (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Le fait juridique10 no. 67 p. 62). This is because the provisions were construed as (or they continue to be construed) (either, as the case may be rebuttable or irrebuttable) presumptions of fault (Van Gerven, Verbintenissenrecht II7, 308; Ravarani, La responsabilité civile, no. 515 pp. 394-395). The reinterpretation of CC art. 1384(1) (gardien-liability) which essentially originates from the arrêts Jand’heur decided by the Cour de Cassation (Cass.civ. 21 February 1927, D. 1927, 1, 97; Cass.ch.réun. 13 February 1930, D. 1930, 1, 57) and completed by arrêt Blieck (Cass.ass.plén. 29 March 1991, D. 1991 Jur. 324) have, however, fundamentally realigned matters under FRENCH law. CC art. 1384(1), which was originally never intended according to the scheme of the Code to enjoy any independent significance, today stands on an equal footing with the basic liability regime under CC arts. 1382 and 1383. Nowadays, the assertion can be made that the French courts, in practice, accord considerably more weight to gardien-liability than to liability for intention or negligence. The BELGIAN Cour de Cassation has, however, only partly followed the reinterpretation of CC art. 1384(1) adopted by its French counterpart. In particular, it has refused to derive un principe général de responsabilité du fait d’autrui from a CC art. 1384(1): Cass. 19 June 1997, JT 1997, 582, concl. Avocat général Piret. MALTESE CC only recognises a number of special cases of strict liability; there is no provision which corresponds to French or Italian law. The position is the same in POLISH law. The specific instances of strict liability (CC arts. 430, 433-436, 4491), however, are in effect supplemented by the doctrine of “anonymous fault” under the general norm of liability, enabling outcomes to be achieved which are equivalent to a strict liability (see Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania-cze˛s´c´ ogólna5, 190-191). Simplifying matters considerably, it can be asserted that a comparable development to that which unfolded under French law as outlined above has also succeeded in taking root under SPANISH law. However, it took a different path in as much as the Spanish courts directly resorted to CC art. 1902, the basic norm of Spanish tort law, largely approximating liability for negligence to strict liability. Case law and legal scholarship expressly term this an “objectivisation” of liability (TS 8 April 1992, RAJ 1992 (2) no. 3187 p. 4202; Albaladejo (-Santos Briz), Comentarios al Código Civil y compilaciones forales, XXIV, 433). This was effected not least by reversing the burden of proof in respect of fault (see below Note VI 34) and by the de facto abandonment of the express requirement of culpa in eligendo or educando stipulated by CC art. 1903 (TS 26 January 1990, RAJ 1990 (1) no. 69, 2. recital, p. 115). Modern Spanish liability law may be delineated into three

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subgroups: liability under culpa clásica, liability under culpa cuasi-objetiva and “genuine” objective liability. The first two groups are governed by CC art. 1902; only the third is the subject of specific regulations (within and outside the parameters of the CC): (see further von Bar, Common European Law of Torts II, nos. 360-363). Likewise, ITALIAN case law originally construed CC art. 2051 (liability for damage caused by things under one’s control, custodia) as constituting a rebuttable presumption (presumption juris tantum) that the defendant was negligent. Cass. 20 May 1998, no. 5031, Foro it. 1998, I, 2875 then clarified that strict liability (liability without fault) arises under this provision. HUNGARIAN CC § 345(1) introduced a broad provision with connotations of a general clause concerning strict liability for “dangerous activities”. According to this provision, a person who “carries out an activity with a high risk attached, is obliged to compensate the damage that thereby arises”. The same holds true for activities which are hazardous to the environment. Proof of force majeure will operate to relieve the defendant from liability.

VI.

Burden of proof

29.

While it is true that questions pertaining to how evidence is submitted and evaluated are matters for procedural law, questions raised concerning the burden of proof remain governed by substantive law. Despite the fact that a number of jurisdictions regulate the burden of proof within the parameters of their Civil Procedure Act (e. g. the DUTCH Code of Civil Procedure [Rv] in art. 177, BELGIAN Gerechtelijk Wetboek in art. 870 and the new SPANISCH Civil Procedure Code in art. 217: under all of these regulations, each party involved must generally plead facts in their favour and prove them if required), it is universally recognised on the European stage that the rules pertaining to the burden of proof are part of substantive law. This conclusion derives from the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations (“Rome I”) art. 14. Moreover, PECL assume that all issues pertaining to the allocation of the burden of proof belong to the substantive law, cf. e. g. DCFR III. – 3:104(1) (Excuse due to an impediment) (ex PECL Art. 8:108(1)). In turn, the cardinal principle of the rules relating to the allocation of the burden of proof sets forth that each party must allege and prove each component of a rule that he or she is seeking to rely on. This principle has garnered acceptance in all European jurisdictions and underpins these Principles, in particular Article 1:101(1) and the provisions of Chapter V. This principle is expressly laid down in a number of national Civil Codes. The jurisdictions that have adopted this conceptual approach have generally abstained from placing the rule in Chapters of the Code regulating tort law, rather the principle is positioned in Chapters of the Code, from whence it can be deduced that the rule is imbued with general significance for the entire civil law (e. g. GREEK CC art. 338, PORTUGUESE CC art. 342(1); ITALIAN CC art. 2697; POLISH CC art. 6). Here and there, the national legislatures have deemed it necessary to enact a further general provision confirming this rule within the parameters of liability law (AUSTRIAN CC § 1296: the onus of proof in respect of proving the defendant’s fault rests on the claimant; and PORTUGUESE CC art. 487(1): “The claimant is obliged to prove that the defendant was at fault, save in cases where a presumption of fault applies”) (in respect of the countries which have statutorily provided for a reversal of the onus of proof for fault – the onus then lies on the defendant – cf. forthwith nos. 32 ff).

30.

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31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

The axiom that emerges from the above basic rule, as far as tort law is concerned, is that the plaintiff must plead/establish and prove all of the requirements pertaining to his claim, in particular damage, grounds of liability and causation save where express regulations permit departures from this rule, whereas it is incumbent upon the defendant to show and prove certain requirements which give rise to a ground of defence, thereby displacing the claimant’s assertions (cf. in respect of the latter Chapter V). There are, however, manifold exceptions to the basic rules on the allocation of the burden of proof. These exceptions typically impinge either on the factual basis for the adjudged negligence or causation. In turn, the exceptions to the statutory basic rule are partly predicated on case law alone. The upshot of these exceptions is that they always entail that the defendant’s liability is aggravated. The particulars concerning the stages of development in this process under the relevant national law will, therefore, fall to be examined within the parameters of the relevant substantive law issue (i. e. in respect of the treatment of accountability and the examination of causation). The onus of proof will not be reversed where the question of whether (legally relevant) damage has been sustained calls for determination. The evidential requirements may be relaxed, however, in respect of the extent of recoverable damage. Attenuating liability via the device of the reversal of the burden of proof is a typical feature of CIVIL LAW jurisdictions. Today, in a number of Central and Eastern European States, it is a general tenet derived from statute that the defendant is obliged to exculpate himself, in other words that the burden of proving the defendant’s fault does not lie with the plaintiff, and it is incumbent upon the defendant to prove that he or she behaved correctly (HUNGARIAN CC § 339(1), second sentence; ESTONIAN LOA § 1050(1); SLOVENIAN LOA § 131(1)). Since these rules are of binding effect for tort law in its entirety, they render superfluous special provisions in discrete areas of law, common to other jurisdictions (but here only in exceptional instances), whereby the burden of proving an absence of negligence rests on the defendant. To all intents and purposes, the position in the three legal systems examined above largely reflects the current legal position in SPAIN. Since the late 1950s, the jurisprudence of the Tribunal Supremo has elevated the reversal of the burden of proof in respect of fault to the status of a general rule (TS 30 June 1959, RAJ 1959 no. 2944 p. 1809; cf. For submissions justifying this development see inter alia Lacruz Berdejo and Rivero Hernández, Elementos II(2)4, 476). Essentially, only the liability of medical practitioners and freelancers are excluded from the ambit of this rule; here the plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating that the defendant was at fault (De Ángel Yágüez, Tratado de responsabilidad civil3, 203; TS 24 May 1990, RAJ 1990 [4] no. 3836 p. 5095); an exception to this state of affairs only arises in the case of absolutely disproportionate damage indicative of a gross negligence (TS 2 December 1996, RAJ 1996 [5] no. 8938 p. 12410). For the most part, comparable jurisprudential developments have crystallised in GERMANY. However, in contrast to Spain, this refinement is confined to a limited number of cases. In the field of product liability, the BGH decided in the “Hühnerpest” judgment (BGH 26 November 1968, BGHZ 51, 91, corrected by BGH 17 March 1981, BGHZ 80, 186, 196) that the injured party should have the benefit of the rules pertaining to the burden of proof, given that the negligence of the manufacturer is presumed provided that it can be established that the damage was caused by a defect in the product. Similar developments can be observed in the sphere of environmental liability law (BGH 18 September 1984, BGHZ 92, 143). Where a so-called protective law is infringed (CC

Chapter 1: Fundamental provisions

36.

37.

38.

39.

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§ 823(2)), fault is presumed until refuted provided that the claimant can establish an objective breach of the protective law and furthermore, provided that the protective law prescribes the required conduct in such concrete terms that the realisation of the objective elements of the rule approaches an inference of subjective fault (BGH 19 November 1991, BGHZ 116, 104, 114; BGH 17 January 1984, VersR 1984, 270, 271; cf. regarding limitations BGH 19 November 1991, BGHZ 116, 104, 115). According to ITALIAN law the burden of proving fault lies principally with the injured party (CC art. 2697(1)). However, the breach of a concrete statutory duty of care must be, per se, tantamount to a colpa specifica, a colpa in re ipsa, which requires no further proof (Visintini, I fatti illeciti II2, 68). The only prerequisite is that the violated norm was designed to prevent the damage in question occurring (cf., derived from case law, in particular Cass.sez.un. 22 October 1984, no. 5361, Foro it. 1985, I, 2358; Cass. 9 June 1995, no. 6542, Giur.it. 1996, I, 1, 191; Cass. 13 May 1997, no. 4186, Giust.civ.Mass. 1997, 722 and Cass. 29 July 1995, no. 8300, Giur.it. 1996, I, 1, 328). According to AUSTRIAN law, the basic rule of CC § 1296 previously touched on (under which the plaintiff must prove the defendant’s lack of care) is usurped by CC § 1298, which provides that the debtor is required to prove, in the event that he or she fails to fulfil a contractual or statutory obligation, that this failure to perform was not caused by any fault on his part. Furthermore, where a violation of a protective law is at issue (CC § 1311 second sentence), the burden of proving the lack of (subjective) fault in Austria rests also on the defendant)(OGH 5 March 1970, ZVR 1970/232 (p. 296) and OGH 25 July 2000, SZ 73/118; in-depth Reischauer, JBl 1998, 473-487, 560-570). In GREECE, in the field of liability for negligence, the fact that there are minimal differences between unlawfulness and fault can also occasionally lead to complexities in respect of the burden of proof (Deliyannis, FS Michaelides-Nouaros I, 303, 315 with reference to A. P. 854/1974 NoB 23/1975, 479 and CA Athens 2688/1969 Arm 24/ 1970, 313). However, the courts have only expressly facilitated relaxations in the requirements relating to the burden of proof within the parameters of product liability (CA Thessaloniki 1259/1977 Arm 32/1978, 121). This approach was enacted as an express regulation in the Consumer Protection Act (Act 2251/1994). Art. 8(4) of this Act introduced a general reversal of the burden of proof rules in services in respect of the fault of the service provider. How this provision was to be interpreted was the matter of some debate. Seemingly, the provision concerned a twofold rebuttable presumption: entailing that the service provider not only has to prove that he did not render, either intentionally or negligently, a defective service but must also prove that the performance of the service was not defective (Georgiades, FS Kiantou-Pampouki, 143, 149; Karakostas, Prostasia tou katanaloti, 138; for an in-depth analysis [in German] Eleftheriadou, Die Haftung aus Verkehrspflichtverletzung im deutschen und griechischen Deliktsrecht, 70). Act 2251/1994 art. 8(4) was amended by Act 3587/2002 art. 10 which concerns the liability of the service provider and now provides that the latter has to prove both absence of unlawfulness and fault. In CIVIL LAW jurisdictions, shifts in the onus of proof as regards proof or negligence or proof of causation are generally the subject of special provisions within the parameters of the Civil Code. The provisions set forth rebuttable legal presumptions, The object of these provisions is that, as the case may be, the defendant has to shoulder the burden of proving that he or she was not at fault or it is incumbent upon him/her to demonstrate that the fault on their part did not cause the damage that resulted (e. g. PORTUGUESE

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40.

41.

CC arts. 350(1) and 487(1); cf. Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 536). Examples for this legislative approach are to be found in many areas of the law of non-contractual liability for damage, in particular parental liability for damage caused by their children (CZECH and SLOVAKIAN CC § 422(2); GERMAN CC § 832; GREEK CC art. 923; ITALIAN CC art. 2048 [which provision, however, generates in its practical effect a strict liability]; MALTESE CC art. 1034; POLISH CC art. 427; PORTUGUESE CC art. 491) and liability for buildings and structures (e. g. AUSTRIAN CC § 1319 [but liability for roads and paths under CC § 1319a is quite different and depends on proof of intention or gross negligence] and GERMAN CC §§ 836-838), but also liability for misleading advertising (DUTCH CC art. 6:195) and liability of employers in relation to their employees (DUTCH CC art. 7:658) or third parties (GERMAN CC § 831; POLISH CC art. 429). In addition, it is not uncommon for the courts to compensate for the lack of a presumption fixed by statute by utilising the corrective device of prima facie proof (according to administrative law) to try and accommodate the interests of the claimant (cf. e. g. for PORTUGAL STJ 26 February 1992, BolMinJus 414 [1992] 533). In a number of legal systems of the ROMAN legal tradition, one comes across presumptions of liability. Here, reversal of the burden of proof in cases of negligence is no longer at issue, rather an irrebuttable presumption of negligence is laid down and consequently, strict liability is engaged. The jurisprudence of the FRENCH courts, for example, reconceived the law relating to the vicarious liability of parents which is based on CC art. 1384(4) along these lines. Originally, the provision was regarded as encompassing a mere présomption de faute (Cass.civ. 12 October 1955, D. 1956 Jur. 301, note Rodière). In present times, it is construed as being consonant with a présomption de responsabilité (Cass.civ. 19 February 1997, Bull.civ. 1997, II, no. 56 p. 32), which, for its part, does not leave the grounds of imputability untouched (Le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats, no. 2364). Similarly, the SPANISH courts did not fashion the reinterpretation of SPANISH CC art. 1903 on the basis of a mere presumptions of negligence rather instead the courts harnessed genuine presumptions of liability (see e. g. TS 22 September 1984, RAJ 1984 (2) no. 4332 p. 3326). In contrast to the foregoing, rules on reversal of the legal burden of proof are unusual in the COMMON LAW of tort. Thus the burden is on the claimant to prove each element of the tort of negligence: Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 622 (Lord Macmillan). Even in matters of causation, the burden of proof rests almost always with the claimant, i. e. the claimant must show it is more likely than not that the wrongful conduct of the defendant resulted in the damage sustained: Clerk and Lindsell (-Jones), Torts16, para. 206. The principal reason why the Common law is able to function without such rules is that, procedurally, the common law rules pertaining to the evaluation of evidence are at variance with most Civil Law jurisdictions. In ENGLAND and IRELAND a civil law matter does not turn on whether the factual evidence presented, requires the presiding judge to be persuaded that the plaintiff has proved his case “beyond a reasonable doubt” (according to the standard test under German case, cf. BGH 17 February 1970, BGHZ 53, 245, 256), rather the standard of proof prescribed relates to the preponderance of evidence, namely, whether the evidence presented by one side is more convincing than that of the opposing side (“on the balance of probabilities”): see, for the tort of negligence, Charlesworth and Percy (-Walton), Negligence11, para. 5-01. It thus suffices to show that the established facts are more consistent with the defendant’s negligence than any other explanation: Ellor v. Selfridge & Co. Ltd. (1930) 46 TLR 236. In end effect, the

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42.

43.

264

balance of probability test can reach equivalent results as provisions shifting the burden of proof (a case in point being Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32). Exceptionally, however, a court may be permitted to draw an inference, whether of negligence or of a causal nexus between the negligence and the damage sustained. In such cases an evidential burden may be placed on the defendant to submit evidence tending to rebut the inference which may be drawn from the claimant’s own evidence, even though the claimant continues throughout to bear the legal burden of proof: see, for example, Ward v. Tesco Stores Ltd. [1976] 1 WLR 810 (spillage of yoghurt on a supermarket floor causing an accident; evidential burden on the defendant supermarket to establish this was not due to a want of care since this would not ordinarily occur without negligence). An attenuated form of inference of negligence where the facts presented by the claimant are more consistent with that explanation than other causes is encapsulated in the maxim res ipsa loquitur, though the use of the term is deprecated by the bench on the basis that strictly this is not a presumption of law, but only an identification of when a prima facie case is established: Ratcliffe v. Plymouth & Torbay Health Authority [1998] PIQR P170 (Hobhouse LJ). In such cases, where the defendant has perhaps only proven the accident giving rise to damage or injury, it may be more likely than not that in the circumstances the cause of the accident was an act or omission of the defendant in breach of a duty of care and the claim in negligence will succeed unless the defendant can offer evidence pointing to a plausible alternative explanation: see for an example Widdowson v. Newgate Meat Corp. [1998] PIQR P138 (pedestrian with a history of mental illness, who was wearing dark clothing but had a sense of road safety, was injured in a collision with one car and struck by another on an unlit dual carriageway; reversing the decision of the court below, the CA held that pure speculation as to the claimant’s suicidal tendencies was not a plausible explanation, consistent with an absence of negligence on the defendant’s part, sufficient to rebut a prima facie inference of negligence by the defendant). The approach adopted by the Common Law is similar to that espoused by the Scandinavian legal systems, in particular SWEDISH law. Thus, where there are multiple causes for the damage, it suffices to prove that, once all the circumstances of the case are taken into account it is clearly more probable that the damage originated in the manner alleged by the claimant (rather than by the defendant) (Swedish HD 28 December 1993, NJA 1993, 764, 775; Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 200 ff, 214 ff). This rule also applies in the field of product liability (HD 21 July 1982, NJA 1982, 421, 483). Under the Environmental Code, it suffices, in the field of environmental liability law to prove that, on the balance of probabilities, the damage was caused in this manner [Miljöbalken] chap. 32 § 3(3), cf. also HD 29 April 1981, NJA 1981, 622, 633. In DENMARK, in this area, there is a perceived correlation between fault and causation: namely, the graver the adduced fault, the less stringent the requirements pertaining to the proof of causation (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 501). The same holds true for the law pertaining to occupational accidents and medical negligence (HD 27 October 1989, UfR 1989, 1108 respectively HD 10 September 1993, UfR 1993, 908). As far as injury sustained by patients is concerned, throughout Scandinavia, anchored in statutory provisions, the standard of proof is proof on the balance of probabilities (SWEDISH Patient Injury Act [Patientskadelag ] § 6; FINNISH Patient Injury Act [Patientskadelag ] § 2 and DANISH Patient Insurance Act (Lovbekendtgørelse om patientforsikring) § 2.

Article 1:102: Prevention

Illustration 5 is based on Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd. [1996] 2 WLR 348 (at 366 per Pill, LJ). Cf. also BGH 18 September 1984, BGHZ 92, 143 (Damage to paint of car from emissions emanating from a nearby factory amounted to damage to property).

Article 1:102: Prevention Where legally relevant damage is impending, this Book confers on a person who would suffer the damage a right to prevent it. This right is against a person who would be accountable for the causation of the damage if it occurred.

Comments A.

Prevention of impending damage

1. General. This Article makes it clear that preventative legal protection is also the concern of this Book. Prevention of damage is regarded as better than atonement for damage. At the same time the Article makes explicit one of the fundamental requirements of preventative protection of rights, namely the threat of damage. The second sentence pinpoints the person obliged to respect that right. All the other requirements of preventative protection of rights as well as limitations and particular forms of the right are the subject-matter of Chapter 6, Section 3 (Prevention). 2. Substantive law. The Article is formulated as a right based in substantive law and not as an instrument of the law of procedure. The entitlement to preventative protection of legal rights is consequently not a matter of judicial discretion. The Article furnishes a right no different in quality from the right under Article 1:101 (Basic rule). Quite how as a matter of the law of procedure the right is to be enforced is not decided by these rules (see DCFR I. – 1:101 (Intended field of application) paragraph (2)(h) and Introduction D36). 3. Prohibition of damage and compensation for loss averting damage. Article 1:102 is formulated in a manner corresponding to Article 1:101. Whereas Article 1:101 provides for a right to reparation, the various forms of which are fleshed out in the first two Sections of Chapter 6, Article 1:102 provides for a right to prevention whose particular forms are the subject matter of the provisions set out in the third Section of Chapter 6. It follows from those provisions that Article 1:102 does not deal only with a right to prohibit; it deals also with rights arising from one’s own voluntary endeavour to avoid damage which, were it not for the injured person’s intervention, would have occurred (or would have been exacerbated) and would have entitled the injured person to reparation (see also Article 6:302 (Liability for loss in preventing damage)). In this way it is made clear that under this Book cases of that type are absorbed within non-contractual liability law rather than the law of benevolent intervention in another’s affairs.

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4. Prevention and the law on non-contractual liability. Although Article 1:102 is contained in the Book setting out the law on non-contractual liability, this does not amount to a definitive statement about whether preventative legal protection as a whole is to be considered part of this branch of the law, an independent area of the law or a part of other areas of the law (such as the law of property or the law of persons). The draft does adopt the position, however, that preventative legal protection forms a part of the law on noncontractual liability in so far as the person responsible for the threat of damage would be liable for the damage under Article 1:101 (Basic rule) if it occurred. Further claims to restrain activities based on other legal grounds are unaffected: see Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (d).

B.

Claimant and responsible person

5. Claimant. The beneficiary of the right conferred by Article 1:102 is the person who would suffer the legally damage if its incidence is not prevented. Quite what counts as a legally relevant damage is to be assessed for the purposes of Article 1:102 using the same framework of rules as applies in relation to Article 1:101, namely in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 2. However, the draft does not purport to answer the question whether (and if so, in which circumstances) associations (howsoever legally constituted) are also beneficiaries of rights to restrain another’s activities in the furtherance of collective interests and entitled to enforce those rights through the courts. This relates in particular to organisations such as environmental groups, consumer associations, or other bodies concerned with prohibiting unfair competition or improper practices (see Introduction D36). Rights under Article 1:102 may of course be held by persons who, had they caused damage, would not themselves be liable: a child abused by a step-father has a claim that such conduct be stopped. 6. Responsible person. The person liable to respect the claimant’s right to prohibition is someone who, were the damage to occur, would have been liable for its causation (called here the “responsible person”). Cases of this type presuppose in the nature of things an impending damage which can only be avoided by the removal of the danger which threatens to be a cause of damage. That danger normally emanates from a person who has acted or failed to act in the manner required in the circumstances. Illustration 1 Owner of a vehicle O notices that a small child is working away at the paint on his car with a metal object. It may well be that the child is entirely unaware of doing any wrong and is therefore not liable under the law on non-contractual liability for causing the damage (see Article 3:103 (Children)). However, O can insist that the child’s mother, standing nearby, exercise her influence over the child to stop the scratching of the car (cf. Article 6:301 (Prevention in general)). The mother would act negligently if she closed her eyes to her child’s conduct. As to whether (and if so, how) O might have a claim directly against the child, see below at illustration 3. 7. Responsible person under strict liability. The responsible person may be someone who would be accountable without intention or negligence for the causation of the 266

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damage if it occurred. A prerequisite here of course is that the relevant judicial redress would be effective from a practical point of view. A genuine claim for prevention against someone who falls into the field of legal accountability merely because of responsibility for some risk will for that reason rarely come into question. The claim to reparation for a loss averting damage, however, remains unaffected.

C.

Essential elements entitling the claimant

8. Impending damage. A prerequisite of every claim to prevention is an impending danger to an interest whose infringement would constitute a legally relevant damage. The danger has to be specific; there must be an immediate risk of legally relevant damage. Neither an abstract potential danger nor the endangerment of another suffices. No one, for example, has a claim against the manufacturer of an automobile that a particular component of the vehicle be constructed in a particular manner or that a defectively constructed vehicle be recalled from the market. A damage ceases to be impending, of course, when it has already occurred and there is no prospect of further damage. Similarly, there will as a rule be no threat of damage if the activity which is to cease does not allow of exact description. As regards the question when a right to prevention also embraces the right to require another to undertake certain positive measures, see the comments to Article 6:301 (Prevention in general). 9. Aggravation of damage. The right to protection from impending damage is concerned not only with preventing the first occurrence of damage. It includes the right to stop the aggravation of damage which the injured person has already started to suffer. The text does not state that point expressly only because (i) it appears self-evident and (ii) a longer formulation would have made it necessary to repeat the formula in all the Articles in the first two Sections of this Book. Illustration 2 Without permission to do so, T heaves an extremely heavy object on to O’s transport vehicle. Due to its sheer weight the object damages the vehicle when it is set down. The continued presence of the object in the vehicle threatens to cause further damage. O has a right of prevention in relation to the impending but avoidable further damage. 10. Protection of rights. Similarly the Articles make no express mention of the impending infringement (or threatened aggravation of an infringement) of an ‘absolute’ right or a legally protected interest. That was not necessary because the expression “legally relevant damage” embraces these positions worthy of legal protection: Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage). 11. Accountability. The claim is directed against the person who would be accountable for the causation of the damage if it occurred. From this it follows that the right contained in Article 1:102 presupposes one of the three grounds of accountability of the responsible person set out in Article 1:101 (Intention, negligence, or responsibility for a source of danger). That applies to Article 6:301 (Prevention) as much as to Article 6:302 267

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(Liability for loss in preventing damage). From a merely factual point of view, there is as a rule no effective right of prevention in respect of aimless conduct or accidental happenings: the danger in such a case has almost always been fully realised when the damage is sustained. A conceivable exception is the impending worsening of a damage which was caused merely negligently. As regards the right of self-defence in relation to persons immune from liability see the comments below. 12. Restriction of the claim. The right to prevention is not unlimited; it has to be particularised and limited in many regards. Those limits are formulated in Article 6:301 (Right to prevention) and Article 6:302 (Liability for loss in preventing damage). Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (a) makes it clear that the Articles in Chapter 6 qualify Article 1:102 in the same manner that they qualify Article 1:101 (Basic rule) in the context of reparation.

D.

Relationship to Article 5:202 (Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity)

13. General. The avoidance of an impending damage is also the concern of Article 5:202 (Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity). However, Article 1:102 and Article 5:202 differ from one another both in outlook and function. The effect of Article 5:202 is that someone who causes another damage in the course of defending that person’s own or another’s property, person or other interests is not liable for that damage. Article 1:102, by contrast, confers on a person who would suffer damage if it is not averted a right to prevention or, as the case may be, a right to reimbursement of the costs of protective measures. Both claims are directed against the person who would be accountable for the causation of the damage according to the provisions of this Book. 14. Persons incapable of being accountable for their causation of damage. It follows from this approach that Article 1:102 is concerned with persons incapable of being accountable for their causation of damage only to the extent that one is confronted with the question whether such persons have a right against someone acting against them in taking measures to avert the damage which threatens. Illustration 3 The facts are the same as in Illustration 1, save that in issue are rights vis-à-vis the child rather than the parent. O has neither rights under Article 1:101 (Basic rule) nor rights under Article 1:102 (Prevention) vis-à-vis the child. An answer to the question whether O may permissibly exercise direct control over the child (by oral command and, if need be, physical restraint) depends simply on whether the child has a right to prevent O’s conduct. This is not the case because O has a ground of defence contained in Article 5:202(1) (Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity). That is a sufficient response: there is no necessity from the point of view of non-contractual liability law to re-formulate this ground of defence as a general right of O’s. Additionally O may have a right to prevention under property law. The latter remains unaffected by virtue of Article 1:103 (Scope of application), subparagraph (d). 268

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Notes I.

Basis of the right to prevent impending legally relevant damage

1.

By considerably simplifying matters, it is possible to assert that all legal systems of the European Union recognise the right (or rights) to demand of a person who is threatening to cause legally relevant damage that he or she desist in their dangerous conduct. However, the concrete particulars of the requisites, the bars to recovery and substantive content of this right (s) may be cast differently (compare on this point the notes on Article 6:301 (Prevention in general)); furthermore many legal remedies provided for by national law oscillate between procedural and substantive law. One is confronted with divergent approaches as far as the positioning within the legal system of the rules on injunctive relief and the substantive reach of this remedy are concerned. Expressly placing the right to restrain the impending danger by means of injunctive relief on a statutory footing is a typical feature of tort law codifications in Central and Eastern European countries (CZECH CC and SLOVAKIAN LOA §§ 415419 (cf. in particular § 417(2); ESTONIAN LOA § 1055; HUNGARIAN CC § 341(1) (under which the “endangered person” has the right “to request the court to restrain the person imposing such (i. e. imminent) danger from continuing such conduct and/or to order such person to take sufficient preventive measures and, if necessary, to provide a guarantee”); LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.255; POLISH CC art. 439; SLOVENIAN LOA § 133)). Amongst the Western European tort law regimes, the NETHERLANDS represents the vanguard in this regard as, on the basis of a successful claim under CC art. 6:162, a claim for injunctive relief (CC art. 3:296) can be raised alongside a claim for a declaratory judgment that a tort or delict is established (CC art. 3:302). The rationale behind the claim for injunctive relief is to compell the defendant to refrain from adopting a particular course of action. The assertion of this remedy is not contingent upon establishing that a tort had been committed and that there is a danger that the tortious conduct will recur. The claimant can also avail of such relief if there is a danger that the tort is about to be committed for the very first time (Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 613; Asser (-Hartkamp) Verbintenissenrecht III10, no. 118, pp. 125126). The most widespread technique of codification in the West European states, however, consists of furnishing specific absolute rights with a claim to injunctive relief which is independent of fault on the part of the defendant. To that extent most codifications fall short of the approach adopted in this draft in protecting only specific absolute rights, but exceed it in so far as those provisions generally dispense with a requirement of fault for the protection of absolute rights. Examples of this legislative technique are typically found in the law protecting ownership and possession (e. g. GERMAN CC §§ 1004, 862 and GREEK CC arts. 1108, 989 first sentence) and in the general law of persons. In the latter case they either relate to particular rights of personality (name: GERMAN CC § 12, GREEK CC art. 58, ITALIAN CC arts. 7 and 8, PORTUGUESE CC art. 72; a pseudonym: ITALIAN CC art. 9, PORTUGUESE CC art. 74; right to one’s own image: ITALIAN CC art. 10, PORTUGUESE CC art. 79) or feature in rules in connection with the general protection of personality rights, see e. g. FRENCH CC art. 9 and PORTUGUESE CC art. 80 (both concerning privacy), GREEK CC art. 57 (general law of rights of personality); PORTUGUESE CC arts. 70(2) (general law of rights of personality) and

2.

3.

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4.

5.

6.

270

71(1) (post mortem rights of personality), and POLISH CC art. 24(1)(first sentence) (protection of rights of personality in general). SPANISH law provides for a claim for injunctive relief in Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act 1/1982 of 5 May 1982 (art. 9(2)). In addition to the foregoing, there is an array of ad hoc provisions within and outside the framework of the Codes which provide for injunctive relief in certain fields of law, in particular, in the field of the law relating to anti competitive practices, e. g. ITALIAN CC art. 2599), intellectual property law and copyright law (e. g. GREEK CC art. 60) as well as in Collective Labour Law. Moreover, a number of the provisions geared towards protecting absolute interests and claims to injunctive relief mentioned in the previous excursus are likewise often not directly regulated in the Codes and are the subjectmatter of special laws instead. Intermittently, claims for substantive injunctive relief can be found in Civil Procedure Codes. For example, in PORTUGAL, CCP arts. 1474 ff on interim court protection for the right to one’s own personality, the right to one’s own name and protection of confidential correspondence supplement the substantive legal provision contained in Portuguese CC art. 70(2). Despite the fact that there is frequently a dearth of a fixed statutory basis, a number of European courts have channelled the provisions of tort law (which wording is, strictly speaking, confined to a damages claim), in order to enhance the legal protection geared towards ensuring that impending damage does come into being. This refinement derives purely from case law and it can be discerned in, e. g. FRANCE and in BELGIUM, where it is accepted that orthodox tort law countenances the possibility that an unlawful disturbance can be brought to an end; it is said that there is a right of suppression de l’illicite (see for FRANCE Le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats, nos. 2441-2446 and for BELGIUM Ronse (-de Wilde/Claeys/Mallems), Schade en schadeloosstelling I2, nos. 302-303 pp. 223-224). A thorny issue is, as previously alluded to, whether tort law provides a means of averting the impending damage. In other words, whether impending damage connotes damage under CC art. 1382 (for an analysis of Belgian law on this issue which, however, lacks reference to case law, see Ronse (-de Wilde/Claeys/Mallems) loc. cit. nos. 119-122 pp. 93-96). Other legal systems have effectively reached or propounded comparable solutions by ushering in injunctive relief via the analogous application of existing specific provisions. In GERMANY, the courts, by expanding the legal policy underpinning CC §§ 12, 862 and 1004, have extended the reach of general injunctive relief to encompass a large number of other rights and legal interests protected under tort law in addition to those governed by CC § 823(1). Fault is not a prerequisite for the availability of such a claim, but it must be established there is a danger that the infringement will subsequently recur. In the case of an interlocutory injunction, a tangible threat of an (initial?) infringement is ranked the same as an infringement which has already been committed; consequently, there is no requirement to await the commission of an unlawful act (Erman (-Schiemann), BGB I10, Pref. to § 823, no. 20). In GREECE, practically identical developments have unfolded. Similarly, today it is further recognised that every case of an infringement or where there is an immediate danger that a right or legally protected interest will be unlawfully infringed (this does not necessarily entail that it has to amount to a culpable infringement), the person affected can seek a substantive legal remedy (Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio III, 317; Pipsou, Anagastiki ektelesi gia paraleipsei i anochi praxis, 55 ff) either putting an end to the source of

Article 1:102: Prevention

7.

8.

9.

damage or preventing the impending danger (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 281 no. 25 as well as in the Pref. to arts. 914-938, no. 56; Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio III, 315 ff; Filios, Enochiko Dikaio II(2), 135 ff). In PORTUGAL, the prevailing situation is identical (Vaz Serra, RLJ 113 [1980/1981] 327). Furthermore, it is recognised in Austria that the awarding of an interlocutory injunction is a matter for the substantive law (OGH 9 October 1991, JBl 1992, 176 = RS 0 010540). Whereas fault is not a prerequisite for the availability of this type of injunctive relief, legal capacity is a prerequisite (OGH 23 July 1997, ecolex 1998, 124 = RS 0 108220; Hirsch, JBl 1998, 541). Further requirements pertain to the locus standi of the plaintiff and the risk that the infringement will recur (see further OGH 22 April 1964, SZ 37/62; OGH 31 August 1983, SZ 56/124 and OGH 27 September 2001, SZ 74/168). Mere threat of an infringement of a subjective right or protective law (on this point OGH 25 September 2001, ÖJZ 2002, 147) will, exceptionally, suffice provided that the party seeking the order establishes that unless the prohibitory order is granted, the claimant would suffer irreparable damage. In contrast, under ITALIAN law, the legal position is as before uncertain. The courts have continued to refuse to embrace a general expansion of the express statutorily permitted canons pertaining to the grant of a prohibitory injunction (Cass. 25 July 1986, no. 4755, Rep.Giur.it. 1986, voce Concorrenza e pubblicità no. 51, in this decision, it was however stated that an analogous application of the cases fixed by law pertaining to the grant of a prohibitory injunction to cases not provided for by law could not be completely ruled out) whereas legal scholarship is divided on this issue (for further analysis see, inter alia, Bianca, Diritto civile V, 785; De Cupis, Il danno II3, 11 and Rapisarda, Profili della tutela civile inibitoria, 241 ff; in opposition Santini, Riv.Dir.Civ. 1959, I, 136-138). Statutory legislation in the NORDIC countries does not recognise a general substantive legal claim to injunctive relief. Instead, a whole array of special rules found in ad hoc regulations regulating particular discrete areas of law as well as authorisation found under procedural law allow the courts to grant interlocutory injunctions in the case of impending danger. Compare for SWEDEN Code of Judicial Procedure [Rättegångsbalk] chap. 15 § 3 (this provision is of particular relevance in competition and environmental law: Fitger and Mellqvist, Domstolsprocessen2, 101); for FINLAND Code of Judicial Procedure [Rättegångsbalk] chap. 7 § 3; and for DENMARK Code of Judicial Procedure [Retsplejelov, public notice of 30 September 2003 no. 815] chap. 57 §§ 641-652, in particular §§ 641-643. Amongst the numerous statutory regulations permitting private persons (and also, to some extent, administrative agencies) to obtain substantive injunctive relief, the below listed are a representative sample of provisions under SWEDISH law namely, Environmental Code [Miljöbalk (1998:808)] chap. 32 § 12; Land (Real Property) Code [ Jordabalk, JB (1970:994)] chap. 3 §§ 3 and 4; Competition Act [Konkurrenslag (1993:20)] §§ 23-25; Marketing Act [Marknadsföringslag (1995:450)] §§ 14, 20 and 21; Copyright Act [Lag (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk] § 53a; Patents Act [Patentlag (1967:837)] § 57a; Design Protection Act [Mönsterskyddslag (1970:485)] § 35a and Trademark Act [Varumärkeslag (1960:644)] § 37a; under DANISH law Marketing Act [Markedføringslov, Legal Notice of 17 July 2000 no. 699] § 21; and under FINNISH law Consumer Protection Act [Konsumentskyddslag of 21 January 1978 no. 38] chap. 2 §§ 7-9; Environmental Damage Compensation Act [Lag

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10.

11.

272

om ersättning för miljöskador of 19 August 1994 no. 737] § 6 (a claim can only be made for the recovery of costs associated with the averting the danger, in other words no general right to claim a prohibitory injunction) as well as the Neighbour Relations Act [Lag angående vissa grannelagsförhållanden of 13 February 1920/26] §§ 10-23 (DENMARK has not placed law concerning neighbour relations on a statutory footing; Injunctive relief for disturbance derives from jurisprudential developments, e. g. HD 21 August 2001, UfR 2001, 2406, compare. also Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, chap. 18). In the COMMON LAW the granting of preventative legal relief in the form of an injunction lies solely within the discretion of the courts. Where damages are the proper relief, an injunction should not be granted, see generally Patterson v. Murphy [1978] ILRM 85. In IRELAND the High Court may issue an injunction wherever it appears just or convenient to do so; see Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 (no 39) s. 8 and Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act 1877 s. 28(8). Injunctions will be obtained in a wide array of torts, including nuisance, trespass, defamation and those which relate to industrial relations (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 1187-1202). Injunctions are granted in accordance with well established principles. These include the notions of the inadequacy of damages, the conduct of the parties and whether or not the principle of laches will apply. When granted, injunctions are generally mandatory or prohibitory. Mandatory injunctions are those which order the defendant to do some positive act to end a wrongful state of affairs that he has created. Prohibitory injunctions restrain the defendant from doing something or repeating a wrongful act. They include interlocutory injunctions which are aimed at protecting the rights of the plaintiff and are granted prior to the trial of action. Some may be merely interim, that is to say, they will be limited to a number of hours or days (Delany, Equity and the Law of Trusts in Ireland, 370). The balance of convenience test developed in England in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. (No. 1) [1975] AC 396 also applies in Ireland where it can be shown that on the balance of conveniences, the status quo between the parties should be preserved and the injunction granted (Miss World Ltd. v. Miss Ireland Beauty Pageant Ltd. [2004] IEHC 13, [2004] 2 IR 394, 405). Quia timet injunctions are granted, where there is a risk of impending damage. Here it is important to consider how likely it is that injury will in fact occur and how severe the apprehended damage will be. The burden of proof is on the applicant (A-G (Boswell) v. Rathmines & Pembroke Joint Hospital Board [1904] 1 IR 161; Radford v. Wexford Corporation [1954] 89 ILTR 184). The courts have also developed a “balance of convenience” test in order for the injunction to be granted (Garrahy v. Bord na gCon [2002] 3 IR 566, 583 (Geoghegan J.)). The plaintiff must prove a substantial risk of danger as well as a strong case of probability that the apprehended mischief would arise. This affirms the ENGLISH approach in Cayne v. Global Natural Resources plc. [1984] 1 All ER 225, 237 (May LJ). In Drury v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2004] EWCA Civ 200, 1 WLR 1906, 1062, Wilson J. held that even an anticipated trespass sometimes gives rise to a right of action. The English courts will adopt a threshold requirement – there must be convincing evidence of real danger of actual violation (Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Forestry v. Heyman (1989) 59 P & CR 48, 50 (Lord Saville)). Legal scholars in England, as in Ireland, have long supported the notion of a quia timet injunction (Baker/Langan/Turner, Snell’s equity29, 651; Delany, Equity and the Law of Trusts in Ireland, 403).

Article 1:102: Prevention

12.

The SCOTS law of delict recognises the prevention by interdict of either the commission of a threatened wrong, or of the repetition of a completed wrong. Like England and Ireland, the discretionary element of the remedy remains the court’s power to order or refuse interdict, and the equitable element relates to the fairness of ordering interdict (or the amount of damages to be awarded). Interdict is similar to the common law quia timet injunction, it is a preventative proceeding directed against a wrong being done or an apprehended violation of a party’s rights (Earl of Breadalbane v. Jamieson 1877 4 R 667; Hoyle v. Shaws Water Company 1854 17 D 83; Walker, Delict, 452. Interdict is only directed against harm, rather than wrong doing – and where there is objectionable conduct without causing harm, interdict will not apply. The terms of the interdict must be specific and precise (Shinwell v. The National Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union of GB and Ireland (1913) 2 SLT 83). Interdicts have been awarded in such cases as threat of or imminence of legal wrong (Martin v. Nisbett (1893) 1 SLT 293; see Walker loc. cit. 453). Interdict, like quia timet injunctions, will be allowed where the wrong is threatened but not committed (Wilson v. Shepherd 1913 SC 300). There must be evidence of reasonable cause of wrong or fear – interdict is allowed therefore to avoid common law nuisance or statutory contraventions, for example. Wrongs based on mistake do not lead to interdict being awarded (Walker loc. cit. 456). Thus the court looks at the matter from the point of view of the pursuer, concentrating more on the continuance of wrong (and the effects) rather than issues of fault (Watt v. Jamieson 1954 SC 56; see Stewart, Delict, 22). Scots law recognises a list of wrongs restrained by interdict, including those against personality, reputation, rights to heritable property, rights to movables, economic wrongs and other miscellaneous wrongs, such as breaches of confidence or breaches of procedure: (Walker loc. cit. 457-460). The provision providing interdict as an equitable and discretionary remedy has also been given a legislative standing. Court of Session Act 1988 s. 47(1) states that “in any cause containing a conclusion or crave for interdict or liberation, the Division of the Inner House [...] may [...] grant interim interdict.” The use of the word ‘may’ indicates the discretionary nature of the remedy.

II.

Basis of the claim for damages in respect of expenditure incurred in averting the damage

13.

Reasonable expenses incurred by the claimant in his attempt to avert the impending damage are, as a general rule, a recoverable head of damages in all legal systems of the European Union. Generally, a link is established between the debtor’s obligation to attend to his affairs in order to avoid a charge of contributory negligence. The further particulars of this claim, which is for the most part regarded as part of tort law, although it occasionally appears clothed in the vestments of the law of Benevolent Intervention in Another’s Affairs (negotiorum gestio), see the comments and notes to Article 6:302 (Liability for loss in preventing damage).

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Article 1:103: Scope of application Article 1:101 (Basic rule) and Article 1:102 (Prevention): (a) apply only in accordance with the following provisions of this Book; (b) apply to both legal and natural persons, unless otherwise stated; (c) do not apply in so far as their application would contradict the purpose of other private law rules; and (d) do not affect remedies available on other legal grounds.

Comments A.

Sub-paragraph (a)

1. Article 1:101 (Basic rule) and Article 1:102 (Prevention) not self-sufficient rules. The significance and operation of Article 1:103(a) have already been explained in the comments to Article 1:101. This provision serves the purpose of guaranteeing that neither Article 1:101 nor Article 1:102 can be read as constituting self-sufficient rules. The content and meaning of the particular elements they invoke (legally relevant damage, accountability, causation, reparation and prevention) are to be drawn exclusively from the provisions of the following Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6. Moreover, Article 1:103(a) makes it clear that the provisions concerning defences (Chapter 5) and the matters left unaffected by this Book (Chapter 7) retain their significance in the application of Article 1:101 and Article 1:102.

B.

Application to legal and natural persons (sub-paragraph (b))

2. Legal persons as claimants. Where the Articles in this Book speak of “a person” or “another” or their cognates, or invoke similar formulations, then, so far as nothing else is expressly designated, these terms, as was already explained, are always to be understood as meaning both natural and legal persons. As regards the few exceptions to this basic rule a distinction must be made according to whether the legal person is a prospective claimant or a responsible person. In the first case there are special rules, confined according to the nature of things to natural persons, to be found in Article 2:201 (Personal injury and consequential loss), in Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third parties as a result of another’s personal injury or death) and in Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy). The question as to the extent to which the legal person may enjoy incorporeal rights of personality must consequently be decided on the basis of Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) (see the Comments to that Article and to Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy)). A further issue, moreover, is whether legal persons can suffer non-economic damage and on that account lay claim to damages. This draft leaves no doubt about the matter: the question is to be answered in the affirmative (see, for more detail, the comments to Article 2:101).

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3. Legal persons as responsible persons. It follows from Article 1:103(b) that a legal person is accountable for the causation of legally relevant damage basically in the same manner as a natural person. A few clarifications only are required. Firstly, legal persons are liable to third parties not only for damage caused by their employees; they are also liable for damage caused by their representatives. See Article 3:201 (Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives) paragraph (2). Clarification is necessary in the second place because legal persons may be subject to special duties of care – in particular the duty to organise their activities in a way which does not expose others to hazards. These duties are “located” in Article 3:102 (Negligence). In other words, it follows from Article 1:103(b) that a legal person too may act negligently or, as the case may be, intentionally within the meaning of Article 3:101 (Intention): cf. Comment B6 below. Thus its liability may be based on (i) its own intention, (ii) its own breach of duty, (iii) a breach of duty of its own representatives, (iv) a breach of duty by its (other) employees, and (v) its responsibility for one of the sources of danger set out in Chapter 3, Section 2 (Accountability without intention or negligence). 4. Bad organisation. The duties of correct organisation just mentioned are, purely from the nature of things, predominantly relevant to legal persons. However, in particular cases they may also come into play within the context of a sole trader’s business or comparable organisation. Illustration 1 A sudden emergency case in a hospital cannot be responded to early enough because the appropriate doctor is overburdened in another department of the hospital and cannot get away quickly enough. Had the hospital’s activities been correctly organised, another doctor would have been present on the ward in question. The hospital is liable for the failure in its organisation. The case would not be decided differently if (as is admittedly rarely if ever the case) the hospital were operated by an individual rather than a legal person. 5. Legal persons under public law. These rules make no fundamental distinction between legal persons regulated by private law and legal persons regulated by public law. As a starting point the latter are subject to the same rules as legal persons regulated by private law. However, note must be taken of Article 7:103 (Public law functions and court proceedings): this Book does not govern the liability of legal persons (or individuals) arising out of the exercise of public law functions. 6. Imputation of knowledge and state of mind of legal persons. A legal person has as such neither its own cognition nor its own will. On the other hand, actual and constructive knowledge, wilfulness and other aspects of state of mind provide elements for a multitude of prerequisites of liability (e. g. intention, negligence, and the definition of a keeper) and grounds of defence (e. g. contributory fault). For that reason clarification is needed that the state of mind and knowledge of persons by whom a legal person acts are imputable to the legal person. This rule is not explicitly taken up in this Book only because (i) it is also of significance well beyond the limits of non-contractual liability law and (ii) there is much to be said for characterising it as a principle of company law. The persons without whom the legal person could never engage in legal relations are its 275

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representatives (see the definition in Article 3:201 (Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives), paragraph (2)). It is immaterial whether the natural persons acting for the corporation are themselves liable or not. Furthermore, the legal person is to be regarded as if the individual knowledge of each of the representatives were bundled together and at its call. It is therefore conceivable that a legal person is liable on the basis of intentionally causing damage, although the member of the board actually taking the critical step was not even negligent. Illustration 2 A, a member of the board of an incorporated company, arranges for building material from supplier L to be used in construction work for the company’s customer K. Board member B, who is responsible for procurement, had arranged for these building materials to be acquired – contrary to the firm’s policy – under reservation of title. A was unaware of this and B, who had no knowledge of the shortage of materials at the building site, had not envisaged that the materials would be deployed at this point in time. As a result of the incorporation in the building work, L loses ownership of the materials. The legal person has committed an intentional infringement of ownership to the detriment of L.

C.

The relationship of the law on non-contractual liability to other areas of private law (sub-paragraph (c) and sub-paragraph (d)); general

7. The principle of free concurrence of actions. Article 1:103(c) and (d) regulate in two provisions the relationship of the law on non-contractual liability to other areas of private law. They proceed on the basis that generally an injured person can select from among the several bases of claim which come into consideration the one which seems the most advantageous (The same holds correspondingly where, according to the applicable law of procedure and jurisdiction, the court is required to recognise the basis of claim relied on by the claimant). Where the claimant, for example, has a claim arising out of unjustified enrichment and out of the law on non-contractual liability, the former providing more extensive relief in the particular case than the latter, the law on non-contractual liability does not prevent the application of the law of unjustified enrichment (sub-paragraph (d)). The claim in respect of the unjustified enrichment, however, is not additional to the claim for reparation; it is an alternative claim. (Similarly, where the enrichment is claimed within the law on non-contractual liability (see Article 6:101(4) (Reparation)) this constitutes an alternative measure of redress to reparation, not an additional one.) However, in the converse situation (the non-contractual liability claim being more advantageous than the other claim) it may well be that the competing system – in particular the competing system for providing reparation – is an exclusive one, that is to say, the purpose of its rules is fulfilled only be ousting the law on non-contractual liability. Account is taken of that in sub-paragraph (c). 8. Preconditions of a situation of concurrent actions. The significance of the problem of concurrence of actions is occasionally overestimated. The problem only emerges if one and the same conduct falls under the provisions of two or more areas of the law, as an

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essential element of the claim, and that conduct is judged differently by those different provisions. Illustration 3 No problem of concurrence of actions therefore emerges when a given non-performance of a contractual obligation does not in fact give rise to non-contractual liability according to the rules of this Book. Hence, for example, the mere failure to perform a contractual obligation to deliver goods at the correct time or of the correct quality is not covered by the terms of Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage). Illustration 4 Similarly, no problem of concurrence of actions emerges where goods on hire are worn out, in accord with the terms of the contract by the hirer of the goods. That is because the act of the hirer is not merely not a failure to perform a contractual obligation; it does not even constitute an infringement of a property right relevant to the law on non-contractual liability since the destruction is justified by the consent of the lessor. The situation is different, however, if the law governing a contract of hire provides for a shorter limitation period for claims in respect of excessive destructive use of the goods than the law on non-contractual liability provides for a claim in respect of an intentional or negligent infringement of a property right. A problem of concurrence of actions likewise emerges if it suffices for liability under the law on non-contractual liability that the destruction was caused by (mere) negligence, whereas the claim under the law of hire turns on a more qualified measure of fault on the part of the hirer. In such a case the purpose of the provisions of the law on hire is such that they claim priority of application over those of the law on non-contractual liability (sub-paragraph (c)), since they would otherwise not achieve their intended effect, namely to protect the hirer from liability in the cases excluded by the more tightly framed rules.

D.

Sub-paragraph (c)

9. Scope of application. The provision concentrates predominantly, but by no means exclusively, on the relationship between the law of contract and the law on non-contractual liability. It plays a similar role in relation to the law on benevolent intervention in another’s affairs, the law of property and even family law. Consequently it does not matter whether it is a provision of autonomous private law or a provision of these rules which in accordance with its objective claims priority of application. Illustration 5 It may well be, for example, that family law seeks to regulate in an exclusive way the legal consequences of a breach of duties of fidelity owed by married or engaged persons. In such a case the law on non-contractual liability would not be applicable if, following the disclosure of adultery, the cuckolded spouse suffers a severe nervous collapse with physical symptoms of the sort prescribed by Article 2:201 (Personal injury and consequential loss). The situation is no different where family law pro277

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vides for a less demanding standard of care between spouses or between parents and children than that applicable generally in the law on non-contractual liability. In that case Article 1:103(c) has the effect that Article 3:102 (Negligence) is rendered inapplicable. Illustration 6 In the law of property too there are many provisions whose purpose is to exclude the law on non-contractual liability. For example, there are the rules on acquisition of title to property in good faith. Someone who according to the provisions of property law acquires ownership in good faith as a result of a disposition by a nonentitled party but in circumstances where a diligent person might have ascertained the absence of title in the disponer cannot be sued by the former owner to make reparation on account of a negligent infringement (destruction) of a property right. That would undermine the purpose of the provisions on acquisition of property in good faith – especially when consideration is given to a claim for reparation in kind. A right to restitution of the property on account of mere negligent infringement of the right of ownership would undermine the rule of property law whereby only (intentional or) grossly negligent disregard of the true owner’s title prevents an acquisition. The point can be underlined in relation to nuisance: the basic rule on nuisance is to be found in the provision on infringement of property rights, but the details regularly arise in the law governing and assigning rights between neighbours. 10. The law on non-contractual liability and the law of contract. As already indicated, however, the main area of application for the provision concerns the relationship to the law of contract. At the outset it must be appreciated that not every non-performance of a contractual obligation constitutes a non-contractual liability and nor is every non-contractual liability involving damage to a contracting party necessarily a non-performance of a contractual obligation (A trivial example is where it just so happens to be the injured person’s own employer who, on a Sunday afternoon, has caused damage by careless driving). A second point of note is that these rules have not merely achieved considerable approximation of the rules on prescription applying to contractual and non-contractual rights but have also increasingly approximated the legal consequences of nonperformance of a contractual obligation and non-contractual liability. In particular DCFR III. – 3:701 (Right to damages) provides for damages for non-economic as well as economic loss resulting from non-performance of a contractual obligation. These developments have effectively diluted the practical significance of the problem of concurrence of actions. Where the law of contract and the law on non-contractual liability do in fact overlap, they only diverge from one another at the margins. 11. Priority of contract law in case of conflict. Should a conflict between the values of contract law and non-contractual liability law arise in any particular case, whereby contract law denies liability which would subsist according to the provisions on non-contractual liability, then it is for the rules of contract law to assert priority if that is to be claimed in accord with the objective of the contract law rules. That is again the case if an application of the law on non-contractual liability in parallel with the corresponding contract law provision would deprive the latter of its effect. The contract law rule has 278

Article 1:103: Scope of application

priority so far as contract law actually claims it, whether expressly or merely by implication from the nature of things. Where contract law makes no such demand for the subsidiarity of non-contractual liability law, sub-paragraph (c) has no application and the principle of free concurrence of actions governs. Illustration 7 III. – 3:703 (Foreseeability) reads: “The debtor in an obligation which arises from a contract or other juridical act is liable only for loss which the debtor foresaw or could reasonably be expected to have foreseen at the time when the obligation was incurred as a likely result of the non-performance, unless the non-performance was intentional, reckless or grossly negligent.” In the commentary to this provision the following illustration (Illustration 2; Lando and Beale, Principles of European Contract Law I, II, 441) is given: “Company S sells an animal food compound to B for feeding to pigs. B does not tell A for what breed of pigs the food is required. S negligently supplies a batch of the compound which contains a mild toxin known to cause discomfort to pigs but no serious harm. B’s pigs are of an unusual breed, however, which is peculiarly sensitive to the toxin and after being fed with the compound many of the pigs die. S is not liable for the loss since it could not reasonably have foreseen it.” It would effectively annul the liability limiting function of this contract law provision if the provisions of non-contractual liability for property damage were to be applicable on these facts and with a contradictory outcome. It makes no difference, moreover, whether that non-contractual liability presupposes a negligence or not. Illustration 8 Seller S sells to buyer B a concrete mixer. As a result of a defect in the mounting, the drum falls out of its anchoring on first use. Both the drum and the surrounding structure are deformed. B fails to make use of the right to terminate the contractual relationship within a reasonable time (cf. DCFR III. – 3:508 (Loss of right to terminate). B claims reparation for the damage to the machine on the ground that there has been an infringement of a property right as recognised by Article 2:206 (Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession). B would, let us suppose, be unable to recover damages for the non-conformity under contract law because of DCFR III. – 3:107 (Failure to notify non-conformity). Moreover, consideration must be given to the fact that art. 9(b) of the EU product liability directive encompasses only damage which is caused to a thing other than the defective product itself. That provision only concerns liability to consumers, but it invites the conclusion that the EU legislator generally wanted to leave cases of this type too to contract law. The priority of contract law can also be supported with the argument that in cases of self-destructive damage to goods after transfer of ownership there is no workable criterion for demarcating contractual and non-contractual responsibility and the legal system therefore always runs the risk of characterising a mere deviation of quality (and thereby also a core part of the law of sales) as a matter of non-contractual liability law. Under the system of these rules it may be that the question no longer merits any great attention. However, a consideration of the rules of general contract law, those of the law of sale and art. 9(b) of the product liability directive, taken together, justifies the conclusion that the law on non-contractual 279

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liability is not applicable to a buyer’s claim to damages against a seller on account of self-inflicted damage to the goods acquired. Illustration 9 Due to a doctor’s error in treating a patient, the patient dies. There are no provisions in Book III specifically relating to legally relevant damage suffered by relatives in the case of a fatal personal injury. This silence on the part of Book III, however, is not an “eloquent silence” that speaks volumes in the sense that such claims are therefore to be excluded because the case is one of non-performance of a contractual obligation. The corresponding provision of the law on non-contractual liability for damage caused to another (Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third parties as a result of another’s personal injury or death)) remains applicable. Within the noncontractual liability claim regard must also be had to Article 6:203(2) (Capitalisation and quantification), Article 7:105 (Reduction or exclusion of liability to indemnified persons), and even, depending on the organisational form of the hospital in the circumstances, Article 7:103 (Public law functions and court proceedings).

E.

Sub-paragraph (d)

12. The law on non-contractual liability does not oust other bases of claim. Sub-paragraph (d) concerns the converse situation: there is no valid claim which can be asserted according to the provisions of the law on non-contractual liability because, for example, there is no legally relevant damage or negligence or because the conditions for the liability for others are not fulfilled. In that case it is open to the claimant to pursue other bases for a claim which are more advantageous. This rule applies without exception and extends to the legal remedies available. Illustration 10 Seller S has sold to buyer B land which is contaminated with oil residues. B has not suffered any infringement of a property right because the land was already contaminated at the time of transfer of ownership. A claim for damages for B against S under the law on non-contractual liability can therefore be contemplated only in the case of an intentional deception of B on the part of S (by an omission to make facts known) (Article 2:210 (Loss upon fraudulent misrepresentation)). That of course does not preclude B from making use of contractual remedies available on account of S’s non-performance of contractual obligations – in particular a contractual claim to damages. Illustration 11 D is driving through a built-up area at an appropriate speed when a three year old girl suddenly steps into the road in front of him. He could not have foreseen that the girl would let go of her aunt’s hand because she had spotted her mother on the opposite side of the street. D tries to avoid hitting the girl and collides with a tree. If he has no claim under the law on non-contractual liability, he can still assert a claim against the girl and/or the girl’s parents under the law of benevolent intervention in another’s affairs (see PEL Ben.Int. Art. 3:103 (Right to reparation)). 280

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Illustration 12 A has registered a patent in respect of a certain industrial machine, but neither builds the machine nor undertakes any other efforts to commercialise the invention. Knowing of A’s protected patent, B builds two machines of this type and sells them. A has suffered no substantial loss and therefore no legally relevant (economic) damage. However, that precludes only a claim in non-contractual liability and does not prevent a claim being made in the law of unjustified enrichment. 13. No limitation to the law of obligations. Sub-paragraph (d) is in no way confined to the relationship to other parts of the law of obligations. Rather the provision makes it clear that the law on non-contractual liability fundamentally does not oust any claims based on other legal grounds. This can obtain practical significance in particular in relation to the law of property and so in relation to the law governing claims for preventative legal protection. So far as the law of property recognises a claim to a prohibitory or mandatory remedy to prevent (impending or continuing) damage which is independent of fault, such a claim may be asserted independently of the requirements of Article 1:102 (Prevention). The same is true for preventative legal protection under the rules protecting trades, as for example under the Community Trade Mark Regulation art. 98(1). 14. Special regimes relating to Article 1:103(d). The following text features special regimes relevant to Article 1:103(d) in three places, namely in Article 2:203 (Defamation) paragraph (2), Article 2:208 (Loss caused to a consumer as a result of unfair competition) paragraph (2) and Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage). The former two relate to exceptional situations in which national law determines whether a legally relevant damage exists beyond that provided for by the express provisions of these rules. Article 3:207, by contrast, refers to further instances of strict liability under national law. See the commentary to those Articles.

Notes I.

Tort law and contract law: theories of concurrence of action

1.

Problems arising from concurrence of actions, which involves an examination how different areas of private law relate to each other, are difficulties which confront every Member State of the European Union. In this area, the focus primarily centres on the relationship between contract and tort law (see generally von Bar and Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract and Tort, nos. 280-315). AUSTRIA, GERMAN and GREEK legal scholarship distinguishes between the following categories where there is a concurrence between possible heads of legal action: If a norm precludes the application of another norm, reference is made to Gesetzeskonkurrenz (concurrence of laws). The term Anspruchshäufung (cumulation of causes of action) describes the phenomenon whereby one and the same act can trigger the cumulation of parallel causes of action, e. g. a claim of damages to repair loss that has already occurred and a claim for injunctive relief directed at averting impending fresh damage. The problem of the cumulation of actions is. inter alia, in these Principles dealt with under Article 6:301(1) (Prevention in gen-

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2.

282

eral). The term alternative Anspruchshäufung (alternative causes of actions) is used to describe when the plaintiff must choose between different causes of actions. An example deriving from these Principles can be discovered in Article 6:101 (Aim and forms of reparation) paragraph (4). If there are several claims triggered by the same damage which, however, do not preclude the continued existence of the other, this situation is classed as one of Anspruchskonkurrenz (concurrence of claims) or Anspruchsnormenkonkurrenz (competing bases of a claim). The former contemplates that the plaintiff can avail of several parallel claims. These claims do not impinge upon each other. The Plaintiff is not even required to state which of these causes of action he is seeking to rely upon (subject to conflicting national rules on procedure); however, it goes without saying that it is not possible to obtain a doubling in compensation or even an increase in the extent of damages awarded, because the plaintiff (e. g.), as well as having sustained loss by virtue of breach of contract has also fallen victim to tortious action. In cases of the Anspruchnormenkonkurrenz it is conclusively accepted that, from the outset, only one claim existed, although it was possible to anchor the claim to a number of bases for liability (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, nos. 17/1 ff; MünchKomm (-Kramer)4, § 241, nos. 25 ff; Medicus, Schuldrecht I13, § 32; Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 85 (1959) 230; Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 499-506; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 247, no. 29; Georgiades, Diki 6/1975, 43; Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio III, 110). In the sense of the terminology discussed above, this text postulates the concurrence of claims principle (however, it does not adopt the fine distinction between this principle and the Anspruchsnormenkonkurrenz), and makes clear in sub-paragraph (d), that tort law does not have the effect of subjugating contract law. Sub-paragraph (c) introduces a regulation, which adopts an opposite approach (priority of contract law and other areas of private law over tort law) leading to, as previously alluded to in the comments above, an application of the principle of Gesetzeskonkurrenz The principle of ”concurrence of laws” is the point of departure for BELGIAN, FRENCH and LUXEMBOURGIAN law for the definition of the relationship between contract and tort law, derived from the fact that in these legal system a person’s liability in damages cannot be contractual and tortious at the same time. In cases of overlap and conflict, contract law prevails (see for FRANCE Mazeaud and Chabas, Leçons de droit civil II(1)9, no. 404 pp. 402-403; for BELGIUM Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Wynant/Debaene, TPR 2000, no. 176 and for LUXEMBOURG Cour 16 June 1982, Pas. luxemb. 25, 344). However, the courts have created exceptions to the principle of non-cumul des responsabilités. These exceptions centre primarily upon the case law of the criminal courts. The jurisprudence of the Chambre criminelle of the Cour de Cassation constantly re-iterates that the criminal courts do not have the authority to apply the laws governing contractual liability. If a criminal court, in the course of a claim for damages which is annexed to the criminal proceedings, is required to determine the merits of a claim for compensation anchored in civil law, the court therefore generally applies non-contractual liability law even if the act committed also amounts to a breach of contract (Viney, Introduction à la responsabilité2, no. 223 p. 412). BELGIAN case law allows the injured party to a contract, breach of which also constitues a criminal act, to elect between claiming in contract or in tort (Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Wynant/ Debaene loc. cit. no. 178). In addition, the general principles of tort law may be applicable between contractual partners, if the faute of one party is not merely the breach of a specific contract but represented the violation of a general duty of care and the damage

Article 1:103: Scope of application

3.

4.

5.

resulting from the breach had nothing to do with disappointed expectation under the contract (Cass. 4 June 1971, RW 1971-72, 371; Cass. 7 December 1973, RW 1973-74, 1597). The trend under SPANISH law is somewhat unclear as a result of contradictory dicta in case law and in legal writing. The majority view in academic writing abstains from adopting a strict application of the principle of non-cumul (of a different view e. g. PazAres/Díez-Picazo/Bercovitz/Salvador (-Pantaleón Prieto), Código Civil II2, 1979, whose view is indeed backed up upon allusion to decisions of the Tribunal Supremo, e. g. TS 16 May 1985, RAJ 1985 (2) no. 2396 p. 2028). For the most part, case law tends to confine contractual liability to “rigurosa órbita de lo pactado”, to the “strict sphere of the agreement” (TS 19 June 1984, RAJ 1984 (2) no. 3250 p. 2482). However, determining the exact particulars of the latter appears, as before, problematic not least because the Tribunal Supremo considers the general duty to conduct oneself according to good faith precepts to come within the remit of this “contractual sphere” (see further Díez-Picazo, Derecho de daños, 265). The Tribunal Supremo has also enabled the injured party to raise both claims either in the alternative or as a subsidiary claim. It has even accepted that the courts can employ the regime of liability which is more favourable to the plaintiff, even where the plaintiff has not asserted this claim (TS 15 February 1993, RAJ 1993 (1) p. 987 no. 771). In ITALY, it is generally accepted that contractual liability will not generally have the effect of displacing parallel tort liability. If a breach of contract can simultaneously amount to the violation of an interest protected by tort law, then the injured party can elect whether he or she wants to pursue a claim under contract or tort law; The principle of concurrence of claims is engaged (Alpa and Bessone (-Rossello), La responsabilità civile I2, 316-317 and 321-326; Rossello, Aggiornamento loc. cit. 1988-1996, I, 139-140; Monateri, Manuale della responsabilità civile, 19-30; Bianca, Diritto civile V, 551-555). It acquires practical significance above all in the field of carriage of persons (breach of contract leads to personal injury) (Alpa and Bessone (-Lopez de Gonzalo), La responsabilità civile IV2, 32-37; Cass. 20 April 1989, no. 1855, Foro it. 1990, I, 1970; Cass. 28 January 1972, no. 226, Giur.it. 1972, I, 1, 1797; compare also [concerning liability for animals ] Cass. 19 January 1977, no. 261, Giur.it. 1978, I, 1, 1791). Moreover, the majority consensus in case law recognizes that, parallel to the Sales Law liability for damage to other interests of the buyer, (his or her health, or property under CC art. 1474(2), liability may arise by virtue of CC art. 2043 (tort) (for citation of relevant case law, see Monateri, Cumulo di responsabilità contrattuale e extracontrattuale, 176). The principle of concurrence of claims is, in this respect, the point of departure (Cass. 5 February 1998, no. 1158, Rep.Giur.it. 1998, voce Vendita no. 45; Cass. 28 July 1986, no. 4833, Rep.Giur.it. 1986, voce Vendita nos. 77-78; Cass. 13 March 1980, no. 1696, Giur.it. 1980, I, 1, 1460; otherwise Cass. 9 February 1965, no. 205, Rep.Foro it. 1965, voce Vendita, no. 68). Naturally, the possibility of obtaining a doubling in compensation in respect of the same damage is always ruled out. See further for complete overview: Castronovo, Europa e dir. priv. 2004, 69. At this point of time, HUNGARIAN CC § 318(1) envisages a uniform system for contractual and tort liability: “The rules on non-contractual liability for damage are to be applied to liability for breach of contract and in the determination of the extent of compensation. A reduction in the amount of damages awarded is not permitted unless otherwise provided by law.” POLISH CC art. 443, by contrast, expressly provides for a

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6.

7.

284

free concurrence of contractual and tortious liability. However, it is commonly recognised that a breach of contractual obligations may constitute a delict only if it infringes at the same time a generally binding rule of law or principles of community life (zasady współz˙ycia społecznego). In that case the claimant may choose the claim which he regards as more advantageous to him. It suffices that the claimant sets out and proves the facts founding his claim since the court is under a duty to choose the legal ground of liability, which in the circumstances of the case is more favourable to the claimant (SN 14 February 2003, LEX no. 78273; Safjan, Kodeks cywilny I4, 1268-1271; Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania-cze˛s´c´ ogólna5, 353-354). According to GERMAN law, breach of contractual obligations is not tantamount to either the breach of an (absolute) law in the sense of CC § 823(1) of the violation of a protective law in the sense of CC § 823(2). However, if, in conjunction with an existing breach of contract, one of the enumerated rights under CC § 823(1) (particularly violation of ownership or infliction of personal injury) has also been infringed, then the principle of concurrence of tort and contract law actions is postulated (reaffirmed on numerous occasions in jurisprudence, see. BGH 28 April 1953, BGHZ 9, 301, 302; BGH 24 May 1976, BGHZ 66, 315, 319; BGH 17 March 1987, BGHZ 100, 190, 201; Erman (-Schiemann), BGB I10, Pref. to § 823, no. 25; Staudinger (-Hager), BGB13, Pref. to §§ 823 ff, no. 38). An exception to this principle is made where applying tort law defeats the purpose of a contract law norm, e. g. because this norm provides for certain privileges from liability or shorter limitation periods. The rationale holds that then this norm would be emasculated and deprived of practical effect, if tort law were to be applied. The case law is extensive: see, for example, on CC § 521 BGH 20 November 1984, BGHZ 93, 23; on CC § 599 and CC § 690 BGH 23 March 1966, BGHZ 46, 140, 145; on CC § 708 BGH 20 December 1966, BGHZ 46, 313, 316 [all cases in which a qualified fault is required]; and on CC § 548 [= CC § 558 in its older version] BGH 31 January 1967, BGHZ 47, 53, 55; BGH 24 May 1976, BGHZ 66, 315, 320; BGH 8 January 1986, NJW 1986, 1608; BGH 23 May 2006, NJW 2006, 2399 and on CC § 606 BGH 31 January 1967, BGHZ 47, 53, 55 [shorter contract law limitation periods]). It is important to note that the reform of the German law of obligations in particular by CC § 280(1) second sentence (reversal of the burden of proof for fault in contract liability) and CC § 253 (introduction of non-economic loss in the context of contractual liability) has rendered many of the issues obsolete, which had previously played a significant role in the discussions pertaining to problems of concurrence. Similarly, in AUSTRIA, the principle of concurrence of tort law and contract law actions or Anspruchnormenkonkurrenz is generally applicable. In contrast to the prevailing legal position in Germany, a shorter limitation period under contract law has no bearing upon a damages claim under tort law (see further Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, nos. 17/8; Rummel (-Reischauer) ABGB II2 § 1295 no. 25). In particular, the specific limitation periods listed in the Third Chapter of the Commercial Code (Ccom §§ 414, 423 and 439) do not apply to tort law damages claims unless otherwise agreed. This is even the case if the consignor is the owner of the good that is lost or damaged. The rationale holds that the tortious actor should not be unduly favoured merely because he or she has a contractual relationship with the injured party (Huber, JBl 1986, 227; OGH 9 September 1986, JBl 1986, 793; OGH 16 November 1989, JBl 1990, 528 = RS 0 062408).

Article 1:103: Scope of application

8.

9.

10.

In GREECE, quite similar issues are the subject of deliberation. The courts have stated that a breach of contract is concurrently a tort under CC art. 914, if the damaging conduct would also be unlawful even if no contract was in existence (A. P. 967/1973 NoB 1974, 505; A. P. 1058/1977 NoB 1978, 929; CA Athens 10288/1986 EllDik 1987, 886). In such cases, the courts adopt the approach of concurrence of actions: contractual and tort claims can be raised separately according to the rules that govern the two areas of law (A. P. 171/1978 NoB 1979, 238; A. P. 967/1973 NoB 1974, 505; CA Athens 10288/1987 EllDik 1987, 886; CA Athens 5653/1987 EllDik 1989, 775). At this juncture, a rider must be added given that particular provisions of contract law (e. g. those providing for a less strict yardstick for the imposition of liability as is the case with CC arts. 811 and 823) would be rendered effectively meaningless, an exception from the principle of concurrence of actions has been established (CA Athens 951/1967 NoB 1968, 279; Balis, Genikai Archai8, 372). Furthermore, as far as prescriptive periods are concerned, contractual and tortious liability generally abide by their own respective rules (A. P. 47/1996 NoB 1998, 206; A. P. 1993 NoB 1993, 1069; A. P. 967/1973 NoB 1974, 505). Landlord and tenant law (CC art. 602) connotes an exceptional case where the landlord’s tort law claims are subject to the shorter contractual limitation periods (CA Athens 6595/1994 EllDik 1995, 1288; CA Dodoni 261/1997 EllDik 1998, 185). Academic writing favours the extension of the shorter period of limitation for consequential damage under the law of service contract to (CC art. 693) to the tort law claim (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Kardaras), arts. 688-690, no. 30), whereby the shorter limitation period for consequential damage under sales law ought not to be embrace tort law claims (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Doris), arts. 554-558, no. 18; of a divergent view Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 260). In preparing the groundwork for the enactment of the PORTUGUESE Civil Code in 1966, there was some deliberation on whether to adopt an express statutory stipulation on the relationship between contract and tort law (Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 85 (1959) 238), but this provision never saw the light of day. The majority legal opinion concedes that the principle of concurrence of actions holds sway whereby the plaintiff can freely choose the regime of liability more favorable to him/her (see, inter alia. Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 637 and STJ 22 October 1987, BolMinJus 370 (1987) 529). However, the opposite view is also propounded; namely, the “princípio da consunção” which is derived from “sistema do não cúmulo” which states that the contractual regime of liability should be accorded priority (Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 501; STJ 9 February 1995, CJ(ST) III (1995-1) 75). There are distinctions between contractual liability and liability under tort in a multitude of areas (inter alia prescription periods, burden of proving fault); however, the law on damages for both regimes is uniform and governed by CC arts. 562–572. In general, it is asserted that contract law covers loss arising from poor or non-performance and the general principles can be found in CC arts. 798-800. Consequently, the liability of a contractor to a property developer or to a purchaser for losses resulting from a defective building is governed by contract law rules (CC art. 1225), the liability of the owner or the occupier of a building to a third party is resolved on the basis of tort law rules (CC art. 492) (Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado II3, 827, note 5 to art. 1225). According to DUTCH law, it would, in principle be conceivable that a breach of contract could connote a violation of a right in the sense of CC art. 6:162(1). However, it can be derived from the fact that given that there are separate provisions regulating the

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11.

12.

286

breach of contractual obligations contained in CC arts. 6:74 ff, they consequently enjoy priority over CC arts. 6:162 (Asser (-Hartkamp) Verbintenissenrecht III10, nos. 8-9 pp. 9-10). Only under exceptional circumstances will non-performance under a contract simultaneously amount to a tort under CC art. 6:162. This state of affairs will arise if the wrongfulness stems from elsewhere other than the (mere) breach of contract. Examples include where the debtor damages a thing owned by the creditor which is held by the debtor by virtue of contractual relations, or where the employer breaches a health and safety obligation owed to the employee. In such cases, there is a concurrence of tort and contractual claims (see further Asser (-Hartkamp) Verbintenissenrecht III10, nos. 811 pp. 9-12; Jansen, Onrechtmatige daad: algemene bepalingen2, no. 15 pp. 23-24; Nieuwenhuis/Stolker/Valk (-Lindenbergh), T & C Vermogensrecht4, art. 6:162 BW no. 5; HR 9 December 1955, NedJur 1956 no. 157 p. 353; HR 6 April 1990, NedJur 1991 no. 689 p. 2961; HR 6 December 1996, NedJur 1997 no. 398 p. 2176). ESTONIAN LOA § 1044 is one of the very few provision which expressly deals with the relationship between contractual and tort law. This provision is on cognate lines to Article 1:103(c) and (d) and provides: “(1) The provisions of this Chapter [= on “Unlawful Causing of Damage”] do not preclude or restrict the right of a victim to claim compensation for damage on a legal basis other than that provided in this Chapter or the right to make other claims, unless otherwise provided by law. (2) Compensation for damage arising from the violation of contractual obligations shall not be claimed on the bases provided in this Chapter, unless otherwise provided by law. Compensation for damage arising from the violation of contractual obligations may be claimed on the bases provided in this Chapter if the objective of the violated contractual obligation was other than to prevent the damage for which compensation is claimed. (3) If the death, personal injury or damage to the health of a person is caused as a result of the violation of a contractual obligation, the tortfeasor shall be liable for such damage on the basis provided in this Chapter.” A comparable regulation which is couched in definitional terms can be discovered in LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.245(2)-(4) (“2. Civil liability is of two kinds: contractual liability and non-contractual (delictual) liability. 3. Contractual liability is a pecuniary obligation resulting from a failure to perform a contract or from its defective performance where one party of the obligation has the right to claim for compensation of damages or demand payment of a penalty (fine, interest), and the other party is bound to make compensation for damages, or to pay a penalty (fine, interest) caused by the failure to perform the contract, or by a defective performance thereof. 4. Non-contractual (delictual) liability is a pecuniary obligation which is not related with contractual relations, except in cases where it is established by laws that delictual liability shall also result from damage related with contractual relations”). In the NORDIC Countries the SWEDISH and FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 1 § 1 state that contractual and tortious liability likewise are in principle subject to free concurrence of actions (cf. Article 1:103(c) and (d)), but tortious liability can as a rule not be asserted if it allows further-reaching legal remedies than the competing contractual liability and if from their interpretation, it results that they wish to replace the tortious liability. This can be the case, for example, where a claim in contract has lapsed (Lindskog, Preskription2, 555-556), or where the contractual claim does not include the entire damage (Swedish HD 25 May 1949, NJA 1949, 289; Swedish HD 28 September 1951, NJA 1951, 656; Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 90). If the tortfeasor is in possession of the object, an existing contractual relationship with the injured party can

Article 1:103: Scope of application

13.

shift the burden of proof, for example in the case of safe-deposit contracts (Hellner and Johansson loc. cit. 87). If, on the other hand, contract law is more favourable to the injured party than tort law, he can rely without further ado on contract law. Examples of this are found in consumer law, for example. In particular Swedish Consumer Sales Act § 31 and (the not totally congruent) Finnish Consumer Protection Act (Konsumentskyddslag) chap. 5 §§ 20 and 21 can be more favourable to the consumer than the transplanted EC Product Liability Directive. An instructive example for the approach of the Swedish courts is found in HD 28 February 1996, NJA 1996, 104. The plaintiff, the owner of a kennel for dogs and cats, was injured by one of the animals staying there, which pulled so strongly on the lead that the plaintiff fell and sustained a broken bone. The court held the strict non-contractual liability for dogs as inapplicable, and was of the opinion that only contractual liability could come into question, and this was to be denied on the basis of a lack of fault (Hellner and Johansson loc. cit. 181). Also in DENMARK contractual and tortious liability in principle are subject to free concurrence of actions (cf. Article 1:103(c) and (d)), but from the interpretation of the rules governing the actual contract one may in some situations say that they wish to replace the tortious liability (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 26-27; Gomard, Forholdet mellem erstatningsregler i og uden for kontraktsforhold, 64). The distinction between contract and tort is of great importance in the COMMON LAW tradition, see generally McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 32-36. In ENGLAND / WALES when there is a contract between the defendant and claimant it does not prevent the notion of there being a duty of care, and, conversely, “if a head of claim ... were recoverable in contract, the fact that it could not be recoverable in tort should not prevent it from being recoverable in contract” (Hamilton Jones v. David & Snape (a firm) [2003] EWHC 3147 (Ch), [2004] 1 WLR 924). A case may therefore be pled cumulatively or alternatively on the basis of breach of contract or of a duty of care in delict or tort, such as to obtain the benefit of any advantage with respect to limitations of time for bringing an action (Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. (No. 1) [1995] 2 AC 145, 182 per Lord Goff of Chieveley). The contract may be seen thus as an enabling actor, determining the range of matters which will be affected. It is not possible to disregard the contract – mutual obligations in tort are not capable of being any greater than those to be found expressly or by necessary implication in their contract (Lord Scarman in Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd. (No. 1) [1986] AC 80, 107). The background of contracts, depending on the context, is a factor that can support the recognition of the situation being one in which a duty of care in delict /tort is capable of arising. However, there is no duty of care to subsequent purchasers of property that is defective (Bellefield Computer Services Ltd. v. E Turner & Sons [2002] EWCA Civ 1823, [2002] Build LR (N. S.) 97), and only once have the ENGLISH courts held that the existence of a contract with a third party would indicate the possibility of a duty of care being capable of arising in tort for negligence, namely Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Co. Ltd. [1983] 1 AC 520, whereby a sub-contractor was held to be negligent in tort in respect of shoddy floors in the building, despite the absence of a direct contract with the injured party. This has not been followed. It is more the case in ENGLAND / WALES that the existence of contract(s) with third party(ies) will be looked on as a factor that strongly tends to negate the possibility of a duty of care arising in delict (Norwich City Council v. Harvey [1989] 1 WLR 828, 834 per May LJ). In SCOTLAND, the trend established in Junior Books has been more sporadically adopted (see Norwich Norwich

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Union Life Insurance Society v. Covell Matthew Partnership 1987 SLT 452, 459 per Lord McCluskey). But later in Strathford East Kilbride Ltd. v. HLM Design Ltd. 1999 SLT 121, 127 per Lord Maclean it was held that no duty of care was capable of arising to prospective tenants where the architect contracted with the owner of the building. For IRELAND, there has been a general trend in the courts to rule that the existence of a contract between the parties does not mean that there cannot be a liability arising out of tort (e. g. Finlay v. Murtagh [1979] IR 249, 256 per Henchy J.). Despite this, modern courts tend to disfavour plaintiffs attempting to sue in the more favourable manner open to them (Madden v. Irish Turf Club [1997] 2 IR 184; Sweeney v. Duggan [1997] 2 ILRM 211). Thus perhaps one could say that the Irish courts disfavour “picking and choosing” claims in contract or tort, in order to gain the most advantage. However, in cases of an employer’s obligations to his workers and those obligations of a professional to a client, the courts will not restrict the injured party to either tortious or contractual remedies – both will be available (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 35). See generally von Bar and Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract and Tort, 203-206. II.

In particular: liability in respect of self-contained damage in defective products and buildings

14.

A particularly problematic issue pertaining to the relationship between contractual and tortious liability and has provoked much discussion concerns the question which of the relevant regimes is applicable in the case involving the “self -destruction” of a product. This term is used to describe cases where a thing has been delivered or manufactured and at the time of acquisition the defect was confined to part of the thing and subsequently insidiously spreads to other components of the thing or takes hold throughout. For example, a complex structure (e. g. a large machine) with attendant defect (an operating switch which should automatically lead to the machine being turned off in the event of it overheating) is delivered but the machine is overall in working order. At a subsequent juncture, the machine is completely destroyed owing to the defect which was present in the machine from the beginning (there is a failure in disconnecting the supply of electricity, the machine catches fire and is completely destroyed). In similar cases to the above cited example, the GERMAN courts have affirmed that there may be a cause of action in tort law in respect of the remaining part of the object which is free from defects (the machine absent defective switch) and therefore, whilst applying the rules on concurring claims, granted a claim in tort law which entailed that the plaintiff could thus bypass contractual hurdles (such as limitation periods, exclusion clauses confined to contractual liability) (BGH 24 November 1976, BGHZ 67, 359). Conversely, a claim for damage to property (which is then as a consequence dealt with exclusively within the realm of contractual liability) cannot be availed of where the damage claimed is equivalent to the “lack of value” which inhered in the thing from the very beginning owing to its defectiveness (BGH 18 January 1983, BGHZ 86, 256; BGH 12 February 1992, BGHZ 117, 183). The exact particulars of where to draw the borderline, continue to vacilliate. It was held in the judgment of the BGH 12 December 2000, NJW 2001, 1346, that there is no physical damage to a building (consequently tort law is inapplicable) where the purchaser built upon land that has been filled with unsound slag and the construction works were later damaged owing to the slag expanding. At no stage did the plaintiff own a building free from defects.

288

Article 1:103: Scope of application

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

GREECE has kept a close eye on the developments that have emerged from Germany (Pouliadis, FS Vavouskos II, 498). Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio III, 348 are of the opinion that when a divisible part of a thing is defective and owing to the defect there is an extension of damage, encompassing the complete object, then it is arguable that the provisions on product liability ought to apply. Pouliadis (loc. cit. 501) is a proponent of utilising the provisions on product liability, if the damage to the product can be attributed to the effect of the defect. PORTUGUESE law provides for liability under sales law (CC arts. 913-922) and liability under a service contract (CC arts. 1218-1226) for damage which is caused by latent defects in a product. Liability is of a tortious nature if the damage involved exceeds the actual defect in the product (Romano Martinez, Direito das obrigações, 130 and 441 ff). In a Supreme Court decision where a defective gas container exploded after it had been delivered to the purchaser, the court (STJ 22 April 1986, BolMinJus 356 (1986) 349) granted a contractual claim in respect of the damage to the gas container and by doing this it was able to avail of the general twenty year limitation period under CC art. 309. At the same time however, it abided by a previous decision of STJ 29 October 1974, BolMinJus 240 (1974) 209 and held that the tort law claim under CC art. 509(1) which was governed by a limitation period of three years (CC art. 498) also came in for consideration. Similarly in SWEDEN it would appear that since the decision in HD 2 April 1918, NJA 1918 156 the problem of an “insidious spreading damage” is predominantly overcome by having resort to tort law (Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 311). However, it should be noted that the Swedish and FINNISH Consumer Protection Acts provide for contractual regulations which could be more favourable to the consumer than claiming under tort law. The predominant view in European legal circles is however, that contract law should solely govern the liability for “damage which spreads insidiously”. The EU Product Liability Directive excludes damage to a defective product itself from its scope of application, art. 9 lit. (b). This rule only pertains to strict liability under the Directive; the regime of liability for negligence is not encompassed within the Directive, the same holds true for the regime of contractual liability (art. 13). The Consumer Protection Directive does not consider this issue directly. The latter, however, does not impinge upon existing national tort law orders (art. 8 of the Directive). In BELGIUM, FRANCE and LUXEMBOURG, liability of the seller against the buyer for loss arising from a latent defect in the purchased product (vices cachés) is, on the basis of the principle of non-cumul des responsabilités governed by contract law (e. g. Cass.civ. 13 November 1984, Bull.civ. 1984 I, no. 303 p. 258). The relevant rules are found in CC arts. 1641 et seq. The damages claim under CC art. 1645 extends to damage to the product itself as well as where harm accrues to other legally protected interests of the purchaser (on this point, see for FRANCE Malaurie/Aynès/Gautier, Contrats spéciaux VIII14, no. 411 p. 293 and for BELGIUM CA Bruxelles 22 November 1991, RGAR 1993, 12237). If a third party sustains loss which can be ascribed to the defect, the latter is confined to a remedy in tort law (see on this point for FRANCE Malaurie/Aynès/Gautier loc. cit. no. 421 p. 299 and for BELGIUM Herbots/Pauwels/Degroote, TPR 1997, no. 111 p. 735). A prerequisite of contractual liability under CC art. 1645 is that the seller has knowledge of the defect. FRENCH jurisprudence, however, has laid down an irrebuttable presumption that the professional seller acted in bad faith. On the other hand, in

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Chapter 1: Fundamental provisions BELGIUM, a rebuttable presumption operates (the seller must adduce proof that it was impossible for him to ascertain the defect) (see, in this respect for FRANCE Cass.civ. 19 January 1965, Bull.civ. 1965, I, no. 52 p. 59 and for BELGIUM Herbots loc. cit. no. 103 p. 729. Since 1985, LUXEMBOURGIAN CC art. 1645 expressly classes the professional

20.

21.

22.

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seller as having acted in bad faith. In all three legal systems, the claim must be filed within a short time frame (bref délai) CC art. 1648. Similarly, in SPAIN a claimant in cases of this type is limited to asserting a contractual remedy. While the German approach (tort liability) has indeed been discussed in academic literature (Cavanillas Múgica and Tapia Fernández, La concurrencia de responsabilidad contractual y extracontractual, 13) there is no corresponding case law on the subject. According to the structure of the Civil Code, CC arts. 1486(2) and 1591 constitute the point of departure (liability for latent defects in products under sales and services law). The limitation period under sales law is 6 months starting from the time when the good was delivered (CC art. 1490). However, the courts in Spain consider that there is concurrence of claims between this cause of action and the general damages claim based on non-performance (CC arts. 1101 ff). This conception of the law has the effect of extending the limitation period to 15 years (TS 3 February 1986, RAJ 1986 (1) no. 409 p. 360, 6. recital). CC art. 1591 as well as Construction Act (Ley 38/1999, de Ordenación de la Edificación) arts. 17 and 18 govern liability for damage resulting from defective construction of the building structure. Loc. cit. art. 17 expressly provides that the contractual liability of those involved in building the structure is not affected by its provisions. Similar to the position under sales law, it is inferred that CC arts. 1101 ff remains applicable to this part of services law (TS 9 February 1990, RAJ 1990 (1) no. 674 p. 782, 4. recital). Art. 1494 of the ITALIAN CC distinguishes between loss which is directly caused by the defective product (Paragraph 1: diminution of value, costs of repair, loss of profits etc.) and the indirect damage to the purchaser’s other legally protected interests caused by the product (Paragraph. 2: personal injury, property etc.). The case where the product is destroyed owing to an inherent defect may be construed as a case falling under CC art. 1494(1) (for case law citations, see Buonocore and Luminoso, Codice della vendita2, art. 1494 § 6). CC art. 1494(1) corresponds to CC art. 1668 which governs services contracts. However, it has not yet been authoratively decided whether the liability of a contractor for the destruction of the subject matter of the contract for work and services or if that object turns out to be gravely defective under CC art. 1669 is of a contractual or tortious nature. At any rate, the courts consider that this scenario is governed by the precepts of non-contractual liability as this provision is concerned with promoting the common good (Cass. 26 May 2000, no. 6997, Rep.Giur.it. 2000, voce Appalto privato no. 84; Cass. 7 January 2000, no. 81, Giur.it. 2000, I, 1, 977). If the requirements of CC art. 1669 are not fulfilled then, depending on the individual circumstances of the case at hand, tort law liability could arise (CC art. 2043) (Cass. 23 March 1977, no. 1136, Giur.it. 1978, I, 316; Cass. 7 April 1999 no. 3338, Rep.Giur.it. 2000, voce Appalto privato no. 85). In AUSTRIA, Weiterfresserschäden is governed by product liability law. According to Product Liability Act (PHG) § 1 the producer of a defective component only has to make good damage caused to the final product if the injured party purchased the component as an independent product. Whether or not this is the case is to be judged by the conceptions of the proper duty of care. The OGH expressly does not follow the German

Article 1:103: Scope of application

23.

24.

25.

26.

case law. The facts dealt with by tort law in German case law, in Austria constitute exclusively contract law (OGH 3 February 1992, SZ 67/22 and OGH 3 February 1994, SZ 67/22 [no liability imposed on the manufacturer of a water hose for damage caused to the engine of the purchaser’s car]) HUNGARIAN Product Liability Act § 1(4) is only concerned with loss caused to other things. The general rules of contractual and tort liability remain in-situ (loc. cit. § 12). Aside from product liability, CC § 310 represents the point of departure for damages claims based on the defect. A contractual claim ensue to which tort law rules apply. Therefore, one is not faced with a problem of qualification (see in more detail Fuglinszky, Mangelfolgeschäden im deutschen und ungarischen Recht, passim). In POLAND on the other hand the view is taken in applying the principle of free concurrence of contractual and tortious liability that putting a defective product into circulation constitutes a wrong which can be the basis of liability in damages even for damage to the damaged thing itself (SN 6 February 1963, OSNC 1964, poz. 95; SN 19 November 1973, OSNCP 1974, poz. 169; Radwan´ ski and Panowicz-Lipska, Zobowia˛zania-cze˛s´c´ szczegółowa5, 43). In the event that a movable or immovable object does not conform to the sales contract, the purchaser can avail of a whole array of legal remedies under DUTCH CC art. 7:21. CC art. 7:22 provides that the purchaser is entitled to avail of these remedies irrespective of other claims that he or she may have. In addition, the purchase can have recourse to a damages claim under a contract for non-performance (CC art. 6:74 CC) as well as asserting a claim under tort law (CC art. 6:162) (Asser (-Hijma), Bijzondere overeenkomsten I6, no. 380 p. 339). In respect of the latter, the question arises whether the damage to the product itself (“bargain write off” (Transaktionsschaden) is encompassed within the scope of the provisions (Hijma loc. cit. no. 475 p. 407 and no. 448 p. 389). For the law of concurrence of actions, it was decided to cede priority to contract law in these particular circumstances; therefore CC arts. 6:162 et seq. (tort) are not applicable and the plaintiff must rely exclusively on CC arts. 6:74 ff. CC arts. 6:162 et seq. are only relevant if the conduct of one party, unconnected with the breach of contract, amounts to a tort (Hijma loc. cit. no. 442 pp. 384-385). Damage to the defective product itself within the framework of consumer sales is governed by CC art. 7:24. Paragraph (1) of the latter refers to the general rules on non-performance in respect of the damages claim. Consequential loss for product liability is not encompassed by this provision (see further Hijma loc. cit. no. 443 p. 385; Nieuwenhuis/Stolker/Valk (-Castermans), T & C Vermogensrecht4, art. 7:24 BW nos. 1-3). A proposition that where there was created a “complex structure” (D. & F. Estates v. Church Commissioners for England [1989] AC 177 per Lord Bridge at 206) that was affected by the negligence of the defender in the creation of one aspect of it there could be a duty of care capable of arising in respect of that negligence resulting in an adverse effect on that other part has also been rejected in ENGLAND (Murphy v. Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398 per Lord Bridge at 479). In SCOTLAND there has been a conflict of authority with respect to the proposition that there can be delictual liability for damage to the defective product. The broad approach (that there could be) was applied in two cases (Mcleod v. Scottish Special Housing Association 1990 SLT 749 per Lord Coulsfield at 751-752; Parkhead Housing Association Ltd. v. Phoenix Preservation Ltd. 1990 SLT 812 per Lord Prosser at 817). However, a recent case (Hughes v. Barratt Urban Construction (Scotland) Ltd. [2002]

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Scot CS 87 per Lord Carloway) has rejected it as inconsistent with later developments in House of Lords English cases formulating the general approach to be adopted in determining whether a duty of care is capable of arising in delict /tort for negligence. Recent English decisions can be taken as being the law. These have limited the idea to a much narrower one covering only situations where the negligent party was responsible for the creation of something in a distinct part of a property already in existence, in circumstances where he was not responsible also for the creation of the whole, or a larger part of that property. It has been held, for example, that, though “close to the border”, this could not apply where a manufacturer of carbon dioxide negligently caused it to be contaminated with benzene and supplied it to another manufacturer who mixed it with a combination of water and a concentrate acquired from another supplier to produce an alcoholic drink. A duty of care was held not to be capable of arising in tort as the claim related to “the finished product” and its diminution in value and consequential losses following later upon the need to recall it from market. The argument was rejected that the contaminated carbon dioxide could be seen as having damaged the concentrate with which it was mixed (Bacardi-Martini Beverages Ltd. v. Thomas Hardy Packaging Ltd. [2002] EWCA Civ 549, [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 379 per Mance LJ at [18]). III.

Tort law and other areas of private law

27.

The rules on concurrence of actions which define the parameters of the relationship between tort law and other areas of private law are complex and convoluted. The constituents of the relevant rules are not invariable and there may be divergence depending on the field of law at issue. The following analysis focuses on the relationship that tort law has to other areas of the law of obligations and to important aspects of property law. In BELGIUM, FRANCE and LUXEMBOURG an unjustified enrichment claim (judicially created) is subsidiary to a tort law claim. Where tort law is applicable, it excludes the assertion of a claim based on enrichissement sans cause (see for France Mazeaud and Chabas, Leçons de droit civil II(1)9, nos. 706-709 and for Belgium de Page, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge III3, nos. 33-34 pp. 41-45). Conversely, an action en répétition de l’indu (condictio indebiti) which is governed by CC arts. 1376-1381 can also be asserted where a tort law claim is admissible (at any rate, this true for France Cass.civ. 19 October 1983, Bull.civ. 1983, I, no. 242 p. 216). As far as the gestion d’affaires which is regulated in CC arts. 1372-1375 is concerned, the exact parameters of the relationship between the latter and a cause of action under tort law are not yet fully determined. There is well nigh universal acceptance that this claim is not of a mere subsidiary character in relation to tort law (at any rate as far as the Belgian legal position is concerned Fagnart, JT 1969, 255; Vael is of a different view, TPR 1999, 104, no. 28, there fn. 67). In two general reports dealing with the law on quasi- contracts, Rép.Dr. Civ. (-le Tourneau) IX, no. 28 and JClCiv (-Jacquet), arts. 1370-1371, v8 Quasi-contrats, no. 77, proffered the opinion that, under French law, all quasi contracts, including the gestion d’affaires in this description, are legal concepts which are of a subsidiary nature. Judicial confirmation of this analysis is still pending. The Cour de Cassation expressly refuted this approach with regard to the law of répétition de l’indu (loc. cit.). Conversely, it is possible in SPAIN that a damages claim on the basis of tort and unjustified enrichment may be asserted cumulatively since the decision of the Supreme

28.

29.

292

Article 1:103: Scope of application

30.

31.

Court in the 1950s (TS 12 April 1955, RAJ 1955 (2) no.1125 p. 602). This is of particular significance, when the short limitation period of one year for bringing a claim under non-contractual liability has expired. A claim based on unjustified enrichment has a limitation period of 15 years. Ad hoc statutory provision may stipulate that a damages claim is to be assessed according to the extent to which the wrongdoer was enriched (for example, Copyright Act [Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1996, de la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual, LPI] of 12 April 1996 and Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act 1/1982 of 5 May 1982). Under ITALIAN law, as far as the relationship to the condictio indebiti is concerned, there is a primary distinction to be drawn between cases where the recipient acts in good faith and where the conduct of recipient acts reprehensibly. A recipient who acts in good faith is liable only for the enrichment that is extant at the time of the action; claims for the deterioration or perishing of the object under tort law are excluded (Moscati, Pagamento dell’indebito, 492-506). However, if the recipient acts in bad faith, then it is permitted to also assert a claim under tort law (Moscati loc. cit. 510 fn. 9 and 515-526). The unjustified enrichment claim is subsidiary to the tort law claim; it cannot be raised in conjunction with a tort law claim (De Cupis, Il danno II3, 234-236). The availability of the possibility of accumulating claims in rem and tort law claims is contentious. It is possibly to avail of the latter if the property owner’s enjoyment of property is disturbed or interfered with of he or she is divested of their property. In such cases, the damages claim can be raised in conjunction with the claim for restoration of the property (CC art. 948) or action for the abatement of the nuisance (CC art. 949) (Cass. 26 February 1986, no. 1214, Rep.Giur.it. 1986, voce Servitù no. 4 [considering the rights of the holder of an easement]). Tort liability is precluded when the interference with property rights only entitles one to monetary compensation under the relevant property law rules. Then, the plaintiff must frame his breach of property rights claim in terms directed at obtaining monetary recompense (Gambaro, Il diritto di proprietà, 894-896); the exact contours and the particulars of the claim are still the subject of discussion (compare on the one hand Cass. 23 May 1985, no. 3110, Rep.Giur.it. 1985, voce Servitù no. 4 [tort liability in conjunction with protection of possessory rights with respect to disturbances, which did not impair the exercise of rights under the servitude]; Cass. 11 August 2000, no. 10733, Giur.it. 2001, 898 [usufruct] and Cass. 16 March 1988, no. 2472, Giur.it. 1989, I, 1, 510 [liability in tort for impairment of rights under easement] and of a different viewpoint Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile3, 614-623 [the distinction between tort liability and an action based on breach of property rights emphasised]). More recently, there has been a trend, also in jurisprudence, towards determining the relationship between tort and family law. Cass. 7 June 2000, no. 7713, Giur.it. 2000, 1352 awarded a son damages under tort law against his father for breach of maintenance obligations, Cass. 10 May 2005, no. 9801, Giust.civ.Mass. 2005, fasc. 5 awarded a woman damages under tort law against her husband who had failed to inform her before the marriage that he was impotent. Family law is not the only medium by which such claims can be asserted. In POLAND the principle of free concurrences of actions applies also as between liability in tort and liability in unjustified enrichment (CC art. 414). However, concurrence between damages claims arising in tort and those arising out of the so-called ownerpossessor relationship is much more complicated. The dominant opinion inclines towards yielding priority to the latter (CC arts. 224 and 225) within its scope of applica-

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33.

294

tion to the exclusion of the law of tort (SN 25 March 1986, OSNCP 1987, poz. 44; Radwan´ ski and Dybowski (-Gniewek), System prawa prywatnego III, 505; Wójcik, System prawa cywilnego II, 509). HUNGARIAN CC § 118 lays down the prerequisites under which a bona fide purchaser for value can acquire property from a person not entitled or authorised to dispose of the property. The conclusion that can be derived from this provision is that the bona fide purchaser for value will not be liable to the true owner. The former is not “enriched” because he paid for the goods acquired. The general tenet under GERMAN law is that, similar to the relationship of tort to contract law, the principle of concurrence of actions applies (RGRK (-Steffen), BGB12, Pref. to § 823, no. 35; Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB65, § 194 no. 8). Only in exceptional circumstances will tort law have to yield to other fields of law, to cite one example the provisions governing owner-occupier relations (CC §§ 989 ff). These rules are special rules which are of exclusive operation (CC § 993(1) in fine). A claim, supplementing these rules, which asserts interference with property rights under tort law, will only arise in the enumerated cases stipulated in CC § 992 or where an exceptional case can be brought within a recognised category of cases (BGH 23 March 1966, BGHZ 46 140, 146). This serves to protect the possessor who is in possession of the thing in good faith albeit unlawfully, for example, the protection of a good faith purchaser who acquired a stolen good (and therefore property in the thing was not transferred); imposing tort liability even for ordinary negligence in such circumstances would contradict the spirit of CC §§ 989 ff (BGH 29 October 1959, BGHZ 31, 129, 134; BGH 31 March 1971, BGHZ 56, 73, 77; BGH 21 January 1980, NJW 1980, 2353, 2354). Identical considerations are prevalent in respect of CC § 932 which provides that the good faith acquisition of property from a person other than the owner of the property does not amount to an interference with property rights, a state of affairs which according to CC §823(1), if attended by at the very least ordinary negligence, would compel the return of the property or give rise to a damages claim (BGH 25 April 1967, NJW 1967, 1660, 1662; BGH 23 May 1956, JZ 1956, 490). A further example featuring the supplanting of tort law derives from rights conferred by marriage and under family law. According to case law, the sole infringement of a fiduciary duty imposed by virtue of marriage does not trigger liability under tort law; the consequences of the infringement are exclusively governed by provisions of family law (further particulars in RGRK (-Steffen), BGB12, Pref. to § 823, no. 51, § 823, nos. 65 ff). Unjustified enrichment claims and claims under negotiorum gestio can arise independent of any liability under tort law (Steffen loc. cit. Pref. to § 823, no. 49; BGH 2 July 1971, BGHZ 56, 317, 319; CA Hamm 25 September 2000, r+s 2001, 320 [Damages claim based on negotiorum gestio in a case where a rescuer injured himself]). In so far as a tort law claim under CC §§ 823 et seq. is concerned, § 852 sentence 1 (= CC § 852(3) (old)) would also appear to lend credence to the assertion that the unjustified enrichment claim arises independently of tort law. According to the latter, the person under a duty to make reparation who acquires something from another at that other’s expense as a result of the commission of a tort, even if the damages claim is out of time, is required to surrender the property in accordance with the provisions pertaining to unjustified enrichment (see further BGH 2 July 1971, BGHZ 56, 317, 319). In AUSTRIA, the principle of alternative concurrence of actions applies in respect of the relationship between a damages claim and the claim for return of the property (rei vindicatio) (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, 532) and Anspruchsnormenkonkurrenz applies to

Article 1:103: Scope of application

34.

35.

the relationship between the damages claim and claim for restitution (Koziol loc. cit. 534). OGH 17 May 2000, ZVR 2001, 44 holds that the erroneous failure to assert a damages claim in respect of recoverable damage is not tantamount to an enrichment under the law of unjustified enrichment; therefore the tort law limitation which had expired in the interim was of no relevance. The GREEK courts have thus far adhered to the principle that the claim under unjustified enrichment is a subsidiary claim (A. P. 1567/1983, NoB 32/1984, 1354; A. P. 890/ 1982, NoB 31/1983, 1156; A. P. 8/1968, NoB 16/1968, 385), but the well-nigh universal view in contemporary academic writing is to refute this stance (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Stathopoulos), Pref. to arts. 904-913, no. 28; Stathopoulos, Axiosis adikaiologitou ploutismou, 236; Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio III, 16), in fact, they furthermore do not rely on the relationship to tort law. Tort law claims do not effect the exclusion of the applicability of claims based on unjustified enrichment (A. P. 72/ 1966, NoB 14/1966, 801; A. P. 7401/1976, NoB 25/1977, 752; CFI Patras 608/1968, NoB 16/1968, 1083; CA Athens 10119/1988, EllDik 30/1989, 1182; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Stathopoulos), Pref. arts. 904-913, no. 36; Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio III, 18). In general, the following principles apply: in respect of the realisation of the elements of the claim pertaining to apparent negotiorum gestio, a claim under tort law always arises in conjunction with this claim. The damages claim can therefore be based on tort law as well as on CC art. 739 (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Papanikolaou), art. 739 no. 12). A claim can only be made under the provisions on negotiorum gestio in respect of the profit made from the unauthorised management of the business (Papanikolaou loc. cit.). The contours of the relationship between tort law and the provisions governing owner /occupier relations are unsettled (CC arts. 1096 ff). Two different approaches may be discerned on this issue. It is submitted that CC arts. 1096 et seq. exclude the applicability of tort law altogether (Toussis, Empragmaton Dikaion4, 478, there fn. 10a). The converse proposition is also advanced, namely that both regimes involve a concurrence of actions which run parallel to one another (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), Introd. arts. 914-938, no. 50; Georgiades, Empragmato dikaio I, § 60, nos. 32 f). In PORTUGAL, determining the ambit of the relationship that tort law has to the law of negotiorum gestio is of particular importance when it comes to determining the burden of proof pertaining to the person performing the service absent the relevant authority. STJ 22 April 1986, RLJ 121 (1988) 59 with note from Baptista Machado in accordance with CC art. 487(1) placed the burden of proof on the injured party, consequently tort law rules were applied. It should be noted that a contrasting approach has been adopted in academic writing, namely a strong trend can be observed which advocates the application of the contractual provisions anchored in CC art. 799(1) (Reversal of the burden of proof) (Menezes Leitão, Responsabilidade do gestor, 291 ff). According to CC art 474, a restitution claim, also a claim based on a condictio indebiti (repetição do indevido) is subsidiary to a tort law claim. The former can only be asserted once other remedies have been exhausted. This provision is however contentious from a policy point of view (particularly critical Vieira Gomes, Conceito de enriquecimento, 415 ff and Menezes Leitão, Enriquecimento sem causa, 700 ff). The courts have also conceded a claim for return of the enrichment in cases of interference with the rights of another which doe not cause pecuniary loss (damage) (STJ 22 April 1999, CJ(ST) VII (1999-2) 58; STJ 23 March 1999, BolMinJus 485 (1999) 396 ff). In general, CC art. 498(4) based on the

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36.

37.

38.

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German model CC § 852 (old) clarifies that “expiry of the period of limitation for the bringing of a damages claim does not impinge upon the period of limitation in respect of bringing a claim in rem for return of the property nor does it affect the limitation period pertaining to the return of the enrichment provided that the necessary requirements are fulfilled” In the NETHERLANDS, if tort law claims and claims anchored on another private law basis collide, the starting point is, in general the principle that causes of action may be invoked cumulatively. This is not only true of the relationship to contract law but also in respect of the relationship to the undue payment provisions of the Civil Code (CC arts. 6:203 et seq) and to unjustified enrichment (CC art. 6:212). Exceptions to this basic principle are made where its application would lead to internal systematic imbalances, provoking an application that would contradict the spirit of the provision or would be unworkable or illogical leading to unacceptable results. In this case, the person entitled to make a claim normally has a right of election (the principle of alternative causes of action): occasionally leading to the result that the basis of the claim precludes raising other claim (so-called principle of exclusivity), for a more in-depth analysis see Boukema, Samenloop, nos. 5-7 pp. 11-14; Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht III10, nos. 122-123 pp. 135-136; Jansen, Onrechtmatige daad: algemene bepalingen2, no. 12 pp. 19-21). On occasion, the varying questions of concurrence of actions are the subject of statutory provision, e. g. in CC art. 3:121 (as far as bad faith cases of possession are concerned, it is possible to invoke the causes of action relating to the return of the property and the fruits and the damages claim cumulatively), in CC art. 3:125(3) (cumulation of the claim of dispossessed possessor for re-delivery of the property and the claim for damages under tort law under CC art. 6:162) and in CC art. 6:193 (Product liability which is strict does not impinge upon the validity of other claims). In other cases, the answer is discovered by perusal of parliamentary debates, e. g. Parlementaire Geschiedenis III, 212 ff (concerning the relationship between claims arising out of CC arts. 3:44(2) or (4) rescission of legal transaction on account of duress] and under CC art. 6:162); Parlementaire Geschiedenis III, 216 ff (concerning the relationship between CC arts. 3:45 et seq [Actio Pauliana; voidness of legal act] to CC art. 6:162); Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 830 (concerning the relationship between claims arising out of unjustified enrichments and damages claims under tort law; rejection of the argument that unjustified enrichment claim is subsidiary to a claim under tort law) and Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 816 (claims based on undue payments [CC art. 6:203] and claims arising under tort law are alternative causes of actions). If research of the parliamentary debates fails to produce reliable indicator of the will of the legislature, then it falls to an appraisal of the purpose of the legal provision (Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht III10, no. 123 p. 136). In the NORDIC countries the contours of the law of negotiorum gestio and unjustified enrichment are poorly mapped out; problems of demarcation seldom arise. In cases of a selling the same good twice, it is conceded that the first purchaser has a claim in rem for restitution of the good as opposed to a tort law claim against the second purchaser who purchases the good in bad faith (Karlgren, Skadeståndsrätt5, 194, 206). In the COMMON LAW it is not so much private law rules of the common law as (public law) rules on enforcement of statutory duties which may serve to limit the scope of tort law, where the ordinary function of the latter would otherwise contradict the special statutory regime: cf. Dobson v. Thames Water Utilities Ltd. [2007] EWHC 2021 (TCC);

Article 1:103: Scope of application

39.

[2008] 2 All ER 362 (where, however, it was held that negligence-based claims in nuisance and negligence claims proper in respect of the odours and mosquitoes generated by a sewage treatment works did not involve any contradiction of the statutory process for enforcement of duties under the Water Industry Act 1991 on the emptying of sewers). SCOTTISH scholars point out that unjustified enrichment has more in common with delict than with contract, with an obligation clearly imposed by law (Stewart, Delict4, 2). The main difference between unjustified enrichment and delict is that in the former case there is no need for the defendant to have done something wrong in order to incur an obligation to pay (Exchange Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. Giulianotti 1959 SC 19). Nonetheless there is significant discussion concerning any possible overlap between the various laws of obligations in Scotland (Hogg, Obligations, 26-31). Concurrent liability will generally apply and has been accepted in case law (Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Co. Ltd. [1983] 1 AC 520).

IV.

Legal persons

40.

Only in BELGIUM, FRANCE and Luxembourg does the basic norm of tort law CC art. 1382 (“Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause ... un dommage”) refer exclusively to natural persons. However, no practical significance is attached to this wording. Legal persons are also subject to the tort law rules of the Code Napoléon (see for FRANCE Cass.civ. 17 July 1967, Bull.civ. 1967, II, no. 261 p. 182 and for BELGIUM Vandeputte, Het aquiliaans foutbegrip, 86-88). In CC art. 1902, the Spanish legislature opted for a preventative corrective device to obviate making the same editorial error as the French paradigm, and deliberately widened the scope of the article to embrace legal persons (García Cantero, Exégesis comparativa del Art. 1.902 CC, 879; see an array of decisions, inter alia. TS 29 September 1964, RAJ 1964 no. 4097 p. 2522). Furthermore, the remainder of the Civil codes in Europe utilise terminology in their basic norms (“whoever violates” the person who does something; “a person” who causes damage etc.) which serves to spell out that legal persons can constitute both tortfeasors and victims of tortious action (CZECH CC and SLOVAKIAN LOA § 420; DUTCH CC art. 6:162; ESTONIAN LOA § 1043; GERMAN CC § 823(1); GREEK CC art. 914; HUNGARIAN CC § 339(1); ITALIAN CC art. 2043; LATVIAN CC art. 1635; LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.263; MALTESE CC art. 1031; POLISH CC art. 415; PORTUGUESE CC art. 483(1) in conjunction with art. 165; SLOVENIAN LOA § 131(1)). In AUSTRIA, CC § 26 expressly prescribes that natural and legal persons are to be generally placed on an equal footing (see further Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht II2, 375). The same principle apples in the culpa rule of the NORDIC counties (“whoever ... causes damage”, cf. e. g. for SWEDEN HD 18 December 1972, NJA 1972, 589 and HD 3 November 1983, NJA 1983, 701; for FINLAND HD 26 August 1982, HD’s årsbok 1982 II 123 and for DENMARK HD 12 October 1949, UfR 1950 p. 21). In the BRITISH ISLES the situation as regards legal persons can vary slightly between incorporated and unincorporated bodies, partnerships and trade unions (see generally Street (-Brazier and Murphy) on Torts10, 584-588; Winfield and Jolowicz (-Rogers), Tort16, 715-719; Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts21, 421-423 for ENGLAND and WALES; McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 1035-1043 for IRELAND; and Stewart, Delict3, 175-179 for SCOTLAND). Corporations may be sued in tort since medieval times

41.

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42.

(Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1613) 10 Co Rep 1a, 77 ER 937, 960 (10 Co.Rep.)). Liability for tort is usually of a vicarious nature for the acts of servants – legal entities, it is said, cannot have intention per se. However, the general rules of vicarious liability will apply with even the malice of the servant capable of being applied to the corporation (Darling J. in Cornford v. Carlton Bank Ltd. [1899] 1 QB 392, 395). Some acts of the corporation itself can be tortious where the act was authorised by the shareholders of the body (Lord Haldane in Lennard’s Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1915] AC 705, 713, the “directing mind” idea). The notion that an incorporated legal body cannot be liable for acts done ultra vires is a topic of debate. There is no firm case law on the matter. McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 1038 seem to favour IRELAND negating the distinction. This would bring it in line with ENGLAND where Companies Act 1989 s. 108(1) will not call into question the validity of an act on the grounds of capacity. Scholars believe this to be ending the distinction between ultra and intra vires actions (Rogers loc. cit. 716). In SCOTLAND incorporated legal persons may carry liability for acts ultra vires (Houldworth v. City of Glasgow Bank (1880) 7 R 53, as quoted in Stewart, Delict3, 178). Partnerships can sue and be sued. Members of a club, however, cannot sue their club; this is based upon the idea of the common interest that would equate to suing oneself (Murphy v. Roche (No. 2) [1987] IR 656 (Gannon J.), as quoted in McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. 1039). In SCOTLAND, unincorporated bodies cannot sue in tort unless their patrimonial interests were damaged (Highland Dancing Board v. Alloa Printing Co. 1971 SLT (Sh.Ct.) 50, 52). A trade union can both sue and be sued in its own name (Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] AC 426; R. (IUDWC) v. Rathmines UDC [1928] IR 260, 300 per Murnaghan J.). Trade unions, however, are generally not liable in tort (ENGLISH Trade Disputes Act 1906 s. 4; IRISH Industrial Relations Act 1990 s. 13(1)). The traditional immunity of the Crown from suit was removed in the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 where the crown is an employer or occupier (see the Occupier’s Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 s. 2(1)). In ENGLAND and IRELAND, certain common law torts cannot give a legal person a right to sue in tort, such as assault or battery (although these torts can, of course, give a right of action against a legal person). For further particulars see the Notes on Article 3:102 (Negligence) and Article 3:202 (Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives).

Illustration 1 is taken from Cass.civ. 15 December 1999, Bull.civ. 1999, I, no. 351 p. 225 = SemJur 2000, I, 241, note Viney; illustration 2 is inspired by CFI Piraeus 1914/2003, DEE 10 (2004), 678 and BGH 27 May 1971, BGHZ 56, 228; illustration 11 is adapted from CA Hamm 25 September 2000, r+s 2001, 320; illustration 12 is taken from STJ 22 April 1999, CJ(ST) VII (1999-2) 58.

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Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage Introduction A.

The concept of legally relevant damage

1. Damage in specific contexts. The essential functions of the second chapter have already been set forth in the general introduction. The second chapter does not seek to draw up a list of abstract interests protected by the law of tort; rather it seeks to clarify within specific contexts the concept of “legally relevant damage” within the meaning of the basic norm – in other words, damage which will be recognised for the purposes of founding liability in tort, given all the other ingredients of the claim. 2. No list of complete torts. The second chapter does not contain complete “torts”. That is because a delict (or a tort) is always only present in any given case as and when all the elements specified in Article 1:101 (Basic rule) coincide (which means, in particular, there must be a ground of accountability and causation in addition to legally relevant damage) and a ground of defence, which would otherwise exclude liability, is missing. 3. Typical situations and a residual rule. Setting out what legally relevant exactly damage “is” does not lend itself to a once-and-for-all, all-purpose definition in the traditional mould. Its existence is always made manifest only in and by the circumstances of the particular case. Hence Chapter 2 (and the same is true of the following chapters) adopts an open and flexible system, particularly in order to allow for future developments by the courts. Due to the multifarious nature of modern (social and economic) life, those varied and infinite sets of circumstances do not allow for any exhaustive description. It is certainly possible for a large number of typical situations to pinpoint the presence of damage within the meaning of tort law, but there will always be a need besides for a residual rule which must content itself with placing in the judge’s hand certain criteria with whose help he or she can ascertain the presence or absence of damage. The text places the means of ascertainment in its own rule at the commencement of the chapter on damage in Section 2, Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage). In the methodical application of the rules to a particular fact situation, however, this residual rule is only engaged when the provisions of the ‘special part’ (Section 2, “Particular Instances of Legally Relevant Damage”) do not yield an exhaustively applicable rule. 4. “Danno ingiusto”. Without invoking the term as such, a certain orientating function of the chapter approaches the Italian image of danno ingiusto in so far as it expresses the points, firstly, that the concept of damage must be viewed in relation to the type of liability and the legal consequences which give it concrete form and, secondly, that there are no methods of defining damage which are applicable for all situations relevant to 299

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liability. The presence of such damage may follow from defined actual events (e. g. damage to property, personal injury); it may be ascertainable within a specific set of facts (e. g. liability for incorrect information); or it may be extrapolated from an infringement of a right (e. g. infringement of human dignity). That said, this draft of course fashions its own concept of damage, that is to say, an autonomous concept which is not to be interpreted by particular reference to Italian legal development. 5. Overlaps. Where there are overlaps, the plaintiff is presented with multiple grounds for action, but of course has only one claim to reparation (or prevention). This presupposes that one and the same damage (loss or injury) can be characterised as legally relevant damage. An example is a deception which induces the person deceived to hand over property to the deceiver. The matter is open to debate, but the view may be held that this results both in a loss resulting from an infringement of a property right within the meaning of Article 2:206 (Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession) as well as reparable economic loss within the meaning of Article 2:210 (Loss upon fraudulent misrepresentation). 6. Distinct manifestations of legally relevant damage. It is equally conceivable that one and the same act may result in two distinct manifestations of legally relevant damage for the claimant. In that case both of the losses or injuries caused generate claims to reparation which must be satisfied independent of the other. An example would be where the tortfeasor’s conduct causes the claimant to suffer both a legally relevant damage in the sense of Article 2:205 (Loss upon breach of confidence) as well as one within the scope of Article 2:201(2)(b) (Personal injury and consequential loss). If, as a result of the breach of confidence, the claimant has sustained a loss of reputation amongst the public and suffered pain in consequence of the injury to his mental health, reparation for both damages can be claimed cumulatively. 7. Legally relevant damage as context-dependant. Finally, in a yet third class of situation one and the same detriment constitutes a legally relevant damage only from one perspective among others. If the same detriment (or loss) is examined in another context, it may well prove to be a legally irrelevant damage, i. e. one which the claimant must shoulder. For example, it might be that a person suffers a non-economic loss as a result of a breach of confidence without actually suffering an injury to health within the meaning of Article 2:201(2)(b) because in the circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the psychological abrasion “amounts to a medical condition”. The fact that there is no legally relevant damage within the scope of the latter provision on personal injury does not preclude the existence of a legally relevant damage within the meaning of Article 2:205 (Loss upon breach of confidence). If the other conditions of Article 1:101 (Basic rule) are met, the tortfeasor is thus liable to make reparation. 8. Damage caused intentionally and damage caused negligently. The provisions of the following chapter determine for the cases which they address what constitutes legally relevant damage if the detriment in question has at least been caused negligently. The restrictions which are necessary for all incidents of liability which do not require either intention or negligence are to be found in the (second sub-section of the) third chapter. In other words, the basic rule reads that all detriments which are defined as legally 300

Introduction

relevant damage in the second chapter under the condition of negligence will also constitute legally relevant damage within the framework of liability without negligence, save that in the second section of the third chapter provision may be made for a divergent rule. These limitations of the concept of legally relevant damage ensue from the ground of accountability which attracts liability and consequently they can only be fixed in that context in conjunction with the ground of accountability.

B.

The second chapter in overview

9. Not a mere restatement. The second chapter picks out those cases for which at present in the European Union there is either already unity de lege lata, or, from a legal philosophical point of view, a majoritarian tendency can be drawn, or a further development of the law seems indispensable. Consequently, the text does not restrict itself to a “restatement” of European tort law; here and there the following “principles” exceed or depart from the existing law in a few jurisdictions. These departures are made known in the relevant accompanying notes. 10. Questions not specifically addressed. It is important to appreciate that the provisions of the following chapters are fundamentally conceived so that they resolve those – but only those – questions which they address and do not permit any reactive conclusion touching the circle of problems which they do not address. Questions which are not addressed by the text in one of the specific provisions must be decided fundamentally on the basis of Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage). Where the specified elements exceptionally contain an exhaustive regime, this is expressly made known by the formulation that the plaintiff is “only” entitled to make a given demand under the specified conditions or that particular detriments are not to be regarded as damage. Unless otherwise indicated, damage includes non-economic damage (see Article 2:101(1)). This holds true for natural and legal persons alike. 11. The order of the Articles. The articles following Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) grapple first with damage to the person, then with damage to personal dignity and related matters and subsequently with damage resulting from the communication of incorrect information and damage resulting from breach of confidence. They are followed by principles governing property damage, damage caused by unlawful impairment of business and “pure” ecological damage. Two further articles are concerned with two particularly important cases in which a legally relevant damage is only present if there is intentional conduct, namely (i) deception and (ii) inducing breach of obligation. Article 2:101 has been placed at the head (and not at the end) of the chapter on damage to counter the possible impression that the text falls back on an exhaustive list of protective interests. The formulation of the provision (see Article 2:101(1)(a)) leaves no doubt, however, that its residual application is to be assessed in subordination to the other (specific) provisions of this chapter. Although the text does not function with a hierarchy of values or interests, it is nonetheless clear that the instances in which the matter falls to be decided under Article 2:101, without recourse to the specific provisions of Section 2 of this chapter, are exceptional cases. A judge who is compelled to decide a case on the basis of this general provision is therefore reminded of the need for caution in 301

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acknowledging the presence of damage recognised in the law of tort. That point finds expression in the formulation “loss or injury constitutes legally relevant damage only if” the conditions of Article 2:101(2) are satisfied.

Section 1:

General Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage (1) Loss, whether economic or non-economic, or injury is legally relevant damage if: (a) one of the following rules of this Chapter so provides; (b) the loss or injury results from a violation of a right otherwise conferred by the law; or (c) the loss or injury results from a violation of an interest worthy of legal protection. (2) In any case covered only by sub-paragraphs (b) or (c) of paragraph (1) loss or injury constitutes legally relevant damage only if it would be fair and reasonable for there to be a right to reparation or prevention, as the case may be, under Article 1:101 (Basic rule) or 1:102 (Prevention). (3) In considering whether it would be fair and reasonable for there to be a right to reparation or prevention regard is to be had to the ground of accountability, to the nature and proximity of the damage or impending damage, to the reasonable expectations of the person who suffers or would suffer the damage, and to considerations of public policy. (4) In this Book: (a) economic loss includes loss of income or profit, burdens incurred and a reduction in the value of property; (b) non-economic loss includes pain and suffering and impairment of the quality of life.

Comments A.

The function of the rule

1. Three pillars of legally relevant damage. This provision is essential in relation to the Chapters on damage (Chapter 2) and reparation for damage (Chapter 6). Its function, as the wording of paragraph (1) makes evident, is to erect a concept of “legally relevant damage” on three pillars. The first, envisaged in sub-paragraph (a), consists of all those particular forms of damage specifically provided for in the following Articles (of Chapter 2, Section 2). The other two are therefore those which are not specially mentioned in the following Articles. They relate to (i) infringements of rights and (ii) infringements of interests which are worthy of legal protection in terms of non-contractual liability. Beyond paragraph (1)(a), this provision finds application (and only finds application) when and in so far as the relevant legal question is not specifically addressed in the subsequent Articles of the Chapter. 2. Indications of legally relevant damage. All three ‘pillars’ of Article 2:101, which together amount to the comprehensive definition of legally relevant damage, presuppose some grievance which, conceptually, is capable of being recognised as damage which is legally relevant. The function of Article 2:101 is to indicate what forms of damage are, in

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given circumstances, legally relevant and so capable of establishing the rights set out in Article 1:101 (Basic rule) and Article 1:102 (Prevention). There must at the outset be some type of detrimental effect (see the definition of “damage” in DCFR Definitions – “any type of detrimental effect”) but there is no need to define the sub-set of all possible harms – loss, personal injury, annoyances, disturbances to existing modes of living, or other adverse effects on welfare or future aspirations which, conceptually, may constitute damage. That is because what matters is the coincidence of detriment amounting to ‘damage’ with the further qualification that the ‘damage’ be legally relevant. All the necessary work which will eliminate irritations or disruptions for which no remedy is due can be achieved by focusing on the requirement that the damage (if such it is) must also be legally relevant. At the same time it must be clear that as a matter of principle loss as well as injury may amount to damage. What matters is whether that damage is legally relevant and, unless specific provision is made otherwise, it will be if it satisfies the requirements of Article 2:101. 3. Forms of legally relevant damage: loss and injury. Legally relevant damage may take the form of either a loss or an injury as such. The starting point must be that damage presupposes a loss, but, as emerges from the following provisions, that does not constitute an invariable rule. Whether the victim has suffered a damage per se because rights or interests have been violated is as a rule specified by the following provisions (see in particular Article 2:201 (Personal injury and consequential loss) and the Comments to that Article). With regard to its own field of application Article 2:101 does not by itself determine whether injury as such is sufficient or whether it is only consequential losses which amount to damage. Hence a judge who, in an exceptional case, is compelled to fall back on Article 2:101 must decide that question simply on the basis of that provision. It will only be in very rare cases that a judge will be confronted with that necessity, but it is a possibility which cannot be excluded. A situation in point would be where an athlete is wrongly disqualified from participating in an Olympic games as a result of a drugs test which was carried out incorrectly and the athlete, soon to be past peak physical condition, will never again be in a position to compete in an international event of such calibre. Whether this detriment is to be characterised as an injury and whether a monetary reparation is due must ultimately be decided by a judge by applying paragraphs (2) and (3). 4. Loss includes non-economic loss. A loss may be either of an economic or of a noneconomic nature, see paragraph (4). As a basic rule both forms of loss are in principle compensatable. Precisely which losses constitute non-economic losses, however, is not conclusively stated by the draft – in keeping with the tradition of most of the national legal systems. The multitude of possibilities life assumes and the variety of circumstances which must necessarily be weighed up in the balance are much too numerous and diverse to be encapsulated in an exhaustive definition. Paragraph (4)(b) confines itself to declaring that “non-economic loss includes pain and suffering and impairment of the quality of life”. On the other hand, the text of the Article puts beyond doubt the proposition that legal persons (and not just natural persons) are capable of sustaining noneconomic loss and demanding reparation on that account.

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5. Interests without a market value. An economic loss is characterised by the fact that the harmed interest has a market value which can be assessed according to the economic rules of the market. Damage which is not economic in nature (such as bodily pain) can only be given a monetary equivalent by judicial decision. The same holds for injuries as such (as in the case of loss of a limb). 6. Quantum of loss. Article 2:101 has the sole purpose of setting out the circumstances in which damage relevant to the law on non-contractual liability can be said to be recognisably present. On the other hand, the quantum of the loss, leaving aside for a moment the de minimis rule in Article 6:102 (De minimis rule), is without significance for the question whether a legally relevant damage is present. It becomes relevant only in the matter of determining appropriate reparation, not least in determining what if any sum the liable person should pay by way of compensation.

B.

The flexibility of the rule

7. Multiformity of life. The residual, flexible provision governing ‘legally relevant damage’ not specifically enumerated in Section 2, which constitutes the bulk of the subject-matter for Article 2:101, is required not merely because it is impossible to capture the multiformity of life within a set of rules without employing some such open-ended clause for matters which the legislator cannot foresee. It is also indispensable for two further reasons. 8. Constitutional issues. The first is that there are some legal issues whose resolution and further development are best left by a European legal text to the courts, especially when regard is had to constitutional peculiarities in the individual jurisdictions (see also in this context Article 7:101 (National constitutional laws)). An example is provided by the question whether and in what circumstances a parent’s obligation to maintain a child, which both parents, or at any rate one of them, did not want, constitutes damage recognised by the law on non-contractual liability. Another is whether a child, whose predisposition to some abnormality has been overlooked by the gynaecologist, can demand reparation on the ground that he or she would have been aborted. A third example is provided by the question of post-mortem protection of a right of personality which is unknown in some legal systems (e. g. no defamation after death in the Common Law) and granted in others with the justification that it follows from the constitutional basic value of protection of human dignity. A fourth example is the question whether legal persons too enjoy a right of personality derived from basic norms (i. e. whether a legal person has a “reputation” or “dignity”) and, if so, how far its protection extends. In so far as an interest is recognised by the European Convention on Human Rights as a basic right in relations between state and citizen, that value judgement at any rate must be fed directly into the application of Article 2:101 for the purposes of ascertaining legally relevant damage within the meaning of the law on non-contractual liability. 9. Underlying issues not yet harmonised. The second reason is that a European law on non-contractual liability can only pave a course for itself in many marginal areas step by step. An example is provided by the infringement of “subjective” rights which enjoy 305

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protection against everybody and which are therefore often called “absolute” rights. That loss consequential to the infringement of such a right constitutes damage in a case where this results from negligence is generally accepted; it is thus possible for a European law on non-contractual liability to articulate this rule. By contrast, it is not possible for a European law on non-contractual liability by itself to harmonise the underlying issue (on which non-contractual liability for infringement would be parasitic) of whether or not such a subjective right exists. One thinks here, for example, of the right to a name: whether there is such a right must in the end be decided by the relevant law of persons and as long as that is not harmonised there can be no harmonised law on non-contractual liability in relation to the infringement of a right to a name. It also follows that a uniform text on the law on non-contractual liability may still lead to divergent solutions in particular areas. That is neither avoidable nor unusual in European law-making, nor exactly a particularity of the element of damage in the non-contractual liability system. A comparable phenomenon also exists, for example, in relation to negligence committed by breach of a statutory duty because statutory duties may have different content not merely from country to country, but also nowadays from place to place. Another example from the sphere of infringement of rights is the right to one’s own image and the right to one’s own voice. Reference in this context to the constitutionally based protection of rights of personality are obvious.

C.

Violation of a right otherwise conferred by the law (paragraph (1)(b))

10. Scope of application. As is immediately apparent from paragraph (1)(a) and as we have already explained (see supra Comments B12-15 under Article 1:101 (Basic rule)), it is only possible to have recourse to paragraph (1)(b) if there is no exhaustive regime for the case provided for in the following Articles of this Chapter. Illustration 1 A is a member of an association of professionally active surveyors who are engaged to value land in connection with sale negotiations and applications for credit from banks. A’s criticism, from a professional standpoint, of the association’s board has placed him in dispute with that board. His membership is terminated as a result on a specious pretext and his name therefore ceases to appear on the publicised list of members. A suffers a substantial reduction in professional engagements. Since there is no legally relevant damage within the meaning of Article 2:208 (Loss upon unlawful impairment of business), the judge must fall back on Article 2:101(1)(b) to reach the result that A’s membership right has been infringed and the loss of income caused in this way constitutes a legally relevant damage. Even if the judge should find that under the applicable law membership of the association does not constitute a “right” which operates erga omnes the judge will nonetheless have to decide on the basis of paragraph (1)(c) in A’s favour. That is because an interest worthy of legal protection has been infringed in any event. Illustration 2 W and H are obtaining a divorce. Custody of their child is granted to W; H has only contact rights. H is unable to accept this outcome and abducts the child. W has to 306

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engage a private detective to help find the child. The cost of doing so is a legally relevant consequential damage arising out of the infringement of a right (the right to custody or the right to provide parental care, howsoever described in the applicable family law) for which the following rules make no special provision. Illustration 3 A damages a car which B has bought from C subject to reservation of title, the instalments of the purchase price remaining fully unpaid. Article 2:206 (Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession) is relevant not merely to the liability to C, but also to the liability in relation to B. There is no cause to resort to Article 2:101(1)(b) because B too had a property right in respect of the car either in the form of a protected right of prospective ownership (cf. Anwartschaftsrecht) or based on his right of lawful possession, depending on the applicable law of property. The situation is no different if A crashes his car into B’s house which is subject to a mortgage in favour of a bank. The bank’s property right is damaged. However, the questions of who in such a case may demand reparation, in what measure and to whom it must be rendered belong, from a systematic point of view, in the Chapter on remedies (Chapter 6) and not in the Chapter on damage (Chapter 2). See further Article 6:104 (Multiple injured persons). 11. Rights and interests worthy of legal protection. The Article distinguishes in paragraph (1) sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) between infringement of rights and injury to interests which are worthy of legal protection. For both of these alternatives the limitations and particularisations contained in paragraphs (2) and (3) apply. For that reason the practical significance of the distinction between “rights” and “interests which are worthy of legal protection” is not especially great. It has little significance because, as indicated already, the legal penumbra of the law on non-contractual liability is not yet harmonised and therefore the European legal systems may have completely diverse perceptions of what qualifies as a “right” and what is merely an “interest worthy of legal protection”. The distinction is therefore perpetuated here primarily because the concept of infringement of a right is a familiar one in many (though by no means all) European jurisdictions. A secondary consideration is that in this way a certain gradation can be reached: a judge will be relatively more cautious in affirming a legally relevant damage if only sub-paragraph (c) presents itself for that purpose. It is, however, important that the concern here is with rights and interests which enjoy protection against all comers and which therefore are generally capable of being infringed by anyone. A mere contractual interest in some performance, for example, is excluded from the scope of application of Article 2:101 for this reason alone. 12. Rights otherwise conferred by the law. As regards the rights referred to in subparagraph (b), we are concerned here with rights which have already been assigned to the claimant by other parts of the legal system with the purpose that the claimant may resist their infringement. To the extent that a national legal system recognises the concept of “absolute” rights, all of the rights so qualified by it will constitute “rights otherwise conferred by the law” within the meaning of paragraph (1)(b). Moreover, these rights need not be rights within private law. A right to vote in an election, for example, is a “right” within the meaning of paragraph (1): it is a potential basis of non-contractual liability for one person to intentionally obstruct another from casting a vote in a public 307

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election. The same holds for the right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of sex or ethnic or racial origin by hoteliers, banks and others trading openly with the public. In cases of the latter type, though, there will often be an infringement of the right to respect for personal dignity, given specific expression in Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy). (See also DCFR II. – 2:101 (Right not to be discriminated against) and DCFR II. – 2:104 (Remedies).) 13. Purely contractual rights are, as a rule, excluded. On the other hand, purely personal “bilateral” rights, such as, for example, claims arising from a contract against the other contractual partner, are, as a rule, excluded. One exception to this is set out in Article 2:211 (Loss upon inducement of breach of obligation). As regards the relationship between the law on non-contractual liability and the law of contract see further Article 1:103 (Scope of application) and the Comments on that Article.

D.

Violation of an interest worthy of legal protection (paragraph (1)(c))

14. Significance of the provision. Paragraph (c) gives expression to the principle mentioned earlier that the law on non-contractual liability is not an ancillary area of the law in the sense that it can only grant legal protection where the claimant is adversely affected in a legal position whose worthiness for legal protection is already immediately ascertainable from the other provisions of the legal system. Rather, the law on noncontractual liability also determines autonomously what detriments in this context qualify as legally relevant damage. Illustration 4 A, a married man, is severely ill with cancer and must contemplate his demise in the near future. The married couple would still like to have a child and A provides sperm which is deep-frozen pending a later in vitro fertilisation. A technician in the laboratory where the sperm is stored destroys it when she confuses test tubes. It would be difficult to argue that this is a case of personal injury within the meaning of Article 2:201 (Personal injury and consequential loss), nor can the matter be subsumed without force under Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy). An interest worthy of legal protection has been violated. 15. Responsibility of the courts for the development of the law on non-contractual liability. Sub-paragraph (c) in paragraph (1) effects the basic rule that legally relevant damage is also present where an interest is violated which is worthy of protection by the law on non-contractual liability. In view of the multifarious forms life takes, such an “open” clause is indispensable and, moreover, present in most of the European legal systems. Furthermore, the provision also consciously makes space for the further development of the law on non-contractual liability by judges. It also avoids setting down in legislated form certain developments and concepts which are presently still in a state of flux. An example of the latter is liability for the loss of a chance. The problem is not merely best addressed at various points within the system of liability law; from a contemporary perspective it can also be said that the task of finding a solution is best delegated to the courts. Paragraphs (2) and (3) provide them only with certain guidelines. 308

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E.

Paragraphs (2) and (3)

16. Application to rights and interests worthy of legal protection. According to paragraph (2) a legally relevant damage only exists in cases of violation of a right or an interest if it is fair and reasonable to grant the claimant a right to reparation or prevention under Article 1:101 (Basic rule) or Article 1:102 (Prevention). Paragraphs (2) and (3) will have their main field of application within the framework of paragraph (1)(c), but they are not restricted to that. They also apply in cases of infringement of rights. In those cases too a weighing-up of interests cannot be entirely avoided. That is evident when one looks, among others, to the case already mentioned of an infringement of a right to a name: such conduct triggers liability (if at all) only when it is perpetrated in certain ways. More particularly, it may turn out that only preventative legal protection and not a right to reparation comes into question because while a legally relevant damage is present it does not also constitute a ‘reparable’ damage. Illustration 5 On a poster are a number of far-right political slogans including the assertion that the genocide of millions of Jews in the Nazi concentration camps is a Zionist conspiracy. The sole surviving descendant of a man murdered in Auschwitz may demand on the basis of his ancestor’s post-mortem right of personality (so far as such a right is recognised by the applicable legal system) that the objectionable poster be taken down. A claim for reparation of non-economic loss may be dismissed by the judge on the basis of paragraph (2). 17. The balancing process in ascertaining an interest worthy of legal protection. The text in paragraphs (2) and (3) equips the judge who must decide whether an interest worthy of protection by the law on non-contractual liability has been infringed with several hints. An essential factor in this decision is the remedies side of the liability equation: the legal protection which is sought must be fair and reasonable (paragraph (2)) and the decision on that point depends inter alia on whether the case presented is one of intentionally inflicting damage, negligence or strict liability (paragraph (3)). Since the connection between a given form of strict liability and legally relevant damage is set out in most of the provisions of Chapter 3, Section 2 (Accountability without intention or negligence), paragraph (3) in fact only has practical significance for vicarious liability under Article 3:201 (Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives). Apart from Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage), none of these Articles uses the term “legally relevant damage”, and in the context of Article 3:207 the term is left to be fleshed out by national law. Article 2:101(2) and (3), however, can have a role to play in the context of Article 3:103 (Persons under eighteen) or Article 3:104 (Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons). 18. The ground of accountability. The question whether a defined detriment constitutes a legally relevant damage often depends on the nature of the conduct which has caused the damage – in particular whether the injuring person has acted intentionally or merely negligently. For example, there is a legally relevant damage only in cases of intentionally inducing non-performance of a contractual obligation (see Article 2:211 (Loss upon inducement of non-performance of obligation)); a merely negligent entice309

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ment not to perform cannot create liability for want of a corresponding obligation not to interfere in that way and therefore consequently because there is no damage. Intentionally permitting the continuation of a detriment suffered by another may also signify in given circumstances an independent damage in the legal sense. An example would be when, without any want of care, someone has communicated incorrect information about another and they intentionally and with a view to causing damage leave the affected individual ‘in the lurch’ instead of making an appropriate correction without undue delay, although subsequently informed of the inaccuracy and despite such correction being possible. This type of damage may assume a more specific form where it amounts to infringement of a natural person’s right to respect for personal dignity (Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy)). Illustration 6 Through his careless failure to maintain a safe distance between his vehicle and the car in front, A causes a traffic accident, which in turn leads to a traffic jam. A commercial agent (H) is caught up in the queue of traffic and misses a business appointment, in consequence of which she suffers a loss of income. Neither an infringement of a right of the commercial agent nor the violation of a legally protected interest comes into play. Such types of obstacles are part and parcel of the everyday risks of life. The situation would be different, however, if A had caused the accident in order to hold up his competitor H. In that case H would suffer a legally relevant damage. 19. Nature of the damage. Moreover, the type of detriment suffered and the considerations involved in causation play a role. (In illustration 6, for example, it would make no difference if one argued that legally relevant damage is present but A did not cause H’s loss.) There is a whole series of detriments which one has to accept without reparation even where it cannot be said that they are trivial within the meaning of Article 6:102 (De minimis rule). An example expressly catered for in the following provisions is to be found in Article 2:201 (Personal injury and consequential loss) paragraph (2)(b) (“personal injury includes injury to mental health only if it amounts to a medical condition”). Of course, the nature of the damage suffered also plays a substantial role besides this. There are interests, for example, which are in essence only assigned to the commonalty as a whole and therefore are not capable of constituting a legally relevant damage in relation to any particular individual. An example would be the loss of quality of life which is inflicted on residents in a given region because as a result of an industrial accident they are no longer able to enjoy the spectacle of particular wildlife, be it animals or plants, affected by the pollution (see Article 2:209 (Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment)). 20. Damage suffered in business competition. In a free market, which thrives on competition, market participants are not merely not allowed to seek to squeeze the market shares of their competitors by improper means. It would amount to a prohibited cartel to come to an agreement with competitors not to enter into competition with one another (or, to formulate it another way, not to inflict damage on one another). Loss suffered in fair competition is thus not legally relevant damage. Consequently, whether damage in the legal sense is present may depend solely on the internal viewpoint of the injuring 310

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person. For example, a person who resells goods below their purchase price is usually just making bad bargains which harm only that person’s own economic interests; but someone who undertakes the same activity with the purpose of driving competitors out of the market causes them legally relevant damage. It remains a pre-condition, of course, that the competitor is not engaged in an illegal market. The ‘business activity’ of a pimp or a heroin dealer does not inflict legally relevant damage on rival criminals in the same sordid trade. 21. Proximity of damage. Also inextricably interwoven with one another on occasion are the concept of legally relevant damage and considerations of causation. That inheres in the nature of the matter and affects the entire perspective. If, for example a partner in an association of tax advisers breaches a (contractual or statutory) prohibition on competition in relation to the fellow partners and subsequently the turnover in the partnership falls off, but as part of an economic cycle and not due to the breach of the prohibition, then there is not merely a lack of causation: there is also no legally relevant damage. The situation would be no different if a doctor makes a false diagnosis, but that has no adverse effects because the progress of the illness could not have been resisted to better effect if the correct diagnosis had been made (e. g. because the treatment would have been the same, or because the treatment rendered did not exacerbate the real illness and it was in any case, at the time of the false diagnosis, too late to render an effective treatment). In cases of this type it is of course traditional for liability of the doctor to be rejected on the basis of a want of causation rather than the absence of a breach of duty or of damage and these basic rules do not alter anything in that regard. The example does, however, demonstrate how closely related these elements are since there is generally no duty to assist someone who cannot be helped and equally someone who is succumbing to such an illness is not suffering any damage which (from a liability viewpoint) is legally relevant. Illustration 7 Equally, there is no legally relevant damage suffered when a person organises a concert with a particular singer about whose private life a newspaper has published incorrect information, so that the audience for the event is smaller than under normal circumstances. That is a risk which every organiser of an event must suffer; the damage is too remote and consequently not legally relevant in terms of liability. However, the singer herself suffers a legally relevant damage if her fee has been fixed by a formula based on turnover (Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another)). 22. Reasonable expectations on the part of the injured person. A further factor is the reasonable expectation of the injured person. The concept mentioned earlier of liability for a lost chance – in particular the lost chance of being healed (though the point is not confined to this) – demonstrates this and is related to this consideration. At the same time it reiterates the point with clarity that ascertaining the existence of damage is often inseparably linked to the remedy which would be available for its reparation. It would be just as inequitable and unjust in those ‘loss of a chance’ cases to award compensation for 100 % as it would be to award nothing at all. It is therefore not possible merely to state that a damage tows along a claim to reparation in its wake. Rather the position is that a 311

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legally relevant damage is only present so far and to the extent that the legal system is prepared to furnish the injured person with legal redress. 23. Considerations of public policy. Judgments of value concerning public welfare and the internal balance of the system of private law also play a role in ascertaining whether or not one is faced with a case of legally relevant damage. The mere non-performance of a contractual obligation (delayed performance, supply of defective goods, failure to transfer a promised debt, etc.) does not amount to a non-contractual liability because the legal system contains its own preferential regime for these cases; it would be superfluous if one proceeded from the converse principle that every non-performance of a contractual obligation constitutes at the same time a non-contractual liability. However, other considerations of public policy also play an appreciable role. If someone is so bodily disfigured as a result of an accident that his spouse cannot endure life with him and they divorce, then ultimately only the answer to the question what stresses and strains a marriage can be expected to ‘endure’, according to contemporary views, is capable of resolving the question whether the economic and non-economic adverse consequences of the divorce amount to a legally relevant damage suffered by the immediate victim of the accident and his partner. It is precisely the same if the marriage breaks down because as a result of the accident the injured person has lost the capacity for sexual intercourse (that damage as such making out, of course, a legally relevant damage in accord with Article 2:201 (Personal injury and consequential loss)). If the marriage remains intact on the other hand, then the uninjured spouse suffers a legally relevant damage since he or she is adversely affected in respect of an interest worthy of legal protection. Someone who only stands in a loose relationship to the injured person, however, does not suffer a legally relevant damage. In that latter situation there is merely an insubstantial reflected damage. Considerations of public policy, however, can also play a crucial role in a multitude of other cases. Illustration 8 If he had given the factual and legal position even a halfway careful examination, A would have had to accept that his legal action against B could have no realistic prospect of success. The proceedings are dismissed with costs. As a result of having to attend to the legal proceedings, B has had to sacrifice time which he would otherwise have devoted to his (thereby partially neglected) business affairs. A legally protected interest of B is not affected. Were the case otherwise, A’s right to unimpeded access to the courts would not be assured.

F.

Paragraph (4)

24. General. Paragraph (4) serves to make clear that the expression “economic loss” includes “loss of income or profit, burdens incurred and a reduction in the value of property” and that the expression “non-economic loss” “includes pain and suffering and impairment of the quality of life”. (The paragraph also serves to avoid unnecessary repetitions of these propositions in the following Articles.) As the use of “includes” indicates, these are not exhaustive definitions or closed lists. Mention is made only of the most important of the forms which these types of loss may assume. The provision 312

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makes no statement about the manner in which the obligation to make reparation is to be discharged or a compensatory monetary sum is to be assessed. Those questions are the province of Chapter 6 (Remedies) and, in part, Chapter 7 (Ancillary rules). 25. Significance of the distinction between economic and non-economic loss. Paragraphs (1) and (4) together minimise the significance of the (occasionally less than straightforward) distinction between economic and non-economic loss. Hence, for example, it is of merely academic interest whether (and if so, to what extent) the form of damage referred to in Article 2:206 (Deprivation of the use of property) paragraph (2)(a) is a species of economic loss or of non-economic loss. In conformity with the general approach, here as in other instances both types of damage are reparable. A basic rule of the type to be found in some legal systems in Europe to the effect that non-economic damage does not generally support an entitlement to reparation and is only (exceptionally) reparable if statute expressly so provides is not a feature of these rules. Indeed some of these rules expressly apply solely to non-economic loss. By contrast, Article 2:209 (Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment) refers only to “burdens” incurred by the State. That expression leaves no room for the contention that in such cases the State might assert a claim to recover for non-economic loss. 26. Economic loss. The existence of an economic loss is usually not difficult to determine. In the main this is determined by a comparison of the current economic position of the claimant (status quo) with that prevailing immediately before the allegedly damaging incident occurred (status quo ante) and ascertainment of a negative net balance. The economic loss is the difference between these two sums. This method of determining economic loss is of course particularly transparent in the case of a reduction in value of the victim’s property. 27. Increase in debts. An economic loss is also present, however, if the victim has damaged property repaired or if, following an injury to body or health, undergoes medical treatment. The economic loss in such cases consists of the increase in debts or outgoings which the victim has sustained in incurring an obligation to pay whoever was engaged to help eradicate or ameliorate the legally relevant damage. There are thus “burdens incurred” by the victim. For the case where an inanimate thing is so severely damaged that the costs of its repair would exceed the market value it possessed before it was damaged (an economic “write-off”) Article 6:101(3) (Aim and forms of reparation) provides a special regime. 28. Loss of income. A genuine ‘balance sheet’ comparison is an inadequate or impossible mechanism as regards the loss of rights which will only arise in the future, that is to say, rights which have not arisen in the interval between the damage causing event and its evaluation by the parties, insurers or the courts and which will only arise after this point in time. In accordance with all European legal systems, this Book expressly provides that a (future) loss of income or profit constitutes a reparable damage. 29. Other forms of economic damage. As already stated, however, the text does not exclude reparation for other forms of economic loss.

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Illustration 9 A wife and mother (M) is so severely injured in a road accident that for a considerable period of time she is no longer able to provide domestic services in the family home. If M engages a home help, the latter’s wages, due from M, constitute for M an economic loss. Moreover, even if a home help is not engaged and the family decides to struggle through the difficult situation without outside assistance, there is still an economic loss. There is admittedly no “loss of income” because M was not remunerated for her domestic activity. Nonetheless M’s housekeeping has an economic value and its cessation constitutes a loss to M for which compensation is due. This result is compatible with the rule in Article 6:201 (Injured person’s right of election) whereby the injured person can choose what to do with the compensation due. 30. Non-economic loss. Paragraph (4) lists in sub-paragraph (b) the most important forms of non-economic loss: pain and suffering and the impairment of the quality of life. These forms, however, are mere examples. Quite what other forms of impairment of emotional well-being constitute reparable loss must be decided by the courts. In doing so regard must be had in particular to Article 6:102 (De minimis rule). Negative emotional responses such as annoyance, anger, disgust and repulsion which lie within the spectrum of normal, everyday feelings cannot suffice according to that provision. If the person concerned was driven to fear for his or her life, on the other hand, then a non-economic loss has been suffered for which reparation would be recoverable if all the other elements of the non-contractual claim are made out. 31. Pain and suffering. Bodily pain and bodily suffering constitute the most obvious forms of non-economic loss. They are capable of being ascertained and evaluated relatively easily. 32. Impairment of the quality of life. Injuries to body and health can of course generate more than an immediate pain; there may be significant long-term reductions in the victim’s quality of life as a consequence – for example, if the injured person is confined for the rest of his or her life to a wheel chair and is thus prevented from pursuing a favourite hobby, such as football. However, such reductions in the quality of life may have other causes. Typical examples are provided by infringements of incorporeal rights of personality (among others, incursions into spheres of privacy; derogatory statements which have as a consequence a negative impact on the social profile of the person concerned). Moreover, infringements of the right of free movement – imprisonment as such – also constitute a non-economic loss. The same is true for a spouse who himself or herself has not sustained any direct injury, but is compelled to accept a vacuous sexual life because his or her partner is no longer capable of sexual intercourse as a result of an accident. 33. Bereavement. Impairment of the quality of life relates to the objective loss of real possibilities for making the most of one’s life. There is, however, a host of situations in which, objectively considered, such possibilities still exist, but subjectively their availability is no longer capable of being recognised. This too can constitute a non-economic loss. Bereavement following the loss of a close relative – more precisely, suffering as a 314

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

result of the sudden emptiness in the life of the person left behind – constitutes a noneconomic damage, even if this is neither an impairment of the quality of life nor pain and suffering in the narrow sense expressed in the Article. Bereavement relates to the consequences of an awareness that an impairment of the quality of life has arisen. It is a matter of self-limitation in the exploitation of life’s opportunities due to the condition of mourning. Although, for example, a widow may have taken part in various social events and activities independently of her husband during his life, her mourning may induce her to pass up on these opportunities for social interaction as she becomes depressed and cuts herself off from society. 34. Other cases. Similar in structure are cases in which a woman loses her emotional capacity to establish an intimate relationship with a man as a result of suffering a sexual assault, or where a man’s self-esteem is dramatically reduced because an accident has rendered him impotent. Furthermore, people suffer a non-economic loss if, as a result of the damage-causing event, they are forced to make a fundamental change in their chosen mode of living. That remains the case irrespective of whether an impartial third party might regard the newly adopted mode of living as qualitatively better. 35. Overlaps. It was considered undesirable to particularise pain suffered and loss of amenity in the text of the Article more precisely. Since these are non-economic damages, their assessment (and later quantification in a compensatory monetary equivalent) is necessarily a process involving a wide range of possible value judgements. There are also many cases in which a given detriment suffered by the injured person might be categorised as either pain or loss of amenity, not least because the constant suffering of pain is in itself the loss of the amenity to enjoy a pain-free life. For such reasons it would be better to leave any necessary subordinate refinement to the courts.

Notes I.

The notion of damage

1.

To date, the notion of “legally relevant damage” is not a feature of any European Civil Code. However, it would not be far off the mark to state that ITALIAN law comes relatively close. According to Italian legal conceptions, which in their exact particulars do not, of course, remain free of controversy, the concept of damage anchored in CC art. 2043 has two limbs. Danno constitutes danno ingiusto, i. e. the breach of a legally protected interest (Cass.sez.un. 22 July 1999, no. 500, Foro it. 1999, I, 2487, 3201); danno also pertains to the content of the obligation to make reparation (Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile3, 12-13). In respect of the damage that is recoverable, a distinction is drawn between pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss. FRENCH law adopts a similarly broad concept of damage. Every breach of a person’s economic or non-economic interests constitutes damage; this also includes bodily integrity as such (Mazeaud and Chabas, Leçons de droit civil II(1)9, no. 409 p. 413). The concept of damage in BELGIUM has similar connotations, namely it is paraphrased as representating loss of an economic or non-economic advantage (van Gerven, Verbintenissenrecht II7, 344). The FRENCH courts require that the damage must be direct and

2.

315

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3.

4.

5.

316

certain (direct et certain), where “certain” incorporates the element of actualité which previously was the subject of separate examination (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II9, no. 136 pp. 124-125). Furthermore, future damage can also be certain, namely in the event that cogent grounds exist which serve to indicate that damage will occur (for an in-depth analysis see Cass.req. 1 June 1932, S. 1933, I, 49, note H. Mazeaud). In academic teaching, the requirement of “directness” is regarded as an element of the rule on causation (Flour/Aubert/Savaux loc. cit.; Malaurie and Aynès, Responsabilité délictuelle11, no. 241 p. 138). A contrasting approach to that prevailing under contract law is adopted, given that unforeseeable damage is also recoverable (Malaurie and Aynès loc. cit.). A number of legal commentators, relying on CCP art. 31, additionally require that the damage exhibit a caractère légitime (Terré/Simler/Lequette, Les obligations8, nos. 704706 pp. 684-686), but this requisite appears to have been divested of any practical importance (Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité2, nos. 271-273 pp. 59-62). The concepts of dommage and préjudice are usually regarded as synonyms (Pradel, Le préjudice dans le droit civil de la responsabilité, no. 15 pp. 10-12). Similarly, in BELGIUM, the damage must be “certain” but, once again, future damage can fulfil this prerequisite of certainty. Damage can only be recovered if the claimant has personally suffered damage and had a legitimate interest in the loss of chance of obtaining an advantage (van Gerven, Verbintenissenrecht II7, 344-350; Ronse (-de Wilde/Claeys/Mallems), Schade en schadeloosstelling I2, no. 225 pp. 169-170). The predominant view in legal circles is that breach of the obligation générale de prudence merely amounts to a faute if the damage was foreseeable in the given circumstances (Dalcq and Schamps, RCJB 1995, no. 6 pp. 536-537). In both countries, no distinction is drawn between the notion of damage which pertains to liability for faute and the concept of damage utilised in founding liability du fait du chose or du fait d’autrui (Viney and Jourdain loc. cit. no. 246 p. 1). Similarly, in SPAIN, a definition of daño has not been placed on a statutory footing. Academic literature has defined it in terms of economic or non-economic damage which has been suffered by a person in the course of an event for which the other party is liable. There is an ongoing debate as to whether loss which is not caused by a tortiously relevant act can amount to damage (cf. Santos Briz, La responsabilidad civil I7, 146 and Roca i Trias, Derecho de daños3, 67). The binomial daños y perjuicios frequently crops up in the Código Civil (e. g. in CC arts. 1101, 1106, 1107, 1108), but these concepts are “uncoupled” in the sphere of tort law (CC arts. 1902 ff). There is a tendancy in academic writing to equate daños with direct damage and perjuicios with indirect damage, i. e. damage that does not appear in the damaged thing itself, but subsequently manifests itself in the injured party’s patrimony. Permanent damage is also included within this rubric (Santos Briz loc. cit. 150). However, the Civil Code for the most part uses the concepts of daños and perjuicios as synonyms. Mere interferences do not amount to damage (TS 19 February 1962, RAJ 1962 (1) no. 714 p. 458), unless their intensity requires them to be thus qualifed (Santos Briz loc. cit. 151). Incidentally, it is also a requisite of Spanish law that the damage be “certain”. Under HUNGARIAN law, damage is understood to encompass every personal injury and all damage to property which is sustained as a result of the act of another. The three types of economic loss (damage to property, loss of profit and costs associated with rectifying the damage) are differentiated from the fourth manifestation of damage, namely, non-economic loss (Petrik (-Köles), Polgári jog II2, 630; Gellért (-Kemenes),

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

6.

A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata I6, 1228-1229; Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata I6, 1327-1328; Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 59-60). According to SLOVENIAN LOA § 132 “damage comprises the diminution of property (ordinary damage), prevention of the appreciation of property (lost profits), the infliction of physical or mental distress or fear on another person, and encroachment upon the reputation of a legal person”. In POLAND damage (szkoda) is usually defined as any detriment to the legally protected interests of another (Radwan´ ski (-Dybowski), System prawa cywilnego III(1), 214-215; Czachórski, Zobowia˛zania9, 99; Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania-cze˛s´c´ ogólna5, 88-89). Both the courts and the majority of academics adopt the view that the notion of damage embraces both economic and non-economic detriment (Dybowski loc. cit. 223-224; Czachórski loc. cit. 100; Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak loc. cit. 8990). Non-economic damage is partly subject to special rules and within the scope of these rules is designated as krzywda (CC arts. 445 § 1, 448). Some of the provisions of CC distinguish between personal injury and damage to property (arts. 4172, 435, 444, 4497 § 1). The former denotes non-economic as well as economic loss (e. g. lost earning capacity) resulting from an infringement of a right of personality, the latter economic loss resulting from the infringement of a property right (Czachórski loc. cit. 100; Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak loc. cit. 90). The GERMAN Civil Code differentiates between the infringement of a right or a protected legal interest and “the damage arising therefrom [i. e. the breach]” under CC § 823(1). Under this provision, damage results from the breach of a right or, in the event that CC § 823(2) is applicable, springs from the infringement of a legally protected interest. The notion of damage crops up frequently in the BGB, but this concept is nowhere defined. It is generally understood to mean every involuntary interference with an interest capable of being valued in economic terms or also interference with a purely non-economic interest (cf. CC § 253) (MünchKomm (-Oetker), BGB4, § 249, no. 16). The particulars are, however, diffuse. The point of departure for determining the ambit of economic damage is the Differenzhypothese (an arithemical concept of damages, “by way of calculating the difference”) (cf. CC § 249) which can be attributed to Mommsen. This theory sets forth that recoverable pecuniary damage amounts to the difference between the injured party’s current financial position and the hypothetical position which would have existed had the harmful event establishing the obligation to make reparation not occurred (Bamberger and Roth (-Grüneberg), BGB, Pref. to § 249, no. 9; Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB64, Pref. to § 249, nos. 8 f; BGH 31 May 1994, NJW 1994, 2357, 2359; BGH 10 December 1986, BGHZ 99, 182, 196). A particular manifestation of the Differenzhypothese can be seen in the principle of prohibition on enrichment (according to the judgment of the BGH 4 June 1992, BGHZ 118, 312, 338 this is understood as constituting a component of the German ordre public). Its objective is to forestall the possibility that the injured party would be placed in a better position than that which was extant prior to the occurrence of the damage (MünchKomm (-Oetker), BGB4, § 249, no. 20). However, in a number of categories of case, the differential between the post-tort and hypothetical “no-tort” positions is adjusted at a normative level (Kommerzialisierungsgedanke (notion of commercialization), normative concept of damage), reflecting the idea that the pleasure or convenience of using a thing has an independent economic value so that the loss of the pleasure or convenience of using the thing constitutes economic harm) (Heinrichs loc. cit. nos. 14, 10, 13). Occasionally, an additional linguistic distinction is drawn between “direct” and “consequential” damage.

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7.

8.

9.

318

Direct damage embraces damage having a detrimental effect on an object or on a person, consequential damage concerns the other losses incurred as a result of the damaging event, especially loss of profits (CC § 252) and, as far as objects are concerned, pertains to liability for the loss of use (Heinrichs loc. cit. no. 15). According to AUSTRIAN CC § 1293 first sentence damage, Schade, means any harm caused to a person’s property, rights or person. This broad notion of damage embraces both “real” damage as well as “calculable” damage. According to academic commentary, real damage connotes an actual alteration in the property, in the rights or the person of the injured party (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 2/2). The concept of real damage is primarily of significance where the wrongdoer is obliged to make restitution in kind (Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht II12, 285). Whether “detriment to rights” (CC § 1293 sent. 1) is ascribed a stand-alone significance is unclear (Koziol loc. cit. no. 2/3; Kramer, ÖJZ 1972, 90, 92). Under CC § 1293 sentence 2 a distinction is drawn between “real damage” and loss of profits which should result in the ordinary course of events. The latter is only recoverable where the degree of fault is substantial (CC § 1324). The notion of damage in the Austrian CC embraces every circumstance which can be conceived as a legal detriment. Every diminution of assets and every increase in liabilities which cannot be offset represents a loss (OGH 11 March 1993, SZ 66/31). In GREECE, a distinction is drawn between the notion of damage understood in its “broad” sense and a “narrow” conception of damage. In academic literature, the broad notion of damage is conceived as involving every interference with a person’s economic or non-pecuniary goods, i. e. every unfavourable change in these goods (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Stathopoulos), arts. 297-298, no. 9; Balis, Enochikon Dikaion Geniko meros3, 86; Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio I, 120). The narrow definition of damage is regarded as encompassing only economic damage, i. e. all damage that financially impacts on the injured party (Stathopoulos loc. cit. art. 299, no. 1). Additionally, in academic teaching, a distinction is made between direct and consequential damage. Direct damage denotes damage that occurs to interests worthy of legal protection as a result of the injury. Frequently, this direct damage impinges upon the injured party’s entire patrimony (e. g. loss of earnings consequent upon personal injury). Consequential damage is postulated by this set of cases (Stathopoulos loc. cit. arts. 297-298, no. 44). Similarly, the PORTUGUESE CC does not contain a definition of the notion of dano. Under CC art. 483(1) a distinction is drawn between the breach of a right or breach of a legal provision which is geared towards protecting third party interests and “the damage that arises out of the infringement”. Only loss which the claimant would probably not have sustained but for the injury is recoverable (CC art. 563). It is stated in academic commentary that every material, spirtual or moral loss which accrues to a a legally protected interest amounts to damage (Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 542; Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 598); other commentators paraphrase damage in terms of frustração de uma utilidade que era objecto de tutela jurídica (the “frustration” of a legally protected “utility”: Menezes Leitão, Obrigações I3, 334). For the most part, a distinction is drawn between financial (dano patrimonial) and non-economic loss (dano não-patrimonial), occasionally between, on the one hand, the dano real and on the other, the dano patrimonial or dano de cálculo. The actual damage correlates with the principle of restitutio in integrum (CC art. 562: restoration of status quo ante), the calculable damage corresponds to the compensation received on the basis of a comparison between the current financial position of the injured party with that which would have existed had

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

10.

11.

12.

the tort not been committed (CC art. 566). Under CC art. 564(1), both the danos emergentes and the loss of profits (benefícios or. lucros cessantes) are recoverable heads of damage. According to CC art. 564(2), damage includes both present loss and loss expected in the future. According to this statutory provision, a court is permitted to consider future damage in the assessement of the award of monetary compensation provided that this damage can determined according to the criterion of foreseeability; if this is not the case, the estimation of the loss must be resolved at a later stage, cf. also CCP art. 661(2). According to DUTCH law ‘damage’ (schade) is understood as encompassing any actual detriment caused by a breach of contract or tortious act; further, according to the prevalent view in legal writing, it is submitted that, also within the framework of CC arts. 6:74 and 6:162, the notion of damage should not be ascribed a meaning which is at variance to that used in common parlance (Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12, no. 409 p. 327). A scratch on the paintwork of a car merely represents the (actual) impairment (beschadiging); the car’s diminution in value as a result of the scratch signifies the schade (Hartkamp loc. cit.). There have been numerous attempts made at formulating a general definition of damage in Dutch legal literature. A number employ normative additions (e. g. Polak, Aanspraak en aansprakelijkheid uit onrechtmatige daad, 17 and Hoekema, NJB 1980, 977, 987), inter alia reasoning that the notion of damage only acquires significance when viewed in conjunction with liability law (Spier, Schade en loss occurrence-verzekeringen, 5; of a contrary view Hartkamp loc. cit. 328-329). LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.249(1) declares, that “damage shall include the amount of the loss or damage of property sustained by a person and the expenses incurred (direct damages) as well as the incomes of which he has been deprived, i. e. the incomes he would have received if unlawful actions had not been committed. Damage expressed in monetary terms shall constitute damages. Where the amount of damages cannot be proved by the party with precision, it shall be assessed by a court”. Further, CC art. 6.250(1) states: “Non-pecuniary damage shall be deemed to be a person’s suffering, emotional experiences, inconveniences, mental shock, emotional depression, humiliation, deterioration of reputation, diminuition of possibilities to associate with others, etc., evaluated by a court in terms of money.” LATVIAN CC art. 1770 defines “loss ... to mean any depriviation which can be assessed financially.” The following provisions then distinguish between the varying manifestations of “losses”: loss that has already occurred, and loss expected in the future, (CC art. 1771), whereby loss of profits is regarded as embraced by present loss (CC art. 1772). Furthermore, a distinction is drawn between direct and consequential damage and blameworthy and “accidental losses” (CC arts. 1773 and 1774). In SWEDEN, “damage” was once defined as “a certain prejudicial effect on the utilisation of property or to an interest” (Karlgren, Skadeståndsrätt5, 194). However, little emphasis is placed on such general definitions because they are of little purport in the absence of a concrete statutory fallback provision (Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans, 297). A distinction is drawn between ‘real’ or actual damage and the sum required to compensate it which is sometimes described as ‘abstract’ or calculated financial damage. For the most part it is simply described as loss (Karlgren loc. cit.). Schaden and Verlust, thereby, form a dichotomy (Andersson loc. cit. 298). Damage is governed by SWEDISH and FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 2, whereas loss is governed by chap. 5. Both statutes primarily deal with ‘real’ damage, i. e. injury to person

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14.

or damage to property provoking a financial loss. Alongside these provisions, regulations pertaining to a number of non-economic types of damage have been incorporated: wounded feelings, pain, infirmity as well as permanent disability and significant impairment. Moreover, case law has introduced the category of ecological damage (Swedish HD 19 April 1995, NJA 1995, 249 and 21 December 1993, NJA 1993, 753 [concerning a public cultural monument]). The DANISH approach holds that the infringement of a legally protected interest (retsbeskyttet gode) is a precondition for the existence of damage; “real damage” could be defined as a “factual interference with a legally protected interest” (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 338). Both material goods (a term not confined to things as this expression also embraces the body if there is a subsequent reduction in earning capacity) as well as non-material goods (e. g. the reputation of the injured party) could be encompassed by this notion. With respect to economic loss, liability relates to the “loss” (tabet); as far as non-economic damage is concerned, one speaks of making amends (godtgørelse) (Damages Liability Act §§ 3, 4 and 6; Vinding Kruse loc. cit. 345; Andersson loc. cit. 298). In the COMMON LAW little need is felt to develop a definition of “damage”. Rather the law has focused on identifying particular heads of damage which are recoverable for a given tort. The diversity of meanings of “general” and “special” damage(s) (as to which, see McGregor, Damages17, para. 1-031 – 1-034) reflects the tendency of the Common Law to use its tort law concepts contextually and to dispense with a sharply demarcated taxonomy or defined conceptual framework in this regard. Moreover, not every form of detriment is recognized as recoverable: damages are not awarded in negligence for mental suffering, fear or anxiety where the victim has sustained no physical injury and the condition does not amount to a psychological illness (Nicholls v. Rushton (1992) Times, 19th June (“severe shock and shaking up” suffered by a motorist). In contrast to cases of physical injury or damage to or loss of property, the courts have adopted a generally restrictive approach to personal injury which is not physical (psychiatric illness or so-called “nervous shock”) and pure economic loss: Charlesworth and Percy (-Walton), Negligence11, para. 2-95. The question of what is recoverable is also absorbed into the question of remoteness of damage, as much as the issue of whether a duty of care was owed.

II.

Injury as damage

15.

In all of the legal systems under discussion, incurring loss is a generally a prerequisite for the existence of legal damage. If a different approach were to be adopted, then the compensatory function of tort law would be rendered nugatory; in other words, a punitive or deterrent function would be ascribed to tort law in its stead (Viney, Introduction à la responsabilité2, no. 67 p. 111). Exceptionally, proof of a breach of a rule prescribing a particular standard of conduct or the infringement of a right may be sufficient to constitute damage. For example, under FRENCH law on unfair advertising practices, the presence of damage is presumed if a faute commerciale is established. In order to circumvent the collapse of the claimant’s action en concurrence déloyale owing to a lack of evidence, the courts have proved to be satisfied with a mere assertion that loss has been incurred (see further Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité2, no. 247 p. 4). Furthermore, it is also accepted that a

16.

320

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

17.

18.

particular anti-competitive practice necessarily imports a dommage moral (Cass.com. 9 February 1993, Bull.civ. 1993, IV, no. 53 p. 34; JCP éd. E 1994, II, 545, note Danglehant). Furthermore, the breach of an intellectual property right can par elle-même constitute damage (Cass.civ. 11 October 1983, Bull.civ. 1983, I, no. 225 p. 201). In addition, a court decision in 1934 determined that the breach of the owner’s droit de possession sufficed to justify an award of damages even in the event that the owner did not suffer any pecuniary loss (Cass.req. 6 March 1934, D. P. 1937, I, 17, note Blaevoet). However, this set of developments has not taken root under BELGIAN law. Breach of a right is not tantamount to a necessary or sufficient precondition for the presence of damage (Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2), 18). Under SPANISH law, as a general rule compensation is only awarded if the claimant has suffered a pecuniary or non-pecuniary loss. Exceptions to this general rule are made for a breach of a constitutionally protected personality right. Above all, violations of bodily integrity (daño a la salud, cf. de Ángel Yágüez, Tratado de responsabilidad civil3, 698), violations of right to privacy, honour and right to one’s own image are actionable per se. These rights are expressly derived from Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act art. 9(3). The prevailing view in ITALY regards the breach of a legally protected interest as constituting a danno ingiusto under CC art. 2043, thereby justifying the imposition of liability. The particulars regarding the recovery of danno are governed in a variety of provisions, depending on whether pecuniary damage or non-economic loss is involved. Breach of Const. art. 32 whose purport is to safeguard the individual’s right to health is the subject of a special regime. With respect to violations of a person’s psycho-physical integrity, namely the danno biologico, the application of the concept of danno evento (event related damage) in this field was the product of judicial refinement. For a long time, the predominant view in case law was that the danno biologico should not only be conceived as the consequence of an event founding liability but should alone be conceived as the event (evento) that caused the infringement to health. The unjustness alone, which inheres in the act leading to the infringement of the psycho-physical integrity, founds the obligation to make reparation on the actionable per se danno biologico. This obligation is not dependent upon any further accrual of possible manifestations of damage which would in any event have to be proved separately. Therefore, the danno biologico was intermittently regarded, in conjunction with pecuniary and nonpecuniary damage (danni conseguenza) as an additional discrete heading of damage (Corte Cost. 14 July 1986, no. 184, Giur.it. 1987, I, 1, 392). In more recent times, while it is true that the courts have somewhat retreated from this conception of the danno evento (initially with Corte Cost. 27 October 1994, no. 372, Foro it. 1994, I, 3297), they have opted to correct its practical results only in marginal areas. According to more recent case law, the danno biologico is regarded as indeed signifying non-pecuniary loss and consequently conceived as a manifestation of the danni conseguenza. These developments have not had any impact on the fact that, in the event that there is an injury to health, the consequential damage is regarded as being actionable per se (Cass. 31 May 2003, nos. 8827 and 8828, Giur.it. 2004, I, 1, 29; Corte Cost. 11 July 2003, no. 233; Resp.civ. e prev. 2003, 1036; Cass.sez.pen. 25 November 2003 and 22 January 2004, Foro it. 2004, II, 138; Cass. 12 December 2003, no. 19057, Danno e resp. 2004, 762; Cass. 20 February 2004, no. 3399, Foro it. 2004, I, 1059). In other words, proof of any interference with a person’s psycho-physical intergrity (health), is now understood in

321

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19.

20.

322

the sense of a result of an injury to health sufficing to render the danno biologico compensatable in conjunction with and (in addition to) the injured party’s claim for pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss (see further Castronovo, Danno e resp. 2004, 237-247 and Gozzi, Der Anspruch iure proprio auf Ersatz des Nichtvermögensschadens, 61). While AUSTRIAN CC § 1293 does indeed state that the mere infringement of a right can represent damage, this declaration has not acquired any practical significance (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 2/3; Kramer, ÖJZ 1972, 90, 92; Ehrenzweig and Ehrenzweig, System II(1)3, 252). Proof of loss is required, otherwise the rules alleviating the burden of proof under CCP § 273 in respect of the extent of the damage incurred will not come into operation (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht II2, 302). There is no exception provided for under competition law (Koppensteiner, Wettbewerbsrecht3, § 34 no. 53). However, it is generally accepted that non-economic loss always arises from infringements of the right to liberty, it therefore does not have to be proven or substantiated (OGH 24 June 1987, SZ 60/117). A uniform amount of damages is also awarded for copyright infringements if actual pecuniary loss cannot be adduced (OGH 26 May 1998, SZ 71/92). In POLAND the question whether the infringement of a right of personality, in particular an injury to body or health, constitutes damage in itself is the subject of debate (in favour: Radwan´ ski (-Dybowski), System prawa cywilnego III(1), 224-226; against – damage only if there is pain or a loss of earning capacity – Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zaniacze˛´sc´ ogólna5, 90). Compensation for infringement of rights of personality is in any case always a matter for the discretion of the court (Szpunar, Zados´c´ uczynienie, no. 81; Pietrzykowski (-Safjan), Kodeks cywilny I4, 1284-1285). There is no doubt that an injured person has a right to compensation even though he or she is in fact incapable of suffering any pain (Szpunar loc. cit. nos. 91, 164). Statute provides in a number of special cases (innocent defamation; infringement of copyright) for compulsory compensation independent of loss. A number of torts are actionable under ENGLISH law without proof of actual damage and are said to be actionable per se; thus in such cases the conduct violating the claimant’s rights amount to a damage per se. This is not so much the product of deliberate legal policy in attaching an inherent value to certain intangible interests as broadly the manifestation of a (now historical) procedural divide between actions on the case (where damage was the essence of the wrong) and actions in trespass (where it was not): see Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale), Torts19, 1-44. Hence trespass to the person and trespass to property (goods or land) is actionable per se (except, perhaps, in so far as the trespass is founded on negligence), as are certain actions in nuisance. The same is also true of libel, but slander is actionable without proof of special damage only where the defamation imputes a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment or one of certain contagious diseases or where it imputes unchastity or adultery to a woman (Slander of Women Act 1891, s. 1) or disparages the claimant in respect of his office, profession, calling, trade or business (including in the indirect sense provided for by the Defamation Act 1952, s. 2). In Watkins v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 966; [2005] 2 WLR 1538, a case concerning the opening of a prisoner’s mail by prison officers in breach of Prison Rules and in bad faith, it was considered that misfeasance in a public office where the wrongful and malicious act of the public officer interferes with a constitutional right of the claimant also belonged to this list of torts actionable without the need to prove special damage. However, on appeal the House of Lords held ([2006] UKHL 17, [2006] 2 AC 395) that such a proposition was based on a

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

21.

misinterpretation of Ashby v. White (1703) 1 Ld Raym 938, 92 ER 126 (where the action arising out of a returning officer’s refusal to accept the claimant’s vote was properly to be regarded as a defence of franchise in the nature of a proprietary rather than a constitutional right). Accordingly, it remains the rule that special damage must be proven to establish the tort of misfeasance in a public office. In contrast the concept of damage per se is unknown in GERMANY, GREECE, PORTUGAL, the NETHERLANDS (Schadevergoeding II (-Lindenbergh), art. 6:106, no. 23; Schadevergoeding II (-Bolt), art. 6:107, nos. 9-25) and in the NORDIC Countries. However, both the GERMAN and PORTUGUESE courts, consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence of other States, have also permitted a claimant to recover non-pecuniary loss where, following an accident, the claimant sustained severe injuries leading to a permanent impairment of cognitive and sensory functions (BGH 13 October 1992, BGHZ 120, 1; STJ 5 March 1969, BolMinJus 185 (1969) 171, 178). In HUNGARY, some legal commentators postulate that the breach of a personality right is of itself sufficient ground for granting statisfaction (on these discussions see for further analysis Boytha, Polgári jogi kodifikáció, 2003, 3-6 Petrik, Polgári jogi kodifikáció 2003, 6-8), but the courts have thus far declined to follow this approach (Citations in Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1322 ff). The draft of the new CC introduces the legal concept of solatium in place of non-pecuniary loss in the law pertaining to persons. The former is not a damages concept but is a legal institution belonging to the law pertaining to individuals. A person whose personality rights are infringed can thereupon claim damages for pain and suffering without having to prove that further loss or detriment was suffered. The Draft contains an irrebuttable presumption that every infringement of the right of personality amounts to a detriment for the party who suffered injury. The extent of the damages awarded for pain and suffering fall to be assessed by the courts (http://www.parlament.hu/irom38/05949/05949.pdf; Vékás (-Székely), Szakérto˝i Javaslat az új Polgári Törvénykönyv tervezetéhez [Expert submissions on the draft of a new Civil Code for Hungary ], Budapest 2008, pp. 174-175).

III.

Economic loss

22.

There is no pan-European universal criterion to assist in ascertaining when an economic loss is sustained and different approaches are adopted throughout Europe. According to FRENCH doctrine a dommage matériel signifies damage that can be directly measured in money. It embraces both physical damage to goods (atteinte aux biens) as well as pecuniary loss as a result of personal injury (atteinte à la personne physique), loss of profits is also embraced under this heading (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II9, no. 135 p. 124). A strong tendency exists to treat the dommage corporel in conjunction with the dommage matériel and the dommage moral as an automonous head of damages (Terré/ Simler/Lequette, Les obligations8, no. 708 p. 687; Mazeaud and Chabas, Leçons de droit civil II(1)9, no. 409 p. 413). Similarly, according to views in BELGIUM economic damage signifies damage that can be measured in money (Dirix, Het begrip schade, no. 85 p. 61). It embraces physical damage to goods or patrimony as well as loss of income resulting from the infringement of a person’s physical intergrity (van Gerven, Verbintenissenrecht II7, 352). The extent of the economic damage is generally described as the difference between the financial position at the date of the judgment and the hypothetical economic position pertaining had the tort not been committed (Dirix, Het begrip

323

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23.

24.

25.

324

schade, no. 85 p. 61). In both countries, loss of profits represents recoverable damage under tort law (lucrum cessans) (Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité2, no. 251 p. 19; Dirix loc. cit. no. 53 p. 46). One example is provided by a case where shortfalls in production occurred when a gas pipe was damaged (Cass.civ. 8 May 1970, Bull.civ. 1970, II, no. 160 p. 122); another example pertains to the proof of loss of earning capacity in respect of permanent incapacity (Viney and Jourdain, Les effets de la responsabilité2, no. 113 p. 214; van Gerven loc. cit.). Under SPANISH law daño encompasses both pecuniary loss (daño emergente) that is sustained as well as loss of profits (lucro cesante). While it is true that, on the basis of the positioning of the provision (which expressly mentions both of these heads of damages) CC art. 1106 only pertains to contractual liability, this provision has also been deemed to apply to tort law (see among other authorities TS 23 March 1954, RAJ 1954 no. 1299 p. 839; TS 31 May 1983, RAJ 1983 (2) no. 2956 p. 2285; TS 3 October 1991, RAJ 1991 (5) no. 6902 p. 9381). The daño emergente covers a thing’s dimunition of value. Loss of profits are only recoverable, if it can be shown that there is an adequate causal nexus between the defendant’s act and the loss suffered and furthermore, measured by objective standards, there is evidence to suggest that the lost profit claimed would probably have been realised (TS 20 March 1978, RAJ 1978 (1) no. 850 p. 747; TS 1 October 1986, RAJ 1986 (3) no. 5230 p. 5119; TS 19 July 1989, RAJ 1989 (5) no. 5725 p. 6651). An additional requisite is that the source of the lost profit must not derive from illegal activities. Diminishment or permanent loss of earning capacity as a consequence of bodily injury or injury to health is encompassed within this head of damages. The calculation of damages is generally based on the teoría de la diferencia: namely, based on the difference between the extent of the victim’s fortune following the occurrence of the damaging event and the hypothetical assessement of the victim’s assets had the damaging event not occurred (TS 10 January 1979, RAJ 1979 (1) no. 18 p. 26; TS 14 February 1980, RAJ 1980 (1) no. 516 p. 396; TS 2 April 1997, RAJ 1997 (2) no. 2727 p. 4133). Similarly, according to the Italian conception, pecuinary loss embraces the detrimental effect that a tort has on the patrimony of the injured party. The extent of the pecuniary loss is calculated according to the difference between the actual state of patrimony adjudged at the time following the accident and a hypothetical consideration of the state that that they would have been in had the loss not been sustained (see further Cendon (-Gaudino), Commentario al codice civile IV(2), arts. 1655-2059, art. 2043, § 10). Regarding the content of the particulars pertaining to the calculation of this head of damages, CC art. 2056 refers to CC arts. 1223, 1226, 1227 and hence to the rules governing the recovery of contractual damages which also recognise a claim for the recovery of lost profits. Additionally, CC art. 2056 expressly prescribes that a damages claim for the recovery of loss of profits is required to be assessed according to an equitable evaluation of the particular circumstances of the case. Recoverable damage entails daamage that arises as an immediate and direct consequence of the injury, irrespective of whether the damage was foreseeable or not. CZECH and SLOVAKIAN CC §§ 442 et seq. contain comprehensive provisions concerning the conceptualisation of pecuniary loss. It comprises of a “real” damage limb and another limb which pertains to lost profit (CC § 442(1)). The amount of damages awarded for physical damage to property is ascertained according to its value at the time the damage occurred (CC § 443). There are extensive rules governing the calcu-

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

26. 27.

28.

lation of compensation for loss of earnings consequent upon personal injury (CC §§ 445-447a). HUNGARIAN CC § 355(1) makes an express distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss. CC § 355(4) augments this provision by providing that “compensation must be made for any depreciation in value of the property of the aggrieved person and any pecuniary advantage lost due to the damage as well as the indemnity or costs necessary for the attenuation or elimination of the economic and non-economic losses sustained by the aggrieved person”. The following definition of damage is set forth in the SLOVENIAN LOA § 132: “Damage comprises the diminution of property (ordinary damage), prevention of the appreciation of property (lost profits), the infliction of physical or mental distress or fear on another person, and encroachment upon the reputation of a legal person”.In POLAND economic loss is understood as damage to goods whose pecuniary value is ascertainable (Radwan´ ski (-Dybowski), System prawa cywilnego III(1), 221). CC art. 361 §§ 1 and 2 expressly state that the reparation of damage encompasses losses (straty) and lost profits (utracone korzys´ci). Both straty and utracone korzys´ci are ascertained according to the so called differential method, which consists in establishing the difference between the actual state of assets and the hypothetical state in which they would have been had the incident not occurred (Dybowski loc. cit. 214-215; Czachórski, Zobowia˛zania9, 101; Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania-cze˛s´c´ ogólna5, 91). See Note I6 which examines the concept of percuniary loss under GERMAN law. In AUSTRIA, pecuniary loss is regarded as encompassing every detriment that is inflicted to goods possessing a monetary value. This concept embraces both the actual damage (destruction or diminution of existing patrimony; liability is imposed for ordinary negligence) as well as loss of profits (liability is only incurred where the defendant acts with gross negligence). If problems of demarcation arise, the courts tend to assume the existence of actual loss (Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht II12, 286). For example, depriving a businessman of the use of his vehicle amounts to actual loss (OGH 23 May 1956, SZ 29/43), likewise, future profits are also embraced by the head of actual damage provided that public opinion would regard the profit making opportunity as having an independent economic value (OGH 14 December 1979, SZ 52/187) or that they would have certainly materialised had the damage not taken place (OGH 17 October 1995, SZ 68/189). Furthermore, loss of earnings is generally comprehended by actual loss (OGH 18 March 1960, ZVR 1960/234, p. 161). Pecuniary loss also encompasses the incurrence of expenses or onerous obligation (OGH OGH 6 June 1987, ZVR 1987/128, p. 376; OGH 24 November 1964, SZ 37/168; Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 2/36). Austrian law also employs the differential method: this involves comparing the actual position which results from the damaging event with the hypothetical position that would have existed had the damaging act not occurred. The negative difference represents the damage that the plaintiff has suffered (OGH 27 August 1980, SZ 53/ 107; Koziol loc. cit., no. 2/19). In GREECE, an identical approach is adopted; economic loss is evaluated based on an assessment of the difference between the hypothetical state of the patrimony had the damaging event not occurred and the actual state of patrimony (Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio I, 120). It is not enough for the courts to confine themselves to assessing the effect of the damaging event on the affected asset, it is necessary for them to consider its effect on the entire patrimony of the aggrieved party (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Stathopoulos), arts. 297-298 no. 10).

325

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29.

30.

31.

32.

326

In a similar fashion, the PORTUGUESE Civil Code does not contain a statutory definition of the dano patrimonial, likewise no distinction is drawn between damage (dano) and loss (prejuízo) (Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 541, fn. 3). Dano patrimonial is conceived in academic teaching as “an injury to patrimonial assets or to legally protected interests comprising of economic interests involving a detimental effect on the patrimony of the aggrieved party” (Almeida Costa loc. cit. 542-543). Physical damage to tangible property or loss of use is filed under the heading of economic loss as is the impairment of earning capacity following personal injury. Economic damage, also defined as “the reflex of the actual damage (dano real) in the economic situation of the injured party, is measured, in principle, by the difference between the actual situation of the injured party and the situation in which he would be if the injury had not occurred (Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 598-599). DUTCH CC art. 6:95 differentiates between ‘economic damage’ and ‘other disadvantages’; a claim for recovery of the latter can only be asserted if provided for expressly by law. Under the rubric of economic loss, a further distinction is drawn between zaakschade, persoonsschade and zuivere vermogensschade. This subdivision is, above all, of relevance within the framework of CC arts. 6:107 and 108. Zaakschade signifies loss resulting from damage to, destruction or loss of tangible property. Persoonsschade comprises of heads of recoverable economic loss which, arise from personal injury (e. g. medical expenses, loss of earnings), and zuivere vermogensschade, encompasses every pecuniary loss not embraced by personal injury or physical damage. It is conceded in Dutch legal literature that determing the dividing line between the three categories of damage, a task which carries particular import for insurance law, can engender some difficulty (Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12, no. 413 p. 335 with further references). The NORDIC Countries, in particular SWEDEN and FINLAND, differentiate between pure and general economic loss. Pure economic loss is defined as economic loss which arises without any connection to personal injury or property damage (Swedish Damages Liability Act chap. 1 § 2). Indirect loss (e. g. loss of financial support arising from the death of the primary victim) constitutes a discrete category; this head of damages (treated similarly to pure economic loss) is only exceptionally recoverable and is generally confined to instances laid down by law. The calculation of damages is extensively regulated down to the last detail. As a general rule, the function of tort law is to place the injured party in the position he or she would have been in, had the damaging event not occurred. The COMMON LAW too distinguishes between on the one hand economic loss as a consequence of personal injury or physical damage to property, or of an interference with the claimant’s person or property, and on the other hand “pure” economic loss. The latter is compensatable only in restricted circumstances including in the torts of deceit and passing-off (where the defendant’s conduct damaging the claimant’s economic interests will be intentional or reckless). Where the damage is caused negligently, recovery is permitted within the parameters of a special relationship on the basis that the defendant has assumed responsibility to safeguard the claimant against loss of this nature (Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] AC 465). There is, however, no single test or factor which has been identified as determinative of whether the particular relationship between parties is such that it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty to take care to prevent economic loss: Customs & Excise Commissioners v.

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

33.

Barclays Bank [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181. In the absence of such a relationship pure economic loss will not be recoverable, despite the foreseeability of such loss to the claimaint resulting from the defendant’s negligent act. In the latter case, due to inattention a bank carried out an instruction of its customer to transfer money from the account, notwithstanding that it had already received notification of an injunction freezing the account. It was held that the bank could not be understood as voluntarily assuming responsibility for its actions so as to give rise to a duty of care; its obligation to comply with the injunction was based on the threat of sanctions for contempt of court if it intentionally refused to comply; the bank’s only duty was to the court. Moreover, given the strictures imposed by subsequent case law (Caparo Industries plc. v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605: see Note 12 to Article 2:207 (Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information)), even if an assumption of responsibility can be affirmed, only wasted expenditure (i. e. a reliance interest) is recoverable as a rule. Compensation for a gain foregone (loss of profit) will be recoverable as a pure economic loss only in very exceptional circumstances, such as those of White v. Jones [1995] 2 AC 207 (solicitor liable to client’s intended beneficiary for negligence in preparing client’s will), where it can be said a duty was assumed to the claimant to protect their expectation interest. In SCOTLAND too, where the English authorities have been followed (see for example Martin v. Bell-Ingram 1986 SLT 575), the existence of a special relationship between the parties serves to filter cases in which liability is justified: cf. Stewart, Delict3, para. 5.6.

IV.

Normative economic loss

34.

The European legal systems, however, frequently permit economic loss to be recovered despite the absence of a genuine (present or future) net loss as measured by way of the difference method (see further von Bar, Essays in Honour of Lord Goff of Chieveley, 2343). The concept of “normative” damage is employed in such cases. It appears in multifarious forms, cf. e. g. for IRELAND Hogan v. Steel & Co. Ltd. [1999] IEHC 175, [2000] 1 ILRM 330 (economic loss resulting from loss of earnings following an accident was judged recoverable, even though the employer had voluntarily continued to pay the wages) and in respect of AUSTRIA Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VII2, § 1293 nos. 8-9 (liability for the abstract annuity, i. e. compensation for possible future disadvantages that a party who has sustained permanent injury may incur in competition with healthy persons). In SWEDEN, the difference method is merely understood as a technique representing the normal case (Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans, 301 fn. 43 with further references.). The courts are vested with a wide margin of discretion when it comes to the calculation of damages (Code of Judicial Procedure [Rättegångsbalk] chap. 35 § 5), cf. HD 20 December 1973, NJA 1973, 717 (following excercise of judicial discretion, damages were awarded on the basis of an unauthorised use of the claimant’s name without proof of actual loss); HD 15 October 1981, NJA 1981, 933 and HD 27 June 2000, NJA 2000, 325 (estimation of the extent of pure economic loss in respect of illegal private copies) as well as Radetzki, Skadeståndsberäkning vid sakskada, 199). The same holds true for FINLAND (Code of Judicial Procedure [Rättegångsbalk] chap. 17 § 6, cf. on this point HD 15 May 1998, HD 1998:53 and HD 31 August 1998, HD 1998:97) and DENMARK (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 352; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 250; see also HD 31 October 1973, UfR 1973, 950 and HD 8 August 1994, UfR 1994, 785).

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Furthermore, it is universally recognised that the “reduced commercial value” of tangible property, in particular a car, amounts to recoverable pecuniary damage. This head of damages compensates the depreciation of value in the case of a damaged car that was repaired correctly (e. g. accident-damaged car). This diminution in value is also compensated even if loss is not incurred in the event that the owner of tangible property decides not to sell (cf. e. g. for AUSTRIA Harrer loc. cit.; for DENMARK ØLD 22 June 1981, UfR 1981, 919; VLD 19 January 1994, UfR 1994, 304 and VLD 23 April 1997, UfR 1997, 969; for FINLAND Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 5; for GERMANY BGH 3 October 1961, BGHZ 35, 396; for GREECE Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio A(1)2, 540; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Stathopoulos), arts. 297-298, no. 115 and CA Athens 737/1971, EEN 1972 75; for POLAND SN 12 October 2001, OSNC 2002, poz. 57 and for SWEDEN Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 7 no. 1). The courts in ITALY have sometimes held that the deprezzamento commerciale is recoverable even without the adduction of concrete proof of actual loss (Cass. 23 June 1972, no. 2109, Rep.Giur.it. 1972, voce Circolazione stradale, no. 363; CFI Palermo 9 October 1984, Riv.giur.circ.trasp. 1985, 394). Similarly, BELGIAN legal science views a reduction in market value of tangible property as constituting recoverable loss. It has, however, been pointed out that the courts are hesitant to allow a claim for recovery because, for the most part, they consider that the condition that the damage was “certain” has not been met (Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2), no. 169 pp. 322-323). The SPANISH courts only rarely particularise the head of damages upon which they are basing the compensatory award; therefore, it cannot be stated with certainty that a special head of damages for “reduction in market value” is extant; however, the possibility of its general incorporation within an award of damages based on an equitable assessment (unassailable on appeal) cannot be discounted (cf. e. g. CA Guipúzcoa 25 October 1999, BDA AC 1999/ 7264 and CA Pontevedra 10 October 1995, BDA AC 1995/1949). Furthermore, European courts have consistently held that a family member who renders gratutious services in the home, typically a housewife, is entitled to claim damages for loss of housekeeping capacity consequent upon personal injury (see, for AUSTRIA Harrer loc. cit.; for POLAND Pietrzykowski (-Safjan), Kodeks cywilny I4, 1279; for BELGIUM Cass. 15 June 1959, Pas. belge 1959, 1050; for FRANCE CA Colmar 15 May 1956, D. 1956 Jur. 653; for GERMANY BGH 9 July 1968, BGHZ 50, 304; for ITALY (Cass. 11 December 2000, no. 15580, Danno e resp. 2001, 587 [the ability to recover for pecuniary loss in correlation with the danno biologico] and Cass. 6 November 1997, no. 10923, Giust.civ.Mass. 1997, 2093, Danno e resp. 1998, 230 [ Award of damages extended in circumstances where the housewife had indeed employed domestic help, however nonetheless was fully focussed on structuring family life]); for SPAIN TS (3. Senat) 20 October 1998, RAJ 1998 (5) no. 8844 p. 13069 as well as Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act (Texto Refundido de la Ley sobre Responsabilidad Civil y Seguro en la Circulación de Vehículos de Motor, enacted by Real Decreto Legislativo no. 8/2004 of 29 October 2004, Damages Table IV, Note 11) and for the COMMON Law Daly v. General Steam Navigation Ltd. [1981] 1 WLR 120. In SWEDEN (Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 1(2) in conjunction with § 1(3) sentence 2) and in DENMARK (Damages Liability Act § 1(3)) the entitlement of a housewife to recover for loss of housekeeping capacity is the subject of express statutory regulation.

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Non-economic loss

37.

The underlying requisites for permitting the recovery of non-economic damage in the European jurisdictions, despite recent steps taken towards convergence, still diverge greatly. As a general rule, two basic models are encountered. A number of European legal systems hold every loss recoverable. The remainder adopt a contrasting approach and espouse the principle that non-economic damage is generally only compensatable where provided for by law. Outside core fields, up to now, no consensus has been reached on the question on whether damage to injured feelings should be compensatable. On the other hand, there is seldom a distinction drawn between liability for fault and strict liability; as far as the latter is concerned, in the interim, it is common practice throughout Europe to permit recovery for non-pecuniary loss. BELGIAN, FRENCH and LUXEMBOURGIAN law proceed on the basis that both economic and non-economic loss which can be attributed to the tortfeasor’s wrongdoing, is a recoverable head of damages (see for France, at an early stage Cass.civ. 13 February 1923, D. 1923, I, 52 and for Luxemburg Cass. 10 May 1990, Pas. luxemb. 1990-92, 37). The Belgian courts consider that the function of compensation for non-economic damage is to ease pain, grief or other non-economic suffering (Cass. 3 February 1987, Pas. belge 1987, I, 644). The recovery of non-pecuniary loss under the three legal systems does not depend on the drawing of any distinction between fault liability and the strict liability of the gardien (CC art. 1384(1)) (Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité2, no. 246 p. 1). In French academic circles, it is submitted that awarding damages for a dommage moral is not cognate to réparer, but must be viewed in the light of compenser of the irréparable (Terré/Simler/Lequette, Les obligations8, no. 712 p. 691). Accordingly, the dommage moral is defined as a damage which does not signify detriment to the patrimony of the aggrieved party (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II9, no. 139 p. 128; Dirix, Het begrip schade, no. 86 p. 62). The mere intention of inflicting injury on another, in other words the abusive exercise of a right, may suffice to render an entitlement to recover the dommage moral in isolated cases (e. g. CA Lyon 9 March 2006, JCP 2006, IV, 2661: refusal to issue a document of divorce as required by religious ordinances). SPANISH CC art. 1902 simply declares (a transplant of the Code Napoléon arts. 13821384) that “damage” which is caused to another is recoverable. No distinction is drawn between economic and non-economic damage. Initially, i. e. until a later decision of the Tribunal Supremo of 12 December 1912 (cited by, inter alia, Santos Briz, La responsabilidad civil I7, 165) only pecuniary loss (daño material) was recoverable. The above cited judgment fundamentally altered this prior conception of damage. Since the handing down of that judgment, Spanish jurisprudence has consistently declared that non-pecuniary loss is recoverable (e. g. TS 26 January 1972, RAJ 1972 (1) no. 120 p. 119; TS 19 December 1986, RAJ 1986 (5) no. 7682 p. 7462). Moreover, CP art. 110(3) expressly provides that non-economic damage is recoverable in the event that the imposition of civil liability derives from the commisssion of a crime. Further, compensation for noneconomic loss is also explicitly envisaged by the Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act art. 9(3). Spanish legal writing does not devote much attention to the distinction between economic and non-economic loss. The ascertainment of the constitutents of the daño moral remains a perenniel problem. In general, it may be asserted that the daño moral comprises of all damage

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which does not have repercussions on the individual’s wealth (Lete del Río, Derecho de obligaciones II3, 193), further, all injuries to the rights of the personality are compensatable. The latter are recoverable independently of any consideration of the effect on the injured party’s patrimony (Díez-Picazo and Gullón, Instituciones I, 828). Spanish legal writing makes a distinction between non-economic damage in a narrow sense (genuine non-pecuniary damage: daños propiamente morales, daños morales propios) and oblique or indirect patrimonial damage (daños patrimoniales indirectos, daños morales impropios). The first category embraces damage which results in injury to beliefs, feelings, dignity, reputation or physical or psychological health which do not directly impinge on the patrimony of the aggrieved party; the latter classification concerns economic loss which specifically derives from the infringement of a non-economic interest. Conversely, the prevailing principle in ITALY provides, (as consecrated in CC art. 2059) that non-economic loss may not be generally recovered unless expressly provided for by law. Effectively, this entails that cases where a tort also amounts to a crime form the vanguard in this area (CP art. 185(2)). Further instances are provided for by supplementary statutes, e. g. Compensation for Damages Caused by Judicial Errors Act art. 2 which provides that a claim for compensation for non-pecuniary damage may be brought where it arises from a deprivation of liberty occasioned by judicial error; Personal Data Protection Code art. 15; and the Prohibition of Discrimination Decree art. 44(70). The precise scope of application of CC arts. 2043 and 2059 (which have always been deemed to be compatible with the Constitution: Corte Cost. 26 July 1979, no. 87, Foro it. 1979, I, 2543; Corte Cost. 14 July 1986, no. 184, Foro it. 1986, I, 2053; Corte Cost. 27 October 1994, no. 372, Foro it. 1994, I, 3297; Corte Cost. 22 July 1996, no. 293, Resp.civ. e prev. 1996, 909) has absorbed both scholars and the courts for a considerable period. Fleetingly, an interpretation of CC art. 2059 held sway whereby the provision, nothwithstanding its express wording (“Non-pecuniary loss”) was deemed solely to govern cases of pure moral damage arising from emotional distress (Corte Cost. 14 July 1986, no. 184, Foro it. 1986, I, 2976); the limits set forth in CC art. 2059 thereby only appertained to damage of this nature. Since the mid eighties (either directly or by way of analogy) recovery has been permitted for injury to the psycho- physical integrity of a person on the basis of CC art. 2043 in conjunction with Const. art. 32. Thus in this way it was possible to prevent liability for the protection of health from being confined within the narrow parameters of CC art. 2059. From a systematical viewpoint, this “trick” was facilitated by channelling this development of the doctrine of danno evento, whose most important manifestaion was the danno biologico. Gradually, however the courts again revisited and retreated from this danno evento line of jurisprudence and proceeded to recognise the non-pecuniary nature of the danno biologico (Corte Cost. 27 October 1994, no. 372, Foro it. 1994, I, 3297). This does not, however, lead to recovery being predicated on satisfying the narrowly drawn requisites of CC art. 2059. The courts have refashioned the provision with the result that its restrictive conditions apply only to claims for the recovery of damage arising from emotional trauma, i. e. moral damage in its narrow sense. Conversely, the restrictive limits of CC art. 2059 should not apply if the claim for the recovery of non-economic loss is predicated on an infringement of a constitutionally protected right (for example, protection against interference to health and bodily integrity and the protection of the family). In this manner, the danno biologico is retained as a recoverable head of damage, irrespective of whether recovery is

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

41.

42.

expressly ordained by a special law (which is required by CC art. 2059) or otherwise (Cass. 31 May 2003, nos. 8827 and 8828, Giur.it. 2004, I, 1, 29; Corte Cost. 11 July 2003, no. 233 Resp.civ. e prev. 2003, 1036). It appears that a corresponding approach is adopted in respect of the recovery of the danno esistenziale. This arises where there is a permanent and negative detrimental effect on a person’s daily life and social interaction with others. Similarly, this category is viewed as representing a discrete indemnifiable head of damages which is separately liquidated, is consequent upon the infringement of a constitutionally protected right and which is exempt from the underlying restrictions of CC art. 2059 (Cass. 31 May 2003, nos. 8827 and 8828, Giur.it. 2004, I, 1, 29; Corte Cost. 11 July 2003, no. 233, Resp.civ. e prev. 2003, 1036; Cass. Pen. 25 November 2003 – 22 January 2004, Foro it. 2004, II, 138; Cass.sez.un. 24 March 2006, no. 6572, Giur.it. 2006, I, 1359). After all that, it should be noted that Italian law recognises three different catergories of non-economic loss (danno morale, biologico and esistenziale), the recovery of which is governed by various regulations (Corte Cost. 11 July 2003, no. 233 loc. cit.; the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court displays an increased tendency to distance itself from the discrete category of danno esistenziale. Instead the court is inclined to advert, in general terms, to the non-pecuniary consequences of the infringement of constitutionally protected rights). According to recent jurisprudence, the calculation of the award of damages is once again vested in the discretion of the trial judge; this entails that the latter is no longer bound to follow the prior mathematical formulae utilised for the calculation of award of damages for danno biologico (Cass. 31 May 2003, nos. 8827 and 8828 loc. cit.). This discretionary assessement takes into account the gravity of injury, the intensity of the anguish, the sensitivity of the injured party as well as the respective economic position of the parties. However, the enduring principle in Italian law is to refuse to allow recovery for non-economic loss in strict liability cases. This generally entails (i. e. unless there is a countervailing statutory provision) that the colpa of the tortfeasor must subsist in order to recover for non-pecuniary loss. A failure to rebut a rebuttable statutory presumption of fault in the instant case will satsify this criterion, however a statutory presumption of liability (as in e. g. CC arts. 2054(4), 2051 and 2052) will not suffice. However, the courts have created an exception in the field of strict liability with regard to the infringement of constitutionally protected values of the individual. Here, non-econonmic loss is deemed recoverable even if the liability incurred is strict (Cass. 27 October 2004, no. 20814, Resp.civ. e prev. 2005, 98; cf. CFI La Spezia 27 October 2005, Danno e resp. 2006, 173; Foro it. 2005, I, 3500: recovery for biological damage allowed, moral damage disallowed). Until 1992, the year in which this provision was deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Courts on grounds of its perceived arbitrariness, (Decision of the Constitutional Court [ AB határozat] 34/1992. [VI.1.]), HUNGARIAN CC § 354 k incorporated the rule that a wrongdoer was obliged to compensate non-economic loss in the event that the loss resulted in the irretrievable or severe impairment to the aggrieved party’s ability to participate in social intercourse or ability to organise his or her affairs or where prejudice is sustained by a legal person in its commercial dealings. Since then, the law currently continues to abide by the general rule concerning the indemnification of noneconomic damage (CC § 355(1) and (4)); the precise constitutents are filled in by the courts. Under POLISH CC art. 445(1) and (2), a claim for indemnification of non-pecuniary damage may only be asserted in cases where there is injury to body or health, of depri-

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vation of liberty and infringements of the right to sexual self determination. CC art. 448 broadens the scope of this rule to encompass injury to incorporeal rights of personality and further, confers a right upon the injured party to even direct that the award of compensation be paid to a charitable organisation of choice. The prevailing view, however, is that CC art. 448 also applies to cases of personal injury. According to that view, it is only within the framework of CC art. 448 (and not within the framework of CC art. 445) that fault is a prerequisite for a claim (Pietrzykowski (-Safjan), Kodeks cywilny I4, 1311-1314; Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania-cze˛s´c´ ogólna5, 243; SN 12 December 2002, OSNC 2004, poz. 53). CZECH and SLOVAKIAN CC § 444 awards damages for non-pecuniary loss (in the form of a lump sum) only in cases of injury to body or to health. Damages are designed to compensate “pains and aggravation of (the victim’s) social assertion”. The former reluctance of Central and Eastern European jurisdictions, to permit recovery for non-pecuniary loss was abandoned in SLOVENIAN LOA § 132, which, since 2002, sets forth: “Damage comprises the diminution of property (ordinary damage), prevention of the appreciation of property (lost profits), the infliction of physical or mental distress or fear on another person, and encroachment upon the reputation of a legal person”. Further particulars are regulated in LOA §§ 178 and 179 (for further analysis Trstenjak, WGO 2002, 90, 106-107). The “Second Act on the Amendment of Provisions Pertaining to the Law of Damages” of the 18 April 2002 (BGBl. 2002 I 2674) which was commenced on the 1 of August 2002 heralded a reform of the GERMAN law on the indemnification of non-pecuniary loss. The point of departure remains CC § 253(1), according to which compensation for nonpecuniary loss may only be awarded in the cases specfied by law. This provision is supplemented by the addition of a new subpara. CC § 253(2), which provides that:” if compensation is to be awarded for injury to body, health, liberty, the right to sexual self determination, a fair monetary compensation may also be claimed in respect of any noneconomic loss.” This rule embraces both fault-based and strict liability under the Code. In addition, with a number of modifications, CC § 253(2) is referred to in all supplementary statutes regulating instances where strict liability is imposed. The upshot is that in the instancs enumerated above compensation for non-economic loss may also be claimed in cases of strict liability. The right to claim damages for non-pecuniary loss for infringements of rights of personality directly derives from the provisions of the Constitution which protect basic human rights (Const. art. 2 in conjunction with art. 1) (BGH 19 September 1961, BGHZ 35, 363, 368; BGH 15 November 1994, BGHZ 120, 1, 15; BGH 5 April 2000, NJW 2000, 2195, 2197). Similarly, in AUSTRIA, as a general rule, non-economic loss may only be recovered in cases expressly ordained by law (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 11/17; Rummel (-Reischauer) ABGB II2, § 1324 no. 11; OGH 21 March 1951, JBl 1951, 377; OGH 26 April 1989, JBl 1989, 792 = RS 0 022551 [on compensation for loss of enjoyment on holiday]). The view has been advanced in legal literature that, CC § 1323 provides a general basis for the rule that non-economic damage is recoverable if the damage sustained is caused by gross negligence (Bydlinski, JBl 1965, 237, 247). At least in light of the results achieved, it can be said that there is a convergence between this conception and recent jurisprudence of the OGH (OGH 16 May 2001, ZVR 2001, 284, note Karner; Fötschl, VersRAI 2001, 60). In this decision, the court awarded non-pecuniary damages in respect of parents’ emotional suffering which was occasioned by the loss of their child. A claim for this head of damages may only be made in cases of intention or

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

45.

46.

47.

gross negligence. Despite strong critiscism from legal commentators, this distinction remains and thus entails that no claim can be made, in relation to this head of damages, in cases of strict liability (e. g. Schobel, RdW 2002, 206). While GREEK CC art. 299 also takes, as its point of departure, the basic rule that compensation for non-pecuniary loss may only be awarded in cases provided for by law, it does not, however, pan out in this way in the field of non-contractual liability law. This is due to the fact that CC art. 932 is also comprehended by the enumerated cases contained in CC art. 299. The former deems that equitable compensation may be recovered for non-economic damage occasioned by a tortious act. This claim arises independently of the existence of any pre-existing pecuniary loss (Paterakis, I chrimatiki ikanopoiisi logo ithikis vlavis, 244, 253; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 932, no. 4; Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio III, 291) and, further, the claim does not hinge upon whether liability is fault-based (Kornilakis, I evthini apo diakindinevsi, 185; Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio III, 290; Paterakis, I chrimatiki ikanopoiisi logo ithikis vlavis, 263; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 932, no. 5; A. P. 444/1964, NoB 12 (1964) 1075; CA Patras 256/1984, NoB 32 (1984) 1567). CC arts. 57 and 59 stipulate that damages may be recovered for noneconomic loss consequent upon the infringement of personality rights. CC art. 59 extends beyond CC art. 932, in so far as it provides for other forms of redress other than monetary compensation. Within the confines of CC art. 932 recovery is permitted for non-economic loss arising out of the commission of any tort. This is because CC art. 932 second sentence only contains indicative example of the application of the rule and it has been expressly stated that an exhaustive rule is not comprehended by the provision, compare A. P. 1589/1979, NoB 28 (1980) 1115, 1117 and CA Athens, 658/1975, NoB 23 (1975) 508 (non-economic loss resulting from infringements of the right to ownership); CA Athens 3995/1970, Arm 1971, 410 (killing of a dog); CA Thessaloniki 1809/ 1990, Arm 1990 440 (Parental liability; daughter damaged a car); CA Thessaloniki 455/ 1982, Arm 1983, 212 (a brawl in pub for which the defendant was responsible; the plaintiff landlord was permitted to claim non-economic damage); A. P. 175/2005, NoB 53 (2005) 2023 (Non-economic damage given because another swimmer, in contravention of byelaws, took his dog to the beach and took the dog for a dip in the sea with him) The family of a person killed as a result of a tortious act may assert a claim for nonpecuniary loss for emotional distress (CC art. 933 sent. 3). PORTUGUESE CC art. 483(1) embraces both economic and non-economic damage. CC art. 483(1) is supplemented by CC art. 496, according to which compensation for non-pecuniary loss (danos não patrimoniais) may only be recoved if that loss “is deserving of legal protection on grounds of its severity” (on this point e. g. STJ 18 Novemer 1975, BolMinJus 251 (1975) 148, whereby mere inconvenience is excluded from the ambit of recovery for non-pecuniary loss). Portuguese law does not contain a rule which corresponds to the German CC § 253 or the Greek CC art. 299. It may be recalled that these provisions both provide that non-economic damage may only be compensated in instances provided for by law. However, DUTCH CC art. 6:95 has adopted the latter principle and it provides: “to the extent that the law confers a right to compensation, the damage comprises of pecuniary loss and any other prejudice”, a claim for the latter may only be asserted “in so far as a right of compensation is envisaged by the law”. CC art. 6:95 expressly distinguishes patrimonial loss from other prejudice; the latter are only compensatable when the law

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49.

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expressly provides for their recovery. The terms “other prejudice” is understood as encompassing the non-economic (intangible or non-patrimonial) loss (see further Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12, nos. 464 ff, pp. 424 ff). A claim may only be asserted once the requisites of CC art. 6:101 are satisfied, essentially therefore, (a) in respect of intentional infliction of non-economic prejudice (b) in respect of injury to corporeal and incorporeal personality rights and (c) violations to the reputation of the dead. ESTONIAN LOA § 128(1) makes the distinction between pecuniary and non-economic loss. LOA § 128(5) adds that: “non-patrimonial damage involves primarily the physical and emotional distress and suffering caused to the aggrieved person”. The subsequent provisions each explicitly detail which forms of injury entitle a claim for damages: LOA § 130(2) (injury to Body and to health), LOA § 131 in conjunction with LOA § 134(2) (grave injury to liberty, honour and personality) and LOA § 134(4) (damage to or loss of intangible property; only in circumscribed circumstances is a tortfeasor deemed liable for non-economic damage). For further analysis see Tammiste, Juridica 2004, 129–141. In a similar fashion, LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.250(2) embodies the principle that “non-pecuniary damage shall be compensated only in cases provided for by laws.” Once more, CC art. 6.263(2) explicitly confirms the applicability of this principle to the field of tort law. CC art. 6.250(1) defines non-pecuniary loss in the following terms : “Non-pecuniary damage shall be deemed to be a person’s suffering, emotional experiences, inconveniences, mental shock, emotional depression, humiliation, deterioration of reputation, diminution of possibilities to associate with others, etc., evaluated by a court in terms of money”. Similarly, in the NORDIC COUNTRIES, a distinction is drawn between economic and non-economic loss. The latter are only recoverable in cases specially ordained by law. However, there is no express statutory provision which supports this basic principle (Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 371; Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 346). SWEDISH law takes the Damages Liability Act (EAL) chap. 5 § 1(3) as its point of departure. According to this provision, damages for personal injury encompass compensation for pain and suffering (sveda och värk) and other enduring impairments (lyte eller annat stadigvarande men); both heads of damages imply compensation for noneconomic loss. The same holds true for compensation for “particular interferences” which are also enumerated in this provision, (Sandstedt, VersRAI 2002, 10, 11). The corresponding regulations under DANISH law are encountered in Damages Liabilty Act (EAL) § 1 in conjunction with §§ 3-4 and, under FINNISH law in Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 2 and § 2c (however, there is no corresponding reference to “particular interferences”). The recoverable heads of damages for non-pecuniary loss comprise further compensation for injury caused by affront to feelings, i. e. recovery is permitted for injury to liberty and honour as well as for particular manifestations of an intrusion into another person’s privacy. According to SWEDISH law, damages to one’s feelings (e. g. in respect of criminal “disturbances of the peace”) may also be awarded in cases of mere damage to physical property (Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 373). The legal basis for compensation for injured feelings is presently anchored in EAL chap. 2 § 3 (for the most recent amendment to this Act, see Sandstedt loc. cit.). Under DANISH law, compensation for injured feelings is governed by EAL § 26; under FINNISH law the claim for damages for “suffering” is regulated in Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 6. Moreover, in Scandinavia, a claim for non-economic damage may be asserted for brea-

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

50.

51.

ches of intellectual property rights and the right to a name (Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 73, fn. 56 and 57). Finally, SWEDISH Marketing Act (Marknadsföringslag) § 29(2) provides: “When determining compensation to be awarded to business operators, regard may be had to circumstances which are not exclusively of an economic nature.” In DENMARK the courts have reached the same conclusion based on a statutory provision that deviates somewhat from the Swedish position (HD 30 August 1989, UfR 1989, 1146). Conversely, in FINLAND it may be assumed that recovery of compensation for non-economic loss is not permitted for infringements of competition law (Kaulamo, Probleme des finnischen Wettbewerbs- und Marketingrechts, 401). In both ENGLISH and SCOTS law damages for non-pecuniary loss are available where the tort (or delict) results in physical personal injury, death, psychiatric injury, intentional invasion of a person’s personal sphere, defamation, or where there is nuisance affecting the environment of immoveable property (Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd. [1996] 2 WLR 348). In cases of nuisance in English law this is confined to householders, on a view that the tort is aimed at protecting land (ibid.). However, recently in effect such a claim has been recognised in cases against public authorities as available to a wider range of people affected though basing the claim on a breach of Human Rights law (Marcic v. Thames Water Utilities Ltd. [2002] EWCA Civ 64, [2002] QB 929). The question whether a distinction between intention and other bases of liability has a bearing on whether non-pecuniary damages are available is in English law currently controversial. The view has been expressed judicially that in all torts involving intention damages for non-pecuniary loss are always available for distress, inconvenience or discomfort (Hunter v. Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655 per Lord Hoffmann). Non-pecuniary damages are generally available in strict liability cases on the same basis as they are in negligence cases. Consumer Protection Act 1987 s. 6(1)(a) and (c) confirm this general rule. In the law of defamation liability is strict and awards under this head can be large. In both England and Scotland defamation cases can be heard and decided by jury trial. In response to the European Court of Human Rights (Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom, ECHR 13 July 1995, App. no. 18139/91) holding that jury awards without any control result in this field in a potential breach of ECHR art. 10 (freedom of expression), control at appellate level has now been instituted, putting maximum levels on such awards. The terminology for describing awards of non-pecuniary damages differs between English and Scots law. In SCOTLAND these awards are categorised as awards of solatium as opposed to damages for “patrimonial loss”. In ENGLAND they are awards made under the head of “general damages”, which is the heading that comprehends all aspects of a claim that are not capable of precise assessment. In cases of physical personal injury the award in England is characterised within this as an award for “pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life”. In both jurisdictions the general nature of such awards results in them also being made in cases where the claimant is permanently unconscious and shown not to be suffering any pain (H. West Ltd. v. Shephard [1964] AC 326; Dalgleish v. Glasgow Corp. 1976 SC 32). In Scotland solatium awards for personal injury are analysed into three components (while awarding one figure), namely, pain and suffering, loss of faculties and amenities, and loss of expectation of life, which roughly map on to the factors that are considered in an English award.

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VI.

Non-economic loss of legal persons

52.

It is widely recognised that legal persons can also sustain non-economic loss and be entitled to compensation thereof. This is a valid proposition e. g. for FRANCE (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2002/2003), no. 1466 pp. 387-388; compare also. Cass.ch.mixte 6 September 2002, Bull.ch.mixte 2002, no. 4 p. 9 symbolic sum of one franc awarded in favour of a consumer protection agency]) and for BELGIUM (Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2), 260). Typical cases pertain to injury to reputation (Schuermans/Van Oevelen/Persyn/Ernst/Schuermans, TPR 1994, no. 4.2 pp. 932-934). The criminal law division of the French Cour de cassation decided, however, in an action civile (in which a tort claim in respect of damage arising out of a criminal offence is raised and adjudicated upon within the criminal process) that the State and local authorities cannot assert a claim for compensation for non-pecuniary loss (Cass.crim. 26 February 1986, GazPal 1986 Som., 339). In addition, under the private law, legal persons are not entitled to assert a claim for damages for infringement of the right to one’s own image or the breach of the right to respect for privacy (Rép.Dr.Civ. (-Tallon) VIII, no. 153; otherwise for Belgium – protection of the company’s inner workings regarded as an aspect of the protection of the right to “private life” – de Page and Masson, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge II(1)4, no. 20 pp. 2930). Despite eliciting some criticism in legal literature, (e. g. Gómez Pomar, InDret 1/2005, 4) the approach of the SPANISH courts is also to award legal persons damages for nonpecuniary loss (TS 23 March 1987, RAJ 1987 (1) no. 1716 p. 1631; TS 4 October 1997, RAJ 1997 (4) no. 7641 p. 12103; TS 20 February 2002, RAJ 2002 (2) no. 3501 p. 6117). A corresponding situation prevails in AUSTRIA (OGH 5 December 1989, SZ 62/192; Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 11/2, fn. 5) and ITALY. Practical examples relate mostly to interference with honour and reputation, (Cass. 10 July 1991, no. 7642, Giur.it. 1992, I, 1, 96), prejudicing credibility (Cass. 3 March 2000, no. 2367, Giust.civ.Mass. 2000, 518; Cass. 5 December 1992, no. 12951, Foro it. 1994, I, 561), injury to the right to one’s name and image (for the latter see Corte dei Conti, Sez. riun. 23 April 2003, no. 10, Giur.it. 2003, 1710 re the protection of a local authority’s image; Compensation of the danno esistenziale). It is even possible to infringe a legal person’s private sphere (Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, arts. 2043-2059, 1204-1205). The following have been deemed to connote creditors: private law companies (Cass. 3 March 2000 loc. cit.), local authorites (Cass. 15 April 1998, no. 3807, Resp.civ. e prev. 1998, 992), a foreign State (Cass. 5 December 1992 loc. cit.) and Italian State (Cass. 10 July 1991 loc. cit.). Furthermore, non-pecuniary loss suffered by legal persons is also deemed recoverable in HUNGARY (where this followed already from the former CC § 354), in SLOVENIA (LOA § 132: “encroachment upon the reputation of a legal person”), in POLAND (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania-cze˛s´c´ ogólna5, 244; SN 15 December 1975, LEX no. 77/80), in THE NETHERLANDS (see. inter alia Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 380; Schadevergoeding (-Deurvorst), art. 106, no. 11; Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht III10, no. 240 p. 227; Overeem, Smartegeld, 54-55; CFI Amsterdam 8 March 2006, LJN AV3959), in GREECE (A. P. 479/1968, NoB 17/1969, 597; CA Athens 4105/ 2004, DEE 12 (2006), 306 [The Consumer Protection Act 2251/1994 art. 10(9) and (13) (now art. 10(15) and (16)(b) as inserted by Act no. 3587/2007): award of non-economic damages to Consumer Protection Agency; relayed to charitable organisation]), in POR-

53.

54.

336

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

55.

56.

TUGAL (Capelo de Sousa, O direito geral de personalidade, 599; Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 83 (1959) 70; Gouveia de Andrade, Da ofensa do crédito, 73; Ferreira Dias, O dano moral, 39; STJ 15 June 1994, BolMinJus [1998] 438; STJ 5 October 2003 and STJ 5 October 2003; compare, however, on the issue of danos patrimoniais indirectos of legal persons STJ 9 June 2005) and in the NORDIC COUNTRIES (e. g. for SWEDEN Marketing Act § 29 and for DENMARK Lynge Andersen, UfR 1977, 241). Conversely, in GERMANY, a legal person cannot generally claim damages for nonpecuniary loss. The fact that tort law protects the incorporeal personality rights of legal persons is indeed uncontentious, but the courts are of the view that the function of an award of “satisfaction” cannot not be fulfilled in the case of a legal person thereby leading to the exclusion of a claim for non-economic loss (BGH 8 July 1980, BGHZ 78, 24, 28; CA Munich 28 May 2003, MDR 2003, 1418). An exception is however permitted for legally incorporated religious organisations (BGH 25 September 1980, BGHZ 78, 274, 280). In contrast, the COMMON Law entitles a legal person to pursue a claim for redress of non-economic harm in respect of damage to business reputation (Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No. 3) [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359). On 6 April 2000, the European Court of Human Rights decided in that case of Comingersoll S. A. v. Portugal, ECHR [GC] 6 April 2000, App. no. 35382/97, that a public limited company may also claim compensation for non-pecuniary loss under ECHR art. 41, the loss originated from the undue length of civil proceeding relating to a claim arising out of bills of exchange (see further Ress, FS Ishikawa, 429).

VII. Breach of absolute rights

57.

58.

In Europe, one of the most controversial questions remains the question as to what significance should be ascribed to the concept of absolute rights within the framework of tort law. While in all of the European jurisdictions prejudice resulting from a breach of absolute rights is, in principle, recoverable, there is a lack of consensus on what hierarcharical level these rights are to be ranked (for further analysis of this issue, see VIII), and, secondly and above all, on the determination of whether a violation of absolute rights is of paramount or merely accidental importance for tort law. In the latter case, tort liability may arise even in the absence of an infringement of such a right; its presence merely amounts to an evaluatory parameter, one of many, to be used by the courts when it comes to fleshing out the content of the “intrinsic” requisites for establishing liability (damage, fault and causation). It should be noted that the concept of absolute rights is not one that is employed in common law jurisdictions. Tort liability under BELGIAN, FRENCH, MALTESE and LUXEMBOURGIAN law does not depend on the breach of a legally protected absolute right. These legal systems only require the occurrence of damage, but then are of the view that the mere infringement of a right alone cannot justify the imposition of liability because this infringement does not necessarily entail that damage arises from the breach (Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité2, no. 247 p. 3; Dirix, Het begrip schade, no. 1 p. 13; Ravarani, La responsabilité civile, no. 691 p. 487; Cass. 21 June 1990, RW 1990-91, 1199). An exception to this basic rule has developed out of a number of judgments of the FRENCH Cour de cassation, which espied not only a dommage arising out of breaches of rights to ownership and intellectual property ipso iure but at the same time also perceived a delictual faute (see in particular Cass.civ. 11 October 1983, Bull.civ. 1983, I, no. 225

337

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

59.

60.

61.

62.

63.

338

p. 201 [infringement of copyright] and Cass.req. 6 March 1934, D. P. 1937, I, 17, note Blaevoet [violation of an owner’s droit de possession]). Similarly from a SPANISH persepective, protection of absolute rights is not the function of tort law, rather this task is assigned to other civil actions, in particular, the action for the restitution of goods (acción reivindicatoria) and a negatory action (acción negatoria) (Paz-Ares/Díez-Picazo/Bercovitz/Salvador (-Pantaleón Prieto), Código Civil, p. 1972; Díez-Picazo, Derecho de daños, 291; De Ángel Yágüez, Tratado de responsabilidad civil3, 260). These claims merely require an encroachment of the claimant’s sphere of control amounting to a violation of the holder’s subjective right; neither damage nor fault are required. In contrast to this position, the provisions of Spanish tort law do not require the violation of the claimant’s subjective right (either absolute or relative) or breach of a legally protected interest (Pantaleón Prieto loc. cit. 1993 ff; Díez-Picazo loc. cit. 50). According to CC art. 1902 in principle, all damage is recoverable, the rider added that recovery is not permitted if the loss was sustained to an interest that was immoral or illegal. Similarly ITALIAN CC art. 2043 does not employ the notion of the violation of an absolute right or legal interest. The determinative prerequisite for the imposition of liability is rather the (culpable) infliction of a danno ingiusto. In turn, a danno ingiusto generally arises when a legally protected interest is infringed (see Note I1 above). Detriment suffered as a result of the breach of an absolute right connotes a legally protected interest, therefore there is no doubt tort liability can be incurred for sucgh breachs (Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, arts. 2043-2059, p. 194). Of course, this does not preclude the recovery of damage under CC art. 2043 which does not arise from such a breach. The codifications of Central and Eastern Europe universally follow the approach of the Romance legal systems. None of the Codes in the basic norm refer to the infringement of a right as a prerequisite for tort liability to arise; the determining factor (and adequate in itself) everywhere is the infliction of damage (CZECH and SLOVAKIAN CC § 420; HUNGARIAN CC § 339(1); POLISH CC art. 415; SLOVENIAN LOA § 131). The approach of GERMAN CC § 823(1) stands in stark contrast to these codifications. According to this provision, tort liability only arises if injury is caused in an unlawful and culpable manner to “life, body, health, liberty, property or any other right”. Only under exceptional circumstances, will tort liability arise independently of a breach of these right. This will ensue particularly in the cases appertaining to § 823(2) (violation of a protective law) and to § 826 (intentionally causing harm to another in a manner that is contra bono mores). PORTUGUESE CC art. 483(1) largely corresponds to German CC § 823(1) and (2). According to the wording of AUSTRIAN CC §§ 1293 and 1295, there is no requirement that an absolute right be infringed in order for tort liability to arise (analogous position to French CC arts. 1382 and 1383). However, belying this wording, both the courts and academic teaching require the violation of an absolute right or the breach of a protective statute, in order for tort liability to be incurred. The argument advanced is that it is necessary to avoid the spectre of boundless liability for damage, which would thereby place an overwhemling burden on the economy (see for adivergent view to many Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VII2, § 1293 no. 2 and OGH 7 March 1973, SZ 46/31). The “patrimony” as such of a person is not accorded absolute protection (OGH 12 April 1984, JBl 1985, 38).

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

64.

DUTCH CC art. 6:162(2) expressly defines an unlawful act as comprising of a “violation

of a right”. A similar, however considerably more precise definition is contained in ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(1).

65.

The notion of “absolute rights” is not a feature of the tort law of the NORDIC COUNTRIES; these types of dogmatic categories are incompatible with Scandinavian legal realism. Similarly, the ENGLISH and IRISH law of torts as well as that of SCOTS law function without the legal doctrine of absolute rights.

VIII. Particulars to certain rights

66.

It is a self evident proposition that the killing of a person, injury to health or to body, deprivation of liberty and damage to physical property all give rise to a claim for damages. However, the treatment of other rights under tort law is subjected to a variegated approach. While not claiming to be an exhaustive portrayal, the following treatise affords an overview of a number of the most practically relevant rights, which the Article in Section 2 of Chapter 2 does not paticularise.

(1)

Incorporeal rights of the personality

67.

The Civil law legal systems largely regard the protection from the arrogation by a third party of the absolute right to one’s name as self evident. Preventative legal protection as well as repressive legal protection (in the case of loss) exists to combat such transgressions. See for FRANCE le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2002/2003), no. 1608 p. 419 (a family member who does not bear the same name would even have locus standi: Cass.civ. 5 February 1968, JCP 1968, II, 15670); for BELGIUM (where it is a bone of contention in the case of incorporeal patrimonal rights whether a mere infringement of rights suffices for a claim of damages or whether loss must be proved.) Guldix and Wylleman, TPR 1999, 1589, 1624-1631 and CA Brussels 8 November 1989, RGAR 1992, 11906; for SPAIN Civil Registry Act of 8 July 1957 (Ley del Registro Civil) art. 53; for ITALY CC arts. 7, 8 and 9 (on which see Cass. 5 October 1994, no. 8081, Giur.it. 1996, I, 1, 842 and Cass. 7 March 1991, no. 2426, Foro it. 1991, I, 2082; on the controversarial question as to whether a claim for recovery of danno morale, Cian and Trabucchi, Commentario breve6, sub art. 8, § 3); for HUNGARY CC §§ 77 and 84; for POLAND CC art. 23; for ROMANIA CC art. 54, for GERMANY CC § 12 (on which see BGH 26 June 2003, BGHZ 155, 273 and BGH 5 October 2006, WM 2007, 35); for AUSTRIA CC § 43 (on which see OGH 7 November 1962, SZ 35/110; OGH 22 October 1986, SZ 59/182 and Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht II2, 9); for GREECE CC art. 58; for PORTUGAL CC arts. 72 and 74; for THE NETHERLANDS CFI Rotterdam, 4 February 1994, NedJur 1995, no. 39 p. 149; for ESTONIA LOA § 1046(1) and for SWEDEN the Names and Pictures in Advertising Act [Lag om namn och bild i reklam]. The same holds true for the right to oppose unauthorised use and exploitaion of one’s image and to assert a claim for damages in such cases. See for FRANCE CA Versailles 30 June 1994, D. 1995 jur. 645, note Ravanas; TGI Nanterre 6 April 1995, GazPal 1995 jur. 285; for BELGIUM see the references in the previous note; for SPAIN Const. art. 18(1) and Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act art. 7(5) and (6) in conjunction with art. 8(2) and on this TS 26 January 1990, RAJ 1990 (1) no. 26 p. 60; for ITALY CC art. 10 (liability incurred if own picture or that of

68.

339

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

69.

70.

340

one’s parents, spouse or child is reproduced without authorisation; see further Cass. 16 April 1991, no. 4031, Giur.it. 1991, I, 1, 1345 and – no compensation for danno morale – Cass. 10 november 1979, no. 5790, Resp.civ. e prev. 1980, 212); for HUNGARY CC §§ 80 and 84; for POLAND CC art. 23; for ROMANIA CC art. 54, for GERMANY Copyright on Works of Fine Art and Photography Act (KunstUrhG) § 22; for AUSTRIA Copyright Act (UrhG) § 78 (see further OGH 6 December 1994, ZfRV 1995, 158, Rummel (-Aicher), ABGB I3, § 16 no. 19); for PORTUGAL CC art. 79; for THE NETHERLANDS HR 1 July 1988, NedJur 1988, 1000; for ESTONIA LOA § 1046(1), for SWEDEN the Names and Images in Advertising Act cited in the previous paragraph; for FINLAND among other decisions HD 21 November 1980, HD 1980 II 123 and for DENMARK among other decisions HD 25 January 1965, UfR 1965, 126. The right to claim damages for a breach of the right to one’s own voice is becoming increasedly accepted. See for FRANCE CFI Paris 3 December 1975, JCP 1978, II, 19002, note Bécourt; Rép.Dr.Civ. (-Tallon) VIII, no. 20 and no. 148 (here, allusions are made that a claim for damages only arises in the event of a pecuniary or non-pecuniary loss); for SPAIN TC 25 April 1994, no. 117/1994, BOE no. 129 of 31 May 1994 and CA Barcelona 10 September 2003, RAJ (TSJ y AP) 2004 (1) no. 289 p. 375); for ITALY Bianca, Diritto civile I2, 187; for HUNGARY CC §§ 80 and 84; for POLAND CA Gdan´ sk 21 June 1991, OSA 1992, no. 8; and for AUSTRIA OGH 29 November 2001, MR-Int 2002, 26 = RIS-Justiz RS 0 115837). Conversely, it remains uncertain whether the right to one’s own voice is deemed a protectable interest under DUTCH law (denying this claim CFI Utrecht 4 December 1996, NedJur 1998, no. 43 p. 237). In contrast to civil law jurisdictions, the COMMON LAW has not traditionally recognised rights of personality such as a right to one’s name, reproduction of one’s image or voice in such terms, but it has developed means to protect them, at least when they are actually commercialised by the person concerned, and it is clear that their protection is still being developed in the case law. Famous personalities who trade on their reputation by permitting commercial exploitation of their image may protect themselves against unlicensed use of the facets of their personality by the tort of passing off, which protects the goodwill not merely of businesses, but of any trader. For these purposes persons involved in professional, artistic or literary occupations, who are thus entitled to sue in respect of the use of their name or image as false endorsements of products or services (Irvine v. Talksport Ltd. [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch); [2002] 1 WLR 2355, affirmed as to law (but allowing the appeal as to quantum) sub nom. Irvine v. Talksport Ltd. (Nos. 1 and 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 423; [2003] 2 All ER 881) or a false (or at least confusing) attribution (Clark v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [1998] 1 WLR 1558 [parody of diarist’s fictive journal, prominently featuring name and image]). However, the person concerned must be a trader in relation to matter for which their personality right is exploited: see Kaye v. Robertson [1991] FSR 62, 69 (where an actor, who had suffered an accident, was not a trader in relation to the story about his accident and recovery). A further basis for protecting rights of personality lies in the law of defamation on the basis that the individual whose name or image is exploited is falsely represented as having endorsed or consented to the matter concerned: Tolley v. J. S. Fry & Sons Ltd. [1931] AC 333 (amateur cricketer’s image used in advertising for defendant’s chocolate defamatory in that it implied he had received payment for his endorsement, contrary to his status as a non-professional player), followed in Kaye v. Robertson, loc. cit. (arguably libellous to imply plaintiff actor had consented to newspaper article about his accident and recov-

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

ery, but not a suitable case for an interlocutory injunction). Finally, the evolving law on breach of confidence, expanded to protect reasonable expectations of privacy, also provides a framework for rights of personality: see OBG Ltd. v. Allan [2007] UKHL, [2008] 1 AC 1 (where photographic images of a celebrity wedding, not being publicly available, were regarded as confidential information of commercial value); Murray v. Express Newspapers plc. [2008] EWCA Civ 446; [2008] 3 WLR 1360 (where a magazine published a photograph of the claimant, the son of the author J. K. Rowling, with his parents walking in an Edinburgh street, it was at least arguable that the child, though in a public place, had a reasonable expectation of privacy and no publicity had been courted and the photograph was taken covertly using a long range lens).

(2)

Post-mortal protection of personality rights

71.

There are varying approaches in evidence dealing with the issue as to whether and in which respect tort law protection of the personality of a person can extend beyond the grave and the purport of such rights is also contentious. We are not concerned here with cases where there was a transgression of the deceased’s personality rights while he was still alive and the assertion of such a claim befalls his successors in title. (These cases essentially fall to be resolved under the law of succession, compare. e. g. Cass.civ. 14 December 1999, Bull.civ. 1999, I, no. 345 p. 222: The right to respect private and family law expires on the death of the bearer.) The cases that come under consideration here concern circumstances where the deceased is “insulted”. It has been held in FRANCE that the deceased’s successors are only entitled to defend his or her memory against being portrayed in false or distorting reports, reports which are published in bad faith or where the report is excessively facetious (CA Paris 3 November 1982, D. 1983, 248, note Lindon; compare on the issue on postal-protection of image rights CA Paris 7 June 1983, GazPal 1984 jur. 528, note Lamoureux and Pochon, as well as, different view in parts, CFI Aix-en-Provence 24 November 1988, JCP éd. G 1989, II, no. 21329, note Joël Henderycksen). In the case of an unauthorised publication of a photograph of a person’s mortal remains and funeral, the widow and children are entitled to a damages claim on the grounds of interference with the right to respect for family life derived from CC art. 1382 (CA Paris 26 April 1983, D. 1983 jur. 376, note Lindon). Considerable prominence is given to the fact that a criminal offence under Freedom of Press Act art. 34(1) gives rise to a tort law action for damages (compare. Cass.civ. 22 June 1994, Bull.civ. 1994, II, no. 165 p. 95). The right to respect for private life expires eith an individual’s death (Cass. 14 December 1999, Bull.civ. 1999, I, no. 345 p. 222). Equally, the approach in BELGIAN leans towards the protection of certain rights of the personality following the death of the bearer. This is especially true for the right to one’s image, irrespective of whether it concerns the photograph of a corpse or depictions from the deceased’s life which unlawfully discredit his memory (see further de Page and Masson, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge II(1)4, no. 55 p. 69). Likewise, post-mortal protection of personality rights commands general acceptance in SPANISH law. Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act arts. 4 and 5 define the class of persons entitled to make a claim and also regulates an entitlement in the event that the injurious act took place during the lifetime of the deceased; loc. cit. art. 9(4) additionally clarifies the issue to whom non-

72.

73.

74.

341

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

75.

76.

77.

pecuniary damages are due. TC 214/1991 of 11 November 1991, BOE no. 301 of 17 December 1991 conferred a right on a Jewish woman living in Spain in her capacity as a survivor of the Holocaust the right to pursue civil and criminal law actions in order to defend the collective honour of the Jewish people against attacks. ITALIAN law principally guarantees the protection of the deceased’s dignity by vesting a right of action in the deceased relatives to vindicate this protection (Bianca, Diritto civile I2, 154 and 187; CFI Rome 29 June 1998, Resp.civ. e prev. 1999, 477). Special copyright rules augment this protection (see in particular LA art. 23). In GERMANY, post-mortal personality rights even enjoy the status of constitutional protection (constitutively BVerfG 24 February 1971, BVerfGE 30, 173, 194; compare also BVerfG 5 April 2001, NJW 2001, 2957; for a comprehensive overview see Pabst, NJW 2002, 9991004). An obligation to compensate for non-economic loss is not generally recognised (BGH 6 December 2005, BGHZ 165, 203 and BGH 5 October 2006, WM 2007, 35); however, at first instance, there have been deliberations as to whether an exception to this rule should be fashioned for severe violations (CA Jena 31 March 2005, NJW-RR 2005, 1566). Post-mortal protection of the right to one’s image is subject to special regulation (KunstUrhG § 22). In AUSTRIA it has been emphasised that the right of free development of the personality can only be fully comprehended if it is recognised that the right endures after death, the protection of the deceased’s honour and right to respect for private life merit special consideration under the heading of post-mortal protection (OGH 23 May 1984, SZ 57/98, Rummel (-Aicher), ABGB I3, no. 28). HUNGARIAN CC §§ 84 and 85(3) (1)(e), ROMANIAN Natural and Legal Persons Decree art. 56, GREEK CC art. 57(1), DUTCH CC art. 6:106(1)(c) and PORTUGUESE CC art. 71(1) adopt a similar approach. The latter provision introduces a special rule to CC art. 68(1), stipulating that an individual’s personality does not endure after death. CC art. 71(2) determines the class of persons that are entitled to bring an action to vindicate an individual’s posthumous interests (see further Leite de Campos, BFD L (1974), 297 and STJ 11 December 2003). POLISH law too allows a close relative of a deceased person to recover damages if the latter’s memory or reputation is injured by false statements (SN 24 February 2004, OSNC 2005, poz. 48; Radwan´ ski, Prawo cywilne – cze˛s´c´ ogólna8, 167). Likewise, the NORDIC COUNTRIES also recognise a right to psot motal protection of personality rights, but this right is only crystallised under criminal law, cf. DANISH Penal Code §§ 264c, 264d, 274; SWEDISH CP chap. 5 § 4 (on this point, see HD 14 December 1966, NJA 1966, 565) and FINNISH CP chap. 27 § 4. The COMMON LAW of England and Ireland exclude any posthumous protection for injuries to an individual’s reputation; it is said that one cannot defame the dead (Clerk and Lindsell (-Brazier), Torts16, 21-01).

(3)

Further rights with personality aspects attached

78.

Moroever, courts of some jurisdictions are displaying an increasing tendency to create new absolute rights which reinforce the right to personality. They include the courts of e. g. PORTUGAL (von Bar, Common European Law of Torts II, 88; Hörster, Parte geral, 259; STJ 2 October 2003; STJ 4 July 1978, BolMinJus, 279 [1978], 124; direito ao repouso e à tranquilidade) and SPAIN (TS 29 April 2003, RAJ 2003 (2) no. 3041 p. 5721; cf. Martín Vida, VersRAI 2004, 20-23; Martín Vida, VersRAI 2005, 57-63 and 2006, 5-8)

342

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

79.

80.

81.

where the courts have recognised a right to rest and recovery which is derived from the constitutionally protected rights to intimate sphere and inviolability of a dwelling. Claimants in other jusrisditions must rely on the law concerning the respective interests of neighbours in cases of noise nuisance because tort liability is dependent on the presence of injury to body or health. This corresponds to the prevailing situation in GERMANY (CC § 823(1)) and in AUSTRIA (OGH 13 July 1988, JBl 1989, 41). In turn, the latter two countries recognise that membership of an association is accorded the status of a right and thus the unjustified exclusion of a member of the association can give rise to a claim for damages (BGH 6 February 1984, NJW 1984, 1884; BGH 12 March 1990, NJW 1990, 2877; OGH 10 July 1997, RIS-Justiz RS 0 108196). In ROMANIA adopts a similar stance (CC art. 998; CSJ 16 March 2001, sect¸ia civila˘, decision no. 1609). In DENMARK, damages may be recovered for the unlawful exclusion from a trade union (HD 16 December 1936, UfR 1936, 672), and the same holds true for SPAIN in respect of an unjustified withdrawal of shareholder position (TS 20 March 1998, RAJ 1998 (1) no. 1712 p. 2649). In addition, under Spanish law, reference must be made to the right of protection of the family’s intimate sphere (intimidad familiar) which is derived from Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act (intimidad familiar), which geared towards protecting “family secrets”, i. e. facts which affect the family and of which only family members have cognisance of (TC 197/1991 of 17 October, BOE no. 274 of 15 November 1991; TC 134/1999 of 15 July, BOE no. 197 of 18 August 1999; cf. also Igartua Arregui, La Ley 1990, I, 1066, 1071). In turn, the ITALIAN court consistently express the interests which they have classified as worthy of protection rights in terms of rights, their number include e. g. the right to family serenity (diritto alla serenità familiare: CFI Milano 18 February 1988, Resp.civ. e prev. 1988, 454) and the right to the integrity of one’s patrimony (diritto all’integrità del patrimonio: Cass.sez.un. 26 January 1971, no. 174, Giur.it. 1971, I, 1, 680, note Visintini; Foro it. 1971, I, 342, 1284, notes Jemolo and Busnelli).

(4)

Personality rights of legal persons

82.

For an examination of how the personality rights of legal persons are legally protected in the various jurisdictions, see the notes under VI. Wherever a legal person is permitted recovery for non-pecuniary loss, it thereby follows that legal persons are also entitled to personality rights. The SPANISH courts have even conferred a right on legal entities under private law to inviolability of certain areas of its business premises (TC 69/1999 of 26 April 1999, BOE no. 130 of 1 June 1999). Conversely, it has been held that legal persons under public law are not holders of personality rights (TC 107/1988 of 8 June 1988, BOE no. 152 of 25 June 1988; TS 24 October 1988, RAJ 1988 (5) no. 7635 p. 7492). It is a self- evident proposition that private corporations enjoy a right to protection of their professional reputation (TC 139/1995 of 26 September, BOE no. 246 of 14 October 1995; TC 193/1995 of 11 December 1995, BOE no. 11 of 12 January 1996; TS 15 April 1992, RAJ 1992 (3) no. 4419 p. 5849; TS 14 March 1996, RAJ 1996 (2) no. 2178 p. 2936; TS 20 February 2002, RAJ 2002 (2) no. 3501 p. 6117, TS 5 October 1989, RAJ 1989 (6) no. 6889 p. 8011); they can even assert a right to their own image (TC 19/1983, of 14 March 1983, BOE no. 87 of 12 April 1983). Similarly, in ITALY, in conjunction with a right to claim damages for violations of honour and good reputation,

343

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

83.

it is conceded that legal entities enjoy a right under tort law to personal identity (Cass. 10 July 1991, no. 7642, Giur.it. 1992, I, 1, 96), integrity (Cass 3 March 2000, no. 2367, Giust.civ.Mass. 2000, 518; Cass. 5 December 1992, no. 12951, Foro it. 1994, I, 561) and to protection of its private sphere (Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, arts. 2043-2059, pp. 12041205). The position under HUNGARIAN law is to apply the rules pertaining to protection of the personality to legal persons, unless the nature of the rights entails that they can only be asserted by natural persons (CC § 75(2) i. V. m. § 84(1)(e)). The position is the same in POLAND (CC art. 43). Similarly, ROMANIA intends to adopt an approach along these lines (Proiectul Noului Cod civil: Draft CC art. 196). Under AUSTRIAN law, while it is true that the prevailing law holds that only natural persons can be insulted, this does not preclude granting an absolute right to legal persons in respect of the protection of their corporate professional reputation (OGH 11 January 1996, ecolex 1996, 361). SLOVENIAN LOA § 183 stipulates that the court shall award a legal person just monetary compensation for the defamation of its reputation or good name, independently of the reimbursement of economic damage, if it finds that the circumstances so justify, even if there is no material damage. On this provision see further Supreme Court 7 May 1993, II Ips 586/92. Similarly, it is accepted under the COMMON Law, that it is possible to defame legal persons. It is not necessary to plead or adduce proof of actual economic damage in cases where the defamation affects the plaintiff’s corporate reputation; general damages will also be awarded where such proof is absent (Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No. 3) [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359).

IX.

Violations of relative rights

84.

Relative rights, in particular contractual claims, can generally only be transgressed by those who are under an obligation to perform under the contract. Liability for legal injuries of this type accordingly fall to be dealt with by that part of the legal system which regulates such claims, this especially pertains to contract law. In principle, parties who are not privy to the contract cannot acquire rights from it nor are they placed under any duty to observe the rights flowing from the contract as these rights are solely relative and effect the relations between the contractual partners. As a general rule, it is against public policy and thereby prohibited to intentionally prevail on another not to perform his contract with a third party; only in such circumstances will a tort action which can be enforced erga omnes flows from a right under a contract (see Notes under Article 2:211 (Loss upon inducement of breach of obligation)). Naturally, many exceptions, which are not of an inconsiderable purport have been created regarding the application of this common point of departure. Developments engendered in France are particularly noteworthy in this regard. FRENCH CC art. 1165 clearly articulates the basic rule that “agreements produce effect only between the contracting parties”. Nonetheless (and despite drawing weighty academic criticism) it appears that the principle of opposabilité du contrat par les parties aux tiers has gained the upperhand. According to this exegesis, a third party is bound to respect the legal situation created by the contractual partners (for an in-depth analysis see von Bar and Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law in Europe, nos. 625-664). The converse situation, in which a contractual infringement establishes delictual faute is called faute opposabilité du contrat par les tiers aux parties

85.

344

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

86.

87.

88.

(Terré/Simler/Lequette, Les obligations8, no. 490 pp. 482-483). The Supreme Court has, on many occasions, endorsed both aspects of the new doctrine (e. g. Cass.civ. 17 October 2000, JCP éd. G 2001, I, 338, no. 6, note Viney [ faute of the editor of a magazine for publishing advance excerpts of book which was about to be published] and Cass.civ. 18 July 2000 and 13 Febraury 2001, JCP éd. G 2001, I, 338, nos. 8-10, note Viney [a breach of contract committed by one of the parties which caused harm to a third party represented faute pursant to CC art. 1382 ]). Cass. 5 April 2005, RTD civ 2005, 602, observant. Jourdain, argument is however contained: a third party can only rely on the breach of contract to ground tort liability if this breach amounts to a breach of a general duty to refrain from injuring others. Similarly, the BELGIAN courts have affirmed that the fact that there is a contract in existence is a fact which a third party must take account of. Consequently, collaborating in a breach of contract based on a negligent omission to acquaint oneself of these circumstances can constitute a delictual faute (essentially Cass. 22 April 1983, RW 1983-84, 427, note Dirix; RCJB 1984, 359, note Merchiers). Whether the same result holds true for SPAIN on the question whether a third party is only liable vis-à-vis a creditor for intentionally inducing the debtor to breach its contract remains shrouded in uncertainty (Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 93; Lacruz Berdejo, Elementos II(1)4, 480; Díez-Picazo, Fundamentos II5, 604 [who opines that intention is a necessary prerequisite]). For this rubric under ITALIAN law, it is necessary to advert to cases where the creditor suffers loss as the result of an injury or the death of his contractual debtor. This type of loss has been qualified as a danno ingiusto in the sense of CC art. 2043 vis-à-vis the third party who caused the harm (the landmark Meroni case: Cass.sez.un. 26 January 1971, no. 174, Giur.it. 1971, I, 1, 680, note Visintini; Foro it. 1971, I, 342, 1284, notes Jemolo and Busnelli [killing of an employee]; see further e. g. Cass.sez.un. 12 November 1988, no. 6132, Giur.it. 1990, I, 1, 280; Cass. 22 September 1986, no. 5699, Giust.civ.Mass. 1986, fasc. 8-9; Cass. 27 May 1982, no. 3284, Giust.civ.Mass. 1982, fasc. 5; Cass. 1 April 1980, no. 2105, Giust.civ.Mass. 1980, fasc. 4 [all of these cases affect the injury or death of employees ] as well as Cass. 24 June 1972, no. 2135, Giur.it. 1973, I, 1, 1123 [interruption in the supply of electricity; possibly in connection with violation of property rights]); cf. on this point especially Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile3, 590 and Trimarchi, Riv.Dir.Civ. 1983, I, 224, 229). In cases of inducing and acting as an accomplice to a breach of contract (e. g. Cass. 20 October 1983, no. 6160, Giur.it. 1984, I, 1, 439; Cass. 9 January 1997, no. 99, Giur. civ. comm. 1998, I, 17 and Cass. 15 June 1988, no. 4090, Foro it. 1989, I, 1568 [Same piece of real estate sold twice; liability of the second buyer vis-à-vis the first buyer ]) it appears that evidence of intention was always provided (Bianca, Diritto civile V, 605-607). In POLAND academic analysis adopts the position that an infringement of relative rights by a third person gives rise to tortious liability vis-à-vis the creditor where the third person unlawfully and through his or her fault renders the fulfilment of the obligation impossible (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania-cze˛s´c´ ogólna5, 17; Czachórski, Zobowia˛zania9, 58). Under GERMAN law, the mere negligent contribution of a third party to a breach of contract will not suffice in principle to ground the liability of the latter as against the creditor (BGH 24 February 1954, BGHZ 12, 308). However, it has been mooted that the “entitlement to make a claim” amounts to “another right” under CC § 823(1). This doctrine encompasses cases where a third party who is not a creditor accepts the per-

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89.

90.

91.

92.

346

formance of a good faith debtor whereupon the latter is released from his obligations visà-vis the true creditor. However, the courts have, thus far, failed to pick up on this submission (overview of the current state of the discussions inter alia. in Medicus, Schuldrecht II13, no. 812). In contrast, in AUSTRIA, the OGH 30 August 2000, JBl 2002, 182, note Dullinger and Riedler and detailed analysis by Fötschl, VersRAI 2002, 57 and 2003, 9, has held that “damages claims against third parties who encroach upon a third party’s right to recover a debt, in certain circumscribed circumstances, may be asserted in cases of merely negligent interference” (liability of a bank affirmed where the bank arranged for a borrower to pay his debts into a bank account even though these debts were previously assigned to the claimant), cf. Pletzer, Doppelveräußerung und Forderungseingriff, 103. In OGH 12 December 2002, RdW 2003, no. 255 these principles were refined further. In GREECE, it is exceptional that tort liability arises in cases where a third party merely negligently interferes in the contractual relations of another (e. g. Vavouskos, I paraleipsis os simiogono gegonos eis ta adikimata tou Astikou Dikaiou, 83 and CA Athens 4393/1976, NoB 25/1977, 1367). The prevailing academic opinion regards intention as a prequisite for the imposition of liability in this case (CC art. 919) (Georgiades, FS Larenz 1983, 175, 186; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 914, no. 46). However, liability under the basic norm of tort law (CC art. 914) ought to arise, where a third party collects or assigns effectively the debt of a third party. In addition, CA Athens 3148/1982, NoB 31/1983, 519 ruled that an interruption in electricity supply caused by a third party constituted interference with the tenant’s relative right to require their landlord to surrender the use of the property which was the subject of the rental agreement in conformity with the contract and this interference sufficed for the imposition of liability under CC art. 914. In a similar manner, the touchstone concept in PORTUGAL remains the principle that contractual obligations can only be breached by the contractual partners (CC art. 40(2); cf. Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 74 (1958) 334; Santos Silva, ERPL 2006, 826, 828-829 and VersRAI 2007, 24). A third party who profits from the breach is only liable to the creditor when the prerequisites of CC art. 483 are fulfilled, i. e. where there is a coinciding breach of an absolute right or protective law (Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 85 (1959) 346; Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 44). The principle of relativity of contract appears thus far only to have been perforated in cases involving the protection of third parties not privy to the contract, namely by utilising the conceptual technique of contracts with protective effects for third parties (contratos com eficácia de protecção de terceiros, see STJ 14 October 2004; Sinde Monteiro, RLJ 131 [1988/89], 49; Carneiro da Frada, Teoria da confiança, 109 and 135). Rights deriving from a contract are not counted as “rights” in the terms of DUTCH CC art. 6:162(2). Therefore, interference with contractual relations by a third party is actionable under tort law if it can be interpreted as amounting to a breach of an obligation under the same provision. Apart from cases involving the procurement of a breach of contract, this cause of action is rarely successful, cf. e. g. HR 3 May 1946, NedJur 1946 no. 323 pp. 420-423 (breach of contract by supplier also led to an increase in costs to a client of the recipient; tort liability was incurred on the former) and HR 14 June 2002, RvdW 2002, 104 (vendor sold contaminated land with full knowledge of the circumstance that the purchaser intended to sell it on to a third party; liability incurred vis-àvis the ultimate purchaser). The courts further recognise that exploiting another’s

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

93.

94.

breach of contract to the creditor’s disadvantage can constitute an unlawful act (HR 23 December 1955, NedJur 1956, 54). See further du Perron, Overeenkomsten en derden, nos. 287-292 and 326-352. In respect of SWEDISH law, it has recently been decided in HD 14 September 1998, NJA 1998, 520 that a bank which released stock to a depositor even though it was aware that a lien was issued on the deposit facility, was liable in damages to the holder of the lien. In addition, recent cases have awarded damages for inducement of breach of contract (HD 2 September 2005, NJA 2005, 608). It is generally recognised in the Nordic countries that intentionally procuring a breach of contract gives rise to a claim for damages cf. for DENMARK, at an early stage, HD 16 September 1947, UfR 1947, 1005, on this case see Gomard, Obligationsret II, 146, and for FINLAND Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 74 ff. See further Hagstrøm and Aarbakke, Obligasjonsrett2, 816 ff). In the COMMON LAW a person may be liable for inducing breach of contract: see Note 13 to Article 2:211. In SCOTLAND likewise it is an actionable wrong knowingly to induce a person to breach a subsisting contract which is valid, if damage results: British Motor Trade Association v. Gray 1951 SC 586. The threshold of knowledge of the existence of the contract which is required under Scots law has been regarded as a higher one than under English law: the latter judges the defendant by what he ought to have known, at least in the sense of recklessness (Stratford & Son Ltd. v. Lindley [1965] AC 269), whereas Scottish authority implies that only actual knowledge will suffice (Rossleigh Ltd. v. Leader Cars Ltd. 1987 SLT 355, 360). However, in the light of the House of Lords’ decision in OBG Ltd. v. Allan [2007] UKHL, [2008] 1 AC 1, holding that a conscious decision not to inquire into the existence of a fact could be treated as knowledge for the purposes of the tort Scots law on this point is now likely to follow the English approach. Beyond this English law has developed the tort (or a broader tort) of wrongful interference with the performance of a contract (or perhaps more widely, business); the parameters of the tort originating in Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Cousins [1969] 2 Ch 106 (CA) (where the breaches of contract induced by the defendant were those of employees whose obligations were owed not to the claimant, but to actual or potential suppliers to the claimant) are uncertain. In OBG Ltd. v. Allan loc. cit., the House of Lords held that the unitary approach which regards causing loss by unlawful means as an extension of the tort of inducing a breach of contract ought to be abandoned in favour of the view that there are two separate torts. For the view that the tort of unlawful interference with economic relations is an anomaly in enabling a claimant to sue for a loss occasioned by an unlawful act committed against a third party and that its theoretical underpinnings are poorly treated see Neyers, (2008) 28 Legal Studies 215233. Finally, OBG Ltd. v. Allan, loc. cit., affirms the proposition that intentional inducement of breach of an obligation of confidence is tortious: a media outlet having bought the benefit of an obligation of confidence imposed by a celebrity couple on the guests present at their wedding was entitled to protect the right to that benefit against any third party who intentionally destroyed it.

X.

Wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life

95.

The most hotly discussed and one of the most exceptionally contentious tort law issues in many of the European jurisdictions concerns legal questions arising in connection with the birth of a child. These issues fall overwhemingly within the confines of Article

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2:101 of this Draft. Based on the prevailing terminolgy used in the European jurisdictions, it follows consequently that a distinction will be drawn between liability for wrongful conception (the birth of a healthy child which was not desired by its parents, liability to the parents for medical or other error in connection with recommended contraception methods), wrongful birth (birth of a disabled child which the mother would have aborted had the disability been correctly diagnosed in time, liability to the parents) and wrongful life (similarly involves the birth of a disabled child but is actionable at the suit of the child because of a failure to abort). In all three categories, liability can be tortious or contractual.

(1)

Wrongful conception

96.

If a child, while healthy, is born to parents who did not want it and the birth can be ascribed to a contraceptive failure, which arose due to the faute of a third party, in particular owing to erroneous information provided by the doctor, according to FRENCH law the patient is entitled to assert a claim against her contractual partner (doctor or hospital) for economic or non-economic loss which she has suffered (at any rate according to Castelletta, Responsabilité médicale2, no. 71.54; there is a derth of case law on the subject). This must be distinguished from the case where a child is born as a result of rape. In these cases, according to previous case law, the child itself may maintain an action for compensation against the rapist (Cass.crim. 4 February 1998, JCP 1998, I, 185 no. 15, note Viney; CA Caen 7 November 2002, JCP éd. G 2002, II, 10001, note Sériaux). In light of the newly in force Loi no. 2002-303 of 4 March 2002 relative aux droits des malades et à la qualité du système de santé (see the notes under ‘wrongful birth’ and ‘wrongful life’) it remains to be seen whether the courts will adhere to conventional practice). According to BELGIAN law liability of a doctor for erroneous performance or the provision of erroneous information in connection with a sterilisation procedure for the father or mother is generally governed by contractual rules. It is necessary to prove the faute of the doctor (de Kezel, NjW 2004, p. 546 no. 9). The doctor is liable to compensate the financial and mental suffering that can be attributed to the pregnancy, birth and presence of an unwanted child. Factors taken into account are those that can be fairly attributed to the medical professional as a result of his (contractual) faute are the subject of examination. The courts will not take into account the fact that the child’s mother could have aborted the child or could have given it up for adoption (de Kezel loc. cit. no. 20; CFI Kortrijk 1 February 1994, RW 1995-96, 57; of a different view CFI Luik 10 May 2001, T. Gez. 2001-02, 247). Under SPANISH law, this type of liability, a number of exceptions apart, is generally recognised. Liability is based on a violation of the right to self determination (TS (3. Senat) 3 October 2000, RAJ 2000 (4) no. 7799 p. 12036); For the most part liability was imposed for breach of the duty to inform of risks in connection with the sterilisation (TS 25 April 1994, RAJ 1994 (2) no. 3073 p. 4169; TS 31 January 1996, RAJ 1996 (1) no. 546 p. 719; TS 11 February 1997, RAJ 1997 (1) no. 940 p. 1469; TS 11 May 2001, RAJ 2001 (3) no. 6197 p. 9524), technically incorrect performance of surgery (TS 10 October 1995, RAJ 1995 (4) no. 7403 p. 9826) or incorrectly inserted contraception (TS 24 September 1999, RAJ 1999 (4) no. 7272 p. 11439). The extent of recoverable damage remains a contentious issue. A number of courts situate the recovery of costs for

97.

98.

348

Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

99.

100.

101.

102.

the maintaining of the child as economic loss (e. g. CA Barcelona 20 September 1999, AC 1999-III, no. 1973 p. 487), other courts have held only non-pecuniary loss to be recoverable stemming from a pregnancy, risk of which was thought to have been eliminated; conversely, the doctor is not burdened with the actual costs of maintaining the child (TS 24 September 1999 loc. cit.; CA Alicante 9 July 1999, zitiert nach Vicente Domingo, El daño, 250, fn. 187; CA Badajoz, 22 April 1991, La Ley 1991, III, no. 11795 p. 484). ITALIAN Cass. 8 July 1994, no. 6464, Giur.it. 1995, I, 1, 790 rejected a parents’claim for recovery of economic loss resulting from an unsuccessful abortion; solely the mother’s danno biologico is recoverable. In cases where failure in birth control methods can be attributed to medical error, the courts of first instance have held that here the parents’ economic loss was recoverable and the courts did not regard the failure to abort as contributory negligence (CFI Venezia, 10 September 2002, Giur.mer. 2003, 468; CFI Milano 10 October 1997, Danno e resp. 1999, 82). The HUNGARIAN courts have refused to acknowledge damages claims arising from the birth of a healthy child; neither maintenance costs or mental suffering associated with the upbringing of an unwanted child are recoverable (CFI and CA Veszprém [zit. nach Köles, Orvosi mu˝hiba perek, 287-291]; BH 2000/207 and BH 2004/143 [=EBH 2003/ 941]). Academic writers share the same views as the courts (Dósa, Állam- és Jogtudomány 1-2/2000, 143-153; Dósa, Az orvos kártérítési felelo˝ssége, 134-154; Jobbágyi, Jogtudományi Közlöny 2004, 1-9; Herpai, Magyar Jog 11/2005, 691-701). POLISH courts have decided that where pregnancy results from a rape and a doctor unlawfully prevents a legal abortion contrary to the wish of the pregnant woman, that constitutes an infringement of her general personal freedom and gives rise to liability for both economic and non-economic loss (SN 21 November 2003, OSNC 2003, poz. 104; SN 22 February 2006, OSNC 2006, poz. 123). If a healthy but unwanted child is born owing to a clinical error, then under GERMAN law, the parents have an actionable loss under both tort and contract law. An unwanted pregnancy, the product of a failed sterilisation is qualified as physical injury (BGH 18 March 1980, NJW 1980, 1452, 1453). This in turn gives rise to a claim for compensation of non-economic loss. This claim will also ensue if no side effects materialise during the course of the pregnancy (BGH 10 March 1981, NJW 1981, 2002, 2003; BGH 19 June 1984, NJW 1984, 2625). Together with the doctor, the pharmacist may also be liable in negligence, for example, by providing negligent advice in respect of method of birth control (BGH 27 June 1995, NJW 1995, 2407, 2408). However, an action for the loss that the parents suffer in respect of costs of maintaining the unwanted child lies solely within contract law, namely the loss is not recoverable under tort law (Staudinger (-Hager), BGB13, § 823, no. B 14; CA Frankfurt 25 June 1992, NJW 1993, 2388, 2389; BGH 18 March 1980 loc. cit.; BGH 10 March 1981 loc. cit.; BGH 2 December 1980, NJW 1981, 630; BGH 19 June 1984 loc. cit.; BGH 27 June 1995, NJW 1995, 2407, 2409). The claim is also actionable at the suit of the father on the grounds that his loss is regarded as coming within the protective scope of the contract (BGH 18 March 1980 loc. cit.; BGH 19 February 2002, NJW 2002, 1489, 1490; BGH 18 January 1983, BGHZ 86, 240, 249). As regards AUSTRIAN law it was decided in OGH 14 September 2006, JBl 2007, 171 that “the birth of a healthy, but unwanted child [is] not damage in the legal sense”. Consequently a doctor is not liable either for maintenance of the child or to compensate

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for pain and suffering of childbirth if, despite a vasectomy, a pregnancy occurs and no warning of this risk was given. See also OGH 25 May 1999, SZ 72/91. 103. PORTUGUESE academic writing had adopted the umbrella term of “wrongful birth” to encapsulate the cases we have designated as “wrongful conception” (Pinto Monteiro, RLJ 134 [2001-2002], 378). It is assumed that every time that a medical error results in an unplanned pregnancy, the parents may bring an action in order to obtain compensation (Menezes Cordeiro, Tratado I(3), 282). This claim is either based on the violation of the mother’s right to self-determination (autodeterminação) in family planning or on the breach of the doctor’s duty to give serious, credible and responsible information under CC art. 485(2). In practical terms, cases of failed sterilisations or failed abortions primarily end up before the courts (Pinto Monteiro loc. cit.). Negligently rendering performance of contractual duties is deemed to obligate compensation of losses which stem from this. There is no abridgement of the claim on the basis of the perceived joy attendant upon the birth of a healthy child. If the contract was concluded with a hospital run by the State, the hospital is also obliged to compensate loss (Menezes Cordeiro loc. cit.; Trib.Conf. 19 March 1971 [quoted by Figueiredo Dias and Sinde Monteiro, BolMinJus 332 (1984), 22, notes 2 and 3]; Trib.Conf. 5 November 1981, BolMinJus 311 (1981) 195). The parents could also choose to pursue an action under tort law instead of basing their claim in contract. This follows from the general doctrine pertaining to concurrence of actions (see the Notes under Article 1:103 (Scope of application), see further e. g. STJ 19 June 2001, RLJ 134 [2001-2002] 371). Naturally, the child cannot hope to base an action on the fact of its existence, even if its birth transpired due to clinical error. At the time of writing, there is a lack of case law on the issue, the same holds true for GREECE. Greek legal writing solely envisages a contractual liability to the parents derived from CC art. 690 (Androulidaki-Dimitriadi, I ipochreosi enimersosis tou asthenous, 415). 104. Under DUTCH law, a claim for wrongful conception is generally recognised; it can be based in contract (HR 21 February 1997, NedJur 1999 no. 145 p. 837; HR 9 August 2002, RvdW 2002 no. 132 p. 1195), general tort law (CC art. 6:162: liability to the father) or, in the event of a faulty contraceptive product, an action may lie according to the rules on product liability (CC art. 6:185). It is averred that the child does not represent the damage, rather the hardship that results to its parents in respect of rearing and supporting the child. In addition, the deprivation of income of the mother owing to the fact that she must care for the child amounts to recoverable loss; however, according to previous case law, infringing upon the parents’ life plans does not amount to noneconomic damage. Compensation for non-pecuniary loss is only awarded for pain and suffering of the mother arising from the pregnancy or birth, treatment of which was deemed medically necessary (HR loc. cit.). 105. At an early stage, the DANISH courts permitted a mother to recover economic (maintenance costs) and non-economic loss (HD 19 November 1960, UfR 1961, 239). In the remainder of the Nordic Countries, the issue has not been resolved; SWEDISH literature is not in favour of permitting the parents to recover the costs of maintaining the child (Andersson, Trepartsrelationer i skadeståndsrätten, 312); the mother alone should only be permitted to recover compensation for non-economic loss in connection with the pain and suffering sustained during the course of the pregnancy (Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans, 383).

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Article 2:101: Meaning of legally relevant damage

106. Conversely, the COMMON LAW does not regard wrongful conception as actionable McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59 (HL) and for Ireland Byrne v. Ryan (2007) 26 ILT (N. S.) 276 (value placed by Constitution on the family, and the dignity and protection of human life best served by denying damages for cost of rearing an unintended healthy child conceived after failed tubal ligation). However, Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 3 WLR 1091 (HL) added a gloss to the McFarlane decision and held that a parent of a healthy but unwanted child who was wrongly treated or advised in matters of reproductive medicine is entitled to claim conventional damages of £15.000 for the loss of reproductive autonomy and an infringement of the right to plan their family.

(2)

Wrongful birth

107. According to FRENCH Ill Persons Act (“Loi Koucher”) art. 1(1) al. 3 (Code of Family Law and Social Benefits § L 114-5), parents who, had they discovered the child’s disability in time, would have induced its abortion can assert a claim for economic and non-economic damage. Of course, the prerequiste for the success of this claim is the presence of a faute caractérisée (see further Lambert-Faivre, D. 2002, 1217-1220 and Arnold, VersR 2004, 309-313). In addition, restrictions are placed on the extent of the claim. Parents may only assert a claim for the recovery of their own préjudice économique; they may not assert a claim for recovery of the costs arising in connection with the care of a disabled child as such costs should be borne by the solidarité nationale. However, lines of demarcation between the two heads of damages are blurred, which causes difficulties. The transitional arrangements for the Act, which had the effect of denying claimants the possibility of recovering under a damages claim which had already vested, infringed the provisions on the protection of property under the European Convention of Human Rights (Draon v. France, ECHR [GC] 6 October 2005, App. no. 1513/03 and Maurice v. France, ECHR [GC] 6 October 2005, App. no. 11810/03). 108. In BELGIUM, cases of wrongful birth are not subjected to the same analysis as the wrongful conception cases. In this regard, emphasis is placed solely on the fact that the damages recoverable under the first category are higher than under the second, given the greater child rearing costs associated with disabled children (de Kezel, NjW 2004, p. 546 no. 7). 109. In SPANISH TS 6 June 1997, RAJ 1997 (3) no. 4610 p. 7083 found a gynaecologist (and the health service executive) was liable vis-à-vis the mother who was deprived of the choice of undergoing an abortion on the grounds of an error in examining the amniotic fluid. The birth of a child suffering from Downs-Syndrome constituted a daño gravísimo. In TS 4 February 1999, RAJ 1999 (1) no. 748 p. 1217 the principles enunciated in this decision were affirmed, however the action was dismissed given that the doctor did not commit a medical error. According to case law, the recoverable economic damage encompasses the entire basic costs associated with the child’s upbringing. However, academic literature (De Ángel Yágüez, Revista de Derecho y Genoma Humano 1996, V, 105, 151) argues that only the additional expenses arising in connection with the disability are recoverable. However, the extent of liability may be reduced on equitable grounds (at any rate according to the CA Cádiz 17 September 2002, AC 2002-III, no. 1929 p. 1117).

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110. The ITALIAN courts awarded a mother who would have terminated the pregnancy if she had been informed of the child’s impairment in time by her medical practitioner, compensation for danno biologico as well as damages for pecuniary loss. Furthermore, the father’s claim for the recovery of danno biologico is also recognised (Cass. 1 December 1998, no. 12195, Giur.it. 1999, 2038; see. also Cass. 24 March 1999, no. 2793, Giur.it. 2000, 43 and on the father’s entitlement to assert a claim– Cass. 10 May 2002, no. 6735, Foro it. 2002, I, 3115. 111. Today, the HUNGARIAN courts recognise that a claim for “wrongful birth” is actionable, in so far as there was a breach of the doctor’s or hospital’s duty to provide information or pre-natal exams were negligently carried out (BH 2004/10; BH 2004/112; see Köles, Orvosi mu˝hiba perek, 203-208, 239-242). In the POLISH decision of the Supreme Court 13 October 2005, OSPiKA 2006, no. 71 the view was taken that misleading medical advice on the risk of the child’s disability and a refusal of a closer genetic examination which results in the parents being deprived of the possibility of legal abortion generate liability for non-economic and economic loss (costs of pregnancy and birth, loss of earning capacity of the mother and increased costs of maintenance of the child). 112. In GERMANY, a distinction is drawn between cases where there is negligence attendant upon birth control methods or prenatal screening for genetic defects and cases where there is negligence respect of the termination of the pregnancy. In the latter case, it is averred that, at the most, special complications arising during the pregnancy or birth are caused by the doctor’s negligence, not the pregnancy itself- (BGH 18 January 1983, BGHZ 86, 240, 248; BGH 27 November 1984, NJW 1985, 671, 673). The mother’s emotional distress will only be compensated if it constitutes an illness of pathological significance (CC §§ 823, 253(2); BGH 18 January 1983 loc. cit.; BGH 30 May 1995, NJW 1995, 2412, 2413). The fact that the parents have “had” a disabled child is not sufficient in itself (BGH 18 January 1983 loc. cit.). Increased costs of maintenance and additional expenditure associated with the child’s disability are actionable under contract law (BGH 4 March 1997, NJW 1997, 1638, 1640; BGH 16 November 1993, BGHZ 124, 128, 134; BGH 15 February 2000, BGHZ 143, 389, 393; BGH 4 December 2001, NJW 2002, 886; BGH 18 June 2002, NJW 2002, 2636, 2637). The parents’ contractual claim for damages principally encompasses the entire basic expenses associated with rearing a disabled child. The compensation is not restricted to the recovery of only the special additional financial outlay associated with rearing a disabled child as this is regarded as incompatible with the protective scope of the contract and above all with the human dignity of the disabled child (BGH 22 November 1983, BGHZ 89, 95, 104; BGH 16 November 1993 loc. cit.). However, the duty to compensate does not extend to the parents’ loss of income, in the event that they had to give up their careers in order to care for their child (BGH 2 December 1980, NJW 1981, 630; BGH 4 March 1997 loc. cit.). 113. AUSTRIAN OGH 25 May 1999, SZ 72/91 (see Rebhahn, JBl 2000, 265, 266; Kopetzki, RdM 1999, 177) awarded the additional costs associated with rearing a disabled child to a woman who gave birth to a boy without arms, with club feet and truncated leg and to her husband. The relief sought was confined to the recovery of these special expenses. However, minor fault on the part of the doctor whose duty it was to provide the correct information will recede into the background vis à vis the parents’ contributory negligence during the communication of medical advice (OGH 23 October 2003, JBl 2004,

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311, note Bernat). The issue whether basic child rearing expenses are recoverable was deliberately left unresolved by the OGH. Views expressed in legal literature submit that a corresponding entitlement should be awarded provided that the birth of the child constitutes an extraordinary burden on the basis that financial resources will be strained (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 2/29, Bernat, JBl 2004, 316). Since the judgment of OGH 11 December 2007, JBl 2008, 521, there can be no doubt that the entire maintenance costs associated with an unwanted disabled child represent recoverable damage. For a treatise on the legal position in PORTUGAL see note 103 above. 114. For DUTCH law, the HR 8 September 2000, RvdW 2000, 180C declined to endorse a claim for compensation of non-pecuniary damage of parents of a child who was injured in the womb owing to negligent medical treatment. The HR 22 February 2002, NedJur 2002 no. 240 p. 1704 adjudicated similarly in the case of a child who was not aborted owing to a diagnostic error. Both cases turned on the absence of psychiatric shock requiring medical treatment. HR 28 May 1999, NedJur 1999, no. 614 p. 3484 was of a divergent view and held every pecuniary loss arising from the additional costs invoved in rearing a disabled child resonated in damages. 115. At present, there is a dearth of case law on this issue in the NORDIC Countries. There are dissonant views in academic writing (see further Andersson, Trepartsrelationer i skadeståndsrätten, 312, 316). The predominant view is that recovery for the parents’ emotional distress should be denied (Andersson loc. cit. 310). 116. For the COMMON LAW, the case of Parkinson v. St. James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2002] QB 266 held that the parents of disabled child who was conceived following a negligently performed sterilisation operation could claim the extra special upbringing costs associated with rearing a disabled child. Following the case of Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 3 WLR 1091 (HL) it is questionable whether this decision can continue unchallenged, cf. Pedain, [2004] CLJ, 19-21.

(3)

Wrongful life

117. The Ill Persons Act (“Loi Koucher”) was a reaction of the French legislature to the Perruche-decision Cass.ass.plen. 17 November 2000, JCP 2000, 2309 (cf. also prior decision Cass.civ. 26 March 1996, D. 1997 Jur. 35, notes by Roche-Dahan and by von Bar, ZEuP 2000, 119), where a doctor was held liable to both the parents and to the child for failing to correctly diagnose the state of health of the embryo. The Act rejects that that there is any liability owed to the child on the basis of the argument that a correct diagnosis would have induced its abortion (Ill Persons Act (“Loi Koucher”) art. 1(1) al. 1: “Nul ne peut se prévaloir d’un préjudice du seul fait de sa naissance”). The Act does not preclude a right of action if the prenatal injuries are caused by medical error (al. 2 loc. cit.). If the child’s injuries cannot be attributed to the negligence of the physician, then these costs are instead covered by the solidarité nationale (Malinvaud, Droit des obligations8, no. 545 p. 391). 118. In BELGIUM, this problematic issue has only been a matter of adjudication in the lower courts. CFI Bruxelles 7 June 2002, TBBR 2002, 483 awarded a child born with congenital disability damages on the grounds that medical error had deprived its parents of the choice of terminating the pregnancy. In SPAIN, the majoritarian view leans against imputing liability to the doctor, provided that it is not asserted that fault on his or her part contributed to the child’s abnormality (CA Cádiz 17 September 2002, AC 2002,

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De Ángel Yágüez, Revista de Derecho y Genoma Humano 1996, V, 151; otherwise Ruiz Larrea, La Ley 1998, I, 2039, where it is mooted that the child may assert a claim against the parents). 119. ITALIAN (Cass. 29 July 2004, no. 14488, Foro it. 2004, I, 3327; Resp.civ. e prev. 2004, 1348; Cass. 14 July 2006, no. 16123, Dir.fam.pers. 2007, 137; cf. an early decision of CA Perugia 24 May 2000, Rass.Giur.Umbra, 2000, 636), GERMAN (BGH 18 January 1983, BGHZ 86, 240, 251; CA Munich 27 February 1981, NJW 1981, 2012; CA Düsseldorf 14 July 1994, VersR 1995, 1498) and AUSTRIAN law (OGH 25 May 1999, SZ 72/91) rejects the notion that the damages claim of the child can be solely based on the assertion that had the disability been correctly diagnosed, it would not have been born. There is no right not to be born. Recent DUTCH case law reached a similar conclusion (CA The Hague 26 March 2003, NedJur 2003, no. 249 p. 1964; however, for a discordant view CA Amsterdam 4 January 1996, NedJur 1997, no. 213 p. 1169; cf. for further analysis Lindenbergh, AA 52 (2003) no. 5 p. 365). In GREECE, there is a dearth of case law on this issue; in Greek legal literature, comparative legal resources have been drawn upon, based on this the claims of the child would be excluded (Androulidaki-Dimitriadi, I ipochreosi enimersosis tou asthenous, 427). In end effect, this appears to represent the lion’s share of views among PORTUGUESE authors. It is postulated that if the child were permitted to recover on the basis of the argument that it would have been better had he or she not been born, this would infringe notions of human dignity (Menezes Cordeiro, Tratado I, 288; Álvaro Dias, Dano Corporal 500; of a divergent opinion de Oliveira, O direito do diagnóstico pré-natal, 214 and Pinto Monteiro, RLJ 134 [20012002] 384, who contemplates that the child may have a claim deriving from a contract having protective effects for third parties). This correponds to the stance adopted by the courts. Moreover, the courts have clarified that the hypothetical damages claim can only be asserted by the child and not by its parents (STJ 19 June 2001, RLJ 134 [20012002] 371, 377). 120. In the first instance adjudications by HUNGARIAN courts, it was held that the child could not assert a claim for damages because life could not constitute damage. Consequently, claimants could not seek compensation based on the argument that one was not aborted (Citations in Dósa, Az orvos kártérítési felelo˝ssége, 137; Köles, Orvosi mu˝hiba perek, 239-242; CA Pécs, Pf. I.20.187/2004/5.). However, the Supreme Court (BH 2004/112, BH 2005/394) did not follow this line of jurisprudence and in November 2005 – in opposition to the European main stream (Herpai, Magyar Jog 11/2005, 699; Lábady, Családi Jog 3/2006, 15-25) – in a decision laying down principles for this area (EBH 2005/1206 = BH 2005/394) – held that a child born with congenital disabilities could demand compensation if the responsible doctor, by his mistake, deprived the mother of the possbility of exercising her statutory guaranteed right of opting for a termination of her pregnancy. This decision was however revised by the uniform application of private law no. 1/2008 (Supreme Court 12 March 2008, Hungarian Gazette no. 2008/50, p. 2462). This judgment, which draws heavily from the law in other jurisdictions and which binds the other courts (Const. § 47(2)), rejected the claim of a disabled child who would have been aborted, had its mother been informed of its condition in time. 121. For the NORDIC Countries Andersson, Trepartsrelationer i skadeståndsrätten, 307 is a proponent of the view that the child is not entitled to assert a claim for damages.

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122. In ENGLAND it was settled in McKay v. Essex Area Health Authority [1982] QB 1166 that an action for wrongful life cannot succeed. The judgments of the Court of Appeal rationalise the decision on the ground that it is impossible to assess compensation for the “loss of expectation of death”, i. e. the difference between the value of being born alive injured and the value of never being born at all. XI.

Interests worthy of legal protection

123. Similar to the concept of “legally relevant damage”, the notion of “interests worthy of legal protection” constitutes a linguistic innovation given that the notion does not feature in any of the Civil Codes or Damage Liability Acts which are currently in force. However, this concept features in the jurisprudence of many countries. In the FRENCH legal system, this concept crops up together with the debate on the issue of whether the infringement of an illegitimate interest can give rise to a damages claim. Afterall CCP art. 31 provides that persons with standing to sue are those having “a legitimate interest in the success ... of a claim”. A rule which is partly governed by administrative law is derived from this providing that only an action for dommage licite can be brought (Starck/Roland/Boyer, Obligations I5, no. 111 p. 64 and Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité2, nos. 271-273 p. 59). In more recent times, a trend appears to be emerging which requires even for the substantive law proof that the damage concerned had a detrimental effect on a legally protected interest (Terré/Simler/Lequette, Les obligations8, nos. 704-706 pp. 684-686; Malinvaud, Droit des obligations8, no. 555 p. 398; Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II10, no. 145 p. 138 and Cass.civ. 24 January 2002, Bull.civ. 2002, II, no. 5 p. 4 [the loss of revenue which was derived from clandestine employment does not constitute damage]). All in all, the argument that the damage that ensues is “illegimate” has lost much of its practical importance (Viney and Jourdain loc. cit.). 124. Furthermore, in BELGIUM, the question is as yet unresolved whether a claim based on the infringement of a legally protected interest is to be classified as issue pertaining to its admissibility under adminstrative law or whether it concerns the substantive merits of a claim. The majoritarian view in legal writing is to plump for the former (Ronse (-de Wilde/Claeys/Mallems), Schade en schadeloosstelling I2, no. 33 p. 39; Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2), no. 21 p. 42); However, Cass. 14 May 2003, RGAR 2003, 13767, concl. Spreutels) concluded that it should be interpreted in the sense of a qualification under the substantive law (it was also determined here that the loss of revenue from moonlighting jobs did not amount to a recoverable loss). 125. The SPANISH courts held that a legally protected interest was infringed and accordingly awarded a wife damages when her husband was rendered impotent either on physical or pschological grounds following an accident (TS 9 February 1988, RAJ 1988 (1) no. 771 p. 752). The ITALIAN courts deemed that the infringement of an interessi legittimi (cf. Const. art. 24(1)) sufficed for recovery of the danno ingiusto (CC art. 2043), in particular concerning relations with the public adminstration (see in particular Cass.sez.un. 22 July 1999, no. 500, Foro it. 1999, I, 2487, 3201). HUNGARIAN CC § 2(1) expressly prescribes that the Code is designed to protect the property and personality rights as well as the “legally protected interests” of citizens. POLISH doctrine usually defines damage as any detriment to the legally protected interests of another. This assumes practical significance, for example, in justifiying the award of

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reparation for damage resulting from a disturbance of possession and the denial of reparation for loss of profits from illegal activities (Radwan´ ski (-Dybowski), System prawa cywilnego III(1), 217, 235-236). The GERMAN courts have recourse to the concept of “interests worthy of legal protection” in diverse argumentative strategies, the doctrine of general risks of life connotes one example, according to which damages cannot be claimed for the realisation of one of life’s general risks (BGH 6 June 1989, JZ 1989, 1069, note von Bar; BGH 17 September 1991, NJW 1991, 3275) or, for example, in the context of decisions which have held that where the sole cause of damage lies in subjecting the defendant to court proceedings, this does not connote a legally protected interest on the grounds that the right of unrestricted access to the courts has greater weight (BGH 25 March 2003, BGHZ 154, 269, 272; the position in AUSTRIA is identical, see OGH 1 October 1986, SZ 59/159). In ENGLAND, this concept appears in judgments on the law of privacy (e. g. A v. B plc [2002] 3 WLR 542, 550, Woolf CJ) and in SWEDEN this concept was latched onto in order to pave the way for recovery for particular ecological damage (HD 19 April 1995, NJA 1995, 249 and HD 21 December 1993, NJA 1993, 753). See also for DENMARK the Supreme Court case from the 4 November 2005, UfR 2006, 446 (in the absence of a legally protected interest of the individual, the State was not liable to the proprietor of a supermarket on the grounds that the authorites (wrongfully) gave a competitor permission to open its doors on a Sunday). XII. In particular: loss of chance

126. A special case of the concept of liability for the infringement of an “interest worthy of legal protection” is represented in a whole array of European legal systems by liability for the loss of a chance. The approach adopted in the respective jurisdictions varies considerably. At its root, it concerns whether the loss of the chance of an improvement which it is not certain will be obtained (for example the loss of a chance of recovery where medical care was wrongly terminated or withheld, or a loss, caused by personal injury, of the chance to take an exam in the current year, where a successful outcome in the exam is uncertain) can be qualified per se as compensatable damage. 127. In the FRENCH legal system the problem of the perte d’une chance is discussed in context of the “certain” character of the damage (Malaurie and Aynès, Responsabilité délictuelle VI(1)11, nos. 241-242 pp. 138-139) (For LUXEMBOURG see on this Ravarani, La responsabilité civile, no. 700 p. 490). The perte d’une chance qualifies as compensatable damage if the chance was real. The extent of the damage depends upon the probability that the chance would have led to the desired result; compensation remains necessarily under the value of the advantage not realized (Cass.civ. 16 July 1998, Bull.civ. 1998, I, no. 260 p. 181; CA Lyon 2 February 2006, JCP 2006, IV, 2662; Malaurie and Aynès loc. cit.). In BELGIUM also, the perte d’une chance represents compensatable damage, whereby the extent of damage depends upon the value of the expected advantage and the probability of its occurrence. If necessary it is estimated ex aequo et bono (B. H.Verb. (-Hens), II-4, no. 1853; Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2), no. 26 pp. 54-55). In both countries a requisite is “la disparition certaine d’une éventualité favorable” (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II9, no. 138 p. 126). 128. Similarly, under SPANISH law, for damage to be actionable, it is necessary that it is “certain” (cierto). This requirement of certainty is not met if only a chance is lost

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129.

130.

131.

132.

(Lacruz Berdejo, Elementos II(2)4, 480). Support can be found for this approach in older court decisions (TS 29 September 1986, RAJ 1986 (3) no. 4922 p. 4849 and TS 20 April 1995, RAJ 1995 (3) no. 3487 p. 4637). However, in the context of the contractual liability of a lawyer for missing a deadline, inter alia decision of TS 26 January 1999, RAJ 1999 (1) no. 323 p. 464 and of TS 14 May 1999, RAJ 1999 (2) no. 3106 p. 4817, damages were awarded for the lost chance of winning the case and for the tort law sphere, TS 10 October 1998, RAJ 1998 (5) no. 8371 p. 12306 affirmed liability for the lost chance of a successful cure. ITALY also belongs to the legal systems in which a loss of chance qualifies as an autonomous head of damage. The loss of a chance can represent a danno ingiusto in the sense of CC art. 2043 (Cass. 19 December 1985, no. 6506, Foro it. 1986, I, 383; see also Cass. 29 April 1993, no. 5026, Giur.it. 1994, I, 1, 234; contra aber Busnelli, Foro it. 1965, IV, 47, 50). The extent of compensation is assessed according to equitable principles and the courts inquire into the probability that the chance would have materialised (Gazzoni, Manuale di diritto privato10, 697). The loss of chance of cure is regarded as connoting a lost chance. In the lost chance analysis, a clear distinction is not always made between the existence of a danno ingiusto and the damaging consequences which result from it. In GERMAN law (rejecting its place in tort law Mäsch, Chance und Schaden. Zur Dienstleisterhaftung bei unaufklärbaren Kausalverläufen, 2004) and in DUTCH law (see further Brunner, AA 44 (1995), 935) it is still a matter of controversy whether the loss of a chance per se can be characterised as damage. The position is similar in AUSTRIA (from the case law see in particular OGH 3 April 1962, SZ 35/42 and OGH 29 January 1992, SZ 65/13) and POLAND (rejecting the idea – Radwan´ ski (-Dybowski), System prawa cywilnego III(1), 280). The Dutch courts, above all in cases concerning the negligence of doctors (HR 24 October 1997, NedJur 1998, no. 257 p. 1359) and similar professionals (CA Amsterdam 4 January 1996, NedJur 1997, no. 213 p. 1169; CFI Middelburg 11 March 1998, NedJur 1999, no. 41 p. 136; CFI Amsterdam 28 October 1998, NedJur 1999, no. 406 p. 2205) have awarded damages on a percentage basis according to the degree of likelihood that the lost chance would materialise. SWEDISH HD 28 November 1964, NJA 1964, 431 held that a student who was injured six months before the exams that he would have in all liklihood sat, and whose entry into employment had to be deferred for a year as a result could recover damages for the loss of income for that year. DANISH ØLD 19 February 1974, UfR 1974, 625 reached the same conclusion in a comparable case. Likewise, henceforth, VLD 18 May 2005, UfR 2005, 2590 and Danish HD 24 May 1991, UfR 1991, 570. The law in both ENGLAND and SCOTLAND does not recognise the possibility of a claim based on “loss of a chance” in the sense of a claim based on a delict or tort which gives rise only to worsened statistical prospects of the occurrence of harm. “Loss of a chance simpliciter” cannot form the basis of a claim (Gregg v. Scott [2002] EWCA Civ 1471 per Latham LJ at [39]; affirmed by Gregg v. Scott [2005] UKHL 2; [2005] 2 WLR 268). Academic writing (in particular Stapleton, (1988) 104 LQR 213 and 389), highlighting dangers that would stem from such a claim being recognised, has been expressly approved by the Court of Appeal. However, it has been held that a claimant may recover for loss of a chance in deceit, where this is directly caused by the deceit: 4 Eng Ltd. v. Harper [2008] EWHC 915 (Ch) at [44], [2008] 3 WLR 892 (Richards J) (loss of an 80 % chance to acquire another company, which on the balance of probabilities, the

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claimants could and would have exercised, giving rise to a claim for loss of profits which would have been obtained and the increase in capital value of that company between the date of assumed acquisition and the date of presumed disposal [at the latest the date of trial]). 133. In respect of the issues associated with the loss of a chance under contract law, see DCFR III. – 3:701 (Right to damages) (ex PECL art. 9:501) as well as von Bar and Drobnig, Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law in Europe, nos. 113-119. Illustration 1 is taken from BGH 12 March 1990, NJW 1990, 2877; illustration 2 from BGH 24 April 1990, BGHZ 111, 168; illustration 3 from Trib. Superiore della Acque 16 January 1995, no. 3, Cons. Stato, 1995, II, 122 and Cass. 30 May 1981, no. 3541, Giust.civ.Mass. 1981, fasc. 5; illustration 4 from BGH 9 November 1993, BGHZ 124, 52; illustration 5 from BGH 18 September 1979, NJW 1980, 45, note Deutsch; illustration 8 from OGH 1 October 1986, SZ 59/159, and illustration 9 from TS 20 October 1998, RAJ 1998 (5) no. 8844 p. 13069.

Section 2:

Particular instances of legally relevant damage Article 2:201: Personal injury and consequential loss (1) Loss caused to a natural person as a result of injury to his or her body or health and the injury as such are legally relevant damage. (2) In this Book: (a) such loss includes the costs of health care including expenses reasonably incurred for the care of the injured person by those close to him or her; and (b) personal injury includes injury to mental health only if it amounts to a medical condition.

Comments A.

Matters not regulated

1. Wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life. This provision deals with the most important aspects of the law governing liability for injury to body and health. Deliberately left unregulated, as indicated earlier (see Comment B8 under Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage)), are the extraordinarily problematic questions arising in the context of the birth of children which their parents (or one of their parents) did not want to have, whether it be for reasons of family planning or because the infant would have been aborted if the affliction had been recognised in time (wrongful conception, wrongful birth, wrongful life, see Notes X95-122 under Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage)). The proposition that a child can be injured in the womb, however, is beyond all doubt. It is not material whether the child has even been conceived at the time of the act causing injury (e. g. in the case where a woman becomes pregnant after she has received an infusion of blood contaminated with a pathogen). As soon as the child obtains legal capacity, he or she has a claim against the person causing the damage, subject to the further requirements of the basic norm. Where, however, a child in the womb is so severely injured that a miscarriage or stillbirth results, the injury is to the mother’s physical integrity and it is she who is correspondingly entitled to claim damages. 2. Detrimental impact on the quality of life without personal injury. Article 2:201 concerns only injury to body or health. Adverse disturbance of the quality of life which does not result from such injuries can only be asserted as legally relevant damage on the basis of other rules in this Chapter – in particular on the basis of Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy) and, in part, Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information).

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3. Loss of chance. As already mentioned (see Comments D15 and E22 under Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage)), no specific mention has been made of loss of a chance, in particular the loss of a chance of being cured. At present no special rule can be stipulated here. This area is therefore left to the judiciary for future development (see Notes XII 126-132 under Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage)). However, the general rule on legally relevant damage does leave room for characterising the loss of a chance as an independent form of damage for the purposes of the law on noncontractual liability (and not merely for the purposes of the law of contract: cf. DCFR III. – 3:701 (Right to damages); that is to say, the rule permits a departure from the strict “all or nothing” principle. 4. Quantum of damages. Questions as to quantum of damages are the subject matter of Chapter 6. That is nothing peculiar to the law governing personal injury and needs no special mention here. It should be noted, however, that these rules do not determine the manner in which compensation for personal injury and non-economic loss is to be quantified (e. g. exact figures for a claim for damages in respect of defined injuries, or amounts for each day’s stay in hospital, etc.). See Article 6:203 (Capitalisation and quantification) paragraph (2). 5. Type and mode of reparation. Equally, particulars concerning the type and mode of reparation (e. g. lump sum or periodical payment) are provided for in Chapter 6. The fundamental principles governing the necessary assessment of an emergent loss – in particular the loss of a future or hypothetical income – are by contrast to be derived from the relevant national (procedural) laws.

B.

Damage to a person’s body or health

6. Body and health distinguished. Article 2:201 regulates the questions of identifying damage given the occurrence in fact of an injury to a natural person’s body or health. The distinction between injury to the body on the one side and injury to health on the other has no great significance. Where an injury to the body is present, an injury to health will also be involved except in exceptional cases (e. g. the cutting or shaving of hair). It may also be noted that injuries to health concern disturbance to the internal bodily processes, while injuries to the body as a rule look towards interference with the external bodily integrity. Harassment (e. g. sexual harassment or harassment by unsolicited photography) does not fall under Article 2:201; it falls under Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy) instead. By contrast, rape of course also constitutes a personal injury. 7. Injury to the person. With the exception of paragraph (2)(b) (Mental health), the provisions do not specify any answer to the question when in a particular case an injury to body or health is present. As a rule, the existence of bodily injuries will be ascertained without difficulty. Every infringement of a person’s bodily integrity is conceived by these Rules to amount to a personal injury. In this context too, however, regard must be had to Article 6:102 (De minimis rule) (for example, where an intramuscular injection is being given and as a result of the nurse’s clumsiness a small and harmless haematoma occurs, 360

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but nothing more serious happens). If an expectant mother is injured with the result that her child is stillborn this constitutes personal injury to the mother (and only to her; cf. above Comment A1). 8. Medical treatment; sports injuries. The question whether a person’s body has been injured or not does not depend on the purpose of the interference with the bodily integrity. Medical operations and treatment constitute an infringement of bodily integrity even though they are for a beneficial purpose. Whether or not such treatment is allowed is decided by the patient on the basis of consent (see Article 5:101 (Consent and acting at own risk)). The same is correspondingly true for sports injuries – in particular the injuries sustained in the course of participation in competitive sports (e. g. football, rugby) and more especially boxing and the martial arts, so long as these relate to the realisation of risks which are accepted simply on the basis of participation in the activity concerned. 9. Injury to health. In contrast, not entirely straightforward questions of demarcation may arise in the context of the concept of injury to health. One can consider, for example, noise nuisance resulting in a short-term headache and a multitude of other cases of diffuse departures from well-being. Here the decision in the particular case must be left to the judge. The impairment of health must not be of a banal nature. On the other hand, severe injuries to health may already be present at a point in time at which the injured person’s subjective sense of well-being is not yet adversely affected. Illustration 1 A person suffering from the common cold who in going about daily life passes the illness on to another does not cause an injury to health. Illustration 2 An AIDS infection, on the other hand, constitutes an injury to health from the time of contracting the HIV virus; the injured person does not have to wait until the disease itself has broken out. The same holds for other illnesses or diseases whose manifestation develops only over the course of time. What is admittedly required, of course, is that there is at least some form of illness which can be diagnosed. Asbestosis, for example, has a long period of incubation and occasionally it is not detectable over many years. An injury to health will be acknowledged in such cases – not least for the practical reasons pertaining to the submission of proof – only at that point in time when the illness can be diagnosed by competent medically-trained persons. 10. Related interests worthy of legal protection. In other cases it must be recognised that the denial of an injury to (body and) health by no means necessarily implies that no protection under the law governing liability is granted to the affected party. In this context one must recall the example of the spouse who loses the capacity for sexual intercourse as a result of an accident. The other spouse suffers thereby no damage to health, but they are still adversely affected in respect of an interest worthy of legal protection: see above Comment E23 under Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage). Further examples for Article 2:101 are provided by the unauthorised extraction 361

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of organs from deceased persons (infringement of their post-mortem right of personality) or the improper use of bodily substances taken from living persons (blood, sperm taken for the purposes of insemination) which are not property and therefore not the subject of property law within the meaning of Article 2:206 (Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession). 11. Mental health. Paragraph (2)(b) merely stipulates a general basic rule for dealing with injuries to health taking the form of injuries to mental health. It is one of the provisions which in regard to the basic rule contain by way of exception a conclusive (“only”) definition. The problem of nervous shock cases is deliberately addressed only partially. The further particulars remain left to the courts which must clarify them on the basis of the general rule of causation. Not every disturbance to the balance of mental and psychological well-being constitutes legally relevant damage. Rather injury must assume a condition which, according to the rules of medical science, can be diagnosed as an illness or complaint and which therefore calls for treatment (whether or not, according to the current state of medical science, treatment is in fact possible). In other words, psychiatric injury to health must amount to a medically ascertainable injury or recognisable condition. Precisely how such an illness is caused generally plays no role. What is decisive is only that it has been caused by conduct or an occurrence for which the injuring person is accountable. Provided the requirements of Article 4:101 (General rule [on causation]) are satisfied, the legally relevant damage might take the form of damage to mental or psychiatric health, within the meaning of paragraph (2), which has its cause in the (well-founded) suspicion that an injury to physical health has been sustained. 12. Injury as such constitutes legally relevant damage. Paragraph (1) treats the injury as such as an independent head of legally relevant damage. That takes account of the fact that the practical results of the concept of danno biologico have found increasing pervasive acceptance, albeit in various ways and with varied intensity. The physical injury is to be understood as damage in its own right, giving rise to its own entitlement to monetary compensation additional to and, as the case may be, independently of the existence of some economic or non-economic damage. According to the concept of the text, “injury as such” constitutes neither an economic damage nor a non-economic damage (the latter two being “losses” consequential to the injury), but rather falls into an independent category of its own. However, in quantifying monetary damages for some biological damage which has been suffered, it may well be necessary to put into the balance the other related heads of damage and weigh these up collectively. See also on this point Article 6:204 (Compensation for injury as such), according to which “injury as such is to be compensated independently of compensation for economic or non-economic loss”. Illustration 3 The cerebral injuries of the victim after an accident are so severe that he permanently loses his sensory capacity and sense of awareness. He has a claim to reparation for the obliteration of his personality, i. e. because of the injury per se, regardless of the fact that he suffers no pain.

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C.

Loss

13. Economic and non-economic loss. Paragraph (1) extends to the injury as such and to all consequential loss. The word “loss” is defined in Article 2:101(4) (Meaning of legally relevant damage) and embraces economic loss as well as non-economic loss. The most important forms of economic loss are listed in Article 2:101(4)(a); the most important forms of non-economic loss are listed in Article 2:101(4)(b). These rules apply also to Article 2:201. As their wording indicates (“... loss includes”), they are not, however, exhaustive definitions. Rather they purport to do no more than list mere examples of typical economic and non-economic loss. Obviously further injury to health which results from an initially rather limited injury to the body or health is also a consequential damage. Moreover, there might be other consequential economic losses besides loss of income because the injured person is unable to attend to his or her affairs. An example would be the inability of a man or woman to provide domestic services at home. The fact that this activity is not remunerated dictates that there is no reparable loss of earnings, but that does not mean that there is therefore also no reparable economic loss. Consequential loss embraces a multitude of other economic losses – for example, the loss sustained when the victim is compelled as a result of the injury to sell his or her business at an undervalue or is unable to work and has to fall back on more expensive outside labour. 14. Cost of health care. Especially important in the context of injury to body or health are the “costs of health care” referred to explicitly in paragraph (2)(a). They include an increase in basic needs (e. g. the need to make use of a wheelchair). The concomitant multiplication of necessities required to support daily life (such as the expenditure which someone confined to a wheelchair must make in order to re-structure accommodation) also belongs to this category. 15. Loss of income. Loss of income (Article 2:101(4)(a) (Meaning of legally relevant damage)), moreover, includes both loss of actual income and loss of future income. The loss of earning capacity – not least of persons who, at the time of injury, were not in fact in gainful employment but who in all probability would have been in due course (e. g. children or young persons) – also falls within the latter category. The judge is granted further room for discretion in the interpretation both of the concept of “consequential loss” and the notion of “loss of income”. In dealing with these the judge must also take into account the fact that the text recognises a further distinct category of damage in the form of “injury as such”.

D.

Damage to the injured person and damage to third parties

16. Personal injury. As far as personal injury is concerned, the text does not draw any fundamental distinction between primary and secondary victims. This distinction is not helpful. That is because the decisive issue is always only whether the claimant has or has not suffered injury to his or her body or health. In the first case the claimant is a victim; in the second case not. Everything else is, within the framework of this article, immaterial. 363

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Illustration 4 A is so severely injured in an accident that she temporarily loses consciousness. She is thus unable to arrange for someone to deputise for her in providing the care, incumbent on her, required by a bedridden lady, L, whose condition of health deteriorates as a result. Whether L has a claim is determined by the rules on accountability and causation; that she has suffered a legally relevant damage within the meaning of Article 2:201, by contrast, is beyond question. 17. Economic or non-economic losses of third persons. However, it is inherent in the nature of the matter that as a result of the injury of one person other persons may come to suffer damage of a different nature. Their damage need not be to their health (as in the above illustration), but may take other forms (e. g. damage to property, in which case Article 2:206 (Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession) would become applicable), and in particular the form of loss of support or mental suffering not amounting to a medical condition within the meaning of paragraph (2)(b). Where that is the case, the problem that arises is one addressed by Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third parties as a result of another’s personal injury or death) and not Article 2:201. That is because Article 2:201 only concerns damage suffered by the injured person, as indicated earlier. 18. Expenses of persons close to the injured person. There are, however, situations where it is difficult to say which losses qualify as damage suffered by the injured person and which are damage sustained by third parties. In respect of one problem which is important in practice paragraph (2)(a) (“including expenses reasonably incurred for the care of the injured person by those close to him or her”) provides an answer. This provision regulates a case at the boundary of transferred loss (Drittschadensliquidation) which is not so easy to construe as a matter of law. The solution consists of assigning the expenditures of the relatives to the damage sustained by the injured person. As between these parties, the injured person is liable in turn to the relatives from the standpoint of either benevolent intervention in another’s affairs or unjustified enrichment. 19. Reasonable expenses of carers. The “expenses” of carers will not necessarily include the cost of sacrificing employment (e. g. foregone salary) in order to care for the injured person. An exceptional case is where the carer provides care as a matter of his or her profession (e. g. as a nurse), in which case the loss incurred by giving up remunerated work would ordinarily equate to the cost of paying someone to provide the same care. In other cases, recovery will depend on whether the loss of earnings of the carer are less than or exceed the cost of contracting for care. The expenses are recovered as part of the loss suffered by the injured person and in the latter case recovery in excess of the costs of nursing care will be barred because the injured person might have obtained care more cheaply. It should be noted that it will only be possible to speak of “care” provided by the attendance of visiting relatives, supporting the emotional well-being of the injured person in recovering health or providing comfort in distress, when the injured person is conscious and thus able to reap the associated psychological benefit. The magnitude of the expenditure must be “reasonable”. This qualification is necessary for the protection of the liable person (and, correspondingly, that person’s insurer). An excessively frequent

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number of journeys to a remote special clinic where the injured person is being treated, for example, would not be reasonable. 20. Those close to the injured person. The injured person may only claim costs for those persons who are “close to him or her”. Decisive here is not a formal or legal familial relationship, rather that an emotional and special relationship exists between the carer and the injured person. The litmus test should be whether the person concerned is one whose presence at the bedside of the injured person is necessary for the advancement of the injured person’s convalescence or to stabilise his or her condition. This subgroup of people does not necessarily correspond to those people who under Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third parties as a result of another’s personal injury or death) paragraph (1) have a claim to damages for their non-economic losses sustained as a repercussion. The latter subgroup is more confined; a “particularly close personal relationship to the injured person” is the prerequisite here. If, for example, someone lives alone and therefore has no one who falls within Article 2:202(1), it might well be that the sole surviving brother or only sister is called to the injured person’s bedside. Their travel expenses in getting to the hospital are recoverable, but, if the patient dies, the brother or sister in question has no claim to reparation for non-economic loss.

Notes I.

General

1.

It goes without saying that one’s body and health are protected under every state’s law of torts. The fact that they are seldom mentioned explicitly in basic legal norms of extracontractual liability (see e. g. GERMAN CC § 823(1) and ESTONIAN LOA § 1045 (1) (ii)) is of no practical consequence. One’s body and health amount to “rights” under DUTCH CC art. 6:162 and PORTUGUESE CC art. 483(1) and infringements of such riglets are also considered manifestations of illegal conduct under GREEK CC art. 914. Incidentally, without doubt injury to body and health constitutes “legally relevant damage” within the meaning of all relevant basic norms of CIVIL LAW. A new chapter 2 “Du respect du corps humain” (CC arts. 16 – 16-9) was even inserted (by Statute no. 94-653 of 29 July 1994) into Volume 1 of Title I of the FRENCH CC. The principe d’inviolabilité du corps humain is herein laid down. Third parties who do not respect this principle are subject to an action in damages under the rules of the law of obligations (Rép.Dr.Civ. (-Penneau) IV, no. 4). In SPAIN concrete protection of one’s health beyond CC art. 1902 and certain specific statutes (e. g. Consumer Protection Law arts. 3 et seq. [Consumer Protection Act arts. 11 et seq. which replaced Ley 26/1984, General para la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios from 19 July 1984]) is derived directly from the Constitution (arts. 15 and 43). HUNGARIAN CC § 76 explicitly enumerates the inviolability of body and health as being among personal rights. ROMANIA is considering the implementation of equivalent rules into its Civil Code (Draft CC arts. 45 and 193). Injury to body and health are ultimate or “personal damages” under NORDIC compensation statutes and the subject of protection of countless torts of the COMMON Law, especially trespass to the person, negligence (and particularly professional negligence), occupiers’ liability and product liability.

2.

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II.

Injury to body and health

3.

In GERMANY (CC § 823(1)), ESTONIA (LOA § 1045(1)(ii)), HUNGARY (CC § 76), POLAND (CC arts. 444-447) and SLOVENIA (LOA § 174) it is common practice to

4.

5.

6.

7.

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distinguish between injury to the body and that to health. Injury to body is usually understood as an (outwardly apparent) violation of bodily integrity. On the other hand, the term injury to health includes “any inducement of a state, which varies – in an adverse way – with that of the body’s normal functioning; it is inconsequential whether a condition of pain comes about or a drastic change of one’s existential orientation occurs” (BGH 14 June 2005, VersR 2005, 1238). There are, however, no practical consequences attaching to the distinction between injury to body or that to health. This distinction is also uncommon in most legal systems, e. g. in BELGIUM, FRANCE, ITALY, LUXEMBURG and MALTA. In FRENCH legal doctrine, the expression dommage corporel has established itself as an overarching term for all economic and incorporeal damage caused by harm to body or to health. BELGIAN legal theory speaks mostly of menselijke schade or persoonsschade. Whether and how further sub-categories are possible and indeed desirable is debatable (Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2), no. 65 pp. 122-125). The daño corporal of SPANISH law is defined as “Non-property and Personal Damage”, i. e. as the result of a violation of bodily or mental integrity (Vicente Domingo, El daño, 230). The terminology used in this area is, of course, inconsistent. Instead of daño corporal, often daño personal or daño en la persona is used; and recently daño a la salud is also increasingly being used (De Ángel Yágüez, Tratado de Responsabilidad Civil, 698; Vicente Domingo loc. cit. 138). DUTCH law recognises as personal injury any injury which results from an adverse effect on the person (Schadevergoeding I (-Lindenbergh(, art. 95, no. 7 pp. 25-26). The BW does not distinguish between injury to body and to health, but solely between non-property damage, personal damage and “fatal damage” (overlijdensschade) (Lindenbergh loc. cit. no. 27.2 pp. 196-205). The compensation statutes of the NORDIC countries operate using the term personal injury (SWEDISH Damages Liability Act chap. 2 § 1, chap. 3 §§ 1-2, chap. 5 §§ 1-2, chap. 6 § 1; FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 1 [chap. 5 § 2 speaks conversely of “physical injury or other personal injury”]; DANISH Damages Liability Act §§ 1, 18). According to the Swedish and Finnish position, personal injury encompasses physical as well as mental adverse effects and indeed independently of whether they can be traced back to the ostensible effects of the use of force or not (Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen, 134). In Denmark the situation is similar, however psychological damage is in principle only recoverable if suffered in the context of (actual or imminent) economic damage (Hertz, UfR 2004, 180; Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 293; Øe and Røn, J 2004, 85, 89). For cases of wrongful consultancy to pregnant women causing an unwanted birth see above, Notes X95 et seq. under Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage). In relation to unwanted pregnancies, tortious liability of the natural father in relation to the mother only comes into play in cases of rape (for BELGIUM see CA Bruxelles 8 May 1985, JT 1986, 252, note Van Gysel). It is generally accepted that prenatal injuries damage the health and /or the body of a child, as long as it is born alive (i. e. has not already died as a nasciturus; in such a case the mother, and in some jurisdictions [e. g. in SPAIN: TS 31 July 2002, RAJ 2002 (5) no. 7741 p. 14090], in addition the father has a valid cause of action), cf. e. g. for

Article 2:201: Personal injury and consequential loss FRANCE Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité2, no. 249-3 p. 13; for BELGIUM Dirix, Het begrip schade, no. 209 p. 132; for ITALY Cass. 22 November 1993,

no. 11503, Giur.it. 1995, I, 1, 318 (contractual liability) and Cass. 9 May 2000, no. 5881, Giust.civ.Mass. 2000, 967 (tortious liability); for POLAND CC art. 446; for SPAIN TS 23 November 2004, RAJ 2004 (5) no. 7384 p. 14992; TS 27 May 2002, RAJ 2002 (4) no. 7159 p. 12951; TS 14 May 2001, RAJ 2001 (3) no. 6204 p. 9535; TS 10 December 1997, RAJ 1997 (5) no. 8775 p. 14041 and TS 13 October 1992, RAJ 1992 (4) no. 7547 p. 9915; for PORTUGAL Álvaro Dias, Dano corporal, 485; Capelo de Sousa, O direito geral de personalidade, 158); for SWEDEN Andersson, Trepartsrelationer i skadeståndsrätten, 306 and for the legal position in ENGLAND and SCOTLAND Thomson, SLT 2005, 121. The occurrence of damage can also take place before the procreation of the child (e. g. BGH 20 December 1952, BGHZ 8, 243 [infection of the mother by the transfusion of lues infected blood]). In contrast, the legal position where a nascent mother harms her child by imprudent conduct (alcohol, drug or nicotine abuse) is still largely unclear. III.

Harm to mental health

8.

It is seldom expressly stated in the statutes or codes of CIVIL LAW jurisdictions that severe adverse effects on one’s mental well-being – even when not constituting the sole consequence of physical injury to oneself or another (see further Notes under Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third parties as a result of another’s personal injury or death)) – can constitute recoverable damage (for an exception see SLOVENIAN LOA § 132 in conjunction with § 179, whereby “damage comprises ... the infliction of physical or mental distress or fear on another person”). Nevertheless, this may be deemed to be generally accepted. Thus, substantial suffering caused by an adverse effect on the victim’s senses is qualified in FRENCH law as dommage moral resulting in compensation (Rép.Dr.Civ. (-Lapoyade Deschamps) V, nos. 217-218). So too in the BELGIAN legal system, the victim’s lost well-being constitutes legally relevant damage in the context of the law of obligations (Peeters, De indicatieve tabel, no. 22 p. 34). SPANISH law classifies serious harm to one’s mental health as daño corporal or daño a la salud (i. e. TS 31 October 1973, RAJ 1973 (2) no. 4060 p. 3200 and TS 31 May 2003, RAJ 2003 (3) no. 4391 p. 8309 [though these decisions relate partially to consequential loss resulting from injuries suffered in an accident, partially to damage suffered by relatives). In GERMAN law it is stated that mental illness only constitutes an injury to health if it is medically ascertainable and exceeds what is endured in general everyday life (BGH 11 November 1997, BGHZ 137, 142, 145; BGH 30 April 1996, BGHZ 132, 341, 343; BGH 25 February 1997, NJW 1997, 1640, 1641). “Nervous shock” arising out of the witnessing of a fatal accident of a close relative is more restrictively formulated in that the harm to one’s health must clearly exceed the nature and severity of the loss usually sustained by loved ones – in their capacity as parties indirectly concerned in such accidents – through the victim’s injuries. This is gauged according to experience (BGH 11 May 1971, NJW 1971, 1883; BGH 4 April 1989, NJW 1989, 2317). As a general rule, particular mental instability on the part of the injured party does not exonerate the wrongdoer, however (BGH 29 February 1956, NJW 1956, 1108; BGH 30 April 1996 loc. cit.). Along with those persons classified as close relatives under family law (BGH 31 January 1984, NJW 1984, 1405), fiancé(e)s and cohabitees are entitled to a claim for

9.

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compensation (CFI Frankfurt/M. 28 March 1969, NJW 1969, 2286). Under AUSTRIAN law any mental impairment inflicted on a person that is a recognisable illness,

10.

11.

12.

368

thereby requiring medical treatment (e. g. anorexia or severe depression) constitutes recoverable damage within the meaning of CC § 1325 (Karner, Der Ersatz ideeller Schäden bei Körperverletzung, 94). Mental impairment amounts to a recognisable illness if it requires medical treatment or at least if it is medically diagnosable and therefore medically comprehensible (OGH 14 October 2003, ZVR 2004/49, 164; OGH 30 October 2003, ZVR 2004/6, 19). Where “facial surgery becomes necessary following psychological shock of the severest degree to a woman who has substantially and prematurely aged”, its cost is thus recoverable (OGH 20 January 2005, ZVR 2005/47, 166). HUNGARIAN law confines itself to the statement that responsibility for mental crises, psychological pain and psychopathy can in principle lead to liability for non-economic damage (Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 74-75; Petrik (-Petrik), Polgári jog I2, 202/3, 204). If, for other reasons, a personality problem is already present, then every substantial detrimental change to the victim’s physical or mental quality of life establishes a correlative claim for compensation (see further BH 2001/12). An award of compensation for noneconomic loss is, however, always a matter of judicial discretion (Gellért (-Bendedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1328-1334). In POLAND injury to health encompasses injury to mental health (Pietrzykowski (-Safjan), Kodeks cywilny I4, 1273, 1284). In some older decisions there are indications that the injury must not be insignificant (SN 23 January 1947, OSN 1948, no. 7). If death results, the bereaved relatives in severe cases also have a claim to compensation for their pain (Szpunar, Odszkodowanie za szkode˛ maja˛tkowa˛, 140-141; Pietrzykowski (-Safjan), Kodeks cywilny I4, 1273). In ROMANIA it is accepted that, at any rate, causing emotional trauma triggers a claim for reparation for non-economic loss (Adam, Drept civil, 259-263 with further references to case law). GREEK law recognises as an injury to health any substantial (from a medical perspective) impairment to the physical, mental or psychological functioning of a person that necessitates treatment (cf. Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 929, no. 5; similarly Filios, Enochiko Dikaio II(2)3, 110). Harm to mental health is thus recognised as an injury to health where it requires medical treatment. Nervous breakdowns or other severe psychological shock that follows from the death or injury of a close relative also fall under this category (Georgiades loc. cit. no. 6, Filios loc. cit. 111; Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 625 and CFI Athens 7246/1986, EllDik 29/1988, p. 134). In PORTUGAL it is a bone of contention, whether or not impairment of one’s “psyche” (danos biológicos de natureza psíquica) may be classified as a stand-alone category of legally relevant damage (see, on the one hand, Álvaro Dias, Dano corporal, 142 and, on the other, Costa Basto, Personal injury compensation in Portugal, 410). This debate does not, however, seem to have effects in practice. Recoverable damage to mental health consists of psychopathological disorders which affect mental well-being (Álvaro Dias loc. cit. 151 note 331). In the case law, which mainly involves traffic accident litigation, the following examples have been deemed to be recoverable and have been compensated by the granting of non-economic damages: anxiety and fear for one’s own life because of the violence of the collision (STJ 22 September 2005), irritability and humour changes in virtue of multiple excoriations and treatments (STJ 17 November 2005), grief and personality changes in virtue of internments and immobilisation with plastering (STJ 23 October 2003), post-traumatic neuroses (STJ 17 January 2002),

Article 2:201: Personal injury and consequential loss

13.

14.

15.

epilepsy (STJ 20 November 2003), behaviour of auto and hetero-aggression, mental retardation and insanity (STJ 27 April 2004). Furthermore, the Supreme Court accepted the claim of an employee who was persecuted, mistreated and humiliated by his employer, for non-economic damages, on the basis of Portuguese Labour Code art. 24(1). Anxiety due to a potential risk to health resulting from an ecological accident may also constitute a recoverable non-economic loss (Costa Basto, Personal injury compensation in Portugal, 410). Harm to mental health can constitute recoverable damage under DUTCH CC 6:106(1) (b) (third alternative). In formulating this provision, what was contemplated was harm resulting from an “Offence against the Person” (Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 371, MvA II, Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 372), e. g. kidnapping, indiscriminate imprisonment or rape. However, serious disturbance of privacy is also categorised under this heading (Schadevergoeding II (-Lindenbergh), art. 106, no. 27.6). In the context of legally relevant damage to relatives, the Hoge Raad of course only recognised the existence of personal injury where the victim suffers from a psychiatrically definable illness (HR 22 February 2002, NedJur 2002, no. 240 p. 1704, referring to Bouma, VR 1995, 207, 209; Holzhauer, RM-Themis 1986, 4, 28; Verheij, NTBR 1998, 324, 329). Furthermore, reference must also be made to CC art. 7:658. According to this provision, an employer may be held liable for his employees’ psychological damage suffered as a result of an excessively high degree of pressure at work or work that is too difficult for them (Vegter, NJB 2002, 1935-1942). Examples from case law relate to damage due to anxiety (CFI Middelburg, 30 May 2001, JAR 2001, 232), damage for post-traumatic stress (CFI The Hague 2 August 2001, TAR 2001, 118) and psychological damage resulting from sexual harassment (CFI Rotterdam 30 September 1999, JAR 1999, 230). SWEDEN and FINLAND rank harm to mental health likewise as personal injury. Here it is also not a prerequisite that it is the result of an earlier physical injury (Swedish HD 30 March 1971, NJA 1971, 78; Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 398; Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen, 134; Finnish HD 27 January 1982, HD 1982 II-6; HD 12 December 1980, HD 1980 II-133 and HD 25 June 1998, HD 1998:80). As a matter of principle, DANISH law, on the other hand, only compensates such losses where they are in connection with a physical injury or arise as a result of a situation of distress (Hertz, UfR 2004, 180; Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 293; Øe and Røn, J 2004, 85, 89). The legal position in ENGLAND is similar to that in Ireland (no. 16 below). For the purposes of the Employers’ Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969, for example, “personal injury” is defined as including loss of life, impairment of physical or mental condition and disease. Employers are not liable for unforeseeable mental injuries that are suffered by an employee due to his fear of outbreak of disease, even where the risk that this disease could be actually contracted was foreseeable and is also attributable to the employer’s negligence (Rothwell v. Chemical & Insulating Co. Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ 27, [2006] 4 All ER 1161). The SCOTTISH Law Commission prepared an exhaustive ‘Report on Damages for Psychiatric Injury (Scot.Law Com. no. 196) in August 2004 and a draft of a ‘Reparation for Mental Harm (Scotland) Bill’ is therein published. S. 3(1) of this draft bill states: “A person is not liable for causing mental harm, whether intentional or otherwise, if the harm is of such a type that a person in the position of the victim could reasonably be expected to endure it without seeking reparation”. And s. 4(1)(a) provides that the injured party shall only have a claim in damages for an unintentional act (along with other requirements), “if the harm amounts to a medically

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16.

370

recognised mental disorder”. Under current law damages for mental distress, anxiety or loss of enjoyment may be recovered under the rules of the common law along with damages for personal injuries or other losses (Reid v. Ski Independence 1999 SLT (Sh.Ct.) 62). Thus a person pursuing a claim for physical injury will be entitled to compensation for mental distress etc. arising as a consequence of the injury (Anderson v. Secretary of State for Scotland 1999 SLT 515). A successful claim for pure psychiatric injury requires pursuers to establish that they suffered something beyond the normal emotional responses to an incident such as grief, distress or fear (Simpson v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. 1983 SLT 601, 605; McLoughlin v. O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410, 431; Rorrison v. West Lothian Council 2000 SCLR 245, 250). Reparation is possible only where the injuries have been induced by shock or if there is a sudden realisation of danger within a continuing process. A secondary victim may claim damages for a psychiatric injury if it arose out of an incident for which the defender was responsible and the secondary victim satisfies the three criteria set out by Lord Oliver in Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 at 411, namely that: (i) there must be a close tie of love and affection between the secondary victim and the injured person; (ii) the secondary victim must have been present at the accident or at its aftermath; and (iii) the secondary victim’s psychiatric injury must have been caused by direct perception (i. e. through his or her own unaided senses) of the accident or its immediate aftermath. In IRELAND mental injury is divided into “grief and sorrow” – for which damages are not recoverable – and “nervous shock (i. e. post traumatic stress disorder) and psychiatric illness” – for which damages are recoverable without the necessity of showing direct impact or fear of immediate personal injuries for oneself (Kelly, [1998] 16 ILT, 10, 11). A claim will lie in damages for nervous shock sustained by reason of actual or apprehended physical injury, not only to the plaintiff, but equally to a person other than the plaintiff (Kelly loc. cit. 39, 42). Where a physically injured plaintiff suffers an unforeseeable psychiatric response or a psychiatric response that is more severe than might reasonably have been anticipated, the “egg-shell skull” rule (McSweeney v. Cork Corporation (DPIJ: Hilary & Easter Terms 1994, p. 37) ensures that the defendant will have to compensate for the full extent of that response (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 44.176). In Kelly v. Hennessy [1995] 3 IR 253, Hamilton C. J. laid down five requirements for a successful nervous shock claim: (i) a recognisable psychiatric illness, which (ii) has been “shock induced”, (iii) caused by the defendants’ act or omission and (iv) occurred “by reason of actual or apprehended physical injury to the plaintiff or a person other than the plaintiff”, and (v) the breach of a duty of care not to cause the plaintiff a reasonably foreseeable injury in the form of nervous shock. In Cuddy v. Mays & Ors [2003] IEHC 103, Kearns J. regarded Kelly v. Hennessy as determining the issue of damages for post-traumatic stress disorder suffered by the plaintiff, a hospital porter, when ambulances brought a number of traffic accident victims to the hospital where he worked, including his deceased brother and severely injured sister, as well as cousins and lifelong friends. Kearns J. applied a “close proximity test” (rather than the test of foreseeability, for which he expressly did not opt) to qualify the close family relationship between the plaintiff and his brother and sister. An employer who is or ought to be aware that an employee is working under such pressures that his or her mental health is likely to break down owes a duty to take reasonable steps to deal with the problem (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. 18.60). Equally, the careless failure by an employer to recognise and treat the obvious symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder in an employee may generate liability

Article 2:201: Personal injury and consequential loss

(McHugh v. Minister for Defence [1999] IEHC 91, [2001] 1 IR 424). The duty to protect an employee’s mental health is contained in the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 1989, s. 12. S. 2 defines injury as “any disease and any impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition”. Fletcher v. Commissioners of Public Works [2003] IESC 13, [2003] 1 IR 465 concerned a plaintiff employee who suffered no physical injuries as a result of his prolonged exposure to asbestos dust, but did suffer from a recognised mental illness because of his fear of contracting mesothelioma, though medical advice proved this fear was irrational. The claim was dismissed. The case suggests that psychiatric damage that is not accompanied by physical injury will only be allowed in nervous shock cases or where relatives have suffered mental stress in fatal injuries cases; see also Rafter v. A-G & Ors [2004] IEHC 28). However, damages for negligently inflicted psychiatric harm were allowed in a number of other cases arising out of similar circumstances, but where the defendants did not establish the unreasonableness of the psychological suffering. See, for example, Commissioners for Public Works v. Swaine [2003] IESC 30, [2003] 1 IR 521 and Commissioners of Public Works v. Brewer [2003] IESC 51, [2003] 3 IR 539. On the extent of the employer’s duty of care to employees in the context of stress and bullying in the workplace see further McGrath v. Trintech Technologies Ltd. [2004] IEHC 342; Quigley v. Complex Tooling & Moulding [2005] IEHC 71 and Maher v. Jabil Global Services Ltd. [2005] IEHC 130. IV.

Injury as such and “danno biologico”

17.

For the foundations of “biological harm” in ITALIAN law, see above: Notes II 18 and V40 under Article 2:101 (Duties during intervention). In SPAIN – due to the influence of the Constitution of 1978 (especially of arts. 10, 15 and 43) – it is now likewise accepted that harm to physical or general health (daño corporal respectively daño a la salud) amounts to damage as such, i. e. independently of its effects on property or nonproperty rights (Vicente Domingo, El daño, 231). Synonymous with the term “physical injury” (dano corporal), lately the use of the phrase dano biológico has also become customary in PORTUGAL (e. g. STJ 29 November 2005 and Álvaro Dias, Dano corporal, 99). According to the Civil Code, bodily injuries as such seem to be considered as non-economic losses (Sousa Dinis, CJ(ST) IX (2001-1), 5, 11 A baremização do dano corporal). Nevertheless, case law, which used to see it as a creature of non-economic damage (CA Porto 7 April 1997, CJ XXII [1997-2] 205; STJ 8 March 1979, BolMinJus 285 [1979] 290 and STJ 9 January 1979, BolMinJus 283 [1979], 266), has been recently considering it an economic damage (STJ 17 November 2005; STJ 22 September 2005). Grave physical injuries to the individual or his way of life are seen as forms of loss requiring independent compensation regardless of any loss of property or physical pain (Álvaro Dias loc. cit. 137; Sinde Monteiro, Estudos sobre a responsabilidade civil, 248; STJ 27 April 2004; STJ 17 November 2005; see also STJ 6 May 1999 and STJ 19 December 2001). Examples include limping (STJ 10 October 2002), prothesis and incapacity to stand for long periods of time (STJ 14 October 2004), grief, immobilisation and displacement depending upon calliper-crutches (STJ 29 April 2004), wounds, fractures, loss of labour capacity and disfigurement (STJ 6 May 2003), permanent dependence upon others to satisfy basic needs (STJ 22 September 2005), loss of vision and sense of smell (STJ 16 January 2003) and sexual dysfunctions (STJ 27 April 2004: loss of a testicle). In this respect the Portuguese case law quite consciously in-

18.

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19.

20.

clined towards Italian case law, which had for a long time qualified danno biologico as danno evento (its basis has already been evinced in STJ 5 February 1987, BolMinJus 364 [1987] 819 and STJ 17 May 1994, CJ(ST) II (1994-II), 101; see further Álvaro Dias, Dano corporal, 123 as well as Álvaro Dias, FS Almeida Costa, 754). See also the Notes under Article 6:204 (Compensation for injury as such). In AUSTRIA the rudiments of a similar approach are also apparent, in so far as the fact that the injured party suffers pain is not a prerequisite for compensation for economic damage caused by physical injury. “Damages for pain and suffering” are awarded e. g. for the cutting of hair against the will of the relevant party (Rummel (-Reischauer) ABGB II2, § 1325 no. 1). More importantly even an injured party, for whom no pain results from the accident, has a claim to be compensated by “damages for pain and suffering” (OGH 26 July 2006, ecolex 2007, 4; Karner, Der Ersatz ideeller Schäden bei Körperverletzung, 125). This is referred to as damage per se (Karner loc. cit. 127). The OGH (Austrian Supreme Court) expresses that damages for pain and suffering are also afforded to any person, who “is disabled by a liability-inducing detrimental effect on his overall personality, experiences pain and suffering deemed to be detrimental to his well-being and contentment and is thereby robbed of the most fundamental of human feelings” (OGH 14 January 1993, ZVR 1993/150, p. 339). The remaining countries’ positions are evidenced above in Notes II 15-21 under Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage).

V.

Recoverable consequential economic damage

21.

In the context of economic consequential loss flowing from dommage corporel, FRENCH commentators suggest differentiating between “functional” damage (préjudice fonctionnel) and economic damage (préjudice économique) (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2004/2005), no. 1533). “Functional damage” refers to the adverse disturbance of one’s psychiatric or physical health leading to a deterioration of one’s functioning capacity. This “functional deficiency” is expressed in terms of percentages – the taux d’invalidité. When assessing this loss in financial terms, however, it is not within the court’s jurisdiction to expressly found their judgment on this well-established table of damages (Bourrié-Quenillet, JCP éd. G 2004, I no. 136, 24). “Economic damages” include the cost of medical care, including necessary transport costs. The cost of assistance of a third party after an accident and costs in connection with the renovation of one’s house also fall under this category of damages. The same goes for lost income. In cases of permanent disability, loss of earnings is estimated (le Tourneau and Cadiet loc. cit. no. 1534). Under BELGIAN law, the aggrieved party is to be put in the position in which he or she would have been, had the injurious event not occurred. Consequently he or she has a claim to be compensated for loss of earnings caused by the accident. Moreover, additional strain, with which one must carry out one’s normal duties, restriction of one’s capacity in maintaining one’s home, costs of aid from third parties and the availing of medical care, as well as necessary modifications to one’s dwelling or one’s car, are all subject to compensation (Lindenbergh, TPR 2002 no. 10 p. 1427). Under MALTESE CC art. 1045(1) actual and direct losses are subject to compensation, in addition to the expenses which the injured party may have been compelled to incur in consequence of

22.

372

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23.

24.

the damage, his loss of actual wages or other earnings, and the loss of future earnings arising from any permanent incapacity, total or partial. According to SPANISH law, along with the cost of medical treatment, loss of earnings is considered a recoverable financial loss. During the recuperation period, lost wages and the lost income of a freelance worker are equally recoverable (Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 156, also in relation to the marginal importance of evidence by submission of tax returns). Though, as a matter of principle, evidence must be adduced for lost gains (TS 26 September 2000, RAJ 2000 (4) no. 7529 p. 11578), that still does not rule out the compensation of “house-wife losses” (TS (3rd Senate) 20 October 1998, RAJ 1998 (5) no. 8844 p. 13069) or the compensation of a minor’s losses, who, as a consequence of his or her injury, must attend school for a longer period of time or under difficult circumstances (TS 11 March 2000, RAJ 2000 (1) no. 1520 p. 2368; Vicente Domingo, El daño, 233; CFI Granada 14 June 1985, La Ley 1985, IV, no. 5784 p. 462; this is different from the case of a third level student: Audiencia Nacional (Senate for Administrative Litigation Proceedings) 20 November 2002, RAJ (TSJ y AP) 2003 (1) no. 51 p. 1244). The Third Party Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act expressly provides, in Table of Damages IV (Correction Factors for the Compensation of Permanent Physical Injury) of its appendix, that any injured party of employable age, even if he or she cannot prove any income, has a claim to the lowest bracket of compensation provided for in the table. Minors also benefit from this (Catalonian TSJ 20 February 2003, RAJ (TSJ y AP) 2003 (2) no. 304 p. 1296). As a general rule, ambulance, hospitalisation, domestic nursing, medication and physiotherapy costs are borne – in accordance with public law – by social insurance bodies, who only enjoy a right of recovery against the wrongdoer for these health care expenses in the case of fault (intent or negligence) (Social Insurance Act art. 127(3); see further TS 21 October 1981, RAJ 1981 (2) no. 3948 p. 3175). In contrast, the costs of making one’s dwelling handicappedaccessible, of rehabilitation, and of psychotherapy fall to be met directly by the party held liable (Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 156). He or she must also bear the expenses that are incurred by the injured party or by his or her family due to private hospitalisation that is not – under public law – covered by social insurance but is nevertheless reasonable in the circumstances (TS 19 November 1981, RAJ 1981 (2) no. 4536 p. 3627; TS 4 May 1984, RAJ 1984 (2) no. 2396 p. 1792; TS 13 September 1985, RAJ 1985 (2) no. 4259 p. 3591). Courts charged with establishing facts have a relatively wide discretion when assessing the amount of other damages e. g. with regard to violations of property rights caused by disfiguring physical injuries to models, actors or persons whose work requires face-to-face contact with customers (TS 20 November 2000, RAJ 2000 (5) no. 9310 p. 14424). Under ITALIAN law, “costs of health” (medical care, medication etc.) are considered recoverable pecuniary loss, i. e. expenditure that is necessary for the regeneration of psycho-physical integrity, incl. the costs of daily home care (Cass. 8 April 2003, no. 5504, Giust.civ.Mass. 2003, fasc. 4) and of other costs of health care (Cass. 1 December 1999, no. 13358, Giust.civ.Mass. 1999, 2413). Loss of one’s ablilty to earn one’s specific livelihood (capacità lavorativa specifica) also constitutes pecuniary loss. The claimant must show proof of this damage. His point of reference is his actual or probable future occupation (Cass. 12 September 2000, no. 12022, Danno e resp. 2001, 949; Cass. 29 October 2001, no. 13409, Giust.civ.Mass. 2001, 1814; Cass. 18 April 2003, no. 6291,

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25.

26.

27.

374

Giust.civ.Mass. 2003, fasc. 4). Lost chance is also recoverable as future pecuniary loss (Cass. 27 October 2001, no. 10291, Giust.civ.Mass. 2001, 1489). In HUNGARY costs of treatment and of lost profit (typically loss of salary) also fall under the category of recoverable prima facie pecuniary loss (Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 54-55). In the case of treatment and hospitalisation costs damages are mandatory, along with, for example, expenses for medication, physical therapy, physiotherapy, ambulance, domestic health care, assistance from third parties and for a special diet, in addition to increased expenditure for washing, cleaning, electricity, heating, telephone and transport and the cost of renovating one’s dwelling in order to make it handicapped-accessible (Petrik (-Köles), Polgári jog II2, 632; Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1358-1363; Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 188; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 230-236). CC §§ 356 and 357 regulate in a detailed manner, the compensation for loss of earnings. CZECH and SLOVAKIAN CC §§ 445-447a also feature a range of detailed regulations for the compensation of loss of earnings arising out of an accident. CC § 449 adds that “compensation shall also include compensation of purposeful expenses connected with medical treatment”. POLISH CC art. 444 § 1 states that damages resulting from injury to one’s body and health “shall cover all the resulting costs”. They include treatment, special care and rehabilitation costs (medication, medical advice and operation, transport, rehabilitation equipment, wheelchair), and lost earnings during the treatment and recovery period (Pietrzykowski (-Safjan), Kodeks cywilny I4, 1274-1275). If the injured party so requests, the wrongdoer is obliged to make an advance payment. This is also true for the necessary costs of re-education. Partial or entire loss of earning capacity and the cost of additional basic needs are to be covered by ongoing payments (loc. cit. § 2). SLOVENIAN LOA § 174(1) enumerates “the costs in connection with treatment, other necessary expenses thereto connected and the earnings lost because of incapacity to work during treatment”. Moreover, compensation falls due for partial or entire loss of earning capacity, the costs of increased basic needs and for loss of, or detriment to prospects of occupational success. In the context of personal injury, under GERMAN CC § 249, primarily the costs of medical treatment are recoverable (Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB65, § 249, no. 8). Where these are borne by the social insurance carrier or a private insurance company, the relevant claim is vested, by law, in the insurer (Social Security Code [SGB] Book X § 116; Insurance Contracts Act [VVG] § 67). Although expenses are sustained based on those of the reasonable person (BGH 23 September 1969, NJW 1969, 2281), the injured party may select such a standard of service as is customary for him or her (BGH 18 October 1988, NJW-RR 1989, 670). For panel patients, availing of private medical services that are not insured is justified where the services offered by statutory health insurance are inadequate for the eradication of the harm and either other reasonable alternatives are not available (BGH 6 July 2004, BGHZ 160, 126) or the suffered injuries are particularly severe (CA Munich 29 July 2004, DAR 2004, 651). The cost of an expensive cosmetic operation, for which there is no sufficient reason are not recoverable (BGH 3 December 1974, NJW 1975, 640). In contrast, costs of treatment and care are recoverable (RG 11 June 1936, RGZ 151, 298; BGH 8 November 1977, VersR 1978, 149), so too are expenses for occupational rehabilitation, especially re-education (BGH 4 May 1982, NJW 1982, 1638; BGH 26 February 1991, NJW-RR 1991, 854). Recovery of the cost of returning to education for a more highly qualified job is restricted to partial

Article 2:201: Personal injury and consequential loss

28.

compensation (BGH 2 June 1987, NJW 1987, 2741). Where increased basic needs result from the injury, a distinction is drawn: where once-off measures are necessary (like, e. g. the acquisition of ancillary medical equipment, the overhauling of a vehicle to make it handicapped-accessible or the renovation of a dwelling to make it wheelchair-accessible) full particulars are provided for under CC § 249(2) (BGH 19 May 1981, NJW 1982, 757; BGH 20 January 2004, NJW-RR 2004, 671). However, if on-going special needs result, then the wrongdoer is liable for damages in the measure so provided for in the special regulations contained in CC § 843 (Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB65, § 249, no. 10). Lost profit also falls under the category of “natural restitution” [whereby the wrongdoer must compensate the injured party in order to restore his or her circumstances to the state he or she would have been in, had the wrongful event not occurred] (CC § 249 with clarification in § 252 sentence 1; BGH 9 July 1986, BGHZ 98, 212, 219). Under AUSTRIAN CC § 1325 the tortfeasor must compensate for costs of recovery and for present and future loss of earnings. Costs of recovery include all appropriate expenses resulting from the physical injury, as long as they are with a view to eradicating or mitigating the medical after-effects of the accident (OGH 18 November 1982, ZVR 1983/281, p. 312; OGH 20 February 1963, ZVR 1963/144, p. 154). This does not depend on actual successful recovery (OGH 18 May 1971, ZVR 1972/56, p. 86). Counted among costs of recovery are, e. g. the costs of medical treatment, of hospitalisation or residence in a health resort, costs of transport, of operations, expense for medication and other aids to recovery, even the payment of gratuity to nursing staff (Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht II12, 321; Rummel (-Reischauer) ABGB II2, § 1325 no. 14). The costs of treatment by a private doctor or of being in the special class of a hospital are recoverable, if they appear to be necessary from a medical standpoint or at least where they facilitate the expectation of a more favourable result from treatment (OGH 24 May 1962, JBl 1963, 40) or where they are in keeping with the particular lifestyle of the injured party (OGH 5 February 1970, SZ 43/32; OGH 24 April 2003, ZVR 2004/38, p. 131). The injured party is not entitled to compensation if it is established that the treatment for recovery has ceased (no “fictitious treatment costs”: OGH strengthened senate 23 October 1997, SZ 70/220). Along with actual costs of treatment, costs of an increase in basic needs are compensatable (OGH 10 December 1964, ZVR 1965/225, p. 243). Belonging to this category are, e. g. a wheelchair, nursing services, the cost of a disabled-ready vehicle or the renovation of a dwelling in order to make it handicappedaccessible (Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VII2, § 1325 no. 8). Lost earnings within the meaning of CC § 1325 are everything the injured party loses as a result of the deterioration of his or her ability to earn his or her livelihood, i. e. the ability to earn one’s livelihood in a position that corresponds with one’s education, qualifications and hitherto pursued occupation (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht II2, 134). Loss of occupational promotion opportunities are also recoverable (Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht II12, 322). In contrast to loss of earnings, which is qualified as “positive damage”, compensation for lost profit only falls due where there is intention or gross negligence (Koziol loc. cit. 132). Where someone is not in gainful employment, he or she has no claim for compensation of loss of earnings until his or her probable point of entry into the working world (Rummel (-Reischauer), ABGB II2, § 1325 no. 23); losses that result from delayed entry into gainful employment, however, are recoverable (OGH 24 April 1969, EvBl 1969/374, p. 374). Where there is permanent damage, which goes part and parcel with a probable future reduction in earning capacity, a so-called “abstract pen-

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29.

30.

376

sion” may be granted (OGH 30 September 1965, SZ 38/153; OGH 12 November 2003, ZVR 2004/18, p. 67). Additionally, CC § 1326 provides for compensation where a disfigurement arising out of the injury hinders the improved progression of the injured party; a low probability suffices here (OGH 11 November 1991, ZVR 1992/79, p. 176). Primarily belonging to this category is the diminution of employment prospects, but also the loss of the opportunity to marry or of social contact (OGH 11 January 1983, ZVR 1984/90, p. 84). GREEK CC art. 929 clarifies that compensation for damages encompasses suffered damage and “costs of the medical condition”, along with that which the injured party must do without in future or which he must expend as a result of increased basic needs; this provision complements CC arts. 297 and 914, but does not replace them (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 929, no. 2; Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 625). Costs of the medical condition cover all expenses that are necessary for the rehabilitation of the injured party (treatment, medication, transport). Furthermore, loss of earnings during the period of treatment is recoverable (Georgiades loc. cit. no. 19) as well as the impairment of performing domestic activities (even if no home help is hired in order to take care of household activities: CA Athens 5163/1996, EllDik/38/1997, p. 650; CA Athens 2043/1986, EllDik 27/1986, p. 678). Primarily, pecuniary loss resulting from one’s diminished capacity to earn one’s livelihood falls under the category of liability to compensate for that, which the injured party must do without, while expenditure for a specialised diet or for the hiring of a home carer, for example, falls under the category of liability to compensate for necessary additional expenditure (Georgiades loc. cit. nos. 22 and 28). According to CC art. 931, mutilation or disfigurement of the injured party shall carry weight when assessing the compensation for damages (for a more detailed account, see A. P. 739/1996, EllDik 38/1997, p. 72 and A. P. 477/2001 [unpublished, here cited under Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 634). PORTUGUESE law follows much the same principles. The obligation to compensate for damage relates as much to current pecuniary disadvantages (danos emergentes: CC art. 564(1)), as it does to lost pecuniary advantages, as long as their realisation were sufficiently probable, had the accident not occurred (CC art. 564(2)), see Costa Basto, Personal injury compensation in Portugal, 400). Liability covers, inter alia, costs of all types of treatment (STJ 21 December 2005), travel costs, actual loss of income and lost pay increases (in the case of permanent incapacity to earn one’s livelihood, see STJ 7 April 2005) as well as the cost of necessary hired help (STJ 8 March 2005; Álvaro Dias, Dano corporal, 210 and 228). In contrast to labour law, traffic accident law does not recognise any fixed sums of damages (STJ 8 March 1979, BolMinJus 285 [1979] 290). It is therefore assumed in cases of permanent incapacity to earn one’s livelihood, that the injured party is to be paid such lump sum that accords with his or her probable future earnings until death (STJ 6 July 2000, CJ VIII [2000-2] 144; STJ 9 January 1979, BolMinJus 283 [1979] 260; Costa Basto, Personal injury compensation in Portugal, 405). More precise mathematical methods were developed for the concretisation of these methods of calculation (STJ 5 May 1994, CJ II [1994-1] 86; STJ 7 February 2002), which can in turn be adjusted to accommodate the facts of each individual case (STJ 8 March 1979, BolMinJus 285 [1979] 290; STJ 6 July 2005). A claim in damages for pecuniary loss does not require that the injured party actually drew an income (see STJ 3 June 2004 and STJ 13 November 2001: the claim of a child due to the foreseeable delay

Article 2:201: Personal injury and consequential loss

31.

32.

33.

of his entry into the working world, as well as STJ 13 May 2004: the claim of a housewife; see further STJ 13 November 2003 for the claim of a pensioner). A model, who can no longer pursue his or her occupation because of physical disfigurement, suffers not merely non-pecuniary damage, but genuine pecuniary losses (STJ 26 July 1968, BolMinJus 179 [1968] 165). Under DUTCH CC art. 6:96, loss suffered, lost profit and all expenses that appear reasonable for the prevention and mitigation of the damage are considered recoverable pecuniary losses, see above HR 2 November 1962, NedJur 1963, no. 61 p. 193). For physical injury, CC art. 6:107 specifies that, in particular medical treatment and nursing, whether the latter is provided by a professional or a family member, e. g. the parents (HR 28 May 1999, NedJur 1999, no. 564 p. 3109) are covered. Liability for a specific fixed amount (currently 23 Euro per day) is imposed for additional costs that are not specified further. Furthermore, expenses for medication, transport costs, costs of everyday and industrial rehabilitation are recoverable (for more on this issue and what follows, see the commentary of Lindenbergh, Schadevergoeding II, art. 6:107, nos. 9-17). As long as recovery is still expected, in principle lost income may be recovered until one completes one’s 65th year, and under certain circumstances also after this date (CFI Assen 15 January 1963, VR 1967, 61). For permanent damage, the difference between presumed attained income and actually earned income is compensated (HR 15 May 1998, NedJur 1998, no. 624 p. 3562; CFI Leeuwarden 26. April 1973, VR 1974, 21). For employees the starting point is always the net income, to which expenses and emoluments may belong (CA ’s-Hertogenbosch 25 March 1970, VR 1973, 23). The percentage of one’s incapacity to earn a livelihood offers indication when estimating this figure. Where illicit work is involved, it shall depend on the net income, with which the injured party would have been left after tax. In the case of the self-employed, the judge is vested with yet further reaching jurisdiction to assess this figure. Costs arising from a permanent disability (wheelchair and other aids, medical help and nursing, transport costs, costs for a home help and costs for higher health insurance premiums) are generally recoverable. Lump sums are awarded, e. g. for increased wear and tear of clothes and shoes (CFI Amsterdam 17 March and 15 December 1993, VR 1994, 206) or for the fact that the injured party must seek out a hotel for his or her holiday rather than camping like before, which was less expensive (CFI Amsterdam 20 November 1985, VR 1987, 48). The same is true for the inability to carry out smaller jobs and repairs oneself any longer (CA ‘s-Hertogensbosch 10 September 1968, VR 1970, 10). No compensation is granted for a decrease in one’s chances of marriage (CFI Amsterdam 27 January 1961, VR 1964, 60). ESTONIAN LOA § 130(1) formulates it thus: “In the case of an obligation to compensate for damage arising from harm to one’s physical or general health caused to a person, the obligated person shall compensate the aggrieved person for expenses arising from such damage or injury, including expenses arising from the increased needs of the aggrieved person, and damage arising from total or partial incapacity to work, including damage arising from a decrease in income or deterioration of the future economic potential of the aggrieved person”. Under the SWEDISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 1 no. 1 the “costs of recovery and other costs, including a reasonable allowance for the injured party’s loved ones” are recoverable, so too is loss of earnings according to loc. cit. no. 2 and according to loc. cit. no. 3 “pain, affliction or other on-going disabilities, as well as particular (formerly: “other”: Sandstedt, VersRAI 2002, 9, 11) adverse effects resulting from the harm” are also

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34.

378

compensatable. DANISH Damages Liabilty Act § 1(1) enumerates the same heads of damages (loss of income, costs of recovery and other losses); reasonable remuneration of loved ones, however, is not expressly included (for a more detailed account, see von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 257; Møller and Wiisbye, Erstatningsansvarsloven6, 22). FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 2 nos. 1-4 accord with the equivalent Swedish rule. SWEDISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 1 nos. 2 and 3 regulate the establishing of recoverable loss of income including damages of tradesmen and persons who maintain a household. The subject matter of loc. cit. no. 1 is, inter alia, the costs of health care. They must be reasonable and necessary. Only costs that are not covered by general insurance come into play here (see also loc. cit. chap. 5 § 3 and in connection with that Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen, 141). The same is true in DENMARK (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 257). Treatment in a private hospital is compensatable when public hospitals are overcrowded (Swedish HD 27 November 1967, NJA 1967, 497). The same goes for medically necessary care in a private home (HD 9 January 1968, NJA 1968, 23; HD 23 March 1976, NJA 1976, 103). The term “other costs” in the SWEDISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 1 no. 1 encompasses costs that are otherwise not covered, e. g. transport and travel costs in connection with after-treatment or costs of training to enable industrial rehabilitation, in addition to increased costs of getting to and from work and the additional expense – which resulted from the injury – of having to hire help with the upkeep of private property (Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen, 145; HD 16 November 1992, NJA 1992, 642). In DENMARK removal costs as a result of the injury are compensated (ØLD 15 August 2000, UfR 2000, 2357; HD 3 July 2002, UfR 2002, 2407). The costs of renovating a dwelling for a disabled person as well as for other increased basic needs are recoverable (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 258; Møller and Wiisbye loc. cit. 35). Calculation of compensation for loss of income in SWEDEN is done according to the Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 1 nos. 2-3, the calculation of compensation for loss of future earnings, according to chap. 5 § 4. The equivalent provisions of the FINNISH Damages Liability Act are to be found in chap. 5 § 2a and chap. 5 § 2b. The DANISH Damages Liability Act contains corresponding provisions in § 2 (Loss of income) and §§ 5-9 (diminished ability to earn one’s livelihood). Under SCOTS law consequential economic damage will include: wages lost by the injured party (Doonan v. Scottish Motor Traction Co. Ltd. 1950 SC 136); loss of capital (Fox v. Caulfield & Co. Ltd. 1975 SLT (Notes) 71); loss of earning capacity (Whyte v. University of Dundee 1990 SLT 545; loss of employability (Robertson’s Robertson’s Curator Bonis v. Anderson 1996 SC 217); pension rights lost by the injured party (Mitchell v. Glenrothes Development Corp. 1991 SLT 284); all medical expenses reasonably incurred (Rubens v. Walker 1946 SC 215) and other necessary expenditure such as the costs of prostheses, nursing, special clothing and altered premises (White and Fletcher, Delictual Damages, 15; Tuttle v. Edinburgh University 1984 SLT 172). Future loss of income and damages for the future cost of caring for an injured party are usually calculated by computing an annual loss (the multiplicand) to which is applied a multiplier appropriate to the age of the party and other relevant circumstances. This produces a lump sum which, when invested, should provide an annual income equivalent to the loss (McNulty v. Marshall’s Food Group Ltd. 1999 SC 195). Under Administration of Justice Act 1982 s. 9 the claimant may seek a “reasonable sum” for services which, by virtue of his injuries, the claimant himself is no longer able to render to his relatives (Brown v.

Article 2:201: Personal injury and consequential loss

35.

Ferguson 1990 SLT 274; Ingham v. John G. Russell (Transport) Ltd. 1991 SC 201; Lynch v. W. Alexander & Sons (Midlands) Ltd. 1987 SCLR 780). Under s. 10(c) and (iii), in assessing the amount of damages payable in respect of personal injuries, there must be deducted any benefit payable from public funds, in respect of any period before the date of the award of damages, designed to secure to the injured person a minimum level of subsistence. Under IRISH law loss of earnings is also one of the principle heads of damage. In assessing loss of future earning capacity, “[n]ot merely is the former earning capacity of the plaintiff relevant but so also is the present physical condition, his prospective physical condition, the state of the labour market, the particular trade or skill which he has and the prospects for exercising it in the future having regard to the diminution of his capacity to do so resulting from the injuries he has sustained” (Walsh J. in Long v. O’Brien & Cronin Ltd., SC 24 March 1972, unreported. In Reddy v. Bates [1983] IR 141 the Supreme Court stated that “where damages are to be assessed under several headings, where the jury has added the various sums awarded and arrived at a total for damages, they should then consider this total sum, as should this court on any appeal, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the total sum awarded is, in the circumstances of the case, fair compensation for the plaintiff for the injury suffered, or whether it is out of all proportion to such circumstances.” The length of time by which the expectation of life has been reduced must also be taken into account (Walsh J. in Doherty v. Bowaters Irish Wallboard Mills Ltd. [1968] IR 277 at 285). Where there is probability of some disability or illness arising or developing in the future, the damages to be awarded “should be commensurate with, and proportionate to, the degree of that possibility or probability” (Dunlop v. Kenny, SC 29 July 1969, unreported, per Ó Dálaigh C. J. at p. 11). The plaintiff is also entitled to compensation “for the reduction in the spectrum of employment which would have been ope[n] to him if uninjured” (Feeney v. John Sisk & Sons Ltd., DPIJ: Hilary and Easter Terms 1993, p. 254 at p. 258 [HC]). An injured plaintiff is entitled to recover all expenses reasonably incurred (or to be incurred) in respect of his or her medical care, inclusive of hospital expenses (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 44.107). A plaintiff who is eligible to receive free treatment and care under the Health Act 1970 is not obliged to avail himself or herself of free services under pain of being held otherwise to have unreasonably failed to mitigate damages (Civil Liability Act 1961 s. 34(2)(b)). Where the spouse, parents, or other close relatives or friends take on the task of caring for the injured plaintiff on an ongoing basis, that is also recoverable loss to the plaintiff (Doherty v. Bowaters Irish Wallboard Mills Ltd. [1968] IR 277, 286). In Curley v. Dublin Corporation [2003] IEHC 28, Gilligan J. in awarding damages took into account “the risk of unemployment, redundancy, illness, accident or the like”. In O’Sullivan v. Kiernan [2004] IEHC 78, O’Neill J. awarded general damages because the plaintiff’s range of choice of career was significantly reduced (although the plaintiff had not suffered any actual loss of earning capacity).

VI.

Expenses of close relations

36.

Under FRENCH law, close relatives who betake themselves to an immobile injured party can claim the reasonable costs of visiting (travel and overnight stay) as damages of their own – so-called préjudice économique par ricochet – (Cass.civ. 20 December 1960, s. 1961 jur. 178). In contrast, costs that are incurred by third parties (whether strangers or

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37.

38.

39.

40.

380

relatives: Cass.civ. 14 November 2002, Bull.civ. 2002, II, no. 260 p. 205) who provide assistance to the victim (assistance d’une tierce personne) qualify as pecuniary losses of the victim (Viney and Jourdain, Les effets de la responsabilité2, no. 110-2 p. 208; CA Paris 10 November 1983, D. 1984 jur. 214, note Chartier). In BELGIUM close relatives also have their own claim to compensation of reasonable visiting costs, whereas the costs of third parties for actual assistance provided has been to date deemed as (recoverable) damage to the victim, and indeed even when the help is gratuitously provided (Cass. 30 November 1977, Pas. belge 1978, I, 351). Cass. 6 November 2001, Pas. belge 2001, 1790, concl. du Jardin) has, however, granted those who render assistance their own claim against the wrongdoer from now on; it seems that the resulting question of the relationship of the claim of the victim and that of those who provide assistance has yet to be clarified (see further Lindenbergh, TPR 2002, no. 27 pp. 1437-1438). The SPANISH Tribunal Supremo has confirmed on numerous occasions that close relatives have a claim to compensation for their own economic and incorporeal losses arising from the harm to the primary injured party. According to case law hitherto reported these damages can not only be claimed by the relatives themselves (see e. g. TS 23 April 1992, RAJ 1992 (2) no. 3323 p. 4388 and TS 9 February 1988, RAJ 1988 (1) no. 771 p. 752) but also by the primary injured party (in his or her own name) (see e. g. TS (5th Senate) 23 February 1988, RAJ 1988 (1) no. 1451 p. 1389). Parents often have successful claims in their own names, as well as in the name of their injured children (like e. g. in TS (3rd Senate) 25 April 1989, RAJ 1989 (3) no. 3471 p. 3921 and in TS 15 October 1996, RAJ 1996 (4) no. 7110 p. 9586). Where someone continually cares for a severely injured relative and must give up work as a result, he or she has a claim in damages for loss of earnings suffered (TS (5th Senate) 23 February 1988 loc. cit.). ITALIAN case law also allows for care of the injured party by relatives in various aspects. Due to the impossibility of estimating a loss in financial terms, compensation for parents who care for a brain-damaged child – e. g. for the costs of renovating one’s dwelling and its sanitary facilities, for the child’s specialised diet and for his or her daily care and supervision – is granted according to equity (Cass. 31 May 2003, no. 8827, Giust.civ.Mass., fasc. 5). A wife who gave up work in order to take care of her seriously injured husband is also recognised as having her own claim in damages for compensation. This is treated as pecuniary loss to the wife in the form of lost gains (Cass. 2 February 2001, no. 1516, Resp.civ. e prev. 2001, 881). Independent of this, relatives may assert their own claim for incorporeal damages based on CC art. 2059 for the harm to the familial relationship (Cass. 31 May 2003, no. 8827, Giust.civ.Mass. 2003, fasc. 5). Under HUNGARIAN law family members who nurse the victim may assert claims for their own loss of earnings as well as for costs incurred arising from the care provided. Care by a wife who was not gainfully employed before her husband’s accident is also compensatable (Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 177 f). No person should have to undertake additional gratuitous work to relieve the injuring party from his obligation (Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1358 f; Petrik (-Köles), Polgári jog II2, 631). Travel and visiting costs of family members are equally recoverable, not, however, those of friends. The cost of gifts brought to the hospital are also not recoverable (Gellért (-Benedek) loc. cit. 1362 f). BH 2001/15 granted the most severely injured victim of a car accident the costs for treatment (inter alia for physiotherapy, massage therapy, logopedic therapy), loss of salary and transport costs (includ-

Article 2:201: Personal injury and consequential loss

41.

42.

43.

44.

ing the costs of necessary treatment abroad), as well as the costs of a vehicle, the costs of increased basic needs (e. g. television set, books), increased costs in maintaining the household and nursing costs. His parents, who cared for their son, were granted damages for loss of salary, for the deterioration of the maintenance of the garden, travel and visiting costs, the cost of the supervision of their other child during their absence and the cost of renovating their dwelling in order to make it handicapped-accessible. Under GERMAN law the visiting expenses of close relatives are counted among the costs that are recoverable by the injured party (BGH 22 November 1988, BGHZ 106, 28, 29; BGH 21 May 1985, NJW 1985, 2757; BGH 19 February 1991, NJW 1991, 2340). Compensatability depends on whether the visits are medically beneficial and necessary to the recovery process and whether the costs were unavoidable. Therefore, compensation is only granted for the costs of e. g. the most economic mode of transport, loss of salary only for working hours that may not be made up, and lost profit of the selfemployed only to the extent that it is directly assignable to the visitation time and can not be obtained by other means (BGH 19 February 1991, NJW 1991, 2340, 2341). Within the context of the case law here, “relative” is taken to mean cohabitees as well (CFI Münster 12 June 1997, NJW 1998, 1801). The relatives themselves have no claim against the injuring party, but can make a claim on the injured party to compensation (BGH 21 December 1978, NJW 1979, 598). Within the meaning of AUSTRIAN CC § 1325, visting expenses of close relatives are regarded as recoverable costs because their visit usually enhances recovery (Rummel (-Reischauer), ABGB II2, § 1325 no. 16; OGH 11 November 2004, ÖJZ 2005, 390). Those who bear these visitation costs are entitled to claim (OGH 30 March 1967, ZVR 1968/83, p. 189). As a result, relatives can themselves be entitled to claim (OGH 20 June 1989, SZ 62/116: children of the injured party who were of full age; OGH 20 June 2002, ÖJZ 2002/190, p. 725: cohabitee). Though mere expenditure of time is not recoverable (OGH 1 March 1984, EFSlg 46.093), parents still enjoy a claim in damages when they take unpaid leave in order to look after their underage child in hospital (OGH 25 April 1985, EFSlg 48.648) or if they otherwise have to take on a particular extra burden (CA Innsbruck 20 September 2000, ZVR 2001/100, p. 363). Where a relative takes care of the injured party, this person can personally take a claim against the tortfeasor, no different than if the injured party would have had to admit himself to a nursing home. The wrongdoer is liable for the cost that would have fallen due for professional carers (OGH 26 May 1999, ZVR 1999/109, p. 375 and OGH 20 June 2002, ZVR 2003/47, p. 166; different approach OGH 10 September 1998, SZ 71/146). In GREEK law it is argued that the term “costs of illness” in CC art. 929 also encompasses expenses that close relatives take on in order to visit the injured party. This relates to e. g. costs for phone calls, travel costs, loss of earnings or hiring a third party in the business of the relative in question for the time that he spends with the injured party (Filios, Enochiko Dikaio II(2)3, 186). Others regard this as an interpretation which is no longer true to the text of the law, but accept that appropriate further legal embellishment may be justified according to considerations of equity (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 929, no. 15). PORTUGUESE CC art. 495 acknowledges some exceptions to the principle that tortious claims are only open to those whose right has been infringed (Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 620). According to this provision, along with hospitals and doctors, particularly those who have provided help to the injured party have their own claim in

381

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45.

46.

47.

382

damages against the injuring party (for a more detailed account, see Abrantes Geraldes, Temas da responsabilidade civil I2, 14). Although family members who suffer loss of salary because they are providing the victim with assistance are not expressly mentioned, they are also considered entitled to compensation according to the case law (STJ 16 December 1993, CJ(ST) I (1993-3) 182; CA Porto 4 April 1991), so as to benefit the mother of a victim of a traffic accident who had given up her job to care for her daughter (STJ 8 March 2005). Naturally, a causal nexus between the injury of the primary victim arising from the accident and the pecuniary damage of the relative is required (STJ 26 February 2004). DUTCH CC art. 6:107 entitles third parties (with the exception of insurance carriers), who have paid expenses for the benefit of the injured party, to a claim in damages against the wrongdoer, if the injured party were likewise entitled to claim damages for these expenses, had he paid them himself. Costs of treatment, nursing, rehabilitation and medication, in addition to reasonable costs of visitation come into play in this context (Parlementaire Geschiedenis Inv., 1283; Schadevergoeding II (-Lindenbergh), art. 107, no. 45). The loss of earnings of a close relative who temporarily gives up work in order to nurse the victim is recoverable, indeed to the amount that otherwise necessary professional assistance would have cost. Where an unscathed close family member hires home help, they shall have a claim to the costs of such expense (Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12, no. 474); however, if the family themselves help, without being able to show an actual loss, a claim in damages does not arise (Lindenbergh loc. cit. no. 47). The SWEDISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 1 requires compensation for “costs of recovery and other costs, including reasonable compensation for the injured party’s loved ones.” This relates to expenses incurred for care and visiting. Where circumstances so allow, relatives who nurse the victim may even recover loss of revenue that exceeds the (hypothetical) costs of professional carers (Sandstedt, VersRAI 2002, 9, 10; HD 5 November 1996, NJA 1996, 639). It is unclear, who exactly can claim the damages. HD 23 March 1976, NJA 1976, 103 and HD 10 November 1982, NJA 1982, 668 granted the relatives their own claim. The explanatory notes on the newly formulated provision of loc. cit. chap. 5 § 1 indicate, however, that it is the claim of the injured party (Prop 2000/01:68 [Ersättning för ideell skada] 68). Loss of income and travel costs incurred by a relative who cares for an injured minor fall within the meaning of “other loss” in § 1(1) of the DANISH Damages Liability Act (ØLD 14 September 1995, FED 1995.1020 and HD 10 October 2000, UfR 2001, 28). However, it is required that measures taken by the relative are necessary for the injured party’s recovery (HD 3 July 2002, UfR 2002, 2407). Whoever is entitled to the claim (the injured party or the relative) seems not to have been conclusively cleared up. In FINLAND close relatives can in certain circumstances claim loss of income and necessary costs incurred as a result of their care (Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 2d sentence 1), in addition to compensation for other measures that aid recovery (loc. cit., second sentence), not however after the point in time at which the damage subsided (loc. cit. sentence 3). The ENGLISH Administration of Justice Act 1982 ss. 7 to 10 provide that services rendered to an injured person by a relative, unless it is expressly agreed that no sum shall be payable, will be a head of loss allowing recovery of “reasonable remuneration” and repayment of reasonable expenses. In SCOTLAND, a wide range of “necessary services” have yielded compensation under s. 8 (services rendered to the injured party): the wife

Article 2:201: Personal injury and consequential loss

48.

who assisted her husband with washing and dressing (Gripper v. British Railways Board 1991 SLT 659); the wife who walked her husband’s dog and drove his car (Millar v. Fife Regional Council 1990 SLT 651); the husband who took over the running of the household (Smith v. Chief Constable, Central Scotland Police 1991 SLT 634); the cohabitee who “effectively performed the services of a nursing auxiliary” (Lynch v. W. Alexander & Sons (Midlands) Ltd. 1987 SCLR 780). ‘Relative’ for the purposes of s. 8 is defined in s. 13(1) of the 1982 Act – it is restricted to spouses; ‘ascendants’; descendants’; siblings; and uncles and aunts. Divorced spouses, ‘common law spouses’, those treated as children of the family, illegitimate children, and stepchildren are included, and since ‘any relationship of the half blood shall be treated as a relationship of the whole blood’ and ‘any relationship by affinity shall be treated as a relationship by consanguinity’ (loc. cit. s. 13(a)), a broad array of relationships is provided for, such as half-siblings, uncles and aunts by marriage, and even ‘grandparents-in-law’, and combinations of these categories. The loss is recovered in a claim made by the injured person, who is placed under an obligation to account to the person suffering the loss. Under IRISH law the spouse or parents of an injured victim of a tort can claim compensation for loss of consortium (McKinley v. The Minister for Defence (No. 2) [1997] IEHC 93, [1997] 2 IR 176) or loss of services as the case may be, in respect of, inter alia, the medical expenses that they incur in relation to the victim (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 44.109). Where the spouse, parents or other close relations or friends have taken on the task of caring for the injured plaintiff on an ongoing basis, some judges in recent years (e. g. Smith v. Ireland, HC 16 August 1996, unreported [Flood J.]) have been willing to make an award directly in favour of the carer-spouse (or other caring relations or friends) rather than resorting to a trust (as has been done in England) of a restitutionary (Hughes v. O’Flaherty, HC 19 January 1996, unreported) characterisation.

VII. Recoverable consequential non-economic damage

49.

50.

51.

The FRENCH legal system recognises a range of recoverable non-economic damage (see further le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2004/2005), nos. 1582 et seq.; Chartier, La réparation du préjudice dans la responsabilité civile, 221 et seq.). It is normally divided into four categories: (i) mental and physical pain (souffrances morales ou physiques), (ii) aesthetic damage (préjudice esthétique), (iii) damage to sex life and fertility (préjudice sexuel) and (iv) loss of well-being (préjudice d’agrément). Even victims who find themselves in a vegetative and thereby unconscious state are fully compensated; their damages are evaluated “in abstracto” (Bourrié-Quenillet, JCP éd. G 2004, I no. 136, 20). In BELGIUM the reference point is the same. Temporary or complete loss of the ability to earn one’s livelihood is also compensated as non-economic damage – either as pretium doloris or as préjudice d’agrément (Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2)v, nos. 142-150 pp. 271-296). SPANISH legal doctrine, much like its French counterpart, distinguishes between pretium (or pecunia) doloris (actual damages for pain and suffering), perjuicio estético (disfiguring physical damage), pérdida de agrado (loss of the pleasures or amenities of life) and perjuicio sexual; it also recognises, however, e. g. perjuicio juvenil (the “abstract” loss of the ability of a minor who has not yet entered the working world to earn a livelihood) (de Ángel Yágüez, Tratado de responsabilidad civil3, 693; Vicente Domingo, Los daños

383

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52.

53.

384

corporales, 130). The question of the precise categorisation of a set of circumstances into any of these respective heads of damages is not, of course, answered consistently (see e. g. Vicente Domingo, El daño, 238 with Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 161). Compensatability of valid disfiguring physical harm, which is easily proven (TS 26 January 1988, RAJ 1988 (1) no. 477 p. 487) neither depends on the relevant part of the body, nor the age, gender or occupation of the injured party; this is not so for the assessment of the amount of compensation (TS 15 November 1990, RAJ 1990 (7) no. 8919 p. 11365), for which the judge has full discretion (TS 2 December 1989, RAJ 1989 (7) no. 9671 p. 11248). Table of damages no. VI contained in the appendix of the Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act (Texto Refundido de la Ley sobre Responsabilidad Civil y Seguro en la Circulación de Vehículos de Motor, brought into force by Real Decreto Legislativo no. 8/2004 of 29 October 2004) expressly provides for compensation for disfiguring physical harm. Loss of the pleasures or amenities of life relates to everyday events, such as shopping, taking walks, dressing oneself and the loss of zest and energy for life (TS 7 May 1987, RAJ 1987 (2) no. 3022 p. 2814). After a long and volatile history (see Notes II 18 and V40 under Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) above), under ITALIAN law danno biologico now also numbers among the consequential non-economic losses of physical injury (CC art. 2059) (Cass. 12 December 2003, no. 19057, Danno e resp. 2004, 762; Cass. 10 August 2004, no. 15434, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, fasc. 7-8). This has not changed the fact that damages falling due for causing danno biologico, as before, aim to compensate for the damage to a person’s psycho-physical integrity (Cass. 20 February 2004, no. 3399, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, fasc. 2; Cass. 27 April 2004, no. 7980, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, fasc. 4). New here, however, is that damage resulting from a violation of a constitutionally relevant interest closely relating to the person are compensated, without the restrictive requirements of CC art. 2059 (violation of a criminal law provision or the existence of another provision which expressly declares a danno morale as recoverable) coming into play. This is true for danno morale in the narrow sense (i. e. for mental suffering) (Cass. 6 August 2004, no. 15179, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, fasc. 7-8) as well as for (so-called – at least, until now) danno esistenziale (i. e. for harm to necessary elements of personal development worthy of protection) (Cass. 31 May 2003, nos. 8828 and 8827, Giur.it. 2004, 1129; Cass. 19 August 2003, no. 12124, Giur.it. 2004, 1129; Cass. 27 April 2004, no. 7980, Danno e resp. 2004, 962, note Ponzanelli; Cass. 15 January 2005, no. 729, Giust.civ.Mass. 2005, fasc. 1; Cass. 18 March 2005, no. 5677, Dir. e Giust. 2005, fasc. 19, 38). The claim to compensation of danno morale only remains subject to the limitations of CC art. 2059 if it does not relate to a violation of a constitutionally relevant right closely relating to the person. Under HUNGARIAN law the judge enjoys a wide case-by-case discretion in granting incorporeal damages (see in more detail Lábady, A nem vagyoni kártérítés újabb bírói gyakorlata, 51). Incorporeal damages are only granted in cases of reasonably significant interference with one’s physical or mental well-being. Injury per se does not suffice to ground a claim for reparation; a non-economic detriment must be proven (BH 2002/24; BH 2001/110; BH 2001/12; BH 1997/435), unless it is obvious (BH 2002/186), see Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1328-1330). For example, mere worry over the recovery of a child is insufficient (Petrik (-Petrik), Polgári jog I2, 202). In contrast, compensation was awarded to a mentally indisposed mother who lost

Article 2:201: Personal injury and consequential loss

54.

55.

56.

a child as a result of a doctor’s error (BH 2005/105). The granting of incorporeal damages does not necessarily require fault on the part of the person liable (BH 2000/100 and BH 2005/250: objective liability of the state for a Hepatitis C infection). Even victims who are in a coma, do not feel the pain for other reasons or who have lost their comprehension capacity have a claim to compensation of their incorporeal losses (Petrik loc. cit. I2, 165-166, 202/8-203; Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1326-1327, 1346; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 261-262). On top of physical damage (amputation, deterioration of general health, humiliation, mental suffering, psychopathy), also adverse effects on social surroundings and the loss of particular options when planning one’s life goals (Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 74-75; ibid., Polgári jog I2 loc. cit.) are considered recoverable non-economic detriment. CZECH and SLOVAKIAN CC provide that in the case of harm to physical or mental health, “the injured party’s pain and aggravation of his or her social assertion shall be compensated by lump sum”. POLISH CC art. 445 § 2 comes to the same result. SLOVENIAN LOA art. 179 prescribes reasonable monetary compensation for “physical distress suffered, for mental distress suffered owing to a reduction in life activities”, and for “disfigurement”. ROMANIA distinguishes between physical pain (durerea fizica˘), aesthetic damage (prejudiciu estetic), physiological damage (prejudiciu fiziologic) and the prejudiciu de agrement, i. e. the damage that emanates from the fact that it is impossible for the injured party to pursue a sporting, artistic or other activity (Adam, Drept civil, 277). In the context of harm to physical or general health, GERMAN CC § 253(2) expressly provides for the compensation of incorporeal damage. According to the case law, “damages for pain and suffering” serves a dual function. They should serve to compensate for pain and suffering sustained as well as to provide the injured party with a sense of atonement about the sanctioning of the wrongdoer (BGH [Grand Senate For Civil Matters] 6 July 1955, BGHZ 18, 149, 154; BGH 29 November 1994, BGHZ 128, 117, 120) (this atonement function of damages for pain and suffering is, however, the subject of debate, see further, inter alia, MünchKomm (-Oetker), BGB4, § 253 no. 11). The compensatory function is concerned with putting the injured party in such a position that he may avail of measures of alleviation and convenience (Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB65, § 253 no. 11). The assessment of compensation is carried out according to equity and under CCP § 287, this is at the full discretion of the court. All relevant circumstances of each particular case are to be considered, particularly the form, intensity and length of the injury suffered. Furthermore, it is noted by the courts that as far as possible, comparable injuries should result in approximately the same compensation. In practice, the “table of damages for pain and suffering”, which is based on an analysis of numerous decided cases, along with the court’s own jurisprudence, are accorded significant weight. “Damages for pain and suffering”, which fall due under AUSTRIAN CC § 1325 should be an atonement for all detriment experienced by the injured party’s sensory spectrum. They should compensate the entire complex of pain, the feelings of listlessness that thereby arise and put the injured party in the position to be able to provide monetary reparation for suffering undergone and loss of the pleasures or amenities of life (OGH 22 November 1988, ZVR 1989/90, p. 147). Such claims for damages for pain and suffering are transferable and capable of being bequeathed (Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht II12, 323). Damages for pain and suffering are also granted to those who are in an

385

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57.

58.

59.

386

anaesthetic state due to the accident. “Compensation for disfigurement” (CC § 1326) is qualified by case law as a special case of compensation for economic loss (see above, Note IV 19). GREECE grants incorporeal damages resulting from harm to physical or general health in the context of CC art. 932. Non-economic damage is damage, which a person suffers due to a violation of his moral, mental or physical integrity (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Vossinakis), art. 932, no. 1). The injured party shall receive reparation for grief, pain, discomfort or depression suffered (Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 647). Whether non-economic damages also fall due to victims who have lost their apperceptive and sensory capacity, is the subject of debate. In literature, the question is mostly answered in the affirmative (e. g. Paterakis, I chrimatiki ikanopoiisi gia ithiki vlavis, 277 and Kritikos, Aposimiosi apo trochaia avtokinitika atiximata, no. 891); in contrast, by granting a quite exceptionally low sum of compensation, CA Athens 2461/1991 (unpublished, cited here under Kritikos loc. cit. 308, fn. 13) basically answered it in the negative. It is recognised that loss of sex life amounts to recoverable non-economic loss (CA Athens 6055/1989 ArchN 41/1990, 776). Whether the “compensation for disfigurement” (CC art. 931) provides reparation for economic or non-economic damages, is not consistently ruled upon. A. P. 739/1996, EllDik 38/1997, 72 opined, that both CC art. 931 and CC art. 932 sought to provide reparation for non-economic damages. Consequently, a unitary sum may be awarded for both. Primarily enumerated in PORTUGAL as recoverable forms of non-economic damages are pain, aesthetic damage, loss of amenities of life, harm to general health and longevity and “loss of youth” (STJ 17 June 2004). Pretium doloris comprises the physical and moral pain suffered during the disease and the temporary impairment (STJ 17 June 2004). Compensation for disfigurement is granted independently of whether the victim has to reckon with other concrete disadvantages (Álvaro Dias, FS Almeida Costa, 764). Its quantum is influenced by, among other elements, the victim’s job, the intensity and place of the injury, its static or dynamic character and the victim’s age and sex. The loss of amenities of life (dano de afirmação pessoal or dano à vida de relação), consists of the injury to social and relational capacity, to the possibility of living a life to enjoy moments of physical, social and familial pleasure. The loss of the capacity to play football with friends (STJ 22 September 2005) or to lop off grape-vines and breed cattle (STJ 9 December 2004) and the isolation from family during hospitalisation (STJ 9 December 2004) are non-economic losses worthy of compensation. This category also includes the loss of sexual enjoyment (dano sexual), as it implies the limitation or suppression of the sexual function and other handicaps, such as the deterioration of one’s self-image and loss of attractiveness. Also, the abandonment by the spouse, of a man who became impotent after a road traffic accident, yields a cause of action for non-economic damage to the victim (STJ 27 January 2005). The loss of general health and longevity of life involves irreversible damage to health and well-being of the victim and the decrease in life expectancy (STJ 17 June 2004). Finally, pretium juventutis relates to the impairment of the ability to live out one’s youth (STJ 29 May 2003). DUTCH CC art. 6:106(1)(a-c) lists the circumstances under which a party has a claim in non-economic damages. Hereunder falls – in cases of physical injury and harm to general health – physical and mental pain, emotional distress, insomnia, aggravation, anxiety, feelings of inferiority, disfigurement of the body and decreased life expectancy (Schadevergoeding II (-Lindenbergh), art. 6:106, no. 5). It is still the subject of debate,

Article 2:201: Personal injury and consequential loss

60.

61.

62.

whether victims who are unable to realise their situation (because they lie in a coma, for example, or are incapable of comprehension) also have a claim to damages for pain and suffering (see further Lindenbergh loc. cit. no. 10 and Stolker, RM-Themis 1998, 3-29). HR 20 September 2002, NedJur 2002, no. 112 p. 871 refused a cause of action for compensation of non-economic damages for a victim who never wakes from his state of unconsciousness; on the other hand, a short period of consciousness between injury and death is sufficient to found a cause of action and where a victim, who lies in a coma for a long time, later regains consciousness, his or her compensation is back-dated for that time (HR 20 September 2002 loc. cit.; Vranken, NedJur 2004, no. 112 p. 891). ESTONIAN LOA § 130(2) avoids an exact classification of individual non-economic damages: “In the case of an obligation to compensate for damage arising from harm to one’s physical or general health, the obligated person shall pay the aggrieved person a reasonable amount of money as compensation for incorporeal damage caused to the person by such damage or injury.” LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.250(2) safeguards the compensability of non-pecuniary damages in the case of harm to one’s physical or general health. CC art. 6.250(1) specifies that “non-pecuniary damage shall be deemed to be a person’s suffering, emotional experiences, inconveniences, mental shock, emotional depression, humiliation, deterioration of reputation, diminution of possibilities to associate with others, etc., evaluated by a court in monetary terms”. According to the SWEDISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 1 no. 3 a cause of action exists for reparation of (temporary) pain and affliction (sveda och värk), for permanent disabilities (lyte eller annat stadigvarande men) and also as an exception for other particular impediments of a non-pecuniary nature (särskilda olägenheter) (Sandstedt, VersRAI 2002, 9, 11). DANISH Damages Liability Act § 3 regulates the compensation for pain and affliction in the case of illness (svie og smerte), and § 4 the non-economic compensation for permanent disabilities (varigt mén). FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 2 nos. 3-4 in conjunction with chap. 5 § 2c deals again with the compensation for pain and affliction as well as for permanent disabilities (see further Sisula-Tulokas, JFT 2000, 634-651). In SCOTLAND the injured person can recover solatium (described by Lord President Clyde in Duffy v. Kinneil Cannel & Coking Co. Ltd. 1930 SC 596, 597 as “properly mean[ing] reparation for the pain and suffering inflicted on anyone in consequence of the commission of a delict against him”). Solatium may be divided up into three main segments: (i) pain and suffering; (ii) loss of faculties and amenities; and (iii) shortened expectation of life (Dalgleish v. Glasgow Corp. 1976 SC 32, 53; Scottish Law Commission Report on the Effect of Death on Damages (Scot.Law Com. no. 134) (Cm 1848 [1992] para. 2.3). A person in a coma or persistent vegetative state presumably suffers no pain, so no award under this head is appropriate (Dalgleish v. Glasgow Corporation loc. cit.). Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 s. 9A allows loss of expectation of life to be taken into account in awarding solatium. The claimant’s right to damages by way of solatium for a shortened expectation of life depends on whether or not he is aware that his expectation of life has been reduced (Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland11, para. 34.15). The courts will generally take a broad brush approach to questions of quantification (Stewart, Delict3, para. 12.15). Courts are assisted by awards in clearly similar cases but obviously every case has its own peculiarities (Barker v. Murdoch 1979 SLT 145; Bowers v. Strathclyde Regional Council 1981 SLT 122). Jury cases are becoming more common, which inevitably results in increased awards.

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63.

64.

In IRELAND there are two main heads of non-pecuniary loss: (i) pain and suffering; and (ii) loss of expectation of life. A plaintiff may recover damages (for future as well as for present and past) suffering not only as a direct result of the injury but also for the pain and suffering that may accompany or result from a reasonably necessary medical operation (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 44.144). In Lee v. Joyce, SC 3 December 1964, unreported, Lavery J. concluded that it was impossible to explain “on any logical or mathematical basis”, the translation of suffering into terms of money – the judge or a jury could only express a personal (and thereby subjective) view as to what was fair compensation. In Sinnott v. Quinnsworth Ltd. [1984] ILRM 523), the Supreme Court introduced a rough tariff in relation to damages for pain and suffering. O’Higgins C. J. noted that “unless there are particular circumstances which suggest otherwise, general damages ... should not exceed a sum in the region of contemporary standards and money value”. In other decisions, the court has regarded damages under this limb as another piece of the broader jigsaw that represents the total sum of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff in light of an intuitive “feel” for what is fair and proportionate compensation for the plaintiff (Reddy v. Bates [1983] IR 141, Burke v. Blanch, HC 28 July 1989, unreported; Kealy v. Minister for Health, HC 19 April 1999, unreported [Morris P]). The apparent cap of IR£ 150,000 [EUR 190,500] that was placed on damages in the Sinnott case has since been overhauled, in order to maintain comparability with the status quo (Connolly v. Bus Éireann, HC 29 January 1996, unreported (Barr J.); Coppinger v. Waterford County Council, DPIJ: Hilary & Easter Terms 1996, p. 1; Kealy v. Minister for Health, HC 19 April 1999, unreported [Morris P]; McEneaney McEneaney v. Monaghan County Council [2001] IEHC 114). Where a plaintiff accommodates himself particularly well to his plight, he will have his damages reduced (Prendergast v. Joe Malone Self Drive Ltd., SC 21 June 1967, unreported; O’Toole v. Kearns, SC 31 July 1957, unreported). The Courts have tended to regard facial injuries as being of more importance for women than for men (Prendergast v. Joe Malone Self Drive Ltd., SC 21 June 1967, unreported; Foley v. Thermocement Products Ltd. (1954) 90 ILTR 92 at 94 [SC]; Ronayne v. Ronayne [1970] IR 15 at 22 [SC]). The social standing of the plaintiff has also been considered relevant (Ronayne v. Ronayne [1970] IR 15 at 22 [SC]). In Cooke v. Walsh [1984] ILRM 208 [SC], the majority of the Supreme Court agreed that the amount to be awarded for general damages should be “moderate” on account of the plaintiff’s lack of awareness or appreciation of his condition because he had been “spared the considerable mental suffering which would follow from knowledge or appreciation of the virtual destruction of his life.” See also Dunne v. National Maternity Hospital [1989] IR 91. Where a cause of action survives for the benefit of the estate of a deceased person, the damages recoverable for the benefit of his estate are not to include damages “for loss or diminution of expectation of life or happiness” (Civil Liability Act 1961, s. 7(2)). Thus, recovery here is limited to cases where the victim is still alive but his or her expectation of life has been reduced. It seems that the position today is that damages may be recovered under this head, but that they should be moderate (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para. 44.197). For an analysis of the wide discrepancies in the sums of compensation awarded by courts for non-economic damages see von Bar, FS Deutsch (1999), 27-43.

Illustration 2 is taken from BGH 14 June 2005, BGHZ 163, 209; illustration 3 from STJ 5 March 1969, BolMinJus 185 (1969) 171.

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Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death (1) Non-economic loss caused to a natural person as a result of another’s personal injury or death is legally relevant damage if at the time of injury that person is in a particularly close personal relationship to the injured person. (2) Where a person has been fatally injured: (a) legally relevant damage caused to the deceased on account of the injury to the time of death becomes legally relevant damage to the deceased’s successors; (b) reasonable funeral expenses are legally relevant damage to the person incurring them; and (c) loss of maintenance is legally relevant damage to a natural person whom the deceased maintained or, had death not occurred, would have maintained under statutory provisions or to whom the deceased provided care and financial support.

Comments A.

General

1. Overview. This Article concerns a segment of the question which losses suffered by third parties as a result of the injury or death of another constitute for them legally relevant damage. The Article is concerned with the claims of close relatives and other persons who were particularly close to the injured person or, as the case may be, the deceased. 2. Persons not covered. Others having a relationship to the deceased (e. g. employers or employees, partners in a firm, etc.) may also be adversely affected by the death of the injured person and likewise suffer consequential damage. Whether or not such persons, in given circumstances, can have any claim against the injuring person will depend on the application of the residual rule on damage under Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) paragraph (1)(b) and (c). It follows, however, by inference from the text of this provision that persons who were connected with the injured person only in a business sense and not in a personal sense will only suffer a legally relevant damage in highly exceptionally circumstances. It is conceivable that they might be given a claim in cases of intentional killing with the aim of causing loss to the third party. The claim for labour or services which the employer had in relation to the party killed who was obliged to provide that service or those services does not amount to a “right” within the meaning of Article 2:101(1)(b). It therefore depends on the circumstances listed in Article 2:101(1) (c) whether or not the employer or business partner is injured in respect of an “interest worthy of legal protection”. Illustration 1 A, one half of a couple of professional figure skaters, is injured in a road accident caused by C’s negligence. Because of the severity of his injuries, A is unable to skate for a while and consequently his skating partner B is unable to pursue her profession 389

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too. B has no claim under paragraph (1) to compensation for non-economic loss unless she was tied to B in a more than merely professional capacity on the basis of a particularly close personal relationship (as his spouse or cohabiting partner). Although it can be accepted that A and B are jointly exercising a profession or pursuing a trade within the meaning of Article 2:208 (Loss upon unlawful impairment of business), a deliberate interference in the profession or trade is missing. A legally relevant damage can therefore only be made out within the scope of Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage). However, after consideration of all the circumstances, such an application of that provision to that effect must be rejected. 3. Non-economic losses. It follows ultimately from Article 2:202(1) that third parties who are not referred to here do not have a claim to compensation for possible noneconomic losses. Their opportunities to recover compensation are confined to economic losses (if any). 4. Structure and organisation of the rules. Paragraph (1) relates to non-economic losses of dependants arising out of the injury or death of a closely connected person. Looked at from a systematic point of view, this is an exception to paragraph (2)(b) of Article 2:201 (Personal injury and consequential loss): paragraph (1) in substance states that in the cases which it addresses nothing turns on the fact that the affected persons have not in fact suffered a damage to their psychological health which “amounts to a medical condition”. Paragraph (2) in contrast relates only to those cases in which someone has been killed. The provision makes clear that (a) a legally relevant damage which the deceased suffered continues after the death to be one for which compensation is due, the entitlement to compensation passing to the heirs or representatives, (b) the reasonable costs of a funeral are a damage for which compensation is due, and (c) the survivors left behind by the deceased have a claim to reparation in respect of the maintenance foregone by them as a result of the death of their maintenance provider. Paragraph (1) concerns non-economic loss; paragraph (2)(a) relates to both economic and non-economic loss; and paragraphs (2)(b) and (c) are concerned only with economic loss.

B.

Non-economic loss of close relations in cases of personal injury and death (paragraph (1))

5. Relation to Article 2:201(2)(b) (Personal injury and consequential loss). As already stated, paragraph (1) provides persons who are particularly close to the injured or deceased person with a claim for compensation for their non-economic damage. This claim will exist even though the conditions of paragraph (2)(b) of Article 2:201 (Personal injury and consequential loss) are not satisfied: Persons who are particularly close to the severely or fatally injured victim are also to be compensated for their mental suffering, even though their suffering may not amount to a medical condition. 6. Policy consideration. Paragraph (1) consciously exceeds the present legal position in certain European jurisdictions. It would be a value judgement which nowadays is no longer acceptable if a damage of the significance described in paragraph (1) were not to 390

Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of

qualify as legally relevant damage. The emptiness which a person feels when a life partner, a child or a parent is killed or severely injured need not be suffered without reparation, though the parties concerned do not suffer injury to their health. Should they in fact suffer such damage, then two bases of claim are available to them. The judge must express the entire damage in terms of one sum – as a rule a lump sum (see further Article 6:203 (Capitalisation and quantification) paragraph (1)). The rule in paragraph (1) reflects the legal position in what is by far the predominant majority of the Member States. However, this rule would be misunderstood if it were interpreted as (and criticised for) “commercialising death”. That is certainly not the case. The reason is that this rule is concerned not with enriching the relatives, but with recognising that the severest of detrimental impacts on one’s enjoyment of life is worthy of reparation. 7. The circle of persons affected. Included are persons who stand in a particularly close personal relationship either formally in law (spouse, children, parents) or de facto (cohabiting partner, step-parents). A mere friendship or a close professional or business relationship, on the other hand, is not sufficient. Such persons might exceptionally have a claim for reparation of their economic loss if the conditions of Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) are met, but they do not acquire a claim to reparation of their non-economic loss. 8. Claim by third parties for loss of maintenance in case of death only. In contrast to the rule applicable when the injured person dies (cf. Article 2:202(2)(c)), a person who was being maintained by the injured person, before the latter sustained the injury, will have no claim against the injuring person for any consequential loss of maintenance during the life of the injured person. A third party might suffer a loss of maintenance because, for example, incapacity to work has deprived the injured person of the means to earn the income out of which the injured person would otherwise have paid maintenance to the third party. However, until the death of the injured person, this expectation loss does not constitute legally relevant damage to the third party. The injured person will have a claim for loss of income (or consequential loss in general) under Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) paragraph (4)(a), so that, even though not put in funds for some time to come, the injured person nonetheless has a legal entitlement to income out of which maintenance might be paid. That right might be either enforced or else partially disposed of in favour of the third party in lieu of maintenance. Any loss of maintenance during the life of the injured person is thus to be attributed to the decision of the injured person. This result – which emerges directly from a comparison of the various provisions on injury to body or health on the one hand and those applicable in case of death on the other – may not and cannot be circumvented by invoking the assistance of Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage).

C.

Loss suffered as a result of another’s death (paragraph (2))

9. Death as such not legally relevant damage. Paragraph (2) introduces additional rules for the case where a personal injury has led to the death of the victim (whether immediately or only after the lapse of some period of time). The rules of Article 2:201 (Personal injury and consequential loss) and potentially also Article 2:101 (Meaning of 391

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legally relevant damage) paragraph (1)(b) and (c) remain applicable. The provision proceeds from the principle that death as such does not constitute legally relevant damage within the meaning of non-contractual liability law. The deceased has no claim which can be asserted on account of the death as such, and the loss of life as such has no value quantifiable in monetary terms which can be assigned by the system of private law to heirs or successors.

D.

The claim of the deceased’s successors (paragraph (2)(a))

10. Succession to subsisting claims of the deceased to reparation. Sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph (2) makes it clear that the deceased’s successors (by which is to be understood the heirs or personal representatives, depending on what is determined by the law of succession) inherit all the rights (but only those rights) which the deceased would have been able to exercise while alive. Rights to compensation for economic damage belong in this category as much as rights to compensation for non-economic damage. Moreover, claims for compensation for non-economic damage or for anatomical damage are also generally capable of transmitting on death (a question which must be answered in the law on non-contractual liability) and that is so independently of whether the deceased while alive asserted these claims in or outside of the courts. However, had the deceased made it known that no claim would be made for compensation for non-economic damage, the deceased would in that case have waived this claim. Consequently the claim will not pass as part of the estate. The situation would be the same in a case of economic loss. 11. The limits of the claim. Sub-paragraph (a), however, contains a further limitation. Only those rights which the deceased had acquired during life pass to the successors. If death occurs instantaneously (without an intermediate period of suffering), then neither a claim for compensation for non-economic damage nor a claim for compensation for anatomical damage existed. The same holds for patrimonial losses. Illustration 2 If the injured person while alive had received a complete settlement (as a lump sum) for future loss of income, this sum remains part of the inherited estate. (The situation is the same if, in the lifetime of the deceased, a lump sum settlement was reached but not paid or judgment was given.) In contrast, if the claim has been settled on the basis of monthly compensatory payments during the lifetime of the deceased, the claim will expire at the end of the month in which the deceased dies. Illustration 3 If the deceased took to the grave some secret (such as a code word for a computer program which was only known to the deceased), the successors will receive no compensation at all. Only exceptionally will the result be different under the rule in Article 2:101(1)(b)-(c) – in particular in the case of an intentional killing.

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E.

Funeral expenses (paragraph (2)(b))

12. Funeral costs constitute legally relevant damage. In some countries there exists a dispute of legal theory about whether funeral costs can be compensated (because they would have to be incurred anyway at some time), but the legal position today is unequivocal: funeral costs must be compensated everywhere. Sub-paragraph (b) sticks to this principle. The only problem is to determine the amount of compensation and the person entitled to claim it. 13. Reasonable funeral expenses. As regards the amount, the text states only that the costs must be “reasonable”; an express reference to the living standards of the deceased seemed not to be appropriate. The expression “funeral costs” is broader than the expression ‘burial costs’. The former includes, for example, the costs of transporting the body from the place of death to the place of burial. The costs of caring for a grave, however, do not come within funeral costs. 14. Persons entitled to claim funeral expenses. Sub-paragraph (b) only states that a person is entitled to compensation if that person has paid for the costs of the funeral. A more detailed regulation is excluded for a number of reasons. One of these is the fact that the national laws of succession are not harmonised and therefore it cannot be said for the purposes of the law on non-contractual liability who is obliged under those laws to arrange the funeral. On the other hand, of course, the person who is obliged under the law of succession or by other legal provisions to organise the burial had “reasonable funeral costs”. It is even possible, depending on the particular circumstances of a country, that a moral obligation to organise the burial may suffice. However, an insurer who takes care of the funeral “in natura” will not be able to claim on the basis of this Article. Ultimately it is the criterion of “reasonableness” which determines who can assert a claim to compensation for funeral costs.

F.

Loss of maintenance (paragraph (2)(c))

15. Loss of breadwinner. Unlike the case where the injured person does not die (or has not yet died) as a result of the injury, Article 2:202(2)(c) gives a direct claim against the injuring person to certain classes of persons who suffer a consequential loss of maintenance. As already explained in Comment B8, such a claim is inappropriate if the injured person has not died. Moreover, even if the injured person subsequently dies, a third party whom the injured person had previously maintained will not acquire a claim for loss of maintenance in the period between the victim’s incapacity through injury and his or her later death. The injured person’s right to reparation for loss of earnings (out of which maintenance might have been paid, if damages had been recovered) is not extinguished by death and will pass to the successors. However, the death of the injured person does create a material difference in the legal position of the injured person and alimentary creditors in respect of maintenance foregone after death. The deceased’s successors have no claim to the loss of income which the deceased might have earned after the time of death, had there been no injury. Consequently, there is no person entitled as against the injuring person to the income out of which maintenance might have been paid after the 393

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injured person’s death. The loss of maintenance suffered by certain classes of affected persons therefore becomes a legally relevant damage. 16. Persons entitled to compensation. Entitled to compensation are primarily those to whom the deceased according to legal rules (in family law) was obliged to pay maintenance. Additionally the proposed text provides for an extension of the entitlement to compensation to those who were dependent on the deceased as their Versorger (provider). The expression Versorger is easily understood in, for example, German and Swedish legal discourse. An example of a Versorger is the breadwinner who provides for a life partner within a stable relationship, but the term also includes, for example, a step-father in relation to a step-child within the family. The English circumlocution “provided care and financial support” is intended to express the requirement of just such a personal Versorger relationship. 17. “Statutory provisions”. These rules do not determine what is to be understood as coming within the notion of “statutory provisions”. This question must instead be decided on the basis of the applicable national law concerned. See Article 7:102 (Statutory provisions). 18. Time limits. The right to reparation for lost maintenance is not of course without any kind of restriction in time. It is limited to the extent that the loss of maintenance was in fact caused by the injuring person. The relevant period of time is thus that in which the deceased would probably have maintained the surviving claimants. That period of time must be estimated, based on the probable life expectancy of the deceased had the fatal accident not occurred and, in respect of children, by considering the period during which they would have had a right to maintenance from the deceased.

Notes I.

No civil liability for death as such

1.

A person cannot mount a personal cause of action for loss of his or her own life. While GERMAN CC § 823(1) and ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(1)(i) seem to be formulated otherwise, they cannot alter the fact that the “right to life” extinguishes when it is violated (see further von Bar, FS Sturm, 1151-1163). The consequences affect third parties, not the bearer of the right him/herself. For the most part, the death of a person as such does not trigger a corresponding obligation to pay damages. In this way, as far as the deceased is concerned, death as such does not constitute legally relevant damage (see for BELGIUM Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2), no. 107 p. 205 and for HUNGARY Petrik (-Petrik), Polgári jog I2, 178, 204, 213). In the context of ITALIAN law, death as such does not amount to danno biologico either (Cass. 23 May 2003, no. 8204, Giust.civ.Mass. 2003, fasc. 5). Separate from one’s health, one’s life is a stand-alone interest worthy of legal protection, protected only by the criminal law (Cass.sez.pen. 30 January 2003, no. 7632, Riv.it.med.leg. 2003, 694; Cass. 16 May 2003, no. 7632, Foro it. 2003, I, 2681). In this regard it is also stated in AUSTRIA that claims arising out of CC § 1327 (lost mainte-

2.

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Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of

3.

nance) constitute original and personal claims of the surviving parties, and not of the deceased him/herself (OGH 17 October 1963, SZ 36/133). Other than for funeral expenses, no liability accrues de lege lata for the death of a person who was not obliged to support another (Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VII2, § 1327 no. 1), not even for nonpecuniary loss due to the untimely death of the deceased (OGH 1 March 2005, RdW 2005, 289). The same view is taken in the Netherlands (Schadevergoeding II (-Lindenberg), art. 108, no. 17) and in SPAIN. Despite scholarly criticism, which is not to be completely disregarded (Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 377; Lacruz Berdejo, Elementos II(2)4, 485; Vicente Domingo, Los daños corporales, 241) the case law in this jurisdiction likewise denies that loss of life constitutes damage for the victim, which might generate a claim transferable mortis causa and actionable iuris hereditatis by the survivors (TS 20 December 1930, RAJ 1930-31 (1) no. 1365 p. 538; TS 25 February 1963, RAJ 1963 (1) no. 1187 p. 734; TS 9 June 1969, RAJ 1969 (2) no. 3353 p. 2275; TS 24 November 1970, RAJ 1970 (2) no. 4889 p. 3345; TS 1 July 1981, RAJ 1981 (2) no. 3037 p. 2495; TS 18 May 1999, RAJ 1999 (2) no. 4112 p. 6346 and often recurs). The criminal division of the Tribunal Supremo, which had originally taken a different view (TS 30 November 1932, RAJ 1932-33 (2) no. 2178 p. 857; TS 12 November 1957, RAJ 1957 no. 2969 p. 1987) has for some time now followed suit from the case law of the civil division (e. g. TS 20 October 1986, RAJ 1986 (4) no. 5702 p. 5579). In ENGLAND too the Common Law has articulated the rule that death is not an actionable injury (Baker v. Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 493, 170 ER 1033). However, in PORTUGAL the case law maintains that indeed loss of life itself amounts to damage capable of monetary valuation payable to the survivors. The claim is treated as the deceased’s claim for pain and suffering, which then passes under the law of succession and is included in the personal economic and non-economic claims of the surviving parties (CA Oporto 13 April 1989, CJ XIV (1989-2) 221). The loss of life has been recently evaluated at approx. J 40,000 (STJ 16 June 2005; the older methods of calculating damages are seen in CA Lisbon 25 January 1994, CJ XIX (1994-1) 151). The Portuguese Ombudsman, however, has recommended that compensation should always be 10,000,000 escudos (approximately J 50,000) (Critérios apresentados pelo Provedor de Justiça para indemnização dos danos causados pela derrocada da ponte de Entre-osRios, http://www.provedor-jus.pt/restrito/rec_ficheiros/Ponte_Entre-Rios.pdf, p. 14), with the non-economic damage suffered by the victim also included in this amount. If a foetus is killed in utero, the mother is entitled to a claim due to her own losses; the loss of life of the foetus is not compensated, however, because it is not yet afforded the enititlements of a human person (STJ 23 May 1985, BolMinJus 347 (1985) 398).

II.

Recoverability of non-economic damage to relatives in the case of death or injury to the primary victim

4.

Where a person is severely injured or killed, the question of whether and under what circumstances his or her relatives are entitled to the reparation of their non-economic loss still yields quite different answers in the various European legal systems (for up-todate comparisons see also Janssen, ZRP 2003, 156-159 and Wagner, JZ 2004, 319-331). In Resolution (75)7 of 14 March 1975, the Council of Europe expressed the opinion that in cases of injury to the body, damages for pain and suffering endured by relatives should only be considered for parents or spouses, and even then only “if the suffering is of an

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5.

6.

7.

396

exceptional nature” (no. 2.10). It seems that more generous practices of compensation – even for the benefit of fiancé(e)s – have been supported in the case of death; however, damages will only be granted where the surviving parties in question “have maintained close bonds of affection with the victim at the time of his death” (no. 3.6). FRENCH law recognises that as a result of the victim’s injury, persons who are closely connected to the victim may suffer their own préjudice moral within the scope of recoverable non-economic damages. The sole prerequisite is that personal, proximate and fixed damages are incurred (the seminal decision of Cass.civ. 23 May 1977, Bull.civ. 1977, II, no. 139 p. 96). It is not necessary that the primary victim has suffered particularly severe injuries (Cass.civ. 23 May 1977 loc. cit.); neither does it depend on proof of any particular family relationship – purely “the genuineness of the suffering counts” (Bourrié-Quenillet, JCP éd. G 1998, I, no. 186, 14). The decision as to who is entitled to claim under this criterion is made by the courts charged with establishing the facts. Individual cases may not only concern surviving spouses, non-marital life partners, parents, children, grandparents and siblings, but also parents-in-law, nephews, nieces, uncles and aunts, e. g. where the latter have brought up the child who has been killed or an otherwise significant emotional relationship with the primary victim exists. According to statistics, on average, 2.6 close relatives are compensated in cases of injury to body and even 5.0 in cases of death (Bourrié-Quenillet, JCP éd. G 2004, I, no. 136, 35). Also, where the parents raise a child who is born disabled owing to an accident during the pregnancy, non-economic damage suffered by the parents is recognised (Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité2, no. 249-3 p. 13). So too under BELGIAN law, loss sustained due to the sight of a loved one’s suffering or owing to a fear of their condition deteriorating, is recoverable. The case law is more conservative than in France, however, and a claim will only usually be granted where the primary victim suffers serious and permanent injuries (Schuermans/Van Oevelen/ Persyn/Ernst/Schuermans, TPR 1994, 851-1430 [no. 35]). Proof of strong mutual affection between the primary victim and the injured third party is decisive here. Where a death occurs, such persons, who did not live with the deceased, may be entitled to a claim for the recovery of their non-economic harm; however, the level of their claim is normally lower than that of someone who lived with the primary victim in the one household (e. g. Indicatieve Tabel 1 May 2004, NjW 2004, annex to issue no. 72, no. 53: J 7,500 where the parents lived with the deceased child, otherwise J 3,750). In cases where death has occurred, MALTESE CC art. 1046 leaves it to the discretion of the court to grant compensation for the non-economic losses of the deceased’s heirs. SPANISH case law recognises the recoverability of non-economic damage to relatives in the case of death or serious injury to the primary victim, as long as the relatives’ losses are certain and have been evidenced. A fiancé(e) (TS 12 February 2003, RAJ 2003 (2) no. 2491 p. 4590 [posttraumatic stress disorder of a fiancée who had to witness the accidental death of her fiancé]) or the deceased’s homosexual partner (CA Sevilla (Criminal Division) 6 September 2004, RAJ (TSJ y AP) 2004 (3) no. 480 p. 776) may also qualify as a “relative” in this sense. The basis for the claim is either CC art. 1902 or, in the case of a criminal offence, CP art. 113 (“Compensation for economic and noneconomic detriment not only encompasses that incurred by the injured party, but also that inflicted upon his or her family members or upon third parties”). What is at stake here, is the survivors’ own personal claim, not a right reserved to them by virtue of its transmission from the deceased (TS 20 December 1930, RAJ 1930-31 no. 1365 p. 538;

Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of

8.

9.

TS 1 July 1981, RAJ 1981 (2) no. 3037 p. 2495; TS 4 May 1983, RAJ 1983 (2) no. 2622 p. 1975; TS 19 December 1986, RAJ 1986 (5) no. 7682 p. 7462; TS 31 December 1986, RAJ 1986 (5) no. 7881 p. 7682; TS 14 December 1996, RAJ 1996 (5) no. 8970 p. 12478; TS 24 November 1998, RAJ 1998 (5) no. 9694 p. 14172). For its part, the survivors’ claim may be inherited (TS 19 June 2003, RAJ 2003 (3) no. 4244 p. 7941). Table of Damages I and II of the Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act expressly provide for the reparation of consequential damages sustained by close relatives of the deceased or injured victim of a traffic accident. Likewise, the Tribunal Supremo has confirmed on numerous occasions that such a claim also arises in the case of severe injuries to the primary victim’s body and health, e. g. in favour of his or her parents (TS 23 February 1988, RAJ 1988 (1) no. 1451 p. 1389; TS 25 April 1989, RAJ 1989 (3) no. 3471 p. 3921; TS 23 April 1992, RAJ 1992 (2) no. 3323 p. 4388; TS 15 October 1996, RAJ 1996 (4) no. 7110 p. 9586) or his or her spouse (TS 9 February 1988, RAJ 1988 (1) no. 771 p. 752). CA Ciudad Real 14 September 2000 (cited under Vicente Domingo, El daño, 258) indicates, however, that the consequential damage of third parties resulting solely from the injury of the primary victim must be extraordinarily severe and must exceed what one must normally endure when a loved one is injured. Cass. 31 May 2003, no. 8828, Foro it. 2003, I, 2272 has clarified the position in ITALIAN law, stating that close relatives of a deceased party have a claim to reparation of their non-economic losses under CC art. 2059, even where the requirements of CP art. 185 (criminal offence) are not fulfilled. Interpreting CC art. 2059 in conformance with the Constitution, relatives have a claim to the recovery of their danno biologico (see above Corte Cost. 27 October 1994, no. 372, Foro it. 1994, I, 3297; Cass. 25 February 2000, no. 2134, Riv.it.med.leg. 2001, 1135; Cass. 25 January 2002, no. 881, Danno e resp. 2002, 747 and Cass. 13 February 2002, no. 2082, Giust.civ.Mass. 2002, 235), their danno morale and their danno da lesione del rapporto parentale, i. e. damage arising from the harm to their family relationship. Cass. 31 May 2003, no. 8827, Foro it. 2003, I, 2273 extended this principle in favour of a mother who had given birth to a severely impaired child due to a medical error. Corte Cost. 11 July 2003, no. 233, Giur.it. 2004, 1129 approved this decision in obiter dictum. Already there seems to be a wealth of case law for the compensation of non-economic losses suffered by relatives, certainly in the case of death (Cass. 19 August 2003, no. 12124, Giur.it. 2004, 1129) and also in the case of the birth of a severely impaired child (Cass. 22 July 2004, no. 13634, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, 7-8). Where the primary injured party dies as a result of his or her injuries, but lives for a short period after the injury (a few hours suffice: Cass. 2 April 2001, no. 4783, Danno e resp. 2001, 820; Cass. 16 June 2003, no. 9620, Giust.civ.Mass. 2003, fasc. 6), his or her biological damage may be claimed iure hereditatis by his or her survivors. Under HUNGARIAN law also, the claim to recovery of non-economic damages is not restricted to the primary victim (BH 2006/15; see in more detail Lábady, A nem vagyoni kártérítés újabb bírói gyakorlata, 68-70, 213, 247). So, for example, in the case of a severely injured son, BH 2001/15 granted the parents damages for their non-economic loss, justified on the grounds that they had to give up their normal lives and jobs in order to care for their son. Where the primary victim dies, a distinction is to be drawn. The mere fact that someone becomes a widow(er) or orphan or otherwise loses a relative, is not yet accepted as sufficient grounds for non-economic damages; pain and suffering alone do not suffice (Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1330; Petrik (-Petrik), Polgári jog I2, 207-208; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 260-265). In fact, proof of

397

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

10.

11.

398

actual adverse effects and aggravation to the secondary victim’s life is necessary. This is so, e. g. where a widow suffers a mental illness requiring medical treatment as a consequence of the accidental death of her husband (Gellért (-Benedek) loc. cit. 1336-1338) or where the parents of a child who has been killed (BH 2001/14) or a child whose parents have been killed (BH 1992/529) sustain particular detriment by other means. The courts draw on the intensity of the pain or dolour for the detriment actually suffered. Sometimes the right to family life is also qualified as the infringed interest worthy of legal protection in question, which can be of heightened importance if, for example, the case concerns an infant who is incapable of feeling sorrow for the loss of his or her parents (see further Petrik loc. cit. 208/1-208/5). For cases involving death POLISH CC art. 446 § 3 merely provides that the court may award an appropriate indemnity to the closest members of the family of the deceased person if his death resulted in a considerable deterioriation of their standard of living. Traditionally, the provision is interpreted quite narrowly; it is regarded as an exception to the general rule that parties who are harmed indirectly are not entitled to claim compensation (Supreme Court 17 April 2001, Orzecznictwo Sa˛du Najwyz˙szego, Izba Cywilna 2001, no 11 p. 161). CZECH and SLOVAKIAN CC’s do not provide for the recovery of non-economic damage to relatives. In contrast, the detailed rules of SLOVENIAN LOA §§ 179 and 180 follow the modern European trend. Married couples, children and parents have a claim to the compensation of their mental suffering as a result of the death or serious injury of their family members (LOA § 180(1) and (2)). In addition, partners of a long-term non-marital cohabiting relationship are entitled to claim (LOA § 180(3)). ROMANIAN law recognises a claim on behalf of close relatives to recover compensation for grief (Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘, 262-263; Adam, Drept civil, 260; Dogaru and Dra˘ghici, Drept civil, 213). It is intended to codify this approach in the proposed Draft CC art. 1131 (Proiectul Noului Cod civil, 222). GERMAN law is markedly more restrictive. Damages for relatives’ pain and suffering only comes into play here under the requirement that the relevant party suffered personal damage to his or her health as a result of being informed of the death or serious physical injury of someone close to him or her (CC §§ 253(2), 823(1); see Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB65, § 253, no. 12; Staudinger (-Schiemann), BGB [2005], § 249, no. 44). For example, compensation was granted to children whose mother had been killed in front of them (CA Nürnberg 27 February 1998, NJW 1998, 2293), children whose mother died due to an error in medical treatment (CA Frankfurt/M. 15 December 1998, FamRZ 1999, 1064), parents and siblings of an infant who drowned in a public swimming pool (CA Koblenz 22 November 2000, NJW-RR 2001, 318) and to a father who suffered nervous shock as a consequence of the death of his daughter (CA Oldenburg 1 December 1998, NJW-RR 1999, 820). The constant prerequisite is that the surviving family member’s impairment of health is medically ascertainable, as well as clearly exceeding the type and severity of adverse effects ordinarily sustained by loved ones in their capacity as indirectly affected parties in these types of cases (judged on empirical evidence) (BGH 11 May 1971, NJW 1971, 1883; BGH 4 April 1989, NJW 1989, 2317). CA Naumburg 7 March 2005, NJW-RR 2005, 900 accordingly held as insufficient the claim in damages for pain and suffering of a mother who, after experiencing the serious injuries of her brutally abused son – the son having died in the hospital 36 hours later – was rendered helpless as against them and had not yet mentally come to terms with his senseless killing. In addition, the shock must be understandable, taking into account its

Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of

12.

13.

14.

cause. This applies to death and serious injury, if the relative has not personally witnessed the incident but ‘only’ been informed of it (BGH 5 February 1985, NJW 1985, 1390). Along with the close relatives defined under family law (BGH 31 January 1984, NJW 1984, 1405) faince(e)s and cohabitees are also protected (CFI Frankfurt/M. 28 March 1969, NJW 1969, 2286; MünchKomm (-Oetker), BGB4, § 249, no. 147). According to recent AUSTRIAN case law, “damages for pain and suffering caused to relatives” are granted, where as a consequence of the death or serious injury of the primary victim, close relatives suffer adverse psychological effects of a medically diagnosable character (CC § 1325, see to this OGH 16 June 1994, ZVR 1995/46; OGH 29 August 2002, JBl 2003, 118 = ZVR 2002, 388, note Karner; OGH 12 June 2003, JBl 2004, 111). If “only” mental suffering in involved, which does not amount to a medically diagnosable illness, since OGH 16 May 2001, SZ 74/90, the granting of nonpecuniary damages has three requirements: (i) the primary victim’s injury must have been caused by the gross fault of the defendant (intention or gross negligence, see Schobel, RdW 2002, 206-209), (ii) the person affected must be a close relative of the primary victim and (iii) there must have been a close personal relationship between the parties in question. These are rebuttably presumed in the case of parents and children, and spouses and partners, but in all other cases they must be proven (OGH 1 July 2004, ZVR 2004, 294; OGH 21 April 2005, ZVR 2005/73). Damages for the pain of bereavement were denied in the case of a seven month old infant following the death of its grandfather (OGH 12 May 2005, ZVR 2005/88). In contrast, such damages were granted to siblings, who had had a particular close emotional bond with the victim (OGH 21 April 2005 loc. cit.; OGH 23 May 2005, ZVR 2005/89). In addition, damages for pain and suffering occasioned to relatives may be awarded even where the case is not one of death, but of a particularly severe injury to the body or health of the primary victim (OGH 12 June 2006, ZVR 2006/178 p. 458 [where, however, the claim was dismissed]; Rummel (-Reischauer), ABGB II(2b)3 § 1324 no. 1/5b). A similar approach is adopted by the draft new law on damages (Draft CC § 1316(3); Griss, JBl 2005, 273, 282). According to GREEK CC art. 932 third sentence, in cases of death (not of mere injury to body, however) the party’s “family members” have a claim in compensation for adverse psychological effects suffered. The term “family” is broadly interpreted in Greek case law. Non-pecuniary damages have been granted to parents (A. P. 404/1964, NoB 12 [1964] 1000), parents-in-law (CA Athens 4287/1988, EllDik 30 [1988] 1464) and spouses living apart (CA Athens 5805/1991, EllDik 33 [1992] 1495). According to more recent case law, the family extends principally to the parents, children, siblings and halfsiblings, spouse, relations in the direct line, and parents-in-law and children-in-law (A. P. 795/2004, NoB 53 [2005] 1414; A. P. 924/2004, EEN 2005, 34), but not unmarried co-habiting partners (A. P. 434/2005, EEN 2005, 676). For a more detailed account of this issue, see Karakostas, ZEuP 2005, 107. PORTUGAL distinguishes between non-economic damage caused to relatives consequent upon death and consequent upon injury to body. CC art. 496(2) grants compensation for non-economic damage to surviving spouses, children and other descendants, parents and other ascendants, siblings as well as nephews and nieces of the deceased, whereby preferential beneficiaries exclude those lower ranked (Abrantes Geraldes, Temas da responsabilidade civil II, 22). Children not yet born at the time of their father’s death are also entitled to claim; they are likewise entitled to a share of the damages granted for the death per se (dano-morte; see above Note I3). Whether non-marital

399

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

15.

16.

400

cohabitees may be included in the list of claimants entitled to reparation is still contentious (affirmatively answered by CA Coimbra 21 February 2003 and – but only where death was intended – TC 19 June 2002, Diário Rep. II Serie de 24 July 2002; answered in the negative by STJ 4 November 2003, CJ(ST) XI (1993) 133). The amount of damages is assessed by the courts according to principles of fairness (Abrantes Geraldes loc. cit. 23). In cases where the primary victim has been “only” injured, and not killed, the CC offers no clear solution. In the case law (STJ 30 April 2003) and scholarly legal writing (for a more detailed discussion see, inter alia, Abrantes Geraldes loc. cit. 36 and 50; Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 621) the existence of a claim in principle has mostly been denied. However, the victim of a traffic accident’s widow (STJ 27 April 2004) and son (STJ 27 February 2003) have been granted non-pecuniary damages for the injury to their mental health. The courts have even gone so far as to recognise a right of compensation for non-economic loss incurred by virtue of a son’s pain and suffering which resulted from having to witness his mother’s depression (STJ 13 May 2004). Furthermore, damages were granted to a spouse because the primary victim could no longer engage in sexual intercourse due to the accident (STJ 8 March 2005; CA Porto 23 March 2006; but decided otherwise in STJ 26 February 2004). More recent case law also seems to be moving in the direction of basing the claims of a secondary victim on an infringement of the right to protection of the family (STJ 3 June 2004). The result is the extensive erosion of CC art. 496(2), in so far as this provision provides for the award of damages to relatives for pain and suffering only in the case of the primary victim’s death (CA Porto 23 March 2006). Under DUTCH law it was decided by HR 22 February 2002, NedJur 2002 no. 240 p. 1704 (=ERPL 2003, 412 with comparative notes by Zinnen, Pretto, Janssen, MeilhacRedon, Pasa, Ebers, Arroyo i Amayuelas and Michalowska) that while medically diagnosable harm to mental health inflicted on a mother, which was suffered following the death of her child, was recoverable, damages purely for injured emotions were not. The case law is very restrictive. It requires that the secondary victim: (i) was a witness to the accident or its consequences; (ii) that he had a close affectionate relationship with the primary victim; (iii) that the accident was attributable to the defendant’s wrongdoing; and (iv) that the accident caused the secondary victim to suffer from a disease pattern recognised by psychiatric science (van Dam, Smartengeld voor affectieschade en shockschade; VR, 2003, 8-12). Additionally, damages for pain and suffering caused to relatives have only thus far been granted in cases where the primary victim has died. If an injury to emotions is intentionally caused, it is recoverable regardless of the presence of an injury to mental health (CC art. 6:106(1)(a); HR 26 October 2001, NedJur 2002 no. 216 p. 1500: death of a child because of revenge against the mother). Whether this (on the whole conservative) attitude to the recoverability of harm to emotions will remain is open, given the current discussion for reform (see the following, taken from parliamentary debates, Kamerstukken II, 2002-2003, 28 781, no. 3 [Memorie van Toelichting] and Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003–2004, 28 781, no. 6). ESTONIAN LOA § 134(3) rules that “in the case of an obligation to compensate for damage arising from the death of a person or a serious bodily injury or health damage caused to the person, the persons close to the deceased or the aggrieved person may also claim compensation for non-economic damage if payment of such compensation is justified by exceptional circumstances”. LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.284(1), second sentence, contains a comparable rule for the benefit of “minor children, spouses, parents

Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of

17.

18.

19.

incapable of work, or other factual dependants incapable of work”. In contrast, the LATVIAN CC has no analogous provision. Since 1 January 2002, SWEDISH EAL chap. 5 § 2 no. 3 provides that damages also fall due for personal injuries that result from the death of someone to whom the applicant was particularly close (for a discussion of the term “close relatives” within the meaning of this provision, see HD 21 April 2005, NJA 2005, 237; see also HD 29 December 2006, NJA 2006, 738 and Sandstedt, VersRAI 2002, 11). In the case law, such “damages for pain and suffering caused to relatives” are granted according to the circumstances of each individual case, even where the primary injured party has not been killed (HD 5 April 2006, NJA 2006, 181; for older case law of the lower courts, see Sandstedt, VersRAI 2003, 43 and 2004, 23). The primary significance of this statutory amendment would lie in the fact that the granting of damages for pain and suffering caused to relatives no longer hinges on the tortfeasor acting intentionally (as in HD 24 February 1993, NJA 1993, 41 I and II) or with gross negligence (as in HD 13 June 1996, NJA 1996, 377) (mere negligence did not suffice: HD 18 October 1999, NJA 1999, 632, note Sandstedt, VersRAI 2002, 11, 14). Under the new law, even strict liability suffices (Sandstedt loc. cit.). However, higher sums are awarded in cases of intentionally caused death or injury than in the context of liability in negligence or absolute liability (HD 4 February 2004, NJA 2004, 26; Sandstedt, VersRAI 2004, 28, 29). HD 17 October 2000, NJA 2000, 521 enunciated a presumption of the presence of non-pecuniary damage caused to relatives (for a critique, see Andersson, JT 2000-01, 897, 902), which expressly endorses the legislature’s motives for the statutory amendment (Prop 2000/01:68 [Ersättning för ideell skada], 35). Following the situation whereby the FINNISH courts were not willing to grant damages for pain and suffering caused to relatives, without first having an express statutory basis (HD 21 October 1991, 1991:146; for a more detailed account, see Sisula-Tulokas, JFT 2000, 634, 641), this basis is now provided by Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 4a. However, the provision requires intention or gross negligence (in contrast to its Swedish counterpart) and is not satisfied with a presumption of non-pecuniary damage, in fact requiring proof of actual suffering from the relatives. DANISH EAL has been supplemented by Law no. 35 of 21 January 2003 on § 26a. Here also, intention and gross negligence have been elevated to the status of being prerequisites of a claim (loc. cit. para. (1)); recoverable suffering is, however, presumed (para. (2); see further Øe and Røn, J 2004, 85). The object of the rule is to compensate for the relatives’ grievance caused by the death, not the compensation of their personal injuries (Øe and Røn loc. cit. 88). ENGLISH law is quite restrictive. In cases of psychiatric injury where the claim is based on negligence but takes the form that it is alleged to have arisen as a result of becoming aware of injuries caused or about to be caused to a third party, there will be no liability at all unless there is in the light of the relationship to the victim of the person suffering the psychiatric injury and the spatial and temporal closeness to the event, and the general nature of it, seen to be a relationship of proximity, such that it is fair and reasonable for a duty of care to be capable of arising (Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310). The same is probably true of cases of psychiatric injury based on such facts where liability is strict, as in a products liability case (The question has never been considered, but arguably follows from the meaning of the word “caused” in Consumer Protection Act 1987 s. 2(1)). In SCOTLAND the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976, s. 1,

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Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

building on established principles of the common law (see Mackintosh v Morrice’s Exrs [2005] CSOH 167 at [9], 2006 SLT 580 at 583) provides that in a case of death in consequence of personal injuries a member of the deceased’s immediate family has a statutory clam to damages from the person responsible for causing the death as compensation for (a) distress and anxiety endured in contemplation of the deceased’s suffering before his death; (b) grief and sorrow caused by the death; and (c) loss of the nonpatrimonial benefit which the relative might have been expected to derive from the deceased’s society and guidance if the deceased had not died: see s. 1 (1) in conjunction with s. 1(4) (as amended by the Damages (Scotland) Act 1993, s. 1(1)). The Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 thus abandoned the traditional general term solatium in favour of a head of “loss of society and guidance” (loc. cit. s. 1(4)), but, other than the amounts becoming somewhat larger, made no substantive change in the factors taken into account. Although specific categories of non-economic loss are enumerated in the Act, the statute directs that, in deciding what sum of damages the court thinks just by way of compensation, the court is not required to ascribe specifically any part of the award of damages to any of these particular heads (see s. 1(4)) and is thus able to award a global sum for non-economic loss. For the purposes of this Act, the members of the deceased’s immediate family are defined as (a) a spouse, a civil partner, or a person who was living with the deceased as husband of wife or in a relationship which had the characteristics of a relationship between civil partners, (b) a parent or child of the deceased, (c) a person whom the deceased accepted as a child of the deceased’s family or who accepted the deceased as a child of that person’s family, and (d) a sibling of the deceased or a person who was brought up in the same household as the deceased and accepted as a child of the family in which the deceased was a child, and (e) grandparents and grandchildren of the deceased: s. 10(2) and Sched. 1, as amended by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s. 35(4),(5), and s. 45(1) and Sched. 2, para. 2. However, a claim from stepchildren, step-parents, stepbrothers and stepsisters, ascendants and descendants of such step-relatives, and other persons who are only “related by affinity” to the deceased are excluded: s. 1(4A)-(4B), as inserted by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s. 35(3). In England the equivalent awards are provided for in the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (as amended by the Administration of Justice Act 1982 and more recently the Civil Partnership Act 2004). Damages for bereavement are limited to the (modest and arbitrary) sum of £11,800 for the benefit of a spouse or civil partner or, if the deceased died an unmarried minor without a civil partner, are divided between the deceased’s parents: s. 1A and the Damages for Bereavement (Variation of Sum) (England and Wales) Order 2007, art. 2. III.

Survival of the deceased person’s claims

20.

Claims for the reparation of pecuniary damage suffered by the deceased during his lifetime are inheritable in all member states (see, e. g. for FRANCE Rép.Dr.Civ (-Lapoyade Deschamps) V, no. 224; for BELGIUM Dirix, Het begrip schade, no. 138 p. 94; for HUNGARY Gellért (-So˝thné), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 2134-2135; for PORTUGAL Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 622 note 3 and for the NORDIC Countries Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen, 329 as well as von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 382). In SPAIN it is established that in cases where the death of the victim did not occur instantly on being injured, making the deceased

402

Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of

21.

22.

23.

24.

himself (in the time between his injury and death) personally in arrears for the cost of attempting to save his life, his successors acquire the relevant claim in damages against the tortfeasor. Conversely, where the primary injured party has already personally brought a claim for the reparation of his damage, his successors are entitled to the sum awarded after his death, as long as they carried on the proceedings (De Ángel Yágüez, Tratado de responsabilidad civil3, 896; TS 20 November 1990, RAJ 1990 (7) no. 9174 p. 11680; TS 24 June 1997, RAJ 1997 (3) no. 5208 p. 7978; TS 3 December 1999, RAJ 1999 (5) no. 8532 p. 13363). A predominant body of legal opinion in Europe also favours the survival of claims to compensation for non-pecuniary damage suffered. Their survival is recognised today in FRANCE (in the seminal judgments of Cass.ch.mixte 30 April 1976, Bull.ch.mixte 1976 p. 1 no. 2 and Cass.ch.mixte 30 April 1976, Bull.ch.mixte 1976 p. 2 no. 3); in BELGIUM (in the seminal judgment of Cass. 30 June 1930, Pas. belge 1930, I, 281; however, non-pecuniary damages on the part of the victim, which may transfer to the heirs, shall not exist where the victim was instantly rendered unconscious and died without regaining consciousness: Indicatieve Tabel 1 May 2004, NjW 2004, bijlage bij no. 72, no. 51 p. 9); in GERMANY (where CC § 847 (old version) was repealed in 2002); in AUSTRIA (where the words “by request” (“auf Verlangen”) in CC § 1325 are no longer attributed any independent sifnificance: Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht II12, 323; OGH 30 September 1996, SZ 69/217; OGH 11 July 2002, ZVR 2004/26, p. 95); in the BALTIC States and in DENMARK (statutory amendment by Law no. 35 of 21 January 2003; see further von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 382; Øe and Røn, J 2004, 85, 91). In ITALY also, the deceased’s claims in damages do not extinguish on his death. They are transferred to the survivors, regardless of whether economic or non-economic losses are involved (as indicative of the situation in many cases, see Cass. 7 March 2003, no. 3414, Giust.civ.Mass. 2003, 485). The same is true for a claim for compensation of danno biologico suffered. In this respect, the only prerequisite is that the deceased survived the injury for an (albeit short) period of “cognizance” (Cass.sez.pen. 30 January 2003, no. 7632, Riv.it.med.leg. 2003, 694; Cass. 16 May 2003, no. 7632, Foro it. 2003, I, 2681); any schematical examination of the length of this period and the amount of compensation is to be avoided (Cass. 14 July 2003, no. 11003, Resp.civ. e prev. 2003, 1049). Today, there are still notable exceptions to the general rule of the survival of nonpecuniary claims. Under GREEK CC art. 933, such a claim is only transferable and only passes to the survivors where it had been recognised in a contract or already asserted before a court. This is also the situation in POLAND (CC art. 449). HUNGARY also follows the older school of thought, under which the compensation of non-economic damages are of a highly personal nature and therefore do not pass to the deceased’s survivors. This only changes if the deceased asserted his claim before a court while still alive; in this case, the survivors are allowed to join the lawsuit. The same is true if the party causing the damage acknowledged his duty without litigation (Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1332, 1340-1341). SLOVENIAN LOA § 176 additionally even rules out the inter vivos transfer of non-pecuniary claims in damages. To date, in SPAIN it has been always inferred that it follows from the nature of nonpecuniary damages that they may only be claimed by the person who has suffered them

403

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

25.

26.

27.

404

(Gómez Calle, Los sujetos de la responsabilidad civil, 395, 404; Roca i Trias, Derecho de daños3, 175). Only when the injured party personally brings an action before his death, could the survivors carry on the action (TS 20 November 1990, RAJ 1990 (7) no. 9174 p. 11680; TS 24 June 1997, RAJ 1997 (3) no. 5208 p. 7978; TS 3 December 1999, RAJ 1999 (5) no. 8532 p. 13363). TS 19 June 2003, RAJ 2003 (3) no. 4244 p. 7941 has, however, acknowledged the survival of all claims in damages suffered by third parties where a person has been killed. In its judgment, the court did not distinguish between pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. Whether this signifies a fundamental change in the case law may not yet be said with any certainty. PORTUGUESE CC art. 496(2) contains a special regulation to the extent that “in the case of death to the victim ... a spouse who is not judicially separated (i. e. separation of the person and of assets) and children or other progeny [are] together [entitled to] the claim in non-economic damages” (see Note II 14 above). In successive order, the parents, grandparents, siblings and where these do not exist, the nephews and nieces of the deceased are entitled to claim in all other cases. These relatives also have the right to be compensated for the non-economic losses that the injured person suffered from the moment he or she was injured until the time he or she died (Menezes Cordeiro, Tratado III, 139). The claims in damages for pain and suffering are thus accumulated. From a systematic perpective, CC art. 496(2) is a special succession law rule for non-pecuniary claims (Leite de Campos, BFD L (1974), 247, 270). Their survival as such is not disputed (STJ 16 June 2005; Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, 500). Under CC art. 496(2) a child not yet born at the time of the killing is entitled to claim; he is not, however, entitled to the reparation of his own personal non-pecuniary losses (Abrantes Geraldes, Temas da responsabilidade civil II, 24). Under DUTCH law, while claims for compensation of non-pecuniary damages are transferable in principle, CC art. 6:106(2) also restricts their survival. A claim to non-economic damages is a personal right. It is also assumed that it would run contrary to the legal system as a whole to block survivors from recovering for their own personal non-economic damages with one hand (CC arts. 6:107 and 108, see Note II 15 above) and then to compensate them in a roundabout way through the law of succession, with the other. Therefore, in the Netherlands a claim to recovery of non-economic damages only forms part of the deceased’s legal estate where it has been acknowledged to the primary victim or had already been asserted before a court. Contractual recognition leads to a claim under the law of property, which is inheritable, like any other claim under property law. According to the ESTONIAN Succession Act § 2, an estate does not include the rights and obligations of the deceased which by law or by their nature are inseparably bound to the person of the deceased. The transfer of a deceased person’s claim of compensation for non-economic loss to the heir is therefore problematic. There seems to be no case law on this point. SWEDISH EAL chap. 6 § 3 and FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 7 § 3 also provide that claims in damages for pain and suffering, for particular adverse effects and for grievances extinguish on the death of the injured party, as long as he did not assert them as against the injuring party or his insurance carrier in his lifetime. A judicial determination of these claims is no longer required in order to ensure their survival, see Sandstedt, VersRAI 2002, 9, 11. It is also not necessary for the deceased to have expressly stated that he wished to assert his claim in non-economic damages (Prop 2000/01:68 [Ersättning för ideell skada] 77).

Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of

28.

In ENGLAND and IRELAND the previous common law rule encapsulated by the Latin maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona has been largely inverted by statute. Under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, s. 1(1) (England) and the Civil Liability Act 1961, s. 7(1) (Ireland), the general rule is that all causes of action vested in the deceased survive for the benefit of his estate. In both jurisdictions, however, actions for defamation are excluded (loc. cit., s. 1(1), proviso; loc. cit., s. 6(a) respectively) and exemplary damages cannot be recovered (loc., cit. s. 1(2)(a)(i); loc. cit., s. 7(2)). Under the English Act a right to damages for bereavement will also lapse on the deceased’s own death (loc. cit., s. 1(1A)). Nor can the estate recoup damages for loss of future income (i. e. for the period after death) (loc. cit., s. 1(2)(a)(ii). In Ireland damages for any pain or suffering or personal injury or for loss or diminution of expectation of life or happiness are also excluded: loc. cit. s. 7(2). The damages recoverable in any action on behalf of the estate must be assessed regardless of any loss (e. g. the termination of a life interest in property) or gain (e. g. insurance policies) consequent on the death of the plaintiff. It is also reasonable to assume that the position enunciated in Gammell v. Wilson [1982] AC 27 will be followed in Ireland, thereby allowing damages to the estate for the “lost years” to be recovered (see, although on a narrower issue, McMahon v. Burke and Midwestern health Board [1991] ILRM 59 [HC] and White, Irish Law of Damages for Personal Injuries and Death, paras. 14.3.03 – 14.3.04). In SCOTLAND, the right to sue passes, on the death of the injured party, to his executor (Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland11, para. 34.12; Smith v. Duncan Stewart & Co. Ltd. (No. 2) 1961 SC 91; Russell’s Executix v. British Railways Board 1965 SC 422) who sues in a representative capacity, thereby not precluding claims by relatives (e. g. by immediate family for loss of support) arising out of the same events (White and Fletcher, Delictual Damages, 52 and 55; citing Dick v. Burgh of Falkirk 1976 SC (HL) 1 and the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 s. 4). The 1976 Act (which replaced the previous common law rule) currently regulates the entitlement of an executor to claim. Thus, according to loc. cit. s. 2, the “like rights to damages in relation to personal injury... as were vested in the deceased immediately before his death” are transmitted to the executor. This includes the right of solatium (awards of damages for suffering which lasted only minutes will be modest: Beggs v. Motherwell Bridge Fabricators Ltd. 1998 SLT 1215); but damages by way of solatium or by way of compensation for patrimonial loss attributable to any period after the deceased’s death are excluded (1976 Act s. 2(1)-(3), as substituted by the Damages (Scotland) Act 1993. This codifies and supersedes the established common law principle that an executor can only recover patrimonial losses suffered by the deceased during his lifetime: see Mackintosh v. Morrice’s Exrs [2005] CSOH 167 at [9]-[10], 2006 SLT 580 at 583 (Lord Carloway) and likewise on appeal [2006] CSIH 43 at [11], 2007 SC 6 (where the claim of executors to recover in respect of an increased liability to inheritance tax failed because the tax liability was a consequence of premature death and did not arise during the deceased’s lifetime). The fact of whether or not the deceased had brought an action in his lifetime has no practical effect on the executor’s title to claim (loc. cit. s. 2A, as inserted by the Damages (Scotland) Act 1993). However, in relation to “defamation, or any other verbal injury, or other injury to reputation”, s. 2(4) provides that this principle does not apply to non-patrimonial claims (all solatium claims which are not “real” personal injury ones); these may be continued by executors, but not initiated by them (White and Fletcher loc. cit. 55). Any right the deceased had to damages in respect of the death of another (e. g. loss of society claims) will transmit to his executor, but in

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assessing damages the court will have regard only to the period ending immediately before the relative’s death (loc. cit. s. 1A, as inserted by the Damages (Scotland) Act 1993, which also repealed the 1976 Act s. 3). IV.

Funeral costs

29.

Today, funeral costs are also recognised everywhere as recoverable economic loss. The various European legal systems differ only on peripheral issues, which mostly relate to the claimants and the level of claim. FRENCH law grants a claim in compensation to the surviving family members who have actually paid for the funeral (Cass.soc. 8 January 1981, Bull.civ. 1981, V, no. 22 p. 16; Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité2, no. 110-2 p. 209). BELGIAN doctrine also infers that funeral costs constitute recoverable damage for the person who actually bears them, and indeed regardless of whether he is an heir or not. However, in the case of the death of a parent, for example, a significant reduction is supported by the argument that the younger generation would have one day had to pay for the older’s funeral costs anyway; the killing only caused such damage as results from the untimeliness of the funeral. Within the boundaries of reasonableness, therefore, as a general rule only the funeral costs that are incurred by someone from the older generation (parents) for the burial of someone from the younger generation (children) are fully recoverable (Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2), no. 132 pp. 250-252). In SPAIN funeral costs form part of the deceased’s legal estate (CC arts. 902(1) and 903). Where they have actually been denied as forming part of the estate, the successors have a relevant claim in damages against the tortfeasor (TS 17 February 1956, RAJ 1956 (1) no. 1103 p. 691). If the funeral is financed not from the estate but by a relative personally (e. g. the widow), this relative can take action iure proprio against the tortfeasor (Vicente Domingo, Los daños corporales, 232, fn. 735). In its appendix in s. 1 no. 6, the Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act confirms the recoverability of funeral costs for a traffic accident which has fatal effects. Where there is contributory fault, the claim is proportionately reduced (loc. cit. no. 7). As regards the level of claim, it is stated that “average funeral costs” are recoverable; anything seen as luxurious or extraordinary would have to be paid for by the survivors themselves (Gázquez Serrano, La indemnización por causa de muerte, 100). According to TS 10 March 1973, RAJ 1973 (1) no. 1235 p. 984, the cost of flying the body over from a foreign country is also counted as reasonable costs. Under ITALIAN law, the successors are entitled to claim for compensation of funeral costs (Cass. 12 May 1993, no. 5416, Giust.civ.Mass. 1993, 850). In HUNGARY funeral costs are awarded to the ascending and descending relatives, the spouse and siblings of the deceased. Only expenses actually executed and even then only to an economically acceptable extent, are recoverable. The cost of the gravestone, the wreath, the church service, the transport of the body and even proportionate costs of mourning have been enumerated (Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1360-1361; Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 169-170; Petrik (-Köles), Polgári jog II, 634). That corresponds to the legal situation in ROMANIA (Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘, 256; Adam, Drept civil, 279). CZECH and SLOVAKIAN CC § 449(2) express that “in case of death, the compensation shall also include compensation of adequate expenses connected with the burial”.

30.

31.

32.

33.

406

Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

Of course that does not apply, if and so far as these costs are covered by health insurance. Incidentally, paragraph (3) loc. cit. adds that the claim in damages falls due to the person who has actually borne the cost. This corresponds to the position in POLAND (CC art. 446 § 1). On the other hand, under GERMAN CC § 844(1) “in the case of death ... the party liable in damages [has] to compensate for the funeral costs of the person(s) on whom the obligation to bear the costs lies”. Normally this is the heirs (CC § 1968). Thus, someone who de facto takes on the funeral costs without any de jure obligation to do so, has no claim in tort (BGH 5 February 1962, NJW 1962, 791, 792; CA Oldenburg 27 July 1979, VersR 1979, 1135); however, in such cases a claim against the tortfeasor under agency of necessity comes into play (CA Berlin 12 February 1979, VersR 1979, 379). Funeral costs that are reasonable in view of the social and economic status of the deceased are recoverable. The cost of transporting the body also fall within the scope of application of CC § 844(1) (CA Berlin 10 November 1997, VersR 1999, 504, 508). The position in AUSTRIA corresponds to this in all essential respects. Funeral costs constitute recoverable economic loss (e. g. OGH 18 December 1957, ZVR 1958/144, p. 153; OGH 26 November 1998, ZVR 1999/126, p. 417). It covers all costs that are in keeping with local traditions, the status and the economic circumstances of the deceased (OGH 4 November 1971, SZ 44/168; see further Rummel (-Reischauer), ABGB II2, § 1327 no. 7). Who exactly can claim the costs, is not expressly mentioned in the ABGB (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht II2, 147). It is inferred that such person(s) may claim who have to bear the costs under law. This is normally the heirs who have acquired seisin (Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VII2, § 1327 no. 4). GREEK CC art. 928 expressly provides for the recoverability of funeral costs. Funeral costs befitting the economic status of the deceased are recoverable to a reasonable extent; the costs of taking care of the grave are not covered here, however (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 928 no. 17). Any person required, by operation of the law, to arrange the funeral has title to claim for reparation. A contenious point, however, is whether this is the person who had to pay for the maintenace of the deceased (the opinion of Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 614-615), or the heir(s) (the view of Filios, Enochiko Dikaio II(2)3, 105). Where a third party, without being obliged to do so, takes on the funeral costs, he shall also have a direct claim against the injuring party (see in any case Georgiades loc. cit. no. 15). PORTUGUESE CC art. 495(1) also expressly requires the party tortiously responsible to compensate for funeral costs. Whoever aided the deceased is entitled to claim, namely (and accordingly, whoever organised the funeral) the hospital, the doctors or other persons and institutions who had contributed to the treatment (CC art. 495(2)). Further, those who had drawn maintenance from the deceased are entitled to claim (CC art. 495(3)). The funeral costs must be reasonable and are determined by, inter alia, the deceased’s standard of living. They include the cost of transporting the body home from abroad (STJ 5 May 2005), costs of calling in a funeral home, as well as a priest to celebrate the funeral mass (STJ 11 December 2003), further, the cost of a gravestone and for the grave-diggers (STJ 11 December 2003; Abrantes Geraldes, Temas da responsabilidade civil I, 15). In the case of fatal accidents in the workplace, there is a special regime. Under DUTCH CC art. 6:108(2) reparation for funeral costs is payable to the person who actually bore them; that can be e. g. an employer. In relation to the level of

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Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

39.

40.

408

recoverable costs, along with the expectations of the deceased it depends on his social status and on his financial circumstances (Schadevergoeding II (-Lindenbergh), art. 108, no. 18). ESTONIAN LOA § 129(1) and (2) restrict compensation to “reasonable” funeral expenses. In principle, anyone who has to de jure bear the funeral costs may claim. However, “if funeral expenses are borne by another person, compensation for the expenses shall be paid to that person”. LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.291 requires the person responsible for the death “to compensate the person who incurred the funeral expenses for those expenses. Only such funeral expenses that conform to the criterion of reasonableness shall be subject to compensation.” LATVIAN CC art. 2350 requires anyone who is at fault for the death of another to compensate the heirs for the funeral costs. This bears correlation to the position in the NORDIC Countries, who restrict the level of any damages to “reasonable” costs (SWEDISH Damages Law chap. 5 § 2 no. 1 and Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen, 215; FINNISH Damages Law chap. 5 § 3; DANISH Damages Law § 12). In ENGLAND funeral costs may be recovered as part of the damages awarded to the deceased’s estate after the deceased’s claim has devolved on his death: Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, s. 1(2)(c) and for IRELAND see similarly Civil Liability Act 1961, s. 7(3). Alternatively, funeral expenses may be recovered by the deceased’s dependants under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, s. 3(5) if they have incurred them. IRISH Civil Liability Act 1961 s. 49(2) provides for damages in respect of funeral and other expenses actually incurred by the deceased’s dependants. Funeral costs include the costs of a normal tombstone and of embalming, but not the cost of an elaborate monument (O’Brien v. Higgins, SC 13 March 1967, unreported). Funeral expenses would also include expenses connected with the burial operation (or with cremation), and also with religious services for the deceased (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 42.20). Coupled with having to be reasonably necessary, the “other expenses” that can be claimed here must also be immediately related to the obsequies, or perhaps medical expenses caused by the wrongful act (Byrne v. Houlihan & De Courcy [1966] IR 274). Besides these expenses, travelling costs incurred by the dependants visiting the deceased before he died and attending the funeral, and also the costs of acknowledgement cards to sympathisers, a wake and mourning clothes may be included here (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit.). The phrase does not include expenses incurred by a widower for extra domestic help or for the tuition of his children (Byrne v. Houlihan & De Courcy [1966] IR 274). In SCOTLAND, in fatal accident cases the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 s. 1(1),(3) permits the claim for expenses in connection with the deceased’s funeral, incurred by a “relative” as defined in the Act. The claim is on their own behalf, viz. not on behalf of the deceased. The Act does not confer a like claim on executors in that capacity, who also have no such claim at common law: see Mackintosh v. Morrice’s Exrs [2005] CSOH 167 at [18], 2006 SLT 580 at 585 (Lord Carloway: action in respect of funeral expenses properly brought by pursuers as relatives rather than as executrices). The definition of relatives, in loc. cit. Schedule 1, is the same as for “loss of support” claims, see below, Note V53. S. 1(3) of the Act limits funeral costs to “any reasonable expense”. There is a paucity of case law in this area, where in this small body of decisions, the primary concern was whether a headstone is a funeral expense at all; in the Inner House in Prentice v. Chalmers 1985 SLT 168 at 171), Lord Hunter observed that it was not argued that the cost of the headstone “was unreasonable in amount having

Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of

regard to the station in life of the deceased and his family”. Thus, “reasonableness” may vary according to the circumstances.

V.

Loss of maintenance

41.

The tortious obligation to assume the role of maintaining those who had been economically dependant on the deceased in a special way is of common ground in Europe. Differences in legal systems, however, are encountered in determining precisely who is entitled to damages and occasionally in the level and legal construction of the claim in damages. Under FRENCH law, anyone to whom the deceased had provided maintenance is, in principle, entitled to claim; it does not depend on an existing legal relationship inter partes (Cass.ch.mixte 27 February 1970, Bull.ch.mixte 1970 no. 1; RTD civ 1970, 353, note Durry; D. 1970 jur. 201, note Combaldieu; JCP 1970 II 16305, concl. Lindon, note Parlange; see also Beysen, VersRAI 2004, 41, 44). As a result, not only family members and non-marital cohabitees may be entitled to claim, but also any other person whom the victim had supported, provided only that the discontinuation of the advantage is a definite consequence of the primary victim’s death (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats, no. 1456). This mirrors the position in BELGIUM (e. g. Cass. 24 March 1969, Pas. belge 1969, I, 655: the claim of a cloistral community for reparation of monies paid by a deceased nun to the community fund). Under SPANISH law, anyone who was financially dependent on the deceased is entitled to claim for damages, as long as the lost maintenance can be proven. The law provides no precise criteria for the calculation of the level of this claim. However, in traffic accident cases the courts apply the table of damages in the appendix to the Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act. The assessment of damages is incumbent upon the courts charged with jurisdiction to establish facts; the Tribunal Supremo does not review it in cassation proceedings (see e. g. TS 26 March 1997, RAJ 1997 (1) no. 1864 p. 2856). Normally, an all-inclusive sum is awarded for all damages, without differentiating between the details of the various positions. So too, the ITALIAN CC does not expressly regulate the liability for lost maintenance after death. The older case law had considered whether secondary injured parties had a statutory claim to maintenance (CC art. 433) against the deceased. However, for some time now, economic disadvantages of others are compensated, to the extent that they can prove that they have been continuously supported by the deceased (Cass. 10 April 1979, no. 2076, Giust.civ.Mass. 1979, fasc. 4; Cass. 1 August 1987, no. 6672, Riv.giur.circ.trasp. 1988, 102). Even persons who have not yet been supported by the deceased, but would have been supported by him in the future, are entitled to claim, even where no statutory claim to maintenance would have accrued to them (Cass. 12 October 1998, no. 10085, Resp.civ. e prev. 1999, 752; Cass. 10 October 1992, no. 11097, Giust.civ.Mass. 1992, 10). The only prerequisite is that they would have been supported in the normal course of events (Cass 14 February 2000, no. 1637, Resp.civ. e prev. 2000, 609). As regards the quantum of the claim for lost maintenance and other economic loss caused to children following the death of their wage-earning mother, see the detailed judgment of Cass. 12 September 2005, no. 18092, Danno e resp. 2006, 753. HUNGARIAN CC § 358(1) states that “dependents of a person who has died in an accident shall be entitled to claim an annuity that will supplement any support and

42.

43.

44.

45.

409

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

46.

47.

48.

410

ensure the satisfaction of their needs in accordance with the standard of living to which they were accustomed before the accident (by considering their actual or expected earnings)”. When calculating the pension, consideration is to be given to whether the surviving dependants also had a claim against another party who had an obligation to provide maintenance, which made this party liable to an equal degree to that of the deceased (CC § 358(3)). According to case law, only those who had a statutory claim for maintenance against the deceased are entitled to claim. Maintenance provided out of genorosity may be given as little consideration as that which goes over and above the level required by statute. Thus, non-marital cohabitees do not form part of the circle of possible claimants (Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 13741375.; Petrik (-Köles), Polgári jog II2, 641-643; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 251-255; Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 200-204). POLISH CC art. 446 § 2 provides a claim to those surviving dependents who had a statutory claim to maintenance against the deceased. However, “the same pension may be claimed by other persons related to the deceased whom the latter voluntarily and permanently supplied with means of maintenance if it follows from the circumstances that this is required by the principles of community life”. Likewise, CZECH and SLOVAKIAN CC § 448(1) considers as entitled to claim, not only those who had a statutory claim to maintenance, but also those to whom the deceased actually provided maintenance. However, a claim does not exist to the extent that sums accrued to the relevant parties out of (social) insurance. In the same way, SLOVENIAN LOA § 173(1) considers those “who were maintained or regularly supported by the deceased”, just as much entitled to claim as those who had a statutory claim against the deceased. That is also the position in ROMANIA (Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘, 258-262; Adam, Drept civil, 279-281). Draft CC art. 1133 provides for an express statutory provision. GERMAN CC § 844(2) only affords a claim to persons to whom the deceased was (or could become) required under statute to provide maintenance, and indeed in the amount and for a time period that the deceased would have had to provide maintenance in the likely duration of his life. Contributory fault of the deceased leads to a reduction of the claim (CC § 846). The position is the same in AUSTRIA (CC § 1327); damages are only afforded to those entitled to maintenance under statute (OGH 14 November 1934, SZ 16/223); a contractual claim to maintenance does not suffice (OGH 26 April 1991, JBl 1992, 44). Monetary compensation also falls due for maintenance the deceased had provided by nature (OGH 30 August 1988, ZVR 1989/106, p. 178). Where the de facto maintenance provided exceeds the de jure obligation – without being disproportionate – it is to be fully compensated. On the other hand, the statutory level of maintenance is to be paid, even where the maintenance previously provided by the deceased had fallen short of this level (OGH 2 September 1999, SZ 72/135). In Austria, contributory fault on the part of the deceased has to be considered also (OGH 19 November 1957, JBl 1957, 645). GREEK CC art. 928 (second sentence) affords a claim in damages to those (and only those) to whom the deceased provided maintenance or services under a statutory obligation; solely contractual obligations to provide maintenance and services do not suffice. The precise determination of the list of entitled claimants takes its cue from the relevant family law provisions (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 928, no. 26). The point in time at which the tortious act was committed is key here, not the time of death. Therefore, a widow who married the already injured party is not entitled

Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of

49.

50.

to claim (Georgiades loc. cit. no. 9). If, and so far as the maintenance obligation passes to the deceased’s survivors and they in turn are able to economically meet the claim to maintenance, no damages shall exist (Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 615). On the other hand, it is sufficient that the deceased would have had an obligation to provide maintenance to the claimant in the near future (A. P. 359/1957, NoB 5/ 1957, 1012: the death of a 15-year-old male who would have completed his apprenticeship as a watchmaker in one year and then would have earned enough to provide his mother with maintenance). Spouses are also obliged to support each other and their children generally; the previous obligation of a wife for the provision of services has fallen away (CC arts. 1389 and 1390). The widower or the widow is thus likewise afforded a claim under CC art. 928 (Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 621; Kounougeri-Manoledaki, FS Vavouskos II, 221). The material factor is the economic value of the contribution, which the deceased was obliged to make towards family maintenance according to provisions of family law (A. P. 84/2005, NoB 53 [2005] 1418). It is doubtful whether this also applies in relation to the lost services on the part of the deceased in the spouses’ joint enterprise (answered in the negative by CA Athens 7212/1984, NoB 32/1984, 1561; answered in the affirmative by Doris in the note on this decision (loc. cit. 1562)). PORTUGUESE CC art. 495(3) also provides a right to be compensated to those who could claim alimony (under CC art. 2009) from the victim or to those to whom the latter rendered support under a ‘natural obligation’ (see further Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 622; Abrantes Geraldes, Temas da responsabilidade civil I, 16-17). CC art. 495(3) throws up an exception to the general principle, whereby only those directly injured have a claim to compensation (Almeida Costa, Obrigações8, 546-547). According to case law, non-marital life partners are also entitled to claim (CA Lisbon 20 February 1974, BolMinJus 234 [1974] 336) as are children, who have already been conceived at the time of death, but not yet born (Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 86 [1959] 103, 123). The claim requires actual loss of maintenance. In contrast, it is not invariably necessary that the deceased provided maintenance in pursuance of a statutory obligation on him to do so; it suffices that maintenance had been rendered under a moral duty. Evidence that the injured third party was “needy” within the meaning of maintenance law is also not necessary (STJ 16 April 1974, RLJ 108 [1975-76] no. 3549 p. 182). The equivalent rule in DUTCH law is to be found in CC art. 6:108(1). Lost maintenance does not only cover pecuniary support, but also extends to the provision of physical care, sustenance, accommodation, clothing and other support in kind. Primarily, spouses, registered partners and children are entitled to claim. They are entitled to a claim to the level of statutory maintenance at the very least; however, where the deceased has provided maintenance over and above what is necessary this is also recoverable (lit. (a) loc. cit.; on this issue and what follows, see in particular Schadevergoeding II (-Lindenbergh), art. 108, nos. 19 et seq.). Other relatives or in-laws only have a claim in damages if the deceased contributed to their maintenance at the time of his death or would have been compelled by a court order to do so (lit. (b)). Further, belonging to the circle of claimants entitled to damages is – according to lit. (c) loc. cit. – anyone, who lived together with the deceased as part of a family unit, if and so far as the deceased had actually covered their maintenance and it may be inferred that this would have continued, had his death not occurred and that the relevant parties cannot fairly provide for their own maintenance. Finally, those persons are entitled to claim

411

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

51.

52.

53.

412

who lived with the deceased as part of a family unit, in which the deceased kept house; they essentially have a claim to reparation of the costs for a home help (lit. (d)). In all cases, contributory fault on the deceased’s part results in a corresponding reduction of the claim (CC art. 6:108(3)). ESTONIAN LOA § 129(3)-(6) contains just as detailed a regulation: persons, who had a statutory claim to maintenance against the deceased, may claim the amount of lost maintenance actually incurred (para. (3)). The same goes for persons, for whom the deceased would have had a maintenance obligation under statute (para. (4)). This applies particularly in relation to children who were in fact already conceived at the time of death but had not yet been born (para. (5)). Finally, anyone who had permanently lived with the deceased as part of a family unit or had been otherwise provided maintenance by him due to a moral duty, is also entitled to damages, as long as they are dependent on this maintenace, they cannot obtain maintenance through other means and the deceased would have also provided them maintenance in the future (para. (6)). LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.284(1) lists “minor children, spouses, parents incapable of work, or other factual dependants incapable of work” as entitled to claim. LATVIAN CC art. 2351 is to the same effect. However, the provision only benefits those persons, for whose maintenance the deceased was obliged to provide. The death must have been caused through fault. The obligation to provide maintenance ends as soon as the beneficiary can provide for himself. The Damages Laws of the NORDIC Countries coincide with these Principles in that reparation for lost maintenance only comes into play in cases of death (DANISH EAL §§ 12-14a; FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 4 [in force since 1 January 2006]; SWEDISH EAL chap. 5 § 2 no. 2). Anyone who had – or would have shortly acquired – a statutory claim to maintenance against the deceased is entitled to reparation under the Swedish regulation; additionally, anyone who was dependent on the deceased. This involves primarily family members and non-marital cohabitees (Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 413-414). When assessing the level of damages, the economic circumstances of the surviving family members comes into consideration, taking into account possible insurance benefits (Swedish EAL chap. 5 § 3). Danish EAL § 12 states that damages fall due to anyone, who has lost his or her breadwinner. Loc. cit. §§ 13-14a regulate the details of the level of reparation. Under FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. § 4(1) anyone is entitled to claim, who had a claim against the deceased for maintenance or received maintenance from him de facto. Work in the home only equates to maintenance under special circumstances (chap. 5 § 4(3)). In ENGLAND under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (as amended by the Administration of Justice Act 1982 and the Civil Partnership Act 2004) a claim for loss of pecuniary benefit may be brought by the personal representatives of the deceased for the benefit of the deceased’s dependants: ss. 1(1), (2) and 2(1). The dependants include a spouse or civil partner, former spouses or civil partners, persons who were living with the deceased as a spouse or civil partner for at least two years before death, parents and grandparents, children and grandchildren, nephews and nieces and cousins: s. 1(3). In order that individuals who, despite the width of the definition, are not caught by the Act do not suffer hardship, the Law Commission has recommended that a residual category of persons who were and would still have been maintained be added: Claims for Wrongful Death [1999] Law Com 263, para. 7.7. The claim of the dependants is for such damages (other than for bereavement) as are proportioned to the injury to the dependents result-

Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of

ing from the death (s. 3(1)); compensation is for loss of pecuniary advantage – a socalled loss of dependency. Damages are thus awarded to compensate for the loss of a reasonable expectation of economic benefit from the deceased. Under SCOTS law, in a case of death in consequence of personal injuries a relative has a statutory clam to damages from the person responsible for causing the death as compensation for loss of support which the claimant has suffered or is likely to suffer as a result: Damages (Scotland) Act 1976, s. 1(1),(3). At common law a legal duty of support was required; the Act abolished the necessity for the relative to show that the deceased was under, or might have become subject to, a legal duty to provide or contribute the support, but if that fact is established it can be taken into account to determine whether and to what extent the deceased would have been likely to provide or contribute such support: s. 1(6). Support is a factual matter, which must be established (White and Fletcher, Delictual Damages, 34). Under loc. cit. s. 1(6) it is not essential in such a claim that the deceased had a legal obligation to support, but if that is so, it is to be taken into account in establishing a claim to support. The loss of support claim is based on the actual amount of support that was usually received (Hatherley v. Smith 1989 SLT 316). Where the deceased has been earning and supporting his family, a basic approach is to identify the proportion of the net income which might reasonably have been used for family support and mulitply this by the years between death and the time when support might otherwise have ceased (e. g. retirement, in the case of support to a spouse, and, in the case of support for children, when their education would finish and they might have started to support themselves): Mackintosh v. Morrice’s Exrs [2005] CSOH 167 at [15], 2006 SLT 580 at 584-585 (Lord Carloway). It is appropriate to take account of likely increases in support which would have followed (Smith v. Comrie’s Executrix 1944 SC 499) but not speculative matters (Daniell v. Aviemore Station Hotel Co. Ltd. 1951 SLT (Notes) 75). However, loss of support need not equate to a proportion of the deceased’s income and might include sums which the deceased paid out of capital or obtained from third parties: Mackintosh v. Morrice’s Exrs [2005] CSOH 167 at [16], 2006 SLT 580 at 585 (Lord Carloway) (where, however, it was not averred that the deceased would have made further gifts of large sums in the future in order to avoid inheritance tax in due course). Since the issue of loss of support is a question of fact about what the relative would have received, the claim is not limited to money which might be regarded as covering the necessities of life: Mackintosh v. Morrice’s Exrs [2005] CSOH 167 at [16], 2006 SLT 580 at 585 (Lord Carloway). On the other hand, loss of support does not include any sums which would have been transferred after the deceased had died (i.e, an inheritance under the deceased’s will) and accordingly does not extend to a reduction in the deceased’s estate on death due to an incidence of or increase in inheritance taxation which has arisen due to the deceased’s premature death: see Mackintosh v. Morrice’s Exrs [2005] CSOH 167 at [15], 2006 SLT 580 at 585. In assessing loss of support, the court will not take account of remarriage prospects (Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1971 s. 4), nor will the court deduct any social security benefits paid or money that will accrue from the deceased’s estate, such as insurance policies (Stewart, Delict3, para. 11.29). For the purposes of this claim, a relative is exhaustively defined as the members of the deceased’s immediate family (as to which, see the note to para. (1)), other ascendants and descendants of the deceased (i.e, besides [grand]children and [grand]parents), the issue of the deceased’s siblings, uncles and aunts, and a former spouse or civil partner: s. 10(1) and Sched. 1, as amended by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s. 35(5) and and s. 45(1) and Sched. 2, para. 2.

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In IRELAND, loss of pecuniary benefits that could have reasonably been expected, but for the wrongful act of the defendant, represents the principal heading under which dependants (defined according to Civil Liability Act 1961, Part IV) may claim damages under the fatal injuries provisions of the Act. To ascertain the value of dependency, the dependants’ annual average loss is first calculated, which is then multiplied by the number of years during which the loss is likely to continue and is discounted to give the present value of the dependency. Finally, benefits as a consequence of the death are deducted in order to reach the amount recoverable (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 42.26). The courts take into account the deceased’s actual income, his prospects for advancement in his job or profession, the fringe benefits to which he was entitled (e. g. company car, free heat and light, bonuses, pension rights, etc.) and the proportion of his income that was directed at his dependants (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para. 42.27). Along with direct financial contributions made by the deceased and likely to have continued but for his death, the loss of services, or acts in kind that can be reduced to financial terms is also recoverable; this includes the compensation of expenses incurred where a tutor must be employed to replace the deceased’s contributions in the instruction of his children, a gardener must be taken on in the management of the family garden or a carpenter or a painter has to be engaged to do routine maintenance work in the home that the deceased did before his death (O’Sullivan v. Córas Iompair Éireann [1978] IR 407; Waters v. Cruikshank [1967] IR 378; Berry v. Humm & Co. [1915] 1 KB 627). The primary victim’s dependants can only recover damages for pecuniary benefits that could be reasonably expected to be made by the deceased in the future; therefore, damages may be awarded to the dependants in the case of the death of a minor son or daughter if a future pecuniary benefit could be reasonably expected (Hamilton v. O’Reilly [1951] IR 200; Malynn v. Farrell (1956) 90 ILTR 137). The inferences made in the dependants’ claim must be substantiated by facts in order to enable the Court to reasonably conclude that a benefit would have accrued; otherwise their claim will fail as being predicated on mere speculation (Horgan v. Buckley [1938] IR 115; Good v. Callaghan, Supreme Court, 25 April 1967). The Court considers the working life expectancy of the deceased and the life expectancy of the relevant dependants in assessing the period of loss. In the case of minor dependants, the extent of the child’s education and whether the child was likely to move away after taking up employment are relevant factors. Taxation (of the deceased’s income), inflation and the likely increase of the deceased’s income, had he continued to earn, also come into play when assessing the value of the claim (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. 42.32). As a general rule, pecuniary benefits to the deceased’s dependants are also taken into account (Byrne v. Houlihan & De Courcy [1966] IR 274; Murphy v. Cronin [1966] IR 699, 708). This includes the accelerated nature of the inheritance (Tubridy v. White, High Court, 31 January 1974; O’Sullivan v. Córas Iompair Éireann [1978] IR 407). Any possible increase of savings that would have accumulated during the deceased’s lifetime, had he lived, is also relevant (Murphy v. Cronin [1966] IR 699 at 710; v. Córas Iompair Éireann loc. cit.). There are two exceptions to the general rule that benefits will be taken into account: (i) property of which the widowed claimant had the shared use during the deceased’s lifetime (v. Córas Iompair Éireann loc. cit.; Murphy v. Cronin loc. cit.) shall not be a relevant factor in the assessment; and (ii) Civil Liability Act 1961 s. 50 states that in a fatal injuries action, no account is to be taken of (a) any sum payable on the death of the deceased under any contract of insurance, or (b) any pension, gratuity or other like benefit payable under

Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of

statute or otherwise in consequence of the death of the deceased. Loc. cit. s. 49(5) provides that where a cohabitant of three years standing had no enforceable right to financial maintenance by the deceased, the court shall take that fact into the account, together with any other relevant matter, in determining the damages to be awarded. It must be noted, however, that merely the absence of a legal claim is to be taken into account by the Court, with no further direction as to apportionment of damages. VI.

Pecuniary and non-pecuniary claims of other third parties harmed

55.

Death or injury to a person can also cause sustained harm to other third parties, for instance employers or business partners, and inflict disadvantages on them that do not fit within the framework of lost maintenance. There is no uniform yardstick in the various European legal systems for measuring whether such damages are entitled to be recovered (and if so, by whom). However, it may be stated in general that great reluctance as to the recoverability of such consequential damages prevails. In most legal systems a claim in damages would only be affirmed in such cases where the harm was intentionally inflicted on the third party. The FRENCH courts usually deny claims in damages of third parties, whose interests are infringed or compromised by the death or injury of the primary injured party, but who are only linked to him by a relationship under the law of obligations (Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité2, no. 312 pp. 135-136). While there are, indeed, exceptions (e. g. CA Colmar 20 April 1955, D. 1966 jur. 723, note Savatier: Reparation of the harm suffered by a football club as a result of the accident-caused death of one of its players), they do not correspond with the main line of reasoning of the court of cassation (see, in particular, Cass.civ. 14 November 1958, GazPal 1959, I, 31: no claim for an Opera against the originator of an accident, which had the effect of rendering a singer unable to perform). This is also how the issue is dealt with in BELGIUM. At most a claim arises where the contractual relationship between the primary injured party and the claimant is of a nature that the promised performance of the injured party may only be carried out exclusively by him personally and no-one else (Dirix, Het begrip schade, no. 225 pp. 140-141). So too, the SPANISH Tribunal Supremo only apparently considers the compensation of third parties if they had a particularly close personal relationship with the deceased. TS 17 May 1973, RAJ 1973 (1) no. 2087 p. 1664 provides an example of this (a “wet nurse” who had taken care of the deceased for a significant part of her life, was now left without a job and had no prospect of getting another one or of gaining income by other means). In a decision that was met to some extent with sharp criticism by academic commentators (Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 381) the Supreme Court granted a claim to an order of nuns who ran the nursing home in which the deceased had lived (TS 31 May 1972, RAJ 1972 (1) no. 2787 p. 2121), and in TS 30 June 1965, RAJ 1965 (2) no. 3425 p. 2080 it even suggested the possibility that the Church could be entitled to damages for the death of a bishop or capitular. On the other hand, it denied the claim in compensation of a congregation for the death of one of its members (TS 12 June 1970, RAJ 1970 (2) no. 3500 p. 2388). Conversely, the state has been compensated for the pecuniary damages (continuation of wage payments) occasioned to them due to the intentional injury of a member of the Guardia Civil (TS 24 April 1979, RAJ 1979 (1) no. 1430, p. 1178; for similar cases see also TS 13 December 1983,

56.

57.

58.

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Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage RAJ 1983 (3) no. 6522 p. 5022; TS 20 September 1982, RAJ 1982 (2) no. 4948 p. 3215; TS 12 June 1989, RAJ 1989 (4) no. 5094 p. 5892 and TS 11 December 1989, RAJ 1989

59.

60.

61.

62.

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(7) no. 9527 p. 11090). The case law is of course inconsistent, as in a number of cases whose facts were identical to these, pecuniary damages were denied (TS 14 February 1980, RAJ 1980 (1) no. 516 p. 396; TS 14 April 1981, RAJ 1981 (1) no. 1539 p. 1282 and TS 29 December 1986, RAJ 1986 (3) no. 4922 p. 4849; see Santos Briz, La responsabilidad civil I7, 238). In certain instances, ITALIAN case law has also extended the protection of relative rights of claim beyond maintenance obligees. In the co-called Meroni-decision (Cass.sez.un. 26 January 1971, no. 174, Giur.it. 1971, I, 1, 680, note Visintini = Foro it. 1971, I, 342, notes Jemolo and Busnelli 1284) the Court granted damages to an obligee who, due to the obligor’s death, had lost his claim against the obligor for the provision of nondelegable services. Likewise, an employer, who has to continue to pay the wages of an employee injured by a third party receives relief (settled case law, see Cass. 12 November 1988, no. 6132, Giur.it. 1990, I, 1, 280). As a matter of principle, HUNGARIAN law grants no damages to third parties, and so does not compensate non-economic loss, like e. g. in the case of friends, neighbours or carers (Petrik (-Petrik), Polgári jog I, 208/2; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 260-261). In principle, GERMAN law in no way grants persons indirectly harmed (apart from cases of intentional harm: CC § 826) a claim in damages, not even for the reparation of their economic losses suffered. According to BGH 21 Novemer 2000, NJW 2001, 971, this even applies where the beneficiary’s claim (in this case the original owner of agricultural property) against the deceased (the adult son and heir to the farm) to pension benefits in old age was backed up by its entry in the land register. Additionally, in a case where a man who represented one half of a well-known and successful figure skating duo was injured in a traffic accident, BGH 10 December 2002, NJW 2003, 1040 decided that his female partner could not claim any damages from the injuring party for loss occasioned to her due to the temporary accident-caused absence of her partner. However, if an employee is injured and his employer has to continue to pay his wages, the employee’s claim against the injuring third party is transferred to the employer by operation of statute (Law on the Payment of Remuneration on Public Holidays and in the Case of Illness [EntgFG ] § 6). In AUSTRIA, despite the broad formulation of CC § 1295(1), in principle the pure economic losses of third parties still go without reparation (Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VII2, § 1295 no. 3). CC § 1327 (loss of maintenance) is interpreted as an exhaustive exception; apart from the circumstances enumerated here, in no case will a claim be entertained if no intention is present (OGH 19 November 1956, ZVR 1957/37, p. 51; OGH 5 April 1979, ZVR 1980/240, p. 226; OGH 8 July 1993, ZVR 1994/129, p. 311). However, an employer who continues to pay the wages of an injured worker during his illness acquires the employee’s claim in damages against the injuring third party by operation of statute (General Social Insurance Act [ ASVG ] § 332(1)). GREECE also grants no reparation to persons who suffer economic damages as a result of the death or injury of another but are not mentioned in CC arts. 928 and 929 (loss of maintenance). Only “indirectly injured parties” are concerned here (Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 596; Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio, Geniko meros, 608; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 914, no. 70, and art. 928, no. 1). Examples offered by these commentators include a football club, which loses a famous player, an opera

Article 2:202: Loss suffered by third persons as a result of

63.

64.

65.

66.

house, in which a famous singer cannot perform and obligees of a building contractor, to whom he cannot fulfill his contractual obligations in due time because of his injury. The position in PORTUGAL is the same. Third parties, who are merely ‘indirectly’ harmed and not mentioned in CC art. 495 (supra, Note V49), have no personal claim of their own (Sinde Monteiro, Responsabilidade por conselhos, 190). Exceptions to this basic rule require a specific statutory basis. Among them, is Decree-Law no. 218/99 of 15 June 1999, which grants the national health services the right to reimbursement in regard to hospitalisation costs caused by criminal acts, road traffic accidents and accidents at work (Abrantes Geraldes, Temas da responsabilidade civil II, 14; see STJ 13 February 2003). Likewise, Social Security Act art. 70 grants social security institutions the right to claim reimbursement for expenditure caused by an injured party’s personal injury or death in civil or criminal proceedings (Abrantes Geraldes loc. cit. 19). Similar regimes operate in favour of the employer and the insurer in regard to accidents at work attributable to a third party (Act no. 100/97 of 13 September 1997, art. 31; see now Labour Code art. 294), and to the State (by means of subrogation to the injured civil servant’s claim, see the acórdão uniformizador de jurisprudência no. 5/97, Diário Rep. no.73, Series I-A, 27 March 1997). So too in DUTCH law pure economic losses of third parties in principle still go without compensation. However, according to CC art. 6:107(1) an employer is entitled – through a right of his own (and not only an assigned right) – to damages for medical costs and costs of other treatment, which he incurred for the benefit of his employee. The claim to compensation of wages continuously paid during the period of illness results from CC art. 6:107a. This does not encompass the cost of hiring a substitute or damages attributable to a disruption of operations. Damages suffered by a company because of injury to one of its members are also unrecoverable; only the personal losses of the member are recoverable (CA Amsterdam 9 July 1998, VR 1999, 64). The claims of third parties in SWEDEN are likewise rejected (Hellner, SvJT 1969, 332; Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 364, 411; Kleineman, Ren förmögenhetsskada, 180; Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans, 560; Andersson, Trepartsrelationer i skadeståndsrätten, 38; Radetzki, Skadeståndsberäkning vid sakskada, 56). Also, HD 5 May 1995, NJA 1995, 269 would not represent an exception to this rule (damages to the mother of a child abducted by the father and brought to Tunisia). At COMMON LAW the general principle is that “the loss of A arising out of an injury whereby B is unable to perform his contract [with A] is not actionable”: Admiralty Commissioners v. Owners of Steamsship Amerika [1917] AC 38, 45 per Lord Parker. Consequently a company or a partnership has no claim for loss of services where a director or employee of the company or a partner of the firm is injured and equally an employee has no claim if injury to his employer ends his employment: Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Hambrook [1956] 2 QB 641, 660 (Denning LJ). In ENGLAND, before the Administration of Justice Act, 1982 s. 2(c) abolished the anomalous common law action per quod servitium amisit for the loss of domestic services rendered by a servant within the employer’s household (Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Hambrook [1956] 2 QB 641, 666 [Denning LJ]), this action had been subject to judicial scepticism. Due to the lack of statutory reform in this area in IRELAND, this anomalous action survives to this day. It is founded on the now out-dated concept of the servant falling within the proprietorship of his master. Similar to the position before its abolition in England, the Irish courts have little sympathy with this concept today and have tended to regard the action as

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67.

anomalous and restrict its scope as much as possible (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 32.03). The action does not depend on any contract of service (A-G for New South Wales v. Perpetual Trustee Co. (Ltd) [1955] AC 457 at 483 [PC]) but rather on the fact (or even right) of service. Mirroring the position of the Court of Appeal in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Hambrook (loc. cit.), in A-G v. Ryan’s Car Hire Ltd. [1965] IR 642), the Irish Supreme Court (in emphasising the restricted scope of this anomaly) concluded that public servants (e. g. in the armed forces, police or civil service) did not fall under this exception. It is also unclear in Ireland, whether the action should be limited to deny the right to sue to all masters apart from those of “menial” servants (i. e. living as part of their master’s household). In Ryan v. Ireland [1989] IR 177), Finlay CJ (although only obiter) expressed the view that the action should in fact be limited in this way. Some damage must be shown to ground the action (Hall v. Hollander (1825) 4 B & C 660, 107 ER 1206). Recovery may be allowed for the actual pecuniary loss because of the loss of services and other expenses necessarily sustained in consequence of the servant’s injury (Chapman v. McDonald [1969] IR 188). Thus, the master may recover for the extra cost of obtaining and training a substitute for the servant or in paying overtime rates to existing staff (McMahon and Binchy, loc. cit., para. 32.11). Whether the foreseeability limitation applicable to negligence actions applies to actions per quod servitium amisit has not been decided upon (see, however, Jones v. Fabbi (1973) 37 DLR (3d) 27). In SCOTLAND, it is not an actionable wrong to cause a person indirect economic loss by injuring, or causing death of, another person with whom the loser has contractual ties (Walker, Delict2, 916). In this way, an employer has no claim where his employee is injured or killed by the fault of a third party (Allan v. Barclay (1864) 2 M 873; Reavis v. Clan Line Steamers, 1925 SC 725), nor has one business partner where another partner has been injured or killed (Gibson v. Glasgow Corp. 1963 SLT (Notes) 16), nor has a company for loss of services of a director (cf. Young v. Ormiston, 1936 SLT 79, though its authority was doubted in Vaughan v. Greater Glasgow Passenger Transport Executive 1984 SC 32), nor the owner of a business for the death of the manager (Quin v. Greenock & Port-Glasgow Tramways Co. 1926 SC 544), nor a professional dancer for the death of his dancing partner (though because they were also married, he could claim for damages in his capacity as a widower who had lost his wife under other heads of damages) (Burgess v. Florence Nightingale Hospital [1955] 1 QB 349). The principle has been stated to be that the foresight of harmful consequences attributed to a wrongdoer does not extend to include the victim’s contractual relationships (Walker, loc. cit. 917).

Illustration 1 is taken from BGH 10 December 2002, NJW 2003, 1040.

Article 2:203: Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy (1) Loss caused to a natural person as a result of infringement of his or her right to respect for his or her dignity, such as the rights to liberty and privacy, and the injury as such are legally relevant damage. (2) Loss caused to a person as a result of injury to that person’s reputation and the injury as such are also legally relevant damage if national law so provides.

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Comments A.

General

1. Purpose of the provision. The purpose of this provision is to clarify that loss and injury caused by the infringement of human dignity constitutes legally relevant damage which leads to an obligation to make reparation according to the basic rule on noncontractual liability. One important aspect of human dignity is the protection of a person’s right to liberty; another is the protection of a person’s private sphere. Of course consequential losses also constitute damage relevant to the law on non-contractual liability, whether they be economic or non-economic losses. 2. Horizontal effects of human rights. DCFR I. – 1:102 (Interpretation and development) paragraph (2) states that these model rules “are to be read in the light of any applicable instruments guaranteeing human rights and fundamental freedoms”. The very position of this provision indicates its status as a general provision, whose significance goes far beyond the law on non-contractual liability. It is also necessary for the law of contract – for example in the law of credit securities. It seems to be certain, however, that such a general norm on the ‘horizontal effects’ of human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot render a specific non-contractual liability law protection of rights of personality superfluous. Furthermore, it goes without saying that holders of rights in private law in relation to others are not subject to the same duties as the state in its dealings with citizens. Persons subject to private law who offer their goods or services to the public, however, must comply with more stringent rules than individuals conducting their private lives. Illustration 1 For example, an infringement of dignity is made out when a business which is open to the public (e. g. a bank, restaurant or hotel) turns someone away on account of their skin colour or creed. A private person by contrast may generally adopt entirely arbitrary criteria in deciding when to let someone into his or her house.

B.

Infringement of human dignity (paragraph (1))

3. Infringement. Technically speaking, there can be an “infringement” of the incorporeal rights of personality in Article 2:203 within the meaning of these rules even where the injuring person can invoke a ground of defence set out in Chapter 5, e. g. Article 5:203 (Protection of public interest). The distinction is important because the allocation of the burden of proof turns on it. 4. Injury and loss. The infringement of human dignity, like injury to body or health, constitutes a damage per se. However, a legally relevant damage is also constituted by the losses which result from that infringement. Infringements of human dignity can entail economic as well as non-economic damage.

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5. Trivial injury. In every case the injury must not be merely trivial (Article 6:102 (De minimis rule)). In establishing whether the case is one of trivial damage it will be material whether the injuring person has acted intentionally or merely negligently and, moreover, whether a violation of a private sphere or an infringement of freedom is at stake. For infringements of rights of personality or interferences in the private sphere which result from mere negligence there is sometimes no scope for a claim to damages. With infringements of the right to liberty, however, the position is usually different. Here negligence is often sufficient, provided that the circumstances are such that the infringement of the right to liberty equates to an infringement of human dignity. Everything depends on assessing the circumstances of the individual case. The regulation of the corresponding details must therefore be left to the courts. Furthermore, the generally applicable principle of Chapter 6 that reparation is to be awarded in a way which best corresponds to the injury suffered (Article 6:101(2) (Aim and forms of reparation)), which necessarily involves a consideration of commensurability between the award and the damage, may have particular significance here. Compensation, for example, will not be due where the infringement of a right to respect for personal dignity is trivial. Illustration 2 A sensationalist news gatherer forces a way into a hotel room in order to catch a famous person “in flagranti”. Protection against such conduct obviously calls for liability to make monetary reparation. Where, however, a hotel guest enters the wrong room by mistake, that is not normally such a serious infringement of the private life of the other guest concerned as to give rise to a claim to compensation. However, the hotel guest is of course obliged to leave the room immediately (i. e., there is a right against further intrusion) and in the event of a stubborn refusal to do that, the invasion of the private sphere ceases to be trivial. 6. Groups of cases. Furthermore, there exists today a whole spectrum of relatively firmly settled groups of cases in which the laws on non-contractual liability affirm an infringement of human dignity or, as is often said, an infringement of personality. Particular mention may be made of degrading and marginalising the social profile of a person, cases of unlawful exposure to publicity and infringements of family-related rights of personality. However, these groups of cases are not particularly stressed in the text of the provision in order not to hinder further developments and its application to specific cases. An example of unlawful exposure to publicity is to be found in the following illustration: Illustration 3 While in hospital recovering from severe head surgery, a famous actor is illicitly tracked down to his hospital room, and interviewed and photographed there by sensationalist journalists. This occurs while he is neither capable of answering questions rationally, nor even consenting to the “interview”. This amounts to a case of an infringement of his right to the protection of his personal dignity. 7. Sexual harassment; Community law; DCFR II. – 2:101 (Right not to be discriminated against). An infringement of human dignity is of course also made out in a case of sexual harassment. European Community law defines “harassment” in Council Directive 2004/ 420

Article 2:203: Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy

113/ EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods (OJ EC L 373/37 of 21 December 2004) art. 2(c) as “an unwanted conduct related to the sex of a person ... with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment”. Art. 8(2) loc. cit. provides: “Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems such measures as are necessary to ensure real and effective compensation or reparation ... for the loss and damage sustained by a person injured as a result of discrimination within the meaning of this Directive, in a way which is dissuasive and proportionate to the damage suffered. The fixing of a prior upper limit shall not restrict such compensation or reparation.” Article 2:203 does not provide merely for protection against sexual harassment. The rule also guarantees that in cases regulated by DCFR II. – 2:101 an appropriate remedy under the law on non-contractual liability is available: see DCFR II. – 2:104 (Remedies). 8.

Protection of minors. Minors require special protection from sexual assault. Illustration 4 Father F coerces his underage daughter to have sexual intercourse with the threat of killing himself otherwise. This constitutes a violation of the child’s personality; and in addition, depending on the other circumstances of the case, also an infringement of the mother and wife’s right of personality. Illustration 5 An infringement of a person’s sexual sphere through omission is also conceivable, e. g. where the administration of a home for mentally disabled minors fails to prevent young girls from engaging in sexual intercourse for which they are not emotionally and socially prepared. To deal with the specific problem area of electronic media, a Council Recommendation on the protection of minors and human dignity in audiovisual and information services has been in place since 24 September 1998, and has been expeditiously incorporated in a number of national legal systems (Evaluation Report, COM(2001) 106 final).

9. The right to liberty. Article 2:203 does not attempt to enumerate all manifestations of the infringement of another’s dignity that are relevant to the law on non-contractual liability. In light of the multifaceted nature of life, this would be impossible. However, particular mention is given to the invasion of a person’s private or indeed intimate sphere, and the infringement of another person’s liberty. By ‘liberty’ the text comprehends freedom of physical movement, i. e. the right to leave the place in which one currently finds oneself and the right not to be compelled to go to a specified place. On the other hand there is no infringement of liberty in being prevented from entering a given space or in being merely adversely affected in the freedom to resolve upon some action. Illustration 6 Without good reason an association prohibits one of its members access to the club rooms. There is no infringement of liberty to the detriment of the member of the association.

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Illustration 7 The position is the same if somebody parks a car so as to block another parked vehicle and prevent its owner, returning from a shopping trip, from driving away. This case may well be relevant from the viewpoint of the violation of a property right. It does not involve an infringement of liberty, however, for the simple reason that the driver of the car can leave the parking space at any time by other means. Illustration 8 On the other hand, liberty is infringed if someone is locked in a room – even if the occupant is lying inside with a broken leg and could not possibly have ventured from the spot. Critical is the fact that the right is infringed and not whether the right could actually have been utilised. 10. Arrest and imprisonment of innocent persons. The problem of the state’s liability in cases where innocent persons are arrested and imprisoned remains outside the scope of application of Article 2:203. This follows from Article 7:103 (Public law functions and court proceedings). 11. The right to privacy. The Article also gives express mention to the right to protection of the private sphere which is conceived as a manifestation of the right to protection of personal dignity. The right to protection of the private sphere assures every person an untouchable personal living space which everyone must respect. The ways in which the private sphere may be violated are for their part so numerous that they elude capture within an exhaustive group of cases. They include, for example, harassment and, more remotely, deliberately spying on others in their personal life. On the other hand, there is no violation of the private sphere when a photograph is taken of a private estate, albeit without permission. Such conduct may, however, amount to a violation of a property right or a violation of a legally protected interest. 12. Persons of contemporary celebrity. It must be stressed that the right to a private sphere is enjoyed by everyone and therefore also by celebrities. “Private sphere” must be understood not merely spatially, in the sense of a private dwelling (flat, house, etc). Rather it also subsists where, for example, someone wishes to eat in a restaurant alone or with friends and the existence there of a private sphere is quite independent of whether the person is or is not of current notoriety. Illustration 9 The right to a private sphere is thus infringed by someone who covertly photographs a world famous princess during her stay in a fitness studio with a hidden camera and without her knowledge while she is exercising in a separate room, or by someone who photographs her in a café in which she is chatting with friends in private company. 13. Protecting a public interest. The defence of protection of the public interest (see Article 5:203 (Protection of public interest)) is not fundamentally set against infringements of human dignity because the protection of human dignity is itself (also) in the public interest. However, that does not remove the need to consider all the circumstan422

Article 2:203: Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy

ces of the individual case when determining whether there is in fact an infringement of dignity. The defence of acting in the public interest can also assume significance in the context of Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another) where defamation takes the form of disseminating false information about another person to that person’s prejudice.

C.

Legal persons

14. Application of the general rule on legally relevant damage. The text specifically addresses only the infringements of incorporeal ‘personality rights’ (Persönlichkeitsrechte) of natural persons. The particular problem whether legal persons too are endowed with a “right of dignity” is not expressly addressed in the provision. The matter therefore falls to be resolved by judicial consideration under Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) paragraph (1)(b). See Comments on Article 1:103 (Scope of application). Depending on the current rules on fundamental rights in a given country, it is conceivable that this issue will result in diverse solutions (see Note VIII 82 under Article 2:101). On the other hand, there is no doubt that legal persons can commit a violation of a right of personality. In other words, within the framework of Article 2:203, they do not come into consideration as claimants and injured persons, but they certainly do as opponents of claims and injuring persons. That holds true also for businesses in the media. Such undertakings enjoy no constitutional protection of their existence in the sense that they cannot be called on to make reparation, even though the quantum of the claim may be such as to endanger the financial basis of the undertaking.

D.

Posthumous protection of personality rights

15. Post-mortem protection of personality and protection of one’s own rights. As already mentioned (see above, Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage), Comment B8), the problem of posthumous protection of personality rights is likewise not expressly regulated. Here too substantial reference is made to the relevant national conception of fundamental rights (see Notes VIII 71-77 under Article 2:101). The courts consequently must resolve the questions relating to posthumous protection of personality rights on the basis of Article 2:101(1)(b). Often the matter will only revolve around claims to a prohibitory order made by near relatives who are contesting a particular account of the deceased’s life. A claim to damages in such cases would only rarely come under consideration, but it is not excluded if it concerns an economic loss – for example, where unfair use is made of the deceased’s name or image for advertising purposes. However, it will not infrequently be the case that the relatives themselves can proceed on the basis of an infringement of their own rights because they are affected in their own dignity. Where a posthumous right of personality is accepted, it is also beyond question that such a right cannot be protected in perpetuity. A solution which commends itself, by analogy to the EU Directive 93/98 / EEC harmonising the term of protection of copyright art. 1(1), is to adopt at the uppermost a maximum period of 70 years from death.

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E.

Defamation (paragraph (2))

16. Defamation not specifically addressed in the Chapter 2, Section 2. Section 2 of Chapter 2 does not contain any specific provisions on defamation. That is because it appears to be extraordinarily difficult to formulate in a way which is politically acceptable some regulation in non-contractual liability law of the complex issue of protection of ‘honour’. The extent to which honour, reputation, good standing or status in society, or similar attributes of a person should be protected by the legal system is a matter of controversy among the various European jurisdictions, not least because of the correlative limitation of freedom of expression which such protection necessarily entails. Consequently, no attempt has been made directly to protect such attributes of the person in any general way. The text confines itself to providing that an injury to reputation is a legally relevant damage if this is envisaged by the applicable national law. However, where national law does not impose liability, a claim may nonetheless succeed if it involves communication of false information for which the responsible person is accountable: see Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another). 17. Criminal defamation. It has also emerged as impossible to base the rule on the minimum proposition that a legally relevant damage is at least present if the claimant is made the victim of a criminal defamation. That approach would have led to diverse legal results (since the criminal laws are not coordinated). For example, a defamatory statement which is communicated only to the individual defamed constitutes a criminal defamation in some criminal jurisdictions only (e. g. in Germany, England and Wales, but not in Austria and in Spain). Admittedly, such variations in the applicable criminal law would not have been a peculiarity of this area. The same inherent diversity is also true, for example, of liability for breach of statutory obligation (because such obligations differ from place to place) and even for liability for negligence because the way in which this concept is made concrete is and will remain dependent on local particularities. Nonetheless the problem of diversity is particularly acute here. There are some national legal systems (e. g. the Common Law ones) for which certain criminal defamations do not give rise to liability in private law. This problem of a criminal law which runs into overkill for private law purposes would necessitate an express limitation. For the purposes of liability in private law only those crimes could be regarded which serve to protect the honour and good reputation of the individual; one would have to disregard those crimes which seek to protect the public interest (e. g. preventing a disturbance of the peace or an affray) and where the making of a defamatory statement which is true is therefore criminalised. The necessity for such a limitation, however, would serve only to show that the fundamental question of when an individual should be entitled to redress for defamation would not be solved by appeal to the criminal law. For while the existence of a crime shows, by definition, that in relation to society a person has overstepped the bounds of freedom of expression, this does not automatically resolve the further question whether in relation to the claimant that act warrants a right to redress in private law. Conversely, there are also cases in which a private law liability is affirmed but the criminal law takes no cognisance of a crime. That is again particularly problematic for English law, where libel but not slander may constitute a crime and where the arguably required element of seriousness for punishment 424

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by the state excludes many non-trivial cases where non-contractual liability is recognised. The position is even starker in Scotland, which no longer recognises a criminal act of defamation. In that regard, as regards Scottish law, a provision on non-contractual liability for criminal defamation would have achieved nothing. It is in the light of such difficulties and complexities that the attempt to couple non-contractual liability for defamation at a European level with infraction of national criminal law was abandoned. 18. Freedom of expression. Obviously all European societies respect and nurture a domain for freedom of expression, quite irrespective of considerations of public interest protecting the making of statements which would otherwise be regarded as having overstepped the bounds of that freedom. However, in given circumstances, an attack on a person’s status in society may be so wanton or so severe in its means or depth, for example, that it can properly be said to have infringed a person’s right to respect for personal dignity. There may be no right to any particular level of standing in society (since society will make its own mind up about the merits of one’s character and achievements); but an individual’s right to respect for personal dignity includes the right not to have to tolerate a vicious and unjustified rubbishing of reputation.

F.

Relation to other provisions in Chapter 2, Section 2

19. Overlaps. It is conceivable that the scope of application of Article 2:203 overlaps in several cases with the scope of application of other provisions, but that does not represent a problem. The injured person in such a case would have two or even more grounds of action but naturally only one claim to compensation or other remedy. However, it may well be that in a single event a cumulative set of wrongs emerges which, in ascertaining and making good the damage done, are to be treated separately. An example would be where personal injury to a foreigner is caused by right-wing thugs simply on account of the victim’s different appearance.

Notes I.

Infringement of liberty

1.

Infringements of liberty are criminally punishable in FRANCE (NCP art. 224-1) and in BELGIUM (CP art. 434). In both countries the violation of a criminal law provision constitutes ipso facto a tortious faute civile (Carbonnier, Droit civil IV21, no. 231 p. 398); freedom of physical movement is thus an independent interest protected by the law of extra-contractual liability. The position is exactly the same in SPAIN (CP arts. 163 et seq. in conjunction with art. 109) and in ITALY. Economic loss and noneconomic loss are equally recoverable; in this respect the limits in CC art. 2059 are no longer a source of dependence and the same goes for unjust imprisonment suffered (Cass.pén. 25 November 2003-22 January 2004, no. 2050, Giur. civ. comm. 2004, I, 56).

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2.

3.

4.

In all other member states of the EU infringements of the right to freedom of physical movement are of course also counted among the independent legal interests protected by the law of tort, see e. g. for GERMANY CC §§ 823(1) in conjunction with 253(2); for PORTUGAL CC art. 483; for GREECE CC arts. 914 in conjunction with 932; for HUNGARY Const. § 55(1) and CC § 76 in conjunction with § 84(1)(e); for POLAND CC art. 445(2); for SLOVENIA LOA §§ 134 and 179; for AUSTRIA CC § 1329; for DUTCH law CC art. 6:106(1)(b) (“infringement of another right of personality”; Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12, nos. 465-467 pp. 425-430); for SWEDEN, EAL chap. 2 § 3 (infringement of liberty by a criminal offence); for FINLAND, Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 6(1) (same); for DENMARK, EAL § 26(1) and for ESTONIA LOA § 1045(3). Some of these provisions confine themselves to clarifying that in the case of an infringement of liberty a cause of action will also lie for the reparation of nonpecuniary losses. In SWEDEN these damages are termed “reparation for indignation”; in FINLAND one speaks of reparation for pain endured through indignation. Special rules are in place almost everywhere to govern the state’s liability in damages in the case of the unjust imprisonment of those wrongly presumed to be offenders. Among the torts of the COMMON LAW that compensate for the detrimental consequences of an infringement of liberty, the tort of false imprisonment is the most obvious. “False imprisonment” was defined in the IRISH case of Dullaghan v. Hillen [1957] Ir Jur 10, 15 as “unlawful and total restraint of the personal liberty of another whether by constraining him or compelling him to go to a particular place”. Surveillance is not considered false imprisonment (Finlay CJ in Kane v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison [1988] ILRM 724, 735). However false imprisonment may be psychological (Phillips v. G. N. Railway Co. Ltd. (1903) 4 NIJR 154). In some legal systems the tort law concept of the protection of liberty goes over and above the protection of freedom of physical movement. Under GREEK law it has been decided, for example, that an infringement of liberty is suffered where someone is refused access by unauthorised means to a particular room (CA Athens 807/1956, NoB 4 [1956] 624) or to a place of general use (e. g. to the beach, cf. A. P. 244/1959, NoB 8 [1960] 162). In ITALY it is recognised that some rights of liberty specifically protected under constitutional law (e. g. Const. art. 16 [freedom of movement and freedom to choose one’s place of dwelling]) assume third-party effect even between private legal persons (Bianca, Diritto civile I2, 146). In SPAIN the right to the free development of personality (libre desarollo de la personalidad) is based on the concept of the protection of liberty, which has become practical, for example, in the context of excessive noise pollution (TS 29 April 2003, RAJ 2003 (3) no. 3041 p. 5721). Additionally, liability for insufficient disclosure of information to a patient before surgical operation has been grounded on the basis of, inter alia, the concept of the infringement of personal liberty (TS 12 January 2001, RAJ 2001 (1) no. 3 p. 18), and the same applies to doctors’ liability in cases of wrongful conception (infringement of an individual’s freedom to decide upon parenthood him/herself: TS 3 October 2000, RAJ 2000 (4) no. 7799 p. 12036).

II.

The protection of incorporeal rights of personality

5.

It is generally accepted today, that not only are an individual’s bodily integrity and his freedom of physical movement protected by the law of tort, but also his incorporeal rights of personality. There exists, however, no prevailing uniformity on the extent of

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this tort law protection or on its underlying legal basis. Legal systems like the COMMON LAW work with individual, quite specific claims; further, there are other legal systems

6.

7.

8.

that have developed a comparatively large number of “specific” rights of personality; and then there are other legal systems that, because they only recognise fewer “specific” rights of personality, developed in addition to these the concept of an all-encompassing “general right of personality”. The “specific” incorporeal rights of personality are of course ultimately only distinct from the “general” ones to the extent that they have been independently elaborated upon in the relevant laws, while the “general” right of personality takes the form of a general clause, regardless of whether it has been expounded in statute, or amounts solely to the result of the judicial development of the law. FRENCH law belongs to the category of legal systems that guarantee the necessary tort law protection via a multitude of specific incorporeal rights of personality. The most extensive rule relates to the right to the protection of one’s private sphere (CC art. 9). Further, tort law protection is afforded to e. g. the right to control over the use of one’s name (Cass.civ. 5 Febraury 1968, JCP 1968, II, 15670), the right to control over the reproduction of one’s image (CA Versailles 30 June 1994, D. 1995 jur. 645, note Ravanas) and the right to control over the reproduction of one’s voice (CFI Paris 3 December 1975, JCP 1978, II, 19002, note Bécourt), the infringement of which can, however, also constitute an infringement of CC art. 9. Whether evidence of actual loss is necessary in the latter cases or whether the infringement as such already justifies a claim, does not seem to be well and truly clear; in any event non-economic damage suffices (Rép.Dr.Civ. (-Tallon) VIII, no. 148; see further CFI Nanterre 6 April 1995, GazPal 1995 jur. 285). The starting point in BELGIUM and LUXEMBURG is the same, with the only deviation being the lack of a specific statutory regulation for the protection of one’s private sphere (for a more detailed account see Guldix and Wylleman, TPR 1999, pp. 1624-1631 nos. 21-23). Here also indeed the predominant opinion is that an infringement of a right of personality is not yet sufficient per se for proving a faute and damage (see e. g. CA Brussels 8 November 1989, RGAR 1992, 11906), of course others believe that the case law to date has to be interpreted in the opposite sense (Guldix and Wylleman loc. cit. pp. 1632-1639 nos. 25-26). SPANISH law also does not recognise a “general personality right”. Nevertheless it does protect a large number of “specific” incorporeal rights of personality and indeed mostly with recourse to the correlative fundamental constitutional rights. Those cited are e. g. the prohibition of discrimination (Const. art. 14), the right to life and to bodily as well as moral integrity (Const. art. 15), the right to honour, to a personal and familial sphere of intimacy and to control over the reproduction of one’s image (Const. art. 18(1); specifically laid out and regulated for the purposes of civil law in Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act, the right to inviolability of the dwelling (Const. art. 18(2)) and the right to the safeguarding of communicative secrecy (Const. art. 18(3)). A further incorporeal personality right is the right to control over the use of one’s name (Civil Registry Act [art. 53: protection of the right to control over the use of one’s fore- and surname “against everyone”). There is debate in ITALIAN doctrine as to whether there are solely “specific” personality rights or whether these are the collective manifestation of a comprehensive “general” personality right, which lies at the root of them all (references in Cendon, Commentario al codice civile IV(2), art. 2043, no. 11.2. p. 1993). The Italian CC only expressly recognises “specific” personality rights (e. g. CC arts. 6-10: name and image).

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9.

10.

11.

428

However, the case law has for some time departed from this catalogue and accepted the existence of further subjective personality rights (like, for example, the right to the observance of one’s private sphere [Cass. 25 March 2003, no. 4366, Giust.civ. 2004, I, 2417; Cass. 10 May 2001, no. 6507, Giur. civ. comm. 2002, I, 529] and the right to one’s own identity [Cass. 7 February 1996, no. 978, Foro it. 1996, I, 1253 (relating to a body corporate); CFI Modena 23 October 1996, Riv.dir.ind. 1997, II, 177; CFI Rome 10 February 1993, Foro it. 1994, I, 1237; CFI Rome 27 March 1984, Foro it. 1984, I, 1687]). Since the incorporeal personality rights are clothed with constitutional protection, the earlier difficulties in the context of the recoverability of non-patrimonial losses have been surmounted by the recent developments in the interpretation of CC art. 2059; these losses are now also recoverable (Cass. 18 March 2005, no. 5677, Dir. e Giust. 2005, fasc. 19, 38: non-patromonial loss caused by affronts to dignity or reputation even falls to be compensated where no criminal offence has been thereby committed; the limits of CC art. 2059 are not determinative, where personality rights of a constitutional degree are involved). HUNGARY is one of the countries in which, along with the classic specific rights of personality (name, image, voice, honour and good name and reputation, secrecy of postal correspondence, protection of personal intellectual creations etc.), the concept of a general right of personality is also recognised (CC §§ 75 and 84; Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1343; Gellért (-Zoltán), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 267-272; Petrik (-Petrik), Polgári jog I2, 160/26-171; AB határozat 8/ 1990. (IV. 23.)). Violations of human dignity and freedom of belief are, inter alia, qualified as infringements of the general right of personality (CC § 76). A personality right to education would also exist, for the violation of which (e. g. by a college that does not refer to the nullity of a concluded training contract in a timely fashion: BH 2004/235) non-economic damages have also been provided in case law. SLOVENIAN LOA § 181 under the heading “violation of dignity” provides a claim to reparation of non-patrimonial losses to those persons who are made the victim of an infringement of their right to sexual self-determination or the victim of a criminal offence against their dignity. POLISH CC arts. 23 and 24 protect the individual’s rights of personality by means of numerous legal remedies (prohibitive injunction, retraction, damages). It is expressly stated that these rights of personality include “freedom, dignity, [and] freedom of conscience”. Among the legal systems that invoke the construct of a “general right of personality” even in their civil codes, are GREECE (CC art. 57) and PORTUGAL (CC art. 70(1)). Both codes additionally outline a range of “specific” rights of personality; PORTUGUESE CC e. g. the post-mortem personality right (art. 71), the right to control over the use of one’s name (arts. 72 and 73), the right to control over the use of one’s pseudonym (art. 74), rights to confidential postal correspondence (arts. 75 and 76), family memoirs and other confidential manuscripts (art. 77), to non-confidential postal correspondence (art. 78), to control over the reproduction of one’s image (art. 79) and the right to the protection of the intimacy of one’s private life (art. 80). GERMANY and AUSTRIA also operate with the concept of a general right of personality. In GERMANY it was exclusively developed by case law, which based itself directly on the provisions of the Constitution on the protection of human dignity (Const. art. 1) and the right to the free development of one’s personality (Const. art. 2(1)) (the seminal case of BGH 25 May 1954, BGHZ 13, 334, 338; see further, inter alia, BGH 2 April

Article 2:203: Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy

12.

13.

14.

15.

1957, BGHZ 24, 72, 76; BGH 20 March 1968, BGHZ 50, 133, 143; BGH 5 December 1995, NJW 1996, 984; BGH 1 December 1999, NJW 2000, 2195, 2197). Damages for non-patrimonial losses awarded for significant infringements of this general right of personality assume an exemplary or deterrent character, primarily as against the mass media, which in turn is the reason for the comparatively high sums of compensation (BGH 15 November 1994, BGHZ 128, 1, 15; BGH 5 December 1995, NJW 1996, 984). The claim in non-patrimonial damages is based directly on Const. arts. 2(1) in conjunction with 1 (BVerfG 8 March 2000, NJW 2000, 2187, 2188; MünchKomm (-Oetker), BGB4, § 253, no. 14). In AUSTRIA, CC § 16 was previously (i. e. before CC § 1328a [right to protection of one’s private sphere] came into force on 1 January 2004) relied upon. Today, inter alia, the right to bodily integrity, honour, protection of commercial reputation, to control over the reproduction of one’s image, to the observance of one’s private sphere, to the restraint of telephone calls, tape and picture recording and to the post mortem protection of one’s personality rights, fall under this provision (see particularly OGH 27 February 1990, SZ 63/32, according to which CC § 16 essentially protects human dignity, and OGH 18 December 1992, SZ 65/166, which states that the general moral concepts of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitution permeate the system of private law through CC § 16). Whether there is also a “general” right of personality in addition to these specific situations, however, has not yet been conclusively clarified (for an overview of the differing approaches see Rummel (-Aicher), ABGB I3, § 16 nos. 12 et seq.). DUTCH CC art. 6:162(2) protects “rights” of every kind. CC art. 6:106(1)(b) grants a claim to reparation of non-patrimonial losses, “where the victim has suffered bodily injuries, his honour or good name and reputation have been tarnished or his state of personality has been harmed by other means”. Among these latterly named harmful acts are invasions of one’s private sphere (HR 9 January 1987, NedJur 1987 no. 928 p. 3139); infringements of dignity (damage to one’s feeling of self worth and to one’s estimation in the eyes of third parties as a consequence of media torts) are litigated in the context of infringements of honour and reputation (Schadevergoeding II (-Lindenbergh), art. 6:106, no. 27.1 pp. 195-204). Incorporeal rights of personality, so it is stated, have their source typically in the constitution and international treaties on the protection of human rights referred to (in art. 93). It is even debated, whether such rights of personality are to be understood as the fallout from a general and unenumerated basic norm located on the periphery of the four corners of the CC, so that reliance on the rights listed in CC art. 6:162(2) is “in fact” not at all necessary and that one should in fact rely on the infringement of the “unwritten norms of social interaction” mentioned in CC art. 6:162(3). The case law has taken both paths, without it actually having a practical effect on the outcome (for a more detailed account, with references, see Jansen, Onrechtmatige Daad: algemene bepalingen2, art. 6:162(2) nos. 7-8, pp. 75-95 and no. 32 p. 262). ESTONIAN LOA § 1046 states that “the defamation of a person, inter alia, by passing undue judgement, by the unjustified use of the name or image of the person, or by breaching the inviolability of the private life or another personality right of the person is unlawful unless otherwise provided by law.” In the NORDIC countries the term “right of personality” is to a great extent unknown and in any event unusual. It has been deemed too difficult to define the scope of a

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16.

17.

18.

430

general right of privacy or personality, both under the constitutional and private law (Strömholm, SvJT 1971, 695; Strömholm, Right to Privacy and Rights of Personality, 59; Stenvik, TfR 2003, 601). The protection of privacy and personality is thus based on a series of specific statutes; ‘horizontal’ effects of ECHR art. 8 are denied (Swedish HD 29 October 2007, NJA 2007, 747). The national laws on damages operate predominantly with the concept of reparation for “affronts”, and compensation sometimes requires the existence of a crime (SWEDISH EAL chap. 2 § 3). Some specially drafted statutory regulations supplement these general laws, see e. g. for Sweden: Prohibition of Discrimination Act § 16 and § 21 (reversal of the burden of proof – on which see HD 28 March 2006, NJA 2006, 170 [damages for injured feelings awarded to a lesbian couple who were ejected from a restaurant after kissing there), Credit Information Act (Kreditupplysningslag) § 21, Personal Data Act (Personuppgiftslag) § 48, further the system of liability under the Names and Pictures in Advertising Act (Lag om namn och bild i reklam) and the definitively and fully independently regulated system of liability of the press in the Freedom of the Press Act (Tryckfrihetsförordningen) as well as in the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression (Yttrandefrihetsgrundlag) (DENMARK, which likewise has a Law on Media at its disposal, but subjects the liability of the press to the general law of tort, even in the case of the unauthorised publication of images taken from the private life of the person concerned, cf. e. g. Eastern CA 16 April 1985, UfR 1986, 405 and Eastern CA 23 October 1990, UfR 1991, 194). Of particular note in FINNISH case law are Supreme Court 1 April 1982, HD 1982, II, 36 (publication of a photo of an officer in a tourism brochure; liability affirmed because no person may be represented in such a brochure without his or her permission, but no infringement of privacy arose solely from the mere fact that the officer had worn his uniform without the complete consent of the Garnisonsordre) and Supreme Court 15 October 1986, HD 1986, II, 131 (advertisement for a newspaper on television; no infringement of the rights of the celebrity legitimately represented in the newspaper arose solely out of the mere fact that he had not consented to the newspaper’s advertisement). In the meantime, however, FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 6(1) nos. 2-4 have advanced towards the concept of the general protection of one’s personality. According to these provisions, “2) any person who through a criminally punishable offence is discriminated against, 3) any person whose personal integrity is seriously affronted, either intentionally or through gross negligence”, as well as “4) any person, whose human merit is affronted intentionally or through gross negligence and in such a way that is comparable to no. 1-3” has a claim in damages. Similar provisions are indeed to be found in SWEDEN and in DENMARK, but they are more narrowly formulated. ENGLISH law does not recognise a “general right of personality”; it does not even recognise an “overarching, all-embracing cause of action for ‘invasion of privacy’” (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457; [2004] 2 WLR 1232, 1236 at 11). Essential aspects of the protection of incorporeal rights of personality, however, do fall within the scope of the new interpretation of the tort of breach of confidence (for more detail, see below Note III 28). In IRELAND there prevails the concept of acknowledging a civil wrong where an individual’s constitutional right has been interfered with – “constitutional torts”, see Meskell v. Córas Iompair Éireann [1973] IR 121, 133 (Walsh J). The protection of expressly enumerated fundamental rights is drawn from Const. arts. 40-44 (e. g. personal liberty, inviolability of the dwelling, freedom of expression and freedom of conscience

Article 2:203: Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy

and the free profession and practice of religion. Moreover, certain unenumerated rights are derived from Const. art. 40.3.1, the existence of which was first recognised by Kenny J in Ryan v. A-G [1965] IR 294, who extended the recognition of unspecified “personal rights” founded upon the “Christian and democratic nature of the State”. Among the list of rights that do not enjoy express reference in the Constitution but have yet been deemed by the judiciary as warranting protection are, inter alia, the right of bodily integrity and the right to (marital) privacy. However, in the context of private law, the age-old common law practice of having to crowbar one’s cause of action within specific cases in which a tort has been affirmed (see note II 5) results in the prevailing idea that there is no need for a clearly defined notion of a “general” incorporeal right of personality and hence the lack of any reference to the notion of specific personality rights where private law comes into play. The unfolding of this judicial predilection for clinging to previously acknowledged torts instead of delving into the realms of constitutional law in order to found a cause of action in a private law context (thus hampering the advancement of “constitutional torts”) begins with the statement of Henchy J in Hanrahan v. Merck, Sharpe & Dohme (Ireland) Ltd. [1988] ILRM 629 that “[a] person may of course in the absence of a common law or statutory cause of action, sue directly for breach of a constitutional right ... but when he founds his action on an existing tort he is normally confined to the limitations of that tort”. In W. v. Ireland (No. 2) [1997] IEHC 212, [1997] 2 IR 141 Costello P considered obiter that constitutionally guaranteed rights might be split into two categories: first those which, independently of the Constitution, were regulated and protected by law (common law and statutory law) and secondly, those that were not so regulated and protected. Costello P concluded (in compliance with Meskell and Hanrahan) that it was well established that for the latter class of rights the Constitution was to be construed as providing a separate cause of action for damages for breach of a constitutional right. Barrington J then stated in McDonnell v. Ireland [1998] 1 IR 134, 148 that “[i]f the general law provides an adequate cause of action to vindicate a constitutional right it appears to me that the injured party cannot ask the Court to devise a new and different cause of action”. Indeed it has been succinctly noted in commentary that “the courts, having established the principle that the infringement of constitutional rights, by the State or by private individuals, warrants a remedy in the form of damages or an injunction, have baulked at the prospect of replacing the pre-existing statutory and common law remedies by a new constitutional remedial regime but they have not repudiated the principle. Instead they have sought to mitigate its practical effects by looking to the pre-existing law as the medium through which the constitutional remedy should be channelled in most cases” (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 1.60). In a private law context, one’s right to a good name (Const. art. 40.3.1) is traditionally protected under the tort of defamation, without direct recourse to the Constitution. However, this preference for pre-existing torts is most vividly seen where in spite of a right to privacy being recognised as an unenumerated constitutional right, its existence under private law is nevertheless catered for by a range of different torts (shaped for different circumstances in which it has been infringed), leading to such an unsatisfactory state that reform in this area has been mooted and indeed a Privacy Bill published (see below Note III 29). It may be argued, however, that in the case of Norris v. A-G [1984] IR 36, 71, in stating that “[a]mongst those basic personal rights is a complex of rights which vary in nature, purpose and range (each necessarily being a facet of the citizen’s core of individuality within the constitutional

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order) and which may be compendiously referred to as the right of privacy”, Henchy J (dissenting) was acknowledging the existence of such a general right of personality (albeit clothing it in the language of a right of privacy) and using privacy as the linchpin for all rights of personality. However, although this dictum has been since cited (in A Ward of Court, Re [1996] 2 IR 73), nothing has come of the opportunity herein presented to use this statement as a conceptual hook upon which to place a group of such rights and to hence develop Henchy J’s exposition in order to forge either a “general”, catch-all right of personality or to derive other specific rights of personality therefrom. The right over the use of one’s actual name (dealt with under the tort of passing off) is seen in a commercial and above all proprietary sense, which is difficult to reconcile with the ideology that such a right falls under the heading of an incorporeal right of personality requiring protection by the fact of being an inherent feature of one’s personality, inextricably linked to human dignity. The conceptual understanding of the equitable realm of breach of confidence has also been connected to this proprietary idea (the dicta of Lord Denning MR and Winn LJ in Seager v. Copydex Ltd. (No. 2) [1969] 1 WLR 809 give some support for the argument that an analogy can be drawn with the tort of conversion of a property interest). As has been noted, however, whereas confidential information of a commercial kind might be regarded as property, this is hardly the case with most personal intimate confidences (McMahon and Binchy, loc. cit. para. 37.22). On the issue of whether constitutional infringements constitute a case of injuria sine damno, viz. whether they are actionable per se, although in the case of Kearney Kearney v. Minister for Justice, Ireland and the A-G [1986] IR 116, Costello J regarded the infringement of a prisoner’s constitutional right to communicate as actionable without proof of damage, one cannot conclude that this is so in all cases (McMahon and Binchy, loc. cit. para. 1.63). In SCOTLAND, the 1998 Human Rights Act entered into force on 2 October 2000 (in order to “give further effect” to the European Convention on Human Rights). The horizontality of this act has not yet been definitively clarified in case law (MacQueen, (2003) 78 TulLRev 363), with the practice also being to use established protected legal interests under the law of delict, rather than developing or indeed recognising any incorporeal rights of personality as such. The position in Scotland is a little closer to that in Civil Law jurisdictions here, as can be seen from a look at the general context of liability for an actio injuriarum. Here it has been stated that injuria is actionable at least for solatium if the injuria, referred to as “the insult or affront to personality”, and animus injuriandi are proved, without proof of any actual or patrimonial loss (Walker, Delict2, 40). Self-esteem and honour are protected from unjustifiable attack, as are public reputation and good name in the eyes of others (Walker loc. cit. 729; see below Note IV 42). Publicity with respect to private matters of purely personal concern is an injury to personality which is protected in “pockets of liability” rather than by a general right (MacQueen, (2004) 8 Edinburgh LRev 248, 251). The kind of cases in which the issue of the recognition of the right to privacy has traditionally arisen include the publication of a photograph taken surreptitiously and without consent (Pollard v. Photographic Co. (1889) 40 Ch. D 345, arguendo), the use of a person’s name or title or photograph or other reference to or representation of him in an advertisement without his consent (cf. Tolley v. J. S. Fry & Sons Ltd. [1931] AC 333), the unauthorised use of a person’s name in bogus testimonials published in advertisements (cf. Mazatti v. Acme Products Ltd. [1930] 4 DLR 601), and the publication of a biography of a distinguished person without that

Article 2:203: Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy

person’s permission, knowledge or co-operation, and against his wishes (Walker loc. cit.). It is evident from this list that here privacy is seen as a wider source of various rights of personality, including the right to control over the use of one’s name and image, although in recent decisions, it has in fact been the idea of breach of confidence that has been extended and applied to cover the wider area of personality rights (see Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457; Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. (No. 3) [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch), 3 All ER 996 (Lindsay J); and A v. B plc. [2002] EWCA Civ 337, [2003] QB 195). III.

The right to privacy

20.

The right to privacy has gained particular distinction in certain jurisdictions. Thus, under FRENCH CC art. 9 “everyone has the right to respect for his private life” and when this right is infringed, the courts have opened up the law to a broad range of possible remedies. The exact meaning of the term vie privée has not been defined by statute. Further developments continue to be left to the courts. Primarily what is meant is family and private life, everyday domestic events, a person’s state of health, his or her love-life and emotional life, his or her friendships and holidays, private aspects of his or her working life and also the place and type of his or her funeral (Cornu, Droit civil10, no. 516 pp. 234-235). Overlap with other personal rights is also conceivable (e. g. Cass.civ. 10 June 1987, Bull.civ. 1987, I, no. 191 p. 141: the infringement of vie privée as well as of droit à l’image if an actress is photographed against her will leaving the hospital in a wheelchair). CC art. 9 is even brought into play as the basis for the recognition of a change of sex after an operation (Cass.ass.plén. 11 December 1992, Bull.civ. [ass.plén.] 1992 no. 13 p. 27). The legitimate interests of others, however, remain unaffected by CC art. 9 (e. g. Cass.civ. 6 May 1999, Bull.civ. 1999, II, no. 85 p. 63: the use of diary entries as evidence of infidelity in divorce proceedings permitted). Infringements of CC art. 9 lead to a claim in damages even when proof of actual damage or a faute is absent (Cass.civ. 5 November 1996, Bull.civ. 1996, I, no. 378 p. 265). In BELGIAN law the starting point for the law of obligations in this area is also Const. art. 22, which guarantees to every person the right to a private and family life. To date, a generally accepted definition of these terms does not exist. Generally what is meant is the freedom of an individual to shape his own life and the protection of the confidentiality of his personal living space (de Theux, Ann. Louv. 2002, 287, 293-297). Claims in damages are subject to the general prerequisites of CC arts. 1382 and 1383 (e. g. CA Gent 12 June 2001, TBBR 2003, 305, note Sottiaux: the liability of a newspaper that – truthfully – had reported on the homosexual disposition of a member of a music band). In SPANISH law the right to privacy has its foundations in Const. art. 18 as well as in the Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act. The Spanish jurisprudence extends the right to privacy quite broadly. It covers e. g. the right to peace and relaxation (TS 29 April 2003, RAJ 2003 (3) no. 3041 p. 5721; see also Martín Vida, VersRAI 2004, 20-23; Martín Vida, VersRAI 2005, 57-63 and 2006, 58) (not however a claim in damages or an injunction where the marital obligation of fidelity is infringed: TS 22 July 1999, RAJ 1999 (3) no. 5721 p. 8928 and TS 30 July 1999, RAJ 1999 (3) no. 5726 p. 8933). The right to privacy encompasses the right to personal information; no one is permitted to interfere with the confidential documents

21.

22.

433

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23.

24.

25.

26.

434

concerning another’s private life (Balaguer Callejón, Los derechos fundamentals al honor, 102). Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act art. 7 lists as impermissible injurious behaviour, inter alia, the installation of bugging devices and photographic equipment, and further, methods of spying on private communication and the publishing of confidential information relating to the person. Moreover, the law expressly protects one’s private family life (intimidad familiar). The ITALIAN jurisprudence has also recognised the right to privacy. It aims to protect the confidentiality of personal and familial affairs and information from the curiosity of others; infringing this right constitutes a danno ingiusto in the sense of CC art. 2043 (Cass. 25 March 2003, no. 4366, Giust.civ.Mass. 2003, 594). During the development of the right to privacy, originally a claim was based on a correlative application of the rules on certain “specific” personal rights (right to control over the reproduction of one’s own image [CC art. 10], right to correspondence [Copyright Act arts. 93-97], right to restrain publication of a manuscript [Copyright Act arts. 21-24] etc.), on ECHR art. 8 and, as far as the existence of an all-encompassing “general” personal right was granted, on Const. art. 2. Later, Statute 675/96 on the protection of private data brought express statutory recognition to the right to privacy, if only for a specified area. The limits of the right to privacy are established through a balancing of interests on a case-by-case basis (Cian and Trabucchi, Commentario breve6, arts. 1-10, § IV, nos. 1-3). The HUNGARIAN Constitutional Court (AB határozat 8/1990 [IV. 23.]) stresses that the general right of personality is a subsidiary basic right, to which the civil courts may refer, if a more concrete basis for a claim is absent. Violations of privacy often fall under this category (Gellért (-Zoltán), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 274-279) unless in specially regulated cases like the invasion into private secrets or the right to a private dwelling. The protection afforded to an individual’s private sphere is based on the protection of human dignity (AB határozat 46/1991 [IX. 10.]). Examples relate, for instance, to truthful press reports about the sexual behaviour of private persons (BH 2004/103), the right to know one’s own descent and the right that no outsider negates an existing relationship between relatives (AB határozat 57/1991 [XI. 8.]; Petrik (-Petrik), Polgári jog I2, 168-171). SLOVENIAN LOA § 134 provides the courts with a broad spectrum of remedies in the case of contravention of the “inviolability of the person, personal and family life or any other personal right”. In GERMANY the right to privacy is a component of the judicially developed general personality right (e. g. BVerfG 19 December 1995, BVerfGE 101, 361, 382 and BGH 15 December 1999, BGHZ 131, 332, 338). One’s sphere of privacy, so it is stated, “does not end at the front door ... if in the first instance it encompasses the inner area between the four walls of one’s house in a spatial sense. Privacy worthy of protection exists equally outside the house ... when one places one’s self in a secluded area in which it is objectively evident that there exists the wish to be by one’s self” (BGH 9 December 2003, JZ 2004, 622, note v. Gerlach). Therefore, an intrusion into one’s privacy also occurs if someone “by surmounting existing obstacles or with suitable aids (e. g. telephoto lens, ladder or aeroplane), spies on the living space of another” (BGH 9 December 2003 loc. cit.). In contrast, the right to privacy is again the subject of an express statutory regulation in AUSTRIA (CC § 1328a; in force since 1 January 2004) and in Portugal (CC art. 80). Under Austrian CC § 1328a illegal and culpable intrusion into one’s privacy and actions, through which a person’s private affairs are revealed or exploited, leads to liability

Article 2:203: Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy

27.

28.

29.

for the compensation of pecuniary and, in cases of considerable infringements, also for non-pecuniary damage (see Helmich, ecolex 2003, 888). According to PORTUGUESE CC art. 80 everyone must “respect the intimate private life of another. The scope of this protection is defined based on the facts of each case and the living conditions of the person in question”. Similar protective measures are to be found in GREEK CC art. 57. In DUTCH law violations of privacy fall under CC art. 6:106(1)(b) and justify a claim to compensation of non-pecuniary damage (Memorie van Antwoord II, Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 380; HR 30 October 1987, NedJur 1988 no. 277 pp. 1097-1107; HR 1 November 1991, NedJur 1992 no. 58 pp. 177-180; Asser (-Hartkamp) Verbintenissenrecht I12, nos. 465 and 467, pp. 425-430). The ESTONIAN LOA § 1046(1) expressly classifies contraventions of “the inviolability of the private life or another personal right” as illegal acts. On this aspect, see Supreme Court 3-2-1-161-06, RT III 2006, 23, 209. In the NORDIC countries numerous statutory instruments for the protection of individual aspects of privacy are in place, among them is also the right against unauthorised publications of one’s portrait; see Notes II 15-16 above. Incidentally, the right to compensation for indignation does the necessary work here (loc. cit.). Here the natural starting point is the Damages Liability Act chap. 2 § 3 (“Any person who offends another through wrongdoing, which includes an attack on the person, on his or her freedom, on his or her ability to live peaceably, or on his or her honour, has to compensate the injured party for damage suffered.” The protection of someone’s ability to live peaceably includes the right to be left in peace and consequently not to be obliged to extend one’s private life to others (Sandstedt, VersRAI 2002, 9, 10). This is also the law under the relevant formulation of the DANISH EAL § 26 (see also, inter alia, Eastern CA 24 September 2004, UfR 2005, 123). The FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 6(1) no. 1 expressly states that privacy enjoys protection under the law of torts (for a more detailed account see Supreme Court 19 December 2005, HD 2005 no. 136; Supreme Court 25 August 2000, HD 2000 no. 83 and Sisula-Tulokas, JFT 2000, 634). In ENGLAND it has been repeatedly stressed that there is no tort of invasion of privacy as such: Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457, 464 (Lord Nicholls); Wainwright v. Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 at [28]-[35]; [2004] 2 AC 406 (Lord Hoffmann). The absence of a tort of infringement of privacy has led to a degree of (controversial) judicial creativity to fill a perceived gap in the tort law armoury prior to the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, which enshrined protection of “Convention rights” under the ECHR as part of domestic law. To this end, even before the 1998 Act, breach of confidence was “shoehorned” into service (Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. (No. 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595 [at 53]; [2006] QB 125), since if the information gathered by an intrusion, e.g by the media, is confidential and disclosure prohibitive the incentive to intrude is emaciated: see, for example, Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804, 807 (Laws J: someone using a telephoto lens to take at a distance a picture of a private act would be in breach of confidence in disclosing that photograph). It is now clear that the values enshrined in ECHR art. 8 and 10 permeate the cause of action for breach of confidence (see Note 11 to Article 2:205 (Loss upon breach of confidence)). However, other torts may also serve to protect rights of privacy, e. g. trespass to goods can be invoked in respect of a mere handling of papers: Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Rossminster Ltd. [1980] AC 952, 1011 (Lord Diplock). Although the law in IRELAND had been slow to recognise a general “right to privacy”, interference with which causes a tort, such a right has been recognised as a constitu-

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tional right since 1987 (Kennedy & Arnold v. Ireland [1987] 1 IR 587, a case involving telephone-tapping). Rather than delving into the realm of the law of torts the courts have developed this right under Const. art. 40.3.1 (see also, in relation to a marital couple’s access to contraceptive facilities, McGee v. A-G [1974] IR 284). Privacy interests are however still subject to tort law actions (see in more detail McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 994), particularly to: (i) Trespass to land (e. g. Whelan v. Madigan [1978] ILRM 136 (HC); see, however, the Law Reform Commission‘s Consultation Paper on Privacy: Surveillance and the Interception of Communications (1996), para. 4.4: this tort does not extend to surveillance activities which are conducted outside the boundaries of the property); (ii) torts affecting interests in goods, e. g. trespass to goods (The People (D. P. P.) v. Morgan (1980) 114 ILTR 60, 62 [a person takes another’s diary and reads it]); (iii) trespass to the person (which however requires physical contact or threat of such contact); (iv) intentional infliction of mental suffering (improper techniques of investigations, intimidatory debt collection, harassment of tenants by landlords); (v) private nuisance (intrusions on the ability of a person to live peaceably in his or her home); (vi) injurious falsehood (see Law Reform Commission loc. cit. paras. 4.22-4.24); (vii) negligence (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. 997); and (viii) breach of statutory duty (disclosure of confidential information by semi-state agencies, see House of Spring Gardens Ltd. v. Point Blank Ltd. [1984] IR 611 (Sup.Ct.); Private Research Ltd. v. Brosnan [1996] 1 ILRM 27, 31 (HC) and Cogley v. Radio Telifis Éireann [2005] IEHC 180, [2005] 4 IR 79). The publication of a new privacy bill (Privacy Bill 2006) based on recommendations put forward by the Working Group on Privacy has recently been approved by the Government in order to adapt to recent court decisions in Ireland and Europe in the area of privacy. The main purpose of this Bill is to introduce a modern statutory framework to protect all citizens from the invasion of their privacy. The Bill creates a specific tort to violate the privacy of an individual, which is actionable without proof of special damages. In deciding whether or not a breach of privacy has taken place and in assessing the extent to which a defendant may be liable for damages for any such breach, a court may have regard to factors such as the extent to which an individual has engaged in surveillance of another, the means used and the extent to which the individual has engaged in the harassment of another or has trespassed upon the property of another. In SCOTLAND, notwithstanding the entry into force of the 1998 Human Rights Act on 2 October 2000, the statement still holds true that the law has “not yet fully recognised the interest which an individual has that his private and personal affairs shall not be unjustifiably pried into and disclosed to outsiders” (Walker, Delict2, 703). In seeking a definition of privacy, it has been pointed out that “access, attention, and information are all necessary components of privacy” (Hogg, (1992) SLT 349). It has been submitted that the principle of actio injuriarum would justify a Scottish court in giving a remedy for unjustifiable infringement of privacy (Walker loc. cit. 704; Hogg, loc. cit. 351). That a privacy right might develop in Scotland was noted by the Calcutt Report, in recognising that “a common law right to privacy could possibly develop in Scotland, where there is a more general concept of culpa ... compared with the more narrowly-drawn English torts” (Committee on Privacy and Related Matters, Cm 1102, July 1992, para. 12.2). However, in Martin v. Mcguiness 2003 SLT 1424 arguments based on actio injuriarum were submitted by counsel for the pursuer, essentially asserting that the court had a duty to develop the existing law to be compatible with the ECHR, and that the actio injuriarum provided a basis for the protection of privacy in Scots law. Lord Bonomy merely noted

Article 2:203: Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy

the submissions made on this point, deciding the case on other grounds, “giving little support to any development of the law in this particular way” (MacQueen, (2004) 8 Edinburgh LRev 249, 253). The difficulty with any possible attempt to develop the common law to create a general obligation to respect individual privacy is the fact that “privacy is so multi-faceted that generalisation by judges arising from particular cases is dangerous, and that the responsibility for the creation of a general right, if that is needed or desirable, should fall on the legislature”. Instead of having an express privacy right, “[p]rivacy, as with other interests, is protected, but in pockets of liability, rather than in general” (MacQueen loc. cit., 251). Such cases in which the claim over a right to privacy has been incidentally grafted onto other causes of action include causes of action primarily in libel (Monson v. Tussaud [1894] 1 QB 671; Tolley v. J. S. Fry & Sons Ltd. [1931] AC 333), infringement of copyright (Williams v. Settle [1960] 1 WLR 1072) and breach of confidence (Pollard v. Photographic Co. (1889) 40 Ch. D 345). The essence of the wrong consists in bringing the name, characteristics, appearance or facts relating to the pursuer into the public notice without the consent of the pursuer or legal justification (Walker loc. cit.). Telephone tapping and intercepting information being communicated also falls under an infringement of privacy (Walker loc. cit. 706). Where a person has been charged with crime and liberalised on bail, photographs and finger-prints may not be taken without consent, and to do so is illegal and actionable (Adamson v. Martin 1916 SC 319). Nor in such a case may a person be searched, or have his finger-prints taken or scrapings taken from under his fingernails (McGovern v. H. M. Advocate 1950 JC 33). A person who is merely charged cannot be subjected to medical examination without his consent, though he may be observed medically (Reid v. Nixon 1948 JC 68; Forrester v. H. M.Advocate 1952 JC 28; Farrell v. Concannon 1957 JC 12; McKie v. H. M. Advocate 1958 JC 24). The clearest case of infringement of privacy is where a wrongful or unwarranted search is made of the pursuer’s premises, and such facts are recognised as wrongful (Walker loc. cit. 707). In a civil action, Lord Jauncey described the act of asking a woman in police custody to remove her brassiere as “not justified in law” and an “invasion of privacy” as well as of liberty (Henderson v. Chief Constable of Fife Police 1988 SLT 361). Based on this decision, it has been submitted in scholarly writing that this case supports the award of damages for the invasion of the right to privacy (Hogg loc. cit. 351). In considering a claim for infringement of privacy, countervailing social interests (freedom of speech and of the press, the reasonable interest of individuals in the lives and deeds of persons prominent in the community and the public interest in government and the administration of justice) have to be weighed (Walker loc. cit. 708). Although the notion of public interest (as a counterbalancing factor against one’s privacy) is normally seen from the vantage point of freedom of speech and of press (as indispensable elements of a democratic society), it has also been noted in case law that “the interest of an individual in his own privacy is itself a public interest” (Parks v. Tayside Regional Council 1989 SC 38, 42). Despite the lack of a general right of privacy, it has been argued that over the last two decades the law of confidence has been continually evolving to fill the gaps left by the lack of a statute based privacy law (Mackenzie, (2002) SLT 98, 99). In light of the constantly adapting interpretation of breach of confidence in order to cater for this area, the practical effects of the denial of a general right to privacy in Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457 are not as major as it would seem at first blush.

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IV.

Defamation

31.

Under the law governing liability for affronts to honour, some not-so-insignificant distinctions once again crop up, especially between the common law and the civil law; in this branch of the law, even among the civil law countries, some very different regulatory techniques have developed. It is the settled case law of the FRENCH Courts to rule that an affront to another person’s honour (atteinte à l’honneur et à la considération) constitutes a tortious faute (see solely CA Paris 8 October 1985, D. 1986 I. R. 190, note Lindon); furthermore, affronts to honour are normally liable to criminal prosecution. CC art. 9-1 provides protection from the publication of the name of an accused party, who has not yet been convicted and can therefore rely on the presumption of innocence “the respect for which is the right of all”. In BELGIUM varying standpoints subsist on the question of whether the protection of honour is to be understood as an independent category of tort law or simply as a case encompassed by the application of the protection of one’s private sphere (see in detail de Theux, Ann. Louv. 2002, 287, 300); it is indisputable, however, that affronts to honour fall under the normal requirements of CC arts. 1382 and 1383, amounting to a claim in damages (e. g. CA Gent 28 March 2002, RW 2003-2004, 507). SPANISH Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act art. 7(7) defines difamación as a statement of fact or value judgement, through which an individual’s dignity is violated by means of injury to their good name and reputation or detriment to their self-estimation; this extensively overlaps with the definition of injuria (affront) in CP art. 208 (Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 51) (“defamation/affront is an act or expression, which violates a person’s dignity through the injury to their reputation or detriment to their self-estimation. Only those affronts that – due to their form, consequences and circumstances – are deemed to be severe by public opinion, amount to a criminal offence. Affronts implicit in the imputation of having committed a criminal offence are not to be deemed severe, unless they are carried out with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth”. In ITALIAN law a distinction is drawn between honour (onore), decorum (decoro) and reputation (reputazione). Onore relates to the sum of a person’s moral qualities, decoro to their remaining qualities and reputazione to their estimation in society, whereby in turn personal reputation is distinguished from professional reputation. Legal entities, political parties and religious communities can bring a claim based on an injury to reputation. The civil law protection of honour and reputation goes over and above that under criminal law (CP arts. 594 et seq.). This is due to the fact that negligence suffices for civil liability (Cass. 13 May 1958, no. 1563, Rep.Giur.it. 1959, Resp. uso mezzi diffusione, no. 9; Cass. 18 October 1984, no. 5259, Giur.it. 1985, I, 1, 1100; Visintini, I fatti illeciti I2, 334); moreover, civil law protection steps in even where the defamatory statement is made to one single third party (Cass. 13 October 1972, no. 3045, Giur.it. 1973, I, 1, 36). Furthermore, liability for justifiably catering to the public’s interest in important information can yet be excluded even where the complete criminal law defence of exceptio veritatis was not available to the defendant (Cass. 12 December 1955, Giur.it. 1956, I, 326; Cass. 24 April 1962, no. 816, Foro it. 1962, I, 1722; Cass. 28 March 1974, no. 868, Foro it. 1974, I, 1358; Cass. 24 May 2002, no. 7628, Foro it. 2002, I, 2322).

32.

33.

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34.

35.

36.

37.

HUNGARIAN CC § 76 expressly counts “honour”, along with human dignity, as an interest worthy of tort law protection; CC § 78(1) additionally enumerates one’s good reputation/name. Honour, as is stated, concerns a value judgement that has formed in society about a human being (whether bodies corporate can suffer an injury to their “honour” is controversial). Unreasonable and unjustifiably injurious, abasing or degrading statements or behaviour can even lead to liability for an affront to honour, where their core fact assertion is true; in each individual case it always depends on the result of balancing the injury with the fundamental right to the free expression of one’s opinions (Petrik (-Petrik), Polgári jog I2, 178/2). In cases of a “disparagement of honour”, AUSTRIAN CC § 1330(1) in conjunction with § 1295 provides a claim for patrimonial damages and lost gains, not however in noneconomic damages. The latter are only recoverable where statute expressly so provides (CC § 1340), and that is precisely not the case with CC § 1330(1) (Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht II12, 327; Bydlinski, JBl 1965, 237, 252; OGH 26 September 1951, EvBl 1951/487 p 618). Conversely, GERMAN CC § 823(1) does not list honour as among the absolute rights protected by this provision. According to the original spirit of this law, civil liability for affronts to honour should be dependent on the existence of a criminal offence in the case in question (CC § 823(2)). Today liability for affronts to honour fall however within the scope of the “general right of personality” afforded under § 823(1) (e. g. BGH 5 March 1963, BGHZ 39, 124, 129). In GREECE “honour” is undoubtedly counted among the interests protected under CC arts. 57 et seq.; a culpable affront to honour results in liability under CC art. 914, without the requirement of having to prove the existence of a criminal offence (for more detail, see Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Karakatsanes), art. 57, no. 6; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 914, no. 35 and Karakostas, Prosopikotita kai tipos, 55). All people, even children and those of unsound mind, bear this interest worthy of legal protection (Karakatsanes, loc. cit. no. 6). In the context of publications in the press, a distinction is made between statements of fact and value judgements; the impact of the publication on the party in question, the extent of its circulation, the reason for it, and the motives of its author (information of general interest; deliberateness of harm) are drawn upon in the overall consideration, in order to take account of the freedom of the press (Karakostas, loc. cit. 56 et seq.; CA Athens, 9975/1986, EllDik 27/1987, 299). Just like the Law on the Mass Media no. 2328/1995 art. 4(10), Law no. 1178/1981 on the Civil Liability of the Press, art. 1 provides for a minimum threshold sum for the reparation of non-pecuniary losses (cf. CFI Thessaloniki 26488/2001, Arm 2003, 931: minimum liability set at 10,000,000 Drachma). This provision does not violate the Greek Constitution (A. P. 1043/2001, NoB 50/2002, 1108). Though admittedly PORTUGUESE CC art. 483 does not expressly list “honour” as an interest worthy of legal protection, on the one hand it still falls under the “rights” protected by this provision and on the other it is the subject-matter of a protective law in the sense meant in this provision, namely of CP art. 180, which regulates the criminality of affronts to honour. It is conceivable that false information about one person will affront the honour of a third party close to this person, cf. e. g. STJ 26 February 2004 (National newspaper reports in a major exposé on the alleged frivolities and adultery of a married woman; also an affront to the husband’s honour). However, in recent case law, there has been a clear retreat from the legal protection afforded for affronts to honour; there is talk of an “erosion” of the protection of honour (Faria

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38.

39.

40.

41.

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Costa and da Silva, Direito Penal Especial, 104), cf. especially CA Guimarães 27 April 2006 (where someone is held up to ridicule, this constitutes merely bad conduct, not however a tort); CA Porto 7 December 2005 (no affront, if someone is called maluco – crazy); CA Porto 19 April 2006 (no affront, where it is said of a priest “he was not a priest, he was not anything”) and CA Porto 11 January 2006 (assassino “murderer” of an animal; no affront). DUTCH CC art. 6:106(1)(b) enumerates injuries to honour among the torts in which the tortfeasor will be held liable for non-pecuniary losses. CC art. 6:106(1)(c) provides a special rule for the reparation of non-economic damages in the case of the denigration of a deceased’s remembrance. ESTONIAN LOA § 1046(1) expressly counts the “defamation of a person” among its list of torts. In contrast, LITHUANIA and LATVIA lack a corresponding regulation. The SWEDISH EAL chap. 2 § 3 imposes liability in damages on a person who “grossly affronts someone else through the commission of a crime, which includes an attack against his person, his freedom, his ability to live peacably or his honour”. This corresponds to the FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 6(1) (as of 1 January 2006); a criminal offence and an affront are also required here. In contrast, DANISH EAL § 26(1) omits the requirement of a criminal affront to honour in the establishment of civil liability. The situation in ENGLAND is quite complex. The Common Law traditionally distinguishes between libel and slander. Libel is an affront to honour in fixed (typically, but not necessarily, written) form, while slander is an affront to honour in transient, typically spoken form. The prerequisite element for a claim in defamation is fulfilled in both cases by anything that is seen as holding the relevant party up to public hate, contempt or ridicule (Parmiter v. Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105; 151 ER 340), see e. g. R. v. Adams (1888) 22 QBD 66 (letter sent to a young woman of modest virtue inviting her to name her price for surrender of her virginity). The threshold question remains to this day: “Would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally ... or would cause him to be shunned or avoided?” (Sim v. Stretch (1936) 52 TLR 669, per Lord Atkin). Libel is at the same time a crime, slander just a tort. The criminal and private law concepts of libel, however, are not identical. For example, under criminal law a libel which is true may nonetheless amount to an offence at common law, if the defendant cannot show that publication was for the public benefit (Libel Act 1843 s. 6), whereas under tort law the justification of the libel will provide a complete defence. Nor is it possible under tort law to libel an indeterminate class of persons, although the same libel may constitute an offence under criminal law if calculated to provoke the members of that class to commit a breach of the peace. The ability to defame a public corporation in tort is also more limited than in the criminal law of libel: see Derbyshire CC v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [1993] AC 534. A further extension of the protection of the criminal law of libel is that a deceased person can be defamed, if the libel would tend to provoke living persons such as members of the deceased’s family, although the same libel will not give rise to tort law liability. In IRELAND, although one’s right to a good name is expressly protected by Const. art. 40.3.2 and defamation is governed under the Defamation Act 1961, defamation takes much the same format as the approach in England (in regard to the libel and slander distinction and the definition of the concept of “defamation” itself). Defama-

Article 2:203: Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy

42.

tion is committed by the wrongful publication (i. e. to a third party, cf M’Laughlin v. Doey (1893) 32 IrLR 518 (Ex. D)) of a false statement about a person, which tends to lower that person in the eyes of right-thinking members of society or tends to hold that person up to hatred, ridicule or contempt, or causes that person to be shunned or avoided by right thinking members of society (Quigley v. Creation Ltd. [1971] IR 269; Berry v. Irish Times Ltd. [1973] IR 368). Once the defamatory nature of the statement is proven, its falsity is presumed. Vulgar abuse does not amount to defamation – the gist of the action is injury to reputation and if the remarks are made in an abusive way or in anger so that they injure only the pride of the plaintiff rather than his reputation no action lies at common law (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 34.85). Libel is actionable per se, whereas slander requires proof of special (actual) damage, unless it falls under one of four categories of slander. They are: (i) slanders which impute unchastity or adultery to any woman or girl (Defamation Act 1961 s. 16); (ii) slanders affecting a person’s official, professional or business reputation (Defamation Act 1961 s. 19); (iii) slanders imputing a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment (cf Ruckley v. Kiernan (1857) 7 ICLR 75; McCabe v. Foot (1866) 11 Ir.Jurist (ns) 287; Dempsey v. Wall & Co. Ltd. (1943) 78 ILTR 73; Coleman v. Keanes Ltd. [1946] Ir Jur 5; Corcoran v. W. & R. Jacob & Co. Ltd. [1945] IR 446); and (iv) slanders imputing a contagious disease which tends to exclude the sufferer from society (Bloodworth v. Gray (1844) 7 Man & G 334, 135 ER 140; Milner v. Reeves (1617) 1 Roll Abr 43 pl. 3; Taylor v. Perkins (1607) Cro Jac 144, 79 ER 126; Villers v. Monsley (1769) 2 Wils KB 403, 95 ER 886). Reform of defamation is imminent in Ireland, with the publishing of the Defamation Bill 2006 (in tandem with the Privacy Bill 2006 – see above, Note III 29). The main proposals of the Bill are: (i) the present torts of libel and slander will cease to be so described and are henceforth to be collectively described as the tort of defamation (s. 5); (ii) an offer of apology shall not be construed as an admission of liability (s. 23); (iii) provision is made for new remedies which a court may grant in addition to damages; (iv) a correction order is envisaged (s. 28); (v) the defence of fair and reasonable publication on a matter of public importance is created (s. 24); (vi) the common law position with regard to the liability of distributors for defamatory material is being given a statutory basis (s. 25); (vii) bodies corporate are to be allowed to sue for defamation irrespective of whether financial loss has occurred (s. 11); (viii) a limitation period of one year will apply in relation to the bringing of defamation proceedings unless a court directs otherwise where the interests of justice so require (s. 37); and (ix) although there is no provision for a defamation action to be taken in the name of a deceased plaintiff, the Defamation Bill provides that where a defamation action is pending in court, the cause of action will survive for the benefit of the estate of a person who dies before the actual hearing /determination of the matter. In SCOTLAND a person has a legally recognised interest in the preservation of his own self-esteem and honour from unjustifiable attacks, and this has come to be extended to include an interest in his own public reputation and good name in the eyes of others (Walker, Delict2, chap. 23). A claim for solatium, of the nature of an actio injuriarum, accordingly lies against another who unjustifiably impugns a person’s honour and selfesteem, and a claim for patrimonial loss lies in addition, where his public reputation has been impugned as well (Walker loc. cit. 749). Although the wrong has been variously called verbal injury, convicium, defamation, slander and libel in books and cases, the

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position has emerged that verbal injury and convicium (if indeed there is a distinction between these two, discussed below at Note I14 under Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another) are in fact detached from defamation. Marking a distinction from the position in England (and currently in Ireland), in Scots law libel and slander are frequently used interchangeably for each other and for defamation, with no distinction between written and oral communication. Defamation is “the wrong or delict which is committed when a person makes an injurious and false imputation, conveyed by words or signs, against the character or reputation of another” (Cooper, Defamation and Verbal Injury2, 1). There are three requisites which must be proven: (i) there must be a false statement made, of and concerning the pursuer; (ii) the statement must be defamatory (or libellous or slanderous); and (iii) there must exist malice on the part of the defender in making the statement or communicating the idea (Walker loc. cit. 742). It is possible to defame by innuendo or other than by express communication (Cooper loc. cit. 29). While the fact of communication must be proved, it is not necessary that the statement be communicated to a third party, i. e. anyone other than the pursuer himself (Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland11, para. 35.04), just that it was as such capable of deeply hurting the pursuer’s feelings. This element underlines the character of the claim as one of solatium for hurt feelings and not of reparation. Defamatory statements include statements against the moral character, the trade, business, or occupation, profession, or office, and the public character of another; and statements attributing insanity or obnoxious physical defects to persons, and verbal injuries” (Cooper loc. cit. 33). Allegations of certain sexual conduct may be, for example that a man has associated with a known prostitute (Dwek v. MacMillan Publishers Ltd. [2000] EMLR 284), but an allegation of homosexuality is probably not now defamatory (Quilty v. Windsor 1999 SLT 346). There is a material distinction between private individuals and public figures, critics of the latter being allowed a wide latitude in the public interest (Gloag and Henderson loc. cit. para. 35.05); a person’s status as a public figure is not, however, a defence to an allegation of defamation (Bennett v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 1) [1997] EMLR 625). Although in the prevailing formula for defamation, the defamatory nature of the statements is the second requisite (after the falsity of the statements), this is in fact the primary and central requirement because once the statements are proved to be defamatory, there is a presumption of malice (Norrie, (1984) JuridRev 163, 168)) and a presumption of the falsity of the statement, though the defence under the maxim veritas convicii excusat is open to the defendant. The following other nine defences are also open to the defender (see Gloag and Henderson loc. cit. 35.07): (i) that the words founded on were not used by the defender; (ii) that the statement did not refer to the pursuer and could not reasonably construed as referring to him; (iii) that the words used were not reasonably capable of bearing the alleged defamatory meaning ascribed to them; (iv) that the slander was unintentional, coupled with an offer of amends (under the Defamation Act 1996); (v) that the pursuer expressly or impliedly assented to the statement being made (Friend v. Civil Aviation Authority (No. 1) [1998] IRLR 253); (vi) absolute privilege; (vii) qualified privilege; (viii) fair retort; (ix) fair comment (for more detail, see below at Note II 25 under Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another)).

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Illustration 1 is taken from Bavarian Supreme Court 7 March 1983, NJW 1983, 2040; illustration 3 from Kaye v. Robertson [1991] FSR 62; illustration 4 from CA Amsterdam 22 October 1975, NedJur 1977 no. 282 p. 973; illustration 5 from Cass.civ. 24 January 1996, Bull.civ. 1996, II, no. 16 p.11; D. 1996 I. R. 63; illustration 6 from CA Athens 807/1956, NoB 4 (1956) 624; illustration 8 from Grainger v. Hill (1838) 4 Bing NC 212, 132 ER 769; illustration 9 from BGH 15 November 1994, BGHZ 128, 1.

Article 2:204: Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another Loss caused to a person as a result of the communication of information about that person which the person communicating the information knows or could reasonably be expected to know is incorrect is legally relevant damage.

Comments A.

General

1. Liability for misinformation instead of protection of honour. This Article is based on the notion that one can hardly dispute liability for misinformation, whereas liability for “injury to honour” can easily open up a source of endless disputes and the exertion of influence by lobbyists (e. g. through the press). The concepts of honour or reputation therefore only play a role within the scheme of these rules to the extent that they are also applicable as part of national law: see Article 2:203(2) (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy) and the Comments on that Article. Moreover, in an open society a rule which simply characterised injury to reputation as a legally relevant damage would be too imprecise. The assertion that someone belongs to a political party or has subscribed to a particular school of thought is anything other than an imputation of dishonour. At the same time such assertions, if they are false, may inflict substantial damage on that person’s progress in life. The same applies to the assertion that a given Catholic priest supports abortion. It would also be less productive to have to resolve the question whether an athlete’s honour is injured when it is falsely asserted that he or she takes drugs. All of these cases turn only on the point that the information was false. 2. Protection of the media. From the perspective of the media too it can hardly be maintained that there is a fundamental problem with press freedom when the published information is false. False assertions are as a matter of general principle not within the protection of press freedom. However, incorrect assertions which cast the person concerned in a more favourable light than they are really entitled to will as a rule not result in damage.

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3. Personal honour need not be affected. It follows from the approach chosen here that the incorrect information need not affect the injured person’s personal honour at all. It suffices, for instance, that the incorrect information causes doubt about the injured person’s credit-worthiness. If, however, the false information also adversely affects the injured person in the pursuit of a profession or trade, as is likely to be the case e. g. if information is addressed to customers or suppliers, the requirements of Article 2:208 (Loss upon unlawful impairment of business) may also be satisfied. 4. Persons. The text makes no distinction between natural and legal persons. A “person” within the meaning of this provision includes (according to the general rule, see Article 1:103(b) (Scope of application)) legal as well as natural persons. Deliberately omitted from this provision, however, is the protection of personality after death: see Comments under Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) and Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy). 5. Defences. The general grounds of defence in Chapter 5 have application in relation to Article 2:204 as they do in relation to other instances of legally relevant damage. However, Article 5:203 (Protection of public interest) takes on a special significance here. Furthermore, regard must also be had to Article 6:102 (De minimis rule) – in particular in relation to the legal relevance of non-economic losses. (See the Comments on those Articles.) Moreover, liability in consequence of Article 2:204 (or indeed any other Article under this Chapter) will be excluded where it would conflict with constitutional rights, such as rights of freedom of expression, which are enshrined in the national laws: see Article 7:101 (National constitutional laws). National constitutional law may, for example, come into play to protect the fundamental right to marriage and family life with the consequence that confidential information communicated between spouses can never give rise to liability and in particular therefore when information about a third party which is known to be false is communicated by one spouse to the other.

B.

Communication

6. Communication and dissemination distinguished. The element of communication of the information does not require a “dissemination” in the sense of either communication to a determinate or indeterminate group of persons or a chain or repetition of communications to a number of persons (multiple simultaneous or serial communications). A “one to one” communication can fall within the Article and likewise a communication on a single occasion suffices. It is not essential that communication should take the form of a wide publication of information directed to the public at large. Depending on the circumstances, it may suffice that the information has been passed down the telephone line to a single individual. Article 2:204 is therefore in no way confined to the dissemination of false news in the media. It may also apply to false information communicated among business persons or even private contacts (who turn, for example, to the press, or the employer or school of the individual concerned) where, however, according to the general rules on accountability, different standards of care are imposed.

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7. Internet communication. The position is the same where false information about another is incorporated into a web page on the internet. As regards publications in the internet, it will always be necessary to ascertain precisely who is the person who “ought to know” that the information is incorrect. As far as intermediary service providers are concerned, this issue is specifically addressed and conclusively resolved by Directive 2000/31/ EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) (OJ EC L 178 of 17 July 2000, pp. 1-16), s. 4 (“Liability of intermediary service providers”), arts. 12-15. 8. Repetition of incorrect information. The person communicating the misinformation need not be the person who has created or formulated it. The repetition of incorrect information which has been obtained from another will amount to a communication; there is no requirement of ‘first dissemination’ in Article 2:204. In the context of transmission of false information in this manner, however, note must be taken of the element of accountability. If publishers have repeated in good faith information obtained from a source in whom it would be reasonable to place reliance (such as communications from public authorities within their sphere of activities) and where it would be unreasonable to expect the publishers to examine the matter in any depth for themselves without repeating it (because, on its face, it has an innocent character), there may be no legally relevant damage. 9. Telling lies. On the other hand, Article 2:204 does not mean that a person is liable per se for having told a lie. Making a misstatement, even intentionally, does not by itself give rise to liability. Only when additional elements besides the mere falsehood of the information are present does a right to relief arise under this Article. The misstatement must be “about another” and it must result in either a disturbance to that person’s life or economic loss. Trivial damage is not legally relevant (Article 6:102 (De minimis rule)). It is the consequences – the prejudice caused to another in consequence of the misstatement – which generates the claim under this Article and not the mere fact of the misstatement.

C.

Incorrect information

10. Facts and value judgements distinguished. Information within the meaning of Article 2:204 is an assertion of fact and does not extend to mere expressions of opinion or value judgements. The borderline between these two basic categories is not always easy to draw, but it is conceptually clear because only assertions of fact are susceptible to proof of veracity. Information is incorrect when it does not correspond with the truth. Information which is hearsay must be disclosed as such in order to correspond with the truth: someone who in that manner communicates information, making it clear that it is not known whether the reported assertion is correct, does not generally communicate false information unless this caveat serves only as a blind to escape liability (e. g. because it is sham and the information is relayed not merely to report that another has made such an assertion, but rather to imply also that the assertion is correct). The same applies when

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the information communicated contains the pointer that the assertion is made on the basis of only limited investigation. Illustration 1 In the course of divorce proceedings, in order to further his position, a husband asserts that his wife “cheated” on him with another man. This is an assertion of fact. Illustration 2 A theatre critic writes of a singer and actress that her voice and acting are so bad that she belongs not on the stage, but at the cash register in a self service restaurant. This is a value judgement. 11. Information about a person. Article 2:204 concerns false information about a “person”; it does not extend to false information about a product or service. Illustration 3 The assertion that electronic organs are completely unsuitable for use in churches falls outside Article 2:204 and consequently does not provide the manufacturer of such organs with a claim to reparation of legally relevant damage under this rule, even where the statement was reinforced by concrete (but false) assertions of fact: it does not pertain to information about the manufacturer’s person. 12. Burden of proof. The provision refers to information which is “incorrect”. Starting from the proposition that the claimant must make out all the elements necessary to support the cause of action, this Article has the effect of placing on the claimant the burden of proving that the information communicated was “incorrect”. However, in contrast to burden of proof (which is a material aspect of the rule), the standard of proof required will remain a procedural matter not governed by these rules. The same holds true for the question whether any alteration in the rules governing the standard of proof are considered appropriate so as indirectly to ease the onus placed on the injured person.

D.

The mental state of the responsible person

13. Carelessness in relation to the incorrectness. As regards the mental state of the injuring person, negligence is always sufficient. That is so as much in relation to the act of communication or publication (which is governed by Article 3:102 (Negligence)) as in regard to the fact that the injuring person ought to have known that the information was incorrect (which is governed by this Article). The Article therefore provides for liability when, for want of reasonable thoroughness or accuracy in research, the injuring person has communicated the false information. This will entitle the claimant to any appropriate remedy, including compensation. Conversely, where false information is published without negligence, because the information was communicated with every good reason (in the light of scrupulous research) to suppose that it was correct, there will

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be no liability, notwithstanding that the publication of false information may make a detrimental impact.

E.

Relationship to other provisions

14. Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy). However, the fact that there is no liability under Article 2:204 (and therefore no right to a correction of the falsehood as reparation for damage under this Article either) does not mean that the party innocently injured is entirely without redress. Precisely because the publisher has injured another by actions (albeit without liability), the publisher may in given circumstances be under an obligation to publish a correction in order to eradicate or ameliorate the prejudice or detriment generated. Such a positive obligation to rectify may arise out of the duty not to infringe an individual’s right to respect for dignity implied by Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy). A failure to respond to the plea of an affected individual, whom one has significantly maligned or prejudiced by one’s own (innocent) act, to salvage that individual’s reputation may amount in some cases to such a failure to treat the other person with the minimum respect which a fellow member of society merits as to infringe the right to personal dignity. This specific damage falling under Article 2:203 makes it unnecessary to fall back on the wider argument to the same effect under the general residual rule on damage in Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage), at any rate where the person adversely affected is a natural person. 15. Reporting suspicions. Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy) may be of particular relevance in relation to the reporting of suspicions. Where a report is made that someone is suspected of wrongdoing or circumstances are detailed which pinpoint a given individual as a plausible suspect for the wrongdoing, there will as a rule be no scope for liability under Article 2:204. That is for the simple reason that the reported information is correct so far as it goes (i. e. there is a suspicion, there is no good reason to assume that the suspicion is wrong or ill-founded, and the circumstances are as narrated). Illustration 4 A newspaper reports about a letter in which A informs B that he (A) suspects a third party (C) of being guilty of electoral malpractice and having committed a criminal offence which should be reported to the police. Since the newspaper correctly reproduced the contents of the letter, without passing the contents off as its own, and since there was a public interest in the publication of the news, the report does not cause legally relevant damage in the sense of Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy) or Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another), even if C is later acquitted of the charge. 16. Freedom of expression and the right to respect of dignity. However, depending on the precise circumstances of the case, it is conceivable that reporting of the suspicion itself in this way, while communicating correct information, could nonetheless be subject to the competing right of the individual to respect for personal dignity. This must nec447

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essarily be the case because reporting (truthfully) a suspicion so as to expose a given individual to the negative attention of others may in some contexts amount to placing an individual on trial in a forum in which there is no means of defence against the more or less explicit accusation. This may easily overstep the bounds of fair treatment of the individual and thus amount to a denial of the right to respect for personal dignity. No definite guidance can be given here, since the matter will be one for the courts to elaborate in the context of the inescapable conflict of interests between freedom of expression and a right to be treated with dignity. However, even where reporting a suspicion does infringe a person’s right to respect for personal dignity, this will be subject to the defence of public interest, that is to say a justifiable ground for publishing the suspicion (see further Article 5:203 (Protection of public interest)). This will clearly be the case, for example, where a newspaper acts responsibly in publishing descriptions or images of persons wanted for questioning in respect of serious crimes. Quite aside from that defence, it may well be that an infringement is not so profound as to justify compensation, as opposed to some other remedy which serves directly to remove the stigma or prejudice which reporting the suspicion generated (such as a right to have published further details which will make manifest the individual’s innocence). In every case the remedy must be appropriate to the injury caused: see Article 6:101(2) (Aim and forms of reparation). 17. Article 2:205 (Loss upon breach of confidence) and Article 2:207 (Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information). Liability arising under Article 2:204 in respect of communication of information to another’s prejudice is further flanked by the rules in Article 2:205 (Loss upon breach of confidence) (where there is a breach of confidence) and Article 2:207 (Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information) (where false information is communicated in the course of business to one who relies on it). 18. Article 2:208 (Loss upon unlawful impairment of business). In a few cases there may be an overlap with the scope of application of Article 2:208 (Loss upon unlawful impairment of business) – for instance where false information about a competitor is “spread” to customers in order to ruin the competitor.

Notes I.

Liability for misinformation

1.

All European legal systems recognise the basic rule that the dissemination of false assertions of fact results in liability for a person’s ensuing losses. However, in each respective system it is to be found in entirely different quarters. In BELGIUM, FRANCE and LUXEMBOURG it is a part of the general tort law clause of CC arts. 1382 and 1383. It is settled case law that the spreading of lies about another amounts to a faute leading to a claim in damages when it causes pecuniary or non-pecuniary losses (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats, no. 1645; CFI Brussels 5 December 2000, AM 2001, 409). Of particular note in this context is the fact that in France the right against unfair competition likewise has its roots in CC arts. 1382 and 1383. There-

448

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2.

3.

4.

5.

fore, these provisions also govern cases of discrediting competitors and their products (JClCiv (-Courtieu), arts. 1382 à 1386, fasc. 132-1 (1998) no. 43). In SPAIN the basis for liability for misinformation, at least in so far as it concerns press publications, is mostly extracted directly from the constitution (arts. 18(1) and 20(4)) and transposed into civil law through Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act. Journalists are under an obligation of accurate research. False assertions, however, may not be avoidable in every circumstance; thus the press does not assume a guarantee of truth. Of course, freedom of press neither protects the spreading of mere rumours, nor complete fabrications or malicious insinuations. However, it protects the dissemination of carefully surveyed information, even where it should later turn out to be false (TC 21 January 1988, BOE no. 31 of 5 February 1988. See also TS 5 July 1999, RAJ 1999 (3) no. 5898 p. 9197; TS 20 November 1999, RAJ 1999 (5) no. 8293 p. 13010 and TC 31 January 2000, BOE no. 54 of 3 March 2000). This is only different where the information has been presented in an undignified way (TS 17 April 2000, RAJ 2000 (2) no. 2567 p. 3985) or otherwise infringes the right to the protection of one’s sphere of privacy (TC 10 May 2000, BOE no. 136 of 7 June 2000). Misinformation supplied to customers about a competitor is subject to the law on unfair competition (TS 11 July 2006, BDA RAJ 2006 no. 4977). ITALY makes liability for the publication of false assertions of fact dependent upon the incidentally occasioned infringement of an interest protected under tort law (Bianca, Diritto civile V, 614). It is not of course necessary that the infringement of an absolute right is at issue. The false reproduction of a lawyer’s forename in a telephone book, with the result that he loses clients after moving office even suffices (Cass. 6 December 1994, no. 10457, Foro it. 1995, I, 3258), likewise for false information by a television journalist about alleged harmful substances in a type of food (Cass. 4 February 1992, no. 1147, Foro it. 1992, I, 2127). HUNGARIAN law deals with false assertions of fact using a whole range of legal instruments. Among them is the protection of personality, which according to CC § 78(1) also extends to good name and reputation. CC § 78(2) adds that damage to reputation is to be especially inferred “if someone intimates or spreads a false injurious statement in relation to another or allows a true fact to be released, which represents them in a false light.” An untrue statement is only “injurious” if it may engender in the minds of others negative prejudice against the party in question (for a more detailed account of this and what follows, see in particular Gellért (-Zoltán), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 286-291). Different from false assertions of fact, which in principle do not fall under the scope of protection of freedom of opinion (Petrik (-Petrik), Polgári jog I2, 182/5-182/8), negative value judgments only lead to an affront to personality if they injuriously abase the party without any grounds. False assertions of fact in the media may be combated under CC § 79(1) with the claim for the release of the text within eight days (or in the next issue), from which it is to emerge, which assertion was unfounded. CC § 83(3) additionally grants particular rights, e. g. to correction of an entry in a register. SLOVENIAN LOA § 177 consolidates very similar principles in the following way: “(1) Any person who defames another or asserts or disseminates untrue statements on the past, knowledge or capability of another, even thought the former knows or should have known that they were untrue, and thereby inflicts material damage on the latter must reimburse such damage. (2) However, any person that reports anything untrue about another without knowledge that such was untrue shall not be liable for the damage

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6.

7.

8.

9.

450

inflicted if there was a genuine interest in so doing for the former or the person to whom the report was made.” In the GERMAN CC an express rule of liability in relation to the publication of false assertions of fact only surfaces in § 824. This concerns the basic fact situation of “jeopardising credit-worthiness”. Under CC § 824(1) liability accrues to “a person who asserts or disseminates a fact contrary to the truth that is apt to put the credit-worthiness of another in jeopardy or occasion other detriment to his spending power or advancement”. If the communicator was not aware of the untrue nature, he is absolved of liability “where he or the addressee of the communication had a legitimate interest in it” CC § 824(2). There is a special regulation in CC § 839a for expert witnesses called by the court. Incidentally, extra-contractual liability for false assertions of fact requires in principle the infringement of one of the rights enumerated in CC § 823(1), the infringement of a protective law (CC § 823(2)) or an affront to public morals (CC § 826). See also BGH 24 January 2006, BGHZ 166, 84, 108. Express reference in the AUSTRIAN CC (in § 1330(2)) is also confined only to the basic fact situation of jeopardising credit-worthiness. Hereunder, liability for patrimonial losses is incurred by a person who spreads incorrect facts that jeopardise the creditworthiness, spending power or advancement of another, as long as the communicator of the asserted facts was aware of their untruth or must have been aware of it. Proof of actual damage is not required; damage to economically significant relationships through assertions contrary to fact suffices (OGH 14 November 1963, SZ 37/146). From a systematic point of view, CC § 1330(2) was inserted into the part above the class of damages awarded for affronts to honour, however it equally does not require an affront to honour (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht II2, 174). The basic fact situation of adverse effects on credit-worthiness (ofensa do crédito ou do bom nome) is also to be found in PORTUGAL (CC art. 484). However, some commentators here find it superfluous because the interests protected under this regulation – good name and reputation – already fall under the scope of application of both Const. art. 26(1) and CC art. 70(1) (Capelo de Sousa, O direito geral de personalidade, 305; Gouveia de Andrade, Da ofensa do crédito, 28). A claim under CC art. 484 is open not only to natural, but also to legal persons (STJ 15 June 1994, BolMinJus 438 [1994] 383; STJ 24 February 1960, BolMinJus 94 [1960] 107; Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 517). Conversely, the point on the admissibility of exceptio veritatis (the defence of truth) is extraordinarily contentious (for the proponents’ arguments, see e. g. Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 517 and Menezes Leitão, Obrigações I4, 285; and for those of the opponents, see Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 548 and STJ 3 October 1995, BolMinJus 450 [1995] 424). In relation to the omnipresent conflict between the right to the free expression of one’s opinion and the protection of good name, a practical concordance is suggested (Cardoso da Costa, BolMinJus 396 (1990), 5, 16; STJ 14 May 2002; STJ 2 March 1995). In cases of doubt, however, freedom of opinion shall be given precedence (Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, 226; STJ 26 February 2004; STJ 5 December 2002). ESTONIA also deploys the concept of jeopardising credit-worthiness in LOA § 1047(1). LOA § 1047(2) and (3) regulate the cases where the communication of information is not unlawful; subs. (4) provides for the legal remedies. See Supreme Court 3-2-1-16106, RT III 2006, 23, 209. Under GREEK CC art. 920 “a person who knowingly or with a culpable lack of knowledge alleges or disseminates untruthful messages that put the

Article 2:204: Loss upon communication of incorrect

10.

11.

12.

credit-worthiness, occupation or advancement of another at risk” is likewise liable for damages. In DUTCH law the situations addressed in Article 2:204 correspond to CC art. 6:162(2), because the spirit of this provision deals with the breach of a right or obligation (through an action that infringes unwritten norms of social interaction).Under the latter aspect, accusations are in any event more seriously unlawful when they are not demonstrably true(Onrechtmatige Daad IV (-Schuijt), chap. VII, note 37, pp. 442 et seq.). So, for instance, if a stockbroker is accused of introducing an untrustworthy person to his acquaintances but it cannot be proven that the stockbroker knew of the untrustworthiness, if damage is suffered, this grounds liability (CFI Amsterdam 17 December 1974, reproduced in HR 30 January 1976, NedJur 1977 no. 106 p. 397). The incorrectness of an assertion alone does not always establish its unlawfulness, for instance where mistakes or discrepancies of minor significance are at issue or if the statement in question was not made recklessly (Schuijt loc. cit. 477-478). Comprehensive provisions for the regulation of the problem of liability for harm through false information do not exist in the NORDIC countries either. Consequently, the general norms are drawn upon, in SWEDEN thus on EAL chap. 2 § 2. However, individual special laws occasionally offer clarification and precision, in Sweden especially the Credit Information Act [Kreditupplysningslag] § 21, which provides for the liability of persons who administer credit information on a commercial basis (loc. cit. § 1(1)), as well as for pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses (for more detail, see Kleineman, Ren förmögenhetsskada, 501 and – for the previous position – HD 26 January 1962, NJA 1962, 31). Negligence is rebuttably presumed. FINNISH Personal Data Act (Personuppgiftslag) § 9(2) first sentence obliges the respective registrar (and hence also commercial credit agencies) to use only data that is up-to-date and correct; § 29(1) first sentence prohibits the relaying of incorrect data and obliges the person from whom the original incorrect data came to re-register. Violations of the law found claims to pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages (loc. cit. § 47). This corresponds to the DANISH Personal Data Act (Lov om behandling av personoplysninger) §§ 5(4), 24 and 69. Here also liability for rebuttably presumed fault is concerned. Another area for which there is specific regulation is the law on liability for false information through the press and other media, cf. for SWEDEN Freedom of the Press Act (Tryckfrihetsförordningen) chap. 7 § 4 nos. 14 and 15 in conjunction with chap. 11 (liability on the basis of a criminal offence) as well as the provisions of the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression (Yttrandefrihetsgrundlag, cf. RH 1994:14); for DENMARK the Media Liability Act Statutory Proclamation (Lovbekendtgørelse af medieansvarsloven) §§ 29-33 (connection to the existing elements of the criminal offence through the respective mass medium); and for FINLAND the Law on Freedom of Expression in Mass Communication (Lag om yttrandefrihet i masskommunikation) § 14 (liability according to the rules under the Damages Liability Act). In ENGLAND liability for misinformation, so far as prejudicial to a peron’s reputation, is governed by the law on libel and slander. These are strict liability torts, although the Defamation Act 1996, s. 1(1) provides a defence to a person who was not the author, editor or (commercial) publisher of the statement, who took reasonable care in relation to its publication, and who did not know, and had no reason to believe, that he was causing or contributing to the publication of a defamatory statement. This statutory

451

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

13.

452

provision thus offers a “no negligence” defence to those who are (in substance, though not in form) only “secondarily” responsible for the defamation. In IRELAND too this issue falls under the torts of defamation (see above, Note IV 41 under Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy)), injurious falsehood and negligent misstatement. The term injurious falsehood, coined by Salmond (Torts1, § 149), is used in preference to “slander of title”, “slander of goods” or “malicious falsehood” and covers false statements calculated to injure a person in his trade or, more broadly, even damaging falsehoods of a non-commercial nature (e. g. Sheperd v. Wakeman (1662) 1 Sid 79, 82 ER 982 – loss of marriage; cf. Irish Transport & General Workers Union v. The Transport & General Workers Union [1936] IR 471). The essence of this tort is that the falsehood deceives others about the plaintiff (Schulke & Mayr U. K. Ltd. v. Alkapharm U. K. Ltd. [1999] FSR 161) so as to cause loss to the plaintiff (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 35.26). It consists of the publication or communication to a third person, of false statements concerning the plaintiff, his property, or his business, which cause him pecuniary loss. The tort differs from defamation in that the falsehood may reflect well on the plaintiff whilst nonetheless causing loss to him (Jones v. McGovern IR 1 CL 100 at 103-104, and cf Irish Toys & Utilities Ltd. v. “The Irish Times” Ltd. [1937] IR 298); however, as is noted in commentary (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para. 35.26), sometimes the difference between the two torts is a narrow one. Thus, injurious falsehood does not require the lowering of reputation or holding the person up to ridicule, hatred or contempt, with the focus rather being on injurious statements reflecting on tangibles or services (for more detail on the distinction, see McDonald, Irish Law of Defamation2, 23-26). The requisites for a claim under injurious falsehood were set out by Lord Davey in Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Wright Crossley (1901) 18 RPC 95 at 99 (1901), stating that “to support such an action it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove (i) that the statements complained of were untrue; (ii) that they were made maliciously – i. e. without just cause or excuse; (iii) that the plaintiffs have suffered special damage thereby.” Hence, the burden of proof in relation to the falsity of the statements is on the claimant here (unlike where the statements are proven to be defamatory) and at common law special damage must also be proven (in contrast to libel and instances where slander is actionable per se, see above in Note IV 41 under Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy)). There is no uniform view on the definition of “malice”, with some courts following Lord Davey’s “without just cause or excuse” approach and others requiring that some indirect, dishonest or improper motive be established (London Ferro-Concrete Co. v. Justicz (1951) 68 RPC 261; Serville v. Constance [1954] 1 WLR 487). It is clear that an honest belief in an unfounded assertion will not make a defendant liable (Loudon v. Ryder (No 2) [1953] Ch 423; Spring v. Guardian Assurance plc. [1995] 2 AC 296; Greers Ltd. v. Pearman & Corder Ltd. (1922) 39 RPC 406; Cooke v. McGuigan (1927) 61 ILTR 45; Malone v. McQuaid [1998] IEHC 86). Carelessness will also be insufficient to mount a claim here, although in this case the plaintiff may raise the claim in the form of negligent misstatement; recklessness in the sense of gross negligence, however, may provide a basis for liability for injurious falsehood (Malone v. McQuaid loc. cit.; cf. Sherriff v. McMullen [1952] IR 236). Under common law, actual damage must be proven and it is also of note that only damage of a monetary nature is actionable; non-financial damage such as injured feelings may not be compensated (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para. 35.29). However, the common law position has been changed somewhat by Defamation Act 1961 s. 20(1), which provides that it is not

Article 2:204: Loss upon communication of incorrect

14.

necessary to allege or prove special damage (i) if the words on which the action is founded are calculated to cause pecuniary damage to the plaintiff and are published in writing or other permanent form (including radio and television broadcasts, loc. cit. s. 20(2)), or (ii) if the words are calculated to cause pecuniary damage to the plaintiff in respect of any office, profession, calling, trade or business carried on by him at the time of the publication. In SCOTLAND, a claim may be mounted under the guise of defamation (see above Note IV 42 under Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy)), verbal injury or indeed negligent misstatement of the Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] AC 465 variety. Verbal injury (sometimes referred to as malicious falsehood, see Trapp v. Mackie 1977 SLT 194, Trapp v. Mackie 1979 SLT 126) is seen as an alternative to defamation (contrary to the views of Walker, Delict2, 730-732, who sees the notion of verbal injury as the umbrella term for the whole class of injury), with certain commentators seeing verbal injury as being restricted to the aspect of the wrong which is concerned with solatium for insult only (see, e. g., Smith, Short Commentary, 726-727). Verbal injury as an independent claim was first recognised in Paterson v. Welch (1893) 20 R 744, in which Lord President Robertson concluded that the attribution to the pursuer of certain unpopular statements, though not slanderous could amount to an action in damages if it could be shown that: (i) the statement made by the defender was false; (ii) it was made with a design to injure; and (iii) it did in fact injure. Thus, the distinction with defamation is in the lack of the defamatory or slanderous nature of the statements. If the words are slanderous, then malice and falsity are presumed, whereas if the words are not per se slanderous, then malice and falsity are not presumed but will have to be proved (North of Scotland Banking Co. v. Duncan (1857) 19 D 881; see Lord Deas’ dissenting judgment). At common law, in cases of malicious falsehood or other verbal injuries some damage had always to be averred and proved (Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law, 35). However, this situation has been changed by Defamation Act 1952 s. 3 (as applied to Scotland by s. 14), which provides that in actions for verbal injury it is not necessary to aver and prove special damage if the words founded on are calculated to cause pecuniary damage to the pursuer. As with defamation, it suffices that the statement be communicated to its subject alone (where solatium may be granted for affront or insult suffered), not only where it is published to third parties (where economic losses occasioned to the pursuer may also be recovered). Broader than the rule contained in Article 2:204, which is restricted to communications concerning the person himself, and not his products or services (see above, Comment C11), slander of title, property or business is committed when a person maliciously communicates to a third party some falsehood about the pursuer’s property (see Hamilton v. Arbuthnot (1750) Mor 13923, Bruce v. J. M. Smith (1898) 1 F 327 and Argyllshire Weavers v. A Macaulay (Tweeds) Ltd. (No. 3) 1965 SLT 21) or title to property (Philip v. Morton (1816) Hume 865) or his business (Parlane v. Templeton (1896) 4 SLT 153; Lamond v. Daily Record (Glasgow) Ltd. 1923 SLT 512) in a manner intended to cause and with the result of causing loss (invariably economic) to the pursuer (Norrie loc. cit. 44). Under an action known as “third party slander”, the law even extends relief to instances where another person is the subject of the communication (see Lord Deas’ judgment in North of Scotland Banking Company v. Duncan loc. cit. 887, where, inter alia, the example is given of an injury to credit being suffered by the pursuer on the basis of a statement being “spread abroad” that his factor or agent has defrauded him and abscon-

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ded with his funds). If an attack on another can reasonably be read as an attack on the pursuer, he may sue in defamation (Bradbury v. Outram & Co. (1903) 11 SLT 71), and in verbal injury if it can be shown that by attacking another person the defender is intending to cause loss to the pursuer and actually did so (Cooper, Defamation and Verbal Injury2, 1). However, there is no case in the Scottish law reports in which such an action has been successfully pursued, and some dicta seem to strike out actionability on this basis (Norrie loc. cit. 58). Any person, natural or legal, who is capable of suffering the loss complained of has title to sue for defamation or verbal injury, and will have an interest to do so if the loss is actually suffered; although, for instance, it is clear that solatium for hurt feelings may not be claimed by a body corporate, for such an entity has no feelings that the law recognises as capable of being hurt (Norrie loc. cit. 63). If neither the hurdles of defamation nor verbal injury can be surmounted, for instance where the defence of qualified privilege may be validly invoked, which in turn requires malice to be proven (and it is lacking), then the claim of negligent misstatement is open to the pursuer (see Spring v. Guardian Assurance plc. [1995] 2 AC 296, where liability for economic loss was imposed for a negligently inaccurate reference given by the defendant [the claimant’s ex-employer] to a third party; the majority of the House of Lords adopted the two-stage test [of proximity and policy] laid down by Lord Wilberforce in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728). II.

Distinction between assertion of fact and value judgement

15.

The distinction between an assertion of fact and a value judgment is relied upon in most legal systems and is also enforced for the most part according to the same criteria. In FRANCE it plays a role primarily because it is acknowledged that any person who circulates “critical” information is under an obligation de prudence concerning the content, to ensure that the disseminated facts correspond to reality. The dissemination of in principle correct information only founds a faute in exceptional cases. The main examples of where this occurs stem from the law against unfair competition. It may even be that the impartation to a competitor’s customers of information that is true constitutes a concurrence déloyale, due to the concomitant circumstances under which it is carried out (Cass.civ. 12 October 1966, Bull.civ. 1966, III, no. 393 p. 345). Under the case law of the SPANISH Constitutional Court (TC 104/1986 of 17 July 1986, BOE no. 193 of 13 August 1986; TC 160/2003 of 15 September 2003, BOE no. 242 of 9 Oktober 2003) and the Supreme Court (e. g. TS 11 December 2003, RAJ 2003 (5) no. 8653 p. 16209) the subject matter of freedom of expression includes thoughts, ideas and opinions, i. e. value judgements of every kind. The subject matter of freedom of the press is the dissemination of relevant facts. Great importance is attached to the distinction between thoughts, ideas and opinions on the one hand and the dissemination of facts on the other. Different from facts, the accuracy of an opinion or value judgement may not be proven; however, the two streams frequently intermingle (TC 160/2003 of 15 September 2003 loc. cit.; critical Balaguer Callejón, Los derechos fundamentales al honor, 111). In such cases, it is helpful to consider each concept’s focal point of emphasis. Freedom of expression is only limited by the concept of an affront, whereas constraints are placed on freedom of press through the criterion of truthfulness (TC 240/ 1992 of 21 December 1992, BOE no. 17 of 20 January 1993; TS 14 November 2001, RAJ 2001 (5) no. 9303 p. 14707). The civil courts also employ these criteria where the

16.

454

Article 2:204: Loss upon communication of incorrect

17.

18.

19.

20.

interests of the person affected and the communicator have to be balanced (e. g. TS 8 March 2002, RAJ 2002 (1) no. 1882 p. 3129; TS 10 July 2003, RAJ 2003 (3) no. 4624 p. 8851). In ITALY the point of departure is similar. This is because here the distinction between an assertion of fact and a value judgement predominantly plays a role in the assessment of infringements of personality rights and then within this framework, it in turn has a role in the balancing of the interests involved. Thus, the liability of the press hinges on overstepping the right to free reporting, the frontiers of which are staked out not only by the pertinenza (the social relevance of the piece of news) and the continenza (the moderateness in the sense of formally correct, inoffensive portrayal), but also by the verità del fatto (the truth of the asserted fact). Here the content of the information, as well as the existence of the information as such (where it is merely forwarded) are open to be proven true (Cass. 26 July 2002, no. 11060, Giust.civ.Mass. 2002, 1365). What is important is that the facts were carefully researched and fully portrayed (Cass. 13 February 2002, no. 2066, Giust.civ. 2002, I, 1880). Assertions of fact found in official documentation may be presumed to be true (Cass. 24 May 2002, no. 7628, Foro it. 2002, I, 2322). Tort law protection against defamation requires the circulation of an assertion of fact, i. e. communication to third parties (Cappellari, Resp.civ. e prev. 2000, 1061). HUNGARIAN law also draws a line of distinction between assertions of fact and value judgements, see above Note I4. The expression of an opinion, a value judgment or a critique only result in the establishing of an affront to honour or dignity in the sense of CC § 76, where by its nature, the expression is unreasonably injurious, offensive or abasing. A negative value judgement in itself does not occasion the infringement of a personality right, even where an erroneous, unsuitable or inappropriate opinion lies behind it (BH 2001/468). Only false assertions of fact and not erroneous expressions of opinion found a right to a counterstatement (BH 1999/357; Gellért (-Zoltán), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 294, 298; Petrik (-Petrik), Polgári jog I2, 182/8-183, 186). For GERMAN law the distinction between assertion of fact and value judgment is primarily important, because the conclusive rule contained in CC § 824 is only applicable to the dissemination of untrue facts, whereas recourse to CC § 823(1) may be had where the facts and value judgements that are circulated are true (BGH 24 January 2006, ZIP 2006, 317). Furthermore, the right to a counter statement, regulated by the federal states’ press laws, only relates to assertions of fact. “Assertions of fact are characterised by the objective relationship between comment and reality, whereas the communicator’s subjective connection with the content of his statement is the hallmark of value judgements and expressions of opinion ... To be classified as an assertion of fact, it is accordingly essential whether the statement is open to examination for accuracy with the aid of verification. This excludes value judgements and expressions of opinion because they are denoted by the element of opinion and point of view and therefore are not susceptible to being proven true or untrue” (BGH 24 January 2006 loc. cit. 323). Under AUSTRIAN law value judgements are comments that are based on one’s own thinking and convey the purely subjective opinion of the communicator; they consequently escape objective examination. Facts are, in contrast, circumstances, events or attributes with an identifiable content that is cognisable to third parties and capable of being examined for accuracy with the aid of definite or definable criteria by them. Comments are assertions of fact, where their accuracy may be verified, viz. where they

455

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21.

22.

456

can be adjudged to be true or false; otherwise value judgments are at issue (OGH 18 December 1991, SZ 64/182). The term assertion of fact is interpreted broadly; as long as their objective accuracy is examinable, evaluative appraisals equate to assertions of fact (Rummel (-Reischauer), ABGB II2, § 1330 no. 8). Indeed examples of what has been qualified as a value judgement include the description of comic strips as inferior reading material that vulgarises youths and incites them to criminal activity (OGH 14 November 1962, SZ 35/113), the comment that a particular political party could never become a liberal party (OGH 30 November 1987, SZ 60/225) or the assertion “only a camel walks miles for a cigarette” (OGH 13 September 1988, SZ 61/193). Conversely, an assertion that an undertaking was afflicted with organisational deficiencies, the wrong product mix policy and high personal drawings, was deemed an assertion of fact (OGH 31 August 1977, SZ 50/111), the same is true for the allegation that someone functions as a “guerrilla in a tree” (OGH 29 October 1979, JBl 1980, 481: the assertion contained the allegation of unlawful felling of trees), the allegation that a political party was solely made up of bar-room politicians (OGH 30 November 1987, JBl 1988, 174), the assertion that a particular report in a newspaper was a “disgrace” (OGH 9 Jan 1990, SZ 63/2), the description of an academic painter as an “amateur painter” (OGH 19 March 1975, SZ 48/28) and the description of an innkeeper as a “whore” (OGH 13 November 1957, JBl 1958, 233). In GREECE there is also the distinction between assertions of fact and value judgements, especially where the liability of the press for affronts to personality is concerned. It is often immediately added, however, that the distinction is problematic because in many cases factual statements and value judgements are intertwined (Karakostas, Prosopikotita kai tipos, 57). A specific action for a correction order may be brought against untrue offensive assertions of a factual character. Negative value judgements only amount to an affront to personality if they go over and above the limits of reasonable criticism and offend the dignity of the person in question (Karakostas loc. cit. 58). The distinction between value judgements and assertions of fact plays a further role in the context of CC art. 920 (placing credit-worthiness in jeopardy), because value judgments are not “news” in the sense of this provision. However, CC art. 920 is also applied where untrue items of news are circulated, which are accompanied by value judgments (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Vosinakis), art. 920 no. 3). In PORTUGAL the distinction between assertions of fact and value judgements is even accorded constitutional significance in the context of Const. art. 37 (for more detail, see Carvalho Rebelo, A responsabilidade civil pela televisão, 36; in case law they are not as sharply distinguished as in commentary, cf. e. g. CA Lisbon 20 June 1994, CJ XIX [19944] 117 and CA Coimbra 3 July 1993, CJ XVIII [1993-4] 71). It is also stated here that assertions of fact – as distinct from expressions of opinion – are open to verification (Carvalho Rebelo loc. cit. 38). The basic fact situation of placing credit-worthiness in jeopardy in CC art. 484 is likewise geared towards assertions of fact. The provision protects the “credit-worthiness or the good name and reputation of a natural or legal person”. Expressions of opinion that rest upon false assertions of fact are covered (for more detail, see Gouveia de Andrade, Da ofensa do crédito, 70-72). The form in which the fact is disseminated is immaterial. This can also concern the publication of a picture in the context of a report about criminals (cf. STJ 27 June 1995, BolMinJus 448 [1995] 378; Vasconcelos Abreu, FS Magalhães Collaço II, 472), especially where the newspaper

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23.

24.

25.

was aware, due to official sources, that the person affected was no longer suspected of the offence (STJ 24 February 1999, CJ(ST) VII [1999-1] 118). DUTCH law distinguishes both in criminal and civil law between harm to reputation and honour through assertions of a factual character and affronts by disparaging value judgements. The line of demarcation is once again drawn with the aid of the criterion of proof; here one relies on the case law of the ECHR (ECHR 8 July 1986, NedJur 1987 no. 901 p. 2992; ECHR 24 February 1997, NedJur 1998 no. 360 p. 2026). It depends in the respective case on whether a comment was founded upon a kernel of fact or not (cf. e. g. Gemeenschappelijk Hof Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba 4 May 1999, NedJur 1999 no. 545 p. 2971 on the one hand and CA Amsterdam 19 October 2000, www.rechtspraa k.nl, LJN-no. AA 7654 on the other: the description of a doctor as a “kwakzalver” [quack(salver) or charlatan] contains an assertion of fact). In SWEDEN the distinction between assertions of fact and value judgements can assume importance in the context of the EAL chap. 2 § 2, where and to the extent that it is interpreted under the corresponding criminal norm referred to by the cited norm of liability. Among these criminal norms is especially CP chap. 5 § 1 (defamation). However, under this provision a true statement can in exceptional cases amount to defamation if it lacks a basis for making it. This can in turn lead to problems of co-ordination with ECHR art. 10, cf. ECHR 19 January 2006, Albert-Engelmann-Gesellschaft mbH v. Österreich, ECHR 19 January 2006, App. no. 46389/99. In SCOTLAND, the comment (statement of opinion) and assertion of fact distinction assumes relevance primarily in the field of defamation where after the defamatory nature of the statement has been affirmed, the defender wishes to raise the defence of fair comment; this defence would equally apply to verbal injury (though its invocation would be unlikely) and perhaps appear dressed in different robes under negligent misstatement. The defence is not open to statements of fact, liability for which can only be escaped through the means of veritatis (truth), privilege or other miscellaneous defences. It has been noted that in flowing from the right of free speech, “the right to make comment is a right that attaches equally to everyone, and the publisher or broadcaster has no greater or higher right to do so than a private individual” (Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law, 135). The authoritative appraisal of the defence emanates from the case of Archer v. Ritchie & Co. (1891) 18 R 719, where Lord McLaren enunciated that “[t]he expression of an opinion as to a state of facts truly set forth is not actionable, even when that opinion is couched in vituperative or contentious language” (Archer v. Ritchie & Co. loc. cit. 727). In order to succeed with the defence of fair comment, the defender must establish (i) that the statement complained of is a comment on fact or facts; (ii) that the facts upon which the comment is made are truly stated; and (iii) that the facts concern some matter of public interest (Norrie loc. cit. 139). The judge has the task of deciding whether the statement can be understood as containing both fact and comment. If the conclusion is drawn by him that there is no doubt that only fact or only comment exists then the defence cannot be put to the jury (London Artists v. Littler [1969] 2 QB 375, 394 per Edmund-Davies LJ; Waddell v. BBC 1973 SLT 246, 249 per Sherriff Principal Walker; Fairbairn v. Scottish National Party 1979 SC 393, 397 per Lord Ross). If the statement is reasonably capable of being considered as comment, then it is for the jury to establish whether it is indeed comment or fact (London Artists v. Littler loc. cit. 199 per Lord Denning MR; Telnikoff v. Matusevitch [1992] 2 AC 343, 351 per Lord Keith of Kinkel). If the jury decides that the statement

457

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458

contains both fact and comment, then it must go on to consider whether the comment is fair and on a matter of public interest (Norrie loc. cit. 141). It is for the pursuer to prove lack of fairness (in the sense of being irrelevant to the facts being commented upon or not warranted by the facts) once the defender has established that the statement complained of is a comment on facts. The truth of the comment itself is inconsequential (Wheatley v. Anderson & Miller 1927 SC 133, 147 per Lord Anderson; Broadway Approvals v. Odhams Press Ltd. [1965] 1 WLR 805, 817 per Sellers LJ). In IRELAND the distinction between assertions of fact and value judgements takes on importance under the heading of defamation in that here the defence of fair comment on matters of public interest is open to the defendant (the term “comment” is used, though as with the term “value judgement”, an expression of opinion is meant). To establish this defence, the defendant must show: (i) that the comment was made on a matter of public interest; (ii) that what he said was comment as opposed to fact; and (iii) that the comment was fair in the sense of being honest (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 34.201). The distinction is important here because facts must be proved to be true (or privileged) whereas comments need only be shown to be fair and honest. However, the comment must also be based on facts (proven to have been) truly stated (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para. 34.205). The facts if given or accessible must be shown to be true if they are to support the comment. If the facts on which the comment is based are not given and not available to the public, then the defence of fair comment is not available and the defendant must justify the comment or show that the occasion was privileged (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para. 34.207). There are no fixed rules in distinguishing between fact and comment (McDonald, Irish Law of Defamation2, 212). The courts currently rely on a variety of circumstances, such as the language used and its arrangement, the person who makes the statement, and the way he conducts his case (see Campbell v. Irish Press Ltd. (1955) 90 ILTR 105 and London Artists v. Littler [1969] 2 QB 375). The sole principle that has emerged is that “if what is intended to be comment appears in the guise of a fact, and there is nothing to show on what it is based, then it must be treated as a statement of fact ... but [not as a comment]” (Crawford v. Albu [1917] 1 AD 102 at 105). In the realm of defamation, from the victim’s point of view, the overall significance of the distinction between the two is muted by the fact that defamatory statements can either take the form of a factually untrue assertion or indeed of indirect derogatory language. The object of such derogatory language may well find himself or herself shunned but those who do the shunning may be unclear as to precisely what fact is being alleged by the stigmatised person (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para. 34.209). In commentary, one may see the traditional distinction being drawn between factual assertions and value judgments founded on the accepted idea that factual assertions may be validated and refuted and thus may be characterised as true or false, while expressions of value judgments are incapable of validation or refutation (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. 34.210); however, there is no Irish case law on this point. Resorting to first principles, this recognised distinction begs the question of why the defence of comment per se (i. e. without the qualification of “on a matter of public importance”) is not argued when, from a theoretical standpoint, aside from issues of freedom of expression (which would tend to reinforce it), this simple argument should relieve the defendant of liability since a sheer comment (as an expression of opinion) itself is not capable of being proven true or false, thus logically undermining the presumption of falsity where defamation is concerned and thwarting a plaintiff’s assertion of falsity in

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attempting to fulfil Lord Davey’s first requirement of a claim in injurious falsehood (see above in Note I13). However, from the foregoing requirements of fair comment it would seem that the answer lies in the reality that for the most part a comment (or expression of opinion) only assumes legal relevance where it is based on facts proven true (a naked, unsupported statement is not considered a comment). This also muddies the waters when one tries to distil the de facto distinction between the two. Due to this mist which shrouds the distinction between facts and comments, defendant’s lawyers have adopted at common law a form of pleading known as the “rolled-up plea”, which in effect asserts both the truth of any factual assertions and the fairness of any comments. The new Defamation Bill 2006 proposes to introduce the defences of honest opinion (s. 18, replacing fair comment) and fair and reasonable publication on a matter of public importance (s. 24). Under s. 19, in distinguishing between a statement consisting of allegations of fact and a statement consisting of opinion, a court is to have due regard to: “(a) the extent to which the statement is capable of being proved; (b) the extent to which the statement was made in circumstances in which it was likely to have been reasonably understood as a statement of opinion rather than a statement consisting of an allegation of fact; and (c) the words used in the statement and the extent to which the statement was subject to a qualification or disclaimer or was accompanied by cautionary words”. III.

Reporting suspicions

27.

Under FRENCH law the question of whether it is permitted to report on a mere suspicion depends on the person who is the subject of the report and in what manner it is carried out. For instance, a concurrence déloyale can lie in pointedly informing a competitor’s customers of an existing suspicion against this competitor. Incidentally, CC art. 9-1 is to be heeded, according to which “everyone has the right to respect of the presumption of innocence. Where, before any sentence, a person is publicly shown as being guilty of facts under inquiries or preliminary investigation, the court, even by interim order and without prejudice to compensation for injury suffered, may prescribe any measures, such as the insertion of a rectification or the circulation of a communiqué, in order to put an end to the infringement of the presumption of innocence, at the expenses of the natural or juridical person liable for that infringement”. The requisites of this provision shall only be fulfilled, however, where the publication contains the journalist’s prejudice that the person in question is guilty (Cass.civ. 12 July 2001, Bull.civ. 2001, I, no. 222 p. 139). The publication of the name of an accused of full age is permitted in principle (Cass.civ. 20 June 2002, Bull.civ. 2002, II, no. 142 p. 113). Infringements of the presumption of innocence no longer depend on CC art. 1382; CC art. 9-1 is exclusively applicable (Cass.civ. 8 March 2001, Bull.civ. 2001, II, no. 46 p. 31). In BELGIAN case law it has been pointed out that a journalist is indeed free to disseminate information. This must however be accurate, thorough and objective. The journalist must act with the utmost caution in collecting and circulating his information; he may only rely on information that he has fairly examined, with regard to its ramifications. The presumption of innocence places particularly high demands on objectivity and impartiality (CFI Brussels 16 February 1999, AM 1999, 282). The SPANISH Constitutional Court opines that the spreading of mere rumours is not shielded by the protection of freedom of press (TC 158/2003 of 15 September 2003, BOE no. 242 of 9 October 2003). The publication of a suspicion does not automatically

28.

459

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30.

460

result in an affront to honour. TS 7 June 2001, RAJ 2001 (3) no. 5535 p. 8476 rejected, for instance, the liability of a newspaper that had truthfully reported on a letter in which the claimant was accused by a third party of having committed a criminal offence. TS 31 May 2001, RAJ 2001 (3) no. 5529 p. 8465 clarified that neither the lodging of a complaint to the police nor the report thereof, amount to an affront to honour per se. It rather depends on the circumstances of each individual case. For example, people in the public eye have to put up with more with reference to their position than private persons under comparable circumstances (TC 297/2000 of 11 December, BOE no. 14 of 16 January 2001). Under HUNGARIAN law criminal proceedings may be truthfully reported upon, also that someone was justifiably suspected, charged or convicted at first instance. It is against the law, however, to later conceal the fact that the accused was acquitted or that the judgment does not yet have force of law (see further Petrik (-Petrik), Polgári jog I2, 178/2, 182/6, 182/8, 186; Gellért (-Zoltán), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 300-301). CC § 80(3) states additionally, that the picture and a voice recording of a person who was prosecuted for a severe crime may be used freely on the basis of cogent public interest reasons or a particularly appreciable private interest upon the authorisation of the authorities. GERMAN CC § 824 protects the commercial esteem of persons and enterprises, “commercial honour”, from adverse effects that are brought about by the assertion or circulation of untrue facts about them (Palandt (-Sprau), BGB65, § 824 no. 1). Expressing a suspicion can fall hereunder (BGH 20 June 1978, NJW 1978, 2151), where the unbiased recipient of the communication gets the impression that it is an – even hidden – assertion of fact (BGH 26 January 1951, NJW 1951, 352). The factual prerequisites of CC § 824 BGB are met where the train of thought of a report does not arrive at any other destination than that of wrongdoing (BGH 12 May 1987, NJW 1987, 2225; see also BGH 8 July 1980, BGHZ 78, 9, 14 and BGH 20 May 1986, NJW 1987, 1398, 1399). However, when inferring such hidden assertions particular restraint is advised, in order to take account of freedom of opinion. It is to be accordingly decided, whether the author himself draws his own conclusions or leaves that solely to the reader (BGH 8 July 1980, loc. cit. 15). Liability for infringements of the general right of personality (CC § 823(1)) remains unaffected; conversely, liability for encroaching on the right to private enterprise takes a back seat as subsidiary to CC § 824 (Erman (-Schiemann), BGB II11, § 824 no. 1). Cases of reporting on the suspicion of a criminal offence remain under the protection of personality rights. This requires a minimum amount of verificatory facts that maintain the truthful substance of the information and thereby afford it “public value” (CA Dresden 27 November 2003, NJW 2004, 1181, 1182; BGH 7 December 1999, BGHZ 143, 199, 203; BGH 26 November 1996, NJW 1997, 1148, 1149). The demands on the cautiousness of the media are higher, the more severely and permanently the estimation of the person in question is curtailed. The portrayal may not contain any prejudgment and must take into account the facts and arguments presented in defence of the accused. The decisive factor is that a pressing need for information in the general public justifies the publication (BGH 7 December 1999 loc. cit.; Palandt (-Sprau), BGB65, § 823 no. 103). Naming the accused is only admissible in cases of severe criminality or criminal offences that particularly stir the public (BGH 7 December 1999 loc. cit. 207; Sprau loc. cit.).

Article 2:204: Loss upon communication of incorrect

31.

32.

33.

34.

AUSTRIAN Media Act (BGBl 1981/314, of 12 June 1981) § 7b(1) provides a claim to reparation of non-pecuniary damage, where a person who has been suspected of a criminal offence but not yet convicted with full force of law, is portrayed by the media as having been convicted or found guilty or as the perpetrator of this criminal offence and not merely described as a suspect. The amount of liability is limited to J 14,535. Permitted will be, inter alia, a truthful report on a judgment of a criminal court of first instance, as long as it is expressed that the judgment does not yet have force of law (Media Act § 7b(2)). GREEK commentary points out that in reporting on persons who are suspected of having committed a criminal offence, a balance must be drawn between the public interest in the information and the interest of the suspect in not appearing in the media. The rule of never publishing the name or picture of a suspect before he has been arrested has even been mooted. The protection of personality and the presumption of innocence would even counter the inference that someone who has been arrested automatically becomes a person of celebrity, meaning that every report about him must come off reservedly and may only be carried out for informational purposes. As soon as the case goes to trial, the name and image of the accused may be published, at least for severe crimes, because here the public interest in the information prevails (for more detail on this whole issue, see Paparigopoulou-Skorrini, NoB 25 (1977), 278). Under PORTUGUESE CP art. 180 it is criminally punishable to insult another by disseminating false assertions of fact or false suspicions. A violation of this rule also leads to civil liability. The same holds true for the spreading of suspicions with the aim of discrediting a competitor (Industrial Property Code art. 317(b)). Journalists are subject to the general duty to examine the truthful substance of the information they disseminate in a reasonable fashion. They are not allowed to invent news, spread mere rumours or to blaspheme others in their writings (Carvalho Rebelo, A responsabilidade civil pela televisão, 39). In this context the Portuguese courts also ascribe great importance to the protection of rights of personality (Vasconcelos Abreu, FS Magalhães Collaço II, 472; see e. g. CA Lisbon 18 May 1988, CJ XIII [1988-3] 180; CA Lisbon 14 May 1998, CJ XXIII [1998-3] 101; STJ 14 February 2002). For instance, a television station is not permitted to claim without sufficient evidence that an international company had installed wiretapping devices in a law enforcement agency in order to be able to spy out on-going investigations there (STJ 17 October 2000, CJ(ST) VIII [2000-3] 78). Where in a press conference, a football manager repeats his previously expressed, but unsubstantiated suspicion that a colleague was the anonymous author of a threat to sabotage the clubs’ upcoming league game, he also commits a severe affront to personality justifying damages (STJ 27 June 1995, BolMinJus 448 [1995] 378). It is a defence to prove either the truth of the assertion or at least having been convinced of the truth and therefore disseminating it bona fide (CP art. 180(2); STJ 8 April 1999). In DUTCH case law it is underscored that a suspicion may only be published if it is founded on facts (HR 27 January 1984, NedJur 1984 no. 802 p. 2859). Any person who spreads information but does not want to divulge its source because, e. g. he is subject to an occupational duty of maintaining confidentiality, bears the risk of not being able to show probable cause for the accuracy of his accusations by other means (President CFI Groningen 26 June 1996, KG 1996 no. 238; Onrechtmatige Daad IV (-Schuijt), Chapter VII, note 39, pp. 501-502).

461

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35.

36.

462

In SCOTLAND, any repetition of a defamatory communication is actionable against a person, other than the original defamer, responsible for repeating the defamation, publishing it, or otherwise putting it in circulation (Hayford v. Forrester-Paton 1927 SC 740). However, the publisher or broadcaster will usually be less culpable than the original framer of the defamatory idea and might indeed be entirely innocent (Morrison v. Ritchie & Co. (1902) 4 F 645). The defence of innocent dissemination (see below, under Note IV 44) is normally regarded as limited to situations in which the distributor cannot be aware of the defamatory content of the material being distributed. It is no defence for a newspaper or broadcaster to say that a story it publishes is merely a rumour or that someone else alleged it, for “the existence of a slanderous report, or its prevalent currency, is no justification for repeating it. Each repetition is a new injury to the party slandered” (Marshall v. Renwick (1835) 13 S 1127, 1129 per Lord President Hope). “The injury to the pursuer is exactly the same, whether the writer himself affirms the truth of the story, or whether he says that some lawyer or other person has affirmed it” (Pope v. Outram 1909 SC 230, 235 per Lord McLaren; Fairbairn v. Scottish National Party 1979 SC 393, 397 per Lord Ross). For a newspaper or magazine to report that a certain rumour is current while stating that it is untrue is usually considered not to protect the defender if the rumour is defamatory (Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law, 30). Though such a disclaimer does not negative the defamatory nature of the communication, it may serve to mitigate any damages awarded (Macculloch v. Litt (1851) 13 D 960; Morrison v. Ritchie & Co. loc. cit. 652 per Lord Moncrieff). While the general rule is that a person who repeats or republishes a defamatory statement is as liable as the original utterer, there are some circumstances in which newspaper reports of parliamentary or judicial proceedings will be protected by qualified privilege (which may be defeated by the pursuer with proof of malicious intent to injure). In Richardson v. Wilson (1879) 7 R 237, 241 Lord President Inglis stated that “[t]he publication by newspapers of what takes place in Court at the hearing of any case is undoubtedly lawful; and if it be reported in a fair and faithful manner the publisher is not responsible though the report contains statements or details of evidence affecting the character of either of the parties or other persons”. In the Outer House decision of Cunningham v. The Scotsman Publications Ltd. 1987 SC 107, 116, Lord Clyde affirmed the recognised proposition that “[t]he Scottish cases disclose the general principle that a fair and accurate report of what takes place in court may be protected by qualified privilege”. Comment on the report is not privileged (Drew v. Mackenzie & Co. (1862) 24 D 649), though the independent defence of fair comment might be available (see above, Note II 25). The report is to be read as a whole, and if a headline gives a misleading impression then the report as a whole might not be held to be fair and accurate (Clive/Watt/McKain, Scots Law for Journalists5, 186, CarterRuck/Walker/Starte, Libel and Slander4, 141). In IRISH scholarly legal writing, reference has been made to the general policy of defamation law of rejecting the views of the suspicious and unreasonable (McDonald, Irish Law of Defamation2, 248 f). Again in the context of defamation, under the heading of the defence of justification, if the defendant makes the statement that “X is helping the police with their enquiries” in a criminal investigation and the context would also support the innuendo that X is under suspicion, then the defendant must, to succeed in the defence of justification be prepared not only to show that the police interviewed X, but they suspected him also (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 34.131). To prelude a defamatory statement with the clause “It is rumoured that ...” or “It is

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suspected that...” (or some similar phrase) will not protect the defendant who can only prove that such a rumour or suspicion existed; the law will also oblige him to prove the content of the rumour before it allows him a defence (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para. 34.133). In the area of defamation dealing with instances in which slander will be actionable per se (see Note IV 41 under Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy)) and specifically with the case of slanders imputing a criminal offence punishable by death or imprisonment, the Law Reform Commission in its Consultation Paper points out that “the imputation must be that the plaintiff actually committed the offence, and not merely that he is under suspicion of having done so” (Consultation Paper on the Civil Law of Defamation, 1991, http://www.lawreform.ie/publications/data /volume8/lrc_61.html, para. 42), though from the foregoing it is logical to conclude that the latter will found a claim in the lesser degree of slander where special damages can be proven (or indeed in libel). Statements that a person had in the past been convicted of an offence and served a term of imprisonment were held actionable in themselves (Gainsford v. Tuke (1620) Cro Jac 536, 79 ER 460) or where the person had been pardoned, or whose prosecution was time barred (McDonald loc. cit. 84 f). This subject is also relevant in relation to the defence of qualified privilege where a person may in certain circumstances be absolved of liability for making a defamatory statement in self defence. It has also been noted in commentary that such a statement should not be based only on rumours, or fear of a suspicion of wrongdoing that might arise because a person is a member of a group, one or all of whom is suspected of wrongdoing (McDonald loc. cit. 146). Under common law, the defence of qualified privilege (which may be countered by proof of malice) is available for fair and accurate reports of judicial proceedings, howsoever published or whether or not published contemporaneously with the proceedings. However, according to the Law Reform Commission: “the courts have consistently refused to recognise an interest or duty on the part of the press to report matters of public interest to the public sufficient to constitute an occasion of privilege. There is therefore no media qualified privilege as such” (loc. cit. para. 111). Certain reports are privileged under Defamation Act 1961 s. 24. The Second Schedule sets out a lengthy list of matters the reports of which enjoy qualified privilege. This list represents the range of subjects of which the media are entitled to make fair and accurate reports, which does not include anything relating to suspicions or accusations made in the period before judicial proceedings are initiated, pointing to the conclusion that anything reported during this time will not enjoy privilege and may only escape liability by means of the defence of justification where the suspicions can be substantiated. IV.

Liability of internet service providers

37.

Liability of access providers (who enable the user to access the internet) and above all, of host providers (who offer internet users storage space, e. g. for setting up a homepage) is, as is stated above (Comment B7) the subject matter of Directive 2000/31/ EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) (OJ EC L 178 of 17 July 2000, pp. 1-16). FRANCE implemented the Directive with Trust in Digital Economy Act (Loi no. 575 du 21/6 / 2004 pour la confiance dans l’économie numérique), BELGIUM with Electronic Commerce Act (Loi du 11 mars 2003 sur certains aspects juridiques des services de la société de l’infor-

463

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38.

39.

40.

41.

464

mation), thereby likewise replacing the previously applicable system of liability in CC arts. 1382 and 1383 (on this, de Groote, De onrechtmatige daad op het internet, 657, 677). The SPANISH implementing law is Services of Information Companies and Electronic Commerce Act (Ley 34/2002, de 11 de julio, de servicios de la sociedad de la información y de comercio electrónico). In general, no liability accrues where the host providers were not aware of the unlawfulness of the information, in the absence of culpable hesitation to do what was necessary to remove the information or to make access to it impossible (loc. cit. arts. 16 and 17). In ITALY the directive was implemented by Implementation of European Directives Act (Legge Delega no. 39/2002), for which further executing stipulations have been enacted. The system of liability broadly follows the general tort law ethos of CC art. 2043 (for more detail, see Cassano and Cimino, Giur.it. 2004, 671-675). HUNGARIAN Electronic Commercial Services Act predominantly adopts the Directive word for word, but supplements it with regulations on material which lies outside the scope of the latter (e. g. on the ways in which facilitators of search engines may be discharged of liability). For GERMAN law it was decided in BGH 23 September 2003, MDR 2004, 92, that liability of the host provider for the infringement of the general right of personality (CC § 823(1)) only comes into focus where the requirements under the Telecommunications Services Act (TDG) in its version from 22 July 1997 (BGBl I 1870) § 5(2) are also fulfilled. AUSTRIA regulates the accountability of access providers and host-service providers in its E-Commerce Act (ECG) §§ 13-19. However, this law brought no new and independent system of liability, relying rather on the general rules of the CC and supplementing them through individual caps on liability in relation to the storage of external texts and contents (loc. cit. § 16, cf. OGH 6 July 2004, RIS-Justiz RS 0 118525). Prohibitory injunction (no-fault liability) actions arising out of CC § 1330(2) remain unaffected (OGH 19 February 2004, RdW 2004, 536). PORTUGAL likewise distinguishes between various internet providers. The content providers are clearly liable for the unlawfulness of the content of material they place on the internet (Vasconcelos Casimiro, A responsabilidade civil pelo conteúdo da informação, 53); CP art. 183(1), with effect from 24 November 2005 even regulates the details of the criminal prosecutability of such behaviour). Causing particular debate is the question of whether someone who has a link to pages with unlawful content is thereby liable for the text to which he has referred (as argued by Vasconcelos Casimiro loc. cit. 55), or whether such liability is only affirmed where the referrer identifies himself with the referred text (according to Menezes Leitão, Responsabilidade civil na Internet, 147, 163; similarly in Vasconcelos Casimiro loc. cit. 58). A content provider can become contractually liable to the access provider where he feeds illicit content onto the web (Vasconcelos Casimiro loc. cit. 62). The access provider is however not liable to third parties, unless he knew of the illegal content and did not block it according to art. 12(3) of the Directive (Vasconcelos Casimiro loc. cit. 24; Menezes Leitão loc. cit. 159). The TV services providers are jointly liable with those responsible for the broadcast of previously recorded television shows (Television Act art. 70(2). GREECE implemented Directive 2000/31/ EC by Presidential Regulation 131/2003. The rule of liability in this Presidential Regulation (arts. 11 et seq.) corresponds nearly verbatim to the provisions of the Directive (arts. 12 et seq.). A person who merely provides access to external information, without having had an influence on its content,

Article 2:204: Loss upon communication of incorrect

42.

43.

44.

is placed in more ameliorating circumstances than content providers; they are subject to the general tort law (Alexandridou, To dikaio tou ilektronikou emporiou, 101). Likewise DUTCH law refrained from introducing strict liability and left the liability of internet providers up to the open-ended system of its law on civil offences (Onrechtmatige Daad I (-Jansen), art. 162, note 7 p. 73). The question of whether host providers are liable owing to an infringement of copyright law when the host’s customers violate the rights of third parties in using the storage space it has provided, was answered in the negative by CA The Hague 4 September 2003, NedJur 2003 no. 664 p. 5102. CA Amsterdam 7 November 2002, NedJur 2003 no. 54 p. 374 required a provider to block access to a site, on which information was to be found on how best to sabotage the rail system of Deutsche Bahn (Germany’s rail operator). The provision of compensation in kind would also have been in the picture. Comparable case law also exists on the deletion of domain names (CFI Arnhem 3 December 2002, KG 2003, 20). SWEDISH Liability for Electronic Message Boards Act (Lag [1998:112] om ansvar för elektroniska anslagstavlor) relates to all services in the electronic transfer of communications with the exception of the communications of authorities, emails and publications through the mass media falling under the protection of freedom of the press (loc. cit. §§ 1 and 2). Liability is concentrated on those who provide the service (loc. cit. §§ 4 and 5); it complies with criminal accountability (loc. cit. §§ 6 and 7 in conjunction with EAL chap. 2 § 2). The system of liability of Directive 2000/31/ EC was implemented in Sweden by the E-commerce Act (Lag [2002:562] om elektronisk handel och andra informationssamhällets tjänster §§ 16-18), in FINLAND by the Provision of Services in the Information Society Act (Lag om tillhandahållande av informationssamhällets tjänster of 5 June 2002, no. 458, §§ 13-15) and in DENMARK by the Services in the Information Society (with particular Provision for E-commerce Transactions) Act (Lov om tjenester i informationssamfundet, herunder visse aspekter af elektronisk handel of 22 April 2002, no. 227, §§ 14-16) in conjunction with the general culpa rule (D-Karnov 2005 IV (-Latrup-Pedersen), nos. 70 and 83). In ENGLAND, Bunt v. Tilley [2006] EWHC 407 (QB), [2007] 1 WLR 1243 (Eady J) settled that for the purposes of the law of defamation an internet service provider which performed no more than a passive role in facilitating postings on the internet is not to be regarded as a publisher at common law, and nor is its position comparable to that of a distributor (who at common law would have to disprove negligence). However, liability can ensue when there is a demonstrable degree of awareness or an assumption of general responsibility imposing legal responsibility under the common law for the publication of words: cf. Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd. [2001] QB 201 (where the aggrieved person notified the internet service provider of the defamatory statement, but the posting was not removed and was left to expire automatically). In SCOTLAND (as with the rest of the UK) the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 were brought into force on 21 August 2002 through S. I. 2002 No. 2013. Ss. 17-19 follow the wording of arts. 12-14 of Directive 2000/31/ EC virtually word for word, relieving internet service providers of liability for “damages or for any other pecuniary remedy” in relation to either being a “mere conduit” for information, “caching” it and “hosting” it respectively, where the internet service provider has a purely passive role in the relaying or storing of information and would be otherwise liable. Under the common law in Scotland before these regulations, Lord Anderson held that innocence was a defence pleadable by “mere messengers”, or the mechanical instrument by which the slander was published (Gibson

465

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45.

46.

v. National Citizens’ Council (1921) 1 SLT 241). Defenders who are not responsible for the form or content of the material in which the defamation is contained will be prima facie liable for defamation but may have a defence if they can show that they did not know that the material contained a libel and that this ignorance was not due to any negligence on their part. A library is not expected to check every single book that it possesses and cannot therefore be held to be aware of the contents of them all (Weldon v. “The Times” Book Co. Ltd. (1911) 28 TLR 143). However, it is no excuse for a distributor to say that the mass and volume of its business precludes it from checking the material it distributes (Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. W. H. Smith & Son Ltd. (1933) 150 LT 211). The net result of Morrison v. Ritchie & Co. (1902) 4 F 645 does not read well for initial publishers or broadcasters of information provided by third parties. In this case, the defence of innocent publication did not apply since the newspaper (as the initial publisher) was held responsible for whatever appeared in its own columns and was therefore expected to take care to ensure that it printed nothing defamatory. In IRELAND the European Communities (Directive 2000/31/ EC) Regulations 2003 were brought into force on 24 February 2003 by S. I. No. 68 of 2003. “The Regulations create an exemption from liability for intermediary service providers (persons whose business consists in the connection of persons to the Internet) where certain activities are performed and in certain circumstances” (Explanatory Note to S. I. No. 68 of 2003, available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/ZZSI68Y2003.html). Ss. 16-18 of S. I. no. 68 of 2003 follow a near-identical format and wording to arts. 12-14 of the Directive, under which purely passive and anonymous intermediary service providers that transmit, cache and host information are relieved of liability for misinformation. At common law, persons who are in the final stage of the distribution process of a libel such as newspaper vendors, booksellers and others may avail themselves of an exception to the rule that each time another person becomes aware of a defamatory statement there is actionable publication (innocent dissemination). Provided that, as persons carrying on their business properly, they neither knew nor ought to have known that the paper or book contained a libel, they are not deemed to be publishers at all (Fitzgibbon v. Eason & Son Ltd. (1910) 45 ILTR 91; Ross v. Eason & Son Ltd. [1911] 2 IR 459; O’Brien v. Eason & Son (1913) 47 ILTR 266; McDermott v. Eason & Son (1913) 48 ILTR 1; Vizetelly v. Mudie’s Select Library Ltd. [1900] 2 QB 170; Bottomley v. F. W. Woolworth & Co. Ltd (1932) 48 TLR 521). The onus is on the defendant to establish that he or she is innocent and comes within the exception (Ross v. Eason & Son Ltd. loc. cit.; McDermott v. Eason & Son loc. cit.). See also the Notes under Article 2:208 (Loss upon unlawful impairment of business).

Illustration 1 is taken from from CA Oporto 20 October 1988, CJ XIII (1988-4) 201; illustration 2 from OGH 18 May 1995, SZ 68/97; illustration 3 from BGH 2 July 1963, NJW 1963, 1871; illustration 4 from TS 7 June 2001, RAJ 2001 (3) no. 5535 p. 8476.

466

Article 2:205: Loss upon breach of confidence

Article 2:205: Loss upon breach of confidence Loss caused to a person as a result of the communication of information which, either from its nature or the circumstances in which it was obtained, the person communicating the information knows or could reasonably be expected to know is confidential to the person suffering the loss is legally relevant damage.

Comments A.

General

1. Source of inspiration. The provision takes its inspiration from the rules on liability for breach of confidence originating in the Common Law. Loss suffered as a result of a breach of confidence amounts to damage recognised in the law on non-contractual liability. Liability, however, only arises if all the other requirements of Article 1:101 (Basic rule) (i. e. causation and accountability) are satisfied as well. 2. Relationship to other rules. In a few situations, the damage described in this Article may coincide with injuries or losses that already amount to legally relevant damage under other provisions. According to the general rules, the claimant then has multiple causes of action, but of course can only have the total damage satisfied once. Since Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another) relates to false information while the present Article, in contrast, deals with correct (but confidential) information, each rule’s scope of application is clearly separate from the other. It is readily conceivable, however, that a breach of confidence may cause e. g. damage to mental health in the sense of Article 2:201 (Personal injury and consequential loss) – for instance, where a doctor breaches doctor /patient confidentiality and consequently an already psychologically fragile patient becomes severely depressed. Moreover, cases of absolute confidentiality may fall to be addressed under the right to privacy whose infringement constitutes a breach of the right to respect for personal dignity (Article 2:203 (Infringement of personal dignity, liberty and privacy)). Nonetheless, despite such overlaps, it cannot be assumed that Article 2:205 is superfluous. In the first place, Article 2:203 is confined to protecting a natural person’s right to personal dignity, whereas Article 2:205 also provides protection for the confidences of legal persons. And secondly, the confidential information may not be of a ‘private’, that is to say, personal nature: an individual’s sensitive commercial information would fall for protection primarily under this Article, rather than as an aspect of privacy. DCFR II. – 3:302 (Breach of confidentiality). DCFR II. – 3:302 governs a special case 3. of culpa in contrahendo. The Article imposes on a party who has obtained confidential information from a contractual partner in the course of the contractual negotiations a duty neither to disclose that information nor to use it for the party’s own ends. Provision is made for compensation for damage suffered and restitution of the benefit received where this duty is breached. Thus Article 2:205 and DCFR II. – 3:302 in part cover like situations. Their relationship to one another is determined by the general rules for cases

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of conflicting regulations set out in Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraphs (c) and (d). Due to Article 6:101 (Aim and forms of reparation) paragraph (4) it is conceivable that liability under DCFR II. – 3:302 extends further than liability under general non-contractual liability law. In this case, according to Article 1:103(d), contractual liability for the committed culpa in contrahendo prevails. Conversely, Article 2:205 is the basis for a claim where the parties neither concluded a contract nor even engaged in any contractual negotiations. Illustration 1 A informs B about A’s idea for a new carpet grip with express reference to the confidentiality of this information. Without the conscious intention of plagiarism, B further develops this idea and exploits it for commercial ends. B is liable to A in damages even where B and A were not in contractual negotiations. 4. Relation to Chapter 3, Section 1. The subject matter of Article 2:205 are all those circumstances establishing an obligation to respect the confidentiality of information. This extends beyond cases of actual knowledge of confidentiality to cases in which there is an absence of knowledge only because the injuring person has been careless in appreciating the circumstances. All questions relating to the mode of breach of duty, however, are the subject matter of Chapter 3, Section 1. The breach of duty consists in the communication of the confidential information. To be capable of establishing liability the communication must either be intentional or negligent within the meanings of Article 3:101 (Intention) or Article 3:102 (Negligence).

B.

Communication of confidential information

5. Communication. The provision, like Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another) which invokes the same concept of “communication” of information, presupposes a communication of the information to a third party. What types of act constitute such a “communication” must be established on a case by case basis in harmony with the development of that concept within the parameters of the preceding Article. It is not a ground of defence that the information is true, but furtherance of a public interest (see Article 5:203 (Protection of public interest)) may play a role here too as a ground of defence. 6. Information. The expression “information” in the context of Article 2:205 has the same meaning as in the context of Article 2:204. It embraces assertions of fact, not mere value judgements. The subject-matter of Article 2:205, however, consists of true assertions of fact (since only true assertions of fact can be confidential), and, in contrast to Article 2:204, it need not necessarily relate to information about the injured person. It may concern information about third parties or other circumstances e. g. a commercial transaction or a business concept (as in illustration 1). 7. Third parties. Liability arising on the basis of Article 2:205 only affects those who communicate the confidential information. Third parties who exploit for their own purposes a breach of confidence by those to whom the information was entrusted do not 468

Article 2:205: Loss upon breach of confidence

come within this provision. Conceivably, however, such persons may be liable under the rules of unjustified enrichment in respect of the benefits derived from making use of this protected ‘asset’ of the victim. 8. Absolute and relative confidentiality. The provision embraces not merely cases in which the recipient of the information has obtained the information when sworn to silence, but also cases in which the information is relayed when the recipient knew or ought to have known that the information was confidential and not for further communication. The injuring person need not positively have known that confidential information was involved; it is enough that the confidentiality of the information ought to have been recognised and that the information is communicated merely negligently. Thus the confidentiality protected may be either ‘relative’ or ‘absolute’ in character. The former is concerned with information which is made confidential only by the manner in which it is transmitted (typically, where it is made explicit that the information is to be treated as a matter of confidence). This certainly addresses cases in which information is directly imparted by the person affected in explicit terms of secrecy, but it also extends to cases where the information is received directly, provided the recipient ought to know from the manner of communication that the information is confidential to someone other than the intermediary (e. g. because the intermediary has repeated the explicit requirement of secrecy) or has ‘eavesdropped’ on the original communication and in that way learned that the recipient must treat the information as confidential. The latter is concerned with cases where the information has in some other manner become available to the injuring person and it is the very obvious sensitive nature of the information itself, rather than the manner in which it is come by, which signals or ought to signal the confidential character of the information. Classic examples would be the discovery of another’s medical records or private journal. Illustration 2 An employee of a health authority passes on information to a reporter, which, if published, would be sufficient to identify two doctors as suffering from AIDS. The doctors can claim an order (under Article 1:102 (Prevention)) to restrain publication.

C.

Legal consequences

9. Reparation and prevention. As long as the other prerequisites of Article 1:101 (Basic rule) are present, in particular causation and intention (or negligence), the usual legal consequences arise. Thus reparation may be demanded for both non-economic and economic losses (Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) paragraph (1)). In cases involving Article 2:205, preventative legal protection (Article 1:102 (Prevention) and Chapter 6 Section 3 below) as well as the rule in Article 6:101 (Aim and forms of reparation) paragraph (4) assume particular significance. The latter provision allows damages to be assessed according to the amount of profit realised by the injuring person.

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Notes 1.

2.

470

Damage resulting from the unauthorised disclosure of confidential information is dealt with by the various European tort law systems in varying systematic contexts. However, the outcomes respectively attained only marginally diverge from each other. In FRANCE and BELGIUM certain emphasis is placed upon the law of breach of professional secrecy, which is accorded criminal liability under French NCP art. 226-13 and Belgian CP art. 458 and therefore also civil liability under CC arts. 1382 and 1383. Criminality of conduct is not, however, a prerequisite for civil liability. Non-pecuniary damage caused by the breach of a professional duty of secrecy or discretion is as recoverable as pecuniary damage caused by same (CFI Brussels 25 February 2000, TBH 2001, 860, note Buyle and Delierneux: negligent breach of banking confidentiality; since the recipient of the information had not made use of it, there was solely non-pecuniary damage). A breach of confidence may in some situations further constitute a violation of the right to respect for one’s private or family life (French CC art. 9; Belgian Const. art. 22) (JClCiv (-Ravanas), art. 9, fasc. 10 no. 30; de Theux, Ann. Louv. 2002, 296). In French doctrine it is additionally alluded to, that where in the course of contractual negotiations confidential information is disclosed to a contracting party by the other side, he has a duty of discretion, and indeed even where confidentiality is not expressly agreed upon (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2004/ 2005), no. 3710-1). In SPAIN there is extensive overlap between the criminal norms on the spying out and divulgement of secrets (CP arts. 197 et seq.; CP art. 200 extends its protective purpose to legal persons also) and the matters that ground liability under Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act (Law 1/1982) art. 7 (Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 49). Within the scope of application of Law 1/1982, the civil law consequences of a criminal offence are subject to the rules of this law alone and not those of CP (loc. cit. art. 1(2)). Express enumeration is provided for, inter alia, the unauthorised publication of letters, memoirs or other private personal writings (loc. cit. art. 7(3)). The relevant criminal and civil law norms are interpreted as flowing from the fundamental rights to protection of secrecy of communication (TS 23 October 2000, RAJ 2000 (5) no. 8791 p. 13632), this being a strand of the fundamental right to the protection of one’s sphere of privacy (TS 14 May 2001, RAJ 2001 (2) no. 2719 p. 4370). Against this backdrop, TS 7 December 1995, RAJ 1995 (5) no. 9268 p. 12329 granted e. g. the adoptive children of a prominent couple non-pecuniary compensation because a newspaper had published information on the children’s biological descent; in applying Law 1/1982 art. 9 the estimated profit of the newspaper was included in the amount of damages. In the context of this and similar decisions, the protection offered by the law on liability for exposing “family secrets” is ultimately at issue, i. e. the confidentiality of facts that relate to the family and are known only by its members (TC 231/1988 of 2 December 1988, BOE no. 307 of 23 December 1988; TC 197/1991 of 17 October 1991, BOE no. 274 of 15 November 1991; TC 134/1999 of 15 July 1999, BOE no. 197 of 18 August 1999). Breach of professional secrecy is likewise relevant for both the civil (loc. cit. art. 7(4)) and criminal (CP art. 199) law. The term professional secrecy is interpreted broadly (Yzquierdo Tolsada, Daños a los derechos de la personalidad, 1113). Even a nanny who has worked at a prominent couple’s house is bound to secrecy by these provisions (TC 115/2000 of 10 May 2000, BOE no. 136 of 7

Article 2:205: Loss upon breach of confidence

3.

4.

June 2000). Furthermore, liability is founded where after finding out in the course of her work at a public hospital that one of her patients had had two abortions, a doctor tells her (the doctor’s) mother about it, who in turn spills the beans to a relation of the patient, who shares the same home town (TS 4 April 2001, RAJ 2001 (2) no. 2016 p. 3292). Further special rules of liability relate to the protection of confidential personal data (Data Protection Act arts. 10 and 19) and the protection against premature publication of secret information in patent registrations (CP art. 277). In ITALY the first question is whether a specific duty of secrecy has been breached. Typical cases relate to the unauthorised disclosure of professional secrets (CP art. 622) and the breach of duties of loyalty arising out of an employment relationship (CC art. 2105; see Cass.sez.lav. 9 May 1996, no. 4328, Giust.civ.Mass. 1996, 696). A breach of confidence leaves in its wake fallout for primarily criminal, employment and administrative law, and founds civil liability where it occasions danno ingiusto, i. e. harm to a subjective legal position (Cass.sez.pen. 13 January 1999, no. 2183, Riv.giur.pol. 1999, 480). In any event, the only decisive point for private law is of course whether the prerequisites of CC art. 2043 are fulfilled and it is readily conceivable that after taking all the circumstances of the individual case into consideration and affirming the existence of danno ingiusto, liability will be also declared where the breach of a specific duty of secrecy is absent. To date, case law on this point seems to be non-existent. In the central and southern European countries, as in all civil law countries, an independent head of liability for “breach of confidence” is lacking. However, functional equivalents are to be found in every system. Under HUNGARIAN CC § 81(1) a violation of another’s right of personality is committed by anyone who e. g. interferes with secrecy of postal correspondence, comes into the possession of private or business secrets and publishes them without authorisation or misuses them in another way. In 2003, a more precise definition of the term “trade secret” was adopted into law through CC § 81(2)-(4). In contrast, there is no corresponding legal definition of the term “private secret”. It is said that private secrets are facts that are known only by few people and to the non-disclosure of which the person affected has a justified claim because his personality would be injured if the fact were to reach the public (Petrik (-Petrik), Polgári jog I2, 190/3). A certain amount of effort is therefore required of the affected party in shielding the secret. Private secrets may be simultaneously “professional secrets”; particularly prominent examples are offered by doctor /patient and lawyer /client confidentiality (Gellert (-Zoltán), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 313; cf. in case law also BH 1999/156 [along with doctors, other hospital workers are under a duty of discretion in relation to patients’ medical information and indeed even after their treatment is concluded] and BH 1995/87 [a hospital violates a patient’s personality rights where it refuses to issue to him the documents relating to his treatment and operation]). CC § 80 brings additional claims against the misuse of a person’s image or utterances into play, CC §§ 86 and 87 guarantee the protection of intellectual creations, among which e. g. particular business knowledge (“know how”) is also counted. A greater number of criminal law norms supplement the private law bases; where any person acts contrary to these criminal provisions and damage is occasioned, this person is as a rule also civilly liable. Among those enumerated are for example CP § 177(1) (breach of private secrets); CP § 177/A(1) (protection of personal data); CP § 178(1) (breach of postal secrecy) and CP § 178 /A(1) (spying out of private secrets through trespass to property or the use of technological devices).

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5.

6.

7.

8.

472

In GERMANY the general right of personality (CC § 823(1)) also safeguards against the disclosure of personal secrets worthy of protection (MünchKomm (-Rixecker), BGB4, appendix to § 12, no. 107). A distinction is drawn between one’s sphere of individuality, privacy and intimacy (for more detail, see Palandt (-Sprau), BGB65, § 823, no. 87; BVerfG 15 December 1999, NJW 2000, 1021; BVerfG 7 May 1997, NJW 1997, 2669). A violation of the general right of personality was seen e. g. in secretly taken photographs (BGH 10 May 1957, BGHZ 24, 200), in a detailed press report on a person’s sex life (BGH 24 November 1987, NJW 1988, 1984), as well as in the television broadcast of a naked photograph of a person who had only consented to its publication in a biology book (BGH 22 January 1985, NJW 1985, 1617). Other forms of betraying confidentiality are covered by criminal laws (in particular CP §§ 201 et seq.: breach of oral confidentiality and highly personal living space through the taking of photographs; breach of postal secrecy; spying out of data, as well as of corporate or trade secrets; breach of doctors’, lawyers’, administrations’ etc. duty of confidentiality) that, for their part, are protective laws in the sense of CC § 823(2). Additionally, the provisions of the Federal Data Protection Law is counted as a protective law (Staudinger (-Hager), BGB13, § 823, no. C 172). Corporate secrets, under further specific requisites, are singled out, even advocated, as belonging among the “other” absolute rights of CC § 823(1) (BGH 25 January 1955, BGHZ 16, 172, 175; Soergel (-Zeuner), BGB12, § 823, no. 145); however, that may not be the prevailing opinion (see further Erman (-Schiemann), BGB II11, § 823, no. 40; MünchKomm (-Wagner), BGB4, § 823, no. 158; BGH 18 March 1955, BGHZ 17, 41, 51; BGH 9 March 1989, BGHZ 107, 117, 122). AUSTRIAN law also does not work with an independent head of liability for breach of confidence. It systematically covers the corresponding potential for social conflict by other means. Of particular note are the rules on affronts to honour (CC § 1330(1)) and on the violation of the right of personality. An infringement of the right of personality takes place e. g. where the right to respect for one’s sphere of secrecy is disregarded. It protects privacy of the person and his or her utterances that are not intended for the public (Rummel (-Aicher), ABGB I3, § 16 no. 24, with further references to the concretisation of this principle in specific laws). The right to observance of one’s sphere of privacy embraces the protection against the penetration of one’s sphere of secrecy, as well as the protection against the publication of legally obtained secrets (OGH 24 October 1978, SZ 51/146). A breach of professional secrecy will also typically fulfil the requisites for the violation of a protective law. In GREECE the right to respect for private life is interpreted as a facet of the general right of personality (Karakostas, Prosopikotita kai tipos, 62). The latter is violated where details from a person’s private life are published, even where true statements are concerned (Karakostas loc. cit. 64 and 76). The “right to privacy” is infringed, for instance, where hitherto secret bodily imperfections are dragged into the public domain. The secret zone of one’s private life is very generally protected by CC art. 57 (Kapsalis, Persönlichkeitsrecht und Persönlichkeitsschutz, 106). Infringements of postal (CP art. 370) and professional secrecy (CP art. 371; e. g. doctors) are criminally punishable; in such cases civil liability flows from CC art. 914 (Alexiades, Eisagogi sto Iatriko Dikaio, 28). In PORTUGAL the basis for tort law protection of secrecy is CC art. 70(2) (Injury to personality). It is stated that all the thoughts, opinions, feelings, events, actions, omissions or characters that an individual recognizably hides, thus manifesting their will not

Article 2:205: Loss upon breach of confidence

9.

10.

to reveal them, are interests of personality worthy of legal protection where the person affected has a legal and socially acceptable interest in maintaining the respective secret (Capelo de Sousa, O direito geral de personalidade, 335). A civil wrong is committed under CC arts. 75(1) and 77 particularly where someone publishes the private letters or confidential diary entries and memories of another for their own gain; the situation is of course different where the affected party personally makes this and other personal data accessible to the public (Carvalho Rebelo, A responsabilidade civil pela televisão, 80). CC art. 79(2) provides for specific limitations in the case of persons of contemporary celebrity. However, that does not give the press a carte blanche. For instance, it is not permitted to publish details on the private home of a famous football player (STJ 14 June 2005). Special rules have been developed for data protection, especially for information on the religious affiliation, membership in political parties, state of health and sex life of the affected party (1999 and 2001/2003 reports of the activities of the Comissão Nacional de Protecção de Dados, http://www.cnpd.pt/bin/relatorios/anos/relat 99.htm). DUTCH law addresses the problematics of “breach of confidence” first and foremost in the context of privacy protection (cf. Const. art. 10), among which the right to personally determine whether personal data may be collected, saved and viewed is counted. This in turn encompasses the right to personally decide on the relay of such information (Verheij, Vergoeding van immateriële schade, 192; Onrechtmatige Daad IV (-Schuijt), chap. VII, note 101 pp. 1387-1410). Whether a breach of confidentiality will constitute a civil wrong is decided either according to whether a protective law (particularly a provision of the criminal code on professional duties of secrecy) is infringed, or if such a criminal offence is lacking, whether the breach of confidentiality contravenes “codes of practice for commercial dealings based on unwritten law” (CC art. 6:162(2)(third alternative)). The aspects to be taken into consideration within the framework of this assessment are manifold (severity of infringement, type and degree of intimacy of the information, duration of the adverse effects, meaning and recency of the information’s content, the affected party’s personal living circumstances, the reason for and circumstances of publication, the character of the publication medium and the expense that was necessary in order to obtain possession of another’s personal data: Onrechtmatige Daad IV (-Schuijt) loc. cit. note 104, pp. 1412-1414). Liability for breach of professional secrecy is subject to the respective contract regime. The internal rules set down by the profession itself and even disciplinary decisions of the respective professional bodies can be considered in the assessment of liability, but are not of decisive significance for its result (Onrechtmatige Daad IV (-Huijgen) chap. VI.2, note 18 pp. 24-25; note 31 p. 47 and notes 118- 119 pp. 240-241). The ESTONIAN LOA contains no provision similar to Article 2:205. However, the disclosure of confidential information may give rise to an obligation to compensate for damage if the unlawfulness can be established on some basis, e. g. the confidentiality duty of providers of health care services (LOA § 768) and the confidentiality duty of parties to precontractual negotiations (LOA § 14(4)). In SWEDEN, on top of Damages Liability Act (EAL) chap. 2 § 2, criminal law (e. g. CP chap. 4 §§ 8-9c [secrecy of communication and data] and chap. 20 § 3 [professional secrecy]) often also provides the framework for civil liability, provided the result of the infringement committed falls within the scope of protection of the respective norm (Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 86). A breach of confidentiality with a subsequent injury to personality entails additional liability for compensation for insult

473

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

11.

474

(EAL chap. 2 § 3; Bengtsson and Strömbäck loc. cit. 62); it may also concern damage to health (Conradi, Brottsskadelagen, 27: the “nervous disorder” of a woman after an employee of a hospital spoke freely about her abortion). Several specialised laws come to the table with their own criminal norms and occasionally even their own systems of liability, e. g. Protection of Commercial Secrets Act (Lag [1990:409] om skydd för företagshemligheter) §§ 5-10; Banking and Financial Efficacy Act (Lag om bank- och finansieringsrörelse) chap. 1 § 10(1) and (3) (on its significance for civil liability, see further Prop 2002/03:139 pp. 472, 477) as well as Electronic Communication Act (Lag om elektronisk kommunikation) chap. 7 § 15(1). In chap. 38, FINNISH CP (Strafflag) lists an array of criminal offences from the area of breach of secrecy, the commission of which can simultaneously trigger civil liability (Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 1). Further basic requisites for criminal offences in this context are to be found in CP chap. 24 § 8 (dissemination of information that infringes on privacy), chap. 24 § 5 (unauthorised eavesdropping) and chap. 24 § 6 (unauthorised observation). Additionally, the Improper Commercial Conduct Act also applies to the protection of corporate secrets (Lag om otillbörligt förfarande i näringsverksamhet) §§ 4 and 10, cf. Supreme Court 15 March 1984, HD 1984, II, 43. The duty of discretion of credit institutions is to be found in Credit Institutions Act (Kreditinstitutslag) § 94. DANISH CP (Bekendtgørelse af straffeloven) § 152 (Duty of Discretion in the Civil Service), § 263, § 264 (Postal, Telephone and further Secrets) and § 264c(2) (Trade Secrets) become civilly operative in the context of the general culpa rule. On the protection of corporate secrets, see also Marketing Act (Lov om markedsføring) §§ 19 and 117 (Banking Secrecy). Other injuries to personality are subject to general tort law, cf. e. g. Eastern CA 23 October 1990, UfR 1991, 194 (a doctor publishes photos from an operation in which the applicant was having liposuction done; the applicant’s face remained recognisable in the picture; liability under Damages Liability Act § 26). In ENGLAND an obligation of confidentiality can arise either by virtue of an express or implied term of a contract, or independently of contract: Seager v. Copydex (No. 1) [1967] 1 WLR 923; Argyll v. Argyll [1967] Ch 302, 322. The obligation arises in equity and a breach can be restrained by the equitable remedy of injunction; an alternative remedy will be damages in lieu of an injunction, though this analysis is not unproblematic in justifying a jurisdiction for the courts to award damages once the confidential material has been (wrongfully) disclosed and there are thus no grounds for granting an injunction; and accordingly breach of confidence is at least as much regarded as a common law tort. A relationship of confidentiality will arise when confidential information is imparted in circumstances in which the confidant knows or ought reasonably to have known it was subject to an obligation of confidence: A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545, 658 (Lord Goff); Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457. This requirement is satisfied where the confidant has given a (contractual or gratuitous) undertaking not to reveal the information, where the confidential nature of the information is made explicit when it is communicated (cf. Stephens v. Avery [1988] Ch 449, where it was assumed for the purpose of the proceedings that the divulgence of a past lesbian affair to a friend had been prefaced by the remark the information was being imparted in confidence) or where the information is by its nature evidently confidential (e. g. a diary or journal of private opinions and impressions (A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) loc. cit., 659 (Lord Goff); HRH Prince of Wales v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ 1776,

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[2008] Ch 57) or secrets relating to a person’s private life, affairs and conduct communicated to a spouse or partner [Argyll v. Argyll, loc. cit.]; as regards the latter, the earlier working assuption that unmarried sexual partners do not owe a duty of confidentiality [cf. Stephens v. Avery [1988] Ch 449, 454 (Browne-Wilkinson VC assuming the proposition, but where a duty of confidence was nonetheless recognised for other reasons] has been overtaken by the new wider approach to breach of confidence (McKennitt v. Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73; Lord Browne of Madingley v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2007] EWCA Civ 295, [2008] QB 103). Confidentiality is also established where the information is obtained by surreptitious or reprehensible means: cf. F. Gurry, Breach of Confidence in: Essays in Equity, ed. by P. D. Finn) (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1985), 116; Ashburton v. Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469, 475 (client tricked by his solicitor’s clerk into handing over legally privileged correspondence); Francome v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 892 (illegal telephone intercept); Hellewell v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804, 807 (Laws J: thief of diary bound to a confidential relationship). The information to be protected must be confidential. This means, firstly, it must have the requisite degree of secrecy or privacy; material will not be confidential if it is already substantially in the public domain.: see A-G v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2), loc. cit. (final injunction refused because the book had been published abroad). Secondly, it has been a requirement that the information must be sensitive, trivia or useless information not being protected: A-G v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2), loc. cit., 659 and 643 (e. g. fact of being treated for a disease); Stephens v. Avery, loc. cit. (details of a person’s sexual life are not trivial); A-G v. Jonathan Cape Ltd [1976] QB 752 (confidential Cabinet discussions recorded in political diaries no longer protected by law of confidence after 10 years as their political sensitivity had lapsed and with it the need to protect them). Information about a person may be sensitive in this sense and thus confidential even if it is favourable rather than a matter of indiscretion (Prince Albert v. Strange (1849) 2 De G. & Sm 652, 697; 64 ER 293, 312 [Knight Bruce VC]; A-G v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), loc. cit., 640 [Lord Keith], giving the example of a donation to a worthy cause which the donor wishes to remain anonymous). In such circumstances the claimant will not as a rule suffer detriment and would not obtain more than nominal damages, but precisely because damages are inadequate in such circumstances, the remedy of an injunction would be available.Following the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, it has been established that in developing and applying the principles on breach of confidence a court must balance ECHR art. 8 (“ECHR”) (right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence) and art. 10 (right to freedom of expression), whose values are now enshrined in the cause of action: Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457 (where their Lordships, while not in agreement as to the outcome, were in agreement as to the principles to be applied). Against the background of the Convention the courts have extended the law of confidentiality so as to protect article 8 rights in circumstances which do not involve a breach of a confidential relationship to fashion protection against infringement of privacy (i. e. to prevent misuse of private information): cf. Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. (No. 1) [2001] QB 967, 1001 (Sedley LJ); Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [2004] UKHL 22 at [14] and [51]; [2004] 2 AC 457 (Lords Nicholls and Hoffmann); A v. B plc. [2002] EWCA Civ 337, [2003] QB 195) (Lord Woolf CJ: “If there is an intrusion in a situation where a person can reasonably expect his privacy to be respected then that intrusion will be capable of giving rise to a liability in an action for

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476

breach of confidence unless the intrusion can be justified.”); HRH Prince of Wales v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ 1776 at [26]; [2008] Ch 57 (Lord Phillips CJ). The issue is thus whether there is a reasonable expection of privacy on the one side and whether publication advances a legitimate aim and will achieve benefits which are proportionate to the harm that may be done by the interference with the right to privacy: Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [2004] UKHL 22 at [113]; [2004] 2 AC 457 (Lord Hope). On this basis both the instances in which protection may be claimed as well as the categories of exceptions in which disclosure can be justified would seem to have been enlarged, though the parameters of the tort remain to be settled. In IRELAND, the exact basis for the protection afforded against misuse of confidential information is not easy to identify, with elements of contract, equity, property law, tort and constitutional law evident in the leading cases on the subject (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 37.21). It is sometimes stated that the courts are “asked to enforce what is essentially a moral obligation” (House of Spring Gardens Ltd. v. Point Blank Ltd. [1984] IR 611, 663 (SC) [Costello J. in the High Court, O’Higgins C. J. in the Supreme Court]; Oblique Financial Services Ltd. v. The Promise Production Co. Ltd. [1994] 1 ILRM 74, 77 [Keane J.]). The argument, supported in Seager v. Copydex Ltd. (No. 2) [1969] 1 WLR 809 by Lord Denning MR and Winn LJ, that it is akin to the tort of conversion of a proprietary interest has been criticised in commentaries where the proprietary nature of most intimate confidences is questioned (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para. 37.22; Lavery, Commercial Secrets, chap. 2). In Coco v. AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd. [1969] FSR 415; [1969] RPC 41, Megarry J. stated the three elements of breach of confidence: “First, the information itself ... must have the necessary quality of confidence about it. Secondly, that information must have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. Thirdly, there must be an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party communicating it” (loc. cit. 419-420). In order to fulfil the first requirement, the information “must not be something which is public property and public knowledge” (Lord Greene MR in Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd. [1978] 65 RPC 203, 215). The obligation under the second requirement can arise as a term of contract, express or implied, or “by imposition of the law” (Gurry, Breach of Confidence, para. 2-24); this includes relationships such as those between employer and employee (Lavery loc. cit. chap. 7), doctor and patient (Tomkin and Hanafin, Irish Medical Law, chap. 4; Mason and McCall Smith, Law and Medical Ethics7, chap. 8), accountants (Parry-Jones v. Law Society [1969] 1 Ch 1), lawyers (Gurry loc. cit. chap. 18), bankers (Donnelly, The Law of Banks and Credit Institutions, 147166; Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461) and their clients, intimate personal relationships (see preceding Note) and other situations where confidences have been relied upon for a particular limited purpose. A general test for such obligation was suggested by Megarry J. in Coco v. AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd. [1969] FSR 415; [1969] RPC 41, 48, namely that “if the circumstances are such that any reasonable man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information would have realised upon reasonable grounds the information was being given to them in confidence, then this should suffice to impose upon him the equitable obligation of confidence”. Remedies for breach of confidence range from injunctions, Anton Piller – or “search and seize” – orders (House of Spring Gardens Ltd. v. Point Blank Ltd. [1984] IR 611; Toulson and Phipps, Confidentiality2, para. 10-15), orders for delivery up or destruction (Franklin v. Giddins [1978] Qd R 72; Robb v. Green [1895] 2 QB 315; Peter Pan Manufacturing Corp. v.

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Corsets Silhouette Ltd. [1964] 1 WLR 96), an account for profits (House of Spring Gardens Ltd. v. Point Blank Ltd. loc. cit.; Peter Pan Manufacturing Corporation v. Corsets Silhouette Ltd. loc. cit.; A-G v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109), restitutionary (Lavery loc. cit. 253-254; Toulson and Phipps loc. cit. paras 10.06-10.08) or declaratory (Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner (No. 2) [1979] Ch 344) relief and – most controversially – damages (Lavery loc. cit. 244-252; Toulson and Phipps loc. cit. paras. 2.06-2.11, 10.09-10.13). It must also be noted that Ireland has not seen the tendency apparent in the UK to expand breach of confidence as a panacea for claims involving privacy (Report of the Working Group on Privacy, 31 March 2006, para. 2.44, http://www. justice.ie/en/JELR/WkgGrpPrivacy.pdf/Files/WkgGrpPrivacy.pdf). Scholarly writing (Cassidy, [2004] LSG 98, 14) attributes this lack of expansion to the recognition of a general right of privacy in 1987 (Kennedy & Arnold v. Ireland [1987] 1 IR 587) and the statement in the High Court in 1992, that the constitutional right to privacy was co-extensive with the common law right to confidentiality (Desmond & Dedeir v. Glackin (Minister for Industry and Commerce, Ireland) & A-G (No. 2) [1993] 3 IR 67: confidential information obtained from the Central Bank). SCOTLAND also recognises the wrong of disclosing information in breach of confidence, of an implied undertaking or obligation not to do so (Walker, Delict2, 709), with Megarry J.’s three requirements from Coco v. AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd. [1969] FSR 415; [1969] RPC 41 (see above, Note 12) also applicable in the aftermath of the case (though the requirement of a pre-existing obligation of confidence was whittled away by cases such as Francome v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [1984] 1 WLR 892; Stephens v. Avery [1988] Ch 449; Barrymore v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [1997] FSR 600; A-G v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109; Shelley Films Ltd. v. Rex Features Ltd. [1994] EMLR 134 and Hellewell v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804). The traditional action centres around the issue of whether the circumstances were such as to impose a duty on the defender to keep confidence and maintain secrecy about the information which had been disclosed to him. Here the absence of an express contractual prohibition on disclosing secrets is not fatal to a pursuer’s claim (Printers & Finishers Ltd. v. Holloway (No. 2) [1965] 1 WLR 1), being an implied term for persons of “professional standing” (Walker loc. cit.). An obligation also exists where there was no contract of employment, e. g. where information would be divulged to a clergyman by a parishioner making confession or seeking advice (Broad v. Pitt (1828) 3 C & P 518, 172 ER 528). The duty of confidence in this sense also probably exists in any case where one person communicates information to another with the request that the latter do not publish it further, agreement to this becoming contractual if the second person does not demur to receiving the information (Walker loc. cit. 710). It seems that case law (Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. (No. 1) [2001] QB 967; Venables and Thompson v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2001] Fam 430; Theakston v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [2002] EWHC 137 (QB), [2002] EMLR 22; A v. B plc. [2002] EWCA Civ 337, [2003] QB 195; Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [2002] EWHC 499 (QB), [2002] EMLR 30; reversed [2003] QB 633 (CA); Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. (No. 3) [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch), 3 All ER 996 (Lindsay J.); X, A Woman formerly known as Mary Bell v. O’Brien [2003] EWHC (QB) 1101; [2003] EMLR 37) has recently cross-bred breach of confidence in the UK with the rights contained in ECHR arts. 8 and 10. This has resulted in an overarching cause of action, thus casting the net beyond merely cases of breach of confidence, reeling in breach of privacy wholesale, and thereby – through its protection of privacy – rendering

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any apparent (necessity for) recognition of a free-standing right to privacy virtually immaterial. The two main extensions of the law of breach of confidence have been summarised thus: “(1) the scope of the information recognised as confidential has broadened and the assessment of this includes the impact of the form of the proposed publication, the test being whether the disclosure would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities and would shock the conscience...; and (2) there may be an obligation of confidentiality even although the information was not really imparted in a relation of confidence” (MacQueen, (2004) 8 Edinburgh LRev, 249). The second extension is particularly relevant to the amalgamation with breach of privacy and is a significant departure from the statement that “[t]he law of confidentiality proceeds on the basis of the existence between confider and confidant of an obligation of confidence” (Bonnigton, (1992) SLT 289, 290) existing before the information has been imparted. In its current form, the “basis” of breach of confidence is no longer to be found; this is since, in the cross-over cases mentioned above involving the surreptitious taking of photographs, the information is not willingly or voluntarily imparted in confidence, rather the information is seized by or comes into the possession of the defender, resulting in the situation that in fact no confidence or trust ever existed at all. This means that the obligation of confidence is imposed because of the very surreptitious “gathering” of private information and not (as was traditionally so) due to an obligation based on information confided by the pursuer and so carrying the essential ingredient of trust and confidence, with the defender’s conscience binding him not to relay the information to a party external to this relationship of trust. See further Directive 2004/48 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, art. 7.

Illustration 1 is taken from Seager v. Copydex Ltd. (No. 1) [1967] 1 WLR 923, and illustration 2 from X Health Authority v. Y [1988] 2 All ER 648 (QBD).

Article 2:206: Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession (1) Loss caused to a person as a result of an infringement of that person’s property right or lawful possession of a movable or immovable thing is legally relevant damage. (2) In this Article: (a) loss includes being deprived of the use of property; (b) infringement of a property right includes destruction of or physical damage to the subjectmatter of the right (property damage), disposition of the right, interference with its use and other disturbance of the exercise of the right.

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Comments A.

General

1. The Article in overview. This Article takes as its subject-matter loss caused by an infringement of another’s property right or lawful possession (paragraph (1)). Paragraph (2) explains what is meant by “loss” and “infringement” of property. The definition of “loss” in Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) remains unaffected by this; Article 2:206(2)(a) is concerned with extending, not restricting, that general definition. 2. Accountability. Under these rules, the infringement of a property right and infliction of legally relevant damage thereby occasioned do not automatically result in liability. As with all the Articles in Chapter 2, Article 2:206 pertains only to the question of what constitutes legally relevant damage. Whether someone is then liable for it, is only decided in the Chapters that follow: the injuring person must have caused the damage deliberately or negligently or be otherwise responsible for its causation and have no defences available. 3. Loss as legally relevant damage. Article 2:206(1) makes it clear that an infringement of a property right is not damage per se (injury as such). Rather the existence of a legally relevant damage depends on the existence of an economic or a non-economic loss. Illustration 1 N has cultivated land belonging to L without L’s permission or other authority. The pleasant decorative effect as well as the investment of plants has added considerably to the value of the land. Since N has made use of L’s land and modified its appearance, N has infringed L’s property rights in respect of the land and L may have a right to prevent further acts of gardening, infringing his property rights, under Article 1:102 (Prevention), but N’s interference has not necessarily caused L any legally relevant damage. Indeed, so far from causing L an economic loss, N’s activity has conferred on L a valuable benefit if L is not correspondingly liable to N (under the law of unjustified enrichments) for the full value of the improvement to the land. Unless L can show that the use of the land has interfered with his (L’s) plans (e. g. because L will now incur a cost in having to clear the land of trees and shrubs to make way for a building) or that he has suffered some other loss as a result of the infringement of his property rights, L will have suffered no legally relevant damage. Illustration 2 A ship damages a disused and worthless quay. Damage to property, in the sense of a violation of ownership rights, it may be, but legally relevant damage it is not. The latter would require a financial loss on the part of the quay owner. 4. Relationship to other regimes. Consideration must also be given to the fact that in relation to title to things some special statutory regime may apply and will then take 479

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precedence over Article 2:206 (see Article 1:103(c) (Scope of application)) as far as its purposes so require. That will be of significance in particular in relation to infringements of property rights within a so-called owner-possessor relationship (see below Comment B9). 5. Remedies. Article 2:206 must be read in conjunction with the provisions on remedies contained in Chapter 6. Particularly of Note in this context are Article 6:101 (Aim and forms of reparation) paragraph (3), Article 6:104 (Multiple injured parties) and Article 6:201 (Injured person’s right of election). Article 6:101(3) concerns cases in which the costs for the repair of a thing exceed their value. Article 6:104 in its main thrust addresses the question who among several holders of property rights in relation to a given thing can demand reimbursement of expenditure on repairs. Finally, it falls within the framework of Article 6:201 (Injured person’s right of election) to consider whether it is one or the other holder of a property right or only both of them together who is or are authorised to decide whether the compensation provided is to be invested in reinstating the property to its former condition or whether it should be applied for other purposes.

B.

Property rights and questions arising from property law

6. Terminological difficulties. Hitherto, the private law systems of the European Union neither boast a unified concept of “ownership” nor a uniform notion of “lawful possession”. Thus, it may be that in the course of further deliberations on a European private law it will prove necessary to adjust the formulation of Article 2:206 in line with more recent developments. On the other hand, it appeared to be untenable not to expressly rank losses resulting from an infringement of ownership or lawful possession under the “Particular Instances of Legally Relevant Damage” solely because of apparent terminological and conceptual difficulties that are still tied to both those notions. The law of property’s inconsistent terminology does not call into question the general core content of the values underlying non-contractual liability law. 7. Property rights. Article 2:206 expressly relates only to property rights in movable or immovable things. However, this provision is not limited to any specific type of property right. Generally any proprietary right will suffice. It is not necessary that the claimant affected be the owner of all interest in the property. “Infringement of property” within the meaning of the provision may also be suffered by one who is admittedly not the holder of all the rights of an owner in the property, but who holds some of the property rights which make up ownership (e. g. an mere pledge). What rights are in point of fact “property rights” can only be answered, at the current stage of European legal development, by dipping into the respective applicable national law. An example is provided by the question of whether one who has acquired subject to the seller’s reservation of title is to be regarded as a holder of a property right (i. e. of an Anwartschaftsrecht). The answers to this question may turn out differently, without thereby putting in doubt the principle that Article 2:206 seeks to express. 8. Nuisance. In order to ascertain whether there is damage under Article 2:206, which turns on the infringement of a property right, it will be necessary to look to property law 480

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to ascertain the boundaries of any right: the act of the injuring person must be an incursion on another’s rights of property. As has already been noted, this interrelation between the law in this Book and the law of property (on which European rules remain to be developed) will be of particular significance in relation to nuisance. While the cause of action arises in this Book by virtue of damage suffered within the meaning of Article 2:206, to establish that the injuring person’s conduct infringed the injured person’s rights as landowner will depend on showing that the injuring person exceeded the bounds of enjoyment determined in property law for the use of the land. What levels of noise from neighbours, for example, must be tolerated by a landowner, and what can be objected to, will be part and parcel of the demarcation of the limits of property rights as between neighbours. Such intangible boundaries are as much a part of property law as the physical divide between different land holdings. A similar point may be made in relation to rights of property in movables. Those rights may be limited by social mores and accepted conventions, so that in given circumstances, quite aside from questions of whether the injury is so trivial as to preclude the grant of redress, it may be that as a matter of property law there is no infringement of a property right and therefore no damage under this Article. Questions of this sort must also be resolved on the basis of national property law. 9. The owner-possessor relationship. However, this does not exhaust the property law dimension. In particular, it is important to recognise that Article 2:206 may be ousted by special rules in the various jurisdictions (until now often collated in a self-contained part of a civil code) governing the so-called owner-possessor relationship. There are two difficulties here arising from the fact that many (but by no means all) jurisdictions allow the claim of acquisition in good faith from transferors to succeed where the acquirer obtains title being ‘merely’ (as opposed to grossly) negligent as to the seller’s title. Thus, for example, a purchaser of a car from a person who presents a log book with a falsified entry may acquire good title from the unauthorised transferor, even though the falsification could have been ascertained if the log book had been scrutinised with more care. The first implication of this proposition of property law is that the transferee can acquire property in circumstances of bare negligence. That means that if, without more, the noncontractual liability law provisions on infringement of property rights were applicable, it could be supposed that the transferee causes damage to the owner negligently when acquiring ownership in such circumstances since the owner’s title is destroyed by the (negligent) good faith acquisition. Such a non-contractual liability law rule, however, would serve no purpose, of course, because while property law would assure ownership of the good faith acquirer, non-contractual liability law would impose an obligation to make reparation and therefore to transfer it back to the previous owner. Burdening the new owner with such an obligation would in large measure frustrate the aim of the property law rule. It must therefore be taken as implicit that such cases will not give rise to noncontractual liability. This is encapsulated by the rule in Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (c) which disapplies the provisions of this Book where they would contradict the purpose of other rules of private law. 10. Stolen goods. The second problem arising from the possibility of acquisition of property in good faith in the absence of gross negligence is the exception sometimes made which completely excludes the possibility of acquisition in good faith where the property is stolen or has otherwise gone astray. Without an adjustment to the non-contractual 481

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liability law provisions one would arrive on the basis of such property law at the contradictory notion that a person who by mere negligence failed to appreciate the transferor’s lack of title, but neither knew nor should have known that the property had been taken from the owner, will be liable for destroying or damaging it, whereas such a person would become owner if the property has not been stolen, and would consequently not be liable for its subsequent destruction, this being the destruction of the person’s own property. The different outcome for the two cases is determined solely by whether the property is stolen (about the existence of which state of affairs the acquirer was not grossly negligent). Given that the acquirer’s state of mind is the same in both cases, there is a necessity to treat the two cases alike from a non-contractual liability law perspective. This involves extending to damage of stolen property for non-contractual liability law purposes only the protection granted by property law to the ‘merely’ negligent good faith acquirer of non-stolen property. Article 1:103(c) (Scope of application) in turn ensures that there is no resulting contradiction between non-contractual liability and property law. 11. Property rights in corporeal things. Article 2:206 applies to immovable as well as movable property. Plots of land, houses and corporeal movable objects are “things” within the meaning of the Article. It does not, however, apply to incorporeal property. Intellectual property rights (copyright, patents, etc.) are subject to special legal regimes in all the Member States of the EU which are unaffected by these rules. The same is true for rights embodied in an instrument. The right “to” a bond is ownership in property within the meaning of Article 2:206; the right “from” a bond is not. 12. Mere contractual or other relative rights excluded. Mere contractual or other relative rights are also excluded from the provision. That does not mean, though, that such rights are not capable of enjoying legal protection under the law on non-contractual liability. Rather it means only that the question whether one is faced with a legally relevant damage must be decided in the absence of a special regime (e. g. in Article 2:211 (Loss upon inducement of breach of obligation)) according to Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) paragraph (1)(c). Here again it can depend in particular on whether the injuring person acted intentionally or merely negligently. The practical result differs little from a concept whereby the presence of an infringement of a property right is assessed differentially based on whether the injuring person acted intentionally or negligently. Illustration 3 A operates a hairdresser’s salon in house which is damaged by T with a lorry. Of necessity the business must be closed for a period. Two of A’s employee hairdressers sue on account of their loss of wages. They have neither suffered an infringement of any “property right” of theirs nor suffered an infringement of lawful possession in regard to the hairdresser’s salon nor become the victim of an inducement of their employer to fail to perform obligations towards employees. Had T however acted to cause loss intentionally – for example, by an act of vandalism – then the employees too would have suffered a legally relevant damage, though not under this Article or Article 2:211 (Loss upon inducement of breach of obligation), but instead on the basis of Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage).

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Illustration 4 A construction company carrying out road works negligently cuts through a subsurface electricity cable. Legally relevant damage is suffered as a result by the electricity company, which is the owner of the cable, but not by a business at whose head office work is consequently temporarily interrupted. The negligent impact on its contractual relationship with the electricity company does not establish legally relevant damage. The situation is different where as a result of the power cut, property is damaged or destroyed, e. g. heated metal cools down or (in a private household) the contents of a freezer are spoiled.

C.

Lawful possession

13. Possession. For the purposes of Article 2:206 “property rights” do not include lawful possession of corporeal things. For that reason lawful possession is given separate mention in paragraph (1). Possession as such is a mere state of affairs, not a right and thus not a property right. If, however, possession is reinforced by a right to possession, then in accordance with paragraph (1) it likewise amounts to an interest protected by this rule. 14. Detention included. Mirroring the hitherto lack of a common European notion of ownership, there is to date no uniform European concept of lawful possession. In a range of legal systems the notion of possession only encompasses so-called “proprietary possession” (or, in relation to immovables, “owner occupation”) and thus only cases in which someone possesses the thing “as his own”. In these systems, therefore, even a lessee is not a possessor; but only a so-called detentor. In contrast, the category of detention is completely unknown in other legal systems. They use the term “possessor” also of a person who possesses “for another”. Consequently in these legal systems the complete opposite prevails: – a lessee is seen as the prototype of a possessor. Article 2:206 does not seek to take a stand on this difference of views in property law; as stated above, the provision must therefore be adjusted at a later point in time to take on board more recent developments, as the need arises. Here it is only necessary to clarify that the notion of possession deployed by Article 2:206 is to be understood as including detention. This readily follows from the protective aim of the rule: a proprietary possessor (i. e. a “possessor” in the sense of systems that distinguish between possession and detention) is either entitled to claim as an owner or falls completely outside this rule because the possessor would be a thief and would not have lawful possession. 15. Lawful possession. Article 2:206 is not concerned with possession as such, but rather the right to possession. A thief does not fall within the provision’s scope of protection. The same goes for a possessor to whom the thing is unlawfully sub-let by its lessee; in any such case the sub-lessee has no right to possession as against the owner. 16. Several possessors. The legal protection which several possessors (or detentors) of the same thing are to enjoy in their relations to one another must be determined on the basis of the applicable national property law.

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17. Property law protection of possession remains unaffected. It follows from Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (d) that Article 2:206 does not affect remedies available on other legal grounds. Thus, to the extent that legal protection of possession is also provided for by property law and the injured person is equipped with a more favourable course of action under that regime, this will not be impinged upon by the parallel provisions of non-contractual liability law. The same is of course equally true for protection of ownership under property law, as the case may be. 18. Loss caused by infringement of lawful possession. Legally relevant damage within the meaning of Article 2:206 is only loss resulting from the infringement of a right to possession of the thing. While that normally includes loss of use, it does not encompass loss resulting from harm to the thing’s substance. Illustration 5 If a business traveller’s hired car is stolen, he has a claim against the thief to reparation of damage arising from having to hire another car. By contrast, however, the business traveller does not suffer legally relevant damage where someone damages the vehicle without adversely affecting its roadworthiness. It is the owner who is entitled to reparation on account of the property damage. Illustration 6 A renovates B’s apartment in an unauthorised fashion, despite the fact that B is not at all in agreement with this. B therefore restores the apartment to its previous state. The costs of restoration constitute recoverable damage.

D.

Infringement

19. The concept. Paragraph (1) invokes a broad concept of infringement of another’s property right. Another’s property right is infringed where a person uses the property in a manner solely befitting the holder of the property right. The most important cases of infringement of a property right are enumerated in paragraph 2(b). The cases listed there are not, however, exhaustive (“includes”). Illustration 7 A accepts B’s request to bring a picture bought by B in London back to Munich – the place of residence of both A and B – on A’s return journey. A carelessly leaves the picture unattended at the airport and it is stolen. A has infringed B’s property right (by omission), although A has neither damaged the picture, nor disposed of it, nor occasioned an interference with use or other disturbance of the exercise of B’s right. 20. Defences. The concept of infringement operates independently of the existence of a defence. It is based on a “factual” concept to that extent. Someone who is attacked by another’s dog and injures the dog in self-defence “infringes” the property rights of the dog owner, but is not liable to the dog owner (Article 5:202(1) (Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity)). The same is true for an insurance fraudster who, with the 484

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assent of the owner, drives the latter’s car in order to stage an accident: Article 5:101 (Consent and acting at own risk) does not change the fact that this concerns property damage.

E.

The most important modes of infringement of another’s property right (paragraph (2)(b))

21. Damage to property. Typical infringements of property rights consist of the destruction or damaging of the subject-matter to which the property right relates. The wording of the text therefore employs for this purpose (and solely for this purpose) the expression “property damage”, to which reference is made in later Articles. This relates in particular to Article 3:202 (Accountability for damage caused by the unsafe state of an immovable) and Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions), from which it follows that the “strict liability” regulated there is not tailored to infringements of property rights of every kind, but only to infringements of property rights in the form of damage to property. 22. Ineffectual products. Property damage can also be the result of an ineffectual protective measure and in particular an inoperative product. Illustration 8 A obtains for use on fruit plantations a fungicide which should prevent the natural fungal infestation of apples. It does not do what it says on the tin. The apples get worse and prove to be unmerchantable. This is loss resulting from property damage. 23. Self-contained damage in defective products and buildings. One case of property damage which is excluded from this Article, though not alluded to in the text, is where damage results to the entirety of a product or spreads to other parts of a product as the result of a defect within it. As regards strict liability, the matter is governed exhaustively by the EU directive on product liability to the effect that strict liability is excluded (see Article 3:204(1) (Accountability for damage caused by defective products)). With regard to negligence-based liability the matter will reside exclusively within contract law. That follows from Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (c): see Comment D11 and Notes II 14-26 on that rule. The provisions of non-contractual liability law do not apply if they would contradict other rules of private law. That would be the case in respect of damage to the product itself because the application of Article 2:206 would have the effect of displacing or making inroads on contract law rules on liability. Consequently, Article 2:206 will only apply where the impairment to property caused by a defective product is damage to property other than the defective product itself. 24. Sale of land. Comparable problems can also arise in regard to the sale of land. They concern the same general problem of concurrence of actions in relation to the law of contract and the law on non-contractual liability and they must therefore be resolved likewise on the basis of Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (c).

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25. Disposition of the right. An infringement of property rights can of course also occur where the thing itself remains undamaged. An important example of this type of case relates to the disposition of another’s property. This is because a disposition of the property may amount to its destruction in economic terms if, as a result of a third party’s acquisition of title in good faith, this brings about a loss of ownership. The position is quite similar where, as a result of the injuring person’s disposition, a third person acquires a limited right in rem in respect of the owner’s property. Illustration 9 A acquires goods from B under reservation of title. B does not consent to their resale or consents only under certain conditions, such as A transferring to B his claims to payment from his sub-purchasers. A does not comply; his sub-purchasers acquire title in good faith. Besides a non-performance of a contractual obligation, there is also the causation of damage relevant to the law on non-contractual liability. B therefore (under certain circumstances) also has a non-contractual (but not a contractual) claim to damages directly against C, the managing director of A, a legal person. Illustration 10 A hired an item from B and pawned it to X, to whom it is handed over. In view of her good faith assumption as to A’s title, X has acquired a security right burdening the property which is also effective against B. A has caused an infringement of B’s ownership. 26. Law of unjustified enrichment. Concurrent liability under the law of unjustified enrichment remains unaffected by non-contractual liability for damage under this Book: see Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (d). This is of particular significance where the disponer neither acts intentionally nor negligently disregards the owner’s title. 27. Interference with use. An infringement of a property right is also made out when the owner’s use of property is disturbed. This is obvious for immovable property (see Comment B8 above), but it also occurs frequently in cases of movables. Illustration 11 Destroying the ordered system of an archive, warehouse, stamp collection or files in an office does not amount to property damage because the individual items remain undamaged and because, in any event under most legal systems, there is no property in the archive (etc.) as such. However, there is an infringement of a property right in the form of a detrimental interference with use. However, transient interferences with use of the sort that permanently occur in daily life will not suffice. That follows from Article 6:102 (De minimis rule). Illustration 12 Where a person parks a vehicle in a city for a short time in such a way that another vehicle is hemmed in, no infringement of property is committed. The situation is 486

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different where a car is blocked for days on end or where a ship (which docked for unloading) cannot leave a canal harbour for over half a year due to the collapse of a negligently and inadequately secured retaining wall. 28. Deprivation of use: infringement and loss distinguished. Paragraph 2(b) states that interferences with use amount to an infringement of property rights; conversely, paragraph 2(a) takes up the loss of use resulting from an infringement of a property right. Both aspects are to be differentiated. Paragraph 2(a) requires an infringement of a property right, regardless of the kind of infringement. Property damage provides the typical example. Paragraph 2(b), in contrast, makes it clear that interference with use as such can constitute an infringement of the property right of another. See also Comment E33 below. 29. Other disturbance of the exercise of the right. Other disturbances of the exercise of property rights, which do not take the form of property damage, the loss of a right or an interference with use but nonetheless amount to infringements of property rights, are equally numerous. Frequent examples include thefts, misappropriation and trespass. Illustration 13 A, the owner of historical castle grounds, forbids visitors from taking photographs in the interior, as she wants to make a small additional income from the sale of postcards and the like. It is to be used for the upkeep of the site. A commercial photographer does not comply with the ban and subsequently offers his own postcards for sale to tourists. The photography of the rooms constitutes an infringement of property rights.

F.

Loss

30. General. Article 2:206(1) makes it clear that losses which result from an infringement of a property right constitute legally relevant damage. Typically these take the form of costs of repair, the subject-matter of the property right having been physically damaged, and a loss of profit because the claimant has been deprived of the opportunity to exploit the property commercially. These losses are already covered by the general rule in Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) paragraph (1) in conjunction with (4)(a), and the same holds true for a reduction in the value of property. If a thing is damaged, then the property right which subsists in relation to that thing loses value. (The case differs only if, for example, the thing affected is a building which is standing empty and destined for demolition and damage arises through children throwing stones to break the window panes, see Comment A3 above.) 31. Depreciation in merchantable value. A not uncommon case is where a complete repair or restoration will not in fact eradicate entirely the loss of value which has arisen. In such cases there must be compensation for the residual loss of value in addition to the repair costs.

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Illustration 14 A’s vehicle is damaged in a traffic accident. While it can be fully repaired, it nevertheless loses value because an “accident damaged car” will sell for less on the used car market than an otherwise identical, but accident-free car. This “depreciation in merchantable value” is recoverable loss, which must be compensated in addition to the repair costs. 32. Non-economic loss. As regards non-economic losses, it equally follows from the general rule contained in Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) paragraph (1) that they are also recoverable in principle, as long as the other requisites of liability under Article 1:101 (Basic rule) are fulfilled. The affirmation of legally relevant damage in the form of non-economic loss caused by an infringement of property rights is particularly self-evident where there is an intentional infringement of property rights, which was orchestrated purely to inflict mental pain on the owner. An example would be where a person intentionally shoots another’s pet, whose death causes distress to the pet owner. Article 2:206 is not of course restricted to such cases. It is not necessary that the injuring person should want to inflict mental suffering on the owner. Instead liability for noneconomic losses as a rule falls to be considered whenever an intentional infringement of property has taken place. Whether or not the injuring person intended to cause mental suffering will not affect liability, provided the injuring person intended to cause the infringement of the claimant’s property right (the act of destruction) whose consequential loss constitutes the damage, meaning to inflict that property damage on the owner. A case in point would be where a burglar disrupts possessions in the dwelling which he has broken into and it is this violation of the home owner’s rights which causes distress: the burglar, intent on finding and stealing any valuables he finds, means to infringe the owner’s property rights when he disturbs the owner’s belongings; he need not intend to cause distress, but it suffices that this is the result of his intentional infringement. Conversely, in cases of purely negligent infringements of property rights, a precise assessment is to be carried out as to whether the alleged non-economic losses have actually occurred. Such liability is not ruled out in these cases, but a more precise analysis of the consequences of the infringement of property rights is demanded. A run-of-the-mill traffic accident involving physical damage to a standard vehicle cannot be seen as the cause of non-economic loss (see Article 4:101 (General rule [on causation]). 33. Deprivation of use (paragraph 2(a)). However, other forms of loss beyond the ones already mentioned may also arise. Of these one form is explicitly mentioned in paragraph (2)(a), namely, a deprivation of the benefits of using or being able to use property. This constitutes a loss and thus a legally relevant damage. Withholding property from another or preventing others from using their property, in other words, can constitute both an “infringement” (sub-paragraph (b)) as well as a “loss” (sub-paragraph (a)). Illustration 15 Consider the case where property (in particular a motor vehicle) is damaged and not available for use during the period of repair. In that case damage is not merely present when the person affected must procure a substitute and must incur the expense of using public transport. Rather the loss of potential use – the loss of the benefit which the property right would otherwise have assured – is in itself a legally 488

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relevant damage. It does not matter that the use which would have been made of the vehicle would have been for pleasure, rather than for business. That avoids a differential treatment of property which is not deployed by the owner in a profitearning capacity. If a taxi is damaged, the owner can naturally claim the profit foregone during the period of repair or the cost of procuring a new vehicle; a private individual ought to have a corresponding claim on account of the loss of the opportunity to make use of the car whenever so desired, which necessarily looks towards the latter of these two measures of loss. Given the absence of actual economic loss of profit, the measure of the loss referred to in paragraph (2)(a) will generally be a substantial part of the cost of hiring a substitute vehicle (even if that is not done), because that approximates the value of the use of which the injured person was deprived. However, it is of course a requirement that the claimant wanted to make use of the property right or was at least able to do so. Illustration 16 Youths occupy an empty house in a university town. They infringe the property rights of the house owner (paragraph 2(b)) and occasion loss to the owner in the amount of the estimated rental value of the house; they are still liable even if the owner cannot prove that during their period of occupancy a tenant willing to pay rent was dissuaded from renting. 34. Cable cases. In other words sub-paragraph (a) concerns situations in which it cannot be said that there is legally relevant damage simply on the basis of Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) paragraph (4)(a). Article 2:206(2)(b) on the other hand does not provide any clarification as to the concept of a loss. Rather Article 2:206(2)(b) describes the forms of infringement of property rights and makes the (essentially obvious) point that a deprivation of use is numbered among them. Illustration 17 The “cable cases” (see illustration 4 above) were not concerned with either an infringement of property within the meaning of paragraph (2)(b) (the owner of the machine is admittedly cut off from electricity, but is not hindered in the use of it or otherwise disturbed in the exercise of the right) nor with loss in the sense of paragraph 2(a) (which would need to be assessed if, for example, property damage were caused as a result of the interruption in power supply). The loss lies in the expense of repair, a fall in value and lost profit, not in the loss of use as such.

Notes I.

Tort law protection of property rights

1.

“Ownership” within the meaning of FRENCH, BELGIAN AND LUXEMBOURGIAN private law is an absolute, exclusive and perpetual right (CC art. 544; Cornu, Droit civil11, 440) in material objects; according to conventional (Cass.req. 25 July 1887, S. 1888, I, 17, note Lyon-Caen), albeit now no longer indisputable opinion (see further e. g. Carbonnier, Droit civil III19, nos. 250-251 pp. 388-391 and no. 254 pp. 392-394, as

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2.

490

well as van Neste, Eigendom, toch meer dan een zakelijk recht, 511-537) “intellectual” property is not counted among property in the sense of civil law. The owner’s monopoly position entitles him to prohibit any action of any third person which amounts to laying a claim to one of his property rights (namely jus utendi, jus fructuendi and jus abutendi) and indeed independently of whether the interference would cause actual loss or not (Bergel/Bruschi/Cimamonti, Les biens, no. 95 p. 99; Hansenne, Les biens I(1), no. 632 pp. 585-586). Along with the actions en révindication and en bornage the general tort law action is also open to the owner of property. In relation to the latter, there is the peculiarity in France that a claim in damages is already made out where an infringement of a droit de possession flowing from property rights is established; in such a case there is no requirement of actual loss (Cass.req. 6 March 1934, D. P. 1937, I, 17, note Blaevoet). However, Belgian law does not follow suit. The infringement of a right is neither a necessary nor a sufficient requisite for proof of damage, according to Belgian opinion (Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2), 18). For both countries it is to be noted that an infringement of property rights implies a violation of CC art. 544 and that such a violation of a law is assessed ipso iure as a faute; atteintes à la propriété constitute fautes contre la légalité (from which it is additionally concluded in France, as is stated, that they themselves would amount to dommages et interest, independently of proof of damage: le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2006/2007), no. 6746). The use of another’s historical building (Cass.civ. 10 March 1993, Bull.civ. 1993, I, no. 87 p. 58; D. 1999 jur. 319, concl. Sainte-Rose, note Agostini) or ship (Cass.civ. 25 January 2000, Bull.civ. 2000, I, no. 24 p. 16; D. 2000 I. R. 61; JCP éd. G 2001, II, 10554, note Tenenbaum) for the marketing of photographs of these objects has even been occasionally qualified as an infringement of property rights grounding liability (on its limits, see Cass.civ. 2 May 2001, Bull.civ. 2001, I, no. 114 p. 74; D. 2001, 1973, note Gridel: no infringement of property rights by the depiction of a private island in a state’s tourist advertising campagne). The assemblée plénière of the court of cassation corrected this case law, however, to the extent that in such cases a claim for a prohibitory court order or in damages required a severe interference, a trouble anormal (Cass.ass.plén. 7 May 2004, Bull.ass.plén. 2004 no. 10 p. 21). Damage that arises due to the fact that someone temporarily cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his item of property, is recoverable (Cass.civ. 23 June 1993, Bull.civ. 1993, III, no. 102 p. 66); likewise for the depreciation in value of a plot of land due to the fact that an overhanging boulder from a neighbour’s land threatens to come crashing down (Cass.civ. 17 May 1995, Bull.civ. 1995, II, no. 142 p. 81). It is fully self-evident that theft and receiving stolen goods also amount to torts relevant for private law (e. g. Cass. 13 October 2004, Pas. belge 2004, no. 476 p. 1558). The starting point in SPANISH law is CC art. 348, according to which “ownership ... [is] the right to dispose of a thing and enjoy it without prejudice to further statutory restrictions”. As in France, protection of ownership is served first and foremost by the action to vindicate title, which is complemented by an action to establish title (TS 12 June 1976, RAJ 1976 (1) no. 2699 p. 2003). The tort law action in damages is not actually a claim for the protection of absolute rights; however the owner, like every other injured party, is entitled to draw on it when damage occurrs. In general, one can therefore say of Spain that an infringement of a right of property results in liability to the owner for the damage thereby occasioned to him, and indeed on the basis of CC arts. 1902 et seq. or on the basis of CP arts. 109-112 (Díez-Picazo, Sistema II9, 546). The

Article 2:206: Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession

3.

4.

special rules of Law 40/2002 of 14 November (Ley 40/2002, reguladora del contrato de aparcamiento de vehículos) apply with regard to damage to vehicles in public car parks. They relate to the non-negotiable duty on the car park operator, to return the vehicles stored there in the same state as when they were parked there (loc. cit. arts. 3(1)(c) and 5(1)). This would involve strict liability; the only disputed point is whether a vis major or happenstance relieves liability (see further Carrasco Perera, AJA 2002 (557), 2 and Álvarez Lata, InDret 2/2003, 12). Liability ensues in any event for theft (CA Madrid 28 November 2000, BDA JUR 2001/73233; CA Asturias 26 July 2002, BDA JUR 2002/ 253857) and the “unexplained disappearance” of a parked vehicle (CA Barcelona 22 April 2002, AC 2002, no. 1137). Where any person destroys or damages the property of another, evidently an infringement of property rights is committed and liability to that other in damages results. The same also applies to someone who broadens the bandwidth of the electric masts and circuits above ground without the consent of the land owner and in this way lays claim to more ground than he had been entitled to (CA Girona 6 February 2006, AC 2006 (5) no. 341 p. 750 [however, no damages for use of the claimant’s private roadways by an electricity company’s vehicles, as the value of using the road could not be expressed in numbers]). An infringement of property rights resulting in liability in damages was further seen e. g. in the delayed return of an item of property (CA Huesca 8 March 2006, AC 2006 (5) no. 374 p. 836). TS 5 November 1998, RAJ 1998 (5) no. 8404 p. 12363 indeed granted the affected telecommunications company compensation for costs of repair in a “cable case”, but no compensation for lost profit because the company had been able to (at least provisionally) repair the cable. Under ITALIAN law ownership is an absolute right and as such is protected by tort law. This has been attested to by the jurisprudence in numerous decisions, particularly in the context of actions against the public administration (e. g. Cass. 5 May 2005, no. 9361, Giust.civ.Mass. 2005, fasc. 5; Cass. 3 May 2005, no. 9173, Giust.civ.Mass. 2005, fasc. 5; Cass.sez.un. 20 April 2005, no. 8209, Giust.civ.Mass. 2005, fasc. 4; Cass. 4 March 2005, no. 4797, Giust.civ.Mass. 2005, fasc. 4; Cass.sez.un. 7 December 2004, no. 22891, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, fasc. 12; Cass.sez.un. 29 November 2004, no. 22490, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, fasc. 11. See further ECHR 12 January 2006, Sciarrotta and others v. Italy, ECHR 12 January 2006, App. no. 14793/02, Resp.civ. e prev. 2006, 834 and the Presidential Decree thereupon enacted [DPR] 327/2001 of 8 June 2001, no. 327 [Consolidating Act on Compulsory Purchase for Public Purposes art. 43). Difficulties are however posed by the determination of the relationship between the general tort law action in damages and the claim in damages under CC arts. 948-949, which is built upon the action for vindication of title and the property law action for a prohibitory court order (see further Gambaro, Il diritto di proprietà, 894). Damages in tort (CC art. 2043) done to the whole building by a co-owner fall due to the other co-owner (Cass. 18 May 2001, no. 6849, Giust.civ.Mass. 2001, 1007), likewise for damage to a neighbour’s land resulting from carelessly carried out building projects (Giust.civ.Mass. 2001, 568). HUNGARY also interprets the right of ownership as an absolute economic-oriented right, which affords its holder extensive powers (Petrik (-Sárközy), Polgári jog I2, 231); in contrast, “intellectual property” does not amount to property in the sense of civil law (see further and with references to diverging opinions Gellért (-Petrik), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 348). The right of ownership comprises the right to possession (CC § 98), the right to use and reap the benefits of an asset (CC § 99) and from the right of disposition (CC § 112(1)). An unauthorised disposition of another’s property con-

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5.

6.

7.

492

stitutes a tort. The owner can claim damages from the unauthorised disposer, where the transferee acquires title to the property under the provisions of the law of property (Lenkovics, Dologi jog, 132-134). CZECH and SLOVAK CC § 415 expressly enumerates the infringement of the property rights of another as a ground of liability for the loss which results. While SLOVENIAN LOA §§ 131 and 132, as well as POLISH CC art. 415 refrain from an express mention for infringement of property rights; the loss flowing from it is still of course legally relevant damage. GERMAN CC § 823(1) protects the right to ownership in objects (CC § 903). Naturally, economic harm (destruction, damage, defacement) is covered. The deprivation of and interference with the possibility of another’s use of his or her property also constitutes an infringement of property rights (Palandt (-Sprau), BGB65, § 823, no. 7; Erman (-Schiemann), BGB II11, § 823, no. 25). Therefore, the alienation of another’s property to a bona fide transferee triggers a tort law obligation to pay damages (BGH 12 March 1996, NJW 1996, 1535, 1537) (the – even negligent – bona fide transferee is clearly not liable: BGH 14 February 1967, WM 1967, 562, 564). Furthermore, an infringement of property rights will not only be affirmed in cases of short term (BGH 18 November 2003, NJW 2004, 356, 358) interferences with the designated use of property (BGH 21 December 1970, BGHZ 55, 153, 159; BGH 2 July 1959, BGHZ 30, 241). An infringement of property rights will also be inferred where the systematic order or an arrangement of items (stamp collection, library, archive) is destroyed (BGH 26 February 1980, BGHZ 76, 216). No infringement of property rights shall occur in relation to a standstill in production resulting from an interruption of energy supply (BGH 9 December 1958, BGHZ 29, 65), unless property damage simultaneously occurs (BGH 4 February 1964, BGHZ 41, 123). AUSTRIAN CC §§ 1331-1332a relate to the compensation of damage to personalty, to which all rights in assets also belong. Although these provisions only apply to legal consequences of damage to personalty, it is undisputed that ownership and all restricted rights in rem enjoy tort law protection (Schilcher and Kleewein, in: von Bar (ed.), Deliktsrecht in Europa, 35). “All that appertains to a person, all of his corporeal and incorporeal objects, equates to his property” (CC § 353). According to CC § 285, on top of corporeal “objects”, energy, rights and especially intellectual property rights, as well as prospective objects, as long as they are dealt with by a law or juridical act as such (e. g. rights of expectancy, CC § 1276). According to CC § 354, ownership in property in a subjective sense is the discretionary control over the subject matter and use of an object and the power to exclude any other person from such. Animals indeed belong to one’s property, but are not objects (CC § 285a). Along with the actions in property law for establishment of title, recovery of property, prohibitory and mandatory restorative court orders (CC §§ 372, 366, 523, 364), claims for damages in tort also arise (CC §§ 1295 et seq.; for more on the relationship of these claims to one another, see OGH 20 June 1962, JBl 1963, 320). Every culpable interference with rights of ownership and possession, which at the same time occasions damage within the meaning of CC § 1294, grounds liability (OGH 10 January 1968, SZ 41/2; OGH 13 December 1988, SZ 61/270; Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht II12, 293). CC §§ 1331-1132a provide more detailed regulations on the scope of the duty to compensate. The very exposure to harm of another’s property is prohibited (OGH 18 September 1975, ZVR 1976/229). Infringements of property rights are not only encountered in the guise of the destruction and

Article 2:206: Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession

8.

9.

10.

deprivation of an object. The distribution of trail maps with incorrect markings, which cause hikers to trespass on another’s property (OGH 29 August 1995, SZ 68/145) and the “occupancy” of a building site by anti-power plant protestors (OGH 25 May 1994, SZ 67/92; see also OGH 25 March 1999, ZVR 1999/56) also constitute modes of behaviour that found liability. In contrast, “indirect” production outages resulting from the damage to an electricity cable that is not owned by the injured party are not compensatable (OGH 8 July 1976, SZ 49/96; OGH 4 March 1982, RZ 1982/68), indeed even where strains of bacteria are thereby destroyed (OGH 18 June 1975, JBl 1976, 210) or electronic appliances are damaged (OGH 1 December 1977, RZ 1978/31; OGH 20 August 2005, 1 Ob 117/05w). CC § 367 second sentence clarifies that a bona fide acquisition of title does not ground liability in damages. In GREECE it is likewise a given that the right to ownership and restricted rights in rem enjoy tort law protection as absolute rights (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 914, no. 36; Georgiades Ap., Enochiko Dikaio, geniko meros, 597; Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 484; A. P. 1110/1996, EllDik 38 [1997] 1045). Interference with rights of ownership is not only represented by property damage (A. P. 1110/1996 loc. cit.) or destruction (A. P. 38/1996, EllDik 38 [1997] 41), but also by e. g. the unlawful disposition of another’s property (e. g. CFI Trikala 201/1962, NoB 11 [1963] 1154: an authorised execution of foreclosure; auctioning of items not owned by the debtor). Case law is at times criticised in scholarly writing for not always drawing a sufficiently trenchant line between pure economic loss and economic loss resulting from interference with property rights (Georgiades loc. cit. no. 37; see also Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio, geniko meros, 597). In PORTUGAL it is derived right back from Const. art. 62 that private tort law must also cater for the reasonable protection of property rights (Miranda, Manual de Direito Constitucional IV3, 467). CC art. 483 accordingly lays out liability in damages for all culpable infringements of rights; infringements of property rights belong among them (Almeida Costa, Obrigações8, 505). The claims in tort law accompany the property law claims for establishment of title, recovery of property and a prohibitory court order (CC arts. 1311 and 1314; STJ 4 April 2006). The destruction or damaging of things is not the only manifestation of an infringement of property rights. Such an infringement also occurs, e. g. where entry to land is hampered due to a neighbour’s construction work (STJ 3 February 2005) (the situation is different where a tenant builds a fence in order to prevent intrusion by strangers: STJ 24 February 2005) or where rubbish is left on land (STJ 23 September 2004 and 18 March 2004). In case of conflict between the owner’s interest in use and the health interests of his neighbours, the latter is given preference (STJ 6 May 1998, CJ(ST) 1998-II, 76; STJ 9 January 2006). DUTCH CC art. 6:162(2) (first alternative) is counted among the civil wrongs expressed in terms of interferences with another’s rights. Title in property is evidently one such “right”. Along with the general requisites for a civil wrong, the claimant must prove his title in the property and the “interference”; however, CC art. 3:119 accommodates him with the presumption of title in favour of the party who holds the property as his own (for more detail, see Onrechtmatige Daad I (-Jansen), art. 6:162(2), nos. 44, 45, 108, pp. 452-453, 1159-1203). According to CC art. 5:1(2) “the owner [is entitled] to freely use the item of property to the exclusion of all others, provided that this use does not infringe the rights of others and restrictions in relation to statutory provisions and rules of unwritten law are adhered to”. This limitation of the right to private property can

493

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

11.

12.

494

have significant consequences for tort law, cf. e. g. CFI Middelburg 1 October 1980, NedJur 1981 no. 374 p. 1243 (empty houses in a trouble hotspot are temporarily “occupied”; an interference with property rights is affirmed, however a civil wrong is denied) and HR 12 January 1923, NedJur 1923 p. 307 (raising an embankment without the consent of the owner of the land; no infringement of ownership) as well as CC arts. 5:37 et seq. (limitations under the law concerning the respective interests of neighbours) and 3:13 (abuse of right). An interference with the right to ownership principally occurs where another engages in conduct peculiar to the owner or hinders the exercise of his powers (Jansen loc. cit. nos. 52-53 pp. 479-501). An “interference” with the right of another is only typically spoken of in cases of direct, immediate infringements. Acts and omissions further down the chain of causation are mostly not deemed “interferences”, but are analysed under different aspects, particularly the issue of whether the party claimed against has breached a statutory duty or acted contrary to the demands of “unwritten rules of social interaction”, i. e. the general precept of care (Jansen loc. cit. nos. 56-57 pp. 528-559). Ownership is not infringed when a purchaser acquires land from a seller which is already contaminated at the time of transfer of title (HR 4 March 2005, JOL 2005, 142; RvdW 2005 no. 36 p. 331). ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(1)(v) sets out that the occasioning of damage is inter alia unlawful where “the damage is caused by violation of the right of ownership or a similar right or right of possession of the victim”. The details of the damages are, however, regulated in LOA § 128(3) and (4). LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.263(2) likewise enumerates the infringement of the right to ownership as a civil offence grounding liability. SWEDISH EAL chap. 2 § 1 distinguishes between personal and economic damage; the calculation of compensation for economic damage is the subject-matter of chap. 5 § 7. The owner is the first in line for the entitlement of compensation, without it being expressly stated; others indirectly harmed only exceptionally come into the picture as claimants (for more detail, see HD 27 October 2004, NJA 2004, 609; Sandstedt, VersRAI 2005, 38; Andersson, Pointlex 2004-12-20). Physical damage to corporeal objects, i. e. to moveable and immoveable objects, is in any event understood as property damage. However, aesthetic changes as well as the removal or reduction of the functional capabilities of a thing and its loss (e. g. by theft) are interpreted as property damage (Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 98; Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 43 and 319; Radetzki, Skadeståndsberäkning vid sakskada, 11 fn. 1). A further case is that of impairment of use (Hellner and Johansson loc. cit 98 and 429; Hellner, Obehörig vinst, 229; Bengtsson and Strömbäck loc. cit. 319; Agell, Skadeståndsansvaret vid obehöriga förfoganden över annans egendom, 205 and 211). HD 28 February 1990, NJA 1990, 80 has deemed the impregnation of a thoroughbred dog by a mongrel as property damage, HD 20 February 1996, NJA 1996, 68 affirmed property damage in a case in which the purchaser of a defective item had welded it to another new one; it comes down to the adverse effects on the functionality of the latter, not to its physical alteration. The FINNISH rule on property damage (Damages Liability Act chap. 2 § 1) is to be similarly interpreted as its Swedish counterpart, despite not entirely identical wording. In DENMARK, under the term property damage (tingsskade), not only the physical harm to corporeal objects, but also consequential losses are covered (e. g. production outage: von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 9). In the course of the claimant’s investigation, drawing a distinction between property law entitlements and those under the law of obligations is not first and foremost on the agenda, this position is assumed by the

Article 2:206: Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession

13.

“power of disposition” (rådighedsretssynspunktet). In a case in which an electricity cable was severed, Danish Supreme Court 22 June 2004, UfR 2004, 2389 denied damages in favour of a business; the disadvantage suffered did not lie in the property damage, but purely in the interruption of work and therefore did not constitute legally relevant damage. In ENGLAND property rights in chattels are protected primarily by the strict liability tort of conversion, which presupposes an intentional dealing with property inconsistent with the proprietary right of the owner. A claimant will have title to sue if he is in actual possession or has a right to immediate possession. The traditional principle (derived from the fiction underpinning the historical form of the action in trover that the chattel was lost by the plaintiff and found by the defendant) has been that the tort is confined to choses in possession (Douglas, LMCLQ 2008, 129), and in OBG Ltd. v. Allan [2007] UKHL, [2008] 1 AC 1, by a majority, the House of Lords confirmed that the tort does not extend to choses in action, as this might impose strict liability for pure economic loss persons who have acted in good faith. The cause of action is based on an unequivocal act of ownership by the defendant over the goods of the plaintiff without any authority or right: Beaman v. ARTS Ltd. [1948] 2 All ER 89, 92 (Denning J) (reversed on other grounds [1949] 1 KB 550). The tort has been criticized for its enduring uncertainty and the lack of definition in the ways it may be committed: Douglas, LMCLQ 2008, 129; Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraq Airways Co. (Nos. 4 and 5) [2002] UKHL 19, [2002] 2 AC 883, 1084 (Lord Nicholls). It may be committed on a continuous basis – there may be a series of conversions (e. g. where there is a sustained denial of the right of the owner), but there can only be one recovery of damages, representing the full value of the chattel, by the claimant, since recovery extinguishes the claimant’s title to the property. The tort requires (1) an intention to do an act which asserts a right inconsistent with the owner’s or denies the owner’s right. There must be an intentional (as opposed to a merely negligent) act. As in the kindred strict liability tort of trespass, the intention must relate to the act, but need not be an intention specifically to oust the true owner if the defendant intends to do an act which does in fact oust the true owner. It may thus be that the defendant has no knowledge of the plaintiff’s ownership, acting in misapprehension and supposing himself or a third party to be entitled. It suffices for the requisite mental element if the defendant (at any rate if he is a bailee) intends an act whose probable consequence is to lead to the ouster of the plaintiff (e. g. loss of the property): Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Finch [1962] 1 QB 701 (sub-bailee using hire purchase car to smuggle watches; forfeited under statute; conversion because he was minded to use the car for an act which entailed such grave risk of detriment to the plaintiff’s interest). (2) There must be an act of conversion, i. e. an unequivocal act of ownership (an act such as acquiring, dealing with, or disposing of the goods), which is inconsistent with the rights of an owner, because some acts of interference with property will not amount to an exercise of dominion over property: Beaman v. ARTS Ltd., loc. cit., 92. A wrongful withholding after the owner has demanded return of the goods will suffice (loc. cit.) once a reasonable time for the defendant to make inquiries has elapsed (Clayton v. Le Roy [1911] 2 KB 1031). The law has taken an unforgiving view where the defendant takes the property under a disposition from a stranger which does not transfer title: as a rule receipt can itself amount to a conversion (Ingram v Little [1961] 1 QB 31). On the other hand, a mere denial of title as such, without physical interference or other injurious conduct, is no longer a con-

495

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

14.

496

version: Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, s.11(3) (reversing the rule at common law: see Oakley v. Lyster [1931] 1 KB 148). In IRELAND, as with other common law jurisdictions, torts have developed centring on the concept of possession rather than of exclusive or absolute ownership. Due to the stronger gravitational pull of the torts of conversion, detinue and (in relation to intellectual property rights) passing off towards affording protection against infringements of property rights (of ownership) they are dealt with under this heading (for infringements of other property rights with more affinity to those in possession, see below Note II 27). Conversion consists of any act relating to the goods of another that constitutes an unjustifiable denial of his or her title to them, or the wrongful assertion of dominion over them (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 30.01). Conversion may be committed by the wrongful taking possession of the goods where the defendant deals with the goods in a manner inconsistent with the right of the true owner, abusing possession already acquired (by pawning another’s goods: Parker v. Godin (1728) 2 Strange 813, 93 ER 866; sale or delivery of them: Hollins v. Fowler (1874-75) LR 7 HL 757; Haggan v. Pasley (1878) 2 IrLR 573; Magee v. D’Arcy (1879) 4 IrLR 312; or where the chattel is wilfully destroyed: see Heald v. Carey (1852) 11 CB 977, 138 ER 762); or otherwise denying the title of the other person to them, whether or not possession has been acquired (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit.). One may be guilty of conversion of any corporeal personal property (Allen v. Sharp (1848) 2 Ex. 352, 154 ER 529), including papers and title deeds (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para. 30.19). Money can be converted (Dillon v. O’Brien (1887) 16 Cox CC 245); Fitzpatrick v. Dunphy (1851) 1 ICLR 366; Shield Life Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ulster Bank Ltd. [1995] 3 IR 225; cf. Hennerty v. Bank of Ireland, HC 5 July 1988, unreported) as may negotiable instruments (Alsager v. Close (1842) 10 M & W 576, 152 ER 600; Liston v. Munster Leinster Bank Ltd. [1940] IR 77), title deeds (Plant v. Cotterill (1860) 5 H & N 430, 157 ER 1249; Curry v. Rea [1937] NI 1 (CA)) and realty when severed (Mills v. Brooker [1919] 1 KB 555; Quinn v. Pratt [1908] 2 IR 69). Animals and birds may also be converted (cf. Wymes v. Tehan [1988] IR 717; Toome Eeel Fishery (Northern Ireland) Ltd. v. Cardwell [1966] NI 1). A plaintiff may maintain an action if, at the time of the defendant’s act, he had either (i) ownership and possession of the goods; or (ii) possession of them; or (iii) merely an immediate right to possess them, unless the defendant can prove that the title to the goods is in some other party (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para. 30.20). The measure of damages for conversion is generally the value of the article converted at the date of the conversion (Allibert SA v. O’Connor [1982] ILRM 40). Where the converted article would have been put to profitable use – such as being hired out – losses for this use may also be recovered (Fleming, Law of Torts9, 77-78). Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 chap. 9 contains provisions prescribing remedies for infringement of copyright in this context. These include actions for damages (s. 128) and for orders for delivery up (s. 131). The copyright owner also has the right to seize infringing copies, articles or devices (s. 133). The essence of the tort of detinue (abolished in England by means of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 s. 2(1)) is the wrongful refusal by the defendant to deliver up to the plaintiff a chattel after demand has been made by the plaintiff to do so, whereby a detention is not wrongful unless the defendant’s possession is adverse to or in defiance of the plaintiff’s right (Spackman Spackman v. Foster (1882-83) 11 QBD 99; King v. Walsh [1932] IR 178; Treasure Island Ltd. v. Zebedee Enterprises Ltd., HC 29 May 1987, unreported; see also e. g. Webb v. Ireland [1987] IESC 2, [1988] IR 353 and McKenna v.

Article 2:206: Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession

15.

Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [1993] 3 IR 543). The action may lie even where the chattel is no longer in the defendant’s possession (Morgan v. Maurer & Son [1964] Ir Jur 31). One of the advantages of the action for detinue over that of conversion lies in the range of remedies available to the plaintiff (on the role of restitutionary remedies in this context, see the dicta of Kinlen J. in Hanley v. ICC Finance Ltd. [1995] IEHC 5, [1996] 1 ILRM 463, with reference to Denning L. J. in Strand Electric & Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Brisford Entertainments Ltd. [1952] 2 QB 246, 255, and for a comprehensive analysis of the subject see O’Dell, Submission to the Law Reform Commission on Damages in the Restitution Measure for Tort and Breach of Contract (1999)). Three possible forms of judgment exist: (i) for the value of the chattel as assessed and damages for its detention; (ii) for the return of the chattel or its value as assessed in damages; (iii) for the return of the chattel and damages for its detention (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para. 29.10). Despite statutory regulation of trade marks (Trade Marks Act 1996), copyright (Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000) and industrial design (Industrial and Commercial Property (Protection) Act 1927), the tort of passing off remains a means of common law protection of the plaintiff’s proprietary interest in his goodwill (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para. 31.03). Although it has its roots in the concept of deceit (Clark and Smith, Intellectual Property Law in Ireland, chap. 24), the requirement of fraudulent intent fell away (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para. 31.02). The essence of the tort is that one trader represents its goods or services as those of another (thus “passing them off” as those of that other), so as to be likely to mislead the public and involve an appreciable risk of detriment to the plaintiff (Polycell Products Ltd. v. O’Carroll & others [1959] Ir Jur 34; Player & Wills (Ireland) Ltd. v. Gallagher (Dublin) Ltd., HC 26 September 1983, unreported). In SCOTLAND, an action for interdict or damages lies for any unjustifiable interference with or infringement of any interest which a person has in any heritable property (Walker, Delict2, 936). Corporeal moveable property – including a wide range of things, all having a corporeal tangible corpus capable of physical possession and the interests which may subsist in such things, viz. ownership and possession – may be infringed in many different ways, by taking away from the legitimate owner or possessor, by withholding or failing to return, by selling by mistake, by damaging deliberately or carelessly etc. (Walker loc. cit. 1002). Incorporeal moveable property includes all those kinds of proprietary rights which consist in legal rights or claims only, conferring no right to actual possession or control of any corporeal moveable subject (Walker loc. cit. 1023) and is protected in this context. Of the above interests, ownership in property is protected, inter alia, under the following headings: (i) title of ownership in heritable property; (ii) trespass – a temporary intrusion into property owned by another without the permission of the owner, e. g. playing football in the owner’s field or taking a short cut through his garden (Thomson, Delictual Liability3, 19-20); (iii) withdrawal of or interference with support – it is wrongful to conduct operations on one’s land so as to interfere with the support afforded to adjacent or superincumbent land or buildings without a contract agreement thereto (Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland10, § 965); (iv) abstraction of water (Walker loc. cit. 951); (v) interference with servitudes (Walker loc. cit. 954); (vi) malicious damage to lands or buildings; (vii) misuse of land leased; (viii) incorporeal heritable rights (London Midland & Scottish Railway v. McDonald 1924 SC 835: interdict granted to restrain an infringement of the right to ferry); (ix) damage to animals; (x) damage to ships by other ships; (xi) the infringement of interests in

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Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

incorporeal moveable property (including claims of debt or damages, company shares, stock in public funds, life insurance policies, negotiable instruments, goodwill, patents, trade marks, literary copyright, copyright in industrial designs and plant breeders’ rights – see Walker loc. cit. 1023). II.

Infringement of other rights in rem and of lawful possession or detention

16.

In FRANCE, BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG the general point of departure is that anyone who has personally suffered “sure” damage can claim in tort. Any person whose lawful use of the thing in question is impaired belongs to this category. The precise basis for the right of use, however, is inconsequential: it might be title to ownership, a restricted right in rem or a mere entitlement under the law of obligations, like for instance a rental relationship. Even mere bona fide natural possession suffices (Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2), no. 152 p. 301). The borrower of an object, from whom a thief takes the borrowed object, is also entitled to a claim in damages (JClCiv (-Maistre du Chambon), arts. 1382 à 1386, fasc. 220, no. 9). Property law (but not tort law) draws a distinction between possession and detention. Both possession and detention are additionally protected by other possible specific actions (actions possessoires) (CC arts. 2255, 2279; French CCP arts. 1265 and 1266). Their relationship with the material tort law is of course, especially in France, extraordinarily difficult to define. BELGIUM allows actions for the protection of possession only for the protection of immoveable objects (Gerechtelijk wetboek/Code judiciaire arts. 1370-1371). In SPAIN it is likewise beyond question that where the object is e. g. destroyed or damaged, such damages that are not suffered by the owner, but by the holder of another right in rem, are relevant for tort law (Díez-Picazo, Derecho de daños, 307). Apart from that, several decisions of the Supreme Court confirm that the tenant of a building which is destroyed or damaged has his or her own claim against the third person (TS 13 March 1976, RAJ 1976 (1) no. 1324 p. 966; TS 28 February 1983, RAJ 1983 (1) no. 1079 p. 815; TS 16 December 1988, RAJ 1988 (6) no. 9471 p. 9311). Infringements of restricted rights in rem also trigger liability in damages in ITALY under the general requisites (for a case of easement, see further 23 May 1985, no. 3110, Giust.civ.Mass. 1985, fasc. 5, and for one of beneficial use, see Cass. 11 August 2000, no. 10733, Giur.it. 2001, 898, note Tommasi). Further, a bona fide possessor who is deprived of possession can claim damages under the provisions of tort law (Cass. 6 February 1984, no. 889, Giust.civ.Mass. 1984, fasc. 2; Cass. 21 July 1980, no. 4776, Giust.civ.Mass. 1980, fasc. 7; Cass. 28 February 1989, no. 1093, Giust.civ.Mass. 1989, fasc. 2). Damage arising out of the temporary deprivation of use is recoverable, as well as any other loss which is causally connected to the infringement of possession. The free standing tort law action falls into line alongside the action for restoration (CC art. 1168) and preservation of possession (CC art. 1170) (Cass. 16 March 1988, no. 2472, Giur.it. 1989, I, 1, 510). Therefore, the grant of damages should also be possible where the object has been destroyed or alienated (see further Gambaro, Il diritto di proprietà, 895). Tort law protection extends to the lawful detentor (Cass. 30 October 1986, no. 6394, Giust.civ.Mass. 1986, fasc. 10; Monateri, Manuale della responsabilità civile, 167). In principle, the possessor is not entitled to compensation for the value of the item, but only to damages due to the loss of possible use (for an exception to this, see Cass. 12 May 1987, no. 4367, Giust.civ.Mass. 1987, fasc. 5).

17.

18.

498

Article 2:206: Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession

19.

20.

21.

22.

Under HUNGARIAN law the holders of restricted rights in rem and of lawful possession can claim damages according to the general rules of tort law where they are seen as injured parties and the disadvantages they suffered are deemed tortiously relevant damage. Where a rented object is destroyed, the rental agreement is brought to an end (CC § 430(2)). In such a case the renter can also claim compensation for his damages (see further Besenyei, A bérleti szerzo˝dés, 49-50). The situation is the same where an object is destroyed, in which there lies a beneficial interest, cf. CC § 163. As to the relationship between the owner and the holder of a restricted right in rem, issues of damages are subject to the respective property law regime. GERMAN CC § 823(1) sees only “absolute rights” – namely rights that (in contrast to choses in action) are to be observed by all – as falling under “other rights”. Belonging to this category are also restricted rights in rem, rights of expectancy in property (RG 1 July 1942, RGZ 170, 1, 6; BGH 11 November 1970, BGHZ 55, 20; BGH 5 April 1991, BGHZ 114, 161), public easements (hunting and fishery rights: BGH 30 October 2003, NJWRR 2004, 100; CFI Trier 21 June 2005, NJW-RR 2006, 894; BGH 3 January 1968, BGHZ 49, 231; BGH 5 April 1968, BGHZ 50, 73; BGH 21 July 1969, VersR 1969, 928) and lawful possession (RG 25 October 1917, RGZ 91, 60, 65; BGH 26 March 1974, BGHZ 62, 243, 248). However, the extent of the protection of possession is a much debated issue (see further Soergel (-Zeuner), BGB12, § 823, no. 58; MünchKomm (-Wagner), BGB4, § 823, no. 151). In AUSTRIA it is likewise undisputed that along with the right of ownership, all restricted rights in rem enjoy tort law protection (Schilcher and Kleewein, in: von Bar (ed.), Deliktsrecht in Europa, 35). Herein included are prospective entitlements to property (like e. g. the prospective entitlement of a purchaser under retention of title: Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht II2, 31, 34). Possessors and detentors (e. g. a renter or leaseholder) enjoy absolute protection in the context of CC § 372 (Rummel (-Spielbüchler), ABGB I3, § 372 no. 5); consequently they may enforce their own claim against the tortfeasor where there is property damage (Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht I11, 246; OGH 20 June 1990, JBl 1991, 247, note Rummel). The same goes for a lessee if in relation to the owner, he bears the costs of repair (OGH 24 May 1995, JBl 1996, 114 note Lukas, OGH 29 April 1997, SZ 70/85, 627). Conversely, any person who, without such an internal rule on bearing the costs of damage, solely has a relationship with the owner under the law of obligations, does not have his own personal claim in compensation (Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht II12, 298, discussing a cable case). Therefore, a person who borrows a car and has to rent a replacement car because of an accident which was the fault of another does not suffer any recoverable damage (CA Innsbruck 2 December 1992, ZVR 1994, 28). The situation in Austria mirrors that of GREECE in all essential aspects. Alongside the right in ownership and restricted rights in rem, possession and protected detention also count among the interests worthy of tort law protection here (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 914, no. 38; Filios, Enochiko dikaio II(2)3, 29). In the case of property damage the possessor is consequently entitled to a claim in damages. It exists independently of the owner’s claim and covers the loss of use and the costs to be borne by the renter. Damages for depreciation in value and (in case of the object’s destruction) for economic damage are, in contrast, only open to the owner (A. P. 983/1986, NoB 36 [1988] 339). The right of expectancy of a purchaser under retention of title also enjoys tort law protection. The purchaser under retention of title indeed already has his own

499

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

23.

24.

25.

500

claim in damages in view of the infringement of his detention. Moreover, in his capacity as the holder of a right, he also has a claim to economic damages, bestowed upon him by CA Athens 1554/1996, EllDik 39 (1998) 602, where the object is destroyed. Conversely, in academic writing, the opinion prevails, that in such a case the purchaser under retention of title as well as the vendor under retention of title could claim damages, however only in a manner in which both claim payment communally. This is supported by an analogy to CC arts. 495, 11 second sentence, 1180 first sentence and 1253 (Kritikos, note under CA Athens loc. cit.). PORTUGUESE law equips the lawful possessor of a thing with legal protection against impending or current interferences with use (CC arts. 336, 337, 1276-1286 and 1277; cf. CA Oporto 3 April 1984, CJ [1984-2] 225; CA Lisbon 2 April 1973, BolMinJus 226 [1973] 262; STJ 15 May 2006; STJ 3 November 2005; STJ 8 May 2001, CJ(ST) 2001-2, 57). In some cases statute also extends this protection on equitable grounds to a mere detentor (CC arts. 1037 no. 2, 1125 no. 2, 1133 no. 2 and 1188 no. 2; CA Evora 29 July 1987, CJ [1987-4] 289). Under tort law (CC art. 483), the leaseholder of an agricultural site can therefore claim damages for lost profit from a township that builds a street on a piece of his land without his authorisation and without a compulsory purchase order (STJ 20 January 2005). On the other hand, a renter is not liable for the normal wear and tear of the rented item (STJ 27 April 2005; CA Oporto 30 June 2005). Despite some reservations, in DUTCH law, it has been derived from arts. 3:107(1) and 3:125 that not only restricted rights in rem (like e. g. a land easement [CC art. 5:70], fee farm [CC art. 5:85], usufruct [CC art. 3:201], residential property [CC art. 5:106] and right of abode [CC art. 3:226]), belong among the “rights” within the meaning of CC art. 162(2), but also lawful possession (distinct from detention) (Onrechtmatige Daad I (-Jansen), art. 6:162(2), no. 15 pp. 142-143). Holders of restricted rights in rem can consequently enforce their own claims in damages, especially in the case of property damage by a third party (CA Amsterdam 27 October 1938, NedJur 1939 no. 242 p. 380; Jansen loc. cit. no. 21 pp. 168-188). The legal position is the same under ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(1)(v). Though the action for compensation of property damage in SWEDEN lies first and foremost with the owner, it is recognised that others may have interests worthy of protection in the damaged property. Therefore, in analogy to insurance law provisions, compensation for value (not: compensation for consequential loss) can be granted particularly to the holders of real securities as well as of a heritable building right, and further those who bear the risk of the property’s destruction (Sandstedt, VersRAI 2005, 38, 43; Andersson, Trepartsrelationer i skadeståndsrätten, 137; similarly for DENMARK Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 295 as well as [with a detailed compilation of case groups] von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 251 and for FINLAND Insurance Contract Act [Lag om försäkringsavtal] §§ 62, 65(2) and 66). However, the basic rule is that only the directly injured party is entitled to recover in tort. Those indirectly harmed must show “concrete and proximate interests” in the object (Andersson, loc. cit. 20, 179 and 184; SWEDISH HD 4 April 1966, NJA 1966, 210; cf. HD 27 October 2004, NJA 2004, 609). HD 18 December 1972, NJA 1972, 598 granted the renter of a cottage in which he kept chickens, damages for their freezing to death when the electricity cable which belonged to the owner had been negligently damaged by a third party. HD 7 March 1988, NJA 1988, 62 denied damages for a breakdown in production resulting from a power outage but granted compensation for destroyed materials and

Article 2:206: Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession

26.

27.

materials to be disposed of, although this also concerned damage to a third party (the cable did not belong to the injured party). FINNISH Supreme Court 12 December 2003, HD 2003:124 denied damages for breakdown in production in a case where someone had intentionally shot at power supply lines. Cf. further Finnish Supreme Court 6 October 1994, HD 1994:94. DANISH Supreme Court 5 July 1988, UfR 1988, 878 deemed a sport fishing club eligible for recovery of damages for the destruction of a fish stock resulting from water pollution, although it had no real fishery right. An action for compensation of higher maintenance costs for ships as a result of damage to a bridge was turned down (HD 16 November 1939, UfR 1940, 117); in contrast, a rail operator that had a real right in the overpass was granted compensation in a similar case (HD 7 April 1960, UfR 1960, 932). In ENGLAND the primary tort for protection of possession of land or goods is trespass, which guards against unlawful intentional direct interference such as moving property from one room to another (Kirk v. Gregory (1875-76) 1 Ex. D 55) or shooting another’s animals (Hamps v. Darby [1948] 2 KB 311) or even simply handling the property (IRC v Rossminster Ltd [1980] AC 952, 1011 (Lord Diplock). Unless they are an owner in a fidicuary capacity as trustee or personal representative (see Barker v. Furlong [1891] 2 Ch 172, where the beneficiary was in actual possession), the claimant must be in possession of the chattel or (in so far as the defendant’s concession to that effect in Wilson v. Lombank [1963] 1 WLR 1294 was sound) must have a right to immediate possession. A trespass to a chattel is made out where, without authority, the defendant wilfully does an act of direct interference with the chattel. The act must be done intentionally in the sense that there is an intention to contact with the chattel, though not necessarily to cause an interference; if the act is involuntary, (e. g. the defendant is pushed by a third party against the claimant’s chattel), there is no trespass (Bridge, Personal Property Law, 41) and the same is true where the act of interference is done unwittingly (National Coal Board v. J. E. Evans & Co. (Cardiff) Ltd. [1951] 2 KB 861: no trespass in damaging claimant’s (unlawfully) buried power cable when digging trench which the defendants did not know and had no reason to know was there). Indirect interference, such as surrounding a chattel with obstacles making access and use impossible or leaving poisoned food out for an animal to eat, is not trespass, though there may be tortious liability on another basis: cf. Bridge, loc. cit., 40, and see also Conversion and Detinue, Law Reform Committee, 18th Report (London: HMSO, 1971) Cmnd. 4774, para. 20, proposing abolition of the requirement that interference must be direct for the purposes of a proposed new tort of wrongful intereference with chattels. In IRELAND the torts of trespass to land and trespass to goods protect rights of possession, with nuisance protecting against “any interference with a person’s use and enjoyment of his land” (Redfont Ltd. v. Custom House Dock Management Ltd. [1998] IEHC 206, per Shanley J.). In Farrell v. Minister for Agriculture and Food, HC 11 October 1995, unreported, Carroll J. observed that the tort of trespass to goods “consists of wrongfully and directly interfering with the possession of chattels”. A number of aspects of the tort are uncertain in the absence of clear Irish authorities in point (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 28.03). The interference may consist of taking the chattel out of the possession of another (Brewer v. Dew (1843) 11 M & W 625, 152 ER 955; Gahan v. Maingay (1793) Ridg L & S 20; Conway v. Archdall (1826) 1 Batt 182; Wilson v. Lombank Ltd. [1963] 1 WLR 1294), moving it from one place to another (Kirk v. Gregory (1875-76) 1 Ex. D 55), or doing damage to it (Fouldes v. Willoughby (1841) 8 M & W

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540, 151 ER 1153, 1157; Deering v. Mahon (1851) 2 ICLR 25; M’Cormick v. Ballantine (1861) 10 ICLR 305). The interference must be direct (McDonagh v. West of Ireland Fisheries Ltd., HC 19 December 1986, unreported, Blayney J). In commentary the general consensus is that trespass to goods is actionable per se (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para.28.07), but the judicial authorities are less than compelling on this issue (Leitch & Co. Ltd. v. Leydon [1931] AC 90, 106 [Lord Blanesburgh]). As in the case with trespass to land the tort of trespass to goods is “founded on possession” (Ward v. Macauley (1791) 4 T. R. 489, 100 ER 1135) and not ownership. To be actionable a trespass must be either wilful or negligent (M’Cormick v. Ballantine loc. cit.). The defendant will however be liable even where he did not appreciate that the interference was wrongful (Farrell v. Minister for Agriculture and Food loc. cit.; M’Mullan v. Bradshaw (1916) 50 ILTR 205). Thus, the deliberate use of a chattel in the mistaken belief that it is one’s own will constitute a trespass (Wilson v. Lombank Ltd. [1963] 1 WLR 1294). In some circumstances an action that would otherwise constitute a trespass to goods may not be tortious because the actor has lawful authority to do the action (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para. 28.14). Trespass to land is defined by Shanley J. in Royal Dublin Society v. Yates [1997] IEHC 144, as consisting “in any unjustifiable intrusion by one person upon land in the possession of another”, noting that the “intrusion may be intentional or it may be negligent: in either case, it is actionable in the absence of lawful justification”. Where persons have lawfully entered land in the possession of another, they will commit a trespass if they remain there after their right to stay has ended (Wood v. Leadbitter (1845) 13 M & W 838, 153 ER 351; Duffield v. Police [1971] NZLR 381; Carson v. Jeffers [1961] IR 44; Irish Shell & B. P. Ltd. v. John Costello Ltd. [1984] IR 511). It is trespass for a person to place any chattel (including animals) on the land of another or to cause any object or substance directly to cross the boundary of another’s land, or even to reach the boundary (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para. 23.29). Where the plaintiff establishes an act which physically constitutes a trespass, the onus is upon the defendant to show that he was neither negligent nor acted intentionally (Electricity Supply Board v. Hastings & Co. Ltd. [1965] Ir Jur 51; Royal Dublin Society v. Yates loc. cit.). The tort is not generally available to persons out of possession at the time of the intrusion (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. para.23.41). Nuisance may be broken down into public nuisance and private nuisance (O’Higgins C. J. in Connolly v. South of Ireland Asphalt Co. Ltd. [1977] IR 99). Public nuisance is a crime, the essence of which is injury to the reasonable comfort and convenience of the public or a section of the public (Re Article 26 and the Employment Equality Bill 1996 [1997] 2 IR 321 [SC] and Truloc Ltd. v. District Judge McMenamin & Donegal County Council [1994] 1 ILRM 151). Only where a person has suffered ‘particular’ or ‘special’ damage over and above that suffered by other members of the public may he or she take civil proceedings (Coppinger v. Sheehan [1906] 1 IR 519, 522-523). It has been stated in commentary that private nuisance is “really a field of tortious liability rather than a single type of tortious conduct: the feature which gives it unity is the interest invaded – that of the use and enjoyment of land” (Salmond and Heuston on the Law or Torts21, 53). In Hanrahan v. Merck, Sharpe & Dohme (Ireland) Ltd. [1988] ILRM 629, Henchy J. stated that it was “clear from authorities on the law of nuisance that what an occupier of land is entitled to as against his neighbour, is the comfortable and healthy enjoyment of the land to the degree that would be expected by an ordinary person whose requirements are objectively reasonable in all the particular circumstances” (loc. cit. 634). With three notable exceptions, private nuisance is not generally actionable

502

Article 2:206: Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession

28.

per se, and actual damage must be proven; the damage may consist in (i) physical injury to land, (ii) a substantial interference with the enjoyment of land, or (iii) an interference with servitudes, where the disturbance constitutes a substantial interference with the plaintiff’s rights (McMahon and Binchy loc. cit. chap. 24). In SCOTLAND, possession is protected under the heading of various different delicts, including: (i) ejection and intrusion; (ii) molestation; (iii) encroachment; (iv) nuisance; (v) use of land in aemulationem vicini; and (vi) spuilzie. Ejection is where someone enters on to lands and removes another or stays on when his right to stay there has expired (Stewart, Delict3, para. 2.10). Intrusion is sneaking on to the subjects when the possessor holds animo (by will) rather than corpore (in person): “[ejection and intrusion] differ in this; that intrusion is the entering in possession, being for the time void, without consent of the parties interested, or order of law ... but ejection ... is not only the unwarrantable entering in lands, but the casting out violently of the then possessor” (Stair, Institutions I5, 25). The remedies for these nominate delicts are: (a) summary ejection; (b) violent profits, being the greatest profit the pursuer could have made if in possession; and (c) actual compensatory damages (Stewart loc. cit.). Molestation is a possessory action, now disused, for determining “to which of two coterminous tenements some disputed part or pertinent pertains, so as to prevent the pursuer being further molested or troubled in his possession of the lands claimed; the modern remedy is by way of declarator or interdict” (Walker, Delict2, 938). Encroachment consists in the permanent usurpation by another in some portion of a man’s lands, which deprives him of the free use of it for the future (Walker loc. cit. 944). Examples of encroachment include a building projecting over the property of another (Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland10, §§ 941, 967; Graham v. Greig (1838) 1 D 171; M’Intosh v. Scott & Co. (1859) 21 D 363; Leonard v. Lindsay & Benzie (1886) 13 R 958 or a pipe running through a neighbour’s property (Galbreath v. Armour (1845) 4 Bell 374) or by trees overhanging the neighbour’s garden (Wedderburne v. Halkerston (1781) Mor. 10495), or by the roots of trees penetrating the ground beyond the boundary (McCombe v. Read [1955] 2 QB 429; Davey v. Harrow Corp. [1958] 1 QB 60). The term nuisance is used loosely to cover any use of property which causes trouble or annoyance to neighbours (Walker loc. cit. 955). Scotland does not follow suit with the distinction drawn in England and Ireland between public and private nuisance, with Scots law taking its own tripartite approach, distinguishing between common law nuisances, statutory nuisances and conventional nuisances (Walker loc. cit.). In Scots law use of land which is otherwise lawful may be actionable as wrongful if the predominant motive for the use in question is the harm of a neighbour, the gratification of spite, or the oblique motive: this is termed “use of the land in aemulationem vicini” (Walker loc. cit. 993-995). Spuilzie both describes: (a) the act of interfering with property, namely spoliation; and (b) a remedy known to the law of Scotland in respect of such actions (Stewart loc. cit. para. 2.21). It is committed by a person who takes away moveables without the consent of the possessor or without order of law – it is not even necessary for the pursuer to establish ownership of the property so long as there is a right of possession or custody (Stair, Institutions I, 16). There is liability for property destroyed, property of another taken, property of another used without permission and property detained (Stewart loc. cit. para. 2.22).

503

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

III.

Loss, in particular, recoverability of non-economic losses and loss of use

29.

Under BELGIAN, FRENCH and LUXEMBOURGIAN law every loss following from the destruction, loss, damaging or depreciation in value of an object constitutes damage recoverable under tort law, without there really being any distinction in principle between these different heads of damages (Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité2, no. 251-1 p. 19). Where a new car is damaged, according to French doctrine (the situation in Belgium has yet to be definitively clarified) not only costs of repair, but also the depreciation in market value of an accidentally damaged car are to be made good (Cass.civ. 6 October 1966, D. 1967, jur. 5). Loss of use (the temporary impossibility of being able to use an object) amounts to recoverable damage in both legal systems (Viney and Jourdain loc. cit. 20; Schryvers and Ulrichts, Schaderegeling in België5, 34-37); it is even granted where animals are injured (e. g. a riding horse: CFI Nijvel 3 February 2003, RGAR 2004, no. 13927). Up to the delivery of the new car, the owner of a car that is written off has a claim to compensation of the costs of a reasonable rental car, and furthermore a claim to compensation for the fact that he has lost the advantage of free servicing on the old car (CFI Charleroi 7 May 2001, RGAR 2002, no. 13575). If it is established that the atteinte au bien has caused dommage moral, this is also to be compensated (JClCiv (-Bertolaso), art. 1382 à 1386, fasc. 110, no. 18; Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2), no. 175 pp. 327-328). The principle of objective and complete reparation applies generally: the state in which the injured party would have found himself, had the injurious event not occurred, is to be restored (Simoens loc. cit. no. 152 p. 300). In SPANISH academic writing there is debate on whether non-economic losses, which the owner of a thing suffers as a result of its destruction or damage to it, are also recoverable (for those in favour, see e. g. Albaladejo (-Santos Briz), Comentarios al Código Civil y compilaciones forales XXIV, art. 1902, 217; for the opposing view see Díez-Picazo, Derecho de daños, 328). CA Álava 18 June 1999, AC 2000 (1) no. 118 p. 204 granted non-economic compensation to a house owner when her front door was damaged by the defendant company and as a result she could not close it for a time, meaning that she had lived in constant fear of intruders. Every crease in relation to tort law recoverability for damage resulting purely from loss of use has not yet been ironed out, viz. the question of whether the abstract possibility of using an object amounts to economic value per se. It is affirmed here and there, see e. g. Albaladejo (-Santos Briz) loc. cit. art. 1902, 231; CA Ciudad Real 12 February 1998, BDA AC 1998/3435 (amount of damages assessed at 20 % of the costs of public transport); CA Pontevedra 10 October 1995, BDA AC 1995/1949 (damages for loss of use affirmed but only for the time in which it was actually being repaired in the workshop); CA Soria 15 February 2000, BDA JUR 2000/113208 (same); CA Zamora 1 February 2001, BDA JUR 2001/123000 (damages for loss of use affirmed for an apartment, although the owners did not live in it consistently); CA Barcelona 24 November 2000, BDA JUR 2001/63518 (in the case of a car being used for professional purposes, no compensation for time during public holidays). Also Catalan CC art. 546-14 points in a similar direction with its rule on damages (for the position before codification see further Martín Vida, VersRAI 2005, 57-63; VersRAI 2006, 5-8). In the same way, the overwhelming number of appellate court decisions (clarifying words of the Supreme Court are absent) constantly insist on the existence of actual loss, thereby granting no compensation of abstract damages for loss

30.

504

Article 2:206: Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession

31.

32.

of use. See for instance CA Guadalajara 22 March 2006, BDA JUR 2006/140758 (no compensation for the mere loss of potential use); CA Baleares 13 February 2006, BDA JUR 2006/84138 (water leak caused by neighbour, no damages for the deprivation of the use of the house during the period of repair because the house was a second home, not designated for renting purposes); CA Caceres 6 May 1998, BDA AC 1998/5721 (no damages for the deprivation of the use of a car during the period of repair because the plaintiff did not manage to prove any loss); CA Zamora 1 February 2001, BDA AC 2001/ 229 (no compensation for the deprivation of the use of two hotel rooms during repair works because there was no full booking and thus no relevant damage); and CA Barcelona 15 January 1999, BDA AC 1999/2960 (no compensation for the deprivation of the use of an apartment because there was no tenant). In ITALY non-economic damage as a result of damage to property or destruction thereof is not recoverable (CC art. 2059; for a revision of this traditional viewpoint Conti, Danno e resp. 2006, 237). Conversely, the situation in Italy in relation to damages flowing from loss of use is not completely clear. If another’s land is illegally occupied, the assessment of damages takes its cue from the rental value (Cass. 4 November 1995, no. 11524, Giust.civ.Mass. 1995, fasc. 11). The damage is in re ipsa, since the dispositional authority of the dominus can be injured and the utilitas (= the civil fruits, namely the rent) can no longer be drawn (Cass. 11 March 1995, no. 2859, Giust.civ.Mass. 1995, 583). An estimated amount is granted, a danno figurativo. Recoverability of accident damage to cars had been denied some few years ago; the owner must at least have proven that he would have actually used the car, if it did not have to be repaired and that he could no longer work or was forced to use public transport (danno da fermo tecnico, see particularly from case law: Cass. 19 November 1999, no. 12820, Giust.civ.Mass. 1999, 2295). In more recent decisions, however, it has been stated that danno da fermo tecnico is to be compensated independently of particular proof of damage according to the free discretion of the trial judge, in order to compensate frustrated expenses (general running costs of the car) and depreciation in value (Cass. 13 July 2004, no. 12908, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, fasc. 7-8; Cass. 14 December 2002, no. 17963, Giust.civ.Mass. 2002, 2202). Under HUNGARIAN CC § 355(4) loss in value occasioned to the assets of the injured party (BH 1996/196) and proprietary advantages that fail to come to fruition (BH 1984/ 401; the claim in this case was denied due to factual reasons, however) are to be compensated, as are, furthermore, all costs that are necessary to reduce or eradicate the injured party’s economic and non-economic detriment. Where an apartment is flooded, the costs of repair are consequently to be compensated; moreover, compensation for the restriction of the use of the apartment – as lost profit – is to be provided. In contrast, the fact that a family get-together could not take place to a respectable degree in the apartment in question was not deemed severe enough to make out a further claim in non-economic damages (BH 2002/482). If someone misses a business appointment due to a traffic accident for which another is at fault, the loss is recoverable flowing from the fact that a contract failed to be concluded as a result (BH 2001/273); the same goes for lost profit as a result of the destruction of an ice cream parlour (BH 1997/332). The consequential costs of an interference with possession are also recoverable (BH 1999/ 202: restorative building work as a result of the unauthorised renovation of an apartment). Where someone expertly repairs an item personally, he or she can account for the market price of such repairs (BH 1996/313). Further, e. g. the rental costs of a replacement vehicle during the period of repair may be compensatable (BH 1984/

505

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

33.

34.

35.

506

499, relates to a locomotive). In contrast, the recoverability of damages for non-economic loss for damage to property is denied, see Vékás, FS Boytha György, 332. BH 2002/ 482 follows the view that non-economic damages only fall due for infringements of personality rights. See also BH 1996/358 (the right to property does not belong among personal rights, which is why a claim in non-economic compensation does not come into the picture where a thing is merely confiscated by a judge for an amount of time that exceeds the lawful period). The proposed scheme for a new CC tends in the same direction (Herpai, VersRAI, 2005, 46). Under GERMAN law non-economic damage as a result of an infringement of property rights is not recoverable (CC § 253(2)). More often than not, this throws up the question of which disadvantages are to be qualified as economic and which as non-economic. BGH 9 July 1986 (Grand Senate for Civil Matters), BGHZ 98, 212) inferred that where objects are used on the operations side of a business, the lost possibility of use is to be qualified as lost gains. If private use is at issue, compensation only comes into focus in cases of commercial goods of basic necessity; however, even a “normative supplementation” of the calculation of the differential under the law of damages is imperative here. The loss of use in elementary necessities (automobile, abode, necessary fixtures) is qualified as economic, the loss of use in luxurious goods (private swimming pool, fur coat, private jet) as non-economic damages (see further Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB65, preliminary observations to § 249, nos. 20, 25 and MünchKomm (-Oetker), BGB4, § 249, no. 58). It is also true for AUSTRIA that for property damage, compensation in kind (repair) falls due first and foremost. Compensation of value in the amount of the value of reconstruction is payable in cases of the destruction of a thing due to slight negligence (CC § 1332), in cases of gross fault, lost gains are additionally recoverable (CC § 1331 first sentence) and for malice also non-economic damages (CC § 1331 second sentence: “particular sentimental value”; the “sentimental interest”). Furthermore, the drop in market value is recoverable (Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VII2, § 1323 no. 20), not however pure loss of use (thus no reparation of “notional car rental costs”: OGH 3 March 1969, SZ 42/33, Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 2/108). There is, however, a claim to the compensation of frustrated expenses (tax, insurance, garage rental) during the period of repair (Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht I11, 287). On the other hand, the cancellation fee for a boat, which the claimant had rented for his holidays but could not take due to an accident, is not compensatable; in reality this type of frustrated expenses is concerned with non-economic loss (CFI Salzburg 10 April 2004, 22R34/ 04k). Pure loss of the possibility to use a thing is also not recoverable (OGH 9 October 1986, SZ 59/165; OGH 17 June 1993, JBl 1994, 121; OGH 4 June 1987, SZ 60/102), which is why e. g. ‘notional rental costs’ (illustration 15 above) are qualified as irrecoverable non-economic loss (Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht II12, 287). Things are different where deprivation of use brings with it a real loss of assets (OGH 14 August 1996, EFSlg 81.472; OGH 16 December 1992, ecolex 1993, 379). In GREECE, just like in Austria, but not in Germany, the opinion prevails that an “abstract loss of use” is not recoverable damage; it lacks a loss of assets in the sense of the method of calculating damages whereby the disparity of assets between the situation before and after the injurious event is sought to be remedied (Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio A(1)2, 540; Sourlas, NoB 33 (1985), 728, 743). The additional expenditure of time, the discomfort and effort on the part of the injured party are, how-

Article 2:206: Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession

36.

37.

38.

ever, recoverable as non-economic damage in the context of CC art. 932 (Stathopoulos loc. cit. 541). During the period of repair of a damaged car, frustrated expenses are additionally compensated (Stathopoulos loc. cit.; CFI Athens 3053/1978, NoB 27 [1979] 106; critical, Sourlas loc. cit. 736); to this extent, the situation corresponds with that in Austria. In PORTUGAL the question of the recoverability of damage resulting from loss of use has to date remained unanswered (details in Abrantes Geraldes, Indemnização do dano, 6). It seems that previously in relation to vehicles, it was predominantly affirmatively answered (Mesquita, RLJ 125 [1992/1993], 159; Menezes Leitão, Obrigações I, 297; STJ 6 June 2006; STJ 9 May 1995, BolMinJus 457 [1995] 325), of late it tends mostly to be answered in the negative (STJ 8 June 2006; STJ 12 January 2006; STJ 4 December 2003; CA Oporto 8 July 1997, BolMinJus 469 [1997] 663; see also CA Coimbra 4 October 1994, BolMinJus 440 [1994] 554). Squatting on land, however, grounds liability even where the owner cannot prove that he would have let it for this period (CA Lisbon 11 March 2003, CJ 2003-II, 70). Evidence of actual loss is therefore unnecessary here (STJ 29 June 2004). It is self-evident that the expense of having to rent a car during the period of repair of one’s own car is recoverable (Abrantes Geraldes loc. cit., 33; STJ 5 March 2002). In the context of lost use even compensation for non-economic losses has been granted (STJ 23 January 2001; CA Evora 26 March 1980, CJ 1980-II, 96), but that is not done as a rule (denied by e. g. STJ 4 December 2003 and CA Coimbra 4 October 1994 loc. cit.). In DUTCH law the rule that the party liable in tort is automatically in default (CC art. 6:83(b)) and therefore must pay statutory interest on his liability in damages from the moment the tort is committed, is transferred to the situation of the detention of a thing. Bedrijfsschade (loss of operation) and gebruiksderving (loss of use) are spoken of here. Compensation for such a loss of use is concretely calculated; the value of the real lost use is authoritative, not a mere abstract possibility of use (for more detail and references to diverging views, see Salomon, Schadevergoeding, no. 21 pp. 45-50). A claim in compensation of non-economic losses will only lie where the person responsible had the intention of inflicting such damage (CC art. 6:106(1)(a)). The provision foresees cases in which an object is destroyed or damaged with the purpose of inflicting mental pain on the owner, thus injuring his “sentimental interest” (Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 378-380). The intention must also cover this advanced purpose; it is not sufficient that it “only” relates to the property damage as such (Schadevergoeding II (-Lindenbergh), art. 6:106, nos. 20-21, pp. 134-145). ESTONIAN LOA § 134(4) follows a very similar, if not perfectly identical approach (“In the case of destruction or loss of a thing, the aggrieved person has, taking into account exceptional circumstances, the right to claim a reasonable amount of money as compensation for non-patrimonial damage in addition to compensation for patrimonial damage regardless of the usefulness of the thing if the person had a special interest in the destroyed or lost thing primarily for personal reasons”). The compensatory obligation in relation to patrimonial damages is elaborately regulated in LOA § 132. In the case of destroyed things, the point of departure is the principal of compensation of value (paras. (1) and (2)); in the case of property damage, the costs of repair are to be met (para. (3)). Loss of use is the subject-matter of the rule in § 132(4): “If a thing damaged was necessary or useful for the aggrieved person, in particular, for the person’s economic or professional activities or work, compensation for the damage shall also cover the costs of

507

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

39.

40.

508

using a thing of equal value during the time in which the damaged thing is being repaired or a new thing is being acquired. If the person does not use a thing of equal value, the person may claim compensation for loss of the advantages of use which the person could have benefited from during the time in which the thing is repaired or a new thing is being acquired”. On this provision see Supreme Court 3-2-1-137-05, RT III 2006, 3, 26. SWEDISH EAL chap. 5 § 7 states: “Compensation for property damage encompasses compensation for (i) the value of the thing or the costs of repair and depreciation in value, (ii) other costs resulting from the damage, (iii) lost income or interference with commercial activity.” This extensively corresponds with FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 5. The DANISH EAL is silent on the issue of property damage. For all three legal systems, see also the Notes under Article 6:101 (Aim and forms of reparation). In a case in which someone felled six large old trees on neighbouring land, DANISH Supreme Court 12 September 1994, FED 1994.995V expressly also compensated the non-pecuniary damage. The “other costs” enumerated in SWEDISH EAL loc. cit. may refer to wholly different headings. In particular what is meant are costs for the transportation of the damaged thing, costs of inspection (restricted, however, by HD 5 June 1989, NJA 1989, 251), of an expert valuation and for expenses for the mitigation of damage. Furthermore, “standstill compensation” (pure loss of use in the case of vehicles) and the recoverability of the cost of keeping a reserve are also recognised (a transportation company’s precaution of keeping by a replacement vehicle in case of an accident); compensation of costs on a pro rata basis) (HD 6 February 1932 and 14 October 1939, NJA 1939, 481; HD 4 June 1945, NJA 1945, 295; HD 27 September 1950, NJA 1950, 409; cf. HD 8 February 1993, NJA 1993, 13). Compensation has even been granted for the impossibility of using a damaged yacht during the holiday season (HD 5 October 1945, NJA 1945, 440), the same goes for three lost days of vacation resulting from damage to a car and caravan (HD 10 April 1992, NJA 1992, 213) and for the reward paid by the insurance company after a theft (HD 6 May 1994, NJA 1994, 283). DANISH case law grants compensation for increased maintenance costs as a result of property damage (Supreme Court 12 April 1960, UfR 1960, 932) and for the loss of use during repair and the waiting period until repurchase (von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 251). In ENGLAND the reasonable cost of hiring a car while the damaged vehicle is being repaired or replaced is the yardstick for compensation for loss of use of the damaged car. Accident car hire companies or credit hire companies that do not require a debit or credit card ‘up front’ (going against the grain of the normal practice of charging the pursuer’s card first, with damages then eventually recovered by the pursuer from the defender) partake in the practice of assessing the merits of the motorist’s case when he seeks a replacement car; if satisfied that the claim is unanswerable, the company provides a car and then pursues the motorist’s claim against the defender’s insurer, charging an additional fee beyond the ‘spot rate’ for simple car hire (Thomson, Delictual Liability3, 253). In Dimond v. Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384 the House of Lords held that compensation for loss of use of a damaged car was restricted to the spot rate for hiring a car from a company other than an accident or credit hire company, i. e. the additional fee element charged by an accident or credit hire company was not recoverable. In Lagden v. O’Connor [2003] UKHL 64, [2004] 1 AC 1067, however, the House held that where the motorist was not in a pecuniary position to fund the cost of hiring a replacement car

Article 2:206: Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession

41.

42.

from a car or credit hire company himself, his loss could be assessed taking account of the accident or credit hire company’s charges including the additional fee. The majority held that the impecuniosity of the plaintiff should be taken into account, with the effect that Lord Wright’s opinion in Dredger Liesbosch v. Steamship Edison [1933] AC 449 (that a claimant’s lack of means should not be taken into account when assessing the loss) was no longer to be followed. It is apparent that in IRELAND, apart from rulings in connection with car accident damage, there is near sole reliance on English rules due to the former’s dearth of case law on this subject (for the case of car accident damage, see Hayes v. Callanan [2000] 1 IR 321: a case involving a road traffic accident where a previous action between the parties had come before the District Court and damages for loss of use and depreciation of the plaintiff’s car, along with travelling expenses, were granted; subsequent proceedings were brought for personal injuries, the admissibility of which constituted, inter alia, the subject-matter of the case coming before the High Court in this reported case). As far as its significance for Ireland is concerned, reported case law and commentary in England on the recovery of damages for loss of use seems to be restricted to where the plaintiff would have derived direct commercial benefit (more easily transferable into a monetary sum) from its use, as is noted above in the context of conversion (under Note I14): where the converted article would have been put to profitable use – such as being hired out – losses for this use may also be recovered (Fleming, Law of Torts9, 77-78). In an action for detinue the scope is broader (see above, Note I14), with damages for the chattel’s detention also recoverable, under which damages for rental costs (General & Finance Facilities Ltd. v. Cooks Cars (Romford) [1963] 1 WLR 644, quoted with approval by Blayney J. in Webb v. Ireland [1987] IESC 2, [1988] IR 353) and the depreciation in value of the chattel between the date of the defendant’s refusal to deliver the chattel (up to the plaintiff) and its actual return also fall (Rosenthal v. Alderton & Sons Ltd. [1946] KB 374, 378, per Evershed J.; see also Hymas v. Ogden [1905] 1 KB 246, where damages were awarded for the wrongful detention of the plaintiff’s running dog). In General & Finance Facilities Ltd. v. Cooks Cars (Romford) loc. cit. Diplock L. J. referred to the damages awarded under conversion as being “for a single sum of which the measure is generally the value of the chattel at the date of the conversion together with any consequential damage flowing from the conversion and not too remote to be recoverable in law” (loc. cit. 649). In Egan & Sons Ltd. v. Sisk & Sons Ltd. [1986] ILRM 283 (where the plaintiff’s warehouse was flooded due to the negligence of the first named defendant and brochures stored there to be used in connection with their mail order business were destroyed), the plaintiffs recovered loss of profits on anticipated sales, Carroll J. stating that “if a defendant through its negligence injures property in a warehouse, it must take the responsibility for damaging whatever goods are there ... It is also foreseeable that because a warehouse is part of the world of commerce, there will be economic loss and possible loss of profits. If the goods can be replaced at cost, so much the better for the defendant; if the goods cannot be replaced, then the economic loss, including loss of profits, is foreseeable.” In SCOTLAND where a car is damaged in a road accident, the owner is entitled to loss of use of the damaged car while it is being repaired or replaced (Thomson, Delictual Liability3, 253). In the context of ejection and intrusion, an owner kept out of possession by a tenant may claim damages for loss resulting from that person’s failure to remove and wrongful retention of possession, and possible also violent profits, which

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are penal damages instituted as a special deterrent against taking the law into one’s own hands (Walker, Delict2, 937). In the case of encroachment, the invasion of the pursuer’s exclusive rights in the property is sufficient to justify an action, and no damage or loss need be proved (Colquhoun’s Trustees v. Orr Ewing & Co. (1877) 4 R 344). In an action of spuilzie, the “action lies against the delinquent, not only for restoring to the former possessor the goods or their value, but for all the profits he might have made of these goods had it not been for the spuilzie. These profits are estimated by the pursuer’s own oath ... and get the name of violent, because they are due in no other case than of violence or wrong” (Erskine, An Institute of the Law of Scotland II8, 7, 16). Illustration 2 is taken from HR 20 September 1985, NedJur 1986 no. 211 p. 775; illustration 4 from Danish Supreme Court 22 June 2004, UfR 2004, 2389; similarly Swedish HD 7 March 1988, NJA 1988, 62; illustration 6 from BH 1999/202; illustration 8 from BGH 17 March 1981, BGHZ 80, 186 and 199; illustration 9 from CFI Piraeus, DEE 10 (2004), 678; illustration 11 from Finnish HD 27 May 1994, NDS 1995, 264; illustration 12 from BGH 21 December 1970, BGHZ 55, 153 and from BGH 18 November 2003, NJW 2004, 356, 358; illustration 13 from Cass.ass.plén. 7 May 2004, Bull.ass.plén. 2004 no. 10 p. 21; similarly BH 2005/143; illustration 14 from Payton v. Brooks [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 241; and OGH 23 February 1995, ZVR 1995, 304; illustration 15 from CA Pontevedra 10 October 1995, BDA AC 1995/1949; and illustration 16 from Cass. 4 November 1995, no. 11524, Giust.civ.Mass. 1995, fasc. 11 and Cass. 11 March 1995, no. 2859, Giust.civ.Mass. 1995, 583.

Article 2:207: Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information Loss caused to a person as a result of making a decision in reasonable reliance on incorrect advice or information is legally relevant damage if: (a) the advice or information is provided by a person in pursuit of a profession or in the course of trade; and (b) the provider knew or could reasonably be expected to have known that the recipient would rely on the advice or information in making a decision of the kind made.

Comments A.

General

1. Policy considerations. As a general principle there is no liability for advice, recommendation and information. Any such liability would go too far to be workable for daily life and would burden every interpersonal communication with an unbearable risk of liability. The case is otherwise only when the recipient of the information has special cause to rely on the correctness of the information and the provider of the information knows or should know about this special situation in which the recipient of the information is placed. Typical cases concern information about credit-worthiness provided by banks and faulty valuations or certifications. Further instances would be instructions on 510

Article 2:207: Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information

use which a producer encloses with a product for the guidance of the end consumer or where a certificating authority issues digital signatures. However, the provision can also have effect in the realm of legal liability of doctors and other professionals. 2. European community law. As regards the special rules for internet service providers see Comment B7 and Notes IV 37-45 under Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another). In contrast to the Directive on Electronic Commerce (2000/31/ EC), the Directive on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading 2003/71/ EC (OJ EC L 345 of 31 December 2003) has left the civil liability of the publisher of the prospectus unaffected (loc. cit. art. 6). 3. Relationship to contractual liability. Like all rules in this Book, Article 2:207 is related to non-contractual liability. In some of the cases covered by Article 2:207 a liability in contract may also arise. See further Book IV Part C. (Services). It is possible that contract law may undergo further developments whose effect will be to buttress or overlap with Article 2:207 to a not insignificant extent. Whether in a particular case a parallel liability in non-contractual liability ought to be excluded must then be determined by contract law (Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (c)). However, the text proceeds on the basis that in cases comparable to the English decision in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] AC 465 (concerning a credit reference provided by a bank in response to the third party’s inquiry whether the bank’s customer would be in a position financially to discharge obligations under a prospective transaction) a contract solely containing an obligation of the bank to be liable in the event of the information being incorrect would not arise. That is because there is no unilateral promise. 4. Relationship to Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another). Whereas Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another) governs legally relevant damage in case of incorrect information communicated to a third party, Article 2:207 governs damage in case of incorrect information communicated to the recipient. Article 2:207 thus concerns the question when does a recipient of false advice or information suffer a legally relevant damage if suffering loss by relying on that advice or information. It does not concern the situation in which false information is given about the claimant to a third party. Illustration 1 If in deciding to make a (detrimental) tax-privileged capital investment a dentist relies on the incorrect information which an accountant and tax consultant has given the dentist orally, in a letter or in a brochure, the resultant loss will be legally relevant damage within the meaning of Article 2:207. If it is reported that the dentist is evading tax, the matter falls within the ambit of Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another).

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B.

The circle of protected recipients of the information

5. Professional advice or information. Not every provision of information and advice which is defective and relied on by the recipient to the recipient’s detriment can lead to liability under this Article. The damage must be caused by provision of information “in pursuit of a profession or in the course of trade”. ‘Kerbstone’ advice falls outside those terms because provision by a professional is not enough; what is required is provision of the defective information or advice in the course of carrying out the profession. In the usual case this will mean in the context of a business activity, albeit irrespective of whether that is remunerated and whether there is a pre-existing contractual relationship with the recipient. 6. “The” recipient, not “a” recipient. The recipient of the information may be either a private individual or a person engaged in a business, trade or profession and may be either a natural or a legal person. The provision does not apply, however, to just any incidental recipient of the information who happens to rely on the correctness of the message that has come to that recipient’s attention. The matter does not turn on whether the person communicating the information knew or ought to have known that somebody at least would rely on the information. What is essential is rather that that person must have had a definite circle of persons in view (sub-paragraph (b)). The person who gives the information or advice certainly need not know the actual recipient. An anonymous recipient suffices. Nor is it necessary that the recipient received the defective information or advice from the provider directly. An indirect recipient who obtains the information through intermediate third parties may equally have a claim. However, in both such cases the claimant must belong to the class of potential recipients of the information whose members the provider of the information knew or ought to have known would be dependent on the corrections of that information in coming to a decision of substantial significance and would rely on it. A person who does not reach a business appointment due to an incorrect traffic congestion report does not suffer legally relevant damage.

C.

Reliance

7. Reasonable reliance. The existence of relevant damage for the purposes of the law on non-contractual liability arises crucially out of the disappointment of a legitimate reliance. It does not suffice that the recipient of the information actually relied on its correctness. This must be accompanied by the element that in the circumstances and in relation to the decision to be made, the recipient might reasonably rely on the information. A reasonable reliance on the accuracy of the information or advice is missing if one has trusted the utterances of a fortune teller, astrologist or similar charlatan. The recipient of information may also not rely on it if the recipient knows or should know that the provider of the information does not wish to vouch for the correctness of the communication. Illustration 2 The element of justifiable reliance is therefore missing if the providers of the information makes it explicit that they do not or cannot accept responsibility for the 512

Article 2:207: Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information

correctness of the information (e. g. by making use of a “without obligation” clause or similar formulation). 8. Foreseeability of reasonable reliance. The requirement that the provider should have foreseen reasonable reliance on the advice or information provided (sub-paragraph (b)) will also operate to qualify implicitly the types of decision which can result in a loss relevant to Article 2:207. The claimant must show that the provider ought to have foreseen that (i) the injured person would have made a decision of the type in fact made and (ii) would make such a decision in reliance on the information or advice provided. It is inherent in the foreseeability of such (reasonable) reliance on the information or advice that a decision of the sort made will be a significant one. The more serious the decision, the more the recipient’s need for expert insight and correspondingly the greater opportunity for dependence on another’s provision of expertise because of the informational imbalance between the parties. Conversely, the more trivial the decision, the less the grounds for supposing that the recipient would depend on the information given and the greater the reason for assuming that the recipient would not be strongly influenced by it. An information provider can safely expect others to make trivial decisions under their own steam and not to act parasitically on the guidance of others. Illustration 3 Representatives of a regional agency of an association pour l’emploi dans l’industrie et le commerce hold an information session on the terms of early retirement annuities in the rooms of the claimant’s employer. The claimant relies on this information; the damage that is caused to her as a result of her leaving the working world on the basis of too generous statements of her prospective pension is legally relevant damage. The association is liable if negligence is attributed to its representative. Contributory fault on the part of the claimant leads to a reduction in the claim to reparation.

D.

Incorrect advice or information

9. An inseparable composite term. The subject-matter of Article 2:207 is loss as a result of decisions that are attributable to “incorrect advice or information”. This term does not denote two separate events (either advice or information), but rather a single activity in which an assertion of fact blends with a recommendation to make a decision based thereon. Mere advice (“travel by train, not by car”) taken on its own lends itself just as little to being qualified as “right” or “wrong” as a mere value judgement. The advice must be based on a core of fact. On the other hand, a pure assertion of fact is likewise no sufficient basis for ascribing decision-making to that assertion. Instead a combination of both elements, for instance the (false) statement that the required planning permission for a piece of land had been given, coupled with at least the implicit recommendation to opt for the acquisition of that land. Mere conjecture is no assertion of fact. 10. Causation. Article 2:207 operates with a two-pronged requirement for causation. The incorrect advice or information must have been a cause of the affected party making 513

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the relevant decision and this must in turn be seen as a cause of the loss. In each case, “psychological causation” is in issue, which can be ascribed to an omission by the party responsible. Illustration 4 A firm of accountants negligently overlooks considerable book losses while auditing a company’s balances. Relying on the report, private persons invest in the audited company, which shortly afterwards goes into liquidation. The firm of accountants is liable to the investors for the price paid for the shares. 11. Accountability. Article 2:207 relates only to the question of the prerequisites for the affirmation of legally relevant damage. As with all the provisions of this Section, it does not constitute a complete norm of liability. In particular it remains to be examined, whether the provider of the information acted negligently and whether contributory fault may be attributed to the recipient of the information in not having verified the information.

Notes 1.

2.

514

In cases of erroneous information to the detriment of a contracting party, FRENCH and BELGIAN contract law first and foremost differentiate according to whether the person who has to furnish the information is to assume an obligation de moyens or an obligation de résultat (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats 2004/2005, nos. 5379-5381; CA Antwerp 2 May 1995, RW 1996-1997, 302 [upon request of a customer, a bank provides trade information; liability for its incorrectness only where breach of duty is present]). Against the backdrop of an extra- or precontractual relationship, in both systems it depends on the existence of a faute causing damage (Cass.soc. 5 November 1999, Bull.civ. 1999, V, no. 430 p. 318; CFI Bergen 26 September 1994, TBH 1995, 1035). Any person who declares himself as being willing to provide information has the duty to sufficiently inform himself beforehand (Cass.civ. 19 October 1994, Bull.civ. 1994, II, no. 200 p. 115; Raad van State/Conseil d’État 28 March 1996, RW 1996-1997, 435, note Lambrechts [false information by a borough on the competent court of review; liability for the claimant’s procedural costs]). The SPANISH CC likewise contains no general provision on liability for damage resulting from erroneous information or advice; jurisprudence on the extracontractual side of this problem field seems to be absent to date. In academic writing, reference is made to suggestions from English law (particularly Frades de la Fuente, La responsabilidad profesional; also Del Olmo García, ADC, 2001, 257-368). Moreno Martínez (-De Ángel Yágüez), Perfiles de la responsabilidad civil en el nuevo milenio, 171, 188 opines that extracontractual liability for erroneous information would in principle not be made out by mere negligence. This is of course not on all fours with CA Barcelona 31 July 2000, BDA JUR 2000/306843 (following an erroneous audit report in which considerable book losses had been overlooked, liability of the relevant accountancy firm was affirmed not only to the client and contractual partner, but also to later investors, who lost their investment as a consequence of the insolvency of the audited company).

Article 2:207: Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information

3.

4.

The situation in ITALY corresponds to the rule in Article 2:207. Case law only allows a tort law claim for erroneous information where it reaches the stage of qualified contact between the participants in the context of an economically relevant decision-makingprocess. Anyone who has requested the information must have relied on the specialist skills and knowledge of the person who has provided the information (Cass. 9 June 1998, no. 5659, Foro it. 1999, I, 660 and Cass. 10 October 1998, no. 10067, Resp.civ. e prev. 1999, 404; cf. for information from a public authority, also Cass. 9 January 2004, no. 2424, Resp.civ. e prev. 2004, 731 [liability in casu denied because of a lack of negligence]). Most cases concern the liability of banks for erroneous information on the financial status of one of their customers (Cass. 9 June 1998 loc. cit. [emphasising the legally protected interest in informed decision-making]; Cass. 10 October 1998 loc. cit.; Cass. 1 August 2001, no. 10492, Giust.civ.Mass. 2001, 1517) and the liability of governmental posts to private persons (see, along with Cass. 9 January 2004 loc. cit., e. g. also Cass.sez.lav. 9 April 2001, no. 5247, Giust.civ.Mass. 2001, 751 [inflated details of paid social insurance contributions]; Cass.sez.lav. 18 November 2000, no. 14953, Giust.civ.Mass. 2000, 2373 [similar facts; claim however qualified by contract]; Cass.sez.lav. 31 January 2003, no. 1104, Giust.civ.Mass. 2003, 173 [erroneous information on a pension claim apparently already obtained; liability for the remaining outstanding payments]). In academic commentary it is disputed, whether cases of this type concern liability in tort or contract law, cf. on one side Busnelli, Contr. Impr. 1991, 561 (tort law; the ingiustizia of the damage lies in the innocent reliance of the recipient of the information which is cognisable by the other party) and on the other Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile3, 492 and Scognamiglio, Giur.it. 1995, IV, 356 (contract law; liability for the breach of a duty of care, which is to be derived from the fact that the recipient relied on the professional qualifications of the other party). In HUNGARIAN law the point of departure is the general presumption of fault in CC § 339(1) second sentence. It can be expected of those gainfully employed in the relevant area, that the information provided by them is correct (BH 1996/471). In principle, it is also true in Hungary that pure words of advice or suggestions do not trigger liability; the recipient may decide whether or not to follow them himself (BH 1993/425). However, CC § 6 places the grant of damages at the discretion of the courts where someone bona fide and with cogent reason allows himself to be guided towards certain behaviour by another, through which he innocently harms himself. What is in issue here is a rule of liability, which is neither of a tortious nor contractual nature, since the conduct of the party proffering the recommendation or encouragement is not unlawful (Gellért (-Vékás), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 56-63; Bíró and Lenkovics, Magyar Polgári Jog, 194-199). Practically speaking, CC § 6 only plays a minor role because personal fault on the part of the party affected is mostly inferred. It would also be expected of entrepreneurs that they should not rely on the statements of their negotiating partner uncritically and without their own personal assessment under normal market practices (BH 1990/64). Furthermore, CC § 6 is to be distinguished from liability due to culpa in contrahendo, which is in any event subject to the general tort law, where the conclusion of a contract between the negotiating partners has not been arrived at (Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 766-767). Where stocks and bonds are issued on the basis of false information, the contract is invalid; the duty to compensate is subject to Law No. CXX /2001 on the Capital Market § 29(1) (EBH 2001/ 544). Apart from that, it is conceivable that erroneous information is deemed as an

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5.

6.

516

affront to personality (BH 2004/235: invalid indenture with the consequence of a disruption of the affected party’s career). Reference is also ultimately made to CC § 210(2), whereunder a contract can be avoided due to a mistake of law, where the mistake was essential and was attributable to misinformation that had been furnished to both parties by a legal expert. GERMANY deals with liability for pure economic loss through erroneous information predominantly with the aid of contract law constructs. In the context of tort law, essentially only CC § 826 is at hand. “Immoral” within the meaning of this provision is e. g. providing information, the incorrectness of which is known to its communicator (RG 18 October 1917, RGZ 91, 80, 81; RG 9 March 1938, RGZ 157, 228, 229; BGH 22 June 1992, NJW 1992, 3167, 3174) or which the communicator recklessly confers as a “shot in the dark”, despite its content being of recognisable importance to the recipient and the communicator reckoning with possible harm to the recipient (BGH 22 June 1992 loc. cit.). This can assume practical significane, e. g. where banks provide information on the solvency and credit-worthiness of their customers to the latter’s contractual partners and default on their claim upon the insolvency of the customer (BGH 20 February 1979, NJW 1979, 1599; BGH 6 December 1983, NJW 1984, 921, 922). However, more frequently case law falls back on the inference that despite the rule in CC § 675(2), a contract for information is implicitly concluded between the requester and provider of information, for the breach of which damages fall due in the case of negligence. The prerequisites are simply that (i) the information is of considerable commercial importance to the recipient, (ii) he wants to make use of it as the basis for essential decisions and (iii) the provider of information either has particular expertise at their disposal or has a personal commercial interest in the provision of the information (BGH 29 October 1952, BGHZ 7, 371, 374; BGH 22 March 1979, BGHZ 74, 103, 106; BGH 17 October 1989, NJW 1990, 513; BGH 16 October 1990, NJW 1991, 352; BGH 7 July 1998, WM 1998, 1771). Even the Supreme Court of the Reich argued thus (RG 27 October 1902, RGZ 52, 365, 366; RG 3 June 1913, RGZ 82, 337, 339). Where a credit institution provides an incorrect attestation to his pecuniary circumstances and where this is submitted in accordance with stipulations to a third party, who in reliance on its correctness makes economic arrangements, the bank is liable for the resulting damages. This is likewise under the guise of an implicitly concluded contract for information (BGH 7 July 1998, WM 1998, 1771). Only where one of the requisites ia absent is there therefore still a current need for recourse to CC § 826. Similar developments are emerging for the liability of accountants as well as for the liability of evaluators and experts (for more detail, see MünchKomm (-Wagner), BGB4, § 826, no. 54; Erman (-Schiemann), BGB II11, § 826, no. 38). Under AUSTRIAN CC § 1300 (first sentence) an “expert” is liable when he provides advice or information “for remuneration” and thereby acts with at least slight negligence (CC § 1299). Everything that is not done out of “pure courtesy” and “selflessness” is done “for remuneration” (OGH 11 July 1990, JBl 1991, 249; OGH 27 March 1995, SZ 68/60; Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VI3, § 1300 no. 2). “Selflessness” is lacking where the advice is given in preparation of a transaction for remuneration (Harrer loc. cit.). Even trade unions and interest groups do not act selflessly (OGH 27 March 1995, SZ 68/ 60: liability of the medical association for omitting to advise of an imminently expiring claim under the law on prescription of claims), this is not so for banks that gratuitously provide credit information (OGH 28 March 2002, ÖBA 2002, 937, note Koziol). Even

Article 2:207: Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information

7.

8.

in such cases a contract for information implictly comes into existence (OGH 17 November 1970, SZ 43/208). Liability for advice and information can also be based on public law relationships of duty (OGH 27 May 1980, SZ 53/83; OGH 14 November 1984, SZ 57/172). Hence, false information provided by authorities or courts can ground liability (of the state) (Harrer loc. cit. no. 36). If information is indeed provided “for remuneration” in this wide sense and yet gratuitously, individual factors mitigating liability may come into question (see further Welser, Die Haftung für Rat, Auskunft und Gutachten, 36). In principle, only the person to whom the advice is provided is entitled to claim, unless a contract for the protective benefit of the injured third party is in issue. The latter is inferred where the information was recognisably directed at a third party so that the third party could rely on it and make it the basis of his decision (Koziol/ Bydlinski/Bollenberger (-Karner), ABGB, § 1300 no. 3; OGH 20 November 1996, SZ 69/258 [evaluation of land submittable to a bank]). In contrast, it does not suffice if the provider of information must solely notionally reckon with the relaying of the information to third parties (OGH 27 June 1994, SZ 57/122). Where a specific relationship of proximity between the parties is absent, liability only comes into focus if the provider of the information acted with the intention to harm and with knowledge of the erroneousness of the advice or information (CC § 1300 second sentence); dolus eventualis is sufficient (OGH 15 June 1978, MietSlg 30.246; OGH 14 November 2000, ÖBA 2001, 819). CC § 1300 second sentence relates to everyone, not only “official experts”. The provision essentially has the function of founding liability also for pure economic losses, since cases of the infringement of absolute rights and interests worthy of legal protection remain within the scope of the general rules (OGH 13 July 1964, SZ 37/105: persuasion to make a mountain trip with the untruthful claim that this was completely safe). Liability for omissions also comes to this table (OGH 4 November 1959, SZ 32/144), but not however for denying being able to bear a child with the conscious knowledge that it was untruthful (OGH 27 January 1994, SZ 67/17). In GREECE the cases covered by Article 2:207, particularly the liability of banks to third parties, are categorised under tort and not contract law (Kotsiris, Arm 38/1984, 601, 615; Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio III, 144). While the tort law protection does not in principle extend to property in general, there are still exceptions thereto in the context of specific duties of care (Eleftheriadou, Die Haftung aus Verkehrspflichtverletzung im deutschen und griechischen Deliktsrecht, 124). CC art. 729 does not alter any of this; the application of tort law remains imperative where the information or recommendation no longer turns upon everyday affairs due to its recognisable significance for the recipient and due to the occupation of the provider (Truli, Dienstleistungshaftung, 200; see also again ErmAK (-Kapodistrias), art. 729 nos. 21, 28). CA Athens 4486/1989, ArchN 1991, 206 affirmed liability of a newspaper for errors in the publication of boat connections to a holiday island. Today, along with CC art. 914, also 2251/1994 art. 8 (as amended by Act no. 3587/2007) is deemed a basis for liability (Truli loc. cit. 201 and 203: banks and official experts). PORTUGUESE CC art. 485(1) – like German CC § 675(2) and Greek CC art. 729 – takes the irrelevance of advice, recommendations and information to the law of liability as its point of departure. According to CC art. 485(2), however, a duty to compensate damages emerges in the case of fault, where liability for the damage was assumed and where there was a contractual or statutory duty to provide the advice, recommendation or information (for more detail, see Carneiro da Frada, Uma terceira via, 66 and STJ 4

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9.

10.

11.

518

April 2006). In the cases where contractual or statutory duties to provide information are infringed, liability only accrues in principle as against the entitled recipient of the information (Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, 487; CA Lisbon 22 May, CJ 1993-III, 188). However, a mediator can also become liable to persons who were not party to the mediation contract (CA Oporto 29 May 2003). Further, participants of a course for learner drivers who receive false information on the legal prerequisites for self-employment are entitled to compensation for economic and non-economic damage where they had reason to rely on its correctness (STJ 28 February 2002). Conversely, an assistant of a clerk of court who rendered erroneous information to a party to suit against express instructions given by the lawyer of the latter is not liable (STA 3 November 1988, BolMinJus 381 [1988] 358). In DUTCH law the starting point is the third alternative in CC art. 6:162(2), according to which conduct constitutes a wrong when it “contravenes unwritten norms of social interaction” (see further Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht III12, nos. 32-33 p. 42). Counted among these “unwritten norms” are also general norms of care for the protection against pure economic losses; usually this would concern the requirements of care in such groups of occupations that take care of others’ property (Hartkamp loc. cit. nos. 45 and 51, pp. 59 and 69; Onrechtmatige Daad I (-Jansen), art. 6:162 paragraph 2, no 86.2 pp. 884-885). The particular details are left up to jurisprudence, which generally recognises the liability of expert officials for information, on the correctness of which the recipient could rely (see from the cases of the court of first instance e. g. CFI Assen 24 March 1992, Prg 1997, 4771 and CFI Leeuwarden 20 August 1987, NedJur 1992 no. 803 p. 3456). HR 11 April 1997, NedJur 1998 no. 236 pp. 1231-1245 inferred that a bank that executes against the owner of land may rely on the information through his consultant without having to directly contact the owner once again. Conversely, a bank is liable for erroneous or insufficient information on the credit history of one of its customers, which was provided to the latter’s contractual partner (HR 10 December 1993, NedJur 1994 no. 667 p. 3192; HR 22 December 1993, NedJur 1994 no 668 p. 3206). HR 19 May 1967, NedJur 1967 no. 261 p. 705 accepted a clause excluding liability in a case in which on its own initiative and in good faith a bank had advised the purchase of particular shares in a company, which immediately lost their value. ESTONIAN LOA § 1048 corresponds in large part to Article 2:207. It provides: “The behaviour of an expert is deemed to be unlawful if the expert provides incorrect information or an incorrect opinion to another person in a financial matter or, regardless of receiving new knowledge concerning the matter, fails to correct the information or opinion already provided, and if the expert enjoys particular trust due to his or her professional activities and the person who was given the information or opinion could expect to rely on such trust.” LOA § 1048 thus expressly clarifies that the omission to correct incorrect information can give rise to liability if the person providing the opinion or information becomes aware of new circumstances. See further Tammiste, Juridica 2005, 385-395. SWEDISH law provides compensation for pure economic losses only under quite strict requirements; this also applies to extracontractual liability for false information (on contractual liability in this context, see e. g. HD 14 April 1992, NJA 1992, 243). It only comes into focus in “quasi-contractual” relationships (Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 76; Kleineman, Ren förmögenhetsskada, 439-469). Occasionally it has even operated with a type of artificial contractual liability, like in Germany (e. g. HD 14 July

Article 2:207: Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information

12.

1980, NJA 1980, 383: false information on financial figures of one of the parties to proceedings by a representative of an authority). Later, liability (first in the context of a false expert appraisal) was then grounded on the justified reliance of the injured third party (HD 14 October 1987, NJA 1987, 692; affirmed on this point by HD 19 December 2001, NJA 2001, 878, cf. Kleineman, JT 2001-02, 625, 632). Liability under the Financial Advice to Consumers Act (Lag om finansiell rådgivning till konsumenter) § 1 also oscillates between tort and contract law, which likewise rests upon the principle of justified reliance (Swahn and Wendleby, Lagen om finansiell rådgivning till konsumenter, 31). In DENMARK it is said that no clear line can be drawn between contract and tort law for liability for professional information (Ulfbeck, Erstatningsretlige grænseområder, 7). In any event, culpable behaviour (culpøst) as against a third party, so not only as against the contractual partner, is a prerequisite of liability (Samuelsson and Søgaard, Rådgiveransvaret, 88). Specific laws can impose on individual occupational groups such duties directed towards third parties; occasionally they have also been developed by jurisprudence (Ulfbeck loc. cit. 36, 46, 60), e. g. for accountants (Supreme Court 9 April 2002, UfR 2002. 1444 and 25 June 2002, UfR 2002, 2032 [liability of an accountant for false information to a bank providing credit]). FINNISH Supreme Court 4 March 1999, HD 1999:32 affirmed an obligation to pay compensation on grounds of incorrect information in a case in which a civil servant gave a potential customer a much too rosy picture of the financial situation of a ship builder’s dockyard, which was partly in Finnish state ownership, with the result that the customer made an advance payment which he was not able to recover due to the subsequent insolvency of the shipyard. See also HD 1999:33. In ENGLAND the landmark case establishing the shape of liability for negligent misstatement in the modern law is Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] AC 465, where the bankers of a client of the claimants misstated to the claimants the creditworthiness of the client. While recovery was ultimately denied because of a disclaimer, the information being provided expressly “without responsibility”, the basis for liability for a pure economic loss was articulated: while there is no general duty of care to avoid negligent misstatements or to avoid causing pure economic loss, even if that is foreseeable, such a duty of care will arise, regardless of any contract, if there is a special relationship between the parties. Where there is no fiduciary relationship between the parties, this will arise where the defendant has voluntarily answered a question or tendered advice in circumstances where he knows or ought to know that an identified plaintiff will rely on his answers or advice. The special relationship is created by the defendant voluntarily assuming to act in the matter by involving himself in the plaintiff’s affairs or by choosing to speak and thus assuming responsibility for his advice or information. The overriding question remains whether, in the absence of any contractual or fiduciary duty, the circumstances give rise to a special relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant sufficient to justify the imposition of the duty of care in the making of statements: White v. Jones [1995] 2 AC 207, 272 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). Hence, no duty is owed, for example, by an accountant preparing company accounts to a prospective purchaser of shares in that company, though they do owe a tortious duty to the existing shareholders (the members of the company): Caparo Industries plc. v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. For SCOTLAND see similarly Martin v. Bell-Ingram 1986 SC 208, applying Hedley Byrne principles to establish the liability of a surveyor of a property engaged by a mortgage lender to the purchaser, a written disclaimer arriving after the pursuers had relied on the misinformation.

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Illustration 2 is taken from Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] AC 465; illustration 3 from Cass.civ. 19 October 1994, Bull.civ. 1994, II, no. 200 p. 115; and illustration 4 from CA Barcelona 31 July 2000, BDA JUR 2000/306843.

Article 2:208: Loss upon unlawful impairment of business (1) Loss caused to a person as a result of an unlawful impairment of that person’s exercise of a profession or conduct of a trade is legally relevant damage. (2) Loss caused to a consumer as a result of unfair competition is also legally relevant damage if Community or national law so provides.

Comments A.

Purpose and scope

1. Purpose. The purpose of this provision is to make it clear that loss resulting from an unlawful interference with another’s business or profession constitutes a recognised damage for the purpose of the law on non-contractual liability. It concerns losses as a result of prohibited interferences with competitors’ access to the market. Falling outside its remit, therefore, is the question whether and under what circumstances a consumer too can claim reparation from an undertaking that has caused him or her a loss by an unfair competitive practice (paragraph (2)). This problem area is the subject-matter of a self-contained branch of law in many (if not in all) European legal systems; today, only exceptionally is it still located in the general law on non-contractual liability. 2. Prevention. In the situations covered by this Article, it is not only compensation for losses suffered which plays a role. Preventative legal protection is also of great practical significance here. For that reason particular regard is to be given to Article 1:102 (Prevention) and Article 6:301 (Prevention in general). 3. Scope. The Article borrows in part from the concept developed in German noncontractual liability law of a “right to form and operate a business enterprise” (or “right to enterprise”), but does not correspond with its scope of application in every regard. In particular, Article 2:208 is narrower because it is silent on the legal liability arising from unauthorised forms of labour disputes: see Article 7:104 (Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers associations). Due to Article 7:104, all cases of “harassment” of fellow-employees also remain unaffected by Article 2:208. The “jeopardising of credit-worthiness” recognised in many legal systems is covered by Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another). Article 2:211 (Loss upon inducement of breach of obligation) provides for another special rule for legally relevant damage arising from inducing non-performance of a contractual obligation. On the other hand, Article 2:208 markedly goes beyond the concept of the “right to form and operate a business enterprise” referred to above in so far as the provision also gives effect to the 520

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general proposition that a market participant’s losses as a result of any unauthorised competitive behaviour of a competitor constitute legally relevant damage. 4. Groups of cases covered. Cases which may fall under Article 2:208(1) may, therefore, involve industrial espionage, boycotts and (other) activity in contravention of competition law including the law against cartels or the abuse of dominant positions, and the law against unfair commercial practices such as wrongful advertising. True assertions about a competitor can also fall under Article 2:208 if they have no intrinsic connection to the substance of the competitor’s commercial activity and therefore are only made in order to scare away potential or current customers. Of further note are e. g. product piracy and cases of unlawful warning to a rival or a rival’s customers with the false claim that the rival’s products infringe an industrial property right of the person giving the warning. Illustration 1 Company X asserts that the sanitary fittings manufactured by company Y are infringing its three-dimensional trademark and seeks a court order prohibiting Y from marketing the fittings. In the ensuing trademark law dispute, X’s trademark is deleted from the trademark registry with retroactive effect for lack of any distinctiveness. The losses that Y suffers as a result of the temporary discontinuation of the marketing of their sanitary fittings represents legally relevant damage, which must be compensated if X acted intentionally or negligently. 5. Infringement of EU competition law. Under Article 2:208 legally relevant damage is also constituted by losses that are inflicted upon an undertaking through a competitor’s breach of EU competition law. According to the case law of the ECJ, Member States must provide for such a claim for reparation. Even a person who was party to the anti-competitive agreement may invoke the protection of Community Law, unless this would amount to rewarding it for its own unlawful conduct (Courage Ltd. v. Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v. Courage Ltd. and Others, ECJ 20 September 2001, C-453/99, ECR 2001, I-6297). The legal discussion as to whether such a claim for reparation should depend on fault or be independent of fault has just begun (Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper – Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672 final). Under these rules, negligence is required as a minimum according to the general rules (Article 3:102 (Negligence) in conjunction with Article 1:101 (Basic rule)).

B.

Unlawful impairment of profession or trade

6. Profession or trade. The cause of the damage is an unlawful impairment of another person’s exercise of a profession or conduct of a trade. The formulation “profession or trade” ensures that not only trading companies (regardless of their legal form), but also other working persons, whether they engage in trade or not, fall within the provision’s scope of protection.

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Illustration 2 A company offers medical services without the necessary governmental licence. It calls its business “Polyklinik” and advertises in a catalogue of an international travel operator with a logo similar to the Red Cross with the slogan “medical aid wherever it is needed, first line of human assistance day and night.” The advertisement violates the legislation of all the countries in which the company operates its business. The doctors who work in the vicinity of the “Polyklinik” may seek a court order prohibiting the business and the advertisement. The advertising material must be withdrawn. 7. Exercise of a profession. The term “exercise” of a profession was chosen in order to make it clear that the provision protects not merely existing professional activities but also a person who has not yet commenced a professional activity but is unlawfully hindered in doing so. Illustration 3 In applying for a position, a doctor claims credit for a scientific study carried out by someone else, as a result of which a competing applicant loses out. The competitor suffers legally relevant damage. The competitor’s non-economic loss is also recoverable. 8. Impairment. An “impairment” of another’s exercise of a profession or conduct of a trade is sufficient because it is the unlawful harming of business which is at stake; its complete destruction or obstruction is not essential. Illustration 4 The personnel of several tugboats are incited not to tug out of the harbour the claimant’s tankership which sails under a flag of convenience. There is an unlawful impairment of the claimant’s business.. 9. Unlawful impairment. The interference must be unlawful, i. e. contrary to either statutory provisions or established practice, the latter including rules of correct conduct developed by the courts. “Unlawful” incorporates into the draft the benchmarks of both European Community law and the relevant individual jurisdictions in the Member States. An interference directed at the business or occupational activity of the claimant is required. It must involve an impairment of either the right to access the market or the right to compete on the market under fair conditions for customers. Purely accidental (even if possibly severe) consequences of an act which, according to its nature, is not directed at another’s freedom of business is insufficient. Illustration 5 In the “cable cases” (see illustration 4 under Article 2:206 (Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession)), an unlawful impairment of another’s business is absent even where production is at a complete standstill for some time. 10. Unfair competition to the detriment of competitors included. An unlawful impairment of another’s business within the meaning of paragraph (1) is also present in cases of 522

Article 2:208: Loss upon unlawful impairment of business

unfair competition to the detriment of a competitor. Account has been taken of the fact that there is at present no common concept in Europe of what is “unfair competition”. In addition, some legal systems operate in this area, for want of a special regime, with the general law on non-contractual liability, while others have addressed this field either completely or partially with special statutes. It did not therefore seem appropriate to exclude the law of unfair competition with regard to business to business relations from the Article’s scope of application. However, wherever specific rules intend to provide an exclusive regime for the law against unfair competition they have priority of application over Article 2:208(1). That follows from Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (c). 11. Unfair competition to the detriment of consumers excluded. Paragraph (2) follows the approach adopted for Article 2:203 (Infringement of personal dignity, liberty and privacy) paragraph (2). A loss which a consumer suffers due to the unfair competition of a business is only a legally relevant damage according to these rules if Community or national law so provides – in other words, if the consumer (and not merely competing businesses) come within the scope of protection of the law on unfair competition. Consequently, the Article does not address the question whether consumers or consumer associations can assert claims on the basis of a business’s unlawful anti-competitive acts. This question remains to be answered by national (substantive or procedural) law.

Notes 1.

The action en concurrence déloyale in FRENCH law is nothing more than a specific case of the application of the general tort law clause in CC arts. 1382 and 1383 (Cass.com. 29 May 1967, Bull.civ. 1967, III, no. 209 p. 200). It provides claims against other commercial competitors who wish to procure unfair advantages on the market. It is irrelevant whether the competitors involved are commerçants; it is only important that both pursue an activité professionnelle (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats 2004/2005, no. 7014) and are in direct competition with one another. Where such a situation de concurrence is lacking, the unfair conduct – as an agissement parasitaire – may still be relevant for tort law. Many seek to furthermore distinguish between concurrence déloyale and concurrence interdite (where the very competitive activity as such is prohibited, not solely the means applied), whereas others, and particularly the majority of jurisprudence, opine that every statutory breach is automatically déloyale (see further le Tourneau loc. cit. no. 7020 or 7012 and Rép.Dr.Com. (-Serra), no. 41). For the action en concurrence déloyale, proof of a faute, damage, and causation between faute and damage is necessary (Reinhard and Chazal, Droit commercial6, no. 226 p. 174). A faute commerciale lies in the infringement of statutory requirements and in the breach of trade practices (Ripert/Roblot/Vogel, Traité de droit commercial I(1)18, no. 729 p. 595); negligence is sufficient. Conceivably little demand is placed on proof of damage (e. g. Cass.com. 9 February 1993, Bull.civ. 1993, IV, no. 53 p. 34); on the other hand, the action en concurrence déloyale is subsidiary to contract law and property law, including intellectual property law (Cass.com. 3 October 1978, Bull.civ. 1978, IV, no. 208 p. 176; le Tourneau, Le parasitisme, no. 250-254 pp. 195-199).

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2.

3.

4.

524

BELGIUM had already consolidated the rules on the combatting of “dishonourable trade

practices” by the beginning of the 1970’s in a specific law – Commercial Practices and Consumer Protection Act (Loi sur les pratiques du commerce [LPC]) – which in 1991 was superseded by the Trade Practices and Consumer Information and Protection Act (Loi sur les pratiques du commerce et sur l’information et la protection du consommateur of 14 July 1991 [ConsProtA]). This regulates consumer information, indications of sources, advertisements, methods of sale, and the prohibition of illicit clauses in contracts for the sale of goods and supply of services. Thereupon, ConsProtA arts. 93-94bis bring two general clauses with the prohibition of dishonourable trade practices, through which competitors or consumers are or can be harmed (see further Verougstraete, Praktijken strijdig met de eerlijke gebruiken, 129-147). With Unfair Competition Act (Ley de Competencia Desleal, LCD), SPAIN also has a specific piece of legislation in this terrain. “Any conduct, which objectively proves to offend against requirements of good faith, is unfair”, loc. cit. art. 5. Thereafter, this general clause is concretised by a range of specific regulations. Provisions on denigration (art. 9; on this complex, see the previously cited TS 31 March 1930, RAJ 1930-31 [1] no. 816 p. 303) and inducing breach of contract (art. 14) also fall hereunder. It only respectively depends on the involvement of a market-related act; a relationship of competition between the parties is not necessary (arts. 2 and 3(2)). The claim in damages requires fault (intention or negligence), which is, however, rebuttably presumed where a civil wrong is objectively present (TS 10 July 1985, RAJ 1985 [2] no. 3965 p. 3338; Wirth, Das neue Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs in Spanien, 180). The provisions of the Unfair Competition Act (LCD) are in free competition with the provisions of the Anti-Trust Act (Ley 15/2007, de Defensa de la Competencia, LDC). Both pursue the same aim. Therefore, it is unproblematically accepted that the LCD e. g. in art. 16 (prohibition of discrimination) and art. 17 (selling below cost price) regulates material that is dealt with in other countries by the anticartel aspect of the law rather than the law prohibiting unfair behaviour (Berg, Das neue spanische Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb von 1991, 156). ITALIAN law regulates questions of unfair competition in CC arts. 2598-2601. This is accompanied by the Legge Antitrust of 10 October 1990, no. 287 (Gazz. Uff. 13 October 1990, no. 240) on the protection of competition and the market. CC art. 2598 regulates the requisites of unfair competition, CC arts. 2599-2600 its legal consequences. Compensation for damages requires fault; however negligence is rebuttably presumed (CC art. 2600(3)). The relationship between the claims in damages arising out of CC art. 2600(1) and out of CC art. 2043 (the basic tort law norm) is disputed. Jurisprudence still seems to regard CC art. 2043 as ancillarily applicable (Cass. 11 April 2001, no. 5375, Danno e resp. 2002, 288; Giur.it. 2002, I, 1, 1010: where a relationship of competition was absent, recourse could be had to CC art. 2043), provided of course, that it is an interest protected by the general tort law that is injured (Cass.sez.un. 15 March 1985, no. 2018, Foro it. 1985, I, 1663). In contrast, the voices in commentary that wish to see a special rule displacing tort law in CC art. 2600(1) are multiplying (Cian and Trabucchi, Commentario breve6, art. 2043, no. 42). Injury to commerical reputation, often in the form of the unlawful raising of an act of protest (e. g. Cass. 3 April 2001, no. 4881, Giur.it. 2001, 1657), and further the “bullying” of fellow employees (Frati/ Montanari Vergallo/Di Luca, Riv.it.med.leg. 2003, 533) are subject to general tort law.

Article 2:208: Loss upon unlawful impairment of business

5.

6.

In HUNGARY, as long as special laws do not step in, the problem field dealt with by Article 2:208 likewise belongs within the context of the general tort law clause there. The right to pursue an occupation or trade undisturbed is a personal right; therefore, its unlawful disturbance “undoubtedly” amounts to a wrong. In the case of considerable infringements, a claim to the compensation of non-ecnomic damage also comes into focus (CA Baranya 1. Pf. 20 574/2001/3: economic and non-economic compensation for the scheduled disruption of water supply to a chemist over a period of two months). Incidentally, Competition Act § 2 provides a general clause on the prohibition of unfair competition; it also facilitates the grant of non-economic damages (BH 2004/479). Loc. cit. § 3 not only prohibits the assertion or dissemination of untrue facts, but also true facts presented “in a false light”. Numerous further concretisations of the general clause ensue, inter alia, rules on the incitement to boycott (§ 5), passing off (§ 6), public tenders (§ 7; cf. BH 2005/364), cartel contracts (§§ 11-17) and breaches of the prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position on the market (§ 21). The consequences of breach of the Competition Act flowing from the law on damages are normally subject to general tort law; however, in all cases which are not covered by §§ 2-7 of the Act, a breach of competition must have been first established by the Office of Commercial Competition (BH 2004/151). Liability requires a damage caused by the breach of competition law and a failure to prove an exemption (BH 2001/73). According to settled case law in GERMANY, the “right to form and run a business enterprise” (or more simply: “right to enterprise”) counts among the “other rights” within the meaning of CC § 823(1). This construct fills gaps in legal protection, particularly in the area of commercial protection of rights (BGH 21 June 1966, BGHZ 45, 296, 307; BGH 10 December 2002, NJW 2003, 1040, 1041). At the beginning of the development there was the vexatious notice of infringement of trademark law, against which neither the avenues under competition law, nor CC §§ 824 and 826 could offer a sufficient remedy (RG 27 February 1904, RGZ 58, 24, 29: RG 19 December 1918, RGZ 94, 248; see furter RGRK (-Steffen), BGB12, § 823, no. 36). The vexatious notice of infringement of trademark law has remained a significant field of application to this day (BGH 17 April 1997, NJW-RR 1998, 331, 332; BGH 19 January 1979, NJW 1979, 916; BGH 15 July 2005 [Grand Civil Senate], BGHZ 164, 1). Further case groups have long since taken up their seat at this table: blockading business (BGH 30 May 1972, BGHZ 59, 30, 34; BGH 4 November 1997, BGHZ 137, 89, 97), illegal strike action (BAG 4 May 1955, BAGE 2, 75; BAG 20 December 1963, BAGE 15, 174), incitement to boycott without a competitive aim (BVerfG 26 February 1969, BVerfGE 25, 256, 266), the circulation of true facts damaging to business (e. g. by sending “blacklists” with the names of defaulters [BGH 28 November 1952, BGHZ 8, 142, 145; cf. also CA Rostock 21 March 2001, ZIP 2001, 793], value judgements damaging to business but not necessarily offensive, without a competitive aim (BGH 21 June 1966, BGHZ 45, 296, 310; BGH 9 December 1975, BGHZ 65, 325, 333) and the publication of insufficiently verified product testing (BGH 2 July 1963, NJW 1963, 1871, 1872; BGH 20 March 1986, NJW 1987, 1082, 1083). It is generally the case that such a gap-filling exercise only comes into question when existing statutory law on the fact situation is not already at the ready (RG 21 April 1931, RGZ 132, 311, 316; BGH 16 June 1977, BGHZ 69, 128, 138; BGH 21 June 1977, NJW 1977, 2264, 2265; BGH 23 October 1979, NJW 1980, 881; BGH 10 December 2002, NJW 2003, 1040, 1041). Furthermore, a “business-related” interference is required, hence direct impairment of the business enterprise itself (BGH

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7.

8.

526

15 November 1982, BGHZ 86, 152, 156) or the commercial decision-making freedom of its proprietor (BGH 10 December 2002, NJW 2003, 1040; BGH 18 November 2003, NJW 2004, 356; BGH 11 January 2005, NJW-RR 2005, 673). Mere inconveniences or socially usual hindrances are not sufficient (BGH 21 April 1998, BGHZ 138, 311, 317; BGH 29 January 1985, NJW 1985, 1620). The illegality of the interference is established on the basis of balancing the respective legally protected rights and interests in each individual case (BGH 21 April 1998, BGHZ 138, 311, 318). Where German and European antitrust law is breached, in addition to CC § 823(1) and (2), Restraints on Competition Act (GWB) § 33(3) itself grants a claim in damages. Under AUSTRIAN Federal Law against Unfair Competition 1984 (UWG) § 7(1) “degrading a business” in competition by means of factual assertions that are not demonstrably true about the undertaking, its proprietor’s or manager’s person and about his goods or services is forbidden. “Degrading” is that which is apt to harm the business’ operations or the credit-worthiness of its proprietor. The injured party is entitled to a strict liability claim in damages (OGH 31 August 1983, SZ 56/124), or further, a claim to a prohibitory court order, to a retraction of the statement(s) and to the publication of the retraction; other circumstances only apply to (like under CC § 1330(2) third sentence) confidential communications, in which the communicator had a vested interest. Damage covers lost earnings (§ 16(1)) as well as a reasonable sum of money for the reparation of suffered illnesses or other personal detriment (loc. cit. para. (3)). Alongside this, CC § 1330(2) remains applicable, according to which any person is liable in damages where they disseminate facts, which place the credit-worthiness, the purchasepower or the advancement of another in jeopardy, when he was aware or ought to have been aware of their falsity. In practice the general civil law (disfavourable to the claimant) also plays a role if the statement is not made “for competitive purposes” and therefore gives no room for the application of the law on unfair practices (OGH 19 May 1987, RS 0 031715, 4 Ob 391/86) or if the deadline under which a claim arising from the law on fair practices may lawfully be brought has already expired (loc. cit. § 20(1): six months from knwoledge, three years at the longest). Comparative advertisement is permitted when it is substantively justified (loc. cit. § 2(2)). The dissemination of true facts can constitute a civil wrong when it is made without sufficient grounds and can only be explained with the intention to offend or harm the persona affected (OGH 26 April 2001, RIS-Justiz, 6 Ob 69/01t; OGH 23 October 1990, RS 0 031783, 4 Ob 143/90). The spying-out of commercial and trade secrets is prohibited (UWG § 11) and results in liability (§ 13); the same applies for the betrayal of such secrets by employees (§ 12(1)) and their exploitation by the recipient (§ 12(2)). The damages side of violations of the Federal Law against Cartels and other Restrictions of Competition (BGBl 2005 I no. 61/ 2005) is subject to CC § 1311 (violation of a protective law, see further Stillfried and Stockenhuber, WBl 1995, 301 and OGH 16 December 2002, RS 0 117115, 16 Ok 10/02). Vexatious notice with reference to alleged patency protection (see illustration 1 above) results in liability, as long as the person whose patency protection was invalidated had culpably misjudged the inventive value lacking in his idea (OGH 21 September 1982, SZ 55/131). The ever-noted “right to enterprise” in Germany is only received by few commentators in GREECE (e. g. Filios, Enochiko Dikaio II[2]3, 28). Predominantly however, this construct is deemed superfluous because interferences with commercial activity in any event fall under CC art. 914 (see further Eleftheriadou, Die Haftung aus Verkehrspflicht-

Article 2:208: Loss upon unlawful impairment of business

9.

10.

11.

verletzung im deutschen und griechischen Deliktsrecht, 125). Thereunder a claim in damages is enjoyed by e. g. a kiosk owner, if a neighbour blocks off the pavement by the erection of a site fence (CA Athens 217/1967, NoB 16 [1968] 859; similarly also CFI Athens 6541/1961, NoB 10 [1962] 920). Incidentally, Law 146/1914 on Unfair Competition has created a specific tort law regime under which, along with competitors, consumer interest groups, though not individual consumers, are also protected (see futher Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), preface 52 to arts. 914-938). PORTUGAL likewise has an extensive specific piece of legislation on the Restriction of Competition and Fair Practices Decree Law (Act no. 18/2003 of 11 June 2003 and DL no. 370/93 of 29 October 1993 as amended). Practical cases relate to e. g. unauthorised legal advice (CA Oporto 16 March 2006; CA Lisbon 14 April 2005); the importation of piratic merchandise (CA Oporto 29 March 2006 and 7 January 2004), software piracy (CA Oporto 16 June 2004) and the unlawful increase of charges by the public telephone service (STJ 7 October 2003). In the general tort law (CC art. 483) it is inferred that an unlawful impairment of business at least in severe cases grounds a claim in damages (Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 93 (1960) 11; Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 83; STJ 19 March 2002, CJ(ST) X (2002-I) 139), particularly where an abuso de direito is concerned (Carneiro da Frada, Uma terceira via, 50). The right “to set up and run a business enterprsie”, longsince a part of the furniture in German law (see Sinde Monteiro, Responsabilidade por conselhos, 206, fn. 102) has not, however, found general recognition in Portugal (dos Santos Silva, ERPL 2006, 836). Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court has stated on one occasion that the Constitution also guarantees the right to form an enterprise and that therefore the direito à empresa is protected as a fundamental right (TC 12 July 1990). The DUTCH law against unfair competition (ongeoorloofde mededinging, previously oneerlijke mededinging) is fundamentally buttressed by the general tort law norm in CC art. 6:162 (specific rules are to be found in CP art. 328bis and – for false advertising – in CC arts. 6:194-196). In relation to conduct between competitors, the applicable point of departure is freedom of trade and business (HR 1 November 1991, NedJur 1992, no. 423 p. 1697 and HR 1 November 1991, NedJur 1992, no. 424 p. 1707; Onrechtmatige Daad I (-Jansen), art. 162[2], no. 38 pp. 337-379). Liability therefore requires either the breach of a duty or right. Such duties can also be the result of standardisation by public law organisations (so-called PBOs) for specific occupational sectors (Onrechtmatige Daad IV (-van Nispen), nos. 22-26, pp. 1-13). In the instance of a breach of statutory duties, the assessment is made whether the claimant falls under the category of persons that the statute seeks to protect; if that is not the case, the test is then whether he can rely on a breach of an “unwritten rule of social interaction” (Onrechtmatige Daad II (-van Maanen), art. 6:163, no. 10 pp. 71-93). In the assessment of the further necessary fault for a claim in damages, a very strict standard has been set in place (CFI ’s-Hertogenbosch 15 February 1982, NedJur 1984, no. 603 p. 2096; CA ’s-Hertogenbosch 11 November 1986, NedJur 1987, no. 841 p. 2778). ESTONIAN law corresponds to Article 2:208 on all essential points. According to LOA § 1045(1)(vi) “the causing of damage is unlawful if ... the damage is caused by ... interference with the economic or professional activities of a person”. LOA § 1049 specifies “[i]t is deemed unlawful to cause a complete or partial halt in the economic or professional activities of another person for a significant period if the halt is caused by interfering in the activities by means of an unlawful threat or a prohibited boycott, demonstration or strike, or in another manner aimed specifically at halting the eco-

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12.

nomic or professional activities of the person”. It is conceivable that LOA § 1049 is narrower than Article 2:208 in so far as the former requires a “halt” in the business activities of the person concerned. Unfair competition is prohibited under the Competition Act § 50(2). Where a consumer suffers loss resulting from unfair competition, the consumer may claim compensation under the provisions of the CC. Unlawfulness can be established by relying on the violation of the relevant provisions of the Competition Act as violation of duties arising from law within the meaning of LOA § 1045(1)(vii). On competition law in LITHUANIA see Eisfeld, WiRO 2006, 225-230. While SWEDISH EAL chap. 5 § 7 no. 3 indeed expressly states that compensation for “property damage” also embraces compensation for “loss of income or interference with an economic activity”, there is still only little illustrative material on the explanation of this provision. Intended first and foremost are obviously the consequential losses of an integral injury (e. g. lost gains after the total write-off of a ship: HD 4 March 1955, NJA 1955, 119), not interferences with commercial activity as such. Furthermore, the provision does not nullify the rules on the restriction of compensation for third-party damages (see the Notes under Article 2:206 (Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession)): where a machine is damaged, employees who consequently lose the performance-related part of their wages have no claim to compensation. However, a not-so-insignificant role is played by Competition Act (Konkurrenslag) § 33 (which establishes a duty in damages due to particular restrictions of competition), Marketing Act (Marknadsföringslag) § 29 (which foresees a duty to compensate for unfair competitive practices primarily as against the consumer; see further Sandstedt, VersRAI 2007, 44) and Protection of Commercial Secrets Act (Lag om skydd för företagshemligheter) §§ 5-10 (on this issue, see above, Note 10 under Article 2:205). The FINNISH Improprietous Commercial Conduct Act (Lag om otillbörligt förfarande i näringsverksamhet) operates with a general clause (§ 1 [1]), which in conjunction with Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 1 establishes a claim in damages. Loc. cit. § 4 safeguards commercial secrets; loc. cit. §§ 2-3 are directed at individual unfair marketing strategies. Supreme Court 29 September 2005, HD 2005:105 saw a tort to the detriment of a competitor in the vexatious notice to the competitor’s buyers of a supposed existing copyright. The Restrictions of Competition Act (Lag om konkurrensbegränsningar) and the Consumer Protection Act (Konsumentskyddslag) contain likewise no stand-alone rules on damages, but at the same time do not rule out the application of the Damages Liability Act. DANISH Marketing Act (Lov om markedsføring) §§ 1 and 20(2), through their reference to the “general rules” of Danish law, include a duty of reparation (D-Karnov 2005 IV (-Skovbo), no. 156). Supreme Court 8 August 1994, UfR 1994, 785 denied an interference with another’s freedom of commercial activity when that other’s trawler could no longer sail after his partner’s ship, the only person with whom he could fish, had been damaged.

Illustration 1 is taken from BGH (Great Senat in Civil Matters) 15 July 2005, BGHZ 164, 1; similarly OGH 21 September 1982, SZ 55/131 and Finnish Supreme Court 29 September 2005, HD 2005:105; illustration 2 from CFI Rethymnon 149/2004, NoB 53 (2005) 1657; illustration 3 from Cass. 11 December 1995, no. 1540, Riv.Dir.Civ. 1997, 91; illustration 4 from Merkur Island Shipping Corp. v. Laughton [1983] 2 AC 570.

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Article 2:209: Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment Burdens incurred by the State or designated competent authorities in restoring substantially impaired natural elements constituting the environment, such as air, water, soil, flora and fauna, are legally relevant damage to the State or the authorities concerned.

Comments A.

Pure ecological damage

1. Directive 2004/35/ EC on environmental liability. Article 2:209 latches on to the autonomous legislation of some of the Member States, while at the same time inserting two core messages of Directive 2004/35/ EC of the Council and the European Parliament of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage (OJ EC L 143, 30 April 2004, pp. 56-75) into the structure and language of these basic rules: (i) ecological damage is legally relevant damage. It is, however, (ii) not legally relevant damage to the individual in the sense that each citizen can claim reparation for it. Environmental impairments may – depending on the point of view – also infringe individual rights to the environment, but as a matter of the law on reparation they are only recoverable in their capacity as damage to a legally protected interest, to which all citizens are entitled indivisibly. Hence only public authorities can claim compensation for such damage (under the general prerequisites of Article 1:101 (Basic rule)). This accords with recital no. 14 to that Directive which reads: “This Directive does not apply to cases of personal injury, to damage to private property or to any economic loss and does not affect any right regarding these types of damages.” Incorporating this, Directive 2004/35/ EC art. 3(3) specifies: “Without prejudice to national legislation, this Directive shall not give private parties a right of compensation as a consequence of environmental damage or of an imminent threat of such damage.” Consequently, Directive 2004/35/ EC art. 8 only grants a claim for recovery of costs to the “competent authority” and not to private parties. This formulation is also to be found in Article 2:209. Under Directive 2004/35/ EC art. 19, the Member States are obliged to implement the Directive by 30 April 2007. 2. Public and private law. This Article lies on the border between private and public law. Its characterisation as a creature of public law stems from the element that pure environmental damage becomes legally relevant solely from the perspective of the public – the state or a competent authority (and so therefore only the state can enforce a claim to reparation). On the other hand, the rule also has the exact opposite function in saying that private law subjects do not normally suffer any legally relevant damage from detriment resulting from pure environmental damage (e. g. the loss of quality of life springs to mind, but also, for instance, for hotels or petrol stations, the absence of tourists). This second statement in the Article is certainly one of private law. Ultimately, however, the question of characterisation must remain open here. This is so not only because to date there are no criteria accepted across Europe for the theoretically “correct” demarcation between public and private law, but also because in this instance the ques529

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tion is wholly irrelevant. Rather the critical point is that compensation for the expense of redressing environmental damage follows categories of civil liability and not those of public order. In other words, the Article is formulated as if it related to a normal private law claim under non-contractual liability law. This is shown not just by the prerequisites for a claim, but also by the defences to it (such as e. g. force majeure, see Article 5:302 (Event beyond control) or Directive 2004/35/ EC art. 4) and the applicability of the rules on causation and compensation.

B.

Legally relevant damage and accountability

3. Damage to individuals and damage to the society at large. As outlined above, the object of this Article is to provide that “pure ecological damage” constitutes legally relevant damage. This is a damage suffered by the public at large, rather than by particular individuals. However, the Article is not concerned with damage which natural persons or legal persons constituted under private law may suffer as a result of an impairment of the environment. Such forms of damage constitute legally relevant damage if (but only if) the conditions of the preceding Articles of this Chapter are fulfilled. From the individual’s point of view it is a matter of indifference whether a personal injury or property damage, for example, has been caused by some run-of-the-mill incident such as a road accident or by an environmental catastrophe. Infringements of property rights and bodily injury invariably remain legally relevant damage to the individual, regardless of how they are caused. Conversely, genuine environmental damage is collective damage; this Article is concerned exclusively with the latter. 4. Environmental organisations. The Article also makes it clear that the collective damage it covers is not legally relevant damage to the detriment of environmental protection organisations constituted under private law or any other associations. Notwithstanding the fact that they have devoted themselves to environmental protection, no legally protected interest of their own is affected. This does not exclude national arrangements under which authorities at least partially cede the pursuit of environmental interests to such organisations (cf. Directive 2004/35/ EC arts. 11(3) and 12(1)). On the other hand this very possibility shows how difficult the demarcation between public law and private law is within this overall matrix. 5. Relationship to Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions). As regards accountability for damage a special rule has been formulated in Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions). In contrast to Article 2:209, which only specifies that expenses for the elimination of pure environmental damage are legally relevant damage, Article 3:206 relates to the attribution as well as the causation of both individual and collective forms of damage within the meaning of Article 2:209. Naturally, the State can also assert a claim under Article 1:101 (Basic rule) in conjunction with Article 3:206 in its capacity as the holder of an individual right (e. g. as the owner of a forest); that it has sustained a legally relevant damage results in such cases from Article 3:206 in conjunction with Article 2:206 (Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession) and not from Article 3:206 in conjunction with Article 2:209. 530

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6. Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage). With regard to the issue of attribution (independently of legally relevant damage), reference should also be made to Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage) sub-paragraph (b): as soon as all Member States have implemented Directive 2004/35/ EC, attribution will first and foremost follow the national laws implementing the Directive.

C.

Other matters

7. Expenditure incurred by private persons. The Article is silent on the issue of whether a private person (or a legal person constituted under private law, i. e. a NGO) who (or which) has for good reason incurred expenditure in order to eliminate environmental damage, can claim compensation from the person who is responsible for the environmental damage. From the point of view of non-contractual liability law, this question will usually be answered in the negative, whether that be due to the lack of legally relevant damage, or a denial of causation because the affected party deliberately incurred exposure to the risk of loss or injury. The answer is thus to be sought in the law on benevolent intervention. This relates, for example, to the costs of cleaning prompted by environmental damage before the responsible public body or professional services are able to intervene. The advantage of this solution is that the claim to reimbursement of expenditure is linked in this way to the general requirements of the law on benevolent intervention in another’s affairs. That in turn means that a right to reimbursement is excluded in respect of rash or unreasonably extensive intervention. 8. Environmental impairment. Directive 2004/35/ EC art. 2(1) defines what is to be understood by the term environmental damage. Article 2:209 refers to this definition by means of a mere summary of the essential elements of that definition in a language tailored to these rules. 9. The State or designated competent authorities. The text also draws on the Directive with the formulation that the damage described in Article 2:209 is legally relevant damage “to the State or designated competent authority”. However, it appeared inexact to rely only on the “competent authority”, as the Directive does, because mostly it is not the authority, but rather the representative regional administrative body, that will suffer the damage. 10. Burdens incurred and loss in preventing damage. “Burdens” are expenditure for the redress of environmental damage. Thus, the cost of restorative measures is at issue. On the other hand, expenditure made before the injurious event occurred and frustrated by the injurious event is in principle non-recoverable damage. Examples here would be the high costs of the renaturalisation of a particular species of animal whose population is wiped out once more. Frustrated expenditure may serve, however, as an indicator for the assessment of the amount of restorative costs (in this case: the resettlement of the animals). The costs of preventing further threatening environmental damage are subject to the general rule in Article 6:302 (Liability for loss in preventing damage).

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Notes I.

Implementation of the Directive

1.

To date (as of August 2008), Directive 2004/35/ EC has been implemented in the following Member States: FRANCE (Law no. 2008-757 of 1 August 2008, relative à la responsabilité environnementale et à diverses dispositions d’adaptation au droit communautaire dans le domain de l’environnnement), this law will be incorporated in Code de l’environnement (Environmental Code); SPAIN (Environmental Liability Act 2007 [Ley de responsabilidad medioambiental]); ITALY Rules for the Environmental Area (Norme in materia ambientale, in particular arts. 300, 306 and 318); POLAND Prevention and Repair of Damages to the Environment Act (Ustawa o zapobieganiu szkodom w s´rodowisku i ich naprawie, in particular art. 23, which contains the basis of the state authority’s cause of action); GERMANY Environmental Damage Act (Umweltschadensgesetz – USchadG); SWEDEN Amendment of the Environmental Code Act (Lag om ändring av miljöbalken); BELGIUM Environmental Liability Implementation Act (Arrêté royal concernant la prévention et la réparation des dommages environnementaux lors de la mise sur le marché d’organismes génétiquement modifiés ou de produits en contenant); CZECH REPUBLIC Administrative Procedures Act (Zákon cˇ. 500/2004 Sb., správní rˇád); ESTONIA Environmental Liability Act (Keskkonnavastutuse seadus); HUNGARY Modification Act on Environmental Liability Issues (2007. évi XXIX. törvény egyes környezetvédelmi tárgyú törvények környezeti felelo˝sséggel összefüggo˝ módosításáról); ROMANIA Government EmergencyDecree on Environmental Liability (Ordonant¸a˘ de urgent¸a˘ privind ra˘spunderea de mediu cu referire la prevenirea s¸i repararea prejudiciului asupra mediului) and SLOVAKIA Prevention and Repair of Damages to the Environment Law Act (Z. z. o prevencii a náprave environmentálnych s˘kôd a o zmene a doplnení niektory´ch zákonov). Preliminary governmental drafts are also existent in DENMARK (2006-07 – L 175 [ forslag til lov om ændring af miljøbeskyttelsesloven og forskellige andre love og] and 200607 – L 176 [ forslag til lov om undersøgelse, forebyggelse og afhjælpning af miljø-skader (miljøskadeloven)]) and FINLAND (Regeringens proposition om verkställighet av Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2004/35/ EG om miljöansvar för att förebygga och avhjälpa miljöskador). Furthermore, a draft law is extant for LUXEMBOURG. For commentary on the Directive, see incidentally, inter alia, Garcia-Bragado Manen, [2006] 14 ILT, 220-224; Hager and Leonhard, FS Stoll, 167-184; Hager, ZEuP 2006, 21-44; Wagner, VersR 2005, 177-189.

2.

II.

Collective damage relevant to the environment in other national laws

3.

Since in the case of environmental impairment – which affects the general public – an individual often lacks an intérêt personnel pour agir, FRENCH Environmental Code (Code de l’Environnement) arts. L 142-1 and L 142-2 provide accredited environmental organisations with the right to bring certain proceedings in administrative courts or tribunals. Where the requisities of an offence under environmental criminal law are fulfilled, these organisations are also hereunder equipped with the right to appear as a civil law joint claimant in the criminal law proceedings and claim damages in their own name (which must be then invested to further the registered aims of the organisation, i. e. the protection of the environment). The Environmental Code provides further specific

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Article 2:209: Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment

4.

5.

rules for individual forms of environmental impairment, e. g. in arts. L 571-1 to L 57126, which give the “competent authorities”, inter alia, the right to take measures against unlawful noise pollution. In relation to BELGIUM, it is bemoaned that a clear definition of the term “ecologische schade” is still lacking (Deloddere, NjW 2004, 38). An attempt is made to distinguish between damage to things serving the public interest, and yet ownerless, and then on the other hand things that lie within the realm of private property. Damage solely to the first group of things constitutes ecological damage (Deloddere loc. cit. no. 4). Damage resulting from environmental impairment to things under private ownership is subject to the general rules of private law, and is thus recoverable particularly in the case of a faute of the respondent (e. g. CA Antwerpen 2 December 2002, NjW 2004, 56: the liability in damages of the constructor of a sewer for damage flowing from the subsidence of the ground water level on his neighbour’s land). There are specific statutory regulations – often susceptible to swift change – for many forms of environmental pollution. Environmental Pollution Decree (Décret relatif au Livre II du Code de l’Environnement constituant le Code de l’Eau) art. 410 provides that the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions makes an application against the polluter for a judgment for the repair of the harmed natural resource. SPANISH Const. art. 45 expressly authorises public authorities to make a claim against polluters of the environment for damages or reparation of the costs of preventative measures taken (see further Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 314). The duty to pay damages for ecological collective damage has been formulated in a more detailed format by a multitude of individual statutory regulations; an all-encompassing regulation at the level of a general standard law is not in existence to date. Counted among these specific regulations are praticularly Water Act (Real Decreto Legislativo 1/ 2001 of 20 July, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de Aguas) art. 118; Coast Act (Ley 22/1988, de Costas) arts. 95(1) and 100; Integrated Prevention and Control of Contaminations Act (Ley 16/2002, de prevención y control integrados de la contaminación) art. 36; Nature Reserve and Flora and Fauna Act (Ley 42/2007, del Patrimonio Natural y Biodiversidad, of 13 December 2007) art. 37; Waste Act (Ley 10/1998, de Residuos) art. 36; and Genetically modified Organisms Act (Ley 9/2003, por la que se establece el régimen jurídico de la utilización confinada, liberación voluntaria y comercialización de organismos modificados genéticamente) art. 38. Conversely, damage to the individual is further subject to the general rules of civil liability (CC arts. 1902 and 1908). ITALIAN Establishment of a Ministry for the Environment and Regulations on Environmental Damage Act (Istutuzione del Ministero dell’ambiente e norme in materia di danno ambientale, no. 349/86) art. 18 attaches an obligation to “any intentional or negligent act in contravention of a law or of regulations enacted on the basis of a law, which endangers the environment in its infliction of damage thereto, its alteration, impairment or its partial or complete destruction thereof ... obliging the originator of the act to pay damages to the State”. Fault-based liability is in issue here; an amelioration of the State’s burden of proof is not provided for (Comai, Il danno ambientale, 101-102). It is also necessary to prove the breach of a statutory provision or of a regulation enacted on the basis of a statutory provision (Cass. 3 February 1998, no. 1087, Foro it. 1998, I, 1142). This follows the model of the basic tort law norm in CC art. 2043. Law 349/86 art. 18(6) provides the judge with the authority to evaluate the amount of damages where precise indications are not possible. Some even see a form of compensation of non-economic losses here (Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile2, 741). In any

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6.

7.

534

event an impairment of the environment as such is what is involved (Comai loc. cit. 95), not the sum of the damage to its component parts (Cass. 1 September 1995, no. 9211, Giur.it. 1996, I, 1, 950). The action is to be brought before a (civil) court of law (Cass.sez.un. 25 January 1989, no. 440, Foro it. 1990, I, 232); the Italian State and the relevant regional statutory corporations constitute the actively legitimate claimants. The judge can decree that the State itself, but at the cost of the injurer, may arrange for the reconstruction of the former state of affairs (loc. cit. art. 18(8)). An element for consideration is the fact that under loc. cit. art. 18, a proprietor who himself harms his own immoveable property can also become liable as against the State (Castronovo loc. cit. 750, 756). In relation to the general bases of liability for collective environmental detriment, the courts also often refer to the Constitution (Const. arts. 2, 3, 9, 41, 42) and use it to substantiate the existence of a danno ingiusto to a noneconomic interest vested in the public (e. g. Cass. 19 June 1996, no. 5650, Foro it. 1996, I, 3062). Cass. 1 September 1995, no. 9211, Giur.it. 1996, I, 1, 950 accordingly emphasised that Law 349/86 art. 18 only applies to environmental damage as such; damage to individual legally protected interests remains in the realm of the ordinary civil liability in CC art. 2043. HUNGARY also fuses the general rules of tort law (particularly CC § 345(1): strict liability of undertakings endangering the environment for damage to the individual) with its rules on liability for purely ecological damage. Environmental Protection Act § 103(1) refers to CC §§ 345 and 346 (strict liability for activity endangering the environment). Loc. cit. § 4 defines the following as elements of the environment: earth, air, water, the biosphere as well the man-made environment and its respective components; these “elements of the environment” and their systems, processes and structures constitute ‘the environment’. Loc. cit. § 103(2) further provides that in all cases in which the injured party would not wish to enforce his claim against the originator of the damage, the Minister for the Environment – on the basis of the injured party’s corresponding declaration – can pursue the claim for the benefit of the State treasury under the chapter “Restricted Allocation of Environmental Protection Funds”. According to § 109(2), in relation to the (not necessarily criminally punishable) endangerment of the environment, the state attorney is also justified in bringing an action in damages. Nature Preservation Act § 3(2) refers to the provisions listed in Environmental Protection Act, but also additionally contains its own regulation in § 60(2) on the role of the state attorney in the enforcement of compensation claims and a definition of damage in § 81(2). Also falling due for recovery are, inter alia, the non-economic damages following from the harm to the natural environment and its natural features and the noneconomic damages due to the deterioration of the living conditions of society, its groupings or its individual members. The claim in non-economic collective damages due to the deterioration of the living conditions of society, its groupings or its individual members is enforced by the state attorney’s office (§§ 81(4) and 60(2)) in favour of the state environmental protection fund. Under the autonomous GERMAN civil law, the duty of the injuring party to compensate depends on the infringement of the individual right or legally protected interest of another party. The Law on environmental protection § 1 makes no exception to this; it requires personal or property damage. The protection of collective interests in the environment is simply a side-effect of this rule of liability. It materialises through the duty to remove such ecological damage that is directly linked with the damaged prop-

Article 2:209: Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment

8.

9.

erty (CC § 251[1]; Staudinger (-Hager), BGB13, § 823, no. B 186). The occasionally raised claim, to recognise a (supplemental) “right in the environment” in the context of CC § 823(1) has not gained currency. However, in connection with the duty to compensate for damage to the individual, Environmental Liability Act (UmweltHG) § 16 states that where nature or the countryside is impaired through the harming of a thing, expenses for the restoration of the previous state of affairs is not to be seen as disproportionate within the meaning of CC § 251(2) solely on the basis of the fact that the cost of such restoration exceeds the value of the thing. Additionally, a similar rule is to be found in Genetic Engineering Act (GenTG) § 32(7). AUSTRIA has already attempted in 1994 to enact an exhaustive Law on liability for impairment of the environment, though this plan was foiled at that time. The applicable law leaves the matter predominantly to the federal criminal (CP §§ 169 et seq.) and state-level Law on the protection of nature. Thus, for instance, Viennese Nature Conservation Act § 17, along with its express prohibitions on impairing the environment, provides for a duty to make good the environmental damage caused. The other federal states also have similar rules at their disposal. Federal law is acquainted with similar provisions only in the form of specific regulations on the protection of individual environmental resources (Water Law Act; Mineral Resources Act – MinroG). Private law provides a general action for defending against emissions (CC §§ 364[2], 364a), in which some commentators are inclined to see a basis (albeit flawed) for “private claims resulting from environmental impairment” (Koziol/Bydlinski/Bollenberger (-Eccher), ABGB, § 364, no. 1). The currently discussed draft of a new Law on damages in Austria only provides for civil claims for compensation in the case of damage inflicted on the individual (§§ 1334 et seq.). Claims of the State or of the competent regional corporation for the compensation of purely ecological damage remain factored out; anticipating the implementation of the Directive was not desirable (Griss/Kathrein/Koziol (-Hinteregger), Entwurf eines neuen österreichischen Schadenersatzrechts XV, 122). Moreover, such claims are referred to public law (Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB3, Pref. to §§ 1293 et seq., no. 42). In GREECE a distinction is drawn between “liability for environmental impairment” and civil liability for causing damage to the environment (Tzimapiti, Prolipsi kai apokatastasi tis perivallontikis simias, http://www.nomosphysis.org). The general “liability for environmental impairment” relates to matters in the (not yet implemented) Directive, viz. pure ecological damage. In the case of civil liability for causing damage to the environment, damage to an individual’s health, property and other interests resulting from harming the environment are in issue. Where such damage to the individual is compensated in accordance with either CC art. 914 or Environmental Protection Act art. 29 (“Any natural or legal person who occasions pollution or other impairment to the environment is liable for damages, unless this person can prove that the damage is attributable to a vis major or is the result of the culpable conduct of a third party acting intentionally”) (on this point, see further Karakostas, Perivallon kai Astiko Dikaio, 104), the restoration of “the environment” is thus solely an indirect consequence of civil liability. In contrast, liability as against the State for pure ecological damage is hitherto not yet in existence. However, doctrine and jurisprudence proceed on the basis that contaminating things dedicated to general use (like, for example, the beach) also injure the individual citizen in his or her personality, if he or she is affected in the right to use this thing. Along with claims to reparation of patrimonial damage, in such cases a

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10.

11.

536

claim for the compensation of non-economic loss also comes into focus (Karakostas, loc. cit., 71). PORTUGUESE Basic Environment Act (Lei de Bases do Ambiente) art. 40(4) provides all “citizens who are indirectly threatened or injured in their right to a healthy and ecologically balanced social living environment” with the right “under general laws” to seek a prohibitory order or to claim damages. For “particularly dangerous activities” occasioning considerable damage to the environment, art. 41 provides for strict liability in damages. Art. 48 clarifies that the impairment of the environment is to be put to an end and the previous state of affairs is to be restored, as far as possible. On the other hand, Water Quality Decree Law (Lei da qualidade das águas) art. 73 provides that any person who intentionally or negligently harms the environment by impairing the quality of the water is liable to “the State” in damages. This latter claim in damages in favour of the State (see STJ 14 January 1999, cited in Cunhal Sendim, Responsabilidade civil por danos ecológicos, 12) is deemed an exception today. This is because in principle every citizen is seen as being justified in claiming compensation as much for the environmental damage inflicted individually on him as well as collectively, the latter in the form of an actio popularis (acção popular, see Const. art. 52(3), Popular Action Decree Law art. 12 and Basic Environment Act art. 41(6)). The right to bring such an actio popularis is also enjoyed by environmental protection agencies. The Portuguese system, it is stated, is thus based on a vision of “environmental democracy”. It is not believed that “the environment is a public good and the damage to the environment is a damage to the State-community”. The infringement of rights of the State are not involved here, but the infringement of private rights in the environment (Cunhal Sendim loc. cit. 55; Sousa Antunes, FS Almeida Costa, 643, 659). In practical terms, this means that in an action for damages, private law entities (including environmental protection organisations) may not only plead their own personal (economic and non-economic) losses, but also additionally and in the same proceedings, damages in favour of the local authority and the State (CA Guimarães 17 November 2004 [re: a claim of land owners]). To date there is of course a general dearth in jurisprudence on these issues. Under DUTCH law, along with the legal remedy in CC art. 3:299 (prohibitory order), the State is also equipped with the claim to damages resulting from a civil wrong (CC art. 6:162). While CC art. 3:303 admittedly requires a “sufficient interest” in order to be enforceable before the court, this does not mean that the State would have to pursue its own private law interest; a relevant interest in the environment is sufficient (Nieuwenhuis/Stolker/Valk (-Stolker), T & C Vermogensrecht3, art. 3:303 no. 1 p. 1368). Redress for costs within the parameters of the law on liability for environmental impairment on the basis of CC art. 6:162 only comes into the picture where the polluter of the environment had to have reckoned on the State taking care of the restoration (HR 9 Februar 1990, NedJur 1991 no. 462 pp. 1973-1990). Furthermore, the courts assess whether the State is overstepping an existing rule of public law in an unacceptable manner when it avails itself of private law remedies. This is the doctrine of onaanvaardbare doorkuising. Private law may only be drawn on by the State when public law leaves the State no reasonable opportunity to pursue its interests (HR 26 January 1990, NedJur 1991 no. 393 p. 1657). Environmental protection organisations shall also be entitled to damages within the framework of their registered aims (CFI Rotterdam 15 March 1991, NedJur 1992 no. 91 p. 304: damages in favour of an asscoaition for the protection of birds following oil pollution). The extent of the damages is assessed on the basis of CC

Article 2:209: Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment

12.

13.

arts. 6:95-110 and 6:184 (in relation to preventative measures). In the event that it is no longer possible to restore the situation that existed before the environmental damage, varying methods of calculating the level of damages are weighed up (see further Kottenhagen-Edzes, Onrechtmatige daad en milieu, 79). Jurisprudence on this matter seems to still be absent, however. Under ESTONIAN LOA § 133(1), where damage is caused by environmentally hazardous activities, reparation related to the deterioration in environmental quality also falls due. Expenses relating to preventing an increase in the damage and to applying reasonable measures for mitigating the consequences of the damage, and the damage arising from the application of such measures are also subject to compensation. FINNISH Environmental Damage Compensation Act (Lag om ersättning för miljöskador) § 6(1)(ii) entitles public authorities to compensation for the cost of reasonable and proportionate measures that they have put in place in order to avert imminent environmental damage or to restore the impaired environment to its previous state. Comparable provisions are to be found for the protection of inland waters and waterways in the Environmental Protection Act (Miljöskyddslag) §§ 66 and 67. Where the party liable to compensate is not in a financial position to do so or the originator of the environmental damage can not be established, insurance against environmental damage steps in (Environmental Damage Insurance Act [Lag om miljöskadeförsäkring] § 1(1)(i-ii)); pollution of the environment by oil is subject to a specific regime to this extent (Funds for Oil Damage Act [Lagen om oljeskyddsfonden]). While SWEDEN does not boast a clear cause of action in favour of the State for the compensation of pure ecological damage, it arrives at essentially the same destination after taking a detour through the (public law) rule on recovery of costs in the Environemental Code (Miljöbalk) chap. 26 §§ 17(1) and 18(1) in conjunction with § 9(1) and chap. 10. Loc. cit. chap. 10 contains rules on (in addition to chap. 2 § 8) key issues of responsibility under environmental law and of private law liability in damages. “Costs of after-treatment” are also within its scope. Regarding the claims of the State, in the recorded reasons (Prop 1997/98:45 p. 757) for placing the rule on damages in chap. 10 § 3, the observation is to be found that it was about “regulating” the responsibility of the land owner as against the “general public”. Chap. 26 (“Surveillance”) §§ 17-18 refer accordingly, inter alia, to chap. 26 §§ 9-13. Chap. 26 § 9(1) in turn empowers the competent public authority to pass ordinances and prohibitions in order to achieve the aim of the Law. Remedial measures at the expense of the responsible party under civil law rules are also counted hereunder (cf. Prop 1997/98:45 p. 909). Where the said party is not in an economic position to fulfil this obligation or where he can not be identified, insurance steps in (chap. 33 §§ 1 and 3). On the duty to compensate for damage to the individual, see the Notes under Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions).

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Article 2:210: Loss upon fraudulent misrepresentation (1) Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Section loss caused to a person as a result of another’s fraudulent misrepresentation, whether by words or conduct, is legally relevant damage. (2) A misrepresentation is fraudulent if it is made with knowledge or belief that the representation is false and it is intended to induce the recipient to make a mistake.

Comments A.

The legally relevant damage

1. General. This Article contains the proposition – essentially self-evident for all non-contractual liability law systems – that losses as a result of fraudulent misrepresentation are legally relevant damage. In practice, however, claims for damages for fraudulent misrepresentation (‘actio de dolo’) do not arise very often in most jurisdictions. This is because fraudsters are in many cases economically incapable of fulfilling their obligation to compensate and personal liability insurance does not provide cover in cases of intentionally committed wrongs. 2. Relationship to Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another). The present Article operates “without prejudice to the other provisions of this Section”, thus leaving especially Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another) and Article 2:207 (Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information) unaffected. Article 2:204 addresses losses resulting from the communication of false information about the injured person to third parties. Overlap with the present Article is less likely here. However, both Articles may apply in one and the same case for the benefit of different injured parties. Illustration 1 In order to prevent a competitor B from “remaining in business” with a mutual customer C, A tells B that C is embroiled in a bribery scandal. B consequently refrains from concluding a contract with C, as originally planned. The losses B suffers are legally relevant damage within the meaning of the present Article, while C suffers legally relevant damage within the meaning of Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another). 3. Article 2:207 (Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information). The present Article differs from Article 2:207 (Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information) essentially on the point that the present Article relates to losses caused by misinformation outside professional or trade activity. In private life, false advice and misinformation remain in principle without consequence in the law of liability. It is only actual deception which gives rise to liability. The latter also naturally applies to working life. As a result, it can arise that one and the same loss constitutes legally relevant damage within the

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meaning of these two Articles. Of course, as always in such cases, this does not alter the fact that the injured person can only have the damage satisfied once. 4. Loss. The legally relevant damage within the meaning of this Article will often take the form of “pure economic loss”, i. e. loss which is independent of injury to the person or damage to property and which is equally independent of an infringement of some other right. Pure economic loss in this sense is suffered by any person who is induced by a fraudulent misrepresentation to enter into a disadvantageous contract. The fact that rules on the compensatory consequences of such deceit are to be found in DCFR II. – 7:214 (Damages for loss) does not conflict with a concurrent application of noncontractual liability law: the fraudster has no claim to protection by insistence on a rule of contract law which is potentially more favourable: see Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (c). 5. Non-economic losses. The Article is not, however, restricted to specific forms of loss; consequently, non-economic loss in particular constitutes legally relevant damage within the meaning of this provision. That relates not only to cases of deception, causing suffering on the part of the victim, but to all intentional infliction of detriment through fraudulent misinformation for the purpose of inducing a mistake on the part of the affected party. Illustration 2 X, having a peculiar sense of “humour”, knocks on his neighbour N’s door and informs her that her husband has had a severe accident and is in the intensive care unit of the hospital. N makes her way to the hospital with great anxiety, where she is told that her husband is not there. Nothing at all had happened to her husband; X has taken the liberty, as he says, of making a “joke”. N has suffered not only economic loss due to the travel expenses, but also primarily recoverable non-economic loss arising out of her anxiety, and this is so even where the requisites of Article 2:201 (Personal injury and consequential loss) paragraph (2)(b) are not fulfilled (i. e. she has not suffered a mental condition requiring medical treatment). 6. Damage and accountability. The Article produces an appreciable proximity between legally relevant damage and the basis for accountability. This lies in the nature of the beast and is therefore unavoidable. However, one must still distinguish between these two aspects. This is evident in all cases in which a claim is brought against an employer on the ground that an employee has fraudulently deceived the injured person (see Article 3:201 (Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives)). The distinction between legally relevant damage and the basis of accountability of course also remains important where the person causing the damage and the person sued are the same person. This is because the person causing the deception need not have acted with intention as regards causing the loss of the deceived party. While under the conditions of this Article this may indeed very rarely not be the case, deviating case structures are certainly conceivable.

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Illustration 3 A bank (B) makes a credit guarantee to one of its customers (X) dependant on proof that goods sold have also actually been delivered to X’s buyers. Upon X’s request, one of his buyers, Y, accordingly signs a receipt, although Y knows that the goods have not yet been delivered. Y merely wishes to speed up the process of B’s obtaining credit, having no cause to suppose that X could be in financial difficulty, nor thus that it was not an everyday transaction with B which was at stake. B’s claim against X for the repayment of the loan proves worthless. Y has caused B’s loss negligently, even though Y fraudulently deceived B and thereby caused B’s loss. Causing the loss negligently suffices for liability (Article 1:101 (Basic rule) in conjunction with Article 3:102 (Negligence)).

B.

Fraudulent misrepresentation

7. Misrepresentation. The Article relates to causing loss through misrepresentation. The formulation takes its cue from DCFR II. – 7:205 (Fraud) which, however, speaks of fraudulent ‘representation’. Both texts consciously avoid technical concepts of particular national legal systems, especially those of criminal law (e. g. Betrug or ‘obtaining something by deception’). The misrepresentation, moreover, can take place in any conceivable manner, thus “by words or conduct”. As regards the latter aspect, a fraudulent misrepresentation through omission is conceivable where a duty to provide information exists. Illustration 4 A does not inform B before they enter into marriage that he is impotent. B is entitled to claim against B for reparation of non-economic loss suffered. The family law repercussions (divorce, post-marital maintenance) do not conflict with the award of reparation. 8. ‘Fraudulent’ misrepresentation. According to Article 2:210(2) a misrepresentation is “fraudulent” under two (cumulative) conditions: (i) it must be made with knowledge or belief that the representation is false, and (ii) it must be intended to induce the recipient to make a mistake. With the formulation “made with belief that the representation is false” those cases are addressed in which the person making the representation was not sure that the information was false but made it in the hope and assumption that it was false. If the information was in actual fact true, what we have is merely an attempt, irrelevant for private law; there is then no ‘misrepresentation’ within the meaning of section (1). 9. Intention to induce the recipient to make a mistake. The second element of a fraudulent misrepresentation lies in the intention to induce the recipient to make a mistake; furthermore, the latter must actually make a mistake, since otherwise the misrepresentation cannot have been causative of the loss. The term “intention”, so far as it relates to the causation of the loss, is defined in Article 3:101 (Intention). In Article 2:210(2) it is the intention to induce a mistake which is in issue. It is not every ill-considered statement capable of inducing error which justifies liability. What is required in this context is 540

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rather that the deceiver’s mind is directed towards the causation of the victim’s error. The aim of the misrepresentation must be to induce an error; it is not sufficient that the person making the misrepresentation merely willingly reckons with an error on the part of the deceived person. Illustration 5 B, a board member of a company intentionally falsely informs a broker that after exploratory drilling the company has not found any oil reserves. In doing so B wanted to protect the interests of the company. He was not, however, concerned with inducing the shareholders to infer that their shares were likely to become worthless and therefore should be sold as soon as possible. B did not fraudulently deceive the shareholders.

Notes 1.

2.

Under FRENCH and BELGIAN law any person who knowingly deceives another is liable under tort law (Cass.civ. 28 June 1995, D. 1996 jur. 180, note Mouralis). However, a tortiously relevant faute may also be committed by someone who negligently and unintentionally misleads another (Cass.civ. 19 October 1994, Bull.civ. 1994, II, no. 200 p. 115; Arbitragehof Gent 27 December 1999, RW 2000-01, 168). Also falling under this category is the French jurisprudence, according to which a bank that opens an account for a new customer without carrying out sufficient checks can be made liable for damage as against a third party for the damage the latter incurs due to the new customer’s fraudulent use of the account, e. g. by writing out cheques which cannot be honoured (see further JClCiv (-Grua), arts. 1382 à 1386, fasc. 335-10 [2001], nos. 8085). While SPANISH CP art. 248 defines criminal fraud (special forms thereof are to be found in CP art. 251; including the disposal of a thing while concealing rights of third parties therein), CC art. 1269 defines the civil law equivalent: deceit. This is present “where the deceitful words or underhanded dealings of one of the contractual partners leads his or her counterpart to conclude a contract which he or she would otherwise have not concluded”. Fraudulent intent (the mala fides, intentional malice, the dolo civil) is nowhere presumed; even in a purely tort law context (CC art. 1902), it must be always fully proven (TS 21 May 1982, RAJ 1982 [1] no. 2586 p. 1775). The dolo civil consists of malice and outward conduct. The latter objective element is a question of fact, with its subjective counterpart being a question of law. Dolo, as is stated, is frequently accompanied “by artfulness and dishonest scheming” (TS 28 February 1969, RAJ 1969 [1] no. 1034 p. 759); furtiveness, mala fide concealment and exploiting another’s naivety are other indicators of the existence of dolo (TS 15 June 1995, RAJ 1995 [3] no. 5296 p. 7097). There is an ambiguous line of demarcation between civil law deceit and criminal fraud (Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 40). When utilised by the wrongdoer in misleading the victim, the following are deemed in jurisprudence as the cornerstones of criminal fraud: deceptiveness, falsehood, trickery, craftiness, swindle and mendacity (TS 5 October 1988, RAJ 1988 [5] no. 7669 p. 7526). On the question of when a breach of contract fulfils the requisites for fraud, see TS 16 June 1992, RAJ 1992 (3) no. 5397 p. 7070.

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3.

4.

5.

6.

542

Under ITALIAN law fraud per se constitutes a wrong (Alpa, Trattato di diritto civile IV, 235; Bianca, Diritto civile V, 574-575). In some other cases the dolo is a necessary prerequisite for the presence of a wrong in the sense of (civil) tort law. Vexatious actions (CCP art. 96(1)) and “enticement through the promise of marriage”, which falls under CC art. 2043 provide examples of such (Cass. 8 July 1993, no. 7493, Giust.civ.Mass. 1993, 1135) (further cases in which intention is a requisite of liability are cited in Visintini, Fatti illeciti II2, 382). Dolo in the sense of fraud is often deemed a necessary prerequisite for the affirmation of a delictual wrong within the arena of contractual negotiations (Alpa loc. cit. 236-239). Cass. 9 February 1980, no. 921, Giust.civ.Mass. 1980, fasc. 2 passed judgment against an Italian vendor for full damages in tort (reparation of depreciation and lost profit), who tricked the buyer into thinking that the sale price of the real property was below the market value and that there were high returns in the form of rent. Cass. 18 December 1987, no. 9407, Giur.it. 1989, I, 1, 537 awarded damages against a third party who had strung along the bailee in mala fides in relation to his (the third party’s) debts as against the bailor and in relation to the bailor’s things, which were in the possession of the third party. In HUNGARIAN law fraudulent misrepresentations likewise fall under the general tort law norm (CC § 339(1)). Where the injuring party acts with malicious intent, within the meaning of this provision, he or she also always acts “objectionably”. It also includes claims to compensation of pure economic losses (as long as they, as with all other economic losses, are sufficient for the definition of damage in CC § 355(4)). The general provision of CC § 6, which relates to “damage resulting from incitement or fomentation” also comes to the table of tort liability here. Hereunder, the court can impose the payment of full or partial compensation on persons whose intentional conduct induces with cogent reason a bona fide person to engage in behaviour causing damage to him- or herself through no fault of his or her own. However, CC § 6 is not a tort law norm due to the fact that the provision (i) does not consider the conduct an unlawful act and (ii) the grant of damages lies with the discretion of the court (Gellért (-Vékás), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 56-63; Bíró and Lenkovics, Magyar Polgári Jog, 194199); where the “incitement” occurred with intention to harm, this is not a case for CC § 6, rather a tort under CC § 339 (Vékás loc. cit. 56, 58, 60-61; Légrádi, Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció 2003-4, 20-27). Incidentally, fraudulent misrepresentation of course constitutes a ground of contractual avoidance (CC § 210(1) and (4)) and – as fraud – a criminal act (CP § 318(1)). Criminal conviction for fraud at the same time provides evidence of the existence of a deceit in civil proceedings (BH 1996/200; BH 1996/ 253). CZECH and SLOVAK law handle cases of harm through fraudulent misrepresentation in CC § 424, whereunder “a person who caused damage by intentional conduct offending good morals shall be liable for such”. ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(1)(viii) and LATVIAN CC art. 1641 (which states that “every intentional harm shall be understood as wrongful intent”) deal with these matters in the same way. Under GERMAN law liability for causing so-called pure economic losses through criminal fraud (CP § 263) results from CC § 823(2) (e. g. BGH 14 October 1971, BGHZ 57, 137: deceit in the purchase of a used car; BGH 5 March 2002, NJW 2002, 1643: incorrect details in a contract of sale for a freehold apartment; BGH 17 September 2001, NJW 2001, 3622: subsidy fraud). Moreover, liability under CC § 826 for intentionally and immorally inflicted damage is incurred by any person who knowingly deceives another

Article 2:210: Loss upon fraudulent misrepresentation

7.

8.

9.

e. g. in order to conclude a contract with the latter (in such cases the corresponding right to avoidance flows from § 123). This applies particularly to untrue information on a subject matter essential to the contract. Even concealing such details (e. g. about personal insolvency) can constitute fraudulent misrepresentation (for more detail, see e. g. Palandt (-Sprau), BGB65, § 826, no. 20). It is widely believed that where one contracting partner fraudulently wards off his counterpart from the necessary form of a juridical act, in order to be able to rely later on formal defects, the deceived person shall at the same time have a claim to fulfillment of the contract, and not arising out of the contract, but out of tort law (CC § 826; Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB65, § 125, no. 22). AUSTRIA has rules on fraudulent misrepresentation at its disposal in contract law, as well as in tort law. The deceived party can avoid his or her statement of intent to contract (CC § 870) and also claim damages for pure economic losses (CC § 874). Criminal fraud is not required. Any unlawful, intentional misrepresentation suffices for the existence of “deceitfulness” (“List”) within the meaning of CC § 870; the intention need not also extend to the occurrence of damage (Koziol/Bydlinski/Bollenberger (-Bollenberger), ABGB, § 870, no. 1). Incidentally, even dolus eventualis is sufficient. Fraudulent misrepresentation can also be committed through the concealment of facts that have to be disclosed (Bollenberger loc. cit. no. 1). Information, advice or a recommendation known to be false likewise results in liability in tort because such acts are immoral within the meaning of CC § 1295(2). Here, however, the intention must also cover the infliction of damage. In all cases in which criminal fraud is present, under GREEK CC art. 914 civil liability also ensues (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 914, no. 53). Fraudulent misrepresentation furthermore grounds liability under CC art. 919 because it has the immoral and intentional infliction of harm at its core (Eleftheriadou, Die Haftung aus Verkehrspflichtverletzung im deutschen und griechischen Deliktsrecht, 65). Examples are provided by intentionally giving false advice out of self interest (CA Athens 4172/ 1982, NoB 31 [1983] 822; Georgiades loc. cit. art. 919, no. 5) and the conclusion of a contract as a result of a fraudulent misrepresentation (Georgiades loc. cit. art. 919, no. 25). Further, CC art. 919 imposes liability in damages on any person who fraudulently induces the formal invalidity of a juridical act and then relies on this invalidity (CA Athens 414/1972, Arm 26 [1972] 519; CA Crete 138/1965, EEN 33 [1966] 366). Contrary to the opinions of Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 85 (1959) 243 and 335-342, the PORTUGUESE Civil Code did not formulate the actio de dolo in a separate provision (von Bar, Common European Law of Torts I, 52). Recourse may only be had to CC art. 334 (“abuso de direito”) in few exceptional situations; according to the prevailing opinion, the provision does not even constitute a protectionary law within the meaning of CC art. 483 (Santos Silva, ERPL 2006, 834; CA Coimbra 14 December 1993, CJ XVIII [1993-5] 48). Therefore, in the context of tort liability for fraudulent misrepresentation outside the realm of contractual dealings (the concept of liability for culpa in contrahendo [CC art. 227] is available in this case: von Bar loc. cit. 36; Carneiro da Frada, Uma terceira via, 96; Almeida Costa, Responsabilidade civil pela ruptura, 98) usually criminal fraud (CP art. 217) is required (CC art. 483(1)). The fraud in turn requires astúcia, namely an act of deception, without which merely an irrelevant reserva mental is concerned (CC art. 244) (CA Oporto 3 May 2000, CJ XXV [2000-3] 223). Any person who has shares transferred to him, after he has previously instructed a bank not to honour a cheque issued as counterperformance, commits fraud (STJ 20 March 2003); on the other

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10.

11.

12.

544

hand, any person who does not pay the purchase price for delivered goods is, in the absence of certain circumstances, not criminally liable (STJ 3 February 2005). For the purposes of the law on contractual avoidance, DUTCH CC art. 3:44(1) defines fraud (bedrog) in the following manner: “Fraud takes place where someone induces another to engage in a particular juridical act, either by means of giving information known to be false and with the intention of bringing about this result, intentional concealment of a fact for his own ends, which the concealing party was under a duty to communicate, or by way of another act of deception. Instructions in general language, even where they are untrue, treated on their own do not constitute fraud.” Fraud within the meaning of this provision is at the same time a civil wrong under CC art. 6:162 (Boukema, Samenloop, no. 30, p. 65). The victim can enforce the corresponding claim in damages additional to his right of avoidance in CC art. 3:44 (HR 2 April 1993, NedJur 1995, no. 94 p. 385; Boukema loc. cit. no. 9, pp. 17-18). This is primarily important because of the longer proscription period in tort law and because of the damage that is not yet eliminated upon avoidance (Onrechtmatige Daad III (-van der Wiel), s. II.3, no. 72 pp. 64-71; Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht II12, no. 204 p. 200). Damage caused by fraud can be compensated under both ESTONIAN LOA § 1048 and § 1045(1)(viii). In addition, compensation for damage caused by misrepresentation can also be claimed under LOA § 14(1)(second sentence). If the aim of the fraud is to induce a person to enter into a transaction, compensation can be claimed also under GPCCA § 101(1). SWEDISH EAL chap. 2 § 2 in conjunction with CP chap. 9 § 1 sets down civil liability for criminal fraud (which requires the making of profit by the wrongdoer); it also encompasses pure economic losses. Under Parental Code chap. 9 § 7(2)(first sentence), liability is incurred by the parents of minors who commit an act of deception when concluding a contract (which is ineffectual as against them). Similar provisions are to be found in DANISH Supervision Act (Værgemålslov) § 45(2) and (3) and FINNISH Function of Guardians Act (Lag om förmyndarverksamhet) § 28(3). Further regulations that relate to liability for fraudulent misrepresentation are to be found in the Scandinavian Contracts Act § 30 (see further Grönfors and Dotevall, Avtalslagen3, 187-190 and Gomard, Obligationsret I4, 143) and, for the special case of the liability of the falsus procurator, in § 25. Deceit is counted among the “malicious torts” of the COMMON LAW (Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] AC 465). To establish deceit, the plaintiff must establish misrepresentation (a false representation was made to the claimant by or on behalf of the defendant), scienter (the defendant knew of the falsity of the statement when it was made and thus that the representation was made fraudulently), intent (the defendant intended the claimant to act on the false representation), reliance (the inducement caused the claimant to incur loss or act in detrimental reliance on the false representation) and damage: see, for recent statements, Petromec Inc. v. Petroleo Brasiliero SA Petrobras [2006] EWHC 1443 (Comm) at [89], [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 629 (Gloster J) (adopting Clerk and Lindsell (-Tettenborn), Torts19, para. 18-01), and the similar (slightly varied) list of elements in 4 Eng Ltd. v. Harper [2007] EWHC 1568 (Ch) at [18], [2008] 3 WLR 892 (Briggs J). The statement relied on by the claimant must be one of present or past fact; this includes a statement of a party’s present intention, belief or hope: Petromec Inc. v. Petroleo Brasiliero SA Petrobras, loc. cit. at [91]. A statement of opinion may imply a representation that the maker knows facts which justify that opinion: Smith v. Land & House Property Corp. (1884) 28 Ch. D 7, 15. The content of

Article 2:210: Loss upon fraudulent misrepresentation

a statement is to be determined in its context and from the standpoint of a reasonable person in the position of the party receiving it: Petromec Inc. v. Petroleo Brasiliero SA Petrobras loc. cit. at [92]. Aside from vicarious liability for fraudulent misrepresentations made by employees in the course of their employment, a company can be liable in deceit where a person, being authorised to do so, makes the false statement on the company’s behalf, but was unaware of its falsity; it suffices in such a case if those authorising the making of the statement knew it to be false: Man Nutzfahrzeuge AG v. Freightliner Ltd. [2005] EWHC 2347 (Comm) at [156] (Moore-Bick J). Knowledge of the falsity of the statement extends to so-called “blind eye” knowledge – i. e., appreciation that the statement may not be true coupled with a deliberate decision not to inform oneself: Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Uni-Polaris Insurance Co. Ltd. [2001] UKHL 1, [2003] 1 AC 469. However, negligence in making the false statement (i. e. a careless assumption that the statement is true or a want of reasonable care in verifying the accuracy of the statement) is insufficient for liability in deceit: Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337, 374 (Lord Herschell). As regards the loss recoverable, the defendant is bound to make reparation for all the damage flowing directly from the transaction induced by the misrepresentation, even if it is not foreseeable: Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v. Scrimgeour Vickers Ltd. [1997] AC 254, 266 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). Consequential loss may include damages for the loss of an alternative purchase, if caused by the fraudulent misrepresentation and the claimant’s reliance on it: East v. Maurer [1991] 1 WLR 461 (CA) (damages for loss of profits which, on the balance of probabilities, the claimants would have made in an alternative (hypothetical) hairdressing business which they would have bought, if they had not been induced to buy the defendant’s business). As regards proof of the tort, the more serious the allegation, the higher degree of probability required to establish it: Hornal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 247, 258; Re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563, 586-587, endorsed in Petromec Inc. v. Petroleo Brasiliero SA Petrobras loc. cit. at [90]. If the misrepresentation is shown to have been material, the court may infer (in the absence of other evidence) that the addressee relied on it: 4 Eng Ltd. v. Harper loc. cit. at [43] (Briggs J). The practical scope of the tort is significantly circumscribed where the representation relates to the creditworthiness of another by the Statute of Frauds Amendment Act 1828, s. 6, which provides that “[n]o action shall be brought [...] to charge any person upon or by reason of any representation [...] made or given concerning or relating to the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade, or dealings of any other person, to the intent or purpose that such other person may obtain credit, money, or goods [...] unless such representation or assurance be made in writing, signed by the party to be charged”. Despite its broad wording, the provision does not affect tortious claims in respect of negligent misrepresentation (Banbury v. Bank of Montreal [1918] AC 626, applied in W. B. Anderson & Sons Ltd. v Rhodes (Liverpool) Ltd. [1967] 2 All ER 850) – an interpretation which is criticised in Dias, [1967] CLJ 155. Illustration 2 is taken from Wilkinson v. Downton [1897] 2 QB 57; illlustration 3 from Shinhan Bank Ltd. v. Sea Containers Ltd. [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 406; illustration 4 from Cass. 10 May 2005, no. 9801, Giur.it. 2006, IV, 691, Danno e resp. 2006, 37 and illustration 5 from Tackey v. McBain [1912] AC 186.

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Article 2:211: Loss upon inducement of non-performance of obligation Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Section, loss caused to a person as a result of another’s inducement of the non-performance of an obligation by a third person is legally relevant damage only if: (a) the obligation was owed to the person sustaining the loss; and (b) the person inducing the non-performance: (i) intended the third person to fail to perform the obligation; and (ii) did not act in legitimate protection of the inducing person’s own interest.

Comments A.

The Article in overview

1. Inducing non-performance of an obligation. Inducing non-performance of a contractual obligation gives rise to non-contractual liability in all parts of the European Union. In classical Roman law this was one of the recognised groups of cases of the actio de dolo, which even today – often as “intentional causation of damage contrary to good morals” – still features in many civil codes. Where this specific basis of claim is missing, inducing non-performance of a contractual obligation is either subsumed within the basic non-contractual liability law norms or (as in the Common Law) constitutes an independent basis of non-contractual liability in itself. 2. Intention required. Inducing non-performance of a contractual or other obligation necessarily requires intention. Legally relevant damage is not caused by a third party to the contract when that third party merely exploits the conduct of another party in nonperformance of a contractual obligation or causes it through negligence. This Article therefore has a direct intrinsic connection with Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) paragraph (1)(b) and (c). These provisions give expression to the general (and essentially self-evident) rule that “relative” rights can in principle only be infringed by persons who owe a corresponding obligation to the holder of the right to render the relevant performance. Were this not so, the right would cease to be “relative” in character. However, if a person is intentionally induced not to perform contractual or other obligations to a third party, the third party who thereby suffers loss may claim reparation from the person inducing the non-performance. Illustration 1 A and B conclude a contract for the production of a film. A assists with approximately 25% of the production costs and in return is to get a share of the expected net profit. A considerable part of the remaining costs are financed by B on credit, including a loan from company X. In order to secure its loan and despite knowledge of the agreements (under partnership law) between A and B, X has all of B’s rights over the subsequent film distribution assigned to it. X induced B to breach the contract with A.

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Illustration 2 The organiser of an opera production (A) persuades a famous female opera singer (S) not to honour her contract with a competing opera production B and instead to sing with A. A is liable to B to compensate for the damage this causes. A would not be liable to B, however, if A had merely brought S on a ski trip, during which she broke her leg and was unable to perform for B; that remains so even if A had known that the contract with B forbade S from such recreational activities during the period of her contractual engagement to B. 3. Damage and accountability. The relationship between legally relevant damage and accountability in this Article is no different from how it is under Article 2:210 (Loss upon fraudulent misrepresentation). Thus, an intentional inducement of the non-performance of a contractual obligation or other obligation is all that is involved (Article 2:211(b)(i)). In contrast, it is not necessary that the loss resulting from it was also intended or was at least willingly reckoned with (Article 1:101 (Basic rule) paragraph (2)). However, in the context of the present Article the two aspects can for the most part scarcely be separated from one another. This is because any person who induces another to fail to perform an obligation also invariably does so conscious of the fact that this harms the creditor. It remains to be considered in the context of this Article that an employer can be liable for an employee’s inducement of a non-performance of an obligation. 4. Loss. As in Article 2:210 (Loss upon fraudulent misrepresentation), “pure economic losses” are what are mostly in issue in this Article, but it is not limited to such losses. Non-economic losses are also recoverable. For harm of other kinds, overlap with previous provisions of this Chapter will also occur, e. g. where the supplier of a service is bribed to damage the item to be repaired. Article 2:208 (Loss upon unlawful impairment of business) stretches beyond the scope of the present Article. This is because undertakings which are in a competitive relationship with one another may be subject to more stringent obligations under competition law to respect others’ contractual relationships than is the case under the general rule in this Article. 5. The entitled claimant. According to sub-paragraph (a) only the person whose entitlement (within the law of obligations) is interfered with suffers a legally relevant damage. The person who is induced not to perform the obligation, by contrast, is expected to withstand temptation and, on failing to do so, to must suffer the consequences of the non-performance (vis-à-vis the creditor). That person will not be able to invoke this Article to pass the burden of any resultant liability to pay damages for non-performance of the obligation to the person inducing the non-performance. Nor is there any solidary liability, in relation to the third party, between the person inducing the nonperformance of the obligation and the non-performing party (which would in effect provide the inducing person with a right of recourse vis-à-vis the non-performer). In cases in which the person who is to be induced is subjected to physical or mental pressure, that person has a preventative recourse on the basis of Article 1:102 (Prevention) in conjunction with Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage).

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Illustration 3 X, formerly a member of a religiously active sect (S), has since become an employee in an ecclesiastical undertaking. The contract of employment prohibits X from membership in associations of a type like S. Nevertheless, S threatens X with considerable disadvantages if he does not pay his membership fees to the sect and serve its interests. Membership in the community is for life, the sect insists. X has a claim against S for prevention of the pressure.

B.

Non-performance of obligation

6. Contractual and other obligations. The Article is not restricted to inducing nonperformance of a contractual obligation. In practice that may be the most important type of case, but there is no reason in principle why contractual rights should be treated differently from rights to the performance of other obligations. Hence this provision embraces claims in respect of non-contractual obligations, including alimentary obligations. Moreover, where the obligation arises out of a contract, the fact that the contract may be avoided does not prevent a right to reparation under non-contractual liability law. Illustration 4 M, operator of a hamburger restaurant, wishes to enlarge the business and to cease using the premises hitherto used in favour of larger restaurant premises in direct proximity. He enters into negotiations with company P, surrendering to P his former premises because P assures him that it will operate an art gallery there, thus not intending to compete with M. In reality, at the time of the negotiations, X had attained a decisive influence over P (through an acquisition of shares effected in secrecy). X instructs P, as planned from the beginning, to open a hamburger restaurant in M’s former premises. Shortly afterwards, P gets into financial difficulties. Although M can avoid the contract with P due to fraudulent misrepresentation, M also has a claim to reparation directly against X, who induced P to breach its agreement with M. 7. Obligation ‘owed to the person sustaining the loss’. As already noted, the obligation in question must always be owed to the injured person by the party induced to fail to perform (sub-paragraph (a)). It does not suffice that the obligation is owed to another person. Conversely, the Article does not require that the identity of the injured creditor was known to the deceiver. 8. Breach of conjugal obligations. According to its wording, interferences in another’s marriage, and in particular the inducement to commit adultery also fall under this provision. In this context, however, regard must be had to Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (c), and thus the question is raised whether the applicable law on marriage strives to regulate such cases conclusively. That would usually be the case in the matter of adultery: cf. above: illustration 5 under Article 1:103. If the adulterous spouse does not become liable under non-contractual liability law, the third party who commits adultery with him or her cannot be held liable either. Otherwise the third party could 548

Article 2:211: Loss upon inducement of non-performance of obligation

have recourse against the spouse as a joint injuring person in their internal relationship as joint debtors and thereby circumvent the conclusiveness of the rule provided for by family law. 9. Non-performance. Legally relevant damage is only ever present where the respective loss is the consequence of a non-performance of an obligation on the part of the claimant’s debtor. Thus, if e. g. an employee is poached from an employer due to the poacher’s offering the employee a higher salary, then as long as the latter terminates the existing employment relationship and changes employment, inducement to non-performance of a contractual obligation is not in issue. The situation is the same if a competitor approaches the customer of another undertaking with the purpose of doing business with the customer in the future. Where unfair means are used in these and other types of cases, it may be a case concerning Article 2:208 (Loss upon unlawful impairment of business). Typical situations for Article 2:211 by contrast consist of the inducement to breach a prohibition against competition contained in the contract between the party induced to breach and the injured third party and inducements to terminate contractual relationships unlawfully. Illustration 5 During the owners’ general meeting, certain apartment owners of a multi-storey building instigate the dismissal of the building’s supposedly inefficient caretaker, using false facts as a pretext, after having accepted payment from the prospective replacement caretaker as remuneration for “being instrumental” in procuring the new job. The caretaker who is dismissed suffers legally relevant damage under Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another), as well as under Article 2:208 (Loss upon unlawful impairment of business) and the present Article.

C.

Intentional inducement

10. Intentional inducement. According to paragraph (i) the person inducing the nonperformance must have “intended” the third person to fail to perform the obligation. As in Article 2:210 (Loss upon fraudulent misrepresentation), the requirement of “intention” is thus related not to loss, but to the failure to perform. The concept of “intention” is therefore once again not identical with that of Article 3:101 (Intention), which is linked to the causation of the damage. What is required in the context of the present Article is rather that the inducing person’s mind is directed towards the non-performance. The non-performance itself must be intended; it does not suffice that the inducing person acting merely willingly reckoned with it as a side-effect or exploited a non-performance which had already occurred. Only in the case of acts of infringement to the detriment of competitors may this be different, as noted above, due to the application of standards of competition law. That case is within the scope of application of Article 2:208 (Loss upon unlawful impairment of business). 11. Absence of legitimate interest. Legally relevant damage within the meaning of the Article is also absent under sub-paragraph (b)(ii), if the inducing person acted “in legit549

Chapter 2: Legally relevant damage

imate protection” of the inducing person’s own interest. A person is not bound to allow a fortuitous legal opportunity to go to waste, solely because by grasping it detriment would be caused to a third party. Illustration 6 Before her death, an old lady (L) gives away the same piece of land to two different donees consecutively. The second donee (X) effects a registration in the land registry and in this way acquires ownership under the applicable land law because the prior donee (Y) did not carry out registration. At the time the conclusion of the contract of donation was offered to her by L, X did not know anything of the contract with Y, but X found out about it before the registration in the land registry was effected. X merely pursued her legitimate interests. She did not induce L to breach her contract with Y; consequently, X has no non-contractual liability to Y.

Notes 1.

2.

550

FRENCH law goes over and above the principle opted for in Article 2:211. This is owing

to the reality that it corresponds with settled case law whereby any person who knowingly aids another in breaching the latter’s contractual obligations, commits a tortious faute in relation to the party who is affected by this breach of contract. The principe d’opposabilité des conventions aux tiers holds true (Cass.civ. 17 October 2000, Bull.civ. 2000, I, no. 246 p. 161). Not only incitement, but even the abetting of a breach of contract grounds a faute. It suffices that the third (non-contractual) party had knowledge of the existence of the contract. Business people are often even required to provide information on whether and what form of contractual relationship their business associate has with third parties (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2004/2005), no. 977). This is in conformity with the reality that French jurisprudence solves issues of unfair competition drawing on general tort law (see above Note 1 under Article 2:208 (Loss upon unlawful impairment of business)). Special regulations for labour law are to be found in Labour Code (Code du travail) art. L 1237-3. Hereunder the new employer and the employee are solidarily liable for reparation of the damage which the old employer suffers through the unlawful termination of the contract of employment, effectuated by the employee, as long as some participation therein on the part of the new employer is proven. In tandem with this, the general tort law action remains applicable, for instance where a non-compete obligation is intentionally breached (a clause de non-concurrence), which the employee had signed in favour of the previous employer (Cass.com. 5 February 1991, Bull.civ. 1991, IV, no. 51 p. 34). In BELGIAN case law it is also recognised that a tortious faute is committed by any person who knows or must know that he is assisting another’s breach of contract (see the seminal case of Cass. 22 April 1983, Pas. belge 1983, 944). However, it is necessary that the the third party knew of the existence of the contract in question and knew or must have known that he was playing his part in a breach of contract, i. e. taking part in it (see further Stijns, Les contrats et les tiers, pp. 189, 214-221, nos. 41-50).

Article 2:211: Loss upon inducement of non-performance of obligation

3.

4.

According to SPANISH Unfair Competition Act (Ley 3/1991, de Competencia Desleal, LCD) art. 14(1) it is unfair “to induce employees, suppliers, customers and other creditors to breach essential contractual duties owed to competitors”. Conversely, “inducing the customary cessation of a contract or exploiting a breach of an extrinsic contract for the benefit of oneself or a third party” is only unfair under art. 14(2) where either a betrayal or exploitation of an industry or trade secret is in issue or where deceit, an intention to oust the other party or other scheming is in play (see further Berg, Spanisches Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 279). The mere exploitation of a breach of an extrinsic contract, poaching customers or enticing away employees through the submission of a better offer are inconsequential to competition law as long as no special circumstances arise (CA Málaga 23 October 1995, RGD 1996, 4753). This is down to the fact that according to Spanish doctrine, contracts only generate effects on the contracting parties (CA Sevilla 21 June 1993, AC 1993-II no. 1270). When in doubt, an “essential contractual duty” (LCD art. 14(1)) is breached, where the conduct is severe enough to warrant the aggrieved party being given the right to terminate the contract (CA Madrid 1 July 1996, AC 1996-III no. 1942 p. 394). Any person who, e. g. pays extraordinarily high premiums or who expresses their readiness to take on a potential duty in damages on the part of the party in breach of contract, “induces” a breach. Overall, Spanish jurisprudence holds back from affirming that an incitement to breach of a contract carries liability, see e. g. Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia 6 February 1995, AC 1995-I, no. 889 p. 1498 and 7 July 1995, AC 1995-II no. 1500 p. 962. Non-economic damage suffered by a spouse as a result of the adultery of the counterpart is not recoverable (TS 22 July 1999, RAJ 1999 [3] no. 5721 p. 8929 and TS 30 July 1999, RAJ 1999 [3] no. 5726 p. 8933). However, a tortious wrong shall occur where it has been kept from a man for years that the three youngest of his four children are actually from another man (CA Valencia 2 November 2004, AC 2004-XXI no. 1994 p. 1069). Under ITALIAN law the party injured by an “incitement to non-fulfillment” (induzione all’inadempimento) is equipped with a tortious claim for damages against the third party (Bianca, Diritto civile V, 605-607). Therefore, e. g. the second buyer of immovable property is liable to the first buyer under CC art. 2043 where the second buyer planned the harm to the first buyer (loss of title in ownership due to the registration of title of the second buyer) and participated in the vendor’s breach of contract (from a long line of case law, see inter alia, Cass. 9 January 1997, no. 99, Giur. civ. comm. 1998, I, 17; Cass. 18 August 1990, no. 8403, Foro it. 1991, I, 2473; Cass. 17 December 1991, no. 13573, Giust.civ.Mass. 1991, fasc. 12; Cass. 15 June 1988, no. 4090, Foro it. 1989, I, 1568; Cass. 20 October 1983, no. 6160, Giur.it. 1984, I, 1, 439; Cass. 8 January 1982, no. 76, Riv.Dir.Civ. 1983, II, 678; CFI Ivrea 16 May 2003, Giur.it. 2004, 778; CFI Verona 4 March 1991, Giur.mer. 1992, 569). However, it is a bone of contention whether the mere knowledge of a contract with the first buyer suffices (rejected by Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile2, 113). Cass. 25 October 2004, no. 20721, Giur.it. 2006, I, 1, 486 rejected it in a case where the same gift was given to two people and disallowed the action due to the lacking intention to harm. The principles on liability for incitement to sell the same thing to two parties also hold true where merely two preliminary contracts are involved (Cass. 20 October 1983, no. 6160, Giur.it. 1984, I, 1, 439). Furthermore, the principles apply to the purchaser of a plot of land, who in collusion with the vendor infringes the previous owner’s right to repurchase (Cass. 9 January 1997, no. 99, Giur.it.

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5.

6.

7.

552

1998, 928) and an acquirer who through de facto acts prevents a third party from exercising the azione revocatoria under CC art. 2901 (Cass. 13 January 1996, no. 251, Giur. civ. comm. 1998, 104). The first buyer injured as a result of the “double sale” would suffer pure economic losses and not consequential losses flowing from an infringement of the title in ownership (Castronovo loc. cit. 109). Acts for purposes relevant to competition law may additionally be appraised under CC art. 2598(3) and accordingly be subject to more stringent requirements. HUNGARY covers the inflicting of damage through inducement to breach of contract under civil law by means of its general tort law clause (CC § 339(1)): inducements to breach of contract may be “objectionable” within the meaning of this regulation. The inducer and inducee are liable solidarily as against the injured obligee (CC § 344). This is due to the fact that solidary liability even rears its head under Hungarian law where the contributory causes are independent of one other and occur after each other from a temporal perspective (see further Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 64-65; Gellért (-Kemenes), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1238-1240; Petrik (-Harmathy), Polgári jog II2, 581-582; Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 75-80). In competition law inducements to breach of contract are subject to Competition Act § 5. Hereunder it is forbidden to call upon others in an unfair manner to discontinue their contacts with third parties or to refrain from taking up new commercial contacts. Tpvt § 5 does not require that the call for a boycott comes from a competitor. Of course it is not yet unfair to advertise to new potential customers by offering more favourable conditions. The POLISH Civil Code leaves the actio de dolo undecided in its general tort law clause (CC art. 415). CC art. 422 adds as a general clause that “not only the person who directly caused the damage shall be liable, but also any person who has induced or helped another person to cause the damage, including those who consciously took benefit from a damage caused to another person”. On the other hand, CZECH and SLOVAK CC § 424 deal with the inducement to breach of contract in a general provision on intentional and immoral infliction of damage. Things are the same in ESTONIA (LOA § 1045(1)(viii)). In principle, GERMAN CC § 823(1) excludes tortious liability for third party interference with a contractual relationship existing between two others: contracts do not generate absolute, but merely relative rights, which thus cannot be enforced against third parties (e. g. Medicus, Bürgerliches Recht20, no. 610; same author, Schuldrecht II12, no. 842). However, under CC § 826, inter alia, as long as they are caused intentionally and immorally, liability ensues for pure economic losses, which are – from a German understanding – losses that are not the result of the infringement of an absolute right. The inference of an immoral act requires special circumstances. In the case of a double sale, for instance, the second purchaser’s mere knowledge of the vendor’s breach of contract in itself will usually not suffice (Medicus, Schuldrecht II12, no. 842). Immorality only comes into focus in the case of an active inducement to breach of contract. The inducement to breach of contract is immoral where the inducer exhibits a particular measure of recklessness or in other words: when he behaves in such a manner that is incompatible with the basic necessities of good faith in the legal sense (BGH 24 February 1954, BGHZ 12, 308, 317; BGH 23 April 1999, NJW-RR 1999, 1186 and BGH 19 October 1993, NJW 1994, 128). This shall also be the case where e. g. the second purchaser promises the vendor that he will release him from all the claims of the first buyer (BGH 2 June 1981, NJW 1981, 2184, 2185; ähnlich BGH 19 October 1993, NJW

Article 2:211: Loss upon inducement of non-performance of obligation

8.

9.

10.

1994, 128, 129). The finding of immorality can also result from the fact that the third party caused the breach of contract (or the non-performance of another obligation: BGH 1 April 1992, NJW 1992, 2152, 2153) through deceit or unlawful threat or from the fact that he co-operated with the vendor based on a plan (collusion) (Palandt (-Sprau), BGB65, § 826, no. 23). For instance, where in collusive co-operation with the recipient of the credit, a bank clerk carries out a forged transfer order, without prjudice to his claims against the bank, the debited account holder also has a claim in damages against the recipient of the credit under CC § 826 (BGH 31 May 1994, NJW 1994, 2357). The inducement to breach of contract for purposes relevant to competition is always immoral (Sprau loc. cit. no. 24). Moreover, conscious exploitation of the abuse of the representative authority of another or the fraudulent co-operation of a contractual partner with the representative of his contractual counterpart is also immoral in this sense (BGH 26 March 1962, NJW 1962, 1099). Head-hunting workers and “pinching” customers are per se not immoral. Immorality can however be established with the aid of accompanying circumstances, particularly by a plan of action under the acceptance of a contractual penalty or by exploiting or impairing an employer or supplier (Erman (-Schiemann), BGB II11, § 826, no. 29). AUSTRIA likewise treats inducement to breach of contract as a subset of the immoral inflicting of damage (CC § 1295(2); OGH 9 November 1982, 4 Ob 562/82). Where a third party induces the injured party’s contractual partner to breach the contract, jurisprudence even dispenses with the requirement of special evidence of intention to harm (necessary per se under CC § 1295(2)) (OGH 28 April 1998, 1 Ob 186/97b). Of the not so numerously reported judgments, most relate to inducements to the double sale of things that have already been sold. Instead of monetary damages, the injured party can claim damages in kind, namely the return of the thing (OGH 29 May 2001, 5 Ob 259/00z). In another case the inducement to pay membership fees to a frozen account was in question (OGH 12 December 2002, 6 Ob 62/02i, RdW 2003, 314). The case groups that are particularly economically relevant – the head-hunting of employees and the inducement to breach of contract to the detriment of competitors – are decided according to the rules of competition law and not general private law (OGH 18 February 2003, 4 Ob290/02d, SZ 2003/12). Any person who exploits an external breach of contract – i. e. a contract to which he was not party – for his own ends, will not be liable (compilation of the relevant cases in RIS-Justiz RS 0 107766). Inflicting damage by inducing a third party to breach a contract fulfills the requisites of GREEK CC art. 919 (A. P. 2169/1958, NoB 7 [1959] 195 [= illustration 5 above]; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 919, no. 5 [with the example of an inducement to double sale by offering a higher price for a thing which is already sold, but not yet transferred]). The point of departure in PORTUGUESE law is CC art. 406(2), under which “in relation to third parties, the contract only produces effects on the cases and terms specially provided by law”. According to CC art. 490, while as well as the wrongdoer, the inducer and abettor are also liable, this is only so in cases where the principal wrongdoer commits a tortious (and not just contractual) wrong. Consequently, it is said, in cases of inducement to breach of contract in principle only the inducee, and not also the inducer is liable (Antunes Varela, Obrigações em Geral I10, 179); the injured party has only the possibility of attaching himself to the rights of the inducee as against the inducer (CC art. 794). Jurisprudence occasionally draws upon other techniques for jus-

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11.

12.

554

tifying liability (e. g. STJ 18 December 2003: where a bank debits an account held with it, though knowing that the signature of a second manager was also necessary for this (and was not provided), it is liable to him due to the infringement of his good name). The principle of relativity of contractual obligations should be open to exceptions, according to some commentators (pointers in Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 82 and 83; Antunes Varela loc. cit. 175). The proponents of this thesis particularly want to attain the position of where inducement to breach of contract is recognised as a tort (Galvão Telles, Obrigações7, 20 and Menezes Cordeiro, Obrigações, 251). Prevailing opinion (e. g. Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 85 (1959) 345; Antunes Varela loc. cit. 176; Almeida Costa loc. cit. 81) and more importantly case law (CA Coimbra 20 January 2004; STJ 19 March 2002, CJ(ST) [2002-1] 139; CA Lisbon 21 February 1991, CJ XVI [1991-1] 165; see also STJ 25 October 1993, BolMinJus 430 [1993] 455) have hitherto not followed this viewpoint, however. Due to CC arts. 406(2) and 1306(1) liability for inducement to breach of contract only comes into play on other bases, in particular under the heading of competition law (Antunes Varela loc. cit. 177; Alarcão, Obrigações, 84) (for an example of such, see STJ 29 September 1995, BolMinJus 449 [1995] 374). Under DUTCH law it is a civil wrong to intentionally induce another to breach his obligation existing as against a third party, as long as it is apparent that the third party will suffer detriment thereby and as long as a justificatory reason for the inducement is lacking (Onrechtmatige Daad III (-van der Wiel), s. II.3, no. 122; Onrechtmatige Daad IV (-van Nispen), nos. 209 and 230). HR 18 June 1971, NedJur 1971 no. 408 p. 1226 related to e. g. the sale and transfer of a plot of land in breach of a preemptive right to purchase of the leaseholder; the purchaser of the plot of land is also liable to the latter. Incidentally, even unlawful assistance with another’s breach of contract can constitute a civil wrong. Moreover, the unlawfulness of the interference with another’s right of claim can also result from other circumstances, e. g. from the abuse of a relationship of trust and confidence (HR 3 January 1964, NedJur 1965 no. 16 p. 65: purchase of immovable property already sold to a third party). Reparation in cases of inducement to breach of contract can also take the form of the return of the thing, e. g. where the second purchaser transfers title in ownership to the first buyer. In this case what arises is an aangepaste veroordeling, a “customised award” (HR 28 June 1974, NedJur 1974 no. 400 p. 1105; Verkade, FS van der Grinten, 561-576). The ESTONIAN LOA does not contain provisions similar to Article 2:211. In the NORDIC Countries, pure economic losses are in principle only compensated under tight requirements. The most important case is the violation of a criminal law. However, there are a range of exceptions thereto. Among them is the recoverability of damages – at this stage recognised in principle everywhere – which result from an inducement to breach of contract (see for SWEDEN HD 12 September 2005, NJA 2005, 608 [above, illustration 4; see Bernitz, JT 2005-06, 620 and Sandstedt, VersRAI 2007, 44]; for DENMARK HD 16 September 1947, UfR 1947, 1005 [on this issue Gomard, Obligationsret II, 146]; for FINLAND Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 74 and for NORWAY Hagstrøm and Aarbakke, Obligasjonsrett2, 816). Where a second purchaser induces the vendor to re-sell him the thing already sold to another, the doctrine of bona fide acquisition of title of the second purchaser fails under Nordic law due to his mala fides (SWEDEN: Good Faith Acquisition of Personal Property Act [Lag om godtrosförvärv av lösöre] § 2(1); Land Code [ Jordabalk – JB] chap. 17 §§ 1-2; DENMARK: Elmer and Skovby, Ejendomsretten I4, 193; FINLAND: Ccom chap. 1 § 5; Immoveable Property Code [ Jor-

Article 2:211: Loss upon inducement of non-performance of obligation

13.

dabalk] chap. 13 § 3). Where a damage is lacking, issues of liability in such cases have to date not arisen. In ENGLAND the tort of inducing breach of contract has received a recent authoritative review in the House of Lords in OBG Ltd. v. Allan [2007] UKHL, [2008] 1 AC 1. That case has settled that an intention to cause a breach of contract was a necessary and sufficient requirement for liability and, furthermore, that, while a person had to know he was inducing a breach of contract and to intend to do so (with knowledge of the consequences) in order to commit the tort a person who knowingly induced a breach of contract as a means to an end had the required intent even if he was not motivated by malice: an intent to cause damage to the claimant is not necessary, so that the tort can be committed even where the defendant’s motive is to secure an economic advantage for himself. However, mere foreseeability of another’s breach of contract as a consequence of the defendant’s acts is insufficient to give rise to liability. Liability is now regarded as secondary in nature, so that a person cannot be liable for inducing a breach of contract unless there had in fact been a breach by the contracting party (from which it also follows that the tort of interference by unlawful means is to be regarded as a distinct tort of primary liability). In keeping with this, where the contract is voidable, it is not a tort to induce the party entitled to avoid it to exercise their right to rescind the contract, since this is not a breach of contract: Proform Sports Management Ltd. v. Proactive Sports Management Ltd. [2006] EWHC 2812 (Ch), [2007] 1 All ER 542.

Illustration 1 is taken from BGH 24 February 1954, BGHZ 12, 308; illustration 2 is based on Lumley v. Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216, 118 ER 749; illustration 3 draws on Boulting v. Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians [1963] 2 QB 606; illustration 4 is taken from Swedish HD 12 September 2005, NJA 2005, 608; illustration 5 from A. P. 2169/1958, NoB 7 [1959] 195; and illustration 6 from Cass. 25 October 2004, no. 20721, Giur.it. 2006, I, 1, 486.

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Chapter 3: Accountability Introduction A.

General

1. Three distinct grounds of liability. These Principles proceed on the basis that there are three distinct grounds of liability: intention, negligence and objective responsibility for a source of danger. To a certain degree the extent of liability and the existence of legally relevant damage depend on the presence of one of these grounds of liability. When exactly in cases of negligence or intentional conduct a legally relevant damage exists is set down, as already explained, in Chapter II. The necessary restrictions for the cases of liability without intention or negligence are to be found in the second Section of Chapter III. The basic proposition is that unless otherwise stated occurrences which amount to legally relevant damage within the meaning of Chapter II also constitute such damage within the framework of liability without intention or negligence. 2. “Fault” based liability vs. “strict” liability. In the continental European legal systems and in Scandinavia it is usual (at least when approaching the matter at the level of theory) to take as a starting point liability for “fault” – whereby “fault” is normally treated as the umbrella term for intention and negligence. This so-called ‘fault-based liability’ is usually contrasted with ‘strict liability’. The Principles reproduce this bifurcation to some extent in both Sections of Chapter III; however, the use of these terminological concepts is avoided. The Principles differentiate instead, as elaborated in the Introduction at C25 before Article 1:101 (Basic rule), between accountability because of intention and negligence and accountability without intention or negligence, thereby avoiding conceptual baggage and use of the terms fault-based liability and strict liability. Accordingly, theoretical discourse regarding the “strict” character of discrete grounds of accountability is rendered superfluous as is the question whether and to what degree modern negligencebased liability denotes fault.

B.

Liability for intention or negligence

3. Intention and negligence as generally recognised grounds of liability. This starting point commends itself because it is axiomatic, from the perspective of the legal systems of the individual Member States, that the intentional or negligent causation of legally relevant damage should entail reparation. Furthermore, leaving aside an appreciable number of marginal issues (see the Notes to Article 3:101 (Intention) and 3:102 (Negligence)), there is in essence agreement on the meaning of the concepts of intention and negligence. However, for a considerable number of years now, the proposition that these 557

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grounds of accountability give rise to liability has ceased to be reversible – i.e, where “fault”, that is to say intention and negligence, are absent, no liability thereby results. 4. Accentuation of liability within liability for negligence. The reason for accentuating liability within liability for negligence is not exclusively grounded in the overt expansion of what is referred to as strict or objective liability via newly enacted statutory provisions (or even a new interpretation of previously enacted statutory provisions: see C8-15 below). In fact, in many legal systems, and above all in civil law jurisdictions, the boundaries between the customary ‘fault’-based liability and strict liability have become more fluid, in that liability for ‘negligence’ has increasingly diverged from a genuine liability for fault. The most striking manifestation of this deviation is to be found in two closely interlinked developments; namely in the heightening of the requirements for satisfying the duty of care, which in some spheres of life has been pushed to unrealistic extremes, and in the reversal of the burden of proof for establishing the required standard of care. Both techniques, where applied, indicate that the national courts consider that the existing statutory machinery is inadequate to cope with the exigencies of modern life. However, to the event that the development of liability without fault is adequately advanced by statute or where a civil code operates in a pro-claimant manner in the apportionment of the burden of proof, it would appear, conversely, that the concept ‘fault’ is given a subjective interpretation, owing to the fact that, in these cases, it is allocated a rather marginal importance. 5. Spain. Spain belongs to a category of countries with particularly noteworthy case law developments in the area of liability for negligence. CC art. 1902 requires culpa o negligencia for liability to arise and it is therefore said that the principle of fault is fundamental in the Spanish legal system. However, this starting point did not hinder the courts and academic opinion from expressly deploying an “objectification” of extra-contractual liability.1 This was essentially realised in three steps, namely: (i) by case law which truncated the possibility of absolving oneself from liability under the provisions of CC art. 1903 (liability for others) upon proof of an absence of culpa in eligendo oder culpa in educando,2 (ii) by case law holding that only proof of an “exhaustive carefulness” enabled exoneration from liability in cases where there was a situation of increased danger, with the result that ultimately (even within the framework of CC art. 1902) only force majeure remained as a defence,3 and (iii) by case law which clearly expanded upon CC art. 1908, in contradiction of the literal wording of the provision, reinterpreting it as a “strict liability” provision.4 In this manner the field of application for the culpa clásica was

1

2 3

4

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For example, TS 8 April 1992, RAJ 1992 [2] no. 3187 p. 4202 and Albaladejo (-Santos Briz), Comentarios al Código Civil y compilaciones forales XXIV, 433. For example, TS 26 January 1990, RAJ 1990 (1) no. 69 p. 115, 2nd. Recital. See for example, TS 20 May 2005, RAJ 2005 (5) no. 6693 p. 14224 for an examination of developments up to this juncture and further commentary in von Bar, Common European Law of Torts II, nos. 360-363. Especially illuminating TS 14 March 2005, RAJ 2005 (2) no. 2226 p. 4747 and TS 31 May 2007, BDA RAJ 2007 no. 3431 – two cases concerning liability for environmental damage. The wording of CC art. 1908 imposes liability on the owner of the property, which compels the

Introduction

dramatically narrowed.5 In one decision of note (TS 22 September 20046), where a fire led to a loss of jobs, the resulting liability for the non-economic loss of the employee was interpreted, once again, as “a type of strict liability” and in this case it was emphasised that “the concept of fault was broadened to encompass a voluntary act, which, while carefully and legally carried out, entailed a harmful result, resulting in the deprecation of the entire act.”7 6. Hungary. In Hungary a general reversal of the burden of proof is invoked for the requirement of “blameworthiness” (felróhatóság). However, this approach did not emerge from judicial creativity and case law; it is the subject matter of an explicit statutory provision found in the basic norm of tort law (CC § 339(1)(ii)). “Blameworthiness” is a terminus technicus and is employed as a generic term for intention and negligence. Even though the legislator has consciously steered clear of the use of these terms in the basic norm, it has nonetheless reverted to adopting these concepts in other contexts (e. g. CC §§ 342(1) and 360(4)). Since blameworthiness is seen as an individualised social standard, Hungarian commentators describe their system as one of “objectified liability for fault”. 8 In an earlier discussion on reform, the suggestion had been made that only proof that the causation of the injury was inevitable in the circumstances might be a ground of defence. However, at present the retention of the present wording is the preferred option. 9 7. The Netherlands. Dutch law adopts an approach which is similar in terms of policy aims but quite different in its implementation. CC art. 6:162(3) assumes that fault is a prerequisite for tort liability. Here too “fault” is used as generic term for intention and negligence (see further Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht III10, no. 70 pp. 82-83), but is again construed in terms of personal blameworthiness or individual wrongdoing (Hartkamp loc. cit. no. 76 pp. 87-88). This is possible because CC art. 6:162(3) recognises, contiguous to fault, two other grounds of accountability, namely that, according to “statutory provisions or generally accepted standards”, the damage caused belongs within the wrongdoer’s sphere of risk. The objectivising tendencies of Dutch law are evident not just here; they are also apparent in the allocation of the burden of proof. In principle, where liability is contingent upon proof of the defendant’s fault, the claimant must be in a position to provide supporting evidence. At the same time, it is said that torts committed without fault remain the exception. On the other hand, the burden of proof is reversed, to the disadvantage of the defendant, where a written or unwritten safety norm or a duty to observe safety standards is violated (Hartkamp loc. cit. no. 77, pp. 88-89; Onrechtmatige Daad I (-Jansen), art. 6:162(3), no. 57).

5

6 7 8

9

courts to base liability on CC art. 1902 if the danger emanates from a tenant or occupier who is not the owner of the property (TS 20 May 2005, RAJ 2005 (5) no. 6693 p. 14224). Accidents in sport and leisure time remain an important area of application: see, for example, TS 9 March 2006, RAJ 2006 (2) no. 1882 p. 4474 and CA Pontevedra 11 May 2006, BDA JUR 2006/158510. RAJ 2004 (4) no. 5681 p. 11634. For trenchant criticism see Gómez Pomar, InDret 1/2005. Gyula Eörsi is regarded as the creator of this system in e. g. Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 66-76. To this see also Herpai, VersRAI, 2005, 43, 44.

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C.

Liability without intention or negligence: the current situation in overview

8. The point of departure. Throughout the EU, it is taken for granted that liability without fault forms part of the law of non-contractual liability; indeed an examination of the cases decided on that basis suggest it has clearly become as prominent as liability for intention or negligence, if not more so. This is especially true of liability in the field of road traffic accidents. In no other part of the law concerning non-contractual liability for damage can such pronounced divergences between the legal systems of the Member States be seen.10 This position will be explored briefly in the following paragraphs. The discussion is limited to the traditional core materials of private tort law of a certain number of selected jurisdictions. Further details can be found in the Notes under the Articles in the second Section of the third Chapter. 9. French and Belgian gardien liability. Modern French tort law is based, to a great extent, on the arrêts Jand’heur of the Cour de Cassation decided in 1929 and 1930,11 whereby CC art. 1384(1) was re-interpreted as a general strict liability clause on the realisation of danger from things. Today, this gardien liability has in practice become much more important than liability for faute, although on closer inspection it is sometimes not too easy to decide in what respect the two differ: liability for faute does not require personal fault in the sense of a moral blameworthiness, whereas the liability of the gardien requires a comportement anormal of the thing – which in turn, in some instances, seems to be just another way of saying that its keeper was committing a faute. French gardien liability covers both liability for damage caused by things and (since the arrêt Bliek12) liability for persons under one’s garde. Gardien liability is a very good example of laws originating from an identical text but developing different solutions. Belgium accepted gardien liability, but with so many qualifications that one can hardly speak of the same legal rule. Under Belgian law, but not under French law, the thing that causes the damage must be defective (that is to say, must suffer from a vice).13 For this reason, strict liability of car owners or keepers never saw the light of day.14 Furthermore, the Belgian Cour de Cassation has declared that it would not accept a general strict liability for others under one’s garde.15 10. Italy. A modified form of gardien liability is also to be found in Italy.16 Apart from provisons on vicarious liability, animals, buildings and motor vehicles, the Italian Civil 10

11 12 13 14 15 16

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The ancient casum sentit dominus-principle is also found today in the enactments of Member States. Maltese CC art. 1029, the first provision of the Chapter on tort law (“Of Torts and QuasiTorts”) provides: “Any damage which is produced by a fortuitous event, or in consequence of an irresistible force, shall, in the absence of an express provision of the law to the contrary, be borne by the party on whsoe person or property such damage occurs.” Cass.civ. 21 February 1927, D. 1927, I, 97; Cass.ch.réun. 13 February 1930, D. 1930, I, 57. Cass.ass.plén. 29 March 1991, D. 1991 jur. 324, note Larroumet. For a case law overview see von Bar, Common European Law of Torts I, no. 114. This is, however, balanced by extensive insurance obligations (see Notes under Article 3:205). Cass. 19 June 1997, JT 1997, 582, note Moreau-Margrève loc. cit. 705. For an overview (in English) of strict liability in Italy see Alpa, (2006) 17 EBLR 1441-1503.

Introduction

Code recognises two general provisons on liability for the pursuit of dangerous activities and liability for damage caused by a thing in one’s care in CC arts. 2050 and 2051. The liability under CC art. 2050 (pursuit of dangerous activities) does not arise if a defendant proves that appropriate measures to prevent the damage were taken. Since precise standards are laid down, the predominant view is that it amounts to strict liability.17 Cass. 20 May 1998 no. 5031 has construed CC art. 2051 in the same manner.18 11. Hungary. A general provision of strict liability for undertaking dangerous activities is also a feature of Hungarian law, namely in CC § 345(1). Liability can only be avoided by proof of an inevitable occurrence which lay outside the sphere of the dangerous activity. Dangerous activities include, for example, the use of a motor vehicle, the operation of a nuclear power station, construction sites, pit mines, waterworks, gas works, electricity supply stations and substations, the handling of explosives, radioactive materials and poisons; the laying of a roof is also classified as a dangerous activity. Furthermore dangerous activities also encompass: operating an electrical knife in combination with a highly explosive antiseptic,19 igniting fireworks,20 and driving farm machinery loaded with bales of straw after the bales have caught fire.21 However, operating a motorway22 and igniting a candelabra during a funeral23 have not be classified as dangerous activities by the courts. Further specified dangerous activities can be found in a number of Acts which directly refer to the regime of CC §§ 345-346. 24 12. Germany, Austria, Greece, Portugal, and Poland. In contrast, German law pursues an altogether divergent approach. German law does not recognise a general rule of strict liability for things or for people; nor does it contain a general provision on strict liability for dangerous things or activities. The Civil Code does, however, envisiage strict liability for certain animals (CC § 833 first sentence). Everything else is the subject of a large number of Acts limited to certain risks such as motor vehicles, aeroplanes, electricity plants, pipelines and so forth. A unifying principle does not exist. In the same manner, Austrian law also contents itself with a number of specific statutes, thereby abstaining from having a general rule on strict liability in the Civil Code. As regards dangerous undertakings and dangerous activities, the judiciary resorts to the use of analogies with the existing specific statutes.25 German case law, however, has rejected this approach. 26 The same position is adopted in Greece. 27 Academic writing has pressed for an analogous application of existing rules on strict liability for at least those cases where, internation17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

26 27

Alpa, Trattato di diritto civile IV, 690. Foro it. 1998, I, 2875. BH 2005/251. BH 1991/314. BH 2000/349. BH 2006/10. BH 1988/183. See e. g. Herpai, VersRAI 2005, 47. See for example OGH 28 March 1973, SZ 46/36 = RS 0 029156 (shower of sparks induced by a firework). BGH 7 November 1974, BGHZ 63, 234, 237. Filios loc. cit. 144, 146.

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ally, liability independent of fault has long been widely accepted (e. g. for railways28). CC art. 483(2) of the Portuguese Civil Code, in substance in accordance with the rules in Germany and Greece, even expressly provides that “liability independent of fault arises only in the cases provided for by legislation.” These cases, however, are not only found in numerous specific statutes; they are also comparatively widespread in the Civil Code itself (CC arts. 499-510). The Polish Civil Code likewise does not have a general rule on strict liability, although it regulates some cases of risk liability (CC arts. 430, 433-436, 4491). 13. The Netherlands. The Dutch Civil Code showed enterprising zeal when it was decided in 1992 to insert strict liability for defective things (CC art. 6:173), hazardous substances (CC art. 6:175), building constructions “which are not compliant with requirements” (CC art. 6:174), landfills (CC art. 6:176) and boreholes (CC art. 6:177) into the code. The term “substances” in CC art. 6:175 encompasses gases, fluids and solids, but does not embrace radiation (as it is merely a characteristic of the substance), or electricity (as it is a product). 29 A substance is hazardous if it is known that it exhibits properties that pose a particularly serious danger to persons or things (thus, for example, the substance is oxygenous, inflammable or poisonous). The relationship between the liability for hazardous materials and the other strict liability torts (for example liability for building works) is precisely balanced, in each case, in Dutch legislation. The liability for hazardous materials, for example, is subordinate in most (but not all) cases to product liability (CC art. 6:173(2)), so that blood plasma, ampullae and intravenous drips in principle only come within the latter. Comparable problems of demarcation can be seen between liability for defective products on the one hand and the other fields of application for strict liability on the other. The most important distinction, when compared to the French gardien liability, is that the Dutch solution (similar to the one prevailing in Belgian law) does not focus on all things, but only attaches to moveables, where there is a known risk that those moveables pose a particular danger for persons or things, if they do not comply with the requirements which are demanded of it in the given circumstances. 14. Nordic Countries. All of the Nordic states adopt the so called culpa rule of liability as their starting point. They adhere to the principle that strict liabilty requires an express statutory provision. However, there are court cases, where instances of strict liability have been affirmed although not anchored in an express statutory provision. 30 15. England. English law has few strict liability torts and, liability for animals, products liability and damage to the environment apart, the statutory provisions that have introduced a strict liability are rather negligible. 31 Even the liability of car owners or keepers has remained, in theory at last, based in the law of negligence. In the common law of 28 29 30

31

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Filios loc. cit. 144, 146. Onrechtmatige Daad II (-Oldenhuis), art. 6:174, no. 25 pp. 117-118. HD 27 June 1928, NJA 1928, 316. For an overview see Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 178. As to the law in the Baltic States, especially Estonia: cf. Z Lahe, Juridica International 2005, 60-70. For an example, see Water Industry Act 1991, s. 209 (strict liability, subject to exceptions and defences, of a water company for damage caused by an escape of water from its pipes.

Introduction

England (but not in Scotland) the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher32 subsists. This rule is not found in Scots law. In England, it is only of relatively minor importance because the House of Lords decided in the Cambridge Water case33 that liability under the rule, although strict in nature, requires foreseeability of the way the damage was finally caused by the escape of the thing from the defendant’s premises. There are, in essence, five requirements for liability under this rule. (i) It must concern a thing which is likely to do mischief if it escapes. (ii) The thing must have been brought on to the land or been kept there by the defendant. (iii) There is no liability if the source of danger occurs naturally or is a usual feature of land of this type. (iv) The thing must originate from the land where the defendant has occupation or control and it must escape from a place where the defendant had occupation or control of the land; and (v) the thing must have caused a damage which can be remedied.34

D.

International instruments and EU law

16. International Instruments. Multilateral treaties on issues of extra contractual liability have, hitherto, been comparatively rare.35 They predominantly arise in conventions on standards of strict liability for specific environmental risks (such as liability for nuclear power stations and oil pollution at sea) and for risks involving the transport of persons or goods over land, at sea or in the air. In a broader sense the rules developed by the Council of Europe on the liability of innkeepers for loss or damage to property of guests also fall under this rubric. 17. EU law. European Community law has also generated a significant volume of sector specific laws on extra contractual liability for damage which have predominantly, but not exclusively, opted for forms of liability independent of fault. Council Directive 85/374 / EEC of 25 July 1985 on liability for defective products (as amended by Directive 1999/34 / EC art. 1) is of special importance in this regard. Account is taken of it in Article 3:204 (Accountability for damage caused by defective products). A proposal for a directive from the year 1990 envisaged modelling liability for services along the lines of the Product Liability Directive,36 but this proposal was withdrawn soon afterwards by the European Commission. 37 As regards air carriers’ liability, Regulation 2027/9738 builds on the Montreal Convention of 28 May 1999.39 Both regimes are referred to in Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage). What in common 32 33 34

35 36 37 38

39

(1865) 3 H & C 774, 159 ER 737; (1865-66) LR 1 Ex 265; (1868) LR 3 HL 330, HL(E). Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc. [1994] 2 AC 264. See further Transco plc v. Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] UKHL 61; [2003] 3 WLR 1467, HL(E); cf. von Bar, Common European Law of Torts II, nos. 356-359. Compiled in von Bar and Mankowski, Internationales Privatrecht I2, nos. 41-54. OJ EC C 12 of 18 January 1991, p. 8. Communication of 23 June 1994, COM(1994) 260 final. OJ EC L 285 of 17 October 1997, p. 1, as amendended by Regulation (EC) 889/2002 of 13 May 2002, OJ EC L 140 of 30 May 2002, p. 2. Montreal Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, OJ EC L 194 of 18 July 2001, p. 39.

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parlance is known as the E-Commerce Directive40 is taken account of in Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another).41 As regards liability for infringements of European Competition law, see Article 2:208 (Loss upon unlawful impairment of business). The Community law prohibitions on discrimination, so far as relevant to the law of non-contractual liability, is considered in Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy) and Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage). Community and international instruments dealing with intellectual property fall under the proviso dealing with competing legal claims, Article 1:103(c) (Scope of application). The Environmental Liability Directive is echoed in Article 2:209 (Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment): see further the Comments on that article. Community legal instruments, concerning the problem of road traffic accidents primarily concern questions of insurance coverage; see further the Comments under Article 3:205 (Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles).

E.

The concept of the text

18. Accountability. Without exception, a claim for reparation is only given under these Principles if the prerequistes of Article 1:101 (Basic ule) are fulfilled. One of these prerequisites is accountability. Article 1:101 refers to the three manifestations of accountability: namely, intention, negligence, and accountability without intention or negligence. This Chapter deals with these concepts. Accountability without intention or negligence is the subject of the second Section; intention and negligence are discussed in the first Section. 19. Intention and negligence. The first Section defines intention and negligence. Defintions of negligence are widespread. Most systems of private law, however, do not lay down a statutory definition of what is meant by intention. In a European context, however, such a definition seems indispensable, not least because these Principles are written in English and because the English legal language uses the term ‘intention’ in various ways. 20. Presumed negligence. An intermediate position between liability with and liability without negligence is established by a rebuttable presumption of negligence, a concept on which Article 3:104(1) and (2) (Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons) are based (cf. Article 3:104(3)). These Principles treat such a form of liability as an instance of liability for negligence. That is because liability arises under rules which proceed on the basis that negligence is made out unless and until the contrary is proven. That in such cases the practical outcome may be one of liability without negligence (because the defendant cannot lead evidence to show that he or she in fact

40

41

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Directive 2000/31/ EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) (OJ EC L 178 of 17 July 2000, pp. 1-16). See Comment 7 under Article 2:204.

Introduction

did everything correctly) does not affect the location of the rules within the theoretical scheme of things. 21. Minors. Article 3:103 (Persons under eighteen) specifies in paragraph (1) the standard of care expected of minors from the age of seven upwards. They are required to exercise such care that a child or adolescent of their age would reasonably exercise in the same circumstances. In contrast, children under the age of seven are not, in principle, accountable for intentionally or negligently causing damage (Article 3:103(2)). An exception will arise however if they are so wealthy that an obligation to make reparation should be imposed on equitable grounds (Article 3:103(3)). This “liability for equitable reasons” contains elements of liability without intention or negligence and will apply also to situations where the young adult acts according to his age, yet does not act as carefully as would be demanded of an adult in the same circumstances. 22. Mentally disabled persons. For mentally disabled persons – as a rule adults who owing to their mental infirmity are incapable of recognising the wrongfulness of their actions – Article 5:301 (Mental incompetence) provides for a rule which is in some respects comparable to the provision just mentioned concerning children. This does not alter the fact that healthy children and adults with an illness are deliberately not placed on the same footing since the policy grounds elicting protection from liability for these groups are not identical. Consequently Article 5:301 (Mental incompetence) has been placed in the Chapter enumerating grounds of defence and is not located in the Chapter which deals with intention and negligence. The capacity to understand the effect of one’s conduct is somewhat different from not adhering to the required standard of care. Persons who cannot recognise the wrongfulness of their actions cannot intentionally cause a legally relevant damage. They can only do so by deviating from the generally accepted standard of care contained in Article 3:102 (Negligence). 23. Liability without intention or negligence. Linked to this (and not just this), is the point that the following text deliberately shuns the dichotomy of ‘fault-based’ liability on the one hand and “strict liability” on the other (see this Introduction at A2). Neither expression is entirely apt. Quite aside from the fact that liability, once it arises, is always “strict”, liability for negligence does not necessarily presuppose an identifiable fault or some reproachable conduct. The divergence between grounds of accountability in the first and second Sections of the third Chapter is not based on the presence or absence of moral culpability. In the second Section one is concerned rather with situations in which the defendant is liable even though he or she has behaved correctly in the judgment of the legal system. 24. No general theory of liability without intention or negligence. Whether it is possible to construct a general theory of liability without intention or negligence which can gather all its various manifestations into a single mould is certainly doubtful. These Principles shy away from such an attempt, since it did not appear propitious for these purposes. There are simply too many considerations which play a role here: protection of the victim and the environment, procedural questions pertaining to the difficulty of proving essential matters, liability insurance, the notion that a person who has created or adopted for their own advantage and under their control an extraordinarily large 565

Chapter 3: Accountability

source of danger should be liable, the consideration that for some new technologies (which must be allowed in the interest of the general economy) there is not yet sufficient experience to answer questions as to what constitutes a reasonable manner of handling the technology or what amounts to negligent handling, and empirical (statistical) data as to the frequency of accidents and the type and severity of damage. Against this background, the following Articles aspire to do no more than bring together that material which, according to a majority of the European legal systems, does not appear to be adequately addressed by a negligence-based regime. The Comments and Notes to the individual Articles provide further information in each case. 25. Vicarious liability. A special case of liability without intention or negligence (aside from the liability on equitable grounds (E21)) is constituteed by the law of what is often known (though imprecisely referred to) as vicarious liability. It is the subject matter of Article 3:201 (Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives). This is a special case, owing to the fact that there is, in most cases, intention or negligence (see Article 3:201(1)(b)), namely on the part of the employee who has acted, but not on the part of the liable employer. For the integration of the rules within the framework for liability, it is the latter aspect that is decisive. The expression “vicarious liability” is imprecise because it is not concerned with imposing liability on the employer instead of the employee; it involves instead an additional liability. Whether an employee should enjoy certain privileges from liability to a third party (for example, whether the employee should be personally liable only in cases where there is grave or particularly grave fault) is a question which is so heavily intertwined with aspects of labour law that it has been excluded under these Principles (Article 7:104(a) (Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers associations)). 26. Guiding considerations for the third Chapter’s second Section. Beyond Article 3:201, Section 2 of Chapter 3 proceeds from the proposition that, given the current state of development in the legal systems of the member states, it is not possible to distil an exhaustive common canon of circumstances in which strict liability arises – or to propose such a canon (going beyond the existing law in many member states). The second guiding consideration is that moves towards convergence in the law on liability without intention or negligence must not be directed towards recommending that only those legal systems which remain reluctant to impose such liability adjust to its extension, whereas legal systems which have already intensively embraced forms of strict liability might largely hold onto their status quo. (Moreover, it seems at any event politically unrealistic to suppose that they would be prepared to roll back strict liability regimes.) It must be possible to insure against liability without intention or negligence and such insurance must in practice be in place. That is because “strict liability” entails a risk of liability which, though capable of driving a person into bankruptcy, by its nature cannot be avoided by care and circumspection. However, the Group did not have information as to the European insurance market and the actual extent of given types of insurance cover. 27. Specific issues and a general rule. In view of these difficulties the draft takes as its starting point the following. (i) These Principles envisage liability without intention or negligence only for those matters for which the majority of the European legal systems 566

Introduction

already provide for some sort of regime of strict liability – namely, for dangerous premises, for animals, for defective products, for motor vehicles, and for dangerous substances and emissions. For these sources of danger it also seemed possible to reconcile the demands of many national legal systems as regards the detail of regulation with a style resembling the codifications. (ii) On the other hand, the text is silent in relation to other situations in which a liability without intention or negligence is worthy of consideration. That is as much as can be achieved given the current state of the law in the member states. From the pan-European perspective of these Principles we have therefore formulated Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage): “A person is also accountable for the causation of legally relevant damage if national law so provides ...”. The draft thus envisages that every legal system may extend its instances of “strict liability” beyond those cases in the Principles, but may not exclude the minimum provided for by them. (iii) However, the rule in Article 3:207 must be subject to an exception, otherwise it would be senseless to attempt to construct in rule form at least a core and initial set of common legal propositions. One would have ended up with what from a European standpoint would have been an increase in minimum standards of legal liability, but the rules would not have been conclusive in the fields covered in the sense that one could rely on the boundaries of liability they set out: Article 3:207 would have made them meaningless. For this reason the draft proposes in Article 3:207(a) that for most of the Articles in the second Section of Chapter 3 national law may not go beyond the terms of the Article. Conversely, these Principles also recognise a liability without intention or negligence where the applicable national law provides for such liability for matters which are not the subject of Articles 3:104-3:205. Additional exceptions are provided for only in relation to Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions) and for one special case under the product liability directive (liability for development risks): see Article 3:207(b) and (c). The exception for Article 3:206 relates primarily to the persons liable and the legally relevant damage. 28. Liability confined to the causation of death, injury to health and property damage. The following text is furthermore based on the principle that (iv) not all detriments which may constitute legally relevant damage in the context of liability for intention and/or negligence are to be characterised as legally relevant damage in the context of “strict liability”. Rather the latter is to be confined as a rule to the causation of death, injury to body or health, and damage to property. That follows the model of the product liability directive. 29. Consequences of liability; ceilings, etc. On the other hand, in keeping with the vast majority of European legal systems, the draft does not provide for fixed monetary sums setting a ceiling on liability. Moreover, it does not confine liability to economic losses. In particular, there may be liability for non-economic damage even in the absence of intention and negligence. In this regard the rules in the second Section do not differ from those governing liability for intention or negligence.

567

Section 1:

Intention and negligence Article 3:101: Intention A person causes legally relevant damage intentionally when that person causes such damage either: (a) meaning to cause damage of the type caused; or (b) by conduct which that person means to do, knowing that such damage, or damage of that type, will or will almost certainly be caused.

Comments A.

General

1. Intention as ground of accountability. Intention, like negligence, is a ground of accountability (Article 1:101 (Basic rule)). What is to be understood by the notions of intention and negligence is defined in this Section. Liability arising from intentional acts and liability arising from negligence follow in part different rules: see e. g. Article 2:101(3) (Meaning of legally relevant damage), Article 5:103 (Damage caused by a criminal to a collaborator) and Article 5:401 (Contractual exclusions and limitation of liability). Moreover, the distinction plays a role in the rule on reduction of claims due to contributory fault: see Article 5:102 (Contributory fault and accountability). The question whether the causation of damage occurred intentionally or negligently can also be crucial, however, in other contexts – for example, within the field of causation. Illustration 1 A ten year old child drops a stone from a bridge over a motorway and as a result cause the death of a passenger in a bus. The passenger’s surviving dependants make a claim against, among others, the undertaking responsible for the motorway on the basis (well-founded in the circumstances) that it has failed to adopt the required safety measures and has thus acted negligently. The causal connection between that negligence and the damage is only broken if the child brought about the death of the passenger intentionally. Assuming the child was not focused on killing another (Article 3:101(a)), the matter turns on whether, according to the child’s individual’s stage of development, the child knew that with the greatest probability a death would result from the action of dropping the stone. In the case of a ten year old, that will be answered in the negative if there is doubt on the issue. 2. Natural and legal persons. The provisions of this Section are not restricted to natural persons; the general rule of interpretation applies whereby “person” is to be understood as including legal as well as natural persons (see DCFR Definitions). Legal

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persons are as capable of causing damage intentionally (or negligently, as the case may be) as natural persons. The intention of the legal person is found by establishing the state of mind of natural persons acting as its governing organ (see Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (b) and Comments on that Article).

B.

Intention

3. The need for a definition. The Article effects a definition of the concept of intention in relation to the causing of damage. Such a definition is indispensable for various reasons. In the first place, European private law currently lacks a uniform definition of intention. Secondly, under these rules, the presence (or absence) of intention can play a role in a significant number of cases. Thirdly, liability for intentionally causing damage is, as a rule, not insurable. For that reason such liability affects the person liable in a direct and potentially ruinous way. The inclination of private law therefore ought to be towards invoking a somewhat narrow concept of intention. 4. Intention to do the act required but not sufficient. The Article does not adopt the notion of ‘intention’ invoked in the English law of trespass where a mere intention to do the act suffices, it being established that the act interferes with another’s rights. A person only acts intentionally in the sense of this Article if that person (i) acts as he or she meant to act, and (ii) either means to cause legally relevant damage (sub-paragraph (a)) or recognises that it is as good as certain that such damage will be the consequence of the conduct and nonetheless does not desist from that conduct (sub-paragraph (b)). The reference point for intention for present purposes is thus always the causation of a legally relevant damage. Illustration 2 A damages or destroys the property of another, believing that it belongs to him. A acts negligently if he ought reasonably to have known that it was not his property, but there is no intentional causation of legally relevant damage. That is because the destruction of one’s own property does not constitute a legally relevant damage. 5. Conduct. On the other hand, a person does not act intentionally if the person does not know what he or she is doing (e. g. a patient at a hospital who unconsciously hits out in their sleep or under the influence of medication), or, while so aware, is unable to act differently (e. g. because of duress or because a sudden impairment of certain cerebral functions temporarily deprives that person of the ability to control their conduct).

C.

Sub-paragraph (a)

6. Deliberate causation of legally relevant damage. A person acts intentionally when the causation of the legally relevant damage is deliberate. The concept of legally relevant damage is established by Chapter 2. The person liable therefore must know the elements of the applicable concept of damage and have intended to bring these about. It is not essential, of course, that the person acting recognises that the damage about to be caused 569

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would be characterised in law as “legally relevant”. On the other hand, the person must be conscious of doing wrong; in other words, the lay person must anticipate that civil legal consequences are to be reckoned with. Where the person acting has made a mistake about the circumstances or the wrongful nature of the conduct, the ground of accountability (if any) will be negligence rather than intention. 7. Breach of a statutory rule of behaviour. Equally, a person who deliberately and knowingly infringes a given statutory rule of behaviour (e. g. by driving faster than traffic regulations permit), but who in no way means to cause an accident by doing so, will not act intentionally. 8. Omissions. The same applies to cases of omission. Someone who is obliged to intervene and who is also aware of that, but does nothing to avert the impending damage, only acts intentionally if he or she remains inactive precisely in order that the damage may occur. Intention always relates to the incidence of damage, and the infringement of a norm of behaviour does not constitute a damage per se (only negligence per se). Where a woman, who knows she is obliged in the morning to clear the snow and black ice from the pavement in front of her house, resolves nonetheless to stay in bed, and a neighbour slips and suffers a leg fracture, the neighbour’s injury is caused negligently and not intentionally. Illustration 3 By contrast, a drunken car driver, who suddenly steers his vehicle towards two pedestrians in order to terrify them and in doing so runs them over, causes death intentionally by an omission if, although he knows that one of them is particularly badly injured and is unlikely to be helped by a third party at that time of night, simply drives on, leaving the pedestrian to bleed to death. 9. Causation. On the other hand, those who witness a situation in which they are not obliged to intervene and do not intervene, although capable of doing so, because they take delight in the impending damage, act intentionally, but they do not cause legally relevant damage intentionally. Illustration 4 A sees that in the house belonging to her neighbour, whom she has always hated, a fire has started to burn. She does not inform the fire service because she hopes that the whole building will be destroyed. A acts intentionally, but she has not caused the loss of the house. A would only have caused the damage by her omission to act if she had been under a duty towards her neighbour (and not only to the public at large) to intervene. 10. “Damage of the type caused”. To establish intention it is sufficient that the person meant to cause damage of the type in fact brought about. If the person is mistaken about circumstances which are immaterial for the qualification of a damage as legally relevant, the conduct remains governed by the regime for liability for intentional causation of damage.

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Illustration 5 A intends to damage B’s car and vandalises a car which formerly belonged to B. A did not know that B had recently transferred the car to C. The property damage suffered by C was caused intentionally. A knew that he was causing damage to the property of another and meant to do so. The situation is the same in the textbook case where A means to shoot B, but in the darkness shoots C by mistake.

D.

Sub-paragraph (b)

11. General. Sub-paragraph (b) concerns cases on the border between intention and negligence. A person causes legally relevant damage intentionally (and not merely negligently) when that person acts as he or she means to act and at the same time knows that in doing so he or she will cause legally relevant damage. The present Article (in conformity with these rules generally) does not adopt the formulation of ex PECL art. 1:301 under which “[a]n ‘intentional’ act includes an act done recklessly”. Nor does the Article use the concept of “recklessness” (defined in the DCFR Definitions to the DCFR as follows – “[a] person is “reckless” if the person knows of an obvious and serious risk of proceeding in a certain way but nonetheless voluntarily proceeds without caring whether or not the risk materialises”). That concept is helpful for the purposes of contract law (see, e. g., DCFR III. – 3:501 (Scope and definition) and DCFR III. – 3:703 (Foreseeability)), but not for those of the law on non-contractual liability for damage. It was important for the latter that a simple structure of grounds of accountability be maintained and thus merely to distinguish between intention and negligence and not between intention, negligence and recklessness. However, first and foremost the decisive question for the purposes of non-contractual liability should not be whether a person ‘could not care less’ whether or not the damage concerned will result from conduct, but rather whether the person knows that the damage will be a well-nigh certain consequence of the conduct. A person who hopes desperately that damage will not result, but who knows that the hope is completely unrealistic in the circumstances, brings about that damage intentionally. Illustration 6 A drives at high speed in the outside lane round a blind bend in the road. Houses by the side of the road hide the headlights of an oncoming car. A head-on collision results. The damage is not caused intentionally. Had A, however, seen the oncoming car before he began to overtake and it was evident to him that an accident was highly probable and unavoidable if he did not pull back into the inside lane, the damage caused by carrying on in the outside lane is intentional. Intention in such a case is not excluded simply because the person acting hoped at the time that ‘everything would turn out all right’. 12. Dolus eventualis. Sub-paragraph (b) therefore equates extensively, but not perfectly, to the traditional notion of dolus eventualis which in some legal systems is defined exactly as the DCFR defines “recklessness”. However, sub-paragraph (b) excludes conscious carelessness from the notion of intention. Furthermore, a person does not act intentionally when causing damage simply through gross negligence, whether or not that person is aware of the carelessness. 571

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Illustration 7 A construction company which undertakes excavation work on another’s land and is aware of a cable laid there causes damage intentionally, when it slices the cable, if it made no inquiries as to the position of the cable and knew that, in view of the size of the machine being deployed and the small size of the plot of land, it was wellnigh impossible that the machine would miss the cable. On the other hand, a person who negligently fails even to contemplate that there might be cables laid beneath the soil acts merely negligently. 13. Gross negligence. Gross negligence is an unreasonable or extraordinary want of care (see the DCFR Definitions to the DCFR: “There is ‘gross negligence’ if a person is guilty of a profound failure to take such care as is self-evidently required in the circumstances”) and therefore does not amount to intention. See also Article 5:102(2)(c) (Contributory fault and accountability). 14. “by conduct which that person means to do ...” A person causes legally relevant damage intentionally only when he or she meant to act in the way in which he or she has in fact acted. This excludes from the notion of intention, therefore, not just acts under duress, but also unintended incorrect responses. A guest whose lit cigar falls from his hand and damages the carpet in his host’s flat does not cause that damage intentionally. While he means to smoke, he does not mean to drop the cigar. 15. “... knowing that ... damage ... will almost certainly be caused”. Crucial for the demarcation between intention and negligence, however, is the question of whether the person acting knew that legally relevant damage would be caused by the conduct. The assured knowledge that such damage will arise is placed by sub-paragraph (b) on the same footing as cases in which the person acting knew that legally relevant damage would “almost certainly” be caused. This gives the judge a certain amount of discretion in order to do justice in the circumstances of each individual case. Where the abnormally high likelihood of damage occurring would be obvious to everyone and there are no special circumstances present which would justify the inference that the person in question was not aware of this well-nigh certain likelihood, then this suffices for the inference of intentional harm, even in the case of an omission. Once again, it is not necessary that the perpetrator should have foreseen the exact causal chain of events and the concrete damage arising. The foresight need only have related to damage of this type. Illustration 8 A as owner carries the responsibility for a dilapidated old building. It is empty and ought to be torn down to make way for a new one. Children in shorts are playing soccer in the building. A watches this and is aware that in light of the countless glass shards lying around, it is impossible that this will “end well” if he does not intervene immediately. Nonetheless he does nothing about it. Assuming that A is obliged to undertake preventative measures in respect of the dangers facing the children and supposing also that A is conscious of this obligation, A will have acted intentionally in relation to the injuries suffered later by the children even though his main reason for doing nothing might have been to save money.

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Illustration 9 A person who fires at a jeep from a distance of a few short metres and knows that the passengers of the car may be killed by the shots, kills intentionally even where the primary motive was to injure the victim in order to satiate a need for revenge.

Notes 1.

2.

3.

FRENCH CC arts. 1382 and 1383 distinguish between faute intentionnelle and faute non intentionnelle. Nowadays it is seldom argued that there is substantial difference between liability for intention and liability for negligence; for the most part there is universal agreement that it does not involve a summa divisio (Mazeaud and Chabas, Leçons de droit civil II(1)9, no. 444 p. 451 and see further e. g. Brun, Responsabilité civile extracontractuelle, no. 363 pp. 187-188 and Lévy and Castaldo, Histoire du droit civil, no. 640 p. 917). The faute intentionnelle is based on the wrongdoer’s intention to cause the legally relevant damage (Brun, loc. cit. no. 364 p. 188). It provides that the wrongdoer must deliberately act or omit to act, and intend to cause damage unlawfully. In comparision the faute lourde and the faute inexcusable do not require an intention to cause damage (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II11, no. 110 pp. 109-110). Making the distinction occasionally remains difficult, in spite of the clear criteria, especially where the wrongdoer must have known that his actions would cause damage to another person (see Terré/Simler/Lequette, Les obligations9, no. 727 p. 711). Persons who are not capable of distinguishing between right and wrong cannot act intentionally, in the sense of faute intentionnelle (Brun loc. cit.; Flour/Aubert/Savaux loc. cit. no. 101 p. 103). The distinction between faute intentionnelle and faute non intentionnelle acquires practical importance above all in insurance law, owing to the fact that personal liability insurance does not provide coverage in cases of intentional infliction of damage (Insurance Code art. L. 113-1(2)). Intention presupposes here “la volonté de causer le dommage”, that is to say, a mere intent to create a situation of damger will not suffice (Cass.civ. 10 April 1996, Bull.civ. 1996, I, no. 172 p. 120). Moreover, not only do the courts appear to award higher amounts of compensation in these cases (Carbonnier, Droit civil IV21, no. 226 p. 389; Flour/Aubert/Savaux loc. cit. no. 111 p. 111), they also settle for applying a lesser standard of proof of causation (Carbonnier loc. cit.). In contemporary BELGIAN doctrine, faute intentionnelle is on occasion defined as the deliberate infringement of a legal rule or general standard of care; the intent to infringe a particular standard of conduct is decisive. Initially the faute dolosive additionally required the intention to cause damage to another (Cornelis, Responsabilité extra-contractuelle, nos. 96-97 pp. 178-180). However, the distinction between faute intentionelle (CC art. 1382) and faute non intentionnelle (CC art. 1383) in Belgium is only exceptionally decisive, since the gravity of the fault has no impact on the legal consequences (Vandeputte, Het aquiliaans foutbegrip, nos. 16-17 p. 22). One such special case is constituted by the rule that contractual clauses seeking to limit liability cannot exclude liability for a faute intentionnelle (Kruithof, TPR 1984, 233, 269-272 [no. 31]). Other commentators continue to regard this (unwritten) rule as applying only to cases of faute dolosive (Cornelis loc. cit.). The SPANISH CC is silent on the issue of intentional infliction of damage and consequently does not contain any definition of intent (Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de re-

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4.

5.

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sponsabilidad civil, 236). This exclusion of an express reference to intent has been traditionally explained on the basis that the distinction between dolo and culpa is a meaningless one for the law on non-contractual liability; the concepts culpa o negligencia (CC art. 1902) are to be read in such a manner that they also embrace dolo (Lacruz Berdejo and Rivero Hernández, Elementos II(2)4, 471-472; Díez-Picazo, Derecho de daños, 351; Roca i Trias, Derecho de daños3, 60). However, the distinction between liability arising from intentional acts and liability arising from negligence plays an important role within the area of insurance law. Liability arising from intentional acts is excluded from liability insurance (Insurance Contract Act art. 19). (It is only unclear whether the insurer can rely on this against the plaintiff, if the plaintiff claims against the insurer in a direct action; see loc. cit. art. 76 as well as Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act art. 7.) The distinction between intentional and negligent infliction of damage can also play a role in family law; at any rate it appears that the courts will not allow themselves to be satisfied with proof of mere negligence in order to guarantee compensation for loss or damage between close family members (Salvador/Ramos/Luna, InDret 3/2000, p. 9; Ferrer i Riba, InDret 4/2001, p. 12; see also TS 22 July 1999, RAJ 1999 (3) no. 5721 p. 8928 [no right to damages in cases of adultery, when it was not committed with the intent of inflicting damage] and CA Valencia 2 November 2004, AC 2004 (21) no. 1994 p. 1069). ITALIAN CC art. 2043 expressly provides that every fatto doloso o colposo founds an obligation to pay damages; it therefore brackets together both pillars of fault-based liability without actually defining them (as regards a number of exceptional provisions, where only proof of intention suffices to establish liability, see Alpa and Mariconda (-Alpa) Codice civile commentato IV, sub art. 2043 § 14). Nowadays the concept of intent is not defined in an identical manner throughout the legal system. In the area of private law, intentional behaviour presupposes willed action, the intention to cause damage, knowledge of the wrongfulness of the damage, absence of grounds of defence as well as the capacity to commit fault on the part of the wrongdoer. However the the aim of acting does not have to be synonymous with the infliction of damage; dolo eventuale suffices in this regard (Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, arts. 2043-2059, 110). Negligence is affirmed by CP art. 43(1)), if the damage, although foreseen, was not intended by the actor, but was the product of inattentiveness, carelessness, or solecism (socalled colpa generica) or was the result of breach of a statutory rule of behaviour (commonly called colpa specifica). Whether the defendant acts in an intentional or merely negligent manner, may also be relevant in establishing whether the claimant suffers a compensatable damage – for example in cases of procuring a breach of contract, in cases of boycott and in defamation cases (Cass. pen. 5 November 2004, no. 46311, Giur.it. 2005, I, 1, 2385). The basic norm of HUNGARIAN tort law, (CC § 339(1)) deliberately does not refer to the concepts of “intention and negligence”; these concepts receive as a result little attention from academics. They are instead superseded by the concept of “blameworthiness” in Hungarian civil law (Gellért (-Kemenes), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1231-1232; Lábady, A magyar magánjog (polgári jog) általános része, 308-309; Bíró, A kötelmi jog és a szerzo˝déstan közös szabályai6, 466), which is assessed objectively and is differentiated from fault by its individual graduations (Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 4851). It is also employed in attributing liability to legal persons (Kemenes loc. cit. 12261227). Intention and negligence are, however encountered in some special provisions.

Article 3:101: Intention

6.

The concept of intention is used in CC § 6 (see above Note 4 under Article 2:207 (Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information)), in CC § 342(1) (Inoperativeness of contractual clauses which limit or exclude liability for intention or gross negligence), in CC § 360(4) (limitation period for wilful infliction of damage), in CC § 581 (liability of the donor) and above all in insurance law. As regards property insurance CC § 556(1) provides that the insurer is exempt from its payment obligation upon proof that the damage was caused by the insured person (or by certain persons with whom he is associated) intentionally or in a grossly negligent manner. Proof of intentional or grossly negligent conduct on the part of the insured person does not exempt the insurer from its payment obligation under liability insurance to the injured party, but the insurer in these circumstances has a right to reimbursement from the insured person (CC § 559(3)). A similar position is adopted by POLISH tort law. The notion of intention does not appear expressly in the basic rule of CC art. 415, but it is universally recognised that the term “fault” invoked there encompasses both intentional fault and unintentional fault (negligence) (Czachórski, Zobowia˛zania9, 212). The distinction between liability arising from intentional fault and liability arising from negligence is vital, as many CC provisions are confined to cases of damage caused intentionally: e. g. CC art. 473 § 2 (invalidity of contract terms excluding liability for damage caused to a creditor intentionally), CC art. 757 (liability of a negotiorum gestor for damage caused trying to save another’s property limited to cases of intention or gross negligence), CC art. 827 § 1 (insurer’s liability exluded where the insured caused the damage intentionally). The Civil Code avoids defining intentional fault (wina umys´lna). In doctrine and case law it is understood as embracing cases where unlawful conduct was aimed at causing the damage (dolus directus) as well as where the tortfeasor did not aim at causing it, but knew that damage would result (dolus eventualis) (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛s´c´ ogólna7, 197). In BULGARIAN tort law, in contrast to negligence, intention is not presumed (LOA art. 45(2)); proof must be adduced (Konov, Osnovanie na grajdanskata otgovornost, 131; Kalaydjiev, Obligazionno pravo, Obshta chast, 373). In cases of intentional fault, a higher compensatory sum will usually be awarded for causing non-economic damage than in cases of simple negligence (Takoff, Obzor na deliktnoto pravo na Bulgaria, no. 61 p. 8). The employee is only personally liable to an unlimited monetary extent for damage caused to their employers if they acted in an intentional manner (Labour Code art. 203(2); in all other cases the extent of financial liability is restricted to not more than three times the monthly renumeration (loc. cit. art. 206 no. 1). Other special statutes (e. g. Ccom art. 631a: Liability for error in filing for insolvency) require intention or negligence for the attribution of liability. “Fault” under GERMAN law is comprised of intention and negligence (CC § 276). However, the components of intention are not statutorily defined. It is generally stated that intention connotes knowledge and desire to bring about an unlawful result (BGH 5 July 2008, VersR 2008, 1407 [pupil deliberately throwing a snowball – no intention in relation to the eye injury of a fellow pupil which resulted]). The distinctions that are made between dolus directus and dolus eventualis in the criminal law are meaningless in tort law (Medicus, Schuldrecht I16, no. 306); in tort law dolus eventualis suffices. A person is regarded as acting with conditional intent when he or she accepts the unlawful result as a possible consequence of his act or omission. Advertent or conscious negligence exists when the actor trusts that the damage will not ensue (Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB65, § 276, no. 10; Erman (-Westermann), BGB I11, § 276, no. 7). Intention need only relate

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7.

576

to the infringement of another’s rights; it is not necessary that it correlate to the economic or non-economic loss that results from the infringement of those rights (the “damage” under German law); CC § 826 provides an exception to this rule (Heinrichs loc. cit.). Intent in civil law presupposes an awareness of the wrongfulness of the act. A mistake of law as well as factual error therefore preclude the existence of intent (Heinrichs loc. cit. no. 11). However, special criteria apply where liability is based on the violation of a protective criminal norm (CC § 823(2)); in this case the law relating to criminal intent is also applicable for private law purposes (BGH 26 February 1962, NJW 1962, 910; BGH 10 July 1984, NJW 1985, 134, 135). Moreover in order to establish liability under CC § 826, it is not a prerequisite that the defendant acted with the knowledge that his act was morally culpable; knowledge of the factual circumstances which make his actions morally culpable in the eyes of the law is sufficient (BGH 26 March 1962, NJW 1962, 1099, 1100; BGH 13 September 2004, NJW 2004, 3706, 3710). Within the framework of CC § 823(2) a problematic question is whether a person acts intentionally, if he or she wants to violate a protective law, but does not intend the subsequent injury. The predominant view is that only the intentional transgression of the protective law is relevant (Palandt (-Sprau), BGB66, § 823, no. 60; BGH 20 March 1961, BGHZ 34, 375, 381). The AUSTRIAN CC § 1294 distinguishes between damage which is caused by “malicious intent” and damage caused by “oversight”. In interpreting these concepts the courts have strictly adhered to the definitions of “intention” and “negligence” which are found in CP §§ 5(1) and 6(1). Accordingly a person acts intentionally, when he or she wants to bring about a certain state of affairs which corresponds to the ingredients of a tortious cause of action. In this case it suffices that the wrongdoer seriously considers that the realisation of this state of affairs is possible and approves of this result. According to CC § 1294 malicious purpose (intent) is given when the damage is caused knowingly and wilfully. “The knowledge must relate to the unlawfulness as well as to the possibility of occurrence of the harmful result, whereas the wilfulness need only relate to the latter” (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 5/25). As regards CC § 1295(2) (Liability for intentional infliction of damage considered a violation of public morals) it is regarded as sufficient that the wrongdoer foresees the occurrence of the result and approves of it (dolus eventualis) (Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VI3, § 1295, no. 146; OGH 20 May 1992, SZ 65/76). A person who hopes that the damaging result will not occur acts negligently (Koziol loc. cit. no. 5/27). Since the decision of OGH 1 January 1951 SZ 24/5 regarding the violation of a protective law, fault only has to relate to the transgression of the norm and not to the harmful result. As regards the violation of public morals it is deemed sufficient that the wrongdoer has knowledge of the circumstances that would entail an infringement of public morals (Bydlinski, JBl 1986, 631). In contrast, according to a decision of OGH 31 August 2005, 9 ObA 16/05a the intentional violation of occupational health and safety provisions in social security law will not suffice to deprive the employer of its privileged position as to liability by categorising it as intentional damage; rather it is necessary that the harmful result be intended. Other situations where intent has been deemed to be present include where a car dealer who was found to have acted intentionally in relation to the bank which financed the buyer’s purchase when he lied to the purchaser and the bank about the year of manufacture of the vehicle, and consequently the longer prescription period under CC § 1489(2) ap-

Article 3:101: Intention

8.

9.

10.

plied to the bank’s claim in respect of damage resulting from default on the loan (OGH 30 June 1987, WBl 1987, 273). The GREEK CC regards intention as a pillar of fault, but it is not defined. For a long period, two competing doctrines were championed in academic treatment. According to one exposition, the question whether intention exists ought to depend on whether the wrongdoer foresaw the unlawful result and nonetheless continued to act. The alternative view maintained is to regard as decisive the question whether the wrongdoer wished or intended the prohibited result. The current prevailing view is that intention is given if the wrongdoer has foreseen the unlawful result and has assimilated its occurrence into his will; it is not necessary that he intends the unlawful result (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Stathopoulos), art. 330, nos. 13-14). In particular Greek law distinguishes between the following different forms of intention. Dolus directus is given when the wrongdoer recognises the unlawful result as the necessary consequence of his actions; on the other hand, dolus eventulais arises when the wrongdoer envisages the occurrence of the unlawful result merely as possible and approvingly accepts it. It is important for the affirmation of intent in each case that the wrongdoer acts knowing that his acts or omissions are prohibited (Stathopoulos loc. cit. no. 21; Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio III, 158): the existence of a factual error as well as an error as to the prohibited nature of the act preclude the existence of intention (ErmAK -Michaelides-Nouaros), art. 330, no. 18. The PORTUGUESE CC art. 483(1) also differentiates between intentional and merely culpable tortious acts (meramente culposos). The former are characterised by the intent to cause damage (Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 506-507). Intention is a manifestation of the culpa grave. It features in many contexts in civil law, especially in connection with the quantum of reparation (CC arts. 494, 497(2), 506(2), 507(2) and 570(1); see Almeida Costa loc. cit. 496-497, 507-508, 534-535; Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 568-569; Pessoa Jorge, Ensaio sobre os pressupostos da responsabilidade civil, 361, 364). Exceptions from the basic principle that intentional as well as negligent tortious acts establish a right to damages are found in CC arts. 814(1), 815(1) and 1681(1). However, these provisions concern issues of contract law and family law and do not concern tort law. Awareness that one is acting in an unlawful manner is a prerequisite for intention (Almeida Costa loc. cit. 533), and as a consequence the mistaken belief that there was an emergency or some other justifiable ground for acting precludes the existence of intention. A distinction is made in Portugal too between dolo directo, dolo indirecto and dolo eventual, cf. CP art. 14(1)-(3); Almeida Costa loc. cit. 533; Antunes Varela loc. cit.; Pessoa Jorge loc. cit. 322). Dolus directus was affirmed e. g. where a person removed the boundary stone from a plot of land and thereby claimed that the boundary was incorrectly constituted (STJ 18 April 2006). The Portuguese understanding of dolus indirectus (see Almeida Costa and Pessoa Jorge loc. cit.; CA Coimbra 18 January 2006) largerly corresponds to the rule anchored in Article 3:101(b); The remit of dolus eventualis is more akin to the definition of recklessness under the DCFR (see above for Comment D10 and also CA Evora 18 June 2002). DUTCH law regards intention (opzet) and negligence (onachtzaamheid) as mutually exclusive polar opposites. In particular, its civil law differentiates between numerous graduations of fault (for an in-depth consideration see the contributions in Haak and Koot, Bewuste roekeloosheid in het privaatrecht): opzet (intention), grove Schuld (gross negligence) or roekeloosheid (“recklessness” in the sense of carelessness), voorwaardelijk

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11.

12.

578

opzet (dolus eventualis) and lichte schuld (slight fault). Opzet in a criminal law context does not necessarily have the same meaning as that prevailing under private law (Haak and Koot loc. cit. 1-11). It is unclear and is a matter of contention in which area of private law opzet is actually required. It has even been suggested that the various categories of wrongful acts found in CC art. 6:162 also adhere to varying requirements at the level of the imputation of liability, such that the “infringement of a right” can only invariably be given in the case of an intentional act. This view is held because in the case of negligent actions liability is imputed under the alternative heading in CC art. 6:162(3) “according to generally accepted standards” (Onrechtmatige Daad II (-van Maanen), 210-213; contra Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht III12, nos. 69-73 pp. 92-95). Of course, the distinction between opzet and mere negligence attains practical importance not under this rubric (where the question is essentially academic), but rather at the stage where causation is investigated (CC art. 6:98; see the Notes under Article 4:101 (General Rule) in conjunction with this topic), within the framework of curtailing claims on the grounds of contributory negligence (CC art. 6:101), liability for non-economic damage (CC art. 6:106) and within the area of the claim to recourse on the part of the social insurance authority (CC arts. 6:108 and 6:109). ESTONIAN LOA § 104(5) provides: “Intent is the will to bring about an unlawful consequence upon the creation, performance or termination of an obligation”. It is maintained that this definition is solely concerned with the dolus directus; the dolus indirectus was deliberately left undefined, because the strategy was adopted of leaving conceptual elucidation to academic erudition and case law (Lahe, Fault in the Law of Delict, passim; Lahe. Juridica 2002, 30-36). LATVIAN CC art. 1641 provides: “As wrongful intent shall be understood every intentional harm”. In the NORDIC Countries intention and negligence, as regards the provisions concerning liability, are in principle on the same footing. Following the expansion of the traditional boundaries of tort law, it is now easier to determine the components of intentional causation of damage than for negligent causation of damage. For example in Swedish case law there are decisions regarding compensation for the pain and suffering of relatives (see above, Note II 17 under Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death) and on liability as to the procurement of a breach of contract (see above, Note 12 under Article 2:211 (Loss upon inducement of non-performance of obligation)). Of further importance is the fact that according to DANISH Damages Liability Act § 19(2) a private individual is only liable for damage to an insured thing if intention or gross negligence are present. The criminal and civil legal concept of intention should be regarded as identical in terms of content (in any event according to Swedish literature: Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 124; Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 46 and 58; see also HD 12 September 2005, NJA 2005, 608). The notion of direct and indirect intention coincide with the definitions contained in Article 3:101(a) and (b); in respect of the second alternative in lit. (b) (“knowing that such damage ... will almost certainly be caused”) one speaks of an intention based on indifference, a concept which is espoused in place of dolus eventualis (S-Karnov 2005/06 (-Rekke), no. 2 p. 2502). Apart from direct and indirect intent, Danish law recognized the ‘intention based on probability’ (which depends on what the wrongdoer recognised as a preponderant possibility) along with the intention based on risk, which can be likened to dolus eventualis (D-Karnov 2004 IV (-Elmer), no. 86 p. 4952; Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 52).

Article 3:101: Intention

13.

In ENGLAND the very dominant role played by the tort of negligence (with its ingredient of breach of a duty of care) coupled with the disparate nature of the torts in which intentional conduct may play a role means that the search for a universal concept of intention within tort law has not been a traditional focus of legal analysis. It has long been recognised that the term is equivocal and thus may denote an intention to do that which is designed as an aim or main object of the intending party, or it may mean that which he merely foresees as a result to which he is indifferent (Jeffries v. Alexander (1860) 7 HLC 594; 11 ER 562, 576). In the modern law it is helpful to identify whether intention relates to harm or to conduct and in the latter case the required intended conduct turns very much on the specific interest which the tort seeks to protect and the law has proved receptive to imputing intention on the basis of recklessness: see Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale and Jones), Torts19, 1-50–1-55. In relation to trespass to land, for example, the requirement that the defendant acted intentionally (or negligently) amounts only to a requirement that the conduct infringing the claimant’s rights was voluntary: Basely v. Clarkson (1682) 3 Lev. 37, 83 ER 565 (where the defendant, who meant to mow his own land, was held liable for mowing and taking grass from the claimant’s land). By contrast where the intention to cause harm is the essence of the tort, as is the case for liability for intentional infliction of injury to the person under Wilkinson v. Downton [1897] 2 QB 57, the courts have elaborated on the meaning of intention, but the resolution of the precise boundaries of the concept are so intimately tied to (conflicting) views about the scope of the tort concerned and its relationship to other torts that no broader picture necessarily emerges: in relation to Wilkinson v. Downton see, for instance, Wong v. Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721 at [12]; [2003] All ER 932 (Hale LJ: defendant may be taken to have meant physical harm or a psychiatric illness by the combination of the likelihood of such harm being suffered as the result of his behaviour and his deliberately engaging in that behaviour); Wainwright v. Home Office [2001] EWCA Civ 2081 at [49]; [2002] QB 1334 at 1349 (Lord Woolf CJ: there must be intention to cause harm or recklessness as to whether harm is caused); contrast [79] (1358) (Buxton LJ: subjective recklessness required or, if that view was incorrect, at the very least objective recklessness in the sense that the defendant’s act was so clearly likely to produce a result of the kind that occurred that an intention to produce it should be imputed), all of which must be glossed by Lord Hoffmann’s view that the exlusion of liability under Wilkinson v. Downton for harm not amounting to a psychiatric illness, coupled with the subsequent development of the tort of negligence, leaves the tort with no leading role in the modern law ([2003] UKHL 53 at [41]; [2004] 2 AC 406, 425).

Illustration 1 is taken from TS 27 January 2006, RAJ 2006 (1) no. 615 p. 1486; illustration 2 from Wilson v. Lombank Ltd. [1963] 1 WLR 1294; illustration 3 from STJ 27 September 1995; illustration 6 is based on STJ 30 October 2002; illustration 7 is based on CA Valencia 18 May 2004, BDA JUR 2005/13603; illustration 8 is based on Smith (or Maloco) v. Littlewoods Organisation Ltd. [1987] AC 241; and illustration 9 is taken from CA Evora 18 June 2002.

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Article 3:102: Negligence A person causes legally relevant damage negligently when that person causes the damage by conduct which either: (a) does not meet the particular standard of care provided by a statutory provision whose purpose is the protection of the person suffering the damage from that damage; or (b) does not otherwise amount to such care as could be expected from a reasonably careful person in the circumstances of the case.

Comments A.

General

1. Scope. This Article defines negligence as a ground of accountability for the purposes of the present Book. It is not a question of creating a self-standing “tort of negligence” but rather (as has been done for intention in the preceding Article) of fleshing out the notion of negligence referred to in Article 1:101 (Basic rule). The present Article is only concerned with negligent or careless conduct. Consequently, it does not address cases in which liability is derived from infringement of a statutory duty which does not revolve around a requirement to exercise care. Where liability is exclusively based on the fact that the level of safety demanded by statute has not been achieved (as may be the case, for example, in respect of certain statutes concerned with accidents at work), one has left the realm of negligence and is concerned instead with a specific form of liability without (intention or) negligence, see Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage). 2. “by conduct”. Negligence requires conduct controlled by will. An unconscious act, for instance movement while asleep, under narcosis or under the influence of a sudden apoplectic seizure, is not “conduct” within the meaning of Article 3:101 (Intention) or the present Article. The same goes for an omission in a situation in which the affected party could not have recognised or removed the danger even when exercising all due care. Illustration 1 On a foggy winter evening a boat capsizes on a lake. The occupant calls for help but the fog is too dense for his cries to be heard. It cannot be said of a woman walking along the shore – who does not hear the calls and therefore does not act – that she “omitted” to undertake a rescue effort; in fact there was no “conduct” at all on her part in relation to the person drowning. Illustration 2 However, the situation is different where an old man who is hard of hearing is shovelling snow from the pavement and without hearing the warning cry of a passer-by approaching him from behind, hits her across the face with the shovel. His bad hearing does not alter the fact that the motion with the shovel was conduct 580

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relevant to the danger and controlled by will. Due to the fact that the man was aware of his bad hearing, he even acted negligently: he should have been aware of the danger and should have looked behind him before swinging the shovel. 3. Sources of duties of careful conduct. This rule mirrors the two sources which in every Member State generate the duties of careful conduct in relation to the interests of another protected by the law on non-contractual liability for damage: statutory provisions (sub-paragraph (a)) and the general precept of not harming another (neminem laedere, sub-paragraph (b)). A general duty of care is implied here. Previous generations formulated it by referring to the conduct expected of a bonus paterfamilias or reasonable man. 4. Positive acts and omissions. The Article relates – in both alternatives – as much to omissions as it does to positive acts. This follows from the use of the word “conduct” (see DCFR Definitions – conduct includes “not doing something”). A person who omits doing something acts negligently if he or she either does not take the preventive measures that must be taken in the interests of the injured person under statutory provisions or where he or she does not do something that a reasonably careful person in the circumstances of the case would have done to protect the injured person. It is not possible to draw a clearly-defined line between positive acts and omissions. The draft therefore deals with both forms of conduct in principally the same fashion. 5. Persons under eighteen. In relation to the requirements of due care to be placed on youths and children under sub-paragraph (b) of the Article, special rules are to be found in Article 3:103 (Persons under eighteen) paragraph (1). While children who have not yet attained their seventh year may indeed likewise be capable of acting negligently, the consequences of such action will not be imputed to them under Article 3:103(2). 6. Mentally handicapped persons. In cases concerning mentally disabled persons, who cannot distinguish between right and wrong as a result of their disability, there is a different starting point. Such persons may also readily deviate from the standard of care, which according to Article 3:201 (Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons) is to be observed in principle by everyone. The only requirement is that it is “conduct” controlled by will. Under the circumstances in Article 5:301 (Mental incompetence), for which the party claimed against bears the burden of proof, a mental disability is a defence that, depending on the circumstances of the case, can lead to a reduction or exclusion of liability. The rule relates mainly to mentally disabled adults, but can also be of benefit to mentally disabled adolescents, who fall short of the behavioural standard for their age group. Of course, the relief from liability only embraces cases where intention or negligence is the source of accountability, and not a possible basis of responsibility within one of the particular situations governed by the second Section of the third Chapter of these basic rules. Illustration 3 While sitting at the steering wheel, X suddenly and unforeseeably suffers a brain haemorrhage. While he remains conscious and realises that he is steering the car into the middle of a lane of traffic, he is no longer capable of doing anything to stop 581

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this due to the brain haemorrhage. X acts negligently within the meaning of Article 3:102. He is also not entitled to any defence under Article 5:301 (Mental incompetence), since he fully recognises that he is acting improperly. Conversely, had X been rendered unconscious, under Article 3:205 (Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles) he would only be liable for the subsequent accident if he was not merely the driver, but also the owner of the vehicle. 7. Physically disabled persons. Physically disabled persons are subject to the same requirements of due care as physically able persons, to the extent that they are aware of their physical disability, and their conduct must be adjusted accordingly, see Illustration 2 above. A person who must anticipate sudden but short-lived losses of vision due to a chronic circulatory disorder is not permitted to sit at the wheel of a car.

B.

Duties of care required by statute (sub-paragraph (a))

8. Statutory provisions. A person acts negligently where they do not behave as prescribed by statute in a given situation, if a danger is realised thereby, the prevention of which is the aim of the law for the protection of the injured person. The meaning of a “statute” under Article 3:102 is not elucidated by these rules. Read with Article 7:102 (Statutory provisions), the term “statute” in this article has the meaning given to it in the relevant applicable law. However, it should be emphasised that “statute” covers not only primary legislation, but also secondary legislation made by central and regional governments (regulations, etc.) and by local authorities (e. g. bye-laws). On the other hand, guidelines issued by social insurance bodies for the prevention of accidents are, as a rule, not “statutory” provisions. 9. Criminal law provisions. If the statute is part of the criminal law, it is sufficient that the person liable objectively failed to behave in the manner required by the statutory norm. It is not necessary that the person can also in fact be punished for an offence. It may well be, for example, that in that particular jurisdiction criminal responsibility commences only at the age of 16 or that criminal prosecution depends on circumstances that have nothing to do with the reparation of damage in civil law. 10. Mere references to the duty to act with reasonable care. From the perspective of the law on negligence one must differentiate four types of statutory provision. There are, first, statutory provisions which merely involve a general requirement to take care not to violate the physical integrity, rights or interests of another. Provisions of this type are irrelevant for the purposes of sub-paragraph (a) because they do not say more than is already to be found in sub-paragraph (b). In other words, statutory provisions of this type set down no “particular” standard of care. For instance, provisions that state no more than that “negligent bodily injury” is criminally punishable belong to this group. 11. Provisions reducing the standard of care. Secondly, there are provisions whose effect is that in defined situations or for defined persons (e. g. parents and children or spouses in their relation to each other) compliance with a lower standard of care than the general one suffices. Typically, such provisions prescribe liability for damage caused only in cases 582

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of gross negligence (and of course in cases of intention). They take priority over the general requirement of care by constituting special regimes. That is taken care of in Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (c). To the extent that employees are also personally liable vis à vis third parties under the applicable law only in the case of grave fault, in particular only where they are charged with gross negligence, Article 7:104 (Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers’ associations) is to be taken into account. 12. Provisions requiring a higher standard of care. A third class of statutory provision is one which requires persons undertaking defined activities to comply with a higher standard of care than the general standard. The failure to reach the stipulated higher standard then amounts to negligence. Of course, such provisions must have the establishment of duties of care as their subject-matter; they must not impose on their addressees an obligation to ensure that a particular state of affairs (a particular outcome) occurs. This is because provisions of the latter type do not refer to the notion of care at all. They are therefore excluded from this Article, as mentioned earlier, and are dealt with in Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage). This includes, for example, of provisions relating to safety equipment for machines which are operated by workers. It is indeed correct that the borderline between the protective laws embraced by sub-paragraph (a) of the present Article and by Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage) is not always easily drawn, either in theory or in practice. This is because there may be statutory rules capable of being subsumed under both provisions. For instance, a statutory rule might prescribe that for certain operations a second heart-lung machine must be available in the operating theatre. Such duties of conduct have a double function because they indeed specify a special standard of care in relation to the protected interest, and simultaneously call for a certain state of affairs. As a result, in such a case the injured person can invoke two grounds of accountability. However, this does not greatly affect the practical result. This is down to the fact that Article 5:302 (Event beyond control) also applies to Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage). 13. Provisions particularising the general duty of care. Fourthly, a number of statutory provisions have as their function a particularisation or concretisation of the general duty of care for a defined situation. They are the focus of the rule in Article 3:102. Typical examples are provided by provisions of building and planning law and of commercial law, regulations on exercising professions, provisions on health protection and road traffic regulations. 14. Adherence to the provision does not automatically exclude liability in negligence. Provisions of this type, however, are not a carte blanche for acting negligently in a given case. Where the average person under the circumstances must recognise that adherence to a specific statutory safety requirement is insufficient in a given situation and where statute leaves a corresponding discretion to act, then a person in that situation must use the discretion as a reasonably careful person in the circumstances of the case would have done.

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Illustration 4 A regulation on the protection of woods requires farmers burning stubble in their fields in autumn to observe a minimum distance of 300 metres from the nearest wood when igniting the stubble. B complies with that requirement. However, on the day in question an exceptionally strong wind prevails and B ought to have appreciated that the minimum distance laid down in the statute would not suffice under these weather conditions. The wood catches fire. B has acted negligently according to sub-paragraph (b). Compliance with the statutory provision does not relieve B from the need to comply with the general standard of care. Illustration 5 Things are of course different where statute practically prohibits taking reliable safety measures. For instance, one thinks of provisions for the protection of buildings of historic importance and natural monuments, like for example a medieval tree of justice, which may not be felled although this would be the only available safety measure for the protection of passers-by. 15. Prohibitory norms and norms of care. Where statute merely provides for a prohibition, but does not articulate any specific duties of care, then the issue of negligence is judged according to the rule in sub-paragraph (b), which of course does not rule out considering the values of the prohibitory norm in the context of the general norm of care. Illustration 6 A road traffic sign which indicates a one-way street and accordingly prohibits entry into the street from the exit is masked by a parked lorry. As A does not know this area and there are no other indications by which she might recognise that the road is a one-way street (as would be the case if there were indicative road markings or the cars on her side of the road were all parked against her direction of passage), she does not act negligently if she turns into the road and an accident results. That does not exclude the argument, however, that the level of care required in recognising traffic signs will be rather high. 16. The purpose of the statute. The purpose of the statutory norm of care infringed must be to safeguard the injured person from the legally relevant damage, which he has actually suffered. Hence the purpose of the statute must not simply be either the assurance of protection in general or predominantly of the public interest, or the protection of the injured person from a damage other than the one which has in fact occurred. Illustration 7 A, B and C are witnesses to an accident in which X is badly injured. It would have been an easy matter for them to render first aid to X and to alert the emergency services. They neglect to do that. A, B and C are not liable under these rules if, even though breach of that duty to render first aid at the place where the accident has taken place constitutes a crime, the duty to render assistance existed solely for reasons of public interest. This is the practice in most Member States.

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Illustration 8 There exists a statutory obligation to keep animals transported on the deck of a ship caged up. The purpose of this statute is to prevent the transmission of disease amongst animals. Its purpose is not to prevent the animals from falling overboard, though it has that collateral effect. In regard to the statutory provision at least, therefore, there is consequently no negligence when a failure to cage animals leads to their loss when they fall overboard. That of course does not exclude the possibility of recognising, aside from the statute, a breach of the general duty of care under sub-paragraph (b).

C.

The general duty of care (sub-paragraph (b))

17. An objective standard. Sub-paragraph (b) deals with the second form of negligence. Conduct is negligent when it does not satisfy the care which must be exercised under the circumstances of the case by a reasonably prudent person. The standard is an objective one. It does not turn on the individual abilities of the person acting, rather it is based on what can be reasonably expected of that person: a dentist cannot escape liability by claiming to be a slow learner and very forgetful. Persons commencing their professional lives must likewise live up to the standard of the competent professional (and likewise the newly qualified driver must reach the standard of the more experienced), although it would be wrong to measure them by the standard of the most capable. 18. Conclusive list of deciding factors impossible. The question of what reasonably careful conduct means under the circumstances of each individual case is affected by several factors which are beyond conclusive enumeration. On the one hand, maintaining concentration is necessary because this facilitates the awareness of danger. Whoever turns a blind eye to the foreseeable negative consequences of actions can only be saved by sheer luck from harming others. Illustration 9 Where a construction company lays underground pipelines for drinking water, it must not only obtain the plans from the other utility companies on the exact location of their cables and pipes, in fact it must also check whether the site plan specifications are accurate. 19. What actually has to done does not ultimately hinge on a weighing up of the costs and benefits of prevention. The type and extent of the imminent damage serve to dictate the type and extent of the measures necessary for its prevention. In some cases information to the public or a simple indication of a particular source of danger will be sufficient, in others the source of danger itself must be confronted. Also relevant is whether there was a particular close relationship or a relationship of trust between the person acting and the injured party, since fiduciary duties and similar factors can raise the degree of necessary care. Other relevant factors may be whether risks of private or commercial life are involved, whether children or only adults are to be anticipated as being in proximity to the source of danger, whether the relevant risk was known or arose for the first time etc. The conceivable situations are unlimited. The assessment of negligence in particular 585

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cases must therefore remain with the courts, whose assessment of what constitutes careful conduct or conduct without due care in a given set of facts may quite properly change over time. Generally it is of course to be borne in mind that the requirements of necessary care may not be arbitrarily raised. This would not only diminish the distinction with “strict” liability, but also emphatically hinder human activity; people would scarcely be able to move freely, constantly in fear of possibly encountering liability. Illustration 10 During the warm-up before a volleyball game a ball is inadvertently hit high into the tiers of spectators, where it hits a visitor so hard in the eye that she is blinded. The distance and arrangement of the spectator area by the club was in conformity with the structural safety measures; neither the player nor the organising club ought to have perceived any need for further measures. No negligent physical injury exists. 20. Organisational defects. A particular form of negligence is seen in the notion of what is sometimes termed defective organisation. It is not only the specific safety risks associated with events with mass attendance which are involved here. Here, emphaisis is particularly placed on the duty of all large organisations to arrange their work processes in such a way that third parties are not endangered by problems of internal communication, the hierarchy of authority or decision-making. In practice legal persons in particular bear the burden of such organisational duties. They are subject to them independent of the organisational duties to which the natural persons acting on their behalf are subject.

Notes I.

The concept of negligence in general

1.

According to the concept of negligence under FRENCH law, a faute d’imprudence ou de négligence (CC art. 1383) is established if the defendant makes a mistake which a very prudent person (a homme très diligent) would not have made under the same circumstances: a faute is given even in the case of the slightest fault (culpa levissima) (Terré/ Simler/Lequette, Les obligations9, no. 728 p. 711). Whilst the standard of care is indeed abstract, in that the defendant’s conduct will be judged against the standard of a bon père de famille, consideration will also be given, where appropriate, as to how the bon père de famille would have acted had he, for example, had the same occupation or been of the same age as the defendant and found himself in the same situation (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2004/2005), no. 6707). However, there is no exoneration from liability on the grounds of lack of capacity (CC art. 489-2). In this respect, no distinction is made between adults and minors, nor is one made in respect of a person suffering sous l’empire d’un trouble mental (Terré/Simler/ Lequette loc. cit. no. 733 pp. 715-716) be it merely temporary or permanent. The prerequisite of liability for this class of individuals remains the identification of faute (Cass.civ. 24 June 1987, Bull.civ. 1987, II, no. 137 p. 78). The faute d’imprudence ou de négligence in civil law is more wide ranging than the faute non-intentionnelle in criminal law: despite the criminal law judges expressly rejecting the latter, the judges of the civil

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2.

3. 4.

5.

law still remain free to rely on the former (Cass.civ. 30 January 2001, Bull.civ. 2001, I, no. 19; JCP 2001, I, 338, obs. Viney). Moreover CP art. 121-3(4) has appreciably modified the previously prevailing doctrine that the concept of faute is uniform in both the civil law and criminal law. The test taken to establish negligence in BELGIUM revolves around the assessment of whether a person acted in a manner contrary to that expected of the ordinary prudent person acting with foresight (the bonus pater familias) (van Gerven, Verbintenissenrecht II7, 298) who finds himself in the same situation as the defendant (Cass. 30 April 1976, RW 1976-77, 1709). More specifically, a distinction is made between external and internal factors. However, only the external circumstances are taken into account. They include, for example, the time and place of the occurrence, the prevailing weather conditions and the social status and education of the defendant. The internal factors include age, sex, intelligence, character and temperament (van Gerven loc. cit. 300). A faute is committed only by a person with capacity to commit the tort and to whom tortious liability can be imputed in respect of their act or omission. This is known as the subjective element of faute (Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Wynant/Debaene, TPR 2000, 1688). The capacity of children is determined in each individual case; for adults suffering from a mental impairment CC art. 1386bis provides for an obligation to compensate where it is just and reasonable. Under MALTESE CC art. 1032(1) “a person shall be deemed to be in fault if, in his own acts, he does not use the prudence, diligence, and attention of a bonus paterfamilias”. In SPAIN, culpa o negligencia (CC art. 1902) is defined, by reference to the notion contained in CC art. 1104, as the infringement of a duty of care (e. g. TS 9 April 1963, RAJ 1963 (1) no. 1964 p. 1217; Reglero Campos, Responsabilidad civil3, 235; Peña López, La culpabilidad en la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, 443). The applicable standard of care is defined in a corresponding manner by case law and legal scholarship by recourse to CC art. 1104(2), which requires that a person acts in the same manner as a buen padre de familia would have acted in the circumstances of the case. The standard of care is determined abstractly according to objective criteria (Paz-Ares/Díez-Picazo/ Bercovitz/Salvador (-Badosa Coll), Código Civil II2, 41; Díez-Picazo, Derecho de daños, 360). The judiciary has, however, heightened the required standard of care on many occasions (see Introduction to Chapter III B5). As regards risky occupational or commercial activities, the yardstick of the bonus paterfamiliasis is not decisive; instead a higher standard of care is imposed, measured according to the conduct of a member of a relevant group of experts in each case (e. g. TS 9 April 1963, RAJ 1963 (1) no. 1964 p. 1217; TS 28 April 1992, RAJ 1992 (3) no. 4466 p. 5917; TS 23 March 1993, RAJ 1993 (2) no. 2545 p. 3291; TS 3 May 1997, RAJ 1997 (2) no. 3668 p. 5546). Under the rubric of negligence ITALIAN law differentiates between (CP art. 43(1)) colpa generica (causing damage through inattentiveness, carelessness or solecism) and the colpa specifica (causing damage which results from breach of a statutory rule of beahaviour). Colpa generica postulates the foreseeability of resulting damage and the possibility of its avoidance and both are decisive. The test for foreseeability is based on the knowledge of the average citizen and on the special knowledge of the defendant which extends beyond the former. It is sometimes maintained that allowances can be made for below average knowledge or ability in individual cases (Alpa, Trattato di diritto civile IV, 246; Bussani, La colpa soggettiva, 1-25). From a theoretical viewpoint, this proposition is not easily reconciled with the prevailing objective definition of negli-

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6.

7.

588

gence which legal scholarship is equally inclined to endorse (Bianca, Diritto civile V, 576; Alpa, loc. cit. 240). One of the basic principles in the HUNGARIAN CC § 4(4) is formulated so as to require that in the context of private law, unless statute imposes stricter requirements, a person must conduct himself or herself in a manner that can be generally expected in the given situation. No person should benefit from his own blameworthy conduct; but such conduct does not per se preclude a claim in damages against another who for his or her part acted in a blameworthy manner. An autonomous theory of negligence has not developed. Even in academic commentary the concept of negligence is only rarely defined (e. g. by Lábady, A magyar magánjog (polgári jog) általános része, 309). The reason for this is that Hungarian tort law utilises the concept of the objectively assessed “blameworthiness” instead of intention and negligence. The defendant must prove the absence of blameworthiness (CC § 339(1)). Nonetheless, it is also maintained that the wording in CC § 4(4) epitomises the Hungarian equivalent to the bonus et diligens paterfamilias or reasonable man which are features of other European legal systems (Lábady loc. cit. 144-145; Bíró and Lenkovics, Általános tanok, 98-101) and accordingly, this provision has to be drawn on in order to interpret CC § 339(1) (Lábady loc. cit.). Under POLISH tort law, negligence (wina nieumys´lna, niedbalstwo) is tied to the notion of due care. Some commentators consider conduct is negligent, if it does not meet the required standard of care and is reproachable in the circumstances of the case. Whereas the compliance with the required standard of care is judged by reference to the objective or abstract touchstone of the careful person (careful driver, careful doctor, etc.), disregarding strictly personal characteristics, reproachability depends on those personal characteristics, e. g. the state of mind (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛s´c´ ogólna7, 197-198). Other writers simply equate negligence with lack of due care in the particular circumstances of the case, subject to a reservation for the general requisites for fault such as age or soundness of mind (Czachórski, Zobowia˛zania10, 238-240). The required standard of care is set out in CC art. 355 § 1, according to which the debtor is obliged to take the care generally required in such circumstances; CC art. 355 § 2 raises the standard of care as it provides that the due care of a debtor pursuing a business activity is to be determined having regard to the professional character of the activity. Despite the use of the term “debtor” the majority of commentators as well as the case law treat the rule as applicable also to tort liability (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak loc. cit. 197; Pietrzykowski (-Safjan), Kodeks cywilny I4, art. 355 p. 847). Art. 6 of the SLOVENIAN LOA displays cognate tendencies. The remaining codifications in Central and Eastern Europe also avoid a statutory definition of negligence and also forego a definition of the required standard of care. However, it is also commonplace to define negligence according to objective criteria (for a detailed exposition e. g. for BULGARIA see Konov, Osnovanie na grajdanskata otgovornost, 133). Under the GERMAN CC § 276(2) a person acts negligently if he or she disregards the standard of due care expected in the circumstances. The decisive yardstick is not typical care; rather it is emphasised that due care must be taken. In contrast to the criminal law, an abstract objective yardstick is utilised (BGH 21 May 1963, BGHZ 39, 281, 283; BGH 17 March 1981, BGHZ 80, 186, 193; BGH 26 January 1989, BGHZ 106, 323, 330; BGH 20 October 1987, NJW 1988, 909; BGH 11 April 2000, NJW 2000, 2812; BGH 13 February 2001, NJW 2001, 1786). Consequently, in principle, it does not depend on the care that the individual defendant can muster (Medicus, Schuldrecht I16, no. 309).

Article 3:102: Negligence

8.

9.

10.

Special knowledge or skills of the defendant raise the required standard of care to a higher level. Moreover, pursuing a particular occupation, belonging to a particular age group and the level of education are significant factors in determining the standard of due care, as are legal provisions (for example, road traffic legislation), regulations pertaining to prevention of accidents, technical norms and even rules of sport, if the latter can assist in concretising the concept of negligence (Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB66, § 276, no. 15). Important elements of the test of negligence are foreseeability and avoidability of the unlawful result (Erman (-Westermann), BGB I11, § 276, no. 13). Forseeability relates to the injury, not to the damaging consequences (Heinrichs loc. cit. no. 20). An error as to the prohibited nature of an act can equally ground liability in negligence. A graduated distinction is drawn between gross, mere and slight negligence. Gross negligence denotes conduct which has deviated to an unusually high degree from the required standard of care, i. e. there is a disregard of circumstances which would have been clear to anyone in the same situation (BGH 11 May 1953, BGHZ 10, 14, 16). In addition CC § 277 recognises “the care, that the defendant would have customarily exercised in his own affairs” (the diligentia quam in suis rebus adhiberi solet). AUSTRIAN law also recognises that intention and negligence are constituents of fault (CC § 1294); negligence is established when an objective standard of due care is subjectively flouted on the wrongdoer’s part (OGH 1 March 1988, ZVR 1989/64, RS 0 022399). The requirements of care developed in case law are, comparatively speaking, lenient (e. g. OGH 10 April 1997, ZVR 1998/92, RS 0 107618 and OGH 26 March 1987, ZVR 1989/28, RS 0 023787). In respect of a number of discrete professions for which particular expertise is required stricter standards of care are imposed (CC § 1299) – for example, for lawyers (OGH 11 November 1971, EvBl 1972/124, RS 0 038663) and for medical consultants (OGH 4 February 1959, JBl 1960, 188, RS 0 026598: the skill and knowledge of a general practitioner is not measured against that of a consultant). GREEK CC art. 330 tallies with the German CC § 276(2). A person, who disregards the standard of due care, is negligent. An objective standard of care applies (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Stathopoulos), art. 330, no. 30). The care required to be taken is that which an average member of the profession or average citizen would exercise as the case may be (Stathopoulos loc. cit. no. 33; Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio III, 160). PORTUGUESE law also defines negligence as the disregard of the standard of due care (Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 533; Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 573; STJ 2 February 2006). A distinction is made between culpa consciente and culpa inconsciente. “Conscious” negligence is established when an individual knows that he or she is behaving in an improper manner, but owing to carelessness or over confidence does not amend his or her behaviour accordingly. In contrast, “inadvertent” negligence is given when a person, owing to carelessness or inattentiveness, does not realise that he or she will probably cause damage to another by the conduct (Antunes Varela loc. cit. 573; Pessoa Jorge, Ensaio sobre os pressupostos da responsabilidade civil, 331). The extent of the required standard of care is derived from CC arts. 487(2) and 799(2); the decisive factor is the question of what a bonus paterfamilias would have done or would have omitted to do, if he found himself in the same situation as the tortfeasor (STJ 19 September 2006). A slight degree of negligence suffices (STJ 27 May 1997, BolMinJus 467 [1997] 565). Ordinary care is not a determining factor; the pertinent question is what measures were necessary in the circumstances to avoid causing the damage (An-

589

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12.

13.

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tunes Varela loc. cit. 574; Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, art. 487(2) no. 2; STJ 23 September 1998, CJ(ST) VI [1998-3] 32; STJ 12 February 2004 and STJ 30 October 2002). Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the special requirements for care in particular occupations, if a doctor acts according to what is customary in the practise of surgery, but the results of his performance were harmful to a patient, this will not be a case of medical negligence (CA Lisbon 27 October 1998, CJ XXIII [1998-4] 130). In respect of the standard of care of lawyers, see STJ 10 May 2001. In DUTCH law while the distinction between intention and negligence is not a facet of the basic norm of tort law (CC art. 6:162), the disparity between the two grounds for the attribution of liability plays a decisive role in an array of other regulations, e. g. in the context of CC art. 6:98 (Definition of the nature of damage for which liability to pay compensation arises), CC art. 6:101 (reduction of damages owing to contributory negligence), CC art. 6:106 (Liability for non-pecuniary loss), CC art. 6:108 (Right of the social insurer to initiate an action for contribution) and CC art. 6:109 (reduction in liaibility in the case of slight fault). The Code only uses the term negligence (nalatigheid) in company law (CC arts. 2:9, 2:138 and 2:48), and not in tort law. The concept remains undefined in company law. ESTONIAN LOA § 104(3) adopts a contrasting position (“Carelessness is failure to exercise necessary care”) and CC § 104(4) (“Gross negligence is failure to exercise necessary care to a material extent”). A person is negligent, if he or she does not conduct himself or herself as a reasonably careful person would have acted in the given situation. LOA § 1050(2) adds that liability cannot be attibuted to individuals, who lack capacity to recognise the wrongfulness of their actions, unless they had put themselves in this position as a result of their fault. Legal scholarship derives from this the premise that the concept of negligence is subjective and therefore it is argued that account should be taken of the personal characteristics of the actor (Lahe, Fault in the Law of Delict, passim; Lahe, Juridica International 2004, 108; Lahe, Juridica 2002, 30; Lahe, Juridica International 2001, 125. LATVIAN CC art. 1644(1) provides: “If a person inflicts harm upon another without wrongful intent, if such person is at fault for the wrong, then he or she acted negligently”. A distinction is drawn between gross and ordinary negligence (CC arts. 1644(2), 1645 and 1646). Ordinary negligence suffices for the imposition of liability in tort (CC art. 1649(1)). “Ordinary negligence shall be considered to be that lack of care and due diligence as must be observed by any reasonably prudent and careful person” (CC art. 1646). LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.246(1) differentiates as Article 3:102 does between statutory specifications of negligence and the “general duty of care”. In the NORDIC countries, there is no statutory definition of negligence. Nonetheless, there is consensus that negligence should be defined objectively and therefore in principle no account is taken of the personal characteristics and abilities of the wrongdoer (Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 45; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 61; Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 55). In respect of straightforward activities SWEDISH case law appears to make an exception (e. g. Swedish HD 14 August 1948, NJA 1948, 489 [illustration 2 above: negligence denied; in more detail in e. g. Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 138 and Vinding Kruse loc. cit. 128] as well as DANISH Western CA 16 October 1967, UfR 1968, 133). Apart from this, it will depend, in the abstract, on how a reasonable person would have acted in the same situation. In clarifying the concept of negligence, recourse is also had to statutory

Article 3:102: Negligence

14.

provisions, public policy, customs and prior case law (Bengtsson and Strömbäck loc. cit. 46). If the wrongdoer knew that an accident had already occurred on an earlier occasion, it is expected that he or she take particular care in acting (FINNISH Supreme Court 17 June 1981, HD 1981 II 84). In an overall weighting, account is taken of the probability of damage, the type and extent of the probable damage, the avoidability of the damage and the recognition of the respective dangers for wrongdoer and victim (Hellner and Johansson loc. cit. 130; SWEDISH HD 4 June 1981, NJA 1981, 683; HD 9 March 1967, NJA 1967, 164 and HD 14 April 1987, NJA 1987, 222). Socially desirable conduct is treated less strictly than anti-social behaviour (Swedish HD 25 June 1958, NJA 1958, 461; (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 44; Vinding Kruse loc. cit. 52). In ENGLAND questions of negligence in the sense of a breach of a duty of care feature most prominently within the tort of negligence itself, to which the decision in Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 gave modern shape, and cognate torts which are based on a breach of a duty to take care (such as occupiers’ liability). Within negligence a defendant is regarded as having breached the duty of care when his conduct fell below the legally required standard which is the that of a reasonable and prudent person: Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale and Jones), Torts19, 8-119. Despite dissenting views in the case law, this objective standard is ordinarily not tempered by regard to the personal weaknesses or inexperience of the defendant: Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority [1987] QB 730 (CA); [1988] AC 1074 (HL) (trainee hospital doctor working in a special care unit held to standards required for such specialist work); Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 2 QB 691 (CA) (learner driver’s “incompetent best” insufficient: “He must drive in as good a manner as a driver of skill, experience and care, who is sound in mind and limb, who makes no errors of judgment, has good eyesight and hearing, and is free from any infirmity.” Pace Lord Denning MR, also stating that this high standard was a move towards no-fault liability for the policy reason of better [insured] risk allocation). The same is true where the defendant is physically unable to provide the required care: Barnet v. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428 (doctor negligent despite fatigue and illness). The case is otherwise, however, where the inability arises suddenly and the defendant had no reason to be aware of it: Mansfield v. Weetabix Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1263 (driver suffering from hypoglycaemia). However, while generally irrelevant, the defendant’s lack of resources may be material where damage results from a public body in relation to provision of a public service which it is bound to provide. In determining whether the defendant has breached the duty of care regard will be had to the likelihood of harm resulting from such acts or omissions, assessed at the time the incident causing damage occurred, and the potential severity of such harm, the costs of taking precautions and the social utility that would be sacrificed by taking precautions: see Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale and Jones), Torts19, 8-131 et seq. Departure from common practice as regards safety precautions is regarded as strongly indicative (but not conclusive) evidence of negligence; compliance with common practice, conversely, is evidence that due care was taken provided that practice did not create unreasonable risks: loc. cit., 8-144. Where, e. g. in relation to professional standards, there are two schools of thought, compliance with one accepted practice suffices (Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582; Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634) unless that practice involves unreasonable risk.

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IRISH law, which also differentiates between negligence (or carelessness) as a pillar of

16.

fault and the tort of negligence as such has adopted essentially the same approach as in England: see generally McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, Ch. 7. Thus on the objective standard of the reasonable person a driver crashing into another’s vehicle after an epileptic attack will have been negligent if he had had symptoms beforehand and failed to react: O’Brien v. Parker [1997] 2 ILRM 170. Liability for negligence under SCOTS law is also derived from Donoghue v. Stevenson (no. 14 above), cited as M’Allister v. Stevenson. Here too the test of reasonableness is regarded as eliminating consideration of the defendant’s personal idiosyncrasies: Glasgow Corporation v. Muir [1943] AC 448, 457 (Lord Macmillan). The defence of inevitable accident remains, however: cf. Waugh v. James K. Allan Ltd. 1964 SLT 173 (driver suffering coronary thrombosis).

II.

Negligent omissions

17.

In all legal systems of the Member States it is nowadays self evident that negligent conduct can also also encompass omissions and need not merely denote a positive act. This truism is only expressly anchored in a number of Civil Codes (e. g. in AUSTRIAN CC § 1294, MALTESE CC art. 1033, SPANISH CC art. 1902, PORTUGUESE CC art. 486 and LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.246(1)). Others have left it to special provisions, which stipulate an obligaton to supervise defined individuals or things in a number of given situations. Initially, therefore, liability for negligent omissions had to carve out a position for itself gradually under the basic norms of tort law. This is true for e. g. FRANCE, BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG CC arts. 1382 and 1383 which speak of faute, imprudence and négligence. Based on the wording of the provisions, it cannot be conclusively asserted, that these concepts are exclusively confined to positive acts. Nonetheless the present guiding principle, namely that tort liability can arise from an act as well as from an omission, was contentious for a long time. It became firmly entrenched only after the second world war (see for France Cass.civ. 27 February 1951, D. 1951, 329, for Belgium Dalcq, Responsabilité civile I2, nos. 356-366 and for Luxemburg Cour 23 December 1971, Pas. luxemb. 22 [1972] 93). In contrast the text of the SPANISH CC art. 1902 does not leave any room for doubt, given that any person “who by action or omission causes damage to another by fault or negligence is obliged to compensate the damage caused”. Of course this does not preclude a distinction between the discrete variant types of omissions and subjecting them to different rules. In any event, some commentators see a fundamental difference between omissions arising as a consequence of an antecedent positive act and the “pure” or “simple” omission (de Ángel Yágüez, Tratado de responsabilidad civil3, 257; Lacruz Berdejo and Rivero Hernández, Elementos II(2)4, 466). TS 9 March 2000, RAJ 2000 (1) no. 1183 p. 1861 is an example of the first category (Liability of a doctor who omitted to inquire of his patient whether he was allergic to the drug which was eventually administered). In this case no special requirements would apply. However, in respect of “pure omissions” intention is a prerequiste (de Ángel loc. cit.). This doctrine is by no means undisputed and is possibly also not prevailing legal scholarly opinion (Lacruz Berdejo and Rivero Hernández loc. cit.; Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 110). Other voices suggest it depends on whether the defendant was subject to a particular obligation to act prior to the ensuing result (Albaladejo (-Santos Briz), Comentarios al

18.

592

Article 3:102: Negligence

19.

20.

21.

Código Civil y compilaciones forales XXIV, 103). If such an obligation is missing, the omisson must either flow from the intention to inflict damage or otherwise not correspond to what could have normally been required from the defendant in the circumstances of the case (Lete del Río, Derecho de obligaciones II3, 187; Lacruz Berdejo and Rivero Hernández loc. cit. 466; de Ángel Yágüez loc. cit. 257). The principle that an unlawful act can be established either as a result of a positive act or omission is also the approach adopted in ITALIAN law. A distinction is made between an omissione propria (the violation of an express statutory obligation in respect of a positive act) and an omissione impropria (the infringement of a general duty of care, which is linked with CP art. 40(2), whereby causation is established when a person fails to hinder a result despite being legally obliged to do so Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile3, 319). The judiciary examine in the first instance whether a statutory duty to avoid the damaging outcome existed. The violation of the duty makes the application of CC art. 2043 possible. However, the judiciary also regard as sufficient the violation of a duty to act postively which is based on a legal transaction or if the defendant did not adhere to a duty of protection which was compelling in the given circumstances of the case (Cass. 29 July 2004, no. 14484, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, 7-8; Cass. 1 December 2004, no. 22588, Giust.civ.Mass. 2005, fasc. 1; Cass. 23 May 2006, no. 12111, Danno e resp. 2007, 163; Alpa, Trattato di diritto civile IV, 265-267). It is contended in HUNGARY that in principle an omission is only unlawful if there was a statutory or contractual duty to act (Gellért (-Kemenes), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1227 and 1230). Liability for omissions arises only if there was a positive legal duty to act which was violated (Marton, A polgári jogi felelo˝sség, 128-129). Certainly, in this context, an omission is causal for the resulting damage (Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 65; Marton loc. cit.; Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 51-52, 63; Bárdos, Kárfelelo˝sség a Polgári Törvénykönyv rendszerében, 52-53; Szalma, Okozatosság és polgári jogi felelo˝sség, 76). The duty to act positively does not have to be subject of a specific statutory provision, rather such an obligation can be derived from the general axiom to respect the interests of others, see the extensive case law on the subject, e. g. BH 2003/152; BH 2002/435; BH 2002/266; BH 2002/227; BH 2002/185; BH 2000/445; BH 2000/198; BH 1998/131; BH 1996/530 (in casu action denied) and BH 1994/596. In POLAND too there is no doubt that an unlawful omission may give rise to tortious liability. An omission is unlawful if it constitutes a breach of a statutory duty (SN 19 February 2003, LEX no. 121742). Whether unlawfulness may also result from a breach of a duty of action stemming from the principles of community life (zasady współz˙ycia społecznego) is controversial (see in support Czachórski and Ignatowicz, System prawa cywilnego III, 1, 534; contra Pietrzykowski (-Banaszczyk), Kodeks cywilny I4, art. 415 p. 1092, arguing that the principles are not precise enough). In GERMANY similar principles apply. In this jurisdiction too the factual elements of a tort can be fulfilled by either a positive act or an omission (Erman (-Schiemann), BGB I10, § 823, no. 13). However, an omission is then only unlawful if the wrongdoer has breached a legal duty to act (Palandt (-Thomas), BGB66, § 823, no. 35). The duty to act can derive from: statute, contract, an antecedent act which increased the risk of danger, a close relationship in the sense of family law, initiation of contractual negotiations, or, above all, from the general principle that every person who, within the scope of his responsibility. creates a source of danger or allows it to continue must do everything necessary in the circumstances of the case to prevent the realisation of the danger. Via

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23.

24.

594

this concept of liability for the violation of a Vehrkehrspflicht (the duty to be observed in various situations of social interaction), which is a creature of case law, the statutory obligations to act in CC §§ 823(2), 831-838 which are of themselves narrowly defined have expanded greatly. In essence the only remaining question is whether the general duty of care (CC § 276) requires a postive act (von Bar, Verkehrspflichten, passim; see the very extensive case law on the subject) e. g. BGH 8 November 2005, NJW 2006, 610 (regarding the Verkehrspflicht of the proprietor of a theatre in respect of a shot fired in the air by an actor during a performance). The Verkehrssicherungspflichten are special instances of the duty to be observed in various situations of social interaction and comprise of the duty to take appropriate measures to ensure safety on property to which the public have access. AUSTRIAN CC § 1294 expressly provides that damage can be caused by acts as well as omissions. However, liability in respect of the consequences of an omission only arises when the defendant is under a legal duty to prevent the damage (von Zeiller, Commentar zum ABGB III, 702 [no. 2 under CC § 1294]; see OGH 13 December 1966, SZ 39/170 and OGH 15 January 1986, SZ 59/7, RS 0 022458). An positive duty may derive from statute (CC § 1311; on this point see OGH 16 September 1999, JBl 2000, 113, RS 0 112533, note Fötschl, VersRAI 2001, 24), from contract or from an antecedent act aggravating risk (Ingerenz) (Rummel (-Reischauer) ABGB II2, § 1294 no. 4). In GREECE, legal scholarship and the judiciary are in agreement that omissions can also constitute relevant conduct under tort law in the sense of CC art. 914; the fact that the provision is silent on this issue is of no account. Affirmative legal duties are again derived from statute, contract or from the tenets of Ingerenz (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 914, nos. 27-30). Moreover in Greece, the principle applies that every person who creates a dangerous situation or allows it to persist is obliged to take all necessary measures to ensure that others are not harmed (e. g. A. P. 250/1956, ArchN 7 [1957] 451; A. P. 343/1968, NoB 16 [1968] 943; A. P. 854/1974, NoB 23 [1975] 479; CA Athens 1773/1982, Arm 37 [1983] 215; CA Athens 46/1985, EllDik 26 [1985] 511). In addition it is accepted that a positive duty to act can also be derived from the tenets of good faith and the prevailing precepts of a generally accepted social standard (see essentially A. P. 510/1959, NoB 8 [1960] 251; A. P. 343/1968, NoB 116 [1968] 943 and A. P. 854/1974, NoB 23 [1975] 479; more recent case law e. g. CA Athens 12263/ 1990, NoB 39 [1991] 583; CFI Athens 9286/1985, Arm 40 [1986] 501 and A. P. 81/1991, EllDik 32 [1991] 1215). In both cases, similar to the German position, this points to duties to be observed in various situations of social interaction and duties to ensure the safety of third parties (Filios, Enochiko Dikaio II(2)4, 35; Eleftheriadou, Die Haftung aus Verkehrspflichtverletzung im deutschen und griechischen Deliktsrecht, passim). PORTUGUESE CC art. 486 provides that “a simple omission”, independent of other statutory prerequisites, can only give rise to liability if it an affimative duty to act can be derived from a statute or a legal transaction. A positive duty to act under tort law can arise in particular under ancillary contractual obligations, e. g. a duty to ensure the safety of fans attending a football match (CA Lisbon 17 October 2002, CJ XXVII [2002-4] 97) or the duty of a hospital to ensure that a mentally impaired patient who absconded was brought back to the in-patient treatment centre. STJ 25 July 1985, BolMinJus 349 [1985] 516; see also STJ 22 September 2005). DUTCH CC art. 6:162(2) also expressly distinguishes between acts and omissions, but, in substance, it treats both forms of conduct as equivalent in principle. “Saving grounds for justification, the fol-

Article 3:102: Negligence

25.

26.

lowing acts are deemed to be wrongful, the infringement of a right, an act or omission violating a statutory duty or conduct contrary to the standard of conduct seemly in society”. This corresponds in all essential points to the LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.246(1). The NORDIC legal systems proceed from the premise that omissions do not establish liability and thereafter define numerous exceptions to this rule. A positive duty to act can be derived, in the first instance, from statutes (Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 106). Such statutory obligations to act are found, for example, in the Swedish criminal code (negligent manslaughter, the consequence of an omission HD 26 May 2005, NJA 2005, 372), in the Public Road Act [Väglagen] § 26; Control of Air Pollution Act [Renhållningslagen] §§ 18 and 19 and in the Parental Code [Föräldrabalk] chap. 6 § 2(2)(iii). Moreover, duties to act can also be contractual (e. g. HD 9 September 1932, NJA 1932, 457 [landlord fails to remove ice from the tenant’s tap; the tenant slips on the icy patch] and HD 19 December 1995, NJA 1995, 720 [failure to fulfil promise to lay waterpipes, damage resulting to neighbour; see Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 47]). Finally, it is recognised that a duty to act can be created by virtue of a prior act which aggravates risk: the wrongdoer is obliged to take appropriate measures to counteract the danger which has arisen (HD 14 December 1935, NJA 1935, 636). The same is true of DENMARK (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 111, 117; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 69 and HD 9 April 1975, UfR 1975, 504 [liability of organisers of events]) and of FINLAND (Supreme Court 10 October 1991, HD 1991:138 [road maintenance; failure to signify the existence of a pit ]; Supreme Court 6 October 1997, HD 1997:151 [build up of ice on the street following a burst water pipe, no warning sign was displayed nor was salt placed on the roads] and Supreme Court 4 October 1996, HD 1996:117 [a 13 year old girl was found not liable in negligence when she failed to prevent her playmate from negligently setting fire to a building and failed to warn the property owner]). In ENGLAND the fundamental principle of the Common Law is that liability is not imposed for “pure omissions”: Smith v. Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] 2 AC 241, 247 (Lord Goff), and for examples in dicta see Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004 at 1027 (Viscount Dilhorne) and 1060 (Lord Diplock). Where, however, a person has created a danger, even if through no fault of their own, that person will come under a duty to prevent injury resulting from that danger: e. g. a manufacturer discovering that a product, which is already in circulation, contains some defect or feature likely to injure must take reasonable steps to warn customers (E. Hobbs (Farms) Ltd. v. Baxenden Chemical Co. Ltd. [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 54, 65. Exceptionally a duty to take affirmative action may be justified by a special reason. This may be based on the protective nature of the relationship between the parties: affirmative duties are thus imposed, for example, on occupiers of land in relation to their visitors, custodial authorities in relation to detainees, and parents and schools in relation to children (outlined in Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale and Jones), Torts19, 8-48). A positive duty to act may also arise out of a voluntary (express or implied) assumption of responsibility; a failure to act renders the defendant liable for the loss which the claimant has suffered in reliance on the defendant’s undertaking to act: Bromley London Borough Council v. Ellis [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 97 (insurance broker, acting gratuitously, failed to warn of cancellation of claimant’s insurance policy) and consider also Mercer v. South Eastern & Chatham Railways Companies’ Management Committee [1922] 2 KB 549 (practice of closing pedestrian gate

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27.

28.

alongside vehicular level crossing, though no statutory duty to do so, created public expectation that it was safe to cross when gate was unlocked). Finally, a duty to prevent a third party causing damage to another may arise e. g. because the defendant has control over the third party (e. g. Carmarthenshire County Council v. Lewis [955] AC 549 [motorist injured swerving to avoid toddler which the local authority’s nursery had allowed to wander out of school]) or is responsible for danger which, to the defendant’s knowledge, the third party might utilise (Haynes v. Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146 [horsedrawn van left unattended in a street; horses bolding when child threw stone at the horses]; P. Perl (Exporters) Ltd v. Camden London Borough Council [1984] QB 342, 359 per Goff LJ: allowing a drunk to drive defendant’s car; but no liability for failing to secure property against intruders who thereby obtain access to and damaging third party property). The IRISH law on liability for negligent omissions is the same on all essential points to that of England: see generally McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, Ch. 8. Thus a positive duty to act in tort law can be derived from an employer-employee relationship: see for example on this point the duty to protect an employee from bullying by colleagues considered in Quigley v. Complex Tooling & Moulding [2005] IEHC 71. In SCOTLAND broadly the same approach is applied as in England: there is no liability for pure omissions, but only liability for an omission in breach of a legal duty to act and a duty of care to prevent harm may arise out of the defendant’s own careless conduct: Walker, Delict2, 33, 35-36; Thomson, Delictual Liability3, 71-72. However, it is arguable that Scots law is more inclined to impose on a property owners a duty to prevent their property being used by third parties to cause damage to others: for details see Stewart, Delict3, 5.40-5.43.

III.

Breach of statutory duty

29.

Under BELGIAN, FRENCH and LUXEMBURGIAN law the breach of a statutory standard of conduct only grounds per se the existence of a faute provided that the defendant commits the breach librement et consciemment (Cass. 3 October 1994, Pas. belge 1994, I, no. 412 p. 788; Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité2, no. 448 pp. 327330). Prevailing legal opinion has rejected the theory of relativité aquilienne, according to which the breach of a statutory standard of behaviour only establishes a causal faute when the aggrieved party is a member of the class which the provision is geared towards protecting (see further Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité, 157 and 318 and Cornelis, Responsabilité extra-contractuelle, 65; cf. also Cass.civ. 27 October 1975, GazPal 1976, I, 169, note Plancqueel). It is even understood as a special feature of CC art. 1382 since this provision establishes a general protective norm for every person who suffers damage because another did not adhere to the law, irrespective of whether the applicable statute was designed to protect the injured party or otherwise (Ravarani, La responsabilité civile2, 711). In contrast, the legal position in SPAIN corresponds to Article 3:102(a): namely the breach of a particular standard of care as provided by the statutory provision only grounds the charge of negligence when the purpose of the provision breached was the protection of the injured party from the damage suffered (Díez-Picazo, Derecho de daños, 360; TS 27 April 1992, RAJ 1992 [2] no. 3414 p. 4519). On the other hand, the compliance with defined statutory specifications does not automatically mean that the

30.

596

Article 3:102: Negligence

31.

32.

observance of the general duty of care is always regarded as given. Rather, the Tribunal Supremo has pronounced in numereous decisions that CC art. 1902 not only requires the care and attention as prescribed by the specific statute, but it also always requires that measures are taken which the bonus paterfamilias would have taken in the circumstances of the case (TS 3 May 1997, RAJ 1997 [2] no. 3668 p. 5546; TS 24 December 1992, RAJ 1992 [5] no. 10656 p. 13899; TS 19 December 1992, RAJ 1992 [5] no. 10703 p. 13990). The ITALIAN civil law abstains from defining negligence and therefore, as a starting point, resort must be had to CP art. 43(3). According to this provision a criminal offence is committed in a negligent manner when the result was not desired by the wrongdoer, but was the product of inattentiveness, carelessness, or solecism or resulted from a breach of Acts, Regulations, Statutory Orders or Rules. This proposition holds true even if the result may have been foreseen by the wrongdoer. In the first instance a colpa generica is established, in the second (breach of statutes, etc.) colpa specifica. It is emphasised that colpa specifica can only arise under provisions which have as their purpose the avoidance of certain damage. Only under these conditions can one speak of a colpa per inosservanza di leggi which is relevant for liability (Visintini, I fatti illeciti II2, 62; Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, 127). If these prerequisites are given, then negligence in re ipsa is established (Cass. 9 June 1995, no. 6542, Giur.it. 1996, I, 1, 191; Cass. 13 May 1997, no. 4186, Giust.civ.Mass. 1997, 722 [in each case unlawful administrative acts]; Cass.sez.un. 29 July 1995, no. 8300, Giur.it. 1996, I, 1, 328, note Musy [Violation of CC art. 844]). The breach of a statute as such constitutes negligence because the legislator has already statutorily clarified questions of foreseeability and the required standard of care. Nonetheless, the existence of a causal nexus between the breach of the norm and the damage sustained needs to be examined (Franzoni loc. cit. 127; Cass. 4 September 1981, no. 5051, Giust.civ.Mass. 1981, fasc. 9; Cass. 20 March 1998, no. 2980, Giust.civ.Mass. 1998, 626; Cass. 26 Januar 1990, no. 480, Giust.civ.Mass. 1990, fasc. 1). In order to establish causation the question has to be asked whether the purpose of the breached statutory provision was to protect the injured person from the damage suffered (Visintini loc. cit. 63). The starting point under HUNGARIAN tort law is that the infliction of damage is prohibited by law and that therefore every infliction of damage is unlawful unless otherwise provided by law. It is envisaged that this principle will be expressly adapted in the new Civil Code (http://www.parlament.hu/irom38/05949/05949.pdf). A provision along the lines of Article 3:102(a) is thus unnecessary. Moreover, the theory of the protective purpose rule (under which only damage, which the violated statute was designed to hinder, is recoverable) has not taken root. In principle a causal nexus in respect of the damage inflicted suffices to establish liability. Of course related questions can implicitly arise in the analysis of causation and above all concerning the question as to whether the defendant can relieve himself of liability by arguing a lack of blameworthiness (Petrik (-Harmathy), Polgári jog II2, 570; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 49). Nothing in the general formula of POLISH CC art. 415 corresponds to Article 3:102(a). Some scholars take the view that in principle every infringement of a statutory rule is unlawful (subject to exceptions such as self-defence) irrespective of whether the injured party or the damage sustained falls within the protective range of the rule (Czachórski, System prawa cywilnego III, 1, 533-534; Safjan, FS Maksymilian Pazdan, 1329; SN 22 February 2006, OSNC 2006, poz. 123). Liability arises if the other party is at fault (i. e. breach of the statutory rule resulted from negligence) and the infringement and the damage are

597

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33.

34.

35.

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causally linked. On the other hand, a large number of commentaries adhere to the concept of “relative” unlawfulness, according to which an act or omission is unlawful vis-à-vis an injured person only if the person belongs to the group for whose protection the rule had been made (and the same applies to the type of inflicted damage – see Kasprzyk, Stud.Prawn. 1988, 149, 150-151, 165, 171; SN 27 April 2001, OSNC 2001, poz. 161). GERMAN CC § 823(2)(i) provides that the violation of a law which has as its aim the protection of another is one type of unlawful act. Therefore, a person who violates a statute, is liable under this provision only when the statute was geared towards protecting the person injured from the damage suffered. For example, legal provisions concerning clearways near construction sites are not geared towards protecting building contractors from loss of earnings (BGH 18 November 2003, MDR 2004, 274). On the other hand, numerous provisions of the Civil Code have been recognised as Schutzgesetze (e. g. CC §§ 226, 618, 858, 906-909 and 1004). Further archetypes of protective laws can be found in the Criminal Code (e. g. CP §§ 123 [trespass to property], 185 [defamation], 263 [fraud], 266 [breach of trust] and 306 [arson]) and in the Road Traffic Ordinance (e. g. provisions relating to maximum speed limits, keeping a minimum distance behind vehicles, prohibition on overtaking et al.) (see further MünchKomm (-Wagner), BGB4, § 823, no. 357). CC § 823(2) does not regard the violation of a protective law as a manifestation of negligence; it is treated instead as a manifestation of unlawfulnesss. Liability under CC § 823(2)(ii) therefore depends on whether the violation of the statute was a consequence of negligence or intention. Under AUSTRIAN CC § 1311 second sentence a person is liable, who culpably infringes a law which seeks to prevent “incidental injuries” (OGH 26 April 1977, ZVR 1978/ 42; OGH 6 July 1978, SZ 51/109). However, the wrongdoer’s fault is presumed in cases of the violation of a protective law. This presumption can be rebutted (OGH 6 July 1978 loc. cit.; OGH 31. 8. 1984, SZ 57/134; OGH 14. 1. 2004, 7 Ob 276, 03v). In practice, while possible in theory, adducing exculpatory evidence hardly ever succeeds (Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VI3, § 1311 no. 36). The concept of a protective law is given a very broad interpretation. It is not exclusively confined to parliamentary legislation and encompasses all types of legal norms. Even an administrative act (e.g a Bescheid) can fall within its remit (see OGH 25 February 1982, ZVR 1983/35). The decisive question is whether the applicable legal provision pursues, in terms of its substance, a protective aim for the benefit of private individuals (OGH 17 April 1969, ZVR 1969/330; OGH 15 October 1978, ZVR 1979/283). As a matter of substance, protective laws comprise a prohibition on conduct which is dangerous in the abstract, the aim of these prohibitions being to safeguard certain individuals or classes of individuals against an infringement of their legal interests (Harrer loc. cit. no. 9; OGH 22 August 1996, SZ 69/188). Liability is restricted to the damage which the protective norm was intended to avoid. Discrete provisions of the Civil Code can also themselves constitute protective laws (e. g. CC § 154(3)). For further examples, see for instance OGH 15 February 1983, JBl 1983, 373; OGH 21 October 1987, 8 Ob 29/87; OGH 20 September 1978, ZVR 1979/203 and OGH 21 December 1982, ZVR 1984/46. In GREECE the violation of a statutory provision can likewise constitute a species of unlawful act. However, it is accepted that in order to found liability it is simply not enough to violate any statutory provision; the provision must either establish an absolute subjective right or it must safeguard a legally relevant interest (Georgiades, FS

Article 3:102: Negligence

36.

37.

38.

Larenz 1983, 175, 184; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 914, no. 32; Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 484, 487). It is critical whether the affected interest is within the scope of the violated provision. Not every provision containing a duty to act or a duty to refrain from acting are inevitably protective laws (Georgiades loc. cit. no. 50). The question as to whether the infringed provision has (as a minimum) to safeguard a private interest is to be ascertained by means of interpreting the provision at hand (Kornilakis loc. cit. 487). This question was answered affirmatively in respect of e. g. offences under the Criminal Code pertaining to fraud, embezzlement, handling of stolen goods, perjury and false criminal accusations (Georgiades loc. cit. no. 53). CC art. 281 (prohibition on abusive exercise of a right) also constitues a protective law along these lines (Georgiades loc. cit. no. 56; contra Filios, Enochiko Dikaio II(2)4, 33). In contrast, offences relating to espionage and treason, for example, are exclusively concerned with the wider public interest (Georgiades loc. cit. no. 54). PORTUGUESE CC art. 483 proceeds from a starting point underpinned by considerations similar to those outlined above. If the injured party can prove that the defendant violated a legal provision directed at safeguarding the interests of the injured party, then a (rebuttable) presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant arises (STJ 10 March 1998, BolMinJus 475 [1998] 635; STJ 13 December 1990, BolMinJus 402 [1990] 558). In contrast, proof of negligence must be positively adduced in the case, for example, of a road traffic accident, if it cannot be successfully proven that a provision of the Road Traffic Ordinance was violated (STJ 13 December 1990, BolMinJus 402 [1990] 537). On many occasions the courts have considered that the infringement of a legal provision suffices per se as proof of negligence (e. g. STJ 16 February 1993, BolMinJus 424 [1993] 635 [concerning conduct at railway level crossings]). For particularly dangerous places a higher degree of care may be required under statutory provisions (e. g. CA Coimbra 26 October 2000, CJ XXV [2000-4]) 132: safety on the corridors of a hospital]). Breach of statutory duty (be it in the commission of an act or omission) under the DUTCH CC art. 6:162(2) is subsumed into the category of wrongful acts. A breach of a statutory duty does give rise to an obligation to make reparation, but only if the additional prerequisites of tort law are fulfilled. Therefore, the damage must be encompassed by the protective purpose of the violated rule and must result from a breach of the statute, breach of which can be imputed to the wrongdoer. “Statutory duties” in the sense of CC art. 6:162(2) are found in the Civil Code itself as well as in special civil or public law statutes. As regards the latter, it is, however, necessary to examine precisely whether the statute was designed solely to safeguard the public interest (TM, Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 675; Onrechtmatige Daad I (-Jansen) art. 6:162(2) nos. 67-71 pp. 600-635; see also HR 20 November 1924, NedJur 1925, 89). If the breach of a statute is identified, it is rebuttably presumed that the defendant was at fault. However, in contrast to the infringement of the statute, the fault element remains a separate issue of determination (Jansen loc. cit. para. (3) no. 7.3 pp. 48-68 and no. 57 pp. 910-911). The legal position in the NORDIC countries corresponds largely to that covered by Article 3:102(a)). For instance in DENMARK numerous statutory provisions are of direct significance when it comes to determining culpa. The general doctrine of culpa is not permitted to negate the specific thrust of statutory provisions, such as the Road Traffic Ordinance or Regulations pertaining to the Health and Safety of Workers (von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 62; HD 26 June 1950, UfR 1950, 746). The

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damage actually suffered must be encompassed by the protective purpose of the rule (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 65; HD 12 December 1966, UfR 1967, 72). In addition, the contravention of an administrative order is qualified as a relevant factor for establishing culpa (Eastern CA 8 December 1988, UfR 1989, 353). Similarly, in SWEDEN many statutory provisions are judged to be relevant to tort law, provided that the damage suffered is embraced by the protective purpose of the rule. The more precisely the direction to act is formulated, the less discretion is left for an independent determination of culpa according to the general tenets of culpa (Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 125; HD 11 June 1976, NJA 1976, 379 [pedestrian on signposted cycle path]). Conversly, however, it is not enough to blindly adhere to certain statutory or administrative standards; a general duty of care may additionally require an appreciation of risk (HD 20 December 1977, NJA 1977, 788 and HD 5 November 1991, NJA 1991, 580). In ENGLAND non-compliance with a statutory requirement may either found a discrete action for breach of statutory duty (i. e., distinct from any liability in the tort of negligence) or establish a breach of a duty of care (so as to establish one ingredient of the tort of negligence). In practice (e. g. in actions by employees against employers) the two causes of action may be combined. It is accepted that depending on its nature the statutory provision may either concretise a negligence standard, may provide mere prima facie evidence of negligence, or may impose strict liability: Clerk and Lindsell (-Jones), Torts19, 9-53-9-55. The proper characterization of the provision depends on its wording. While a duty to undertake a certain measure or achieve a certain state of affairs may be regarded as absolute, a qualification (which the employer will have the burden of showing: Nimmo v. Alexander Cowan & Sons Ltd [1968] AC 107) that the duty applies only “so far as [reasonably] practicable” or to make equipment or a place safe will involve considerations of proportionality between prevention and risk or foreseeability of danger and thus shade into negligence: Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale and Jones), Torts19, paras. 13-25-13-26. (In some cases, however, the statutory provision will not be regarded as superseding or particularising the duty of care so that compliance will not preclude liability in negligence: Bux v. Slough Metals [1973] 1 WLR 1358 [insufficient to make goggles available, as statute required; duty of care required persuasion of employees to use them].) Whether a breach of statutory duty gives rise per se to an action for damages depends on the interpretation of the statute, a matter whose outcome is often difficult to anticipate not least because the courts’ earlier liberal approach in imposing civil liability has been replaced by a more thorough endeavour to the find the intention of Parliament: loc. cit., 9-02 and 9-12. A Law Commission proposal which would provide for a general statutory presumption that breach of duty is actionable ([1969] Law Com 21, The Interpretation of Statutes, para. 38) has not been implemented, but Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, s. 47(2) provides that breach of a duty imposed by health and safety regulations under that Act which cause damage are actionable unless the regulations provide otherwise. In order for the breach of statutory duty to found an action, it must have been Parliament’s intention that the statutory duty protect a limited class of the public and to confer on them a private law right of action for breach: X (minors) v. Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 671. The damage suffered by the claimant must fall within the scope of the statute in the sense that the legislation was intended to prevent damage of that type being suffered by a class of persons to whom the claimant belongs: loc. cit., 9-04. Whether it was the legislator’s intention to confer an action will

Article 3:103: Persons under eighteen

depend on such matters as to whether there is any other remedy for breach of the duty, and, if so, its adequacy and its alternatives: loc. cit., 9-06 and 9-17 et seq. Much industrial safety legislation has been held to give rise to actions for breach of statutory duty, but conversely no action arises, for example, out of administrative regimes for protecting “at risk” children through welfare services (X (minors) v Bedfordshire County Council, loc. cit.). Illustration 1 is similar to MvA II Inv., Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 1350-1351; illustration 2 is taken from Swedish HD 14 August 1948, NJA 1948 no. 99 p. 489; illustration 3 from Roberts v. Ramsbottom [1980] 1 WLR 823; illustration 4 from BGH 3 December 1952, LM no. 1 zu WaldschutzVO; illustration 8 from Gorris v. Scott (1873-74) LR 9 Ex. 125; illustration 9 from CA Valencia 18 May 2004, BDA JUR 2005/13603 and illustration 10 from Finnish Supreme Court 17 June 1981, HD 1981 II 84.

Article 3:103: Persons under eighteen (1) A person under eighteen years of age is accountable for causing legally relevant damage according to Article 3:102 (Negligence) sub-paragraph (b) only in so far as that person does not exercise such care as could be expected from a reasonably careful person of the same age in the circumstances of the case. (2) A person under seven years of age is not accountable for causing damage intentionally or negligently. (3) However, paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the extent that: (a) the person suffering the damage cannot obtain reparation under this Book from another; and (b) liability to make reparation would be equitable having regard to the financial means of the parties and all other circumstances of the case.

Comments A.

The Article in overview

1. Matters covered. This Article deals with issues of intention and negligence on the part of persons under eighteen. The provision thus leaves all grounds of accountability in Chapter 3, Section 2 (Accountability without intention or negligence) unaffected. Those grounds do not hinge on intention or negligence. It is the objective criteria for accountability which are far more crucial under that Section; for the most part it turns on the liable person’s capacity as a keeper of a thing or an animal. 2. Purpose. The purpose of paragraph (1) is to particularise the general standard of care in Article 3:102 (Negligence) sub-paragraph (b) for children between seven and seventeen years of age. The provision relates to the personal liability of children in relation to third parties. The liability of parents for the misconduct of their children is 601

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the subject of Article 3:104 (Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons). Paragraph (2) clarifies that children who have not yet attained their seventh year are in principle liable for neither intention nor negligence. Paragraph (3) provides a counter-exception for the case in which the relief for persons under eighteen provided for in paragraphs (1) and (2) would lead to unjust results, in particular in view of the financial circumstances of the parties involved. 3. Persons under eighteen. The Article does not use the expression “minor”, rather speaking of persons under eighteen. The reason for this is that while persons who have attained the age of eighteen are indeed of full age everywhere in the EU, this proposition is not capable of being inverted. It may be, for example, that married persons attain the legal status of an adult before that age. They also benefit from paragraph (1).

B.

Intention; violation of a statutory norm of conduct

4. Intention. Paragraph (1) provides clarification that this provision only involves the concretisation of the general duty of care in relation to minors. Thus, liability in negligence in the form of a violation of a statutory norm of conduct, as well as liability for intention, remain unaffected. Apart from paragraph (2) there is no special rule for the latter. Its definition in Article 3:101 (Intention) is determined consistently by reference to “subjective” elements. For that reason the definition appears equally fitting in relation specifically to persons under eighteen. It is decisive that “intention” depends on the person who acted wanting to do exactly what was done, rather than it being clear to him or her that their conduct would almost certainly inflict legally relevant damage on another. This will be often lacking in children in their early school years. Conduct which for adults would have to be readily qualified as intentional, can be merely negligent for young persons, whether because they could not clearly anticipate the danger due to lack of experience or because their desire to play relegated all other concerns to the background. Illustration 1 In order to scare their detested neighbour, several ten-year-olds inform her in conscious knowledge of its falsity that her husband is severely injured in a traffic accident and is lying in hospital. Children of this age are not normally aware of the danger of severe mental harm. Therefore, they do not cause the damage to the neighbour’s mental health intentionally Illustration 2 Two children aged seven and ten throw stones at moving vehicles from a motorway bridge. The boys are not in a position to comprehend what they are doing; the tragic death of a driver, whose windscreen is smashed by one of the stones, was not intentionally caused by them. In contrast, in the case of an adult who throws stones at the windscreen of a moving car, there is usually dolus eventualis in respect of the driver’s death.

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5. Article 3:102 (Negligence) sub-paragraph (a). Neither does the present Article lay down a special rule in respect of Article 3:102 (Negligence) sub-paragraph (a) (failure to meet a statutory standard of care). This is because there is no need for such a rule. If a statute lays down a specific duty of care for a defined area of life (e. g. for road traffic), that standard must be met by everyone – including minors. Most of the standards of care stipulated by statute are in any case not directed at activities undertaken by young persons. In fact they typically pertain to working, business and professional life, and hence to matters which are not generally accessible to minors anyway.

C.

The general standard of care for persons under eighteen (paragraph (1))

6. A group-specific standard of care. Paragraph (1) has the aim of assessing the conduct of children and juveniles aged seven to seventeen by only using a standard of care which takes into consideration their youth and thus their lesser experience compared with adults. A twelve-year-old girl need only behave as can be expected of a girl of this age in the circumstances and a fifteen-year-old boy, as may be expected from a boy of this age. The older children become, the more the care which can be expected of them approaches the care expected of adults. Illustration 3 A 16-year-old boy, who grew up in the mountains, chooses a dangerous route for an excursion with a group of other minors, during which one of the party is severely injured due to the difficult terrain. The age and experience of the 16-year-old allow him to comprehend and foresee the danger to which he would expose others. Consequently the route planning was negligent. Illustration 4 During their stay at a holiday camp, five youths aged between twelve and sixteen buy two bottles of caustic acid and a roll of cooking foil in the campsite shop in order to carry out an experiment with a bottle of Coke with the aim of causing an explosion. After the experiment, they hide one of the bottles containing the chemicals in a small house at the edge of the campsite, where it is found by smaller children aged below ten. One of them throws the bottle against the wall of the house, smashing it. Some of the fluid splashes in the eye of one of the small children involved, causing blindness. The two 12-year-olds, who had participated in the experiment, could neither anticipate the dangerousness of their actions nor withstand the influence of the older members of the group. The latter ought however to have reckoned with endangering younger children at the campsite. They are solidarily liable with the parents who breached their supervisory duty. In the internal relationship with the other solidarily liable parties, the liability of the 16-year-olds is however reduced to zero due to their very slight fault.

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D.

Children below the age of seven (paragraph (2))

7. No liability in principle for intentional or negligent infliction of damage. Paragraph (2) provides for an age limit whereby children under seven years of age are not accountable for causing damage intentionally or negligently. The provision opts for a normative proposition that, for the purposes of Article 1:101 (Basic rule), children under seven years of age are not capable of causing damage either intentionally or negligently (although, from a purely factual point of view, the contrary notion may certainly be entertained). Hence, this involves neither a presumption of the incapacity to commit fault, which the claimant may rebut, nor a rule allowing children to prove that they do not yet have the ability to distinguish right from wrong. The provision cuts out all issues of this type. This appeared to be the most effective means of protecting children from premature liability. Such protection is indispensable in order to prevent minors from later entering adulthood with a burden of debt, which makes future considered life choices impossible. The age limit of seven years seemed realistic because the development of a true-to-life standard of care for children under this age is scarcely possible., This age restriction does not create a chasm in liability because, in the case of harm by small children, usually (if not always) the parents incur liability; see Article 3:104 (Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons). 8. Strict liability remains unaffected. The liability of children due to one of the fact situations set out in Chapter 3, Section 2 (Accountability without intention or negligence) remains unaffected by Article 3:103(2). Of course, children of this young age will rarely be the keepers of a dangerous animal or thing. They can however be the owners of a thing occasioning damage, e. g. a building.

E.

Liability according to equity and fairness (paragraph (3))

9. Purpose of the rule. A significant aim of the rule in paragraph (2) is to safeguard children from premature financial burdens through liability for damage caused by them. However, in special, rather rare individual cases this purpose can be dropped for purely factual reasons. It can exceptionally turn out that a child (e. g. as a result of an early inheritance) is readily in a financial position to provide reparation for damage done, whereas the injured person may be in a position of financial difficulty and may be unable to bear the burden of the damage alone. In such a case equity and fairness demand reasonable reparation of the damage. Paragraph (3) adopts a legal idea which is to be found in many (but by no means all) European legal systems. 10. Situations covered. Liability according to equity and fairness represents a counterweight to the rules of both the preceding paragraphs. It corrects where necessary not only the effect of paragraph (2) (children under seven years of age), but also the effect of paragraph (1) (age-specific standard of care). Therefore, there is also room for liability according to equity and fairness where an adolescent satisfies the standard of care for his or her age group, but did not behave as would have been expected of an adult under the circumstances. In practice, the second group of cases can even be more important than the first. 604

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11. Subsidiarity of liability according to equity and fairness (sub-paragraph (a)). There is no room for personal liability of small children according to equity and fairness where the injured person can obtain damages by other means. This is again typically the case where parents or other persons who are obliged to supervise the child cannot prove that they reasonably performed their supervisory duty, see Article 3:104 (Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons) paragraph (4). There are also other conceivable situations, e. g. where a six-year-old in collaboration with a 10-year-old, throws stones at windows, for which the 10-year-old is readily responsible under the law on liability. A third party’s ability to pay reparation must of course always be taken into account along with the legal responsibility; where the ability to pay is lacking, then the injured person simply cannot “obtain reparation” from another. The third party must ultimately have been liable “under this Book”. The issue of what influence existing insurance cover has on the liability according to equity and fairness is not a question of its subsidiarity, rather a question of its other requisites. 12. Liability to make reparation must be equitable (sub-paragraph (b)). What matters is an overall assessment of all the circumstances of the individual case, among which the financial circumstances of the parties (the child and the injured person, not infrequently also a child) are particularly significant, while not necessarily solely decisive. It will also be relevant whether e. g. there was “inherently” harmless infantile behaviour or deliberate harm. Another relevant factor is whether there was contributory fault on the part of the injured person, as this normally rules out a claim according to equity and fairness. The insurance cover of the parties involved is a factor in the assessment of their financial circumstances. Where the injured person is sufficiently insured through personal insurance cover, equity and fairness do not justify pursuit of the child; the child is also not liable to an uninsured injured person if the family indemnity insurance of the parents also encompasses their children – in this case, indemnification for the parents’ liability according to equity and fairness. Ultimately, equity and fairness must also justify the reparation of the damage actually claimed. This justification may be absent, e. g. where, in cases in which major physical harm or injury to health is concerned, reparation of noneconomic losses is also claimed. 13. Article 5:301 (Mental incompetence). Children are not placed on the same level as mentally disabled adults. Article 5:301 (Mental incompetence) is therefore, as a rule, of no relevance to infants. However, it is conceivable that an adolescent who suffers from a mental disability could rely on this provision. Such an adolescent has the same defences available as fellow sufferers who are adults.

Notes I.

Personal accountability of persons under eighteen

1.

In the interests of victim protection FRANCE subjects minors to a more rigorous regime of liability than that of Article 3:103. Since Cass.ass.plén. 9 May 1984, JCP 1984, II, no. 20256 (two judgments with a note by Jourdain) the tort liability of minors does not depend on their ability to understand the wrongfulness of their acts. This capacity is not

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3.

4.

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generally a prereqisite for tort liability. The relevant standard of care determinative in ascertaining a faute is nonetheless as before lowered to take account of the age of the tortfeasor (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2004/ 2005), no. 6707). The latter rule contradicts at least the policy direction exhibited in the judgments of the Court of Cassation. However, this rule was confirmed by the same court in Cass.civ. 7 March 1989, JCP éd. G 1990, II, no. 21403, note Dejean de la Bâtie (see, illustration 3). Moreover, account should be taken of recent French case law which has developed a theory of strict liability for parents for damage caused by their children – with the result that only on rare occasions will the personal liability of children be determinative (cf. the Notes under Article 3:104). In contrast, in BELGIUM it is still the case that capacity is a prerequisite for liability for faute under CC arts. 1382 and 1383. Children are regarded as having the capacity to commit fault only if they have reached an age when they can appreciate the distinction between good and evil, namely when they have attained the jaren des onderscheids. A child must appreciate what he or she is doing and must forsee the consequences of his or her actions. Whether a child has attained the “age of discernment” does not hinge on whether the child has reached a legally defined minimum age. This is a fact to be determined in each individual case, based on an assessment of the individual child and on the concrete circumstances of the case (Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Wynant/ Debaene, TPR 2000, 1551, 1688, no. 36). No specific age is mentioned in the SPANISH Civil Code, after which a minor would be personally liable for tortious acts. Hence, the view is also taken that the applicable yardstick in each individual case is the determination of whether the minor can be held accountable for his or her acts (Gómez Calle, Los sujetos de la responsabilidad civil3, 479). In more concrete terms this entails that the minor must be able to distinguish between good and evil and must appreciate what it means to cause damage to another (Pantaleón Prieto, CCJC 1983, 452; TS 27 January 2006, BDA RAJ 2006 no. 615). In general the liability of minors is subject to the general rules anchored in CC art. 1902. In particular, it is important to note that the liability of minors is not displaced by parental liability (but another view is put forward by a number of academic commentators, e. g. Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 230 and Díez-Picazo and Gullón, Sistema I10, 229). The Tribunal Supremo has approved this proposition on many occasions (e. g. TS 22 September 1992, RAJ 1992 [4] no. 7014 p. 9220; TS 30 December 1992, RAJ 1992 [5] no. 10565 p. 13807; TS 9 July 1998, RAJ 1998 [3] no. 5547 p. 8208 and TS 8 March 2002, RAJ 2002 [1] no. 1912 p. 3178). According to the Criminal Liability of Minors Act arts. 1(1) and 61(3) minors are criminally responsible and therefore also have capacity under civil law from the age of 14. As regards children under the age of 14, liability remains to be judged according to the precepts of the Código Civil (Act 5/2000 art. 3). The ITALIAN CC also does not contain a provision which regulates the personal liability of children. The starting point for any examination for attributing liability for the act causing damage is first and foremost the question of capacity (CC art. 2046). If the defendant lacks capacity, then the court will proceed to examine whether a person charged with supervision is liable (CC art. 2047). On the other hand if a minor is found to have capacity, a concrete assessment for each individual child is required to be undertaken; liability is then subject to the general provisions of CC art. 2043. The court takes account, inter alia, of the age, the physical and mental maturity of the child and all

Article 3:103: Persons under eighteen

5.

6.

the other circumstances relevant to his actions (e. g. Cass. 19 November 1990, no. 11163, Giust.civ.Mass. 1990, fasc. 11). There is a concurrence of liability, namely that of personal liability of the minor and the liability of parents, guardians, teachers and tutors (CC art. 2048; Cass. 3 March 1995, no. 2463, Giust.civ.Mass. 1995, 513; Cass. 13 September 1996, no. 8263, Giust.civ.Mass. 1996, 1278); the former is an independent liability, not merely a subsidiary one (Cass. 1 August 1995, no. 8384, Giust.civ.Mass. 1995, 1455). The HUNGARIAN Civil Code does not contain special provisions on the personal accountabilty of minors (defined in CC § 12) nor does it contain special provisions on the liability of their parents. Thus they fall within CC § 347, which states that individuals lacking capacity are not liable for reparation. A person lacks capacity under CC § 347(1) first sentence if he or she cannot appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her act or can do so only to a limited extent (see further Petrik (-Wellmann), Polgári jog II, 598, 603; Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 124). This concept applies equally to persons with a mental impairment and to small children. A stipulated legal minimum age of responsibilty exists only under criminal law, not under civil law. However, a person who has attained the age of criminal responsiblity can also be held accountable for his acts under the civil law. De facto the courts appear to work mostly with an age limit of 12 in respect of children who have developed normally. However, it is important to note that here a fixed rule has not been laid down; divergences from the rule can be found in both directions (Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1284). If a minor can understand the wrongfulness of his or her act, then, theoretically, it is not necessary to continue to differentiate according to age and type of fault. However, it appears that these factors are already taken into consideration in the examination of fault or capacity. For example, a nine year old boy ought to be liable for his actions if he intentionally breaks his neighbour’s window pane, but he ought not to be liable when he does the same thing unintentionally when playing football (Benedek loc. cit. 1282). According to POLISH CC art. 426 a minor under thirteen years of age is not accountable for causing damage. He can be liable only on equitable grounds (CC art. 428). The accountability of minors over thirteen is controversial. Where the damage has been caused by a minor between thirteen and eighteen years of age, courts and some commentators consider that the plaintiff must prove the minor had obtained sufficient intellectual maturity to be reproachable for the negligence (SN 11 January 2001, OSPiKA 2002, poz. 2; Czachórski, Zobowia˛zania10, 240). Others opt for a factual presumption of sufficient maturity in such cases, which can be rebutted by the minor (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛s´c´ ogólna7, 196). SLOVENIAN LOA § 137(1) resembles Article 3:103(2). According to LOA § 137(2) “minors aged seven and over but under fourteen shall not be liable for damage, unless it is shown that they are capable of accounting for their actions when the damage was inflicted”. Upon attaining the age of 14, minors are subject to the general provisions of tort law (LOA § 137(3)). The proposed draft for reforming the ROMANIAN Civil Code openly displays quite similar policy considerations, but it does not provide for a fixed minimum age limit of seven (Draft CC art. 1105). In contrast, the CZECH and SLOVAK CC § 422(1) again forgo a fixed minimum age limit for the accountability of a minor under tort law. The decisive factor is merely whether he or she “was able to govern his or her conduct and consider its consequences”.

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8.

9.

608

Under the GERMAN CC § 828(1) children under seven years are not liable for damage caused by them. Furthermore, up to this age their conduct cannot be capable of amounting to contributory negligence justifying a reduction in the apportionment of damages (Palandt (-Sprau), BGB66, § 828, no. 2). In respect of minors who have attained the age of seven but have yet to reach the age of 18, it is necessary to examine whether they had the capacity to recognise that they are responsible for their acts (CC § 828(3)). In this case, the examination of intention and negligence must be kept strictly separate (CC § 276) (BGH 14 November 1978, NJW 1979, 864, 865). The ascertainment of tortious responsibility depends on the particular minor’s capacity to appreciate the dangerousness of his actions and his awareness that he is responsible for his action. However, according to case law, the individual’s capacity for self-control, i. e. the ability to conduct oneself according to one’s appreciation of the dangerousness of one’s actions and in the awareness that one is responsible for one’s actions, is not relevant (BGH 30 November 2004, NJW 2005, 354, 355). The minor has the burden of adducing evidence and proving the lack of appreciation of the wrongfulness of his acts (Erman (-Schiemann), BGB II11, § 828, no. 6). The examination of negligence – in contrast to the question of tortious capacity – does not depend on the ability of the particular minor to foresee the dangerousness of his actions and conduct himself so as to avoid the danger; rather the decisive factor is the capacity of a child of the same age and normal development (Sprau loc. cit no. 7). Children up to the age of ten years are exempt from liability for negligently caused motor vehicle or railway accidents on the basis of CC § 828(2). As a general rule children who have yet to attain this age are not able to recognise the specific dangers of vehicles on roads or rail traffic and therefore cannot behave accordingly (Sprau loc. cit. no. 3). The major significance of this provision in practice is that it also has the effect that minors up to this age are not guilty of contributory negligence. According to CC § 828(2)(ii) in the case of intentional conduct, liability remains governed by the provisions in CC § 828(3). According to the AUSTRIAN CC § 1308 “minors”, that is, persons who have not attained the age of 14 (CC § 21(2)) are generally not accountable for the damage that they cause. They may be accountable only under the rules relating to liability on the basis of equity and fairness (CC § 1310). Under GREEK CC art. 915 children, once they reach the age of ten, can be liable in tort. Only once the age of ten is reached are they viewed as possessing the necessary intellectual maturity in order to comprehend the significance of their actions (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 916, no. 1). Juveniles who have reached the age of ten, but who have yet to reach the age of fourteen, are liable under the general tort law provisions unless in exceptional cases they lack the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their act (CC art. 917). It is debatable whether the ability to appeciate the wrongfulness of one’s actions also requires knowledge in order to be liable in damages (answered in the negative by Georgiades loc. cit. art. 917, no. 4; answered in the affirmative Filios, Enochiko Dikaio II(2)4, 48; CA Athens 2494/1978, NoB 26 [1978] 387). The lack of a pre-existing capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of one’s actions and the ability to conduct oneself accordingly ought to not to preclude tortious responsibilty but should exclude the existence of negligence (Georgiades loc. cit. no. 5). PORTUGUESE CC art. 488(1) exempts from liability, individuals who lack the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their act and persons who lack the ability to control themselves at the time of the unlawful act (see further Antunes Varela, Obrigações em

Article 3:103: Persons under eighteen

10.

11.

12.

geral I10, 563; Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 68 (1957) 89). In respect of children who have yet to attain the age of seven (CC art. 350(2)), there is a rebuttable presumption that they are not responsible for their tortious acts (CC art. 488(2)). Once they have reached this age, the presumption is inverted and the onus of proof rests on the child (Antunes Varela loc. cit.; Pessoa Jorge, Ensaio sobre os pressupostos da responsabilidade civil, 332; Neto, Código Civil Anotado14, 540). According to DUTCH CC art. 6:164 once the age of fourteen is reached, a minor can be held accountable for unlawful acts. This rule is tenable on policy grounds given that it is supplemented by a provision which provides that parents can be held strictly liable for the tortious acts of children who have yet to reach the age of fourteen (CC art. 6:169(1)). Another factor which led to the fixing of the age of fourteen was the insurability of the risk of damage to a third party caused by children (Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 645, 652, 678; Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht III11, no. 84 p. 93). Children who have attained the age of 14 are subject to the general provisions contained in CC art. 6:162(3). In principle, mental impairment or physical disability are not grounds of defence (CC art. 6:165). However the required standard of care is defined by reference to age, Where liability depends on knowledge of particular circumstances, unlawfulness may not be established owing to the defendant’s young age, if this knowledge could not have been expected from a juvenile. CC art. 6:164 does not exempt a child from strict liability; the child is responsible for causing a certain source of danger under CC arts. 6:169-184, i. e. liability is not excluded when the child is in possession of a moveable thing, (CC art. 6:173), a building or other construction (CC art. 6:174) or an animal (CC art. 6:179) which causes damage. This conclusion is derived from CC art. 6:183(1). However, CC art. 6:183(2) immediately adds that the parent or guardian of a child who has not reached the age of fourteen, is liable in the place of the child for damage caused by the thing or animal, (CC arts. 6:173 and 6:179 unless they were used in the course of carrying on a business (see further Hartkamp loc. cit. no. 85 p. 94). The prevailing legal position in ESTONIA corresponds to that of the Netherlands. According to the law pertaining to liability, responsibility for unlawful acts can be attributed once the age of fourteen is attained. LOA § 1052(1)). A similar situation prevails also in LITHUANIA (CC arts. 6.275 and 6.276). For minors who have reached the age of fourteen, the age of the wrongdoer is taken into account when ascertaining the required standard of care (LOA § 1050(2)). SWEDISH EAL chap. 2 § 4 provides that a person who, prior to reaching the age of eighteen, causes damage to a person or thing, causes pure economic loss or pain and suffering, only has to pay damages to the extent that this is reasonable. The criterion of reasonableness is determined by an examination of a range of factors. These factors include the age and maturity of the minor, the nature of his actions alongside a consideration of the individual’s economic circumstances especially a consideration of whether the individual is covered by liability insurance. There is no fixed minimum age limit either generally or under current insurance policies (Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 265). However, HD 3 February 1977, NJA 1977, 186 rejected a claim against a child who was three years and two months old on the grounds that it was not yet possible to speak of fault in a child of this age. There is a dearth of more recent case law on the personal liability of minors. It appears that the problem is largely disposed of via the rules pertaining to parental liability and insurance coverage. The FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 2 § 2 largely corresponds to the Swedish provisions but it

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does not contain any reference to existing liability insurance. In the Supreme Court 12 February 1991, HD 1991:73 damages were awarded against a fifteen year old girl who encouraged her boyfriend of the same age to set fire to a rubbish bin, which led to a building catching fire. The DANISH EAL § 24a permits the court to reduce damages on equitable grounds in favour of minors who have yet to attain the age of fifteen. The existence of insurance coverage is a factor relevant to the assessment of whether an equity to reduce damages exists. The Damages Liability Act § 24a only concerns liability for fault and has no relevance for strict liability (Møller and Wiisbye, Erstatningsansvarsloven6, 486), § 24 of the Damages Liability Act provides that damages can be reduced in a case of strict liability (Møller and Wiisbye loc. cit. 502, 517). For the remainder the principle applies that being below the age of eighteen does not make an individual, as a rule, immune from liability; age will, however, be taken into account when it comes to assessing the standard of required care in the circumstances of the case (von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 89). The courts have, on many occasions, awarded damages against four and five year olds (see for sources von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 93). The Insurance Contracts Act (Forsikringsaftaleloven) is of practical importance in this regard. According to § 19(1), liability insurance also guarantees coverage for damage which was intentionally caused by children under the age of eighteen (see further Møller and Wiisbye loc. cit. 515). SWEDEN and FINLAND have the same provision regarding children who have yet to attain the age of twelve, (Insurance Contracts Act chap. 4 § 9(1)(ii) and in FINLAND Insurance Contract Act § 36). In principle in ENGLAND a child (i. e. a person under 18: see Family Law Reform Act 1969, s. 1(1); Children Act 1989, s. 105(1)) is liable in tort to the same extent as an adult and has no defence of minority: Gorely v. Codd [1967] 1 WLR 19 (16 year old boy negligent in using an air rifle) and see also the dicta in Jennings v. Rundall (1799) 8 TR 335; 101 ER 1419 (infant can be liable for assault or slander [Lord Kenyon CJ:] or conversion [Lawrence J]). However, within the tort of negligence a child is not held to the same standard as an ordinarily prudent and reasonable adult; the child is only liable if an ordinarily prudent and reasonable child of the same age would have appreciated the risk of injury: Mullin v. Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304 (CA held 15 year schoolgirl not liable for injury to a classmate when, during a playful sword fight with plastic rulers, a ruler broke and a piece of plastic entered the classmate’s eye). Likewise, a child’s age is also material in torts where the defendant’s state of mind is essential to liability (i. e. where the tort requires intention or malice). Furthermore, an action in tort against a child will not succeed if it is indirect enforcement of a contract which does not bind the child: Jennings v. Rundall (1799) 8 TR 335; 101 ER 1419 (where the minor had breached duties of care on hire of a horse); Burnard v. Haggis (1863) 14 CB NS 45, 54; 143 ER 360, 364 per Byles J; R. Leslie Ltd. v. Shiell [1914] 3 KB 607 (child fraudulently obtaining a loan not liable in deceit). This does not prevent a claim in tort against the minor where the rights infringed or duties breached do not depend on the existence of the contract (i. e. where the contract merely conferred the opportunity to commit the tort): Burnard v. Haggis (1863) 14 CB NS 45, 143 ER 360 (horse hired on terms it was not to be ridden for jumping; minor liable in trespass for injuries from jumping because he had no permission to use the horse for that purpose and in that regard was no different from a stranger to the contract taking the horse without any permission at all).

Article 3:103: Persons under eighteen

14.

15.

16.

Tort liability of minors in IRELAND is based on the same structure as in England. Minority is not a defence: Law Reform Commission, Report on the Liability in Tort of Minors and the Liability of Parents for Damage Caused by Minors (LRC 17-1985), 1-2. A child – even one under the age of 7 (see McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 40.04) – is generally liable in tort in the same way as an adult: O’Brien v. McNamee [1953] IR 86 (Davitt P) (7 year old liable in trespass for burning down barn when the flame from a lighted paper he brought into the barn spread and set light to hay). Conversely, a minor may escape liability by reason of his immaturity where the tort requires an element of intention if the minor is incapable of forming that intent: McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 40.03. The best view seems to be that in determining whether a child defendant has committed the tort of negligence the Irish courts will apply the same standard as for determining whether a child claimant was contributorily negligent (LRC 17-1985, 13; McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 40.27), which takes account of the minority, but leaves considerable uncertainty as to whether a subjective or objective approach governs, i. e. whether the defendant’s conduct is to be judged against the standard of the child’s own potential, having regard to his or her actual mental development, or the conduct to be expected of a child of the same age (ibid, 40.15-40.25). In SCOTLAND too a child (whether pupil or minor) may be liable in delict: Walker, Delict2, 86-87; Thomson, Delictual Liability3, 238 (implying that liability is more theoretical than a matter of legal practice). It will be a question of fact whether the particular child had the required mental capacity to know the nature and quality of their act and to appreciate if their conduct was harmful and legally wrongful: Walker, Delict2, 86-87. In the case of minors there may be a presumption in favour of such mental capacity which is particularly strong when the minor is close to the age of majority: ibid, 86-87. Conversely, the case law treatment of contributory negligence of pupils of tender age (i. e. under five) imply that they cannot reasonably be held responsible in delict because they will not be mature enough to appreciate the risks inherent in their conduct: ibid, 87-88. The delictual liability of children is unaffected by the reduction (from 18 to 16) of the age of legal capacity for the purposes of entering into transactions: see Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s. 1(3)(c). According to CYPRUS Civil Wrongs Law s. 9 “no action shall be brought against any person in respect of any civil wrong committed by such person when such person was under the age of twelve years.” Civil Wrongs Law s. 8 enacts the rule derived from Jennings v. Rundall (1799) 8 TR 335, 101 ER 1419 (see I13 above) that, subject to s. 9, a person under the age of eighteen may be sued in respect of a civil wrong, but no action may be brought when that wrong arises directly or indirectly out of a contract entered into by the minor. Under MALTESE CC art. 1035 minors under the age of nine are exempt from liability and children who have yet to attain the age of 14 are only liable for their acts in tort law if they “have acted with a mischievous discretion”.

II.

Liability on equitable grounds

17.

FRANCE, SPAIN and LUXEMBURG do not recognise liability based on equity and fairness. BELGIAN CC art. 1386bis envisages such liability only for persons with a mental impairment (irrespective of age), and not for children or young adults of normal development. In contrast, in all essential points the MALTESE CC art. 1036 resembles the situation contemplated by Article 3:103(3).

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18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

ITALIAN CC art. 2047(2) provides that the court can award compensation as deemed appropriate in the circumstances, against a child to whom liability can not yet be attributed on account of age, upon consideration of the financial means of the injured person. However, in order to award compensation, it must not be possible to obtain compensation from the person whose duty it was to supervise the child. In end effect it involves in the same manner as Article 3:103(3) a liability which is subsidiary. Within this framework the court not only has to decide whether compensation should be awarded but must also determine the measure of compensation according to equitable discretion (CFI Macerata 20 May 1986, Foro it. 1986, I, 2594). This corresponds to the legal position under the HUNGARIAN CC § 347(2). A wrongdoer who cannot generally be held responsible for tortious acts, is exceptionally liable in whole or in part according to judicial discretion, if this is clearly necessary in the circumstances of the case and upon consideration of the financial means of the parties involved. Here, it must also be proven that the wrongdoer either does not have a supervisor at all or that the responsibilty of the person whose duty it was to supervise the child for the ensuing damage cannot be established. Under POLISH CC art. 428, where a person is not accountable for the inflicted damage due to their minority or mental or physical state, and either there are no persons obliged to supervise the person or they are not able to make good the damage, the injured person may claim reparation in whole or in part from the person who caused the damage if this is equitable in the circumstances of the case, in particular having regard to the parties’ financial means. GERMAN CC § 829, AUSTRIAN CC § 1310, PORTUGUESE CC art. 489, ESTONIAN LOA § 1052(3) and GREEK CC art. 918 resemble on all essential points Article 3:103(3). The liability of a child on the basis of fairness and equity in Greece is predicated on the absence of another means of compensating the party who has suffered loss. Insurance policies are taken account of in the assessment of whether there is another method of compensating the claimant (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 918, no. 11). In assessing whether there are equitable grounds to award compensation, the economic means of the parties is not the only focus: the gravity and permanence of the injury, the contributory negligence of the injured party and the intellectual development of the wrongdoer are all taken into account (Georgiades loc. cit. no. 16). The court can award full or partial compensation against a wrongdoer; moreover, it can judge the claimant not liable to make reparation (Georgiades loc. cit. 918, no.19). In the NORDIC Countries provisions which reduce damages as outlined above in I12 fulfill a comparable function. The Common Law in ENGLAND and IRELAND as well as SCOTS law does not recognise tortious liability on the basis of equity. See generally von Bar, FS Egon Lorenz, 73-93.

Illustration 1 is based on Wilkinson v. Downton [1897] 2 QB 57; illustration 2 is taken from TS 27 January 2006, BDA RAJ 2006 no. 615 (cf. also, in regard to adults, R. v. Hancock & Shankland [1986] AC 455); illustration 3 inspired by Cass.civ. 7 March 1989, JCP éd. G 1990, II, no. 21403, note Dejean de la Bâtie and illustration 4 from TS 8 March 2006, RAJ 2006 (1) no. 1076 p. 2795.

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Article 3:104: Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons

Article 3:104: Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons (1) Parents or other persons obliged by law to provide parental care for a person under fourteen years of age are accountable for the causation of legally relevant damage where that person under age caused the damage by conduct that would constitute intentional or negligent conduct if it were the conduct of an adult. (2) An institution or other body obliged to supervise a person is accountable for the causation of legally relevant damage suffered by a third party when: (a) the damage is personal injury, loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death) or property damage; (b) the person whom the institution or other body is obliged to supervise caused that damage intentionally or negligently or, in the case of a person under eighteen, by conduct that would constitute intention or negligence if it were the conduct of an adult; and (c) the person whom the institution or other body is obliged to supervise is a person likely to cause damage of that type. (3) However, a person is not accountable under this Article for the causation of damage if that person shows that there was no defective supervision of the person causing the damage.

Comments A.

General

1. Subject matter of the rule in Article 3:104. While Article 3:103 (Persons under eighteen) relates to the personal liability of minors, the subject matter of the present Article is liability of persons (natural and legal) who are obliged by law to provide parental care. It concerns not only liability for damage caused by persons under eighteen, but also, in paragraph (2), liability for damage caused by certain adults. Paragraph (1) regulates the liability of parents (and others subject to a duty to provide parental care) for harm caused by children who have not yet attained the age of fourteen (The present Article does not contain a specific provision for damage caused by older children; to this extent such damage remains within the general rule in Article 3:102 (Negligence)). Paragraph (2) of the present Article provides a rule of liability for institutions inhabited by persons (under or over eighteen) who might inflict personal injury or property damage on third parties if unsupervised. Issues of personal liability of mentally disabled persons are specifically addressed in Article 5:301 (Mental incompetence). 2. The regime of liability. Under paragraph (1) of the present Article persons who are obliged by law to provide parental care for a child under fourteen years of age have the liability for damage caused by the child which would have been imposed on the child, had the child already attained the age of eighteen when the harm was occasioned. Paragraph (2) contains a similar rule for cases where persons requiring supervision cause legally relevant damage to a third party, for which damage they are responsible under the general rules or, in so far as youths are involved, would have been responsible had they been subject to assessment under the standard of care for adults. Paragraph (3) clarifies 613

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that in both cases the ground of liability is insufficient supervision. Therefore, the person under the supervisory obligation has the opportunity to provide evidence proving that reasonable supervision was carried out in relation to the person causing the damage. 3. No strict liability. From this and from the very positioning of Article 3:104 in the Section 1 (Intention and negligence) of the this Chapter, it follows that these rules do not propose the imposition of strict liability on parents: having children is not a sufficient basis of liability. The protection of the family under fundamental rights prohibits socialising the advantages brought by children with one hand and individualising the disadvantages with the other. The basis of parental liability lies in that most primary right and resulting duty to take care of and supervise the child. Where the child occasions harm to a third party, then the presumption of failure to supervise takes hold. As a result the parents are obliged in such a case to present and prove that in spite of the damage, they satisfied their supervisory duty.

B.

Liability for children under fourteen (paragraph (1))

4. The risk covered by liability. The point of liability for parents is that they carry the risk (but only that risk) which arises out of the circumstance that children are unable to muster the maturity and care of an adult. Such liability therefore presupposes conduct on the part of the child which, assessed according to the standards of a careful adult, amounts to negligence. Whether the child was in fact personally capable of recognising the harmfulness or at any rate the perilousness of his or her behaviour plays no role. Conversely, the mere fact that the child occasions legally relevant damage to a third party does not suffice. Where liability would not be imposed on an adult who, in the position of the child, would have done exactly as the child did, then the child’s conduct does not trigger any parental liability. Illustration 1 Children are playing in a sandpit. A boy throws sand into a playmate’s face. This results in an eye injury. The boy may well not have been at all conscious of the dangerousness of his act, but it nonetheless leads to parental liability. This is because an adult acting in the same manner as the child would naturally have been liable. Illustration 2 A holiday resort organises a water polo match for children in a designated children’s swimming pool. A mother comes to the edge of the pool to take a photograph. A ball volleyed by a player hits the camera which is knocked into the water. Playing water polo in the pool was permitted; an adult exercising reasonable care would have behaved no differently from the children in the pool. Consequently, no parental liability arises. The further question of contributory negligence on the part of the mother does not come into issue.

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Article 3:104: Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons

5. Various age brackets. Paragraph (1) of this Article relates to harm by children under fourteen years of age. The age bracket in Article 3:103 (Persons under eighteen) paragraph (2) (attainment of the age of seven) plays no role here. It is also irrelevant for the purposes of paragraph (1) whether the damage was caused by a child capable of comprehending the consequences of actions or one who is still incapable of such comprehension. In fact what is consistently crucial is only that the child, gauged using the standards of an adult, caused the damage negligently or in any way intentionally. The possible strict liability of a minor does not trigger parental liability. For children who have attained the age of fourteen, the injured person will again have to provide evidence of a breach of supervisory duty. Whether parents in this phase of life are in turn subject to a supervisory duty will for the most part depend on the applicable family law. Under the general rules parents can also be subject to a supervisory duty in relation to adult offspring who are still living with them. 6. Persons liable. Liability under paragraph (1) affects “parents or other persons obliged by law to provide parental care”. Thus, in so far as only the two parents are entitled to parental care it makes no difference whether the child lives in the shared family household or grows up with one of the parents, or whether the parent claimed against is responsible for taking care of the household duties or pursues gainful employment. On whom the parental care and with it the supervisory duty rests in the case of broken families or unmarried parents, is decided by relevant applicable family law. “Other persons obliged by law to provide parental care” are, for instance, guardians and adoptive parents. On the other hand, stepparents remain under Article 3:102 (Negligence), in so far as nothing different results from the applicable family law. Babysitters, nannies or childminders who take care of the child on a contractual basis do not fall under Article 3:104(1). Of course, occasional temporary helps (neighbourly help, grandparents, etc.) are not obliged “by law”, “to provide parental care”. 7. Relationship to Article 3:103 (Persons under eighteen). In principle, the liability under the present Article operates independently of the liability of a child under Article 3:103 (Persons under eighteen). Where the requisites of liability of both Articles are fulfilled, the child and parents are in principle solidarily liable (Article 6:105 (Solidary liability)). In their relationship to each other, liability usually of course solely rests with the parents. 8. Children as victims. If children are harmed by third parties, they must indeed live with their claim being reduced for personal contributory fault under the criteria in Article 5:102 (Contributory fault and accountability), not however for a contributory supervisory failure on the part of their parents. This follows from an argumentum e contrario to Article 5:102 (Contributory fault and accountability) paragraph (3), which refers exclusively to Article 3:201 (Accountability caused by employees and representatives), not, however to Article 3:104. Where children are harmed though a failure to supervise on the part of their parents or others subject to the supervisory duty, the claim to reparation follows the general rules or, to the extent that they are more beneficial, the rules of applicable family or contract law. If children are the victim of the actions of a third party as well as a breach of duty of their own parents, then the third party and parents are solidarily liable to the child. 615

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C.

Liability of institutions (paragraph (2))

9. Policy considerations. Paragraph (2) provides for liability of institutions and other bodies, which are under a duty to supervise persons who are a danger to third parties. The provision mirrors a legal situation which is to be found in a similar or at least comparable way in many of the Member States’ legal systems. Whether the persons to be supervised are under or over age makes no fundamental difference. What is far more crucial is that the institution concentrates in one area persons who require particular control. This heightened potential for danger justifies the rebuttable presumption of defective supervision in case of harm (see paragraph (3)). However, it seems appropriate to limit liability to corporeal damage, that is to say, personal injury and property damage (paragraph (2) (a)). 10. The duty to supervise. The duty to supervise covered here has its legal basis in the general rules on liability for omissions. It can also therefore follow from specific statutory regulations, have its basis in a contract or quite simply result from the fact that the institution, through its assembly of persons with certain problems, has created a particular source of danger which must be kept under control according to Article 3:102 (Negligence). 11. Institution or body. These rules do “not govern the liability of a person or body arising from the exercise or omission to exercise public law functions” (Article 7:103 (Public law functions and court proceedings)). Therefore, e. g. prisons from which criminals escape do not fall under paragraph (2); the same goes for State hospitals or similar institutions catering for those who would have been convicted of a crime but for mental incapacity. Also damage caused by juvenile delinquents who have escaped from a public institution (“borstal boys”) does not fall under paragraph (2) because of the effect of Article 7:103 (Public law functions and court proceedings). Examples of the operation of paragraph (2) are provided by private playschools and private schools and boarding schools, old peoples’ homes in relation to demented inmates and psychiatric clinics with severely ill private patients. 12. Persons likely to cause personal injury or property damage. Persons of whom it ought to be assumed that they are likely to injure others or cause property damage if they are not supervised need not have criminal proclivities of any kind. The examples given in the previous paragraph themselves show that the issue may arise in relation to persons who are ill or children and youths who lose their inhibition to harm others when they are in a group. Illustration 3 A depressive hospital patient jumps out of an upper storey window in order to commit suicide. He brings a pedestrian with him to the grave. The hospital is liable to the pedestrian’s survivors to the extent that it cannot prove that it properly supervised the patient.

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Article 3:104: Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons

Illustration 4 A man accommodated in a public institution for the mentally disabled sets the forest of a married couple (C) alight while unsupervised on day release. The institution is responsible for the fire damage under Article 3:104(2). 13. Requisites personal to the direct injurer. As with paragraph (1), in the framework of paragraph (2) the conduct in question must be such that it would be qualified as intentional or negligent were it the conduct of an adult of sound mind. A possible incapacity to comprehend the nature of one’s actions on the part of the person directly causative of the damage is irrelevant to this extent (cf. Article 5:301 (Mental incompetence)). In fact, such persons require particularly special supervision.

D.

Defective supervision (paragraph (3))

14. General. In relation to both paragraph (1) and paragraph (2), it is open to the potentially liable person to prove that the damage sustained by the third party was not the consequence of defective supervision of the person causing it. The concept of “defective supervision” set out here draws on the notion of what is “defective” invoked by the Product Liability Directive (cf. Article 3:204 (Accountability for damage caused by defective products) paragraphs (1) and (7)) and thus takes as its basis an objectified and – in comparison with Article 3:102 (Negligence) – higher standard. It hinges on the fact that the person who was the immediate cause of the damage was inadequately supervised. It does not depend on whether this inadequate supervision was a breach of an obligation or could have been prevented by a reasonable and prudent person in the circumstances. A child who manages to wander off from its parents’ premises or play school when the parents’ or teacher’s attention is absorbed by more pressing problems with other children is nonetheless defectively supervised. Illustration 5 An infant succeeds in leaving the premises of a play school for reasons later inexplicable. She walks out on to the road, where a driver manages to prevent a collision but suffers severe injury himself because he steers his car into a roadside ditch in order to save the child. The play school is liable to the driver. In contrast, the parents of the child are not liable under Article 3:104(1) since they did not breach their supervisory duty, even using the yardstick of an objective standard. Vis à vis the parents, only a claim under PEL Ben.Int. Art. 3:103 (Right to reparation) comes into the picture. 15. Supervision of children. With regard to the supervision of children, for the same reason, it makes no difference which parent was responsible for the defective supervision in the concrete case. To this extent, it only depends on the result – inadequate supervision of the child. If the father goes to the zoo with the child, the mother who stays at home is just as liable, and it is the same in the reverse situation of the father sitting in his office when the mother inadequately supervises the child. However, where supervision on the part of both persons entitled to custody is factually impossible (e. g. because the

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child lives in a boarding school far away), paragraph (3) opens up to both the possibility of being discharged of liability. It does not come down to a parental failure. 16. Supervision of high-risk groups. Matters are dealt with correspondingly for the case of the supervision of high-risk groups in permanent or temporary accommodation. The injured person is not obliged to single out individual employees or clarify the circumstances which led to the accident. It is sufficient that a person requiring supervision remained unsupervised and caused the damage while supposed to be under supervision.

Notes I.

Liability of the individual who is required to exercise parental care

1.

According to the FRENCH CC art. 1384(4) (as slightly modified by the Law of 4 March 2002) and (7) the predominant view for a long period of time was that, as regards liability of parents for harm caused by a minor, a twofold présomption de faute existed which could be rebutted; it was presumed that the child was either badly brought up or badly supervised (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II11, no. 193 p. 195). Since the decision of the Cass.civ. 19 February 1997, Bull.civ. 1997, II, no. 56 p. 32 (arrêt Bertrand) it is now accepted that parents are only relieved from liability upon proof of force majeure or a faute de la victime. In essence, for liability of the parent to be affirmed, four prerequisites have to be fulfilled, namely (i) the existence of parental authority (autorité parentale), (ii) the fact that the child is a minor (iii) that the child is living with the parent(s) (cohabitation) and (iv) the fait causal, namely, that the child caused the damage. The concept of cohabitation is given a very broad interpretation, see for instance, Cass.crim. 8 February 2005, JCP 2005, II, no. 10049 (13 year old child had lived with his grandparents from the age of one; this was nonetheless regarded as cohabitation with his parents). Since Cass.ass.plén. 13 December 2002, Bull.ass.plén. 2002, no. 4 p. 7 (two decisions), it is moreover accepted that the liability of parents is not based on the faute of the child. The conclusion drawn is that the fact that the damage was directly caused by the child suffices, even if no mistake on his part occurred (similarly Cass.civ. 10 May 2001, Bull.civ. 2001, II, no. 96 p. 64). This parental liability is ancillary to the personal liability of the child; it does not replace it (Flour/Aubert/Savaux loc. cit. no. 198 p. 203). Given the very strict regime operating in respect of the liability of parents the Court of Cassation suggested in its end of year report for 2002 that to avoid the prospect that the parents do not have liability insurance the legislator should either make insurance mandatory for parents or set up a guarantee fund. At the time of writing, the legislator has not yet reacted to these calls. A less harsh liability regime operates under BELGIAN law. Liability arising under CC art. 1384(2) is based on a rebuttable presumption (CC art. 1384(5)), that there has been a dereliction of parental or supervisory duty (Cass. 28 September 1989, Pas. belge 1990, I, no. 63 p. 117). The parents must adduce evidence to exonerate themselves on both fronts (Cass. 23 February 1989, Pas. belge 1989, I, no. 356 p. 649), even where, at the time, the child was under the supervision of another individual(s) or institution, for example, if the child was in school (Cass. 23 February 1989 loc. cit.;for a different view Cass. 22 September 1978, Pas. belge 1979, I, 108). Cass. 20 October 1999, Pas. belge

2.

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Article 3:104: Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons

3.

1999, no. 549 p. 1360 regarded CC art. 1384(2) not merely as a présomption de faute, but qualified it as a présomption de responsabilité. This entails that there is a rebuttable presumption that the damage was caused due to the fault of the parents (Tilleman and Claeys (-Fagnart), Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid, 172, 200). Even when the minor is incapable of fault, he or she must commit un acte objectivement illicite. This means that the minor must have done something which would constitute fault in an adult of sound mind (Fagnart loc. cit. 199). The liability of the parents is additional to the personal liability of the minor (compare the case of minors with a mental impairment and the relationship to CC art. 1386bis Cass. 18 October 1990, Pas. belge 1991, I, no. 90 p. 171). In SPAIN a distinction is drawn between the regime of the Código Civil and the rules on damages anchored in the Criminal Code and in more specific statutes pertaining to criminal law (especially the Criminal Liability of Minors Act [Ley Orgánica 5/2000, Reguladora de la Responsabilidad Penal de los Menores]). Liability for damage which is caused by non-criminal acts of minors is dealt with under the laws pertaining to liability of parents and guardians under CC art. 1903. The basis for liability, according to this provision, is a presumed dereliction of parental or supervisory duty (a culpa in vigilando or educando), see e. g. TS 24 March 1979, RAJ 1979 (1) no. 919 p. 741; TS 11 March 2000, RAJ 2000 (1) no. 1520 p. 2368; TS 8 March 2002, RAJ 2002 (1) no. 1912 p. 3178 and TS 13 September 2002, RAJ 2002 (5) no. 8828 p. 16172. According to prevailing legal opinion CC art. 1903 is not a strict liability provision, owing to the fact that the parents can exonerate themselves from liability upon proof that they acted with all due care to avoid the harm caused by the child (Díaz Alabart, ADC 1987, 803, 819; Gómez Calle, Responsabilidad de padres y centros docentes3. 1234, 1237). In practice, this transpires to be a purely theoretical possibility, given that the courts have glossed the Code, no longer accept such proof of exculpation and state that CC art. 1903 concerns a quasi strict liability (TS 17 June 1980, RAJ 1980 (1) no. 2409 p. 1874; TS 10 March 1983, RAJ 1983 (1) no. 1469 p. 1128; TS 22 September 1984, RAJ 1984 (2) no. 4332 p. 3326). In more recent times CC art. 1903 has been openly classed by the Tribunal Supremo as a case of where liability is based on risk (TS 22 January 1991, RAJ 1991 (1) no. 304 p. 333; TS 7 January 1992, RAJ 1992 (1) no. 149 p. 174; TS 30 June 1996, RAJ 1996 (3) no. 5272 p. 7064; TS 28 July 1997, RAJ 1997 (3) no. 5810 p. 8942; TS 11 March 2000, RAJ 2000 (1) no. 1520 p. 2368; for criticism see Gómez Calle loc. cit. 1236). The liability of parents has been – sporadically – qualified as subsidiary to the personal liability of the minor (confirmed by TS 24 May 1947, RAJ 1947 nos. 631 and 631bis p. 407; see also TS 22 January 1991, RAJ 1991 (1) no. 304 p. 333). However this view does not correspond to current understanding (Gómez Calle loc. cit. 1049, 1238; Díaz Alabart loc. cit. 876; Roca i Trias, Derecho de daños3, 94); parents and children are solidarily liable (TS 14 April 1977, RAJ 1977 (1) no. 1654 p. 1230; TS 30 December 1992, RAJ 1992 (5) no. 10565 p. 13807; TS 28 July 1997, RAJ 1997 (3) no. 5810 p. 8942; TS 8 March 2002, RAJ 2002 (1) no. 1912 p. 3178). In general, similar to Article 3:104, the liability of parents depends on the child acting in such a manner, that if an adult had been found to be acting in that way, the conduct would at least constitute negligence (Gómez Calle loc. cit. 1239; see also TS 10 June 1983, RAJ 1983 (2) no. 3517 p. 2738 and TS 4 May 1984, RAJ 1984 (2) no. 2396 p. 1792). The defendants must furthermore have parental authority, but they do not have to live with the child (Gómez Calle loc. cit. 1242).

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4.

5.

6.

620

Where the act commited by the minor amounts to a criminal act, resort is had to the Spanish Criminal Code and the Criminal Liability of Minors Act. Minors who have yet to attain the age of fourteen cannot be held criminally liable. They are instead subject to the rules relating to liability of parents under CC art. 1903. In respect to minors who have attained the age of fourteen, Criminal Liability of Minors Act art. 61(2) provides that they are (in the following order) “solidarily liable with their parents, guardians, foster parents or persons charged with legal supervision or who as a matter of fact have them in their supervisory care” for the damage which results from the criminal act. If the named individuals do not promote the conduct of the minor either intentionally or in a grossly negligent manner, the court can decide “to reduce responsibility”. Liability is strict (loc. cit. art. 61(3)), Therefore, it arises independent of any existence of culpa in vigilando or educando (Gómez Calle loc. cit. 1266; Durany Pich, FS Díez-Picazo II, 1749, 1762; CA Asturias 19 June 2003, BDA JUR 2003/184176; CA Asturias 6 May 2004, BDA JUR 2004/259497, CA Asturias 24 February 2005, BDA JUR 2005/90985; CA Asturias 4 March 2005, BDA JUR 2005/90490; CA Lleida 11 March 2002, BDA JUR 2002/118814; CA Jaén 28 November 2002, BDA JUR 2003/14953; CA Sevilla 3 June 2004, BDA JUR 2004/216620; CA Badajoz 25 January 2005, BDA AC 2005/333). The injured person can also bring a civil action against the parents before a judge of the children’s court with jurisdiction to hear the criminal matter. ITALIAN CC art. 2048 establishes direct liability of the parents and other persons charged with supervision of the child, if they fail to prove that they could not have hindered the conduct of the child which led to the damaging event (CC art. 2048(3)). The ground of liability is usually declared to be a presumed fault in relation to the parental and/or supervisory duty (Cass. 29 May 2001, no. 7270, Giur. civ. comm. 2002, II, 326; Cass. 10 July 1998, no. 6741, Giust.civ. 1998, I, 1809; de Cupis, Il danno II3, 134137; Alpa, Trattato di diritto civile IV, 672-673), for which the yardstick is an upbringing which would, as a general rule, enable an individual to conduct himself correctly when socially interacting with others (Cass. 11 August 1997, no. 7459, Danno e resp. 1998, 251; Alpa loc. cit. 672). In order to establish liability it must be shown the child’s conduct if committed by an adult, would fulfill all conditions to establish liability (Cass. 26 June 2001, no. 8740, Foro it. 2001, I, 3098). HUNGARIAN CC § 347 employs the wide ranging concept of the “curator”, a term which encompasses the parents as well as other individuals entrusted with the supervision of the child. The liability of the curator is imposed in place of liability of persons who are incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of their acts (CC § 347(1)(ii)) while the curator is solidarily liable with the minor who is liable on the grounds that he has sufficient capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts (CC § 347(4)). In the former case, liability is based on a rebuttable presumption of fault, while in the second case the fault as to the defective supervision requires positive proof (BH 1995/214). The defective supervision is manifested by a failure to supervise adequately and can also be attributed to an inadequate upbringing (Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1286-1287, 1290; Petrik (-Wellmann), Polgári jog II2, 600; BH 1980/129). A curator is defined as a person who as a matter of fact supervises the individual and is in a position to control and guide their behaviour or who is obliged to control and direct their behaviour as the case may be. Normally, parents with whom the child shares a household, are curators. If the parents do not live together, the curator is the parent with whom the child actually resides or who supervises it. Curators are, moreover, the child’s

Article 3:104: Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons

7.

8.

guardian and all persons (relations, friends) or institutions (Kindergarten, schools and hospitals) who merely temporarily and factually take on the supervision of the child. Depending on circumtances this may not impact on the qualification of the parents as curators. Schools and parents are solidarily liable, when, for example, the child causes damage at school and the cause for this lay in the lack of supervision or a failure of the parents to ensure proper upbringing. Natural persons, who have the task of supervising a child as part of their conditions of employment, e. g. teachers, nurses, tutors, social welfare workers and trained educational staff are not curators. Here, only the curator is the employer (Benedek loc. cit. 1285-1287; Wellmann loc. cit. 599). Under CZECH and SLOVAK CC § 422 persons with a duty to supervise are liable; this liability is based on a rebuttable persumption of fault. The liability is solidary if the child is adjudged to be personally liable. According to POLISH CC art. 427, someone who is bound under a statutory duty (such as a parent, teacher, or doctor in a psychiatric institution) or a contractual obligation (e. g. a babysitter) to supervise another, who is not reproachable for fault due to their age or mental or physical state, is accountable for the damage caused by that person, unless he or she had discharged the duty of supervision or the damage would have been occasioned notwithstanding due supervision. The rule applies also to persons who without any statutory or contractual obligation in fact permanently exercise supervision over such persons (e. g. relatives or neighbours). It in effect introduces a rebuttable presumption of culpa in custodiendo as well as a rebuttable presumption of the causal link between improper supervision and the damage (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛s´c´ ogólna7, 203; Czachórski, Zobowia˛zania10, 253). It is now widely recognised that culpa in custodiendo must consist of specific acts or omissions and may not be inferred solely from the general social maladjustment of a child (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak loc. cit.) in the form of a general educational neglect (Czachórski loc. cit.; Pietrzykowski (-Safjan), Kodeks cywilny I4, art. 427 p. 1208). The application of CC art. 427 is precluded if the conduct of the minor (or mentally disabled person) was not objectively unlawful (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak loc. cit. 204; Safjan loc. cit. 1206). Furthermore, the rule does not apply where the damage is caused by a person under supervision who may be accountable on the basis of fault. In that case the basic rule of CC art. 415 applies, so that a person supervising improperly may be jointly liable if at fault (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak loc. cit. 202). However, it falls to the injured person to prove all the requisites of the claim (Safjan loc. cit. 1205). SLOVENIAN LOA § 142(1) envisages strict liability for parents, whose child has yet to attain the age of seven. This liability is not imposed if “if the damage occurred while the child was entrusted to another and such person was liable therefore” (loc. cit. para. (3)). In addition LOA § 145(1) introduces a “special parental liability”, whereby parents are liable for a failure to educate their child properly if this failure materialises at a time when the child was under the supervision of another. The parents are solely liable, the person exercising the supervision excapes liability (loc. cit. para. (2)). GERMAN CC § 832 is the applicable provision governing liability of persons who, are either legally or contractually obliged to supervise other persons, namely due to their being under the age of majority or on the grounds of a mental or physical disability. This relates to a liability which is based on a presumption of fault. The loss recoverable is that which was inflicted on a third party by the person who was under supervision. A duty to supervise is imposed by law on those who are responsible for the care, custody and upbringing of a minor, as a general rule the parents (CC §§ 1626, 1671, 1757 and 1765),

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9.

10.

622

but also guardians and carers (§§ 1793, 1797, 1800, 1909 f, 1915). A further prerequisite for liability is the unlawful infliction of damage by the person who was to be supervised. An unlawful act must have been committed (CC §§ 823-826); according to the wording of the applicable legal provisons, fault is irrelevant in this respect. It is possible for the person with the legal duty to supervise to prove that this duty was not breached. It is also possible to prove that if there was such a violation of duty, this neglect of duty did not cause the damage which was sustained. It is becoming more difficult to rebut this presumption (Bernau, FamRZ 2007, 92). AUSTRIAN CC § 1309 governs the liability for the acts of minors and individuals with a mental disability. The liability impacts on those with a duty to supervise; it also embraces cases of self inflicted harm by the individual who was under supervision (CA Innsbruck 11 March 1985, ZVR 1986/114 p. 274). Although CC § 1309 refers to “minors” (according to CC § 21(2) persons under 14), liability extends to older minors who are aged fourteen and above (OGH 27 January 1971, SZ 44/8; OGH 29 November 2006, FamZ 2007/35). The basis for liability is the intentional or negligent breach of a supervisory duty; the burden of proof rest on the claimant (OGH 6 October 1961, SZ 34/137). The duty to supervise can arise under a statute or a contract (OGH 24 April 1968, EvBl 1968/379). In the first instance, the duty to supervise rests with the parents, (CC §§ 144, 146), then grandparents (CC § 145(1)) and foster parents (OGH 14 October 1970, EvBl 1971/74). The requirements of the supervisory duty are comparatively modest (see further Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VI3, § 1309 no. 1). The decisive question is what a reasonably prudent parent would have done in the concrete circumstances of the case in order to prevent damage resulting to a third party as a consequence of their child’s conduct (OGH 26 August 2004, 3 Ob 128/04a). The situation of the parents is also taken into consideration (Harrer loc. cit. no. 11). A typical case where liability would be affirmed is where smaller children are permitted to play with dangerous toys and then left to their own devices (OGH 24 January 1968, EvBl 1968/379; OGH 22 November 1938, SZ 20/241; OGH 11 January 1967, JBl 1967, 431). GREEK CC art. 923 differentiates between persons who are under a statutory duty to supervise (para. (1)) and those under a contractual obligation (para. (2)). In both cases, a rebuttable presumption arises that the person whose duty it was to supervise breached their duty either intentionally or negligently and this breach caused the resulting damage (Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 549; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 923, no. 1; CA Athens 6492/1998, EllDik 39 [1998] 1645; A. P. 1173/1994, EllDik 37 [1996] 79). CC art. 923 is geared only towards protecting third parties, not the person who required supervison, who will have to base any claim that they might have as regards damage that they have suffered on applicable family law provisions or contractual law provisions (e. g. CC arts. 335 et seq., 380 et seq.) (Kornilakis loc. cit.). The criteria used to determine the content of the supervisory duty include, in particular, age, maturity and degree of development of the minor. Furthermore, the foreseeability and the dangerousness of the conduct which caused the damage are important factors (Kornilakis loc. cit. 550; Georgiades loc. cit. no. 6; A. P. 1173/1994, EllDik 37 [1996] 79). The task of a person charged with the duty to supervise is to steer the person who requires supervision towards socially accepted conduct and to point out to him or her the dangerousness of particular objects and conduct (Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio III, 195). Minors are persons who require supervision (CC art. 127). Parents when exercising parental care have a duty to supervise. A prerequisite of liabil-

Article 3:104: Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons

11.

12.

ity under CC art. 923 is that the minor’s conduct objectively fulfils the requirements of a tort, Whether the presence of fault on the minor’s part is required is debatable (see further Georgiades loc. cit. no. 13). According to CC art. 932(2) persons who have a contractual duty to supervise are also liable. An implied contractual assumption of a duty to supervise will arise where the minor resides for a long period of time with relatives. However, if the duration of stay is short or where an individual cares for a child as a favour to the parents, the duty is denied (Georgiades loc. cit. no. 10). In a similar manner, according to PORTUGUESE CC art. 491 liability is imputed to a person who has a statutory or contractual duty over a person incapable of fault. The latter concept does not exclusively pertain to minors (Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 101 (1960) 15, 124). The statutory supervisory duty of parents arises under CC art. 1878(1), that of a guardian (tutor) under CC art. 1935 (Sottomayor, BFD LXXI (1995), 403, 405). Once the age of sixteen is reached, minors become criminally responsible. From this point onwards CC art. 491 is no longer applicable, given that it is not possible to regard minors who are criminally responsible for their acts as “naturally incapable” under the terms of this provision (CA Lisbon 15 October 2002; another view taken in a decision which has not been followed since in STJ 20 March 1991, BolMinJus 445 (1991) 220). CC art. 491 does not apply when the claim of the injured child is at issue (Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, 493; Sottomayor loc. cit. 411; STJ 17 January 1980, BolMinJus 293 [1980] 308; otherwise CA Oporto 10 October 1996). The basis for liability is a culpa in vigilando (Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 590; Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela loc. cit. 492; Sottomayor loc. cit. 411, 456 and 466; STJ 3 June 2004; CA Oporto 6 June 2001). There is a rebuttable presumption that the supervision was defective (CC art. 491(2); see Antunes Varela loc. cit. 491). In the context of adducing proof, exonerating the parent from liability, it is necessary to prove that the standard of the bonus paterfamilias was adhered to (STJ 13 February 1979, BolMinJus 284 [1979] 190; STJ 15 October 2002). The requirements appear to have become more rigid in recent times (e. g. STJ 17 January 1980, BolMinJus 293 [1980] 308). The courts also require proof of an absence of culpa in educando, and in this requirement go beyond the wording of the statutory provision (Sottomayor loc. cit. 424; STJ 18 May 1999; STJ 20 March 1991, BolMinJus 405 [1991] 220; CA Lisbon 17 March 1987, BolMinJus 366 [1987] 550). If the parents live apart then, in principle, the parent, who is responsible for the exercise of parental care has the supervisory duty. The duty to supervise is only imposed on the other parent when the child pays a visit (Sottomayor loc. cit. 443). However a duty to supervise should be borne by a stepfather given his capacity as head of the family (Sottomayor loc. cit. 406, note 7). DUTCH CC art. 6:169(1) provides that: “the parents or guardians of a child are liable, in respect of the damage that is suffered by a third party, caused by the acts of a child, who has not yet attained the age of fourteen, if these acts would have been imputable as an actionable tort to the child if its age would not have prevented this imputation”. According to this provision the parents are vicariously responsible. In respect of children who have attained the age of fourteen but who have yet to reach sixteen, according to CC art. 6:169(2) there is a rebuttable presumption that the parents are liable, on the basis that the child was inadequately supervised. The age limits were fixed based on the insurabilty of the respective risks (Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht III11, no. 84 p. 93; Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 645, 652, 678) In both cases, the defendant must either exercise parental authority or be the guardian of the child; it is not necessary that

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13.

14.

15.

624

the child act in an intentional or negligent manner If the child can invoke a defence or adduce a ground which excludes fault, and this ground of defence or justification is not age related, then the parents can also rely on this defence or justification (Onrechtmatige Daad II (-Oldenhuis), art. 6:169, no. 4 p. 66, no. 14 p. 197, no. 18 p. 241). Both parents are responsible for the exercise of parental authority (CC art. 1:125(1)); consequently both parents are solidarily liable even when the child only lives with one parent. Judicial separation (Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 25 February 1997, NedJur 1997 no. 659 p. 3595) and divorce do not, in principle, impact on the continuity of the exercise of parental care; they are relieved from their duty only when a court pronounces on the matter (CC arts. 1:266 and 1:269). Even when a child welfare agency is appointed guardian of the child, (voogdij-instelling), the parents remain liable (Oldenhuis loc. cit. nos 5-6, p. 66). The use of the formula that the conduct of the child must amount to an act, serves to indicate that the parents are not liable if their child fails to warn another of an impending danger or otherwise omitted to do something to safeguard a third party (Oldenhuis loc. cit. no. 12, pp. 156-197). ESTONIAN LOA § 1053(1) is similar to Article 3:104(1). The liability of parents for defective supervision is based on fault once the child has attained the age of fourteen. Liability can no longer be imposed, when the child reaches the age of nineteen (LOA § 1053(2). In SWEDEN the liability of parents, while anchored in the general culpa-rules, has however been extended by chap. 6 § 2(2)(third sentence) of the Parental Code which was enacted in 1993 (Föräldrabalk). According to this provision “a person who exercises care and custody over a child is required to ensure that the child is supervised or other appropriate measures are adopted, in order to prevent the child inflicting damage on another”. This provision has noticeably tightened the liability of the parents (Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 270; Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 54; contrast the older decisions of HD 8 November 1949, NJA 1949, 617 and HD 29 October 1954, NJA 1954, 450). Under FINNISH law the liability of parents is still determined by reference to the general culpa-liability under the Damages Liability Act chap. 2 § 1, cf. Supreme Court 16 January 1976, HD 1976 II 1 (no liability was imposed for damage, which was intentionally caused by an intoxicated fourteen year old), Supreme Court 7 October 1981, HD 1981 II 124 (a reduction in liability for a sixteen year old who, while unsupervised, fired shots at objects owned by a third party), and Supreme Court 12 April 1983, HD 1983 II 41 (seven year old child threw a dart at a five year old child, liability was imposed on the parents). Similarly, DANISH law does not have special regulations pertaining to the liability of parents and other persons (guardians, childminders, Kindergarten, schools, holiday camps). As regards defective supervision, recourse is had to the general fault-based liability (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 123; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 100). Under ENGLISH law (leaving aside the exceptional case where there is an employeremployee relationship between the parent and the child), a parent is not vicariously liable for the torts which their child commits: Donaldson v. McNiven [1952] 2 All ER 691 (where a 13 year old fired a pellet from an air rifle in an alley, injuring an infant). Moreover, a parent is not under a general duty to prevent their child causing damage to a third party: Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale), Torts19, 8-173. However, a parent may be liable under the normal rules of the tort of negligence, but this requires the particular circumstances to give rise to a duty and thus a responsibility for the child’s acts, e. g. in

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16.

17.

enabling or permitting untrained use of a dangerous object: Newton v. Edgerley [1959] 1 WLR 1031 (father liable for injury to another child caused by his 12 year old son, whose cocked shot gun was unintentionally triggered by the claimant, as the father had permitted his son to buy the gun, but had not trained him in its safe use). Depending on the degree of manifest risk arising from the source of danger, the child’s maturity, intelligence, previous conduct and temperament, so far as reasonably evident to the parent, the duty of care to third parties may be discharged by giving appropriate cautions, instructions or prohibitions to the child: cf Donaldson v. McNiven [1952] 2 All ER 691 (father not liable as the son was not specially disobedient, had been told only to use the gun in the house and had hitherto only used it in the cellar) and contrast Beebee v. Sales (1916) 32 TLR 412 (father liable for eye injury caused by 15 year old son’s use of airgun because a neighbour, whose window had been broken by a pellet from the gun, had previously warned the father of the son’s dangerous conduct). In IRELAND too parents are not liable, by virtue of that status, for the torts of their children: Curley v. Mannion [1965] IR 543, 546; McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 16.02 and see also Sullivan v. Creed [1904] 2 IR 317, 340 (FitzGibbon LJ: “The ground of liability [...] is not that the boy was the defendant’s son.”). Parental liability is based on negligence. This may take the form of permitting their children access to dangerous things in circumstances where injury to others is foreseeable: Sullivan v. Creed, loc. cit. (farmer leaving gun cocked against a fence; 15 year old son, not appreciating it was loaded, pointing it in play, and accidentally shooting plaintiff). Equally, it may be negligent for a parent to fail to control his or her child properly in circumstances where it is reasonably foreseeable that they will cause injury to others: Curley v. Mannion [1965] IR 543 (13 year old daughter of driver opening passenger car door into path of cyclist). In its 1985 review of this area of the law, the Law Reform Commission rejected options for reform based on vicarious liability, strict liability or a presumption of parental negligence and recommended no change in the existing law: Law Reform Commission, Report on the Liability in Tort of Minors and the Liability of Parents for Damage Caused by Minors LRC 171985. Similarly, in SCOTLAND, unless they authorise, instigate or ratify the child’s wrong, parents are likewise not vicariously liable for the delicts of their children: Walker, Delict2, 86 and 88; Stewart, Delict3, 180; Thomson, Delictual Liability3, 238. They may, however, be liable for breach of their own duty of care: Walker, Delict2, 86 and 88 (e. g. if a parent puts a dangerous thing into the hands of the child without giving proper instruction); Thomson, Delictual Liability3, 238.

II.

Liability of other persons and institutions for damage caused by others

18.

According to the FRENCH CC art. 1384(6), teachers and craftsmen are liable for damage caused to a third party by their pupils or apprentices while under their supervision. CC art. 1384(8) provides that the claimant has the burden of proving that the instructor (instituteur) acted in a negligent manner, thereby displacing the presumption of fault which had held sway until 1937 (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2004/2005), no. 7472). The liability of teachers in public schools is displaced by State liability (Education Code art. L 911-4). Such teachers are liable only via their internal relationship with the State. There is a rebuttable presumption of fault as regards the liability of craftsmen (artisans) towards a third party (CC art. 1384(6) and (7)), but

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nowadays this liability is of little practical significance. This is due to the fact that it is no longer customary that apprentices live with their masters (Brun, Responsabilité civile extracontractuelle, no. 561 p. 289). The Napoléonic Code does not explicitly recognise a general rule pertaining to liability for other individuals (fait d’autrui) (compare. Cass.civ. 15 February 1956, JCP 1956, II, 9564, note Rodière). Nonetheless, the Cass.ass.plén. 29 March 1991, Bull.ass.plén. 1991, no. 1 p. 1 (arrêt Blieck) introduced a fundamental change in direction. This is grounded in the Court of Cassation’s confirmation that an institution responsible for the care of the mentally disabled was liable for damage suffered by a third party, the result of arson, which was inflicted by a mentally disabled person under the care of the institution. The basis of liability was CC art. 1384(1), namely, liability was based on the general strict gardien-liability. It remains a subject of debate, whether the court thereby created a new principe général de responsabilité du fait d’autrui or created merely a new special head of vicarious liability (see on the one hand Malinvaud, Droit des obligations9, no. 584 p. 370 and Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II11, no. 223 p. 239 and on the other Brun loc. cit. no. 566 p. 292). According to current case law CC art. 1384(1) is applicable, if (i) a natural or legal person has the garde over another or (ii) an institution had assumed control over the acts of another person. A garde d’autrui in the sense of arrêt Blieck is established, if a natural or legal person holds le pouvoir d’organisation, de direction et de contrôle du mode de vie over the person requiring supervision. The second category can be traced back to Cass.civ. 22 May 1995, Bull.civ. 1995, II, no. 155 p. 88 (2 decisions) whereby sports clubs, established for the purpose of organising, managing and controlling the activities of their members in sporting events, are liable under CC art. 1384(1) for damage caused during this time by their members. Both decisions affirmed liability of a rugby club for injuries inflicted on the opposing team, as the player who inflicted the injuries could not be identified. The basis for liability is the contrôle de l’activité d’autrui (Flour/Aubert/ Savaux loc. cit. no. 227 p. 245). In later decisions this was used as a basis to extend liability to other clubs (e. g. Cass.civ. 12 December 2002, Bull.civ. 2002, II, no. 289 p. 230). It remains uncertain whether liability can be broadened in scope to encompass other legal persons and institutions (Flour/Aubert/Savaux loc. cit. no. 227 p. 247). Moreover, it is also unclear whether, in order to ground liability, it is necessary to have at the very minimum the existence of an (objective) faute of the person who directly caused the damage. According to BELGIAN CC art. 1384(4) there is a rebuttable presumption that teachers and craftsmen are liable, either intentionally or negligently (CC art. 1384(5)) for damage caused to a third party by a pupil or apprentice who was under their supervision at the time. The word “teacher” is broadly interpreted (Cass. 1 December 1986, JT 1987, 196). Craftsmen are subject to the provisions of CC art. 1384(4), once the apprentices whom they are training are under a contract of training. At the same time, the craftsmen concerned are also employers in the sense of CC art. 1384(3), but CC art. 1384(4) has precedence as a special norm (Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Wynant/Debaene, TPR 2000, 1827, no. 118). It is a prerequisite for liability that the pupil or apprentice commits a faute or in the case of a youth who is not able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act that an acte objectivement illicite is committed (Tilleman and Claeys (-Fagnart), Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid, 172, 204, nos. 80-82). Teachers who are also employees under the Employment Contracts Act can rely on art. 18 of that Act which provides that employees have a privileged position as far as liability is concerned. A

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20.

21.

general liability for fait d’autrui is not a feature of Belgian law (Cass. 19 June 1997, Pas. belge 1997, I, no. 284 p. 700, concl. Piret). SPANISH CC art. 1903(5) establishes that the governing body of a school is liable for damage caused by a minor, during the time that he or she was under the supervision of the teaching staff of the institution The governing body is relieved from liability when it adduces proof that it used the standard of care of a bonus paterfamilias in order to prevent the damage occurring. The governing body can only seek redress from the teacher, if the teacher acted intentionally or in a grossly negligent manner (CC art. 1904), In practice this right of redress is rarely exercised (Roca i Trias, ADC 1998, 7). The Tribunal Supremo exonerates the school from liability more willingly than it exempts parents from liability (which today is practically impossible to achieve; see above at Note I3), see e. g. TS 8 March 1999, RAJ 1999 (2) no. 2249 p. 3575 and TS 27 September 2001, RAJ 2001 (4) no. 8155 p. 12833). CC art. 1903(5) is only applicable to private schools; it does not extend to state owned schools, because the latter are subject to a special regime within administrative law (Gómez Calle, Responsabilidad de padres y centros docentes1, 1098), providing for strict liability for damage caused by civil servants and other public service employees. On the other hand, private schools are also liable under CC art. 1903(5), when the tort committed by the pupil also amounts to a criminal act (see further Gómez Calle loc. cit. 1315; Vaquer Aloy, La Ley 2001, I, 1635; cf. CA Álava 27 May 2005, BDA AC 2005/1062). CC art. 1903(3) also establishes the liability of guardians (tutores). Whether the liability under CC art. 1903 can be extended to other persons or institutions not specifically alluded to in the provisions is debatable. The prevailing opinion of legal scholarship is that the provision contains a numerus clausus list that cannot be extended or applied analogously (Lacruz Berdejo and Rivero Hernández, Elementos II(2)4, 524; de Ángel Yágüez, Tratado de responsabilidad civil3, 329; Roca i Trias, Derecho de daños, 95; TS 16 October 2003, RAJ 2003 (5) no. 7392 p. 13834). Other commentators would extend CC art. 1903(3) to embrace the “factual carer” e. g. apply the provision correspondingly to psychiatric clincs or holiday camps (Gómez Calle loc. cit. 519). It is undisputed that such institutions could be liable according to the general clause of CC art. 1902 (Miquel González, ADC 1983, 1505). ITALIAN CC art. 2048(2) provides that persons responsible for educating children and persons who are responsible for training of apprentice craftsmen or training in a particular trade, are liable for the damage caused by an unlawful act of their pupils or apprentices while under their supervision. Persons responsible for education and training supervisors can exonerate themselves from liability by proof that they could not prevent the unlawful act (CC art. 2048(3)). Persons reponsible for the education of minors are teachers who are employed to teach on a regular basis by virtue of their civil service position or a private contractual duty. This establishes the duty to supervise (Cass. 18 July 2003, no. 11241, Giust.civ.Mass. 2003, fasc. 7-8; Visintini, Trattato breve della responsabilità civile, 745; Bianca, Diritto civile V, 699; Monateri, Manuale della responsabilità civile, 315). The liability of public school teachers is subject to a special public law regime, which essentially entails that those teachers are not liable vis-à-vis third parties and are only liable as against the State if they acted in an intentional or grossly negligent manner (as to the constitutionality of the provision, see Corte Cost. 24 February 1992, no. 64, Giur. it. 1992, I, 1, 1618). Individuals and institutions which conduct sports training on a private basis are also liable under CC art. 2048(2) (Cass. 22 October 1965, no. 2202, Giur.it. 1966, I, 1, 1281; CFI Monza 13 September 1988,

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22.

23.

628

Resp.civ. e prev. 1989, 1200), as are educational institutions charged with supervising minors (Cass. 7 December 1968, no. 3933, Giur.it. 1969, I, 1, 2187), organisers of a hoilday camp (CA Genova 11 July 1962, Arch.resp.civ. 1962, 192) and even school caretakers (Cass.sez.un. 3 February 1972, no. 260, Giur. it. 1972, I, 1, 1310). In contrast, the liability of those charged with the responsibility for training trade apprentices or trainee craftsmen is no longer of practical significance, owing to changing social perceptions. The vicarious liability of employers for employees has emerged in its stead (Visintini loc. cit. 748). The content of the duty to supervise is proportional to the age of the minor, namely, the more mature the minor, the less need for constant supervision on the teacher’s part (Cass. 23 June 1993, no. 6937, Giust.civ.Mass. 1993, 1065). In respect of adducing proof to relieve liability (CC art. 2048(3)) the decisive factor is whether the damage was foreseeable; since only that which is forseen can also be avoided (Cass. 2 December 1996, no. 10723, Stud.Iuris 1997, 314). Moreover, persons responsible for the education of children can also exonerate themselves upon proof that the necessary precautionary organisational measures were taken, in order to rule out the possibility of the injury occurring (Cass. 3 February 1999, no. 916, Giust.civ.Mass. 1999, 244). The HUNGARIAN Public Education Act (Statute no. LXXIX of 1993) § 77, in principle, renders pupils subject to the rules of liability anchored in the Civil Code. However, the extent of liability (graduated according to intention and negligence) is restricted to the amount of damages that can be awarded. Loc. cit. § 77(3) constitutes strict liability for Kindergarten, schools, boarding schools and the “organisers of practical schooling”. It is possible to be relieved of liability (departing from the general provisions of the Civil Code) only if the defendant institution can prove that the damage was caused by an unavoidable occurrence outside the scope of their activities (BH 2003/62; BH 1996/310; BH 1996/148). Furthermore, the provisions pertaining to the liability of parents (above at Note I6) are also applicable to the liability of other institutions and bodies, provided that they are only “curators” according to the meaning of the statute. A sanitorium or any other institution which assumes a factual duty of supervision can be regarded as a curator. A person who has a duty to supervise because of their status as employee is not a curator (Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1286; Petrik (-Wellmann), Polgári jog II2, 599). The same rule (liability of the institution, not the employee) is also found in the CZECH and SLOVAK CC § 422(3). For POLAND see note I7 above. SLOVENIAN LOA § 144 provides: “(1) The guardian, school or other institution shall be liable for damage inflicted by a minor while under the supervision of the guardian, school or other institution unless it is shown that the supervision was conducted with due care or that the damage would have occurred even under careful supervision. (2) If the minor is also liable for damage, they shall be jointly and severally liable”. According to the GERMAN CC § 832 a duty to supervise those entrusted in their care (particularly arising under a contract) can be imposed on persons and institutions, notwithstanding the fact they are not exercising parental care and custody, e. g. in schools, Kindergarten, educational institutions and nursing homes as well as hospitals (Palandt (-Sprau), BGB66, § 832, no. 5). However, the foregoing provision only concerns private institutions. In respect of civil service employees of state institutions, CC § 832 is displaced by the public law rules on state liability for the wrongs of public servants (Const. art. 34 in conjunction with CC § 839). A duty to supervise under CC § 832 is no longer imposed on masters and other job training instructors (Bundesbildungsgesetz

Article 3:104: Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons

24.

25.

26.

[ BBiG] § 6); older case law (e. g. BGH 24 June 1958, VersR 1958, 549, 550) is thereby rendered obsolete by the more recently enacted statute. Those persons with responsibility for training could nonetheless be liable as employers under CC § 831 (Soergel (-Krause), BGB13, § 832, no. 11). Guardians, (CC § 1896) are only obliged to supervise their (adult) wards, if their sphere of supervision includes a statutory obligation for care and maintenance of the person cared for or if they were specifically appointed to supervise him or her. Under AUSTRIAN CC § 1309 liability of other persons and institutions for damage caused by minors and mentally disabled adults follows the rules on the liability of parents. The supervisory duty can be established by contract (Kindergarten: OGH 11 February 1997, 10 Ob 2441/96k, RS 0107494; au pair: OGH 26 June 1901, GlUNF 1483) as well as in statutory provisions (e. g. for teachers and the management of youth custody centres: OGH 29 November 2006, FamZ 2007/35). Liability was affirmed in the following case of a dangerous mentally ill patient who absconded from a psychiatric clinic (OGH 24 November 1998, JBl 1999, 325). In GREEK legal literature, it is postulated that CC art. 923 should be used analogously for cases where a natural or legal person assumes a contractual duty to supervise an individual in need of supervision owing to a psychosomatic condition or mental disability. It is contemplated that the duty would be imposed on e. g. the director of a psychiatric clinic or a self employed nurse (Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 551). The liability of state schools and teachers employed in the schools, is subject to a special regime of state liability (Kornilakis loc. cit.; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 923, no. 9). PORTUGUESE CC art. 491 essentially follows the model of the German CC § 832. However, it should be noted that the two provisions are not identical. CC art. 491 subjects every person who “by virtue of law or by virtue of a legal transaction is under a duty to supervise those who are naturally incapacitated” to liability based on a rebuttable presumption that the supervision was defective. The contractual duty to supervise can impinge on a large number of individuals, particularly teachers and proprietors of all types of educational institutions (Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 590). The supervision of children on holiday in non-residential and open camps is specifically regulated by statute (DL no. 304/2003, DR 283/2003 I-A (revised by DL no. 109/2005 of 8 July 2005, DR 130/2005 I-A), art. 10). If a duty to supervise is imposed on more than one person (parents, teachers) then they are jointly and severally liable (Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, 492). “Natural incapacity” is not identical in meaning to being incapable of understanding and controlling one’s acts. Consequently it can also arise that the person requiring supervision and the person whose duty it was to supervise can be solidarily liable (CC art. 497; Sottomayor, BFD LXXI (1995), 403, 409). If a seven month old baby is left unsupervised for a moment in a Kindergarten and suffers injury in this time, the management of the Kindergarten is liable to the child according to the general rules of liability (STJ 25 November 1998, BolMinJus 441 [1998] 470; also compare CA Lisbon 16 February 1995). In another case, a different approach was taken. Here a child pilfered explosives from his father and gave them to his playmate. Despite the fact that at the time of the accident the child was under the supervision of a holiday camp, the father was found liable (CA Oporto 23 March 2006). A contractual assumption of a supervisory duty, e. g. by grandparents, can also be implied, provided that they assume the duty to bring up the child (STJ 15 October 2002; CA

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27.

28.

29.

30.

630

Oporto 14 February 2002, CJ XXVII [2002-1] 14; CA Oporto 28 February 2002). It will not suffice if the child was supervised merely as a favour to the parents (Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 85 (1959) 381, 409; Sottomayor loc. cit. 409; STJ 14 December 1994). Furthermore, the Supreme Court confirmed a decision from the Court of Appeal of Lisbon (of 28 January 2003, CJ XXVIII [2003-1] 79), which held that a clinic violated its contractual duty of supervision of a mentally ill in-patient who, during the night, severely injured another patient (STJ 22 September 2005). According to DUTCH law, liability is imposed under the general rule of CC art. 6:162 on a person who exercises a supervisory duty but does not exercise parental control (toezichthouder). The requirements imposed are stricter when the supervison is exercised in a professional capacity (HR 12 May 1995, NedJur 1996, no. 118 p. 561). CC art. 6:162 applies also in respect of the liability of teachers (CA Amsterdam 17 July 1997, VR 1998, no. 187 p. 378). Here also, the prerequisite for liability is that, judged objectively, the child committed an unlawful act, namely that the child violated a norm of social behaviour. The liability of schools for the breach of the teacher’s supervisory duty arises under the general rules pertaining to the liability of employers (CC art. 6:170). Moreover, a school can also be liable for defective organisation under CC art. 6:162 (Onrechtmatige Daad II (-Oldenhuis) art. 6:169, nos. 58A-58C, pp. 447-469). ESTONIAN law does not have an express statutory regulation along the lines of Article 3:104(2) but the prevailing legal position is largely identical (see Tampuu, Juridica 2003, 464/474). In SWEDEN, individuals, who supervise children but do no exercise parental control, are not subject to the special rules pertaining to liability of parents anchored in the Parental Code chap. 6 § 2(2)(third sentence) (above at I14). They are subject solely to the general culpa-liability (Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 272; HD 9 November 1984, NJA 1984, 764 [liability of a recreational facility operated by a local authority]). The same also holds true for DENMARK (Møller and Wiisbye, Erstatningsansvarsloven6, 516; Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 122) and FINLAND (Supreme Court 10 January 1994, HD 1994:1 [A local authority was found liable for injury to a pupil inflicted during school sport. Liability was imposed on the basis that the teacher failed to clamp down on a game that was too boisterous; but damages were reduced because the injured party participated in the game]). Liability in damages on the grounds of defective supervision can also be imposed on those entrusted with the care of a mentally disturbed individual; although this liability will affect mostly state institutions (Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 54; HD 20 October 1939, NJA 1939, 501 and cf. Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans, 422). A special public law regime, namely Prison Treatment Act exists in Sweden to deal with injuries inflicted by prisoners (Lag om kriminalvård i anstalt). For ENGLAND, as in the case of those exercising parental responsibility, the liability of others in charge of children for damage caused by the children rests in negligence founded on a duty to the victim to prevent such damage. Thus, for example, a nursery school can be expected to exercise the same care as a “careful parent” in relation to the children in their charge: see Carmarthenshire County Council v. Lewis [1955] AC 549 (illustration 5). The same holds for institutions in their supervision of others; liability depends on breach of a duty of care. The existence of a duty of a custodial agency to a victim, as an exception to the general principle that there is no duty to prevent a third party from causing damage to another, turns on the custodian’s ability to control the

Article 3:104: Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons

third party and the foreseeability that the third party will cause injury or damage if there is a failure to exercise proper control: Home Office v. Dorset Yacht [1970] AC 1004 (where young offenders in a youth penal institution, training on an island, were able to escape and caused damage to a yacht). The degree of proximity between the parties, which fixes the scope of persons to whom a duty is owed, is critical in determining the boundaries of liability: consider Home Office v. Dorset Yacht loc. cit., where it was held that the duty was owed to those whose property was likely to be damaged in the course of the escape, but Lord Morris would have extended the duty to residents in the area of the escape); Palmer v. Tees Health Authority [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 351 (no duty owed by custodial authority to victim of fatal attack by mental patient, who was negligently released from custody, where prospective victim not identifiable because authority could not know whom to warn). Illustration 3 is taken from TS 12 March 1975, RAJ 1975 (1) no. 1798 p. 1355; illustration 4 from Cass.ass.plén. 29 March 1991, D. 1991 jur. 324, note Larroumet; and illustration 5 from Carmarthenshire County Council v. Lewis [1955] AC 549.

Section 2:

Accountability without intention or negligence Article 3:201: Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives (1) A person who employs or similarly engages another is accountable for the causation of legally relevant damage suffered by a third person when the person employed or engaged: (a) caused the damage in the course of the employment or engagement; and (b) caused the damage intentionally or negligently, or is otherwise accountable for the causation of the damage. (2) Paragraph (1) applies correspondingly to a legal person in relation to a representative causing damage in the course of acting as such a representative. For the purposes of this paragraph, a representative is a person who is authorised to effect juridical acts on behalf of the legal person by its constitution.

Comments A.

The Article in overview

1. Instances of strict liability for others. This Article addresses instances of liability for others. Liability under this provision is “strict”; it does not depend on the intention or negligence of the liable person. Paragraph (1) is concerned with liability for employees and auxiliary persons placed on an equal footing to them; paragraph (2) gives effect to a structurally quite similar liability of legal persons for their representatives. The premise that employers’ liability for their personnel ought to be independent of personal fault on the part of the employer is currently representative of the legal conception in the vast majority of Member States. Even where the text of the respective codification clings to the requirement of a failure to supervise on the part of the employer, the courts have consistently attached such high requirements to the proof necessary to escape liability that, although theoretically possible under these provisions, such escape is practically a dead letter. 2. Liability of legal persons for their representatives. Legal persons can only act through their board members and, since the legal persons themselves simply cannot supervise liability tied to the negligent supervision by the legal person of its representatives is discarded on “technical” grounds. In other words the rule in paragraph (2) follows from the nature of the beast. It expresses a well-nigh unanimous European value judgement. A further rule on the liability of legal persons was not required. This is because Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (b) already clarifies that in principle all provisions of this Book apply in equal measure to natural and to legal persons. Under the general rules, legal persons are consequently already liable for civil wrongs which 632

Article 3:201: Accountability for damage caused by

they themselves commit; see Comments on Article 1:103 (Scope of application), on Article 3:101 (Intention) and on Article 3:102 (Negligence). Legal persons, just as much as natural persons, are liable under paragraph (1) of the present Article for those they ordinarily employ. 3. Public sector bodies. The Article applies to all employers and legal persons, including the state and public sector bodies. However, where the exercise of a public law function is at stake, this Book has no application, see Article 7:103 (Public law functions and court proceedings). 4. “Legally relevant damage ...” The Article covers liability for legally relevant damage of all types. Thus, although the provision declares strict liability, it is not limited bodily injury and property damage but applies to all kinds of legally relevant damage listed in the catalogue in the second Chapter. This corresponds to the legal situation in all Member States of the Union. A restriction of liability to personal injury and property damage applies to certain forms of liability without intention or negligence (see the following Articles of this Section), not, however, in the context of employer’s liability. On the other hand, the present Article still requires that the injured person has suffered some form of legally relevant damage within the meaning of the second Chapter of this Book. As a result, in particular liability for “ordinary” non-performance of a contractual obligation lies outside its scope of application. Cases which have to deal with a nonperformance of a contractual obligation as well as non-contractual liability for damage are conversely again subject to the general conflicts rules in Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraphs (c) and (d). 5. “... suffered by a third person”. Both paragraphs of the Article exclusively pertain to harm of “third parties”. Harm of the employee or the representative by the employer or legal person remains out of the equation, as does the reverse, viz. harm of the employer or legal person by an employee or representative. The same result follows to a great extent also from Article 7:104 (Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers’ associations), but only Article 7:104, not Article 3:201, expressly clarifies that harm of an employee by another employee in the same company is not embraced by this Book (and that it does not make any proposals on the fashioning of personal liability of employees as against third parties). 6. Defences. Every defence in Chapter 5 is applicable to the liability under this Article. If such a defence is not open to the employer (or legal person) personally, but to the employee (or representative), then this likewise exonerates the employer (or legal person). This results from the fact that it is not a basis of liability simply to employ someone. The basis of liability under the present Article lies in the fact that someone has duties carried out by others. Consequently, the liable person must indeed submit to everything that would have had to be submitted to had the duties been carried out personally, but only to that precisely. Where there would have been no liability had the employer done (or omitted to do) exactly what the employee did (or did not do) then the delegation of duties has not become effective for the law on liability; as a consequence, there is no room for employer’s liability.

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B.

Employer’s liability (paragraph (1))

7. Employees. The Article provides first and foremost for liability for employees, i. e. persons who have a normal relationship of employment with their employer. However, in conformity with almost every Member State’s legal system, the provision does not lay down any liability for independent (sub-) contractors and their operatives. The requisite for liability for another is always the minimum abstract possibility of directing and supervising their conduct through binding instructions. That is not the case with independent subcontractors. Liability under Article 3:102 (Negligence) remains of course unaffected by this. Illustration 1 In an aeroplane accident, the flying instructor and two student pilots are killed. One of the two students had been flying the plane; the flight instructor had not properly fulfilled his instructional and inspectional duties. The company which runs the flying instruction centre is liable for the flight instructor’s error, although he was not its employee and in fact issued personal receipts for the flying lessons. This is because the flight instructor continuously worked in the framework of the instruction centre and had been subject to the directions of the school’s operator. It was furthermore subject to the very high requirements of the duty to carefully select and monitor the instructors working at the school. Illustration 2 A Bulgarian company obtained an arbitral award against an Italian debtor from an arbitral tribunal instituted by the Bulgarian Chamber of Industry and Trade. However, the arbitral tribunal was guilty of such gross procedural defects that the Bulgarian claimant could not obtain executory title in Italy. The Chamber of Industry and Trade is not the employer of the arbitral tribunal; it does not matter that the Chamber had published lists with the names of persons whom the parties could select as arbitrator. Illustration 3 A sailing club rents a crane in order to bring its members’ boats to land. The crane firm also provides the operating personnel. As a result of the negligence of the operating staff, a harness is broken and a boat is damaged. The specialist crane company is liable for the damage, not the sailing club. 8. “Similarly engages”. The Article is not, however, confined to the liability of employers. Even where the liable person and the person whose actions are in question are not connected through an employment relationship in the technical sense, the requisites of the provision may be fulfilled. The only decisive factor is that there is a relationship of instructional dependence (or superiority and inferiority), out of which flows an authority on the part of the liable person to control the conduct of the relevant acting party. Therefore, the Article also applies e. g. where without being detected, the employment relationship was invalid or where it has been avoided with retroactive effect at the time of the injury. A contract for service (e. g. with a lawyer) can also suffice under certain criteria, namely where a lawyer is retained for a concrete task with a precisely specified 634

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line of approach and without room for personal discretion. It is not even a requirement for the application of this Article that the person acting is gainfully working for the liable person. Illustration 4 While standing on a ski slope, a woman is hit by a toboggan driven by a first aid relief worker. The company which operates the ski slope is liable for the accident, although it does not employ the driver of the toboggan on the basis of an employment contract. A local law stipulates in detail that operators of ski slopes must arrange a transport service for injured persons. This suffices for the inference that the questionable first aid service was employed within the scope of the organised commercial activity of the ski slope operator. The fact that the aid-worker was working voluntarily and without payment does not affect this result. A hospital is liable for the errors of its chief physicians, as long as it has the authority to determine their area of activity and to have an influence over their working hours. Where the chief physician is a member of the board, the hospital’s liability then follows from paragraph (2). Illustration 5 The negligence of a gynaecologist causes blindness to a newborn child. The private hospital is liable for this where there is a relationship of instructional connection and dependence between it and the doctor; it does not depend on the existence of an employment contract. In the case of temporary agency workers, in principle liability falls on the company who contracts out, or supplies, the workers. If however the agency worker is integrated into the client company over a longer period of time and this is externally documented (e. g. through wearing its work uniform), then such agency workers are as “similarly engaged” (in the sense of this Article) by the client company as its own workers. Illustration 6 An oil company is in need of an extra truck and driver for transporting oil during a few months, due to capacity constraints. The oil company contracted a transportation firm for this purpose. The driver from the firm was given an educational course by the oil company. The driver negligently caused damage to a third person when delivering oil. This is not within the work sphere of the transportation company but rather of the oil company on account of the driver having the same tasks as the company’s own drivers; he was integrated into the general organisation of the company, the latter also being his supervisor and instructor. Even though the driver was hired and paid by the transportation firm, he was to be seen as a natural integrated operator of the oil company which was familiar with, and de facto supervising and instructing, the driver’s work and hence was familiar with the risk.

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Illustration 7 A bystander loses an eye from a chipping thrown up in the course of excavation work. The driver of the mechanical digger responsible was subject to the instruction of the construction company, although from a technical legal perspective he was an employee of a third party. The construction company is liable for the error of the driver of the mechanical digger, even though the relationship between the two parties was not permanently laid out. It suffices that the construction company insured the work of the driver and had instructional authority over him. 9. Temporary relief workers. The duration of engagement plays no role in the operation of this Article. A temporary worker responsible for looking after children for a couple of hours also falls under this provision. However, a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship between the party liable and the relevant person acting must always be at issue. A spontaneous favour in everyday life does not suffice. Illustration 8 A housewife asks a guest to carry a pan of hot soup from the kitchen to the dining table, in the course of which the soup is inadvertently emptied over the trousers of another guest. The housewife is not liable under Article 3:201 for the damage caused. 10. In the course of employment or engagement (sub-paragraph (a)). Liability only takes hold where the person engaged caused the damage “in the course of the employment or engagement”. The demarcation depends on whether the person acting was working within the employer’s sphere of influence or was exclusively pursuing personal aims. Illustration 9 Where a doctor is on holiday far away from home and helps a fellow holiday-maker, harming her through negligence in the process, this does not ground any liability on the part of the doctor’s employer. The risk of harm to a third person must have had its basis in the employment relationship. Therefore, intentional damage through employees is in principle included in the liability – this expressly results from sub-paragraph (b). Damage only lies outside the context of accountability (i. e. it only does not occur in the course of the employment or engagement), where the employee pursues entirely personal interests on occasion. Illustration 10 A legal apprentice who is assigned to a lawyer under a civil law contract provides advice to a terminally ill woman who wishes to draw up her will. The information given by the apprentice on the requirements for formal validity is wrong; the will is void. The lawyer is liable under Article 3:201 in conjunction with Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) in damages to the “heirs” now left emptyhanded. The fact that advice in testamentary matters was not part of the duties that the lawyer had allocated to the apprentice, so that the latter consciously acted contrary to instructions, does not alter the result under the law governing liability. 636

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Illustration 11 The doorman of a nightclub is beaten up by guests. He manages to flee. He runs back to his nearby apartment and gets a knife, hurries back and pursues one of the guests, now fleeing themselves, and severely injures him. The act occurs “in the course of the employment”. This is because the doorman had been employed for the purposes of removing riotous guests, using force where necessary. 11. Employees excluded from service. An employer is not liable under Article 3:201 for employees who have already been excluded from service at the time of the injury; under special circumstances only liability under Article 3:102 (Negligence) is otherwise conceivable, for instance because the third person should have been warned and this warning was not given. Illustration 12 The manager of a pizzeria, the franchisee of a large chain, is shot and severely injured by a former employee of the franchisor; the latter had been dismissed by the manager. The franchisor is not liable for the shooting injury under the present Article or under Article 3:102 (Negligence). Possible faults in the dismissal process would not have been causative of the damage; the intentional act interrupted the chain of causation. 12. Personal requisites of the person acting (sub-paragraph (b)). The liability of the employer arises if the employee causes legally relevant damage intentionally, negligently, or is otherwise accountable for its causation. The liability of the employer is not intertwined with the personal liability of the employee, rather that the latter acted intentionally or negligently within the meaning of Article 3:101 (Intention) and Article 3:102 (Negligence) or is responsible for damage due to one of the grounds enumerated in Chapter 3, Section 2 (Accountability without intention or negligence). That is not the same. This is because it may be that under the applicable law employees are quite generally only personally liable under special requirements, e. g. only where they are guilty of qualified fault (intention; gross negligence), see Article 7:104 (Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers’ associations) sub-paragraph (a). In such a case the liability of the employer is already triggered by simple negligence on the part of the employee. The same goes for a mentally disabled employee. The mental disability exonerates the employee personally under the criteria in Article 5:301 (Mental incompetence), but not the employer. 13. “... is otherwise accountable for the causation of the damage”. Liability under this Article arises not only where the employee harms the third person through intention or negligence, but also where the employee is responsible for the damage arising due to an objective ground of accountability. This can be of practical importance particularly where the responsibility of the employee personally as a keeper is at issue, for instance as the keeper of an animal (Article 3:203 (Accountability for damage caused by animals)) or as the keeper of a motor vehicle (Article 3:205 (Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles)). In the case of animals or motor vehicles used by an employee professionally in the interests of the employer, it is often questionable who the keeper is. Paragraph (1)(b) relieves the injured person from the necessity of explaining in detail the 637

Chapter 3: Accountability

internal operational circumstances relevant to the determination of who is the keeper. The employer is also liable even if in the individual case not the keeper of the thing causing the damage. 14. Solidary liability. According to its basic system, liability under this Article does not displace the personal liability of the employee; rather it is added to it. Thus, where the employee as well as the employer are liable under the rules of this Book or under the applicable law (Article 7:104 (Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers’ associations) sub-paragraph (a); see above), then there is solidary liability (Article 6:105(1) (Solidary liability)). Conversely, the internal relationship between employer and employee is usually determined by a special regime of labour law, which according to Article 7:104sub-paragraph (a) displaces the general rule in Article 6:105 (Solidary liability) paragraph (2).

C.

Liability of legal persons for their representatives (paragraph (2))

15. Purpose of the rule. Paragraph (2) provides for liability of a legal person for damage caused by its representatives. This rule appears necessary because a representative is not always also an employee. Incidentally, the requisites of both paragraphs in Article 3:201 are of course identical. As a result the operation of the Article is not strained by the occasionally problematic distinction between a “simple” employee and a representative. As long as it is certain that the person acting is to be allocated to either one or the other category, the liability of the legal person for the harmful conduct of the person acting is fixed. 16. Representative. The second sentence of paragraph (2) defines a representative as a person who is authorised to effect juridical acts on behalf of the legal person by its constitution. It is for the terms of the latter (charter, memorandum and articles of association, etc.) to determine the persons who are its representatives. That constitution is of course subject to the statutory rules of the legal system to which the legal person owes its existence. Paragraph (2) also applies where the representative in turn is a legal person.

Notes I.

Employers’ liability and liability for independent contractors

1.

Under FRENCH CC art. 1384(5) masters (maîtres) and employers (commettants) are liable for the damage caused by their servants (domestiques) and employees (préposés) during the course of the performance of their functions of employment. The term commettant encompasses the epithet of the maître, likewise the term préposé embraces the concept of the domestique; consequently it suffices to speak of liability of an employer for their employees (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II11, no. 203 p. 209). Originally the personal liability of the employee was ‘cumulated’ with that of the employer, but since the decision of Cass.ass.plén. 25 February 2000, Bull.ass.plén. 2000, no. 2 p. 3 the former is only relevant if the employee exceeds the scope of his duties assigned to him by

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2.

his employer. CC art. 1384(5) requires a rapport de préposition between employer and employee and this is based on a relation d’autorité, i. e. authority to give directions. In respect of this authority, a legal basis ought not to be required. It is sufficient that this authority derives from the actual prevailing state of affairs in the individual case (Flour/ Aubert/Savaux loc. cit. no. 211 p. 217). In the majority of cases, an employment contract provides the basis for the relation d’autorité (Brun, Responsabilité civile extracontractuelle, nos. 535-536 pp. 270-271). Furthermore, as derived from the wording of CC art. 1384(5) the only additional requirement is that the préposé caused the damage. At least, according to the prevailing rule, damage caused by the employee in his capacity as gardien of a thing (CC art. 1384(1)) should therefore not be taken into account in this context because it is not possible to be simultaneously préposé and gardien (Flour/Aubert/Savaux loc. cit. no. 214 pp. 221-222). The employer is regarded as the gardien of the thing which is utilised by the préposé in the course of his employment. This state of affairs entails the result that the employer is directly liable under CC art. 1384(1). This issue, however, is the subject of contentious debate. A number of influential voices argue that liability under CC art. 1384(5) should be not only based on a faute of the préposé, and argue that strict liability ought to suffice, in order to trigger the liability of the employer which is understood as a liability which does not depend on fault (Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité3, no. 807 p. 1010). The final requirement is that the damage must have been caused within the functions for which the employee was employed. Drawing the line of demarcation is not always straightforward. It is however incontrovertible that the employer is not liable, when an employee commits a faute, which does not bear any relation to the performance of his duties and responsibilities (Cass.civ. 23 November 1961, D. 1962 Som. 85). The borderline cases are usually discussed under the heading abus de fonction. On this point Cass.ass.plén. 19 May 1988, Bull.ass.plén. 1988, no. 5 p. 7 has clarified that le commettant s’exonère de sa responsabilité à la triple condition que son préposé ait agi hors des fonctions auxquelles il était employé, sans autorisation et à des fins étrangères à ses attributions. Independent contractors are personally liable for injuries suffered by a third party and are moreover liable when the unlawful act ensued during the course of performing duties on the instructions of the principal (CC art. 1992; Cass.civ. 20 April 1977, Bull. civ. 1977, I, no. 181). BELGIAN CC art. 1384(3) corresponds to French CC art. 1384(5): Masters and employers are liable for the damage caused by servants and employees in the functions for which they have been employed. Therefore, it is also necessary in Belgium to have a relationship of appointment /subordination which is largely derived from a contract of employment. However it can also be grounded on a de facto state of affairs (van Gerven, Verbintenissenrecht II7, 320-321). The premise adopted is that a person should solely have the ability to exercise a power of control or direction in one’s own affairs (Tilleman and Claeys (-Fagnart), Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid, 172, 186, no. 38). Furthermore, there must be grounds for imposing liability on the préposé, namely either a faute or another factor triggering liability (Fagnart loc. cit. no. 42 pp. 187-188). The employee’s lack of necessary tortious capacity has no bearing on the liability of the employer (van Gerven loc. cit. 323). Finally the préposé must have caused the damage in the course of performing the functions for which he was employed. The courts have interpreted these criteria in a pro-plaintiff manner. It suffices that the conduct ait été accompli pendant le temps de la fonction et soit, même indirectement et occasionnellement, en relation avec ladite fonction. Consequently the employer can only exculpate himself from liability

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3.

640

upon proof that the employee acted outside the scope of his functions, sans autorisation, et à des fins étrangères à ses attributions (Cass. 26 October 1989, Pas. belge 1990, I, no. 123 p. 241). In Belgium, the liability under CC art. 1384(3) is also strict; it is not open to the employer to exonerate himself by proving that he was not at fault in either the selection or supervision of the employee or that he could not have either foreseen or hindered the conduct of the employee (Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Wynant/Debaene, TPR 2000, 1551, 1867, no. 138). Employees may be liable under Employment Contracts Act art. 18, for damage inflicted on a third party during the course of their employment, if they acted in an intentional or grossly negligent manner (faute lourde). Employees are only liable in ordinary negligence (a faute légère) if such conduct was a regular occurrence. In respect of independant contractors the legal rules in Belgium and France are identical (CC art. 1992). The principal is however, liable for culpa in contrahendo on the part of his contracting agent against a third party which is not simultaneously a tort (Cass. 20 June 2005, no. JC056K5_2, no. de rôle C030105F; Cass. 16 February 2000, no. JC012G2_2, no. de rôle C990477Nt). SPANISH CC art. 1903 provides, that (1) Liability for damages does not solely arise “on the basis of personal acts and omissions”, but also for the acts of those persons for whom they are responsible for ... (4) Owners or directors of companies or establishments are liable for the damage caused by their employees in the services of the branches in which they are employed or on account of their duties ... Liability referred to under this article ceases when the persons referred to therein prove that they employed all the assiduity of a good father of a family to prevent the damage from occurring.“ CC art. 1904 permits an unqualified right of recourse on the part of the person incurring liabilty under CC art. 1903 against the employee (in the case of a a teacher, the right of seek indemnity from the employee is restricted to cases where the teacher acted with intention or gross negligence). The prerequisites of liability under CC art. 1903 are as follows (i) a relationship of subordination or dependence between the person who directly caused the damage and the person incurring liability (ii) fault on the part of the principal (which connotes a presumption of fault which can be rebutted, however this argument rarely succeeds in relieving liability before the Tribunal Supremo, see e. g. TS 9 June 1998, RAJ 1998 (2) no. 3717 p. 5368; TS 10 March 1997, RAJ 1997 (2) no. 2483 p. 3786; TS 29 March 1996, RAJ 1996 (2) no. 2203 p. 2993), and (iii) a fault on the part of the employee. Also under this rubric, the courts lean towards a iuris tantum presumption of fault unless the employee belongs to a particular occupation, in respect of which, especially in the case of doctors, a reveral of the burden of proof would not otherwise occur (Rodríguez y Rowinski, Die Haftung für Hilfspersonen im spanischen Recht, 79). In practical terms the employer can only escape liability along these lines, if he can prove that the employee acted beyond the scope of his duties of employment (TS 18 March 1986, RAJ 1986 (1) no. 1268 p. 1238; TS 2 July 1990, RAJ 1990 (5) no. 5766 p. 7471) or when the employee had caused intentional damage or in breach of the orders or instructions received (TS 13 April 1981, RAJ 1981 (1) no. 1637 p. 1337; TS 29 November 1982, RAJ 1982 (3) no. 7217 p. 4769). According to the wording of CC art. 1903 owners and directors of establishments and companies can also incur liability (dueños o directores de un establecimiento o empresa). “Directors” are all altos cargos (Managing Directors CEO or Executive Directors on the Board of Directors, chief operating officers, Head of administration) under the Employment Contract Act (Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1995 por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley del Estatuto de los Trabajadores) art. 2,

Article 3:201: Accountability for damage caused by

4.

however middle management are not embraced by this term. They are classed as dependientes. A relationship of dependence to a company is given when an individual is subject to its control, direction or supervision (Barceló Domenech, Responsabilidad extracontractual del empresario, 216). In respect of independent contractors, liability does not arise under CC art. 1903 (Pantaleón Prieto, Responsabilidad por hecho ajeno, 5957; Salvador Coderch and Gómez Ligüerre, InDret 3/2002, 15; TS 14 May 2001, RAJ 2001 (3) no. 6204 p. 9535; TS 18 June 1979, RAJ 1979 (2) no. 2895 p. 2353; TS 4 January 1982, RAJ 1982 (1) no. 178 p. 117; TS 9 July 1984, RAJ 1984 (2) no. 3801 p. 2902). On the other hand, liability may arise, if the main contractor retains the authority to supervise, control or instruct the personnel of the sub contractor. It has not as yet been comprehensively clarified, whether and on what grounds a person commissioning construction work is liable for the unlawful acts of the building firm and its employees under CC art. 1903(4); cf. on this issue TS 26 May 1989, RAJ 1989 (3) no. 3890 p. 4420; TS 12 November 1986, RAJ 1986 (4) no. 6386 p. 6231; TS 31 October 1984, RAJ 1984 (3) no. 5159 p. 4054; TS 5 July 1979, RAJ 1979 (2) no. 2931 p. 2390; TS 18 June 1979, RAJ 1979 (2) no. 2895 p. 2353). The general principle holds that an employer will only escape liability for the damages inflicted on a third party by the acts of his employees, if he can adduce proof that there is no connection between the damage caused and the duties assigned to the employee (TS 19 November 1991, RAJ 1991 (6) no. 8412 p. 11517; TS 26 November 1984, RAJ 1984 (3) no. 5992 p. 4715). In contrast to CP art. 120 nos. 4 and 5 the liability of the principal under CC art. 1903 is not subsidiary to the personal liability of the employee (TS 16 March 1987, RAJ 1988 (6) no. 10213 p. 10001; TS 8 February 1989, RAJ 1989 (1) no. 756 p. 785); rather a joint and several liability arises (TS 14 February 1964, RAJ 1964 (1) no. 749 p. 453; TS 7 February 1986, RAJ 1986 (1) no. 446 p. 409; TS 2 February 1987, RAJ 1987 (1) no. 673 p. 580). For a consideration of the prerequisites for liability in damages for employers governed by the Código Penal see Rodríguez y Rowinski loc. cit. 105). According to the ITALIAN CC art. 2049 masters and employers incur direct and strict liability (Alpa, Trattato di diritto civile IV, 673); the courts view the grounds for liability in the “operating risk” of the defendant (Cass. 18 July 2003, no. 11241, Giust.civ.Mass. 2003, fasc. 7-8). CC art. 2049 requires a rapporto di preposizione and a rapporto di occasionalità necessaria between the unlawful act and the duties assigned to the employee. The actual duration of the relationship of subordination is not relevant. The decisive issue is whether the actor was factually under the control of another and acted on that other’s account (Cass. 24 May 1988, no. 3616, Giur.it. 1989, I, 1, 99). The criterion of factual control can effect the result that the employer in the labour law sense, is not liable under CC art. 2049, rather liability is borne by the individual with day to day responsibility for supervision and assignment of tasks (Cass. 19 December 2003, no. 19553, Giust.civ.Mass. 2003, fasc. 12). The necessary connection to the duties carried out is present when the assigned task facilitates the commission of the illicit act or renders the performance of it easier; it is not relevant that the employee did not adhere to the instructions given to him by the employer (Cass. 10 December 1998, no. 12471, Giur.it. 1999, 2031; Cass. 20 March 1999, no. 2574, Danno e resp. 1999, 1021; Cass. 9 June 1995, no. 6506, Giust.civ.Mass. 1995, fasc. 6). The master is liable when the servant fulfils the requirements for the commission of a tort. However, masters are also liable for the servants who lack tortious capacity (Cass. 12 November 1979, no. 5851, Giust.civ.Mass. 1979, fasc. 11) and for torts committed in an emergency (Cass.

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5.

642

24 July 1951, no. 2095; Monateri, Manuale della responsabilità civile, 353). CC art. 2049 has also been held to apply to employers of employees who are minors (Cass. 10 May 2000, no. 5957, Giust.civ.Mass. 2000, 980) and to state adminstration for the acts of civil servants (Cass. 9 February 2004, no. 2423, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, fasc. 2). Employer and employees are jointly and severally liable (CC art. 2055; see Cass. 9 November 2005, no. 21685, Foro it. 2006, I, 1454). HUNGARIAN CC § 348(1) establishes strict liability for employees (and also for members of a cooperative). When an employee causes damage to a thrid party in connection with his employment, in the absence of a conflicting statutory provision, the employer is liable to the injured party for the damage caused. However, if the injured person is not a third party but another employee of the same employer, CC § 348(1) does not apply (BH 2008/59). The employer can only exonerate himself from liability if the employee could also adduce grounds to exculpate himself from liability. However, proof that the employer acted with care in the selection and supervision of the employee will not suffice (Petrik (-Wellmann), Polgári jog II2, 606/1; Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 137). The conduct of the employee who directly caused the damage must satisfy the requisites laid down under CC § 339 and it must occur in connection with the employment (BH 1988/ 239).Accidents with vehicles of the employer are governed by the provisions relating to the liability of keepers under CC § 345, thereby not encompassed by CC § 348. An employer is also keeper of a vehicle, which, although it belongs to the employee, was financed as working equipment by the employer (BH 1991/148). CC § 348 is employed in respect of interns and apprentices (Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1293-1294). The link with a relationship of employment is not necessarily interrupted by the employee not adhering to instructions (BH 2001/526; BH 1986/ 230; BH 1983/443). The employer’s right to claim of compensation /indemnity from the employee is covered by the Labour Code (CC § 350(5)), which restricts the claim according to its merits and amount (Labour Code, Law no. XXII /1992, §§ 166-168). As regards “borrowered” workers, responsibility must be borne by both “employers” (Labour Code § 193/C). Likewise, the liability of civil servants is governed by special rules (CC § 349(1)). CC § 350(1) establishes liability based on a refutable presumption of fault on the part of the principal for contractually authorised representatives and “agents”. However, this article does not apply in respect of individuals who perform harzardous activities. In respect of permanent agency or if the principal and agent are companies, the court can also apply CC § 348 (CC § 350(2)). As regards the internal relationship, principal and agent are individually liable. CC § 350(1) only governs principal-agency relationships, it does not impinge on a contract for services or contracts of carriage (Benedek loc. cit. 1308). If the agent can exonerate himself, then the principal is also exculpated (Benedek loc. cit.; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 164). The regulation of POLISH CC on damage occasioned by a person in the course of activities entrusted to them by another is not uniform. The Civil Code distinguishes between an activity entrusted (on a contractual or even factual basis) to an independent person (CC art. 429) and one entrusted to a dependant person, who remains under the direction of and subject to the instructions of the person entrusting them with it (CC art. 430). In the first case the employer is accountable for culpa in eligendo – the fault is presumed – and may escape liability by showing that he was not at fault while choosing the employee or that he entrusted the activity to one who carries out this activity professionally. Whether the employee acted negligently is irrelevant; however, liability arises only

Article 3:201: Accountability for damage caused by

6.

7.

when the conduct is unlawful (Pietrzykowski (-Safjan), Kodeks cywilny I4, art. 429 p. 1213). The second scenario is a case of liability without fault; the employer is accountable for the damage only if the employee was at fault while causing the damage. CC art. 430 applies mostly to damage occasioned by employees, whose personal liability vis-à-vis third persons is excluded by Labour Code art. 120. However it is equally applicable in other cases where the person causing the damage is under statutory duty (e. g. in the army), a contractual duty, or even a factual duty (e. g. in family relations) to comply with the instructions of the person entrusting the activity (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛s´c´ ogólna7, 207; Czachórski, Zobowia˛zania10, 257). In the current law the relation of dependence between the person entrusting the activity and the one to whom it is entrusted is interpreted in a rather extensive way. An organisational dependence suffices as is the case between a person operating a hospital and physicians working there who are actually independent within the field of medical treatment (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak loc. cit.; Czachórski loc. cit.; Safjan loc. cit. art. 430 p. 1217). Pursant to GERMAN CC § 831(1)(first sent.) a person, who employs another to do any work is bound to compensate for any damage which that other unlawfully causes to a third party in the performance of his work. The employer or master has the possibilty, derived from the wording of CC § 831(1)(second sent.), of exculpating himself. According to this provision, the duty to compensate does not arise if the employer has exercised the necesasry care in the selection of the employee/servant and also exercised the necessary care in the event that he had to supply appliances or equipment or supervise the work, or if the damage would have arisen, notwithstanding the exercise of care. A person is employed to do work when assigned duties by another, and is integrated into that person’s sphere of influence and is,to a certain extent, dependent on that person (BGH 12 June 1997, NJW-RR 1998, 250, 251). It suffices that the employer /master can restrict the duties of the actor at any stage or can relieve them from their duties, or can delineate the duration and extent of those duties (BGH 30 June 1966, BGHZ 45, 311, 313). As a consequence, independent contractors are not employees /servants (Palandt (-Sprau), BGB66, § 831 no. 5). The damage suffered by a third party in the execution of tasks during the course of employment, when a direct intrinsic connection exists between the damaging act and the function of the assigned duty, is recoverable (BGH 6 October 1970, NJW 1971, 31; BGH 14 February 1989, NJW-RR 1989, 723, 725); his conduct should not exceed the scope of the duties entrusted to him (BGH 13 July 1977, WM 1977, 1169). The servant /employee acts “wrongfully” when his conduct objectively fulfills one of the requirements of CC §§ 823 ff and a ground of justification is not extant. The fault of the employee /servant ought not to be relevant (Sprau loc. cit. no. 8). An extremly high bar has been set regarding the proof sufficient to relieve the master /employer of liability and is accordingly rarely successful. Moreover, in order to evade this requirement, the courts have had covert resort to quasi contractual constructions. The courts have also developed a very strict general supervisory duty derived from CC § 823(1). The practical significance of the latter lies in the fact that independent contractors can thus be incorporated within its scope (Medicus, Schuldrecht II13, no. 859). The point of departure in AUSTRIAN law is “of itself” CC § 1315. The prerequisite of liability under this provision is that the employer appoints dangerous (knowing that that person is dangerous) or an unfit person to carry out appointed functions. The restrictiveness of this provision is viewed as unsatisfactory, therefore the courts and

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academics increasingly resorted to devices which attempt to circumvent the application of the provision. One such avoidance strategy is extending the application of CC § 1313a, which, in its original manifestation, was conceived to cover contractual liability (strict liability for principals for all misconduct of person employed to perform an obligation), to embrace all types of legal obligations. Utilising the concept of culpa in contrahendo and the rules in respect to contracts with a protective purpose in favour of third parties reinforces this strategy. From a systematic viewpoint, CC § 1313a connotes an exception to the general rules of CC § 1313, according to which a person is generally not responsible for the unlawful acts of another. As regards relationships arising under the law of obligations, extant prior to the occurrence of the damaging event, the appointment of the person employed to perform an obligation should not lead to the creditor being disadvantaged (CC § 1313a; OGH 30 May 1994, SZ 67/101). The same also holds true, if the person appointed (helper) avails himself of additional helpers (OGH 2 March 1955, SZ 28/61; OGH 24 May 1972, JBl 1973, 151). The prerequisite for liability is the fault of the person appointed (negligence or intention: OGH 26 April 2000, ZVR 2000/102 p. 423; OGH 25 November 1959, SZ 32/153; OGH 7 Ob 400/97t, RdW 1998, 459) and that when performing, he acted within the scope of the duties assigned to him by his employer (OGH 26 April 2000 loc. cit.). In determining whether the conduct was either intentional or negligent, the decisive factor is if the performance of the conduct had been ordained by the employer (OGH 7 September 1988, JBl 1989, 175; OGH 24 April 1991, JBl 1992, 31; OGH 6 October 2000, SZ 73/151). If, at the very minimum, there is a lack of a special legal relationship akin to contract between employer and the party who causes the damage, the sole remaining possibility for the creditor is a cause of action under CC § 1315. In this context, the determining factor is the presence of fault in selecting the employee/servant. According to case law defective supervision will also suffice. The concept of “helper” has been given a broad interpretation, namely the term can also encompass a contractor, provided that the necessary integration in the management and organisational fields has taken place (OGH 28 February 1968, JBl 1968, 473; OGH 25 April 1995, SZ 68/79); the decisive factor is whether the contractor is bound to abide by any instructions given (OGH 28 October 1975, SZ 48/110). However, there are also a number of ad hoc provisions which extend far beyond CC § 1315 and ordain strict liability, (e. g. EKHG § 19(2); AtomHG § 17; ForstG § 56(2)). Against this backdrop the courts have developed the tenet that keepers of dangerous things are vicariously liable for the gross fault of persons whom they have appointed to perform an obligation (OGH 2 April 1958, JBl 1958, 550; OGH 20 October 1981, JBl 1982, 150). In addition, legal persons are liable not only for the damages caused by their organs, liability is extended to embrace all types of representatives (OGH 17 July 1997, SZ 70/150; OGH 28 February 2000, ZVR 2000/90 p. 376; OGH 20 December 2000, JBl 2001, 525). In the interim, this “liability for representatives” has also been employed and has been used to the detriment of natural persons (OGH 20 May 1998, JBl 1998, 713 [Liability of a building firm for engineers in executive positions]; OGH 12 September 2002, ZVR 2003/108 p. 394). GREEK CC art. 922 refers in an old fashioned manner to “masters” and “servants”, however the current meaning given to this provision has transcended the problems associated with this formulation. The provision implements a genuine objective liability for damage which is inflicted on a third party by a subordinate employee (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Stathopoulos), art. 922, nos. 3, 11, 38; Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko

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Dikaio I, 533). According to the wording of the provision, an unlawful act of a subordinate is sufficient to invoke liability; fault on his part is not required. However, prevailing legal opinion considers that this state of affairs amounts to a legislative blunder which was influenced by German law. Therefore, legal scholarship only dispenses with the minimum requirement of negligence on the part of the employee, if the legal provision infringed by the employee also dispenses with the requirement of fault (Stathopoulos loc. cit. no. 23; A. P. 156/1953, NoB 1 [1953] 192; A. P. 1125/1977, NoB 26 [1978] 934; CA Thessaloniki 522/1990, EllDik 31 [1990] 1331; otherwise MichaelidesNouaros, EllDik 29 (1988), 1641). The prerequisite of liability under CC art. 922 is the existence of a relationship of subordination between the master and person appointed to perform a duty (ErmAK (-Michaelides-Nouaros), art. 334, no. 17; A. P. 651/2001, Arm 45 [2001] 1475; A. P. 248/1992, EllDik 34 [1993] 1312; Areopag 385/1988, NoB 37 [1989] 258). The search for a concrete line of demarcation has proven to be difficult (Georgiades, FS Larenz 1983, pp. 175, 185, 192). The courts have taken an increasingly relaxed approach to the relationship of subordination. It has been affirmed in e. g. a case between a company and independent contractor, where the company had reserved the right to instruct and supervise the contractor (A. P. 942/1976, NoB 25 [1977] 359; Areopag 300/1980, NoB 28 [1980] 1723, 1724). Damage is caused “in the course of performing his duties” if the conduct of the employee is intrinsically connected to the task that he has been assigned (Stathopoulos loc. cit. no. 33). The fact that the damage occurs merely on the occasion of the duty should not break the connection (A. P. 380/ 1979, NoB 27 [1979] 1437). It is suggested, that for cases in which the employee has not adhered to the instructions given, a distinction should be drawn between typical and abnormal dangers. Theft, or acts of revenge on the part of the employee cannot ground liability of the employer, unless, the risk that such torts would occur was increased owing to the employee’s engagement. PORTUGUESE CC art. 500 has, in a similar fashion, established vicarious liability for employers. The prequisites of liability under this article are that (i) the person appointed to perform the duty (comissário) is tortiously liable and (ii) the act was commited in the course of performing the duties assigned to him by his employer, even in the event that the act causing damage was intentionally committed or occurred because the employee failed to adhere to the instructions of the employer (comitente). Employer and employee are jointly and severally liable to the third party (CC arts. 497(2) and 500(3)); in respect of their internal dealings, the employer has a right to seek indemnity from the employee, provided that he himself was not at fault (CC art. 500(3); see Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 639). The employee must have acted either intentionally or negligently in order for the liability of the employer to arise (CC art. 500(1) in fine; STJ 26 October 1978); presumed fault which is not refuted suffices (CC arts. 503(3) and 506(1)), but a mere objective liability on the part of the employee will not be sufficient (CC art. 503(1) and (3); see Antunes Varela loc. cit. 644; Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, 513; see also Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 569). The employer is only liable for damage caused by the comissário when exercising the function to which he was entrusted (CC art. 500(2); Almeida Costa loc. cit. 567). The relation of “representation” (CC art. 500(1)) consists of the execution of material or legal acts which are part of a task or function entrusted to someone other than the comitente (Pessoa Jorge, Ensaio sobre os pressupostos da responsabilidade civil, 148), a mere temporal or spatial connection with the assigned duty will not suffice

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(Antunes Varela loc. cit. 642; STJ 14 October 1987, BolMinJus 370 [1987] 519). In this respect, a cleaning contractor will not be held liable under CC art. 500 for the theft of a credit card by staff (STJ 2 March 2006), similarly a football club ought not to be liable for a player who poleaxes a referee (CA Coimbra 13 December 2000). On the othe hand, the operator of a mine will be liable for errors of his employees in dealing with explosive substances (STJ 26 October 1978). DUTCH CC art. 6:170(1) is a legislative measure which places the risk liability of the employer on a statutory footing. According to this provision, an employer is liable for damage caused to a third party by his subordinates. The prerequisites for liability are as follows (i) misconduct on the part of the actor, (ii) a relationship of superiority/subordination, and (iii) a functional relationship between the tasks assigned to the subordinate and his wrongful conduct. CC art. 6:170(1) consequently requires liability on the part of the employee, which entails that the employer is entitled to rely on all applicable defences and grounds of justification, which the employee would be entitled to assert (Nieuwenhuis/Stolker/Valk (-Lankhorst), T & C Burgerlijk Wetboek, art. 6:170 no. 2 p. 2350). Injuries which were caused by the employee under the influence of a physical or mental defect, will not be attributed to the employer, if the conduct of the employee constituted a positive act (otherwise: in respect of an omission, CC art. 6:165) (Onrechtmatige Daad II (-Oldenhuis), art. 6:170, no 35 p. 126). The concept of “subordinate” (ondergeschikte) is given a broad interpretation. The core idea is found in the existence of a juridical relationship of authority. The existence of an employment contract is not the decisive factor here, rather that a person either gives instructions and has the power of control or receives instructions and must adhere to them (Oldenhuis loc. cit. no. 8 p. 41; HR 28 May 1999, NedJur 1999 no. 564 p. 3109 [local authority in their relations with a primary school teacher]; HR 2 March 2001, NedJur 2001 no. 649 p. 4809 [hospital doctor]). With respect to the functional relationship between the act of the employee and the employment, the basic principle holds that the employer is always liable if the employment relationship has increased the liklihood that such an error would materialise. This requirement is relatively easy to prove (e. g. CFI Utrecht 25 September 2002, NedJur 2002 no. 592 p. 4373 and HR 12 April 2002, NedJur 2003 no. 138 p. 920). In addition, the courts also examine whether the employer has the authority to prohibit the conduct in question. Demonstrating that the employer had in fact prohibited the questionable conduct, and that in spite of this prohibition the employee continued to act in defiance of the instructions does not relieve the employer from liability (HR 1 February 1957, NedJur 1957 no. 175 p. 311; CA The Hague 19 April 1963, NedJur 1964 no. 407 p. 975; CA Amsterdam 2 February 1961, NedJur 1961 no. 190 p. 398; Oldenhuis loc. cit. nos. 38-39 pp. 137-153). If the employee commits a crime, independent of any duty which was assigned to him by the employer, the employer is not liable. Questions of demarcation are resolved by balancing all of the relevant consideration, namely, a consideration of the type of damage, the time and place of the act causing damage and the resources used to commit the act (Lankhorst loc. cit. no. 2c p. 2350). As regards damage caused by persons working outside of the business or profession of the employer (e. g. housekeeper or babysitter) CC art. 6:170(2) mitigates the liability of the employer; above all, the employer is only liable if there is a close relationship between the event causing damage and the duty that the employee has been assigned to carry out (Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 715). In contrast in the commercial world CC art. 6:171 introduces liability for principals for torts committed by

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independent contractors employed by him.: “if a person who is not a subordinate performs duties on the order of another person, in the exercise of that other person’s business, and a tort is committed by the commissioned person during the course of the performance of these duties, the commissioning person is also liable for the damage suffered by the third party.” This regulation is based on the rationale that the injured party should be able to regard all activities generated by the operations of the defendant as indivisible (Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 712, 728-729; Oldenhuis loc. cit. art. 6:171 no. 3 p. 13). CC art. 6:171 is not applicable when the independent contractor is only liable under a tort of strict liability and this tort does not involve questions of vicarious liability. ESTONIAN LOA § 1054(1) establishes strict liability of an individual who engages another person to carry out financial or professional activities on their behalf “on a regular basis”. LOA § 1054(2) is also a strict liability provision, governing the liability of a person who avails himself of the services of another in performing his duties, similarly according to LOA § 1054(3), a strict liability provision, governing the liability of an individual who calls on another to perform a service for him. Liability only arises if the person performing the service acts in an intentional or negligent manner and commits an unlawful act (Supreme Court 3-2-1-53-06, RT III 2006, 33, 283; Tampuu, Juridica 2003, 464-474. In SWEDEN Damages Liability Act chap. 3 § 1 provides for the liability of persons engaging employees in their undertaking, with regard to damages caused by employees in the course of their engagement for that employer. The employer is accountable for (i) personal injuries and damage to property, where the employee was ‘wrongful or negligent’; (ii) pure economic loss, where the employee committed a crime; and (iii) damage to incorporeal personality rights (as defined in chap. 2 § 3), where the employee was ‘wrongful or negligent’. The concept of employer’s vicarious liability is generally known as principalansvar. The particular requirement for accountability, including both intentional and negligent acts or omissions – the requirement of ‘wrongful or negligent’ – is intended to make the assessment more objective, whereby the employer is not excused from liability due to particular circumstances related to the individual employee (such as inexperience). However, the case law does not make any particular distinction (HD 20 December 1979, NJA 1979, 773 [operator of an excavator caused damage, but was not found negligent due to his youth and inexperience, instead the employer was held liable for his negligence in selecting such an operator, i. e. for culpa in eligendo]; see also HD 26 September 1974, NJA 1974, 476). A particular employee must not be identified as negligent. It is sufficient for negligence to be attributed to the employer’s workforce in general (so-called anonymous and cumulated negligence, see Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 80-82). Damage must be caused in the course of the employee’s engagement which requires a sufficient link between the act or omission and the engaged person’s duties at the employer’s enterprise. Damage caused during the engaged person’s free time, outside the office or due to acts of a private nature are thus generally excluded. However, it is not necessary that the act causing damage is specifically part of the employee’s duty to his employer or in the latter’s interest. In HD 15 November 1977, NJA 1977, 639, a group of workers assigned to clear the area under power lines from trees, also cut down trees in the near vicinity on the request of neighbouring property owners, which still was considered in the course of the workers’ engagement. Liability for pure economic loss requires a closer connection to the employer’s enterprise and is

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related to the latter’s possibility of preventing the criminal act (HD 13 July 2000, NJA 2000, 380; HD 4 December 2000, NJA 2000, 639; Kleineman, JT 2000-01, 924). In all cases a subordinate relation to the employer, who supervises the worker, is regarded as an indication for a person being an employee. However, persons with supervisory or controlling functions may also be regarded as employees (Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 5). Even persons without formal employment, such as a house caretaker who sporadically manages house property or a functionary of a non-profit sports association are regarded as employees (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 157). However, a person is generally not liable for other independent subcontractors or their operatives (Bengtsson and Strömbeck loc. cit. 79). Certain statutory duties may not be passed on by engaging an independent contractor though (‘non-delegable duties’, such as the duty of clearing one’s roof from snow for public safety: Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit.166), and if a certain type of enterprise is regulated under a strict liability regime, this also usually encompasses liability for subcontractors or leased services. Leges speciales may also extend the scope of vicarious liability, such as the Maritime Code providing liability of the ship-owner for the pilot, and Environmental Code chap. 32 providing vicarious liability for persons engaging independent subcontractors for excavation and activities dangerous to the environment. Some cases involve difficulties as to who the liable employer is, especially when a person engages workers from independent subcontractor. This must be decided on a case-by-case basis, where the question of who controls, instructs and supervises the professional will be decisive (HD 20 December 1979, NJA 1979, 773; HD 8 January 1992, NJA 1992, 21). FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 3 § 1, based on the Swedish regulation, provides that the employer is liable for damage caused by his employee, or a person comparable to an employee, through ‘wrongful or negligent’ conduct. Furthermore, it is provided that such liability also covers independent contractors if they “can be regarded as employees”, having regard to the duration of the engagement, the nature of the work and other circumstances of the particular case. The notion of accountability – ‘wrongful or negligent’ – makes it, as in Sweden, possible to establish liability even if negligence cannot be traced to an individual employee (Finnish Supreme Court 24 August 1982, HD 1982 II 120). The principle of ‘non-delegable duties’ is codified under this provision, whereby liability is vicarious regarding activities which are prescribed by law, even if they are carried out by independent contractors (see e. g. Finnish Supreme Court 20 October 1992, HD 1992:142). In DENMARK, the basis for employers’ vicarious liability is derived from a provision of the ancient Danish Code (1683), § 3-19-2, providing that the house master answers for his servant (von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 105-120, Trolle, Risiko & Skyld2, 222-257). The liability is vicarious as to persons involved in entrepreneurial activity, but also as to persons with a comparable relationship such as parents and baby-sitters, house owners and selfemployed gardeners – the rationale being that persons who carry out work which is being instructed, supervised and controlled are encompassed (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 107; Eastern CA 15 February 1958, UfR 1958, 628). The presence of a formal employment relationship (involving a contract, certain duration, or even salary) is not decisive (HD 29 June 1937, UfR 1937, 785). Negligence or intent of the employee must be established. However, as in Sweden and Finland, the fault or negligence may be ‘anonymous’ or ‘cumulated’ (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 110). Further, some connection to the engagement is required for vicarious liability; the employer does not answer for abnormal acts, such as sexual harassment (Western CA 6 December 1993, UfR 1994,

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215) or a fight during the break (HD 30 November 1951, UfR 1952, 73). By contrast, liability was established for a harbor worker who put out his cigarette on the goods which he was unloading (SH 5 August 1965, UfR 1967, 664). Like in Sweden, in principle, independent contactors are accountable for themselves (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 107). Problems arise when several employers are involved, especially situations involving the temporary engagement of workers in one firm from another, and typically a person leasing equipment together with an operator. The general contention is that less importance is placed in who’s interest work is being done, and more regard is had to who instructs and supervises the worker (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 112; Trolle loc. cit. 256; Selvig, Såkalte husbondsansvar, 168; SH 2 August 1983, UfR 1983, 1065; HD 13 December 1990, UfR 1991, 106). However, there are situations where the engaging person is held liable for an independent subcontractor (see e. g. Western CA 10 March 1981, UfR 1981, 564: land owner engaged an independent contractor for spraying his fields with chemicals, neighbouring crops were damaged; the land owner was held liable because the spraying was part of the general caretaking of the land; see further (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 134-148). In DENMARK, liability is not passed on to the employer if the employee only answers for strict accountability (Eastern CA 29 September 1970, UfR 1970, 940). Correspondingly, in SWEDEN strict accountability is also not passed on (Bengtsson and Strömbeck loc. cit. 80), and the same holds for FINLAND (Supreme Court 21 September 1993, HD 1993:114). In ENGLAND AND WALES the rule on employer’s vicarious liability was traditionally that, besides liability for a wrong ful act of an employee which the employer authorised, an employer is liable for a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing an authorised.act: Salmond, The Law of Torts9, 95. Under the modern wider test, however, (at any rate for trespass) an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of an employee if the employee’s tort is so closely connected with the employment that it is “fair and just” to hold the employer vicariously liable: Lister v. Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215. For an application of this rule see Mattis v. Pollock (trading as Flamingos Nightclub) [2003] EWCA Civ 887; [2003] 1 WLR 2158 (nightclub doorman was set upon in a nightclub; escaping to a nearby apartment, he grabbed a knife, ran back to the nightclub premises, chased one of the fleeing customers and caused him grave injury; this activity was held to fall within the ambit of vicarious liability as the doorman was expected to use violence in the course of performing his duties of employment). For criticism of the test as a questionbegging formula which confirms rather than explains a decision see Yap, (2008) 28 Legal Studies, 197. Vicarious liability is not confined to claims at common law; an employer can be vicariously liable for a breach of a statutory duty imposed on his employee, provided the statute in question does not exclude such liability: Majrowski v. Guy’s & St. Thomas’ NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 251, [2005] QB 848 (upholding vicarious liability for harassment of an employee by his manager contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997). The modern law has abandoned the notion of a single universal test to identify a relationship of employer and employee, adopting a “multiple factor” approach, based on such matters as the economic realities of the situation, the degree of control, ownership of equipment used, engagement of helpers and chances of profit and risks of loss: Clerk and Lindsell (-Murphy), Torts19, 6-10 – 6-11. In the case of employees temporarily “on loan” by an employer to another, whether the employee remains an employee of the general employer for the purposes of vicarious liability or whether he is deemed to be the temporary employee of the hirer of his services is regarded as a matter

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turning on the facts of the individual case with a heavy burden of showing that responsibility has moved to a temporary employer resting on the general employe, the question being whose duty it was to prevent the employee’s act; whether the temporary employer had acquired the right to control the employee’s mode of working will be a factor: Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins and Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd [1947] AC 1 (HL); Hawley v. Luminar Leisure Limited [2006] EWCA Civ 18 at [28], [2006] P. I. Q. R. P17, 220 (owner of nightclub vicariously liable for assault by doorman supplied by a security services company, who had worked at the nightclub for two years before the incident). It seems that dual vicarious liability in such circumstances is now conceivable: Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd. v. Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ 1151, [2006] Q. B. 510. An unauthorised mode of performing a task under a gratuitous engagement which is not ancillary to an employment relationship and which falls short of a master-servant relationship will not as a rule suffice to give rise to vicarious liability, even if the person was instructed to act: see Watkins v. Birmingham City Council (1975) Times, 1st August (CA) (school not vicariously liable for acts of ten year old schoolboy, who in complying with a teacher’s direction to distribute milk moved a tricycle close to a door, where a staff member fell over it and was injured: the boy’s conduct was referable to the teacher-pupil relationship, so that there was no scope for inferring a masterservant relationship). In such cases the person engaging another who causes damage in the course of acting may nonetheless be liable in negligence for breach of a duty of care, e. g. in engaging an unsuitable person, failing to make reasonably safe arrangements for performance of the task, or failing to supervise the person engaged: Clerk and Lindsell (-Murphy), Torts19, 6-02 and cf. (in relation to servants) Williams v. Curzon Syndicate Ltd. (1919) 35 TLR 475 (CA) (failure of club to investigate thoroughly character of person engaged as night porter, who stole members’ property). As regards independent contractors, the general rule of law is that a person who engages them is not vicariously liable for wrongs committed by them in the course of that engagement, unless he has instigated or ratified them, but the employer may be liable for his own negligence in e. g. employing incompetent or too few persons for the work or interfering in it: Clerk and Lindsell (-Murphy), Torts19, para. 6-52 In addition, the employer may be in breach of a statutory or common law duty which is non-delegable, so that employing a contractor reasonably considered to be competent will not discharge the employer, as would be the case for fulfilling the ordinary duty to take care. In particular, a person instructing an independent contractor to undertake an exceptionally hazardous operation, i. e. one involving an obviously serious danger of considerable harm if not carried out safely, the person engaging the contractor may be liable if harm results: Dalton v. Angus (1881) 6 App Cas 740 (explicable, however, also on the narrower basis of a non-delegable duty of the owner of a servient tenement to ensure support to a dominant tenement); Honeywill & Stein v. Larkin Brothers Ltd. [1934] 1 KB 191. The approach has been followed in more recent cases, but not without reservations about the soundness of the doctrine and emphasising restriction by virtue of the qualification of the hazard, which, however, is recognised to be a difficult criterium to apply: see Bottomley v. Todmorden Cricket Club [2003] EWCA Civ 1575 and Biffa Waste Services Ltd. v. Maschinenfibric Ernst Hese GmbH [2008] EWCA Civ 1257. Whether the test of “close connection” ushered into English law in Lister v. Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215 will be adopted in IRELAND in place of the traditional Common Law approach is not yet settled. In O’Keeffe v. Hickey [2008] IESC 72 (concerning

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liability for sexual abuse of a school pupil) opposing views were expressed (Hardiman J critical, Fennelly J favourable), but a decision on the point was unnecessary since the second defendant (the Minister for Education and Science) did not have sufficient control over the school principal to constitute an employer for the purposes of the law on vicarious liability. In SCOTLAND too, besides being liable for its own negligent or intentional acts, an employer may be vicariously liable in delict for harm caused by an employee. Whether a principal is vicariously liable for the delicts of an agent on the same basis as employers are for the delicts of their employees remains to be definitively determined: cf. M. v. Hendron [2007] CSIH 27 at [131], 2007 SLT 467 at 497 (Lord Osborne, reserving his opinion on that issue). However, it appears that the ratio of Lister v. Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215 at least does not apply to vicarious liability of a principal for an agent’s wrong: M. v. Hendron [2007] CSIH 27 at [132], 2007 SLT 467 at 497-498 (Lord Osborne). As in England a person is as a rule not vicariously liable for the negligent causation of damage by an independent contractor: Stewart, Delict3, para. 10.17. Lord Justice Clerk Moncrieff at page 540; Crolla v. Hussain 2008 SLT (Sh.Ct.) 145. Whether the exception based on “inherently dangerous activities” applies in Scots law or applies to the same extent is unclear. It has traditionally been assumed that the English doctrine has been accepted. Thus in Crolla v. Hussain 2008 SLT (Sh.Ct.) 145 the principle was applied that where a person carries out operations on his land which are likely to cause damage to his neighbour’s land, this imposes on him a duty to take care to prevent such damage and, that duty cannot be avoided by delegation to a contractor. This was not vicarious liability for the torts of an independent contractor, but liability based on culpa for breach of the employer’s own non-delegable duty. However, the correctness of the traditional view was left open in Stewart v. Malik [2009] CSIH 5 at [22] (which case also concerned damage to the structure of one part of a tenement building caused by work carried out in another part). In the latter case reliance was placed on the law of the tenement, which burdens the owner of the servient property with a positive duty in carrying out works which may affect support to avoid endangering the dominant property, thus finding on a narrower basis a personal duty to execute the works with care which could not be avoided by employing an independent contractor.

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Liability of legal persons for their representatives

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According to FRENCH case law, fault on the part of a decision-making body acting on behalf of a legal person is regarded as the fault on the part of the legal person itself (Cass.civ. 15 January 1872, D. P. 1872, 1, 165). The decision-making body is the legal representive of the legal person (Cass.com. 8 December 1981, Rev.soc. 1981, 351, note Bouloc). Both a single individual and a class of individuals can constitute the competent body (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2006/2007), no. 1373). The decision-making body and the legal person are liable in solidum (Ghestin, Les conditions de la responsabilité3, no. 855). The legal position in BELGIUM is identical. In the event that there is fault on the part of the decision-making body, but this fault cannot be qualified as a tort, the courts have recourse to CC art. 1992 (Cass. 20 June 2005, no. JC056K5_1, no. de rôle C030105F). In SPAIN, liability of a legal person for the wrongful acts of a decision-making body acting on its behalf is subject to the rules anchored in the basic norm, CC art. 1902.

17.

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19.

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Liability is not attributed on the basis of the provisions concerning the liability of employers under CC art. 1903. The decision-making body and the legal person are regarded as one single entity Correspondingly, for the large part in academic scholarship there is a tendency to differentiate between damage caused by a decision-making body and damage caused by a mere representative, only in the latter case is liability governed by CC art. 1903(4) (Albaladejo and Díaz Alabart (-Capilla Roncero), Comentarios al Código Civil y Compilaciones Forales I(3)2, 865; Díez-Picazo and Gullón, Sistema II9, 556-557). The courts have also routinely adopted this bifurication (TS 29 September 1964. RAJ 1964 (2) no. 4097 p. 2522; TS 3 July 1968, RAJ 1968 (2) no. 3610 p. 2426; TS 23 January 1986, RAJ 1986 (1) no. 113 p. 124; TS 19 February 1985, RAJ 1985 (1) no. 561 p. 464; TS 25 October 2000, RAJ 2000 (5) no. 9588 p. 14895; TS 27 May 2003, RAJ 2003 (3) no. 3930 p. 7257 [on each occasion, the direct liability of a legal person under CC art. 1902 was affirmed]). However, it is not a seldom occurrence that there is a lack of more specific detail concerning the representative and their fault, and even in the exceptional case where CC art. 1903 is, for once, cited, the legal person is treated as if they had directly caused the ensuing damage (e. g. TS 29 June 1984, RAJ 1984 (2) no. 3443 p. 2619). Tortious liability of unincorporated associations and companies not endowed with legal personality is also recognised, e. g. an informal joint venture (TS 29 April 1988, RAJ 1988 (3) no. 3326 p. 3299). Similarly in ITALY, CC art. 2043 is relied upon to attribute liability to a legal person for the acts of a natural person. The tort of a natural person is imputed to the legal person directly on the basis of the relationship between the decision-making body and the legal person (Alpa, Trattato di diritto civile IV, 199). The legal person and the relevant member of the board of directors are solidarily liable (Bianca, Diritto civile V, 631). In respect of unincorporated associations, individuals who act in its name and on the account of the association are (personally) solidarily liable (CC art. 38). Likewise, members of charitable committees are (personally) solidarily liable (CC art. 41). The inquiry as to who in fact acted on the committee’s behalf is extraneous (Cass. 12 January 1982, no. 134, Foro it. 1982, I, 385). The “simple partnership” (società semplice) is itself liable and is solidarily liable together with the partner who acted on its behalf (particulars in CC art. 2267). Companies with a share-holding are directly liable on the basis of CC art. 2043; the directors’ liability to the company is governed by CC arts. 2392 et seq. In HUNGARY the liability of legal persons for the injuries suffered by third parties caused by members of the board of directors of the company is governed by CC § 350 in conjunction with the rules on agency contained in CC §§ 29(2), 219 and 220; if the representative is also an employee of the company, then CC §§ 348 and 349 must also be taken into account. Commercial Companies Act § 30(1) also ordains that a company is liable for damage inflicted on a third party by a representative in an executive position in the course of exercising his authority. Loc. cit. § 16(3) and (4) provide further clarification in respect of companies before incorporation, the liquidation phase is dealt with in loc. cit. § 50(1)-(2). In POLAND cases where the damage is occasioned by a person acting as a statutory representative of a legal person do not fall under either CC art. 429 or CC art. 430 (Pietrzykowski (-Safjan), Kodeks cywilny I4, art. 430 pp. 1215, 1218). The fault of the decision-making body is deemed a fault of the legal person itself. In such cases CC art. 416 applies, according to which a legal person is obliged to make good the damage caused by fault of the decision-making body. The legal person and the

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20.

natural persons acting as its competent body are solidarily liable (Pietrzykowski (-Banaszczyk), Kodeks cywilny I4, art. 416 p. 1097). In the case of a decision-making body consisting of several persons, the fault of one of the members taking part in harmful activity (usually the taking of a decision), is sufficient (Banaszczyk loc. cit.). In the context of liability of legal persons, case law and legal writing often refer to the concept of ‘anonymous fault’, according to which in a case of objective conflict with the required standard of care within the structure of a legal person it is not necessary to establish who precisely among the members of the decision-making body was at fault (SN 11 May 2005, LEX no. 151668; Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛s´c´ ogólna7, 201). The application of CC art. 416 is expressly confined to the liability of legal persons. Whether the rule governs the liability of organisations without legal personality is disputed (see, opposing its application, Banaszczyk loc. cit.). GERMAN CC § 31 governs the liability of legal persons for damage sustained by a third party which was caused by its decision-making body in the course of acting in the discharge of the functions with which it was entrusted and where the damage gives rise to a liability in damages. The provision imputes liability to the legal person, given that the decision-making body is itself liable on the basis of another provision (BGH 13 January 1987, BGHZ 99, 298, 302). Therefore, it is a matter of some debate, whether it suffices that the duty violated was exclusively a duty owed by the legal person or whether the duty violated must always be one owed by the decision-making body as well. The courts appear to want to sidestep the issue by invariably qualifying the obligations of the legal person as embracing also the obligations of the authorised representative who is internally appointed to discharge the obligations (BGH 5 December 1989, BGHZ 109, 297). CC § 31 has been held to apply to all types of legal persons, not just associations and legal persons under public law (CC § 89) as the wording and context of the provision might imply (MünchKomm (-Reuter), BGB4, § 31, no. 11). In order to overcome the manifold difficulties associated with CC § 831, the courts have extended CC § 31 to govern liability for representatives. Going beyond the wording of the provisions, the courts have imposed liability on individuals who are not strictly speaking constitutional bodies of the companies, but who “through the general operational and management rules, have been appointed to autonomously carry out significant and core functions associated with a legal person and have been allocated sole responsibility regarding the discharge of those functions, with the result that those individuals represent the legal person in legal transactions” (BGH 5 March 1998, NJW 1998, 1854, 1856; BGH 30 October 1967, BGHZ 49, 19, 21). In addition, liability can also be imposed on legal persons under the heading of ‘shortcomings’ in the organisational structure of the legal entity. Under this rubric, liability arises when no constitutionally appointed representative in the sense of CC § 31 has been appointed to deal with important tasks which the board of directors cannot perform. Legal persons are regarded as having a duty to organise their fields of activity in such a way, with the result that a decision-making body or representative in the sense of CC § 31 is responsible for each area of importance. If this obligation is not adhered to, then the legal person is treated as if it were a constitutionally authorised person or a servant of the decision-making body. In this manner the possibility of exculpation under CC § 831 is cut off and this is referred to as the legal fiction of liability for defective organisation (see further BGH 10 May 1957, BGHZ 24, 200, 213; BGH 5 March 1963, BGHZ 39, 124, 129; BGH 8 July 1980, NJW 1980, 2810, 2811; BGH 5 March 1998, NJW 1998, 1854, 1857).

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21.

22.

23.

24.

654

AUSTRIAN CC § 26 places natural and legal persons, in principle, on an equal footing vis à vis third parties (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht II2, 375). However, legal persons are not,

of themselves, regarded as being capable of fault. In fact, they are liable for the tortious acts of their executive bodies and the representatives of the decision-making bodies, to which an autonomous sphere of influence has been assigned (e. g. OGH 25 January 1995, SZ 68/14=RS 0 009102) (Liability of a cooperative for a member of the supervisory board with auditing responsibilities who made a false allegation of theft against an employee). It is conceiveable that in a given case, only a duty of the legal person has been breached, in this case liability is solely attributed to the legal person. It is only when the representative of the decision-making body himself is guilty of the commission of a tort that the natural person, besides the legal person, is also capable of being sued (OGH 15 October 1985, JBl 1986, 184; OGH 28 March 2000, RS 0 009105). GREEK CC art. 71 establishes liability of legal persons for damage inflicted on a third party by their decision-making bodies (CC arts. 65, 67-69, 74), this damage being committed during the discharge of functions which they were appointed to carry out, where this act gives rise to a liability in damages. It is apparent that here, we are dealing with the same construction as in German CC § 31 (Arxaniotakis, I astiki evthini tou nomikou prosopou idiotikou dikaiou, 106). Going beyond CC art. 71, legal persons are held accountable for the acts of natural persons, when the duties of the natural person are laid down in the company’s constitution. This is the case even where that natural person has not been empowered to represent the competent body (Papantoniou, Genikes Arches tou Astikou dikaiou, 151). Contemporary legal scholarship suggests with reference to developments in German law, that the concept of decision-making body should encompass all persons who, through the general operational rules and management structure, have been appointed to autonomously carry out significant and core functions associated with a legal person and have been allocated sole responsibility regarding the discharge of those functions, (Arxaniotakis loc. cit. 204; Filios, Enochiko Dikaio II(2)3, 73). The liability of the legal person does not hinge on the existence of fault in the selection of a representative (Papantoniou loc. cit. 152). CC art. 71 is not solely confined to claims for damages but is also employed in unjustified enrichment claims (CC art. 904) and applies in claims for mandatory relief (CC arts. 57, 59) (Papantoniou loc. cit.; Arxaniotakis loc. cit. 189). According to PORTUGUESE CC art. 165 liability is attributed in civil law to legal persons for the acts or omissions of their representatives (representantes), agents (agentes) and mandataries (mandatários) under the same prerequisites, by which an employer or master /principal (comitente) is liable under CC art. 500 (see above Note I9) for the acts or omissions of his employees /servants (comissários). Corresponding regulations are found for partnerships under the Civil Code (CC art. 998) and for the State or other corporations under public law in so far as they pursue a private law activity (CC art. 501) (see further Hörster, Parte geral, 391), such as where a state owned company operates a railway (CA Lisbon 21 May 2005; previously Procuradoria-Geral da República 19 June 1975, BolMinJus 252 [1976] 69). Representantes can include individuals who act temporarily for the legal person (Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 640; STJ 12 July 2001, CJ(ST) IX [2001-2] 27; CA Lisbon 18 May 2004). DUTCH CC art. 6:162 does not differeniate between natural and legal persons; it is also possible for the latter to commit an unlawful act (Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht III10, no. 155 p. 153) and in this regard the imposition of liability does not hinge on

Article 3:201: Accountability for damage caused by

25.

26.

27.

whether a natural person who is in the service of the legal person has committed an unlawful act (President CFI Zwolle 2 September 1992, KG 1992 no. 327; Onrechtmatige Daad II (-Oldenhuis), art. 6:170 no. 4A p. 23). A legal person is liable for the acts of its decision-making bodies according to CC art. 6:170 (see above Note I10), provided that they acted on the basis of an employment contract. However (above Note I10), independent of any employment contract, the conduct of the competent body is generally regarded as the conduct of the legal person itself. Consequently CC art. 6:162 applies. In respect of larger organisations, it may be necessary to aggregate the conduct of different representatives of the decision-making body in order to constitute the unlawful act of the legal person. Staff changes, which have the effect of rendering it impossible to discover the identity of the natural person who was responsible for acting, have no impact on the imposition of liability on the legal person (HR 8 January 1982, NedJur 1982 no. 614 p. 2138; Oldenhuis loc. cit. art. 6:170 no. 30 p. 119). In ESTONIA GPCCA § 31(5) expresses the basic principle that the actions of a decision-making body of a legal entity are attributed to the legal person as though they were committed by the legal person itself, and hence, the liability for the representative does not equate to employer’s vicarious liability. However, if the representative of the decision-making body commits a tort, the representative and the legal perso are solidarily liable, cf. Saare, Juridica 2003, 673–683 and Saare, Juridica 2000, 203–211. In SWEDEN it is generally recognised that a legal person per se may be held accountable under the same basic provisions of the Damages Liability Act which apply to natural persons. Hence, damage caused by representatives of a legal body, where the representative acts or omits something when acting for the legal body, the legal person encompassing that body is held directly accountable. This embraces representatives for a limited company, associations, a deceased person’s estate, and other legal persons acting as a decision-making body of the legal person (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 142, 151). In FINLAND legal persons are similarily accountable for board members and other representatives (Supreme Court 21 May 1992, 1992:66; Supreme Court 9 August 2001, 2001:70; Kurkela, JFT 2003, 40-56). In DENMARK, the Swedish notion of liability for bodies of legal persons does not exist. Nevertheless, the Danish rule for liability of employees and representatives is widely defined and non-formalistic, thus also including the liability for e. g. the board of a limited company (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsreten5, 188). However, formal legal representatives such as liquidators do not fall within its scope (von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 107, fn. 7). In ENGLAND AND WALES a corporation such as an incorporated company may be liable in tort, even where the ingredients of the tort require some specific state of mind (e. g. intention), such state of mind being imputable to it under the ordinary rules of attribution applicable to companies (cf. Meretz Investments N. V. v. ACP Ltd. [2006] EWHC 74 (Ch) at [366]; [2007] Ch 197). Moreover, a principal (whether legal or natural person) may be vicariously liable for the torts of another which that legal person has authorized (i. e. instigated or procured) or ratified: Clerk and Lindsell (-Murphy), Torts19, 6-01 and 6-76. Where, however, corporators act in their corporate capacity within the scope of their corporate powers (i. e. not as agents), the corporation alone will be liable, the act being attributed to the corporation: Mill v. Hawker (1874) LR 9 Ex 309, 321 (Kelly CB, dissenting, but not so as to affect this point: “[N]o action lies against the individual members of a corporation for a corporate act done by the corporation in its corporate capacity, unless the act be maliciously done by the individuals charged, and

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the corporate name be used as a mere colour for the malicious act, or unless the act is ultra vires, and is not, and cannot be in contemplation of law, a corporate act at all.”). Thus where the tort is expressly authorised by the corporation’s board, the corporation is liable for its own tort and is not vicariously liable: Clerk and Lindsell (-Murphy), Torts19, 5-72. Moreover, a corporation can be liable in tort notwithstanding that under its corporate constitution it has no capacity to do the act complained of: Campbell v. Paddington Corporation [1911] 1 KB 869, 875, and see also Companies Act 2006, s. 39(1) (providing that the validity of an act of a company cannot be called into question on the ground of lack of capacity by reason of anything in the company’s constitution). The board members will be personally liable and joint tortfeasors if they act with malice: Mill v. Hawker, loc. cit. See generally Hartkamp/Hesselink/Hondius/Joustra/du Perron (-von Bar), Towards a European Civil Code2, 431-447 sowie Renner, Die deliktische Haftung für Hilfspersonen in Europa.

Illustration 1 is taken from TS 19 June 2000, RAJ 2000 (3) no. 5291 p. 8152; illustration 2 from Bulgarian Supreme Court 19 January 2000, judgment no. 8470, case no. 1095/1999; illustration 3 from Danish SH 2 August 1983, UfR 1983, 1065; illustration 4 from Cass. 9 November 2005, no. 21685, Foro it. 2006, I, 1454; illustration 5 from TS 24 March 2001, RAJ 2001 (2) no. 3986 p. 6032: illustration 6 from Danish HD 13 December 1990, UfR 1991, 106; illustration 7 from Cass. 9 October 1998, no. 10034, Giust.civ.Mass. 1998, 2055; illustration 9 from BH 1996/89; illustration 10 from BH 2001/56; illustration 11 from Mattis v. Pollock (trading as Flamingos Nightclub) [2003] EWCA Civ 887; [2003] 1 WLR 2158; and illustration 12 from TS 26 June 2006, BDA RAJ 2006 no. 4612.

Article 3:202: Accountability for damage caused by the unsafe state of an immovable (1) A person who independently exercises control over an immovable is accountable for the causation of personal injury and consequential loss, loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death), and loss resulting from property damage (other than to the immovable itself) by a state of the immovable which does not ensure such safety as a person in or near the immovable is entitled to expect having regard to the circumstances including: (a) the nature of the immovable; (b) the access to the immovable; and (c) the cost of avoiding the immovable being in that state. (2) A person exercises independent control over an immovable if that person exercises such control that it is reasonable to impose a duty on that person to prevent legally relevant damage within the scope of this Article. (3) The owner of the immovable is to be regarded as independently exercising control, unless the owner shows that another independently exercises control.

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Comments A.

The legal policy

1. Liability for the unsafe state of an immovable. This Article imposes strict liability for personal injury and property damage caused by the unsafe state of an immovable. It is not confined to damage which has its cause in the poor state of construction or maintenance of buildings and other man-made structures, and it is not confined to damage which results from parts of these structures falling off, coming apart or entirely collapsing. In fact, the Article pertains to all types of dangers on immovables. Furthermore, it relates both to damage sustained on the land or in the building itself and damage suffered by persons or property in the vicinity of the immovable concerned, but not actually on it or in it. Liability attaches to anyone who exercises control over the property independently and without being subject to instructions; in cases of doubt, this is the owner (paragraph (3)). 2. Liability is strict. Liability is “strict” in the same sense as it is strict under the Product Liability Directive: the injured person only has to show that the immovable was unsafe (in the language of product liability: “defective”), according to the criteria set out in paragraph (1). This is most clearly demonstrated by considering cases of defective construction of a building which the occupier has taken over from another (e. g. inherited). The decisive issue is not whether the occupier as such could have arranged for greater safety. Rather the decisive issue is simply whether it had been ensured that the required safety precautions were actually in place. The operator of a supermarket is accountable for the causation of damage if, in its vegetables department, foliage which has fallen to the floor and created for customers a danger of slipping is not removed and results in injury: the floor must be kept safe at all times and not merely (as would be the case if resort were had to the general standard of care) at regular intervals. Everything of course depends on the exact circumstances of the individual case: the owner of a wild wood is not obliged to ensure the safety of paths through the wood vis-à-vis recreational users; someone who operates a nature reserve for commercial purposes and attracts visitors to that end is bound to ensure their safety. 3. Policy considerations. The Article corresponds to the current legal situation in several Member States of the EU, but in many respects goes beyond the present state of legal development there. To the extent that this is the case, the justification is the protection of the victim, taking into account that the owner of an immovable should in any case have reasonable insurance cover and that in many situations there are no sufficient grounds for distinguishing between damage through defective products and damage through unsafe immovables: if a customer in a supermarket has a right to damages if a bottle of mineral water explodes on being picked up, then the customer also ought to have a right to damages if injured by stepping on a glass shard in the drinks section. A further argument in favour of the solution opted for in the Article, is the fact that even in those legal systems which have at least theoretically held on to liability for immovables connected with negligence, the borders between liability for, and without, negligence no longer lend themselves to being authoritatively defined; quite apart from the other fact that numerous reversals of the burden of proof have further contributed to 657

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the situation that adherence to the “fault principle” has increasingly taken on the features of mere lip service. The solution in the present Article is further supported by the consideration that the injured person is often left with no other choice than to go on to another’s property, without being able to deal sensibly with hidden dangers present there. In contrast, it must normally be expected that the person responsible for the property should be aware of these dangers and should deal with them in a reasonable manner. The way in which paragraph (1) is phrased takes account of the fact that this argument does not apply to undeveloped land in the open countryside. Finally, it would not be consistent with present-day legal understanding to distinguish in principle between, on the one hand “constructs” (man-made structures), and on the other hand “natural” dangers of an immovable (falling trees; black ice on the way to the front door); this is just as weak as distinguishing for the purposes of the law on liability between, on the one hand, matter that falls downwards and, on the other, unevenness in the ground or an excavated pit. 4. Legally relevant damage. In conformity with all the provisions of Chapter 3, Section 2 (Accountability without intention or negligence), the liability under this Article is limited to cases of death, personal injury and property damage (as defined in Article 2:206(2)(b) (Loss upon infringement of property and lawful possession)). Only damage of this kind is within the protective purpose of liability due to the realisation of dangers on immovables. In relation to liability for all other types of damage, the necessity for intention or negligence remains. 5. Public roads excluded. Excluded from the scope of application of the present Article is the liability of the State and its organs, in so far as they attend to or omit to attend to public law duties in relation to public roads. This follows from Article 7:103 (Public law functions and court proceedings). 6. Relationship to Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions). The present Article concerns the liability of the person who is responsible for the dangerous state of the land or building. Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions) relates to the liability of those who are responsible for dangerous substances or installations which release or discharge substances or emissions dangerous to the environment. Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions) is concerned essentially with dangers arising from an enterprise or undertaking, whereas the present Article is concerned with “static” dangers which are inherent in an immovable. It is conceivable that in exceptional cases the requirements of both provisions may be satisfied simultaneously (in which case the claimant may rely on whichever regime is the more advantageous), but they remain clearly distinct in their tenet. The present Article is solely geared to the unsafe state of an immovable (“state” including both the condition of the immovable and its features). Furthermore, it is directed at risks for persons “in or near the immovable”; that is not the case for Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions) (which also covers mobile installations). Illustration 1 Only this Article (and not Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions)) is relevant if someone is injured by a roofing 658

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shingle which falls from a roof or if a customer of a bank with access to a safe suffers a shock after a door slams to behind him, locking him in, because no emergency call system has been installed. On the other hand, it is only Article 3:206 (and not the present Article) which is relevant if the danger in question arises not from the state of the land or a building, but from the use of a building in a particular way. A building is not unsafe merely by reason of the fact that fireworks are stored there; a public house is not unsafe simply because it runs a disco. 7. Relationship to contract law. The relationship between liability under this Article and liability under contract law is subject to the general rules of Article 1:103 (Scope of application). A lessee, for example, can invoke the present Article unless the relevant law governing leases contains provisions which would lose their effect were the rules of non-contractual liability applied. By the same token, the rules in the present Article leave unaffected not only the general non-contractual liability for negligence, but also a basis of claim in contract that is more favourable to the lessee. Illustration 2 X rented rooms in Y’s building for the pursuit of a tailoring business. A fire breaks out in the storage room; items belonging to X are burnt, along with items of clothing that belong to his customer C. The fire can be traced back to the accumulation of soot in the chimney, which had ignited, causing an explosion, which itself left a hole in the wall. X and C have a claim against Y under Article 3:202 for the damage suffered to their respective property; the building was clearly in an unsafe state. Y cannot exonerate himself by proving that he contracted a chimney-sweeper for the regular cleaning of the chimney. X can also base a claim for damages in contract law (Article 1:103(d) (Scope of application)), which can be more favourable to him because (i) it compensates for the lost profit that results from the temporary standstill in business operations and (ii) the fire is not attributable to force majeure (see DCFR III. – 3:104 (Excuse due to an impediment)). Also, in relation to the issue of whether X can have recourse against Y for the damage that X suffers because he must replace C’s burnt suits under the applicable contract law (which may be assumed here), it would be more beneficial for X to claim damages under contract law. This is because under the law on non-contractual liability for damage this element only constitutes legally relevant damage (Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage)) where Y had acted negligently. However, this is lacking here. 8. Defences. The defences in Chapter 5 of this Book also apply to claims under the present Article. Of particular practical significance is Article 5:302 (Event beyond control), which can rule out liability for the realisation of dangers on immovables as a consequence of extreme weather conditions.

B.

The risk embraced by liability

9. Basis. The liability under Article 3:202 relates to personal injury and property damage which arises because an immovable does not come up to standard of safety which persons who find themselves on it or in it or in its vicinity may reasonably expect. The 659

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type of hazard plays no role. The Article can cover cases where parts of a building or structure become detached, where a gravestone falls over in a cemetery, where the floor of a house is slippery from being over-polished and a corresponding warning to the public is lacking, where a tree falls over, where an icy footpath is not treated with grit and there is no corresponding sign, where a pit has not been secured or where the water extraction system in a swimming pool is set so high that children who are caught by its suction when diving cannot free themselves from its pull. Illustration 3 Sloped premises are unsafe where frequent torrential rainfall occurs in the area and the water drainage system does not function properly, so that walls on a neighbour’s property situated below break under the pressure from a mudslide. 10. Immovable. “Immovable property” is defined in DCFR Definitions as “land and anything so attached to land as not to be subject to change of place by usual human action.” This clearly covers buildings, permanent bridges and similar structures. The term immovable is not further defined for the purposes of this Article. This appeared neither possible nor necessary because the Article does not depend on technical issues. In fact it usually suffices for the term immovable as used in this Article to equate it in a natural sense with “premises”. Where the goals on a football field designed for competitive sport fall over from even light contact, this sports ground is unsafe for its users regardless of whether the goals formed an essential part of the football field or not. 11. “Other than to the immovable itself”. In cases of property damage, accountability under this Article is limited to damage to other items of property than the premises themselves. This restriction has been formulated following the corresponding rule in the Product Liability Directive (see Article 3:204(1) (Accountability for damage caused by defective products)). It seemed necessary in order not to disturb the numerous special regimes of landlord and tenant law and residential property law. Illustration 4 A chimney jutting high above the roof of a block of apartments collapses; stones break through the roof into an apartment situated below. Its owner cannot hold the owners of the other apartments accountable under Article 3:202. 12. “In or near the immovable”. It makes no difference to the liability under Article 3:202 whether the harm comes about on or in the premises or outside the premises but near to them: the owner is liable for the damage caused by parts of a building falling away or a tree falling over, regardless of whether the victim is hit while on the premises or on a footpath belonging to someone else or in a public car park. 13. “Such safety as a person ... is entitled to expect”. The test decisive for liability is whether the premises lacked the safety which the injured person could reasonably have expected under the circumstances. The test is an objective one, to be applied from the standpoint of the injured person in or near the immovable. Quite what is “safe” depends on the particular circumstances. The concept is based on the notion of what is ‘defective’ adopted in the product liability defective. 660

Article 3:202: Accountability for damage caused by the

Illustration 5 An adventure playground for children may well involve some risks because it otherwise would not be an adventure playground. Illustration 6 In contrast, a ski slope is unsafe if it has an integrated liftmast whose sharp edges are not padded by bails of straw or by other means. 14. The nature of the immovable (paragraph (1)(a)). It is in the nature of the matter that the safety which can be expected from an immovable depends on all the circumstances of the particular case. Among these circumstances is the kind of land or the kind of premises involved and the kind of danger which is present. A person who strolls around private gardens open to the public can expect a different type of safety to someone collecting mushrooms in the forest, who can at most reckon with warning signs in particularly dangerous spots and this only in a recreational area close to urban life. 15. The access to the immovable. It is also important to identify whether the case involves land or premises on to which people have been invited by a person entitled to do so or land or premises on to which people may come against that person’s will. In the latter case the standard of safety which the public can expect is much lower than in the former. Someone who is in an area of danger without authority can naturally expect less safety (the matter may be otherwise in relation to children) and a thief or another person who violates the sanctity of the home cannot basically expect any safety at all. 16. Costs. Only such a standard of safety can be ultimately expected as can be produced with reasonable cost under the circumstances. Therefore, often warnings of certain dangers must suffice; to this extent, of course, everything depends on the circumstances of the individual case. Where a pit is excavated in the course of construction work, it must be fenced in and the fence must be lit up at night; a mere warning sign is certainly insufficient here. Furthermore, the amount of expenditure must be in reasonable proportion to the type of risk. More must be done to protect against dangers to life and limb than to protect against dangers to property. Illustration 7 Subsequent to an accident in the outside lane of a motorway, the passenger of the vehicle attempts to seek safety from the fast-moving traffic by leaping over the crash barrier. Between this and the crash barrier on the opposite carriageway there is a dangerous twenty metre drop, into which the passenger plunges to her death. The drop between the carriageways was not discernible in the darkness. The structure of the elevated motorway was unsafe at this point. The operator of the motorway is liable under Article 3:202. However the person causing the car accident is not liable because the fatal plunge is no longer to be qualified as a consequence of the accident, see Article 4:101 (General rule [on causation]).

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Persons liable

17. Policy considerations. There is no uniformity between the various European legal systems as to the question on whom the liability should be imposed. Essentially the owner, the person possessing for himself or herself (in contrast to a mere detentor) and the occupier come into focus. Against this backdrop, the Group proposes a compromise. Under Article 3:202 the basic rule is that the liability is that of the person “who independently exercises control”. In relation to the victim, however, it is (rebuttably) presumed that the owner of the immovable is the person who independently exercises control (paragraph (3)). In order to prevent an amicable solution to the problem of liability for an immovable collapsing (so to speak) simply because of the different concepts of “ownership” in relation to immovables in the various jurisdictions, it is left to national laws to determine what is meant by an owner of an immovable. In the countries that have land registries at their disposal, for the most part this does not present a problem; here the owner of the premises is also the person whom the injured person may identify most easily and thereby minimise the procedural risk. This fact also justifies the policy decision behind paragraph (3). 18. Paragraph (2). Paragraph (2) furnishes an additional clarification as to the persons who may be liable because they are exercising independent control. The primary source of inspiration for paragraph (2) is the definition of “occupier” in the Irish Occupiers’ Liability Act 1995, s. 1(1). Despite its partial circularity it expresses all the essential elements. In any given case the outcome of this criterion will depend on all the circumstances. In the case of larger residential property it may be that different persons are occupiers in relation to different parts of the property. A tenant of a flat is capable of being an occupier of the rented area. During the building phase, the construction company is liable for the safety of the building site and the stability of the scaffolding erected by it. 19. Occupier and keeper. The definition of the person who independently exercises control (“occupier”) was restricted to immovables because the policy question of who is to be burdened with liability for damage caused by an unsafe immovable cannot in all cases be satisfactorily addressed by a purely factual assessment as in the case of keepers of motor vehicles, animals and substances in determining whether there should be accountability without intention or negligence. The situation for immovables is distinguishable from that of motor vehicles or animals because with immovables (e. g. large buildings) different parts may be under the control of different persons. The concept of a keeper is not designed to cover such situations. 20. Paragraph (3). Under paragraph (3) the owner can show “that another independently exercises control”. In such a case liability does not attach to the owner, but to the third person. A person who has leased out a large complex of commercial premises is not responsible for the state of the commercial units within the complex; a person who lets out an apartment is not responsible for the quality of the carpet laid by the lessee. The owner of an empty house is not faced with liability for damage which has its basis in its neglect if youths occupy the house and the police are afraid to cause a stir by initiating a move to evacuate the house. However, in such a case the owner must do everything 662

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possible to put the occupation of the house to an end; otherwise there may be liability for negligence. 21. Abandonment. Under Article 3:208 (Abandonment) a person who abandons an immovable remains accountable for it up until the time when another person exercises independent control over it. For further details see the Comments on that Article.

Notes 1.

2.

According to FRENCH CC art. 1386 the owner of a building is responsible for damage which is caused by the building’s collapse provided that the cause of the collapse was due to a lack of maintenance or a structural defect. The concepts of “building” and “collapse” have been broadly interpreted by the courts (see further le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2004/2005), nos. 8028 and 8030); the fact that a brick or a slate in the roof has become dislodged is sufficient. A faute on the part of the de facto owner is not necessary. For many years, CC art. 1386 was construed as a lex specialis provision which superceded the general gardien-liability anchored in CC art. 1384(1) (Cass.civ. 17 December 1997, Bull.civ. 1997, II, no. 323 p. 190). However, Cass.civ. 23 March 2000, Bull.civ. 2000, II, no. 54 p. 37 permitted a suit against a gardien who was not the landowner on the basis of CC art. 1384(1). In its report for the year 2000 the same Court suggested to the legislature that CC art. 1386 should be repealed (Rapport Annuel de la Cour de Cassation 2000, http://www.courdecassation.fr /_rapport/rapport.htm). In its 2005 annual report (http://www.courdecassation.fr/_rapp ort/rapport05) the Cour de cassation renewed its recommendation and, moreover, submitted that CC art. 1384(2) (“However, a person who possesses, regardless of the basis thereof, all or part of a building or of movable property in which a fire has originated is not liable towards third parties for damages caused by that fire unless it is proved that the fire must be attributed to his fault or to the fault of persons for whom he is responsible”) should also be repealed. CC arts. 1384(2) and 1386 contradicted the judicially created system of gardien liability for all manner of things (see further Depadt-Sebag, D. 2006, 2113). According to BELGIAN CC art. 1386, similar to the French position, the owner of a building is liable for the damage, which was caused by the collapse (ruine) of the building. Again, similar to the position adopted in French law, the collapse must have been due to defective maintenance or must result from a structural defect. The owner of the building is liable, even where he is not the gardien of the building concerned (Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Wynant/Debaene, TPR 2000, 1781, no. 89). The term “building” encompasses all building constructions which are attached to land (house, bridge) or structures covered by water (swimming pool, piers etc.) (van Gerven, Verbintenissenrecht II7, 341-342). The use of the word “collapse” does not simply denote that the entire building must cave in, the dislodgement of other building materials can connote a “collapse” (Cass. 18 April 1975, RW 1975-76, 159). The fact that the owner is not at fault is not a grounds of defence; CC art. 1386 establishs an irrebuttable presumption of liability to the prejudice of the owner (Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Wynant/ Debaene loc. cit. 1789-1791, no. 96).

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3.

4.

664

Similarly, under the SPANISH CC art. 1907, liability is imposed on the owner. The predominant view in legal scholarship is that the liability for faulty maintenance (not, however, defective construction) of a building structure should be extended to the occupiers that have accepted a duty to ensure the repairs (Albaladejo (-Santos Briz), Comentarios al Código Civil y compilaciones forales XXIV, arts. 1907-1909, p. 623; Roca i Trias, Derecho de daños3, 270). It is, however, far from clear whether the liability of an occupier excludes the liability of the owner (e. g. Paz-Ares/Díez-Picazo/Bercovitz/ Salvador (-de Ángel Yagüez), Código Civil II2, arts. 1905, 2040 and CA Alicante 9 February 2005, BDA JUR 2005/80628) or whether both owner and occupier are jointly liable vis-à-vis third parties (in this respect Herbosa Martínez, La responsabilidad extracontractual por ruina de los edificios, 113 and, implicitly, Santos Briz loc. cit.). When the damage caused by the collapse of a construction is not due to the lack of repairs, but to a mistake in the construction of a building, CC art. 1909 – which entitles the victim to address his or her claim to the architect or the builder – applies (TS 29 March 1983, RAJ 1983 (1) no. 1652 p. 1295; TS 29 November 1990, RAJ 1990 (7) no. 9059 p. 11543). Where a building is threatening to collapse CC art. 389 applies, whereas, when the collapse has already occurred, CC arts. 1907 and 1909 apply. CC art. 1907 is often qualified as a form of liability which derives from a rebuttable presumption of fault, in respect of the necessitated repairs which were not carried out (Albadalejo, Derecho Civil II12, 966). However, some authors consider that it is a strict liability provision (Lacruz Berdejo and Rivero Hernández, Elementos II(2)4, 535; Puig Ferriol/ Gete-Alonso/Gil Rodríguez/Hualde Sánchez (-Asúa González), Manual de Derecho Civil II3, 514) or, at least, a ‘liability based on risk’ (Santos Briz, La responsabilidad civil II7, 774; Herbosa Martínez loc. cit.). Court decisions follow the trend set by prevailing legal doctrine and consider that liability under CC art. 1907 arises from negligence (TS 25 April 1986, RAJ 1986 (2) no. 1999 p. 1941; TS 9 March 1998, RAJ 1998 (1) no. 1269 p. 2039; TS 29 October 1999, RAJ 1999 (4) no. 7628 p. 12042; TS 22 November 1999, RAJ 1999 (5) no. 8296 p. 13016; TS 8 June 2006, BDA RAJ 2006 no. 3207 [dismissing a claim as there was ‘no negligent action of the defendant’]). A “building” within the meaning of CC art. 1907 is any kind of man-made ‘construction’ (see CC art. 389: “building, wall, column or whatever other construction”; de Ángel Yagüez loc. cit. 2045; Roca i Trias loc. cit. 269; TS 25 February 1987, RAJ 1987 (1) no. 736 p. 668: damage caused by the fall of a ‘column’; TS 9 March 1998, RAJ 1998 (1) no. 1269 p. 2039: damage caused by the fall of a ‘post’). CC art. 1907 does not apply to other dangers or risks associated with immovables, for example flooding of a neighbour’s land (TS 3 April 1996, RAJ 1996 (2) no. 2880 p. 3822, obiter; see also TS 6 April 2001, RAJ 2001 (2) no. 3636 p. 5582; TS 22 July 2003, RAJ 2003 (4) no. 5852 p. 10961). According to ITALIAN CC art. 2053, the owner of a building or other man made structure is liable for damage which ensues from the collapse of the construction, unless he can adduce proof that the collapse cannot be ascribed to construction or maintenance defects. Prevailing legal opinion considers the provision to be one of strict liability (Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, 622; Monateri, Manuale della responsabilità civile, 414; de Cupis, Il danno, 206); in case law occasional reference is made to a legal presumption that the owner of the property is liable, which in end effect achieves the same result (Cass. 12 March 2004, no. 5127, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, fasc. 3). CC art. 2053 is a lex specialis in relation to CC art. 2051 (Franzoni loc. cit. 623; Cass. 8 September 1998, no. 8876, Giur.it. 1999, I, 1, 1822). CC art. 1669 governs the right of the owner to claim

Article 3:202: Accountability for damage caused by the

5.

compensation from the construction company. “Buildings or structures” CC art. 2053 denote man made constructions which are, at a minimum, temporarily attached to land (Monateri loc. cit. 416). The terms structure connotes a river dam, (Cass.sez.un. 14 December 2001, no. 15875, Giust.civ.Mass. 2001, 2165), the basin of a river (CFI Città di Castello 13 November 1964, Foro pad. 1966, I, 120, obiter), a footbridge for pedestrians (CFI Parma 25 January 1960, Arch.resp.civ. 1961, 218), an advertising billboard which was brought onto a balcony (CFI Taranto 15 March 1977, Giur.it. 1978, I, 2, 296), an audience tribune (CA Firenze 3 April 1963, Resp. civ. e prev. 1963, 205), a funicular railing at the entrance to a building site (CA Rome 19 May 1958, Monateri loc. cit. 416, fn. 32) and a window (CFI Roma 30 November 1967, Giur.it. 1968, I, 2, 436), even debris is embraced by the term (Cian and Trabucchi, Commentario breve6, sub art. 2053, II), but snow, trees and paving are not within its scope (Cass. 31 October 1961, no. 2530, Rep.Giur.it. 1961, voce R. C. no. 27). The term “collapse” also encompasses parts of the buildings which have become dislodged. Apart from the owner, responsibility is attributed to those individuals who have rights over an immoveable, conferring a power of control. The holder of a right to use and enjoy the property will be occasionally held to be solely liable (Monateri loc. cit. 423-424; Bianca, Diritto civile V, 762; Gazzoni, Manuale di diritto privato11, 707), however the usual case is that this party is held liable in addition to the owner (Cass. 7 May 1957, no. 1533, Foro it. 1958, I, 1310; Franzoni loc. cit. 628). Whoever accepts an inheritence is liable for the medio tempore resulting damage, because the acceptance has an ex tunc effect (Cass. 24 August 1954, no. 2987, Resp.civ. e prev. 1955, 190). CC art. 2053 also applies when a building is owned by the public adminstation (Cass. 11 November 1977, no. 4898, Rep.Giur.it. 1977, voce R. C. nos. 20, 21). The defendant can exculpate himself from liability upon proof of a caso fortuito or a forza maggiore (Cian and Trabucchi loc. cit. V). The lines of demarcation are difficult to draw in respect to the general custodia-liability anchored in CC art. 2051 (cf. Cass. 6 October 2005, no. 19474, Danno e resp. 2006, 642: damage caused by a mudslide, by-product of construction of motorway; Liability of contractor and person who commissioned the contract affirmed under CC art. 2051). HUNGARIAN CC § 352(1) establishes the liability of an owner for damage suffered by another, which is caused by falling objects or other defects of the building. The owner can however escape liability upon proof that the current regulations pertaining to maintenance and construction of buildings were not infringed and furthermore, that the measures necessary to prevent damage occurring were adopted. Liability for falling objects which had been affixed to the building (for example, flags, billboards, illuminated advertsing hoardings, street lighting affixed to buildings), is imposed on the individual, whose interest was served in attaching the object to the building (CC § 352(2)). In respect of damage ensuing from objects which were thrown out of, dropped or emptied from a dwelling or other premises, the tenant or the user of the premises is liable and liability is strict (CC § 353(1)); if the tenant can identify the person who was responsible for causing the damage, he remains liable as surety unless he can prove that the person who caused the damage was not authorised to stay in the dwelling (CC § 353(2)). Under CC § 352(1) a person in a contractual relationship with the individual responsible for the damage is not entitled to claim under CC § 352(1) (Petrik (-Wellmann), Polgári jog II2, 624/3; Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1316-1317; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 215-216). The term “building” encompasses all types of building structures (CC § 686), for example, garages, basements, chur-

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7.

666

ches, factory chimney, and audience tribunes. Construction defects typically embrace defective roofs, lack of barriers, unsecure terrain and steps or crumbling waterpipes. The courts have interpreted dropped objects to include heavy snowfall from the roof (BH 1979/236). Liability is strict, in so far as the owner cannot escape liability upon proof that the mistake was already committed by the previous owner and could not be discerned by the new owner. In respect of damage which materialised during construction work, the construction firm, not the owner, is liable (Wellmann loc. cit.; Benedek loc. cit. 1317-1319). The person who is responsible according to these rules can claim reimbursement from the person which actually caused the damage (CC §§ 352(3), 353(4)). Under POLISH CC art. 434 the person in direct possession of a structure (samoistny posiadacz) is accountable for damage caused by parts of that structure falling off or by its collapse, unless the collapse or falling off did not result from an improper maintenance of the structure or defects in construction. This is a case of liability without fault, although the risk for the possessor is limited to improper maintenance and construction defects (Pietrzykowski (-Safjan), Kodeks cywilny I4, art. 434 p. 1226). The possessor may be accountable despite exercising required care and in ignorance of construction defects (e. g. where the property has been recently inherited or acquired). Liability of the possessor arises even if he or she entrusted the maintenance of the structure to a professional, who failed to exercise his duties properly (SN 13 September 1988, OSN 1990, poz. 55; Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛s´c´ ogólna7, 231). The possessor may escape liability only by proving that the damage resulted from something other than improper maintenance or construction defects (and some scholars consider this constitutes a rebuttal of the presumption introduced by the rule: Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak loc. cit.; Safjan loc. cit. 1229). The notion of the structure is interpreted broadly and covers any man-made construction connected, even if temporarily, with the soil (such as buildings, towers, bridges, monuments, and street lamps; Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak loc. cit. 230; Safjan loc. cit. 1228). The parts of the structure are usually its essential parts (chimney, balcony, and balustrade). CC art. 433 regulates separately the actio de effusis vel ejectis: “The person who occupies premises shall be liable for the damage caused by the ejection, effusion or falling off of any object from those premises, unless the damage arose out of force majeur, solely through the injured party’s fault or through the fault of a third person for whom the occupier is not responsible and whose action he or she could not prevent”. It is also a case of strict liability. The occupier is a person who exercises factual control over the premises in their own interest (Safjan loc. cit. art. 433 p. 1224). If an object falls from premises dedicated to the common use of all inhabitants, the possessor of the building incurs liability (Safjan loc. cit.). There has been an enduring discussion in the commentaries whether the flood of a lower flat due to a plumbing defect in the upper flat falls under CC art. 433 (pro Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak loc. cit. 229 and Safjan loc. cit.; contra SN 5 March 2002, OSPiKA 2003, poz. 5). Two provisions of the SLOVENIAN LOA also deal with dangers associated with immoveables. LOA § 159 establishes strict liability for the “keeper” of an immoveable in respect of falling objects, whereas LOA § 106 corresponds in many respects to the Polish CC art. 434. The keeper of the immoveable can however adduce proof that he “did everything to avert the danger.” GERMAN CC § 836 governs the liability of the owner of an immoveable. This provision is supplemented by the rules anchored in CC §§ 837 and 838 pertaining to the liability

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8.

of occupier of a building and person who is under a duty to maintain the building. In each case, liability is attributed on the basis of a refutable presumption of fault. CC § 836(1) pertains to the collapse of a building or other structure which is attached to the land or any part of the building which becomes detached from the building. The tortfeasor is liable for bodily injury and damage to property. The term “building” connotes an immoveable and generally enclosed structure which is firmly attached to the ground, into which people can enter (Erman (-Schiemann), BGB II11, § 836 no. 2; MünchKomm (-Wagner), BGB4, § 836 no. 8). Liability can also arise in respect of parts of the building, for example for balconies (BGH 11 December 1984, NJW 1985, 1076), roof slates (CA Düsseldorf 20 December 2002, NJW-RR 2003, 885) or roofing felt (BGH 23 March 1993, NJW 1993, 1782). Destruction or damage does not entail that the structure forfeits its categorisation as a building. Consequently building ruins and derlict or demolished buildings are also embraced by CC § 836 (Wagner loc. cit.). “Other structures attached to the land” include, for example, fences, scaffolding, monuments and gravestones (Palandt (-Sprau), BGB66, § 836 no. 3). A building is constructed in a defective manner, if the requirements necessary to ensure that the life and health and safety of others are not placed in jeopardy have not been satisfied. An element of the duty of maintenance is the examination of the structural and physical condition of the building (Sprau loc. cit. no. 8). In principle, the person who suffered damage must prove the presence of a structural defect or that the structure was inadequately maintained and must proved a causal nexus between the damage suffered and the structural defect or the inadequate upkeep. However the rules pertaining to prima facie-proof are often of great assistance to him (however, these rules will not apply in cases of extraordinary natural occurrences: BGH 23 March 1993 loc. cit. 1783; BGH 27 April 1999, NJW 1999, 2593, 2594). Exculpation, while still theoretically possible, is subject to stringent requirements which have been established by the courts (BGH 23 March 1993 loc. cit. 1783; BGH 27 April 1999 loc. cit.). Liability is imposed on the owner-occupier (CC § 836(3)); this concept is defined in CC § 872. Liability does not depend on the ownership structure. Under certain prerequisites, liability may be imposed solely on former owner-occupiers (CC § 836(2)). The successor becomes owner-occupier immediately, upon succession (CC § 857), this is the case even when he has no knowledge of the inheritance. A lack of knowledge may be a relevant factor in the question of exculpation (Wagner loc. cit. no. 27). The liability of the owner-occupier under CC § 837 supplants liability in CC§ 836 (BGH 29 March 1977, NJW 1977, 1392), liability of the person under a duty to maintain the building under CC § 838 is joined to the liability under CC §§ 836, 837 (Sprau loc. cit. § 838, no. 1). AUSTRIAN CC § 1319 governs liability for damage which is caused by the collapse or dislodgment of parts of a structure. The liability of the occupier of a dwelling is the subject of a separate regulation, CC § 1318. Structures in the sense of CC § 1319 are all man made buildings, excavations or other artifical structures on the ground or terrain (OGH 29 November 2001, JBl 2002, 463; Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht II12, 342). CC § 1319 has been deemed to apply analogously to trees, (OGH 31 March 1970, EvBl 1970/294) and even to heavy snow sliding from a roof (Koziol and Welser loc. cit. 343; Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VI3, § 1319 no. 16; Koziol/Bydlinski/Bollenberger (-Danzl), ABGB, § 1319 no. 2). The damage must be attributable to the defective condition of the building, damage which is caused by typical dangers associated with a man made structure suffices (OGH 12 February 1998, JBl 1998, 715 note Koziol). The person

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responsible can exonerate himself from liability upon proof that he exercised reasonable care to prevent the danger materialising. e. g. in that he adopted sensible precautionary measures (OGH 20 March 1951, SZ 24/78; OGH 8 July 1986, SZ 59/121). Therefore it is unclear whether, as regards liability, CC § 1319 provides for a rebuttable presumption of fault (still of this view OGH 30 July 1963, SZ 36/103) or whether it is a strict liability provision (According to recent perception: OGH 25 June 2002, ZVR 2003/37, p. 130; Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht II2, 400). According to the wording of CC § 1319, liability is imposed on the “holder” of a building or structure. According to case law, this concept is not identical to the concept of possessor under property law. Holding in the sense of CC § 1319 requires a link to a building or structures “which enables appropriate preventative measures to be taken to avoid the danger” (OGH 17 February 1954, SZ 27/37). This interpretation is similar in many respects to the interpretation given to the concept of keeper in modern law (OGH 8 April 1997, ZVR 1997/124 p. 356). Therefore, this approach entails that a tenant can also be a holder under CC § 1319 (OGH 7 February 1968, EvBl 1968/192). GREEK CC art. 925 provides that an “owner or occupier” of a building is liable for damage which is suffered by a third party owing to the collapse of the building. Owners or occupiers can escape liability upon proof that the collapse could not be ascribed to either defective construction or inadequate upkeep of the building. Nonetheless, according to prevailing legal opinion, this provision triggers objective liability; the presence of fault on the part of the owner or occupier is not required (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Vosinakis), art. 925 no. 1; Balis, Genikai Archai8, 453; Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 565; its qualification as liability based on a rebuttable presumption of fault is advanced only by Zepos, Enochikon Dikaion II(2), 802). The term “building” connotes any man made construction which is attached to the land, even where the structure is incomplete or is derelict. “Other structures” include walls, fences, scaffolding as well as installations used for the production, relaying and use of electricity and gas (Vosinakis loc. cit. no. 5). Plants and rocks are not included within its scope (Kornilakis loc. cit. 566). There is a rebuttable presumption that the collapse was the result of defective construction or maintenance. Only damage which ensues from the realisation of risks typically associated with a collapse is recoverable, therefore e. g. the damage suffered by a passer-by, who stumbled over rubble from the building was not recoverable (Kornilakis loc. cit. 567). According to the wording of the statutory provision, either the owner or occupier may be held liable. This is understood to mean that liability will only be imposed on the owner if he is simultaneously an occupier. Otherwise, the occupier is held solely liable (Kornilakis loc. cit. 568; Vosinakis loc. cit. no. 9). As regards liability, the tenant is privileged in that he can choose between claiming under contract (CC arts. 575 ff) or tort law. The tort claims are more favourable because CC arts. 579 ff are not applicable under tort law (Kornilakis loc. cit. 568; CFI Athens 30/1980, Arm 35 [1981] 471). PORTUGUESE CC art. 492(1) similarly provides, that the owner or possessor of a building or other construction (obras) is liable for damage which ensues from the partial or complete collapse of a structure, provided that the collapse was caused by inadequate upkeep of the structure or resulted from a structural defect. The individuals responsible can escape liability, however, upon proof that they exercised reasonable care or that the damage would have resulted in any event even if they had exercised reasonable care (STJ 17 March 1977, BolMinJus 265 [1977] 223). In cases involving the inadequate

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11.

upkeep of a building, the individual, who is under a legal or contractual duty to maintain the building is liable in the place of the owner or the occupier (CC art. 492(2)). Liability in each case is based on a rebuttable presumption of fault, liability is not strict. The prerequisite needed to trigger the presumption of fault is proof of a collapse which was the consequence of defective construction or inadequate upkeep (Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 592; STJ 6 February 1996, BolMinJus 454 [1996] 697; CA Lisbon 6 June 1995, CJ XX [1995-3] 127; STJ 28 April 1977, BolMinJus 266 [1977] 161). CC art. 492 is also applicable to constructions connected to the soil or attached to the building (e. g. bridges, columns, wells and water pipes (STJ 6 February 1996, CJ(ST) (1996-1) 77)) but neither to movables without such a connection (e. g. a vase on the window-sill) nor to natural products connected to the soil (trees etc.) (Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, 493, note 3 to art. 492; Antunes Varela loc. cit. 592). The “collapse” can be total or partial (tiles falling down) (Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela loc. cit.). Liability is attached to ownership or possession. The owner of a flat in which a water pipe breaks is liable vis-à-vis the owner of the flat below (CA Oporto 18 March 1999; CA Lisbon 9 March 2002). During execution works, the master-of-works (empreiteiro) and not the owner of the building or construction will be liable, as it is the former who has the effective direction of the work (STJ 14 April 2005; STJ 26 April 1988, BolMinJus 376 [1988] 587). According to the DUTCH CC art. 6:174(1) liability is predicated on the basis that a structure “does not correspond to established standards” and consequently “presents a danger for persons or things” Liability is imposed on the basis of the unsafe state of the building, however, liability is not premised on a structural defect as is the case under Article 3:202. The former is established when, for example, software which is used to control a lift does not function properly. In respect of buildings owned by the state, the unsafe state of the building is more readily affirmed than in the case of a privately owned building (Nieuwenhuis/Stolker/Valk (-Lankhorst), T & C Burgerlijk Wetboek4, art. 6:174, no. 4a p. 2361; Onrechtmatige Daad II (-Oldenhuis), art. 6:174, no. 6 p. 69 and nos. 73-74 p. 216). Liability arises independent of the question whether the owner / occupier recognised the defect (Oldenhuis loc. cit. no. 93 p. 357, Parlementaire Geschiedenis Inv. VI, 1378). “Structures” are buildings and other structures which are permanently attached to the land, either directly or indirectly via the linkage with other buildings or structures (CC art. 6:174(4)). Therefore, gravel on roof cladding, (CFI The Hague 16 November 1977, BR 1978 no. 89), a linoleum flooring which is too smooth (CA ’s-Hertogenbosch 5 February 2002, VR 2003, no. 139 p. 310), doors, lifts and houses which are in the process of being built, fall within the scope of CC art. 6:174, in similar manner also the cables which are found in the building (CC art. 6:174(2)). However, temporary works put in place by a building firms do not fall within CC art. 6:174 (HR 6 December 1963, NedJur 1965 no. 9 p. 33). The concept “structure” includes, inter alia, fences, (CFI Rotterdam 8 January 1917, NedJur 1917, 754), walls (CA Amsterdam 21 June 1956, NedJur 1957 no. 261 p. 462), bridges (CFI Amsterdam 27 March 1956, NedJur 1956 no. 281 p. 641), equipment on a playground, boat bridges, oil tankers, monuments and aerials on a building (Oldenhuis loc. cit. nos. 42-43 pp. 143-167). Special rules govern underground structures (CC art. 6:174(3)). Liability under CC art. 6:174(1) is imposed, in principle, on the owner /occupier (Definition in CC art. 3:109); CC art. 6:174(5) supplements this provision by providing for a presumption that whoever is registered in the Land Registry as owner, is also owner- occupier for the

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purposes of CC art. 6:6174. Joint occupiers are jointly and severally liable. In the event that a construction is used in the course of a business, the operators are solely liable (CC art. 6:181).In each case, liability is imposed only for bodily injury or physical damages to things (as regards the former law, see for comparative purposes HR 13 June 1975, NedJur 1975 no. 509 p. 1619). According to ESTONIAN LOA § 1059 a landowner is liable for structures which are attached to the land. If a structure was built by a person exercising a real right over the land, liability is imposed on the holder of that right (cf. Supreme Court 3-2-1-64-06, RT III 2006, 26, 241). Liability attaches solely to the property or to the ownership of the right, liability does not hinge upon the question of the exercise of factual control. In both cases, liability is strict, only proof of force majeure or “of an act of the victim” will exclude the imposition of liability. Additionally liability of the owner for a “dangerous structure or thing” arises under LOA § 1058. This provision is concerned with the production, storage or transmission in the structure of energy or hazardous materials. Moreover, LOA § 1056(1) establishes liability of an operator of a “major source of danger”. Apart from a small number of exceptions, liability for the unsafe state of buildings in the NORDIC Countries is premised on the general principles of liability for negligent omissons; in general, the exceptions pertain to the law regulating relations between neighbours and interests of owners of adjoining properties (SWEDEN: Land Code § 3 and Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 329; DENMARK: Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 135, 248-258; FINLAND: Hakulinen, Obligationsrätt, 312) and to environmental liability law which has been constructed on the basis of “neighbour law” and – in the meantime – has even supplanted it to some extent (Swedish Environmental Code chap. 32 [see further under Article 3:206 below]). The point of departure is the basic rule, according to which liability for omissions is exceptional (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 111; Karlgren, Skadeståndsrätt5, 31; Vinding Kruse loc. cit. 111-124; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 41). The imposition of liability for the unsafe state of property must therefore be based upon the principle that a person has a duty to avert an antecedent act which increases risk of danger or must derive from the fact that an individual infringed a specific statutory or contractual duty to act (Vinding Kruse loc. cit. 117, Danish HD 7 December 1976, UfR 1977, 75; Hakulinen loc. cit. 256). In exceptional cases, pure omissions have also been deemed by the courts to ground liability, but strict liability has been rejected by the courts. In order to establish negligence, the general rules are followed; namely, foreseeability, probability and avoidance of the damage are guiding criteria (Swedish HD 16 October 1996, NJA 1996, 564; Swedish HD 24 June 1975, NJA 1975, 319; Swedish HD 9 September 1969, NJA 1969, 375; Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 134; Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans, 268; Danish HD 15 April 1953, UfR 1953, 519; Finnish Supreme Court 26 August 1982, HD 1982 II 123; Saxén loc. cit. 10). Occassionally however, extremely strict requirements are placed on the standard of care (see e. g. für Sweden HD 17 April 1934, NJA 1934, 227; HD 26 June 1973, NJA 1973, 365 I and II; and for Denmark von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 72). The specific purpose and risks associated with a particular device may lead to a stricter assessment. If an incident of the type previously occurred, without causing damage, negligence is affirmed in respect of the failure to adopt appropriate remedial measures in respect of the cause of the incident (Swedish HD 3 April 1985, NJA 1985, 269; Danish Eastern CA 2 December 1974, UfR 1975, 463; Danish HD 24 Novermber 1982, UfR

Article 3:202: Accountability for damage caused by the

14.

1983, 55). In respect of property which is designated to be accessed by the public, a similarly high standard of care (albeit unrealistic: Swedish HD 8 April 1976, NJA 1976, 196) is imposed (Swedish HD 22 February 1979, NJA 1979, 129; Swedish HD 6 April 1973, NJA 1973, 141; Danish HD 30 January 1980, UfR 1980, 205; Finnish Supreme Court 10 October 1991, HD 1991:138). The current occupier of an immovable will also be held liable even if the unsafe state results from an activity of a previous occupier (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 168). The duty to act is imposed, depending on the circumstances of the individual case, on the owner or the occupier of the property (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 113). In constrast, at least under Danish law, liability is practically strict as regards the landlord- tenant relationship, (HD 25 October 1984, UfR 1984, 1098; Trolle, Risiko & Skyld2, 78). Finnish Supreme Court 6 October 1997, HD 1997:151 placed the burden of proof for taking sufficient precautionary measures on the defendant owner of a building, from which water had pored down on the street; the plaintiff slipped during the night when passing the building as the water had frozen. In all three countries, liability in respect of trespassers who enter the zone of danger, depends on the circumstances of the individual case (Karlgren loc. cit. 36). At common law, occupiers’ liability in ENGLAND was based on negligence, albeit a special regime in which the scope of the occupiers’ duties depended on whether a visitor to the premises was a trespasser, an invitee, a licensee, or entitled to enter by virtue of a contract (and in the latter case, whether use of the premises was the main or merely an ancillary purpose of the contract): Clerk and Lindsell (-Tettenborn), Torts19, para. 12-01. These rules were superseded under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 (5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31) by the imposition of a statutory “common duty of care” (s. 1(1)), eradicating the fixed significance of different categories of lawful visitor and bringing liability more into line with ordinary negligence law, but not imposing a regime of strict liability or even a presumption of negligence. The rules of the Act regulate the duty which an occupier of premises owes to visitors in respect of dangers due to the state of the premises or to things done or omitted to be done on them (s. 1(1)) and govern liability for property damage as well as personal injury (s. 1(3)). Despite the possibilities which the broad wording of the Act makes possible, it would seem that the Act preserves the distinction between occupancy duties (duties arising because of dangers due to the state of the premises) and activity duties (duties arising from danger in an activity on the land, e. g. shooting or driving vehicles) and is confined to the former, the latter being governed by the general law of negligence: Clerk and Lindsell (-Tettenborn), Torts19, para. 12-03. While the term premises (undefined in the Act) may be understood as meaning land, (with any buildings on it) (loc. cit, para. 12-06), the ambit of the Act is extended to regulate the obligations of a person “occupying or having control over any fixed or movable structure, including any vessel, vehicle or aircraft”: s. 1(3)(a). The notion of who is an occupier remains governed by the common law: s. 1(2). Equally, it remains a matter of common law to whom the occupier owes a duty of care (loc. cit.), and thus duties are owed to persons who have the express or implied permission of the occupier to enter the premises or, subject to exceptions [see s. 1(4)], who enter the premises in the exercise of a right). The common duty of care is a duty which is owed is a duty to take such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that the visitor will be reasonably safe in using the premises for the purposes for which he is invited or permitted by the occupier to be there: s. 2(2). S. 2(3) stipulates circumstances which are relevant: viz., the degree of care and the degree of want of care which would

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ordinarily be looked for in such a visitor. In particular, an occupier must be prepared for children to be less careful than adults (s. 2(3)(a)) and that in the exercise of his calling a person will appreciate and guard against any special risk ordinarily incident, so far as the occupier leaves him free to do so (s. 2(3)(b)). A warning does not discharge the duty of care (and so absolve an occupier from liability) unless in the circumstances it was enough to enable the visitor to be reasonably safe: s. 2(4). Liability for personal injury to trespassers is governed by the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 which imposes a duty to take “such care as is reasonable in all the circumstances of the case to see that the trespasser does not suffer injury on the premises” (s. 1(4)). The duty is owed only in respect of dangers of which the occupier is aware or has reasonable grounds to believe exists; further restrictions are that the occupier must know or have reasonable grounds to believe the trespasser is or may come into the vicinity of the danger and the risk is one against which he can reasonably be expected to offer some protection (s. 1(3)). Finally, the Defective Premises Act 1972 imposes certain duties on landlords, who are not occupiers for the purposes of the 1957 Act. Thus if the landlord is under an obligation under the lease to maintain or repair the premises, he owes a duty of care to all persons who might reasonably be expected to be affected by defects in the state of the premises, provided he knows of or ought to know of the defect: s. 4(1). The duty is to take such care as is reasonable in all the circumstances to see that they are reasonably safe from personal injury or from damage to their property caused by a relevant defect: loc. cit. In IRELAND too legislation has substituted a statutory “common duty of care” owed by an occupier of premises to visitors in place of the common law duties of care: Occupiers’ Liability Act 1995, ss. 2(1) and 3(1). The Act governs liability for personal injury and for property damage, including property of another in the possession or under the control of the entrant;, damage is specifically defined as including, besides loss of property, injury to an animal, and injury is defined as including loss of life, any disease and any impairment of physical or mental condition (s. 1(1)). Similar to the position in the United Kingdom, premises are defined as including land, water and any fixed or movable structures (including vessels, vehicles, trains, aircraft and other means of transport). The Act clearly preserves the distinction between occupancy duties and activity duties since the duty under the Act relates only to “a danger due to the state of the premises”: s. 1(1) (definition of “danger”). In relation to trespassers and “recreational users” (i. e., according to the definition in s. 1(1), individuals who are present on the premises for the purpose of engaging in a recreational activity without charge) the occupier is liable only if he injures the person or damages their property intentionally or such injury or damage results from “reckless disgegard”: s. 4(1). The Act sets out a list of matters to be taken into account in determining whether the occupier has acted with reckless disregard which include whether the occupier knew or had reasonable grounds to know of danger on the premises or whether the person or property was or was likely to be on the premises and in the vicinity of any danger: s. 4(2) In Weir Rodgers v. The S. F. Trust Ltd. [2005] IESC 2, where (without deciding the point) an objective standard was applied, it was understood that in departing from the recommendation of the Law Reform Commission (Report on Occupiers’ Liability, LRC 46-1994, paras. 2.18 and 3.14) the term might be understood as greater fault than gross negligence. The Irish Act makes explicit certain points which are assumed in the British legislation, namely that status as an occupier depends on that person “exercising such control over the state of the premises that it is reasonable to impose upon that person a duty towards an entrant

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in respect of a particular danger thereon” and that there may be more than one occupier of the same premises, each being under a duty to use care in accordance with his degree of control and each liable to an injured visitor (with the possibility of contribution): s. 1(1) (definition of “occupier”). A hotel proprietor also owes a statutory duty of care to a guest to take reasonable care of the person of the guest and to ensure the premises are as safe as reasonable care and skill can make them: Hotel Proprietors Act 1963, s. 4(1). It is not clear, however, what additional duty this imposed beyond the then common law duty: Duggan v. Armstrong [1992] 2 IR 161, 165 (McCarthy J). In SCOTLAND the position is very close to that in England. The rules of the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 likewise supersede those of the occupier of premises under Scots common law (s. 1(1)) and lay down the obligations of a person occupying or having control over a fixed or movable structure (s. s. 1(3)(a)). The Act governs liability for property damage as well as personal injury: s. 1(3). The occupier owes a duty to take such case as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that the a person entering will not suffer injury or damage by reason of any danger due to the state of the premises or anything done or omitted to be done on them and for which the occupier is in law responsible: s. 2(1). As in the English statute, the notion of who is an occupier remains governed by the common law: s. 1(2).

Illustration 2 is taken from Polish Supreme Court 13 September 1988, OSNC 1990/12/155; illustration 3 from Catalan Supreme Court 27 February 2006, BDA RAJ 2006 no. 5155; illustration 4 draws on CA Burgos 24 January 2001, BDA JUR 2001/82707; illustration 5 is taken from BGH 25 April 1978, NJW 1978, 1626; illustration 6 is taken from BGH 23 October 1984, NJW 1985, 620; and illustration 7 from Cass. 7 December 2005, no. 26997, Resp.civ. e prev. 2006, 862.

Article 3:203: Accountability for damage caused by animals A keeper of an animal is accountable for the causation by the animal of personal injury and consequential loss, loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death), and loss resulting from property damage.

Comments A.

General

1. Strict liability for animals of all types. The Article provides for strict liability for animals of all types, without distinguishing between animals kept as household pets or for business purposes, between domestic and wild animals, or between native and foreign species. The provision thus follows the prevailing approach of the Member States’ legal systems. Even where individual groups of animals have been excluded from strict liability in principle, such special rules are today frequently met with considerable political criticism. Liability for the realisation of the dangers inherent in animals should lie with their 673

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keepers independently of personal negligence (or the negligence of their workers). This is widely acknowledged in Europe today and represents the applicable law. 2. Animals living in the wild excluded. Liability only arises, however, in respect of animals which are “kept”. Wild animals, living in the wild, are therefore not within the scope of this rule. Damage caused by game is generally subject to its own regime. Its idiosyncrasies are not covered by the present Article, see Article 3:207(a) (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage). 3. Legally relevant damage; relationship to contract law. As with all cases within Chapter 3, Section 2 (Accountability without intention or negligence), liability under Article 3:203 only relates to death, personal injury, health injuries (e. g. infection with a disease) and property damage. On the other hand, the scope of protection also encompasses a person who temporarily exercises control of the animal, without being its keeper, e. g. someone who takes another’s dog for a walk or who rides another’s horse. Where a contract for the care of the animal was concluded between the victim and the keeper, liability depends on whether the regime of contract law demands primacy of applicability (Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (c)). Illustration 1 K, who runs a home for cats and dogs, takes a sheepdog which had been left with her for a few days out for a walk. The dog recognises a place where it has the opportunity to run free and pulls so fiercely on the leash that K falls and breaks her wrist, which leads to prolonged pain and inconvenience. The applicable law of contract provides for liability of a person who, providing payment, temporarily gives over an animal for care only where negligence is present. This interpretation results in the situation that the stipulation under contract law seeks to provide a conclusive rule. Since there is no negligence evident, K is not entitled to a claim in damages. 4. Defences. The defences in Chapter 5 also apply in relation to the liability of the keepers of animals. In the area of equestrian sport, the rider’s claim in damages against the keeper of the horse will therefore often fall at the hurdle of Article 5:101 (Acting at own risk) paragraph (2). Where one animal injures another, Article 5:102 (Contributory fault and accountability) paragraph (4) is of particular note. Illustration 2 A dog belonging to Carlos but whose possessor and keeper is his sister Esther enters the injured person’s rabbit farm and causes the death of 73 ‘mother rabbits’, the miscarriage of 12 other ‘mother rabbits’ and the death of several baby rabbits. Esther, not Carlos, is liable for this damage. Due to the fact that the owner of the farm had left open the gate to the area in which the rabbits were kept and that the damage would not at all have arisen had the gate been properly closed, the damages are reduced to approximately 80 %. A further reduction as a consequence of the fact that there was also strict liability for the rabbits, does not, however, come into play. This is because there was no danger inherent in the rabbits.

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Illustration 3 K’s dog, who is off the lead, fights with another dog (kept by B), likewise not on a leash. K attempts to separate them but is permanently injured by B’s dog in the process. K did not accept the risk of injury solely because she let her dog walk around without a leash. However, she must face a reduction in her claim because her own dog was actively involved in the occurrence of the accident.

B.

Damage caused by animals

5. Animal. The notion of an animal is not necessarily being used here in a biologically exact sense. Rather it is the conventional notion of ordinary language which forms the basis of all rules on the liability of a keeper of an animal. Consequently, bacteria (and in any case viruses) are not animals within the meaning of Article 3:203. That proposition also follows from the fact that Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions) paragraph (2) envisages a special regime for microorganisms. The practical outcome is that the smallest animals in the sense invoked by Article 3:203 are insects. 6. Causation by the animal. In keeping with the preponderant majority of the existing statutory rules, Article 3:203 does not (i) single out particular modes of causing damage or (ii) confine liability to the realisation of dangers specific to animals. The criterion of causation in Article 4:101 (General rule) is flexible enough to avoid absurd outcomes (e. g. a cat does not “cause” damage if it is thrown by someone at the victim, who is thereby injured). The rule proceeds on the basis, however, that animals (as is also the case for things) are capable of “causing” damage. The concept of causation in the draft is not confined to human conduct. See further Article 1:101 (Basic rule). 7. Notion of keeper. The concept of a “keeper” is of general significance for the entire law on non-contractual liability. It is invoked in these rules not only within the framework of liability for animals, but also in the regimes under Article 3:205 (Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles) and Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions). The meaning is always the same: a keeper, in relation to an animal (motor vehicle or substance), is the person who has the beneficial use or physical control of it for that person’s own benefit, and who exercises the right to control it or its use. The rules deliberately avoid invoking the concept of “possession”: “possession” is a concept of property law and has or may have a meaning which differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 8. Examples. A person who rents a horse to ride at stables is not its keeper. A shortterm loan by a keeper to another for that other’s use does not mean that the existing keeper will lose the status of keeper. Conversely, a stable which competes at tournaments and to which a horse is rented for use in tournament events for two years is a keeper during this time. Employees who take care of their employer’s animals (non-self-employed shepherds; circus workers etc.) are not the keepers of the animals. Animals which are not desired are not even “kept” at all (fleas are not “kept” – unless in a flea circus – because the individual afflicted is an involuntary carrier). Also not bearing the charac675

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teristic of keeper of an animal is an association for the protection of animals, which temporarily takes dogs and cats knocked down on the road into care in order that they are given back to their owner as soon as possible after care. Illustration 4 V is bitten by a pit-bull terrier. X’s adult daughter is the owner of the dog. For two years the daughter has lived on the third floor of an apartment building. In order that she does not have to go up and down so many flights of stairs with the dog every day, the dog lives on the first floor with X, who feeds it, cares for it and pays for the dog tax and insurance. X is the keeper and in this capacity is liable for the damage caused by the bite. 9. Ownership. Ownership of an animal is an important indicator of the presence of a right to control and enjoy beneficial use, but it is not ultimately decisive. There are many cases in which someone other than the owner is the keeper: examples are where an animal is acquired under retention of title or leased or where a valuable horse is loaned out under a long-term arrangement. Moreover, there are cases in which, despite someone being owner of an animal, there is no keeper: for example, wild animals may belong to the state or another public body, but, unless fenced or caged in, the state does not “keep” them. 10. Children. Children are as a rule not the keeper of things which belong to them. Rather it will be the children’s parents as a rule who are the keeper because they enjoy the right to exercise control. 11. Several keepers. It is possible for an animal to have more than one keeper. In that case, they will be liable as solidary debtors. The same applies where several animals of different keepers occasion the same damage or if it cannot be established which of these animals has caused the damage, see Article 4:103 (Alternative causes). Illustration 5 At a beekeeping demonstration, bees from hives belonging to several beekeepers have been disturbed and are flying about aggressively. X is severely stung by many bees. Among the bees flying about near X were bees belonging to Y, but it is not possible to establish whether X was actually stung by Y’s bees. Y is liable under Article 3:203 in conjunction with Article 4:103 (Alternative causes). Illustration 6 X suffers damage to her vehicle when she reverses into a flock of sheep, which are being herded on the road. There are sheep of various different owners in the flock. Since they have all caused the source of danger (Article 4:101) (General rule), it is not only the owner of the sheep who happens to be walking at the back of the flock who is liable (Article 6:105(1)) (Solidary liability).

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Illustration 7 A victim bitten by a dog suffers severe injuries. The dog belongs to a partnership; its keepers are three brothers, each of whom is a partner. The three brothers are solidarily liable for the damage (Article 6:105(1) (Solidary liability)). 12. Thieves. As a rule a thief may be a keeper. It is not possible, however, to state in general whether the former keeper’s status as keeper terminates as a result of the theft. In any event the former keeper may remain accountable for damage caused by the animal on the basis of negligence if the former keeper has not taken reasonable precautions to prevent the theft: see Article 3:102 (Negligence) sub-paragraph (a).

Notes 1.

2.

3.

According to FRENCH, Belgian and Luxembourgian CC art. 1385 the owner of an animal or the person using it, and who was using it when damage occurred, is liable for the damage which the animal has caused. Liability is triggered, independent of the fact whether the animal was, at the relevant time, in the custody of the person responsible, whether it had strayed or had escaped. Liability is imposed only for animals that have an owner, CC art. 1385 is not applied in respect of damage caused by game (Cass.civ. 4 June 1997, Bull.civ. 1997, II, no. 166 p. 99). Liability is imposed on the gardien of the animal, i. e. the person who exercises pouvoirs de direction, de contrôle et d’usage (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2004/2005), no. 7958). If the animal has a gardien, and this person does not own the animal, the latter is only liable when the requirements listed in CC arts. 1382-1383 are satisfied; however, in contrast to the owner, the gardien cannot escape liability by proving a lack of faute (le Tourneau and Cadiet loc. cit. nos. 7959 and 7985). The legal position in BELGIUM is, in all essential matters, identical to that prevailing in France. CC art. 1385 establishes an objective liability, which presupposes an “act” of the animal as well as damage resulting from that act. Liability in Belgium does not hinge upon a faute des gardien (Weyts, RW 1998/99, 932, no. 7). Incidentally, liability can be imposed upon the gardien of the animal in question (Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Wynant/Debaene, TPR 2000, 1551, 1758, no. 73). A non-owner is gardien, if, at the time of the damaging occurrence, he had la maîtrise de l’animal, comportant un pouvoir de direction et de surveillance, sans intervention du propriétaire, et un pouvoir d’usage égal à celui de ce dernier. It is not necessary that the gardien exercises this power for his own account (Cass. 18 November 1993, Pas. belge 1993, I, no. 472 p. 970). Similarly, in Belgium, wild game does not fall within the scope of the provisions pertaining to the liability of the keeper of an animal (van Gerven, Verbintenissenrecht II7, 338). SPANISH CC art. 1905 provides that “the possessor of an animal, or the person who makes use of it, is liable for the damage that it causes, although it had escaped or got lost. This liability shall only cease if damage results from force majeure or fault on the part of the victim”. This provision is one of strict liabiliy; absence of negligence does not connote a ground of defence (Roca i Trias, Derecho de daños3, 225; Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 308; TS 3 April 1957, RAJ 1957 (1) no. 1944 p. 1284; TS 26 January 1972, RAJ 1972 (1) no. 120 p. 119; TS 15 March 1982, RAJ 1982 (1) no. 1379 p. 1380; TS 31 December 1992, RAJ 1992 (5) no. 10662 p. 13907; TS 10 July

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1995, RAJ 1995 (3) no. 5556 p. 7492; TS 21 November 1998, RAJ 1998 (5) no. 8751 p. 12913; TS 12 April 2000, RAJ 2000 (2) no. 2972 p. 4630; TS 10 October 2002, RAJ 2002 (6) no. 9978 p. 18515; TS 29 May 2003, RAJ 2003 (3) no. 5216 p. 9730; TS 24 November 2004, RAJ 2004 (5) no. 7248 p. 14697). No distinction is drawn between domestic and wild animals; the decisive factor is that the animal is the object of possession (for example, a swarm of bees: CA Guadalajara 10 December 2004, BDA JUR 2005/ 29458), because liability attaches to possession and not to ownership (Díez-Picazo and Gullón, Sistema I10, 570; Roca i Trias loc. cit. 225). According to case law, liability is imposed nonetheless on the owner, if he fails to aver that he is not the possessor of the animal or that he did not have the beneficial use of the animal (TS 12 April 2000, RAJ 2000 (2) no. 2972 p. 4630). Legal doctrine and the courts concur that the notion of possessor does not include the servidor de la posesión, i. e. a person who possesses in someone else’s name (CC art. 431) (such as employees: TS 2 November 2004, RAJ 2004 (5) no. 6864 p. 13956). Where several persons have the beneficial use of an animal they are solidarily liable (TS 29 May 2003, RAJ 2003 (3) no. 5216 p. 9730). Minors appear to be capable of possessing animals (CC art. 443) and are thus also liable under CC art. 1905 (Gómez Calle, La responsabilidad civil de los padres, 193). ITALIAN CC art. 2052 provides that the owner of an animal or the person who makes use of it, the liability of the latter being confined to the period of use, is liable for the damage which is caused by the animal, irrespective of the fact that at the relevant time, the animal was not in his or her custody, had strayed or had escaped. The owner is permitted to adduce proof of a caso fortuito. Consequently, the liability underpinning the provision is an objective one (Cass. 4 December 1998, no. 12307, Foro it. 1999, I, 1938; Cass. 9 January 2002, no. 200, Resp.civ. e prev. 2002, 1390; Monateri, Manuale della responsabilità civile, 405). The owner’s liability is excluded, if he has accorded a third party a right to use the animal and this right encompasses the authority to have the beneficial use of the animal (Cass. 4 December 1998 loc. cit.; Cass. 17 October 2002, no. 14743, Foro it. 2003, I, 1175). “Animals” in the sense of. CC art. 2052 are all types of animals, including bees (CFI Torino 4 December 1956, Giur.it. 1957, I, 2, 1001), but not microbes (Monateri loc. cit. 407). Animals which have their natural habitat in the wild are embraced by CC art. 2052, regardless of the fact that they belong to the State. Consequently, liability is predicated on the presence of a fault (CC art. 2043; Cass. 14 February 2000, no. 1638, Danno e resp. 2000, 398; Cass. 24 June 2003, no. 10008, Giust.civ.Mass. 2003, fasc. 6). In general, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the causal nexus between the damage suffered by him and the “fatto” of the animal (Cass. 29 October 2003, no. 16226, Danno e resp. 2004, 612; Cass. 9 January 2002, no. 200, Resp.civ. e prev. 2002, 1390). The animal must have played an active part in the event which caused damage (liability was denied under CC art. 2052, when a shop customer tripped over a sleeping dog:1965, 264; of a different view Alpa, Trattato di diritto civile IV, 702). As regards infections with disease contracted from an animal, it is unresolved whether they are governed by CC art. 2052 or by art. 2043 (so Cass. 10 April 1970, no. 1004, Rep.Giur.it. 1970, voce R. C. 143). A caso fortuito (proof of which can relieve the defendant of liability) connotes an extraordinary, unforeseeable and unavoidable event (Cass. 30 March 2001, no. 4742, Giur. civ. comm. 2002, I, 412) Grave fault on the part of the person who suffered damage leads to the exclusion of liability (Alpa loc. cit. 703; CFI Pordenone 10 April 1989, Foro it. 1989, I, 2950; Cass. 23 February 1983, no. 1400, Resp.civ. e prev. 1983, 632; Cass. 26 June 1981, no. 4160, Giust.civ.Mass.

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6.

7.

1981, fasc. 6; CFI Rome 27 March 1997, Resp.civ. e prev. 1997, 1215). There is an obligation to take out liability insurance in respect of dogs belonging to a particularly aggressive breed. This obligation derives from the ordinanza issued by the Department of Healthdes of 12 December 2006 (Gazz. Uff. 31 January 2007). HUNGARIAN CC § 351(1) sets out that liability is imposed on a person who keeps animals, “in accordance with the general provisions, for damage caused by the animal to another person.” In contrast, the liability of a keeper of a wild animal is governed in the same manner as the liability of a person who pursues an activity involving a considerable hazard (CC § 351(2)). Game is subject to the special provisions of Hunting Act § 75(1)-(3). A keeper of an animal connotes a person who has the animal in his possession and under his control. Aside from the owner a keeper of an animal is, in particular, a person who has control over the animal grounded in a legal relationship (agency, hiring of animal), in this case the principal and agent are solidarily liable (CC §§ 350(1), 344). Thieves can also be keepers of an animal, as can a person who takes in a stray animal. The employer is liable for animal minders (CC § 348(1)). The liability for damage caused by animals under CC § 351(1) is not conceived as one of strict liability; the basic norm of CC § 339(1) remains applicable. Only CC § 351(2), which makes reference to CC §§ 345-346, channels strict liability. The concept of “wild animals” does not have an identical meaning to game: many zoo and circus animals and, for example, snakes and scorpions which are kept in dwellings are considered to be “wild animals”. However, hares and deer are not embraced by the term. CC § 351(2) signifies animals which are volatile in nature and therefore represent a danger for persons and things. Special provisions qualify particular (attack) dogs as dangerous and therefore they are classified as “wild” under the civil law. Under POLISH CC art. 431 § 1 “whoever keeps or uses an animal shall be obliged to redress the damage it caused regardless of whether it was under his care or went astray or ran away, unless he or the person for whom he is responsible is at fault”. This is liability based on culpa in custodiendo (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛s´c´ ogólna7, 228). The rule reinforces the legal position of the injured party by introducing a rebuttable presumption that the damage resulted from the keeper’s fault (Pietrzykowski (-Safjan), Kodeks cywilny I4, art. 431 p. 1221). A keeper is a person who for his own purposes (which may be non-pecuniary), with or without legal title, takes care of the animal over a longer time, providing it with shelter and food (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak loc. cit. 226). On the other hand temporary use of the animal may be sufficient to give rise to liability. The rule applies only if an animal caused the damage on its own initiative; if it is directed by a person (e. g. a dog is set on another), the general rule of CC art. 415 applies. CC art. 431 does not apply to damage caused by wild animals; such cases are partially subject to special regulations (e. g. under Hunting Act art. 50 the State is liable for damage occasioned by the animals used in the chase which are under yearlong protection). CC art. 431 § 2 stipulates that compensation may be awarded on equitable grounds for cases in which the keeper can exculpate himself, but the financial means of the parties justify partial or full compensatation for the damage inflicted. SLOVENIAN LOA § 158 differentiates between “dangerous animals” and “domestic animals”. Liability for the former is consonant with strict liability (para. (1)), liability for the latter is based on a rebuttable presumption of fault (para. (2)). GERMAN CC § 833 provides for a bifurcation of liability for the keeper of an animal, depending on whether the individual concerned is a keeper of “luxury animals” (first

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sentence), for whom risk-based liability applies, or a keeper of domestic animals (second sentence), for whom liability is based on a rebuttable presumption of fault. In principle, the term “animal” encompasses all creatures; no distinction is drawn between tame, wild, animals with a vicious prospensity or goodnatured animals (Palandt (-Sprau), BGB66, § 833 no. 4). Insects also belong to this classification (RG 19 November 1938, RGZ 158, 388; BGH 24 January 1992, BGHZ 117, 110), according to prevailing, yet not uncontentious, opinion, micro-organisms are not embraced by the term (MünchKomm (-Wagner), BGB4, § 833, no. 5). CC § 833 second sentence refers only to domestic animals which are used for a certain purpose. In contrast to “wild” animals (CC § 960), domestic animals are animals which are tame by nature, horses, cattle, pigs, horses and cats are regarded as domestic animals. They must, in fact, be put to use as domestic animals (that is, they must not be used in scientific animal testing experiments). In addition, the domestic animal must have been intended to serve the occupation, business or livlihood of the keeper. According to prevailing legal opinion, the damage caused by an animal must have resulted from a typical danger inherent in the animal. The damage must have ensued from inherent, unpredictable and autonomous behaviour associated with the animal (BGH 20 December 2005, NJW-RR 2006, 813, 814). In contrast, CC § 833 does not apply, if the animal obeyed the commands of his instructor and thereby the individual concerned is the sole cause of the damage suffered (see for line of demarcation, BGH 20 December 2005 loc. cit.). In addition, the impact that the animal caused must have been unlawful, the requirement of unlawfulness may not be satisified in, for example, pollination of flowers by bees kept by a neighbour (BGH 24 January 1992 loc. cit.). In each case, liability is imposed on the keeper. Possession and ownership serve as indicators for the categorisation of the individual as a keeper; however, they are not pre-requisites. The decisive factors are the ascertainment of who had the power of control, who was burdened with the expenses associated with keeping the animal, who had the benefit and use of the animal and who bore the risk of the loss of the animal. A temporary loss in possession or loss of the ability to exert control over the animal (e.g in the event that the animal runs away) does not impinge on the classification as keeper. In addition to the liability of the keeper of an animal under § 833, liability is also imposed on the minder of the animal under CC § 834. Liability is conceived in terms of a rebuttable presumption of fault and no distinction is made between wild animals and domestic animals. AUSTRIAN CC § 1320 (first sentence) provides for conventional fault-based liability for diverse forms of misconduct in respect of all types of animals (OGH 4 July 1983, ZVR 1985/45 p. 86). The keeper of the animal is liable, provided he does not adduce proof that he took care to arrange for the custody and supervision of the animal (loc. cit. second sentence). According to current prevailing legal opinion, this provision is not one of strict liability nor one which is based on fault but connotes a liability which is imposed for an unlawful omission (OGH 10 July 1996, SZ 69/162). The provision is considered to be in need of reform (Schwimann (-Harrer) ABGB VI3, § 1320 no. 32). A keeper is a person who exercises the factual control over the animal and can decide, on his own account, how the animal should be kept and supervised (OGH 12 March 1964, ZVR 1964/201 p. 241; OGH 15 March 1953, SZ 26/121); ownership is not the decisive criterion (OGH 15 January 1986, EvBl 1986/111; OGH 22 June 1972, ZVR 1973/157 p. 216). If there is more than one keeper, they are jointly and severally liable (OGH 11 April 1962, SZ 35/45; OGH 29 April 1982, SZ 55/62). The question whether the animal

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9.

10.

was kept in an appropriate manner will depend on the circumstances of the individual case (OGH 10 July 1996, JBl 1997, 99; OGH 27 March 2003, 2 Ob 40/03a). Entrusting the animal to the safekeeping of reliable individual, can entail that the keeper of the animal has fulfilled his obligations, in this case the keeper is liable for this person only under the prerequisites of CC § 1315 (OGH 2 April 1962, ZVR 1964/200 p. 240). GREEK CC art. 924 also differentiates between liability of the keeper of a domestic animal (para. (2)) and liability of a keeper of other animals (para. (1)). In respect of the latter, liability is strict, namely as liability does not hinge upon the establishment of fault in the supervision of the animal (Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 556). The situation is different where domestic animals are concerned under the provisions of CC art. 924(2); the keeper, however, has the possibility of excuplating himself. This has been criticised on policy grounds. The provision is regarded as antiquated when viewed in the light of current prevailing economic and social standards (Kornilakis loc. cit.; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Vosinakis), art. 924 no. 3). “Animal” in the sense of this provision connotes that it must be possible for humans to control the animal, because otherwise the animals would not be capable of having keepers (Kornilakis loc. cit. 557 [who also counts micro-organisms cultivated in a lab in this category]; Vosinakis loc. cit. no. 4). Similarly, under Greek law, in order for a keeper to be held accountable for the damage caused by the animal, it is necessary for a specific danger inherent in the animal to be realised, i. e. autonomous action on the part of the animal (Kornilakis loc. cit. 558). The concept of “keeper” in the sense of CC art. 924 denotes a natural or legal person, who uses the animal for his own account and not on a short term basis. A person who uses the animal typically holds the factual control over the animal, namely in the sense that he determines who cares for and determines the life span of the animal. If the control over the animal and the benefical use are segregated, then whoever has the benefit (benefical use) of the animal is the keeper. Ownership and possession merely serve as prima facie indicators that a person is a keeper (Kornilakis loc. cit. 561). In PORTUGAL a distinction is drawn between the strict liability of the keeper of an animal (CC art. 502) and liability of the animal minder; liability of the latter is based on a rebuttable presumption of fault (CC art. 493(1)), see Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 573; Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, 511, art. 502 no. 1). In respect of the damage caused, once again, it must pertain to the realisation of a specific danger inherent in the animal. This was even affirmed, for example, in a case where a 600 strong herd of sheep broke through their enclosure and ran onto a train track, the keeper was found liable and it was adjudged that the keeper was obliged to compensate the damage which accrued to the train (STJ 17 June 2003). On the other hand, a danger inherent in an animal will not materialise, if the damage can be attributed to human behaviour asssociated with the animal e. g. where a team of oxen were driven on the streets at night without any appropriate lighting (Almeida Costa loc. cit. 574; Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 593; Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela loc. cit. art. 493 no. 5; Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 86 (1959) 41; CA Coimbra 13 January 2004). CC art. 493(1) pertains to individuals who have assumed the control over an animal, (bailee, herdsman, cattleman, a person who has an animal on a ‘sale or return’ basis, etc.: Antunes Varela loc. cit. 653, fn. 3; CA Oporto 7 July 1997); in contrast CC art. 502 only concerns those persons who use an animal for their own benefit (STJ 17 June 2003; STJ 9 March 1978, BolMinJus 275 [1978] 191). Both heads of liability – that arising under CC art. 493 and that under CC art. 502 – can coincide in one and the same case-

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11.

12.

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(Almeida Costa loc. cit. 574-575), e. g. in cases concerning the hire of an animal (CA Oporto 3 February 1997). DUTCH CC art. 6:173(3) expressly stipulates that (strict) liability of keepers of animals does not arise under CC art. 6:173 (liability for moveables), but is derived from CC art. 6:179. In principle, any kind of damage caused by an animal suffices (e. g. where an accident is caused by the animal crossing the street: Onrechtmatige Daad II (-Oldenhuis), art. 6:179, no. 6 p. 70). However, damage caused by an infection which does not stem from the conduct of the animal is excluded from the ambit of the provision (HR 24 January 1984, NedJur 1984, no. 415 p. 1518: a farmer drove a sick pig which had run away onto his meadow, in the wrongly held belief that it was one of his own; no liablity was imposed on the keeper of the sick pig for the consequences resulting from the infection of the other animals). A contrasting approach is adopted, for example, in a case where the infection results from a bite, the infection can be atttributed to the conduct of the animal and the unpredicitability of the animal (HR 24 January 1984 loc. cit.). Wild animals as well as domestic are embraced by art. 6:179, but game are not governed by this provision (but are subject to the provisions of hunting law). Microorganisms are also excluded from the ambit of CC art. 6:179 (Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 763); they are dealt with under CC art. 6:175 (dangerous substances), in certain circumstances they could fall to be dealt with under CC art. 6:186 (defective products: Oldenhuis loc. cit. art. 6:179, no. 32 pp. 142-143). Liability under art. 6:179 is imposed on the owner-possessor (bezitter). If the animal is used for professional purposes, then the proprietor of the business is liable (CC art. 6:181(1)), if the benefit of the animal is obtained from hiring the animal out, for commercial purposes, to other businesses, then the liability is imposed on the latter (loc. cit. para. (2)). In defining the term “owner-posessor”, recourse must be had to the general rules contained in CC arts. 3:107-109. Therefore, for example, a managing director not acting upon instruction, carriers, custodians and operators of boarding facilities for animals and animal homes are not liable under CC art. 6:179. The parents of children who have yet to attain the age of fourteen are liable in their stead, unless the circumstances pertain to an animal which is used in the course of a commercial enterprise (CC art. 6:183(2)). Liability is strict in all cases. The person responsible can only relieve himself/herself of liability upon proof that he or she could not have avoided the damage if he had the animal under his control, for example, in self defence, the defendant set his or her dog on an assailant. ESTONIAN LOA § 1060 succinctly provides that: “The keeper of an animal shall be liable for damage caused by the animal”. Consequently, under this provision, liability is similarly strict. Only the damage stipulated in LOA § 1056(1) is recoverable.This corresponds to the regulation contained in Article 3:203. According to the consonant provision of LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.267(1) liability for the keeping of all animals is strict; however, game conotes an exception and is the subject of a special regime (para. (2)). In SWEDEN, several statutes regulate the liability for the keeping of animals. Supervision of Dogs and Cats Act § 6 (now § 19) introduces strict liability for the owner of a dog and introduces solidary liability, in the event that another individual uses or keeps the animal (see e. g. HD 10 December 1947, NJA 1947, 594 and HD 28 February 1990, NJA 1990, 80). The owner is only liable to the keeper in the case where he is at fault (HD 28 February 1996, NJA 1996, 104). Cats (and also dogs) have to be supervised by

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their owner, in order to prevent them causing damage (loc. cit. § 1). Peaceful Enjoyment of Property Act § 47 subjects the owner as well as the keeper of the animal to strict liability for cattle causing damages to other persons’ crops. The Ancient Land Code (Byggningabalken) chap. 22 § 7 establishes strict liability for damage caused by cattle to another’s cattle, and loc. cit. § 8 regulates the liability for damage caused by game. DENMARK also does not recognize any general liability for the keeping of animals (von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 179). Dog Act (Hundloven) § 8 provides for strict liability of the dog’s possessor; it covers all types of damage (see Western CA 21 January 1931, UfR 1931, 356 and Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 201-203). Peaceful Enjoyment of Land and Roads Act (Mark- og vejfredsloven) § 3 provides for strict liability of the possessor of a domestic animal, for damage caused to other domestic animals, crops or other agrarian property; other damage remains however within the realm of the general culpa rule (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 180). The Ancient Danish Code (Danske Lov) § 6-10-2 establishes strict liability for the possessor of cattle which is outside of his immediate control (Western CA 19 April 1994, UfR 1994, 573; see also Western CA 15 December 1997, UfR 1998, 502 and HD 19 June 1974, UfR 1974, 692). Personal injuries may also be compensated under this head (Western CA 19 April 1994 loc. cit.). Loc. cit. § 6-10-4 and 5 also provide for strict liability for damage caused to another’s cattle and for damage caused by wild animals. On the notion of “possessor” within Dogs Act § 8 see Eastern CA 31 January 2007, UfR 2007, 1169. Under FINNISH Hunting Act (Jaktlagen) § 87 compensation for damage caused by wild animals, domestic animals and cattle may be sought from the state. The Ancient Land Code (Byggningabalken) chap. 22 § 8 provides for strict liability of the owner of dangerous, but not domestic, animals (see in more detail Hakulinen, Obligationsrätt, 311). For other types of animals, the general culpa rule applies (Supreme Court, HD 1951 II 154). Damage caused by animals to another’s crop are also subjected to the rules on negligence (Hakulinen loc. cit. 312). In ENGLAND AND WALES statute provides for a keeper’s strict liability for damage caused by an animal in certain demarcated categories of case, although judicial interpretation has tended to give a broad scope to the provisions based on a keeper’s choice whether to run the unavoidable risks of keeping the animal and whether to insure against them: cf. Mirvahedy v. Henley [2003] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 491 (Lord Walker), approved in Welsh v. Stokes [2007] EWCA Civ 796 at [47], [2008] 1 WLR 1224 at 1239 (Dyson LJ). The Animals Act 1971, s. 2(1), provides for a strict liability of a keeper of an animal for damage caused by that animal if the animal belongs to a “dangerous species”, defined by s. 6(2) as a species which is not commonly domesticated in the British Islands and whose fully grown animals, if not restrained, are likely to cause severe damage or may cause damage which, if it occurs, is likely to be severe. If the animal belongs to a dangerous species, it does not matter whether the particular animal was dangerous or tame or whether the keeper knew the species was dangerous: Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale and Jones), Torts19, 22-03. For damage caused by animals belonging to a non-dangerous species, a keeper is liable if three conditions are satisfied: (a) the damage is of a kind which the animal, unless restrained, was likely to cause or which was likely to be severe if the animal caused it; (b) that likelihood was due to characteristics not normally found in animals of that species (e. g. the animal is abnormally aggressive) or only at particular times or in particular circumstances (e. g. a horse with a particular fear of farm machinery: Flack v. Hudson [2001] QB 698); and (c) those characteristics were known to

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the keeper, a servant of the keeper in change of the animal at the time, or, for the head of a household, another keeper under the age of 16 within that household: s. 2(2). A propensity to cause injury is sufficient without the need for proof of any vicious tendency of the animal: Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale and Jones), Torts19, 22-05. Nor must the characteristic of the animal which renders (severe) damage likely in particular circumstances be one which is abnormal for that species, even though this interpretation renders the second condition of liability otiose in most cases and creates strict liability for normal behavior of animals of non-dangerous species: Curtis v. Betts [1990] 1 WLR 459; Cummings v. Granger [1977] QB 397 (where an Alsatian guard dog, acting normally for such dogs, attacked a trespasser), approved in Mirvahedy v. Henley [2003] UKHL 16 at [43], [2003] 2 AC 491 (collision with a bolting horse – normal for a horse to panic when frightened). The characteristic giving rise to danger may thus be a natural, yet unusual one: Welsh v. Stokes [2007] EWCA Civ 796 at [47], [2008] 1 WLR 1224 at 1239 (where a frightened horse, instead of turning and fleeing, reared and fell on its rider). However, such a characteristic must be one which is only found in the animal in particular circumstances: Mirvahedy v. Henley, loc. cit. (Lord Nicholls giving the example of a large and heavy cow stumbling and falling on a person – such danger is attributable to a characteristic normally found in cows at all time, namely their size and weight). The precise degree of “likelihood” of damage required is not settled: contrast Smith v. Ainger (1990) Times, 5th June (“material risk” sufficient) with Mirvahedy v. Henley [2003] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 491 (damage need not be “probable”, but must be “reasonably to be epected” and more than a mere possibility). It seems that actual knowledge of the animal’s propensities is required; it is not enough that the keeper (or servant or minor) merely ought to have known of this fact: Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale and Jones), Torts19, 22-08. However, proof of a keeper’s knowledge of the normal behaviour of animals of the particular species in question suffices to establish the keeper’s knowledge of the characteristic of the animal in question where its normal behaviour has caused the damage: Welsh v. Stokes [2007] EWCA Civ 796 at [71], [2008] 1 WLR 1224 at 1244 (Dylon LJ). Recoverable damage expressly embraces personal injury (including fatal personal injury) (s. 11), but the unrestricted wording of s. 2(1) (“any damage”) implies that recovery is not apparently confined to particular types of damage and would thus extend to property damage: Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale and Jones), Torts19, 1279 nos. 15 and 17. The damage need not be severe: Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale and Jones), Torts19, 1279 no. 17. It would also seem that to be recoverable damage need only be causally related and need not be reasonably foreseeable: Behrens v. Bertram Mills Circus Ltd. [1957] 2 QB 1, 17 (Devlin J). Nor need the damage result directly from a characteristic of an animal which renders it dangerous; there is sufficient causation when a person is injured in fleeing from the danger, e. g. by falling over or suffering a heart attack: Behrens v. Bertram Mills Circus Ltd. [1957] 2 QB 1, 17 (Devlin J); Chauhan v. Paul [1998] CLY 3990. The Animals Act 1971 also provides for the strict liability of a keeper of a dog which causes damage by killing or injuring livestock (s. 3), but not if the livestock strayed onto land whose occupier permitted the dog’s presence (s. 5(4)). A person is a keeper if he owns the animal or has it in his possession: s. 6(3)(a). However, a person does not become a keeper merely by taking into and keeping possession of an animal for the purpose of preventing it from causing damage or restoring it to its owner: s. 6(4). If the animal is owned or possessed by a member of a household under the age of sixteen, both that person and the head of the household are keepers: s. 6(3)(b). Furthermore,

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under s. 4 a person who has possession of livestock is strictly liable for damage done by the livestock to land, or property on land, in another’s ownership or occupation onto which the livestock strayed, unless it strayed from a highway where its presence was lawful. Residual liability for damage caused by animals rests on establishing a breach of a duty of care in common law negligence: Draper v. Hodder [1972] 2 QB 556 (defendant liable for failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent foreseeable risk of a pack of terriers attacking a child); Smith v. Prendergast (1984) Times, 18 October (liability for damage resulting from attack by stray Alsatian dog, which had taken up residence in the defendant’s scrapyard three weeks earlier, as the defendant was negligent in not controlling the dog or checking whether the dog was aggressive); Hole v. Ross-Skinner [2003] EWCA Civ 774 (no liability for injury to a user of highway caused by collision with the defendant’s escaped horse straying onto the highway as the fence had been cut and a gate opened by an unknown third party). Alternatively there may be a breach of duty under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. Liability may also be founded on trespass (e. g. driving animals onto another’s land) or nuisance, whether public (e. g. where animals obstruct the highway) or private (e. g. stench from farm animals): Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale and Jones), Torts19, 22-19. In such cases it will be necessary to establish the requisite fault: see, for example, League against Cruel Sports Ltd. v. Scott [1986] QB 240, 251-252 (Park J: a master of hounds was liable for trespass on land by the hounds only if it is shown that he either intended that they should enter the land, or by negligence failed to prevent them from doing so). The IRISH law on liability for injury or damage caused by animals relies on special rules of strict liability (which, unlike ENGLISH law, remain largely matters of common law), supplemented by the general rules of the law of tort: McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 27.01. Under the scienter principle, the owner of an animal is strictly liable in respect of damage which it causes if the animal had a vicious propensity to cause the damage of the type caused and the owner knew this: 27.15. The vicious propensity and the owner’s knowledge is irrebuttably presumed for animals of a dangerous class, so that the owner of a wild animal which is kept is strictly liable for damage which it causes; proof of the propensity and knowledge is only required for tame animals: Binchy loc. cit., 27.15. For other animals, proof of past display of aggressive behavior is sufficient to establish an animal’s viscious propensity; there is no necessity to show that actual harm had previously resulted: Duggan v. Armstrong [1992] 2 IR 161, 164-165 (McCarthy J) (where a dog had growled and run at children, but had not hitherto bitten one). The requirement of the owner’s knowledge may be established by showing the knowledge of another family member: Duggan v. Armstrong [1992] 2 IR 161, 165 (McCarthy J) (where a child’s knowledge was imputed to a parent). As regards general rules, liability may be founded on trespass (Binchy loc. cit, 27.07), nuisance (Binchy loc. cit, 27.05-27.06), negligence (Binchy loc. cit, 27.03-27.04) or Rylands v. Fletcher (Binchy loc. cit, 27.08). Liability on the latter basis will be in practice be rare since liability presupposes an escape of a “dangerous thing” and a “non-natural” user of the land (e. g. keeping an unreasonable number of animals): Binchy loc. cit. Liability under the Occupier’s Liability Act 1995 is also probably arguable if, in the circumstances, the presence of the animal can be regarded as “a danger due to the state of the premises” (within the meaning of s. 1(1)): Binchy loc. cit, 27.09-27.14 and cf. Duggan v. Armstrong [1992] 2 IR 161 (breach of common law duty of care [superseded by Act] in permitting a large mongrel Alsatian dog with a known vicious propensity towards children to run free within the premises in

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16.

an area where a large number of guests, including children, congregated). Equally, a hotel proprietor may be in breach of the duty of care under the Hotel Proprietors Act 1963, s. 4: Duggan v. Armstrong [1992] 2 IR 161. The law in SCOTLAND on liability for injury and damage caused by animals closely resembles that in ENGLAND AND WALES with specific statutory rules providing for strict liability in defined cases (though not in terms identical to those enacted earlier for the sister jurisdiction), supplemented by the residual application of general (fault-based) principles of delictual liability: see generally Stair, The Laws of Scotland II, para. 161. Under the Animals (Scotland) Act 1987, s. 1, a keeper of an animal is liable for injury or damage caused by an animal if the animal belongs to a species whose members generally are, by virtue of their physical attributes or habits, likely (unless controlled or restrained) to injure severely persons or animals or to damage property to a material extent. The injury or damage must be directly referable to the physical attributes or habits of the animal which rendered it likely to injure or damage: s. 1(1)(c). It is irrebuttably presumed that dogs and certain dangerous wild animals are likely to injure severely by biting or otherwise savaging, attacking or harrying (s. 3(a)) and that (among others) cattle, horses, sheep, pigs, goats and deer are likely, in the course of foraging, to damage land or its produce to a material extent (s. 3(b)). However, liability for disease is excluded if it is transmitted by means unlikely to cause severe injury other than disease: s. 1(4). Besides strict liability, an owner or keeper of an animal may be liable under the rules relating to negligence if his breach of a duty of care caused actual harm: Stair, The laws of Scotland II, para. 163 (setting out the various judicially recognized duties of care). Culpa-based liability may also arise under the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960: Hill v. Lovett 1992 SLT 994 (occupiers liable to window cleaner attacked by their pugnacious dog). Equally there may be liability for intentionally causing harm, such as setting a dog on another (Stair, The Laws of Scotland II, paras. 160 and 164) or under the rules relating to nuisance (loc. cit., para. 162).

Illustration 1 is taken from Swedish HD 28 February 1996, NJA 1996, 104; illustration 2 from CA Navarra 30 November 2004, BDA JUR 2005/87935; illustration 3 from HR 24 January 1992, NedJur 1992, no. 302 p. 1187; illustration 4 from CFI Amsterdam 11 April 1995, VR 1995, no. 192 p. 351; illustration 5 from CA Guadalajara 10 December 2004, BDA JUR 2005/ 29458; illustration 6 from CFI Assen 16 January 1962, NedJur 1963, no. 301 p. 742; and illustration 7 from TS 29 May 2003, RAJ 2003 (3) no. 5216 p. 9730.

Article 3:204: Accountability for damage caused by defective products (1) The producer of a product is accountable for the causation of personal injury and consequential loss, loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death), and, in relation to consumers, loss resulting from property damage (other than to the product itself) by a defect in the product. (2) A person who imported the product into the European Economic Area for sale, hire, leasing or distribution in the course of that person’s business is accountable correspondingly.

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(3) A supplier of the product is accountable correspondingly if: (a) the producer cannot be identified; or (b) in the case of an imported product, the product does not indicate the identity of the importer (whether or not the producer’s name is indicated), unless the supplier informs the person suffering the damage, within a reasonable time, of the identity of the producer or the person who supplied that supplier with the product. (4) A person is not accountable under this Article for the causation of damage if that person shows that: (a) that person did not put the product into circulation; (b) it is probable that the defect which caused the damage did not exist at the time when that person put the product into circulation; (c) that person neither manufactured the product for sale or distribution for economic purpose nor manufactured or distributed it in the course of business; (d) the defect is due to the product’s compliance with mandatory regulations issued by public authorities; (e) the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time that person put the product into circulation did not enable the existence of the defect to be discovered; or (f) in the case of a manufacturer of a component, the defect is attributable to: (i) the design of the product into which the component has been fitted; or (ii) instructions given by the manufacturer of the product. (5) “Producer” means: (a) in the case of a finished product or a component, the manufacturer; (b) in the case of raw material, the person who abstracts or wins it; and (c) any person who, by putting a name, trademark or other distinguishing feature on the product, gives the impression of being its producer. (6) “Product” means a movable, even if incorporated into another movable or an immovable, or electricity. (7) A product is defective if it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, having regard to the circumstances including: (a) the presentation of the product; (b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put; and (c) the time when the product was put into circulation, but a product is not defective merely because a better product is subsequently put into circulation.

Comments A.

General

Council Directive 85/374 / EEC. This Article reproduces Council Directive 85/374 / EEC of 25th July 1985 on liability for defective products (as amended by Directive 1999/ 34 / EC art. 1). Since the liability regime under the product liability Directive undoubt1.

edly constitutes a cornerstone of the European law on liability for damage, it did not appear sufficient simply to make reference to the Directive in the text of the Article. Rather it seemed necessary to spell out its effects in these rules.

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2. Detailed commentary unnecessary. To the extent that the Article coincides with the Directive this text can dispense with a more detailed commentary. Reference can be had for that purpose to the voluminous literature devoted to this topic to be found in each Member State. 3. Restriction to consumer protection. In keeping with the fundamental legal policy adopted by the Directive, Article 3:204 is restricted to matters of consumer protection. For that reason it deliberately refrains from extending strict liability to “business to business” relationships. Such a step would depart from the Directive’s purpose of consumer protection and entail a wide-ranging interference with freedom of contract – quite apart from the fact that to date there have been no audible demands in the business sector that a corresponding liability regime be established. Rather the complete opposite is the case. The European Commission, which posed the question whether product liability should be extended to business property in its Green Paper of 28 July 1999 (COM(1999) 396 final, p. 31), stated in its report of 31 January 2001 on the application of the product liability Directive (COM(2000) 893 final, p. 25) that the tenor of responses was “in general negative” and “[o]n the basis of data available it does not seem appropriate to amend the Directive on this point”. 4. Burden of proof in relation to damage to business property. Given this background, Article 3:204 likewise does not provide for a reversal of the burden of proof to the detriment of the producer of the sort adopted in a few of the legal systems not just for “business to consumer” cases, but also for “business to business” cases. Such rules have the effect of presuming negligence to the producer’s detriment if one of the products causes damage to another’s business property. Where those rules are to be found in the law currently in force, their practical effect is barely distinguishable from a strict liability. 5. No contractual exclusion or restriction of liability. Article 3:204 must be read in conjunction with Article 5:401 (Contractual exclusion and limitation of liability) paragraph (3). By virtue of the latter Article, liability under Article 3:204 can neither be restricted nor excluded before the occurrence of the damage. This, too, follows from the product liability Directive (art. 12). The nullity of an exclusion of liability relates both to personal injury and damage to consumer property. 6. No punitive or aggravated damages. The draft does not provide for punitive damages in general and the law on product liability does not constitute an exception. Since Article 3:204 is concerned with strict liability and no element of fault is required, the introduction of punitive damages in this context must be completely out of the question. 7. Primary agricultural products and game. Since Directive 1999/34 / EC art. 1(2) came into force, Directive 85/374 / EEC no longer permits Member States a decision-making power in regard to whether or not primary agricultural products and game should be subjected to strict liability. Article 3:204 reflects this legal development. Products of this type are included in its scope of application.

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8. Liability for development risks. The draft follows the Directive also in its approach to liability for “development risks”. Under Article 3:204(4)(e) there is no strict liability if the producer shows that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time that person put the product into circulation did not enable the existence of the defect to be discovered. That rule, however, must be read in conjunction with Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage) sub-paragraph (c) which, like Council Directive 85/374 / EEC art. 15(1)(b), leaves to the national legal systems the option not to introduce this ground of defence into their law. The various jurisdictions do not asses in a completely uniform way, however, the conditions under which it may be said that the risk which has realised is merely a ‘development risk’. The ECJ in its judgment of 29 May 1997 in Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom, ECJ 29 May 1997, C-300/95, ECR 1997, I-2649 at para. 29 defined in the following terms how the concept deployed by the Directive is to be understood: “the producer must prove that the objective state of scientific and technical knowledge, including the most advanced level of such knowledge, at the time when the product in question was put into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered. Further, in order for the relevant scientific and technical knowledge to be successfully pleaded as against the producer, that knowledge must have been accessible at the time when the product in question was put into circulation.” In so doing the court essentially adopted the Opinion of Advocate-General Tesauro. 9. Policy considerations. The question whether product liability should also embrace liability for development risks has been and remains a matter of controversial discussion at the level of legal policy in many Member States. According to a study in 2003 by the Fondazione Rosselli compiled for the European Commission the argument that the risk concerned was a development risk has only rarely been successful. To date it has been pleaded as a defence primarily in proceedings relating to blood products and their derivatives, medicines and vaccines, foodstuffs and chemicals (For further information see ht tp://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/regulation/goods/liability_de.htm). The study concludes by advocating the retention of the development risk defence. One of the reasons put forward is the difficulty of finding a reasonable cover for the risk on the insurance market, an aspect which the European Commission also emphasises in its report referred to in the third paragraph of this Comment. Moreover, mention is also made of the concern that the propensity to innovate and the range of industrial products might otherwise diminish. 10. Further considerations. These rules consider – in agreement with the studies referred to – that the current regime in the Directive is a balanced one. It does not appear to have caused difficulties in practice or gaps in liability which cannot be easily accommodated. It is sufficient to leave the decision as to maintenance or abolition of the development risk defences to the national legal systems. They (i) enjoy as a result the freedom to define the concept in a manner which appears to them to be reasonable and (ii) retain the freedom to abolish the defence only for defined products with special potential for hazard (blood products, medicines, genetically modified produce) and to create the necessary insurance framework.

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11. Application of the general provisions. In accordance with Council Directive 85/ 374 / EEC art. 13, Article 3:204 leaves other causes of action unaffected. Product liability based on the law on non-contractual liability for negligence and on contract (see Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (d)) remains applicable. That is of practical significance in particular in reference to damage to property of businesses or professionals. Compensation for damage to property (as a result of a defective product) which a business causes to another business is consequently (as already indicated) only obtainable under the rules on non-contractual liability if the injured person can prove that the person causing the damage did so intentionally or negligently. 12. Duty to warn of development risks. The exclusion of strict liability for development risks does not then simultaneously mean an exclusion of liability for negligence. Such liability can arise in this context if the producer breaches duties to warn in relation to the realisation of development risks that have only become apparent after the product has been put on the open market and of which the consumer would have been made aware by a producer monitoring its products with reasonable care. 13. Deviations from the Directive; options left to discretion of Member States. Article 3:204 departs from the Directive on one point (there is no excess provision for consumers suffering property damage) and Article 3:204 also proposes that the options left by the Directive to the Member States in respect of non-economic losses and the introduction of a quantitative ceiling on liability be superseded by solutions which are in harmony with the general approach of these rules).

B.

Damage to consumer property

14. Deviation from the Directive. Departing from the Community law currently in force (Product Liability Directive art. 9(b)), Article 3:204 proposes to extend the strict liability of a producer in favour of consumers to damage to property which amounts to less than J 500 (The Directive originally provided for an excess of 500,- ECU. Council Regulation EC /1103/97 of 17 June 1997 on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro [OJ EC L 162, 19 June 1997, p. 1] art. 2 converted that sum into J 500). It may well be that for such small levels of damage solutions outside of the court system ought to be found. The Commission report referred to in paragraph 3 of these Comments mentions this topic, but does not go into any detail. 15. Policy considerations. A primary explanation for the excess for consumers in relation to property damage which has been given is that producers, insurers and the courts ought not to be burdened with proceedings in respect of trivial sums and, furthermore, that a limit of this nature reduces transaction costs. However, tending against the rule are the facts not only that it constitutes a rather singular ‘foreign body’ within Community law, but that in a predominant number of the legal systems of the Member States it is practically an empty shell because both contract law and the law on non-contractual liability have developed mechanisms in the law of evidence which in terms of practical outcome cut out the producer’s defence of an absence of fault. Furthermore, in all cases of property damage which exceed the minimum limit for liability the rule leads to an 690

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unjustifiable difficulty for the consumer in the conduct of proceedings; the claim must be based in such cases on different causes of action. The rule also contributes towards new legal differences in European product liability partly because the character of the rule as a general excess is liable to fall into disrespect, but also because the Directive originally expressed the excess in terms of ECU and the Euro has not yet been introduced in all Member States. Fluctuations in currency values consequently have the effect that the amount of the excess varies not inconsiderably from country to country. Finally, a want of justice is inherent in the excess: it seems anomalous that damage to property of less than J 500 is to be withdrawn from just one regime of strict liability, but to allow such damage to be compensated in all other cases (a property damage of, say, J 450 is certainly not within the notion of “trivial damage” within the meaning of Article 6:102 (De minimis rule)). The same goes for damage to property which exceeds J 500 in value. From the point of view of legal policy it is hardly a convincing standpoint that if there is a damage of, for example, J 20,000, compensation will only amount to J 19,500, and one may speculate that in judgments for which (as is often the case) the quantum of damage depends on an estimation, the excess will be ‘reckoned in’ before the level of compensation is set.

C.

Liability for non-economic losses; no maximum limit to liability

16. Liability for non-economic loss and injury as such. The definition of damage in the Directive is “without prejudice to national provisions relating to non-material damage” (art. 9, second sentence). Since the rules in this Book do not generally distinguish between economic and non-economic loss, the term “loss” consequently embracing loss of a non-economic nature (see Article 2:101(1) (Meaning of legally relevant damage), Article 3:204 too will provide a platform for a claim for reparation for such losses. The same applies to the claim for compensation for the injury as such. The reparable nature of noneconomic loss within a strict liability regime corresponds with the current position in the legal systems of most EU Member States. 17. No maximum limit to liability. Article 3:204 likewise corresponds with the majority of the legal systems in the EU Member States in not proposing an upper limit to liability (cf. Council Directive 85/374 / EEC art. 16). Such limits are not an appropriate instrument to structure issues of strict liability, including product liability.

Notes I.

Implementation of the Directive

1.

The product liability directive 85/374 / EEC, as amended by Directive 1999/34 / EC, has been implemented in all Member States. See for FRANCE Defective Products Liability Act (= CC arts. 1386-1 – 1386-13); for BELGIUM Product Liability Act; for LUXEMBOURG Products Liability Act; for MALTA the Consumer Affairs Act part VII; for SPAIN the Consumer Protection Act and related statutes (Real Decreto Legislativo 1/ 2007, of 16 November, que aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de

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2.

los consumidores y usuarios y otras leyes complementarias) book III chaps. 1 and 2; for ITALY ConsC (arts. 114-127); for HUNGARY Product Liability Act; for POLAND Products Liability Act (= CC Book III, title VI1); for the CZECH Republic Product Liability Act; for the SLOVAK Republic Products Liability Act; for SLOVENIA the Consumer Protection Act 1998 (Official Journal 20/1998, amended by the statutes 23/ 1999, 110/2002, 51/2004); for BULGARIA Consumer Protection Act of 9 December 2005 (DV no. 99), which repealed the Consumer Protection and Trade Rules Act of 2 April 1999 (DV no. 30) commenced on the 10 June 2006; for ROMANIA Products Liability Act; for GERMANY the Product Liability Act of 15 December 1989 (BGBl I 1989, 2198) as amended (BGBl I 2002, 2674); for AUSTRIA Products Liability Act of 21 January 1988, amended in 1993 and subsequently (BGBl I 1988/99, 1993/95, 1999/ 185, 2001/98); for GREECE the Consumer Protection Act no. 2251/1994 (as amended by Act no. 3587/2007); for PORTUGAL Products LiabilityDecree Law; for THE NETHERLANDS CC arts. 6:185-193; for ESTONIA LOA § 1061; for LITHUANIA CC arts. 6.292-6.300; for LATVIA Liability for Defective Goods and Deficient Services Act of 5 July 2000; for DENMARK the Products Liability Act of 7 June 1989/371 (Lov om produktansvar); for FINLAND the Products Liability Act of 17 August 1990/694 (Produktansvarslag); for SWEDEN Products Liability Act of 23 January 1992 (Produktansvarslag); for the UNITED KINGDOM the Consumer Protection Act 1987, Part I (ENGLAND AND WALES, SCOTLAND) and the Consumer Protection (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, Part II (NORTHERN IRELAND); for IRELAND the Liability for Defective Products Act of 1991; and for CYPRUS the Products Liability Acts of 1995 to 2002. FRANCE has reacted to the condemnation of the ECJ 14 March 2006, JCP éd. G 2006, and has enacted Law no. 2006-406 of 5 April 2006 and reformulated CC art. 1386-7(1) accordingly, prompted by the requirement to ensure conformity with the Directive. The ECJ in its judgment of the 10th of January 2006, C-402/03, Skov Æg v. Bilka Lavprisvarehus A / S, ECJ 10 January 2006, C-402/03, ECR 2006, I-199 clarified that the Directive must be interpreted as (i) “precluding a national rule, according to which the supplier is subject to a no fault liability, beyond the cases which are exhaustively listed in art. 3(3), which the Directive ... burdens the producer with, and (ii) as not precluding a national rule, according to which the supplier is accountable without restriction for the producer’s fault-based liability.”

II.

Liability for damage to property

(1)

Damage to things intended for private use

3.

The commonly called lower threshold for property damage claims of consumers is mandatorily prescribed in community law (ECJ 25 April 2002, Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic, ECJ 25 April 2002, C-418/00 and C-419/00, ECR 2002, I-3969, Commission of the European Communities v. Hellenic Republic, ECJ 25 April 2002, C-154/00, ECR 2002, I-3879). In spite of this, provisions effecting its transposition have only been found since the beginning of 2005 in all the legal systems of the Member States. Even today (writing as of January 2007) the threshold amounts under national laws vary considerably; moreover many issues have been left undecided,

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4.

5.

6.

7.

namely, how the damage, the extent of which exceeds the stipulated amount, is to be regulated. On this and on many other policy grounds, the threshold has come in for heavy criticism. FRANCE did not transpose the threshold amount envisaged by the Directive and was consequently condemned for omitting to do so by the ECJ (see previous Note). The French legislature thereupon amended CC art. 1386-2 by the Act no. 2004-1343 of 9 December 2004, under which the heading pertaining to product liability is only applicable to injury to persons (para. (1)) and to damage to property which exceeds a particular amount to be fixed by decree (para. (2)). This sum was set at J 500 (Décret no. 2005-113 of 11 February 2005). BELGIUM transposed the threshold amount at an early stage in the form of a deductible excess (Products Liablity Act art. 11: J 500); there is also case law pertaining to this provision (e. g. CFI Brugge 30 October 2000, RW 2001-2002, 1182: damage inflicted to an electrical applicance by a too high electrical voltage), however it is emphaised throughout that in respect of such “minor” damage, the general (and to some extent rules which also operate on a strict liability basis) contract and extra contractual rules on liability remain applicable (CFI Brugge loc. cit.; CFI Hasselt 8 November 1999, RW 2001-2002, 100, note De Boeck; Verlinden, Twintig jaar productaansprakelijkheid, 31-32. LUXEMBOURG has also fixed the threshold at J 500 (Products Liability Act art. 2(2)). MALTA has fixed the lower threshold amount at Liri 200,- (ca. J 510), but at the same time, the Minister responsible was given the power to alter the sum (Consumer Affairs Act art. 61(b)), should the need arise. As of the time of writing, no use has been made of this authorisation. SPANISH ConsProtA art. 141(a) (formerly Products Liability Act (LRCP) art. 10(1)(a)) provides for a lower threshold (deductible) amount of J 390,66. Damage caused to property used for private purposes is thereunder not completely recoverable but can always only be recovered following deduction of this fixed amount (Lasarte Álvarez, Manual de protección, 295-296). Also in Spain, this regulation is highly controversial on policy grounds (de la Vega García, Responsabilidad civil derivada del producto defectuoso, 63; see otherwise also Salvador Coderch, Green Paper – Civil Liability for Defective Products, 21, who points out the danger of class actions, if the lower threshold amount was abolished). In addition, it is also recognised in law that damage to property falling below the stipulated lower threshold amount can be recovered under general contract and tort rules, in practice this leads, in most cases, to the result that the provision is drained of any effect (Instituto Nacional de Consumo, Green Paper, 59). Up to now, it appears that the amount was actually deducted in two reported judgments, both cases dealt with more significant damage (namely CA Burgos 13 February 2003, BDA JUR 2003 no. 122404 and CA Jaén 22 October 2002, BDA JUR 2003 no. 118952. The ITALIAN ConsC (Note 1 above) provides in art. 123(2), that damage to property is only recoverable if it exceeds the sum of J 387. The Act makes clear that the provision provides for an excess, the “first” 387 Euro, therefore are irrecoverable. Italian consumer organisations have trenchantly criticised this regulation (e. g. the Associazione Italiana Difesa Consumatori e Ambiente, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/regulation/goods/d ocs/liability/1999-greenpaper-replies/002.pdf) and the Comitato Consumatori Altroconsumo (CCA) Milano, www.altroconsumo.it).

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8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

694

HUNGARY, before its accession to the European Union, only provided for a lower threshold amount of 10.000 Forint (ca. J 40), then, reluctantly however, enacted the Products Liability Act (§ 1(4)(b)) providing for an amount in Forints as converted by the official conversion rate on the date that the damage occurred, corresponding to J 500. In SLOVENIA comparable developments transpired. In spite of a comparably low standard of living, the lower threshold amount was increased in 2004 to 100.000 Tolar (ca. J 418) (Consumer Protection Act § 2(4) as amended by Act of 3 May 2004). BULGARIA has adopted a lower threshold amount of 500 Lewa (J 255) (Consumer Protection Act art. 131(1) no. 2). POLISH CC art. 4497 § 2 provides that reparation of the damage caused by a defective product is not available, if the property damage (other than damage to the product itself) does not exceed the value of 500 euro. Academic writing takes the view that if the damage exceeds 500 euro, it is to be compensated fully (i. e. the sum of 500 euro is not to be deducted: Pietrzykowski (-Banaszczyk), Kodeks cywilny I4, art. 4497 p. 1343). Damage below this limit may be compensatable under general rules (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛s´c´ ogólna7, 275). According to the GERMAN Product Liability Act § 11 a consumer must “in the event of damage to property ... bear the loss of up to 500 Euro”. Therefore, until this threshold is exceeded, the manufacture is not liable under the strict product liability regime, and in respect of damage to property exceeding that amount, the manufacturer is only burdened with the remaining amount (BT-Drucks. 11/5520, 16). In practice, the provision is regarded as largely devoid of effect, due to the fact that according to prevailing legal opinion, the regime has no bearing on the general liability under tort law grounded in CC § 823(1). In order to combat this, the courts have reversed the burden of proof in respect of the negligence of a producer. In practical terms, this approach is not inferior to “real” strict liability or, may be, at the most, only in peripheral areas (Erman (-Schiemann), BGB II11, § 11 ProdHG, no. 1; MünchKomm (-Wagner), BGB4, § 11 ProdHG, no. 2). Originally the AUSTRIAN Product Liability Act 1988 § 3 no. 2 provided for a threshold amount of 5.000 Schilling (ca. J 363), however this amount was increased to 7.900 Schilling (ca. J 749) upon accession to the European Economic Community and was reduced again to J 500 on the 1 January 2002. Damage to property under this threshold is subject to the general tort law regime or the rules of contract law dealing with the rights of third parties (Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht II12, 355; Welser and Rabl, Produkthaftungsgesetz2, § 2 no. 11); Product Liability Act § 14 makes clear that the general civil law remains unaffected by the regulation pertaining to the threshold amount. Originally, the GREEK Consumer Protection Act no. 2251/1994 did not provide for a threshold amount. In 2002, only following the condemnation of Greece by the ECJ in a judgment pertaining to the incorrect transposition of a Directive (detailed above, see Note A3) a threshold amount of J 500 was introduced by legislation (Act no. 2251/ 1994 art. 6(6) as amended; on this see Karakostas, Dikaio prostasias tou katanaloti, 231; Rokas, Evthini gia ta proionta, 260; Alexandridou, Dikaio prostasias tou katanaloti, no. 168). Originally the PORTUGUESE Products Liability Act art. 8(2) provided that “damage to property is only compensated if it exceeds 70,000 escudos”. This provision was repealed by Products Liability Decree Law no. 131/2001 and was replaced by a new article 9, which increased the amount to J 500. This provision also specified that damage to goods

Article 3:204: Accountability for damage caused by defective products

13.

14.

15.

16.

intended for private use could only be compensated, “in so far as they exceed the sum of 500 J”. This wording, similarly, led to problems of interpretation. Calvão da Silva, Responsabilidade civil do produtor, 701 opines that that art. 9 must be read in the sense of a general deduction to the extent of the stipulated amount. This approach, however, does not yet entail that only the “first” J 500 are only recoverable, if the person suffering damage can prove fault on the part of the manufacturer under the general regime of liability under CC art. 483 as, namely, the consumer can base his action on the strict liability regime under the Consumer Protection Act 24/96 of 31 July 1996 art. 12(5). DUTCH CC art. 6:190(1) (b) states that liability for any damage to property intended for private use arises, “upon application of a franchise of J 500”. The legislature was of the opinion that the text of the Directive permitted a “threshold franchise” (drempel) which would be fully recoverable because the property damage incurred was beyond that amount as well as a “deductible excess” (aftrek). Against this backdrop, the Dutch expressly opted for the “threshold franchise” (Onrechtmatige daad III (-Stolker), art. 6:190, no. 11 p. 14; for criticism of this solution, see Snijders, Produktenrecht, 8384). In the Netherlands, therefore, this entails that damages of (e. g.) J 750 are fully recoverable and not replaced by a sum of J 250 (cf. MvA, Kamerstukken II 1987/88, 19636, no. 6 pp. 27-28). In respect of minor damage under the J 500 threshold, the consumer can, in any event, make a claim against the vendor based on the strict liability provision contained in CC art. 7:24(2)(c) (Nieuwenhuis/Stolker/Valk (-Lankhorst), T & C Burgerlijk Wetboek4, art. 6:190 no. 3 p. 1943; Jongeneel, Koop en consumentenkoop3, 65). The limits placed on liability set out in the Product Liability Directive as thereby practically thwarted. Accordingly, legal commentators have clamoured for the repeal of the franchise (see for an opposing view Dommering-van Rongen, Produktenaansprakelijkheid, 141). Even the restriction of the ambit of liability to damage to goods intended for private use has been heavily criticised (e. g. Knottenbelt, Hoofdstukken produktenaansprakelijkheid, 74-75). ESTONIAN LOA § 1061(2)(iii) guarantees damages for damage to property intended solely for private use, “if the extent of the damage exceeds an amount equal to J 500”. This wording alludes to the fact that damage which is in excess of this amount is fully recoverable. No liability is generally imposed on damage caused to the product itself by a defect (LOA § 1061(3), see further Tampuu, Juridica 2003, no. 3, 161–168. Similarly, the rules on the threshold amount are not uniform in the NORDIC Countries DENMARK has opted for a sum of 4000 dkr (Products Liability Act § 8; ca. J 527); FINLAND 2.350 finnische Mark (Products Liability Act § 8; ca. J 395) and SWEDEN 3.500 Kronen (Products Liability Act § 9; ca. J 375).The DANISH Products Liability Act § 8 and the SWEDISH Products Liability Act § 9 expressly provide that when ascertaining the compensation of damage to property, the relevant sum will be deducted. In contrast, the FINNISH Products Liability Act § 8(2) is expressed in terms that the obligation to compensate “ceases to apply” when the damage to property is valued at under 2.350 (finnish) markka. Damage which exceeds this sum is 100 % recoverable. In the UNITED KINGDOM the Consumer Protection Act 1987, s. 5(4) and the identically worded Consumer Protection (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, art. 8(4) provide that no damages are to be awarded in respect of any loss or damage to property if the amount to be awarded apart from any liability for interest does not exceed £ 275 (ca. J 403). A claim for amounts which fall under that threshold may still be made on the basis of negligence (Nelson-Jones and Stewart, Product Liability, 56; Clerk and Lindsell

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17.

(-Tettenborn), Torts18, para. 9-63). The provision is regarded as only setting out a threshold, so that a claim which exceeds it may be recovered in full – i. e. without deduction (Clark, Product Liability, 129 [implicitly]; Geddes, Product and Service Liability, 28). This is thought by some at least to be an incorrect implemention of the directive on the basis that art. 9(b) of the latter requires that the first J 500 will always be irrecoverable (Clark loc. cit.). Since the exclusion under the statute is tied to the amount of compensation actually to be awarded, a claimant will fall foul of the provision and recover nothing if his claim is above the threshold, but reduced below it by the effect of a defence based on the claimant’s own contributory negligence (Nelson-Jones and Stewart loc. cit. 56; Tettenborn loc. cit. para. 9-63 no. 54). Literature recognises that the purpose of the rule is to discourage small claims (Nelson-Jones and Stewart loc. cit.), but criticises its tendency to produce fortuitous results (Clark loc. cit.). Similarly in IRELAND, it is also discussed whether the Directive provides for a threshold or excess franchise (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 280). The Irish legislature has plumped for the second alternative. Liability for Defective Products Act s. 3(1) provides “where, but for this section, damages not exceeding J 500 in respect of any loss of or damage to, or destruction of, any item of property other than the defective product itself would fall to be awarded by virtue of this Act, no damages shall be awarded, and where, but for this section, damages exceeding that amount would fall to be awarded, only that excess shall be awarded.” Thus IRELAND has a two pronged approach – the loss must be greater than J 500 and then J 500 will be deducted from the compensation awarded.

(2)

Damage to business property

18.

Liability for damage to property used in the course of business lies outside the scope of the Directive. The corollary is that there are not inconsiderable differences in this respect between the various legal systems of the Member States. FRENCH CC art. 1386-1 initially clarifies that the producteur is also liable under the subsequent provisions pertaining to extra contractual liability, if he has a contractual relationship with the victim; the principle of non cumul des responsabilités is therefore not applicable here (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2006/ 2007), 8404-8405). The law pertaining to product liability is understood as a typical case of the théorie de la risque (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II11, no. 300 p. 303). Therefore, even subsequent to the transposition of the Directive, a distinction is still made under French law between damage to property used for private purposes and damage to property used in the course of business (le Tourneau and Cadiet loc. cit. 8406; Rép.Dr.Civ. (-Caillé) IX2, no. 30). The revised CC art. 1386-2(2) has not made any modifications. However, CC art. 1386-15 enables businessmen to contractually exclude liability for damage to property in their dealings with one another. In contrast to France, in BELGIUM, damage to business property is only recoverable upon application of the general rules (contractual or extra contracual) on liability law (Act of 25 February 1991 [Note 1 above] art. 11). These provisions determine whether and under which circumstances this liability is strict or whether the imposition of liability depends on the presence of a faute. An identical situation prevails in LUXEMBURG (Products Liability Act art. 2(1) no. 4). Similarly, according to the SPANISH ConsProtA art. 129(1) (formerly Products Liability Act art. 10(1)), the sole beneficiaries of a strict liability regime in relation to damage

19.

20.

21.

696

Article 3:204: Accountability for damage caused by defective products

22.

23.

24.

25.

to property are consumers (CA Toledo 16 March 2000, AC 2000/959 [liability was not imposed on the proprietor of a restaurant due to an interruption in the supply of electricity]; similarly CA Alicante 8 January 2002, BDA JUR 2002/48487; compare in addition CA Burgos 13 February 2003, BDA JUR 2003/122404 [no liability imposed under the (former) Products Liability Act for fire damage to a hairdressing salon caused by a technical defect in an applicance; strict liability was only imposed in respect of the damage accruing to the private property of the staff and customers]). Product Liability for damage to business property is therefore subject to the general contract or tort law regimes of the CC (e. g. CA Navarra 22 September 2003, BDA JUR 2004/112848: no analogous application of the (former) Products Liablity Act where defective property was acquired; strict liability was not imposed on a manufacturer in respect of a purchaser’s loss of profits; furthermore no liability for risk under general tort law precepts). ITALIAN ConsC art. 123(1)(b) clarifies, that the Code is not applicable to damage to property intended for use in the course of business or for professional purposes. Therefore, for example, damage resulting from a disruption in production or damage flowing from the sale of the defective product to customer, who thereupon took their business elsewhere, is only recoverable under the general rules of contract or tort law (loc. cit. art. 127(1); see also Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, sub art. 2056, p. 846). In conjunction with the general liability for negligence in tort law contained in CC art. 2043, regard must, above all, be had to the strict liability provisions of CC arts. 2049 and 2050. Additionally, damage which results from defective production of a vehicle is also subject to the strict liability regime anchored in CC art. 2054(4) (Alpa and Mariconda (-Alpa), Codice civile commentato IV, art. 2054, VI, no. 11). In a similar manner, the HUNGARIAN Products Liability Act § 1(4)(b) recognises a strict product liability for damage to property only in the consumer’s favour. Under POLISH CC art. 4492 the producer of the dangerous product is accountable only for the damage to the property designated for personal use if that property had in fact been mostly used for personal purposes. Damage to “business” property may only be compensated under general rules. While the GERMAN Products Liability Act § 1(1) second sentence also only provides for strict liability in favour of consumers for damage to property, under the general provisions of tort law (CC § 823(1)) a special case must be taken note of, namely, that also in respect of business undertakings that have suffered damage, there is a rebuttable presumption that the manufacturer of a defective product acted illegally and was at fault (fundamentally BGH 26 November 1968, BGHZ 51, 91). However, it is debatable whether this situation as it stands can be reconciled with the stated objective of the Directive as a regulation providing for the complete harmonisation of the liability for defective products (Langenbucher (-Riehm), Europarechtliche Bezüge des Privatrechts, 202-203). Originally the AUSTRIAN Products Liability Act § 2 (old version) also included businessmen in the protective strict liability regime for damage to property, however this legal position was changed in 1993 in the course of the preparations for accession to the EU (§ 2(2) (new version)).The OGH has since repeatedly confirmed that in respect to damage to property, only consumers fall within the protective scope of the provisions, not “everyone” can avail of the protection proffered by the Act (OGH 26 November 2002, ecolex 2003, 161; OGH 22 February 2005, RS 0117224). As far as damage to

697

Chapter 3: Accountability

26.

27.

28.

business property is concerned, liability falls to be determined under the general provisions pertaining to fault-based liability under the CC. In GREECE, only goods intended for private use or consumption were subject to the regime of the Consumer Protection Act (art. 6(6); the term employed there, namely “items of property” ought to mean the same as “thing”: Karakostas, I evthini tou paragogou gia elattomatika proionta, 82). After the amendment of the Consumer Protection Act by Act no. 3587/2007, the notion “items of property” includes the right to use environmental “goods”. The strict liability regime has no application to things which have been acquired for use in the course of business even where, in the concrete case at hand, they were actually used for non-commerical purposes (Karakostas, Dikaio prostasias tou katanaloti, 228; for a different view see Baltoudis, I evthini apo ta elattomatika prioionta, 310). However, business operators can rely on the judicially created rules pertaining to the reversal of the burden of proof in respect of the property damage suffered by them (Karakostas loc. cit., 82). Equally the PORTUGUESE Products Liability Act art. 8(1) confines strict liability for damage to property to things inteneded for private use. The sole recourse of business operators is under the general rules of fault-based liability under the CC (STJ 27 April 2004, Proc. 04B44057, Relator Ferreira de Almeida; CA Lisbon 9 July 2003, Proc. 3635/ 2003-6, Relator Lúcia de Sousa). This situation also corresponds to that prevailing under the DUTCH CC art. 6:190(1)(b), under DANISH Products Liability Act § 2, under FINNISH Products Liability Act § 1(1) and under SWEDISH Products Liability Act § 1(2) or where appropriate under the culpa-rules of the common Scandinavian tort law. Finally, the situation is the same in the UNITED KINGDOM (Consumer Protection Act 1987, s. 5(3); Consumer Protection (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, art. 8(3)) and in IRELAND (Liability for Defective Products Act 1991 s. 1(1)). Loss of or damage to property will only fall within the ambit of liability if the property is of a type ordinarily intended for private use or consumption – thus commercial usage will be excluded. Any liability in the latter case will be on the basis of the general rules on tort or delict.

III.

Liability for non-economic loss

29.

The Directive on Product Liability leaves it to the Member States to decide whether they wish to provide that non-pecuniary loss should also be recoverable under the strict liability regime. The majority of Member States have answered this question in the affirmative. According to FRENCH, BELGIAN, LUXEMBURGIAN and SPANISH law [compare the latter’s ConsProtA art. 129(1) (formerly Products Liability Act art. 10(2))] it is indisputable that non-economic damage is recoverable under the strict product liability regime. This proposition is self-evident. In ITALY damage of this type was irrecoverable for a long period of time (e. g. CFI Milan 31 January 2003,Resp.civ. e prev. 2003, 115), but now recovery is assured, following a change in approach in the decisions of the higher courts as to the recoverability of non-pecuniary loss (e. g. CFIRome 4 December 2003,Danno e resp. 2004, 52;CFI Rome 3 November 2003,Danno e resp. 2004, 529 and CFI Brescia 31 March 2003, Danno e resp. 2004, 666). Moreover, recovery of non-economic loss is guaranteed by the PORTUGUESE (Products Liability Act art. 8(1); see Calvão da Silva, Responsabilidade civil do produtor, 678

30.

31.

698

Article 3:204: Accountability for damage caused by defective products

32.

with the additional reference that liability is also directed at “bystanders” according to the CC art. 496), the HUNGARIAN (Products Liablity Act § 1(4)(a)), the POLISH (CC art. 4491 in conjunction with art. 445 § 1); the ROMANIAN (Products Liability Act art. 2(3)); the GERMAN (Product Liability Act § 8 second sentence), the BULGARIAN (Consumer Protection Act art. 131(2)), the IRISH (Liability for Defective Products Act 1991 s. 1(1), defining “personal injury” as including “any disease and any impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition”) and the UNITED KINGDOM law (Geddes, Product and Service Liability, 25-26; Clerk and Lindsell (-Tettenborn), Torts18, para. 9-63; Clark, Product Liability, 130-131; Nelson-Jones and Stewart, Product Liability, 53). In the Nordic countries, it is similarly recognised that non-economic loss can be recovered. In SWEDEN recovery of such damage is permitted, based on the rationale anchored in the general rules of the Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 1(3), namely that the product liability regime was not designed to restrict the entitlement of the victim, rather is geared at broadening the entitlement of the victim (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 317). DANISH Products Liability Act chap. 6 § 13, provides that the Act does not limit the plaintiff’s possibilities of attaining compensation under the general rules of contract or tort. A corresponding provision can be found in FINNISH Products Liabilty Act § 11. In contrast, non-pecuniary damage was previously considered to be irrecoverable under the GREEK strict product liability regime. The Consumer Protection Act (2251/1994) referred, in respect of such damage, to the general tort law rules. Prevailing legal opinion interpreted this cross reference to mean that a claim for compensation in respect of nonpecuniary loss could only be asserted in circumstances where there was fault on the part of the manufacturer (Karakostas, I evthini tou paragogou gia elattomatika proionta, 196; CA Thessaloniki 3141/2002, ChrID 2003, 135; CA Athens 5298/2001, DEE 8 (2002), 1137; unclear CA Piräus 301/2001, DEE 7 (2001), 1147, note Karakostas; see for an opposing view especially Eleftheriadou, PHI 1999, 102, 107 and Baltoudis, I evthini apo ta elattomatika prioionta, 312). However, Act no.2251/1994 art. 7 was amended by Act no.3587/2007 which now provides for the recoverability of non-economic losses.

IV.

Liability for development risks

33.

The question, whether a producer can relieve himself of liability by asserting a development risk defence, resulting in the materialisation of a development risk outside the scope of his control, is, in spite of its minor importance, one of the most debated policy questions of the European Product Liability regime. In this regard, not only is it necessary to assess two opposing camps, but furthermore within both camps there are varying degrees of differences in detail. According to the FRENCH CC art. 1386-11(1) no. 4 a producer is liable, unless he can prove that the defect was not discoverable according to the state of scientific and technological knowledge existing at the time that the affected product was put into circulation. Accordingly, the risk of a development defect materialising is borne, in principle, by the consumer. CC art. 1386-12(2) attenuates this point of departure by providing that: “A producer may not invoke the exonerating circumstance provided for in art. 1386-11(4) and (5), where, faced with a defect which has revealed itself within a period of ten years after the product has been put into circulation, he did not take the appropriate steps to avoid its damaging consequences”. If, within ten years of putting the

34.

699

Chapter 3: Accountability

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

700

product into circulation of the product, new findings emerge in respect of the development risks, the producer is under an obligation to warn about or recall the product as the case may be (see further le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2006/2007), 8425). Even though this provision has been deemed by the ECJ to infringe community law (ECJ 25 April 2002, Note 3 above), the French legislature has not as yet seen fit to introduce an amendment to the provision. BELGIAN Products Liability Act art. 8 lit. e has remained true to the wording of the Directive. A parliamentary initiative proposing to strike out the development risks defence was unsuccessful (Parl. St. Kamer, Zittingsperiode 1999-2000, 0480/001 and Parl. St. Kamer, Zittingsperiode 2000-2001, 0966/003, p. 6). However, the adoption of a restrictive approach to this ground of defence has been advanced in academic literature (Van de Gehuchte, De aansprakelijkheid voor producten, 84; Verlinden, Twintig jaar productaansprakelijkheid, no. 24 p. 44). Similarly, MALTA permits exculpation in the case of the realisation of a development risk (Consumers Affairs Act art. 62(e)). In contrast, according to LUXEMBURGIAN law the producer bears the development risk (Ravarani, Pas. luxemb. (31) 2000, 393, no. 511). SPANISH ConsProtA art. 140(1)(e) (formerly Products Liability Act art. 6(1)(e)) enables the producer, in principle, to adduce proof that “the state of existing scientific and technical knowledge at the time when the product was put into circulation did not allow to find out the existence of the defect”, but ConsProtA art. 140(3) (formerly Products Liability Act art. 6(3)) provides that this exception is disapplied in the case of medicines, food and food products for human consumption. Further special legislation introduced additional exceptions from the basic rule for cases where the State is the defendant (General Regime of Public Administrations Act [LRJ-PAC] art. 141(1)). Following the introduction of special rules particular to this area, there does not appear to be any further cases, in which the development risks exception has been successfully invoked. According to the ITALIAN ConsC art. 118 lit. e the producer is exempted from liability if the state of scientific and technological knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the presence of the defect to be ascertained. Up to now, it appears that also in Italy, no action has failed because the defence was asserted. The SLOVENIAN Consumer Protection Act § 10(5) indeed accepts that the materialisation of a development risk can amount to an defence which leads to exculpation, however the wording of the Act differs from that of the Directive by expressly providing that proof must be adduced that the state of scientific and technological knowledge “worldwide” was not such as to enable the defect to be discovered. However, it has been submitted that this formulation, contentwise, does not deviate from the Directive (Siegel, Produkthaftung im polnischen, tschechischen und slowenischen Recht, 127). HUNGARIAN Products Liability Act § 7(1)(d) and BULGARIAN Consumer Protection Act art. 137(1) no. 5 have adhered to the text of the Directive. Furthermore, the development risks defence is also espoused by ROMANIAN Products Liability Act art. 7(1) lit. e and POLISH CC art. 4493 § 2 second sentence. The development risks defence is also recognised by the GERMAN Product Liability Act § 1(2) no. 5; however, this defence does not apply in respect of medicinal products liability (Medicines Act [AMG] § 84) and also to products which contain genetically modified organisms or is composed of such organisms (Genetic Engineering Act

Article 3:204: Accountability for damage caused by defective products

40.

41.

42.

43.

[GenTG] § 37(2) second sentence). According to case law, the Product Liability Act § 1(2) no. 5 is only applicable to design defects and not to manufacturing defects (BGH 9 May 1995, BGHZ 129, 353, 358). In a similar manner, the AUSTRIAN Products Liability Act § 8 no. 2 excludes liability for development risks. A development risk is defined as a danger resulting from the nature of the product which could not have been detected according to the current stare of scientific and technological knowledge at the time the product was put into circulation (OGH 8 April 1997, SZ 70/61; OGH 24 October 2001, RS 0 107608). Extremely exacting criteria have been placed on the requirement regarding the discoverability of the defect. Liability is only excluded upon proof that it was impossible to view a certain attribute of the product as a defect, the defence will not apply when it was impossible to ascertain the defectiveness of a rogue product (in German literally “runaways”, e. g. a defect in material) (OGH 22 October 2002, ecolex 2003, 46). There does not appear to be cases, where the producer was relieved from liability because of the existence of a development risk (compare e. g. OGH 6 September 2000, ZVR 2001/36 p. 127 [a flanged wheel of a cable care broke off, the site of rupture could have been detected by X-ray.]; OGH 8 April 1997, SZ 70/61 [the cap of a bottle of mineral water exploded due to excess pressure] and OGH 28 June 1995, JBl 1996, 188 [contamination of hydraulic oil resulting in the collapse of a hydraulic hoist]). The legal position under the GREEK Consumer Protection Act art. 6(9) lit. e and under the PORTUGUESE Products Liability Act art. 5 corresponds in all essential matters to the prevailing legal position in Austria. In legal commentary, the provisions have been to some extent, subjected to sharp criticism (Alexandridou, Dikaio prostasias tou katanaloti, nos. 219-221; Rokas, Evthini gia ta proionta, 224-225; Alves, A responsabilidade do produtor: soluções actuais e perspectivas futuras, 44). The same holds true for the NETHERLANDS (CC art. 6:185(1)); similarly in this jurisdiction (as far as can be ascertained) there is a lack of decided case law where the development risks defence has been successfully argued. FINNISH Products Liability Act § 7 does not recognise a development risks defence. Accordingly, the Finnish legal position can be distinguished from the legal position prevailing in DENMARK (Products Liability Act § 7 no. 4) as well as that prevailing in SWEDEN (Products Liability Act § 8 no. 4). Above all in Denmark, it appeares that the focal point of attention was in choosing a regulation that had been adopted by the majority of the remainder of the Member States (Bloth, Produkthaftung, 48). In Sweden the regulation was the subject of heated political debate. The issue that tipped the scales at the end was the desire to ensure that Swedish industry was not placed at a competitive disadvantage (Bloth loc. cit. 49). Unsurprisingly (since inclusion of the defence was insisted upon by the UK before it would accept the directive) the development risks defence has been adopted in the UNITED KINGDOM (Consumer Protection Act 1987, s. 4(1)(e); Consumer Protection (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, art. 7(1)(e)), though in terms formulated more generous to the producer than the directive (Nelson-Jones and Stewart, Product Liability, 69). The defence, which is seen as principally applicable to advanced technologies (aerospace, pharmaceuticals, chemicals), is regarded by some commentators as leaving a significant gap in the network of strict liability for defective products (Nelson-Jones and Stewart loc. cit. 68). That claimants in cases of a ‘thalidomide nature’ (one of the mainsprings leading to the directive and the implementing statute) may continue to

701

Chapter 3: Accountability

44.

go uncompensated is seen as the price for safeguarding industrial innovation and technological progress which might otherwise be inhibited (Nelson-Jones and Stewart loc. cit.). Another primary reason is to keep down insurance costs. However, the need for and correctness of the defence (even as formulated in the directive) is doubted by some commentators (Clark, Product Liability, 183-184). Similarly in IRELAND, the difficulties attending the development risks defence has given rise to heated policy discussions (Pelly, [2002] 20 ILT, 9, 12; McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 290). In the end, it was decided to strictly adhere to the wording of the Directive (Liability for Defective Products Act 1991, s. 6(e)). At the time of writing, there do not appear to be any decisions concerning the applicable section relating to the development risks defence.

V.

Financial ceiling on liability

45.

The Member Statees have reacted differently to the question as to whether they wished to provide for a financial cap on liability. The following Member States have decided to abstain from adopting such a regulation: FRENCH CC; BELGIAN Products Liability Act; LUXEMBOURG Products Liability Act; MALTESE Consumer Affairs Act; ITALIAN Products Liability Act; SLOVENIAN Consumer Protection Act; HUNGARIAN Products Liability Act (see § 13(2)); POLISH CC, BULGARIAN Consumer Protection Act; ROMANIAN Product Liability Act (see art. 3); AUSTRIAN Products Liability Act; GREEK Consumer Protection Act 2251/1994 (which repealed an earlier financial ceiling); PORTUGUESE Products Liability Act (since the 2001 reform); ESTONIAN LOA, LITHUANIAN CC, LATVIAN Liability for Defective Products and Deficient Services Act; DUTCH CC; The Product Liability Acts of all the NORDIC Countries, the UNITED KINGDOM Consumer Protection Act 1987 and Consumer Protection (Northern Ireland) Order 1987; the IRISH Liability for Defective Products Act 1991 and the CYPRUS Defective Products (Civil Liability) Law. In contrast, the Acts in Spain and Germany have introduced a financial ceiling on liability. SPANISH ConsProtA art. 141(e) (formerly Products Liability Act art. 11) restricts the monetary extent of liability for personal injury to J 63.106.270,96. In contrast, no financial limits have been placed on the liability for damage to property. On many occasions, the abolishment of the financial ceiling (which has yet to attain a practical relevance) has been recommended (Instituto Nacional de Consumo, Green Paper, 62). Products Liability Act art. 11 concerns only cases where the personal injury suffered, has been caused by “identical products with the same defect”. This regulation raises numerous questions of interpretation (de la Vega García, Responsabilidad civil derivada del producto defectuoso, 129). In addition, the liability regime under the Civil Code remains applicable, with the result that it is, in end effect, possible to circumvent the financial ceiling on liability by resorting to the provisions of the Civil Code (de la Vega García loc. cit.). The GERMAN Product Liability Act § 10(1) essentially corresponds to the Spanish regulation. However, the damages cap in Germany is 85 Million J. The ceiling only covers damage flowing from personal injury, it does not apply to damage to property. It was primarily Germany which insisted that the Directive should allow the Member States the possibility of introducing a cap on damages (MünchKomm (-Wagner), BGB4, § 10 ProdHG, no. 1; Taschner, NJW 1986, 612). However, the Product Liability Act

46.

47.

702

Article 3:205: Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles

§ 10(1) deviates from the authorisation contained in the Directive, in that the financial ceiling is also applicable to major damage caused by a single product (e. g. by a plane or train). Similarly, the Product Liability Act § 10(2),which provides for a proportional reduction in damages payable to several injured parties in the case that the maximum rate is exceeded, is not a feature of the Directive.

Article 3:205: Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles (1) A keeper of a motor vehicle is accountable for the causation of personal injury and consequential loss, loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death), and loss resulting from property damage (other than to the vehicle and its freight) in a traffic accident which results from the use of the vehicle. (2) “Motor vehicle” means any vehicle intended for travel on land and propelled by mechanical power, but not running on rails, and any trailer, whether or not coupled.

Comments A.

The concept of the rule

1. Formulation of the principle; no detailed rules. Liability for damage by motor vehicles is in many Member States the subject matter of an elaborate and detailed special regime of legislation, which for its part is flanked by a plethora of rules of the law on insurance, mainly indemnity insurance. The comprehensive legal matters which are the subject matter of this legislation did not lend themselves to being portrayed in detail in the context of these rules. On the other hand, the rules would have suffered from a considerable lacuna if they had remained silent on the law governing traffic accidents: traffic is still generally one of the most significant causes of damage. Therefore, this Article formulates the two principles crucial to the law on liability, but goes no further. These principles are: liability for personal injury and property damage caused by motor vehicles (i) is strict, and (ii) lies with the keeper of the vehicle. A strict liability for keepers of a motor vehicle is nowadays almost a common feature within Europe. In the few countries which do not provide for it, there are insurance solutions or a raising of the standard of care which in practice more or less produce the same outcome. 2. Article 3:207(a) (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage). The present Article must be read in conjunction with Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage) sub-paragraph (a). This is because under the present Article there is liability only for motor-driven vehicles and not for other dangerous machines (e. g. a crane, or a concrete mixer or a shredder making tree branches into wood chips). These rules do not themselves propose strict liability for such machines and the same goes for vehicles like bicycles which are not motor-powered. The Member States’ viewpoints are simply too far apart from each other to be able to devise an acceptable common proposal for all of these areas. These rules do not therefore 703

Chapter 3: Accountability

contain the proposal to again forego the regime of liability already existing in the areas enumerated; through Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage) the Group in fact clarifies that it could not arrive at a unified stance on these issues. 3. Insurance. Where insurance solutions limit the liability of the keeper (or any other person responsible for the damage caused), those rules will have priority by virtue of Article 7:105 (Reduction or exclusion of liability to indemnified persons). Issues of direct liability of insurers or insurance funds are not the subject-matter of this Book. Issues of this kind belong in insurance law, not in the general law on non-contractual liability for damage. This follows indeed from Article 1:101 (Basic rule). Solutions provided by insurance which operates independently of personal liability on the part of the keeper or the originator of the damage (including insurance remedies which leave it up to the injured person to pursue rights against the insurer or against the injuring person) remain likewise unaffected. The same applies to claims against funds, in particular in cases in which the identity of the person causing the damage cannot be established due to the driver fleeing the scene of the accident. Both follow from Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (d). 4. Legally relevant damage. As with all the strict liability cases in Chapter 3, Section 2, the present Article relates only to personal injury and property damage. The specific risk which is of concern to the liability of keepers of motor vehicles only manifests itself in personal injury and property damage. For all other damage, only in the case of intention or negligence on the part of the person acting is the damage legally relevant and thus recoverable; the keeper qua keeper is not involved here. Illustration 1 On the spur of the moment, a frustrated lover locks his girlfriend, who wants to break up with him, in the boot of an acquaintance’s vehicle. The acquaintance is not responsible for the false imprisonment merely because he is the keeper of the vehicle. 5. Property damage. The damage caused due to the use of the motor vehicle must have been done to something other than the vehicle or its freight. In regard to damage to the vehicle itself there is no strict liability of the keeper vis-à-vis the owner of the vehicle. The liability of the keeper aims at protecting third persons and not the property interests of persons who have rights in the vehicle (e. g. a seller who has retained ownership of the vehicle until full payment of the price). Also excluded from the keeper’s liability is any commercial freight transported using the vehicle. Damage to it is subject to a special regime of transport law. However, liability for property damage suffered by persons transported is included, e. g. damage to clothes or a mobile phone carried with them. 6. Personal injury. As regards personal injury, by contrast, there are no restrictions on the range of persons entitled to claim reparation. In particular, individuals are not deprived of the protection of this Article because they were passengers in the vehicle or driving it at the time. Persons who are active in the operation of the vehicle also have a claim in damages against the keeper in the case of personal injury. 704

Article 3:205: Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles

7. Defences. The general defences in Chapter 5 also apply to the liability of keepers under Article 3:205. However, Article 5:102 (Contributory fault and accountability) paragraph (2)(c) deserves particular mention because under it, in road traffic cases, only considerable contributory fault (gross negligence) on the part of the victim is to be taken into account. The provision expressly relates only to personal and health injury.

B.

Details

8. Motor vehicles and trailers. The Article provides for strict liability to the detriment of keepers of motor vehicles. What “motor vehicles” are is defined by paragraph (2). That definition is in turn taken from Directive 72/166 / EEC ([First] Directive on Insurance against Civil Liability in Respect of the Use of Motor Vehicles). The strict liability under Article 3:205(1) thus relates to motor-driven vehicles of all types, including slow-moving vehicles (such as tractors, bicycles with an auxiliary motor, and sit-on lawnmowers, which, depending on their construction, may not be capable of more than 20 km/h). Trailers are also “motor vehicles” according to the Directive, even where they are not connected to the towing vehicle at the time of the accident. Railway vehicles (including trams and underground railway), aeroplanes and ships are excluded; they are consistently subject to special regimes of liability, which remain unaffected by these rules (Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage) sub-paragraph (a)). 9. Keeper. The term keeper in the context of this Article also follows from the general rules (see above Comments under Article 3:203 (Accountability for damage caused by animals)). Thieves and others who use the vehicle against the keeper’s will are themselves made keepers. However, the “real” keeper’s liability in negligence remains potentially applicable in such cases; it takes hold where the keeper in breach of duty omitted to reasonably secure the vehicle against unauthorised use. 10. No special liability for drivers. The Article channels the liability to the keeper (or the keeper’s insurer). In contrast, the liability of a driver who is not at the same time the keeper is subject to the general rules. In the case of professional drivers there may even be specific relief from liability provided for in the national legal systems, see Article 7:104 (Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers’ associations) sub-paragraph (a). To subject private drivers to a particularly intensified liability (in the form of either strict liability or liability for presumed misconduct) seemed unreasonable against this background. The strict liability of the keeper, coupled with compulsory insurance and a direct claim against the insurer, suffices for the requirements of victim protection. 11. Traffic accident resulting from the use of the vehicle. Liability is confined to those cases where the damage has been caused “in a traffic accident which results from the use of the vehicle”. Damage in connection with a parked car is therefore only within the scope of the Article if the vehicle has been parked on a road or area open to traffic or the public. In other words, the Article relates only to situations in which the vehicle is used on

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a public road or on a road accessible to the public, and in which an “accident” in the sense of a sudden occurrence, typically a collision, occurs. Illustration 2 X, renter and keeper of a tractor, drives home from a field with a trailer full of bales of hay. Not noticing that the hay has caught fire, he causes fire damage to the adjoining fields, which are likewise currently being harvested. X is liable due to a negligent breach of property rights, not however in his capacity as keeper of the tractor and trailer. A traffic accident is not at issue here. Illustration 3 Someone illegally parked causes a traffic jam. This does not involve a traffic accident. 12. Causation. In relation to causation, the general rules in Chapter 4 apply. Thus, it must be possible to say of the relevant personal injury or property damage that it is to be regarded as a consequence of the use of the relevant vehicle, see Article 4:101 (General rule). A vehicle properly parked at the side of the road is not to be regarded as the cause of the injury suffered when someone drives against this vehicle due to carelessness or drunkenness. The same applies to a car, which is at the front of a queue, into which the third person in the queue pushes the second vehicle. The use of the vehicle at the front did not cause the damage to the second and third vehicles. It is not sufficient that the vehicle (the parked car or vehicle number one) was “involved” in the accident; in fact it is decisive whether its use has caused the relevant accident within the meaning of Article 4:101 (General rule). Illustration 4 A collision between two vehicles occurs, leaving them stationary on the road with the consequence that a subsequent vehicle can no longer brake and drives into them. Here the person causing the first accident also caused the second accident.

Notes 1.

706

In FRANCE the law governing the legal liability for traffic accidents is anchored in the Improvement of the Situation for Victims of Traffic Accidents and for the Acceleration of Compensation Proceedings Act (Loi tendant à l’amélioration de la situation des victimes d’accidents de la circulation et à l’accélération des procédures d’indemnisation – Loi Badinter); it has even been asserted of the regulations contained therein that they are d’ordre public (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II11, no. 320 p. 337). According to loc. cit. art. 1 the law is designed at compensating the victim of a traffic accident in which a landborne motorised vehicle is “involved” (impliqué). All types of trailers are embraced by the law, however track bound vehicles (trains, trams etc.) are excluded from its scope. Whether the victim found himself/herself inside or outside of the vehicle or whether the victim was conveyed on the basis of a contract or otherwise is irrelevant. The term “accident” denotes every event which has resulted in the damage occurring (Flour/Aubert/Savaux loc. cit. no. 324 p. 341). The concept of a “landborne” motor vehicle has also to be

Article 3:205: Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles

2.

given a broad interpretation (e. g. Cass.civ. 24 June 2004, Bull.civ. 2004, II, no. 308: lawnmower with traction drive). A car becomes “involved” in an accident when it, as a matter of fact, becomes implicated in an accident (e. g. Cass.civ. 29 April 1998, JCP éd. G 1998, IV, 2342 [A motor vehicle, which is involved in a collision, is involved in the accident, at all times and independent of whether it was being driven or was stationary and Cass.civ. 24 June 1998, Bull.civ. 1998, II, no. 205 p. 121 [In a collision involving a number of vehicles, each one is involved in the accident, independent of the question of the role it played leading to the collosion occurring.]). The requirement of involvement (implication) does not denote a causation criterion, the mere coïncidence of the events is sufficient (Favre Rochex, GazPal 1998, doctr., 355). Only when the affected vehicle did not play any role whatsoever in the accident can it be said that the vehicle was not involved in the accident (detailed in Lambert-Faivre, Droit du dommage corporel5, no. 473 p. 632 and Fabre-Magnan, Les obligations, no. 299 p. 804). The concept of “traffic accident” entails that the pertinent vehicle engaged in traffic at the point of time of the accident. It is not necessary that the vehicle was in motion, as accidents involving parked or stationary vehicles are also, as a rule, traffic accidents (e. g. Cass.civ. 22 November 1995, JCP 1996, II, 22656, note Mouly: traffic accident affirmed, when a fire which originated in a parked car, spread to a building and other vehicles). However, an accident is not given where damage was intentionally inflicted (Cass.civ. 12 Dezember 2002, D. 2003, I. R., 468). The statute establishes claims which can be made against the driver and the gardiens of the vehicle involved in the accident. If an accident results between a motorised vehicle and a pedestrian or a cyclist, the liability of the latter (e. g. in respect of damage to the vehicle) continues to be subject to the droit commun (Cass.civ. 19 January 1994, Bull.civ. 1994, II, no. 28 p. 15). Loi Badinter art. 2 defines the persons liable as the driver (conducteur) and the keeper of the vehicle involved in the accident; the outcome of this is that the “appropriate” insurance can be determined (Terré/Simler/Lequette, Les obligations9, no. 960 p. 931). Drivers and gardien can invoke neither force majeure nor the acts of a third party against the victim; if the driver is the victim, the same holds true for the gardien. Victims who are not drivers, can recover damages for personal injury (loc. cit. art. 3(1)); these damages cannot be recovered if the sole cause of the accident is a faute inexcusable of the person injured. Victims who are younger than 16 or who are older than 70 or who have suffered at least an 80 % reduction in earning capacity, this ground of defence remains inapplicable (loc. cit. art. 3(2)). Effectively, their claims for compensation are only excluded in the event of a suicide or in an attempt to commit suicide (loc. cit. art. 3(3)). If the driver of the vehicle is the victim, his or her claim to damages will be reduced to take account of his contributory negligence, loc. cit. art. 4. In respect of damage to property, the contributory negligence of the person who has suffered injury may lead to a restriction or even exclusion of liability (loc. cit. art. 5(1)). An exception under this head exists for medically prescribed items and apparatus; they are subject to the rules applicable to bodily injury. In respect of damage to the vehicle itself, the owner of the vehicle must be able to assert fault on the driver’s part against the gardien of the vehicle and his insurance; however, in such an event, the owner has a direct right of recourse against the owner (loc. cit. art. 5(2)). According to the BELGIAN Motor Insurance Liability Act (Loi relative à l’assurance obligatoire de la responsabilité en matière de véhicules automoteurs – WAM) art. 29bis § 1(1) insurers, who provide coverage in respect of the liability of owners, the driver, or the

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3.

708

détenteurs of a vehicle which has been involved in a traffic accident, are jointly and severally obliged to compensate personal injury (death, bodily injury), resulting from the accident. The foregoing also remains applicable, when the driver of the vehicle intentionally caused the damage. All types of damage to property are expressly excluded from the ambit of the provision, (exceptions: prostheses and other similar aids [wheelchairs, guidedogs, baby seats: Simoens, RW 2000-01, 1577, 1584, no. 27]) and damage to the clothes of the injured parties as well as bodily injury suffered by the driver of the vehicle which was implicated in the accident, furthermore personal injury suffered by victimes who are older than 14 and who intentionally caused the accident is also exempted (loc. cit. art. 29bis § 1(6)). The term “motor vehicle” denotes all véhicules destinés à circuler sur le sol et qui peuvent être actionnés par une force mécanique sans être liés à une voie ferrée (loc. cit. art. 1). Motorised vehicles are placed in the same bracket as trailers, in so far as they meet the standards of the appropriate royal decree and were designed to transport persons or things. Motorised wheelchairs are not embraced by the term motorised vehicles (loc. cit. art. 29bis § 3). Under art. 29bis § 1(2) owners of track bound vehicles are also liable. In every case where a collision occurs, the relevant vehicle is “involved” in an accident. If the victim does not come into contact with the other party’s vehicle, it must be proved that this vehicle played a role of some type in causing the accident (Simoens loc. cit. 1580, no. 15). Only traffic accidents occurring on public streets or in areas which are either freely accessible to the public or to a certain number of indivduals fall within the scope of the application of the statute (loc. cit. art. 2 § 1 in conjunction with art. 29bis §1(1)). The driver excepted, claims can be asserted by all victims and their descendents (loc. cit. art. 29bis § 2; see also for an analysis of the concept of “driver” Simoens loc. cit. no. 21 p. 1582); Drivers can only acquire compensation, if two requirements are met, namely that they are the descendant of the victim and did not intentionally cause the damage. If the damage resulting is not dealt with by the provisions of the statute, it can be recovered under the general civil law precepts (loc. cit. art. 29bis § 5); this particularly concerns damage to property and the personal injury claims of the driver. SPANISH Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act art. 1(1) provides that “the driver of motor vehicles is liable, by virtue of the risk created by their driving, for the damage caused to persons or to property in the course of traffic”. In so far as bodily injury and death are concerned, liability is strict for the realisation of the risk that is linked with the use of a motor vehicle (Díez-Picazo and Gullón, Sistema II9, 574); in contrast, damage to property remains subject to the general regime of art. 1902 of the CC (Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act art. 1(1) and (2)). The scope of application of the Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act is governed by the concepts ‘fact of traffic’ (hecho de la circulación) and ‘motor vehicle’ (vehículo a motor). Road Traffic Liability Regulations (Real Decreto 1507/2008) art. 2 provides that a hecho de la circulación is every fact occurring as a consequence of the risk created by the driving of motor vehicles, including those occurring in garages and car parks, and no matter whether they happen on a public or private road. No such hechos are: (i) accidents occurring in sport competitions and on circuits specially designed or adapted for such use; (ii) accidents occurring in the course of industrial or agricultural activities, unless they happen on a road; and (iii) the use of a motor vehicle as an instrument to commit an intentional crime. The definition of a “motor vehicle” in Road Traffic Liability Regulations art. 1 is based on Directive 72/166 / EEC. Damage which ensues from

Article 3:205: Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles

4.

exposure to farm machinery does not connote a traffic accident (TS 10 February 1998, RAJ 1998 (1) no. 752 p. 1178; TS 7 May 1998, RAJ 1998 (2) no. 3238 p. 4723) nor does carbon monoxide posisoning of children in a garage (TS 4 July 2002, RAJ 2002 (4) no. 5900 p. 10483). According to the Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act art. 1(1) liability is imposed on the driver. Loc. cit. art. 5(1)(i), however, provides that along with the driver, the owner of the vehicle shall also be strictly liable, if the driver, in the sense of CP art. 120(5), is an employee of the owner and commits a criminal act (see further Gómez Calle, Los sujetos de la responsabilidad civil3, 524). If the conduct of the employee which causes damage does not amount to a criminal act, the liability of the owner is based on CC art. 1903 (Díez-Picazo, Derecho de daños, 130; Roca i Trias, Derecho de daños3, 247). Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act art. 5(1)(i in fine) provides that the liability of the owner shall cease if the owner proves that he or she acted as buen padre de familia to prevent the damage. This provision accords with CC art. 1903, but not with the CP, which provides for strict liability which is subsidiary. At this juncture it cannot be conclusively asserted, how this tension is to be resolved (see further Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 294 and Gómez Calle loc. cit. 525-527). There are no statutory regulations pertaining to the liability of the custodian; this state of affairs has been frequently criticised (Reglero Campos, Responsabilidad civil, 913). TS 30 December 1992, RAJ 1992 (5) no. 10565 p. 13807 refused to find a company liable, where the company had placed a company car at the disposal of an employee. The employee, for his part, permitted his son to use the car (without the permission of the company); the son caused a traffic accident; the company was not liable, owing to the fact that it did not have any control over the use of the car. Liability under the Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act is curtailed by force majeure and fault on the part of the victim (art. 1(1)(ii)); caso fortuito is not admitted as defence (TS 22 December 1992, RAJ 1992 (5) no. 10639 p. 13873; TS 17 November 1989, RAJ 1989 (6) no. 7889 p. 9187; TS 8 February 1992, RAJ 1992 (1) no. 1198 p. 1516). Contributory negligence on the part of the victim leads to the exclusion of liability if it was the sole cause of the accident; in other cases it leads to an appropriate reduction in the award of damages (loc. cit. art. 1(1)(iv)). Under the ITALIAN CC art. 2054(1) “the driver of a vehicle which is not track bound ... ... is obliged to compensate loss accruing to persons or property caused by placing the vehicle into traffic circulation, unless he or she can prove that he or she did everything in his or her power to avoid the damage”. Passengers in the vehicle may also assert a claim for compensation, independent of inquiry into the reason as to their carriage. In respect of transport for a fee, contractual claims (CC art. 1681) compete with extra contractual liability. A “vehicle” denotes every machine in circulation on public streets or their equivalent, which is capable of transporting persons or property. It can be mechanically propelled or propelled by animals and human power. All types of bicycles and trolleybuses are therefore “vehicles” Art (Cass. 7 January 1991, no. 57, Giust.civ.Mass. 1991, fasc. 1), however motorised wheelchairs and skis are not encompassed by this term (Cass. 30 July 1987, no. 6603, Arch.Giur.circolaz. 1988, 863). The term “circulation” is understood to mean driving, being stationary in traffic and parking (Cass. 5 July 2004, no. 12284, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, fasc. 7; Cass. 28 November 1990, no. 11467, Giust.civ.Mass. 1990, fasc. 11; Cass. 24 July 1987, no. 6445, Riv.giur.circ.trasp. 1988, 100; Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, 647-648), vehicles on the areas designed for use by public transport, also if these are owned privately (Cass. 3 February 1987, no. 965,

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5.

710

Giust.civ.Mass. 1987, fasc. 2). Whether liability under CC art. 2054(1) is based on a presumption of fault (according to Monateri, Manuale della responsabilità civile, 433438; cf. also de Cupis, Il danno I, 208) or must be constued as being strict (Franzoni loc. cit. 668-669; Visintini, Trattato breve della responsabilità civile, 681), remains theroretically contentious. The courts rely on the non-avoidability of the event causing the accident as providing a basis for exoneration from liability (Cass. 7 August 2000, no. 10352, Giust.civ.Mass. 2000, 1732). According to CC art. 2054(2), in the case where two vehicles collide, unless proved otherwise, it is presumed that each driver contributed to the same extent to the damage caused to the individual vehicles. According to the Corte Cost. 29 December 1972, no. 205, Giur.it. 1973, I, 1, 708; Foro it. 1973, I, 1 the provision remains operative, if one of the vehicles implicated in the accident is in itself not damaged. In practice, CC art. 2054(2) for the most part boils down tot he result that each of the drivers concerned must bear half of the damage caused by another (Monateri loc. cit. 441). CC art. 2054(3) provides that the owner of the car or the holder of a usufructuary right or the hire purchaser are jointly and severally liable with the driver, unless they can prove that the vehicle was used ahgainst his or her will. The exact legal nature of this provision is contentious (see further Visintini loc. cit. 684). The ability to adduce exculpatory evidence is subject to stringent criteria (Cass. 21 June 2004, no. 11471, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, fasc. 6: proof of theft alone will not suffice). A person who leaves his car in a company’s custody is relieved of liability (Cass. 27 January 1995, no. 981, Giust.civ.Mass. 1995, 198; Cass. 29 August 1987, no. 7118, Giust.civ.Mass. 1987, fasc. 8-9). Finally, CC art. 2054(4) imposes strict liability on drivers, owners and on other persons enumerated in CC art. 2054(3) in the event that the accident was caused by a manufacturing or maintenance defect in the vehicle. Only proof that there was no causal nexus between the defect and the accident will exclude lthe attribution of liability (Cass. 9 March 2004, no. 4755, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, fasc. 3; Visintini loc. cit. 686). In HUNGARY, liability for damage caused by motor vehicles is dealt with under the extremely comprehensive regime of strict liability for dangerous activities (CC § 345(1)); only proof that the damage occurred for an unavoidable reason, unconnected with the dangerous activity can provide relief from liability (e. g. natural phenomenon; also inevitable damage caused by animals). Contributory negligence on the part of the victim will be taken account of and will lead to the abridgment of the claim for compensation (para. (2)), a contractual disclaimer of liability will in principle be disregarded (para. (3)). For example, a defective tyre which could not have been forseen or a sudden indisposition of the driver are deemed to be connected with the dangerous activity (Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1263-1268; Petrik (-Wellmann), Polgári jog II2, 590-592), no longer in contrast the explosion of a bomb which was placed on the defendant’s bus by a third party and detonated (BH 2000/200). A parked car does not partake in traffic and therefore does not signify a hazardous activity; the same holds true for a bus which stopped and was waiting at a bus stop in accordance with its timetable, however the opposite conclusion was drawn in the case of a car stopped at a traffic light, even when the engine was turned off (Benedek loc. cit. 1245-1246; Wellmann loc. cit. 586-587). The keeper is deemed to exercise the dangerous activity; the driver is only liable under the general civil law precepts. Ownership and registration merely serve as indicators as to the existence of custodianship. It is possible to have more than one keeper (e. g. married couple who both use the vehicle); permis-

Article 3:205: Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles

6.

sion use of the vehicle temporarily does not alter the custodianship (Benedek loc. cit. 1250-1253, 1255; Wellmann loc. cit. 587-590). As regards the convergence of “danagerous activities”, typically therefore the collosion of vehicles, liability based on a presumption of fault according to the general rules governing liability are applicable in the stead of strict liability (CC § 346(1)). In the absence of fault of both sides if an “irregularity” is ascertained in one of the vehicles, liability is imposed solely on the keeper of this vehicle (CC § 346(2)). Examples under this rubric include the sudden indisposition of the driver, the unforeseeable flat tyre, the dispersal of a stone which hits another car (EBH 1999/99; BH 2000/348) and the sudden swerve to avoid hitting an animal of one of the vehicles involved in the accident (BH 2003/500). If such an irregularity is attributable to both parties or is lacking on both sides and each party can exculpate itself, each party is responsible for its own loss (CC § 346(3)). In relation to accidents involving passengers, the strict liability regime under extra contractual liability is employed in practice, even when the accident is the result of a violation of contractual obligations, unless a special regulation is applicable (Benedek loc. cit. 1280-1281). The proposed new Hungarian Civil Code envisages that the regime of liability pertaining to dangerous substances will remain for the foreseeable future essentially in situ (http://ww w.parlament.hu/irom38/05949/05949.pdf). POLISH CC art. 436 governs liability for damage caused by the movement of a “mechanical means of conveyance”. Liability is strict and is primarily imposed on the independent possessor; if the means of conveyance is transferred to a dependent possessor, the dependent possessor is liable (CC art. 436 § 1 second sentence). The existence of a causal nexus between the use of the means of transport and the resulting damage is all that is required (CC art. 361; see Supreme Court 28 December 1981, IV CR 465/81, OSNCP 1982, nos. 5-6, poz. 88; Pietrzykowski (-Safjan), Kodeks cywilny I4, art. 436, no. 12). According to prevailing legal opinion, the concept of “conveyance” comprehends the entering and alighting from the vehicle as well as stopping on the way (Supreme Court 14 April 1975, II CR 114/75, OSNCP 1976, no. 2, poz. 37). A car crashed in a car accident is in the movement in the legal sense as long as it remains on the public road (SN 7 April 2005, LEX no. 151656; Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛s´c´ ogólna7, 236). The term “means of conveyance” embraces all vehicles which are propelled by an engine, therefore the term denotes not only cars but also aeroplanes, motorboats, street trams and motorbikes etc (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak loc. cit. 234). Proof of force majeure as well as exclusive fault on the party of the person who suffered damage or of a third party, the exception being where the possessor of the vehicle is responsible for the third party, operates to exclude the imposition of liability (CC art. 435 § 1 in fine in conjunction with. CC art. 436 § 1). The liability regime reverts back to liability based on fault in two instances, namely: in the case of collision between mechanical means of conveyance and in the circumstances where a person is conveyed as a courtesy (CC art. 436 § 2). However, driving into a stationary vehicle does not connote a “collision” under the statutory provision (Supreme Court 4 March 1958, 1 CR 154/56, OSPiKA 1959, no. 10, poz. 257; Safjan loc. cit. art. 436, no. 24). The possessor is accountable also for damage caused to the car driver (Czachórski, Zobowia˛zania10, 288). Particularities pertaining to liability insurance can be found in Compulsory Insurance, Guarantee Fund and Polish Office of Traffic Insurance Act (Dz. U. no. 124 poz. 1152 as amended).

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7.

8.

712

SLOVENIAN LOA § 150 establishes strict liability for keepers of all types of dangerous

objects; a rebuttable presumption exists in respect of their potential to cause damage (LOA § 149). An individual who steals a dangeous object (e. g. a car), is liable in the stead of the keeper, provided that the latter was not at fault as far as the theft is concerned (LOA § 151). Cases involving the collision of vehicles are the subject of a standalone regulation (LOA § 154). It amounts to a liability based on fault, proportionate to the number of keepers involved; if there is an absence of fault, then each party is liable, in principle, for the half of the total loss. According to BULGARIAN law, the driver of a motor vehicle is liable if he is at fault in causing the accident (LOA art. 45(1)). If the driver was e. g. employed at a transport company or as a chauffeur, the employer is also liable (LOA art. 49; Burov, Grajdanska otgovornost za vredi, prichineni pri avtomobilna zlopoluka, 35).The owner and the keeper of the motor vehicle are jointly and severally liable for damage resulting from a hidden defect in the motor vehicle (an unforeseen failure of the brakes) which can not be attributed to the fault of the driver (LOA art. 50). The differences between the two liability regimes are, of course, minor, owing to the fact that liability under LOA art. 45(1) is constructed as liability based on a presumption of fault (LOA art. 45(2)); where the distinctions exist, they only become relevant if the vehicle is owned by the driver. If the driver is simultaneously the owner and the accident can be attributed to fault on his part, then if there is more than one owner of the same vehicle, they will not be liable for the ensuing loss. The liability will not be imposed on the owner, if the accident can be attrbuted to force majeure, to the exclusive fault of the person who has suffered damage or to the third party intervention (e. g. theft) (Decree no. 7 of the Supreme Court of 30 December 1959, Plenum, no. 10). GERMANY has constructed the liability for damage caused by the operation of motor vehicles in the Road Traffic Act (Straßenverkehrsgesetz, StVG) § 7 in the form of a strict liability imposed on the registered user of the vehicle. Liability is based on the special danger present for other users in motorised traffic which inheres in every vehicle, regardless of the circumstances of the individual case (Greger, Haftungsrecht des Straßenverkehrs3, § 7, no. 2). This liability is also imposed on the keeper of a trailer which is designed to be carried along by a motor vehicle. According to StVG § 1(2) “motor vehicles” are all land motorised vehicle propelled by engine power, with the exception of vehicles running on tracks. The vehicle must be capable of reaching a minimum speed of 20 km/h (StVG § 8). The “user” of the vehicle is assessed not predominantly by legal means but also by assessing factual and financial circumstances. A user connotes a person who uses the motor vehicle or trailer on his own account and who, in addition, exerts the factual control with is connected with the use of the vehicle (BGH 3 December 1991, NJW 1992, 900, 902). Ownership serves as an indicator for the custodianship, but not a required element (Geigel (-Rixecker), Der Haftpflichtprozess24, chap. 25, no. 36 p. 863; Hentschel (-Hentschel), Straßenverkehrsrecht37, § 7, no. 14). If a father donates to a child a Go kart with the capacity to achieve 40 km/h, despite the change in ownership, the father remains the keeper of the go-cart if he solely continues to exert power of disposal, bears all running costs associated with the operation of a gocart and determines when the go-cart can be used (CA Koblenz 26 April 2004, NJW-RR 2004, 822). Liability is triggered, if, in the course of operating the vehicle, a person is killed, or personal injury, damage to health, or damage to property ensues (StVG § 7(1)). A motor vehicle is “in operation” when it is used in the area of public traffic.

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9.

The “operation” begins when the engine is started up and finishes once the motor is turned off outside the area of public traffic (Hentschel loc. cit. no. 5). Operating the vehicle must have caused the loss which resulted. Liability is precluded when the damage results from force majeure (StVG § 7(2)). “Force majeure” denotes an extraordinary external event, which is caused by a supervening natural event or by the actions of third parties (external) and which, according to human perceptions and experience amounts to an unavoidable event. This event cannot neither be avoided by exercise of the utmost care to be expected under the circumstances and employing commercially viable means nor could be predicated on the basis of its frequency of occurrence (Hentschel loc. cit. no. 32). Liability of the keeper is excluded, if a third party uses the vehicle without the knowledge and permission of the keeper. The unauthorised person using the vehicle is is liable instead of the keeper. The keeper is liable in conjunction with the unauthorised user, if it was the fault of the keeper that the unauthorised person could use the vehicle (StVG § 7(3)). However, the keeper remains liable if the user if the vehicle is an employee or if he gave the vehicle to the user. The liability of the keeper is restricted in amount (StVG §§ 12, 12a and 12b), but it also encompasses non-pecuniary loss (StVG § 11 sent. 2). Damage, resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle, is subject to the provisions of the AUSTRIAN Traffic Liability Act (EKHG) § 5 which provides for a strict liability in respect of keepers. It also encompasses damage which occurs upon entering and alighting, dangerous parking or is caused by a leakage of oil. A keeper is not liable to those persons, who use the motor vehicle without the permission of the keeper (loc. cit. § 6), and no liability exists in respect of individuals who are employed to operate the motor vehicle (loc. cit. § 3(1)). Keeper denotes anyone, who, at the time of the accident, used the vehicle for his advantage and had the ability to avert the danger. Ownership merely serves as an indicator of custodianship, it is not however a prerequisite (the hire purchaser, in particular, is a keeper). In conjunction with the keeper, his or her insurer is jointly and severally liable (Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance Act § 26), the person who has suffered loss may make a direct claim against the insurer. The concept “motor vehicles” denotes all vehicle powered by an engine which can attain a speed greater than 10 km/h (therefore e. g. snow groomers are not emcompassed by the concept: Barta, Zivilrecht II2, 639) and can be regarded as road vehicles (for these grounds e. g. lawnmowers are not subject to the strict liability regime: OGH 19 December 1996, ZVR 1998/18 p. 47). Liability is excluded, when the cause of the accident has its roots in an unavoidable event (EKHG § 9(1)), therefore e. g. in the conduct of the person who has suffered damage (person committing suicide), caused by a third party or an animal (loc. cit. § 9(2)). The driver must exercise all due diligence according to the circumstances of the case. The prerequisites of the EKHG § 9 were not established where e. g. the mistake on the driver’s part resulted from an insect sting to the eye (OGH 30 September 1965, ZVR 1966/87 p. 104). Furthermore, a sudden unconsciousness of the driver does not lead to exculpation from liability because the classification as an unavoidable event must be triggered by an external influence (OGH 30 March 1978, SZ 49/20). The sphere of legally relevant damage corresponds to the rule contained in Article 3:205. Disclaimers of liability are inoperative. However, there are limits placed on the compensation that can be awarded (loc. cit. §§ 15 and 16); in respect of the loss which exceeds these limits, it may be recoverable under the general liability regime under the CC (EKHG § 19).

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GREEK Road Traffic Liability Act (Law of 4/5 December 1911 on the criminal and civil liability in respect of motor vehicles) introduced at an early stage a strict liability regime for damage caused by motor vehicles (Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio I, 688; Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 674). Liability is imposed on the driver, the owner (provided he is not the keeper but in this case only up to the extent of value of the motor vehicle: loc. cit. art. 4) and the keeper. The term “keeper” denotes a person who, at the time of the accident, was the owner of the vehicle or who held the vehicle under a contract and used it in his own name. Furthermore the term encompasses every person who without permission acquires possession of the motor vehicle and uses it in some manner (loc. cit. art. 2(2)). A person who rents out a motor vehicle for commercial purposes, is or remains the keeper of that vehicle (Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio I, 690; A. P. 3/1987, NoB 36 [1988] 71); the property law notion of possession is not decisive (A. P. 558/1990, EllDik 1990, 1000). An employee who uses the vehicle in the course of his employment is not the keeper of the vehicle (A. P. 682/1983, NoB 32 [1984] 276). “Motor vehicles” also connote according to the definition contained in the Road Traffic Liability Act art. 2(1) motorbikes, mopeds and tracked vehicles (Georgiades loc. cit. 689). The Act does not apply to military or emergency response vehicles. Only “third parties” are entitled to assert a claim, i. e. individuals who were not in the vehicle (Georgiades loc. cit. 689); an exception is carved out for bus passengers (Act 48441/1930 art. 45). Damage can be caused “while the vehicle is in operation” when the engine is switched off. Liability can be avoided once proof of “force majeure” (for an analysis of this concept see Georgiades loc. cit. 693 and CA Thessaloniki 274/1980, Arm 34 [1981] 462) and fault of a third party is adduced (Road Traffic Liability Act art. 5). In respect of the victim’s contributory negligence, today only CC art. 300 remains a point of reference and can effect a reduction in the extent of liability. However, the fact of the victim’s contributory negligence does not lead to an automatic exclusion of liability (as was orginally envisaged by the Road Traffic Liability Act) (Kornilakis, I evthini apo diakindinevsi, 174; Livanis, I efarmogi tou arthrou 300 is to pedion tis antikimenikis evthinis, 140; Georgiades loc. cit. 693). However, it will be presumed that the person who suffered injury was partly at fault, if the driver, unlike the injured party adhered to the rules of the Road Traffic Liability Act (Road Traffic Liability Act art. 50); if the injured party bases his claim on CC art. 914, this presumption does not apply (A. P. 1618/1987, EllDik 1988, 1375). The driver can exonerate himself by proving that the accident was caused by a defect in the motor vehicle which he could not have discovered (Road Traffic Liability Act art. 5(2)). The extent of damages to be awarded is limited to a “reasonable amount of compensation”. In measuring the amount of compensation to be awarded, assessment of fault is of paramount consideration (loc. cit. art. 9; see further Georgiades loc. cit. 691). According to these principles, non-pecuniary loss is also recoverable (CA Patras 257/1984, NoB 32 [1984] 1567; A. P. 516/1967, NoB 16 [1968] 94; A. P. 997/1983, NoB 32 [1984] 649). Damage which results from the collision of vehicles cannot be recovered; in such a case, the mutual claims of the drivers fall to be dealt with under the general provisions pertaining to liability based on fault (loc. cit. art. 10). Meanwhile, the objective liability of the owner and keeper remains untouched by this (CA Athens 1019/1988, EllDik 1990, 360; CA Athens 11768/1986, EllDik 1987, 1338; A. P. 683/ 1983, NoB 32 [1984] 276). According to the PORTUGUESE CC art. 503(1) strict liability for the damage caused to “land bound vehicles” is imposed on the person who holds the effective control (direcção

Article 3:205: Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles

12.

13.

efectiva) over the vehicle and uses the vehicle for his own benefit. even if this person is merely an employee (commissário). Liability may also lie with the keeper of the vehicle (Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 656; Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, 513; Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 578; STJ 12 May 2005), however not necessarily with the owner (STJ 9 July 1998). CC art. 503(1) is applicable to all types of land bound vehicles and also applies to track bound vehicles (STJ 18 May 2006; STJ 27 June 2002; STJ 5 February 1971, BolMinJus 204 [1971] 138) and also to vehicles without a motor, for examples bicycles (Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 90 (1959) 102). Only damage, (economic and non-pecuniary: CA Oporto 14 September 2006; STJ 17 March 2005; CA Lisbon 17 November 2005), which “emanantes from a danger inherent in the vehicle even if this vehicle was not involved in traffic”. It is irrelevant whether the accident occurred on public or private terrain (Antunes Varela loc. cit. 667; Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela loc. cit. 514; CA Oporto 11 April 2005; STJ 26 April 1974, BolMinJus 236 [1974] 147). According to the DUTCH Road Traffic Act (Wegenverkeerswet of 1994 as amended) art. 185 strict liability is similarly imposed, in the first instance on the keeper; the owner becomes liable only in the event that there is no keeper of the motor vehicle. Liability is attched to “motor vehicles driven on a public road”. The damage that is recoverable is that which results from a traffic accident to the prejudice of a person or property which was not transported in the vehicle itself. According to the Road Traffic Act art. 1 a motor vehicle is defined as “any vehicle intended to be moved, other than on rails, propelled totally or partially by mechanical power on or in the vehicle itself or by electrical traction with power supplied from elsewhere”. Consequently, damaged vehicles being towed for repairs are encompassed by this term (HR 14 December 1965, NedJur 1966 no. 360 p. 966) as well as mopeds; however, bicycles are excluded from the scope of application, as are (Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht III12, no. 215 p. 235) switched off vehicles, which are not running. The concept of “traffic accident” no longer requires a collision to occur (the position was otherwise under an earlier law, see for comparison in so far as relevant HR 4 February 1937, NedJur 1937 no. 489 p. 659); e. g. it suffices that a vehicle catches fire or that the vehicle takes a wrong turn thereby so discomfiting a cyclist that he falls (see further van Dam, VR 2005, 301). Injury to passengers of the vehicle is only recoverable under the general rules, i. e. under CC arts. 6:162, 6:170 and under contractual law provision; in respect of persons who were conveyed out of courtesy, further limitations on liability have been debated and their adoption has even been deemed imperative (see further Onrechtmatige Daad III (-Bouman), no. 221 p. 46; HR 3 December 1971, NedJur 1972 no. 144 p. 433; HR 11 April 1975, NedJur 1975 no. 373 p. 1131), it has been suggested that CC art. 6:109 (reduction of liability on the basis of fairness and equity: Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12 no. 429 p. 358) should be applied. No liability exists in resepect of “stowaways” (HR 27 January 1984, NedJur 1984 no. 536 p. 1855). Liability is excluded in a case of force majeure. CA Arnhem 4 April 2006, VR 2006 no. 107 p. 253 affirmed the existence of force majeure in a case where the driver of a recumbent bike, who drove directly in front of the vehicle of the defendant, thereby in disregard of the rules on who had the right of way. Similarly ESTONIA has constructed liability for damage caused by motor vehicles along the line of strict liability. According to LOA § 1057 liability is imposed on the “direct possessor” of the vehicle. However, strict liability can also be imposed for damage caused

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by a motor vehicle under LOA § 1056, which applies in respect of all things constituting “a major source of danger” (Supreme Court 3-2-1-48-06, RT III 2006, 25, 228). The extent of damage recoverable is ascertainable according to the regulation anchored in Article 3:205 (LOA § 1056(1)). The concept of “motor vehicle” is defined by the Estonian Traffic Act § 12, according to which a motor vehicle is a vehicle powered by an engine. Motor assisted cycles, mopeds and power-driven rail-borne vehicles are not deemed to be power-driven vehicles. In the NORDIC COUNTRIES compulsory insurance schemes provide compensation regardless of whether or not a natural or legal person is liable for the accident. If such a liability exists, while the injured party can proceed directly against the the person responsible for the causing the loss, this way of proceeding is not compulsory. Consequently, in practice, the latter claim is rarely asserted. In a similar manner to all cognate Nordic Acts, the SWEDISH Traffic Damages Act (Trafikskadelag) permits the person who has suffered damage to claim traffic insurance compensation for personal injury and property damage directly from the other party’s insurer, independent of any investigation into liability (see further Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 279-282). An insurer, who has compensated the victim of a traffic accident has a right of recourse agsinst the person who caused the damage, provided that this person was at least negligent in causing the accident. The amount of compensation obtainable under the scheme of traffic insurance is constructed along the lines of general laws pertaining to liability, i. e. according to the provisions of the Damages Liability Act. The prerequisite for claiming traffic insurance compensation is, namely, that the damage was “caused in the course of traffic involving a motor vehicle”. “In the course of traffic” has been given a broad interpretation; even an accident occurring in a repair shop (CA for Skåne och Blekinge 4 May 1961, NJA 1962, 172), an injury to a front-seat passenger by the hurried slammed closure of the front door of the car by the driver (HD 29 April 1988, NJA 1988, 221) and loss of balance while alighting from the vehicle (HD 15 November 1974, NJA 1974, 616) are embraced by this term (see for further examples Nordenson, Trafikskadeersättning, 579). Drivers, passengers, pedestrians and cyclists are entitled to assert a claim for damages in personal injury cases, even in cases where they were negligent; this claim can only be reduced in cases of contributory gross negligence (intention, gross negligence) (Traffic Damages Act §§ 10-12). Compensation for damaging the motor vehicle of another and the load transported on it will only be granted under traffic insurance, if the driver of the vehicle which caused the damage conducted himself in a negligent manner (loc. cit. §§ 10-11). The traffic insurance will not compensate damage to the insured person’s vehicle. In contrast, damage to the property of other individuals involved (e. g. cyclists) is recoverable, irrespective of whether the driver was at fault; the claim will be reduced correspondingly if the person who suffered damage has contributed negligently to his damage (loc. cit. § 12). DANISH Traffic Act (Færdselslov) § 101 provides for a strict liability for personal injury, loss of maintenance and loss resulting from property damage caused by motor vehicles from a traffic accident, explosion or fire. Liability is on the owner (ejer) or, if he shows that another person used it, on the user of the motor vehicle (loc. cit. § 104; see in more detail von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 163). However, Traffic Act § 105 provides for compulsory insurance, under which the injured party may seek compensation directly from the insurer (loc. cit. § 108), regardless of whether or not the person causing the damage paid the insurance premium (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 155). Injury and other dam-

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15.

age to the policyholder himself or herself are excluded from the insurance cover (HD 1 September 1998, UfR 1998, 1626; HD 15 November 2003, UfR 2003, 339), unless they are caused by a collision with another motor vehicle. In the latter case any damage to the owner, user or driver is to be compensated under the basic rule in Traffic Act § 101 which requires that the damage resulted from the “use” (see on this notion HD 9 August 2002, UfR 2002, 2432) of a motor vehicle. Furthermore, according to loc. cit. § 101 the damage has to be caused on a road for public use, and must be the consequence of a traffic accident, an explosion or fire. The notion of “traffic accident” is a very broad concept. It covers, for example, damage caused by objects which fall from the vehicle and hit other road users following behind (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 161). If the prerequisites of loc. cit. § 101 are not satisfied, then the liability of the person reseponsible for the vehicle is governed by the general culpa rule (loc. cit. § 102). The “person responsible for the vehicle” is the owner or user; the liability os the driver remains unaffected by this and is, likewise, governed by the general culpa rule (loc. cit. § 104). FINNISH Traffic Insurance Act (Trafikförsäkringslag) § 1 provides that a personal injury or a loss resulting from property damage, suffered in the course of using a motor vehicle in traffic, shall be compensated from the traffic insurance of the vehicle. The vehicle’s owner or permanent user is obliged to insure the vehicle (loc. cit. § 15). Compensation is awarded in accordance with the rules of the Damages Liability Act (loc. cit. § 6). The party suffering the loss or injury thus has a direct claim on the insurance company, regardless of another person’s liability (loc. cit. §§ 4 and 11). Compensation is also awarded even if there is no valid insurance contract, except for losses or injuries caused by the owner or driver to him- or herself (loc. cit. § 10). A right to claim damages from the owner, driver or passenger who caused the damage is available on the basis of the general culpa rule, if the insurance company may deny compensation (loc. cit. § 12). Personal injuries of the policyholder caused to him- or herself are covered by the compulsory insurance, but not property damage (loc. cit. § 5; see Supreme Court, HD 1976 II 10). Personal injury compensation can be adjusted in cases of contributory gross negligence, and be excluded in cases of illegal use of the vehicle or driving under severe influence of alcohol or drugs. The vehicle need not be in motion (Supreme Court 1990:159) but must be on a public road at the time of the accident (Supreme Court 1991:169; Hakulinen, Obligationsrätt, 309). Damage caused during car repairs are excluded (loc. cit. § 2). In ENGLAND liability for injury or damage caused by motor vehicles in traffic accidents is governed by the general rules of the tort of negligence and thus turns on establishing a breach of the duty of care to other road users: see generally Charlesworth and Percy (-Cooper), Negligence11, para. 9-186 et. seq. Non-compliance with a rule set out in road traffic regulations resulting in damage may be evidence of negligence, but almost invariably it will not ground an action for breach of statutory duty since the duties owed under the regulations are public, enforceable by fines or other punishments provided for in the road traffic legislation itself, and not enforceable by civil remedies by individual road users: Phillips v. Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co. Ltd [1923] 2 KB 832; Clarke v. Brims [1947] KB 497; Coote v. Stone [1971] 1 WLR 279.

Illustration 1 is taken from CA The Hague 11 April 1984, VR 1990 no. 44 p. 74; illustration 2 from BH 2000/349; illustration 3 from CFI Mechelen 10 May 2006, RW 2006-2007, 732, note Vandeplas; and illustration 4 from STJ 11 October 2005.

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Article 3:206: Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions (1) A keeper of a substance or an operator of an installation is accountable for the causation by that substance or by emissions from that installation of personal injury and consequential loss, loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death), loss resulting from property damage, and burdens within Article 2:209 (Burdens incurred by the State upon environmental impairment), if: (a) having regard to their quantity and attributes, at the time of the emission, or, failing an emission, at the time of contact with the substance it is very likely that the substance or emission will cause such damage unless adequately controlled; and (b) the damage results from the realisation of that danger. (2) “Substance” includes chemicals (whether solid, liquid or gaseous). Microorganisms are to be treated like substances. (3) “Emission” includes: (a) the release or escape of substances; (b) the conduction of electricity; (c) heat, light and other radiation; (d) noise and other vibrations; and (e) other incorporeal impact on the environment. (4) “Installation” includes a mobile installation and an installation under construction or not in use. (5) However, a person is not accountable for the causation of damage under this Article if that person: (a) does not keep the substance or operate the installation for purposes related to that person’s trade, business or profession; or (b) shows that there was no failure to comply with statutory standards of control of the substance or management of the installation.

Comments A.

A strict regime for environmental liability

1. Structure of the regime. This Article relates to liability for damage arising from dangerous substances or emissions. The provision establishes a strict environmental liability for businesses (paragraph (5)(a)). Paragraphs (1) and (5) clarify the ground of accountability, while paragraphs (2)-(4) add clarity as regards certain concepts which are invoked by paragraph (1): substance, emission, and installation. 2. Relationship to Article 2:209 (Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment). Article 2:209 (Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment) only regulates the question of what constitutes a legally relevant damage (of the state) in the circumstances set out there. It says nothing about the ground of liability or accountability. The latter aspect, even in relation to the “pure ecological damage” detailed in Article 2:209 (Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment), is only taken up in the present Article. 718

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Illustration 1 Cyanide which has been used in the process of extracting gold escapes from a gold mine. A major river is polluted; an entire region suffers ecological damage. The State concerned may demand reparation from the business operating the mine by virtue of Article 3:206 and, if the infringement of safety and maintenance rules can be established, Article 2:209 (Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment) in conjunction with Article 3:102 (Negligence). 3. Legally relevant damage. Apart from this “pure ecological damage”, only injury to the body or health of an individual, detriments sustained by that individual’s relatives, and losses consequential to property damage are legally relevant in the context of the strict liability under the present Article. All other forms of damage are legally relevant only on the basis of liability for intention or negligence or in the context of national law (Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage) subparagraph (b)). The contamination of land by emissions amounts to property damage sustained by the owner. Illustration 2 Fluorine used in the processing of bauxite leaks from an aluminium plant. The toxic substance pollutes the surrounding agricultural estates, which as a result of the emission lose 90 % of their earning potential. The company operating the plant is liable to the farmers for this damage independently of whether they can show that it was negligent in controlling the chemicals. Illustration 3 Clouds of dark foul-smelling particles escape from a factory and settle on the roofs of houses in the locality. This is property damage for which there is strict liability under Article 3:206. 4. Policy considerations. The Article is based on the observation that the predominant number by far of the EU Member States have shaped the core of environmental liability within private law – liability for injury to health and damage to property as a result of impairment of the ecosystem – in terms of strict liability. However, there still exist such substantial differences in detail between the national legal systems that it did not seem either sensible or indeed possible to formulate the rule in the manner of a proposal for maximum harmonisation. This Article therefore confines itself to expressing what, according to the appraisal of the comparative legal survey of the laws of the Member States, proved to be the “common denominator” of the preponderant number of the EU’s legal systems. Those marginal areas which do not lie within this intersection thus remain to be dealt with by reference to the applicable national law (Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage) sub-paragraph (b)). Illustration 4 A large accident occurs at a chemical plant, as a result of which steam containing dioxins is released into the atmosphere. The local population has to keep windows and doors closed and cannot leave their homes for 36 hours. Under these rules the restriction on freedom of movement for the individuals affected which has been 719

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caused by the air pollution is only a legally relevant damage (Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy) paragraph (1)) if the operator of the chemical plant can be shown to have been negligent or if the applicable law provides for a strict liability for infringements of liberty. Illustration 5 Following a fire at a business’s warehouse, substances containing oil mix with the water used to extinguish the fire and flow into the nearby river. A few kilometres downstream company X operates open air swimming baths, which it is forced to close for several days. X sustains a loss of income, but no property damage. The question whether such a “pure economic loss” falls within the protection of a strict regime of environmental liability is determined exclusively by national law (Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage)); under these rules X does not suffer legally relevant damage which is caught by the strict liability envisaged in Article 3:206.

B.

The persons liable

5. Keeper of a substance and operator of an installation. Liability under Article 3:206 attaches to persons who independently exercise control over a substance or an installation, i. e. to the “keeper” of a substance and the “operator” of an installation. The “keeper” of a substance is liable for damage which is caused by the substance; the “operator” of an installation is liable for emissions. The concept of “keeper” follows the general rules. The term “operator” (Betreiber) designates the person (as a rule, a legal person) to whose business assets the installation belongs. 6. Private use excluded (paragraph (5)(a)). Liability does not arise under paragraph (1) if the relevant person does not keep the substance or operate the installation for purposes related to that person’s trade, business or profession (paragraph (5)(a)). An owner-operator’s private oil tank constitutes an “installation”, but strict liability by reason of Article 3:206 is not imposed on the owner-operator. Depending on their properties, pills and other medicines may be dangerous substances within the meaning of paragraph (1) and the same may be true of chemicals which are used for household cleaning or weed control. A general strict liability in such cases does not seem appropriate; it ought to arise only in respect of industrial production or commercial storage of these or similar chemicals, not least because in such cases entirely different quantities are involved. However, private individuals are subject to a particular duty of care if they possess or operate substances or installations of the type referred to in this Article. Moreover, the more dangerous a substance is, the more probable it is that there are prohibitions on private possession or at least public law rules to ensure the safe storage of such substances. The infringement of such rules is by itself negligence within the meaning of Article 3:102 (Negligence) sub-paragraph (a). The same applies for the operation of installations with a potential environmental impact. 7. Other legal bases for a claim remain unaffected. Paragraph (5)(a) does not allow any room for doubt as to the fact that it is only liability “under this Article” which does not 720

Article 3:206: Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions

apply to private individuals. All other bases for a claim therefore remain unaffected. That applies not only to the claims just mentioned on the grounds of intention or negligence but also to claims for some other legal reason, e. g. property law claims between owners of neighbouring land (Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (d)) and claims based on public law duties to eliminate dangers to public safety.

C.

The risk within the scope of the strict liability

8. Causation of damage by dangerous substances and emissions (paragraph (1) (a)). The potential danger which is intended to be covered by this Article is paraphrased in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph (1). Strict liability is not envisaged for every kind of substance or emission, but only for those which, viewed in the abstract, inherently pose a high risk for the environment (Article 2:209 (Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment)), for people and for property. The test question is whether it is “very likely” that the stored substance or emitted material will cause damage to health, property or the environment if it is not taken care of in an appropriate manner. Whether in an individual case appropriate care was in fact taken is not decisive; what is decisive is merely the fact that the dangerous characteristics of the substance or material make special precautions necessary. That is an objective test; the issue does not turn on the actual or constructive knowledge of the keeper or operator. 9. Dangerous quantity. The risk which is inherent in the relevant substance must be identified by having regard the quantity and its specific characteristics. For example, water is, as such, completely harmless. However, when held in large volumes, it constitutes an obvious danger for people and property unless it is secured against leakage either above ground or subterraneously: a dam can burst and the base of a reservoir can be permeable. Even large quantities of grain or milk powder can be dangerous due to the risk of spontaneous combustion. Pure and therefore easily ignited alcohol can also be a dangerous substance if stored in larger quantities. If, on the other hand, it is merely used to disinfect a wound, liability under this Article can be excluded for several reasons. Illustration 6 Doctors disinfect a patient prior to an operation, using chemicals containing alcohol. At the same time they use an electronic scalpel which produces a spark that ignites the alcohol in the chemicals. As a result the patient suffers severe burns. The liability of the hospital (Article 3:201 (Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives)) turns on the negligence of the doctors, not on the present Article. At the point in time that the injuries occurred, the hospital was not keeper of the chemicals; nor could it be said that it was “very probable” that “if not adequately controlled” those chemicals, in that small amount, would cause damage of that type. Nor is the electronic scalpel an “installation” within the meaning of this Article. 10. Relationship to Article 3:202 (Accountability for damage caused by the unsafe state of an immovable). The relationship between this Article and Article 3:202 (Accountability for damage caused by the unsafe state of an immovable) has already been explained in 721

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the Comments on Article 3:202. The rule in that Article embraces, for example, damage as a result of a burst water pipe. If, on the other hand, corrosive material is transported through a defective pipe, reparation for the damage will be recoverable on the basis of both provisions because the case involves a dangerous substance. 11. Dangerous attributes. Substances which pose a particular danger to persons and property due to their specific attributes are, for example, substances which ignite, explode or oxidise easily, poisonous and radiating materials of every sort and corrosive chemicals. Danger for the environment (though not necessarily for the health of individuals) is associated with, for example, genetically experimental breeding, but equally with mere liquid manure which is stored in the tanks of a large-scale agricultural concern. The number of dangerous substances is in fact so large that they cannot be exhaustively listed here. A good indicator of the dangerousness of a substance is the obligation to use hazard signs when transporting such materials by road. Many European legal systems, moreover, have special regimes in which particular substances are characterised as dangerous for persons, property or the environment. This Article refers to such regulations implicitly. 12. Realisation of the risk establishing liability (paragraph (1)(b)). The strict liability for dangerous substances and emissions only arises if the damage results from the realisation of the risk which is specifically associated with the substance or emission. The danger which justifies a strict liability for the storage of a large volume of water in a reservoir is not that someone swimming in the reservoir might drown, but that the dam might burst and people or animals may be killed or injured as a result or that damage may be caused to premises in the neighbourhood. Illustration 7 The owner of an estate constructs a water reservoir on his land. The contractor entrusted to undertake the work overlooks the fact that tunnels run under the reservoir, linking the land to a mine whose seams consequently fill up with water. The owner of the mine has a claim to reparation against the owner of the estate under this Article. 13. Causation. The damage must have been caused by the dangerous substance or emission. The test of causation is subject to the general rules of Chapter 4. Issues of the law of evidence and thus also questions of alleviation of the burden of proof (such as, for example, rules on prima facie evidence) remain matters for the law of evidence and procedure. Illustration 8 A fish farming company loses a substantial part of its stock. The fish have been poisoned by substances which got into the ground with the effluent from X’s plant and from there passed into the river whose waters transported the toxins into the company’s breeding tanks. The death of the fish has been caused by the substances from X’s plant. That the natural flow of the river has played a role in the causation of the damage does not detract from that.

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14. Substance (paragraph (2)). The concept of ‘substance’ does not presuppose any particular physical condition. It may be solid, liquid or gaseous in form. The damage may be brought about by particles which are transported by the wind, by disposal of effluent, or by vapours. Micro-organisms as well as chemicals are substances. The former, however, are not animals within the meaning of Article 3:203 (Accountability for damage caused by animals). 15. Emission (paragraph (3)). It follows from paragraphs (2) and (3) that the concept of an emission extends further than the concept of a substance. While substances (in whatever form) are also capable of being emitted, the notion of an emission equally embraces the conduct of electricity, heat, light and other radiation, noise and other vibrations and other incorporeal impact on the environment which is not referable to some substance. The concept of an emission always connotes a negative impact on the environment. In order to ascertain what is meant by “impact on the environment” in paragraph (3)(e) reference can be had to Article 2:209 (Burdens incurred by the State upon environmental impairment). 16. Installation (paragraph (4)). Paragraph (4) extends the liability of the operator of an installation to its construction phase. The provision also makes it clear that the mere closure of an installation will not preclude liability. In contrast to a “plant” an “installation” also embraces a mobile installation. 17. No failure to comply with statutory standards. Paragraph (5)(b) makes it possible for the potentially liable person to escape liability by proving that control of the substance was not defective or, as the case may be, that there was no mismanagement of the installation. That does not detract from the strict liability character of the rule because, as in the case of liability for products, only objectively defective control or management is in issue. However, such a provision is necessary – for example, in order to enable the operator of an installation to establish that the statutorily prescribed emission levels were not exceeded. Such statutory rules which lay down the extent of permitted emissions may be found in either Community law or national legal provisions. 18. Other defences. The defences in Chapter 5 are also applicable in the context of this Article. In particular Article 5:302 (Event beyond control) is unaffected. In applying this provision, however, it is always necessary to assess whether it was really an external risk which materialised or whether, despite the influence of, for example, adverse weather conditions, it was in truth a risk on account of which the present Article envisages strict liability. Illustration 9 In an agricultural concern rapeseed is sprayed with pesticides. As a result of torrential rainfall, the pesticide residues are transported on to neighbouring land where they cause the death of fish in a pond. The rain has not interrupted the chain of causation. It is not an event beyond control within the meaning of Article 5:302 (Event beyond control), so as to excuse the farmer from liability. It does not excuse liability because it was the materialisation of a risk for which the farmer must bear responsibility under the present Article. 723

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Notes 1.

2.

724

The FRENCH law relating to environmental liability is based on many pillars, namely, on the théorie des troubles anormaux de voisinage, on the liability for faute (CC arts. 13821383), on a number of special regimes dealing with certain hazardous substances and on the liability du fait des choses under CC art. 1384. A requisite of the latter is that the thing, which is in the keeping (garde) of the defendant has caused the relevant damage. It is not an essential requirement that the thing be inherently dangerous (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2004/2005) nos. 7729-7731). The notion of a thing is given a broad interpretation (e. g. Cass.civ. 10 February 1967, Bull.civ. 1967, II, no. 66 p. 47: condensated water vapour which froze leading to black ice on a street). In order to constitute a fait de la chose, there is no requirement fort he existence of direct contact between the thing and the person who has suffered damage nor is it a requirement that the thing be in motion. It is only necessary that the thing plays a rôle actif, with the result that it becomes an instrument du dommage. A person is regarded as having garde, if the person exercises a pouvoir d’usage, de direction et de contrôle over the thing (Cass.ch.réun. 2 December 1941, D. C. 1942 jur., p. 25, note Ripert); the term garde denotes (also when it is merely temporary) actual control over the thing (pouvoir de fait). A person will be relieved of liability solely upon proof of cause étrangère which cannot be attributed to the gardien (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II11, no. 269 p. 290). There are no special statutory regulations in respect of an array of dangerous substances. The strict liability imposed on hospitals is included in this classification (private doctors’ practices are however excluded: Mistretta, JCP éd. G 2003, I no. 57, 165) as regards infections nosocomiales under Public Health Code (Code de la Santé Publique, CSP) art. L 1142-1, I(2). In this regard, what the law is concerned with is, the responsibility for illnesses which are caused by micro organisms typically associated with hospitals (Lambert-Faivre, D. 2003, 361, 362). Liability is supplemented by a compulsory liability insurance provided for by statute (CSP art. L 1142-1). In the case of permanent diminution of earning capacity of more than 25% a state scheme then intervenes (CSP art. L 1142-1-1), which the hospital can have recourse to, in the event of gross negligence (CSP art. L 1142-17). A further example of a special staututory regime can be found in the Mining Code (Code minier) arts. 75-1 ff in respect of the liability of mining operators for damage resulting from mining operations. Strict liability for troubles anormaux du voisinage becomes relevant in cases for example, of water pollution (Cass.civ. 2 March 1966, Bull.civ. 1966, II, no. 279; Cass.civ. 12 February 1974, JCP éd. G 1975, II, 18016, note Despax; Cass.civ. 15 February 1989, JCP éd. G 1989, IV, 142). It is a matter for the discretion of the court of first instance to determine whether an emission can be characterised as normal or abnormal (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2006/2007), nos. 7180 and 7184). Similarly, in BELGIUM, the point of departure is generally CC art. 1384(1). In Belgium this regulation only becomes applicable, if the damage originated owing to a defect in the thing (in the stead of many Tilleman and Claeys (-Baudoncq and Debaene), Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid, 83, 88; van Gerven, Verbintenissenrecht II7, 329). The definition of the gardien is largerly identical to the French definition (e. g. Cass. 24 January 1991, Pas. belge 1991, I, no. 276 p. 500); however, in contrast to the prevailing law in France, it must be possible to impute the legally relevant act to the defendant. A thing is defective if it exhibits an abnormal characteristic which renders it susceptible,

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3.

in the circumstances of the case, to causing injury to a third party; the defect can be transitory, it is, furthermore, not essential that the defect be an inherent attribute of the thing (Cass. 3 September 1992, Pas. belge 1992, I, no. 585 p. 985). The SPANISH law on liability for environmental damage is governed by a number of disparate regimes. The rule contained in CC art. 1908(1) is among their number. According to this article, the owner shall be liable for damage caused “by explosion of machinery that had not been maintained with due care”, and for damage caused “by the ignition of explosive materials that had not been put in a safe and appropriate place”. Prevailing legal opinion asserts that this regulation is a special case of liability based on fault. The same opinion is professed in respect of CC art. 1908(4), according to which the owner is liable for damage caused “by emissions from sewers or deposits of infecting substances that had been built without the preventive measures that were appropriate according to the place where they were located” (Díez-Picazo and Gullón, Sistema II9, 572). Loss which falls within the scope of both of these statutory provisions, is, therefore, treated by the courts as generally falling within CC art. 1902 which enables the application of the risk theory devised under this norm which pertains to liability as well as the application of the doctrine of culpa cuasi-objetiva (see above, introduction to Chapter 3 B5) (e. g. TS 18 November 1998, RAJ 1998 (5) no. 8814 p. 13018; TS 20 May 2005, RAJ 2005 (5) no. 6693 p. 14224; TS 28 January 2004, RAJ 2004 (1) no. 153 p. 305). In contrast, it is not necessary for the courts to resort to such a “circuitous route” in the event that the damage is encompassed within the scope of application of CC art. 1908(2). This is due to the fact that this provision already provides for strict liability (Díez-Picazo and Gullón loc. cit.; Álvarez Lata, La responsabilidad civil por daños al medio ambiente3, 1917; TS 15 March 1993, RAJ 1993 (2) no. 2284 p. 2958; TS 24 May 1993, RAJ 1993 (2) no. 3727 p. 4743; TS 14 March 2005, RAJ 2005 (2) no. 2236 p. 4747). Liability is imposed on the owner for damage caused “by noxious fumes that are harmful to persons or property”. The disputable issue is whether this liability can be extended to any kind of emission or whether it must remain restricted to ‘noxious fumes’. In general, the courts do not hesitate to apply this provision analogously to other emissions (e. g. TS 29 April 2003, RAJ 2003 (2) no. 3041 p. 5720; CA Valencia 26 March 2004, A. C. 2004 (2) no. 890 p. 248 [both on noise]; CA Alicante 15 March 2002, BDA JUR 2002/140080 [electromagnetic radiation]; CA Baleares 21 February 2005, BDA JUR 2005/118262 [humidity]). In contrast, views are split in legal commentary (in favour of an analogous application e. g. Cabanillas Sánchez, ADC 1993, 19691974; Moreno Martínez (-Algarra Prats), Perfiles de la responsabilidad civil en el nuevo milenio, 639; Martín Vida, InDret 2/2005, p. 3; against e. g. Santos Morón, FS Díez-Picazo II, 3022). Among the regulations pertaining to liability external to the Civil Code to which a certain importance has been conferred, include, inter alia, the Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act. This is due to the fact that a number of courts have had recourse to its provisions regarding the protection of personality rights, in order to establish liability for excessive noise (TS 29 April 2003, RAJ 2003 (2) no. 3041 p. 5720). In addition, a specific regime of liability can be found in the Nuclear Energy Act (Ley 25/1964, de 29 de abril, reguladora de la energía nuclear). Moreover, regard must be had to the CATALAN CC arts. 546-13 and 546-14, which provide for liability for damage caused by wrongful emissions. Generally speaking, Spanish statutory law does not formally use the concept of ‘keeper of the dangerous thing’; rather it tries to connect this sort of liability to ownership or possession. TS 20

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5.

726

May 2005, RAJ 2005 (5) no. 6693 p. 14224, however, applied CC art. 1902 to circumvent the wording of CC art. 1908 and to impose strict liability on a tenant for damage caused by the ignition of dangerous substances. According to case law of the Supreme Court, the observance of duties imposed by statute is no defence in the area of liability arising out of damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions (TS 24 May 1993, RAJ 1993 (2) no. 3727 p. 4743; TS 14 March 2005, RAJ 2005 (2) no. 2236 p. 4747). The point of departure of ITALIAN law in respect of liability for environmental damage is the legislative scheme contained in Establishment of a Ministry for the Environment and Regulations on Environmental Damage Act of 8 July 1986 no. 349 (Istituzione del Ministero dell’ambiente e norme in materia di danno ambientale) art. 18 (see above Note II 5 under Article 2:209 (Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment)). This provision governs liability in respect of damage caused to the environment by a violation of a statutory provision, the tortfeasor must provide redress to the State. Tortious liability owed to private individuals remains unaffected by this Law; in other words loc. cit. art. 18 governs only “pure ecological damage” (see further Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile3, 747). Both liability regimes can be applied cumulatively, in the event that damage is caused to the specific legally protected interests of the individual as well as to the environment (Cass.sez.un. 21 February 2002, no. 2515, Resp.civ. e prev. 2002, 385; 726; Cass. 3 February 1998, no. 1087, Danno e resp. 1998, 495). Apart from CC art. 2043, CC art. 2050 could provide another basis for the imposition of liability in respect of environmental damage. According to this provision “whoever causes injury to another in carrying out an activity which is inherently dangerous or by reason of the instruments employed to carry it out, shall be obliged to pay compensation unless he can prove that he took all the necessary measures to avoid the damage occurring”. The notion of “dangerous activity” under CC art. 2050 connotes that the means employed to carry out the activity must be continuos and organised, however it does not connote business organisation in the sense of commercial law? (Cass. 24 February 1983, no. 1425, Giust.civ.Mass. 1983, fasc. 1). Liability arising from injuries resulting from peaceful nuclear activities is governed by the Pacific Employment of Nuclear Energy Act of 31 December 1962, no. 1860; of 30 December 1965, no. 1704; of 19 December 1969, no. 1008 and a number of supplementary Presidential Orders. HUNGARIAN CC § 345(1)(third sentence) expressly states that the strict liability provided for in this provision (liability for dangerous activities) is also applicable to individuals, “who cause damage to other persons through activities that endanger the human environment”. Handling hazardous substances or operating an installation from which dangerous emissions could escape, are examples denoting a dangerous activity under this provision (see further Petrik (-Wellmann), Polgári jog II2, 596/2). Liability for damage in the field of nuclear energy is governed by the Nuclear Energy Act no. CXVI of 1996, liability for losses arising out of the mining operations is governed by Mining Act no. XLVIII of 1993. “Dangerous operations” or “activities” under CC § 345(1) include inter alia, power stations, structures, mines, water works, gasworks, electricity power stations, electricity supply installations, handling explosions, radioactive substances and poisonous substances (unless small amounts, used only for household purposes, are involved; spraying fields with pesticides is considered to be a dangerous activity, of course, in particular, if this is carried out from an aeroplane: BH 1983/203 and BH 1987/437; Petrik (-Wellmann), Polgári jog II2, 585-586; Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata I6, 1246-1250, 1256-1257; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 109-111).

Article 3:206: Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions

6.

However, medical radiation therapy is subject to the general rules pertaining to liability (Wellmann loc. cit. 585). Use of an open flame does not of itself denote a dangerous activity, (BH 1988/183), the use of a pyrotechnical device is by all means a dangerous activity (BH 2000/349; BH 1991/314). Furthermore, spread of corrosive substances through a supermarket is dangerous (BH 1993/678); the keeper of a helicopter is liable for noise (BH 1984/114). Further cases emerging from the extensive case law on the subject include cases where liability was imposed on an installation for vibrations (BH 1981/15), in respect of dangerous pesticides (BH 1981/413) and for excessive dust particles (BH 1973/71). Under POLISH CC art. 435 § 1 a person operating on its own account an installation driven by natural forces (steam, natural gas, electricity, liquid fuels, etc.) is accountable for personal injury or damage to property, occasioned to anyone by the movement of the installation, unless the damage resulted from force majeur, the sole fault of the injured person or of a third person, for whom the person who runs the enterprise is not responsible. The same applies to installations producing or using explosives. This is a case of strict liability (Pietrzykowski (-Safjan), Kodeks cywilny I4, art. 435 p. 1231) incurred usually by legal persons (not necessarily the owner, e. g. a lessee, Safjan loc. cit. 1233) operating a large installation such as operators of electric plants and transportation or building companies. The movement of the installation is interpreted broadly; it covers among other things cases of air pollution, piping off sewage (even below the norm – see SN 7 April 1970, OSPiKA 1971, poz. 169; Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛´sc´ ogólna7, 235), and noise pollution. The application of CC art. 435 is extended to mining installations (with some modifications – see Geological and Mining Law arts. 93 ff) and installations which, due to the quantity or quality of accumulated dangerous substances, create a danger of a serious industrial breakdown (even if the installation is not driven by natural forces and even if its activity is exercised on the basis and within the confines of an administrative decision: Environmental Protection Act arts. 324 and 325). Where the damage was caused by the latter type of installation, the aggrieved party (in the case of damage to the environment as a common good: the State, local government or an ecological organisation) may claim from the person liable inter alia in respect of taking preventive measures; if those measures are impossible or excessively difficult he may claim cessation of the dangerous activity (loc. cit. art. 323). Liability for nuclear damage is regulated separately by Atomic Law arts. 100 ff. A special regime for prevention and reparation of damage to the environment caused by an activity creating the risk of such damages is established by Prevention and Repair of Damages to the Environment Act arts. 1 ff. BULGARIAN Environmental Protection Act art. 170 contains a general principle that damage to the environment, which is culpably inflicted by the State, local authorites or private (natural or legal) persons, must be compensated. According to § 1 nos. 5 and 6 of the supplementary provisions of the Environmental Protection Act damage that is recoverable encompasses damage that appears as a result of physical, chemical or biological processes. Damage which occurs despite compliance with statutory reglations is also encompassed within this provision. The notion of “damage to the environment” connotes a change to the ecological balance in the area, leading to the impairment of the standard of living, leading to a poorer biological diversity or leads to a lasting adverse impact on the natural ecological system. The damages claim is supplemented by injunctive relief (mandatory and prohibitory) (Environmental Protection Act art. 171).

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GERMAN law pertaining to liability for damage to the environment is essentially regu-

lated in an array of specific strict liability statutes ([Environmental Liability Act [UmweltHG] §§ 1 ff, Water Resources Act [WHG] § 22, Liability Act [HaftPflG] § 2, Genetic Engineering Act [GenTG] §§ 32 ff, Mining Act [BBergG] §§ 114 ff, Nuclear Energy Act [AtomG] §§ 25 ff), on the provisions of the law pertaining to the respective interests of neighbours (CC § 906(2) second sentence); Immission Control Act [BImSchG] § 14 second sentence) as well as by the general tort law liability for intention and negligence (CC § 823). The Environmental Liability Act § 1 provides for the imposition of strict liability in respect of impact to the environment, which emanates from techinical works, plants or installations enumerated in the Act. Furthermore, strict liability is imposed in respect of death, bodily injury, detriment to health as well as economic loss to another caused by an environmental impact. The loss must be due to an enviromental impact on the soil, air or water, caused by substances, vibrations, noise, pressure, radiation, gases, steam, vapour, heat or other similar manifestations (UmweltHG § 3(1)). This causal nexus is presumed once certain prerequisites are satisified (loc. cit. §§ 6 and 7). There is a cap placed, limiting the amount of damages that can be awarded (loc. cit. § 15) and liability is excluded in the event of force majeure (loc. cit. § 4). In respect of installations which have yet to be completed or installations which are no longer operated, liability is governed by the requirements of loc. cit. § 2(1) and (2). WHG § 22 provides for strict liability in respect of the introduction or discharge of substances into water resources (para. (1)) and in respect of the operation of a plant which poses a danger for the preservation of water resources (para. (2)). This liability, therefore, extends beyond the scope of liability regulated in the Environmental Liability Act, primarily because there is no cap placed on the amount of damages that may be awarded. Furthermore, liability under the Water Resources Act is restricted to the violation of a specific legal interest, in particular the act permits recovery of damages for non-pecuniary loss (BGH 23 December 1966, BGHZ 47, 1, 13; BGH 21 January 1988, BGHZ 103, 129, 140; BGH 6 May 1999, NJW 1999, 3203). § 2 of the Liability Act governs the liability of the keeper of electrical cables and pipelines for water, gas, oil etc; the Genetic Engineering Act §§ 32 ff regulates liability for damage arising from genetically modified organisms; Mining Act §§ 114 ff regulates liability for damage resulting from mining activities or mining operations. There is no cap placed on the amount of damages that can be awarded in the event that the possessor of a nuclear facility (Nuclear Energy Act § 31(1)) and the possessor of nuclear ship (Nuclear Energy Act § 25(1)) are found to be strictly liable. According to CC § 906(2) second sentence a landowner, who must generally tolerate emissions emanating from a neighbouring property, may be entitled to claim compensation from the user of that property, provided that the emissions unreasonably interfere with the common use of the land at that location or the income that he derives from the property. The Immission Control Act § 14 second sentence permits the owner of property to claim damages, provided that a number of additional requisites are satisified in the case that the detrimental impact emanates from an installation on a neighbouring property, where the licence to operate has become final. In the context of a cause of action under CC § 823(1), the courts try to accommodate the interests of the claimant, in they have relaxed the requirements in respect of the allocation of the burden of proof. This relaxation of the rules of evidence also has import for the question of causation, for example, significant in a decision where the defendant polluter excee-

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Article 3:206: Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions

8.

9.

ded the emission and immission limits (essentially BGH 18 September 1984, BGHZ 92, 143, 147). In the mid 1990s, proposals were advanced advocating the adoption of an AUSTRIAN Environmental Liability Act, yet these recommendations did not herald concrete legislative action. Consequently, the Austrian legal position remains governed by the provisions of the Civil Code and a number of additional specific statutes. According to CC § 364(2) an owner of property can prohibit emissions (liquid effluents, smoke, heat, smells, noise, vibrations and other emissions of comparable impact) emanating from a neighbouring property, if and to the extent that they exceed the amount that is customary for that area and significantly impair the use of the land that is customary in that location. CC § 364a adds, that in the event that a licence to emit has been granted, the claimant is only entitled to damages. Based on this, the inference is drawn that under CC § 364 the claimant is entitled to assert a claim to prohibitory injunctive relief as well as a claim for damages and this claim is actionable regardless of the presence of fault (Jabornegg, ÖJZ 1983, 365 and Gimpel-Hinteregger, ÖJZ 1991, 145). An array of special Acts pertaining to liability for particularly dangerous activites and Acts geared towards protecting particularly important environmental interests complete the regime (e. g. Nuclear Liability Act § 11, Forestry Act § 54, Mining Act § 185, Water Act § 26 and Aviation Act § 148). These specific Acts in turn are regarded as being suspectible to analogous application; correspondingly they have been deemed to apply in cases where the damage is caused by comparable dangerous activites (essentially OGH 28 March 1973, SZ 46/36; see further OGH 25 July 2000, SZ 73/118). An operation is “dangerous”, if the operator is permitted, in the collective interest, to conduct operations, which would of themselves be prohibited, if sole regard was had to the legal interests of another at risk from the operation (OGH 24 October 1985, JBl 1986, 525), e. g. igniting a firework (OGH 28 March 1973 loc. cit.), operating a munitions factory or high voltage equipment (OGH 2 April 1954, SZ 25/84), and operation of plants and installations where harmful gases and matter are generated (OGH 20 February 1958, SZ 31/26 [magnesite plant]; OGH 16 July 1998, SZ 71/126 [chlorine-hydrocarbon plant]). However, it should be noted that not every industrial or manufacturing operation is per se “dangerous” (OGH 25 July 2000, SZ 73/118 [Hotel]). According to GREEK law 1650/1986 art. 29 “every natural or legal person who pollutes or otherwise damages the environment is liable to pay damages unless he can prove that the damage could be attributed to force majeure or occurred due to the intentional culpable act of a third party”. This provision is one of strict liability (Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Diakio III, 365; Dimopoulou, Evthini apo diakindinevsi, 240; Karakostas, Perivallon kai Astiko Dikaio, 334). The concepts of “pollution” and “damage to the environment” are defined in loc. cit. art. 2. According to prevailing Greek academic opinion, the damage must be capable of being attributed to a source of danger which poses a particularly high risk to the environment. Extending beyond the wording of the statutory provision, an additional requirement is that damage resulted from a danger typically associated with the possession or operation of a potential source of pollution or damage (Dimopoulou loc. cit. 242; Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio I, 702). Every person who suffers injury to their person or damage to property is entitled to assert a claim. The State also has a claim for the costs involved in remedying environmental damage (Dimopoulou loc. cit. 241; Georgiades loc. cit.). In addition, CC art. 57 (Protection of Personality) and the fundamental basic norm of tort law (CC art. 914), together

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730

with the law pertaining to the respective interests of neighbours (CC art. 1003) are of considerable relevance. In respect of oil pollution at sea, the owner of the ship is strictly liable under Maritime Pollution by Oil Act [Law 314/1976]. Similarly, harm caused by the peaceful use of nuclear energy is governed by a special regime of liability operating to the detriment of the operator of the relevant nuclear facility (Legislative Decree 336/ 1969, amended by Law 1758/1988; on this point Dimopoulou loc. cit. 252). PORTUGUESE CC art. 493(2) establishes liability for damage which is caused by a dangerous activity; liability is grounded on a rebuttable presumption of fault. Dangerous activity is denoted by e. g. the manufacture of explosives, the treatment or examination of patients with short waves or X-rays, transporting oil or petrol (Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 595; CA Oporto 9 February 2006; STJ 12 February 2004), conveying high tension energy supply via overland cables (STJ 25 March 2004; CA Oporto 3 February 2004; STJ 10 July 2003) and lighting a firework (STJ 17 June 2004). The keeper (detentor) can excuplate himself of liability if he proves that in the circumstances of the case all due diligence was exercised to prevent the onset of the damage (Antunes Varela loc. cit.). In contrast, CC art. 509(1) does not permit any investigation of fault and provides that “a person who has the effective direction of an installation aimed at conducting or delivering electric energy or gas, and utilises it in their own interest, is accountable for damage which may arise from the conduction or delivery of electricity or gas, as much as for damage resulting from the installation itself, except if at the time of the accident the latter is in accordance with the binding technical rules and in a perfect maintenance state”. This provision is not simply concerned with damage resulting from the supply of energy or gas (on this point Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 92 [1960] 139; STJ 25 March 2004; CA Lisbon 22 October 1973, BolMinJus 230 [1973] 155), it also governs damage which results from the generation of electricity or gas or from its storage (Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 599; CA Lisbon 8 January 1975, BolMinJus 243 [1975] 318; see, however, CA Coimbra 15 January 1991, CJ XVI [1991-1] 47). The operator of the installation incurs liability (Almeida Costa loc. cit.); he can exonerate himself from liability under the same prerequistes as those detailed under Article 3:206(5)(b) (see further Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, 525, note 1 under art. 509; Vaz Serra loc. cit.; STJ 18 April 1996, CJ(ST) IV [1996-2] 26; see also STJ 25 March 2004 [where, however, liability was confirmed due to the infringement of a statutory safety regulation]). An additional ground providing a defence to the imposition of liability is force majeure (CC art. 509(2)): an example would be the uprooting of a pylon on account of entirely exceptional stormy conditions (Almeida Costa loc. cit. 600; Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela loc. cit. note 2; see STJ 5 June 1985, BolMinJus 348 [1985] 397). Liability under CC art. 509 will not be imposed on consumers who have errected electrical installations for their private use; this corresponds to the regulation in Article 3:206(5)(a) (see further Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela loc. cit. note 3 under art. 509; Antunes Varela loc. cit. 713). Strict liability (however, solely strict liability) is capped (CC arts. 510 and 508(1)). There is a specific regulation in CC art. 1346 in respect of relations between neighbours. This provision governs emissions which endure for some time and are of a particular intensity (Mesquita, Direitos Reais, 143-145; STJ 3 December 1992; STJ 7 April 2005). DUTCH CC art. 6:175 imposes strict liability on the keeper of a substance (see further Asser (-Hartkamp) Verbintenissenrecht III12, no. 192a, p. 206). The concept of “substance” in liability law extends beyond the legal definiton of “thing” under property law

Article 3:206: Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions

12.

13.

(Memorie van Toelichting, Tweede Kamer 1988-1989, Kamerstukken no. 21202, p. 13; Onrechtmatige Daad II (-Oldenhuis), art. 6:173, no. 28 p. 95). Together with solid substances, the provision also regulates gases and fluids. The substance could be a basic element, adjuvant substance, crude oil, finished product or waste material. Radiation and electricity are not regarded as substances (the latter is incorporated within the concept of product): Oldenhuis loc. cit. art. 6:174 no. 25 p. 117). Similarly, blood plasma, ampules and intravenous liquids are governed by product liability and are not subject to the rules governing liability in respect of dangerous substances (CC art. 173(2)); bacteria and virus cultures are regulated by the latter. “Dangerous substances” are substances of which is is known that they possess properties which pose a particular danger of a serious type for persons or things. The Environmental Management Act (Stb. 2005, 282) provides guidance (art. 9.2.3.1(3)); CC art. 6:175(1) mentions explosive, oxidative, flammable and poisonous substances. In any event a substance is “known” to exhibit dangerous properties, if the substance is statutorily classified as dangerous (CC art. 6:175(6)). Substances, which are carried by pipes are subject to an independent regime (CC art. 6:174; on this point see CFI Utrecht 30 January 1998, NedJur (kort) 1999, no. 29). The defences to liability (force majeure and comparable situations, including mandatory statutory regulations) are governed in CC art. 6:178. Under ESTONIAN law, strict liability for environmental damage is based primarily on CC § 1058 in conjunction with CC § 1056. The former provision, however, does not adhere to the approach of imposing liability on the possessor or operator. Rather, CC § 1058 imposes strict liability on the owner of a dangerous structure or thing. Furthermore, this liability makes no distinction between private and commercial use. In contrast the specifications in, on the one hand CC § 1058(1), and on the other Article 3:206(2) and (3), are largely similar. CC § 1058(4) corresponds largely to Article 3:206(5)(b). It is impossible overlook the legal provisions relating to liability for environmental damage in the NORDIC Countries. SWEDISH Environmental Code chap. 32 provides for liability for personal injury, loss resulting from property damage and pure economic loss (§ 1) caused by (§ 3) pollution of water areas, pollution of groundwater, changes in the groundwater level, air pollution, land pollution, noise, vibration, or other similar disturbances, such as heat, strong light, bacteria, insects. It has been held that a pure economic loss suffered from the restriction of access to a business during construction work is repairable damage (HD 1 November 1996, NJA 1996, 634). In another case damages were awarded, where excavation work was carried out to avert the torrent of water from one property during heavy rainfall, causing flooding on another property (Environmental Appellate Court 22 December 2006, MÖB M 1785/06). Environmental Code chap. 32 §§ 4-5 provide for claims for damages for loss or injury caused by blasting or excavating work. Loc. cit. chap. 10 entails rules on strict liability of the operator, and, subsidiarily, of the property owner, for environmental clean-up, including costs incurred by the state. Damages for loss or injury suffered from electric currents are regulated under Electricity Act (1997:857) chap. 10, providing strict liability for the operator of the electrical installation from which the electricity last came. Nuclear Liability Act (1968:45) § 5 provides for strict liability of the operator of a nuclear installation. Liability under Environmental Code chap. 32 requires that an activity (see on this notion e. g. Environmental Appellate Court 11 January 2007, MÖB M 9741/05) on immovable property caused loss or injury to its surroundings (loc. cit. § 1), thus

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excluding e. g. damage to the owner himself caused by his tenant (HD 3 October 2003, NJA 2003, 384). The source of the emission must have a connection with an immovable (noise from airplanes flying low over a suburban area falls outside the scope of loc. cit. chap. 32; it covers however noise from a nearby airport: Environmental Appellate Court 8 November 2002, MÖD 2002 DM 92; Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 330). Where the Environmental Code does not apply, other regimes may fill the gap, such as the Liability for Damage Caused in the Course of Aviation Act (1922:382) (see HD 11 May 1945, NJA 1945, 210: strict liability for noise from an airplane causing damage to animals); the Traffic Damages Act (1975:1410) (e. g. oil spills from a truck causing damage) and the Maritime Code (oil pollution: chap. 10). If no such special regime applies, damages may be sought under the general culpa rule or under the more general rules on strict liability for ‘dangerous activities’ (Hellner, JT 1991/92, 646-650; Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 181; Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 36). Unless intent or negligence can be attributed to the causation of the loss or injury, all claims for damages are subjected to a test of whether the emission should be tolerated by the claimant with regard to local conditions or the general presence of the emission under similar circumstances (Environmental Code chap. 32 § 1(3); see HD 20 March 1975, NJA 1975, 155; HD 30 June 1977, NJA 1977, 424; HD 26 July 1988, NJA 1988, 376 and HD 14 June 1999, NJA 1999, 385). Instances involving intent or negligence, whereby this test does not apply, may inter alia include unauthorized activities, non-compliance with an authorization for an activity, emissions which could have been prevented through relatively inexpensive measures, emissions which were brought to the defendant’s attention, although the mere fact that the defendant was aware of the emission does not per se imply negligence (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 333). Specific rules facilitate the proof of causation (loc. cit. § 3), whereby a damage shall be deemed to have been caused by a disturbance if, in view of the nature of the disturbance and its adverse effects, other possible causes and any other circumstances, the balance of probability indicates that the disturbance was the cause (see HD 29 December 1992, NJA 1992, 896). An insurance scheme exists under Environmental Code chap. 33 for cases where liability under chap. 32 exists but cannot be executed, e. g. due to insolvent or unidentifiable defendants. DANISH Environmental Damage Liability Act (Lov om erstatning for miljøskader) § 1 provides for strict liability for personal injury, loss resulting from property damage, pure economic loss, and costs for preventing damage or restoring the environment, caused by pollution of water, air, soil, underground, or interferences from disturbance, vibrations or similar emissions (Pagh, Miljøansvar, 34, 145). Damage must be caused in the course of a commercial or public activity of a certain specified type (the Act enlists eleven categories). This is intended to create a transparent strict liability regime for activities carrying a high risk for the environment (von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 193). An emission must not be insignificant, having regard to what normally or reasonably can be expected to be tolerated under similar circumstances (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 196). The defendant has a defence, if the damage is caused by an activity which was exercised in accordance with compulsory prescriptions ordered by a public authority (loc. cit. § 3(2)), the mere permission of a certain type of activity does not itself amount to such defence. Proof of causation follows general principles. Liability rests with the operator. An insurance scheme has not been enacted. Recent case law has primarily dealt with polluters’ and property owners’ non-statutory liability for environ-

Article 3:206: Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions

15.

mental clean-up costs incurred by public authorities, where strict liability was consistently rejected (HD UfR 1991, 674; UfR 1995, 505; UfR 1998, 549; UfR 2001, 1709). The current Environment Protection Act (Lov om miljøbeskyttelse) however has introduced strict liability also towards the public authorities in regard of their clean-up costs (§§ 69-70). Soil Pollution Act (Lov om forurenet jord) § 41 also provides for strict liability for costs incurred by the public authorities. It targets all commercial or public activities regardless of their nature, and also other persons if negligence or stricter accountability under another statute can be attributed to them. These regulations concern public enforcement, based on injunctions and reimbursements of the authorities’ costs. The Environmental Damage Liability Act thus only concerns damage or injury to private persons. Other statutes may also provide for a (specific) strict liability regime, e. g. Maritime Act (Søloven) § 191, Traffic Act (Faerdselloven) § 101, Aviation Traffic Act (Luftfartsloven), Nuclear Liability Act (Atomskadeloven) and Electrical Power Act (Lov om elektriske stærkstrømsanlæg og elektrisk materiel). A sort of strict liability may also come into play under the law concerning neighbours (e. g. HD 8 February 1996, UfR 1996, 661; HD 1 December 1998, UfR 1999, 360; HD 14 February 2005, UfR 2005, 1551). Non-statutory strict liability has also been established for certain specific activities, in particular for excavation work and similar activities (HD 10 January 1968, UfR 1968, 84, HD 24 June 1983, UfR 1983, 714; Gjerulff, UfR 1968 B, 333; Pontoppidan, UfR 1984 B, 50) and for damage caused by the breaking of main water, gas and sewage pipes (HD 18 August 1983, UfR 1983, 866; HD 2 September 1983, UfR 1983, 895; HD 23 May 2000, UfR 2000, 1779; Gomard, Moderne Erstatningsret, 74, Hellner, JT 1991-92, 646-650); in contrast strict liability was rejected in HD 13 November 1987, UfR 1988, 19 for a gas explosion caused by a small gas installation in a private summer house. The scope for non-statutory strict liability is however limited; there is no general principle of strict liability for ‘dangerous activities’ (Gomard loc. cit. 83) FINNISH Environmental Damage Compensation Act (737/1994) § 5 provides for strict liability for personal injury, loss resulting from property damage, pure economic loss (if it is not insignificant), and also other environmental damage caused by water, air or soil pollution; noise, by vibration, radiation, light, heat or smell, or by any similar disturbance. Prevention and clean-up cost of public authorities or other organisations may also be compensated (loc. cit. § 6). The notion of emission includes e. g. dust from a sand-blasting operation causing damage to a parked car and personal injury to its driver (Supreme Court 13 December 1999, HD 1999:124). Emissions must relate to an activity on a specific area, causing damage to its surroundings (loc. cit. § 1), implying a link to immovable property although the activity must not necessarily be of a long-lasting nature (Wetterstein, SvJT 1993, 737). Other activities may trigger strict liability under e. g. Maritime Act (1994/674) chap. 10 (Wetterstein, JFT 2007, 119), the Traffic Insurance Act (1959/279), the Air Traffic Act (1995/281) and under Water Act chap. 11 § 2 (strict liability for activities causing damage due to a defective installation). The Certain Respective Interests of Neighbours Act (1920/26), although subsidiary to the Environmental Damage Compensation Act, covers certain less significant disturbances. Electricity Safety Act (1996/410) chap. 7 and the Nuclear Liability Act (1972/484) constitute leges specialis. Accidents caused by breaks in sewage and water pipes have also in Finland given rise to non-statutory strict liability, with force majeure as defence (Supreme Court 21 February 1980, HD 1980:20; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 238). Damages under the Environmental Damage Compensation Act are only awarded if it is consid-

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16.

734

ered unreasonable to tolerate the disturbance, unless it was caused by intent or criminal behaviour; the counter-exceptions being personal injury and property damage of a not insignificant extent (§ 4; see Supreme Court 20 September 2004, HD 2004:87). Environmental Damage Compensation Act § 3 facilitates proof of causation. The Environmental Damage Insurance Act (81/1998) guarantees full compensation for environmental damage in cases where the liable person is either insolvent or cannot be identified. In ENGLAND a form of strict liability for the escape of dangerous things to neighbouring land – regarded by some commentators at least as a rule of uncertain provenance, though considered by the judiciary itself, at least with hindsight, as merely an extrapolation from the existing law of nuisance (see Birks (-Davies), English Private Law II, paras. 14.256-14.257) – has developed from the landmark case Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330. In that case the defendant, by means of a contractor, was constructing a reservoir on his land and, in the course of filling it, a dam burst resulting in water flooding through disused mine shafts and overwhelming an adjacent colliery. The defendant was held liable regardless of fault, on the basis that “[a] person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequences of its escape”: Rylands v. Fletcher (1865-66) LR 1 Ex. 265, 279 (Blackburn J). Liability is qualified in that the danger must arise from a non-natural user of the land: Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330, 339 (Lord Cairns LC). This was interpreted in Rickards v. Lothian [1913] AC 263, 280 (Lord Moulton) “some special use bringing with it increased danger to others, and [...] not merely [...] the ordinary use of the land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the community,” a concept which in subsequent case law is recognised as lacking precision and which is open to more generous re-interpretation: Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc. [1994] 2 AC 264, 308-309 (Lord Goff: storage of large quantities of chemicals on industrial premises is a non-natural user). Following Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc., loc. cit. (HL), the scope of both nuisance and the tort under Rylands v. Fletcher have been considerably narrowed in that liability is confined to harm which was reasonably foreseeable. Nonetheless, they remain strict liability torts (in the sense that the defendant may be held liable notwithstanding that he has exercised all due care: Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc., loc. cit.) and have not been absorbed with the tort of negligence. On the other hand, the tort is primarily seen as one of damage to neighbouring land, like its parent tort of nuisance, so that the extent to which damages for personal injuries are recoverable under this cause of action is still in some doubt: cf. Read v. J. Lyons & Co. Ltd. [1947] AC 156, 170-171 (Lord Macmillan). Statute provides that there is no strict liability of an owner or occupier of premises for fires which have begun “accidentally” (i. e. without intention or negligence of the defendant or his employees), which have not resulted from the escape of a dangerous thing (under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher) and which have not been perpetuated by negligence in breach of duty to abate the fire: Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774, s. 86. Conversely, and without abridging the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, statute provides for strict liability in respect of specific dangers. Thus under the Environmental Protection Act 1990, s. 73(6), a person who deposits controlled waste in or on land, or knowingly causes or permits it to be deposited, other than in accordance with an environmental permit authorising the

Article 3:207: Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage

deposit, contrary to s. 33 of the Act, is liable for damage which the waste causes. “Damage” for the purposes of this provision extends to death or injury (including any disease and any impairment of physical or mental condition): loc. cit., s. 73(8). The liability is subject to the defences that the damage was wholly due to the fault of the person who suffered it or they voluntarily accepted the risk of the damage: loc. cit., s. 73(6). The defence of contributory negligence applies: loc. cit., s. 73(9)(b). The defendant also has a defence if he proves that “he took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence”: loc. cit., s. 33(7) in conjunction with s. 73(7). Liability for oil pollution from ships is regulated in the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, Part VI, Chapter III. Under the Civil Aviation Act 1982, s. 76(2) damages are recoverable without proof of negligence or intention for loss or damage caused to any person or property on land or water by an aircraft or a person in it, or an article, animal or person falling from it, while the aircraft is in flight, taking off or landing. Liability is subject to the defence of contributory negligence:loc. cit.. Moreover, the owner of the aircraft has a right of indemnity if another is legally liable in respect of the damage: loc. cit., s. 76(3). The Nuclear Installations Act 1965, s. 12 provides for a strict liability regime for compensation for injury or damage caused by breach of duties under that Act and for other injury or damage which is not reasonably separable from it. Illustration 1 is taken from Metropolitan Court Budapest 4.P.23.771/2001/137, 8 May 2006; illustration 2 from TS 14 March 2005, RAJ 2005 (2) no. 2236 p. 4747; see also STJ 3 December 1992; illustration 3 from CA Oporto 3 January 2003; illustration 4 is based on CFI Milan 11 July 1991, Arch.civ. 1991, 1277; illustration 5 is taken from BGH 31 December 1972, cited according to Wüsthoff and Kumpf, Handbuch des deutschen Wasserrechts, R 1219; illustration 6 from BH 2005/251; illustration 7 from Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330; illustration 8 from Cass.civ. 23 September 2004, Bull.civ. 2004, II, no. 432 p. 366; and illustration 9 from BH 1981/413.

Article 3:207: Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage A person is also accountable for the causation of legally relevant damage if national law so provides where it: (a) relates to a source of danger which is not within Article 3:104 (Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons) to Article 3:205 (Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles); (b) relates to substances or emissions; or (c) disapplies Article 3:204 (Accountability for damage caused by defective products) paragraph (4)(e).

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Comments A.

Policy considerations

1. Wide-ranging national law on strict liability; international treaties. The laws of the Member States on non-contractual liability for damage adopt differing standpoints on the issue of which matters should be the subject of accountability without intention or negligence. Hence the Articles under Chapter 3, Section 2 (Accountability without intention or negligence) which have so far been discussed only contain rules for those matters which according to the predominant European legal view ought to be subject to a regime of strict liability. Beyond this, matters must be left to the national legal systems. That is equally true for the issues of liability which have already become the subject of international treaties unifying the law. Their myriad details and minutiae cannot be reproduced in model rules such as these. The rules could not address and do not aspire to address those matters of liability law which are unified by international treaty. A further consideration supporting this reticence is that for some matters, namely those of environmental liability law (e. g. in the area of oil pollution at sea) insurance and liability have been so closely tied up that a separate liability rule on these matters would not seem sound. In yet other areas of the law of reparation unified by international treaty the question may well be asked whether they actually form part of the law of noncontractual liability for damage. The law on the liability of innkeepers for things brought on to the premises is an example of that. In these rules this question is dealt with in Book IV, Part C in connection with contracts for storage (see DCFR IV. C. – 5:110 (Liability of the hotel-keeper)). 2. Overview. This Article gives expression to the basic principle that a person is also accountable under these rules without intention or negligence if that person is subject to strict liability according to the applicable national law of a Member State. The word “also” makes it clear that one is concerned here with the causation of damage in circumstances in which there is no strict liability under Article 3:201 to Article 3:206. The relevant national non-contractual liability law must of course be applicable according to the private international law rules of the forum. That appeared so self-evident that it has not been mentioned expressly. On the other hand, it was necessary to spell out that the rules which this draft itself establishes for accountability without intention or negligence ought basically to be conclusive for the matters they address. Without this restriction it would be senseless to extend these rules to matters of strict liability. So the present Article circumscribes the referral to national law. It is only to be effective in three groups of cases, namely (i) where it is the realisation of a source of danger which is not already covered by Article 3:104 (Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons) to Article 3:205 (Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles) which is at stake, (ii) where questions of environmental liability law are concerned, and (iii) where national product liability law recognises strict liability for development risks. 3. Legally relevant damage; national law. The provisions of Chapter 2 determine what is to be understood as a legally relevant damage in the context of this Article. The referral to “national” law includes a referral to national implementations of internationally unified liability law since international treaties as such bind the ratifying states. 736

Article 3:207: Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage

National implementation of Directives of the European Community are also “national law”.

B.

Details

4. Sub-paragraph (a). The rules in Article 3:104 (Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons) are also conceived as being exhaustive for their field of application. In other words these rules adopt the position that there is to be no strict liability of parents (Article 3:104(3)). They do not regard the fact that people have children as being a sufficient ground of liability. The reference to Article 3:201 (Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives) has the effect, for example, that there can be no going behind the proposition implied there which rules out a strict liability for the conduct of employees who cause damage other than “in the course of their employment”. It follows from the references to Article 3:202 to Article 3:205 that the strict liability set out there may not be extended to damage which is only legally relevant in cases of intention or negligence. 5. Examples. Dangers which are not addressed by the Articles referred to in paragraph (a) include, for example, the danger envisaged by the rule in Council Directive 2004/ 113/ EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods (OJ EC L 373/37 of 21 December 2004). The Directive makes provision regarding unwanted conduct related to the sex of a person with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person (art. 2(c)). Article 3:207 sub-paragraph (a) also embraces those cases in which the liable person (from a purely objective point of view) has infringed a statute which requires compliance with a certain standard of safety (e. g. in respect of safety of machinery in a factory) independent of any considerations as to want of care, and liability for the accident turns only on the fact that the required measure of safety was not in place. “Breach of statutory duty” in this specific sense is not negligence, but rather a form of strict liability. The source of danger which is at issue in Article 3:201 (Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives) is labour under the control of the person accountable. Consequently there remains scope under sub-paragraph (a) of the present Article for a strict liability for independent contractors or sub-contractors and for mere casual helpers. Similarly Article 3:205 (Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles) relates to the dangers arising from motor vehicles but is silent as regards other dangerous vehicles and machines (e. g. a crane, or a concrete mixer or a shredder making wood chips out of tree branches). Railways, aircraft and watercraft are expressly excluded from the scope of that Article by its second paragraph. Consequently the present Article creates scope for strict liability in those fields under the applicable national law. That applies even for movables which cannot even be described as a “machine” (e. g. weapons of all sorts) and it applies also for movables which are not inherently dangerous (such as, for example, bicycles, tables or items of sports equipment). 6. Sub-paragraph (b). There is also broad scope for supplementary strict liability under national law by virtue of sub-paragraph (b). The provision gives expression to the proposition that Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substan737

Chapter 3: Accountability

ces or emissions) only covers the core component of rules on environmental liability. Beyond that core it neither intrudes into special regimes (nuclear civil liability, oil pollution at sea, etc) nor purports to develop a conclusive set of rules for legally relevant damage in the context of liability without intention or negligence. 7. Sub-paragraph (c). Finally, sub-paragraph (c) translates into the language of these rules the principle in Council Directive 85/374 / EEC art. 15(1)(b): see Comments under Article 3:204 (Accountability for damage caused by defective products).

Notes 1.

2.

3.

738

For an earlier consideration of the differing positions adopted by the national legal systems with respect to the forms of accountability without intention and negligence, see the comparative legal note prefacing this Chapter, as regards the gardien-liability of FRENCH law see also Note II 18 unter Article 3:104 and Note 1 under the previous Article. Given the previous analysis, the ensuing notes only deal with a number of ancillary matters. As regards SPAIN, in addition to the exposition in the Introduction B5 and in the Notes under Article 3:103-3:206 note must be taken of an array of additional strict liability provisions. CC art. 1910 imposes liability on the head of the household for damage caused by things that fall down or are thrown from there. Negligence on the part of the defendant is not a requirement (TS 14 April 1984, RAJ 1984 (1) no. 1958 p. 1490; TS 20 April 1993, RAJ 1993 (2) no. 3103 p. 3975; TS 26 June 1993, RAJ 1993 (3) no. 5383 p. 6869). The expression “head of the household” has been broadly interpreted; for example, the possessor /occupier of a night club is also liable under CC art. 1910, if a client loses his eye owing to an object being thrown at him by an unknown assailant (TS 21 May 2001, RAJ 2001 (4) no. 6464 p. 10039). CC art. 1908(3) imposes strict liability on the owner of a tree located in areas of passage, see e. g. TS 17 March 1998, RAJ 1998 (1) no. 1122 p. 1783. Hunting Act (Ley 1/1970 of 4 April 1970, BOE no. 82 of 6 April 1970) art. 33(5) imposes strict liability on hunters, see CA Palencia 9 October 1996, AC 1996 (3) no. 1838 p. 246 (“quasi-strict liability”). ConsProtA art. 148 introduces an additional strict liability regime (former Consumer Protection Act 1984 art. 28). This provision retains significance, even following the transposition of the Product Liability Directive, especially for specific medical services (see further concerning the former regulation under the Consumer Protection Act 1984 Asua González, Responsabilidad civil médica, 1219-1226) and transport law (Álvarez Lata, La responsabilidad civil por daños al medio ambiente, 1961, 1979-1980). Finally, mention must also be made of the specific regime of nuclear liability under the Nuclear Energy Act (Ley 25/1964 of 29 April reguladora de la energía nuclear, BOE no. 107 of 4 May 1964). ITALIAN tort law adopts a divergent approach to these Principles, namely in that it has codified a discrete basis for liability in respect of the carrying out of a dangerous activity under CC art. 2050. According to this provision, liability is imposed on a person who causes loss to another in the exercise of an activity which of itself or by reason of the means employed to carry it out is considered dangerous unless that person proves that all necessitated measures were adopted to avoid the damage occurring. For example, organising a premier division football game connotes a dangerous activity, when rampaging

Article 3:207: Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage

4.

5.

6.

fans and throwing of smoke bombs are to be expected (CFI Torino 11 November 2004, Danno e resp. 2006, 767), likewise CA Rome 7 March 2005, Danno e resp. 2005, 641 marketing of cigarettes. CC art. 2051 prescribes further that a person is liable for damage arising from things in his custody, unless he proves that the damage derived from a chance event. A person having the actual factual control over the thing is regarded as custodian of the thing (Cass. 18 February 2000, no. 1859, Danno e resp. 2000, 390; Cass.sez.un. 11 November 1991, no. 12019, Giur.it. 1992, I, 1, 2218). The range of potential defendants under CC art. 2051 include e. g. the rail operator who is liable for dangers on the platform or footbridge caused by inclement weather conditions (Cass. 10 July 2005, no. 14091, Giur.it. 2006, I, 1, 1378). In a similar manner HUNGARIAN strict liability law also harnesses the categories of liability for dangerous operations and liability for dangerous activities (CC § 345). Consequently, in Hungary, a further festoon of activies are subject to a regime of liability which does not depend on the presence of intention or negligence (blameworthiness); these activities cannot be exhaustively enumerated owing to the broad formulation of CC § 345 which is cognate to a general clause (Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1242; Petrik (-Wellmann), Polgári jog II2, 584-586; Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért7, 102-104; Marton, A polgári jogi felelo˝sség, 196-197; Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 106-110; see in case law BH 2002/306 and BH 2005/251). For example, all types of motorised appliances and a whole arrray of tools (apart from household appliances and medical devices: Benedek loc. cit. 1242 and 1246; BH 1996/199), are subject to the regime of strict liability, furthermore the handling of weapons and explosives are subject to a strict liability regime, furthermore covering roofs, felling trees as well as errecting buildings and civil engineering works (Benedek loc. cit. 1249-1250; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 112). A whole array of specific statutes complement the provisions in the Civil Code, e. g. the Nuclear Energy Act, the Law pertaining to the Protection of Game, Game Managment and Hunting Act and Public Education Act. According to POLISH CC art. 433 the occupier of a premises is liable for damage caused by the ejection, effusion or falling of any object from the premises. See also Article 3:206, Note 6. Extending beyond that envisaged in these PEL Liab.Dam. Principles SLOVENIAN LOA § 156 imposes strict liability on the State or on those who should have prevented the damage, in the event that a person sustains personal injury arising from an act of terrorism or during the course of a public demonstration; in respect of the latter, the organisers are also liable (see further Juhart and Plavs˘ak (-Pensa) Obligacijski zakonik I, no. 1 under art. 156, p. 903). Organisers of all types of mass events are subject to a strict liability regime in respect of personal injury arising from an “extraordinary occurrence” (panic outbreak; rush of spectators climb and traverse unchecked the crowd control fence at football grounds: Pravno mnenje obcˇne seje VS RS, 21, 22 December 1987, Porocˇilo VS RS 2/87, 13) (LOA art. 157). In ROMANIA, large swathes of environmental liability law have been placed subject to a regime of objective liability under the Environmental Liability Emergency Ordinance 68/2007. The Nuclear Energy Liability Act (Act no. 703/2001) art. 4(1) is also an example of a provision laying down objective liability. In GERMANY, a rail operator or operator of an elevated railway will be strictly liable for fatal or personal injuries or damage to property arising in connection with the operation of a railway (Liability Act § 1), in a similar fashion the keeper of aircraft incurs strict liability (Air Traffic Act § 33 (LuftVG)). According to the Medicines Act § 84 a phar-

739

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7.

8.

9.

10.

740

meuctical untertaking incurs liability, if the use of product placed in circulation causes death or causes substantial personal injury to another. A further specific regime in respect of game is contained in § 29 of the Hunting Act. With respect to the prevailing law in AUSTRIA see the previous discussion in Note 8 under Article 3:206. Alongside the actio de effusis vel ejectis CC § 1318 provides for the imposition of strict liability for dangerously placed objects if these items fall from a dwelling (examples include an advertising board, flower pot etc.). CC § 1318 is correspondingly employed for water damage (defective dishwashers or washing machines, cracked aquariums). A number of important provisions in specific Acts place strict liability for certain fields of activity on a statutory footing and are found in the Nuclear LiabilityAct § 11, Forestry Act § 54, Mining Act § 185, Water Act § 26, Aviation Act § 148 and Conduit of Gas and Liquids Act Act § 10. Austrian federal law is also familar with such ad hoc statutes, regulation of hunting being one such example. GREEK law provides for further forms of strict liability in the field of air transport law. The Air LawCodex [Law 1815/1988] art. 106 provides for liability of the air carrier for personal injury incurred by passengers aboard domestic flights (see Dimopoulou, I evthini apo diakindinevsi, 121); loc. cit. art. 117 sets forth a corresponding claim for persons who are on the ground (see Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio I, 696). Employer’s liability for work related accidents of employees is also a case of strict liability and is regulated in Law 551/1915 (Dimopoulou loc. cit. 136); however, a social security scheme was implemented to cover this field of liability (Georgiades loc. cit. 698). Maritime Pollution by Oil Act [Law 314/1976] pertaining to oil pollution at sea, nuclear energy law (Dimopoulou loc. cit. 251) and the Liability for Damage caused by Objects from Space Act [Law 563/1977] (Dimopoulou loc. cit. 257) are further instances of ad hoc strict liability provisions. Similarly, a copious number of strict liability provisions remain to be considered under PORTUGUESE law (i. e. ancillary to those provisions already examined in the Notes pertaining to Article 3:201-3:206), to some extent integrated within the Civil Code, otherwise can be found in various ad hoc statutes. Under CC art. 1347(3), the owner of constructions, installations or deposits of corrosive substances is liable independent of fault for damage caused by them. It is important to note that CC art. 493(2) (on liability for dangerous activities, see Note 10 under Article 3:206) has been given a wide scope of application. For example, this provision has been held to apply to the organisers of large sporting events (STJ 17 November 2005). Further strict liability regimes can be encountered in numerous specific statutes which have not been integrated within the Civil Code, inter alia the Labour Code arts. 120g, 239, 281, Hunting Act art. 33(1) (see STJ 10 October 2002) and Ultra-light (non-motorised) Aircraft Decree Law art. 14(1). DUTCH CC arts. 6:176 and 6:177 are discrete provisions where strict liability is attached to the operation of dumping grounds and drilling holes. Additionally, by virtue of CC art. 7:658(1) a strict liability regime exists to render the employer liable for damage arising from an unsafe work environment (see further HR 10 December 1999, NedJur 2000 no. 211 p. 1376; HR 17 November 2000, NedJur 2001, no. 596 p. 4376; HR 26 January 2001, NedJur 2001, no. 597 p. 4393; HR 15 December 2000, NedJur 2001, no. 198 p. 1306; HR 4 May 2001, NedJur 2001, no. 377 p. 2814 and HR 29 June 2001, NedJur 2001, no. 476 p. 3556). Likewise, further additional expositions of strict liability can be found in the NORDIC countries. They include regulations pertaining damage arising in the course of transport

Article 3:207: Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage

11.

by plane, rail and ship (in respect of SWEDEN see the Liability for Damage Caused in the Course of Aviation Act [1922:382], Railway Traffic Act [1985:192] chap. 5 § 1 and Maritime Code chaps. 7 and 10; for DENMARK Aviation Traffic Act (Luftfartsloven), Railway Act (Jernbaneloven) chap. 7 and Maritime Act (Søloven) § 191; and for FINLAND Air Traffic Act [1995/281], Railway Traffic Liability Act [1999/113] and Maritime Act [1994/674] chaps. 7 and 10). The general tenor of liability for individual loss arising from damage to the environment in SWEDEN and FINLAND can have a considerably more wide ranging reach than these Principles, in particular in that pure economic loss is captured (e. g. Swedish Supreme Court 1 November 1996, NJA 1996, 634). It may also be noted that in a number of cases, the FINNISH Environmental Damage Compensation Act § 7 allows for liability to be imposed on the natural person which is controlled by the legal person, this entails that the natural person incurs liability when the relevant installation is formally operated by the legal person (Finnish Supreme Court 22 March 2001, HD 2001:61). Moreover, the trinity of Nordic Countries have developed rules of strict liability for damage arising from excavations and similar construction work. There is also a special regime in respect of damage arising from fractured water and sewage pipes. In the UNITED KINGDOM too there are statutes which provide for a form of liability without negligence in closely-defined circumstances going beyond the matters set out in the preceding articles, though these are usually in the context of existing legal relationships or may be regarded as at the borderline to salvage. An example of additional liability is the Employers’ Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969, which provides that where personal injury is sustained by an employee in the course of his employment due to a defect in equipment provided by the employer for the purposes of the employer’s business and the defect is due to the fault of a third party, the injury is deemed attributable to negligence of the employer: s. 1(1). Rights of contribution from the third party are expressly preserved by the Act: ibid. Fault, for these purposes, means negligence, breach of statutory duty and other acts or omissions giving rise to tortious liability (for English law) or which are wrongful and give rise to a liability in damages (for Scots law): s. 1(3). As regards the latter, public or private Acts may incorporate the the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847, which in s. 56 provides that a harbour master may recover the expense of removing any wreck or other obstruction from the owner of the wreck or obstruction. The liability of the owner is independent of negligence: Great Western Railway Co. v. Owners of the SS Mostyn (The Mostyn) [1928] AC 57; as to the meaning of owner see Arrow Shipping Co. v. Tyne Improvement Commissioners (The “Crystal”) [1894] AC 508. It has also been argued that there is vicarious liability of an owner of a chattel (at any rate for cars or boats) for the negligence of its user in injuring another when the chattel is lent to another, but the defendant is liable only if a right to control the use is retained and the defendant has some purpose of his own in the user and in such circumstances liability could perhaps be explained on the basis of conventional principles in view of a master-servant relationship: see Clerk and Lindsell (-Murphy), Torts19, para. 6-70 et seq.

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Article 3:208: Abandonment For the purposes of this Section, a person remains accountable for an immovable, vehicle, substance or installation which that person abandons until another exercises independent control over it or becomes its keeper or operator. This applies correspondingly, so far as reasonable, in respect of a keeper of an animal.

Comments A.

First sentence

1. Purpose of the rule. This Article adds a clarification for the purposes of Article 3:202 (Accountability for damage caused by the unsafe state of an immovable), Article 3:203 (Accountability for damage caused by animals), Article 3:205 (Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles) and Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions). The point in time for which status as owner, keeper or occupier is material is essentially the moment when the event causing the damage occurs. This Article makes an exception to that basic rule. No-one should be able to avoid responsibility as owner, keeper or occupier simply by abandonment. 2. Abandonment. “Abandonment” presupposes an intentional and voluntary act which is directed towards giving up control of the thing. The unintended loss of a thing is not an abandonment. Nor is there an abandonment when another’s property is returned properly, e. g. when a motor vehicle is parked by its temporary keeper at a given car park, as agreed with the owner, in order that the latter can drive it away from there later. Equally the correct disposal of a thing or substance is not an abandonment because in such a case the thing or substance passes without hiatus into another’s control. By contrast, a person who simply leaves an old, but still fully functional, vehicle at the side of the road or lets an installation or plant become derelict without taking measures to safeguard it or who tips dangerous substances on to a rubbish dump, buries them somewhere in the countryside or lets them sink into a pond, remains responsible for that thing, even if no longer its keeper at this point in time.

B.

Second sentence

3. Animals. The same starting point applies also to animals, but requires qualification by a reasonableness test. This is necessary to take account, for example, of wild animals which have been raised in captivity, but with a view to their reintroduction into the wild, and animals which have run away and can no longer be recaptured.

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Article 3:208: Abandonment

Notes 1.

2.

Under FRENCH law “abandoned” objects (res derelictae) are things which are ownerless or without a keeper; consequently, no person can be made accountable for the ensuing damage (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2006/2007), no. 7695). The feasibility of renouncing ownership is derived from an analogous application of CC arts. 656, 699, 917 and 2172, culminating in a release from obligations tied to ownership (Zenati and Revet, Les biens2, no. 202 p. 242). This premise essentially applies also in respect of liability for animals under CC art. 1385. In general property in ownerless things accrues to the State (CC arts. 539 and 713; Code général de la propriété des personnes publiques art. L. 1122-1 and 1123-1). There is a scarcity of case law in respect of the liability for res derelictae. Cass.civ. 18 June 1997, Bull.civ. 1997, II, no. 197 p. 116 concerned an abandoned warhead in a mine which had not been operated in eight years. The claimant picked it up and succeded in manipulating it in such a manner that it denotated, resulting in severe injury. It was held that while the quarry belonged to the commune, it could not be said that the commune was the gardien; on the contrary the injured party himself was its gardien. Similary, according to the prevailing view in BELGIUM res derelictae are, as a general rule regarded as res nullius, i. e. things which do not have a keeper (Dalcq, Responsabilité civile I2, no. 2090). As a consequence liability is excluded under CC art. 1384(1) (Dalcq loc. cit. no. 2042). In SPAIN the basic rule provides that a person who has legally abandoned a thing and therefore renounced their property right no longer has the duty of care that ownership requires or involves (Albaladejo, Derecho Civil, III(1)8, 231-232). That implies, for instance, that the owner or possessor of an animal, once the animal was abandoned, will not be liable for damage caused by the latter under CC art. 1905 (Albaladejo (-Pantaleón Prieto), Comentarios al Código Civil y compilaciones forales VIII(1), art. 610 p. 187). Nevertheless, damage caused by a thing which was abandoned may be attributed to the conduct of the former owner or former possessor under the general rule on non-contractual liability (CC art. 1902, see Albadalejo loc. cit. 232, fn. 5; Paz-Ares/ Díez-Picazo/Bercovitz/Salvador (-Miquel González), Código Civil II2, 1232). In respect of waste, some provisions within the autonomous legislation of the regions establish a specific liability regime (see, for instance, Waste Management (Madrid) Act [Ley Comunidad de Madrid 5/2003 of 20 May de residuos de la Comunidad de Madrid, BOE of 29 May 2003] art. 25(6) [producers of waste substances remain liable for damage caused as long as they possess these substances] and Urban Solid Waste Management (Galicia) Act [Ley Parlamento de Galicia 10/1997 of 22 August de residuos sólidos urbanos] art. 10 [all urban waste substances shall always have a keeper]). It must be stressed, however, that abandonment of a substance does not seem to play any significant role when determining liability (see e. g. TS 8 March 2006, RAJ 2006 (1) no. 1076 p. 2795: parental liability under CC art. 1903(2) for dangerous substances in a bottle which was probably abandoned by their children). Of course a distinction must be drawn beween moveables and immoveables. If ownership of an immoveable is renounced, then ownership then accrues (escheats?) to the State by virtue of law (Assets of the Public Administration Act [Ley 33/2003 of 3 November de patrimonio de las Administraciones públicas, BOE of 4 November 2003] art. 17). Thus, the competent public administration becomes strictly liable for damage caused by an immovable that has been abandoned (loc. cit. art. 139).

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Chapter 3: Accountability

3.

4.

5.

744

Similarly in ITALY a distinction is drawn betweem moveables and immoveable property. It can be deduced from CC art. 923(2), that ownership of a moveable can be renounced by means of a derelictio and hence acquires the status of a res nullius. This circumstance alone does not alter the fact that a derelictio can also in the individual case simulataneously amount to a tort in particular cases which entails that the renounciation of ownership is not effected. This is the case e. g. if rubbish is not correctly disposed of or where it is sold illegally (Gambaro, Diritto di proprietà, 862-863). The liability of a person in its capacity as custodian of the thing ends as soon as the person relenquishes control over the thing. In respect of immoveables, italian law recognised what is commonly called abbandono liberatorio (CC arts. 888, 1070, 2858). This doctrine permits the owner to absolve himself of particular encumbrances or obligations in a number of defined circumstances. Naturally the property does not become ownerless but ownership is immediately vested in the new owner (e. g. in the case that the owner of a servient estate renounces ownership in favour of the owner of the dominant estate). In a case of abbandono semplice, as can be inferred from CC art. 827, ownerhip is immediately vested in the State (Gambaro loc. cit. 867-868). Similarly, HUNGARIAN law takes cognisance of the derelictio, however its application is precluded in the case of registered land (CC § 112(2)). Incidentially there is no corresponding provision to Article 3:208 in the Civil Code. Environmental Protection Act (Law no. LIII /1995) §§ 102(4) and 104 set forth specific provisions on liability for environmental damage for a company’s legal successor. POLISH CC art. 340 provides that a temporary loss of possession will not interrupt the continuance of possession, hence this has an impact on all strict liability provisions which relate to the possession of a thing (CC arts. 434, 436 § 1). There is a presumption that possession endures continously. The possessor cannot excuplate himself from tortious liability by claiming that he assigned the running of the business to another (CC art. 429). The application of CC art. 431 § 1 extends the liability of the keeper to animals which have strayed. Derelictio is possible only in respect of movables (CC art. 180) in the form of an abandonment (an intention to abandon is required) which entails the loss of possession having an effect on all provisions of strict liability which are based on possession of a thing (CC arts. 434, 436 § 1). It is accepted within the framework of the provisions pertaining to the keeper’s liability under ROMANIAN CC art. 1000(1) that the owner does not via derelictio forfeit his status as keeper, until another party acquires actual control and a congruent right of control over the thing (Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘, 187). There is correspondence between these provisions and the provisions dealing with liability for animals under CC art. 1001 (Lupan loc. cit. 221). Under GERMAN law ownership of land (CC § 928) as well as ownership of moveable property (CC § 959) can be renounced, hence the property becomes ownerless. As a general rule, the voluntary abandonment of goods is bound up with the relinquishment of the attribute of keeper. However, the argument has been advanced that under § 7(1) of the Road Traffic Act the former keeper retains responsibilty because the motor vehicle is not permitted to be keeperless in operation (Greger, Haftungsrecht des Straßenverkehrs4, § 3, no. 274). The Environmental Liability Act § 2(2) provides, in respect to dangers posed to the environment by installations that liability will be incurred by the previous operator provided that the impact to the environment derives from a hazard, and the basis for the danger posed by the installation was already in place prior to the cessation of operations.

Article 3:208: Abandonment

6.

7.

8.

In AUSTRIA ownership of moveable property can be relinquished by a voluntary renouncement of possession (CC § 349); renouncing the ownership of real property requires the deletion of the land registry entry (CC § 350). Renouncing ownership does not entail that any previously incurred obligation to pay damages or obligation to remove the harmful consequences is nullified (OGH 31 October 1968, JBl 1968, 568; Ertl, JBl 1974, 281, 342) nor does it follow that the defendant is relieved of his obligations in respect of the fulfillment of specific protective duties owed to the general public (Rummel (-Spielbüchler), ABGB I3, § 387 no. 2). This holds true, e. g. in respect of the duty of the landowner to maintain and keep the property in proper condition. Ad hoc statutes, in particularly environmental statutes, clarify that the last keeper or proprietor remain liable, and hence cannot abdicate responsibility simply by means of voluntary renouncement of posession (e. g. Waste Management Act § 18). Within the framework of the derelictio, a similar distinction is made in PORTUGAL between movable and immovable property. The ownership of animals and other movables abandoned by their owners can be acquired by occupation (CC arts. 1316, 1317(d), 1318 and 1323(2)); if the freehold is renounced then ownership accrues ex lege to the State (Const. art. 89; Menezes Cordeiro, Direitos Reais, 484- 485). If someone abandons a vehicle he loses “effective direction” (CC art. 503(1)) over it and is therefore no longer strictly liable. As far as dangerous substances are concerned, the same holds true for the point of departure under CC art. 509(1). However, the failure to properly dispose of such substances could amount to a dangerous activity in the sense of CC art. 493(2). When building works are completed, a duty is extant in respect of the removal of waste and other rest matter from the area (Urbanisation and Construction Decree Law art. 86; Public Contracts Code art. 177(2)). A commune which fails to remove the charred part of a building which resulted from a fire in a palace owned by it, hence causing damage to neighbouring property, is liable under the general tenets of tort law (CA Oporto 6 January 2003; STJ 8 July 2003). If wild or stray animals stray onto a motorway owing to a failure to secure a fence which ringed them in and their keeper cannot be ascertained, recent case law has held that the person licensed to operate the motor way is liable for accidents caused in this manner (STJ 22 June 2004; CA Lisbon 15 May 2007; CA Evora 25 January 2007). According to DUTCH law the scope of application of the regulation contained in Article 3:208 corresponds to CC art. 6:176(1), whereupon the operator of a dumping ground is also liable for damage which is caused by air, water of ground pollution, even if it originates following the closure of the dumping ground. Ownership of ownerless property accrues to the State (CC art. 5:24). In the NORDIC countries the issue addressed by Article 3:208 is rarely broached. In the first instance, liability for omissions could be regarded as providing a basis for liability for an abandoned object. This stems from the fact that the relinquishing of the object could entail a prior positive act increasing the risk of danger, which according to general tort law rules would ground a duty to proactively obviate the ensuing danger (see further Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 114; Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 111; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 41). Swedish HD 14 December 1935, NJA 1935, 636 held e. g. that a man was liable to pay damages, who left a piece of quick lime in a bucket, after pouring water on it, which later exploded, injuring some bypassing children. DANISH Eastern CA 12 February 1931, UfR 1931, 598 confirmed the liability of a tenant who had moved away from his apartment and left an accumulator in it, which later started leaking acid causing damage to the tenant occupying an apartment below. Furthermore Finnish HD

745

Chapter 3: Accountability

9.

746

1954 II 66 affirmed the liability of a man who wished to dispose of some chemical waste by burning it on another person’s property, subsequently causing damage to the latter’s animals. For Sweden, the prepatory works to the Environmental Code confirm that a person who secretly disposes of substances on another person’s property is liable for damage caused by those substances (NJA 1986 II, 141). At the same time, it is necessary to take note of the fact that conceptually, the Environmental Code chap. 32 employs a very extensive meaning of an installation posing a danger to the environment or an activity dangerous to the environment (e. g. a person who acquires real property is liable for substances which pose a danger to the environment, which had been left on the land by the previous operator of an installation without the knowledge of the new owner: HD 3 September 1983, NJA 1984, 602; Supreme Administrative Court 16 January 1997, RÅ 1997, 12 I; S-Karnov 2006/07 (-Karlsson), Miljöbalk, no. 347 p. 2385). It is uncertain that this position prevails in Denmark and Finland; however actual and constructive knowledge of dangerous substances leads to the new owner being made accountable (Danish Western CA 24 May 1994, FED 1994, 537; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 190; Finnish Environmental Damage Compensation Act § 7(1-3)). For ENGLISH law the Animals Act 1971, s. 6(3), provides that if an animal cases to be owned or possessed, the person who was keeper immediately beforehand continues to be a keeper until another person becomes the keeper. This extends to both escaped as well as abandoned animals; it has been doubted with liability unlimited in time, unless another becomes a keeper, is reasonable for all indigenous wild animals which, escaping captivity, revert to life in the wild: see Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale and Jones), Torts19, para. 22-09, no. 37 (contrasting liability for foxes and tigers). Where nobody is in physical control of premises, the person with legal title is regarded under the common law rules as the occupier for the purposes of liability under Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957: see Harris v. Birkenhead Corp. [1976] 1 WLR 279 (buyer of an empty slum house, compulsorily purchased for demolition, became an occupier on conveyance, even before taking possession).

Chapter 4: Causation Article 4:101: General rule (1) A person causes legally relevant damage to another if the damage is to be regarded as a consequence of: (a) that person’s conduct; or (b) a source of danger for which that person is responsible. (2) In cases of personal injury or death the injured person’s predisposition with respect to the type or extent of the injury sustained is to be disregarded.

Comments A.

General

1. Scope. Paragraph (1) contains a general rule on causation. It relates to both the causation of damage by human conduct and the causation of damage in cases in which the ground of accountability is not human conduct, but rather a person’s responsibility for a source of danger. In the latter case the legally relevant damage must have been caused by the source of danger. The Article is linked to Article 1:101 (Basic rule) paragraph (1), under which causation constitutes one of the three indispensable pillars for liability under this Book (alongside legally relevant damage and accountability). Paragraph (2) of the present Article contains a special rule for the case of the injury or death of a person who already, prior to the accident, suffered from an infirmity or illness which contributed to the severity of the physical injury. 2. Policy considerations. Notwithstanding the many questions connected with the concept of causation, it is an undisputed cornerstone of all European legal systems of liability – including Community law – that the legally relevant damage must have been “caused” either by the liable person or by another person or a material source of danger for which that person bears responsibility. Although causation alone is never sufficient for liability – apart from some regional exceptions in the law on traffic accidents – civil liability in damages never comes into the picture without it. This branch of the law does not impose liability for damages simply for moral or general political reasons. It is not the “duty defaulter”, the “rich person” or the “insured party” who is made liable, but rather a person to whose sphere of control the subsequent mishap may be traced back. Where sufficient evidence of this causal link is lacking, while a person may be exposed to responsibility under criminal or insurance law or may incur other sanctions, there is no liability under this branch of the law. In the Europe of today, a mere attempt to harm no longer grounds civil liability in damages in any jurisdiction. However, wrongful conduct

747

Chapter 4: Causation

that is apt to occasion damage, but has not yet done so, may be prevented by means of a prior restraint order (Article 1:102 (Prevention)). Illustration 1 A claim in damages does not materialise where the dishonest competitive conduct of A did not cause the subsequent loss of profit of competitor B, because the lost profit had been attributable to a dip in sales due to a slow-down in the economy. B can, however, obtain protection from further dishonest anti-competitive behaviour on A’s part where there is a threat of a further setback in profits because of it. 3. The term causation. The term “causation” is used in all European systems of legal liability, but is nowhere defined. Provisions giving some indication of how causation is to be determined are encountered, but only infrequently. As can be seen from this Article and from Article 1:101 (Basic rule), this Book regards causation as the necessary link between (a) the intentional or negligent conduct of the person who is to be held liable or a source of danger for which that person bears responsibility and (b) legally relevant damage. It must be possible to say of the damage that it is to be regarded as a consequence of the liable person’s conduct or of a source of danger for which that person is responsible. The Article builds on Chapters 2 and 3 and makes it clear that causation can follow differently nuanced rules depending on the attributive cause and the legally relevant damage. 4. Causation by conduct. Paragraph (1)(a) governs the case in which a person has caused the relevant damage by that person’s own conduct. “Conduct” has the same meaning here as in the context of Article 3:102 (Negligence). See the comments on that provision. 5. Causation by omission. The Article makes no distinction between positive action on the one hand and passivity or omission on the other. The cause of legally relevant damage as a matter of law under these rules may well be an omission. This follows the pattern set in the context of negligence, where the draft also avoids differentiating between positive acts and omissions (see comments to Article 3:102 (Negligence)). It would contradict that approach to adopt a different line in relation to causation. The only possibility for a precise separation of positive acts from omissions would presumably be a test of whether a person had physically acted or not. Such a criterion is, however, not legally workable. For example, a driver who fails to stop at a red light and consequently injures a passenger would have to be regarded as having omitted to act (by omitting to remove the foot from the accelerator and apply it to the brake pedal) rather than as having positively done something which ought not to have been done. That would scarcely be in line with normal conceptions of the basis of liability. An omission by a person is a cause of damage when (a) the person had the opportunity to intervene and was under a duty to use that opportunity and (b) the damage is to be regarded as a consequence of the failure to intervene.

748

Article 4:101: General rule

Illustration 2 A doctor fails to tell the hospital of a patient’s high risk of suicide. However, the hospital was already aware of this danger. The omission to inform was thus not causative of the death of the patient. Illustration 3 Two acquaintances go fishing together. For that they use electric power – as they have done on previous occasions – which one of them (A) feeds into the river with the aid of an insulated cable from a public power supply line, while from the riverbank the other (B) drags a long wooden rod with a wire net on it through the water. B suddenly falls into the river. A sets about getting him out of the water but abandons his attempt when he feels the electricity in the water. First of all, he disconnects the cable from the supply line, which costs him a lot of time. B’s deceased body is later taken from the water. It turns out that he was already dead when he fell into the water. The cause of B’s death was not A’s omission to rescue him, but a circulatory failure (resulting from a stance tension caused by the splay of his legs while fishing). Conversely, while A’s joint action with B in relation to the fishing was indeed causative of B’s death, the latter acted at his own risk when he got involved in such a dangerous activity (Article 5:101(2) (Consent and acting at own risk)). 6. Causation by a source of danger. Chapter 3, Section 2 (Accountability without intention or negligence) sets out the situations in which a person is liable although that person may have behaved entirely correctly and not caused the damage by conduct. While in these cases liability also requires causation, the damage will not have been caused by the person liable. Precisely because this is so, in most cases of this nature it is only the causing of particular types of damage which will lead to liability. In other words, in the context of this type of attributive cause, only certain types of damage are legally relevant. Two basic situations must be distinguished. 7. Vicarious liability. In the first group of cases – often and imprecisely termed “vicarious liability” – the damage has been caused by a person for whom the person liable must take responsibility. The main example is to be found in Article 3:201 (Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives). The damage is actually caused by, for example, the employee and not the employer. The mere hiring of an employee is insufficient to qualify as a cause of damage because such conduct is allowed and even desired (It would be different where the employee is hired for a job which is manifestly beyond the employee’s capabilities; here the employer is acting in breach of duty). In contrast, the case of a parent’s liability (Article 3:104 (Accountability for damage caused by children or supervised persons)) has to do with a double test of causation because the wrongdoing of the child as well as the parent’s failure to supervise will be causative of the damage. 8. Damage caused by animals and things. In the second group of cases the damage has been caused by the realisation of a danger from a source for which the liable person is responsible. The text does not therefore proceed from the proposition that only humans are capable of being the “cause” of damage. Rather the cause of a legally relevant damage 749

Chapter 4: Causation

might equally be an animal, the condition of land or premises, motor vehicles, products, substances or the like. In such cases the rules set out in Article 4:103 (Alternative causes) might also apply.. 9. Connection between legally relevant damage, attributive cause and causation. Paragraph (1) of the Article sets out the connecting link – necessary for the law on liability – between legally relevant damage and attributive cause (intention, negligence, source of risk). The formulation has been deliberately kept flexible (“is to be regarded as a consequence...”) so as to ensure that, in the context of causation, differences between individual attributive causes and legally relevant damage can be taken into account. In a legal setting there is no “one-size-fits-all” general test for causation. Rather, considerations relevant to causation may be different depending on which ground of liability and which kind of legally relevant damage is in focus. If the person causing the damage has acted intentionally, it will be easier to characterise a legally relevant damage as the consequence of the conduct than if the matter is one of misjudgement or minor carelessness. Similarly, if the damage takes the form of personal injury, causation may be more readily affirmed than would be the case with damage to property or a pure economic loss. For the cases of liability without intention or negligence the provisions of Chapter 3, Section 2 contain specific rules which are also important for the test for causation. This is because their underlying feature is that liability depends on whether the risk which justifies the imposition of the strict liability is realised in the damage which has occurred. 10. Special rules. A few special rules supplement the general rule in paragraph (1) of the Article. Paragraph (2) expresses the idea that a wrongdoer “must take his victim as he finds him”, thus precluding the argument that the injury is in reality attributable to a condition or affliction from which the victim already suffered and not to the conduct of the wrongdoer. Article 4:102 (Collaboration) may be regarded as a rule which clarifies in a specific case the application of the doctrine of “psychological” causation. Article 4:103 (Alternative causes) governs the special case of so-called “alternative” causation. In contrast, Article 6:103 (Equalisation of benefits) proceeds on the basis that issues of benefit equalisation are not to be qualified as a matter of causation, but as a question of the extent of the reparation which is to be provided. However, there is no provision in this Book which would render the members of a group (e. g. participants in a protest march willing to resort to violence) liable solely because of their participation in the activities of the group. Incidentally, that would also be a rule which would have to be conceived as a norm of accountability (liability for the causation of legally relevant damage by others), not of causation. The question of liability for loss of a chance would be a question concerning legally relevant damage, not causation; of course the differences of opinion on this issue confirm that these two elements of liability (legally relevant damage and causation) partially intersect.

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Article 4:101: General rule

B.

Particulars

11. Cause in fact and cause in law not distinguished. Many jurists are inclined to make questions of causation the subject of fundamental and philosophically elevated treatment. It is not the function of paragraph (1) of this Article to attach itself firmly to a defined theoretical position within the broad spectrum of opinion. The width and complexity of the subject do not speak in favour of a precise rule on causation. Paragraph (1) therefore only establishes the basic principle on which all juristic considerations of causation rest: a conduct or a source of danger causes a legally relevant damage if the damage is to be regarded as a consequence of that conduct or source of danger. Consequently, the provision does not distinguish between a cause in fact and a cause in law. The Article rather leaves it for further discussion whether and to what extent such a distinction will stand up in theory and in turn lend itself to be being put into practice. 12. No reduction to a “conditio sine qua non” formula. This is in turn the reason why paragraph (1) does not reduce the test for causation to a “but for” or “conditio sine qua non” test. This would have merely put a “factual” or “scientific” concept of causation into words. Numerous exceptions and expansions would have been necessary, even at this level, without there being any real prospect of exhaustively covering the subject-matter. Just as important is the point that the “but for” test alone cannot separate consequences falling within the perimeter of relevant liability from consequences falling outside this perimeter and not giving rise to liability. This process of separation takes place well-nigh unavoidably on the basis of a value judgement, of what might be called a “legal” or “normative” test for causation. Incidentally, in the context of these rules, the decisive factor is not whether a random event is the cause of another random event, but rather whether there is a link of cause and effect between an intentional or negligent conduct or a source of danger on the one hand and a legally relevant damage on the other. The jurist does not ask the question e. g. whether someone who gets up in the morning five minutes earlier and was therefore earlier at the scene of the accident has caused the accident solely by virtue of this fact, because the very breach of duty is already lacking. The question would be just as pointless as the question whether a person injured by an assault caused the injury through mere presence at the site of the incident. Illustration 4 An accident occurs on a straight road. Through lack of attention, A drives into B’s car, which is at the side of the road fully in accordance with traffic regulations. Neither the damage to B’s vehicle nor the damage to A’s car is the consequence of negligent conduct on the part of B; nor are they a consequence of the use of B’s car. 13. Elements of assessment. The factors to be taken into account in deciding whether a particular legally relevant damage is to be seen as a consequence (even if it is not the only one) of particular wrongdoing or of a particular source of danger do not lend themselves well to being conclusively listed nor to being given a relative weighting in relation to each other. Each individual case can make a new calibration necessary. Aspects of probability and foreseeability come into play but so too do the type of the attributive cause and the type of damage. Also relevant are the protective aim of the 751

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norm of social behaviour which has been infringed and (occasionally) general policy considerations. In European legal doctrine there are numerous formulations on this topic – for instance that the damage arising must be an “adequate” consequence of the act breaching a duty, that it may not be “too remote” or that through it, an individually specified risk must have been realised. These doctrinal approaches are neither confirmed nor challenged by the Article. 14. Break in the chain of causation. Only through carefully evaluated considerations of the type mentioned may a solution be found to questions like whether the damage incurred is to be deemed a consequence of a particular person’s conduct or whether it is to be attributed in whole or in part to the conduct of an intervening third party or even to the conduct of the victim. While the intentional intervention of a third party typically breaks the chain of causation or liability, it depends on the circumstances of each individual case whether or not the damage is to be seen as a consequence of a particular person’s conduct. Illustration 5 While having a rest, a hunter (A) leaves a loaded rifle leaning against a tree contrary to regulations. B lifts the rifle; it lets off a shot and C is killed. A’s conduct in breach of duty was causative for the death of C if the shot went off by accident when B was holding the rifle or if B indeed intended to fire the rifle and then mistakenly hit C. In contrast, C’s death can no longer be seen as a consequence of A’s not unloading the weapon if B took the rifle for the purpose of killing C, unless A had set up the scenario in order to facilitate this deed. Illustration 6 A is responsible for a road accident. The scene of the accident must be closed off for a spell. Impatient drivers drive around the accident scene and so damage the bordering cycle lanes and pedestrian pathways. This is no longer a consequence of A’s wrongdoing, through which the road accident occurred. Illustration 7 A and her life partner B are accosted by D and E when leaving C’s discotheque. After an exchange of words between C and D, B is beaten up. A attempts to get help but is then struck herself by E and severely injured. C (who is sued by A because he alone has a deep pocket) is also liable to A for her damage. The intervention of E does not break the chain of causation because life experience shows that when someone out of a group begins a brawl, it easily leads to uncontrollable complications. 15. Self-harm of the victim; contributory fault. Where the intervening person is later the victim, two questions must be kept apart. The first question is always whether the person alleged to be liable also caused (along with the victim) the victim’s conduct and subsequent damage. This is typically answered in the affirmative if the victim’s act or omission was provoked by the person’s wrongdoing, i. e. where it was probable that the victim would react in this way. Only when this question has been answered in the affirmative does the further question arise whether the injured person’s right to compen752

Article 4:101: General rule

sation under Article 5:102 (Contributory fault and accountability) is to be reduced because of contributory fault. Illustration 8 A suffers a head injury in a traffic accident and then develops a tendency to attack women. He is rendered liable in damages to the women and demands compensation from B, who was responsible for the traffic accident. However, the liabilities to pay damages are not to be regarded as a consequence of the accident; they are to be regarded as the consequences of A’s own criminal acts. Illustration 9 In the course of an operation, A’s daughter’s only kidney is culpably removed; A’s mother then decides to donate one of her kidneys. An easily understandable and obvious decision is what is at issue here; consequently, the doctor is liable as against the mother. Illustration 10 Following the theft of several vehicles and their retrieval, an insurance company pays a finder’s reward. The vehicle thief must compensate the insurance company for this because even the insured party, whose claims to insurance were passed over, would have had to pay a finder’s reward. The latter is a consequence of the theft. Illustration 11 A tram driver is stopped by an inspector and summoned to pay a fine. The driver jumps up and runs through the opening door of a train just arriving at the stop. The inspector follows, falls and breaks a leg. This is still deemed a consequence of the conduct of the tram driver, unless the tram driver did not know of the pursuit and would have had no reason to infer this. 16. Causation of a legally relevant damage. The Article is concerned with the causation of legally relevant damage. What exactly constitutes a legally relevant damage is determined by Chapter 2. It may take the form of a mere injury, but equally it may consist in a particular loss. In the latter case, strictly considered, there are two issues of causation in the majority of cases. In a case involving Article 2:206 (Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession), for example, the conduct must have caused physical damage to the thing and that in turn must have resulted in a loss. However, the considerations as a legal matter of causation are in the two cases fundamentally the same. The same arguments apply in relation to those provisions in Chapter 2 which refer to a loss arising “as a result” of a given injury, infringement of a right or physical damage. 17. Burden of proof. In this context, the decisive element is the determination that the legally relevant damage suffered is to be deemed a consequence of a person’s conduct or the realisation of a source of risk, for which a person bears responsibility. Therefore, under paragraph (1) there is no room for specific provisions on the burden of proof, and particularly no room for the reversal of the burden of proof in special situations. After all the relevant circumstances have been weighed up in an individual case, the conclusion that the damage is to be deemed a consequence of the relevant conduct or source of danger is 753

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based on a legal assessment. If the matter goes to court, the judge is afforded a certain amount of discretion which may and must be exercised. The facts upon which a judgment will be based are to be proven by the claimant according to general provisions (possibly including the res ipsa loquitur rule, depending on the applicable law of evidence). Whether the existence of a cause-and-effect relationship between the wrongdoing and damage can be drawn from them, is not something which seems to be amenable to the allocation of the burden of proof. Particularly in the frequently very complex situations of cause and effect with which the law on liability for environmental pollution has to struggle, the assessment of causation must be undisturbed in relation to probability assessment. Where for instance rays of a certain kind very frequently lead to a cancerous disease of the relevant kind and the victim lives in the vicinity of the emitting entity and belongs to a special risk group, there is no reasonable ground for the inference that the disease is not a consequence of the rays. 18. “Egg shell skull” (paragraph (2)). Under paragraph (2), in cases of personal injury or death, the injured person’s predisposition with respect to the type or extent of the injury sustained is to be disregarded. In principle, any person who injures another should not be exonerated because the victim’s health was previously unsound or because the victim suffered from a physical or mental affliction. Injury to body or health, and death, in cases caught by paragraph (2) in conjunction with paragraph (1) must be seen as a consequence of the relevant conduct. A person who injures a victim in weak health cannot demand to be put in the position which would have existed if the victim had been healthy; also, in cases of psychological injury, the injury is in principle attributable to the person who inflicted the injury despite the injured person’s particular vulnerability. However, depending on the situation in each case, it is conceivable that some pre-existing harm might be regarded as relevant to a reduction of the amount of compensation owed. Illustration 12 Following an accident for which X is responsible, malignant tumour tissue in the victim’s head is torn open and she dies three weeks later. Her hitherto unknown cancerous disease would have ended fatally in any event. However, the accident sped up the process; as a result, the death was a consequence of the accident. The compensation due to dependants for lost maintenance (Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death) paragraph (2)(c)) is limited to the period of time the victim would have probably lived had it not been for the accident. When calculating the non-economic losses suffered by third persons as a result of the death, the pre-existing cancerous disease is also to be taken into account. Illustration 13 As a result of the severe injury of both parents, a child suffers nervous shock, requiring medical treatment. The fact that the child had a pre-existing illness and even a hereditary affliction changes nothing vis à vis causation.

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Notes I.

General theory of causation

1.

The requirement of causation is a feature common to all European tort law regimes. However, it is very often the case that its precise constitutents cannot be easily discerned from statutory sources. This is true of the FRENCH CC. The only uncontentious issue is that in order for tortious liability to arise, there must be a causal connection between the fait générateur and the resulting loss (Cass.civ. 27 October 1975, GazPal 1976, I, 169, note Plancqueel). Legal scholarship differentiates between two main theories of causation: the doctrine called l’équivalence des conditions and the théorie de la causalité adéquate. The doctrine of equivalent conditions provides that every circumstance which was instrumental in the damage occurring is to be regarded as the cause of the whole extent of the damage; every conditio sine qua non is causal (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2006/2007), no. 1715). Conversely, the doctrine of adequate causation sets forth that an act is only causal when, objectively and a posteriori considered, it seems generally capable of bringing about the resulting damage (le Tourneau and Cadiet loc. cit. no. 1716). Both doctrines have been utilised in jurisprudence; it cannot be conclusively asserted that one theory prevails over the other, compare. e. g. in respect of the adequacy doctrine Cass.civ. 24 February 2005, Bull.civ. 2005, II, no. 53 (the children of a man who was injured in an accident long before their birth, sued the defendant on the grounds of préjudice moral, on the basis that they never could establish a normal affectionate relationship with their father; the court held that there was no lien de causalité between the accident and the loss suffered by the children) and as regards the theory of equivalence Cass.ass.plén. 24 June 2005, Bull.ass.plén. 2005, no. 7 p. 16 (occupational accident; it was sufficient that the employer’s faute inexcusable was a cause nécessaire for the accident, even where, other fautes, could have contributed to the damage occurring). Conversely, the majority of courts in BELGIUM tend to favour application of the conventional test commonly known as the theory of equivalence of conditions (but for test) (Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Wynant/Debaene, TPR 2000, 1551, 1876, no. 144; Dalcq and Schamps, RCJB 1995, 663, 696 no. 126); it is frequently very strictly applied. It suffices that, but for the act of the defendant, the harm would not have occurred in the manner that actually transpired (Cass. 13 October 2004, Pas. belge 2004, I, no. 476 p. 1558). Every condition or event, without which the concrete damage would not have occurred in the manner that it did occur, is regarded as one of the causes of the damage (Cass. 23 February 1994, Pas. belge 1994, I, no. 90 p. 196; Cass.ch.réun. 1 April 2004, JT 2005, 357, note Estienne). The trial judge hypothetically reconstructs the chain of events leading to the damage: causation will only be denied in the event that the damage would have occurred anyhow, had the defendant behaved in a manner which was not tortious (Bocken, TBBR 1988, 273, no. 8). However, it remains to be said that the Cour de cassation has not always strictly abided by these criteria. In several decisions, the courts have had recourse to the doctrine of “rightful alternative behaviour” (the issue that presents itself here is that the damage can be attributed to the wrongful behaviour of the defendant, even if he had acted lawfully, the damage would have resulted nonetheless) (Cass. 25 September 1979, Pas. belge 1980, I, 111; Cass. 8 September 1983, RW 1983-84, 2033; Cass. 19 November 1987, RW 1987-88, 1125). This

2.

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3.

4.

756

approach has not been well received in academic circles, (Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Geelen/De Coster, TPR 1987, 1522, no. 164) and the decision of the Cass. (audience plénière) 25 March 1997, Pas. belge 1997, I, no. 161 p. 405 does not fully clarify whether the courts will continue to observe this jurisprudential direction. In any event, there are further indications that the Cour de Cassation has departed from the strict application of equivalence theory, thereby, ceding some scope to the adequacy theory (Cass. 14 June 1996 and Cass. 5 November 1996, Pas. belge 1996, I, nos. 413-414 p. 1070, see illustration 4 above; Cass. 10 May 1994, Pas. belge 1994, I, no. 228 p. 455; Beysen, VersRAI 2004, 10). Generally, SPANISH courts rarely delve into questions of causation. However, it can be asserted that given that the Supreme Court refers so frequently to the criterion of “adequate causation” (TS 15 March 1993, RAJ 1993 (2) no. 2284 p. 2958; TS 9 October 1999, RAJ 1999 (4) no. 7245 p. 11381; TS 16 January 2002, RAJ 2002 (1) no. 8 p. 24; TS 5 December 2002, RAJ 2002 (6) no. 10427 p. 19300; TS 27 June 2005, RAJ 2005 (3) no. 4438 p. 9337; TS 9 March 2006, RAJ 2006 (2) no. 1882 p. 4474), that it has matured into a point of departure under prevailing law. TS 24 May 1993, RAJ 1993 (2) no. 3727 p. 4743, however, applied the ‘preponderance evidence criterion’; the causal nexus was affirmed owing to the fact that it was highly improbable that harm was not caused by the defendant’s emissions. TS 10 February 2006, RAJ 2006 (1) no. 675 p. 1617 u (at FJ3) expressly distinguished between causation in fact and causation in law; factually the damage was caused by the defendant but legally the damage was caused by the injured party itself. Older decisions were based simply on the buen sentido, “common sense” (e. g. TS 18 April 1985, RAJ 1985 (1) no. 1770 p. 1511 and TS 4 March 1988, RAJ 1988 (1) no. 1553 p. 1497), furthermore, until recently, the doctrine of ‘effective cause’ was frequently utilised (causa eficiente)(TS 11 February 1993, RAJ 1993 (1) no. 1459 p. 1836; TS 3 December 2002, RAJ 2002 (6) no. 10414 p. 19277). The First Chamber of the Tribunal Supremo recently applied the ‘general risk of life’ criterion in order to exclude the liability of a gardening company for the damage caused to a passer-by who fell down because of a hose that lay on the pavement (TS 2 March 2006, BDA RAJ 2006 no. 5508) or to exclude the liability of the owner of a building for damage caused to the tenant after its collapse (TS 5 January 2006, RAJ 2006 (1) no. 131 p. 320). It also excluded liability of a hotel owner for damage caused by a fire that had started in the hotel kitchen but spread rapidly due to explosive substances deposited by a third person in the hotel (TS 11 March 1988, RAJ 1988 (2) no. 1961 p. 1925). A break in the chain of causation was denied, however, if the intervening third party did not act in an intentional or grossly negligent manner (TS 27 January 2006, RAJ 2006 (1) no. 615 p. 1486). In order to establish causation, the courts sometimes have recourse to the reliance principle, namely, where the injured party could have relied on the absence of a particular risk (TS 9 March 2006, RAJ 2006 (2) no. 1882 p. 4474); in contrast, causation was denied where the wrongdoer was not able to appreciate the source of danger (TS 23 February 2001, RAJ 2001 (2) no. 2549 p. 4071). Furthermore, if an infringement of a statutory provision is at issue, the courts will inquire into the protective purpose of the norm (TS 8 October 1998, RAJ 1998 (4) no. 7559 p. 11113). The ITALIAN civil courts apply the same principles as govern causation under the criminal law (CP arts. 40 and 41) to what is commonly known as “causation which founds liability”, i. e. a link must be found to exist between the act or omission entailing a breach of duty and the primary damage sustained. These provisions are regarded as an

Article 4:101: General rule

5.

6.

expression of general legal principles. The Italian courts tend predominantly to abide by the conditio sine qua non formula, but conduct will no longer be considered as causing the harmful event, if the ensuing damage constitutes a departure from the normally expected course of events (regolarità causale) (Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, sub art. 2043, p. 95; cf. e. g. Cass. 7 December 2005, no. 26997, Resp.civ. e prev. 2006, 862: night-time car accident on the left lane of motorway; the passenger in the car attempted to save himself by jumping over the middle crash barrier but precipitated into an abyss through a hole which was not visible in the darkness and died; the operator of the motorway was found liable; the person who caused the accident did not incur liability based on causation grounds). HUNGARIAN CC makes reference to the requirement of causation in several provisions (e. g. in §§ 339(1), 345(1) and 347(4)). The test usually applied is that the damage must either be caused by a wrongful and culpable / blameworthy act of the defendant (Petrik (-Harmathy), Polgári jog II2, 568; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 64; Bárdos, Kárfelelo˝sség a Polgári Törvénykönyv rendszerében, 50; Szalma, Okozatosság és polgári jogi felelo˝sség, 52) or derive from that fact that the defendant pursued an activity bound up with an increased potential for danger (Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1241, 1259; Szalma loc. cit. 50, 70); if causation is not given, then no liability is incurred (BH 2005/364; BH 2004/409; BH 2002/186; BH 1996/255; BH 1993/355; BH 1992/637). Causation is also of significance in determining the extent of the damage and in the determination of the compensation that can be obtained as, namely, under Hungarian law, losses are only compensated, if a causal nexus exists between the loss suffered and the damage caused (Marton, A polgári jogi felelo˝sség, 122; Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 60). Finally, the question of the unlawfulness of the defendant’s behaviour falls to be considered under the causation heading, because once damage is caused, it is qualified as unlawful (Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 56). A causal connection between the conduct and the damage ought to be given, if the damage would not have occurred but for the conduct of the defendant, the conduct can be imputed to the defendant and his behaviour can be influenced by the threat of sanctions (Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 62-63; Gellért (-Kemenes), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1230). The question of liability for indirect causation is of significance especially in the sphere of liability for others and for objects (see further Marton loc. cit. 129-130; Bárdos loc. cit. 53-54); here the courts factor in the foreseeability of the damage as well as the extent of fault on the part of the defendant (Marton loc. cit. 178-179; Petrik loc. cit. 66-69). According to POLISH CC art. 361 § 1 the person obliged to make reparation is responsible only for the “normal consequences” of an act or omission, out of which the damage arose. The yardstick of “normal consequences” determines also the extent of losses (including loss of profits) which are to be compensated (CC art. 361 § 2). On these grounds legal writing and case law consider that the causal link fulfils two functions: it is a prerequisite of liability and it determines the amount of reparation (Radwan´ ski (-Dybowski), System prawa cywilnego III(1), 247; Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛´sc´ ogólna7, 86). The assessment of the consequence as “normal” is a two step process: first, the test of conditio sine qua non is applied, determining whether there was any causal link between the act or omission and the damage. If that is answered in the affirmative, the second test is whether the consequence is normal, i. e. whether such an act or omission is generally (in particular, statistically) conducive to the occurrence of

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7.

758

such a consequence (Dybowski loc. cit. 251, 257; Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak loc. cit. 8788). According to the dominant legal opinion objective connections are decisive; whether the tortfeasor knew or should have known of this connection is irrelevant (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak loc. cit.; Dybowski loc. cit. 247). An omission may be regarded as causing damage if there was a duty to act, possibility of action and typically that action would have prevented the damage (Dybowski loc. cit. 269). BULGARIAN LOA art. 51(1) first sentence provides that “there is an obligation to make reparation for all losses which are the direct or indirect result of a damaging act.” A loss is direct or indirect (these expressions are read as synonyms, they are not meant to represent discrete categories of damage: Staneva, Otgovornost za vredi, prichineni ot deza i nesposobni, 115) according to the Bulgarian interpretation of the adequacy theory, if it is the typical or usual result of an event establishing liability (Kalaydjiev, Obligazionno pravo, Obshta chast, 360). “Consequential” or indirect damage encompasses the idea of damage which, if anything, unexpectedly occurs and is not necessarily causally linked to a tortious act; this damage consequently arises as the typical and usual result of a separate event (Kojucharov, Obligazionno pravo I, 278). According to ROMANIAN CC art. 1086 (however, this provision is only directly pertinent to contract law), the damage is required to be a direct and necessary consequence of the injury that transpired. There are two co-existing doctrines of causation, namely, the doctrine of “necessary cause” (sistemul cauzalita˘¸tii necesare) and the theory of the indivisible unity of all causes and conditions (sistemul unita˘¸tii indivizibile dintre cauza˘ s¸i condit¸ii); the courts conventionally favour the latter (Adam, Drept civil, 296; Dogaru and Dra˘ghici, Drept civil, 242-245; Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘, 94-95). However, an intervening act of a third party or an intervening voluntary autonomous act on the plaintiff’s part will break the chain of causation. Therefore, the theft of property from a vehicle involved in a traffic accident cannot be attributed to the party who caused the accident. Likewise, the fact that the victim of accident contracted hepatitis while recuperating from the accident cannot be ascribed to the defendant who caused the accident (for accompanying case law see Lupan loc. cit. 363-364). A tenet of GERMAN tort law holds that, in order to succeed in a claim for damages, a claimant is required to establish that the damage can be imputed to the defendant. A distinction is drawn between causation which founds liability (haftungsbegründene Kausalität) and causation which determines the ambit of liability (haftungsausfüllende Kausalität). Under the rubric of “causation founding liability” the usual requirement is to demonstrate the existence of an adequate causal nexus between the conduct (an act or an omission) and the breach of law, and secondly, it calls for further examination into whether the ensuing damage is encompassed within the protective scope of the rule that has been infringed (Palandt (-Sprau), BGB66, § 823, no. 2a). Causation determining the ambit of liability concerns the causal link between the basis for liability (breach of law) and the ensuing damage (Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB66, Pref. to § 249, no. 56). The theory of equivalence lays down minimum requirements pertaining to Haftungsbegründung and -ausfüllung harnessing the conditio-sine-qua-non formula. Accordingly, an event causes damage, on the basis that were it “assumed away”, the concrete damage would not have occurred. The conditio-sine-qua-non approach is complemented by the adequacy theory, which operates to reduce the scope of liability. According to this exposition, an event is an adequate cause of the damage, if it is generally suitable to cause the damage that ensued. An event is not an adequate cause of the damage, if it could

Article 4:101: General rule

8.

9.

engender the damage in question only under particularly unique, improbable circumstances which would have been disregarded had events followed their usual course. The adequancy theory is premised on an assessement of probabilities and is supplemented by the “scope of rule” theory. This postulates that an obligation to make reparation will only arise, if the damage claimed, according to its type and its origin, stems from a sphere of danger which the infringed norm was enacted to protect against (Heinrichs loc. cit. no. 57 with extensive examination of case law). Similarly, AUSTRIAN CC fails to particularise the exact constitutents of the notion of causation. The answer to the question of when damage is “caused” or “inflicted” by the damaging party must therefore be derived from legal teaching and from case law. Consensus exists on the conventional approach to be adopted, namely, a distinction is made between metaphysical and legal causation, the latter being decisive. Therefore, arguments have been tendered that one should refer to “imputability of damage” as opposed to employing the term “causation” (e. g. Barta, Zivilrecht II2, 590). The so-called causation doctrine or doctrine of imputability of damage differentiates between the equivalence theory or but for test and the theory of adequate cause. The first step under the adequacy theory based on CC § 1311, is the examination of the question of whether if the defendant’s conduct was assumed away, the same result would not have occurred. Thereafter, the identified causes of the damage are narrowed down by further control mechanisms regarding the imputation of liability, the most important of these being adequate cause. An event is regarded as the adequate cause of the damage if the conduct of the tortfeasor (either a positive act or an omission) appears to be generally apt to bring about the result that has occurred. This approach has the effect of excluding abnormal causal effects. A person will not be held accountable for damage over which no judicious control can be exercised (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, nos. 8/2 and 8/3). A more expansive approach has been adopted in the case of intentional torts as opposed to negligence torts (Koziol loc. cit. no. 8/16). For example, an adequate causal nexus was affirmed between leaving a loaded weapon unattended and damage which occurred from unauthorised use of it (OGH 16 January 1952, SZ 25/14); similarly, between a child in peril and an injury sustained by the rescuer who rushed to the child’s assistance (OGH 23 June 1967, ZVR 1968/87 p. 193); between a grave permanent injury and an attempt at suicide while in a depressed state (OGH 12 June 1991, JBl 1992, 255; for further comparisons see OGH 30 January 2003, ZVR 2004/37 p. 128) and for an ensuing drug addiction (OGH 28 October 1993, ZVR 1995/73 p. 181). OGH 27 March 2001, JBl 2001, 656 determined that “a voluntary act of a third party does not necessarily preclude a finding that damage is an adequate consequence”. At this juncture. the decisive point is to determine whether the conduct of the third party lay outside the realm of every possibility. Only “sheer unforeseeable” intervention of a third party will have the effect of breaking the chain of adequate causation. The adequacy criterion as a means of restricting accountability is of no effect, if a law is violated and the purpose of the enactment was directed against preventing the occurrence of the kind of damage that occurred. Remote or improbable damage is included within its scope (as e. g. in any case falling under CC §§ 460, 996, 979 and § 1311); this is because, in these circumstances, sole recourse is had to the doctrine of the protective purpose of the violated rule (Koziol loc. cit. no. 8/18). Similarly, under GREEK law, it is a self evident proposition that causation is a prerequisite of liability (Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio, 468; Georgiades, Enochiko

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10.

11.

760

Dikaio, Geniko meros, 139). Within the framework of CC art. 914, an examination is conducted to determine whether a causal relation exists between the unlawful culpable conduct and the ensuing damage (Stathopoulos loc. cit. 469; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Stathopoulos), arts. 297-298, no. 41). The theory of equivalence and the theory of adequate cause are employed for this purpose. Within the scope of the doctrine of “rightful alternative behaviour” there is a tendency to deny the presence of a causal link; the unlawful conduct is not the cause of the damage (Stathopoulos loc. cit. no. 49; Georgiades loc. cit. 141). The theory of adequate cause has been recognised for decades (Stathopoulos loc. cit. no. 50). The theory of “the purpose of the rule” is increasingly espoused in both academic commentary and case law,(Stathopoulos loc. cit. no. 60; for an in- depth analysis of the relationship between the theory of adequate cause and the purpose of the rule doctrine, see Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio A(1)2, 491 and Georgiades loc. cit. 144). The PORTUGUESE CC also defines the basis (CC art. 483(1)) and the ambit of liability (CC art. 563) by reference to the causation criterion. The approach adopted in case law is to split the requirement of causation into factual and legal strands (STJ 27 January 2005; STJ 12 October 1999). The determination of whether a cause is legally imputable is assessed according to the principles of the theory of adequate cause (Menezes Cordeiro, Obrigações II, 335; Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, 578; Galvão Telles, Obrigações7, 404, 409; CA Lisbon 17 June 2006; STJ 7 April 2005). However, this theory is only capable of filtering out a relatively small number of cases on the basis that the causal nexus was “inadequate” (see e. g. CA Oporto 10 February 2000, CJ XXV [2000-1] 215; CA Oporto 4 October 2006 and STJ 11 October 2005 [in respect of a multiple car pile up on the motorway, the first accident was regarded as causing the subsequent accidents that ensued]). A textbook example of where adequate cause is not given, is where a landlord attempting to collect his rent from a recalcitrant tenant is hit by a whirlwind (Galvão Telles loc. cit. 404). It is certain that omissions, e. g. failure to warn can be causal (CA Oporto 31 October 2006; STJ 12 December 2002; RL 9 May 2002, CJ XXVII [2002-3] 69 and 70). A break in the chain of causation is affirmed, if one adequate cause is superimosed on another (CA Oporto 4 October 2006; Pereira Coelho, O problema da causa virtual, 38, 109; Galvão Telles loc. cit. 413); a break in the chain of causation can arise via the voluntary act of a third party (also on the part of the State: STJ 25 March 2003) and can be due to the conduct of the injured party itself (e. g. CA Lisbon 17 June 2006 and CA Coimbra 4 April 1995, CJ XX [1995-2] 31). DUTCH CC art. 6:98 states that damage is only recoverable when “it is related to the event giving rise to the liability of the debtor and that, having regard to the nature of liability involved and that of the damage, the damage can be imputed to the debtor as a result of this event”. Dutch law has recanted from the earlier prevailing Adequatie doctrine and has fixed upon a test of imputability, whereby other questions, apart from general foreseeability, play a decisive role (Schadevergoeding I (-Boonekamp), art. 98, no. 26 p. 79). The type of damage and the gravity of imputation of fault are of decisive importance; the graver the fault is, the more likely it will be that damage is imputed (Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12, no. 434 p. 367; see also Boonekamp loc. cit. no. 29.4 p. 94). A wrongdoer who acts with intent will be answerable for all damage which is capable of being embraced by the scope of his intent, provided that there is a conditio-sine-qua-non relation between his conduct and the damage that ensues. The

Article 4:101: General rule

12.

13.

14.

argument has been advanced that the conditio-sine-qua-non-test is to be found in CC art. 6:162 as opposed to CC art. 6:98 (Boonekamp loc. cit. no. 26 p. 79). ESTONIAN LOA § 127(4) defines causation in a quite similar fashion to Article 4:101(1): “A person shall compensate for damage only if the circumstances on which the liability of the person is based and the damage caused are related in such a manner that the damage is a consequence of the circumstances (damage)”. In the NORDIC countries, the common core of causation is generally considered to consist of the conditio sine qua non test and the test of adequacy (Dufwa, Flera skadeståndsskyldiga, 2401; Schultz, Kausalitet, 375; Karlgren, Skadeståndsrätt5, 37). There are no general statutory rules on causation, except for certain relaxations of the burden of proving the causal link. In SWEDEN, case law and legal doctrine consider the conditio sine qua non test as starting point for any inquiry into causation (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 197; Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans, 290; Agell, in Festskrift Ekelöf, 1; Hellner, 40 Scandinavian Studies in Law 2000, 119). An additional requirement is that the defendant’s conduct was a sufficient? cause of the damage suffered. On this doctrinal basis, the HD 21 October 1987, NJA 1987, 710 affirmed that an individual who hired a room to a band was liable for theft of the musical instruments by an unknown third party because he had wrongly assured the band that there was an alarm system in place. Conversely, the HD 23 September 1983, NJA 1983, 606 found that the keeper of a hunting dog was not liable for an accident occurring between an elk and a car, because it could not proved that the dog had a decisive influence on the elk’s behaviour. HD 29 December 1998, NJA 1998, 893 articulated the adequate cause test as follows, “that the damage should have appeared to a person with the knowledge of all the circumstances as a foreseeable and to a certain extent typical consequence of the harmful conduct”. In DENMARK and FINLAND the two-stage assessment – one of natural causation (cause-in-fact) and one of adequate causation – is also applied. The DANISH HD 22 November 1995, UfR 1996, 245 denied the liability of a lawyer who had failed to file a claim in time, on the grounds that he would have, in any event, lost the case. FINNISH Supreme Court 23 January 1991, KKO 1991:13 refused to find an auditor liable to a creditor of the company for which he had prepared accounts. The Court reasoned that the creditor would not have read the report in any case; similar arguments have been advanced by the Finnish Supreme Court 18 November 1992, KKO 1992:167 and the SWEDISH Supreme Court HD 13 January 1983, NJA 1983, 3. A multitude of alternative causation theories have been maintained in recent academic exegesis. The four step test as advanced by Peczenik, Causes and Damages, passim and Schultz’s empirical theory Schultz loc. cit. can be counted among their number. A great deal of attention is devoted to cases involving multiple causation or ‘competing causes’ (e. g. see Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 213; Peczenik loc. cit. 100; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 237 and Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 330). If the damage can be attributed to multiple contemporaneous causal factors, then the parties responsible are jointly and severally liable (Dufwa loc. cit. 2498; Saxén loc. cit. 342); however, if the damage can be attributed to a non-tortious cause, then the outcome is uncertain; it is widely accepted that the individuals responsible for the event grounding liability are jointly and severally liable and that based on his or her contribution to the ensuing damage, each defendant would pay a percentage of the total damage (Hellner and Radetzki, loc. cit. 215; von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 239; Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 145; Iversen, Erstatningsberegning i

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kontraktsforhold, 813; Saxén loc. cit. 340). If two consecutive causal factors have contributed to the damage, the person who caused the initial harm will be held liable for the entire damage, provided his conduct increased the risk of the subsequent injury (see e. g. Swedish HD 15 February 1957, NJA 1957, 139: the first accident was causal for the victim being run over twice). Swedish HD 19 December 1950, NJA 1950, 650 concerned a personal injury sustained from a traffic accident, but the plaintiff also later on sustained a gastric ulcer, whereby two independent sufficient conditions competed. Three different opinions were delivered, but the leading rationale was based on the principle that no damages were to be awarded for the time that the gastric ulcer was a sufficient condition for work disability. Some Danish case law supports this view (Eastern CA 18 June 1925, UfR 1925, 769).The Danish HD 18 May 1961, UfR 1961, 574 reduced the quantum of damages awarded following the bursting of a dam and ensuing damage. The court surmised that the land would have flooded as quickly even if the dam had not burst. Other cases involve two separate conditions which start working in different timeframes but render an undividable damage. Cases involving a pre-existing illness that also may have contributed to the harm are of particular interest. In Swedish HD 31 July 1961, NJA 1961, 425 the plaintiff had been assaulted, sustaining a head injury, and a few years later he also sustained a head injury in a car accident with the second defendant. It was held that, since it could not be distinguished to what extent each condition had contributed to the final injury, both defendants should be jointly liable for the total damage (similarly HD 25 November 1992, NJA 1992, 740 I and II). In comparable cases under Danish and Finnish law, the courts ruminate on whether the precepts of fairness and equity should intervene in order to attentuate the extent of incurred liability (e. g. Danish HD 6 December 2001, UfR 2002, 519 and 15 August 2002, UfR 2002, 2458; Finnish Supreme Court 13 July 1995, KKO 1995:129). In the ENGLISH case Corr v. IBC Vehicles Ltd. [2008] UKHL 13, [2008] 1 AC 884 it was held that the chain of causation between personal injury (in the form of severe head injuries) and the subsequent death of the victim was not broken by the latter’s suicide when post-traumatic stress disorder resulted in depression. While the death resulted from his own deliberate and conscious act, it was nonetheless to be regarded as the direct result of that depressive illness at a time when his capacity to make reasoned and informed judgements about his future had been impaired by it; accordingly, the chain of causal consequences for which the defendant was liable was not broken by the suicide as a novus actus interveniens. As regards remoteness of damage – which is not an issue in relation to intended consequences of a breach of a duty of care (see Quinn v. Leathem [1901] AC 495, 537 (Lord Lindley) – the test was at one time that the defendant was liable for all the direct consequences of his negligence: Re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co. Ltd. [1921] 3 KB 560, but see also the decision in SS “Baron Vernon” v. SS “Metagama” 1928 SC (HL) 21, 25 (Viscount Haldane) (a Scottish authority, but equally expressive of English law), implying a somewhat different test in that damage was said to be recoverable if it was the “natural and reasonable result of the negligent act”, which would be established by showing it to be “such a consequence as in the ordinary course of things would flow from the situation”, which could be understood as assuming that the Re Polemis test imposed additional critieria to determine recoverable damage. The confused state of the law was dispelled by the decision in The Wagon Mound (No. 1) (Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock Engineering Co Ltd [1961] AC 388), which

Article 4:101: General rule

16.

established that a tortfeasor is liable for damage of a kind that a reasonable person ought to have foreseen at the time of his negligent conduct. In SCOTLAND too a breach of a duty of care does not give rise to liability if it is not established that the breach caused or materially contributed to the injury: cf. Clegg v. Rogerson [2007] CSIH 87, 2008 SLT 345 (where the rail network operator had failed to mount instructions for a user operated level crossing on a set of controls for use by a vehicle driver, but the driver would not have heeded such instructions in any event since she was blindly following instructions from a passenger). In McTear v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd. [2005] CSOH 69, 2005 2 SC 1 a claim by a smoker against a cigarettes manufacturer failed when the claimant was unable to produce expert evidence supporting a causal connection between smoking and lung cancer.

II.

Founding liability and determining the ambit (limits) of liability

17.

The distinction between the basis of liability and determining the ambit of liability and thereafter the treatment of causation under both of these headings is a particularly pronounced feature of legal systems which place the infringement of a right or legally protected interest at the focal point of their system of tort law. The distinction between causation as a fount of liability (causal link between the conduct and the main damage) and causation which determines the extent of liability (causal link between the primary damage and consequential loss) is, for this reason, unknown to both French and Belgian tort law systems. Occasionally, SPANISH legal commentators espouse adopting such a differentiation (e. g. Albaladejo (-Santos Briz), Comentarios al Código Civil y compilaciones forales, XXIV, art. 1902, 263); in general, in so far as such an issue is broached, there is consensus that no distinction exists between causation extablishing the grounds of liability and causation which acts as a determinant on the scope of liability under Spanish law (recently, once again Luna Yerga, La prueba de la responsabilidad civil medico-sanitaria, 406). The courts formerly emphasised that conduct and damage are questions of fact, not of law. Therefore, under CCP art. 477 a cassation cannot be based on these concepts (TS 26 November 1990, RAJ 1990 (7) no. 9047 p. 11522). However, it must be noted that a new trend in the case law of the Tribunal Supremo clearly distinguishes between causation in fact and causation in law; and therefore cassation can be based on causation (in law) (see, inter alia, TS 24 May 2004, RAJ 2004 (3) no. 4033 p. 8321; TS 27 January 2006, RAJ 2006 (1) no. 615 p. 1486). Conversely, it is said, that the twin objectives of the causation requirement under ITALIAN law are: attributing the commission of tort to the wrongdoer and determining the extent of compensation to be awarded (Cass.sez.un. 26 January 1971, no. 174, Giur.it. 1971, I, 1, 680). Therefore, the causal nexus between the conduct of the actor and the unlawful event as well as the causal link between the unlawful result and the consequences that derive from that result are the subjects of examination (Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, arts. 2043-2059, p. 89). The first phase entails an inquiry underpinned by the principles contained in CP arts. 40 and 41: conditio sine qua non and regolarità causale (i. e. that there was no divergence from the normal course of events leading to the damage: Alpa and Bessone (-Carbone), La responsabilità civile I, 64-65). Under CC arts. 2056 and 2057 the second step involves an assessment of the direct or primary damage that has resulted. CC art. 1225 is only applicable within the remit of contract

18.

19.

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21.

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law. It is of no irrelevance to tort law. This provision restricts the obligation to make reparation to losses which were foreseeable at the time that the contract was concluded. The HUNGARIAN legal theory emphasises that the causation requirement fulfills twin functions. On the one hand, there needs to be a causal nexus between the tortious conduct or wrongfulness and the damage (Petrik (-Harmathy), Polgári jog II2, 568; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 64; Bárdos, Kárfelelo˝sség a Polgári Törvénykönyv rendszerében, 50; Szalma, Okozatosság és polgári jogi felelo˝sség, 52; Gellért (-Kemenes), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1220, 1230); on the other hand, causation is significant in determining the extent of the damage and thereby also the recovery of damages, owing to the fact that the liable person will only bear those losses which can be attributed to his tortious conduct (Marton, A polgári jogi felelo˝sség, 122; Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 60; Fuglinszky, Mangelfolgeschäden im deutschen und ungarischen Recht, 17 and 260). In POLAND the distinction is not drawn. Unlawfulness of an act or omission occurs in the case of infringement of statutory or moral rule; the infringement of rights or interests is not necessary. The consistent position is that the existence of an adequate causal link is to be considered only as regards the relationship between the occurrence for which a person is accountable and the damage suffered by the injured party (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛´sc´ ogólna7, 86; Radwan´ ski (-Dybowski), System prawa cywilnego III(1), 247). A coherent bifuricated classification of the causation requirement does not underpin BULGARIAN tort law; it is simply examined whether the defendant caused the resulting loss. The proposition, namely, that the determination of causation envisages a two step assessment, is sporadically advanced. According to this approach, it is submitted that the first step involves the assessment of the nexus between the conduct and the result, the second step entails examining the connection between the result and the damage (Konov, Osnovanie na grajdanskata otgovornost2, 60). The distinction between Haftungsbegründung and Haftungsausfüllung is also alien to ROMANIAN law. Causation is examined as the nexus between the wrongful act and the damage. This distinction is habitually drawn under GERMAN law and is particularly acute under CC § 823(1). An obligation to make good the damage which the tortfeasor has caused underlies this provision. The “basis for liability” requirement is a systematic feature of the German tort law system (CC §§ 823 ff), whereas the “determining the scope of liability” requisite is subsumed under the general law of obligations (CC §§ 249 ff). An identical situation prevails in PORTUGAL (CC arts. 483 ff and arts. 562 ff). The opposite is true of AUSTRIA where the general consensus is that this distinction is of no relevance for the prevailing law (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 3/12). GREEK legal teaching views the distinction drawn in German law between casuation as a basis for liability and causation as a determinant of the ambit of liability as a corollary of the manner in which German CC § 823(1) is structured and regards such a distinction as superfluous to Greek law (Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio A(1)2, 473474; Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio, Geniko meros, 139; anders aber Filios, Enochiko Dikaio II(2)4, 52). Similarly, DUTCH law also adopts a distinction between liability itself (CC arts. 6:162 ff) and the limits of liability, the latter is employed to discern the scope of the damage (CC arts. 6:95 ff). Causation is examined under both of these headings. The courts first proceed by examining whether a causal link is extant in respect of the

Article 4:101: General rule

24.

25.

26.

primary damage (personal injury, damage to property). An evaluation then takes place as to whether the actual loss and the ensuing financial losses can be causally linked (occasionally the terms primary and secondary causation are employed: Schadevergoeding I (-Boonekamp), art. 6:98, no. 4). It is well nigh universally accepted that a conditio sine qua non link suffices to meet the test of primary causation (Nieuwenhuis/Stolker/ Valk (-Lindenbergh), T & C Burgerlijk Wetboek6, art. 6:162(1), no. 1; see also below). The assesment of the extent of the obligation to pay damages hinges on the test of imputability (CC art. 6:98). Within its confines, particular significance is accorded to the type of liability and to the purport of the infringed statutory rule of behaviour (see further Lindenberg loc. cit.; Nieuwenhuis/Stolker/Valk (-Oosterveen), T & C Burgerlijk Wetboek6, art. 6:98, nos. 1-10; Boonekamp loc. cit.). Intermittently, it is espoused that CC art. 6:98 should also be relevant in assessement of whether primary causation is given (advanced by Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12, no. 432 p. 363 and no. 437 pp. 380-381 as well as van Schellen, Toerekening naar redelijkheid, 15, 32-33); this does not, however, correspond to prevailing academic opinion (see Schut, Onrechtmatige Daad4, 83-91; Hijma and Olthof, Compendium van het Nederlands Vermogensrecht3, no. 396 p. 268 and Lindenbergh loc. cit.). In the NORDIC legal systems, this distinction is relevant, at the very least due to the mulitiude of statutory provisions facilitating a reduction of the extent of recovery on the grounds of equity and fairness: on this point see the notes under Article 6:202 (Reduction of liability). Generally, great weight is not accorded to this distinction. In ENGLAND the distinction between these types or aspects of causations (as opposed to a distinction between causation in fact and causation in law) is, at least as a conceptual tool, not prevalent. Nonetheless, it features in so far as in the tort of negligence the remoteness of damage rule focuses on the kind of damage which was reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the negligent act or omission of the defendant, but not on its extent: see Charlesworth and Percy (-Cooper), Negligence11, para. 4.13. In IRELAND too the same conceptual distinction informs discussion of liability issues but without a particular terminological framework. There is perceived to be a threshold question of liability to be established first before addressing the question for what the defendant is liable: see McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 3.04.

III.

Burden of proof

27.

A basic tenet of tort law holds that the burden of proving that a causal nexus exists between the tortious conduct and the ensuing damage rests on the claimant. This is also the case in FRANCE (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II11, no. 164 p. 162). There are no restrictions on the evidence admissible to adduce proof and resort may also be had to evidential presumputions (Cass.civ. 24 May 1978, Bull.civ. 1978, II, no. 139 p. 111), thereunder to a “negative” presumption, according to which causation is established by ruling out all other probable causal factors other than the defendant’s fault (Cass.civ. 10 June 2004, Bull.civ. 2004, II, no. 293 p. 247: a wave, which swept the claimant’s husband out to sea, could have only come from the defendant’s ship, given that proof that other ships were in the area at the time could not be adduced). Similarly, in BELGIUM, the general rule holds that the onus of proving causation rests on the claimant (Cass.ch.réun. 1 April 2004, JT 2005, 357, note Estienne; see also Fagnart, RGAR 2006, 14080 no. 29). It is not sufficient that the trial judge has ascer-

28.

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30.

31.

32.

766

tained that a causal link exists between the faute and the ensuing damage is highly probable. This link must be legally certain (Cass. 17 September 1981, Pas. belge 1982, I, 90; compare also Cass. 19 June 1998, Pas. belge 1998, I, no. 324 p. 763). Reservations surrounding the establishment of certain causation cannot be overcome by recourse to the theory of perte d’une chance (Cass.ch.réun. 1 April 2004 loc. cit. 356); as, namely, this analysis is only of relevance in respect of the quantification of damages (CA Mons 10 October 2005, JT 2005, 717). SPANISH law does not recognise a reversal of burden of proof in the law of causation, in contrast to the law of negligence; according to the general rules, the onus is on the claimant to prove that there is a causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the resukting damage (CCP [Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil 1/2000] art. 217). The Supreme Court staunchly adheres to this analysis (e. g. TS 25 September 1999, RAJ 1999 [4] no. 7275 p. 11445; TS 30 June 2000, RAJ 2000 [3] no. 5918 p. 9083; TS 8 February 2000, RAJ 2000 [1] no. 1235 p. 1946). According to CCP art. 217(6), the claimant may be relieved of the burden of proof, in some circumstances, by virtue of the principles of disponibilidad (availability/disposability) and facilidad (easiness). This is of particular relevance in cases where the parties respective knowledge of the circumstances relevant to establishing the causal link is imbalanced and where, in complying with the evidentiary requirements would render the claimant subject to extraordinary financial expense, for example in medical negligence cases (TS 10 June 2004, RAJ 2004 [3] no. 3605 p. 7445; TS 29 November 2002, RAJ 2002 [6] no. 10404 p. 19265). Within the confines of medical neglience claims and a number of other areas, the courts have recourse to evidentiary presumptions. Particular significance is accorded to the theory of “disproportionate or extraordinary result” (resultado desproporcionado). This presumption entails that e. g. an inference is drawn that exceptional negative results from a course of treatment, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are regarded as having been caused by the initial surgical procedure (TS 18 March 2004, RAJ 2004 [2] no. 1823 p. 3435; TS 2 April 2004, RAJ 2004 [2] no. 2607 p. 5215; TS 7 October 2004, RAJ 2004 [5] no. 6692 p. 13644; TS 17 November 2004, RAJ 2004 [5] no. 7238 p. 14674). In ITALY, HUNGARY, and POLAND, the onus is on the injured party to prove that a causal nexus exists between the alleged cause of the damage and the damage itself (Cass. 11 January 1982, no. 103, Giur.it.Mass. 1982, fasc. 1; Petrik (-Harmathy), Polgári jog II2, 568; Gellért (-Kemenes), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1230-1231; Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 68; Czachórski, Zobowia˛zania10, 251, for an exception see above Article 3:104, Notes, I 7). The same holds true for ROMANIA (CC art. 1169). When compared with other European legal systems, SLOVENIAN LOA § 149 derogates significantly from the norm in allocating the burden of proof. Within the framework of rules governing the liability for danagerous things and activities, this provision ushers in a general reversal of the burden of proof of causation: “Damage in connection with a dangerous object or dangerous activities shall be deemed to originate from the dangerous object or dangerous activities unless it is shown that such was not the cause.” According to GERMAN CC § 823, the onus generally lies on the injured party to prove the two prong test of causality. The possibility is however open to the claimant to rely on the rules governing prima facie evidence and in exceptional circumstances he or she can also benefit from reversal in the burden of proof in respect of causation which founds liability, which is of particular significance, if it is established that the defendant violated a protective law or statutory duty of care. This was the case where the defen-

Article 4:101: General rule

33.

34.

35.

dant, a licensed operator of a facilty, constituting an environmental hazard, exceeded emission values laid down by adminstrative rules and by state authorities (BGH 17 June 1997, NJW 1997, 2748). Other illustrations are furnished by infringements of statutes aimed at accident prevention. The burden of proof is also shifted in cases of serious malpractice, namely, in cases where healthcare professionals breach their obligations (doctors, midwives) (BGH 27 March 2007, NJW 2007, 2767, 2769; BGH 27 April 2004, BGHZ 159, 48, 53; BGH 16 May 2000, NJW 2000, 2737). If an infraction of a protective law (CC § 823(2)) is established, then making out a prima facie case that this violation caused damage will suffice, provided that the enactment in question was aimed at avoiding the onset of a typical source of risk and if, subsequent to the violation, the type of damage which the protective law was devised to protect against, has ensued, subsequent to the violation (BGH 4 October 1983, NJW 1984, 432, 433; BGH 19 April 1991, NJW 1991, 2021, 2022; Palandt (-Sprau), BGB67, § 823, no. 80). Rules governing a reversal in the burden of proof in respect of causation are occasionally envisaged by statute (see in particular the Environmental Liability Act [Umwelthaftungsgesetz] §§ 6 and 7). In AUSTRIA the burden of proof lies on the claimant to prove that the defendant’s conduct caused the ensuing damage (CC § 1296; cf. Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 16/ 11). This general principle is harnessed in contract law as well as in the field of tort law. However, this is only the prevailing tenet of general tort law. Exceptions to this basic premise can be found in a number of ad hoc statutes. These special regimes either employ rebuttable presumptions regarding causation (e. g. Genetic Engineering Act § 79a; Nuclear LiabilityAct § 12(1)) or a right to request information against the likely wrongdoer is conceded to the plaintiff. The judge can overcome difficulties in assessing the extent of recoverable damage by reverting to the rules governing loss appraisal (CCP § 273). According to GREEK CCP art. 338, the onus of proof in respect of causality rests on the claimant. In legal commentary, the issue of the difficulty of discharging the burden of proof, particularly in medical negligence cases is adverted to, but the solution to this problem remains within the remit of the legislature (Foundedaki, EllDik 35 (1994), 1230). Liapis, DEE 9 (2003), 147 submits that, in respect of negligent representations in a prospectus, a “typified causation” ought to suffice. The claimant is not required to prove that he had knowledge of the initial prospectus that was issued. It is sufficient that the issuing of the prospectus created a favourable selling climate for the financial product in question. DUTCH courts have tried to accommodate the interests of the claimant by adulterating the burden of proof requirements in the field of causation. The obligation to keep records plays a significant role in cases of professional negligence. If the defendant cannot substantiate his arguments by reverting to his records, it is conceivable that his submissions on this point will be thereby rendered immaterial and disregarded by the court (HR 20 November 1987, NedJur 1988 no. 500 p. 1852; HR 13 January 1995, NedJur 1997 no. 175 p. 881; HR 10 January 1997, NedJur 1999 no. 286 p. 1521). The courts have even reversed the burden of proof requirement in a number of discrete fields. This shift is particularly prominent in cases where specific rules precribing conduct or (health and) safety regulations are infringed, and the ensuing damage falls within the protective remit of the violated norm (HR 16 November 1990, NedJur 1991 no. 55 p. 228; HR 23 June 1995, NedJur 1995 no. 730 p. 3718; HR 21 October 1994, NedJur

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36.

768

1995 no. 95 p. 396). In the interim, the courts have also reversed the burden of proof in cases dealing with the departures from standard practice (HR 26 January 1996, NedJur 1996 no. 607 p. 3388; HR 19 January 2001, NedJur 2001 no. 524 p. 3805; HR 16 June 2000, NedJur 2000 no. 584 p. 4079). The defendant is required to introduce evidence and prove that the damage would have ensued in any event, had the breach of duty not occurred (Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12, no. 434a p. 367; Sieburgh, WPNR 2001, no. 6450 p. 588). A particularly manifest application of the regulation of this general principle can be seen in CC art. 7:658(2), which governs injuries to employees resulting from the employer’s contravention of Health and Safety Regulations. If the risk of damage was precipitated by the violation, and if damage of this kind materialises, then it is presumed that there is a causal link between the violation of the Health and Safety Regulations and the resulting damage (HR 17 November 2000, NedJur 2001 no. 596 p. 4376). The general rule in SWEDEN is that the plaintiff has to prove causation. However, where there are two or more possible causes of damage the plaintiff will in most cases succeed if he can make his causal explanation “clearly more probable” than any other explanation, provided the plaintiff’s explanation is probable in itself (HD 13 April 1977, NJA 1977, 176; HD 29 April 1981, NJA 1981, 622; HD 21 July 1982, NJA 1982, 421; HD 28 December 1993, NJA 1993, 764; HD 31 October 2001, NJA 2001, 657). Although there are still some doubts as to the groups of cases to which this rule applies (see in more detail Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 37), it is beyond dispute that it requires a probability which exceeds 51 per cent (Dufwa, Flera skadeståndsskyldiga, 2658; Nygaard, Placing the Burden of Proof of a Hypothetical Cause, 421). A reversal of the burden of proof is only rarely accepted. One exception is HD 4 May 1988, NJA 1988, 226, where the burden of proof was reversed to a person in possession of stolen property (not the thief), which was damaged, but it was disputed when the damage occurred. It was presumed that the damage had occurred in the hands of the defendant (see further Peczenik, Causes and Damages, 316). Also in DENMARK, the general rule is that the plaintiff has the full burden of proof; the probability test (under which proof of a probability exceeding 51 per cent suffices) has not been accepted (von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 221; Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 143). Nevertheless, several cases of intentionnally or grossly negligently inflicted bodily harm display a tendency to facilitate proving causation (see e. g. HD 16 April 2002, UfR 2002, 1496; von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 222; Gomard, J 2003, 132). In a tort case concerning severe professional negligence of a lawyer, causation was even rebuttably presumed (HD 14 June 2002, UfR 2002, 2000). In HD 14 August 2002, UfR 2002, 2443, strict liability for the unsafe state of a passage in a warehouse was rejected for lack of proof of causation. In FINLAND, as in Sweden, it often seems sufficient for the plaintiff to show that his explanation of the causal link is more probable than any other possible explanation; the burden of proof then passes on to the defendant (Saxén, Skadestånd vid avtalsbrott, 133; Supreme Court 8 June 1993, HD 1993:80; Supreme Court 2 April 1990, KKO 1990:42). Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 58 draws attention to the difficulties which are affiliated with proving causation in cases involving omissions, contending that where an omission corresponds to the non-compliance with a statutory regulation, causation should be presumed. Proof of causation by proving a probability of at least 51% is sometimes explicitly recognised by statute (e. g. Swedish Environmental Code [Miljöbalken (SFS 1998:808)] chap. 32 § 3(3); Finnish Environmental Damage Compensation

Article 4:101: General rule

37.

38.

Act [Lag om ersättning för miljöskador of 19 August 1994/737] § 3 [here even mere “probability” suffices]; Swedish Patient Injuries Act [Patientskadelag (1996:799)] § 6; Finnish Patient Injury Act [Patientskadelag of 25 July 1986/585] § 2; Danish Patient Insurance Act [Lovbekendtgørelse of 24 March 1997 no. 228 om patientforsikring] § 2). In ENGLISH law the burden of proving causation rests almost always with the claimant, i. e. the claimant must show it is more likely than not that the wrongful conduct of the defendant resulted in the damage sustained: Clerk and Lindsell (-Jones), Torts16, para. 2-06. The claimant must lead direct or circumstantial evidence which tends to show, on a balance of probabilities, that e. g. the damage or injury was caused by the negligence or breach of statutory duty of the defendant or a default of a person for whom the defendant is vicariously liable: Charlesworth and Percy (-Walton), Negligence11, para. 5-15. Where the defendant’s negligent act has been shown to be the primary and substantial cause of some damage sustained by the claimant, the burden of showing that in relation to further loss the chain of causation has been broken has been stated to lie with the defendant: SS “Baron Vernon” v. SS “Metagama” 1928 SC (HL) 21, 26 (Viscount Haldane), but contrast 31 (Lord Phillimore, leaving the point open). In SCOTLAND the law of delict operates, comparably with English law, with inferences that the defender’s actions were a cause of the damage sustained by the pursuer, so as to shift the onus of proof: see Stewart, Delict3, para. 12.3.

IV.

The “egg shell skull” rule

39.

A particular prédisposition de la victime does not have the effect of interrupting the chain of causation under FRENCH law. The general premise is that if a vulnerable plaintiff, would not have ended up the condition that he now finds himself in but for the conduct leading to liability, then this conduct also caused this loss (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II11, no. 179 p. 179). However, it is conceivable that the predispositions of the injured party will have an effect in the assessment of recoverable damages (Cass.civ. 28 November 1974, Bull.civ. 1974, II, no. 317 p. 261: accident ruptured maligant tumour tissue); the same also holds true, in the case that multiple cause of the injury are present, the claimant’s predispoition being one of those causes (CA Rouen 13 March 1986, GazPal 1987 Som. 136: Husband suffering from depression commited sucicide following the death of his wife in an accident). Victims, who suffered from a disability prior to the accident, have generally only a damages claim based on the aggravation of their preexisting condition (Cass.ass.plén. 27 November 1970, Bull.ass.plén. 1970, no. 6 p. 9). However, it has been held that a defendant is liable for the full extent of a claimant’s incapacity to work which only occurred following the loss of the claimant’s remaining good eye in a hunting accident (Cass.civ. 19 July 1966, D. 1966, 598). Similarly, the prevailing law in BELGIUM deems that the victim’s predisposition does not break the chain of causation: the duty to make reparation extends to both foreseeable damage and to loss that is actually suffered (Ronse (-De Wilde, Claeys and Mallems), Schade en Schadeloosstelling I2, p. 191 no. 255; Cass. 14 June 1995, Pas. belge 1995, I, no. 298 p. 630). An exception exists where the predisposition would have, in any event, caused the same injury as was caused by the defendant’s wrongful conduct. In this case, the victim’s damages are reduced. Legal scholarship postulated, in respect of the classical example employed in teaching, namely, the case of the one – armed man who loses his other arm as the consequence of an accident, that 100 % recovery in respect of the

40.

769

Chapter 4: Causation

41.

42.

43.

44.

770

incapacity to work would not be allowed (van Gerven (-Stijns), Verbintenissenrecht II8. 334). A converse position is adopted in FRANCE. In the light of CFI Turnhout 8 November 1994, Turn. Rechtsl. 1994-95, 40 it is not apparent that this approach corresponds to that adopted by the courts. The rule contained in Article 4:101(2) appears to be the accepted rule in SPAIN (see CA Madrid 4 April 2005, BDA JUR 2005/106828 and, implicitly, also CA Baleares 19 September 2001, BDA JUR 2001/322667). An identical position prevails in ITALY. As a general rule, pre-existing ill health on the victim’s part prior to the accident is regarded as being immaterial. This state of affairs by itself is considered to amount to an inadequate concurrent cause of the ensuing damage (Cass.sez.pen. 1 March 1989, Cass. Pen. 1990, I, 838; Cass.sez.pen. 24 March 1986, Cass. Pen. 1986, 1924 = Riv.it.med.leg. 1988, 612). The judge is furthermore precluded from reducing the amount of damages. The premise is as follows; either it is espoused that a wholly inadequate consequence is concerned (Busnelli, Il danno biologico, 202; Bona, Danno e resp. 2005, 353), that, simulataneously, a forza maggiore is implicated which has the effect of precluding the imposition of liability, or that the defendant is liable to compensate the full extent oft the damage (Cass. 2 February 1991, no. 981, Giur. civ. comm. 1991, I, 797; Cass. 9 April 2003, no. 5539, Resp.civ. e prev. 2003, 1074; Cass. 4 November 2003, no. 16525, Giur.it.Mass. 2003, fasc. 11). At the time of writing, the rule anchored in Article 4:101(2) has been the subject of occasional discourse in HUNGARY. It seems that the matter is viewed with some scepticism. Loss is only recoverable if it was foreseeable under normal circumstances. Therefore, for example, liability will not be imposed, if a person who previously underwent brain surgery, succumbs to his or her death because of a small slap in the face (Bárdos, Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció 5-6/2004, p. 5). In other words, the wrongodoer may not be liable to pay damages, if he or she would not be capable of recognising the serious medical condition of the aggrieved party. However, the courts will more readily assume foreseeability in the case of an intentional act than where a loss is attributable to a negligent act (Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 69-70). POLISH legal writing and case law do not devote particular attention to the issue. Some scholars consider that where an act causes a personal injury due to the abnormal predispositions of the victim, the damage, although inevitable, is not to be regarded as an adequate consequence (Radwan´ ski (-Dybowski), System prawa cywilnego III(1), 259). This position seems to be adopted by the case law too. In SN 22 June 1972, OSNCP 1973, poz. 46 the court denied the liability of the employer for the mental disease of a dismissed employee on the ground that the disease resulted from his particular psychological predispositions. A similar position was taken in SN 21 June 1976, OSPiKA 1977, poz. 106. The court recognised that the suicide of a schoolgirl might constitute a normal consequence of her consultation with the doctor, in the course of which the doctor expressed the suspicion she had contracted a venereal disease, unless the suicide resulted from the mental abnormality of the victim. To date, the ROMANIAN Supreme Court has determined that where a plaintiff’s pre-existing illness was exacerbated by nervous shock of great magnitude sustained in an accident, the defendant could be made accountable for this course of events (Tribunalul Suprem, decision no. 1589/1974, cited by Adam, Drept civil, 290). According to GERMAN law, similarly, the attribution of responsibility will not be forestalled owing to some inherent factor in the victim’s constitution which makes

Article 4:101: General rule

45.

46.

47.

him/her more susceptible to injury and which facilitates the actual damage caused or amplifies it (Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB66, Pref. to § 249, no. 67; MünchKomm (-Oetker), BGB4, § 249, no. 133; Erman (-Kuckuk), BGB I11, Pref. to § 249, no. 51; Staudinger (-Schiemann), BGB [2005], § 249, no. 35). A person who injures a person in ill health or person with a frail constitution, cannot expected to be treated in the same manner, as far as the asssessment of liability is concerned, as if he or she had injured a person in optimal health (BGH 29 February 1956, BGHZ 20, 137, 139; BGH 30 April 1996, BGHZ 132, 341, 345; BGH 19 April 2005, NJW-RR 2005, 897, 898). Attribution of responsibility is not excluded on the basis given that, apart from the event giving rise to the duty to compensate, there may be other factors contributing to the damage that has occurred (Heinrichs loc. cit. no. 66; BGH 10 May 1990, NJW 1990, 2882, 2883). The case is otherwise, if a course of events takes a wholly unexpected turn (BGH 3 February 1976, NJW 1976, 1143 [ minor defamation leading to cerebral haemorrhage]; BGH 6 June 1989, NJW 1989, 2616 [stroke resulting from an altercation concerning who was responsible for a traffic accident]). In the case of a victim, who, owing to an earlier accident, is predisposed to injury, and who sustains injury in a subsequent accident, the party responsible for the earlier accident is liable for further loss sustained by the victim, provided that the preceding accident either established the victim’s vulnerability or at the very least increased the plaintiff’s sensitivity (BGH 20 November 2001, NJW 2002, 504; cf. also BGH 16 March 2004, NJW 2004, 1945). In general, the same reasoning is employed to deal with pre-existing psychological conditions (CA Hamm 2 April 2001, NJW-RR 2001, 1676). However, exceptions exist for cases of “compensation neurosis”, where the expectation that damages will be awarded impedes recovery (BGH 29 February 1956, BGHZ 20, 137, 142; BGH 8 May 1979, NJW 1979, 1935, 1936). A basic tenet of AUSTRIAN law holds that the tortfeasor has to take his victim as he finds him. The risk that the injury could bring about consequence of varying degrees in persons with different states of health, is allocated to the wrongdoer (OGH 19 June 1973, 8 Ob 110/72; OGH 12 June 2003, JBl 2004, 111, 112). Furthermore, even if the magnitude of the ensuing injury can be attributed to the predisposition of the plaintiff, in legal terms the injury remains wholly attributable to the conduct of the wrongdoer (OGH 7 February 1974, 2 Ob 6/74). The victim’s vulnerability is only of relevance to cases which concern the so-called superseding causation. This entails that the wrongdoer is capable of adducing proof that the damage which occurred would have resulted in any event without any action taken on his part (OGH 15 December 1992, JBl 1993, 663). In these cases, the wrongdoer will not be required to answer for the full extent of the damage, merely for the acceleration of its occurrence (OGH 25 March 1999, SZ 72/ 55; OGH 22 May 2002, 7Ob 86/02a). As a general rule, GREEK courts have rejected the notion that the victim’s vulnerability can break the chain of causation (CA Athens 9835/1984, Arm 39 (1985) 118; ErmAK (-Litzeropoulos), Pref. to arts. 297-298, no. 60; Foundedaki, EllDik 35 (1994), 1230; Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio A(1)2, 507 [this issue is examined futher in the context of the protective purpose of the rule doctrine]). The principle contained in Article 4:101(2) is, apart from the law pertaining to occupational injury, rarely considered in PORTUGAL. It has been maintained by some legal scholars that it is prima facie unjust that to alone tortfeasor alone is burdened with the risk that he might injury a person with physical or psyhological abnormalities. Special case must be excerised in respect of the latter as regards the participation in general

771

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48.

49.

50.

51.

772

dealing with others by virtue of CC art. 570(1) (Contributory negligence) (Brandão Proença, A conduta do lesado, 192 and 199). Moreover, it follows from the general doctrine of adequate causation that the tortfeasor should not be held accountable for unusually grave consequences deriving from a minor injury (Galvão Telles, Obrigações7, 404; Almeida Costa, Obrigações10, 764; Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I8, 629). In medical negligence cases, the predispositions of the victim operate to reduce damages claims. The classical example employed in teaching is that of where the victim loses the use of his only functioning eye (Esperança Pina, A responsabilidade dos médicos3, 125). The Labour Code art. 287(1) and (2) represents a deviation from the general principles (STJ 4 June 2003, Proc. 02S 3 304) and provides that the “pathological predisposition of the accident victim does not exclude the right to full compensation except when such predisposition was concealed. When the injury or illness following the accident is worsened by prior injury or illness, or when the latter is worsened by the accident, the incapacity will be determined as if it had all resulted from the accident, unless the victim had already been compensated for the prior injury or illness”. CA Coimbra 1 June 2006, Proc. 478/06 applied the exception anchored in art. 287(1) to the employee’s disadvantage, who, while sustaining a diabetic shock, was injured by a machine. DUTCH cases, in which, in contrast to the normal run of events, the resulting damage, owing to certain physical or psychological predispostion of the victim, is amplified, primarly encompass post traumatic disorders, from which the victim has never fully recovered from. According to decisions of the Hoge Raad, the wrongdoer must answer for all of the consequences flowing from the physical injury. The fact that the damage partly arose owing to a preexisting condition on the part of the victim, save for an exceptional turn of events, is immaterial. However, the predisposition will have an impact on the measure of damages, and will operate to restrict the amount of damages awarded (HR 8 February 1985, NedJur 1986 nos. 136 and 137 pp. 497-514). In a similar manner to other European jurisdictions, the prevailing principle in the Netherlands holds that the wrongdoer must take his victim as he finds him and that the victim’s predispostions do not have the effect of breaking the chain of causation (van Wassenaer, Eigen Schuld, 213). There is no ESTONIAN statute in force that recognises a corresponding rule to that contained in Article 4:101(2). Howver, legal scholarship is in favour of such a rule. At the time of writing, there was no decided case law on the issue (Lahe and Tampuu, Training Guide for Judges 2006). In the NORDIC Countries the ‘egg shell skull’ rule is generally acknowledged, and sometimes coined as “one finds the plaintiff in the state as he or she is” (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 208; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 243; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 143; Danish HD 20 August 1996, UfR 1996, 1334; Swedish HD 25 November 1992, NJA 1992, 740 I and II; Finnish Supreme Court, HD 1950 II 240). In the COMMON LAW it has long been the doctrine that a defendant must take his victim as he finds him and accordingly if it was reasonable to foresee some (slight) injury to the claimant (if he were a normal person) then the defendant is liable for the full extent of the injury sustained, even though the severity is due to the defendant’s abnormal susceptibility: Clerk and Lindsell (-Jones), Torts16, para. 2-132. Thus where employers were at fault in not shielding a workman, who was burned by a splash of molten metal, they were liable to his dependants when, due to a predisposition (which,

Article 4:102: Collaboration

were it not for the burn, might never have been triggered), the burn initiated a cancerous growth causing death: Smith v. Leech Brain & Co. Ltd. [1962] 2 QB 405. The “egg shell skull” principle has more recently been held to extend to the economic as well as physical sensitivity of the claimant and thus may also be operate in relation to the duty to mitigage (which is equally formulated in terms of causation), when this relates to the reasonableness of conduct of impecunious claimants. By virtue of their lack of funds they may be permitted to take measures which are more expensive than those which would be available to more affluent litigants without diminishing their right to recover: cf. Lagden v. O’Connor [2003] UKHL 64; [2004] 1 AC 1067 (hire of replacement car through an accident-hire scheme); contra Dredger Liesbosch v. Steamship Edison [1933] AC 449 (HL). Illustration 1 is taken from BH 2005/364; illustration 2 from Cass.civ. 11 December 1984, D. 1985 I. R. 367; illustration 3 from Polish Supreme Court 3 March 1956, OSPiKA 1959, nos. 78, poz. 197; illustration 4 from Cass. 14 June 1996 and Cass. 5 November 1996, Pas. belge 1996, I, nos. 413-414 p. 1070; illustration 5 is based onOGH 16 January 1952, SZ 25/14; illustration 6 is taken from BGH 16 February 1972, BGHZ 58, 162; illustration 7 from OGH 28 January 1997, SZ 70/11; illustration 8 from Meah v. McCreamer (No. 2) [1986] 1 All ER 943; illustration 9 from BGH 30 June 1987, BGHZ 101, 215; illustration 10 from Swedish HD 6 May 1994, NJA 1994, 283; illustration 11 from BGH 13 July 1971, BGHZ 57, 25; illustration 12 from Cass.civ. 28 November 1974, Bull.civ. 1974, II, no. 317 p. 261; and illustration 13 from OGH 12 June 2003, JBl 2004, 111.

Article 4:102: Collaboration A person who participates with, instigates or materially assists another in causing legally relevant damage is to be regarded as causing that damage.

Comments 1. Purpose. This Article establishes the rule that persons who collaborate in causing legally relevant damage are to be regarded as causing the damage. Normally the question at issue here is liability for intention – on the part of the main actor and the persons with a contributory role. In cases of liability without intention or negligence collaboration is not conceivable. That is because in those cases no conduct of the liable person is required. In cases of instigation or assistance, all parties act intentionally. Where accomplices are involved, it is conceivable that as a consequence of an intentional antecedent wrong, merely negligent consequential harm then comes about, for which all accomplices are solidarily liable, even where their participation was not active. Several thieves can also become collective holders of a stolen vehicle; they are already liable under Article 3:205 (Accountability for damage caused by motor verhicles).

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Illustration 1 A, B and C have stolen a car and wish to bring it to a safe place. A sits at the wheel, B in the passenger seat and C in the back seat. Through a driving error during the nervous getaway, A causes damage to the car or to property belonging to a third party. B and C are also liable for this because the theft and getaway rested upon a common resolution of intent and a common plan. This liability results from the present Article. Liability as holder of the vehicle under Article 3:205 (Accountability for damage caused by motor verhicles) remains unaffected. 2. Scope. This Article relates to the causation of damage by participants, instigators and accessories or aiders. It concerns situations which may be described as ones of “psychological causation”. This is because the issue here is responsibility for having either brought about the resolution of intent of the person acting directly or having spurred that person on in the relevant conduct. Since all three classes of persons are treated alike, no precise differentiation among them is required. Hence the wording of the rule deliberately avoids the use of terminology from criminal law. 3. Relation to Article 4:103 (Alternative causes). The present Article requires a conscious and wilful co-operation of the participant in the causation of damage. If this is present every person acting causes the damage. In contrast, Article 4:103 (Alternative causes) deals with cases in which multiple occurrences are possible alternative causes of the damage – where, in other words, it is an open question whether one person or another has caused the damage but where it is clear that either the one or the other caused it. Where a case falls under Article 4:102, there is consequently no room for the application of Article 4:103; this is because under the former Article it is already given that each collaborator is regarded as causing the damage. Moreover, Article 4:103 may also come into play in cases of strict liability, whereas Article 4:102 presupposes a liability for some misconduct. 4. Relation to Article 6:105 (Solidary liability). Article 4:102 must be read in conjunction with Article 6:105 (Solidary liability). Participants, instigators and accessories are solidarily liable with the (principal) wrongdoer. Illustration 2 At a public meeting, a son reads the text of a speech drafted by his father, which contains serious defamatory attacks on the personal and professional reputation of another. The media report on this event and on the defamatory allegations made in the speech. Both father and son are looked upon as the cause of the third party’s damage; they are solidarily liable. Illustration 3 A, B, C and D had drawn up a plan to poach X’s customers through the provision of false information on X’s supposed infringements of copyright law. A drafts and (alone) signs the relevant letter. B, C and D have also caused X’s damage (see Article 2:208 (Loss upon unlawful impairment of business)).

774

Article 4:102: Collaboration

5. Collaboration. Article 4:102 only relates to cases in which several persons collaborate to cause one and the same damage. This applies e. g. to the thief and the receiver of stolen goods in relation to the owner. Conversely, where collaboration is absent, the case is then one of concurrent wrongdoers. Such persons, who act independently of each other or are independently responsible for different sources of danger, are solidarily liable under Article 6:105 (Solidary liability) where the same damage is attributable to each of them, for instance, where liability results from the positive act of one party and the omission of another or where an employee is liable for intentionally inflicted damage and he employer is subject to strict liability for the same damage. 6. Members of a group. During the preparation of this Book, intense discussion took place on the issue of whether a further rule should be adopted in addition to this Article. Under this mooted rule, where a member of a group intentionally causes a third party a legally relevant damage, other members of that group would be liable for the damage in so far as the risk of intentional occurrence of damage of that type was foreseeable and those members should have abstained from participating in the group. It was also discussed whether this liability should rest only upon those who were present at the scene of the wrong and whether their liability should only come into play in a subsidiary fashion. This suggestion was, however, rejected as being too far-reaching. The main objection was that such a rule, which would forego the requirement of collaboration and would be based solely upon “membership” in a group, would not be capable of being brought into harmony with the freedom to demonstrate. 7. Participants. “Participants” in the sense of the Article are those persons who either play a part in carrying out an overall plan (one person breaks into a house in order to make away with items from it, the other stands at the door and keeps a look out or waits in the getaway car), or persons who indeed do not participate in the actual act of wrongdoing themselves, and yet stay “in the background” maintaining command or co-command over the course of events. Injurious conduct of the primary acting party going beyond the original common plan will be attributed to them as a consequence of their own participation in the act, unless there are extraordinary circumstances. 8. Instigators. Instigators cannot make the excuse that the acting party wished to carry out the act and did so intentionally. Rather, the Article makes it clear that this does not break the chain of cause and effect between the incitement and the legally relevant damage. The decisive point is that the instigator has provided the party acting with an additional reason to take action. It is not necessary that the instigator was the person who first put the idea into the acting party’s mind. Illustration 4 Students have occupied an empty house in order to draw attention to what in their view are indefensible machinations of local property dealers, who are apparently raising the price of property by reducing the availability of accommodation. The police attempt to clear the property and an affray with the students breaks out on the ground floor. On the floor above other students call out heated encouragement to their colleagues below. The students in the upper storey have caused damage to the police officers even if the students below would have initiated the affray with775

Chapter 4: Causation

out their calls to arms. On the other hand the students in the upper storey are not causally connected if, in the tumult below, their encouragement could not be heard. 9. Accessories. Accessories or aiders support the person acting directly in carrying out the act, but have no influence over whether it actually comes about or not. The requirement is that the aider knows of the general outline of the primary act and wishes to assist in it. There is no negligent assistance; the same goes for assistance with a negligent act.

Notes 1.

2.

776

The point of departure in FRANCE is CC art. 1202. By virtue of this provision, there is no presumption of solidary liability (solidarité). However, heretofore Cass.civ. 11 July 1892, D. 1894, I, 561, note Levillain determined that, in the event that loss to the injured party is caused by the faute of several wrongdoers, the duty to compensate for the entire loss sustained by the plaintiff falls individually on each debtor, provided that there is a direct causal nexus between each faute and the resulting damage. In such cases, liability is said to be incurred in solidum. This type of liability presupposes that the same damage is caused by several faits générateurs. Nowadays, no distinction is made between gardien liability and liability which derives from a faute (Terré/Simler/Lequette, Les obligations9, no. 864 p. 839). Liability in solidum does not arise, if several coauteurs have caused different damage and the respective causes of the damage can be independently apportioned (Cass.civ. 19 April 1956, JCP éd. G 1956, 9381). There is no requirement that the faits générateurs be contemporaneous (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2006/2007), no. 1741). A coauteur, who has paid the entire compensation, is entitled to recover contributions in proportion to the part in the loss sustained played by the other coauteurs (CC art. 1251(3)). The same principle applies, if the insurance company is to pay for the loss (in respect of the latter (Code des Assurances art. L121-12.) If the claimant renounced his or her claim against one of the coauteurs, the remaining tortfeasors, despite the rule anchored in CC art. 1251 can initiate a recourse action against the co-debtor who would have otherwise, if sued, have been liable (Cass.civ. 7 June 1977, Bull.civ. 1977, I, no. 266 p. 210). The starting point in BELGIUM under CC art. 1202 is identical to that prevailing in France. Similarly, the consistent position adopted by the Cour de Cassation has been that whenever damage is caused by fautes concurrentes of several debtors, each is liable, in solidum, for the whole of the damage (Cass. 26 April 1996, Pas. belge 1996, I, no. 138 p. 392). However, the courts have displayed a tendency, whenever intentional fautes and negligent fautes concur to disregard the latter in this context (Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Wynant/Debaene, TPR 2000, p. 1917 no. 166). As regards concurrent criminal offences, in this case, by virtue of CP art. 50, solidary liability is incurred. In contrast to France, it can be of significance in Belgian law to ascertain the exact constitutents of the fait générateur in the instant case. It is true to state that, the faute of a third party will not, in principle, operate to exclude the imposition of liability on the gardien for a defective thing (CA Gent 8 June 1994, RW 1996-97, 1063), but in the context of where liability is imposed on the keeper of an animal (CC art. 1385), the faute of a third party can operate to break the chain of causation, if the third party was

Article 4:102: Collaboration

3.

4.

5.

responsible for the fait de l’animal (Cass. 19 January 1996, Pas. belge 1996, I, no. 41 p. 85). Incidentally, the rules governing actions for contribution from other concurrent wrongdoers has developed along the same lines as in France (CC art. 1251(3); Cass. 9 March 1992, Pas. belge 1992, I, 607). Within SPANISH tort law it is beyond doubt that if several persons participate under a common agreement with the purpose to cause a damage, they all are jointly liable, even if it clear that only one of them materially caused the damage (Paz-Ares/Díez-Picazo/ Bercovitz/Salvador (-Pantaleón), Código Civil II2, 1983; Roca i Trias, Derecho de daños3, 143; TS 20 February 1981, RAJ 1981 [1] no. 756 p. 610). The same rule applies if damage is caused by crime (CP art. 116(2)). The rationale for the rule is namely, that the existence of a plan formulated by the tortfeasors would have to entail that each of them is liable for the whole of the damage caused (TS 11 July 2006, BDA RAJ 2006 no. 4977; Pantaleón loc. cit.; Gómez Calle, Los sujetos de la responsabilidad civil3, 499). The ITALIAN Civil Code does not contain a corresponding provision to Article 4.102 (CC art. 2055 corresponds to Article 6:105 (Solidary liability); see the notes following this rule), but collective participation in the commission of a tort entails that each individual wrongdoer is jointly and severally liable, provided that he or she contributed to creating the risk that damage would ensue (Bianca, Diritto civile V, 648; De Cupis, Il danno, 273-275). It is widely accepted in case law and legal commentary that the rule contained in CP art. 113 (criminal liability for collaboration in a crime of negligence) is also applicable in the private law context (De Cupis loc. cit. 275; Monateri, Manuale della responsabilità civile, 141; Cass. 18 October 1982, no. 5425, Giur.it.Mass. 1982, fasc. 9). Seemingly, there is no requirement that the parties be aware that their individual actions converged to amount to a single joint action (Visintini, I fatti illeciti III, 52; Cass. 15 January 1996, no. 268, Danno e resp. 1996, 521). CFI Rome 3 February 2003, Giur.rom., 2003, 291, held that the organisers of an event were liable as “instigators” and were obliged to compensate for damage caused by an angry mob. The crowd’s wrath was vented because the entry tickets sold exceeded the seats available. HUNGARIAN CC § 344 provides for solidary liability in the case that two or more defendants “jointly” cause damage. The notion of “jointly causing damage” has been broadly interpreted. It is not a prerequisite that the defendants acted with a common purpose in mind. The fact that, viewed objectively, they acted in concert will suffice to make them solidarily liable (Petrik (-Harmathy]), Polgári jog II2, 581-582; Gellért (-Kemenes), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata I6, 1238-1240; Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 75-80; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 93-95; Bárdos, Kárfelelo˝sség a Polgári Törvénykönyv rendszerében, 54-55). Whether the exertion of psychological influence will be regarded as (not causal) mere advice or as (causal) instigating the decision to commit the [tortious] act will be determined by the courts upon examination of the circumstances of the individual case (Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 64-65). In the context of private law, no sharp distinction is drawn betweeen joint enterprise, incitement, and aiding and abetting a crime/tort. All three categories entail that the parties are “jointly” responsible for causing the damage compare e. g. BH 1980/471. The thief and receiver of the stolen goods are jointly and severally liable to the victim (BH 2004/145), furthermore, the person who negligently facilitated the commission of an intentional offence is solidarily liable with the immediate tortfeasor (BH 2008/118, BH 2000/198; compare. also EBH 2000/199). This dovetails with the legal position prevailing in BULGARIA. According to LOA art. 53 e. g. all co-principals involved in the theft of a car are soli-

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6.

7.

778

darily liable for damage to property directly caused by the person who was driving the car, (Supreme Court 10 May 1978, decision 1207 in civil matters no. 116/1978, first chamber). In ROMANIA, the courts reach the same result by adverting to the general doctrine of causation (Tribunalul Suprem, decison no. 1769/1982 in criminal matters, cited by Adam, Drept civil, 296); it is proposed under the Draft Civil Code that this rule will be codified in art. 1107 (Proiectul Noului Cod civil, 217). SLOVENIAN LOA § 186(2) conforms in all essential points to Article 4:102. Article 4:102 corresponds to POLISH CC art. 422, according to which liability for damage is incurred not only by the person who directly caused the damage, but also by one who induced or helped another to cause it and by one who knowingly took advantage of it. The general view is that the rule is based on the normative relation between the act and the damage; in such a case the question whether there was an adequate causal link is irrelevant (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛s´c´ ogólna7, 89; Radwan´ ski (-Dybowski), System prawa cywilnego III(1), 271). GERMAN CC prescribes solidary liability for the event that several persons are responsible for damage deriving from a tortious act. CC § 830 governs three discrete cases of participation, namely the joint commission of a tortious act, (para. 1 sent. 1) its instigation and when the tortfeasor aids and abets its commission (2). The legal consequences are identical in each case. Each tortfeasor is jointly liable for the whole of the damage. It is not a prerequisite to prove that the defendant directly caused the damage (BGH 7 November 1978, BGHZ 72, 355, 358). Joint enterprise where several persons collaborate to cause the same damage, instigation and aiding and abetting are notions which derive from criminal law and the meaning given to these terms under CP §§ 2527 has been transposed into the civil law. Accordingly, joint enterpise denotes a deliberate and willed collaboration on the part of the participants to achieve a certain result (BGH 11 May 1971, NJW 1972, 40, 41). Under this framework, the contributions of the parties concerned are imputed to each tortfeasor (BGH 24 January 1984, NJW 1984, 1226, 1228; BGH 4 November 1997, NJW 1998, 377, 381 f). A prerequisite as far as secondary particiption (incitement and aiding and abetting) is concerned is that the tortfeasor deliberately assisted in the commission of an intentional act by a third party. “Instigation” denotes that the tortfeasor procured the commission of the act giving rise to damage by the principal tortfeasor. “Aiding and abetting” denotes every assistance that is intentionally rendered, i. e. conduct that encourages the tortious conduct of the principal wrongdoer, which strengthens his resolve to commit the act, which facilitates the commission of the act. For these purposes, mere psychological encouragement will suffice (see further Palandt (-Sprau), BGB66, § 830, no. 3; MünchKomm (-Wagner), BGB4, § 830, nos. 9 and 19). AUSTRIAN CC § 1301 speaks of joint participants in the commission of a tortious act, instigators and accessories (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 14/5). “Joint” commission of the tortious act under CC § 1301 is not only established if there is a common understanding amongst the tortfeasors to inflict damage. It is sufficient that the tortfeasors were in agreement that they would collaborate to achieve a certain purpose and that in so doing, damage was inflicted negligently on a third party (OGH 12 February 1998, SZ 71/22; OGH 21 October 1999, SZ 72/156) – for example, within the scope of a common demonstration (OGH 25 March 1999, SZ 72/55). In respect of harm that is inflicted intentionally, the parties are solidarily liable. Conversely, in respect of damage that is inflicted negligently, solidary liability is only imposed if the respective individual con-

Article 4:102: Collaboration

8.

9.

10.

tributions to causing the damage cannot be ascertained (CC § 1302). In the following decision by the OGH, it was held that all three wrongdoers were jointly and severally liable for damage inflicted on the claimant, who, when he attempted to obtain assistance for his companion mishandled by two of the wrongdoers, was set upon and injured by the third (OGH ZVR 1998/6). It is possible for a joint tortfeasor who is found liable to seek contributions from the co-debtor. The size of the share to be contributed by the other parties in the internal relationship will depends on the extent of their input in causing the damage and the degree of respective fault (OGH 23 February 1999, SZ 72/ 35). In cases of doubt, the parties in the internal relationship are liable to pay equal shares (Koziol and Welser, II13, 327). Under GREEK CC art. 926, solidary liability is imposed in the case that the ensuing damage was caused by the colloborative action of several parties. Any contribution to the unlawful act of another which can be regarded as causal for damage that resulted, will suffice (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 926 no. 5; Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 572; a narrower interpretation is adopted in Filios, Enochiko Dikaio II(2)4, 92). Intention is not a prerequisite. It is sufficient, for example that, independently of each other, two individuals omitted to adopt necessary preventative safety measures. Joint enterprise, instigation, aiding and abetting are self evident components of CC art. 926. Further, cases of the so-called direct contemporaneous causation (which occurs when damage is caused solely by the convergece of two acts;namely, one act on its own would not have been sufficient) and “double causation” (each single act was sufficient, taken on its own to cause the entire damage) (Georgiades loc. cit. no. 10; Kornilakis loc. cit. 573). It has been espoused that CC art. 926 should be applied, even in constellations where a certain act contributes to the perpetuation of the damage (For example: the stolen goods are hidden by a third party: Georgiades loc. cit. no. 12; Kornilakis loc. cit. 574). PORTUGUESE CC art. 490 corresponds in all essential elements to Article 4:102. Each participant in the commission of a tortious act is solidarily liable (CC art. 497). This is also true for those who steal and those who receive stolen goods, (STJ 29 March 1989, BolMinJus 385 [1989] 379) or for the author of a defamatory text and the person who reads it out loud in public (CA Oporto 10 March 2005). CC art. 490 does not even have intentional collaboration as a prerequisite. Negligent co-participation will suffice (STJ 11 March 1999; Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 101 (1960) 121). For each participant (deelnemer), the DUTCH CC art. 6:166 precludes the possibilty to assert that his contribution to the commision of the tortious act was not causal. Members of a dangerous “group” are already liable for the fact that they joined the group (TM Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 662; Asser (-Hartkamp) Verbintenissenrecht III12, nos. 9394 pp. 114-116; Nieuwenhuis/Stolker/Valk (-Lindenbergh), T & C Burgerlijk Wetboek, art. 6:166, no. 1 p. 2340): Reliance is no longer placed on the parties’ individual contributions to causing the damage because participation in the activities of a group that one should not, in the first place, have joined, suffices for liability to be imposed. A prerequsite is conscious and willed collective conduct, whereas there is no requirement that a common purpose to inflict damage be extant (Hartkamp loc. cit.). It must be possible for the participation to be imputable according to the general rules of tort law and the person who is responsible for directly causing the damage mus have committed a tort in the sense of CC art. 6:162 (Lindenbergh loc. cit.; Hartkamp loc. cit. no. 93 p. 115). It can be derived from CC art. 6:102 that the members of the group are solidarily liable.

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11. 12.

13.

ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(4) tallies with Article 4:102. Similarly in the NORDIC countries if several persons collaborate in causing damage or injury it is generally accepted that they are jointly liable for the damage caused (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 216; Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 149, 307; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 342). The concept of ‘psychological causation’ allows the question as to which of the collaborators actually initiated the chain of causation to be disregarded (Vinding Kruse loc. cit. 150). In Swedish HD 15 December 1980, NJA 1980, 670 a school pupil (A) brought staples with him to school and distributed them. It was common practice for pupils to fire pieces of papers tied with rubber bands, but their activities stepped up a level in using the staples. A classmate (B) injured a another pupil (C). A and B were solidarily liable for the damage inflicted to C. As regards ENGLISH law, where multiple tortfeasors cause damage in concert (e. g. as part of a joint venture) or where one tortfeasor instigates another to commit the tort, the parties are joint tortfeasors, and each is liable for the whole damage and may be sued alone: Clark v. Newsam (1847) 1 Ex. 131, 154 ER 55. However, it may be doubted whether a person who has only facilitated (and not instigated or procured) a tort would be liable as a joint tortfeasor: see Clerk and Lindsell (-Murphy), Torts19, para. 5-77.

Illustration 1 is taken from Bulgarian Supreme Court, decision no. 1207, case no. 116/1978 in civil matters of 10 May 1978 and from BH 1980/471; illustration 2 from CA Oporto 10 March 2005; and illustration 3 from TS 11 July 2006, BDA RAJ 2006 no. 4977.

Article 4:103: Alternative causes Where legally relevant damage may have been caused by any one or more of a number of occurrences for which different persons are accountable and it is established that the damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which one, each person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably presumed to have caused that damage.

Comments 1. Relaxing requirements for establishing the chain of cause and effect. The aim of this Article is to facilitate the establishment of a causal link between legally relevant damage and conduct in breach of duty or flowing from a source of danger even in certain cases where such a link would have to be denied under Article 4:101 (General rule) paragraph (1) or under Article 4:102 (Collaboration). Where under the rule in Article 4:101(1), a legally relevant damage is to be seen as the consequence of either the wrongdoing (etc.) of A or the wrongdoing of B (or of C, etc.) but it is not possible to conclusively say that it was the consequence of A’s behaviour or of B’s behaviour, the effect of the present Article is that the damage is presumed to be the consequence of the conduct of A as well as of B (and of C etc.). Each is free, however, to prove facts from which it may be gathered under Article 4:101(1) that his or her conduct in breach of duty was not part of the causal chain. 780

Article 4:103: Alternative causes

2. Policy considerations. Such a special rule requires justification. This is to be found in a general consideration of justice. A person who breaches a duty owed to the injured person or exposes that person to a greater risk should not be exonerated from liability solely because another person also breached a duty owed to the injured person and it is no longer possible to say which of the breaches of duty caused the damage. The corresponding risk of inexplicability must be borne by those in breach of duty and not by the injured person. Illustration 1 Solidary liability falls on the operators of two mountain coal-mines, in which the injured person worked under conditions of exposure to an unreasonably high health risk; even if it can no longer be determined in which of the two work places the person contracted the illness. The position would be different if a social insurance scheme for accidents at work provided a different solution for such cases (Article 1:103 (Scope of application) and Article 7:104 (Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers’ associations)). 3. General requirements. The Article aims to relieve the victim of an undue necessity to prove facts from which a court, under Article 4:101 (General rule) paragraph (1), would have drawn the conclusion that the legally relevant damage suffered by the victim is to be regarded as a consequence of a particular person’s intentional or negligent conduct (or a source of danger for which that person is responsible). It is not intended to do more. The victim must therefore, as before, prove the existence of a legally relevant damage and that the other person would be liable for the damage suffered if the causality of that person’s contribution is supposed. The victim must also establish that the other person belongs to that circle of persons of whom it can be said with certainty that one caused the damage. On the other hand the Article is not intended to provide the victim with an additional person against whom a claim can be made. If it is clear that a particular person is fully responsible for the damage, but that person is not financially capable of making full reparation, there is no reason why the victim should have the windfall benefit of other persons to sue. The same holds true where it is clear that two persons have respectively caused different damage. Illustration 2 In a traffic accident, for which T is responsible, O is thrown from a bicycle on to the tarmac. T stops, but is not able to prevent a following vehicle (driven by F) from hitting O. It is not clear which injuries O had sustained before the second collision. T is liable for the full damage because T’s conduct was causal in relation to the subsequent accident and the injuries it entailed. F is not liable for the full damage; but is at most liable for a share of the damage to be assessed on the basis of the rules of civil procedure (If no such assessment is possible, F is not liable at all.) The situation would not be different if T failed to stop and left the scene unidentified. As regards the share for which F is liable, T and F are solidary debtors. The case is not one for the application of Article 4:103.

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Illustration 3 An employee A suffers a lung disease. It is not clear whether this disease is triggered by a single proximate exposure to a particular chemical or an accumulation of such exposures. Successive employers of A in breach of their duty failed to protect A from the hazard posed by this chemical. It is therefore uncertain whether only one (and, if so, which one) of these breaches of duty has caused A’s damage or whether both have. The causation by each of these breaches of duty is presumed; Article 4:103 dispenses with A’s difficulties of proof. Illustration 4: Two hunters discharge their weapons at the same time and in the same direction. A third party is hit and injured, once in the left leg and once in the right. Ballistics experts can identify from which weapon each relevant shot was fired. Each hunter is liable solely for the consequences of his shot; the case does not fall under Article 4:103. It would be different where the victim had only been injured by one shot, and it could no longer be established from which of the weapons the shot in question had come. 4. Different persons must be accountable. In relation to the claimant’s legally relevant damage, the Article requires that the various parties fulfill the requisites of liability of Article 1:101 (Basic rule) (except for causation) and that at the least it is established that the damage is the consequence of the intentional or negligent conduct of one of the persons or the consequence of the realisation of a source of danger for which one of these persons bears responsibilty. It is thus not necessary that these persons, assuming causation in each case, have acted culpably or that their liablility arises out of the same attributive cause. Illustration 5: Cows from two different herds which graze on the same pasture attack a man and fatally injure him. It is later no longer possible to say whether just one cow caused the fatal injury or whether it was more than one and it is also no longer possible to determine to which of the two herds the cow(s) belonged. The keepers of livestock are solidarily liable. Persons who, without being livestock keepers themselves, were to supervise the animals and neglected to carry out the supervision necessary under the circumstances are likewise solidarily liable (Article 3:102 (Negligence)). 5. The damage must be caused by one of two or more occurrences. It is, however, necessary that “it [be] established that the damage was caused by one of these occurrences”. This is not the case where it is unclear whether one of the occurrences brought about the damage at all. Article 4:103 particularly does not bring in any market-shareliability, thus no pro rata liability for damage from products of an ambiguous origin attributed according to the market share of their manufacturers. Illustration 6 The claimants’ mothers had during their pregnancy taken medication, which was marketed in the same chemical formula under different brand names by competing companies. This medication caused the claimants to suffer from cancer of the 782

Article 4:103: Alternative causes

uterus years later. They cannot say, however, which brand of medication the mothers bought at the time, nor even whether the medication taken came from any one of the companies which they now seek to hold liable; the medication may well have come from a company which does not exist any more. Article 4:103 does not help the claimants’ with either of these difficulties. An “occurrence” within the meaning of Article 4:103 is lacking. This is because even if all of the companies were active and present in the market, the claimants could not prove that each had unleashed a danger on their mothers. In other words, it is not even ascertained that any one of the mothers took medication from different companies. The people involved simply cannot remember who brought about the cause of damage. This does not suffice for Article 4:103. 6. Defences. Each person accountable for one of the occurrences may not only prove a lack of responsibility for the damage due to factual reasons, but may also show that another defence from Chapter 5, including the possible contributory fault of the injured person, is available. Illustration 7 Several children throw stones in the injured person’s direction. It is no longer possible to establish which child hit the injured person’s eye with a stone. The parents of one of the stone throwers can prove, however, with the aid of a witness who happened to be at the scene, that in any event the only stone thrown by their child went in a different direction. Only the other parents are liable. Illustration 8 The injured person, X, was consecutively employed by several employers and was exposed to asbestos dust at the workplaces. The severe lung disease that X contracted can be caused by even a single inhalation of particular asbestos particles. It is consequently unclear whether the disease was contracted when X worked for employer A or employer B; it is clear only that both acted negligently. A and B are solidarily liable. If contributory fault is attributed to X because of a failure to wear the necessary protective clothing, X’s claim is to be correspondingly reduced, and this holds true whether the contributory fault occurred during the period of employment with A or with B. In contrast, if X had occasionally pursued the same occupation in a self-employed capacity, so that the cause of the illness could have been due to that independent exposure during the same time period, Article 4:103 does not apply. In such a case it cannot even be established that either A or B caused the damage.

Notes 1.

A number of older French decisions declined to impose liability in the set of circumstances enumerated by Article 4:103. This disinclination was rooted in a strict application of the conditio sine qua non test (e. g. Cass.civ. 4 January 1957, D. 1957 jur. 264: two men fired contemporaneously in the direction of a fellow hunter, resulting in him suffering hand and facial injuries; his claim was rejected by the courts because it could

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2.

3.

4.

784

not be clarified which weapon fired the shot). However, subsequently, the Cour de Cassation veered in a more claimant friendly direction and decided that the solidary liability of the defendants who had possibly caused the damage was grounded either on the assumption that participation in the dangerous activity was capable of being qualified as a common faute (so Cass.civ. 6 March 1968, Bull.civ. 1968, II, no. 76 p. 52: a group of seven youths threw stones at other adolesecents, one person was hit but the actual perpetrator could not be identified; all seven members were held to be solidarily liable because they had collectively participated in the dangerous activity), or on the assumption that all of the participants were gardiens of the object which caused damage (of this view Cass.civ. 13 May 1975, Bull.civ. 1975, II, no. 88 p. 73: two hunters fired simultaneously in the same direction and generated a cloud of pellets thereby injuring a third hunter; solidary liability was imposed, based on the implicit rationale that both hunters were collectively gardiens of the “cloud of pellets”). If it is determined that the cause of the damage must be attributed to at least one member of a group but the actual offender’s identity cannot be established, then similarly in BELGIUM all of the members of the group are regarded as having collectively committed a causal faute, provided that they had hitherto reached an understanding that they would collectively bring about the dangerous situation. In such a case, proof that the direct cause of the damage emanated from another member of the group will not serve to exculpate the other members from liability. In contrast, if the fautes of several parties coincide purely by happenstance and it remains unclear who was concretely responsible for causing the damage, then according to prevailing legal doctrine, the claim must be dismissed (Bocken and Boone, TPR 2002, 1625, 1665, nos. 41-43). With the exception of an ad hoc regulation in the SPANISH Hunting Act (Ley 1/1970 of 4 April) art. 33(5)(ii) (which imposes strict liability on all the participants to a hunting party for the damage caused while hunting, when the author of the damage remains unknown), there is not, within the scope of Spanish tort law, any general provision dealing with the issue of alternative causes. Most legal writers consider that all members of the group should be solidarily liable unless they are able to show that they did not cause the damage (de Ángel Yágüez, Tratado de responsabilidad civil3, 877888; Roca i Trias, Derecho de daños3, 143; Díez-Picazo, Derecho de daños, 167-168; contra Paz-Ares/Díez-Picazo/Bercovitz/Salvador (-Pantaleón), Código Civil II2, 1984). The Supreme Court follows the opinion of the prevailing doctrine, see e. g. TS 8 February 1983, RAJ 1983 (1) no. 867 p. 602 (several children were playing by throwing different objects; one of these objects caused injury to another child; solidary liability of all parents of the children that were throwing objects); TS 13 September 1985, RAJ 1985 (1) no. 4259 p. 3591; TS 11 April 2000, RAJ 2000 (2) no. 2148 p. 3316; TS 2 November 2004, RAJ 2004 (5) no. 6864 p. 13956 (illustration 5 above). There are of course a number of decisions, in which there was a refusal to impose liability along the lines of Article 4:103 on the basis that proof of causation had not been established. see TS 2 April 1996, RAJ 1996 (2) no. 2984 p. 4005 and in TS 26 November 2003, RAJ 2003 (5) no. 8354 p. 15639. Similarly the ITALIAN CC does not contain a provision which corresponds to 4:103; the absence of such a provision was criticised, without success, before the Constitutional Court (Corte Cost. 4 March 1992, no. 79, Foro it. 1992, I, 1347, note Ponzanelli). It is suggested in legal writing that a finding that the members of a group are solidarily liable will not be precluded in any event, if the individual culprit cannot be identified,

Article 4:103: Alternative causes

5.

6.

7.

provided that the ensuing damage emanated from a group acting in a collective manner, for example, from a riotous group of people who broke into a licensed premises and smashed up corporeal moveables. Otherwise, it is, of course, necessary to identify the instigator of the damage; it will not suffice to prove that the defendant had involved himself in a group where, within the parameters of the group, there was a number of possible contenders for causing the damage (Bianca, Diritto civile V, 648). The premise is as follows, namely that solidarily liability should only be imposed on several parties, if those parties all played a role in causing the ensuing damage (Cass. 13 May 1989, no. 2204, Giur.it.Mass. 1989, fasc. 5; Cass. 4 June 1977, no. 2294, Arch.Giur.circolaz. 1977, 261). The question of alternative causation is rarely a matter of deliberation under Hungarian legal doctrine; statute law is silent on this issue. However, case law has arrived at a pratically identical result as that contained in Article 4:103, see e. g. BH 1995/214 (woodscrews were thrown from a group of primary school pupils; a fellow student suffered an eye injury as a result; the courts imposed solidary liability on all those who were involved in throwing the screws, even though it was unclear who actually succeeding in hitting the injured pupil) and BH 1991/314 (damage caused by firecrackers used by members of a music ensemble; liability of all the members was affirmed; the initial step of inquiry did not relate to who threw the firecracker). SLOVENIAN LOA § 186(3) embodies the same rule as that contained in Article 4:103. There is no rule under POLISH law corresponding to Article 4:103. The majority of scholars contend that where there are two or more dangerous occurrences which could have caused the damage and it has been established that the damage was caused by one of them, but not which one, all the persons accountable for these occurrences are solidarily liable, as they all caused the dangerous state (Radwan´ ski (-Dybowski), System prawa cywilnego III(1), 264). Solidary liability has been accepted by the Supreme Court where two persons were “strictly” liable for one damage (one as the possessor of the construction – CC art. 434 – and the other as the operator of an installation – CC art. 435) and neither could prove facts allowing them to escape liability (SN 4 July 1985, LEX no. 8724). According to the GERMAN CC § 830(1) second sentence, where several “participants” are involved in causing damage, each participant is liable for the damage caused, if it cannot be conclusively ascertained which party’s conduct was actually responsible for the damage caused. The purpose of this provision is to overcome the evidential difficulties which a claimant is confronted with, if it is unclear, when more than one person is involved, which party was the culprit responsible for the damage caused, or, if it transpires that the individual role that each party played in causing the ensuing damage can indeed be established, however the actual share of damage attributable to each individual involved cannot be calculated with any degree of success. The premise is that a damages claim, in the event that the damage has been caused by several parties, ought not to fail due to the fact that the “real” culprit cannot be conclusively ascertained (BGH 15 December 1970, BGHZ 55, 86, 88). The prerequisites for such a claim are as follows (i) that, causation excepted, each party involved acted in a manner which would serve to ground tortious liability (ii) that, at any rate, one of the parties involved has caused damage and (iii) it cannot be conclusively ascertained which of the participants was directly responsible for the damage that ensues (BGH 12 July 1996, NJW 1996, 3205, 3207; BGH 23 May 2006, NJW 2006, 2399; BGH 7 November 1978, BGHZ 72,

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8.

9.

10.

786

355, 358). The claim does not hinge upon whether the liability is based on fault, presumed fault or on the creation of a risk (strict liability) (Palandt (-Sprau), BGB66, § 830, no. 7; Staudinger (-Belling and Eberl-Borges), BGB [2002], § 830, no. 72; BGH 15 December 1970, BGHZ 55, 96, 98; BGH 22 July 1999, NJW 1999, 3633, 3635). Parties are only “involved”, if their conduct is factually, spatially and temporally connected to the damage, i. e. constitutes a homogeneous event (BGH 15 November 1960, BGHZ 33, 286, 291). Each party involved can refute the presumption of causation in his or her favour (Sprau loc. cit. no. 11; BGH 23 March 1999, NJW 1999, 2895). If it is ascertained that one party is the culprit and thereby responsible for the entire damage caused, then the other parties, who only potentially caused the damage, are not not liable (BGH 22 June 1976, BGHZ 67, 14, 20; BGH 18 December 1984, VersR 1985, 268, 269). Even if only one involved party can rely on a ground of defence, this entails that the other involved parties are also exonerated from liability (BGH 17 December 1952, LM no. 2 under § 830 BGB). The other parties are also relieved of liability if the injured party was also an “involved party” (BGH 8 May 1973, NJW 1973, 1283; BGH 30 January 1973, BGHZ 60, 177). GREEK CC art. 926 (second sentence) corresponds in all essential points to Article 4:103. Examples, apart from hunting accidents, include where a passer- by falls victim to a street affray, or car collisions where a cyclist suffers injury but cannot conclusively prove which car struck him (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 926 no. 17). It is a matter of some dispute whether CC art. 926 (second sentence) can be applied to cases corresponding to illustration 2 above (in favour Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 580; in opposition Filios, Enochiko Dikaio II(2)4, 97). An earlier decision of the PORTUGUESE courts dealing with inconclusive alternative causation declined to make a finding that the parties involved wer solidarily liable. This conclusion was reached on the basis that there was a failure to establish proof of causation (STJ 9 December 1959, BolMinJus 92 [1959] 301). This approach of the courts continues to be supported in contemporary legal commentary (Pereira Coelho, O problema da causa virtual, 24 fn. 5). Within the framework of the preparatory materials which led to the introduction of the Portueguse Civil Code, Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 84 (1959) 138 strongly advocated the adoption of a cognate provision to that of Article 4:103. However, CC art. 493(2) only introduced a rebuttable presumption to the detriment of the person who inflicted damage on another owing to the nature of the dangerous activity exercised or owing to instrument employed to carry out the activity (see further on this point Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 617). The issue of causation is not dealt with under CC art. 493(2); therefore the matter remains to be tackled under the general rules of tort law. If the damage that ensues may have be caused by any one of a number of occurrences for which differents persons are accountable for and if it is determined that that the damage was caused by at least one of these occurrences, then, under DUTCH CC art. 6:99, each of these persons is liable. The onus of proof in respect of causation is reversed in such cases (Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 346). The legal basis of liability is irrelevant; liability can be imposed on the basis of fault or strict liability (Schadevergoeding I (-Boonekamp), art. 6:99, no. 3 p. 11). There has been much discussion of late whether the case law of Supreme Court dealing with DES-pharmaceutical product case (HR 9 October 1992, NedJur 1994 no. 535 p. 2474) is compatible with the Product Liability Directive (of this view Asser (-Hartkamp) Verbintenissenrecht I12, nos. 441a-b pp. 388-

Article 4:103: Alternative causes

11.

12.

13.

392). According to the judgment of the Hoge Raad, CC art. 6:99 is, in any event, also applicable if the contribution of one involved party to causing the damage is uncertain whereas in respect of the other involved party it is beyond doubt that they played a role in causing the damage (HR 31 January 2003, NedJur 2003 no. 346 p. 2777 [dealing with two successive arson attacks]; see Boonekamp loc. cit. no. 4 p. 12; Hartkamp loc. cit. no. 441b p. 391; Akkermans, WPNR 1992, no. 6043, 249). ESTONIAN LOA § 138(1) corresponds in all essential points to Article 4:103. LOA § 138(2) permits each party involved to exculpate themselves by adducing proof that they did not cause the damage. Under LOA § 138(3) liability is assessed in proportion to the probability that the involved party caused the resulting damage. In SWEDEN, as noted above under Article 4:101, the plaintiff must make his causal explanation “clearly more probable” than any other possible explanation, provided, the plaintiff’s explanation is probable in itself (HD 28 December 1993, NJA 1993, 764; HD 31 October 2001, NJA 2001, 657). HD 21 July 1982, NJA 1982, 421 concerned personal injury from pharmaceutical drugs used during x-ray examinations. The defendant pharmaceutical company claimed that the injury was sustained by another company’s drugs which were also used during the examinations. Each of the drugs were considered as probable causes, but the defendant’s not as the ‘clearly more probable’ one, so that the claim was dismissed (this case met with much criticism, however, see Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 201; Dufwa, Flera skadeståndsskyldiga, 2659, 3007; Schultz, Kausalitet, 494). The result is that a special provision concerning solidary liability in the event that alternative tortfeasors are at work has not been enacted (Dufwa loc. cit. 3008). However, HD 31 July 1961, NJA 1961, 425 previously affirmed solidary liability in a case where it could not be conclusively ascertained in the case of two competing torts, what share of the damage could be attributed to each tort. In contrast to Sweden, in the interim, it appears that in FINLAND (see Supreme Court 14 June 1990, KKO 1990:78 and Supreme Court 11 April 1990, KKO 1990:47) and in DENMARK in (of a different view Eastern CA 15 June 1914, UfR 1914, 897) it is universally accepted that where alternative causes are involved, unless proved otherwise, all the parties involved are solidarily liable (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 151-152; Westen CA 30 December 1948, UfR 1949, 439 [a girl was injured by two boys who fired sling shots in her direction; both boys were held jointly liable]; Western CA 2 July 1894, UfR 1894, 1042 [three hunters fired in the same direction; all three were held to be solidarily liable, although it was not clear which of them was direcly responsible for injuring the victim]; contra von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 239) (HD 22 October 1982, UfR 1982, 1111 concerned a gas explosion which had killed several persons, the leak could either be attributed to A or B. A, who was sued, was held to be the considerably more likely source). The problem of alternative causes has focused in ENGLAND not on accidents but on cases of exposure to harmful conditions in an industrial setting which result in indivisible injury where apportionment of liability is unobtainable. (The former has been the setting in other Common Law jurisdictions for developing a rule along the lines of Article 4:101: see the Canadian case of Cook v. Lewis [1951] SCR 830, where injury to a third party resulted from a single bullet fired from the gun of either of two others.) Faced with the impossibility of attributing precise responsibility for the contracting of a given industrial disease whose onset cannot be exactly identified, case law has adapted to provide an equitable solution by imposing liability on those who were responsible for

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materially increasing risk which later materialised, even though others were also responsible for increasing the risk. In Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. [2002] UKHL 22; [2003] 1 AC 32 (see Illustration 3) relaxed the normal rule for proof of causation of the damage (i. e., that “but for” the defendant’s breach of duty the damage would not have been suffered; each employer who exposed the employee in breach of duty to the asbestos fibres, which were the sole likely cause of the mesothelioma, would be liable. In Barker v. Corus UK Ltd. [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572 it was settled that liability is several rather than joint and is attributed to the defendant’s relative degree of contribution to the risk, measured by the duration and intensity of the exposure which the defendant wrongfully inflicted on the claimant. This was on the basis that where liability is exceptionally imposed because a person may have caused harm because scientific knowledge can only operate in the realm of probabilities, liability should be divided according to the same probabilities of causing harm: loc. cit., 43 (Lord Hoffmann). It was also determined in Barker that since liability is merely proportionate to the contribution of risk, the principle of Fairchild also applies where there are other (innocent or natural) exposures (here: in the course of the claimant’s self-employment) which cannot be excluded as the (alternative) cause of the condition. However, the principle that the defendant who has contributed to the risk of the claimant contracting mesothelioma is only severally liable for his own contribution to the risk, rather than jointly and severally liable with other contributors for the entire damage has been reversed by statute: Compensation Act 2006, s. 3, which extends to SCOTLAND. To prevent hardship to defendants, the Act envisages a regime of compensation for defendants who are faced with liability under the Act for the entire damage and are unable or unlikely to obtain contribution from others because the liability insurer of others liable is unable to provide satisfaction: loc. cit, s.3(7). Illustration 1 is taken from Bulgarian Supreme Court decision no. 2286, case no. 89/1978 in civil matters of 16 August 1978; illustration 2 from BGH 15 November 1960, BGHZ 33, 286 and BGH 7 November 1978, BGHZ 72, 355; illustration 3 from Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32; illustration 4 from Cass.civ. 19 April 1956, JCP éd. G 1956, 9381; illustration 5 from TS 2 November 2004, RAJ 2004 (5) no. 6864 p. 13956; illustration 6 from HR 9 October 1992, NedJur 1994, no. 535 p. 2474; illustration 7 from Cass.civ. 6 March 1968, Bull.civ. 1968, II, no. 76 p. 52; and illustration 8 from Barker v. Corus UK Ltd. [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572.

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Chapter 5: Defences Section 1:

Consent or conduct of the person suffering the damage Article 5:101: Consent and acting at own risk (1) A person has a defence if the person suffering the damage validly consented to the legally relevant damage and was aware or could reasonably be expected to have been aware of the consequences of that consent. (2) The same applies if the person suffering the damage, knowing the risk of damage of the type caused, voluntarily takes that risk and is to be regarded as accepting it.

Comments A.

Chapter 5 in overview

1. The notion of defence. The subject-matter of this Chapter is the defences open to a person against whom a claim is made under this Book. Even where the requisites of Article 1:101 (Basic rule) are fulfilled, such a person is relieved of liability where and to the extent that one of the defences in this Chapter is available (see Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (a)). It is to be assumed that, under the general rules of evidence, the factual prerequisites for a defence are to be presented by the person founding on them and where contradicted must then be evidenced. A defence can extinguish liability but may also, depending on its type and on the circumstances, be used to reduce the level of damages. 2. Five Sections. The five Sections in the Chapter are structured not according to dogmatic categories, but according to predominantly factual aspects. In particular, they are not based on the distinction known to some legal systems between “justificatory” and “exculpatory” grounds. This is because technically speaking the category of “justificatory grounds” requires “unlawfulness”, which is not actually one of the requisites of liability for these model rules (Article 1:101 (Basic rule)). Section 1 contains those defences that are derived from consent or other contributory conduct on the part of the injured person, like consciously incurring danger or participating in a criminal act. Cases of justifiably serving one’s own or another’s interests are the subject-matter of Section 2, with Section 3 handling situations where the damage-causing risk was uncontrollable. Section 4 deals with contractual terms excluding or limiting liability and Section 5 deals with a particular problem in the area of damage suffered by family members.

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3. Further defences. Further defences may result from Book III (in particular Chapter 7 (Prescription)) and indirectly also from such rules of national law as are mentioned in Chapter 7 of this Book (Ancillary rules). This is because these model rules are silent on issues that permeate the law on extra-contractual liability from other legal quarters. Thus, further defences may be derived from e. g. the fundamentally protected rights to freedom of opinion and of the press or from the special protection of marriage and the family which is constitutionally guaranteed (see Article 7:101 (National constitutional law)). Judges and lawyers may enjoy certain privileges in relation to the law on liability (see Article 7:103 (Public law functions and court proceedings)), and employees are often not personally liable for damage that they inflict on other persons in the course of their employment unless very strict conditions are satisfied (see Article 7:104 (Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers’ associations)). This Book leaves these issues (and their corresponding defences) completely untouched. Apart from such matters the list of defences in the present Chapter is formulated conclusively. The Group saw no adequate grounds for having more rules on exceptions than are here mentioned.

B.

Consent (paragraph (1))

4. The basic principle. Paragraph (1) expresses a rule which is to be found in all European systems of law on non-contractual liability for damage, although it is only rarely codified expressly: any person who inflicts damage (that is legally relevant, within the meaning of Chapter 2) on another with the latter’s previous consent, commits no civil wrong. It would have been possible to formulate the rule so as to provide that damage which is occasioned with the consent of the victim is not legally relevant vis à vis the latter party, but that would have lost the element that the person committing the injury must make out the requisites for (effective) consent. Of course, this does not rule out the reality that there are cases in which the previous consent of the injured person to certain conduct also leads to the situation under these rules that the very existence of legally relevant damage is to be denied. Such situations no longer involve paragraph (1) of the present Article. Illustration 1 A theft (and consequently an infringement of property rights) is not committed by a person who takes another’s property with the owner’s permission; a breach of confidence is not committed by a person who is authorised by the relevant person to publish the entrusted information. Upon approval, it ceased to be “confidential” within the meaning of Article 2:205 (Breach of confidence). 5. The person suffering the damage. Paragraph (1) covers legally relevant damage of every type. The person suffering the damage is therefore not only someone who suffers a bodily injury (for fatal injuries, see Article 5:501 (Extension of defences against the injured person to third persons)), but also any person who has consented to damage of another type, e. g. property damage. On the other hand, paragraph (1) assumes that in principle one can consent to an infringement of one’s own bodily integrity, e. g. to an operation, a tattoo, to the cutting of hair or to certain sexual practices that are connected with the infliction of pain. 790

Article 5:101: Consent and acting at own risk

6. Non-contractual liability and contract. The consent can be part of a contract (e. g. a contract with a construction company on the demolition of a building or a contract for medical treatment). It can also constitute counter-performance for some payment or other performance by the other party (permission, in exchange for payment, to exploit a copyright or to build over the border between two pieces of land). Issues such as whether the consent in such cases is to be qualified as the acceptance of an offer for the conclusion of a contract or as the fulfilment of a contractual obligation and whether the contract law regime displaces the law on non-contractual liability, are questions to be answered solely by contract law. In principle, contractual and non-contractual liability freely compete under these rules, see Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (c). Illustration 2 X commissioned Y to chop down trees in X’s nursery and shred them. A dispute emerges as to whether X had also instructed Y’s workers to chop down lime trees and oak trees to the left and right of a path. Y has the burden of proving this instruction. This affects X’s claim in damages against Y as well as Y’s (possible) claim for payment from X under their contract. 7. Consent, acting at own risk and contributory fault. Consent and acting at one’s own risk will rule out a claim in damages. Where contributory fault alone is in issue the claim may also be completely precluded under special circumstances; but this is not the case as a rule. In a case where contributory fault is present, the claim is typically only partially reduced (Article 5:102(1) (Contributory fault and accountability)). Illustration 3 An employee of a farm-owner transports an inebriated man on a tractor trailer, together with a large amount of wood. Soon after the driver starts to travel with excessive speed and the passenger is thrown from the trailer and crushed by its wheels, suffering severe bodily injury. The employer of the tractor driver is liable for the damage because the passenger did not consent to the harm or voluntarily expose himself to the risk of injury in such a manner that it must be inferred that he accepted it. The injured man’s claim is, however, subject to a reduction due to 50 % contributory fault. 8. Consent. The previous agreement of the injured person is what is to be understood under the term “consent”. Subsequent agreement (“approval”) can have the effect of waiving a claim in damages but does not take away the unlawful character of the behaviour. The situation is different only in cases in which the approval transforms an originally unlawful act into a lawful benevolent intervention in another’s affairs, see PEL Ben.Int. Art. 1:101 (Intervention to benefit another) paragraph (1)(b) and Article 5:202 (Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity) paragraph (2). Consent need not be expressly given; it may result from the circumstances thus it is implicitly conferred. The person giving consent decides on the scope of the consent; a mistake by the other person on the extent of the consent given may exclude negligence, depending on the circumstances of each individual case.

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Chapter 5: Defences

Illustration 4 By way of a clearly visible sign, the owner of a car park warns persons who store their vehicles on her premises without authorisation that she will demand a release fee. In order to enforce it, she puts a wheel clamp on the claimant’s car. The claimant in this case gave implied consent to this infringement of property rights. Illustration 5 A, an actress, is involved in a photo reportage. This implies agreement to publication, but not to the publication of any random photo, where it is clear under the circumstances that A wants to examine the selection in order to avoid the situation where pictures are released that in her view have not turned out well. 9. Consent as a defence against purposeful conduct. The defence of consent under paragraph (1) requires purposeful conduct on the part of the other person. “Consent” to inattention is excluded; such cases come under the rules on the acceptance of a risk in paragraph (2). In the case of the latter, the person accepting the risk knows that there is a specific danger and accepts it but then hopes that it will not transpire. Conversely, in consent cases, typically both sides envisage that the primary injury will occur. Of course, in such cases consent also rules out liability under Chapter 3, Section 2 (Liability without intention or negligence). Illustration 6 A and B plan an insurance fraud. A drives A’s worthless vehicle into B’s already damaged vehicle, with B hoping to be able to shift the previous damage on to A’s third-party insurance. B has neither a claim under Article 3:101 (Intention) nor a claim under Article 3:205 (Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles) for the second damage and indeed not even where it is not A, but C who is the owner of the other vehicle. 10. Valid consent. Only valid consent will preclude liability. Paragraph (1) does not, however, specify the requirements for “valid” consent. Life is too multi-faceted and legal structure-requirements too complex for a detailed rule on this issue. The typical grounds of invalidity of consent are: lack of capacity of the injured person; the absence of sufficient information before the consent was given; and illegality or immorality. 11. Lack of capacity. Valid consent requires that the person giving consent be of sound mind. A person who, while completely inebriated, agrees to allow a similarly drunk contemporary to drive her home, does not confer valid consent and does not validly accept the risk of an accident. For persons under age, however, no general rule could be stated, because European rules for minors are not yet in existence (see DCFR I. – 1:101 (Intended field of application) paragraph (2)(a). The issue of minors’ capacity to consent must therefore be developed from the Member States’ general law on minors. Where the consent has the disposition of property as its contents or consequence, then it rests on the corresponding rules of the relevant applicable contract or property law. Often special rules apply to consent to medical operations. However, it can be said that even with the approval of the parents, curative medical operations against a minor’s will are no longer 792

Article 5:101: Consent and acting at own risk

admissible where the minor has attained a sufficient degree of maturity to make the decision not to be operated upon. 12. Informed consent. Consent is valid only where the person giving consent knows or at least has a general idea of what the other party plans to do and what consequences this conduct will have or could have, in the event that things turn out unfavourably. Therefore, paragraph (1) links this defence to the requisite that the person giving consent “is aware or could reasonably be expected to be aware of the consequences of that consent”. The rule thereby seeks to express the recognised rules on the requirement of “informed consent”. Its main field of application lies in the law on curative medical operations, for which – as long as they result from a contract – further elaboration is to be found in the commentary under DCFR IV. C. – 8:108 (Obligation not to treat without consent). 13. Illegality. Consent can also be invalid because it contravenes the law or is incompatible with basic ethical values of the legal system. Of course, on a more specific level, the more pertinent question to be posed in each case is why a law prohibits certain behaviour (even making it criminally punishable) even in the case where the party injured expresses agreement with it. Where the prohibition does not serve the protection of the individual, but the protection of the public interest, then consent further rules out civil liability. 14. Benevolent interventions in another’s affairs. Where effective consent is lacking or where the consent granted does not extend to the actual concrete events, then the defence of benevolent intervention in another’s affairs in particular also comes into focus for the originator of the damage. Of course, the prerequisites for this must all be satisfied.

C.

Acting at own risk (paragraph (2))

15. The basic idea. Paragraph (2) expresses a general consideration of justice. A person cannot complain about damage if that person has voluntarily incurred exposure to the danger of it arising and thereby indicated acceptance of the risk of damage occurring. The rule’s main practical field of operation lies in the realm of participation in martial arts or dangerous sports, but it is not confined to that. In principle its application is conceivable for all fields of the law on liability, e. g. as a defence against product liability, vehicle liability or liability for animals and as against liability for the unsafe condition of land, which would arise in its absence. 16. Systematic considerations. The rule also has the purpose of providing the defence of acting at one’s own risk with a self-contained and independent place in the overall system of liability. The circumstance that the claimant freely accepts the risk that is then realised can play a role in several contexts. Usually, the first test is whether the other person acted negligently under the circumstances. In football, for instance, physical contact is a part of the game and the higher the division, the higher the contact. Therefore, certain behaviour is allowed on the pitch that is prohibited in normal life, and even an infringement of the rules of the game does not necessarily lead to the inference of 793

Chapter 5: Defences

negligence. This is because not only do the rules of the game not equate with legal rules, they also frequently serve a different purpose than the protection of players. Even in combat sports, the defence of voluntary assumption of risk is only brought to bear where negligence on the part of the opponent or team-mate is established. Conversely, where the acceptance of a risk is in issue, there is no more room for a test of contributory fault; the acceptance of a risk rules out liability. This also applies where from the outset there is no room for a test for negligence because the basis of liability is the liability of a keeper within the meaning of Chapter 3, Section 2. Further, there is a certain proximity between the assumption of a risk and the contractual exclusion of liability. The defence of the voluntary assumption of a risk is not, however, bound to the restrictive prerequisites of Article 5:401 (Contractual exclusion and limitation of liability). 17. Knowing the risk of damage of the type caused. Paragraph (2) requires that the injured person was aware of the type of damage risked. The amount or magnitude of the damage is not at issue here, but rather its type, thus e. g. personal injury, property damage, or economic loss. Illustration 7 During a sailing regatta, a collision occurs, resulting in the death of one of the sailors. There is no room for the defence of voluntary assumption of risk because it did not relate to risking one’s life. 18. Voluntary exposure to and acceptance of the risk. The decisive point is that the injured person voluntarily incurred exposure to the risk and that a neutral bystander would come to the conclusion that the injured person did indeed accept the risk (if not also the damage). To this extent, everything hangs on the circumstances of each case. One of the factors to be considered is the distinction between a mere leisure activity and a sporting exercise governed by rules; only in the latter case do the participants typically accept the dangers inherent in the sport because only then can it be said that it ultimately depends on the mere chance of “whom it will hit today”. The form of the cause of damage is also to be considered, as well as why the injured person incurred the exposure to the risk. Illustration 8 A football player kicks an opponent out of anger, leaving the opponent severely injured. At this point the ball is no longer near the incident because the flow of the game had shifted long before. There is no acceptance of this risk. Illustration 9 A sixteen-year-old girl embarks on a trip with a female friend and two young men. The friend and one of the men split off from the group. In order to get home that evening (the last bus has already left), the girl sits in the other young man’s passenger seat, although she knows that he only has a provisional driving licence. In an effort to show off, he drives too fast, causing an accident. The girl did not voluntarily accept the risk.

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Article 5:101: Consent and acting at own risk

Notes I.

Consent

1.

In FRANCE, while it is indeed true that the maxim volenti non fit iniuria is generally recognised, however, that a person can legally consent to the infliction of bodily injury is the matter of some controversy. A number of exceptions to this principle are extant. This is particularly the case in respect to operations which are deemed to be medically necessary (CC art. 16-3; see further Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II10, no. 131 pp. 6061; on liability for cosmetic procedure further Cass. 22 November 2007, JCP éd. G 2007 no. 51). If the expressed consent to a particular course of action of the other party results in a contract (as is often the case of consent to an operation, cf. for BELGIUM Vansweevelt, De civielrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid van de geneesheer en het ziekenhuis, 48), then the contractual liability law supercedes tort law; the principle of non cumul des responsabilités applies. Liability will be imputed for a failure to fully disclose the medical risks associated with the operation (CA Mons 27 September 2005, Rev.gén.Ass.Resp. 2007 no. 14323), if the failure to fully inform was causal for the resulting damage (which was rejected e. g. in CA Liège 25 September 2006, Rev.gén.Ass.Resp. 2007 no. 14324). Likewise, in SPAIN a distinction is required to be drawn depending on whether pecuniary interests or non-pecuniary interests are involved. The consent of the owner of pecuniary goods is legally effective (see further Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 353). The legal status in respect of non-pecuniary goods is more complex i. e. in respect of personality rights because they are regarded as comprising of inalienable rights. Consent can be given to infringements to the rights of protection one’s honour, the right to protection of a sphere of intimacy and right to control the reproduction of one’s own image given that there is an express statutory mechanism providing for the effectiveness of consent (Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act [Ley 1/1982] art. 2(2)); the consent can be revoked at any time (loc. cit. art. 2(3)). Furthermore, the Tribunal Supremo regards consent to infringements of the right to honour as legally binding (TS 7 March 1990, RAJ 1990 [2] no. 1677 p. 2228; TS 1 July 1992, RAJ 1992 [4] no. 6499 p. 8488; TS 30 November 1992, RAJ 1992 [5] no. 9458 p. 12411; TS 19 July 2000, RAJ 2000 [4] no. 6753 p. 10329). In contrast, consent to death and consent to infringements of bodily intergrity is generally ineffective (Yzquierdo Tolsada loc. cit. 351). Consent to medical procedures connotes an exception to this rule (see further Patients Act [Ley 41/2002 básica reguladora de la autonomía del paciente y de derechos y obligaciones en materia de información y documentación clínica] arts. 2-5 and 8-11). In ITALY, the defence of consent under private law is prinicipally governed by the criminal law, more specifically by CP art. 50 (Cass. 24 February 1997, no. 1682, Giust.civ.Mass. 1997, 303). The defence also pertains to infringements of bodily integrity as governed by CC art. 5, therefore, in particular medical procedures (Cass. 15 November 1999, no. 12621, Foro it. 2000, I, 3588; Cass. 8 November 1994, no. 9261, Giust.civ.Mass. 1994, fasc. 11). The rules on legal capacity govern consent to breaches of corporeal rights (CC art. 2). The same holds true for consent to the collection and storage of personal data (Personal Data Protection Code [Decreto legislativo 30 June 2003, no. 196, Codice in materia di protezione dei dati personali). For the remainder, it depends on whether

2.

3.

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4.

796

the injured party can lawfully dispose of the right. It is not possible to lawfully dispose of the right to life (CP art. 579). CC art. 5 probits the lawful disposition of rights of bodily integrity if the disposition has the effect of creating a permanent physical impairment or if on other grounds it would contravene the basic values of the legal system or would be contra bonos mores (Cass. Pen. 11 July 2002, no. 26446, Foro amm. CDS 2003, 2902). As far as medical procedures are concerned, a distinction is drawn between procedures which are deemed medically necessary and cosmetic surgery. There is not an unfettered application of CC art. 5 as far as medically necessary procedures are concerned; occasionally the courts have rejected the applicability of the defence in this area (Cass. 15 January 1997, no. 364, Riv.it.med.leg. 1998, 345). It is a requirement that the patient be informed about the significance and risks entailed with the operation. If the patient is not in a position to consent, then a relative can consent in the patient’s stead (Cass. 8 November 1994, no. 9261, Giust.civ.Mass. 1994, fasc. 11). If a close relative cannot be reached, then the operation can be justified on other grounds (in an emergency; exercise of an activity permitted by law). Difficulties arise in repect of justifying a merely cosmetic procedure (see further e. g. Cian and Trabucchi, Commentario breve6, sub CC art. 5). Organ transplants or partial organ transplants are the subject of special regulations in an array of statutes (Kidneys: Legge 26 June 1967, no. 458 [Gazz. Uff. 27 June, no. 160, edizione straordinaria] Trapianto del rene tra persone viventi; cornea: Legge 12 August 1993, no. 301 [Gazz. Uff. 17 August, no. 192] Norme in materia di prelievi ed innesti di cornea; Liver: Legge 16 December 1999, no. 483 [Gazz. Uff. 20 December, no. 297] Norme per consentire il trapianto parziale di fegato; Bone marrow: Legge 6 March 2001, no. 52 [Gazz. Uff. 15 March, no. 62] Riconoscimento del Registro nazionale italiano dei donatori di midollo osseo; Taking of blood and removal of specific cells: Legge 4 May 1990, no. 107 [Gazz. Uff. 11 May, no. 108] Disciplina per le attività trasfusionali relative al sangue umano ed ai suoi componenti e per la produzione di plasmaderivati). HUNGARIAN CC § 342(2) makes clear that compensation can be recovered if the damage was caused with the assent of the injured party and the damage caused does not endanger or cause harm to any social (public) interest. Harm is caused to a social interest if e. g. assent is given to the destruction of an object which is endowned with public importance e. g. a valuable painting, a building, it can also even comprise of a field given over to the production of grain (Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 53). Consent is not effective if the result is to endanger third party interests, e. g. consent to laying of a fire (Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 35). Further, CC § 75(3) provides that the rights to bodily integrity, health and life are not regarded as having been infringed if the holder of the right consents to the infringement provided that the assent does not entail that the a social interest is transgressed or endangered. Therefore, consent to medical surgical procedures is valid provided that appropriate steps are taken to properly inform the patient about the nature of the proposed operation – of its risks and the consequences should treatment be refused (Szalma, Okozatosság és polgári jogi felelo˝sség, 91, 151; Gellért (-Kemenes), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1238; BH 2000/536). Even in the case of terminally ill patients, euthanasia is not permitted; it is not possible for a person to consent to conscious termination of one’s own life (Kemenes loc. cit. 1237; Petrik loc. cit. 35-36). Further, ROMANIA recognises consent as a ground of defence. This defence contemplates an agreement between the parties and legal capacity and a right to dispose of the relevant right are prerequisites of this accord. In particular, this encapsulates consent to infringements of corporeal rights; the defence

Article 5:101: Consent and acting at own risk

5.

6.

of consent can be invoked in respect of physical injuries resulting from partaking in sports and in respect of medical procedures (cf. CC art. 998; further Adam, Drept civil, 288; Dogaru and Dra˘ghici, Drept civil, 238; Romos¸an, Vinova˘t¸ia, 85). The Draft of the new Civil Code contemplates in arts. 1136 and 1137 comprehensive regulations on the validity of consent and on the waiver of liability before the putative tortious event (Proiectul Noului Cod civil, 223). SLOVENIAN LOA § 140(1) provides that “any person that allows another person to do something to the former’s detriment may not demand from the latter the reimbursement of the damage that the latter thereby inflicted”. However, one cannot validly consent to an unlawful action (LOA § 140(2) in conjunction with §§ 14 and 86). Consent is a unilateral legal transation and the rules pertaining to declaration of intention apply (Juhart and Plavs˘ak (-Pensa), Obligacijski zakonik I, 817-818). In POLAND, an individual’s consent renders the putative tortfeasor’s conduct lawful (Supreme Court 11 April 2006, I CSK 191/05, OSNC 2007, no. 1, poz. 18, p. 111). The defence of consent is however not expressly regulated under the Civil Code (Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛s´c´ ogólna5, 183; Pietrzykowski (-Banaszczyk), Kodeks cywilny I4, art. 415 no. 27), however, numerous provisions regulating special cases are found elsewhere (e. g. CP art. 27 § 2 [Consent to participation in an experiment]; CP art. 192 [medical treatment without consent]; Mental Health Act [Official Journal 1994. 111.535] arts. 21, 22, 26 and 28 [Consent to psychiatric treatment]). A It is always necessary to prove that the victim had a right of disposal over the legal interest (Przybylska, MoP 2003/16/740, LEX no. 38745; Bieniek (-Bieniek) III(1)5, art. 415 no. 5). Jehovah’s witnesses have the right to refuse a blood transfusion prior to an operation, even where that decision could endanger their life (Supreme Court 27 October 2005, III CK 155/05, OSNC 2006, nos. 7-8, poz. 137). Consent is partly classified as a unilateral juridical act and is governed by the general rules on declaration of intent (so Supreme Court 27 October 2005 loc. cit.), and partly categorised as an act which has connotations of a legal transaction but to some degree has a different status (see further Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak loc. cit.; Banaszczyk loc. cit. no. 30). In BULGARIAN legal doctrine, similarly it is universally recognised that consent operates to vitiate the unlawful conduct of the tortfeasor (Kalaydjiev, Obligazionno pravo, Obshta chast, 347). It is yet to be clarified whether under the private law, consent to an act can be operative, if that act contravenes the law or is contra bonos mores (Takoff, Obzor na deliktnoto pravo na Bulgaria). Likewise, a general proposition under GERMAN law is that consent, validly given, renders lawful the violation of the legal interest lawful (Palandt (-Sprau), BGB66, § 823, no. 38). Consent does not amount to a jurdical act (Medicus, Schuldrecht II13, no. 765; Erman (-Schiemann), BGB II11, § 823, no. 147; MünchKomm (-Wagner), BGB4, § 823, no. 666; Soergel (-Spickhoff), BGB13, § 823, no. 119), however, in order to flesh out its contours, the general principles on the interpretaion of juridical declarations of intent may be drawn upon (BGH 18 March 1980, NJW 1980, 1903; BGH 3 December 1991, NJW 1992, 1558, 1559). Consent that is elicited because of force, duress, pressure or fraud is vitiated (BGH 2 December 1963, NJW 1964, 1177, 1178), further, consent to an unlawful act or to an act which is contra bonos mores is also not a valid consent (Sprau loc. cit. no. 39). Legal capacity is not a prerequisite; the individucal who consents must, however, understand the import of the encroachment (BGH 5 December 1958, BGHZ 29, 33, 36). Therapeutic medical procedures also require the patient’s

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8.

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consent (BGH 14 March 2006, NJW 2006, 2108; BGH 9 December 1958, BGHZ 29, 46). The patient must at least be aware of the nature and major risks of the medical procedure, which in turn entails that the doctor is obliged to impart the information to the patient in a timeous fashion, the current state of scientific knowledge being the diagnostic benchmark (BGH 23 September 1980, NJW 1981, 633; BGH 25 March 2003, NJW 2003, 2012, 2013). It is necesary to disclose the facts which are of decisive import for the informed decision of the patient; if grave consequences are a potential result of the treatment, then a particularly comprehensive disclosure is required (BGH 17 December 1991, BGHZ 116, 379: Hepatitis- or AIDS-infection acquired via a blood transfusion), the same holds true for cosmetic procedures (BGH 6 November 1990, NJW 1991, 2349) and blood donations (BGH 14 March 2006, NJW 2006, 2108). Implied consent may establish a ground of justification, in circumstances where deferaal of the operation is not possible and close relatives or a person who acts as proxy to the unconscious patient cannot be asked for their consent (BGH 10 March 1987, NJW 1987, 2291, 2293; BGH 25 March 1988, NJW 1988, 2310; BGH 16 January 1959, BGHZ 29, 176, 182, 185). The burden of proof regarding proof of procurement of consent rests on the injuring party; this also applies in the case of a contract of repair where the nature and extent of the oblugation to perform is dispute and the claimant has recourse to a tort law claim of infringement of property rights (BGH 19 October 2004, VersR 2005, 282). The point of departure in AUSTRIA is identical: conduct which would otherwise be unlawful is justified by procuring the consent of the injured party, if he has a right of disposal over the impaired legal interest (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 4/90). This is true for both property rights (CC § 354) as well as consent to violations of the right to bodily integrity. The latter dispositions cannot be contra bonos mores (CP § 90(1)), and this is adjudicated by balancing the respective interests involved (OGH 26 January 1978, JBl 1978, 385). For consent to be operative in the case of grave physical injury, it must be deemed necessary to promote the recognised interests of the injured party or of a third party (Koziol loc. cit. no. 4/92). Conversely, consent cannot render killing permissible (CP § 77), but it is possible to consent to risk-carrying medical procedures, e. g. transplants. Legal capacity is a prerequisite for an operative consent. Moreover, the declaration of consent must be imparted with knowledge of possible risks (OGH 26 January 1978 loc. cit.). The medical practitioner is required to inform the patient of the nature and consequences of the procedure, the consequences of electing not to undergo the procedure and alternatives prior to beginning treatment. Otherwise, liability will be triggered even in the case of, in all other respects, correctly adminstered treatment (OGH 23 January 1986, SZ 59/18 p. 71; OGH 7 February 1989, SZ 62/18). The Advance Health Care Directives Act 2006 (PatVG) governs the validity of declarations which a person makes in the case he or she is no longer able to make a judgment or express consent in emergencies and in case of illness. The circumstance that the injured party factually consented but the consent is not legally operative, can be of significance because on this ground, it may be possible to reduce the amount of compensation payable (CC § 1304). Im GREEK law, it is accepted that consent embodies a ground of justification; volenti non fit injuria (Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio A(1)2, 819; Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 505). The provisions pertaining to juridical acts correspondingly govern such declarations (Stathopoulos loc. cit.; Kornilakis loc. cit.). As a consequence, a con-

Article 5:101: Consent and acting at own risk

9.

10.

sent is inoperative if it contravenes the law or is contra bonos mores (CC arts. 174 and 178; Stathopoulos loc. cit.; Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio, Geniko meros, 603). Consent to violations of property rights are generally unproblematic; in contrast, consent to infringements of personality rights are generally regarded as contra bonos mores, at any rate, if it amounts to a serious violation (Stathopoulos loc. cit.). A divergent approach is only adopted where the infringement was necesary to protect an elevated legal interest (on this basis, operations which are deemed medically necessary are permissible, whereas mere cosmetic procedures are not Kornilakis loc. cit. which are deemed tob e uunlawful even where consent is given; however, see also Foundedaki, Astiki iatriki evthini, 256: only in respect of dangerous cosmetic surgery does consent not amount to a ground of justification). In the case of damage or dstruction to property, consent is inoperative if e. g. a rare painting was involved. Consent to therapeutic medical treatment is only operatibe if the patient was fully informed of the risks and advantages associated with the procedure (Fountedaki loc. cit. 174; Agalopoulou-Zervogiani, FS Litzeropoulos I, 27). Consent, which does not have the effect of rendering the infringement lawful, remains relevant under the heading of contributory negligence (Stathopoulos loc. cit. 819-820). PORTUGUESE CC art. 340(1) provides that violations of the rights of other are not unlawful of the holder of the right consent to their violation; similarly, at this juncture, the maxim volenti non fit iniuria applies (Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 528; Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 560). The courts appear to favour a strict application (STJ 23 September 2004: Consent to the storage of construction materials in a backyard precludes a claim for damages, even in respect of chemicals and fecal matter which was left behind). The validity of consent is ascertained according to the general rules on declarations of intent. Special provisions govern medical law (Dias Pereira, O consentimento informado, 214). Consent is required to be given voluntarily and is required to be an informed consent (Const. arts. 1, 25 and 26; CP arts. 156 and 157; CC art. 70; Vaz Rodrigues, O consentimento informado para o acto médico, passim). Consent may not always be requiered if the procedure was carried out in the interests of the affected party and corresponded to his or her presumed will (CC art. 340(3)). Cases involving unconscious patients provide important examples for the application of this principle; in essence, these relate to cases of benevolent intervention in another’s affairs (see further Almeida Costa loc. cit.). Procedures which are not deemed necesary from a medical point of view (as, for example, cosmetic surgery, experiments, consent to organ removal) require an express declaration of consent; an implied consent here will not afford a defence (Dias Pereira loc. cit. 478 and 626; Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use Act art. 6(1)(d) and before the Clinical Trials on Human Beings Decree Law art. 10(1)). Consent to illegal conduct or conduct which contravenes “good practice” is inoperative (CC art. 340(2)). An example is provided by a case where a professional football transfer of the right to control the reprodution of his image in its entirity to his club (CA Evora 24 February 2005; see also STJ 8 November 2001, CJ(ST) IX [2001-3], 113), consent of a sixteen year old to live in de facto cohabitation with a man denotes another example (STJ 21 November 1985, BolMinJus 351 [1985] 429). The following principle is derived from DUTCH CC art. 6:162(2), namely that an unlawful act is rendered lawful, if the tortfeasor can aduce a ground of justification. Consent affords a ground of justification e. g. consent to an operation carried out lege artis (Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12, no. 455 p. 414). ESTONIAN LOA

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§ 1045(2) adheres to the same conceptual understanding. The consent of the injured party renders the damaging conduct lawful provided that the consent was legally operative. The injured party must be aware of the consequences of that consent, i. e. that he or she knew the consequences or could have reasonably been expected to know of them. In addition, the consent cannot be unlawful or contra bonos mores. Similarly, in the NORDIC countries, the defence of consent is occasionally discussed in connection with the theory of “wrongfulness” (rättsstridighetsläran), a valid consent being regarded as rendering the damaging act lawful (Ussing, Retstridighed, passim; Karlgren, Skadeståndsrätt5, 67). However, in SWEDEN (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 62; Agell, Samtycke och risktagande, 67; Conradi, SvJT 1989, 225-234) and FINLAND (Taxell, JFT 1944, 367-387; Hakulinen, Obligationsrätt, 237), and now also in DENMARK (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 30; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 44) there are hardly any remaining proponents of the theory of wrongfulness. This does not have any impact on the fact that only an express or implied consent affords a defence to liability; a presumed consent will not generally be enough (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 124; von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 51; Taipale, Accept af risiko, 385). Consent to a particular type of damage will also not suffice if the actual damage that has occurred is atypically more serious than was previously contemplated (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit.; von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 52; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 112; Hakulinen loc. cit. 265). In ENGLISH law “[i]t is a general principle of the law of tort that a person cannot complain of injury arising out of a risk to which he willingly consented”: Meretz Investments v. ACP [2006] EWHC 74 (Ch) at [383]; [2006] 3 All ER 1029, 1118 (Lewison J), holding that the principle applies not just to to intentional torts but also to economic torts. On one view consent does not function as a defence to the tort of trespass; instead absence of consent is an essential element of the tort, with the consequence that the claimant has the burden of showing absence of consent in an action for trespass to the person (Freeman v. Home Office (No. 2) [1984] QB 524, 539). However, the traditional view reflected in dicta assumes that consent operates as a defence to be proven by the defendant: see, for example, Re F. (Mental patient: sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 29. The defence, which is of most relevance to the intentional torts, requires that the consent is freely given and relates to the particular act of the defendant – in particular, therefore, that it is not induced by the defendant’s duress (i. e. force or threats of violence) or fraud affecting the nature and quality of the act (Clerk and Lindsell (-Jones), Torts19, para. 15100) and any force used by the defendant is of the kind reasonably expected (loc. cit., 15-99). While e. g. consent to medical treatment provides a defence to an action in trespass in respect of the physical contact, it will not serve as a defence to an action in negligence if the treatment is carried out without proper care or if proper advice about the medical procedure is not provided before the consent is given: loc. cit., para. 3-75. Tortious liability may be negatived by expressly authorising an act which, were it not for that permission, would be an infringement of a right (e. g. in entering onto land or conducting surgery): loc. cit., 3-73. Consent may also extend to implied authorisations such as acceptance within a game of sport of those bodily contacts which are a legitimate part of the game (e. g. a tackle which is within the match rules) (see Blake v. Galloway [2004] EWCA Civ 814, [2004] 1 WLR 2844 (injury sustained from horseplay where twigs and bark were thrown; court held that in activities such as sports and games which inevitably involve the risk of physical contact, the participants are taken impli-

Article 5:101: Consent and acting at own risk

13.

edly to consent to those contacts which could reasonably be expected to occur in the course of the activity and to assume the risk of injury from such contacts). Similar principles will apply to spectators who are regarded as consenting to the lack of care that may produce the risk of injury e. g. by balls or pucks being hit into the crowd: Clerk and Lindsell (-Jones), Torts19, para. 3-102. In such cases the consent defence shades into the defence of the claimant’s assumption of the risk of tortious injury or damage arising e. g. out of a negligent act which does not comply with the rules. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the formula volenti non fit injuria (which may be seen as properly the preserve of the latter defence, despite its literal terms) is also used in the context of the defence of consent: ibid. In SCOTLAND too consent is a defence to conduct interfering with the pursuer’s rights provided it does not exceed the terms of the consent and the consent is not extorted: Stewart, Delict3, 206, and on the latter point Adamson v. Martin 1916 SC 319 (police “request” to take photograph and fingerprints of a 17 year old, in the absence of a parent, “had all the appearance of an order”).

II.

Acting at own risk

14.

Questions in connection with the contentious principle of acting at one’s own risk raise a mutitude of not inconsiderable systematic difficulties in national legal systems and under EU law. In conjunction with art. 2(1) of the Second Council Directive 84/5/ EEC of 30 December 1983 on the approximation of laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability and art. 1 of the Third Council Directive 90/232 / EWG of 14 May 1990 on the approximation of laws of Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, the ECJ held in a judgment handed down on 30 June 2005 – C-537/03, Candolin v. Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtiö Pohjola, EuZW 2005, 593, that it amounted to a contravention of community law to deny a passenger of a motor vehicle, who was also the owner of the vehicle, the right to be compensated by the driver’s third party liability insurance on the grounds that the injured party must have recognised the driver’s drunken condition. In respect of the legal consequences of an acceptation des risques, in FRANCE, a distinction is made between liability for faute and the objective liability. In the first category of cases, namely the responsabilité du fait personnel, it is acknowleged that the fact that the victim voluntarily accepts the risk does not have the effect of either reducing or exempting the liability of the tortfeasor (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II10, no. 180 p. 172), unless, the assumption of risk amounts to contributory negligence (Cass.ch.mixte 28 January 1972, Bull.ch.mixte 1972, no. 1 [passenger injured; here the claim was reduced by 25%, because the victim knew that the driver was drunk]). An acceptance of risk where there is no underlying fault can impinge on the question of whether the injuring party actually acted fautivement: a person who injures another in a combat sport where the rules were observed, does not commit a faute vis-à-vis the injured party (Cass.civ. 5 December 1990, Bull.civ. 1990, II, no. 258 p. 133 [Boxing] and Cass.civ. 23 September 2004, Bull.civ. 2004, II, no. 435 p. 369). In respect of the second category (objective liability) consensus exists at any rate on the point that an acceptation des risques generally entails that individuals injured while participating in a sporting activity cannot rely on the gardien-liability under CC art. 1384(1). How this conclusion is be rationalised on a dogmatic basis is a bone of contention. A number of legal writers

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Chapter 5: Defences

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contend that it can be regarded as a legal consequences of a faute de la victime (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2004/2005), no. 1894), other commentators consider the assumption of risk amounts to a mutual agreement to absolve each other from liability (Flour/Aubert/Savaux loc. cit. no. 262 p. 267, particularly fn. 5). The theory of the acceptation des risques only comes to the fore in competitive sporting events, it is inapplicable in the case of a non-competitive or impromptu sporting meetings (Cass.civ. 28 March 2002, Bull.civ. 2002, II, no. 67 p. 54) or during youth sports training (Cass.civ. 4 July 2002, D. 2003, 519, note Cordelier). In BELGIUM, the doctrine of risicoaanvaarding or. acceptation des risques is typically exemplied by the case of travelling in a vehicle with a driver in a recognisably drunken state (Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Wynant/Debaene, TPR 2000, 1551, 1673, no. 30). Indeed, assumption of risk “of itself” is not tantamount to a ground of justification leading to the exclusion of tort liability (Cornelis and Claeys, TBBR 2003, 586, 595 no. 46), but it may be classifed as contributory negligence leading to an apportionment of liability (CA Gent 21 March 1995, RGAR 1996, no. 12557). In other words, the injured party is required to have breached a duty of care (CA Gent 22 January 1999, RGAR 2000, no. 13.200). Therefore, the theory of assumption of risk is only relevent if the victim did not breach any other legal norms (e. g. provisions relating to the compulsory wearing of a seat-belt) (Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Wynant/Debaene loc. cit. no. 31). The SPANISH Supreme Court has, on many occassions, approved the theory of assumption of risk (see further Orti Vallejo, Responsabilidad en la explotación, 1357; for a critical exposition, see Solé Feliu, FS Díez-Picazo II, 3097-3123), see e. g. TS 10 February 2006, RAJ 2006 (1) no. 675 p. 1617 (no liability vis-à-vis a man who took part in a bullfighting festivity; the plaintiff assumed the risk) and TS 31 May 2006, RAJ 2006 (3) no. 3494 p. 8007 accident between racing cyclists; however, the race organisers were liable for inadequate safety on the cycle route). The assumption of risk doctine was deemed inapplicable to operators of a golf course in a case where the ball of one player hit another player while he was searching for his golf ball; operating a golf course does not constitute a dangerous activity which was a prerequisite for the imposition of strict liability (CA Pontevedra 11 May 2006, BDA JUR 2006/158510; see also TS 9 March 2006, RAJ 2006 (2) no. 1882 p. 4474). Similarly, the basic tenet in respect of all kinds of combat sports is that injuries that habitually crop up in these sports must be tolerated and therefore, such injuries must be reckoned with see TS 22 October 1992, RAJ 1992 (5) no. 8399, p. 11045; TS 20 March 1996, RAJ 1996 (2) no. 2244 p. 3058; TS 16 October 1998, RAJ 1998 (4) no. 8070 p. 11793. The organisers are liable to the participants only where proof of fault can be adduced (CA Valladolid 21 September 1994, AC 1994 (2) no. 1397 p. 1030; CA Vizcaya 15 March 1999, AC 1999 (2) no. 881 p. 83; TS 14 April 1999, RAJ 1999 (2), no. 3140, p. 481; TS 29 December 1997, RAJ 1997 (5) no. 9602 p. 15314 [Non fulfilment of safety obligations]; TS 30 October 1992, RAJ 1992 (4) no. 8186 p. 10736 [negligent organisation]); a judgment following different lines TS 17 September 1998, RAJ 1998 (4) no. 7282 p. 10711 is is apparently still in force (liability was imposed on the organisers of a bullfight solely on the grounds of the creation of an increased risk). The theory of assumption of risk is even applied in the case of accidents occurring during public entertainment spectacles (Big wheel etc.) (CA Guadalajara 27 Juli 1994, AC 1994 (2) no. 1190 p. 715; CA Segovia 14 February 1997, AC 1997 (1) no. 254 p. 447; CA Córdoba 16 December 1997, AC 1997 (3) no. 2417 p. 1200; however, of a differnt view, CA Granada 3 February 1998, AC 1998 (3)

Article 5:101: Consent and acting at own risk

18.

19.

20.

no. 1696 p. 63; CA Granada 11 May 1999, AC 1999 (1) no. 470 p. 665; CA León 9 April 1999, AC 1999 (2) no. 1387 p. 820), it does not apply in the case of accidents in public swimming pools (TS 23 November 1982, RAJ 1982 (3) no. 6558 p. 4358; TS 14 June 1984, RAJ 1984 (2) no. 3242 p. 2471; TS 10 April 1988, RAJ 1988 (2) no. 3116 p. 2956; TS 2 April 1993, RAJ 1993 (2) no. 2986 p. 3820). A distinction, not always a sharp one, has been drawn in case law between a lack of negligence, contributory fault and assumption of risk. In a similar fashion, the ITALIAN courts apply the following rule to competitive sporting activities, namely, the participants waive their damages claim against each other owing to their voluntarily assumption of risk (the accettazione del rischio), provided that the injury remains within the boundaries of a typical risk associated with a sport of this nature and the injury is not linked to failure to abide by the rules, was not deliberate or the result of the exercise of disproportionate force (Cass. 27 October 2005, no. 20908, Giust.civ.Mass. 2005, fasc. 10; Cass. 20 February 1997, no. 1564, Resp.civ. e prev. 1997, 669; Cass. 8 August 2002, no. 12012, Danno e resp. 2003, 529 = Foro it. 2003, I, 1,168). In HUNGARY, it is assumed that sporting injuries are governed by CC § 342(2) and therefore consent is presumed (Petrik (-Harmathy), Polgári jog II2, 580), unless the rules of the sport were flagrantly disobeyed or the organiser did not adhere to health and safety obligations (Petrik (-Petrik), Polgári jog I2, 178/1; Gellért (-Kemenes), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1327). An implied consent can only be invoked in respect of those injuries which are necessarily comprehended by the relevant sporting activity, therefore, implied consent will not afford a consent in cases e. g. of deliberate infliction of injury. Commonplace infringements of the rules governing a particular sport are classified as coming within the risk associated with the particular sport provided that the infringement was not intentional (Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 35 et seq.; Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 52). The legal postion in SLOVENIA appears to correspond in nearly all respects to the Hungarian situation (Cigoj, Teorija obligacij, splos˘ni del obligacijskega prava, 179). However, the injury must have come to pass while abiding by the rules of the game (Supreme Court of Yugoslavia 21 November 1984, Porocˇilo VS RS 2/84, 20). A person does not act at their own risk if they sustain injury while attempting to rescue another (Cigoj loc. cit.). Under ROMANIAN Civil law, it appears that there is no distinction between consent and acting at one’s own risk. Under POLISH law, the theory of acting at one’s own risk is considered to render lawful what would otherwise be unlawful. It is not unusual for the same substantive considerations to be employed in the context of contributory negligence, as regards causation and within the framework of rules on implied consent (see further Pietrzykowski (-Banaszczyk), Kodeks cywilny I4, art. 415 no. 32; Bieniek (-Bieniek) III(1)5, art. 415 no. 5). As regards the field of sports, there is some leeway here as competitive athletes are under a duty to insure themselves against an accident (Qualified Sports Act [Dz. U. 2005.155.1298], art. 29(1)). Similarly, the concept of assumption of risk is a familar one to BULGARIAN law (Goleva, Pravna misul 1985 [4] 46-56) It primarily comes to the fore in the context of dangerous sports (football, boxing) and is deployed in cases where an individual allows himself or herself to be transported in a vehicle driven by a recognisably drunk driver or recognisably dangerous vehicle and the ensuing accident is caused by these dangers (Goleva loc. cit. 48). The doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk is deemed to be inapplicable in cases where a person suffers injury while attempting

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22.

23.

24.

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to rescue another (Supreme Court 19 August 1972, decision no. 2031, case no. 967/72 in civil matters, first chamber). In GERMANY, for the most part, consent justifying an exemption from liability is only recognised in the case of markedly dangerous sports (boxing; motorsports) (BGH 14 March 1961, BGHZ 34, 355, 363; BGH 5 November 1974, BGHZ 63, 140, 144; BGH 5 March 1963, BGHZ 39, 156, 161; however, see also BGH 1 April 2003, NJW 2003, 2018, 2019). In the context of other competitive sports (e.g football), where even full compliance with the rules or minor infringements carries a potential risk of injury to both sides, it is assumed that each participant has accepted the consequences, even if grave, of injuries that cannot be avoided in sports of this nature. If a claim were to be asserted against the injuring party, this would constitute inconsistent behaviour (venire contra factum proprium) and therefore, such a claim is precluded. Consent is not contemplated hereby, because e. g. every football player plays in the hope that he won’t sustain injury (BGH 5 November 1974, BGHZ 63, 140, 144; BGH 1 April 2003, BGHZ 154, 316). The rules governing the assumption of risk are not deployed in the context of sporting events which are not subject to a hard and fast set of rules (BGH 7 February 2006, NJW-RR 2006, 672, 674). Occasionally, the assumption of risk is reinterpreted to connote implied consent (CA Karlsruhe 19 March 2004, NJW-RR 2004, 1257: Segelregatta). In AUSTRIA, implied consent is held to be extant where an individual sustains injury while partaking in a sporting activity despite the rules having been fully observed or where the injury was the result of a commonplace violation (OGH 24 September 1981, SZ 54/133 p. 660; OGH 22 September 1987, SZ 60/176 p. 219); divergent principles to the rules usually governing the infliction of physical injury, apply in the context of injuries sustained in competitive sports (OGH 24 September 1981 loc. cit.). If the transgression goes beyond a typical breach of the rules, liability, governed by the general tort law principles, is triggered (OGH 22 September 1994, EvBl 1995/74). This is the case e. g. if a football player sticks out his leg and strikes his opponent’s leg, deliberately bringing him to the ground (OGH 22 September 1994 loc. cit.). A duty to compensate was held to exist where in contravention of the rules, a racing driver was guilty of overtaking during the race and by doing so killed a track attendent. The rules which have developed for competitive sports are also valid for games which involve physical contact and where it is required to at least comply with a minimum number of rules or conventions (OGH 22 March 1983, ZVR 1984/92 p. 89; OGH 25 November 2004, JBl 2005, 380). The rules are deemed not to apply to the detriment of a rescuer who sustains injury during a rescue attempt (OGH 17 March 2005, ÖJZ 2005, 713). In GREECE, it is said that wrongfulness is nullified if the injured party is deemed to have assumed the risk of injury bound up with a particular activity. The most important case of application for this doctrine is participation in competive sports. One requisite of this defence is that there is adherence to the rules of the sport. A further requirement is that the harm caused is regarded as a typical risk associated with sports of this type (Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 506; Georgiades and Stathopoulos(-Georgiades) assert that such cases should be solved by utilising the consent mechanism, art. 914, no. 59). Similarly, in PORTUGAL, the doctrine of assunção do risco also represents a ground of defense (in depth Brandão Proença, A conduta do lesado, 615; Ribeiro de Faria, Direito das Obrigações, 525; Calvão da Silva, Responsabilidade civil do produtor, 735). This defence is seldom invoked in the law pertaining to traffic liability (Brandão Proença loc. cit. 626: passengers who were given a free lift), it is largely significant in determining

Article 5:101: Consent and acting at own risk

25.

26.

27.

liability under sports law. Here, it serves to impute consent to players of competitive sports in respect of the realisation of risks which are synonymous with their sport (Brandão Proença loc. cit. 613, 631 and 632; Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 562; Hörster, Parte geral, 269). Implied consent to contact is excluded if the injury was caused intentionally or resulted from a serious breach of the rules (Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 529). Under DUTCH law, there is no overall consensus on how to order a risico-aanvaarding within the Civil law system. On these grounds, nor is there agreement on the legal consequences flowing from an assumption of risk. The law on consent, the implied waiver of liability, contributory negligence and negligence all feature in the discussion (Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12, no. 454 p. 413); at any rate, assumption of risk is not tantamount to an autonomous ground of justification (HR 28 Juni 1992, NedJur 1992 no. 662 p. 2546; Nieuwenhuis/Stolker/Valk (-Lindenbergh), T & C Vermogensrecht4, art. 6:162 p. 1861; Hartkamp loc. cit.). A person, who was transported gratutiously, does not impliedly waive a potential damages claim; a person who permits himself to be driven by a driver in a recognisably drunken state must reckon with a reduction in damages owing to contributory negligence (HR 28 September 1990, NedJur 1992 no. 619 p. 2530; HR 20 October 1990, NedJur 1992 no. 620 p. 2535). A reduction in liability on the basis that risk was assumed can also be attained in other instances by reverting to CC art. 6:109 (Hartkamp loc. cit. nos. 456-456a p. 416). Similarly, there is no corresponding express regulation in ESTONIA which is comparable to Article 5:101(2). If acting at one’s own risk cannot be regarded as consent, then recourse is had to the rules on contributory negligence (LOA § 139) (Lahe, Juridica 2003, 83-91). The universal consenus in the NORDIC legal writing is that acting ot one’s own risk does not lead to complete exculpation from liability but is classified as contributory negligence (see e. g. for SWEDEN HD 6 April 1973, NJA 1973, 141; HD 22 February 1979, NJA 1979, 129 and HD 6 April 2000, NJA 2000, 150) which will only result in a reduction of the extent of liability (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 124; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 53; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 112; Bengtsson, Skadestånd vid sport, lek och sällskapsliv, 62; Agell, Samtycke och risktagande, 12 and 176; Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 45; Hahto, JFT 2005, 250, 265). Closer analysis reveals that a distinction is drawn between personal injury and physical damage to property. In the case of bodily injury, considerable hurdles under the Swedish Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 1 and Swedish Traffic Damages Act § 12 must be surmounted before a reduction of liablity will be entertained; even where the injured party was guilty of gross negligence, the hurdles are not always overcome (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 224). Therefore, acting at one’s own risk remains a line of argument that only comes to the fore in cases leaving no room for doubt and where the defence self-evidently applies. It is of particular relevance in the sports law context (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit.; Bengtsson, SvJT 1976, 613; Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 50). Today, assumption of risk is classified as contributory negligence in DENMARK, (it is, therefore, no longer characterised as acting at one’s risk operating to exclude the imposition of liability), for example, where an individual permits himself or herself to be transported by a driver in a recognisably drunken state (Traffic Act § 101(2)). As a general rule, the damages claim is reduced by a third (Jensen, UfR 1988 B, 383-389; HD 15 November 2003, UfR 2003, 339; Western CA 15 May 2007, UfR 2007, 2275). In FINNISH Su-

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preme Court 28 November 1980, KKO 1980:126 a guest on a sail boat was injured in the course of helping to get the boat off a shoal: he was not deemed to have acted on his own risk and received full compensation. In Supreme Court 5 September 1980, KKO 1980 II 89 pedestrians walked through a dark residential court yard and fell into a hole; they were regarded as acting with contributory negligence. In Supreme Court KKO 1979:99 a person diving from an unfamiliar deck was injured by hitting his head on a raft lying in water, invisible from the deck; he was considered to have acted at his own risk. In a similar vein, passengers, who travel with a recognisably drunken driver, must, on the grounds of their contributory negligencem, reckon with a reduced damages claim (Supreme Court 6 March 1996, KKO 1996:24); if they also encourage the driver to particularly risky driving behaviour, then the damages claim is reduced to nothing (Supreme Court 6 September 1999, KKO 1999:93). Acting at one’s own risk in respect of physical damage to property has more potential as a successful defence (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 125; Taipale, Accept af risiko, 385). Decisions on this point amount to a rara avis (see e. g. SWEDISH HD 8 April 1993, NJA 1993, 149: a golfer’s ball hit a car in the parking lot of a golf course; no acceptance of such risk by the owner of the car). In DANISH HD 22 January 1959, UfR 1959, 160 an airplane, being transported on a public road was negligently damaged by another truck; compensation was reduced due to the extraordinary transport, its value and its fragile nature. Under ENGLISH law the assumption by the claimant of a risk that a tort will be committed constitutes the defence of volenti non fit injuria. The defence subsists at common law, but statutory effect is given to the defence within the strict liability regime for animals under the Animals Act 1971, s. 5(2) and in respect of occupiers’ liability to visitors under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957, s. 2(5) and trespassers under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984, s. 1(6). On the other hand, the defence is excluded by the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 149(3) in respect of the liability of a user of a motor vehicle to passengers (the liability being covered by compulsory liability insurance). Despite suggestions to the contrary, it would appear the defence can apply to liability for breach of statutory duty, though perhaps only within narrow bounds: Clerk and Lindsell (-Jones), Torts19, paras. 3-97–3-99. The defence applies where the claimant, having full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk, agrees voluntarily to absolve the defendant from legal responsibility for his conduct: Letang v. Ottawa Electric Railway Co. [1926] AC 725, 731. The defence is not established if the agreement is due to compulsion from the defendant or (as is the case where the claimant is a rescuer intervening to save another from death or personal injury: Haynes v. Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146 [injury sustained in stopping a runaway horse]) social or moral duty. It is thus largely inapplicable to an employer’s liability to an employee (Clerk and Lindsell (-Jones), Torts19, paras. 3-84 and see, for example, Animals Act 1971, s. 6(5), providing that a person employed by a keeper is not treated as voluntarily accepting a risk incidental to his employment) and cannot apply if the claimant lacked the requisite mental capacity. The scope for the defence is further restricted by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, s. 2(3), so far as it relates to “business liability” (i. e. liability for breach of duty incurred in the course of a business or from the occupation of premises used for business purposes). That provision stipulates in relation to such liability for breach of the duty of care under the common law or the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 that a person‘s agreement to a contract term or awareness of a notice purporting to exclude or limit liability is not of itself to be taken as indicating voluntary acceptance of any risk. Moreover, the claimant must be fully aware

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29.

of the danger: arguably a subjective standard of knowledge applies: Morris v. Murray [1991] 2 QB 6 (claimant agreeing to a flight in a light aircraft with a friend whom he knew had been drinking heavily and who was so drunk that he was incapable of even attempting to exercise care; the claimant had also been drinking heavily, but was held not to be so intoxicated that he was incapable of properly appreciating the risk). The defence only applies to the risk of a breach of duty; it does not apply where liability is denied instead on the basis that there was no breach of duty, although this finding too may be based on attributing a risk to the claimant’s sphere: cf. Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2003] UKHL 47; [2004] 1 AC 46 (local authority not liable for injuries to claimant who, despite a prohibition on swimming and notices warning of the danger, dived into a lake which was shallow and struck his head on the bottom; it was not reasonable for the defendant as occupier to take further precautions against risks which individuals could be expected to contemplate as inherent in their freely chosen activities); Blake v. Galloway [2004] EWCA Civ 814, [2004] 1 WLR 2844 (injury sustained from horseplay where twigs and bark were thrown; court held that while the participants owed each other a duty to take reasonable care not to cause injury, a participant breached that duty only where his conduct amounted to recklessness or a very high degree of carelessness). In the absence of an agreement, the alternative defence of contributory negligence should be available if the defendant knew of the risk and acted unreasonably in taking it: Clerk and Lindsell (-Jones), Torts19, paras. 3-82. Indeed the flexibility of the latter defence (which no longer bars a claim, but only reduces liability) has had the effect of marginalising the “all or nothing” volenti defence in practice. Essentially the same principles (and difficulties) govern in SCOTLAND as in the Common Law as regards this defence: see Stewart, Delict3, 11.19 A statutory defence of voluntary acceptance of risk is to be found in the Animals (Scotland) Act 1987, s. 2(1) (b), which exempts a keeper from strict liability under s. 1 of that Act for damage caused by an animal.

Illustration 2 is taken from BGH 19 October 2004, VersR 2005, 282; illustration 3 from STJ 23 November 2005; illustration 4 from Arthur v. Anker [1997] QB 564; illustration 5 from Cass. 10 June 1997, no. 5175, Foro it. 1997, I, 2920, note Chiarolla; illustration 6 is comparable to BGH 13 December 1977, BGHZ 71, 339; illustration 7 is taken from Cass.civ. 8 March 1995, Bull.civ. 1995, II, no. 83; illustration 8 from HR 28 June 1991, NedJur 1991 no. 622 p. 2546; and illustration 9 from Weir v. Wyper 1992 SLT 579.

Article 5:102: Contributory fault and accountability (1) Where the fault of the person suffering the damage contributed to the occurrence or extent of legally relevant damage, reparation is to be reduced according to the degree of such fault. (2) However, no regard is to be had to: (a) an insubstantial fault of the person suffering the damage; (b) fault or accountability whose contribution to the causation of the damage was insubstantial; or

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(c) the injured person’s want of care contributing to that person’s personal injury caused by a motor vehicle in a traffic accident, unless that want of care constituted profound failure to take such care as was manifestly required in the circumstances. (3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) apply correspondingly where the fault of a person for whom the person suffering the damage is responsible within the scope of Article 3:201 (Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives) contributed to the occurrence or extent of the damage. (4) Compensation is to be reduced likewise if and in so far as any other source of danger for which the person suffering the damage is responsible under Chapter 3 (Accountability) contributed to the occurrence or extent of the damage.

Comments A.

General

1. Contributory fault, contributory fault of auxiliary persons and contributory sources of danger. Strictly speaking, this Article features three defences. Paragraphs (1) and (2) involve the personal contributory fault of the person suffering the damage. Paragraph (3) clarifies that the injured person is also to be imputed with the contributory fault of an employee or representative for whom the injured person is responsible and paragraph (4) relates to the circumstances in which compensation is to be reduced because of the injured person’s own responsibility for a contributory source of danger. The legal basis of liability on the part of the injuring person does not matter; this Article relates both to those situations in which liability is based on intention or negligence and those in which liability is strict. 2. Reparation. This provision is applicable to all forms of reparation, not only to compensation (i. e. reparation by means of monetary payment: Article 6:101 (Aim and forms of reparation) paragraph (2)). Admittedly this will only rarely be practically relevant, but it is conceivable, e. g. where damages are to be rendered in natura in the form of the carrying out of work and this can be confined to a part of the necessary repairs. 3. Contribution to the occurrence or extent of the damage. The Article refers throughout to contributory responsibility on the part of the injured person for the materialisation of the damage as well as to contributory responsibility for the extent of the damage. This corresponds to DCFR III. – 3:704 (Loss attributable to creditor), which the present Article concretises and (partially) modifies for the purposes of the law on non-contractual liability. Where both points of view coincide (contributory responsibility regarding the materialisation of damage as well as with respect to the extent of the damage) then account must be taken of both together. 4. Type of damage. The type of legally relevant damage makes no fundamental difference. However, paragraph (2)(c) provides a special rule for bodily injury resulting from traffic accidents.

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5. The mirror principle. In essence (and apart from some exceptions mentioned below) this Article is built upon what might be called the “mirror principle”: everything which can go towards establishing accountability and thus liability on the part of one party for a legally relevant damage can (wholly or partially) reduce liability when the roles are reversed and it is the injured person’s conduct or source of danger which is under scrutiny. This approach did not cause controversy. The legal system is not allowed to be “blind in one eye”: whatever is advantageous for the injured person, as regards the law of liability, should also act to the injured person’s disadvantage in the reverse situation. The injured person’s claim indeed remains in principle preserved (if not ruled out by another defence), but its amount is reduced. The claim is entirely cut down (“reduced to zero”) only in cases in which it may be said that the injured person’s contributory fault outweighs the injuring person’s responsibility to such an extent that there is no more room for liability on the part of the latter. Of course, in cases of this type, negligence of the injuring person or the realisation of a risk justifying liability will often already be absent. 6. Exceptions. The mirror principle is only capable, however, of being the starting point for the formation of the rule. It is not without its limitations, from a theoretical standpoint, as well as from a policy point of view. Neither “intention” nor “negligence” within the meaning of Article 3:101 (Intention) and Article 3:102 (Negligence) can be given their normal meaning in relation to the victim and, in a nutshell, the policy question is invariably to what extent the protection of the victim will be deemed reasonable and necessary; to this end, paragraph (2) of the Article presents a number of compromises. 7. Fault. It is common ground that “contributory fault” does not hinge upon negligence. This is because any person who harms himself or herself (or who co-operates in doing so) does nothing forbidden and consequently occasions no legally relevant damage. The issue is not that the injured person injures the liable person through the former’s conduct, but rather that the injured person must accept the consequences of having been careless with that person’s own rights and assets. The claim is reduced because the injured person has shown through the relevant behaviour that the protected personal interests were not in fact so important. The expression “contributory negligence” is therefore an unfortunate one. It is better to speak of “contributory fault”, not only because the injured person does not cause any harm to another person, but also because it better reflects why the claim is to be reduced, namely the adoption of a personally neglectful position towards one’s own interests. Consequently, in contrast to accountability, paragraph (1) (and, as far as the employee is concerned, also paragraph (3)) comes into operation only if there is genuine “fault” on the part of the injured person, that is to say, conduct which is improper or reprehensible or at least may be criticised in a moral or ethical sense. 8. Children and mentally handicapped people. For persons who are incapable of “fault” (such as small children and the mentally incapacitated) no such reduction of their claim can therefore arise. In the case of older children, account is taken of their immaturity and their incompletely developed capacity for reasoned deliberation. For the purposes of this Article children are not imputed with the contributory fault of their parents or supervisors. This is because children are not liable for their parents; rather, in the case of a 809

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failure to supervise, typically they are entitled not only to a claim against the third person causing injury but also a concurrent claim in damages against their parents. (The finer details of the latter claim may be specifically regulated by family law, however; this Book leaves such rules unaffected DCFR I. – 1:101 (Intended field of application) paragraph (2) (c); Article 1:103(c) (Scope of application)). In the case of preponderant fault on the parents’ part, the third person causing the injury must therefore bring in the parents under the mechanism of solidary liability in damages. It is conceivable, however, that the wrongdoing of a person who is taking care of the child (regardless of whether it is the parents or someone else) heavily tips the balance so much on one side that it causes the third person’s contribution to the cause or to a source of danger for which the third party is responsible to completely fade into the background. Illustration 1 A fifteen-month old baby has died. Instead of giving him medication for relieving inhalation difficulties, his grandmother had given him a chemical product which removes toilet lime scale. The medication and the chemical product were next to each other in the closet. Indeed the chemical product had not been correctly packaged and labelled but, under the circumstances, that alone does not suffice to render the manufacturer liable for the child’s death. The parents and grandmother have behaved in such a grossly negligent way that the death of the child can no longer be deemed as having been caused by the packaging and labelling defects. 9. Paragraph (2). In the interest of protecting the injured person, paragraph (2)(a) and (b) provide that immaterial contributory fault and an insignificant contribution to the cause are to be disregarded. Less care is necessary when dealing with one’s own personal interests than in dealing with those of another; a bicycle thief cannot use the argument against the victim of the theft that the bicycle was not locked. In the “normal” cases of the negligent infliction of damage, it is also to be considered that liability – though this is considerably less so for the economic consequences of contributory fault – is insured against or insurable. Paragraph (2)(c) allows for the special dangers of road traffic and takes up a widespread tendency in European general liability law in affording more robust protection for traffic accident victims than for those who are injured in other areas of life, e. g. when playing sport or in their free time.

B.

Contributory fault (paragraph (1))

10. Fault contributory to the materialisation of the damage. Paragraph (1) contains the basic rule on contributory fault: a person who, through fault, is a contributory cause of the damage must accept a reduction in compensation, depending on the degree of this fault. “Fault” means intentional or neglectful harm to one’s own interests. Where the injured person intentionally caused the accident, the liability will usually be reduced to zero. The dependants of a person who commits suicide by jumping in front of a car do not even have a claim against the driver, cf. Article 5:101 (Consent and acting at own risk) and Article 5:501 (Extension of defences against the injured person to third persons). A reduction of the claim due to the intentional contributory fault of the injured person mostly crops up in cases in which that person intentionally and unreasonably refuses to 810

Article 5:102: Contributory fault and accountability

minimise damage that has already occurred. Even in cases where grossly negligent fault contributes to the materialisation of the damage, a reduction of the claim to zero is by no means rare; cases of this type often border on the defence of an inescapable event (Article 5:302 (Event beyond control)). Illustration 2 The claimant was bitten by X’s dog, but had ignored a clearly visible sign saying “Beware of the dog”. The claimant must accept a reduction in the claim for damages. Illustration 3 A law, which seeks to protect gamblers from the dangers of an addiction to gambling and the detrimental effects it can have on one’s life, requires casinos not to admit certain gamblers. A casino which has breached this duty cannot defend itself with the argument that the claimant is guilty of contributory fault by not respecting the ban. Illustration 4 A patient admitted to a psychiatric clinic jumps out of the window and kills himself. The personnel of the clinic were aware of the danger of suicide but did not deal with it. The family members’ claim (cf. Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death)) is not to be reduced (see Article 5:501 (Extension of defences against the injured person to third persons)). 11. Reduction of liability. The claim is to be reduced according to the degree of contributory fault on the part of the injured person. The result is mostly a division of liability; the proportions will depend on the circumstances – for instance one third to two thirds or one fifth to four fifths. In appropriate cases – where contributory fault is overwhelming – reduction of the claim can even mean a complete denial of compensation. 12. Co-responsibility for the extent of the damage. The contributory fault of the victim is still relevant to mitigation of the claim where it relates not to the materialisation of the damage, but to its extent or amount. In principle, this requirement to minimise damage is independent of the type of damage occasioned. Under paragraph (1) it also relates to the minimisation of patrimonial consequences of a bodily injury. However, the injured person is only required to take or permit reasonable measures; there is no requirement to take new risks. Illustration 5 A local newspaper had falsely reported that the claimant had been caught having sexual intercourse with another man during the wedding breakfast. Subsequent to this, the national press also reported on the story. The claimant’s lawyers first made the issue “properly public” through their request to her to hold a large press conference on the day after the wedding. This made the damage worse; the claimant’s claim in damages against the media is to be reduced by approximately one third.

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Illustration 6 A woman and her daughter are seriously injured in an accident. The woman must close her butcher’s shop for several years. When she is fit for work again, the machines are outdated and she has lost her customers; the business has become worthless. In fact the woman had the opportunity of continuing the business in between with staff, but did not want to do this. Her claim in damages due to the loss of business is to be reduced by a high fraction.

C.

Exceptions (paragraph (2))

13. Insubstantial fault and causation. Paragraph (2)(a) contains a clarification in relation to paragraph (1): very minimal contributory fault is not to be taken into account. This means that it is left out of account altogether. A reduction of the claim by merely nominal percentages is not to be undertaken; the minimum threshold is usually set at 10 %. This corresponds to widespread court practice, saves work for the judiciary, is in line with the considerations that support the defence of contributory fault and reflects in this area the rule of liability in Article 6:102 (De minimis rule). Paragraph (2)(b) contains a comparable rule for cases in which the injured person’s causal contribution is negligibly low, regardless of whether it concerns the causal contribution of the fault or the causal contribution of a source of danger for which the injured person is responsible. However, there is an intrinsic relationship between the reason for the claim and the issue of whether the victim’s contributory fault is inconsequential or substantial. Illustration 7 A postal worker, P, steals credit cards out of letters sent by banks. Using the cards, P is able to withdraw money from the injured parties’ accounts at an ATM. P obtains the necessary PIN numbers from the bank’s customers by posing as the bank official who is investigating the whereabouts of the credit cards. In light of P’s elaborate criminal scheme, what is involved here is merely negligible inattention on the part of the customers; their claim against P and P’s employers is not reduced. 14. Traffic accidents. Paragraph (2)(c) contains a special rule for traffic accidents. In cases of bodily injury as a result of a traffic accident, contributory fault only gives cause for reducing the claim if it constitutes a gross disregard of one’s own safety. This rule reflects a widespread tendency of European systems of liability – namely affording special protection to victims of traffic accidents. Encountering road traffic constitutes an unabatedly high risk. Slight breaches of the rules happen every day and are a reality of life. The originator of the damage is normally insured against liability; conversely, a pedestrian or cyclist affected outside the course of employment can only rarely shift the pecuniary consequences of contributory fault to an insurer. This lack of balance is at least partially remedied by paragraph (2)(c). This provision pertains to contributory fault in the materialisation of the damage, not a failure to minimise the damage. It only affects damage that falls under the scope of application of Article 3:205 (Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles). Where on an icy winter’s day a person wearing slippery leather shoes walks on an ungritted pavement, a reduction under paragraph

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(1) ensues; it is only traffic accidents caused by a motor vehicle which are covered by paragraph (2)(c). 15. Policy considerations. Due to varying conceptions on the form of contributory fault on the part of traffic accident victims which should be afforded consideration (in relation to its capacity to reduce the claim), on who is to be deemed the “weaker candidate” enjoying a claim to special legal protection and on the type of damage that should be covered by this protection, paragraph (2)(c) suggests a middle ground: where bodily injury is at issue, everyone is affected in a special way and is at the mercy of the dangers of road traffic. Therefore, it did not seem advisable to include further distinctions between the various categories of persons. On the other hand, with property damage, the usual care in dealing with one’s own goods can also be required where traffic is concerned; in the case of contributory fault, it would not be reasonable to allow virtually the entire weight to be shifted on to the risk borne by the other party’s indemnity insurance. 16. Gross negligence. As far as bodily injuries are concerned, where the injured person has behaved in a grossly negligent manner, the limit of the special rule in paragraph (2) (c) has been reached. Depending on the grounds for the liability, in such cases the claim is to be reduced or even ruled out altogether. Gross negligence is a profound failure to take such care as is manifestly required in the circumstances. Standard examples include not buckling one’s seatbelt, drunkenness at the wheel or driving through a red light.

D.

Extension of the mirror principle to the law of strict liability (paragraphs (3) and (4))

17. Contributory fault of employees. Paragraph (3) concerns cases in which employers must accept a reduction in their claim to reparation on account of the contributory fault of their employees. Illustration 8 Small children are gathered around X’s company car; using a screwdriver, they want to see whether they can succeed in putting a scratch in the paintwork. The company’s employees follow the goings-on, but do not intervene. Liability to the company on the part of the parents does not arise because the company’s employees willingly allowed the damage to occur. 18. Contribution of a source of danger. When considering the injured person’s contribution, it is not only contributory fault in the sense of intentional or careless harming of one’s own interests which follows from the mirror principle; in fact, another element is to be weighed up: where in an individual case, a source of danger – for which the injured person would be liable under Chapter 3, Section 2 (Accountability without intention or negligence) – contributes to the accident or to its consequences, it would be that person’s role as an injuring party which is at issue. That is the content of paragraph (4). This rule is of particular importance where the strict liability of the two parties collide, but it also has significance where the injuring party must be deemed contributorily responsible for the accident due to negligence and the injured person is also seen in such a light, but owing 813

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to an objective ground; both cases have the restriction that the intervention of the injuring party does not constitute an unavoidable occurrence from the perspective of the injured person (mirrored application of Article 5:302 (Event beyond control)). It is worth noting that in the context of paragraph (4), paragraph (2)(b) remains applicable: an insubstantial contribution to the causal element is not deemed capable of reducing the claim. Where necessary, in the case of the collision of two strict liabilities, an amendment to the result is to be made with the aid of Article 6:202 (Reduction of liability). Illustration 9 An accident between two vehicles occurs in the middle of a road consisting of two lanes going in opposite directions. It is no longer possible to establish which of the vehicles had crossed over the line in the middle of the road. A’s vehicle, a larger and more expensive car, has suffered damage to the extent of J 20,000; B’s vehicle, a budget-priced “student car”, has suffered damage to the extent of J 2,000. Each of the owners bears half of the damage to each car; A has a claim against B for J 10,000, from which J 1,000 will be deducted in the course of the setting-off calculations. Illustration 10 A drives into B’s vehicle, which was correctly positioned in the traffic. The contribution of B’s vehicle to the cause is so slight that B’s claim against A is not reduced. Illustration 11 Messenger pigeons get caught up in the jets of an aeroplane set to land, leaving it considerably damaged as a result of the collision with the birds. The owner of the messenger pigeons is still ascertainable. Here the basic rule is again that each of the owners involved (supposing that the liability of the owner of the aeroplane is also strict, see Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage)) bears half of the other party’s and half of its own damage. However, account is to be taken of the fact that aeroplanes are far more dangerous and it must be expected that their owners can draw on insurance premiums, in the context of Article 6:202 (Reduction of liability). In the case of a private pigeon keeper, the liability is even to be reduced to zero due to considerations of equity and fairness.

Notes I.

Contributory fault in causing the damage

1.

Under FRENCH law both liability based on faute and strict liability yield to force majeure (see the notes under Article 5:302 (Event beyond Control)). There is equally no liability as a rule if the injured party has committed faute intentionelle and the person causing the damage has merely acted negligently (Cass.civ. 16 October 1984, Bull.civ. 1984, I, no. 266 p. 225). A typical faute of the injured party which has in part contributed to causing the damage normally results in a reduction of liability, even when the claim to

814

Article 5:102: Contributory fault and accountability

2.

reparation is based on CC art. 1384 (Cass.ass.plén. 6 April 1987, JCP 1987, II, 20828, with a note by Chabas). Parents who are liable for the conduct of their children may invoke the negligent faute of the injured party in order to obtain a reduction in liability (Cass.civ. 29 April 2004, D. 2005, 188, note Denis Mazeaud). The reduction is proportionate to the comparative gravity of the fautes concerned (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II10, no. 176 p. 168). In BELGIUM the law likewise proceeds from the precept that the injured party’s own faute results in a reduction of liability if there is a causal connection between that faute and the damage; here too this principle applies to both fautebased liability and strict liability under CC art. 1384 (Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/ Wynant/Debaene, TPR 2000, 1551, 1907, no. 158). The proportionate reduction in liability is determined by the gravity of the fautes in issue (Cass. 29 November 1995, Pas. belge 1995, I, no. 517 p. 1087). The more serious the faute of the victim is, the greater is the scope for the supposition that the causal connection between the conduct of the injuring party and the damage has been broken (Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Wynant/Debaene loc. cit. 1913-1915 no. 163). In SPAIN it is concerned self-evident that a detriment which is sustained as a result of one’s own fault is not damage in a legal sense: quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur damnum sentire (Medina Alcoz, La culpa de la víctima, 158). The statutory basis from which this ground of defence is derived is, however, a matter of dispute. Aside from exceptional instances where it is possible to resort to a more specific statutory regime, it is CC arts. 1105 (according to which no one is to be liable for an unforeseeable or unavoidable incident) and 1103 (the rule on liability for negligence) in particular which are the suitable candidates. Specific statutory provisions on contributory fault are to be found in amongst other statutes: the Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act art. 1(1)(ii) and (iv); Atomic Energy Act art. 45(2); ConsProtA art. 145 and CP art. 114. The Tribunal Supremo has on many occasions confirmed in relation to CC art. 1105 that the responsabilidad objetiva (or responsabilidad por riesgo) is disapplied in the case where damage is exclusively the fault of the victim; such fault breaks the causal nexus (e. g. TS 14 October 1957, RAJ 1957 no. 2865 p. 1921; TS 26 May 1969, RAJ 1969 (1) no. 2864 p. 1978; TS 1 October 1985, RAJ 1985 (3) no. 4566 p. 3818; TS 1 February 1989, RAJ 1989 (1) no. 650 p. 703; TS 29 May 1999, RAJ 1999 (3) no. 4382 p. 6739; TS 21 November 1985, RAJ 1985 (3) no. 5624 p. 4783 and TS 11 July 1990, RAJ 1990 (5) no. 5852 p. 7579). Among other requirements for damage to be attributed exclusively to the fault of the victim, the party causing the injury must have behaved correctly and the injured party must have been mentally competent (TS 31 December 1997, RAJ 1997 (5) no. 9195 p. 14688); it is not necessary, however, for the victim to have injured himself deliberately since negligence suffices (see further Reglero Campos, El nexo causal3, 431; Medina Alcoz, La culpa de la víctima, 144). The terminology is admittedly not uniform in those cases in which the party causing the damage is also at fault (TS 16 January 1991, RAJ 1991 (1) no. 297 p. 320 disapproves of the widespread use of the expression compensación de culpas on the basis there is no “compensation of fault”, only an end reduction in liability; see further Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 207 [concurrencia de concausas is a suitable expression]; Reglero Campos, El nexo causal3, 443 and Roca i Trias, Derecho de daños3, 144 [concurrencia de culpas] as well as Martín Casals, FS Díez-Picazo II, 2472 [concurrencia de culpa de la víctima]). Nonetheless the legal position is unequivocal in so far as case law based on CC art. 1103, reduces the quantum of liability in accordance with the extent of the

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3.

4.

816

contributory fault (e. g. TS 22 February 1985, RAJ 1985 (1) no. 739 p. 585; TS 5 February 1991, RAJ 1991 (1) no. 992 p. 1190; TS 20 April 1993, RAJ 1993 (2) no. 3103 p. 3975; TS 3 February 1995, RAJ 1995 (1) no. 737 p. 971; TS 12 September 1996, RAJ 1996 (4) no. 6561 p. 8801; TS 15 December 1999, RAJ 1999 (5) no. 9200 p. 14491). It has been mooted, however, that the same outcome can be achieved on the basis of CC art. 1902 because the reduction in liability is not a mere matter of equity, but rather one of of accountability (e. g. Pantaleón, ADC 1991, 1042; Díaz Alabart, ADC 1988, 11681169; Montés Penadés, FS Díez-Picazo II, 2591, 2627; TS 14 June 2007 (BDA RAJ 2007/ 5120,TS 29 December 1998, RAJ 1998 (5) no. 9980 p. 14596; Medina Alcoz loc. cit. 224). Where the fault of the person causing the damage is substantial and that of the victim is minor there is no reduction in liability (TS 18 January 1936, RAJ 1936 no. 86 p. 41; TS 10 July 1943, RAJ 1943 no. 856 p. 481; TS 8 July 1999, RAJ 1999 (3) no. 4766 p. 7360); generally it seems that the injured party’s claim is also not reduced if either the person causing the damage acted intentionally (TS 8 June 1995, RAJ 1995 (3) no. 4563 p. 6101) or the fraction of contributory fault on the part of the victim is less than 10 % (Solé Feliu, ADC 1997, 874, 896). A court will take account of contributory fault on its own motion; it is not necessary for the defendant to plead the defence (TS 22 April 1987, RAJ 1987 (2) no. 2723 p. 2546; TS 7 June 1991, RAJ 1991 (4) no. 4431 p. 6072). As regards injuries to children, a contributory fault of their parents is only taken into account where the parents’ own damage is at stake (TS 1 February 1989, RAJ 1989 (1) no. 650 p. 703) and not it seems – the issue has not yet been settled by case law – to the extent that it is the child’s own damage which is in issue (Paz-Ares/Díez-Picazo/Bercovitz/Salvador (-Pantaleón), Código Civil II2, art. 1902 p. 1998; Solé Feliu loc. cit. 879). ITALIAN CC art. 1227(1) expressly extends to non-contractual liability law (CC art. 2056). If the event causing damage is also causally attributable to the injured person, the claim to reparation is to be reduced in accordance with the “severity of the fault” and “the extent of the resultant consequences”. If the injured party is not capable of being at fault or there is only an objective (i. e. strict) ground of accountability on his or her part, then regard is had to the causal contribution to the damage instead of fault (Cass. 10 February 2005, no. 2704, Giur.it.Mass. 2005, fasc. 2; Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, sub art. 2056, 776-777; Cass. 20 July 2002, no. 10641, Danno e resp. 2002, 1201). A claim will also be reduced under CC art. 1227(1) for reasons of strict accountability (e. g. under CC art. 2051, see Cass. 20 July 2002, no. 10641, Danno e resp. 2002, 1201 and CFI Bologna 25 September 1988, Danno e resp. 1999, 560: customer ran too quickly to an exit and thus ran into an unsafe pane of glass in the shop front). The HUNGARIAN CC addresses the “apportionment of damage” in § 340(1) and, so far as strict liability for dangerous enterprises is concerned, in § 345(2). CC § 340(1) places the injured party under an obligation when averting or mitigating the damage to proceed as could generally be expected in the circumstances. The other party is not obliged to compensate damage which arises from the non-performance of this duty. The injured party is also burdened by the defaults of persons for whose conduct he or she is responsible (CC § 340(2)) – for example, an employee or a person who is not capable of being held responsible for their conduct (Gellért (-Kemenes), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1235). The party causing the damage is therefore not liable for that part of the damage which has resulted from the negligent conduct of the victim or an employee or other auxiliary of the victim. In a particular case the claim to reparation

Article 5:102: Contributory fault and accountability

5.

6.

can also be reduced beyond that provided for by § 340 under CC § 339(2), which enables a court to relieve the person responsible for the damage partially from liability on the basis of extraordinary circumstances. Under CC § 345(2) damage caused by a dangerous enterprise (typically a vehicle) need not be compensated in so far as it arises from reproachable conduct of the party sustaining the damage. CC § 345(2) therefore does not apply if the injured party is incapable of being held responsible for their conduct; a fault of a parent does not operate as a contributory fault so as to reduce a child’s claim (Opinion of the Civil College of the Supreme Court PK 39; BH 1980/90; Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1270 f; Petrik (-Wellmann), Polgári jog II2, 592; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 124 ff,; cf. BH 1998/381[on the liability of a keeper of animals]). The apportionment of liability is a matter for the discretion of the court, which is based on the relative degree of reproachability or the extent of the contribution to causation of the damage (e. g. a 60 %/40 % split in BH 1995/27 or a 20 %/80 % split in BH 1992/242 because the injured passenger had thoroughly disturbed the driver or a 20 % (passenger-victim), 80 % (driver) split in BH 2008/61 in case of not fastening the seat-belt). According to POLISH CC art. 362, where the plaintiff’s conduct contributed to either causing or worsening the injury that was sustained by him/her, the damages recoverable by the injured party are reduced having regard to the circumstances and in particular having regard to the degrees of fault of both parties. This provision is employed in both contractual and extra-contractual damages claims (Supreme Court 23 June 1999, I CKN 57/98, OSNC 2000, no. 1, poz. 13; Bieniek (-Wis´niewski) III(1)5, art. 362, no. 3; Pietrzykowski (-Banaszczyk), Kodeks cywilny I4, art. 362 no. 2). Difficulties arise when it comes to the conceptual understanding of “contribution of the injured party” to the ensuing harm. Some commentators intrepret it to signify a case of adequate contributory causation, other writers additionally require objective misconduct, some opine that subjective fault is required whereas a fourth view distinguishes between the various grounds of liability: only where, the injured party is held liable for fault, can it be said that he or she similarly culpably contributed to causing the damage; on the other hand, if the injuring party is liable on the basis of strict liability, then solely objective misconduct on the part of the injured party will lead to a reduction in the amount of damages recoverable (see further Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛s´c´ ogólna5, 96 no. 250; Radwan´ ski (-Dybowski), System prawa cywilnego III(1), 298; Wis´niewski loc. cit. nos. 5 and 7). The question as to which approach is favoured by the Supreme Court does not allow a definite answer. The victim’s response to fear will not amount to contributory negligence, even if this response is objectively wrong (Supreme Court 16 August 1956, NP no. 11-12/1956, p. 181; Wis´niewski loc. cit. 11, Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak loc. cit. 97 no. 254). Contributory fault, while it does reduce the extent of the injuring party’s liability, will not serve to nullify it Banaszczyk loc. cit. no. 13). Objective misconduct of persons who lack torious capacity will also operate to reduce liability (Supreme Court 20 September 1975, III CZP 8/75, OSN 1976, nos. 7-8, poz. 151; Banaszczyk loc. cit. no. 18). Further, contributory negligence of his or her auxiliary (CC arts. 417, 427, 430, 474) is imputed to the injured party (Banaszczyk loc. cit. no. 24; Wis´niewski loc. cit. no. 10). Similarly, under BULGARIAN LOA art. 51(1) the amount of compensation can be reduced if the damage is not only attibutable to the tortious conduct of the injuring party but also to the victim’s contributory negligence; only the exclusive fault of the

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7.

8.

818

injured party affords a complete defence. The employer’s duty to compensate only completely falls away, if the victim intentionally brought about the accident at work or the illness (Labour Code art. 201(1)). If the injured partyis deemed to be incapable of fault, then the tortfeasor can rely on negligence of the victim’s supervisor, especially on the parent’s failure to adequately supervise their child (Interpretative judgment no. 88 des Obersten Gerichtshofs of 12 September 1962, full civil chamber). According to SLOVENIAN LOA § 171(1), contributory fault results in reducible damages, provided that the injured party contributed to the event giving rise to damage or contributed to an aggravation of that damage. The conduct of the injured party must be a failure to take the care that a sober-minded individual would take. Whether a minor is contributory negligent is determined on a consideration of age, experience and intellectual development (Juhart and Plavs˘ak (-Plavs˘ak), Obligacijski zakonik I, art. 171 p. 964; VS RS II 28 June 2001, Ips 190/2000). Contributory fault also results in a reduction in claims based on strict liability (LOA § 153(2)). An express regulation on contributory fault is absent from the ROMANIAN Civil Code. The courts and academic teaching present nonetheless a united front on this issue and the victim’s contributory fault is relevant in the assessment of the award of damages (Adam, Drept civil, 301, 310-311; Dogaru and Dra˘ghici, Drept civil, 250; CSJ 26 March 1992, sect¸ia penala˘, decision no. 818; CSJ 2 June 1993, sect¸ia penala˘, decision no. 937; both in Culegere de practica˘ judiciara˘ pe anul 2003 [2004]). The draft of a new Romanian Civil Code envisages an array of reformative measures under arts. 1109 and 1125(3), which for the most part correspond to Article 5:102 (cf. Proiectul Noului Cod civil, 221). GERMAN CC § 254(1) reduces the extent of the tortfeasor’s duty to compensate, if fault on the part of the victim contributed to the cause of the injury. A blameworthy transgression of the duty to appropriately safeguard one’s own interests, “fault committed against oneself” is intended hereby (BGH 18 April 1997, NJW 1997, 2234, 2235; MünchKomm (-Oetker), BGB5, § 254, no. 3). CC § 254 is also operative in respect of claims arising under strict liability regimes (Oetker loc. cit. no. 7; Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB66, § 254, no. 2). CC §§ 827-829 is deemed to apply analogously to individually who are deemed incapable of committing a fault. The victim’s contributory fault must amount to an adequate cause of the ensuing damage; further, the doctrine on the protective scope of the rule is also directly relevant in this regard. A doctor who gives a patient the wrong treatment cannot raise the argument that the patient was at fault in requiring the treatment (BGH 21 September 1971, NJW 1972, 334, 335). The extent to which damages are reduced depends on the particular circumstances of the case, an especially weighty factor is the degrees of fault of the respective parties. This evaluation generally results in an apportionment of damages in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each party. This assessment can exceptionally result in the duty to compensate being obviated or indeed there may be no curtailment of liability at all (Heinrichs loc. cit. nos. 59 and 66). Similarly, in AUSTRIA, the doctrine of the protective scope of the transgressed norm is also relevant in connection with the examination of the presence of contributory fault. OGH 21 December 2004, ecolex 2005, 204 held e.g, that a provision which provided that pathological gambers must be refused entry to casinos constituted a protective law, the purpose of which was to safeguard gamblers (pathological) from the lure of games of chance which threatened their very existence. Therefore, the fact that the gambler continued to partake in the game and did not voluntarily request to be barred from

Article 5:102: Contributory fault and accountability

9.

10.

11.

participation is not of decisive weight in assessing contributory fault. see also on the extent of liability in such a case OGH 17 February 2005, 8 Ob 134/04w, RS 0117007 T1 and T2. If the injured party’s “own fault” contributed to cause the damage, then the claim for compensation can also be reduced or even negated altogether according to the GREEK Civil Code. “One’s own fault” connotes that the conduct of the injured party did not adequately protect his own interests (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Stathopoulos), art. 300, no. 5). While it is true to assert that the injured party’s fault must have contributed to the damage, chronologically, this conduct can occur prior or subsequent to the act of the injuring party (Stathopoulos loc. cit. no. 9; ErmAK (-Litzeropoulos), art. 300, no. 5). The extent to which the claim is reduced will depends on the circumstances of the individual case, in particular, emphasis is placed on the determination of whether one party can be regarded as the primary cause of the damage (Stathopoulos loc. cit. no. 12). According to PORTUGUESE CC art. 570(1), the courts determine the legal consequences of fault of the injured party which has contributed to the damage or has operated to aggravate it; in the light of the fact that there is a degree of negligence on both sides, contributory fault may operate to reduce or obviate liability or on the other hand full damages may be recoverable. CC art. 570(2) adds that contributory fault on the part of the victim will operate to negate liability in all cases where the injuring party’s fault rests on a mere presumption of fault. It can thereby be concluded that the victims’s contributory fault must operate to exclude claims arising under strict liability provisions (Menezes Leitão, Obrigações I3, 332; Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral, I10, 677). Contributory fault on the part of an employee or legal representative are attributed to the injured party, CC art. 571; the same holds true for the parents of minors (Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, art. 571 no. 1). The burden of proving contributory fault on the part of the victim rests on the injuring party; however, there is no need for him to expressly invoke this defence in order for it to afford a defence (CC art. 572). Under DUTCH law, the injured party’s “own fault” connotes that, in the circumstances of the case, the victim failed to deal carefully with his own interests (Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12, no. 448 pp. 399, 409; Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 351). In cases where contributory fault oft eh victim is of overwhelming preponderence, then, according to CC art. 6:98, the necessary causal nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the ensuing damage may be absent. CC art. 6:101, according to which there may be a curtailment of liability, provided that the damage is caused by an event (s) which can be attributable to the injured party, only comes to the fore once the requisites of CC art. 6:98 are established (HR 1 Juli 1977, NedJur 1978 no. 118 p. 371). Since the judgment of the HR 4 February 1916, NedJur 1916, 450, the fact that fault on the part of the injured party operates to reduce his damages claim constituted well-entrenched judicial principle. CC art. 6:101 had the effect of codifying this judicial principle. The decisive feature of this provision is that the damage suffered is caused by the injured party himself or herself (Hartkamp loc. cit. no. 450 p. 402). That part of the damage for which compensation cannot be recovered, is imputed to the claimant according the general precepts of CC art. 6:162(1) and (3) aswell as art. 6:163; therefore the claimant must have been at fault or the cause is regarded as being encompassed within his sphere

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12.

13.

820

of risk according to law or social convention (Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht III11, no. 69 p. 81). ESTONIAN LOA § 139(1) and (2) correspond to Article 5:102(1) in all essential points. The enumerated provisions do not refer to contributory fault, rather they refer in general terms to contributing to a risk which the injured party is deemed to be reponsible for. See Supreme Court 3-2-1-38-06, RT III 2005 (18) 187. A provision similar to Article 5:102(3) does not feature in the LOA. Similarly, in the NORDIC countries, contributory fault of the claimant is regarded as a mirror image of the other party’s liability, although it is stressed that contributory fault does not constitue a breach of duty (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 320, 323; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 319; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 108; Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 222, 228). The various countries adopt clearly divergent approachs as far as further particulars are concerned. from each other. SWEDISH Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 1 differentiates between bodily injury and other harm; only gross negligence and intention on the part of the injured party leads to a reducible damages owing to contributory negligence. FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 1 merely contains a general rule, according to which damages may be reduced as to what is reasonable. On the other hand, the DANISH Damages Liability Act (EAL) does not contain any general regulation on the issue of contributory negligence. Nonetheless, the precept that contributory fault results in a reduced damages claim is generally recognised; the axiom can be indirectly derived from EAL § 24. Contributory negligence can only operate to reduce a compensation claim in respect of physical injury sustained in a traffic accident if the injured party is at a minimum guilty of gross negligence. In general, Incidentially, other general propositions in this area include the precepts that contributory fault leads to a proportional reduction in liability and that a minor fault of the injured party will be disregarded; as a general rule, damages claims are seldom reduced by less than one- third (Karlgren, Skadeståndsrätt5, 219; Vinding Kruse loc. cit. 318; Saxén loc. cit. 125). In SWEDEN and DENMARK the considerations for reduction include, primarily, the degree of contributory fault, but also in certain instances the dangerousness of the activity of each party, the risk-allocations of the parties through insurance schemes, and in exceptional cases the economic situation of the parties (Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 340; von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 319; see also EAL § 24). Conversely, the position adopted in FINLAND appears to concentrate solely on the contributory fault of the injured party; at any rate, it is a matter of some dispute whether other factors are permitted to flow into the equitable assessment (Hahto, JFT 2005, 267; Saxén loc. cit. 124). The regulation in SWEDISH Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 1, according to which damages claims for physcial injury can be reduced in the event that the injured party was grossly negligent is, comparably speaking, rarely employed. Examples are provided, inter alia, HD 22 February 1979, NJA 1979, 129 (headfirst dive into shallow water in public swimming pool; the claim was reduced by 50 %), in HD 1 December 1995, NJA 1995, 661 (Robber shot by victim of robbery; claim reduced by two-thirds) and in HD 6 April 1973, NJA 1973, 141 (a man who trespassed onto construction site at night fell into an unsecured manhole; claim reduced by a third). Conversely, reduction in claims in cases involving bodily injury are a common occurrence in FINLAND (Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, Tillägg till Skadeståndsrätt, 407; Hahto, JFT 2005, 267-268; see e. g. Supreme Court 25 June 1980, KKO 1980 II 72; Supreme Court 20 August 2003, KKO 2003:70; Supreme Court 13 August 2003,

Article 5:102: Contributory fault and accountability

14.

KKO 2003:67 and Supreme Court 31 August 1994, KKO 1994:74). In DENMARK the courts appear to require (and not only in the case of traffic accidents) an increased acuteness of contributory fault, in order to reduce liability in cases of physical injury; see e. g. HD 4 October 1979, UfR 1979, 964; HD 24 November 1981; UfR 1982, 50; HD 25 October 1984, UfR 1984, 1098; Western CA 30 August 2002, UfR 2002, 2546 and HD 6 December 2002, UfR 2002, 519). Suicide attempts do not automatically result in an exclusion of liability (SWEDISH HD 11 July 1983, NJA 1983, 522 II; FINNISH Supreme Court 5 March, KKO 1985 II 30; Bengtsson and Strömbäck loc. cit. 333; DANISH Western CA 7 June 1993, UfR 1993, 785). In each of the three Nordic countries, contributory fault of children and mentally disabled adults is subject to a special judically created regulatory regime (Bengtsson and Strömbäck loc. cit. 346; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 120; von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 322. In SWEDEN, the “normal” rules apply with regard to physical damage to property and pure economic loss, whereby ordinary (not gross) negligence will suffice to support a claim for the reduction of liability (Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 1(2); see in more detail Bengtsson and Strömbäck loc. cit. 340). The failure of an employer or the State to insure their property can amount to contributory fault (Damages Liability Act chap. 3 § 6); the courts have displayed a reluctance to extend this provision analogously to other cases (e. g. HD 29 October 1991, NJA 1991, 567; see Bengtsson, Om jämkning av skadestånd, 103). The DANISH courts, in particular, tend to regard the failure of a property owner to adopt appropriate measures to safeguard particularly valuable property or property which is prone to damage, thereby exposing that property to risk of damage, as amounting to contributory fault (Trolle, Risiko och Skyld2, 445; von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 332; HD 28 January 1941, UfR 1941, 291; HD 10 November 1952, UfR 1953, 12; Eastern CA 18 March 1955, UfR 1955, 607; HD 6 June 1956, UfR 1956, 742; Eastern CA 10 December 1969, UfR 1970, 407; HD 15 April 1981, UfR 1981, 415 and Western CA 19 January 1994, UfR 1994, 304). In ENGLAND the defendant’s contributory negligence was at common law a complete defence to an action in negligence, though the injustice of the rule was mitigated in a crude fashion by an extended doctrine that the party with the last opportunity to avert the damage would be regarded as solely responsible (Davies v. Mann (1842) 10 M & W 546, 152 ER 588). The standard of care required of the plaintiff was an objective one comparable to that of the claimant: The Genua (1936) 55 Lloyd’s L. Rep 139, 147 (Langton J: “ordinary nautical skill”). A mere error of judgement was not regarded as contributory negligence: SS “Baron Vernon” v. SS “Metagama” 1928 SC (HL) 21, 27 (Viscount Dunedin) and 32 (Lord Phillimore) (who both, however, considered the claimant’s “supine inaction” amounted to negligence). The burden of proving the claimant’s contributory negligence rested on the defendant: SS “Baron Vernon” v. SS “Metagama” 1928 SC (HL) 21, 25-26 (Viscount Haldane) and 29 (Lord Shaw), explained in The Genua loc. cit., 144 (Langton J). However, if the contributory negligence was established the burden of proof as regards the extent to which it had or had not exacerbated the claimant’s damage was said to rest on the claimant: SS “Baron Vernon” v. SS “Metagama” loc. cit., 27 (Viscount Dunedin), but contrast 33 (Lord Blanesburgh: act of negligence must be regarded as otiose unless it is shown that damage would in ordinary course flow from it). The ‘all or nothing’ nature of the defence (and with it the doctrine of last opportunity) was swept aside by the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, which also applies in SCOTLAND (loc. cit., s. 5). The Act enables the court to

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15.

reduce damages to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage: loc. cit., s. 1(1). For an application see, for example, Badger v. Ministry of Defence [2005] EWHC 2941 (QB); [2006] 3 All ER 173 (a widow’s claim based on the exposure of her deceased husband to asbestos, from which he contracted lung cancer, was reduced by 20 % on the grounds of his contributory negligence since he had continued to smoke despite being aware of the danger that his smoking enhanced the risk of contracting the disease). The defence applies to negligence, breach of statutory duty and other torts: see the definition of “fault” in s. 4 of the Act. For claims based on strict liability arising under the Animals Act 1971 express provision is made in s. 10 of that Act for the application of the defence; for SCOTLAND see likewise for liability under the Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 s. 1(6) of that Act. The defence is also expressly applicable to strict liability under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (in respect of defective products): see s. 6(4) of that Act. Where the claimant has sustained damage in attempting to avert or minimise loss or injury, the claim for reparation is likewise subject to the defence of contributory negligence: Sayers v. Harlow Urban District Council [1958] 1 WLR 623 (where the claimant, who had been locked in a lavatory cubicle due to the defendants’ negligence and attempted to climb out, was 25% to blame for her injuries in precariously resting her weight on the toilet roll when, realising that it was impossible to climb out, she abandoned the attempt). The defence is also expressly safeguarded for claims by an employee against his employer in respect of the latter’s deemed negligence (i. e. vicarious liability) in deploying equipment which is defective due to the fault of a third party: see Employers’ Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969, s. 1(1) proviso. Fault of the claimant embraces intentional self-injury: Reeves v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360. On the other hand, the defence is not available in the tort of deceit (Alliance & Leicester Building Society v. Edgestop Ltd. [1993] 1 WLR 1462 (holding that the common law principles were unaffected on this point by statute)), or in respect of conversion or intentional trespass to goods (Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, s. 11(1)), although it is arguable the defence may now be invoked in relation to other intentional torts (cf. Murphy v. Culhane [1977] QB 94 (assault)). Contributory negligence of the defendant continues to be assessed objectively, based on what was reasonable in the circumstances, and thus corresponds as a rule to that in governing the negligence of the defendant: A. C. Billings & Sons Ltd. v. Riden [1958] AC 240. However, the standard expected of an employee vis-à-vis his employer in complying with statutory duties under health and safety legislation may be less exacting than under the general law, while (as for negligence proper) children and the mentally disabled are not expected to meet the standards of a prudent adult: for details, see Clerk and Lindsell (-Jones), Torts19, 3-51–3-56. The burden of proof continues to rest on the defendant: Widdowson v. Newgate Meat Corp. [1998] PIQR P138, 143 (Nourse LJ). In IRELAND too statute has substituted a power in the court to apportion liability based on the comparative fault of the parties in place of the absolute ‘all or nothing’ defence of the Common Law: see the Civil Liability Act 1961, s. 34(1).

II.

The duty to mitigate damage

16.

In two decisions, the FRENCH Cass.civ. 19 June 2003, Bull.civ. 2003, II, no. 203, cases nos. 930 and 931 principally rejected the argument that the victim has a duty to

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18.

mitigate his or her damage under tort law; la victime n’est pas tenue de limiter son préjudice dans l’intérêt du responsable. Prior to this, the Cass.civ. 19 March 1997, Bull.civ. 1997, II, no. 86 p. 48 already formulated the specific principle that the victim has a right to refuse medical treatment and this refusal can therefore not be characterised as a faute Many legal writers point out that these decisions cannot be interpreted to connote that the tortfeasor is under a duty to compensate such consequential damage which the victim could have simply avoided and fails to do this in a grossly careless manner. Furthermore, there is no bar in characterising conduct which aggravates the damage caused as a faute on the part of the victim, If this is the case, then liablity is principally split (Jourdain, RTD civ 2003, 716). In contrast, under BELGIUM the traditional view that every victim of tort has a duty to mitigate the damage, is still adhered to. However, the victim is not required to resort to anything more than a mesures raisonnables (Cass. 14 May 1992, Pas. belge 1992, I, no. 478 p. 798). The criterion employed is whether an homme raisonnable et prudent would have had recourse to appropriate measure in the case at issue. Acadamic teaching regards the duty to mitigae or reduce damage as emanating from the general tort law duty of care (Ronse (-De Wilde/Claeys/Mallems), Schade en schadeloosstelling I2, p. 325 no. 464). In SPAIN, there is universal consensus on the principle that an injured party is required to take all suitable measures to reduce the damage. This deber de mitigar los daños finds its rationale in the general principle of good faith (CC art. 7(1); TS 29 November 1995, RAJ 1995 (5) no. 8361 p. 11143). It does not imply disproportionate sacrifices or the confrontation of the victim with new risks (Díez-Picazo, Derecho de daños, 322). On the other hand, reduction in liability claims as a consequence of a failure to mitigate damage are not confined to physical injury or damage to property; e. g. an injury of incorporeal personality rights can also be counted among their number (see TS 23 April 1999, RAJ 1999 (3) no. 4248 p. 6542: a report in the local press where it was alleged that the claimant had sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband at her wedding reception, was elevated to a national news story as the claimant called a press conference the next day to speak about the issue; the damages claim was reduced by approximately one-third). According to ITALIAN CC art. 2056, CC art. 1227 is also applicable to tort law claims. CC art. 1227(2) introduces a rule for the reduction of a liability claim in cases where the injured party did not act in a sufficiently careful manner subsequent to the damaging event in order to contain its impact (Cass. 13 March 1987, no. 2655, Foro it. Mass. 1987, 2655). The compensation claim is reduced, if the ensuing damage cannot be regarded as a normal consequence in the chain of causation set in motion by the tortfeasor (Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, sub art. 2056, 785-786). CC art. 1227(2) is employed e. g. where the victim of an accident claimed disproportionally high repair costs (see CFI Genova 8 April 1983, Arch.Giur.circolaz. 1983, 775; CFI Forlì 9 March 1994, Arch.Giur.circolaz. 1994, 1073; CA Genova 6 May 1985, Giust.civ. 1986, I, 2257) or where a victim unnecessarily sought medical treatment in a private clinic instead of at a state run hospital (CFI Trieste 14 January 1988, Dir. Economia assicur. 1988, 539). A further example for CC art. 1227 is provided by a decision in which a shopkeeper failed to move goods threatened by floodwaters into safe storage (Cass. 9 February 2004, no. 2422, Giur.it.Mass. 2002, fasc. 2). CC art. 1227 also crops up in a case of an employee, who was at first unfairly dismissed, then reinstated to his position where that employee failed

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20.

824

to exercise himself to find another position during the period of unemployment (Cass. sez.lav. 21 September 2000, no. 10859, Stud.Iuris 2001, 217). In order to supplement the analysis for HUNGARY in note I4 above, it is necessary to advert inter alia to BH 1996/38 (whereby the failure to mitigate damage resulted in the victim incurring further costs, the tortfeasor’s insurer was not required to compenates these additional costs), BH 1987/450 (according to which the duty to mitigate damage cannot impose an undue burden on the injured party; its purpose is not to exculpate the tortfeasor from liability) and BH 1984/197 (according to which the tortfeasor is only required to compesnate those costs which would have arisen, if the injured party had fulfilled his duty to mitigate damage in an appropriate manner). Similarly, under BULGARIAN LOA art. 83(2) the debtor is not liable for damage which an honest creditor could have avoided. However, he cannot be expected to resort to measures which would generate more costs than the prevention of the damage, in addition, he or she cannot be required to resort to unlawful measures or to measures contra bonos mores nor be expected to employ means that have the effect of injuring his good reputation (Kalaydjiev, Obligazionno pravo, Obshta chast, 389). According to SLOVENIAN LOA § 171(1) a breach of the duty to mitigate damage results in a reduction of claims for compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss (LOA § 185) (VS RS II 25 January 1996, Ips 423/ 94: refusal to consent to an operation performed under general anaesthetic). The injured party is not obliged to resort to extaordinary measures nor act as a sacrificial lamb (VS RS II 14 March 1996, Ips 652/94). ROMANIAN statute law currently does not recognise any duty to mitigate damage; however, this duty ought to achieve statutory recognition in the proposed Civil Code (Draft CC art. 1109(1); Proiectul Noului Cod civil, 217). GERMAN CC § 254(2) makes explicit what in actual fact already follows from CC § 254(1), namely, that contributory fault on the part of the injured party can also stem from a failure to point out an extraordinary risk that extensive damage will result or may derive from a failure to prevent the damage occurring or failing to take measures that minimise the impact of the damage. Three duties are imposed on the injured party, namely, a duty to warn, a duty to avoid damage and a duty to take appropriate measures to reduce the extent of the damage. The injured party is guilty of contributory fault if he or she violates the duty to act in good faith by failing to take those measures that an ordinarily careful and reasonable person would take in the circumstances to safeguard his or her interests (BGH 13 December 1951, NJW 1952, 299, 300). It is incumbent upon a person who is seriously injured to take it upon themselves to seek medical treatment and to follow doctors’s orders (Medicus, Schuldrecht I16, no. 675); he is even obliged to consent to an operation, if it can be regarded as a safe routine procedure, recovery is not particularly painful, there is a excellent chance of recovery or the operation offers a prospect of considerable improvement (BGH 15 March 1994, NJW 1994, 1592, 1593). The injured party is also under a duty, within reasonable bounds, to utilise his remaining working capacity to avoid or reduce a loss of earnings and if necessary to undergo training in this regard (BGH 13 May 1953, NJW 1953, 1098; BGH 9 October 1990, NJW 1991, 1412, 1413). The tortfeasor must compensatte the injured party for expenditure incurred while fullfilling the duties outlined above (BGH 1 April 1993, NJW 1993, 2685, 2687). The duty to warn is only extant when it was possible for the injured party to have recognised the high potential for harm or he or she should have recognised this risk (Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB66, § 254, no. 38; Erman (-Kuckuk),

Article 5:102: Contributory fault and accountability

21.

22.

23.

BGB I11, § 254, no. 56; BGH 1 February 1965, VersR 1965, 484, 487). A warning is not required, in circumstances where the tortfeasor and injured party are in a similar position as far as recognising the risk is concerned (Staudinger (-Schiemann), BGB [Neubearbeitung 2005], § 254, no. 75). If the tortfeasor in any case, would have failed to heed the warning had it been given, then the causation requirement is not established for the presence of contributory fault (BGH 26 May 1988, NJW 1989, 290, 292; see also BGH 19 September 1995, VersR 1996, 380, 381). However, it will suffice for the tortfeasor to assert that had he been warned, he would have resorted to approrpriate measures, even in a case where it was not certain that this course of action would have prevented the ensuing harm (BGH 1 December 2005, NJW 2006, 1426, 1428; BGH 1 December 2005, NJW-RR 2006, 1108, 1110). The risk of unusually extensive damage was e. g. approved in a decision where a daily loss of J 11.500 was accrued where a printer valued at J 14.400 broke down (CA Hamm 17 June 1996, NJW-RR 1998, 380); loss resulting from a translating error, which amounted to 40 times the fee charged (CA Hamm 28 February 1989, NJW 1989, 2066) and in respect of a risk of losing a particularly favourable financial investment (RG 29 October 1910, JW 1911, 35; however, the BGH 18 February 2002, NJW 2002, 2553, 2554 was critical of this decision). Under AUSTRIAN law, an injured party violates his duty to mitigate damage when he or she culpably (OGH 30 May 1974, SZ 47/69 p. 301) fails to act as the ordinary person would have done to avert or minimise the ensuing damage (OGH 28 March 2000, 1 Ob 9/00 f). The measures that the injured party is expected to adopt fall to be decided on a case by case basis, (OGH 30 May 1974 loc. cit.; OGH 26 February 2002, 1 Ob 24/02i), and will also hinge on whether the fact that such protective measures were necessary was common knowledge (OGH 10 October 1983, ZVR 1984/122 p. 116; OGH 7 July 2005, 2 Ob 135/04y: cyclist failed to wear a helmet; did not amount to contributory fault). Refusal to undergo therapeutic medical treatment or an operation may constitute contributory fault (OGH 12 March 1963, SZ 36/37 p. 104; OGH 30 May 1974 loc. cit.; OGH 12 February 1981, ZVR 1982/113 p. 86), as may the failure to pursue a occupation that can be reasonably expected of one (OGH 25 June 1998, ZVR 1999/25 p. 91; OGH 7 December 2000, ZVR 2002/5 p. 13) or allow repairs to be carried out (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 12/104). A Von Jehovah’s witness is not required to accept a blood transfusion (OGH 25 June 1998, ZVR 1999/25 p. 91). As a general rule, a person cannot be reasonabl expected to consent to serious or even potentially life-threatening surgery (OGH 30 May 1974 loc. cit.). The tortfeasor bears the burden of proving that the injured party breached the duty to mitigate his loss (OGH 8 November 1984, ZVR 1985/114 p. 212; OGH 26 November 1992, JBl 1994, 331). GREEK CC art. 300(1)(second sentence) makes explicit that an injured party can be guilty of contributory fault in failing to point out the risk of the occurrence of unusually extensive damage or failed to avert the damage or take steps to minimise it. It will depend on whether the injured party has infringed the duty to act in good faith or remained inactive, thereby in contravention of social conventions (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Stathopoulos), art. 300, no. 10). A textbook example is provided by the failure to quench a fire in the expectation that the arsonist would have to pay anyhow and refusing to consent to a routine unproblematic medical treatment or operation (Stathopoulos loc. cit. no. 11). PORTUGUESE CC art. 570(1) confers a discretion on the courts to reduce damages if the injured party culpably failed to hinder an aggravation of the damage, see note I10

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25.

826

above; Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, 588, note 2 under art. 570 and Brandão Proença, A conduta do lesado, 101. This state of affairs can occur if the victim of accident spurns medical treatment befitting the circumstances where it might be generally expected that such consent would be forthcoming. In a similar fashion, the DUTCH CC art. 6:101(1) requires victims to take measures to contain the damage within reasonable bounds (Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 351; Schadevergoeding I (-Lindenbergh) art. 6:96, note 172 p. 768; HR 24 January 1997, NedJur 1999 no. 56 p. 224). This provision is supplemented by CC art. 6:96(2), according to which the injured party is entitled to claim for reasonable expenditure incurred in his or her attempt to avert or minimise the loss. The courts determine reasonableness by reference, inter alia, to the relation between the impending damage and the costs of containing it as well as examining the risk incurred by the injured party in adopting these containment measures (Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 335). The duty to mitigate damage is universally recognised in the NORDIC countries (Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 338; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 245; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 122). At the same time, while it is indeed conceded that this duty is related to the doctrine of contributory fault, the duty to mitigate is usually only mentioned under the heading of adequate causation (Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans, 479; Radetzki, Skadeståndsberäkning vid sakskada, 158; Peczenik, Causes and Damages, 246). We are concerned here with the extent of the damage once part of it has already occurred whereas contributory negligence concerns the occurrence of the damaging event itself. Compensation is restricted to the loss which the injured party could not have adverted by resorting to appropriate measures (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 334; Andersson loc. cit. 480; Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 417; Saxén loc. cit. 117, 122). “Appropriateness” is measured according to an evaluation of the particulars of the individual case, inter alia, the courts have regard to the basis for liability and the nature of the loss sustained (Andersson loc. cit. 482; Radetzki loc. cit. 159). The injured party is required to seek medical treatment, if he cannot have failed to have realised the seriousness of his injury or illness (Swedish HD 19 July 1909, NJA 1909, 369 and HD 15 December 1939, NJA 1939, 601); he is also required to undergo an operation to which he could reasonably be expected to consent as it was not particularly risky nor were any other reasons extant to justify a refusal to consent (Jørgensen, Erstatning for personskade og tab af forsørger3, 467; Danish HD 23 June 1969, UfR 1969, 682). A further requirement is that proactive measures are adopted in respect of reintregration into the workforce (Swedish Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 1, Finnish Damages Liabaility Act chap. 5 § 2a, Danish EAL chap. 1 § 5(2); see also Swedish HD 4 December 1991, NJA 1991 662. In general, physical damage to property damage and pure economic loss are treated the same as physical injury. For example, if a fire breaks out, the plaintiff must attempt to rescue the livestock (Danish Western CA 25 February 1942, UfR 1942, 560), and moor vehicles must be brought promptly for repair so that loss of earnings and damages resulting from loss of use can be contained Fa (Swedish HD 20 April 1938, NJA 1938, 147; HD 31 May 1965, NJA 1965, 165; HD 12 April 1978, NJA 1978, 207). Of course, it is not per se inappropriate to charge a vet to take measures that cost more than the animal itself (Swedish HD 22 February 2001, NJA 2001, 65 I-II; Danish Eastern CA 14 September 1981, UfR 1981, 1074; Vinding Kruse loc. cit. 334; Andersson loc. cit. 484; Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 416; Saxén loc. cit. 122, 280). As far as pure economic loss is concerned, e,g a break

Article 5:102: Contributory fault and accountability

26.

27.

down in operations, it may be necessary in exceptional circumstances to make employees redundant (HD 11 November 1959, NJA 1959, 552) or to take out a bank loan to get the production up and running again (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 245); it may also be required to restructure costly working practices (Danish SH 7 April 1960, UfR 1960, 932; Danish HD 24 June 1983, UfR 1983, 714). In ENGLAND and SCOTLAND the duty to mitigate is well-established: see SS “Baron Vernon” v. SS “Metagama” 1928 SC (HL) 21, 26 (Viscount Haldane), 27 (Viscount Dunedin) (a Scottish authority equally expressive of English law). A claimant is not allowed to recover losses sustained which he might reasonably have avoided: Darbishire v. Warran [1963] 1 WLR 1067 (CA) (plaintiff only allowed cost of purchasing a near equivalent car on the open market where this was less than the cost of repair of the plaintiff’s damaged vehicle). The duty has been regarded as a restatement of the proposition that any part of the damage suffered which the claimant might reasonably have avoided is not such as to arise directly from the defendant’s act: SS “Baron Vernon” v. SS “Metagama”, loc. cit., 27. The defendant has the burden of establishing that the claimant failed to mitigate and in determining what is reasonable the courts have striven to ensure that the claimant is not burdened with satisfying demands which would be excessive or an imposition: London and South of England Building Society v. Stone [1983] 1 WLR 1242 (CA), where the court refused to find that a lender, whose security had been negligently overvalued and suffered from subsidence, should have enforced the personal covenant against the borrower, there being only a speculative chance this would yield anything. Statute also sets limits to the notion of what are reasonably avoidable costs in order that a claimant is not deprived of freedom in arranging his or her life choices. Thus in an action for damages for personal injuries, the possibility of avoiding or minimising expenses by taking advantage of facilities available under the National Health Service is to be disregarded in determining their reasonableness (Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948, s. 2(4)), thus enabling a claimant to choose private medical care. In IRELAND a negligent or careless failure to mitigate damage is deemed to be contributory negligence in respect of the amount by which such damage exceeds the damage that would otherwise have occurred: Civil Liability Act 1961, s. 34(2)(b). This reform means that apportionment rather than an absolute denial of recovery is the consequence in a case of slight negligence on the part of the claimant after sustaining the injury or damage. It is assumed that a failure to mitigate which is the deliberate act of the claimant, being outside the terms of the statute, would represent a novus actus interveniens and in this manner preclude recovery: McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, para. 20.28.

III.

Contributory fault in road traffic accidents

28.

In FRANCE, compensation for traffic accidents is governed by the Loi Badinter (of 5 July 1985). These rules, in so far as they apply, have precedence over the general rules on liability (Bénabent, Obligations9, no. 647 p. 428); the latter are only employed when the Loi Badinter no longer applies (Cass.civ. 4 March 1999, Bull.civ. 1999, II, no. 36 p. 27: liability of a pedestrian vis-à-vis a motor cyclist). The victim of a traffic accident has a compensation claim against the driver of the gardien of the involved vehicle and this claim does not require proof of fault. Drivers and gardien cannot rely on either force

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30.

31.

828

majeure or argue that it was a case fait d’un tiers (loc. cit. art. 2). A distinction is drawn between bodily injury and physical damage to property in cases where the victim was guilty of contributory fault. The defence of a faute inexcusable can only be asserted against a victim, who is not the driver of the vehicle, and only when the cause of the accident could solely be attributed to the victim (loc. cit. art. 3(1)) and the victim was not younger than 16, older than 70, or has a degree of permanent disability or incapacity to work of at least 80 % (loc. cit. art. 3(2)). Liability will not be imposed on a defendant in cases of suicide or attempted suicide (loc. cit. art. 3(3)). If the driver sustains injury, then his or her contributory negligence generally reduces the liability of the gardien by 50 %; in serious cases liability can be reduced by up to 100 % (loc. cit. art. 4); that the driver contributed to the cause of the accident (under the influence of alcohol; driving too fast) is always a prerequisite fort he reduction of liability (Cass.ass.plén. 6 April 2007, Bull.civ. 2007, no. 5 p. 11; Cass.ass.plén. 6 April 2007, Bull.civ. 2007, no. 6 p. 12). Article 4 regulates physical damage to property and is also relevant vis-à-vis injured parties who were not the drivers of the vehicle (loc. cit. art. 5(1)). In BELGIUM, compensation for victims of traffic accidents is governed by the Motor Insurance Liability Act of 21 November 1989. Loc. cit. art. 29bis §1(1), governs the liability of the insurer of the owner, driver and keeper of a motor vehicle involved in an accident for death or bodily injury to someone other than the driver. Persons, over the age of 14 or those who intend the occurrence of the accident and intend its consequences cannot rely on this provision (loc. cit. (6)). SPANISH Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act art. 1(1) 4 provides that in the case that the driver is at fault, the victim’s claim is reduced in proportion tot he extent that he or she contributed to the cause of the damage. This rule applies to both physical injury and economic loss (loc. cit. art. 4(3)). The wording of the statutory provision has attracted criticism, but legal commentators have given a broad welcome to the clarification that the rules on contributory fault also apply in the context of a traffic accident (Reglero Campos, Responsabilidad civil y seguro en la circulación de vehículos de motor3, 933-934). Loc. cit. art. 1(2) contributory fault on the part of a person to whom fault cannot generally be imputed is treated no differently from the fault of every other victim of a traffic accident (see CA Ciudad Real 25 February 2002, BDA JUR 2002/117158; critical on policy grounds Medina Alcoz, La culpa de la víctima, 297. ITALIAN CC art. 1227 applies also to traffic accidents. Not wearing a seat belt is an orthodox example; if a front-seat passenger fails to wear a seatbelt, then, up to a certain percentage amount which is assessed on the circumstances of the case, the driver can also be held responsible (compare Cass. 11 March 2004, no. 4993, Foro it. 2004, I, 2108 and 3129: here, failure to wear a seat-belt contributed to the cause of the accident by 50 %; 30 % of liability was apportioned to the injured party, 20 % to the driver). Further, pedestrians must reckon with a reduction in their claim for damages under CC art. 2054(1) if they can be deemed to have conducted themselves in a dangerous manner and displayed a want of care (Cass. 10 August 2000, no. 10352, Giur.it.Mass. 2000, 1732; Cass. 16 September 1996, no. 8281, Danno e resp. 1997, 252). In the event that two vehicles collide, according to CC art. 2054(2), “until there is evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that each driver contributed in equal measure to the cause of the damage sustained by the respective vehicles. In BULGARIA, the general rules on contributory fault govern traffic accidents. A passenger is not deemed to have contributed to the cause of the accident where, for

Article 5:102: Contributory fault and accountability

32.

33.

34.

example, subsequent to the accident, where a car travelling at too high a speed spun around, sprang out of the window and was thereby fatally injured (Supreme Court 22 September 1983, decision no. 590 in criminal matters, case no. 599/83). On the other hand, a pedestrian was found guilty of contibutory fault which has the effect of reducing liability, where he traversed a zebra crossing without watching out for oncoming traffic (Supreme Court 19 August 1980, decision no. 846 in criminal matters, case no. 756/ 1980). According to case law, individuals who are deemed to be incapable of committing a tort (e. g. minors) are required to either know the rules of the road or at all times are required to be accompanied (Supreme Court 16 October 1979, decision no. 1082 in criminal matters, case no. 956/79). Proof of contributory fault must be established; it is not possible to derive a presumption of contributory fault from an analogous application of LOA art. 45(2) (Burov, Grajdanska otgovornost za vredi, prichineni pri avtomobilna zlopoluka, 158). Strict liability of the keeper of a mechically propelled vehicle under POLISH CC art. 436 § 1 cannot be imposed if, the accident was exclusivley caused by the injured party or by a third party, for whom the injured party bore no responsibility (Bieniek (-Bieniek) III(1)5, art. 436 nos. 17 and 21; Pietrzykowski (-Safjan), Kodeks cywilny I4, art. 436 no. 14). This “exclusive fault” must be the sole cause of the accident (Radwan´ ski (-Olejniczak), Zobowia˛zania – cze˛s´c´ ogólna5, p. 226 no. 576; Bieniek loc. cit. art. 435 no. 33; Safjan loc. cit. art. 435 no. 21; Supreme Court 18 December 1961, 4 CR 328/61, NP no. 11/1962, p. 1523: in spite of defendant’s warning, the claimant stepped onto a mowing machine which was running at the time). If the injured party does not commit an “exclusive” fault, rather is guilty of a “common” fault, then his or her claim will be reduced according to the criteria contained in the general rule under CC art. 362 (Bieniek loc. cit. art. 436, no. 19; ; Bieniek (-Wis´niewski) III(1)5, art. 362 no. 6; Safjan loc. cit. art. 435 no. 25 and art. 436 no. 14; Supreme Court 2 December 1985, IV CR 412/85, OSPiKA 1986, no. 4, poz. 87; Supreme Court 6 June 1997, II CKN 213/97, OSNC 1998, no. 1, poz. 5: travelling with an intoxicated driver following joint alcohol consumption). A rule governing the reduction in recovery of damages to the detriment of the victim of an accident can be derived from GERMAN CC § 254(1). This rule comes into operation if the victim does not observe traffic regulations or was responsible for operating a vehicle with an inherent danger (BGH 9 January 1959, BGHZ 29, 163, 171; BGH 30 January 1979, NJW 1979, 980). It is certainly true that CC § 254 only impinges on a relatively minor number of cases of loss sustained in traffic accidents. If the damage is caused by more than one vehicle or if the keeper of one vehicle sustains loss which is caused by the other, then Road Traffic Act § 17(1) is applicable; however, this provision fully corresponds with CC § 254(1) (Erman (-Kuckuk), BGB I11, § 254, no. 35). The duty to mitigate damage under CC § 254(2) is left unaffected by the Road Traffic Act § 17 (MünchKomm (-Oetker), BGB5, § 254, no. 13). Children who have yet to attain the age of ten are not liable for damage that they unintentionally inflict on another party in a trsffic accident (CC § 828(2)); consequently, they do not have to reckon with a reduction in recovery. AUSTRIAN CC § 1304 also operates to govern road traffic accidents. It is also applicable to cases where the injured party bases his claim to recovery on the defendant being strictly liable (EKHG § 7). Special rules solely arise in the context of a breach of a duty to wear a seat-belt or in the contxt of motorcycles, a failure to wear a helmet (see note I8 above). An individual will be deemed to have committed a contributory fault, for

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36.

37.

830

example, where he or she agrees to be carried by a recognisably a drunken driver (OGH 10 December 1970, SZ 43/231 p. 813) by employing CC § 1310 in a corresponding manner, the courts affirmed the contributory fault of a child who was capable of distinguishing between right and wrong who suddenly jumped out from behind a parked car and ran onto the road (see further Koziol/Bydlinski/Bollenberger (-Karner), ABGB2 § 1310 no. 7). GREEK CC art. 300 (note I9 above) also applicable to road traffic accidents (Kritikos, Aposimiosi apo trochaia avtokinitika atichimata, 34 and 460). As far as minors who have yet to attain the age of ten are concerned, it is questionable on the grounds of CC art. 915 whether their claims can be reduced on the grounds of contributory fault. The majority view in legal commentary submits that the question should be resolved by employing CC art. 918 in a corresponding manner: it then hinges on whether the minor should be deemed liable upon application of the rules on equitable liability, if he himself did not sustain injury but caused loss to a third party (ErmAK (-Litzeropoulos), art. 300, no. 22; Kritikos loc. cit. 36; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Stathopoulos), art. 300, no. 8; Dimopoulou, Evthini apo diakindinevsi, 39). Road Traffic Liability Act art. 6 does indeed contain a provision under which liability of the injured party is completely excluded, but this provision is regarded as having been rendered obsolete by the subsequent enactment of CC art. 300, (Kornilakis, I evthini apo diakindinevsi, 174; Livanis, I efarmogi tou arthrou 300 is to pedion tis antikimenikis evthinis, 140; see also Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio, Geniko meros, 694). PORTUGUESE CC art. 505 makes explicit that the rules on reduction of liability on the grounds of contributory fault (CC art. 570) are also valid in cases where the keeper is deemed strictly liable under art. 503(1). Incidentially, liability is only excluded where the victim alone or an act of a third party causes the accident or if the gardien invokes force majeure, which does not arise in connection with the operation of a motor vehicle (see further Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 676). For the cases governed by CC art. 505, the realisation of a risk, for which CC art. 503 affixes strict liability, should be absent. Cases, where both the driver and the injured party contributed to the cause of the accident remain governed by art. 570 (see e. g. CA Evora 17 April 1997, BolMinJus 466 [1997] 610 and STJ 6 July 1971, BolMinJus 209 [1971] 102). The driver is exempt from liability, if and in so far as the accident can be attributed to the misconduct of an individual not capable of committing a fault. In the event that two or more vehicles collide, the following distinction is required to be drawn: CC art. 570 is applicable, if both sides are at fault. If neither one of the drivers is at fault, it will then depend on the degree to which the inherent operating risk present in the respective vehicles contributed to the cause of the accident (CC art. 506(1)). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the inherent operational risks of both vehicles are taken to be the same, and if it is ascertained that fault was present on both sides, then liability is equally apportioned (CC art. 506(2)). As a general rule, DUTCH CC art. 6:101 (see I11 above) is also applicable to road traffic accidents. However, the prerequiste that a reduction in liability must meet the requirements of fairness, is attibuted a particular significance in this area. It has been noted that the courts display a tendency to protect the interests of weaker road user even in the event of a breach of traffic and safety regulations and the courts curb the use of CC art. 6:101 in this context (see further Onrechtmatige daad III (-Bouman), nos. 253-254 pp. 97-118; Schadevergoeding I (-Boonekamp), art. 6:101, no. 12.1, p. 38). As far as in-

Article 5:102: Contributory fault and accountability

38.

39.

40.

jury to children who have yet to attain the age of 14 is concerned, it is accepted that full damages can be recovered from the individual who caused the dangerous situations. This rule is only diverged from if it can be proved that the child acted with a lack of due care and require express justification (HR 8 Dezember 1989, NedJur 1990 no. 778 p. 3248). Furthermore, cyclist and pedestrians enjoy a measure of special protection, namely, provided that they neither acted in an intentional or careless manner, such plaintiffs are entitled to recover a damages award of at least 50 % from the keeper of the motor vehicle (HR 28 Februar 1992, NedJur 1993 no. 566 p. 2117). ESTONIAN LOA § 139(1) confers a discretion on the judge to disregard an insignificant fault of the injured party. Article 5:102(2)(b) resembles LOA § 139(3), but the latter provision is not confined to regulating road traffic accidents, it impinges on all types of personal injury. See also the note following under IV for a detailed examination of the situation prevailing in the NORDIC Countries. SWEDISH Traffic Damages Act § 12 corresponds to the general rule govening general tort liability (see note I13 above), according to which liability for personal injury may only be reduced where the victim acts intentionally or in a grossly negligent manner. An identical situation prevails under the DANISH Traffic Act § 101(2) and FINNISH Traffic Insurance Act chap. 2 § 7. The SWEDISH Act additionally provides for the possibility that liability can be reduced tot he detriment of a drunken driver, who negligently contributed to causing his own damage (see HD 6 April 2000, NJA 2000, 150). The situation in DENMARK (HD 15 November 2002, UfR 2003, 339) and FINLAND (loc. cit.) is similar. An individual who permits himself to be driven by a driver who is recognisably under the influence of alcohol is grossly negligent. Ordinary (not gross) contributory fault on the part of the injured party suffices to reduce a liability claim in cases of damage to property (SWEDISH Traffic Damages Act § 12(2); DANISH Traffic Act § 101(3); FINNISH Traffic Insurance Act chap. 2 § 7(2)). In the event of a vehicle collison, the respective degree of fault and other determining factors (such as the existence of other risks that contributed to the cause of the accident) are taken account of by the courts when weighing up all the circumstances of the case (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 228, 235; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 167; Lyngsø, Færdselsansvar3, 73; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 256). In ENGLAND contributory negligence in traffic cases is governed by the ordinary rules of contributory negligence, so that damages may be reduced where the negligence of the claimant has contributed to the accident, each case being assessed on the basis of its own circumstances rather than any fixed “rules of law” defining particular conduct as in all circumstances negligent: see Clerk and Lindsell (-Jones), Torts19, 3-57 and for details Charlesworth and Percy (-Cooper), Negligence11, Chap. 9.

IV.

Reduction in liability where the ‘strict liability’ of the injured party contributes to the cause of the accident

41.

The notion that liability can be reduced on the basis of the injured party’s objective fault is not recognised under FRENCH and BELGIAN law. Each party is obliged to fully compensate the other, unless the injured party contributed to the cause of the damage (Cass.civ. 11 Februray 1976, D. 1976 Jur. 609, note Larroumet).

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42.

43.

44.

832

In SPAIN, the defence of contributory fault operates in cases of fault-based liability as well as in cases of strict liability (e. g. Reglero Campos, El nexo causal3, 446; see also Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act art. 1.1(4)). Initially, in cases involving motor vehicle collisons, the Tribunal Supremo deemed the strict liability regime to be inapplicable and that liabilty was tob e apportioned along the respective lines of fault (TS 6 March 1992, RAJ 1992 [2] no 2397 p. 3245; TS 15 April 1992, RAJ 1992 [2] no. 3306 p. 4368; TS 29 April 1994, RAJ 1994 [2] no. 2983 p. 4029). However, the courts of first instance have decided that each party must compensate 50 % of the loss of the other party in cases, where the facts resemble those contained in illustration 9 under Article 5:102, provided that the respective degrees of fault and contributions to the cause of the accident cannot be definitively ascertained (CA Islas Baleares 12 September 2006, BDA JUR 2006/279403; CA Islas Baleares 2 February 2006, BDA JUR 2006/155482). CA Barcelona 19 January 2006, JUR 2006/112784 reduced the claim of each party by a half, without having determined the presence of a concrete fault on the part of either of the drivers. In a collision between a car and motorbike CA Barcelona 2 March 2006, JUR 2006/232076 reduced the car drivers’ claim by 75 % (because he had overlooked a traffic sign), and the motorbiker’s claim by 25 %. In line with Article 5:102(2)(a) and (b), courts seem to disregard an insubstantial contributory fault or accountability (CA Barcelona 23 October 2006, BDA JUR 2007/149; CA Madrid 28 September 2006, JUR 2006/268555; CFI Barcelona 16 May 2007, La Ley 18 July 2007 no. 6758). The prevailing legal doctrine also favours a reduction of compensation when two sources of danger mutually contribute to the occurrence or the extent of the damage (Reglero Campos loc. cit. 447). It goes without saying that the contributory fault of an employee is imputed to his or her employer and operates to reduce liability (TS 9 March 1995, RAJ 1995 [1] no 1847 p. 2431). The rational of ITALIAN CC art. 1227(1) is interpreted as connoting that the injured party must bear his or her share of the entire damage that he or she contributed to cause. Consequently, this provision also applies where one or both the parties concerned are strictly liable or where fault is presumed (Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, supplement to arts. 2043, 2056-2059, sub art. 2043, pp. 41, 46). For example, in a case involving a motor vehicle and an animal, the extent of the relevant liability (CC arts. 2052 and 2054(1)) is determined with reference to the circumstances of the individual case (Cass. 9 December 1992, no. 13016, Giust.civ.Mass. 1992, fasc. 12; Cass. 27 June 1997, no. 5783, Giust.civ.Mass. 1997, 1077). If the animal caused the driver of the motor vehicle to suffer a loss and affirmative proof cannot be adduced that the latter did everything in his power to avoid the loss occurring, (CC art. 2054(1)), this has the effect of reducing his damages claim upon application of CC art. 1227(1) (Cass. 9 June 2002, no. 200, Resp. civ. e prev. 2002, 1390). In the event that a “collision of motor vehicles” occurs, then under CC art. 2054(2) “unless contrary evidence is adduced, there is a presumption that the drivers of the vehicles are jointly and severally liable for causing the damage”. Therefore, it is incumbant upon each party to bear 50 % of the damage that he or she has sustained and each party is bound to compensate 50 % of the other party’s loss. This corresponds to the rule anchored in Article 5:102. If two considerably hazardous activities (e.g two motor vehicles) meet head on, then, according to HUNGARIAN CC § 346(1), first and foremost, the “classical” rules pertaining to fault-based liability govern the relationship to one another. If fault is absent, and the cause of the damage can be attributed to an “irregularity” inherent in one of the

Article 5:102: Contributory fault and accountability

45.

vehicles involved, then liability is imposed on that party (CC § 346(2)). However, if such an irregularity was present in each vehicle or it cannot be positively affirmed in respect of any of them and fault is absent, then each party has the burden of bearing his or her own loss (CC § 346(3)); in this case, a solution entailing that each party is to compensate the loss of the other is regarded as “absurd”: Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 118 ff. If a dangerous activity collides with a non-hazardous activity and damage is also incurred by the dangerous activity, then the claim of that party is reduced according to the extent that the inherent operating risk contributed to the cause of the damage (Opinion of the Civil College of the Supreme Court PK 38 Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata I6, 1271 f; Petrik (-Wellmann), Polgári jog II, 593 f). Likewise, CC § 346 applies to cases where a road traffic accident is caused by wild game. That game turn up on highways is not regarded as an “irregularity”, but individuals holding a hunting permit are liable for game which venture onto motorway and for game that do not behave as expect on highways (Benedek loc. cit. 1278; BH 2003/237; BH 2000/401; cf. also Wellmann loc. cit. 596; BH 2000/402). Similarly, in ROMANIA, the courts and prevailing legal opinion operate on the assumption that liabilites which collide operate to cancel each other out so that systematically, it falls to be governed by the generally rules pertaining to fault-based liability (Romos¸an, Vinova˘t¸i, 177-178). BULGARIAN law does not recognise a reduction in liability on the grounds of strict liability of the injured party which contributes to the cause of the acccident. The courts simply declare that objective liability for animals and property is dispenseed with in cases where the cause of the accident can be exclusively ascribed to the fault of the injured party (Supreme Court 26 November 1960, decision no. 799 in civil matters, case no. 6940/60, fourth chamber). Under SLOVENIAN LOA § 154(3), as a general rule both parties are liable for road traffic accidents which were not caused by the fault of either of the involved parties, unless achieving an equitable result necessitates a different apportionment of liability. Above all, consideration of the dangerous state of the respective vehicles flows into this equitable assessement (see further Juhart and Plavs˘ak (-Pensa), Obligacijski zakonik I, art. 154 p. 882). The issue of confining the scope of a damages claim in cases where there is no actual contributory fault on the part of the injured party, but strict liability of that party operates to contribute to the cause of the damage is the subject of intense discussion in POLAND (for further analysis e. g. Szpunar, Rejent no. 2001 (6) 13; Granecki, PiP 2003 (1), 68; Radwan´ ski (-Olejniczak), Zobowia˛zania – cze˛s´c´ ogólna5, 96, no. 249; Radwan´ ski (-Dybowski), System prawa cywilnego III(1), 298; Pietrzykowski (-Banaszczyk) Kodeks cywilny I4, art. 362 no. 5). The majoritarian view in teaching and jurisprudence appears to favour an approach where it hinges on the grounds for which liability was imposed on the defendan: if fault liability is at issue, then only the contributory fault of the injured party will operate to reduce his damages claim; conversely if strict liability is involved, then the strict liability of the injured party will operate to reduce his claim (Olejniczak loc. cit. no. 250; Dybowski loc. cit. 298; Bieniek (-Wis´niewski) III(1)5, art. 362 nos. 5 and 7; Supreme Court 7 October 1977, I CR 366/77, OSNC 1978, no. 7, poz. 118; Supreme Court 13 October 1998, II UKN 259/98, OSNP 1999, no. 21, poz. 698; Supreme Court 6 October 2000, II UKN 27/00, OSNP 2002, no. 10, poz. 249). In the case of a venicle collison, according to CC art. 436 § 2, the general rules pertaining to fault-based liability prevail over the strict liability rules, with the result that if fault is absent, then, in end effect, each party bears his or her

833

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46.

47.

48.

49.

834

own loss (for an interpretation of the concept of collision, see Supreme Court 4 March 1958, 1 CR 154/56, OSP 1959, no. 10, poz. 257; Supreme Court 2 January 1976, III CZP 79/75, OSNCP 1976, nos. 7-8, poz. 155). Of course, strict liability (and joint and several liability) endures vis à vis third parties (Supreme Court 19 May 1970, II CR 137/70, OSPiKA 1971, no. 5, poz. 90). According to GERMAN law, an operational risk or an inherent danger in tangible property on the part of the injured party which contributed to cause the damage has the effect of reducing his or her claim and whether the damaging party is liable under contract or tort law is irrelevant for these purposes (BGH 9 June 1952, NJW 1952, 1015; BGH 30 May 1972, NJW 1972, 1415). According to case law, the operating risk inherent in the injured keeper’s motor vehicle is taken account of in the assessment of damages for non-pecuniary loss (BGH 13 April 1956, NJW 1956, 1067; BGH 18 November 1957, NJW 1958, 341; cf. CC § 253(2)). The factor is, however, disregarded in cases involving a claim of the keeper vis-à-vis the driver (BGH 30 May 1972, NJW 1972, 1415). The principle that a risk inherent in a thing or an inherent operating risk which contributes to cause the damage sustained, operates to reduce a claim for reparation is not applicable in cases involving the liability of an animal keeper (BGH 6 July 1976, NJW 1976, 2130), to cases pertaining to the liability for damage caused by aircraft (BGH 18 November 1999, NJW-RR 2000, 549) nor even to certain areas of environmental liability law (BGH 13 December 1994, NJW 1995, 1150, 1151). The mirror image principle (in Austria it is known as principle of equal treatment) is also valid in AUSTRIA. Consequently, it follows that liability will be reduced, in the event that the inherent operational risk in the injured party’s vehicle (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 12/1) or another reason for imposing strict liability (as e. g. strict liability under the Product Liability Act § 11) operated to contribute to the cause of the damage sustained. The position under GREEK law is essentially the same. CC art. 300 is also applicable to cases if an inherent risk in a thing or operational risk or other ground for imposing strict liability contributes to cause the loss sustained (Dimopoulou, Evthini apo diakindinevsi, 33). Therefore, for example, a claim will be reduced to the prejudice of e. g. the owner, if a dog is killed as a result of a road traffic accident (for which strict liability under CC art. 924 is imposed; for further analysis see Dimopoulou loc. cit. 36) PORTUGUSE CC art. 506(1) makes a distinction for the case where there is a motor vehicle collison which is not to due to fault of either one of the drivers, on the basis whether only one of the vehicles may be regarded as the cause of the accident (e. g. because the brakes of that vehicle malfunctioned), or whether both are involved (e. g. because both skidded on an imperceptible patch of oil), see Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 683, Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, art. 506 no. 1 p. 519). In the first case, the keeper of the vehicle that caused the accident is liable, in the second case, it depends on the degree of gravity of the risk of fault with which both vehicles contributed to the cause of the accident; in the case of doubt, it is generally assumed that both parties are equally at fault (CC art. 506(2). For example, in a case involving a collision between a van and a moped, liability of the keeper of the small van was apportioned at 75% and the driver of the moped was deemed to be responsible for 25% of the entire damage (CA Oporto 28 February 2005, Proc. 0550692). However, in addition, whether the general contributory fault rules regulation contained in CC art. 570(1) could be applied analogously to the case where the strict liability of the

Article 5:102: Contributory fault and accountability

50.

51.

52.

injured party contributes to the cause of the accident is a matter of some contention. Academic teaching is predominantly in favour of this solution (Brandão Proença, A conduta do lesado, 170, 174-175; Vaz Serra, RLJ 111 [1978/1979] 281 and Almeida Costa, Obrigações10, 641). STJ 9 March 1978, RLJ 111 [1978/1978] 276 rejected the analogous application of CC art. 506(2) in respect of the liabilityof the keeper of an animal. Prevailing legal opinion deems that DUTCH CC art. 6:101 (claim will be reduced, if the damage is also the result of circumstances which may be imputed to the injured party) is not only applicable in cases where the injured party was guilty of contributory fault, but may be also employed in cases where circumstances which belong in his sphere of risk contributed to the cause of the accident. Risk based liability imposed by statute or imposed on the basis of social convention which contributes to cause the accident will also be taken account of by the courts (Asser (-Hartkamp) Verbintenissenrecht I12, no. 450 p. 402; Schadevergoeding I (-Boonekamp), art. 6:101, no. 5 pp. 14-20; HR 27 April 2001, NedJur 2002, no. 54 p. 383; HR 2 December 2005, NedJur 2006, no. 444 p. 4241). Article 5:101(4) largely corresponds to ESTONIAN LOA § 139(1); similarly, according to this provision, the extent of damages may be reduced if the damage was caused partly as a result of a risk for which the injured party is liable (Lahe, Juridica 2003, 83). In SWEDEN a claim for damages is only reduced in cases of direct physical injury and injuries to health if the injured party acted intentionally or was grossly negligent; the injured party’s strict liability which contributed to the cause of the accident does not therefore impinge upon his damages claim (Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 1(1); Traffic Damages Act § 12(1)). The legal solution is unsettled, however, where physical damage to property is at issue. Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 1(1) only specifies contributory fault as a reason for reducing a liability claim; the authors of the provision, however, had contemplated enacting a general principle of tort law under which the injured party would be required to reckon with a reduced damages claim in the event that he or she was strictly liable (Prop. 1975/76:15, 84). In the period following, this principle has been embraced by a majority of legal commentators (Dufwa, SvJT 1979, 401; ibid., JT 1990-91, 456; Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans, 579; Bengtsson, Om jämkning av skadestånd, 111; Agell, FS Grönfors, 9-28; see also Dufwa, Flera skadeståndsskyldiga II, 4440; for a critical viewpoint, above all Hellner, JT 1991-92, 252) and by the courts (HD 11 April 1985, NJA 1985, 309 and HD 1 October 1990, NJA 1990, 569 [collison between a car and a bicycle; the cyclist was solely negligent; the claim of the driver of the car was nonetheless reduced by a half]; HD 10 November 1987, NJA 1987, 749 [collison between a car and a construction vehicle; only the latter was negligent; claim of the driver of the car was reduced by a quarter]; HD 14 October 1988, NJA 1988, 495 [a hound attacked a goat and was shot by their owner; the owner of the dog claim was reduced by one third, owing to the fact that strict liability on his part contributed to the cause of the accident]). In the interim, the Traffic Damages Act § 18(2) has been amended and it now provided that damages may be reduced, if the inherent operational risk of the damaged vehicle contributed to the cause of the road traffic accident; therefore, an “automatic” reduction no longer takes place. Furthermore, the explanatory note to this amendment deliberately leaves undecided the issue as to whether the mirror principle can be regarded as a general tort law principle (NJA II 1999, 393, 395-396). At the time of writing, it is unclear whether it will continue in force (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 114; Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 52). In a number of special statutory provisions, the following approach has

835

Chapter 5: Defences

53.

836

been adopted, namely, in the case involving a motor vehicle, where both parties are jointly responsible for the collison which “of itself” is usually subject to the rules of strict liability, is once again admitted to the ranks of the general tort liability regime (Traffic Damages Act §§ 10(2) and 12(2); Railway Traffic Act chap. 5 § 3(3); Maritime Code chap. 8 § 1 [with the addendum that if negligence of neither party can be ascertained, then each side must bear 50 % of the entire damage] and Liability for Damage Caused in the Course of Aviation Act [1922:382] § 2(2)). If, the contributory fault of a third party for whom the injured party was liable contributed to cause the accident, then the question is raised whether in conjuncton with an aktiv, a passiv identifikation should also take place. In turn, under the general principles of tort law, this proposition is generally rejected in the event that personal injury is at stake, whereas it is approved if physical damage to property results (see in more detail Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 229; Bengtsson loc. cit. 157; Dufwa, Flera skadeståndsskyldiga, no. 4066; HD 26 February 1955, NJA 1955, 102 (Judge Walin); HD 24 May 1984, NJA 1984, 420). In DENMARK a general mirror principle with regard to the injured party’s strict liability was supported in the literature (Ussing, Erstatningsret, 191; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 329; cf. Trolle, Risiko og Skyld2, 424). This principle has not, as yet, been approved by the courts (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 327). Where personal injury is sustained by passengers and drivers, it is submitted that a claim may only be reduced, where the accident could be also ascribed to the driver’s negligence and the defendant was a non-motorist (prepatory works Betænkning no. 1036/1985, 47). Conversely, in the event that physical damage to property has occurred, the mirror principle remains applicable (Vinding Kruse loc. cit. 213), unless the damaging party acted in a grossly negligent manner (Eastern CA 2 February 1987, UfR 1987, 587: an intoxicated pedestrian ran onto the street) (if the damaging party was only gulity of ordinary negligence and the injured party is insured, then private individuals are not at all liable: Damages Liability Act § 19). If a dog’s death is due to a collision between that dog and a car, then strict liability of the owner of the dog will operate to reduce his or her claim (HD 13 January 1961, UfR 1961, 170); in the case where two dogs attack each other causing mutual injury and causing damage, then, save where special circumstances exist to justify a departure from the rule, each keeper is required to bear half of the other party’s loss (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 184; Eastern CA 18 December 1941, UfR 1942, 412). In the case of a collision between two motor vehicles, claims for personal injury are only reduced if intention and gross negligence were extant (Traffic Act § 103, § 101 (2)). If neither party is guilty of negligent conduct, then both parties share the costs of the damage (Vinding Kruse, loc. cit. 327). Cases where the values of the property and the risks involved are clearly dissonant (e. g. Eastern CA 17 June 1938, UfR 1938, 972: dog ran into the propeller of a plane which was just starting its engines), then the outcome can be corrected by having recourse to the Damages Liability Act § 24. Similarly, in FINLAND, a reduction in damages with reference to the injured party’s strict liability is advocated (Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 110). It is possible to avail of this possibility in cases of personal injury and physical damage to property (Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 1; Saxén, Tillägg till Skadeståndsrätt, 407). In cases of personal injury which derives from a road traffic accident, a reduction is not exclusively imposed in cases where the injured party acted with intent or was grossly negligent (Traffic Insurance Act § 7). Exceptional circumstances may generate a reduction of liability on equitable grounds (Damages Liability Act chap. 2 § 1 (2)).

Article 5:103: Damage caused by a criminal to a collaborator

Illustration 1 is taken from STJ 6 May 2003; illustration 2 from BH 1982/119; illustration 3 from OGH 21 December 2004, ecolex 2005, 204; illustration 4 from TS 3 April 2001, La Ley 2001 (3) no. 3371 p. 608; illustration 5 from TS 23 April 1999, RAJ 1999 (3) no. 4248 p. 6542; illustration 6 from Cass.civ. 19. 06. 2003, Bull. Civ. 2003, II, no. 203, case no. 930 (reaching, however, the opposite conclusion); illustration 7 from TS 8 June 1995, RAJ 1995 (3) no. 4563 p. 6101; and illustration 11 from CA Hamm 11 February 2004, NJW 2004, 2246, note Pfab, VersR 2006, 894.

Article 5:103: Damage caused by a criminal to a collaborator Legally relevant damage caused unintentionally in the course of committing a criminal offence to another person participating or otherwise collaborating in the offence does not give rise to a right to reparation if this would be contrary to public policy.

Comments 1. Ex turpi causa non oritur actio. The maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio is known to many, but not all, of Europe’s legal systems. It is sometimes restricted to the law of unjustified enrichment but in some other systems is a well-established part of the law on non-contractual liability. This Article follows the latter model. The defence not only partially overlaps with the defences of contributory fault and acting at one’s own risk, but also adds new dimensions to the question of whether a person has acted negligently at all. However, in none of these three systematic categories can the true character of this idea be unqualifiedly expressed, namely that an injured person may lose a claim to compensation through particularly dishonourable conduct. Illustration 1 Two young men steal a car; A drives, B sits in the passenger seat. A negligently causes an accident, through which B is injured. B has no claim in damages against A. The reason for this under these model rules is not that A did not owe to B a duty of care, nor that B was guilty of contributory fault, nor that he acted at his own risk. The reason for the exclusion of liability is the participation of the injured person in the theft and the inevitable getaway. Illustration 2 The position is the same where other things, apart from a car, are stolen, and as a consequence of drunkenness in the undertaking of the crime or the subsequent getaway, an accident occurs. The injured person sitting in the back seat has neither a claim against the driver nor a claim against the owner who was sitting in the front passenger’s seat. 2. Illegality. A further argument in favour of the rule in this Article is that it would not be plausible if, as the case may be, an unjustified enrichment could not be retained 837

Chapter 5: Defences

due to illegality (see DCFR VII. – 6:103) (Illegality)) but the claim in damages were to stand (see Article 6:101 (Aims and forms of reparation) paragraph (4)). 3. Burden of proof. Technically speaking, what is involved is a defence because the person seeking to escape liability must prove that the rule’s requirements are in fact met. Indeed, this is not entirely unproblematic, because public ends are also served by the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio; however, this is unavoidable in the law of civil procedure. 4. Damage must be caused unintentionally. It does not flow from the recognition of the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio that the injured person is stripped of all rights. It is not about denying an injured person all legal protection, but about avoiding the absurdity of a legal system developing standards of care for the conduct of criminals vis à vis each other. The provision therefore only excludes those rights to reparation which one participant in a crime unintentionally confers on another participant in the very same crime. 5. Collaborator. The Article covers only damage to a participant in a criminal act by a fellow participant. The term collaborator or collaboration has the same meaning as in Article 4:102 (Collaboration). Illustration 3 While fleeing the scene of the crime, a young delinquent is shot dead by an overzealous security guard, whose job was merely to call the police in the event of the threat of theft. The victim’s parents do not lose their claim by virtue of this Article. Illustration 4 A thief steals from a narcotics dealer money which the dealer has earned from his illegal trade. The thief does not have a defence under this Article to the dealer’s claim arising out of the infringement of his property rights in the money: the thief is not a collaborator in the dealer’s unlawful activity. 6. Reparation must be contrary to public policy. Collaboration in a criminal act should not automatically defeat a right to damages against another participant. In view of the multi-faceted nature of everyday life, it seems to be preferable to once again subject the outcome to a test of justice and fairness. The Article incorporates such a control mechanism through the criterion that a right to damages is only to be excluded where awarding it would be contrary to public policy. Ultimately this decision depends on the circumstances of each individual case, particularly on whether the injured person is injured in a manner that is directly connected to the participation in the criminal act. Illustration 5 A and B are involved in a brawl and are thus criminally punishable. In full knowledge of his physical superiority, the younger of the two, A, who was provoked by B, hits B so hard that he fractures his skull. Even where it can be inferred that A did not intentionally inflict this injury to B, Article 5:103 does not stand in the way of B’s claim. 838

Article 5:103: Damage caused by a criminal to a collaborator

Notes 1.

2.

The legal systems of Europe are divided on the question of whether to recognise ex turpi causa- as a general defence under tort law. The majority of jurisdictions answer this question in the negative; however, this does not preclude the possibility of the legal policy behind it appearing in another dogmatical guise. This ground of defence is not recognised in FRANCE (Cass.civ. 22 June 2004, D. 2005, 189, note Denis Mazeaud; Roland and Boyer, Adages du droit français4, 487), ITALY, ROMANIA, GERMANY, GREECE, the NETHERLANDS or SPAIN (CA Las Palmas 1 March 2002, BDA JUR 2002/126749 and CA Jaén 1 September 2003, BDA JUR 2003/242232 does indeed mention the principle of ex delicto or iniuria ius non oritur, but derived no concrete legal consequence from it). HUNGARIAN BH 1980/471 imputed contributory fault to an intoxicated victim who suffered injury as a passenger in a car accident on the grounds that she stole the car together with the similarly intoxicated driver. In AUSTRIA, it can even transpire that an injured party who contributes to cause the commission of a criminal offence will be denied a remedy on the basis of contributory fault (OGH 19 May 1994, ZVR 1995/41 p. 108 [illustration 1 above]). Other legal systems make available the general prohibition on abuse of rights (PORTUGUESE CC art. 334; POLISH CC art. 5) or a general rule permitting the reduction of liability on equitable grounds (e. g. CZECH and SLOVAK CC § 450). These provisions are also valid for tort law. MALTESE CC art. 1051A(5) contains a special rule which governs cases of corruption. For SWEDEN see illustration 4 above. In contrast, the ex turpi causa defence is recognised in LATVIA (CC art. 1642) and in the COMMON Law jurisdictions, though its juridical basis and scope is a contentious matter. The defence may operate where the claimant is involved in illegal conduct in a joint enterprise with the defendant: Birks (-Davies), English Private Law I, para. 14.225 (“One burglar cannot hope to sue another for failing to take reasonable care in blowing open a safe”). However, the defence may also operate where the involvement in criminal activity is the independent act of the claimant: Clunis v. Camden and Islington Health Authority [1998] QB 978 (where a mental patient, after release from an institution under the charge of the defendant local authority, attacked and killed a person and was convicted of manslaughter; his action against the authority alleging the crime resulted from the defendant’s negligent treatment of his condition failed as it was founded on his crime). There can be little doubt that a thief suffering personal injuries could not claim for loss of (ill-gotten) earnings: consider Burns v. Edman [1970] 2 QB 541 (where a criminal was killed in a traffic accident and the claim of his dependants under the Fatal Accidents Act in respect of their deprivation of support was barred by the defence of ex turpi causa because, as his widow knew, all his income was the proceeds of robbery and other crimes). In this regard, however, it is clear that certain infringements of statutory prohibitions by the claimant will not prevent a claim: cf. National Coal Board v. England [1954] AC 403 (employee’s own breach of safety regulations no bar to action based on employer’s breach of statutory duty on the basis that the claimant’s breach of statutory duty was absorbed within the defence of contributory negligence, the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, s. 4 defining “fault” to include breach of statutory duty). Other case law is not easy to reconcile: contrast the views of Lord Denning in Lane v. Holloway [1968] 1 QB 379 (claimant’s pre-emptive assault of defendant did not bar a claim to compensatory damages from defendant whose own battery in response was

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disproportionate) with Murphy v. Culhane [1977] QB 94 (defence of ex turpi casua available alongside those of (total) contributory negligence and volenti) The principle of the cases, so far as they can be reconciled, has been stated to be whether the claimant must rely on his own illegal conduct: Clunis v. Camden and Islington Health Authority, loc. cit.. Finally, it has been judicially stated that the defence of is not limited to cases where the claimant’s conduct is criminal; it extends to other reprehensible or grossly immoral conduct which is such that it would be improper to grant the claimant a remedy for the damage or injury, though a precedent has yet to be set: Kirkham v. Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB 283, 296 (Farquharson LJ). Illustration 1 is taken from OGH 19 May 1994, ZVR 1995/41 (p. 108); illustration 2 from Ashton v. Turner [1981] 1 QB 137; illustration 3 from TS 22 November 1993, RAJ 1993 no. 8654 p. 11139; illustration 4 from Swedish HD 2 September 2008, NJA 2008, 861; and illustration 5 from Lane v. Holloway [1968] 1 QB 379.

Section 2:

Interests of accountable persons or third parties Article 5:201: Authority conferred by law A person has a defence if legally relevant damage is caused with authority conferred by law.

Comments 1. General. A person who is exercising an authority conferred by law and who remains within the bounds of this authority does not incur non-contractual liability, even where the conduct harms another. The present Article formulates this universally accepted principle as a defence. This is because the person seeking to found on the rule has the burden of proving the factual prerequisites for its application. 2. Applicable to private persons only. The Article relates only to private persons and not to public bodies or other persons, such as police officers, exercising public law authority. That follows from DCFR I. – 1:101 (Intended field of application) paragraph (2) as well as from Article 7:103 (Public law functions and court proceedings). Liabilities arising out of the performance of public law functions are altogether excluded from these model rules. 3. Relation to other defences. The defence provided by the Article is a residual defence, which helps to slot this Chapter neatly into the overall legal system. It refers to the authority which the law grants to the injuring person in a different, separate arena (i. e. outside this Book). While it could indeed be argued that further defences in this Book confer legal authority to harm another, there is still the systematic consideration that these defences are not at issue here or – and this boils down to the same result – take priority over this Article as leges speciales. The defences in Article 5:202 (Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity) are prominent members of this group. Furthermore, the present Article is focussed on, and more heavily justified by, the injuring person’s standpoint rather than the victim’s predicament. 4. Scope. The Article covers a wide range of situations. It covers such disparate cases as the lawful arrest of a criminal by private individuals pending the arrival of the police, damage to the environment based on special statutory or regulatory permission, the authority to report the suspicion of criminal activity to the police, the authority to enter another’s land while hunting, the authority to take water from a river, and even the relatively “harmless” case of rules governing rights of neighbours, whereby proprietors may cut back vegetation protruding on to their land from the adjacent property.

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Illustration A woman harassed by a sex offender follows him in her car. She cuts across his getaway car with her own car in order to stop him and to allow him to be arrested by the police, whom she herself has notified. The woman is not liable for the damage to the getaway car on the basis of intention nor on in her capacity as keeper of the car causing the accident. 5. Authority. “Authority” within the meaning of this Article is held only by those authorised by law to interfere with the rights of others or to inflict damage on them in another manner. Therefore, it is particularly pertinent in the law governing liability for environmental impairment that there is exact examination into whether merely permission to carry out certain operations is concerned, which leaves the rights of third parties unaffected or takes from them only certain specific legal remedies (e. g. the right to demand that the operations be restrained, leaving the right to damages unaffected), or indeed whether the content of the permission is really the right to harm others or the environment without any consequences in terms of liability. It is comparatively rare for this type of permission to be given. 6. Conferred by law. The Article relates only to authority conferred “by law”. Thus, it does not apply to authority which has its basis in a contract or in the agreement of the affected party (in cases of a benevolent intervention attributable to an alleged agreement on the part of the affected person, the categorisation is naturally more difficult, but precisely because of this, these situations are also specifically regulated). Rather the Article is concerned with authority which results directly from the law as such. Conferred “by law” does, of course, not necessarily mean “conferred by statute”. It suffices that a legal norm allows the intervention in the form which occurred. The same applies to authority conferred on a person by an individual decision of a governmental body, which is based on a legal norm. 7. Limits. While the Article provides a defence against all forms of liability (thus, also against liability under Chapter 3, Section 2 (Accountability without intention or negligence)), it does not allow an abuse of rights. It was not necessary to individually express this in the text of the model rule because it is an inherent component of the term “authority conferred by law”: no legal system confers authority to act in abuse of the law.

Notes 1.

842

Ordre de la loi and commandement de l’autorité légale rank among the grounds of defence (faits justificatifs) explicitly regulated under FRENCH criminal law (CP art. 122-4). They are also valid within the context of tort law (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2004/2005), no. 1969); whatever the law decrees or authorises, establishes a cause d’irresponsabilité (Malaurie/Aynès/Stoffel-Munck, Les obligations, no. 120 p. 51). To take an actual decision as an example, where a man sexually harrassed a woman and thereafter, in her endeavours to apprehend him, she succeeded in injuring him, such damage is embraced by this defence (C.proc.pén. art. 73; Cass.civ.

Article 5:201: Authority conferred by law

2.

3.

10 June 1970, D. 1970 jur. 691). However, it should be noted that legal authority does not release one from the obligation to exercise the legal authority conferred with due care when dealing with the legal interests of other persons (le Tourneau and Cadiet loc. cit. no. 1970). The aforegoing analysis also represents the current legal position in BELGIUM (Tilleman and Claeys (-Claeys), Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid, pp. 1, 38-39 nos. 61-63). Similarly, under SPANISH law, there may be a ground of justification for the infliction of damage on another if it is done in furtherance of a subjective right and the relevant legal boundaries are respected (qui suo iure utitur næminem lædit: Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 115; Díez-Picazo, Derecho de daños, 303). The prohibition of abuse of a legal right (CC art. 7; TS 14 February 1944, RAJ 1944 no. 293 p. 160; TS 25 November 1960, RAJ 1960 no. 3766 p. 2431; TS 10 June 1963, RAJ 1963 (2) no. 3596 p. 2298; TS 12 February 1964, RAJ 1964 (1) no. 688 p. 418; TS 5 January 1977, RAJ 1977 (1) no. 6 p. 13; TS 14 February 1986, RAJ 1986 (1) no. 674 p. 651) is an example of the limits on the exercise of this right. For example, an abuse of right can arise where a person brings a suit against another, even though he or she is positively aware that their claim was unfounded (De Ángel Yágüez, Tratado de responsabilidad civil3, 264; Yzquierdo Tolsada loc. cit. 118). In such a case, there is an absence of any iusta causa litigandi and the person bringing the proceedings incurs a liability to compensate (TS 4 April 1932, RAJ 1932-33 (1) no. 991 p. 430; TS 20 April 1933, RAJ 1932-33 (1) no. 1633 p. 668; TS 5 January 1977 loc. cit.; TS 15 December 1992, RAJ 1992 (5) no. 10496 p. 13708; TS 4 December 1996, RAJ 1996 (5) no. 8810 p. 12171; TS 20 May 1998, RAJ 1998 (2) no. 3379 p. 4915). An authority by law to cause damage is found in an array of statutory provisions. Those of particular note in this regard include the Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act (Ley Orgánica 1/1982, of 5 May, de protección civil del derecho al honor, a la intimidad personal y familiar y a la propia imagen) art. 2(2) in conjunction with CC art. 184 (pertaining to the authority to publish a missing person’s photo; see Medrano, El derecho fundamental a la propia imagen, 164); Catalan CC art. 546-14 (which governs immissions legítimes, “permitted emissions”); Copyright Act (Texto Refundido de la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual of 1996) arts. 31(2), 31bis(2) and 32 permission to make photocopies of copyrighted material for private use or for the benefit of disabled persons ; permission to cite for scientific purposes). The legal ground of justification namely conferring authority to commit an offence if it is in pursuance of the exercise of a right, codified in ITALIAN CP art. 51 is also applicable in the following manner within the context of the civil law, namely, that having evaluated all the relevant circumstances, the damage is regarded as having been inflicted secundum ius (Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, sub. art. 2043, p. 192; Cass. 16 October 2001, no. 12617, Danno e resp. 2002, 321). A number of statutes already provide for atto lecito dannoso e. g. in cases of CC arts. 843, 924 and 925. It goes without saying that the legal justification of exercise of a right is of special significance for public authorities (e. g. Cass. 16 May 1996, no. 4561, Danno e resp. 1997, 119), but may also benefit private citizens who act in the public interest (reporting a crime: CFI Naples 11 December 1997, Dir.fam.pers. 2000, 1096; Cass. 13 January 2005, no. 560, Giur.it.Mass. 2005, fasc. 1). Furthermore, it plays a particularly significant role within environmental liability law (Cass.sez.un. 18 November 1992, no. 12316, Giur.it.Mass. 1992, fasc. 11)

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4.

5.

6.

844

and in the context of hunting (Cass. 28 July 2004, no. 14241, Giur.it.Mass. 2004, fasc. 7-8). HUNGARY also recognises the legal ground of justification contained in Article 5:201; it is irrelevant that this defence is not expressly mentioned in the Civil Code. According to Hungarian law damage is unlawful unless permitted by law (cf. Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 49). Damage, which results from an exercise of a right in accordance with the terms of the law is also permissible. This category includes e. g. the exercise of rights of use and exercise of rights vis-à-vis neighbours (Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 53; Ujváriné loc. cit. 58). According to CC § 100 a landowner is obliged to refrain from doing anything which would disturb his neighbours unnecessarily or jeopardise the exercise of their rights (see further BH 2006/184, EBH 2001/408, and BH 1993/161). If a right is not exercised according to law, then it amounts to an abusive exercise of that right (CC §§ 2(2) and 5). Similarly, under SLOVENIAN and under ROMANIAN law, a person will not incur liability, if that person is entitled to encroach on the legal interests of another under a licence from the relevant authority (Cigoj, Teorija obligacij, 179; CSJ 17 July 2001, sect¸ia comerciala˘, decision no. 4718). Similarly, under BULGARIAN law, no liability is generally imposed on a person pursuing a “legally regulated activity”. The justification that the damage was authorised by law may be invoked, for example, by individuals who detain a suspected criminal until the arrival of the authorities and use force to combat resistance (CP art. 12a). The duty to compensate is also countermanded if the cause of the damage is due to honest and legal advertising practices of a competitor (Takoff, Obzor na deliktnoto pravo na Bulgaria, 23). An important departure from the principle of no liability arises under the Agricultual Enterprises’ Protection Act art. 30(1): There is a duty to compensate the landowner for damage to agricultural enterprises caused by air, soil or water pollution, even if the polluter adhered to the relevant legal standards; however, there may be a reduction in the quantum of damages awarded, given that the injuring party acted according to the governing regulations. Similarly, under GERMAN law, there is a whole array of provisions in existence which authorise an individual to encroach in the rights or legal interests of another. Provided that the person thus entitled confines himself or herself to acting with the parameters of the authorisation thus conferred, then according to German law, his conduct is justified and he or she does not have to fear that tort law consequences will ensue. CC § 229 (Self-help), CC §§ 859 and 860 (Self-help by the possessor) as well as CC § 910 (Right of self-help by the owner) serve as illustrations of the foregoing. CP § 193 (Safeguarding legitimate legal interests in the context of torts involving expression or criticism is also of considerable importance for the realm of tort law, see further Erman (-Schiemann), BGB II11, § 823, no. 148). CCrimProc § 127(1) confers a right on every citizen to provisionally arrest a person who is caught in the act or being pursued, even without a judicial order, if there are grounds for suspecting that this person might take flight or if his or her identity cannot be immediately established. A parental right to physically chastise their children is no longer in force (CC § 1631(2)). In contrast, it is not impermissible for a person who acts in good faith during court or other official proceedings to introduce or pursue untrue claims, if he or she does not knowlingly or carelessly do so even if those claims turn out to be unjustified, and this results in prejudice to the other party extending beyond the immediate proceedings (Palandt (-Sprau), BGB66, § 823, no. 37).

Article 5:201: Authority conferred by law

7.

8.

9.

10.

In AUSTRIA, the defence of self-help is understood to mean an exceptional legal (not: contractual) right which is permitted to be exercised in order to secure or bring about a situation that is in line with the law (CC §§ 19, 344 and 422). A prerequisite for the successful invocation of the defence is that assistance from authorities could not be obtained in time and that the parameters of the defence were not exceeded, those same parameter also apply to self-defence. However, self-help can be invoked in respect of interests which are excluded from the scope of self-defence, provided that the concrete act manifests itself as lawful following an assessment of all of the interests involved (OGH 11 July 1989, SZ 62/132 p. 22). Private citizens are permitted to pursue criminals offenders where assistance from the authorites would come too late provided that the frontiers of the defence must not be traversed (OGH 19 September 1996, SZ 69/214 p. 426; OGH 9 October 1991, SZ 64/137 p. 230). Similarly, under GREEK law, where the plaintiff is entitled to redress the harm conduct in doing so amounts to a ground of justification which excludes the imposition of liability (Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio A(1)2, 818; Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 507). A requisite of CC art. 282 is that an actionable entitlement under private law is put at risk and assistance from the authorities in enforcing this entitlement could not be obtained in time (Karakostas, AK, art. 282, no. 1811; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Tabakis), art. 282, no. 7). The measures taken for the purposes of exercising selfhelp must not exceed that permitted to defend oneself against the impending harm (CC art. 283). Special cases where self-help is lawful are regulated in CC arts. 985, 986 (Protection of posssession) and in CC arts. 1008, 1079 (Rights vis-à-vis neighbours; bees in flight); the defence of self-help under criminal law, anchored in CP art. 367 can also be of relevance in a civil law context (Kornilakis loc. cit.). The regular exercise of a right also constitutes a ground of justification in PORTUGAL and operates to exculpate the putative tortfeasor from liability, see Const. art. 271(2) and (3) and CP art. 31(2)(b). Examples found in academic teaching include entry onto land without a licence in pursuance of an entitlement to hunt or where the owner of land located on higher ground extracts water, thereby causing prejudice to the owner of the property located below (Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 552). Regard must also be had to CC art. 335 and the doctrine of abuse of a right (Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 568; STJ 15 May 2003). DUTCH CP art. 42 provides that an act is not punishable under the criminal law, where that act is carried out in furtherance of a statutory obligation or under legal authority. The aforegoing is also a valid ground of justification under the private law (For examples, see Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht III11, no. 63 p. 77, Onrechtmatige daad I (-Jansen), art. 6:162 lid 2 no. 152.1 p. 1661). It may be indeed be difficult to distinguish between the two alternatives contained in an actual case, however the result does not depend on a clear cut distinction being made. For example, statutory provisions pertaining to getting into the correct traffic lane are regarding as constituting a duty as well as conferring statutory authority (HR 8 November 1957, NedJur 1958, no. 1 p. 5). A person who abides by an administrative order (ambtelijk bevel) acts in futherance of a statutory obligation (Jansen loc. cit. no. 152.2 p. 1662). A prerequisite for the successful assertion of the claim that one acted under a statutory duty or administrative order depends naturally on the validity of the relevant statute invoked to underpin that claim (HR 22 March 1946, NedJur 1946, no. 206 p. 289-292; HR 20 April 1990, NedJur 1991,

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Chapter 5: Defences

11. 12.

13.

no. 53 p. 214); in addition, the act carried out, in its exact manifestation, must fall within the scope of the statute. ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(2) corresponds with Article 5:201. The causation of damage is not unlawful if the authority to cause such damage arises from law. In the NORDIC countries it has been been held that a “legal” exercise of a right can a fortiori not be deemed wrongful (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 50). The classical defences are consent (and acting at own risk), self-defence, state of emergency (Notstand), and official duty. There may be, however, further defences (see e. g. Swedish HD 20 October 1915, NJA 1915, 511 [no liability of a man violently removing a person disturbing a church service]; HD 21 December 1960, NJA 1960, 670 [no liability of a concert pianist practicing in his apartment, disturbing other tenants]; HD 1 March 1990, NJA 1990, 71 [no liability because the defendant had a right to trim the hedge]). A particular explicit authority conferred by Swedish Consitution chap. 2 § 18(3) and Finnish CP chap. 28 § 14 is the right to enjoy nature, to a certain extent even on another private person’s property (see Swedish HD 27 September 1996, NJA 1996, 495). No authority conferred by law allows for chicanery; chicanery is a tort in itself (see e. g. Finnish Neighbour RelationsAct [Lag angående vissa grannelagsförhållande of 13 February 1920] § 13; Hakulinen, Obligationsrätt, 259; Karlgren, Skadeståndsrätt5, 86; Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 71, 128; Kleineman, Ren förmögenhetsskada, 245; Ussing, Erstatningsret, 62). In ENGLAND the Criminal Law Act 1967, s. 3(1) constitutes an instance of statutory authority for a citizen to do what would otherwise be a tort. It provides that “[a] person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.” Depending on the circumstances the defence in this instance overlaps with those of self-defence and necessity, although the latter defences are not confined (as this provision is) to protection of harm from criminal acts. Another instance of lawful authority is provided by an access order granted by a court under the Access to Neighbouring Land Act 1992 to enable the owner of one property to effect repairs by entry onto neighbouring property when the conditions set out in that Act are satisfied. Common law rights to self-help may also provide authority in the sense of this Article, such as the right to abate a nuisance by acts carried out on the victim’s own property (see, for example, Lemmon v. Webb [1895] AC 1 (trimming of branches overhanging into defendant’s property) or even on the wrongdoer’s property, provided, in particular, that this can be effected peacefully (i. e. entry is not resisted) and if an application were made to court it would not refuse a mandatory injunction: see Clerk and Lindsell (-Burrows), Torts19, 31-25.

The illustration is taken from Cass.civ. 10 June 1970, D. 1970 jur. 691.

846

Article 5:202: Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity

Article 5:202: Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity (1) A person has a defence if that person causes legally relevant damage in reasonable protection of a right or of an interest worthy of legal protection of that person or a third person if the person suffering the legally relevant damage is accountable for endangering the right or interest protected. For the purposes of this paragraph Article 3:103 (Persons under eighteen) is to be disregarded. (2) The same applies to legally relevant damage caused by a benevolent intervener to a principal without breach of the intervener’s duties. (3) Where a person causes legally relevant damage to the patrimony of another in a situation of imminent danger to life, body, health or liberty in order to save the person causing the damage or a third person from that danger and the danger could not be eliminated without causing the damage, the person causing the damage is not liable to make reparation beyond providing reasonable recompense.

Comments A.

Three grounds of defence

1. Overview. This Article gives effect to two “classic” grounds of defence, namely self-defence (paragraph (1)) and necessity (paragraph (3)), and, in paragraph (2), to the ground of defence based on justified benevolent intervention in another’s affairs. The second sentence of paragraph (1) contains a clarification in regard to self-defence against children. Paragraphs (1) and (2) lead to a complete defence. Paragraph (3) has as its main consequence a reduction of liability to what is under the circumstances a reasonable recompense.

B.

Self-defence (paragraph (1))

2. Protecting personal rights and interests and those of another. The law must not yield to injustice. Therefore, every Member State’s legal system recognises the right to selfdefence. Precisely speaking, it is broken up into two characteristics: self-defence in the strict sense and the defence of others, namely protecting the rights and interests of another against danger from a third party. In contrast, self-defence against self-defence is not possible: such a protective measure would not be reasonable (as is required by paragraph (1) of the Article). Illustration 1 A is attacked by B with a blunt object. A defends herself by attempting to destroy the weapon. B in turn defends his property. The latter is without good reason and may therefore be overcome by A by force, as long as B’s attack continues. 3. Endangerment. The defence of self-defence requires, first, the actual endangerment of a right or legally protected interest (see Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant 847

Chapter 5: Defences

damage)). An endangerment can lie in a person, a thing or an animal. Paragraph (1) is not limited to attacks by people. Illustration 2 A is attacked by a dog whose keeper and owner is B. A is only able to defend himself by striking the dog with a slat which he tears from a wooden fence belonging to C. In relation to B, A acts in self-defence; the situation would only be different if B was the owner, but not the keeper of the dog (in which case paragraph (3) would apply in relation to B). In relation to C, it is paragraph (3) which applies. A is not liable to C under the general rules on non-contractual liability in this Book, but he is liable nonetheless to make reasonable compensation. On the other hand, C cannot defend himself against the intervention by A in accordance with paragraph (1). That is because A is not responsible under this Book for the property damage, nor would he be responsible for it if C had tried but failed to hinder it by force. B in turn is unequivocally liable for the damage to the fence under Article 3:203 (Accountability for damage caused by animals) in conjunction with Article 4:101 (General rule [on causation]); a break in the chain of causation by A’s conduct is to be denied. 4. Reasonable protection. A person who relies on this defence must also demonstrate, and if necessary prove, that the acts were done with defensive intent. Moreover the person must have opted for a means of defence that was reasonable under the circumstances. That will be so only where the means chosen were apt and necessary to fulfil the intended aim. Furthermore, the act of self-defence must not have been out of all proportion to the interest under threat – even if there was no other possibility of defence. Illustration 3: The owner of a cherry tree may not shoot at children who are stealing cherries and refuse to budge despite the owner’s protests – even if the owner is confined to a wheelchair and has no other means to defend the property. 5. Self-defence against children. The second sentence of paragraph (1) clarifies that self-defence may as a matter of principle be exercised against children (provided that the act of self-defence is reasonable). A corresponding rule in relation to the mentally disabled is not necessary because, in principle, mental incapacity in the context of a ground for liability is not afforded any consideration. It only comes into focus as an independent defence (see Article 5:301 (Mental incompetence)); self-defence is therefore also possible against attacks from mentally disabled or intoxicated perpetrators. 6. Putative self-defence and excessive self-defence. Paragraph (1) does not come into operation where a person misreads the situation and wrongly believes there is an attack (so-called putative self-defence), nor where there is indeed an attack but the person resorts to an unreasonable method of defence (so-called excessive self-defence). In both situations, the issue of liability is decided solely under Article 3:102 (Negligence). Where the mistake was avoidable, negligence is present; where it was unavoidable, liability is absent.

848

Article 5:202: Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity

Illustration 4 A strikes B, who has acted threateningly towards him and claims to have a weapon in his bag with A in mind. Since B is in truth not carrying any weapon in his bag, A is not acting in self-defence; however, he is not liable because he did not negligently infer an instance requiring self-defence. Illustration 5 An employee of a security firm is attacked by an intruder, who threatens to kill him. A fight ensues, during the course of which the security guard shoots at the intruder and in an ironic turn of events ends up actually killing him. Under the circumstances, a non-fatal shot to the leg would have sufficed to defend himself. The widow has no claim where the security guard cannot be blamed for being negligent for over-reacting in a life-threatening situation.

C.

Benevolent intervention in another’s affairs (paragraph (2))

7. Benevolent intervention as a defence within the framework of the law on non-contractual liability. Interfering in the affairs of another under the prerequisites of PEL Ben.Int. Art. 1:101 (Intervention to benefit another) and PEL Ben.Int. Art. 1:102 (Intervention to perform another’s duty) is quite allowed and indeed desired. Where the principal is harmed thereby, the intervener is equipped with a defence in the context of the rules in this Book, see the Comments under PEL Ben.Int. Art. 1:101 (Intervention to benefit another) and illustration 3 there. Expressing that is the aim of paragraph (2) of the present Article. 8. Without breach of the intervener’s duties. However, benevolent intervention is only a ground of defence if the intervention is carried out with all care due in the circumstances. Where the intervener breaches a duty of care vis à vis the principal’s rights and interests, the intervener remains liable under the conditions set out in PEL Ben.Int. Art. 2:103 (Reparation for damage caused by breach of duty).

D.

Necessity (paragraph (3))

9. Situations covered. Paragraph (3) closes a gap in the law governing self-defence. It deals with situations in which a defence against a direct threat to life, body or freedom is possible only by making use of another person’s property. Given the serious discrepancy between the legally protected interests in play here, the owner of the property must endure this interference and cannot block the original self-defensive action by in turn defending the property against it. A person who uses the property of another in legitimate self-defence does not commit a legal wrong. However, in so far as the owner is not responsible for the danger arising and can regard it as “none of his business”, the owner has a right to reasonable recompense. Thus, paragraph (3) follows the maxim “endure, then claim”. This “imperative endurance” is a part of the law on non-contractual liability for damage, the granting of a right to reasonable recompense is strictu sensu not. In actual

849

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fact, of course both parts of the rule are inextricably entangled; they are dependent on each other. 10. Precedence of the interest defended over the legally protected interest. Paragraph (3) covers only situations where there is a clear legal discrepancy between the values of the conflicting interests. This is a question not of economic comparison, but of weighing-up moral values. The rule assumes that in those situations property rights, possessions and money cede to life, body and freedom. For conflict situations within both groups, a general defence cannot be formulated. Such situations have to be solved by reference to the general rules on liability for intention or negligence. In some cases recourse to Article 6:202 (Reduction of liability) may be possible. Illustration 6 The victim of a kidnapping is locked inside a stolen car or is detained in the rooms of a bank by the kidnappers, with a view to extracting a ransom. The kidnapped person may damage the car or the windows in the bank in order to flee. The same applies where a third party rescues the victim. Illustration 7 Lady A is out and about in an expensive designer dress; Lady B is wearing jeans and a T-shirt. The difference in value of the clothes does not give Lady A the right to wrench Lady B’s umbrella from her, after it has suddenly begun to rain. 11. Imminent danger. The special authority to interfere with the property of another arises only in cases of imminent danger to the life, body or freedom of the person in danger. Only dangers for which one cannot reasonably prepare and with which one cannot reckon are meant here. If it were otherwise, it would be possible to tackle the dangers without inflicting the damage. Illustration 8 Where homeless people have not arranged a place to stay for the cold winter months in a timely fashion, paragraph (3) does not give them the right to break into houses, even where they are empty. 12. Liability. Under the law on non-contractual liability for damage, liability falls naturally on the negligent or intentional causer of the dangerous situation or the person who must account for the source of danger according to objective criteria. However, there will not always be such a person principally responsible (e. g. if the dangerous situation is attributable to natural events) and even where there is, the question remains as to who should bear the risk that that person will be unable to pay the damages or will be unidentifiable. Paragraph (3) decides this issue in favour of the owner and to the detriment of the person who resorted to self-defence: the latter must bear the risk of not being able to recover damages from the principally responsible person, because the person resorting to self-defence, and not the owner, was the pro-active party. 13. Reasonable compensation. Equally, there often remains the delicate task of coming up with a solution to compensate for the damage which adequately serves the interests of 850

Article 5:202: Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity

the two parties. On the one hand, paragraph (3) provides for strict liability of a person acting in an emergency situation requiring self-defence, but then limits this liability, depending on its extent, to a reasonable compensation. The rule gives a certain amount of discretion to the court as regards the evaluation. It is not necessary to compensate the full damage; in fact a balance of values is more appropriate. The amount payable turns upon the time and market value of the damaged thing; in contrast, general damages are not recoverable, i. e. compensation for lost profit and losses of a non-pecuniary nature.

Notes I.

Self-defence

1.

The specifics of légitime défense are regulated in FRENCH CP arts. 122-5 and 122-6; these provisions, with appropriate adaptations being undertaken, also apply in the sphere of private law (Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité2, no. 563 p. 503). Self defence can only be legitimately exercised if there was aggression directed towards the involved party which rendered it necessary to act with immediate effect. A prerequiste for the success of the defence is the existence of a real danger to the person himself, or another person or to their legally protected goods. Self- defence is only permitted to obvert an unlawful attack and a further precondition is that the act of self-defence must be proportionate in the circumstances (Viney and Jourdain loc. cit. nos. 563-1 – 564-1 pp. 503-506). The successful invocation of légitime défense also precludes liability even where an objective liability, which arises independent of fault is present on the side of the actor (Cass.civ. 22 April 1992, Bull.civ. 1992, II, no. 127 p. 62). The foregoing analysis corresponds to the legal position in BELGIUM. However, in this jurisdiction, it is stressed that lawful self-defence can only constitute a fait justificatif, if the reaction which caused injury was not disproportional in the circumstances, namely the question which is asked is whether un homme normalement prudent et raisonnable would have reacted in the same manner in the circumstances of the case (Cornelis, Responsabilité extra-contractuelle, no. 20 p. 34). Although the SPANISH Código Civil expressly mentions neither self-defence (legítima defensa) nor the defence of necessity (estado de necesidad), there is universal agreement that self-defence constitutes a ground of justification operating to preclude the imposition of liability (de Ángel Yágüez, Tratado de responsabilidad civil3, 284; Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 113; Díez-Picazo and Gullón, Sistema II9, 554; Santos Briz, La responsabilidad civil I7, 36). It is expressly envisaged for civil liability which has its roots in the commission of a criminal offence únder CP art. 118 in conjunction with art. 20(4). The following prerequisites are listed therein, namely, (i) an unlawful attack (ii) necessary act of self-defence using proportionate force and (iii) an lack of serious provocation on the part of the person exercising self-defence. An acquittal under the criminal law does not bind the civil law courts; if, the civil courts determine that the person who exercised self-defence was negligent, then the courts are permitted to require him or her to pay damages even after the wrongdoer has been acquitted under the criminal law (TS 28 June 1996, RAJ 1996 [3] no. 4905 p. 6421; however, in casu liability was refuted).

2.

851

Chapter 5: Defences

3.

4.

5.

852

ITALIAN CC art. 2044 provides that a person is not liable, “for causing damage in selfdefence or in defence of others”. CC art. 2044 is augmented by CP art. 52. According to

this provision, a person will not be punished for conduct, which was necessited in order to defend his own rights or the rights of another against an imminent danger of an unlawful attack, provided that means of self-defence employed was proportionate to the attack, see further Alpa and Mariconda (-Marvasi), Codice civile commentato IV, art. 2044, II, no. 6; Cass. 24 February 2000, no. 2091, Danno e resp. 2000, 877). This provision was modified by Legge 13 February 2006, no. 59 modifica all’articolo 52 del codice penale in materia di diritto all’autotutela in un privato domicilio (Gazz.Uff. 2 March 2006 no. 51) which added two further articles to CP art. 52, providing that in certain defined constellations, the proportionality of the act of self-defence is presumed. Legittima difesa excludes the ingiustizia of the damage (Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, sub. art. 2044, p. 289). It is also possible to exercise self-defence against a person not endowed with legal capacity as well as in respect of things and animals, for which the other party is strictly liable. It is said that the reaction of the person attacked must be necessitated, unavoidable and proportional (Franzoni loc. cit. 291; Marvasi loc. cit. sub art. 2044, III, nos. 1617). If the person attacked intentionally created the risk, then, that person cannot invoke a legittima difesa. In cases of putative self-defence, the person attacked may not be regarded as having committed a fault. In such cases, according to prevailing legal opinion, the damage is apportioned along equitable lines between the parties concerned, either, by applying CC art. 1227(1) with appropriate adaptations (provision on contributory negligence, see Franzoni loc. cit. 294) or CC art. 2045 (provision on necessity, see Cass. 6 April 1995, no. 4029, Giur. civ. comm. 1995, I, 1137 and Cass. 12 August 1991, no. 8772, Giur.it. 1992, I, 1, 734). According to HUNGARIAN CC § 343 damage, which is caused to an aggressor in order to avert an unlawful attack or threat suggesting that an imminent unlawful attack would be carried out, need not be compensated, provided that the person acting in self-defence did not adopt excessive measures to stave off the attack. Self-defence operates to negate the unlawfulness of the damage inflicted (Petrik (-Harmathy), Polgári jog II2, 580 f; Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 50 f). Excessive self-defence or putative self-defence remains unlawful (Marton, A polgári jogi felelo˝sség, 138); its presence or absence is judged according to CC § 339(1) (BH 2001/574). Whereas exceeding the parameters of self- defence need not result in liability under criminal law, the imposition of liability under civil law in such circumstances lies in the discretion of the court (Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 38; Gellért (-Kemenes), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1238; BH 1980/128). However, the contributory negligence of the injured party usually leads to a reduction in liability in cases of this type (Marton loc. cit.). It is also permitted to exercise self-defence vis-à-vis individuals who are deemed not to be responsible for their actions under the civil law. If a person exerting self-defence injures somebody other than the aggressor, it is not quite clear whether the former only has a claim against the aggressor or whether, by applying CC § 107 (Necessity) with appropriate adaptations, he or she can also claim against the person who exercised self-defence (see further Petrik loc. cit. 39). The conceptual understanding of self-defence under BULGARIAN LOA art. 46(1) is that it connotes a ground of justification, thereby precluding the imposition of liability. A precondition for the valid invocation of this defence is that the actor does not exceed the measures deemed sufficient to repel the attack (Plenum of the Supreme Court,

Article 5:202: Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity

6.

7.

ordinance no. 12 of 29 November 1973, case no. 11/1973 in criminal matters). In the event that the self-defence exerted is excessive, then even where the actor was influenced by fear or fright and is, therefore, immune from criminal liability, civil liability will be incurred (Supreme Court loc. cit.). POLISH CC art. 423 provides: “Whoever acts in necessary defence by repelling a direct and unlawful attempt against any interest of his own or another person shall not be liable for the damage caused to the assailant”. The foregoing also corresponds to ROMANIAN CP art. 44(2), which is also relevant in the civil law context. Excessive self-defence does not serve as a ground of justification, but it can operate to release the actor from liability on the grounds that the actor was not guilty of negligence (Adam, Drept civil, 285). According to SLOVENIAN LOA § 138(1), a person who acts in self-defence, is not liable for damage caused to the agressor, unless the limits of the defence were negligently exceeded. The elements of this defence are derived from CP art. 11(2) which is also pertinent in the civil law context. There must be an unlawful and imminent attack; in addition, the means taken to avert the attack must be proportionate to the attack itself (Juhart and Plavs˘ak (-Pensa), Obligacijski zakonik I, art. 138 p. 809). A person who uses bodily force in response to a verbal attack does not act in self-defence (VS RS II Ips 718/94). Similarly, under GERMAN CC § 227(1), an act prompted by the need to defend oneself is not unlawful. Self-defence denotes a defence which is required to ward off an unlawful imminent attack oneself or another (CC § 227(2); see further CP § 32). It is said that the law is not required to yield to an unlawful action (Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB66, § 227, no. 1). The notion of “attack” connotes solely an attack coming from a person (not: that emanating from an animal or thing) where there is an imminent threat of attack to a legally protected interest; it does not depend to any extent on the fault of the aggressor. The attack must be unlawful and imminient: this requirement is not fulfilled if the act is completed The act of self-defence must be accompanied by a subjective element, namely the requisite intent to defend oneself. The actor is required to employ the least dangerous means or the means calculated to cause the less damage when warding off the attack; however, the law does not require that the person exercising self defence risks that the act of self defence would prove ineffectual to repel the attack (BGH 23 September 1975, NJW 1976, 41, 42; BGH 5 October 1990, NJW 1991, 503, 504). The prohibition on abusing one’s rights which derives from CC § 242 may entail that an act of self defence cannot be exercised against children or those suffering from a mental disability or that the act of self defence must be employed in a suitably restrictive manner. If there is a glaring disparity between the defence of the legal interest and the damaged legal interest, then in a similar fashion, an abuse of right may be given (BGH 23 September 1975 loc. cit.). There is no right to self-defence, if the person attacked provoked the situation where he or she found himself or herself having to act in selfdefence (BGH 7 June 1983, NJW 1983, 2267; see also BGH 14 June 1972, NJW 1972, 1821, 1822; BGH 15 May 1975, NJW 1975, 1423, 1424). Cases of excessive self-defence and putative self-defence hinge upon whether the actor was negligent (BGH 23 September 1975 loc. cit.). According to AUSTRIAN CC § 19, an act is not unlawful, if the offender acted in selfdefence. According to CP § 3 self-defence is given, if what is done is necessary to repel a real attack or an imminently threatened unlawful attack on one’s life, health, bodily intergrity, liberty or property or that or another. This definition is also applicable in the private law context (OGH 29 June 1989, JBl 1990, 104). An act of putative self-defence

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8.

9.

10.

854

only eliminates the obligation to compensate if the injured party conduted himself in such a manner which engendered on the part of the person exercising self-defence a belief that he or she was about to be attacked and therefore reacted accordingly. Negligently misjudging the situation has no impact on the existence of liability (OGH 19 January 1972, EvBl 1972/219, 433). The same rules apply when excessive self-defence is exercise (OGH 17 September 1964, SZ 37/121 p. 348). Similarly, under GREEK CC art. 284, an act of self-defence negates unlawfulness; the concept of self-defence is identical under the criminal and civil law (Karakostas, AK, art. 284, no. 1823; ErmAK (-Gafos), art. 284, no. 3; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Tabakis), art. 284, no. 1). The same notion as that existing under German law is employed. In Greece, the successful invocation of self defence also hinges on the existence of an attack which originates from a person; a threat of attack by an animal will not connote an attack for the purposes of this provision (Karakostas loc. cit. no. 1827; Tabakis loc. cit. no. 7). The prohibition on abuse of rights (CC art. 281) is also relevant for self-defence. For example, a person can be guilty of an abuse of rights where a trenchant act of selfdefence is employed to stave off an attack to property of minor value, and this attack emanates from a minor or from a person who is deemed not to be responsible for his or her actions under tort law (Karakostas loc. cit. no. 1834). According to PORTUGUESE CC art. 337(1), an act of self-defence which is employed to avert a present (see further STJ 6 January 1993, BolMinJus 423 (1993) 342) and unlawful attack serves as a ground of justification, if it was not possible to parry the attack by utilising “normal means” and further, if “the loss occasioned by the act of selfdefence is not manifestly higher than that which would have been caused by the attack”. According to CC art. 337(2), excessive self-defence which resuls from “confusion or fear on the part of the actor which was not negligent in the circumstances” is also justified. The ground of justification of excessive self-defence is not given, where a person, in response to verbal provocation, used an axe to hit the offender on the head (STJ 4 January 2006; see, also, 2 July 2003). Conversely, self-defence has been successfuly invoked in a case, where a man, in order to defend his right of way, threatened to physicaly harm the person who was about to set out to destroy the right of way (CA Porto 14 June 2006). There is no requirement that the aggressor be at fault (Pessoa Jorge, Ensaio sobre os pressupostos da responsabilidade civil, 234). If putative self-defence is employed, then the person employing such force, comes under a duty to compensate, “if the mistake cannot be excused”, CC art. 338. For example, a person is excused, if that person knocks down a putative attacker because the latter ostensibly threatened him with a weapon concealed under his coat (STJ 1 February 1996). The President of a Public Limited Company does not act in self-defence, if, in response to third party statements endangering the company’s credit, he made defamatory statements in public concerning that other party. It follows from the principle of proportionality that the right of reply and the defence of honour do not justify a new act of defamation (STJ 14 October 2003). DUTCH CP art. 41(1) precludes the imposition of criminal liability where an act is exercised in noodweer. According to this provision, self-defence has five prerequisites in order for it to be legimately invoked: there must be (i) a present and (ii) unlawful attack. The attack must be directed (iii) at the body or property of the person attacked or those of a third party. The act of self defence must have been (iv) necessary and (v) apt and proportionate to avert the attack (Onrechtmatige Daad I (-Jansen), art. 6:162(2),

Article 5:202: Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity

11.

12.

13.

no. 167 p. 1737; HR 10 December 1999, NedJur 2000, no. 9 p. 82; Asser (-Hartkamp) Verbintenissenrecht III11, no. 62 p. 76). A person remains liable if the self defence exercised is excessive, namely, the parameters of a legimate act of self-defence were culpably exceeded, cf. CP art. 41(2). Thus, liability may not be incurred, because the contrbutory negligence of the attacker clearly outweighes the culpability of the person acting in self-defence (CC art. 6:101; Jansen loc. cit. no. 170 p. 1780). ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(2) states tersely, an act exercised in self-defence is not unlawful. LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.269(1) is to the same effect. CC art. 6.269(2) adds that “the aggrieved person can claim from the person against whose unlawful actions defence was used, i. e. from the assailant, to compensate for the damage occurred”. In the NORDIC countries self-defence in private law is governed by the same rules as in criminal law (SWEDISH CP chap. 24 § 1; DANISH CP § 13 and FINNISH CP chap. 4 § 4). Where criminal liability is excluded civil liability is also excluded. However, in cases of excessive self-defence and putative self-defence, the actor remains liable (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 120). An attack, emanating from an animal or property are not embraced by this defence but are governed by the laws on necessity, which can require that stricter preconditions are met than in the context of self-defence (see HD 14 October 1988, NJA 1988, 495: goat keeper held liable for shooting a valuable hunting dog which attacked some goats; see also Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 38). If a third party is injured or suffers a loss from the action of self-defence, liability is attributed to the original attacker (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 120; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 49; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 172; HD 13 December 1947, NJA 1947, 626 [a group of persons assaulting a person, who in self-defence fired a shot hitting a by-passer, was found solidarily liable for the by-passer’s personal injuries). In SCOTLAND under the Animals (Scotland) Act 1987, s. 4(1)(a), a person who kills or injures an animal has a defence if he proves he acted in self-defence or to protect another person. Additionally, a person who proves he killed or injured the animal in acting for the protection of livestock has a defence if he is (a) a keeper of the livestock, (b) the owner or occupier of the land where the livestock is present, or (c) authorised by a keeper or by the owner or occupier of the land to act for its protection: s. 4(1)(a)(iii), (3). Each of these defences requires that the animal attack or be about to attack the person causing the damage or the person or livestock being protected (or have attacked a person or livestock and remained in the vicinity) and that there were reasonable grounds for believing there was no other practicable means of ending or preventing the attack (or a further attack): s. 4(4). Each is subject to the proviso that the killing or injury is reported to the police within 48 hours (s. 4(1)(b)) and is excluded if the damage is caused in furtherance of criminal activity or at or near a place where that person was present for that purpose (s. 4(2)). A very similar defence is provided had already been enacted for ENGLAND in the Animals Act 1971, s. 9, but confined to protection of livestock. This is a limited statutory enactment of the defence of selfdefence – the keeper of a dog being strictly liable under s. 3 if it kills or injures livestock – which also subsisted at common law: Cresswell v. Sirl [1948] 1 KB 241 (defendant shooting dog to prevent it worrying ewes in lamb). Thus it is recognised that a defendant may act reasonably in defence of his person or property or that of third parties, provided no more than reasonable force is used; the reasonableness of the force is judged objectively, but on the basis of the defendant’s genuine belief as to the circumstances

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and having regard to the difficulties of judgement in the anguish of the critical moment: Cross v. Kirkby (2000) Times, 5th April (CA). II.

Benevolent intervention

14.

On the issue of liability arising from a lawful but carelessly performed act of benevolent intervention, see the notes under DCFR VII. – 2:103 (Consenting or performing freely). A benevolent intervention in another’s affairs which was lawfully undertaken and carefully carried out, does not lead to liability in any legal system which recognise this legal institute, not even if the intervention results in bodily injury, property damage, or loss of rights to the principal’s detriment. This result is either rationalised on the basis that there is a lack faute or fault or on the basis that the fact that the benevolent intervention was justified constitutes a defence. Cf. e. g. for SPAIN CA Jaén 2 July 1999, AC 1999 (3) no. 1950 p. 452 and CA Alicante 7 March 2005, BDA JUR 2005/132762; for ITALY Cian and Trabucchi, Commentario breve6, sub art. 2028, no. 4; for HUNGARY CC § 485(1) (from whence, it can be inferred that a person who appropriately intervenes in another’s affairs without authority does not act in a culpable manner according to § 339); for GERMANY Medicus, Schuldrecht II13, no. 760; Palandt (-Sprau), BGB66, Pref. to § 677, nos. 5, 11; Larenz and Canaris, Schuldrecht II(1)13, § 57Ib and Staudinger (-Bergmann), BGB, Pref. to §§ 677 ff, no. 243; of a different view MünchKomm (-Seiler), BGB4, Pref. to § 677, no. 16); for PORTUGAL CC art. 340(3) (legal fiction that consent has been obtained to a lawful benevolent intervention in another’s affairs, see Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 85 [1959] 13, 108109 and Menezes Leitão, Responsabilidade do gestor, 248); for GREECE Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 506; Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio, Geniko meros, 604 (ground of justification); for the NETHERLANDS Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 617 and Onrechtmatige Daad I (-Jansen), art. 6:162(2), no. 233 p. 6100 and for ROMANIA Adam, Drept civil, 182 as well as Dogaru and Dra˘ghici, Drept civil, 358. At any rate, in AUSTRIA, intervening in another’s affairs in order to avert an emergency (CC § 1036) constitutes a ground of justification (CC §§ 1311 and 1312; Koziol/ Bydlinski/Bollenberger (-Koziol), ABGB2, § 1036 no. 7). That the same ought to hold true for the mere “benevolent” intervention in another’s affairs (CC § 1037), has been refuted by recent legal commentary (Koziol loc. cit. § 1037 no. 1; Meissel, GoA, 119, 135). In any event, this issue is not ascribed with any considerable practical importance as, in the latter case, for liability to be incurred, there would have to be fault. Liability of the intervener under ESTONIAN LOA § 1022(1) and (2) is also dependent on the existence of fault. In BULGARIA, it appears that the submission that a lawfully exercised benevolent intervention in another affair’s can operate to exculpate from liability has not been discussed. Within the NORDIC countries in DENMARK negotiorum gestio is explicitly referred to as a separate defence, whereby the intervener has a defence if the principal is harmed (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 41; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 51). However, the issue of the intervener causing damage to the principal or another has also been dealt with in SWEDEN (Håstad, Tjänster utan uppdrag, 139) and FINLAND (Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 173). See in more detail PEL /von Bar, Ben.Int., Introduction I53-57.

15.

16.

17.

856

Article 5:202: Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity

18.

In ENGLAND, where the Roman concept of negotiorum gestio was never received into the law and the closest comparable institution for benevolent intervention in another’s affairs takes the form of “agency of necessity”, it is the defence of necessity which has been invoked, for example, as a defence to battery where medical treatment is carried out for the benefit of a person who is unable to give an effective consent. Provided that what is carried out is in the patient’s best interests, the defence is made out at common law (Re F (Mental patient: sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1) and now (unless there are advance decisions to refuse treatment) by statute (Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 5 [with an express saving for tortious liability for loss or damage resulting from negligence in carrying out the treatment]).

III.

Necessity

19.

Under FRENCH CP art. 122-7 “a person is not criminally liable if, confronted with a present or imminent danger to himself, another person or property, he performs an act necessary to ensure the safety of the person or property, except where the means used are disproportionate to the seriousness of the threat.” A person is in an état de nécessité, a condition which serves to justify the commission of a damaging act, if they are threatened by a danger of the kind mentioned above and employ proportionate measures to counteract it. The interest violated must always lie below the preserved interest in the hierarchy of competing values; for example, it is permitted to sacrifice the property of another, however not his life, in order to rescue one’s own property. A person whose property is damaged in an act done under necessity has a claim under enrichissement sans cause for recompense against the person who either saved himself or was rescued by another (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2004/2005), nos. 1973-1976). The prevailing legal position in BELGIUM is similar. It is said, that a justficatory état de nécessité would particularly lie, if the actor or a third party found himself in a situation of danger, which is so concrete that it compels the actor to react in a specific manner. The endangered interest and the violated interest must, at a minimum, be of equal value. In addition, the defence is not available to an actor who himself brought about circumstances, whereupon it was then incumbent upon him to exercise the defence of necessity (Tilleman and Claeys (-Claeys), Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid, 1, 34-37, nos. 55-59). In SPAIN, necessity negates criminal liability; however, it does not operate to cancel out the civil liability which is triggered by the commission of the criminal offence (CP arts. 118(3) and 20(5)). This affects the person who benefited from its exercise (even where the conduct done under necessity was unsuccessful) and also affects a person who did not personally exercise the defence. The relative values of the protected interest and the damaged interest serves as a basis for the assessment of damage; if, this approach is not feasible, then the judge is conferred with an equitable discretion. Necessity, under these CP provisions is established if (i) the damage inflicted is not greater than that which was threatened; (ii) the circumstances giving rise to necessity were not deliberately instigated by the actor; and (iii) it was not incumbent upon the person benefiting to sacrifice himself owing to their occupation or an office held. The same critieria apply in the context of civil liability (Díez-Picazo and Gullón, Sistema II9, 554). In contemporary legal theory, the submission has been made that CP art. 118(3) concerns a recompense for lawfully inflicted damage, in other words, that it is not connected with

20.

857

Chapter 5: Defences

21.

22.

858

genuine tort liability. The proposition tendered is that the law should solely seek to preclude that the person who benefits from the defence should be unjustly enriched (Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 115; de Ángel Yágüez, Tratado de responsabilidad civil3, 285; Díez-Picazo and Gullón loc. cit.). The law pertaining to benevolent intervention in another’s affairs is also of relevance in determining the basis of the duty of the person benefitting to make reparation (CC art. 1893(2)) (Paz-Ares/ Díez-Picazo/Bercovitz/Salvador (-Pantaleón), Código Civil II2, art. 1902 p. 1986; for a discordant view e. g. Busto Lago, La antijuridicidad del daño, 412). CATALAN CC art. 546-12 ushers in the following clarification for the scope of application of the defence of necessity, namely, that the owner of assets which are utilised in a situation of danger, must tolerate such interference. However, the former can demand appropriate compensation to offset the damage caused. ITALIAN CC art. 2045 provides: “If a person causes damage and that act was compelled by a situation of necessity, in order to save himself or another from an immediate danger of sustaining grave personal injury and this danger was not deliberately created by the person exercising the defence of necessity nor was it possible to employ other means to avert the danger, then the injured party is entitled to compensation, the extent of which is determined equitably by the court”. CC art. 2045 corresponds, for the most part, at least in so far as the prerequisites of the defence of necessity are concerned, with CP art. 54(1). That a threat of “grave personal injury” must be extant is always a precondition. Relying on Const. art. 2, this concept has been interpreted to connote not only a person’s bodily intergrity but also extends to incorporeal personality rights (Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, sub art. 2045, p. 296). The interim period which lies between the perception of the danger and reacting to it as well as between the reaction and damage caused, must, each time, bear a proportionate relation (Franzoni loc. cit. 303-305; Cass. 21 December 2004, no. 23696, Giur.it.Mass. 2005, fasc. 1). The obligation to compensate is anchored in the fact that the actor was conscious of, and deliberately resolute in his actions (Cass. 3 April 1980, no. 2206, Arch.Giur.circolaz 1980, 743). A discretion is conferred on the courts regarding the determination of the quantum of compensation. It can fix a duty to compensate on either the actor or the person profiting from the exercise of the defence (Franzoni loc. cit. 314). HUNGARIAN CC § 107 imposes a duty on the owner of property to tolerate interference with their property, if the life or bodily integrity or property of another is in immediate danger and that danger cannot be averted in any other manner. However, if, merely, the property of another is endangered, then the owner is only obliged to tolerate interference with his or her property, if the foreseeable damage accruing to the other party would considerably outweigh the damage likely to be caused to the former by the exercise of the defence of necessity. However, the owner can demand compensation from the endangered person; the owner can assert a claim for reparation against the person who causes an unjustifiably large amount of damage in order to dispel the emergency in respect the additional damage. If more than one person is affected by the state of emergency, then they incur liability in proportion to the extent of their involvement. To date, the defence is contained within the confines of property law, but the draft for a new CC also refers to the situation of emergency as a matter which negates unlawfulness (http://www.parlament.hu/irom38/05949/05949.pdf). In ROMANIA, recourse is had to the provision on necessity in CP art. 45(2) which also applies in the civil law context. The duty to compensate the party whose property has been used by

Article 5:202: Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity

23.

24.

25.

the person in protection of his legal interests in order to elimate a state of emergency is partly derived from the provisions pertaining to Benvolent intervention in another’s affairs and partly anchored in the law on unjustified enrichment (Adam, Drept civil, 286; Dogaru and Dra˘ghici, Drept civil, 236). Similarly, BULGARIAN LOA art. 46(2) provides for the obligation to compensate for damage caused to another’s property, if it was used to ward off a state of emergency, but it does not indicate exactly who owes the duty of compensation. The Supreme Court has opted for a “cascade liability”: namely, the person who caused the situation of emergency primarily incurs liability. If, this state of emergency was brought about by an animal or a thing, then its owner or keeper is liable. Finally, the person benefitting from the exercise of the defence of necessity is subsidiarily liable (Supreme Court, ordinance no. 4 of 30 October 1975, Plenum). Under SLOVENIAN LOA § 138(2), the injured party may bring a claim either against the person responsible for bringing about the dangerous situation or against the person whose legal interest were endangered, “but may not request compensation from the latter greater than the benefit they had therefrom”. Under LOA § 138(3) any person that incurs damage when the risk of damage from another is averted shall have the right to demand from that other the reimbursement of the damage to which the former was reasonably exposed. The GERMAN Civil Code distingusihes between defensive (CC § 228) and aggressive necessity (CC § 904); both afford a ground of justification. CC § 228 permits property of another to be damaged if it was necessary to avert danger and the danger emanated from this object; CC § 904 confers the right to interfere with the property of another, if it was necessary to utilise that property in order to defend oneself. Both provisions are predicated on the concept that, in a state of emergency, a lesser legally protected good may be sacrificed in order to preserve a higher ranked interest. Moreover, CP § 34 is also relevant to the private law context, as it (to some extent, under more rigourous prerequisites than those contained in CC § 228) allows interferences with legal interests which are personal to the individual such as interference with health and liberty. Under CC § 228, a thing owned by another must present an immediate actual danger to the rights or legal interests of the actor (necessity) or to another (assistance in an emergency). This thing may be damaged or destroyed, in so far as the damge caused was not a disproportionate response to the danger threatened. If the actor himself brought about the dangerous situation, then he or she must recompense the damage caused. If, in order to ward off the danger, it is necessary to interfere with the property of an uninvolved third party and the danger threatened is disproportionally great when compared to the damage caused to the owner by the interference, then the owner must tolerate the interference under the provisions of CC § 904. However, the owner may demand compensation from the person causing the damage and this claim does not hinge upon whether the latter was subjectively at fault. AUSTRIAN CC § 1306a regards a state of emergency as given, if a person can only save himself from a dangerous situation, which is not directly occassioned by an unlawful attack, by interfering in another’s legally protected interests. Necessity is treated the same as aid given to another in an emergency (another person’s interests are endangered) (OGH 10 May 1979, ZVR 1980/277, 280). Necessity and aid given to another in an emergency constitute grounds of justifications if the relevant conduct was directed at safeguarding a legally protected interest, and following an examination of all the circumstances, the conduct is classified as proportionate and was confined to causing the

859

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26.

27.

28.

860

least amount of harm (OGH 13 December 1988, SZ 61/270 p. 509). The actor comes nonetheless under a duty to compensate the injured party according to equitable precepts (see further Koziol/Bydlinski/Bollenberger (-Karner), ABGB2, § 1306a no. 4). According to GREEK CC art. 285, an act which is occassioned by necessity is justified (Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 507; Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio, Geniko meros, 603). In the event that there is a conflict of interests, a legally protected interest which is accorded less value in the eyes of the law must cede to the protection of a higher interest (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Tabakis), art. 285, no. 1). CC art. 285 solely governs interference with someone else’s property, it does not concern (like CP art. 25) the violation of personality rights. However, the approach adopted by the majority of legal commentators is that CP art. 25 also applies in the context of the civil law (see further Tabakis loc. cit. no. 5).There is no requirement that the danger, against which CC art. 285 is geared towards preventing, emanates from the same object which is utilised to fend off the attack (Karakostas, AK, art. 285, no. 1841; Tabakis loc. cit. no. 6). Assistance in an emergency in support of another is possible (Karakostas loc. cit. no. 1842; Tabakis loc. cit. no. 9). The damage averted is required to be disproportionately greater than that which is occasioned by exercising the defence of necessity. The actor comes under a duty to compensate, if he or she was at fault in creating the state of emergency i. e. the danger (CC art. 286(first sentence); see further Tabakis loc. cit. art. 286, no. 2). In all other cases, a discretion is conferred on the courts to require the person exercising the defence of necessity to pay a reasonable amount of damages (CC art. 286(second sentence); see further Karakostas loc. cit. no. 1850). PORTUGUESE CC art. 339(1) contains a regulation which governs the defence of “aggressive” necessity (Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 527). According to this provision, it is permitted to damage or destroy the property of another, in order to ward off an immediate threat of considerably more severe damage accruing to oneself or to another. The danger may originate from any source and operate to threaten the person or legal interests of the actor or a third party (CA Lisbon 12 May 2005). A person who causes damage to property or even its destruction is liable in damages to the owner, if he culpably provoked the threatening danger (see further CA Porto 25 September 1997); in all other cases, the court is conferred with an equitable discretion to determine recompense, whereupon (in turn according to the court’s discretion) the actor or the person profiting from his actions or indeed both may come under a duty to compensate the owner’s loss (see further Pessoa Jorge, Ensaio sobre os pressupostos da responsabilidade civil, 260). The following case will serve to illustrate, whereby the driver of a vehicle swerved to prevent an accident occurring (STJ 17 June 1999); if the driver had provoked the dangerous situation by failing to observe the Rules of the Road, then conversely the driver alone would be liable to pay compensation (STJ 19 April 1988, BolMinJus 376 [1988] 602; STJ 3 March 1990, BolMinJus 395 [1990] 534; different view CA Coimbra 20 March 2001). Under DUTCH law, noodtoestand is conceptualised as a particular manifestation of overmacht (“force majeure”). It concerns a case of competing obligations: the legal obligation not to commit an unlawful act must cede to a superior interest. The example employed in legal textbooks to illustrate this maxim pertains to breaking into a house to rescue another. Also, a local authority would act in accordance with law if it refused to hand over meat endangering human health to its owner (HR 3 May 1934, NedJur 1934, 1549; see also CFI Arnhem 22 June 1950, NedJur 1951, no. 290 p. 558 and Asser

Article 5:202: Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity

29.

30.

31.

(-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht III11, no. 60 p. 76). The defence always concerns cases where immediate action is necessitated (Onrechtmatige Daad I (-Jansen), art. 6:162(2), no. 176.2, p. 1875). The state of emergency must not derive from circumstances which may be imputed to the actor (HR 19. March 1943, NedJur 1943, no. 312 p. 417 and HR 20 June 1986, NedJur 1987, no. 35 p. 152 [harbour workers’ strike]). An act which is necessitated to ward off actual damager is lawful and, therefore, does not trigger the imposition of liability under CC art. 6:162. However, upon application of the rules governing unjustified enrichment, a reasonable compensation may be mandated (Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 617; Hartkamp loc. cit. no. 359 p. 362). Under ESTONIAN LOA § 1045(2) and (3) it is not unlawful to cause damage in necessity. Necessity is defined in GPCCA § 141(1). However, the fact that the act was justified does not obviate the duty to pay a reasonable recompense. This obligation is incurred by the actor (GPCCA § 141(2)) as well as the person profiting from his or her actions (loc. cit. § 141(3)). LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.274 confers a discretion on the courts regarding the determination of the obligation to compensate. It can require the person in whose favour the defence was exercised to compensate the damage in whole or in part. In the NORDIC countries the notion of necessity implies that another’s patrimony is sacrificed in order to rescue a person, property or a legitimate interest protected by law under imminent danger. This defence is codified in criminal law (SWEDISH CP chap. 24 § 4, DANISH CP § 14 and FINNISH CP chap. 4 § 5) and reflected in the law of civil liability. Within the latter, however, the person who has rescued his property by damaging another’s property will, as a rule, be held liable (HD 19 October 1929, NJA 1929, 542 concerning the owner of a dam who due to heavy rainfall had to open the flood gates, causing damage to other premises). If there is a tortfeasor who created the danger, he shall primarily bear the liability. Otherwise, the person who was endangered is liable for the consequences of the rescue measures. If a third person has taken action in another’s interest, liability shall fall upon the latter (Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 171; Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 122; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 50). Necessity requires an imminent danger. The protective measure must be legitimate, whereby the value of property serves as a natural reference, but regard is also to be had to the severity of the danger (HD 14 October 1988, NJA 1988, 495). However, if a less valuable thing is used to rescue a more valuable one that cannot foreclose the right of the owner of the former to be compensated (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 40). It is also established in ENGLAND that necessity can establish a defence to an action for trespass infringing another’s property rights or causing property damage where the acts are done reasonably to avert a real and imminent danger: Cope v. Sharpe (No. 2) [1912] 1 KB 496 (defendant setting fire to strips of heather on plaintiff’s land, in advance of flames from a conflagration, to protect his employer’s game); Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Southport Corp. [1956] AC 218, 235 (master of tanker jettisoning cargo of oil to prevent tanker breaking in the interest of safety of the crew; oil slick carried by tide to fore-shore causing damage). The defence will apply on the same basis if the action is framed in terms of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 in the exceptional case (so far as the rule applies to direct damage) where the escape of the dangerous thing is deliberate: Rigby v. Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 1 WLR 1242 (Taylor J) (police firing tear gas canister into gunsmith’s premises to flush out a

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dangerous psychopath: pyrotechnic device in the canister set premises on fire). On the other hand, the defence will not be available if the need to act is brought about by negligence on the part of the defendant: Rigby v. Chief Constable of Northamptonshire, loc. cit., 1253. Illustration 4 is taken from STJ 1 February 1996; illustration 5 from TS 28 June 1996, RAJ 1996 (3) no. 4905 p. 6421; and illustration 8 takes up an example given by Lord Denning MR in Southwark London Borough Council v. Williams [1971] Ch. 734, 744.

Article 5:203: Protection of public interest A person has a defence if legally relevant damage is caused in necessary protection of values fundamental to a democratic society, in particular where damage is caused by dissemination of information in the media.

Comments 1. Purpose of the rule. This Article grants the originator of the damage a defence where the damage was caused in necessary protection of values fundamental to a democratic society. It gives effect to a principle which is rarely clearly visible in the blackletter law of the Member States, but is encountered in the jurisprudence on the law on non-contractual liability virtually everywhere. The Article should reduce the necessity to rely on Article 7:101 (National constitutional laws). The latter provision cannot be expected to serve as a panacea for all problematic cases. 2. Protection of public interest. The primary significance of the rule lies in giving the press and other forms of media a defence in cases in which the person who is the subject of a report suffers legally relevant damage under the criteria set out in Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy), Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another) and Article 2:205 (Loss upon breach of confidence). The person must put up with such damage if the prerequisites of Article 5:203 are satisfied. Very frequently there is a particular public interest in reporting on celebrities or leading personalities in political life. This also applies to the latter in relation to such news about their private lives as concerns their integrity and therefore is relevant to voters in deciding whether or not to vote for them. Moreover, the public interest in certain information can make particularly speedy reporting necessary, in the context of which the full accuracy of the disseminated news cannot always be guaranteed. Nor can it always be expected in such circumstances that the publisher or the organ of the press authoritatively assesses all the associated legal issues. Of course, the Article protects neither invented stories nor the reckless publication of untrue facts or mere rumours. However, in the case of journalistic investigations deemed to be of a reasonable intensity under the circumstances, it may be permissible to publish information which later proves to be partially false. Where the report is corrected upon learning the truth, no liability 862

Article 5:203: Protection of public interest

arises. For accuracy’s sake, of course everything depends on the conditions of each individual case; weighing-up the interests involved must be left to the courts. 3. Fundamental to a democratic society. If the Article is to apply, the mere existence of any arbitrary public interest does not suffice. Rather, basic values of a democratic society must be at issue, and the protective measure taken must be necessary. Included among the basic values of a democratic society are particularly freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. The Article can therefore be important in relation to the freedom to demonstrate. The participants in a large demonstration, for instance, are not liable for the fact that private persons cannot use their vehicles for a certain period of time or that delivery vans cannot reach a factory which the demonstration passes. Also the mere participation in the demonstration itself is not a ground for liability where under the circumstances it may be expected that rather violent people will join the demonstration. Certainly, the Article does not provide carte blanche for irresponsible carelessness in the planning and organisation of such processions, but seeks to ensure that the exercise of fundamental rights is not made factually impossible by the consequences of civil liability.

Notes 1.

2.

The FRENCH courts strive to attain a balance between freedom of the press and the right to respect for private and family life (CC art. 9). Publications, containing hyperbole which the reader does not require to know in order to inform himself, cannot be justified by invoking the function of the press as affording a vehicle of information (Cass.civ. 23 April 2003, Bull.civ. 2003, I, no. 98 and D. 2003, 1854, note Bigot; JCP 2003, II, 10085, note Ravanas and GazPal 2003, IV, 2403, note Amson [two judgments delivered on the same day]). A person, against whom criminal proceedings have been instituted, cannot be portrayed as guilty in the media prior to the handing down of the court’s decision (Conseil d’Etat 14 March 2005, AJDA 2005, 576; Cass.civ. 6 March 1996, Bull.civ. 1996, I, no. 123; D. 1997, Somm.Comm.72, obs. Dupeux; Cass.civ. 29 April 1998, Bull.civ. 1998, II, no. 141). The presumption of innocence is ranked higher than the freedom of the press to report news (CFI Nanterre, 22 June 1996, GazPal 1996, II, 559). Conversely, a published report which merely mentions that the dead victim was married and was the father of two children and which correctly depicted the circumstances which surrounded the discovery of the body must be tolerated (Cass.civ. 20 November 2003, Bull.civ. 2003, II, no. 354; GazPal 2005, II, 1224, note Guerder). Furthermore, infringements of the right to one’s own image can be justified if a higher ranked legal interest is involved e. g. artistic freedom (CFI Paris 9 May 2007, D. 2008, 57; CFI Paris 25 June 2007, D. 2008, 58). Claims in respect of an abuse of press freedom may only be based on CC art. 9; CC art. 1382 is no longer applicable in this regard (Cass.civ. 27 September 2005, Bull.civ. 2005, I, no. 348; Dreyer, D. 2006, Chron. 1337). This remains the case even in the light of the Freedom of Press Act of 29 July 1881, which expressly refers to both of the CC provisions. The BELGIAN Cour de Cassation (Cass. 14 January 2005, no. JC051E4_1, no. de rôle C030622N) permits restrictions on press freedom, with the proviso being added that these restrictions must be necessary in a democratic society in that they meet a compel-

863

Chapter 5: Defences

3.

4.

864

ling social purpose. Moreover, in order for the restrictions to be justified. a proportionate relationship must be extant between the means employed and the strived for purpose and a cogent and satisfactory reason must exist for the restriction. When freedom of the press and the right to respect for private life collide, the courts try to strike a balance between the competing values. The courts examine, making full use of all the circumstances of the individual case, whether the interference with journalistic freedom exceeds what is necessary to vindicate the individual rights of the person affected (CA Brussels 5 February 1999, no. JB40966_1, no. de rôle 98 / AR /425). It is possible that preventative legal measures may be granted to check impending press publications (Cass. 25 September 1969, Pas. belge 1969, I, 89). SPANISH Const. arts. 18(1) in conjunction with 20(4) is also directly employed in the private law context; these provisions ground and abridge the right of freedom of expression and freedom of the press. According to jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, it is indeed incumbent on journalists to carefully verify the correctness of the asserted claims; however, there is no requirement that every aspect of the claim has to be substantiated. The legal system affords protection if the information is carefully collated and disseminated, but the law does not afford protection in the event that there is a careless disdain for the truth, spreading of rumours, fabrications or spiteful intimations (TC 21 January 1988, no. 6/1988, BOE 1988 no. 31 of 5 February; see also TS 5 July 1999, RAJ 1999 (3) no. 5898 p. 9197; TS 20 November 1999, RAJ 1999 (5) no. 8293 p. 13010 and TC 31 January 2000, no. 21/2000, BOE 2000 no. 54 of 3 March). In addition, making false statements of fact will not result in liability being incurred for infringing a person’s honour, if, prior to making these claims, appropriate measures were adopted by the journalist concerned to verify the truth of these statements and the report was characterised by an absence of insults and disrespectful terms were not employed (TS 17 April 2000, RAJ 2000 (2) no. 2567 p. 3985). Of course, it is conceivable that liability may be incurred for a breach of the right to protection of family life and right to a sphere of intimacy, in the event that no public interest was served by the article (TC 10 May 2000, no. 115/2000, BOE 2000 no. 136 of 7 June). According to the jurisprudence of the Spanish Constitutional Court (TC 17 July 1986, no. 104/1986, BOE 1986 no. 193 of 13 August; TC 15 September 2003, no. 160/2003, BOE 2003 no. 242 of 9 October; TS 11 December 2003, RAJ 2003 (5) no. 8653 p. 16209), thoughts, ideas and opinions are embraced by the right to freedom of expression, whereas the dissemination of relevant facts is the subject matter of the freedom of the press. Thus, above all, this distinction acquires significance under the civil law in respect of the burden of proof in respect of the correctness of the factual assertion as it generally behoves the person who makes those claims to prove their accuracy (see further on this delineation and on the many cases which mix freedom of expression and assertions of claims of fact TC 21 December 1992, no. 240/1992, BOE 1993 no. 17 of 20 January; TS 14 November 2001, RAJ 2001 (5) no. 9303 p. 14707). The Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act (Ley Orgánica 1/1982, de 5 de mayo, de protección civil del derecho al honor, a la intimidad personal y familiar y a la propia imagen) art. 2(2) also pertains to the primacy accorded to the protection of the public interest. According to this provision, the breach of a legally protected right is not regarded as unlawful if a historical, scientific or cultural interests prevails over it. The ITALIAN courts have developed a number of criteria in order to tackle the collision between constitutionally protected rights (as, for example, the clash between the right

Article 5:203: Protection of public interest

5.

to freedom of information or freedom of expression and personality rights of the person involved). The ingiustizia of the damage is a factor which flows into this determination. The media are permitted to publish reports which represent a legitimate exercise of their diritto di cronaca (right to broadcast news). Here, the report must have been true, there must be a legitimate public interest in acquiring the pertinent information (pertinenza), and the report must appear in a suitable format (known as continenza). A “close relationship” must exist between the newsworthy event and the subsequent report. This is necessary in order to meet the requirement that the public interest was served by the report (Const. art. 21) (Cass. 4 February 2005, no. 2271, Giur.it.Mass. 2005, fasc. 2; Cass. 13 January 2005, no. 559, Giur.it.Mass. 2005, fasc. 1; Cass. 15 December 2004, no. 23366, Giur.it.Mass. 2004, fasc. 1). The subject matter of the diritto di critica is the publication of a subjective opinion (in contrast to the diritto di cronaca) and not the report on the newsworthy event. The diritto di critica is ranked below the continenza. It can only be exercised to the extent that it is justified as being in the public interest. Furthermore, negative value judgements which affect the reputation or honour of the affected party must be properly accounted for (Cass. 11 January 2005, no. 379, Giur.it.Mass. 2005, fasc. 1). The publication of negative value judgments and criticism must be based on circumstances which the public have an interest in knowing about (Cass. 11 January 2005 loc. cit.). Similarly, in HUNGARY, clashes between, on the one hand, freedom of expression, freedom of the press and right of freedom of information (Const. § 61) and, on the other hand, protection of the affected party’s personality rights, (Const. §§ 54 and 59) are resolved by balancing the respective interests in individual cases (cf. Petrik (-Petrik), Polgári jog I2, 178/2). Print Media Act § 3 makes it clear that the freedom of the press is abridged in that the media may not commit a criminal offence, incite the commission of a criminal offence or breach the precepts of public morality or violate personality rights. § 4 imposes a duty on public authorities to give the press information which is of importance for the general public. CC §§ 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83 and 85(3) and (4) provide for extensive protection of incorporeal personality rights which are once again safeguarded by the general clause contained in CC § 75(1); see the notes above under Article 2:203 (Infringement of personal dignity, liberty and privacy) and Article 2:204 (Loss upon communication of incorrect information about another). Under the civil law, in the event that there is a clash between the competing rights, the court, in attempting to strike a balance between those rights may have recourse to CC § 2(2) (according to which the law ensures that all persons “can freely exercise the rights to which they are entitled in accordance with the social intent of these rights”) as well as to CC § 5(1) and (2). CC § 5(1) prohibits an abuse of rights; CC § 5(2) provides that the exercises of a right which is directed at a goal which is incompatible with the social intent of the right may be regarded as an abuse of a right, particularly if it harms the national economy, results in a person being harassed, or leads to an impairment of their rights or legal interests, or results in the acquisition of undue advantages. According to continual jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of ROMANIA, the law absolutely protects incorporeal personality rights against untrue claims and injurious statements (CSJ 24 September 2003, sect¸ia civila˘, decision no. 3623; CSJ 30 September 2003, sect¸ia civila˘, decision no. 3733). Persons, holding public office must accept that there will be a commensurate public interest in undisclosed information (CSJ 28 November 2001, sect¸ia civila˘, decision no. 5435).

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6.

7.

866

SLOVENIAN LOA § 177(2) affords a ground of defence to any person who acts in ignorance of the falsity of information in respect of another which he or she has disseminated, provided that the precondition is met that the injuring party or the recipient of the information has a justifiable interest in the disclosure of that information. It is incumbent upon the injuring party to prove that this criterion is met (Juhart and Plavs˘ak (-Pensa), Obligacijski zakonik I, art. 177 p. 1018). POLISH Supreme Court 14 May 2003, OSPiKA 2004, no. 2 p. 87 ruling bears out Article 5:203. This judgment concerned allegations about the President which appeared in a press article, namely that in 1997 he conspiratorially met with former KGB agents. The plaintiff claimed an apology and non-pecuniary damages corresponding to J 600.000, which were to be paid to the Polish Red Cross. The Supreme Court pointed out that the mere fact that a statement is not true does not, without more, give rise to liability of the press. Liability for the infringement of a right to respect for personality rights depends on the unlawfulness of the infringement. Although the unlawfulness of such infringement is presumed under CC art. 24, this presumption may be rebutted inter alia by proving that the infringement aimed at the protection of a legitimate social (or public) interest. Supreme Court 18 February 2005, OSNC 2005 nos. 7-8 p. 1 is to the same effect: “a journalist’s proof that in collecting and using press material he acted in defense of a legitimate public interest with all reasonable care and diligence excludes the unlawfulness of his activity. However, if the allegation turns out to be untrue the journalist is obliged to withdraw it”. Under BULGARIAN Const. art. 41, a person may disseminate information provided that it does not infringe the rights or reputation of another citizen and further, that it does not endanger national security, constitute a breach of public order, harm public health or infringe against public morals. The Court of Cassation no. 891 of 7 June 2002, civil matters 183/2002 held that an article must contain true facts and must convey information, which it is the public’s interest to know. Further, information which owing to its incompleteness engenders a false impression in the mind of the recipient, is regarded as false and, thus, does not enjoy constitutional protection. See Note 6 under Article 5:201 Authority conferred by law) for a treatise on the ground of justification of safeguarding a legitimate interest under GERMAN law. Interests personal to the individual and, moreover, the wider public interest are recognised as pertinent in this regard (BGH 22 December 1959, BGHZ 31, 308, 312). It is universally recognised (also on the basis of Const. art. 5(1) second sentence) that the press are authorised to safeguard the interests of society. Naturally, this authority is not boundless. The press have a duty to carefully examine the information that they intend on publishing; false allegations about an individual may not be published without due care being taken. In addition, the press must attempt to achieve a respectful balance between the relevant interests, namely, it has to examine whether the detriment that accrues to the affected party is outweighed by a substantial and justifiable public interest in the disclosure of the information (see further Soergel (-Spickhoff), BGB13, § 823, no. 131). The criteria developed to govern the publication of articles also apply to the publication of images (BGH 6 March 2007, BGHZ 171, 275). Additionally, conduct which is unlawful can be rendered lawful by invoking the fundamanetal right of freedom of assembly (Const. art. 8). The unintentional, yet inevitable side-effects of a demonstration (as e. g. obstructions to traffic or impeding access) must be tolerated (Spickhoff loc. cit. no. 133).

Article 5:203: Protection of public interest

8.

9.

10.

A comparable regulation to Article 5:203 can be found in the AUSTRIAN Media Act (BGBl 1981/314) § 6(2)(iv) which affords a ground of justification. According to this provision, a claim for damages for injury to feelings may not be made if the report concerns an accurate quotation of a statement made by a third party and there was a prevailing public interest in knowing about the statement concerned (see further Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VI3, § 1330 no. 49). The making of political statements may be justified on the basis of ECHR art. 10 (OGH 14 December 2000, SZ 73/198 p. 546; Harrer loc. cit. no. 48). Conversely, the right of freedom of assembly does not constitute a ground of justification in respect of the interference with third party rights. The frontiers of this right are reached when the exercise of the right results in an interference with the rights of a third party; each exertion of force against persons or things is, also in the context of assemblies, unlawful (OGH 25 May 1994, SZ 67/92 p. 531; OGH 25 March 1999, SZ 72/55 p. 337; Harrer loc. cit. § 1301 no 60). GREEK Civil Press Liability Act (Law no. 1178/1981) provides that strict liability will be imposed on the owner of a newspaper in respect of publications which operate to breach an individual’s personailty rights; as far as damages are concerned, minimum amounts are fixed which depend on the newspaper circulation and these amounts were raised again by Law no. 2243/1994. Law 1178/1981 also applies to other forms of mass media (Mass Media Act no. 2328/1995 art. 4(10)); the Act provides for minimum amount of damages for violations also in the field of television and radio. However, the damages awarded by the courts frequently tend to considerably exceed these amounts (e. g. CFI Thessaloniki 26488/2001, Arm 2003, 931; A. P. 788/2000, EllDik 42/2001, 162; CFI Athens 6472/2003, ChrID 4/2004, 120). In Greece, owing to these minimum fixed amounts of damages, in the context of breaches of right to honour by the press, a particular manifestation of the problem arises concerning the clash, on the one hand, between freedom of expression and freedom of the press and, on the other, safeguarding personality rights of the person affected. CA Athens 9975/1986, EllDik 28/ 1987, 299 stressed, in this context, that the press have a legitimate interest in sharply criticising public personae; the article at issue in this case was, when objectively examined, untrue, however it was the only means available of obtaining the truth. A. P. 167/2000 EllDik 41/2000, 772 tends in the same direction. However, prior case law shows that the courts do not always attempt to strike a careful balance between all of the interests involved; therefore, in recent times, Greece has been brought before the European Court of Human Rights on this very point. PORTUGUESE courts generally resolve conflicts between freedom of expression and freedom of the press, on the one hand (Const. arts. 37 and 38 and the rights to good name, reputation and protection of intimacy of private life (Const. arts. 25 and 26) on the other, according to the same rules employed by the rest of the European courts. Freedom of expression and freedom of the press only have precedence over the individual’s interest in safeguarding enumerated incorporeal personality rights, if a public interest is involved and the disclosure does not exceeed what was necessary to vindicate the public interest (CA Evora 8 February 2001, CJ 2001-1 [XXVI] 267; STJ 29 October 1996, BolMinJus 460 [1996] 686; STJ 5 March 1996, CJ(ST) IV [1996-1] 122). A person acts to vindicate a public interest, for example, if he informs the relevant authorities about the workshy ethic of the manager of a public health centre, whose job it was to introduce particular procedures to pave the way for the establishment of further healthcare agencies, where the situation endured for over a year (STJ 3 March 2005). The

867

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11.

12.

13.

868

same holds true for an article which reported about financial irregularities in the books of a state hospital and the ensuing issuance of reprimands against the Minister for Health; of course, such information is required to be reported in an objective manner and should be not contain barbs leading to the infringement of a person’s honour (STJ 18 April 2002; CA Lisbon 27 April 1978, BolMinJus 276 [1978] 170). No public interest is given, where an article reports on a woman’s premarital sex life, in the event that she is not a public figure (CA Evora 8 February 2001 loc. cit.). Likewise, there is no public interest in seeing photos of a world famous footballer together with his wife on the buidling site where their future family home was being constructed (STJ 14 June 2005). Under DUTCH law, within the parameters of noodtoestand (see above note III 28 under Article 5:202) it can happen that the actor invokes the protection of algemene belang (a public interest). The justification for this is reasoned on the basis that the community’s welfare is more deserving of protection than the competing private interest. For legal persons under the civil law to successfully invoke the public interest defence in order to justify their actions, their actions must meet a societal function which is directed at preserving the public interest. The function of the press is relevant here as is e. g. consumer agencies which inform their members about the quality of a particular product (see further Onrechtmatige Daad I (-Jansen), art. 6:162(2), no. 178 pp. 1900-1926; HR 24 June 1983, NedJur 1984, no. 801 p. 2849; HR 27 January 1984, NedJur 1984, no. 802 p. 2859; HR 27 January 1984, NedJur 1984, no. 803 p. 2870; HR 19 April 1968, NedJur 1968, no. 263 p. 865 [a consumer agency is permitted to warn the public about selling methods in respect of the marketing of particular pressure cookers]). The ground of justification of safeguarding the public interest is of particular relevance in the arena of torts committed by the press. In addition, CC art. 6:168 permits the opening of the following avenue, namely that the courts may award the plaintiff damages, but dismiss his claim for an injunction prohibiting the defendant’s conduct, on the basis that there was a profound public interest opposing the grant of an injunction (see further Onrechtmatige Daad II (-van Nispen), art. 6:168, no. 1 p. 2). An example for the application of this provision is provided by claims asserted at short notice by environmental organisations (see further van Nispen loc. cit. no. 7 pp. 21-22). The ESTONIAN LOA does not contain an article along similar lines to Article 5:203. However, the public interest is taken into account in cases which concern the breach of an incorporeal personality right (LOA § 1046(2)). The public interest is also pertinent in the context of LOA § 1045(2)(i). In SWEDEN, the liability of the relevant medium which is channelled through the editor, is governed by two Acts which are regarded as having constitutional status, namely, the Freedom of the Press Act (Tryckfrihetsförordningen [1949:105], chap. 11) and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression (Yttrandefrihetsgrundlag [1991:1469], chap. 8) and depends on whether particular criminal provisions have been infringed. A jury is sworn in to try the accused in the criminal proceedings. Liability for defamation (Freedom of the Press Act chap. 7 § 4(14)) is excluded if the communication of the information was justifiable and if the information was either correct or if there was a reasonable basis for the assumption that it was correct, the burden of proof being on the editor. The issue of “justifiability” is determined by the courts striking a balance between the public’s need to know and safeguarding the individual’s private sphere (HD 15 April 1987, NJA 1987, 285; HD 5 December 2003, NJA 2003, 567; HD 16 November 1994,

Article 5:203: Protection of public interest

14.

NJA 1994, 637; Svea CA 21 February 2002, RH 2002:39 [see further ECHR 19 September 2006, White v. Sweden, ECHR 19 September 2006, App. no. 42435/02]). Under special circumstances it may even be justifiable to disseminate untruthful and unfounded information (HD 14 December 1966, NJA 1966, 656, concerning a report on already disseminated incorrect information). Persons who in confidence give information to the media for the purpose of making that information public, have a right to remain anonymous; revealing that kind of source amounts to a crime (Freedom of the Press Act chap. 1 § 1(3), chap. 3; Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression chap. 1 § 2). DANISH Media Liability Act (Medieansvarslov) identifies the persons who can be held liable, under civil and criminal law; civil liability, however, is grounded on general principles. Under Damages Liability Act § 26 the latter does not depend on the existence of a crime. Liability for defamation is excluded if the information is correct or if it was disseminated in good faith for a significant public interest. In that context special regard is had to ECHR art. 10 (HD 28 October 1998, UfR 1999, 122; HD 6 January 1999, UfR 1999, 560; HD 2 July 2002, UfR 2002, 2398; HD 18 December 2002, UfR 2003, 624; Eastern CA 24 September 2004, UfR 2005, 123; Werlauff, J 2002, 1). FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 6 (amended in 2006) remsembles the Swedish regulation. Likewise, the editor or the person who is the head of programming is deemed liable (Freedom of Expression in Mass Communication Act [Lag om yttrandefrihet i masskommunikation 460/2003] § 14) and, the imposition of civil liability is predicated on the commission of a criminal offence. CP chap. 24 § 9 excludes liability for defamation in respect of criticism directed at someone’s conduct in, inter alia, politics, business, or similar ‘public’ services, and which does not clearly transgress what may be considered justifiable (Supreme Court 22 August 1980, KKO 1980 II 86; Supreme Court 28 March 2000, KKO 2000:45; Supreme Court 7 January 2005, KKO 2005:1). Under CP chap. 24 § 8 it amounts to a crime, and thus a tort, to disseminate information that violates private life, with a defence regarding public persons if the information relates to that person’s official duty and is of public interest (see Supreme Court 26 September 2001, KKO 2001:96; Supreme Court 25 August 2000, KKO 2000:83; Supreme Court 11 June 1997, KKO 1997:80; Supreme Court 25 June 2002, KKO 2002:55; see Sisula-Tulokas, JFT 2000, 634). In ENGLAND disclosure of matters of public interest, as one form of just cause for disclosure, is a defence to an action for breach of confidence, but its ambit is still evolving in the wake of the Human Rights Act 1998 having regard to the rights under the ECHR which the Act enshrines. The judge in such cases is called upon to undertake a balancing exercise between ECHR art. 8 (right to respect for private life) and the art. 10 (right to freedom of expression): see further HRH Prince of Wales v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ 1776, [2008] Ch 57. The defendant has traditionally had the burden of showing there is a good reason for disclosing the confidential information (A-G v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109) and formerly the justification for disclosure as being in the public interest might take the form of exposing a breach of the country’s security, or a breach of law, including statutory duty, fraud or matters destructive of the country or its people, including matters medically dangerous to the public; and other misdeeds of similar gravity Beloff v. Pressdram Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 241, 260 (Ungoed-Thomas J), a test formulated in part on the basis that the fiduciary duty underpinning the confidence would not bind where confidence served only the purposes of iniquity. The test now is one of proportionality and whether a fetter of the

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right of freedom of expression is, in the particular circumstances, “necessary in a democratic society”, given the importance of upholding duties of confidence; this issue is not whether the information is a matter of public interest but whether, in all the circumstances, it is in the public interest that the duty of confidence should be breached (or conversely whether it is legitimate for the owner of the information to seek to keep it confidential): HRH Prince of Wales v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ 1776 at [67]-[68], [2008] Ch 57. For cases satisfying even the stricter test, see e. g. Lion Laboratories v. Evans [1985] QB 526 (employees disclosing to newspaper information as to reliability of breathalysers which had been approved for police use disclosed to newspaper); Initial Services Ltd v. Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396 (plaintiffs had issued to customers a circular indicating that recent price rises were due to the imposition of an indirect tax, but in reality they were using the imposition of the new tax as a mask for a covert increase of their profit margin; public interest defence not struck out). Moreover, the new approach no doubt leaves unaffected the principle that disclosure in the media is not always to be regarded as permitted by the defence if, in view of the competing interest in upholding confidentiality against which the defence must be weighed up, disclosure only to a particular competent authority is sufficient advancement of the countervailing public interest: Francome v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [1984] 1 WLR 892 (public interest in information relating to breaches of Jockey Club rules could be best served by disclosure to the Jockey Club and the police); X (Health Authority) v. Y [1988] 2 All ER 648 (no basis for publication in a newspaper of the AIDS diagnosis of two doctors still in practice). Moreover, a “fair and accurate” report of public proceedings of a court, tribunal or other body exercising the judicial power of the state which is contemporaneous (i. e. published as soon as practicable after publication is permitted) enjoys absolute privilege under the law of defamation: Defamation Act 1996, s. 14(1),(2). Media publications on matters of public interest, moreover, may enjoy qualified privilege, i. e. the maker of the statement has a defence unless the malice of the maker of the statement is established. The defence is expressed in terms of a notional “moral duty” of the newspaper or broadcaster on the one side and a corresponding legitimate interest of the public on the other, this being part of the fabric of democracy that matters relating to public life are vigorously discussed, and depends on the relevant journalist having behaved responsibly: see Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [2001] 2 AC 127, where Lord Nicholls set down ten criteria to determine whether the matter was something the public was entitled to know and pointed to (1) the seriousness of the allegation, (2) the nature of the information and its extent as a matter of public concern, (3) the source of the information, (4) steps taken to verify the story, (5) the status of the information as e. g. already having been under investigation so as to command respect, (6) the urgency of the matter, (7) whether the claimant was approached for comments, (8) whether the gist of the claimant’s story is included, (9) the article’s tone and (9) the timing and other circumstances of the publication. Similarly, a complaint against a public official will also enjoy qualified privilege, provided it is communicated to a person who is able either to redress the matter or take action against the official: cf. Harrison v. Bush (1855) 5 El & Bl 344, 119 ER 509; Truth (N. Z.) Ltd. v. Holloway [1960] 1 WLR 997 (PC) (demand for a public inquiry into import licences including a defamatory statement about the responsible Minister not privileged when reproduced in a newspaper). Qualified privilege is also conferred on, among other things, reports of proceedings in public in any legislature or court or of any person holding a public

870

Article 5:203: Protection of public interest

inquiry or of any international organisation or conference, in whichever jurisdiction, as well as fair and accurate copies of or extracts from matter published by any government or legislature or international organisation or conference: Defamation Act 1996, s. 15(1) and Schedule 1 Part I. Such privilege also extends to fair and accurate copies of or extracts from matter issued for public information by any legislature, government or government authority, or international organisation or conference, and also fair accurate reports of sittings of local authorities, commissions, local inquiries, public meetings, general meetings of public companies, charitable associations, and the like (loc. cit., Schedule 1 Part II), but in that case the privilege is lost if the defendant fails to accede to the claimant’s request for the publication in a comparable manner of a reasonable letter or statement by way of explanation or contradiction: loc. cit., s. 15(2). Akin to, but notionally separate from, the defence of qualified privilege is a further defence of fair comment on a matter of public interest. The defence is made out only if the comment is based on proven facts which are expressly or impliedly indicated in the publication (though not every allegation of fact must be substantiated if those which are proven suffice to support the comment: see Defamation Act 1952, s. 6) and if that comment is (in an objective, but weak sense) fair, i. e. an honest person could hold it (Branson v. Bower (No. 2) [2002] QB 737 (Eady J), following the persuasive authority of Tse Wai Chun Paul v. Cheng [2001] EMLR 31 (Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region).

871

Section 3:

Inability to control Article 5:301: Mental incompetence (1) A person who is mentally incompetent at the time of conduct causing legally relevant damage is liable only if this is equitable, having regard to the mentally incompetent person’s financial means and all the other circumstances of the case. Liability is limited to reasonable recompense. (2) A person is to be regarded as mentally incompetent if that person lacks sufficient insight into the nature of his or her conduct, unless the lack of sufficient insight is the temporary result of his or her own misconduct.

Comments A.

Policy considerations and overview

1. Options. In Europe, there is no prevailing uniformity on the issue of how harm caused by mentally disabled persons (typically, but not necessarily mentally incompetent adults) is to be dealt with reasonably by the law on liability. As a result, there were several options available. The rule could have been (i) formulated in such a way that a mental disability was either not considered in any respect or in any event did not come into consideration in the field of liability for negligence. It could also have been formulated in the exactly opposite manner, namely (ii) upon the principle that a mentally disabled person was, without exception, never liable for damage caused, or (iii) a middle ground between the two could have been taken up. That is the solution opted for in the Article. 2. The preferred solution. The Article takes as its starting point the consideration that a balancing of the interests of the injuring person and the injured person is necessary. The legal system should lose sight neither of the protection of the victim nor of the adverse circumstances of the injuring person who cannot be held responsible for his or her condition. A person who, due to mental illness, cannot distinguish between right and wrong (see paragraph (2)), does not act “intentionally” within the meaning of Article 3:101 (Intention); this is because such a person is not in a position to differentiate between arbitrary and legally relevant damage. On the other hand, the liability of a mentally disabled person in cases covered by the Chapter 3, Section 2 of this Book solely depends on whether – under the circumstances – he or she can be qualified as a “producer”, “keeper” or “occupier”. In the standard case that will usually be answered in the negative. However in the case of a sudden onset of mental illness exceptions are conceivable (see illustration 3 under Article 3:102 (Negligence)). Therefore, the actual problem area is liability for negligence. Under Article 3:102 (Negligence), deviation from the standard of care which can be expected from a reasonably careful person under the circumstances 872

Article 5:301: Mental incompetence

of the individual case is sufficient. Conduct caused by illness may constitute such a deviation; something like the average “care” taken by a mentally disabled person does not exist. As a consequence, in the terminology of these model rules a person with mental incapacity is “accountable” for negligently occasioned legally relevant damage under the same prerequisites as for someone of sound mind. However the present Article restricts the normal effects of this accountability in three different respects. Liability can (i) only lie in the duty to pay a sum of money from available assets; due to the nature of the situation, rendering compensation through reparation in kind is excluded from the outset. Liability lies (ii) not in the payment of the full monetary damages (“compensation”), but in a reasonable recompense (“recompense”). Hence, Article 5:301 draws on the concept which has already been presented in Article 5:202(3) (Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity) for the reparation of loss in an emergency situation necessitating self-defence. Both cases exhibit certain similarities. Even liability for reasonable monetary compensation under Article 5:301, however, (iii) only remains justifiable where it conforms to equity and fairness under the circumstances, as might be the case if the liability could easily be borne by the liable person because of his or her favourable financial situation. On this point, the model of liability in Article 5:301 is in accord with several (but in no way all) of the European legal systems. The considerations are similar to those relating to Article 3:103 (Persons under eighteen) paragraph (3) on the personal liability of children. Of course the liability of children is subsidiary (Article 3:103(3)(a)); the liability of mentally disabled adults is not.

B.

Mental incompetence

3. Lack of insight. According to the definition in paragraph (2), a natural person is “mentally incompetent” if he or she is not in a position to grasp the nature of his or her conduct (act or omission), i. e. to foresee its possible consequences and to understand how society judges it in general. Typically the issue is that the person in question in not in a position to differentiate between right and wrong. A person who has this ability, but is not able to fashion his or her behaviour accordingly, is not mentally incompetent within the meaning of Article 5:301, see illustration 3 under Article 3:201 (Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives). Also other physical disabilities, which do not have an effect on a person’s mental capacity, do not fall under Article 5:301. They can only be taken into account in the context of Article 3:102 (Negligence), depending on the circumstances of each individual case (see comments under that Article). 4. Temporary lack of insight. The lack of sufficient insight can be either temporary or permanent. However, where the lack of sufficient insight is only temporary, the conduct of the person concerned must be considered in order to determine whether the temporary lack of insight can provide a defence. Consideration must be given to what that person has done to bring about the condition and whether this amounts to misconduct. Thus an alcoholic who has suffered brain damage and has a permanent deficiency of insight into his or her conduct will fall under Article 5:301, whereas a mentally fit and healthy individual who embarks on a one-off “bender” and so puts himself or herself beyond proper self-control will not have a defence under this Article for damage caused during the drunken escapade. 873

Chapter 5: Defences

5. Instinctive reflex actions. Article 5:301 does not extend to bodily movements while in a state of unconsciousness and to the mere instinctive reflex actions of mentally competent persons. Such reflex actions do not constitute “conduct” within the meaning of this Book, see comments under Article 3:102 (Negligence). In such a case there is no liability at all. The situation is different only where the injuring person should have anticipated having such episodes or reflex actions as a consequence of a physical problem and therefore should have refrained from the activity in question in advance. Illustration 1 A dancer falls and to steady herself she reaches out to another dancer, who is pulled down and injured. That is not “conduct”. Illustration 2 In the course of an operation, a doctor loses consciousness. If the loss of consciousness is attributable to a sudden and unforeseeable drop in blood pressure, the doctor is not liable for the harm caused to the patient; conversely, where the doctor should have been aware of the risk of such a loss of consciousness, then the doctor should not have been allowed to operate at all in the first place.

C.

Recompense according to equity and fairness

6. Parallel comments. According to Article 5:301(1) second sentence the originator of damage is liable for reasonable monetary recompense, subject to the proviso of equity and fairness. The concept of liability subject to equity and fairness has already been explained in comments under Article 3:103 (Persons under eighteen) paragraph (3) and the concept of liability for a reasonable monetary recompense in comments under Article 5:202 (Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity). Thus, reference can be made to both here. Illustration 3 A suffers from schizophrenia. He notices that someone has turned off the light in his apartment. He takes a hunting rifle and shoots at two men, who are standing near the electricity meter: his father and an electrician. Both are killed. A comes from a wealthy family and commands a great personal fortune. The electrician’s dependants have a claim to reasonable monetary compensation. However, A must meet the necessary means for the maintenance of himself and his mother, who is financially dependent on him.

Notes 1.

874

According to settled and recurrent jursiprudence of the FRENCH courts, the presence of culpability on the part of the injuring party is not a prerequisite for the determination of faute under tort law (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II10, nos. 99-101 pp. 96-99). This premise derives from an amendment to the Civil Code in 1968 which led to the insertion of CC art. 489-2 which provides that “a person who has caused damage to another

Article 5:301: Mental incompetence

2.

3.

when he or she was under the influence of a mental disorder is nonetheless liable to compensation”. The absence de discernement (the inability to distinguish between right and wrong) will not afford a defence. The approach adopted in BELGIUM is that faute comprises of a subjective element which takes account of the tortfeasor’s personal characteristics (fault or culpabilité oder imputabilité) and an objective element which refers to the behaviour (onrechtmatigheid or illicéité). Consequently, the principle that tortious capacity is a requisite is firmly adhered to (Tilleman and Claeys (-Claeys), Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid, pp. 1, 7, no. 7; Cass. 3 October 1994, Pas. belge 1994, I, no. 412 p. 788). This also holds true for gardien liability which derives from CC art. 1384(1); only a person in full control of his or her mental faculties can be a gardien (Tilleman and Claeys (-Baudoncq and Debeane) loc. cit. pp. 83, 89 no. 8). Mentally disabled persons may be subject to the imposition of a liability in equity under CC art. 1386bis. This article confers a discretionary power on the courts to award compensation, either in full or in part, against the class of persons enumerated in this provision, having regard to the financial position of the respective parties (CA Bruxelles 21 April 2006, Rev.gén.Ass.Resp. 2007, no. 14313). An analogous application of ths provision to other groups of persons,in particular, to small children (who have developed normally) is however precluded (Cass. 24 April 1980, Pas. belge 1980, I, p. 1055, concl. Dumon). A person lacks tortious capacity if that individual is not aware of the damaging nature of his or her act or acts and it is not possible to reproach that person for voluntarily bringing about a condition in which they could lose control over their actions. A person lacks tortious capacity where at the time of the commision ofthe tort, he or she could not distinguish between right and wrong (van Gerven (-Covemaeker), Verbintenissenrecht II7, 302). SPANISH CC art. 1902 requires culpa or negligencia, these terms, according to the professed views of many commentators connote that civil legal reponsibilty is a pre-condition for the imposition of liability (Gómez Calle, Los sujetos de la responsabilidad civil3, 461, 479). Legal responsibility connotes that an individual is in a position to understand the implications of his or her behaviour and foresee the possible results thereof and act on the basis of this knowledge (Gómez Calle, Los sujetos de la responsabilidad civil1, 406). However, apart from the proposition that lack of legal repsonsibility entails that the putative tortfeasor is absolved from liability (so e. g. Albaladejo, Derecho Civil II(2)10, 490), it is also espoused that the tortfeasor who lacks tortious capacity should at least be secondarily liable in order to protect the interests of the victim, if the person whose duty it was to supervise was unavailable or was bankrupt or could adduce grounds for exculpation under CC art. 1903. This submission is backed up by arguments based on comparative legal research, which are inter alia deduced from CC art. 3(2) (Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 230; see also de Ángel Yágüez, Tratado de responsabilidad civil3, 308). The regulation, which was previously contained in CP(old) art. 20 m ties in therewith. However, CP art. 118(1) likewise contains a special rule for the case that a criminal offence is committed by a person who has reached the age of majority but who cannot be deemed to be responsible for his or her actions according to the criminal law. Accordingly, parents, legal guardians or persons who were under a duty to supervise, may “also” be civily liable on an equitable basis, provided that they can be held accountable for their negligence. This liability which is joint and several, arises in conjunction with the liability of the person who directly causes the damage who remains civily, if not criminally, responsible (Yzquierdo

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4.

5.

876

Tolsada loc. cit. 259); further particulars remain the matter of some dispute (see the discussion in Gómez Calle, Responsabilidad de padres y centros docentes3, 1234, 12511252). If the tort is committed by a person who has attained the age of legal majority, who, however, remains under the care of his or her parents or legal guardian and who, nonetheless, is criminally responsible, then the parents or legal guardian, with whom the tortfeasor lives with, are secondarily liable, based on a corresponding application of CP art. 120(1), if negligence can be imputed and the tortfeasor who is of full age is insolvent (TS 22 April 2004, RAJ 2004 (3) no. 3992 p. 8236). All in all a much criticised twofold regime governs the liability of the primary tortfeasor: if his act does not amount to a criminal offence, then civil liability under CC art. 1902 is ruled out; conversely, if a criminal offence is involved, then the perpetrator is liable under CP art. 118(1). The court has been imparted with an equitable discretion to curtail liability (Gómez Calle loc. cit. 1286). According to ITALIAN CC art. 2046 a person is not liable for the consequences of a damaging act if, at the time of its commission, that person lacked torious capacity unless the lack of tortious capacity can be attributed to his or her culpabilty. CC art. 2047 provides that, in such an event, the person under a duty to supervise is liable to pay compensation unless it was not possible to forestall the conduct of the tortfeasor lacking capacity. If the injured party cannot obtain compensatation from the person who was under a supervisory duty, then the court can award an equitable compensation against the instigator of the damage, having regard to the financial circumstances of the respective parties. According to case law, the same holds true if a person exercising a supervisory duty was absent (Cass. 28 January 1953, no. 216, Giur.it. 1953, I, 1, 496). Tortious capacity is ascertained on an individial basis; the Civil Code does not furnish any criteria wth which to measure tortious capacity (Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, sub art. 2045, p. 317; Visintini, I fatti illeciti II2, 1 ff; Cass. 18 July 1975, no. 2425, Giur.it. 1976, I, 1, 1587). The capacità di intendere e di volere is based on the ability to realise the consequences of one’s conduct and to act according to this insight (Cass. 27 March 1984, no. 2027, Giur.it.Mass. 1984, fasc. 3-4). Whether tortious capacity is encompassed within the concept of fault or whether it is divorced from this concept is a matter of some controversy (see further Salvi, La responsabilità civile2, 106; Bianca, Diritto civile V, 656). As far as minors are concerned, the ability to exercise self determination, the recognition of the impact that one’s conduct has on third parties, mental and physical development and strength of character are factors which influence the adjudication on the presence or absence of tortious capacity (Cass. 26 June 2001, no. 8740, Giur.it.Mass. 2001, 1270). According to HUNGARIAN CC § 347(1)(i) the inability to distinguish between right or wrong operates to exclude the imposition of liability. An exception to the foregoing, which is deemed to be warranted on equitable grounds, is contained in CC § 347(2). In so far as compensation cannot be extracted from the person upon whom it was incumbant to exercise a duty of supervision, and the circumstances of the individual case and the financial positions of the parties justify it, the court may award damages (in full or in part) against the tortfeasor lacking tortious capacity. According to prevailing legal opinion, every natural person is endowed with tortious capacity, if that person can foresee the possible consequences of his or her actions and is able to grasp that society in general would condemn such conduct (Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 66). Accordingly, the court then examines whether the damaging party was capable of comprehending the

Article 5:301: Mental incompetence

6.

7.

wrongfulness of his or her actions and the foreseeable detrimental consequences of that conduct (Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1282; Petrik (-Wellmann), Polgári jog II2, 598; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 139). Of course, a wrongdoer cannot invoke lack of tortious capacity if self-induced (CC § 347(3)) and cannot aduce a ground for exculpation (for further analysis, see Ujváriné loc. cit. 124-126). POLISH CC arts. 425 and 428 and SLOVENIAN LOA §§ 136 and 146 are similar in all essential points. By contrast, CZECH CC §§ 422 and 423 do not recognise a liability which is imposed on equitable grounds. BULGARIAN LOA art. 47(1) generally precludes those persons who are incapable of committing a tort from incurring liability, unless this condition was self induced. A person, deemed by the criminal courts to lack the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, is also regarded as incapable of committing a tort (Supreme Court 9 October 1964, decision no. 1046, criminal case no. 924/1964). Conversely, a person possesses the capacity to commit a tort, if, although he or she was under the control of a court appointed guardian or supervisor, at the time of acting, that person was in actual fact legally capable of committing a tort (Supreme Court 8 October 1973, decision no. 2469, civil case no. 1410/73). Moreover, a person who suffers from an “impaired capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her actions” which induced the damaging act, possesses tortious capacity (Supreme Court 28 June 1995, decision no. 190, criminal case no. 48/1995). According to ROMANIAN law, as a general rule, a person is only liable, if he or she has the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct; however, this precept is solely the subject of a formal statutory provision iunder the criminal law (CP art. 48). There is a presumption in force in respect of persons who have attained the age of fourteen, whereby it is presumed that such persons possessed the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions, which must be positively ascertained in respect of persons below this age limit. However, according to case law, persons not possessing tortious capacity (adults and minors) can be deemed liable on equitable grounds (for citations of relevant case law, see Adam, Drept civil, 306; Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘, 376). There is a proposal contained in the Draft Civil Code which envisages that liability based on equitable considerations will be the subject of specific statutory provision (art. 1106). Under GERMAN CC § 827 first sentence, a person is not liable for damage which he or she caused to another, while in a state of unconsciousness or in a state of pathological mental disturbance which operated to preclude the exercise of free will. If this condition precluding the exercise of free will was temporary and self-induced, then CC § 827 second sentence provides that liability will be imposed as if that person was guilty of negligence at the time of committing the act; consequently, the wrongdoer comes under a duty to compensate, if the remaining prerequisites for imposing liability are satisified. CC § 829 provides that a person who, for the above cited reasons contained in CC § 827 is deemed not responsible for the damage which he or she has caused, must, nonetheless, compensate the damage sustained, if equity demands that damages should be awarded in the circumstances of the case. Particular regard is had to the financial means of the parties involved and moreover that the wrongdoer is not deprived of financial resources required to meet legal maintenance obligations or he or she would be bereft of funds needed for reasonable maintenance. The duty to compensate is subsidiary to the liability of persons with a duty of supervision (CC § 832). Thus, liability under CC § 829 only comes to the fore, where there was no duty to supervise the wrong-

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doer or compensation cannot be obtained from that person for either factual or legal reasons. Similarly, under AUSTRIAN CC § 1306, damage which is caused by an involuntary action is not generally compensatable. On the other hand, the duty to compensate endures, where the damaging party voluntarily creates a state of self induced disorientation (CC § 1307). However, if the injured party, by his or her own (contributory) fault gave rise to the commission of the act by the mentally impaired person, then again, the latter escapes liability (CC § 1308). Aside from this special instance, the injured party can pursue the person who culpably breached his or her obligation to supervise for damages (CC § 1309). A subsidiary equitable liability may be imposed on the person incapable of committing fault under CC § 1310. The court may also decide to award partial compensation. In determining whether equitable grounds exist for awarding compensation, the courts have regard to all the circumstances of the individual case, including the available insurance coverage (Koziol/Bydlinski/Bollenberger (-Karner), ABGB2, § 1310 no. 8). GREEK CC art. 914 includes fault among the prequisities for the imposition of tortious liability. A person can only commit a fault if that person is endowed with tortious capacity (CC art. 915). Thus, the actor must possess intellectual maturity and must not suffer from impaired mental health. These qualities are indispensible in order for the person concerned to recognise the significance and reach of his or her own actions (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 915, no. 1). This ability is generally extant; exceptional cases are caught by CC art. 915 (CC art. 915(1) which was amended by Law no. 2447/1996). According to this provision, a person will not incur liability, if he or she was unconscious at the time of acting or was in a mentally disturbed state, which had the effect of considerably restricting the exercise of his power of judgement and the exercise of his or her free will. An exception to the foregoing arises when the wrongdoer himself (e.g via alcohol) culpably and voluntarily brings about the impairment of mental faculties (CC art. 915(2)). CC art. 915(1) is augmented in CC art. 918 by a subsidiary liability imposed on grounds of equity and fairness. Under PORTUGUESE CC art. 488(1), a person is not responsible for the damaging effect of their conduct, if they are, for whatever reason, not capable of “understanding or desiring” those effects, unless this condition was self induced (STJ 25 July 1978, BolMinJus 279 [1978] 160) and only temporal in nature. It is rebuttably presumed that minors under the age of seven and persons who are subject to court protection owing to their mental illness are incapable of committing a tort (CC art. 488(2); Hörster, Parte geral, 351). Tortious capacity comprises of two limbs, namely an intellectual and a willed component (Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 384; STJ 13 January 1998, BolMinJus 473 [1998] 78). Furthermore, a person who is not capable of conducting himself or herself according to his or her knowledge or experience, is considered to be incapable of committing a tort. However, a person who is deemed not to possess the capacity to commit a tort may, under CC art. 489, come under an obligation to pay damages (in whole or in part) if the requirements of equity so demand. This liability which is incurred on equitable grounds,in turn, constitutes a subsidiary liability; this entails that it can only be invoked if no liability exists in respect of a breach of a duty to supervise or it cannot be realised. Apart from the existence of capacity to commit a tort, all (other) prequisites for the imposition of tort liability as enumerated under CC art. 489 are required to be extant. In Portugal, the assessment which is based on the

Article 5:301: Mental incompetence

11.

12.

13.

individual circumstance of the case at hand, takes account of the financial positions of the respective parties (Antunes Varela loc. cit. 565). Under CC art. 489 e. g. it was held that a man suffering from paranoia was liable to pay damages for conduct following his release from a relevant institution, where he attempted to murder 3 people, including his wife (STJ 13 January 1998 loc. cit.). The same holds true for a case where a man suffering from schizophrenia shot his father and an electrician who were present in his apartment. The wrongdoer came from an extremely wealthy family, following his death, the family of the electrician found themeselves living in very straightened financial circumstances (STJ 31 January 1996, BolMinJus 453 [1996] 205). DUTCH CC art. 6:162(3) clarifies that an unlawful act may be imputed to the wrongdoer, in the absence of fault if it results from a cause which is allocated to his sphere of risk by law. CC art. 6:165 is a case in point for the application of this provision. It lays down that a wrongful act (not however, omission) can also be imputed to person aged 14 or older, even if the act came about under the influence of a mental deficiency. Mental impairment does not alter the fact that the act was unlawful nor does it operate to affect the existence of civil responsibility (Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 661; Onrechtmatige Daad II (-Jansen), art. 6:165, nos. 3-5 pp. 2-24; CA ’s-Hertogenbosch 3 February 1998, VR 1999, no. 63 p. 114). However, the quantum of the damages owed may be reduced on equitable grounds (CC art. 6:109; Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 449; Asser (-Hartkamp) Verbintenissenrecht III12, nos. 86-89 pp. 105-108). The concept of “mental deficiency” is given a broad interpretation. It encompasses not only illness, intoxication but also embraces somnambulism and self inflicted injury caused in a state of unconsciousness (CFI Zwolle 13 November 1991, VR 1992, no. 111 p. 253 [doctor falls in a state of unconsciousness during the course of an operation; liability affirmed]; Jansen loc. cit. no. 6 pp. 24-44). ESTONIAN LOA § 1052 corresponds in all essential matters to Article 5:301(1). The rule, however, does not refer to the notion of ‘mental incompetence’ as such, but rather in terms of a person’s inability to understand the meaning of an activity or to direct it. The liability based on equity and fairness under LOA § 1052(3) is not limited to a reasonable compensation; it is necessary to adjudicate on the circumstances of the instant case whether an award of full compensation would be fair. A person who culpably induces a state which renders him or her incapable of committing a tort, remains liable (LOA § 1052(2); see Lahe, Juridica 2002, 391-400). In the NORDIC countries, legal capacity is not counted among the prerequisites necessary for the establishment of negligence or culpa. Psychological or other “internal” characteristics of the actor are, in principle, not taken into account (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 108, 140; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret6, 66; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 104; Rodhe, Obligationsrätt, 310). Conversly, physical infirmity is by all means taken into consideration, see SWEDISH HD 14 August 1948, NJA 1948, 489 (hard of hearing); DANISH Western CA 16 October 1967, UfR 1968, 133 (blind person stepped on a guitar which was lying on the ground; contributory negligence of the owner prevailed entirely) and Western CA 11 January 1995, FED 1995, 108 (a person who suffered an unforeseeable epileptic seizure stumbled against another person; no “act”, no liability). However, under SWEDISH Damages Liability Act chap. 2 § 5 the liability of the mentally disabled may be reduced on equitable grounds. A person who, while suffering from a mental illnes or impaired intellectual development, causes injury to a person or physical damage to property, is obliged to make reparation for the damage,

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but “only to the extent that this would be an equitable result having regard to the actor’s mental state, the nature of the act, whether liability insurance was extant and the economic positions of the parties as well as other relevant circumstances of the case at hand”. The same holds true, if a person causes such damage while suffering from impaired mental activity which was not voluntarily brought about and was not only of a temporary nature. Similar rules exist under DANISH EAL § 24b and FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 2 § 3. The general rule therefore connotes that mentally disabled persons are liable for the damage that they cause; howver, this liability may be reduced if equitable grounds exists for its mitigation (Swedish HD 15 April 1992, NJA 1992, 541; Swedish HD 24 September 1979, NJA 1979, 581; Swedish HD 17 June 1999, NJA 1999, 441; Danish HD 26 March 1926, UfR 1926, 380; Danish Western CA 4 February 2004, FED 2004, 177; Danish HD 20 January 2005, UfR 2005, 1259; FINNISH Supreme Court 19 June 1980, KKO 1980 II 67). It is important to note that the insurer cannot invoke the defence that the person insured suffered from a mental disorder (Swedish Insurance Contracts Act; Danish Insurance Contracts Act § 19; Finnish Insurance Contract Act chap. 4 § 36). Drunkenness or consumption of other intoxicating substances does not amount to a “mental disorder” under the regulations governing tort liability. The legal position of mentally incompetent persons in ENGLISH tort law is uncertain due to the paucity of case law. It is thought that such persons may escape liability in given circumstances because tortious liability (e. g. for trespass) will depend on voluntary conduct, whereas their condition may be such that that they simply do not know what they are doing. Conversely, if the mentally ill person knows the nature and quality of his act, the fact that his illness prevents him from knowing that what he was doing was wrong will not provide him with a defence to a tort where a specific intent or state of mind, e. g. malice, is not required: Morriss v. Marsden [1952] 1 All ER 925 (violent schizophrenic liable for assault). In relation to negligence it is assumed that the same principles apply as for children, i. e. in determining whether there was a breach of duty the mentally incompetent person will be measured against the standards of an ordinarily prudent and reasonable person of comparable mental condition (Clerk and Lindsell (-Murphy), Torts19, 5-59; Mansfield v. Weetabix Ltd. [1998] 1 WLR 1263 [lorry-driver employed unaware that he suffered from malignant insulinoma, resulting in a hypoglycaemic state starving the brain of glucose so that it was unable to function properly; at the end of a 40-mile journey he crashed into the plaintiff’s shop; court held his ability to drive properly was impaired by the hypoglycaemia and that he did not know and could not reasonably have known of his infirmity and was therefore not negligent]). The case is otherwise if the mentally incompetent person appreciates or ought to appreciate that by reason of their infirmty they will not be able to provide the care ordinarily required: cf. loc.cit. and see also Roberts v. Ramsbottom [1980] 1 WLR 823 (regarded in Mansfield as wrongly decided, but explicable on the basis that the defendant continued to drive when he should have appreciated his unfitness to do so).

Illustration 1 is taken from CA Celle 27 March 2002, NdsRpflege 2002, 263; illustration 2 from CFI Zwolle 13 November 1991, VR 1992 no. 111 p. 253; and illustration 3 from STJ 31 January 1996, BolMinJus 453 (1996) 205.

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Article 5:302: Event beyond control

Article 5:302: Event beyond control A person has a defence if legally relevant damage is caused by an abnormal event which cannot be averted by any reasonable measure and which is not to be regarded as that person’s risk.

Comments A.

General

1. Event beyond control as a defence in the framework of strict liability. This Article deals with the defence of an event beyond control. Under these model rules, this is only significant for the law on liability without intention or negligence. This is because where an uncontrollable event has caused the damage, then it is already a certainty that, to this extent, the person could not have acted negligently. Where an uncontrollable natural occurrence was, however, foreseeable and where the consequences of it could and should have been avoided by taking anticipatory measures, then under the criteria set out in Article 3:102 (Negligence), negligence is to be affirmed. There is no room for Article 5:302 here; the two provisions preclude each other. 2. Accountability without intention or negligence. This Article can also be important in the realm of employers’ liability (Article 3:201 (Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives)) – however, only where the employee’s liability does not depend on negligence. Illustration 1 While dismantling his market stall, a trader leaves his unsold goods (items of clothing), packed in plastic refuse sacks, unattended behind his stall. Third parties unknown to him carry the bags to the side of the street. On their daily route, the local refuse collectors take the plastic bags with them; the pieces of clothing are mixed with domestic waste in the bin truck and are irreparably damaged. The refuse collectors did not act negligently (Article 3:201(1)(b) (Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives)). Their employer would not be liable even where it transpired that one of them was the owner of the truck: the defence in Article 5:302 would not only be of benefit to the refuse collector, but also to the employer.

B.

Event beyond control

3. Notion. An event beyond control is an abnormal occurrence which cannot be averted by any reasonable measure and which is not to be regarded as the realisation of a risk for which a person is responsible under Chapter 3, Section 2 (Accountability without intention or negligence). As far as possible and reasonable for the purposes of the law on non-contractual liability, this definition follows the corresponding rules provided by CISG art. 79(1) and DCFR III. – 3:104 (Excuse due to an impediment) for contract law. 881

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4. Two elements. An event beyond control is thus characterised by two elements – a factual one and a normative one. On the factual plane it is marked by the fact that the cause of damage would not have been discovered or precluded even if as much care had been taken as could possibly be expected in the circumstances. On the normative plane, damage must not have resulted from the realisation of the very risk on account of which liability is rendered strict. The Article does not address the distinction between “force majeure” and an “inescapable event”. This distinction is not prevalent in many Member States’ private law systems and, even where it is recognised, the boundary between force majeure and inescapable event is often drawn by reference to different criteria. The defence under the Article does not depend on whether the actual cause of the damage is a natural occurrence or human behaviour (that of a third party or the victim), but on the fact that even where extraordinary care and prudence is exercised, it could not have been foreseen or, though foreseeable, could not have been avoided. 5. Abnormal event. The defence of an event beyond control only comes into play where an abnormal event was causative of the damage. Damage from the continuous operation of equipment would rarely constitute such an abnormal event. Nor would injury to health caused by the regular noise of low-flying aircraft. Everyday events do not lend themselves well to being termed events beyond control. Illustration 2 An abnormal event would be where a bolt of lightning causes a sudden power cut, which in turn leads to an electrical cable being broken and a house being set on fire. Conversely, such an abnormal event is lacking where the power cut and subsequent cable breakage occur because birds have sat on a power line and momentarily connect it with another power line, so that a short-circuit occurs. 6. ‘Not to be regarded as that person’s risk’. The predominant field of application for the defence is naturally that of strict liability. The purpose of the Article is not, however, to reduce the strict liability of keepers, occupiers, owners, producers or operators “through the back-door” to mere liability for negligence. Its sole purpose is to keep strict liability within the borders of the risk for which it exists. Illustration 3 Where a terrorist ignites a bomb that has been deposited on a bus, the danger normally lying in vehicles is no longer an issue. From the point of view of the bus driver, this is an event beyond control exonerating him or her from liability. Illustration 4 During the night, martens nibble at the brake cable of a car parked in a town. The conduct of the martens is “beyond any control”, but the risk that the car brakes do not function as the result of such an event must be borne by the keeper of the car. Illustration 5 A fire breaks out in a train station because an extraordinarily strong gale throws a tree on to the electricity line and breaks it. The railway operator is not liable under Article 3:202 (Accountability for damage caused by the unsafe state of an immo882

Article 5:302: Event beyond control

vable) or under Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage). 7. Relationship to contributory fault. In contrast to the defence of contributory fault, the defence of an event beyond control always leads to a complete exclusion of liability and never merely to an apportionment of damage. Where the victim’s contributory fault is totally dominant the result can, however, be the same because a reduction of liability “to zero” will then also come about by the application of Article 5:102 (Contributory fault and accountability). Illustration 6 The facts are the same as in illustration 1, with the only difference that it is not third parties who place the refuse sacks filled with goods at the side of the street, but the market dealer himself. His contributory fault is so extensive that it is indistinguishable from an event beyond control.

Notes 1.

In FRANCE, whether force majeure is given, depends on the presence of three cumulative criteria, namely the extériorité, the imprévisibilité and the irrésistibilité of the harmful event (Malaurie/Aynès/Stoffel-Munck, Les obligations, no. 195 p. 96; le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2004/2005), nos. 1807-1824). The most important element is the irrésistibilité, i. e. it was impossible to avoid the event occurring or to take measures to resist its occurrence (Malaurie/Aynès/Stoffel-Munck loc. cit.). The irrésistibilité of an occurrence is assessed in abstracto; an event will only be qualified as force majeure if the average person in the position of the defendant could not have avoided its occurrence (le Tourneau loc. cit. no. 1808). The precise connotations of the imprévisibilité requirement were equivocal for a period of time. Whereas the Second Chamber of the Cour de cassation adhered to the view that the presence of this criterion was indispensible, the remaining Civil Chambers were inclined to regard irrésistibilité as sufficient to qualify an event as force majeure (see further le Tourneau loc. cit. no. 1813). However, Cass.ass.plén. 14 April 2006, JCP éd. G 2006, no. 194 p. 835 made clear that the approach of the second Civil Chamber must be followed, i. e. that the irrésistibilité as well as the imprévisibilité are required to subsist in order for an event to qualify as a force majeure event. The extériorité characteristic (cf. for contract law CC art. 1147) denotes that the relevant event was not within the sphere of control of the person invoking the defence of force majeure (le Tourneau and Cadiet loc. cit. no. 1816). A case will serve to illustrate this requirement: a company providing water supply services which was under a contractual obligation de résultat in regard of the supply of drinking water could not invoke the defence of force majeure; the water had to be free of nitrate and pesticide residues (Cass.civ. 30 May 2006, D. 2006, 1705). If it is ascertained that the damage is based on force majeure, then the liability of the putative tortfeasor is completely denied (le Tourneau and Cadiet loc. cit. no. 1803). This rule is valid in the arena of liability for fait personnel as well as in the field of liability for fait d’autrui and for fait des choses (Flour/ Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II10, no. 168 p. 160 and no. 228 p. 233). A faute on the part of the tortfeasor or strict liability under CC arts. 1384-1386 is also denied, if the faute of

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the victim which was causal for the damage, exhibits attributes of force majeure (Cass.civ. 25 June 1998, Bull.civ. 1998, II, no. 238 p. 141; Cass.civ. 11 July 2002, Bull.civ. 2002, II, no. 174 p. 138; CA Poitiers 18 May 2005, JCP 2006, IV 2302; Cass.ass.plén. 14 April 2006, D. 2006, 1577, note Jourdain [Suicide; force majeure for the rail company]). However, as regards liability for road traffic accidents, the “Badinter Act” (Loi Badinter) art. 2 provides that it is not open to the driver or gardien of a motor vehicle to invoke the defence of force majeure or rely on a fait d’un tiers vis-à-vis the victim (see above the notes under Article 3:205 (Accountability for damage caused by motor vehicles)). In BELGIUM, for the most part force majeure /overmacht is defined as an event which occurs independently of the will of a person, is unforeseeable and unavoidable. In contrast to France, the extériorité of the event does not count as a prerequisite for the establishment of force majeure/overmacht. Similarly, in Belgium, the main focus is on the issue of the unavoidability of the event. A foreseeable event which is unavoidable can qualify as a force majeure/overmacht event. Naturally, the successful invocation of this defence, is contingent on whether the alleged tortfeasor himself or herself caused the force majeure/overmacht-event (Tilleman and Claeys (-Claeys), Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid, 1, 16-17, nos. 21-22). Force majeure /overmacht results in a complete denial of liability for faute as well as in areas governed by strict liability (Claeys loc. cit. p. 24 no. 38). According to SPANISH CC art. 1105, a person is not liable for an event which was unforeseeable or for a foreseeable event which could not have been avoided. A different approach is only adopted if a law or contract provides otherwise. CC art. 1105 is also employed in the realm of extra contractual liability (TS 16 February 1988, RAJ 1988 (2) no. 1994 p. 1966; TS 5 February 1991, RAJ 1991 (1) no. 991 p. 1188; TS 4 April 2000, RAJ 2000 (2) no. 2506 p. 3887). Consequently, the resulting damage cannot have been intended, foreseeable or avoidable (TS 31 May 1995, RAJ 1995 (2) no. 4106 p. 5467; TS 20 July 1995, RAJ 1995 (3) no. 5717 p. 7654). The burden of proof rests on the person who caused damage (TS 2 February 1989, RAJ 1989 (1) no. 657 p. 713). However, the terminology employed in the Civil Code is vacillatory. Occasionally the concept of caso fortuito (CC arts. 1096(3), 1891) is utilised, in other areas fuerza mayor (CC arts. 1784, 1905 and 1908(3)), other governing provisions employ either both concepts (CC arts. 1602, 1625), or, here and there completely different expressions are used (e. g. CC art. 484: siniestro o caso extraordinario [misfortune or extraordinary event]; CC art. 499: acontecimiento no común [extraordinary event ] and CC art. 1561: causa inevitable [unavoidable cause]). In general, the following holds true, a debtor is deemed not to be responsible for an “absolutely unavoidable” event, i. e. events that, in the best case scenario could be resisted with “excessive” and therefore unreasonable efforts (prestación exorbitante) (TS 9 November 1949, RAJ 1949 no. 1245 p. 750; TS 7 April 1965, RAJ 1965 (1) no. 2118 p. 1295). Case law inclines to the view that a fuerza mayor must constitute an unforeseeable event which is completely outside the debtor’s activities, whereas a caso fortuito connotes an unavoidable event, which is connected with the debtor’s activities (TS 15 February 1968, RAJ 1968 (1) no. 1082 p. 733; TS 30 September 1983, RAJ 1983 (2) no. 4688 p. 3594 and TS 3 March 1999, RAJ 1999 (1) no. 1400 p. 2235). The distinction between caso fortuito and fuerza mayor is primarily of relevance within the context of (strict) state liability, because the State is only permitted to raise the case of fuerza mayor as a defence. The presence of a caso fortuito will not lead to a denial of liability (see further TS 31 May 1999, RAJ 1999 (4) no. 6154

Article 5:302: Event beyond control

4.

5.

p. 9656; TS 15 February 1968 loc. cit. and TS 28 July 1986, RAJ 1986 no. 4451 p. 4279). However, TS 30 September 1983 loc. cit. stressed that, within the context of CC arts. 1784 (liability of custodian) and 1905 (liability of animal keeper), a distinction must be drawn between fuerza mayor and caso fortuito, because in both cases only a fuerza mayor will operate to absolve the putative tortfeasor from liability. In addition, most of the laws which impose strict liability, either refer solely to fuerza mayor (e. g. Hunting Act [Ley 1/1970, of 4 April, de Caza] art. 33(5); Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act art. 1(1)(i); Social Insurance Act [Real Decreto Legislativo 1/ 1994, of 20 June, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley General de la Seguridad Social] art. 115(4)(a)), or expressly list the events that qualify as a fuerza mayor (e. g. Nuclear Energy Act [Ley 25/1964, of 29 April, sobre Energía Nuclear] art. 45(3)). Air Navigation Act (Ley 48/1960, of 21 July, sobre Navegación Aérea) art. 120 expressly provides that a caso fortuito does not constitute a ground of exculpation; a fuerza mayor must be established. Fuerza mayor “or” caso fortuito was affirmed in a case where, as a result of a storm (92 km/h), a tree fell against an electricity power line which in turn caused a fire at a railway station; the electricity supply company was not liable for the damage (TS 12 September 2002, RAJ 2002 (5) no. 8555 p. 15592). The same result was reached in a case involving a minor who was killed by a falling electricity cable, owing to the fact that the accident was due to extraordinary weather conditions (TS 15 December 1996, RAJ 1996 (5) no. 8979 p. 12495). ITALIAN jurisprudence has also applied the contractual regulation contained in CC art. 1218 analogously for the field of tort law. This provision concerns damaging events which stem from insurmountable and unforeseeable natural phenomenona or unavoidable and unforeseeable acts of a third party (Cass. 5 December 1967, no. 2897, Rep.Giur.it., voce Resp. civ. 165; Cass. 7 September 1966, no. 2333, Rep.Giur.it. 1966, voce Resp. civ. 232; Cass. 22 Mai 1998, no. 5133, Danno e resp. 1998, 945). No distinction is drawn in tort law (in contrast to the criminal law) between caso fortuito and forza maggiore; indeed, the courts often use these terms interchangeably (Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, sub art. 2051, p. 575). Ultimately, such cases are regarded as connoting that there is a lack of a causal nexus between the damage and the tortfeasor’s act or the source of danger for which he or she was responsible (Cass. 13 April 1989, no. 1774, Giur.it.Mass. 1989, fasc. 4; Cass. 8 January 1981, no. 170, Giur.it.Mass. 1981, fasc. 1). Caso fortuito is the defence typically invoked in the context of strict liability e. g. within the framework of CC art. 2051. HUNGARIAN CC § 339(1) bases tort law on a system whereby the onus is generally on the damaging party to prove that “he or she acted in a manner that can be generally expected in the given situation”. In a number of special provisions (e. g. CC § 352(1) [liability for buildings]) the same formula is repeated. A stricter benchmark applies in the strict liability context (CC §§ 345-346). According to CC § 345(1) a person who carries on an activity imbued with considerable hazards will only be released from liability if he or she can adduce proof that the damage arose due to an unavoidable event which did not arise in connection with the carrying out of the hazardous activity. This corresponds to Article 5:302 in all essential matters. Vis maior can constitute such an unavoidable reason under CC § 345(1); however, it could also be envisaged that the injured party himself or indeed a third party could furnish the unavoidable cause. For example, an unavoidable reason was deemed to be present which operated to relieve a bus operator from liability, where a third party deposited a bomb in a bus and subse-

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7.

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quently detonated it (BH 2000/200). The unavoidable criterion is only given, when, viewed objectively, it was impossible for the injuring party to prevent the damage occurring (Wellmann loc. cit.; Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 106-107). The following occurrences are not outside the tortfeasor’s sphere of responsibility: unforeseeable tyre blow-out, defective brakes or the sudden indisposition of the driver (Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1263-1268; Petrik (-Wellmann), Polgári jog II2, 590-592). In ROMANIAN Civil law, a distinction is drawn between fort¸a majora˘ and cazul fortuit. Force majeure is a complete defence to liability. Force majeure connotes an extraordinary external event which was neither foreseeable nor could have been avoided (CC arts. 1082 and 1083; CSJ 27 January 2000, sect¸ia comerciala˘, decision no. 414). Ground frost during the winter naturally does not amount to force majeure (CSJ 4 February 1999, sect¸ia comerciala˘, decision no. 403). Conversely, extraordinary natural events do amount to force majeure, as do wars and insurgences. A “happenstance” could be regarded as stemming from internal factors, for example, the hidden defect or an animal’s fear; happenstance begins where fault ends. In a similar fashion, happenstance generally excludes the imposition of liability; however, in some fields, it is expressly deemed to be inapplicable (nuclear accidents, damage caused by airplanes etc.). Furthermore, the only defence to the imposition of strict liability under CC arts. 1000(1), 1001 and 1002 is force majeure (Romos¸an, Vinova˘t¸ia, 99; Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘, 368 with citations from case law). BULGARIAN case law adheres to the distinction between casus fortuitis and force majeure (Overview in Kalaydjiev, Obligazionno pravo, Obshta chast, 274). Casus fortuitis is composed of an unforeseeable and thereby blameless event, force majeure denotes the consequences of an event which even if they were foreseeable could not be eluded; the typical example is a natural catastrophe (Kalaydjiev loc. cit. 276). Casus fortuitis permits an excuplation from liability (only) within the framework of fault-based liability; force majeure alone is a defence in a case of strict liability (Tassev, Nepozvoleno uvrejdane, 172). Consequently, the operator of a mine remains liable if, owing to an imperceptible crack, rock blasting causes an unforeseeable avalanche resulting in personal injury (Supreme Court 10 December 1960, decision no. 868, case no. 7466/60 in civil matters). According to the Labour Code art. 200(2), an employer is liable to his employee for work accidents even in the case of force majeure (on this matter critical Tassev loc. cit. 173, who suggests that this result should be corrected by judicial intrepretation). POLISH CC art. 435 § 1 restricts the strict liability of a person, who runs on his own account an enterprise or business set in motion by natural forces (steam, gas, electricity, liquid fuels etc.) via the defence of force majeure. Similarly, the SLOVENIAN Law of Obligations Act does not contain a general defence of an event beyond control. However, LOA § 153(1) releases the keeper of a dangerous thing from liability “if it is shown that the damage originated from any cause outside the object whose effect could not be foreseen, avoided or averted”. For the most part, under GERMAN law only höhere Gewalt (force majeure), see e. g. Road Traffic Act § 7(2); Liability Act (Haftpflichtgesetz) §§ 1(2) and § 2(3)(iii); Environmental Liability Act (Umwelthaftungsgesetz) § 4; Water Resources Act (Wasserhaushaltsgesetz) § 22(2)(ii) affords a defence to the imposition of strict liability. Sporadically, the caso fortuito, the unabwendbare Ereignis (unavoidable event) (Road Traffic Act § 17(3); Liability Act § 13(3)) can operate as a defence, but this criterion typically only come to the fore within the framework of the internal relationship between keepers who are

Article 5:302: Event beyond control

8.

9.

10.

jointly and severally liable and in the context of their obligation to make contribution. Höhere Gewalt in the context of liability of keepers of motor vehicles connotes an extraordinary, external cause, which arises from elemental forces of nature or is caused by the acts of third parties and viewed from human experience and knowledge connotes an unavoidable event which cannot be prevented by resorting to reasonable financial measures nor by exercising extreme care that would be expected in the circumstances (Hentschel (-König), Straßenverkehrsrecht39, § 7 StVG, no. 32). A typical case concerns unforeseeable natural events (sudden flooding, lightening, earthquake, landslide, avalanche, squalls). Conversely, gross violations of regulations do not come within the scope of force majeure (breaching rules pertaining to the right of way, misconduct of children), see further König loc. cit. no. 34). An unavoidable event connotes an event which cannot be avoided even if extreme care is adopted. The primary way in which it can be practically distinguished from force majeure is in the fact that one is permitted to repose trust in other road traffic user that they will refrain from grossly violating the rules of the road (König loc. cit. nos. 22 and 31). According to AUSTRIAN EKHG § 9, the keeper of a motor vehicle’s duty to compensate is denied, if the accident was caused by an unabwendbares Ereignis i. e. if the accident could not be avoided, despite taking all imaginable precautions and care (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht II2, 546). The following case will serve to illustrate. A keeper is not liable for damage which a stone lying on navigated street causes, after the motor vehicle accidently caused it to be hurled about (OGH 21 January 1959, SZ 32/10). In particular, an event is deemed to be unavoidable according to EKHG § 9(2), if it can be attributed to the conduct of the injured party, to a third party who was not operating the vehicle or an animal and if the keeper or driver had observed the due care that was necessary in the circumstances of the case. Conversely, if, in connection with the operation of a vehicle, a risk (if also extraordinary) is realised, then liability ensues (e. g. OGH 30 September 1965, SZ 38/152: insect sting to the eye of the driver). Forestry Act § 53 no. 4 corresponds to EKHG § 9. In sporadic cases, höhere Gewalt operates as a defence to liability (Nuclear Liability Act § 9; Conduit of Gas and Liquids Act § 12; further references and details in Koziol loc. cit. 430 and 578). Traditionally, force majeure also provides a defence to liability in GREECE. However, the exact particulars of force majeure is a matter of some debate and the subject of an array of theories (in-depth Kornilakis, I evthini apo diakindinevsi, 175 ff). The better view may be that the concept enjoys a meaning which varies subtly from provision to provision. (Kornilakis loc. cit. 176). The defence of force majeure is expressly mentioned in, inter alia, the Act of 1911 concerning the liability for traffic accidents art. 5 (further examples can be found in Dimopoulou, Evthini apo diakindinevsi, 62). Only unforeseeable and unavoidable events, which occur even after taking the greatest amount of care and which do not connote a typical risk associated with the operation of a motor vehicle fall within the scope of the defence of force majeure (Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio, Geniko meros, 693; CA Thessaloniki 274/1980, Arm 34/1980, 462). A particularly dangerous slippy patch on the motorway does not amount to force majeure (CA Thessaloniki loc. cit.), even where it was caused by an oil spill (CFI Drama, EsingD 1992, 96). Similarly, PORTUGUESE law employs the concepts caso de força maior and caso fortuito. Both concepts describe an unforeseeable and unavoidable event (Prata, Dicionário jurídico4, 184; Melo Franco and Antunes Martins, Dicionário de conceitos, 151). A different view regards force majeure as defined by the unforeseeability element, whereas

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11.

12.

888

caso fortuito is characterised by the unavoidable factor (Almeida Costa, Obrigações10, 586; Prata loc. cit.). Of course, force majeure is the only available defence to the imposition of liability which is not based on fault. For example, CC art. 505 precludes the imposition of liability under CC art. 503 (on strict liability for accidents caused by vehicles), if the cause of the accident can be attributed to the injured party or a third party or if it can be ascribed to force majeure, which does not arise in connection with the vehicle’s operation. Whether an unavoidable loss of control over the vehicle (as a consequence of an oil spill or black ice on the motorway) amounts to force majeure, has been the subject of differing judicial pronouncements (in the affirmative e. g. STJ 11 December 1970, BolMinJus 202 [1970] 190; in the negative CA Oporto 2 June 2005 and STJ 9 January 2003; in a similar fashion Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, art. 505 note 4, p. 519 and Almeida Costa loc. cit.). A controversial topic is also whether the sudden unconsciousness of the driver can be regarded as falling within the scope of force majeure (of this view Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 668 and Almeida Costa loc. cit. 645; for an opposing view STJ 10 Febuary 2005 and STJ 27 July 1971, BolMinJus 209 [1971] 120). Liability for damage caused by electricity cables and gas pipes is excluded under CC art. 509(2) if the damage is due to force majeure, whereby “force majeure connotes every external cause which is not connected to the operation or use of a thing”. In this context, force majeure is given, when a ray provokes an electrical discharge which leads to the break of a high-tension wire which causes a fire (STJ 3 October 2000, CJ(ST) X (2002-3) 77). Conversely, force majeure was not established where an electric cable came into contact with another cable after a bird rested on it, leading to it short circuiting, falling and causing death (CA Coimbra 15 January 1991, CJ (1991-1) XVI 47). Finally, Labour Code art. 291(1) relieves the employer from liability if an occupational accident is caused by force majeure. Force majeuere under this provision solely connotes an event ”which due to unavoidable forces of nature, independent from human intervention, does not constitute a risk created by the conditions of work nor occurs during performance of the services expressly ordered by the employer in conditions of obvious danger”. In ESTONIA, an event beyond control (LOA § 103(2)) is primarily understood to mean that it has the effect of breaking the chain of causation. If, in exceptional circumstances, this is not the case, then, as a general rule, imposing liability for fault is nonetheless precluded (see further Lahe, Juridica 2003, 236-242). The imposition of strict liability for dangerous activities (such as, the operation of motor vehicles, machines, utilising electrical or nuclear energy and the use of explosives or poisonous substances) under LITHUANIAN CC art. 6.270(1) is subject to the proviso that the damage was not caused by force majeure. The defendant bears the burden of proof. Whilst DUTCH CC art. 6:162(2) does indeed provide that the prerequisite for an unlawful act is the absence of a ground of justification; the provision fails to fill out the particulars of the ground of justification, owing to the fact that its exact constitutents can be determined by referring to the criminal law, which is also applicable in the civil law context. CP art. 40 (“A person is not liable for an act under criminal law if that act was compelled by force majeure [overmacht]”) is of analogous application. This includes all situations of compulsion which are impossible to check (Onrechtmatige Daad I (-Jansen), art. 6:162(2), nos. 171-172 pp. 1782-1783; Schrage, Van delict tot onrechtmatige daad, 71; see on necessity the previous note III 28 under Article 5:202). Overmacht connotes a sudden extraordinary situation which has occurred, which could not have

Article 5:302: Event beyond control

13.

14.

been foreseen and which left the act in question unavoidable (Jansen loc. cit. no. 173 pp. 1786-1826). If a vehicle remains at a standstill, this is regarded as a case of force majeure. Of course, this state of affairs will not therefore preclude the imposition of liability for a subsequent accident because the driver failed to secure the place where the accident took place in an adequate manner. Only where, and this argument is rarely successful, the defendant could not be expected to reckon with the actual behaviour of the other road users will the imposition of liability be precluded (Spier/Hartlief/Van Maanen/Vriesendorp, Verbintenissen uit de wet en Schadevergoeding (-Hartlief)2, no. 157 p. 142; Jansen loc. cit. no. 175 pp. 1830-1850). In the NORDIC Countries, force majeure is not a generally recognised defence within strict liability, and it plays only a minor role in defining the scope of that liability (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 177; Hellner, in: In memoriam Jean Limpens, 53, 59; cf. Rodhe, Obligationsrätt, 540; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret6, 149; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 215 ; Sandvik, JFT 1998, 544, 550). Force majeure is explicitly provided for as a defence only in legislation which has its origin in international conventions (such as strict liability for nuclear installations, maritime and railway traffic). Conversely, it is not expected that the courts will accept the defence of force majeure in the context of environmental liability (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit.; Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 339, 342; Sandvik loc. cit.). The general question raised is whether and in what manner the concept of adequate causation could apply in the strict liability context; a thorny issue is that it does not depend on (or not essentially on) probability and foreseeability of the relevant harm (Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans, 105). At any rate, it is required that the risk, at which the strict liability provision is directed at containing, materalises (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 176; Andersson loc. cit. 396; Saxén loc. cit. 216). As regards strict liability regimes which have their basis solely in judge-made law (and not in statute), the courts tend to consider the entry of extraordinary circumstances as nullifying liability (e. g. Swedish HD 16 October 1997, NJA 1997, 684 [flooding, after very heavy rainfall, forced a dam to burst]; Swedish HD 10 March 1983, NJA 1983, 209 [ force majeure explicitly accepted in a quasi-contractual context]; Danish HD 18 August 1983, UfR 1983, 866 and 2 September 1983, UfR 1983, 895 [broken water pipes; no strict liability for “unforeseeable” damage]; Danish HD 12 February 1987, UfR 1987, 258 [flooding of a sewage installation caused by extraordinary amounts of rainfall; no defective construction of the pipe systems]); see further Hornslet, UfR 1987 B, 288-291; von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 160 and Sandvik, loc. cit. 556. Under ENGLISH law proof that damage arose as a result of an “inevitable accident” (i. e. one which no precaution which a reasonable person could be expected to take could prevent) serves only to negative fault, it thus has no function as a defence to strict liability (where absence of fault is no defence): Clerk and Lindsell (-Jones), Torts19, paras. 3-138. In relation to negligence (where breach of a duty of care must be established) the defence merely amounts to a prima facie statement of “no case” or as a genuine defence if the evidential onus is reversed as a result of res ipsa loquitur: Ng Chun Pui v. Lee Chuen Tat [1988] RTR 298 (PC). The same is true of its operation in the law on trespass, which (in its modern form) does require intention or negligence, but where the onus may be on the defendant to show absence of fault once the causation of the damage is established. The application of the defence to liability for breach of statutory duty depends on whether, in relation to the particular statutory provision at hand, this is in substance a fault or no-fault-based tort.The defence of act of God, by contrast, can in

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principle apply to strict liability torts, although the requirement of foreseeability of damage for liability under Rylands v. Fletcher (following the decision in Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc. [1994] 2 AC 264) means that this defence is superfluous: ibid. However, there is no defence of act of God against strict liability under the Animals Act 1971: Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale and Jones), Torts19, paras. 22-10 and 2215. Whether the defence of act of God applies to breach of statutory duty again depends on the degree of absoluteness of the obligation which the provision imposes and thus turns on the wording of the legislation: cf. Great Western Railway Co. v. Owners of the SS Mostyn (The Mostyn) [1928] AC 57. Illustration 2 is taken from STJ 3 October 2000, CJ(ST) X (2002-3) 77 and CA Coimbra 15 January 1991, CJ 1991-1 (XVI) 47; illustration 3 from BH 2000/200; illustration 5 from TS 12 September 2002, RAJ 2002 (5) no. 8555 p. 15592; and illustration 6 from CA Poitiers 18 May 2005, JCP 2006, IV, 2302.

Section 4:

Contractual exclusion and restriction of liability Article 5:401: Contractual exclusion and restriction of liability (1) Liability for causing legally relevant damage intentionally cannot be excluded or restricted. (2) Liability for causing legally relevant damage as a result of a profound failure to take such care as is manifestly required in the circumstances cannot be excluded or restricted: (a) in respect of personal injury (including fatal injury); or (b) if the exclusion or restriction is otherwise illegal or contrary to good faith and fair dealing. (3) Liability for damage for the causation of which a person is accountable under Article 3:204 (Accountability for damage caused by defective products) cannot be restricted or excluded. (4) Other liability under this Book can be excluded or restricted unless statute provides otherwise.

Comments A.

Exclusion and restriction of liability

1. Pre-emptive exclusion of liability. This Article relates exclusively to the validity of a pre-emptive exclusion or restriction of liability. It is not concerned with agreements on liability after the event giving rise to the damage. Once liability arises, any agreed absolution from that liability is a transaction relating to an existing debt. That is not an ‘exclusion’ of liability. Ex post facto agreements as to liability are therefore subject to no special restrictions; nobody is obliged to exercise a right (apart from cases where a person is bound in some such capacity as a guardian to make a claim on behalf of a ward.) 2. Exclusion and restriction of liability. The Article covers both contractual arrangements for the complete exclusion of possible subsequent liability and arrangements under which the materialisation of such liability is made dependent on certain circumstances (e. g. no liability in cases of slight negligence) or its level restricted. Included are all agreements which put the subsequently injured person in a worse position than if there were no rules on non-contractual liability. 3. Implied exclusion of liability. An exclusion or reduction of liability does not have to be expressly agreed upon. A contract with this effect can come into existence implicitly. Illustration 1 Where help is provided out of courtesy in rescuing a lorry which is stuck, an implied exclusion of liability for slight negligence is to be inferred in all events where the rescue is risky due to the surrounding local conditions and available aids.

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4. Contractual exclusions. Agreements as to liability require a valid contract between the injuring person and the injured person. This in turn is subject to the general rules, particularly the provisions on concluding a contract, and the invoking of standard terms and their validity. In a range of cases, the restriction of liability by contractual terms is already struck at under DCFR II. – 9:411 (Terms which are presumed to be unfair in contracts between a business and a consumer) paragraph (1)(a). These provisions remain unaffected by Article 5:401, see Article 1:103 (Scope of application) sub-paragraph (c). 5. Unilaterally imparted information. Unilaterally imparted items of information do not constitute agreements restricting or excluding liability within the meaning of this Article. Their significance for the law on liability lies in other fields. So, for example, a remark by the provider of information that “no liability is accepted” for the accuracy of the information imparted can lead to the recipient of the information having no reasonable ground to rely on the accuracy of the communication within the meaning of Article 2:207 (Loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or information) paragraph (1); see Illustration 2 under that Article. Often the very wording of unilaterally provided items of information does not contain a statement as to liability, but rather draws attention to a particular source of danger (“During snowfall and icy weather, this path will not be cleared”, or “Beware of biting dog”). Then, depending on the circumstances, it may have to be decided whether the information justifies the inference that there was no negligence, that the piece of land was not in an unsafe state or that overwhelming contributory fault is to be ascribed to the injured person because that person proceeded, without good reason, into a situation known to be dangerous. 6. Freedom of contract. The Article stems from the principle of freedom of contract. This allows the parties to set precautionary stipulations in relation to non-contractual liability possibly arising between them in the future. Paragraph (4) reflects this principle. 7. Basis. The rationale behind the extension of the principle of freedom of contract to non-contractual liability is not self-evident. Under these model rules it follows primarily from the principle of free concurrence of contractual and non-contractual claims (‘cumul des responsabilités’), which is set out in Article 1:103 (Scope of application). Even at the level of the law governing the exclusion and restriction of liability, this demands a greater synchronisation of the two regimes than would be necessary had these model rules proceeded on the basis of the opposing principle of mutual exclusivity of contractual and non-contractual liability (‘non-cumul des responsabilités’). Illustration 2 Where a person leaves a suit at the cleaners and it is returned damaged, (where there is negligence as to its cleaning) there isn’t only a claim for damages for nonperformance of a contractual obligation, but also a claim for damages under the law on non-contractual liability. Where and in so far as it is possible in such cases to limit the contractual liability to a pre-agreed multiple of the amount to be paid for cleaning a suit, it must also be possible to come to a corresponding agreement for parallel liability under this Book; the agreement to restrict liability would be pointless otherwise. 892

Article 5:401: Contractual exclusion and restriction of liability

8. Exceptions. However, no Member State’s legal system (nor Community law) handles the law on the exclusion and restriction of non-contractual liability without having a large number of exceptions to the principle of freedom of contract. After long and controversial discussion, Article 5:401 strives for a middle ground, which (as with the law on liability without negligence or intention, above; see Article 3:207 (Other accountability for the causation of legally relevant damage)) partially operates with references to the respectively applicable national law. The principles are as follows. (i) An exclusion or restriction of non-contractual liability for damage should generally not be permitted if it relates to the intentional causation of legally relevant damage of any type. (ii) An exclusion or restriction of liability should likewise not be permitted if it relates to grossly negligent causation of legally relevant damage and if either the latter consists of personal injury or, where other types of legally relevant damage occur, the exclusion would be illegal or immoral. (iii) Producers’ liability for damage caused by a defective product under Article 3:204 (Accountability for damage caused by defective products) cannot be excluded or restricted. (iv) Although, in all other cases, the general principle of freedom of contract prevails, it remains subject to statutory limitations in the applicable national law. In this way paragraph (4) provides room for certain “isolated solutions” to regional and precisely defined sectors of the law on liability. Conversely, paragraph (2)(b) contains a special rule applicable only to damage caused by gross negligence and to this extent grants the law of contract precedence over the law on non-contractual liability.

B.

No exclusion of liability for damage caused intentionally (paragraph (1))

9. Policy considerations. Paragraph (1) contains a rule which is widely regarded as axiomatic: agreements waiving liability in the case of future intentional damage are essentially the prototype for an immoral contract, since this boils down to rendering oneself defenceless against another. Agreements with such content are invalid, regardless of the type of damage. 10. Employers’ liability. Paragraph (1) does not rule out the situation in which an employer excludes or restricts liability for eventual intentional wrongs on the part of personnel, e. g. for thefts. If contained in standard terms, however, usually such an exclusion or restriction of liability will fail under the fairness test and, in relation to physical injury already falls under DCFR II. – 9:411(1)(a) (Terms which are presumed to be unfair in contracts between a business and a consumer). 11. Line of demarcation with consent and acting at own risk. The impossibility of contracting out of subsequent liability for the intentional infliction of damage does not affect the defences of consent and acting at own risk (see Article 5:101 (Consent and acting at own risk)). The difference lies in the fact that consent relates to a concrete event and acting at own risk pertains to an occurrence which by its nature is foreseen, while the exclusion of liability for intentionally caused damage would include acts that do not remain within the context of something agreed in advance between the injuring person and the injured person.

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C.

Exclusion of liability in cases of gross negligence (paragraph (2))

12. Personal injury (sub-paragraph (a)). In accordance with the position adopted in an overwhelming number of European legal systems, and in line with the policy of placing a high value on protecting body and health, paragraph (2)(a) rules out the exclusion of liability for personal injuries caused by gross negligence. In any event, the rule only has significance for individual agreements; in standard terms between businesses and consumers, every term in a contract is presumed to be unfair if it “excludes or limits the liability of a business for death or personal injury caused to a consumer through an act or omission of that business”, see DCFR II. – 9:411 (Terms which are presumed to be unfair in contracts between a business and a consumer). Both rules ensure that the rights of dependants and (in the case of fatal injuries) the surviving dependants are immune from a contractual exclusion of liability. 13. “Gross negligence”. Paragraph (2) does not explicitly invoke the concept of “gross negligence” as such. Instead it provides an immediate definition: gross negligence consists of a profound failure to take such care as is manifestly required in the circumstances. 14. Other types of legally relevant damage (sub-paragraph (b)). Where damage of another type is at issue (e. g. damage to property), an exclusion of liability for causing such damage through gross negligence is invalid where it is illegal or offends against the precepts of good faith. Hence, paragraph (2)(b) is linked to the rules in DCFR II. – 7:301 and in DCFR II. – 7:302 (Infringement of fundamental principles or mandatory rules) and refers to the rules of the applicable contract law. An exclusion of liability for property damage caused by gross negligence is thus impossible where the national applicable national law stands in opposition to it, e. g. because the law governing the exclusion of liability deals with intention and gross negligence in principle in the same way. Alongside this, Article 5:401(2)(b) is based on whether, under the circumstances of each individual case, it is to be deemed an offence against the principle of good faith for a personally grossly negligent injuring person to invoke an equivalent contractual exclusion of liability. An implied waiver of liability is to be denied without exception in cases of gross negligence. A contractual exclusion of liability is in any case contrary to good faith even where the injuring person is reasonably insured against the risk of liability for causing damage through gross negligence.

D.

Product liability (paragraph (3))

15. No contractual exclusion of liability. Paragraph (3) adopts the corresponding rule of the product liability directive (Directive 85/374 / EEC, art. 12). A contractual exclusion of liability for negligently caused damage to commercial property remains possible. This is not addressed by Article 3:204(1) (Accountability for damage caused by defective products).

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Article 5:401: Contractual exclusion and restriction of liability

E.

Paragraph (4)

16. Exclusion of liability in cases of ordinary liability in negligence. Paragraph (4) expresses the principle that a pre-emptive exclusion or restriction of liability is possible in all remaining cases. What is essentially involved here is the exclusion of liability in cases of ordinary negligence and the exclusion or restriction of liability without intention or negligence. In turn, DCFR II. – 9:411 (Terms which are presumed to be unfair in contracts between a business and a consumer) is to be observed here. Liability for damage to body and health caused by slight negligence is also immune from being contractually excluded in standard terms. Of course, the same does not apply to liability without intention or negligence. This is because DCFR II. – 9:411 requires an “act or omission” on the part of the business and this is lacking in the cases covered by Chapter 3, Section 2 (Accountability without intention or negligence). Where a person is liable without having “done something wrong”, that person is liable for neither a positive act nor an omission; but is liable regardless of conduct. 17. Unless contrary to statute. Also under paragraph (4), an exclusion or restriction of liability is invalid where such a contractual stipulation contradicts the applicable national law. Thus, these model rules leave room for regional statutory rules for individual fields of activity, e. g. for the prohibition of the contractual exclusion or restriction of vehicle owners’ liability or for a prohibition of the contractual exclusion or restriction of liability for certain professional groups that are subject to the duty to take out indemnity insurance and have arranged such insurance. In the Member States there is such a large spectrum of such “isolated solutions” specific to certain activities, for which various insurance practices and duties provide the basis, that it did not seem possible to reduce them all to a general concrete principle. An example of paragraph (4) from Community law is to be found in Council Directive 2004/113/ EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods (OJ EC L 373/37 of 21 December 2004) art. 8(2), which provides: “Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems such measures as are necessary to ensure real and effective compensation or reparation ... for the loss and damage sustained by a person injured as a result of discrimination within the meaning of this Directive, in a way which is dissuasive and proportionate to the damage suffered. The fixing of a prior upper limit shall not restrict such compensation or reparation.”

Notes 1.

FRENCH jurispridence regards contractual agreements which attempt to exclude liabil-

ity for torts committed in the future as null and void. The same holds true for agreements which do not impinge on the grounds of liability but solely affect the ambit of liability (immutable line of jurisprudence since Cass.civ. 17 February 1955, JCP 1955, II, 8951, note Rodière). Extra contractual liability constitutes a matter d’ordre public. Conversely, an agreement which impinges on the contractual partner’s respective rights and obligations following the onset of damage is valid (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2004/2005), nos. 1054-1058).

895

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2.

3.

4.

896

In contrast to France, in BELGIUM, the view is adopted that an injured party is capable of agreeing to a waiver of the (potential) damaging party’s liability both prior to and following the onset of damage. This result is possible owing to the fact that the rules on tort liability are neither mandatory nor constitute a matter d’ordre public (Cass. 4 January 1993, Pas. belge 1993, I, no. 1 p. 1; Cass. 15 February 1993, Pas. belge 1993, I, no. 92 p. 171). In general, a contractual exclusion of liability is therefore effective. It is only ruled out in the case of causing intentional damage and where the law expressly provides that a waiver of liability is deemed to be ineffective (Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Wynant/Debaene, TPR 2000, 1551, 1702, no. 45). The (at a later stage) injured party is required to, at the very least, have impliedly consented to the waiver of liability (CA Antwerp 16 January 1996, RW 1995-1996, 1417). In SPAIN, it is a contentious issue whether prospective tort liability can be excluded or resticted by contractual agreement. Prevailing academic opinion refutes this suggestion (Lacruz Berdejo and Rivero Hernández, Elementos II(2)4, 515; Cavanillas Múgica and Tapia Fernández, La concurrencia de responsabilidad contractual y extracontractual, 56-57; Santos Briz, La responsabilidad civil I7, 37-38; Álvarez Lata, Cláusulas restrictivas de responsabilidad civil, 108). Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 370, currently adopts an opposite approach, justifying it, inter alia, by reference to CC art. 1255 which guarantees freedom of contract within the boundaries of the law and public morals. Similarly, however, Tolsada considers that the constitutional protection afforded to basic fundamental rights also features among the legal boundaries in CC art. 1255 and from this state of affairs deduces that, for example, a hospital cannot restrict or exclude liability for medical negligence by contractual means (Yzquierdo Tolsada loc. cit. 346). According to law, liability for intentional acts cannot be restricted premptively (CC art. 1102). Occasionally, intention is equated with gross negligence (TS 2 July 1992, RAJ 1992 (4) no. 6502 p. 8492), on occasion, it is not (TS 25 April 1984, RAJ 1984 (1) no. 1969 p. 1501). ConsProtA art. 86(2) classifies clauses which purport to exclude or restrict liability of professionals for personal injury as an abuse of law. Such contractual provisions are null and void (ConsProtA art. 83(1)). As far as we can tell, the Supreme Court has only dealt with the issue of contractual waivers of extra contractual liability on two occasions. TS 4 July 1953, RAJ 1953 (1) no. 2017 p. 1305 held that a contractual stipulation of a railway company was against public policy and therefore void, which sought to exclude the liability of the railway for passengers’ death. Conversely, TS 5 March 1992, RAJ 1992 (2) no. 2390 p. 3232 deemed valid an arrangement between a bank and an employee, who had embezzled money from the bank, which had the means of making amends as its focus. According to ITALIAN CC art. 1229(1), contracts are null and void which purport to restrict or exclude in advance the liability of the debtor for intention or gross negligence. According to CFI Rome 11 July 1979, Giur.it. 1980, I, 2, 611, this also pertains to waivers of tort liability. It is debatable whether liability for “normal” or ordinary negligence can be contractually modified. This proposition is mostly refuted on the grounds that extra-contractual liability belongs to the realm of the ordre public (Alpa, Trattato di diritto civile IV, 346-348; Visintini and Cabella-Pisu, L’inadempimento delle obbligazioni IX(1)2, 289-290); naturally, there are strong views in literature and (older) jurisprudence which favour the validity of such arrangements (Bianca, Diritto civile V, 66; Cass. 3 July 1968, no. 2240, Giust.civ. 1968, I, 1121). Ponzanelli, Le clausole di esonero della responsabilità civile, 204 regards a clause disclaiming liability as possible for property

Article 5:401: Contractual exclusion and restriction of liability

5.

6.

7.

8.

damage, but unacceptable in the context of personal injury. Of course, disclaimers of liability which infringe an express statutory provision are ineffective. An example would be in the case of product liability. HUNGARIAN CC § 342(1) states that contracts are void which attempt to restrict or exclude tort liability for intentional or grossly negligent infliction of damage. The same applies for causing death, bodily injury, injury to health and for consequences of a criminal act. CC § 314(1) is worded in practically the same manner and regulates contract law. During the debate on reform, a proposal was made to repeal CC § 342(1), on the grounds that the provision is systemically out of place and is expendable (Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 82-85), but the proposal is not adopted in the current draft. Similarly, under BULGARIAN LOA art. 94(1), it is possible to contractually exclude liability for damage which has not been intentionally caused or caused in a grossly negligent manner; however, it is also contentious whether this regulation governs tort liability as well as contractual liability (refuting this e. g. Kalaydjiev, Obligazionno pravo, Obshta chast, 343 and Kojucharov, Obligazionno pravo I, 261; of a differnt view and supporting this approach Mousseva, Suvremenno pravo, H. 6/2003 and Supreme Court 16 January 1970, decision no. 47, case no. 780/69 in criminal matters). The view that the frontiers of in LOA art. 94(1) generally include the possibility of disclaiming tortious liability is supported by reference to Consumer Protection Act art. 139, where it is provided that product liability cannot be the subject of a contractual disclaimer. The provision would otherwise be superfluous. The same conclusion can be derived from POLISH CC art. 437 which provides that liability under arts. 435 and 436 (pertaining to dangerous activities) cannot be excluded or limited in advance. In GERMANY, contractual stipulations exempting or restricting tort liability are generally permissible (BGH 28 April 1953, BGHZ 9, 301, 306; Staudinger (-Hager), BGB13, Pref. to §§ 823 ff, no. 41; Soergel (-Spickhoff), BGB13, Pref. to § 823, no. 99). However, liability for intentional acts cannot be restricted in advance (CC § 276(3)). Many strict liability provisions cannot be the subject of a disclaimer (e. g. Product Liability Act § 14; Liability Act § 7, Road Traffic Act § 8a; Aviation Act § 49c); additionally, a clause disclaiming liability cannot infringe public policy or be contrary to good faith (e. g. RG 24 April 1908, RGZ 68, 358, 367; CA Stuttgart 7 December 1977, NJW 1979, 2355, 2356; BGH 25 September 1952, BGHZ 7, 198, 207). According to CC § 309 no. 7 a stipulation in standard terms and conditions which purports to exclude or restrict liability for death, personal injury or injury to health which was culpably inflicted and clauses which purport to exclude liability for all types of damage which was caused in a grossly negligent manner are ineffective. If general disclaimers are deemed effective, then clauses which attempt to restrict the amount of compensation due are also valid (Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB67, § 276, no. 35) as well as stipulations which shorten the prescriptive period within which to bring a claim (CC § 202(1)). It is also possible for an implied restriction of liability for intention and gross negligence to be valid. However, adequate pointers must exist for an implied restriction to be effective (Staudinger (-Löwisch), BGB, § 276, no. 118; Heinrichs loc. cit. no. 37; CA Koblenz 11 October 2004, NJWRR 2005, 1048). CA Dresden 27 June 1996, VersR 1998, 1027 held that an implied disclaimer of liability for ordinary negligence was valid in a case which involved assistance rendered gratuitously in a risky attempt to salvage a lorry which was stuck. AUSTRIAN case law shows a tendency to qualify an exemption from liability for bodily harm in general contract terms as grossly disadvantaging the other party and therefore

897

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9.

10.

898

void even if merely liability for slight negligence is excluded (OGH 24 March 1998, SZ 71/58 p. 336). Liability for property damage, on the other hand, can be excluded in standard terms and conditions, at any rate for cases of slight negligence, and, within the framework of individual agreements in the domain of courtesy relationships, even to the extent of gross negligence, see Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 18/35 p. 558). For the remainder, it is accepted that nobody can withdraw from legal liability by means of a one-sided declaration. One-sided declarations can destroy the basis of trust and reliance, however, which in an individual case may be the basis of liability, for example with reliance on information or where the public is granted entry into certain premises, the dangerousness of which is pointed out (see also CC § 1319a which restricts liability for the unsafe state of paths and roads to gross fault). In GREECE, restrictions and exclusions on liability are, in principle, permitted (Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio A(1)2, 343). However, liability for intention and gross negligence cannot be excluded in advance (CC art. 332). Since the amendment of CC art. 332 in 2002, every contractual disclaimer of liability is void (even in cases of slight negligence), if the injured party was an employee of the debtor or liability arises from the operation of a business operated under a concession granted by the relevant public authority. A contractual disclaimer of liability cannot be effected by incorporation within standard terms and conditions. Moreover, in an individually negotiated agreement, a disclaimer of liability is void if there is an attempt to use this as a vehicle for the restriction or exclusion of liabilty for injury to corporeal and incorporeal personality rights. Special statutes ordain that clauses excluding liability are void under product liability law or under the law pertaining to the liability of service providers (see further Stathopoulos loc. cit. 335). It is a matter of interpretation as to whether a clause disclaiming liability pertains to contractual or tortious liability; if there is any doubt, the view taken is that the exclusion of extra-contractual liability was intended (Stathopoulos loc. cit. 343; Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio, Geniko meros, 255). In PORTUGAL parties to a contract can in advance agree on the amount of compensation or its maximum limit (Pinto Monteiro, Cláusulas limitativas e de exclusão de responsabilidade civil, 91; STJ 25 March 2004; STJ 13 February 2001; see also the notes under Article 6:202). CC art. 809 is intrepreted by a number of legal writers to solely govern the validity of exemption of liability for intention or gross negligence (Pessoa Jorge, BolMinJus 1978 [281] 5, 9 and 18; Pinto Monteiro loc. cit. 237; unclear STJ 9 July 1991, BolMinJus 409 [1991] 759). It is the matter of some dispute whether CC art. 809 may even be applied in the context of extra-contractual liability. Pessoa Jorge loc. cit. 22 is of the view that it may be applied, however, subject to the caveat that liability cannot be excluded in the case of personal injury and in cases which concern damage which flows from the commission of a criminal offence; such contracts are contrary to public policy. Liability for auxiliaries can generally be excluded unless these persons infringe obligations imposed by norms of public order (CC art. 808(2)). Consequently, it is even possible to exclude liabilities for intentional acts of auxilaries (Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 72 (1958) 287-289; Pessoa Jorge loc. cit. 31; Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado II3, note to art. 800; critical, on this point Pinto Monteiro loc. cit. 245, 264). Similarly, in Portugal, it is not possible to exclude liability for defective products (Products Liability Decree Law 383/1989 art. 10). Such clauses are regarded as “not having been drafted”.

Article 5:401: Contractual exclusion and restriction of liability

11.

12.

13.

In a similar fashion, DUTCH law generally adopts the possibilty of a exempting liability by contractual means as a starting point, but restricts it via an array of mandatory statutory provisions (e. g. CC arts. 6:192 [product liability], 7:24 and 7:6 [Purchase by consumer], 7:463 [medical assistance], 7:658(3) [liability of employers] and 7:762 [liability of construction company]). However, CC art. 7:463 does not preclude an exemption of liability under CC art. 6:109 (Onrechtmatige Daad IV (-Slabbers) chapter VI.3, note 18 p. 261; Stolker, AA 1995, 13; de Vries, AA 1995, 186-192). According to CC art. 7:508, tour operators are not permitted to exclude or restrict liability for death or personal injury of their clients. This only applies to damage to property if the damage was caused in an intentionally or grossly careless manner (CC art. 7:509). However, it is possible to exempt liability for the intentional or grossly negligent actions of subordinates (CC art. 6:170) (HR 26 March 1920, NedJur 1920, 476 and HR 3 June 1938, NedJur 1938 no. 920 p. 1290; the reform of the law has not impinged on this state of affairs). This is only precluded in the context of standard terms and conditions (CC arts. 6:233, 6:237(f)). The acts of the directors of a company are deemed to be the acts of the legal person itself (HR 20 February 1976, NedJur 1976 no. 486 p. 1418; HR 31 December 1993, NedJur 1995 no. 389 p. 1719 and HR 12 December 1997, NedJur 1998 no. 208 p. 1086), with the result that the rules pertaining to subordinates do not apply. Mandatory tort law can also be found in ad hoc statutes e. g. in theOil Tankers (Third Party Liability) Act art. 10. Disclaimers must meet the requisites of general contractual provisions, therefore, one contratual partner is not permitted to grossly disadvantage the other and disclaimers must not contravene public policy. The latter is established if there is an attempt to exclude liability for intention or gross negligence (see further Hartkamp, Compendium Vermogensrecht volgens het nieuwe BW5, note 274a pp. 266267). ESTONIAN LOA § 1051(2) corresponds to Article 5:401(1). While there is no provision that equates to Article 5:401(2), the same result is frequently achieved by resorting to contractual legal norms which govern the nullity of contracts which contravene law or public policy. Article 5:401(3) corresponds to LOA § 1067. The regulation in Article 5:401(4) is derived from the general principles on freedom of contract. SWEDISH Damages Liability Act chap. 1 § 1 and FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 1 § 1 expressly provide that the following provisions of that Act only apply in the event that nothing else has been contractually agreed. On the other hand, DANISH EAL § 27 provides that the parties are not generally permitted to deviate from the statute; thus contractual arrangements providing for such a scenario are generally ineffective. However, by means of this regulation, contractual stipulations providing for an exemption of liability are generally not prohibited because the statute only governs the consequences of liability and not the foundation of liability (Møller and Wiisbye, Erstatningsansvarsloven6, 585). The Nordic countries generally adhere to the principle of free concurrence of claims. However, contractual restrictions on liability also operate in the realm of extra-contractual liability unless they are solely designed to govern contractual liability (then extra-contractual liability remains untouched and this plays a significant role especially in the context of occupational liability Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 95; Gomard, Forholdet mellem erstatningsregler i og uden for kontraktsforhold, 40; ibid. Obligationsret II, 143; Ulfbeck, Kontrakters relativitet, 94; Langsted, Rådgivning I, 153; Hakulinen, Obligationsrätt, 230). Consumer protection law aside, contractual and tortious exemptions from liability run parallel to each other:

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900

liability that can be effectively excluded under contract law, can also be exempted under tort law (Kleineman, JT 2001-02, 625, 634). It is not possible to exempt liability for intention or gross negligence, at any rate, in the contextof personal injuries (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 91; Danish Eastern CA 22 November 2002, UfR 2003, 500; Hakulinen loc. cit. 231). Further, it is not possible to exclude the liability of an employer, if this has the effect of extending the personal liability of an employee (Danish EAL § 27; Finnish Damages Liability Act chap. 7 § 1; Swedish Contracts Act § 36); therefore, employer’s liability can be regarded as a category where it is not possible to exempt future liability. On the other hand, liability for damage by to intellectual property rights by products can be validly exempted or restricted (Ulfbeck, Professionsansvar og produktansvar, 171, 198). An important area for disclaimers of liability is pure economic loss which results from incorrect advice or incorrect information (HD 14 October 1987, NJA 1987, 692; HD 19 December 2001, NJA 2001, 878; Kleineman loc. cit. 625-635). Prior to statutory changes, liability in tort under ENGLISH law could be excluded or limited by (i) contractual agreement, or (so far as such liability is in issue) (ii) notice that the claimant by entering on the land occupied by the defendant agreed to exempt the defendant from liability in respect of that occupation or (iii) a disclaimer stating that no responsibility is undertaken for the information or advice provided to the claimant: Clerk and Lindsell (-Jones), Torts19, para. 3-104. However, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, s. 2(1) (read with s. 1(1) and (3)) provides in relation to “business liability” (i. e. liability for breach of duty incurred in the course of a business or from the occupation of premises used for business purposes) that liability for death or personal injury cannot be excluded or limited by contract or a notice where it results from a breach of the duty of care under the common law or the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. An exclusion or restriction of such liability for other loss or damage is effective only if the contractual term or notice satisfies the requirement of reasonableness: loc. cit. s. 2(2). The Act amplifies the requirement of reasonableness in s. 11 and the criteria in Schedule 2 to the Act. Moreover, in circumstances in which a contract term or notice will be struck down for restricting or excluding liability the Act will also strike down a notice which attempts to exclude a duty of care arising in the first place: s. 13(1), as interpreted in Smith v. Eric S. Bush [1990] 1 AC 831. There are a number of other statutory provisions which specifically restrict the freedom of parties to exclude tortious liability for personal injury. Specifically as regards personal injury sustained by an employee under English and Scots law, the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948, s. 1(3) specifically provides that a term of a contract of service or apprenticeship or a collateral agreement is void if it would have the effect of excluding or limiting the employer’s liability for personal injuries caused to the employee or apprentice by the negligence of persons in common employment. Likewise, exclusions or restrictions of liability of an employer to an employee in respect of the former’s deemed negligence (i. e. vicarious liability) in deploying equipment which is defective due to the fault of a third party are also void by statute: see Employers’ Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969, s. 1(2). See also the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, 47(5), which provides that a term of an agreement which purports to exclude or restrict the rule set out in s. 47(2) of that Act (namely, that breaches of a duty imposed by health and safety regulations under that Act which cause damage are actionable unless the regulations provide otherwise), or any liability arising by virtue of that rule, is void, except in so far as health and safety regulations provide otherwise. Conversely, the Electricity Act 1989,

Article 5:401: Contractual exclusion and restriction of liability

s. 21 expressly makes provision for the supply of electricity on terms that that the supplier’s liability for economic loss as a consequence of negligence may be restricted as is reasonable in the circumstances. The Misrepresentation Act 1967, s. 3 (substituted by Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, s. 8(1)) prevents a person from excluding or restricting liability for misrepresentation, or any remedy available for misrepresentation, by a contractual term unless it satisfies the requirement of reasonableness. It is implicit in the requirements of that Act that the exclusion operate by way of contractual agreement, a mere declaration that a person does not accept liability for misrepresentation is ineffectual: IFE Fund SA v. Goldman Sachs International [2006] EWHC 2887 (Comm) at [65], [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 264 (Toulson J). Illustration 1 is taken from CA Dresden 27 June 1996, VersR 1998, 1027.

Section 5:

Loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death)

Article 5:501: Extension of defences against the injured person to third persons A defence which may be asserted against a person’s right of reparation in respect of that person’s personal injury or, if death had not occurred, could have been asserted, may also be asserted against a person suffering loss within Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death).

Comments 1. Aim. This Article contains the rule that every defence which is available to the injuring person against the directly injured person, may also be asserted against the latter’s dependants or surviving dependants (Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death)). This corresponds to a consideration of justice that is widely acknowledged in Europe: where the injured person could not have brought a personal claim, or at any rate must bear a reduction of its extent, the same applies to the detriment of persons who derive rights from the injury or death of that person. 2. Examples. The Article pertains to every defence in this Chapter. Third party claims are e. g. excluded where the injured person validly consents to treatment or had participated in a team sport having accepted the risks. They are likewise ruled out where the person directly affected has been killed or injured in an emergency situation requiring self-defence or had validly agreed to a contractual exclusion of liability. Even contributory fault is not an exception. Where the injured person is ascribed half of the fault for the mishap, the claims of family members and surviving dependants are reduced to 50 % of the amount of damages to which they are otherwise entitled.

Notes 1.

902

According to FRENCH law, a person will be partly relieved of liability if it can be established that fault on the part of the victim contributed to the cause of the damage. This is a valid proposition when the primary victim seeks compensation and also if a secondary victim asserts a claim for damages for the death or injury of another and in this manner seeks to enforce his or her own claim for damages. The subject matter of the secondary victim’s claim is different to that of the primary victim (this remains the case even if the secondary victim is the primary victim’s successor in title); however, both

Article 5:501: Extension of defences against the injured person to third persons

2.

3.

4.

claims arise from the same set of facts (Cass.ass.plén. 19 June 1981, D. 1981. I, 641, note Larroumet; D. 1982, Jur. 85, concl. Cabannes, note Chabas; JCP 1982, II, 19712, rapport Ponsard; GazPal 1981, II, 529, note Boré; RTD civ 1981, 857, obs. Durry). The same rule applies in BELGIUM (and also in the context of gardien liability: Cass. 30 September 2004, Pas. belge 2004, I, no. 444 p. 1437) and in SPAIN (Paz-Ares/Díez-Picazo/Bercovitz/Salvador (-Pantaleón Prieto), Código Civil II2, art. 1902 p. 1998; TS 18 July 2006, BDA RAJ 2006/4952; TS 8 July 2005, RAJ 2005 (7) no. 9577 p. 20268 [reduction of the damages awarded to the widow of the deceased because of his contributory fault in the accident which occurred in a bullfighting festivity]). In the event that the contributory fault of the injured or deceased primary victim completely overshadows that of the defendant, then his dependants’ claim for compensation is consequently excluded (TS 26 May 2006, RAJ 2006 (3) no. 3786 p. 8795). If a person is killed or injured and the actor relies on a ground of justification, then the antigiuridicità is excluded also in respect of the claim asserted by the secondary victim; therefore, in a similar fashion, the latter is not entitled to assert a claim for compensation under ITALIAN law (Navarretta, Diritti inviolabili e risarcimento del danno, 210; Gozzi, Der Anspruch iure proprio auf Ersatz des Nichtvermögensschadens, 134-135). The same holds true with respect to contributory negligence of the de cuius. It results in a reduction in the ambit of the claims of close relatives (CC arts. 2056 and 1227; Cass. 25 July 1957, no. 3143, Rep.Foro it. 1957, voce Resp. civ. no. 308; Cass. 20 March 1959, no. 849, Giur.it. 1959, I, 966). The jurispriudence of the Corte di Cassazione leaves no room for doubt that contributory negligence on the part of the primary victim can work to the disadvantage of dependants if they wish to assert a claim iure proprio. The reduction in the claim is a consequence of the primary victim’s conduct (Cass. 18 February 1971, no. 430, Rep.Giur.it. 1971, voce Resp. civ. no. 117 and no. 311; Cass. 29 September 1995, no. 10271, Giust.civ.Mass. 1995, 1689; Cass. 6 October 1999, no. 11137, Giust.civ.Mass. 1999, 2079; Gozzi loc. cit. 153-154). HUNGARY does not have an express statutory provision which corresponds to Article 5:401. As far as we can tell, the subject matter of the latter has not been considered further. However, the general norms concerning the legal effect of grounds of defence permit the conclusion to be drawn that the general legal position does not deviate from that contained in Article 5:401. In BULGARIA, it is recognised that the secondary victim can also be met by grounds of defence that are available against a primary victim. According to the rules governing assignment, this also applies if the claim of the injured party passes to its insurer (Decree no. 7 of the Supreme Court of 4 October 1978). This corresponds to the current legal position in ROMANIA (Adam, Drept civil, 260; Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘, 88). Where a plaintiff seeks to assert their own claim for damages for loss caused owing to the death of another under CC §§ 844 and 845, under GERMAN CC § 846, the contributory fault of the deceased person will operate to reduce the plaintiff’s claim for compensation. The same holds true in the case of an operational risk which contributed to the cause of the damage (CC § 254 applied with appropriate adapations). Similarly, in nervous shock cases, the contributory fault of the injured primary victim will be imputed to the secondary victim who has suffered psychiatric injury. This can be adduced from CC § 242 (Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB67, § 254, no. 57; Erman (-Kuckuk), BGB I11, § 254, no. 82; BGH 11 May 1971, NJW 1971, 1883, 1885). The foregoing equates to the legal

903

Chapter 5: Defences

5.

6.

7.

8.

904

position in AUSTRIA (loss of maintenance: EKHG § 7(2); Koziol, JBl 1997, 207; damages for grief and nervous shock: OGH 23 September 2004, ecolex 2005, 112). In PORTUGAL, while there is no express statutory provision on this issue, case law does set forth that the defences which may be asserted against a person’s right of reparation may also be asserted by a third person who suffers a loss subsequent to another’s personal injury or death. If the primary victim’s contributory fault prevails, then, consequently, the secondary victim has no claim for compensation (STJ 19 October 2004), and this is even the case if the primary victim is a child (STJ 28 January 1992, BolMinJus 413 [1992] 554; STJ 21 June 1994; CA Oporto 5 April 2001). Of course, the primary victim’s wrongdoing must have, at the very least, contributed to cause the accident; if this prerequisite is not met, then a reduction of the extent of the claim will not take place (STJ 17 October 2006; STJ 11 January 2007). DUTCH CC art. 6:107(2) makes clear that a tortfeasor can avail of the very same defences in action against a secondary victim as would have been available in a personal injury action initiated by a primary victim. CC art. 6:108(3) contains the same regulation for accidents which result in death. CC art. 6:184(2) echoes these principles in connection with the reparation for measures adopted to avert or reduce the damage. ESTONIAN law also does not feature an express regulation governing this matter, but an implicit rule can be derived from the internal logic of the law on liability which is in force there. A person who does not act in an illegal manner towards the primary victim must therefore also be capable of asserting the same grounds of justification in the action initiated by the secondary victim. According to SWEDISH Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 1, a claim for compenstion for personal injury as a result of contributory fault may only be reduced in extent if the injured party contributed either intentionally or in a grossly negligent manner to the cause of his injury; this ground of defence may not be asserted against third parties (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 227). A different approach is only adopted in the case of a suicide, but it should be noted that even this exception is subject to restrictions imposed on equitable grounds (HD 14 October 1981, NJA 1981, 920; see Dufwa, Flera skadeståndsskyldiga, nos. 4354-4355; and Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 226). While Sweden generally rejects the “principle of identification” on the basis of victim protection, the law in DENMARK corresponds to Article 5:501 (von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret6, 376; HD 6 October 1958, UfR 1958, 1119), and this is also true for the law governing road traffic accidents (Traffic Act § 101(2), see HD 15 November 2002, UfR 2003, 339 [gross contributory fault of a mother who was killed in an accident, led to a reduction of the claims of her children to the same extent as her claim would have been reduced had she been had lived]; Western CA 9 June 1993, UfR 1993, 785 and HD 29 October 1999, UfR 2000, 197). In FINNISH legal writing, there are calls for restraint when dealing with the principle of identification (Saxén, Tillägg till Skadeståndsrätt, 407). There is, however, no basis in law for this assertion and the courts have not hesitated to reduce the claims of surviving dependants on the basis that the deceased played a major contributory role in the cause of the accident (Supreme Court 25 June 1980, KKO 1980 II 72; Supreme Court 23 April 1998, KKO 1998:46). For ENGLAND it is a pre-condition of a claim under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 that the deceased would have been entitled to recover damages if death had not occurred (s. 1(1)), so that if the injured person’s own conduct gave rise to a complete defence this will preclude a claim under the Act: cf. Burns v Edman [1970] 2 QB 541 (where a

Article 5:501: Extension of defences against the injured person to third persons

criminal was killed in a traffic accident and the claim of his dependants in respect of their deprivation of support was barred by the defence of ex turpi causa because, as his widow knew, all his income was the proceeds of robbery and other crimes). Moreover, s. 5 provides for a proportionate reduction of damages where the defence of contributory negligence would have been available against the deceased. Under SCOTS law, as a general rule a person responsible for causing death is not liable to a relative of the deceased under the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976, s. 1, if liability to the deceased (or the deceased’s executor) has been excluded or discharged by the deceased before his death (including by prior agreement): loc. cit. s. 1(2). An exception exists in respect of the claim of members of the deceased’s immediate family to compensation for noneconomic loss under s. 1(4) of the Act. Notwithstanding discharge of liability before the deceased’s death, the relatives’ claims subsist if (a) the personal injury from which the deceased died is mesothelioma and (b) discharge of liability and death both occurred on or after 20 December 2006: loc. cit. s. 1(2A)-(2B) of the 1976 Act, inserted by the Rights of Relatives to Damages (Mesothelioma) (Scotland) Act 2007, s. 1. The purpose of the exception (as explained in the Scottish Executive’s Explanatory Notes to the Act, para. 3) is to remove the incentive for sufferers of mesothelioma not to pursue their claim to compensation in their lifetime so as to benefit their family: under the general rule in s. 1(2) the claim of the relatives is barred if liability to the injured person is discharged in their lifetime; a settlement in the injured person’s lifetime (which would provide the injured person with some material comfort before death) thus operates to the prejudice of the injured person’s family. Where the liability of the person responsible for the deceased’s personal injury to the deceased was limited by a prior agreement or by an enactment, the aggregate liability to the deceased’s executor and the deceased’s relatives cannot exceed the specified amount of damages and the claims are reduced pro rata: Damages (Scotland) Act 1976, s. 6(1).

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Reparation in general Article 6:101: Aim and forms of reparation (1) Reparation is to reinstate the person suffering the legally relevant damage in the position that person would have been in had the legally relevant damage not occurred. (2) Reparation may be in money (compensation) or otherwise, as is most appropriate, having regard to the kind and extent of damage suffered and all the other circumstances of the case. (3) Where a tangible object is damaged, compensation equal to its depreciation of value is to be awarded instead of the cost of its repair if the cost of repair unreasonably exceeds the depreciation of value. This rule applies to animals only if appropriate, having regard to the purpose for which the animal was kept. (4) As an alternative to reinstatement under paragraph (1), but only where this is reasonable, reparation may take the form of recovery from the person accountable for the causation of the legally relevant damage of any advantage obtained by the latter in connection with causing the damage.

Comments A.

Chapter six in overview

1. Reparation, compensation, prevention. This Chapter deals with the legal consequences of non-contractual liability. Section 1 provides rules for all forms of reparation. Section 2 provides special rules for the monetary reparation of damage (“compensation”). Section 3 addresses issues of damage prevention. Claims for the costs incurred in the prevention of imminent damage also fall under this Section. Section 1 applies in principle (i. e. as far as possible with due regard to the nature of the thing) to all remedies, Section 2 only to monetary damages, and Section 3 solely to the preventive protection of rights. 2. Overlap between reparation and prevention. In certain special cases there can be an overlap between reparation and prevention. Here the injured person can choose which of these remedies to claim.

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Illustration 1 A man has sexually abused a minor for two years. Then he has the portrait of the boy tattooed on his chest. The boy claims the removal of the tattoo, which is a constant affront to his personal dignity. This claim is as much a claim in damages (Article 6:101(1) and (2)) as a claim under Article 1:102 (Prevention) in conjunction with Article 6:301 (Right to prevention). 3. Relationship to Chapter 2. This Chapter applies only where the claimant has suffered legally relevant damage or where such damage is imminent. Chapter 2 states what legally relevant damage is. This Chapter is concerned with the liable person’s obligation to provide compensation for causing such damage. The answers to such questions as what is meant by “loss” are therefore to be found not in this Chapter, but in Chapter 2 (see e. g. Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) paragraph (4), Article 2:201 (Personal injury and consequential loss) paragraphs (1) and (2), and Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons)). 4. Substantive law, not procedural law. This Chapter deals exclusively with questions of substantive law. Matters relating primarily to procedure or enforcement are beyond the scope of application of these model rules (I. – 1:101 (Intended field of application) paragraph (2)(h)). Rules on the assessment of damages are regarded for this purpose as being of a procedural nature, as are such questions as whether and to what extent appellate courts may review decisions taken by courts of first instance charged with establishing the facts.

B.

The Article in overview

5. Aim and forms of reparation. The Article relates to the aim and forms of reparation. Paragraph (1) expresses the general principle that a person who is obliged to make reparation must reinstate the situation which would have existed if the event giving rise to liability had not occurred. This general principle applies to the type as well as the extent of compensation. The question of how the damage is to be made good is answered by paragraph (2), which states that reparation must be made in a manner that best befits the type and measure of damage in the circumstances of the case. Paragraph (3) provides special rules on the amount of compensation payable where things are harmed and animals injured. Finally, paragraph (4) opens up the possibility of claiming the profit gained from the wrongful activity, instead of restoration of the previous situation.

C.

Restoration of the previous situation (paragraph (1))

6. The principle of reparation. The injuring event should be “undone” as far as possible by the obligation to provide damages. Therefore, in principle the injuring person has to restore the situation which would have existed had the harm not been occasioned. This is the principle of reparation. How the original situation is restored is another question. It can be done in various ways. The injuring person can perform the necessary work, or commission a third party to do so or pay the injured person money, so that the latter can 908

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eliminate the damage, either personally or in turn through a third party commissioned to do so. Where the injured person undertakes the removal of the damage personally or has it done by another, the claim in damages is for the costs incurred. 7. Reparation in kind and full reparation. Reparation in kind indeed means restoration of the situation that would have existed were it not for the injuring event, but not necessarily restoration through the injuring person’s personal work or through the work of someone who is commissioned to do so. Reparation in the form of the payment of money (compensation) can also be reinstatement or in furtherance of it. In this case the principle of reparation has the task of contributing towards concretising the amount of money falling due. It is subject to the principle of full reparation: in the case of compensation the amount of money which is necessary for the complete elimination of the damage falls due – no less, but also no more. Illustration 2 A is the owner of items of clothing specified for sale. B soils the goods. They can be cleaned; however, after they are cleaned, they are no longer suitable to be sold as new. The payment of cleaning costs does not provide total reparation for the damage; the overall loss in value is what is in fact to be compensated. Illustration 3 The wooden floorboards in a house are damaged. It proves to be impossible to even partially repair them; the entire flooring must be re-laid. The owner must incur a “new for old” deduction; without such a deduction, the laying of completely new flooring would lead to an unjustified enrichment on the part of the injured person, in that it would exceed the target for full reparation. 8. No punitive damages. The punishment of wrongdoers is a question for criminal law, not private law. Under these model rules, punitive damages are not available. They are not consistent with the principle of reparation.

D.

Damages in money or by other means (paragraph (2))

9. General. Paragraph (2) concerns the question how reparation is to be made. The answer is: in money (“compensation”) unless another form of reparation (“reparation in kind”) is better suited to the nature and extent of the damage. While paragraph (2) does not expressly give normative precedence over other forms of reparation to monetary compensation, the provision of damages is still, purely “statistically”, the most reasonable form of reparation. In cases of injuries to body and health – apart from minor wounds occurring in everyday life – every other type of reparation, practically without exception, is inapplicable and in cases of property damage or loss of property of another kind (e. g. as a consequence of false information) things are no different. 10. Reparation not in money. There are of course cases in which only a claim for reparation in kind (i. e. not in money) can carry into effect the basic principle formulated in paragraph (1). The claim in damages against a thief, for instance, is first and foremost 909

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directed at the return of the thing; if this were different, the practical result under the law on damages would be to aid and abet an obligatory sale of property. The main field of application of reparation in kind is without doubt the law on infringements of incorporeal personality rights. The retraction of a statement about another is a common example, but not the only one. Moreover such a retraction is often not sufficient to make good the damage. Paragraph (2) can therefore also justify the right to demand the publication by the injuring person of a corrective judicial decision in the same manner as the incriminating comments were published. 11. Forms of reparation not mutually exclusive. Damages are not necessarily always to be performed either exclusively in the form of a payment of money or in the form of reparation in kind; it may be that the damage suffered can only be completely removed by the payment of money and a certain de facto act. Illustration 4 A construction company causes damage to the claimant’s house and removes the damage using its own people. That does not change anything with regard to its obligation to pay the cost of renting a replacement apartment, into which the claimant must move until the repair work is finished.

E.

Economic total loss (paragraph (3))

12. An exception to paragraph (1). It follows from paragraph (1) that the entire damage is to be compensated; as stated, the principle of full reparation applies. Where a thing is harmed and the necessary expense of repairing it exceeds its value, the question arises of what “full reparation” means in such a case. Under paragraph (1) it is arguable that it does not depend on the value but on the amount of the repair costs. This is because the protection of property rights also means that the integrity of concrete assets is protected and their restoration is only possible by the (albeit costly) repair of the damaged thing. In many situations, however, that would lead to the result that an unreasonable burden is placed on the liable person. Consequently, paragraph (3) limits the extent of reparation in accordance with the majority of the Member States’ legal systems. Where the repair costs are disproportionately high in relation to the loss in value of the thing, compensation is restricted to the loss in value. It is not possible to give a single answer to the question of when the repair costs will exceed the loss in value in an unreasonable fashion. In the normal case, especially cases of vehicle damage, a scale of 30 % may serve as a guideline, but that is nothing more than a general figure. Where for understandable reasons things have a non-economic value to the owner as well as an economic one, increased repair expenses may also be reasonable. 13. Animals. The second sentence of paragraph (3) provides an exception for animals, according to the purpose for which they are kept. Where normal production animals are at issue (e. g. a farmer’s cows) the reparation falling due remains limited to their market value (plus a marginal amount in excess of that for veterinary treatment, as the case may be); in the case of domestic animals kept by families, such a limit does not correspond to the legally protected interest of the owner. 910

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F.

Recovery of profit instead of compensation of loss (paragraph (4))

14. Siphoning-off of profits. Not being concerned with reinstatement, paragraph (4) provides another exception to paragraph (1). It involves infusing into the law on damages the principle that the profits made from a civil wrong should not be retained by the wrongdoer. 15. Systematical issues. Paragraph (4) clarifies two systematical issues. The recovery of profits has not been assigned to the law on benevolent intervention in another’s affairs nor solely to the law on unjustified enrichment. The law of benevolent intervention in these model rules is confined to genuine and justified intervention in and conducting of another’s affairs (see PEL Ben.Int. Art. 1:101 (Scope of application)). 16. Relationship to the law of unjustified enrichment. Paragraph (4) bears a very close resemblance to the situations that are the subject-matter of DCFR VII. – 4:101 (Instances of attribution) sub-paragraph (c) in the Book on unjustified enrichment. That rule pertains to enrichments as a result of the interference with another’s rights and interests, i. e. enrichments through actions, which usually constitute a civil wrong as well. DCFR VII. – 4:101(c) indeed goes beyond the law on non-contractual liability to the extent that it denies a bona fide person the advantages of exploiting another’s goods and interests and deems such a person liable to surrender the fruits even where and so far as the entitled party did not want to exploit the goods or interests personally and thus suffered no loss (or damage). Notwithstanding that, paragraph (4) seemed indispensable because although this provision has an unjustified enrichment “varnish”, it is solely concerned with following the intrinsic logic of the law on non-contractual liability for damage caused to another. Potential wrongdoers are warned that there is no profit to be made from a civil wrong. Furthermore, paragraph (4) is intended to ease the burdens on the courts, sparing them from carrying out another, separate unjustified enrichment test in addition to the one under this branch of the law. In many cases the law of unjustified enrichment and the law on non-contractual liability through their separate means of reasoning will reach the same or at least similar results. This is because the cases dealt with here will usually concern people acting in bad faith and they will not only be liable under the law of unjustified enrichment for the fruits of the exploited benefit but will also not typically have the defence of disenrichment (DCFR VII. – 6:101 (Disenrichment) paragraph (2) (b)). To the extent that the wrongdoer satisfies the claim under paragraph (4) of the present Article, concurrent liability under the law of unjustified enrichment is then extinguished (DCFR VII. – 7:102 (Concurrent obligations) paragraph (1)(b)). 17. Commercial trademark rights and copyright. Paragraph (4) is of particular significance in the law governing the infringement of incorporeal personal interests worthy of legal protection. Under the law on liability for commercial trademark rights and copyright, the claim to recovery of profits has been particularly moulded by a range of special laws (see e. g. Directive 2004/48 / EC of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights art. 13(1)(a)); the same is true for the law against unfair competition. These provisions are not affected by Article 6:101(4); as long as they conclusively govern the subject-matter they enjoy precedence of application over the general law on noncontractual liability (Article 1:103 (Scope of application) paragraphs (d) and (c)).

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18. Right of choice. Paragraph (4) provides the injured person with a right to choose between a claim to reparation of the actual loss occasioned and a claim to the recovery of the injuring person’s profit, i. e. another method of quantifying the claim to reparation due to the detriment suffered. The claim to recovery of the injuring person’s profit proceeds from the fiction that the injured person would have been able to exploit the relevant rights in the same way and with more or less the same economic success as the injuring person. Only where such a fiction is entirely inappropriate in the circumstances of the case can the court reject the exercise of the right of choice as abusive.

Notes I.

Nature and extent of the compensation

1.

Under FRENCH law, a claim for reparation of damage caused by a faute civile enjoys constitutional protection (Conseil constitutionnel 22 October 1982, D. 1983 jur. 189, note Luchaire; le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2006/ 2007), no. 2438). The responsabilité civile is directed at restoring the victim in as far as possible to the same position as he or she would have been in, had the damaging event had not occurred (Cass.civ. 7 December 1978, Bull.civ. 1978, II, no. 269 p. 207). The victim should not be enriched nor be burdened with a loss (Cass.civ. 23 January 2003, Bull.civ. 2003, II, no. 20 p. 16: ni perte ni profit). The reparation can take the form of a réparation en nature (unwavering jurisprudence since Cass.req. 6 December 1869, D. 1871, I, 56) or réparation par équivalent. By means of réparation en nature, the status quo ante is restored; the réparation par équivalent is achieved by the payment of a sum of money. Réparation en nature is of particular importance in the context of physical damage to property; conversely, the latter principle is not applicable in the context of personal injury and is only exceptionally granted in the case of a dommage morale (Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II11, no. 385 p. 411). The duty imposed on the damaging party in respect of the payment of the victim’s costs incurred while attempting to rectify the damage is regarded as a particular manifestation of the réparation en nature (Cass.civ. 19 November 1975, RTD civ 1976, 550, note Durry; see further le Tourneau and Cadiet loc. cit. no. 2447). As a general rule, réparation en nature is not only granted when the wrongdoer himself performs the necessary work but is also available if he or she pays or must pay for its performance by another (Cass.civ. 9 July 1981, GazPal 1982, jur., 109, note Chabas). The decision on whether compensation is to be made on the basis of réparation en nature or réparation par equivalent is generally taken by the court of first instance at their discretion (Cass.com. 5 December 1989, Bull.civ. 1989, IV, no. 307 p. 207). However, the Court of Cassation supervises the exercise of this discretion on the following point, striving to ensure that the cost of repairing a thing does not exceed the cost of its replacement (Cass.civ. 7 December 1978, Bull.civ. 1978, II, no. 269 p. 207). Only when its replacement is impossible, then, exceptionally, the cost of repairs greatly exceeding the value of the thing may be awarded (CFI Créteil 26 May 1981, JCP éd. G 1982, 19745, note Chabas). Similarly, in BELGIUM, the prevailing maxim holds that the purpose of reparation is to restore the injured party to the position that he or she would have been in, had the damage not occurred (Cass. 13 April 1995, Pas. belge 1995, I, no. 201, p. 423). The

2.

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3.

victim has a claim for reparation of the entire damage, not more and not less (van Gerven (-Covemaeker), Verbintenissenrecht II2, 456). Similar to the position adopted in France, a distinction is drawn between herstel /réparation en nature and vergoeding /réparation en équivalent, namely, between the actual restoration of the status quo ante and its monetary equivalent (Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2), no. 33 p. 64). The injured party can request reparation in kind, if this is feasible and the redress sought does not amount to an abuse of law (Cass. 26 June 1980, Pas. belge 1980, I, 1341). A commonly used example is the return of a stolen article (Cass. 8 May 1952, Pas. belge 1952, I, 570). The reparation awarded for repairing a damaged good may not exceed the market value of that good (Cass. 23 October 1986, RW 1986-87, 54). Réparation en équivalent is always owed if reparation in kind is impossible; it falls to the court to decide on the amount of reparation and it decides this matter by reference to the concrete circumstances of the case at hand and, if necessary, ex aequo et bono (Covemaeker loc. cit. 457-458). If the injured party took it upon himself to rectify the damage because he was legally or contractually obliged to do so, then no claim for reparation can be made on the grounds that either the obligation broke the chain of causation (so held in Cass. 28 April 1978, RW 1978-79, 1695, note Dumon [city of Antwerp unable to claim the costs of salvaging a sunken ship from the person who caused the ships to collide because the city was statutorily bound to undertake a salvage operation] and Cass. 26 September 1979, Pas. belge 1981, I, 119) or the assumption is justified that there was no legally relevant damage (according to more recent jurisprudence which rejected the claims of the State to continued payment of wages and social security contributions where a civil servant was injured: Cass. 19 February 2001, Pas. belge 2001, I, no. 97 p. 322, no. 98 p. 327, no. 99 p. 329 and no. 100 p. 332 as well as Cass. 20 February 2001, Pas. belge 2001, I, no. 101 p. 334). Finally, reparation in kind is also a feature of LUXEMBOURGIAN law (CFI Luxembourg 27 March 1954, Pas. luxemb. 16 [1954-1956] 181). Similarly, under SPANISH law, a distinction is drawn between compensation in money (indemnización) and reparation in kind; the latter is described in the following terms, namely restitución, resarcimiento or indemnización en forma específica, occasionally, it is also designated as reparación en especie or reparación in natura (Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 477; Díez-Picazo and Gullón, Sistema II9, 559; Roca i Trias, Derecho de daños3, 181; Carrasco Perera, Aranzadi Civil 1996, II, 51-68). Reparation in kind is the basic rule; indemnización is the exception to the rule and is utilised in cases where reparation in kind is not possible (Albaladejo (-Santos Briz), Comentarios al Código Civil y compilaciones forales XXIV, art. 1902, p. 188; Lete del Río, Derecho de obligaciones II3, 211; Lacruz Berdejo and Rivero Hernández, Elementos II(2)4, 512; DíezPicazo and Gullón, Instituciones I, 837). This can be deduced from CC art. 1096 and from CP art. 110. CP art. 110 provides, however, for three ways of reparation: (i) restitution; (ii) reparation in kind, and (iii) compensation of economic and non-economic losses. Reparation in kind also plays an important role within the scope of protection of incorporeal personality rights, see Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act art. 9(2) (which e. g. lists the publication of a judgment as a possible form of compensation) and Retraction Act (Ley Orgánica 2/1984 reguladora del derecho de rectificación) (which allows any natural or legal person to obtain the correction of any information which is inaccurate and potentially harmful). A claim for monetary compensation is, however, not precluded by these other means of making

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4.

914

reparation (Salvador Coderch (-Martín Casals), El mercado de las ideas, 383-384). In comparative terms, the Spanish courts frequently order the remedy of the publication of the judgment (e. g. TS 25 January 2002, RAJ 2002 (1) no. 31 p. 51). The choice between the various types of redress is controlled by the courts (TS 22 October 1932, RAJ 193233 (1) no. 1245 p. 526; TS 24 March 1952, RAJ 1952 no. 1209 p. 862; TS 3 March 1978, RAJ 1978 (1) no. 954 p. 829; Lacruz Berdejo and Rivero Hernández loc. cit. 513; DíezPicazo and Gullón, Sistema II8, 181). In the context of physical damage to property, reparation (performed or paid by the injured party) or resarcimiento por equivalente (compensation for lost value) is available. The latter is then the sole form of reparation if restoration of the status quo ante is impossible or unreasonably expensive (Lacruz Berdejo and Rivero Hernández loc. cit. 553; Lasarte, Principios de Derecho Civil II(2), 432; Yzquierdo Tolsada loc. cit. 478; Roca i Trias loc. cit. 181). The property owner is not obliged to choose the alternative that would have the least impact on the damaging party’s pocket (Albaladejo (-Carrasco Perera), Comentarios al Código Civil y compilaciones forales XV(1), art. 1106, p. 669). In the absence of an application to the contrary, the courts favour reparation in kind (Luna Yerga, InDret 2/2002; CA Badajoz 2 March 1998, AC 1998 (1) no. 406 p. 584; CA Álava 12 September 1996, AC 1996 (3) no. 2482 p. 1326; CA Badajoz 3 September 1996, AC 1996 (2) no. 1512 p. 1083). This corresponds to the regulation contained in CP art. 111(1)(i). Whether the current market price of a vehicle constitutes the upper limit of repair costs that can be recovered is contentious (of this view TS 30 October 1997, RAJ 1997 (5) no. 8563 p. 13711 and CA Pontevedra 21 July 2006, BDA JUR 2006/216508; rejecting this approach, TS 3 March 1978, RAJ 1978 (1) no. 759 p. 671; TS 9 July 1987, RAJ 1987 (3) no. 5213 p. 4973; CA Cantabria 5 November 1993, BDA AC 1993/2307; CA Baleares 10 October 2006, BDA JUR 2006/278350 and many others). A number of courts do not take the current market value as a benchmark, instead they look to the value in the use of the car (valor de uso oder valor de reposición), which connotes approximately 20 to 30 % of the current market value of the car before the accident occurred (CA Huesca 11 January 1994, BDA AC 1994/39; CA Asturias 1 December 1994, BDA AC 1994/2129) (even 50 % CA Cuenca 18 September 1997, BDA AC 1997/1794; CA Cáceres 31 March 1997, BDA AC 1997/ 502; CA Badajoz 25 February 1998, AC 1998 (1) no. 142, p. 216). Frequently, a deduction “new for old” (deducción nuevo por viejo) is made (CA Asturias 9 January 1998, BDA AC 1998/2967; CA Cantabria 1 March 1999, AC 1999 (1) no. 656 p. 917). In ITALY, compensation (risarcimento del danno) is achieved through the payment of a sum of money (risarcimento per equivalente) or reparation in kind (riparazione oder risarcimento in forma specifica; reintegrazione in forma specifica; risarcimento in natura). The injured party can request that he or she be restored to the position that he or she would have been in had the event giving rise to liability not occurred, provided and in so far as this is possible (CC art. 2058). The court can however order compensation by payment of a monetary sum if reinstating the status quo ante would prove to be an unreasonable burden for the debtor. Risarcimento in forma specifica does not only comprise of the reinstatment of the creditor’s earlier position but is also extant when the debtor pays the sum of money necessary to reinstate the status quo ante (di Majo, La tutela civile dei diritti III4, 269; de Cupis, Il danno II2, 307). Nonetheless, the creditor is not obliged to apply this sum to restore his earlier position (de Cupis loc. cit. 337). According to judicial pronouncements, the distinction between risarcimento in forma specifica and risarcimento per equivalente lies in the fact that, in the first category, the extent of the

Article 6:101: Aim and forms of reparation

5.

6.

reparation is assessed on the basis of the costs of restoring the status quo ante, in the second case, it is assessed on the basis of the loss of value suffered (Cass. 3 July 1997, no. 5993, Giust.civ.Mass. 1997, fasc. 1128; Cass. 4 March 1998, no. 2402, Giur.it. 1999, 255; critical, on this point, Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile3, 824). A very controversial issue is whether the costs of repair may exceed the market value of the damaged property. In the opinion of many commentators, the market value always represents the upper limit of the recoverable damage (e. g. Castronovo loc. cit. 828; Salvi, Il danno extracontrattuale, 40; Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, 1126). The deduction “new for old” will take place, if the repair has the effect of increasing the value of the property (Cass. 4 March 1983, no. 1636, Giust.civ.Mass. 1983, fasc. 3). Generally, the injured party may choose to opt for either risarcimento in forma specifica or risarcimento per equivalente (Cass. 25 July 1997, no. 6985, Giust.civ.Mass. 1997, 1280). If no particular application is filed, then compensation per equivalente will be awarded. Of course, an order of risarcimento in forma specifica does not preclude a claim of compensation per equivalente for the period of time that the damaged good could not be used (Cass. 20 August 1981, no. 4958, Giust.civ.Mass. 1981, fasc. 8). In the context of personal injury of a permanent character, the courts may award compensation in the form of an annuity (CC art. 2057). HUNGARIAN CC § 355(1) provides that a person who is liable for causing loss must restore the status quo ante. Only when this is impossible or for cogent reasons, is not desired by the injured party, will there be an award of compensation for economic and non-economic loss. Compensation is awarded for the depreciation in value accruing to the injured party’s patrimony, economic benefits foregone as well as costs necessary to reduce or eliminate the economic and non-economic losses sustained (CC § 355(4)) The civil law in ROMANIA adopts the principle of integral reparation as its point of departure (CC arts. 998, 1073, 1084). The entire damage that flows from the injury is recoverable. Reparation can take the form of payment of a sum of money or may lie in the performance of an act, such as by publishing or making a public apology or even doing both of these. The primary form of compensation is reparation in kind. The return of a dispossessed item and the repair of a damaged thing serve as illustrations; if it is unclear whether they are still in existence, then, the courts may alternatively award damages to the extent of its value (Adam, Drept civil, 273-275; Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘, 247-248). Conversely, in the context of personal injury, reparation in kind is not possible. Here, monetary compensation is awarded. The distinction between restoring the status quo ante and monetary compensation is also a familiar one to BULGARIAN law (Kojucharov, Obligazionno pravo I, 286). While it is true to state that the basic principle that the injured party should be restored to the position that he would have found himself in, had the damaging event not occurred is only codified in the contractual law provisions of LOA art. 79(2), according to the view of some legal writers, this principle can be applied analogously in the tort law context (Antonov, Nepozvoleno uvrejdane, 193; Kojucharov loc. cit. 287). In a similar fashion, under tort law reparation in kind has precedence over monetary compensation; in respect of the latter, the injuring party does not come under any obligation, provided and to the extent that reparation in kind is possible. The analogous application of LOA art. 79(2) in the realm of tort law is rejected by Kalaydjiev, Obligazionno pravo, Obshta chast, 392 and Supreme Court 27 September 1955, decision no. 1787, civil case no. 5611/55. Kalaydjiev was of the opinion that reparation in kind was not possible

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7.

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within the frameworkl of extra-contractual liability. The Supreme Court held that the injuring party was not obliged to procure a thing of the same type and quality as the damaged item and nor were they obliged to repair it. The following should not be regarded as a form of compensation, namely, if the injuring party, following the accident, attends to the needs of the injured party by, e. g. delivering the latter’s belongings from the scene of the accident to the hospital or to the injured party’s place of residence (Supreme Court 25 March 1972, decision no. 786, civil case no. 5/72). Under SLOVENIAN LOA § 164(1), while the principle of resitution in kind does indeed prevail, the creditor can always seek monetary compensation unless important grounds would necessitate a different result (LOA § 164(4)). Additionally, only monetary compensation may be claimed if reparation in natura is impossible or, in the discretion of the court, is deemed inequitable (LOA § 164(3)). Reparation in kind is, for the most part, impossible in the context of non-pecuniary loss (see LOA § 178). The correction of a false portrayal in the media constitutes an exception to this general rule (Media Act art. 26). Reparation in kind can be deemed inequitable, e. g. if the costs of repair exceed the current market value of a damaged vehicle (Juhart and Plavs˘ak (-Plavs˘ak), Obligacijski zakonik I, art. 164 p. 926). Similarly, GERMAN law draws a distinction between reparation in kind and compensation. The modalities of reparation in kind are described in CC § 249. The first sentence concerns restoring the situation that would have existed, had the event giving rise to liability not occurred. In the context of personal injuries or damage to property, the second sentence confers a right on the creditor to claim “monetary compensation in lieu of reparation in kind”. CC § 251 governs compensation; the focus is placed on safeguarding the value of the claimant’s assets (Medicus, Schuldrecht I17, no. 589). Priority is generally accorded to reparation in kind (CC § 251(1)): the person with a duty to make reparation is only obliged to pay compensation, provided that and in so far as reparation in kind is impossible or deemed to be inadequate to compensate the creditor. Moreover, CC § 251(2)(i) permits the debtor to pay monetary compensation if restitition in kind is only possible with disproportionate expenditure (with respect to animals, CC § 251(2) (ii) postulates an exception to the general rule which corresponds to 6:101(3)(ii)). The “disproportionality” of the expenditure is usually assessed by comparing the costs of restoring the orginal position – occasionally employing a deduction “new for old” (BGH 8 December 1987, NJW 1988, 1835) – and the monetary compensation due under CC § 251. In the context of damage to motor vehicles, the courts have developed the following rule, namely that the costs of repair cannot exceed the replacement value of the vehicle by more than 30 % (BGH 15 October 1991, NJW 1992, 305; BGH 17 March 1992, NJW 1992, 1618; BGH 15 February 2005, NJW 2005, 1108, 1109). Other ceilings may apply in the context of other things (Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB67, § 251, no. 7). Together with costs of repair, replacing the thing damaged with a thing of the same value is also a form of reparation in kind (BT-Drucks. 14/7752, 13, 23; BGH 23 March 1976, BGHZ 66, 239, 247; BGH 15 October 1991, BGHZ 115, 364, 368; BGH 15 October 1991, BGHZ 115, 375, 378; BGH 20 June 1972, NJW 1972, 1800, 1801; BGH 4 March 1976, NJW 1976, 1202, 1203; BGH 6 April 1993, NJW 1993, 1849, 1850; BGH 7 June 2005, NJW 2005, 2541, 2542). The damaging party is permitted to elect the most favourable form of redress (BGH 7 June 2005, NJW 2005, 2541, 2542). The injured party who decides to carry out the repairs himself may claim the higher costs of repair as

Article 6:101: Aim and forms of reparation

8.

estimated by an expert to the extent that those costs do not exceed the value of its replacement (BGH 29 April 2004, JR 2004, 23). According to AUSTRIAN CC § 1323 (first sentence), the injuring party is obliged to do “everything in his power to restore the status quo ante or, if this is not possible, it is incumbent upon him to reimburse the estimated value of damaged good”. Therefore, priority is given to reparation in kind: monetary compensation is a subsidiary claim (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 9/1). Generally speaking, the same holds true for other obligations to pay compensation which are contained in other statutes, extraneous to the Civil Code. However, a number of these (including the Insurance Contract Act which is of significant practical relevance) expressly exclude reparation in kind. Reparation in kind denotes reinstating a situation which is similar to and on a par with that in existence before the damaging event occurred (OGH 26 February 2002, 1 Ob 15/ 02s; OGH 14 October 2003, SZ 2003/119 p. 293). Reparation in natura is understood to connote not only reparation by the damaging party itself but is also understood to mean that a commensurate sum of money may be paid to a third party who is capable of reinstating the status quo ante. In the context of property damage, the procurement of a thing which is commensurate to and is of equal value to the damaged thing constitutes reparation in kind (Koziol/Bydlinski/Bollenberger (-Danzl) ABGB2, § 1323 no. 4). With respect to payments of money, the basis for calculating the expenditure necessary to cover the cost of repairs is not, as distinct to monetary compensation, the deterioration in value resulting from the damage to property. A claim for reparation in kind can be made if, “an economically minded person who had to bear the costs of the damage himself, would have also incurred such expenditure” (OGH 18 April 2003, JBl 2004, 657). If the costs of repair only negligibly exceed the market value of the thing, then, repairing the item can be considered justifiable from an economic point of view (OGH 9 July 1974, ZVR 1975/79 p. 116; Danzl loc. cit. 7). Fixed percentage rates are not endorsed; rather, it will depend on the individual circumstances of the case at hand (Koziol loc. cit. no. 9/19). Nonetheless, a tendency to draw the line at around 10 % of the eclipsed market value can be observed (Danzl loc. cit. no. 7, Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VI3, § 1323 no. 43). If it is only possible to partially recompense the damage caused by means of reparation in kind, then the remainder of the damage is compensated in money; reparation in kind and monetary compensation can coexist (Koziol loc. cit. no. 9/1). A person is liable to pay monetary compensation if reinstating the status quo ante proves to be factually impossible or economically unviable (OGH 25 November 2004, 6 Ob 139/04s; OGH 25 January 1978, SZ 51/7 p. 24). The leading example in this area is total loss, whereby the costs of repair considerably exceed the market value (Danzl loc. cit. no. 7). In this case, the difference between the market value of the damaged property and the projected value in its undamaged state is recoverable (Danzl loc. cit. no. 8). As a general rule, the injured party may claim compensation if the injuring party defaults in the performance of his obligations under the reparation in natura head (OGH 18 November 1964, SZ 37/165 p. 471). CC § 1323a is applicable in respect of animals. According to this provision, the actual costs incurred in treating the animal are also recoverable if those costs would exceed the cost of the animal, subject to the condition that a reasonable animal keeper would have also incurred these costs. Punitive damages are not recognised under Austrian law (Harrer loc. cit. Pref. to §§ 1293 ff, no. 4).

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9.

10.

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GREECE distinguishes between reparation in kind and monetary compensation (Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio, Geniko meros, 158). Monetary compensation is the basic rule (CC art. 297 first sentence; see ErmAK (-Litzeropoulos), art. 297, no. 2; Georgiades loc. cit.); the courts only award reparation in kind if the particular circumstances of the case render its award justifiable (CC art. 297 second sentence). In this respect, the Code refers to the “restoration of the status quo ante”. For this requirement to be met, it is sufficient that an approximately equivalent situation is restored, e. g. this could be achieved by repair or procuring a similar type of thing or paying the costs of medical care directly to the hospital (Balis, Enochikon Dikaion, Geniko meros3, 124; Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio A(1)2, 77). Reparation in kind connotes that the injuring party is required to bring about an actual result (Stathopoulos loc. cit.). CA Athens 97/ 1965, NoB 13 (1965) 502 opined that a claim for repair costs was a form of reparation in kind (therefore, not tantamount to compensation), on the grounds that the sum of money served to effect an actual result. If repairing the damaged property would lead to unreasonably high costs, then the injured party is only obliged to make reparation to the extent of the costs of replacement (Filios, Enochiko Dikaio I2, 267). Under PORTUGUESE CC art. 562(1) it is incumbent upon the injuring party to restore the (hypothtical) position that would have existed had the damaging event not occurred (Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 905; STJ 23 October 2003; STJ 18 September 2003), it contains therefore, the princípio da reposição or princípio da reconstituição natural (Antunes Varela loc. cit. 904; STJ 9 December 2004, CJ(ST) XII (2004-3) 137). In conjunction with the reconstituição natural, forms of reparation also envisaged comprise (in CC art. 566) monetary compensation or (in CC art. 567) compensation in the form of an annuity. Reparation in kind is accorded priority (CC art. 562); compensation is always constituted in money, if reparation in kind is impossible, further, if this remedy will not serve to completely rectify the damage caused or if it would result in the debtor being unreasonably burdened (CC art. 566(1)). There is no right of election between forms of redress; the forms of reparation are determined by the court. In the case that property is destroyed, lost or damaged, the injuring party is required to procure property of the same quality (or similar in all essential points: CA Oporto 16 December 1997, BolMinJus 472 [1998] 564) or to carry out repairs at his or her own cost; in the context of personal injuries, he is liable for the necessary medical treatment costs and nursing expenses (Antunes Varela loc. cit.) and in the context of infringements of the right of honour, there may be publication of the judgment (Vasconcelos Abreu, FS Magalhães Collaço II, 472). Frequently, reparation in kind will not suffice to completely remedy the damage caused, e. g. it may cover only the costs of repairing a vehicle, but it does not encompass the loss of use, or only covers medical costs but does not embrace compensation for pain suffered (Antunes Varela loc. cit. 905; Abrantes Geraldes, Temas da responsabilidade civil I2, 95-113 [with a summary of cases on deprivation of use]). The assessment of compensation principally addresses the interesse, namely, the difference between the existing state of affairs and the situation prevailing before the event generating liability occurred (CC art. 562(2); Antunes Varela loc. cit. 907); this includes compensation for losses due to inflation (CA Évora 19 February 1987, CJ XII (1987-1) 308; CA Lisbon 21 February 1985, CJ X (1985-1) 69). This difference is assessed according to the principle of replacement value, in the event that reparation in kind would be “excessively burdensome” for the debtor (CC art. 566(1); STJ 7 July 1999, CJ(ST) VII (1999-3) 16). The leading example concerns the extent of expenditure

Article 6:101: Aim and forms of reparation

11.

12.

necessary to repair an older car model. CA Évora 12 February 1987, CJ XII (1987-1) 300 refused to award the costs of repairing a used car which, following an accident, was rendered practically worthless, on the grounds that such an award would represent economic folly as the repair costs would have been twice as high as the value of the car prior to the accident. However, this does not entail that the courts will never award the costs of repairing an older car; because a small award of compensation for lost value can entail that the injured party will not be able to afford a suitable mode of transport any more (STJ 7 July 1999, CJ(ST) VII (1999-3) 16; STJ 29 April 2003, CJ(ST) XXVIII (2003-2) 28). Whether reparation in kind would be “excessively burdensome” for the injured party depends on an assessment of the individual circumstances of the case. This can also connote that, in the event that a pet is injured, the injuring party must pay the veterinary costs of treating the animal, even if those costs considerably exceed the value of the animal (Pessoa Jorge, Ensaio sobre os pressupostos da responsabilidade civil, 422) The point of departure of DUTCH CC art. 6:103 is indeed the general principle that the notion of compensation connotes the payment of a sum of money, but a caveat is added to this provision which provides that upon application by the injured party the courts may award another form of reparation; if this decision is not complied with timeously, then the injured party again acquires the right to claim monetary compensation. A grant of compensation which takes a different form to that of the payment of money includes an order to render actual performance as well as an order to render a legal act (see further Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12, no. 411 p. 331; Spier, Schadevergoeding: algemeen, deel III, no. 22 pp. 44-45). ESTONIAN LOA § 127(1) tallies with Article 6:101(1). The basic rule provides that compensation takes the form of a monetary payment and, in particular, a lump sum (LOA § 136(1)). Other forms of reparation are not expressly excluded (LOA § 136(5)). There is no special provision concerning animals. SWEDISH statute law almost exclusively concentrates on monetary compensation (e. g. Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 7 no. 1: Reparation in the context of property damage). A distinction is drawn between the cost of replacement and the costs of repair; the injuring party is generally liable for the lowest amount in each case. However, in the context of injury to domestic animals and damage to things possessing special qualities (e. g. a rare car), the courts will consider conferring a right of election on the injured party (Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans, 488); at any rate, in the context of cases dealing with pets, an analysis of case law shows that the courts have accepted that treatment costs which exceed the market value of the animal can be claimed (HD 22 February 2001, NJA 2001, 65 I-II; similarly, for DENMARK Eastern CA 14 September 1981, UfR 1981, 1074). Awarding compensation which takes another form to that of a monetary payment plays a relatively ancillary role. It can be encountered e. g. clothed in the garb of restitutionary claims in property law (Karlgren, Skadeståndsrätt5, 194, 206) and in the area of protection of the right to honour. In this context, the most important example pertains to the award of costs in respect of the publication of judgments in one or more newspapers (Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 6). Moreover, FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 clearly postulates that monetary compensation denotes the normal rule. A statutory exception to this rule can be found in CP chap. 27 § 7, which provides that person who violates the right to honour, and this infringement amounts to a criminal offence, an order granting publication of the judgment may be granted. This

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13.

920

corresponds to the position in DENMARK (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 348 resp. CP § 273(2)). In the context of total loss, the amount of monetary compensation is generally directed at the cost of replacing the thing to its state immediately before the damaging event occurred (Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 321; Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6, 420; Swedish HD 7 May 1991, NJA 1991, 269; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 247; see also Swedish Insurance Contracts Act chap. 6 §§ 1-2 and Danish Insurance Contracts Act § 37). If replacement is precluded, then the assessment hinges on the market value of the thing. In the case of partial damage, two methods are used. If considerable damage is caused, this is governed by the net realisable value method, whereby the compensation awarded is the difference between the market value and the residual value of the damaged object (Hellner and Johansson loc. cit. 423; Swedish HD 7 April 1971, NJA 1971, 126; Bengtsson and Strömbäck loc. cit. 324; von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 249). In contrast, if the damage is minor, the actual costs of repair provide the basis for calculation, provided that this method is more favourable for the injuring party when compared to the net realisable value method (Danish Eastern CA 14 September 1981 loc. cit.); the reduced market value of a vehicle damaged in an accident is still recoverable (Hellner and Johansson loc. cit.; Danish Western CA 9 May 1972, UfR 1972, 809 and 23 April 1997, UfR 1997, 969). The same holds true for loss of value to land which ocurred after a neighbour mistakenly allowed six mature trees to be felled onto the land (Danish Western CA 12 September 1994, FED 1994, 995). Conversely, in the context of repairs which have the effect of increasing the value of the thing, an “old for new” deduction is carried out (Swedish HD 16 March 1955, NJA 1955, 89 II; von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 249; Vinding Kruse loc. cit. 350). In ENGLISH law too the general rule is that tortious injury is to be compensated by damages. This means compensation measured in money: Leeds Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Slack [1924] AC 851, 868 and 874 (Lords Sumner and Carson, also referring in the alternative to the seemingly wider concept of “recompense by process of law”). Specific remedies, which in other systems could be regarded as reparation in kind, are exceptional and, unlike damages which are available as of right as a matter of common law, once the tort is established, they depend on the exercise of judicial discretion. They include the equitable remedy of a mandatory injunction (ordering the defendant to reinstate a status quo ante, e. g. by demolishing a building unlawfully built so as to infringe the claimant’s rights) and the statutory power under the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, s. 3(2)(a) to order delivery of goods which the defendant has wrongly retained. In relation to defamation, the tortfeasor may make an offer of amends under the Defamation Act 1996, s. 2, viz. to publish a suitable correction of the defamatory statement and a sufficient apology in a manner which is reasonable and practicable in the circumstances and to pay compensation; the rejection of the offer may form the basis of a defence: loc. cit., s. 4(2). (The defence is not available if the claimant shows that the defendant knew or had reason to believe that the statement referred to the claimant, or was likely to be understood as referring to him, and that it was false and defamatory: s. 4(3)). While not a remedy as such, this does serve and is intended to serve the function of enabling an innocent defendant (who is strictly liable for the defamation) to deflect relief away from monetary reparation. As regards damages, the sum of money to be given for reparation should be as nearly as possible that which will put the injured person in the same position which he would have been in if he had not

Article 6:101: Aim and forms of reparation

14.

suffered the wrong: Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. (1879-80) 5 App.Cas. 25, 39 (Lord Blackburn); London and South of England Building Society v. Stone [1983] 1 WLR 1242, 1250 (O’Connor LJ). As a rule, even in deceit, damage will be assessed at the date of the breach of duty constituting the tort, so that an asset acquired will be valued at the transaction date if that truly reflects the value of what the claimant obtained, e. g. where the asset is readily marketable: Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v. Scrimgeour Vickers Ltd. [1997] AC 254, 266 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). The rule will be departed from, however, where this is necessary in order to ensure full compensation for the wrong suffered because of special features such as the fact that the fraud continued to influence the claimant’s conduct after the transaction, so as to induce the claimant to retain the asset, or the claimant was locked in the circumstances into continuing to hold the asset acquired: Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v. Scrimgeour Vickers Ltd. loc. cit. Equally, however, supervening events will be taken into account where the principle of restitutio in integrum might otherwise be seen to have delivered a windfall: cf. Hibbert Pownall & Newton v. Whitehead [2008] EWCA Civ 285; (2008) Times, 14th May (mother’s solicitors negligently failed to pursue vigorously the mother’s claim for damages against a health authority in respect of future losses for wrongful birth; the mother committed suicide before the action was set down for trial; had the action been successfully concluded before her death, the damages recoverable from the local authority (costs of future care) would not have been curtailed by her death; it was held that her personal representatives could not recover from the solicitors in respect of these lost damages for future care). An increased award of general damages known as aggravated damages may be awarded where the defendant has acted in a way calculated to wound the claimant’s feelings, particularly his dignity and pride (or self-respect) and are most commonly (but not only) granted in defamation cases: Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129, 1221. Such damages are not to be regarded as not going beyond compensation; they amount to compensation for injured feelings and their restricted availability merely reflects the proposition that injury to feelings is not as a rule a recognized head of damage: compare the definition (“Additional damages which the court may award as compensation for the defendant’s objectionable behavior”) in the Glossary to the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. By contrast, an award of exemplary (or punitive) damages has the object of punishing the defendant or an exemplary function in deterring others from imitating the defendant’s wrong. Such an award is not compensatory in character (compare the definition [”Damages which go beyond compensating for actual loss and are awarded to show the court’s disapproval of the defendant’s behaviour”] in the Glossary to the Civil Procedure Rules 1998), but is exceptional. At common law exemplary damages may be awarded only either to (in effect) disgorge profit (as to which see Note II 26 below) or in a case of “oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of government” (Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129). They may also be awarded under specific statutory authority, e. g. the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces (Protection of Civil Interests) Act 1951, s. 13(2) (in relation to conversion). A claim to exemplary damages does not survive the death of the claimant: Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, s. 1(2)(a)(i) (as amended by the Administration of Justice Act 1982, s. 4(2). In IRELAND, while the Common Law approach to compensatory damages is fundamentally the same as in England, it is unclear to what extent the restriction on the award of exemplary damages to the specified categories of case articulated in Rookes v. Barnard 1964] AC 1129 apply: McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 44.16 et seq. It seems clear,

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however, that the restrictions formulated in the English case do not apply to infringements of constitutional rights: Conway v. Irish National Teachers Organisation [1991] 2 IR 305. In its report on exemplary damages, the Law Reform Commission proposed that the development of the law be left to the courts: Report on Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages (LRC 60-2000), para. 1.64. II.

The injuring party’s gains as a basis for recovery

15.

In principle, “profit-erasing” is not recognised by FRENCH or BELGIAN liability law. The profits which a wrongdoer has generated by way of his wrong may be taken into account when the courts come to assessing the extent of an award of compensation to which a victim who has sufferred dommage moral is entitled, cf. e. g. CA Paris of 4 January 1988, D. 1989 Somm.Comm. 92, note Amson (unlawful publication of private nude images of a woman who subsequently became famous). Some see in this developement a gateway ushering in the notion of punitive damages (Carval, La responsabilité civile dans sa fonction de peine privée, no. 29 p. 31). SPAIN has a number of special statutes which expressly provide that, upon application by the claimant, the measure of compensation may be assessed on the basis of the enrichment obtained by the injuring party from the wrong (inter alia Copyright Act art. 140, Trade Marks Act art. 43; Patents and Utility Models Act art. 66; Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act art. 9(3) and (4)). Moreover, it is important to note that Spain regulates the relationship between law on delict and law on unjustified enrichment in a different manner to France. This is of major significance if the prescription period for making a claim under CC art. 1902 has expired; given that the limitation period for a claim under unjustified enrichment is fifteen years (TS 5 October 1985, RAJ 1985 (3) no. 4840 p. 4085). It is also relevant where the benefit acquired by the wrongdoer through the commission of a tort is greater than the loss that the victim sustains. In such cases, it can turn out to be more favourable for the victim to assert a claim under unjustified enrichment, directed at erasing the profits of the wrongdoer (Álvarez-Caperochipi, El enriquecimiento sin causa3, 119). For years, the Tribunal Supremo has repeatedly confirmed that both claims subsist independently from each other, i. e. the claim under delict and the unjustified enrichment claim. The tort law claim requires a culpable wrongful act in contrast to the prerequisite of a successful unjustified enrichment claim which requires an increase to the estate of the defendant, without a legal basis and at the claimant’s expense, but no more (TS 12 April 1955, RAJ 1955 (2) no. 1125 p. 602; TS 5 May 1964, RAJ 1964 no. 2208 p. 1380). In conjunction with the foregoing, Spanish legal writers, influenced by German legal doctrine refer to a Eingriffskondiktion or condictio por intromisión (Camara Alvarez and Díez-Picazo, Dos estudios sobre el enriquecimiento sin causa, 116). A tortfeasor is not only obliged to make reparation for the damage caused but is also obliged to compensate for the value of the increase which has accrued to his assets, in particular in the cases dealing with the use of another’s property and the exploitation of another’s intellectual property. With respect to cases dealing with the exploitation of another’s reputation and for all other cases concerning infringements of another’s personality rights, a presumption relating to the presence of damage is contained in Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act art. 9(4). Consequently, it is only necessary to prove an unlawful infringement of these rights. Additionally, in the context

16.

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Article 6:101: Aim and forms of reparation

17.

18.

of the calculation of the measure of compensation, the courts take account of an enrichment which the infringer has obtained from the commission of a tort (loc. cit. art. 9(3)). In this way, the claim for non-pecuniary damages and the restitution claim indivisibly merge together to emerge in the delta of one single claim. Moreover, the extremely wide margin of discretion conferred by Spanish law on the courts of first instance in the field of the assessment of compensation is of practical importance (Basozabal Arrue, Enriquecimiento injustificado por intromisión en derecho ajeno, 173; Carrasco Perera, ADC 1988, II, 149). Incidentally, an attempt has been made to base a general tort law doctrine which would be directed at erasing the enrichment obtained on the theory of the bilateralisation of lost profits (bilateralización de lucro cesante), whereby a loss of profits tends to connote the same to the injured party as profits which are actually obtained by the wrongdoer (Bercovitz (-Carrasco Perera), Comentarios a Ley de propiedad intelectual, 1796). Similarly, TS 11 July 2006, BDA RAJ 2006/4977 could be explained on this basis. According to ITALIAN CC art. 2042, while an unjustified enrichment claim is subsidiary to a claim initiated under tort law, frequently, this provision does not clearly provide an adequate answer to solve the problem of concurrence of tort law and unjustified enrichment actions. At any rate, jurisprudence and academic teaching lean towards permitting the injured party to assert a claim, directed at erasing the unlawful profits which the wrongdoer has obtained (Sacco, L’arricchimento ottenuto mediante fatto ingiusto, passim). This primarily impinges on dispositions of another’s property, which are then effective against the holder of the right (Trimarchi, L’arricchimento senza causa, 55; Sacco loc. cit. 99; Gallo, Arricchimento senza causa e quasi contratti 44; Cian andTrabucchi, Commentario breve8, note X under art. 1153), and breaches of incorporeal personality rights of another (CFI Monza 26 March 1990, Foro it. 1991, I, 2862) and intellectual property right infringements (Intellectual Property Code art. 125). Within this framework, when calculating the reparation due, account is taken of all the circumstances of the individual case, including the benefits that the injuring party has obtained. In addition, reparation for loss of profits which is a feature of the total sum awarded, may not fall below the sum which the infringer would have had to pay for a licence permitting him to use the right (loc. cit. art. 125(2)). Of course, the general civil law basis for claiming the profits which the injuring party has obtained from his wrongdoing remains contentious, some commentators contend that this claim is not anchored in tort law, rather, that it is tantamount to an unjustified enrichment claim, which, because tort law does not recognise such claims, therefore, does not fall foul of the principle of subsidiarity (see further de Cupis, Il danno II3, 16; Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, 665-666; Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile3, 648-654). HUNGARIAN tort law does not contain a rule comparable to that contained in Article 6:101(4). However, a number of statutes governing the protection of intellectual property and copyright confer a right on the holder of a right to claim back the advantage which the injuring party acquired through the commission of the infringement (Patents Act no. XXXIII /1995 § 35(2)(e); Trademark Act no. XI /1997 § 27(2)(e); Copyright Act no. LXXVI /1999 § 94(1)(e)). Unjustified enrichment claims which are aimed at restituting profits are also taken into account in the context of using another’s property for economic gain (BH 2005/143: publishing unauthorised photos of a house with an architecturally interesting roof; redress conceivable under CC § 361(1), as an exploitation of the owner’s right of use and right to fruits, but awarded on the facts under the

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19.

20.

21.

924

Copyright Act which protected the roof’s design). In the context of a breach of incorporeal personality rights, the courts determine the extent of compensation for nonpecuniary loss according to a discretion which is exercised according to equitable precepts; it cannot be affirmatively stated that the profits garnered by the infringer are taken account of when it comes to assessing compensation. In addition, decisions on the unlawful appropriation of the reputation of another in an advertisement do not express an opinion on this point (BH 2002/261; BH 1995/509). Legal commentary on the reform of the Hungarian Civil Code tends to leave resolution of the problematic issue of disgorgement of profits to the law on unjustified enrichment out of concern that it would otherwise not be possible to keep out the notion of punitive damages from tort law (Vékás, FS Boytha György, 351-355; Vékás (-Vékás), Szakérto˝i Javaslat az új Polgári Törvénykönyv tervezetéhez, 1144). BULGARIAN tort law also does not recognise a claim to restitution of the enrichment obtained by the infringer. The compensation claim only embraces the compensation of the injured party’s lost profits. This also applies in patent law (Patents and Registration of Useful Designs Act art. 28(1)(no. 2)); in this context, however, the loss of profits is calculated on the basis of lost licence fees (Supreme Court 18 November 2004, decision no. 669, civil case no. 1907/2003). According to copyright law, the profits realised by the injuring party also constitutes a relevant basis for the assessment of compensation (Copyright Act art. 94(3)). A method of calculating damages which takes account of the enrichment accruing to the injuring party can also be found in ROMANIAN Copyright Act art. 139(4). While GERMAN CC § 252(sent. 2) does indeed the injured party to assert a claim for recovery of lost profits, the provision fails to stipulate anything about clawing back the profits obtained by the injuring party by his wrong; the statutorily regulated damages law is also silent on this issue (MünchKomm (-Oetker), BGB5, § 252, no. 52). In the context of intellectual property infringements or infringements of other positions protected by the law on unfair competition, the courts confer a “right of election” on the injured party. The latter can either claim the recovery of lost profits which can be postively adduced or payment of a reasonable licence fee (without having to adduce an actual loss of profits) or the recovery of the gain actually realised by the wrongdoer (BGH 2 November 2000, BGHZ 145, 366, 375; BGH 6 October 2005, NJW-RR 2006, 834, 835; BGH 27 February 2007, MittDtPatAnw 2007, 317; BGH 21 September 2007, WRP 2007, 533). In the field of copyright law, the later claim is expressly regulated in Copyright Act § 97(1)(ii). This right of election is also conferred in cases of slavish imitation of products and the unlawful exploitation of trade secrets (see further Oetker loc. cit. no. 53). In the context of calculating non-pecuniary reparation for infringements of incorporeal personal rights, the injuring party’s share of the profits can be taken into consideration. The general rule is that a claim for disgorgement of profits can only be based on a special construction of the law of benevolent intervention in another’s affairs which for its part, has intention as a prerequisite to any successful claim (CC § 687(2)). In AUSTRIA, while the principle that a wrongdoer may not gain any profit from his wrongful action is indeed recognised, the corresponding claim of the the injured party is classified as one anchored in the law of unjustified enrichment and is not regarded as a tort law claim; the causes of action under tort law and unjustified enrichment are concurrent (Koziol/Bydlinski/Bollenberger (-Koziol) ABGB, § 1041 no. 4). If the vic-

Article 6:101: Aim and forms of reparation

22. 23.

24.

25.

tim’s loss and the injuring party’s gain coincide in amount, then a claim for compensation will indeed arise; if, however, there is no loss of profits, then only a claim under unjustified enrichment will arise. Thereby, every opportunity of making use of or exploiting [the asset] which the injured party has been deprived of and which has passed to the injuring party is regarded as an “enrichment” (OGH 13 July 1953, ÖBl 1953, 52; OGH 15 September 2005, SZ 2005/130 p. 181). Special statutory regulations governing the claim to restituting the profits that the injuring party has derived from his wrong are found in the Unfair Competition Act (UWG § 9) and under intellectual property law (Patents Act § 150; Trademark Act § 55; Copyright Act § 87), for the rest, “profiterasing” is governed by CC § 1041. It should be noted that the “disgorgement of profits” claims under competition law and intellectual property law, despite their classification as an unjustified enrichment claim, require fault on the part of the defendant (Schönherr and Kucsko, GRUR Int 1980, 282, 284) and that the gravity of the injury calibrates with the legal sanctions. The current legal position is not in dispute; de lege ferenda it is proposed that the profits garnered by the injured party should be recognised as a general principle of liability (Koziol, FS Bydlinski, 175, 194). A claim for disgorgement of profits obtained by wrongdoing is also not a feature of PORTUGUESE tort law. Under DUTCH CC art. 6:104, upon application by the injured party, the judge can calculate the damages so as to include, completely or in part, the profits wrongfully obtained by the injuring party. HR 24 December 1993, NedJur 1995 no. 421 p. 1942 held that this claim did not constitute a claim to resitution of the profits, rather it connoted the exercise of a “discretionary power of the court.” CC art. 6:104 is construed as a form of abstract method of calculating loss. The injuring party’s gain is regarded as a good benchmark to measure the loss actually suffered. The provision’s scope of application is confined to contract and tort law; it is not applicable in the context of the law on unjustified enrichment. With respect to infringements of personality rights by the media, the profits obtained are incorporated in the determination of the measure of non-pecuniary damages (Memorie van Antwoord II Inv. Parlementaire Geschiedenis, 1267; HR 4 March 1988, NedJur 1989 no. 361 p. 1236; Schadevergoeding II (-Deurvorst), art. 6:104, no. 5 p. 11 and no. 7 p. 14). Special statutory provisions which expressly provide for claims of disgorgement of profits, are primarily found in intellectual property law (see further Deurvorst loc. cit. no. 6 p. 12 and HR 14 April 2000, NedJur 2000 no. 489 p. 3267). Similarly, ESTONIAN tort law does not contain a provision similar to Article 6:101(4). The injured party can assert a claim against the injuring party under unjustified enrichment (see in particular LOA § 1037(1)) (see further on the relationship that exists between these two causes of action RKTKo 3-2-1-70-06 – RT III 2006, 32, 274). As a general rule, one claim excludes the other. The principle expressed in Article 6:101(4) is not generally recognised in NORDIC tort law. However, instances involving unauthorised use of another’s property may be subsumed under the principle of unjustified enrichment, and compensation can be awarded regardless of the plaintiff proving a loss or negligence (Hellner, Obehörig vinst, 232; Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 421; Agell, Skadeståndsansvaret vid obehöriga förfoganden över annans egendom, 197-239; HD 2 July 2007, NJA 2007, 519; Vinding Kruse, Restitutioner, 363; Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 264; Hakulinen, Obligationsrätt, 368). Furthermore, in cases concerning someone selling another’s property

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26.

926

without authorisation, compensation corresponding to the actual sale price may be awarded regardless of the actual value (Hellner loc. cit. 241; Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 414). Compensation for infringement of incorporeal property rights (such as trade name [ firma], trademark, patent and copyright) share similar enrichment characteristics; reasonable compensation is due even for infringements made in good faith (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 421; Monsen, Berikelsekrav, 330). However, the notion of assessing damages according to the enrichment of the infringer is rather unknown to the nordic countries (Koktedgaard and Levin, Immaterialrätt7, 454; Skovbo, Erstatning for uphavsretliga krænkelser, 238). With the implementation of Directive 2004/48 / EC, the profit of the infringer is explicitly listed in SWEDEN and DENMARK in the relevant statutes as a condition to be taken into account when assessing damages (SWEDISH proposal Ds 2007:18 Civilrättsliga sanktioner på immaterialrättens område – genomförande av direktiv 2004/48 / EG; DANISH Copyright Act § 83 (The FINNISH Government Bill RP 26/ 2006 did not consider it necessary to explicitly mention enrichment in the relevant statutory amendments). SWEDISH HD 16 November 1994, NJA 1994, 637 concerned a photo montage. A porno magazine stuck the heads of celebrities onto the heads of persons featured in the magazine who were depicted in compromising positions. When it came to the assessment of damages, the fact that the plaintiffs were in the public eye plus the fact that but the fact that “financial considerations” were the reason for the publication served to ground the unusually high award of compensation (see further Axberger, JT 1994-95, 716, 726). In DENMARK (Eastern CA 20 December 2004, UfR 2005, 1131) and FINLAND (Supreme Court 12 April 2000, HD 2000:54; Supreme Court 24 November 1997, HD 1997:185; see Sisula-Tulokas, JFT 2000, 634, 637; ibid., Contract and tort law: twenty cases from the Finnish Supreme Court, 121) it is possible to find quite similar decisions. In ENGLAND restitutionary damages to reverse the defendant’s wrongful enrichment may be awarded in place of compensatory damages, at any rate for torts involving interference with property: e. g. Ministry of Defence v. Ashman (1993) 66 P & CR 195 (damages from a tenant who disregarded a notice to quit air force accommodation assessed according to what it would have cost the tenant to rent alternative accommodation, rather than the air force’s loss). Furthermore, as an alternative to damages, the equitable (and therefore discretionary) remedy of an account of profits may be granted in respect of infringement of intellectual property rights (Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 96(2) (copyright); Patents Act 1977, s. 61(1)(d) (patents); for trade marks the availability of an account is implicit in the Trade Marks Act 1994 s. 31(6)). A claimant in such a case can apply in proceedings in the alternative for damages and an account, but cannot obtain judgment for both and loses his right of election when judgment is entered: Island Records Ltd. v. Tring International plc. [1996] 1 WLR 1256, 1258. Moreover, disgorgement of profit may also be achieved in a rough and ready manner by an award of exemplary damages in accordance with Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129, 1226 where “the defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable”. The aim of such damages has been expressed as one of teaching the wrongdoer that tort does not pay (loc. cit., 1227), but a better view is perhaps that they are awarded to prevent unjustified enrichment (McGregor, Damages17, para. 11-027). Further restitutionary remedies for torts involving interference with property are available within the law of unjustified enrichment (under the infamous doctrine of “waiver of tort”) under the

Article 6:102: De minimis rule

27.

28.

action for money had and received: cf. United Australia Ltd v. Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1. Indeed the view that restitutionary damages should be regarded as a remedy within the law of restitution rather than the law of damages has its proponents: e.g McGregor, Damages17, para. 12-003. Restitution for wrongs in SCOTLAND is regarded by commentators as a category which has not been articulated until recently. Nonetheless awards which are directed at restoring to the pursuer the enrichment which the wrongdoer has obtained, rather than redressing the loss caused, are known to Scots law in the form of an award of violent profits for cases of spuilzie, ejection and intrusion: Stewart, Delict3, para. 13.21 and see further Blackie, Enrichment and Wrongs in Scots Law, Acta Juridica (1992), 23. Directive 2004/48 / EC of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights art. 13(1) provides that the Member States are obliged to ensure that when the courts calculate damages in respect of the culpable infringement of rights under the Directive, account is taken of the profits that the injuring party derives from the wrong. The Member States are also permitted to provide for legal sanctions which do not depend on the commission of a fault by the injuring party (loc. cit. art. 13(2)). The ECJ has held that: “Community law does not prevent national courts from taking steps to ensure that the protection of the rights guaranteed by Community law does not entail the unjust enrichment of those who enjoy them”. Case law: Ireks-Arkady GmbH v. European Economic Community, ECJ 1 July 1981, C-238/78, ECR 1981, 1723, paragraph 14, Hans Just I / S v. Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs, ECJ 27 February 1980, C-68/79, ECR 1980, 501, paragraph 26; Joined Cases Kapniki Michaïlidis AE v. Idryma Koinonikon Asfaliseon (IKA), ECJ 21 September 2000, C-441/98 and C-442/98, ECR 2000, I-7145, paragraph 31; Courage Ltd. v. Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v. Courage Ltd. and Others, ECJ 20 September 2001, C-453/99, ECR 2001, I-6297, paragraph 30

Illustration 1 is taken from CFI Groningen 31 May 2002, LJN AE3727, note van der Hoek, NJB 2006 no. 29 p. 1618; illustration 2 from CA Jaén 29 January 1998, BDA AC 1998/3150; illustration 3 from Cass. 4 March 1983, no. 1636, Giust.civ.Mass. 1983, fasc. 3; and illustration 4 from CA Murcia 25 January 1999, BDA AC 1999/3056.

Article 6:102: De minimis rule Trivial damage is to be disregarded.

Comments 1. Policy considerations. This Article provides that trivial damage does not lead to a claim for reparation or to a claim to preventive legal protection. The idea is that trivial damage must be accepted in highly civilised society as a socially acceptable interference not warranting reparation; and actions for damages should be prevented if they do not primarily involve making good a loss, but rather involve harming the other party through the burden of having to bear the costs of legal proceedings. The rule of leaving trivial 927

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damage without a corresponding claim to compensation can also prevent class actions or other collective actions in which ultimately it is only the lawyers who profit or the organisations to which the relevant rights to reparation have been assigned. Trivial damage remains trivial even where it is suffered by many simultaneously. 2. Trivial damage. On the issue of whether damage is trivial, economic considerations are not decisive, but rather the legally protected interests of those involved, the type of grounds for attribution and the other conditions of damage causation. It is not trivial where a child’s old and almost economically worthless doll is destroyed or taken away, and it is also not trivial when the dog of an old lady living alone is killed; even if the amount of compensation in such a case were to be at the lowest level, it would not fall under the present Article as trivial damage. Intentionally inflicted damage can hardly ever be categorised as trivial. However, it would be trivial to complain about a medically notified and correctly carried out injection, solely because one is subsequently made aware of the fact that one had not been sufficiently briefed by the hasty nurse. The situation is of course different where a complication arises as a consequence of the injection: serious consequences of minor individual damage are not trivial. Minor inconveniences of everyday life are also socially acceptable and thus trivial: a banal infection (a head cold) that one contracts in a packed airport shuttle bus does not provide a basis for a claim in damages against the fellow passenger, entering a room which one inadvertently thinks is one’s own guest room does not ground liability in damages for the infringement of another’s privacy. 3. Products liability. Departing from the Community law currently in force (Product Liability Directive art. 9(b)), Article 3:204 (Accountability for damage caused by defective products) proposes to extend the strict liability of a producer in favour of consumers to damage to property which amounts to less than J 500. This proposition does not contradict the tendency of Article 6:102. Quite apart from the fact that losses of several hundred Euros are not, on any view, trivial, Article 6:102 in no way depends on such quantifications.

Notes 1.

2.

928

Under FRENCH liability law, an inclination on the part of the courts can be observed to disregard trivial damage (Roland and Boyer, Adages du droit français4, 151). Cass.civ. 4 April 1991, Bull.civ. 1991, I, no. 127 p. 85 e. g. confirms that an appeal court may derive from the caractère insignifiant du fait invoqué that there is no recoverable damage. However, this does not preclude an award of nominal damages in the particular case of noneconomic loss which is not trivial as such (cf. for BELGIUM e. g. CFI Brugge 7 February 2005, NJW 2005, 316, note Boone: damages of J 1 to compensate the non-economic loss of an elderly lady whose dog was killed). In SPAIN, the de minimis rule mainly comes to the fore in the context of violations of incorporeal personality rights. In exceptional cases, a number of courts have only awarded nominal damages (e. g. TS 23 February 1989, RAJ 1989 [1] no. 1250 p. 1334 [Catholic priest defamed a medical doctor who was a proponent of abortion; 1 peseta as compensation]; TS 31 December 1993, RAJ 1993 no. 9918 p. 12834; CA Barcelona 12

Article 6:102: De minimis rule

3.

4.

5.

6.

December 2000, BDA JUR 2001/130964; CA Granada 20 December 2004, AC 2005 [1] no. 63 p. 150 [Meeting of joint property owners; one co-owner was accused of failing to discharge his obligations; damages of J 1 as the injury was “minimal”]). This line of jurisprudence has been sharply criticised; on the grounds that an award of nominal damages is not a salient feature of Spanish law (Martín Casals, Notas sobre la indemnificazión del daño moral en las acciones por difamación de la LO 1/1982, 1231, 1263; Salvador Coderch (-Salvador Coderch), El mercado de las ideas, 183 [espousing an application of the ‘de minimis non curat iudex’ principle within the law of defamation]). TS 14 December 1993, RAJ 1993 no. 9886 p. 12784 picked up on this criticism and denied the existence of legally relevant damage where a plaintiff would normally have had merely an action for nominal damages; TS 18 November 2002, RAJ 2002 (6) no. 10261 p. 19070 and TS 28 April 2003, RAJ 2003 (2) no. 3548 p. 6541 endorsed this approach. Naturally, this course of action has been censured (in particular by Carrasco Perera, CCJC 1993, 1105-1117). The de minimis rule is not merely relevant in the law governing breaches of incorporeal personality rights but is also pertinent in the field of environmental liability law. In the latter context, only significant damage is recoverable (Álvarez Lata, La responsabilidad civil por daños al medio ambiente3, 1912-1913; see also CFI Bilbao 11 October 2005, AC 2006 [1], no. 60 p. 124 [playing of a piano in a neighbouring apartment]). In ITALY, in each particular case, it will depend on whether the party concerned has suffered a danno ingiusto. Whether this is extant is decided by striking a balance between the interested parties’ conflicting interests (Cass.sez.un. 22 July 1999, no. 500, Foro it. 2000, III, 481; Cass. 17 May 2004, no. 9345, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, fasc. 5). Occasionally, it can be derived from law that a particular detriment does not constitute a danno ingiusto (see e. g. Cass. 28 July 2004, no. 14241, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, fasc. 7-8 [on damage to a farm occasioned by wild animals]; CC art. 924 [bee flight]; further examples can be found in the statutory rules regulating the liability of the postal service). Apart from the cases regulated by statute, the de minimis non curat praetor rule has not permeated other fields, but it should be noted that CC art. 2059 can be read in this light. Even today, non-pecuniary loss, the recovery of which is not expressly provided for by law, will only be redressed, if it stems from a breach of a constitutionally protected position and is not restricted to trivial damage (Zivic, Resp.civ. e prev. 2007, 517, 526). HUNGARIAN law does not contain a rule governing trivial damage. Claims for the recovery of non-economic damage are nonetheless dismissed by the courts, if there is merely a trivial violation of the affected interest (e. g. BH 2002/482: Water damage in an apartment; no compensation for non-pecuniary loss for the forced cancellation of a family celebration). Similarly, BULGARIAN civil law does not recognise a general principle of non-recoverability of trivial damage. However, it can be increasingly gauged from case law dealing with non-economic harm, whereby, in a case of trivial damage, permitting recovery is deemed inequitable (see further Supreme Court 9 April 1981, decision no. 1102, civil case no. 623/81). Likewise, the GERMAN courts dismiss claims for the recovery of non-economic damage, if the damage is trivial, if the injured party’s well-being is merely temporarily, and to an insignificant extent, affected (BGH 14 January 1992, NJW 1992, 1043; BGH 27 May 1993, NJW 1993, 2173, 2175); an exception is allowed for cases of intentionally in-

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7.

8.

930

flicted harm (Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB67, § 253, no. 15). The legislature has approved of this judicially created de minimus ceiling, but it did not deem it necessary to expressly restrict claims for compensation for pain and suffering by means of a de minimis threshold (BT-Drucks. 14/8780, 21). A special case regulated by statute precluding recovery of trivial damage is the threshold operating to a consumer’s disadvantage in the context of property damage under product liability law (Product Liability Act § 11). Moreover, it is generally recognised that socially acceptable interferences must be tolerated. This principle is derived from an analogous application of CC § 906, e. g. discomfort occasioned by overcrowded public transport. Even the circumcision of young boys in a family has been deemed to be socially acceptable, but of course this criterion will not be met in a case where an eleven year old boy who was residing with his mother was forced during a visit to his father to undergo a circumcision without his mother’s consent (CA Frankfurt/Main 21 August 2007, FamRZ 2008, 785). The point of departure in AUSTRIA is the same: neither statute nor the courts recognise a general rule precluding the recovery of trivial damage. However, a number of discrete statutory provisions provide that the prejudice caused must have been “material”. CC § 364a(2) in its first sentence provides a salient illustration, stipulating that marginal interference caused by emissions must be tolerated. This rule is derived from the principle of minima non curat praetor (OGH 3 February 2005, 2 Ob 11/05i). The qualification “marginal” is e. g. given where an interference with the use of the claimant’s property led to damage which amounted to a maximum of J 2; nor will it justify an award of an injunction (OGH 23 March 1983, 1 Ob 6/83). However, it should be noted that this line of jurisprudence dealing with legal relations between neighbours has not led to the creation of a general prevailing principle governing the entire law on liability. Therefore, trivial damage generally grounds a claim for recovery. However, a plea of legal chicanery by the defendant can stand in the way of a valid assertion of this claim. If the purpose of the claimant’s action was solely to cause prejudice to the other party (e. g. with the aim of burdening it with the legal costs), then, a tort claim may be given under CC § 1295(2)(second alt.). An award of damages for pain and suffering can be ruled out where the interference with bodily integrity is regarded as insignificant, e. g. minor skin abrasions, bruises or temporary discomfort (Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VI3, § 1325 no. 83). Trivial damage in the context of the mercantile decrease in value of vehicles involved in an accident is also disregarded (OGH 26 January 1977, ZVR 1977/298 p. 370; OGH 2 September 1982, ZVR 1983/280 p. 311). In PORTUGAL, it is said that the duty to pay compensation requires not only a certain loss and that it results from an injury, but also that the loss is sufficiently grave (Prata, Dicionário jurídico, 311). In light of the fact that an insignificant deviation by the debtor from the terms of the contract does not amount to a breach of contract, it must therefore be possible to derive from this, the principle that a trivial loss is not worthy of compensation (Pessoa Jorge, Ensaio sobre os pressupostos da responsabilidade civil, 387 who uses the example of damage to a stalk of corn or causing a minor scratch to an old vehicle). This principle is derived from the canon of good faith and from CC art. 398(2), according to the latter, compensation “shall correspond to an interest of the creditor worthy of legal protection” (Pessoa Jorge loc. cit.). Payments which only serve to satisfy the the creditor’s capricious demands, do not connote a legally protected interest (Pereira Coelho, Obrigações, 8; cf. in relation to CC art. 398(2) also Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 73). Additionally, CC art. 496(1) makes it clear that damages for

Article 6:102: De minimis rule

9.

10.

non-economic loss can only be recovered, if the loss is regarded as sufficiently grave to merit legal protection. The gravity of the damage should be serious enough to justify the grant of a pecuniary satisfaction (Antunes Varela loc. cit. 605-606; Neto, Código Civil Anotado14, 498). Mere inconvenience or annoyance and the suffering or grief resulting from an abnormal sensitivity do not, as a rule, justify a compensation for non-economic loss. The same holds true for sadness and concern caused by redundancy (STJ 14 March 2007; STJ 22 March 2006). A contentious issue relates to the actual constitutents of the de minimus ceiling, for example, this occurred in a case where a woman was falsely accused in a restaurant of attempting to pay with counterfeit money (STJ 19 September 2006). In addition, the de minimis threshold can be exceeded in a case of repeated- even in cases concerning damage of an insubstantial nature-infringements (Pessoa Jorge loc. cit. 388). Moreover, de minimus ceilings can be found in both substantive and procedural law (CCP art. 822(c)). Under DUTCH law, CFI Arnhem 21 September 2005, LJN no. AU5454 dismissed a damages claim based on an infringement of copyright on the grounds that the prejudice suffered was trivial; an award of compensation would have been disproportionate to the insignificant loss suffered. However, a de minimis rule comes close to the rule contained in CC art. 3:303, which provides that a person does not have a right of action where “he lacks sufficient interest”. Not every trifling damage will ground such an interest. However, the legislator and courts proceed from the assumption that the claimant is pursuing a sufficient interest; the defendant is obliged to rebut this by proof to the contrary (Parlementaire Geschiedenis III, 915-916; HR 17 September 1993, NJ 1994, no. 118 p. 462; HR 9 October 1998, NedJur 1998, no. 853 p. 4904; Nieuwenhuis/Stolker/Valk (-Stolker), T & C Vermogensrecht4, art. 3:303, pp. 1468-1469). There is no corresponding provision to Article 6:102 under ESTONIAN law. In the NORDIC countries a rule that generally bars a claim based on the damage’s nominally or substantively trivial nature does not exist. However similar concerns may be identified. Under SWEDISH Environmental Code chap. 32 (similarly the FINNISH Environmental Damage Compensation Act), which entails a rather wide understanding of emissions under a strict liability regime, damages for pure economic loss do not necessarily require a criminal offence (as is the general rule under the Damages Liability Act); however, damages are only awarded if the damage is of some significance (see in more detail Bengtsson, 21 uppsatser, 53, 65). With regard to other types of damage or loss no such requirement exists. However, compensation is subject to the general rule which requires a reasonable balance between the competing interests, e. g. as to what must be tolerated with regard to local conditions or the general presence of emissions of the relevant type. The same applies to disputes between neighbours (Swedish Land Code chap. 3 § 1). HD 1 March 1990, NJA 1990, 71 concerned a damages claim for 100 kr. [10 EUR] against a neighbour who had cut down the plaintiff’s hedge, which was dismissed as the latter had disregarded his obligations to his neighbour of taking reasonable consideration; see also FINNISH Supreme Court 10 February 1981, KKO 1981 II 10. Furthermore, a prerequisite for the recovery of damages under SWEDISH Damages Liability Act chap. 2 § 3 in the context of a breach of incorporeal personality rights is a “great anguish. One is consequently not entitled to recover damages for trivial infringements (Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2; 62; HD 21 September 2007, NJA 2007, 584). Furthermore, under FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 6, a prerequisite for an award of damages for non-pecuniary loss is a “serious” breach of personal integrity or

931

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11.

dignity. The restiction of actions for trivial breachs of incorporeal personality rights also helps to explain why Swedish law habitually requires the commission of a criminal offence in this context (Government Reports [Ds] 2007:10, Skadeståndsfrågor vid kränkning, 36). ENGLISH law has not in formal terms developed a principle of this nature, no doubt because tort law (especially in respect of trespass) performs the declaratory function of demarcating rights which would be jeopardised if a claim were precluded on the grounds of the trivial nature of the injury. The emphasis is rather on emasculating the remedies available where damage is trivial. Thus where a tort is actionable without proof of special damage and the claimant is entitled to recover damages despite not sustaining any actual loss, the compensation will take the form of nominal damages: cf. Twyman v. Knowles (1853) 13 CB 222, 138 ER 1183 (concerning trespass to a transient tenancy). The fact that damage is trivial may constitute a reason for refusing an injunction to prevent further wrongs: see Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. [1895] 1 Ch 287. It is also of note, perhaps, that not every impact on or physiological change to a person’s body is regarded as a personal injury. A change in physical condition which is consistent with better welfare or has no perceptibe detrimental effect on health or capability is not damage (see e. g. for pleural plaques Rothwell v. Chemical & Insulating Co. Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ 27, [2006] 4 All ER 1161, noted with approval in Turton, (2008) 71 MLR 1009-1014). Protection against liability for one form of trivial infringement of property rights is provided for by the Civil Aviation Act 1982, s. 76(1) which stipulates that no action shall lie in respect of trespass or in respect of nuisance merely because of the flight of an aircraft over property at a height above the ground which, having regard to wind, weather and all the circumstances of the case is reasonable.

Article 6:103: Equalisation of benefits (1) Benefits arising to the person suffering legally relevant damage as a result of the damaging event are to be disregarded unless it would be fair and reasonable to take them into account. (2) In deciding whether it would be fair and reasonable to take the benefits into account, regard shall be had to the kind of damage sustained, the nature of the accountability of the person causing the damage and, where the benefits are conferred by a third person, the purpose of conferring those benefits.

Comments 1. General. This Article deals with the problematic question of “equalisation of benefits” (compensatio lucri cum danno). It concerns cases in which the behaviour of the wrongdoer caused not only detriment to the injured person but also some (mostly) economic advantage, especially because third parties provided payment or are liable for such payment to the injured person due to the damage suffered. The question is thus always whether such advantages may be set off against the liable person’s obligation to pay damages or whether such a mitigation of liability is to be denied, with the result that 932

Article 6:103: Equalisation of benefits

the injured person (provided the wrongdoer is in a position to satisfy the claim) may be entitled to multiple payments by reason of the damage suffered. The answer is that in principle the latter holds true and a mitigation of liability only comes into the picture if it is fair and reasonable under the circumstances (paragraph (1)). Paragraph (2) lists the criteria that are important in the context of this fairness test. 2. Policy considerations. The basic rule (no set-off) seems to be substantively imperative due to the variety of insurance systems and provisions on sick pay resting upon the model that the insurer or a party performing a comparable service acquires the injured person’s rights against the injuring person in the amount of the performance rendered. Such an acquisition of rights would be impossible if the right to damages were to be reduced. Naturally, only an existing right can be assigned. In other words, the basic rule is required and confirmed by insurance law. However, it also follows from considerations of justice inherent in the present branch of the law. In principle, the acts of third parties benefiting the injured person are no concern of the liable person; the fact that others are looking after the victim does not free the liable person of personal responsibility. 3. Causation. It is a general prerequisite of the equalisation of benefits that there be a causal link between the injuring event and the subsequent advantage. The tighter this link is, the easier it is for an equalisation of benefits to come into focus; the looser it is, the more susceptible to exclusion such an equalisation becomes. Illustration 1 Trader T’s claim is frustrated as a result of erroneous information as to the solvency of T’s customer (C) provided by the bank. C is insolvent. T’s claim against the bank is to be correspondingly reduced only where the bank can prove that it was solely the proceeds of reselling the delivery, the payment for which remained outstanding, that enabled C to satisfy another debt of long standing to T. 4. Article 7:105 (Reduction or exclusion of liability to indemnified persons). Article 7:105 remains unaffected by the present Article. The rule in Article 7:105 does not involve issues of benefit equalisation, but provisions of national law, which channel the de jure liability to an insurer, a fund or another institution with the consequence that the originator of the damage does not even come “face to face” with the liability in the first place. It is correct, however, that, at least in the economic result, this is close to an equalisation of benefits. 5. Several liable parties. Situations in which several persons are liable to the injured person under this Book for the same damage are to be strictly distinguished from the cases covered by the present Article. In cases of the former type a double payment of damages is ruled out without exception; this would constitute an unjustified enrichment. Therefore, the rule only applies to the case where, along with the damages to be satisfied by the injuring person, another advantage based on a different legal basis accrues to the injured person.

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6. Case groups. Precisely speaking, two different basic fact situations are to be distinguished. In the first (and less frequent) case, the advantage is a direct consequence of the event giving rise to liability; in the second, compensation payments or other economic benefits accrue to the injured person from third parties. 7. Kind of damage. In both types of case, it is first of all the type of damage suffered which plays a role. This is because in the case of solely economic detriment and also in the case of property damage, an equalisation of benefits in relation to the economic losses comes into play more frequently than in the case of bodily injury and death. This results from the fact that in the case of the latter, it would be cynical and anything but “fair and reasonable” to say that the loss of someone close had also brought with it monetary benefits. Furthermore, such benefits are normally to be deemed a consequence of certain provisions of the law of succession and family law, not as a consequence of the wrongdoer’s behaviour. 8. Examples. A textbook example of one situation in which an equalisation of benefits would exceptionally be seen as fair and reasonable, is the destruction of a house with the consequent discovery of treasure trove on the owner’s land. The following are more true to life: Illustration 2 A lorry driver drives into the claimant’s house, which is so badly damaged that it has to be completely demolished. By this very occurrence, the piece of land goes up in value enormously; a new urban development plan allows economically far more attractive forms of development. The owner exploits this increase in value by auctioning off the piece of land on very beneficial terms. The claimant’s claim in damages is, as far as it concerns economic detriment, to be reduced according to the extent of the increase in value, perhaps even to zero. However, the non-economic damage of the claimant remains unaffected by this; the claimant did not vacate the house voluntarily, but merely made the best of the situation. Illustration 3 An equalisation of benefits also comes into play if a vehicle has to be repaired over a lengthy period and there are savings as a result of the fact that there would otherwise be wear and tear on the vehicle during that time. Illustration 4 A child is killed. The parents’ claim in damages for the non-economic damage they have suffered is not to be reduced by the argument that their nerves and finances, which would have been expended in raising the child, have been “spared”. Illustration 5 A father, who financially supported his children’s education, dies in an accident. The children’s claim to compensation for their loss of maintenance is not be reduced for the reason that, as a consequence of their father’s death, they were able to inherit his estate earlier. As long as the accident was neither caused through intention nor appreciable negligence, it could however be fair if the considerable 934

Article 6:103: Equalisation of benefits

income from interest gained due to the prematurely inherited assets were to be counted as reducing the claim when calculating the level of damage due to loss of maintenance. 9. Nature of the accountability. In assessing whether an advantage accrued is to be set against liability, the basis of liability is also of great significance. In particular, there will be no reduction in liability where the liable person caused the damage intentionally. 10. Performance by a third party. Most issues in relation to a possible equalisation of benefits are raised in the context of benefits performed for the injured person by third parties by reason of the harm. Under paragraph (2) the result depends on the aim of these benefits, i. e. on whether alleviating the position of the injuring person was or was not an objective. In the normal case there will be no such purpose, which once more confirms the rule (no setting off). In special circumstances it can even occur that third party expenditure not only does not mitigate the liable person’s obligation to pay damages but also increases it: see Article 2:201(2)(a) (Personal injury and consequential loss). 11. Examples. As already stated, the most important examples relate to insurance payments to injured persons and continuation of pay by employers (to injured and therefore absent workers). Other examples are donations from third parties (not being participants in the causation of damage) and increased income as a result of a change in career necessitated by injuries sustained. Such benefits are generally not to be taken into account to reduce compensation. If there is no assignment by operation of law of the injured person’s right to compensation, the injured person may effectively recover twice over. The position is different only where the aim of the contribution from the third party was also to benefit the injuring person. The other criteria of the fairness test also hold true in cases involving benefits from third parties, especially the rule that a wrongdoer who acted intentionally will in principle not be entitled to any relief. Illustration 6 At a major football event a police officer from the host nation is beaten up and very severely injured by hooligans from a participating nation. There is extensive media coverage of the event. People from the country from which the hooligans come are ashamed of their fellow countrymen and donate large sums for the benefit of the police officer. This does not reduce the hooligans’ liability.

Notes 1.

The point of departure of FRENCH law is the principle that the injured party is to be restored to the position that he would have been in had the damaging event not occurred; the injured party is not permitted to suffer a loss or obtain a benefit (Cass.civ. 23 January 2003, Bull.civ. 2003, II, no. 20 p. 16). Therefore, claiming cumulative recovery for overlapping items of damage is, as a general rule, excluded (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2006/2007), no. 2546). A divergent approach is only adopted if the collateral source of benefit does not evoke connotations of indemnification (Cass.crim. 17 December 1970, D. 1971 Somm.Comm., 41 [com-

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2.

3.

936

pensation awarded to the widow of a farmer; the widow’s legal right share was not taken into account in the computation of damages under CC art. 1382]; Cass.crim. 1 June 1999, JCP éd. G 2000, I, 197, no. 7, note Viney [no reduction in compensation for children’s claim for loss of support following the accidental death of their father on account of their fixed right to a share of the latter’s estate]). According to BELGIAN legal doctrine, in this context, a difference must be drawn between distinct groups of cases (on the following, see Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2), no. 48 p. 92). (i) Collateral benefits directly arising from an event grounding liability are taken into account in the assessment of damages (textbook example: the destruction of a house leads to a treasure trove being unearthed). (ii) However, involuntary (undesired) savings in expenditure are disregarded (textbook example: parents who have a lost a child are spared the financial costs of rearing that child). (iii) Moreover, there is no set-off in respect of benefits arising consequent upon the rectification of the damage and which are unavoidable (textbook example: a damaged vehicle is repaired by using new parts). (iv) Benefits, which can be attributed to the injured party’s initiative, are only set off in the event that his actions could be reasonably expected of him. If, in the course of a limiting his possible loss, the victim goes over and above his obligations and through this secures a benefit, here, no corresponding set off in damages as against benefits will be entertained (Cass. 7 September 1982, Pas. belge 1983, I, p. 19). (v) The most pervasive difficulty in this field arises in cases where compensation is paid by a third party. The general rule propounds that, in this case, cumulative recovery is permitted, if the legal basis and the purpose of the collateral subvention paid by the third party is not identical with the tortfeasor’s duty to make reparation (Cass. 28 April 1992, Pas. belge 1992, I, no. 452 p. 761 [no set off of unemployment insurance contributions against the delictual damages claim]). The focus of professional legal discourse is on the issue as to whether the third party can seek to recoup his payment from the tortfeasor. If this were indeed the case, then the upshot of this is that the third party’s payment stemmed from the same legal basis and for the same purpose as the tortfeasor’s duty to make reparation (van Gerven (Covemaeker), Verbintenissenrecht2, 480). SPANISH TS 15 December 1981, RAJ 1981 (2) no. 5157 p. 4131 held, in connection with the doctrine of compensación de beneficios (or compensatio lucri cum damno), that benefits arising from the damage caused, which the tort victim obtains as a result of the incident, must also be taken account of when it comes to computing damages (a heavy goods vehicle drove into a building, which, as a result had to be torn down. However, as the land had been rezoned, the demolition led to an enormous increase in the value of the property; critical, on this point Paz-Ares/Díez-Picazo/Bercovitz/Salvador (-Pantaleón Prieto), Código Civil II2, art. 1902, pp. 1989-1990). However, an exception is made for cases of payments arising under a contract of insurance (TS 27 November 1965, RAJ 1965 (2) no. 5534 p. 3387); in such cases, at any rate, the losses are first of all frequently taken care of by the insurer and should the injured party advance a claim against the tortfeasor, the former is liable to his insurer under the principles of unjustified enrichment (Insurance Contract Act 1980 art. 26). Legal commentary postulates that a model which espouses that collateral benefits should be set-off against damages would only be relevant in cases where the benefits received are a direct consequence of the damaging event and stem from the same cause (Díez-Picazo, Derecho de daños, 320; Roca i Trias, FS Albaladejo, 4255; see also Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 498). Where damage is

Article 6:103: Equalisation of benefits

4.

5.

caused by terrorist attacks, the State is thereupon obliged to compensate the victim of such attacks; the State is thereby subrogated to victim’s claims against the offender (Solidarity with the Victims of Terrorism Act [Ley 32/1999, de solidaridad con las víctimas del terrorismo]); the same rule is found in the law governing the compensation of victims of crime (Allowances and Assistance to the Victims of Violent Crimes and Crimes against Sexual Liberty Act [Ley 35/1995]) and in the Regional regulations governing compensation of HIV infected patients. In the ‘colza oil case’, collateral benefits conferred by the State were set off against the delictual compensation owed by the State. Both subventions arose from the same catastrophe (TS 24 May 2001, RAJ 2001 [3] no. 5442 p. 8342). Previously, cumulative recovery was allowed in respect of payments made under an occupational injury insurance scheme and tort damages (TS 27 November 1993, RAJ 1993 no. 9143 p. 11794; TS 19 February 1998, RAJ 1998 [1] no. 986 p. 1564). However, recent case law of the social chamber of the Tribunal Supremo demonstrates that this trend has waned and such benefits must be brought into account in the calculation of damages (see, instead of many, TS 10 December 1998, RAJ 1998 [5] no. 10501 p. 15488). In the interim, this approach has been approved by the Civil Chamber (TS 21 July 2000, RAJ 2000 [3] no. 5500 p. 8397; TS 8 October 2001, RAJ 2001 [4] no. 7551 p. 11863). While there is no express statutory basis for compensatio lucri cum damno in ITALY, it is in principle recognised (Salvi, La responsabilità civile2, 251). This postulates that an injured party is not permitted to profit from the unlawful act. A prerequisite for setting off benefits against damages is that both the benefit and the damage are an immediate and direct consequence of the same occurrence (as e. g. in Cass. 22 June 2005, no. 13401, Giust.civ.Mass. 2005, fasc. 6: damage caused to a salt production plant; the plant was fitted out with new and therefore, more valuable machines; 40 % of the costs had to be borne by the injured party; cf. also Corte dei Conti reg. Basilicata, Sez. giur., 2 February 2005, no. 14, Riv. Corte dei Conti 2005, fasc. 1, 234: employee fraudulently secured his position by submitting bogus qualifications; benefits derived from the part of job which did not require a professional qualification taken into account). Furthermore, in HUNGARY, the operative assumption is that an award of compensation should not lead to the enrichment of the injured party. Consequently, benefits received by the plaintiff which are immediately derived from the damaging event will be factored in the computation of damage leading to a reduction in the award. A deduction “new for old” takes place in the cases where vehicles are repaired by using new parts (see further Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1363). In the context of insurance benefits, a distinction is drawn between “indemnity” insurance (such as liability insurance) and fixed sum insurance (such as life insurance or accident insurance). Benefits deriving from a compensatory insurance are deducted from the compensation; the corresponding claim of the victim against the tortfeasor is subrogated to the insurer. By contrast, a cumulation of benefits is permitted in respect of the collateral benefits obtained under a fixed sum insurance policy and grant of compensation (Benedek loc. cit. 1364-1367; Petrik (-Köles), Polgári jog II, 632 et seq.; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 235 et seq.; Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 157 et seq.). In cases concerning the death of a person, the expenses incurred by the deceased dependants in connection with the administration of the estate do not amount to recoverable damage, but equally the benefits obtained from the inheritance do not operate to reduce the award of damages; tort law and the law on succession are kept strictly separate from one another (Köles loc. cit.).

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6.

7.

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Similarly, the principle of compensatio lucri cum damno does not find statutory expression in BULGARIA. Nonetheless, it is deemed operative in a number of constellations (see further Tzachev, Zakon za zaduljeniyata i dogovorite I2, 201; Kojucharov, Obligazionno pravo I, 271). The tortfeasor’s liability will only be reduced by a collateral benefit if a causal nexus exists between the benefit and the unlawful act (Kojucharov loc. cit.). This criterion is not met e. g. where a donation is made by a third party or in cases of assistance rendered following an accident. Life insurance or accident insurance payouts to the injured party will not operate to reduce a tortfeasor’s liability (see Insurance Code art. 238(2)). According to the (older) jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the same does not hold true for disability pensions (Supreme Court 23 December 1968, Decree no. 4); however, a complicated model has been adopted which distinguishes between varying degrees of disability. Typically, where payments are property insurance payouts, the insurer becomes subrogated to the injured party’s right to assert a claim against the damaging party (Insurance Code art. 213(1)). The economically realisable vestiges of a damaged thing are set-off against damages, i.e, e. g. the fur of an animal which was killed (Kojucharov loc. cit.). In ROMANIA, social security benefits supplant the injured party’s recovery under tort law; however, the claim is subrogated to the insurer who has paid the loss. Benefits obtained from third parties, the purpose of which was not to redress the damage caused but were merely furnished as a means of providing support, do not operate to reduce the extent of the damages claim (Adam, Drept civil, 268-272; Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘, 78-82, 342). The drafters of the GERMAN CC (old) expressly left the problem of set-off to the courts and legal teaching (Mot. II 19). However, the drafters did consider its dimensions in a number of instances and either expressly ordained that a set off would take place in a number of isolated provisions (e. g. in CC § 642(2) [contract for work and services; breach of contract by the person ordering the work, expenditure that is saved by the contractor]) or that there was a bar to the right of set-off (as in CC § 843(4) [no set-off of maintenance payments provided by a third party as against the injured party’s damages claim]). Great practical importance is ascribed to the provisions governing cessio legis, namely the automatic passing of the injured party’s rights to the insurer who has made a payment to the insured (especially Social Security Code [ SGB ] X § 116 and Insurance Contract Law[ VVG ] § 86). A requirement of these provisions is the denial of a right to set-off as otherwise, the insurer cannot be subrogated to the rights of the insured person against the tortfeasor. Moreover, there is no prevailing general rule; the outcome will depend upon an assessment of the individual circumstances of the case at hand (see further Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB67, Pref. to § 249, nos. 122 and 125; Staudinger (-Schiemann), BGB, § 249, nos. 140 and 145). A generally recognised principle is the deduction “old for new” in the context of repairing things (Schiemann loc. cit. no. 175; Medicus, Schuldrecht I17, no. 607). Further, one has to make do with a general rule of thumb, which provides that (i) there must be an adequate causal nexus between the damaging event and the benefit accrued (BGH 15 November 1967, NJW 1968, 491, 492; BGH 13 July 1981, NJW 1982, 32, 33; BGH 16 January 1990, NJW 1990, 1360), and (ii) an unreasonable burden must not be imposed on the injured party by the set off and, the tortfeasor taking unreasonable advantage of the collateral benefit is not condoned (BGH 15 January 1953, NJW 1953, 618, 619; BGH 17 May 1984, NJW 1984, 2457, 2458; BGH 6 June 1997, NJW 1997, 2378; BGH 17 November 2005, NJW 2006, 499).

Article 6:103: Equalisation of benefits

8.

9.

In turn, it has been held in AUSTRIA that the injured party is to be restored as far as is possible to the position he would have been in had the event generating liability not occurred, but the award of damages must not represent a profit for the claimant (OGH 16 February 1955, SZ 28/46 p. 109). The principle that all benefits are to be set-off against damages is derived from this (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 10/33; Rummel (-Reischauer), ABGB II3, § 1312 no. 2). Deductible benefits can consist of cost savings, availability of manpower, earnings, and any third party dispositions (Reischauer loc. cit. no. 5). However, the prerequisite for a deduction of benefits is a causal nexus between the damaging event and the subsequent benefit. In addition, a temporal and objective congruity between the damage and the ensuing benefit is required (OGH 2 April 2003, 7 Ob 298/02b, RIS-Justiz 0114259; OGH 28 September 2000, ÖJZ 2001, 268). This criterion is not met if the injured party nets a higher wage following vocational retraining which was prompted by injuries which he sustained in the accident (OGH 28 September 2000 loc. cit.) or where a person is “spared” household expenses given that they are lying in a hospital bed (OGH 23 November 1971, ZVR 1972/154 p. 299; cf. also OGH 27 September 1978, ZVR 1979/277 p. 334). If it was incumbent on the person who was killed to provide maintenance to the dependants who were the successors in title to the deceased’s estate, the causation requirements for a valid set-off will not be met if the person concerned would also have inherited in the event that the deceased succumbed to a natural death (Koziol loc. cit. no. 10/48); therefore, claims for loss of support may only be reduced by the advantages derived from the accelerated availability of the inheritance (OGH 5 November 1965, SZ 38/186 p. 567; OGH 5 December 1968, SZ 41/169 p. 532). The current earned income from the inheritance reduces the damage of the survivors. There is no causation in respect of the death and subsequent funeral expenses as the successors in title would have had to bear those costs in any event (CC § 569). In general, the acceleration of this claim for reimbursement is offset by the early receipt of the inheritance (Koziol loc. cit. no. 10/51). Third party payments are not included in the set-off if it is deemed that the damaging party should not have the benefit of them (Reischauer loc. cit. no. 3a; Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht II13, 331). This will depend on the content of the statutory obligations of the third party which can be ascertained by examining the statutory purpose underpinning the norm, voluntary payments are contingent upon the intention of the provider (Koziol loc. cit. no. 10/38). In case of doubt, it is presumed that the purpose of the disposition was not to alleviate the plight of the damaging party (Reischauer loc. cit. no. 4a). This is true e. g. for compulsory insurance pay-out and for maintenance payments (OGH 18 December 1969, ZVR 1970/150 p. 205), for emergency payments by the Social Welfare (OGH 29 April 2004, 6 Ob 260/03h), for charitable donations (OGH 15 April 1980, SZ 53/58 p. 265) and for all other dispositions made with solidarity with the injured party in mind (OGH 4 February 1965, ZVR 1965/283 p. 335; CA Wien 1 December 1993, ZVR 1994/ 130 p. 314). However, in many instances, the problem of set-off is solved by subrogation of the claim (e. g. General Social InsuranceAct [ ASVG ] § 332; Insurance Contract Law[ VVG ] § 67). Whether pain “spared” can be set off against pain actually suffered is questionable and at any rate is only conceivable once very restrictive pre-conditions have been satisfied (see further OGH 13 January 2004, ZVR 2005/28, p. 95). In GREECE, the tenet holds that the injured party should receive full reparation, however should not be enriched by his loss and therefore, for the most part by relying on CC art. 930(3), professional legal opinion favours deduction benefits obtained from the

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10.

11.

940

award of damages (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Stathopoulos), arts. 297-298, no. 89; Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio A(1)2, 546). The criterion of adequate causation is promoted in this context in an attempt to circumvent charges of unfairness. An adequate causal nexus must be extant between the damaging event and the subsequent benefit; only if this is given, will the benefit be deducted. Additionally however, the courts occasionally simply refer to the principle of good faith to justify the non-deductibility of benefits (CC art. 288; see Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio, Geniko meros, 154 and A. P. 523/1995, NoB 45 [1997] 966, note Stathopoulos). Voluntary payments made by a third party, which are intended to benefit the victim and not release the damaging party from its obligations are not deducted (Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio A(1)2, 556). By contrast, a deduction “new for old” takes place in the context of repairs (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Stathopoulos), arts. 297-298, nos. 97, 114). In PORTUGAL, the appositeness of compensação de lucros com danos (or compensação de vantagens) is inferred from CC art. 568 which provides that, under certain circumstances, a person who is under a duty to pay damages, can require the injured party to relinquish his rights vis-à-vis a third party; moreover, reference is made to CC art. 803(2) (commodum de representação) and CC art. 566(2) in this regard, whereby the assessment of damages hinges on the difference between the injured party’s current financial situation and the financial situation which would have probably existed had the accident not occurred (Pessoa Jorge, Ensaio sobre os pressupostos da responsabilidade civil, 379, 413, 416). There must be a causal link between the damage and the ensuing benefit; a mere coincidence will not suffice in this regard (Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, note 2 under art. 568, p. 586). For example, if, a person is not permitted to sit his driving instructor exams, despite having secured a guarantee from his training school assuring the claimant that his application would not fail on the basis of his failure to meet a number of statutory requirements, it then followed that the advantage that he secured from these lessons, which were indeed of help to him in passing his exams which he had taken once the necessary changes in the law had been made, could not be deducted from his award of damages (STJ 28 February 2002). By contrast, in a case concerning the cause of action of a manager pertaining to his loss of employment at a charitable foundation which functions had been transferred to the State, his salary earned as an employee of another State institution was set off against the damages (CA Lisbon 12 May 2005). It appears that the philosophy of the compensatio lucri cum damno is primarily drawn upon in connection with the breach of a precontractual obligation, namely, where the complainant subsequently saves costs as a result of the failure to realise the contract (Prata, Notas sobre a responsabilidade civil pré-contratual, 180; STJ 11 January 2007). If the same damaging event causes the injured party to suffer damage and at the same time to obtain a benefit, then, according to DUTCH CC art. 6:100 this benefit will be set off against the compensation, but only in so far “as it is reasonable to do so”. The “benefit” could be anything that reduces the extent of the damage suffered (savings in expenditure; increase in assets; continued payment of salary even though no work is performed; payment of a pension; tax savings). Non-economic benefits are only relevant in the context of calculating compensation for non-pecuniary loss (HR 21 February 1997, NedJur 1999, no. 145 p. 837: wrongful birth). Set-off of benefits as against damages does not take place in the context of payments derived from indemnity insurance; the victim’s claim against the tortfeasor is subrogated to the insurer. In the context of a

Article 6:103: Equalisation of benefits

12.

13.

pay-out under a fixed sum insurance policy (e. g. life insurance), it still appears to be the case that the amount paid out on the death of the assured is set off against the dependent’s claim for loss of support (CC art. 6:108) if these payments are a means of subsistence for the dependants (HR 19 June 1970, NedJur 1970, no. 380 p. 1066; HR 4 February 2000, NedJur 2000, no. 600 p. 4155). Continuation of salary during protracted illness (CC art. 6:107a) and in a number of other situations is the subject of special statutory regulations. At any rate, a set-off will not be “reasonable” under CC art. 6:100 if there is not a sufficient causal nexus between the damaging event and the benefit obtained (Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 348; Schadevergoeding I (-Lindenbergh), art. 6:100, no. 4 p. 10, nos. 7-8 pp. 13-24; Salomons, Schadevergoeding, no. 19 p. 34). ESTONIAN LOA § 127(5) proceeds from the principle that every benefit obtained from a injuring event will operate to reduce the quantum of damages. However, it should be noted that the set-off may not run contrary to the purpose of an award of damages. The principle of compensatio lucri cum danno is generally recognised in the NORDIC countries. It is, however, referred to only in a limited number of cases. Equalization of benefits should be reserved for obvious advantages which have a clear causal link with the injuring event (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 368; Rodhe, Obligationsrätt, 476; cf. Hellner, Obehörig vinst, 163). Others rely on a general reasonableness test (Bengtsson, Ersättning vid offentliga ingrepp II, 234; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 269), a number of commentators point to the a formula whereby the protective scope of the reparation is examined (Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans, 459), other rely on the concept of adequacy (Radetzki, Skadeståndsberäkning vid sakskada, 184; critical on this point, however, Rodhe loc. cit. 476 and Iversen, Erstatningsberegning i kontraktsforhold, 734). In DENMARK, stress is placed on the tenet that an award of damages should not operate to enrich the injured party (von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret6, 285; Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 342). Therefore, e. g. living expenses saved during hospitalisation are set off against the compensation claim (HD 13 March 1959, NJA 1959, 181), whereas donations, prompted by the accident, made by a third party are disregarded (HD 4 December 1947, NJA 1947, 586; Andersson loc. cit. 459; similar for FINLAND Saxén loc. cit. 320; cf. Møller and Wiisbye, Erstatningsansvarsloven6, 371). In SWEDISH HD 3 December 1990, NJA 1990, 705 a municipality had recommended a house owner to install a special heating system, as the municipality wrongfully claimed that a nuisance was at hand due to high radon levels. The municipality was held liable for the cost of the instalment of the heating system, and no reduction was made, as the municipality had argued, with reference to that the plaintiff would not have installed the system unless mislead by the recommendation and furthermore no economic benefit to the plaintiff had been proven by the defendant such as cost savings or a sustaining increase of property value. In HD 21 December 1993, NJA 1993, 753 a person carrying out excavation work negligently damaged ancient remains enjoying statutory protection, necessitating archaeological examination for which costs the defendant was liable, who claimed equalisation due to the benefit of knowledge which the national heritage agency gained through the examination. The Court dismissed that defence, as the advantage had no commercial value, and the agency should be free to freely decide which sites to examine. Generally speaking, cumulative (double) compensation is not allowed in the Nordic countries. Most deductions, however, are not based on the principle of compensatio lucri cum danno, but rather follow from principles and rules on the assessment of damages (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 418; von Eyben and

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14.

942

Isager loc. cit. 291). Swedish Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 3 ordains e. g. that, in the context of assessing damages arising out of a claim for loss of income and support, benefits arising from the compulsory social security insurance, industrial injury insurance and other benefits paid for by the employer are to be deducted. Subrogation of the victim’s claim to the relevant insurer does not take place. By contrast, benefits obtained from insurance privately taken out does not lead to a reduction in damages (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 388; Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 248). Similarly, according to Danish EAL §§ 2 and 7 compensation flowing from social security and industrial injury insurance is deducted from the damages claim. This also includes pay-outs under private health insurance. A right of subrogation (to the employer) is only envisaged for continuance of salary in cases of illness and for other employee benefits (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 331; Møller and Wiisbye loc. cit. 370 and 597). There is no right to subrogation (by the insurer) in respect of damage caused to insured property; a private individual who was merely negligent in causing such damage does not incur liability (EAL §§ 19 and 22). In Finland, payouts made under social security compensation (sick pay) as well as industrial injury insurance compensation are generally deducted from the victim’s damages claim (lag om sjukföräkring, 21 December 2004, chap. 12 § 2; lag om olycksfallsförsäkring, 20 August 1948/608, § 61), but the insurer has a right to recoup the payment from the tortfeasor. Special regulations exist to govern damage caused by a criminal act (e. g. lag om sjukföräkring chap. 12 § 7). Incidentally, for all of the Nordic countries, the principle holds that payouts under a fixed sum insurance (summaförsäkring) are not deductible; therefore the damages claim and insurance payout may be cumulatively recovered, the victim’s rights are also not subrogated to the insurer. In the UNITED KINGDOM the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997 sets out a detailed regime whereby a tortfeasor who has caused the claimant personal injury is to reimburse the state for specified forms of social security benefits received by the claimant during the maximum five year period before settlement. Such benefits are correspondingly to be deducted from the compensation payable to the claimant from an equivalent head of compensation (loc. cit., s. 8), a restriction which can result in a tortfeasor not being able to deduct a given benefit, but being liable to reimburse the state. Benefits outside the five year period are not within the clawback and correspondingly are not to be deducted from the damages: s. 17 specifies that in assessing damages in respect of any accident, injury or disease, the amount of any listed benefits paid or likely to be paid is to be disregarded. The deductability of benefits is otherwise determined by case law. In keeping with the principle that the claimant should not recover more than his loss, the starting point is that liability is reduced by collateral benefits received by the claimant, since only net loss is recoverable (Hussain v. New Taplow Paper Mills Ltd. [1988] AC 514, 527), but deductibility depends on a consideration of the causal connection between the benefit and the injury, the source of the benefit and the nature and purpose of the benefit: Clerk and Lindsell (-Burrows), Torts19, para. 29-4229-44. It is established that the proceeds of an accident insurance which the claimant himself concluded and gratuitous payments by third parties are not to be deducted: Hunt v. Severs [1994] 1 AC 350, 358. An occupational disability pension is treated as analogous to accident insurance: Parry v. Cleaver [1970] AC 1; Smoker v. London Fire and Civil Defence Authority [1991] 2 AC 502 (even if operated by the tortfeasor because it still represents the product of the claimant’s own expenditure). Gratuitous payments by the tortfeasor are deductible: Gaca v. Pirelli General plc [2004] EWCA Civ 373; [2004] 1 WLR

Article 6:103: Equalisation of benefits

15.

2683. As regards employment benefits, sick pay, sickness benefit or a continuation of wages must be deducted: Hussain v. New Taplow Paper Mills Ltd, loc. cit. Where, exceptionally, the third party who has provided the collateral benefit can recover its equivalent, such benefit must also be deducted if the third party can recoup it from the tortfeasor (which is the policy underpinning the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997) and should not be deducted if it is the claimant who is obliged to reimburse the third party (as may be the case with a refund of sickpay to the claimant’s employer):. Clerk and Lindsell (-Burrows), Torts19, para. 29-51. For claims under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, benefits accruing to a dependent from the deceased’s estate as a result of the death are disregarded: Fatal Accidents Act 1976, s. 4. Those benefits include as a general rule the market value of the property acquired by the claimant in the transaction: loc. cit. In SCOTS law, as regards the statutory claim of a relative of the deceased to damages for loss of support as a result of the deceased’s fatal personal injury, the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 explicitly provides that no account is to be taken of (a) any patrimonial gain or advantage accruing to the relative or another by way of succession or settlement or (b) any insurance money (including return of premiums), benefit under social security legislation, payment by a friendly society or trade union for the relief or maintenance of a member’s dependants, pension (including a return of contributions as well as a lump sum), or gratuity which may be paid as a result of the deceased’s death: loc. cit., s. 1(5), (6). However, in order to prevent what in substance amounts to a double recovery, account will be taken of provisional damages awarded to the deceased for future patrimonial loss in so far as that award was intended to compensate the deceased for a period beyond the time of death: loc. cit., s. 1(5A), as inserted by the Damages (Scotland) Act 1993, s. 1(3). In the ENGLISH law of deceit the claimant is entitled to recover as damages the full price paid by him under a transaction induced by deceit, but must give credit for any benefits which he has received as a result of the transaction: Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v. Scrimgeour Vickers Ltd. [1997] AC 254, 266 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). The IRISH Civil Liability (Amendment) Act 1964 s. 2 provides that “[i]n assessing damages in an action to recover damages in respect of a wrongful act (including a crime) resulting in personal injury not causing death, account shall not be taken of (a) any sum payable in respect of the injury under any contract or insurance, (b) any pension, gratuity or other like benefit payable under statute or otherwise in consequence of the injury.” By operation of this section a plaintiff may receive double compensation for the same loss. Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1993 s. 75(1) states that, not withstanding s. 2 of the 1964 Act, in an action for personal injuries account is to be taken in assessing damages, against any loss of earnings or profits that has accrued or probably will accrue to the injured person from the injuries, of the value of any rights that have accrued or will probably accrue to the injured person in respect of injury benefit (a weekly benefit payable where a person is unfit for work on account of an accident at work or an occupational disease) or disablement benefit (payable to a person who suffers a loss of physical or mental faculty as a result of an occupational injury or disease while in insurable employment) for the five years beginning with the time when the cause of action accrued. S. 237(1) of the 1993 Act provides that, notwithstanding s. 2 of the 1964 Act, in assessing damages in any action in respect of liability for personal injuries not causing death relating to the use of a mechanically propelled vehicle, account is to be taken of “the value of any rights arising from such injuries which have accrued, or are

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likely to accrue, to the injured person in respect of disability benefit [...] or invalidity pension under Part II [of the Act] for the period of five years beginning with the time when the cause of action accrued.” Judicial disapproval has been expressed for this legislative policy (O’Loughlin v. Teeling [1988] ILRM 617 [HC] per McKenzie J). In its Report on Section 2 of the Civil Liability (Amendment) Act 1964: The Deductibility of Collateral Benefits from Awards of Damages (LRC 68-2002), the Law Reform Commission made radical recommendations for changes in the law of collateral benefits. The Commission proposes that double recovery should be barred in respect of permanent health insurance [para. 1.49]. Where a plaintiff has paid the entirety of the insurance premiums payable under a personal accident insurance policy, directly and independently and in his or her own name, the Commission recommends that the plaintiff should be allowed double recovery (para. 1.56). It is recommended that, in general, charitable benefits should not be deducted from an award of damages (para. 2.05) and that occupational pensions should not be subject to deductibility. It is also proposed that sick pay should be deductible from the award of damages against the wrongdoer, “save that no account shall be taken where the sick pay gives rise to a legally enforceable debt or where the sick pay is a charitable debt or where the sick pay is a charitable donation” (para. 4.36). The Commission also recommends that the principle of deductibility apply across the board to social welfare payments (para. 5.016). It is recommended by the Commission that the two statutory exceptions to the general rule against deductibility contained in Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1993 ss. 75 and 237 apply equally to all types of accident. It proposes (para. 5.054) that social welfare payments, which arise in consequence of injury and compensation for loss of earnings or profits, should be deducted but only from damages for loss of earnings or profits. Finally, the Commission recommends (para. 5.110) that the Department of Social and Family Affairs give consideration to the setting up of a reimbursement system under which the amount by which a compensation award has been reduced, by virtue of the payment of social welfare payments including health allowance, should be reimbursed by the defendant to the Department or a Health Board, as is appropriate. In O’Neill v. Electricity Supply Board (unreported, High Court, July 31, 2002), Finnegan P. made no reduction under the rule in Reddy v. Bates, where the plaintiff, aged 52 at the time of the accident in 1999, had been an employee of the defendant since 1965. In view of the plaintiff’s security of employment, Finnegan P. stated that he thought that a reduction would be inappropriate. In contrast, in Boyne v. Bus Átha Cliath (unreported, High Court, 11 April 2002), Finnegan P. made a 10 % reduction on the basis of Reddy v. Bates where the plaintiff, prior to the accident, had had two fairly long bouts of unemployment. The general concerns about the employment market over time which were expressed in Reddy v. Bates do not need to find foundation in a plaintiff’s pre-accident history but such history will no doubt strengthen the argument for the application of the rule in a particular case (Byrne and Binchy, Annual Review of Irish Law 2002, 523). In Hogan v. Steele & Co. Ltd. [2000] 1 ILRM 330 (HC), the High Court held that that it was not possible to set off the voluntary salary continuance against the employee’s damages claim against the person who caused the accident; however, the damages must be remitted to the employer. Illustration 1 is taken from BGH 23 June 1992, NJW-RR 1992, 1397; illustration 2 from TS 15 December 1981, RAJ 1981 (2) no. 5157, p. 4131); and illustration 5 from Cass. crim. 1 June 1999, JCP éd. G 2000, I, 197, no. 7, note Viney.

944

Article 6:104: Multiple persons suffering damage

Article 6:104: Multiple persons suffering damage Where multiple persons suffer legally relevant damage and reparation to one person will also make reparation to another, Book III, Chapter 4, Section 2 (Plurality of creditors) applies with appropriate adaptation to their rights to reparation.

Comments 1. Reparation to one person will also make reparation to another. This Article relates to a problem which arises relatively frequently in the law on non-contractual liability. It concerns the question of who can claim damages (or as the case may be, who can claim which part of the damages) where the injuring person has inflicted a legally relevant damage on several persons and the making good of one of these damages results in the simultaneous reparation of all others; this meaning in turn that the injuring person must only satisfy the damages once in total. The most frequent case in practice is that of damaging a thing in which various different people hold a property right. The repair of the thing or the compensation of the necessary repair costs remedies the consequences of several separate legally relevant damages. Illustration 1 B has purchased goods from S who enjoys a reservation of ownership. T damages this property negligently. Although there is legally relevant damage both to S’s ownership and to B’s property right in the goods (if such a property right, e. g. an Anwartschaftsrecht, exists under the applicable law), T is in any case never liable as regards the repair costs (the position will be different, for example, as regards an additional loss of income for B during the time of repair) for more than 100 % of the expense. 2. Damage and damages. In these cases it is important as a first step to distinguish between determining the existence of a legally relevant damage for a given interested party and, on the other hand, the appropriate remedy which responds to that claim. Article 2:206 (Loss upon infringement of property or lawful possession) is concerned solely with the ascertainment of a legally relevant damage. By contrast, the questions of (i) the mode, (ii) the quantum and (iii) the appropriate recipient of reparatory legal redress which may be claimed belong in the law of remedies. The present Article addresses the third of these questions. This provision does not, however, apply where the same conduct has caused several separate legally relevant damages and they can only be made good separately and independently from their counterparts. Illustration 2 A operates a hairdresser’s salon in a house which is damaged by T’s lorry. Of necessity the business must be closed for a period. O, the owner of the building, and A have each suffered loss, O as a result of the infringement of his property right and A as a result of the infringement of her right to lawful possession of the salon. O has a claim to compensation for the repair costs; A has an independent claim to 945

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compensation for the loss of business income during the time in which it was not possible to operate the salon. The fact constellation required in Article 6:104 is not present here. 3. Reference to Book III. The Article deals with the question by making reference to the rules in Book III, Chapter 4, Section 2 (Plurality of creditors). Within these rules, DCFR III. – 4:202 (Solidary, divided and joint rights) distinguishes between these different types of right; DCFR III. – 4:203 (When different types of right arise) paragraph (1) stipulates that whether a right to performance is solidary, divided or joint depends on the terms regulating the right, and paragraph (2) of the same Article provides that the default rule is that the rights of co-creditors are divided. 4. Significance for the rules in this Book. These basic rules also apply to situations which may arise in the law on non-contractual liability. In view of the variety of possible case constellations, a more precise rule could not be formulated. The point of departure may nonetheless be set down, namely that in principle the damages must accrue to the person who in actual fact suffers a loss due to the property damage. This is because such a loss is a prerequisite for the fact that a person has suffered a legally relevant damage according to the rules of Chapter 2. The mere breach of a right is not sufficient for this except in those specific situations in which the very breach itself is expressly qualified as legally relevant damage. Illustration 3 T, driving too fast, loses control of a lorry on a bend and damages a house owned by O. The land on which the building stands is burdened with a security in favour of the B bank. Both O and B suffer an infringement of their property rights. The quantum of loss in each case, however, depends on the circumstances of the particular case. Depending on the creditworthiness of O, the width of the security (i. e. whether it extends to O’s right to reparation and any proceeds of it) and the extent of their (other) securities, the bank may suffer only a limited loss or perhaps none at all. In the latter case, despite the infringement of its property right, B suffers no legally relevant damage. Illustration 4 The facts are the same as in illustration 1. If B performs the obligations under the contract with S, as agreed, and continues to pay the instalments of the price, a case of default does not arise. S has no loss; B alone is entitled to the damages. Things are different where at the time of the accident B has already stopped performing the obligations under the contract of sale. In case of doubt, B is entitled to the part of the claim in damages that correlates to the percentage of the cost price which has already been paid off and S to the other part. That is so, in any event, where the car is a total loss. Conversely, where lesser damage is involved, which can still be reasonably removed by repair, both of the injured parties are entitled as joint creditors to the claim to reparation for repair costs and the claims due to loss of use and loss in value of the now damaged car; this is in the case where the security interest matures. The issue of equalising the interests between them is an issue that should not burden the action for damages following from the accident. As a con946

Article 6:104: Multiple persons suffering damage

sequence, each creditor may only demand performance to both collectively (see DCFR III. – 4:202 (Solidary, divided and joint rights) paragraph (3)).

Notes 1.

2.

3.

In FRENCH tort law, this problem is seldom discussed; apparently, whoever has paid the costs of repair is entitled to compensation. At any rate, the relevant damage must be immediate, ascertained and personal (Cass.civ. 23 May 1997, GazPal 1977, II, 677). A damages claim can only be asserted by a person who has actually suffered damage (Mazeaud/Mazeaud/Tunc, Traité théorique et pratique de la responsabilité civile délictuelle et contractuelle6, no. 272 p. 359). If more than one person is affected by the same act, it is not possible that they suffer the same damage. This is the case e. g. where a person is killed, where the extent of liability essentially turns on how many family members survive the deceased (Savatier, Traité de la responsabilité civil II2, no. 559 p. 125). Each person concerned is entitled to assert their own individual claim, each person has a right to claim compensation for the damage that they suffer, this compensation is assessed on a discretionary basis by the court of first instance (Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité3, no. 291 p. 120). Consequently, a partner in a commercial firm who suffers economic loss following the death of one of the other partners can bring an action for his individual loss which results out of the diminution in the value of the business (Cass.crim. 16 May 1979, JCP 1979, IV, 237). As far as BELGIUM is concerned, it has been pointed out that it is invariably the case that whenever several persons hold a property right in a damaged thing (or a right to it), the claim to compensation of one holder of a property right restricts the claim of the other. At any rate, owners of property and tenants of a house that has sustained damage cannot claim a higher sum in total than what would have been due to the landlord, had he not rented the house (Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2), no. 152 p. 301). In SPAIN, each holder of a joint right, independently and in his own name, is permitted to pursue the matter on behalf of the rest of the community of right holders; as a general rule, the judgment which is handed down also operates in favour of the other rightholders (TS 31 January 1973, RAJ 1973 [1] no. 100 p. 74; Paz-Ares/Díez-Picazo/Bercovitz/Salvador (-Miquel), Código Civil II2, 1077). Most notably, special rules can be discovered in the Patents and Utility Models Act (Ley 11/1986, de patentes de invención y modelos de utilidad). Art. 72 states that: “(1) Where a patent application or patent already granted belongs to a number of persons in undivided parts, the resultant coownership shall be governed by agreement among the parties or, in its absence, by the provisions of the present Article, or, ultimately, by the common law provisions on joint ownership. (2) However, any one of the parties alone may [...] (d) bring civil or criminal action against third parties who in any way injure the rights conferred by the joint application or patent. The party exercising such action shall be obliged to notify the other parties of the action taken so that they may also take part”. A similar provision can be found in Trademarks Act (Ley 17/2001, de marcas) art. 46(1). According to the legal doctrine, the co-owners of a trade mark or patent right are to be regarded as solidary creditors of the obligation that arises from the infringement of the right and therefore the debtor of the obligation to compensate damages (i. e. the infringer of the

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4.

948

right) is entitled to pay to any of the solidary creditors; but where only one of them has brought the tort law suit, the debtor is obliged to pay to that creditor (CC art. 1142; Reglero Campos, Responsabilidad civil por daños a la propiedad industrial3, 2207 and, concerning patents right, TS 13 May 1996, RAJ 1996 [2] no. 3903 p. 5054). The assessment of the amount of damages will depend on the share of ownership. However, the assessment of damages seems to be more difficult within the scope of the relationship between rightholder and licensee of intellectual property rights. It is usually admitted that where the licensee is an exclusive one, the damage is basically sustained by the licensee and although both the rightholder and the licensee are entitled to claim (Patents and Utility Models Act arts. 62 and 124(1)) the right to compensation belongs to the licensee. Therefore, if the plaintiff is not the same person who has the right to compensation, he/she has to reverse in the internal relationship the compensation to that other person (Portellano Díez, La defensa del derecho de patente, 112). In case the rightholder also sustained a damage by the infringement (for instance, the loss of reputation of the patented invention: Patents and Utility Models Act art. 68), it should be assessed in the internal relationship who is entitled to the compensation (Portellano Díez loc. cit.). Under ITALIAN law, only a buyer, and not a seller retaining property in the goods under a retention of title clause has a right to claim reparation against the person who caused damage to the thing. The rationale for this is that the damage is only suffered by the buyer as he or she alone used the thing (Cass. 30 May 1981, no. 3541, Giur.it.Mass. 1981, fasc. 5; Tribunale Superiore delle Acque 16 January 1995, no. 3, Cons. Stato, 1995, II, 122). The seller is confined to asserting a claim against the buyer (Carpino, Obbligazioni e contratti III, 319). A similar state of affairs can be observed within the framework of a contract for the lease of goods. The right to reparation devolves upon the lessee because the damage occurs in his legal sphere (Bianca, Diritto civile V, 597). The legal position is not as clear-cut if the thing that is damaged or destroyed is burdened with a proprietary security right. The claim of the person holding the security right in the property is denied, partly on the basis of the argument that the security interest also comprises part of the former’s compensation claim (CC art. 2742(1)), with the result that the secured creditor does not suffer a legally relevant damage (Bianca loc. cit.). In addition, CC art. 2743 also confers upon the creditor a right to demand that the debtor provide something else as security if the originally encumbered asset was destroyed or becomes worthless. The counter argument that is made is, namely, that the proprietary interest as such must be protected by tort law on the grounds that the claim arising under CC art. 2743 could be rendered worthless in some cases (see further de Cupis, Il danno II, 61-62). The predominant view in legal writing is that the right to assert a claim iure proprio is conferred upon the holder of a lien owing to the fact that he or she exercises factual control over the thing (Cendon (-Realmonte), Commentario al codice civile VI, sub art. 2789 p. 333). If ownership and possession diverge, then each person concerned has the right to assert a claim for the damage that he has sustained (Sacco, Il possesso, 309; Cendon (-Gaudino) loc. cit. IV(2), sub art. 2043, § 20.1 p. 2016). The same holds true for the relationship between owner /detentor (Cass. 10 June 1977, no. 2420, Rep.Giur.it. 1977, voce Resp. civ. 185; Cass. 22 July 1971, no. 2410, Foro it. 1971, I, 2482; Cass. 23 October 1976, no. 3815, Foro it. 1977, I, 2763). Therefore, the lessee may claim compensation for the loss of use of a leased good, the claim for compensation on the grounds of the diminished value of the good falls to be asserted by the

Article 6:104: Multiple persons suffering damage

5.

6.

7.

owner (Cass. 27 July 1998, no. 7337, Giur.it. 1999, I, 1, 1601; Cass.sez.un. 30 March 1972, no. 1008, Foro it. 1972, I, 880; Cass. 24 February 1981, no. 1131, Giur.it. 1981, I, 1, 1586). In HUNGARY, the following distinction is made. If there are several co-owners of the same thing, then they are co-creditors of the claim to reparation (cf CC § 139(1)). Within the internal relationship between the co-owners, the compensation is allocated in proportion to their share in the ownership (CC § 141). If several persons hold different rights in rem over the same thing then, as a general rule, the owner is regarded as the injured party vis-à-vis the injuring party (arg. e CC § 99) if it relates to property damage and reparation to one person will also make reparation to another (cf. Marton, A polgári jogi felelo˝sség, 136). According to property law provisions, he or she must then grapple with the holder of the security right in the property (e. g. CC §§ 159(3) and 163 [usufruct] and § 260 [lien]). A similar situation prevails in the context of a lease: the owner is regarded as the injured party who, for his part, must contend with the lessee under the provisions of the law relating to the lease of goods (CC §§ 424(1), 430(2)). Where title is retained in goods that are destroyed or damaged, the tenet, derived from an analogous interpretation of the passing of risk provisions under CC § 368(3) which deals with immoveable property (for further analysis of this analogy, see Kisfaludi, Az adásvételi szerzo˝dés, 183-185; Bíró, Szerzo˝dési Alaptípusok, 51-53) is that the reparation claim may be asserted by the buyer. BULGARIAN legal writing does not provide any pointers on this issue. If the seller retains title, then, in the case of loss or damage to the good, the risk passes to the buyer (LOA art. 205(1)). Whether the claim to reparation (in exceptional cases) can be directly asserted by the buyer or whether he is forced to tackle the seller has not been determinatively resolved. In GERMAN law, the question as to who is entitled to assert a claim is a polemical one. A judgment handed down by RG 1 July 1942, RGZ 170, 1, 7, which, even today, is followed by a number of legal writers (e. g. Müller-Laube, JuS 1993, 534), ordains that a buyer on reservation of title terms is solely entitled to assert a damages claim; namely, he or she is the holder of a proprietary right (the Anwartschaftsrecht). However, BGH 11 November 1970, BGHZ 55, 20, 31 took a different approach and divided the indemnity between the owner and purchaser in proportion to the values held. The buyer’s damages will not run to the extent of the full value of the good (plus damages for loss of use); this is because the remaining outstanding payments in respect of the good are to be deducted from this amount. The remainder must be asserted by the owner. Another approach proclaims that only the seller under a reservation of title clause is entitled to assert a damages claim, but he or she can only demand that the buyer receive performance (Flume, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts II3, 741). In reliance on CC §§ 851 and 1281, a fourth view advocates employing, with appropriate adaptations, the rules which govern several creditors of an indivisible performance (CC § 432) (Baur and Stürner, Sachenrecht17, 761; Larenz and Canaris, Schuldrecht II(2)13, 393; MünchKomm (-Wagner), BGB4, § 823, no. 146; Staudinger (-Hager), BGB13, § 823, no. B 155). Comparable problems of concurrence exist in the context of the relationship between the owner and creditor with a right of lien or the person in possession of the property. With the aim being to avoid the damaging party being hit with a twofold claim for compensation, the majority view among legal practitioners is to commend an analogous application of CC § 1281 BGB. This entails that the injuring party is only obliged

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8.

9.

10.

950

to effect performance to the owner and to the other entitled persons jointly and indeed may only do so. Other commentators favour a solution which is derived from CC § 428 (joint creditors of an indivisible performance) or rely on the concept of reparation in kind (see further Wagner loc. cit. no. 144 and Medicus, Bürgerliches Recht20, no. 609). According to AUSTRIAN CC § 1295, a person has a right to claim compensation for damage which another has inflicted on him. This means that the person who is directly injured, namely, every person whose rights are infringed. Other persons holding a property right as well as the owner (or co-owner) are included within the provision’s scope. Within the internal relationship, the co-owners’ right to pursue a claim for reparation and the distribution of damages are governed by the rules relating to coownership or partnership law. In contrast, if damage is not only caused to the person of the owner but, at the same time, the financial status of a person standing in a contractual relationship with the owner who primarily suffers harms, is also compromised by the injuring event, then the rules governing recovery of compensation on account of damage sustained by third parties apply. This deals with the problematic case, where the primary victim does not suffer a detriment or, at any rate, only a minor one on the grounds that the risk of financial loss was already contractually shifted to a third party (Rummel (-Reischauer), ABGB I3, § 1295 no. 27). However, the latter has only suffered (as a general rule, irrecoverable) pure economic loss. This is regarded as being incorrect (OGH 22 November 1978, SZ 51/164 p. 725; OGH 26 June 1991, JBl 2003, 379). Consequently, the defence, namely that the third party was merely a secondary victim, may not be availed of by the injuring party. Therefore, the former can require that he or she receive the same extent of compensation as the owner would have been entitled to, had there not been a passing of risk (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 13/24). The most important case of application for this doctrine is where the goods being sold are destroyed after the passing of risk; however, it is, inter alia, also employed within the framework of transactions on a commission basis and cases concerning the continuance of salary payments (Bollenberger, JBl 1997, 284). The rules governing recovery of compensation in respect of damage sustained by a third party can also impinge on other fields of law (OGH 18 February 1986, JBl 1986, 468), for example, if a leased business premises are culpably destroyed and, as a result, the lessee who merely has contractual rights, suffers damage (Koziol loc. cit. no. 13/5; Harrer, Schadenersatzrecht, 67). For an analysis of the legal position in GREECE see above note II 22 under Article 2:206 (Loss upon infringement of property). Under PORTUGUESE CC art. 1405, as a general rule, co-owners can pursue claims against third parties on their own behalf (the exception being rei vindicatio) (Neto, Código Civil Anotado14, 1156, note 4 under art. 1405) and, therefore, the compensation claim is proportionate to their share in the co-ownership (CA Oporto 4 June 1981, CJ [1981-3], 143). Under procedural law, we are dealing with a litisconsórcio voluntário. The holders of the right may elect to pursue the claim alone or jointly with the other co-owners. If they choose the second path, then the court will only award them a sum of damages in proportion to the share of ownership, in so far as this is permitted by the nature of the claim (CCP art. 27; see STJ 27 June 1995, BolMinJus 448 [1995] 309-313; Neto loc. cit. 1157, note 15 under art. 1405). DUTCH CC art. 6:15(1) provides that, if a performance is owed to two or more creditors, each creditor may pursue claim to an equal share provided that no other result can be derived from law, custom or other juridical act. By contrast, the creditors have a joint single claim where an indivisible performance is concerned or the right to assert the

Article 6:104: Multiple persons suffering damage

11.

12.

claim is held jointly. In the context of co-ownership, CC art. 3:170(2) provides that the co-owners may only proceed with a joint claim for compensation against a third party (see further Nieuwenhuis/Stolker/Valk (-Valk), T & C Vermogensrecht4, art. 6:15, pp. 2133-2134; Verbintenissenrecht I (-Busch) art. 6:15, nos. 3-8 pp. 2-12). ESTONIAN LOA §§ 73-75 contains a number of general rules governing the plurality of creditors. In the NORDIC countries damages for the mere loss of value of damaged property may be awarded to either the owner or other property right holder, or to both, but the total liability of the tortfeasor has to remain unaffected (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 362). This may also be derived from the Insurance Contract Acts of SWEDEN (chap. 9 § 1), FINLAND (§ 62) and DENMARK (§ 54) which provide for compensation by a property value insurance to third persons, such as the holder of an usufruct, a security right holder, or a person who carries the risk for the property in connection with the transfer of ownership in it. In a similar fashion, these provisions do not specifically lay down what share can be recovered by each of the respective claimants; only the fact that more than one claimant does not entail an increase in the damages awarded, is not surrounded by doubt (Radetzki, Skadeståndsberäkning vid sakskada, 60; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret6, 293). The following rule is of general applicability, namely, the person who, following the conclusion of a contract (already concluded or still to be concluded) bears the risk of loss, may also assert a damages claim against the injuring party (Radetzki loc. cit. 62; Andersson, Trepartsrelationer i skadeståndsrätten, 148-151). Holders of limited property rights who exercise control over the property may in some (so far not very clearly specified) cases have an own right to claim damages (Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 298; Andersson loc. cit. 137). At common law a claimant in the ENGLISH tort of conversion who relied on interference with his actual possession was entitled, as against a tortfeasor with no interest in the goods, to recover the same measure of damages as the owner on the ground of relativity of title, i. e. that the tortfeasor could not deny the title of the claimant by asserting a jus tertii: The Winkfield [1902] P 42. The overcompensation of the bailee was prevented by the bailee’s common law restitutionary obligation to account to the owner for the excess beyond the value of his own interest as money had and received to the owner’s use or conceivably as a trustee: Tomlinson (Hauliers) Ltd. v. Hepburn [1966] AC 451. Since the enactment of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 abolishing the rule against asserting a jus tertii and permitting joinder of other prospective claimants, the overcompensation of the bailee can only arise where the true owner cannot be identified and joined at the time of the proceedings (e. g. where the bailee is a finder). For such situations the Act preserves the obligation to account for the excess compensation and places it on a statutory basis: loc.cit., s. 7(3). In contrast, a co-owner or mortgagor or other person with a limited proprietory interest in goods may only recover damages to the extent of his limited interest: Clerk and Lindsell (-Tettenborn), Torts19, 17-110 and 17-113.

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Article 6:105: Solidary liability Where several persons are liable for the same legally relevant damage, they are liable solidarily.

Comments A.

Solidary liability of multiple liable persons

1. Common European law. This Article expresses a rule which is part of every Member State’s legal system and is also to be found in Community law (primarily in Council Directive 85/374 / EEC of 25th July 1985 on liability for defective products art. 5): if several persons are liable to the injured person for causing the same damage, they are solidarily liable. This rule has also prevailed (with some minor differences in the details) in a notable fashion where, under the wording of the legal authorities, another solution (separate liability) would have been more obvious. 2. Policy considerations. The principle formulated in the Article is justified by a range of policy considerations. Each of the liable persons has caused the entire damage and so is therefore liable to the victim for the reparation of the entire damage. It should not become a “defence” against the victim – so far as the economic result is concerned – that another person has also caused the same damage. The victim should not be expected to establish the respective shares of liability; this issue must be ironed out by the liable persons between themselves. It would be unfair to require the injured person always to sue each and every liable person and dispute with them all and it would be especially unfair to require the injured person to bear the risk of personal insolvency of one of the liable persons. The injured person should in fact have the option of pursuing the person from whom reparation can probably be obtained most quickly and most easily. Along with economic reasons (inability to pay), legal and tactical considerations may also play a role here. One claim might be more difficult to establish than another or it may seem desirable not to bring an action against a particular person, in order to remain free to call that person as a witness (e. g. the employee of the liable employer). 3. Terminology. The Article invokes the terminology of DCFR III. – 4:102 (Solidary, divided and joint obligations), which states: “An obligation is solidary when each debtor is bound to perform the obligation in full and the creditor may require performance of any of them until full performance has been received”. The present Article provides an answer for one situation for the purposes of DCFR III. – 4:103 (When different types of obligation arise) paragraph (1) and simultaneously establishes the principle of solidary liability of several liable persons in the law on non-contractual liability. Furthermore, the present Article is confirmation of the general rule in DCFR III. – 4:103 (When different types of obligation arise) paragraph (2), second sentence, according to which the liability of several persons for the same damage is solidary in cases of doubt. 4. Scope of application. The Article covers all cases in which at least two persons are responsible for the same damage under the rules of this Book. “The same damage” may 952

Article 6:105: Solidary liability

relate to only a part of the overall loss of the victim. The Article then applies to this part. The basis of the liability of the individual liable persons plays no role in relation to the injured person. Accessories are just as liable under solidary liability as accomplices, and as persons whose contribution to the chain of causation is presumed under Article 4:103 (Alternative causes) and who cannot rebut this presumption. It is possible for liability due to a positive act and liability due to an omission to converge; the same goes for faultbased and strict liability (e. g. in the case of liability of employees and employers), and in the same way it can happen that two bases of strict liability may concur and ground solidary liability. Illustration At 5.30 am, horses of different owners are standing out on a dark roadway. The horses have broken out of their paddock. A man rides into the group of horses on his motorbike and is fatally injured as a result. Through hair follicles from a mare and a gelding found on the motor bike, forensic scientists can identify the owners of the two horses. The two owners are solidarily liable to the widow.

B.

Internal allocation of liability

5. DCFR III. – 4:106. (Apportionment between solidary debtors). Article 6:105 does not deal with the internal allocation of liability between the solidarily liable parties. This is already adequately dealt with in DCFR III. – 4:106. Paragraph (2) of that Article sets out the basic rule that in their internal relationship each of the co-debtors is burdened with the same share of the debt. However, superimposed on that basic rule is a reasonableness test. Deviations from liability in per capita shares may be justified for a multitude of reasons which are not susceptible of being comprehensively listed. From the point of view of the law on non-contractual liability the most important factors are the extent of the fault of the participants and the extent of the realisation of a danger for which Chapter 3, Section 2 of this Book imposes strict liability. However, contribution between the debtors may also be affected by matters which are not related to the law on noncontractual liability – in particular those which derive from a contractual relationship between the co-debtors. It may be, for example, that a person has contractually agreed with an owner to keep the latter’s building safe. In such a case the contractor alone will be liable in a question with the owner. As regards contribution between an employer and an employee in cases in which both are liable as solidary debtors to a third party, Article 7:104 (Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employer’s associations) applies. Questions relating to employment law are not addressed by this Book.

Notes 1.

FRENCH CC art. 1202 enacts the principle that solidary liability will not be presumed.

However, at an early stage, the Cass.civ. 11 July 1892, D. 1894, I, 561, note Levillain held that where damage is caused by the fautes of two or more persons, each comes under an obligation to make reparation for the full extent of the damage. This is termed the liability in solidum. Today, the only prerequisite remaining is that several faits générateurs

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3.

954

cause the same damage; no distinction is drawn between liability which is based on faute and the gardien liability (Terré/Simler/Lequette, Les obligations9, no. 864 p. 839). By contrast, if the several coauteurs cause different damage and the particular damage caused can only be attributed to one specific coauteur, then he or she is solely liable (Cass.civ. 19 April 1956, JCP éd. G 1956, II, 9381). If the faits générateurs do not occur at the same time, this state of affairs will not hinder in solidum-liability (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2006/2007), no. 1741; see also Cass.civ. 25 January 2007, JCP éd. G 2007, no. 10 p. 29, note Radé [in solidum-liability of blood transfusion services and injuring person for AIDS infection]). If the wrongdoers are liable in solidum, then a coauteur who has satisfied the entire claim, can recover a contribution, based on the respective share of liability from the other solidary tortfeasors in the internal relationship (CC art. 1251(3)). The shares of liability are apportioned on a discretionary basis by the court (Cass.civ. 11 January 1979, Bull.civ. 1979, II, no. 19 p. 14). Above all, the court examines the gravity of the faute committed by each of the relevant parties (Cass.civ. 3 April 1973, GazPal 1973 jur. 559; Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II11, no. 173 p. 172). If the insurer of one of the coauteurs pays the compensation owed, then the insurer is subrogated to the insured’s right to claim contribution against the remaining tortfeasors (Code des Assurances art. L121-12). If the injured party decides not to proceed in his claim against one of the coauteurs, the latter remains nonetheless liable to the other coauteurs within the internal relationship (Cass.civ. 7 June 1977, Bull.civ. 1977, I, no. 266 p. 210). Similarly, despite the rule in CC art. 1202, the BELGIAN courts presume an in solidum liability if several persons cause the same damage (Cass. 2 April 1936, Pas. belge 1936, I, 209; Cass. 10 July 1952, Pas. belge 1952, I, 738). Here, no distinction is drawn between liability which is based on fault and strict liability. In solidum-liability will even arise if the court can determine the part played by each of the parties in events giving rise to the damaging occurrence and their share of liability in respect to that damage (van Gerven and Covemaeker, Verbintenissenrecht2, 556). If the tortfeasors have acted intentionally, then a true in-solidum liability under CC arts. 1200 et seq. arises (Cass. 3 May 1996, Pas. belge 1996, I, 410). The right of the debtor in solidum, who has already paid off the plaintiff’s entire claim, to seek contribution from the remaining tortfeasors is primarily derived from CC art. 1251(3) (Cass. 17 June 1982, Pas. belge 1982, I, 1221); occasionally, however, the rules on enrichissement sans cause govern this situation (Cass. 21 October 1965, Pas. belge 1966, I, 240) or CC art. 1382 may apply (Cass. 17 June 1982, Pas. belge 1982, I, 1221). The amount that can be recovered under a contribution claim essentially depends on the magnitude of respective fault and on the degree to which each of the separate torts contributed to cause the damage (van Gerven and Covemaeker loc. cit. 434-435). In a similar fashion, the SPANISH CC art. 1137 also adopts the principle of divided liability as a point of departure, not that of solidary liabilty. Case law, however, has made the exception the general rule in many legal areas and has, inter alia, pronounced “solidary liability is the general rule” for all contractual law cases (TS 11 July 2006, BDA RAJ 2006/4977 at FJ 7; see also TS 31 October 2005, RAJ 2005 (5) no. 7351 p. 15730). A specific rule on plurality of debtors is absent in the tort law regulations of the CC. However, several special statutes ordain a system of solidary liability (e. g. Air Navigation Act art. 123; Nuclear Energy Act art. 52; ConsProtA art. 132; Construction Act art. 17(3); Press and Printing Act art. 65 [on this see further TS 17 March 2004, RAJ

Article 6:105: Solidary liability

4.

2004 (2) no. 1927 p. 3697]), and the rules on the imposition of civil liability for the commission of criminal offence also proceed from the assumption that solidary liability applies (CP art. 116). According to the prevailing view of practitioners, the applicability of the principle of solidary liability can be derived from these provisions. If it is possible to ascertain precisely the contribution made by each of the tortfeasors to the damage caused, only then will the issue of solidary liability not arise (Díez-Picazo and Gullón, Sistema II9, 557-558; Roca i Trias, Derecho de daños3, 174; Paz-Ares/Díez-Picazo/Bercovitz/Salvador (-Pantaleón), Código Civil II2, art. 1902, p. 2001; for the applicability of CC art. 1137 in a tort law context, see, however Paz-Ares/Díez-Picazo/Bercovitz/Salvador (-Caffarena), Código Civil II2, art. 1137, p. 120). The courts had long determined that several tortfeasors causing the same damage, are solidary liable (TS 3 December 1998, RAJ 1998 (5) no. 9703 p. 14187; TS 15 July 2000, RAJ 2000 (4) no. 6885 p. 10573; TS 13 February 2001, RAJ 2001 (4) no. 853 p. 10573; TS 10 March 1994, RAJ 1994 (1) no. 1736 p. 2323; TS 15 December 1999, RAJ 1999? (5) no. 8908 p. 13978). Here, the only prerequisite is that the degree to which the defendant contributed to cause the damage cannot be precisely determined (TS 27 June 2001, RAJ 2001 (3) no. 5087 p. 7758; TS 31 October 2003, RAJ 2003 (5) no. 7978 p. 14953). The Tribunal Supremo would not affirm solidarity when it is possible to precisely individualise the liability of each of the torfeasors (TS 3 April 1987, RAJ 1987 (2) no. 2485 p. 2327; 23 January 2004, RAJ 2004 (1) no. 1 p. 17). The rationale for the validity of the principle of solidary liability is based on the notion of victim protection. In this connection, the Supreme Court often refers to the emergence of solidaridad impropia (‘improper or sui generis solidarity’), namely because, in this context, solidary liability does not result from either under a contract or under a statutory regulation (TS 7 November 2000, RAJ 2000 (5) no. 9911 p. 15406; TS 29 May 2003, RAJ 2003 (3) no. 5216 p. 9730). The most important legal consequence of this is that it enables the injured party to take action against anyone of the concurrent tortfeasors (TS 1 July 1986, RAJ 1986 (3) no. 4559 p. 4416; TS 22 January 2004, RAJ 2004 (1) no. 207 p. 384). The issue of whether an interruption in the running of the presecription period operates in favour of the remaining tortfeasors does not appear to have been definitively determined (in favour inter alia, TS 17 December 1979, RAJ 1979 (2) no. 4363 p. 3532 and TS 14 April 2001, RAJ 2001 (2) no. 3640 p. 5587; against TS 21 October 2002, RAJ 2002 (5) no. 8770 p. 16021 and TS 14 March 2003, RAJ 2003 (3) no. 3645 p. 6729). That a concurrent wrongdoer who has paid the entire compensation may assert a claim for contribution against the remaining tortfeasors is derived from CC art. 1145(2). In case of doubt, concurrent tortfeasors are liable for the same share of the damage caused (CC art. 1138). ITALIAN CC art. 2055 which is operative in the tort law context, provides that where several tortfeasors are responsible for the same damage, they are liable in solidum. Each concurrent wrongdoer must have contributed to cause the damage (Cass. 4 February 1992, no. 1147, Foro it. 1992, I, 2127) and each of them must have violated the same interest (Cass. 18 July 2002, no. 10403, Giust.civ. 2003, I, 2876). CC art. 2055 is also applicable in the strict liability context, furthermore, if, in the concrete case at hand, one tortfeasor is at fault, whereas the other is not fault but is strictly liable (Alpa, Trattato di diritto civile IV, 330; Salvi, La responsabilità civile2, 235). Each injured party may claim the entire compensation from any one of the concurrent wrongdoers; among the concurrent tortfeasors, the right to claim contribution remains intact (Cass. 17

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5.

6.

7.

956

November 2003, no. 17372, Giust.civ. 2004, I, 637). Generally, the claim is asecertained by examining the magnitude and the degree to which the tortfeasors contributed to the accident; in case of doubt, it is presumed that the respective degrees of faults are equal (CC art. 2055). If a concurrent tortfeasor is liable under strict liability, the widespread view is held that fault is replaced by an examination of the extent of contribution to the damage caused (Salvi loc. cit.). HUNGARIAN CC § 344 corresponds to Article 6:105. If several persons cause the same damage, then they are solidarily liable; the extent of their liability towards each other is fixed in proportionate to their degree of blameworthiness. Here, the courts can take into account the fact that one of wrongdoers has obtained a particular benefit from the commission of the tort (Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 95-99; Petrik (-Harmathy), Polgári jog II2, 582). If there is any doubt about the degree of blameworthiness, liability is divided in equal proportions among the concurrent tortfeasors. However, according to CC § 344(3), the courts are entitled to refrain from imposing a liability which is joint and several and may instead impose liability on the tortfeasors in proportion to their contributions if (a) this will endanger or significantly delay the award of compensation, or if (b) the injured party also contributed to cause the damage or was remiss in asserting his claim and could adduce no cogent ground to excuse the delay. A reform of this provision is to be expected. Incidentially, solidary liability also arises even if each of the tortfeasors is liable on different legal grounds (Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 79; Gellért (-Kemenes), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1238-1240). Similarly, according to BULGARIAN LOA art. 53, solidary liability arises when the same damage is caused by multiple persons. This principle is, however, subject to some exceptions which can be discovered in specific statutes. The exceptions concern liability for damage to ship and cargo following a ship collision (Commercial Shipping Code art. 314(1)(first sentence): In the context of divided liability, responsibility is apportioned according to the degree of fault). However, in the context of this exception, solidary liability continues to apply if personal injury is caused (loc. cit. art. 314(2)). If the concurrent wrongdoers are held to be co –principals in the commission of a crime by the criminal courts, that judgment of the criminal court binds the civil court when apportioning the responsibility of those solidarily liable (CCP art. 300). ROMANIAN CC art. 1003 makes clear that solidary liability arises where “a tort or quasi-tort can be imputed to several persons”. The most frequent example that crops up in practice concerns the solidary liability of employees and employers to a third party (CC art. 1000(3); Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘, 358-359). Persons who jointly cause damage are also liable in solidium under SLOVENIAN LOA § 186(1). The same holds true for instigators, accessories and persons who attempt to conceal the identity of the injuring party (LOA § 186(2)). Likewise, tortfeasors, who, although acting independently cause the same damage, are liable in solidum, unless their precise causal contribution can be ascertained (LOA § 186(3)). The parties to a building contract will be liable in solidum to a third party for damage caused during the course of construction of the building (CC § 187). According to GERMAN CC § 840(1), if several persons is responsible for damage arising from the commission of a tort, then those persons are solidary liable. CC § 840(1) does not denote an independent cause of action (BGH 7 November 1978, BGHZ 72, 355, 358), rather it is regarded as a basis for structuring the tortfeasors’ liability to the injured party and the internal legal relationship between the tortfeasors. The concept of “un-

Article 6:105: Solidary liability

8.

9.

lawful act” is given a wide interpretation and embraces all types of extra contractual liability. In particular, it also extends to strict liability (which is the subject of specific regulation in various ad hoc statutes, see further Palandt (-Sprau), BGB67, § 840, no. 1; Erman (-Schiemann), BGB II11, § 840, no. 2). Each solidary tortfeasor is liable to compensate the claimant for the entire damage, but the claimant is only entitled to recover compensation once. The tortfeasors among themselves are liable in equal shares unless otherwise determinable (CC § 426(1)(first sentence)). Statute can “determine otherwise” (e. f. CC § 840(2) and (3)), as can a pre-existing legal relationship between those responsible or it simply follows from the circumstances (Sprau loc. cit. no. 7). In AUSTRIA, solidary liability can either arise where multiple wrongdoers contribute to cause the same damage and this damage can be imputed to them, or if a tortious claim to compensation coincides with a claim based on another legal ground (e. g. in unjustified enrichment). In both cases, of course, the injured party will not be compensated twice over. With respect to the first case, (plurality of tortfeasors), CC §§ 1301 and 1302, most notably, provide that solidary liability is to arise; these provisions also apply outside the confines of fault-based liability, unless, the relevant special statutes contain specific regulations to the contrary (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 14/7). Notwithstanding the wording of both provisions, the prevailing interpretation of CC §§ 1301 and 1302 is that the existence of a common plan is not a prerequisite for solidary liability to arise. Instead, solidary liability is said to arise if several persons independently cause the same damage (Koziol loc. cit.). However, CC § 1302 provides that divided liability will arise if (i) the respective degrees of contribution to the entire damage can be determined and that it concerns (ii) damage that was caused through negligence (CC § 1302 second sentence). By contrast, tortfeasors acting together will not enjoy the advantages conferred by divided liability, on the grounds that each wrongdoer is in any event liable for the entire damage and should not benefit merely because the same is true of another codefendant (Koziol loc. cit. no. 14/11). Since the injured party, ordinarily has no knowledge of the course of events which led to the commission of the tort nor does he have any idea about the respective causal contributions to the damage, it is considered that he or she deserves the protection of a claim based solely on the fact that a possible contributor to the injury may have caused it (Koziol/Bydlinski/Bollenberger (-Karner) ABGB2, § 1302 no. 3). Solidary liability also arises where it is not possible to identify the tortfeasors’ respective separate shares in causing the damage or where the injury has been caused intentionally (CC § 1302 second sentence). Acting in concert to carry out the forbidden intent will, in itself, be sufficient (see further Karner loc. cit. § 1301 no. 3). Joint tortfeasors are even liable solidarily under CC § 1302, if the respective shares in causing the injury can be established affirmatively (OGH 14 April 1957, SZ 27/ 103; OGH 2 September 1970, SZ 43/141; against Koziol loc. cit. no. 14/10). Internally, the right to seek contribution in order to apportion the loss is regulated by CC § 896. GREEK CC art. 926 first sentence ordains solidary liability in the event that the damage is the result of joint action by several persons. The notion of “joint acton” is broadly interpreted; it is sufficient that several persons make a causal contribution to commit the tort (Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Georgiades), art. 926, no. 5; Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I, 572). Employer and employee or supervisor and supervisee are liable in solidum, in a similar fashion, the owner of a newspaper, the editor and all other persons listed in the Media Acts are solidarily liable for defamatory publications (A. P. 635/2001, EllDik 42 [2001] 1639). Each concurrent wrongdoer is liable for the entire

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amount of the plaintiff’s claim; the plaintiff is not, however, permitted to obtain double recovery (A. P. 119/1999, NoB 48 [2000] 478). Liability of the concurrent tortfeasors to each other essentially depends on the respective degree of fault (CC art. 927); in the case of doubt, they share responsibility equally. As regards the respective magnitude of fault, the respective degree of causal contribution is also taken into account in apportioning liability (Georgiades loc. cit. art. 927, no. 10), which permits CC art. 927 to be applied correspondingly if the tortfeasors commit two independent strict liability torts which coincide to cause the same damage (Georgiades loc. cit. no. 15). PORTUGUESE CC art. 497(1) makes clear that multiple tortfeasors are solidary liable. Solidary liability is also of great importance in the law regulating traffic accidents (CC art. 507(1)). The concurrent tortfeasor right to recover contribution from his fellow concurrent tortfeasors is determined by the magnitude of respective fault; in case of doubt, the concurrent tortfeasors share liabilty in equal proportions (CC art. 497(2)). The general rules on solidary liability (CC arts. 512 et seq.) are applied. CC art. 497 governs all types of delictual liability, it therefore embraces e. g. instigators and auxiliaries (CC art. 490; STJ 13 September 2006; STJ 29 March 1989, BolMinJus 385 [1989] 379; Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 85 (1959 139), principals /employers (CC art. 500; STJ 14 September 2006; CA Oporto 22 April 1972, BolMinJus 216 [1972] 199; STJ 12 January 1984, BolMinJus 333 [1984] 413), supervisors (CC art. 491; STJ 21 September 2006), owners and possessors of a building (STJ 12 June 2003), and the State (CC art. 501; Const. art. 22; STJ 14 September 2006; STJ 20 January 2005). CC art. 497(1) does not concern the causal contribution made by the injured party; this issue is mentioned in connection with contributory negligence (CC art. 570; STJ 2 November 1971, BolMinJus 211 [1971] 276; Neto, Código Civil Anotado14, 515). An array of special statutes governing the liability of specific persons and cases also provide for the imposition of solidary liability; in contrast, consorts (the members of an unincorporated joint venture) are only subject to a regime of proportionate liability (Contract of Consortium Participation Decree Law no. 231/81 art. 19(3); see Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 607, note 2). In the internal relationship amongst the concurrent tortfeasors, if one tortfeasor was at fault, and, in contrasdistinction to this, the other was strictly liable and did not commit a fault, then, the former bears the entire loss (Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, note 1 under art. 497, p. 502; Almeida Costa loc. cit.; Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 697; see also CC arts. 507(2) and 497(2)). If both wrongdoers were strictly liable, then the apportionment of liability will depend on the respective causal contributions to the injury. In the context of liability for motor vehicles, it will depend on the extent of the benefit that each party obtained from using the vehicle (CC art. 507(2); Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela loc. cit. note 2 under art. 507). If one coowner only used the vehicle for two months in the year, and the other co-owner used it for ten months, then the liability will be apportioned based on their respective usage (see further Antunes Varela loc. cit. 698; see also STJ 18 May 2006). The same applies if several vehicles caused the same damage (Antunes Varela loc. cit. 697). Solidary liability will not arise if several separate acts have accumulated to result in the aggregate damage (RL 17 November 1983, CJ VIII (1983-5) 118: shipping company was fined for smuggling carried out by various crews of the same ship; liability of the crews involved to the company was divided, the liability of natural persons within the respective crews was solidary in respect of that crew’s contribution to the damage).

Article 6:105: Solidary liability

11.

12.

13.

DUTCH CC art. 6:102(1) reads: “Two or more persons who are each obliged to repair

damage for the same damage are solidarily liable. In order to determine their contribution as amongst themselves under article 10, the damage shall be apportioned amongst them by corresponding application of article 101 [of Book 6] unless the law or a juridical act requires a different apportionment”. Solidary liability also arises if the liabilities of the debtors are mixed (e. g. one debtor is liable under tort, another for non-performance of a contract, another under benenvolent intervention in another’s affairs and another debtor is strictly liable: Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 354). The sole decisive criterion is that they are responsible for causing the same damage (Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12, nos. 458-460, pp. 419-421). The legal consequences of solidary liability are governed by CC arts. 6:6 et seq.; the injured party can claim reparation for the entire damage from any of one of the concurrent tortfeasors. As regards the right of contribution amongst the concurrent tortfeasors, dictates of equity are of considerable importance under CC art. 6:102. This provision is supplemented by CC art. 6:165(2) which provides that persons with a duty to supervise, where they failed to look after the child properly, have to bear the entire damage in the internal relationship with the other injuring parties. By relying on CC art. 6:109 (reducing compensation on equitable grounds), the foregoing result can also be taken into account when the courts come to assess the extent of compensation owed to the child (Hartkamp loc. cit. no. 21 pp. 25-27 and no. 90, pp. 98-99). ESTONIAN LOA § 137(1) corresponds to Article 6:105. Whether the concurrent wrongdoers are liable under the same cause of action or commit independent torts is of no particular relevance (RKTKo 3-2-1-48-06 – RT III 2006, 25, 228). The right to seek contribution is regulated in LOA § 137(2). The principle of solidary liability is also in force in the NORDIC countries. Only SWEDEN (Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 4) and FINLAND (Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 2) have enacted an express statutory regulation to this effect; With DANISH EAL § 25, the Danish legislature have contented themselves with a rule regulating the apportionment of loss amongst the concurrent tortfeasors. The imposition of solidary liability does not hinge on any requirement that same grounds for imposing liability are extant (e. g. negligence and strict liability, see Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 238; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret6, 387; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 323), instead, liability depends on whether the concurrent tortfeasors cause the “same damage” (In Denmark, the doctrine of ‘primary cause’ occasionally results in a departure from this principle: von Eyben and Isager loc. cit.). Similarly, employer and employee can, in principle, be held to be liable in solidum; however, the employee enjoys special privileges as regards his liability vis-à-vis the victim (Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 361; Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 271; D-Karnov 2006 IV (-von Eyben), no. 113 p. 5645) (Finnish Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 2(2) even provides that an employee can only be held liable for reparation which cannot successfully be sought from the employer). According to Swedish Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 4, solidary liability is restricted, if one person’s liability is reduced under the numerous adjustment clauses which reduce damages on equitable grounds. In the event of such a reduction taking place, solidary liability is then restricted to that reduced amount of compensation; the excess is a matter of sole liability of the tortfeasor who does not have the benefit of the adjustment clause (HD 16 December 1993, NJA 1993, 727; Finnish Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 2(2); von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 388). Moreover,

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14.

difficult issues arise when it comes to coordinating the contributory negligence rules with those governing solidary liability. In this context, the following contentious issue arises, namely whether the extent to which the victim was guilty of contributory negligence is compared against all the concurrent tortfeasors as a unit or whether it has to assessed against each individual separately (Dufwa, Flera skadeståndsskyldiga, 4031; Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 240; Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5, 310; Bengtsson and Strömbäck loc cit 362). Amongst the concurrent tortfeasors themselves, only the Finnish Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 3 and Danish EAL § 25 regulates this issue statutorily. How loss is apportioned in the internal relationship will depend on an assessment of all the circumstances of the individual case, including an assessment of the magnitude of fault and the degree of respective causal contribution to the damage. Additionally, Danish EAL § 25(2) provides that the existence of liability insurance is to be taken into account: a concurrent tortfeasor who is not covered by liability insurance and who did not act intentionally or in a grossly negligent manner, is not liable to the other concurrent tortfeasors. Exceptions to this rule exist in respect of public bodies, business operators and the statutorily regulated regime of strict liability. In Sweden, it is generally accepted that a person who is strictly liable always has a right of contribution against the multiple wrongdoers who were negligent in causing the same damage (for a critical view of this see Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 247). In ENGLISH law, where multiple tortfeasors cause damage in concert (e. g. as part of a joint venture), where one tortfeasor instigates another to commit the tort, or where one tortfeasor is vicariously liable for the tort of the other, the parties are joint tortfeasors, each is liable for the whole damage and may be sued alone: Clerk and Lindsell (-Jones), Torts16, 4-02 and 4-04. The same legal consequence applies to several tortfeasors if their independent wrongful acts cause the same damage: ibid. Between them joint tortfeasors or several tortfeasors may recover contribution under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, s. 1.The quantum of contribution which may be recovered by a claimant is “such as may be found by the court to be just and equitable” having regard to the extent of the defendant’s responsibility for the damage (s. 2(1)) and in an appropriate case the defendant may be exempted or called upon to give a complete indemnity (s. 2(2)), but not more than the defendant could have been called upon to pay to the person suffering the damage having regard, for example, to any contributory negligence of that person (see s. 2(3)).

The illustration is taken from CA Saarbrücken 17 January 2006, NJW-RR 2006, 893.

Article 6:106: Assignment of right to reparation The person suffering the damage may assign a right to reparation, including a right to reparation for non-economic loss.

960

Article 6:106: Assignment of right to reparation

Comments 1. General. This Article provides that non-contractual rights to reparation are freely assignable (and hence, depending on the applicable law of succession, also transmissible on death to heirs or successors). There is no exception for rights to the reparation of noneconomic loss. From the perspective of the law on non-contractual liability for damage, it is not necessary that the right has been made the subject of a court action or recognised by the liable person before the death of the injured person; it is not even necessary that the injured person clearly declared a wish to pursue the claim if in a position to do so. In contrast, a valid waiver of the right to damages brings about its extinction; in the absence of an existing right, there is no room for assignment or succession. 2. Policy considerations. The ability to assign (and with it to bequeath) rights to reparation for economic damage is for the most part unproblematic. More heated policy debate continues to centre on the ability to assign or bequeath rights to reparation for non-economic loss. This Article adopts the position that such rights should not be treated any differently from rights to reparation for economic loss. This corresponds to the equation – in principle – of economic and non-economic damage, which finds expression in Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) and it is in conformity with the majority of legal systems and the trend of more recent statutory law-making. 3. Moral reservations obsolete. Earlier moral reservations against such a rule should nowadays be regarded as obsolete. It would unreasonably diminish the legal position of the surviving injured person if that person could not personally decide upon the means of realising the rights held. Conversely, the issue of the ability to bequeath a right to compensation for non-economic losses is indeed in principle an issue of the law of succession and as such not the subject-matter of these model rules (I. – 1:101 (Intended field of application) paragraph (2)(b)). However, where the applicable law of succession is built on the principle that only those rights can be bequeathed which can be transferred in one’s lifetime (thus are not of a highly personal nature and therefore do not disappear upon the death of their holder), Article 6:106 also has an indirect effect in succession law. This is desired. There is little force in the argument that the law should not allow third parties (especially the heirs) to be “enriched” by the suffering of the deceased. The sole concern here is the post-mortem realisation of interests which the person concerned was not able to realise while alive: a dying person should at least be aware that the law will not close its eyes to the pain endured in the fight for life. 4. Assignability in specific cases. The Article leaves it to the injured person to decide how to realise a right to damages; it need not necessarily be exercised personally, but can be sold or donated. This applies to rights to damages of all types, even those directed at compensating for the loss of a right which would not have been assignable itself. Such a case is conceivable e. g. in the situation set out in Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death) paragraph (2)(c): the fact that the right to maintenance in question may not have been assignable under the applicable law does not mean that the right to damages for its loss should be unassignable. That may also be justified by the fact that reparation will itself often take the form of lump sum

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compensation and that the corresponding right should not be less freely available than a lump sum already paid.

Notes 1.

2.

962

According to FRENCH law, (CC arts. 1689 ff), the general rule is that all types of claims may be assigned; exceptions only exist in respect of maintenance claims (créances alimentaires) and claims to particular social benefits (see further Terré/Simler/Lequette, Les obligations9, no. 1278 p. 1217). The view has been advanced in legal scholarship that an action en réparation d’un préjudice moral must also constitute a claim which is not capable of assignment. It is said that this claim is personal to the injured person: an assigment of a right to reparation is only permissible in cases of préjudice matériel (Mazeaud and Chabas, Leçons de droit civil II(1)9, no. 608 pp. 705-706). However, this analysis is no longer supported by the jurisprudence of the courts. Instead, it is accepted,that, in the event that the victim dies, claims for reparation of préjudice moral may be asserted by the victim’s survivors (Cass.ch.mixte 30 April 1976, D. 1977 jur. 185, note ContamineRaynaud), and indeed, this encompasses claims based on the loss of a close relative (Cass.ch.mixte 30 April 1976 loc. cit. note Contamine-Raynaud [2ème espèce]; RTD civ 1976, 556, obs. Durry; GazPal 1976 jur. 459 [for example, a claim based on pain and suffering consequent upon the death of his son in an accident, that the deceased could have brought, prior to his death, will also be vested in his survivors]; see. also Cass.civ. 11 March 1981, GazPal 1981 Pan. 240, note Chabas, and Cass.crim. 9 October 1985, D. 1987 jur. 93, note Breton). A claim for compensation for non-pecuniary loss is also vested in the survivors even in the event that the victim of accident did not feel any pain in the short space of time prior to his death (Cass.crim. 28 October 1992, D. 1993 Som. 203, note Pradel). In BELGIUM, the general principle is that all claims are freely assignable, unless, that assignment is prohibited by law or would contradict the personal nature of the claim (de Page, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge III3, no. 382 p. 368; van Gerven and Covemaeker, Verbintenissenrecht2, 565). As far as we can tell, the issue relating to restrictions placed on the assignment of tort claims has not been broached. In SPAIN, only a small minority of legal writers, who mainly cite moral reservations, are opposed to the assignment of tort claims (Martín Villa and Blanco López, RDP 1992, 663). The prevailing legal opinion regards such claims as assignable (Roca i Trias, Derecho de daños3, 173; Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 389; Gómez Calle, Los sujetos de la responsabilidad civil3, 461, 478), a view which finds statutory confirmation in the regulation on covering the risk of nuclear damage (Decreto 2177/1967, reglamento sobre cobertura del riesgo de daños nucleares, of 22 July 1967) art. 29, which deals with this special case. The general principles in the Civil Code relating to cesión de créditos do not expressly regulate this issue; CC art. 1112 merely states that “every right which is acquired by virtue of an obligation is assignable according to the legal norms, unless something else is stipulated”. Three grounds of non-assignability of claims are derived from this provision: (i) legal prohibition; (ii) pactum de non cedendo, and (iii) where the nature of the claim implies its non-assignability (Pantaleón Prieto, ADC 1988, 1096). Tort claims do not fall under either of these classifications; they belong to the patrimonio of the victim (Roca i Trias loc. cit.). This is only contentious in respect to claims for reparation for non-economic loss. These claims are occasionally characterised as perso-

Article 6:106: Assignment of right to reparation

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

nalísima (highly personal) (Gómez Calle loc. cit.; also apparently Roca Trias loc. cit. 174). It is difficult to find a rationale for this assumption (compare. Yzquierdo Tolsada loc. cit. 390), in particular, because the Solidarity with the Victims of Terrorism Act (Ley 32/ 1999, de solidaridad con las víctimas del terrorismo) art. 8 (see also art. 6 and Annex I to the Act) expressly provides that the victim’s claim for non-economic loss against the wrongdoer may be assigned to the State. According to ITALIAN CC art. 1260(1), all claims are assignable. The exceptions to the rule are claims of a highly personal character or where the assignment would contravene a statutory prohibition. Claims for compensation are not encompassed within either of these categories (Cass. 21 April 1986, no. 2812, Giust.civ.Mass. 1986, fasc. 4 [while the case deals only with contract law, the propositions enunciated in the cases are of general validity]). HUNGARIAN CC § 360(3) refers to the general rules on assignment of claims CC §§ 328-331; they are applied correspondingly to the assignment of claims for reparation. According to CC § 328(2), inter alia, claims which are of a personal nature cannot be assigned. According to BH 1998/379 and BH 2000/197 (dealing with the same case), an injured party’s compensation claim for breach of his personality rights and other damage which he had suffered due to an unlawful criminal proceeding initiated against him, falls under the exception. According to POLISH CC art. 445 § 3 and art. 448 (second sentence), claims for compensation of non-pecuniary loss for infringement of corporeal and incorporeal personality rights are only transmissable on death to the injured party’s survivors during the lifetime of the former, if he or she had either filed a claim or the injuring party acknowledged that claim in writing. This corresponds to the legal position prevailing under the SLOVENIAN LOA § 184(2). The ROMANIAN Civil Code does not (yet) contain a similar regulation; however, it should be noted that de lege lata, the question as to whether a claim for compensation for “moral” damage can be the subject of an inter vivos assignment, remains unresolved. The new Draft Civil Code proposes that such claims may only be assigned if they are accepted in writing or have become final; the heritability of such claims is organised in a similar fashion to arts. 445 and 448 in the Polish Civil Code (Proiectul Noului Cod civil, 223: arts. 1131(3) and (4)). According to BULGARIAN law, claims cannot be assigned if the assingment is precluded by claw, by contract or by the nature of the claim (LOA art. 99 (1)). It appears that claims for the compensation of non-pecuniary loss fall into the third category (Kalaydjiev, Obligazionno pravo, Obshta chast, 433); it is said that they are of a highly personal nature and, therefore, are only form part of the estate if the testator, during his or her lifetime, enforced them in court proceedings (Supreme Court 5 August 1969, decision no. 829, criminal case no. 730/1969). The special rules that dealt with assignment of claims and succession to thos claims contained in GERMAN CC § 847(1)(ii) (old version) were repealed in 2002 by the reform of law on damages, with the result that there are no restrictions placed on the transmissibility of compensation claim (Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB67, § 253, no. 23). Similarly, under AUSTRIAN CC § 1393, the general rule is that compensation claims are assignable. The injured party can even be legally obliged to assign such claims (OGH 27 May 1992, SZ 65/83 [leasing]). Many special statutes contain a subrogation claim in favour of a third party who has already performed (such as insurer, employer). The only problematic issue that arises in the context of claims that are inherently personal (CC

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8.

9.

10.

11.

964

§ 1393) regards the assignability of claims for loss of maintenance (CC § 1327) and compensation for pain and suffering. In end effect, prevailing legal scholarship and the courts are united on the issue and consider that these claims can also be assigned (claim for maintenance: OGH 15 March 1989, SZ 62/44; OGH 25 November 1992, EvBl 1993/ 106; Schwimann (-Heidinger), ABGB VI3, § 1393, no. 6; Schmerzensgeld: Heidinger loc. cit. no. 13 with further citations). Notwithstanding the wording of CC § 1325, more recent jurisprudence has held that claims for compensation for pain and suffering may also be transferred on death and the ability to transfer these claims does not hinge on whether the victim enforced this claim during his lifetime (OGH 30 September 1996, SZ 69/217; Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VI3, § 1325 no. 91; Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht II12, 323). According to GREEK CC art. 933, the claim for compensation for pain and suffering (CC art. 932) is not assignable and upon death, is not transmissible to the deceased’s survivors, unless the claim forms part of a contract or the testator enforced the claim in court proceedings. PORTUGUESE law regulates numerous cases where a third party is subrogated to another’s statutory compensation claim where that third party (e. g. insurer or the State) has compensated the victim. Contractual assignment of a claim is permissible in so far as it is not precluded by law or by contract or conflicts with the highly personal nature of the claim. For example, maintenance claims (CC art. 2008(1) cannot be assigned; see Ribeiro de Faria, Direito das Obrigações II, 512) and neither can the “litigious rights” (CC art. 579(3)). There is no rule precluding the assignability of claims for reparation; it is also conceivable that compensation claims for pain and suffering may be assigned. Under DUTCH CC art. 3:83, all claims are assignable unless an assignment is prohibited by law. Claims for compensation for non-pecuniary loss cannor be assigned or pledged, unless, the claim is acknowledged in a contract or enforced in court proceedings. In order to esure the transmissibility of the claim to the deceased’s survivors, it suffices that the deceased, during his lifetime, informed the defendant that he or she wished to enforce the claim (CC art. 6:106(2); for details see Goederenrecht (-Snijders), no. 309 p. 278, no. 311 p. 280; Nieuwenhuis/Stolker/Valk (-Oosterveen), T & C Vermogensrecht4, art. 6:106, no. 9 p. 2240). This largerly corresponds to the legal position under the ESTONIAN LOA §§ 164(1) and 166(1). SWEDISH Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 3 as well as FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 7 § 3 proceed from the assumption that claims for compensation for non-economic loss are extinguished upon the victim’s death, if he himself made no attempt to enforce the claim. Enforcement may have been instigated by the deceased himself or by someone on his behalf, such as an insurance company; there is no requirement that the quantum of the claim was established at this stage. By contrast, it is possible to freely assign claims for the reparation of economic loss (Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 359; Karlgren, Skadeståndsrätt5, 231). DANISH EAL § 18(1) provides that compensation claims for personal injury and loss of maintenance cannot be assigned, unless the claim and its quantum have been established by a court, except for loss of income. However, compensation claims for personal injury, including non-economic loss, may be inherited; it is not necessary that the deceased have sought to enforce the claim during his lifetime. Compensation claims arising from an interference with the enjoyment of property are freely assignable (von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret6, 434).

Article 6:106: Assignment of right to reparation

12.

Under ENGLISH law, by an arguably misplaced application of the policy of discouraging champerty (i. e. extrinsic support of litigation without good reason in return for all or part of the proceeds), a right of action in tort was originally considered as a rule not assignable: Defries v. Milne [1913] 1 Ch 98. However, an injured person could agree prospectively to assign the proceeds of a tort claim (giving rise to an assignment in equity effective when the proceeds are obtained): Glegg v. Bromley [1912] 3 KB 474, 484 and 489, approved in Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Credit Suisse [1980] QB 629, 656 and 670; [1982] AC 679, 702. Moreover, since only a so-called bare right to litigate might not be assigned, it has always been possible to effect an ancillary assignment of a tortious claim – i. e., where the claim is for compensation for damage to property, the right of action could be transferred with that property – since in such a case the right was attached to a property interest: cf. Williams v. Protheroe (1829) 5 Bing 309, 130 ER 1080; 3 Y & J 129, 148 ER 1122 (Court of Exchequer Chamber) (where the claim for compensation for dilapidations caused by a tenant could be regarded as contractual); Dawson v. Great Northern & City Railway Co. [1905] 1 KB 260, 271 (Stirling LJ) (where the claim was statutory rather than tortious); Sparham-Souter v. Town and Country Developments (Essex) Ltd. [1976] QB 858, 868 (Lord Denning MR assuming the point); and, making the point implicitly, Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Credit Suisse [1980] QB 629, 654-655 (Lord Denning MR). Nor was an assignment to an insurer who had indemnified the person suffering the damage precluded, where, in the absence of the assignment, the insurer would have been able to sue in the insured’s name under the doctrine of subrogation: King v. Victoria Insurance Co. Ltd. [1896] AC 250, 256 (Lord Hobhouse); Compania Colombiana de Seguros v. Pacific Steam Navigation Co. [1965] 1 QB 101 (correspondingly where an underwriter indemnified an insurer); Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Credit Suisse [1980] QB 629, 655-656 and 671. The modern (and more liberal) basic principle is that a claim for compensation can be assigned provided the assignee has a “genuine commercial interest” in the enforcement of the claim to be assigned: Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679, 703 (Lord Roskill); Tettenborn, [2007] LMCLQ 392. This extends to a claim for damages in tort: see Browntown Ltd v Edward Moore Inbucon Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 499, 509 (Lloyd J); 24 Seven Utility Services Ltd. v. Rosekey Ltd. [2003] EWHC 3415 (QB) (negligent property damage); Massai Aviation Services Ltd. v. A-G for the Bahamas [2007] UKPC 12 (trespass) and see also Empire Resolution Ltd. v. MPW Brokers Ltd. [1999] BPIR 486 (Judge Thornton QC) (where a Hedley Byrne claim in negligence was held assignable); contra English Private Law (-Treitel) I, para. 8.344 (“a right of action in tort cannot generally be assigned”). A genuine commercial interest is not required for an assignment for the benefit of the creditors by a trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator which is a valid exercise of statutory powers set out in the Insolvency Act 1986 to dispose of the bankrupt’s or insolvent company’s property: see Circuit Systems Ltd. v. Zuken-Redac (UK) Ltd. [1996] 1 WLR 721, 734-735 (Brown LJ). An assignment of a tort claim for the purposes of factoring remains ineffective: Tettenborn, [2007] LMCLQ 392, 397-398. Moreover, essentially personal (as opposed to proprietary) tort claims such as claims for assault, defamation or personal injury – i. e. rights of action relating to “personal wrongs” – remain incapable of assignment: see Glegg v. Bromley [1912] 3 KB 474, 488; Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Credit Suisse [1980] QB 629, 656 and 670671; [1982] AC 679, 702; 24 Seven Utility Services Ltd. v. Rosekey Ltd. [2003] EWHC 3415 (QB), [25]; Chitty (-Burrows), Contracts I29, para. 19-050. However, this may be simply because it is unlikely in such cases that an assignee can establish the requisite legitimate

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13.

14.

interest: Smith, Assignment, para. 12.105. Academic criticism is against a broad prohibition on the assignment of tortious rights of action (Smith, Assignment, para. 12.103), preferring to confine restrictions on assignment of tort claims to cases where specific policy concerns apply (Tettenborn, [2007] LMCLQ 392). By statute a right to receive periodical payments of damages may not be assigned or charged without the approval of the court (unless it is an assignment to the scheme manager established under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 212): Damages Act 1996, s. 2(6), as inserted by the Courts Act 2003, s. 100(1) IRISH law, which rests on the English authorities, is to the same effect as the law in its sister Common Law jurisdiction: see McDermott, Contract, para. 18.120 – 18.122. In particular, there can be no assignment under Irish law of purely personal claims such as those in respect of defamation or assault: McDermott, Contract, para. 18.122. Under SCOTS law claims ex delicto – including claims to solatium in respect of personal injuries as much as claims to reparation of patrimonial loss (e. g. for medical expenses and loss of income) – are assignable: Walker, Delict2, p.410; McBryde, Contract, para. 17-35.

Section 2:

Compensation Article 6:201: Right of election The person suffering the damage may choose whether or not to spend compensation on the reinstatement of the damaged interest.

Comments 1. General. The rules of Section 2 of this Chapter relate only to monetary damages (‘compensation’, see Article 6:101 (Aim and forms of reparation) paragraph (2)). This Article begins with a clarification: the fact that damages are intended to restore the circumstances that would have prevailed had the event causing damage not occurred (see Article 6:101 (Aim and forms of reparation) paragraph (1)), should not lead to the inference that a sum of money received for the reparation of the damage must be actually invested by the injured person in the restoration of the previous state. 2. Property damage. The Article relates primarily to property damage. The injured person can claim the cost of repair even if having no intention of repairing the damaged thing or having it repaired. The injured person is freely entitled to invest the money received for the reparation of the damage in another way. However, if the repair is not carried out then no value added tax falls due; the reparation of VAT which might have been payable had there been an actual restoration is consequently unnecessary. 3. Other cases. So too, in other cases neither the court nor the liable person may dictate to the injured person how the compensation is to be used. Furthermore, the award of damages may not be made subject to a condition that it be used in a certain specified way. Depending on the applicable procedural law it may indeed be possible that, upon application by the claimant, the court orders payment directly to a third party (e. g. in the case of the infringement of the personal dignity of a well-known politician who requests that the compensation due for non-economic losses be transferred by the liable person directly to a named charity); however, such a decision may not be made against the will of the claimant.

Notes 1.

Under FRENCH law, the “compensation creditor” is free to dispose of the money that he receives. A court cannot direct that a creditor pay part of the award of compensation to a third party (e.g to a nursing home where the victim is forced to reside) (Cass.crim. 22 February 1995, JCP éd. G 1995, I, 3893, no. 22, note Viney), nor can additional condi-

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2.

3.

4.

968

tions be attached to the disposal of an award of compensation (Cass.civ. 8 July 2004, Bull.civ. 2004, II, no. 391 p. 329 [for example, an award of compensation for damage to property will not be contingent upon the presentation of a receipt detailing the costs of repair; the victim has a right to full compensation which includes VAT]; see also Cass.civ. 21 October 1987, Bull.civ. 1987, II, no. 207 p. 116). This corresponds to the legal position in BELGIUM (Cass. 28 May 1996, JT 1996, 757). VAT must be paid, not only in the case where the victim has not carried out repairs himself, but also where the victim repairs the damage himself (Cass. 23 December 1992, Pas. belge 1992, I, no. 812 p. 1406). The guiding principle contained Article 6:201 was confirmed in SPAIN by TS (criminal chamber) 28 April 1989, RAJ 1989 (3) no. 3567 p. 4025 (traffic accident with terrible consequences for a 12 year old girl; damages of 60 million pesetas were awarded and it was expressly stated that the award was not predicated on “any restriction in the enjoyment and disposition [of it] inter vivos or mortis causa”). The calculation of compensation for property damage is generally based on the costs of repairs; however, there is no requirement that repairs be actually carried out (see further, critical in some parts, Carrasco Perera, Aranzadi Civil 1996, II, 55). By contrast, a point for discussion is whether compensation awarded for a violation of the reputation of the deceased must be invested in measures directed at restoring the good (post-mortem) reputation of the latter, if the person entitled to compensation has not personally suffered any loss (a proponent of this view; Salvador Coderch (-Salvador Coderch), El mercado de las ideas, 202). The rule in Article 6:201 is the same as in ITALIAN (de Cupis, Il danno II, 337), BULGARIAN (Supreme Court 1 September 1989, decision no. 447, civil case no. 420/89 [top up of compensation ordered for the employment of a nurse, whose employment was deemed, in the circumstance of the case, to be objectively necessary, even although the accrued costs of that employment were not documented]), in ROMANIAN (here, it is conceivable that the court may impose restrictions on how the award of compensation is spent, given that reparation in kind is accorded priority) and HUNGARIAN law (Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 152); it should, however, be noted that the issue of contributory negligence could arise in connection with a claim for loss of profits, where a payment in respect of property damage is not used to acquire a replacement machine (BH 1997/332). The GERMAN courts have used CC § 249(2) as a basis to sanction an abstract (or “fictive”) calculation of damages. The “requisite sum of money” in the sense of this provision is that which is calculated by an expert witness, i. e. the sum that would have been paid to a garage in order to carry out repairs. The injured party can even claim this amount if he or she fails to repair the thing (as a general rule, a motor vehicle), if the work is carried out “off the books” or he or she repairs it himself or herself (BGH 19 June 1973, NJW 1973, 1647; BGH 29 October 1974, NJW 1975, 160, 161; BGH 23 March 1976, NJW 1976, 1396; BGH 30 January 1985, NJW 1985, 1222; BGH 29 April 2003, NJW 2003, 2085). This “notional” assessment of damages is even permitted, if the repairs were actually carried out by a garage and the amount invoiced is considerably lower than that estimated by the expert witness (BGH 20 June 1989, NJW 1989, 3009). If an opposite result is reached (i. e. the actual costs accrued are lower than the notional valuation) then the injured party may request the court to adopt a “concrete” calculation of damages, provided that the claimant did not irretrievably bind himself to the

Article 6:201: Right of election

5.

“fictive” calculation of damages (BGH 17 October 2006, NJW 2007, 67). However, sales tax may only be recovered if it has actually accrued (CC § 249(2) (second sentence)). Under AUSTRIAN law, the injured party may generally choose between reparation in kind and monetary compensation (OGH 29 May 2001, 4 Ob 118/01h), unless, the choice made is detrimental to one of the legitimate interest of the injuring party (OGH 12 October 2004, 1 Ob 264/03k). Whether the injured party can make use of this right of election in the case that he or she does not use the award of compensation to reinstate the damaged interest, is contentious. Indeed, the courts have proceeded from the assumption that they are free to calculate the damages on the basis of the sum of money which is deemed necessary to reinstate the damaged interest, even if the injured party does not intend to use the award of compensation for this purpose. A number of legal commentators have asserted that, in the context of compensation for economic loss, the injured party is only entitled to claim reimbursement of expenditure incurred, if reparation in kind is possible and is actually carried out (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 10/13). If the financial resources of the injured party do not permit reparation in kind, then he can claim an advance payment or require that the costs are borne by the defendant (Koziol loc. cit. no. 9/11); “Fictive” manufacturing costs cannot be compensated (Koziol loc. cit. no. 10/19; Apathy, ZVR 1981, 261). A number of commentators hold an opposing view and argue that a victim is entitled to spend an award of compensation as he or she chooses (e. g. Koziol/Bydlinski/Bollenberger (-Danzl), ABGB2, § 1323 no. 10). In recent times, the Supreme Court, has in turn, on numerous occasions, awarded “notional” repair costs, but limited the award of damages to the amount required to compensate for the diminution of the value of the damaged thing (OGH 28 October 1987, JBl 1988, 249; OGH 29 March 1989, JBl 1990, 718; OGH 23 March 1990, SZ 63/46; OGH 29 May 1995, SZ 68/101; concurring Danzl loc. cit. no. 11). If no repair work is carried out, then, a claim may only be made for compensation for the depreciation in the value of the injured party’s patrimony. At the same time, it follows from this that sales tax is only be recoverable if it was actually paid by the injured party (OGH 7 June 1978, SZ 51/7; OGH 23 March 1990 loc. cit.; a different approach is seen in OGH 10 July 1975, JBl 1976, 44). A contentious issue is, as before, whether costs of medical care, which, from an objective point of view, the incurrence of which would be considered appropriate, are recoverable if those costs have not actually been incurred. Initially, the recovery of these costs was endorsed, e. g. where the injured party did not purchase the required medication (OGH 12 January 1955, JBl 1955, 305) or did not consent to cosmetic surgery which was reasonable for him to undergo in the circumstances of the case (OGH 19 October 1977, ZVR 1978/179 p. 215; critical on this point Apathy, Aufwendungen zur Schadensbeseitigung, 82 and Rummel (-Reischauer) ABGB II2, § 1325 no. 18). However, following more recent jurisprudence emerging from the Austrian courts on the issue of recovery of “fictive” repair costs in the context of damage to property, the decision of OGH 23 October 1987, SZ 70/220 (see further OGH 21 January 1993, ZVR 1994/22 p. 52) completed a jurisprudential shift in the context of the recovery of notional medical costs. If it is determined that the injured party has not undergone medical treatment, then it now follows that it does not have to be paid for (Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VI3, § 1325 nos. 12-13). By contrast, it appears that, today, it is still possible to claim for “notional” nursing costs. If a dependant cares for the injured party, then that carer can recover his or her actual expenditure as well as the costs that would have been incurred, had a professional carer been employed (OGH 25

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6.

7.

8.

9.

970

November 1992, 2 Ob 60/92; OGH 26 May 1999, ZVR 1999/109 p. 375; OGH 10 December 1999, ecolex 2000, 120; OGH 27 April 2006, 2 Ob 176/05d; critical Harrer loc. cit. no. 15; different approach OGH 10 September 1998, SZ 71/146). In PORTUGAL, it appears that this issue has not been discussed. It has been observed that the injured party may freely invest his award of compensation in anything that facilitates enjoyment of life or makes his life easier (e. g. Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral10, 602; Almeida Costa, Obrigações10, 599; Ribeiro de Faria, Direito das Obrigações I, 488). According to DUTCH CC art. 6:103, if requested by the claimant, the judge can award compensation in form other than a payment of a sum of money. If this result is not carried into effect within a reasonable time, then the injured party once again acquires the right to demand monetary compensation. Conversely, it is conceivable, that the (compensation) creditor may be guilty of contributory fault if he or she rejects the offer of reparation in kind or an offer to cover the costs of repair proffered by the injuring party (Schadevergoeding II (-Deurvorst), art. 6:103, nos. 7-11 pp. 25-35; Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12, nos. 410-411 pp. 330-332). Under ESTONIAN law the injured person is not required to spend compensation on the reinstatement of the damaged interest. In the NORDIC countries, the alternative method for evaluating property damage is guided by the cost of reparation (as opposed to the replacement cost), which is applied to less significant damages to property and based on the condition that the injured party keeps the property although an explicit requirement with regard to the spending of the damages does not exist. It should be noted, that the injured party may not elect the most advantageous method of calculating damages; this choice is made by the court having regard to the reasonableness of each method (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 415; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret6, 287; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 276). An issue both related to the principles of quantifying damages and the injured person’s right of election, is the value compensation method applied for property damage (see notes under Article 6:101). In that context the injured party’s intention to sell the property is to be disregarded (e. g. HD 7 May 1991, NJA 1991, 269). The notion of the injured person’s right of election is also to some extent interrelated with the question of whether a lump sum or periodical payment is awarded, as the latter delimits the injured person’s factual freedom to spend the compensation. Since damages under ENGLISH law means a monetary payment rather than reparation in kind, the question of an election can hardly arise: the claimant has no option but to take a monetary solatium and is thus left to decide for himself whether to expend it in or towards e. g. repair or replacement of damaged property. In awarding compensation for damage to goods English law proceeds on the basis that the costs of repair (which may form the yardstick for determining the reduction in the value of the goods: The London Corporation [1935] P 70) will be assessed at the point in time when it was reasonable in the circumstances for the claimant to have the goods repaired: Dodd Properties (Kent) Ltd. v. Canterbury City Council [1980] 1 WLR 433. This is unaffected by the fact that at the time of trial the repairs have not in fact been carried out: The Kingsway [1918] P 344. An action for such damages is not barred even if the repairs can never be carried out at all because the damaged goods are lost in the meantime: The York [1929] P 178, 184-185; The London Corporation, loc. cit.

Article 6:202: Reduction of liability

Article 6:202: Reduction of liability Where it is fair and reasonable to do so, a person may be relieved of liability to compensate, either wholly or in part, if, where the damage is not caused intentionally, liability in full would be disproportionate to the accountability of the person causing the damage or the extent of the damage or the means to prevent it.

Comments 1. A rule subject to policy debate. The reduction clause contained in this Article is a particular bone of contention in the Member States. Opinion is divided. The idea behind the reduction clause has as many resolute supporters as it has adversaries. It is rejected in systems which hold that the extent of damages should depend only on the extent of the damage suffered; it is supported in systems which hold that the basis of liability can also play a role in the assessment of the reparation to be made, where this appears to be fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the individual case. The Article follows the latter approach. 2. No reduction of liability where damage is intentionally inflicted. Where damage is intentionally inflicted, a reduction of liability under this Article is excluded. This is in line with the general convictions of all Member States’ legal systems. 3. Grounds for and prerequisites of a reduction of liability. In all remaining cases a policy decision is ultimately required between the two alternatives. The deciding ground for the solution chosen here is mentioned in the Article itself. Such abnormal discrepancies between the basis of liability and the extent of the damage may arise as to make it seem intolerable to let the liable person bear liability for the entire damage. There should therefore be an instrument available to allow a final check of the decision against general considerations of justice and fairness. This is mainly significant where a slight oversight or a technically negligent but morally unobjectionable act leads to damage, the reparation of which would disproportionately burden the injuring person, there being other possibilities for reparation open to the injured person. The rule can play a role in certain emergency situations requiring self-defence and it may also be the only way of achieving a reasonable result in cases coming under Chapter 3, Section 2 (Accountability without intention or negligence). Illustration 1 Children aged eight and nine are playing in the barn of a farm. They light a “campfire”; the entire premises are burnt down, after hay stored nearby caught fire and the children had fled in panic. The insurer, to whom the farmer’s claim in damages is assigned, sues the children personally, in order to be able to execute the judgment as soon as they (many years later) begin gainful activity. As long as the parents’ indemnity insurance does not have to step in, until their middle age the children would have no prospect of earning more money through personal initiative than the limit set for them that is free from whatever form of execution is used 971

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by the insurer. Their lives would be ruined before they have even begun. A reduction of the extent of their duty to render compensation is fair and reasonable. Illustration 2 A water pipe bursts in A’s apartment. As a result, a very valuable archive in B’s apartment (directly below A’s) is damaged. B had specifically insured the archive with his household insurance. The liability of A is to be reduced so that the discrepancy between the grounds of liability (A could not have discovered the fault and is thus liable only under Article 3:202 (Accountability for damage caused by the unsafe state of an immovable)) and the extraordinary risk of damage can be balanced out. 4. The reduction clause in the overall system of these model rules. The Article also helps usefully to reduce the distinctions between contractual and non-contractual liability. DCFR III. – 3:703 (Foreseeability) restricts the extent of damages for non-performance of a contractual obligation to the foreseeable loss of the other party. The law on non-contractual liability does not have a corresponding rule. The resulting differences are diminished, however, by Article 6:202, so that it becomes less significant whether certain conduct between contractual parties is at the same time to be qualified as a civil wrong giving rise to non-contractual liability. There is also a reduction clause in the rules on benevolent intervention (see PEL Ben.Int. Art. 2:103(2) (Obligations after intervention) and PEL Ben.Int. Art. 3:104 (Reduction or exclusion of intervener’s rights)) and it diminishes the importance of Article 7:105 (Reduction or exclusion of liability to indemnified persons), a provision, which, inter alia, refers to legal systems which provide that private persons are not liable for property damage caused through negligence in so far as the injured person is indemnified by an insurer. 5. Scope. The Article covers all non-intentionally caused damage. It is therefore applicable not only in the context of liability for negligence, but also in the context of strict liability. In this latter area the availability of such a reduction mechanism can be particularly important if reasonable solutions are to be possible. Illustration 3 While an aeroplane is landing, X’s messenger pigeons get caught in the air duct of the propellers. The owner of the aeroplane claims compensation from X, as the keeper of the pigeons, for the damage, which amounts to several hundred thousand Euros. It would be inequitable to allow X – who is not insured against such cases – to incur unlimited liability even for the portion of the damage remaining after the application of Article 5:102 (Contributory fault and accountability) paragraph (4). As long as X was not negligent, X’s liability is to be reduced to zero. 6. Extent of the reduction. Illustration 3 shows not only that in exceptional cases a reduction of liability to zero is possible under this Article, but also that the formulation “liability in full” means “reparation, so far as due”. In other words, even liability which has already been reduced for other reasons (such as contributory fault) can be reduced again under this Article.

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Notes 1.

2.

3.

4.

In FRANCE, the sole basis for determining the extent of the duty to compensate remains the damage sustained; the courts are not permitted to take the financial resources of the injuring party into account when it comes to assessing compensation (Cass.civ. 21 July 1982, Bull.civ. 1982, II, no. 109 p. 80). Moreover, the magnitude of faute and the personal circumstances of the injured party may also not be taken into consideration (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2006/2007), no. 2522). The same principle applies in BELGIUM. Tort liability law is so conceptualised in the Code Civil to entail that even a culpa levissima will serve to ground an obligation to compensate in full (Ronse (-de Wilde/Claeys/Mallems), Schade en schadeloosstelling I2, nos. 267-269 pp. 200-269). However, CC art. 1386bis contains an exception, according to which the court may reduce the extent of a mentally disabled person’s obligation to pay compensation, should equity and the circumstances of the case so require. Similarly, SPANISH law does not, it is said, permit the courts to reduce compensation on equitable grounds (Paz-Ares/Díez-Picazo/Bercovitz/Salvador (-Pantaleón), Código Civil II2, art. 1902, pp. 1971, 1998-1999). However, Criminal Liability of Minors Act (Ley Orgánica 5/2000, de responsabilidad penal de los menores) art. 61(3) in fine provides that, in the event that the individuals listed under a supervisory duty and are therefore, solidarily liable with the minor “have not promoted the conduct of the minor with intention or gross negligence, courts shall be able to moderate their liability according to the circumstances of the case”. This possibility to reduce liability is of major practical significance; liability is usually reduced by 50 % (e. g. CA Asturias 4 March 2005, BDA JUR 2005/90490; CA Badajoz 25 January 2005, Aranzadi Civil 2005 (1) no. 333 p. 741; CA Córdoba 20 February 2004, BDA JUR 2004/105382 [concerning a mother who had quit her job because of the drug addiction of her child and had tried to help him constantly]). Above all, the Supreme Court has conceded that CC art. 1103 (which allows damages to be adjusted in the event that a negligent breach of contract arises) permits liability to be reduced in the realm of extra-contractual liability (e. g. TS 13 October 1981, RAJ 1981 (2) no. 3734 p. 3018 and TS 20 June 1989, RAJ 1989 (4) no. p. 5438). Equidad is regarded as providing the rationale for an analogous application of CC art. 1103. This result, however, remains a bone of contention in legal commentary (Díaz Alabart, ADC 1988, 1133, 1222; Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, 234; TS 29 September 2005, RAJ 2005 (5) no. 7155 p. 15272). TS 20 April 1993, RAJ 1993 (2) no. 3103 p. 3975 concerned a water pipe which burst, in the process damaging an unusually valuable archive contained in the dwelling below. The owner of the archive received a pay-out under his house insurance; the insurer’s recourse claim against the tenant of the dwelling above who was responsible for the damage was reduced by a half. In ITALY, a functional equivalent to Article 6:202 can be seen, at most, where the court is conferred with a discretion to determine the extent of compensation (such as e. g. within the framework of CC arts. 2056 in conjunction with 1226 and 1227). However, note should be taken of Private Assurance Code (Codice delle Assicurazioni private) art. 140(1), according to which the claims of several injured parties against the motor insurer are to be reduced on a pro-rata basis if the claims exceed the amount insured. HUNGARIAN tort law, as a rule, adopts the principle of full compensation as its point of departure, but CC § 339(2) allows the court to reduce liability in exceptional cir-

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6.

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cumstances. This provision is confined to tort law, it is not a valid proposition for contract law (CC § 318(1)). According to CC § 339(2), the court can partly relieve the person responsible for the causing the damage “from liability” on equitable grounds in extraordinary circumstances. According to prevailing legal opinion, the extent of compensation is reduced (Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 73 et seq.). The Code fails to particularise the exact grounds permitting a reduction of liability, instead leaves this to the discretion of the judge. The courts take account of the wrongdoer’s financial position, the degree of fault and other relevant personal factors (Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 83 et seq.). It is not possible to reduce liability to nil (Gellért (-Kemenes), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1223; Petrik loc. cit. 84); liability cannot be reduced where a wrong is intentionally committed (Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért, 168 et seq.; cf. also Petrik loc. cit. 85). However, in practice, CC § 339(2) is rarely cited (Petrik (-Harmathy), Polgári jog II2, 575). Instead, the courts avail of the provisions governing contributory fault and by this, achieve the same result (Ujváriné loc. cit. 74 et seq.). Generally, it is possible that CC §§ 340(1) and 339(2) may be cumulatively applied (Ujváriné loc. cit.). Under the proposed reform of the Hungarian Civil Code, it is submitted that this damages adjustment clause should be retained with some modifications (http://www.parlament.hu/irom38/05949/05949.pdf) Similarly, SLOVENIAN LOA § 170 allows an exception to be made to the principle of full compensation on equitable grounds. In particular, this comes to the fore if the injuring party is guilty of simple negligence and only has meagre funds at his or her disposal (LOA § 170(1)) or if the injuring party wanted to actually do something beneficial for the injured party and in this way observed a standard of care which he would have observed had he been dealing with his own affairs (diligentia quam in suis), and did not act in a grossly negligent manner (LOA § 170(2)). BULGARIAN law does not contain an independent provision permitting an adjustment of liability. A possible reduction of liability on the grounds of equity and fairness therefore only comes to the fore where, at the outset, the measure of compensation was determined by the courts on equitable grounds, as in the case of reparation for noneconomic loss under LOA art. 52. For example, under this provision a wife will not be able to obtain compensation for non-pecuniary loss in the event that at the time of his death, she no longer had either marital relations or an emotional connection with her husband who died in a car accident (Supreme Court 15 November 1979, decision no. 1235, criminal case no. 1125/79). ROMANIAN law also does not feature a provision equivalent to Art des Article 6:202. The financial resources of the parties concerned has no influence on the measure of compensation (Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘, 242, 341, 347). Similarly, under GERMAN law, the principle of full compensation applies; even in cases of the slightest degree of negligence, the injuring party is obliged to make reparation in full. The principle also applies in the event that the obligation to pay compensation would clearly overextend the financial resources of the injuring party (Palandt (-Heinrichs) BGB67, Pref. to § 249, no. 5). Under CC § 828, only children under 10 in cases involving motor vehicle or train accidents, are, as a rule, exempt from liability (exception: intention). In essence, only the rules on contributory fault operate to extenuate the impact of the premise “everything or nothing” which is inherent in the principle of full compensation (CC § 254); there was a conscious decision not to adopt a provision permitting damages to be adjusted (Medicus, Schuldrecht I17, no. 585). Generally the

Article 6:202: Reduction of liability

7.

8.

9.

compensation that can be obtained under strict liability provisions is fixed by statute (e. g. ProdHG § 10, StVG § 12, UmweltHG § 15). In AUSTRIA, the extent of liability depends on the degree of fault. Whereas in case of simple negligence only “positive damage” (the economic loss that has actually occurred) may be recovered, in cases of intent and gross negligence, the injuring party must also compensate loss of profits. Additionally, note must be taken of provisions in supplementary statutes, providing for a reduction of liability in cases where the degree of fault is slight or very slight (e. g. DHG § 2, ForstG § 176, KMG § 11). From this, it follows in the reverse that there is, as yet, no general damages adjustment clause in Austrian law (critical on this point Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 6/24). The examples mentioned in the comments to Article 2:202 are nonetheless the subject matter of special rules, see for example, under CC § 1306a (emergency; liability may be reduced to nill) and under CC § 1307 (pertaining to the liability of minors). The liability of children who have yet to reach the age of 14 remains governed by the subsidiary liability based on equity and fairness under CC § 1310 (see further OGH 1 December 1927, SZ 9/ 257; CA Vienna 3 December 1996, ZVR 1998, 68 p. 166; OGH 9 July 1996, SZ 69/156 and OGH 30 March 1999, SZ 72/59 [affirmed that it was permissible to take account of the existence of liability insurance policy when determining liability based on equity and fairness]). Equitable considerations may also feature at the assessment of damages stage (CC § 1325; Koziol loc. cit. no. 11/24). The notion that the financial resources of the injuring party may justify a reduction in liability is the rationale behind strict liability provisions which limit liability to a predetermined amount (e. g. RHG § 7; EKHG §§ 15 and 16; AtomHG §§ 15 and 29). This system which is perceived as inflexible is due for reform; the proposal for reform envisage an expansion of CC § 1317 to include a reduction clause. GREECE adheres to the principle of full reparation; the injuring party is obliged to compensate damage in full, irrespective of the degree of fault (Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio, Geniko meros, 151; A. P. 698/1992, EllDik 35 [1994] 1503). An “all or nothing” principle applies (Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio A(1)2, 515). The Greek Civil Code has not adopted a rule permitting the judge to assess the quantum of compensation according to the circumstances of the case, in particular by taking account of the the degree of fault, or to reduce the amount of compensation recoverable (Stathopoulos loc. cit.). Exceptions to the rule of full compensation are encountered only in special statutes providing for strict liability, where the extent of liability is fixed to a predetermined amount, and in those provisions which stipulate that an “equitable” compensation must be paid (e. g. CC art. 286 [causing damage in a situation of emergency] and CC art. 918 [liability of person not deemed to possess tortious capacity in equity]). According to PORTUGUESE CC art. 494, the duty to compensate may, on equitable grounds, be reduced to an amount lower than that which would have been necessary to make full reparation for the damage caused. The foregoing amounts to an exception to teoria da diferença in the law of damages which is based on CC art. 566 (Almeida Costa, Obrigações10, 779; STJ 19 February 2004; STJ 17 January 2007). Liability may only be reduced in cases of negligence (negligência or. mera culpa), not in cases of intent (critical, on these grounds CA Evora 13 March 1986, BolMinJus 357 [1986] 512); the slighter the degree of negligence, the more probable the reduction in liability (Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, note 2 to art. 494, p. 497; STJ 19 November 2002). The factors relevant in the equitable assessment were deliberately not enumer-

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10.

11.

976

ated in statute (Galvão Telles, Obrigações7, 211, fn. 1). Legal writing and the courts consider that, in conjunction with the degree of fault, above all the financial positions of the injured and injuring party to be relevant (Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela loc. cit.; Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 913; STJ 5 July 2007; STJ 8 March 2007). CA Lisbon 6 May 1999, CJ XXIV [1999-3] 88 reduced to half the compensation owed by the driver and owner of a personal watercraft (“JetSki”) due to the fact that they were both minors and students without personal income. According to contemporary prevailing legal opinion, CC art. 494 can also be applied within the framework of the responsabilidade pelo risco (Almeida Costa loc. cit. 780; Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela loc. cit.; Antunes Varela loc. cit. 914; STJ 4 April 2002; STJ 21 March 2000, CJ(ST) VIII [2000-1] 138; the courts held a different view up until CA Lisbon 16 February 1979, CJ IV [1979-1] 163). DUTCH CC art. 6:109(1) provides that the judge can reduce the legal duty to pay compensation if imposing full liability in the circumstances, would lead to unacceptable results. Factors taken account of include, inter alia the nature of liability, the legal relationship existing between the parties and their ability to pay compensation. This reduction in amount may not be less than the amount that is covered by the debtor’s insurance or should have been covered (CC art. 6:109(2)). Generally, the presence of intention or gross negligence preclude the applicability of the clause permitting the extent of liability to be reduced (Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 404 and 452; Asser (-Hartkamp) Verbintenissenrecht I12, no. 498 p. 459). The type of damage caused is also of relevance: CC art. 6:109(1) is employed far less in cases of bodily injury than in cases of property damage (Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 450; Hartkamp loc. cit. no. 499 p. 460). ESTONIAN LOA § 140(1) contains a similar provision. In the NORDIC countries particular regimes on the reduction of liability exist. They are based on considerations of equity, channelling of liability, and the injured party’s interest in full compensation. However, special circumstances are required for applying these regimes; their relevance in practice should not be overestimated. In all the Nordic countries, the extent of children’s and mentally incompetent persons’ liability is assessed under separate heads of the respective Damages Liability Acts (see the notes under Article 3:103 (Persons under eighteen) and Article 5:301 (Mental incompetence)). The general rule on reduction of liability in SWEDISH Damages Liability Act chap. 6 § 2 requires that the liability is unreasonably burdensome with regard to the tortfeasor’s economic situation; however, the injured party’s need to receive compensation and other circumstances are also taken into consideration (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 425; Bengtsson, Om jämkning av skadestånd, 231). If liability is covered by a liability insurance reduction generally does not come into play. The same applies to a tortfeasor who has omitted to obtain appropriately available liability insurance, although this shall only apply with regard to legal persons. The ‘deep pockets’ of the injured party may not per se render reduction. A poor economic situation of the injured party may on the other hand encumber a reduction even if liability would be burdensome for the tortfeasor. Another factor which may be taken into account is the degree of the tortfeasor’s fault. Damage caused intentionally shall only be reduced in exceptional circumstances (e. g. HD 3 April 1986, NJA 1986, 193 and HD 16 December 1993, NJA 1993, 727 [young offenders]; HD 21 April 1987, NJA 1987, 376; HD 25 November 1992, NJA 1992, 660; see generally Kleineman, JT 1993-94, 789). It has been submitted that the protective purpose of strict liability as a rule militates against permitting a reduction

Article 6:203: Capitalisation and quantification

12.

in liability, but that a reduction may take place in exceptional cases (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 426; Bengtsson loc. cit. 285). Similarly, DANISH EAL § 24 focusses on the financial resources of the parties responsible which also entails examining whether liability insurance was extant. Factors taken into consideration include, the seriousness of fault, the extent of the damage and the injured party’s interest in obtaining indemnification. The courts will only reduce liability where equity so requires (von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret6, 415). Where damage has been inflicted intentionally, even through criminal conduct, reduction may in exceptional cases take place with regard to humanitarian and social concerns (HD 2 April 1996, UfR 1996, 862). Legal persons hardly ever benefit from a reduction in liability (Western CA 9 September 2004, FED 2004, 1804; HD 16 August 2005, UfR 2005, 3151). FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 2 § 1 adheres to the same principle (Saxén, Skadestånd vid avtalsbrott, 245; ibid., Skadeståndsrätt, 162). In the context of intentional acts, it is expressly provided that a reduction in liability may only take place where such a result is necessitated by the dictates of equity; as a result, such a claim is generally rebuffed by the courts (e. g. Supreme Court 19 June 1985, KKO 1985 II 101 and Supreme Court 18 March 1999, KKO 1999:41). ENGLISH law does not provide for any general power for a court to reduce liability on equitable grounds. Such a power could well be seen as tending to undermine the predictability of awards of damages the desire for which has underpinned, for example, the judicial adherence to a de facto ‘tariff’ system for assessing non-pecuniary loss: cf. Clerk and Lindsell (-Burrows), Torts19, 29-06. The approach of the common law is to some extent the reverse in that particular factors such as the intentional nature of the tort may operate to enhance the quantum of compensation. This is seen in awards of aggravated damages, which may be ordered to compensate for mental distress where the manner in which or the motives with which the defendant committed the tort or how the defendant behaved afterwards was such as to injure the claimant’s feelings of dignity and pride: for details, see Law Commission, Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages (1997) Law Com Rep 247, Part II. The same point applies of course in so far as exemplary (or punitive) damages may be awarded.

Illustration 1 is similar to BGH 28 February 1984, NJW 1984, 1958; illustration 2 from TS 20 April 1993, RAJ 1993 (2) no. 3103 p. 3975, and illustration 3 from CA Hamm 11 February 2004, NJW 2004, 2246, note Pfab, VersR 2006, 894.

Article 6:203: Capitalisation and quantification (1) Compensation is to be awarded as a lump sum unless a good reason requires periodical payment. (2) National law determines how compensation for personal injury and non-economic loss is to be quantified.

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Comments 1. The Article in overview. This Article relates to two different issues. Paragraph (1) provides that damages are in principle to be paid as a lump sum. Payment in the form of an annuity is to be exceptional and is to require special grounds. Paragraph (2) clarifies that this Book does not deal with the actual quantification of monetary damages in the case of personal injury and non-economic loss: that is left to national laws. 2. Paragraph (1). Monetary damages have as their purpose the restoration of the circumstances which would have prevailed if the event causing the damage had not occurred. In the normal case, viewed statistically, this purpose is best served by the payment of damages in the form of a lump sum. This has the beneficial side-effect that no protracted legal relationship persists between the injuring person and the injured person, during which new difficulties arising could be used as a reason for new conflicts and further court proceedings. In the case of property damage and damage to other assets there is therefore practically no alternative to the payment of damages by way of a lump sum. This is also true for damages for the reparation of lost profit, or losses flowing from a misguided investment and a decrease in turnover. 3. Good reason. The situation is different in the case of death or personal injury. In cases of this kind every European legal system provides for the possibility of ordering the liable person to make recurring periodic payments; most systems even prefer annuity payments as the general rule in this type of case and therefore require a good reason for ordering payment of a one-off lump sum. Apart from tax aspects, which can sometimes play a role, the main consideration in favour of granting annuity payments is that in cases of death or personal injury they are better suited to ensuring (as far as possible) the maintenance of the quality of life enjoyed before the accident. This is because a lump sum can often not protect against the danger of future underprovision; money is fleeting and is subject to the risk of inflation. Furthermore, the damage to be made good is often the loss of a regular periodic income and precisely this loss is then to be compensated for under the general rules of Article 6:101 (Aim and forms of reparation) paragraph (1). This is particularly apparent where the damage in question is the death or disabling injury of a person who provided the claimant with maintenance, see Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death) paragraph (2) (c). The question whether there is a good reason for ordering the wrongdoer to make periodic payments is decided by the court; to this extent it does not depend on an agreement of the parties. Of course they are always free to contractually agree on the amount of damages and methods of payment. 4. Heads of compensation. The payment of an annuity may be useful not only for the compensation of economic damage. In the case of severe personal injury this mode of reparation may also be appropriate in relation to continuous non-economic losses. A combination of both types of damages is possible, e. g. a basic lump sum and subsequent annuity payments. The duration of periodic payments is geared according to the extent of the damage suffered; the frequency (usually every month) is set by the court. Conversely, in the case of an infringement of incorporeal patrimonial rights there will only rarely be a good reason for not using a lump sum. 978

Article 6:203: Capitalisation and quantification

5. Procedural issues. This Article does not deal with questions of a procedural nature. In particular, it does not deal with the issue of whether a non-contractual claim in damages must be litigated once and for all or whether, in the interests of minimising the risk associated with bringing proceedings, a claimant is permitted to claim only a partial amount of the entire damage and then claim the rest before the court when the preceding action has been won. 6. Paragraph (2). This Book also makes no statement on the issue of whether in the case of personal injury fixed sums of money are to be set as reparation for individual injuries (e. g. for the loss of one’s right arm) or disadvantages (e. g. for each day which the injured person had to spend in bed) or whether in these cases an individual quantification of the monetary compensation is to be carried out. This Book likewise refrains from addressing the problem of whether for the case of the infringement of non-economic personal rights, a minimum monetary sum for the reparation of the non-economic damage is to be set (see, however, comments under Article 6:204 (Compensation for injury as such)). It also abstains from proposing an approach to the very variable high sums of money awarded for the compensation of non-economic loss. It seemed just as impossible to submit precise proposals for the quantification (in table form) of compensation of biological damage (see Article 6:204 (Compensation for injury as such)). The question of whether such tables of damages are desired at all was not discussed. They are established practice in many countries, in some even statutorily set out; by contrast, in others they are strictly rejected. Even if an understanding had been achieved on such tables for certain issues, the specification of figures would have been impossible. Paragraph (2) of the present Article also counts compensation for bereavement among non-economic losses. The basic decision of this Book not to make provision for punitive damages remains untouched by this rule.

Notes 1.

Under FRENCH law, compensation can take the form of a lump sum (capital) or be awarded in the form of a recurring periodical payment (rente). The courts of first instance are conferred with a discretion with respect to this and, in this regard, are not bound to defer to the claimant’s request (Cass.crim. 19 June 1996, GazPal 1996, Chron. de droit criminel, 190 [lifetime annuity, although the claimant had requested that compensation be partly paid in the form of a lump sum]). The measure of compensation is not affected by the modalities of payment. An award of a rente may not exceed the lump sum payment that the claimant would have received (Cass.civ. 3 February 1960, Bull.civ. 1960, II, no. 89 p. 58), furthermore the measure of compensation may not be reduced because a lump sum compensation payment is awarded (Cass.civ. 20 December 1966, D. 1967, 669, note Le Roy). The quantification of damages for non-economic loss resulting from bodily injury is accorded great significance. This is because the social security institutions and other tiers payeurs cannot exercise a right of recourse in respect of this element of reparation; irrespective of any possible payments made by the social insurer, the victim alone is entitled to receive compensation for dommages moraux (Viney and Jourdain, Les effets de la responsabilité2, no. 142 p. 259). Essentially, it concerns compensation for souffrances physiques et morales, for préjudice esthétique and for

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2.

3.

980

préjudice d’agrément. In order to determine the level of the award, the courts, without mentioning this expressly (on the grounds of CC art. 5) often have recourse to tables which appear in special publications on an on-going basis. Of course, the courts are not bound by these tables (see further le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2006/2007), no. 2516). In order to quantify the préjudice d’agrément (definition found in Cass.ass.plén. 19 December 2003, Bull.ass.plén. 2003, no. 8 p. 21) the courts routinely ascribe a certain monetary sum to each degree of permanent incapacity which is expressed in percentage terms, which, in turn, derives from the jurisprudence of the court having jurisdiction over the case or case law from a group of courts (Le Roy, L’évaluation du préjudice corporel17, nos. 136-1–142 pp. 52-54). The monetary value allotted to such a percentage can vary according to the age of the injured party and the severity of his or her incapacity; the younger the victim and the greater the incapacity, the greater the amount allocated to that percentage value (Le Roy loc. cit. 67 with actual examples of quantification of damages). As regards the classification of souffrances physiques et morales a table featuring a scale of seven classes of damage (ranging from very slight to very serious) developed by Thierry is mostly followed (cf. Viney and Jourdain loc. cit. no. 148 pp. 273-275). The extent of compensation awarded per damage class can vary extensively from court to court (Le Roy loc. cit. no. 148 p. 60). In the context of an assessment of damages for préjudice esthétique, in conjunction with the severity of the deformation, the courts take account of the victim’s sex, age, marital status and occupation. An award of damages can lie anywhere between J 500 and tens of thousands of euro (Le Roy loc. cit. nos. 149-151 p. 61). This disparity termed loterie judiciaire has been strongly criticised in legal scholarship (Viney and Jourdain loc. cit. no. 152 p. 279). Similarly, in BELGIUM, the courts are at liberty to decide between an award in the form of a capital sum or an award of periodical payments; the courts are not bound by the claim filed by the plaintiff: they can also decide that the sum should be divided into two parts, namely party lump sum, part periodic payment (Ronse (-de Wilde/Claeys/Mallems), Schade en schadeloosstelling I2, no. 313 p. 225). As a rule, a capital sum is awarded (Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2), no. 97 p. 184). For the first time, in 1995, the indicatieve tabel of the Working Group of the Union nationale des magistrats de première instance and the Union royale des juges de paix et de police were published. Since then, they have been reissued and updated on a regular basis. These tables contain guidelines and fixed sums for the assessment of damages. As well as the variant manisfestations of property damage, these tables primarily concern economic and non-economic damage as a consequence of bodily injury (including the loss suffered by dependants). Despite garnering (not inconsiderable) criticism in academic literature, these tables have acquired great significance in judicial and extra judicial practice dealing with the meting out of compensation (see Van den Bossche, NjW 2004, 615 no. 2). Insurance companies are said to decide 90 % of all of the cases involving compensation that don’t make it to court on the basis of these tables (Van den Bossche loc. cit. 621 no. 25). The guiding principle that the judge is conferred with a discretion to decide the nature and extent of compensation is also recognised in SPAIN (cases which fall under the Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act [Texto Refundido de la Ley sobre Responsabilidad Civil y Seguro en la Circulación de Vehículos de Motor]) (e. g. TS 22 April 1983, RAJ 1983 (1) no. 2118 p. 1613; TS 10 July 1987, RAJ 1987 (3) no. 5318 p. 5079).

Article 6:203: Capitalisation and quantification

4.

5.

Although Spanish courts award usually a lump sum (indemnización a tanto alzado or capital) the award of periodical payments (rentas periódicas) is, particularly in cases of permanent personal injuries, also common court practice. A life annuity (renta vitalicia) is regarded as an efficient remedy to assess certain damages (Pintos Ager, Baremos, seguros y derecho de daños, 193) and may therefore be awarded instead of a lump sump (TS 5 June 1997, RAJ 1997 (4) no. 5945 p. 9184; Medina Crespo, La valoración civil del daño corporal III(1), 283). Even though courts were initially reluctant to award periodical payments (see e. g. TS 2 February 1980, RAJ (1) 1980 no. 743 p. 579; TS 13 June 1984, RAJ 1984 (2) no. 4374 p. 3365; TS 28 April 1989, RAJ 1989 (3) no. 3567 p. 4025), this technique has been increasingly applied by courts and has been explicitly acknowledged both (i) within the scope of liability of legal persons subject to public law (General Regime of Public Administrations Act [Ley de Régimen Jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas y Procedimiento Administrativo Común] art. 141(4) and (ii) within the scope of damage arising out of traffic liability (Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act [Ley de responsabilidad civil y seguro en la circulación de vehículos a motor] Annex point 8). Courts may even award a life annuity when the plaintiff claims a lump sum (TS 5 June 1997 loc. cit.; TS 17 March 1998, RAJ 1998 (1) no. 1122 p. 1773; contra CA Castelló 1 March 2005, BDA JUR 2005/131696 and CA Castelló 8 February 2005, BDA JUR 2005/118706). According to ITALIAN CC arts. 2056 and 1226, damage, the extent of which cannot be definitively ascertained, is determined by the court on an equitable basis. Under CC art. 2057, in the context of compensation for permanent bodily injury, the courts, having regard to the conditions of the parties and the nature of the injury, may ordain the payment of a life annuity. The matter of the quantum of compensation for personal injury, in particular danno biologico, is left solely to the judge’s discretion, but a practice has developed whereby the courts tend to resort to indicative tables to assist them to quantify the level of damages. The values contained in these tables are based on the average compensatory sums which are awarded in court decisions of precedential value in instances involving archetypal consequences of injury. However, the courts are not bound by these tables. Personal injury compensation claims deriving from traffic accident are governed by Private Assurance Code (Codice delle assicurazioni private) arts. 137-139, which provide that special tables are to be devised for this area. Similarly in HUNGARY, compensation may either take the form of a lump sum or a recurring periodical payment. In particular, an annuity may be awarded in cases concerning claims for loss of support or claims for supplementary assistance (CC § 355(3)) and therefore in the context of death, bodily injury and injury to health (Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 190 et seq.; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 238 et seq.). The courts also award an annuity in order to compensate the permanent special needs of the victim (Petrik loc. cit. 236 f; Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1355). The courts are not bound by the request filed by the victim; the decision regarding the form of the award, is left to the discretion of the court. The payment of an annuity to compensate a victim of an accident for his or her restricted ability to work is regulated in CC §§ 356357 is directed at compensating loss of earnings. CC § 358 governs a dependent’s claim for an annuity payment following the death of the bread-winner in an accident. Moreover, compensation for non-pecuniary loss can take the form of an annuity payment (for an overview of case law, see Lábady, A nem vagyoni kártérítés újabb bírói gyakorlata, 201-212, 229-234). The cases affected are primarily those involving a very young victim

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6.

7.

982

or where the future medical prospects are inconclusive. Nowadays, it is possible to award a settlement that combines a lump sum award and periodical payments (Lábady loc. cit. 67 et seq.; Ujváriné loc. cit. 218 et seq.; Benedek loc. cit. 1334 et seq., 1356). Alimony, life annuities and accident compensation must be paid in advance (CC § 280(3)). The Code is silent as regards the quantification of compensation for non-pecuniary loss; CC § 355(1) and (4) merely make clear that such loss is, in principle, recoverable. The determination of the measure of compensation is left to the discretion of the court (see Herpai, VersRAI 2005, 43, 45-46) (Bárdos, Kárfelelo˝sség a Polgári Törvénykönyv rendszerében, 43 et seq.; Petrik (-Köles), Polgári jog II2, 634/2; Benedek loc. cit. 1333). Generally, the courts may not resort to actuarial tables. Legal practitioners seek direction from previous court cases, in particular relying on those cases handed down by the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the awards vary greatly; overall, the awards seem to be keeping in line with society that is becoming increasingly prosperous (Lábady loc. cit. 63 et seq., only with citations up to 1992). BULGARIAN LOA art. 51(1)(second sentence) expressly provides that compensation may take the form of as a once off capital sum or that of a periodical sum. Annuities generally come to the fore in cases where the main bread-winner dies or in cases of loss of capacity to work (Kojucharov, Obligazionno pravo I, 292). The court can adjust the amount at a later stage to take account of medical developments and any other effects that the disability has on the ability to work; the legal validity of previous decisions does not hinder the handing down of this adjustment judgment (LOA art. 51(3)). In all essential terms the legal position in ROMANIA is similar (Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘, 263-264, 346 with citations from case law). If there is a possibility that the injured party may leave the jurisdiction or otherwise evade his obligation to pay, he will be ordered to make a capital payment; annuities may also be unsuitable because of the risk of inflation (Lupan loc. cit. 265). The point of departure of GERMAN CC §§ 249 et seq. is that compensation usually takes the form of an award of a lump sum; an annuity payment is only awarded in exceptional cases (RG 27 May 1908, RGZ 68, 429, 431; Erman (-Schiemann), BGB II12, § 843 no. 1; Soergel (-Beater), BGB13, § 843 no. 1; Staudinger (-Vieweg), BGB13 [2007], § 843 no. 2). CC § 843(1) accommodates such an exception: in the event that, as a consequence of bodily injury or injury to health, capacity to work is impaired or there are increased needs, then in these cases an annuity must generally be paid unless cogent grounds justify the award of a capital sum (CC § 843(3)). CC § 843 is germane to cases involving permanent injury; once-off outlays, especially medical expenses, are governed by the general regime anchored in CC §§ 249 and following provisions (Beater loc. cit.; Vieweg loc. cit. nos. 4 and 9). However, within the framework dedicated to governance of permanent injury, an even more precise distinction must be drawn between permanent and constant increased needs (CC § 843) and once -off expenditure (CC §§ 249, 251) (BGH 12 July 2005, NJW 2006, 1271, 1273). The rationale behind the award of an annuity is to relieve the injured party of the burden of adducing and proving that the expenditure incurred was necessary; moreover, the reasoning is that the claimant should not have to pay the necessary expenditure in advance out of his of her own pocket (RG 11 June 1936, RGZ 151, 298, 302; Beater loc. cit.). An array of supplementary statutes contain corresponding rules or refer to CC § 843 (HaftPflG § 8; ProdHG § 9; StVG § 13; UmweltHG § 14).

Article 6:203: Capitalisation and quantification

8.

9.

10.

The AUSTRIAN CC is silent on the modes of reparation. While the payment of compensation in the form of an annuity is recognised, it is confined to exceptional cases and can have disadvantageous tax repercussions for the injured party (Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VI3, § 1325 no. 94). Damages for pain and suffering are chiefly awarded in the form of a lump sum which is designed to compensate the entire non-economic loss sustained (OGH 20 January 1977, ZVR 1977/169 p. 210; OGH 27 February 1979, ZVR 1980/159 p. 159; Harrer loc. cit. no. 87). Periodic payments geared towards compensatig non-economic loss are only awarded where cogent grounds are established justifying such an award, for example, in cases of grave personal injury with severe (or not compeletely negligible) permanent consequences (OGH 21 November 1968, SZ 41/159; OGH 20 January 1977 and 27 February 1979 loc. cit.; OGH 10 September 1985, ZVR 1986/50 p. 141; OGH 11 June 1987, ZVR 1988/66 p. 142; OGH 8 August 2002, ZVR 2002/95 p. 385) or in cases where it is foreseeable that the injured party will be afflicted by considerable bodily pain or psychiatric illness for the duration of his life (OGH 13 March 1976, JBl 1976, 539; OGH 8 August 2002 loc. cit.). furthermore, annuity payments are awarded in cases of disfigurement (CC § 1326) and in order to compensate loss of earnings (CC § 1325; see OGH 21 November 1974, ZVR 1975/198 p. 277); in cases of this kind, a lump sum will only be awarded if a good reason exists justifying such an award (OGH 26 January 1988, ZVR 1989/107 p. 179: award of a lump sum in order to restructure an agricultural enterprise) and, taking account of his or her financial resources, it is reasonable to require the wrongdoer to pay a lump sum (OGH 26 April 1973, SZ 46/45). It is said that an “abstract annuity” arises where the de facto reduction in income has not yet occurred but will probably materialise in the future and is awarded in order to make it possible for the injured party to put funds aside to buffer a future loss of employment (OGH 21 November 1968 loc. cit.; OGH 5 June 2002, JBl 2003, 242). Similarly, compensation for loss of maintenance of dependants deriving from the death of the main breadwinner, principally takes the form of an annuity payment (CC § 1327; for an exceptional case, see CA Linz 11 January 2002, ZVR 2002/68 p. 274). In GREECE, compensation for non-pecuniary loss is statutorily fixed to at least the amount stipulated in a number of supplementary statutes (for a case involving unlawful junk mail, see, e. g. CFI Piräus 2061/2005, NoB 53 [2005] 1469 on Act 2472/1997 art. 23: Minimum liability to the extent of 2 Mio Drachma). Similarly, in PORTUGAL compensation is, as a rule, to be awarded as a lump sum. However, according to CC art. 567(1), if requested by the claimant, the court may choose to grant a periodic payment, either entirely or in combination with a capital sum, in order to compensate permanent physical injury and the consequent heightened needs of the injured party; in this case, the court must make the necessary arrangements in order to guarantee the payment. The extent of the annuity is determined by the court freely exercising their discretion; this does not alter the fact that life annuity payments are often calculated by adverting to acturial tables which take account of inflation (CA Lisbon 5 July 2001, CJ XXVI [2001-4] 76 and 77; STJ 12 September 2006; STJ 3 June 2003; STJ 8 March 2005; STJ 20 June 2006). CC art. 567(1) governs immediate and future damage including loss of profits (CA Lisbon 5 July 2001 loc. cit.); in an individual case, it is possible for an award to combine an annuity payment and payment in the form of a capital sum (Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, note to art. 567, p. 585). Similarly, loss incurred by dependants can be compensated by the award of an annuity payment, this will occur in particular where minors are concerned

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11.

12.

984

(STJ 20 June 2006). An annuity payment will only be awarded if a request to that effect is made by the claimant;the court is not conferred with a discretion in this regard (STJ 6 July 1971, BolMinJus 209 [1971] 102; critical Vaz Serra, RLJ 105 [1972] 154). Subsequently, each party can return to court to seek adjustment of the award if their situations change substantially (CC art. 567(2)); this possibility is precluded in the case of claims for reparation of non-economic loss (CA Lisbon 5 July 2001 loc. cit.). According to DUTCH CC art. 6:97, the judge assesses damage in the manner most compatible with its nature; if the extent of damage cannot be precisely ascertained then it will be estimated. The court is also given a discretion in this regard unless either there is an upper ceiling placed on the award of damages (e. g. CC art. 6:110) or a statute sets the relevant parameters. There are no rules governing the capitalisation of an award of damages; the decision lies with the court (Schadevergoeding I (-Lindenbergh), art. 6:97, nos. 19-20 pp. 99-144, no. 2728 pp. 147-158; Spier/Hartlief/Van Maanen/ Vriesendorp, Verbintenissen uit de wet en Schadevergoeding (-Hartlief)2, nos. 206211 pp. 195-201). By contrast, a corresponding regulation to Article 6:203(1) is found in the ESTONIAN LOA § 136(1). Compensation by periodical payment is further regulated by LOA § 136(2)–(4). Compensation for bodily injury is regulated by LOA §§ 130 and 134(3). The special conditions for compensation for non-economic loss are set out in LOA § 134. Each year, DENMARK fixes the level of reparation that can be awarded for non-pecuniary loss (EAL §§ 3 and 15). The is also the case with regard to compensation for permanent disability, loss of ability to work and compensation of the loss suffered by surviving dependants (EAL §§ 4, 7, 13-15; see further Møller and Wiisbye, Erstatningsansvarsloven6, 333). In SWEDEN, the quantum of damages for pain and suffering is set at a fixed amount; the Supreme Court approved the adoption of the Traffic Accident Compensation Board (trafikskadenämnden) tables as a guide (HD 3 March 1972, NJA 1972, 81). However, it is possible to depart from these tables in special circumstances and in these types of cases, the court is conferred with a discretion to determine the level of compensation (HD 14 June 2000, NJA 2000, 278; HD 4 April 1990, NJA 1990, 186; Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 185). Tables issued by the Traffic Accident Compensation Board are also relevant for assessing compensation for permanent disability (lyte eller annat stadigvarande men). The indexes listed in these tables are structured along a sliding scale; a percentage of invalidity is allocated a corresponding monetary amount; the greater the disability and the younger the victim is, the higher the level of compensation (see further Bengtsson and Strömbäck loc. cit. 197). In FINLAND, the recovery of compensation for non-economic loss is assessed on an individual basis; particular account is had to the severity of the injury and the wrongdoer’s degree of fault (Supreme Court 5 July 1994, HD 1994:62; Supreme Court 10 October 1980, HD 1980 II 98). As far as the form the compensation payment is to take (capital sum or annuity) it has been asserted that the award of a capital sum is the preferred solution, because the injured party is then completely free to use the award as he sees fit and it ensures that the wrongdoer’s future insolvency will not affect the injured party; moreover, another advantage is that an award of a capital sum creates less administrative costs. The advantage of an annuity payment lies in the fact that it ensures that the injured party has a regular income. Swedish Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 4 confers a wide discretion on the courts: “Reparation for future loss of future earnings or loss of maintenance is awarded in the form of a life time annuity or in the form of a capital sum

Article 6:203: Capitalisation and quantification

13.

or a combination of both. If the reparation is of major importance for the continuous maintenance of the injured party, a lifetime annuity will be awarded unless particular circumstances dictate that another result should be reached. The award of an annuity for life can be converted into a capital sum, either entirely or in part, if cogent reasons exist for such a conversion”. However, the parties are free to reach an agreement on this issue (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 386; Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen2, 262). Essentially, Finnish Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 7 follows the rules. In Denmark, however, compensation is always awarded in lump sums. Annuity payments are regarded as too complex and uncertain, the injured party may retain the economic value of the capital sum by careful investment; in this regard, he or she does not depend on the injuring party (von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret6, 423). In ENGLAND, while damages are generally awarded in the form of a lump sum, a departure from this principle may be made under the (extended) scheme (introduced by the Damages Act 1996, s. 2, but amended and thus enlarged by the Courts Act 2003, s. 100) for the award of (reviewable) periodical payments in an action for personal injury (building on experience with out-of-court “structured settlements”). A court awarding damages for future pecuniary loss may order that damages are wholly or partly to take the form of periodical payments and must consider making such an order: see the Damages Act 1996, s. 2(1) as substituted by the Courts Act 2003, s. 100(1). Other damages in respect of personal injury may take the form of periodical payments if the court so orders and the parties consent: Damages Act 1996, s. 2(2) as substituted by the Courts Act 2003, s. 100(1). Periodical payments may not be ordered unless the court is satisfied that the continuity of payment is reasonably secure as provided for by the Act: Damages Act 1996, s. 2(3) as substituted by the Courts Act 2003, s. 100(1). An award or settlement providing for periodical payments may include provision that it is subject to review by the courts in the future: Damages Act 1996, ss. 2(5) and 2B, as inserted by the Courts Act 2003, s. 100(1). Furthermore, if claimed, a court may award provisional damages for personal injuries if it is proved or admitted that at some future time the injured person may develop some serious disease or suffer some serious deterioration in his physical or mental condition as a result of the act or omission giving rise to the cause of action: see the Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 32A (inserted by inserted by Administration of Justice Act 1982, s. 6(1)), County Courts Act 1984, s. 51, and the Civil Procedure Rules, Part 41. Damages can then be assessed on the basis that the disease or deterioration will not arise and an award of further damages can be made in the future if the risk in fact materialises. For the case that the claimant dies as a result of the diease or deterioration materialising, see the Damages Act 1996, s. 3. As regards quantification, compensation for loss of faculty and loss of amenity is assessed by the judge based on a perception of what is fair, just and reasonable in the circumstances. In order to render awards certain and thus more predictable (in furtherance of the public policy of encouraging parties to reach settlements out of court), conventional sums are awarded for different types of injury based on previous judicial assessments in comparable cases. These are collated in practitioners’ works (such as Kemp and Kemp, The Quantum of Damages) and the Judicial Studies Board’s Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injuries Cases, uplifted to take account of inflation (as to the importance of which see Heil v. Rankin [2001] QB 272) and adjusted for any special circumstances.

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Article 6:204: Compensation for injury as such Injury as such is to be compensated independently of compensation for economic or non-economic loss.

Comments 1. Injury as such. This Article is a corollary to Article 2:201 (Personal injury and consequential loss) paragraph (1) and Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy) paragraph (1). In both of these Articles (and, under certain conditions, in Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage)), certain injuries are qualified as legally relevant damage even where they have caused neither economic nor non-economic loss. Violations of bodily integrity or injuries to a person’s health or incorporeal personality rights are already as such legally relevant damage; it is not just (as is otherwise the case) the loss flowing from them which counts as legally relevant damage. These rules only take effect in conjunction with the present Article. “Injury as such” is to be compensated not only where there is an absence of any economic or non-economic loss, but also where the injured person also suffered such losses. In the latter case compensation for the injury as such will be independent of and additional to compensation for those losses. 2. A new concept. A rule in this form is not found in any national civil code or other national legislation. Its substance, which has been essentially adopted from Italy, is however recognised in the laws of several Member States and in others enjoys increasing acceptance. Frequently the courts act upon this idea even without an express statutory basis. In some legal systems minimum thresholds of liability laid down by the law fulfil the same function, at least in the field of the infringement of incorporeal personality rights.

Notes 1.

2.

986

See the previous notes on II 15-21 and V40 under Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) as well as the notes IV 17-20 under Article 2:201 (Personal injury and consequential loss). SPANISH Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act (Ley de responsabilidad civil y seguro en la circulación de vehículos a motor), Annex art. 1(7) expressly provides that, in the context of personal injury (as in Italy), the daños psicofísicos suffered denotes a separate item of redress. Moreover, the Supreme Court has, on numerous occasions, distinguished between daño biológico, daño moral and economic loss (TS 21 January 1998, RAJ 1998 (1) no. 350 p. 568; TS 21 April 1998, RAJ 1998 (2) no. 4045 p. 5903; TS 27 July 2006, BDA RAJ 2006/6548); as can be seen from the case law of the courts of first instance, it has long been common practice for the daño biologica to operate as a separate compensatable head of damages (e. g. CA Madrid 10 July 2006, BDA JUR 2007/16767; CA Sevilla 18 May 2006, BDA JUR 2007/28095; CA Madrid 4 May 2006, BDA JUR

Article 6:204: Compensation for injury as such

3.

4.

2006/192847; CA Madrid 7 July 2005, BDA JUR 2006/12356; CA Madrid 6 September 2005, BDA JUR 2006/70043; CA Madrid 20 June 2006, BDA JUR 2007/41433). In the context of a breach of incorporeal personality rights “the existence of injury shall be presumed, whenever the illegitimate intrusion is proven” (Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act art. 9(3)). This presumption only arises in the context of non-economic loss (Casas Vallés, RJC 1989, 49; Salvador Coderch (-Martín Casals), El mercado de las ideas, 382, 385). According to case law, this presumption is a presumption iuris et de iure, i. e. an irrebuttable presumption (TS 9 March 2006, RAJ 2006 (4) no. 5413 p. 11866; TS 7 March 2003, RAJ 2003 (2) no. 2900 p. 5410)) (an opposing view, shared by a not insignificant number, can be discovered in legal writing: Díez-Picazo and Gullón, Sistema I11, 355; Yzquierdo Tolsada, Daños a los derechos de la personalidad3, 1333, 1393). See with respect to the quantification of the damages for danno biologico which is based on indexes in tables under ITALIAN law, inter alia, Cass. 11 August 2000, no. 10725, Giust.civ.Mass. 2000, 1782; Cass. 22 May 2000, no. 6616, Giust.civ.Mass. 2000, 1078; Cass. 20 October 1998, no. 10405, Giust.civ.Mass. 1998, 2130; Cass. 16 September 1996, no. 8286, Giust.civ.Mass. 1996, 1283; Cass. 8 October 1996, no. 8784, Giust.Civ.Mass. 1996, 1386 sowie Gozzi, Der Anspruch iure proprio auf Ersatz des Nichtvermögensschadens, 208 et seq.). More minor injuries of a permanent nature arising from a traffic accident are governed by Dispositions in matter of Opening and Regulation of the Markets Act of 5 March 2001, no. 57 (Disposizioni in materia di apertura e regolazione dei mercati) art. 5(2)-(6). Danno biologico is defined in this Act as “an interference with the psychological and physical integrity”, “which can be ascertained by reference to medical criteria” and for which “compensation should not be linked to any influence the injury may have on the injured party’s ability to work”. Originally, the assessment of damages for all cases was based on variable percentages of invalidity (punto variabile) corresponding to a monetary amount and to the age of the injured person which were fixed by statute (and regularly adjusted to take account of inflation). Since the 1st of January 2006, a new rule was introduced by the coming into force of Private Assurance Code (Codice delle assicurazioni private) arts. 138 and 139. The foregoing solely govern damage which arises from a traffic or maritime accident and in this context, a distinction is drawn between severe (macropermanenti) and minor injuries (micropermanenti). In a similar fashion, tables are employed to liquidate the damages, the aim being to establish a uniform system, used countrywide, for the assessment of compensation for macropermanenti. It is argued that this new regulation may not be compatible with the Constitution (see futher Chindemi, Resp.civ. e prev. 2006, 549-569; Zivic, Resp.civ. e prev. 2006, 641-646). To date, in HUNGARY, a mere infringement of rights will not suffice to ground a damages claim; there must be an additional economic or non-economic loss (Petrik (-Petrik), Polgári jog I2, 201-203; Petrik (-Köles), Polgári jog II2, 634/2; Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1325, 1328, 1344; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 74, 258 et seq.; Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 216 et seq.; Vékás, FS Boytha György, 331, 332; BH 2002/24; BH 2001/110; BH 2001/12 and BH 1997/435). Whether the injured party has suffered a non-economic loss is determined by the courts exercising their discretion (Lábady, A nem vagyoni kártérítés újabb bírói gyakorlata, 51 et seq.), but nonetheless a specific justification is given for a finding of non-economic loss. Even the loss of a kidney appears not to be enough of and in itself to ground a claim for compensation of

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non-pecuniary loss. What is decisive in this context is that the claimant is forced to alter his or her way of life and to live in a way which does not endanger the remaing kidney. The position is similar in the context of facial burns and, in this context, the non-pecuniary loss is found in the fact that the claimant’s life is made more difficult (see further with citations from case law Petrik (-Petrik) loc. cit. 204). In contrast, adducing proof of a particular non-pecuniary loss is not necessary in the context of illegal deprivation of liberty (jail) (BH 2002/186); the illegal detention imports non-economic damage per se. By contrast, a person, whose facial lacerations have healed completely, does not suffer non-economic damage (Benedek loc. cit. 1330). An award of compensation for non-economic loss was rejected in a case which concerned a woman, who having been forced to her knees and had a leg pressed to her back, had her hair forcibly cut (Lábady loc. cit. 54). This extremely restrictive approach which is called the “liability law theory” appears to have ceded ground to the “personal rights theory” in the discussions surrounding the reform of the Civil Code. The latter rationale holds that breach per se of a subjective right will suffice for an award of reparation (see further Boytha, Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció 2003, 3-6 and Petrik, Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció 2003, 6-8). There is a proposal to abolish a claim for compensation for non-economic damage while introducing a claim for satisfaction in the form of damages for pain and suffering in the part dealing with the vindication of the rights of the individual. It is proposed to introduce an irrebuttable presumption that all infringements of personality cause noneconomic loss (http://www.parlament.hu/irom38/05949/05949.pdf). In ROMANIAN legal writing, it has been observed that every personal injury imports damage (Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘, 73) but no positive outcome, with respect to the creation of an actionable head of redressable damage, can be gleaned from this statement. On the basis of CC § 1293, a distinction is drawn under AUSTRIAN law between “real” and calculable damage (Koziol/Bydlinski/Bollenberger (-Karner), ABGB2, § 1293, no. 1). The real damage means the adverse impact accruing to the legally recognised interest; the calculable damage corresponds to the pecuniary quantification of that damage. Reparation is only exceptionally awarded in cases where no calculable damage has (at least not yet) materialised e. g. in the shape of an “abstract annuity” in cases of reduced earning capacity. This annuity is geared at compensating the diminished prospects on the jobmarket. In this context, there is no need to adduce that this has already occurred (OGH 22 September 1983, ZVR 1984/325 p. 347; OGH 20 January 2002, JBl 2003, 242; for a discussion on the parameters of this claim, see also OGH 15 July 1987, SZ 41/157). The view has been expressed in legal commentary that the claim is one for the recovery for non-pecuniary loss (Apathy and Riedler, Bürgerliches Recht III3, no. 14/ 9). Moreover, a type of compensation for “injury as such” may be seen in the heatedly discussed cases which deal with ‘compensation for pain and suffering without pain being felt’ (e. g. OGH 26 July 2006, ZVR 2006/202 p. 498: a paraplegic woman, who was wheelchair bound, was injured in her right knee where she could feel no pain). In contrast to earlier decisions, nowadays reparation is awarded in cases of this kind, and not only in cases where the inability to feel pain is a consequence of the injury suffered but also in cases where this inability was already extant. This stance of the courts has been criticised (Schwimann (Harrer), ABGB VI3, § 1325, no. 80; Huber, ZVR 2000, 221). Moreover, mention should be made of recovery of “fictive” nursing costs. The injured party can claim the costs of professional care that would have been required in

Article 6:204: Compensation for injury as such

7.

8.

9.

10.

the event that his or her relatives voluntarily care for him or her (OGH 26 February 1998, ZVR 1998/128 p. 373; OGH 21 June 2001, 2 Ob 148/01 f). For the remainder, compensation for pain and suffering is always awarded as a lump sum and should not be commuted to a daily rate (CA Linz 11 January 2002, ZVR 2002/68 p. 275; Kossak, ZVR 2001, 227). Legal practioners use works referring to comparable cases as a guide (“Schmerzensgeld” tables), but the courts are not bound by these tables and they merely act as an evaluative guide. There is no fixed upper limit on the compensation that can be awarded for non-economic loss (OGH 20 February 1975, RZ 1975/68). In PORTUGAL, dano corporal, dano funcional and dano biológico are all used synonymously and defined as the somatic and psychological devaluation of the person (CA Oporto 3 May 2007; CA Oporto 29 June 2006; STJ 29 November 2005; Álvaro Dias, Dano corporal, 99). A number of authors are inclined to adopt the view that such damage imports non-economic loss (Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10, 601; Sousa Dinis, RPDC XIII [2004-14] 9). Other authors consider this damage a tertium genus; namely, an amphibious creature which cannot be classed as either pecuniary or nonpecuniary damage (Álvaro Dias, RPDC X [2001-11] 47; ibid., RPDC IX [2000-10] 86). The courts appear to vacilliate between classifying such damage as non-economic harm (so CA Lisbon 12 June 2006; CA Coimbra 26 April 2005; CA Oporto 7 April 1997, CJ XXII [1997-2] 205; STJ 8 March 1979, BolMinJus 285 [1979] 290) and qualifying it as future pecuniary loss (so STJ 5 July 2007; STJ 17 November 2005; STJ 22 September 2005; STJ 6 May 1999). At any rate, it is clear that grave personal injury in and of itself, independent of any economic loss or pain, grounds a claim for redress (Álvaro Dias, RPDC X [2001-11] 47, 53; STJ 17 November 2005; STJ 10 October 2002; STJ 14 October 2004; STJ 29 April 2004; STJ 6 May 2003; STJ 22 September 2005; STJ 16 January 2003). Statutory rules which fix a minimum threshold for an award of compensation for the infringement of incorporeal personality rights can be encountered in GREECE (see note 9 under Article 5:203 and note 9 under Article 6:203). In the NORDIC countries, while the notion of “injury as such” is unknown, parallels, at least in part, can be drawn between that notion and the concept of reparation for grave violations to the rights of personality of the injured party. FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 5 § 6 provides that, e. g. causing great anguish to and vilifying another, grounds a claim for compensation. Such damage is not placed within the receptacle of compensation for pain and suffering but is a separate compensatable head of damage. This remains the case even if the damage has its roots in the violation of the victim’s bodily integrity. Similarly, the corresponding SWEDISH provision on violations of human dignity is based on an objective assessment of the damage (see e. g. HD 6 July 2007, NJA 2007, 540 [sexual abuse of a sleeping child]). An affront to dignity is sufficient; the cause of action does not depend on subjective pain or suffering (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 392). Similarly, DANISH EAL § 26 provides that a grave violation in the context of an unlawful deprivation of liberty, violation of the honour or person of another is a separate compensatable head of damage. ENGLISH law recognises that in a case of personal injury the injury as such is to be compensated. Indeed a claimant may, it seems, recover in respect of the injury even where this has no significant effect on the claimant’s life: Forster v. Pugh [1955] CLY 741 (loss of spleen). This “loss of faculty” (Andrews v. Freeborough [1967] 1 QB 1, 18) is conceptually distinct from its consequences for the injured person’s lifestyle and happi-

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ness (i. e. loss of amenity) (cf. H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard [1964] AC 326, 355), although damages are in practice often awarded for the two elements together, assuming there is a breakdown of compensation for non-pecuniary loss. Similarly, in awarding damages for trespass a court may award substantial damages for the indignity as such, even where there is no physical or pecuniary injury – not least in order to vindicate the claimant’s legal rights: cf. Simmons v. Polak [1986] CLY 974 (£250 awarded where exfiancé locked claimant in a car for five minutes). However, in relation to defamation (save for slanders which are not actionable per se), while it has long been recognised that the claimant is entitled to general damages by reason of the mere probability that injurious consequences may result from the injury to reputation (Clerk and Lindsell (-Doudu and Price), Torts19, 23-235), this is in substance a presumption as to a consequence – a compensation for loss of reputation – and therefore arguably not to be characterised as compensation for the injury as such.

Section 3:

Prevention Article 6:301: Right to prevention (1) The right to prevention exists only in so far as: (a) reparation would not be an adequate alternative remedy; and (b) it is reasonable for the person who would be accountable for the causation of the damage to prevent it from occurring. (2) Where the source of danger is an object or an animal and it is not reasonably possible for the endangered person to avoid the danger the right to prevention includes a right to have the source of danger removed.

Comments 1. Prevention is better than cure. This Article is a corollary to and a concretisation of Article 1:102 (Prevention). Both rules must be read together. The underlying idea is that someone faced with imminent damage must be able under the law on non-contractual liability (and not only if the requisites of other branches of the law, for instance the law of property, are satisfied) to take positive action to prevent the damage from happening. Prevention is better than cure. Moreover a person who simply lets the damage happen and then claims reparation may be exposed to a plea of contributory fault and consequently to a reduction of compensation. 2. Forms of prevention. Damage prevention can take various forms. The person under threat can resort to self-help and then try to recover the costs from the person responsible for the threat (see Article 6:302 (Liability for loss in preventing damage)). Alternatively, the person under threat can require the person responsible for the threat to remove or neutralise the source of danger. This latter type of claim is the subject-matter of this Article. (On the relationship to Article 5:202 (Self-defence, benevolent intervention and necessity) see the Comments under Article 1:102 (Prevention)). 3. Paragraph (1). The right to oblige another to perform a positive act in order to protect the interests of the claimant can only exist within certain narrow borders; otherwise, it would lead to intolerable restrictions of personal freedom. This is to be weighed up against the security interests of potential injured parties and in doubt takes priority over the latter. Therefore, it is not only required (in Article 1:102 (Prevention)) that the claimant is under threat of imminent danger but it is also made clear that the claimant is entitled to claim positive action to prevent the damage only where a subsequent claim for damages would not be a sufficient remedy and where it is reasonable to impose the burden of removing the source of damage on the other person. The right to become personally active in the prevention of damage and then claim the costs incurred from the 991

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other party remains unaffected by this. Its requisites are dealt with in Article 6:302 (Liability for loss in preventing damage). 4. Reparation not an adequate remedy. Whether reparation, especially monetary reparation, is a sufficient alternative remedy, depends on the circumstances of each individual case. First and foremost, it depends on whether damage irreparable by other means is imminent, on the type and measure of the imminent damage, on how high the probability of its materialisation seems to be from a factual and a legal perspective and whether the other person will be in a financial position to repair it. Illustration 1 Neighbour X has built a swimming pool on her land. After it has been filled, the swimming pool starts to leak; the escaping water causes damage in the garden of Neighbour Y. Along with monetary reparation the latter requests precisely described measures for repair so that such an occurrence cannot recur. However, under the circumstances of the case the risk that another water leak will occur is rather slight. A right to have specific repairs carried out has not been established Illustration 2 Politician P requests Publishers A to stop the printing of a publication that contains information on P damaging to his reputation. Due to the short time span, it is not possible to check to a sufficiently precise degree whether A has a defence at his disposal; in particular it is unclear whether the requisites of Article 5:203 (Protection of public interest) are met. P does not have a claim under Article 1:102 (Prevention). Illustration 3 The facts are the same as in illustration 1 under Article 6:101 (Aim and forms of reparation). The abused boy can also request of his abuser that he not appear in public with a naked torso until the removal of the tattoo. During this period, monetary reparation would not be a sufficient remedy. 5. Paragraph (2). Paragraph (2) ensures freedom of activity for those persons who might potentially occasion damage. The abatement of the source of danger through positive action may be claimed only where it does not burden the potential injuring person unreasonably. A cricket club may only be required to fence in the playing field for the purpose of protecting the neighbourhood from “flying balls” to a degree which guarantees stability against collapse in case of a storm and does not unreasonably burden the club financially; anything else would amount to banning the game of cricket completely. The remaining risk must be borne by the neighbours. The manufacturer of a certain product may not be compelled by ultimate consumers to carry out certain improvements to the product, in order to mitigate the risk of damage; the producer must be left the freedom to decide on suitable measures. This even applies where the claimant wants the product for personal or professional reasons. In contrast, it is reasonable for a house owner to be required to secure loose roof tiles which are in danger of falling on to a neighbour’s land. The measure is simple, there is no sensible alternative and it is directed at a precisely defined class of persons, whose fear of considerable harm is justifiable (conse992

Article 6:301: Right to prevention

quently, it would be unreasonable if every random street user were able to pester the owners of the adjacent houses with the argument of being under threat when passing the house).

Notes 1.

2.

An action to end a continuing disturbance is recognised under FRENCH and BELGIAN tort law, therefore an injured party may file a claim requiring the suppression de l’illicite (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats, nos. 2441-2446; Ronse (-de Wilde/Claeys/Mallems), Schade en schadeloosstelling I2, nos. 302-303 pp. 223-224). French CC art. 9(2) additionally, contains a general preventative remedy to protect against every atteinte à l’intimité de la vie privée. Incidentally, the person concerned may only claim an interim injunction to ward off the threat of imminent damage under the measures contained in the Code of Civil Procedures dealing with procédures de référé (CCP arts. 809(1), 849(1)). Furthermore, in Belgium, once stringent requirements are satisfied, the courts may prescribe measures geared towards anticipating the commission of immediate damage (Dirix, Het begrip schade, no. 62 p. 51). The orthodox view in SPANISH tort law is that the function of tort law is not a preventative or punitive one; it is solely compensatory (Paz-Ares/Díez-Picazo/Bercovitz/Salvador (-Pantaleón), Código Civil II2, art. 1902 pp. 1971-1972). More recent legal scholarship points out that modern tort law can no longer dismiss the appropriateness of a remedy geared towards preventing the commission of an unlawful act, either from the viewpoint of efficiency or protection of the individual (Llamas Pombo, FS Díez-Picazo II, 2203, 2211). CCP arts. 721 et seq. govern the tutela inhibitoria cautelar. It entitles the plaintiff to obtain an interim ruling from the court that obliges the defendant to perform a positive or a negative act in order to prevent the occurrence of a damage. However, this remedy is regarded as inadequate as it does not give rise, of itself, to a general independent claim to prohibitory injunctive relief (Llamas Pombo loc. cit. 2219). Moreover, tort law does not permit such a claim. A tutela inhibitoria del daño is restricted by law to a number of specific cases, namely: safeguarding possession; preventative legal protection in respect of a threat emanating from neighbouring land (CC art. 389 in conjunction with CCP art. 250(6); preliminary proceedings in order to obtain judgment for the “demolition of constructions, buildings, trees or columns or analogous objects that are ruinous and threat to cause damage to the plaintiff”; see CA Huelva 23 September 2005, BDA JUR 2006/30245 and Paz-Ares/Díez-Picazo/Bercovitz/Salvador (-Pantaleón Prieto), Código Civil I2, art. 389 p. 1064) and to the acción negatoria which is recognised under environmental law (Salvador and Santidumenge, PJ 1988, no. 10, 117; TS 3 December 1987, RAJ 1987 (5) no. 9176 p. 8507; CATALAN CC art. 546-14). A claim for prohibitory injunction can also be encountered in CC art. 7(2) (abuse of right), in Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act 1/1982 art. 9(2) and under intellectual property law (Copyright Act art. 139; Patents and Utility Models Act art. 63; Trademarks Act art. 41). On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has stated that a claim of a prohibitory injunction to prevent the realisation of an imminent danger is the “logical and legal” corollary of a damages claim and this rationale provides the basis for the claim for injunctive relief (e. g. TS 16 January 1989, RAJ 1989 (1) no. 101 p. 102 and TS 15 March 1993, RAJ 1993 (2)

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4.

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no. 2284 p. 2958). CA Murcia 13 July 2006, BDA JUR 2006/258763 concerned a dispute between neighbours which centred on a leaking swimming pool. The claim which was directed at requiring the owner to undertake repairs was rejected on the grounds that it was based on tort law and it could not be proven that there was a probability of future damage. Similarly, under ITALIAN law, the use of the tutela inibitoria preventiva is restricted and it is employed to vindicate a number of legally protected interests, in particular, property interests (CC art. 949), possession (CC art. 1170), servitudes (CC art. 1079, actio confessoria) and the right to one’s own name or one’s own image (CC arts. 7 and 10). According to CC art. 844, a court is permitted to grant an order directed at the cessation of emissions which, upon examination of local conditions, exceed reasonable limits (see further, Cass.sez.un. 15 October 1998, no. 10186, Giust.civ.Mass. 1998, 2086). Under CC art. 1172, neighbours can require that the other adopt preventative measures to, inter alia, protect against buildings in danger of collapse. Further claims to prohibitory injunctive relief can be found in regulations geared towards protecting intellectual property rights (Intellectual Property Code [Codice della proprietà industrial] art. 124), consumer protection in the context of unfair contract terms (CC art. 1469sexies), the protection of businesses against unfair competitive practices of their competitors, and finally, protection of trade unions against employers (Statuto dei Lavoratori [Act of 20 May 1970, no. 300, Gazz. Uff. 27 May 1970, no. 131] art. 28). That these individual provisions permitting prohibitory injunction relief pave the way, by analogy, for a general claim (or an “atypical” one) to a tutela inibitoria, while not uncontroversial, nowadays appears to be the prevailing legal view (Di Majo, La tutela civile dei diritti III4, 142143; Cass. 25 July 1986, no. 4755, Giust.civ.Mass. 1986, fasc. 7). A remedy, directed at preventing damage from occurring is recognised under HUNGARIAN tort law, namely in CC § 341. However, this provision only entitles the person whose rights are threatened to seek relief before a court. The court can call a halt to the dangerous activity or can order the person responsible to adopt appropriate measures to eliminate the threat and, if necessary, provide security. CC § 341 is based on the preventative function accorded to liability law. This claim does not depend upon blameworthiness; the only necessary requirements are that the damage is imminent and the person endangered requires protection. Typical fields of application for this claim include environmental law and competition law (CC § 341(2)). However, there is a dearth of case law on CC § 341 (Gellért (-Kemenes), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1236; Petrik (-Harmathy), Polgári jog II2, 579; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 86-88). BH 1990/424 made clear that CC § 341(1) may only be invoked against a person from whom the threat emanates; BH 2005/103 held that CC § 341(1) claim could also be raised in the contractual law context. In turn, a special type of prohibitory injunction can be found in property law and the law on possession (CC §§ 115(2), 190(1)), as well as in relation to particular property rights (e. g. CC § 161(2), (3) [usufruct]). Numerous other provisions require, based on their wording, that the injury has already been inflicted; here, the claim for prohibitory relief is geared towards the prevention of further injury (e. g. CC § 84(1)b [personality rights]; Competition Act no. LVII /1996 § 86(2)b; Patents Act [Act no. XXXIII /1995] § 35; Trademark Act [Act no. XI /1997] § 27; Copyright Act [Act no. LXXVI /1999] § 94). The interlocutory injunction is a feature of administrative law and is regulated in CCP § 156. CC § 341(1) has largely been left

Article 6:301: Right to prevention

5.

6.

7.

untouched by the reform of the Hungarian Civil Code; however, it is proposed to repeal CC § 341(2) (http://www.parlament.hu/irom38/05949/05949.pdf) BULGARIAN law does not recognise a general tortious clam permitting injunctive relief. However, claims for prohibitory injunctions which are directed towards ending unlawful activity, are regulated in a large number of supplementary statutes (e. g. Competition Protection Act art. 7(1)(viii); Copyright Act art. 95(1)(ii); Patent and Registration of Useful Designs Act art. 28(1)(iii)). Recourse is had to the actio negatoria in order to protect against breaches (also of a temporary nature) of property rights. This largely corresponds to the legal position in ROMANIA (Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘, 70). CCP art. 581 governs the particulars of the jurisdiction under administrative law conferred on the President of the Court, enabling the award of an interloctury injunction in respect to pending proceedings. GERMAN CC § 908 permits an injunction to be granted in order to compel the adoption of necessary protective measures,in the event that there is a threat that a neighbouring building will collapse or there is a danger that parts of a neighbouring building will become detached. There is no need to wait for damage to occur; the mere threat of danger entitles a claimant to injunctive relief (see further Soergel (-Baur), BGB13, § 908, no. 6; Erman (-Lorenz), BGB II12, § 908 no. 5; BGH 8 February 1972, NJW 1972, 724). According to CC § 1004(1)(ii), an owner is entitled to claim a prohibitory injunction requiring the defendant to cease interfering with his property. This entails that the defendant must ensure that the threatened breach does not materialise (Staudinger (-Gursky), BGB13, § 1004 no. 211), which also connotes that he or she may be required to adopt positive measures if this is the only means by which the damage can be prevented (BGH 12 December 2003, NJW 2004, 1035, 1037). In contrast to the express wording of the provision, contemporary legal scholarship and the courts consider that the owner has a general claim to injunctive relief under CC § 1004(1)(ii) in the case of a mere initial threat of damage and therefore, this claim is not only confined to cases where there is a risk that the damage will reoccur (Gursky loc. cit. no. 213). Several other prohibitory injunction claims can be found in supplementary statutes outside the confines of the Civil Code, for example, provisions which safeguard against unfair competitive practices and those that afford protection against breaches of intellectual property rights. The Civil Code contains provisions which afford a claim for a prohibitory injunction in cases concerning the protection of the rights to one’s own name (CC § 12), possession and an array of limited proprietary rights. A general claim to prohibitory injunctive relief exists for the protection of every enumerated absolute right contained in CC § 823(1). According to AUSTRIAN law, a distinction must be drawn between three legal remedies: the prohibitory injunction, abatement of a nuisance i. e. the claim for the removal or elimination of a source of disturbance and self-help being the ultima ratio (CC §§ 19, 344, 1101 and 1321). A threat to an absolute right grounds a claim for prohibitory injunctive relief (OGH 13 April 1983, SZ 56/63; OGH 28 March 2000, SZ 73/57). If the breach is already extant, then only the danger of recurrence and the need for legal protection are required, whereby the danger of recurrence is presumed in a case invovling a breach of an absolute right (OGH 23 June 2005, 6 Ob 84/05d). There is no general statutory provision governing prohibitory injunctions regulation; it is expressly envisaged that this remedy will only come to the fore in certain defined cases (OGH 5 December 1978, SZ 51/171), e. g. in CC §§ 43, 339, 364 and 523; Ccom § 37(2) and

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Chapter 6: Remedies UWG § 14). The question, whether, nowadays, it remains worthwhile to continue to

8.

9.

10.

996

draw a distinction between the remedial injunction as such (which comes to the fore where the breach has already been initiated) and a preventative prohibitory injunction (in the context of a threat of a breach) is increasingly doubted (Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VI3, Pref. to §§ 1293 no. 39). Whether a successful claim for a prohibitory injunction requires a fault on the part of the defendant was unclear for a long period of time (see OGH 23 July 1997, ecolex 1998, 124 and OGH 31 August 1983, SZ 56/124; see further Hirsch, JBl 1998, 541). Today, for the most part, this question is answered in the negative (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 4/10; Apathy and Riedler, Bürgerliches Recht III3, no. 13/15; OGH 18 October 1991, 8 Ob 612/91; OGH 26 January 2006, 6 Ob 273/05y). PORTUGUESE CC art. 1350 provides that “if a building or other construct threatens to collapse in part or in full and the collapse could result in damage to neighbouring property, the owner is entitled in accordance with art. 492 to demand the person responsible for the damage to take the measures necessary to eliminate the danger”. This provision is based on German CC § 908 (note 6 above) (Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado III2, note 2 under art. 1350). For the remainder, a general rule governing the duty to prevent the realisation of a danger is absent but there is an array of specific norms which give voice to this line of thought (STJ 8 July 2003 mentions, although these norms predominantly govern liability, inter alia, CC arts. 492, 493, 502, 1347-1350 and 1352). The notion that civil liability should not be simply confined to its compensatory function (função reparadora) stems from environmental law, namely, on the principle of prevention (princípio da prevenção) which is contained in the Basic Environment Act (Lei de Bases do Ambiente, no. 11/87 of 7 April 1987) art. 3(a) (see further Meira Lourenço, A função punitiva da responsabilidade civil, 323). Loc. cit. art. 40(4) confers a right on every citizen, whose right to a healthy and ecologically sound environment is directly breached or where there is a threat of such a breach, to require the removal of the damaging cause and claim compensation. Where a breach of corporeal or incorporeal personality rights is threatened, CC art. 70 provides for diverse remedies, which can be carried into effect under administrative law by availing of CCP arts. 381 et seq., i. e. by means of procedimento cautelar comum, see CA Lisbon 20 January 2005, CJ XXX (2005-1) 97. According to DUTCH CC art. 3:296 in conjunction with art. 6:168(1), a judge is conferred with a discretion to “reject a claim for the prohibition of unlawful conduct, on the grounds that this conduct must be tolerated in the interests of a countervailing public interest”; the injured party retains his or her claim for damages (see further Nieuwenhuis/Stolker/Valk (-Lindenbergh), T & C Vermogensrecht, art. 6:162, note 6 and art. 6:168 notes 1-2). Similarly, ESTONIAN LOA § 1055 does not recognise a general claim for injunctive relief under tort law. LOA § 1055(2) largely corresponds to Article 6:301(1)(a); there are no express rules regulating the content of Article 6:301(1)(b) and Article 6:301(2). However, the right to remove a source of danger may arise from necessity (LOA § 1045(2) and (3)). The NORDIC legal systems do not recognise a general right to claim prevention. According to the SWEDISH Code of Judicial Procedure chap. 15 § 3 injunctive relief can be obtained inter alia for the protection of one’s real and intellectual property rights (e. g. HD 14 October 1982, NJA 1982, 633). FINNISH Code of Judicial Procedure chap. 7 § 3 contains a similar provision. In a similar fashion, in DENMARK, claims for injunctive

Article 6:301: Right to prevention

11.

relief belong to the realm of administrative law. CCP § 641(1) concerns the protection of every “right” of the claimant. For example, this embraces landlord-tenant disputes and disputes arising between neighbours (HD 5 December 1980, UfR 1981, 362), labour (HD 28 October 1929, UfR 1930, 142) and intellectual property law (HD 24 February 1994, UfR 1994, 397), see in more detail D-Karnov 2005 III (-Rothe), § 641 no. 2487. According to CCP §§ 642 and 643, a claim for an injunction must be rejected: if the general sentencing rules and rules governing damages claims afford adequate protection; if the defendant provides sufficient security, or if granting the injunction would be amount to a disproportionate measure. The initiation cermonies of freemasons are regarded as a “private matter” (CP § 264d) of this organization; it was therefore possible for them to restrain a television station from broadcasting on this matter (HD 3 June 1982, UfR 1982, 750). Under ENGLISH law the discretionary equitable remedy of an injunction may be available to restrain a person from committing or continuing a tort where this is anticipated. The injunction is usually prohibitory in character, to prevent an act, but in exceptional cases e. g. where the defendant has infringed the claimant’s rights by building a construction, it may be mandatory, to compel a positive act, i. e. in such a case removal. The basis of the jurisdiction to grant an injunction where it appears to the court to be “just and convenient” to do so (for the High Court under the Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 37(1); for the County Court, see the County Court Act 1984, s. 38, as substituted by the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s. 3) is the inadequacy of damages as a remedy should the tort occur or continue and the threatened damage or injury be sustained. This may be because damages would be unquantifiable or, due, for example, to the impending insolvency of the defendant, an award would be ineffective. Alternatively money may not compensate the claimant because continuous breaches of the claimant’s right would necessitate multiple actions for damages for loss or injury sustained over various time periods: cf. Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. [1895] 1 Ch 287 (injunction granted in favour of tenants of a neighbouring public house to prevent further nuisance where noise and vibration from the defendant’s electricity generating plant was causing structural damage as well as discomfort and annoyance). Once grounds for the grant of an injunction are established, it will only be refused and damages awarded in lieu in exceptional cases, such as where the injury to the claimant’s legal rights is small, the injury can be adequately estimated and compensated by a small money payment, granting the injunction would be oppressive, the claimant has shown he only wants money, or the claimant’s own conduct renders it unjust to grant more than money: see Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co., loc. cit., applied in Regan v. Paul Properties Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ 1319; [2006] 46 EG 210 (where it was held there was no exceptional case because the defendants had taken a calculated risk to proceed with the development infringing the claimant’s right to light and it was not oppressive to grant the order). Moreover, where there is an infringement of proprietary rights and the tortfeasor intends to perpetuate the wrong, the claimant may be entitled to an injunction, even though a sum awarded as damages would be nominal – so as in effect to grant the claimant leverage in negotiations for a commercial exploitation of his rights: cf. Kelsen v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd. [1957] 2 QB 334 (trespass in infringing the air space over the claimant’s shop with an advertisement). It is a contested matter as to what extent regard should be had to the wider public interest in deciding whether to grant the injunction: contrast Miller v. Jackson [1977] QB 966 (injunction refused, pre-

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serving the open space of a cricket ground despite nuisance in causing cricket balls to land on the claimants’ property) with Kennaway v. Thompson [1981] 1 QB 88 (injunction to prevent further nuisance by a motor boat racing club, on grounds of excessive noise, to the detriment of a plaintiff living near the lake) and indeed the Shelfer case itself. Save for exceptional cases, the essential principles for granting an interlocutory injunction were settled in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] AC 396 on an application for a quia timet injunction to restrain infringement of a patent. The court must be satisfied that the claimant has a good arguable case, i. e. that the claimant’s case is not frivolous or vexatious, that its prospect of success at trial is not fanciful, and that there is a serious question to be tried, but not that the claimant can establish a prima facie case. The second and decisive consideration is the balance of convenience, i. e. whether damages would adequately compensate the claimant for loss caused by the defendant’s acts prior to trial and whether loss caused to the defendant by grant of the injunction would be adequately compensated for by damages, if the plaintiff loses in the main action. Regard is had to the relative strength of the parties’ cases as a rule only where it appears that the strength of one party’s case is disproportionate. Because of the potential waste from destruction required by the order, however, more stringent rules apply for the grant of a mandatory injunction: Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham [1971] Ch 340. Nor will the American Cyanamid principles apply if a trial is unlikely and the grant or refusal of the interlocutory relief will in effect decide the dispute; here too a strong case will be required: Cayne v. Global Natural Resources plc. [1984] 1 All ER 225. Finally, in the interests of protecting freedom of speech, an interlocutory injunction will not granted in support of a libel action where the defendant intends to plead justification or rely on the defence of fair comment on a matter of public interest or privilege unless it is clear that the defence will not succeed at trial; the court will thus as a rule not impose a prior restraint on publication: see Greene v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2004] EWCA Civ 1462, [2005] QB 972, holding that the Human Rights Act 1998 had not changed the rule in Bonnard v. Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269. Illustration 1 is taken from CA Murcia 13 July 2006, BDA JUR 2006/258763; illustration 2 from Greene v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2004] EWCA Civ 1462, [2005] QB 972; and illustration 3 from CFI Groningen 31 May 2002, LJN AE3727, note van der Hoek, NJB 2006 no. 29 p. 1618.

Article 6:302: Liability for loss in preventing damage A person who has reasonably incurred expenditure or sustained other loss in order to prevent that person from suffering an impending damage, or in order to limit the extent or severity of damage suffered, has a right to compensation from the person who would have been accountable for the causation of the damage.

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Comments 1. Fundamentals. A person, who is active in averting imminent damage in a reasonable manner or restricting its extent is exercising a right under Article 1:102 (Prevention) and therefore has a right to reparation of the costs incurred. This basic rule is affirmed in every Member State. It is also an indirect consequence of Article 5:102 (Contributory fault and accountability). This is because Article 5:102 is based on the idea that a person who has not looked after his or her own affairs with sufficient care may not request full reparation. Conversely, a person who actually does look after the preservation of his or her goods and interests when they are threatened by another person must then be able to claim reparation for the costs of doing so. They have been ultimately caused by a danger for which the other person bears responsibility. 2. Systematic significance. Beyond its material content, this Article in fact has inherent systematic significance. With its insertion into this Book, the character of the rule as part of the law on non-contractual liability is underscored. What is involved here is not a rule which belongs in the law of benevolent intervention in another’s affairs or one whose results could also be achieved with the instruments of this branch of the law. This is because a person who makes expenditure for the avoidance or mitigation of personal damage does not act or in any case does not primarily act for the purpose of benefiting the potential injuring person (see PEL Ben.Int. Art. 1:101 (Intervention to benefit another)); the person in fact wants to help himself or herself. Article 6:302 has further significance for the general rule of causation in Article 4:101 (General rule): the intervention described in Article 6:302 does not break the chain of causation between the conduct of the potential injuring person and the loss (which in this case lies in the expenditure incurred to avoid an otherwise threatening damage). The present Article is to be distinguished systematically from Article 2:209 (Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment) by the fact that under the present Article a damage within the meaning of Chapter 2 must not yet have arisen; by contrast, Article 2:209 (Burdens incurred by the state upon environmental impairment) clarifies that the expenditure (which is more precisely described therein) constitutes a legally relevant damage. Illustration 1 P parks her vehicle directly in front of the entrance to G’s garage and goes off to a hairdresser’s. G needs the use of his car. After inquiring at neighbouring properties without success as to the whereabouts of the person in charge of P’s vehicle, G telephones a recovery service which tows P’s vehicle across to the opposite side of the road. The costs of this undertaking are less than if G had hired a taxi or a rented car in order to reach the distant airport from which G is due to fly. G cannot demand compensation under the rules of benevolent intervention in another’s affairs because he acted predominantly in his own interest and was not acting in pursuit of an overriding public interest. However, he does have a claim to compensation under Article 6:302. By acting as he did G has avoided a loss resulting from an infringement of his property rights. Whether P was agreeable to the measure or not plays no role.

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3. Reasonably incurred expenditure. The expenditure incurred must be reasonable in relation to the threatened damage. Therefore, it is limited to the amount which would have resulted in damages, had the damage actually arisen or been exacerbated in the manner feared. The right to compensation does not however depend on the success of the measures taken. Article 6:302 consciously follows the formulation in PEL Ben.Int. Art. 3:101 (Right to indemnification or reimbursement). There as here, all that matters is that a reasonable neutral observer would have acted as the claimant did under the circumstances. If the claimant acted carelessly in the course of a reaction which in itself was sensible and reasonable then it may be that the claim will fall to be reduced under the rules on contributory fault. Illustration 2 Upstream, large quantities of water plants up to 12 metres long are cut-back and simply thrown into the water by a company responsible for the maintenance of clean waters. They float downstream to an aqueduct connected to a hydroelectric power station, threatening to block it. The company which operates the station removes these plants. While it cannot base its claim for reparation of the costs incurred on the argument that it benevolently intervened for the maintenance company, it has a good claim under Article 1:102 (Prevention) read with the present Article, if the company would have been liable in negligence for the imminent (considerable) damage. Illustration 3 An abnormally large, long and recognisably unsound tree on X’s land falls down, knocking over electrical power lines on its way down. The power lines supplied electricity to a drying facility for tobacco on the neighbouring land. In order to limit the extent of the damage, the company operating the drying facility arranges for the installation of provisional electric cables. Along with the damages for the tobacco rendered unusable and for the destroyed cables, it is also entitled to reparation for the costs of the provisional solution. Illustration 4 In a poster campaign, an advertising business, X, created the impression that a competitor would work together with it under its direction. In reality, the competitor had ended the co-operative work a long time ago due to a dispute and had prohibited X from using its name. At the same time as bringing an action, the competitor placed advertisements in several daily newspapers in which it corrected X’s misleading indications. It did this because it had been constantly quizzed about X’s advertisement at a conference of all the advertising businesses in the country and loss of turnover was imminent; customers’ reactions had been so emphatically negative that a slow-down of orders had become highly likely. The requested judgment would have been granted even if the advertisements had not been published in time to be able to effectuate prevention. The competitor can claim reparation from X for the costs of the advertising campaign, which were reasonable.

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Article 6:302: Liability for loss in preventing damage

Notes 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

In FRANCE and BELGIUM the question of liability for expenditure in the course of preventing damage is barely the subject of analysis. That is explained by the fact that in such cases a legally relevant damage is recognised in any case. That the loss is actually caused by the injured party seeking to avert an impending damage only becomes relevant if the injured party commits a faute in doing so: see e. g. CA Brussels June 1998, Tijdschrift voor Aansprakelijkheid en Verzekering in het Wegverkeer 1999, 225 (the injured party, confronted with the tortfeasor’s bad driving, reacted so ineptly in taking evasive action as to turn his vehicle over; claim reduced by 50 %). In SPAIN too the issue of compensation for loss in preventing damage is hardly addressed as such. Such expenditure is as a rule damage within the meaning of CC art. 1902 and as such recoverable in tort law (e. g. CA Cáceres 6 November 2006, BDA JUR 2007/ 46155: the collapse of an enormous tree which was located on the defendant’s land, caused severe damages to the plaintiff’s power line that affected the dry place where the plaintiff treated tobacco for commercial purposes. In order to limit the extent of his losses, the plaintiff installed a provisional power line; the costs of that installation were included in his heads of damage). In ITALY reparation for the cost of averting a (greater) damage seem to depend on the existence of a precedent damage: CC art. 2056 in conjunction with art. 1227. However, in Cass. 12 April 1980, no. 2331, Giust.civ. 1980, I, 2226 a company which as a result of profound chemical changes to the water was compelled to opt for a more expensive bridge construction was entitled to compensation for the additional costs as against the party responsible for the pollution; a greater loss would have been sustained if the work had been suspended. HUNGARIAN law has detailed rules on reduction of claims in the case of contributory fault (CC § 340), but does not have a rule on the obligation to bear the costs in those cases in which the creditor discharges his duty to mitigate damage. Such a rule does not appear necessary here either because such costs can be considered damage within the meaning of the general norm on tort law liability. That view is supported by CC § 355(4), under which the party causing damage is obliged to reimburse the costs which are necessary for diminishing or eliminating the injured party’s economic and noneconomic loss. The legal position in ROMANIA is unclear because the claim under tort law to reparation possibly fails for the reason that the costs of averting damage are not regarded as a direct consequence of the tortious conduct. CZECH and SLOVAK CC § 419, on the other hand, correspond with Article 6:302: “A person who averted threatening damage shall be entitled to a compensation of usefully spent costs and of damages suffered therein; this right may be exercised even against the person in whose interest he acted; the compensation shall be given maximally in the extent corresponding to the damage that was averted”. Under GERMAN CC § 249(2)(i) in the case of personal injury and property damage the injured party instead of claiming reinstatement of the status quo ante can claim the monetary sum necessary to achieve that. That includes reparation for his expenditure (Palandt (-Heinrichs), BGB67, Pref. to § 249 no. 82). The duty to make reparation under CC § 249(1) also embraces expenditure of the injured party so far as that was necessary in the circumstances (BGH 6 April 1976, BGHZ 66, 182, 192; BGH 24 April 1990, BGHZ 111, 168, 175). The obligation to compensate for expenditure extends to costs

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6.

7.

1002

which are incurred to prevent a specific impending damage or to minimise it if compensation for the damage which that expenditure was to prevent or minimise would itself have been recoverable (BGH 30 September 1993, BGHZ 123, 303, 309; MünchKomm (-Oetker), BGB5, § 249 no. 172; Staudinger (-Schiemann), BGB13, § 249 no. 57). Expenditure arising in connection with measures taken to fulfil one of the duties to mitigate arising under CC § 254 (Contributory fault) must even be compensated in the event that those measures were unsuccessful though not due to the fault of the injured party (Oetker loc. cit. no. 69). In the German Supreme Court case dated 13 November 2003, BGH Report 2004, 305, the operator of a hydroelectric plant removed a large number of aquatic plants washed up ashore, up to 12m in length which should have been cut down by the defendant further upstream. A claim for expenditure based on benevolent intervention in another’s affairs was rejected; howeve. a tort law claim was regarded as feasible in principle but was rejected on the facts of the instant case. According to AUSTRIAN law, costs incurred to prevent damage from occurring are regarded by legal scholarship (Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, no. 2/21; Rummel (-Reischauer), ABGB II2, § 1293 no. 10 and § 1304 no. 45) and constant jurisprudence of the courts (OGH 8 March 1994, SZ 67/35; OGH 16 March 2004, SZ 2004/36) as constituting a so-called “positive damage”, provided that they serve a purpose. These costs may be recovered even if the measures adopted are unsuccessful. The test is what a reasonable person would have done in the same circumstances (OGH 11 January 1927, SZ 9/10 [however, the ratio of this case is based on benevolent intervention in another’s affairs]; OGH 10 February 1960, EvBl 1960/161; OGH 30 August 1988, JBl 1989, 46). The recoverability of contingency costs and reserve costs is contentious. Contingency costs encompass costs incurred to prevent probable damage (video cameras, store detectives). Such claims will fail for lack of causation (Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht II13, 310). For example. a wife’s claim against her violent husband (soon to be exhusband) for the costs of an alarm system, security locks and an ex- directory number failed because of a failure to establish the requisite causation (OGH 28 April 1998, JBl 1999, 49; for criticism see Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VI3, Pref. to §§ 1293 no. 41). By contrast, claims for pro-rata share of the costs associated with the maintenance, purchase and upkeep of replacements, the Reservehaltungskosten (as a rule the costs incurred by passenger transport companies for keeping a spare vehicle in reserve in order to tide them over if one of their vehicles is involved in an accident) are resolved according to the law on benevolent intervention (OGH 9 April 1987, JBl 1988, 319; OGH 6 December 2001, 2 Ob 272/01s; Reischauer loc. cit. § 1323 no. 11a; Koziol/Bydlinski/Bollenberger (-Danzl), ABGB2, § 1323 no. 18). Under GREEK law, whether expenses incurred directed at averting an impending damage are recoverable depends on whether, having regard to provisions on contributory fault (CC art. 300) such expenditure may be deemed to have been necessary (Kalavros, Perivallon kai idiotiko dikaio, http://www.law.uoa.gr/epaek/perivallon_kai_idiotiko_dik aio). The recovery of costs, spent as a precautionary measure in order to prevent loss accruing to the claimant’s patrimony is controversial. For the most part, the view held is that such a claim will fail for lack of causation. (Kalavros loc. cit.). If, in the context of environmental damage, measures are taken to avert future damage occurring, then, in this case, liability arising under the rules governing benevolent intervention in another’s affairs (CC art. 736) should be considered by the courts (Kalavros loc. cit.).

Article 6:302: Liability for loss in preventing damage

8.

9.

10.

DUTCH CC art. 6:96(2) expressly provides that “reasonable costs incurred to prevent or

mitigate damage, the incurrence of which could have been expected, having regard to event founding liability” is a compensatable head of damages (see further inter alia. Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12, no. 414 p. 335). ESTONIAN LOA does not contain a similar rule. Nonetheless, the incurrence of such costs may be recovered under tort law provided that there is proof of causation. The issue of the recoverability of costs incurred to avert impending damage appears to have only been rarely discussed in SWEDEN. HD 22 February 1947, NJA 1947, 82 which concerned costs incurred by a buyer of cattle when he discovered an infectious outbreak in his herd. The costs associated with the measures taken to contain the infection to a section of the herd were regarded as recoverable (see Håstad, Tjänster utan uppdrag, 144, 150). HD 31 December 1946, NJA 1946, 758 I-II held that the costs associated with the slaughter of vixens who as a result of noise generated by military exercises killed their pups, were recoverable. The general view that they were no longer suitable for breeding prompted the slaughter of the vixens. The Court held that these costs were recoverable even though the view held by the breeders was not borne out by scientific evidence (see further Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans, 489). FINNISH Environmental Damages Compensation Act (Lag om ersättning för miljöskador) § 6 confers a right to claim the costs of measures taken by the claimant which were necessary to prevent damage occurring. Measures include carrying out necessary investigations. This corresponds in all essential points to the DANISH Environmental Damage Liability Act (Lov om erstatning for miljøskader) § 2 no. 4. Under ENGLISH law the expenses of averting imminent danger of probable damage for which another would be responsible in tort law can be obtained before the damage is averted where a court awards damages, quantified as the cost of preventing the potential danger, in lieu of a quia timet injunction to prevent the tort (and thus the [more costly] damage) occurring: see Hooper v. Rogers [1975] Ch 43 (where the defendant had excavated a track on a slope and resultant soil erosion threatened removal of support to the claimant’s farmhouse). After the event a claim for loss sustained with a view to minimising possible future damage is generally subsumed within the basic rules on liability in tort (including the requirement of a causal link) and are regarded as a correlative of the duty to mitigate loss, though typical losses such as medical expenses or hiring substitutes are rarely considered in this light: cf. Charlesworth and Percy (-Cooper), Negligence11, para. 4-36; McGregor, Damages17, paras. 2-049–2-050. The approach of IRISH law is fundamentally the same: see McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, 2.47. Such loss can be claimed under the Common Law from the person who would be responsible in tort law for the damage, provided the claimant’s act is not “extraneous or extrinsic” so as to break the chain of causation and render the damage too remote: Clerk and Lindsell (-Burrows), Torts19, 29-10; Mcgregor, Damages17, para. 6-061; and for IRISH law Hogg v. Keane [1956] IR 155, 158 (Maguire CJ: the plaintiff, who injured herself fleeing from a parked car when the defendant in his vehicle negligently collided with it, would be entitled to damages if she could connect her injuries with the accident by showing her fright was reasonable). The claimant can thus recover reasonable expenses incurred in preventing (further) damage: see, for example, Dee Conservancy Board v. McConnell [1928] 2 KB 159 (costs of raising and removing the defendant’s boat which sank due to the defendant’s negligence and was obstructing navigation of the river for which the claimants were conservators). A claimant may recover even if his conduct is ultimately

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based on a mistaken judgment; an unsuccessful attempt to avert or mitigate loss which actually aggravates the damage sustained by the claimant will not amount to a novus actus interveniens, provided it was reasonable conduct of the claimant to avoid (further) loss: Charlesworth and Percy (-Cooper), Negligence11, para. 4-36; Burrows, Remedies3, p. 127; McGregor, Damages17, para. 6-061; Sayers v. Harlow Urban District Council [1958] 1 WLR 623 (claimant could recover damages for injury sustained in attempting to climb over the door of a lavatory cubicle after the defendants negligently locked her in); Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd. v. Modern Cars & Caravans (Kingston) Ltd. [1966] 1 QB 764, 782 per Edmund Davies J (in the context of contractual, rather than tortious, liability, but approving the general proposition set out in the contemporary edition of McGregor, Damages). SCOTS law on these issues is similar (see Walker, Delict2, 217218). In particular, recovery is possible where the pursuer’s reasonable, but mistaken conduct has exacerbated the damage: see Walker loc. cit. 217, and SS “Baron Vernon” v. SS “Metagama” 1928 SC (HL) 21, 25-26 (Viscount Haldane: no breach of the duty to minimise damage if there is a mere error of judgement in difficult circumstances) (which dictum is equally authoritative in English law). Illustration 2 is taken from BGH 13 November 2003, BGHReport 2004, 305; illustration 3 from CA Cáceres 6 November 2006, BDA JUR 2007/46155; and illustration 4 from OGH 8 March 1994, SZ 67/35=RS 0 023516.

Chapter 7: Ancillary rules Article 7:101: National constitutional laws The provisions of this Book are to be interpreted and applied in a manner compatible with the constitutional law of the court.

Comments 1. Chapter 7 in overview. Chapter 7 provides ancillary rules, which essentially clarify that certain legal issues in the field of non-contractual liability are not the subject matter of these model rules. The interaction of these matters with the law on non-contractual liability is partially too complex and also partially too sensitive from a policy perspective to be able to pronounce on them in model rules. Therefore, issues of the involvement of constitutional law – especially fundamental rights – in the law on non-contractual liability remain out of the equation (Article 7:101). Further, the model rules of this Book do not themselves define the term “statutory provisions” (Article 7:102) (Statutory provisions), they are silent on questions on the liability of the State (Article 7:103) (Public law functions and court proceedings), do not probe into labour law (Article 7:104) (Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers associations) and do not pronounce on issues that result from the interplay between insurance law and the law on liability (Article 7:105) (Reduction or exclusion of liability to indemnified persons). In so far as they do not already fall outside the subject field of the model rules due to DCFR I. – 1:101 (Intended field of application), of course other matters are intentionally not enumerated in Chapter 7. In particular, the working teams did not find a sufficient reason for including in the catalogue of exceptional rules further privileges from liability for individual professional groups. 2. Article 7:101. This Article picks up the rule in DCFR I. – 1:102 (Interpretation and development) paragraph (2) for the purposes of this Book. Strictly speaking, this is perhaps unnecessary. However, the influence of fundamental rights on the law on private liability is particularly strong, which is why an express statement and a somewhat more definite formulation appeared helpful. Not only are the rules of this Book to be interpreted in the light of the respective applicable constitutional law, in fact their application falls under the general proviso that they are congruent with the constitutional protection of fundamental rights. This is not only a constitutional statement, but also one of the law on non-contractual liability. It becomes particularly clear in connection with the evaluation of infringements of personality rights by the press. Here, like everywhere else, it is a self-evident aspect of the present branch of the law that it seeks to protect fundamental rights (like freedom of press) and not infringe them.

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Chapter 7: Ancillary rules

Notes 1.

2.

3.

1006

The precise details of the impact that constitutional rules have on civil liability cannot be depicted here in their entirety. A number of pointers will have to suffice. According to FRENCH law, the principle that every person who suffers damage as a consequence of a faute civile is entitled to compensation enjoys constitutional protection (Conseil constitutionnel 22 October 1982, D. 1983 jur. 189, note Luchaire). BELGIAN Const. art. 25 is one of those provisions which exert a strong influence over the private law, in that, in the context of torts committed by the press, it provides that liability must be imposed on defendants in a particular sequential order. For SPAIN, ever since the Constitution came into force in 1978, it is beyond doubt that the principle that statutes must be construed in a manner that is compatible with the constitution is one of the tenets of CC art. 3(1) (Organic Act on Judiciary Power [Ley Orgánica 6/1985, del poder judicial] art. 5; Paz-Ares/Díez-Picazo/Bercovitz/Salvador (-Salvador), Código Civil I2, 25). The practice of assessing the compensation of victims of traffic accidents by adverting to actuarial tables was deemed compatible with the Constitution. This ruling does not impinge upon the fact that the right to claim compensation where corporeal and incorporeal personality rights are culpably infringed is guaranteed by the Constitution (TC 29 June 2000, no. 181, BDA RTC 2000/181). This constitutional protection is also afforded to claims for compensation for non-pecuniary loss for breaches of the right to an intimate sphere committed by the press (TC 17 September 2001, no. 186, BDA RTC 2001/186). It remains to be said that the presumption of innocence is only a feature of criminal law and is not a feature of private law (TC 13 December 1993, no. 367, BDA RTC 1993/367; TS 19 June 1997, RAJ 1997 (3) no. 5420 p. 8287; TS 13 February 2003, RAJ 2003 (1) no. 1045 p. 1998). See notes II 18 and V40 under Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) on the constitutionally inspired re-orientation under ITALIAN law in the field of liability for non-economic loss. With respect to GERMANY, the BVerfG 18 January 2001, NJW 2001, 1639 held that requiring a media company to pay damages for the publication of an article which had the knock-on effect of impinging on its economic basis did not infringe on the freedom of the press. See above Note VIII 75 under Article 2:101 (Meaning of legally relevant damage) and II 11 under Article 2:203 (Infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy). AUSTRIAN CC § 1330 confers a right on the person concerned to claim compensation if the claimant’s right to honour is infringed by a defamatory statement. However, this right may be abridged by the right to freedom of expression (Basic Law on General Rights of Nationals art. 13; ECHR art. 10) which may, to a certain degree, justify exaggerated or provocative statements (OGH 14 March 2000, JBl 2000, 664; OGH 18 August 2004, SZ 2004/127; OGH 28 November 1997, ÖJZ 1997, 956). In SWEDEN, as in other countries, state liability has been extended for violations of the ECHR. The courts accepted an independent claim flowing from the Convention itself, granting a right to claim non-pecuniary damages for state violations of the Convention regardless of a statutory basis under national law (HD 9 June 2005, NJA 2005, 462; HD 21 September 2007, NJA 2007, 584). However, the Convention does not apply between two private parties. The Supreme Court rejected the claim of a private individual, based on the ECHR, initiated against her insurance company who had subjected her to covert surveillance (HD 29 October 2007, NJA 2007, 747). By contrast, the NORWEGIAN

Article 7:102: Statutory provisions

4.

courts are more inclined to rely on the ECHR when they are called upon to determine a claim between private individuals involving a breach of the right to respect for private life (HD 7 May 2007, Rt 2007, 687; HD 10 April 2008, HR-2008-647-A). While the UNITED KINGDOM does not have a written constitution in the traditional sense, English case law does recognise ‘constitutional statutes’ or ‘legislation of constitutional significance’, a notion which embraces (among others) legislation which enlarges or diminishes the scope of fundamental constitutional rights and of which the Human Rights Act 1998 is an example: Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) at [62], [2003] QB 151, 186 (Laws LJ). Legislation must be interpreted compatibly with rights under the ECHR, so far as possible: Human Rights Act 1998, s. 3. Moreover, the prohibition on courts as “public authorities” acting in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right (s. 6(1),(3)(a)) requires tort law rules to be modified where necessary to comply with the ECHR: see, for example, Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457; McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB) at [48]-[49], [2006] EMLR 178, 190 (Eady J) on the requirement that claims based on a right to privacy or breach of confidence take account of and balance ECHR arts. 8 (protection of private life) and 10 (freedom of expression), the justifications for interfering with or restricting rights under those articles and, considerations of proportionality.

Article 7:102: Statutory provisions National law determines what legal provisions are statutory provisions.

Comments The Articles of this Book use the expressions “statute” or “statutory provisions” on many occasions (see Article 2:202 (Loss suffered by third persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death) paragraph (2)(c), Article 3:102 (Negligence) sub-paragraph (a), Article 3:206 (Accountability for damage caused by dangerous substances or emissions) paragraph (5)(b)and Article 5:401 (Contractual exclusion or limitation of liability) paragraph (4)). In each case, statutes in a material sense are what is meant by “statutes”, not necessarily parliamentary statutes (see Comments under Article 3:102 (Negligence)). Such norms, which are binding for all, take a diverse spectrum of outward forms. Their detailed classification and distinction from individual regulations on the one hand and sets of rules without normative character on the other (the usual of example of which would be the safety regulations of public insurance or maintenance bodies), cannot be provided by these model rules. Clarifying this is the aim of the present Article.

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Notes 1.

2.

3.

1008

Most of the Member States differentiate between different types of law-making, between Acts in the strict sense and Laws in a wider sense (including Public General Acts and Measures, secondary legislation and recognised rules of customary law). The FRENCH approach regards Law in the wider sense as connoting a legal norm emanating from the State, the breach of which entails some legal sanction (Carbonnier, Droit civil I, p. 13 no. 5). A law in the wider sense must be in writing, may not be ad hominem and must be an expression of the general will (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen [Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen] of 1789, art. 6); it is abstract, general and permanent. Acts in the strict sense are parliamentary enactments; they can also be stem from a referendum. Acts in the strict sense are not necessarily Laws in the wider sense (Ghestin/Goubeaux/Fabre-Magnan, Introduction generale4, no. 244; Chabas, Lecon de droit civil I(1)12, no. 66), because the former may solely be directed at a specific person. Regulations made by central and local government (règlements) and International Conventions can be only Laws in the wider sense. As regards Regulations, a distinction is drawn between règlements autonomes (Const. art. 37) and règlements d’exécution or règlements administratifs. Règlements d’exécution are made by Ministers, while decrees made by Prefects and Mayors are designated arrêtés. In the BELGIAN hierarchy of norms (detailed by Hansenne, Introduction au droit privé, no. 34) the Constitution ranks before Acts; below these are the décrets of the Conseils des Communautés et des régions (which in the region Bruxelles-Capitale are designated ordonnances). Décrets and ordonnances have the same effect as an Act in the strict sense for the localities in which they operate. SPANISH CC art. 1(1) sets out the following hierarchy of legal sources: (i) law (ley), (ii) custom (costumbre) and (iii) general principles of law (principios generales del Derecho). According to current understanding, the concept of ley includes (Gordillo Cañas, ADC 1988, 469-515) the Constitution as well as the decisions of the Tribunal Constitucional on the constitutionality of a statute ranked below the Constitution. Ley also embraces an enactment of the national parliament (Cortes Generales) as well as an enactment emanating from the (regional) Autonomous Parliaments (Parlamentos autonómicos), furthermore it encompasses regulations and other legal norms, which may be enacted by the central government and automonous regions once particular requirements are met. In the context of private law, regional law is becoming increasingly significant. Whilst legislative competence principally lies exclusively with the national legislature, those automonous regions which traditionally have their own civil law are permitted to ‘conserve, modify and develop’ the state private law (Const. art. 149(1)(no. 8a)). In a similar manner, ITALIAN disp. prel. art. 1 designates Acts, Regulations and Custom or usage as sources of law. Laws of a constitutional character regulate the issue of governmental decrees having the force of law (Preliminary Provisions to the Civil Code art. 2). In HUNGARY, statutes may only be enacted by parliament. The competence to regulate a particular area derives from the Constitution. CC § 685 is numbered among the “statutory provisions” in the sense of the terminology employed in the Civil Code alongside Acts, governmental regulations and legislation made by automonous administrative bodies under the authority conferred on them by law. According to ROMANIAN Const. art. 73(1) Acts in the strict sense are Constitutional Acts, Acts to amend

Article 7:102: Statutory provisions

4.

5.

6.

and supplement the Constitution and ordinary Acts of the legislature (legi ordinare), and also include Parliamentary Resolutions which only pertain to a particular case. By virtue of Const. art. 115, the central government, if authorised by an enabling statute, may issue an ordinance (ordonant¸a˘); the government also has the power to issue ordinances in a situation of emergency (ordonant¸a˘ de urgent¸a˘) (Const. art. 115(4)). Matters involving great technical detail may be regulated by governmental decrees (Hota˘rârea Guvernului) and orders (Ordin); this method is utilised, for example, in the context of the law on motor liability insurance. A number of decrees and decree laws stemming from the time prior to change in the system of government remain in force, e. g. Prescription Decree [Decree no. 167/1958]. According to GERMAN CCIA art. 2, the concept of “statute” for the purposes of private law is defined as “every legal norm”. GREEK CC art. 1 arrives at the same result, as it provides that “legal norms are contained in statutes and rules of custom and usage.” In a similar fashion, AUSTRIAN law differentiates between Acts in a strict sense (Acts of Parliament) and Law in a wider sense. Laws in a wider sense embrace every general abstract norm and include all norms, which are made on the basis of a authority conferred in primary legislation. Laws in a wider sense also include protective laws in the sense of CC § 1311. Even technical guidelines can also be included under this rubric provided that they were declared as binding in an Act in the strict sense or in a Regulation (Schwimann (-Harrer), ABGB VI3, § 1311, no. 9). The notion of “statutory provision” (disposição legal) under PORTUGUESE CC art. 483(1) embraces, according to CC art. 1(2) all general provisions which stem from the competent state body. These include Acts of Parliament, Ordinances and regional legislative decrees (Const. art. 111(1)). Statutes emanating from the Assembleia da República are called leis, the government issues decretos-lei. Leis and decretos-lei have the same normative effect (Const. art. 112(2)). The government is conferred with an independent legislative competence in all matters which are not exclusively accorded to the parliamentary domain (Const. art. 164). As regards the civil law, the precise demarcation of competences may be derived from Const. arts. 161(c) and (d), 198(1). According to DUTCH Const. art. 81 statutes shall be passed jointly by the government and the Staten-Generaal. If the Constitution refers to “statute”, it always refers to Acts in the strict sense. Laws in the wider sense can also be passed by other competent bodies, provided that they are empowered to do so by the Constitution or by an Act in a strict sense; if the same perequisites are satisfied, this competence can be delegated further. Laws in the wider sense embrace, in particular, algemene maatregelen van bestuur (generally binding governmental regulations established by Royal Decree [Const. art. 89]); ministeriële regelingen (generally binding Ministerial Orders); provinciale verordeningen (generally binding regulations of the provinces); gemeentelijke verordeningen (generally binding regulations of municipalities) and Regulations of water boards and public bodies. In the NORDIC countries the term “statute” (or “statutory provisions”) refers to all enacted legal instruments, whether by parliament, the government, municipalities or public authorities. Therefore, when it comes to ascertaining the extent of the duty of care in negligence, recourse may be had to a large spectrum of special statutory rules on the protection of the interest concerned; reliance may also be placed on rules of custom (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 128; von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret6, 66; Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt, 15; Hagstrøm, TfR 1980, 292-366).

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For the UNITED KINGDOM Parliament has chosen different terms for different persons so that “statutory provisions” could not be regarded as a term of art devoid of context, though it is capable of embracing both secondary as well as primary legislation: cf., for example, the definition of “local statutory provision” in the Water Consolidation (Consequential Provisions) Act 1991, s. 1(2) and of “statutory provisions” in the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 2002, s. 2(6), where the term both includes and excludes subordinate legislation for the different purposes of the Act. It is clear that for the purposes of breach of statutory duty, regulations made under an Act may contain such duties, though whether the Act authorising the regulations gave authority to the executive to create private rights of action may be regarded as critical in determining whether duties in the secondary legislation can form the basis for a tort: see Clerk and Lindsell (-Jones), Torts19, paras. 9-44. The Human Rights Act 1998, s. 21(1) defines for the purposes of that Act primary legislation and secondary legislation. The former includes public general Acts, local and personal Acts, private Acts, Measures of the General Synod of the Church of England (or its predecessor, the Church Assembly), and Orders in Council made under the Royal Prerogative (as opposed to a statutory power) as well as instruments made under such legislation to amend such legislation or bringing it into force. The latter include other Orders in Council, Acts of the Scottish Parliament, Measures and Acts of the National Assembly for Wales, Acts of the Northern Ireland Assembly (and Acts and Measures of its predecessor bodies), orders, rules, regulations, schemes, warrants, byelaws and other instruments made under primary legislation (so far as not amending primary legislation or bringing it into force).

Article 7:103: Public law functions and court proceedings This Book does not govern the liability of a person or body arising from the exercise or omission to exercise public law functions or from performing duties during court proceedings.

Comments 1. Relationship with DCFR I. – 1:101(2) (Intended field of application). This Article absorbs the rule in DCFR I. – 1:101 (Intended field of application) paragraph (2), concretising and extending it for the purposes of the law on non-contractual liability. This Book neither concerns itself with issues of liability for the erroneous exercise of sovereign power nor with questions of liability for damage in connection with conducting court proceedings. The same applies to matters relating primarily to procedure or enforcement (DCFR I. – 1:101(2)(h)). 2. Person or body exercising public law functions. Remaining excluded from the scope of application of this Book is the liability of the State and its institutions as well as the personal liability of its office holders for the exercise or the failure to exercise sovereign power in breach of duty.

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Article 7:103: Public law functions and court proceedings

Illustration X, a prison inmate and perpetrator of violence, is let out on parole on many occasions and, after a period of time, even let out for one year. During this time, he abducts a woman and forces her to perform sexual acts. Neither the issue of whether the State is liable for the wrongful omission of its officials, nor the question of whether one of them is personally liable, is governed by these rules. What exactly is to be understood under the exercise of public authority is to be decided in conformity with the criteria developed on EC Treaty art. 45(1). Remaining borderline cases must be left to the respective lex fori for demarcation; whether it is possible for uniform criteria on the demarcation between the realisation of public functions on the one hand and private law (fiscal) duties on the other, could not be verified. 3. Performing duties during court proceedings. Moreover, this Book contains no statement on the liability of judges or the liability of lawyers and expert witnesses for their activities in court. In this area of their professional activity, all three professional groups typically enjoy privileges from liability, which remain unaffected by the rules of this Book. The term “court” includes arbitration tribunals, see DCFR I. – 1:103 (Definitions) paragraph (1) in conjunction with DCFR Definitions, keyword “Court”.

Notes 1.

In many of the Member States, the issue of liability of a State, of its emanations and public servants is made subject to a special regime and frequently, particular courts are vested with jurisdiction to hear the matter. In FRANCE, it is chiefly the administrative courts which have jurisdiction to exercise authority in this area; however, jurisdiction to resolve cases involving vehicular damage is vested in the civil courts (Act on the Jurisdiction of the Tribunaux Judiciaires in Proceedings on Compensation for Injury sustained in Traffic against Public Persons of 31 December 1957). The State is liable for every fault committed by it or by a public servant during the course of performing his or her functions; the State is not merely liable for grave fault (CE 7 February 2003, no. 223882, Secrétaire d’Etat au logement v. SNC Empain Graham). According to the Responsibility of Judges Act (Act no. 79-43 of 18 January 1979), the State is liable for the personal fault of judges and lawyers of the State: the State is permitted, in this context, to initiate an action claiming contribution from the civil servant in special proceedings before the Civil Chamber of the Cour de Cassation (Responsibility of Judges Act art. 11-1; Cass.civ. 5 March 1980, Bull.civ. 1980, I, no. 79, RTD civ 1980, 771, noted by Durry; Cass.civ. 5 May 1982, D. 1983, I. R. 1956, noted by Julien; Cass.civ. 30 January 1996, D. 1997, 83, note Legrand). Criminal police officers are treated the same as judges and public prosecutors (Cass.civ. 9 March 1999, Bull.civ. 1999, I, no. 84), but lay judges are subject to a special regime. Personal fault is established in cases of a denial of justice, intention, fraud, where excess fees are demanded and in cases of grave professional fault (Judicature Act [Code de l’organisation judiciaire] art. L. 141-1; CA Versailles 27 July 1989, JCP éd. G 1990, II, 21450, note Estoup; Cass.civ. 3 July 1990, JCP éd. G 1990, IV, 336; Cass.civ. 10 May 1995, I. R. 1995, 143). Stricter rules apply in the event that a judicial error occurs in cases concerning wardship (CC art. 473). Law-

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2.

3.

1012

yers are liable according to the general rules (Legal Professions Act art. 26; liability insurance is mandatory [loc. cit. art. 27]). In BELGIUM, as regards the civil liability of the State, it is necessary to differentiate between the three organs of government. For the executive, the rules pertaining to faute apply as they do in relation to any other person (Leclercq, concl. under Cass. 25 October 2004, R. W. 2006-07, 1486). Consequently, an administrative body or other emanation of the executive commits a faute under CC arts. 1382 and 1383 if it breaches a duty of care or statutory provision and cannot invoke a ground of defence (e. g. an unavoidable mistake) (Cass. 14 January 2000, R. W. 2001-02, 1096, note Van Oevelen). Every unlawful interpretation or application of a legal norm by the executive obliges the State to make good the damage this caused to third parties. Since Cass. 19 December 1991, Pas. belge 1992, I, 316, the State is also liable under CC arts. 1382 and 1383 for damage arising as a résultant d’une faute commise par un juge ou un officier du ministère public lorsque ce magistrat a agi dans les limites de ses attributions légales ou lorsque celui-ci doit être considéré comme ayant agi dans ces limites, par tout homme raisonnable et prudent. However, this principle is relevant only for the case where the erroneous decision was overruled or annulled by another legally binding decision, on the grounds that it infringed a legal norm, and, further, if the erroneous interpretation or application of law constituted a faute (Cass. 26 June 1998, www.cass.be). Finally, the State may incur civil liability where mistakes occur during the exercise of legislative power (Cass.ass.pl. 1 June 2006, R. W. 2006-07, 213, concl. De Swaef, note Van Oevelen). Cass. 28 September 2006, no. de rôle c020570F confirmed that the State could be liable. The ratio of the judgment was that the legislature had committed a faute because it failed to provide the judiciary with the funds which were needed to ensure that civil proceedings could be conducted timeously. The Public Authority’s Liability Act of 10 February 2003 (Loi relative à la responsabilité des et pour les membres du personnel au service des personnes publiques) provided for new regulations on many aspects pertaining to liability of the State. Of particular note are the changes introduced by art. 3, which provides that the general rules governing employer liability (CC art. 1384(3)) now apply in the context of state liability. Judges and public prosecutors are only personally liable for perverting the course of justice (prise à partie, Code judiciaire arts. 1140-1147), fraudulent conduct and denial of justice. Lawyers incur liability under the general principles on civil liability (CFR Brussels 27 February 1986, no. JB00131_1; CA Brussels 3 March 1987, RGDC 1987, 1869). According to the LUXEMBOURGIAN State and other Public Bodies Civil Liability Act of 1 September 1988, under art. 1(1), the State and other public bodies in the course of exercising an administrative act are liable for all damage that stems from a judicial or an administrative error (see further Ravarani, La responsabilité civile2, no. 120). Therefore, the liability of the State follows the general rules of liability for faute set forth in the Civil Code (Ravarani, La responsabilité civile2, p. 414 no. 500). If special circumstances are extant, moreover, liability will be imposed without proof of misconduct having to be adduced (loc. cit. arts. 1(2) and (2)). Judges and public prosecutors may be held personally liable once stringent requirements are satisfied; this also holds true for liability in respect of an action by the State for contribution. The legal position is, for the most part, identical to that prevailing in Belgium.The same holds true for the liability of lawyers (see further Ravarani loc. cit. no. 258).

Article 7:103: Public law functions and court proceedings

4.

5.

In SPAIN extracontractual liability of public administration is governed by General Regime of Public Administrations Act (Ley 30/1992, de régimen jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas y procedimiento administrativo común, of 26 November 1992 [as amended] – LRJ-PAC) arts. 139-146. Loc. cit. art. 139(1) provides that “individuals shall be entitled to compensation by the relevant Public Administration for all damage sustained to any of their goods and rights”, if the damage is the result “of the normal or abnormal functioning of the public services”. The rule applies to all public law bodies and it embraces all sorts of activities of the Public Administration, even if in a private law relationship (loc. cit. art. 144); only the liability arising from court proceedings has its own regime (see below). All natural and legal persons are protected, including civil servants and (other) bodies exercising public law functions. The liability is direct in the sense that the civil servant or public employee that caused the damage cannot be taken to court, unless either he/she was criminally liable or he/she caused the damage with intention or gross negligence. In the latter case the Public Administration may seek reimbursement under loc. cit. art. 145(2), in the former its liability is of a subsidiary nature (TS 19 November 2001, RAJ 2002 (2) no. 2775 p. 4806; Busto Lago, La responsabilidad civil de las administraciones públicas3, 1721). The civil servant’s conduct must be ‘in the exercise or on the occasion of public functions’ (TS 25 June 1997, RAJ 1997 (3) no. 5834 p. 8983). Liability is strict (loc. cit. arts. 139-146), the only defence being force majeure. Const. art. 121 states that “damage caused by either a judicial mistake or by the abnormal functioning of the Public Administration of Justice shall entitle [the victim] to a compensation by the State”. Organic Act on Judiciary Power [LOPJ] art. 252 develops this provision further. Advocates are not within that regime, unless appointed by the State. On the personal liability of judges of the Constitutional Court see TS 23 January 2004, RAJ 2004 (1) no. 1 p. 17. Damage caused by an Act of Parliament may also be compensated under LRJ-PAC arts. 139-146. A typical case would be an infringement of EC law (e. g. TS 12 June 2003, RAJ 2003 (5) no. 8844 p. 16562). ITALIAN Const. art. 28 provides that public employees are personally liable under criminal, civil and adminstrative law for breaches of official duty. In such cases, tort liability extends to the State or to the relevant public sector body employing the civil servant concerned. (Alpa and Mariconda (-Alpa and Mariconda), Codice civile commentato IV, sub art. 2043, XIII, § 62, p. 2398). The general principles of civil liability apply in this context in so far as they do not conflict with the public law status of the defendant (Cass. 7 February 1974, no. 330, Giur.it. 1974, I, 1, 1158; Cass. 29 November 1973, no. 3245, Giur.it. 1974, I, 1, 1343). The prerequisites for the imposition of liability are a culpable (Cass.sez.un. 22 July 1999, no. 500, Foro it. 1999, I, 2478; Cass. 29 March 2004, no. 6199, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, fasc. 3; Cass. 23 July 2004, no. 13801, Giust.civ.Mass. 2004, fasc. 7-8) unlawful violation of an official duty (e. g. Cass. 10 February 2005, no. 2705, Giust.civ.Mass. 2005, fasc. 2), causation and an activity that correlates with the institutional functions exercised by the State or public authority (Cass. 17 September 1997, no. 9260, Foro it. 1998, I, 1217; Cass. 18 March 2003, no. 3980, Giust.civ.Mass. 2003, 538). Intentional acts may also be imputed to the State if there is a nesso di occasionalità necessaria between the act and the official duties entrusted to the civil servant (Cass. 14 May 1997, no. 4232, Giust.civ.Mass. 1997, 732). The public servant is personally liable in conjunction with the State and, in an applicable case, the State may claim contribution from the former. In the context of a number of occupations that require training, practised in State institutions, special statutes

1013

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6.

7.

8.

1014

apply, which provide in part for divergent rules. Compensation for Damages Caused by Juridical Errors Act (Risarcimento dei danni cagionati nell’esercizio delle funzioni giudiziarie e Responsabilità civile dei Magistrate) governs the recovery of damage which was caused by the exercise of judicial functions and governs the civil liability of judges and public prosecutors. The liability of the State is triggered in cases of intention, gross negligence and denial of justice. Compensation for non-pecuniary loss is only recoverable in a case of deprivation of liberty (loc. cit. art. 2(1)). Judges and public prosecutors are liable (via a claim for contribution) only against the State (loc. cit. art. 7); a different outcome results only where they are guilty of a criminal offence (loc. cit. art. 13). HUNGARIAN CC § 349(1) governs the liability for damage caused by the public administration; this rule applies correspondingly to the liability of judges and public prosecutors for damage caused by them (CC § 349(3)). Liability is only triggered if no ordinary legal redress is available to avert the damage or the injured party has already resorted to a common legal remedy in order to avert the damage. Liability is imposed on the relevant competent body to which the conduct of the natural person can be imputed; therefore, CC § 349 merely represents a special manifestation of employee liability (Gellért (-Benedek), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6, 1296 ff; Petrik (-Wellmann), Polgári jog II2, 606/3 ff; Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7, 141 ff). According to the general principles (CC § 339), blameworthiness is a prerequisite for the imposition of liability. In this context, an examination as to whether whether the defendant has behaved in a manner as might be reasonably expected given the particular circumstances of the case will take place. An incorrect interpretation of a legal provision or a failure to evaluate evidence correctly, of itself, will not suffice; instead a grave and manifest violation of the law is required (Benedek loc. cit. 1304 ff; Wellmann loc. cit. 608 ff; Petrik, Kártérítési jog, 170 ff). Under BULGARIAN law, judges and civil servants are liable for intention and gross negligence. ROMANIAN Const. art. 52, in conjunction with Act no. 554/2004 on official disputes art. 1, confers a right on every individual to claim compensation for economic and noneconomic loss if his or her rights (not a mere interest) have been breached by the public administration. Liability is strict; the relevant office-holder is only personally liable in cases where fault is established by the injured party (loc. cit. art. 13(1)). A special regime governs judicial errors in criminal matters (Const. art. 52(3) in conjunction with CCrimProc arts. 504-507. POLISH CC arts. 417, 4171, 4172 and 418 govern the civil liability of the State and are placed immediately after the basic norm of tort law (CC art. 415). Under art. 417(1) the State Treasury, territorial self-government unit or another legal person exercising public authority by virtue of law shall be liable for damage inflicted by unlawful activity or cessation thereof which occurred in exercise of such authority. Liability for legislative error is the subject of a detailed regulation in CC art. 4171. GERMAN CC § 839 only governs the personal liability of civil servants where there have breached their official duty owed to the citizen and it is of no consequence as to whether they were engaged in sovereign or fiscal activities (BGH [Great Senate in Civil Matters] 19 December 1960, BGHZ 34, 99, 104). Within the framework of the Civil Code, it exclusively governs this field of law and is lex specialis to all other rules of liability based on the principle of fault and excludes their application (Soergel (-Vinke), BGB13, § 839, no. 12). CC § 839 also renders the official concerned liable for pecuniary loss and furthermore, contains specific rules restricting liability (CC § 839(1)(ii) [sub-

Article 7:103: Public law functions and court proceedings

9.

10.

11.

sidarity], § 839(2) [judicial immunity] and § 839(3) [the duty to avert the damage by having recourse to a legal remedy]). However, it must be read in conjunction with Const. art. 34, according to which a distinction must be drawn between the personal liability of civil servants and the liability of public authorities. The latter only applies to activities involving the exercise of public power and in this context liability is imposed on the public body and not the official acting on its behalf (Palandt (-Sprau), BGB67, § 839, nos. 1, 12). Within the scope of application of Const. art. 34, the civil servant is liable only towards the State and is not directly liable towards the citizen concerned. Liability is only triggered in cases of intention and gross negligence. Const. art. 34 therefore extends the category of persons who may be held liable under the precepts of state liability to include all persons who are entrusted to perform official duties by the employing public authority (see further Medicus, Schuldrecht II14, no. 913; BGH 23 November 1995, BGHZ 131, 200, 203); it entails the statutory assumption of an obligation on the part of the public authority and the official is immune from liability visà-vis a third party. According to AUSTRIAN Civil Servants’ Liability Act (AHG) § 1 the liability of relevant public authority (Federal Goverment, state government and local authorities) is governed by general civil law precepts and liability is imposed for personal injury or property damage which is caused to a third party by the unlawful and culpable act of a person when implementing the law on behalf of the competent body. This encompasses administrative as well as judicial acts but does not embrace unlawful conduct on the part of the legislature (OGH 15 October 2004, SZ 2004/148). As a rule, the public authority is obliged to pay monetary compensation (in contrast to reparation in kind); gross negligence is a prerequisite for a successful loss of profits claim. For a number of special statutes the existence of fault is not a prerequisite (on the unlawful deprivation of liberty, see e. g. OGH 18 June 1975, SZ 48/69). Many restrictions are placed on imposition of liability for errors in judical decision-making; liability may not be imposed for mistakes which occur at Supreme Court level where that error results in an inferior court having to examine a Supreme Court decision (AHG § 2(3); see OGH 25 August 1993, SZ 66/97 and OGH 25 February 1997, SZ 70/32). In order for the liability to be imposed on the State for an error in a ruling of an inferior court where there is no right to appeal, a material departure from a clear-cut legal position is required. In the context of decisions governing parent and child relations, a failure to supervise a lawyer adequately may give rise to state liability (OGH 14 July 1992, SZ 65/108). There are, as yet, no statutory provisions in respect of unlawful legislative actions, which particularly result from a non-existent or defective transposition of Community law Under GREEK law, according to recent case law (A. P. 18/1999, EEN 67/2000, 230 = EllDik 40/1999, 1290 = DEE 11 (1999), 1172) lawyers are not embraced by the scope of application of the rules governing the strict liability of service providers under GREEK Consumer Protection Act 2251/1994 (as amended by Act no. 3587/2007). The ground of justification adduced in support of this development is based on considerations of the special status held by lawyers as holders of a public office. Consequently liability continues to be imposed according to the rules contained in the Code of Civil Procedure Implementation Act art. 73. In PORTUGAL, State Liability Act no. 67/2007 is a comprehensive regulation governing the liability of the State. In this context, account also has to be taken of CC art. 501 which provides for strict liability of the state and other legal persons under public law

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12.

13.

14.

1016

when exercising a private law activity. Under Law no. 67/2007 art. 11 the State and other public corporate bodies are liable for “special and abnormal losses resulting from specially dangerous administrative services or things”, unless a defence of force majeure may be invoked or the damage can be attributed to the fault of the injured party or that of a third party. In the NETHERLANDS, the legal rules governing unlawful acts of the State (onrechtmatige overheidsdaad) generally derive from the general rules contained CC art. 6:162. It should be noted, however, that administrative law is accorded priority in a number of areas. The civil courts have jurisdiction to examine the legality of particular administrative acts and adopt the criterion of whether the conduct in question meets the “general principles of proper administrative behaviour”. (HR 27 March 1987, NedJur 1987 no. 727 p. 2454; Asser (-Hartkamp) Verbintenissenrecht III12, nos. 266-271c; Parlementaire Geschiedenis VI, 1347). ESTONIA has consolidated regulations on the liability of the State in the State Liability Act. SWEDISH Damages Liability Act chap. 3 § 2 provides for state (and municipal) liability for personal injuries, property damage, pure economic loss and violations within chap. 2 § 3 (infringements of human dignity etc), if caused by negligence in the course of exercising duties of a public authority. The standard of care is, in contrast to the normal rules under private law, an objective one; the personal characteristics of individual public servants are irrelevant. Negligence may be “anonymous” in that the injured party is not obliged to prove that a particular civil servant was negligent nor is it necessary to adduce proof that he or she knew about another civil servant’s conduct. Negligent conduct may be found based on separate actions or omissions by several servants or authorities which in total amount to negligent conduct. The requirement that the damage must have been caused in the course of exercising public authority has caused several difficult questions of delimitation (see e. g. HD 20 July 1987, NJA 1987, 535. Damages Liability Act chap. 3 § 3 extends state liability to pure economic losses caused by negligently given information or advice (see in more detail Bengtsson, Det allmännas ansvar enligt skadeståndslagen, passim; Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 443). State liability for infringements of the ECHR is exclusively based on the Convention itself and includes liability for non-economic losses (e. g. HD 9 June 2005, NJA 2005, 462; HD 21 September 2007, NJA 2007, 584; Crafoord, ERT 2000, 519-547; Andersson, JFT 2007, 377-414). FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 3 § 3 corresponds to Swedish Damages Liability Act chap. 3 § 2; however, there is no specific rule on liability for wrongful information or advice. On the rules governing state liability in DENMARK see Gomard, UfR 2004 B, 383-390. In all the Nordic countries public bodies share the same vicarious liability as other employers (von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret6, 128; Swedish Damages Liability Act chap. 3 § 1; Finnish Damages Liability Act chap. 3 § 1). Under ENGLISH law the common law immunity of the Crown to actions in tort never extended to the individual public servants, who could always be sued for their own wrongdoing: Clerk and Lindsell (-Murphy), Torts16, 5-02. The immunity of the Crown itself against vicarious liability for the torts committed by its servants and agents, for breach of duty as an employer, and for breach of common law duties attaching to ownership, occupation, possession and control of property, and in respect of breach of statutory duty (so far as those duties are imposed on the Crown) was substantially abolished by the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, s. 2. The special provision in respect

Article 7:103: Public law functions and court proceedings

of the armed forces in s. 10 of that Act has also been repealed, but may be re-introduced by subordinate legislation if regarded as expedient by reason of any imminent national danger or great emergency or for the purposes of “warlike operations” outside the UK: Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act 1987. While there is no separate public law of tort, the general principles of tort law do take account of the public function of the tortfeasor in appropriate cases. The Bill of Rights 1688, art. 9 (in modernised spelling) provides “[t]hat the freedom of speech, and of debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court, or any place out of Parliament”. This provision is the basis of absolute privilege against actions for defamation brought in respect of statements made during parliamentary proceedings, but the privilege may be waived (Defamation Act 1996, s. 13(4)). The privilege is confirmed by the Defamation Act 1996, s. 13(1), (5) (nothing in the section affects any enactment or rule of law so far as it protects a person from legal liability for words spoken or things done in the course of, or for the purposes of or incidental to proceedings in Parliament, including the giving of evidence or submission of a document to either House or a committee, and communications with the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards). Absolute privilege also attaches to official communications (i. e. by one civil or military public servants to another in the course of their duties), regardless of malice in making the statement: Dawkins v. Lord Paulet (1869) LR 5 QB 94 (report by general to his superiors about a subordinate); Chatterton v. Secretary of State for India [1895] 2 QB 189 (communications made by a Secretary of State to his Parliamentary Under-Secretary). Specific statutory provisions provide for absolute privilege in respect of reports and other publications by or communications to certain officers and bodies: see, among others, the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, s. 10(5) (for the Parliamentary Comissioner for Administration), Local Government Act 1974, s. 32(1) (for Local Commissioners) and Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s. 23(5) (for the Legal Services Ombudsman). By its nature the tort of misfeasance in a public office is only capable of being committed by a public officer. This tort requires proof of damage (variously described as material damage or special damage), regardless of whether the right interfered with can be described as constitutional or not: Watkins v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 17, [2006] 2 AC 395. However, loss of liberty, even if partial only, is regarded as sufficient damage for these purposes: Karagozlu v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2006] EWCA Civ 1691 at [45], [2007] 1 WLR 1881. Equally, the judicial discretion to award damages or other relief under the Human Rights Act 1998, s. 8 against a public authority where the court is satisfied the award is necessary to afford just satisfaction where the authority has acted incompatibly with the claimant’s rights under the ECHR (see s. 6) is confined to redress against persons whose functions are of a public nature. The availability of damages is restricted in respect of judicial acts done in good faith: in such cases damages may only be awarded to compensate to the extent required by art. 5(5) of the Convention (loc. cit., s. 9(3)) and may only be awarded against the Crown (i. e. not against a judge or other public servant) (loc. cit., s. 9(4)). Furthermore, one of the two anomalous categories of case in which (aside from any statutory basis) exemplary damages may be awarded is where there has been “oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of government”: Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129, 1226 (Lord Devlin). Conversely, the defence of act of state is specific to the exercise of the executive function. Equally, in the application of the rules on negligence, the public function to be exercised by the defendant may be relevant in denying a duty of care (i) because the dis-

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cretionary nature of the public body’s decision-making renders the matter non-justiciable (X (Minors) v. Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633) or (ii) because, in applying the criteria set out in Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, it may not be regarded as fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care in the provision of the particular public service. The latter is particularly strong in relation to the exercise of investigatory powers to prevent a “detrimentally defensive frame of mind”: Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 (no proximity between police and a member of the public to found a claim of negligence in failing to apprehend a mass murderer who killed the claimant’s daughter) D v. East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 23; [2005] 2 WLR 993 (no duty owed to parents under investigation in case of suspected child abuse). The existence of a statutory obligation to act imposed on a public officer or body precludes a voluntary assumption of responsibility towards the persons foreseeably affected by that act and so may negate a common law duty of care in negligence: Rowley v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2007] EWCA Civ 598, [2007] 1 WLR 2861 (concerning alleged delays and errors of the Child Support Agency in assessing and enforcing maintenance payments due from a non-resident father to his children). Hence whether as part of the issue whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose on a public body a common law duty of care, as an aspect of justiciability, or as an entirely free-standing question, the court considers whether such a duty would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme under which the body acts and whether the statute confers a private law right of action for breach of statutory duty: Rowley v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2007] EWCA Civ 598 at [49] at [61], [2007] 1 WLR 2861 at 2876B-C and 2879A-B (Dyson LJ). Specific limited statutory immunities are provided by the Postal Services Act 2000, s. 90 for the providers of a universal postal service, its employees and sub-contractors in connection with the provision of that service. Legislation also provides for the immunity (from suit, rather than from liability) of foreign states and embassy staff: see the State Immunity Act 1978 and the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964. For visiting military personnel, see the Visiting Forces Act 1952, s. 9(1) (providing for compensation from public funds). Under the Representation of the People Act 1983, s. 63 (as substituted by the Representation of the People Act 1985, s. 24 and Schedule 4, para. 19), registration officers, returning officers and other officials involved in Parliamentary or local elections have an immunity from liability at common law for breach of official duty (barring the right to damages laid down in Ashby v. White (1703) 1 Ld Raym 938, 92 ER 126 where the returning officer refused to accept the claimant’s vote). On grounds of public policy to exclude the risk of vexatious proceedings against honest judges, no action lies against for a judge’s abuse of jurisdiction (i. e. a dishonest judicial act within the apparent scope of the judge’s authority) in a court of record (a concept which includes certain inferior courts as well as the senior courts): Anderson v. Gorrie [1895] 1 QB 668. The Courts Act 2003, s. 31 (replacing the Justices of the Peace Act 1997, s. 51), confers the like immunity on a justice of the peace and (so far as exercising the functions of a justice) a justice’s clerk, where they act in the execution of their duty within their jurisdiction. The position is uncertain as regards abuse of jurisdiction by courts which are not courts of record: Clerk and Lindsell (-Murphy), Torts16, 5-98. For judicial acts outside the jurisdiction (which necessarily applies only to courts of limited jurisdiction) there is no immunity – at any rate if the judge knowingly acts without jurisdiction: see Clerk and Lindsell (-Murphy), Torts16, 5-100-5-101. As regards justices of the peace, the Courts Act 2003, s. 32

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Article 7:104: Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers’ associations

(replacing the Justices of the Peace Act 1997, s. 52), expressly provides for immunity if the act outside the jurisdiction was in good faith. For the vicarious liability of chief constables for the torts of officers within the constabulary see Police Act 1996, s. 88, which also makes provision for settlement of claims against the chief officer and (at the police authority’s discretion) other members of the force. Furthermore, parties, witnesses, advocates, judge and jury enjoy absolute privilege in respect of their utterances during court proceedings as a defence to an action for defamation, irrespective of malice, so that these statements are not actionable: Dawkins v Lord Rokeby (1875) LR 7 HL 744 (defamatory statement by witness). The defence extends to inquiries conducted by tribunals acting in a manner similar to a court of justice: Dawkins v Lord Rokeby, loc. cit. (military court of inquiry) An immunity was previously enjoyed by barristers (Rondel v. Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191) and later extended to solicitors (Saif Ali v. Sydney Mitchell & Co. (a firm) [1980] AC 198; Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s. 62) qua advocate in respect of the negligent conduct of a case during court proceedings, and in respect of pre-trial work intimately connected with that. This was justified by the public policy considerations that such liability might lead to collateral re-opening of the subject of a judicial decision or undermine the advocate’s ability to perform his duty to the court as well as the desire to uphold a general immunity for conduct in judicial proceedings. The immunity has been abolished by a majority decision of the House of Lords: Arthur J. S. Hall & Co. (a firm) v. Simons [2002] 1 AC 615, and see also the further explanation in Awoyomi v. Radford [2007] EWHC 1671 (QB); [2008] QB 793 as to when the immunity ceased. However, there is still a great reluctance to hold that a lawyer has acted negligently (Moy v. Pettman Smith [2005] UKHL 7; [2005] 1 WLR 581). The legal position in IRELAND on this matter is unsettled; there appears to be an inclination to follow more recent English jurisprudence (McMahon and Binchy, Torts3, no. 14.167). The illustration is taken from HR 28 May 2004, JOL 2004, 279, RvdW 2004, 78.

Article 7:104: Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers’ associations This Book does not govern the liability of: (a) employees (whether to co-employees, employers or third parties) arising in the course of employment; (b) employers to employees arising in the course of employment; and (c) trade unions and employers’ associations arising in the course of an industrial dispute.

Comments 1. General. This Article is another example of the application of DCFR I. – 1:101 (Intended field of application) paragraph (2). Issues on the border between the law on non-contractual liability and individual and collective labour law are removed from the

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scope of application of this Book. This is an area of great sensitivity in legal and social policy, to whose great complexity justice cannot be done by these model rules. 2. Individual labour law. Therefore, on the one hand, all issues remain excluded from these rules which relate to the personal liability of employees for damage caused by them in the course of their work. This applies to harming colleagues from the same establishment, as well as to damage to the detriment of the employer and of third parties, whether they are employees themselves or not (sub-paragraph (a)). The reason for remaining silent on the liability between members of the same enterprise is to be primarily found in the circumstance that in many legal systems this problem area is subject to a specific regime of occupational accident insurance, which for its part demands priority of application over the general law on non-contractual liability. Issues on the relationship to third parties remain out of the equation because the field covering the personal liability of employees vis à vis external parties is (i) very controversial from a general policy perspective and because they (ii) are not capable of consistent development without considering the internal relationship between the employer and employee, which is subject to the rules of the law on labour contracts. Therefore, issues of joint and several liability shared between employer and employee also fall under this exclusionary rule in cases in which the personal liability of the employee for damage occasioned to third parties results from the applicable law. Sub-paragraph (b) follows the same philosophy for the reverse situation (claims of the employer against the employee). The qualification of the relevant legal issue as falling under either non-contractual liability law or labour law is not decisive here. 3. Collective labour law. Sub-paragraph (c) covers issues of non-contractual liability in connection with industrial disputes. Thus, it covers not only liability for the consequences of a strike, but also liability for counter-measures (including lock-outs) on the part of the employer in the context of disputes over working conditions and pay.

Notes 1.

1020

According to the jurisprudence of the FRENCH Court of Cassation, an employee’s personal liability vis-à-vis a third party is only triggered under CC art. 1382, if his or her faute bears no relation to the duties of the employment (Cass.soc. 9 November 2005, pourvoi 04-14419). The same holds true where injury is caused to a work colleague. Under Labour Code art. L 1234-9 harcèlement moral (workplace “bullying”) is considered a crime. Therefore, superiors are personally liable to their subbordinates if they repeatedly subject them to such practices (Cass.soc. 21 June 2006, Bull.civ. 2006, V, no. 223 p. 212); presumably, the same applies in the context of intercollegial relations. An employee only incurs personal liability vis-à-vis the employer if they were gravely at fault in causing the damage (faute lourde) (Cass.soc. 11 March 1998, Bull.civ. 1998, V, no. 135 p. 100; Cass.soc. 12 June 2002, pourvoi 00-41954); a faute grave will not suffice. The existence of a faute lourde is usually only given in cases where the employee intended to cause damage (Cass.soc. 5 December 1996, Bull.civ. 1996, V, no. 424 p. 306). An employee is not liable for damage caused to a third party in the course of performing his or her functions (not: outside those functions; see above), if the em-

Article 7:104: Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers’ associations

2.

ployee has not exceeded the limits of the mandate assigned to him or her and does not intentionally commit a criminal offence or other faute d’une particulière gravité (Cass.ass. plén. 25 February 2000, Bull.ass.plén. 2000, no. 2 p. 3; SemJur 2000 II 10295, concl. Kessous, note Billiau; Resp. civ. et assur. 2000, 4, note Groutel; Rev.jur.soc. 2002, Chron. 711-718, note Desportes; see also Mouly, D. 2006, 2756 and Großerichter and Rageade, ZEuP 2002, 611-628). Conversely, employers are subject to a contractual obligation de sécurité de résultat in respect of their employees’ physical and mental health (Cass.soc. 21 June 2006, pourvois 05-43.914 – 05-43.919, no. 1733; Cass.soc. 29 June 2005, D. 2005, 2565, note Bugada; Bull.civ. 2005, V, no. 219), but this is only of practical effect, if, under the Labour Accidents Liability Act of 9 April 1898, the employee cannot, exceptionally, make a claim under his social insurance. Employers enjoy an immunity from civil liability; claims of employees are only admissible in cases where the damage is caused intentionally; clandestine employment and workplace and commuting accidents connote exceptions to this rule (le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2006/2007), no. 76). However, the social insurer may have a right of recourse against the employer’s liability insurer under the provisions of the Social Security Code art. L 452-3(3) (see further Cass.civ. 17 April 2008, pourvois 07-13592 and 07-13593). The compensation entitlement under social insurance provisions will be increased if it can be established that the employer is guilty of a faute inexcusable (inexcusable fault; see for an analysis of this notion, in particular Cass.ass.plén. 24 June 2005, D. 2005, I. R. 1881; JCP éd. E 2005, no. 1201, note Morvan and Cass.soc. 31 October 2002, Bull.civ. 2002, V, no. 336); conversely, compensation will be lowered if the employer is guilty of such fault (le Tourneau and Cadiet loc. cit. nos. 3565-3566). Liability for damage occasioned by strike action (on this concept, cf. Cass.soc. 2 February 2006, Bull.civ. 2006, V, no. 52 p. 46) is only of relevance in cases where a faute lourde is committed (Cass.soc. 7 July 1983, pourvois 81-40191 and 81-40194; CA Reims 23 October 2002, pourvoi 01/ 00290). Trade unions are only liable for their fault and are not liable for fault committed by their members (Cass.civ. 26 October 2006, pourvoi 04-11665). A lock-out is qualified as an unlawful act, namely, as a rétorsion illicite (Cass.soc. 25 September 2001, pourvoi 99-43628; however, on the temporary shutdown of factory, see Cass.soc. 4 July 2000, Bull.civ. 2000, V, no. 262 p. 207; Cass.soc. 22 February 2005, pourvoi 0245879). BELGIAN Employment Contracts Act of 3 July 1978, provides, under art. 18(1), that an employee, who, in the course of performing his or her contractual duties causes damage to his or her employer or a third party is only liable for intention or gross negligence; ordinary negligence only grounds a liability claim if it involved an error which had been habitually committed (loc. cit. art. 18(2); see further Cour de travail Brussels 22 November 2005, JTT 2006, 218). Employers are not legally insulated by means of this regulation; they are then liable under CC art. 1384(3), if the employee is not personally liable under the provisions of loc. cit. art. 18 (Cass. 18 November 1981, RW 1982-83, 859). A special rule governs the liability of civil servants and other public service employees. According to the Accidents at Work Act of 10 April 1971 art. 46, an employer will only incur liability towards their employees, once very restrictive prerequisites are met; in essence, the cases covered are grave fault, occupational and commuting accidents and damage to property. Liability may be imposed for strike involvement if a criminal offence is committed thereby (voies du fait); in prin-

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3.

4.

5.

1022

ciple, a lock-out is permitted (Cass. 7 May 1984, JTT 1984, 292; RW 1984-85, 2194; Pas. belge 1984, I, 1092. According to LUXEMBOURGIAN Labour Code (Code du travail) of 31 July 2006 art. L 121-9, an employee is only liable for damage that he or she causes to a third party, other employees or to his or her employer in the event that he or she was guilty of gross negligence. In the context of occupational accidents, the employer is liable for intentional or criminal acts vis-à-vis employees; in all other cases, the employee’s social insurance is responsible for paying out compensation (Social Insurance Code [Code des assurances socials] arts. 92 ff, CA Luxembourg 9 November 2004, pourvoi 363/04), an exception being where the damage is caused by a vehicle covered by liability insurance. The social insurer has a recourse action against the employer in cases where the latter would be directly liable to the employee (see further Ravarani, La responsabilité civile2, no. 1215). According to SPANISH CC art. 1903(4), employers are liable for damage which an employee inflicts on a third party. Parallel to this, the employee’s personal liability (under CC art. 1902) remains untouched (Gómez Calle, Los sujetos de la responsabilidad civil3, 461, 497; CA Pontevedra 9 March 2006, BDA JUR 2006/127086). Whether issues concerning the liability of employers vis-à-vis their employees fall to be resolved by civil or labour courts remains contentious, despite a provision in the Labour Procedure Act art. 2(a) and LOPJ art. 9(5) which would appear to have come down in favour of exclusive jurisdiction being vested in the Labour Courts to decide these matters (in favour of Labour Court jurisdiction TS [4th chamber] 10 December 1998, RAJ 1998 (5) no. 10501 p. 15488; in favour of jurisdiction by the civil courts TS [1st chamber] 4 March 2002, RAJ 2002 (3) no. 5242 p. 9227; TS 31 December 2003, RAJ 2004 (1) no. 367 p. 661). The practical consequence of this can be seen primarily in the context of the set-off of the recovery of tort damages against benefits derived from collateral sources, in particular, social benefits which are then set-off against the damages in tort (see e. g. TS 9 March 2006, RAJ 2006 (2) no. 1882 p. 4474; see further the notes to Article 6:103 (Equalisation of benefits) and Article 7:105 (Reduction or exclusion of liability to indemnified persons)). Strike and lock out in the course of industrial disputes are permitted (Const. art. 37(2)). Organic Act on Trade-Union Freedom, of 2 August 1985 art. 5 makes clear that trade unions are liable for torts commited by them, but they are not liable for the delictual acts of their members. Labour Law (Strike) Reform Act (Royal Decree 17/1977 of 4 May 1977) art. 7 provides for a definition of lawful strike. Courts appear to be reluctant to find trade unions liable in tort (e. g. TS 14 February 1990, RAJ 1990 (1) no. 1088 p. 1288; TS 30 June 1990, RAJ 1990 (5) no. 5551 p. 7196; TS 6 July 1990, RAJ 1990 (5) no. 6072 p. 7843); CC art. 1902 does in any event not apply to a lawful strike, unless there is an abuse of the right to strike (TS 3 April 1991, RAJ 1991 (3) no. 3248 p. 4394; TSJ Galicia 26 April 2005, RAJ (TSJ y AP) 2005 (2) no. 1548 p. 2987). Under ITALIAN Consolidating Act on Insurance against Accidents at Work and Occupational Deseases art. 10(1) employers are exempt from personal liability towards their employees; delictual liability gives way to mandatory insurance for work related accidents. Exceptions to the rule (essentially envisaged for the commission of criminal offences) are specified individually; the insurer is also liable to pay compensation in these instances, but it can seek contribution from the employer (loc. cit. art. 11). Under the reform heralded byAccidents at Work and Occupational Diseases Insurance Act

Article 7:104: Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers’ associations

6.

7.

art. 13(1) and (2), nowadays, the social security carrier will also compensate the danno biologico, if a certain degree of severity of injury is attained; the extent of compensation to be awarded is specified in tables. Under HUNGARIAN CC § 348, employers are liable for damage inflicted on a third party that an employees causes in connection with their employment; in accordance with CC § 350(5), the employer’s claim to contribution is governed by Labour Code provisions (Act no. XXII /1992). The latter provisions provide that employees are liable to their employers for damage which they intentionally or negligently cause by violating their employment related duties (loc. cit. § 166(1)). The employer bears the onus of proof (loc. cit. § 166(2)). If the employee has merely been negligent, the quantum of reparation is limited to half the average monthly wage. Collective wage agreements or indeed the contract of employment may provide otherwise (loc. cit. § 167). If the employee acted with intent to cause damage, then he or she is made subject to unrestricted liability (loc. cit. § 168). Special rules apply to particular professions and employees in supervisory roles (loc. cit. §§ 169-173, § 192 /A). In contrast, employers are subjected to a strict liability regime with respect to their liability towards their employees (loc. cit. § 174(1)), unless the employer proves that the damage was caused by an unavoidable event which lies outside the employer’s field of activity or by conduct of the employee which the employer could not prevent (loc. cit. § 174(2)). The employee’s contributory fault operates to reduce liability (loc. cit. § 174(3)). Employers who do not employ more than ten are permitted to exculpate themeselves from liability by proving an absence of fault (loc. cit. § 175). Act no. VII /1989 on Strikes § 1(1) provides for a right to strike and abuse of this right is naturally proscribed (loc. cit. § 1(3)). GERMAN CC § 276 proceeds from the assumption that liability will be incurred for intention and all manifestations of neglience, but important exceptions to this general rule are envisaged for employment relationships (Palandt (-Weidenkaff), BGB67, § 611, no. 152). Employees are not answerable for cases of slight negligence vis-à-vis their employer; in contrast to this, employees are, in principle fully liable, for grossly negligent and intentional conduct (see further e. g. Staudinger (-Richardi), BGB [2005], § 611, no. 588). In the context of “medium” negligence, loss is apportioned between the employer and employee, based on an evaluation of what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the case (BAG 27 September 1994, NJW 1995, 210; further particulars Erman (-Edenfeld), BGB I12, § 611, no. 340). Factors taken into consideration include the intensity of fault and above all, the dangerousness per se of the activity carried out, the extent of damage caused, the insured risk, the position of the employee in the company and the salary that he or she received (BAG 27 September 1994 loc. cit.; BGH 11 March 1996, NJW 1996, 1532). If the employee injures a third party in the course of performing his or her employment, the general tort law liability under CC § 823(1) governs (BGH 19 September 1989, BGHZ 108, 305; BGH 21 December 1993, NJW 1994, 852; critical on this point Katzenstein, RdA 2003, 346). However, the employee may claim a right to be exempted from liability towards his employer, if and in so far as the former would not be liable vis-à-vis his employer for the same damage (see further e. g. Edenfeld loc. cit. no. 344). The same holds true for the case where an employee causes damage to the property of a work colleague (Weidenkaff loc. cit. no. 154). Personal injury is covered by the statutory accident insurance; employers are only liable to their employees or vis-à-vis the social security carrier in exceptional circumstances (Social Security Code, Book VII §§ 104-105, 110-111).

1023

Chapter 7: Ancillary rules

8.

9.

10.

1024

According to AUSTRIAN law, the liability of employers and employees to third parties is determined by general civil law principles. The internal relationship between employee and employer, however, is governed by the Employees’ Liability Act (DHG) § 2. An employee is not liable towards his employer for damage which is caused as a result of slight misconduct (culpa levissima). In all other cases of negligent infliction of damage, the judge can reduce the amount of compensation if the circumstances of the case so require. Conversely, the employers’ liability towards their employees and his or her dependents is only triggered in cases of intentional conduct (General Social Insurance Act [ASVG] § 333). In all other cases, the social security carrier takes the place of the employer. The justification for this insulation from liability lies in the fact that accident insurance is financed by employers; however, the privilege extends further than the actual payments made by the latter, which in this respect leaves the injured party without any rights (OGH 22 December 2004, ÖJZ LSK 2005/125 [compensation for pain and suffering; dependant’s compensation for pain and suffering]; OGH 11 November 2004, ÖJZ 2005, 390; OGH 21 May 2005, SZ 2005/58). Under GREEK law, according to the general civil law rules, the employee (in conjunction with the employer, see CC art. 922) is personally and directly liable for damage which they cause to a third party. The employer and employee are solidarily liable (Vrellis, in: von Bar [ed.], Deliktsrecht in Europa, 19; Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-Stathopoulos), art. 922, no. 41). The internal relationship between employee and employer is governed by the terms of the contract of employment, which generally gives the employer who makes an advance payment, a right to seek contribution from the employee. If this right is not regulated in the contract, the employee has a claim against the employer under CC art. 927 (Stathopoulos loc. cit. no. 44). As a general rule, the mutual obligations of employer and employee in the NETHERLANDS are derived from CC art. 7:611 (duty to act with care), a stand-alone cause of action has emerged from this, which even envisages that claims can be made for nonpecuniary loss (CFI Utrecht 29 June 1994, JAR 1994 no. 182 [employer v, employee]; HR 26 Juni 1998, JAR 1998, no. 199 [employee v. employer]). The employee will only incur liability in cases of intent and conscious (advertent) negligence. The foregoing is also true for cases where the employee is liable under delict towards a third party. CC art. 6:170(3) supplements this insulation from liability by providing for a rule which sets forth that the employer can only seek contribution from his employee in cases where the latter has acted with intent or conscious negligence. The onus of proof rests on the employer (CFI Zwolle 8 November 1995, JAR 1996, no. 59; HR 10 May 1996, JAR 1996, no. 131; Asser (-Hartkamp) Verbintenissenrecht III12, no. 139 p. 161; Asser (-Hartkamp) Verbintenissenrecht I12, no. 342 p. 261). Employers continue to be strictly liable for occupational accidents vis-à-vis their employees under CC art. 7:658; however, the former may adduce proof that the damage, inter alia, was a product of the negligence of the employee (see HR 9 January 1987, NedJur 1987, no. 948 p. 3258) or that they exercised the “required care” in order to meet the obligations under the employment relationship (HR 24 June 1994, NedJur 1995, no. 137 p. 574). Additionally, in this context, general tort law provisions continue to apply (Hartkamp III12 loc. cit.; ibid. I12, no. 451c p. 407). Legal strikes are protected under the European Social Charter art. 6(4). In contrast, under national law, delictual liability for occupation of the works may be incurred if this action was unlawful (HR 19 April 1991, NedJur 1991, no. 690 p. 2967).

Article 7:104: Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers’ associations

11.

12.

According to SWEDISH and FINNISH Damages Liability Act chap. 4 § 1, an employee is only liable for damage caused by him through error or through an omission during the course of performing his duties of employment to the extent that special grounds justify the imposition of liability. In this context, regard is to be had to the nature of the act, the status of the person causing damage, the interests of the injured party and all other relevant circumstances. Liability may be imposed if e. g. the employer lacks insurance and is insolvent and there is a pressing interest for the injured person to receive damages (Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7, 271; Saxén, Skadestånd vid avtalsbrott, 159). Liability may also be triggered in the case of intention (theft) or gross negligence. DANISH EAL § 19(3) provides that the employee is not liable for property damage which is covered by the injured party’s or the employer’s insurance, unless gross negligence or intent is at hand. In other instances the employer may seek recourse from the employee if it is considered reasonable, having regard to the accountability, the position of the employee and other circumstances (EAL § 23 (1)). As a general rule, the employee is not liable vis-à-vis his or her employer. Liability towards third parties is subject to a judicial power to reduce liability (EAL § 23(2)), which refers to the factors listed in EAL § 23(1); in addition, once the same pre-requisites are met, the employee can seek contribution from his employer, in the event that the employee is liable to pay compensation to a third party. Whether the same can be said of the employer’s right to seek contribution from his employee is likewise contingent upon the application of an equitable balancing test governed by EAL § 23(1) (von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret6, 129). In all the Nordic countries an employee who suffers personal injury at work may seek compensation from the general public social insurance scheme as well as the special social insurance scheme for industrial injuries. Employees often also enjoy protection under a private collective industrial injury insurance scheme. In Sweden and Finland they may also seek a tort law based compensation, from which, however, compensation received under the insurance schemes is deducted (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 291); tort law based liability is only excluded by the Danish Work Injury Insurance Act (Lovbekendtgørelse 2006-03-07, no. 154, om arbejdsskadesikring) (von Eyben and Isager loc. cit. 335). The liability of trade unions and employers’ associations is regulated in labour law. Liability for collective actions by trade unions has traditionally been practically nonexistent, save for collective actions which amount to a criminal offence (Hellner and Radetzki loc. cit. 71; Kleineman, Ren förmögenhetsskada, 267). Gustafsson v. Sweden, ECHR [GC] 25 April 1996, App. no. 15573/89 refused to find that SWEDEN had violated ECHR art. 11 when an employer was unable to enjoy a measure of protection under national liability law after an attempt was made, by means of an all-out blockade of his business, to force him to sign a collective labour agreement with a trade union (Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet et al, ECJ 18 December 2007, C-341/ 05, ECR 2007, I-11767, however, decided in a similar case, in favour of a Latvian company that this amounted to an unlawful discrimination). In addition, Evaldsson and others v. Sweden, ECHR 13 February 2007, App. no. 75252/01 refused to find that there was a violation of the freedom of disassociation (i.e the right not to be forced to join a trade union) where a number of employees who were not trade union memebers were forced to pay fees to a trade union; this right to receive fees was derived from the collective labour agreement with the employer. However, it should be noted that this forced contribution was deemed to fall foul of the guarantee of property. The DANISH

1025

Chapter 7: Ancillary rules

13. 14.

1026

trade union practice requiring employers to only employ trade union members did not withstand the Convention (Sørensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark, ECHR [GC] 11 January 2006, App. nos. 52562/99 and 52620/99. For FINLAND see Supreme Court 16 March 1999, KKO 1999:39 (A trade union publically called for a boycott of a hotel because the cleaning firm employed by the hotel chain refused to enter into a collective labour agreement. The Supreme Court held that the trade union was not liable. The boycott was not unlawful nor did it infringe against public policy, moreover, no unlawful means had been employed). ESTONIA has regulated issues of liability arising in connection with industrial relations primarily in the Employment Contracts Act and other labour legislation. In ENGLISH law the liability of both employees and employers for torts committed during the course of employment are not excluded from tort law. Indeed the liability of employers to employees forms a chief field for the application of general tort law principles, especially those relating to negligence and (by virtue of legislation regulating safety in the workplace, such as regulations made under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 – for a detailed list, see Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale and Jones), Torts19, para. 13-29 n. 81) breach of statutory duty. Besides contractual duties of care, an employer owes an employee a tortious duty of care which is not to be regarded as part of a separate tort, but merely as an aspect of the general law of negligence: White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455, 506. By virtue of the special relationship between the parties based on the employer’s right to control the work, the employer is under a duty to prevent harm and may thus be liable for an omission to act. The duty (often subdivided into the four safeties of safe staff, safe equipment, a safe place of work and a safe system of work) is primarily to protect the health and safety of the employee (including the employee’s mental health (Barber v. Somerset County Council [2004] UKHL 13; [2004] 1 WLR 1089 [psychiatric illness resulting from occupational stress]), though not for the employee’s property or economic interests unless there is a a specific assumption of responsibility for these too (as in e. g. Lennon v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2004] EWCA Civ 130; [2004] 1 WLR 2594 [a case of a non-contractual relationship “akin to employment” in which false advice caused a loss of housing allowance]). Moreover, the duty of care may not be delegated: Wilson and Clyde Coal Co. Ltd. v. English [1938] AC 57. The rule that an employer could not be vicariously liable to an employee for the torts of a co-employee on the basis that each employee was to be regarded as having accepted the risk of negligence on the part of their colleague (the doctrine of common employment) was abolished by the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948, s. 1(1). Consequently no special rules apply to vicarious liability of employers to employees: Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale and Jones), Torts19, para. 13-01. Vicarious liability of an employer for the negligence of an employee and the employer’s liability for its own negligence are distinguishable in practice only as a matter of degree, since the latter implies a failure of management or organisation rather than the casual carelessness of a particular employee: ibid. Moreover, while it is argued that by reason of his status an employee should not owe a duty of care to third parties, principally the employer’s clients, as regards negligence in the course of employment (Clerk and Lindsell (-Dugdale), Torts19, 8-41), such an approach has not been adopted in the case law: see Merrett v. Babb [2001] QB 1174 (employed surveyor), applying Phelps v. Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619 (educational psychologist employed by the local authority also owed a duty to the child being assessed). Moreover, an employee

Article 7:105: Reduction or exclusion of liability to indemnified persons

may be obliged on the basis of breach of an implied term in the contract of employment (but also potentially under the Civil Liability (Contibution) Act 1978) to indemnify his employer in respect of loss the latter suffers due to the latter’s vicarious liability for the former’s tort causing damage to a third party: Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd. [1957] AC 555. That this right of recourse is seldom exercised in practice is due to the agreement of employers’ liability insurers to make claims against insured employers’ employees where the evidence pointed to collusion or wilful misconduct: Clerk and Lindsell (-Murphy), Torts19, 4-33. The partial immunity from tortious liability of trade unions is governed by the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. An act done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute is not actionable in tort as inducing breach of contract, intimidation, threats or interference with performance of a contract (subs. (1)) or conspiracy to commit such torts (subs. (2)), but this immunity extends to picketing only if it is lawful under the Act (i. e. peaceful picketing, as detailed in s. 220) (subs. (3)). The immunity does not extend to trade union activity to enforce a union only labour force or union recognition, in response to dismissal for taking unofficial action, or secondary action (other than lawful picketing) or in furtherance of an illegal strike (i. e. one for which no strike ballot is held) (subs. (4) in conjunction with ss. 222-235). Moreover, s. 22 provides for a ceiling on damages recoverable which is linked to the number of union members. These limitations apply in effect only to economic torts (such as inducing breach of contract and intimidation) because the limitations are expressly disapplied to proceedings for personal injury as a result of negligence, nuisance or breach of duty, for breach of duty in connection with the ownership, occupation, possession, control or use of property (e. g. occupier’s liability) or in product liability. Finally, for both trade unions (loc. cit. s. 23) and employers’ associations (loc. cit. s. 130) a restriction is placed on the enforcement of awards of damages so that these are not enforceable against the personal property of their trustees, officials or members. In IRELAND the Industrial Relations Act 1990, ss. 11-13 provide in wide terms for an immunity in tort for trade union activity in contemplation or furtherance of trade disputes.

Article 7:105: Reduction or exclusion of liability to indemnified persons If a person is entitled from another source to reparation, whether in full or in part, for that person’s damage, in particular from an insurer, fund or other body, national law determines whether or not by virtue of that entitlement liability under this Book is limited or excluded.

Comments 1. Channelling of liability. This Book ultimately leaves untouched those rules of national law which displace the rules of civil liability in certain spheres by way of an insurance regime under which the injured person loses the claim to damages under the law on non-contractual liability and in its place receives a claim against an insurer, a fund or another institution. Thus, this does not involve situations in which a right to repara1027

Chapter 7: Ancillary rules

tion passes to an insurer by operation of law. This is because in these cases the right remains preserved and it is solely a change of creditor which takes place. Cases of mere de facto channelling of liability to an insurer (by which it is open to the injured person to decide between a claim against the injuring person and a claim against the insurer) are also not in issue here. In fact, Article 7:105 only pertains to the de jure channelling of liability by rules that relieve the injuring person of liability where and because the injured person is indemnified by a third party, in particular by an insurer. 2. Examples. To the extent that such rules relate to the law on occupational accidents, they are already covered by Article 7:104 (Liability of employees, employers, trade unions and employers associations). However, they are in no way restricted to this branch of the law; in fact, they may also be encountered in other matters, for instance, liability in the health sector, liability for road accidents or quite simply where liability between private persons for negligent damage to property is excluded if and in so far as the owner is insured against the damage or destruction of the thing. It is also conceivable that rules might provide, for example, that a claim cannot be made against the keeper of a motor vehicle on the basis of strict liability and that the victim must instead obtain redress from the keeper’s insurer because it would be regarded as an abuse of law to go against the keeper directly and personally. Article 7:105 also encompasses such rules as channel liability de jure to a legal entity, where for example the liability of teachers in a private school is channelled to the State.

Notes 1.

2.

1028

Under the FRENCH Education Code (Code de l’éducation), art. L 911-4, the liability of the State is substituted for the personal liability of teachers at public and semi-private schools; recourse may not be had to the teachers themselves (e. g. Cass.civ. 13 December 2001, Bull.civ. 2001, II, no. 189 p. 133; RTD civ 2002, 312, with a note by Jourdain). Similar rules exist for damage arising from a faute in the process of appointing a guardian (tutelle) under CC art. 473. Reparation due as a result of a road accident is provided under the statute of 5 July 1985 (the loi Badinter) by a compulsory insurance of the vehicle. Case law has repeatedly emphasised that the rules of this statute are d’ordre public (Cass.civ. 13 January 1988, Bull.civ. 1988, II, no. 15 p. 8; D. 1988 jur. 293, with a note by Groutel; Cass.civ. 20 April 1988, Bull.civ. 1988, II, no. 87 p. 45; D. 1988 jur. 580, with a note by Lambert-Faivre; Cass.civ. 5 July 1989, Bull.civ. 1989, II, no. 144 p. 73; Cass.civ. 6 December 1989, Bull.civ. 1989, II, no. 213 p. 111; see Viney, L’indemnisation des victimes d’accidents de la circulation, no. 10), from which it may be deduced that a personal liability of the gardien of the vehicle is precluded. For liability arising out of accidents at work see the notes to the preceding Article. In SPAIN some state and regional provisions provide for social benefits to patients infected with HIV or with haemophilia and other congenital diseases related to blood coagulation. These laws normally contain as a requirement a previous waiver of any claim against any public health administration or against their staff (see, for instance, the Act on social benefits for persons with haemophilia and other congenital diseases related to blood coagulation who have developed hepatitis C as a result of medical treatment within the scope of the public health system [Ley 14/2002 of 5 June 2002]

Article 7:105: Reduction or exclusion of liability to indemnified persons

3.

4.

art. 3(5)). GERMANY provides for a substitution of liablity by insurance protection only in relation to compensation for damage sustained in workplace accidents. Employers and fellow employees in the same company are not liable for the losses sustained by the insured person, his dependants and his next of kin (Social Security Code, Book VII §§ 104 and 105). Their claims are directed against the body responsible for the statutory accident insurance unless the damage is caused intentionally. A right of recourse for the insurance against the person causing the damage requires the latter to have acted intentionally or with gross negligence (Social Security Code, Book VII §§ 110, 111). AUSTRIA is another country in which claims to reparation as between employees are cut away because the damage is covered by a social insurance of the injured party; the person causing the damage is also not liable to the social insurance fund in a case of mere negligence. In the context of liability on equitable grounds under CC § 1310 regard is had to whether the injured person can obtain compensation from another source. If that is the case because, for example, the damage which has occurred is covered by fire insurance, liability may be disapplied (OGH 30 March 1999, SZ 72/ 59). Art. 64 (1) lit. a of the PORTUGUESE Motor Insurance Liability Decree Law provides that claims arising out of a road accident can only be asserted against the other party’s compulsory liability insurance if they do not exceed the maximum limits that compulsory insurance will cover; if the person responsible does not have insurance, then according to art. 62, claims must be asserted against the Fundo de Garantia Automóvel and person incurring civil liability. Under the ESTONIAN LOA § 140(1) the extent of the reparation may be reduced on grounds of equity and as part of those considerations insurance coverage is to be taken into account. All the NORDIC countries rely on far-reaching insurance schemes for specific areas. However, they differ on the issue of whether to allow or exclude parallel claims in tort (for a general overview see von Eyben, ScandStudL 41 [2001] 193-232; Hellner, AJCL 34 [1986] 613-633; Ussing, AJCL 1 [1952] 359-372). DANISH law predominantly adopts the latter approach. One example among many is to be found in EAL § 19(1). The provision excludes a claim to reparation for damage to property to the extent that the damage is covered by property insurance or a loss-of-use insurance. However, liability is excluded only for the benefit of private individuals (i. e. not also for the benefit of businesses or public bodies) and if the property damage did not result from intentional or grossly negligent conduct. In the two other countries, by contrast, the basic rule is that although persons are not in general obliged to seek compensation through tort law in order to benefit from the insurance scheme, they may also opt out of the alternative insurance scheme and seek damages under tort law. However, the option to invoke the tort law claim is often of limited practical importance: enforcing claims under the relevant insurance scheme is typically less expensive and more promising because the requirements for substantiating the claim are less demanding. In ENGLAND the requirement for employees injured in industrial accidents to elect between compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Acts and compensation under the common law was abolished in 1948 when among other welfare legislation the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1946 came into force, substituting a new national insurance scheme. Industrial injuries benefits are now governed by social security legislation with the state having a right of recourse against the employer and the employer’s liability insurer under the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997, s. 6(1) and s. 22(1). The position is comparable in IRELAND, where the obligation under

1029

Chapter 7: Ancillary rules

the Workman’s Compensation Act 1934, s. 60(1) to choose the mode of compensation was prospectively repealed when the Social Welfare (Occupational Injuries) Act 1966 absorbed the system of no fault compensation into social security legislation. However, a partial no fault compensation scheme does operate in the UNITED KINGDOM under the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 in respect of disability caused by vaccinations after 5th July 1948 (s. 2(1)(a)(ii) against diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, poliomyelitis, measles, rubella, tuberculosis, or (for vaccinations before 1st August 1971: see s. 2(a)(iii)) smallpox (s. 1(2)). Persons who are severely disabled as a result of vaccination against one of the diseases listed in or under the Act are entitled to a payment from public funds: s. 1(1). The same applies to persons who are severely disabled as a result either of the vaccination of a claimant’s mother before the claimant was born or coming into contact with a person who was vaccinated: s.1(3). Where the severely disabled victim has died, the victim’s personal representatives are entitled to payment: s.1(1) and see also s. 6(2). However, the disabled claimant must be over two; if the victim has died under that age, no claim can be made: s. 2(1)(c). Severely disabled in the terms of the Act means a disability of at least 60 %, as assessed under social security legislation for the purposes of disablement gratuity and pension: s. 1(4), as amended by the Regulatory Reform (Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979) Order 2002, art. 2 (in conjunction with art. 4 and Schedule). The Act contains a number of restrictions. First, it relates only to vaccinations carried out (or, e. g. for military personnel serving abroad, treated under the Act as carried out) in the UK or the Isle of Man: s. 2(1)(a)(i) in conjunction with s. 2(5). Except for vaccinations against poliomyelitis or rubella, the vaccination must have been carried out either when the person vaccinated was under 18 or there was an outbreak of the relevant disease in the UK or Isle of Man: s. 2(1)(b). Moreover, the claim must be made before the victim reaches (or, if the victim had survived, would have reached) the age of 21 and in any case within six years of vaccination: s. 3(1)(c). The Act contains a special rule on causation: whether severe disablement has resulted from vaccination against a listed disease is to be determined for the purposes of the Act on the balance of probability, if there is severe disablement: s. 3(5). The fixed sum presently payable to those entitled under the Act is £120,000: s. 1(1A), as inserted by the Social Security Act 1985, s. 23 and supplemented by the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 Statutory Sum Order 2007, art. 2. The Act does not prevent a claim being made on the basis of general tort law principles, but compensation under the Act is to be deducted from any damages awarded: s. 6(4). However, there is no obligation on a victim to make a claim from public funds and nothing in the Act implies judicial discretion to deduct the statutory sum from any award of damages if the victim, although entitled to, has not demanded payment under the Act. In IRELAND the Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal Act 1997, as amended by the Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal (Amendment) Act 2002, provides a procedure for claims to be made against public funds by persons contracting hepatitis or HIV as a result of a blood transfusion or infected blood product (whether directly or indirectly as the child or spouse of such a person), carers incurring financial loss or expenses, and dependants where the infected person has died: s. 4(1). A spouse of an infected person and a person who has been living with an infected person for a continuous period of at least three years may claim for loss of consortium, including impairment of sexual relations arising from the risk of transmission: ibid. The claimant must prove on the balance of probabilities that the disease or condition was contracted from the transfusion or blood

1030

Article 7:105: Reduction or exclusion of liability to indemnified persons

product or transmitted from such a person: s. 4(8). An award under the Act is made on the same basis as an award of damages in the law of tort and aggravated and (except where a provisional award is made and further compensation is subsequently granted: s. 5(6)(c)) exemplary damages are expressly contemplated: s. 5(1), (3) and see also s. 4(13). The claimant may elect between a lump sum and a provisional award. The Act does not bar ordinary proceedings (s. 4(3) of the 1997 Act), but a court award or settlement precludes claims under the Act (s. 4(2), subject to (2A)) and the acceptance of an award under the Act requires the claimant to waive any right of action (s. 5(10), subject to s. 10 of the 2002 Act). Where an award is made under the Act, the claimant may opt for a payment out of a Reparation Fund in lieu of an award of aggravated or exemplary damages (s. 11(4)) equal to a 20 % uplift of the general and special damages awarded (s. 11(6); a claimant who has such an award is precluded from payment from the Fund (s. 11(5)).

Annexes

Abbreviations* A&V

A.N. a.o. A.P. AA AB AB ABGB AC

AC ACLR

AcP

AD

ADC

affd AfP AG

A-G AHG

*

Aansprakelijkheid en Verzekering. Tijdschrift voor beroeps-, bedrijfs- en overheidsaanspakelijkheid (Deventer 1.1993-8.2000; since 2000/01 published as Aansprakelijkheid, verzekering en schade; cited by year and page) ÁmacjarsijoŁ| moŁlo| (Emergency laws, Greece) and others Aqeio| PaŁco| (Greek Supreme Court in civil matters, Greece) Ars Aequi Juridisch Studentenblad (Zwolle, later Nijmegen, 1.1951/1952 ff; cited by year and page) Wet algemeene bepalingen (Act of 15 May 1829 on the general provisions for the legislation of the kingdom, The Netherlands, Stb. 28) Alkotmánybírósági határozat (Decisions of the Constitutional Court of Hungary; cited by number and year) cf. CC Appeal Cases (House of Lords) (London 1.1875/76 ff; the older part of the collection up to 1890 cited as App. Cas.; from 1891 the abbreviation AC is used; cited by year, book and page); see LR Repertorio Aranzadi de Jurisprudencia Civil (Navarra 1.1992 ff; cited by year, volume, number and page) Australian Current Law Review (Sydney 1.1969/70-2.1970/71; cited by year, volume and page) Archiv für die civilistische Praxis (Tübingen 1.1818(1820)-50.1867; N.S. 1. = 51.1868-49. = 99.1906; 100.1906-120.1922; N.S. [= 3.F.] 1. = 121.1923-29. = 149.1944; 30. = 150.1948/49-53. = 173.1973; 174.1974 ff; incorporating Archiv für bürgerliches Recht, Berlin 1.1888/89-43.1917/19; cited by volume, year and page) South African Law Reports. Decisions of The Supreme Court of South Africa, the South-West Africa Division, the High Court of Rhodesia, Appellate Division (1910-1945/46; cited by year and page) Annuario de Derecho Civil (Madrid 1.1948 ff; cited by year and page) affirmed AfP. Zeitschrift für Medien- und Kommunikationsrecht (Düsseldorf 26.1995 ff; 1.1953-25.1994 published as Archiv für Presserecht; cited by year and page) Amtsgericht (Local Court, Austria and Germany); Aktiengesellschaft (jointstock company, plc) Advocaat-Generaal (The Netherlands); Attorney-General (England, Ireland); Avocat-Général (Belgium, France) Amtshaftungsgesetz (Civil Servant’s Liability Act, Austria)

Table compiled by Daniel Smith (Osnabrück) together with Johanna Graf, Anneke Lohmann and Aleksandra Kryskow (Osnabrück).

1035

Annexes AID AJA AJCL AJDA AJP / PJA AK ALJR

All ER Alm.Del ALR

ALR

alt. AM AMG

AnDerCiv. AnfO AngG Ann. Louv.

Ann.Dr.Liège

Annal.prop. industr.

1036

AqveiŁ o IdixsijotŁ DijaiŁ ot (Triminiaia nomiki epitheorisis; Civil Law Archive, Athens 1.1934-17.1954/59; cited by volume, year and page) Actualidad Jurídica Aranzadi (Madrid 1.1991 ff; cited by year, number and page) The American Journal of Comparative Law (Baltimore, Berkeley, since 2005 Ann Arbor 1.1952 ff; cited by volume, year and page) L’actualité juridique. Droit administratif (Paris 1.1945 ff; cited by year and page) Aktuelle juristische Praxis/Pratique Juridique actuelle (Lachen 1.1992 ff; cited by year and page) cf. CC The Australian Law Journal Reports, incorporated into The Australian Law Journal (Sydney et. al. 32.1958/59 ff; cited by volume and page) All England Law Reports (London 1.1936 ff; cited by year, book and page) Almindelig Del (general part) The Australian Law Reports. Being reports of judgments of the High Court of Australia, the Federal Court of Australia, other federal courts and tribunals, state and territory supreme courts exercising federal jurisdiction and incorporating reports of judgements of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (revised by the judges) and the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory (Chatswood et al., 1.1973/74 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten vom 5. Februar 1794 (Civil Code of 5 February 1794, Prussia, 1 June 1794) alternative Auteurs en media/Auteurs et média (Brussels 1.1996; cited by year and page) Arzneimittelgesetz (Medicines Act, Germany) Anuario de Derecho Civil (Madrid 1.1948 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Anfechtungsordnung (Contesting Act, Austria) Angestelltengesetz (Employees’ Act, Austria) Annales de Droit de Louvain – revue trimestrielle (Brussels 41.1981 ff; since 1.1930/33-2.1933/34 Annales de l’Association des Anciens Etudiants de la Faculté de Droit de l’Université de Louvain – revue trimestrielle/Annalen van de Vereeniging der Oud-Studenten van de Rechtsfaculteit der Universiteit van Leuven, 3.1934/35-24.1964 Annales de droit et de sciences politiques – revue trimestrielle/Annalen voor rechtsgeleerdheid en staatswetenschappen, 25.1965-40.1980 Annales de droit – revue trimestrielle de droit belge; cited by year and page) Actualités du droit. Revue de la Faculté de droit de Liège (Liège 1.195635.1990, later Antwerpen, Brussels 1.1991-13.2003; since 1.1956-21.1976 Annales de la Faculté de Droit de Liège, 21.1976-27.1982 Annales de la Faculté de Droit, d’Économie et de Sciences Sociales de Liège, 28.198335.1990 Annales de droit de Liège; since 49.2004 ff published as Revue de la Faculté de Droit de l’Université de Liège [RFDL]; cited by year and page) Annales de la propriété industrielle, artistique et littéraire – revue trimestrielle (Paris 1.1855 ff; cited by year and page)

Abbreviations Anst

Anstruther’s Exchequer Reports (ER 145) (volumes 1 to 3 covering the years 1792-1797; cited by year, volume and page) ANWB Algemene Nederlandse Wielrijdersbond (Netherlands General Cyclists Association) AP Audiencia Provincial (Court of Appeal, Spain) App Corte d’Appello (Court of Appeal, Italy) App.Cas. Appeal Cases (1875-1890); see AC and LR appr. approximate APR Annual percentage of rate Apygardu˛ teismai Regional Court (Lithuania) Apylinkiu˛ teismai Local Court (Lithuania) AR Arrêté Royal (Royal decree, Belgium) Arch.civ. Archivio civile (Piacenza, 4th Series 18.1975-47.2004; since 1.1958-17.1974 Archivo della responsabilità civile e dei problemi generali delle danno – rivista bimestrale di legislazione, dottrina e giurisprudenza; cited by year and page) Arch.Giur.circolaz. Archivio Giuridico della circolazione e dei sinistri stradali – rivista mensile di dottrina, giurisprudenza e legislazione (Piacenza, 4th Series 1.1955 ff; cited by year and page) Arch.resp.civ. Archivio della responsabilità civile e dei problemi generali del danno (Piacenza 1.1958 ff; 1959-1974; since 1975 published as Archivio civile; cited by year and page) ArchN AqveiŁ o MolokociŁ a| (Athens 1.1949 ff; cited by volume, year and page) ARIL Annual Review of Irish Law (Dublin 1.1987/1988; cited by year and page) AqlemoŁpotko| (Thessaloniki 1.1946/47 ff; cited by year and page) Arm Arr.Cass. Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie (Brussels 1.1967 ff; 1937-1961 published as Arresten van het Hof van Verbreking; the collection did not appear 1962-1966; cited by year and page) art(s). article(s) ASA Advertising Standards Authority; a self-regulatory body established by the advertising industry to monitor compliance with codes of practice regulating the content of advertisements, sales promotions and direct marketing within the UK asp Act of the Scottish Parliament ASVG Allgemeines Sozialversicherungsgesetz (General Social Insurance Act, Austria) AT Audiencia Territorial (Court of First Instance, Spain) AtomG Gesetz vom 31. Oktober 1976 über die friedliche Verwendung der Kernenergie und den Schutz gegen ihre Gefahren. Atomgesetz (Law on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the protection against its dangers, Germany, 31. October 1976, BGBl. I p. 3035) AtomHG Atomhaftpflichtgesetz (Nuclear Liability Act, Austria) Avd Avdeling (part) Avv. e proc. Avvocato e procuratore (Italy) AWSt-A Reference term used in the publications of the BfAI; see BfAI

1037

Annexes B B & Ad B & Ald B&C B&S B.R.H. BAG BAGE

BankFin

Banque

BAnz

Batt BB BBergG BBTC

BCASPDM BCLC BD BDA

Beav BfAI

1038

Baron; a judge of the Court of Exchequer Barnewall & Adolphus’ King’s Bench Reports (ER 109-110) (volumes 1 to 5 covering the years 1830-1834; cited by volume and page) Barnewall and Alderson’s Reports, King’s Bench (ER 106) (volumes 1-5 covering the years 1817-1822; cited by volume and page) Barnewall & Cresswell’s King’s Bench Reports (ER 107-109) (volumes 1-10 covering the years 1822-1830; cited by volume and page) Best & Smith Queen’s Bench Reports (volumes 1-6 covering the years 1861-1865; cited by volume and page) Belgische Rechtspraak in Handelszaken/Jurisprudence commerciale de Belgique (Antwerp 1.1968-15.1982; cited by year and page) Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court, Germany) Entscheidungen des Bundesarbeitsgericht (Decisions of the Federal Labour Court, Germany; Berlin, later Heidelberg and Frankfurt/M. 1.1955 ff; cited by volume and page) Bank- en Financiewezen/Revue de la banque (Brussels 1.1936/37-64.2000; since 65.2001 published as Bank- en Financiewezen/Revue bancaire et financière; cited by year and page) Revue banque (Paris 666.2005 ff; since 1.1926-14.1939; N.S. 15.1946-60.1991 = nos. 1-522; nos. 523.1992-598.1998 published as Banque – revue mensuelle du banquier, de son personnel et de sa clientèle, from nos. 599.1999-665.2005 as BanqueMagazine; cited by year, volume and page) Bundesanzeiger (Cologne 1.1949 ff; cited by year, number and page) Batty’s King’s Bench Reports (Ireland, covering the years 1825-1846; cited by volume and page) Betriebs-Berater. Zeitschrift für Recht und Wirtschaft (Heidelberg, later Frankfurt/M. 1.1946 ff; cited by year and page) Bundesberggesetz (Mining Act, Germany) Banca, borsa e titoli di credito – rivista di dottrina e giurisprudenza (Milan 1.1934-8.1941; 9.1942-10.1943; 11.1948-32.1969 = N.S. 1-22; N.S. 23 = 33.1970; N.S. 51 = 61.1998 ff; cited by year, book and column) British Code of Advertising, Sales Promotion and Direct Marketing Butterworths Company Law Cases (London 1.1983/84 ff; cited by year, book and page) Byretsdom (local court judgment, Denmark) Base de Datos Aranzadi (Online database linked to Westlaw, Spain) BDA AC = Aranzadi Civil, see AC BDA JUR = Jurisprudencia (all other decisions not specifically compilated in other areas) BDA RTC = Repertorio Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court Compilation) BDA RJ = Repetorio de Jurisprudencia Aranzadi; see RAJ Beaven’s Rolls Court Reports (ER 48-55) (volumes 1-36 covering the years 1838-1866; cited by volume and page) Bundesagentur für Außenwirtschaft, former Bundesstelle für Außenhandelsinformation (Federal Information Centre on Foreign Trade Law; Cologne, Germany)

Abbreviations BFD BG

BGB BGB (old) BGBl.

BGE

BGH BGHR BGHReport

BGHZ

BH

Universidade de Coimbra. Boletim da Faculdade de Direito (Coimbra 1.1914/ 15-9.1925/26 = Nr. 1-90; 10.1926/28 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Bundesgericht (Supreme Court of Switzerland); Bezirksgericht (Court of Appeal, former German Democratic Republic; partly also Germany; Court of First Instance, general jurisdiction, Austria) cf. CC Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch of 18 August 1896 (Civil Code, Germany, 18 August 1896, RGBl. p. 195) effective up to 31 December 2001 Bundesgesetzblatt (Official Journal issued by the Ministry of Justice, Germany; Bonn, Cologne 1949-1950; then in parts: BGBl. part I [1951 ff]; BGBl. part II [1951 ff]; BGBl. part III [1951-1967] Fundstellennachweis der Sammlung des Bundesrechts [Collection of Federal Statutes], since 1968 published as Bundesgesetzblatt Teil 1. Fundstellennachweis A, Bundesrecht ohne völkerrechtliche Vereinbarungen respectively as Bundesgesetzblatt Teil 2. Fundstellennachweis B, Völkerrechtliche Vereinbarungen, Verträge zur Vorbereitung und Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands); Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich (Official Journal, Austria 1920-1938; 1945 ff., since 2004 distributed online: www.ris.bka.gv.at Entscheidungen des schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes (Decisions of the Swiss Supreme Court; can also be referred to as Arrêts du Tribunal Fédéral Suisse, Lausanne 1.1875 ff; from 23.1897 two books without special titles; separation in sub-series with changing titels and numeration from 40.1914; book I: Verfassungsrecht [incl. Kompetenzkonflikte] = Droit constitutionnel [y compris les conflits de compétence] = Diritto costituzionale [ivi compresi i conflitti di competenza] [121.1995 ff]; book II: Verwaltungsrecht und internationales öffentliches Recht [inkl. Klagen aus dem öffentlichen Recht] = Droit administratif et droit international public [y compris les actions fondées sur le droit public] [121.1995 ff]; book III: Zivilrecht und Schuldbetreibungs- und Konkursrecht = Droit civile et poursuite pour dettes et faillite = Diritto civile e esecuzioni fallimenti [40.1914/15]; book IV: Strafrecht und Strafvollzug = Droit pénal, exécution des peines = Diritto penale, esecuzione delle pene [40.1914/15]; book V: Sozialversicherungsrecht = Droit des assurances sociales = Diritto delle assicurazioni sociali [96.1970 ff]; cited by volume, book and page) Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany; before 1990 only for West Germany) BGH-Rechtsprechung Zivilsachen (Decisions of the German Supreme Court in civil matters, Cologne et al., 1987, CD-ROM; cited by § and keyword) BGH-Report. Schnelldienst zur Zivilrechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs (Cologne 1.2001 ff; since 1998 published online as: ZR-Report.de; cited by year and page) Amtliche Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen (Decisions of the German Federal Court of Justice in civil matters, Cologne et al., 1.1951 ff; cited by volume and page) Bírósági Határozatok (Reported Cases, Court Decisions, Hungary)

1039

Annexes BImSchG

Bing BinnSchG

BJagdG BJC BJIBFL

Bligh N.S. BOE

BolMinJus

BPIR BR BRats-Drucks.

BrB Brussels Convention BS BT-Drucks.

Build LR Bull.Ass. Bull.ass.plén.

Bull.ch.mixte Bull.civ.

Bull.com.

1040

Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz (Immission Control Act, Germany) Bingham’s Reports, Common Pleas (ER 130-131) (volumes 1-10 covering the years 1822-1834; cited by volume and page) Binnenschiffahrtsgesetz (Inland Waterways Act, Austria) and Gesetz über den gewerblichen Binnenschiffsverkehr vom 1. Oktober 1953 (Industrial Inland Waterway Traffic Act, Germany) Bundesjagdgesetz (Hunting Act, Germany) Boletín de Jurisprudencia Constitucional (Bulletin of the Constitutional Court of Spain, Madrid 1.1981 ff; cited by volume year and page) Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law (London 1.1986 ff; cited by year and page) Bligh’s House of Lords Reports, New Series (ER 4-6) (volumes 1-11 covering the years 1827-1837; cited by volume and page) Boletín Oficial del Estado (Official Gazette, Spain; Madrid 1.1936 ff; cited by year, number and date) Boletim do Ministério da Justiça (Bulletin of the Ministry of Justice, Portugal; Lisboa 1.1940/41-7.1947 = nos. 1-40 published as Boletim oficial do Ministério da Justiça; N.S. 1.1947; 2.1947-499.2000 published as Boletim do Ministério da Justiça; cited by volume, year and page) Bankruptcy and Personal Insolvency Reports (Bristol 1.1996. ff; cited by year and page) Tijdschrift Bouwrecht (Deventer 1.1972 ff; cited by year and number) Bundesratsdrucksachen. Verhandlungen des Bundesrates (Proceedings of the 2nd Chamber of the German Federal Parliament; Bonn 1.1949 ff; cited by volume, year and, if necessary, by page) Brottsbalk (Criminal Code, Sweden, 21 December 1962, SFS 1962:700) Brussels Convention. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in civil and commercial matters, 27 Sept. 1968 (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 77) Belgisch Staatsblad; see Monit. belge Bundestagsdrucksachen. Verhandlungen des Bundestages (Proceedings of the 1st Chamber of the German Federal Parliament; Bonn 1.1949 ff; cited by volume, year and if necessary, by page) Building Law Reports (Harlow 1.1976-89.1998; cited by volume and page) Bulletin des Assurances (Antwerpen 1.1921-85.2005 = no. 1-353; 354.2006 ff; cited by year and page) Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation, assemblée plénière (Bulletin of the decisions of the Court of Cassation, Full Assembly of the Court, France) Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation, chambre mixte (Bulletin of the decisions of the Court of cassation, Mixed Chamber, France) Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation rendus en matière civile (Bulletin of the decisions of the Court of cassation in civil matters, France; Paris 12.1804/05, 128.1926 ff; cited by year, book and number) Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation rendus en matière commerciale (Bulletin of the decisions of the Court of cassation in commercial matters = Book IV [formerly Book III] of Bull.civ.)

Abbreviations Bull.crim.

BullEU Burr BVerfG BVerfGE

BVerfGG BW BW (old)

C&P C.J. C.P. C.proc.civ. C.proc.crim. C.proc.pen. C.proc.pén. CA

CA CAA

Cal 3d Cass.

Cass. Pen. Cass.ass.pl

Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation rendus en matière criminelle (Bulletin of the decisions of the Court of cassation in criminal matters, France; Paris 9.1804 ff; cited by year, book and number) Bulletin of the European Union (Bulletin of the European Communities, before 1993; Luxembourg 1.1968 ff; cited by year and number) Burrows King’s Bench Reports tempore Mansfield (ER 97-98) (volumes 1-5 covering the years 1757-1771; cited by volume and page) Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany) Amtliche Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany; Tübingen 1952 ff; cited by volume and page) Gesetz über das Bundesverfassungsgericht (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz) (Statute of the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany) cf. CC Burgerlijk Wetboek (Civil Code, The Netherlands, 1 September 1838, Stb. 1831 nos. 1 and 6 in conjunction with KB, 10 April 1838, Stb. 1838 no. 12) Carrington and Payne’s Nisi Prius Reports (ER 171-173) (volumes 1-9 covering the years 1823-1841; cited by volume and page) Lord Chief Justice (England) Common Pleas Cases (1865-1875; cited by year, volume and page; see LR) cf. CCP cf. CCrimProc cf. CCrimProc cf. CCrimProc Audiencia Provincial (Spain); Corte d’Appello (Italy); Cour d’Appel (Belgium, France); Court of Appeal (England); Curte de Apel (Romania); E}eseiŁ o (Greece); High Court (Ireland; in its appellate jurisdiction); Hof (The Netherlands); Hovrätt (Finland, Sweden); Inner House (Court of Session, Scotland); Kammergericht (Berlin, Germany); Krajsky sùd (Slovakia); Lietuvos apeliacinis teismas (Lithuania), Megyei Bíróság (Hungary); Oberlandesgericht (Austria, Germany); Østre Landsret (Denmark); Relação (Portugal); Ringkonnakohus (Estonia); Sa˛d Apelacyjny (Poland); Søndre Landsret (Denmark), Vestre Landsret (Denmark); Visje Sodisce (Slovenia); Vrnchi soud (Czech Republic) cf. Ccom (for Bulgaria) Cour d’appel administratif (Administrative Court of Appeal, France) California Reports, Third Series (San Francisco 1974 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Hof van Cassatie/Cour de cassation (Belgium); Cour de cassation (France); Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italy, when none other specified: sezione civile = Civil Law Chamber) (Court of Cassation) Cassazione penale. Rivista mensile di giurisprudenza (Milan 1961 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Cour de Cassation siègeant en assemblée plénière (Court of Cassation, Full Assembly of the Court, Belgium)

1041

Annexes Cass.ass.plén. Cass.ch.mixte Cass.ch.réun. Cass.civ. Cass.com. Cass.crim. Cass.pén. Cass.req. Cass.sez.lav. Cass.sez.pen. Cass.sez.trib. Cass.sez.un. Cass.soc. CB CB (N.S.) CBR Jaarboek CC

CCC CCIA

CCJC

1042

Cour de cassation, Assemblée Plénière (Court of Cassation, Full Assembly of the Court, France) Cour de cassation, Chambre Mixte (Court of Cassation, Mixed Chamber, France) Cour de cassation, Chambres Réunies (Court of Cassation, France) Cour de cassation, Chambre Civile (Court of Cassation, Civil Law Chamber, France) Cour de cassation, Chambre Commerciale et Financière (Court of Cassation, Commercial, Economic and Financial Law Chamber, France) Cour de cassation, Chambre criminelle (Court of Cassation, Criminal Law Chamber, France) Cour de cassation, Chambre pénale (France); see Cass.crim. Cour de cassation, Chambre des Requêtes (Court of Cassation, Petition Chamber, France; abolished) Corte di Cassazione, sezione lavoro (Supreme Court of Cassation, Labour Law Chamber, Italy) Corte di Cassazione, sezione penale (Supreme Court of Cassation, Criminal Law Chamber, Italy) Corte di Cassazione, sezione tributaria (Supreme Court of Cassation, Tax Law Chamber, Italy) Corte di Cassazione, sezione unite (Supreme Court of Cassation, Joint Chambers, Italy) Cour de cassation, Chambre Sociale (Court of Cassation, Social Law Chamber, France) Common Bench Reports (ER 135-139) (volumes 1-18 covering the years 1845-1856; cited by volume and page) Common Bench Reports, New Series (ER 140-144) (volumes 1-20 covering the years 1856-1865; cited by volume and page) Centrum voor Beroepsvervolmaking in de Rechten. Universiteit Antwerpen. Jaarboek (Antwerp and Apeldoorn 1.1996/97 ff; cited by year and page) Civil Code; abbreviation used coherent for the following Codes: Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [ABGB] (Austria); ArsijoŁ| JxŁdija| [AK] (Greece); Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] (Germany); Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW / NBW] (The Netherlands); Civil Code (Malta); Civillikums (Latvia); Cod civil [C.civ.] (Romania); Code Civil (Belgium, France and Luxembourg); Codice Civile (Italy); Código Civil (Portugal and Spain); Kodeks cywilny [KC] (Poland); Lietuvos civilinis kodeksas [CK] (Lithuania); Obcˇiansky zákonník [OZ] (Czech Republic and Republic of Slovakia); Polgári Törvényköny [Ptk] (Hungary) Contrats, concurrence et consommation (Paris 1.1991 ff; cited by year, volume and page) Civil Code Implementation Act; abbreviation used coherent for the following Codes: EiracxcijoŁ| MoŁlo| (Greece); Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch [EGBGB] (Germany) Cuadernos Civitas de Jurisprudencia Civil (Madrid 1.1983 ff; cited by year and page)

Abbreviations CCLT

Ccom

CCP

CCrimProc

Cdo

CE CE

cf. CFI

Ch Ch. App. Ch. D chap(s).

Canadian Cases on the Law of Torts (Toronto 1.1976 ff; cited by volume and page) Commercial Code; abbreviation used coherent for the following Codes: Code de commerce (France); Código Comercial (Portugal); Código de comercio (Spain); ElpoqijoŁ| MoŁlo| (Greece); Handelsbalk (Finland); Handelsbalken (Sweden); Handelsgesetzbuch (Austria and Germany [HGB]); Obchodny´ zákoník (Czech Republic); Ochodny´ zákonník [ObchZ] (Slovakia); œªæŒŁ ÅŒ [CA] (Bulgaria); Wetboek van Koophandel/Code de commerce (Belgium) Code of Civil Procedure; abbreviation used coherent for the following Codes: Cod de procedura˘ civila˘ (Romania); Code de Procédure Civile [C.proc.civ.] (France); Codice di procedura civile [C.proc.civ./ CPC] (Italy); Código de Processo Civil [C.proc.civ.] (Portugal); Ley de enjuiciamiento civil [LEC] (Spain); Code judiciaire/Gerechtelijk Wetboek [Code jud./GerW] (Part IV of the Code Judiciare, Belgium); JxŁdija| PokisijtŁ| DijomoliŁ a| [KPolDik] (Greece); Polgári perrendtartás [Pp] (Hungary); Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering [Rv] (The Netherlands); Zakon o pravdnem postopku [ZPP] (Slovenia); Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] (Austria and Germany) Code of Criminal Procedure; abbreviation used coherent for the following Codes: Code de procédure pénale [C.proc.pén.] (France); Code d’instruction criminelle/Wetboek van Strafvordering [C.proc.crim.] (Belgium); Codice di procedura penale [C.proc.pen.] (Italy); Código de Processo Penal [C.proc.pen.] (Portugal); JxŁdija| PoimijtŁ| DijomoliŁ a| [KPD] (Greece); Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal [LECr] (Spain); Strafprozessordnung [StPO] (Germany); Wetboek van Strafvordering [Sv] (The Netherlands) Dovolání proti pravomocny´m rozhodnutím odvolacích soudu° ve veˇcech obcˇanskoprávních (In references to cases from Czech Supreme Court, designates that the case concerns a civil appeal to the Supreme Court [dovolání], in distinction to “Odo” [commercial cases] and “Tdo” [criminal cases]) cf. Const. (for Spain) Conseil d’Etat (Council of State, France) confer Court of First Instance, general jurisdiction: See further AG, Apygardu teismai, Apylinkiu teismai, AT, BD, BG, Civ., Conc., Corr, HC, Helyi Bíróság, JP, Kerületi Bíróság, KS, Ktg, LG, Linnakohus, Maakohus, MPr, OH, Okj, Okz, ØL, OS, PPr, Pr, Pret., Rb, Sa˛d grodzki, Sa˛d okre˛gowy, SH, Sh.Ct., TGI, TI, Trib., Trib.com., Trib.Corr., Trib.enfants, Varosi birosàg, VL, Vred The Law Reports. Chancery Cases (1.1891 ff; cited by year, volume and page) The Law Reports. Chancery Appeal Cases (1865-1875; cited by year, volume and page; see LR) The Law Reports. Chancery Division (1875/76-1890; cited by year, volume and page; see LR) chapter(s)

1043

Annexes ChrID CICR

CIM

Cir. CISG

Civ. CJ CJ(ST) CK CLC CLJ CLR CLY

Cm CMLR

Cmnd CMR

Co. Code jud. col Col.Leg.Esp. Coll. Arb. COM

CompLYB Conc. concl.

1044

Vqomija IdixsijotŁ DijaiŁ ot (Annals of Private Law, Greek legal journal, Athens 1.2001 ff) Comitato interministeriale per il credito e il consume (The Interministerial Committee for Credit and Savings, referred also as the Credit Committee, Italy) Convention internationale concernant le transport des marchandises par chemins de fer (International Agreement of 7 February 1970 on Rail Freight, BGBl. II 1974 p. 381) Circuit Vienna United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods of 11 April 1980 (http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/ 1980CISG.html) Tribunal de première instance, Chambre civile (Court of First Instance, Belgium) Colectânea de Jurisprudência (Coimbra 1.1976 ff; cited by year, volume and page) Colectânea de Jurisprudência. Acórdãos do Supremo Tribunal de Justiça (Coimbra 1.1993 ff; cited by volume, year and page) cf. CC Commercial Law Cases (London 1.2002 ff; cited by year, volume and page) The Cambridge Law Journal (Cambridge 1.1921/23 ff, parts without volume numbers; cited, as far as possible, by volume, year and page) Commonwealth Law Reports (Melbourne 1.1903 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Current Law Yearbook (London 1.1947 ff; cited by year and issue) Command Papers (London 1986 ff., United Kingdom; cited by document number) Common Market Law Reports (London 1.1963 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Command Papers (London 1956-1986, United Kingdom; cited by document number) Convention relative au Contrat de transport international de marchandises par route (Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, 19 May 1956, UNTS vol. 399 p. 189) Company cf. CCP Colonna (column) Colección Legislativa de España. First series, third part: Jurisprudencia civil (Madrid 1.1889 ff; cited by volume, year, book, number and page) Collegio Arbitrale (National Arbitration Court; Italy) Publications of the European Commission (Brussels 1.1968 ff; cited by year, page and status) Comparative Law Yearbook (’s-Gravenhage/The Hague 1.1977 ff; cited by year and page) Conciliatore (Justice of the Peace, Italy) conclusion(s)

Abbreviations Cons. Stato ConsC ConsCredA

ConsProtA

Const LJ Const LR Const.

Contr. Impr. ContrA

Consiglio di Stato (Supreme Court in administrative matters, Italy) Code de la consommation (Consumer Code, France) Consumer Credit Act; abbreviation used coherent for the following Constitutions: Consumer Credit Act 1974 (United Kingdom); Consumer Credit Act 1995 (Ireland); Crédito ao Consumo (Portugal); Konsumentkreditlag (Sweden); Konsumkreditgesetz (Switzerland); Ley 7/1995, de Credito al Consumo (Spain); Loi réglementant le crédit à la consummation (Luxembourg); Loi relative à la prévention et au règlement des difficultés liées au surendettement des particuliers et des familles – Loi Neiertz (France); Loi relative au crédit à la consommation/Wet op het consumentenkrediet (Belgium); Verbraucherkreditgesetz (Germany); Wet op het comsumentenkrediet (The Netherlands) Consumer Protection Act; abbreviation used coherent for the following Constitutions: Codice del Consumo (Italy); Consumer Protection Act 1987 (England/ Scotland); Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2007, que aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de los consumidores y usuarios y otras leyes complementarias [LCU] (Spain); Konsumentenschutzgesetz [KSchG] (Austria); Konsumentskyddslag (Finland); Pqorsaia sxm JasamakxsxŁm (Greece); Lei de Defesa do Consumidor (Portugal); Loi relative à la protection juridique du consommateur (Luxemburg); Loi du 14/7/1991 sur les pratiques du commerce et sur l’information et la protection du consommateur/Wet van 14 juni 1991 betreffende de handelspraktijken en de voorlichting en bescherming van de consument (Belgium); Regime legal aplicável à defesa dos consumidores/Lei de Defesa do Consumidor (Portugal); ˙Œ Å ÅøŁ   ÆŁ ºŁ (Bulgaria); Tarbijakaitseseadus (Estonia); Törvény a fogyasztóvédelemro˝l (Hungary); Zákon o ochraneˇ spotrˇebitele (Czech Republic); Zákon o ochrane spotrebitel'a a o zmene zákona Slovenskej národnej rady cˇ. 372/1990 Zb. o priestupkoch v znení neskorších predpisov (Slovakia); Zakon o varstvu potrošnikov (Slovenia) Construction Law Journal (London 1.1984 ff; cited by volume and page) Construction Law Reports (London 1.1985 ff; cited by volume and page) Constitution /constitutional; abbreviation used coherent for the following Constitutions: Alkotmány (Hungary); Bunreacht na hÉireann (Ireland); Constituição da República Portuguesa [CRP] (Portugal); Constitución Española [CE] (Spain); Constitut¸ia României (Romania); Constitution francaise de 1958 (France); Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana [Cost.] (Italy); Grondwet [GrW] (The Netherlands); Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus (Estonia); Grundgesetz [GG] (Germany); ˚æŁçŁ  — ƺŁŒ `œºªŁ (Bulgaria); La Constitution belge/Belgische Grondwet (Belgium); RtŁmsacla EkkaŁda| (Greece) Contratto e Impresa (Padova 1.1985 ff; cited by year and page) Contracts Act; abbreviation used coherent for the following Codes: Aftaleloven/Lovbekendtgørelse om aftaler og andre retshandler på formuerettens område (Denmark); Lag om avtal och andra rättshandlingar på

1045

Annexes

CoPECL Corr Corr.giur. Corte Cost. Cost. COTIF

Cour Cox CP

CPC CPD CPR CR

CrimLR Cro Jac CRvB CSJ CSOH CSP

ctr. CuadCivJur. CurrLegProbl. D D D

1046

förmögenhetsrättens område (Sweden); Lag om rättshandlingar på förmögenhetsrättens område (Finland) Common Principles of European Contract Law Correctionnel (Court of First Instance in criminal matters, Belgium) Corriere giuridico (Milan 1.1984 ff; cited by year and page) Corte Costituzionale (Constitutional Court of Italy) cf. Const. Convention relative aux transports internationaux ferroviaires of 9 May 1980 (Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail) Cour Supérieure de Justice (Superior Court of Justice, Luxembourg; in its function as Cour d’assises, Cour de cassation or Cour d’appel) Cox’s Equity Cases (ER 29-30) (volumes 1-2 covering the years 1783-1796; cited by volume and page) Penal Code; abbreviation used coherent for the following Codes: Bekendtgørelse af straffeloven [STRFL] (Denmark); Brottsbalk [BrB] (Sweden); Cod penal (Romania); Code Pénal (France and Luxembourg); Code Pénal/Strafwetboek (Belgium); Codice Penale (Italy); Código Penal (Portugal and Spain [NCP]); ˝ŒÅ º  Œ Œæ (Bulgaria); Kodeks karny (Poland); PeqiŁ jtqxŁrex| sot PoimijotŁ JxŁdijo| [PK] (Greece); Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] (Austria and Germany); Strafflag (Finland); Bünteto˝ Törvénykönyv [Btk] (Hungary); Voorafgaande Titel Wetboek van Strafvordering [V.T.SV.] (Belgium); Wetboek van Strafrecht [Sr] (The Netherlands) cf. CCP Common Pleas Division (London 1875/76-1880; cited by year, volume and page; see LR) The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (England, S.I. 1998 No. 3132 L.17) Izba Cywilna (Chamber in civil matters, Poland) Criminal Law Review (London 1.1954 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Croke’s King’s Bench Reports tempore James I (ER 79) (1603-1625; cited by year and page) Centrale Raad van Beroep (Administrative Court, The Netherlands) Curtea Suprema˘ de Justit¸ie (High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romania; until 2003) Court of Session Outer House (Scotland; cited by year and page) Code de la Santé Publique (Public Health Code, France) contra Cuadernos Civitas de Jurisprudencia Civil (Madrid 1.1983 ff; cited by year and page) Current Legal Problems (London 1.1948 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Décret (decree, France) Digesten Dunlop, Bell & Murray’s Reports, Session Cases, Second Series (Edinburgh, volumes 1-24 covering the years.1838-1862; cited by volume and page)

Abbreviations D.

D. Chron./Jur. D. I.R./Légis. D. Somm.Comm. D.A. D.C. D.H. D.P. Danno e resp. Danske Lov DAOR DAR DB DCFR DCI DDike

De G.F. & J. De G. & Sm De Verz DEE

Def.

DFG

DHG

Recueil de jurisprudence Dalloz (Paris; with different forms and titles: D.A. (Recueil analytique Dalloz [1941-1944]); D.C. (Recueil critique Dalloz [1941-1944]); D.H. (Recueil hebdomadaire Dalloz [1924-1940]); D.P. (Recueil périodique et critique mensuel Dalloz [1924-1940]); Recueil Dalloz, Recueil Sirey, combined since 1955; Recueil Dalloz et Recueil Sirey; from 1965: Recueil Dalloz-Sirey; appearing in sections: D. Chron./ Jur. [Chronique/Jurisprudence], D. I.R./Légis. [Informations Rapides/ Législation], D. Somm.Comm. [Sommaires Commentés]; cited by year, book and page) (older forms and titles omitted) see D. see D. see D. see D. see D. see D. see D. Danno e responsabilità. Problemi di responsabilitá civile e assicurazioni (Milan 1.1996 ff; cited by year and page) Kong Christian den Femtes Danske Lov af 15. april 1683 (Danish Code of King Christian the fifth of 15 April 1683) Le droit des affaires/Het ondernemingsrecht (Gent 1.2000/01 ff; cited by year and page) Deutsches Autorecht (Munich 1.1926 ff; cited by year and page) Der Betrieb. Wochenschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, Steuerrecht, Wirtschaftsrecht, Arbeitsrecht (Düsseldorf 1.1948 ff; cited by year and page) Draft Common Frame of Reference Diritto del commercio internationazionale (Milan 1.1987 ff; cited by year and page) DioijtsijtŁ DiŁ jt (Athens 1.1989 ff; cited by year and page) De Gex, Fisher and Jones’ Chancery Reports (ER 45) (volumes 1-4 covering the years 1859-1862; cited by volume and page) De Gex and Smale (ER 63-64) (volumes 1-5 covering the years 1846-1852; cited by volume and page) Tijdschrift voor Verzekering/Bulletin des Assurances (formerly De Verzekering) (Brussels 1.1921 ff; cited by year and page) DiŁ jaio Epiveiqtrexm jai EsaiqeixŁm (Athens 1.1995 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Répertoire du Notariat Defrénois (Paris 86.1966 ff; previousely Répertoire général pratique du notariat et de l’enregistrement (Paris 1.1881-85.1965); cited by year, number and page) Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation; central, self-governing research funding organisation that promotes research at universities and other publicly financed research institutions in Germany) Dienstnehmerhaftpflichtgesetz. Bundesgesetz vom 31. März 1965 über die Beschränkung der Schadensersatzpflicht der Dienstnehmer (Federal Law on the Limitation of Personal Liability of Employees, Austria, 31 March 1965, BGBl. 80/1965)

1047

Annexes Diário Rep. Dir. e Giust. Dir. Economia assicur. Dir.fam.pers. Dir.inf. Dir.just. disp. prel. diss. DJ DJT DL DLgs DLR

DM DNotZ

Dow Dow & RyKB DPIJ DPR

Dr.prat.com.int. Droit soc. Ds DStR DTI DULJ

Dz. U. E&B e.g.

1048

Diário da República (Government gazette, Portugal; Lisboa 1.1976 ff; cited by year and number) Diritto e giustizia. Supplemento settimanale cartaceo al quotidiano giuridico on line (Milan 2003 ff; cited by year, fasc. and page) Diritto ed economia dell’assicurazione (Milan 1.1955/59 ff; cited by year and page) Il diritto di famiglia e delle persone (Milan 1.1972 ff; cited by year and if necessary, by part and page) Diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica (Milan 1.1985 ff; cited by year and page) Direito e justicia (Lisboa 1.1980 ff; cited by year and page) Disposizioni sulla legge in generale o preleggi (Preliminary Provisions to the Civil Code, Italy)) dissertation Deutsche Justiz (Berlin 1.1933-13.1945; cited by year and page) Deutscher Juristentag (German Lawyers’ Forum) Decreto legge (Italy); Decreto ley (Spain); Decreto-Lei (Portugal); Ordonnance (France); Decree Law Decreto legislativo (Legislative Decree, Italy) Dominion Law Reports (Toronto et al., First Series 1.1912-70.1922; 1923-1955; Second Series 1.1956-70.1968; Third Series 1.1969-150.1984; Fourth Series 1.1984 ff; cited by year, volume and page) Deutsche Mark (Former German currency) Deutsche Notarzeitschrift (Magazine of the German Association of Public Notaries; Munich, Berlin 1.1901-33.1933; 33.1933 ff; cited by year and page) Dow’s Reports, House of Lords (ER 3) (volumes 1-6 covering the years 1812-1818; cited by volume and page) Dowling and Ryland’s Reports, King’s Bench (ER 171) (covering the years 1822-1823; cited by book an page) Doyle’s Personal Injury Journal (1990-2000; cited by year and page) Decreto Presidente della Repubblica (Presidential decree, Italy) Droit et pratique du commerce international (Paris 1.1975-22.1996; cited by year and page) Droit social (Paris 1.1938 ff; cited by year and page) Departementsserien. Series of reports published by Swedish ministers (Stockholm 1988 ff.; cited by year and report number) Deutsches Steuerrecht (Munich 1.1962/63 ff; cited by year and page) Department of Trade and Industry (United Kingdom) Dublin University Law Journal (Dublin 1.1976-1981; New Series from 1982; cited by year, volume and page) Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Official Gazette, Poland) Ellis and Blackburn’s Reports (ER 118-120) (volumes 1-8 covering the years 1852-1858; cited by volume and page) exempli gratia (for example)

Abbreviations EAL

East EBH EBLR EC EC ECE ECG ECHR ECHR ECJ ECJ Rep.

ECLR

ecolex ECR

ECU

ed(s). Edinburgh LRev EEB-Newsletter EEC EED EEN

Ef EFSlg EGBGB

Eis. EKHG

El. & Bl. El.Bl.&El. EllDik

Erstatningsansvarsloven (Damages Liability Act, Denmark, Lovbekendtgørelse om erstatningsansvar, no. 228, 23 May 1984; Lovtidende A p. 742; amended by Lovbekendtgørelse om erstatningsansvar, no. 885, 20 Sept. 2005) East’s Term Reports, King’s Bench (ER 102-104) (volumes 1-16 covering the years 1801-1812; cited by volume and page) Elvi Bírósági Határozat (Principle Decision of the Hungarian Supreme Court) European Business Law Review (London 1.1990 ff; cited by year and page) European Commission European Community Economic Commission for Europe E-Commerce Gesetz (E-Commerce Act, Austria) European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg) European Convention on Human Rights Court of Justice of the European Communities (Luxembourg) European Court of Justice Reporter; a digest of all decisions and opinions of the European Court of Justice (Oxford 1.1982 ff; cited by year and page) European Competition Law Review (Oxford 1.1980 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Fachzeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (Vienna 1.1990 ff; cited by year and page) European Court Reports. Reports of cases before the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance/Court of Justice of the European Communities (Luxembourg 1.1954 ff; until 1989 published as Reports of cases before the Court; cited by volume, year and page) European Currency Unit edition, editor(s) The Edinburgh Law Review (Edinburgh 1.1997 ff; cited by volume, year and page) The European Environmental Bureau Newsletter (http://www.eeb.org/publication/general.htm) European Economic Community EpihexŁqtri| EqcasijotŁ DijaiŁ ot (Review of Commercial Law, Athens 1.1941 ff; cited by volume, year and page) E}tleqiŁ da EkktŁmxm MolijxŁm (Journal of Greek Jurists, Athens 1.1934 ff; cited by volume, year and page) E}eseiŁ o (Court of Appeal, Greece) Ehe- und familienrechtliche Entscheidungen (Decisions on marriage and family law, Austria, Vienna 1.1965 ff; cited by the number of the decision) cf. CCIA EiracxctŁ (Introduction, Greece) Eisenbahn- und Kraftfahrzeughaftpflichtgesetz (Traffic Liability Act, Austria) Ellis & Blackburn’s Queen’s Bench Reports (ER 118-120) (volumes 1-8 covering the years 1851-1858; cited by book and page) Ellis, Blackburn & Ellis’ Queen’s Bench Reports (ER 120) (London 1858; cited by book and page) EkktŁmijtŁ DijoxrtŁmt (Athens 1.1960 ff; cited by volume, year and page)

1049

Annexes EMLR

EntgFG EOA EPA ER

ErmAK ERPL ERT

EsingD estab. et al. et seq. etc. ETS

EU EuGRZ

Eur.Conv.Hum. Rights Eur.Transp.L. Europa e dir. priv. EuZW EvBl EWCA Civ EWHC EWiR EWS

Ex. Ex. D Exch Exch Ch

1050

Entertainment and Media Law Reports (London 1.1998 ff; cited by year and page) Entgeltfortzahlungsgesetz (Employee Remuneration (Public Holidays and Illness) Act, Germany) cf. LOA Employment Protection Act 1990 (United Kingdom) The English Reports (London, 1900-1932; reprint of the nominate reports of English judgements from the years 1220-1865/66 in 178 volumes; cited by volume and page) EqlgmeiŁ a sot ArsijotŁ JxŁdijo| (Commentary to the Greek Civil Code) European Review of Private Law (Deventer 1.1994 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Europarättslig Tidskrift (Stockholm 1998 ff; cited by year and page) EpihexŁqgri| RtcjoimxmiajotŁ DijaiŁ ot (Athens 1.1973 ff; cited by year and page) established et alii (and others) et sequens, et sequentes or sequential (and the following) et cetera European Treaty Series of Agreements and Conventions of the Council of Europe (Strasbourg 1.1949-3.1949, 4.1950 ff/61.1971 ff; cited by volume and number) European Union Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift (Strasbourg 1.1974 ff; cited by year and page) European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights, 4 November 1950 European Transport Law (Antwerp 1.1966 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Europa e diritto privato (Milan, 1.1998 ff; cited by year and page) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (Munich, Frankfurt/M. 1.1990 ff; cited by year and page) Evidenzblatt der Rechtsmittelentscheidungen (Vienna 1.1934 ff; included in the ÖJZ since 1946, see there; cited by year and page) Approved Judgment of the Court of Appeal, Civil Division, England and Wales Approved Judgment of the High Court (England and Wales) Entscheidungen zum Wirtschaftsrecht (Cologne 1.1985 ff; cited by §, number, year and page) Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (Munich 1.1990 ff; cited by year and page) Exchequer Cases (London 1865-1875; cited by volume, year and page; see LR) Exchequer Division (London 1.1875/76-5.1879/80; cited by volume, year and page; see LR) Court of the Exchequer (United Kingdom) Exchequer Chamber (United Kingdom)

Abbreviations F F&F f(f) FAL

Fallim Fam

FamRZ

FamZ fasc. FED FEK FFR FFS

Fin LR FL

fn. Foro amm. CDS Foro it. Foro it. Mass. Foro pad. ForstG FP6 FS FSA FSMA FSR FSupp FTLR

Fraser’s Session Cases, 5th Series (Edinburgh, volumes 1-8 covering the years 1898-1906; cited by volume and page) Foster & Finlason’s Nisi Prius Reports (ER 175-176) (volumes 1-4 covering the years 1858-1867; cited by volume and page) following page(s) Forsikringsaftaleloven (Insurance Contracts Act, Denmark); Lag om Försäkringsavtal (Insurance Contracts Act, Finland); Lag om Försäkringsavtal (Insurance Contracts Act, Sweden) Fallimento e le altre procedure concorsuali (Milan 1.1979 ff; cited by year and page) The Law Reports, Family Division (London 1.1972 ff; formerly: The Law Reports, Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division 1.1865/1869 ff; cited by year and page) Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht (Bielefeld 1.1954 ff; until 9.1962: Ehe und Familie im privaten und öffentlichen Recht [Marriage and Family within Private and Public Law]; cited by year and page) Interdisziplinäre Zeitschrift für Familienrecht. Beratung – Unterbringung – Rechtsfürsorge (Vienna 1.2006 ff; cited by year and page) fascicle Forsikrings- og Erstatningsretlig Domssamling (Collection of Insurance and Tort Law Cases, Copenhagen 1.1994 ff; cited by year and page) UtŁkko E}tleqiŁ da| JtbeqmtŁoex| (Government Gazette, Greece; Athens 1.1833 ff; cited by year, volume and if necessary, book and number) Försäkringsjuridiska föreningens rättsfallsamling (Stockholm 1939-1984; cited by year and page) Finlands Författningssamling (Official Gazette, Finland; Helsingfors 1.1860 ff; cited by year, number and page) Financial Law Reports (Brentford 1.1982 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Færdselsloven (Traffic Act, Denmark) footnote(s) Il Foro amministrativo. Consiglio Di Stato (Milan, 1.2002 ff; cited by year and page) Il Foro italiano: raccolta di giurisprudenza civile, commerciale, penale, amministrativa (Roma, 1.1876 ff; cited by year, volume and column) Massimario del Foro italiano (Rome 1.1930 ff; cited by volume, year, number and column) Il Foro padano (Milan 1.1946 ff; cited by year, volume and column) Forstgesetz (Forestry Act, Austria) Sixth Framework Programme on Research Festschrift/Commemorative Publication/Essays in honour of sb. Financial Services Authority (United Kingdom) Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (United Kingdom) Fleet Street Patent Law Reports (London 1.1963 ff; cited by year and page) Federal Supplement (St. Paul/Minnesota 1.1932/33 ff; cited by volume and page) Financial Times Law Reports (Brentford 1.1982-1988; cited by year, volume and page)

1051

Annexes FuR FWO

GazPal Gazz. Uff. GenTG GerW GG

Giff Giur.cost.

Giur.it.

Giur.it.Mass. Giur.mer. Giur.rom. Giur.tosc. Giust.civ. Giust.civ.Mass.

Giust.pen. GlU

GlUNF

GmbH GmbHR GoA GPCCA

1052

Familie und Recht (Neuwied 1.1990 ff; cited by year and page) Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek-Vlaanderen La gazette du palais: feuille officielle d’annonces légales (Paris 1.1886 ff; cited by year, book and page) Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana (Official Gazette, Italy; Rome 1.1860 ff; cited by year, number and page) Gentechnikgesetz (Genetic Engineering Act, Germany) Gerechtelijk Wetboek (Code of Civil Procedure, Part IV of the Code Judiciare, Belgium); see CCP Grundgesetz (Basic Law, Constitution of Germany) Giffard’s Chancery Reports (ER 65-66) (volumes 1-5 covering the years 1857-1865; cited by volume and page) Giurisprudenza costituzionale (Milan 1.1956-20.1975; then: Parte 1 = Corte costituzionale 21.1976 ff; Parte 2 = Ordinanza di rinivio ed i ricorsi 21.1976 ff; Parte 3 = Quaderni della giurisprudenza costituzionale 1.1964-7.1968; New Series 1.1972 ff) Giurisprudenza italiana (Turin 14.1862-25.1873; 3rd series 26.1874-32.1880, 4th series 33.1881-43.1891, 5th series 44.1892-64.1912, 110.1958 ff; cited by year, part and if necessary, section and column) Massimario della Giurisprudenza italiana (Turin 1.1931 ff; cited by year, number and page) Giurisprudenza di merito (Milan 1.1969 ff; cited by year, book and page) Giurisprudenza romana (Milan 1.1997 ff; cited by year and page) Giurisprudenza toscana (Milan et al. 1.1950 ff; cited by year and page) Giustizia civile. Rivista bimestrale di giurisprudenza (Milan 1.1951 ff; cited by year, book and page) Giustizia Civile. Massimario annotato della Cassazione (Milan 5.1955 (1955/56)-7.1957 (1957/58); [8.]1958-[31.]1981; 32.1983 ff (Giustizia civile); cited by year and page La Giustizia penale. Rivista critica di dottrina, giurisprudenza, legislazione (Rome 1.1895 ff; cited by year, book and page) Sammlung von Civilrechtlichen Entscheidungen des k. k. Obersten Gerichtshofes, begründet von Julius Glaser und Joseph Unger (Collection of Civil Law cases, established by Julius Glaser and Joseph Unger, Vienna 1.1859-34.1901; cited by the number of the decision) Neue Folge der Sammlung von Civilrechtlichen Entscheidungen des k. k. Obersten Gerichtshofes, begründet von Julius Glaser und Joseph Unger (New collection of civil law cases, established by Julius Glaser and Joseph Unger, Vienna 1=35.1900-18=52.1919; cited by the number of the decision) Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (Private company limited by shares) GmbH-Report. Gesellschafts- und Steuerrecht der GmbH und GmbH & Co (Cologne 1.1963 ff, until 75.1985: GmbH-Rundschau; cited by year and page) Geschäftsführung ohne Auftrag (Benevolent intervention in another’s affairs, Austria and Germany) General Part of the Civil Code Act (Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus, Estonia)

Abbreviations GRUR GRUR Int

GrW GWB

H H&C H&N H & Tw HaftPflG Harv.LR HBl HC HD

HD

Hdst. Helyi Bíróság HGB HK HKLR HL HL(E) HL(Ir) HL(Sc) HLC HLR

Hof HovR HR HRR

Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht (Weinheim 1.1896-49.1944, 50.1948 ff; cited by year and page) Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, Internationaler Teil (Weinheim 1.1980 ff; from 1966 to 1980 Auslands- und internationaler Teil; cited by year and page) cf. Const. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Restraints on Competition Act, Germany) Danish Højesteret (Supreme Court of Denmark) Hurlstone and Coltman’s Exchequer Reports (ER 158-159) (volumes 1-3 covering the years 1862-1866; cited by volume and page) Hurlstone and Norman’s Reports (ER 156-158) (volumes 1-7 covering the years 1856-1862, cited by volume and page) Hall & Twell’s Chancery Reports (ER 47) (volumes 1-2 covering the years 1849-1850; cited by volume and page) Haftpflichtgesetz (Liability Act, Germany) Harvard Law Review (Cambridge, Mass. 1.1887/1888 ff; cited by year, volume and page) Henry Blackstone’s Common Pleas Reports (ER 126) (volumes 1-2 covering the years 1788-1796; cited by volume and page) High Court (Court of first Instance, England; Court of Appeal, Ireland) Redogörelser och meddelanden angående högsta domstolens avgöranden (Collection of Judgments by the Finnish Supreme Court, Helsinki 1.1926 ff; cited by year, number and page) Højesteretsdom (Denmark); Høyesterettsdom (Norway); Högsta domstolens domar (Sweden, Finland) (Judgment of the Supreme Court) Hoofdstuk (Chapter) Local Court (Court of First Instance, Hungary) cf. Ccom Højesterets kendelse (Supreme Court Decisions, Denmark) Hong Kong Law Reports (Hong Kong 1.1905/06-40.1956; 1957-1995; cited by year, volume and page) House of Lords (United Kingdom) cf. LR cf. LR cf. LR Clark’s House of Lords Cases (ER 9-11) (volumes 1-11 covering the years 1847-1866; cited by volume and page) Housing Law Reports (London 1.1967 ff; cited by year, volume and page) Gerechtshof (Court of Appeal, The Netherlands) Hovrätt (Court of Appeal, Finland and Sweden) Hoge Raad (Supreme Court of The Netherlands) Höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung (Berlin, book 4 [1928]-book 18 [1942]; formerly: Juristische Rundschau [Suppl.], Die Rechtsprechung der Oberlandesgerichte und Höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung auf dem Gebiet des Strafrechts; cited by year and number)

1053

Annexes i.e. I.R. ibid. ICC ICCJ ICCLR ICLQ ICLR ICR ICSTIS IECL IEHC IESC IHR ILRM ILT ILTR

Incoterms InDret Inf AuslR Inf. prev. Inner House IntBusLawyer Inv. IPRax IPRE

IPRG IR

Ir Jur Ir Jur (N.S.)

1054

id est (that is to say) Informations rapides du recueil Dalloz (France; see D.) ibidem International Chamber of Commerce (Paris, France) Înalta Curte de Casat¸ie s¸i Justit¸ie (High Court of Cassation and Justice in Romania; since 2003) International Company and Commercial Law Review (London 1.1990 ff; cited by year and page) International and Comparative Law Quarterly (London 1.1952 ff; cited by year, number and page) Irish Common Law Reports, 2nd Series (Dublin 1.1850-17.1866; cited by volume, year and page) Industrial Cases Reports (London 1.1975 ff; cited by year and page) Independent Committee for the Supervision of Telefone Information Services (United Kingdom) The International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Tübingen, New York 1.1970 ff; cited by volume, chapter and margin number) Approved Judgment of the High Court (Republic of Ireland) Approved Judgement of the Supreme Court (Republic of Ireland) Internationales Handelsrecht, Zeitschrift für das Recht des internationalen Warenkaufs und -vertriebs (Munich 1.1999 ff; cited by year and page) Irish Law Reports Monthly (Dublin 1.1981 ff; cited by year and page) Irish Law Times, New Series (Dublin 1.1983 ff; cited by year and page) Irish Law Times Reports (Dublin 1.1867 ff; cited by year, book and page) International Commercial Terms Review on the Analysis of Law; Online (cited by number and year) Informationsbrief Ausländerrecht (Frankfurt/M. 1.1979 ff; cited by year and page) Informazione e previdenziale. Rivista bimestriale dell’avvocatura dell’Istituto Nazionale delle Previdenza Sociale (Rome 1.1985 ff; cited by year and page) Inner House (Court of Session, Scotland) International Business Lawyer (London 1.1973 ff; cited by year and page) Invoering (promulgated) Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (Bielefeld 1.1981 ff; cited by year and page) IPR-Entscheidungen 1-3, Österreichische Entscheidungen zum Internationalen Privatrecht [Vienna 1.1983(1984)], since volume 2 published as: Österreichische Entscheidungen zum Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht [Vienna 2.1983/87(1991) – 3.1988/90(1994); cited by volume and page] Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht (Private International Law Act, Austria) The Irish Reports (Dublin 1.1894 ff; including the sub-series Common Law Series [1.1867 (1868)-11.1877 (1878)] as well as Equity Series [1.1867 (1868) ff]; cited by year, book and page) Irish Jurist (Dublin 1.1935-31.1965; cited by volume, year and page) Irish Jurist (New Series) (Dublin 1.1966 ff; cited by volume, year and page)

Abbreviations IrEqR IRLR IrLR IT-law

J J. J. Int’l Fin. Mkt. J.Environ.L. JA

Jahrb.f.ital.R. JAR JBl

JbOstR JC JClCiv JCP JCP éd. E JCP éd. G JCP éd. N JDI JFT JGG JGS

JhJb

JL JLMB JO

Johns JOL

Irish Equity Reports (Dublin 1.1838-12.1850; cited by year and page) Industrial Relations Law Reports (London 1.1972 ff; cited by year and page) Irish Law Reports, 1st Series (Dublin 1.1838-12.1850; cited by year, book and page) The law related to Information Technology Juristen (Copenhagen 1.1918 ff; cited by year and page) Judge (High Court, United Kingdom) Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money (Amsterdam, 1.1991 ff; cited by year, volume and page) Journal of Environmental Law (New York 1.1974/75 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Juristische Arbeitsblätter. Zeitschrift für Studenten und Referendare (Cologne et al., 1.1969 ff; cited by year and page) Jahrbuch für italienisches Recht (Heidelberg 1.1988 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Jurisprudentie arbeidsrecht (The Hague 1.1992 ff; cited by year and page) Juristische Blätter (Vienna 1.1872 ff; cited by year and page) Jahrbuch für Ostrecht (Munich 1.1960 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Justiciary Cases (Edinburgh 1.1916/20 – 4.1930/35; 1935/40 – 1960/65; cases decided in the High Court of Justiciary) Collection des Juris-Classeurs. Juris-Classeur Civil (Paris 1.1962 ff, ; cited by art., fasc./vo and no.) Juris-Classeur périodique (see SemJur) Semaine Juridique édition entreprise (France; see SemJur) Semaine Juridique édition générale (France; see SemJur) Semaine Juridique éditions nouvelles (France; see SemJur) Journal du droit international (Paris 1.1874 ff; cited by year and page; also known as Clunet) Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska Föreningen i Finland (Helsingfors 1.1936 ff; cited by year and page) Jugendgerichtsgesetz (Juvenile Court Act, Germany) Justizgesetzsammlung. Gesetze und Verordnungen in Justizsachen (Vienna 1780-1848; cited by year and number) Jherings Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des bürgerlichen Rechts (Jena 1.1857-90.1943; until 37.1897 Jahrbuch für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen Rechts und deutschen Privatrechts; cited by volume, year and page) Jurisprudence de Liège (Liège 83.1978-93.1986, afterwards published as JLMB [see JLMB]) Revue de jurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Bruxelles (Liége, 94.1987 ff; cited by year and page) Journal Officiel de la République Française. Lois et Décrets. (Official gazette of the French Republic. Acts and Decrees, Paris 1.1869 ff; cited by date of issue) Johnson’s Chancery Reports (ER 70) (1859; cited by book and page) Jurisprudentie Online (cited by year and page)

1055

Annexes JöR JP JR JT JT JT (Lausanne) JTT

jur. Jura JuridRev JuS JUS JW

JZ

KartG 2005 KATTI KB KB KB KC

Kerületi Bíróság KF KFG KG KG KHVG KIR KKO KMG

1056

Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart (Tübingen 1.1907-25.1938; N.S. 1.1951 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Juge de Paix (Justice of the Peace, Belgium and Luxembourg) Juristische Rundschau (Berlin 1.1947 ff; cited by year and page) Juridisk tidskrift vid Stockholms universitet (Stockholm 1.1989/90 ff; cited by year and page) Journal des Tribunaux (Brussels 1.1881-96.1981; 101.1982 ff; volumes 97-100 not published; cited by year and page) Journal des Tribunaux (Lausanne 1.1929 ff; cited by year and page) Journal des Tribunaux du Travail (Brussels, 1.1970-844.2002; since 2003 published as JTT. Droit du travail, droit de la sécurité sociale, droit judiciaire social, droit pénal social; cited by year and page) jurisprudence Jura. Juristische Ausbildung (Berlin et al. 1.1979 ff; cited by year and page) The Juridical Review (Edingburgh, London 1.1889-67.1955; New Series 1.1956 ff; cited by year and page) Juristische Schulung. Zeitschrift für Studium und Referendariat (Munich, Frankfurt/M. 1.1961 ff; cited by year and page) Rivista di scienze giuridiche (Milan 1.1940-4.1943; N.S. 1.1950-20.1969; 21.1974 ff; cited by year and page) Juristische Wochenschrift. Organ des Deutschen Anwaltsvereins (Bulletin of the German Lawyers’ Association, Leipzig 1.1872-68.1939, 1940 merged with Deutsches Recht as the A ed.; cited by year and page) Juristenzeitung (Tübingen 1.1945 ff; Continuation of the German Rechtszeitschrift and the South German Juristenzeitung, vol. 6.1951 ff; cited by year and page) Bundesgesetz gegen Kartelle und andere Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – Kartellgesetz (Cartels and other Restraints on Competition Act, Austria) Institute of International Commercial Law (KATTI) of Helsinki University King’s Bench The Law Reports. King’s Bench Division (London 1.1875/76 ff; cited by year, book and page; see LR) Koninklijk Besluit (Royal decree, Belgium and The Netherlands) cf. CC District Court (Court of First Instance, Hungary) Karlsruher Forum. Supplement to VersR (Karlsruhe 1.1959 ff; cited by year and page) Kraftfahrgesetz (Act on Road Traffic, Austria, 23 June 1967, BGBl. 267/1967) Kort Geding (from 1.1981 contained in Rechtspraak van de Week; see RvdW) Kammergericht (Court of Appeal, Berlin, Germany) Kraftfahrzeug-Haftpflichtversicherungsgesetz (Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance Act, Austria) Knight’s Industrial Reports (London 1.1966-10.1975; cited by year, volume and page) Korkein oikeus (Finnish Supreme Court) Kapitalmarktgesetz (Capital Market Act, Austria)

Abbreviations KO KPD KPolDik

KritE KS KSchG

Ktg KTS

KunstUrhG

L l.fall LA

La Ley Lav.prev.oggi Lavoro 80 Law Com. LC LCD

Ld Raym LDC LEC LECr

Legal Studies Legf. Bír. LEX LFZG LG LGDJ LGR

Lietuvos apeliacinis teismas

Konkursordnung (Bankruptcy Act, Austria) of 20 May 1898, RGBl. p. 369 cf. CCrimProc cf. CCP JqisijtŁ EpihexŁqtrt molijtŁ| hexqiŁ a| jai molokociŁ a| (Athens 1.1994; cited by year and page) Krajsky soud (District Court, Court of First Instance, Czech Republik), cf. CFI; Krajsky sùd (District Court, Court of Appeal, Slovakia), cf. CA cf. ConsProtA Kantongerecht (Local Court, The Netherlands) Konkurs-, Treuhand- und Schiedsgerichtswesen (Cologne et al. 1.1939-52.1991; cited by year and page) Kunsturhebergesetz (Copyright on Works of Fine Art and Photography Act, Germany) Lag (Finland, Sweden); Loi (France); Lov (Denmark); Legge (Italy): Law Legge fallimentare (Insolvency Act, Italy, RD 16 March 1942, no. 267) Protezione del diritto d’autore e di altri diritti connessi al suo esercizio (Copyright Act, Italy) Revista jurídica española de doctrina, jurisprudencia y bibliografía (Madrid 1.1980 ff; cited by year, book and page) Lavoro e previdenza oggi (Milan 1.1974 ff; cited by year and page) Lavoro 80 – Rivista di diritto del lavoro pubblico e privato (Milan 1.1981 ff; cited by year and page) Law Commission Report (England and Wales) Lord Chancellor (United Kingdom) Ley de Competencia Desleal (Unfair Competition Act, Spain) Lord Raymond’s King’s Bench and Common Pleas Reports (ER 91-92) (volumes 1-3 covering the years 1694-1732; cited by volume and page) Ley de Defensa de la Competencia (Anti-Trust Act, Spain) cf. CCP cf. CCrimProc Legal Studies. The Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law (London 1.1947 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Legfelso˝bb Bíróság (Supreme Court of Hungary) System informacji prawnej LEX (Legal Information System LEX, Poland) Lohnfortzahlungsgesetz. (Continued Payment of Wages for Employees Absent due to Illness Act, Germany) Landgericht (Germany); Landesgericht (Court of First Instance, general jurisdiction, also Court of Appeal for Local Courts, Austria) Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence (French publishing company) Local Government Law Reports (London 1.1911 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Court of Appeal (Lithuania)

1057

Annexes Lietuvos auksciausiasis teismas Limb. Rechtsl. Linnakohus lit. LJ LJAdm(N.S.), LJCP, LJCh (N.S.), LJExch (N.S.), LJKB

Supreme Court of Lithuania

Limburgs Rechtsleven (Beringen 1.1958 ff; cited by year and page) City Court( Estonia) litera Lord Justice (Court of Appeal judge, United Kingdom) Law Journal Reports, London. Various series covering the years 1831-1946, decisions cited with indicator of competent jurisdiction: Adm (Admiralty), CP (Common Pleas), Ch (Chancery), Exch (Exchequer), KB / QB (King’s or Queen’s Bench) (N.S.: New Series)

(N.S.) LJG LJN

Lloyd’s L. Rep Lloyd’s Rep Lloyd’s Rep Med LM

LMCLQ LNTS LOA

loc. cit. LOPJ LOTC

Loyers et copr. LPC LPCC

LQR LR

1058

Lord Justice-General (Presiding Judge in the High Court of Justiciary, Scotland) Landelijk Jurisprudentie Nummer (National case database serial number, http://www.rechtspraak.nl) Lloyd’s List Law Reports (London 1.1919-32.1950; cited by year, volume and page) Lloyd’s Law Reports (London 1.1968 ff; cited by year, volume and page) Lloyd’s Reports: Medical (London 1.1968 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Lindenmaier-Möhring, Nachschlagwerk des Bundesgerichtshofs (Reference Book of the Federal Court of Justice in Civil Cases, Munich 1.1951 ff; cited by act, paragraph and number) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly (London 1.1974 ff; cited by year and page) League of Nations Treaty Series (Geneva 1.1920-205.1944/46; cited by volume and page) Law of Obligations Act; abbreviation used coherent for following Acts: Võlaõigusseadus [EOA /VÕS] (Estonia); ˙Œ Å Å œºÇ Ł  Ł ªŁ

[OCA] (Bulgaria); Obligacijski zakonik [OZ] (Slovenia); Bundesgesetz betreffend die Ergänzung des Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuches. 5th part: Obligationenrecht [OR] (Switzerland) loco citato (the place already cited) Ley del poder judicial (Organic Act on Judiciary Power, Spain) Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Constitucional (Statute of the Constitutional Court of Spain) Loyers et copropriété (Paris 1.1987 ff; cited by year and number of commentary) Loi sur les pratiques du commerce (Dishonourable Trade Practices Act, Belgium) Loi sur les pratiques du commerce et sur l’information et la protection du consommateur (The Belgian Law of 14 July 1991 on commercial practices, consumer information and consumer protection) The Law Quaterly Review (London 1.1885 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Law Reports. Publications of the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting (1865-1875 [the year of foundation of the High Court] in 11 series [here cited with the A&E, Ch.App., the C.P., Eq., the Ex., the H.L.(E), H.L.(Ir),

Abbreviations

LR Ir LRCP LSG

LT

Ltd. LuftVG M M&M M&S M&W M.No. Maakohus Mac & G Magyar Jog MB

McGill LJ MDR

MedienG MietSlg MittDtPatAnw MJ ML MLR

H.L.(Sc), P.C. and the Q.B.]; usually LR is put at the head of citations of decisions of the series up to 1875. 1875 the 11 series were reduced to 6 [App.Cas., Ch.D., Q.B.D., C.P.D., Ex.D., P.D.]. Since 1881 the Law Reports are published in 4 series [App.Cas., Ch.D., Q.B.D., P.D.]. Since 1890 cited in a different way: the volume does not appear any more, but the year, put at the head within brackets; in case the reporting took more than one volume, the volume appears behind the year) Law Reports, Ireland (Dublin 1.1878/79-32.1893; cited by year, book and page) Ley de Responsabilidad Civil por Daños causados por Productos Defectuosos (Product Liability Act, Spain) Law Society Gazette (Dublin 94.2000 ff; previously published as Incorporated Law Society of Irleand, Dublin 76.1982 – 93.1999; cited by year, volume, book and page) Law Times Reports (London 1859-1947; cited by year, book and page) Limited Luftverkehrsgesetz (Aviation Act, Germany) Macpherson’s Session Cases, Third Series (Edinburgh 1.1862-11.1873; cited by year, book and page) Moody and Malkin’s Nisi Prius Reports (ER 173) (covering the years 1826-1830; cited by book and page) Maule & Selwyn’s King’s Bench Reports (ER 105) (volumes 1-6 covering the years 1813-1817; cited by volume and page) Meeson and Welsby’s Reports, Exchequer (ER 150-153) (volumes 1-16 covering the years 1836-1847; cited by volume and page) Marginal number County Court (Estonia) Macnaghten & Gordon’s Chancery Reports (ER 41-42) (volumes 1-3 covering the years 1849-1851; cited by volume and page) Magyar Jog (Budapest 1.1954-13.1966; 38.1991 ff; 14.1967-37.1990 published as Magyar jog és külföldi jogi szemle; cited by year and page) Megyei Bíróság (Court of Appeal, Hungary) McGill Law Journal (Montreal 1.1952/55 [1954]; cited by volume, year and page) Monatsschrift für Deutsches Recht. Zeitschrift für die Zivilrechts-Praxis (Cologne, Hamburg 1.1947 ff; cited by year and page) Mediengesetz (Media Act, Austria) Mietrechtliche Entscheidungen (Vienna 1.1951 ff; cited by year and number of the decision) Mitteilugen der deutschen Patentanwälte (Munich 1.1909 ff.; cited by year and page) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (Antwerp, Baden-Baden 1.1994 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Myndighedsloven (Minors and Guardianship Act, Denmark) The Modern Law Review (London 1.1937/38 ff; cited by year and page)

1059

Annexes MÖB M MÖD

Mon.Trib. MonC

Monit. belge Moore PC MoP Mor Mot II Mot. MPr MR MR-Int

MvA MvT

N.S. NBW NCP NCPC ND NDS

NdsRpflege Ned. Rechtspraak

NedJur NedJur (kort)

1060

Miljööverdomstolens beslut (Decisions of the Environmental Appellate Court, Sweden) Miljööverdomstolens dom (Judgment of the Environmental Appellate Court, Sweden) Monitore dei Tribunali, giornale di legislazione e giurisprudenza civile e penale (Milan 1.1859/60-117.1977; cited by year and page) Code monétaire (ordonnance relative à la partie législative du code monétaire et financier, France: since government act no. 2000-1223 of 14 December 2000) Moniteur belge des arrêtés des secrétaires généraux: journal officiel (Official gazette, Belgium; Brussels 1.1831 ff; cited by date) Moore’s Privy Council Cases (ER 12-15, volumes 1-15 covering the years 1836-1862 ; cited by volume and year) Monitor Prawniczy (Warsaw 1.1993 ff., cited by year, number and page) Morison’s Dictionary of Decisions, Court of Session (Edinburgh 1540-1808; cited by year and page) Motive (Explanatory Report on the Draft of a Civil Code for the German Reich. Vol. II: Law of Obligations, Berlin, Leipzig 1888) Motive (Germany) LomolekeŁ| PqxsodijeiŁ o (One-Member CFI, Greece); cf. PPr Master of the Rolls (Member and President of the Court of Appeal, United Kingdom) Medien und Recht International, Europäische Rundschau zum Medienrecht, IP- & IT-Recht (Saarbrücken 1.2004 ff.; cited by year and page) Memorie van Antwoord. Parlementaire Geschiedenis (Ministerial Statements on Draft Laws, The Netherlands) Memorie van Toelichting. Parlementaire Geschiedenis (Explanations of Draft Laws, The Netherlands) New Series cf. CC cf. CP Nouveau Code de procédure civile (Code on procedural law, France) [since 20 December 2007: “Code de procédure civile”] MeŁom DiŁ jaiot (New Law, Greece) Nordisk Domssamling (Oslo 1.1958 ff; cited by year and page; in Scandinavia the NDS is often cited by the year of the judgment, which is often one year prior to the year of publication) Niedersächsische Rechtspflege (Celle 1.1947 ff; cited by year and page) Nederlandsche Rechtspraak of verzameling van arresten en gewijsden van den Hoogen Raad der Nederlanden en verdere rechtscollegien (Older collection of Dutch decisions; The Hague 1.1839-222.1912/13; cited by volume, year and page) Nederlandse jurisprudentie (Zwolle 1.1913 ff; cited by year, number and page) See NedJur (supplementary collection of judgments that have not entered into effect; cited by year and number)

Abbreviations NedTIR

Nederlands Tijdschrift voor International Recht (Leiden 1.1953/54 with various titles; Nederlands International Law Review 22.1975 ff; cited by volume, year and page) New LJ New Law Journal (London 1.1850 ff; cited by volume, year and page) NFT Nordisk forsikringstidsskrift (Danish ed.); Nordisk försäkringstidskrift (Swedish ed.) (Copenhagen 1.1921 ff; cited by year and page) NGO Non-governmental organisation NI Norther Ireland Law Reports (containing reports of cases argued and determinedin the High Court of Justice and on appeal there-from in the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland; London, 1925 ff; cited by year and page) NIJR New Irish Jurist Reports (Dublin 1900-1905; cited by year, volume and page) NILQ Northern Ireland Legal Quaterly (Belfast 1.1936/37-14.1960/61; N.S. 1 = 15.1964 ff; cited by volume, year and page) NILR Netherlands International Law Review; see NedTIR NJ Nederlandse Jurisprudentie – Uitspraken in burgerlijke en strafzaken (Zwolle 1.1913 ff; cited by year and page) NJA Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv (Stockholm 1.1874 ff; as of 1876 separation into two divisions: division 1: Rättsfall från högsta domstolen, cited by year, division and page; division 2: Tidskrift för lagstiftning; cited by year, division and page) NJB Nederlands Juristenblad (Zwolle, Deventer 1.1926 ff; 11.1936-18.1943, the same content as Weekblad van het recht (see W); cited by year and page) NjW Nieuw juridisch weekblad (Mechelen 1.2002 ff; 14.1993-23.2002 published as Tijdschrift rechtsdocumentatie en -informatie; cited by year and page) NJW Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (Munich, Frankfurt/M. 1.1947 ff; previously: Juristische Wochenschrift (see JW); cited by year and page) NjW Nieuw juridisch weekblad (Mechelen 1.2002 ff; previously published as Tijdschrift rechtsdocumentatie en -informatie: Antwerpen 14.1993-23.2002; cited by year, page and issue number) NJW-RR NJW-Rechtsprechungs-Report Zivilrecht (Munich, Frankfurt/M. 1.1986 ff; cited by year and page) no(s). number(s); margin number(s) NoB MolijoŁ BtŁla (Athens 1.1953 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Notiziario giur. lav. Notiziario giuridico. Diritto del lavoro, diritto civile e commerciale, diritto amministrativo e costituzionale, diritto communitario (Turin 1.1970 ff; cited by year and page) Nouva giur. civ. La Nuova giurisprudenza civile commentata: rivista bimestrale delle nuove comm. leggi civili commentate (Padova 1.1985 ff; cited by year, book and page) Nov.Dig.it. Nuovissimo Digesto italiano (Turin 1.1957 ff; previously published as Nuovo digesto italiano; cited by volume, year and page) NP Nowe Prawo (Warsaw 6.1950-47.1991; since 1.1991-7.1997; 8.1998 ff published as Przegla˛d sa˛dowy; cited by year and decision number) NPC New Property Cases (London 1.1998 ff; cited by year and page) NRt cf. “Rt” NS Nejvyssi soud (Supreme Court of the Czech Republic) NS SR Najvyssi sùd Slovenskej Republiky (Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovakia)

1061

Annexes NSWLR NTBR

NuR NVwZ NY NZLR NZV

ÖBA ÖBl

obs. OCA OER OGH OGH BritZ OH OJ OJ EC

ÖJZ ÖJZ LSK

Okj Okz ØL ØLD OLG OLGR

OLGZ

ØLK

1062

New South Wales Law Reports (Sydney 51.2000/01 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht (Deventer 1.1984 ff; cited by year and page) Natur und Recht (Hamburg, Berlin 1.1979 ff; cited by year and page) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (Munich, Frankfurt/M. 1.1988 ff; cited by year and page) New York Court of Appeals Reports (Albany, New York, 1.1893 ff; cited by number, year and page) New Zealand Law Reports (Wellington 1.1883 ff; cited by year, section and page) Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht (Munich, Frankfurt/M. 1.1988 ff; cited by year and page) Österreichisches Bankarchiv (Vienna 1.1953 ff; cited by year and page) Österreichische Blätter für gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht (Vienna 1.1952 ff; cited by year and page) observations cf. LOA Osteuropa-Recht. Gegenwartsfragen aus den Rechten des Ostens (Berlin 1.1955 ff; cited by year and page) Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court of Austria) Oberster Gerichtshof für die Britische Zone, 1948-1959 (Supreme Court for the British Zone, Germany) Outer House (Court of Session, Scotland) Official Journal Official Journal of the European Communities (Brussels 1.1958 ff; from 11.1968 ff: issue C [Communication]: Information and Notice; Issue L [Législation]: Legislation; cited by issue, number, date and page) Österreichische Juristenzeitung (Vienna 1.1946 ff; cited by year and page) Österreichische Juristen-Zeitung – Leitsatzkartei (Vienna 1996-2006; 1988-2004 published as Neue Rechtsprechung des OGH, Beilage zu ÖJZ; cited by year and page) Okrajno sodisce (District Court, Court of First Instance, Slovenia) Okrozno sodisce (Regional Court, Court of First Instance, Slovenia) Østre Landsret (Eastern High Court, Denmark) Østre Landsrets Dom (Judgments of the Eastern High Court, Denmark) Oberlandesgericht (Court of Appeal, Austria, Germany [for Berlin in particular, see KG], Greece) OLG-Report. Zivilrechtsprechung der Oberlandesgerichte (Decisions of the Court of Appeal in civil matters, Germany; Cologne 1.1997 ff; cited by year and page) Entscheidungen der Oberlandesgerichte in Zivilsachen einschließlich der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit (Decisions of the Court of Appeal in civil matters including jurisdiction over non-contentious matters, Germany; Munich, Berlin 1.1965 ff; cited by year and page) Østre Landsrets Kendelse (Decisions of the Eastern High Court, Denmark)

Abbreviations Ont HCJ op. cit. OR OR 2nd ÖRZ OS OSA OSN OSNC

OSNCP

OSNP

OSPiKA

OUP OVG

Ow OZ OZ

P P P & CR

p(p). Pan. para(s)

Ontario High Court of Justice (Canada) opera citato (work already cited) cf. LOA (for Switzerland) Ontario Reports, 2nd Series (Toronto 1.1882 ff; cited by year, number and page) Österreichische Richterzeitung (Vienna 1.1908-3.1909, 7.1914-12.1919, 19.1926-31.1938, 32.1954 ff; cited by year and page) Okrajno sodišcˇe (District Court, CFI, Slovenia); Okresni soud (District Court, CFI, Czech Republic); Okresny súd (District Court, CFI, Republic of Slovakia) Orzecznictwo Sa˛dów Apelacyjnych (Collection of Courts of Appeal’s Decisions, Poland, Warsaw 3.1991 ff; cited by year, decision number and poz.) Orzecznictwo Sa˛du Najwyz˙szego. Zbiór Orzeczen´ Sa˛du Najwyz˙szego (Collection of Supreme Court Decisions, Poland) Zbiór Orzeczen´ Sa˛du Najwyz˙szego. Orzeczenia Izby Cywilnej (Collection of Supreme Court Decisions. Civil Chamber, Poland, Warsaw 1917-1939, 1945/46-1952; since 1953 published as Orzecznictwo Sa˛du Najwyz˙szego Izby Cywilnej i Izby Karnej) Zbiór Orzeczen´ Sa˛du Najwyz˙szego. Orzeczenia Izby Cywilnej i Administracyjnej oraz Izby Pracy i Ubezpieczen´ Społecznych (Collection of Supreme Court Decisions. Civil and Administrative Chamber and Chamber of Labour and Social Insurance Law, Poland) Orzecznictwo Sa˛du Najwyz˙szego. Izba Pracy, Ubezpieczen´ Społecznych i Spraw Publicznych (Warsaw, 206.2003 ff; 1.1963-1994 published as Orzecznictwo Sa˛du Najwyz˙szego. Izba Cywilna oraz Izba Administracyjna, Pracy i Ubezpieczen´ Społecznych; 1994-2003 Orzecznictwo Sa˛du Najwyz˙szego: zbiór urze˛dowy. Izba Administracyjna, Pracy i Ubezpieczen´ Społecznych) Orzecznictwo Sa˛dów Polskich i Komisji Arbitraz˙owych (Jurisprudence of the Polish Courts and Arbitration Tribunals, Warsaw 1.1957-33.1989) Oxford University Press Oberverwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court of Appeal, Germany) (Rijks-) Octrooiwet (Patent Act, The Netherlands) cf. CC (for Czech Republic and Republic of Slovakia) cf. LOA (for Slovenia) President (official name, United Kingdom) Law Reports. Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Divison (London 1.1891 ff; cited by year and page) Property, Planning and Compensation Reports (since 1986; before published as Planning and Compensation Reports from 1949-1967 and continued by Property and Compensation Reports from 1968-1985; cited by year, volume and page) page(s) Edition Nouvelles, Panorama (cf. SemJur) paragraph(s)

1063

Annexes Parl. St. Kamer

Pas. belge

Pas. luxemb.

Pasin belge

PC PC PD PECL PEL PEL Ben.Int. PEL Liab. Dam. PEL Unj.Enr. PHG PHI

PiP PIQR PJ

PK

plc. PNLR POS Regulations

poz. PPr

Pr pr. Pref. to

1064

Parlamentaire Stukken Kamer (Publications of the committee of the chamber of the Belgian parliament, Brussels) Pasicrisie belge (Recueil général de la jurisprudence des cours et tribunaux de Belgique; Brussel, vol. I: Arrêts de la Cour de cassation, 3rd Series 1865-1924, 112.1925 ff; vol. II: Arrêts de la Cour d’Appel, 3rd Series 1865-1924, 112.1925 ff; vol. III: Jugements des tribunaux, 3rd Series 1865-1924, 112.1925 ff; vol. IV: Jurisprudence étrangère, 3rd Series 1893-1924, 112.1925 ff; vol. V: Revue de droit belge, 3rd Series 1893 ff; cited by year, book and page) Pasicrisie luxembourgeoise. Recueil de la jurisprudence luxembourgeoise en matière civile, commerciale, criminale, de droit public, fiscal, administratif et notariel (Luxemburg 1.1881 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Pasinomie belge ou Collection complète des lois, décrets, arrêtés et règlements généraux qui peuvent être invoqués en Belgique (Brussels 1.1788 ff; cited by year and page) Privy Council (United Kingdom) Privy Council Appeals (London 1865-1875; cited by year, volume and page; see LR) Probate, Divorce and Admirality Division (London 1875/76-1890; cited by year, volume and page; see LR) Principles of European Contract Law Principles of European Law Principles of European Law – Benevolent Intervention in Another’s Affairs Principles of European Law – Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another Principles of European Law – Unjustified Enrichment Produkthaftungsgesetz (Product Liability Act, Austria and Germany) Produkthaftung International (Karlsruhe 1.1981 ff; cited by year and page) Pan´ stwo i Prawo (Warsaw 1.1946 ff; cited by year, number and page) Personal Injuries and Quantum Reports (London 1.1992 ff; cited by year and page) Poder Judicial. Conseijo General del Poder Judicial (Madrid 1.1981-43/ 44.1996; since 45.1997 published as Revista del Poder Judicial; cited by year and page) cf. CP public limited company Professional Negligence and Liability Reports (London 1.1999 ff; cited by year and page) The Public Offers of Securities Regulations (United Kingdom) pozycja (Number in a collection of decisions, Poland) PoktlekeŁ| PqxsodijeiŁ o (CFI, Multi-Member Chamber, Greece) PqxsodijeiŁ o (Court of First Instance, Greece) principium Preface to Annotation for the commentaries in French reports that follow cases and Notes before commenting to specific paragraph in Austrian, German and Greek commentaries

Abbreviations Pret. Prg

Proc. ProdHG Proiectul Noului Cod civil Prop Prot II

Ptk QB QB (ComCt) QBD QC

Qd R R R. R. r+s RÅ RabelsZ

RAJ RAJ (TSJ y AP)

Rass.Avv.Stato Rass.dir.civ. Rass.Giur.Umbra Rb

RC

Pretura (Local Court, Italy) De Praktijkgids. Tijdschrift gewijd aan de rechtspraktijk en aan de jurisprudentie van de kantongerechten (Arnhem 1.1980 ff; cited by year and number) Processo (Court case, Italy and Portugal) Produkthaftungsgesetz. Gesetz über die Haftung für fehlerhafte Produkte (Product Liability Act, Germany) Draft of a new Civil Code (Romania) Proposition (Official proposal for a statute, Sweden) Protokolle (Reports of the Commission for the Second Reading of the Draft Civil Code, Germany; Prepared by Order of the Reich Ministry of Justice by Achilles, Gebhard and Spahn. Vol. II: Law of Obligations, Berlin 1898) cf. CC The Law Reports. Queen’s Bench Division (London 1.1891 ff; cited by year, book and page, additional LR cited: London 1865-1875) Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial Court Queen’s Bench Division (London 1875/76-1890; cited by year, book and page; see LR) Queen’s Council Queensland Reports (Australia, 1958 ff; cited by year and page) Rettie, Crawford & Melville, Session Cases (4th Series) (Edinburgh 1.1873-25.1898; cited by year, Book and page) Regina or Rex Règlement (order, France) Recht und Schaden (Kippenheim 1.1974 ff; cited by year and page) Regeringsrättens årsbok (Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court, Sweden) Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (Berlin, Tübingen 1.1927 ff; from vol. 26.1961: Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht; cited by volume, year and page) Repertorio Aranzadi de Jurisprudencia (Pamplona 1.1930/31, 2.1934 ff; cited by year, number and page); cf. BDA RAJ Repertorio Aranzadi de Jurisprudencia. Sentencias de Tribunales Superiores de Justicia y Audiencias Provinciales y otros Tribunales (Pamplona 1.1996 ff; cited by year, number and page) La Rassegna mensile dell’ Avvocatura dello Stato (Rome 1.1948 ff; cited by year, book and page) Rassegna di diritto civile (Napoli 1.1980 ff; cited by year and page) Rassegna Giuridica Umbra (Perugia 1.1955 ff; cited by year and page) Arrondissementsrechtbank (District Court, Court of First Instance, general jurisdiction, The Netherlands); Rechtbank van eerste anleg (Court of First Instance, Belgium) Relação de Coimbra (CA Coimbra, Portugal); cf. CA

1065

Annexes Revue critique de jurisprudence belge (Brussels 1.1947 ff; cited by year and page) RCR Relazione della Commissione Reale al progetto del libro ‘obbligazioni e contratti’ (see Pandolfelli et al., Codice civile, in the Table of Literature Cited in an Abbreviated Form) RD Regio Decreto (Italy); Real decreto (Spain): Royal decree RD banc Revue de droit bancaire et de la bourse (France 1.1987 ff; cited by volume, year and page) RdA Recht der Arbeit (Munich 1.1948 ff; cited by year and page) RDBB Revista de Derecho Bancario y Bursátil (Madrid 1.1981 ff; cited by year and page) RDE Revista de Direito e Economia (Coimbra 1.1975 ff; cited by volume, year and page) RdM Recht der Medizin (Vienna 1.1994 ff; cited by year and page) RDP Revista de Derecho Privado (Madrid 1.1913 ff; cited by year and page) RdS Recht der Schule (Vienna 1.1979 ff; cited by year and page) RdW Österreichisches Recht der Wirtschaft (Vienna 1.1983 ff; cited by year and page) RE Relação de Évora (CA Evora, Portugal); cf. CA recht recht. Zeitschrift für juristische Ausbildung und Praxis (Bern 1.1983 ff; cited by year and page) ref(s). reference(s) reg. regulation Rejent Rejent (Kluczbork 1.1991-2000; 11.2001 = 117 ff; cited by year and page) Rel. cf. CA Rel.Guard. Relazione del Guardasigilli al progetto ministeriale delle obbligazioni (see Pandolfelli et al., Codice civile in the Table of Literature Cited in an Abbreviated Form) Rép.Dr.Civ. Répertoire de droit civil (Paris 1.1951-5.1955; 2nd ed. 1.1970 ff; cited by volume, year and number, sometimes also by key word) Rép.Dr.Com. Répertoire de droit commercial (Paris 1.1972 ff; cited by volume, year and number, sometimes also by key word) Rep.Foro it. Repertorio del Foro italiano (legislazione, bibliografia, giurisprudenza; Rome 1.1878 ff; previously: Repertorio generale annuale di giurisprudenza, bibliografia e legislazione; cited by volume, year and column) Rep.Giur.it. Repertorio generale della giurisprudenza italiana (Turin 71.1969 ff; previously: Repertorio generale annuale della Giurisprudenza italiana, Turin 1.1899-70.1968; cited by year, key word and number) resp. respectively Resp. civ. et assur. Responsabilité civile et assurances. Revue mensuelle (Paris 1.1988 ff; cited by year and number of commentary) Resp.civ. e prev. Responsabilità Civile e Previdenza (Milan 1.1930 ff; cited by year and page) Rev.crit.dr.int.pr. Revue critique de droit international privé (Paris 1.1905 ff; cited by year and page) Rev.crit.jur.belge Revue critique de jurisprudence belge (Brussels 1.1947 ff; cited by year and page) RCJB

1066

Abbreviations Rev.crit.légis. Revue critique de législation et de jurisprudence et juris. (Paris 1.1851 ff; cited by year and page) Rev.dr.int.dr.comp. Revue de droit international et de droit comparé (Brussels 26.1949 ff; 1940-1948 not published; 11.1925-25.1939 published as: Revue trimestrielle; cited by volume, year and page) Rev.dr.publ. Revue de droit public et de la science politique en France et à l’étranger (Paris 1.1894 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Rev.dr.sanit.soc. Revue de droit sanitaire et social (Paris 1.1965 ff; cited by year and page) Rev.dr.uniforme Revue de droit uniforme. Uniform Law Review (Rome 1.1973 ff; cited by year, part and page) Rev.gén.dr. Revue générale du droit, de la législation et de jurisprudence en France et à l’étranger (Paris 1.1877-62.1938; cited by year and page) Rev.Hell. Revue Hellénique de droit international (Athens 1.1948 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Rev.int.dr.comp. Revue internationale de droit comparé (1.1869/72-71.1947/48; previously: Bulletin de la Société de législation comparée, Paris 1.1949 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Rev.jur.pol. Revue juridique et politique, Indépendance et Coopération Ind.Coop. (Paris N.S. 1.1946 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Rev.jur.soc. Revue de jurisprudence sociale (Levallois-Perret 1.1989 ff; cited by year and page) Rev.not.b. Revue du notariat belge (Brussels 1.1896 ff; until 1970 Revue pratique du notariat belge and Annales du notariat et de l’Enregistrement) Rev.soc. Revue de sociétés (Paris 1.1883 ff; cited by year and page) Rev.trim.dr.civ. cf. RTD civ Rev.trim.dr.com. cf. RTD com RFDA Revue Française de Droit Administratif (Paris 1.1946/47 ff; cited by year and page) RG Reichsgericht (Supreme Court of the German Reich, Germany) RG Relação de Guimarães (CA Guimaraes, Portugal); cf. CA RGAR Révue générale des assurances et des responsabilités (Brussels 1.1927 ff; cited by year and number) RGBl. Reichsgesetzblatt (Government Gazette of the German Reich; Berlin 1871-1945, since 1922 divided into parts I and II) and Rechts- und Staatsgesetzblätter (Government Gazette, Austria; Vienna 1849-1940) RGD Revista General de Derecho (Valencia 1.1945 ff; cited by year and page) RGDC Revue générale de droit civil/Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Burgerlijk Recht (Antwerp 1.1987 ff; cited by year and page) RGZ Amtliche Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichtes in Zivilsachen (Decisions of the German Imperial Court in civil matters, Berlin 1.1872-172.1945; cited by volume and page) RH Rättsfall från Hovrätterna (Decisions of the Swedish court of appeal, changing places of publication, usually Stockholm, 1.1980 ff; cited by year and number) RHG Reichshaftpflichtgesetz (Reich Liability Act, Austria) Riigikohus Supreme Court Civil Chamber (Estonia) tsiviilkollegium Ringkonnakohus District Court, Court of Appeal (Estonia)

1067

Annexes RIS-Justiz

Riv. Corte dei Conti Riv.crit.dir.priv. Riv.Dir.Civ. Riv.Dir.Com. Riv.dir.eur. Riv.dir.ind. Riv.dir.int. priv.proc. Riv.dir.lav. Riv.dir.sport. Riv.giur.circ.trasp. Riv.giur.circ.trasp. Riv.giur.lav.

Riv.giur.pol. Riv.it.med.leg. Riv.pen. Riv.trim.dir. proc.civ. RIW

RJ RJC

RJDA RL RLJ RLR RM RM-Themis RN

1068

Austrian internetpublication of OGH-decisions, (http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/jus/; decisions are cited by date, number of legal subject and keyword) Rivista della Corte dei Conti: pubblicazione bimestrale di servizio (Rome 5.1952 ff ; cited by year, fasc. and page) Rivista critica del diritto privato (Bologna 1.1989 ff; cited by year and page) Rivista di Diritto Civile (Padova 1.1955 ff; cited by year, book and page) Rivista del Diritto Commerciale e del Diritto generale delle obbligazioni (Milan 1.1903 ff; cited by year, book and page) Rivista di diritto europeo (Rome 1.1961 ff; cited by year and page) Rivista di diritto industriale (Milan 1.1952 ff; cited by year and page) Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (Padova 1.1969 ff; cited by year and page) Rivista di diritto del lavoro (Milan 1.1949-32.1980; cited by year and page) Rivista di diritto sportivo (Milan 1.1949 ff; cited by year and page) Rivista giuridica della circolazione e dei trasporti (Rome 1.1947 ff; cited by year and page) Rivista giuridica della circolazione e dei trasporti (Rome 1.1947 ff; cited by year and page) Rivista giuridica del lavoro e della previdenza sociale (Rome 1.1954 ff; part 1: Dottrina; part 2: Giurisprudenza; part 3: Previdenza; part 4: Diritto penale del lavoro; cited by year, book and page) Rivista giuridica di polizia locale (Rimini 1.2000 ff; cited by year and page) Rivista italiana di medicina legale (Milan 1.1979 ff; cited by year and page) Rivista penale (Rome 1.1952 ff; cited by year and page) Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile (Milan 1.1947 ff; cited by year and page) Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft. Betriebs-Berater International (Frankfurt/M., until 2004 Heidelberg 1.1954/55-3.1957 and 21.1975 ff; from 4.1958-20.1974 Außenwirtschaftdienst des Betriebsberaters [AWD]; cited by year and page) Repetorio de Jurisprudencia Aranzadi, see RAJ Revista jurídica de Cataluña; Acadèmia de Jurisprudència i Legislació de Catalunya (Barcelona 1.1895-42.1936; 43.1945-69.1970; 70.1971-81.1982; 82.1983 ff. avalable online, cf. http://dialnet.unirioja.es; cited by volume, year and page) Revue de jurisprudence du droit des affaires (Paris 1.1991 ff; cited by year and page) Relação de Lisboa (Court of Appeal, Lisbon) Revista de Legislação e Jurisprudência (Coimbra 1.1868/69 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Restitution Law Review (London 1.1993 ff; cited by year and page) Rechtsgeleerd magazijn: tijdschrift voor binnen- en buitenlandsche rechtsstudie (Haarlem 1.1882-58.1939; cited by year and page) Rechtsgeleerd magazijn Themis. Tijdschrift voor publiek- en privaatrecht (Zwolle 1.1939 ff; cited by year and page) Rivista del notariato (Milan 1.1947 ff; cited by year and page)

Abbreviations ROA

Roll Abr

RP

RPC RPDB RPDC RPL RRJ RS RSC RSCOrd RT RT

Rt RTD civ

RTD com RTR

Rv RvdW RvT RW RZ

S S&S s(s). S. S.I.

Revista da Ordem dos Advogados (Lisboa 1.1941 ff; cited by year, volume and page) Un Abridgment Des Plusieurs Cases Et Resolutions Del Common Ley: Alphabeticalment Digest Desouth Severall Titles (Rolle’s Abridgment of the Common Law, London, 1668) RP 189/1998 rd – Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till lagstiftning om borgen och tredjemanspant (Government bill to the Riksdag proposing legislation on surety and security pledged by a third party, Finland) Reports of Patent, Design & Trade Mark Cases (London 1.1884 ff; cited by year and page) Répertoire pratique du droit belge – Encyclopédie Reeks (Brussels and Paris 1.1928 ff; cited by year, volume and page, sometimes also by key word) Revista Portuguesa do Dano Corporal (Coimbra 9.2000 ff; cited by volume, year, book and page) Retsplejeloven (Rules of Procedure, Denmark, no. 90, 11 April 1916, lovbekendtgørelse no. 815 of 30 Sept. 2003) Revue de la Recherche Juridique. Droit Prospectif (Aix-en-Provence 1.1974/75 ff; cited by year and page) cf. RIS-Justiz Rules of the Supreme Court (England) Rules of the Supreme Court, Order (England) Revista dos Tribunais (Sao Paulo 1.1912 ff; cited by year and page) Riigi Teataja (Official Journal, Estonia; cases published there are also available on http://www.riigikohus.ee) Norsk retstidende (Publishing the decisions of the Høyesterett, Supreme Court of Norway) Revue trimestrielle de droit civil (Paris 1.1902-38.1939, 39/40.1940/41-78.1979 = tome 39-77, 79.1980 ff; until 1977 cited by volume, then by year and page) Revue trimestrielle de droit commercial (Paris 1.1948 ff; cited by year and page) Road Traffic Reports (London 1.1970 ff; cited by year and page) cf. CCP Rechtspraak van de Week (Zwolle 1.1939 ff; cited by year and number) Raad van Toezicht op het Verzekeringswezen (Council for the Supervision of the Insurance Sector, The Netherlands) Rechtskundig Weekblad (Antwerp 1.1931/32 ff; cited by year and page) Österreichische Richterzeitung (Vienna 1.1908-3.1909; 7.1914-11.1918, 10; 19.1926-31.1938; 32.1954 ff; cited by year and page) Shaw’s Session Cases, First Series (Scotland 1821-1838; cited by volume and page) Schip en Schade. Beslissingen op het gebiet van zee- en binnenvaartrecht en brandverzekeringsrecht (Zwolle 1.1957 ff; cited by year and page) section(s) Recueil général des lois et arrêts resp. Recueil Sirey; 1.1801/02 ff; cf. D. Statutory Instrument (United Kingdom)

1069

Annexes Sa˛d grodzki Sa˛d okre˛gowy Sa˛d pierwszej instancji Salk SALR SAP

SavZ Rom.Abt.

Sb. SC

SC

ScanStudL sch. Scientia jurídica SCLR Scot CS

Scot.Law Com. SDR SEK

SemJur

sent. SeuffArch

Sez. giur. SFS SGB SGECC SH

1070

District Court (Poland) Circuit Court, Court of First Instance (Poland) Court of First Instance (Poland) Salkeld’s Reports (ER 91) (volumes 1-3 covering the years 1689-1712; cited by volume and page) South Australian Law Reports (Melbourne 1.1869 ff; cited by number and page) Sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial (Decision of a Court of Appeal, Spain) Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Vienna et al.; until vol. 31 divided into Germanist.Abt., Romanist.Abt. and Kanonist.Abt.; each department has its own system of numbering volumes. Rom.Abt.: 1 = 14.1880-64 = 77.1944; not published 1945/46; 65 = 78.1947 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Sbirka Zakonu (Official Journal, Czech Republic) Session Cases, New Series. Cases decided in the Court of Session and also in the Court of Justiciary (SC (J) from 1907-1916; J.C. from 1917 ff) and the House of Lords (SC (HL)) (Edinburgh 1.1907 ff; cited by year and page) Supreme Court Scandinavian Studies in Law (Stockholm 1.1957 ff; cited by volume, year and page) schedule(s) Scientia jurídica. Revista de direito comparado português e brasileiro (Braga 1.1951/52 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Scottish Civil Law Reports (Edinburgh 1.1987 ff; cited by year and page) Approved judgment of the Court of Session (Scotland) Scottish Law Commission Report (Edinburgh 1.1966 ff; cited by number, year and paras.) Special Drawing Rights Reference of the Commission General Secretary’s Office and of the Council of the European Union La Semaine Juridique. Edition Entreprise. Cahiers de Droit de l’entreprise (Paris 1.1966 ff; cited by year, part and number), Edition Générale (also Juris Classeur Périodique; Paris 1.1927 ff; cited by year, part and number), Edition Nouvelles, Panorama (Pan.), Sommaire (Som.), also quoted as JCP, see there sentence(s) Seuffert’s Archiv für Entscheidungen der obersten Gerichte in den deutschen Staaten (1.1847-98.1944; from 1.1847-11.1857: Archiv für Entscheidungen der obersten Gerichte in den deutschen Staaten; cited by volume, year, number and page) Sezione giurisdizionale (Chamber with jurisdiction, Italy) Svensk författningssamling (Official Gazette, Sweden; Stockholm 1.1825 ff; cited by year and number) Sozialgesetzbuch (Social Security Code, Germany) Study Group on a European Civil Code Sø- og Handelsretten (Maritime and Commercial Court Copenhagen, Denmark)

Abbreviations Sh.Ct. ShApp SHD

Sid SJ SJF SJZ SKL

skr SLD SLPQ SLR SLT

SmLC SN SN

Som. SOU

Sr SR SR NSW

STA

Stark StAZ

Stb. StGB STJ

Sheriff Court (Court of First Instance in civil and criminal matters, Scotland) Shaw’s Appeals Cases (1821-1824; cited by year, book and page) Sø- og Handelsretsdom (Judgement of the Maritime and Commercial Court Copenhagen, Denmark) Siderfin’s King’s Bench Reports (ER 82) (volumes 1-2 covering the years 1657-1670; cited by volume and page) Solicitor’s Journal (London 1.1857 ff; cited by year, volume and page) Stiftelsen Juridisk Fakultetslitteratur Schweizerische Juristenzeitung (Zurich 1.1904/1905 ff; cited by year and page) Skadeståndslag (Damages Liability Act, Sweden: SFS 1972:207; Finland: 31 May 1974 no. 412) Svensk krona (Swedish currency) Søndre Landsrets Dom (Decisions of the southern court in Denmark) Scottish Law and Practice Quarterly (London 1.1995 ff; cited by year, number and page) Scottish Law Reporter (Edinburgh 1.1865-61.1925; cited by year and page) The Scots Law Times (Edinburgh 1.1893/94-16.1908; since 1909 published as The Scots Law Times/News; cited by year and page) Smith’s Leading Cases in Various Branches of the Law (13th ed. London 1.1929 ff) Sa˛d Najwyz˙szy (Supreme Court of Poland) Session Notes (Edinburgh 1925-1948) cf. SemJur Statens offentliga utredningar (Government gazette, Sweden; Stockholm 1.1939 ff; cited by year, number, title and page) cf. CP Systematische Sammlung des Bundesrechts (Switzerland, since 1970; cited by number) New South Wales, State Reports (Sydney 1.1901-72.1968/70; 1.1880-21.1900; 1971-1984/85; 1.1985/86 ff published as New South Wales law reports; cited by year, volume and page) Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (Supreme Court in administrative matters, Portugal) Starkie’s Nisi Prius Reports (ER 171) (volumes 1-3 covering the years 1814-1823; cited by volume and page) Das Standesamt. Zeitschrift für Standesamtswesen, Familienrecht, Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht, Personenstandsrecht, internationales Privatrecht des In- und Auslands (Frankfurt/M. 1.1949 ff; cited by year and page) Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Official Gazette, The Netherlands; Zwolle 1.1813 ff; cited by year and page) cf. CP Supremo Tribunal da Justiça (Supreme Court of Portugal). The judgements of the Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice after September 2000 are unpublished, as the publication of the periodical BolMinJus (see there) came to an end. The same judgements may be, nevertheless, consulted in http://www.dgsi.pt, which corresponds to the juridical-documentary basis of

1071

Annexes

StPO STRFL

Stud.Iuris Stud.Prawn. StVG StVO SUBB Iur.

subs. Sup.Ct. Suppl. Suppl.ord. Sv SvJT SZ

SZIER SZW / RSDA

T&C T. Gez. T. R. tab. TAgrR TBBR TBH

TBP

TBR

1072

the Institute of Technologies of Information in Justice, belonging to the Ministry of Justice cf. CCrimProc cf. CP Studium Iuris. Rivista per la formazione nelle professioni giuridiche (Padova 1.1995 ff; cited by year and page) Studia Prawnicze (Warszawa 1.1960 ff; cited by year and page) Straßenverkehrsgesetz (Road Traffic Act, Germany) Straßenverkehrsordnung (Road Traffic Regulations Act, Germany) Studia Universitatis Babes¸-Bolyai. Iurisprudentia (Cluj-Napoca 1.1955 ff, until 1975 Studia Universitatis Babes¸-Bolyai. Series Jurisprudentia; cited by issue, year and page) subsections Supreme Court (Ireland) Supplement Supplemento ordinario (Part of the Government Gazette, Italy) cf. CCrimProc Svensk Juristtidning (Stockholm 1.1916 ff; cited by year and page) Entscheidungen des österreichischen Obersten Gerichtshofs in Zivilsachen (Vienna 1.1919-20.1938; 21.1946 ff; with changing titles; until vol. 34.1961: Entscheidungen des österreichischen Obersten Gerichtshofs in Zivil- und Justizverwaltungssachen; cited by volume, number and page) Schweizerische Zeitschrift für internationales und europäisches Recht (Zurich 1.1991 ff; cited by year and page) Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht/Revue suisse de droit des affaires (Zurich 62.1990-77.2005, ab 78.2006 fortgesetzt als Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Finanzmarktrecht/Revue suisse de droit des affaires et du marché financier; cited by year and page) Tekst & Commentaar (The Netherlands) Tijdschrift voor gesondheitdsrecht/Revue de droit de la santé (Mechelen 1.1995/96-12.2006/07; cited by year and page) Durnford & East’s Term Reports, King’s Bench (ER 99-101) (volumes 1-8 covering the years 1785-1800; cited by volume and page) tabulae Tijdschrift voor agrarisch recht/Revue de droit rural (Brussels 1.1979 ff; cited by year and page) Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Burgerlijk Recht/Revue générale de droit civil (Antwerp 1.1987 ff; cf. RGDC) Tijdschrift voor Belgisch handelsrecht/Revue de droit commercial belge (Antwerp 1.1967-29.1996; 103.1997 ff; continuation of the Jurisprudence commerciale de Belgique; cited by year and page); cf. RDC Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht (Brussels 1.1946 ff, from 1.1946 to 6.1951 published as Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen; cited by year and page) Tijdschrift voor Brugse rechtspraak (Brugge 1.1983 ff; cited by year and page)

Abbreviations Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court of Spain, Constitutional Court of Portugal) TCC Technology and Construction Court (United Kingdom) TDG Gesetz über die Nutzung von Telediensten. Teledienstgesetz (Telecommunications Services Act, Germany) Tel Aviv Tel Aviv University Studies in Law (Tel Aviv 1.1975 ff; UnivStudL cited by volume, year and page) Temi Temi. Rivista di giurisprudenza Italiana (Parma, Milan et al. N.S. 1 = 22.1946 ff; cited by year and page) Temi nap. Temi napoletana (Milan 1.1958 ff; cited by year and page) Temi rom. Temi romana (Milan 1.1929-5.1933; N.S. 1.1952-40.1991; cited by year and page) TfR Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap (Oslo 1.1888 ff; cited by year and page) TGI Tribunal de grande instance (Court of First Instance, France); cf. CFI Themis Hebdomacliaia dikastike ephemeris ekdiclomene en Athenais (Athens 1.1890/91-65.1954/55; cited by volume, year and page) TI Tribunal d’instance (Court of First Instance, France) Times Times Newspaper Law Reports (1953 ff; cited by year and date) TLR Annual Digest of the Times Law Reports (London 1.1884 ff; cited by volume, year and page) TMA Tweemaandelijks tijdschrift voor milieu aansprakelijkheid (Environmental Liability Law Review; Lelystad 1.1987 ff; cited by year and page) To So RtŁmsacla (Athens 1.1975 ff; cited by volume, year and page) TPR Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht (Ghent 1.1964 ff; cited by year and page) TranspR Transportrecht (Cologne 6.1983 ff; previously published as Transport- + Speditionsrecht: Frankfurt/M. 1.1978-2.1979, 3.1980-5.1982; cited by year and page) Trb Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Official Gazette recording treaties in force in the Netherlands, ’s-Gravenhage/The Hague 1.1951 ff; cited by year and page) Trib. Tribunale (Court of First Instance, general jurisdiction; Court of Appeal in small claims matters, Italy); Tribunal de première instance (Court of First Instance, Belgium, France); Tribunal d’arrondissement (Court of First Instance, general jurisdiction, Luxembourg) Trib.com. Tribunal de Commerce (Commercial Court, Belgium and France) Trib.Conf. Tribunal de Conflitos (Department of the Supreme Court in administrative matters for the arbitration of conflicts between public authorities, Portugal) Trib.Corr. Tribunal Correctionnel (Criminal Court, Belgium) Trib.enfants Tribunal pour enfants (Youth Court, France) TS Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court of Spain; if not specified: senate for civil matters) TSJ Tribunal Superior de Justicia (Supreme Court of the autonomous regions, Spain) TSL Trafikskadelag (Traffic Damages Act, Sweden) TulCivLaw Forum Tulane Civil Law Forum (New Orleans 1.1973-6./7.1991/92; since 8.1993 published as The Tulane European and civil law forum; cited by volume, year and page) TC

1073

Annexes TulLRev Turn. Rechtsl. TvC

UfR

UIC UKHL UKPC

Ulp. UmweltHG UNCITRAL UnfContTA

UnifLRev UNTS

UrhG USchadG UTR UWG

v. V.T.SV. V8 Városi Bíróság VAT

V-C Vern VersR VersRAI

VfGH VfSlg

1074

Tulane Law Review (New Orleans 1.1916 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Turnhouts rechtsleven (Turnhout 1.1971 ff; not published: 1984-1986, 1996/1997; cited by year and page) Tijdschrift voor Consumentenrecht (Deventer 1.1985 ff; cited by year and page) Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen (Copenhagen 1.1867 ff; as of 1902 division into: A = Danks domssamling; B = Juridiske afhandlinger, meddelelser; C = Abstracts; cited by year and page) Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi (Italian Foreign Exchange Office) Approved judgment of the House of Lords (United Kingdom) United Kingdom Privy Council Decisions (United Kingdom) Ulpian (Dometius Ulpianus, Roman jurist, died 228) Umwelthaftungsgesetz (Environmental Liability Act, Germany) United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Unfair Contract Terms Act (France: Law no. 95-96 of 1 February 1995, art. 1 consolidated in ConsC art. 132-1 [see under ConsC]; United Kingdom: Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977) Uniform Law Review/Revue de droit uniforme (see Rev.dr.uniforme) United Nations Treaty Series. Treaties and international agreements registered or filed and recorded with the Secretariat of the United Nations/Recueil des traités et des engagement internationaus enregistrés par le Secrétariat de las Societé des Nations (Washington DC 1.1946/47 ff; cited by volume and page) Urhebergesetz/Urheberrechtsgesetz (Copyright Act, Austria and Germany) Umweltschadensgesetz (Environmental Damage Act, Germany) Umwelt- und Technikrecht (Düsseldorf 1.1986 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (Unfair Competition Act, Austria and Germany) versus Voorafgaande Titel Wetboek van Strafvordering (Preliminary Title to the Penal Code, Belgium) Verbo City Court (Court of First Instance, Hungary) Value added tax Vice-Chancellor (United Kingdom) Vernon’s Chancery Reports (ER 23) (volumes 1-2 covering the years 1681-1719; cited by volume and page) Versicherungsrecht. Zeitschrift für Versicherungsrecht, Haftungs- und Schadensrecht (Karlsruhe 1.1950 ff; cited by year and page) Versicherungsrecht. Zeitschrift für Versicherungsrecht, Haftungs- und Schadensrecht; Beilage Ausland (Karlsruhe 1.1959/60, 2.1961 ff; cited by year and page) Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court of Austria) Verfassungssammlung. Sammlung der Erkenntnisse und wichtigsten Beschlüsse des Verfassungsgerichtshofes (Collection of cases before the

Abbreviations

VG

Vita not. viz. VL VLD VLK

vol(s). VÕS VR

Vrb Vred VS VS RS VVDStRL VVG

Vw VwGH W WAM

Warsaw Convention WBl WGO

WHG

WiB

WiRO

WL

Austrian Constitutional Court, Vienna 1.1919 ff, N.S. 33.1968 ff; cited by the number of the decision) Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court, Germany) Vita notarile (Palermo 1.1949 ff; cited by year and page) videlicet Vestre Landsret (Western High Court, Denmark) Vestre Landsrets dom (Judgments of Western High Court, Denmark) Vestre Landsrets kendelse (Decisions of Western High Court, Denmark) volume(s) cf. LOA Verkeersrecht (’s-Gravenhage/The Hague 1.1953/54 ff; cited by year and page) Verzekeringsrechtelijke berichten (Zwolle 1.1989 ff; cited by year and page) Vredegerecht (Magistrates court, Belgium) Visje sodisce (Court of Appeal, Slovenia); Vrnchi soud (Court of Appeal, Czech Republic) Vrhovno Sodišcˇe Republike Slovenije (Supreme Court of Slovenia) Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung Deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer (Berlin 1.1924 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Gesetz über den Versicherungsvertrag (Insurance Contracts Act, Germany) Versicherungswirtschaft. Halbmonatsschrift für die deutsche Individualversicherung (Karlsruhe 1.1946 ff; cited by year and page) Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Court in administrative matters of Austria) Weekblad van het Recht (Zwolle et al., 1.1839-105.1943; since 1936 the same contents as Nederlands Juristenblad [see NJB]; cited by year, number and page) Wet betreffende de verplichte aansprakelijkheidsverzekering inzake motorrijtuigen (Act on Compulsory Insurance for Keepers of a Motor Vehicle, Belgium, 1 July 1956, BS 15 July 1956; as amended by Act of 21 November 1989, BS 8. December 1989) Warsaw Convention of 12 October 1929 (Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air [as amended]) Wirtschaftsrechtliche Blätter. Zeitschrift für österreichisches und europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht (Vienna 1.1987 ff; cited by year and page) Monatshefte für Osteuropäisches Recht; die wichtigsten Gesetzgebungsakte in den Ländern Ost- und Südosteuropas, Abteilung für Ostrechtsforschung vom Seminar für Deutsche und Nordische Rechtsgeschichte der Universität Hamburg, edited by Georg Geilke (Münster et al., 1.1959; cited by year and page) Wasserhaushaltsgesetz. Gesetz zur Ordnung des Wasserhaushalts (Water Resources Act, Germany) Wirtschaftsrechtliche Beratung. Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsanwälte und Unternehmensjuristen (Munich, Frankfurt/M. 1.1994-4.1997; since 1.1998 published as Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht; cited by year and page) Wirtschaft und Recht in Osteuropa. Zeitschrift zur Rechts- und Wirtschaftsentwicklung in den Staaten Mittel- und Osteuropas (Munich 1.1992 ff; cited by year and page) West Law (www.westlaw.com)

1075

Annexes WLR

WM WPNR WR WRG WRP WVW WWR

Y&J YAR

Z.z. Zacchia Zb. ZBB ZBernJV ZEuP ZEV

ZfRV ZfS ZfU

ZfVB ZHR

ZIP ZPO

1076

The Weekly Law Reports (containing decisions in the House of Lords, the Privy Council, the Supreme Court of Judicature, Assize Courts; London 1.1953 ff; cited by year, book and page) Wertpapier-Mitteilungen. Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht (Frankfurt/M. et al., 1.1947 ff; cited by year and page) Weekblad voor privaatrecht, notariaat en registratie (’s-Gravenhage/The Hague 1.1870 ff; cited by year, number and page) The Weekly Reporter (London 1.1852/53 [1853]-54.1905/06 [1906]; cited by year, volume and page) Wasserrechtsgesetz (Water Law Act, Austria) Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis (Frankfurt/M. 1.1955 ff; cited by year and page) Wegenverkeerswet (Road Traffic Act, The Netherlands) Western Weekly Reports (Calgary 1.1911/12 [1912]-10.1916; 1917-1950; N.S. 1.1951-75.1970; 1971 ff; cited by year, book and page) Younge and Jervis’ Exchequer Reports (ER 148) (volumes 1-3 covering the years 1826-1830; cited by volume and page) York Antwerp Rules (London 1996) Zbierka zákonov (Official Journal since 1993, Slovakia) Zacchia. Archivio di medicina legale, sociale e criminologica (Rome 1.1921-13.1934; 2nd series 1.1937 ff; cited by year and page) Zbirka Zakonu (Official Journal until 1992, Slovakia); cf. Z.z. Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft (Cologne 1.1989 ff; cited by year and page) Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins/Revue de la société des juristes bernois (Bern 1.1864/65 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (Munich 1.1993 ff; cited by year and page) Zeitschrift für Erbrecht und Vermögensnachfolge (Munich, Frankfurt/M. 1.1994 ff; cited by year and page) Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung (Vienna 1.1960 ff; cited by year and page) Zeitschrift für Schadensrecht (Essen 1.1980 ff; cited by year and page) Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht. Journal of Environmental Law and Policy. Revue de la politique et du droit d’environnement (Frankfurt/M. 1.1978 ff; cited by year and page) Zeitschrift für Verwaltung (Supplement: decisions of the VfGH and VwGH [see there], Vienna 1.1976 ff; cited by year and page) Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht (Heidelberg 1.1858-110.1944, 111.1948 under different titles: until vol. 60: Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht, until vol. 124: Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht; then Frankfurt/M. 124.1961/62; cited by volume, year and page) Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (Cologne 1.1980 ff; previously published under various titles; cited by year and page) cf. CCP

Abbreviations ZPP ZRP ZSR / RDS

ZVersWiss

ZVglRWiss

ZVR ZZP

cf. CCP Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik. Beilage zur NJW, see there (Munich, Frankfurt/M. 1.1968 ff; cited by year and page) Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht/Revue de droit suisse/Rivista di diritto svizzero/Revista da dretg svizzer (Basel 1.1852-22.1882, N.S. 1 = 23.1882 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft (Karlsruhe, later Berlin 1.1901-43.1943; not published from 1944-1954; [44.]1955-[48.]1959 published as Versicherungswissenschaftliches Archiv; 49.1960 ff; cited by year and page) Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft. Archiv für internationales Wirtschaftsrecht (Stuttgart 1.1878 ff; Berlin 103.1994 ff; cited by volume, year and page) Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht (Vienna 1.1956 ff; cited by year, number of the decision and page) Zeitschrift für Zivilprozeß (Cologne et al., 63.1943, 64.1950/51 ff; cited by volume, year and page)

Table of Codes and Statutes* Austria ..................................... Belgium .................................... Bulgaria .................................... Cyprus ...................................... Czech Republik .......................... Denmark ................................... Estonia ..................................... Finland ..................................... France ...................................... Germany ................................... Greece ..................................... Hungary .................................... Ireland ..................................... Italy .........................................

1079 1085 1087 1089 1090 1090 1094 1096 1100 1105 1111 1115 1119 1122

Latvia ...................................... Lithuania .................................. Luxembourg .............................. Malta ....................................... The Netherlands ........................ Poland ...................................... Portugal .................................... Romania ................................... Slovakia ................................... Slovenia ................................... Spain ....................................... Sweden ..................................... United Kingdom .........................

1127 1128 1128 1129 1130 1133 1136 1142 1144 1144 1146 1154 1160

Austria Advance Health Care Directiv es Act [Patientenverfügungsgesetz 2006 – PatVG ] in force since 1 June 2006 (BGBl. I 55/2006) generally:

Art. 5:101, Notes I 7

Aviation Act [Luftfahrtgesetz – LFG ] of 2 December 1957 (BGBl. 253/1957; amended among others by BGBl. I 194/1999 and BGBl. I 83/2008 of 26 June 2008) § 148:

Art. 3:206, Notes 8; Art. 3:207, Notes 7

Basic Law on General Rights of Nationals [Staatsgrundgesetz vom 21. Dezember 1867 über die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsbürger für die im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder] of 21 December 1867 (RGBl. 142/1867) art. 13:

Art. 7:101, Notes 2

Capital Market Act [Kapitalmarktgesetz – KMG ] of 6 December 1991 (BGBl. 625/1991, as amended by BGBl. I 80/2003) § 11:

Art. 6:202, Notes 7

Cartels and other Restraints on Competition Act [Bundesgesetz gegen Kartelle und andere Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – KartG 2005] in force since 1 Januar 2006 (BGBl. 2005 I 61/2005) generally: *

Art. 2:208, Notes 7

Table compiled by Daniel Smith (Osnabrück) together with Julia Behrendt, Anneke Lohmann and Aleksandra Kryskow (Osnabrück).

1079

Annexes

Civil Code [ Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – CC ] of 1 June 1811 (JGS no. 946) generally: § 16: § 19: § 21: § 25: § 26: § 43: § 144: § 146: § 154: § 285a: § 339: § 344: § 349: § 350: § 353: § 354: § 364: § 364a: § 366: § 367: § 372: § 422: § 460: § 523: § 870: § 874: § 896: § 979: § 979: § 1036: § 1037: § 1041: § 1101: § 1276: § 1293: § 1294: § 1295:

§ 1296: § 1298: § 1299:

1080

Art. 2:101, Notes I 7; Art. 3:204, Notes II (2) 25 Art. 2:203, Notes II 12 Art. 5:201, Notes 7; Art. 5:202, Notes I 7; Art. 6:301, Notes 7 Art. 3:103, Notes I 8; Art. 3:104, Notes I 9 Art. 2:206, Notes I 7 Art. 1:103, Notes IV 40; Art. 3:201, Notes II 21 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 67; Art. 6:301, Notes 7 Art. 3:104, Notes I 9 Art. 3:104, Notes I 9 Art. 3:102, Notes III 34 Art. 2:206, Notes I 7 Art. 6:301, Notes 7 Art. 5:201, Notes 7; Art. 6:301, Notes 7 Art. 3:208, Notes 6 Art. 3:208, Notes 6 Art. 2:206, Notes I 7 Art. 2:206, Notes I 7, Art. 2:206, Notes I 7; Art. 2:209, Notes II 8; Art. 3:206, Notes 8; Art. 6:301, Notes 7 Art. 2:209, Notes II 8; Art. 3:206, Notes 8; Art. 6:102, Notes 7 Art. 2:206, Notes I 7 Art. 2:206, Notes I 7 Art. 2:206, Notes I 7, II 21 Art. 5:201, Notes 7 Art. 4:101, Notes I 8 Art. 2:206, Notes I 7; Art. 6:301, Notes 7 Art. 2:210, Notes 7 Art. 2:210, Notes 7 Art. 6:105, Notes 8 Art. 4:101, Notes I 8 Art. 4:101, Notes I 8 Art. 5:202, Notes II 16 Art. 5:202, Notes II 16 Art. 6:101, Notes II 21 Art. 6:301, Notes 7 Art. 2:206, Notes I 7 Art. 2:101, Notes I 7, II 19; Art. 6:204, Notes 6 Art. 1:101, Notes III 9, IV 18; Art. 2:206, Notes I 7; Art. 3:101, Notes 7; Art. 3:102, Notes I 8, II 17, II 22 Chap. 1, Introd. B 8; Art. 1:101, Notes II 2, III 9, III 16, IV 18, IV 20; Art. 2:202, Notes VI 61; Art. 2:203, Notes IV 35; Art. 2:206, Notes I 7; Art. 2:210, Notes 7; Art. 2:211, Notes 8; Art. 3:101, Notes 7; Art. 6:102, Notes 7; Art. 6:104, Notes 8 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 30, 37; Art. 4:101, Notes III 33 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 37; Art. 3:102, Notes III 34 Art. 3:102, Notes I 8; Art. 2:207, Notes 6

Table of Codes and Statutes (Austria) § 1300: § 1301: § 1302: § 1304: § 1306: § 1306a: § 1307: § 1308: § 1309: § 1310: § 1311:

§ 1312: § 1313: § 1313a: § 1315: § 1318: § 1319: § 1319a: § 1320: § 1321: § 1323: § 1323a: § 1324: § 1325: § 1326: § 1327: § 1328a: § 1329: § 1330: § 1331: § 1332: § 1332a: § 1340: § 1393: § 1489:

Art. 2:207, Notes 6 Art. 4:102, Notes 7; Art. 6:105, Notes 8 Art. 4:102, Notes 7; Art. 6:105, Notes 8 Art. 5:101, Notes I 7; Art. 5:102, Notes I 8; Art. 5:102, Notes III 34 Art. 5:301, Notes 8 Art. 5:202, Notes III 25; Art. 6:202, Notes 7 Art. 5:102, Notes I 8; Art. 5:301, Notes 8; Art. 6:202, Notes 7 Art. 3:103, Notes I 8; Art. 5:301, Notes 8 Art. 3:104, Notes I 9, II 24; Art. 5:301, Notes 8 Art. 3:103, Notes I 8, II 20; Art. 5:102, Notes I 8, III 34; Art. 5:301, Notes 8; Art. 6:202, Notes 7; Art. 7:105, Notes 2 Art. 1:101, Notes III 16, VI 37; Art. 2:208, Notes 7; Art. 3:102, Notes II 22, III 34; Art. 4:101, Notes I 8; Art. 5:202, Notes II 16; Art. 7:102, Notes 4 Art. 5:202, Notes II 16 Art. 3:201, Notes I 7 Art. 3:201, Notes I 7 Art. 3:201, Notes I 7; Art. 3:203, Notes 8 Art. 3:202, Notes 8; Art. 3:207, Notes 7 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 39; Art. 3:202, Notes 8 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 39; Art. 5:401, Notes 8 Art. 3:203, Notes 8 Art. 6:301, Notes 7 Art. 2:101, Notes V 44; Art. 6:101, Notes I 8 Art. 6:101, Notes I 8 Art. 2:101, Notes I 7 Art. 2:201, Notes III 9, V 28, VI 42, VII 56; Art. 2:202, Notes II 12, III 21; Art. 6:106, Notes 7; Art. 6:202, Notes 7; Art. 6:203, Notes 8 Art. 2:201, Notes V 28, VII 56; Art. 6:203, Notes 8 Art. 2:202, Notes I 2, V 47, VI 61; Art. 6:106, Notes 7; Art. 6:203, Notes 8 Art. 2:203, Notes II 12, III 26 Art. 2:203, Notes I 2 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 35; Art. 2:204, Notes I 7, IV 39; Art. 2:205, Notes 6; Art. 2:208, Notes 7; Art. 7:101, Notes 2 Art. 2:206, Notes I 7; Art. 2:206, Notes III 34 Art. 2:206, Notes III 34 Art. 2:206, Notes I 7 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 35 Art. 6:106, Notes 7 Art. 3:101, Notes 7

1081

Annexes

Civil Servants’ Liability Act [Bundesgesetz vom 18. Dezember 1948, womit die Haftung des Bundes, der Länder, der Bezirke, der Gemeinden und der sonstigen Körperschaften und Anstalten des öffentlichen Rechts für den in Vollziehung der Gesetze zugefügten Schaden geregelt wird – Amtshaftungsgesetz – AHG ] of 18 December 1948 (BGBl. 20/1949, as amended among others by BGBl. I 194/1999) § 1: § 2:

Art. 7:103, Notes 9 Art. 7:103, Notes 9

Code of Civil Procedure [Zivilprozeßordnung – CCP ] of 1 August 1895 (RGBl 113/1895) § 273:

Art. 2:101, Notes II 19; Art. 4:101, Notes III 33

Commercial Code [previously Handelsgesetzbuch, since 27 October 2007 Unternehmensgesetzbuch – Ccom] of 10 Mai 1897 (dRGBl. 219/1897; amended among others by BGBl. I 120/2005 of 27 October 2007 and BGBl. I 70/2008 of 7 May 2008) § 37: § 414: § 423: § 439:

Art. 6:301, Notes Art. 1:103, Notes Art. 1:103, Notes Art. 1:103, Notes

7 I7 I7 I7

Conduit of Gas and Liquids Act [ Rohrleitungsgesetz ] of 3 July 1975 (BGBl. 411/1975, as amended by BGBl. I 115/2004) § 10: § 12:

Art. 3:207, Notes 7 Art. 5:302, Notes 8

Copyright Act [Bundesgesetz über das Urheberrecht an Werken der Literatur und der Kunst und über verwandte Schutzrechte – Urhebergesetz – UrhG] of 9 April 1936 (BGBl. 111/1936, as amended by BGBl. I 32/2003) § 78: § 87:

Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 68 Art. 6:101, Notes II 21

Draft CC § 1316:

Art. 2:202, Notes II 12

E-commerce Act [E-Commerce Gesetz – ECG ] of 21 December 2001 (BGBl. I 152/2001, in force since 1 January 2002) § 13: § 16:

Art. 2:204, Notes IV 39 Art. 2:204, Notes IV 39

Employees’ Liability Act [Dienstnehmerhaftpflichtgesetz – DHG ] of 31 March 1965 (BGBl. 80/1965, as amended among others by BGBl. 169/1983) § 2:

Art. 6:202, Notes 7; Art. 7:104, Notes 8

Forestry Act [Forstgesetz – ForstG] of 3 July 1975 (BGBl. 440/1975, as restated in BGBl. I 108/2001) § 53: § 54: § 56: § 176:

1082

Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:302, Notes 8 3:206, Notes 8; Art. 3:207, Notes 7 3:201, Notes I 7 6:202, Notes 7

Table of Codes and Statutes (Austria)

General Social Insurance Act [ Allgemeines Sozialversicherungsgesetz – ASVG ] of 9 November 1955 (BGBl. 1955/189) § 332: § 333:

Art. 2:202, Notes VI 61; Art. 6:103, Notes 8 Art. 7:104, Notes 8

Genetic Engineering Act [Gentechnikgesetz – GTG ] in force since 1 January 1995 (BGBl. 510/1994, as amended by BGBl. I 127/2005) § 79a:

Art. 4:101, Notes III 33

Insurance Contract Act [Versicherungsvertragsgesetz – VVG ] in force since 12 December 1959 (BGBl. 2/1959) generally: § 67:

Art. 6:101, Notes I 8 Art. 6:103, Notes 8

Media Act [Mediengesetz – MedienG] of 12 June 1981 (BGBl. 314/1981, in the revised version of BGBl. I 49/2005) § 6: § 7b:

Art. 5:203, Notes 8 Art. 2:204, Notes III 31

Mineral Resources Act [Mineralrohstoffgesetz – MinroG] in force since 1 January 1999 (BGBl. I 38/1999) generally:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 8

Mining Act [Bergbaugesetz] of 1975 (BGBl. 259/1975) § 185:

Art. 3:206, Notes 8; Art. 3:207, Notes 7

Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance Act [Kraftfahrzeug-Haftpflichtversicherungsgesetz – KHVG ] of 1994 (previously BGBl. 652/1994; replaced by BGBl. I 115/2004) § 26:

Art. 3:205, Notes 9

Nuclear Liability Act [Atomhaftungsgesetz 1999 – AtomHG ] in force since 1 January 1999 (BGBl. I 170/1998, in the revised version of BGBl. I 33/2003) § 9: § 11: § 12: § 15: § 17: § 29:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:302, Notes 8 3:206, Notes 8; Art. 3:207, Notes 7 4:101, Notes III 33 6:202, Notes 7 3:201, Notes I 7 6:202, Notes 7

Patents Act [Patentgesetz – PatG] of 19 August 1970 (BGBl. 259/1970, as amended among others by BGBl. I 143/2001) § 150:

Art. 6:101, Notes II 21

Penal Code [Strafgesetzbuch – CP ] of 23 January 1974 (BGBl. 60/1974, in the revised version of BGBl. I 15/2004) § 3: § 5:

Art. 5:202, Notes I 7 Art. 3:101, Notes 7

1083

Annexes § 6: § 77: § 90: § 169:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:101, Notes 7 5:101, Notes I 7 5:101, Notes I 7 2:209, Notes II 8

Product Liability Act [Produkthaftungsgesetz – PHG ] of 21 January 1988 (BGBl. 99/1988) amended in 1993 and subsequently (BGBl. 95/1993, 185/1999, I 98/2001) generally: § 1: § 2: § 3: § 8: § 11: § 14:

Art. 3:204, Notes I 1, V 45 Art. 1:103, Notes II 22 Art. 3:204, Notes II (2) 25 Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 10 Art. 3:204, Notes IV 40 Art. 5:102, Notes IV 47 Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 10

Reich Liability Act [Reichshaftpflichtgesetz – RHG ] of 7 June 1871 (dRGBl. 207/1871, as amended by BGBl. I 115/2004) § 7:

Art. 6:202, Notes 7

Reparation Law Bill [Entwurf für ein neues österreichisches Schadenersatzrecht] in the revised version of March 2005 § 1334:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 8

Service User Liability Act [Dienstnehmerhaftpflichtgesetz. Bundesgesetz vom 31. März 1965 über die Beschränkung der Schadensersatzpflicht der Dienstnehmer – DHG ] of 31 March 1965 (BGBl. 80/1965) § 2:

Art. 6:202, Notes 7; Art. 7:104, Notes 8

State Nature Conservation Law, Viennese Nature Conservation Act [ Landesrechtliches Naturschutzrecht: Wiener Naturschutzgesetz] in force since 1 September 1998 (LGBl. 45/1998, in the revised version of LGBl. 12/2006) generally: § 17:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 8 Art. 2:209, Notes II 8

Trademark Act [Musterschutzgesetz – MSchG] of 7 June 1990 (BGBl. 497/1990, as amended by BGBl. I 81/2003) § 55:

Art. 6:101, Notes II 21

Traffic Liability Act [Eisenbahn- und Kraftfahrzeughaftpflichtgesetz – EKHG ] of 21 January 1959 (BGBl. 48/1959, in the revised version of BGBl. I 115/2004) § 3: § 5: § 6: § 7: § 9: § 15:

1084

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:205, Notes 9 3:205, Notes 9 3:205, Notes 9 5:501, Notes 4 3:205, Notes 9; Art. 5:302, Notes 8 3:205, Notes 9; Art. 6:202, Notes 7

Table of Codes and Statutes (Austria) § 16: § 19:

Art. 3:205, Notes 9; Art. 6:202, Notes 7 Art. 3:201, Notes I 7; Art. 3:205, Notes 9

Unfair Competition Act [Bundesgesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb – UWG ] of 1984 (BGBl. 448/1984, in the revised version of BGBl. I 106/2006) § 2: § 7: § 9: § 11: § 12: § 13: § 14: § 16: § 20:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:208, Notes 7 2:208, Notes 7 6:101, Notes II 21 2:208, Notes 7 2:208, Notes 7 2:208, Notes 7 6:301, Notes 7 2:208, Notes 7 2:208, Notes 7

Waste Management Act [Abfallwirtschaftsgesetz – AWG ] of 6 June 1990 BGBl. 325/1990, in the revised version of BGBl. 115/1997) § 18:

Art. 3:208, Notes 6

Water Law Act [Wasserrechtsgesetz 1959 – WRG ] of 1 November 1959 (BGBl. 215/1959, in the revised version of BGBl. I 123/2006) generally: § 26:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 8 Art. 3:206, Notes 8; Art. 3:207, Notes 7

Belgium Accidents at Work Act [Loi du 10 avril 1971 sur les accidents du travail] of 10 April 1971 (Monit. belge 24 April 1971) art. 46:

Art. 7:104, Notes 2

Civil Code [Code Civil – CC ] of 21 March 1804 (Monit. belge 3 September 1807) art. 544: art. 1200: art. 1202: art. 1251: art. 1372: art. 1376: art. 1382:

art. 1383:

Art. 2:206, Notes I 1 Art. 6:105, Notes 2 Art. 4:102, Notes 2; Art. 6:105, Notes 2 Art. 4:102, Notes 2; Art. 6:105, Notes 2 Art. 1:103, Notes III 28 Art. 1:103, Notes III 28 Chap. 1, Introd. B 6; Art. 1:101, Notes II 2, IV 18; Art. 1:102, Notes I 5; Art. 1:103, Notes IV 39; Art. 2:203, Notes III 21, IV 31; Art. 2:204, Notes I 1, IV 37; Art. 2:205, Notes 1; Art. 3:101, Notes 2; Art. 3:102, Notes II 17, III 29; Art. 3:103, Notes I 2; Art. 6:105, Notes 2; Art. 7:103, Notes 2 Chap. 1, Introd. B 6; Art. 1:101, Notes II 2, IV 18; Art. 2:203, Notes III 21, IV 3; Art. 3:101, Notes 2; Art. 3:102, Notes II 17; Art. 3:103, Notes I 2; Art. 7:103, Notes 2

1085

Annexes art. 1384:

art. 1385: art. 1386: art. 1641: art. 1645: art. 1648: art. 1992: art. 2228: art. 2283:

Art. 1:101, Notes V 26; Art. 2:101, Notes V 38; Art. 3:104, Notes I 2, II 19; Art. 3:201, Notes I 2; Art. 3:206, Notes 2; Art. 5:102, Notes I 1; Art. 5:301, Notes 2; Art. 7:103, Notes 2; Art. 7:104, Notes 2 Art. 3:203, Notes 1, 2; Art. 4:102, Notes 2 Art. 3:102, Notes I 2; Art. 3:103, Notes II 17; Art. 3:104, Notes I 1; Art. 3:202, Notes 2; Art. 5:301, Notes 2; Art. 6:202, Notes 1 Art. 1:103, Notes II 19 Art. 1:103, Notes II 19 Art. 1:103, Notes II 19 Art. 3:201, Notes I 2, II 16 Art. 2:206, Notes II 16 Art. 2:206, Notes II 16

Code of Civil Procedure [Part IV of the Code judiciare/Gerechtelijk Wetboek – CCP ] of 10 October 1967, in force since 1 November 1970 (Monit.belge 31 November 1967) art. 870: art. 1140: art. 1370: art. 1371:

Art. 1:101, Notes VI 29 Art. 7:103, Notes 2 Art. 2:206, Notes II 16 Art. 2:206, Notes II 16

Commercial Practices and Consumer Protection Act [Loi sur les pratiques du commerce – LPC ] of 14 July 1971 (Monit.belge 30 July 1971); repealed by Trade Practices and Consumer Information and Protection Act 1991; cf. below art. 93: art. 94bis:

Art. 2:208, Notes 2 Art. 2:208, Notes 2

Constitution [La Constitution belge/Belgische Grondwet] of 7 February 1831 (Monit. belge 7 February 1931), in the revised version of 14 July 1993 art. 22: art. 25:

Art. 2:203, Notes III 21; Art. 2:205, Notes 1 Art. 7:101, Notes 1

Electronic Commerce Act [Loi du 11 mars 2003 sur certains aspects juridiques des services de la société de l’information] of 11 March 2003 (Monit. belge 17 March 2003) generally:

Art. 2:204, Notes IV 37

Employment Contracts Act [Loi du 3 juillet 1978 relative aux contrats de travail] of 3 July 1978 (Monit. belge 22 August 1978, erratum Monit. belge 30 August1978) art. 18:

Art. 3:104, Notes II 19; Art. 3:201, Notes I 2; Art. 7:104, Notes 2

Environmental Liability Implementation Act [Arrêté royal concernant la prévention et la réparation des dommages environnementaux lors de la mise sur le marché d’organismes génétiquement modifiés ou de produits en contenant] of 3 August 2007 (Monit. belge 20 September 2007) generally:

1086

Art. 2:209, Notes I 1

Table of Codes and Statutes (Bulgaria)

Environmental Pollution Decree [Décret relatif au Livre II du Code de l’Environnement constituant le Code de l’Eau] of 27 May 2004 (Monit. belge 23 September 2004) art. 410:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 3

Motor Insurance Liability Act [Loi relative à l’assurance obligatoire de la responsabilité en matière de véhicules automoteurs] of 21 November 1989 (Monit. belge 8 Decembre 1989) generally: art. 1: art. 2: art. 29bis:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:102, Notes III 29 3:205, Notes 2 3:205, Notes 2 3:205, Notes 2; Art. 5:102, Notes III 29

Penal Code [Code Pénal/Strafwetboek – CP] of 8 June 1867 (Monit. belge 9 June 1867) art. 50: art. 434: art. 458:

Art. 4:102, Notes 2 Art. 2:203, Notes I 1 Art. 2:205, Notes 1

Product Liability Act [Loi du 25 février 1991 relative à la responsabilité du fait des produits défectueux/Wet van 25 februari 1991 betreffende de aansprakelijkheid voor produkten met gebreken] of 25 February 1991 (Monit.belge 22 March1991) generally: art. 8: art. 11:

Art. 3:204, Notes I 1, V 45 Art. 3:204, Notes IV 35 Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 4, Notes II (2) 20

Public Authority’s Liability Act [Loi relative à la responsabilité des et pour les membres du personnel au service des personnes publiques] of 10 February 2003 (Monit. belge 27 February 2003) art. 3:

Art. 7:103, Notes 2

Trade Practices and Consumer Information and Protection Act [Loi sur les pratiques du commerce et sur l’information et la protection du consommateur/Wet betreffende de handelspraktijken en de voorlichting en bescherming van de consument – ConsProtA] of 14 July 1991 (Monit. belge 29 August 1991, errata Monit.belge 10 October 1991); amended among others by Arrêté royal excluant certains contrats à distance de fourniture de services d’hébergement, de transports, de restauration et de loisirs, du champ d’application des articles 79 et 80 de la loi du 14 juillet 1991 sur les pratiques du commerce et sur l’information et la protection du consommateur of 18 November 2002 (Monit. belge 3 December 2002) art. 93: art. 94:

Art. 2:208, Notes 2 Art. 2:208, Notes 2

Bulgaria Agricultural Enterprises’ Protection Act [Закoн за oпазване на селскoстoпанскoтo имуществo ] of 1 October 1974 (DV no. 54 of 12 July 1974, amended among others by DV no. 36 of 4 April 2008) art. 30:

Art. 5:201, Notes 5

1087

Annexes

Code of Civil Procedure [ Граждански прoцесуален кoдекс – CCP ] of 1 March 2008 (DV no. 59 of 20 July 2007, amended among others by DV no. 69 of 5 August 2008) art. 300:

Art. 6:105, Notes 6

Commercial Code [Търгoвски закoн – Ccom] of 1 July 1991 (DV no. 48 of 18 June 1991, amended among others by DV no. 67 of 29 July 2008) art. 631a:

Art. 3:101, Notes 5

Commercial Shipping Code [ Koдекс на търгoвскoтo кoрабoплаване ] of 1. January 1971 (DV no. 55 of 14 July 1970, amended among others by DV no. 71 of 12 August 2008) art. 314:

Art. 6:105, Notes 6

Competition Protection Act [Закoн за защита на кoнкуренциЯта ] of 5 July 1999 (DV no. 52 of 8 May 1998, amended among others by DV no. 64 of 7 August 2007) art. 7:

Art. 6:301, Notes 5

Constitution [KoнституциЯ на Република БългариЯ ] of 13 July 1991 (OJ no. 56 of 13 July 1991, amended among others by OJ no. 12 of 6 February 2007) art. 41:

Art. 5:203, Notes 6

Consumer Protection Act [Закoн за защита на пoтребителите – ConsProtA] of 10 June 2006 (OJ no. 99 of 9 December 2005, amended among others by OJ no. 36 of 4 April 2008) generally: art. 131: art. 137: art. 139:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:204, Notes I 1, V 45 3:204, Notes II (1) 8, III 31 3:204, Notes IV 38 5:401, Notes 6

Consumer Protection and Trade Rules Act [Закoн за защита на пoтребителите и за правилата за търгoвиЯ ] of 3 April 1999 (DV no. 30 of 2 April 1999, repealed by DV no. 99 of 9 December 2005) generally:

Art. 3:204, Notes I 1

Copyright Act [Закoн за автoрскoтo правo и срoдните му права ] of 1 August 1993 (OJ no. 56 of 29 June 1993, amended among others by DV no. 59 of 20 July 2007) art. 94: art. 95:

Art. 6:101, Notes II 19 Art. 6:301, Notes 5

Environmental Protection Act [ Закoн за oпазване на oкoлната среда ] of 25 September 2002 (DV no. 91 of 25. September 2002, amended among others by DV no. 52 of 6 June 2008) art. 170: art. 171: § 1 (supplementary provisions):

1088

Art. 3:206, Notes 6 Art. 3:206, Notes 6 Art. 3:206, Notes 6

Table of Codes and Statutes (Cyprus)

Insurance Code [ Koдекс за застраxoванетo ] of 1 January 2006 (DV no. 103 of 23 December 2005, amended among others by DV no. 69 of 5 August 2008) art. 213: art. 238:

Art. 6:103, Notes 6 Art. 6:103, Notes 6

Labour Code [Koдекс на труда ] of 1 January 2007 (DV no. 26 and 27 of 4 April 1986, amended among others by DV no. 43 of 29 April 2008) art. 200: art. 201: art. 203: art. 206:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:302, 5:102, 3:101, 3:101,

Notes 6 Notes I 6 Notes 5 Notes 5

Law of Obligations Act [Закoн за задължениЯта и дoгoвoрите – LOA ] of 22 November 1950 (DV no. 275, amended among others by DV no. 36 of 2 May 2006) art. 45: art. 46: art. 47: art. 49: art. 50: art. 51: art. 52: art. 52: art. 53: art. 53: art. 79: art. 83: art. 94: art. 99: art. 205:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:101, Notes 5; Art. 3:205, Notes 7; Art. 5:102, Notes III 31 5:202, Notes I 5, III 23 5:301, Notes 6 3:205, Notes 7 3:205, Notes 7 4:101, Notes I 6; Art. 5:102, Notes I 6 3:101, Notes 5 6:202, Notes 5 4:102, Notes 5 6:105, Notes 6 6:101, Notes I 6 5:102, Notes II 19 5:401, Notes 6 6:106, Notes 5 6:104, Notes 6

Patents and Registration of Useful Designs Act [Закoн за патентите и регистрациЯта на пoлезни мoдели ] of 2 April 1993 (DV no. 27 of 2 April 1993, amended among others by DV no. 36 of 4 April 2008) art. 28:

Art. 6:101, Notes II 19; Art. 6:301, Notes 5

Penal Code [Hаказателен кoдекс– CP ] of 1 May 1968 (DV no. 26 of 2 April 1968, amended among others by DV no. 67 of 29 July 2008) art. 12a:

Art. 5:201, Notes 5

Cyprus Courts of Justice Law (Law no. 14 of 1960) s. 29:

Chap. 1, Introd. B 10

Civil Wrongs Law (Law no. 148 of 1933) generally:

Chap. 1, Introd. B 10

1089

Annexes s. 8: s. 9: s. 51:

Art. 3:103, Notes I 16 Art. 3:103, Notes I 16 Art. 1:101, Notes II 8

Defective Product (Civil Liability) Laws (Laws from 1995 to 2002) generally:

Art. 3:204, Notes I 1, V 45

Czech Republik Administrative Procedures Act [Zákon ˇc. 500/2004 Sb., správní ˇrád] of 24 September 2004 (Sb. no. 500/2004) generally:

Art. 2:209, Notes I 1

Civil Code [Obcˇansky´ zákoník – CC ] of 26 February 1964 (Sb. no. 40/1964) generally: § 415: § 417: § 419: § 420: § 422: § 423: § 424: § 442: § 443: § 444: § 445: § 446: § 447: § 447a: § 448: § 449: § 450:

Art. 2:202, Notes II 10 Chap. 1, Introd. B 11; Art. 1:102, Notes I 2; Art. 2:206, Notes I 5 Art. 1:102, Notes I 2 Art. 6:302, Notes 4 Chap. 1, Introd. B 11; Art. 1:101, Notes II 3, III 12; Art. 1:103, Notes IV 40 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 39; Art. 3:103, Notes I 6; Art. 3:104, Notes I 7, II 22; Art. 5:301, Notes 5 Art. 5:301, Notes 5 Art. 1:101, Notes III 16, IV 20; Art. 2:210, Notes 5; Art. 2:211, Notes 6 Art. 2:101, Notes III 25 Art. 2:101, Notes III 25 Art. 2:101, Notes V 42 Art. 2:101, Notes III 25; Art. 2:201, Notes V 26 Art. 2:101, Notes III 25; Art. 2:201, Notes V 26 Art. 2:101, Notes III 25; Art. 2:201, Notes V 26 Art. 2:101, Notes III 25; Art. 2:201, Notes V 26 Art. 2:202, Notes V 46 Art. 2:201, Notes V 26; Art. 2:202, Notes IV 33 Art. 5:103, Notes 1

Product Liability Act [Act on Responsibility for Damage Due to Defect of a Product] [Zákon ˇc. 59/ 1998 Sb. o odpoveˇdnosti za ˘skodu zpu°sobenou vadou vy´robku, ve zneˇní pozdeˇjs˘ích prˇedpisu°] of 5 March 1998 (Sb. no. 59/1998; amended among others by Sb. no. 209/2000) generally:

Art. 3:204, Notes I 1

Denmark Ancient Danish Code [Danske Lov] of 1683 § 3-19-2: § 6-10-2:

1090

Art. 3:201, Notes I 12 Art. 3:203, Notes 13

Table of Codes and Statutes (Denmark) § 6-10-4: § 6-10-5:

Art. 3:203, Notes 13 Art. 3:203, Notes 13

Aviation Traffic Act [Luftfartsloven] of 21 June 2007 no. 731 generally:

Art. 3:206, Notes 14; Art. 3:207, Notes 10

Code of Judicial Procedure [Retsplejelov] of 30 September 2003 no. 815 chap. 57 § 641: chap. 57 § 642: chap. 57 § 643:

Art. 1:102, Notes I 9; Art. 6:301, Notes 10 Art. 1:102, Notes I 9; Art. 6:301, Notes 10 Art. 1:102, Notes I 9; Art. 6:301, Notes 10

Contracts Act [Lovbekendtgørelse om aftaler og andre retshandler på formuerettens område – Aftaleloven – ContrA] of 8 May 1917 no. 242, with frequent amendments (Lovtidende A 1917 p. 614) of 26 August 1996 no. 781 § 25: § 30:

Art. 2:210, Notes 11 Art. 2:210, Notes 11

Copyright Act [Ophavsretslov] of 30 June 2006 no. 763 § 83:

Art. 6:101, Notes II 25

Damage Compensation Act [Erstatningsansvarslov] of 7 June 2001, no. 463 § 19:

Art. 1:101, Notes IV 21

Damages Liability Act [Lovbekendtgørelse om erstatningsansvar – EAL ] of 4 September 2002 no. 750 generally: § 1: § 2: § 3: § 4: § 5: § 6: § 7: § 12: § 13: § 14: § 14a: § 15: § 18: § 19: § 22: § 23: § 24:

Art. 5:102, Notes I 13 Art. 2:101, Notes IV 36, V 49; Art. 2:201, Notes II 5, V 33, VI 46 Art. 2:201, Notes V 33; Art. 6:103, Notes 13 Art. 2:101, Notes I 12, V 49; Art. 2:201, Notes VII 61; Art. 6:203, Notes 12 Art. 2:101, Notes I 12, V 49; Art. 2:201, Notes VII 61; Art. 6:203, Notes 12 Art. 2:101, Notes I 12; Art. 2:201, Notes V 33; Art. 5:102, Notes II 25 Art. 2:101, Notes I 12 Art. 6:103, Notes 13; Art. 6:203, Notes 12 Art. 2:202, Notes IV 39, V 52 Art. 2:202, Notes V 52; Art. 6:203, Notes 12 Art. 2:202, Notes V 52; Art. 6:203, Notes 12 Art. 2:202, Notes V 52; Art. 6:203, Notes 12 Art. 6:203, Notes 12 Art. 2:201, Notes II 5; Art. 6:106, Notes 11 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 21; Art. 3:101, Notes 12; Art. 5:102, Notes IV 53; Art. 6:103, Notes 13; Art. 7:104, Notes 11; Art. 7:105, Notes 3 Art. 6:103, Notes 13 Art. 7:104, Notes 11 Art. 3:103, Notes I 12; Art. 5:102, Notes I 13; Art. 5:102, Notes IV 53; Art. 6:202, Notes 11

1091

Annexes § 24a: § 24b: § 25: § 26: § 26a: § 27:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:103, Notes I 12 5:301, Notes 13 6:105, Notes 13 2:101, Notes V 49; Art. 2:203, Notes I 2, III 27, IV 39; 2:205, Notes 10; Art. 5:203, Notes 13; Art. 6:204, Notes 9 2:202, Notes II 18 5:401, Notes 13

Dog Act [Hundloven] of 12 April 2005 no. 259 § 8:

Art. 3:203, Notes 13

Electrical Power Act [Lov om elektriske stærkstrømsanlæg og elektrisk materiel] of 16 December 2003 no. 990 generally:

Art. 3:206, Notes 14

Environmental Damage Liability Act [Lov om erstatning for miljøskader] of 6 April 1996 no. 225 § 1: § 2: § 3:

Art. 3:206, Notes 14 Art. 6:302, Notes 9 Art. 3:206, Notes 14

Environment Protection Act [Lov om miljøbeskyttelse] of 22 December 2006 no. 1757 § 69: § 70:

Art. 3:206, Notes 14 Art. 3:206, Notes 14

Governmental Bill on the Environment Protection Act [Forslag til lov om ændring af miljøbeskyttelsesloven og foreskellige andre love og] of July 2006 – L 175 generally:

Art. 2:209, Notes I 2

Governmental Bill on the Environment Damage Liability Act [Forslag til lov om undersøgelse, forebyggelse og afhjælpning af miljø-skader – miljøskadeloven] of July 2006 – L 176 generally:

Art. 2:209, Notes I 2

Insurance Contracts Act [Forsikringsaftaleloven – FAL ] of 24 October 1986 no. 726; amended by Law of 5 October 2006 no. 999 § 19: § 37: § 54:

Art. 3:103, Notes I 12; Art. 5:301, Notes 13 Art. 6:101, Notes I 12 Art. 6:104, Notes 11

Maritime Act [Søloven] of 15 June 2006 no. 538 § 191:

Art. 3:206, Notes 14; Art. 3:207, Notes 10

Marketing Act [Markedsføringsloven] of 17 July 2000 no. 699; amended by Act of 21 December 2005 no. 1389 § 1: § 19: § 20:

1092

Art. 2:208, Notes 12 Art. 2:205, Notes 10 Art. 2:208, Notes 12

Table of Codes and Statutes (Denmark) § 21: § 117:

Art. 1:102, Notes I 9 Art. 2:205, Notes 10

Media Liability Act [Medieansvarslov] of 9 February 1998 no. 85 generally:

Art. 5:203, Notes 13

Media Liability Act Statutory Proclamation [Lovbekendtgørelse af medieansvarsloven] of 9 February 1998 no. 85 § 29: § 30: § 31: § 32: § 33:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:204, Notes 2:204, Notes 2:204, Notes 2:204, Notes 2:204, Notes

I 11 I 11 I 11 I 11 I 11

Nuclear Liability Act [Atomskadeloven] of 19 June 1974 no. 332 generally:

Art. 3:206, Notes 14

Patient Insurance Act [Lovbekendtgørelse om patientforsikring] of 24 March 1997 no. 228 § 2:

Art. 1:101, Notes VI 43; Art. 4:101, Notes III 36

Peaceful Enjoyment of Land and Roads Act [Mark- og vejfredsloven] of 19 Janury 2007 no. 61 § 3:

Art. 3:203, Notes 13

Penal Code [Bekendtgørelse af straffeloven – CP ] of 30 September 2003 no. 814; last amended by Act of 5 Oktober 2006 no. 1000; previously Borgerlig Straffelov, Act no. 126, 15 April 1930, Lovtidende A 1930, p. 697-752) § 13: § 14: § 152: § 263: § 264: § 264c: § 264d: § 273: § 274:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:202, Notes I 12 5:202, Notes III 30 2:205, Notes 10 2:205, Notes 10 2:205, Notes 10 2:101, Notes VIII (2) 76; Art. 2:205, Notes 10 2:101, Notes VIII (2) 76; Art. 6:301, Notes 10 6:101, Notes I 12 2:101, Notes VIII (2) 76

Personal Data Act [Lov om behandling av personoplysninger] of 31 May 2000 no. 429 § 5: § 24: § 69:

Art. 2:204, Notes I 11 Art. 2:204, Notes I 11 Art. 2:204, Notes I 11

Products Liability Act [Lov om produktansvar] of 7 June 1989 no. 371 generally: § 2: § 8: § 13:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes

I1 II (2) 27 II (1) 15 III 31

1093

Annexes

Railway Act [ Jernbaneloven] of 2 December 2004 no. 1171 chap. 7:

Art. 3:207, Notes 10

Services in the Information Society (with particular Provision for E-commerce Transactions) Act [Lov om tjenester i informationssamfundet, herunder visse aspekter af elektronisk handel] of 22 April 2002 no. 227 § 14:

Art. 2:204, Notes IV 43

Soil Pollution Act [Lov om forurenet jord] of 22 March 2007 no. 282 § 41:

Art. 3:206, Notes 14

Supervision Act [Værgemålslov] of 14 June 1995, no. 388 § 45:

Art. 2:210, Notes 11

Traffic Act [Færdselslov – FL] of 14 November 2005 no. 1079 § 101: § 102: § 103: § 104: § 105: § 108:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:205, Notes 14; Art. 3:206, Notes 14; Art. 5:101, Notes II 27; 5:102, Notes III 39, IV 53 3:205, Notes 14 5:102, Notes IV 53 3:205, Notes 14 3:205, Notes 14 3:205, Notes 14

Work Injury Insurance Act [Lovbekendtgørelse om arbejdsskadesikring] of 7 March 2006 no. 154 generally:

Art. 7:104, Notes 11

Estonia Competition Act [Konkurentsiseadus] of 5 June 2001 (RT I 2001, 56, 332; entered into force 1 October 2001, amended among others by RT I 2007, 60, 384 of 8 November 2007) § 50:

Art. 2:208, Notes 11

Employment Contracts Act [Eesti Vabariigi töölepingu seadus] of 15 April 1992 (RT 1992, 15/16, 241, entered into force 1 July 1992; repealed as of 1 July 2009 by RT I 2009, 5, 35 of 21 January 2009) generally:

Art. 7:104, Notes 13

Environmental Liability Act [Keskkonnavastutuse seadus] of 14 November 2007 (RT I 2007, 62, 396 of 6 December 2007; entered into force 16 December 2007; amended among others by RT I 2009, 3, 5 of 9 January 2009) generally:

Art. 2:209, Notes I 1

General Part of the Civil Code Act [Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus – GPCCA ] of 27 March 2002 (RT I 2002, 35, 216, entered into force 1 July 2002; amended among others by RT I 2009, 5, 35 of 21 January 2009) § 31:

1094

Art. 3:201, Notes II 25

Table of Codes and Statutes (Estonia) § 101: § 141:

Art. 2:210, Notes 11 Art. 5:202, Notes III 29

Law of Obligations Act [Võlaõigusseadus – LOA ] of 26 September 2001 (RT I 2001, 81, 487, entered into force 1 July 2002; amended among others by RT I 2008, 59, 330 of 31 December 2008) generally: § 14: § 73: § 103: § 104: § 127: § 128: § 129: § 130: § 131: § 132: § 133: § 134: § 136: § 137: § 138: § 139: § 140: § 164: § 166: § 768: § 1022: § 1037: § 1043: § 1044: § 1045:

§ 1046: § 1047: § 1048: § 1049: § 1050: § 1051:

Art. 3:204, Notes V 45; Art. 5:203, Notes 12 Art. 2:205, Notes 9; Art. 2:210, Notes 11 Art. 6:104, Notes 10 Art. 5:302, Notes 11 Art. 3:101, Notes 11; Art. 3:102, Notes I 12 Art. 4:101, Notes I 12; Art. 6:101, Notes I 11; Art. 6:103, Notes 12 Art. 2:101, Notes V 48; Art. 2:206, Notes I 11 Art. 2:202, Notes IV 39, V 51 Art. 2:101, Notes V 48; Art. 2:201, Notes V 32, VII 60; Art. 6:203, Notes 11 Art. 2:101, Notes V 48 Art. 2:206, Notes III 38 Art. 2:209, Notes II 12 Art. 2:101, Notes V 48; Art. 2:201, Notes V 48; Art. 2:202, Notes II 16, 2:206, Notes III 38; Art. 6:203, Notes 11 Art. 6:101, Notes I 11; Art. 6:203, Notes 11 Art. 6:105, Notes 12 Art 4:103, Notes 11 Art. 5:101, Notes II 26; Art. 5:102, Notes I 12, II 25, III 38, IV 51 Art. 6:202, Notes 10; Art. 7:105, Notes 2 Art. 6:106, Notes 10 Art. 6:106, Notes 10 Art. 2:205, Notes 9 Art. 5:202, Notes II 16 Art. 6:101, Notes II 24 Chap. 1, Introd. B 12; Art. 1:101, Notes II 5, III 9, IV 18, V 25; Art. 1:103, Notes IV 40 Art. 1:103, Notes I 11 Chap. 1, Introd. B 12; Art. 1:101, Notes II 5, III 9, III 15, III 16, IV 20; Art. 2:201, Notes I 1, II 3; Art. 2:202, Notes I 1; Art. 2:203, Notes I 2; Art. 2:206, Notes I 11, II 24, ; Art. 2:208, Notes 11; Art. 2:210, Notes 11, 5; Art. 2:211, Notes 6; Art. 4:102, Notes 11; Art. 5:202, Notes I 11, III 29, Art. 5:203, Notes 12; Art. 6:301, Notes 9 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 67; Art. 2:203, Notes II 14, III 26, IV 38; Art. 5:203, Notes 12 Art. 2:204, Notes I 9 Art. 2:207, Notes 10; Art. 2:210, Notes 11 Art. 2:208, Notes 11 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 18, VI 33; Art. 3:102, Notes I 12; Art. 3:103, Notes I 11 Art. 5:401, Notes 12

1095

Annexes § 1052: § 1053: § 1054: § 1055: § 1056: § 1057: § 1058: § 1059: § 1060: § 1061: § 1067:

Art. 3:103, Notes I 11, II 20; Art. 5:301, Notes 12 Art. 3:104, Notes I 13 Art. 3:201, Notes I 11 Art. 1:102, Notes I 2; Art. 6:301, Notes 9 Art. 3:202, Notes 12; Art. 3:203, Notes 12; Art. 3:205, Notes 13; Art. 3:206, Notes 12 Art. 3:205, Notes 13 Art. 3:202, Notes 12; Art. 3:206, Notes 12 Art. 3:202, Notes 12 Art. 3:203, Notes 12 Art. 3:204, Notes I 1, II (1) 14 Art. 5:401, Notes 12

Law of Succession Act [Pärimisseadus] of 15 May 1996 (RT I 1996, 38, 752; entered into force 1 January 1997; repealed as of 1 January 2009 by RT I 2008, 7, 52 of 2 February 2008) § 2:

Art. 2:202, Notes III 26

State Liability Act [Riigivastutuse seadus] of 2 May 2001 (RT I 2001, 47, 260; entered into force 1 January 2002; amended among others by RT I 2006, 48, 360 of 8 November 2006) generally:

Art. 7:103, Notes 12

Traffic Act [Liiklusseadus] of 14 December 2000 (RT I 2001, 3, 6; consolidated text RT I 2002, 92, 531; amended among others by RT I 2008, 54, 304 of 17 December 2008) § 12:

Art. 3:205, Notes 13

Finland Air Traffic Act [Luftfartslag] of 29 December 2005 no. 1242 generally:

Art. 3:206, Notes 15; Art. 3:207, Notes 10

Ancient Land Code [Byggninga Balk] of 1 January 1734 no. 2 chap. 22 § 8:

Art. 3:203, Notes 13

Certain Respective Interests of Neighbours Act [Lag angående vissa grannelagsförhållande] of 13 February 1920 no. 26 generally: § 13:

Art. 3:206, Notes 15 Art. 5:201, Notes 12

Code of Judicial Procedure [Rättegångs Balk] of 1 January 1734 no. 4 chap. 7 § 3: chap. 17 § 6:

Art. 1:102, Notes I 9; Art. 6:301, Notes 10 Art. 2:101, Notes IV 34

Commercial Code [Handels Balk – Ccom] of 31 December 1734 no. 3 chap. 1 § 5:

1096

Art. 2:211, Notes 12

Table of Codes and Statutes (Finland)

Consumer Protection Act [Konsumentskyddslag] of 20 January 1978 no. 38 generally: chap. 2 § 7: chap. 5 § 20: chap. 5 § 21:

Art. 1:103, Notes Art. 1:102, Notes Art. 1:103, Notes Art. 1:103, Notes

II 17; Art. 2:208, Notes 12 I9 I 12 I 12

Contracts Act [Lag om rättshandlingar på förmögenhetsrättens område – ContrA] of 13 June 1929 no. 228 § 25: § 30:

Art. 2:210, Notes 11 Art. 2:210, Notes 11

Credit Institutions Act [Kreditinstitutslag] of 30 December 1993 no. 1607; repealed by Kreditinstitutslag of 9 February 2007 no. 121 § 94:

Art. 2:205, Notes 10

Damages Liability Act [Skadeståndslag – SKL ] of 31 May 1974 no. 412 generally: chap. 1 § 1: chap. 2: chap. 2 § 1: chap. 2 § 2: chap. 2 § 3: chap. 3 § 1: chap. 3 § 3: chap. 4: chap. 4 § 1: chap. 5: chap. 5 § 1: chap. 5 § 2: chap. 5 § 2a: chap. 5 § 2b: chap. 5 § 2c: chap. 5 § 2d: chap. 5 § 3: chap. 5 § 4: chap. 5 § 4a: chap. 5 § 5: chap. 5 § 6: chap. 5 chap. 6 chap. 6 chap. 6 chap. 7 chap. 7

§ 7: § 1: § 2: § 3: § 1: § 3:

Art. 3:205, Notes 14 Art. 1:103, Notes I 12 Art. 2:101, Notes I 12 Art. 1:101, Notes II 6, IV 18; Art. 2:206, Notes I 12; Art. 3:104, Notes I 14; Art. 5:102, Notes IV 53; Art. 6:202, Notes 11 Art. 3:103, Notes I 12 Art. 5:301, Notes 13 Art. 3:201, Notes I 12; Art. 7:103, Notes 13 Art. 7:103, Notes 13 Art. 2:202, Notes V 52 Art. 7:104, Notes 11 Art. 2:101, Notes I 12; Art. 2:206, Notes III 39; Art. 6:101, Notes I 12 Art. 2:201, Notes II 5; Art. 2:205, Notes 10; Art. 2:208, Notes 12 Art. 2:101, Notes V 49; Art. 2:201, Notes II 5, V 33, VII 61 Art. 2:201, Notes V 33; Art. 5:102, Notes II 25 Art. 2:201, Notes V 33 Art. 2:101, Notes V 49; Art. 2:201, Notes VII 61 Art. 2:201, Notes VI 46 Art. 2:202, Notes IV 39 Art. 2:202, Notes V 52 Art. 2:202, Notes II 18 Art. 2:101, Notes IV 35 Art. 2:101, Notes V 49; Art. 2:203, Notes I 2, II 16, III 27, IV 39; Art. 5:203, Notes 13; Art. 6:102, Notes 10; Art. 6:204, Notes 9 Art. 6 :203, Notes 12 Art. 5:102, Notes I 13, IV 53 Art. 6:105, Notes 13 Art. 6:105, Notes 13 Art. 5:401, Notes 13 Art. 2:202, Notes III 27; Art. 6:106, Notes 11

1097

Annexes

Electricity Safety Act [Elsäkerhetslag] of 14 June 1996 no. 410 chap. 7:

Art. 3:206, Notes 15

Employment Accident Act [Lag om olycksfallsförsäkring] of 20 August 1948 no. 608 § 61:

Art. 6:103, Notes 13

Environmental Damage Compensation Act [Lag om ersättning för miljöskador] of 19 August 1994 no. 737 generally: § 1: § 3: § 4: § 5: § 6: § 7:

Art. 6:102, Notes 10 Art. 3:206, Notes 15 Art. 3:206, Notes 15; Art. 4:101, Notes III 36 Art. 3:206, Notes 15 Art. 3:206, Notes 15 Art. 1:102, Notes I 9; Art. 2:209, Notes II 12; Art. 3:206, Notes 15; Art. 6:302, Notes 9 Art. 3:207, Notes 10; Art. 3:208, Notes 8

Environmental Damage Insurance Act [Lag om miljöskadeförsäkring] of 30 January 1998 no. 81 generally:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 12; Art. 3:206, Notes 15

Environmental Protection Act [Miljöskyddslag] of 4 Februar 2000 no. 86 § 66: § 67:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 12 Art. 2:209, Notes II 12

Freedom of Expression in Mass Communication Act [Lag om yttrandefrihet i masskommunikation] of 13 June 2003 no. 460 § 14:

Art. 2:204, Notes I 11; Art. 5:203, Notes 13

Function of Guardians Act [Lag om förmyndarverksamhet] of 1 April 1994 no. 442 § 28:

Art. 2:210, Notes 11

Funds for Oil Damage Act [Lagen om oljeskyddsfonden] of 30 December 2004 no. 1406 generally:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 12

Government Bill on the Implementation of Directive 2004/35/ EG [Regeringens proposition om verkställighet av Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2004/35/ EG om miljöansvar för att förebygga och avhjälpa miljöskador] generally:

Art. 2:209, Notes I 2

Health Insurance Act [Sjukförsäkringslag] of 21 December 2004 no. 1224 chap. 12 § 2: chap. 12 § 7:

Art. 6:103, Notes 13 Art. 6:103, Notes 13

Hunting Act [ Jaktlag] of 28 June 1993 no. 615 § 87:

1098

Art. 3:203, Notes 13

Table of Codes and Statutes (Finland)

Immoveable Property Code [ Jordabalk] of 12 April 1995 no. 540 chap. 13 § 3:

Art. 2:211, Notes 12

Improprietous Commercial Conduct Act [Lag om otillbörligt förfarande i näringsverksamhet] of 22 December 1978 no. 1061 § 1: § 2: § 3: § 4:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:208, Notes 2:208, Notes 2:208, Notes 2:205, Notes

12 12 12 10; Art. 2:208, Notes 12

Insurance against Environmental Damage Act [Lag om miljöskadeförsäkring] of 30 January 1998 no. 81 generally: §1

Art. 3:206, Notes 15 Art. 2:209, Notes II 12

Insurance Contract Act [Lag om försäkringsavtal] of 28 June 1994 no. 543 § 36: § 62: § 65: § 66:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:103, Notes 2:206, Notes 2:206, Notes 2:206, Notes

I 12; Art. 5:301, Notes 13 II 25; Art. 6:104, Notes 11 II 25 II 25

Maritime Act [Sjölag] of 15 July 1994 no. 674 chap. 7: chap. 10:

Art. 3:207, Notes 10 Art. 3:206, Notes 15; Art. 3:207, Notes 10

Neighbour Relations Act [Lag angående vissa grannelagsförhållanden] of 13 February 1920 no. 26 § 10: § 13:

Art. 1:102, Notes I 9 Art. 5:201, Notes 12

Nuclear Liability Act [Atomansvarighetslag] of 8 June 1972 no. 484 generally:

Art. 3:206, Notes 15

Patient Injury Act [Patientskadelag – PL ] of 25 July 1986 no. 585 § 2:

Art. 1:101, Notes VI 43; Art. 4:101, Notes III 36

Penal Code [Strafflag – CP ] of 19 December 1889 no. 39 chap. 4 § 5: chap. 4 § 4: chap. 24 § 5: chap. 24 § 6: chap. 24 § 8: chap. 24 § 9: chap. 27 § 4: chap. 27 § 7: chap. 28 § 14: chap. 38:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:202, Notes III 30 5:202, Notes I 12 2:205, Notes 10 2:205, Notes 10 2:205, Notes 10; Art. 5:203, Notes 13 5:203, Notes 13 2:101, Notes VIII (2) 76 6:101, Notes I 12 5:201, Notes 12 2:205, Notes 10

1099

Annexes

Personal Data Act [Personuppgiftslag] of 22 April 1999 no. 523 § 9: § 29: § 47:

Art. 2:204, Notes I 11 Art. 2:204, Notes I 11 Art. 2:204, Notes I 11

Products Liability Act [Produktansvarslag] of 17 August 1990 no. 694 generally: § 1: § 7: § 8: § 11:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes

I1 II (2) 27 IV 42 II (1) 15 III 31

Provision of Services in the Information Society Act [Lag om tillhandahållande av informationssamhällets tjänster] of 5 June 2002 no. 458 § 13:

Art. 2:204, Notes IV 43

Railway Traffic Liability Act [Lag om ansvar i spårtrafik] of 5 February 1999 no. 113 generally:

Art. 3:207, Notes 10

Restrictions of Competition Act [Lag om konkurrensbegränsningar] of 27 May 1992 no. 480 generally:

Art. 2:208, Notes 12

Traffic Insurance Act [Trafikförsäkringslag] of 26 June 1959 no. 279 generally: § 1: § 2: § 4: § 5: § 6: § 7: § 10: § 11: § 12: § 15:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:206, Notes 15 3:205, Notes 14 3:205, Notes 14 3:205, Notes 14 3:205, Notes 14 3:205, Notes 14 5:102, Notes III 39, IV 53 3:205, Notes 14 3:205, Notes 14 3:205, Notes 14 3:205, Notes 14

Water Act [Vattenlag] of 19 May 1961 no. 264 chap. 11 § 2:

Art. 3:206, Notes 15

France Act on the Jurisdiction of the Tribunaux Judiciaires in Proceedings on Compensation for Injury sustained in Traffic against Public Persons [Loi n857-1424 du 31 décembre 1957 attribuant compétence aux tribunaux judiciaires pour statuer sur les actions en responsabilité des dommages causés par tout véhicule et dirigés contre une personne de droit public] of 31 December 1957 (JO of 5 Januar 1958 p. 196) generally:

1100

Art. 7:103, Notes 1

Table of Codes and Statutes (France)

Civil Code [Code Civil – CC ] of 21 March 1804, amended among others by DL no. 2006-346 on Security [Ordonnance relative aux sûretés] of 23 March 2006 (JO no. 71 of 24 March 2006 p. 4475) and Loi no. 2008-561 du 17 Juin 2008 portant réforme à la prescription en matière civile (JO no. 141 of 18 June 2008 p. 9856) generally: art. 5: art. 9: art. 9-1: art. 16: art. 16-3: art. 16-9: art. 473: art. 489-2: art. 539: art. 544: art. 656: art. 699: art. 713: art. 917: art. 1147: art. 1165: art. 1202: art. 1251: art. 1251: art. 1372: art. 1376: art. 1382:

art. 1383:

art. 1384:

art. 1385: art. 1386: art. 1386-1: art. 1386-2: art. 1386-7: art. 1386-11: art. 1386-12:

Art. 3:204, Notes V 45; Art. 4:101, Notes I 1 Art. 6:203, Notes 1 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3; Art. 2:203, Notes II 6, III 20; Art. 2:205, Notes 1; Art. 5:203, Notes 1; Art. 6:301, Notes 1 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 31; Art. 2:204, Notes III 27 Art. 2:201, Notes I 1 Art. 5:101, Notes I 1 Art. 2:201, Notes I 1 Art. 7:103, Notes 1; Art. 7:105, Notes 1 Art. 3:102, Notes I 1; Art. 5:301, Notes 1 Art. 3:208, Notes 1 Art. 2:206, Notes I 1 Art. 3:208, Notes 1 Art. 3:208, Notes 1 Art. 3:208, Notes 1 Art. 3:208, Notes 1 Art. 5:302, Notes 1 Art. 2:101, Notes IX 85 Art. 4:102, Notes 1; Art. 6:105, Notes 1 Art. 4:102, Notes 1 Art. 4:102, Notes 1; Art. 6:105, Notes 1 Art. 1:103, Notes III 28 Art. 1:103, Notes III 28 Chap. 1, Introd. B 6, B 11; Art. 1:101, Notes II 2, III 14, 16, IV 18, V 26; Art. 1:102, Notes I 5; Art. 1:103, Notes IV 40; Art. 2:101, Notes V 39, VIII (2) 72; Art. 2:204, Notes I 1, III 27; Art. 2:205, Notes 1; Art. 2:208, Notes 1; Art. 3:101, Notes 1; Art. 3:102, Notes II 17, III 29; Art. 3:203, Notes 1; Art. 3:206, Notes 1; Art. 5:203, Notes 1; Art. 6:103, Notes 1; Art. 7:104, Notes 1 Chap. 1, Introd. B 6; Art. 1:101, Notes II 2, IV 18, V 26; Art. 2:204, Notes I 1; Art. 2:208, Notes 1; Art. 3:101, Notes 1; Art. 3:102, Notes I 1, II 17; Art. 3:203, Notes 1; Art. 3:206, Notes 1 Art. 1:101, Notes V 26, VI 40; Art. 2:101, Notes V 38; Chap. 3, Introd. C 9; Art. 3:104, Notes I 1, II 18; Art. 3:201, Notes I 1, 2; Art. 3:202, Notes 1; Art. 3:206, Notes 1; Art. 3:208, Notes 1; Art. 5:101, Notes II 15; Art. 5:102, Notes I 1; Art. 5:302, Notes 1 Art. 3:203, Notes 1; Art. 3:208, Notes 1; Art. 5:302, Notes 1 Art. 3:202, Notes 1; Art. 5:302, Notes 1 Art. 3:204, Notes I 1, II (2) 19 Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 4, II (2) 19 Art. 3:204, Notes I 2 Art. 3:204, Notes IV 34 Art. 3:204, Notes IV 34

1101

Annexes art. 1386-15: art. 1641: art. 1645: art. 1648: art. 1689: art. 1992: art. 2172 (old 2467): art. 2255 (old 2228): art. 2279 (old 2283):

Art. 3:204, Notes II (2) 19 Art. 1:103, Notes II 19 Art. 1:103, Notes II 19 Art. 1:103, Notes II 19 Art. 6:106, Notes 1 Art. 3:201, Notes I 1, 2 Art. 3:208, Notes 1 Art. 2:206, Notes II 16 Art. 2:206, Notes II 16

Code of Civil Procedure [Code de procédure civile – CCP ] of 14 April 1806; repealed by Decree no. 75-1123 of 5 December 1975 no. 75-1123 introducing the New Code of Civil Procedure (JO no. 279-303 of 9 December 1975 p. 12521); amended among others by Loi no. 2007-1787 du 20 décembre 2007 relative à la simplification du droit (1) of 20 December 2007 (JO no. 296 of 21 December 2007 p. 20639) and renamed to “Code de procédure civile” art. 31: art. 809: art. 849:

Art. 2:101, Notes I 2, XI 123 Art. 6:301, Notes 1 Art. 6:301, Notes 1

Code of Criminal Procedure [Code de procédure pénale/Loi n857-1426 du 31 décembre 1957 instituant un Code de procedure pénale – CCrimProc] of 31 December 1957 (JO 8 January 1957 p. 258) and completed by Ordonnance n858-1296 du 23 décembre 1958 modifiant et completant le Code de procedure pénale (JO of 24 December 1958 p. 11711); amended among others by art. 73:

Art. 5:201, Notes 1

Code of Family Law and Social Benefits [Code de l’action sociale et des familles] Ordonnance no. 2000-1249 of 21 December 2000 (JO no. 297 of 23 December 2000 p. 20471) art. L 114-5:

Art. 2:101, Notes X (2) 107

Constitution [Constitution francaise de 1958 – Const.] of 4 October 1958 (JO 5 October 1958 p. 9151) art. 37:

Art. 7:102, Notes 1

Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen [Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen du 26 août 1789] of 26 August 1789 (JO no. 237 of 12 October 1999 p. 275) art. 6:

Art. 7:102, Notes 1

Decree no. 58-1270 on the Statute of Jugdes [Ordonnance no. 58-1270 du 22 décembre 1958 portant loi organique relative au statut de la magistrature] of 22 December 1958 (JO 23 September 1958 p. 11551) art. 11-1:

Art. 7:103, Notes 1

Decree no. 2005-113 on the Application of Article 1386-2 of the French Civil Code [Décret no. 2005-113 du 11 février 2005 pris pour l’application de l’article 1386-2 du code civil] of 11 February 2005 no. 113 (JO 11 February 2005 p. 2408) generally:

1102

Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 4

Table of Codes and Statutes (France)

Defective Products Liability Act [Loi no. 98-389 du 19 May 1998 relative à la responsabilité du fait des produits défectueux] of 19 May 1998 no. 98-389 (JO no. 117 of 21 Mai 1998 p. 7744) generally:

Art. 3:204, Notes I 1

Education Code [Code de l’Éducation] of 15 June 2000 (JO no. 143 of 22 June 2000 p. 9343) art. L 911-4:

Art. 3:104, Notes II 18; Art. 7:105, Notes 1

Environmental Code [Code de l’Environnement] of by the Ordonnance no 2000-914 of 18 September 2000 (JO no. 219 of 21 September 2000 p. 14792); amended among others by Act no. 2006-11 of 5 January 2006 (JO of 6 January 2006 p. 229) generally: art. L 142-1: art. L 142-2: art. L 571-1:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:209, Notes 2:209, Notes 2:209, Notes 2:209, Notes

I1 II 3 II 3 II 3

Freedom of Press Act[Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse] of 29 July 1881 (JO of 30 July 1881 p. 4201) generally: art. 34:

Art. 5:203, Notes 1 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (2) 72

General Public Authority’s Property Code [Code général de la propriété des personnes publiques] (ordonnance no. 2006-460) of 21 April 2006 (JO no. 95 of 22 April 2006 p. 6024) art. L. 1122-1: art. L. 1123-1:

Art. 3:205, Notes 1 Art. 3:205, Notes 1

Ill Persons Act [Loi no. 2002-303 of 4 mars 2002 relative aux droits des malades et à la qualité du système de santé (1) – “Loi-Kouchner”] (JO 5 March 2002 p. 4118, text no. 1) generally: art. 1:

Art. 2:101, Notes X (3) 117 Art. 2:101, Notes X (2) 107, (3) 117

Improvement of the Situation for Victims of Traffic Accidents and for the Acceleration of Compensation Proceedings Act [”Badinter Act”] [Loi no. 85-677 du 5 juillet 1985 tendant à l’amélioration de la situation des victimes d’accidents de la circulation et à l’accélération des procédures d’indemnisation – Loi Badinter] of 5 July 1985 (JO 6 July 1985 p. 7584) generally: art. 1: art. 2: art. 3: art. 4: art. 5:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:102, Notes III 28; Art. 7:105, Notes 1 3:205, Notes 1 3:205, Notes 1; Art. 5:102, Notes III 28; Art. 5:302, Notes 1 3:205, Notes 1; Art. 5:102, Notes III 28 3:205, Notes 1; Art. 5:102, Notes III 28 3:205, Notes 1; Art. 5:102, Notes III 28

Insurance Code [Code des Assurances] Décret no. 76-667 of 16 July 1976 (JO 21 July 1976 p. 4343); Art. L 113-1 as amended by Act no. 81-5 of 7 January 1981, art. 28 II (JO of 8 January 1981 p. 194); amended among others by Act no. 2005-845 of 26 July 2005 (JO of 27 July 2005 p. 12187, text no. 5 and rectified by JO no. 247 of 22 October 2005 p. 16750) art. L. 113-1: art. L. 121-12:

Art. 3:101, Notes 1 Art. 4:102, Notes 1; Art. 6:105, Notes 1

1103

Annexes

Judicature Act [Décret n878-329 du 16 mars 1978 instituant le Code de l’organisation judiciaire] of 16 March 1978 (JO of 18 March 1978 p. 1129); revised by ordonnance no. 2006-637 of 8 June 2006 (JO no. 132 of 9 June 2006 p. 8710) art. L. 141-1:

Art. 7:103, Notes 1

Labour Accidents Liability Act [Loi du 9 avril 1898 concernant les responsabilites dans les accidents du travail] of 9 April 1898 (JO of 10 April 1898 p. 2209) generally:

Art. 7:104, Notes 1

Labour Code [Code du travail] Act no. 73-4 of 2 January 1973 (JO of 3 Januar 1973 p. 52); reformed by Ordonnance no. 2007-329 du 12 mars 2007 relative au code du travail, in force since 1 March 2008 (JO 13 March 2007 p. 4740) art. L 1234-9: art. L 1237-3:

Art. 7:104, Notes 1 Art. 2:211, Notes 1

Legal Professions Act [Loi no. 71-1130 du 31 décembre 1971 portant réforme de certaines professions judiciaires et juridiques] of 31 December 1971 no. 71-1130 (JO 5 Januar 1972 p. 131) art. 26: art. 27:

Art. 7:103, Notes 1 Art. 7:103, Notes 1

Mining Code [Code minier] Decree no. 56-838 of 16 August 1956 (JO 21 August 1956 p. 8004) art. 75-1:

Art. 3:206, Notes 1

Penal Code [Code Penal – CP ] of 12 February 1810; repealed by Nouveau Code Pénal [NCP ] in force since 1 March 1994 (JO no. 169 of 23 July 1992 p. 9864); amended among others by Ordinance no. 2005-759 of 4 July 2005 (JO no. 156 of 6 July 2005 p. 11159, in force 1 July 2006) art. 121-3: art. 122-4: art. 122-5: art. 122-6: art. 122-7: art. 224-1: art. 226-13:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:102, Notes I 1 5:201, Notes 1 5:202, Notes I 1 5:202, Notes I 1 5:202, Notes III 19 2:203, Notes I 1 2:205, Notes 1

Products Liability Act [Loi no. 2006-406 du 5 April 2006 relative à la garantie de conformité du bien au contrat due par le vendeur au consommateur et à la responsabilité du fait des produits défectueux] of 5 April 2006 (JO no. 82 of 6 April 2006 p. 5198) generally:

Art. 3:204, Notes I 2

Public Health Code [Code de la Santé Publique – CSP ] Decret no. 53-1001 of 5 October 1953 (JO 7 October 1953 p. 8833) art. L 1142-1: art. L 1142-1-1: art. L 1142-17:

1104

Art. 3:206, Notes 1 Art. 3:206, Notes 1 Art. 3:206, Notes 1

Table of Codes and Statutes (Germany)

Responsibility of Judges Act [Loi organique no. 79-43 du 18 janvier 1979 modifiant l’ord. 58-1270 du 22-12-1958 modifiée portant loi organique relative au statut de la magistrature] Act no. 79-43 of 18 January 1979 (JO of 19 Januar 1979 p. 162) art. 11-1:

Art. 7:103, Notes 1

Simplification of the Law Act 2004 [Loi no. 2004-1343 du 9 décembre 2004 de simplification du droit] of 9 December 2004 no. 2004-1343 (JO 10 December 2004 p. 20857) generally:

Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 4

Social Security Code [Code de sécurité sociale] Decret no. 56-1279 of 10 December 1956 (JO 18 December 1956 p. 12140) art. L 452-3:

Art. 7:104, Notes 1

Trust in Digital Economy Act [Loi no. 2004-575 du 21 Juin 2004 pour la confiance dans l’économie numérique] of 21 June 2004 (JO no. 143 of 22 June 2004 p. 11168) generally:

Art. 2:204, Notes IV 37

Germany Aviation Act [Luftverkehrsgesetz – LuftVG ] of 1 August 1922 (RGBl. I, 681) as restated in the publication of 10 May 2007 (BGBl. I, 696) and amended by the publication of 1 June 2007 (BGBl. I 986, 991) § 49c:

Art. 5:401, Notes 7

Civil Code [Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – CC ] of 18 August 1896 (RGBl. 195) as amended by the publication of 2 January 2002 (BGBl. 2002 I, 42, corrected on page 2909 and in BGBl. 2003, 738) § 12: § 31: § 89: § 123: § 202: § 226: § 227: § 228: § 229: § 242: § 249:

§ 251: § 252: § 253:

§ 254:

Art. 1:102, Notes I 3, 6; Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 67; Art. 6:301, Notes 6 Art. 3:201, Notes II 20, 22 Art. 3:201, Notes II 20 Art. 2:210, Notes 6 Art. 5:401, Notes 7 Art. 3:102, Notes III 33 Art. 1:101, Notes III 15; Art. 5:202, Notes I 6 Art. 1:101, Notes III 15; Art. 5:202, Notes III 24 Art. 1:101, Notes III 15; Art. 5:201, Notes 6 Art. 5:202, Notes I 6; Art. 5:501, Notes 4 Art. 2:101, Notes I 6; Art. 2:201, Notes V 27; Art. 4:101, Notes II 21; Art. 6:101, Notes I 7; Art. 6:201, Notes 4; Art. 6:203, Notes 7; Art. 6:302, Notes 5 Art. 2:209, Notes II 7; Art. 6:101, Notes I 7; Art. 6:203, Notes 7 Art. 2:101, Notes I 6; Art. 2:201, Notes V 27; Art. 6:101, Notes II 20 Art. 1:103, Notes I 6; Art. 2:101, Notes I 6, Notes V 43, X (2) 112; Art. 2:201, Notes VII 55; Art. 2:202, Notes II 11; Art. 2:203, Notes I 2; Art. 2:206, Notes III 33; Art. 5:102, Notes IV 46 Art. 5:102, Notes I 7, II 20, III 33; Art. 5:501, Notes 4; Art. 6:202, Notes 6

1105

Annexes § 276: § 277: § 280: § 309: § 426: § 428: § 432: § 521: § 548: § 599: § 606: § 618: § 642: § 675: § 687: § 690: § 708: § 823:

§ 824: § 825: § 826:

§ 827: § 828: § 829: § 830: § 831: § 832: § 833: § 834: § 836:

1106

Art. 3:102, Notes I 7, I 9, II 21; Art. 3:103, Notes I 7; Art. 5:401, Notes 7; Art. 7:104, Notes 7 Art. 3:102, Notes I 7 Art. 1:103, Notes I 6 Art. 5:401, Notes 7 Art. 6:105, Notes 7 Art. 6:104, Notes 7 Art. 6:104, Notes 7 Art. 1:103, Notes I 6 Art. 1:103, Notes I 6 Art. 1:103, Notes I 6 Art. 1:103, Notes I 6 Art. 3:102, Notes III 33 Art. 6:103, Notes 7 Art. 2:207, Notes 5, 8 Art. 6:101, Notes II 20 Art. 1:103, Notes I 6 Art. 1:103, Notes I 6 Chap. 1, Introd. B 7, B 8, B 13; Art. 1:101, Notes II 4, III 9, 13, 16, IV 18, VI 35; Art. 1:102, Notes I 6; Art. 1:103, Notes I 6, III 32, IV 40; Art. 2:101, Notes I 6, VIII (3) 78, IX 88, X (2) 112; Art. 2:201, Notes I 1, II 3; Art. 2:202, Notes I 1, II 11; Art. 2:203, Notes I 2, IV 35; Art. 2:204, Notes I 6, II 19, III 30, IV 38; Art. 2:205, Notes 5; Art. 2:206, Notes I 6, II 20; Art. 2:208, Notes 6; Art. 2:209, Notes II 7; Art. 2:210, Notes 6; Art. 2:211, Notes 7; Art. 3:102, Notes II 21, III 33; Art. 3:104, Notes I 8; Art. 3:201, Notes I 6; Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 9, II (2) 24; Art. 3:206, Notes 7; Art. 4:101, Notes II 21, II 22, III 32; Art. 6:301, Notes 6; Art. 7:104, Notes 7 Chap. 1, Introd. B 13; Art. 2:204, Notes I 4, I 6, II 19, III 30; Art. 2:208, Notes 6; Art. 3:104, Notes I 8 Art. 3:104, Notes I 8 Chap. 1, Introd. B 8, B 13; Art. 1:101, Notes II 4, III 16, IV 20; Art. 2:202, Notes VI 60; Art. 2:204, Notes I 6; Art. 2:207, Notes 5; Art. 2:208, Notes 6; Art. 2:210, Notes 6; Art. 3:104, Notes I 8 Art. 5:102, Notes I 7; Art. 5:301, Notes 7 Art. 3:103, Notes I 7; Art. 5:102, Notes III 33; Art. 6:202, Notes 6 Art. 3:103, Notes II 20; Art. 5:301, Notes 7 Art. 4:102, Notes 6, Art 4:103, Notes 7 Art. 1:101, Notes III 9, VI 39; Art. 2:202, Notes II 11; Art. 3:102, Notes II 21; Art. 3:104, Notes II 23; Art. 3:201, Notes I 6, II 20 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 39; Art. 3:104, Notes I 8, II 23, 26; Art. 5:301, Notes 7 Chap. 3, Introd. C 12; Art. 3:203, Notes 7 Art. 3:203, Notes 7 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 39; Art. 3:202, Notes 7

Table of Codes and Statutes (Germany) § 837: § 838: § 839: § 839a: § 840: § 843: § 844: § 845: § 846: § 847 (old): § 851: § 852: § 857: § 858: § 859: § 860: § 862: § 872: § 903: § 904: § 906: § 907: § 908: § 909: § 910: § 932: § 960: § 989: § 992: § 993: § 1004: § 1281: § 1626: § 1631: § 1671: § 1757: § 1765: § 1793: § 1797: § 1800: § 1896: § 1909: § 1915: § 1968:

Art. 3:202, Notes 7 Art. 3:202, Notes 7 Art. 7:103, Notes 8 Art. 2:204, Notes I 6 Art. 6:105, Notes 7 Art. 2:201, Notes V 27; Art. 6:203, Notes 7 Art. 2:202, Notes IV 34, V 47; Art. 5:501, Notes 4 Art. 5:501, Notes 4 Art. 2:202, Notes V 47; Art. 5:501, Notes 4 Art. 2:202, Notes III 21; Art. 6:106, Notes 6 Art. 6:104, Notes 7 Art. 1:103, Notes III 32, III 35 Art. 3:202, Notes 7 Art. 3:102, Notes III 33 Art. 5:201, Notes 6 Art. 5:201, Notes 6 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3, I 6 Art. 3:202, Notes 7 Art. 2:206, Notes I 6 Art. 1:101, Notes III 15; Art. 5:202, Notes III 24 Art. 3:102, Notes III 33; Art. 3:206, Notes 7; Art. 6:102, Notes 6 Art. 3:102, Notes III 33 Art. 3:102, Notes III 33; Art. 6:301, Notes 6; Art. 6:301, Notes 8 Art. 3:102, Notes III 33 Art. 5:201, Notes 6 Art. 1:103, Notes III 32 Art. 3:203, Notes 7 Art. 1:103, Notes III 32 Art. 1:103, Notes III 32 Art. 1:103, Notes III 32 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3, I 6; Art. 3:102, Notes III 33; Art. 6:301, Notes 6 Art. 6:104, Notes 7 Art. 3:104, Notes I 8 Art. 5:201, Notes 6 Art. 3:104, Notes I 8 Art. 3:104, Notes I 8 Art. 3:104, Notes I 8 Art. 3:104, Notes I 8 Art. 3:104, Notes I 8 Art. 3:104, Notes I 8 Art. 3:104, Notes II 23 Art. 3:104, Notes I 8 Art. 3:104, Notes I 8 Art. 2:202, Notes IV 34

1107

Annexes

Civil Code Implementation Act [Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch – EGBGB ] of 31 August 1986, as restated in the publication of 21 September 1994 (BGBl. I, 2494) art. 2:

Art. 7:102, Notes 4

Code of Civil Procedure [Zivilprozessordnung – CCP ] of 30 January 1877 (RGBl. 83), revised by article 9 of the Law of 12 September 1950 (BGBl. I, 455) and as restated by the publication of 5 December 2005 (BGBl. I, 3202) § 287:

Art. 2:201, Notes VII 55

Code of Criminal Procedure [Strafprozessordnung – CCrimProc] as restated in the publication of 7 April 1987 (BGBl. I, 1074, 1319) § 127:

Art. 5:201, Notes 6

Constitution [Grundgesetz – GG ] of 23 May 1949 (BGBl. 1) as amended by the publication of 28 August 2006 (BGBl. I, 2034) art. 1: art. 2: art. 5: art. 8: art. 34:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:101, Notes V 43; Art. 2:203, Notes II 11 2:101, Notes V 43; Art. 2:203, Notes II 11 5:203, Notes 7 5:203, Notes 7 3:104, Notes II 23; Art. 7:103, Notes 8

Copyright Act [Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte vom 9 September 1965 – Urheberrechtsgesetz – UrhG] of 9 September 1965 (BGBl. I, 1273) as amended among others by the publication of 7 July 2008 (BGBl. I, 1191, 1201) § 97:

Art. 6:101, Notes II 20

Copyright on Works of Fine Art and Photography Act [Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Werken der bildenden Künste und der Photographie – Kunsturhebergesetz – KunstUrhG] of 9 January 1907 (RGBl. 1907, 7) § 22:

Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 68, (2) 75

Education Act [Berufsbildungsgesetz – BBiG] of 14 August 1969 (BGBl. I, 1112) as restated in the publication of 23 March 2005 (BGBl. I, 931) § 6:

Art. 3:104, Notes II 23

Employee Remuneration (Public Holidays and Illness) Act [Entgeltfortzahlungsgesetz – EntgFG ] of 26 Mai 1994 (BGBl. I, 1014, 1065) as amended the publication of 23 December 2003 (BGBl. I, 2848) § 6:

Art. 2:202, Notes VI 60

Environmental Damage Act [Umweltschadensgesetz – USchadG] of 10 May 2007 (BGBl. I, 666) generally:

Art. 2:209, Notes I 1

Environmental Liability Act [Umwelthaftungsgesetz – UmweltHG ] of 10 December 1990 (BGBl. I, 2634) as amended by the publication of 23 November 2007 (BGBl. I, 2631) § 1: § 2:

1108

Art. 2:209, Notes II 7; Art. 3:206, Notes 7 Art. 3:206, Notes 7

Table of Codes and Statutes (Germany) § 3: § 4: § 6: § 7: § 14: § 15: § 16:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:206, Notes 7 3:206, Notes 7; Art. 3:206, Notes 7; Art. 3:206, Notes 7; Art. 6:203, Notes 7 3:206, Notes 7; Art. 2:209, Notes II 7

5:302, Notes 7 4:101, Notes III 32 4:101, Notes III 32 6:202, Notes 6

Genetic Engineering Act [Gentechnikgesetz – GenTG ] of 20 June 1990 (BGBl. I, 1080) as restated in the publication of 16 December 1993 (BGBl. I, 2066) and as amended by the publication of 16 August 2002 (BGBl. 2002 I, 3220-3244) § 32: § 37:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 7; Art. 3:206, Notes 7 Art. 3:204, Notes IV 39

Hunting Act [Bundesjagdgesetz – BJagdG] of 29 September 1976 (BGBl. I, 2849) § 29:

Art. 3:207, Notes 6

Immission Control Act [Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz – BImSchG] of 15 March 1974 (BGBl. I, 721, 1193) as amended by the publication of 26 September 2002 (BGBl. I, 3830) § 14:

Art. 3:206, Notes 7

Insurance Contract Law [Versicherungsvertragsgesetz – VVG ] of 30 May 1908 (RGBl. 263) as amended among others by the publication of 23 November 2007 (BGBl. I, 2631) § 67: § 86:

Art. 2:201, Notes V 27 Art. 6:103, Notes 7

Liability Act [Haftpflichtgesetz – HaftPflG] of 7 June 1871 (RGBl. 207) as restated in the publication of 4 January 1978 (BGBl. I, 145) as amended by the publication of 19 July 2002 (BGBl. I, 2674) § 1: § 2: § 7: § 8: § 13:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:302, Notes 7 3:206, Notes 7; Art. 5:302, Notes 7 5:401, Notes 7 6:203, Notes 7 5:302, Notes 7

Medicines Act [Arzneimittelgesetz – AMG ] of 24 August 1976 (BGBl. I, 2445, 2448) as restated in the publication of 12 December 2005 (BGBl. I, 3394) § 84:

Art. 3:204, Notes IV 39; Art. 3:207, Notes 6

Mining Act [Bundesberggesetz – BBergG] of 13 August 1980 (BGBl. I, 1310) as restated in the publication of 9 December 2006 (BGBl. I, 2833) § 114:

Art. 3:206, Notes 7

Penal Code [Strafgesetzbuch – CP ] of 15 May 1871 (RGBl. 127) as restated in the publication of 13 November 1998 (BGBl. I, 3322) § 25: § 32:

Art. 4:102, Notes 6 Art. 5:202, Notes I 6

1109

Annexes § 34: § 185: § 193: § 201: § 263: § 266:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:202, Notes III 24 3:102, Notes III 33 5:201, Notes 6 2:205, Notes 5 2:210, Notes 6; Art. 3:102, Notes III 33 3:102, Notes III 33

Product Liability Act [Produkthaftungsgesetz – PHG ] of 15 December 1989 (BGBl. I, 2198) as amended by the publication of 19 July 2002 (BGBl. I, 2674, 2679) generally: § 1: § 8: § 9: § 10: § 11: § 14:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:204, Notes I 1 3:204, Notes II (2) 24, IV 39 3:204, Notes III 31 6:203, Notes 7 3:204, Notes V 47; Art. 6:202, Notes 6 3:204, Notes II (1) 9; Art. 6:102, Notes 6 5:401, Notes 7

Restraints on Competition Act [Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – GWB ] as restated in the publication of 15 July 2005 (BGBl. I, 2114) and as amended by the publication of 18 December 2007 (BGBl. I, 2966) § 33:

Art. 2:208, Notes 6

Road Traffic Act [Straßenverkehrsgesetz – StVG ] of 3 Mai 1909 (RGBl. 437) as restated in the publication of 5 May 2003 (BGBl. I, 310) § 1: § 7: § 8: § 8a: § 11: § 12: § 13: § 17:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:205, Notes 8 3:205, Notes 8; Art. 5:302, Notes 7 3:205, Notes 8 5:401, Notes 7 3:205, Notes 8 6:202, Notes 6 6:203, Notes 7 5:302, Notes 7

Road Traffic Regulations Act [Straßenverkehrsordnung – StVO ] of 16 November 1970 (BGBl. I, 1565) as amended by the publication of 28 November 2007 (BGBl. I, 2774) generally: § 17:

Art. 3:102, Notes III 33 Art. 5:102, Notes III 33

Social Security Code, Book VII [Sozialgesetzbuch, Siebtes Buch – SGB VII ] of 7 August 1996 (BGBl. I, 1254) as amended by the publication of 23 July 2004 (BGBl. I, 1842) § 104: § 105: § 110: § 111:

1110

Art. Art. Art. Art.

7:104, 7:104, 7:104, 7:104,

Notes 7; Notes 7; Notes 7; Notes 7;

Art. Art. Art. Art.

7:105, Notes 7:105, Notes 7:105, Notes 7:105, Notes

2 2 2 2

Table of Codes and Statutes (Greece)

Social Security Code, Book X [Sozialgesetzbuch, Zehntes Buch – SGB X] of 18 August 1980 (BGBl. I, 1469) § 116:

Art. 2:201, Notes V 27; Art. 6:103, Notes 7

Telecommunications Services Act [Gesetz über die Nutzung von Telediensten. Teledienstgesetz – TDG ] as restated in the publication of 22 July 1997 (BGBl. I, 1870) § 5:

Art. 2:204, Notes IV 38

Water Resources Act [Wasserhaushaltsgesetz – WHG ] of 27 July 1957 (BGBl. I, 1110, 1386) as restated in the publication of 19 August 2002 (BGBl. I, 3245) § 22:

Art. 3:206, Notes 7; Art. 5:302, Notes 7

Greece Accident at Work Liability Act [ —æ Å ıŁ Å æ  Æ ÇÅøÅ ø  ÆıåÆ   Å æªÆÆ ÆŁ ø æªÆ ] no. 551/1915 ( ø ŒøØŒ ØŁÅŒ   .. Åæ 24.07./25/08.1920) generally:

Art. 3:207, Notes 8

Air Law Codex [ ˚ æøÅ  ı ˚ØŒÆ `æ æØŒ ˜ØŒÆ ı ] of 11 November 1988 no. 1815 (¯˚ A 250/11 November 1988) art. 106: art. 117:

Art. 3:207, Notes 8 Art. 3:207, Notes 8

Civil Code [ `ØŒ ˚ØŒÆæ – CC ] of 23 February 1946 (A. N. 2250/1940; ¯˚ A 91/1940, 597) generally: art. 1: art. 11: art. 57:

art. 58: art. 59: art. 60: art. 65: art. 67: art. 68: art. 69: art. 71: art. 74: art. 127: art. 281: art. 282: art. 283: art. 284: art. 285:

Art. 3:101, Notes 8 Art. 7:102, Notes 4 Art. 2:206, Notes II 22 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3; Art. 2:101, Notes V 45, VIII (2) 75; Art. 2:203, Notes II 10, III 26, IV 36; Art. 2:205, Notes 7; Art. 3:201, Notes II 22; Art. 3:206, Notes 9 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3; Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 67 Art. 2:101, Notes V 45; Art. 3:201, Notes II 22 Art. 1:102, Notes I 4 Art. 3:201, Notes II 22 Art. 3:201, Notes II 22 Art. 3:201, Notes II 22 Art. 3:201, Notes II 22 Art. 3:201, Notes II 22 Art. 3:201, Notes II 22 Art. 3:104, Notes I 10 Art. 3:102, Notes III 35; Art. 5:202, Notes I 8 Art. 1:101, Notes III 15; Art. 5:201, Notes 8 Art. 5:201, Notes 8 Art. 1:101, Notes III 15; Art. 5:202, Notes I 8 Art. 1:101, Notes III 15; Art. 5:202, Notes III 26

1111

Annexes art. 286: art. 288: art. 297: art. 299: art. 300: art. 330: art. 332: art. 335: art. 338: art. 380: art. 495: art. 575: art. 579: art. 602: art. 690: art. 693: art. 729: art. 736: art. 739: art. 811: art. 823: art. 904: art. 914:

art. 915: art. 917: art. 918: art. 919: art. 920: art. 922: art. 923: art. 924: art. 924: art. 925: art. 926: art. 927: art. 928: art. 929: art. 930: art. 931:

1112

Art. 1:101, Notes III 15; Art. 5:202, Notes III 26, Art. 6:202, Notes 8 Art. 6:103, Notes 9 Art. 2:201, Notes V 29, Art. 6:101, Notes I 9 Art. 2:101, Notes V 45 Art. 3:205, Notes 10, Art. 6:302, Notes 7 Art. 3:102, Notes I 9 Art. 5:401, Notes 9 Art. 3:104, Notes I 10 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 30 Art. 3:104, Notes I 10 Art. 2:206, Notes II 22 Art. 3:202, Notes 9 Art. 3:202, Notes 9 Art. 1:103, Notes I 8 Art. 2:101, Notes X (1) 103 Art. 1:103, Notes I 8 Art. 2:207, Notes 7, 8 Art. 6:302, Notes 7 Art. 1:103, Notes III 34 Art. 1:103, Notes I 8 Art. 1:103, Notes I 8 Art. 3:201, Notes II 22 Chap. 1, Introd. B 7; Art. 1:101, Notes III 9, III 14, 16, IV 18; Art. 1:103, Notes I 8, IV 40; Art. 2:101, Notes IX 90, X 103; Art. 2:201, Notes I 1, V 29; Art. 2:203, Notes I 2, IV 36; Art. 2:205, Notes 7; Art. 2:207, Notes 7; Art. 2:208, Notes 8; Art. 2:209, Notes II 9; Art. 2:210, Notes 8; Art. 3:102, Notes II 23; Art. 3:104, Notes I 10; Art. 3:205, Notes 10; Art. 3:206, Notes 9; Art. 4:101, Notes I 9; Art. 5:301, Notes 9 Art. 3:103, Notes I 8; Art. 5:301, Notes 9 Art. 3:103, Notes I 8 Art. 3:103, Notes II 20; Art. 5:301, Notes 9, Art. 6:202, Notes 8 Art. 1:101, Notes III 16, IV 20; Art. 2:101, Notes IX 90; Art. 2:210, Notes 8; Art. 2:211, Notes 9 Art. 2:204, Notes I 9, II 21 Art. 3:201, Notes I 8, Art. 7:104, Notes 9 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 39; Art. 3:104, Notes I 10, II 25 Art. 3:203, Notes 9 Art. 3:203, Notes 9 Art. 3:202, Notes 9 Art. 4:102, Notes 8; Art. 4:103, Notes 8, Art. 6:105, Notes 9 Art. 6:105, Notes 9, Art. 7:104, Notes 9 Art. 2:202, Notes IV 36, V 48, VI 62 Art. 2:201, Notes V 29, VI 43; Art. 2:202, Notes VI 62 Art. 6:103, Notes 9 Art. 2:201, Notes V 29, VII 57

Table of Codes and Statutes (Greece) art. 932:

art. 933: art. 985: art. 986: art. 989: art. 1003: art. 1008: art. 1079: art. 1096: art. 1180: art. 1253: art. 1389: art. 1390:

Art. 2:101, Notes V 45, VII 57; Art. 2:202, Notes II 13; Art. 2:203, Notes I 2; Art. 2:206, Notes III 35; Art. 3:104, Notes I 10; Art. 6:106, Notes 8 Art. 2:202, Notes III 23; Art. 6:106, Notes 8 Art. 5:201, Notes 8 Art. 5:201, Notes 8 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3 Art. 3:206, Notes 9 Art. 5:201, Notes 8 Art. 5:201, Notes 8 Art. 1:103, Notes III 34 Art. 2:206, Notes II 22 Art. 2:206, Notes II 22 Art. 2:202, Notes V 48 Art. 2:202, Notes V 48

Civil Press Liability Act [ —æ ÆØŒ ıŁ Å  ı  ı ŒÆØ ººø ØÆø ,  ø æ ØŁÅŒ Æ    1941/1991] of 16 July 1981 no. 1178 (¯˚ ` 187/16 July 1981) generally: art. 1:

Art. 5:203, Notes 9 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 36

Code of Civil Procedure [ ˚ØŒÆ — ºØØŒ ˜ØŒ

Æ 1967/1971 tis 25 Oktobriou/ 1 Noembriou 1971,  ø Øå Ø ŒÆØ ƪºøÅŒ Å ˜Å ØŒ   æ æØŒ ØƪÆ 503/1985 – CCP ] of 25 October 1971 no. 1967 art. 338:

Art. 4:101, Notes III 34

Consumer Protection Act [ —æ ÆÆ ø ˚ÆÆ Æºø – ConsProtA] of 16 November 1994 no. 2251 (¯˚ A 191 16 November 1994, 1116);  ø ºıÆÆ æ ØŁÅŒ    3587/2007 generally: art. 6: art. 8: art. 10:

Art. 3:204, Notes I 1, V 45; Art. 7:103, Notes 10 Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 11, II (2) 26, IV 41 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 38; Art. 2:207, Notes 7 Art. 2:101, Notes VI 54

Data Protection Act [ —æ ÆÆ  ı Æ ı Æ  Å  æªÆÆ   ø

æ ø ØŒ åÆæÆŒæÆ, Æ Ø åØŒ æ ØØ Æ   ı  ıæ ] no. 2472/1997 (¯˚ ` 50/10 April 1997); amended among others by Acts nos. 2263/1988, 2703/1999, 2721/1999, 2819/2000 and 2915/2001 art. 23:

Art. 6:203, Notes 9

Environmental Protection Act [ ˆØÆ Å æ ÆÆ  ı æغº  æ ] of 16 October 1986 no. 1650 (¯˚ ` 160/16 October 1986) art. 2: art. 29:

Art. 3:206, Notes 9 Art. 3:206, Notes 9; Art. 2:209, Notes II 9

1113

Annexes

Liability for Damage Caused by Objects from Space Act [  ÆÅ ªØÆ Å ØŁ  ıŁ Å Æ  ÇÅØ ı æ ŒÆº ÆØ Æ  Æ ØŒ Æ ı Œ  ÆØ  ØÅÆ ] Decree Law ˝  ŁØŒ ØƪÆ no. 563/1977 (¯˚ ` 75) generally:

Art. 3:207, Notes 7

Maritime Pollution by Oil Act [ ˜ØŁ   ÆÅ æ ÆØŒ ıŁ Å ı  Æ ÇÅØ Œ æı  ø ı  æºÆ ı ŒÆØ æıŁø ı Æç Łø ] no. 314/1976 (¯˚ ` 106) generally:

Art. 3:206, Notes 9; Art. 3:207, Notes 8

Mass Media Act [Legal Status of Commercial Television and Braodcasting Act] [ ˝ ØŒ ˚ÆŁ Å ØøØŒ źæÆÅ ŒÆØ Å  ØŒ ÆØ çø Æ, ŁØÅ ¨ø Å ÆØ ź ØŒ `ª æ ŒÆØ ºº ØÆØæ ] of 3 August 1995 no. 2328 (¯˚ ` 159/3 August 1995) art. 4:

Art. 2:203, Notes IV 36; Art. 5:203, Notes 9

Nuclear Energy Liability Act [  ÆØ æ `ØŒ ¯ıŁ Å Ø 

 Æ Å —ıæÅ ØŒ ¯ æªÆæ ] ˝  ŁØŒ ˜ØƪÆ 336/1969 (¯˚ ` 269); amended among others by Act no. 1758/1988 generally:

Art. 3:206, Notes 9

Penal Code [ —æ Œıæø  ı — Ø ØŒ ˚ØŒ æ – CP ] no. 1492/1950 (¯˚ ` 182/17. 8.1950) art. 25: art. 367: art. 370: art. 371:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:202, Notes III 26 5:201, Notes 8 2:205, Notes 7 2:205, Notes 7

Presidential Regulation on the Implementation of the Directive 2000/31/ EC [ —æ Ææ ª Å ŪÆ 31/2000 åØŒ  æØ  ıå ø ı ÅæØ Å Œ Ø ø Æ Å ºÅæ ç æÆ, Øø  ı źŒæ ØŒ  æ ı ] of 16 May 2003, —æ æØŒ ØƪÆ no. 131/2003 (¯˚ ` 116/16 May 2003) art. 11: art. 12:

Art. 2:204, Notes IV 41 Art. 2:204, Notes IV 41

Press Liability Act [ ¯ªŒºÆÆ º  Æ ØÆ  ı  ı ] no. 2243/1995 (¯˚ ` 162/03 August 1995) generally:

Art. 5:203, Notes 9

Road Traffic (Accidents) Liability Act [ ˆ ˝ /1911 æ Å Œ ø

Æı ŒØ ø Ø ØŒ ŒÆØ ÆØŒ ıŁ Åæ ] of 4/5 December 1911 art. 2: art. 4: art. 5: art. 9: art. 10: art. 50:

1114

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:205, Notes 3:205, Notes 3:205, Notes 3:205, Notes 3:205, Notes 3:205, Notes

10 10 10; Art. 5:302, Notes 9 10 10 10

Table of Codes and Statutes (Hungary)

Unfair Competition Act [ —æ ÆŁ ı Æ ƪø Ø ] of 27 January 1914 no. 146 (¯˚ ´ 16. 12. 1913/27. 01. 1914) generally:

Art. 2:208, Notes 8

Hungary Capital Market Act [2001. évi CXX. törvény a to˝kepiacról] of 2001 § 29:

Art. 2:207, Notes 4

Civil Code [1959. évi IV. törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvro˝l – CC ] of 1959 § 2: § 4: § 5: § 6: § 12: § 29: § 75: § 76: § 77: § 78: § 79: § 80: § 80: § 81: § 83: § 84: § 85: § 98: § 99: § 100: § 107: § 112: § 115: § 118: § 139: § 141: § 159: § 161: § 163: § 190: § 193: § 210:

Art. 2:101, Notes XI 125; Art. 5:201, Notes 4; Art. 5:203, Notes 5 Art. 3:102, Notes I 6 Art. 5:201, Notes 4; Art. 5:203, Notes 5 Art. 2:207, Notes 4; Art. 2:210, Notes 4; Art. 3:101, Notes 5 Art. 3:103, Notes I 5 Art. 3:201, Notes II 19 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (4) 82; Art. 2:203, Notes II 9; Art. 5:101, Notes I 4; Art. 5:203, Notes 5 Art. 2:201, Notes I 1, II 3; Art. 2:203, Notes I 2, II 9, IV 34; Art. 2:204, Notes II 18; Art. 5:203, Notes 5 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 67 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 34; Art. 2:204, Notes I 4; Art. 5:203, Notes 5 Art. 2:204, Notes I 4 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII 68, 69; Art. 5:203, Notes 5 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 68, 69; Art. 2:204, Notes III 29; Art. 5:203, Notes 5 Art. 2:205, Notes 4; Art. 5:203, Notes 5 Art. 2:204, Notes I 4; Art. 5:203, Notes 5 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 67, 68, 69, (2) 75, (4) 82; Art. 2:203, Notes I 2, II 9; Art. 6:301, Notes 4 Art. 2:101, Notes, VIII (2) 75; Art. 5:203, Notes 5 Art. 2:206, Notes I 4 Art. 2:206, Notes I 4; Art. 6:104, Notes 5 Art. 2:206, Notes I 4; Art. 5:201, Notes 4 Art. 1:101, Notes III 15; Art. 5:202, Notes I 4; Art. 5:202, Notes III 22 Art. 2:206, Notes I 4; Art. 3:208, Notes 4 Art. 2:206, Notes I 4; Art. 6:301, Notes 4 Art. 1:103, Notes III 31 Art. 6:104, Notes 5 Art. 6:104, Notes 5 Art. 6:104, Notes 5 Art. 6:301, Notes 4 Art. 2:206, Notes II 19; Art. 6:104, Notes 5 Art. 6:301, Notes 4 Art. 2:206, Notes I 4 Art. 2:207, Notes 4; Art. 2:210, Notes 4

1115

Annexes § 219: § 220: § 221: § 260: § 280: § 310: § 314: § 318: § 328: § 329: § 330: § 331: § 339:

§ 340: § 341: § 342: § 343: § 344: § 345:

§ 346: § 347: § 348: § 349: § 350: § 351: § 352: § 353: § 354: § 355: § 356: § 357: § 358: § 360:

1116

Art. 3:201, Notes II 19 Art. 3:201, Notes II 19 Art. 2:206, Notes I 4 Art. 6:104, Notes 5 Art. 6:203, Notes 5 Art. 1:103, Notes II 23 Art. 5:401, Notes 5 Art. 1:103, Notes I 5; Art. 6:202, Notes 4 Art. 6:106, Notes 4 Art. 6:106, Notes 4 Art. 6:106, Notes 4 Art. 6:106, Notes 4 Chap. 1, Introd. B 11; Art. 1:101, Notes II 3, III 9, IV 18, VI 33; Art. 1:103, Notes IV 40; Art. 2:207, Notes 4; Art. 2:210, Notes 4; Art. 2:211, Notes 5; Chap. 3, Introd. B 6; Art. 3:101, Notes 5; Art. 3:102, Notes I 6; Art. 3:201, Notes I 5; Art. 3:203, Notes 5; Art. 4:101, Notes I 5; Art. 5:102, Notes I 4; Art. 5:202, Notes I 4, II 15; Art. 5:302, Notes 5; Art. 6:202, Notes 4; Art. 7:103, Notes 6 Art. 5:102, Notes I 4; Art. 6:202, Notes 4; Art. 6:302, Notes 4 Art. 1:102, Notes I 2; Art. 6:301, Notes 4 Art. 1:101, Notes III 15; Chap. 3, Introd. B 6; Art. 3:101, Notes 5; Art. 5:101, Notes I 4, II 19; Art. 5:401, Notes 5 Art. 1:101, Notes III 15; Art. 5:202, Notes I 3 Art. 2:211, Notes 5; Art. 3:203, Notes 5; Art. 4:102, Notes 5; Art. 6:105, Notes 5 Art. 1:101, Notes V 28; Art. 2:209, Notes II 6; Chap. 3, Introd. C 11; Art. 3:201, Notes I 5; Art. 3:203, Notes 5; Art. 3:205, Notes 5; Art. 3:206, Notes 5; Art. 3:207, Notes 4; Art. 4:101, Notes I 5; Art. 5:102, Notes I 4; Art. 5:302, Notes 5 Art. 2:209, Notes II 6; Chap. 3, Introd. C 11; Art. 3:203, Notes 5; Art. 3:205, Notes 5; Art. 5:102, Notes IV 44; Art. 5:302, Notes 5 Art. 3:103, Notes I 5, II 19; Art. 3:104, Notes I 6; Art. 4:101, Notes I 5; Art. 5:301, Notes 5 Art. 3:201, Notes I 5, II 19; Art. 3:203, Notes 5; Art. 7:104, Notes 6 Art. 3:201, Notes I 5, II 19; Art. 7:103, Notes 6 Art. 3:201, Notes I 5, II 19; Art. 3:203, Notes 5; Art. 7:104, Notes 6 Art. 3:203, Notes 5 Art. 3:202, Notes 5; Art. 5:302, Notes 5 Art. 3:202, Notes 5 Art. 2:101, Notes V 41 Art. 2:101, Notes III 25, V 41; Art. 2:206, Notes III 32; Art. 2:210, Notes 4; Art. 6:101, Notes I 5; Art. 6:203, Notes 5; Art. 6:302, Notes 4 Art. 2:201, Notes V 25; Art. 6:203, Notes 5 Art. 2:201, Notes V 25; Art. 6:203, Notes 5 Art. 2:202, Notes V 45; Art. 6:203, Notes 5 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 19; Chap. 3, Introd. B 6; Art. 3:101, Notes 5; Art. 6:106, Notes 4

Table of Codes and Statutes (Hungary) § 361: § 368: § 424: § 430: § 485: § 556: § 559: § 581: § 685: § 686:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

6:101, Notes II 18 6:104, Notes 5 6:104, Notes 5 2:206, Notes II 19; Art. 6:104, Notes 5 5:202, Notes II 15 3:101, Notes 5 3:101, Notes 5 3:101, Notes 5 7:102, Notes 3 3:202, Notes 5

Code of Civil Procedure [1952. évi III. törvény a polgári perrendtartásról – CCP ] of 1952 art. 156:

Art. 6:301, Notes 4

Commercial Companies Act [2006. évi IV. törvény a gazdasági társaságokról] of 2006 § 16: § 30: § 50:

Art. 3:201, Notes II 19 Art. 3:201, Notes II 19 Art. 3:201, Notes II 19

Competition Act [1996. évi LVII. törvény a tisztességtelen piaci magatartás és a versenykorlátozás tilalmáról – Tpvt ] of 1996 § 2: § 3: § 5: § 6: § 7: § 11: § 21: § 86:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:208, Notes 5 2:208, Notes 5 2:208, Notes 5; Art. 2:211, Notes 5 2:208, Notes 5 2:208, Notes 5 2:208, Notes 5 2:208, Notes 5 6:301, Notes 4

Constitution [1949. évi XX. törvény A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya – Const.] of 1949 § 47: § 54: § 55: § 59: § 60: § 61:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:101, Notes X (3) 120 5:203, Notes 5 2:203, Notes I 2 5:203, Notes 5 5:203, Notes 5 5:203, Notes 5

Copyright Act [1999. évi LXXVI. törvény a szerzo˝i OJgról] of 1999 § 94:

Art. 6:101, Notes II 18; Art. 6:301, Notes 4

Electronic Commercial Services Act [2001. évi CVIII. törvény az elektronikus kereskedelmi szolgáltatások, valamint az információs társadalommal összefüggo˝ szolgáltatások egyes kérdéseiro˝l] of 2001 generally:

Art. 2:204, Notes IV 38

1117

Annexes

Environmental Protection Act [1995. évi LIII. törvény a környezet védelmének általános szabályairól] of 1995 § 4: § 101: § 102: § 103: § 104: § 109:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:209, Notes 2:209, Notes 3:208, Notes 2:209, Notes 3:208, Notes 2:209, Notes

II 6 II 6

4 II 6

4 II 6

Hunting Act [1996. évi LV. törvény a vad védelméro˝l, a vadgazdálkodásról, valamint a vadászatról] of 1996 generally: § 75

Art. 3:207, Notes 4 Art. 3:203, Notes 5

Labour Code [1992. évi XXII. törvény a Munka Törvénykönyvéro˝l] of 1992 § 166: § 167: § 168: § 169: § 174: § 175: § 192 /A: § 193/C:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:201, 3:201, 3:201, 7:104, 7:104, 7:104, 7:104, 3:201,

Notes I 5; Art. 7:104, Notes 6 Notes I 5; Art. 7:104, Notes 6 Notes I 5; Art. 7:104, Notes 6 Notes 6 Notes 6 Notes 6 Notes 6 Notes I 5

Mining Act [1993. évi XLVIII. törvény a bányászatról] of 1993 generally:

Art. 3:206, Notes 5

Modification Act on Environmental Liability Issues [2007. évi XXIX. törvény egyes környezetvédelmi tárgyú törvények környezeti felelo˝sséggel összefüggo˝ módosításáról] of 2007 (MK 2007/52. sz., 3316) generally:

Art. 2:209, Notes I 1

Nature Preservation Act [1996. évi LIII. törvény a természet védelméro˝l] of 1996 § 3: § 60: § 81:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 6 Art. 2:209, Notes II 6 Art. 2:209, Notes II 6

Nuclear Energy Act [1996. évi CXVI. törvény az atomenergiáról] of 1996 generally:

Art. 3:206, Notes 5; Art. 3:207, Notes 4

Patents Act [1995. évi XXXIII. törvény a találmányok szabadalmi oltalmáról] of 1995 § 35:

Art. 6:101, Notes II 18; Art. 6:301, Notes 4

Penal Code [1978. évi IV. törvény a Bünteto˝ Törvénykönyvro˝l – CP ] of 1978 § 177: § 177/A: § 178:

1118

Art. 2:205, Notes 4 Art. 2:205, Notes 4 Art. 2:205, Notes 4

Table of Codes and Statutes (Ireland) § 178 /A: § 318:

Art. 2:205, Notes 4 Art. 2:210, Notes 4

Print Media Act [1986. évi II. törvény a sajtóról] of 1986 § 3: § 4:

Art. 5:203, Notes 5 Art. 5:203, Notes 5

Product Liability Act [1993. évi X. törvény a termékfelelo˝sségro˝l] of 1993 generally: § 1: § 7: § 12: § 13:

Art. 3:204, Notes I 1 Art. 1:101, Notes II 22; Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 8, II (2) 23, III 31 Art. 3:204, Notes IV 38 Art. 1:101, Notes II 22 Art. 3:204, Notes V 45

Public Education Act [1993. évi LXXIX. törvény a közoktatásról] of 1993 § 77:

Art. 3:104, Notes II 22; Art. 3:207, Notes 4

Strike Act [1989. évi VII. törvény a sztrájkról] of 1989 art. 1: art. 6:

Art. 7:104, Notes 6 Art. 7:104, Notes 6

Trademark Act [1997. évi XI. törvény a védjegyek és a földrajzi árujelzo˝k oltalmáról] of 1997 § 27:

Art. 6:101, Notes II 18; Art. 6:301, Notes 4

Ireland See also the United Kingdom table below for legislation between 1801 and 1922 and pre-Union statutes which were extended to Ireland. Civil Liability Act 1961 (no. 41 of 1961) s. 6: s. 7: s. 34: s. 49: s. 50: Part. IV:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:202, Notes III 28 2:201, Notes VII 63; Art. 2:202, Notes III 28, IV 40 2:201, Notes V 35; Art. 5:102, Notes I 15, II 27 2:202, Notes IV 40, V 54 2:202, Notes V 54 2:202, Notes V 54

Civil Liability Amendment Act 1964 (no. 17 of 1964) s. 2:

Art. 6:103, Notes 15

Constitution of Ireland [Bunreacht na hÉireann – Const.] of 29 December 1937 (as amended by 27th amendment of the Constitution Act 2004 [Irish citizenship of children of non-national parents] of 24 June 2004) art. 40:

Art. 2:203, Notes II 18, III 29, IV 41

1119

Annexes

Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (no. 28 of 2000) s. 128: s. 131: s. 133: chap. 9:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:206, Notes 2:206, Notes 2:206, Notes 2:206, Notes

I 14 I 14 I 14 I 14

Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 (no. 39 of 1961) s. 8:

Art. 1:102, Notes I 10

Defamation Act 1961 (no. 40 of 1961) s. 16: s. 19: s. 20: s. 24:

Art. 2:203, Notes IV 41 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 41 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 23; Art. 2:204, Notes I 13 Art. 2:204, Notes III 36

Defamation Bill 2006 [Seanad] [An Bille um Chlúmhilleadh 2006] (no. 43 of 2006) s. 5: s. 11: s. 18: s. 19: s. 23: s. 24: s. 25: s. 28: s. 37:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:203, Notes 2:203, Notes 2:204, Notes 2:204, Notes 2:203, Notes 2:203, Notes 2:203, Notes 2:203, Notes 2:203, Notes

IV 41 IV 41 II 26 II 26 IV 41 IV 41; Art. 2:204, Notes II 26 IV 41 IV 41 IV 41

European Communities (Directive 2000/31/ EC) Regulations 2003 of 24 February 2003 (SI no. 68 of 2003) s. 16:

Art. 2:204, Notes IV 45

Health Act 1970 (no. 1 of 1970) generally:

Art. 2:201, Notes V 35

Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal Act 1997 (no. 34 of 1997) generally: s. 4:

Art. 7:105, Notes 4 Art. 7:105, Notes 4

Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal (Amendment) Act 2002 (no. 21 of 2002) s. 4: s. 5: s. 10: s. 11:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

7:105, 7:105, 7:105, 7:105,

Notes 4 Notes 4 Notes 4 Notes 4

Hotel Proprietors Act 1963 (no. 7/1963) of 14 March 1963 s. 4:

1120

Art. 3:202, Notes 15; Art. 3:203, Notes 15

Table of Codes and Statutes (Ireland)

Industrial and Commercial Property (Protection) Act 1927 (no. 16 of 1927) generally:

Art. 2:206, Notes I 14

Industrial Relations Act 1990 (no. 19 of 1990) s. 11: s. 12: s. 13:

Art. 7:104, Notes 13 Art. 7:104, Notes 13 Art. 1:103, Notes IV 41; Art. 7:104, Notes 13

Liability for Defective Products Act 1991 (no. 28 of 1991) generally: s. 1: s. 3: s. 6:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes

I 1, V 45 II (2) 28, III 31 II (1) 17 IV 44

Occupiers’ Liability Act 1995 (no. 10 of 1995) generally: s. 1: s. 2: s. 3: s. 4:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:203, Notes 15 3:202, Comments C 18, Notes 15; Art. 3:203, Notes 15 3:202, Notes 15 3:202, Notes 15 3:202, Notes 15

Privacy Bill 2006 [Seanad] [An Bille um Príobháideacht 2006] (no. 44 of 2006) generally:

Art. 2:203, Notes IV 41

Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 1989 (no. 7 of 1989) s. 12:

Art. 2:201, Notes III 16

Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1993 (no. 27 of 1993) generally: s. 75: s. 237:

Art. 7:105, Notes 4 Art. 6:103, Notes 15 Art. 6:103, Notes 15

Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Ireland) 1877 (40 & 41 Vict. c. 57) s. 28:

Art. 1:102, Notes I 10

Trade Marks Act 1996 (no. 6 of 1996) generally:

Art. 2:206, Notes I 14

Workman’s Compensation Act 1934 (no. 9 of 1934) generally: 60:

Art. 2:202, Notes III 28 Art. 7:105, Notes 4

1121

Annexes

Italy Accidents at Work and Occupational Diseases Insurance Act [Disposizioni in materia di assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro e le malattie professionali, a norma dell’articolo 55, comma 1, della legge 17 maggio 1999, n. 144] of 23 February 2000, no. 38 (Gazz. Uff. 1 March 2000, no. 50) art. 13:

Art. 7:104, Notes 5

Act on Taking Blood Samples and specific Somatic Cells and the Production of Blood Components [Disciplina per le attività trasfusionali relative al sangue umano ed ai suoi componenti e per la produzione di plasmaderivati] of 4 May 1990 no. 107 (Gazz. Uff. 11 May 1990 no. 108) generally:

Art. 5:101, Notes I 3

Bone Marrow Donor Registry Act [Riconoscimento del Registro nazionale italiano die donatori di midollo osseo] of 6 March 2001 no. 52 (Gazz. Uff. 15 March 2001 no. 62) generally:

Art. 5:101, Notes I 3

Civil Code [Codice Civile – CC ] of 1865; now replaced by Civil Code of 4 April 1942 (Gazz. Uff. no. 79 and 79bis; edizione straordinaria) art. 2: art. 5: art. 6: art. 7: art. 8: art. 9: art. 10: art. 38: art. 41: art. 433: art. 827: art. 843: art. 844: art. 888: art. 923: art. 924: art. 925: art. 948: art. 949: art. 1070: art. 1079: art. 1168: art. 1170: art. 1172: art. 1218:

1122

Art. 5:101, Notes I 3 Art. 5:101, Notes I 3 Art. 2:203, Notes II 8 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3; Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 67; Art. 6:301, Notes 3 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3; Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 68; Art. 2:203, Notes III 23; Art. 6:301, Notes 3 Art. 3:201, Notes II 18 Art. 3:201, Notes II 18 Art. 2:202, Notes V 44 Art. 3:208, Notes 3 Art. 5:201, Notes 3 Art. 3:102, Notes III 31; Art. 6:301, Notes 1 Art. 3:208, Notes 3 Art. 3:208, Notes 3 Art. 5:201, Notes 3; Art. 6:102, Notes 3 Art. 5:201, Notes 3 Art. 1:103, Notes III 30; Art. 2:206, Notes I 3 Art. 1:103, Notes III 30; Art. 2:206, Notes I 3; Art. 6:301, Notes 3 Art. 3:208, Notes 3 Art. 6:301, Notes 3 Art. 2:206, Notes II 18 Art. 2:206, Notes II 18; Art. 6:301, Notes 3 Art. 6:301, Notes 3 Art. 5:302, Notes 4

Table of Codes and Statutes (Italy) art. 1223: art. 1225: art. 1226: art. 1227:

art. 1229: art. 1260: art. 1469: art. 1474: art. 1494: art. 1668: art. 1669: art. 1681: art. 2042: art. 2043:

art. 2044: art. 2045: art. 2046: art. 2047: art. 2048: art. 2049: art. 2050: art. 2051:

art. 2052: art. 2053: art. 2054: art. 2055: art. 2056:

art. 2057: art. 2058:

Art. 2:101, Notes III 24 Art. 4:101, Notes II 19 Art. 2:101, Notes III 24; Art. 6:202, Notes 3; Art. 6:203, Notes 4 Art. 2:101, Notes III 24; Art. 5:102, Notes II 18; Art. 5:102, Notes I 3, II 18, III 30, IV 43; Art. 5:202, Notes I 3; Art. 5:501, Notes 2; Art. 6:202, Notes 3; Art. 6:302, Notes 3 Art. 5:401, Notes 4 Art. 6:106, Notes 3 Art. 6:301, Notes 3 Art. 1:103, Notes I 4 Art. 1:103, Notes II 21 Art. 1:103, Notes II 21 Art. 1:103, Notes II 21; Art. 3:202, Notes 4 Art. 3:205, Notes 4 Art. 6:101, Notes II 17 Chap. 1, Introd. B 7, B 13; Art. 1:101, Notes II 4, III 10, IV 18; Art. 1:103, Notes I 4, II 21, IV 40; Art. 2:101, Notes I 1, II 18, V 40, VII 60, IX 87, XI 125, XII 129; Art. 2:203, Notes III 23; Art. 2:204, Notes IV 38; Art. 2:204, Notes 3; Art. 2:206, Notes I 3; Art. 2:208, Notes 4; Art. 2:209, Notes II 5; Art. 2:210, Notes 3; Art. 2:211, Notes 4; Art. 3:101, Notes 4; Art. 3:102, Notes II 19; Art. 3:103, Notes I 4; Art. 3:201, Notes II 18; Art. 3:203, Notes 4; Art. 3:204, Notes II (2) 22; Art. 3:206, Notes 4 Art. 5:202, Notes I 3 Art. 5:202, Notes I 3; Art. 5:202, Notes III 21 Art. 3:103, Notes I 4; Art. 5:301, Notes 4 Art. 3:103, Notes I 4, II 18; Art. 5:301, Notes 4 Art. 1:101, Notes III 10, VI 39; Art. 3:103, Notes I 4; Art. 3:104, Notes I 5, II 20, 21 Art. 1:101, Notes III 10; Art. 3:201, Notes I 4; Art. 3:204, Notes II (2) 22 Chap. 3, Introd. C 10; Art. 3:204, Notes II (2) 22; Art. 3:206, Notes 4; Art. 3:207, Notes 3 Art. 1:101, Notes V 28; Art. 2:101, Notes V 40; Chap. 3, Introd. C 10; Art. 3:202, Notes 4; Art. 3:207, Notes 3; Art. 5:102, Notes I 3; Art. 5:302, Notes 4 Art. 2:101, Notes V 40; Art. 3:203, Notes 4 Art. 3:202, Notes 4 Art. 2:101, Notes V 40; Art. 3:204, Notes II (2) 22; Art. 3:205, Notes 4; Art. 5:102, Notes III 30; Art. 5:102, Notes IV 43 Art. 3:201, Notes I 4; Art. 4:102, Notes 4; Art. 6:105, Notes 4 Art. 2:101, Notes III 24; Art. 4:101, Notes II 19; Art. 5:102, Notes I 3; Art. 5:102, Notes II 18; Art. 5:501, Notes 2; Art. 6:202, Notes 3; Art. 6:203, Notes 4; Art. 6:302, Notes 3 Art. 4:101, Notes II 19; Art. 6:101, Notes I 4; Art. 6:203, Notes 4 Art. 6:101, Notes I 4

1123

Annexes art. 2059:

art. 2105: art. 2267: art. 2392: art. 2598: art. 2599: art. 2600: art. 2601: art. 2697: art. 2742: art. 2743: art. 2858: art. 2901:

Art. 2:101, Notes V 40; Art. 2:201, Notes VI 39, VII 52; Art. 2:202, Notes II 8; Art. 2:203, Notes I 1, II 8; Art. 2:206, Notes III 31; Art. 6:102, Notes 3 Art. 2:205, Notes 3 Art. 3:201, Notes II 18 Art. 3:201, Notes II 18 Art. 2:208, Notes 4; Art. 2:209, Notes 4 Art. 1:102, Notes I 4; Art. 2:208, Notes 4 Art. 2:208, Notes 4 Art. 2:208, Notes 4 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 30, 36 Art. 6:104, Notes 4 Art. 6:104, Notes 4 Art. 3:208, Notes 3 Art. 2:211, Notes 4

Code of Civil Procedure [Codice di Procedura Civile – CCP ] of 21 April 1942, RD 28 October 1940, no. 1443 (Gazz. Uff. 28 October 1940 no. 253); amended among others by DL 25 June 2008, no. 112 (Gazz. Uff. 25 June 2008 no. 147) art. 96:

Art. 2:210, Notes 3

Code of Industrial PropertyRights [Codice della proprietà industriale], DL of 10 February 2005 no. 30 (Suppl.ord. no. 28 alla Gazz. Uff. of 4 March 2005 no. 52) art. 124: art. 125:

Art. 6:301, Notes 3 Art. 6:101, Notes II 17

Compensation for Damages Caused by Judicial Errors Act [Risarcimento dei danni cagionati nell’esercizio delle funzioni giudiziarie e Responsabilità civile dei Magistrate] of 13 April 1988 no. 117 (Gazz. Uff. 15 April 1988 no. 88) art. 2: art. 7: art. 13:

Art. 2:101, Notes V 40; 7:103, Notes 5 Art. 7:103, Notes 5 Art. 7:103, Notes 5

Consolidating Act on Insurance against Accidents at Work and Occupational Deseases [Testo unico delle disposizioni per l’assicurazione obbligatoria contro gli infortuni sul lavoro e le malattie professionali] of 30 June 1965 (Gazz. Uff. 13 October 1965 no. 257 – Supp.ord.) art. 10: art. 11:

Art. 7:104, Notes 5 Art. 7:104, Notes 5

Consolidating Act on Compulsory Purchase for Public Purposes [Testo unico delle disposizioni legislative e regolamentari in materia di espropriazione per pubblica utilità] of 8 June 2001 no. 327 (Suppl.ord. no. 211 alla Gazz. Uff. of 16 August 2001 no. 189) art. 43:

1124

Art. 2:206, Notes I 3

Table of Codes and Statutes (Italy)

Consolidating Act on Immigration and Condition of Foreign Nationals [Testo unico delle disposizioni concernenti la disciplina dell’immigrazione e norme sulla condizione dello straniero] of 25 July 1998 no. 286 (Suppl. ord. no. 139 alla Gazz. Uff. of 18 August 1998, no. 191) art. 44:

Art. 2:101, Notes V 40

Constitution [La Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana – Const.] of 1 January 1948 art. 2: art. 3: art. 9: art. 16: art. 21: art. 24: art. 28: art. 32: art. 41: art. 42:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:203, Notes III 23; Art. 2:209, Notes II 5; Art. 5:202, Notes III 21 2:209, Notes II 5 2:209, Notes II 5 2:203, Notes I 4 5:203, Notes 4 2:101, Notes XI 125 7:103, Notes 5 2:101, Notes II 18, V 40 2:209, Notes II 5 2:209, Notes II 5

ConsumerCode [Codice del consumo – ConsC] of 6 September 2005 no. 206 based upon art. 7 of the Parliamentary Act no. 229 of 29 July 2003 (Suppl.ord. no. 162 alla Gazz. Uff. 8 October 2005 no. 235) art. 114: art. 118: art. 123: art. 127:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes

I1 IV 37 II (1) 7, (2) 22 II (2) 22

Copyright Act [Protezione del diritto d’autore e di altri diritti connessi al suo esercizio – LA ] of 22 April 1941 no. 633 (Gazz. Uff. 16 July 1941, no. 166) art. 21: art. 93:

Art. 2:203, Notes III 23 Art. 2:203, Notes III 23

Corneal Samples and Transplantation Act [Norme in materia di prelievi ed innesti di cornea] of 12 August 1993 no. 301 (Gazz. Uff. 17 August 1993 no. 192) generally:

Art. 5:101, Notes I 3

Dispositions in Matter of Opening and Regulation of the Markets [Disposizioni in materia di apertura e regolazione dei mercati] of 5 March 2001 no. 57 (Gazz. Uff. 20 March 2001, no. 66) art. 5:

Art. 6:204, Notes 3

Establishment of a Ministry for the Environment and Regulations on Environmental Damage Act [Istituzione del Ministero dell’ambiente e norme in materia di danno ambientale] of 8 July 1986 no. 349 art. 18:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 5; Art. 3:206, Notes 4

General Products Safety Act [Attuazione della direttiva n. 2001/95/ CE relativa alla sicurezza generale dei prodotti] DL of 21 March 2004 no. 172 (Gazz. Uff. of 16 July 2004 no. 165, p. 8) generally:

Art. 3:204, Notes V 45

1125

Annexes

Implementation of European Directives Act 2001 [Disposizioni per l’adempimento di obblighi derivanti dall’appartenenza dell’Italia alle Comunita’ europee, Legge comunitaria 2001] of 1 March 2002 no. 39 generally:

Art. 2:204, Notes IV 38

Kidney Transplantation between Living Individuals Act [Trapianto del rene tra persone viventi] of 26 June 1967 no. 458 (Gazz. Uff. of 27 June 1967 no. 160, edizione straordinaria) generally:

Art. 5:101, Notes I 3

Partial Transplantation of the Liver Act [Norme per consentire il trapianto parziale di fegato] of 16 December 1999 no. 483 (Gazz. Uff. of 20 December 1999 no. 297) generally:

Art. 5:101, Notes I 3

Pacific Employment of Nuclear Energy Act [Impiego pacifico dell’energia nucleare] of 31 December 1962, no. 1860 (Gazz. Uff. of 30 January 1963 no. 27); modified and integrated among others by Presidents Decree [Presidente della Repubblica] of 30 December 1965, no. 1704 (Gazz. Uff. of 9 May 1966 no. 112) generally:

Art. 3:206, Notes 4

Penal Code [Codice Penale – CP ] RD of 19 October 1930 no. 1398 (Gazz. Uff of 28 September 1930 no. 253 Suppl.) as amended among others by RD of 13 February 2006, no. 59 (Gazz. Uff. of 2 March 2006 no. 51) and DL 23 May 2008, no. 92 (Gazz. Uff. of 26 May 2008, no. 122) art. 40: art. 41: art. 43: art. 50: art. 51: art. 52: art. 54: art. 113: art. 185: art. 579: art. 594: art. 622:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:102, Notes II 19; Art. 4:101, Notes I 4, II 19 4:101, Notes I 4, II 19 3:101, Notes 4; Art. 3:102, Notes I 5, III 5 5:101, Notes I 3 5:201, Notes 3 5:202, Notes I 3 5:202, Notes III 21 4:102, Notes 4 2:101, Notes V 40; Art. 2:202, Notes II 8 5:101, Notes I 3 2:203, Notes IV 33 2:205, Notes 3

Personal Data Protection Code [Codice in materia di protezione dei dati personali] Decreto legislativo 30 June 2003, no. 196 (Suppl. ord. no. 123 alla Gazz. Uff. of 29 July 2003 no. 174) generally: art. 15:

Art. 5:101, Notes I 3 Art. 2:101, Notes V 40

Preliminary Provisions to the Civil Code [Disposizioni sulla legge in generale/disposizioni preliminari al codice civile – disp. prel.] RD of 16 March 1942 no. 262 (???) art. 1: art. 2:

1126

Art. 7:102, Notes 2 Art. 7:102, Notes 2

Table of Codes and Statutes (Latvia)

Private Assurance Code [Codice delle Assicurazioni private] DL of 7 September 2005, no. 209 (Suppl. ord. no. 163 alla Gazz. Uff. of 13 October 2005, no. 239) art. 137: art. 138: art. 139: art. 140:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

6:203, 6:204, 6:204, 6:202,

Notes 4 Notes 3 Notes 3 Notes 3

Protection of Public Safety from Aggression of Dogs Act [Tutela dell’incolumità pubblica dall’aggressione di cani] of 12 December 2006 (Gazz. Uff. 31 January 2007) genrally:

Art. 3:203, Notes 4

Protection of Competition and the Market Act [Norme per la tutela della concorrenza e del mercato] of 10 October 1990 no. 287 (Gazz. Uff. 13 October 1990 no. 240) generally:

Art. 2:208, Notes 4

Rules for the Environment [Norme in materia ambientale] of 3 April 2006 no. 152 (Suppl.ord. no. 96 alla Gazz. Uff. 14 April 2006 no. 88) art. 300: art. 306: art. 318:

Art. 2:209, Notes I 1 Art. 2:209, Notes I 1 Art. 2:209, Notes I 1

Latvia Civil Code [Civillikums – CC ] of 1937; after the Latvian independency the validity was renewed in the years 1991-1992; cited in the text were articles of “Part Four. Obligations Law” [Civillikums. Ceturta¯ dal¸a. Saistı¯bu tiesı¯bas] (Zin ¸ota¯js, 1, 14 January 1993) in force since 1 March 1993; amended among others by Act Grozı¯jumi Civillikuma¯ of 22 June 2006 (“LV”, 107 (3475), 7 July 2006), in force since 1 January 2007 art. 1635: art. 1640: art. 1641: art. 1642: art. 1644: art. 1645: art. 1646: art. 1649: art. 1770: art. 1771: art. 1772: art. 1773: art. 1774: art. 2350: art. 2351:

Chap. 1, Introd. B 12; Art. 1:101, Notes II 5, III 9, IV 18; Art. 1:103, Notes IV 40 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 18 Art. 2:210, Notes 5; Art. 3:101, Notes 11 Art. 5:103, Notes 2 Art. 3:102, Notes I 12 Art. 3:102, Notes I 12 Art. 3:102, Notes I 12 Art. 3:102, Notes I 12 Art. 2:101, Notes I 11 Art. 2:101, Notes I 11 Art. 2:101, Notes I 11 Art. 2:101, Notes I 11 Art. 2:101, Notes I 11 Art. 2:202, Notes IV 39 Art. 2:202, Notes V 51

1127

Annexes

Liability for Defective Goods and Deficient Services Act [Par atbildı¯bu par preces un pakalpojuma tru¯kumiem] of 5 July 2000 (“LV”, 250/251 (2161/2162), 5 July 2000) generally:

Art. 3:204, Notes I 1, V 45

Lithuania Civil Code [Lietuvos Respublikos civilinio kodekso patvirtinimas – CC ] of 18 July 2000 (Act no. VIII-1864) generally: art. 6.245: art. 6.246: art. 6.248: art. 6.249: art. 6.250: art. 6.255: art. 6.263: art. 6.267: art. 6.269: art. 6.270: art. 6.274: art. 6.275: art. 6.276: art. 6.284: art. 6.291: art. 6.292:

Art. 3:204, Notes V 45 Art. 1:103, Notes I 11 Chap. 1, Introd. B 12; Art. 1:101, Notes II 5, III 9; Art. 3:102, Notes I 12, II 17, II 24 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 18 Art. 2:101, Notes I 11 Art. 2:101, Notes I 11, V 48; Art. 2:201, Notes V 48, VII 60 Art. 1:102, Notes I 2 Chap. 1, Introd. B 12; Art. 1:101, Notes II 5; Art. 1:103, Notes IV 40; Art. 2:201, Notes V 48; Art. 2:206, Notes I 11 Art. 3:203, Notes 12 Art. 5:202, Notes I 11 Art. 5:302, Notes 11 Art. 5:202, Notes III 29 Art. 3:103, Notes I 11 Art. 3:103, Notes I 11 Art. 2:202, Notes II 16, V 51 Art. 2:202, Notes IV 39 Art. 3:204, Notes I 1

Luxembourg Civil Code [Code Civil – CC ] of 5 March 1803 (Mémorial A of 15 March 1803) art. 544: art. 1372: art. 1376: art. 1382: art. 1383: art. 1384: art. 1385: art. 1641: art. 1645: art. 1648: art. 2228: art. 2283:

1128

Art. 2:206, Notes I 1 Art. 1:103, Notes III 28 Art. 1:103, Notes III 28 Chap. 1, Introd. B 6; Art. 1:101, Notes II 2, IV 18; Art. 1:103, Notes IV 40; Art. 2:204, Notes I 1; Art. 3:102, Notes II 17, III 29 Chap. 1, Introd. B 6; Art. 1:101, Notes II 2, IV 18; Art. 2:204, Notes I 1; Art. 3:102, Notes II 17 Art. 1:101, Notes V 26; Art. 2:101, Notes V 38 Art. 3:203, Notes 1 Art. 1:103, Notes II 19 Art. 1:103, Notes II 19 Art. 1:103, Notes II 19 Art. 2:206, Notes II 16 Art. 2:206, Notes II 16

Table of Codes and Statutes (Malta)

Labour Code [Code du travail] of 31 July 2006 (Mémorial A no. 149 of 29 August 2006, p. 2456) art. L 121-9:

Art. 7:104, Notes 3

Products Liability Act [Loi du 21 avril 1989 relative à la responsabilité civile du fait des produits défectueux] of 21 April 1989 (Mémorial A no. 25 of 28 April 1989) generally: art. 2:

Art. 3:204, Notes I 1, V 45 Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 4, (2) 20

Social Insurance Code [Code des assurances socials] of 17 December 1925 (Mémorial A no. 63 of 31 December 1925) art. 92:

Art. 7:104, Notes 3

State and other Public Bodies Civil Liability Act [Loi du 1er septembre 1988 relative à la responsabilité civile de l’Etat et des collectivités publiques] of 1 September 1988 (Mémorial A no. 51 of 26 September 1988) art. 1:

Art. 7:103, Notes 3

Malta ´ ivili – CC ] of 22 January 1874 (ORDINANCE VII of 1868 Civil Code [Kodic´i C (as amended by Ordinances: I of 1870, IV of 1907, XIV of 1913, II and V of 1920; Acts: III of 1930, XLII of 1933; Ordinances: XL of 1935, XIX of 1937, III of 1938, XXXIX of 1939 and XXV of 1940); ORDINANCE 1 of 1873 (as amended by Ordinances: I of 1908, XIII of 1932; Act XXI of 1933; Ordinances: XX of 1934, XVIII of 1938 and XXII of 1939); Article I of ORDINANCE VI of 1895 and Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 (1) and 9 of ORDINANCE XIII of 1895. Amended among others by Acts III, IV and XV of 2008.) art. 1029: art. 1030: art. 1031: art. 1032: art. 1033: art. 1034: art. 1035: art. 1036: art. 1045: art. 1046: art. 1051A:

Chap. 1, Introd. B 10; Chap. 3, Introd. C 8 Chap. 1, Introd. B 10 Chap. 1, Introd. B 10; Art. 1:101, Notes II 2; Art. 1:103, Notes IV 40 Art. 3:102, Notes I 3 Art. 3:102, Notes II 17 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 39 Art. 3:103, Notes I 16 Art. 3:103, Notes II 17 Art. 2:201, Notes V 22 Art. 2:202, Notes II 6 Art. 5:103, Notes 1

Consumer Affairs Act [Att dwar Affarijiet tal-Konsumatur] of 23 January 1996 (Act XXVIII of 1994; supplemented by Act V of 1995, Act XIX of 1996, Act XXVI of 2000, Act VI of 2001 and XV of 2006; Legal Notice 425 of 2007; and Act II of 2008) generally: art. 61: art. 62:

Art. 3:204, Notes I 1, V 45 Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 5 Art. 3:204, Notes IV 35

1129

Annexes

The Netherlands Civil Code [Burgerlijk Wetboek – CC ] of 1 January 1992 (Boek 1: Stb. 1969, no. 167 in conjunction with Stb. 1969 no. 259, in force since 1 January 1970; Boek 2: Stb. 1976 no. 228 in conjunction with Stb. 1976 no. 342, in force since 26 July 1976; Boek 3, 5, 6 and 7: Stb. 1991 no. 600 in conjunction with Stb. 1989 nos. 616 and 290, in force since 1 January 1992; Boek 4: Stb. 1999 no. 300, in force since 1 January 2003; Book 7A: Stb. 1989 no. 378, in force as Book 4 of the old BW since 18 October 1838; Book 8: Stb. 1991 no. 126, in force since 1 April 1991) generally: art. 1:125: art. 1:266: art. 1:269: art. 2:9: art. 2:48: art. 2:138: art. 3:13: art. 3:44: art. 3:45: art. 3:83: art. 3:107: art. 3:108: art. 3:109: art. 3:119: art. 3:121: art. 3:125: art. 3:170: art. 3:201: art. 3:226: art. 3:296: art. 3:299: art. 3:302: art. 3:303: art. 5:1: art. 5:24: art. 5:37: art. 5:70: art. 5:85: art. 5:106: art. 6:6: art. 6:7: art. 6:15: art. 6:74: art. 6:83: art. 6:95:

1130

Art. 3:204, Notes V 45 Art. 3:104, Notes I 12 Art. 3:104, Notes I 12 Art. 3:104, Notes I 12 Art. 3:102, Notes I 11 Art. 3:102, Notes I 11 Art. 3:102, Notes I 11 Art. 2:206, Notes I 10 Art. 1:103, Notes III 36; Art. 2:210, Notes 10 Art. 1:103, Notes III 36 Art. 6:106, Notes 10 Art. 3:203, Notes 11; Art. 2:206, Notes II 24 Art. 3:203, Notes 11 Art. 3:202, Notes 11; Art. 3:203, Notes 11 Art. 2:206, Notes I 10 Art. 1:103, Notes III 36 Art. 1:103, Notes III 36; Art. 2:206, Notes II 24 Art. 6:104, Notes 10 Art. 2:206, Notes II 24 Art. 2:206, Notes II 24 Art. 1:102, Notes I 2; Art. 6:301, Notes 9 Art. 2:209, Notes II 11 Art. 1:102, Notes I 2 Art. 2:209, Notes II 11; Art. 6:102, Notes 9 Art. 2:206, Notes I 10 Art. 3:208, Notes 7 Art. 2:206, Notes I 10 Art. 2:206, Notes II 24 Art. 2:206, Notes II 24 Art. 2:206, Notes II 24 Art. 6:105, Notes 11 Art. 6:105, Notes 11 Art. 6:104, Notes 10 Art. 1:103, Notes I 9, II 24; Art. 2:101, Notes I 10 Art. 2:206, Notes III 37 Art. 2:101, Notes III 30, V 47; Art. 2:209, Notes II 11; Art. 4:101, Notes II 23

Table of Codes and Statutes (The Netherlands) art. 6:96: art. 6:97: art. 6:98: art. 6.99: art. 6:100: art. 6:101:

art. 6:102: art. 6:103: art. 6:104: art. 6:106:

art. 6:107: art. 6:107a: art. 6:108:

art. 6:109:

art. 6:110: art. 6:162:

art. 6:163: art. 6:164: art. 6:165: art. 6:166: art. 6:168: art. 6:169: art. 6:170: art. 6:171:

Art. 2:201, Notes V 31; Art. 5:102, Notes II 24; Art. 6:302, Notes 8 Art. 6:203, Notes 11 Art. 3:101, Notes 10; Art. 3:102, Notes I 11; Art. 4:101, Notes I 11, II 23; Art. 5:102, Notes I 11 Art 4:103, Notes 10 Art. 6:103, Notes 11 Art. 2:101, Notes V 47; Art. 3:101, Notes 10; Art. 3:102, Notes I 11; Art. 5:102, Notes I 11, II 24, III 37, IV 50; Art. 5:202, Notes I 10; Art. 6:105, Notes 11 Art. 4:102, Notes 10; Art. 6:105, Notes 11 Art. 6:101, Notes I 11; Art. 6:201, Notes 7 Art. 6:101, Notes II 23 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (2) 75; Art. 2:201, Notes III 13, VII 59; Art. 2:202, Notes II 15, III 26; Art. 2:203, Notes I 2, II 13, III 26, IV 38; Art. 2:206, Notes III 37; Art. 3:101, Notes 10; Art. 3:102, Notes I 11; Art. 6:106, Notes 10 Art. 2:101, Notes III 30; Art. 2:201, Notes V 31, VI 45; Art. 2:202, Notes III 26, VI 64; Art. 5:501, Notes 6 Art. 2:202, Notes VI 64; Art. 6:103, Notes 11 Art. 2:101, Notes III 30; Art. 2:202, Notes III 26, IV 38, V 50; Art. 3:101, Notes 10; Art. 3:102, Notes I 11; Art. 5:501, Notes 6; Art. 6:103, Notes 11 Art. 3:101, Notes 10; Art. 3:102, Notes I 11; Art. 3:205, Notes 12; Art. 5:101, Notes II 25; Art. 5:301, Notes 11; Art. 5:401, Notes 11; Art. 6:105, Notes 11; Art. 6:202, Notes 10 Art. 6:203, Notes 11 Chap. 1, Introd. B 9, B 13; Art. 1:101, Notes II 4, III 9, 16, IV 18, 20, V 25; Art. 1:102, Notes I 2; Art. 1:103, Notes I 10, II 24, III 36, IV 40; Art. 2:101, Notes I 10, VII 64, IX 92, X (1) 104; Art. 2:203, Notes II 13; Art. 2:204, Notes I 10; Art. 2:205, Notes 9; Art. 2:206, Notes I 10, II 24; Art. 2:207, Notes 9; Art. 2:208, Notes 10; Art. 2:209, Notes II 11; Art. 2:210, Notes 10; Chap. 3, Introd. B 7; Art. 3:101, Notes 10; Art. 3:102, Notes I 11, II 24, III 37; Art. 3:103, Notes I 10; Art. 3:104, Notes II 27; Art. 3:201, Notes II 24; Art. 3:205, Notes 12; Art. 4:101, Notes I 11, II 23; Art. 4:102, Notes 10; Art. 5:101, Notes I 10; Art. 5:102, Notes I 11; Art. 5:202, Notes III 28; Art. 5:301, Notes 11; Art. 5:302, Notes 12 Art. 5:102, Notes I 11 Art. 3:103, Notes I 10 Art. 1:101, Notes V 25; Art. 3:103, Notes I 10; Art. 3:201, Notes I 10; Art. 5:301, Notes 11; Art. 6:105, Notes 11 Art. 4:102, Notes 10 Art. 5:203, Notes 11; Art. 6:301, Notes 9 Art. 3:103, Notes I 10; Art. 3:104, Notes I 12 Art. 3:104, Notes II 27; Art. 3:201, Notes I 10, II 24; Art. 3:205, Notes 12; Art. 5:401, Notes 11; Art. 7:104, Notes 10 Art. 3:201, Notes I 10

1131

Annexes art. 6:173: art. 6:174: art. 6:175: art. 6:176: art. 6:177: art. 6:178: art. 6:179: art. 6:181: art. 6:183: art. 6:184: art. 6:185: art. 6:186: art. 6:190: art. 6:192: art. 6:193: art. 6:194: art. 6:195: art. 6:196: art. 6:203: art. 6:212: art. 6:233: art. 6:237: art. 7:21: art. 7:22: art. 7:24: art. 7:463: art. 7:508: art. 7:509: art. 7:6: art. 7:611: art. 7:658: art. 7:762:

Chap. 3, Introd. C 13; Art. 3:103, Notes I 10; Art. 3:203, Notes 11; Art. 3:206, Notes 11 Chap. 3, Introd. C 13; Art. 3:103, Notes I 10; Art. 3:202, Notes 11; Art. 3:206, Notes 11 Chap. 3, Introd. C 13; Art. 3:203, Notes 11; Art. 3:206, Notes 11 Chap. 3, Introd. C 13; Art. 3:207, Notes 9; Art. 3:208, Notes 7 Chap. 3, Introd. C 13; Art. 3:207, Notes 9 Art. 3:206, Notes 11 Art. 3:103, Notes I 10; Art. 3:203, Notes 11 Art. 3:202, Notes 11; Art. 3:203, Notes 11 Art. 3:103, Notes I 10; Art. 3:203, Notes 11 Art. 2:209, Notes II 11; Art. 5:501, Notes 6 Art. 2:101, Notes X (1) 104; Art. 3:204, Notes I 1, IV 41 Art. 3:203, Notes 11 Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 13, II (2) 27 Art. 5:401, Notes 11 Art. 1:103, Notes III 36 Art. 2:208, Notes 10 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 39; Art. 2:208, Notes 10 Art. 2:208, Notes 10 Art. 1:103, Notes III 36 Art. 1:103, Notes III 36 Art. 5:401, Notes 11 Art. 5:401, Notes 11 Art. 1:103, Notes II 24 Art. 1:103, Notes II 24 Art. 1:103, Notes II 24; Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 13; Art. 5:401, Notes 11 Art. 5:401, Notes 11 Art. 5:401, Notes 11 Art. 5:401, Notes 11 Art. 5:401, Notes 11 Art. 7:104, Notes 10 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 39; Art. 2:201, Notes III 13; Art. 3:207, Notes 9; Art. 4:101, Notes III 35; Art. 5:401, Notes 11; Art. 7:104, Notes 10 Art. 5:401, Notes 11

Code of Civil Procedure [Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering – CCP ] of 29 March 1828 (Stb. 1828 no. 14) art. 177:

Art. 1:101, Notes VI 29

Constitution [Grondwet – Const.] of 24 August 1815 (Stb. 1815 no. 45); amended among others by Law of 27 June 2008 (Stb. 2008 nos. 272, 273) art. 81: art. 89: art. 93:

1132

Art. 7:102, Notes 5 Art. 7:102, Notes 5 Art. 2:203, Notes II 13

Table of Codes and Statutes (Poland)

Environmental Management Act [Wet Milieubeheer] (Stb. 2005 no. 282) art. 9.2.3.1:

Art. 3:206, Notes 11

Oil Tankers (Third Party Liability) Act [Wet van 11 juni 1975, tot uitvoering van het op 29 november 1969 te Brussel tot stand gekomen Internationaal Verdrag inzake de wettelijke aansprakelijkheid voor schade door verontreiniging door olie, met Bijlage (Trb. 1970, 196) alsmede regeling van die aansprakelijkheid in overeenstemming met dat Verdrag] of 11 June 1975 (Stb. 1975, 677) art. 10:

Art. 5:401, Notes 11

Penal Code [Wetboek van Strafrecht – CP ] of 3 March 1881 (Stb. 1881 no. 35) art. 328bis: art. 41: art. 42: art. 40:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:208, Notes 10 5:202, Notes I 10 5:201, Notes 10 5:302, Notes 12

Road Traffic Act [Wegenverkeerswet] of 21 April 1994 (Stb. 1994 no. 475) art. 1: art. 185:

Art. 3:205, Notes 12 Art. 3:205, Notes 12

Poland Atomic Law [Prawo atomowe] of 29 November 2000 (in the revised version of Dz. U. 2004 no. 70 pos. 632) art. 100:

Art. 3:206, Notes 6

Civil Code [Kodeks cywilny – CC ] of 23 April 1964 (Dz. U. 1964 no. 16 poz. 93) generally: art. 5: art. 6: art. 23: art. 24: art. 43: art. 180: art. 340: art. 341: art. 355: art. 361: art. 362: art. 412: art. 415:

art. 416: art. 417:

Art. 3:204, Notes V 45 Art. 5:103, Notes 1 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 30 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 67, 68; Art. 2:203, Notes II 9 Art. 2:203, Notes II 9; Art. 5:203, Notes 6 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (4) 82 Art. 3:208, Notes 4 Art. 3:208, Notes 4 Art. 3:208, Notes 4 Art. 3:102, Notes I 6 Art. 3:204, Notes III 31; Art. 3:205, Notes 6; Art. 4:101, Notes I 6 Art. 5:102, Notes I 5; Art. 5:102, Notes III 32 Art. 5:103, Notes 1 Chap. 1, Introd. B 11; Art. 1:101, Notes II 3, III 12, IV 18; Art. 1:103, Notes IV 40; Art. 2:101, Notes VII 61; Art. 2:206, Notes I 5; Art. 2:211, Notes 6; Art. 3:101, Notes 5; Art. 3:102, Notes III 32; Art. 3:104, Notes I 7; Art. 3:203, Notes 6; Art. 7:103, Notes 7 Art. 3:201, Notes II 19 Art. 2:101, Notes I 5; Art. 5:102, Notes I 5; Art. 7:103, Notes 7

1133

Annexes art. 4171: art. 4172: art. 418: art. 422: art. 423: art. 425: art. 426: art. 427: art. 428: art. 429: art. 430: art. 431: art. 433: art. 434: art. 435:

art. 436: art. 437: art. 439: art. 443: art. 444: art. 445: art. 446: art. 447: art. 448: art. 449: art. 4491: art. 4492: art. 4493: art. 4497: art. 473: art. 474: art. 483: art. 757: art. 827:

Art. 7:103, Notes 7 Art. 2:101, Notes I 5; Art. 7:103, Notes 7 Art. 7:103, Notes 7 Art. 2:211, Notes 6; Art. 4:102, Notes 5 Art. 5:202, Notes I 5 Art. 5:301, Notes 5 Art. 3:103, Notes I 5 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 39; Art. 3:104, Notes I 7; Art. 5:102, Notes I 5 Art. 3:103, Notes I 5, II 19; Art. 3:104, Notes II 22; Art. 5:301, Notes 5 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 39; Art. 3:201, Notes I 5, II 19; Art. 3:208, Notes 4 Art. 1:101, Notes V 26, VI 39; Art. 3:201, Notes I 5, II 19; Art. 5:102, Notes I 5; Chap. 3, Introd. C 12 Art. 3:203, Notes 6; Art. 3:208, Notes 4 Art. 1:101, Notes V 26; Chap. 3, Introd. C 12; Art. 3:202, Notes 6; Art. 3:207, Notes 5 Art. 3:202, Notes 6; Art. 3:208, Notes 4; Art. 4:103, Notes 6 Art. 2:101, Notes I 5; Art. 3:205, Notes 6; Art. 3:206, Notes 6; Art. 3:207, Notes 5; Art. 4:103, Notes 6; Art. 5:302, Notes 6; Art. 5:401, Notes 6 Chap. 3, Introd. C 12; Art. 3:205, Notes 6; Art. 3:207, Notes 5; Art. 3:208, Notes 4; Art. 5:102, Notes III 32, IV 45; Art. 5:401, Notes 6 Art. 5:401, Notes 6 Art. 1:102, Notes I 2 Art. 1:103, Notes I 5 Art. 2:101, Notes I 5; Art. 2:201, Notes II 3, V 26 Art. 2:101, Notes I 5, V 42; Art. 2:201, Notes IV 19, VII 54; Art. 2:203, Notes I 2; Art. 6:106, Notes 5 Art. 2:201, Notes I 3. Art. 2:202, Notes II 10, IV 33, V 46 Art. 2:201, Notes I 3 Art. 2:101, Notes I 5, V 42; Art. 6:106, Notes 5 Art. 2:202, Notes III 23 Art. 1:101, Notes V 26; Chap. 3, Introd. C 12; Art. 3:204, Notes III 31 Art. 3:204, Notes II (2) 23 Art. 3:204, Notes IV 38 Art. 2:101, Notes I 5; Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 8 Art. 3:101, Notes 5 Art. 5:102, Notes I 5 Art. 1:101, Notes II 4, 16 Art. 3:101, Notes 5 Art. 3:101, Notes 5

Compulsory Insurance, Guarantee Fund and Polish Office of Traffic Insurance Act [Ustawa o ubezpieczeniach obowia˛zkowych, Ubezpieczeniowym Funduszu Gwarancyjnym i Polskim Biurze Ubezpieczycieli Komunikacyjnych] of 22 May 2003 (Dz. U. 2003 no. 124 poz. 1152) generally:

1134

Art. 3:205, Notes 6

Table of Codes and Statutes (Poland)

Environmental Protection Act [Prawo ochrony ´srodowiska] of 27 April 2001 (Dz. U. 2001 no. 62 poz. 627) art. 322: art. 323: art. 324: art. 325:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:207, Notes 5 3:206, Notes 6 3:206, Notes 6; Art. 3:207, Notes 5 3:206, Notes 6

Geological and Mining Law [Prawo geologiczne i górnicze] of 4 February 1994 (Dz. U. 1994 no. 27 poz. 96 as amended) art. 93:

Art. 3:206, Notes 6

Hunting Act [Prawo łowieckie] of 13 October 1995 (Dz. U. 1995 no. 147 poz. 713, in the revised version of Dz. U. 1997 no. 14 poz. 72) art. 50:

Art. 3:203, Notes 6

Labour Code [Kodeks pracy] of 26 June 1974 (in the revised version of Dz. U. 1998 no. 21 poz. 94) art. 120:

Art. 3:201, Notes I 5

Mental Health Act [Ustawa o ochronie zdrowia psychicznego] of 19 August 1994 (Dz. U. 1994 no. 111 poz. 535) art. 21: art. 22: art. 26: art. 28:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:101, Notes 5:101, Notes 5:101, Notes 5:101, Notes

I I I I

5 5 5 5

Penal Code [Kodeks karny – CP ] of 6 June 1997 (Dz. U. 1997 no. 88 poz. 553) art. 27: art. 192:

Art. 5:101, Notes I 5 Art. 5:101, Notes I 5

Prevention and Repair of Damages to the Environment Act [Ustawa o zapobieganiu szkodom w ´srodowisku i ich naprawie] of 13 April 2007 (Dz. U. 2007 no. 75 poz. 493) art. 1: art. 23:

Art. 3:206, Notes 6 Art. 2:209, Notes I 1

Products Liability Act [Ustawa o ochronie niektórych praw konsumentów oraz o odpowiedzialnos´ci za szkode˛ wyrza˛dzona˛ przez produkt niebezpieczny = CC Book III, title VI1] of 2 March 2000 (Dz. U. 2000 no. 22 poz. 271) generally:

Art. 3:204, Notes I 1

Professional Sports Act [Ustawa o sporcie kwalifikowanym] of 29 July 2005 (Dz. U. 2005 no. 155 poz. 1298) art. 29:

Art. 5:101, Notes II 20

1135

Annexes

Portugal Accidents at Work and Ocupational DiseasesAct [Regime jurídico dos acidentes de trabalho e das doenças profissionais] of 13 September 1997 (Lei no. 100/97, DR 212/1997 I-A), repealed by Labour Code art. 31:

Art. 2:202, Notes VI 63

Basic Environment Act [Lei de Bases do Ambiente] of 7 April 1987 (Lei no. 11/87, DR 81/1987 I-A) art. 3: art. 40: art. 41: art. 48:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

6:301, Notes 8 2:209, Notes II 10; Art. 6:301, Notes 8 2:209, Notes II 10 2:209, Notes II 10

Civil Code [Código Civil – CC ] of 25 November 1966 (DL no. 47344, DG 274/1966 I-A), as amended by DL no. 116/2008 of 4 July 2008 (DR 128/2008 I) generally: art. 1: art. 40: art. 68: art. 70: art. 71: art. 72: art. 73: art. 74: art. 75: art. 76: art. 77: art. 78: art. 79: art. 80: art. 165: art. 227: art. 244: art. 309: art. 334: art. 335: art. 336: art. 337: art. 338: art. 339: art. 340: art. 342:

1136

Art. 2:101, Notes I 8, III 29; Art. 2:201, Notes IV 18; Art. 2:202, Notes II 14; Art. 3:204, Notes II (2) 27 Art. 7:102, Notes 4 Art. 2:101, Notes IX 91 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (2) 75 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3, 4; Art. 2:203, Notes II 10; Art. 2:204, Notes I 8; Art. 2:205, Notes 8; Art. 5:101, Notes I 9; Art. 6:301, Notes 8 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3; Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (2) 75; Art. 2:203, Notes II 10 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3; Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 67; Art. 2:203, Notes II 10 Art. 2:203, Notes II 10 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3; Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 67; Art. 2:203, Notes II 10 Art. 2:203, Notes II 10; Art. 2:205, Notes 8 Art. 2:203, Notes II 10 Art. 2:203, Notes II 10; Art. 2:205, Notes 8 Art. 2:203, Notes II 10 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3; Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 68; Art. 2:203, Notes II 10; Art. 2:205, Notes 8 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3; Art. 2:203, Notes II 10, III 26 Art. 1:103, Notes IV 40; Art. 3:201, Notes II 23 Art. 2:210, Notes 9 Art. 2:210, Notes 9 Art. 1:103, Notes II 16 Art. 2:210, Notes 9; Art. 5:103, Notes 1 Art. 5:201, Notes 9 Art. 1:101, Notes III 15; Art. 2:206, Notes II 23 Art. 1:101, Notes III 15; Art. 2:206, Notes II 23; Art. 5:202, Notes I 9 Art. 5:202, Notes I 9 Art. 1:101, Notes III 15; Art. 5:202, Notes III 27 Art. 1:101, Notes III 15; Art. 5:101, Notes I 9; Art. 5:202, Notes II 15 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 30, 39; Art. 3:103, Notes I 9

Table of Codes and Statutes (Portugal) art. 398: art. 406: art. 445: art. 448: art. 474: art. 483:

art. 484: art. 485: art. 486: art. 487: art. 488: art. 489: art. 490: art. 491: art. 492: art. 493: art. 494: art. 495: art. 496: art. 497: art. 498: art. 499: art. 500: art. 501: art. 502: art. 503: art. 505: art. 506: art. 507: art. 508: art. 509: art. 510: art. 512: art. 562: art. 563:

Art. 6:102, Notes 8 Art. 2:211, Notes 10 Art. 2:101, Notes V 42 Art. 2:101, Notes V 42 Art. 1:103, Notes III 35 Chap. 1, Introd. B 8; Art. 1:101, Notes V 25, III 9, 16, IV 18; Art. 1:103, Notes IV 40; Art. 2:101, Notes I 9, V 46, VII 62, IX 91; Art. 2:201, Notes I 1; Art. 2:203, Notes I 2, IV 37; Art. 2:206, Notes I 9; Art. 2:208, Notes 9; Art. 2:210, Notes 9; Chap. 3, Introd. C 12; Art. 3:101, Notes 9; Art. 3:102, Notes III 36; Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 12; Art. 4:101, Notes I 10, II 21; Art. 7:102, Notes 4 Art. 2:204, Notes I 8, II 22 Art. 2:101, Notes X (1) 103; Art. 2:207, Notes 8 Art. 3:102, Notes II 17, II 24 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 30, 39; Art. 1:103, Notes III 35; Art. 3:102, Notes I 10 Art. 3:103, Notes I 9; Art. 5:301, Notes 10 Art. 3:103, Notes II 20; Art. 5:301, Notes 10 Art. 2:211, Notes 10; Art. 4:102, Notes 9; Art. 6:105, Notes 10 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 39; Art. 3:104, Notes I 11, II 26; Art. 6:105, Notes 10 Art. 1:103, Notes I 9; Art. 3:202, Notes 10; Art. 6:301, Notes 7 Art. 3:203, Notes 10; Art. 3:206, Notes 10; Art. 3:207, Notes 9; Art. 3:208, Notes 7, Chap. 4, Art 4:103, Notes 9; Art. 6:301, Notes 8 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 19; Art. 3:101, Notes 9; Art. 6:202, Notes 9 Art. 2:101, Notes V 44; Art. 2:202, Notes IV 37, V 49, VI 63 Art. 2:101, Notes V 46; Art. 2:202, Notes II 14, III 25; Art. 3:204, Notes III 31; Art. 6:102, Notes 8 Art. 3:101, Notes 9; Art. 3:104, Notes II 26; Art. 3:201, Notes I 9; Art. 4:102, Notes 9; Art. 6:105, Notes 10 Art. 1:103, Notes II 16, III 35 Chap. 3, Introd. C 12 Art. 3:201, Notes I 9, II 23; Art. 6:105, Notes 10 Art. 3:201, Notes II 23; Art. 6:105, Notes 10; Art. 7:103, Notes 11 Art. 3:203, Notes 10; Art. 6:301, Notes 8 Art. 3:201, Notes I 9; Art. 3:205, Notes 11; Art. 3:208, Notes 7; Art. 5:102, Notes III 36; Art. 5:302, Notes 10 Art. 5:102, Notes III 36; Art. 5:302, Notes 10 Art. 3:101, Notes 9; Art. 3:201, Notes I 9; Art. 5:102, Notes III 36; Art. 5:102, Notes III 36, IV 49 Art. 3:101, Notes 9; Art. 6:105, Notes 10 Art. 3:206, Notes 10 Art. 1:103, Notes II 16; Art. 3:206, Notes 10; Art. 5:302, Notes 10; Art. 3:208, Notes 7 Art. 3:206, Notes 10 Art. 6:105, Notes 10 Art. 1:103, Notes I 9; Art. 2:101, Notes I 9; Art. 4:101, Notes II 21; Art. 6:101, Notes I 10 Art. 2:101, Notes I 9; Art. 4:101, Notes I 10

1137

Annexes art. 564: art. 566: art. 567: art. 568: art. 570: art. 579: art. 794: art. 798: art. 799: art. 803: art. 808: art. 809: art. 814: art. 815: art. 913: art. 998: art. 1037: art. 1125: art. 1133: art. 1188: art. 1218: art. 1225: art. 1276: art. 1277: art. 1306: art. 1311: art. 1314: art. 1316: art. 1317: art. 1318: art. 1323: art. 1346: art. 1347: art. 1348: art. 1349: art. 1350: art. 1352: art. 1405: art. 1681: art. 1878: art. 1935: art. 2008: art. 2009:

1138

Art. 2:101, Notes I 9; Art. 2:201, Notes V 30 Art. 2:101, Notes I 9; Art. 6:101, Notes I 10; Art. 6:103, Notes 10; Art. 6:202, Notes 9 Art. 6:101, Notes I 10; Art. 6:203, Notes 10 Art. 6:103, Notes 10 Art. 3:101, Notes 9; Art. 4:101, Notes IV 47; Art. 5:102, Notes I 10, II 23, III 36, IV 49; Art. 6:105, Notes 10 Art. 6:106, Notes 9 Art. 2:211, Notes 10 Art. 1:103, Notes I 9 Art. 1:103, Notes III 35; Art. 3:102, Notes I 10 Art. 6:103, Notes 10 Art. 5:401, Notes 10 Art. 5:401, Notes 10 Art. 3:101, Notes 9 Art. 3:101, Notes 9 Art. 1:103, Notes II 16 Art. 3:201, Notes II 23 Art. 2:206, Notes II 23 Art. 2:206, Notes II 23 Art. 2:206, Notes II 23 Art. 2:206, Notes II 23 Art. 1:103, Notes II 16 Art. 1:103, Notes I 9 Art. 2:206, Notes II 23 Art. 2:206, Notes II 23 Art. 2:211, Notes 11 Art. 2:206, Notes I 9 Art. 2:206, Notes I 9 Art. 3:208, Notes 7 Art. 3:208, Notes 7 Art. 3:208, Notes 7 Art. 3:208, Notes 7 Art. 3:206, Notes 10 Art. 3:207, Notes 9; Art. 6:301, Notes 8 Art. 6:301, Notes 8 Art. 6:301, Notes 8 Art. 6:301, Notes 8 Art. 6:301, Notes 8 Art. 6:104, Notes 9 Art. 3:101, Notes 9 Art. 3:104, Notes I 11 Art. 3:104, Notes I 11 Art. 6:106, Notes 9 Art. 2:202, Notes V 49

Table of Codes and Statutes (Portugal)

Clinical Trials on Human Beings Decree Law [Regras dos ensaios clínicos a realizar em seres humanos] of 9 April 1994 (DL no. 97/94, DR 83/1994 I-A), repealed by Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use Act 2004 (see there) art. 10:

Art. 5:101, Notes I 9

Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use Act [Regime jurídico aplicável à realização de ensaios clínicos com medicamentos de uso humano] of 19 August 2004 (Lei no. 46/2004, DR 195/2004 I-A) art. 6:

Art. 5:101, Notes I 9

Code of Civil Procedure [Código de Processo Civil – CCP ] of 28 December 1961 (DL no. 44129/61 of 28 December 1961), revised by DL no. 329-A/ 95 of 12 December 1995 (DR 285/1995 I-A), as amended by DL no. 303/2007 of 24 August 2007 art. 27: art. 381: art. 661: art. 822: art. 1474:

Art. 6:104, Notes 9 Art. 6:301, Notes 8 Art. 2:101, Notes I 9 Art. 6:102, Notes 8 Art. 1:102, Notes I 4

Constitution [Constituição da República Portuguesa – Const.] in force since 25 April 1976 (Decreto de Aprovação da Constituição of 10 April 1976, DR 86/1976 I-A), as revised by Lei Constitucional no. 1/2005 of 12 August 2005 (DR 155/2005 I-A) art. 1: art. 22 art. 25: art. 26: art. 37: art. 38: art. 52: art. 62: art. 89: art. 111: art. 112: art. 161: art. 164: art. 198: art. 271:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:101, Notes I 9 6:105, Notes 10 5:101, Notes I 9; Art. 5:203, Notes 10 2:204, Notes I 8; Art. 5:101, Notes I 9; Art. 5:203, Notes 10 2:204, Notes II 22; Art. 5:203, Notes 10 5:203, Notes 10 2:209, Notes II 10 2:206, Notes I 9 3:208, Notes 7 7:102, Notes 4 7:102, Notes 4 7:102, Notes 4 7:102, Notes 4 7:102, Notes 4 5:201, Notes 9

Consumer Protection Act [Regime legal aplicável à defesa dos consumidores/Lei de Defesa do Consumidor – ConsProtA] of 31 July 1996 (Lei no. 24/96, DR 176/1996 I-A) art. 12:

Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 12

Contract of Consortium Participation Decree Law [Regime jurídico dos contratos de consórcio e de associação em participação] of 28 July 1981 (DL no. 231/81, DR 171/1981 I-A) art. 19:

Art. 6:105, Notes 10

1139

Annexes

Holday Camps Regulations Decree Law [Regime Jurídico de Acesso e de Exercício da Actividade de Promoção e Organização de Campos de Férias] of 9 December 2003 (DL no. 304/2003, DR 283/2003 I-A (revised by DL no. 109/2005 of 8 July 2005, DR 130/2005 I-A) art. 10:

Art. 3:104, Notes II 26

Hunting Act [Lei da caça] of 27 August 1986 (DL no. 30/86), repealed by Lei no. 173/99 of 21 September 1999, DR 221/1999 I-A art. 33:

Art. 3:207, Notes 9

Industrial Property Decree Law [Código da Propriedade Industrial] of 25 July 2008 (DL no. 143/2008, DR 143/2008 I) art. 317:

Art. 2:204, Notes III 33

Labour Code [Código do Trabalho] of 27 August 2003 (Lei no. 99/2003, DR 197/2003 I-A) art. 24: art. 120g: art. 239: art. 281: art. 287: art. 291: art. 294:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:201, Notes III 12 3:207, Notes 9 3:207, Notes 9 3:207, Notes 9 4:101, Notes IV 47 5:302, Notes 10 2:202, Notes VI 63

Motor Insurance Liability Decree Law [Seguro obrigatório de responsabilidade civil automóvel] of 31 December 1985 (DL no. 522/85, DR 301/1985 I-A), as amended by DL no. 83/2006 of 3 May 2006, DR 85/2006 I-A) art. 62: art. 64:

Art. 7:105, Notes 2 Art. 7:105, Notes 2

Penal Code [Código Penal – CP ] of 23 September 1982 (DL no. 400/82, DR 221/1982 I-A), as revised by DL no. 59/2007 of 4 November 2007, DR 170/2007 I-A art. 14: art. 19: art. 31: art. 156: art. 157: art. 180: art. 183: art. 217:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:101, Notes 9 3:104, Notes I 11 5:201, Notes 9 5:101, Notes I 9 5:101, Notes I 9 2:203, Notes IV 37; Art. 2:204, Notes III 33 2:204, Notes IV 40 2:210, Notes 9

Popular Action Decree Law [Direito de participação procedimental e de acção popular] of 31 August 1995 (DL no. 83/95, DR 201/1995 I-A) art. 12:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 10

Press Act [Lei de Imprensa] of 13 January 1999 (Lei no. 2/99, DR 10/1999 I-A) generally:

1140

Art. 2:204, Notes IV 40

Table of Codes and Statutes (Portugal)

Products LiabilityDecree Law [Regime da Responsabilidade Decorrente de Produtos Defeituosos] of 6 November 1989 (DL no. 383/89, DR 255/1989 I-A), as amended by DL no. 131/2001 of 24 April 2001, DR 96/2001 I-A generally: art. 5: art. 8: art. 9: art. 10:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:204, Notes I 1, V 45 3:204, Notes IV 41 3:204, Notes II (1) 12, (2) 27, III 31 3:204, Notes II (1) 12 5:401, Notes 10

PublicContracts Code [Regime jurídico das empreitadas de obras públicas] of 2 March 1999 (DL no. 59/99, DR 51/1999 I-A), repealed by DL no 18/2008 [Código dos Contratos Públicos] of 29 January 2008, DR 20/2008 I art. 177:

Art. 3:208, Notes 7

Restriction of Competition and Fair Practices Decree Law [Proibição de práticas individuais restritivas de comércio] of 29 October 1993 (DL no. 370/93), as amended by DL no. 140/98 of 16 May 1998, DR 113/1998 I-A generally:

Art. 2:208, Notes 9

Social Security Act [Bases gerais do sistema de segurança social] of 16 January 2007 (Lei no. 4/2007, DR 11/2007 I) art. 70:

Art. 2:202, Notes VI 63

State Liability Act [Regime da responsabilidade civil extracontratual do Estado e demais entidades públicas] of 31 December 2007 (Lei no. 67/2007, DR 251/2007 I) art. 11:

Art. 7:103, Notes 11

Television Act [Lei da Televisão] of 30 July 2007 (Lei no. 27/2007, DR 145/2007 I art. 70:

Art. 2:204, Notes IV 40

Ultra-light (non-motorised) Aircraft Decree Law [Regime jurídico da utilização de aeronaves ultraleves] of 2 March 1990 (DL no. 71/90), as revised by DL no. 238/2004 of 18 December 2004, DR 295/2004 I-A art. 40:

Art. 3:207, Notes 9

Urbanisation and Construction Decree Law [Regime Jurídico da Urbanização e da Edificação] of 16 December (DL no. 555/99, DR 291/1999 I-A; as amended by DL no. 177/2001 of 4 June 2001, DR 129/2001 I-A) art. 86:

Art. 3:208, Notes 7

Water Quality Decree Law [Normas para proteger o meio aquático e melhorar a qualidade das águas – Lei da qualidade das águas] of 1 August 1998 (DL no. 236/98, DR 176/1998 I-A) art. 73:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 10

1141

Annexes

Romania Civil Code [Codul civil – CC ] Decret of 26 November 1864 (Monitorul Oficial, in the period from 4 December 1864 to 19 January 1865; republished in 1981 by Ministry of Justice) art. 54: art. 445: art. 448: art. 998: art. 1000: art. 1001: art. 1002: art. 1003: art. 1073: art. 1082: art. 1083: art. 1084: art. 1086: art. 1169:

Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 67, 68 Art. 6:106, Notes 5 Art. 6:106, Notes 5 Chap. 1, Introd. B 11; Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (3) 79; Art. 5:101, Notes I 4; Art. 6:101, Notes I 5 Art. 3:208, Notes 4; Art. 5:302, Notes 5; Art. 6:105, Notes 6 Art. 3:208, Notes 4; Art. 5:302, Notes 5 Art. 5:302, Notes 5 Art. 6:105, Notes 6 Art. 6:101, Notes I 5 Art. 5:302, Notes 5 Art. 5:302, Notes 5 Art. 6:101, Notes I 5 Art. 4:101, Notes I 6 Art. 4:101, Notes III 30

Code on Civil Procedure [Codul de procedura˘ civila˘ – CCP ] Decret of 9 September 1865 (promulgated on 11 September 1865, republished in Monitorul Oficial no. 45 of 24 February 1948) art. 581:

Art. 6:301, Notes 5

˘ – CCrimProc] of Code on Criminal Procedure [Lege nr. 29 Codul de procedura˘ penala 12 November 1968 (Buletinul Oficial no. 145, 146 of 12 November 1968; republished in Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, no. 78 of 30 April 1997) art. 504: art. 581:

Art. 3:207, Notes 5; Art. 7:103, Notes 7 Art. 6:301, Notes 5

Constitution [Constitut¸ia României – Const.] of 21 November 1991 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, no. 233); amended among others by Act no. 429/2003 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, no. 758 of 29 October 2003 and republished in Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, no. 767 of 31 October 2003) art. 52: art. 73: art. 115:

Art. 7:103, Notes 7 Art. 7:102, Notes 3 Art. 7:102, Notes 3

Copyright Act [Lege nr. 8/1996 privind dreptul de autor ¸si drepturile conexe] of 14 March 1996 (Monitorul Oficial al României, no. 60, Partea I, of 26 March 1996); last republication ordered by Act no. 329/2006 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, no. 657 of 31 July 2006) art. 139:

Art. 6:101, Notes II 19

Draft Civil Code [Proiectul Noului Cod civil] (adopted by the Senate on 13 September 2004) art. 45:

1142

Art. 2:201, Notes I 1

Table of Codes and Statutes (Romania) art. 193: art. 196: art. 1097: art. 1105: art. 1106: art. 1107: art. 1109: art. 1125: art. 1131: art. 1133: art. 1136: art. 1137: art. 1316:

Art. 2:201, Notes I 1 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (4) 82 Chap. 1, Introd. B 11 Art. 3:103, Notes I 6 Art. 5:301, Notes 6 Art. 4:102, Notes 5 Art. 5:102, Notes I 6, II 19 Art. 5:102, Notes I 6 Art. 2:202, Notes II 10; Art. 6:106, Notes 5 Art. 2:202, Notes V 46 Art. 5:101, Notes I 4 Art. 5:101, Notes I 4 Art. 2:202, Notes II 12

Government EmergencyDecree on Environmental Liability [Ordonant¸˘a de urgent¸˘a nr. 68 privind ra˘spunderea de mediu cu referire la prevenirea ¸si repararea prejudiciului asupra mediului] of 28 July 2007 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, no. 446 of 29 June 2007); approved by Act no. 19/2008 of 29 February 2008 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, no. 170 of 05 March 2008) generally:

Art. 2:209, Notes I 1; Art. 3:207, Notes 5

Judicial Review Act [Legea nr. 554 contenciosului administrativ] of 02 December 2004 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, no. 1154 of 07 December 2004) art. 1: art. 13:

Art. 7:103, Notes 7 Art. 7:103, Notes 7

Natural and Legal Persons Decree [Decret nr. 31 privitor la persoanele ¸si persoanele juridice] of 30 January 1954 (Buletinul Oficial, Partea I, no. 8 of 30 January 1954) art. 56:

Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (2) 75

Nuclear Energy Liability Act [Lege nr. 703 privind ra˘spunderea civila˘ pentru daune nucleare] of 3 December 2001 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, no. 818 of 19 December 2001; republished in Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, no. 115 of 12 February 2002) art. 4:

Art. 3:207, Notes 5

Penal Code [Lege nr. 15 Codul penal – CP ] of 21 June 1968 (Buletinul Oficial, no. 79-79bis of 21 June 1968; republished in Monitorul Oficial, Partea I no. 65 of 16 April 1997) art. 44: art. 45: art. 48:

Art. 5:202, Notes I 5 Art. 5:202, Notes III 22 Art. 5:301, Notes 6

Prescription Decree [Decret nr. 167 privitor la prescript¸ia extinctiva˘ ] of 10 April 1958 (Buletinul Oficial no. 19 of 21 April 1958) generally:

Art. 7:102, Notes 3

1143

Annexes

Products Liability Act [Lege nr. 240 privind ra˘spunderea produca˘torilor pentru pagubele generate de produsele cu defecte] of 7 June 2004 (Monitorul Oficial, Partea I no. 552 of 22 June 2004); amended and republished among others in Monitorul Oficial, Partea I no. 313 of 22 April 2008) generally: art. 2: art. 3: art. 7:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes

I1 III 31 V 45 IV 38

Slovakia Civil Code [Obcˇansky´ zákoník – CC ] of 26 February 1964 (Zb. no. 40/1964) generally: § 415: § 417: § 419: § 420: § 422: § 424: § 442: § 443: § 444: § 445: § 448: § 449: § 450:

Art. 2:202, Notes II 10 Chap. 1, Introd. B 11; Art. 1:102, Notes I 2; Art. 2:206, Notes I 5 Art. 1:102, Notes I 2 Art. 6:302, Notes 4 Chap. 1, Introd. B 11; Art. 1:101, Notes II 3; Art. 1:103, Notes IV 40; Art. 2:101, Notes VII 61 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 39; Art. 3:103, Notes I 6; Art. 3:104, Notes I 7, II 22 Art. 1:101, Notes III 16, IV 20; Art. 2:210, Notes 5; Art. 2:211, Notes 6 Art. 2:101, Notes III 25 Art. 2:101, Notes III 25 Art. 2:101, Notes V 42 Art. 2:101, Notes III 25; Art. 2:201, Notes V 26 Art. 2:202, Notes V 46 Art. 2:201, Notes V 26; Art. 2:202, Notes IV 33 Art. 5:103, Notes 1

Prevention and Repair of Damages to the Environment Law Act [Z. z. o prevencii a náprave environmentálnych ˘skôd a o zmene a doplnení niektory´ch zákonov] of 3 August 2007 (Zákon no. 359/2007, Z. z. no. 158) generally:

Art. 2:209, Notes I 1

Products Liability [Z. z. o zodpovednosti za ˘skodu spôsobenú vadny´m vy´robkom] of 2 November 1999 (Zákon no. 294/1999) generally:

Art. 3:204, Notes I 1

Slovenia Consumer Protection Act [Zakon o varstvu potros˘nikov – ConsProtA] 13 March 1998 (RS no. 20/1998; amended among others in RS no. 126/2007 of 31 December 2007) generally: § 2: § 10:

1144

Art. 3:204, Notes I 1, V 45 Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 8 Art. 3:204, Notes IV 38

Table of Codes and Statutes (Slovenia)

Law of Obligations Act [Obligacijski zakonik – LOA ] of 3 October 2001 (RS no. 83/2001, 8345; amended among others by RS no. 40/2007 of 7 May 2007) § 6: § 14: § 86: § 106: § 131: § 132: § 133: § 134: § 135: § 136: § 137: § 138: § 140: § 142: § 144: § 145: § 146: § 149: § 150: § 151: § 153: § 154: § 156: § 157: § 158: § 159: § 164: § 170: § 173: § 174: § 176: § 177: § 178: § 179: § 180: § 181: § 183: § 184: § 186: § 187:

Art. 3:102, Notes I 6 Art. 5:101, Notes I 5 Art. 5:101, Notes I 5 Art. 3:202, Notes 6 Chap. 1, Introd. B 11; Art. 1:101, Notes II 3, III 12, IV 18, V 25, VI 33; Art. 1:103, Notes IV 40; Art. 2:101, Notes VII 61; Art. 2:206, Notes I 5 Art. 2:101, Notes I 5, III 25, V 42, VI 54; Art. 2:201, Notes III 8; Art. 2:206, Notes I 5 Art. 1:102, Notes I 2 Art. 2:203, Notes I 2, III 24 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 18 Art. 5:301, Notes 5 Art. 3:103, Notes I 6 Art. 5:202, Notes I 5, II 23 Art. 5:101, Notes I 5 Art. 3:104, Notes I 7 Art. 3:104, Notes II 22 Art. 3:104, Notes I 7 Art. 5:301, Notes 5 Art. 3:205, Notes 7; Art. 4:101, Notes III 31 Art. 3:205, Notes 7 Art. 3:205, Notes 7 Art. 5:302, Notes 6 Art. 3:205, Notes 7 Art. 3:207, Notes 5 Art. 3:207, Notes 5 Art. 3:203, Notes 6 Art. 3:202, Notes 6 Art. 6:101, Notes I 6 Art. 6:202, Notes 4 Art. 2:202, Notes V 46 Art. 2:201, Notes I 1, II 3, V 26 Art. 2:202, Notes III 23 Art. 2:204, Notes I 5; Art. 5:203, Notes 6 Art. 2:101, Notes V 42; Art. 6:101, Notes I 6 Art. 2:101, Notes V 42; Art. 2:201, Notes III 8, VII 54; Art. 2:202, Notes II 10; Art. 2:203, Notes I 2 Art. 2:202, Notes II 10 Art. 2:203, Notes II 9 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (4) 82 Art. 6:106, Notes 5 Art. 4:102, Notes 5, Art 4:103, Notes 6; Art. 6:105, Notes 6 Art. 6:105, Notes 6

1145

Annexes

Media Act [Zakon o Medijih (uradno precˇis˘ˇceno besedilo)] of 11 May 2001 (RS no. 35/2001, 4017); consolidated version of 26 October 2006 (RS no. 110/2006, 11328) art. 26:

Art. 6:101, Notes I 6

Penal Code [Kazenski zakonik – CP ] of 13 October 1994 (RS no. 63/1994); now replaced by the new Penal Code of 4 June 2008 (RS no. 55/2008, 5865), in force since 1 November 2008 art. 11:

Art. 5:202, Notes I 5

Spain Air Navigation Act [Ley 48/1960, de navegación aérea] of 21 July 1960 (BOE no. 176 of 23 July 1960) art. 120: art. 123:

Art. 5:302, Notes 3 Art. 6:105, Notes 3

Allowances and Assistance to the Victims of Violent Crimes and Crimes against Sexual Liberty Act [Ley 35/1995, de ayudas y asistencia a las víctimas de delitos violentos y contra la libertad sexual] of 11 December 1995 (BOE no. 296 of 12 December 1995) generally:

Art. 6:103, Notes 3

Anti-Trust Act [Ley 16/1989, de Defensa de la Competencia – LDC ] of 17 of July (BOE no. 170 of 18 July 1989); repealed by Ley 15/2007, de Defensa de la Competencia, of 3 July (BOE no. 159 of 4 July 2000) generally:

Art. 2:208, Notes 3

Assets of the Public Administration Act [Ley 33/2003, del patrimonio de las Administraciones públicas] of 3 November 2003 (BOE no. 264 of 4 November 2003) art. 17: art. 139:

Art. 3:208, Notes 2 Art. 3:208, Notes 2

Car Park Contract Act [Ley 40/2002, reguladora del contrato de aparcamiento de vehículos] of 14 November 2002 (BOE no. 274 of 15 November) art. 3: art. 5:

Art. 2:206, Notes I 2 Art. 2:206, Notes I 2

Catalan Civil Code [Llei 29/2002, primera llei del Codi civil de Catalunya] of 30 December 2002 (DOGC no. 3798 of 13 January 2003; BOE no. 32 of 6 February 2003); [ Llei 5/2006, del llibre cinquè del Codi civil de Catalunya, relatiu als drets reals ] of 10 May (DOGC no. 4640 of 24 May 2006); [Llei 4/2008, del llibre tercer del Codi civil de Catalunya, relatiu a les persones jurídiques] of 24 April 2008 (DOGC no. 5123 of 2 May 2008); Llei 10/2008, del llibre quart del Codi civil de Catalunya, relatiu a les successions (DOGC no. 5175 of 17 July 2008) art. 546-12: art. 546-13: art. 546-14:

1146

Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:202, Notes III 20 3:206, Notes 3 2:206, Notes III 30; Art. 3:206, Notes 3; Art. 5:201, Notes 2; 6:301, Notes 2

Table of Codes and Statutes (Spain)

Civil Code [Código Civil – CC ] of 24 July 1889 (Gaceta de Madrid no. 206 of 25 July 1889) generally: art. 1: art. 3: art. 7: art. 184: art. 348: art. 389: art. 431: art. 443: art. 477: art. 484: art. 499: art. 902: art. 903: art. 1092: art. 1093: art. 1096: art. 1101: art. 1102: art. 1103: art. 1104: art. 1105: art. 1106: art. 1107: art. 1108: art. 1112: art. 1137: art. 1138: art. 1142: art. 1145: art. 1255: art. 1269: art. 1486: art. 1490: art. 1561: art. 1591: art. 1602: art. 1625: art. 1784: art. 1891: art. 1893: art. 1902:

Art. 3:204, Notes V 46; Art. 5:102, Notes I 17; Art. 5:202, Notes I 2 Art. 7:102, Notes 2 Art. 5:301, Notes 3; Art. 7:101, Notes 1 Art. 5:102, Notes II 17; Art. 5:201, Notes 2; Art. 6:301, Notes 2 Art. 5:201, Notes 2 Art. 2:206, Notes I 2 Art. 3:202, Notes 3; Art. 6:301, Notes 2 Art. 3:203, Notes 3 Art. 3:203, Notes 3 Art. 4:101, Notes II 18 Art. 5:302, Notes 3 Art. 5:302, Notes 3 Art. 2:202, Notes IV 31 Art. 2:202, Notes IV 31 Art. 1:101, Notes II 2, IV 20 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 18 Art. 5:302, Notes 3; Art. 6:101, Notes I 3 Art. 1:103, Notes II 20; Art. 2:101, Notes I 4; Art. 5:102, Notes I 2 Art. 5:401, Notes 3 Art. 5:102, Notes I 2; Art. 6:202, Notes 2 Art. 3:102, Notes I 4 Art. 5:102, Notes I 2; Art. 5:302, Notes 3 Art. 2:101, Notes I 4, III 23 Art. 2:101, Notes I 4 Art. 2:101, Notes I 4 Art. 6:106, Notes 2 Art. 6:105, Notes 3 Art. 6:105, Notes 3 Art. 6:104, Notes 3 Art. 6:105, Notes 3 Art. 5:401, Notes 3 Art. 2:210, Notes 2 Art. 1:103, Notes II 20 Art. 1:103, Notes II 20 Art. 5:302, Notes 3 Art. 1:103, Notes II 20 Art. 5:302, Notes 3 Art. 5:302, Notes 3 Art. 5:302, Notes 3 Art. 5:302, Notes 3 Art. 5:202, Notes III 20 Chap. 1, Introd. B 6; Art. 1:101, Notes III 12, IV 18, V 27; Art. 1:103, Notes IV 40; Art. 2:101, Notes I 4, V 38, VII 59; Art. 2:201, Notes I 1; Art. 2:202, Notes II 7; Art. 2:206, Notes I 2; Art. 2:210, Notes 2; Chap. 3, Introd. B 5; Art. 3:101, Notes 3; Art. 3:102, Notes I 4, II 17, II 18, III 30; Art. 3:103, Notes I 3;

1147

Annexes

art. 1903:

art. 1904: art. 1905: art. 1907: art. 1908: art. 1909: art. 1910:

Art. 3:104, Notes II 20; Art. 3:201, Notes II 17; Art. 3:205, Notes 3; Art. 3:206, Notes 3; Art. 3:208, Notes 2; Art. 5:102, Notes I 2; Art. 5:301, Notes 3; Art. 6:101, Notes II 16; Art. 6:302, Notes 2; Art. 7:104, Notes 4 Art. 1:101, Notes V 27, VI 40; Chap. 3, Introd. B 5; Art. 3:104, Notes I 3, 4, II 20; Art. 3:201, Notes I 3, II 17; Art. 3:205, Notes 3; Art. 3:208, Notes 2; Art. 5:301, Notes 3; Art. 7:104, Notes 4 Art. 3:104, Notes II 20; Art. 3:201, Notes I 3 Art. 3:203, Notes 3; Art. 3:208, Notes 2; Art. 5:302, Notes 3 Art. 3:202, Notes 3 Chap. 3, Introd. B 5; Art. 3:206, Notes 3; Art. 3:207, Notes 2; Art. 5:302, Notes 3 Art. 3:202, Notes 3 Art. 3:207, Notes 2

Civil Protection of the Rights to Honour, to Private Life and to one’s own Image Act [Ley Orgánica 1/1982 de protección civil del derecho al honor, a la intimidad personal y familiar y a la propria imagen] of 5 May 1982 (BOE no. 115 of 14 May 1982) generally: art. 1: art. 2: art. 4: art. 5: art. 7: art. 8: art. 9:

art. 184:

Art. 1:103, Notes III 29; Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (3) 80; Art. 2:203, Notes III 22; Art. 2:204, Notes I 2; Art. 3:206, Notes 3 Art. 2:205, Notes 2 Art. 5:101, Notes I 2; Art. 5:201, Notes 2; Art. 5:203, Notes 3 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (2) 74 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (2) 74 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 68; Art. 2:203, Notes III 22, IV 32; Art. 2:205, Notes 2 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 68 Art. 1:102, Notes I 3; Art. 2:101, Notes II 17, V 39, VIII (2) 74; Art. 2:205, Notes 2; Art. 6:101, Notes I 3, II 16; Art. 6:204, Notes 2; Art. 6:301, Notes 2 Art. 5:201, Notes 2

Civil Registry Act [Ley del Registro Civil] of 8 July 1957 (BOE no. 151 of 10 June 1957) art. 53:

Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 67; Art. 2:203, Notes II 7

Coast Act [Ley 22/1988, de Costas] of 28 July 1988 (BOE no. 181 of 29 July 1988) art. 95: art. 100:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 4 Art. 2:209, Notes II 4

Code of Civil Procedure [Ley 1/2000, de enjuiciamiento civil – CCP ] of 7 January 2000 (BOE no. 7 of 8 January 2000, 575, adjusted by BOE no. 90, 15278 of 14 April 2000, in force since 1 January 2001) art. 217: art. 250: art. 477: art. 721:

1148

Art. 1:101, Notes VI 29; Art. 4:101, Notes III 29 Art. 6:301, Notes 2 Art. 4:101, Notes II 18 Art. 6:301, Notes 2

Table of Codes and Statutes (Spain)

Constitution [Consticución Española – Const.] of 27 December 1978, amended by 27 August 1992, BOE no. 311.1. art. 10: art. 14: art. 15: art. 18: art. 20: art. 43: art. 45: art. 121: art. 149:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:201, Notes IV 17 2:203, Notes II 7 2:201, Notes I 1, IV 17; Art. 2:203, Notes II 7 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 68; Art. 2:203, Notes II 7, III 22; 2:204, Notes I 2; Art. 5:203, Notes 3 2:204, Notes I 2; Art. 5:203, Notes 3 2:201, Notes I 1, IV 17 2:209, Notes II 4 7:103, Notes 4 7:102, Notes 2

Construction Act [Ley 38/1999, de Ordenación de la Edificación – LOE ] of 5 November 1999 (BOE no. 266 of 6 November 1999) art. 17: art. 18:

Art. 1:103, Notes II 20; Art. 6:105, Notes 3 Art. 1:103, Notes II 20

Consumer Protection Act 1984 [Ley 26/1984, General para la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios] of 19 July 1984 (BOE no. 176 of 24 July 1984); repealed by Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2007, cf. Consumer Protection Act 2007 art. 3: art. 11 art. 28:

Art. 2:201, Notes I 1 Art. 2:201, Notes I 1 Art. 3:207, Notes 2

Consumer Protection Act [Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2007, que aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de los consumidores y usuarios y otras leyes complementarias – ConsProtA] of 16 November 2007 (BOE no. 287 of 30 November 2007) generally: art. 86: art. 129: art. 132: art. 140: art. 141: art. 145: art. 148:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:204, Notes I 1 5:401, Notes 3 3:204, Notes II (2) 21, III 30 6:105, Notes 3 3:204, Notes IV 36 3:204, Notes II (1) 6, V 46 5:102, Notes I 2 3:207, Notes 2

Copyright Act [Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1996, que aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual aprobada por la Ley 22/1987, de 11 de noviembre, que regulariza, aclara y armoniza las disposiciones legales y vigentes sobre la materia – LPI ] of 12 April 1996 (BOE no. 97 of 22 April 1996) generally: art. 31: art. 31bis: art. 32: art. 139: art. 140:

Art. 1:103, Notes Art. 5:201, Notes Art. 5:201, Notes Art. 5:201, Notes Art. 6:301, Notes Art. 6:101, Notes

III 29

2 2 2 2 II 16

1149

Annexes

Criminal Liability of Minors Act [Ley Orgánica 5/2000, que regula la Responsabilidad Penal de los Menores] of 12 January 2000 (BOE no. 11 of 13 January 2000) generally: art. 1: art. 3: art. 61:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:104, Notes 3:103, Notes 3:103, Notes 3:103, Notes

I3 I3 I3 I 3; Art. 3:104, Notes I 4; Art. 6:202, Notes 2

Data Protection Act [Ley Orgánica 15/1999, de Protección de Datos de Carácter Personal] of 13 December 1999 (BOE no. 298 of 14 December 1999) art. 10: art. 19:

Art. 2:205, Notes 2 Art. 2:205, Notes 2

Employment Contract Act [Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1995 por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley del Estatuto de los Trabajadores] of 24 March 1995 art. 2:

Art. 3:201, Notes I 3

Environmental Liability Act [Ley 26/2007, de responsabilidad medioambiental] of 23 October 2007 (BOE no. 225 of 24 October 2007) generally:

Art. 2:209, Notes I 1

General Regime of Public Administrations Act [Ley 30/1992, de régimen jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas y procedimiento administrativo común – LRJ-PAC ] of 26 November 1992 (BOE no. 285 of 27 November 1992) art. 139: art. 141: art. 144: art. 145:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

7:103, Notes 4 3:204, Notes IV 36; Art. 6:203, Notes 3 7:103, Notes 4 7:103, Notes 4

Genetically modified Organisms Act [Ley 9/2003, por la que se establece el régimen jurídico de la utilización confinada, liberación voluntaria y comercialización de organismos modificados genéticamente] of 25 April 2003 (BOE no. 100 of 26 April 2003) art. 38:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 4

Hunting Act [Ley 1/1970, de caza] of 4 April 1970 (BOE no. 82 of 6 April 1970) art. 33:

Art. 3:207, Notes 2; Art 4:103, Notes 3; Art. 5:302, Notes 3

Implementation Concerning the Cover of the Risk of Nuclear Damages Regulation [Decreto 2177/1967, reglamento sobre cobertura del riesgo de daños nucleares] of 22 July 1967 (BOE no. 223 of 18 September 1967) art. 29:

Art. 6:106, Notes 2

Insurance Contract Act [Ley 50/1980, de Contrato de Seguro] of 8 October 1980 (BOE no. 250 of 17 October 1980) art. 19: art. 26: art. 76:

1150

Art. 3:101, Notes 3 Art. 6:103, Notes 3 Art. 3:101, Notes 3

Table of Codes and Statutes (Spain)

Integrated Prevention and Control of Contaminations Act [Ley 16/2002, de prevención y control integrados de la contaminación] of 1 July 2002 (BOE no. 157 of 2 July 2002) art. 36:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 4

Labour Law (Strike) Reform Act [Real Decreto-Ley 17/1977, que reforma la normative sobre relaciones de trabajo] of 4 May 1977 (BOE no. 58 of 9 March 1977) art. 7:

Art. 7:104, Notes 4

Labour Procedure Act [Real Decreto Legislativo 2/1995, que aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de Procedimiento Laboral] of 7 April 1995 (BOE no. 86 of 11 April 1995) art. 2:

Art. 7:104, Notes 4

Liability and Insurance for Motor Vehicle Traffic Act [Real Decreto Legislativo 8/2004, que aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley sobre responsabilidad civil y seguro en la circulación de vehículos a motor] of 29 October 2004 (BOE no. 267 of 5 November 2004) generally: art. 1: art. 5: art. 7: Appendix in s. 1: Annex art. 1: Annex point 8: Table of Damages Table of Damages Table of Damages Table of Damages

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. I: Art. II: Art. IV: Art. VI: Art.

2:202, Notes V 43; Art. 6:203, Notes 3 3:205, Notes 3; Art 5:102, Notes I 2, III 29, IV 42; Art. 5:302, Notes 3 3:205, Notes 3 3:101, Notes 3 2:202, Notes IV 31 6:204, Notes 2 6:203, Notes 3 2:202, Notes II 7 2:202, Notes II 7 2:101, Notes IV 36; Art. 2:201, Notes V 23 2:201, Notes VII 51

Nature Reserve and Flora and Fauna Act [Ley 42/2007, del Patrimonio Natural y Biodiversidad] of 13 December 2007 (BOE no. 299 of 14 December 2007) art. 37:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 4

Nuclear Energy Act [Ley 25/1964, reguladora de la energía nuclear] of 29 April 1964 (BOE no. 107 of 4 May 1964) generally: art. 45: art. 52:

Art. 3:206, Notes 3; Art. 3:207, Notes 2 Art. 5:102, Notes I 2; Art. 5:302, Notes 3 Art. 6:105, Notes 3

Organic Act on Judiciary Power [Ley 6/1985, del poder judicial – LOPJ ] of 1 July 1985 (BOE 157 of 2 July 1985) art. 5: art. 9: art. 252:

Art. 7:101, Notes 1 Art. 7:104, Notes 4 Art. 7:103, Notes 4

Organic Act on Trade-Union Freedom [Ley Orgánica 11/1985, de libertad sindical] of 2 August 1985 (BOE no. 86 of 2 August 1985) art. 5:

Art. 7:104, Notes 4

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Annexes

Patents and Utility Models Act [Ley 11/1986, de patentes de invención y modelos de utilidad] of 20 March 1986 (BOE no. 73 of 26 March 1986) art. 62: art. 63: art. 66: art. 68: art. 72: art. 124:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

6:104, Notes 3 6:301, Notes 2 6:101, Notes II 16 6:104, Notes 3 6:104, Notes 3 6:104, Notes 3

Patients Act [Ley 41/2002, básicareguladora de la autonomía del paciente y de derechos y obligaciones en materia de información y documentación clínica] of 14 November 2002 (BOE no. 274 of 15 November 2002) art. 2: art. 8:

Art. 5:101, Notes I 2 Art. 5:101, Notes I 2

Penal Code [Nuevo Código Penal – CP ] of 24 November 1995 (Ley Orgánica 10/1995 of 23 November 1995, BOE no. 281 of 24 November 1995) art. 20: art. 109: art. 110: art. 111: art. 112: art. 113: art. 114: art. 116: art. 118: art. 120: art. 163: art. 197: art. 199: art. 200: art. 208: art. 248: art. 251: art. 277:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:202, Notes I 2, III 20 2:203, Notes I 1; Art. 2:206, Notes I 2 2:101, Notes V 39; Art. 2:206, Notes I 2; Art. 6:101, Notes I 3 2:206, Notes I 2; Art. 6:101, Notes I 3 2:206, Notes I 2 2:202, Notes II 7 5:102, Notes I 2 4:102, Notes 3; Art. 6:105, Notes 3 5:202, Notes I 2, III 20; Art. 5:301, Notes 3 3:201, Notes I 3; Art. 3:205, Notes 3; Art. 5:301, Notes 3 2:203, Notes I 1 2:205, Notes 2 2:205, Notes 2 2:205, Notes 2 2:203, Notes IV 32 2:210, Notes 2 2:210, Notes 2 2:205, Notes 2

Penal Code (Old Version) [Código Penal – CP (old)] of 14 September 1973 (BOE no. 297-300, 12-15 December 1973) art. 20:

Art. 5:301, Notes 3

Press and Printing Act [Ley 14/1966, de prensa e imprenta] of 18 March 1966 (BOE no. 67 of 19 March 1966) art. 65:

1152

Art. 6:105, Notes 3

Table of Codes and Statutes (Spain)

Products Liability Act [Ley 22/1994, de Responsibilidad Civil por los Daños Causados por Productos Defectuosos – LRCP ] of 6 July 1994 (BOE no. 161 of 7 July 1994) repealed by Consumers Protection Act 2007 generally: art. 6: art. 9: art. 10: art. 11:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:204, Notes I 1 3:204, Notes IV 36 5:102, Notes I 2 3:204, Notes II (1) 6, (2) 21, III 30 3:204, Notes V 46

Retraction Act [Ley Orgánica 2/1984 reguladora del derecho de rectificación] of 26 March 1984 (BOE no. 74 of 27 March 1984) generally:

Art. 6:101, Notes I 3

Road Traffic Liability Regulations [Real Decreto 1507/2008, que aprueba el Reglamento sobre la responsabilidad civil y seguro en la circulación de vehículos a motor] of 12 September 2008 (BOE no. 222 of 13 September 2008) art. 1: art. 2:

Art. 3:205, Notes 3 Art. 3:205, Notes 3

Services of Information Companies and Electronic Commerce Act [Ley 34/2002, de servicios de la sociedad de la información y de comercio electrónico] of 11 July 2002 (BOE no. 166 of 12 July 2002) generally: art. 16: art. 17:

Art. 2:204, Notes IV 37 Art. 2:204, Notes IV 37 Art. 2:204, Notes IV 37

Social Benefits for Persons with Haemophilia and other Congenital Diseases Act [Ley 14/2002, que establece ayudas sociales a las personas con hemofilia u otras coagulopatías congénitas que hayan desarrollado hepatitis C como consecuencia de haber recibido tratamiento con concentrados de factores de coagulación en el ámbito del sistema sanitario público, y otras normas tributarias] of 5 June 2002 (BOE no. 135 of 6 June 2002) generally: art. 3:

Art. 7:105, Notes 2 Art. 7:105, Notes 2

Social Insurance Act [Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1994, que aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley General de Seguridad Social] of 20 June 1994 (BOE no. 154 of 29 June 1994) art. 127: art. 115:

Art. 2:201, Notes V 23 Art. 5:302, Notes 3

Solidarity with the Victims of Terrorism Act [Ley 32/1999, de solidaridad con las víctimas del terrorismo] of 8 October 1999 (BOE no. 242 of 9 October 1999) generally: art. 6: art. 8: Annex I:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

6:103, 6:106, 6:106, 6:106,

Notes 3 Notes 2 Notes 2 Notes 2

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Annexes

Trademarks Act [Ley 17/2001, de marcas] of 7 December 2001 (BOE no. 294 of 8 December 2001) art. 41: art. 43: art. 46:

Art. 6:301, Notes 2 Art. 6:101, Notes II 16 Art. 6:104, Notes 3

Unfair Competition Act [Ley 3/1991, de Competencia Desleal – LCD ] of 10 January 1991 (BOE no. 10 of 11 January) art. 2: art. 3: art. 5: art. 9: art. 14: art. 16: art. 17:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:208, Notes 2:208, Notes 2:208, Notes 2:208, Notes 2:208, Notes 2:208, Notes 2:208, Notes

3 3 3 3 3; Art. 2:211, Notes 3 3 3

Urban Solid Waste Management (Galicia) Act [Ley 10/1997, del Parlamento de Galicia, de residuos sólidos urbanos] of 22 August 1997 (DO Galicia no. 168 of 2 September) art. 10:

Art. 3:208, Notes 2

Waste (Management) Act [Ley 10/1998, de Residuos] of 21 April 1998 (BOE no. 96 of 22 April 1998) art. 36:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 4

Waste Management (Madrid) Act [Ley 5/2003 de la Comunidad de Madrid, de residuos de la Comunidad de Madrid] of 20 May 2003 (BO Comunidad de Madrid no. 76 of 31 March 2003) art. 25:

Art. 3:208, Notes 2

Water Act [Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2001, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de Aguas] of 20 July 2001 (BOE no. 176 of 24 July 2001) art. 118:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 4

Working Document [Documento de trabajo] of 14 April 2005 for the implementation of Directive 2004/35/ EC art. 3(2):

Art. 2:209, Notes I 2

Sweden Amendment of the Environmental Code Act [Lag om ändring av miljöbalken] of 20 June 2007 (SFS 2007:660) generally:

Art. 2:209, Notes I 1

Ancient Land Code [Byggningabalken] of 23 January 1736 (SFS 1736:0123.1) chap. 22 § 7: chap. 22 § 8:

1154

Art. 3:203, Notes 13 Art. 3:203, Notes 13

Table of Codes and Statutes (Sweden)

Banking and Financial Efficacy Act [Lag om bank- och finansieringsrörelse] of 19 May 2004 (SFS 2004:297) chap. 1 § 10:

Art. 2:205, Notes 10

Code of Judicial Procedure [Rättegångsbalk] of 18 July 1942 (SFS 1942:740) chap. 15 § 3: chap. 35 § 5:

Art. 1:102, Notes I 9; Art. 6:301, Notes 10 Art. 2:101, Notes IV 34

Contracts Act [Lag om avtal och andra rättshandlingar på förmögenhetsrättens område – ContrA] of 11 June 1915 (SFS 1915:218) § 25: § 30:

Art. 2:210, Notes 11 Art. 2:210, Notes 11

Competition Act [Konkurrenslagen] of 14 January 1993 (SFS 1993:20); repealed by [Konkurrenslag] of 6 June 2008 (SFS 2008:579) § 23: § 33:

Art. 1:102, Notes I 9 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 21; Art. 2:208, Notes 12

Consumer Sales Act [Konsumentköplagen – KKL ] of 6 September 1990 (SFS 1990:932) § 31:

Art. 1:103, Notes I 12

Control of Air Pollution Act [Renhållningslagen] (SFS 1979:596) § 18: § 19:

Art. 3:102, Notes II 25 Art. 3:102, Notes II 25

Copyright Act [Lag om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk] of 30 December 1960 (SFS 1960:729) § 53a:

Art. 1:102, Notes I 9

Credit Information Act [Kreditupplysningslag] of 14 December 1973 (SFS 1973:1173) § 1: § 21:

Art. 2:204, Notes I 11 Art. 2:203, Notes II 15; Art. 2:204, Notes I 11

Damages Liability Act [Skadeståndslag – SKL ] of 2 June 1972 (SFS 1972:207) generally: chap. 1 § 1: chap. 1 § 2: chap. 2: chap. 2 § 1: chap. 2 § 2: chap. 2 § 3:

chap. 2 § 4: chap. 3 § 1:

Art. 3:205, Notes 14 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 21; Art. 1:103, Notes I 12 Art. 2:101, Notes III 31 Art. 2:101, Notes I 12 Art. 1:101, Notes II 6, IV 18; Art. 2:201, Notes II 5; Art. 2:206, Notes I 12; Art. 3:103, Notes I 12 Art. 2:204, Notes I 11, II 24, IV 43; Art. 2:205, Notes 10; Art. 2:210, Notes 11; Art. 3:103, Notes I 12 Art. 2:101, Notes V 49; Art. 2:203, Notes I 2, II 15, III 27, IV 39; Art. 2:205, Notes 10; Art. 3:103, Notes I 12; Art. 3:201, Notes I 12; Art. 5:301, Notes 13; Art. 6:102, Notes 10; Art. 7:103, Notes 13 Art. 3:103, Notes I 12 Art. 2:201, Notes II 5; Art. 3:201, Notes I 12; Art. 7:103, Notes 13

1155

Annexes chap. 3 § 2: chap. 3 § 3: chap. 3 § 6: chap. 4 § 1: chap. 5: chap. 5 § 1: chap. 5 chap. 5 chap. 5 chap. 5 chap. 5

§ 2: § 3: § 4: § 6: § 7:

chap. 6 § 1: chap. 6 chap. 6 chap. 6 chap. 6

§ 2: § 3: § 4: § 5:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

7:103, Notes 13 7:103, Notes 13 5:102, Notes I 13 7:104, Notes 11 2:101, Notes I 12 2:101, Notes IV 36, V 49; Art. 2:201, Notes II 5, V 33, VI 46, VII 61; 3:204, Notes III 31; Art. 5:102, Notes II 25 2:202, Notes II 17, IV 39, V 52 2:201, Notes V 33; Art. 2:202, Notes V 52; Art. 6:103, Notes 13 2:201, Notes V 33; Art. 6:203, Notes 12 2:203, Notes IV 39; Art. 6:101, Notes I 12 2:101, Notes IV 35; Art. 2:206, Notes I 12, III 39; 2:208, Notes 12; Art. 6:101, Notes I 12 2:201, Notes II 5; Art. 5:101, Notes II 27; 5:102, Notes I 13, IV 52; Art. 5:501, Notes 7 6:202, Notes 11 2:202, Notes III 27; Art. 6:106, Notes 11 6:105, Notes 13 3:201, Notes I 12

Design Protection Act [Mönsterskyddslag] of 29 June 1970 (SFS 1970:485) § 35a:

Art. 1:102, Notes I 9

E-commerce Act [Lag om elektronisk handel och andra informationssamhällets tjänster] of 6 June 2002 (SFS 2002:562) § 16:

Art. 2:204, Notes IV 43

Electricity Act [Ellag] of 20 November 1997 (SFS 1997:857) chap. 10:

Art. 3:206, Notes 13

Electronic Communication Act [Lag om elektronisk kommunikation] of 12 June 2003 (SFS 2003:389) chap. 7 § 15:

Art. 2:205, Notes 10

Environmental Code [Miljöbalk] of 11 June 1998 (SFS 1998:808) chap. 2 § 8: chap. 10: chap. 10 § 3: chap. 26 § 9: chap. 26 § 17: chap. 26 § 18: chap. 32: chap. 32 chap. 32 chap. 32 chap. 32

1156

§ 1: § 3: § 4: § 5:

Art. 2:209, Notes II 12 Art. 2:209, Notes II 12 Art. 2:209, Notes II 12; Art. 3:206, Notes 13 Art. 2:209, Notes II 12 Art. 2:209, Notes II 12 Art. 2:209, Notes II 12 Art. 3:202, Notes 13; Art. 3:201, Notes I 12; Art. 3:206, Notes 13; Art. 3:208, Notes 8; Art. 6:102, Notes 10 Art. 3:206, Notes 13 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 43; Art. 3:206, Notes 13; Art. 4:101, Notes III 36 Art. 3:206, Notes 13 Art. 3:206, Notes 13

Table of Codes and Statutes (Sweden) chap. 32 § 12: chap. 33: chap. 33 § 1: chap. 33 § 3:

Art. 1:102, Notes I 9 Art. 3:206, Notes 13 Art. 2:209, Notes II 12 Art. 2:209, Notes II 12

Financial Advice to Consumers Act [Lag om finansiell rådgivning till konsumenter] of 20 November 2003 (SFS 2003:862) § 1:

Art. 2:207, Notes 11

Freedom of the Press Act [Tryckfrihetsförordningen] of 5 April 1949 (SFS 1949:105) generally: chap. 1 § 1: chap. 3: chap. 7 § 4: chap. 11:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:203, Notes II 15 5:203, Notes 13 5:203, Notes 13 2:204, Notes I 11; Art. 5:203, Notes 13 5:203, Notes 13; Art. 2:204, Notes I 11

Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression [Yttrandefrihetsgrundlag] of 14 November 1991 (SFS 1991:1469) generally: chap. 1 § 2: chap. 8:

Art. 2:203, Notes II 15Art. 2:204, Notes I 11 Art. 5:203, Notes 13 Art. 5:203, Notes 13

Good Faith Acquisition of Personal Property Act [Lag om godtrosförvärv av lösöre] of 13 December 1986 (SFS 1986:796) § 2:

Art. 2:211, Notes 12

Insurance Contracts Act [Lag om försäkringsavtal – FAL ] of 8 April 1927 (SFS 1927:77); repealed by Försäkringsavtalslag of 10 March 2005 (SFS 2005:104) generally: chap. 4 § 9: chap. 6 § 1: chap. 6 § 2: chap. 9 § 1:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:301, Notes 13 3:103, Notes I 12 6:101, Notes I 12 6:101, Notes I 12 6:104, Notes 11

Land Code [ Jordabalk – JB ] of 17 December 1970 (SFS 1970:994) § 3: chap. 3 § 1: chap. 3 § 3: chap. 3 § 4: chap. 17 § 1: chap. 17 § 2:

Art. 3:202, Notes 13 Art. 6:102, Notes 10 Art. 1:102, Notes I 9 Art. 1:102, Notes I 9 Art. 2:211, Notes 12 Art. 2:211, Notes 12

Liability for Damage Caused in the Course of Aviation Act [Lag angående ansvarighet för skada i följd av luftfart] of 26 May 1922 (SFS 1922:382) generally: § 2:

Art. 3:206, Notes 13; Art. 3:207, Notes 10 Art. 5:102, Notes IV 52

1157

Annexes

Liability for Electronic Message Boards Act [Lag om ansvar för elektroniska anslagstavlor] of 12 March 1998 (SFS 1998:112) § 1: § 2: § 4: § 5: § 6: § 7:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:204, Notes 2:204, Notes 2:204, Notes 2:204, Notes 2:204, Notes 2:204, Notes

IV IV IV IV IV IV

43 43 43 43 43 43

Maritime Code [Sjölag] of 9 June 1994 (SFS 1994:1009) generally: chap. 7: chap. 8 § 1: chap. 10:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:201, Notes I 12 3:207, Notes 10 5:102, Notes IV 52 3:206, Notes 13; Art. 3:207, Notes 10

Marketing Act [Marknadsföringslag] of 27 April 1995 (SFS 1995:450); replaced by Marknadsföringslag of 5 June 2008 (SFS 2008:486) § 14: § 20: § 21: § 29:

Art. 1:102, Notes I 9 Art. 1:102, Notes I 9 Art. 1:102, Notes I 9 Art. 2:101, Notes V 49, VI 54; Art. 2:208, Notes 12

Names and Pictures in Advertising Act [Lag om namn och bild i reklam] of 22 February 1978 (SFS 1978:800) generally:

Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 67; Art. 2:203, Notes II 15

Nuclear Liability Act [Atomansvarighetslag] of 8 March 1968 (SFS 1968:45) § 5:

Art. 3:206, Notes 13

Parental Code [Föräldrabalk] of 10 June 1949 (SFS 1949:381) and (SFS 1995:974) chap. 9 § 7: chap. 6 § 2:

Art. 2:210, Notes 11 Art. 3:102, Notes II 25; Art. 3:104, Notes I 14, II 29

Patents Act [Patentlag] of 1 December 1967 (SFS 1967:837) § 57a:

Art. 1:102, Notes I 9

Patient Injuries Act [ Patientskadelag – PL ] of 19 June 1996 (SFS 1996:799) § 6:

Art. 1:101, Notes VI 43; Art. 4:101, Notes III 36

Peaceful Enjoyment of Property Act [Lag om ägofred] of 2 June 1933 (SFS 1933:269) § 47:

Art. 3:203, Notes 13

Penal Code [Brottsbalk – CP ] of 21 December 1962 (SFS 1962:700) chap. 4 § 8: chap. 4 § 9: chap. 4 § 9c: chap. 5 § 1:

1158

Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:205, Notes 2:205, Notes 2:205, Notes 2:204, Notes

10 10 10 II 24

Table of Codes and Statutes (Sweden) chap. 5 § 4: chap. 9 § 1: chap. 20 § 3: chap. 24 § 1: chap. 24 § 4:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:101, Notes VIII (2) 76 2:210, Notes 11 2:205, Notes 10 5:202, Notes I 12 5:202, Notes III 30

Personal Data Act [Personuppgiftslag] of 29 April 1998 (SFS 1998:204) § 48:

Art. 2:203, Notes II 15

Prison Treatment Act [Lag om kriminalvård i anstalt] of 19 April 1974 (SFS 1974:203) generally:

Art. 3:104, Notes II 29

Products Liability Act [Produktansvarslag] of 23 January 1992 (SFS 1992:18) generally: § 1: § 8: § 8:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes 3:204, Notes

I1 II (2) 27 II (1) 15 IV 42

Prohibition of Discrimination Act [Lagen om förbud mot diskriminering] of 12 June 2003 (SFS 2003:307) § 16: § 21:

Art. 2:203, Notes II 15 Art. 2:203, Notes II 15

Protection of Commercial Secrets Act [Lag om skydd för företagshemligheter] of 31 May 1990 (SFS 1990:409) § 5: § 6: § 7: § 8: § 9: § 19:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:205, Notes 2:205, Notes 2:205, Notes 2:205, Notes 2:205, Notes 2:205, Notes

10; Art. 10; Art. 10; Art. 10; Art. 10; Art. 10; Art.

2:208, Notes 2:208, Notes 2:208, Notes 2:208, Notes 2:208, Notes 2:208, Notes

12 12 12 12 12 12

Public Road Act [Väglagen] of 10 December 1971 (SFS 1971:948) § 26:

Art. 3:102, Notes II 25

Railway Traffic Act [ Järnvägstrafiklag] of 11 April 1985 (SFS 1985:192) chap. 5 § 1: chap. 5 § 3:

Art. 3:207, Notes 10 Art. 5:102, Notes IV 52

Supervision of Dogs and Cats Act [Lag om tillsyn över hundar och katter] of 30 June 1943 (SFS 1943:459) repealed by Lag om tillsyn över hundar och katter of 29 November 2007 (SFS 2007:1150) § 1: § 6: § 19:

Art. 3:203, Notes 13 Art. 3:203, Notes 13 Art. 3:203, Notes 13

1159

Annexes

The Instrument of Government [Regeringsformen] of 28 February 1974 (SFS 1974:152) chap. 2 § 18:

Art. 5:201, Notes 12

Trademark Act [Varumärkeslag] of 2 December 1960 (SFS 1960:644) § 37a:

Art. 1:102, Notes I 9

Traffic Damages Act [Trafikskadelag] of 15 December 1975 (SFS 1975:1410) generally: § 10 § 11: § 12: § 18:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:206, Notes 13 3:205, Notes 14; Art. 5:102, Notes IV 52 3:205, Notes 14 3:205, Notes 14; Art. 5:101, Notes II 27; 5:102, Notes III 39, IV 52 5:102, Notes IV 52

United Kingdom Access to Neighbouring Land Act 1992 (1992 c. 23) (Royal Assent on 16th March 1992) generally:

Art. 5:201, Notes 13

Administration of Justice Act 1982 (1982 c. 53) (Royal Assent on 28th October 1982, Act not wholly in force) generally: s. 4: s. 6: s. 7: s. 8: s. 9: s. 10: s. 13:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:202, Notes II 19, V 53 6:101, Notes I 13 6:203, Notes 13 2:201, Notes VI 47 2:201, Notes VI 47 2:201, Notes V 34 2:201, Notes V 34 2:201, Notes VI 47

Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 (1991 c. 50) (Royal Assent on 25th July 1991) s. 1:

Art. 3:301, Notes I 15

Animals Act 1971 (1971 c. 22) (Royal Assent on 12th May 1971) generally: s. 2: s. 3: s. 5: s. 6: s. 9: s. 10: s. 11:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:302, Notes 14 3:203, Notes 14; Art. 5:101, Notes II 28 3:203, Notes 14 3:203, Notes 14; Art. 5:101, Notes II 28 3:203, Notes 14; Art. 3:208, Notes 9; Art. 5:101, Notes II 28 5:202, Notes I 13 5:102, Notes I 14 3:203, Notes 14

Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 (1987 c. 9) (Royal Assent on 9th April 1987) s. 1: s. 2:

1160

Art. 3:203, Notes 16; Art. 5:102, Notes I 14; Art. 5:101, Notes II 29

Table of Codes and Statutes (United Kingdom) s. 3: s. 4:

Art. 3:203, Notes 16 Art. 5:202, Notes I 13,

Bill of Rights 1688 (1 Will & Mar Sess 2 c. 2) art. 9:

Art. 7:103, Notes 14

Children Act 1989 (1989 c. 41) (Royal Assent on 16th November 1989) s. 105:

Art. 3:103, Notes I 13

Civil Aviation Act 1982 (1982 c. 16) (Royal Assent on 27th May 1982) s. 76:

Art. 3:206, Notes 16; Art. 6:102, Notes 11

Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (1978 c. 47) (Royal Assent on 31st July 1978) generally: s. 1: s. 2:

Art. 7:104, Notes 14 Art. 6:105, Notes 14 Art. 6:105, Notes 14

Civil Partnership Act 2004 (2004 c. 33) (Royal Assent on 18th November 2004) generally:

Art. 2:202, Notes II 19; V53

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 no. 3132 L.17) (Made on 19th December 1998; in force since 26th April 1999) generally: Part 41:

Art. 6:101, Notes I 13 Art. 6:203, Notes I 13

Companies Act 1989 (1989 c. 40) (Royal Assent on 16th November 1989; wholly in force since 10th August 1998; partly repealed) s. 108:

Art. 1:103, Notes IV 41

Companies Act 2006 (2006 c. 46) (Royal Assent on 8th November 2006) s. 39:

Art. 3:201, Notes II 27

Compensation Act 2006 (2006 c. 29) (Royal Assent on 25th July 2006) s. 3:

Art. 4:103, Notes 13

Consumer Protection Act 1987 (1987 c. 43) (Royal Assent on 15th May 1987; wholly in force since 1st March 1989) generally: s. 2: s. 4 s. 5: s. 6:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

3:204, Notes I 1, V 45 2:202, Notes II 19 3:204, Notes IV 43 3:204, Notes II (1) 16, (2) 28 2:101, Notes V 50; Art. 5:102, Notes I 14

Consumer Protection (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 (SI 1987 no. 2049 (NI 20)) (Made on 26th November 1987, inter alia Parts I and II in force since 1st March 1988) generally: art. 7:

Art. 3:204, Notes I 1, V 45 Art. 3:204, Notes IV 43

1161

Annexes art. 8: art. 9b:

Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 16, (2) 28 Art. 3:204, Notes II (1) 16

Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (1988 c. 48) (Royal Assent on 15th November 1988) s. 96:

Art. 6:101, Notes II 26

County Courts Act 1984 (1984 c. 28) (Royal Assent on 26th June 1984) s. 38: s. 51:

Art. 6:301, Notes 13 Art. 6:203, Notes 13

Courts Act 2003 (2003 c. 39) (Royal Assent on 20th November 2003) s. 31: s. 32: s. 100:

Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 6:106, Notes 12; Art. 6:203, Notes 13

Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (2003 c. 39) (Royal Assent on 20th November 2003) s. 3: s. 23: s. 62:

Art. 6:301, Notes 11 Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 7:103, Notes 14

Criminal Law Act 1967 (1967 c. 58) (Royal Assent on 21st July 1967) s. 3:

Art. 5:201, Notes 13

Crown Proceedings Act 1947 (10 & 11 Geo. 6 c. 44) (Royal Assent on 31st July 1947; wholly in from 1st January 1948 by SI 1947/2527, art. 1) generally: s. 2:

Art. 1:103, Notes IV 41 Art. 7:103, Notes 14

Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act 1987 (1987 c. 25) (Royal Assent on 15th May 1987) generally:

Art. 7:103, Notes 14

Damages Act 1996 (1996 c. 48) (Royal Assent on 24th July 1996; in force since 24th September 1996) s. 2: s. 2B: s. 3:

Art. 6:106, Notes 12; Art. 6:203, Notes 13 Art. 6:203, Notes 13 Art. 6:203, Notes 13

Damages for Bereavement (Variation of Sum) (England and Wales) Order 2002 (SI 2002 no. 644) (Made 11th March 2002, in force since 1st April 2002) generally:

Art. 6:103, Notes 14

Damages for Bereavement (Variation of Sum) (England and Wales) Order 2007 (SI 2007 no. 3489) (Made 10th December 2007, in force since 1st January 2008) art. 2:

1162

Art. 2:202, Notes II 19

Table of Codes and Statutes (United Kingdom)

Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 (1976 c. 13) (Royal Assent on 13th April 1976) s. 1: s. 1A: s. 2: s. 2A: s. 3: s. 4: s. 6: s. 9A: s. 10: Schedule 1:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:202, Notes II 19, IV 40, V 53; 5:501, Notes 8; Art. 6:103, Notes 14 2:202, Notes III 28 2:202, Notes III 28; Art. 6:203, Notes 13 2:202, Notes III 28 2:202, Notes III 28 2:202, Notes III 28 5:501, Notes 8 2:201, Notes VII 62 2:202, Notes II 19 2:202, Notes IV 40, V 53

Damages (Scotland) Act 1993 (1993 c. 5) (Royal Assent on 18th February 1993) s. 1:

Art. 2:202, Notes II 19; Art. 6:103, Notes 14

Defamation Act 1952 (15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2 c. 66) (Royal Assent on 30th October 1952; in force since 30th November 1952) s. 2: s. 3: s. 6: s. 13: s. 14:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:101, Notes II 20 2:204, Notes I 14 5:203, Notes 14 7:103, Notes 14 2:204, Notes I 14

Defamation Act 1996 (1996 c. 31) (Royal Assent on 4th July 1996; so far as applicable, wholly in force in England and Wales from 28th February 2000 and in Scotland from 31st March 2001) generally: s. 1: s. 2: s. 4: s. 14: s. 15:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:203, Notes IV 42 2:204, Notes I 12 6:101, Notes I 13 6:101, Notes I 13 5:203, Notes 14 5:203, Notes 14

Defective Premises Act 1972 (1972 c. 35) (Royal Assent on 29th June 1972) s. 4:

Art. 3:202, Notes 14

Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 (1964 c. 81) (Royal Assent on 31st July 1964) generally:

Art. 7:103, Notes 14

Electricity Act 1989 (1989 c. 29) (Royal Assent on 27th July 1989) s. 21:

Art. 5:401, Notes 14

Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002 no. 2013) (Made on 30th July 2002; reg. 16 in force from 23rd October 2002, remainder in force from 21st August 2002) s. 17: s. 18: s. 19:

Art. 2:204, Notes IV 44 Art. 2:204, Notes IV 44 Art. 2:204, Notes IV 44

1163

Annexes

Employers’ Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 (1969 c. 37) (Royal Assent on 25th July 1969) generally: s. 1:

Art. 2:201, Notes III 15 Art. 3:207, Notes 11; Art. 5:102, Notes I 14; Art. 5:401, Notes 14

Environmental Protection Act 1990 (1990 c. 43) (Royal Assent on 1st November 1990) s. 33: s. 73:

Art. 3:206, Notes 16 Art. 3:206, Notes 16

Family Law Reform Act 1969 (1969 c. 46) (Royal Assent on 25th July 1969) s. 1:

Art. 3:103, Notes I 13

Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 (2006 asp. 2) (Royal Assent on 20th January 2006) s. 1: s. 35: s. 45: Schedule 2:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:202, Notes 2:202, Notes 2:202, Notes 2:202, Notes

II II II II

19 19, V 53 19, V 53 19, V 53

Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (1976 c. 30) (Royal Assent on 22nd July 1976) generally: s. 1: s. 2: s. 3: s. 4: s. 5:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:202, Notes II 19 2:202, Notes II 19; Art. 5:501, Notes 8 2:202, Notes V 53 2:202, Notes IV 40 6:103, Notes 14 5:501, Notes 8

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (2000 c. 8) (Royal Assent on 14th June 2000) s. 212:

Art. 6:106, Notes 12

Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 (14 Geo. 3 c. 78) s. 86:

Art. 3:206, Notes 16

Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 27) (Royal Assent on 11th May 1847) s. 56:

Art. 3:207, Notes 11

Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (1974 c. 37) (Royal Assent on 31st July 1974) generally: s. 47:

Art. 7:104, Notes 14 Art. 3:102, Notes III 39; Art. 5:401, Notes 14

Human Rights Act 1998 (1998 c. 42) (Royal Assent on 9th November 1998; wholly in force from 2nd October 2000) generally: s. 3: s. 6: s. 8:

1164

Art. Art. Art. Art.

2:203, Notes II 19, III 30; Art. 2:205, Notes 11; Art. 6:301, Notes 11 7:101, Notes 4 7:101, Notes 4; Art. 7:103, Notes 14 7:103, Notes 14

Table of Codes and Statutes (United Kingdom) s. 9: s. 21:

Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 7:102, Notes 7

Industrial and Provident Societies Act 2002 (2002 c. 20) (Royal Assent on 8th July 2002) s. 2:

Art. 7:102, Notes 7

Insolvency Act 1986 (1986 c. 45) (Royal Assent on 25th July 1986) generally:

Art. 6:106, Notes 12

Justices of the Peace Act 1997 (1997 c. 25) (Royal Assent on 19th March 1997) s. 52:

Art. 7:103, Notes 14

Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (8 & 9 Geo 6 c. 28) (Royal Assent and commencement on 15th June 1945) s. 1: s. 4: s. 5:

Art. 1:101, Notes IV 17 Art. 5:102, Notes I 14; Art. 5:103, Notes 2 Art. 5:102, Notes I 14

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 (24 & 25 Geo. 5 c. 41) (Royal Assent on 25th July 1934) s. 1:

Art. 2:202, Notes III 28, IV 40; Art. 6:101, Notes I 13

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1971 (1971 c. 43) (Royal Assent on 1st July 1971; in force from 1st August 1971) s. 4:

Art. 2:202, Notes V 53

Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 (11 & 12 Geo. 6 c. 41) (Royal Assent on 30th June 1948) s. 1: s. 2:

Art. 5:401, Notes 14; Art. 7:104, Notes 14 Art. 5:102, Notes II 26

Libel Act 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 96) (Royal Assent on 24th August 1843) s. 6:

Art. 2:203, Notes IV 40

Local Government Act 1974 (1974 c. 7) (Royal Assent on 8th February 1974) s. 32:

Art. 7:103, Notes 14

Mental Capacity Act 2005 (2005 c. 9) (Royal Assent on 7th April 2005) s. 5:

Art. 5:202, Notes II 18

Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (1995 c. 21) (Royal Assent on 19th July 1995) Part VI, Chap. III:

Art. 3:206, Notes 16

Misrepresentation Act 1967 (1957 c. 7) (Royal Assent on 22nd March 1967) s. 3:

Art. 5:401, Notes 14

1165

Annexes

National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1946 (9 & 10 Geo. 6 c. 62) (Royal Assent on 26th July 1946) generally:

Art. 7:105, Notes 4

Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (1965 c. 57) (Royal Assent on 5th August 1965) s. 12:

Art. 3:206, Notes 16

Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 (5 & 6 Eliz. 2 c. 31) (Royal Assent on 6th June 1957) generally: s. 1: s. 2:

Art. 3:208, Notes 9; Art. 5:401, Notes 14 Art. 3:202, Notes 14 Art. 3:202, Notes 14; Art. 5:101, Notes II 28

Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 (1984 c. 3) (Royal Assent on 13th March 1984) s. 1:

Art. 3:202, Notes 14; Art. 5:101, Notes II 28

Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 (8 & 9 Eliz. 2 c. 30) (Royal Assent on 2nd June 1960; in force since 2nd September 1960) generally: s. 1: s. 2:

Art. 3:203, Notes 14, 16 Art. 3:202, Notes 16 Art. 1:103, Notes IV 41; Art. 3:202, Notes 16

Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 (1967 c. 13) (Royal Assent on 22nd March 1967) s. 10:

Art. 7:103, Notes 14

Patents Act 1977 (1977 c. 37) (Royal Assent on 29th July 1977) s. 61:

Art. 6:101, Notes II 26

Police Act 1996 (1996 c. 16) (Royal Assent on 22nd May 1996) s. 88:

Art. 7:103, Notes 14

Postal Services Act 2000 (2000 c. 26) (Royal Assent on 28th July 2000) s. 90:

Art. 7:103, Notes 14

Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (1997 c. 40) (Royal Assent on 21st March 1997; wholly in force from 1st September 1998) s. 3: s. 7(3):

Art. 1:101, Notes IV 23 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 23

Regulatory Reform (Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979) Order 2002 (SI 2002 no. 1592) (Made 15th June 2002, in force since 16th June 2002) art. 2: art. 4:

Art. 7:105, Notes 4 Art. 7:105, Notes 4

Representation of the People Act 1983 (1983 c. 2) (Royal Assent on 8th February 1983) s. 63:

1166

Art. 7:103, Notes 14

Table of Codes and Statutes (United Kingdom)

Representation of the People Act 1985 (1985 c. 50) (Royal Assent on 16th July 1985) s. 24:

Art. 7:103, Notes 14

Reserve and Auxiliary Forces (Protection of Civil Interests) Act 1951 (14 & 15 Geo. 6 c. 65) (Royal Assent on 1st August 1951) s. 13:

Art. 6:101, Notes I 13

Rights of Relatives to Damages (Mesothelioma) (Scotland) Act 2007 (2007 asp. 18) (Royal Assent on 26th April 2007) s. 1:

Art. 5:501, Notes 8

Road Traffic Act 1988 (1988 c. 52) (Royal Assent on 15 November 1988) s. 149:

Art. 5:101, Notes II 28

Slander of Women Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 51) (Royal Assent on 5th August 1891) s. 1:

Art. 2:101, Notes II 20

Social Security Act 1985 (1985 c. 53) (Royal Assent on 22nd July 1985) s. 23:

Art. 7:105, Notes 4

Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997 (1997 c. 27) (Royal Assent on 19th March 1997) s. 6: s. 8: s. 17: s. 22:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

7:105, 6:103, 6:103, 7:105,

Notes 4 Notes 14 Notes 14 Notes 4

State Immunity Act 1978 (1978 c. 33) (Royal Assent on 20th July 1978; in force from 22nd November 1978) generally:

Art. 7:103, Notes 14

Statute of Frauds Amendment Act 1828 (9 Geo. 4 c. 14) (Royal Assent on 9th May 1828) s. 6:

Art. 2:210, Notes 12

Supreme Court Act 1981 (1981 c. 54) (Royal Assent on 28th July 1981) s. 32A: s. 37:

Art. 6:203, Notes 13 Art. 6:301, Notes 11

Tort (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 (1977 c. 32) (Royal Assent on 22nd July 1977) generally: s. 1: s. 2: s. 3: s. 7: s. 11:

Art. 1:101, Notes IV 23 Art. 1:101, Notes III 11 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 6:101, Notes I 13 Art. 6:104, Notes 12 Art. 2:206, Notes I 13; Art. 5:102, Notes I 14

Trade Disputes Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7 c. 47) s. 4:

Art. 1:103, Notes IV 41

1167

Annexes

Trade Marks Act 1994 (1994 c. 26) (Royal Assent on 21st July 1994) s. 31:

Art. 6:101, Notes II 26

Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (1992 c. 52) (Royal Assent on 16th July 1992; in force from 16th October 1992) s. 22: s. 23: s. 130: s. 220: s. 222:

Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.

7:104, 7:104, 7:104, 7:104, 7:104,

Notes 14 Notes 14 Notes 14 Notes 14 Notes 14

Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (1977 c. 50) (Royal Assent on 26th October 1977) s. 1: s. 2: s. 8: s. 11:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

5:401, Notes 5:101, Notes 5:401, Notes 5:401, Notes

14 II 28; Art. 5:401, Notes 14 14 14

Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 (1979 c. 17) (Royal Assent on 22nd March 1979) s. 1: s. 2: s. 3: s. 6:

Art. Art. Art. Art.

7:105, 7:105, 7:105, 7:105,

Notes 4 Notes 4 Notes 4 Notes 4

Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 Statutory Sum Order 2007 (SI 2007 no. 1931) (Made 5th July 2007, in force since 12th July 2007) art. 2:

Art. 7:105, Notes 4

Visiting Forces Act 1952 (15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2 c. 67) (Royal Assent on 30th October 1952; wholly in force from 12th June 1954) s. 9:

Art. 7:103, Notes 14

Water Consolidation (Consequential Provisions) Act 1991 (1991 c. 60) (Royal Assent on 25th July 1991) s. 1:

Art. 7:102, Notes 7

Water Industry Act 1991 (1991 c. 56) (Royal Assent on 25th July 1991) generally: s. 209:

1168

Art. 1:103, Notes III 38 Chap. 3, Introd. C15

Table of Cases* ECHR Albert-Engelmann-Gesellschaft mbH v. Österreich, ECHR 19 January 2006, App. no. 46389/99 Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal, ECHR [GC] 6 April 2000, App. no. 35382/97 Draon v. France, ECHR [GC] 6 October 2005, App. no. 1513/03 Evaldsson and others v. Sweden, ECHR 13 February 2007, App. no. 75252/01 Gustafsson v. Sweden, ECHR [GC] 25 April 1996, App. no. 15573/89 Maurice v. France, ECHR [GC] 6 October 2005, App. no. 11810/03 Sciarrotta and others v. Italy, ECHR 12 January 2006, App. no. 14793/02 Sørensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark, ECHR [GC] 11 January 2006, App. nos. 52562/99 and 52620/99 Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom, ECHR 13 July 1995, App. no. 18139/91 White v. Sweden, ECHR 19 September 2006, App. no. 42435/02

Art. 2:204, Notes II 24 Art. 2:101, Notes VI 56 Art. 2:101, Notes X (2) 107 Art. 7:104, Notes 12 Art. 7:104, Notes 12 Art. 2:101, Notes X (2) 107 Art. 2:206, Notes I 3 Art. 7:104, Notes 12 Art. 2:101, Notes V 50 Art. 5:203, Notes 4

ECJ and CFI EC Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic, ECJ 25 April 2002, C-418/00 and C-419/00, ECR 2002, I-3969 Commission of the European Communities v. Hellenic Republic, ECJ 25 April 2002, C-154/00, ECR 2002, I-3879 Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom, ECJ 29 May 1997, C-300/95, ECR 1997, I-2649 Courage Ltd. v. Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v. Courage Ltd. and Others, ECJ 20 September 2001, C-453/99, ECR 2001, I-6297 Hans Just I / S v. Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs, ECJ 27 February 1980, C-68/79, ECR 1980, 501 Ireks-Arkady GmbH v. European Economic Community, ECJ 1 July 1981, C-238/78, ECR 1981, 1723 Kapniki Michaïlidis AE v. Idryma Koinonikon Asfaliseon (IKA), ECJ 21 September 2000, C-441/98 and C-442/98, ECR 2000, I-7145 *

Art. 3:204, Notes II(1) 24 Art. 3:204, Notes II(1) 24 Art. 3:204, Comments A 41 Art. 2:208, Comments A 5; Art. 6:101, Notes II 28 Art. 6:101, Notes II 28 Art. 6:101, Notes II 28 Art. 6:101, Notes II 28

Table compiled by Daniel Smith and Dr. Stephen Swann (Osnabrück) with the assistance of Christian Dankerl (Osnabrück).

1169

Annexes Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet et al, ECJ 18 December 2007, C-341/05, ECR 2007, I-11767 Skov Æg v. Bilka Lavprisvarehus A / S, ECJ 10 January 2006, C-402/03, ECR 2006, I-199

Art- 7:104, Notes 12 Art. 3:204, Notes I 2

UK and Irish Cases 4 Eng Ltd. v. Harper [2008] EWHC 915, [2008] 3 WLR 892 24 Seven Utility Services Ltd. v. Rosekey Ltd. [2003] EWHC 3415 (QB) A v. B plc. [2002] EWCA Civ 337, [2003] QB 195

A Ward of Court, Re [1996] 2 IR 73 A. C. Billings & Sons Ltd. v. Riden [1958] AC 240 Adamson v. Martin 1916 SC 319 A-G (Boswell) v. Rathmines & Pembroke Joint Hospital Board [1904] 1 IR 161 A-G v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545 A-G v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 A-G for New South Wales v. Perpetual Trustee Co. (Ltd.) [1955] AC 457 A-G v. Ryan’s Car Hire Ltd. [1965] IR 642 Admiralty Commissioners v. Owners of Steamsship Amerika [1917] AC 38 Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 Allan v. Barclay (1864) 2 M 873 Allen v. Sharp (1848) 2 Ex. 352, 154 ER 529 Alliance & Leicester Building Society v. Edgestop Ltd. [1993] 1 WLR 1462 Allibert SA v. O’Connor [1982] ILRM 40 Alsager v. Close (1842) 10 M & W 576, 152 ER 600 American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. (No. 1) [1975] AC 396 Anderson v. Gorrie [1895] 1 QB 668 Anderson v. Secretary of State for Scotland 1999 SLT 515 Andrews v. Freeborough [1967] 1 QB 1 Anns v. Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 Archer v. Ritchie & Co. (1891) 18 R 719 Argyll v. Argyll [1967] Ch 302 Argyllshire Weavers v. A Macaulay (Tweeds) Ltd. (No. 3) 1965 SLT 21

1170

Art. 2:101, Notes XII 132 Art. 6:106, Notes 12 Art. 2:203, Notes II 19; Art. 2:205, Notes 11; Art. 2:205, Notes 13 Art. 2:203, Notes II 18 Art. 5:102, Notes I 14 Art. 2:203, Notes III 30; Art. 5:101, Notes I 13 Art. 1:102, Notes I 10 Art. 2:205, Notes 11 Art. 2:205, Notes 12, 13; Art. 5:203, Notes 14 Art. 2:202, Notes VI 66 Art. 2:202, Notes VI 66 Art. 2:202, Notes VI 66 Art. 2:201, Notes III 15; Art. 2:202, Notes II 19 Art. 2:202, Notes VI 67 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 5:102, Notes I 14 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 1:102, Notes I 10; Art. 6:301, Notes 11 Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 2:201, Notes III 15 Art. 6:204, Notes 10 Art. 2:204, Notes I 14 Art. 2:204, Notes II 25 Art. 2:205, Notes 11 Art. 2:204, Notes I 14

Table of Cases Arrow Shipping Co. v. Tyne Improvement Commissioners (The “Crystal”) [1894] AC 508 Arthur J. S. Hall & Co. (a firm) v. Simons [2002] 1 AC 615 Arthur v. Anker [1997] QB 564 Article 26 and the Employment Equality Bill 1996, Re [1997] 2 IR 321 Ashby v. White (1703) 1 Ld Raym 938, 92 ER 126 Ashton v. Turner [1981] 1 QB 137 Awoyomi v. Radford [2007] EWHC 1671 (QB); [2008] QB 793 Bacardi-Martini Beverages Ltd. v. Thomas Hardy Packaging Ltd. [2002] EWCA Civ 549, [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 379 Badger v. Ministry of Defence [2005] EWHC 2941 (QB), [2006] 3 All ER 173 Baker v. Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 493, 170 ER 1033 Banbury v. Bank of Montreal [1918] AC 626 Barber v. Somerset County Council [2004] UKHL 13; [2004] 1 WLR 1089 Barker v. Corus UK Ltd. [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572 Barker v. Furlong [1891] 2 Ch 172 Barker v. Murdoch 1979 SLT 145 Barnet v. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 42 Barrymore v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [1997] FSR 600 Basely v. Clarkson (1682) 3 Lev. 37, 83 ER 565 Beaman v. ARTS Ltd. [1948] 2 All ER 89 Beaman v. ARTS Ltd.[1949] 1 KB 550 Beebee v. Sales (1916) 32 TLR 412 Behrens v. Bertram Mills Circus Ltd. [1957] 2 QB 1 Bellefield Computer Services Ltd. v. E Turner & Sons [2002] EWCA Civ 1823, [2002] Build LR (N.S.) 97 Beloff v. Pressdram Ltd. [1973] 1 All ER 241 Bennett v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 1) [1997] EMLR 625 Berry v. Humm & Co. [1915] 1 KB 627 Berry v. Irish Times Ltd. [1973] IR 368 Biffa Waste Services Ltd. v. Maschinenfibric Ernst Hese GmbH [2008] EWCA Civ 1257 Blake v. Galloway [2004] EWCA Civ 814, [2004] 1 WLR 2844 Bloodworth v. Gray (1844) 7 Man & G 334, 135 ER 140 Bonnard v. Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269 Bottomley v. F. W. Woolworth & Co. Ltd (1932) 48 TLR 521 Bottomley v. Todmorden Cricket Club [2003] EWCA Civ 1575 Boulting v. Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians [1963] 2 QB 606 Bowers v. Strathclyde Regional Council 1981 SLT 122 Bradbury v. Outram & Co. (1903) 11 SLT 71

Art. 3:207, Notes 11 Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 5:101, ill. 4 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 2:101, Notes II 20; Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 5:103, ill. 2 Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 1:103, Notes II 26 Art. 5:102, Notes I 14 Art. 2:202, Notes I 2 Art. 2:210, Notes 12 Art. 7:104, Notes 14 Art. 4:103, ill. 8 Art. 2:206, Notes II 26 Art. 2:201, Notes VII 62 Art. 3:102, Notes I 14 Art. 2:205, Notes 13 Art. 3:101, Notes 13 Art. 2:206, Notes I 13 Art. 2:206, Notes I 13 Art. 3:104, Notes I 14 Art. 3:203, Notes 14 Art. 1:103, Notes I 13 Art. 5:203, Notes 14 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 42 Art. 2:202, Notes V 54 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 41 Art. 3:201, Notes I 13 Art. 5:101, Notes I 12, II 28 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 41 Art. 6:301, Notes 11 Art. 2:204, Notes IV 45 Art. 3:201, Notes I 13 Art. 2:211, ill. 3 Art. 2:201, Notes VII 62 Art. 2:204, Notes I 14

1171

Annexes Branson v. Bower (No. 2) [2002] QB 737 Brewer v. Dew (1843) 11 M & W 625, 152 ER 955 British Motor Trade Association v. Gray 1951 SC 586 Broad v. Pitt (1828) 3 C & P 518, 172 ER 528 Broadway Approvals v. Odhams Press Ltd. [1965] 1 WLR 805 Bromley London Borough Council v. Ellis [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 97 Browntown Ltd v Edward Moore Inbucon Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 499 Bruce v. J. M. Smith (1898) 1 F 327 Bunt v. Tilley [2006] EWHC 407 (QB), [2007] 1 WLR 1243 Burgess v. Florence Nightingale Hospital [1955] 1 QB 349 Burke v. Blanch, HC 28 July 1989, unreported Burnard v. Haggis (1863) 14 CB NS 45; 143 ER 360 Burns v. Edman [1970] 2 QB 541 Bux v. Slough Metals [1973] 1 WLR 1358 Byrne v. Houlihan & De Courcy [1966] IR 274 Byrne v. Ryan (2007) 26 ILT (N.S.) 276

Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc. [1994] 2 AC 264 Campbell v. Irish Press Ltd. (1955) 90 ILTR 105 Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers [2002] EWHC 499 (QB), [2002] EMLR 30 Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457

Campbell v. Paddington Corporation [1911] 1 KB 869 Caparo Industries plc. v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605

Carmarthenshire County Council v. Lewis [1955] AC 549 Carson v. Jeffers [1961] IR 44 Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1613) 10 Co Rep 1a, 77 ER 937 Cayne v. Global Natural Resources plc. [1984] 1 All ER 225 Chapman v. McDonald [1969] IR 188 Chatterton v. Secretary of State for India [1895] 2 QB 189 Chauhan v. Paul [1998] CLY 3990 Christie v. Davey [1893] 1 Ch 316 Circuit Systems Ltd. v. Zuken-Redac (UK) Ltd. [1996] 1 WLR 721 Clark v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [1998] 1 WLR 1558

1172

Art. 5:203, Notes 14 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 2:101, Notes IX 94 Art. 2:205, Notes 13 Art. 2:204, Notes II 25 Art. 3:102, Notes II 26 Art. 6:106, Notes 12 Art. 2:204, Notes I 14 Art. 2:204, Notes IV 44 Art. 2:202, Notes VI 67 Art. 2:201, Notes VII 63 Art. 3:103, Notes I 13 Art. 5:103, Notes 2; Art. 5:501, Notes 8 Art. 3:102, Notes III 19 Art. 2:202, Notes IV 40, V 54 Art. 2:101, Notes X (1) 106 Chapter 3, Introd. C 15; Art. 3:206, Notes 16; Art. 5:302, Notes 14 Art. 2:204, Notes II 26 Art. 2:205, Notes 13 Art. 2:203, Notes II 17, 19, III, 30; Art. 2:205, Notes 11; Art. 7:101, Notes 4 Art. 3:201, Notes II 27 Art. 2:101, Notes III 32; Art. 2:207, Notes 12; Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 3:102, Notes II 26; Art. 3:104, ill. 5 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 1:103, Notes IV 41 Art. 1:102, Notes I 11; Art. 6:301, Notes 11 Art. 2:202, Notes VI 66 Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 3:203, Notes 14 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 23 Art. 6:106, Notes 12 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 70

Table of Cases Clark v. Newsam (1847) 1 Ex. 131, 154 ER 55 Clark v. Syme (William) 1957 JC 1 Clarke v. Brims [1947] KB 497 Clayton v. Le Roy [1911] 2 KB 1031 Clegg v. Rogerson [2007] CSIH 87, 2008 SLT 345 Clunis v. Camden and Islington Health Authority [1998] QB 978 Coco v. AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd. [1969] FSR 415; [1969] RPC 41 Cogley v. Radio Telifis Éireann [2005] IEHC 180, [2005] 4 IR 79 Coleman v. Keanes Ltd. [1946] Ir Jur 5 Colquhoun’s Trustees v. Orr Ewing & Co. (1877) 4 R 344 Commissioners for Public Works v. Swaine [2003] IESC 30, [2003] 1 IR 521 Commissioners of Public Works v. Brewer [2003] IESC 51, [2003] 3 IR 539 Compania Colombiana de Seguros v. Pacific Steam Navigation Co. [1965] 1 QB 101 Connolly v. Bus Éireann, HC 29 January 1996, unreported Connolly v. South of Ireland Asphalt Co. Ltd. [1977] IR 99 Conway v. Archdall (1826) 1 Batt 182 Conway v. Irish National Teachers Organisation [1991] 2 IR 305 Cook v. Lewis [1951] SCR 830 Cooke v. McGuigan (1927) 61 ILTR 45 Cooke v. Walsh [1984] ILRM 208 Coote v. Stone [1971] 1 WLR 279 Cope v. Sharpe (No. 2) [1912] 1 KB 496 Coppinger v. Sheehan [1906] 1 IR 519 Coppinger v. Waterford County Council, DPIJ: Hilary & Easter Terms 1996, p. 1 Corcoran v. W. & R. Jacob & Co. Ltd. [1945] IR 446 Cornford v. Carlton Bank Ltd. [1899] 1 QB 392 Corr v. IBC Vehicles Ltd. [2008] UKHL 13, [2008] 1 AC 884 Crawford v. Albu [1917] 1 AD 102 Cresswell v. Sirl [1948] 1 KB 241 Crolla v. Hussain 2008 SLT (Sh.Ct.) 145 Cross v. Kirkby (2000) Times, 5th April Cuddy v. Mays & Ors [2003] IEHC 103 Cunningham v. The Scotsman Publications Ltd. 1987 SC 107 Cummings v. Granger [1977] QB 397 Curley v. Dublin Corporation [2003] IEHC 28 Curley v. Mannion [1965] IR 543 Curry v. Rea [1937] NI 1 Customs & Excise Commissioners v. Barclays Bank [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 D. & F. Estates v. Church Commissioners for England [1989] AC 177 D. v. East Bershire Community NHS Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 1151, [2004] QB 558

Art. 4:102, Notes 13 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 24 Art. 3:205, Notes 15 Art. 2:206, Notes I 13 Art. 4:101, Notes I 16 Art. 5:103, Notes 2 Art. 2:205, Notes 12, 13 Art. 2:203, Notes III 29 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 41 Art. 2:206, Notes III 42 Art. 2:201, Notes III 16 Art. 2:201, Notes III 16 Art. 6:106, Notes 12 Art. 2:201, Notes VII 63 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 6:101, Notes I 14 Art. 4:103, Notes 13 Art. 2:204, Notes I 13 Art. 2:201, Notes VII 63 Art. 3:205, Notes 15 Art. 5:202, Notes III 31 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 2:201, Notes VII 63 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 41 Art. 1:103, Notes IV 41 Art. 4:101, Notes I 15 Art. 2:204, Notes II 26 Art. 5:202, Notes I 13 Art. 3:201, Notes I 15 Art. 5:202, Notes I 13 Art. 2:201, Notes III 16 Art. 2:204, Notes III 35 Art. 3:203, Notes 14 Art. 2:201, Notes V 35 Art. 3:104, Notes I 16 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 2:101, Notes III 32

Art. 1:103, Notes II 25 Art. 3:102, Notes I 14; Art. 7:103, Notes 14

1173

Annexes Dalgleish v. Glasgow Corp. 1976 SC 32 Dalton v. Angus (1881) 6 App Cas 740 Daly v. General Steam Navigation Ltd. [1981] 1 WLR 120 Daniell v. Aviemore Station Hotel Co. Ltd. 1951 SLT (Notes) 75 Darbishire v. Warran [1963] 1 WLR 1067 Davey v. Harrow Corp. [1958] 1 QB 60 Davies v. Mann (1842) 10 M & W 546, 152 ER 588 Dawkins v. Lord Paulet (1869) LR 5 QB 94 Dawkins v Lord Rokeby (1875) LR 7 HL 744 Dawson v. Great Northern & City Railway Co. [1905] 1 KB 260 Dee Conservancy Board v. McConnell [1928] 2 KB 159 Deering v. Mahon (1851) 2 ICLR 25 Defries v. Milne [1913] 1 Ch 98 Dempsey v. Wall & Co. Ltd. (1943) 78 ILTR 73 Derbyshire CC v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [1993] AC 534 Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 Desmond & Dedeir v. Glackin (Minister for Industry and Commerce, Ireland) & A-G (No. 2) [1993] 3 IR 67 Dick v. Burgh of Falkirk 1976 SC (HL) 1 Dillon v. O’Brien (1887) 16 Cox CC 245 Dimond v. Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384 Dobson v. Thames Water Utilities Ltd. [2007] EWHC 2021 (TCC); [2008] 2 All ER 362 Dodd Properties (Kent) Ltd. v. Canterbury City Council [1980] 1 WLR 433 Doherty v. Bowaters Irish Wallboard Mills Ltd. [1968] IR 277 Donaldson v. McNiven [1952] 2 All ER 691 Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562

Doonan v. Scottish Motor Traction Co. Ltd. 1950 SC 136 Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. (No. 1) [2001] QB 967 Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. (No. 3) [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch), 3 All ER 996 Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. (No. 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595; [2006] QB 125 Draper v. Hodder [1972] 2 QB 556 Dredger Liesbosch v. Steamship Edison [1933] AC 449 Drew v. Mackenzie & Co. (1862) 24 D 649 Drury v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2004] EWCA Civ 200, 1 WLR 1906 Duffield v. Police [1971] NZLR 381 Duffy v. Kinneil Cannel & Coking Co. Ltd. 1930 SC 596 Dullaghan v. Hillen [1957] Ir Jur 10 Dunlop v. Kenny, SC 29 July 1969, unreported

1174

Art. 2:101, Notes V 51, Art. 2:201, Notes VII 62 Art. 3:201, Notes I 13 Art. 2:101, Notes IV 36 Art. 2:202, Notes V 53 Art. 5:102, Notes II 26 Art. 2:206, Notes II 28 Art. 5:102, Notes I 14 Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 6:106, Notes 12 Art. 6:302, Notes 10 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 6:106, Notes 12 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 41 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 40 Art. 2:210, Notes 12 Art. 2:205, Notes 12 Art. 2:202, Notes III 28 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 2:206, Notes III 40, Art. 1:103, Notes III 38 Art. 6:201, Notes 9 Art. 2:201, Notes V 35 Art. 3: 104, Notes I 15 Art. 1:101, Notes II 8, IV 24, VI 41; Art. 3:102, Notes I 16 Art. 2:201, Notes V 34 Art. 2:205, Notes 11, 13 Art. 2:203, Notes II 19; Art. 2:205, Notes 13 Art. 2:203, Notes III 28; Art. 2:211, Notes 13 Art. 3:203, Notes 14 Art. 2:206, Notes III 40; Art. 4:101, Notes IV 51 Art. 2:204, Notes III 35 Art. 1:102, Notes I 11 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 2:201, Notes VII 62 Art. 2:203, Notes I 3 Art. 2:201, Notes V 35

Table of Cases Dunne v. National Maternity Hospital [1989] IR 91 Dwek v. MacMillan Publishers Ltd. [2000] EMLR 284

Art. 2:201, Notes VII 63 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 42

East v. Maurer [1991] 1 WLR 461 E. Hobbs (Farms) Ltd. v. Baxenden Chemical Co. Ltd. [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 54 Egan & Sons Ltd. v. Sisk & Sons Ltd. [1986] ILRM 283 Electricity Supply Board v. Hastings & Co. Ltd. [1965] Ir Jur 51 Ellor v. Selfridge & Co. Ltd. (1930) 46 TLR 236 Empire Resolution Ltd. v. MPW Brokers Ltd. [1999] BPIR 486 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Southport Corp. [1956] AC 218 Exchange Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. Giulianotti 1959 SC 19

Art. 2:210, Notes 12 Art. 3:102, Notes II 26

F (Mental patient: sterilisation), Re [1990] 2 AC 1 Fairbairn v. Scottish National Party 1979 SC 393 Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 Farrell v. Concannon 1957 JC 12 Farrell v. Minister for Agriculture and Food, HC 11 October 1995, unreported Feeney v. John Sisk & Sons Ltd., DPIJ: Hilary and Easter Terms 1993, p. 254 Finlay v. Murtagh [1979] IR 249 Fitzgibbon v. Eason & Son Ltd. (1910) 45 ILTR 91 Fitzpatrick v. Dunphy (1851) 1 ICLR 366 Flack v. Hudson [2001] QB 698 Fletcher v. Commissioners of Public Works [2003] IESC 13, [2003] 1 IR 465 Flora v. Wakom (Heathrow) Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ 1103, [2007] 1 WLR 482 Foley v. Thermocement Products Ltd. (1954) 90 ILTR 92 Forrester v. H. M. Advocate 1952 JC 28 Forster v. Pugh [1955] CLY 741 Fouldes v. Willoughby (1841) 8 M & W 540, 151 ER 1153 Fox v. Caulfield & Co. Ltd. 1975 SLT (Notes) 71 Franklin v. Giddins [1978] Qd R 72 Francome v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [1984] 1 WLR 892

Art. 2:206, Notes III 41 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 41 Art. 6:106, Notes 12 Art. 5:202, Notes III 31 Art. 1:103, Notes III 39 Art. 5:101, Notes I 12; Art. 5:202, Notes II 18 Art. 2:204, III 35 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 41; Art. 4:103, ill. 3 Art. 2:203, Notes III 30 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 2:201, Notes V 35 Art. 1:103, Notes I 13 Art. 2:204, Notes IV 45 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 3:203, Notes 14 Art. 2:201, Notes III 16; Art. 3:102, Notes I 15 Art. 6:302, Notes 13

Freeman v. Home Office (No. 2) [1984] QB 524 Friend v. Civil Aviation Authority (No. 1) [1998] IRLR 253

Art. 2:201, Notes VII 63 Art. 2:203, Notes III 30 Art. 6:204, Notes 10 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 2:201, Notes V 34 Art. 2:205, Notes 12 Art. 2:205, Notes 13; Art. 5:203, Notes 14 Art. 5:101, Notes I 12 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 42

Gaca v. Pirelli General plc [2004] EWCA Civ 373; [2004] 1 WLR 2683 Gahan v. Maingay (1793) Ridg L & S 20 Gainsford v. Tuke (1620) Cro Jac 536, 79 ER 460 Galbreath v. Armour (1845) 4 Bell 374 Gammell v. Wilson [1982] AC 27

Art. 6:103, Notes 14 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 2:204, Notes III 36 Art. 2:206, Notes II 28 Art. 2:202, Notes III 28

1175

Annexes Garrahy v. Bord na gCon [2002] 3 IR 566 General & Finance Facilities Ltd. v. Cooks Cars (Romford) [1963] 1 WLR 644 Genua, The (1936) 55 Lloyd’s L. Rep 139 Gibson v. Glasgow Corp. 1963 SLT (Notes) 16 Gibson v. National Citizens’ Council (1921) 1 SLT 241 Glasgow Corporation v. Muir [1943] AC 448 Glegg v. Bromley [1912] 3 KB 474 Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd. [2001] QB 201 Gordon v. Stubbs Ltd. (1895) 3 SLT 10 Gorely v. Codd [1967] 1 WLR 19 Gorris v. Scott (1873-74) LR 9 Ex. 125 Graham v. Greig (1838) 1 D 171 Grainger v. Hill (1838) 4 Bing NC 212, 132 ER 769 Great Western Railway Co. v. Owners of the SS Mostyn (The Mostyn) [1928] AC 57 Greene v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2004] EWCA Civ 1462, [2005] QB 972 Greers Ltd. v. Pearman & Corder Ltd. (1922) 39 RPC 406 Gregg v. Scott [2002] EWCA Civ 1471 Gregg v. Scott [2005] UKHL 2; [2005] 2 WLR 268 Gripper v. British Railways Board 1991 SLT 659 H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof), Re [1996] AC 563 H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard [1964] AC 326 Haggan v. Pasley (1878) 2 IrLR 573 Hall v. Hollander (1825) 4 B & C 660, 107 ER 1206 Hamilton Jones v. David & Snape (a firm) [2003] EWHC 3147 (Ch), [2004] 1 WLR 924 Hamilton v. Arbuthnot (1750) Mor 13923 Hamilton v. O’Reilly [1951] IR 200 Hamps v. Darby [1948] 2 KB 311 Hanley v. ICC Finance Ltd. [1995] IEHC 5, [1996] 1 ILRM 463 Hanrahan v. Merck, Sharpe & Dohme (Ireland) Ltd. [1988] ILRM 629 Harris v. Birkenhead Corp. [1976] 1 WLR 279 Harrison v. Bush (1856) 5 El & Bl 344, 119 ER 509 Hatherley v. Smith 1989 SLT 316 Hawley v. Luminar Leisure Limited [2006] EWCA Civ 18, [2006] P.I.Q.R. P17 Hayes v. Callanan [2000] 1 IR 321 Hayford v. Forrester-Paton 1927 SC 740 Haynes v. Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146

1176

Art. 1:102, Notes I 10 Art. 2:206, Notes III 41 Art. 5:102, Notes I 14 Art. 2:202, Notes VI 67 Art. 2:204, Notes IV 44 Art. 3:102, Notes I 16 Art. 6:106, Notes 12 Art. 2:204, Notes IV 44 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 24 Art. 3:103, Notes I 13 Art. 3:102, ill. 8 Art. 2:206, Notes II 28 Art. 2:203, ill. 8 Art. 3:207, Notes 11; Art. 5:302, Notes 14 Art. 6:301, ill. 2 Art. 2:204, Notes I 13 Art. 2:101, Notes XII 132 Art. 2:101, Notes XII 132 Art. 2:201, Notes VI 47 Art. 2:210. Notes 12 Art. 2:101, Notes V 51; Art. 6: 204, Notes I 10 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 2:202, Notes VI 66 Art. 1:103, Notes I 13 Art. 2:204, Notes I 14 Art. 2:202, Notes V 54 Art. 2:206, Notes II 26 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 2:203, Notes II 18; Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 3:208, Notes 9 Art. 5:203, Notes 14 Art. 2:202, Notes V 53 Art. 3: 201, Notes I 13 Art. 2:206, Notes III 41 Art. 2:204, Notes III 35 Art. 3:102, Notes II 26; Art. 5:101, Notes II 28

Table of Cases Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] AC 465

Heil v. Rankin [2001] QB 272 Hellewell v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. (No. 1) [1995] 2 AC 145 Henderson v. Chief Constable of Fife Police 1988 SLT 361 Hennerty v. Bank of Ireland, HC 5 July 1988, unreported Hibbert Pownall & Newton v. Whitehead [2008] EWCA Civ 285; (2008) Times, 14th May Highland Dancing Board v. Alloa Printing Co. 1971 SLT (Sh.Ct.) 50 Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 Hogan v. Steel & Co. Ltd. [1999] IEHC 175, [2000] 1 ILRM 330 Hogg v. Keane [1956] IR 155 Hole v. Ross-Skinner [2003] EWCA Civ 774 Hollins v. Fowler (1874-75) LR 7 HL 757 Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd. v. Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468 Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004 Honeywill & Stein v. Larkin Brothers Ltd. [1934] 1 KB 191 Horgan v. Buckley [1938] IR 115 Hornal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 247 Horsford v. Bird [2006] UKPC 3 Houldworth v. City of Glasgow Bank (1880) 7 R 53 House of Spring Gardens Ltd. v. Point Blank Ltd. [1984] IR 611 Hoyle v. Shaws Water Company 1854 17 D 83 HRH Prince of Wales v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ 1776, [2008] Ch 57 Hughes v. Barratt Urban Construction (Scotland) Ltd. [2002] Scot CS 87 Hughes v. O’Flaherty, HC 19 January 1996, unreported Hunt v. Severs [1994] 1 AC 350 Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd. [1996] 2 WLR 348

Chapter 1, Introd. B 13; Art. 2:101, Notes III 32; Art. 2:204, Notes I 14; Art. 2:207, Comments A 3, ill. 2, Notes 12; Art. 2:210, Notes 12 Art. 6: 203, Notes 13 Art. 2:203, Notes III 28; Art. 2:205, Notes 13 Art. 1:103, Notes I 13 Art. 2:203, Notes III 30 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 6:101, Notes I 13 Art. 1:103, Notes IV 41 Art. 7: 103, Notes 14 Art. 2:101, Notes IV 34 Art. 6:302, Notes 10 Art. 3:203, Notes 14 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 23 Art. 3: 102, Notes II 30 Art. 3:201, Notes I 13 Art. 2:202, Notes V 54 Art. 2:210, Notes 12 Art. 6:101, Notes II 26 Art. 1:103, Notes IV 41 Art. 2:203, Notes III 29; Art. 2:205, Notes 12 Art. 1:102, Notes I 12 Art. 2:205, Notes 11; Art. 5:203, Notes 14 Art. 1:103, Notes II 26

Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd. [1997] AC 655 Hussain v. New Taplow Paper Mills Ltd. [1988] AC 514 Hymas v. Ogden [1905] 1 KB 246

Art. 2:201, Notes VI 48 Art. 6:103, Notes 14 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 43, Art. 2:101, Notes V 50 Art. 2:101, Notes V 50 Art. 6:103, Notes 14 Art. 2:206, Notes III 41

IFE Fund SA v. Goldman Sachs International [2006] EWHC 2887

Art. 5:401, Notes 14

(Comm), [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 264 Ingham v. John G. Russell (Transport) Ltd. 1991 SC 201 Ingram v. Little [1961] 1 QB 31

Art. 2:201, Notes V 34; Art. 2:206, Notes I 13

1177

Annexes Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Hambrook [1956] 2 QB 641 Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Rossminster Ltd. [1980] AC 952 Irish Shell & B. P. Ltd. v. John Costello Ltd. [1984] IR 511 Irish Toys & Utilities Ltd. v. “The Irish Times” Ltd. [1937] IR 298 Irish Transport & General Workers Union v. The Transport & General Workers Union [1936] IR 471 Irvine v. Talksport Ltd. [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch); [2002] 1 WLR 2355 Irvine v. Talksport Ltd. (Nos. 1 and 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 423, [2003] 2 All ER 881 Island Records Ltd. v. Tring International plc. [1996] 1 WLR 1256 Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No. 3) [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359 Jeffries v. Alexander (1860) 7 HLC 594; 11 ER 562 Jennings v. Rundall (1799) 8 TR 335, 101 ER 1419 Jones v. Fabbi (1973) 37 DLR (3d) 27 Jones v. McGovern IR 1 CL 100 Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Co. Ltd. [1983] 1 AC 520

Kane v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison [1988] ILRM 724 Karagozlu v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2006] EWCA Civ 1691, [2007] 1 WLR 1881 Kaye v. Robertson [1991] FSR 62

Kealy v. Minister for Health, HC 19 April 1999, unreported Kearney v. Minister for Justice, Ireland and the A-G [1986] IR 116 Kelly v. Hennessy [1995] 3 IR 253 Kelsen v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd. [1957] 2 QB 334 Kennaway v. Thompson [1981] 1 QB 88 Kennedy & Arnold v. Ireland [1987] 1 IR 587 King v. Victoria Insurance Co. Ltd. [1896] AC 250 King v. Walsh [1932] IR 178 Kingsway, The [1918] P 344 Kirk v. Gregory (1875-76) 1 Ex. D 55 Kirkham v. Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB 283 Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraq Airways Co. (Nos. 4 and 5) [2002] UKHL 19, [2002] 2 AC 883 Lagden v. O’Connor [2003] UKHL 64, [2004] 1 AC 1067 Lamond v. Daily Record (Glasgow) Ltd. 1923 SLT 512

1178

Art. 2:202, Notes Art. 2:203, Notes Art. 2:206, Notes Art. 2:204, Notes Art. 2:204, Notes

VI 66 III 28 II 27

I 13 I 13

Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 70 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 70 Art. 6:101, Notes II 26 Art. 2:101, Notes VI 55, VIII 83 Art. 3:101, Notes 13 Art. 3:103, Notes I 13, 16 Art. 2:202, Notes VI 66 Art. 2:204, Notes I 13 Art. 1:103, Notes I 13, III 39 Art. 2:203. Notes I 3 Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 70; Art. 2:203, ill. 3 Art. 2:201, Notes VII 63 Art. 2:203, Notes II 18 Art. 2:201, Notes III 16 Art. 6:301, Notes 11 Art. 6:301, Notes 11 Art. 2:203, Notes III 29; Art. 2:205, Notes 12 Art. 6:106, Notes 12 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 6:201, Notes 9 Art. 2:206, Notes II 26 Art. 5:103, Notes 2 Art. 2:206, Notes I 13

Art. 2:206, Notes III 40; Art. 4:101, Notes IV 51 Art. 2:204, Notes I 14

Table of Cases Lane v. Holloway [1968] 1 QB 379 Lang v. London Transport Executive [1959] 1 WLR 1168 League against Cruel Sports Ltd. v. Scott [1986] QB 240 Lee v. Joyce, SC 3 December 1964, unreported Leeds Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Slack [1924] AC 851 Leitch & Co. Ltd. v. Leydon [1931] AC 90 Lemmon v. Webb [1895] AC 1 Lennard’s Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1915] AC 705 Lennon v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2004] EWCA Civ 130; [2004] 1 WLR 2594 Leonard v. Lindsay & Benzie (1886) 13 R 958 Leslie Ltd. v. Shiell [1914] 3 KB 607 Letang v. Ottawa Electric Railway Co. [1926] AC 725 Lion Laboratories v. Evans [1985] QB 526 Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd. [1957] AC 555 Lister v. Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215 Liston v. Munster Leinster Bank Ltd. [1940] IR 77 Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. (1879-80) 5 App.Cas. 25 Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd. v. Modern Cars & Caravans (Kingston) Ltd. [1966] 1 QB 764 London and South of England Building Society v. Stone [1983] 1 WLR 1242 London Artists v. Littler [1969] 2 QB 375 London Corporation, The [1935] P 70 London Ferro-Concrete Co. v. Justicz (1951) 68 RPC 261 London Midland & Scottish Railway v. McDonald 1924 SC 835 Long v. O’Brien & Cronin Ltd., SC 24 March 1972, unreported Lord Browne of Madingley v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2007] EWCA Civ 295, [2008] QB 103 Loudon v. Ryder (No 2) [1953] Ch 423 Lumley v. Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216, 118 ER 749 Lynch v. W. Alexander & Sons (Midlands) Ltd. 1987 SCLR 780

M. v. Hendron [2007] CSIH 27, 2007 SLT 467 Macculloch v. Litt (1851) 13 D 960 M’Cormick v. Ballantine (1861) 10 ICLR 305 M’Intosh v. Scott & Co. (1859) 21 D 363 Mackintosh v. Morrice’s Exrs [2005] CSOH 167, 2006 SLT 580 Mackintosh v. Morrice’s Exrs [2006] CSIH 43, 2007 SC 6 M’Laughlin v. Doey (1893) 32 IrLR 518 M’Mullan v. Bradshaw (1916) 50 ILTR 205 Madden v. Irish Turf Club [1997] 2 IR 184

Art. 5:103, Notes 2, ill. 4 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 22 Art. 3:203, Notes 14 Art. 2:201, Notes VII 63 Art. 6:101, Notes I 13 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 5:201, Notes 13 Art. 1:103, Notes IV 41 Art. 7:104, Notes 14 Art. 2:206, Notes II 28 Art. 3:103, Notes I 13 Art. 5:101, Notes II 28 Art. 5:203, Notes 14 Art. 7:104, Notes 14 Art. 3:201, Notes I 13 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 6:101, Notes I 13 Art. 6:302, Notes 10 Art. 5:102, Notes II 26; Art. 6:101, Notes I 13 Art. 2:204, Notes II 25, 26 Art. 6:201, Notes 9 Art. 2:204, Notes I 13 Art. 2:206, Notes I 15 Art. 2:201, Notes V 35 Art. 2:205, Notes 11 Art. 2:204, Notes I 13 Art. 2:211, Notes 13, ill. 2 Art. 2:201, Notes V 34, VI 47 Art. 3:201, Notes I 15 Art. 2:204, Notes III 35 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 2:206, Notes II 28 Art. 2:202, Notes II 19, III 28, IV 40, V 53 Art. 2:202, Notes III 28 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 41 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 1:103, Notes I 13

1179

Annexes Magee v. D’Arcy (1879) 4 IrLR 312 Maher v. Jabil Global Services Ltd. [2005] IEHC 130 Majrowski v. Guy’s & St. Thomas’ NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 251, [2005] QB 848 Malone v. McQuaid [1998] IEHC 86 Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner (No. 2) [1979] Ch 344 Malynn v. Farrell (1956) 90 ILTR 137 MAN Nutzfahrzeuge AG v. Freightliner Ltd. [2005] EWHC 2347 (Comm) Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Uni-Polaris Insurance Co. Ltd. [2001] UKHL 1, [2003] 1 AC 469 Mansfield v. Weetabix Ltd. [1998] 1 WLR 1263 Marcic v. Thames Water Utilities Ltd. [2002] EWCA Civ 64, [2002] QB 929 Marshall v. Renwick (1835) 13 S 1127 Martin v. Bell-Ingram 1986 SC 208 Martin v. Mcguiness 2003 SLT 1424 Martin v. Nisbett (1893) 1 SLT 293 Massai Aviation Services Ltd. v. A-G for the Bahamas [2007] UKPC 12 Mattis v. Pollock (trading as Flamingos Nightclub) [2003] EWCA Civ 887; [2003] 1 WLR 2158 Mazatti v. Acme Products Ltd. [1930] 4 DLR 601 McAllister v. Imperial Chemical Industries plc. 1997 SLT 351 McCabe v. Foot (1866) 11 Ir Jur (N.S.) 287 McCombe v. Read [1955] 2 QB 429 McDermott v. Eason & Son (1913) 48 ILTR 1 McDonagh v. West of Ireland Fisheries Ltd., HC 19 December 1986, unreported McDonnell v. Ireland [1998] 1 IR 134 McEneaney v. Monaghan County Council [2001] IEHC 114 McGee v. A-G [1974] IR 284 McGovern v. H. M. Advocate 1950 JC 33 McGrath v. Trintech Technologies Ltd. [2004] IEHC 342 McHugh v. Minister for Defence [1999] IEHC 91, [2001] 1 IR 424 McKay v. Essex Area Health Authority [1982] QB 1166 McKenna v. Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [1993] 3 IR 543 McKennitt v. Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB), [2006] EMLR 178 McKennitt v. Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73] McKie v. H. M. Advocate 1958 JC 24 McKinley v. The Minister for Defence (No. 2) [1997] IEHC 93, [1997] 2 IR 176 Mcleod v. Scottish Special Housing Association 1990 SLT 749 McLoughlin v. O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410

1180

Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 2:201, Notes III 16 Art. 3:201, Notes I 13 Art. 2:204, Notes I 13 Art. 2:205, Notes 12 Art. 2:202, Notes V 54 Art. 2:210, Notes 12 Art. 2:210, Notes 12 Art. 3:102, Notes I 14; Art. 5:301, Notes 14 Art. 2:101, Notes V 50 Art. 2:204, Notes III 35 Art. 2:101, Notes III 33; Art. 2:207, Notes 12 Art. 2:203, Notes III 30 Art. 1:102, Notes I 12 Art. 6:106, Notes 12 Art. 3:201, ill. 11 Art. 2:203, Notes Art. 2:202, Notes Art. 2:203, Notes Art. 2:206, Notes Art. 2:204, Notes Art. 2:206, Notes

II 19 V 53 IV 41 II 28 IV 45 II 27

Art. 2:203, Notes II 18 Art. 2:201, Notes VII 63 Art. 2:203, Notes III 29 Art. 2:203, Notes III 30 Art. 2:201, Notes III 16 Art. 2:201, Notes III 16 Art. 2:101, Notes X (3) 122 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 7:101, Notes 4 Art. 2:205, Notes 11; Art. 2:203, Notes III 30 Art. 2:201, Notes VI 48 Art. 1:103, Notes II 26 Art. 2:201, Notes III 15

Table of Cases McMahon v. Burke and Midwestern health Board [1991] ILRM 59 [HC] McNulty v. Marshall’s Food Group Ltd. 1999 SC 195 McSweeney v. Cork Corp., DPIJ: Hilary & Easter Terms 1994, p. 37 McTear v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd. [2005] CSOH 69, 2005 2 SC 1 Meah v. McCreamer (No. 2) [1986] 1 All ER 943 Mercer v. South Eastern & Chatham Railways Companies’ Management Committee [1922] 2 KB 549 Meretz Investments N.V. v. ACP Ltd. [2006] EWHC 74 (Ch), [2007] Ch 197 Merkur Island Shipping Corp. v. Laughton [1983] 2 AC 570 Merrett v. Babb [2001] QB 1174 Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins and Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd [1947] AC 1 (HL) Meskell v. Córas Iompair Éireann [1973] IR 121 Mill v. Hawker (1874) LR 9 Ex 309 Millar v. Fife Regional Council 1990 SLT 651 Miller v. Jackson [1977] QB 966 Mills v. Brooker [1919] 1 KB 555 Milner v. Reeves (1617) 1 Roll Abr 43 pl. 3 Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Forestry v. Heyman (1989) 59 P & CR 48 Ministry of Defence v. Ashman (1993) 66 P & CR 195 Mirvahedy v. Henley [2003] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 491 Miss World Ltd. v. Miss Ireland Beauty Pageant Ltd. [2004] IEHC 13, [2004] 2 IR 394 Mitchell v. Glenrothes Development Corp. 1991 SLT 284 Mogul Steamship Co. Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. (1889) 23 QBD 598 Monson v. Tussaud [1894] 1 QB 671 Monteith v. Cape Insulation Ltd. 1998 SC 903 Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Finch [1962] 1 QB 701 Morgan v. Maurer & Son [1964] Ir Jur 31 Morris v. Murray [1991] 2 QB 6 Morrison v. Ritchie & Co. (1902) 4 F 645 Morriss v. Marsden [1952] 1 All ER 925 Moy v. Pettman Smith [2005] UKHL 7; [2005] 1 WLR 581 Muldoon v. Ireland [1988] ILRM 367 Mullin v. Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304 Murphy v. Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398 Murphy v. Cronin [1966] IR 699 Murphy v. Culhane [1977] QB 94 Murphy v. Roche (No. 2) [1987] IR 656

Art. 2:202, Notes III 28 Art. 2:201, Notes V 34 Art. 2:201, Notes III 16 Art. 4:101, Notes I 16 Art. 4:101, Notes IV 52, ill. 8 Art. 3:102, Notes II 26 Art. 3:201, Notes II 27; Art. 5:101, Notes I 12 Art. 2:208, ill. 4 Art. 7:104, Notes 14 Art. 3:201, Notes I 13 Art. 2:203, Notes II 18 Art. 3:201, Notes II 27 Art. 2:201, Notes VI 47 Art. 6:301, Notes 11 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 41 Art. 1:102, Notes I 11 Art. 6:101, Notes II 26 Art. 3:203, Notes 14 Art. 1:102, Notes I 10 Art. 2:201, Notes V 34 Art. 1:101, Notes III 11 Art. 2:203, Notes III 30 Art. 2:202, Notes V 53 Art. 2:206, Notes I 13 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 5:101, Notes II 28 Art. 2:204, Notes III 35, IV 44 Art. 5:301, Notes 14 Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 3:104, Notes II 31 Art. 3:103, Notes I 13 Art. 1:103, Notes II 25 Art. 2:202, Notes V 54 Art. 5:102, Notes I 14; Art. 5:103, Notes 2 Art. 1:103, Notes IV 41

1181

Annexes Murray v. Express Newspapers plc. [2008] EWCA Civ 446; [2008] 3 WLR 1360

Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 70

National Coal Board v. England [1954] AC 403 National Coal Board v. J. E. Evans & Co. (Cardiff) Ltd. [1951] 2 KB 861 Newton v. Edgerley [1959] 1 WLR 1031 Ng Chun Pui v. Lee Chuen Tat [1988] RTR 298 Nicholls v. Rushton (1992) Times, 19th June Nimmo v. Alexander Cowan & Sons Ltd. [1968] AC 107 North of Scotland Banking Co. v. Duncan (1857) 19 D 881 Norwich City Council v. Harvey [1989] 1 WLR 828 Norwich Union Life Insurance Society v. Covell Matthew Partnership 1987 SLT 452

Art. 5:103, Notes 2 Art. 2:206, Notes II 26

O’Brien v. Eason & Son (1913) 47 ILTR 266 O’Brien v. Higgins, SC 13 March 1967, unreported O’Brien v. McNamee [1953] IR 86 O’Brien v. Parker [1997] 2 ILRM 170. O’Keeffe v. Hickey [2008] IESC 72 O’Sullivan v. Kiernan [2004] IEHC 78 O’Toole v. Kearns, SC 31 July 1957, unreported Oakley v. Lyster [1931] 1 KB 148 OBG Ltd. v. Allan [2005] EWCA Civ 106; [2005] QB 762 OBG Ltd. v. Allan [2007] UKHL, [2008] 1 AC 1

Oblique Financial Services Ltd. v. The Promise Production Co. Ltd. [1994] 1 ILRM 74 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Morts Dock Engineering Co. Ltd. [1961] AC 388 (“The Wagon Mound (No. 1)”) P. Perl (Exporters) Ltd v. Camden London Borough Council [1984] QB 342 Palmer v. Tees Health Authority [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 351 Parkhead Housing Association Ltd. v. Phoenix Preservation Ltd. 1990 SLT 812 Parks v. Tayside Regional Council 1989 SC 38 Parlane v. Templeton (1896) 4 SLT 153 Parmiter v. Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105; 151 ER 340 Parry v. Cleaver [1970] AC 1 Parry-Jones v. Law Society [1969] 1 Ch 1 Paterson v. Welch (1893) 20 R 744 Patterson v. Murphy [1978] ILRM 85 Payton v. Brooks [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 241

1182

Art. 3:104, Notes I 14 Art. 5:302, Notes 14 Art. 2:101, Notes I 14 Art. 3:102, Notes III 19 Art. 2:204, Notes I 14 Art. 1:103, Notes I 13 Art. 1:103, Notes I 13

Art. 2:204, Notes IV 45 Art. 2:202, Notes IV 40 Art. 3:103, Notes I 14 Art. 3:102, Notes I 15 Art. 3:201, Notes I 14 Art. 2:201, Notes V 35 Art. 2:201, Notes VII 63 Art. 2:206, Notes I 13 Art. 2:211, Notes 13 Art. 2:101, Notes VIII (1) 70, IX 94; Art. 2:206, Notes I 13; Art. 2:211, Notes 13 Art. 2:205, Notes 12 Art. 4:101, Notes I 15

Art. 3:102, Notes II 26 Art. 3:104, Notes II 30 Art. 1:103, Notes II 26 Art. 2:203, Notes III 30 Art. 2:204, Notes I 14 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 40 Art. 6:104, Notes I 14 Art. 2:205, Notes 12 Art. 2:204, Notes I 14 Art. 1:102, Notes I 10 Art. 2:206, ill. 14

Table of Cases Peter Pan Manufacturing Corp. v. Corsets Silhouette Ltd. [1964] 1 WLR 96 Petromec Inc. v. Petroleo Brasiliero SA Petrobras [2006] EWHC 1443 (Comm), [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 629 Phelps v. Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619 Philip v. Morton (1816) Hume 865 Phillips v. Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co. Ltd [1923] 2 KB 832 Phillips v. G.N. Railway Co. Ltd. (1903) 4 NIJR 154 Plant v. Cotterill (1860) 5 H & N 430, 157 ER 1249 Player & Wills (Ireland) Ltd. v. Gallagher (Dublin) Ltd., HC 26 September 1983, unreported Polemis and Furness Withy & Co. Ltd., Re [1921] 3 KB 560 Pollard v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [1999] PIQR P219 Pollard v. Photographic Co. (1889) 40 Ch. D 345 Polycell Products Ltd. v. O’Carroll & others [1959] Ir Jur 34 Pope v. Outram 1909 SC 230 Prendergast v. Joe Malone Self Drive Ltd., SC 21 June 1967, unreported Prentice v. Chalmers 1985 SLT 168 Prince Albert v. Strange (1849) 2 De Gex & Sm 652, 64 ER 293 Printers & Finishers Ltd. v. Holloway (No. 2) [1965] 1 WLR 1 Private Research Ltd. v. Brosnan [1996] 1 ILRM 27 Proform Sports Management Ltd. v. Proactive Sports Management Ltd. [2006] EWHC 2812 (Ch), [2007] 1 All ER 542 Quigley v. Complex Tooling & Moulding [2005] IEHC 71 Quigley v. Creation Ltd. [1971] IR 269 Quilty v. Windsor 1999 SLT 346 Quin v. Greenock & Port-Glasgow Tramways Co. 1926 SC 544 Quinn v. Leathem [1901] AC 495 Quinn v. Pratt [1908] 2 IR 69 R. (IUDWC) v. Rathmines UDC [1928] IR 260 R. v. Adams (1888) 22 QBD 66 R. v. Hancock & Shankland [1986] AC 455 Radford v. Wexford Corporation (1954) 89 ILTR 184 Rafter v. A-G & Ors [2004] IEHC 28 Ratcliffe v. Plymouth & Torbay Health Authority [1998] PIQR P170 Read v. J. Lyons & Co. Ltd. [1947] AC 156 Reavis v. Clan Line Steamers 1925 SC 725 Reddy v. Bates [1983] IR 141

Art. 2:205, Notes 12 Art. 2:210, Notes 12 Art. 7:104, Notes 14 Art. 2:204, Notes I 14 Art. 3:205, Notes 15 Art. 2:203, Notes I 3 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 4:101, Notes I 15 Art. 5:201, Notes 13 Art. 2:203, Notes II 19, III 30 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 2:204, Notes III 35 Art. 2:201, Notes VII 63 Art. 2:202, Notes IV 40 Art. 2:205, Notes 11 Art. 2:205, Notes 13 Art. 2:203, Notes III 29 Art. 2:211, Notes 13

Art. 2:201, Notes III 16; Art. 3:102, Notes II 27 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 41 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 42 Art. 2:202, Notes VI 67 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 24; Art. 4:101, Notes I 15 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 1:103, Notes IV 41 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 40 Art. 3:103, Notes II 22, ill. 2 Art. 1:102, Notes I 10 Art. 2:201, Notes III 16 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 41 Art. 3:206, Notes 16 Art. 2:202, Notes VI 67 Art. 2:201, Notes V 35, VII 63

1183

Annexes Redfont Ltd. v. Custom House Dock Management Ltd. [1998] IEHC 206 Reeves v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 Regan v. Paul Properties Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ 1319; [2006] 46 EG 210 Reid v. Nixon 1948 JC 68 Reid v. Ski Independence 1999 SLT (Sh.Ct.) 62 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [2001] 2 AC 127 Richardson v. Wilson (1879) 7 R 237 Rickards v. Lothian [1913] AC 263 Rigby v. Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 1 WLR 1242 Robb v. Green [1895] 2 QB 315 Roberts v. Ramsbottom [1980] 1 WLR 823

Robertson’s Curator Bonis v. Anderson 1996 SC 217 Rogers v. Rajendro Dutt (1860) 13 Moore PC 208, 15 ER 78 Ronayne v. Ronayne [1970] IR 15 Rondel v. Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191 Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129

Rorrison v. West Lothian Council 2000 SCLR 245 Rosenthal v. Alderton & Sons Ltd. [1946] KB 374 Ross v. Eason & Son Ltd. [1911] 2 IR 459 Rossleigh Ltd. v. Leader Cars Ltd. 1987 SLT 355 Rothwell v. Chemical & Insulating Co. Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ 27, [2006] 4 All ER 1161 Rowley v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2007] EWCA Civ 598, [2007] 1 WLR 2861 Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Wright Crossley (1901) 18 RPC 95 Royal Dublin Society v. Yates [1997] IEHC 144 Rubens v. Walker 1946 SC 215 Ruckley v. Kiernan (1857) 7 ICLR 75 Russell’s Executix v. British Railways Board 1965 SC 422 Ryan v. A-G [1965] IR 294 Ryan v. Ireland [1989] IR 177 Rylands v. Fletcher (1865) 3 H & C 774, 159 ER 737 Rylands v. Fletcher (1865-66) LR 1 Ex. 265 Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330

1184

Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 5:102, Notes I 14 Art. 6:301, Notes 11 Art. 2:203, Notes III 30 Art. 2:201, Notes III 15 Art. 5:203, Notes 14 Art. 2:204, Notes III 35 Art. 3:206, Notes 16 Art. 5:202, Notes III 31 Art. 2:205, Notes 12 Art. 3:102, Notes III 41, ill. 3; Art. 5:301, Notes 14 Art. 2:201, Notes V 34 Art. 1:101, Notes III 11 Art. 2:201, Notes VII 63 Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 6:101, Notes I 13, 14, II 26; Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 2:201, Notes III 15 Art. 2:206, Notes III 41 Art. 2:204, Notes IV 45 Art. 2:101, Notes IX 94 Art. 2:201, Notes III 15; Art. 6:102, Notes 11 Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 23; Art. 2:204, Notes I 13 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 2:201, Notes V 34 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 41 Art. 2:202, Notes III 28 Art. 2:203, Notes II 18 Art. 2:202, Notes VI 66 Chapter 3, Introd. C 15 Chapter 3, Introd. C 15; Art. 3:206, Notes 16 Chapter 3, Introd. C 15; Art. 3:206, ill. 7; Art. 5:202, Notes III 31; Art. 5:302, Notes 14

Table of Cases Saif Ali v. Sydney Mitchell & Co. (a firm) [1980] AC 198 Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd. [1978] 65 RPC 203 Sayers v. Harlow Urban District Council [1958] 1 WLR 623 Schulke & Mayr U.K. Ltd. v. Alkapharm U.K. Ltd. [1999] FSR 161 Seager v. Copydex Ltd. (No. 2) [1969] 1 WLR 809 Serville v. Constance [1954] 1 WLR 487 Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. [1895] 1 Ch 287 Shelley Films Ltd. v. Rex Features Ltd. [1994] EMLR 134 Sheperd v. Wakeman (1662) 1 Sid 79, 82 ER 982 Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham [1971] Ch 340 Sherriff v. McMullen [1952] IR 236 Shield Life Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ulster Bank Ltd. [1995] 3 IR 225 Shinhan Bank Ltd. v. Sea Containers Ltd. [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 406 Shinwell v. The National Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union of GB and Ireland (1913) 2 SLT 83 Sim v. Stretch (1936) 52 TLR 669 Simmons v. Polak [1986] CLY 974 Simpson v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. 1983 SLT 601 Sinnott v. Quinnsworth Ltd. [1984] ILRM 523 Smith (or Maloco) v. Littlewoods Organisation Ltd. [1987] AC 241 Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v. Scrimgeour Vickers Ltd. [1997] AC 254 Smith v. Ainger (1990) Times, 5th June Smith v. Chief Constable, Central Scotland Police 1991 SLT 634 Smith v. Comrie’s Executrix 1944 SC 499 Smith v. Duncan Stewart & Co. Ltd. (No. 2) 1961 SC 91 Smith v. Eric S. Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 Smith v. Ireland, HC 16 August 1996, unreported Smith v. Land & House Property Corp. (1884) 28 Ch. D 7 Smith v. Leech Brain & Co. Ltd. [1962] 2 QB 405 Smith v. Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] 2 AC 241 Smoker v. London Fire and Civil Defence Authority [1991] 2 AC 502 Southwark London Borough Council v. Williams [1971] Ch. 734 Spackman v. Foster (1882-83) 11 QBD 99 Sparham-Souter v. Town and Country Developments (Essex) Ltd. [1976] QB 858 Spring v. Guardian Assurance plc. [1995] 2 AC 296 SS “Baron Vernon” v. SS “Metagama” 1928 SC (HL) 21

Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 2:205, Notes 12 Art. 5:102, Notes I 14; Art. 6:302, Notes 10 Art. 2:204, Notes I 13 Art. 2:203, Notes II 18; Art. 2:205, Notes 12 Art. 2:204, Notes I 13 Art. 6:102, Notes 11; Art. 6:301, Notes 11 Art. 2:205, Notes 13 Art. 2:204, Notes I 13 Art. 6:301, Notes 11 Art. 2:204, Notes I 13 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 2:210, ill. 3 Art. 1:102, Notes I 12 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 40 Art. 6:204, Notes 10 Art. 2:201, Notes III 15 Art. 2:201, Notes VII 63 Art. 3:101, ill. 7 Art. 2:210, Notes 12; Art. 6:101, Notes I 13; Art. 6:103, Notes 14 Art. 3:203, Notes 14 Art. 2:201, Notes VI 47 Art. 2:202, Notes V 53 Art. 2:202, Notes III 28 Art. 5:401, Notes 14 Art. 2:201, Notes VI 48 Art. 2:210, Notes 12 Art. 4:101, Notes IV 51 Art. 3:102, Notes II 26 Art. 6:103, Notes 14 Art. 5:202, ill. 8 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 6:106, Notes 12 Art. 2:204, Notes I 14 Art. 4:101, Notes I 14, III 37; Art. 5:102, Notes I 14, II 26; Art. 6:302, Notes 10

1185

Annexes Stephens v. Avery [1988] Ch 449 Stewart v. Malik [2009] CSIH 5 Strand Electric & Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Brisford Entertainments Ltd. [1952] 2 QB 246 Stratford & Son Ltd. v. Lindley [1965] AC 269 Strathford East Kilbride Ltd. v. HLM Design Ltd. 1999 SLT 121 Sullivan v. Creed [1904] 2 IR 317 Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. W. H. Smith & Son Ltd. (1933) 150 LT 211 Sweeney v. Duggan [1997] 2 ILRM 211

Art. 2:205, Notes 11, 13 Art. 3:201, Notes I 15 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14

Tackey v. McBain [1912] AC 186 Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] AC 426 Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd. (No. 1) [1986] AC 80 Taylor v. Perkins (1607) Cro Jac 144, 79 ER 126 Telnikoff v. Matusevitch [1992] 2 AC 343 The People (D. P. P.) v. Morgan (1980) 114 ILTR 60 Theakston v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [2002] EWHC 137 (QB), [2002] EMLR 22 Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), [2003] QB 151 Tolley v. J. S. Fry & Sons Ltd. [1931] AC 333

Art. 2:210, ill. 5 Art. 1:103, Notes IV 41

Tomlinson v. Congleton Borough Council [2003] UKHL 47; [2004] 1 AC 46 Tomlinson (Hauliers) Ltd. v. Hepburn [1966] AC 451 Toome Eeel Fishery (Northern Ireland) Ltd. v. Cardwell [1966] NI 1 Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Cousins [1969] 2 Ch 106 Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461 Trapp v. Mackie 1977 SLT 194 Trapp v. Mackie 1979 SLT 126 Treasure Island Ltd. v. Zebedee Enterprises Ltd., HC 29 May 1987, unreported Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Credit Suisse [1980] QB 629; [1982] AC 679 Truloc Ltd. v. District Judge McMenamin & Donegal County Council [1994] 1 ILRM 151 Truth (N.Z.) Ltd. v. Holloway [1960] 1 WLR 997 Tse Wai Chun Paul v. Cheng [2001] EMLR 31 Tubridy v. White, High Court, 31 January 1974 Tuttle v. Edinburgh University 1984 SLT 172 Twyman v. Knowles (1853) 13 CB 222, 138 ER 1183

1186

Art. 2:101, Notes IX 94 Art. 1:103, Notes I 13 Art. 3:104, Notes I 16 Art. 2:204, Notes IV 44 Art. 1:103, Notes I 13

Art. 1:103, Notes I 13 Art. 2:203, Notes Art. 2:204, Notes Art. 2:203, Notes Art. 2:205, Notes

IV 41 II 25 III 29

13

Art. 7:101, Notes 4 Art. 2:203, Notes II 19, III 30 Art. 5:101, Notes II 28 Art. 6:104, Notes 12 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 2:101, Notes IX 94 Art. 2:205, Notes 12 Art. 2:204, Notes I 14 Art. 2:204, Notes I 14 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 6:106, Notes 12 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 5:203, Notes 14 Art. 5:203, Notes 14 Art. 2:202, Notes V 54 Art. 2:201, Notes V 34 Art. 6:102, Notes 11

Table of Cases Vaughan v. Greater Glasgow Passenger Transport Executive 1984 SC 32 Venables and Thompson v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2001] Fam 430 Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd. v. Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ 1151, [2006] Q.B. 510 Villers v. Monsley (1769) 2 Wils KB 403, 95 ER 886 Vizetelly v. Mudie’s Select Library Ltd. [1900] 2 QB 170 W. B. Anderson & Sons Ltd. v Rhodes (Liverpool) Ltd. [1967] 2 All ER 850 W. v. Ireland (No. 2) [1997] IEHC 212, [1997] 2 IR 141 Waddell v. BBC 1973 SLT 246 Wainwright v. Home Office [2001] EWCA Civ 2081, [2002] QB 1334 Wainwright v. Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406 Ward v. Macauley (1791) 4 T. R. 489, 100 ER 1135 Ward v. Tesco Stores Ltd. [1976] 1 WLR 810 Waters v. Cruikshank [1967] IR 378 Watkins v. Birmingham City Council (1975) Times, 1st August (CA) Watkins v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 966, [2005] 2 WLR 1538 Watkins v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 17, [2006] 2 AC 395 Watt v. Jamieson 1954 SC 56 Waugh v. James K. Allan Ltd. 1964 SLT 173 Wedderburne v. Halkerston (1781) Mor. 10495 Weir Rodgers v. The S. F. Trust Ltd. [2005] IESC 2 Weir v. Wyper 1992 SLT 579 Weldon v. “The Times” Book Co. Ltd. (1911) 28 TLR 143 Welsh v. Stokes [2007] EWCA Civ 796 Wheatley v. Anderson & Miller 1927 SC 133 Whelan v. Madigan [1978] ILRM 136 White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455 White v. Jones [1995] 2 AC 207 Whyte v. University of Dundee 1990 SLT 545 Widdowson v. Newgate Meat Corp. [1998] PIQR P138 Wilkinson v. Downton [1897] 2 QB 57

Williams Williams Williams Williams

v. Curzon Syndicate Ltd. (1919) 35 TLR 475 v. Protheroe (1829) 5 Bing 309, 130 ER 1080 v. Protheroe (1829) 3 Y & J 129, 148 ER 1122 v. Settle [1960] 1 WLR 1072

Art. 2:202, Notes VI 67 Art. 2:205, Notes 13 Art. 3:201, Notes I 13 Art. 2:203, Notes IV 41 Art. 2:204, Notes IV 45 Art. 2:210. Notes 12 Art. 2:203, Notes II 18 Art. 2:204, Notes II 25 Art. 3:101, Notes 13 Art. 2:203, Notes III 28 Art. 2:206, Notes II 27 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 41 Art. 2:202, Notes V 54 Art. 3:201, Notes I 13 Art. 2:101, Notes II 20 Art. 2:101, Notes II 20; Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 1:102, Notes I 12 Art. 3:102, Notes I 16 Art. 2:206, Notes II 28 Art. 3:202, Notes 15 Art. 5:101, ill. 9 Art. 2:204, Notes IV 44 Art. 3:203, Notes 14 Art. 2:204, Notes II 25 Art. 2:203, Notes III 29 Art. 7:104, Notes 14 Art. 2:101, Notes III 32; Art. 2:207, Notes 12 Art. 2:201, Notes V 34 Art. 1:101, Notes VI 41; Art. 5:102, Notes I 14 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 23; Art. 2:210, ill. 2; Art. 3:101, Notes 13; Art. 3:103, ill. 1 Art. 3:201, Notes I 13 Art. 6:106, Notes 12 Art. 6:106, Notes 12 Art. 2:203, Notes III 30

1187

Annexes Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority [1987] QB 730 (CA) [1988] AC 1074 (HL) Wilson and Clyde Coal Co. Ltd. v. English [1938] AC 57 Wilson v. Lombank [1963] 1 WLR 1294 Wilson v. Pringle [1987] QB 237 Wilson v. Shepherd 1913 SC 300 Winkfield, The [1902] P 42 Wong v. Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721, [2003] All ER 932 Wymes v. Tehan [1988] IR 717 X (Health Authority) v. Y [1988] 2 All ER 648 X, A Woman formerly known as Mary Bell v. O’Brien [2003] EWHC (QB) 1101; [2003] EMLR 37 X (minors) v. Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633

York, The [1929] P 178 Young v. Ormiston 1936 SLT 79

Art. 3:102, Notes I 14 Art. 7:104, Notes 14 Art. 2:206, Notes II 26 Art. 1:101, Notes IV 23 Art. 1:102, Notes I 12 Art. 6:104, Notes 12 Art. 3:101, Notes 13 Art. 2:206, Notes I 14 Art. 2:205, ill. 2; Art. 5:203, Notes 14 Art. 2:205, Notes 13 Art. 3:102, Notes III 39; Art. 7:103, Notes 14 Art. 6:201, Notes 9 Art. 2:202, Notes VI 67

Table of Treaties and Enactments of the European Union* Treaties and Conventions Brussels Convention – Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters – consolidated version, concluded at Brussels on 27 September 1968, OJ EC C 27, 26 January 1998, 1-27 art. 5: Chapter 1 Introd. D 28 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for the International Carriage by Air – concluded at Montreal on 28 May 1999, OJ no. L 194 of 18 July 2001, 39 generally: Chapter 3, Introd., D 17 EC Treaty – Treaty establishing the European Community, concluded at Rome on 25 March 1957 – Consolidated Version including the amendments of the Treaty of Nice of 26 February 2001, OJ EC C 325, 24 December 2002, 33 ff art. 45: Art. 7:103, Comments 3 ECHR – European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

as amended by Protocol no. 11, concluded at Rome on 4 November 1950 generally: Art. 2:101, Comments B 8 Art. 2:203, Notes III 30 Art. 2:204, Notes II 23; Art. 7:101, Notes 3 Art. 7:103, Notes 13 art. 5 Art. 7:103, Notes 14 art. 8: Art. 2:203, Notes II 15, III 23, 28; Art. 2:205, Notes 11, 13; Art. 5:203, Notes 14; Art. 7:101, Notes 4 art. 10: Art. 2:101, Notes V 50 Art. 2:203, Notes III 28; Art. 2:204, Notes II 24; Art. 2:205, Notes 11, 13 Art. 5:203, Notes 8; 13, 14 Art. 7:101, Notes 2, 4 art. 11 Art. 7:104, Notes 12 art. 41 Art. 2:101, Notes VI 56 Rome Convention – Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, concluded at Rome on 19 June 1980, OJ EC L 266, 9 October 1980, 1-19 generally: Art. 1:101, Notes VI 29

*

Table compiled by Daniel Smith (Osnabrück) with the assistance of Sebastian König (Osnabrück).

1189

Annexes

Regulations Regulation 40/94 / EC [also referred to as Community Trade Mark Regulation] – Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade Mark (CTMR), OJ EC L 11, 14 January 1994, 1 art. 98: Art. 1:103, Comments E 13 Regulation 1103/97/ EC – Council Regulation (EC) No. 1103/97 of 17 June 1997 on certain Provisions relating to the Introduction of the Euro, OJ EC L 162, 19 June 1997, 1-3 art 2: Art. 3:204, Comments B 14 Regulation 2027/97/ EC – Council Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 of 9 October 1997 on air carrier liability in the event of accidents, OJ EC L 285, 17 October 1997, 1-3 (amended by Regulation (EC) 889/2002 of 13 May 2002, OJ no. L 140 of 30 May 2002, p. 2.) generally: Chapter 3, Introd., D 17 Regulation 44/2001/ EC [also referred to as Brussels I Regulation] – Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (“Brussels I”), OJ EC L 12 of 16 January 2001, 1-23 art. 5: Chapter 3, Introd., D 28

Directives Directive 72/166 / EEC – [First] Council Directive 72/166 / EEC of 24 April 1972 on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, OJ EC L 103 of 02 May 1972, 1-4 generally: Art. 3:205, Comments B 8, Notes 3 Directive 84/5/ EEC – [Second] Council Directive 84/5/ EEC of 30 December 1983 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, OJ EC L 8 of 11 January 1984, 17-20 art. 2(1): Art. 5:101, Notes II 14 Directive 85/374 / EEC [also referred to as the Product Liability Directive] – Council Directive 85/374 / EEC of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States concerning Liability for Defective Products, OJ EC L 210 of 7 August 1985, 29-33 (amended by Article 1 of Directive 1999/34 / EC) generally: art. 3: art. 5:

1190

Art. 1:103, Notes I 12; Art. 3:204, Comments A 1, A 7, Notes I 1; II 13 Art. 3:204, Notes I 2 Art. 6:105, Comments A 1

Table of Treaties and Enactments of the European Union art. 9:

art. 12: art. 13: art. 15: art. 16:

Art. 1:103, Comments D 11, Notes II 18; Art. 3:204, Comments B 14, C 16; Notes II (1) 16; Art. 6:102, Comments 3 Art. 3:204, Comments A 5; Art. 5:401, Comments D 15 Art. 1:103, Notes II 18; Art. 3:204, Comments A 11 Art. 3:204, Comments A 8; Art. 3:207, Comments B 7 Art. 3:204, Comments C 17

Directive 90/232 / EEC – [Third] Council Directive 90/232 / EEC of 14 May 1990 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, OJ EC L 129 of 19 May 1990, 33-35 art. 1: Art. 5:101, Notes II 14 Directive 93/98 / EEC – Council Directive 93/98 / EEC of 29 October 1993 harmonizing the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, OJ EC L 290, 24 November 1993, 9-13 art. 1: Art. 2:203, Comments D 15 Directive 97/7/ EC [also referred to as the Distance Sale Directive] of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts – Statement by the Council and the Parliament re Article 6 (1) – Statement by the Commission re Article 3 (1), first indent, OJ EC L 144, 4 June 1997, 19-27 art. 8: Art. 1:103, Notes II 18 Directive 1999/34 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 1999 amending Council Directive 85/374 / EEC on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States concerning Liability for Defective Products, OJ EC L 141 of 4 June 1999, 20-21; corrected by OJ EC L 283 of 6 November 1999, 20 art. 1: Chapter 3, Introd., D 17; Art. 3:204, Comments A 1; 7 Directive 2000/31/ EC [also referred to as the E-Commerce Directive] of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce), OJ EC L 178 of 17 July 2000, 1-16 generally: Art. 2:204, Notes IV 37; 41; 43 Art. 2:207, Comments A 2 Chapter 3, Introd., D 17 art. 12-15: Art. 2:204, Comments B 7 art. 12-14: Art. 2:204, Notes IV 44, IV 45 Directive 2003/71/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34 / EC, OJ EC L 345 of 31 December 2003, 64-89 art. 6: Art. 2:207, Comments A 2

1191

Annexes Directive 2004/35/ EC of the Council and the European Parliament of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, OJ EC L 143, 30 April 2004, 56-75 generally: Art. 2:209, Comments A 1, B 6, Notes I 1 recital no. 14: Art. 2:209, Comments A 1 art. 2: Art. 2:209, Comments C 8 art. 3: Art. 2:209, Comments A 1 art. 4: Art. 2:209, Comments A 2 art. 8: Art. 2:209, Comments A 1 art. 11: Art. 2:209, Comments B 4 art. 12: Art. 2:209, Comments B 4 art. 19: Art. 2:209, Comments A 1 Directive 2004/48 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ EC L 195 of 2 June 2004, 16-25 art. 7: Art. 2:205, Notes 14 art. 13: Art. 6:101, Comments F 17; Notes II 28 Directive 2004/113/ EC [also referred to as the General Sex Discrimination Directive] – Council Directive 2004/113/ EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ EC L 373 of 21 December 2004, 37-43 generally: Art. 3:207, Comments B 5 art. 2: Art. 2:203, Comments B 7 art. 8: Art. 2:203, Comments B 7; Art. 5:401, Comments E 17

Other Sources Council of Europe, Resolution (75)7 on Compensation for Physical Injury or Death – adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 14 March 1975 at the 243rd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies no. 2.10: Art. 2:202, Notes II 4 no. 3.6: Art. 2:202, Notes II 4

1192

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form* Abrantes Geraldes, Temas da responsabilidade civil I2, II

Adam, Drept civil Agalopoulou-Zervogiani, FS Litzeropoulos I, 27

Agell, FS Ekelöf, 1

Agell, FS Grönfors, 9

Agell, Samtycke och risktagande Agell, Skadeståndsansvaret vid obehöriga förfoganden över annans egendom, 197 Akkermans, WPNR 1992, no. 6043, 249 Alarcão, Obrigações Albaladejo (-author), Comentarios al Código Civil y compilaciones forales, VIII(1), XV(1), XXIV

Albaladejo and Díaz Alabart (-author), Comentarios al Código Civil y compilaciones forales, I(3)2 Albaladejo, Derecho Civil II12, II(2)10, III(1)8 *

António Santos Abrantes Geraldes, Temas da responsabilidade civil, vol. I: Indemnização do Dano da Privação do Uso (2nd ed., Coimbra 2005), vol. II: Indemnização dos Danos Reflexos (Coimbra 2005) Ioan Adam, Drept civil. Teoria generala˘ a obligat¸iilor (Bucharest 2004) Penelope Agalopoulou-Zervogiani, I simasia tis synaineseos tou travmatismenou se xirourgiki epemvasi kata to Astiko Dikaio, in: Festschrift in honour of Alexandros Litzeropoulos I (Athens 1985), 27-40 Anders Agell, Orsaksrekvisit och beviskrav i skadeståndsrätten, in: Henrik Hessler (ed.) Festschrift in honour of Per Olof Ekelöf (Stockholm 1972), 1-37 Anders Agell, Skada i följd av trafik som ersättnings- och jämkningsgrund, in: Gorton et al. (ed.), Festschrift in honour of Kurt Grönfors (Stockholm 1991), 9-28 Anders Agell, Samtycke och risktagande (Stockholm 1962) Anders Agell, Skadeståndsansvaret vid obehöriga förfoganden över annans egendom, in: Familjerätt, skadeståndsrätt och annan förmögenhetsrätt: valda skrifter (Uppsala 1993), 197-239 Arno J. Akkermans, Veroorzaking van deelschade, WPNR 6043 (1992), 249-255 Rui Alarcão in cooperation with J. Sousa Ribeiro, Direito das Obrigações (Coimbra 1983) Manuel Albaladejo (ed.), Comentarios al Código Civil y compilaciones forales, vol. VIII, part 1: arts. 609-617 (Madrid 1987), vol. XXIV: arts. 1887-1929 (Madrid 1984) and vol. XV, part 1: arts. 1088-1124 (Madrid 1989), quoted here with the commentaries under arts. 1888-1894, 1902, 1907-1909 by Jaime Santos Briz and arts. 1101, 1106 by Ángel Carrasco Perrera and art. 610 by Fernando Pantaleón Prieto Manuel Albaladejo and Silvia Díaz Alabart, Comentarios al Código Civil y compilaciones forales, vol. I, part 3: arts. 17-41 (2nd ed., Madrid 1993), quoted here with the commentaries of arts. 37 and 38 by Francisco Capilla Roncero Manuel Albaladejo, Derecho Civil, vol. II: Derecho de obligaciones (12 ed., Madrid 2004), sometimes also quoted from

Table compiled by Daniel Smith (Osnabrück) together with Florian Arensmann, Anneke Lohmann, Aleksandra Kryskow and Florian Wolf (Osnabrück).

1193

Annexes

Alexandridou, Dikaio prostasias tou katanaloti Alexandridou, To dikaio tou ilektronikou emporiou Alexiades, Eisagoge sto Iatriko Dikaio Almeida Costa, Obrigações9, 10

Almeida Costa, Responsabilidade civil pela ruptura Alpa and Bessone (-author), La responsabilità civile I2, III, IV2

Alpa and Mariconda (-author), Codice civile commentato IV

Alpa, (2006) 17 EBLR, 1441 Alpa, Trattato di diritto civile IV Alpa/Bessone/ZenoZencovich, Trattato di diritto privato XIV(6) Álvarez Lata, Cláusulas restrictivas de responsabilidad civil Álvarez Lata, InDret 2/2003

1194

the 10th ed., part 2: Los contratos en particular y las obligaciones no contractuales (Barcelona 1997), vol. III: Derecho de bienes, part 1: Parte general y derecho de propiedad (8th ed., Barcelona 1994) Elisa Alexandridou, Dikaio prostasias tou katana loti (Thessaloniki 1996) Elisa Alexandridou, To dikaio tou ilektronikou emporiou (Athens 2004) Aristeides-Dimitrios Alexiades, Eisagoge sto Iatriko Dikaio (Thessaloniki 1996) Mário Júlio de Almeida Costa, Direito das Obrigações (10th ed., Coimbra 2006), sometimes also quoted from the 9th ed. (Coimbra 2001) Mário Júlio de Almeida Costa, Responsabilidade civil pela ruptura das negociações preparatórias de um contrato (Coimbra 1994) Guido Alpa and Mario Bessone, La responsabilità civile, vol. I (2nd ed., Turin 1980), vol. III (Turin 1987) and vol. IV (2nd ed., Turin 1997), quoted here with the contributions of Massimo Dogliotti, Profili di responsabilità civile nella tutela della persona (vol. III, chap. 1, 3-41), Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, Onore, reputazione e identità personale (vol. III, chap. 2, 45-73) and Marco Lopez de Gonzalo, La responsabilità extracontrattuale del vettore (vol. IV, chap. 2, 31-54) Guido Alpa and Vincenzo Mariconda (eds.), Codice civile commentato con Cd-ROM, vol. IV: Delle obbligazioni (arts. 1173-2059) coordinated by Guido Alpa, Vincenzo Cuffaro and Vincenzo Mariconda (Milan 2005), quoted here with the commentaries of arts. 1173-1181 by Vito Pace, of arts. 2044-2049 by Corrado Marvasi, of art. 2054 by Guido Alpa, of sub art. 2043 by Guido Alpa and Vincenzo Mariconda Guido Alpa, Strict Liability in Italian Law, (2006) 17 EBLR, 1441-1472 Guido Alpa, Trattato di diritto civile, vol. IV: La responsabilità civile (Milan 1999) Guido Alpa, Mario Bessone and Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, coordinated by Pietro Rescigno, Trattato di diritto privato, vol. XIV, book 6: Obbligazioni e contratti (Turin 1999) Natalia Álvarez Lata, Cláusulas restrictivas de responsabilidad civil (Granada 1998) Natalia Álvarez Lata, El contrato de aparcamiento de vehículos – Notas a la Ley 40/2002 de 14 de noviembre, InDret, April 2003 (http://www.indret.com/pdf/137_es.pdf)

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Álvarez Lata, La responsabilidad civil por daños al medio ambiente3, 1895 Álvarez-Caperochipi, El enriquecimiento sin causa3 Álvaro Dias, Dano corporal Álvaro Dias, FS Almeida Costa, 753

Álvaro Dias, RPDC IX [2000-10] 71 Álvaro Dias, RPDC X [2001-11] 37 Alves, A responsabilidade do produtor: soluções actuais e perspectivas futuras Andersson, JFT 2007, 377 Andersson, JT 2000-01, 897 Andersson, Pointlex 2004-12-20 Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans Andersson, Trepartsrelationer i skadeståndsrätten Androulidaki-Dimitriadi, I ipochreosi enimersosis tou asthenous Antonov, Nepozvoleno uvrejdane Antunes Varela, Obrigações em geral I10 Apathy and Riedler, Bürgerliches Recht III3 Apathy, Aufwendungen zur Schadensbeseitigung Apathy, JBl 1985, 641 Apathy, ZVR 1981, 257

Natalia Álvarez Lata, La responsabilidad civil por daños al medio ambiente, in: Luis Fernando Reglero Campos (coord.), Tratado de responsabilidad civil (3rd ed., Navarra 2006), 1895-1956 José Antonio Álvarez-Caperochipi, El enriquecimiento sin causa (3rd ed., Granada 1993) João António Álvaro Dias, Dano corporal: quadro epistemológico e aspectos ressarcitórios (Coimbra 2001) João António Álvaro Dias, Consequências não pecuniárias de lesões não letais – algumas considerações, in: Festschrift in honour of Mário Júlio de Almeida Costa, edited by Júlio Gomes (Lisbon 2002), 753-778 João Álvaro Dias, Dano corporal; Uma realidade não subsumível à perda (ou diminuiçao) da capacidade de ganho, RPDC IX [2000-10], 71-98 João Álvaro Dias, Algumas considerações sobre o chamado dano corporal, RPDC X [2001-11], 37-75 Francisco Luís Alves, A responsabilidade do produtor: soluções actuais e perspectivas futuras (http://www.verbojuridico.net/ doutrina/consumidor/responsabilidadeprodutor.html) Håkan Andersson, Nationell EKMR-skadeståndsrätt – en argumentativ probleminventeringsskiss, JFT 2007, 377-414 Håkan Andersson, Judisk verklighetsbild – realitet eller simulacrum?, JT 2000-01, 897-909 Håkan Andersson, Tredjemansersättning – entydig princip eller konkretiserande intressekvalificering, Pointlex 2004-12-20 (www.pointlex.se) Håkan Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans (Uppsala 1993) Håkan Andersson, Trepartsrelationer i skadeståndsrätten (Uppsala 1997) Ismini Androulidaki-Dimitriadi, I ipochreosi enimersosis tou asthenous (Athens 1993) Dimitar Antonov, Nepozvoleno uvrejdane (Sofia 1967) João de Matos Antunes Varela, Das Obrigações em geral, vol. I (10th ed., Coimbra 2000) Peter Apathy and Andreas Riedler, Bürgerliches Recht III, Schuldrecht Besonderer Teil (3rd ed., Vienna a.o. 2008) Peter Apathy, Aufwendungen zur Schadensbeseitigung (Vienna 1979) Peter Apathy, Zivilrechtliche Folgen der Nichtverwendung von Sicherheitsgurten, JBl 1985, 641-646 Peter Apathy, Fragen des Ersatzes von Reparaturkosten nach der Beschädigung von Kraftfahrzeugen, ZVR 1981, 257-262

1195

Annexes Arnold, VersR 2004, 309

Arxaniotakis, I astiki evthini tou nomikou prosopou idiotikou dikaiou Asser (-Hartkamp), Verbintenissenrecht I12, II12, III10, 11, 12

Asser (-Hijma), Bijzondere overeenkomsten I6

Asser (-Kortmann), De Vertegenwoordiging I8

Asua González, Responsabilidad civil médica, 1153 Axberger, JT 1994-95, 716 B.H.Verb. (-author), II-4

Baker/Langan/Turner, Snell’s equity31 Balaguer Callejón, Los derechos fundamentales al honor Balis, Enochikon Dikaion Geniko meros3 Balis, Genikai Archai8 Baltoudis, I evthini apo ta elattomatika prioionta Bamberger and Roth (-author), BGB

1196

Kathrin Arnold, „Kind als Schaden“ in Frankreich – unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des „Anti-Perruche-Gesetzes“, VersR 2004, 309-313 Georg Arxaniotakis, I astiki evthini tou nomikou prosopou idiotikou dikaiou (Thessaloniki 1989) Carel Asser (estab.), Carel Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht. Verbintenissenrecht (4), part I: De verbintenis in het algemeen (12th ed., Deventer 2004), part II: Algemene leer der overeenkomsten (12th ed., Deventer 2005), part III: De verbintenis uit de wet (12th ed., Deventer 2006), authored by Arthur Severijn Hartkamp, sometimes also quoted from the previous editions (Deventer 1998 and 2002) Carel Asser (estab.), Carel Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht. Bijzondere overeenkomsten (5) part I: Koop en ruil (6th ed., Zwolle 2001), authored by Jacob Hijma Carel Asser (estab.), Carel Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht. Vertegenwoordiging en Rechtspersoon (2) part I: De Vertegenwoordiging (8th ed., Deventer 2004), authored by Sebastianus Constantinus Johannes Josephus Kortmann Clara I. Asua González, Responsabilidad civil médica, in: Luis Fernando Reglero Campos (coord.), Tratado de responsabilidad civil (3rd ed., Navarra 2006), 1153-1232 Hans-Gunnar Axberger, Ära och integirtet, JT 1994-95, 716-728 Jan Roodhooft (ed.), Bestendig Handboek Verbintenissenrecht, title II: Bronnen, chapter 4: De overeenkomst by Tom Hens, Loose-leaf (Antwerp 1998-09.2005) Paul Vivian Baker, Peter St. John Langan and Edmund Henry Turner, Snell’s equity (31st ed., London 2005), sometimes also quoted from the 29th ed. (London 1990) María Luisa Balaguer Callejón, Los derechos fundamentales al honor, a la intimidad personal y familiar y a la propia imagen, in: Francisco Balaguer Callejón (ed.), Derecho Constitucional, vol. II (Madrid 1999) Georg Balis, Enochikon Dikaion Geniko meros (3rd ed., Athens 1969) Georg Balis, Genikai Archai tou Astikou Dikaiou (8th ed., Athens 1961, reprint 1969) Anastasios Baltoudis, I evthini apo ta ellatomatika proionta (Thessaloniki 1999) Heinz Georg Bamberger and Herbert Roth (ed.), Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol. I: §§ 1-610 (Munich 2003),

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form

Barceló Domenech, Responsabilidad extracontractual del empresario Bárdos, Kárfelelo˝sség a Polgári Törvénykönyv rendszerében Bárdos, Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció 5-6/2004, 3 Barta, Zivilrecht II2 Basozabal Arrue, Enriquecimiento injustificado por intromisión en derecho ajeno Baur and Stürner, Sachenrecht17 Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland10 Bénabent, Les Obligations9, 10 Bengtsson and Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen1, 2 Bengtsson, 21 uppsatser

Bengtsson, Det allmännas ansvar enligt skadeståndslagen Bengtsson, Ersättning vid offentliga ingrepp II Bengtsson, Om jämkning av skadestånd Bengtsson, Skadestånd vid sport, lek och sällskapsliv Bengtsson, SvJT 1961, 627 Bengtsson, SvJT 1976, 593 Bercovitz (-author), Comentarios a Ley de propiedad intelectual2

quoted here with the commentary of Pref. to § 249 by Christian Grüneberg Javier Barceló Domenech, Responsabilidad extracontractual del empresario por actividades de sus dependientes (Madrid 1995)

Péter Bárdos, Kárfelelo˝sség a Polgári Törvénykönyv rendszerében (Budapest 2001) Péter Bárdos, Az új Ptk. Kárfelelo˝sségi fejezete (Változat egy témára), Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció 5-6/2004, 3-6 Heinz Barta, Zivilrecht. Grundriss und Einführung in das Rechtsdenken, part 2 (2nd ed., Vienna 2004) Xabier Basozabal Arrue, Enriquecimiento injstificado por intromisión en derecho ajeno (Madrid 1998)

Fritz Baur, Sachenrecht, continued by Jürgen F. Baur and Rolf Stürner (17th ed., Munich 1999) George Joseph Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland (10th ed., Edinburgh 1899) Alain Bénabent, Droit civil: Les obligations (10th ed., Paris 2005) sometimes also quoted from the 9th ed. (Paris 2003) Bertil Bengtsson and Erland Strömbäck, Skadeståndslagen: en kommentar (2nd ed., Stockholm 2006), sometimes also quoted from the previous edition (Stockholm 2002) Bertil Bengtsson, 21 uppsatser: skadestånd och försäkring, grundlag, fastighetsrätt och miljö. Ur domarens synvinkel (Lund 2003) Bertil Bengtsson, Det allmännas ansvar enligt skadeståndslagen (Stockholm 1990) Bertil Bengtsson, Ersättning vid offentliga ingrepp, vol. II: Allmänna ersättningsprinciper (Stockholm 1991) Bertil Bengtsson, Om jämkning av skadestånd (Stockholm 1982) Bertil Bengtsson, Skadestånd vid sport, lek och sällskapsliv (Stockholm 1962) Bertil Bengtsson, Om ansvarsförsäkringens betydelse i skadeståndsmål, SvJT 1961, 627-645 Bertil Bengtsson, Nyheter i skadeståndslagstiftningen, SvJT 1976, 593-618 Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodríguez-Cano (coord.), Comentarios a Ley de propiedad intelectual (2nd ed., Madrid 1997), quoted here with the commentary of art. 133-135 by Ángel Carrasco Perera

1197

Annexes Berg, Das neue spanische Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb von 1991

Bergel/Bruschi/Cimamonti, Les biens Bernat, JBl 2004, 311 Bernau, FamRZ 2007, 92

Bernitz, JT 2005-06, 620

Besenyei, A bérleti szerzo˝dés2 Beysen, VersRAI 2004, 10

Beysen, VersRAI 2004, 41

Bianca, Diritto civile I2, V

Bieniek (-author) III(1)5

Birks (-author), English Private Law I, II

Bíró and Lenkovics, Általános Tanok4 Bíró, A kötelmi jog és a szerzo˝déstan közös szabályai6 Bíró, Szerzo˝dési alaptípusok Blackie, Acta Juridica (1992), 23 Bloth, Produkthaftung Bocken and Boone, TPR 2002, 1625

1198

Axel Berg, Das neue spanische Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb von 1991: eine rechtsvergleichende Interpretation des spanischen Gesetzes mit einer Darstellung der bisherigen Rechtsprechung – zugleich eine kritische Betrachtung des deutschen Rechts aus wettbewerbsfunktionaler Sicht (Munich 1997) Jean-Louis Bergel, Marc Bruschi and Sylvie Cimamonti, Les biens (Paris 2000) Erwin Bernat, Zur Ersatzfähigkeit des Unterhaltsschadens nach “wrongful birth”, JBl 2004, 311-317 Falk Bernau, Die Elternhaftung aus § 832 BGB. Eine Übersicht der seit 2000 veröffentlichten Rechtsprechung, FamRZ 2007, 92-99 Ulf Bernitz, Skadeståndsansvar för otillåtet ingripande i avtalsförhållande och medverkan till kontraktsbrott; HD utvidgar ansvaret för ren förmögenhetsskada, JT 2005-06, 620-629 Lajos Besenyei, A bérleti szerzo˝dés (2nd ed., Budapest 2003) Erwin Beysen, Neue Entwicklungen in der belgischen höchstrichterlichen Rechtsprechung zur deliktischen Äquivalenztheorie, VersRAI 2004, 10-15 Erwin Beysen, Der Wegfall von Einkünften aus Schwarzarbeit: ein ersatzfähiger Schaden im Sinne des französischen und des belgischen Deliktsrechts?, VersRAI 2004, 41-48 Cesare Massimo Bianca, Diritto civile, vol. I: La norma giuridica – I soggetti (2nd ed., Milan 2002), vol. V: La responsabilità (Milan 1994, reprint 2003) Gerard Bieniek (ed.), Komentarz do kodeksu cywilnego, vol. III: Zobowia˛zania, book 1, quoted here with the commentary to art. 362 by Tadeusz Wis´niewski and arts. 415, 435, 436 by Gerard Bieniek (5th ed., Warsaw 2003) Peter Birks (ed.), English Private Law, Vol. I: Sources of law, law of persons, law of property; and Vol. 2: Law of obligations (Oxford 2000); quoted was the contribution by Guenter Treitel, John Davies György Bíró and Barnabás Lenkovics, Magyar Polgári Jog, Általános tanok (4th ed., Miskolc 2006, reprint of 2002) György Bíró, A kötelmi jog és a szerzo˝déstan közös szabályai (6th ed., Miskolc 2001) György Bíró, Szerzo˝dési alaptípusok (Miskolc 2003) John Blackie, Enrichment and Wrongs in Scots Law, Acta Juridica (1992), 23 Christian Bloth, Produkthaftung in Schweden, Norwegen und Dänemark (Heidelberg 1993) Hubert Bocken and Ingrid Boone, Causaliteit in het Belgische recht, TPR 2002, 1625-1693

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Bocken, TBBR 1988, 268 Bollenberger, JBl 1997, 284 Bona, Danno e resp. 2005, 353 Bonnington, (1992) SLT, 289 Boukema, Samenloop Boulanger, D. 2005, 2245

Bouma, VR 1995, 207 Bourrié-Quenillet, JCP 1998, éd. G, I no. 112 Bourrié-Quenillet, JCP 1998, éd. G, I no. 186 Bourrié-Quenillet, JCP 2004, éd. G, I no. 136 Boytha, Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció 1/2003, 3 Brandão Proença, A conduta do lesado Bridge, Personal Property Law, 41 Brun, Responsabilité civile extracontractuelle Brunner, AA 44 (1995), 932 Buonocore and Luminoso, Codice della vendita1, 2 Burov, Grajdanska otgovornost za vredi, prichineni pri avtomobilna zlopoluka Burrows, Remedies3 Busnelli, Contr. Impr. 1991, 539

Hubert Bocken, Enkele. hoofdthema’s van de causaliteitsproblematiek, TBBR 1988, 268-273 Raimund Bollenberger, Drittschaden bei obligatorischer Gefahrverlagerung, JBl 1997, 284-303 Marco Bona, Stati pregressi di vulnerabilità: Quid juris?, Danno e resp. 2005, 353-364 Alistair J. Bonnington, Letting the Right Alone, (1992) SLT 289-293 Cornelis Alet Boukema, Samenloop (Mon. Nieuw BW, A-Serie, 21) (Deventer 1992) François Boulanger, Autorité parentale et responsabilité des père et mère des faits dommageables de l’enfant mineur après la réforme du 4 mars 2002. Réflexions critiques, D. 2005, 2245-2249 H. Th. Bouma, Psychische schade, smartegeld en verplichting tot schadebeperking, VR 1995, 207-210 Martine Bourrié-Quenillet, Le préjudice moral des proches d’une victime blessée, JCP 1998, éd. G, I no. 112, 319-325 Martine Bourrié-Quenillet, Lepréjudice moral des proches d’une victime blessée. Dérive litgieure ou prix du désespoir, JCP 1998, éd. G, I no. 186, 2205-2210 Martine Bourrié-Quenillet, Droit du dommage corporel et prix de la vie humaine, JCP 2004, éd. G, I no. 136 György Boytha, A személyi jogok megsértésének vagyoni szankcionálása, Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció 1/2003, 3-6 José Carlos Brandão Proença, A conduta do lesado como pressuposto e critério de imputação do dano extracontratual (Coimbra 1997) Michael G. Bridge, Personal Property Law, (2nd ed., London 1996) Philippe Brun, Responsabilité civile extracontractuelle (Paris 2005) J. C. H. Brunner, Is beroepsaansprakelijkheid iets bijzonders? Rode draad. Artikelen, AA 44 (1995), 932-941 Vincenzo Buonocore and Angelo Luminoso, Codice della vendita (2nd ed., Milan 2005), sometimes also quoted from the previous edition (Milan 2001) Boris Burov, Grajdanska otgovornost za vredi, prichineni pri avtomobilna zlopoluka (Sofia 1970)

Andrew Burrows, Remedies for torts and breach of contract (3rd ed., Oxford 2004) Francesco Donato Busnelli, Itinerari europei nella “terra di nessuno tra contratto e fatto illecito”: la responsabilità da informazioni inesatte, Contr. Impr. 1991, 539-577

1199

Annexes Busnelli, Foro it. 1965, IV, 47

Busnelli, Il danno biologico Bussani, La colpa soggettiva Busto Lago, La antijuridicidad del daño Busto Lago, La responsabilidad civil de las administraciones públicas, 1710 Bustos Pueche, La Ley 1997, V, 1699 Bydlinski, JBl 1965, 173 and 237 Bydlinski, JBl 1986, 626

Cabanillas Sánchez, ADC 1993, 1957 Calvão da Silva, Responsabilidade civil do produtor Camara Alvarez and DíezPicazo, Dos estudios sobre el enriquecimiento sin causa Capelo de Sousa, O direito geral de personalidade Cappellari, Resp.civ. e prev. 2000, 1061

Carbonnier, Droit civil I, III19, IV21

Cardoso da Costa, BolMinJus 396 (1990), 5 Carneiro da Frada, Teoria da confiança

1200

Francesco Donato Busnelli, Perdita di una «chance» e risarcimento del danno (Nota alla sent. App. Parigi 6 marzo 1964) Foro it. 1965, IV, 47-52 Francesco Donato Busnelli, Il danno biologico, Dal «diritto vivente» al «diritto vigente» (Turin 2001) Mauro Bussani, La copa soggettiva, Modelli di valutazione della condotta nella responsabilità extracontrattuale (Padua 1991) José Manuel Busto Lago, La antijuridicidad del daño resarcible en la responsabilidad civil extracontractual (Madrid 1998) José Manuel Busto Lago, La responsabilidad civil de las administraciones públicas, in: Luis Fernando Reglero Campos (coord.), Tratado de responsabilidad civil (3rd ed., Navarra 2006), 1710-1833 José Enriqe Bustos Pueche, Un caso de voluntarismo judicial: la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 6 de junio de 1997, La Ley 1997, V, 1699-1701 Franz Bydlinski, Der Ersatz ideellen Schadens als sachliches und methodisches Problem, JBl 1965, 173-194 (part 1) and 237-254 (part 2) Franz Bydlinski, Schadenersatz wegen materiel rechtswidriger Verfahrensfehler, JBl 1986, 626-639 Antonio Cabanillas Sánchez, La responsabilidad por inmisiones industriales (Comentario a la sentencia del TS de 15 de marzo de 1993), ADC 1993 (4), 1957-1994 João Calvão da Silva, Responsabilidade civil do produtor (Coimbra 1990) Manuel de la Camara Alvarez and Luis Díez-Picazo, Dos estudios sobre el enriquecimiento sin causa (Madrid 1991) Rabindranath Valentino Aleixo Capelo de Sousa, O direito geral de personalidade (Coimbra 1995) Laura Cappellari, In tema di valutazione della sussitenza del requisito della «comunicazione a più persone» quale elemento costitutivo dell’illecito diffamatorio in sede sia penale che civile, note under Cass. 19 May 1999, no. 4855, Resp.civ. e prev. 2000, 1061-1069 Jean Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. I : Introduction, les personnes, la famille, l’enfant, le couple (Paris 2004), vol.III: Les biens: monnaie, immeubles, meubles (19th ed., Paris 2000); vol. IV: Les obligations (21st ed., Paris 1998) José Manuel M. Cardoso da Costa, A hierarquia das normas constitucionais e a sua função na protecção dos direitos fundamentais, BolMinJus 396 (1990), 5-27 Manuel António de Castro Portugal Carneiro da Frada, Teoria da confiança e responsabilidade civil (Coimbra 2001)

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Carneiro da Frada, Uma terceira via Carpino, Obbligazioni e contratti III Carrasco Perera, ADC 1987, 1055 Carrasco Perera, ADC 1988, 5 Carrasco Perera, AJA 2002 (557), 2 Carrasco Perera, Aranzadi Civil 1996, II, 51 Carrasco Perera, CCJC 1993, 1105 Carter-Ruck/Walker/Starte, Libel and Slander4 Carval, La responsabilité civile dans sa fonction de peine privée Carvalho Rebelo, A responsabilidade civil pela televisão Casas Vallés, RJC 1989, 285 Cassano and Cimino, Giur.it. 2004, 671

Cassidy, [2004] LSG 98, 14 Castelletta, Responsabilité médicale2 Castronovo, Danno e resp. 2004, 237 Castronovo, Europa e dir. priv. 2004, 69 Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile2, 3 Cavanillas Múgica and Tapia Fernández, La concurrencia de responsabilidad contractual y extracontractual

Manuel A. Carneiro da Frada, Uma «terceira via» no Direito da responsabilidade civil? O problema da imputação dos danos causados a terceiros por auditores de sociedades (Coimbra 1997) Brunetto Carpino, Obbligazioni e contratti, vol. III, in: Pietro Rescigno, Trattato di diritto privato, 11 (Turin 1992) Ángel Carrasco Perera, Restitución de provechos (I), ADC 1987 (2), 1055-1148 Ángel Carrasco Perera, Restitución de provechos (II), ADC 1988 (1), 5-152 Ángel Carrasco Perera, Aparcamientos: una superfluidad normativa, AJA 2002 (557), 2 Ángel Carrasco Perera, Reparación del daño en forma específica, Aranzadi Civil, 1996, II, 51-68 Ángel Carrasco Perera, 14 de diciembre de 1993. Propiedad intelectual. Derecho moral de autor. Indemnización del daño moral, CCJC 1993, 1105-1119 Peter Frederick Carter-Ruck, Richard Walker and Harvey N. A. Starte, Carter-Ruck on Libel and Slander (4th ed., London 1992) Suzanne Carval, La responsabilité civile dans sa fonction de peine privée (Paris 1995) Maria da Glória Carvalho Rebelo, A responsabilidade civil pela informação transmitida pela televisão (Lisbon 1998) Ramón Casas Vallés, Honor, Intimidad e Imagen. Su tutela en la LO 1/82, RJC 1989, 285-372 Giuseppe Cassano and Jacopo Pietro Cimino, Il nuovo regime di responsabilità dei providers: verso la creazione di un novello «censore telematico»? Un primo commento agli artt. 14-17 del D. Lgs. n. 70/2003, Giur.it. 2004, 671-675 Pamela Cassidy, A model decision, [2004] LSG 98 (5), 14-17 (http://www.ucc.ie/law/irlii/periodicals/12lsgdisp.php?yr=2004) Angelo Castelletta, Responsabilité médicale: droit des malades (2nd ed., Paris 2004) Carlo Castronovo, Il danno alla persona tra essere e avere, Danno e resp. 2004, 237-247 Carlo Castronovo, Le due specie della responsabilità civile e il problema del concorso, Europa e dir. priv. 2004, 69-129 Carlo Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile (3rd ed., Milan 2006), somestimes also quoted from the 2nd ed. (Milan 1997) Santiago Cavanillas Múgica and Isabel Tapia Fernández, La concurrencia de responsabilidad contractual y extracontractual. Tratamiento sustantivo y procesal (Madrid 1992)

1201

Annexes Cendon (-author), Commentario al codice civile IV(2), VI

Cendon and Ziviz (-author), Il danno esistenziale

Charlesworth and Percy (-author), Negligence11 Chartier, D. 1984 jur. 215 Chartier, La réparation du préjudice dans la responsabilité civile Chindemi, Resp.civ. e prev. 2006, 549 Chitty on Contracts I29

Cian and Trabucchi, Commentario breve6, 8 Cian, Antigiuridicità e colpevolezza Cigoj, Teorija obligacij Clark and Smith, Intellectual Property Law in Ireland2 Clark, Product Liability Clerk and Lindsell (-author), Torts16, 18, 19

Clive/Watt/McKain, Scots Law for Journalists5 Comai, Il danno ambientale

1202

Paolo Cendon (ed.), Commentario al codice civile, vol. IV, part 2: arts. 1655-2059 (Turin 1999) and vol. VI: arts. 2643-2969 (Turin 1999), quoted here with the commentaries of art. 2043 by Guigi Gaudino, art. 2058 by Enrico Tomasi, art. 2789 by Francesco Realmonte Paolo Cendon and Patrizia Ziviz (ed.), Il danno esistenziale. Una nuova categoria della responsabilità civile (Milan 2000), quoted here with the contributions of Patrizia Ziviz: Verso un altro paradigma risarcitorio, 25-55 and Pier Giuseppe Monateri: Verso una teoria del danno esistenziale, 713-724 John Charlesworth and Rodney A. Percy, Negligence (11th ed., London 2007) with the contribution of Roger Cooper, Christopher T. Walton Yves Chartier, Note under Court d’Appel de Paris 10 November 1983, D. 1984 jur. 215-216 Yves Chartier, La réparation du préjudice dans la responsabilité civile (Paris 1983) Domenico Chindemi, Il risarcimento del danno non patrimoniale nel nuovo codice delle assicuriazioni: risarcimento o indennizzo?, Resp.civ. e prev. 2006, 549-569 Hugh Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, I General Principles, quoted was the commentary by Andrew Burrows (29th ed. London 2004) Giorgio Cian and Alberto Trabucchi in cooperation with Bruno Barel, Commentario breve al codice civile (8th ed., Padua 2007), sometimes also quoted from the 6th ed. (Padua 2002) Giorgio Cian, Antigiuridicità e colpevolezza, Saggio per una teoria dell’illecito civile (Padua 1966) Stojan Cigoj, Teorija obligacij: splošni del obligacijskega prava (Ljubljana 2003) Robert Clark and Shane Smith, Intellectual Property Law in Ireland (2nd ed., Haywards Heath 2005) Alistair M. Clark, Product liability (London 1989) John Frederick Clerk, Anthony M. Dugdale, Michael A. Jones (general eds.), Clerk & Lindsell on torts (19th ed., London 2006). quoted here with the commentaries of Margaret Brazier, Andrew Burrows, Korieh Doudu, Anthony M. Dugdale, Michael A. Jones, John Murphy, David Price and Andrew Tettenborn; sometimes also quoted from previous editions (London 1989 and 2000) Eric M. Clive, George A. Watt and Bruce McKain, Scots Law for Journalists (5th ed., Edinburgh, 1988) Giulio Ponzanelli (ed.), La responsabilità civile, tredici variazioni sul tema (Padua 2002) quoted here with the contribution of Chiara Comai: Il danno ambientale, 89-118

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper, COM(1999) 396 final Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper, COM(2005) 672 final Commission of the European Communities, Report, COM(2000) 893 final Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2004) 651 final Conradi, Brottsskadelagen Conradi, SvJT 1989, 225 Conti, Danno e resp. 2006, 237 Cooper, Defamation and Verbal Injury2 Cornelis and Claeys, TBBR 2003, 586 Cornelis, Responsabilité extra-contractuelle Cornu, Droit civil10-12

Corsaro, Responsabilità civile

Costa Basto, Personal injury compensation in Portugal, 395

Crafoord, ERT 2000, 519 Cunhal Sendim, Responsabilidade civil por danos ecológicos

Commission of the European Communities, Liability for Defective Products, Green Paper, COM(1999) 396 final (Brussels, 28 July 1999) Commission of the European Communities, Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, Green Paper, COM(2005) 672 final (Brussels, 19 December 2005) Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission on the Application of Directive 85/374 on Liability for Defective Products, COM(2000) 893 final (Brussels, 31 January 2001) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, “European Contract Law and the revision of the Acquis: the way forward”, COM(2004) 651 final (Brussels, 11 October 2004) Erland Conradi, Brottsskadelagen: kommentar och rättsfall (Stockholm 1989) Erland Conradi, Några rättsfall om intressekollision, SvJT 1989, 225-234 Roberto Conti, Il diritto di proprietà è un diritto umano? Ricadute in tema di danno morale (rectius non patrimoniale), Danno e resp. 2006, 237-243 Frank Towers Cooper, The Law of Defamation and Verbal Injury (2nd ed., Edinburgh 1906) Ludo Cornelis and Ignace Claeys, Sport en aansprakelijkheid – Een stand van zaken, TBBR 2003, 586-596 L. Cornelis, Principes du droit belge de la responsabilité extra-contractuelle, L’acte illicite (Brussels 1991) Gérard Cornu, Droit civil. Introduction, les personnes, les biens (12th ed., Paris 2005), sometimes also quoted from the 10th /11th ed. (Paris 2001/2003) Luigi Corsaro, Responsabilità civile. Diritto civile, in: Enciclopedia giuridica Treccani, vol. XXVI (Rome 1987/1991), 2/37 António da Costa Basto, Personal injury compensation in Portugal, in: Marco Bona and Philip Mead (ed.), Personal injury compensation in Europe, a comperative study of and guide to right to claim full and fair compensation, protection of primary victims, recoverable losses, psychiatric damage, limitation law, harmonisation (Deventer 2003), 395-419 Clarence Crafoord, Inhemsk gottgörelse för kränkningar av europakonventionen, ERT 2000, 519-547 José de Sousa Cunhal Sendim, Responsabilidade civil por danos ecológicos (Coimbra 2002)

1203

Annexes Czachórski and Ignatowicz, System prawa cywilnego II Czachórski, Zobowia˛zania9, 10

Dalcq and Schamps, RCJB 1995, 525 and 663 Dalcq, Responsabilité civile I2 de Ángel Yágüez, Revista de Derecho y Genoma Humano 1996, V, 105 de Ángel Yágüez, Tratado de responsabilidad civil3 de Cupis, Il danno I-III3 de Groote, De onrechtmatige daad op het internet

de Kezel, NjW 2004, 546 de la Vega García, Responsabilidad civil derivada del producto defectuoso de Oliveira, O direito do diagnóstico pré-natal2, 217 de Page and Masson, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge II(1)4 de Page, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge III3 de Theux, Ann. Louv. 2002, 287 de Vries, AA 1995, 186 Del Olmo García, ADC, 2001, 257

1204

Witold Czachórski and Jerzy Ignatowicz (eds.), System prawa cywilnego, vol. II: Prawo własnos´ci i inne prawa rzeczowe (Wrocław 1977) Witold Czachórski, Zobowia˛zania. Zarys wykładu (10th ed., Warsaw 2007) also quoted from the 9th ed. (Warsaw 2004) Roger O. Dalcq and Geneviève Schamps, Examen de jurisprudence (1987 à 1993), La responsabilité délictuelle et quasi délictuelle, RCJB 1995, 525-638 (part 1) and 663-777 (part 2) Roger O. Dalcq, Traité de la responsabilité civile, vol. I: Les causes de responsabilité (2nd ed., Brussels 1967) Ricardo de Ángel Yágüez, Diagnósticos genéticos prenatales y responsabilidad (part 2), Revista de Derecho y Genoma Humano 1996, V, 105-117 Ricardo de Ángel Yágüez, Tratado de responsabilidad civil (3rd ed., Madrid 1993) Adriano de Cupis, Il danno. Teoria generale della responsabilità civile, vols. I-III (3rd ed., Milan 1979) Bertel de Groote, De onrechtmatige daad op het internet, in: Karen Broeckx, Bart Claessens, Delphine Counye a. o., Privaatrecht in de reële en virtuele wereld, Postuniversitaire cyclus Willy Delva, 27ste, 2000-2001 (Antwerp 2002), 657-754 Evelien Nicole de Kezel, Wrongful birth en wrongful life. Een stand van zaken, NjW 2004, 546-551 Fernando L. de la Vega García, Responsabilidad civil derivada del producto defectuoso. Un estudio de la Ley 22/1994 en el sistema de responsabilidad civil (Madrid 1998) Guilherme Freire Falcão de Oliveira, O direito do diagnóstico pré-natal, in: Temas de direito da medicina (2nd ed., Coimbra 2005), 217-237 Henri de Page and Jean-Pol Masson, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge: principes, doctrine, jurisprudence, vol. II: Les incapables, les obligations (part 1) (4th ed., Brussels 1990), sometimes also quoted from the 3rd edition (Brussels 1964) Henri de Page, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge: principes, doctrine, jurisprudence, vol. III: Les obligations (part 2) (3rd ed., Brussels 1967) Olivier de Theux, La liberté d’expression de la presse face à la protection civile de la vie privée et de l’honneur et la réputation, Ann. Louv. 2002, 287-348 F.J. de Vries, Vrijtekening van beroepsaansprakelijkheid, AA 1995, 186-192 Del Olmo García, Responsabilidad por daño puramente económico causado al usuario de informaciones falsas, ADC, 2001, 257-368

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form del Pilar de Salas Murillo/ Weyts/Gonçalo Dias Pereira, ERPL 2004, 111 Delany, Equity and the law of trusts in Ireland1-3 Deliyannis and Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I,

Sofia del Pilar de Salas Murillo, Britt Weyts and André Gonçalo Dias Pereira, Cour de Cassation française, 2e chambre civile, 4 juillet 2002 – On the Assumtion of Risk, ERPL 2004, 111-132 Hilary Delany, Equity and the law of trusts in Ireland (3rd ed., Dublin 2003), sometimes also quoted from the 1st /2nd ed. (Dublin 1996/1999) Johannes Deliyannis und Panos Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio, vols. I and III (Thessaloniki 1992)

III

Deliyannis, AID 15/1951-52, 153 Deliyannis, FS MichaelidesNouaros I, 303 Deloddere, NjW 2004, 38 Depadt-Sebag, D. 2006, 2113 di Majo, Problemi e metodo del diritto civile III4 Dias, [1967] CLJ 155 Dias Pereira, O consentimento informado Díaz Alabart, ADC 1987, 795

Díaz Alabart, ADC 1988, 113 Díaz Alabart, Poder Judicial 1988, 135 Díez-Picazo and Gullón, Instituciones I

Díez-Picazo and Gullón, Sistema I10, 11, II9

Díez-Picazo Giménez, La Ley 1998, III, 1700 Díez-Picazo, Derecho de daños

Johannes Deliyannis, To paranomo os stoicheion tis ennoias tou astikou adikimatos. Symvoli eis tin ermineian tou arthrou Astikou Kodikos, AID 15/1951-52, 153-195 Johannes Deliyannis, I paranomia os proypothesi tis adikopraktikis evthinis, in: Festschrift in honour of Michaelides-Nouaros, vol. I (Athens 1987), 303-348 Sophie Deloddere, Ecologische schade en het herstel ervan, NjW 2004, 38-44 Valérie Depadt-Sebag, Faut-il abroger l’article 1386 du code civil?, D. 2006, 2113 Adolfo di Majo, Problemi e metodo del diritto civile, vol. III: La tutela civile dei diritti (4th ed., Milan 2003) R. W. M. Dias, Employer’s Liability for Employee’s Negligent Misrepresentation, [1967] CLJ 155-157 André Gonçalo Dias Pereira, O consentimento informado na relação médico-paciente: Estudo de Direito Civil, (Coimbra 2004) Silvia Díaz Alabart, La responsabilidad por los actos ilícitos dañosos de los sometidos a patria potesta do tutela, ADC 1987 (3), 795-894 Silvia Díaz Alabart, La facultad moderadora del artículo 1.103 del Código Civil, ADC 1988 (4), 1133-1224 Silvia Díaz Alabart, Comentario a la Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 2 de marzo de 1988, Poder Judicial 1988, 135-138 Luis Díez-Picazo and Antonio Gullón, Instituciones de Derecho Civil, vol. I: Introducción, parte general y derecho de la persona. Disciplina general de los contratos y de las obligaciones. Contratos en particular, cuasicontratos, enriquecimiento sin causa y responsabilidad extracontractual (Madrid 1995) Luis Díez-Picazo and Antonio Gullón, Sistema de derecho civil, vol. I: Introducción, derecho de la persona, autonomía privada, persona jurídica (11th ed., Madrid 2003), sometimes also quoted from the 10th ed. (Madrid 2001) Gema Díez-Picazo Giménez, La imposibilidad de abortar: un supuesto más de responsabilidad civil, La Ley 1998, III, 1700-1710 Luis Díez-Picazo y Ponce de León, Derecho de daños (Madrid 1999)

1205

Annexes Díez-Picazo, Fundamentos I4, II5

Dimopoulou, Evthini apo diakindinevsi Dirix, Het begrip schade D-Karnov 2005 III, IV (-author)

D-Karnov 2006 IV (-author)

Dogaru and Dra˘ghici, Drept civil Dommering-van Rongen, Produktenaansprakelijkheid Dósa, Állam- és Jogtudomány 1-2/2000, 143 Dósa, Az orvos kártérítési felelo˝ssége Douglas, LMCLQ 2008, 129

Luis Díez-Picazo y Ponce de León, Fundamentos del Derecho Civil patrimonial, vol. I: Introducción. Teoría del contrato (4th ed., Madrid 1993), vol. II: Las relaciones obligatorias (5th ed., Madrid 1996) Zafeiria Dimopoulou, Evthini apo diakindinevsi (Athens 2003) Eric Dirix, Het begrip schade (Antwerp a. o. 1984) Karnovs lovsamling, edited by Bo von Eyben, Jan Pedersen and Thomas Rørdam, vols. III: 3663-5394 and IV: 5395-7240 (Copenhagen 2006), quoted here with the commentaries of Straffeloven by Michael Elmer, 4952-5100, Produktansvarsloven by Børge Dahl, 5776-5785, E-handelsloven by Tom Latrup-Pedersen, 7062-7066, Markedsføringslov by Eva Aaen Skovbo, 6655-6679 Karnovs lovsamling, edited by Bo von Eyben, Jan Pedersen and Thomas Rørdam, vol. IV: 5401-7340 (Copenhagen 2007), quoted here with the commentary of Erstatningsansvarsloven by Bo von Eyben, 5628-5654 Ion Dogaru and Pompil Dra˘ghici, Drept civil. Teoria generala˘ a obligat¸iilor (Bucharest 2002) Loes Dommering-van Rongen, Produktenaansprakelijkheid, Een nieuwe Europese privaatrechtelijke regeling vergeleken met de produktenaansprakelijkheid in de Verenigde Staten, Europese Monografieën, no. 37 (Deventer 1991) Ágnes Dósa, Az orvos polgári jogi felelo˝ssége az egészséges, nem kívánt gyermek születéséért, Állam- és Jogtudomány 1-2/2000, 143-153 Ágnes Dósa, Az orvos kártérítési felelo˝ssége (Budapest 2004) Simon Douglas, Converting Contractual Rights, LMCLQ 2008, 129-134

du Perron, Overeenkomsten en derden Dufwa, Flera skadeståndsskyldiga Dufwa, JT 1990-91, 456 Dufwa, SvJT 1979, 401 Dullinger and Riedler, JBl 2002, 182 Durany Pich, FS Díez-Picazo II, 1749

1206

Charles Edgar du Perron, Overeenkomsten en derden (Deventer 1999) Bill W. Dufwa, Flera skadeståndsskyldiga (Stockholm 1993) Bill W. Dufwa, Medverkan utan medvållande och ett par andra skadeståndsrättsliga spörsmål, JT 1990-91, 456-467 Bill W. Dufwa, Vår komplicerade trafikskaderätt och framtiden, SvJT 1979, 401-490 Silvia Dullinger and Andreas Riedler, Erfordernisse des Buchvermerks bei der Sicherungszession/Schadenersatzanspruch wegen Verletzung fremder Rechte, JBl 2002, 182-187 Salvador Durany Pich, Responsabilidad civil y Derecho penal de menores, in: Estudios jurídicos en homenaje al Profesor Luis Díez-Picazo (Festschrift in honour of Luis Díez-Picazo), vol. II: Derecho civil, derecho de obligaciones, edited by Antonio Cabanillas Sánchez, Jorge Caffarena Laporta,

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form José María Miquel González, Vicente L. Montés Penadés, Antonio Manuel Morales Moreno, Fernando Pantaleón Prieto (Madrid 2003), 1749-1764 Edelman, (2006) 122 LQR, 391 Ehrenzweig and Ehrenzweig, System II(1)2, 3

Eisfeld, WiRO 2006, 225 Eleftheriadou, Die Haftung aus Verkehrspflichtverletzung im deutschen und griechischen Deliktsrecht Eleftheriadou, PHI 1999, 102

James Edelman, Restitutionary Damages for Torts, (2006) 122 LQR, 391-393 Adolf Ehrenzweig and Armin Ehrenzweig in cooperation with Heinrich Mayrhofer, System des österreichischen allgemeinen Privatrechts, vol. II, part 1: Das Recht der Schuldverhältnisse (3rd. ed., Vienna a. o. 1986), also quoted from 2nd ed. (Vienna 1928) Gero Eisfeld, Wettbewerbsordnung in Litauen – Wettbewerbsund Werbegesetz im Überblick, WiRO 2006, 225-230 Evlalia Eleftheriadou, Die Haftung aus Verkehrspflichtverletzung im deutschen und griechischen Deliktsrecht (Cologne a.o. 2005)

Evlalia Eleftheriadou, Neue Produkthaftung in Griechenland, PHI 1999, 102-108

Elmer and Skovby, Ejendomsretten I4 Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért ErmAK (-author)

Erman (-author), BGB I10, 11, II11, 12

Erskine, An Institute of the Law of Scotland II8 Ertl, JBl 1974, 281 and 342 Esperança Pina, A Responsabilidade dos Médicos3

Michael Elmer and Lise Skovby, Ejendomsretten, vol. I (4th ed., Copenhagen 2001) Gyula Eörsi, Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért (Budapest 1958) Ermineia tou Astikou Kodikos (Athens/Thessaloniki 1949 ff.), quoted here with the commentaries of Pref. to arts. 297-298, art. 300 by Alexandros Litzeropoulos, of art. 330 by Georgios Michaelides-Nouaros, of art. 729 by I. Kapodistrias and of art. 284 by Helias Gafos Walter Erman (editor until 4th ed.) and Harm Peter Westermann (ed.), Handkommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch in zwei Bänden, vol. I: §§ 1-811 (11th ed., Münster 2000), vol. II: §§ 812-2385 (11th ed., Münster 2004), quoted here with the commentaries of §§ 823, 828, 836, 840, 843, § 11 ProdHG by Gottfried Schiemann, of § 276 by Harm Peter Westermann, of Vor § 249, § 254 by Günter Kuckuk, of § 908 by Arndt Lorenz, of § 611 by Stefan Edenfeld, sometimes also quoted from the 10th ed. (Münster 2000), the 12th ed. (Cologne 2008) John Erskine of Carnock, An Institute of the Law of Scotland, edited by James Badenach Nicholson, vol. II, (8th ed., Edinburgh 1871, reprint 1989) Gunter Ertl, Aneignung preisgegebener Sachen. Das Autowrack als Rechtsproblem, JBl 1974, 281-293 and 342-356 José António Esperança Pina, A responsabilidade civil dos médicos (3rd ed., Lisbon/Porto 2003)

1207

Annexes Evaluation Report, COM(2001) 106 final

Evaluation Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of Council Recommendation of 24 September 1998 concerning the protection of minors and human dignity, COM(2001) 106 final (Brussels, 27 February 2001)

Fabre-Magnan, Les obligations Fagnart, JT 1969, 253

Muriel Fabre-Magnan, Les obligations (Paris 2004)

Fagnart, RGAR 2006, no. 14080-3 Faria Costa and da Silva, Direito Penal Especial Favre Rochex, GazPal 1998, doctr., 355 Ferreira Dias, O dano moral Ferrer i Riba, InDret 4/2001

Figueiredo Dias and Sinde Monteiro, BolMinJus 332 (1984), 21 Filios, Enochiko Dikaio II(2)3, 4 Fitger and Mellqvist, Domstolsprocessen2 Fleming, Law of Torts9 Flour/Aubert/Savaux, Droit civil II9-11

Flume, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts II3 Fötschl, VersRAI 2002, 57 and VersRAI 2003, 9 Foundedaki, Astiki iatriki evthini Foundedaki, EllDik 35 (1994), 1226 Frades de la Fuente, La responsabilidad profesional Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti

1208

Jean-Luc Fagnart, Chronique de jurisprudenze. La responsabilité aquilienne (1955-1967), JT 1969, 253-260 Jean-Luc Fagnart, Petite navigation dans les méandres de la causalité, RGAR 2006, no. 14080-3 José de Faria Costa and Marco Antonio Marques da Silva, Direito Penal Especial, Processo Penal e Direitos Fundamentais (Coimbra 2006) André Favre Rochex, Accidents de la circulation: la très riche année 1997, GazPal 1998, doctr., 355-357 Pedro Branquinho Ferreira Dias, O dano moral: na doutrina e na jurisprudência (Coimbra 2001) Josep Ferrer i Riba, Relaciones familiares y límites del derecho de daños, InDret, October 2001 (http://www.indret.com/ rcs_articulos/cas/domestic.pdf) Jorge de Figueiredo Dias and Jorge Ferreira Sinde Monteiro, Responsabilidade médica em Portugal, BolMinJus 332 (1984), 21-79 Pavlos Filios, Enochiko Dikaio, Eidiko meros (Schuldrecht, Besonderer Teil), vol. II, part 2 (4th ed., Athens 1998) Peter Fitger and Mikael Mellqvist, Domstolsprocessen. En kommentar till rättegångsbalken (2nd ed., Stockholm 2002) John G. Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th ed., Sydney 1998) Jacques Flour, Jean-Luc Aubert and Éric Savaux, Droit civil. Les obligations, vol. II: Le fait juridique. Quasicontrats, responsabilité délictuelle, (11th ed., Paris 2005), sometimes also quoted from the 9th /10th ed. (Paris 2001/2003) Werner Flume, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts, vol. II: Das Rechtsgeschäft (3rd ed., Berlin 1979) Andreas Fötschl, Zum Deliktsschutz relativer Rechte in der Rechtsprechung des OGH, VersRAI 2002, 57-63 (part 1), VersRAI 2003, 9-15 (part 2) Katerina Foundedaki, I astiki iatriki evthini meta to nomo 2251/1994 Kritiki Epitherosi 1996, 179-188 Katerina Foundedaki, To provlima tou outiodous syndesmou stin iatriki evthini, EllDik 35 (1994), 1226-1239 Eva Frades de la Fuente, La responsabilidad profesional frente a terceros por consejos negligentes (Madrid 1999) Massimo Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, Commentario del codice civile by Antonio Scialoja and Giuseppe Branca (estab.),

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form

Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti -supplemento

Frati/Montanari Vergallo/ Di Luca, Riv.it.med.leg. 2003, 533 Fuglinszky, Mangelfolgeschäden im deutschen und ungarischen Recht

Galgano, Diritto civile e commerciale II(2)3

Gallo, Arricchimento senza causa e quasi contratti Galvão Telles, Obrigações7 Gambaro, Il diritto di proprietà

Gammerschlag and Perband, VersR 2002, 287 García Cantero, Exégesis comparativa del Art. 1.902 CC, 875 Garcia-Bragado Manen, [2006] 14 ILT, 220 Gázquez Serrano, La indemnización por causa de muerte Gazzoni, Manuale di diritto privato9-11 Geddes, Product and Service Liability Geigel (-author), Der Haftpflichtprozess23, 24

continued by Francesco Galgano (ed.), vol. IV: Delle obbligazioni (arts. 2043-2059) (Bologna/Rome 1993) Massimo Franzoni, Dei fatti illeciti, in: Commentario al codice civile, Antonio Scialoja and Giuseppe Branca (estab.), continued by Francesco Galgano (ed.), vol. IV: Delle obbligazioni-titolo IX: Dei fatti illeciti, supplemento (arts. 2043, 2056-2059) (Bologna/Rome 2004) Paola Frati, Gianluca Montanari Vergallo and Natale Mario di Luca, Il mobbing: evoluzione giurisprudenziale e normativa, Riv.it.med.leg. 2003, 533-548 Adám Fuglinszky, Mangelfolgeschäden im deutschen und ungarischen Recht. Grenzen der Haftung im Kauf- und Werkvertragsrecht (Tübingen 2007)

Francesco Galgano, Diritto civile e commerciale, vol. II: Le obbligazioni e i contratti, part 2: I singoli contratti, gli atti unilaterali e i titoli di credito, i fatti illeciti e gli altri fatti fonte di obbligazione, la tutela del credito (3rd ed., Padua 1999) Paolo Gallo, Arricchimento senza causa e quasi contratti (i rimedi restitutori), in : Trattato di diritto civile, directed by Rodolfo Sacco (Turin 1996) Inocêncio Galvão Telles, Direito das obrigações (7th ed., Coimbra 1997) Antonio Gambaro, Il diritto di proprietà, in: Trattato di diritto civile e commerciale, established by Antonio Cicu and Francesco Messineo, continued by Luigi Mengoni (ed.), vol. VIII, part 2 (Milan 1995) Hans-Karl Gammerschlag and Inga Perband, Mobbing – verstärkter Rechtsschutz gegen ein Massenphänomen in der Arbeitswelt, VersR 2002, 287-291 Gabriel García Cantero, Exégesis comparativa del articulo 1.902 del Código civil, in: Asociación de Profesores de derecho civil (ed.), Centenario del Código civil (1889-1989), vol. I (Madrid 1990), 875-884 Sofia Garcia-Bragado Manen, The Environmental Liability Directive, [2006] 14 ILT, 220-224 Laura Gázquez Serrano, La indemnización por causa de muerte (Madrid 2000) Francesco Gazzoni, Manuale di diritto privato (11th ed., Naples 2004), sometimes also quoted from the 9th /10th ed. (Naples 2001/2003) Andrew Geddes, Product and Service Liability in the EEC: the new strict liability regime (London 1992) Robert Geigel (estab.), Günter Schlegelmilch (ed.), Der Haftpflichtprozess: mit Einschluss des materiellen Haftpflichtrechts

1209

Annexes

Gellért (-author), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata6 Georgiades and Stathopoulos (-author)

Georgiades, Diki 6/1975, 43 Georgiades, Empragmato dikaio I Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio I Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio, Geniko meros Georgiades, FS KiantouPampouki, 143 Georgiades, FS Larenz 1983, 175

Ghestin/Goubeaux/FabreMagnan, Introduction generale4 Gimpel-Hinteregger, ÖJZ 1991, 145 Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland11 Gomard, Forholdet mellem erstatningsregler i og uden for kontraktsforhold Gomard, J 2003, 121

1210

(24th ed., Munich 2004), quoted here with the commentaries of chap. 33: Haftung der juristischen Person und der nicht rechtsfähigen Personenvereinigung by Roland Rixecker, sometimes also quoted from the 23rd ed. (Munich 2001) György Gellért (ed.), A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata, vols. I and II (6th ed., Budapest 2004) quoted here with the contribution of Károly Benedek, Lászlóné So˝th, Ödön Zoltán, Lajos Vékás, Béla Kemenes Apostolos Georgiades and Michael Stathopoulos (ed.), Astikos Kodix. Kat’arthro ermineia, vol. II: Geniko Enochiko (Athens 1979); vol. III: Eidiko Enochiko (Athens 1980); vol. IV: Eidiko Enochiko (Athens 1982) quoted here with the commentaries of arts. 554-558 by Philipos Doris, of arts. 247, 281, Pref. to arts. 914-938, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 926, 929, 932 by Apostolos Georgiades, of arts. 688-690 by Athanassios Kardaras, of art. 739 by Panagiotis Papanikolaou, of arts. 297, 298, 299, 300, 330, 904-938 by Michael Stathopoulos, of art. 924, 925 by Spyros Vosinakis and of arts. 282, 284, 285, 286 by Tabakis Apostolos Georgiades, I “syrroi axioseon” epi syndromis symvatikis kai adikopraktikis evthinis, Diki 6/1975, 43-51 Apostolos Georgiades, Empragmato Dikaio, vol. I (Athens 1991) Asterios Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio, Geniko meros, vol. I (Thessaloniki 1993) Apostolos Georgiades, Enochiko Dikaio, Geniko meros (Athens 1999) Asterios Georgiades, I evthini tou parechontos ypiresies, in: Festschrift in honour of Aliki Kiantou-Pampouki (Thessaloniki 1998), 143-155 Apostel Georgiades, Standpunkt und Entwicklung des griechischen Deliktsrechts, in: Festschrift in honour of Karl Larenz zum 80. Geburtstag am 23. April 1983, edited by Claus-Wilhelm Canaris and Uwe Diederichsen (Munich 1983), 175-198 JacquesGhestin, Gilles Goubeaux and Muriel Fabre-Magnan, Introduction generale, in: Jacques Ghestin (director), Traité de droit civil (4th ed., 1994) Monika Gimpel-Hinteregger, Anspruchsgrundlagen für den Ersatz von Umwletschäden, ÖJZ 1991, 145-154 William Murray Gloag and Robert Candlish Henderson, edited by Laura J. Dunlop, The Law of Scotland (11th ed., Edinburgh 2001) Bernhard Gomard, Forholdet mellem erstatningsregler i og uden for kontraktsforhold (Copenhagen 1990) Bernhard Gomard, Dansk erstatningsret i lovgivning og retspraksis, J 2003, 121-134

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Gomard, Moderne Erstatningsret Gomard, Obligationsret I4, II Gomes, Conceito de enriquecimento Gómez Calle, La responsabilidad civil de los padres Gómez Calle, Los sujetos de la responsabilidad civil1, 3

Gómez Calle, Responsabilidad de padres y centros docentes1, 3

Gómez Pomar, InDret 1/2005 Gómez Pomar, InDret 4/2002

Gordillo Cañas, ADC 1988, 469 Gouveia de Andrade, Da ofensa do crédito Gozzi, Der Anspruch iure proprio auf Ersatz des Nichtvermögensschadens Granecki, PiP 2003 (1), 68 Greger, Haftungsrecht des Straßenverkehrs3

Greger, Haftungsrecht des Straßenverkehrs4 Griss, JBl 2005, 273

Bernhard Gomard, Moderne Erstatningsret (Copenhagen 2002) Bernhard Gomard, Obligationsret, vol. I (4th ed., Copenhagen 2006) and vol. II (Copenhagen 1991) Júlio Manuel Vieira Gomes, O conceito de enriquecimento, o enriquecimento forçado e os vários paradigmas do enriquecimento sem causa (Coimbra 1998) Esther Gómez Calle, La responsabilidad civil de los padres (Madrid 1992) Esther Gómez Calle, Los sujetos de la responsabilidad civil. La responsabilidad por hecho ajeno, in: Luis Fernando Reglero Campos (coord.), Tratado de responsabilidad civil (3rd ed., Navarra 2006), 461-538, sometimes also quoted from the 1st ed. (Navarra 2002), 395-444 Esther Gómez Calle, Responsabilidad de padres y centros docentes, in: Luis Fernando Reglero Campos (coord.), Tratado de responsabilidad civil (3rd ed., Navarra 2006), 1233-1332, sometimes also quoted from the 1st ed. (Navarra 2002), 1033-1106 Fernando Gómez Pomar, El sudor de la frente y el daño moral: Comentario a la STS, 1ª, 22.9.2004, InDret, February 2005 (http://www.indret.com/pdf/337_es.pdf) Fernando Gómez Pomar, Comentario a la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo, Sala 1a, 20.2.2002: el daño moral de las personas jurídicas. InDret, October 2002 (http://www.indret.com/pdf/ 105_es.pdf) Antonio Gordillo Cañas, Apuntes para una relectura de la teoría de las Fuentes del Derecho, ADC 1988, 469-515 Maria Paula Gouveia de Andrade, Da ofensa do crédito e do bom nome: contributo para o estudo do art. 484./ do Código Civil (Lisbon 1996) Caterina Gozzi, Der Anspruch iure proprio auf Ersatz des Nichtvermögensschadens wegen der Tötung eines nahen Angehörigen in Deutschland und Italien (Göttingen 2006) Paweł Granecki, W sprawie wykładni art. 362 kodeksu cywilnego, PiP 2003 (1), 68 Reinhard Greger, Haftungsrecht des Straßenverkehrs: Großkommentar zu §§ 7 bis 20 Straßenverkehrsgesetz und zum Haftpflicht unter Einschluß des Delikts-, Vertrags-, und Versicherungsrechts sowie des Schadensregresses (3rd ed., Berlin 1997) Reinhard Greger, Haftungsrecht des Straßenverkehrs, Handbuch und Kommentar (4th ed., Berlin 2007) Irmgard Griss, Der Entwurf eines neuen österreichischen Schadenersatzrechts, JBl 2005, 273-288

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Annexes Griss/Kathrein/Koziol (-author), Entwurf eines neuen österreichischen Schadenersatzrechts XV Grönfors and Dotevall, Avtalslagen3 Großerichter and Rageade, ZEuP 2002, 611

Guldix and Wylleman, TPR 1999, 1589 Gurry, Breach of Confidence Haak and Koot, Bewuste roekeloosheid in het privaatrecht Haanappel/Mackaay/ Warendorf/ Thomas, Netherlands Business Legislation Hager and Leonhard, FS Stoll, 167

Hager, ZEuP 2006, 21 Hagstrøm and Aarbakke, Obligasjonsrett2 Hagstrøm, TfR 1980, 292-366

Hahto, JFT 2005, 250 Hakulinen, Obligationsrätt Hansenne, Introduction au droit privé Hansenne, Les biens I(1) Harrer, Schadenersatzrecht Hartkamp, Compendium Vermogensrecht volgens het nieuwe BW5

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Irmgard Griss, Georg Kathrein and Helmut Koziol (ed.), Entwurf eines neuen österreichischen Schadenersatzrechts, vol. XV: (Vienna 2006), quoted here with the contributions of Produktund Umwelthaftung by Monika Hinteregger, 119-125 Kurt Grönfors and Rolf Dotevall, Avtalslagen (3rd ed., Stockholm 1995) Helge Großerichter and Jean-Philippe Rageade, Eine Revolution mit ungewissem Ausgang: Der Ausschluss der Eigenhaftung des Verrichtungsgehilfen durch die französische Cour de cassation, ZEuP 2002, 611-628 Erna Guldix and Annelies Wylleman, De positie en de handhaving van persoonlijkheidsrechten in het Belgisch privaatrecht, TPR 1999, 1589-1657 Francis Gurry, Breach of Confidence (New York 1984) K. F. Haak and F. L. Koot (ed.), Bewuste roekeloosheid in het privaatrecht (Rotterdam 2004) Peter P. C. Haanappel, Ejan Mackaay, Hans C. S. Warendorf and Richard Thomas, Netherlands Business Legislation, Loose-leaf (The Hague 1999-12.2004), translated by Peter P. C. Haanappel, Ejan Mackaay, Hans C. S. Warendorf and Richard Thomas Günter Hager and Marc Leonhard, Neuere Entwicklungen im europäischen Umwelthaftungsrecht: Der Ersatz von Schäden am Naturhaushalt, in: Festschrift in honour of Hans Stoll, edited by Rainer Frank, Gerhard Hohloch and Peter Schlechtriem (Tübingen 2001), 167-184 Günter Hager, Die europäische Umwelthaftungsrichtlinie in rechtsvergleichender Sicht, ZEuP 2006, 21-44 Viggo Hagstrøm and Magnus Aarbakke, Obligasjonsrett (2nd ed., Oslo 2003) Viggo Hagstrøm, Culpanorm og skrevne adferdsnormer: lover, forskrifter og interne instruksers betydning for culpavurderingen, TfR 2003, 292-366 Vilja Hahto, Offrets medverkan i straff- och skadeståndsrätten, JFT 2005, 250-277 Yrjö Juho Hakulinen, Obligationsrätt, vol. I: Allmänna läror (Helsingfors 1962) Jaques Hansenne, Introduction au droit privé (Brussels 1990) Jacques Hansenne, Les biens, vol. I, part 1 (Brussels 1996) Friedrich Harrer, Schadenersatzrecht (Vienna 1999) Arthur Severijn Hartkamp, Compendium Vermogensrecht volgens het nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (5th ed., Deventer 1999)

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Hartkamp/Hesselink/ Hondius/Joustra/du Perron (-author), Towards a European Civil Code2, 431 Hartlief and Tjittes, NJB 2001, 1459 Håstad, Tjänster utan uppdrag Hellner and Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt6 Hellner and Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt7 Hellner, Causality and Causation in Law, 111 Hellner, FS Limpens, 53 Hellner, JT 1991-92, 252 Hellner, Obehörig vinst Hellner, SvJT 1969, 332 Helmich, ecolex 2003, 888 Hentschel (-author), Straßenverkehrsrecht37-39

Herbosa Martínez, La responsabilidad extracontractual por ruina de los edificios Herbots/Pauwels/Degroote, TPR 1997, 647

Herpai, Magyar Jog 11/2005, 691

Arthur Hartkamp, Martijn Hesselink, Ewoud Hondius, Carla Joustra, Edgar du Perron (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code (2nd ed., Nijmegen 1998), quoted here with the contribution Vicarious Lability by Christian von Bar, (chapter 27, 431-447) Tom Hartlief and Riema-Jan Tjittes, Kroniek van het vermogensrecht, NJB 2001, 1459-1473 Torgny Håstad, Tjänster utan uppdrag: ersättning och behörighet vid s.k. negotiorum gestio (Stockholm 1973) Jan Hellner and Svante Johansson, Skadeståndsrätt (6th ed., Stockholm 2000) Jan Hellner and Marcus Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt (7h ed., Stockholm 2006) Jan Hellner, Causality and Causation in Law, in: Peter Wahlgren (ed.), Tort liability and insurance, Scandinavian studies in law, vol. 40 (Stockholm 2001), 111-134 Jan Hellner, Strict Liability in Sweden, in: Festschrift in memory of Jean Limpens (Antwerp 1987), 53-63 Jan Hellner, Medverkan till skada vid strikt ansvar, JT 1991-92, 252-274 Jan Hellner, Om obehörig vinst. Särskilt utanför kontraktsförhållanden (Uppsala 1950) Jan Hellner, Ersättning till tredje man vid sak- och personskada, SvJT 1969, 332-361 Elisabeth Helmich, Schadenersatz bei Eingriffen in die Privatsphäre, ecolex 2003, 888-890 Straßenverkehrsrecht: Straßenverkehrsgesetz, StraßenverkehrsOrdnung, Fahrerlaubnis-Verordnung, Fahrzeug-Zulassungsverordnung, Straßenverkehrs-Zulassungs-Ordnung, Bußgeldkatalog, Gesetzesmaterialien, Verwaltungsvorschriften und einschlägige Bestimmungen des StGB und der StPO, established by Johannes Floegel, continued by Fritz Hartung (8th-16th ed.), Heinrich Jagusch (17th-26th ed.) and Peter Hentschel (since 27th ed.), quoted here with the commentaries by Peter Hentschel, Peter König and Peter Dauer (39th ed., Munich 2007), sometimes also quoted from the 37th ed. (Munich 2003) Inmaculada Herbosa Martínez, La responsabilidad extracontractual por ruina de los edificios (desputes de la Ley 38/1999, de 5 de noviembre, sobre Ordenación de la Edificatión (Madrid 2002) J. H. Herbots, C. Pauwels and E. Degroote in cooperation with L. Lamine and F. Convent, Overzicht van Rechtspraak. Bijzondere Overeenkomsten (Rechtspraak verschenen van 1 januari 1988 tot eind 1994), TPR 1997, 647-1281 ´ jabb jelenségek a születéssel kapcsolatos Annamária Herpai, U kártérítési igények körében, Magyar Jog 11/2005, 691-701

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Annexes Herpai, VersRAI 2005, 29 and 43 Hertz, UfR 2004, B 180 Hijma and Olthof, Compendium van het Nederlands Vermogensrecht3 Hirsch, JBl 1998, 541 HK Law Ref Com,

Consultation Paper, Civil Lability for Invasion of Privacy HK Law Ref Com, Consultation Paper, The Regulation of Media Intrusion Hoekema, NJB 1980, 977 Hoffmann, Das spanische Strafgesetzbuch

Hogg, (1992) SLT, 349 Hogg, Obligations Holzhauer, RM-Themis 1986, 4 Hornslet, UfR 1987 B, 288 Hörster, Parte geral Huber, JBl 1986, 227 Huber, ZVR 2000, 218

Hume, Lectures on the Law of Scotland III Hungarian Rules of Law in Force

Igartua Arregui, La Ley 1990, I, 1066

1214

Annamária Herpai, Grundfragen der Reform des ungarischen Deliktsrechts, VersRAI 2005, 29-32 (part 1) and 43-48 (part 2) Ketilbjørn Hertz, Erstatningsansvar for psykiske skader, UfR 2004, B 180-183 Jacob Hijma and M.M. Olthof, Compendium van het Nederlands Vermogensrecht (3rd ed., Deventer 1988)

Christine Hirsch, Ist der Unterlassungsanspruch wirklich verschuldensunabhängig?, JBl 1998, 541-550 The Law Reform Commission’s Sub-Committee on Privacy, chaired by Mr. Justice Mortimer, Civil Lability for Invasion of Privacy (August 20, 1999) (http://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/docs/privacyp-e.pdf) The Law Reform Commission’s Sub-Committee on Privacy, chaired by Mr. Justice Mortimer, The Regulation of Media Intrusion (August 20, 1999) (http://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/do cs/privacyp-e.pdf) J. Hoekema, Rechtssociologische aantekeningen bij het schadevergoedingsrecht, NJB 1980, 977-1000 Markus Hoffmann in cooperation with Manuel Cancio Meliá, Das spanische Strafgesetzbuch vom 23. November 1995 nach dem Stand vom 31. Dezember 2001– Código Penal 1995 (Freiburg 2002) Martin A. Hogg, Privacy: A Valuable and Protected Interest in Scots Law, (1992) SLT, 349-353 Martin Hogg, Obligations (Edinburgh 2003) R.W. Holzhauer, Psychische schade in het aansprakelijkheidsrecht, RM-Themis 1986, 4-29 Mogens Hornslet, Ansvar for kloakanlæg, UfR 1987 B, 288-291 Heinrich Ewald Hörster, A Parte geral do código civil português: teoria geral do direito civil (Coimbra 1992) Christian Huber, Zur Verjährung des Schadenersatzanspruchs gegen den Frachtführer, JBl 1986, 227-230 Christian Huber, Antithesen zum Schmerzengeld ohne Schmerzen – Bemerkungen zur objektiv-abstrakten und subjektiv-konkreten Schadensberechnung, ZVR 2000, 218-232 Baron David Hume, edited by G. Campbell H. Paton, Baron David Hume’s Lectures 1786-1822, vol. III (Edinburgh 1952) Hungarian Rules of Law in Force, CompLex CD HMJ (Budapest 2004) (http://www.complex.hu/CompLex-HMJ@ 72_170_kiadvany.html) Fernando Igartua Aregui, La protección de los aspectos personales y patrimoniales de los bienes de la personalidad tras la muerte de la persona, La Ley 1990, I, 1066-1080

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Instituto Nacional de Consumo, Green Paper Iversen, Erstatningsberegning i kontraktsforhold

Jabornegg, ÖJZ 1983, 365

Instituto Nacional de Consumo (ed.), Green Paper – Liability for Defective Products (Madrid 1999) Torsten Iversen, Erstatningsberegning i kontraktsforhold: et bidrag til undersøgelsen af de i dansk ret gældende principper for erstatningsberegning i kontraktsforhold med særlig henblick på ikke-opfyldelse af aftaler om køb, leje og entreprise (Copenhagen 2000) Peter Jabornegg, Privates Nachbarrecht und Umweltschutz, ÖJZ 1983, 365-373

Jacobs, JR 2004, 490 Jansen, Onrechtmatige daad: algemene bepalingen2 Janssen, ZRP 2003, 156

JClCiv (-author)

Jensen, UfR 1988 B, 383 Jobbágyi, Jogtudományi Közlöny 2004, 1 Johnston, [2004] CLJ, 15 Jongeneel, Koop en consumentenkoop3 Jørgensen, Erstatning for personskade og tab af forsørger3 Jourdain, RTD civ 2003, 716

Matthias Jacobs, Deliktsschutz bei der Beschädigung unbestellter Waren durch Dritte, JR 2004, 490-493 C. H. M. Jansen, Onrechtmatige daad: algemene bepalingen (Mon. Nieuw BW, B-Serie, 45) (2nd ed., Deventer 1996) André Janssen, Das Angehörigenschmerzensgeld in Europa und dessen Entwicklung. Verpasst Deutschland den Anschluss?, ZRP 2003, 156-159 Collection des Juris-Classeurs. Juris-Classeur Civil. Directeurs à partir de 1980 edited by Pierre Catala and Philippe Simler, Looseleaf (Paris 1962 ff.), cited by author, keyword, article, and if necessary fasc.; quoted here with the commentaries of Civil Code art. 9, V0 Jouissance des droits civils, Fasc. 10 by Jacques Ravanas, arts. 1370-1371, V0 Quasi-contrats, Fasc. 10 by Jean-Michel Jacquet, arts. 1370-1375, V0 Quasi-contrats. Gestion d’affaires – Conditions d’existence, Fasc. 10 by Roger Bout, arts. 1382-1386, V0 Responsabilité civile, Fasc. 110, n8 18 by Sabine Bertolaso, arts. 1382-1386, V0 Banquier. Responsabilité civile d’ordre général, Fasc. 335-10, n8 80-85 by François Grua and arts. 1382-1386, V0 Régime de la réparation, Fasc. 220 n8 9 by Patric Maistre du Chambon Gert Drews Jensen, Personskade ved kørsel med spirituspåvirket fører, UfR 1988 B, 383-389 Gábor Jobbágyi, Az ember, mint kár?, in: A joggyakorlat és -elmélet ellentmondásai az Alkotmánybíróság második abortuszdöntése nyomán Jogtudományi Közlöny 2004, 1-9 Angus Johnston, Putting the cart before the horse? Privacy and the Wainwrights, [2004] CLJ, 15-19 Rokus Han Cornelis Jongeneel, Koop en consumentenkoop (3rd ed., Zwolle 1993) Stig Jørgensen, Erstatning for personskade og tab af forsørger (3rd ed., Copenhagen 1972) Patrice Jourdain, La Cour de cassation nie toute obligation de la victime de minimiser son propre dommage (note under Cass.civ. 19.6.2003 (arrêt n8 1 and arrêt n8 2), RTD civ 2003, 716-719

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Annexes Juhart and Plavšak (-author), Obligacijski zakonik I

Miha Juhart and Nina Plavšak (eds.), Obligacijski zakonik (OZ): splošni del) s komentarjem, vol. I: arts. 1-189 (Ljubljana 2003), quoted here with the commentary of arts. 138, 154, 156, 177 by Dunja Jadek Pensa and of arts. 164, 171 by Nina Plavšak

Kalaydjiev, Obligazionno pravo, Obshta chast Kapsalis, Persönlichkeitsrecht und Persönlichkeitsschutz

Angel Kalaydjiev, Obligazionno pravo, Obshta chast (Sofia 2001)

Karakostas, AK Karakostas, Dikaio prostasias tou katanaloti Karakostas, I evthini tou paragogou gia elattomatika proionta Karakostas, Perivallon kai Astiko Dikaio Karakostas, Prosopikotita kai tipos Karakostas, ZEuP 2005, 107

Karlgren, Skadeståndsrätt5 Karner, Der Ersatz ideeller Schäden bei Körperverletzung Kasprzyk, Stud.Prawn. 1988, 149 Katzenstein, RdA 2003, 346 Kaulamo, Probleme des finnischen Wettbewerbsund Marketingrechts Kelly, [1998] 16 ILT, 10 and 39

Kemp and Kemp, The Quantum of Damages Kisfaludi, Az adásvételi szerzo˝dés2 Kivimäki and Ylöstalo, Lärobok i Finlands civilrätt

1216

Christos Kapsalis, Persönlichkeitsrecht und Persönlichkeitsschutz nach griechischem Privatrecht unter Berücksichtigung des deutschen Rechts (Cologne 1983) Johannes Karakostas, Astikos kodikas, vol. II : Genikes Arches, arts. 127-286 (Athens 2005) Johannes Karakostas, Dikaio prostasias tou katanaloti (Athens 2004) Johannes Karakostas, I evthini tou paragogou gia elattomatika proionta (Athens 1995) Johannes Karakostas, Perivallon kai Astiko Dikaio (Athens 1986) Johannes Karakostas, Prosopikotita kai tipos (Athens 1991) Johannes Karakostas, Die Entschädigung in Geld für Nichtvermögensschäden und die Anerkennung eines Angehörigenschmerzensgeldes im griechischen Recht, ZEuP 2005, 107-117 Hjalmar Karlgren, Skadeståndsrätt (5th ed., Stockholm 1972) Ernst Karner, Der Ersatz ideeller Schäden bei Körperverletzung (Vienna 1999) Rafał Kasprzyk, Bezprawnos´c´ wzgle˛dna, Stud.Prawn. 1988 no. 3, 149-172 Matthias Katzenstein, Die Aussenwirkung der arbeitsrechtlichen Haftungsbeschränkungen, RdA 2003, 346-355 Katja Kaulamo, Probleme des finnischen Wettbewerbs- und Marketingrechts: unter Berücksichtigung der Harmonisierung auf europäischer Ebene und mit rechtsvergleichenden Bezügen zum deutschen Recht (Cologne a. o. 2004) Gillian Kelly, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Recognisable Psychiatric Illness: Part 1 [1998] 16 ILT, 10- 13 and Part 3 [1998] 16 ILT 39-42 David A. Kemp and Margaret Sylvia Kemp, The quantum of damages in personal injury and fatal accident claims, loose-leaf issue, volumes 1 to 3 (London since 1982) András Kisfaludi, Az adásvételi szerzo˝dés (2nd ed., Budapest 2003) Toivo Mikael Kivimäki and Matti Ylöstalo, Lärobok i Finlands civilrätt: allmän del (Helsingfors 1961)

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Kleineman, JT 1993-94, 718

Kleineman, JT 2000-01, 920 Kleineman, JT 2001-02, 625 Kleineman, Ren förmögenhetsskada Knottenbelt, Hoofdstukken produktenaansprakelijkheid Kocsis-Kupper, Európai Jog 3/2002, 14 Köhler and Lettl, WRP 2003, 1019

Kojucharov, Obligazionno pravo I Koktedgaard and Levin, Immaterialrätt7 Köles, Orvosi mu˝hiba perek Konov, Osnovanie na grajdanskata otgovornost2 Kopetzki, RdM 1999, 177 Koppensteiner, Wettbewerbsrecht3 Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio I Kornilakis, I evthini apo diakindinevsi Kossak, ZVR 2001, 227 Kotsiris, Arm 38/1984, 601 Kottenhagen-Edzes, Onrechtmatige daad en milieu Koziol and Welser, Bürgerliches Recht I11, II12

Jan Kleinemann, Begreppsbildningen och den skadeståndsrättsliga analysen – en renässans för begreppsjurisprudensen?, JT 1993-94, 718-733 Jan Kleineman, Arbeitsgivarnas s. k. principalansvar – två nya avgöranden i HD, JT 2000-01, 920-927 Jan Kleineman, Om den befogade tillitens skadeståndsrättsliga relevans, JT 2001-02, 625-635 Jan Kleineman, Ren förmögenhetsskada: särskilt vid vilseledande av annan kontraktspart (Stockholm 1987) Door J. Knottenbelt, Hoofdstukken produktenaansprakelijkheid, Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid van de producent van een gebrekkig produkt coor persoonschade (Zwolle 1991) Zsuzsanna Kocsis-Kupper, A romániai eredetu˝ cianid-szennyezés hatása az európai és nemzetközi környezetjogra, Európai Jog 3/2002, 14-19 Helmut Köhler and Tobias Lettl, Das geltende europäische Lauterkeitsrecht, der Vorschlag für eine EG-Richtlinie über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken und die UWG-Reform, WRP 2003, 1019-1057 Alexander Kojucharov, Obligazionno pravo, Obshto uchenie za oblagazionnoto otnoshenie, vol. I (Sofia 1996) Mogens Koktvedgaard and Marianne Levin, Lärobok i immaterialrätt (7th ed., Stockholm 2002) Tibor Köles, Orvosi mu˝hiba perek (Budapest 1999) Trayan Konov, Osnovanie na grajdanskata otgovornost (2nd ed., Sofia 2002) Christian Kopetzki, note under Austrian Supreme Court, 25 May 1999, SZ 72/91, RdM 1999, 177 ff Hans-Georg Koppensteiner, Österreichisches und europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht: Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, unlauterer Wettbewerb, Marken (3rd ed., Vienna 1997) Panos Kornilakis, Eidiko Enochiko Dikaio, vol. I (Athens 2000) Panos Kornilakis, I evthini apo diakindinevsi (Thessaloniki 1982) Wolfgang Kossak, Schmerzengeld nach Tagessätzen, ZVR 2001, 227-229 Lampros Kotsiris, Provlima astikis evthinis trapeson enanti triton kara tin askisi tis pistotikis leitourgeias, Arm 38/1984, 601-614 Pepita Areane Kottenhagen-Edzes, Onrechtmatige daad en milieu: het gebruik van privaatrecht bij het voorkomen van milieuaantasting en het verhaal van milieuschade (Arnhem 1992) Helmut Koziol (ed. until the 10th ed.) and Rudolf Welser (ed.), Grundriß des bürgerlichen Rechts auf Grundlage der von Helmut Koziol und Rudolf Welser gemeinsam herausgegebenen 1.-10. Auflage, in cooperation with Brigitta Jud and Christian Rabl, vol. I: Allgemeiner Teil, Sachenrecht, Familienrecht (11th ed.,

1217

Annexes

Koziol, FS Bydlinski, 175

Koziol, Haftpflichtrecht I3, II2

Koziol, JBl 1997, 201 Koziol, Unification of Tort Law: Wrongfulness Koziol/Bydlinski/ Bollenberger (-author), ABGB1, 2

Kramer, ÖJZ 1972, 90 Kritikos, Aposimiosi apo trochaia avtokinitika atichimata Kruithof, TPR 1984, 233 Kull/Kõve/Käerdi, Law of Obligations I Küpper, OER 2003, 495 Kurkela, JFT 2003, 40

Lábady, A magyar magánjog (polgári jog) általános része Lábady, A nem vagyoni kártérítés újabb bírói gyakorlata Lábady, Családi Jog 3/2006, 15

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Vienna 2000) and vol. II: Schuldrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Schuldrecht Besonderer Teil, Erbrecht (12th ed., Vienna 2001) Helmut Koziol, Die Bereicherung des Schädigers als schadenersatzrechtliches Zurechnungsmoment? Zur Auflockerung der Grenze zwischen Schadenersatz- und Bereicherungsrecht, in: Festschrift in honour of Franz Bydlinski, edited by Helmut Koziol and Peter Rummel (Vienna 2002), 175-195 Helmut Koziol, Österreichisches Haftpflichtrecht, vol. I: Allgemeiner Teil (3rd ed., Vienna 1997); vol. II: Besonderer Teil, mit einem Abschnitt über den „Unlauten Wettbewerb“ von Peter Rummel (2nd ed., Vienna 1984) Helmut Koziol, Die Zurechnung des Gehilfenverhaltens im Rahmen des § 1304 ABGB, JBl 1997, 201-210 Helmut Koziol (ed.) and Francesco Donato Busnelli, Unification of Tort Law: Wrongfulness (The Hague 1998) Helmut Koziol, Peter Bydlinski and Raimund Bollenberger (ed.), Kurzkommentar zum ABGB. Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch samt Ehegesetz und Konsumentenschutzgesetz (Vienna 2005/2nd ed., Vienna 2007), quoted here with the commentaries of §§ 1293, 1300, 1301, 1302, 1304, 1306a, 1310 by Ernst Karner, of § 870 by Raimund Bollenberger, of §§ 1036, 1037, 1041 by Helmut Koziol and of §§ 1319, 1323 by Karl-Heinz Danzl Ernst A. Kramer, Gebrauchentbehrung und Verwendungsanspruch, ÖJZ 1972, 90-95 Athanassios Kritikos, Aposimiosi apo trochaia avtokinitika atichimata (Athens 1992) Robert Kruithof, Contractuele Aansprakelijkheidsregelingen, TPR 1984, 233-298 Irene Kull, Villu Kõve and Martin Käerdi, Law of Obligations, vol. I: General Part (Tallinn, 2004, in Estonian) Herbert Küpper, Deliktsrecht in Osteuropa – Herausforderungen und Antworten, OER 2003, 495-541 Matti S. Kurkela, On the Liability of Directors in Finnish Corporations: to whom and for what?, JFT 2003, 40-56 Tamás Lábady, A magyar magánjog (polgári jog) általános része (Budapest/Pécs 1997) Tamás Lábady, A nem vagyoni kártérítés újabb bírói gyakorlata (Budapest 1992) Tamás Lábady, A fogyatékossággal született gyermek saját jogú kártérítési igényéro˝l, Családi Jog 3/2006, 15-25

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Lacruz Berdejo and Rivero Hernández, Elementos II(1)4, (2)4

Lahe and Tampuu, National Court Practice and European Tort Law I Lahe and Tampuu, Training Guide for Judges 2006

Lahe, About Judge-made Law

Lahe, Fault in the Law of Delict Lahe, Juridica 2002, 30 Lahe, Juridica 2002, 391

Lahe, Juridica 2003, 236

Lahe, Juridica 2003, 83

Lahe, Juridica 2004, 681

Lahe, Juridica International 2001, 125 Lahe, Juridica International 2004, 108 Lahe, Juridica International 2005, 60 Lambert-Faivre, D. 2002, 1217

Lambert-Faivre, D. 2003, 361

José Luis Lacruz Berdejo and Francisco Rivero Hernández, Elementos de Derecho Civil, vol. II: Derecho de Obligaciones, part 1: Parte General. Teoría General del Contrato (4th ed., Madrid 1999); part 2: Contratos y cuasicontratos. Delitos y cuasidelitos (4th ed., Madrid 1999) Janno Lahe and Tambet Tampuu, National Court Practice and European Tort Law I. Causation. Principles of European Tort Law. Research Unit for European Tort Law (Vienna 2007) Janno Lahe, Tambet Tampuu a.o., Establishment of the Necessary Cause in the Case Law Concerning Claims for the Compensation of Damage. Training Guide for Judges 2006 (Tartu 2006; in Estonian) Janno Lahe, About Judge-made Law and the Role of the Supreme Court in Developing the Preconditions for Delictual Liability. Decisions of the Supreme Court in the Estonian Legal Order: Implication and Critique. A Compilation of the Supreme Court Research Competition. Tartu: Republic of Estonia Supreme Court, 2005 (in Estonian) Janno Lahe, The Fault in the Law of Delict (Tartu 2005; in Estonian) Janno Lahe, Presumption of the Fault of Persons Causing Loss, Juridica 2002, 30-36 (in Estonian) Janno Lahe, Incapacity to Commit a Criminal Offence as a Circumstance Precluding Wrongful Liability, Juridica 2002, 391-400 (in Estonian) Janno Lahe, The Role of the Subjective Element in the Preconditions for Liability under Contract Law, Juridica 2003, 236-242 (in Estonian) Janno Lahe, The Fault of Injured Party in Causing Loss as Grounds for Reduction of Damages, Juridica 2003, 83-91 (in Estonian) Janno Lahe, Civil Law Liability Pursuant to the Infringement of Pre-contractual Obligations and Preliminary Contracts, Juridica 2004, 681-687 Janno Lahe, Subjective Fault as a Basis of Delictual Liability, Juridica International 2001, 125-132 Janno Lahe, The Concept of General Duties of Care in the Law of Delict, Juridica International 2004, 108-115 Janno Lahe, Forms of Liability in the Law of Delict: Fault-Based Liability and Liability without Fault, Juridica International 2005, 60-70 Yvonne Lambert-Faivre, La loi n8 2002-303 du 4 mars 2002 relative aux droits des malades et à la qualité du système de santé, D. 2002, 1217-1220 Yvonne Lambert-Faivre, La responsabilité médicale: la loi du 30 décembre modifiant la loi du 4 mars 2002, D. 2003, 361-365

1219

Annexes Lambert-Faivre, Droit du dommage corporel5 Lando and Beale, Principles of European Contract Law I, II Langenbucher (-author), Europarechtliche Bezüge des Privatrechts Langsted, Rådgivning I Larenz and Canaris, Schuldrecht II(1)13, II(2)13 Lasarte Álvarez, Manual de protección Lasarte Álvarez, Principios de Derecho Civil II9 Lavery, Commercial Secrets Law Ref Com 1991, Consultation Paper on the Civil Law of Defamation Le Roy, L’évaluation du préjudice corporel17 Le Tourneau and Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (2002/2003), (2004/2005), (2006/2007)

Le Tourneau, Le parasitisme

Légrádi, Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció 2003, 20 Leite de Campos, BFD L (1974), 247

1220

Yvonne Lambert-Faivre, Droit du dommage corporel. Systèmes d’indemnisation (5th ed., Paris 2004) Ole Lando and Hugh Beale (ed.), Principles of European Contract Law, parts I and II (The Hague 1999) Katja Langenbucher, Europarechtliche Bezüge des Privatrechts (Baden-Baden 2005) Lars Bo Langsted, Rådgivning I det professionelle erstatningsansvar (Copenhagen 2004) Karl Larenz, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts, vol. II: Besonderer Teil, part 1, part 2, continued by Claus-Wilhelm Canaris (13th ed., Munich 1994) Carlos Lasarte Álvarez, Manual sobre protección de consumidores y usuarios (Madrid 2003) Carlos Lasarte Álvarez, Principios de Derecho Civil, vol. II: Derecho de obligationes (9th ed., Madrid 2004) Paul Lavery, Commercial Secrets: The Action for Breach of Confidence in Ireland (Dublin 1996) The Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on the Civil Law of Defamation (Ireland, March 1991) (http://www.lawreform.ie/publications/data/volume8/lrc_61.html) Max Le Roy, L’évaluation du préjudice corporel : expertises, principes, indemnités (17th ed., Paris 2004) Philippe le Tourneau and Loïc Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats: responsabilités administrative et pénale, responsabilité civile délictuelle et quasi délictuelle, formation et exécution des contrats, défaillances contractuelles et professionnelles, contrats civils et commerciaux, construction, garantie de la conformité du bien contrat, régimes spéciaux d’indemnisation, accidents de la circulation, produits défectueux, réparation, actions récursoires, garanties de l’assurance, assurances construction et automobile, in cooperation with Christophe Guettier, André Guidicelli, Didier Krajeski, Jérôme Julien, Michel Leroy, Philippe Stoffel-Munck (Paris 2006), sometimes also quoted from earlier editions Philippe le Tourneau, Le parasitisme: agissements parasitaires et concurrence parasitaire, protection contre les agissements et la concurrence parasitaires, sauvegarde du savoir-faire, des informations, des données et des connaissances des entreprises (Paris 1998) Gergely Légrádi, Az utaló magatartás (biztatási kár) a Ptk.-ban és a bírói gyakorlatban, Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció 2003, 20-27 Diogo José Leite de Campos, A indemnização do dano da morte, BFD L (1974), 247-297

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Leite de Campos, BolMinJus 365 (1987) 5 Lenkovics, Dologi jog6 Lete del Río, Derecho de obligaciones II3 Lettl, GRUR Int 2004, 85 Lettl, ZHR 167 (2003), 473 Lévy and Castaldo, Histoire du droit civil Liapis, DEE 9 (2003), 138 Lindenbergh, AA 52 (2003), 365 Lindenbergh, TPR 2002, 1421 Lindskog, Preskription2 Llamas Pombo, FS Díez-Picazo II, 2203

Lourenço, A função punitiva da responsabilidade civil Luna Yerga, La prueba de la responsabilidad civil medico-sanitaria Luna Yerga/Piñeiro Salguero/ Ramos González/Rubí i Puig, InDret 2/2002 Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘ Lynge Andersen, UfR 1977, B 241 Lyngsø, Færdselsansvar3 Mackenzie, (2002) SLT, 98

Diogo José Leite de Campos, A vida, a morte e a sua indemnização, BolMinJus 365 (1987), 5-20 Barnabás Lenkovics, Magyar polgári jog, Dologi jog, (6th ed., Budapest 2001) José Manuel Lete del Río, Derecho de obligaciones, vol. II: El contrato en general. Cuasicontratos. Enriquecimiento sin causa. Responsabilidad extracontractual (3rd ed., Madrid 1998) Tobias Lettl, Der lauterkeitsrechtliche Schutz vor irreführender Werbung in Europa, GRUR Int 2004, 85-96 Tobias Lettl, Der Schadensersatzanspruch gemäß § 823 Abs. 2 BGB i.V. mit Art. 81 EG, ZHR 167 (2003), 473-493 Jean-Philippe Lévy and André Castaldo, Histoire du droit civil (Paris 2002) Dimitrios Liapis, I aitiodis synafeia stin evthini apo enimerotiko deltio, DEE 9 (2003), 138-149 S. D. Lindenbergh, Blij met de geboorte van ... een schadeclaim. Schadevergoeding wegens wrongful birth en wrongful life, AA 52 (2003), 365-374 S. D. Lindenbergh, Schade van derden door verwonding of overlijden van een naaste, TPR 2002, 1421-1473 Stefan Lindskog, Preskription (2nd ed., Stockholm 2002) Eugenio Llamas Pombo, La tutela inhibitoria del daño (la otra manifestación del derecho de daños), in: Estudios jurídicos en homenaje al Profesor Luis Díez-Picazo (Festschrift in honour of Luis Díez-Picazo), vol. II: Derecho civil, derecho de obligaciones, edited by Antonio Cabanillas Sánchez, Jorge Caffarena Laporta, José María Miquel González, Vicente L. Montés Penadés, Antonio Manuel Morales Moreno, Fernando Pantaleón Prieto (Madrid 2003), 2203-2225 Paula Meira Lourenço, A função punitiva da responsabilidade civil (Coimbra 2006) Álvaro Luna Yerga, La prueba de la responsabilidad civil medico-sanitaria. Culpa y responsabilidad (Madrid 2004) Álvaro Luna Yerga, José Piñeiro Salguero, Sonia Ramos González and Antoni Rubí i Puig, Reparación in natura y por equivalente: opciones de la víctima en el derecho español, InDret, April 2002 Ernest Lupan, Ra˘spunderea civila˘. În contextul ra˘spunderii juridice (Cluj-Napoca 2003) Lennart Lynge Andersen, Godtgørelse for freds – og ærekrænkelser. Nogle lemærkninger om domstolens anvendelse af reglerne i ikrafttrædelsesldens § 15, UfR 1977, B 241-245 Preben Lyngsø, Færdselsansvar (3rd ed., Copenhagen 1996) Andrew P. Mackenzie, Privacy – A New Right in UK law?, (2002) SLT, 98-101

1221

Annexes MacQueen, (2003) 78 TulLRev, 363 MacQueen, (2004) 8 Edinburgh LRev, 249 Malaurie and Aynès, Responsabilité délictuelle VI(1)11 Malaurie/Aynès/Gautier, Contrats spéciaux VIII14 Malaurie/Aynès/StoffelMunck, Les obligations Malinvaud, Droit des obligations8, 9 Martín Casals, FS Díez-Picazo II, 2471

Martín Casals, Notas sobre la indemnización del daño moral en las acciones por difamación de la LO 1/ 1982, 1231 Martín Vida, InDret 2/2005

Martín Vida, VersRAI 2004, 20

Martín Vida, VersRAI 2005, 57 and 2006, 5 Martín Villa and Blanco López, RDP 1992, 662 Marton, A polgári jogi felelo˝sség Mäsch, Chance und Schaden: zur Dienstleisterhaftung bei unaufklärbaren Kausalverläufen

1222

Hector MacQueen, Human rights and private law in Scotland: a response to President Barak, (2003) 78 Tulane Law Review, 363-378 Hector L. MacQueen, Protecting Privacy, (2004) 8 Edinburgh LR, 249-254 Philippe Malaurie and Laurent Aynès, Cours de droit civil, vol. VI: Les obligations, part 1: Responsabilité délictuelle (11th ed., Paris 2001) Philippe Malaurie, Laurent Aynès and Pierre-Yves Gautier, Cours de droit civil, vol. VIII: Les contrats spéciaux: civils et commerciaux (14th ed., Paris 2001) Philippe Malaurie, Laurent Aynès and Philippe Stoffel-Munck, Les obligations (Paris 2003) Philippe Malinvaud, Droit des obligations (9th ed., Paris 2005), sometimes also quoted from the 8th ed. (Paris 2003) Miquel Martín Casals, A través del espejo: concurrencia de culpa de la víctima y culpa del causante del daño, in: Estudios jurídicos en homenaje al Profesor Luis Díez-Picazo (Festschrift in honour of Luis Díez-Picazo), vol. II: Derecho civil, derecho de obligaciones, edited by Antonio Cabanillas Sánchez, Jorge Caffarena Laporta, José María Miquel González, Vicente L. Montés Penadés, Antonio Manuel Morales Moreno, Fernando Pantaleón Prieto (Madrid 2003), 2471-2490 Miquel Martín Casals, Notas sobre la indemnización del daño moral en las acciones por difamación de la LO 1/1982, in: Asociación de Profesores de derecho civil (ed.), Centenario del Código civil (1889-1989), vol. II (Madrid 1990), 1231-1273 María Ángeles Martín Vida, Responsabilidad civil extracontractual por ruidos en Derecho alemán y en Derecho español, InDret, October 2005 (http://www.indret.com/pdf/ 304_es.pdf) María Ángeles Martín Vida, Lärmimmissionen. Gerichtlicher Schutz gegen Lärm in Spanien – zugleich Anmerkung zur Entscheidung des spanischen Tribunal Supremo vom 29.4.2003, VersRAI 2004, 20-23 María Ángeles Martín Vida, Deliktsrechtliche Haftung für Lärm in Spanien, VersRAI 2005, 57-63 (part 1) and 2006, 5-8 (part 2) Pascual Martín Villa and María Dolores Blanco López, Sobre la transmisibilided de las obligaciones “ex cuasi delicto”, RDP 1992, 662-665 Géza Marton, A polgári jogi felelo˝sség (Budapest 1993) Gerald Mäsch, Chance und Schaden: zur Dienstleisterhaftung bei unaufklärbaren Kausalverläufen (Tübingen 2004)

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Mason and McCall Smith, Law and Medical Ethics7 Mazeaud and Chabas, Leçons de droit civil I(1)12, II(1)9,(2)8

Mazeaud/Mazeaud/Tunc, Traité théorique et pratique de la responsabilité civile délictuelle et contractuelle6 McBryde, Contract McDermott, Contract McDonald, Irish Law of Defamation2 McGregor, Damages17 McMahon and Binchy, Torts3 Medicus, Bürgerliches Recht20

Medicus, Schuldrecht I13-17 Medicus, Schuldrecht II13, 14

Medina Alcoz, La culpa de la víctima Medina Crespo, La valoración civil del daño corporal III(1) Medrano, El derecho fundamental a la propia imagen Meissel, GoA

Melo Franco and Antunes Martins, Dicionário de conceitos Menezes Cordeiro, Direitos Reais Menezes Cordeiro, Obrigações I, II

John K. Mason and Alexander McCall Smith, Law and Medical Ethics (7th ed., Oxford 2006) Henri Mazeaud, Jean Mazeaud and Léon Mazeaud (establ.), continued by François Chabas, Leçons de droit civil, vol. I, part 1: Introduction à l’étude du droit (12th ed., Paris 2000), vol. II, part 1: Obligations: théorie générale (9th ed., Paris 1998), part 2: Biens: droit de propriété et ses démembrements (8th ed., Paris 1994) Henri Mazeaud, Léon Mazeaud and André Tunc, Traité théorique et pratique de la responsabilité civile délictuelle et contractuelle (6th ed., Paris 1965) William W. McBryde, The law of contract in Scotland (2nd ed. with suppl., Edinburgh 2002-2003) Paul Anthony McDermott, Contract law (Dublin 2001) Marc McDonald, Irish Law of Defamation (2nd ed., Dublin 1989) Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (17th ed., London 2003) Bryan M. E. McMahon and William Binchy, Law of torts (3rd ed., Dublin 2000) Dieter Medicus, Bürgerliches Recht. Eine nach Anspruchsgrundlagen geordnete Darstellung zur Examensvorbereitung (20th ed., Cologne 2004) Dieter Medicus, Schuldrecht I, Allgemeiner Teil (17th ed., Munich 2006), sometimes also quoted from earlier editions Dieter Medicus, Schuldrecht II, Besonderer Teil (14th ed., Munich 2007), sometimes also quoted from 13th edition, Munich 2006 María Medina Alcoz, La culpa de la víctima en la producción del daño extracontractual (Madrid 2003) Mariano Medina Crespo, La valoración civil del daño corporal, vol. III, part 1: Las reglas generales del sistema (Madrid 1999) Amelia Pascual Medrano, El derecho fundamental a la propia imagen. El Fundamento, Contenido, Titularidad y Límites (Navarra 2003) Franz-Stefan Meissel, Geschäftsführung ohne Auftrag: zwischen Quasikontrakt und aufgedrängter Bereicherung (Vienna 1993) João Melo Franco and António Herlander Antunes Martins, Dicionário de conceitos e princípios jurídicos (3rd ed., Coimbra 1995) António Menezes Cordeiro, Direitos Reais (Lisbon 1979, reprint 1993) António Manuel da Rocha e Menezes Cordeiro, Direito das obrigações, vols. I and II (Lisbon 1988, reprint 1994)

1223

Annexes Menezes Cordeiro, Tratado I(3) Menezes Leitão, Enriquecimento sem causa1

Menezes Leitão, Obrigações I3, 4

Menezes Leitão, Responsabilidade civil na Internet, 147 Menezes Leitão, Responsabilidade do gestor Mesquita, Direitos Reais Mesquita, RLJ 125 [1992/1993], 158 Michaelides-Nouaros, EllDiki 29 (1988), 1641 Miquel González, ADC 1983, 1501 Miranda, Manual de Direito Constitucional IV2, 3 Mistretta, JCP 2003 éd. G, I no. 57 Møller and Wiisbye, Erstatningsansvarsloven6 Monateri, Cumulo di responsabilità contrattuale e extracontrattuale Monateri, Manuale della responsabilità civile Monsen, Berikelsekrav Montés Penadés, FS DíezPicazo II, 2591

1224

António Menezes Cordeiro, Tratado de direito civil português, vol. I: Parte geral, part 3: Pessoas (Coimbra 2004) Luís Manuel Teles de Menezes Leitão, Enriquecimento sem causa no direito civil: estudo dogmático sobre a viabilidade da configuração unitária do instituto, face à contraposição entre as diferentes categorias de enriquecimento sem causa (Lisbon 1996) Luís Manuel Teles de Menezes Leitão, Direito das Obrigações, vol. I: Introdução, da constituição das obrigações (4th ed., Coimbra 2005) sometimes also quoted from the 3rd ed. (Coimbra 2003) Luís Manuel Teles de Menezes Leitão, A responsabilidade civil na Internet, in: Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa (ed.), Direito da sociedade da informação, vol. III (Coimbra 2002), 147-167 Luís Manuel Teles de Menezes Leitão, A responsabilidade do gestor perante o dono do negócio no direito civil português (Lisbon 1991) Manuel Henrique Mesquita, Direitos Reais: sumários das lições ao curso de 1966-1967 (Coimbra 1967) Manuel Henrique Mesquita, Comentário ao acórdão do Supremo Tribunal de Justiça de 29 de Abril de 1992, RLJ 125 [1992/1993], 158-160 Georgios Michaelides-Nouaros, Evthini tou prostisantos gia tis paranomes praxis tou prostithentos (AK 922), EllDiki 29 (1988), 1641-1651 José María Miquel González, Observaciones en torno a la responsabilidad extracontractual por el hecho de un contrato independiente, ADC 1983 (4), 1501-1514 Jorge Miranda, Manual de Direito Constitucional, vol. IV: Direitos Fundamentais (3rd ed., Coimbra 2000), sometimes also quoted from the 2nd ed. (Coimbra 1998) Patrick Mistretta, La Loi n8 2002-1577 du 30 décembre 2002 relative à la responsabilité médicale. Premiers correctifs de la loi n8 2003-303 du 4 mars 2002, JCP 2003, éd. G, I no. 57, 165-166 Jens Møller and Michael S. Wiisbye, Erstatningsansvarsloven med kommentarer (6th ed., Copenhagen 2002) Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Cumulo di responsabilità contrattuale e extracontrattuale: analisi comparata di un problema (Padua 1989) Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Manuale della responsabilità civile (Turin 2001) Erik Monsen, Berikelsekrav. Vederlagskrav og vinningsavståelsekrav (Oslo 2007) Vincente L. Montés Penadés, Causalidad, imputación objetiva y culpa en la “concurrencia de culpas”, in: Festschrift in honour of Luis Díez-Picazo, vol. II: Derecho civil, derecho de

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form

Murphy, Street on Torts12

obligaciones, edited by Antonio Cabanillas Sánchez, Jorge Caffarena Laporta, Jóse María Miquel González, Vincente L. Montés Penadés, Antonio Manuel Morales Moreno and Fernando Pantaleón Prieto (Madrid 2003), 2591-2627 Juan Antonio Moreno Martínez (coord.), Perfiles de la responsabilidad civil en el nuevo milenio (Madrid 2000), quoted here with the contribution “Responsabilidad por informar” by Ricardo de Ángel Yágüez, 171-203 and “Responsabilidad civil por daños causados por inmisiones en el código civil español y la proteccion frente a humos, ruidos, olores y similares perturbaciones entre vecinos” by Esther Algarra Prats, 638-644 Enrico Moscati, Del pagamento dell’indebito, in: Antonio Scialoja and Giuseppe Branca (founders), continued by Francesco Galgano (ed.), Commentario del codice civile, vol. IV: Delle obbligazioni (arts. 2028-2042) (Bologna/Rome 1981) Jean Mouly, Quelle faute pour la responsabilité civile du salarié?, D. 2006, Chron. 2756-2763 Boryana Mousseva, Dopustima li e avtonomiyata na volyata pri nepozvoleno uvrejdane spored bulgarskoto mejdunarodno chastno pravo?, Suvremenno pravo, H. 6/2003, Sofia Boryana Mousseva, Dopustima li e avtonomiyata na volyata pri nepozvoleno uvrejdane spored bulgarskoto mejdunarodno chastno pravo?, Suvremenno pravo, H. 6/2003, Sofia Hans-Martin Müller-Laube, Die Konkurrenz zwischen Eigentümer und Anwartschaftsberechtigtem um die Drittschutzansprüche, JuS 1993, 529-536 Kurt Rebmann, Franz Jürgen Säcker and Roland Rixecker (ed.), Müchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol. I: Allgemeiner Teil, §§ 1-240 (4th ed., Munich 2001), vol. II a: Schuldrecht Allgemeiner Teil, §§ 241-432 (4th ed., Munich 2002) vol. V: Schuldrecht Besonderer Teil II: §§ 611-704, EFZG, TzBfG, KschG (4th ed., Munich 2005), vol. V: Schuldrecht Besonderer Teil III: §§705-853, Partnerschaftsgesellschaftsgesetz, Produkthaftungsgesetz (4th ed., Munich 2004), quoted here with the commentaries of § 31 by Dieter Reuter, § 241 by Ernst A. Kramer, §§ 249, 252, 254 by Hartmut Oetker, Vor § 677 by HansHermann Seiler and §§ 823, 826, 830, 833, 836, §§ 10, 11 ProdHG by Gerhard Wagner, sometimes also quoted from the 5th ed., Munich 2006 John Murphy, Street on Torts (12th ed., Oxford 2007)

Navarretta, Diritti inviolabili e risarcimento del danno Nelson-Jones and Stewart, Product Liability

Emanuela Navarretta, Diritti inviolabili e risarcimento del danno (Turin 1996) Rodney Nelson-Jones and Peter Stewart, Product liability: the new law under the Consumer Procetion Act 1987 (London 1987)

Moreno Martínez (-author), Perfiles de la responsabilidad civil en el nuevo milenio

Moscati, Pagamento dell’indebito

Mouly, D. 2006, 2756 Mousseva, Suvremenno pravo 6/2003 Mousseva, Suvremenno pravo 6/2003, Müller-Laube, JuS 1993, 529

MünchKomm (-author), BGB4, 5

1225

Annexes Neocleous and Campbell (-author), Introduction to Cyprus Law Neto, Código Civil Anotado14, 15 Neyers, (2008) 28 Legal Studies 215 Nieuwenhuis/Stolker/Valk (-author), T & C Burgerlijk Wetboek2, 4, 6

Nieuwenhuis/Stolker/Valk (-author), T & C Vermogensrecht2, 3, 4

Nordenson, Trafikskadeersättning Norrie, (1984) JuridRev 163 Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law Nygaard, Placing the Burden of Proof of a Hypothetical Cause, 421 Øe and Røn, J 2004, 85 Onrechtmatige Daad I, II, III, IV (-author)

1226

Andreas Neocleous and Dennis Campbell (ed.), Introduction to Cyprus Law (Salzburg a.o. 2000), quoted here with the commentaries of chap.13: Law of Torts by Takis Christoforou, Antonis Glykis and Christina Markouli Abílio Neto, Código Civil Anotado (15th ed., Lisbon 2006), sometimes also quoted from the 14th ed. (Lisbon 2004) J. W. Neyers, Rights-based justifications for the tort of unlawful interference with economic relations (2008) 28 Legal Studies 215-233 J. H. Nieuwenhuis, C. J. J. M. Stolker and W. L. Valk (eds.), Burgerlijk Wetboek, Tekst & Commentaar. De tekst van de Boeken 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 en 8 van het BW voorzien van commentaar (4th ed., Deventer 2001), quoted here with the commentaries of art. 7:24 by A. G. Castermans, art. 3:303 by C. J. J. M. Stolker, art. 6:170, 6:174 by G. H. Lankhorst, art. 6:162, 6:166, 6:168 by S. D. Lindenbergh, art. 6:106, 6:98 by W. J. G. Oosterveen, art. 6:15 by W. L. Valk, sometimes also quoted from the 3rd ed. (Deventer 1998) J. H. Nieuwenhuis, C. J. J. M. Stolker, W. L. Valk (eds.), Vermogensrecht, Tekst & Commentaar, De tekst van de Boeken 3, 5, 6, en de titels 1, 7, 7A, 9, 14 en 15 van boek 7 van het BW, verwante regelgeving en IPR voorzien van commentaar (4th ed., Deventer 2007, sometimes also quoted from previous editions, Deventer 1999 and 2002) Ulf Nordenson, Trafikskadeersättning: kommentar till trafikskadelagstiftingen (Stockholm 1977) Kenneth McK. Norrie, Hurts to Character, Honour and Reputation: A Reappraisal (1984) JuridRev 163-184 Kenneth McK. Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law (Edinburgh 1995) Nils Nygaard, Placing the Burden of Proof of a Hypothetical Cause, in: Peter Wahlgren (ed.), Tort liability and insurance, Scandinavian studies in law, vol. 41 (Stockholm 2001), 421-452 Henrik Øe and Jens Røn, Godtgørelse til efterladte ved dødsfald, J 2004, 85-92 Onrechtmatige Daad, vols. I-VI, Loose-leaf (Deventer, August 1991 ff.), quoted here with the contributions of art. 6:162 (vol. I: art. 6:162, p. 1-76), art. 6:162 lid 1 (vol. I: art. 6:162), art. 6:165 (vol. II: art. 6:165, p. 2-24) by C. H. M. Jansen (vol. I: art. 6:162, p. 1-76, art. 6:162 lid 1, p.1-4 and art. 6:162 lid 2, p. 1-1348, November 2005) and G. A. I. Schuijt (vol. IV, chap. VII: Aantasting eer en goede naam en endere aantasting von de persoon, September 2001), C. J. J. C. van Nispen (vol. IV: Ongeoorloofde mededinging, December 1997-June 1999, vol. II, art. 6:168), G. E. van Maanen (vol. II, Art- 6:163,

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form

Orti Vallejo, La responsabilidad civil3, 1629

Orti Vallejo, Responsabilidad en la explotación, 1357

Overeem, Smartegeld

Pabst, NJW 2002, 999 Pagh, Miljøansvar Palandt (-author), BGB61-67

Pantaleón Prieto, ADC 1988, 1033 Pantaleón Prieto, ADC 1991, 1019 Pantaleón Prieto, CCJC 1983, 447 Pantaleón Prieto, Procreación artificial y responsabilidad civil, 245

Pantaleón Prieto, Responsabilidad por hecho ajeno, 5957 Papantoniou, Genikes Arches tou Astikou dikaiou

June 1996-August 2001), B. T. M. van der Wiel (chap. II.3.: Overeenkomst en onrechtmatige daad, July 2002), F. T. Oldenhuis (art. 6:174, August 2004, Art. 6:179, Art. 6:173, 6:174), C. J. J. M. Stolker (art. 6:190), H. A. Bouman (vol. III, chap. III.5: Toerekening, no. 221, p. 46, vol. III, chap. III.7: Veroorzakingen medeveroorzaking, nos. 253-254, p. 97-118), S. Slabbers (vol. IV, chap. VI.3: Medische aansprakelijkheid, no. 18, p. 261) Antonio Orti Vallejo, La responsabilidad civil en la prática de actividades de ocio peligrosas, in: Luis Fernando Reglero Campos (coord.), Tratado de responsabilidad civil (3rd ed., Navarra 2006), 1629-1894 Antonio Orti Vallejo, Responsabilidad en la explotación y práctica de actividades de riesgo, in: Luis Fernando Reglero Campos (coord.), Tratado de responsabilidad civil (Navarra 2002), 1357-1389 R. Oevereem, Smartegeld, een rechtsvergelijkende beschouwing over de vergoeding van niet-economische schade (Zwolle 1979) Heinz-Joachim Pabst, Der postmortale Persönlichkeitsschutz in der neueren Rechtsprechung des BVerfG, NJW 2002, 999-1004 Peter Pagh, Miljøansvar – en ret for hvem (Copenhagen 1998) Palandt, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (67th ed., Munich 2008), quoted here with the commentaries of §§ 125, 194, 227, Vorb. v. § 249 and §§ 251, 253, 254, 276 by Helmut Heinrichs, Einf. v. § 677 and §§ 823, 826, 828, 830, 833, 836, 838, 839, 840 by Heinz Thomas (until 64th ed.) and §§ 823, 824, 826, 828, 821, 830, 832, 833, 836 by Hartwig Sprau (since 65th ed.), of § 611 by Walter Weidenkaff, sometimes also quoted from earlier editions Fernando Pantaleón Prieto, Cesión de créditos, ADC 1988, 1033-1132 Fernando Pantaleón Prieto, El sistema de responsabilidad contractual (Materiales para un debate), ADC 1991, 1019-1091 Angel Fernando Pantaleón Prieto, Comentario a la sentencia de 10 de marzo de 1983. Responsabilidad civil extracontractual, CCJC 1983, 447-458 Fernando Pantaleón Prieto, Procreación artificial y responsabilidad civil, in: La filiación a finales del siglo XX. Problemática planteada por los avances científicos en materia de reproducción asistida, II Congreso Mundial Vasco, Ponencias y Comunicaciones (Madrid 1988), 245-317 Fernando Pantaleón Prieto, Responsabilidad por hecho ajeno, in: Alfredo Montoya Melgar (ed.), Enciclopedia Jurídica Básica, vol. IV (Madrid 1995), 5957 Nikolaos Papantoniou, Genikes Arches tou Astikou dikaiou (Athens 1983)

1227

Annexes Paparigopoulou-Skorrini, NoB 25 (1977), 278 Parlementaire Geschiedenis III, VI

Parlementaire Geschiedenis Inv. III, V, VI

Paterakis, I chrimatiki ikanopoiisi gia ithiki vlavis Paz-Ares/Díez-Picazo/ Bercovitz/Salvador (-author), Código Civil I2, II2

Peczenik, Causes and Damages Pedain, [2004] CLJ, 19 Peeters, De indicatieve tabel PEL /von Bar, Ben.Int.

Pelly, [2002] 20 ILT, 9

Peña López, La culpabilidad en la responsabilidad civil extracontractual Pereira Coelho, O problema da causa virtual Pereira Coelho, Obrigações Pessoa Jorge, BolMinJus 281 (1978) 5 Pessoa Jorge, Ensaio sobre os pressupostos da responsabilidade civil

1228

Phoni Paparigopoulou-Skorrini, I pliroforisi tou koinou dia tou typou kai i prostasia tou katigoroumeneou, NoB 25 (1977), 278-286 Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek. Parlementaire stukken systematisch gerangschikt en van noten voorzien door C. J. van Zeben, J. W. du Pon in cooperation with M. M. Olthof, book III: Vermogensrecht in het algemeen (Deventer 1981), book VI: Algemeen Gedeelte van het Verbintenissenrecht (Deventer 1981) Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (Invoering). Invoering Boeken 3, 5 en 6, book III: Vermogensrecht in het algemeen, book V: Zakelijke rechten, book VI: Algemeen gedeelte van het verbintenissenrecht by W. H. M. Reehuis and E. E. Slob (Deventer 1990) Stylianos Paterakis, I chrimatiki ikanopoiisi gia ithiki vlavis (Athens 1995) Cándido Paz-Ares Rodriguez, Luis Díez-Picazo Ponce de Leon, Rodrigo Bercovitz and Pablo Salvador Coderch (eds.), Comentario del Código Civil, vols. I and II, published by Secretaría General Técnica del Ministerio de Justicia (2nd ed., Madrid 1993), quoted here with the commentaries of art. 3.1 by Pablo Salvador Coderch, art. 460 by José María Miquel González, art. 1.104 by Ferrán Badosa Coll, art. 1.137 by Jorge Caffarena Laporta, arts. 389, 1.902 by Fernando Pantaleón Prieto, arts. 1.903, 1.905 by Ricardo de Ángel Yágüez Aleksander Peczenik, Causes and Damages (Lund 1979) Antje Pedain, Unconventional Justice in the House of Lords, [2004] CLJ, 19-21 Walter Peeters, De indicatieve tabel (Antwerp 2001) Christian von Bar, Principles of European Law. Study Group on a European Civil Code. Benevolent Intervention in Another’s Affairs (PEL Ben. Int.) (Munich 2006) Niall Pelly, Products Liability: Is European Products Liability more protective than the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability? – Part II, [2002] 20 ILT, 9-12 Fernando Peña López, La culpabilidad en la responsabilidad civil extracontractual (Granada 2002) Francisco Manuel Pereira Coelho, O problema da causa virtual na responsabilidade civil (Coimbra 1998) Francisco Manuel Pereira Coelho, Obrigações. Sumários das lições ao curso de 1966-1967 (Coimbra 1967) Fernando Pessoa Jorge, A limitação convencional da responsabilidade civil, BolMinJus 281 (1978) 5-32 Fernando de Sandy Lopes Pessoa Jorge, Ensaio sobre os pressupostos da responsabilidade civil (Coimbra 1995)

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Petrik (-author), Polgári jog I2, II2

Petrik, Kártérítési jog

Petrik, Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció 1/2003, 6 Phillipson, [2003] MLR, 726

Pietrzykowski (-author), Kodeks cywilny I4

Pinto Monteiro, Cláusulas limitativas e de exclusão de responsabilidade civil Pinto Monteiro, RLJ 134 [2001-2002], 371 Pintos Ager, Baremos, seguros y derecho de daños Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado I4, II3, III2, IV2 Pletzer, Doppelveräußerung und Forderungseingriff Polak, Aanspraak en aansprakelijkheid uit onrechtmatige daad Ponzanelli, Danno e resp. 2004, 964 Ponzanelli, Foro it. 1994, I, 3297 Ponzanelli, Le clausole di esonero della responsabilità civile Portellano Díez, La defensa del derecho de patente Pouliadis, Culpa in Contrahendo

Ferenc Petrik (ed.), Polgári jog, Kommentár a gyakorlat számára, vols. I and II, Loose-leaf (2nd ed., Budapest 2001-2004) quoted here with the commentaries by György Bíró, Attila Harmathy, Tibor Köles, Ferenc Petrik, Tamás Sárközy, György Wellmann Ferenc Petrik, Kártérítési jog – az élet, testi épség, egészség megsértésével szerzo˝désen kívül okozott károk megtérítése (Budapest 2002) Ferenc Petrik, A nem vagyoni kár megtérítése védelmében, Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció 1/2003, 6-8 Gavin Phillipson, Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under the Human Rights Act, [2003] MLR, 726-758 Krzysztof Pietrzykowski, Kodeks cywilny, vol. I: Komentarz do art. 1-449 (4th ed., Warsaw 2005), quoted here with the commentary to Introduction to arts. 56, 353 and arts. 56-65, 353-355, 364-365, 427-449 by Marek Safjan and arts. 362, 415, 416, 4497 by Zbigniew Banaszczyk António Joaquim de Matos Pinto Monteiro, Cláusulas limitativas e de exclusão de responsabilidade civil, (Coimbra 2003, reprint of the 1985 edition) António Joaquim de Matos Pinto Monteiro, Direito a não nascer?, RLJ 134 [2001-2002], 371-384 Jesús Pintos Ager, Baremos, seguros y derecho de daños (Madrid 2000) Fernando Andrade Pires de Lima and João de Matos Antunes Varela, Código Civil Anotado, vol. I: arts. 1-761 (4th ed., Coimbra 1987), vol. II (3rd ed., Coimbra 1986), vol. III (2nd ed., Coimbra 1987), vol. IV (2nd ed., Coimbra 1992) Renate Pletzer, Doppelveräußerung und Forderungseingriff: die Auswirkungen der mehrfachen Veräußerung beweglicher Sachen und Liegenschaften (Vienna 2000) R. J. Polak, Aanspraak en aansprakelijkheid uit onrechtmatige daad (Zwolle 1949) Giulio Ponzanelli, Il commento, note under Il caso Azzolina le duplicazioni sono dietro l’angolo, Cassazione Civile, Sez. III, 27 april 2004, no. 7980, Danno e resp. 2004, 964-965 Giulio Ponzanelli, La Corte costituzionale e il danno da morte (Nota a Corte Cost. 27 October 1994, no. 372), Foro it. 1994, I, 3297-3305 Giulio Ponzanelli, Le clausole di esonero della responsabilità civile, Studio di diritto comparato (Milan 1984) Pedro Portellano Díez, La defensa del derecho de patente (Madrid 2003) Athanassios K. Pouliadis, Culpa in Contrahendo und Schutz Dritter. Betrachtungen zur Rechtsprechung des BGH unter

1229

Annexes

Pradel, Le préjudice dans le droit civil de la responsabilité Prata, Dicionário jurídico4 Prata, Notas sobre responsabilidade pré-contratual Przybylska, MoP 2003/16/ 740, LEX no. 38745 Puig Ferriol/Gete-Alonso/ Gil Rodríguez/Hualde Sánchez (-author), Manual de Derecho Civil II3

Radetzki, Skadeståndsberäkning vid sakskada Radwan´ ski (-author), System prawa cywilnego III(1) Radwan´ ski and Dybowski (-author), System prawa prywatnego III Radwan´ ski and Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛´sc´ ogólna2, 5, 7 Radwan´ ski and PanowiczLipska, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛´sc´ szczegółowa5 Radwan´ ski, Prawo cywilne – cze˛´sc´ ogólna8 Rapisarda, Profili della tutela civile inibitoria Ravarani, La responsabilité civile1, 2 Ravarani, Pas. luxemb. (31) 2000, 431

1230

vergleichender Berücksichtigung des griechischen Rechts (Berlin 1982) Xavier Pradel, Le préjudice dans le droit civil de la responsabilité (Paris 2004) Ana Prata, Dicionário jurídico. Direito civil, direito processual civil, organização judiciaria (4th ed., Coimbra 2005) Ana Prata, Notas sobre responsabilidade pré-contratual (Lisbon 1991) Justyna Przybylska, Cywilnoprawne aspekty instytucji zgody pacjenta na interwencje˛ medyczna˛ i jej definicja, MoP 2003/16/740, LEX no. 38745 Lluís Puig i Ferriol, María del Carmen Gete-Alonso y Calera, Jacinto Gil Rodríguez and José Javier Hualde Sánchez (eds.), Manual de Derecho Civil, vol. II: Derecho de obligaciones, Responsabilidad civil, Teoría general del contrato (3rd ed., Barcelona 2000), quoted here with the contribution “La responsabilidad (II)” by Clara I. Asúa González (Chapter 20, 495-523) Marcus Radetzki, Skadeståndsberäkning vid sakskada (Stockholm 2004) Zbigniew Radwan´ ski (ed.), System prawa cywilnego, vol. III, part 1: Prawo zobowia˛zan´ – cze˛´sc´ ogólna, quoted here with the contribution of Tomasz Dybowski (Wrocław 1981) Zbigniew Radwan´ ski and Tomasz Dybowski (eds.), System prawa prywatnego, vol. III: Prawo rzeczowe (Warsaw 2003), quoted here with the contribution Ochrona własnos´ci by Edward Gniewek (chap. VI: 469-561) Zbigniew Radwan´ ski and Adam Olejniczak, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛´sc´ ogólna (7th ed., Warsaw 2006), sometimes also quoted from the 2nd ed. (Warsaw 1997) and the 5th ed. (Warsaw 2004) Zbigniew Radwan´ ski and Janina Panowicz-Lipska, Zobowia˛zania – cze˛´sc´ szczegółowa (5th ed., Warsaw 2004) Zbigniew Radwan´ ski, Prawo cywilne – cze˛s´c´ ogólna (8th ed., Warsaw 2005) Cristina Rapisarda, Profili della tutela civile inibitoria (Padua 1987) Georges Ravarani, La responsabilité civile des personnes privées et publiques (2nd ed., Luxembourg 2006), sometimes also quoted from the previous edition (Luxembourg 2000) Georges Ravarani, Panorama de jurisprudence en matiére d’indemnisation du dommage (octobre 2002), Pas. luxemb. (31) 2000-2001, 431-492

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Rebhahn, JBl 2000, 265 Reglero Campos, El nexo causal1, 3

Reglero Campos, Los sistemas de responsabilidad civil1, 3

Reglero Campos, Responsabilidad civil por daños a la propiedad industrial3 Reglero Campos, Responsabilidad civil y seguro en la circulación de vehículos de motor3 Reinhard and Chazal, Droit commercial6 Reischauer, JBl 1998, 473 and 560 Relatório da Comissão Nacional de Protecção de Dados 1999 and 2001/2002 Renner, Die deliktische Haftung für Hilfspersonen in Europa Rép.Dr.Civ.(-author) IV2, V2, VIII2, IX2

Rép.Dr.Com. (-author) Ress, FS Ishikawa, 429

Robert Rebhahn, Schadenersatz wegen der Geburt eines nicht gewünschten Kindes?, JBl 2000, 265-271 Luis Fernando Reglero Campos, El nexo causal. Las causas de exoneración de responsabilidad: culpa de la víctima y fuerza mayor. La concurrencia de culpas, in: Luis Fernando Reglero Campos (coord.), Tratado de responsabilidad civil (3rd ed., Navarra 2006), 339-459, sometimes also quoted from the 1st ed. (Navarra 2002), 285-394 Luis Fernando Reglero Campos, Los sistemas de responsabilidad civil, in: Luis Fernando Reglero Campos (coord.), Tratado de responsabilidad civil (3rd ed., Navarra 2006), 211-248, sometimes also quoted from the 1st ed. (Navarra 2002), 163-200 Luis Fernando Reglero Campos, Responsabilidad civil por daños a la propiedad industrial, in: Luis Fernando Reglero Campos (coord.), Tratado de responsabilidad civil (3rd ed., Navarra 2006), 2119-2220 Luis Fernando Reglero Campos, Responsabilidad civil y seguro en la circulación de vehículos de motor, in: Luis Fernando Reglero Campos (coord.), Tratado de responsabilidad civil (3rd ed., Navarra 2006), 847-1151, sometimes also quoted from the 1st ed. (Navarra 2002), 717-958 Yves Reinhard and Jean-Pascal Chazal, Droit commercial (6th ed., Paris 2001) Rudolf Reischauer, Neuere Rechtsprechung und Lehre zu § 1298 ABGB, JBl 1998, 473-487 (part 1) and 560-570 (part 2) Relatório da Comissão Nacional de Protecção de Dados 1999 (Lisbon 2000) (http://www.cnpd.pt/bin/relatorios/ anos/relat99.htm); and 2001/2002 (Lisbon s.d.) (http://www.cnpd.pt/bin/relatorios/anos/relat01-02.htm) Cornelius Renner, Die deliktische Haftung für Hilfspersonen in Europa (Berlin 2002) Pierre Raynaud, Jean-Luc Aubert and Éric Savaux (eds.), Répertoire de Droit Civil, Loose-leaf (2nd ed., Paris 1970-), quoted here with the contributions by Jean Penneau, vol. IV, v8 Corps humain (June 1995), Christian Lapoyade Deschamps, vol. V, v8 Dommages et intérêts, (June 1997), Denis Tallon, vol. VIII, v8 Personnalité (Droits de la) (October 1996), Catherine Caillé, vol. IX, v8 Responsabilité du fait des produits défectueux (April 2003), Philippe le Tourneau, vol. IX, v8 Quasicontrat (September 2002) Yves Serra, Rép.Dr.Com., v8 Concurrence déloyale (1996) Georg Ress, Schmerzensgeld für juristische Personen?, in: Festschrift in honour of Akira Ishikawa, edited by Gerhard Lüke, Takehiko Mikami and Hanns Prütting (Berlin 2001), 429-442

1231

Annexes RGRK (-author), BGB12

Ribeiro de Faria, Direito das Obrigações I, II Ripert/Roblot/Vogel, Traité de droit commercial I(1)18

Roca i Trias, ADC 1998, 7 Roca i Trias, Derecho de daños3 Roca i Trias, FS Albaladejo II, 4251

Rodhe, Obligationsrätt Rodríguez y Rowinski, Die Haftung für Hilfspersonen im spanischen Recht Roger Vide, La responsabilidad civil extracontractual en el Derecho español Rokas, Evthini gia ta proionta Roland and Boyer, Adages du droit français4 Romano Martinez, Direito das obrigações Romos¸an, Vinova˘t¸ia

Das Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichts und des Bundesgerichtshofes: Kommentar, edited by members of the Bundesgerichtshof, vol. II, part 5: §§ 812-831 (12th ed., Berlin 1989), quoted here with the commentaries of vor § 823, § 823 by Erich Steffen Jorge Leite Areias Ribeiro de Faria, Direito das vols. I and II (Coimbra 1990) Georges Ripert and René Roblot (establs.), continued by Louis Vogel, Traité de droit commercial, vol. I, part 1: Commerçants, tribunaux de commerce, fonds de commerce, propriété industrielle, concurrence (droits communautaire et français) (18th ed., Paris 2001) Encarna Roca i Trias, La acción de repetición prevista en el artículo 1904 del Código Civil, ADC 1998 (1), 7-40 Encarna Roca i Trias, Derecho de daños: textos y materiales (3rd ed., Valencia 2000) Encarna Roca i Trias, Resarcir o enriquecer. La concurrencia de indemnizaciones por un mismo daño, in: Festschrift in honour of Manuel Albaladejo García, vol. II, edited by J. M. González Porras and F. P. Méndez González (Murcia 2004), 4251-4277 Knut Rodhe, Obligationsrätt (Stockholm 1984) Miguel Félix Rodríguez y Rowinski, Die Haftung für Hilfspersonen im spanischen Recht (Frankfurt on the Main 2001) Carlos Roger Vide, La responsabilidad civil extracontractual en el Derecho español (Madrid 1976)

Ronse (-de Wilde/Claeys/ Mallems), Schade en schadeloosstelling I2

Ioannes Rokas, Evthini gia ta proionta (Athens 1997) Henri Roland and Laurent Boyer, Adages du droit français (4th ed., Paris 1999) Pedro Romano Martinez, Direito das obrigações: (parte especial); contratos; compra e venda, locação, empreitada (Coimbra 2000) Ioan Dorel Romos¸an, Vinova˘t¸ia în dreptul civil român (Bucharest 1999) Jan Ronse, Schade en schadeloosstelling, vol. I actualised by Lode de Wilde, Antoon Claeys and Ingrid Mallems (2nd ed., Brussels 1988)

Rosselli, Economic Impact of the Development Risk Clause as provided by Directive 85/374 / EEC on Liability for Defective Products Roussos, EllDik 35 (1994), 1492

Fondazione Rosselli, Analysis of the Economic Impact of the Development Risk Clause as provided by Directive 85/374 / EEC on Liability for Defective Products (Study for the European Commission, Contract No. ETD /2002 /B5, 2003) (http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/regulation/goods/docs/liability/ 2004-06-dev-risk-clause-study_en.pdf) Kleanthes Roussos, Aitiodis synafeia kai themeliosi evthinis kat’AK 914, 71 i kat’AK 914, 922, EllDik 35 (1994), 1492-1497

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Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Ruda González, CuadCivJur. 71 [2006], 695

Rudden, TulCivLaw Forum 6/7 (1991-92), 105 Ruiz Larrea, La Ley 1998, I, 2039

Rummel (-author), ABGB I3, II2 II(2b)3

Saare, Juridica 2000, 203

Saare, Juridica 2003, 673

Sacco, Il possesso

Sacco, L’arricchimento ottenuto mediante fatto ingiusto Safjan, FS Maksymilian Pazdan

Salmond, Law of Torts9

Albert Ruda González, Sentencia de 14 de marzo de 2005 Responsabilidad civil medioambiental. Contaminación del aire. Carácter objetivo de la responsabilidad. Antijuricidad. El sujeto responsable. El abuso de derecho. Prevención de daños. Daño indemnizable: en particular, el lucro cesante. El problema del daño ecológico puro. Transposición de la Directiva 2004/35/ CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 21 de abril de 2004, sobre responsabilidad medioambiental en relación con la prevención y reparación de daños medioambientales, CuadCivJur. 71 [2006], 695-744 Bernard Rudden, Torticles, TulCivLaw Forum 6/7 (1991-92), 105-129 Nekane Ruiz Larrea, “El daño de procreación”: ¿un caso de responsabilidad civil de los progenitores por las enfermedades y malformaciones transmitidas a sus hijos?, La Ley 1998, I, 2039-2046 Peter Rummel (ed.), Kommentar zum Allgemeinen Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch in zwei Bänden; mit IPR-Gesetz, Ehegesetz, Mietrechtsgesetz, Wohnungseigentumsgesetz, Landpachtgesetz, Konsumentenschutzgesetz, vol. I: §§ 1-1174 ABGB (3rd ed., Vienna 2000), vol. II, part 2b: §§ 1313-1341 (3rd ed., Vienna 2004), quoted here with the commentaries of §§ 1324, 1325 by Rudolf Reischauer, sometimes also quoted from the 2nd ed. (Vienna 1992), vol II: §§ 1175-1502 ABGB with the commentaries of § 16 by Josef Aicher, §§ 1293-1295, § 1304, § 1312, §§ 1294, 1323-1325 by Rudolf Reischauer and § 372, § 387 by Karl Spielbüchler Kalev Saare, Operation of Legal Persons in Private Law through their Bodies and Liability for Activities of the Bodies, Juridica 2000, 203-211 (in Estonian) Kalev Saare, Judgement of a Private Law Legal Person on the Basis of the Conduct of a Member of the Management Body, Juridica 2003, 673-683 (in Estonian) Rodolfo Sacco, Il possesso, in Trattato di diritto civile e commerciale, established by Antonio Cicu and Francesco Messineo, vol. VII (Milan 1988) Rodolfo Sacco, L’arricchimento ottenuto mediante fatto ingiusto: contributo alla teoria della responsabilità estracontrattuale (Turin 1959) Marek Safjan, Problematyka tzw. bezprawnos´ci wzgle˛dnej oraz zwia˛zku przyczynowego na tle odpowiedzialnos´ci za niezgodne z prawem akty normatywne, in: Festschrift in honour of Maksymilian Pazdan, edited by Leszek Ogiegła, Wojciech Popiołek, Maciej Szpunar (Krakow 2005) John William Salmond, Salmond’s Law of torts: a treatise on the English law of liability for civil injuries (9th ed., London 1936)

1233

Annexes Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts20, 21

Salomons, Schadevergoeding Salvador and Santidumenge, PJ 1988, no. 10, 117 Salvador Coderch (-author), El mercado de las ideas

Salvador Coderch and Gómez Ligüerre, InDret 3/2002

Salvador Coderch, Green Paper – Civil Liability for Defective Products Salvador/Ramos/Luna, InDret 3/2000 Salvi, Il danno extracontrattuale Salvi, La responsabilità civile2

Samuelsson and Søgaard, Rådgiveransvaret Sánchez-Beato and Martín Vida, Los derechos fundamentales Sandstedt, VersRAI 2002, 11 Sandstedt, VersRAI 2002, 9 Sandstedt, VersRAI 2003, 43 Sandstedt, VersRAI 2004, 23 Sandstedt, VersRAI 2004, 28 Sandstedt, VersRAI 2007, 44

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John William Salmond (establ.), Robert Francis Vere Heuston and Richard A. Buckley, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (21st ed., London 1996), sometimes also quoted from the 20th ed. (London 1992) R.A. Salomons, Schadevergoeding: zaakschade (Mon. Nieuw BW, B-Serie, 38) (Deventer 1983) Pablo Salvador and Josep Santidumengo, La acción negatoria, PJ 1988, no. 10, 117 Pablo Salvador Coderch (coord.), El mercado de las ideas (Madrid 1990), quoted here with the contribution Indemnización de daños y otras medidas judiciales por intromisión ilegítima contra el derecho al honor by Miquel Martín i Casals, 382-409 Pablo Salvador Coderch and Carlos Ignatio Gómez Ligüerre, “Respondeat Superior II. De la responsabilidad por hecho de otro a la responsabilidad de la organización”, InDret, July 2002 (http://www.indret.com/pdf/088_ca.pdf) Pablo Salvador Coderch a. o., Green Paper – Civil Liability for Defective Products (Barcelona 1999) (http://ec.europa.eu/enter prise/regulation/goods/docs/liability/1999-greenpaper-replies/ gpaper.pdf) Pablo Salvador Coderch, Sònia Ramos González and Álvaro Luna Yerga, Un ojo de la cara (I), InDret, July 2000 (http://www.indret.com/pdf/023_es.pdf) Cesare Salvi, Il danno extracontrattuale. Modelli e funzioni (Naples 1985) Cesare Salvi, La responsabilità civile, Trattato di diritto privato a cura di Iudica e Zatti (2nd ed., Milan 2005), sometimes also quoted from the 1st ed. (Milan 1997) Morten Samuelsson and Kjeld Søgaard, Rådgiveransvaret: erstatingsansvar og forsikring for professionelle rådgivere (Copenhagen 1993) Estefanía Jerónimo Sánchez-Beato and María Ángeles Martín Vida, Los derechos fundamentales en las relaciones sanitarias (Granada 2002) Johan Sandstedt, Schmerzensgeld für Angehörige? – Kommentar zu der neusten schwedischen Entwicklung, VersRAI 2002, 11-15 Johan Sandstedt, Kurze Informationen über die Änderungen im schwedischen Deliktsrecht, VersRAI 2002, 9-11 Johan Sandstedt, Weiteres zum schwedischen Angehörigenschmerzensgeld, VersRAI 2003, 43-48 Johan Sandstedt, Entführung und Angehörigenschmerzensgeld, VersRAI 2004, 23-28 Johan Sandstedt, Neues über die Höhe des Angehörigenschmerzensgeldes in Schweden, VersRAI 2004, 28-30 Johan Sandstedt, Verleitung zum Vertragsbruch in Schweden (part 2), VersRAI 2007, 44-48

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Sandvik, JFT 1998, 544 Santini, Riv.Dir.Civ. 1959, I, 125 Santos Briz, La responsabilidad civil I7, II7 Santos Morón, FS Díez-Picazo II, 3015

Santos Silva, ERPL 2006, 826

Savatier, Traité de la responsabilité civil II2

Saxén, Skadestånd vid avtalsbrott Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt Saxén, Tillägg till skadeståndsrätt Schadevergoeding I, II (-author)

Schilcher and Kleewein, in: von Bar (ed.), Deliktsrecht in Europa Schmidt-Kessel, Reform des Schadenersatzrechts I Schobel, RdW 2002, 206

Schönherr and Kucsko, GRUR Int 1980, 282 Schrage, Van delict tot onrechtmatige daad

Björn Sandvik, Hur strikt är det strikta skadeståndsansvaret enligt Lagen om ersättning för miljöskador?, JFT 1998, 544-570 Gerardo Santini, Concorrenza sleale ed impresa, Riv.Dir.Civ. 1959, I, 125-147 Jaime Santos Briz, La responsabilidad civil. Derecho sustantivo y Derecho procesal, vol. I and II (7th ed., Madrid 1993) María José Santos Morón, Acerca de la tutela civil del medio ambiente: algunas reflexiones críticas, in: Estudios jurídicos en homenaje al Profesor Luis Díez-Picazo (Festschrift in honour of Luis Díez-Picazo), vol. II: Derecho civil, derecho de obligaciones, edited by Antonio Cabanillas Sánchez, Jorge Caffarena Laporta, José María Miquel González, Vicente L. Montés Penadés, Antonio Manuel Morales Moreno, Fernando Pantaleón Prieto (Madrid 2003), 3015-3038 Marta Lívia dos Santos Silva, Comment on the decision of the Court of Cassation (Commercial, Financial and Economic Chamber) of April 5th 2005, ERPL 2006, 826-838 René Savatier, Traité de la responsabilité civil en droit français civil, administratif, professionnel, procédural, vol. II: Conséquences et aspects divers de la responsabilité (2nd ed., Paris 1951) Hans Saxén, Skadestånd vid avtalsbrott – HD praxis i Finland (Stockholm 1995) Hans Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt (Åbo 1975) Hans Saxén, Tillägg till skadeståndsrätt (Åbo 1983) A. T. Bolt (ed.), Schadevergoeding, vols. I and II, (Loose-leaf Deventer 1992-November 2005), quoted here with the commentaries of arts. 6:95, 6:96, 6:97, 6:100, 6:106, 6:108 by S. D. Lindenbergh and art. 6:98, 6:99, 6:101 by R. J. B. Boonekamp, 6:103, 6:104 by T. E. Deurvorst, 6:107 by A. T. Bolt Bernd Schilcher and Wolfgang Kleewein, Landesbericht Österreich, in: Christian von Bar (ed.) in cooperation with Helmut Grothe and Andreas Spickhoff, Deliktsrecht in Europa (Cologne a.o. 1993) Martin Schmidt-Kessel in cooperation with Sandra B. Müller, Reform des Schadenersatzrechts, vol. I: Europäische Vorgaben und Vorbilder (Vienna 2006) Thomas Schobel, Ersatzfähigkeit reiner Trauerschäden – Generelle Rechtsprechungswende bei immateriellen Trauerschäden, RdW 2002, 206-209 Fritz Schönherr and Guido Kucsko, Schadenersatz im gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Österreichs, GRUR Int 1980, 282-286 E. J H. Schrage, Van delict tot onrechtmatige daad (Nijmegen 1998)

1235

Annexes Schryvers and Ulrichts, Schaderegeling in België5 Schuermans/Van Oevelen/ Persyn/Ernst/Schuermans, TPR 1994, 851 Schultz, Kausalitet Schut, Onrechtmatige daad4 Schwimann (-author), ABGB VI3, VII2

Scognamiglio, Giur.it. 1995, IV, 356 Scognamiglio, Riv.Dir.Civ. 1957, I, 277 Seavey, 56 [1942] Harv.LR, 72 Selvig, Såkalte husbondsansvar Sieburgh, WPNR 2001, no. 6450, 588 Siegel, Produkthaftung im polnischen, tschechischen und slowenischen Recht Simester and Chan, [2004] CLJ, 132 Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht XI(2) Simoens, RW 2000-01, 1577

Sinde Monteiro, Estudos sobre a responsabilidade civil I, II Sinde Monteiro, Responsabilidade por conselhos

1236

Jacques Schryvers and Hilde Ulrichts, Schaderegeling in België (5th ed., Mechlin 2004) Luc Schuermans, Aloïs van Oevelen, Chris Persyn, Philippe Ernst and Jean-Luc Schuermans, Overzicht van rechtspraak. Onrechtmatige daad. Schade en schadeloosstelling (1983-1992), TPR 1994, 851-1430 Mårten Schultz, Kausalitet: studier i skadeståndsrättslig argumentation (Stockholm 2007) Gerhardus Hendrik Adriaan Schut, Onrechtmatige daad volgens BW en NBW (4th ed., Zwolle 1990) Michael Schwimann (ed.), Praxiskommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch samt Nebengesetzen in acht Bänden, vol. VI: §§ 1293-1502 ABGB (3rd ed., Vienna 2006), quoted here with the commentaries of vor §§ 1293, §§ 1293, 1300, 1301, 1309, 1319, 1311, 1320, 1323, 1325, 1327, 1330 by Friedrich Harrer and § 1393 by Albert Heidinger and vol. VII: §§ 1293-1502 ABGB (2nd ed., Vienna 1997) Claudio Scognamiglio, Sulla responsabilità dell’impresa bancaria per violazione di obblighi discendenti dal proprio status, Giur.it. 1995, IV, 356-370 Renato Scognamiglio, Il danno morale, – Contributo alla teoria del danno extracontrattuale, Riv.Dir.Civ. 1957, I, 277-336 Warren A. Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 [1942] Harv.LR, 72-98 Erling Selvig, Det såkalte husbondsansvar. Studier i ulike typer av ansvar for hjelpere, herunder rederansvaret efter sjoel. § 8 (Oslo 1968) Carla Heleen Sieburgh, Wat beweegt de buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid omstreeks 2000, WPNR 2001, no. 6450, 588-591 Katharina Siegel, Produkthaftung im polnischen, tschechischen und slowenischen Recht (Frankfurt on the Main a.o. 2002) H. P. Simester and Winnie Chan, Inducing Breach of Contract: One Tort or two?, [2004] CLJ, 132-165 Dries Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht, vol. XI: Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid, part 2: Schade en schadeloosstelling (Antwerp 1999) Dries Simoens, Het verkeersongevallenartikel 29bis W.A.M.: stand van zaken na de wijzigingswet van 19 januari 2001, RW 2000-01, 1577-1586 Jorge Ferreira Sinde Monteiro, Estudos sobre a responsabilidade civil, vol. I: Introdução, vol. II: Responsabilidade por culpa, responsabilidade objectiva, seguro de acidentes (Coimbra 1983) Jorge Ferreira Sinde Monteiro, Responsabilidade por conselhos recomendações ou informações (Coimbra 1989)

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Sinde Monteiro, RLJ 131 [1998/99], 48 Sisula-Tulokas, Contract and tort law: twenty cases from the Finnish Supreme Court Sisula-Tulokas, JFT 2000, 634 S-Karnov 2005/06, 2006/07 (-author)

Skovbo, Erstatning for uphavsretliga krænkelser Smith, Assignment Smith, Short Commentary Snijders and RankBerenschot, Goederenrecht (-author) Snijders, Produktenrecht Soergel (-author), BGB12, 13

Solé Feliu, ADC 1997, 865

Solé Feliu, FS Díez-Picazo II, 3097

Jorge Ferreira Sinde Monteiro, Note under Supremo Tribunal de Justiça Acórdão de 12 de Novembro de 1996, RLJ 131 [1998/99], 48-50 Lena Sisula-Tulokas (ed.), Contract and tort law: twenty cases from Finnish Supreme Court (Helsinki 2001) Lena Sisula-Tulokas, Ersättning för ideell personskada – Norden och utvecklingen i Europa, JFT 2000, 634-651 Karnov, Svensk lagsamling med kommentarer, edited by Birgitta Blom, Anders Eriksson, Johan Hirschfeldt and Jan Ramberg, vol. II: 1487-3000 (Stockholm 2005) quoted here with the commentary of Brottsbalk by Nils Cederstierna, Sven Johannisson, Cecilia Nordenfelt, Nils Rekke, Göran Rosenberg, Göran Rosvall, Hedvig Trost and Josef Zila, 2502-2586 and of Miljöbalk by Bjarne Karlsson, no. 347, 2385 Eva Aaen Skovbo, Erstatning for ophavsretlige krænkelser (Copenhagen 2005) Marcus Smith, The law of assignment: the creation and transfer of choses in action (Oxford 2007) Thomas Broun Smith, A Short Commentary on the Laws of Scotland (Edinburgh 1962) H. J. Snijders and E. B. Rank-Berenschot, Goederenrecht (Deventer 1994) Gerardus Marinus Franciscus Snijders, Produktenrecht, Drie aspecten in Europees perspectief (Deventer 1990) Soergel, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch: mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, etablished by Hans Theodor Soergel, edited by Wolfgang Siebert, vol. XII, book 10: Schuldrecht, §§ 823-853, ProdHG, UmweltHG (13th ed., Stuttgart 2005), quoted here with the commentaries of introduction to § 823, § 823 by Andreas Spickhoff, of § 843 by Axel Beater, of § 908 by Jürgen F. Baur, of § 839 by Harald Vinke; sometimes also quoted from the 12th ed. (Stuttgart 1988) with the commentaries of § 823 by Albrecht Zeuner Josep Solé Feliu, La concurrencia de culpa de la víctima en la jurisprudencia reciente del Tribunal Supremo, ADC 1997 (2), 865-902 Josep Solé Feliu, Los perfiles borrosos de la asunción del riesgo en el Derecho comparado, in: Estudios jurídicos en homenaje al Profesor Luis Díez-Picazo (Festschrift in honour of Luis DíezPicazo), vol. II: Derecho civil, derecho de obligaciones, edited by Antonio Cabanillas Sánchez, Jorge Caffarena Laporta, José María Miquel González, Vicente L. Montés Penadés, Antonio Manuel Morales Moreno, Fernando Pantaleón Prieto (Madrid 2003), 3097-312

1237

Annexes Sottomayor, BFD LXXI (1995), 403 Sourlas, NoB 33 (1985), 728 Sousa Antunes, FS Almeida Costa, 643 Sousa Dinis, CJ (ST) IX (2001-1), 5

Sousa Dinis, RPDC XIII [2004-14], 9 Spier, Schade en loss occurrence-verzekeringen Spier, Schadevergoeding Spier/Hartlief/Van Maanen/ Vriesendorp, Verbintenissen uit de wet en Schadevergoeding (-author)2 Stair, Institutions I5

Staneva, Otgovornost za vredi, prichineni ot deza i nesposobni Stanton, (2004) 120 LQR, 324 Stapleton, (1988) 104 LQR, 213 and 389

Starck/Roland/Boyer, Obligations I5 Stathopoulos, Axiosis adikaiologitou ploutismou Stathopoulos, FS Larenz, 631

Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio A(1)2

1238

Maria Clara Sottomayor, A responsabilidade civil dos pais pelos factos ilícitos praticados pelos filhos menores, BFD, LXXI (1995), 403-468 Pavlos Sourlas, Aposimiosi gia sterisi chriseos pragmatos, NoB 33 (1985), 728-744 Henrique Mário Nunes Sousa Antunes, Ambiente e responsabilidade civil, in: Festschrift in honour of Mário Júlio de Almeida Costa, edited by Júlio Gomes (Lisbon 2002), 643-664 Joaquim José de Sousa Dinis, Dano corporal em acidentes de viação: cálculo da indemnização em situações de morte, incapacidade total e incapacidade parcial; perspectivas futuras, CJ (ST) IX (2001-1) 5-12 Joaquim José de Sousa Dinis, A baremização de dano corporal na responsabilidade civil (excluídos os acidentes laborais), RPDC XIII [2004-14], 9-17 Jaap Spier, Schade en loss occurrence-verzekeringen (Deventer 1999) Jaap Spier, Schadevergoeding: algemeen, deel 3 (Deventer 1992) Jaap Spier, Tom Hartlief, G. E. van Maanen and R. D. Vriesendorp, Verbintenissen uit de wet Schadevergoeding (2nd ed., Deventer 2000)

James Dalrymple Stair, 1st Viscount Stair, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, vol. I, edited by John Schank More (5th ed., Edinburgh 1832) Anna Staneva, Otgovornost za vredi, prichineni ot deza i nesposobni (Sofia 1991) K. M. Stanton, New Forms of the Tort of Breach of Statutory Duty, (2004) 120 LQR, 324-341 Jane Stapleton, The Gist of Negligence, part I: Minimum Actionable Damage, part II: The Relationship between “Damage” and Causation, (1988) 104 LQR, 213-238 and 389-409 Boris Starck, Henri Roland and Laurent Boyer, Obligations, vol. I: Responsabilité délictuelle (5th ed., Paris 1996) Michael Stathopoulos, Axiosis adikaiologitou ploutismou, (Athens 1972) Michael Stathopoulos, Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis zwischen Fahrlässigkeit und Rechtswidrigkeit im Zivilrecht, in: Festschrift in honour of Karl Larenz, edited by Claus-Wilhelm Canaris and Uwe Diederichsen (Munich 1983), 631-647 Michael Stathopoulos, Geniko Enochiko Dikaio, vol. A 1 (2nd ed., Athens 1993)

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Staudinger (-author), BGB13, 14

Stenvik, TfR 2003, 601 Stewart, Delict3, 4

Stijns, Les contrats et les tiers, 189 Stillfried and Stockenhuber, WBl 1995, 301 and 345 Stolker, AA 1995, 13 Stolker, RM-Themis 1988, 3 Street (-Brazier and Murphy), Torts10 Strömholm, Right to Privacy and Rights of Personality Strömholm, SvJT 1971, 695 Swahn and Wendleby, Lagen om finansiell rådgivning till konsumenter Szalma, Okozatosság és polgári jogi felelo˝sség Szécsényi, ZfRV 1999, 175 Szpunar, Odszkodowanie za szkode˛ maja˛tkowa˛ Szpunar, Rejent no. 2001 (6), 13 Szpunar, Zados´c´ uczynienie

Julius von Staudinger’s Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, book 2: Recht der Schuldverhältnisse, §§ 249-254 (revised ed., Berlin 2005), book 2: Recht der Schuldverhältnisse, §§ 823-825 (revised ed., Berlin 1999), book 2: Recht der Schuldverhältnisse, §§ 840-853 (revised ed., Berlin 2007), quoted here with the commentaries of introduction to §§ 823 ff, § 823 by Johannes Hager, §§ 249, 254 by Gottfried Schiemann, Vorb. vor §§ 677 ff. by Andreas Bergmann, § 276 by Manfred Löwisch, § 843 by Klaus Vieweg, § 1004 by Karl-Heinz Gursky, § 611 by Reinhard Richardi, book 2: Recht der Schuldverhältnisse, §§ 830-838 (revised ed., Berlin 2002), quoted here with the commentary of § 830 by Detlev W. Belling and Christina Eberl-Borges Are Stenvik, Rettsbeskyttelse av personlig særpreg, TfR 2003, 601-647 William J. Stewart, Delict and related obligations (4th ed., Edinburgh 2004), sometimes also quoted from the 3rd ed. (Edinburgh 1998) Sophie Stijns, Les contrats et les tiers, in: Patrick Wéry (ed.), Le droit des obligations contractuelles et le bicentenaire du Code civil (Brussels 2004), 189-239 Georg Stillfried and Peter Stockenhuber, Schadenersatz bei Verstoß gegen das Kartelverbot des Art. 85 EG-V, WBl 1995, 301-308 (part 1) and 345-352 (part 2) C.J.J.M. Stolker, Aansprakelijkheid voor beroepsfouten – van droom – nachtmerrie, AA 1995, 13-25 Carel Stolker, Besef als vereiste voor vergoeding van immateriële schade, RM-Themis 1988, 3-29 Margaret Brazier and John Murphy, established by Harry Street, The law of torts. Street on torts (10th ed., London 1999) Stig Strömholm, Right to Privacy and Rights of Personality (Stockholm 1967) Stig Strömholm, Integritetsskydd. Ett försök till internationell lägesbestämning, SvJT 1971, 695-736 Mikael Swahn and Björn Wendleby, Lagen om finansiell rådgivning till konsumenter: en kommentar (Stockholm 2005) József Szalma, Okozatosság és polgári jogi felelo˝sség – az európai és magyar jogban (Miskolc 2000) László Szécsényi, Grundzüge des ungarischen Deliktsrechts, ZfRV 1999, 175-184 Adam Szpunar, Odszkodowanie za szkode˛ maja˛tkowa˛. Szkoda na mieniu i osobie (Bydgoszcz 1998) Adam Szpunar, Przyczynienie sie˛ do powstania szkody w wypadu komunikacyjnym, Rejent 2001, no. 6, 13 Adam Szpunar, Zados´c´ uczynienie za szkode˛ niemaja˛tkowa˛ (Bydgoszcz 1999)

1239

Annexes Taipale, Accept af risiko, 375

Takoff, Obzor na deliktnoto pravo na Bulgaria

Tammiste, Juridica 2004, 129 Tammiste, Juridica 2005, 385

Tampuu, Juridica 2003, 161 Tampuu, Juridica 2003, 464 Tampuu, Juridica 2003, 71 Taschner, NJW 1986, 611 Tassev, Nepozvoleno uvrejdane Taxell, JFT 1944, 367 Terré/Simler/Lequette, Les obligations8, 9 Tettenborn, [2007] LMCLQ 392 Thomson, (2005) SLT, 121 Thomson, Delictual Liability3 Tilleman and Claeys (-author), Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid

TKKST 1987-88, 19 636 TKKST 1988-1989, 21 202 TKKST 2003-2004, 28 781

1240

Erkki-Juhani Taipale, Accept af risiko (risikoovertagelse) og samtykke som civil- og strafferetlig problem, in: Forhandlingerne på det 32. nordiske juristmøde, Reykjavik 22.-24. august 1990 (Reykjavik 1990), 375-386 Christian Takoff Obzor na deliktnoto pravo na Bulgaria, Bulgarian online version of Christian Takoff, Bulgaria, in: Helmut Koziol and Barbara C. Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 2005, Tort and Insurance Law Yearbook (Vienna 2005), 614-649; see (http://www.geocities.com/christian_takoff/Articles.htm) Heleri Tammiste, Non-proprietary Damage in the Estonian Case Law, Juridica 2004, 129-141 (in Estonian) Heleri Tammiste, Compensating Purely Economic Damage Caused by an Erroneous Opinion of an Expert, Juridica 2005, 385-395 (in Estonian) Tambet Tampuu, Strict Liability and Producer’s Liability in the Law of Obligations Act, Juridica 2003, 161-168 (in Estonian) Tambet Tampuu, Delict Law Liability for Damage Caused by another Person, Juridica 2003, 464-474 (in Estonian) Tambet Tampuu, Tort law in the Law of Obligations Act: general problems and liability, Juridica 2003, 71-82 (in Estonian) Hans Claudius Taschner, Die künftige Produzentenhaftung in Deutschland, NJW 1986, 611-616 Simeon Tassev, Nepozvoleno uvrejdane: otgovornost za vredi, prichineni ot veshti i jivotni (1st ed., Sofia 1995) Lars Erik Taxell, Till frågan om skadelidandens medverkan i utomobligatoriskt skadeförorsakande, JFT 1944, 367-387 François Terré, Philippe Simler and Yves Lequette, Les obligations (9th ed., Paris 2005) sometimes also quoted from the 8th ed. (Paris 2002) Andrew Tettenborn, Assignment of rights to compensation, [2007] LMCLQ 392-408 E. A. C. Thomson, Nasciturus and Delict – Born Yesterday?, (2005) SLT, 121-126 Joe Thomson, Delictual Liability (3rd ed., Edinburgh 2004) Bernard Tilleman and Ignace Claeys (eds.), Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid, Die Keure (Brugge 2004), quoted here with the contributions: “Responsabilité du fait d’autrui” by Jean-Luc Fagnart, 169-211, “Fout, overmacht en rechtvaardigingsgronden. Zoveel hoofden” by Ignace Claeys, 1-42 and Frederiek Baudoncq and Maarten Debeane, ”De aansprakelijkheid voor zaken in het licht van artikel 1384”, 83-124, lid 1 B.W. Tweede Kamer vergaderjaar1987-1988, Kamerstukken nr. 19 636 (The Hague 1988) Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1988-1989, Kamerstukken nr. 21 202 (The Hague 1989) Tweede Kamer vergaderjaar 2003-2004, Kamerstukken nr. 28 781 (The Hague 2004)

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Tomkin and Hanafin, Irish Medical Law Toulson and Phipps, Confidentiality2 Toussis, Empragmaton Dikaion4 Trimarchi, L’arricchimento senza causa Trimarchi, Riv.Dir.Civ. 1983, I, 217 Trolle, Risiko & Skyld2 Trstenjak, WGO 2002, 90 Truli, Dienstleistungshaftung

Turton, (2008) 71 MLR 1009 Tzachev, Zakon za zaduljeniyata i dogovorite I2 Ujváriné, Felelo˝sségtan7 Ulfbeck, Erstatningsretlige grænseområder Ulfbeck, Kontrakters relativitet Ussing, Erstatningsret Ussing, Retstridighed

Vael, TPR 1999, 79 van Dam, Smartengeld voor affectieschade en shockschade, 6

van Dam, VR 2005, 301 Van de Gehuchte, De aansprakelijkheid voor produkten van Gerven (-author), Verbintenissenrecht II7

David Tomkin and Patrick Hanafin, Irish Medical Law (Dublin 1995) Roger G. Toulson and Charles M. Phipps, Confidentiality (2nd ed., London 2006) Andreas Toussis, Empragmaton Dikaion (4th ed., Athens 1988) Pietro Trimarchi, L’arricchimento senza causa (Milan 1962) Pietro Trimarchi, Sulla responsabilità del terzo per pregiudizio al diritto di credito, Riv.Dir.Civ. 1983, I, 217-236 Jørgen Trolle, Risiko & skyld i erstatningspraxis (2nd ed., Copenhagen 1969) Verica Trstenjak, Das neue slowenische Obligationenrecht, WGO 2002, 90-110 Emmanuela Truli, Probleme und Entwicklungen der Dienstleistungshaftung im griechischen, deutschen und Gemeinschaftsrecht (Berlin 2001) Gemma Turton, Defining Damage in the House of Lords (2008) 71 MLR 1009-1014 Lubomir Tzachev, Zakon za zaduljeniyata i dogovorite, Tekst, sudebna praktika, literatura i kratki belejki, vol. I (2nd ed., Sofia 1991) Edit Ujváriné Antal, Magyar polgári jog, Felelo˝sségtan (7th ed., Miskolc 2002) Vibe Ulfbeck, Erstatningsretlige grænseområder professionsansvar og produktansvar (Copenhagen 2004) Vibe Ulfbeck, Kontrakters relativitet: det direkte ansvar i formueretten (Copenhagen 2000) Henry Ussing, Erstatningsret (Copenhagen 1937) Henry Ussing, Retstridighed. Strejflys over nordisk retslaere (Copenhagen 1949) Luc Vael, Altruïsme tot recht gekomen (1), TPR 1999, 79-129 Cornelis Christiaan van Dam, Smartengeld voor affectieschade en shockschade, in: Smartengeld: uitspraken van de Nederlandse rechter over de vergoeding van immateriële schade, verzameld en bewerkt door Marijke Jansen (ed.) (15th ed., The Hague 2003), 6-16 M. van Dam, De betrokkenheid bij een verkeersongeval in de zin van artikel 185 WVW, VR 2005, 301-306 Dirk Van de Gehuchte, De aansprakelijkheid voor produkten: de aansprakelijkheid ten opzichte van de consument voor onveilige produkten (Deurne 1992) Walter van Gerven, Verbintenissenrecht, vol. II: Verbintenissen uit de wet (7th ed., Leuven 2000)

1241

Annexes van Gerven and Covemaeker, Verbintenissenrecht2 van Neste, Eigendom, toch meer dan een zakelijk recht, 511 van Schellen, Toerekening naar redelijkheid van Wassenaer, Eigen Schuld Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne /Wynant/ Debaene, TPR 2000, 1551 Vandenberghe/Van Quickenborne/Geelen/ De Coster, TPR 1987, 1255 Vandeputte, Het aquiliaans foutbegrip Vansweevelt, De civielrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid van de geneesheer en het ziekenhuis Vaquer Aloy, La Ley 2001, I, 1632 Vasconcelos Abreu, FS Magalhães Collaço II, 458

Vasconcelos Casimiro, A responsabilidade civil pelo conteúdo da informação Vavouskos, FS MichaelidesNouaros I, 87 Vavouskos, I paraleipsis os simiogono gegonos eis ta adikimata tou Astikou Dikaiou

1242

Walter van Gerven and Sofie Covemaeker, Verbintenissenrecht (2nd ed., Leuven 2006) Fernand van Neste, Eigendom, toch meer dan een zakelijk recht, in: Het zakenrecht, absoluut niet een rustig bezit; XVIII8 Postuniversitaire Cyclus Willy Delva 1991–1992 (Antwerp 1992), 511–538 Jan van Schellen, Toerekening naar redelijkheid, naar huidig en komend recht, Studiepockets privaatrecht nr. 35 (Zwolle 1985) Arent Jacob Otto Baron van Wassenaer van Catwijck, Eigen Schuld (Groningen 1971) Hugo Vandenberghe, Marc Van Quickenborne, Luc Wynant and Maarten Debaene, Overzicht van rechtspraak. Aansprakelijkheid uit onerechtmatige daad 1994-1999, TPR 2000, 1551-1955 Hugo Vandenberghe, Marc Van Quickenborne, Koen Geelen and Steven De Coster, Overzicht van rechtspraak (1979-1984). Aansprakelijkheid uit onrechtmatige daad, TPR 1987, 1255-1615 Robert Vandeputte, Het aquiliaans foutbegrip (Antwerp 1983) Thierry Vansweevelt, De civielrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid van de geneesheer en het ziekenhuis (Antwerp a.o. 1992)

Antoni Vaquer Aloy, La responsabilidad civil en la Ley Orgánica de responsabilidad penal de los menores: una propuesta de interpretación, La Ley 2001, I, 1632-1638 Luís Vasconcelos Abreu, A violação de direitos de personalidade pela comunicação social e as funções da responsabilidade civil. Recentes desenvolvimentos jurisprudenciais. Uma breve comparação Luso-Alemã, in: Festschrift in honour of Isabel de Magalhães Collaço, vol. II, edited by Rui Manuel de Moura Ramos, Carlos Ferreira de Almeida, António Marques dos Santos, Pedro Pais de Vasconcelos, Luís de Lima Pinheiro, Maria Helena Brito and Dário Moura Vicente (Coimbra 2002), 458-475 Sofia de Vasconcelos Casimiro, A responsabilidade civil pelo conteúdo da informação transmitida pela Internet (Coimbra 2000) Konstantinos Vavouskos, I adikos astiki praxis eis tin synchroni epistimi kai nomologia, in: Festschrift in honour of Georges Michaelides-Nouaros, vol. I (Athens 1987), 87-109 Konstantin Vavouskos, I paraleipsis os simiogono gegonos eis ta adikimata tou Astikou Dikaiou. Simvoli eis tin ermineian ton arthron 914 kai 919 AK (Athens 1954)

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Vaz Rodrigues, O consentimento informado para o acto médico Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 101 (1960) 15 and 163 Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 68 (1957) 13 Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 72 (1958) 259 Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 74 (1958) 333 Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 82 (1959) 5 Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 83 (1959) 69 Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 84 (1959) 5

Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 85 (1959) 115 Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 85 (1959) 13 Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 85 (1959) 345 Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 85 (1959) 381 Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 86 (1959) 2 Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 90 (1959) 5 Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 92 (1960) 139

Vaz Serra, BolMinJus 93 (1960) 5 Vaz Serra, RLJ 105 [1972], 5 Vaz Serra, RLJ 111 [1978/1979], 276 Vaz Serra, RLJ 113 [1980/1981], 322

João Vaz Rodrigues, O consentimento informado para o acto médico no ordenamento jurídico português (elementos para o estudo da manifestação da vontade do paciente) (Coimbra 2001) Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, Direito das obrigações (Parte resumida) and Direito das obrigações (Parte extensa), BolMinJus 101 (1960), 15-161 and 163-408 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, Culpa do devedor ou de agente, BolMinJus 68 (1957), 13-149 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, Responsabilidade do devedor pelos factos dos auxiliares, dos representantes legais ou dos substitutos, BolMinJus 72 (1958), 259-305 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, Efeitos dos contratos (princípios gerais), BolMinJus 74 (1958), 333-368 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, Enriquecimento sem causa (Continação), BolMinJus 82 (1959), 5-287 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, Reparação do dano não patrimonial, BolMinJus 83 (1959), 69-109 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, Obrigação de indemnização (Colocação. Fontes. Conceito e espécies de dano. Nexo causal. Extensão do dever de indemnizar. Espécies de indemnização). Direito de abstenção e de remoção, BolMinJus 84 (1959), 5-301 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, Responsabilidade contratual e responsabilidade extracontratual, BolMinJus 85 (1959), 115-239 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, Causas justificativas do facto danoso, BolMinJus 85 (1959), 13-113 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, Responsabilidade de terceiros no não-cumpimento de obrigações, BolMinJus 85 (1959), 345-360 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, Responsabilidade de pessoas obrigadas a vigilância, BolMinJus 85 (1959), 381-444 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, Responsabilidade pelos danos causados por animais, BolMinJus 86 (1959), 21-99 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, Fundamento da responsabilidade civil (em especial, responsabilidade por acidentes de viação terrestre e por intervenções lícitas), BolMinJus 90 (1959), 5-31 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, Responsabiblidade pelos danos causados por instalações de energia eléctrica ou gás e por produção e emprego de energia nuclear, BolMinJus 92 (1960), 139-157 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, Algumas questões em matéria de responsabilidade civil, BolMinJus 93 (1960), 5-77 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, Prescrição e caducidade, RLJ 105 [1972], 5-248 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, note under STJ 09.3.1987, RLJ 111 [1978/1979], 276-283 Adriano Paes da Silva Vaz Serra, note under STJ 22.1.1980, RLJ 113 [1980-1981], 322-328

1243

Annexes Vegter, NJB 2002, 1935

Vékás (-author), Szakérto˝i Javaslat az új Polgári Törvénykönyv tervezetéhez Vékás, FS Boytha György, 331

Verheij, NTBR 1998, 324 Verheij, Vergoeding van immateriële schade Verkade, FS van der Grinten, 561

Verlinden, Twintig jaar productaansprakelijkheid, 29 Verougstraete, Praktijken strijdig met de eerlijke gebruiken, 129

Vicente Domingo, El daño1, 3

Vicente Domingo, Los daños corporales Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten5 Vinding Kruse, Restitutioner

Viney and Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité2, 3 Viney and Jourdain, Les effets de la responsabilité2 Viney, Introduction à la responsabilité2

1244

Marlies S. A. Vegter, Aansprakelijkheid, van de werkgever voor overbelasting (stress) en andere vormen van psychisch letsel, NJB 2002, 1935-1942 Lajos Vékás, Szakérto˝i Javaslat az új Polgári Törvénykönyv tervezetéhez (Budapest 2008) quoted here with the commentaries by Lajos Vékás and István Gardós Lajos Vékás, Sérelemdíj – fájdalomdíj: Gondolatok az új Ptk. reformjavaslatáról a német jog újabb fejleményei tükrében, in: Festschrift in honour of Boytha György (Budapest 2004), 331-358 A. J. Verheij, Vergoeding van affectieschade, NTBR 1998, 324-332 A. J. Verheij, Vergoeding van immateriële schade wegens aantasting in de persoon (Amsterdam 2002) D. W. F. Verkade, Aangepaste veroordelingen, in: Festschrift in honour of Willem Christiaan Leonard van der Grinten edited by E. A. A. Luijten, J. M. M. Maeijer, A. V. M. Struycken and H. J. M. N. Honée (Zwolle 1984), 561-576 Joost Verlinden, Twintig jaar productaansprakelijkheid. Een stand van zaken, in: Maarten Debaene and Paul Soens (eds.), Aansprakelijkheidsrecht. Actuele tendensen (Brussels 2005), 29-66 Ivan Verougstraete, Praktijken strijdig met de eerlijke gebruiken, in: Jules Stuyck and Peter Wytinck (ed.), De nieuwe wet handelspraktijken: wet van 14 juli 1991 betreffende de handelspraktijken en de voorlichting en bescherming van de consument (Brussels 1992), 129-147 Elena Vicente Domingo, El daño, in: Luis Fernando Reglero Campos (coord.), Tratado de responsabilidad civil (3rd ed., Navarra 2006), 249-337, sometimes also quoted from the 1st ed. (Navarra 2002), 201-283 Elena Vicente Domingo, Los daños corporales: tipología y valoracion (Barcelona 1994) Anders Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsretten (5th ed., Copenhagen 1989) Anders Vinding Kruse, Restitutioner. Et Bidrag til Undersøgelsen af Berigelsesgrundsætningen i dansk og fremmed Ret (Copenhagen 1950) Geneviève Viney and Patrice Jourdain, Les conditions de la responsabilité (2nd ed., Paris 1998 and 3rd ed., Paris 2006), in: Jacques Ghestin (director), Traité de droit civil: Les Obligations Geneviève Viney and Patrice Jourdain, Les effets de la responsabilité (2nd ed., Paris 2001), in: Jacques Ghestin (director), Traité de droit civil: Les Obligations Geneviève Viney, Introduction à la responsabilité (2nd ed., Paris 1995), in: Jacques Ghestin (director), Traité de droit civil: Les Obligations

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form Viney, L’indemnisation des victimes d’accidents de la circulation Visintini and Cabella-Pisu, L’inadempimento delle obbligazioni IX(1)2 Visintini, I fatti illeciti I2, II2, III

Visintini, Trattato breve della responsabilità civile von Bar and Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law in Europe von Bar and Mankowski, Internationales Privatrecht I2 von Bar, Common European Law of Torts I, II

von Bar, Essays in Honour of Lord Goff of Chieveley, 23 von Bar, FS Deutsch, 27

von Bar, FS Egon Lorenz, 73

von Bar, FS Sturm, 1151

von Bar, Verkehrspflichten

von Bar, ZEuP 2000, 119

Geneviève Viney, L’indemnisation des victimes d’accidents de la circulation (Paris 1992) Giovanna Visintini and Luciana Cabella-Pisu, L’inadempimento delle obbligazioni, Trattato di diritto privato diretto da Rescigno, vol. IX: Obbligazioni e contratti, part 1 (2nd ed., Turin 1999, reprint 2002) Giovanna Visintini, I fatti illeciti, vol. I: Ingiustizia del danno. Imputabilitá (2nd ed., Padua 1997), vol. II: L’imputabilità e la colpa in rapporto agli altri criteri di imputazione della responsabilità (2nd ed., Padua 1998), vol. III: Causalità e danno (Padua 1999) Giovanna Visintini, Trattato breve della responsabilità civile: fatti illeciti, inadempimento, danno risarcibile (Padua 2005) Christian von Bar and Ulrich Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law in Europe (Munich 2004)

Christian von Bar and Peter Mankowski, Internationales Privatrecht, vol. I: Allgemeine Lehren (2nd ed., Munich 2003) Christian von Bar, The common European law of torts, vol. I: The core areas of tort law, its approximation in Europe, and its accomodation in the legal system (Oxford 1998), vol. II: Damage and damages, liability for and without personal misconduct, causality, and defences (Munich 2000) Christian von Bar, Damage without Loss, The Search for Principle, in: Essays in Honour of Lord Goff of Chieveley (Oxford 2000), 23-43 Christian von Bar, Schmerzensgeld in Europa, in: Festschrift in honour of Erwin Deutsch, edited by Hans-Jürgen Ahrens, Christian von Bar, Gerfried Fischer, Andreas Spickhoff and Jochen Taupitz (Cologne 1999), 27-43 Christian von Bar, Die Billigkeitshaftung in den kontinentalen Rechten der Europäischen Union, in: Recht und Ökonomie der Versicherung, Festschrift in honour of Egon Lorenz, edited by Ulrich Hübner (Karlsruhe 1994), 73-93 Christian von Bar, Der deliktsrechtliche Lebensschutz in Europa, in: Festschrift in honour of Fritz Sturm, edited by Editions Juridiques de la Faculté de Droit de Liège (Liège 1999), 1151-1163 Christian von Bar, Verkehrspflichten. Richterliche Gefahrsteuerungsgebote im deutschen Deliktsrecht (Cologne 1980) Christian von Bar, Wrongful life in Frankreich – Neue Urteile der französischen Cour de Cassation, ZEuP 2000, 119-124

1245

Annexes von Eyben and Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret5, 6 von Gerlach, VersR 2002, 917

von Lersner/Berendes/ Reinhardt (-author), Handbuch des Deutschen Wasserrechts von Zeiller, Commentar zum ABGB III

Vorwerk, ZIP 2005, 1157 Vranken, NedJur 2004, no. 112, 891 Vrellis, in: von Bar [ed.], Deliktsrecht in Europa

Wagner, JZ 2004, 319

Wagner, VersR 2005, 177 Walker, Delict2 Weir, [1999] CLJ, 643

Welser and Rabl, Produkthaftungsgesetz2 Welser, Die Haftung für Rat, Auskunft und Gutachten Werlauff, J 2002, 1 Weyts, RW 1998/99, 930

White and Fletcher, Delictual Damages

1246

Bo von Eyben and Helle Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret (6th ed., Copenhagen 2007), sometimes also quoted from the 5th ed. (Copenhagen 2003) Jürgen von Gerlach, Gewinnherausgabe bei Persönlichkeitsverletzungen nach schweizerischem Vorbild?, VersR 2002, 917-927 Heinrich Freiherr von Lersner, Konrad Berendes, Michael Reinhardt (eds.), Handbuch des Deutschen Wasserrechts (HDW), Neues Recht des Bundes und der Länder established by Alexander Wüsthoff and Walther Kumpf, Loose-leaf (Berlin 1958) Franz von Zeiller, Commentar über das Allgemeine bürgerliche Gesetzbuch für die gesammten Deutschen Erbländer der Oesterreichischen Monarchie, Commentar III (Vienna and Trieste 1812) Volkert Vorwerk, Unberechtigte Schutzrechtsverwarnung auf dem Prüfstand, ZIP 2005, 1157-1164 J. B. M. Vranken, Smartengeld en bewusteloosheid (Note under Hoge 20 September 2002), NedJur 2004, no. 112, 891-893 Spyridon Vrellis, Landesbericht Griechenland, in: Christian von Bar (ed.) in cooperation with Helmut Grothe and Andreas Spickhoff, Deliktsrecht in Europa (Cologne a.o. 1993) Gerhard Wagner, Ersatz immaterieller Schäden: Bestandsaufnahme und europäische Perspektiven, JZ 2004, 319-331 Gerhard Wagner, Die gemeinschaftsrechtliche Umwelthaftung aus der Sicht des Zivilrechts, VersR 2005, 177-189 David M. Walker, The law of delict in Scotland (2nd ed., Edinburgh 1981) Tony Weir, Book Reviews: The Limits of Liability: Keeping the Foodgates Shut. Edited by J. Spier (The Hague a. o. 1996), The Limits of Expanding Liability: Eight Fundamental Cases in a Comperative Perspective. Edited by J. Spier (The Hague a. o. 1998), Unification of Tort Law: Wrongfulness. Edited by H. Koziol (The Hague a. o. 1998) [1999] CLJ, 643-645 Rudolf Welser and Christian Rabl, Produkthaftungsgesetz: Kommentar (2nd ed., Vienna 2004) Rudolf Welser, Die Haftung für Rat, Auskunft und Gutachten (Vienna 1983) Erik Werlauff, Ytringsbegrep og ytringsingreb – hensyn, modhensyn og proportionalitet efter EMK, J 2002, 1-19 Britt Weyts, De toepassingsvoorwaarden van art. 1385 B.W. en de bewaring van een ontsnapt of verdwaald dier, noot onder Vred. Wolvertem, 13 februari 1997, RW 1998/99, 930-934 Robin M. White and Michael J. Fletcher, Delictual damages (Edinburgh 2000)

Table of Literature Cited in Abbreviated Form White, Irish Law of Damages Wiercin´ ski, Niemaja˛tkowa ochrona czci Winfield and Jolowicz (-author), Tort14-16

Wirth, Das neue Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs in Spanien

Yap, (2008) 28 Legal Studies, 197 Yzquierdo Tolsada, Aspectos civiles del nuevo Código Penal Yzquierdo Tolsada, Daños a los derechos de la personalidad1, 3

Yzquierdo Tolsada, La responsabilidad civil del profesional liberal Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil Zenati and Revet, Les biens2 Zepos, Enochikon Dikaion II(2) Zinnen/Pretto/Janssen/ Meilhac-Redon/Pasa/Ebers/ Arroyo i Amayuelas/ Michalowska, ERPL 3/2003, 412 Ziviz, Resp.civ. e prev. 2006, 641 Ziviz, Resp.civ. e prev. 2007, 517

John P. M. White, Irish Law of Damages for Personal Injuries and Death (Dublin, 1989) Jacek Wiercin´ ski, Niemaja˛tkowa ochrona czci (Warsaw 2002) Percy Henry Winfield (establ.), John Anthony Jolowicz and William Vaughan Horton Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on tort (16th ed., London 2002), sometimes also quoted from the 14th /15th ed. (London 1994/1998) Andreas Wirth, Das neue Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs in Spanien: eine Darstellung des Gesetzes 3/1991 über unlauteren Wettbewerb mit rechtsvergleichenden Bezügen (Frankfurt on the Main 1996) Po Jen Yap, Enlisting close connections: a matter of course for vicarious liability, (2008) 28 Legal Studies 197-214 Mariano Yzquierdo Tolsada, Aspectos civiles del nuevo Código Penal (Responsabilidad civil, tutela del derecho de crédito, aspectos de Derecho de familia y otros extremos) (Madrid 1997) Mariano Yzquierdo Tolsada, Daños a los derechos de la personalidad (honor, intimidad y propia imagen), in: Luis Fernando Reglero Campos (coord.), Tratado de responsabilidad civil (3rd ed., Navarra 2006), 1333-1423, sometimes also quoted from the 1st ed. (Navarra 2002), 1107-1174 Mariano Yzquierdo Tolsada, La responsabilidad civil del profesional liberal (Madrid 1989) Mariano Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, contractual y extracontractual (Madrid 2001) Frédéric Zenati and Thierry Revet, Les biens (2nd ed., Paris 1997) Panagiotis Zepos, Enochikon Dikaion, vol. II, part 2 (2nd ed., Athens 1955) Horst Zinnen, Arianna Pretto, André Janssen, Gaelle Meilhac-Redon, Barbara Pasa, Martin Ebers, Esther Arroyo i Amayuelas and Katarzyna Michalowska, Hoge Raad, Judgment of 22 February 2002 – On compensation for psychiatric injury and emotional distress suffered by close relatives, ERPL 3/2003, 412-476 Patrizia Ziviz, La valutazione del danno biologico nel nuovo codice delle assicurazioni, Resp.civ. e prev. 2006, 641-646 Patrizia Ziviz, Lo spettro die danni bagatellari, Resp.civ. e prev. 2007, 517-528

1247

Index abandonment

Art. 3:202 Com. B 21; Art. 3:208 Com. A 1 et seq. animals Art. 3:208 Com. B 3 disposal of things / Art. 3:208 Com. A 2 substances return of property Art. 3:208 Com. A 2 unintended loss Art. 3:208 Com. A 2 absolute rights Introd. Ch. 1, C 16; Art. 1:101 Notes, III 16; Art. 2:101 Com. B 9; Art. 2:101 Com. C 12; Art. 2:101 Notes, VII 57 impending damage Art. 1:102 Com. C 10 specific absolute rights Art. 1:102 Notes, I 3 abuse of dominant Art. 2:208 Com. A 4 positions acceptance of risk See acting at own risk access provider Art. 2:204 Notes, IV 37; Art. 2:204 Notes, IV 39 accessories Art. 4:102 Com. A 2; Art. 4:102 Com. A 9 solidary liability Art. 4:102 Com. A 4; Art. 6:105 Com. A 4 accidents, first aid Art. 3:102 Com. B 16 accidents at work Art. 3:102 Com. A 1 accomplices Art. 4:102 Com. A 1 solidary liability Art. 4:102 Com. A 1; Art. 6:105 Com. A 4 accountability Introd. Ch. 1, C 17; Introd. Ch. 1, C 19; Introd. Ch. 1, C 21 et seq.; Art. 1:101 Com. A 9; Art. 1:101 Com. A 17; Art. 1:103 Com. A 1; Art. 1:103 Com. E 14; Introd. Ch. 2, A 2; Introd. Ch. 3, E 18; Art. 3:207 Com. A 1 burden of proof Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 32 grounds of Art. 1:101 Com. A 6; accountability Art. 1:101 Com. A 8 et seq.; Art. 1:101 Com. A 14 et seq.; Art. 3:101 Com. A 1; Art. 3:102 Com. A 1; Art. 3:103 Com. A 1

intention

legally relevant damage negligence

Art. 1:101 Com. A 6; Art. 1:101 Com. A 8; Introd. Ch. 3, A 2 Art. 3:207 Com. A 3

Art. 1:101 Com. A 6; Art. 1:101 Com. A 8; Art. 3:102 Com. A 1; Introd. Ch. 3, A 2 prevention Art. 1:102 Com. D 14 property right, Art. 2:206 Com. A 2 infringement of source of danger Art. 1:101 Com. A 6; Art. 1:101 Com. A 8 without intention Introd. Ch. 3, A 2; Introd. Ch. 3, E 18; Art. 3:207 Com. A 1 et seq. without negligence Introd. Ch. 3, A 2; Introd. Ch. 3, E 18; Art. 3:207 Com. A 1 et seq. acquisition of Introd. Ch. 1, D 33; ownership Art. 2:206 Com. B 9 in good faith gross negligence Art. 2:206 Com. B 10 negligence Art. 2:206 Com. B 9 et seq. property right, Art. 2:206 Com. E 25 infringement of stolen goods Art. 2:206 Com. B 10 act, positive Art. 1:101 Com. A 10; Art. 1:101 Com. A 14 acting at own risk Art. 3:203 Com. A 4; Art. 5:101 Com. B 7; Art. 5:101 Com. C 15 et seq.; Art. 5:101 Com. C 16; Art. 5:101 Notes, II 14; Art. 5:103 Com. 1; Art. 5:401 Com. B 11 acceptance of risk Art. 5:101 Com. B 9; Art. 5:101 Com. C 18 animals, liability for Art. 5:101 Com. C 15 combat sports Art. 5:101 Com. C 16 contributory fault Art. 5:101 Com. C 16

1249

actio de dolo damage of the type caused economic loss inattention leisure activities martial arts personal injury product liability property damage sporting exercise governed by rules sports, dangerous third party claims, exclusion of unsafe condition of land vehicle liability voluntary exposure to risk actio de dolo

Index Art. 5:101 Com. C 17 Art. 5:101 Com. C 17 Art. 5:101 Com. B 9 Art. 5:101 Com. C 18 Art. 5:101 Com. C 15 Art. 5:101 Com. C 17 Art. 5:101 Com. C 15 Art. 5:101 Com. C 17 Art. 5:101 Com. C 18 Art. 5:101 Com. C 15 Art. 5:501 Com. 2 Art. 5:101 Com. C 15 Art. 5:101 Com. C 15 Art. 5:101 Com. C 18

Art. 2:210 Com. A 1; Art. 2:211 Com. A 1 Acts in the strict sense Art. 7:102 Notes, 1 adjunctive proceedings Introd. Ch. 1, D 26 adolescents Introd. Ch. 3, E 21 mental disability Art. 3:103 Com. E 13 adoptive parents parental care Art. 3:104 Com. B 6 adultery inducement to commit Art. 2:211 Com. B 8 adultery adventure playground Art. 3:202 Com. B 13 advice, incorrect Art. 2:204 Com. E 17; Art. 2:207 Com. A 1; Art. 2:207 Com. B 5 accountability Art. 2:207 Com. D 9; Art. 2:207 Com. D 11 causation Art. 2:207 Com. D 10 foreseeability of Art. 2:207 Com. C 8 reasonable reliance professional advice Art. 2:207 Com. B 5 reliance on incorrect Art. 2:207 Com. A 1; advice Art. 2:207 Com. C 7; Art. 2:210 Com. A 2 et seq. aeroplanes Art. 3:205 Com. B 8 age limit (children) Art. 3:104 Com. B 5 aggravated damages product liability Art. 3:204 Com. A 6

1250

agreements on liability

Art. 5:401 Com. A 1; Art. 5:401 Com. A 4 standard terms Art. 5:401 Com. A 4; Art. 5:401 Com. B 10; Art. 5:401 Com. C 12 unilaterally imparted Art. 5:401 Com. A 5 items of information agricultural products, primary product liability Art. 3:204 Com. A 7 aiders Art. 4:102 Com. A 2 AIDS infection Art. 2:201 Com. B 9 air carriers’ liability Introd. Ch. 3, D 17 aircraft, damage Art. 3:207 Com. B 5 caused by alcohol Art. 3:206 Com. B 9 alcoholic, deficiency Art. 5:301 Com. B 4 of insight alternative causes Art. 4:101 Com. A 10; Art. 4:103 Com. 1 et seq.; Art. 6:105 Com. A 4 burden of proof Art. 4:103 Com. 3 chain of causation Art. 4:103 Com. 1 contributory fault of Art. 4:103 Com. 6 the injured person defences Art. 4:103 Com. 6 multiple occurrences Art. 4:102 Com. A 3; Art. 4:103 Com. 5 strict liability Art. 4:102 Com. A 3 amenity, loss of Art. 2:101 Com. F 35 anatomical Art. 2:202 Com. D 10 et seq. damage anger Art. 2:101 Com. F 30 animal Art. 3:203 Com. B 5 animal transports Art. 3:102 Com. B 16 animals Introd. Ch. 3, E 27; see also damage caused by animals abandonment Art. 3:208 Com. B 3 bacteria Art. 3:203 Com. B 5 business purposes Art. 3:203 Com. A 1 contract for the care Art. 3:203 Com. A 3 of the animal domestic animals Art. 3:203 Com. A 1; Art. 6:101 Com. E 13 economic total loss Art. 6:101 Com. E 13 foreign species Art. 3:203 Com. A 1 household pets Art. 3:203 Com. A 1 injured animals Art. 6:101 Com. B 5

Index insects keeper; kept animals

Austria Art. 3:203 Com. B 5 see keeper of an animal Art. 3:203 Com. A 2; Art. 3:203 Com. B 8 Art. 3:203 Com. A 3

legally relevant damage liability Art. 3:203 Com. A 3 micro-organisms Art. 3:203 Com. B 5 native species Art. 3:203 Com. A 1 one animal injuring Art. 3:203 Com. A 4 another ownership Art. 3:203 Com. B 9 purpose for which Art. 6:101 Com. E 13 they are kept strict liability Art. 3:203 Com. A 1 veterinary treatment Art. 6:101 Com. E 13 viruses Art. 3:203 Com. B 5 wild animals Art. 3:203 Com. A 1 et seq.; Art. 3:203 Com. B 9; Art. 3:208 Com. B 3 annoyance Art. 2:101 Com. A 2; Art. 2:101 Com. F 30 annuity Art. 6:203 Com. 1 combination with Art. 6:203 Com. 4 lump sum death Art. 6:203 Com. 3 economic damage Art. 6:203 Com. 4 personal injury Art. 6:203 Com. 3 another Art. 1:101 Com. A 12; Art. 1:103 Com. B 2 anti-competitive Art. 2:208 Com. A 5 agreement apoplectic seizure Art. 3:102 Com. A 2 appellate courts, Art. 6:101 Com. A 4 review of decisions approval Art. 5:101 Com. B 8 agreement, subsequent Art. 5:101 Com. B 8 benevolent Art. 5:101 Com. B 8 intervention in another’s affairs arbitration tribunals Art. 7:103 Com. 3 arrest by private Art. 5:103 Notes, 4 individuals arrest of innocent Art. 2:203 Com. B 10 persons asbestosis Art. 2:201 Com. B 10

assault Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 assertion of fact Art. 2:207 Com. D 9 assessment of damages Art. 6:101 Com. A 4 assignability Art. 6:106 Com. 2; Art. 6:106 Com. 4 assignment ability to assign Art. 6:106 Com. 2 et seq. right to reparation Art. 6:106 Com. 1 assignment by operation of law benefit equalisation Art. 6:103 Com. 11 assistance Art. 4:102 Com. A 1 associations Introd. Ch. 1, D 35; Art. 1:102 Com. B 5 membership Art. 2:101 Com. C 10 athletes Art. 2:101 Com. A 3 Austria Introd. Ch. 1, B 8 absolute rights Art. 1:101 Notes, III 16; Art. 2:101 Notes, VII 63; Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 78; Art. 6:301 Notes, 7 abstract annuity Art. 6:204 Notes, 6 accessories Art. 4:102 Notes, 7 accident insurance Art. 7:104 Notes, 8 acquisition of Art. 2:206 Notes, I 7 ownership in good faith Acts in the strict sense Art. 7:102 Notes, 4 actual damage Art. 2:101 Notes, III 27 ad hoc statutes Art. 3:208 Notes, 6 ad hoc strict liability Art. 3:207 Notes, 7 provisions adequate causation Art. 4:101 Notes, I 8 adjustment clause Art. 6:202 Notes, 7 administrative acts Art. 3:102 Notes, III 34 advice, incorrect Art. 2:207 Notes, 6; Art. 2:210 Notes, 7 alternative causes of Art. 1:103 Notes, I 1 actions animals Art. 2:206 Notes, I 7; Art. 6:101 Notes, I 8 animals, damage Art. 3:203 Notes, 8 caused by annuity Art. 6:203 Notes, 8 arrest by private Art. 5:201 Notes, 7 individuals assertion of fact Art. 2:204 Notes, II 20 assessment of damages Art. 6:202 Notes, 7

1251

Austria assets, rights in assignment of rights to reparation atonement function of damages au pair authority conferred by law aviation basic rule benefit equalisation benevolent intervention in another’s affairs bereavement blood transfusion bodily integrity

Index Art. 2:206 Notes, I 7 Art. 6:106 Notes, 7 Art. 2:201 Notes, VII 56 Art. 3:104 Notes, II 24 Art. 5:201 Notes, 7 Art. 3:207 Notes, 7 Art. 1:101 Notes, II 2 Art. 6:103 Notes, 8 Art. 5:202 Notes, II 16

Art. 2:202 Notes, II 12 Art. 5:102 Notes, II 21 Art. 2:203 Notes, II 12; Art. 6:102 Notes, 7 bonos mores Art. 5:101 Notes, I 7 breach of bonos Art. 1:101 Notes, III 16; mores Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 20 breach of confidence Art. 2:205 Notes, 6 breach of statutory Art. 3:102 Notes, III 34 duty buildings, damage Art. 3:202 Notes, 8 caused by buildings, liability Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 39 for burden of proof Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 30; Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 37; Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 39; Art. 2:101 Notes, II 19; Art. 4:101 Notes, III 33; Art. 5:102 Notes, II 21 business property Art. 3:204 Notes, II 25 calculable damage Art. 2:101 Notes, I 7; Art. 6:204 Notes, 6 car, damaged Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 35 causation Art. 4:101 Notes, I 8; Art. 4:101 Notes, II 21; Art. 4:101 Notes, III 33 charitable donations Art. 6:103 Notes, 8 chicanery, Art. 6:102 Notes, 7 prohibition of children Art. 2:202 Notes, II 12 children, Art. 5:102 Notes, III 34 contributory fault

1252

Art. 3:103 Notes, II 20 children, liability on equitable grounds children under Art. 6:202 Notes, 7 fourteen years close relatives, care Art. 2:201 Notes, VI 42 for injured party close relatives, Art. 2:201 Notes, VI 42 visiting expenses collaboration Art. 4:102 Notes, 7 collaboration in a Art. 5:103 Notes, 1 criminal act commercial Art. 2:203 Notes, II 12 reputation commercial secrets Art. 2:208 Notes, 7 commercial value, Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 35 reduced commission Art. 6:104 Notes, 8 Community Law, Art. 7:103 Notes, 9 transposition of comparative Art. 2:208 Notes, 7 advertisement compensation Art. 6:101 Notes, I 8; Art. 6:106 Notes, 7; Art. 6:201 Notes, 5; Art. 6:203 Notes, 8; Art. 6:204 Notes, 6 competing bases of Art. 1:103 Notes, I 1 a claim competition law Art. 2:101 Notes, II 19 compulsory insurance Art. 6:103 Notes, 8 compulsory insurance Art. 6:103 Notes, 8 pay-out concealment of facts Art. 2:210 Notes, 7 concurrence of Art. 1:103 Notes, I 1; actions Art. 1:103 Notes, I 7; Art. 1:103 Notes, III 33 concurrence of claims Art. 1:103 Notes, I 1 concurrence of laws Art. 1:103 Notes, I 1 consent Art. 5:101 Notes, I 7 consequential loss Art. 2:201 Notes, V 28; Art. 2:201 Notes, VII 56 consumer property Art. 3:204 Notes, II 25 contingency costs Art. 6:302 Notes, 6 continuance of salary Art. 6:104 Notes, 8 contributory fault Art. 2:202 Notes, V 47; Art. 5:102 Notes, I 8; Art. 5:102 Notes, III 34;

Index Art. 5:102 Notes, IV 47; Art. 5:103 Notes, 1; Art. 5:301 Notes, 8 contributory fault of Art. 5:501 Notes, 4 deceased person co-ownership Art. 6:104 Notes, 8 copyright Art. 2:101 Notes, II 19 infringements courtesy relationships Art. 5:401 Notes, 8 criminal defamation Art. 2:203 Com. E 17 criminal fraud Art. 2:210 Notes, 7 culpa in contrahendo Art. 3:201 Notes, I 7 culpa levissima Art. 7:104 Notes, 8 cumulation of causes Art. 1:103 Notes, I 1 of action custodianship of Art. 3:205 Notes, 9 vehicles damage Art. 2:101 Notes, I 7 damage per se Art. 2:201 Notes, IV 19 danger of recurrence Art. 6:301 Notes, 7 dangerous activities Art. 3:206 Notes, 8; Introd. Ch. 3, C 12 dangerous operations Art. 3:206 Notes, 8 dangerous undertakings Introd. Ch. 3, C 12 dangerously placed Art. 3:207 Notes, 7 objects de minimis rule Art. 6:102 Notes, 7 death Art. 2:202 Notes, I 2 death of primary Art. 2:202 Notes, II 12 victim deceitfulness Art. 2:210 Notes, 7 defamation Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 35; Art. 7:101 Notes, 2 defect in material Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 40 defective supervision Art. 3:201 Notes, I 7 degrading a business Art. 2:208 Notes, 7 destruction of Art. 2:206 Notes, III 34 a thing detention Art. 2:206 Notes, II 21 development risks Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 40 differential method Art. 2:101 Notes, III 27 disfigurement Art. 2:201 Notes, VII 56 disposal of award of compensation Art. 6:201 Notes, 5 dissemination of Art. 2:208 Notes, 7 true facts disturbances Art. 6:301 Notes, 7 double sale Art. 2:211 Notes, 8

Austria driver of a motor vehicle due care duty to mitigate damage duty to prevent damage economic loss emergency

Art. 3:205 Notes, 9 Art. 3:102 Notes, I 8 Art. 5:102 Notes, II 21 Art. 3:102 Notes, II 22

Art. 6:202 Notes, 7 Art. 5:101 Notes, I 7; Art. 6:202 Notes, 7 emergency, state of Art. 5:202 Notes, III 25 emergency payments Art. 6:103 Notes, 8 emissions Art. 2:209 Notes, II 8; Art. 3:206 Notes, 8 employee’s personal Art. 7:104 Notes, 8 liability employers, liability for employees Art. 3:201 Notes, I 7 employer’s liability Art. 7:104 Notes, 8 enrichment, Art. 6:101 Notes, II 21 restitution of environmental Art. 2:209 Notes, II 8 impairment environmental liability Art. 3:206 Notes, 8 equal treatment Art. 5:102 Notes, IV 47 principle equivalence theory Art. 4:101 Notes, I 8 event beyond control Art. 5:302 Notes, 8 ex turpi causa non Art. 5:103 Notes, 1 oritur actio exaggerated statements Art. 7:101 Notes, 2 exclusion of a member Art. 2:101 of an association Notes, VIII 79 exclusion of liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 8 expenditure in Art. 6:302 Notes, 6 preventing damage expenses, Art. 2:101 Notes, III 27 incurrence of experts, liability of Art. 2:207 Notes, 6 fault Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 18; Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 37; Art. 1:102 Notes, I 7; Art. 3:102 Notes, I 8; Art. 6:202 Notes, 7; Art. 7:103 Notes, 9 fictive nursing costs Art. 6:204 Notes, 6 fireworks Art. 3:206 Notes, 8 football Art. 5:101 Notes, II 22 force majeure Art. 5:302 Notes, 8

1253

Austria forestry Art. 3:207 Notes, 7 fraudulent Art. 2:210 Notes, 7 misrepresentation freedom of assembly Art. 5:203 Notes, 8 freedom of expression Art. 7:101 Notes, 2 freedom of physical Art. 2:203 Notes, I 2 movement frustrated expenses Art. 2:206 Notes, III 34 fundamental rights Art. 2:203 Notes, II 12 funeral costs Art. 2:202 Notes, IV 35; Art. 6:103 Notes, 8 funeral expenses Art. 2:202 Notes, I 2 future profits Art. 2:101 Notes, III 27 games involving Art. 5:101 Notes, II 22 physical contact gas Art. 3:207 Notes, 7 general contract terms Art. 5:401 Notes, 8 general right of personality Art. 2:203 Notes, II 11 et seq. genetic engineering Art. 4:101 Notes, III 33 grief Art. 5:501 Notes, 4 gross negligence Art. 2:101 Notes, V 44; Art. 7:103 Notes, 9 hair, cutting of Art. 2:201 Notes, IV 19 head-hunting of Art. 2:211 Notes, 8 employees heat Art. 3:206 Notes, 8 helper Art. 3:201 Notes, I 7 hire purchase Art. 3:205 Notes, 9 holder of a building / Art. 3:202 Notes, 8 structure honour Art. 2:203 Notes, II 12; Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 35; Art. 2:205 Notes, 6; Art. 7:101 Notes, 2 host provider Art. 2:204 Notes, IV 39 housekeeping, Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 36 loss of human dignity Art. 2:203 Notes, II 12 hunting Art. 3:207 Notes, 7 illness Art. 5:101 Notes, I 7 image Art. 2:203 Notes, II 12 immoral inflicting of Art. 2:211 Notes, 8 damage implied consent Art. 5:101 Notes, II 22 imputability of Art. 4:101 Notes, I 8 damage

1254

Index incorrect information Art. 2:204 Notes, I 7; Art. 2:204 Notes, II 20; Art. 2:207 Notes, 6; Art. 2:210 Notes, 7 incorrect information, Art. 2:207 Notes, 6 reliance on inducement to breach Art. 2:211 Notes, 8 of contract informed consent Art. 5:101 Notes, I 7 inherent Art. 5:102 Notes, IV 47 operational risk inheritability of claims for the compensation of non-pecuniary damage Art. 2:202 Notes, III 21 injury as such Art. 6:204 Notes, 6 injury of primary Art. 2:202 Notes, II 12 victim injury to feelings Art. 5:203 Notes, 8 instigation Art. 4:102 Notes, 7 insurance contracts Art. 6:101 Notes, I 8 intellectual property Art. 6:101 Notes, II 21 intention Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 18; Art. 2:101 Notes, V 44; Art. 3:101 Notes, 7; Art. 3:102 Notes, I 8 intentional torts Art. 4:101 Notes, I 8 interests worthy of legal protection Art. 2:101 Notes, XI 125 interlocutory Art. 1:102 Notes, I 7 injunction internet service Art. 2:204 Notes, IV 39 providers jeopardising creditArt. 2:204 Notes, I 7; worthiness Art. 2:208 Notes, 7 joint commission of Art. 4:102 Notes, 7 a tortious act judicial error Art. 7:103 Notes, 9 keeper of a motor Art. 3:205 Notes, 9; vehicle Art. 5:302 Notes, 8 keeper of an animal Art. 3:203 Notes, 8 keeper of dangerous Art. 3:201 Notes, I 7 things killing of a person Art. 5:101 Notes, I 7 Kindergarten Art. 3:104 Notes, II 24 landowner Art. 3:208 Notes, 6 law intended to protect the injured party Art. 1:101 Notes, III 16 lawnmowers Art. 3:205 Notes, 9 Laws in the wider sense Art. 7:102 Notes, 4

Index lawyers leasehold legal capacity

Art. 3:102 Notes, I 8 Art. 2:206 Notes, II 21 Art. 1:102 Notes, I 7; Art. 5:101 Notes, I 7 legal persons Art. 1:103 Notes, III 40; Art. 2:101 Notes, VI 53 legal persons, liability for decision-making body Art. 3:201 Notes, II 21 legal persons, liability Art. 3:201 Notes, I 7 for organs legal persons, liability Art. 3:201 Notes, I 7; for representatives Art. 3:201 Notes, II 21 legal persons, personality rights of Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 82 liability insurance Art. 3:205 Notes, 9 liquids Art. 3:207 Notes, 7 loss Art. 2:101 Notes, I 7 loss of chance Art. 2:101 Notes, XII 130 loss of earnings Art. 2:101 Notes, III 27; Art. 2:201 Notes, V 28; Art. 6:203 Notes, 8 loss of maintenance Art. 6:106 Notes, 7 loss of profits Art. 2:101 Notes, I 7; Art. 2:101 Notes, III 27; Art. 6:101 Notes, II 21; Art. 7:103 Notes, 9 loss of support Art. 6:103 Notes, 8 loss of use Art. 2:206 Notes, III 34 et seq. lost gains Art. 2:206 Notes, III 34 lump sum Art. 6:203 Notes, 8; Art. 6:204 Notes, 6 maintenance, loss of Art. 2:202 Notes, I 2; Art. 2:202 Notes, V 47 maintenance payments Art. 6:103 Notes, 8 malice Art. 2:206 Notes, III 34 malicious intent Art. 3:101 Notes, 7 market value Art. 2:206 Notes, III 34 market value of Art. 6:101 Notes, I 8 damaged property medical consultants Art. 3:102 Notes, I 8 medical costs Art. 6:201 Notes, 5 medical procedures Art. 5:101 Notes, I 7 medical treatment Art. 2:201 Notes, V 28 mental impairment Art. 2:201 Notes, III 9 mental incompetence Art. 5:301 Notes, 8 mentally disabled Art. 3:104 Notes, II 24 adults mining Art. 3:207 Notes, 7

Austria minors

Art. 3:103 Notes, I 8; Art. 3:104 Notes, I 9; Art. 3:104 Notes, II 24; Art. 6:202 Notes, 7 mirror principle Art. 5:102 Notes, IV 47 motor vehicles, Art. 3:205 Notes, 9 damage caused by natural persons Art. 1:103 Notes, III 40 necessity Art. 5:202 Notes, III 25 negligence Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 18; Art. 2:101 Notes, III 27; Art. 3:101 Notes, 7; Art. 3:102 Notes, I 8 negligent torts Art. 4:101 Notes, I 8 nervous shock Art. 5:501 Notes, 4 noise Art. 3:206 Notes, 8 non-economic Art. 2:201 Notes, VII 56 damage non-economic loss Art. 2:101 Notes, II 19; Art. 2:101 Notes, V 44; Art. 6:203 Notes, 8; Art. 6:204 Notes, 6 non-pecuniary loss Art. 2:101 Notes, V 44; Art. 2:101 Notes, VI 53; Art. 6:204 Notes, 6 normative damage Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 34 nuclear liability Art. 3:207 Notes, 7; Art. 4:101 Notes, III 33 nuisance, abatement of Art. 6:301 Notes, 7 occupations, Art. 3:102 Notes, I 8 particular omissions Art. 3:102 Notes, II 17; Art. 3:102 Notes, II 22 onerous obligation Art. 2:101 Notes, III 27 one-sided declarations Art. 5:401 Notes, 8 oversight Art. 3:101 Notes, 7 ownership Art. 2:206 Notes, I 7; Art. 2:206 Notes, II 21 ownership of moveable Art. 3:208 Notes, 6 property ownership of real Art. 3:208 Notes, 6 property ownership of vehicles Art. 3:205 Notes, 9 pain Art. 2:201 Notes, IV 19; Art. 2:201 Notes, VII 56; Art. 2:202 Notes, II 12; Art. 6:102 Notes, 7; Art. 6:106 Notes, 7; Art. 6:203 Notes, 8; Art. 6:204 Notes, 6 parents Art. 2:201 Notes, VI 42; Art. 2:202 Notes, II 12

1255

Austria parents’ emotional Art. 2:101 Notes, V 44 suffering parked cars Art. 3:205 Notes, 9 participants Art. 4:102 Notes, 7 partners Art. 2:202 Notes, II 12 paths, liability for Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 39 patrimony Art. 2:101 Notes, VII 63 pecuniary loss Art. 2:101 Notes, III 27 periodical payments Art. 6:203 Notes, 8 personal injury Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 36; Art. 7:103 Notes, 9 personality rights Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 67; Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 78 personality, damage to Art. 2:206 Notes, I 7 physical injury Art. 2:201 Notes, IV 19; Art. 5:101 Notes, I 7 picture recording Art. 2:203 Notes, II 12 positive acts Art. 3:102 Notes, II 17; Art. 3:102 Notes, II 22 positive damage Art. 6:202 Notes, 7; Art. 6:302 Notes, 6 possession Art. 2:206 Notes, II 21 possession, Art. 2:206 Notes, I 7 interference with post-mortal Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 75 personality rights post-mortem protection of personality rights Art. 2:203 Notes, II 12 predisposition of Art. 4:101 Notes, IV 45 the victim preventative prohibitory injunctions Art. 6:301 Notes, 7 prevention Art. 6:301 Notes, 7 privacy Art. 2:205 Notes, 6 privacy, right to Art. 2:203 Notes, III 26 private sphere of Art. 2:203 Notes, II 12 a person product liability Art. 3:204 Notes, I 1; Art. 3:204 Notes, II 10; Art. 3:204 Notes, II 25; Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 40 product liability, Art. 3:204 Notes, V 45 financial ceiling products, defective Art. 1:103 Notes, II 22 professional secrecy Art. 2:205 Notes, 6 profit, loss of Art. 2:201 Notes, V 28 profits, recovery of Art. 6:101 Notes, II 21

1256

Index prohibitory injunctions Art. 6:301 Notes, 7 proof of loss Art. 2:101 Notes, II 19 property damage Art. 2:206 Notes, II 21; Art. 2:206 Notes, III 34; Art. 5:401 Notes, 8; Art. 6:101 Notes, I 8; Art. 7:103 Notes, 9 property right, Art. 2:206 Notes, I 7 infringement of proprietary right Art. 6:104 Notes, 8 prospective entitlements to property Art. 2:206 Notes, II 21 protective laws, Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 37; infringement of Art. 2:101 Notes, VII 63; Art. 3:101 Notes, 7; Art. 3:102 Notes, III 34 provocative statements Art. 7:101 Notes, 2 psychiatric clinics Art. 3:104 Notes, II 24 public authorities Art. 7:103 Notes, 9 public interest Art. 5:203 Notes, 8 punitive damages Art. 6:101 Notes, I 8 pure economic loss Art. 2:210 Notes, 7; Art. 6:104 Notes, 8; Introd. Ch. 1, B 13 purpose of the rule Art. 4:101 Notes, I 8 racing driver Art. 5:101 Notes, II 22 real damage Art. 2:101 Notes, I 7; Art. 6:204 Notes, 6 recommendations, false Art. 2:210 Notes, 7 reduced commercial value Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 35 reduction of liability Art. 6:202 Notes, 7 rei vindicatio Art. 1:103 Notes, III 33 relatives, loss Art. 2:202 Notes, II 12 suffered by reliance on information Art. 5:401 Notes, 8 remedial injunctions Art. 6:301 Notes, 7 rent Art. 2:206 Notes, II 21 repair costs Art. 2:206 Notes, II 21; Art. 6:101 Notes, I 8; Art. 6:201 Notes, 5 reparation Art. 6:203 Notes, 8; Art. 6:204 Notes, 6 reparation in kind Art. 6:101 Notes, I 8 reputation, Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 82 professional rescuer sustaining injury during rescue attempt Art. 4:101 Notes, I 8; Art. 5:101 Notes, II 22

Index reserve costs Art. 6:302 Notes, 6 restitution in kind Art. 2:101 Notes, I 7 restoration Art. 6:101 Notes, I 8 retention of title Art. 2:206 Notes, II 21 right, mere Art. 2:101 Notes, II 19 infringement of right of election between forms of redress Art. 6:201 Notes, 5 right of personality Art. 2:205 Notes, 6 right to liberty Art. 2:101 Notes, II 19 right to one’s Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 68 image right to one’s Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 69 voice rights, detriment to Art. 2:101 Notes, I 7 rights in rem Art. 2:206 Notes, II 21 roads, liability for Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 39 sales tax Art. 6:201 Notes, 5 scientific Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 40 knowledge seat belts Art. 5:102 Notes, III 34 secondary victims Art. 5:501 Notes, 4 self-defence Art. 5:201 Notes, 7; Art. 5:202 Notes, I 7 self-defence, excessive Art. 5:202 Notes, I 7 self-defence, putative Art. 5:202 Notes, I 7 self-help Art. 5:201 Notes, 7; Art. 6:301 Notes, 7 selflessness Art. 2:207 Notes, 6 set-off Art. 6:103 Notes, 8 several injured parties Art. 6:104 Notes, 8 slight negligence Art. 5:401 Notes, 8 smells Art. 3:206 Notes, 8 social security law Art. 3:101 Notes, 7 solidary liability Art. 4:102 Notes, 7 spared household Art. 6:103 Notes, 8 expenses sphere of secrecy Art. 2:205 Notes, 6 sporting activities Art. 5:101 Notes, II 22 sports, competitive Art. 5:101 Notes, II 22 spouse Art. 2:202 Notes, II 12 standard of care Art. 3:102 Notes, I 8 standard terms Art. 5:401 Notes, 8 status quo ante Art. 6:101 Notes, I 8 strict liability Art. 2:101 Notes, V 44; Introd. Ch. 3, C 12; Art. 3:207 Notes, 7; Art. 5:102 Notes, IV 47; Art. 6:202 Notes, 7

Austria structures, liability for suffering

Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 39 Art. 2:201 Notes, IV 19; Art. 2:201 Notes, VII 56; Art. 2:202 Notes, II 12; Art. 6:102 Notes, 7; Art. 6:106 Notes, 7; Art. 6:203 Notes, 8; Art. 6:204 Notes, 6 superseding Art. 4:101 Notes, IV 45 causation supervisory duty Art. 3:104 Notes, I 9; Art. 3:104 Notes, II 24 suspicions Art. 2:204 Notes, III 31 tables of damages Art. 6:204 Notes, 6 tape recording Art. 2:203 Notes, II 12 tax repercussions Art. 6:203 Notes, 8 teachers, personal Art. 3:104 Notes, II 24 liability technical guidelines Art. 7:102 Notes, 4 technical Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 40 knowledge telephone calls, Art. 2:203 Notes, II 12 recording third parties, claims in damages Art. 2:202 Notes, VI 61 third parties, contribution to a breach of contract Art. 2:101 Notes, IX 89 threat of damage Art. 1:102 Notes, I 7 threshold amount for property damage claims of consumers Art. 3:204 Notes, II 10 tort law claims Art. 6:101 Notes, II 21 trade secrets Art. 2:208 Notes, 7 traffic accidents Art. 3:205 Notes, 9; Art. 5:102 Notes, III 34 transplants Art. 5:101 Notes, I 7 trivial damage Art. 6:102 Notes, 7 unavoidability of Art. 3:205 Notes, 9 accidents unavoidable event Art. 3:205 Notes, 9; Art. 5:302 Notes, 8 unconsciousness Art. 2:201 Notes, VII 56 unfair competition Art. 2:208 Notes, 7; Art. 2:211 Notes, 8; Art. 6:101 Notes, II 21 unjustified Art. 1:103 Notes, III 33; Art. 6:101 Notes, II 21 enrichment utterances of a person Art. 2:205 Notes, 6 value judgments Art. 2:204 Notes, II 20

1257

authority vexatious notice with reference to alleged patency protection Art. 2:208 Notes, 7 vibrations Art. 3:206 Notes, 8 water Art. 3:207 Notes, 7 water damage Art. 3:207 Notes, 7 weapons Art. 4:101 Notes, I 8 wrongful birth Art. 2:101 Notes, X 113 wrongful life Art. 2:101 Notes, X 119 wrongfulness Art. 1:101 Notes, III 9; Art. 1:101 Notes, III 13 youth custody Art. 3:104 Notes, II 24 centres authority Art. 5:103 Notes, 5 authority conferred Art. 5:201 Com. 1 et seq. by law abuse of rights Art. 5:201 Com. 7 authority to report suspicion of criminal activity to the police Art. 5:103 Notes, 4 authority to take Art. 5:103 Notes, 4 water from rivers auxiliary persons Art. 3:201 Com. A 1 babysitters Art. 3:104 Com. B 6 bacteria Art. 3:203 Com. B 5 Baltic legal systems; see also Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania inheritability of claims for the compensation of non-pecuniary damage Art. 2:202 Notes, III 21 pure economic loss Introd. Ch. 1, B 13 banks Art. 2:101 Com. C 12 basic rights Introd. Ch. 1, A 1 basic rule Introd. Ch. 1, C 18; Art. 1:101 Com. A 14 et seq. battery Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 behaviour, standard of Introd. Ch. 1, B 4 Belgium Introd. Ch. 1, B 6; Art. 1:101 Notes, II 2 abandonment Art. 3:208 Notes, 1 abetting of a breach of Art. 2:211 Notes, 2 contract absolute rights Art. 2:101 Notes, VII 58 acceptance of risks Art. 5:101 Notes, II 16 Acts Art. 7:102 Notes, 1 administrative bodies Art. 7:103 Notes, 2 adults Art. 3:102 Notes, I 2 advertisements Art. 2:208 Notes, 2

1258

Index age of discernment Art. 3:103 Notes, I 2 (children) alternative causes Art. 4:103 Notes, 2 animals, damage Art. 3:203 Notes, 1 et seq. caused by animals, injured Art. 2:206 Notes, III 29 apprentices Art. 3:104 Notes, II 19 assessment of damages Art. 6:202 Notes, 1; Art. 6:203 Notes, 2 assignment of rights to reparation Art. 6:106 Notes, 1 assumption of risk Art. 5:101 Notes, II 16 authority conferred Art. 5:201 Notes, 1 by law avoidability Art. 5:302 Notes, 2 banking confidentiality Art. 2:205 Notes, 1 basic rule Art. 1:101 Notes, II 2 benefit equalisation Art. 6:103 Notes, 2 bodily injury Art. 6:203 Notes, 2 body, injury to Art. 2:201 Notes, II 4 bona fide possession Art. 2:206 Notes, II 16 bonus paterfamilias Art. 3:102 Notes, I 2 breach of confidence Art. 2:205 Notes, 1 breach of professional Art. 2:205 Notes, 1 secrecy breach of statutory Art. 3:102 Notes, III 29 duty building’s collapse Art. 3:202 Notes, 2 burden of proof Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 29; Art. 4:101 Notes, III 28 business property Art. 3:204 Notes, II 20 capital sum Art. 6:203 Notes, 2 car keepers Introd. Ch. 3, C 9 car owners Introd. Ch. 3, C 9 causation Art. 4:101 Notes, I 2; Art. 4:101 Notes, II 17; Art. 4:101 Notes, III 28 certainty Art. 2:101 Notes, I 3; Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 35; Art. 2:206 Notes, II 16 chain of causation Art. 4:101 Notes, IV 40 children Art. 3:102 Notes, I 2; Art. 3:103 Notes, I 2 children, liability on Art. 3:103 Notes, II 17 equitable grounds children, small Art. 5:301 Notes, 2 civil servants Art. 7:104 Notes, 2

Index close relatives, care Art. 2:201 Notes, VI 37 for injured party collaboration Art. 4:102 Notes, 2 collateral benefits Art. 6:103 Notes, 2 commercial value, Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 35 reduced compensation Art. 6:202 Notes, 1 concurrence of laws Art. 1:103 Notes, I 2 consent Art. 5:101 Notes, I 1 consequential loss Art. 2:201 Notes, V 22; Art. 2:201 Notes, VII 50 Constitution Art. 7:102 Notes, 1 consumer information Art. 2:208 Notes, 2 contributory fault Art. 5:102 Notes, I 1; Art. 5:102 Notes, IV 41 contributory Art. 5:101 Notes, II 16 negligence craftsmen, liability for damage caused to third parties Art. 3:104 Notes, II 19 damage Art. 2:101 Notes, I 2 et seq.; Art. 2:101 Notes, II 16; Art. 6:202 Notes, 1 damage of an Art. 2:206 Notes, III 29 object dangerous emissions Art. 3:206 Notes, 2 dangerous substances Art. 3:206 Notes, 2 death Art. 2:202 Notes, I 2 death of primary Art. 2:202 Notes, VI 57 party death of primary Art. 2:202 Notes, II 6 victim defamation Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 31 defective things Introd. Ch. 3, C 9 democratic society Art. 5:203 Notes, 2 depreciation of Art. 2:206 Notes, III 29 value destruction Art. 2:206 Notes, III 29 development risks Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 35 dissemination of Art. 2:204 Notes, III 27 information disturbance, continuing Art. 6:301 Notes, 1 driver of a motor Art. 3:205 Notes, 2 vehicle drunken driver Art. 5:101 Notes, II 16 duty of care Art. 5:101 Notes, II 16 duty to mitigate Art. 5:102 Notes, II 16 damage

Belgium ecological damage Art. 2:209 Notes, II 3 economic advantage Art. 2:101 Notes, I 2 economic damage Art. 2:101 Notes, III 22 economic loss Art. 2:101 Notes, V 38 employees, personal Art. 3:201 Notes, I 2; liability Art. 7:104 Notes, 2 employee’s lack of Art. 3:201 Notes, I 2 tortious capacity employers, liability for employees Art. 3:201 Notes, I 2 employer’s liability Art. 7:104 Notes, 2 employment contract Art. 3:201 Notes, I 2 environmental Art. 2:209 Notes, II 3 impairment environmental Art. 2:209 Notes, I 1; liability Art. 3:206 Notes, 2 equivalence of Art. 4:101 Notes, I 2 conditions event beyond control Art. 5:302 Notes, 2 exclusion of liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 2 executive Art. 7:103 Notes, 2 expenditure in preventing damage Art. 6:302 Notes, 1 family life Art. 2:203 Notes, III 21; Art. 2:205 Notes, 1 fault Art. 1:101 Notes, V 26; Art.2:101 Notes, V38; Art.3:102 Notes, I2 fault of third party Art. 4:102 Notes, 2 faute Art. 2:211 Notes, 2; Introd. Ch. 1, B 6 force majeure Art. 5:302 Notes, 2 foreseeability Art. 5:302 Notes, 2 fraudulent Art. 2:210 Notes, 1 misrepresentation freedom of physical Art. 2:203 Notes, I 1 movement freedom of the press Art. 5:203 Notes, 2 funeral costs Art. 2:202 Notes, IV 30 future damage Art. 2:101 Notes, I 3 gardien liability Art. 1:101 Notes, V 26; Art. 3:202 Notes, 2; Art. 4:102 Notes, 2; Art. 5:301 Notes, 2; Introd. Ch. 3, C 9 grief Art. 2:101 Notes, V 38 health, injury to Art. 2:201 Notes, II 4 hierarchy of norms Art. 7:102 Notes, 1 honour Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 31 housekeeping, Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 36 loss of

1259

Belgium immovables, unsafe Art. 3:202 Notes, 2 state impending damage Art. 1:102 Notes, I 5 incorrect information, Art. 2:207 Notes, 1 reliance on independent Art. 3:201 Notes, I 2 contractors inducing non-performance of contractual obligations Art. 2:211 Notes, 2 information, erroneous Art. 2:207 Notes, 1 inheritability of claims for the compensation of non-pecuniary damage Art. 2:202 Notes, III 21 inheritability of claims for the reparation of pecuniary damage Art. 2:202 Notes, III 20 injunctions Art. 6:301 Notes, 1 injury of primary Art. 2:202 Notes, VI 57 party injury of primary Art. 2:202 Notes, II 6 victim intellectual property Art. 2:206 Notes, I 1 intention Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 18; Art. 3:101 Notes, 2 interests worthy of legal protection Art. 2:101 Notes, XI 124 judges Art. 7:103 Notes, 2 judicial error Art. 7:103 Notes, 2 lawyers Art. 7:103 Notes, 2 legal persons Art. 1:103 Notes, III 40; Art. 2:101 Notes, VI 52 legal persons, liability for decision-making body Art. 3:201 Notes, II 16 legal persons, liability for representatives Art. 3:201 Notes, II 16 legislative power Art. 7:103 Notes, 2 liberty, infringement Art. 2:203 Notes, I 1 of loss of an object Art. 2:206 Notes, III 29 loss of chance Art. 2:101 Notes, XII 127 loss of earnings Art. 2:201 Notes, V 22 loss of income Art. 2:101 Notes, III 22 loss of profits Art. 2:101 Notes, III 22 loss of use Art. 2:206 Notes, III 29 lump sum Art. 6:203 Notes, 2

1260

Index masters, liability for Art. 3:201 Notes, I 2 servants medical care Art. 2:201 Notes, V 22 mental health, Art. 2:201 Notes, III 8 harm to mental impairment Art. 3:102 Notes, I 1 mental incompetence Art. 5:301 Notes, 2 mentally disabled Art. 6:202 Notes, 1 persons minors Art. 3:104 Notes, I 2 motor vehicle, damage Art. 3:205 Notes, 2 caused by natural persons Art. 1:103 Notes, III 40 necessity Art. 5:202 Notes, III 19 negligence Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 18; Art. 3:102 Notes, I 2 negotiorum gestio Art. 1:103 Notes, III 28 non-cumul Art. 1:103 Notes, II 19; Art. 5:101 Notes, I 1 non-economic Art. 2:101 Notes, I 2 advantage non-economic Art. 2:201 Notes, VII 50; damage Art. 3:204 Notes, III 30 non-economic loss Art. 2:101 Notes, V 38; Art. 2:101 Notes, VI 52 objective liability Art. 1:101 Notes, V 26 obligations Art. 2:206 Notes, II 16 omissions Art. 3:102 Notes, II 17 operations, medical Art. 5:101 Notes, I 1 ordre public Art. 5:401 Notes, 2 ownership Art. 2:206 Notes, I 1; Art. 2:206 Notes, II 16 pain Art. 2:101 Notes, V 38 parental liability Art. 3:104 Notes, I 2 periodical payments Art. 6:203 Notes, 2 personal injury Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 36 personality rights Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 67 physical damage Art. 2:101 Notes, III 22 to goods physical damage Art. 2:101 Notes, III 22 to patrimony physical integrity Art. 2:101 Notes, III 22 positive acts Art. 3:102 Notes, II 17 possession Art. 2:206 Notes, II 16 post-mortal Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 73 personality rights

Index predisposition of the victim prenatal injuries press, liability prevention

Belgium Art. 4:101 Notes, IV 40

Art. 2:201 Notes, II 7 Art. 7:101 Notes, 1 Art. 6:301 Notes, 1; Art. 6:302 Notes, 1 principal Art. 3:201 Notes, I 3 private life Art. 2:101 Notes, VI 52; Art. 2:203 Notes, III 21; Art. 2:205 Notes, 1 private sphere of a Art. 2:203 Notes, II 6; person Art. 2:203 Notes, III 21; Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 31 product liability Art. 3:204 Notes, I 1; Art. 3:204 Notes, II 4; Art. 3:204 Notes, II 20; Art. 3:204 Notes, III 30; Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 35 product liability, Art. 3:204 Notes, V 45 financial ceiling products, defective Art. 1:103 Notes, II 19 profits, recovery of Art. 6:101 Notes, II 15 property damage Art. 6:203 Notes, 2 property right, Art. 2:206 Notes, I 1 infringement of public interest Art. 5:203 Notes, 2 public prosecutors Art. 7:103 Notes, 2 public servants Art. 7:103 Notes, 2 public service employees Art. 7:104 Notes, 2 pupils Art. 3:104 Notes, II 19 pure economic loss Introd. Ch. 1, B 13 reduced commercial value Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 35 reduction of liability Art. 6:202 Notes, 1 relationship of appointment / subordination Art. 3:201 Notes, I 2 relatives, loss Art. 2:202 Notes, II 6 suffered by reparation in kind Art. 6:101 Notes, I 1 reparation of damage Art. 6:101 Notes, I 2 reputation Art. 2:101 Notes, VI 52 res derelictae Art. 3:208 Notes, 1 restoration Art. 6:101 Notes, I 2 restriction of liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 2 right, breach of Art. 2:101 Notes, II 16 right to one’s image Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 68; Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 73

right to one’s Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 67 own name right to respect for Art. 5:203 Notes, 2 private life rightful alternative Art. 4:101 Notes, I 2 behaviour rights in rem Art. 2:206 Notes, II 16 rights of personality Art. 2:203 Notes, II 6 sale of goods Art. 2:208 Notes, 2 self-defence Art. 5:202 Notes, I 1 several injured parties Art. 6:104 Notes, 2 solidary liability Art. 4:102 Notes, 2; Art. 6:105 Notes, 2 solidary liability legal persons /decisionmaking body Art. 3:201 Notes, II 16 standard of Art. 3:102 Notes, III 29 behaviour State, liability of the Art. 7:103 Notes, 2 status quo ante Art. 6:101 Notes, I 2 sterilisation Art. 2:101 Notes, X 97 strict liability Art. 2:101 Notes, V 38; Introd. Ch. 3, C 9 strike involvement Art. 7:104 Notes, 2 suffering Art. 2:101 Notes, V 38 supervisory duty Art. 3:104 Notes, I 2 supply of services Art. 2:208 Notes, 2 tables of damages Art. 6:203 Notes, 2 teachers, personal Art. 3:104 Notes, II 19 liability third parties Art. 2:101 Notes, IX 86 third parties, claims Art. 2:202 Notes, VI 57 in damages threshold amount for property damage claims of consumers Art. 3:204 Notes, II 5 tortious capacity Art. 5:301 Notes, 2 trade practices, Art. 2:208 Notes, 2 dishonourable traffic accidents Art. 3:205 Notes, 2; Art. 5:102 Notes, III 29 trailers Art. 3:205 Notes, 2 trivial damage Art. 6:102 Notes, 1 unfair competition Art. 2:208 Notes, 2 unjustified Art. 1:103 Notes, III 28; enrichment Art. 5:202 Notes, III 19 use, right of Art. 2:206 Notes, II 16 waiver of liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 2 wheelchairs, motorised Art. 3:205 Notes, 2

1261

benefit equalisation wild game Art. 3:203 Notes, 2 wrongful birth Art. 2:101 Notes, X 108 wrongful Art. 2:101 Notes, X 97 conception wrongful life Art. 2:101 Notes, X 118 wrongfulness Art. 1:101 Notes, III 12 benefit equalisation Art. 6:103 Com. 1 et seq. accountability Art. 6:103 Com. 9 assignment by Art. 6:103 Com. 11 operation of law benefits performed Art. 6:103 Com. 10 by third parties causation Art. 4:101 Com. A 10; Art. 6:103 Com. 3 donations from third Art. 6:103 Com. 11 parties economic loss Art. 6:103 Com. 7 fairness test Art. 6:103 Com. 7 et seq.; Art. 6:103 Com. 11 increased income Art. 6:103 Com. 11 indemnified persons Art. 6:103 Com. 4 insurance payments Art. 6:103 Com. 11 property damage Art. 6:103 Com. 7 set-off Art. 6:103 Com. 2; Art. 6:103 Com. 10 several liable parties Art. 6:103 Com. 5 type of damage Art. 6:103 Com. 7 benevolent intervention in another’s affairs Introd. Ch. 1, D 31 et seq.; Art. 1:103 Com. D 9; Art. 2:201 Com. D 18; Art. 5:202 Com. A 1; Art. 5:202 Com. C 7 et seq.; Art. 5:202 Notes, II 14; Art. 6:302 Com. 2 approval Art. 5:101 Com. B 8 consent Art. 5:101 Com. B 14 damages Introd. Ch. 1, D 32 duty of care Art. 5:202 Com. C 8 environmental Art. 2:209 Com. C 7 damage profits, recovery of Art. 6:101 Com. F 15 reduction clause Art. 6:202 Com. 4 bereavement Art. 2:101 Com. F 33 bicycles Art. 3:205 Com. A 2; Art. 3:207 Com. B 5 bicycles with auxiliary Art. 3:205 Com. B 8 motor bills of exchange Art. 2:101 Notes, VI 56

1262

Index biological damage Art. 2:201 Com. B 12 quantification Art. 6:203 Com. 6 birth, unwanted Art.2:101 Notes, X95 et seq. natural father Art. 2:201 Notes, II 6 blood Art. 2:201 Com. B 10 blood products Art. 3:204 Com. A 9 et seq. boarding schools Art. 3:104 Com. B 11 bodily integrity Art. 2:201 Com. B 8; Art. 2:203 Notes, II 5; Art. 6:204 Com. 1 consent to infringement of bodily integrity Art. 5:101 Com. B 5 bodily substances Art. 2:201 Com. B 10 body, injury to Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 66; Art. 2:201 Com. A 1 et seq.; Art. 2:201 Com. B 6 et seq. external bodily Art. 2:201 Com. B 6 integrity reparation Art. 6:101 Com. D 9 bonds Art. 2:206 Com. B 11 bonos mores Introd. Ch. 1, B 8 bonus paterfamilias Art. 3:102 Com. A 3 borstal boys Art. 3:104 Com. B 11 bottles of mineral water Art. 3:202 Com. A 3 boxing Art. 2:201 Com. B 8 boycotts Art. 2:208 Com. A 4 breach of a right Art. 6:104 Com. 3 breach of confidence Introd. Ch. 2, A 6; Introd. Ch. 2, A 11; Art. 2:204 Com. E 17; Art. 2:205 Com. A 1 et seq.; Art. 2:205 Notes, 1 assertion of fact Art. 2:205 Com. B 6 causation Art. 2:205 Com. C 9 communication Art. 2:205 Com. B 5 confidential Art. 2:205 Com. A 2 information confidentiality, Art. 2:205 Com. B 8 absolute confidentiality, Art. 2:205 Com. B 8 relative eavesdropping Art. 2:205 Com. B 8 economic loss Art. 2:205 Com. C 9 information Art. 2:205 Com. B 6 intention Art. 2:205 Com. C 9 mental health Art. 2:205 Com. A 2 negligence Art. 2:205 Com. B 8; Art. 2:205 Com. C 9

Index non-economic loss preventative legal protection public interest reparation third parties, exploit of breach of confidence value judgments breach of confidentiality breach of duty

Bulgaria Introd. Ch. 2, A 7; Art. 2:205 Com. C 9 Art. 2:205 Com. C 9 Art. 2:205 Com. B 5 Art. 2:205 Com. C 9 Art. 2:205 Com. B 7

Art. 2:205 Com. B 6 Art.2:205 Com.A3 Introd. Ch. 1, B 5; Introd. Ch. 1, C 21 breach of obligation Art. 2:101 Notes, IX 84; Art. 2:208 Com. A 3 breach of statutory duty Art.3:207 Com.B5; Introd. Ch. 1, B 5 breach of statutory Art. 3:101 Com. C 7 rule of behaviour breadwinner Art. 2:202 Com. F 15 et seq. bridges Art. 3:202 Com. B 10 building law Art. 3:102 Com. B 13 building site Art. 3:202 Com. B 18 buildings Art. 3:202 Com. B 10; see also immovables, unsafe state construction phase Art. 3:202 Com. B 18 defective construction Art. 3:202 Com. A 1 et seq. maintenance Art. 3:202 Com. A 1 Bulgaria accessories Art. 6:105 Notes, 6 actio negatoria Art. 6:301 Notes, 5 adjustment of damages Art. 6:203 Notes, 6 adjustment of liability Art. 6:202 Notes, 5 agricultural enterprises Art. 5:201 Notes, 5 annuity Art. 6:203 Notes, 6 arrest by private Art. 5:201 Notes, 5 individuals assignment of rights to reparation Art. 6:106 Notes, 5 assumption of risk Art. 5:101 Notes, II 20 authority conferred Art. 5:201 Notes, 5 by law benefit equalisation Art. 6:103 Notes, 6 benevolent intervention in another’s affairs Art. 5:202 Notes, II 16 boxing Art. 5:101 Notes, II 20 capital sum Art. 6:203 Notes, 6

causation

Art. 4:101 Notes, I 6; Art. 4:101 Notes, II 20 Art. 4:101 Notes, I 6 Art. 7:103 Notes, 6 Art. 4:102 Notes, 5 Art. 6:103 Notes, 6

chain of causation civil servants collaboration compensatio lucri cum damno compensation Art. 6:101 Notes, I 6; Art. 6:101 Notes, II 19; Art. 6:201 Notes, 3; Art. 6:202 Notes, 5; Art. 6:203 Notes, 6 consent Art. 5:101 Notes, I 5 consumer protection Art. 5:401 Notes, 6 contributory fault Art. 5:102 Notes, III 31; Art. 5:102 Notes, IV 44 contributory Art. 5:102 Notes, I 6 negligence copyright Art. 6:301 Notes, 5 development risks Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 38 disclaimer of liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 6 disposal of award of compensation Art. 6:201 Notes, 3 driver of a motor Art. 3:205 Notes, 7 vehicle drunken driver Art. 5:101 Notes, II 20 duty to mitigate Art. 5:102 Notes, II 19 damage emergency, state of Art. 5:202 Notes, III 23 employees, liability of Art. 3:101 Notes, 5 employees, solidary liability with employers Art. 6:105 Notes, 6 employers, solidary liability with employees Art. 6:105 Notes, 6 enrichment, Art. 6:101 Notes, II 19 restitution of event beyond control Art. 5:302 Notes, 6 exclusion of liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 6 exclusive fault Art. 3:205 Notes, 7 football Art. 5:101 Notes, II 20 force majeure Art. 3:205 Notes, 7; Art. 5:302 Notes, 6 gross negligence Art. 5:401 Notes, 6 injunctive relief Art. 6:301 Notes, 5 insolvency, error in Art. 3:101 Notes, 5 filing for instigation Art. 6:105 Notes, 6 intention Art. 3:101 Notes, 5; Art. 5:401 Notes, 6

1263

Bulgaria judges Art. 7:103 Notes, 6 keeper of a dangerous Art. 5:302 Notes, 6 thing keeper of a motor Art. 3:205 Notes, 7 vehicle loss of capacity to work Art. 6:203 Notes, 6 loss of profits Art. 6:101 Notes, II 19 mentally disabled Art. 5:301 Notes, 6 persons motor vehicles, Art. 3:205 Notes, 7 damage caused by necessity Art. 5:202 Notes, III 23 negligence Art. 3:101 Notes, 5; Art. 3:102 Notes, I 6 non-economic Art. 3:204 Notes, III 31; damage Art. 6:102 Notes, 5 passengers Art. 5:102 Notes, III 31 patent law Art. 6:101 Notes, II 19 patents Art. 6:301 Notes, 5 periodical payments Art. 6:203 Notes, 6 prevention Art. 6:301 Notes, 5 product liability Art. 3:204 Notes, I 1; Art. 3:204 Notes, II 8; Art. 3:204 Notes, III 31; Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 38 product liability, financial ceiling Art. 3:204 Notes, V 45 prohibitory injunctions Art. 6:301 Notes, 5 property right, Art. 6:301 Notes, 5 infringement of public interest Art. 5:203 Notes, 6 reduction of liability Art. 6:202 Notes, 5 reparation in kind Art. 6:101 Notes, I 6 rescuer sustaining injury during rescue attempt Art. 5:101 Notes, II 20 secondary victims Art. 5:501 Notes, 3 self-defence Art. 5:202 Notes, I 5 self-defence, excessive Art. 5:202 Notes, I 5 set-off Art. 6:103 Notes, 6 several injured parties Art. 6:104 Notes, 6 ship collision Art. 6:105 Notes, 6 solidary liability Art. 4:102 Notes, 5; Art. 6:105 Notes, 6 sports, dangerous Art. 5:101 Notes, II 20 standard of care Art. 3:102 Notes, I 6 status quo ante Art. 6:101 Notes, I 6

1264

Index strict liability

Art. 5:102 Notes, IV 44; Art. 5:302 Notes, 6 threshold amount for property damage claims of consumers Art. 3:204 Notes, II 8 tortious capacity Art. 5:301 Notes, 6 traffic accidents Art. 3:205 Notes, 7; Art. 5:102 Notes, III 31 trivial damage Art. 6:102 Notes, 5 unavoidable event Art. 5:302 Notes, 6 unfair competition Art. 6:301 Notes, 5 burden of proof Art. 1:101 Com. A 4; Art. 1:101 Com. A 10; Art. 1:101 Com. A 11; Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 30 et seq.; Art. 5:103 Com. 4 accountability Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 32 causation Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 31 et seq.; Art. 4:101 Com. B 17 damage Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 31 et seq. defence, ground of Art. 1:101 Com. A 10 defences Art. 5:101 Com. A 1 liability, grounds of Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 31 negligence Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 32 prima facie proof Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 39 reversal of the burden of proof Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 33; Introd. Ch. 3, B 4 substantive law Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 29 burdens Art. 2:101 Com. F 24 et seq.; incurred Art. 2:101 Com. F 27 burial costs Art. 2:202 Com. E 13 business unlawful Art. 2:204 Com. E 18; impairment Introd. Ch. 2, A 11 business, interference Art. 2:208 Com. A 1; with Art. 2:208 Com. B 6 et seq. prevention Art. 2:208 Com. A 2 unlawfulness Art. 2:208 Com. B 9 business competition Art. 2:101 Com. E 20 business partners Art. 2:202 Com. A 2; Art. 2:202 Notes, VI 55 business property Art. 3:204 Notes, II 18 burden of proof Art. 3:204 Com. A 4 product liability Art. 3:204 Com. A 3 business to business relationships Art. 3:204 Com. A 3 et seq.; Art. 3:204 Com. A 11

Index business to consumer relationships bye-laws capacity, lack of consent care, provided carelessness

chattels intention Art. 3:204 Com. A 4 Art. 3:102 Com. B 8

Art. 5:101 Com. B 11 Art. 2:202 Com. F 16 Introd. Ch. 1, C 21; Art. 3:102 Com. A 1

carers expenses Art. 2:201 Com. D 19 cars; see also motor vehicles accident-damaged car Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 35 cartels Art. 2:208 Com. A 4 casum sentit dominus Introd. Ch. 1, B 10; Introd. Ch. 3, C 8 causation Introd. Ch. 1, C 16 et seq.; Introd. Ch. 1, C 19; Introd. Ch. 1, C 22 et seq.; Art. 1:101 Com. A 9; Art. 1:101 Com. A 15; Art. 1:101 Com. A 17; Art. 1:103 Com. A 1; Introd. Ch. 2, A 2; Art. 2:101 Com. E 21; Art. 3:101 Com. C 9; Art. 4:101 Com. A 1 et seq.; Art. 4:101 Notes, I 1 adequate damage Art. 4:101 Com. B 13 alternative causes Art. 4:101 Com. A 10; Art. 4:103 Com. 1 et seq. ambit of liability Art. 4:101 Notes, II 17 assessment Art. 4:101 Com. B 13 basis of liability Art. 4:101 Notes, II 17 benefit equalisation Art. 4:101 Com. A 10; Art. 6:103 Com. 3 burden of proof Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 31; Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 39; Art. 4:101 Com. B 17 chain of causation Art. 4:101 Com. B 14; Art. 6:302 Com. 2 collaboration Art. 4:101 Com. A 10 conditio sine qua non Art. 4:101 Com. B 11 conduct Art. 4:101 Com. B 11; Art. 4:101 Notes, II 17; Art. 6:302 Com. 2 consequential loss Art. 4:101 Notes, II 17 extent of liability Art. 4:101 Notes, II 17 human conduct Art. 4:101 Com. A 1

intentional conduct legally relevant damage

liability without intention liability without negligence loss main damage negligence

Art. 3:101 Com. A 1; Art. 4:101 Com. A 9 Art. 4:101 Com. A 3 Art. 4:101 Com. A 9; Art. 4:101 Com. B 11; Art. 4:101 Com. B 13; Art. 4:101 Com. B 16 Art. 4:101 Com. A 9 Art. 4:101 Com. A 9 Art. 4:101 Com. B 16; Art. 6:302 Com. 2 Art. 4:101 Notes, II 17 Art. 3:101 Com. A 1; Art. 4:101 Com. A 9 Art. 4:101 Com. A 3 Art. 4:101 Com. A 5 Art. 4:101 Com. A 9 Art. 4:101 Com. B 16 Art. 4:101 Notes, II 17 Art. 4:101 Com. A 9 Art. 4:101 Com. A 10; Art. 4:102 Com. A 2 Art. 4:101 Com. A 9 Art. 4:101 Com. B 13

negligent conduct omissions personal injury physical damage primary damage property damage psychological causation pure economic loss remoteness of damage source of Art. 4:101 Com. A 6 et seq.; danger Art. 4:101 Com. B 11 source of danger, Art. 4:101 Com. A 1; responsibility for Art. 4:101 Com. A 3 source of risk Art. 4:101 Com. A 9 celebrities Art. 2:203 Com. B 12; Art. 5:203 Com. 2 certifications, faulty Art. 2:207 Com. A 1 chance, loss of Art. 2:101 Com. D 15; Art. 2:101 Com. E 22; Art. 2:101 Notes, XII 126; Art. 2:201 Com. A 3 contract law Art. 2:101 Notes, XII 133 lost chance of being Art. 2:101 Com. E 22; healed Art. 2:201 Com. A 3 chattels denial of title Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 wrong delivery Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 wrongful failure to Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 deliver

1265

chemicals chemicals

Art. 3:204 Com. A 9; Art. 3:206 Com. B 14 chief physicians Art. 3:201 Com. B 8 childminders Art. 3:104 Com. B 6 children Art. 2:202 Com. B 7; Art. 3:103 Com. A 1 et seq.; see also minors; persons under eighteen abuse Art. 1:102 Com. B 5 accountability for Introd. Ch. 3, E 21 damage age limit Art. 3:103 Com. D 7; Art. 3:104 Com. B 5 age-specific standard Art. 3:103 Com. C 6; of care Art. 3:103 Com. E 10 behaviour, inherently Art. 3:103 Com. E 12 harmless contributory fault Art. 3:104 Com. B 8; Art. 5:102 Com. A 8 contributory fault on the part of parents /supervisors Art. 3:104 Com. B 8 contributory fault on the part of the injured person Art. 3:103 Com. E 12 deliberate harm Art. 3:103 Com. E 12 fairness; see liability for equitable reasons financial circumstances of the injured person Art. 3:103 Com. E 12 financial means Art. 3:103 Com. E 9; of the child Art. 3:103 Com. E 12 under fourteen years Art. 3:104 Com. B 5 harm by third parties Art. 3:104 Com. B 8 insurance Art. 3:103 Com. E 11 et seq. cover keeper of a thing Art. 3:103 Com. D 8 keeper of an animal Art. 3:103 Com. D 8; Art. 3:203 Com. B 10 liability Art. 3:104 Com. B 7 liability for equitable Introd. Ch. 3, E 21; reasons Art. 3:103 Com. A 2; Art. 3:103 Com. E 9 et seq. liability subject to Art. 3:103 Com. E 11 equity and fairness liability to third Art. 3:103 Com. A 2 parties loss of earning Art. 2:201 Com. C 15 capacity

1266

Index mental incompetence negligence

Art. 3:103 Com. E 13

Art. 3:102 Com. A 5; Art. 3:103 Com. B 4 premature liability Art. 3:103 Com. D 7; Art. 3:103 Com. E 9 prenatal injuries Art. 2:201 Notes, II 7 under seven years Introd. Ch. 3, E 21; Art. 3:102 Com. A 5; Art. 3:103 Com. A 2; Art. 3:103 Com. D 7; Art. 3:103 Com. E 10 solidary liability Art. 3:103 Com. C 6; with parents Art. 3:104 Com. B 7 standard of care Introd. Ch. 3, E 21; Art. 3:103 Com. D 7 strict liability Art. 3:103 Com. D 8 subsidiarity of Art. 3:103 Com. E 11; liability Art. 5:301 Com. A 2 supervision Art. 3:104 Com. D 15 Civil Law body, injury to Art. 2:201 Notes, I 1 burden of proof Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 39 burden of proof, Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 33 reversal of fault Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 17 et seq. health, injury to Art. 2:201 Notes, I 1 mental well-being Art. 2:201 Notes, III 8 civil procedure Art. 5:103 Com. 4 civil responsibility Art. 1:101 Com. A 2 claim Art. 1:101 Com. A 3 multiple grounds Introd. Ch. 2, A 5 et seq. for action claimant Art. 1:101 Com. A 3 class actions Introd. Ch. 1, D 35 close relations Art. 2:202 Com. B 5 et seq. business relationship Art. 2:202 Com. B 7 children Art. 2:202 Com. B 7 cohabiting partner Art. 2:202 Com. B 7 friendship Art. 2:202 Com. B 7 mental suffering Art. 2:202 Com. B 5 parents Art. 2:202 Com. B 7 professional Art. 2:202 Com. B 7 relationship spouse Art. 2:202 Com. B 7 step-parents Art. 2:202 Com. B 7 Code Napoléon Art. 1:101 Notes, II 2 cohabiting partner Art. 2:202 Com. B 7 collaboration Art. 4:102 Com. A 1 et seq.

Index accessories Art. 4:102 Com. A 2; Art. 4:102 Com. A 4; Art. 4:102 Com. A 9 co-operation Art. 4:102 Com. A 3 criminal acts Art. 5:103 Com. 5 et seq. damage caused unintentionally by participant to another participant Art. 5:103 Com. 5 freedom to Art. 4:102 Com. A 6 demonstrate instigators Art. 4:102 Com. A 8 members of a group Art. 4:102 Com. A 6 misconduct Art. 4:102 Com. A 3 participants Art. 4:102 Com. A 2; Art. 4:102 Com. A 4; Art. 4:102 Com. A 7 psychological Art. 4:101 Com. A 10; causation Art. 4:102 Com. A 2 solidary liability Art. 4:102 Com. A 4 collective labour law Art. 1:102 Notes, I 4; Art. 7:104 Com. 1; Art. 7:104 Com. 3 combat sports acting at own risk Art. 5:101 Com. C 16 combustion Art. 3:206 Com. B 9 commercial information Art. 2:205 Com. A 2 commercial law Art. 3:102 Com. B 13 commercial trade Art. 6:101 Com. F 17 mark rights commercial value, Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 35 reduced Common Law Introd. Ch. 1, A 1; Introd. Ch. 1, B 5; Art. 1:101 Notes, I 1 absolute rights Art. 2:101 Notes, VII 57 actio personalis moritur cum persona Art. 2:202 Notes, III 28 action per quod Art. 2:202 Notes, VI 66 servitium amisit anxiety Art. 2:101 Notes, I 14 assault Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 assumption of liability Introd. Ch. 1, B 13 battery Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 blameworthiness Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 22 blind eye knowledge Art. 2:210 Notes, 12 body, injury to Art. 2:201 Notes, I 2 breach of Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 70; confidence Art. 2:205 Com. A 1

Common Law breach of contract, Art. 2:101 Notes, IX 94 inducement of breach of duty Introd. Ch. 1, B 13 burden of proof Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 41 business reputation Art. 2:101 Notes, VI 55 causation Art. 1:101 Notes, II 7; Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 41 chattels, Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 conversion of collaboration in a Art. 5:103 Notes, 2 criminal act conduct of the parties Art. 1:102 Notes, I 10 consequential loss Art. 2:210 Notes, 12 consideration Introd. Ch. 1, B 13 contract Art. 1:103 Notes, I 13 corporations Art. 1:103 Notes, III 41 criminal defamation Art. 2:203 Com. E 17 damage Art. 1:101 Notes, II 7; Art. 2:101 Notes, I 14 deceit Art. 2:101 Notes, III 32; Art. 2:210 Notes, 12 defamation Art. 1:101 Notes, III 11; Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23; Art. 1:102 Notes, I 10; Art. 2:101 Com. B 8; Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 70; Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 83; Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 40 directing mind Art. 1:103 Notes, III 41 disclosure Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 domestic violence Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 duty of care Art. 1:101 Notes, II 7; Art. 1:101 Notes, III 11; Art. 2:101 Notes, I 14; Art. 2:101 Notes, III 32 duty to prevent Art. 2:101 Notes, III 32 economic loss economic loss Art. 2:101 Notes, III 32 egg shell skull Art. 4:101 Notes, IV 51 emotional suffering Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 evidence, Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 41 preponderance of ex turpi causa non Art. 5:103 Notes, 2 oritur actio expenditure Art. 2:101 Notes, III 32 false imprisonment Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23; Art. 2:203 Notes, I 3

1267

Common Law fault

Index Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 17; Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 22 Art. 2:101 Notes, I 14 Art. 2:101 Notes, III 32 Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 Art. 2:210 Notes, 12

fear foreseeability fraud fraudulent misrepresentation general damages Art. 2:101 Notes, I 14 gross negligence Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 22 health, injury to Art. 2:201 Notes, I 2 honour Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 40 housekeeping, Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 36 loss of illegal conduct Art. 5:103 Notes, 2 image, Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 70 reproduction immoral conduct Art. 5:103 Notes, 2 inadequacy of Art. 1:102 Notes, I 10 damages industrial relations, Art. 1:102 Notes, I 10 torts relating to injunctions Art. 1:102 Notes, I 10 innocent Art. 2:204 Notes, IV 44 publication intention Art. 1:101 Notes, II 7; Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 22 intentional Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 22 et seq. torts interlocutory Art. 1:102 Notes, I 10 injunctions justification Art. 1:101 Notes, III 11 laches Art. 1:102 Notes, I 10 legal persons Art. 2:101 Notes, VI 55; Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 83 libel Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23; Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 40 liberty, Art. 2:203 Notes, I 3 infringement of loss of profit Art. 2:101 Notes, III 32 loss of services Art. 2:202 Notes, VI 66 malicious falsehood Art. 1:101 Notes, III 11 malicious Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 22 et seq.; torts Art. 2:210 Notes, 12 mandatory Art. 1:102 Notes, I 10 injunctions mental suffering Art. 2:101 Notes, I 14 misrepresentation Art. 2:210 Notes, 12

1268

negligence

Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 22; Art. 2:101 Notes, III 32; Art. 2:201 Notes, I 2 Art. 2:210 Notes, 12

negligent misrepresentation nervous shock Art. 2:101 Notes, I 14 non-economic loss Art. 2:101 Notes, VI 55 nuisance Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23; Art. 1:102 Notes, I 10; Art. 5:201 Notes, 13 occupier’s liability Art. 2:201 Notes, I 2 omissions Art. 3:102 Notes, II 26 passing-off Art. 2:101 Notes, III 32; Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 70 personal injury Art. 2:101 Notes, I 14; Art. 2:101 Notes, III 32; Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 36 personality rights Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 70; Art. 2:203 Notes, II 5 physical damage to Art. 2:101 Notes, III 32 property physical injury Art. 2:101 Notes, I 14 predisposition of Art. 4:101 Notes, IV 51 the victim prima facie Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 41 privacy, invasion of Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 privacy, reasonable Art.2:101 Notes, VIII 70 expectations of process, malicious Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 abuse of product liability Art. 2:201 Notes, I 2 professional negligence Art.2:201 Notes, I2 prohibitory Art. 1:102 Notes, I 10 injunctions property Art. 2:101 Notes, I 14 prosecution, Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 malicious psychological illness Art. 2:101 Notes, I 14 public law Art. 1:103 Notes, III 38 pure economic loss Art. 2:101 Notes, I 14; Art. 2:101 Notes, III 32 reasonable care Introd. Ch. 1, B 13 reliance interest Art. 2:101 Notes, III 32 remoteness of Art. 2:101 Notes, I 14 damage res ipsa loquitur Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 41 right to one’s Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 70 name

Index self-help slander special damages statutory duties third parties, claims in damages tort of negligence

conscious carelessness Art. 5:201 Notes, 13 Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23; Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 40 Art. 2:101 Notes, I 14 Art. 1:103 Notes, III 38 Art. 2:202 Notes, VI 66

Introd. Ch. 1, C 18; Art. 1:101 Notes, II 7; Art. 1:101 Notes, III 11; Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 41 torts to the person Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 torts to the property Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 trade unions Art. 1:103 Notes, III 41 trespass Art. 1:101 Notes, III 11; Art. 1:102 Notes, I 10 trespass to the Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23; person Art. 2:201 Notes, I 2 ultra vires acts Art. 1:103 Notes, III 41 unlawfulness Art. 1:101 Notes, III 11 vicarious liability Art. 1:103 Notes, III 41; Art. 2:210 Notes, 12 voice, Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 70 reproduction wrongful birth Art. 2:101 Notes, X 116 wrongful Art. 2:101 Notes, X 106 conception wrongful Art. 1:101 Notes, III 11; interference Art. 2:101 Notes, IX 94 wrongfulness Art. 1:101 Notes, III 11 communication of Art. 2:204 Com. B 6; information Art. 2:205 Com. B 5 Community Law causation Art. 4:101 Com. A 2 company law Art. 1:103 Com. B 6 compensatio lucri cum Art. 6:103 Com. 1 damno compensation Introd. Ch.1, A 1; Art. 1:101 Com. A 3; Art. 1:101 Com. A 7; Art. 6:101 Com. A 1; Art. 6:101 Com. C 7; Art. 6:101 Com. D 9; Art. 6:201 Com. 1 animals, injured Art. 6:101 Com. B 5 annuity Art. 6:203 Com. 1 contributory fault Art. 5:102 Com. A 2 damage Introd. Ch.1, A 1 direct payment to third Art. 6:201 Com. 3 party

full reparation injury as such lump sum

Art. 6:101 Com. C 7 Art. 6:204 Com. 1 Art. 6:106 Com. 4; Art. 6:203 Com. 1 et seq. monetary reparation of damage Introd. Ch. 1, C 21; Art. 5:102 Com. A 2; Art. 6:101 Com. A 1 property damage Art. 6:201 Com. 2 reduction of liability Art. 6:202 Com. 1 right of election between forms of redress Art. 6:201 Com. 1 et seq. things harmed Art. 6:101 Com. B 5 competition law Art. 2:208 Com. A 4 et seq. concrete mixer Art. 3:205 Com. A 2; Art. 3:207 Com. B 5 concurrence Introd. Ch. 1, D 30 et seq.; of actions Art. 1:103 Com. C 7 et seq.; Art. 1:103 Com. D 10 et seq.; Art. 1:103 Notes, I 1; Art. 5:401 Com. A 7 conditio sine qua non Art. 4:101 Com. B 11 conduct Art. 3:102 Com. A 4 careful conduct Art. 3:102 Com. C 18 et seq. contributory conduct Art. 5:101 Com. A 2 dishonourable conduct Art. 5:103 Com. 1 human conduct Art. 4:101 Com. A 1; Art. 4:101 Com. A 4 intentional conduct Introd. Ch. 1, C 17; Introd. Ch. 2, A 11; Art. 2:101 Com. E 18; Art. 3:101 Com. B 5; Art. 4:101 Com. A 3 negligent conduct Introd. Ch. 1, C 17; Art. 2:101 Com. E 18; Art. 3:102 Com. C 17; Art. 3:102 Notes, II 17; Art. 4:101 Com. A 4 purposeful conduct Art. 5:101 Com. B 9 standard of care Introd. Ch. 1, C 18; Introd. Ch. 1, C 21; Introd. Ch. 1, D 28 confidential Art. 2:205 Com. A 2; information see also breach of confidence confidentiality Art. 2:205 Com. A 2; Art. 2:205 Com. A 4; see also breach of confidence absolute confidentiality Art. 2:205 Com. B 8 relative Art. 2:205 Com. B 8 confidentiality conjectures Art. 2:207 Com. D 9 conscious carelessness Art. 3:101 Com. D 12

1269

consent consent

Art. 5:101 Com. A 2; Art. 5:101 Com. B 4 et seq.; Art. 5:401 Com. B 11 absence of sufficient Art. 5:101 Com. B 10 information acceptance of an offer for conclusion of a contract Art. 5:101 Com. B 6 agreement, previous Art. 5:101 Com. B 8 benevolent intervention in another’s affairs Art. 5:101 Com. B 14 bodily integrity, Art. 5:101 Com. B 5 infringement of contract Art. 5:101 Com. B 6 copyright, permission Art. 5:101 Com. B 6 to exploit counter-performance for payment Art. 5:101 Com. B 6 cutting of hair Art. 5:101 Com. B 5 demolition of a Art. 5:101 Com. B 6 building illegality Art. 5:101 Com. B 10; Art. 5:101 Com. B 13 immorality Art. 5:101 Com. B 10 implied consent Art. 5:101 Com. B 8 inattention Art. 5:101 Com. B 9 informed consent Art. 5:101 Com. B 12 injured person Art. 5:101 Com. B 5 invalidity Art. 5:101 Com. B 10 lack of capacity of the injured person Art. 5:101 Com. B 10 et seq. medical treatment Art. 5:101 Com. B 6 minors Art. 5:101 Com. B 11 mistake on the extent Art. 5:101 Com. B 8 operation Art. 5:101 Com. B 5; Art. 5:101 Com. B 11 property, disposition of Art.5:101 Com.B11 purposeful conduct Art. 5:101 Com. B 9 scope Art. 5:101 Com. B 8 sexual practices connected with infliction of pain Art. 5:101 Com. B 5 tattoo Art. 5:101 Com. B 5 third party claims, Art. 5:501 Com. 2 exclusion of validity Art. 5:101 Com. B 10 et seq. consequential loss Art. 2:101 Com. A 2 et seq. causation Art. 4:101 Notes, II 17 maintenance, loss of Art. 2:202 Com. F 15

1270

Index personal injury consideration Common Law constitutional law legally relevant damage consumer

Introd. Ch. 2, A 6 Introd. Ch. 1, B 13 Art. 7:101 Com. 1 et seq. Art. 2:101 Com. B 8

Art. 2:208 Com. A 1; Art. 2:208 Com. B 11 property damage Art. 3:204 Notes, II 3 consumer associations Introd. Ch. 1, D 35; Art. 1:102 Com. B 5; Art. 2:208 Com. B 11 consumer property Art. 3:204 Com. A 5; Art. 3:204 Com. B 14 et seq. consumer property legal policy Art. 3:204 Com. B 15 consumer protection Art. 3:204 Com. A 3 legal policy Art. 3:204 Com. A 9 Consumer Protection Art. 1:103 Notes, II 18 Directive contamination of land Art. 3:206 Com. A 3 continued payment of salary in cases of illness Introd. Ch. 1, D 34 contract, conclusion of Introd. Ch. 1, D 28 contract law Introd. Ch. 1, D 28 et seq.; Art. 1:103 Notes, I 1 priority Art. 1:103 Com. D 11; Art. 1:103 Notes, I 1 contractual liability Art. 2:207 Com. A 3; Art. 5:101 Com. B 6; Art. 6:202 Com. 4 contractual obligation inducing Art. 2:211 Com. A 1 et seq.; non-performance Art. 2:211 Com. B 6 non-performance of contractual obligations Art. 2:101 Com. E 18; Art. 2:101 Com. E 23; Art. 2:208 Com. A 3 contractual rights Art. 2:101 Com. C 13; Art. 2:206 Com. B 12 contributory fault Art. 3:101 Com. A 1; Art. 5:101 Com. B 7; Art. 5:102 Com. A 1; Art. 5:102 Com. A 7; Art. 5:102 Com. B 10; Art. 5:103 Com. 1; Art. 5:302 Com. A 7; Art. 6:301 Com. 1 auxiliary persons Art. 5:102 Com. A 1 bodily injury Art. 5:102 Com. A 4 causation Art. 5:102 Com. C 13 children Art. 5:102 Com. A 8 division of liability Art. 5:102 Com. B 11

Index driving through a red light drunkenness at the wheel employees

Czech Republic Art. 5:102 Com. C 16 Art. 5:102 Com. C 16

Art. 5:102 Com. A 1; Art. 5:102 Com. D 17 event beyond control Art. 5:102 Com. B 10 extent of the damage Art. 5:102 Com. A 3; Art. 5:102 Com. B 12 fault Art. 5:102 Com. B 10 gross negligence Art. 5:102 Com. C 16 immaterial Art. 5:102 Com. A 9 contributory fault insubstantial fault Art. 5:102 Com. A 9; Art. 5:102 Com. C 13 intention Art. 5:102 Com. A 6 mentally disabled Art. 5:102 Com. A 8 persons minimal contributory Art. 5:102 Com. C 13 fault mirror Art. 5:102 Com. A 5 et seq.; principle Art. 5:102 Com. D 17 et seq. negligence Art. 5:102 Com. A 6 et seq. not buckling one’s Art. 5:102 Com. C 16 seatbelt occurrence of Art. 5:102 Com. A 3; the damage Art. 5:102 Com. B 10 prevention Art. 6:302 Com. 3 reduction of liability Art. 5:102 Com. B 11; Art. 6:202 Com. 6 reduction of liability Art. 5:102 Com. A 5; to zero Art. 5:102 Com. B 10 et seq.; Art. 5:302 Com. A 7 representatives Art. 5:102 Com. A 1 self-harm of the Art. 4:101 Com. B 15 victim source of danger Art. 5:102 Com. D 18 suicide Art. 5:102 Com. B 10 third party claims Art. 5:501 Com. 2 traffic accidents Art. 5:102 Com. A 4; Art. 5:102 Com. C 14 et seq. victim protection Art. 5:102 Com. A 6; Art. 5:102 Com. A 9; Art. 5:102 Com. C 15 contributory negligence Art. 5:102 Com. A 7 copyright Art. 2:206 Com. B 11 profits, recovery of Art. 6:101 Com. F 17

court court proceedings

Art. 7:103 Com. 3 Art. 7:103 Com. 1; Art. 7:103 Com. 3 cranes Art. 3:205 Com. A 2; Art. 3:207 Com. B 5 credit securities Art. 2:203 Com. A 2 creditworthiness, information about Art. 2:207 Com. A 1; Art. 2:207 Com. A 3 creditworthiness, Art. 2:208 Com. A 3 jeopardising crimes Introd. Ch. 1, D 26 damage caused unintentionally by participant to another participant Art. 5:103 Com. 4 et seq. criminal law Introd. Ch. 1, D 27 duty of care Art. 3:102 Com. B 9 intention Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 19 negligence Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 19 culpa in concreto Introd. Ch. 1, C 25 culpa in contrahendo Art. 2:205 Com. A 3; Introd. Ch. 1, D 28 culpa-rule Introd. Ch. 1, B 5 custody Art. 3:104 Com. D 15 customary law Art. 7:102 Notes, 1 cyclists Art. 5:102 Com. C 14 Cyprus Introd. Ch. 1, B 5; Introd. Ch. 1, B 10 age limit (children) Art. 3:103 Notes, I 16 minors Art. 3:103 Notes, I 16 negligence Art. 1:101 Notes, II 8 product liability Art. 3:204 Notes, I 1 product liability, Art. 3:204 Notes, V 45 financial ceiling tort law Introd. Ch. 1, C 14 Czech Republic Introd. Ch. 1, B 11 age limit (children) Art. 3:103 Notes, I 6 breach of bonos Art. 1:101 Notes, III 16; mores Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 20 burden of proof Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 39 collaboration in a Art. 5:103 Notes, 1 criminal act consequential loss Art. 2:201 Notes, VII 54 damage Art. 2:101 Notes, VII 61 environmental Art. 2:209 Notes, I 1 liability expenditure in Art. 6:302 Notes, 4 preventing damage

1271

damage fraudulent Art. 2:210 Notes, 5 misrepresentation funeral costs Art. 2:202 Notes, IV 33 general clause Art. 1:101 Notes, II 3 health, injury to Art. 2:101 Notes, V 42; Art. 2:201 Notes, VII 54 impending danger Art. 1:102 Notes, I 2 inducement to Art. 2:211 Notes, 6 breach of contract injunctive relief Art. 1:102 Notes, I 2 legal persons Art. 1:103 Notes, III 40 liability on equitable Art. 5:301 Notes, 5 grounds loss of earnings Art. 2:101 Notes, III 25; Art. 2:201 Notes, V 26 loss of profits Art. 2:101 Notes, III 25 maintenance, loss of Art. 2:202 Notes, V 46 minors Art. 3:103 Notes, I 6 non-economic Art. 2:201 Notes, VII 54 damage non-pecuniary loss Art. 2:101 Notes, V 42 parental liability for damage caused by children Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 39 pecuniary loss Art. 2:101 Notes, III 25 personal injury Art. 2:101 Notes, III 25 physical damage to Art. 2:101 Notes, III 25 property product liability Art. 3:204 Notes, I 1 property right, Art. 2:206 Notes, I 5 infringement of real damage Art. 2:101 Notes, III 25 reduction of liability on equitable grounds Art. 5:103 Notes, 1 relatives, loss Art. 2:202 Notes, II 10 suffered by supervisory duty Art. 3:104 Notes, I 7 wrongfulness Art. 1:101 Notes, III 12 damage Introd. Ch. 1, C 16 et seq.; Introd. Ch. 1, C 20; Introd. Ch. 1, C 22 et seq.; Art. 1:101 Com. A 3; Introd. Ch. 2, A 3; Art. 2:101 Com. A 2; see also legally relevant damage burden of proof Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 31 compensation Introd. Ch.1, A 1 economic Introd. Ch. 1, D 29 impending damage; see prevention

1272

Index intention loss of regular periodic income non-economic

Introd. Ch. 1, C 21 Art. 6:203 Com. 3

Introd. Ch. 1, D 29; Introd. Ch. 2, A 10 notion Art. 2:101 Notes, I 1 personal injury Art. 1:101 Com. A 1 property damage Art. 1:101 Com. A 1; Introd. Ch. 1, D 32 proximity of damage Art. 2:101 Com. E 21 remoteness of damage Art. 2:101 Com. E 21 right to reparation Introd. Ch. 1, C 21 threat of damage Art. 1:102 Com. A 1; Art. 1:102 Com. C 8; see also prevention trivial damage Art. 1:101 Com. A 17 damage caused by animals; see also animals acting at own risk Art. 3:203 Com. A 4; Art. 5:101 Com. C 15 causation Art. 3:203 Com. B 6; Art. 4:101 Com. A 8 death Art. 3:203 Com. A 3 defences Art. 3:203 Com. A 4 health injuries Art. 3:203 Com. A 3 infection with disease Art. 3:203 Com. A 3 personal injury Art. 3:203 Com. A 3 property damage Art. 3:203 Com. A 3 damage caused by dangerous emissions See dangerous emissions damage caused by dangerous substances See dangerous substances damage caused by motor vehicles Art. 3:205 Com. A 1 et seq.; see also motor vehicles; road traffic accidents Art. 3:205 Com. B 11 acting at own risk Art. 5:101 Notes, II 14 causation Art. 3:205 Com. B 12 contributory fault Art. 3:205 Com. A 7 defences Art. 3:205 Com. A 7 driver fleeing the scene of the accident Art. 3:205 Com. A 3 exclusion of liability Art. 5:401 Com. E 17 funds, claims against Art. 3:205 Com. A 3 health, injury to Art. 3:205 Com. A 7 legally relevant Art. 3:205 Com. A 4 damage

Index parked cars Art. 3:205 Com. B 11 et seq. personal injury Art. 3:205 Com. A 1; Art. 3:205 Com. A 4; Art. 3:205 Com. A 6 et seq.; Art. 3:205 Com. B 12 property damage Art. 3:205 Com. A 1; Art. 3:205 Com. A 4 et seq.; Art. 3:205 Com. B 12 queue, car at the Art. 3:205 Com. B 12 front of a restriction of liability Art. 5:401 Com. E 17 strict liability Art. 3:207 Com. B 5 damage per se Art. 2:101 Com. A 3; see also injury as such behaviour, norm of Art. 3:101 Com. C 8 human dignity Art. 2:203 Com. B 4 property right, Art. 2:206 Com. A 3 infringement of damages Art. 2:201 Com. A 4 assessment Art. 6:101 Com. A 4 lump sum Art. 6:203 Com. 1 et seq. monetary damages; see compensation quantification Art. 6:203 Com. 1 dangerous emissions Introd. Ch. 3, E 27; Art. 3:202 Com. A 6; Art. 3:206 Com. A 1 causation Art. 3:206 Com. B 13 contamination of land Art. 3:206 Com. A 3 damage Art. 3:206 Com. B 8 defences Art. 3:206 Com. B 18 duty of care Art. 3:206 Com. B 6 ecological damage Art. 2:209 Com. B 5 electricity Art. 3:206 Com. B 15 event beyond control Art. 3:206 Com. B 18 heat Art. 3:206 Com. B 15 impact on Art. 3:206 Com. B 15 environment incorporeal impact Art. 3:206 Com. B 15 light Art. 3:206 Com. B 15 noise Art. 3:206 Com. B 15 operator Art. 3:206 Com. B 5 et seq. of an installation property damage Art. 2:206 Com. E 21 radiation Art. 3:206 Com. B 15 risk, realisation of Art. 3:206 Com. B 12 statutory standards Art. 3:206 Com. B 17 strict liability Art. 3:206 Com. B 12

dangerous substances vibrations Art. 3:206 Com. B 15 dangerous premises Introd. Ch. 3, E 27 dangerous substances Introd. Ch. 3, E 27; Art. 3:202 Com. A 6; Art. 3:206 Com. A 1 alcohol Art. 3:206 Com. B 9 attributes, dangerous Art. 3:206 Com. B 11 causation Art. 3:206 Com. B 13 chemicals Art. 3:206 Com. B 14 control of the Art. 3:206 Com. B 17 substance corrosive Art. 3:206 Com. B 10 et seq. chemicals damage Art. 3:206 Com. B 8 dangerousness Art. 3:206 Com. B 11 defences Art. 3:206 Com. B 18 disposal of effluents Art. 3:206 Com. B 14 duty of care Art. 3:206 Com. B 6 ecological damage Art. 2:209 Com. B 5 environment Art. 3:206 Com. B 11 event beyond control Art. 3:206 Com. B 18 explosion Art. 3:206 Com. B 11 gaseous form Art. 3:206 Com. B 14 genetically experimental breeding Art. 3:206 Com. B 11 grain Art. 3:206 Com. B 9 hazard signs Art. 3:206 Com. B 11 ignition Art. 3:206 Com. B 11 keeper Art. 3:206 Com. B 5 et seq. of a substance liquid form Art. 3:206 Com. B 14 micro-organisms Art. 3:206 Com. B 14 milk powder Art. 3:206 Com. B 9 oxidisation Art. 3:206 Com. B 11 poison Art. 3:206 Com. B 11 property damage Art. 2:206 Com. E 21 quantity Art. 3:206 Com. B 9 radiating materials Art. 3:206 Com. B 11 risk, realisation of Art. 3:206 Com. B 12 solid form Art. 3:206 Com. B 14 statutory standards Art. 3:206 Com. B 17 strict liability Art. 3:206 Com. B 12 transport Art. 3:206 Com. B 11 unsafe state of Art. 3:206 Com. B 10 immovable vapours Art. 3:206 Com. B 14 water Art. 3:206 Com. B 9; Art. 3:206 Com. B 12

1273

danno wind, transportation by danno danno biologico danno ingiusto

Index Art. 3:206 Com. B 14

Introd. Ch. 1, C 22 Art. 2:201 Com. B 12 Introd. Ch. 1, B 7; Introd. Ch. 2, A 4 de minimis rule Art. 1:101 Com. A 17; Art. 2:101 Com. A 6; Art. 6:102 Com. 1; see also trivial damage death Art. 2:202 Com. C 9; Introd. Ch. 3, E 28 annuity payments Art. 6:203 Com. 3 close relations Art. 2:202 Com. A 4; Art. 2:202 Com. B 5 consequential loss Art. 2:202 Com. A 2 inheritability Art. 2:202 Notes, III 20 of claims for the reparation of pecuniary damage lump sum Art. 6:203 Com. 3 maintenance, loss of Art. 2:202 Com. B 8; Art. 2:202 Com. F 15 periodic payments Art. 6:203 Com. 3 predisposition of Art. 4:101 Com. B 18 the injured person predisposition of the Art. 1:101 Com. A 6 victim third parties, Art. 2:202 Notes, VI 55 harm to deception Introd. Ch. 2, A 5; Introd. Ch. 2, A 11 defamation Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23; Art. 1:103 Com. E 14; Art. 2:203 Com. E 16; Introd. Ch. 1, B 5; Introd. Ch. 1, D 27 criminal defamation Art. 2:203 Com. E 17 disseminating false Art. 2:203 Com. B 13 information defective products Introd. Ch. 3, D 17; Introd. Ch. 3, E 27; Art. 3:207 Com. B 7 exclusion of liability Art. 5:401 Com. A 8 restriction of liability Art. 5:401 Com. A 8 defence Introd. Ch. 1, C 19; Introd. Ch. 1, C 25; Introd. Ch. 2, A 2 burden of proof Art. 1:101 Com. A 10 justified furtherance Introd. Ch. 1, D 32 of another’s interest

1274

defences

Art. 1:103 Com. A 1; Art. 5:101 Com. A 1 et seq.; Art. 5:201 Com. 1 authority Art. 5:201 Com. 1 et seq. conferred by law benevolent intervention in another’s affairs, justified Art. 5:202 Com. A 1; Art. 5:202 Com. C 7 burden of proof Art. 5:101 Com. A 1 consciously incurring Art. 5:101 Com. A 2 danger consent Art. 5:101 Com. A 2; Art. 5:101 Com. B 4 contractual terms Art. 5:101 Com. A 2 contributory conduct Art. 5:101 Com. A 2 contributory fault Art. 5:102 Com. A 1; Art. 5:302 Com. A 7 contributory fault, auxiliary persons Art. 5:102 Com. A 1 contributory source Art. 5:102 Com. A 1 of danger damage suffered Art. 5:101 Com. A 2 by family members dependants of the Art. 5:501 Com. 1 injured person event beyond Art. 5:302 Com. A 1 et seq. control Art. 5:103 Com. 1; ex turpi Art. 5:103 Com. 4 et seq.; causa non Art. 5:103 Notes, 1 oritur actio exclusion of liability Art. 5:101 Com. A 2 exculpatory grounds Art. 5:101 Com. A 2 extinction of liability Art. 5:101 Com. A 1 family, protection of Art. 5:101 Com. A 3 freedom of opinion Art. 5:101 Com. A 3 freedom of press Art. 5:101 Com. A 3 incorrect information Art. 2:204 Com. A 5 justificatory grounds Art. 5:101 Com. A 2 limitation of liability Art. 5:101 Com. A 2 marriage, Art. 5:101 Com. A 3 protection of mental disability Art. 3:102 Com. A 6 mental incompetence Introd. Ch. 3, E 22; Art. 5:202 Com. B 5; Art. 5:301 Com. A 1 et seq. national law Art. 5:101 Com. A 3

Index necessity

Denmark Art. 5:202 Com. A 1; Art. 5:202 Com. D 9 Art. 5:101 Com. A 2

participating in criminal act public interest Art. 5:203 Com. 1 et seq. reduction of damages Art. 5:101 Com. A 1 self-defence Art. 5:202 Com. A 1 third party claims Art. 5:501 Com. 1 et seq. uncontrollable risk Art. 5:101 Com. A 2 unlawfulness Art. 5:101 Com. A 2 defendant Art. 1:101 Com. A 3 defender Art. 1:101 Com. A 3 delict Art. 1:101 Com. A 2; Introd. Ch. 2, A 2 demented persons Art. 3:104 Com. B 11 democratic society Art. 5:203 Com. 1; Art. 5:203 Com. 3 demolition of a building Art. 5:101 Com. B 6 demonstrations Art. 5:203 Com. 3 Denmark abandonment Art. 3:208 Notes, 8 accidents, Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 43 occupational accountability Art. 1:101 Notes, II 6 accountants Art. 2:207 Notes, 11 acting at own risk Art. 5:101 Notes, II 27 adequate causation Art. 4:101 Notes, I 14 adjoining properties Art. 3:202 Notes, 13 administrative law Art. 6:301 Notes, 10 age limit (children) Art. 3:103 Notes, I 12 aggravation of risk Art. 3:102 Notes, II 25 alternative causes Art. 4:103 Notes, 12 amends Art. 2:101 Notes, I 13 animals, damage Art. 3:203 Notes, 13 caused by annuity Art. 6:203 Notes, 12 assessment of damages Art. 6:203 Notes, 12 assignment of rights to reparation Art. 6:106 Notes, 11 assumption of risk Art. 5:101 Notes, II 27 babysitters Art. 3:201 Notes, I 12 banking secrecy Art. 2:205 Notes, 10 benefit equalisation Art. 6:103 Notes, 13 breach of confidence Art. 2:205 Notes, 10 breach of contract, Art. 2:101 Notes, IX 93 inducement of breach of statutory Art. 3:102 Notes, III 38 duty

buildings, unsafe state Art. 3:202 Notes, 13 burden of proof Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 43; Art. 4:101 Notes, III 36 business operators Art. 2:101 Notes, V 49 cable cases Art. 2:206 Notes, I 12 car, damaged Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 35 case law Art. 3:102 Notes, I 13 cattle Art. 3:203 Notes, 13 causation Art. 1:101 Notes, II 6; Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 43; Art. 4:101 Notes, I 14; Art. 4:101 Notes, III 36 chicanery, Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 21 prohibition of childminders Art. 3:104 Notes, I 14 clean-up costs Art. 3:206 Notes, 14 close relatives, care Art. 2:201 Notes, VI 46 for injured party collision of vehicles Art. 3:205 Notes, 14 commercial activities, Art. 2:208 Notes, 12 interference with commercial value, Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 35 reduced compensation Art. 6:101 Notes, I 12 compulsory insurance Art. 3:205 Notes, 14 concurrence of Art. 1:103 Notes, I 12 actions consent Art. 5:101 Notes, I 11 consequential loss Art. 2:201 Notes, V 33 construction work Art. 3:207 Notes, 10 continuance of salary Art. 6:103 Notes, 13 contributory fault Art. 5:102 Notes, I 13; Art. 5:102 Notes, III 39 contributory Art. 5:101 Notes, II 27 negligence corporate secrets Art. 2:205 Notes, 10 credit information Art. 2:204 Notes, I 11 criminal fraud Art. 2:210 Notes, 11 culpa-rule Art. 1:101 Notes, II 6; Art. 3:102 Notes, III 38; Art. 3:104 Notes, II 29; Introd. Ch. 1, B 5 customs Art. 3:102 Notes, I 13 damage Art. 1:101 Notes, II 6; Art. 2:101 Notes, I 13 damages, Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 34 calculation of dangerous activities Art. 3:206 Notes, 14

1275

Denmark defamation Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 39 dependants, surviving Art. 6:203 Notes, 12 development risks Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 42 difference method Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 34 direct intention Art. 3:101 Notes, 12 Directive on electronic commerce Art. 2:204 Notes, IV 43 dissemination Art. 5:203 Notes, 13 of information dogs Art. 3:203 Notes, 13 dolus eventualis Art. 3:101 Notes, 12 domestic animals Art. 3:203 Notes, 13 driver of a motor Art. 3:205 Notes, 14 vehicle drunken driver Art. 5:101 Notes, II 27; Art. 5:102 Notes, III 39 drunkenness Art. 5:301 Notes, 13 duty to act Art. 3:102 Notes, II 25 economic loss Art. 2:101 Notes, I 13 emissions Art. 3:206 Notes, 14 employees, personal Art. 5:401 Notes, 13; liability Art. 7:104 Notes, 11 employees, solidary liability with employers Art. 6:105 Notes, 13 employers, liability Art. 3:201 Notes, I 12; for employees Art. 3:201 Notes, II 26 employers, solidary Art. 6:105 Notes, 13 liability with employees employers’ Art. 7:104 Notes, 12 associations employers’ liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 13 employment Art. 3:201 Notes, I 12 relationship environmental Art. 2:209 Notes, I 2; liability Art. 3:202 Notes, 13; Art. 3:206 Notes, 14; Art. 3:208 Notes, 8; Art. 6:302 Notes, 9 excavation work Art. 3:206 Notes, 14 excavations Art. 3:207 Notes, 10 exclusion from a Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 79 trade union exclusion of liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 13 expenditure in Art. 6:302 Notes, 9 preventing damage fault Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 43 feelings, injured Art. 2:101 Notes, V 49

1276

Index fraudulent Art. 2:210 Notes, 11 misrepresentation freedom of Art. 2:204 Notes, I 11 expression freedom of physical Art. 2:203 Notes, I 2 movement funeral costs Art. 2:202 Notes, IV 39 gardeners, Art. 3:201 Notes, I 12 self-employed grief Art. 2:202 Notes, II 18 gross negligence Art. 3:101 Notes, 12; Art. 5:102 Notes, I 13 guardians Art. 3:104 Notes, I 14 harbour worker Art. 3:201 Notes, I 12 health of workers Art. 3:102 Notes, III 38 holiday camps Art. 3:104 Notes, I 14 honour Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 39; Art. 6:101 Notes, I 12; Art. 6:204 Notes, 9 housekeeping, Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 36 loss of images, unauthorised publication Art. 2:203 Notes, II 15 impairment of Art. 2:208 Notes, 12 business incorrect Art. 2:204 Notes, I 11 information incorrect information, Art. 2:207 Notes, 11 reliance on indemnified persons Art. 7:105 Notes, 3 independent Art. 3:201 Notes, I 12 contractors indirect intention Art. 3:101 Notes, 12 inducement to breach of contract Art. 2:211 Notes, 12 industrial injury Art. 6:103 Notes, 13; insurance Art. 7:104 Notes, 11 inheritability of claims for the compensation of nonpecuniary damage Art. 2:202 Notes, III 21 injunctive relief Art. 1:102 Notes, I 9; Art. 6:301 Notes, 10 insurance coverage Art. 3:103 Notes, I 12 insurance payments Introd. Ch. 1, D 34 intellectual property Art. 6:301 Notes, 10 intention Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 21; Art. 3:101 Notes, 12

Index intoxication Art. 5:301 Notes, 13 keeper of an animal Art. 3:203 Notes, 13 Kindergarten Art. 3:104 Notes, I 14 labour law Art. 6:301 Notes, 10 landlord-tenant Art. 6:301 Notes, 10 disputes landlord-tenant Art. 3:202 Notes, 13 relationship legal persons Art. 1:103 Notes, III 40; Art. 2:101 Notes, VI 54 legal persons, liability for decision-making body Art. 3:201 Notes, II 26 legal persons, liability for representatives Art. 3:201 Notes, II 26 legally protected interest, breach of Art. 2:101 Notes, XI 125 legally protected interest, infringement of Art. 2:101 Notes, I 13 liability insurance Art. 3:103 Notes, I 12; Art. 6:105 Notes, 13 liberty, deprivation of Art. 6:204 Notes, 9 liquidators Art. 3:201 Notes, II 26 loss Art. 2:101 Notes, I 13 loss of ability to work Art. 6:203 Notes, 12 loss of income Art. 2:101 Notes, XII 131 loss of use Art. 2:206 Notes, III 39 loss-of-use insurance Art. 7:105 Notes, 3 lump sum Art. 6:203 Notes, 12 maintenance, loss of Art. 2:202 Notes, V 52 market value of Art. 6:101 Notes, I 12 damaged property media liability Art. 5:203 Notes, 13 medical negligence Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 43 mental health Art. 2:201 Notes, III 14 mental incompetence Art. 5:301 Notes, 13 minors Art. 3:103 Notes, I 12; Art. 3:103 Notes, II 21 mirror principle Art. 5:102 Notes, IV 53 motor vehicles, damage caused by Art. 3:205 Notes, 14 natural causation Art. 4:101 Notes, I 14 natural persons Art. 1:103 Notes, III 40 necessity Art. 5:202 Notes, III 30 negligence Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 21; Art. 3:102 Notes, I 13

Denmark negligent Art. 3:102 Notes, II 25 manslaughter negotiorum gestio Art. 5:202 Notes, II 17 neighbour disputes Art. 6:301 Notes, 10 neighbours, relations Art. 3:202 Notes, 13; between Art. 3:206 Notes, 14 non-economic Art. 2:101 Notes, I 13; damage Art. 3:204 Notes, III 31 non-economic loss Art. 2:101 Notes, V 49 non-pecuniary Art. 2:206 Notes, III 39 damage non-pecuniary loss Art. 2:101 Notes, VI 54; Art. 6:203 Notes, 12 omissions Art. 3:102 Notes, II 25 owner of a motor Art. 3:205 Notes, 14 vehicle parental liability Art. 3:104 Notes, I 14; Art. 3:104 Notes, II 29 patient, injury Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 43 sustained by permanent disability Art. 6:203 Notes, 12 personal injury Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 36; Art. 2:201 Notes, II 5; Art. 2:201 Notes, V 33 personality Art. 2:205 Notes, 10 personality, general Art. 2:203 Notes, II 16 protection physical injury Art. 2:201 Notes, III 14 pollution Art. 3:206 Notes, 14 post-mortal Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 76 personality rights press, liability Art. 2:203 Notes, II 15; Art. 2:204 Notes, I 11 prevention Art. 6:302 Notes, 9 privacy, right to Art. 2:203 Notes, III 27 private health Art. 6:103 Notes, 13 insurance private matters Art. 6:301 Notes, 10 product liability Art. 3:204 Notes, I 1; Art. 3:204 Notes, II 15; Art. 3:204 Notes, II 27; Art. 3:204 Notes, III 31; Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 42 product liability, Art. 3:204 Notes, V 45 financial ceiling profit of the Art. 6:101 Notes, II 25 infringer

1277

Denmark property damage

Art. 2:206 Notes, I 12; Art. 2:206 Notes, II 25; Art. 2:206 Notes, III 39 property insurance Art. 7:105 Notes, 3 public interest Art. 5:203 Notes, 13 public policy Art. 3:102 Notes, I 13 pure economic loss Art. 1:101 Notes, II 6; Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 34 real damage Art. 2:101 Notes, I 13 reasonable person Art. 3:102 Notes, I 13 reduced commercial value Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 35 reduction of liability Art. 5:301 Notes, 13; Art. 6:202 Notes, 11 relatives, loss Art. 2:202 Notes, II 18 suffered by repair costs Art. 6:101 Notes, I 12 replacement costs Art. 6:101 Notes, I 12 restriction of liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 13 right to one’s Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 68 image rights in rem Art. 2:206 Notes, II 25 road traffic Art. 3:102 Notes, III 38 ordinance safety of workers Art. 3:102 Notes, III 38 schools Art. 3:104 Notes, I 14 secondary victims Art. 5:501 Notes, 7 self-defence Art. 5:202 Notes, I 12 several creditors Art. 6:104 Notes, 11 sexual harassment Art. 3:201 Notes, I 12 social security benefits Art. 6:103 Notes, 13 solidary liability Art. 4:103 Notes, 12; Art. 6:105 Notes, 13 state liability Art. 7:103 Notes, 13 statutory provisions Art. 3:102 Notes, I 13 strict liability Art. 3:103 Notes, I 12; Art. 3:205 Notes, 14; Art. 3:206 Notes, 14 subcontractors Art. 3:201 Notes, I 12 supervision, Art. 3:104 Notes, I 14 defective supervisory duty Art. 3:104 Notes, II 29 threshold amount for property damage claims of consumers Art. 3:204 Notes, II 15 total loss Art. 6:101 Notes, I 12 trade unions Art. 7:104 Notes, 12

1278

Index traffic accidents

Art. 3:205 Notes, 14; Art. 5:102 Notes, I 13; Art. 5:102 Notes, III 39; Art. 5:102 Notes, IV 53; Art. 5:501 Notes, 7 transport by plane Art. 3:207 Notes, 10 transport by rail Art. 3:207 Notes, 10 transport by ship Art. 3:207 Notes, 10 unfair competition Art. 2:208 Notes, 12 user of a motor vehicle Art. 3:205 Notes, 14 vicarious liability Art. 3:201 Notes, I 12 wild animals Art. 3:203 Notes, 13 work accidents Art. 7:104 Notes, 11 wrongful Art. 2:101 Notes, X 105 conception wrongfulness Art. 5:101 Notes, I 11 dentist standard of care Art. 3:102 Com. C 17 depreciation of value Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 35 detention Art. 2:206 Com. C 14 several detentors Art. 2:206 Com. C 16 detriment Introd. Ch. 1, C 21 et seq. development Art. 3:204 Com. A 8 et seq.; risks Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 33 duty to warn Art. 3:204 Com. A 12 innovations Art. 3:204 Com. A 9; Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 43 insurance costs Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 43 insurance coverage Art. 3:204 Com. A 9 national law Art. 3:207 Com. A 2 range of industrial Art. 3:204 Com. A 9 products technological Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 43 progress thalidomide cases Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 43 digital signatures Art. 2:207 Com. A 1 dignity Art. 2:203 Com. A 2; Art. 3:207 Com. B 5; see also human dignity confidentiality, Art. 2:205 Com. A 2 absolute incorrect Art. 2:204 Com. E 14 et seq. information legal persons Art. 2:101 Com. B 8 personal dignity Introd. Ch. 2, A 11; Art. 2:101 Com. C 12; Art. 2:101 Com. E 18

Index private sphere of Art. 2:203 Com. B 11 a person Directive on electronic Art. 2:204 Com. B 7; commerce Art. 2:204 Notes, IV 37; Art. 2:207 Com. A 2; Introd. Ch. 3, D 17 Directive on environmental liability Introd. Ch. 3, D 17, implementation Art. 2:209 Notes, I 1 et seq. Directive on liability for defective products Introd. Ch. 3, D 17 Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights Art. 6:101 Notes, II 28 Directive on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading Art. 2:207 Com. A 2 Directives of the European Community national law Art. 3:207 Com. A 3 disclosure Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 discrimination, Art. 2:101 Com. C 12; prohibition of Introd. Ch. 3, D 17; see also right not to be discriminated against disenrichment Art. 6:101 Com. F 16 disgust Art. 2:101 Com. F 30 dishonourable conduct Art. 5:103 Com. 1 dissemination of Art. 2:204 Com. B 6 information disturbances Art. 2:101 Com. A 2 divided obligations Art. 6:105 Com. A 3 divided right to Art. 6:104 Com. 3 performance divorce obligation to Art. 2:101 Com. C 10 maintain a child doctor /patient Art. 2:205 Com. A 2; confidentiality Art. 2:205 Notes, 2 doctors legal liability Art. 2:207 Com. A 1 dolus eventualis Art. 3:101 Com. D 12 domestic services Art. 2:201 Com. C 13 domestic violence Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 dommage Introd. Ch. 1, C 22 donations from third parties benefit equalisation Art. 6:103 Com. 11

duty to warn driver of a motor Art. 3:205 Com. B 10 vehicle driver fleeing the scene Art. 3:205 Com. A 3 of the accident professional drivers Art. 3:205 Com. B 10 drugs test Art. 2:101 Com. A 3 drunkenness at Art. 5:102 Com. C 16 the wheel duress Art. 3:101 Com. D 14 Dutch law; see Netherlands, The duties of correct Art. 1:103 Com. B 3 et seq. organisation duty of care Introd. Ch. 3, B 4; Art. 3:102 Com. B 8 et seq. commercial life Art. 3:102 Com. C 19 criminal law Art. 3:102 Com. B 9 provisions fiduciary duty Art. 3:102 Com. C 19 foreseeability Art. 3:102 Com. C 18 general duty of care Art. 3:102 Com. A 3; Art. 3:102 Com. B 13; Art. 3:102 Com. C 17 et seq. information to Art. 3:102 Com. C 19 the public norms of care Art. 3:102 Com. B 15 prevention Art. 3:102 Com. C 19 private life Art. 3:102 Com. C 19 prohibitory norms Art. 3:102 Com. B 15 purpose of statutes Art. 3:102 Com. B 16 reasonably careful Art. 3:102 Com. B 14; person Art. 3:102 Com. C 17 reduction of Art. 3:102 Com. B 11 standard of care relationship, close Art. 3:102 Com. C 19 relationship of trust Art. 3:102 Com. C 19 risks Art. 3:102 Com. C 19 source of danger Art. 3:102 Com. C 19 statutory Art. 3:102 Com. B 8 et seq. provisions duty to provide Art. 2:210 Com. B 7 information duty to supervise See supervisory duty duty to warn development risks Art. 3:204 Com. A 12

1279

earnings, loss of earnings, loss of Art. 2:202 Com. F 15 Eastern central Europe negligence Art. 3:102 Notes, I 6 pure economic loss Introd. Ch. 1, B 13 eavesdropping Art. 2:205 Com. B 8 ecological damage Introd. Ch. 2, A 11; Art. 2:209 Com. A 1; Art. 3:206 Com. A 2 dangerous emissions Art. 2:209 Com. B 5 dangerous substances Art. 2:209 Com. B 5 expenses Art. 2:209 Com. B 5 for elimination NGO Art. 2:209 Com. C 7 private persons Art. 2:209 Com. C 7 public authorities Art. 2:209 Com. A 1 E-Commerce Directive See Directive on electronic commerce economic damage assignment of rights to reparation Art. 6:106 Com. 2 et seq. succession Art. 6:106 Com. 2 et seq. economic loss Introd. Ch. 1, C 17; Art. 1:101 Com. A 3; Art. 1:101 Com. A 5 et seq.; Art. 2:101 Com. F 24 et seq.; Art. 2:101 Com. F 29; Art. 2:101 Notes, III 22; Art. 2:201 Com. C 13 acting at own risk Art. 5:101 Com. C 17 burdens Art. 2:101 Com. F 24 et seq.; incurred Art. 2:101 Com. F 27 consequential loss Art. 2:201 Com. C 13 determination Art. 2:101 Com. F 26 domestic services Art. 2:101 Com. F 29 future loss Art. 2:101 Com. F 28 increase in debts Art. 2:101 Com. F 27 loss of income Art. 2:101 Com. F 24; Art. 2:101 Com. F 28 loss of profit Art. 2:101 Com. F 24; Art. 2:101 Com. F 28 market value Art. 2:101 Com. A 5 normative damage Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 34 property, reduction Art. 2:101 Com. F 24; in the value of Art. 2:101 Com. F 26 status quo Art. 2:101 Com. F 26 status quo ante Art. 2:101 Com. F 26 economic total loss Art. 6:101 Com. E 12 egg shell skull Art. 4:101 Com. B 18 election Art. 2:101 Com. C 12

1280

Index electricity electronic commerce

Art. 3:206 Com. B 15 Art. 2:204 Com. B 7; Art. 2:204 Notes, IV 37 Art. 2:203 Com. B 8

electronic media emergency situations third party claims, Art. 5:501 Com. 2 exclusion of emissions, dangerous See dangerous emissions emotional suffering Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 employees Art. 2:202 Com. A 2 causation of damage Art. 4:101 Com. A 7 continuation of pay Art. 6:103 Com. 2; Art. 6:103 Com. 11 contributory fault Art. 5:102 Com. A 1; Art. 5:102 Com. D 17 damage to detriment of employer Art. 7:104 Com. 2 damage to detriment Art. 3:201 Com. B 13; of third parties Art. 7:104 Com. 2 defences Art. 3:201 Com. A 6 employers’ Art. 3:201 Com. A 1 et seq. liability exclusion from service Art. 3:201 Com. B 11 at time of injury harm by employer Art. 3:201 Com. A 5 harming colleagues Art. 3:201 Com. A 5; Art. 7:104 Com. 2 harming the employer Art. 3:201 Com. A 5 hiring of employees Art. 4:101 Com. A 7 joint liability Art. 7:104 Com. 2 keeper Art. 3:201 Com. B 13 liability Introd. Ch. 3, E 25; Art. 5:101 Com. A 3; Art. 7:104 Com. 2 liability for employees Art. 3:201 Com. A 1 mental disability Art. 3:201 Com. B 12 personal liability Art. 3:201 Com. B 12; Art. 3:201 Com. B 14; Art. 7:104 Com. 2 solidary liability Art. 3:201 Com. B 14; with employer Art. 6:105 Com. B 5; Art. 7:104 Com. 2 standard of care Art. 3:102 Com. B 11 employers Introd. Ch. 1, D 29; Art. 1:101 Com. A 9; Art. 2:202 Com. A 2; Art. 2:202 Notes, VI 55 damage caused by Art. 7:104 Com. 2 employees defences Art. 3:201 Com. A 6

Index event beyond control Art. 5:302 Com. A 2 exclusion of liability Art. 5:401 Com. B 10 fraudulent misrepresentation by employee Art. 2:210 Com. A 6 harm by employee Art. 3:201 Com. A 5 joint liability Art. 7:104 Com. 2 liability for Art. 3:201 Com. A 1; employees Art. 3:201 Com. B 7; Art. 3:201 Com. B 10; Art. 3:201 Com. B 12 solidary liability Art. 3:201 Com. B 14; with employees Art. 6:105 Com. B 5; Art. 7:104 Com. 2 strict liability Art. 3:207 Com. B 4 supervision, defective Art. 3:201 Com. A 1 employment law Art. 6:105 Com. B 5 employment Art. 3:201 Com. B 7 et seq.; relationship Art. 3:201 Com. B 10 enforcement Art. 6:101 Com. A 4; Art. 7:103 Com. 1 England Introd. Ch. 1, B 5; see also Common Law; United Kingdom abandonment Art. 3:208 Notes, 9 absolute rights Art. 2:101 Notes, VII 65 abuse of jurisdiction Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 account of profits Art. 6:101 Notes, II 26 accountants Art. 2:207 Notes, 12 acting at own risk Art. 5:101 Notes, II 28 action for money Art. 6:101 Notes, II 26 had and received actions in trespass Art. 2:101 Notes, II 20 actions on the case Art. 2:101 Notes, II 20 activity duties Art. 3:202 Notes, 14 advocates Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 agency of necessity Art. 5:202 Notes, II 18 aggravated damages Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13; Art. 6:202 Notes, 12 aircraft, damage Art. 3:206 Notes, 16 caused by alternative causes Art. 4:103 Notes, 13 amenities of life, Art. 2:101 Notes, V 51 loss of animal, killing of an Art. 5:202 Notes, I 13 animals Art. 2:206 Notes, II 26; Introd. Ch. 3, C 15 animals, damage Art. 3:203 Notes, 14; caused by Art. 3:208 Notes, 9;

England Art. 5:101 Notes, II 28; Art. 5:102 Notes, I 14 Art. 3:203 Notes, 14

animals, dangerous species anticipated trespass Art. 1:102 Notes, I 11 apology Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13 armed forces Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 assault Art. 1:103 Notes, III 41; Art. 3:103 Notes, I 13; Art. 6:106 Notes, 12 assessment of damages Art. 6:203 Notes, 13 assignment of rights Art. 6:106 Notes, 12 of action in tort assumption of risk Art. 5:101 Notes, II 28 authority conferred Art. 5:201 Notes, 13 by law bailee, Art. 6:104 Notes, 12 overcompensation balance of Art. 1:102 Notes, I 10 convenience test barristers Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 battery Art. 1:103 Notes, III 41; Art. 5:202 Notes, II 18 benefit equalisation Art. 6:103 Notes, 14 bereavement Art. 2:202 Notes, III 28 breach of Art. 2:203 Notes, II 17; Art. 2:203 Notes, III 28; confidence Art. 2:205 Notes, 11; Art. 5:203 Notes, 14; Art. 7:101 Notes, 4 breach of confidence, inducement of Art. 2:101 Notes, IX 94 breach of contract Art. 1:103 Notes, I 13 breach of official duty Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 breach of Art. 3:102 Notes, III 39; statutory duty Art. 3:201 Notes, I 13; Art. 5:101 Notes, II 28; Art. 7:103 Notes, 14; Art. 7:104 Notes, 14 burden of proof Art. 4:101 Notes, III 37 business liability Art. 5:101 Notes, II 28; Art. 5:401 Notes, 14 car, damaged Art. 2:206 Notes, III 40 car hire Art. 2:206 Notes, III 40 car keepers Introd. Ch. 3, C 15 car owners Introd. Ch. 3, C 15 causation Art. 4:101 Notes, III 37 causation in fact Art. 4:101 Notes, II 25

1281

England Art. 4:101 Notes, II 25 Art. 4:101 Notes, I 15; Art. 6:302 Notes, 10 champerty Art. 6:106 Notes, 12 chief constables Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 children Art. 3:103 Notes, I 13 close connection Art. 3:201 Notes, I 13 close relatives, care Art. 2:201 Notes, VI 47 for injured party collaboration Art. 4:102 Notes, 13 common duty of care Art. 3:202 Notes, 14 common law duties Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 common practice Art. 3:102 Notes, I 14 companies, Art. 3:201 Notes, II 27 incorporated compensation Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13; Art. 6:102 Notes, 11; Art. 6:201 Notes, 9 compensatory Art. 6:101 Notes, II 26 damages confidentiality Art. 2:205 Notes, 11 consent Art. 5:101 Notes, I 12 constitutional statutes Art. 7:101 Notes, 4 contribution to risk Art. 4:103 Notes, 13 contributory Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 17; negligence Art. 3:206 Notes, 16; Art. 5:101 Notes, II 28; Art. 5:102 Notes, I 14; Art. 5:102 Notes, III 40; Art. 5:501 Notes, 8; Art. 6:105 Notes, 14 convention rights Art. 2:203 Notes, III 28 conversion Art. 2:206 Notes, I 13; Art. 3:103 Notes, I 13; Art. 5:102 Notes, I 14; Art. 6:104 Notes, 12 co-ownership Art. 6:104 Notes, 12 corporations Art. 3:201 Notes, II 27 correction of Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13 defamatory statement correspondence Art. 2:205 Notes, 11 court proceedings Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 courts of limited Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 jurisdiction creditworthiness, Art. 2:207 Notes, 12 information about criminal defamation Art. 2:203 Com. E 17 Crown, immunity Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 of the causation in law chain of causation

1282

Index custodial agencies Art. 3:104 Notes, II 30 damage per se Art. 2:101 Notes, II 20 damages, assessment Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13 of danger of actual Art. 1:102 Notes, I 11 violation dangerous things, Art. 3:206 Notes, 16 escape of death Art. 2:101 Notes, V 50; Art. 2:202 Notes, I 2; Art. 5:401 Notes, 14 deceit Art. 5:102 Notes, I 14; Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13; Art. 6:103 Notes, 14 defamation Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23; Art. 2:101 Notes, II 20; Art. 2:101 Notes, V 50; Art. 2:202 Notes, III 28; Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 40; Art. 2:204 Notes, I 12; Art. 2:204 Notes, IV 44; Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13; Art. 6:106 Notes, 12; Art. 6:204 Notes, 10; Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 dignity Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13 Directive on electronic commerce Art. 2:204 Notes, IV 44 disclaimer of liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 14 disclosure Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 discomfort Art. 2:101 Notes, V 50 disposal of award of compensation Art. 6:201 Notes, 9 distress Art. 2:101 Notes, V 50 dogs Art. 3:203 Notes, 14 duress Art. 5:101 Notes, I 12 duty of care Art. 1:103 Notes, I 13; Art. 2:207 Notes, 12; Art. 3:101 Notes, 13; Art. 3:102 Notes, I 14; Art. 3:102 Notes, III 39; Art. 3:202 Notes, 14; Art. 3:205 Notes, 15; Art. 5:401 Notes, 14; Art. 7:104 Notes, 14 duty to act Art. 3:102 Notes, II 26 duty to mitigate Art. 5:102 Notes, II 26 damage duty to prevent Art. 3:102 Notes, II 26 injury duty to take Art. 3:102 Notes, II 26 affirmative action economic torts Art. 5:101 Notes, I 12; Art. 7:104 Notes, 14 elections, officials Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 involved in

Index electricity Art. 5:401 Notes, 14 embassy staff Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 emergency, great Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 employee’s personal Art. 7:104 Notes, 14 liability employer, duty to Art. 7:104 Notes, 14 prevent harm employers, liability Art. 3:201 Notes, I 13 for employees employers’ Art. 7:104 Notes, 14 associations employers’ liability Art. 2:201 Notes, III 15; Art. 5:101 Notes, II 28; Art. 5:401 Notes, 14; Art. 7:104 Notes, 14 employment Art. 3:201 Notes, I 13 relationship environment of Art. 2:101 Notes, V 50 immoveable property environmental damage Introd. Ch. 3, C 15 environmental Art. 3:206 Notes, 16 liability equitable remedies Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13; Art. 6:101 Notes, II 26; Art. 6:301 Notes, 11 equity, tortious liability on the basis of Art. 3:103 Notes, II 21 European Convention Art. 7:101 Notes, 4 on Human Rights event beyond control Art. 5:302 Notes, 14 ex turpi causa Art. 5:501 Notes, 8 exclusion of liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 14 exemplary Art. 2:202 Notes, III 28; damages Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13; Art. 6:101 Notes, II 26; Art. 6:202 Notes, 12 expenditure in Art. 6:302 Notes, 10 preventing damage family life Art. 2:205 Notes, 11 fiduciary duty Art. 2:207 Notes, 12 force Art. 5:101 Notes, I 12 foreign states, Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 immunity of foreseeability Introd. Ch. 3, C 15; Art. 3:206 Notes, 16 fraud Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23; Art. 5:101 Notes, I 12

England freedom of expression Art. 2:205 Notes, 11; Art. 5:203 Notes, 14; Art. 7:101 Notes, 4 freedom of speech Art. 6:301 Notes, 11; Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 fundamental constitu- Art. 7:101 Notes, 4 tional rights funeral costs Art. 2:202 Notes, IV 40 future income, Art. 2:202 Notes, III 28 loss of future pecuniary loss Art. 6:203 Notes, 13 games Art. 5:101 Notes, I 12 general damages Art. 2:101 Notes, V 51; Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13; Art. 6:204 Notes, 10 general right of Art. 2:203 Notes, II 17 personality grief Art. 2:201 Notes, III 15 harassment Art. 3:201 Notes, I 13 health regulations Art. 5:401 Notes, 14 home Art. 2:205 Notes, 11 honour Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 40 horses Art. 3:203 Notes, 14 Human Rights Act Art. 7:101 Notes, 4; Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 Human Rights law Art. 2:101 Notes, V 50 imminent danger Art. 6:302 Notes, 10 imminent national Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 danger immunity for conduct in judicial proceedings Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 inconvenience Art. 2:101 Notes, V 50 incorrect Art. 2:204 Notes, I 12 information independent Art. 3:201 Notes, I 13 contractors inducement to breach Art. 2:211 Notes, 13 of contract inducing breach of Art. 7:104 Notes, 14 contract industrial injuries Art. 7:105 Notes, 4 inevitable accident Art. 5:302 Notes, 14 inflation, risk of Art. 6:203 Notes, 13 inherently dangerous Art. 3:201 Notes, I 15 activities inheritability of claims for the compensation of nonpecuniary damage Art. 2:202 Notes, III 28

1283

England injunctions

Art. 1:102 Notes, I 10; Art. 6:301 Notes, 11 injured feelings Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13 injurious falsehood Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 injury as such Art. 6:204 Notes, 10 instigation Art. 4:102 Notes, 13 intellectual property Art. 6:101 Notes, II 26 intention Art. 2:101 Notes, V 50; Art. 3:101 Notes, 13 intentional torts Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23; Art. 5:101 Notes, I 12; Art. 5:102 Notes, I 14 interests worthy of legal protection Art. 2:101 Notes, XI 125 interference Art. 2:206 Notes, II 26 interference with Art. 6:101 Notes, II 26 property interlocutory Art. 6:301 Notes, 11 injunctions internet service Art. 2:204 Notes, IV 44 providers intimidation Art. 7:104 Notes, 14 joint venture Art. 6:105 Notes, 14 judge Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 judge’s abuse of Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 jurisdiction jury Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 justice of the peace Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 justice’s clerks Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 keeper of an animal Art. 3:203 Notes, 14 landlord Art. 3:202 Notes, 14 legal persons Art. 1:103 Notes, III 41 legislation, Art. 7:101 Notes, 4 interpretation of legislation of constitutional significance Art. 7:101 Notes, 4 libel Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23; Art. 2:101 Notes, II 20; Art. 2:203 Com. E 17; Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 40; Art. 2:204 Notes, I 12 life Art. 2:201 Notes, III 15 livestock, Art. 5:202 Notes, I 13 protection of loss of amenity Art. 6:203 Notes, 13; Art. 6:204 Notes, 10 loss of chance Art. 2:101 Notes, XII 132

1284

Index loss of dependency Art. 2:202 Notes, V 53 loss of domestic Art. 2:202 Notes, VI 66 services loss of faculty Art. 6:203 Notes, 13; Art. 6:204 Notes, 10 loss of liberty Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 loss of pecuniary Art. 2:202 Notes, V 53 benefit loss of spleen Art. 6:204 Notes, 10 loss of use Art. 2:206 Notes, III 40 lump sum Art. 6:203 Notes, 13 maintenance, loss of Art. 2:202 Notes, V 53 mandatory Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13; injunctions Art. 6:301 Notes, 11 market value of Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13 damaged property master-servant Art. 3:201 Notes, I 13; relationship Art. 3:207 Notes, 11 medical treatment Art. 5:101 Notes, I 12; Art. 5:202 Notes, II 18 mental capacity Art. 5:101 Notes, II 28 mental condition Art. 2:201 Notes, III 15 mental distress Art. 6:202 Notes, 12 mental incompetence Art. 5:301 Notes, 14 mesothelioma Art. 4:103 Notes, 13 military personnel Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 minority, defence of Art. 3:103 Notes, I 13 misfeasance in a Art. 2:101 Notes, II 20; public office Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 misinformation Art. 2:204 Notes, I 12 misrepresentation Art. 5:401 Notes, 14 misstatements, Art. 2:207 Notes, 12 negligent mortgage Art. 6:104 Notes, 12 motor vehicles, Art. 3:205 Notes, 15 damage caused by multiple tortfeasors Art. 4:102 Notes, 13 necessity Art. 5:201 Notes, 13; Art. 5:202 Notes, II 18; Art. 5:202 Notes, III 31 negligence Introd. Ch. 3, C 15; Art. 3:101 Notes, 13; Art. 3:102 Notes, I 14; Art. 5:302 Notes, 14; Art. 7:104 Notes, 14 negotiorum gestio Art. 5:202 Notes, II 18 nominal damages Art. 6:102 Notes, 11 non-delegable duties Art. 3:201 Notes, I 13

Index non-pecuniary loss

Art. 2:101 Notes, V 50 et seq.; Art. 6:202 Notes, 12; Art. 6:204 Notes, 10 nuclear installations Art. 3:206 Notes, 16 nuisance Art. 2:101 Notes, II 20; Art. 2:101 Notes, V 50; Art. 3:203 Notes, 14; Art. 3:206 Notes, 16; Art. 6:102 Notes, 11 nursery school Art. 3:104 Notes, II 30 occupancy duties Art. 3:202 Notes, 14 occupiers’ liability Art. 3:102 Notes, I 14; Art. 3:202 Notes, 14; Art. 5:401 Notes, 14 oil pollution at sea Art. 3:206 Notes, 16 omissions Art. 3:102 Notes, II 26 pain Art. 2:101 Notes, V 51 parental liability Art. 3:104 Notes, I 15 parental Art. 3:104 Notes, II 30 responsibility parties to court Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 proceedings passengers Art. 5:101 Notes, II 28 patents Art. 6:301 Notes, 11 periodical payment Art. 6:106 Notes, 12 periodical payments Art. 6:203 Notes, 13 personal injury Art. 2:201 Notes, III 15; Art. 5:401 Notes, 14; Art. 6:102 Notes, 11; Art. 6:106 Notes, 12; Art. 6:203 Notes, 13; Art. 6:204 Notes, 10 personal sphere, Art. 2:101 Notes, V 50 invasion of a person’s personal wrongs Art. 6:106 Notes, 12 physical condition Art. 2:201 Notes, III 15 physical Art. 2:101 Notes, V 50 et seq. personal injury possession of chattels of another party, intentional Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 postal services Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 post-mortal Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 77 personality rights premises Art. 3:202 Notes, 14; Art. 3:208 Notes, 9 prenatal injuries Art. 2:201 Notes, II 7 pre-trial work Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 prevention Art. 6:301 Notes, 11 prima facie evidence of negligence Art. 3:102 Notes, III 39 principal Art. 3:201 Notes, II 27

England privacy

Art. 2:101 Notes, XI 125; Art. 2:205 Notes, 11 privacy, invasion Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23; of Art. 2:203 Notes, II 17; Art. 2:203 Notes, III 28 private life Art. 2:205 Notes, 11 process, malicious Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 abuse of product liability Art. 2:202 Notes, II 19; Art. 3:204 Notes, I 1; Art. 3:204 Notes, II 16; Art. 3:204 Notes, II 28; Art. 5:102 Notes, I 14; Introd. Ch. 3, C 15 product liability, Art. 3:204 Notes, V 45 financial ceiling products, defective Art. 1:103 Notes, II 25 professional Art. 3:102 Notes, I 14 standards prohibitory Art. 6:301 Notes, 11 injunctions proof of actual Art. 2:101 Notes, II 20 damage property right, Art. 2:206 Notes, I 13; infringement of Art. 2:206 Notes, II 26; Art. 6:102 Notes, 11 property rights in Art. 2:206 Notes, I 13 chattels proportionality Art. 7:101 Notes, 4 proprietary interests Art. 6:104 Notes, 12 in goods prosecution, Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 malicious provisional damages Art. 6:203 Notes, 13 proximity of the Art. 3:104 Notes, II 30 parties psychiatric injury Art. 2:101 Notes, V 50; Art. 2:202 Notes, II 19 public interest Art. 5:203 Notes, 14 public law of tort Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 public officers Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 public policy Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 punitive damages Art. 6:202 Notes, 12 pure economic loss Introd. Ch. 1, B 13 quantification Art. 6:203 Notes, 13 quantum of damages Art. 6:202 Notes, 12 quia timet Art. 1:102 Notes, I 11; injunctions Art. 6:302 Notes, 10

1285

England reasonable and prudent person recklessness reduction of liability registration officers relatives, loss suffered by remoteness of damage repair costs reparation in kind

Index Art. 3:102 Notes, I 14 Art. 3:101 Notes, Art. 6:202 Notes, Art. 7:103 Notes, Art. 2:202 Notes, II

13 12 14 19

Art. 4:101 Notes, I 15; Art. 6:302 Notes, 10 Art. 6:201 Notes, 9 Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13; Art. 6:201 Notes, 9 Art. 6:204 Notes, 10 Art. 5:302 Notes, 14

reputation res ipsa loquitur rescuer sustaining injury during rescue attempt Art. 5:101 Notes, II 28 restitutio in integrum Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13 restitutionary Art. 6:101 Notes, II 26 damages restriction of liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 14 returning officers Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 right of election between forms of redress Art. 6:101 Notes, II 26 right to privacy Art. 7:101 Notes, 4 right to respect for Art. 5:203 Notes, 14; private life Art. 7:101 Notes, 4 rights of personality Art. 2:203 Notes, II 17 road traffic regulations Art. 3:205 Notes, 15 safety precautions Art. 3:102 Notes, I 14 safety regulations Art. 5:401 Notes, 14 secondary victims Art. 5:501 Notes, 8 secrecy Art. 2:205 Notes, 11 self-defence Art. 5:201 Notes, 13; Art. 5:202 Notes, I 13 self-respect Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13 settlements Art. 6:203 Notes, 13 out-of-court slander Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23; Art. 2:101 Notes, II 20; Art. 2:203 Com. E 17; Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 40; Art. 2:204 Notes, I 12; Art. 3:103 Notes, I 13 solatium Art. 6:201 Notes, 9 solicitors Art. 7:103 Notes, 14

1286

solidary liability

Art. 4:102 Notes, 13; Art. 6:105 Notes, 14 source of danger Art. 3:102 Notes, II 26; Introd. Ch. 3, C 15 special damage Art. 2:101 Notes, II 20 sports Art. 5:101 Notes, I 12 standard of care Art. 3:102 Notes, I 14; Art. 3:102 Notes, III 39 standard of proof Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 41 status quo ante Art. 6:101 Notes, I 13 strict liability Art. 2:101 Notes, V 50; Art. 2:202 Notes, II 19; Art. 3:102 Notes, III 39; Art. 3:206 Notes, 16; Art. 5:202 Notes, III 31; Art. 5:302 Notes, 14; Introd. Ch. 3, C 15 subcontractors Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 substantial damages Art. 6:204 Notes, 10 suffering Art. 2:101 Notes, V 51 supervisory duty Art. 3:104 Notes, II 30 third parties, claims Art. 2:202 Notes, VI 66 in damages threats of violence Art. 5:101 Notes, I 12 threshold amount for property damage claims of consumers Art. 3:204 Notes, II 16 threshold Art. 1:102 Notes, I 11 requirement tort Introd. Ch. 1, C 14; law Art. 1:101 Notes, II 7 et seq. tort law statutes Introd. Ch. 1, B 5 tort of negligence Art. 3:102 Notes, I 14; Art. 3:102 Notes, III 39; Art. 3:103 Notes, I 13; Art. 3:104 Notes, I 15; Art. 3:205 Notes, 15 trade unions Art. 1:103 Notes, III 41; Art. 7:104 Notes, 14 traffic accidents Art. 3:205 Notes, 15; Art. 5:102 Notes, III 40; Art. 5:501 Notes, 8 trespass Art. 2:206 Notes, II 26; Art. 3:103 Notes, I 13; Art. 3:201 Notes, I 13; Art. 3:203 Notes, 14; Art. 5:101 Notes, I 12; Art. 5:202 Notes, III 31; Art. 6:102 Notes, 11; Art. 6:204 Notes, 10 trespass, anticipated Art. 1:102 Notes, I 11 trespass to chattel Art. 2:206 Notes, II 26

Index Art. 2:203 Notes, III 28; Art. 5:102 Notes, I 14 trespass to property Art. 2:101 Notes, II 20 trespass to Art. 2:101 Notes, II 20; Art. 5:101 Notes, I 12 the person trivial damage Art. 6:102 Notes, 11 unjustified Art. 6:101 Notes, II 26 enrichment user of a motor Art. 5:101 Notes, II 28 vehicle vexatious proceedings Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 vicarious liability Art. 3:201 Notes, I 13; Art. 3:201 Notes, II 27; Art. 3:207 Notes, 11; Art. 5:401 Notes, 14; Art. 6:105 Notes, 14; Art. 7:103 Notes, 14; Art. 7:104 Notes, 14 volenti non fit Art. 5:101 Notes, I 12; iniuria Art. 5:101 Notes, II 28 waiver of tort Art. 6:101 Notes, II 26 warlike operations Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 witnesses Art. 7:103 Notes, 14 workplace, safety Art. 7:104 Notes, 14 wrongful interference with chattels Art. 2:206 Notes, II 26 wrongful interference with the performance of a business Art. 2:101 Notes, IX 94 wrongful interference with the performance of a contract Art. 2:101 Notes, IX 94 wrongful life Art. 2:101 Notes, X 122 enterprise, right to Art. 2:208 Com. A 3 environmental damage Art. 2:209 Com. C 8 further damage Art. 2:209 Com. C 10 permission Art. 5:103 Notes, 4 redress Art. 2:209 Com. C 10 environmental groups Introd. Ch. 1, D 35; Art. 1:102 Com. B 5 environmental Art. 2:209 Com. A 1; impairment Art. 3:206 Com. A 2; see also ecological damage accountability Art. 2:209 Com. B 5 et seq. burdens incurred Art. 2:209 Com. C 10 collective damage Art. 2:209 Com. B 4 competent authority Art. 2:209 Com. C 9 force majeure Art. 2:209 Com. A 2 trespass to goods

Estonia permission to carry out operations Art. 5:103 Notes, 5 personal injury Art. 2:209 Com. B 3 private law Art. 2:209 Com. A 2 property damage Art. 2:209 Com. B 3 public law Art. 2:209 Com. A 2 renaturalisation Art. 2:209 Com. C 10 of a species restorative measures Art. 2:209 Com. C 10 State Art. 2:209 Com. C 9 environmental Art. 2:101 Com. E 19; liability Art. 2:209 Com. A 1; Art. 3:206 Com. A 1; Art. 3:207 Com. A 1 body, injury to Art. 3:206 Com. A 3 businesses Art. 3:206 Com. A 1 consequential loss Art. 3:206 Com. A 3 contamination of land Art. 3:206 Com. A 3 health, injury to Art. 3:206 Com. A 3 legally relevant Art. 3:206 Com. A 3 damage national law Art. 3:207 Com. A 2; Art. 3:207 Com. B 6 property damage Art. 3:206 Com. A 3 relatives, detriments Art. 3:206 Com. A 3 sustained by strict liability Art. 3:206 Com. A 1; Art. 3:206 Com. A 3 et seq. Environmental Liability Directive See Directive on environmental liability environmental Art. 2:209 Com. B 4 organisations pursuit of environArt. 2:209 Com. B 4 mental interests environmental risks agreements on standards of strict liability Introd. Ch. 3, D 16 equal treatment between men and women Art. 3:207 Com. B 5; Art. 5:401 Com. E 17 equalisation of benefits See benefit equalisation equestrian sports Art. 3:203 Com. A 4 Estonia Introd. Ch. 1, B 12; see also Baltic legal systems absolute rights Art. 1:101 Notes, III 16 acting at own risk Art. 5:101 Notes, II 26 age limit (children) Art. 3:103 Notes, I 11 alternative causes Art. 4:103 Notes, 11

1287

Estonia animals, damage Art. 3:203 Notes, 12 caused by authority conferred Art. 5:201 Notes, 11 by law basic rule Art. 1:101 Notes, II 5 benefit equalisation Art. 6:103 Notes, 12 benevolent intervention in another’s affairs Art. 5:202 Notes, II 16 bodily injury Art. 6:203 Notes, 11 body Art. 2:201 Notes, I 1 body, injury to Art. 2:101 Notes, V 48; Art. 2:201 Notes, II 3 bonos mores Art. 5:101 Notes, I 10 breach of bonos Art. 1:101 Notes, III 16; mores Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 20 breach of confidence Art. 2:205 Notes, 9 burden of proof, Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 33 reversal of carelessness Art. 3:102 Notes, I 12 causation Art. 4:101 Notes, I 12; Art. 6:302 Notes, 8 chain of causation Art. 5:302 Notes, 11 children Art. 3:103 Notes, I 11 children, liability Art. 3:103 Notes, II 20 on equitable grounds collaboration Art. 4:102 Notes, 11 compensation Art. 6:203 Notes, 11 concurrence of Art. 1:103 Notes, I 11 actions confidential Art. 2:205 Notes, 9 information consent Art. 5:101 Notes, I 10; Art. 5:101 Notes, II 26 consent of the Art. 1:101 Notes, III 15 injured person consequential loss Art. 2:201 Notes, V 32; Art. 2:201 Notes, VII 60 contributory fault Art. 5:102 Notes, I 12; Art. 5:102 Notes, III 38; Art. 5:102 Notes, IV 51 contributory Art. 5:101 Notes, II 26 negligence dangerous structures Art. 3:202 Notes, 12 dangerous things Art. 3:202 Notes, 12 death Art. 2:202 Notes, I 1 death of primary Art. 2:202 Notes, II 16 victim

1288

Index Art. 2:203 Notes, II 14; Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 38 destruction Art. 2:206 Notes, III 38 disposal of award of Art. 6:201 Notes, 7 compensation dolus directus Art. 3:101 Notes, 11 dolus indirectus Art. 3:101 Notes, 11 emergency Art. 1:101 Notes, III 15 emotional distress Art. 2:101 Notes, V 48 employers, liability Art. 3:201 Notes, I 11 for employees energy Art. 3:202 Notes, 12 enrichment, Art. 6:101 Notes, II 24 restitution of environmental Art. 2:209 Notes, II 12 hazardous activities environmental Art. 2:209 Notes, I 1; liability Art. 3:206 Notes, 12 event beyond control Art. 5:302 Notes, 11 exclusion of liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 12 expenditure in Art. 6:302 Notes, 8 preventing damage experts, liability of Art. 2:207 Notes, 10 fault Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 18 force majeure Art. 3:202 Notes, 12 fraud Art. 2:210 Notes, 11 fraudulent Art. 2:210 Notes, 5 misrepresentation freedom of contract Art. 5:401 Notes, 12 freedom of physical Art. 2:203 Notes, I 2 movement funeral costs Art. 2:202 Notes, IV 39 gross negligence Art. 3:102 Notes, I 12 hazardous materials Art. 3:202 Notes, 12 health Art. 2:201 Notes, I 1 health, injury to Art. 2:101 Notes, V 48; Art. 2:201 Notes, II 3 health care service Art. 2:205 Notes, 9 honour Art. 2:101 Notes, V 48 image Art. 2:203 Notes, II 14 impairment of Art. 2:208 Notes, 11 business impending danger Art. 1:102 Notes, I 2 incorrect information Art. 2:204 Notes, I 9; Art. 2:207 Notes, 10 incorrect information, Art. 2:207 Notes, 10 reliance on defamation

Index inducement to breach Art. 2:211 Notes, 6; of contract Art. 2:211 Notes, 11 industrial relations Art. 7:104 Notes, 13 Art. 2:202 Notes, III 21; inheritability of claims for the Art. 2:202 Notes, III 26 compensation of non-pecuniary damage injunctive relief Art. 1:102 Notes, I 2; Art. 6:301 Notes, 9 injury of primary Art. 2:202 Notes, II 16 victim intention Art. 3:101 Notes, 11 jeopardising Art. 2:204 Notes, I 9 credit-worthiness justification Art. 1:101 Notes, III 15 keeper of an animal Art. 3:203 Notes, 12 law intended to protect the injured party Art. 1:101 Notes, III 16 legal persons Art. 1:103 Notes, III 40 legal persons, liability for decision-making body Art. 3:201 Notes, II 25 legal persons, liability for representatives Art. 3:201 Notes, II 25 liability based on Art. 5:301 Notes, 12 equity and fairness liberty Art. 2:101 Notes, V 48 life, loss of Art. 2:202 Notes, I 1 lump sum Art. 6:203 Notes, 11 maintenance, loss of Art. 2:202 Notes, V 51 mental incompetence Art. 5:301 Notes, 12 misrepresentation Art. 2:210 Notes, 11 mopeds Art. 3:205 Notes, 13 motor assisted cycles Art. 3:205 Notes, 13 motor vehicles, Art. 3:205 Notes, 13 damage caused by name Art. 2:203 Notes, II 14 necessity Art. 5:202 Notes, III 29 negligence Art. 3:102 Notes, I 12 non-economic Art. 2:201 Notes, VII 60 damages non-economic loss Art. 6:203 Notes, 11 non-pecuniary loss Art. 2:101 Notes, V 48 ownership Art. 2:206 Notes, I 11 ownership, Art. 2:206 Notes, I 11 infringement of

Estonia parental liability Art. 3:104 Notes, I 13 patrimonial Art. 2:206 Notes, III 38 damage pecuniary loss Art. 2:101 Notes, V 48 periodical payments Art. 6:203 Notes, 11 personal injury Art. 2:201 Notes, V 32 personality Art. 2:101 Notes, V 48 personality rights Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 67; Art. 2:203 Notes, II 14 physical distress Art. 2:101 Notes, V 48 plurality of creditors Art. 6:104 Notes, 10 possession Art. 2:206 Notes, I 11 possession, lawful Art. 2:206 Notes, II 24 precontractual Art. 2:205 Notes, 9 negotiations predisposition of Art. 4:101 Notes, IV 49 the victim private life Art. 2:203 Notes, II 14; Art. 2:203 Notes, III 26 product liability Art. 3:204 Notes, I 1; Art. 3:204 Notes, II 14 product liability, Art. 3:204 Notes, V 45 financial ceiling property Art. 2:101 Notes, V 48 property damage Art. 2:206 Notes, II 24; Art. 2:206 Notes, III 38 property right, Art. 2:206 Notes, I 11 infringement of public interest Art. 5:203 Notes, 12 public policy Art. 5:401 Notes, 12 pure economic loss Introd. Ch. 1, B 13 rail-borne vehicles Art. 3:205 Notes, 13 reasonably careful Art. 3:102 Notes, I 12 person relatives, loss Art. 2:202 Notes, II 16 suffered by repair costs Art. 2:206 Notes, III 38 restriction of liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 12 right, violation of Art. 2:101 Notes, VII 64 right to life Art. 2:202 Notes, I 1 right to one’s Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 68 image rights in rem Art. 2:206 Notes, II 24 secondary victims Art. 5:501 Notes, 6 self-defence Art. 1:101 Notes, III 15; Art. 5:202 Notes, I 11 self-help Art. 1:101 Notes, III 15

1289

ethnic origin set-off solidary liability solidary liability legal persons / representatives source of danger

Index Art. 6:103 Notes, 12 Art. 6:105 Notes, 12 Art. 3:201 Notes, II 25

Art. 3:202 Notes, 12; Art. 3:205 Notes, 13; Art. 6:301 Notes, 9 State, liability of the Art. 7:103 Notes, 12 strict liability Art. 1:101 Notes, V 25; Art. 3:202 Notes, 12; Art. 3:205 Notes, 13 structures, liability of Art. 3:202 Notes, 12 landowner suffering Art. 2:101 Notes, V 48 supervision, Art. 3:104 Notes, I 13 defective supervisory duty Art. 3:104 Notes, II 28 threshold amount for property damage claims of consumers Art. 3:204 Notes, II 14 traffic accidents Art. 3:205 Notes, 13; Art. 5:102 Notes, III 38 unfair competition Art. 2:208 Notes, 11 unjustified Art. 6:101 Notes, II 24 enrichment unlawfulness Art. 1:101 Notes, III 9 ethnic origin Art. 2:101 Com. C 12 European Community Introd. Ch. 3, D 17 law European Introd. Ch. 3, D 17; Competition law Art. 2:208 Com. A 5 fault Art. 2:208 Com. A 5 negligence Art. 2:208 Com. A 5 European Convention Art. 2:101 Com. B 8 on Human Rights event beyond control Art. 3:206 Com. B 18; Art. 5:302 Com. A 1; Art. 5:302 Com. A 3 et seq. abnormal event Art. 5:302 Com. A 5 contributory fault Art. 5:102 Com. B 10 exclusion of liability Art. 5:302 Com. A 7 strict liability Art. 5:302 Com. A 1; Art. 5:302 Com. A 6 events with mass Art. 3:102 Com. C 20 attendance evidence Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 29

1290

ex post facto agreements as to liability Art. 5:401 Com. A 1 ex turpi causa non oritur actio Art. 5:103 Com. 1; Art. 5:103 Com. 4 et seq.; Art. 5:103 Notes, 1 legal policy Art. 5:103 Notes, 1 exclusion of Art. 5:401 Com. A 1 et seq.; liability Art. 5:401 Com. B 11 commercial property Art. 5:401 Com. D 15 contractual exclusion Art. 5:401 Com. A 2; Art. 5:401 Com. A 4 defective products Art. 5:401 Com. A 8 gross negligence Art. 5:401 Com. A 8; Art. 5:401 Com. C 12 et seq. illegality Art. 5:401 Com. A 8 immorality Art. 5:401 Com. A 8; Art. 5:401 Com. B 9 implied exclusion Art. 5:401 Com. A 3 intentional causation Art. 5:401 Com. A 8; Art. 5:401 Com. B 9 of legally relevant damage national law Art. 5:401 Com. E 17 negligence Art. 5:401 Com. E 16 personal injury Art. 5:401 Com. A 8; Art. 5:401 Com. C 12 product liability Art. 3:204 Com. A 5; Art. 5:104 Com. A 8; Art. 5:104 Com. D 15; Art. 5:401 Com. D 15 property damage Art. 5:401 Com. C 14 slight negligence Art. 5:401 Com. A 2 third party claims, Art. 5:501 Com. 2 exclusion of unilaterally imparted Art. 5:401 Com. A 5 items of information exclusivity of contractual and non-contractual liability, mutual Art. 5:401 Com. A 7 exercise of a profession Art. 2:208 Com. B 7 impairment of Art. 2:208 Com. B 8 regulations Art. 3:102 Com. B 13 standard of care Art. 3:102 Com. C 17 unlawfulness of Art. 2:208 Com. B 9 interference expenditure Introd. Ch. 1, D 32; Art. 1:101 Com. A 1; Art. 1:102 Notes, II 1 prevention of Art. 6:302 Com. 1 et seq. damage

Index reasonableness Art. 6:302 Com. 3 expert witnesses Art. 7:103 Com. 3 exposure to publicity, Art. 2:203 Com. B 6 unlawful extracontractual liability European Community Introd. Ch. 3, D 17 law multilateral treaties Introd. Ch. 3, D 16 extraction of organs Art. 2:201 Com. B 10 fair competition Art. 2:101 Com. E 20 false imprisonment Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23 family members, damage suffered by Art. 5:101 Com. A 2 family protection under Art. 3:104 Com. A 3 fundamental rights family, protection of Art. 5:101 Com. A 3 family indemnity Art. 3:103 Com. E 12 insurance family law Introd. Ch. 1, D 30; Art. 1:103 Com. D 9; Art. 2:211 Com. B 8 maintenance Art. 2:202 Com. F 16 fault Introd. Ch. 1, C 18; Introd. Ch. 1, C 25; Art. 1:101 Notes, I 1; Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 23; Art. 2:101 Notes, V 37; Introd. Ch. 3, A 2; Introd. Ch. 3, B 3; Art. 5:102 Com. B 10 fault-based liability Introd. Ch. 3, A 2; Introd. Ch. 3, B 4; Introd. Ch. 3, E 23 faute Introd. Ch.1, B 6 fiancé(e)s Art. 2:202 Notes, II 4 fiduciary duty duty of care Art. 3:102 Com. C 19 financial support Art. 2:202 Com. F 16 Finland abandonment Art. 3:208 Notes, 8 accountability Art. 1:101 Notes, II 6 acting at own risk Art. 5:101 Notes, II 27 adequate causation Art. 4:101 Notes, I 14 adjoining properties Art. 3:202 Notes, 13 advertisements Art. 2:203 Notes, II 15 aggravation of risk Art. 3:102 Notes, II 25 alternative causes Art. 4:103 Notes, 12 anguish Art. 6:204 Notes, 9 annuity Art. 6:203 Notes, 12

Finland assessment of damages Art. 6:203 Notes, 12 assignment of rights Art. 6:106 Notes, 11 to reparation authority conferred Art. 5:201 Notes, 12 by law benefit equalisation Art. 6:103 Notes, 13 boycotts Art. 7:104 Notes, 12 breach of confidence Art. 2:205 Notes, 10 breach of contract, Art. 2:101 Notes, IX 93 inducement of buildings, unsafe state Art. 3:202 Notes, 13 burden of proof Art. 3:202 Notes, 13; Art. 4:101 Notes, III 36 capital sum Art. 6:203 Notes, 12 car, damaged Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 35 causation Art. 1:101 Notes, II 6; Art. 4:101 Notes, I 14; Art. 4:101 Notes, III 36 celebrities Art. 2:203 Notes, II 15 chicanery Art. 5:201 Notes, 12 children Art. 3:103 Notes, I 12 clean-up costs Art. 3:206 Notes, 15 close relatives, care Art. 2:201 Notes, VI 46 for injured party commercial value, Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 35 reduced compensation Art. 6:101 Notes, I 12; Art. 6:203 Notes, 12 competition law Art. 2:101 Notes, V 49 concurrence of Art. 1:103 Notes, I 12 actions consent Art. 5:101 Notes, I 11 consequential loss Art. 2:201 Notes, V 33 construction work Art. 3:207 Notes, 10 consumer law Art. 1:103 Notes, I 12 consumer Art. 1:103 Notes, II 17; protection Art. 2:208 Notes, 12 contributory fault Art. 5:102 Notes, I 13; Art. 5:102 Notes, III 39; Art. 5:102 Notes, IV 53 contributory Art. 5:101 Notes, II 27 negligence corporate secrets Art. 2:205 Notes, 10 credit information Art. 2:204 Notes, I 11 credit institutions, Art. 2:205 Notes, 10 duty of discretion criminal fraud Art. 2:210 Notes, 11

1291

Finland culpa-rule

damage

Index Introd. Ch. 1, B 5; Art. 1:101 Notes, II 6; Art. 3:104 Notes, I 14; Art. 3:104 Notes, II 29; Art. 3:205 Notes, 14 Art. 1:101 Notes, II 6; Art. 2:101 Notes, I 12 Art. 2:101 Notes, III 31; Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 34 Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 39 Art. 2:206 Notes, III 39

damages, calculation of defamation depreciation in value development risks Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 42 difference method Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 34 Directive on Art. 2:204 Notes, IV 43 electronic commerce drunken driver Art. 5:101 Notes, II 27; Art. 5:102 Notes, III 39 drunkenness Art. 5:301 Notes, 13 duty to act Art. 3:102 Notes, II 25 economic loss Art. 2:101 Notes, III 31 employees, personal Art. 5:401 Notes, 13; liability Art. 7:104 Notes, 11 employees, solidary liability with employers Art. 6:105 Notes, 13 employers, solidary liability with employees Art. 6:105 Notes, 13 employers’ Art. 7:104 Notes, 12 associations employers’ liability Art. 3:201 Notes, I 12; Art. 5:401 Notes, 13 environmental damage, insurance against Art. 2:209 Notes, II 12 environmental Art. 2:209 Notes, II 12 impairment environmental Art. 2:209 Notes, I 2; liability Art. 3:202 Notes, 13; Art. 3:206 Notes, 15; Art. 3:207 Notes, 10; Art. 3:208 Notes, 8; Art. 6:102 Notes, 10; Art. 6:302 Notes, 9 excavations Art. 3:207 Notes, 10 exclusion of liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 13 expenditure in Art. 6:302 Notes, 9 preventing damage financial support, Art. 2:101 Notes, III 31 loss of force majeure Art. 3:206 Notes, 15

1292

fraudulent Art. 2:210 Notes, 11 misrepresentation freedom of Art. 2:204 Notes, I 11; expression Art. 5:203 Notes, 13 freedom of physical Art. 2:203 Notes, I 2 movement funeral costs Art. 2:202 Notes, IV 39 heat Art. 3:206 Notes, 15 honour Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 39; Art. 6:101 Notes, I 12 impairment of Art. 2:208 Notes, 12 business incorrect Art. 2:204 Notes, I 11 information incorrect information, Art. 2:207 Notes, 11 reliance on indignation Art. 2:203 Notes, I 2 indirect loss Art. 2:101 Notes, III 31 inducement to breach Art. 2:211 Notes, 12 of contract industrial injury Art. 7:104 Notes, 11 insurance inheritability of Art. 2:202 Notes, III 27 claims for the compensation of non-pecuniary damage injunctive relief Art. 1:102 Notes, I 9 intention Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 18 interference Art. 2:206 Notes, III 39 intoxication Art. 5:301 Notes, 13 justifiability Art. 5:203 Notes, 13 legal persons Art. 1:103 Notes, III 40 legal persons, liability for representatives Art. 3:201 Notes, II 26 liability insurance Art. 3:103 Notes, I 12 life annuities Art. 6:203 Notes, 12 light Art. 3:206 Notes, 15 loss Art. 2:101 Notes, I 12 loss of income Art. 2:206 Notes, III 39 maintenance, loss of Art. 2:202 Notes, V 52 mental health Art. 2:201 Notes, III 14 mental incompetence Art. 5:301 Notes, 13 minors Art. 3:103 Notes, I 12; Art. 3:103 Notes, II 21 motor vehicles, Art. 3:205 Notes, 14 damage caused by natural causation Art. 4:101 Notes, I 14 natural persons Art. 1:103 Notes, III 40

Index necessity negligence

Finland Art. 5:202 Notes, III 30 Art. 1:101 Notes, IV 18; Art. 3:102 Notes, I 13 Art. 3:102 Notes, II 25

negligent manslaughter negotiorum gestio Art. 5:202 Notes, II 17 neighbour disputes Art. 6:102 Notes, 10 neighbours, relations Art. 3:202 Notes, 13 between noise Art. 3:206 Notes, 15 non-delegable duties Art. 3:201 Notes, I 12 non-economic Art. 2:101 Notes, I 12; damage Art. 3:204 Notes, III 31 non-economic loss Art. 2:101 Notes, V 49; Art. 6:203 Notes, 12 non-pecuniary loss Art. 6:102 Notes, 10 oil, pollution of Art. 2:209 Notes, II 12 the environment omissions Art. 3:102 Notes, II 25 owner of a vehicle Art. 3:205 Notes, 14 pain Art. 2:202 Notes, III 27 parental liability Art. 3:104 Notes, I 14; Art. 3:104 Notes, II 29 patient, injury Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 43 sustained by pedestrians Art. 5:101 Notes, II 27 personal injury Art. 2:201 Notes, II 5; Art. 2:201 Notes, III 14; Art. 2:201 Notes, V 33 personality, general Art. 2:203 Notes, II 16 protection pollution Art. 3:206 Notes, 15 post-mortal Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 76 personality rights press, liability Art. 2:204 Notes, I 11 prevention Art. 6:302 Notes, 9 principle of Art. 5:501 Notes, 7 identification privacy, invasion of Art. 2:203 Notes, II 15 privacy, right to Art. 2:203 Notes, III 27 product Art. 3:204 Notes, I 1; liability Art. 3:204 Notes, II 15; Art. 3:204 Notes, II 27; Art. 3:204 Notes, III 31; Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 42 product liability, Art. 3:204 Notes, V 45 financial ceiling

profit of the infringer property damage

Art. 6:101 Notes, II 25

Art. 2:206 Notes, I 12; Art. 2:206 Notes, II 25; Art. 2:206 Notes, III 39; Art. 5:101 Notes, II 27 public interest Art. 5:203 Notes, 13 pure economic loss Introd. Ch.1, B 13; Art. 1:101 Notes, II 6; Art. 2:101 Notes, III 31; Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 34; Art. 3:207 Notes, 10; Art. 6:102 Notes, 10 radiation Art. 3:206 Notes, 15 real damage Art. 2:101 Notes, I 12 reduced commercial Art. 2:101 Notes, IV 35 value reduction of liability Art. 5:301 Notes, 13; Art. 6:202 Notes, 11 relatives, loss Art. 2:202 Notes, II 18 suffered by repair costs Art. 2:206 Notes, III 39 restriction of liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 13 right to Art. 2:101 Notes, VIII 68 one’s image rights in rem Art. 2:206 Notes, II 25 secrecy, protection of Art. 2:205 Notes, 10 self-defence Art. 5:202 Notes, I 12 several creditors Art. 6:104 Notes, 11 smell Art. 3:206 Notes, 15 solidary liability Art. 4:103 Notes, 12 strict liability Art. 3:206 Notes, 15; Art. 5:102 Notes, IV 53 suffering Art. 2:101 Notes, V 49; Art. 2:202 Notes, III 27 supervisory duty Art. 3:104 Notes, II 29 threshold amount for property damage claims of consumers Art. 3:204 Notes, II 15 tort law Art. 2:101 Notes, III 31 trade unions Art. 7:104 Notes, 12 traffic accidents Art. 3:205 Notes, 14; Art. 5:102 Notes, III 39; Art. 5:102 Notes, IV 53 traffic insurance Art. 3:205 Notes, 14 transport by plane Art. 3:207 Notes, 10 transport by rail Art. 3:207 Notes, 10 transport by ship Art. 3:207 Notes, 10

1293

first aid trivial damage Art. 6:102 Notes, 10 unfair competition Art. 2:208 Notes, 12 user of a motor vehicle Art. 3:205 Notes, 14 vexatious notice to buyers of a supposed existing copyright Art. 2:208 Notes, 12 vibrations Art. 3:206 Notes, 15 vilifying another Art. 6:204 Notes, 9 work accidents Art. 7:104 Notes, 11 wrongfulness Art. 5:101 Notes, I 11 first aid Art. 3:102 Com. B 16 fiscal duties Art. 7:103 Com. 2 foodstuffs Art. 3:204 Com. A 9 football Art. 2:201 Com. B 8 acting at own risk Art. 5:101 Com. C 16 force majeure Art. 5:302 Com. A 4 environmental Art. 2:209 Com. A 2 impairment France Introd. Ch. 1, B 6; Art. 1:101 Notes, II 2 abandonment Art. 3:208 Notes, 1 abetting of a breach Art. 2:211 Notes, 1 of contract absolute rights Art. 2:101 Notes, VII 58 acceptance of risks Art. 5:101 Notes, II 15 action civile Art. 2:101 Notes, VI 52 acts in the strict sense Art. 7:102 Notes, 1 adequate causation Art. 4:101 Notes, I 1 administrative courts Art. 7:103 Notes, 1 adults Art. 3:102 Notes, I 1 advertising pracArt. 2:101 Notes, II 16 tices, unfair aesthetic damage Art. 2:201 Notes, VII 49 agreements Art. 2:101 Notes, IX 85 alternative causes Art. 4:103 Notes, 1 animals, damage Art. 3:203 Notes, 1; caused by Art. 3:208 Notes, 1 animals, injured Art. 2:206 Notes, III 29 anti-competitive Art. 2:101 Notes, II 16 practice apprentices Art. 3:104 Notes, II 18 arrêts Jand’heur Introd. Ch. 3, C 9 artistic freedom Art. 5:203 Notes, 1 assertion of fact Art. 2:204 Notes, II 15 assessment of damages Art. 6:202 Notes, 1 assignment of rights Art. 6:106 Notes, 1 to reparation assumption of risk Art. 5:101 Notes, II 15

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Index authority conferred Art. 5:201 Notes, 1 by law basic rule Art. 1:101 Notes, II 2 benefit equalisation Art. 6:103 Notes, 1 birth of severely Art. 2:202 Notes, II 5 impaired child blameworthiness Introd. Ch. 3, C 9 bodily integrity Art. 2:101 Notes, I 2 body Art. 2:201 Notes, I 1 body, injury to Art. 2:201 Notes, II 4 bon père de famille Art. 3:102 Notes, I 1 bona fide possession Art. 2:206 Notes, II 16 breach of confidence Art. 2:205 Notes, 1 breach of professional Art. 2:205 Notes, 1 secrecy breach of statutory Art. 3:102 Notes, III 29 duty building’s collapse Art. 3:202 Notes, 1 bullying of fellow Art. 7:104 Notes, 1 employees burden of proof Art. 1:101 Notes, VI 40; Art. 4:101 Notes, III 27 business property Art. 3:204 Notes, II 19 causation Art. 2:101 Notes, I 2; Art. 4:101 Notes, I 1; Art. 4:101 Notes, II 17; Art. 4:101 Notes, III 27 certainty Art. 2:101 Notes, I 2; Art. 2:101 Notes, XII 127; Art. 2:206 Notes, II 16 chain of Art. 4:101 Notes, IV 39 et seq. causation children Art. 3:103 Notes, I 1 children, liability on Art. 3:103 Notes, II 17 equitable grounds close relatives, care Art. 2:201 Notes, VI 36 for injured party close relatives, loss Art. 2:202 Notes, II 5 suffered by collaboration Art. 4:102 Notes, 1 collaboration in a Art. 5:103 Notes, 1 criminal act collateral benefits Art. 6:103 Notes, 1 combat sports Art. 5:101 Notes, II 15 compensation Art. 2:101 Notes, V 38; Art. 6:101 Notes, II 15; Art. 6:104 Notes, 1; Art. 6:201 Notes, 1; Art. 6:202 Notes, 1; Art. 6:203 Notes, 1

Index competent Art. 2:209 Notes, II 3 authorities compulsory insurance Art. 7:105 Notes, 1 of vehicles compulsory liability Art. 3:206 Notes, 1 insurance concurrence of laws Art. 1:103 Notes, I 2 condictio indebiti Art. 1:103 Notes, III 28 conditio sine qua non Art. 4:101 Notes, I 1; Art. 4:103 Notes, 1 consent Art. 5:101 Notes, I 1 consequential loss Art. 2:201 Notes, V 21; Art. 2:201 Notes, VII 49 constitutional protection of civil liability Art. 7:101 Notes, 1 contractual Art. 2:205 Notes, 1 negotiations contributory fault Art. 5:102 Notes, I 1; Art. 5:102 Notes, III 28; Art. 5:102 Notes, IV 41; Art. 5:501 Notes, 1 contributory Art. 5:101 Notes, II 15 negligence cosmetic procedure Art. 5:101 Notes, I 1 craftsmen, liability for damage caused to third parties Art. 3:104 Notes, II 18 criminal police officers Art. 7:103 Notes, 1 criminal process Art. 2:101 Notes, VI 52 culpa levissima Art. 3:102 Notes, I 1 culpability of the Art. 5:301 Notes, 1 injuring party cumulative recovery Art. 6:103 Notes, 1 cyclists Art. 3:205 Notes, 1 damage Art. 2:101 Notes, I 2; Art. 2:101 Notes, II 16; Art. 2:101 Notes, III 22; Art. 6:202 Notes, 1 damage to an Art. 2:206 Notes, III 29 object dangerous emissions Art. 3:206 Notes, 1 dangerous substances Art. 3:206 Notes, 1 death of primary Art. 2:202 Notes, VI 56 party death of primary Art. 2:202 Notes, II 5 victim defamation Art. 2:203 Notes, IV 31 defences, extension Art. 5:501 Notes, 1 to third parties

France denial of justice Art. 7:103 Notes, 1 depreciation of Art. 2:206 Notes, III 29 value destruction Art. 2:206 Notes, III 29 detention Art. 2:206 Notes, II 16 development risks Art. 3:204 Notes, IV 34 Directive on Art. 2:204 Notes, IV 37 electronic commerce directness Art. 2:101 Notes, I 2 discrediting Art. 2:204 Notes, I 1 competitors discrediting products Art. 2:204 Notes, I 1 disposal of award of compensation Art. 6:201 Notes, 1 disturbance, continuing Art. 6:301 Notes, 1 dommage corporel Art. 2:101 Notes, III 22 dommage moral Art. 2:101 Notes, III 22; Art. 2:101 Notes, V 38 driver of a motor Art. 3:205 Notes, 1 vehicle drunken driver Art. 5:101 Notes, II 15 duty of discretion Art. 2:205 Notes, 1 duty to mitigate Art. 5:102 Notes, II 16 damage earning capacity Art. 2:101 Notes, III 22 economic damage Art. 2:201 Notes, V 21 economic interests Art. 2:101 Notes, I 2 economic loss Art. 2:101 Notes, III 22; Art. 2:101 Notes, V 38 employees, personal Art. 3:201 Notes, I 1; liability Art. 7:104 Notes, 1 employers, authority Art. 3:201 Notes, I 1 to give directions employers, immunity Art. 7:104 Notes, 1 from civil liability employers, liability Art. 3:201 Notes, I 1 for employees employment contract Art. 3:201 Notes, I 1 employment contract, Art. 2:211 Notes, 1 unlawful termination Environmental Code Art. 2:209 Notes, I 1; Art. 2:209 Notes, II 3 environmental Art. 2:209 Notes, II 3 criminal law environmental Art. 2:209 Notes, II 3 impairment

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France environmental Art. 2:209 Notes, I 1; liability Art. 3:206 Notes, 1 event beyond control Art. 5:302 Notes, 1 ex turpi causa non Art. 5:103 Notes, 1 oritur actio excess fees Art. 7:103 Notes, 1 exclusion of liability Art. 5:401 Notes, 1 expenditure in Art. 6:302 Notes, 1 preventing damage fait d’autrui Art. 3:104 Notes, II 18; Art. 5:102 Notes, III 28; Art. 5:302 Notes, 1 family li