Nomads in the Shadows of Empires : Contests, Conflicts and Legacies on the Southern Ethiopian-Northern Kenyan Frontier [1 ed.] 9789004255227, 9789004244399

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Nomads in the Shadows of Empires

African Social Studies Series Editorial Board

Martin R. Doornbos, International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague Preben Kaarsholm, Roskilde University Carola Lentz, University of Mainz John Lonsdale, University of Cambridge

VOLUME 30

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/afss

Nomads in the Shadows of Empires Contests, Conflicts and Legacies on the Southern Ethiopian-Northern Kenyan Frontier

By

Gufu Oba

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2013

Cover illustration: Delegates of the Northern Frontier Political Party representing Northern Peoples United Association (NPUA), hosted by Emperor Haile Selassie in Addis Ababa, February 1962. Left: Haji Wario Guracha, leader of NPUA, right: Abba Jillo Araru, secretary general of NPUA, middle: Emperor Haile Selassie. Photo used by the permission of the family of Abba Jillo Araru. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Oba, Gufu, author.  Nomads in the shadows of empires : contests, conflicts and legacies on the southern Ethiopiannorthern Kenyan frontier / by Gufu Oba.   pages cm. -- (African social studies series ; volume 30)  Includes bibliographical references and index.  ISBN 978-90-04-24439-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-25522-7 (e-book) 1. Nomads-Ethiopia. 2. Nomads--Kenya. 3. Pastoral systems--Ethiopia. 4. Pastoral systems--Kenya. 5. Land use, Rural--Ethiopia. 6. Land use, Rural--Kenya. 7. Ethiopia--Politics and government--19th century. 8. Ethiopia--Politics and government--20th century. 9. Kenya--Politics and government--19th century. 10. Kenya--Politics and government--20th century. 11. Ethiopia--Relations--Kenya. 12. Kenya--Relations--Ethiopia. I. Title. II. Series: African social studies series ; v. 30.  GN650.5.E8O33 2013  963.0086918--dc23

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This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 1568-1203 ISBN 978-90-04-24439-9 (paperback) ISBN 978-90-04-25522-7 (e-book) Copyright 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

This book is dedicated to the memory of my father Oba Sarite Kura (1891–1996)

CONTENTS List of Illustrations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ix Preface������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ xi Acknowledgements�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������xix Abbreviations���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������xxi 1. Introduction�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1 2. Pre-Colonial Shifting Resource Borders and Ethnic Relations, 1800–1908�������������������������������������������������������������������������������11 3. The Marking of an Imperial Frontier: Two Borders, Two States, 1898–1909����������������������������������������������������������������������������33 4. Tax Extractions, Imperial Relations and Responses by Frontier Nomads, 1908–1935����������������������������������������������������������������59 5. Transfrontier Grazing and Watering Rights: A Proxy of Border Contests, 1908–1935�������������������������������������������������������������89 6.  Tigre Frontier Banditry: A Legacy of Imperial Conquest, 1908–1934������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 115 7. Negotiating Ethnic Conflicts: States and Feuding Nomads, 1911–1935������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 137 8. Fascist Italy’s Conquest of Ethiopia: The Southern Front, 1935–1937������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 157 9. A New Imperial Neighbor on the Frontier: The Dilemma of Coexistence, 1936–1939������������������������������������������������������������������ 185 10. War, Contests and Conflicts: A Brief Collapse of an Imperial Frontier, 1939–1942�������������������������������������������������� 209 11. The Return to Imperial Frontier Politics: The British and Ethiopia, 1942–1948����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 231 12. Jeegir Banditry: Rebellion by Frontier Nomads, 1941–1943������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 255

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13. Compensating Victims of Banditry in 1943: States and Pastoralists��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 283 14. Political Legacies of Shifting Politics������������������������������������������������� 313 15. Summary��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 327 Glossary������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 335 Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 341 Index����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 353

LISTS OF ILLUSTRATIONS 1. The Southern Horn of Africa��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12 2. Pre-colonial major ethnic communities in the Southern Horn of Africa������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������14 3. Pre-colonial locations of historical Events in Southern Horn of Africa������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������19 4. The imperial borders in the late nineteenth century������������������������������41 5. The provisional borders of the southern frontier showing the ‘International’ Maud Line (i.e. the Red Line) and the ‘British’ Gwynn Line (i.e. the Blue Line)���������������������������������������������� 54 6. The southern Ethiopian and northern Kenyan frontier showing localities of historical importance from 1908–1948�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 95

PREFACE This work was originally conceived as a regional study on the Horn of Africa, focusing on the nexus between the environment, states and nomads. I realized that the scope of this project was far too wide, and would not do justice to topical issues concerning nomads and imperial states in the context of partitioned frontier communities. The choice was whether to examine all the frontiers of northeastern Africa or focus on just one frontier to capture the political dynamics over time. The choice to opt for the latter was a better way to realize at least part of the original research topic. My choice was the southern Ethiopian-northern Kenyan frontier. In writing this book, I have more than merely scholarly motivations for documenting the relationships between nomads and imperial states on the southern Ethiopian−northern Kenyan frontier. This frontier was the home of my grandparents, their parents and their forebears. Like other nomads in this region, my grandparents experienced shifting pre-colonial resource frontiers that defined ethnic grazing lands in the southern Horn of Africa. Their resource frontiers were divided into ritual and non-ritual lands, with the ritual lands serving as core territories, in which were located the pastoral settlements, the major grazing lands, and the wells used by people and their livestock for centuries. The non-ritual resource frontiers—also called the ‘frontiers of the fools’ (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992a)—were situated in a no-man’s land. They were not only separated from the ritual lands, they also formed resource frontiers with neighbouring ethnic groups. Across these geographical spaces, my grandparents, like others before them, migrated from old resource areas and occupied new ones, giving up those in the ‘frontiers of the fools’ as the situation warranted. My grandparents and parents experienced the partitioning of the frontier region between the empire of Ethiopia and the British East African Protectorate of Kenya. Mass migrations of pastoral populations from the Horn of Africa in the early twentieth century, combined with the process of imperial expansion, dislocated them from some of their historical grazing lands. The ‘frontiers of the fools’ disappeared, after the arrival of the imperial powers, when the tribal territories were incorporated into the imperial states. Finding themselves caught up in the fluctuating political situation on the frontier, my parents were sometimes regarded as British

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subjects; at other times, when they crossed the frontier, they were allocated to Ethiopian settler soldiers as gabbar (serfs). When they felt they were being unduly exploited, they would “escape” to the British side of the frontier. During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia (1935–1941), they again found themselves on the other (Italian) side of the frontier. After the Second World War, when the British replaced the Italians, and after the return of the Ethiopian administration, my parents once again found themselves on the British side of the frontier. As a herd boy, I had direct experience of this same imperial frontier as a British subject. Later, as an academic, my research on environmental and social history and ecology afforded me the opportunity to visit both sides of the frontier, which my parents and previous generations had called ‘home’. The writing of this book has therefore, been guided by this intimate awareness of the past. As an elder from this frontier region once told me: ‘the past is our best teacher…the past is a continuation of the present injustices of land losses’ (Anna Waaqo Doogo, interview, 1993). The injustices mentioned by individual communities are used to frame their claims to ancestral land and wells that have been taken over by others. Never­ theless, as I show in this study, what is considered as ‘injustice’ by one group of contestants may well be considered as ‘justice’ by another. It is impossible to evaluate the different claims without using both oral and written historical sources to analyse the contests, the conflicts and the legacies. This study contributes to the historiography of the colonial frontiers and offers scope for comparative historiographical study. The colonial era has implications for the way control was exercised over formerly free populations (Doyle 1986; Prescott 1965). In areas such as the Horn of Africa, where imperial states competed for control of the frontiers, the discussion needs to shift from the contests between states to resistance by the frontier nomads (see also, Chaudet, Parmentier and Pélopidas 2009; Russell 2001). To achieve this, I have drawn on the work of others. Joseph Ginat and Anatoly Khazanov (1998), argue that in the late nineteenth century nomads were not only incorporated by different imperial states, but they found that land and populations were divided by imperial frontiers that entrenched barriers against pastoral mobility. Partitioned nomads forced empire states to use mobile methods to deal with their needs, which differed from their settled counterparts (Salzman 1980). In nearly all the cases the imperial frontiers split up the nomads from their precolonial pastures and water sources (Lewis 2002; Barnes 2010). In other cases, the

prefacexiii division created new political identities. The Kakwa, after the international Uganda−Sudan border split them, created a socio-political situation that ‘has come to affect the relations between the two countries’ (Adefuye 1984: 58). Mark Leopold’s Inside West Nile (2005) analyses how states induced the emergence of identities on a frontier by subduing uprisings through the use of excessive force that left legacies recounted in local narratives. Other narratives were about gunrunning and banditry (Truilizi 1981; Donham and James 2002, Garretson 2002; Salvadori 2010; Fernyhough 2010). The British, in responding to the Nuer resistance, used oppressive means such as air power to destroy the cattle economy: the ‘destruction [of which] caused lasting resentment… [that] provoked inter-tribal cattle raids’ (Omissi 1990). John Lamphear (1992) reports similar harsh punitive missions to subdue the Turkana resistance through the destruction of the pastoral economy. Nene Mburu in Bandits on the Border (2005) draws out the pastoralist use of banditry and secessionism to fight against state authority during the postcolonial period, emphasizing the importance of history in framing pastoral-state conflicts. Concerning the perspective of the southern Ethiopian and Northern Kenyan frontier, this book benefited from the dissertations by Mahassin Abdel Gedir Hag El-Safi (1972), David Hamilton (1974), Peter T. Daleo (1975), Charles Hickey (1984), Lawrence George Simpson (1994) and Belete Bizuneh (2008) and others. El-Safi’s thesis deals with political relations between Somalia and Britain on the Kenya−Somalia border and covers the colonial and postcolonial periods. Daleo’s work examines pre-colonial and colonial trades and Somali pastoral movements across the Jubalandnorthern Kenyan frontier, focusing on interethnic relations during the early periods of the partitioning of the frontier. Hamilton focuses on boundaries and treaties between imperial Ethiopia and her neighbours in the Horn of Africa, while Hickey and Simpson discuss the southern Ethiopia−northern Kenyan frontier, stressing imperial state relations. Bizuneh’s work is a valuable source on state-to-nomad relations, but deals only with the Ethiopian side of the frontier. Others include; Edmond Turton (1970) whose work focused on the ­peoples of the southeastern frontier (i.e. Jubaland) and their relation­ ships before frontier partitioning, particularly the Somali nomads. Neal Sobania’s dissertation (1980) on northern Kenya, concentrates on the Lake Turkana basin. Paul Robinson (1985), while discussing general aspects of the Ethiopia-British East African frontier, examines the relationships from the perspective of the Gabra. Paul Baxter’s dissertation (1954) explores the interaction between the Borana and the British Northern

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Frontier District administration. None of these studies conducted comparative analyses of the actions and reactions of different actors across the southern-Ethiopian-northern Kenyan frontier. The study’s approach has benefited from the case studies of other imperial African frontiers. JoAnn McGregor’s analysis Crossing the Zambezi (2009) assesses the relationships between precolonial, colonial and postcolonial rights claimed by the various contestants to the Zambezi River resources spanning the frontier between Zambia and Zimbabwe; in each case, the past was used to express present grievances. Emmanuel Kreike in Re-creating Eden (2004), referring to the Namibia−Angolan frontier, shows how divisions and removals of communities from the Angolan side produced refugees, punitive missions and conflicts. He also demonstrates how the fates of the Owambo agro pastoralists were closely tied to access to resources across the Namibia−Angola border. Barber in Imperial Frontier (1968), suggests a unity in the arrangements and relationships of pastoral communities split by international frontiers. In analysing the relationships between imperial states and nomads, I used both historical and geographical frameworks that describe political relations as they changed over time. I took into consideration the multiplicity of actors and timeframes (Ogot 1976: 9). In considering the effect of dynamic imperial interventions on previously stateless nomads, one should appreciate that one cannot step back in time and enter into the same political situation. The usual categorization of relationships on the frontier therefore calls for a broad analysis that captures both the motives of the imperial states and the perspectives of the nomads, which must be untangled and jointly investigated. This is critical, considering that the research straddles both sides of the frontier. It compares the contesting systems of frontier administrations and examines the multiplicity of competing communities from the opposing sides of the frontier (Homewood 1996). This account interweaves these contests throughout the various chapters, focusing on the access of the different players to resources and their relation to the contesting authorities. This approach does not ignore the fact that the frontier is physically the same space; rather, it suggests that political shifts altered the relations between states and local com­ munities on the same colonial frontier across time (Maroya 2003). The study’s emphasis on the importance of comparative methods is therefore realistic. The first sources of data were interviews with the informants from frontier communities that captured the narratives of the local frontier history. I took the opportunity of my visits to interview some of the most

prefacexv knowledgeable oral historians, who shared their personal knowledge of the frontier with me. Their stories live on in this book and in the communal memories of key historical events that helped shape their lives and the pastoral economy. Through interviews with these oral historians, I have retraced the history of the frontier drawn from the stories they told about precolonial migrations, ethnic alliances, the various colonial governments that controlled the frontier, forced taxation, the division of the society into gabbar, the onset of banditry, ongoing ethnic conflicts and imperial wars. Each of these themes provides valuable historical insights into fluctuating frontier relations between imperial states and nomads. The trajectories of these stories and relationships constitute a legacy from which future generations may learn. I began the interviews in 1978 and then conducted more interviews two decades later. The same sources were interviewed over time to gauge the persistence of oral history. My informants were elders, mostly men, but also a few women, who were well versed in frontier history. The informants were from both sides of the frontier. Most of them were between 80 and 102 years old at the time of the interviews. The most important criterion in selecting an informant was a reference from another interviewee. Another important consideration was the availability of the informants while travelling and visiting friends from across the frontier. In nearly all cases, the informants or their families had knowledge of both sides of the frontier during the period covered in this study. Some of the informants participated in the historical events described in this book. For reasons of accessibility and availability, the elders I interviewed were from the Borana Oromo. This group was greatly affected by the political fallouts between the imperial states and its members were victims of ­banditry and ethnic conflicts. The other main sources of historical data were archival materials that provide historical texts concerning key events across time and space. I used the interpretive method based on concepts articulated by Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher (1981 [1961]) and Allen M. Howard and Richard M. Shain (2005). The historical data used in writing this book derives mainly from the British colonial archives located in the Kenyan National Archives (KNA), Nairobi.1 These archives are rich sources of 1 Kenya National Archive [hereafter KNA] materials include documents from the British chargé d’affaires in Addis Ababa, the British consul for southern Ethiopia, the chief secretary in Nairobi, and the administrators of the Northern Frontier District [hereafter NFD] of Kenya. Other archival records used were monthly and annual district reports, provincial reports and, most valuable of all, border intelligence reports.

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information on political activities on both sides of the frontier and cover a wide range of historical topics. I made extensive use of the Kenyan National Archives (KNA) between 2005 and 2010. These records cover the period 1908–1948. Unfortunately, organized Ethiopian archives do not exist for this period (Triulzi 1981; Bizuneh 2008). With regard to the Ethiopian side of the frontier, accounts by the British consuls for southern Ethiopia and His Britannic Majesty’s (H.B.M.) chargé d’affaires in Addis Ababa, who watched political events closely and communicated with the Ethiopian authorities both on the frontier and in Addis Ababa were extremely valuable. Minutes of meetings with Ethiopian officials, correspondence (translated from Amharic), minutes of joint conferences and transcribed interviews with pastoralists from both sides of the frontier were useful for understanding the perspectives of frontier peoples. For the Italian administration of Galla-Sidamo, which briefly controlled Borana province (1935–1941), I relied on British intelligence reports and a limited number of Italian war reports.2 I discuss the archival sources in the context of historical events viewed across time and space. Timelines helped to define the chronology of political events. Through organizing the material by topic and chronology, it was possible to analyse available files and relevant correspondence. These files were cross-checked using computer searches available at KNA and the catalogues of the subject matter contained in district files, provincial files, central government files and consulate files (marked ‘Abyssinian Affairs’ and organized chronologically), and were used to delineate ­historical developments. Actor narratives and excerpts from historical texts, which capture the tempo of the political dynamics on the frontier, were presented and the different motives of different historical actors interpreted. The archival and interview materials were organized and interpreted with each chapter topic in mind. These interpretations helped to determine the course of the argument in each chapter. The data included numbers of fatalities, evidence of attacks and counterattacks, the number of stolen livestock, and the number of individuals ransomed by bandits. I used the data regarding fatalities and stock losses heuristically, without disregarding the emotions that such data might produce in different quarters of the frontier communities. 2 The Italian archives, though desirable, were not accessible to the author. It is the hope of the author that readers would not be missing major events and interpretation of the critically important frontier history from alternative sources.

prefacexvii In bringing together comparative and interpretive perspectives, this book provides a sense of the impact of the British, Ethiopian and Italian administrations on a common frontier. I have looked at whether the different imperial policies explain the differences in state-nomad relationships. I have carefully compared the materials describing the different imperial administrations to see if the differing relationships can be explained in terms of European as opposed to non-European imperial frontier policies (Tignor 1976). By providing a logical analysis, this study contributes to understanding the complex relations among the different imperial states and frontier nomads across time. In understanding the political legacies of these historical developments, I introduce regional level politics after the independence of Somalia with contemporary Ethiopia. During this time regional politics developed into contests over colonial/imperial borders that merged with local grievances at the frontier micro level. This links the threads of the past and the present with a view toward encouraging further study. Finally, there are some caveats concerning the use of archival and other sources connected to a study of the history of the southern Ethiopiannorthern Kenyan frontier. Nomenclature, especially with regard to place names, people’s names and titles, is particularly difficult. Ethiopian names and the ethnic names of local pastoralists were spelt differently in different sources at different times. I have presented the names as cited in the original sources, but where appropriate have supplied a version that is in accordance with common contemporary usage, and placed this in square brackets. In the case of Somali and Oromo names, where a new nomenclature has been developed, my use of the names may not always be consistent with the Oromo Quube (Leus with Salvatori 2006) or the Romanized Somali script. I have used the nomenclature in existing documentation for personal preferences. Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia Spring 2012

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In writing this work, I am indebted to many. The Department of International Environment and Development Studies (Noragric) at Norwegian University of Life Sciences gave both financial and professional support to the project. Many thanks go to the Head of the Depart­ ment, Gry Synvvevåg, for her support and in particular to the department’s financial head, Gulbrandsen Sidsel, for making the budgetary allocation for the editing of the book. Thanks to the Research Committee for assisting with funding for two research trips to the United Kingdom in 2009 and 2010. To the librarians, Liv Ellingsen and Ingeborg Branzæg for their generosity in giving so freely of their time when undertaking searches of the relevant literature. Peter Nielsen has supported the book project in more ways than one. His generous supply of record cards at the beginning of this project, greatly assisted the writing process. Tor Arve Benjaminsen, Espen Sjaastad, Andrei Marin, and Col. D. Rasso made comments on individual chapters, while Peter Little, LaRay I. Denza, Jill Fresen and Mark Bedawi are thanked for their critical comments of the book. Fieldwork for this book took me to southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya, where I established contacts and interviewed elders from the frontier region. Their knowledge afforded important insights into the frontier history that influenced my thinking and motivation for this study. In particular, I remember my father, Oba Sarite Kura, who, until his passing at the age of 105, was the oral librarian of the Borana specifically, and the southern frontier societies in general. It was through him that I was able to contact the majority of my informants. Others who have passed on and whose memories I treasure include Bidu Bankhare, Godana Ajaa, Halakhe Huqana Ch’aari, Fitaurari Halakhe Guyo Xuye, Kenyazmach Roba Bukhura, Haji Wario Guracha and the Honorable Osman Abba Jillo Araru. Others who are still alive are Borbor Bulle, Anna Waaqo Doogo, Dabaasa Arero, Denge Galgallo Sarite, Qaballe Galgallo Matoye and Goje Goollo—all of whom introduced me to the history of the southern Ethiopian-northern Kenyan frontier. I am deeply grateful to the family of the late Osman Abba Jillo Araru, who allowed me to use the photograph on the cover of this book. Together with Haji Wario Guracha, they took the picture when they were hosted by His Imperial Majesty, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, in Addis Ababa in 1962. I also acknowledge Haji Hussein Ka Dida Kosaye

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for his help as an emissary and for his eagerness for this work to be completed. Abdullahi Shongolo shared important audio tapes of the interviews he conducted with Kenyazmach Roba Bukhura. The study relies mainly on archival material. I received assistance from the staff of the Kenyan National Archives in Nairobi over a five-year period from 2005–2010. They diligently searched for materials and retrieved files on different aspects of the frontier. Their guidance in suggesting relevant files—sometimes not on my request lists—helped to unearth valuable documents pertinent to this study. In London, the staff of the British Library and the Library of Anthropology at the British Museum provided some older sources that I had not been able to obtain through interlibrary loan. In 2009, Dr. Hassan Arero facilitated my visit to the British Museum. The writing of this book and the reviews were completed while I was on sabbatical at Emory University. I would like to acknowledge Peter Little for hosting me at the Department of Development Studies. It is my hope that this work will find its way onto the bookshelves of people of nomadic descent in northeastern Africa and of scholars whose lifelong research has focused on pastoral peoples and their relations with colonial and postcolonial states or those who are concerned with global borderlands. Besides specialist readers, this study also targets the frontier peoples concerned. It provides a reference for students of colonial history as well as for the families whose past generations constitute part of the history of the Ethiopian-Kenyan frontier region. Their memories of these past generations (perhaps prompted in part by this book) may encourage them to reflect on the future of the societies described. Finally, I owe heartfelt thanks to my wife and children who endured long separations. My wife Ruth Darmi (Mama) has been a guardian to my family. My children Sora, Deebano, Ha Badasso, Bori, Fugicha and Jillo and our son-in-law, Halkano Bonaya, have given me unwavering support in the course of this project. Their frequent enquiries and constant interest made the writing of this book an enjoyable exercise.

ABBREVIATIONS BC BMA BMME EPA EPRDF H.B.M. IBEAC IOA KAR KNA NFD NCO OETA PF SALF SYL TPLF UNHCR WSLF

Boran Constabulary British Military Administration British Military Mission to Ethiopia Ethiopian Provincial Administration Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front  His Britannic Majesty Imperial British East African Company Italian Oriental Africa King’s African Rifles Kenyan National Archives Northern Frontier District Non-commissioned officer Occupied Enemy Territory Administration Patriotic Front Somali Abbo Liberation Front Somali Youth League Tigray People’s Liberation Front United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF)

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION Nomads in the Shadows of Empires is a history of the frontier marked by the southern borders of imperial Ethiopia and the northern frontier of the British East African colony of Kenya. The frontier was a contested zone between imperial Ethiopia and the British East African Protectorate of Kenya (1896–1935 and 1942–1948), between Fascist Italy and Ethiopia (1935–1937), and between the British and Fascist Italy after the Italian occupation of the Ethiopian frontier (1937–1941). The study examines imperial disputes related to the demarcation of the international borders, the extraction of taxes and tributes from frontier nomads, disagreements over nomads’ trans-frontier grazing and watering rights, and control of frontier banditry and ethnic conflicts. These conflicts were an outcome of clashes between ethnic groups as well as the impact of imperial wars on frontier security. The availability and accessibility of firearms, combined with banditry, also aggravated ethnic conflicts. Thus, this book’s aim is to understand the extent to which the political fallout resulting from the contests between the British and the Ethiopians, and later between the Italians and the British, over the control of the frontier influenced responses by frontier nomads. Huge losses of livestock and human fatalities caused by frontier banditry and state actions were major sources of disagreements among Ethiopians, the British and the frontier nomads, and later among the British, the Italians and the nomads. The book contributes to understanding why persistent legacies of rebellion (banditry) and ethnic conflicts anchored in the mists of history have proved so difficult to resolve, a century later. The book’s storyline begins with the pre-colonial period (the mid- and late-nineteenth century). It discusses the nomads’ resource frontiers, emphasizing the flexibility of resource use that affected ethnic relations. The partitioning prompted a complex evolution of inter-societal relations, as well as the relations between imperial states and the partitioned nomads. The partitioning of the nomadic communities through treaty negotiations and the demarcation of the imperial borders between Ethiopia and the British East African Protectorate (1896–1909) and between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland (1897–1908) determined the

2

chapter one

course of future contests over the frontiers. The frontier treaty between Ethiopia and the British East African Protectorate that allowed the transfrontier nomads to move freely across the border to access water and grazing land became a source of contestation. The new boundary lines prompted a complex evolution of inter-societal relations, as well as the relations between the imperial states. These dramatic changes raise a fundamental question: did the partitioning of the nomads succeed in changing their conception of resource frontiers? This is important if one is to understand why the frontier pastoralists continue to experience conflict over land, even after the transfer of the tribal territories to the imperial and post-imperial states. This is a comparative study. It conducts analysis of the Ethiopian, British and Italian administrations of the southern frontier and examines the nomads’ reactions to each. The discussion explores the methods of political dialogue used by the multiethnic pastoralists as they contrast the methods employed by imperial centers for administering the frontier. The imperial centers exhibited ideological and policy differences on the administration of the frontier. This was reflected in how each empire reacted to the other in terms of frontier grazing and watering treaty, the disagreements over the contested borders, control of banditry and ethnic conflicts in general and control of pastoralists movements in particular. The purposes of frontier control were two: first, taxation of the pastoralist populations and second, creation of new political identities. The study examines the critical features of the administrations of the three imperial states over the southern frontier. One of the most interesting aspects of this comparative historical study is the contrasting features between a non-European feudal African empire and two European colonial powers: one liberal and the other fascist and their relations as part of the frontier history. The comparison is not in their ideologies but in the way the imperial states controlled the frontier. The Ethiopian feudal empire was a subsistence system that relied on the exploitation of the periphery to survive. It differed from the European liberal system in terms of its systems of rule and the extraction of resources from the periphery. Historically, feudal systems were hierarchical. At the head was the king with authority over overlords, lesser lords, and exploited peasants. The king and his overlords represented the center while the peasants represented the periphery (for details, see Tibebu 1995; Hou 2007:8–9). In this study, we will understand the role the Ethiopian feudal empire (also referred to as Abyssinia) played in frontier politics. The feudal center sent neftenya (settler-soldiers) to the peripheral provinces

introduction3 to exploit new resources (Eide 2000). The overlords managed provincial governorates called madbet (‘kitchens’)1 allocated ‘amongst different officers’ who were paid by the conquered populations, the gabbar (serfs) (Hodson 1919; Darley 1926; Markakis and Ayele 1986). Their administration was one of exploitation, creating chaotic political relations with the frontier nomads and the neighboring imperial state. Yet this feudal administration, until its removal by the brief Italian administration from 1936 to 1941, had firmly refused to be intimidated by the British. Their tradition of plurality and power hierarchy that appeared to lack coherence in the administration of the frontier was an irritation to the British administration. In Ethiopia, where carrying of fire arms is the pride of a warrior empire, the British attempts to control the accessibility of fire arms on the frontier and control of border banditry was never successful. A critical feature of the British colonial administration was the maintenance of law and order (Touval 1963; Lewis 1963; Thomas 2003). The system of administration was well integrated into the colonial power structure, with great reliance placed on gathering intelligence across the political frontiers to monitor tribal movements. The administrators at the center—from the colonial secretary in Whitehall to the governor and chief secretary in Nairobi to chargé d’affaires in the neighboring state— were linked to the periphery through networks of consulates that monitored the colonial frontiers. At the periphery, the regional administrators were semi-independent on matters of policy; however, they rarely acted without providing information to higher authorities on the nature of political events on the frontier (Thomas 2003). Appointed chiefs at local levels supported the regional provincial commissioners and their assistant district commissioners. The whole system relied on security networks involving the police, the army and local chiefs, all of which were involved in maintaining law and order. The regional administrators had a lot of leeway in their communications with the authorities of the neighboring states, often through the consular offices or the chargé d’affaires, sometimes bypassing frontier authorities on the opposite side (Chenevix Trench 1964, 1993). The consuls safeguarded the proper application of the frontier treaty as well as serving as foreign emissaries and monitoring disputes, raids and other crimes committed on the other side of the frontier (Hodson 1927; Ray 2008). On the common frontier, the British administration found it necessary to demand the applications of the frontier 1 The name is derived from the place in which the notables ate.

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treaty that allowed the frontier pastoralists from the British side of the frontier to freely have access to water and grazing on the Ethiopian side of the frontier at one level, while at the same time the British insisted on the implementation of the second boundary (hereafter Gwynne Line) which was rejected by the Ethiopians. The persistent demands for the free access by the British nomads and contested status of the border with the neighboring imperial powers, even after the Italians removed the Ethiopians from the southern frontier, pre-occupied the British for much of the recorded history covered by this study. The Italians, after they removed the Ethiopians from power, re-arranged that country into different administrative structures. Their system of administration was structured along the lines of the British system, but with some variations - such as methods used to control the nomads within their territories and systems of tax collection. The southern frontier was under a commissario in-charge of the province and assisted by residente responsible for the administrations of districts. The Italian administration was a military occupational force and therefore, from the top to the local levels, their system of frontier control was highly militarized. Their local levies that watched over the frontier committed heinous crimes that left a lasting impression in the minds of frontier communities. Their suspicions of the British regarding border controls, and the perceived support to the Ethiopian resistance against the Italian occupation, strained relations. Moreover, the Italian frontier policy was to control the movements of the frontier nomads within their borders and to demand taxations and the issuing of passes for British nomads, which created persistent conflicts with the British administration. These contesting frontier relations between the imperial states had adversely influenced the frontier communities. An important aspect of this investigation concerns how ethnic relations revolve around the flexibility of resource use across the frontier and how territoriality was perceived. On one hand, the imperial states each perceived the frontier dividing independent territories as sovereign powers. For the nomads on the other hand, the divisions were artificial. The imperial borders may have been superimposed on the pre-colonial territories but they did not imply the end of pastoral territoriality. Proponents of pastoral territoriality contend that such territories exhibited some of the features of imperial frontiers. Nomadic territories were set within a particular lay of the land. Each territory had a known geographical name and would therefore meet the requirements that it constituted a territory. The right to include or exclude other pastoral groups also marked such areas as territories

introduction5 (Lattimore 1962:469). Opponents of this view claim that pastoral territoriality did not exist until imperial partitioning. For example, Noyes (2001) suggests that the establishment of imperial borders and frontiers promoted territoriality. On the subject of resource frontiers and nomads, Thompson (1995:1) stresses the need to look beyond Eurocentric viewpoints by taking into consideration borders and frontiers from before colonial partitioning. Allott (1969:10) concurs that specific communities make territorial claims that are acknowledged by neighboring groups. Fawcett (1918:25) disagrees, stating that ‘[t]he territories of…pastoral nomadic tribes are incapable of exact demarcation—herdsmen must follow where pasture is good, and hence the ground is not permanently occupied’. In the different arguments, nomads’ territories and mobility do not negate their claims to occupancy. Rather, their conceptions of pastoral territoriality meet the criteria of being geographical and social entities (Kleinschmidt 2000) except where groups reconstruct themselves through migration (Cole and Wolf 1974:119) across the created political ‘borders’. As used in this study, a border is a line of jurisdiction that divides neighboring countries while the term ‘frontier’ refers to a zone of separation between neighbouring states, communities, territories and resources (Sahlings 1989:4). According to the imperial interpretation, ‘[a] frontier… is both the domain of the undomesticated frontier-dweller’ [or] ‘a geopolitical area at the edge of politically and militarily controlled imperial space: a zone of transition of low administrative intensity outside the centers of empire’ (Maroya 2003:271). Typically, a frontier represents a space of contestation and negotiation. Symbolically, it serves as a filter, separating contested identities and contested control of communities who shifted back and forth as environmental conditions and political circumstances demanded. In this study, I argue that the nomads regarded the imperial borders and frontiers as a duality; on the one hand, representing the indigenous concept of pastoral territories, and on the other hand, the new political order with clearly delineated borders (Clapham 1996:236; van der Pijl 2007:61). Frontier communities could hardly remain neutral actors (Donnan and Wilson 1994:2). Rather, their response represented a manifestation of ‘centrifugal forces’ (Kristof 1959:273) that simultaneously tended to integrate peoples of same ethnic groups and pulled communities made up of different groups apart. The struggle between states and the nomads also created the centripetal forces (used by states to control the nomads) and the centrifugal forces (used by the nomads to resist) (Meir 1988). Another centrifugal element is the loyalty of frontier

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communities that shifts according to the policies of the imperial states (Asiwaju 1985a, b; Nugent and Asiwaju 1996:137). This account assesses how nomads took advantage of frontier politics by crossing to the other side of the border, in the process changing allegiance from one imperial state to the other. For the transfrontier nomads, the key requirement was access to resources, but access rights alone were insufficient to determine where they would place their allegiance (Karanagh 1994). Indeed, the political situation was the main determining factor (Prescott 1987:159). The policies of the colonizing powers, forced frontier communities to develop concepts of the ‘interior’ (in the sense that they were forcibly confined within the state boundary) and the ‘exterior’ (i.e., the areas to which they could escape) (Noyes 2001:198). The discourses of the opposing forces represent the relationship between imperial states and the nomads very differently (Meir 1988). In this regard, imperial states created contrasting identities. First, people were grouped according to their cultural identity (e.g., the Oromo versus the Somali), as well as by religion (e.g., Muslim versus non-Muslim). From the perspectives of the imperial states, tensions between and within each category existed (Stokes 1994:32). Second, the nomads became subjects by paying taxes. The imperial states may have facilitated these shifts in ‘presumed’ nationality, but in reality, there were no imperial subjects, but rather embedded ethnic entities. The groups themselves decided their own citizenship, at times switching as prevailing political conditions changed (Samatar 1984:176). The frontier, sometimes acted as a corridor of opportunity, sometimes as a source of resistance (when political conditions were unfavorable) (Salzman 2004:313; Asiwaju 1984:v). In reaction to harsh policies on one side of the border, nomads would escape to the other side, thus obtaining temporary respite. The study shows that persistent banditry, ethnic conflicts and imperial wars left behind lasting legacies of insecurity on the same frontier. Eric J. Hobsbawm (1969:22), whose classic work Bandits has often been relied on for a theoretical understanding of banditry in general and frontier banditry in particular, describes banditry as a sociopolitical activity operating outside of authorized state activities that tends to be highly visible during periods of ‘endemic pauperization’. Hobsbawm’s view is that social bandits robbed from the rich to give to the poor; a ‘Robin Hood’ type of banditry. It is not universally accepted that bandits are ‘champions of the frontier communities’, rather they were in fact unlikely to promote social harmony (Blok 1972:494). Because the origins of bandits might vary, so, do their functions and relations to rural communities. Some of the impacts

introduction7 of banditry are psychological. The bandits create myths related to their real or imagined power (Austen 1986; Bankoff 1998). Thus, the use of ‘social bandits’ should not ignore the proviso that banditry activities might be admired by some peasants (Brown 1990) and state functionaries (Driessen 1983). Over time, bandits might coerce rural populations into cooperating with them, usually through the extraction of protection money. When state officials and local communities are intimidated, they might comply with the bandits’ demands without being open about it (Hobsbawm 1969:90, 91). The bandits gain two advantages from this: first, they can operate freely; and second, their leaders can use their influence over state officials to enhance their own power and future prospects. Still, the sociopolitical environment is equally important. In most cases, people who share cultural and religious affiliations with the bandits provide them with an enabling political environment. Often the bandits gain recruits from disenfranchised groups who come from the same socio­ economic categories they do (Cassia 1993; Wagner 2007). These theories, however, fail to consider the peasant populations that are not part of the bandits’ cultural groups but are victims of bandits’ activities (Blok 1972). This is particularly so when persistent frontier banditry aggravates ethnic conflicts. Although causal factors are not easily discernible in analyzing ethnic conflicts, it is important to investigate the historical and sociopolitical circumstances that influenced conflicts (Simmons 2005). Knowledge of human and political relations on the frontier and its particular precolonial history assists in understanding the causes of ethnic conflict. Among the complex causal factors that lead to conflict are historical relations and material factors such as competition over resources (Allen 1994:113). The work presents case studies that examine the root cause of ethnic conflicts within the context of precolonial relations and how the relations changed following interventions by the imperial states. It argues that the dominant and subordinate precolonial relations nourish contemporary conflicts (Markakis 1994:218; Gelfand 1973:13). Ellis (2006:23) refers to this type of conflict as a ‘zero-sum game’ and a ‘consensual struggle’, in which one of the parties strives to gain the resources of the other. One can identify two main features of consensual conflicts. First, there is competition over scarce resources where one of the groups considers the resources to be of such real or symbolic importance that their loss would perpetuate conflict. Second, the former subordinates, motivated by historical grievances that include a situation in which the ‘aggrieved group has a subjective attitude towards the previously dominant group, must believe that it

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is possible to change things in such a way that the grievance will [be addressed]’ (Ellis 2006:26). Through the avoidance of conflict, the dominant group can exert power while maintaining the façade of an open, equalitarian society (Singh 2008:2). This group shows little desire to be involved in conflict. In contrast, the subordinate group often resorts ‘to physical violence’ (Gelfand 1973:14) hoping in the process ‘to enlarge their share of the resources commanded by the state’ (Markakis 1994:217). This is despite the fact that the precolonial socioeconomic arrangements allowed for the sharing of such resources (Premdas 1997:8). The imperial states redefined previously shared spaces and resources, thus, tending towards ‘exclusion [rather] than…inclusion’ of others (Mustapha 1998:27; Jacquin-Berdal 2002:46). The work further argues that the imperial states ignored the root causes of the conflicts, while believing that conflicts were due to inevitable hatred different groups had for one another. The states were obliged to intervene, if only to reduce fatalities and general insecurity on the frontier (Nnoli 1998). It was common to find that critical resources, such as wells and grazing lands, were transferred from one group to another (Fukui and Markakis 1994:2), although this often backfired, producing the opposite of the desired effect (Ray 2008:15). In the process states often ‘strengthen the weak to weaken the strong’ as far as control over scarce resources is concerned (Ba 1998:242). Those whose resources were transferred to others responded by attacking the beneficiaries of resource transfer (Munro 1975:2), resulting in widespread stealing of livestock and considerable loss of life (Hamilton 1974:387). Additionally, this study examines the dynamics of the political process when the imperial frontiers collapsed following wars between the imperial states. The Italian conquest and occupation of Ethiopia (1935–1941) and the brief occupation of British Somaliland (1939) left Italy in control of all the frontiers in the Horn of Africa with the exception of Kenya and Djibouti. The short-lived Italian administration of the Italian Oriental African Colony (1936–1941), specifically of its southern frontier, had dramatic effects on state-to-state and state-to-nomad relationships. During a short-lived border war after the defeat of Italy in 1941, for a brief period, individual frontiers effectively disappeared, with only one imperial power—the British—controlling the whole of the Horn of Africa. In the midst and aftermath of this war, there were no effective controls over movements of nomads across previously contested imperial frontiers. For all practical purposes, the British could treat the international boundaries as provisional lines of control (Ayele 1969). This work considers the

introduction9 effectiveness of the brief military administration of the Borana under the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) (1941–1942) in dealing with frontier grievances and examines the reemergence of the old political intrigues after the return of Ethiopia as the administrative authority in the Borana province. For the second time (the first being during the partition), the frontier experienced an outbreak of banditry, mostly by the ex-Italian banda recruited from frontier nomads, triggered chain reactions of ethnic feuds and rebellion on unprecedented scale. This study explores banditry’s impact on the frontier pastoral economy during the period 1942–1943. Further, it assesses the outcome of a joint conference, involving officials of the Ethiopian and British administrations, and local leaders of the frontier communities, on the subject of compensation and restitution of the victims of frontier banditry. The study concludes with a brief examination of the political legacy of the partitioned frontier and its historical imprint on subsequent (indeed still continuing) political conflicts.

CHAPTER TWO

PRE-COLONIAL SHIFTING RESOURCE BORDERS AND ETHNIC RELATIONS, 1800–1908 The southern Horn of Africa, which became the frontier region between southern Ethiopia and the British East African Protectorate of Kenya, represents shared resource borders among the southern Oromo, the Darood and other Somali clans in the nineteenth century. The major geographical features separating Somali and Oromo territorial resource borders were the inter-riverine regions of the Daua and Lower Juba rivers (see Fig. 1). Across these natural geographical features, the Somali clans filtered from the north, moving westwards into the regions occupied by the Borana Oromo in the late nineteenth century. Internally, geographical features formed the ecological frontiers of the Borana territory; these eventually constituted the southern imperial frontier. This chapter deals with pre-colonial ethnic relations on the southern frontier during the nineteenth and early twentieth century and analyzing the shifting resource borders between resident Borana Oromo and migratory Somali clans. Here the concepts of external and internal resource borders are useful tools to examine historical relations between various ethnic groups. The Borana model of social relationships, which employs the concept of naaga Borana (peace of Borana) as an overarching sociopolitical principle to build and maintain peaceful coexistence with other ethnic groups, will be examined. This discussion considers aspects of naaga Borana in facilitation of the caravan trade, the sharing of resources and the building of client relationships. The chapter further considers the roles played by environmental disturbances during the late-nineteenth century in changing ethnic resource borders. It shows how external and internal political pressures resulted in the collapse of the internal resource borders in the early twentieth century. Shifting Resource Borders In defining resource borders, I categorize grazing lands either as frontier lands (i.e., the buffer zones) or as core territory, which includes ritual sites, wells and settlement land. Frontier lands represent external resource

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Lake Tana ue Bl

Ni le

L. Zwai L. Shala

L. Awasa L. Abaya

We bi S heb eli

L. Stephanie L. Turkana Mt. Kulal

a R. Jub

ai ob D i eb W

yiro so N a w E Mt. Kenya

ana R. T

R. i Ath

R. Sabaki Mt. Kilimanjaro

LEGEND River Lake Mountain

0

500 Kilometers

Fig. 1. The Southern Horn of Africa. borders while the core territory represents internal resource borders. Because the borders were not fixed in the sense of political borders, the external resource borders tended to define the extent to which groups could exploit resources within their land and the restrictions that they placed on others. The Borana regard borderland as laaf seera dawe (the land of the fools). Not only are the borders porous and hard to defend, they are areas where rules and regulations do not exist and are characterized by endemic conflict. Within the internal resource borders, the Borana maintained population stability by regulating the population within the core territory for



pre-colonial shifting borders and relations, 1800–190813

three reasons. The first, and most important, was the deployment of the Luba-generation class system. This meant that the Luba had to have access to huge numbers of cavalry at all times. To use this strategy effectively, the Borana, whose population was small at that time, prohibited their people from migrating into the peripheral areas so as not to overstretch their defenses. Further, the obligations of paying kaato (social and ritual taxes) and attending ceremonies at sacred gada sites supported the Luba in power (Legesse 1973). The second reason for controlling the dispersal of population across the seera dawe was to manage the wells. This required a labor force for maintaining and for re-excavating old and disused wells. Although the clans did not prohibit the dispersal of their members within the core areas, their dispersal into more remote areas would risk attack, which would leave the clans with insufficient human and livestock resources. The third reason was participation in the rituals necessary for the spiritual well-being of the pastoral economy. The exception was the mobile foora herds that made occasional use of laaf seera dawe, as opposed to the main areas of settlements. Only during extended periods of peace in the wet season did people in the main settlements visit the frontier before returning to the wells within the core territory in the dry season. Tribal folklore provides evidence of external resource borders. In the early nineteenth century, the Borana were neighbors of the Orma in the present-day Jubaland, which the Oromo called Booji. Between 1860 and 1880, the Darood Somalis displaced the Orma in the Jubaland. Borana men born in the early 1900s recall the grazing lands of Dadacha Tabdo (named after acacia tortilis at Tabdo [in political maps the name is Tabda]) in cattle-grazing folklore. Although the folklore does not provide us with exact dates, it gives oral information on the resource frontiers. Pease, suggested that ‘[s]ome eighty years ago [in the 1830s] the whole district of Mandera, except the river area in the northeast corner, seem[s] to have been occupied by the Galla [Oromo].’1 The Borana occupied the entire interior of present-day Mandera District of Kenya, which stretched as far south as Garba Haare, on the present-day Somalia border. Commenting on his interviews with an elderly member of the Garre clan with personal knowledge of this earlier time, Pease states ‘Ahmed Kiti (age 67 in 1928) remembers [the] Borana at Garba Harre when he was a boy… The place is named after [a dam built] by Dida, the Borana owner, who as a boy watered at El Wak.’ The Borana living in El Wak were known 1 J.W.K. Pease, ‘An ethnological treatise on the Gurreh tribe’, p.19, KNA/DC/MDA/4/3.

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by the regional name, Gaarifati (the scoffers). The name suggests frequent hostile encounters with other ethnic groups on the frontiers of the Jubaland. Unlike the external resource borders that fluctuated in accordance with ethnic relations, the core territory of the Borana remained stable for several centuries (Fig. 2). From the beginning, they occupied the rich grazing lands along the resource borders shared with ethnic groups such as the Gabra and the Sakuye, and later the Ajuran, who managed camels. The Borana system of land use is semi-sedentary. The Borana split their herds into foora (mobile herds) and waara (settlement herds). Settlement

Lake Tana ue Bl

Ni le

L. Zwai L. Shala

L. Awasa L. Abaya

ARSI OGADEN

GUJI KONSO

BORANA

L. Stephanie GABRA

HAWIYA

BORANA

L. Turkana

DAROOD

Mt. Kulal

ILE REND

yiro so N Ewa Mt. Kenya

GARRE

a R. Jub

SAMBURU

We bi S heb eli

DAROOD

ai ob D i eb W

ORMA

ana R. T

R. i Ath

R. Sabaki Mt. Kilimanjaro

LEGEND River

Lake Mountain

500.0

0 Kilometers

Fig. 2. Pre-colonial major ethnic communities in the Southern Horn of Africa.



pre-colonial shifting borders and relations, 1800–190815

herds made use of home rangelands (AGROTEC-CRG-SEDES Associates 1974 II:36). The foora moved between the sub-humid Badha and the well-watered Dirre that served as dry-season grazing lands, and the wetseason Golbo lowlands, which had been essential to the survival of Borana pastoralism for several centuries. The Borana benefited from a system of reciprocity built through clan alliances and other social networks. No animosity exists between clans in the Borana system; differences between herding units or individuals would very seldom escalate into clan conflicts.2 Thus during the nineteenth century, ecological diversity and political stability, rather than political fragility and conflict, were the main defining features of the Borana internal resource borders. Usually the systems of resource use were predictable, just as political events, which followed a calendar of ritual events, were also predictable. Resource exploitation created socio-political harmony, enabling individuals to gain access to critically important resources in times of ecological stress. These common rules, which the Borana observed, and the political responsibility taken by individuals, helped them to survive periods of ecological stress in what Buchanan (1978:417) described as ‘ecological compatibility coupled with social compatibility.’ The stability of land use and access to water depended on hierarchical social institutions that varied between settlements, neighborhoods and grazing associations. This complex social and institutional system instilled respect for social values, the administration of justice and periodic revisions of the customary law that ‘provide[d] the ultimate legitimizing tenets of law and social behavior’ (AGROTEC 1974, I:19). These are the rules that governed water sources. The main water sources are numerous shallow wells and chains of ancient deep-well systems referred to as tula salaam. Borana water management encouraged successful pastoralism (Tiki, Oba and Tvedt 2011). The Borana philosophy of property rights with regard to land and water resources meant that all of the above were the property of raba gada, the institution that ran the Borana social and political affairs. The ritual sites were the areas necessary for performing the gada obligations (Legesse 2000).3 Whereas most Borana ritual sites are located in the Liban and Dirre areas, other sites are located along the eastern and southern 2 An exception to this was the internal nine-year war during the gada of Dida Bitata Mamo (1872–1880). 3 The ritual sites that had been resource border markers are Dadacha Waar Abi on the confluence of the Daua and Ganale rivers, Ejersa Filtu across the river, the whole of Liban,

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frontiers, corresponding with the locations of the ancient deep wells (Adugna 2004:132). These systems of resource management stand in contrast with those of the Somali clans. Paul Spencer (1998) describes differences between Somali and Borana territorial relations in terms of their different sociopolitical organizations and perceptions of resource borders. The Somalis consider that the grazing lands should be open to whoever wishes to use them without any form of restriction. Lewis (1998:213) suggests that: ‘[t]he fact remains that the most strongly nomadic groups range over hundreds of miles in their annual movements in search of good grazing…the only limit of maximum extension being the fear of isolation from one’s kin and clan during friction.’ Lewis further argues that past and present distribution of Somali clans provides important clues concerning the participants in the conquest and occupation of other groups’ territories in which both the victors and the conquered evolved narratives to show how the territory in question changed hands. If pastures define pastoralist territory, as in the case of the Somalis, then it can be suggested that resource borders shift because such pastures vary across space and time. This happens through the expansion and contraction of the frontiers, which depends on the ecological and sociopolitical factors that drive the process. Thus, for Somali nomads, land claims are not about the land itself but rather about its resources. This does not preclude some kind of sharing, as groups would often establish heer (agreements) that bind them to exploit given resources or to defend such resources against other Somalis. Agreements or social contracts defined the rules for sharing blood money or for paying the families of the victims (Lewis 1998:201). In principle, this means that individual herding units ideally had access to pastures, achieving this might involve the use of force (Lewis 1999:49). Variable ecology and threats of force are the two main drivers that influence the distribution of Somali herding units (Lewis 1958a,b). Land can be contested by the occupants or others who used the same resources in the past. Whereas effective occupation is the best guarantee of property rights to land, the criteria for occupation can vary from peaceful infiltration and establishing occupancy, to occupation by conquest, wherein the former occupants are driven out or incorporated as clients. This

Mukha Buna in the west toward Wajir, Qaddaduma (spelt ‘Gaddaduma’ in colonial archives; this spelling is used in this book) and several other sites in Dirre.



pre-colonial shifting borders and relations, 1800–190817

means that the strategies that emphasize static land use systems used by the Borana would be of little value to the Somalis. At a regional level, resource frontiers for the Somali clan alliances are extremely fluid and depend on the demographic strength of different groups. The external resource borders were therefore zones of shifting ethnic relations and conflicts. Ravenstein (1884:267) described the Borana as the ‘most powerful of the tribes of Galla [Oromo].’ They were classified as ‘warlike’ due to their organized system of age-sets, Luba classes and formidable cavalry that proved remarkably effective against their enemies. The Borana on the eastern frontier had numerous encounters with the Somalis. The aim of these encounters was plunder and they were mainly opportunistic rather than planned and engaged in by both sides. Ravenstein (1884:270) reported that ‘[t]he cattle taken on these plundering expeditions [by the Borana] are…collected…[in the land] marked lafa danaba (a plain of booty) on the Lèon des Avanchers map.4 Here the booty is divided…After each man has marked the beasts assigned to him, the whole herd is driven to the village of the raiders.’ Ravenstein (p.267) suggests that the whole of the Deshek Wama was formerly the country of the Qofira Orma, who themselves had been ousted by the Kablala Somali [i.e., the Darood clans], and that ‘Wama appears since then to have become a ‘no man’s land’ only occasionally frequented by the] Bworana [Borana] and the Kablala.’ Information about Borana-Somali relations along external frontiers during this early period is sparse. One can assume that the border between the Borana and the Somalis would have facilitated continuous interaction. When analyzing frontier relations, readers need to distinguish between two groups, namely the Borana’s immediate neighbors (e.g., the Garre) and migratory groups (including the Darood and the Hawiya clans). The group with the longest and most peaceful contact with the Borana on the frontiers of Daua and Ganale rivers was the Garri Marro. The frontier between the riverine groups and the Borana was quite stable throughout the centuries. Other sources have claimed that there were earlier Somali migrations across the Borana eastern frontier, perhaps as early as the seventeenth century. The general hypothesis is that these Somali groups might have forced the Borana from the eastern frontier (Schlee 1989). This period coincided with a surge in Borana power that enabled them to establish ‘their own loose hegemony across the region’ 4 See Avanchers (1858).

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(Baxter 2001:240). Gunther Schlee (1989:39) suggests that ‘[w]hen the Borana…established their overlordship, this was not an invasion from outside but a shift in the balance of power between ethnic groups which had known each other and interacted for a long time.’ This applied to the Garre whose movement toward the Borana was an escape strategy. Edmond Turton (1975:520) argues that the dispersal was a response to pressure from their neighbors, the Darood and Hawiya Somalis. He agrees that the picture that emerges from the Somali narratives of these conflicts adds to the confusion surrounding the events. It is also significant that the groups that reported the conflicts had shared the frontier with the Borana for several centuries. This can be deduced from place names that position these groups with the Borana Oromo along the Webbi Shebelle and the lower Juba rivers. These names remained unchanged until the late nineteenth century. Turton suggests that the Garre claim is ‘vague.’ Equally vague however, is the claim that a small population in such a vast territory split up into tiny groups without any clarity regarding the migration trends of this group. Despite Schlee’s interesting hypothesis (1989:94), concrete historical evidence of the early relationships between these groups does not exist. According to Garre oral history, the group arrived in the area some 400 years earlier (probably about 1400) from present-day Somalia. The story of the Borana of Liban attacking this group, and the Garre’s subsequent payment of yearly tributes to the Qallu of Borana, possibly refers to a different period.5 In the nineteenth century, the Garre submitted and paid tribute to the Borana, which occurred later than the early dealings described above. In the absence of alternative sources, neither the recent account of the Borana nor the Garre account of the distant past can be regarded as definitive. Adding to the confusion are the different accounts of Garre origins cited in the literature (see Turton 1970; Schlee 1989). Maud (1904:570), quoting Chief Ali Abdi, claims that the Garre were Hawiya and ‘originated…long ago from Merka on the coast.’ It is certain that the Garre were not originally a single homogenous group, but included both Somali and Oromo. Depending on proximity to these groups, the Garre may have claimed different lengths of contact with their neighbors. J.W.K. Pease, who used oral sources and contributed much to the early history of the Garre, suggests, contrary to other claims, that the Garre were relatively

5 Major Gwynn, 1909, Political records, Mandera Northern Frontier, p.52, KNA/DC/ MDA/4/2.



pre-colonial shifting borders and relations, 1800–190819

Fig. 3. Pre-colonial locations of historical events in Southern Horn of Africa.

new arrivals in the region.6 Oral historians recount the presence of Borana in Boru Hache in present-day Somalia bordering Kenya. This place was named after the wells whose property rights were held by the family of Halakhe Dullo of Boru Hache of Buut’aanna Falama for nearly six generations (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992a). It was, however, the conflict with the Darood (called Eji by the Borana) which had a significant impact on the Borana external and internal resource borders. 6 Pease, ‘An ethnological treatise on the Gurreh tribe’, p.8, KNA/DC/MDA/4/3.

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By the late nineteenth century, the Darood had already adopted the Oromo system of age-sets because it was more effective than its system of clan alliances in conducting war.7 The Trans-Juba Darood deployed age-sets in offensive wars against their neighbors, which proved a highly successful strategy for two reasons. First, every eight years a new crop of young warriors entered the fighting force. Second, the main motivation— fighting nonbelievers—meant that the age-set believed that their religious mission helped to spread Islam (Cerulli 1964). The custom of serving initiates cooked meat on their own sandals encouraged the development of a warlike mentality; metaphorically, the youth ate dirt, implying that this would be their life unless they waged a successful battle. Although the timelines of particular age-set recruitments are not known, the names given to each group indicate their historical roles. For example, the age-set called Simti attacked the Borana; the Seeguli (those who sleep in dirt) drove the Orma out of the Deshek Wama and Afmadu; and the Mulai (ugly Boni) fought the Borana and the Rendille. The madja (uncircumcised) and Bombi (the beetle) age-sets both attacked the Borana to secure their emancipation. In all these cases, the objective was booty in the form of livestock and slaves, not the expansion of territory. According to an archival manuscript: All loot and slaves after collection was placed in a large boma [enclosure] about a two-day march from the enemy’s country. The whole [booty] are supposed to remain here for five days to give the enemy the chance of re-capturing their possessions. The shares are as follows [in terms of priorities]; [specific numbers given to] the mullahs, generals [spear leaders], elders and the fighting men.8

The inclusion of the mullahs in the sharing of the loot is significant because their role in reading selected Quran verses was a prerequisite in urging age-sets to conduct jihad against the nonbelievers. By adding a religious dimension to traditional conflicts, they sanctified these actions as Muslim duties, thus providing an ideological incentive. Catherine Besteman (1995:46, 53) suggests that a primary motivation of these Somali age-set wars was the capture of Oromo slaves: women to use as concubines and children as household slaves. The addition of large numbers of captives increased the numbers of serfs who were ultimately absorbed into the clans that had enslaved them. 7 ‘The history of Jubaland’ 1891–1907, p.8, KNA/PC/NFD4/6/1. 8 Ibid. p.11.



pre-colonial shifting borders and relations, 1800–190821

According to some scholars, these early incursions dislodged the Borana only temporarily from their external resource borders. Prior to the Somali incursion, the Borana prevailed against all military chal­lenges. By the early nineteenth century, the Borana controlled the eastern borders of their territory and had established trade routes with Somalis living at the coast (Fig. 3). In these early conflicts, the Somalis may have peacefully infiltrated the Borana external resource borders (Aylmer 1911:296). Schlee (1984) describes their relationship as guests, which enabled the Somalis to settle in Borana country. They launched such early encroachments through the laaf seera dawe (buffer resource borders) occasionally used by the mobile foora herds during the wet years. Thus, the Somalis were unable to occupy the internal resource borders (i.e. ritual lands). According to Borana oral history, conflicts occurred to the east with groups who were referred to as ‘siidi saagal’ (the nine enemies) (Halakhe Huqana Ch’aari, interview, 1994). These groups were probably the Rahawein of the Juba River Valley who, according to Lee Cassanelli (1982), were divided into eight (saadid) or nine (saagal) subgroups. Evidence from oral sources suggests that by the mid-eighteenth century conflicts between the Somali and the Borana had increased. These sources state that most of the Borana, who shared external frontiers with the Somalis, were overpowered; some were absorbed into Somali clans while others were enslaved. Cassanelli claims that a Rahawein group called the Saab was part of the Borana Saabbo Moiety. The Borana remember being at war with the Ogaden (Eji) during the gada of Guyo Gedo between 1744 and 1752 when there was a large incursion of Somalis into Borana territory (Wilding 1985:30). The Ogaden attacked the Borana again between 1814 and 1821 during the gada of Sako Dadacha Gamada (Adugna 2004:62). These attacks took place in what is present-day southern Somalia. The gada of Dida Bitata Mamo (1872–1880) was a period that oral historians regard as one of the most socially disorganized the Borana had ever experienced. In the course of an infamous internal war, referred to as gaafa xiilo waraaba, the Ogaden were encouraged to attack the core territory of the nine tula well complexes in the Dirre. During this period, the Eji mockingly called the Borana ‘waaya d’eeta’ (running away from white clothes), a reference to the white sheets the Eji wrapped around their bodies to instil fear in their enemies (Borbor Bulle, interview, 1998). In 1872, the Borana clashed with the Marehan and other Hawiya clans over their encroachment on Borana external resource borders. The Borana defeated the Darood (Wilding 1985:53). Mandera District historical records state that the Borana placed a ‘stone at Jirma’ to mark the border

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at ‘Titu Galgallo Gombo near Hereri’ after a fight in 1870s.9 According to Captain L. Aylmer (1911:296), the Borana were attacked and removed from Oddo. Captain Aylmer claims that this occurred in 1876. Although the Borana eventually drove out the attackers, in the process they lost some of their external resource borders with small pockets of Borana still in these buffer zones. One such isolated Borana riverine community in the eastern resource borders was ‘under the leadership of Giibiro Tiiya, whose settlement was at Qolqolla Guballe’, opposite Barder. Giibiro Tiiya’s community, who were enslaved by the Darood in the mid-nineteenth century, belonged to a regional grouping called Waar Goobeesa (Halakhe Huqana Ch’aari, interview, 1993). Relationships between the Borana and the Ogaden alternated between extended periods of peace and conflict. Turton (1970:278) described such fluctuating relationships as ‘unduly complex’ affairs that failed to demonstrate sustained hostility. He suggests that the situation is better described as one of periodic conflict that interrupted long periods of peaceful coexistence. Turton cites evidence from Jibril Farah of Afmadu who ‘claimed to have lived for several years among the Borana [confirming that] most Somali…living among the Borana were traders…[some] were also Somali shegats.’ A long period of peace preceded another conflict. Nevertheless, despite intermittent fighting, the opposing groups probably engaged in peace­ ful   negotiations along the lines described above. Somali entry usually occurred peacefully. Richard Wilding (1985:36) suggests that ‘[t]he expansion did not involve large numbers of people. It took place along lines of least resistance, by diffusion, by intermarriage, by adjustment of husbandry techniques…by trade, by treaty, by seasonal expedition, by subversion, and in the last resort by war, conducted by small mobile parties of youth rather than ranks of ruthless warriors, as the myth would imply.’ The threats, posed imminent challenges to the peace of Borana. The Peace of Borana Interpreting the ‘peace of Borana’ is not straightforward. The philosophical implication of the peace lies in the very name of the group—the Borana—which has a broader meaning. Primarily, it describes an ethnic 9 Mandera District notes found in KNA/MDA/4/6.



pre-colonial shifting borders and relations, 1800–190823

group. Paul Baxter (1986) describes the Borana as ‘consisting [of] persons who speak Boran language [i.e. dialect of Oromo], call themselves Boran, but most importantly [who] acknowledge the naaga Borana (peace of the Boran). Because of the role played by peaceful coexistence in social transactions and the spiritual and material well-being of their com­ munity  (Baxter 1954:13, 14), everyone who observed the aada seera Borana (customary law of Borana) was considered part of Borana society. The cultural preference for peace helps to explain why Borana territory served as a refuge for individuals and groups escaping their own conflicts and wars (Oba 1996). Being Borana required individuals to accept the aada seera (customary law) and to submit to the authority of the Qallu as the ritual leader and the Raba gada as a political institution (Wilding 1985:19). Using the principles of the aada seera, the Borana constructed social institutions that balanced responsibilities with expectations between Saabbo and Goona (the two parts of society) headed by the two houses of the Qallu (AGROTEC 1974, II:24; Bassi 2005). Internal peace made it possible for the group to forge a federation of societies from diverse ethnicities ‘in which the two houses of the Qallu were the undisputed centre of ritual power’ (Schlee 1989:37). The Qallu were responsible for building alliances and absorbing individuals or sections of other tribes who would become members of the Borana (Oba 1996). Through this process, the Somalis infiltrated the Borana territory, building social and political alliances. The Ajuran,10 a Hawiya clan, formed just such a long-term alliance with the Borana. According to major C.W. Gwynn,11 there was little doubt that the ‘peace of Borana’ played a major role in facilitating the caravan trade that accelerated the Somali entry into Boranaland, although the chronology for this is unclear. The early history of the coastal–interior trade reflected the links established earlier than the nineteenth century (Abir 1970, 1975; Daleo 1975). Ravenstein (1884:268–269) describes the trade route from the interior to Kismayu on the Somali coast during periods of peace. The Borana appointed the Eji as providers of ritual flags to use in the gada ceremonies. The Borana remember one such trader who settled among them, called Uruble, whose family was responsible, over several generations, for supplying the ritual flags (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992a). 10 A few members of the Ajuran tribe, perhaps at the time of the collapse of their sultanate in the Mogadishu area in the seventeenth century, linked up with the Borana, both as refugees escaping from conflicts and later as traders (see Cassanelli 1982). 11 Major Gwynn, 1909, Political records, Mandera, Northern Frontier, p.52, KNA/DC/ MDA/4/2.

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Assimilation enabled the Somali groups to share Borana water and grazing resources. To utilize the grazing and watering resources they had to subscribe to the values of aada seera and the social networks. With the exception of the Ajuran section of Gelbris (known to the Borana as Balad), the other Somali clans that were not associated in this way could not claim user rights to resources such as the wells (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992a). However, the Qallu might grant access to water points—this was the prerogative of the Qallu (Borbor Bulle, interview, 1997). Regarding Eji settlement in Borana territory, one informant observed: ‘…The Eji were different…My father’s biological father was called Abdi Hirale. He was the Hayu (councillor) of the Eji … The El Deera at Dabel was given to him by the Qallu Afalata Dido12 (Roba Buhkura, interview, 1993). In addition, the Somali spearhead groups built social relationships with the Borana through intermarriage, establishing the two most valued relationships: jaala (friendship) and soodda (in-laws). The relationships of jaala and soodda were mainly responsible for building the social networks that allowed individual Somali families and their subsections to gain access to Borana water sources. Their only claim was the right to use the resources, but this did not extend to ‘ownership of land and wells’ (Halakhe Huqana Ch’aari, interview, 1993). As the Somali population increased, the Borana became suspicious of their intentions. ‘The issue of infiltration of the Borana territory by the Garre [in particular] and the potential adverse effect they might have in future on inter-ethnic relations was raised by retired octogenarian Abba gada Liban Waata Naffuri (1776–1784) during the Pan Borana Assembly of Gumi Gayo’ (Borbor Bulle, interview, 1997). The issues raised by the retired abba gada were legitimate and reflected the general concerns of the Borana about the implications of Somali infiltration. Nevertheless, the Borana appear to have opened up their territory and resources to the Garre. Participation in the interior trade also afforded the Garre the opportunity to provide the ritual flags, which historically had been provided by the Eji. These ritual items symbolized the acceptance of the Garre as an important group who played an essential role in Borana rituals and thus obtained complete access to water and grazing resources in Borana territory (Halakhe Huqana Ch’aari, interview, 1993). More Garre settlements followed. An informant described the process as follows:

12 Giving wells to outsiders was a very rare event that had the potential for creating long-lasting social contests. In these cases, the decisions were by the authority of the Qallu.



pre-colonial shifting borders and relations, 1800–190825 …Finally, they settled [in c.1902]. When we saw them for the first time in Lae, they were Waar Ilmaan Itiile [the family of Itiile, metaphorically named after the skin and hide trade they conducted]. We were young, about 5 or 6 years old [the informant was 90 years old at the time of the interview in 1993]. We were told that the Garre had settled and they have become Karayu Ajeji [this is the clan of the informant]… They had no wells of their own. They gave gifts to the well owners so as to be given water… This is how the Garre entered the Borana country, initially as guests [and playing ritual roles as well as traders] (Roba Bukhura, interview, 1993).

The Collapse of External Resource Borders The collapse of the Borana’s external resource borders began with epidemics and cattle epizootics. The Somali clans quickly took advantage of this. Outbreaks of smallpox and cholera in the 1860s weakened the Borana and the Orma. The Orma sources claim that the Somalis deliberately infected them with the disease (Bonaya Buubu, interview, 2009).13 These two diseases had not been experienced before by either group (Tiki and Oba 2009). In 1891, the rinderpest epizootic followed, resulting in the collapse of the cattle economy, and prompting the migration of the southern Ogaden and the expansion of the eastern Somalis (e.g., the Marehan and the Degodia) into the periphery of the Borana territory. This migration created political and social pressure, particularly along the Jubaland frontier, which seriously threatened Borana power (Oba 2011). In such altered demographic and economic conditions, the Borana faced the serious problem of how to protect their peripheral grazing frontiers. The rinderpest epizootic left much of the Borana’s territory unpopulated, and the Somali clans gradually filtered into the area. During this period, the Darood and Hawiya Somalis drove out the remaining Borana populations from Lugh and Gedo in present-day Somalia (Adugna 2004:64). The Garre absorbed the displaced Borana families (Tiki and Oba 2009). Daleo (1975:81) suggests that ‘[t]he Borana were seriously weakened.’ Thus, when the human population collapsed, the Somalis easily occupied the empty grazing land (Wilding 1985:31). From the mid-to-late nineteenth century, European travellers provided useful documentation of ethnic resource borders in the southern frontier. 13 According to the Orma sources, three Somali Sheikhs deliberately infected the Orma of Kokabdu with inoculants of the diseases they carried in water they used for ablutions. They painted every household in the settlements they visited at night and escaped (one was killed) after confirming the outbreak of the disease.

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In 1893, Captain Harald George Carlos Swayne (1895) of the Royal Engineers, in one of his seventeen trips to Somalia, came close to Shebelle River and made brief descriptions of the distribution of ethnic groups. Two years later during his trips to the frontiers of Shebelle and Juba, he found the Garre (whom he referred to as the Garre [Oromo]) on the Webbi Ganana, while the Ogaden had pastures on the Webbi Shebelle. The opposite bank of the river marked the Borana frontier, which bordered on the territory of the Aulihan Somalis. Reporting on Swayne’s trips, Elspeth Huxley (1953:26) mentions that he ‘had been forced to return at the Shebelle River three years before by the hostility of the [Oromo].’ While the report does not identify which Oromo group was involved, given the ethnic frontiers at the time, it was probably the Arsi. After 1895, European travellers’ journals provide additional information about the frontiers between the eastern borders of Borana and the southern and western resource borders of the Somalis (Fig. 3). The most comprehensive descriptions of the region come from the journal of Arthur Donaldson Smith, originally written in 1895 during his exploration of Somalia, a journey that included travelling through Borana territory. From Donaldson Smith’s journal (1897:109), one can learn a great deal about the disposition of different ethnic groups. At the crossings of the Shebelle, he reports the first evidence of the Ogaden Somalis carrying out raids on the Oromo people: …My men, as they reached the water, they saw there one hundred and fifty Ogaden Somalis on ponies coming down the broad tug [river] on the other side, and about to cross the water to raid the Gallas[Oromo]. When they spied my boys with their rifles, they fled; whereupon a volley was fired over their heads, causing them to throw their spears and shields and run in all directions.

His description gives the impression that the Ogaden had recently arrived in the area. Journeying inland west of the river in February 1895, the travellers came across the Afgab people (a subsection of the Aulihan). The water point named Mada Garci [Mado Garse] is evidence of the existence of previous Borana Oromo external resource borders. According to Donaldson Smith’s description, his caravan entered the country of Degodia proper. He claims that the Degodia he met were ‘[in] closer proximity to the Borana Oromo’ and reports that ‘the Afgab and Degodia were continuously at war with one another.’ In the Daua valley, they found the Garre Marro who spoke the Oromo language. Up to this point, we can be quite certain that the internal resources borders were as they had been for several centuries. On 22 February 1895,



pre-colonial shifting borders and relations, 1800–190827

when Donaldson Smith’s convoy was travelling in the area north of the Daua River, they came across a great bend in the river, called Mata Safaro (the skull of Somali), as well as an area by the name of Yabich (calves). The name Mata Safaro implies that past conflicts occurred in the area and the name Yabich implies that the territorial frontiers of the main settlements were once located there. At the time of Donaldson Smith’s journey, the Garre Libin inhabited the area. Historically, this group of Garre had been associated with the Borana. On 14 March 1895, the caravan was visited by ‘several Borana who brought them many presents.’ Donaldson Smith (p.177) adds: …[the Borana] are all united under one powerful king [Qallu] named Abofilato [Afalata Dido], who is the hereditary chief of Karayu Borana… having subdued their neighbors and formed themselves into a strong central government, in which at present nothing but harmony prevails.

This is indeed significant evidence of the Borana political power. Once again, they enjoyed peaceful coexistence with the neighboring Somalis. He also shows Borana-Somali trade underscored peaceful interethnic relationships. ‘For years, the Somalis from the coastal towns near the mouth of Jub [Juba] had traded with the Boran for ivory’ (p.178). His convoy then visited settlements in El Der: ‘[We now proceeded] toward the lovely valley of San Kural [Sankura] in the country of Borana… Here we did much trading with the Borana… Near Eil Dere [El Der]…there were… many villages of Boran…but some belonged to the Gabra. Their villages are found scattered all through Abofitato’s [Afalata Dido’s] domain.’ Borana intermingling with other groups clearly indicated peaceful coexistence at the time. Even more significant was Donaldson Smith’s report of a small population of Hawiya Somalis under the protection of the Qallu at the wells of Garca (Qarsa) and Mount Jima: ‘[T]he next march brought us to a thickly populated district about Mount Jima, where there were many Gabra villages, as well as settlements of Hawiya Somalis. These Hawiya Somali had emigrated from Bardera within the last sixteen years [1879] and were now under the protection of…Abofilato.’ As subsequent events show, the Borana’s military power was intact: they not only used this to protect their internal resource borders against Somali incursions, but they were also tempted to attack all foreigners, including Europeans, who crossed into their territory. By this time, news of a European caravan travelling through the country spread among the Borana, and as Donaldson Smith approached the region of the nine tula well clusters and the ritual lands in Dirre (Fig. 3),

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the Borana were suspicious of his intentions and carefully watched his entry into the Dirre central region. He describes his suspicions of the Borana guides: ‘I frequently found tracks of many men on ponies, who had gone before us, and my boys would occasionally see natives spying at us from behind some bush’ (p.185). The Borana thought that the European caravan had something that made the Somalis fear them. Indeed, oral sources and journal descriptions indicate that Donaldson Smith’s practice of hunting wildlife and shooting in presence of the guides was meant as a warning to his would-be attackers. Such an attack did take place, but both oral sources and Donaldson Smith’s own descriptions suggest that it was rushed.14 He describes the event vividly: …As [after killing the antelope and] starting back to the camp I perceived crowds of natives coming from all directions to a rendezvous…We felt most uncomfortable when we saw a body of about a hundred men, mounted on ponies, emerge from the bushes close to us. There was no mistaking the purpose of the natives in assembling here, as many of them wore ostrich feathers in their hair, a sure sign of war. They evidently thought they had better concentrate their forces more before they began their war (p.191).

The impression is that the Borana had two objectives: preparing for a war and testing the reactions of the convoy. This was an unusual strategy for the Borana, despite their use of traditional attack formations with their cavalry.15 However, in this case the enemy appeared to be prepared and had lethal weapons. Donaldson Smith’s convoy continued westwards, taking precautions to avoid a Borana attack.16 Some incidents did occur however. One caravan attendant was speared and killed, and near the Soda Crater, (the salt mine) an attempt was

14 Oral historians confirm Donaldson Smith’s conclusion about the rushed attack. One of my informants, Godana Ajaa, had as a child seen people who had been injured by the gun fire of the caravan of Donaldson Smith. (He was about 78 years when interviewed in 1978). According to this source, the abba gada convinced the Borana chiipra (defences) to turn back and allow the European to pass. But just before the gada army dispersed, a man nicknamed Guracha Hareenqeesa (meaning the black crow; this was due to his dark colour) by his age set, came running, ululating how he had single-handedly looted the white traveller’s caravan, when the whole gada army was giving up! Plucking up some courage, the rush then began (see below). 15 The Borana used its cavalry for frontal attack with the purpose of overwhelming the enemy. However, this attack formation was unsuitable when the enemy used guns, as in this particular case. 16 This was the first time the Borana had ever met a white man at close quarters. Due to his habit of shaking people’s hands, he was nicknamed ‘Godana Harka’ (the nomadic hand shaker).



pre-colonial shifting borders and relations, 1800–190829

made to steal the caravan’s camels. Donaldson Smith (p.195) continues his narrative: We pitched camp as soon as we had emerged from dense bush…there was immediately bang-bang went off few rifles that were guarding the camels… Boran all around, many mounted and many on foot! Large troops of cavalry were rushing about, and an attack seemed imminent. The natives…were trying to drive away the camels, but ran off after the first volley.

The build up to the final showdown not only demonstrated the Borana’s stamina in terms of fighting, but also their relative strength in traditional warfare, even though this was not a traditional war. Donaldson Smith’s caravan experienced daily threats from every direction. The final attack could come at any time. He expressed surprise that the Borana could produce several thousand fighting men; he estimated Borana forces as 3000 foot soldiers armed with spears and more than 1000 cavalry. The final showdown took place at Dukke Igo, a place the Borana remember because of their men who perished from rifle fire (gaaf daara Borana Dukke Igooti Feerenjin d’aaban [when a European massacred the Borana at Dukke Igo]) (Borbor Bulle, interview, 1997; Dabassa Arero, interview, 1997).17 An informant confirms this observation: From the time, his caravan entered the Borana country he was watched to see what he does. Others brought him trade goods; others showed him the way…The abba gada had called for balbaleti [the mobilization of the gada forces in power and the retired]. They came from Liban, Dirre and Golbo. The white man did not seem bothered by the watching and spying. The gada leaders were warning the cavalry to be cautious, stating “East of us there are nine enemies (siidi saagal), if these people were not attacked [by them], it seems that they have unusual powers. We should not attack them [yet]” (Godana Ajaa, interview, 1978).

Donaldson Smith (p.199) noticed that his guides were leading the convoy into an ambush: the inevitable had arrived. As he recounts: …after eight hours on the road, we found a spot, which was fairly open for two hundred yards, and in the centre of this, we halted. The boys started making a zereba…The tents were just up…when shouts made me aware that a troop of cavalry was approaching. We called on them to stop, whereupon one of them came forward as though to speak to us; but now a whole force of cavalry was emerging from the bushes…We were refraining from shooting…but before the last bullock’s tail passed into the Zereba, there were 17 The literal translation is ‘when the ashes of the Borana perished’ (literally, when family heads died, a reference to men who were killed in the fight).

30

chapter two warriors on foot rushing from behind every bush on us. The bushes seemed to grow warriors. Then the firing began. There was a stampede of the cattle, and the mules followed…The natives were thronging upon us. I fired a few loads of SSG shot upon a body of cavalry, and then took my Winchester, aiming at those who were farthest away knowing that my men could attend better to the near ones…The firing was hot, and down went warriors, one on top of another. They held up their shields to protect themselves, and thus offered splendid marks for the rifles. On they came for some minutes, and a few got within ten yards of the Zereba… Plucking up their courage…the whole army of Boran, en masse soon made wild rush upon our camp, brandishing their spears and dancing as they charged. Fortunately they came from one direction…The punishment the natives received was terrible.18

I have described this encounter in detail for four reasons. First, it provides credible evidence of the Borana’s military power, their military positions and their control of the resource frontiers at the time. Second, we have seen how the changes in military technology and tactics (from the traditional cavalry, spear and shield to the rifle) changed the balance of power. Unlike traditional warfare, the number of men did not matter when faced with the power of the gun. Third, although the Borana were still determined to protect their borders from gun bearing attackers, they learnt an important lesson about the ineffectiveness of cavalry and spears against rifles. Fourth, the Somalis observed this defeat at the hands of Donaldson Smith’s caravan from a distance, and by the end of the nineteenth century, began to arrive on the same frontier at the same time and breached the Borana’s internal resource borders. As noted earlier, Turton (1970) reported that the war waged by the Ogaden age-set, Bombi (beetle), was unsuccessful for unknown reasons. According to Borana sources, the encounter with what was probably the age-set, Madja, occurred during the gada, Liban Jaldessa (1888–1896), soon after the rinderpest epizootic. The Bombi age-set during the gada, Adi Doyo, (1896–1904) attacked the Borana in El Wak and in the Dirre. The counterattack of the Madja age-set was referred to as gaaf Saafaar Dongoorso and of the Bombi age-set as gaaf Saafaar Moyale. According to Borana oral historians, on both occasions the Ogaden focused their attacks on the camel-owning Gabra and the Sakuye alliance of Borana (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1994). They attacked the entire southeastern frontier as far as Wajir and Buna, collecting huge booty, which they temporarily held in the camp at Dongoorso near the Lae tula wells in the 18 Godana Ajaa, the elder I interviewed in 1978, had seen people with gun wounds sustained in the attack by Donaldson Smith’s caravan. Among the people who were wounded were Akako Takile, Guyo Tertale and Guyo Adhi Kuno.



pre-colonial shifting borders and relations, 1800–190831

eastern frontier of Borana after the first war and near Moyale after the second. The following are narratives of two sources whose knowledge and memory of the time was impeccable: During the saafara Dongoorso, the Eji attacked the Borana in Golbo and drove them into Dirre… At that time my parents were living at Golbati. Before that attack, they used to migrate to Buna and Batalu, Wajir and El Wak… The Eji attacked the Borana from every direction. The Borana retreated into Dirre and they followed them up. [Here] they attacked the Gabra and Sakuye and looted their camels… The Raba routed them… (Roba Buhkura, interview, 1993).

This is how the second informant recalled the second Ogaden attack on the Borana: [I was a young lad] during Saafaar Moyale. They had raided the cattle calfherds [Korba] of Ollata… Again they attacked the Borana throughout the Dirre region… During the conflict, the Eji, to show their disrespect, cut down the Dambi (ficus sycamore)19 under which the Borana had performed their ceremonies before waging the counterattack. Dambi Kulula Fayo and Xuye Galgallo led the Borana counterattacking force. Xuye did not conduct a frontal attack but [the cavalry of] Dambi Kulula did so… The multiple attacks put the Eji in total disarray. They were weakened by the long marches, hunger, and thirst…so that even the herd of cattle running from the fighting trampled them to death under their feet… The Borana footmen simply picked the weak ones and finished them off (Halakhe Hukana Ch’aari, interview, 1994).20

These counterattacks may have restored Borana power briefly, but this could not be sustained. Other Somali groups were pouring across the internal resource borders. The use of firearms rapidly altered the balance of ethnic military power. Simultaneously, the Ethiopian raids had reached as far as Lugh and into the southwest of the Borana territory, forcing the population to vacate the lower Golbo and move into the highlands, which was to become the Ethiopian southern frontier.

19 The Somalis apparently cut the tree down, not because of the Borana rituals performed there, but as an insult to Dambi Kulula, whose name is taken from the ficus sycamore. Metaphorically, the message of the Somalis was that they would in the same way cut down Dambi Kulula, whom they knew to be the war leader of the Borana. 20 The Borana remember this event in a geerarsa (war song) in praise of the two war leaders, Dambi Kulula Fayo and Xuye Galgallo. In joking jibes between the Saabbo and the Goona sections of Borana, represented by the two leaders respectively, we are told: ‘Kululi Jirmani d’aane (Kulula beat them with tree stumps), Xuye bisaani d’aane (Xuye beat them with water), literally meaning that he used softer methods of killing and Tolaani d’iira baliyo waalin d’aane (the gentler of men), referring to the slaying of the enemy by foot soldiers who became entangled by their large spears in the fury of their attack.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MARKING OF AN IMPERIAL FRONTIER: TWO BORDERS, TWO STATES, 1898–1909 The southern Horn of Africa was the final frontier between the competing European powers and imperial Ethiopia from the end of the nineteenth to the early twentieth century (Hickey 1984:1). For the British, the southern frontier would demarcate the British East African Protectorate boundaries of Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) with Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia (Besteman 1999:11). Initially, the British government directed their involvement by using a chartered company. Its aim was ‘to protect the territory acknowledged as within her sphere’ (Hemphill 1963:393). Likewise, imperial Ethiopia expanded her frontier aggressively to incorporate the southern lowlands into the enlarged empire (Imperato 1998:106). Its annexation policy was in keeping with the Ethiopian concept of frontiers (Bent 1893:66). Ethiopian imperial expansion had two main objectives: first, to save Ethiopia from European colonial machinations (Kapil 1961); and second, to provide access to new, much-needed resources (Pankhurst 1997). In 1896, emperor Menelik’s historic victory over the Italian invasion forces at Adwa expanded his frontier southwards. No doubt, he perceived that the competing European powers threatened the independence of Ethiopia (Imperato 1998:175–176). After this victory, Ethiopia ‘as a very real political entity,’ forced competing Europeans to avoid any military confrontation with Menelik’s forces (Hamilton 1974:3). Perhaps Menelik’s letter of 1891 to the European powers was a response to the protocol signed by the Italians and the British on 24 March 1891, which agreed to a frontier marked by a line running from the Juba River to the Blue Nile (Lytton 1966:23; Hamilton 1974:359). Menelik’s letter served to counter European collaboration as well as to claim this region (and beyond) for Ethiopia. Based on unsubstantiated and rather extravagant historical claims, the territorial expansion of the frontiers of Menelik’s empire included areas as far away as the country of ‘the Gallas [Oromo], known as the Borani [Borana], and all the country of the Arussi [Arsi] to the limits of Somali

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territory, including the Province of Ogaden.’1 There are additional reasons for this. After the epizootic disaster of the 1890s, Menelik was unable to feed his large army after the Adowa war with the Italians. The population in the highlands also lost much livestock, particularly oxen, needed for plowing. By raiding the lowland pastoralists, he saved the highland population from famine, while at the same time, enabled the extraction of tribute and expansion of his empire. According to Bahru Zewde (1978:55, 57), the surplus livestock was sent to Menelik, who then divided it among his makanint nobility. Meanwhile, ‘refugees’ from the famine-ravaged regions ‘such as Begemdir and Tigri, swelled the ranks of the conquering army’ (Zewde 1978). Raids on the lowland pastoralists on the periphery of the empire also helped to establish an Ethiopian presence in the south, which Menelik would later claim as part of his expanded empire. The nomads on the extreme periphery of Menelik’s expanding empire had no cultural ties with the center. They did not speak Amharic or associate in any way with the habasha (i.e. northern Abyssinians). The nomads, referred to by the derogatory term Zelan, were considered people with no abode or “uncivilized.” Their incorporation into Ethiopia was for the sole purpose of providing a new source of wealth (Donham 2002). The more remote areas in the lowlands also provided large numbers of gun-carrying neftenya (soldier settlers) from the northern Abyssinian highlands with the opportunity to settle in the conquered land. From the broader imperial perspective, therefore, the expansion of Menelik’s borders was essential if he were to place the region effectively under his control (Perham 1948:5). Menelik Expands his Southern Frontier The strategy of the Ethiopian center was to send forth predatory expeditions that combined raids and taxation in the name of imperial expansion. This worked in stages. The first stage was the establishment of ketama (military outposts). The second stage was to launch raids against pastoralist groups and capture livestock (Wylde 1901:70–71). In 1892, Menelik’s army seized livestock and property from the Ogaden, which resulted in the starvation of the population (Geshekter 1984:223). In 1895, 1 Confidential report on the work of the Kenya-Ethiopian Boundary Commission, 1950–57, KNA/PC/NFD4/2/8.



the marking of an imperial frontier: 1898–190935

Donaldson Smith (1897:23) witnessed the devastation caused by the actions of Menelik’s soldiers on the southern frontier of the Ogaden. He wrote: When we reached Sessabane, on the 1st of August 1895, I was astonished to find there great herds of fine cattle. I had never seen half so many cattle together before in Somaliland…You can imagine my chagrin when I heard, a few days afterward, that they had been raided by the Abyssinians, under Ras Makonnen, their cattle driven off, the young girls taken as slaves, and the older people killed and mutilated.

The cruelty of these attacks, the theft of livestock, the extraction of tribute and the enslaving of large numbers of people in the name of imperial expansion were widespread. A. Hamilton (1911:69–70) describes one such instance: ‘[a] large proportion of the Abyssinian force…attacked Rer Ibrahim…captured their camels, and killed some 200.’ Whenever the number of captured stock was considered insufficient to meet the food requirements of the occupying force, the soldiers conducted additional raids. In the Arsi highlands, Ras Wolde Gabriel mutilated, robbed and destroyed the Arsi. Donaldson Smith (1897:43, 46) reports: ‘The Galla [Oromo] told us of great atrocities perpetrated by the Abyssinians. The Abyssinians had completely subjugated them four years previously (1890), carrying off their boys and girls as slaves, and capturing all their cattle and sheep… Their rulers demanded as taxes more than half the increase of their flocks yearly.’ In 1896, a column of Menelik’s imperial army consisting of more than 1,000 soldiers under the command of Dejazmach Wolde Gebriel threatened Lugh on the Juba River and attacked the neighborhood of Baidoa (Hess 1966:62). The settled agricultural Somali clans bore the brunt of the attacks (Escher 1994:648). In Dagabur, ‘formerly the site of a considerable village…constant raids to which the natives were exposed…led eventually to its desertion, so that like many places marked on maps…every vestige of human habitation has disappeared’ (Jennings and Addison 1905:6, 107, 170). Geshekter’s report (1984:223) is based on the field notes of Captain R.W. Cobbold, who accompanied the expeditionary force and witnessed Ethiopian ravaging of the area for over three months. He observed: …[On] May 28 1901…the commander [of the Ethiopian expedition] sent some mounted men to loot a village of the Sheikh Asha, they returned today with plunder…[although] the villagers had fled and managed to drive away their camels, much grain and household utensils besides many sheep and goats had been captured. It matters not whether these tribes are friendly to the Abyssinians or have behaved themselves and paid the tribute due from

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chapter three them to [emperor Menelik], they are nonetheless subject to plunder, as the army has to live on the country through which it passes…

The devastation of pastoral activities was total. Geshekter (1984:223) cites other parts of Cobbold’s field notes, which describe how huge agricultural populations had deserted their villages: ‘There [were]…traces of a large population but now not a village or a sign of humanity was to be seen. All had fled at the approach of the army, knowing from bitter experience [what was in store for them].’ In another instance he describes ‘[t]he horrible looting of the friendly villages…. Today [in July 1901] for some three hours a constant stream of camels, cows, sheep and goats passed. The Abyssinians estimate the number of camels at 2,000 and probably half the Rer Auguz tribe is now completely destitute.’ For the pastoralists, such raids were economically ruinous and robbed them of their only source of livelihood. More important, the raids created fear and caused population displacements. The resulting shockwaves led to forced migrations at inappropriate times of the year, such as the dry season, when this could result in mass herd mortality. Attacks during such periods of stress meant that those who escaped would probably lose their remaining livestock, further impoverishing them. The effects of these predatory expeditions went beyond the loss of property alone; the socioeconomic and political impacts were considerable (Samatar 1989:35). By 1897, Menelik’s armies in the south had launched similar raids against the pastoralists on the Borana frontier (Smith 1897). The occupation of Borana region was the last phase of the imperial takeover in the Horn of Africa. Major Charles William Gwynn reports that ‘[w]hen the Abyssinians took possession of Borana country in 1897 the Boran of El Wak and Golbo were forced to come up to the Dirre plateau.’2 In 1898, H.S.H. Cavendish (1898:373, 375) described the Ethiopian raids as following a ‘scorched earth’ policy, looting and killing the local pastoralists. Donaldson Smith had forewarned the British of the importance of Borana country, particularly with regard to supplies of raw materials for trade with the coast. Borana breeds of cattle and horses were popular with the European settlers in the Kenyan highlands (Lytton 1966). Moreover, he emphatically cautioned Great Britain against underestimating Menelik’s policy. Donaldson Smith (1897) had seen first-hand the expansion of Menelik’s peasant army southwards, and their ruthless actions against the 2 Major Gwynn, 1909, Political Records, Mandera, NFD, p.52 KNA/DC/MDA/4/2.



the marking of an imperial frontier: 1898–190937

nomads. He warned of Ethiopia’s claims on the region, which Britain believed to be within her sphere of influence. His assertion (p. 369, 379) that ‘The Anglo-Italian treaty of 1894, in which Abyssinia and the country to the south [was] divided between England and Italy on paper, can no longer hold good,’ resonates with what later transpired. Donaldson Smith based his opinion on two considerations. First, even before the arrival of the Europeans, Ethiopia had expanded her sphere of interest. Second, Ethiopia was very strong militarily, and any military challenge to her empire would be costly in human and material terms. Indeed, major John Boyes (1940:22) had ruled out any such possibility for both tactical and strategic reasons. Observers at the time agreed that Menelik was ‘a potent force’ and that the expansion of the frontier was within his reach (Buxton 1951). Vivian (1901:247, 248) offered a possible scenario that if Menelik were bold enough to threaten the British with the use of force, his country could be invaded, annexed and reorganized within one to two years. Yet, even he was not sure that this would be possible because such an extensive operation required a large military force and significant financial resources—a daunting prospect for even the most ardent colonist. Without ruling out the use of force in the unlikely event that Menelik might claim the area all the way to Mombasa, Donaldson Smith (1897:370) suggested that the best option for the British was to protect their northern frontier. England is therefore left as free…as any other nation to turn the attention to the acquisition of the vast and important territory in question. [This could include] the districts immediately adjacent to these [areas already occupied, which]…could be at once occupied without advancing against the indubitable authority of Menelik. The possession of these latter countries is of the utmost importance to the nations contesting…territory in the Horn of Africa [emphasis mine].

Donaldson Smith felt the urgent need to issue such a warning because of the slow pace of the British occupation of the northern frontier zone. Further, the British desired to prevent Ethiopian raiding parties from crossing into the British sphere of influence. Unfortunately, the British foreign office regarded the area as economically worthless and hesitated to finance efforts to stop Ethiopian incursions (Watkins 1993:138). British indecision benefitted Menelik, who proceeded unhindered to expand his southern frontier by unleashing his peasant army. Politically and strategically, he was in a strong position to make demands with regard to the frontier. He had expanded his frontiers to the southeast and the south where he occupied the upper reaches of the Shebelle and Juba rivers, and the

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Borana frontier. He aimed to stop Italian expansion from the Banadir coast (Reese 1996:62; Galbraith 1970:550). The British had wanted jurisdiction over the Borana; however, the Ethiopians were much more familiar with the Borana situation. Menelik’s advisors described ‘the extent and location of their garrisons in the south and…displayed considerable knowledge of the region’ (Hamilton 1911:369). More significantly, in about 1900, Ethiopian envoys presented two Borana elders during an interview with Mr. Harrington, the British representative in Addis Ababa, to demonstrate their occupation of the south. The British, on the other hand, had only ‘a paper claim…and had never established [effective] occupation there.’ It appeared that the Ethiopians intended to push on until they reached the farthest British outposts (McEwen 1971:105). The conquest of Borana by Menelik’s forces placed the Ethiopians on a frontier with diverse ecological features. Some areas were suited to crop cultivation by the northern habasha settler-soldiers. Furthermore, at that time the Borana region teemed with wildlife such as elephants, which the Ethiopians hunted for ivory (Borbor Bulle, interview, 1997).3 The Borana know the Ethiopian military leader who had initially attacked them as Amsa Darge (Dejazmach Asefaw Derge) (Godana Ajaa, interview, 1978).4 The Borana resisted his forces using traditional cavalry for nearly six months, according to an informant (Dabassa Arero, interview, 1997).5 The forces of Dejazmach Asefaw Derge invaded Liban at Kurkuru, resulting in the destruction of the yaa arbora (ritual settlement) of the gada and the kidnapping of ten of the Daballe (children of the Raba) (Roba Bukhura, interview, 1993).6 Dejazmach Asefaw Derge did not occupy Borana, but 3 The news of the Ethiopian advance, locally called Sidama, reached the Borana through Arsi Oromo messengers, who warned them to submit peacefully. The abba gada, boasted that ‘the Borana cattle [that] were obtained by force of fighting men…will not be given to the enemy.’ He called for mobilization of the gada defensive war formation (ch’iibra). According to oral sources, the prophet Arero Bosaro had warned him of the consequences, informing him about the route the enemy would take and of their intention to capture the Raba of the gada of Adi Doyo (1896–1904). 4 Ras Asefaw Darge was the son of Ras Darge who had conquered the Arsi and whom Donaldson Smith mistakenly referred to as Walde-Gurba. Ras Darge, who in 1896 was in his eighties, was the uncle of Menelik (see Gleichen 1898:154). 5 They fought at Maleka under the authority of five commanders, generally referred to as “Liban Shanaan” (the five Liban): Liban Dikale, Liban Sende, Liban Wata, Liban Nyencho, and one other. The final engagement took place at Hara Qaalo, a battle the Borana refer to as ‘Loola daara’ (‘the war to die or to live’). 6 Among the Dabballe who were kidnapped by the Sidama were Liban Dadacha, Nura Kano, and Liban Qalqalcha. More than 10 Daabballe were kidnapped, the aim apparently being to convert them to Orthodox Christianity before they were returned to the Borana.



the marking of an imperial frontier: 1898–190939

returned to the Ethiopian highlands with the loot they had seized and the people they had kidnapped. A second Ethiopian mission of conquest followed under the command of Fitaurari Habate Giorgis, who headed a 15,000-strong army that forced the Borana to submit on 31 July 1897 (Bizuneh 1999:36). The first Ethiopian garrison established at Arero in Borana controlled the surrounding regions of Dirre and Liban by sending out raiding parties and providing a visible form of effective occupation. The British Sphere of Influence Ethiopia was a regional imperial power, but British colonial expansion in the nineteenth century was part of a broader global venture that spread across the African continent and beyond. The British regarded their empire as a ‘civilizing mission’, whose aim was ‘spreading civilization and teaching the natives the ways of good citizens through establishment of law and order’ (Lugard 1965:35). Initially, colonization was pursued chiefly through the charter company, with the company making treaties with local chiefs as a way of protecting its interests against other potential colonizers. According to Lugard (1965:15, 16), the charter company’s main objective was to serve as a means of extracting resources more than as a force for conquest and settlement. Nonetheless, as Lord Lugard recorded, the treaties did not prevent the outbreak of ‘hostilities with the people with whom these treaties of amity and friendship had been made.’ As I have shown in the case of Ethiopia, the process of claiming territory often involved the violent seizure of assets and punitive action. The British relied on their military superiority to punish those tribes that rebelled against their administration (Tignor 1976:6). In Jubaland, which served as the frontier for the East African Prote­ ctorate, the British initially focused on achieving economic goals through the Imperial British East African Company (IBEAC) (see Turton 1972; Simpson 1994). The company’s main concern was the economic exploitation of the Jubaland, which had long been controlled by the Darood Somalis. It ‘adopted a new tribal policy towards the Somalis’, which essentially aimed to secure the friendship of the Ogaden. According to McDermott (1895:230) ‘[t]he leading idea of the company was to establish such relations with the Somali tribes [as] to ensure free commercial communication with the interior, especially with the country of the Boran…a country supplying numerous products for which there has been no access to the sea save through the hands of the Somali middlemen.’ The Borana

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through their Qallu Afalata Dido, had for some time shown interest in trading with the British at the coast. From the Borana frontier at El Wak and Wajir, Afalata Dido sent messages of his willingness to deal with the British directly and bypass the Somali intermediaries. The Borana region, unlike Jubaland, had a variety of products such as horses, ivory, nitrate soda, hides and skins, and cattle—items that the IBEAC considered very profitable. The Somalis did not support the British trade monopoly, and made trading in the interior unsafe by preventing the Borana caravans from reaching the coast. To reduce Somali opposition, the company reluctantly promised to pay royalties to their leaders. McDermott (1895:228) described Somali behavior as ‘treacherous and quarrelsome.’ Despite this, the company sought to appease them with considerable sums of heshima (bribe money). Although these payments were considered undesirable in principle, they had practical advantages. Unfortunately, even after receiving heshima-money the Somalis were unwilling to hand over the lucrative interior trade to the IBEAC. In 1893, the Somalis confronted Acting Consul General Todd of the IBEAC in Kismayu. In the ensuing encounter, Todd was stabbed and several others were wounded, while the Somalis suffered huge losses of life and property after a warship anchored offshore bombarded their set­ tlements. Political fallout was an inevitable result of the company’s policy of trading directly with the Borana.7 The Ogaden Somalis responded by raiding the Borana and selling the livestock they seized to the company (El-Safi 1972:22, 26). After this incident, the company’s policy hardened to one of forcing the Somali into submission. The IBEAC lacked sufficient means to expand the frontier through Jubaland (Munro 1975:32). Consequently, on 1 July 1895, Arthur Henry Hardinge, the British agent and consul-general at Zanzibar, declared a British protectorate over the territories previously administered by the IBEAC. At the time, the frontier with the Italian territory was the Juba River. The British wanted to establish contact with the Somali chiefs and with the Borana to lay claim to the northern frontier, a claim that depended on the outcome of the conflict between the Jubaland Somalis and the British. Despite sending several expeditionary forces against the Somalis to compel them to submit and pay stock tax, these attempts ended in failure. In fact, there was evidence of intensifying Somali opposition. Rather than being deterred by this, however, the British already envisioned their future northern frontier and planned to claim it before the forces of Menelik advanced further south (Fig. 4) 7 ‘Jubaland’, KNA/PC/NFD4/6/1.



the marking of an imperial frontier: 1898–190941 ERITREA L. Tana

FRENCH SOMALI COAST

S U D A N

E T A R O T C O

T

E

B R I T I S H

R P DA

I

Mt. Kulal E A S T Mt. Elgon L. Victoria

A F R I C A

ro Nyi Lorian aso Ew Swamp Mt. Kenya

a R. Jub

AN

L A M O S

a ori

L. Stephanie L. Turkana

L. Kyoga

iD eb W

T

A

L

I

A

N

ai ob

ana R. T

UG

We bi S heb eli

eD nal Ga

L. Abaya

L. Nyasa

fan Fa

L. Shala

L. Awasa

CONGO FREE STATE L. Albert

I

L

A

N

D

BRITISH SOMALILAND

A B Y S S I N I A L. Zwai

N

LEGEND L. Kivu Mt. Kilimanjaro GERMAN EAST AFRICA

R. Galana

River Lake Mountain Colonial Bdy.

0

500.0 Kilometers

Fig. 4. The imperial borders in the late nineteenth century Sir Arthur Hardinge attached an unmarked frontier map to his 1897 annual report, showing that hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of what was termed ‘raw Africa’ to be claimed by Britain as part of the protectorate. During the same period, the war office marked and circulated a map of what it referred to as ‘a Future Boran District of Jubaland Province’ (Brown 1989:316). The map indicated the extent of the frontier the British wished to claim in the north of the protectorate. The northern boundary of the protectorate has not been fixed, against the southward movements of Menlik’s peasant army. Governor Charles Eliot urged the foreign office to counter Ethiopian expansion and bring the area into the British sphere of influence (Wellby 1901). On 18 October 1889, Lord Salisbury admitted failure: ‘[W]e have no means…of enforcing our claims by effective occupation of the territory.’8 8 Salisbury to Cromer, 18 October 1899, FO 403/284, cited in Hickey (1984).

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The British failure to establish a presence in Borana, even after several attempts, afforded the Ethiopians ample time to reach the southern frontier and stake their claims (Hickey 1984:119). Hardinge, now the governor of Kenya, proposed to establish a station at Serenli with the aim of occupying the Daua and Juba river areas. He considered this as an essential protective measure ‘against the possible incursions by Abyssinian marauders’, but the proposal was not supported by the foreign office, which claimed a lack of finances.9 The southern frontier was already in Menelik’s hands after the Ethiopians had completed the conquest and effective occupation of the Borana. The Qallu Afalata Dido, who had warned about the threat posed by the Ethiopians, communicated the news of the Ethiopian conquest of Borana to the British. Sometime in 1900, he dispatched a delegation to the British on the coast in Kismayu, which painted a gloomy picture of Ethiopian predation: ‘their cattle, their camels…were looted, and the elephants on whose ivory their trade with the coast depended [were] ruthlessly shot down.’ His delegation urged the British to occupy the Borana Province as a matter of urgency. Hardinge, in turn, warned Salisbury that ‘unless something is done, and done quickly…the Borana…as [a] people will be exterminated.’ The foreign office did not respond (Hickey 1984:112). Under the circumstances, the British were in a weak position to negotiate a frontier treaty with Menelik. The Treaty Negotiations From the perspectives of both Ethiopia and the British, 1897 was a significant year in terms of negotiating future border treaties (Lewis 2000). For the first time in her long history, the empire of Ethiopia defined her southern frontier with definite geographic and social markers. Ethiopia’s historical claim to southern frontier, which may at one time have sounded more fictional than real, now became a political reality. The negotiations were complicated by the roles played by the different political actors. What was at stake was ‘the extent of territory over which each was entitled to claim jurisdiction’ (Kapil 1961:87). For Menelik, this would establish the borders of his empire. For both parties, ‘these agreements should shed [light] not only on the nature of these boundaries but also the circumstances which had to be considered in drawing 9 ‘Jubaland’, p.3, KNA/PC/NFD4/6/1.



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boundaries in a…region inhabited by nomadic populations’ (Ibid:89). Despite these statements, the treaties between Ethiopia and the British, and between Ethiopia and Italy, separated the nomadic tribes from their customary grazing lands (Hoskyns 1969:ix). Clearly, fixing the frontier was not a straightforward matter, given the way emperor Menelik had defined his frontiers in his circular of 1891. Thus in 1897, when Francis James Rodd (later Lord Rennell) led a British mission to Menelik to discuss the new frontiers, the touchy question of the southern frontier did not receive prominence for a number of reasons. First, the Ethiopians had established their presence before the arrival of the British, so the British lacked the basis for claiming control of this frontier. Second, the British did not want to give impression that this frontier was that important to them, for fear that Menelik might be encouraged to make incursions deep into the areas already claimed by the British. Third, the British were aware that the Ethiopians were unlikely to concede what they had gained in terms of land and communities brought under their control. Indeed, Rodd had learnt from the emperor’s Swiss advisor, Alfred Ilg, that Menelik had not only sent governors to the occupied southern frontier, but that he had also sent military forces in every direction in anticipation of the upcoming discussions with the British (Rodd 1923:168). Menelik’s insistence to settle the southern frontier with the British in accordance with his 1891 letter (of which Rodd did not have advance knowledge), reinforced Ethiopia’s claim on the basis of ‘effective occupation’ (McEwen 1971:105). Emperor Menelik was a shrewd negotiator. He had not abandoned the idea of establishing the ‘ancient borders of his empire’ (Rodd 1923:172). According to the official at the British legation in Addis Ababa, Menelik was ‘squeezing every drop out of the still fluid position ’ (Brown 1989:304). Rodd faced a challenging situation: the emperor laid claim ‘to a dominion not only covering nearly half of [the] Somali protectorate, but also extending westward to the Nile… [This was supposed] to reconstitute the ancient limits of Ethiopia’ (p.167). According to Harold Marcus (1994:245, 247), Menelik was confident that grounds existed for a final settlement of the frontier. He was keen to make his mark on ‘a blank space on paper’ to demarcate the borders: He told Harrington [the British minister based in Addis Ababa], ‘now, let us settle the other frontier.’ He had marked his idea of Ethiopia’s fron­ tier  with British East Africa on a map. The line started at the Juba. It included the Ishing, Arobe [Arbore] Galla, and Turkana countries, and ran to the southern shore of Lake Rudolf, placing the lake inside Ethiopia.

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chapter three [The emperor] stood on his proclamation of 1891 on the ground of effective occupation…

When Rodd stood firm, emperor Menelik feigned ignorance about ‘maps’ and delegated the task to his chief confidant, Ras Makonnen of Harar. Menelik, who recalled his bitter experience of the Ucciali Treaty that ultimately led to war with the Italians in 1896, asked for the text of the treaty in both French and Amharic, which he could sign (Rodd 1923:172). In June 1900, however, he put forward new proposals: Following tribal limits…the line [should] run south to the Dawa River, then west to Lake Stephanie so that the Karayu and Wadditu [Odditu] tribes remain Abyssinian. The Tortola [Tertali], if they should prove to be a distinct sub-tribe of Borana-Galla, [should] remain British, but if they are in reality a sub-tribe of the Karayu or Wadditu [Odditu], they are Ethiopians (Marcus 1994:245, 247).

A blue chalk line drawn on the map that did not correspond with any definite topographical or ethnographic distributions represented the frontier (Gwynn 1937:150). The newly agreed frontier partitioned the territories of various nomadic groups, with some remaining on the Ethiopian side and others on the British side. Menelik was well aware that his forces had moved far deeper into the frontier region than acknowledged in the standing agreements with the British. Indeed, British officials believed that the only way of stopping Menelik’s southward expansion was to demarcate the frontier with the East African Protectorate (Rey 1923:272). Menelik used Borana territory as the border of his new frontier. Historically, however, the Borana had occupied vast grazing lands. Their frontier stretched from the Daua and Ganale rivers, bordering Liban in the east, with Dirre in the center and Tertalle in the west, to the Golbo lowlands in the south and west (Fig. 4). These geographical features served as natural markers that finally defined the frontier between Ethiopia and the British (Capenny 1905:263). This definitive ethnic and geographical frontier­provided a basis for the negotiation and marking of an international border. Realizing that their future border would split the frontier pastoralists, the two parties were ready to negotiate the terms of the transfrontier agreements on grazing and watering rights. The notes of the protocol exchanged between Ras Makonnen, representing the emperor, and Rodd, representing the British government, in Annex III of the treaty recorded different interpretations of the agreement. The Ethiopian notes in part states: ‘The subjects of both the contracting parties are at liberty to cross their frontiers and graze their



the marking of an imperial frontier: 1898–190945

cattle; but these people, in every place [where they] go, must obey the governor of the country in which they are, and the wells which are in the neighborhood shall remain open for the two parties’ (Wylde 1901:481). The Ethiopian note placed emphasis on the phrase ‘obedience to the governor’ when the tribes crossed the frontier. Unlike the Ethiopian note, the British note stressed that ‘[f]ree access to the nearest wells is equally reserved to the tribes occupying either side of the line’ (Ibid:480). The British version of the agreement even assigned rights of access, implying that while the imperial frontier marked the border between two sovereign states, the frontier nomads were free to move across it as they wished. The agreement recognized the pre-colonial access rights of different pastoralist communities to resources. Rodd’s note (1923:181) stated: The tribes frequenting these regions were nomadic and the essential for them was to secure free access to grazing grounds and water on either side of the border. The settlement [of the frontier agreement]…made due provision [for trans-frontier grazing rights]… [Although] it involved recognition of Abyssinian jurisdiction over Ethiopian outposts [that] had for some time been established, it laid down a well-defined frontier.

Ethiopia and Britain signed the formal transfrontier treaty on 14 May 1897. It was ratified by Queen Victoria on 28 July 1897 and communicated to emperor Menelik on 30 August 1897. Article 1 of the treaty had two sections: part (a) defined the conditions of trade and security, while part (b) dwelt solely on the rights of the transfrontier nomads: a. The subjects of or persons protected by each of the contracting parties shall have full liberty to come and go and engage in commerce in the territories of the other, enjoying protection of the government within whose jurisdiction they are; but it is forbidden for armed bands from either side to cross the frontier of the other on any pretext whatever, without previous authorization from the competent authorities. b. The tribes occupying either side of the line shall have the right to use the grazing grounds on the other side, but during their migrations, it is understood that they shall be subject to the jurisdictions of the territorial authority. Free access to the nearest wells is equally reserved to the tribes occupying either side of the line (Wylde 1901:475).10 10 See also frontier agreement between H.B.M. government and emperor Menelik, 6 December 1907, KNA/PC/NFD4/3/1.

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Part b of Article 1 was central to determining the frontier relations between Ethiopia and the British in later years. Unfortunately, the interpretation and application of this article bedevilled relations between the two nations for the duration of their imperial history, partly because the Ethiopians and the British interpreted different parts of the sub-article differently. The article was to be applied when the border was finally demarcated, but when this was accomplished, it left the frontier with two borders (one of which was contested) separating the two states. Two Borders-Two States The process of determining the southern border involved hard bargaining based on the spheres of influence already established by the competing imperial powers. Menelik had secured the expansive lowlands of the southern frontier region, established military posts, and collected taxes before the British arrival on their northern frontier. In their bid to extract tribute from pastoral tribes, Ethiopian poachers and soldiers continued to move deep into the territory claimed by the British. Ironically, in subsequent negotiations, while Ethiopia’s claims were based on occupation and tax collection, the British claimed an area that they did not effectively occupy (Coupland 1968:319). Neither Ethiopia nor Britain had extensive knowledge of the region. There was little reliable information about the distribution of the ethnic groups and their resources (Katzellenbogen 1996:21). For that reason, demarcation of the southern frontier was difficult. The southern frontier was, however, rather special. It included different topographical areas and multiethnic pastoral communities. Both factors posed challenges to the demarcation. A boundary commission was dispatched in 1902–1903 to survey and mark the border, hereafter referred to as the Red Line (Huxley 1953:39). Led by Mr. A. Butter, a private citizen, who was instructed ‘to place the results of his work at the government’s disposal’ (McEwen 1971:106). His task was to mark the “red” line—a treaty line11—taking into account previous proposals made by emperor Menelik and the British mission led by Rodd in 1897. Butter’s instructions were to ‘set up a line that followed natural features, did not cut through the territory of various tribal groups, 11 This refers to the boundary line marked on maps following the general blue chalk line marked on paper by Menelik. This should be distinguished from the later boundary line marked by major Gwynn, also called the Gwynn line or the Blue Line. The blue line is a deflection of the treaty line.



the marking of an imperial frontier: 1898–190947

and was to some degree in conformity with an 1899 understanding reached [with] Menelik.’ This proved impractical (Imperato 1998:244). Captain Philip Maud (1904) of the Royal Engineers provided professional support to the boundary survey. The Ethiopians in Butter’s expedition were Ato Mammo and two Kenyazmachs as well as the Borana leaders (Capenny 1905). Menelik did not object to the mission, ‘probably feeling that [the] British findings could only lend support to his claims’ (Marcus 1994:249). Butter therefore searched for an alternative line that would not displace the Ethiopians or unnecessarily make things difficult for the British administration (Brownlie 1979:781). Since neither the British nor the Ethiopians were familiar with the territory, Butter was forced to obtain the required geographical information from the Borana. Antici­ pating this, the Ethiopians had threatened the population in advance with various punishments, including cutting off hands, if they cooperated with the British survey party. Maud reported as follows: An unpleasant disclosure then revealed the first of the Abyssinian official’s calculating moves. It was Colli (the Italian) who divulged that ‘the [Borana] had orders not to speak to us or come near our camp, and if by chance they couldn’t avoid speaking to us, give us all the misleading information they could…’ All that was confirmed by the faithful Mohamed Hassan [the Somali caravan head] and the Amhara-speaking Dr. Wakeman (Brown 1989:295).

The Ethiopians forced large-scale movements of the Borana and the Gabra southwards into the areas claimed by the British, with the aim of using these communities as markers of their new frontier.12 Despite such underhanded tactics on the part of the Ethiopians, the task of the boundary survey team, was to ‘get to the bottom of the tribal situation’ in Boranaland through a thorough investigation of the distribution of the Borana, the principal frontier group claimed by Menelik (Brown 1989:298). The Borana utilized two systems of land use along the proposed Anglo-Ethiopian boundary. During the wet season, they sent their camels and herds of small livestock to the arid Golbo plains on the side of the frontier claimed by the British, while during the dry season, they returned to the high plateau to use key wells. At this time, the commission was unable to establish whether the Ethiopians effectively occupied the area or occupied it only during periodic raids (Brown 1989:246). The question of whether the Borana “belonged” to Ethiopia or to Britain was a 12 Moyale District, political records, 1902–1904, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2.

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troubling one. The British continued to uphold the principle, reached in 1891 with the Italians, that ‘[t]he Boran have been from the [beginning of European agreements] regarded as coming within the ambit of the East African Protectorate, they have themselves desired British protection’ (Capenny 1905:263). Another frontier group affected by the demarcation of the frontier was the Garre. The boundary commission had two tasks in this regard: the first was to determine the distribution of the Garre (as opposed to the Borana) and their territorial borders; the second was to determine if, based on their distribution, the Garre qualified as British or Ethiopian subjects. The leaders of the two tribes were considered to be key partners in boundary determination (see Hamilton 1974:380). To satisfy both countries ‘a broad strip of country in the general region of the proposed border had to be surveyed’ (Brown 1989:295), but the commission soon ran into three main problems: first, how to determine the tribal boundaries; second, how to do this in the absence of any physical features; and third, how to incorporate political factors other than the distribution of water and grazing across the frontier. Uncertainty regarding the validity of the traditional boundaries bet­ ween the Borana and the Garre was a major challenge. Inevitably, their claims would aid the determination of which side of the imperial frontier the groups would be located. Since the Borana were distributed across the frontier, the border would split them. Most of the Garre were left on the British side. Their chief, Ali Abdi, was willing to concede the Garre claim to the Guba Galgallo area13 along the Daua River on condition that the group received an alternative water source. According to Captain Maud: ‘This district was practically the only one in which [the] boundary could be modified in favor of Abyssinia in exchange for modifications securing water further west’ (Brownlie 1979:784). The decision, however, created four main challenges. First, it failed to cater to land claims by both the Borana and the Garre. According to the commission, the Gaddaduma wells were left on the Ethiopian side unless the proposed border was further adjusted. Although the aim was ‘safeguarding [the tribes’] access to its wells or the grazing rights of the frontier community’ (Murty 1978:16), the commission did not have adequate information about the resources claimed by the nomadic groups. Thus, the Gaddaduma wells would later become the “Achilles heel” in frontier relations between 13 As the name implies, the region was part of Borana historical territory.



the marking of an imperial frontier: 1898–190949

the two imperial states and the two principal frontier communities: the Borana and the Garre. The survey team found it ‘necessary to make an equivalent concession: the wells at Chillako and the grazing grounds north of Malka Murri [Marri] and Hara Daua-El Mole-Jara’, and all of the Borana traditional grazing lands were placed under Ethiopia’s control in the hope that the very important Gaddaduma wells would remain on the British side of the border. The British team recognized that the wells would be ‘essential to the maintenance of administration on the British side of the frontier.’ The commissioners considered that the Hara Daua–El Mole–Jarra Road was an ‘easily recognizable frontier, which would otherwise have been most difficult to obtain … [due to the] bush-covered steppe.’ This compromise, in their view, would also avoid the ‘insoluble problem of finding a definite tribal boundary between the Garre and the Borana.’14 The boundary commission may have tried their best to separate the two communities, but their ignorance concerning the lay of the land and the history of territorial claims complicated things for future imperial politics. The second equally complicated challenge was the absence of visible physical features to distinguish the territories claimed by Menelik and the British in the region of Liban, a region claimed by the British under the Anglo-Italian protocol. Menelik objected to the British claim, declaring that this was ‘his land by his right of “effective occupation”’ (Brown 1989:297). There was little prospect of implementing the original proposal for locating the frontier. In his frustration, Maud commented: ‘The country gained by us, i.e. the bit [north] of Daua [River], simply isn’t worth it… It is habitable only in the rains…’ In any case, he added, ‘the Abyssinian penetration had proceeded…into the district, and it was obviously determined to stay’ (Brown 1989:299). The third challenge was Butter’s failure to identify a natural escarpment ‘running for a considerable distance east and west, which marked the limits of the plateau inhabited by the…Boran’ (Ibid.). Although recognizing this geographical feature might have eased Butter’s work in fixing the boundary, it also created a major administrative problem for the British, for the escarpment did not mark the end of the Borana country, but simply marked the division between two different systems of land use— the wet and the dry season arrangements. If they used the escarpment as

14 Major Gwynn, 1909, Political records, Mandera, Northern Frontier, p.52, KNA/DC/ MDA/4/2.

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a marker, the British would lose all the key wells on the Ethiopian side of the frontier. Describing the new borderline in terms of its demographics, the survey team surmised that ‘[t]he escarpment, its foothills, and the valleys which intersected them were regarded as Borana and the Golbo plain [was] classified as non-Borana.’ This caused great trepidation among the Borana Qallu, for whom ‘[t]he impending partition represented a potential catastrophe. Many of the Borana…have their camels and goats at Golbo, Wajjeira [Wajir], Takaba, Dantu [Dandu]… To separate the Borana from Golbo … is as if one were to separate the child from his mother… Gedo… declared that the Borana would never consent to be separated from Golbo’ (Hickey 1984:138).15 Maud had assumed that the Borana did not inhabit the valleys and the inlets of the springs that flowed from the escarpment. By placing them on the Ethiopian side of the border, he cut them off from their traditional wet-season grazing lands in Golbo (Hickey 1984:143). The survey team mistakenly judged that recognition of the escarpment, which marked the entire length of the frontier and separated the areas allocated to the British and Ethiopians, would ensure that the frontier was respected. It claimed that ‘if the escarpment were left to the Abyssinians they would have little temptation to advance beyond it’ (Capenny 1905:263); however, there was a problem with this type of thinking. Sir John Harrington, the British minister in Addis Ababa, warned that Menelik did not intend to respect a border that showed little evidence of effective occupation (Chevenix Trench 1993:52). Foreign Office officials and British military intelligence officers disagreed about the final boundary proposed by Captain Maud. Opponents of the boundary regarded it as a ‘surrender to the Abyssinians,’ but Maud saw little prospect that Menelik would ‘return to the line of Anglo-Italian Protocol’ of 1891. He ‘warned that the enforcement of his line might require at least three posts of one hundred armed men’ and constant patrolling (Brown 1989:304). The final problem was that Captain Maud’s recommendation on the borderline focused more on political factors than on the distribution of grazing and watering resources or on the impact of dividing ethnic groups. Political considerations led Maud to take account of Ethiopian claims. The British attempted to placate the Ethiopians by conceding the regions already occupied by Ethiopia in exchange for some areas in the region of the Omo Delta and Lake Rudolf (renamed Lake Turkana). Although they gave up the regions of Liban and Dirre, the British clung to the Daua River 15 Phillip Zaphiro, ‘Notes on tribes west of the Ganale River’, FO 371/192.



the marking of an imperial frontier: 1898–190951

Valley, inhabited by the Garre, while much of the country of the Borana passed over to Ethiopia (Hamilton 1974:373). In his report to the two houses of parliament in Britain, Butter emphasized two special features of his proposal for establishing the boundary: the relevant physical features and the distinction between the Borana and non-Borana peoples. The British, in fact, conceded that ‘[a] boundary recognized by the emperor was a great deal better than no boundary at all, but the Red Line was thoroughly unsatisfactory. It cut through every tribe’s grazing grounds, compelling them to cross it for grass and water, a source of endless friction’ (Chevenix Trench 1965:53). The two imperial powers had different expectations concerning the placement of their final boundary. Menelik used ‘ethnographic constructs, claiming the right to incorporate entire peoples, irrespective of their ultimate location’ (Hickey 1984:134, 135). The line happened to meet his conditions. By contrast, the British ‘[were] anxious to secure an internal border zone that was both defensive and self-contained in terms of seasonal pasturage and water.’ Their failure to do this was the main reason for establishing the secondary boundary commission. No sooner was the agreement concluded than the Ethiopians sent raiders and tax collectors into the region across the surveyed frontier, claiming that they were following orders from Fitaurari Habte Giorgis, the minister of war. Inaccurately reading geographical features like Gar Torbi, the ‘Abyssinians [were] endeavoring to raid into Kenya and collect tributes.’ In response, the British sent a strongly worded complaint to Addis Ababa demanding a clear definition of ‘the Red Line for the benefit of Habte Giorgis and his officers.’16 They followed this by appointing a frontier inspector to maintain law and order along the Ethiopian frontier. The man chosen as frontier inspector was Philip Zaphiro, a Greek national, whose appointment from 1902 to 1905 personified the British presence on the East African (Kenyan) Northern Frontier with Ethiopia.17 From then onwards, the Kenyan frontier became a filter for population movements. The British had two main aims: first, to stop the westward movement of the Somali tribes, who were arriving at that time in large numbers; and second, to prevent incursions by Ethiopian elephant hunters, poachers, bandits and other outlaws.18 Although initially, Zaphiro’s 16 ‘P. Zaphiro and the boundary commission’, Moyale District political record book 1902–1923, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 17 Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province, KNA/PC/NFD1/1. 18 R.G. Turnbull, Annual report for Northern Province, 1948, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/9.

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task of frontier policing may have seemed daunting, he wisely avoided the use of force. His diplomatic disposition, combined with his audacity and multilingualism, won over the frontier nomads.19 He became part of the fabric of frontier oral history. According to one elderly informant, Zaphiro asked the Borana to give him a piece of land for the station at Chure Moyale, which he named Fort Harrington, after John Harrington, British minister in Addis Ababa, who had posted him to the frontier. The Borana hesitated, but Zaphiro insisted that he wanted ‘only a piece of land covered by this skin’, producing the skin of a freshly slaughtered bull. The Borana thought that he was either cunning or foolish to ask for such a small piece of land that was hardly large enough for a station. After they agreed, he proceeded to slit the skin into thin strips that he then stretched to cover the area he needed for the station. Thereafter, his nickname ‘Muuse’ had become part of the frontier oral history (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1993).20 For some four years before the final establishment and ratification of the border, Zaphiro was the only authority protecting British interests on the frontier, preventing it from ‘fall[ing] into Menelik’s hands by default.’ Late in 1905, he confronted three Ethiopian hunting parties, ‘putting people in [chains], seizing cattle and killing elephants.’ His mandate was to ‘keep the peace among [the British] tribes, turn back Abyssinian raiders and halt the tide of Abyssinian expansion along the four-hundred-mile frontier.’ He enthusiastically carried out his mission, as evidenced by his ceaseless encounters with bandits and elephant poachers (Chevenix Trench 1965:49, 53). Part of Zaphiro’s task was to inform the Ethiopians about the new frontier boundaries, beyond which they would be trespassers. He was overwhelmed by instances of Ethiopian hunting parties crossing into British territory along this vast frontier. In one of his letters to the British legation in Addis Ababa, he reported the presence of ‘over two thousand hunters in the Golbo’ (Brown 1989:335). While the numbers were probably exaggerated, they indicated the magnitude of the challenge he faced in trying to contain the continuing raids of the Ethiopians into the British protectorate of Kenya. On his own initiative, he made claims and repelled the Ethiopians from some of the critical wells along the frontier. Although the 19 Philip Zaphiro had an ‘army’ of hardly more than a dozen ragtag untrained Abyssinians armed with ancient Martini rifles (see French 1913). 20 The origin and the meaning of ‘Muuse’ in local source is unclear. It certainly was not in reference to a Kiswahili word “Mzee” (elderly or senior) as it was not the language of the frontier by that date.



the marking of an imperial frontier: 1898–190953

treaty placed these wells on the Ethiopian side of the frontier, ‘the local Ethiopian officers [did not] dispute his claims’ (Brownlie 1979:781). The international treaty between Britain and Ethiopia was drawn up in December 1907. Thereafter, the boundary line, referred to as the ‘Red Line’ or the ‘Maud Line’, was recognized as the frontier. Despite initial delays, Menelik was anxious to implement the agreement. He described the tasks that lay ahead as follows: Both governments shall send Commissioners, who shall, in concert, delimit the exact line of the frontier which is…described, and which is marked, pending such delimitation, with a red line upon the accompanying maps. While they are there, they shall settle the frontier of the Boran with the Garre, in concert with the heads of these tribes and in accordance with their custom…21

The British hoped that the delimitation would correct some of the most obvious problems overlooked by the Butter mission. The main argument of the British was that the ‘Red Line’ marked by Captain Maud in 1903 left all the water points needed by the British frontier pastoralists on the Ethiopian side of the frontier (Simpson 1994:24). Thus, it became necessary to mark a second border, the Gwynn Line (or ‘Blue Line’), to correct the anomalies in the distribution of the wells (Fig. 5). Major Gwynn was appointed in June 1908 to head the second boundary commission and tasked with the delimitation and ‘settling [of] the southern Abyssinian boundary.’ From the British perspective, the second commission aimed to improve ‘the Maud Line so as to give the “British” tribes a fair share of the permanent water’ (Chevenix Trench 1993:55). Gwynn’s boundary team was comprised of six Britons, at least eighty-eight Somalis, and one or two Abyssinian and Oromo interpreters. Their transport consisted of about one hundred camels. He opined that a new workable boundary would somehow depart ‘further from the treaty line than might be accepted’ by the Ethiopians (Hamilton 1974:6). The Ethiopians were uncooperative, failing to send commissioners to join the second British team. Later they sent a separate group of commissioners headed by a German technical adviser, Lieutenant Herr Schubert of the 12th Regiment of Artillery. The Ethiopian commissioners did not begin work until the British team had finalized the surveys and returned to Addis Ababa. Even then, the British reported that the Ethiopians trusted ‘no white man, [and] denied [the technical officer] an interpreter’ (Brown 1989:312). 21 Southern frontier agreement done at Addis Ababa, the 20th day of Hadar 1900 [6 December 1907], with seal of emperor Menelik, p.2, KNA/DC/MDA/4/3.

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El Dima R . Da ua

Burchama

Malka Marri

Mega EI Mole

Dakka Kaqalla

Forrole

N LEGEND Maud’s Line Gwynn’s Line Locality

Burduras

El Dimtu

0

G. Tuka

Agal

Mandera

Gamada Gaddaduma

Borole 100

Moyale

Roka

Kuffole EI Wak

kilometers

Fig. 5. The provisional borders of the southern frontier showing the ‘International’ Maud Line (i.e. the Red Line) and the ‘British’ Gwynn Line (i.e. the Blue Line)

Exacerbating the situation, they ‘miraculously’ disappeared, leaving Herr Schubert to complete the surveys on his own, unable to communicate with the local communities.22 According to major Gwynn, his mission was ‘to ensure that there should be such water points on the British side of the frontier as would enable police work to be carried out effectively in future [and] recommend the rectification of the Butter-Maud Line by shifting it northward so as to include a number of wells within Kenya’ (McEwen 1971:108). Gwynn chose to follow the foot of the escarpment for three reasons: (1) although the wells were situated on the Ethiopian side by the treaty line, Zaphiro had claimed them for the British tribes; (2) the pastoralists living on the Golbo side of the British frontier had always used the wells; and (3) although the boundary had been laid out using natural features, this was ‘a mere identification of line, [and was not intended to represent] hard and fast points to which it was necessary to adhere’ (Brown 1989:108). Unfortunately, the Ethiopians disagreed.

22 Southern frontier agreement (enclosure in No. 23), Gurreh records 1902 to 1912, KNA/DC/MDA/4/3.



the marking of an imperial frontier: 1898–190955

Later Gwynn (1937:150) acknowledged that the boundaries drawn in this remote part of Africa under circumstances where there was little trust between the various parties had little chance of being accepted. The Red Line was intended to define the Borana and Garre borders, but it did not achieve this goal. Neither the Maud nor the Gwynn border considered the history of population movements in the region. For example, Gwynn’s team came across the Borana at the Jarra, but claimed that the area was ‘looked upon [by the boundary team] as Garre country.’23 The treaty map showed that the boundary between the Garre and the Borana was marked by a hill in the Jarra area ‘but [because] both tribes use the wells and grazing indiscriminately it was considered advisable to secure unity of control.’ This was done by taking ‘[t]he road from Jarra [to] remain in the British sphere, as no alternative line which can be traversed in the dry season exists on the British side of the frontier.’ By deflecting the treaty line towards the Ethiopian side of the frontier, the Gwynn boundary included the wells at the foot of the escarpment that had been traditionally used by the Golbo residents on the British side. The Gaddaduma wells fell into the category of valley wells, access to which was critical for the Kenyan pastoralists; however, they posed a technical challenge—how to move the beacon to the Kenya side without upsetting the treaty line.24 Gwynn argued that Maud had seriously miscalculated ‘the number of the inhabitants in the Golbo and their ordinary habitat…and…the wells [they depended on] for their water supply.’25 Exclusion of frontier wells, such as the Gaddaduma wells, from the British side was therefore a serious misjudgment: not only did it deny the “British” tribes access to their traditional sources of water, it also ignored the fact that British patrols needed to use the wells in their efforts to stop the ‘raiding and Ethiopian-inspired extractions’ (Hickey 1984:139). Gwynn26 was concerned that ‘without access to a certain number of the wells, it would be impossible to establish an east and west line of communication along the frontier in the British territory.’ A further deflection of the boundary line was made to correct this anomaly by including the valley wells situated in ‘the indentations in narrow flat valleys divided by 23 Major Gwynn, 1909, Political records, Mandera, Northern Frontier, p.52, KNA/DC/ MDA/4/2. 24 Ibid., p.21. 25 Gwynn to Hervey, 27 January 1909, FO 401/12, 44, see also Hamilton (1974:383). 26 Major Gwynn, 1909, Political records, Mandera, Northern Frontier, p.21, KNA/DC/ MDA/4/2.

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steep spurs. In almost every valley, generally at the head, are perennial sources of water’ (Brownlie 1979:784). Unfortunately, he faced a dilemma in that there were no resources of equal value in the area between Gaddaduma and the Uran that could be conceded to the Ethiopians. His intention was ‘to place all valleys in British territory,’ without denying Ethiopia important wells that had been left on her side by the treaty line. ‘Major Gwynn therefore, adopted the middle course of introducing modifications that left most of the valleys in Abyssinia, but placed a number of wells in British territory at such intervals [that] patrols [using the wells] could control the section of the frontier.’ Ethiopia was compensated by including on her side ‘a large tract of Garre country with wells [such as] Chillako’ (Brownlie 1979:875). Previously, the Butter survey team had described this area as part of Borana country. Gwynn noted that the Moyale station, established by Zaphiro, was now, according to the treaty map, ‘in what was properly Abyssinian territory.’ Here too, he made changes, as he explained, ‘[i]n order not to make the work of Zaphiro to go to waste.’27 Yet, major Gwynn was aware of the difficulties the Ethiopians would place in his path with regard to the proposed new boundary line: ‘I am afraid these deflections will not prove acceptable to the emperor and I have been very unwilling to make them as they may appear to be a departure from the treaty’ (Brown 1989:312). Gwynn’s demarcation lines, ‘though conforming for the most part to the Red Line, departed from it in critical areas. Gwynn[‘s] … adjustments … gave Britain access to wells necessary for patrol activities. The Gwynn Line became the “Blue Line” (Fig. 5), and the Ethiopians immediately contested it (Imperato 1998:249). The Ethiopian objection was based on the fact that Gwynn’s proposed boundary was surveyed by a British team without any Ethiopian representation, to which the British replied that ‘Ethiopia was [at] fault by not appointing her own commissioner in time.’ The Ethiopians conceded that ‘the British might continue to hold the wells appropriated by Gwynn until such time as a final settlement could be reached’ (McEwen 1971:109). Despite the diplomatic furor over the ratification of the Blue Line, the Ethiopians rejected it, resisting strong British pressure. The British declared the boundary limits as defined by the Gwynn line to be ‘an acceptable frontier’ (Mungean 1966:313). Thus, after repeated rejections

27 Major Gwynn, 1909, Political records−Mandera NFD report, p.22, KNA/DC/MDA/4/2.



the marking of an imperial frontier: 1898–190957

by the Ethiopians, the frontier marked by the Blue Line remained unresolved.28 Consequently, these two contested frontier lines—the Red Line and the Blue Line—served as the frontier boundary. Not surprisingly, the new frontier became a source of political intrigues and pastoralist tax evasion, which is the focus of the next chapter.

28 Following an agreement between emperor Haile Selassie and Jomo Kenyatta, the President of Kenya in the 1970s, the Red became the international border, see Watkins 1993.

CHAPTER FOUR

TAX EXTRACTIONS, IMPERIAL RELATIONS AND RESPONSES BY FRONTIER NOMADS, 1908–1935 The imperial partitioning of the frontier between southern Ethiopian and northern Kenyan frontier created three ambiguities: first, which state had the right to extract taxes; second, what modes of taxation and tribute should be imposed; and third, what defined the citizenship of transfrontier pastoralists. Both Ethiopia and the British East African Protectorate developed strong arguments regarding eligibility for citizenship based on the payment of taxes (Bayley 1999:29). Generally, both states relied on the use of force to compel frontier nomads to pay taxes, even when local rulers helped state efforts (Lackner 1973). For local leaders, success or failure in collecting taxes depended on their capabilities as leaders or relations with the state (Conklin 1997). Anthony Kirk-Green (1965:119, 121), a scholar of British colonial administration with personal experience in areas such as the Sudan, considers taxation of colonial subjects to have two important functions. First, it represents a form of civilizing behavior; and second, taxation may reasonably vary from a small amount to as much as ten percent of the livestock holdings of pastoralists. Yet, for both the Ethiopians and the British, the purpose and mode of tax extractions were hugely different. Ethiopian soldiers, based in ketema (military garrisons), conducted periodic raids to collect taxes from nomadic tribes. Perhaps because taxation and the collection of tribute took up so much of the time of the provincial and district officials, the frontier nomads reacted to their arrival with much trepidation. Vivian (1901:242) does not exaggerate when he argues that ‘Abyssinian justice…[is dependent] upon the exigencies of… taxation.’ For the British, ‘payment of tax was a symbol of allegiance’ (Perham 1962). Thus, southern Ethiopia and the northern frontier of the British Protectorate of East Africa offered different histories with regard to taxation and the responses of the societies being taxed. The Ethiopian Tax Extractions In Ethiopia, tax collection was a function of political power hierarchies. Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia was an absolute monarch whose word was

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law. At the time of his conquest, his country lacked a centralized administration. Therefore, he appointed regional governors, who in turn appointed lesser lords to organize tax and tribute collections. His orders to the governors and other officials did not specify how tribute was to be collected (traditionally, force was used), but they did specify the amount of the levy, based on fixed quotas (Boyes 1940:21). Collection methods reflected the personal style of the particular official responsible for extracting taxes (Tignor 1976:18). Matston (1961:166) describes how the gabbar feudal taxation system functioned, beginning with the rases (administrative heads) under whose jurisdiction provinces were divided among dejazmach (overlords), then the fitauraris (commanders of the vanguard), followed by the local balabat (chiefs) and qoro (assistants). The last two groups represented the local hierarchies among the conquered populations. The following scale was used for allocating gabbar to the overlords: ‘A subgovernor could have 200 or 300 gabbar, and so on downwards through the hierarchy until we reach the ordinary soldier who could have two or three gabbar as his share’ (Rey 1923). In the southern frontier, the gabbar system only applied to the Borana and the Gabra. Menelik had given the prov­ ince to Fitaurari Habte Giorgis as his fiefdom, referred to as ya Fitaurari Habte Giorgis guadda (the ‘inner room of Habte Giorgis’) (Kassa n.d.), from where he would ‘eat.’ Habte Giorgis gave ‘the strictest instructions that the inhabitants [should be] looked after’ in order to avoid loss of revenue (Hodson 1928). The Borana case illustrates how the system of tax extraction functioned and how the pastoralists responded. The Ethiopians noticed that the Borana, who were subdivided into two equal halves, corresponding to the two principal houses of the Qallu (ritual leaders), the Saabbo and the Goona moieties, provided a community that was easier to control. They traditionally played semi-feudal roles whereby they received gifts and expected strict obedience (Hogg 1993:81). Furthermore, the houses of the ritual leaders were hereditary (Borbor Bulle, interview, 1988).1 The two Qallu of the Saabbo moiety (Gedo Jillo) and the Goona moiety (Anna Boru) were given the Abyssinian military rank of Fitaurari and became the balabat. They served as instruments of Ethiopian rule, extracting taxes and tribute from their people (Hodson 1919; Rey 1923). Captain Maud described the Borana as ‘cattle producing machines.’ In his words: ‘The Abyssinians…make some attempt to limit their 1 I am grateful to a colleague who attended the Gumi Gayo Assembly and recorded this audiotape.



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demands on the produce of their country, so that the livestock may not be depleted, but their natural avariciousness defeats this object… The Boran…are unable to maintain their stock, and are growing poorer every year’ (quoted in Hickey 1984:113). Another official described the Ethiopian admini­stration of justice as ‘one long tale of oppression and robbery,’2 while Zaphiro added that ‘the Borana must give, give; and if they do not consent they are treated worse than slaves.’3 Some observers ascribed the excessive robbing of the frontier nomads and general indiscipline in the Ethiopian administration to lower-level administrators who were inclined to banditry and tended to ignore government instructions (Fernyhough 1994:694). When levels of taxation became intolerable, the Borana would escape across the newly created political frontier. Such persons were variously referred to as ‘runaways’, ‘refugees’, ‘guests’ or ‘tenants.’ The Borana sought safety across the frontier when their livestock was mercilessly looted. Zaphiro had learned that the Ethiopians had instructions from Wolde Gabriel, the frontier administrator, to cross to the British side of the frontier and bring back in chains those Borana who had escaped into Golbo (Brown 1989:335). In addition, the Ethiopians asked the British frontier agent to return the ‘runaway’ Borana. Zaphiro took a strong stand against these demands on the grounds that the actions of the Ethiopians were forcing their own citizens to escape. From the Ethiopian perspective, the Borana escaped with tacit encouragement from the British side. This issue created mistrust between the two administrations (see discussion below). The Ethiopians and the British had different opinions regarding the morality of tax collection methods and human rights violations. During 1910, the initial diplomatic fault lines began to emerge. As large numbers of Borana had crossed the frontier to the British side, the Ethiopian government asked for their repatriation, and ‘claimed jurisdiction over all Boran residing in the Protectorate, irrespective of their length of tenure’ (Hickey 1984:145). Unfortunately, the British position on the issue of the Borana “runaways” was not consistent. The British minister in Addis Ababa proposed that ‘they [the Borana] should be used as a bargaining chip in the effort to secure the Gwynn Line.’4 Although the British might have regarded the morally repugnant idea of ransoming the frontier community a useful strategy for negotiating purposes, its application to 2 Harrington to Eliot, 6 February 1904, FO 403/346. 3 Zaphiro to Harrington, 15 March 1906, FO 371/192. 4 Thesiger to Grey, 29 October 1910, FO 371/1042.

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frontier communities under existing transfrontier agreements remained doubtful. For the Ethiopians, however, the frontier treaty, which the British needed more than Ethiopia, was an even better “bargaining chip.” Nonetheless, like the British, they refrained from making this their official strategy. Perhaps because of this dilemma, major Gwynn made a more radical proposal ‘that would permit the Protectorate to ‘purchase’ the tenants, and the inhabitants of the marginal territory [who were present] between 1903 and 1908’ when the borders were demarcated. On the basis of this proposal, the Ethiopians would be compensated for their partial loss of the taxable population during the transitional period by being paid the taxes received from the population for between five and ten years (Gwynn 1911). After that time, Ethiopia would technically lose the right to make any claims over the ‘runaway’ population, since the population was an independent entity. Meanwhile, the British minister in Addis Ababa, Wilfred Thesiger, who initially objected to returning the ‘runaway’ population to the Ethiopian side of the frontier changed his mind. He came to believe that this might cause difficulty, given other unsettled frontier business. Moreover, Ethiopian claims that the Borana and the Gabra, by virtue of their traditional territoriality, had been located on the Ethiopian side of the frontier, lay at the root of the dispute. Thesiger argued that the British had made certain promises regarding tribal locations at the time of the demarcation of the frontier: The Abyssinians had levied taxes on these tribes as far as Wajir for ten years before the red line was accepted and he was inclined to consider that their cause was just, in as much as when the treaty was signed they raised the question but were told the matter could be discussed when the final settlement was made. He therefore recommended that these tribes, with all their cattle, should be returned to Abyssinia, and forbidden to cross the line in future.5

Though not precisely documented, when Lord Delamere passed through Eastern Borana in 1899, he reported that a punitive Ethiopian force had reached as far as El Wak, which resulted in the movement of the Borana from this region back into Dirre (Huxley 1953). Using Borana oral sources, we may date the Ethiopian presence and the beginning of forced taxation or tribute to about 1897, with the final occupation taking place in 1900 5 Moyale District political record book 1902 to 1933, Early History: Mr. Zaphiro and the boundary commission, p.4, KNA/PC/NFD/1/2.



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(Borbor Bulle, interview, 1997). The British, who were not present in the frontier region at this time, doubted the validity of the Ethiopian claims. The dilemma was whether ‘the original Borana and Gabra who were cut out from Abyssinia by the Red Line, [together] with those who had since crossed to the south, [should] be regarded as Abyssinian subjects or not’?6 Should Ethiopian tax raids prior to the demarcation of the border be considered a legal levying of tribute? These questions needed answers. The solutions suggested by British officials were likely to have political consequences for the frontier. Maud, who had originally marked the official border, hesitated to recommend any solution, mindful of such issues as morality and British prestige. He observed that ‘in 1902 there [had been] no suggestion that tribes, families or individuals should be forced to move in order to make any frontier line fit a theory.’ He insisted, however, that the British proposal was an afterthought or an ad hoc reaction to new problems, although he failed to address the fundamental question regarding the citizenship of those living on one side of a recently agreed international frontier. The British proposition was therefore neither morally right nor acceptable according to diplomatic practice and precedent. In his opinion the expulsion of these people ‘would cause enormous damage to [British] prestige in that part of Africa.’7 The governor of Kenya Colony, Sir Percy Girouard, supported the counterproposal to repatriate the ‘runaways’ (Hickey 1984). It remained unclear how decisions about the return of the population that had fled to safeguard their lives and livestock should be determined. Indeed, it was on this matter of principle that the plan to repatriate the Borana was opposed by the Colonial Office, which cited a precedent: [During] Uganda-Congo boundary negotiations, great stress [was] laid on… not handing back to the Free Congo State natives who had thrown their lot with Great Britain. The Secretary of State was of the opinion that it would be equally objectionable to approve of the Boran [and] other tribes being returned to the Abyssinian government [to be] again being subjected to the extortion which was the fate of most tribes under Shoan rule.8

The Ethiopians had never abandoned their demand for the return of the Borana ‘runaways’, a point repeatedly articulated by new administrators 6 Moyale District political records 1902–1904, p. 4, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2. 7 Notes on Mr., Thesiger’s dispatches dated October 17 and October 29, 1910, and on major Gwynn’s remarks thereon by major Maud, R.E., FO 371/822. This material was also cited by C. Hickey (1984:146). 8 Moyale District political records, 1902–1904, p.5, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2.

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appointed to the frontier every time questions ‘over [the ‘runaways’] legal standing [were] raised anew’ (Hickey 1984:146, 147). The Borana had been forced to run away from their grazing lands, which they considered their ancestral property, largely because of an abhorrent gabbar-fief system through which they were divided among the neftenya (settler-soldiers). The Gabbar System in Borana Early in 1910, Balambras Wolde Gabriel visited one Mr. Hope, who had been appointed officer-in-charge of the Northern Frontier District (NFD). Wolde Gabriel demanded that the Borana who had escaped to the British side be returned to Ethiopia forthwith. When this was refused, he raised the contentious issue of the border, saying that ‘he recognized the “red line” only’ claiming that the frontier station at Churre Moyale, located about 2.4 km from the border, was, in fact, on the Ethiopian side. Following the rejection of his demands, Wolde Gabriel ‘started seizing the Boran who had left Abyssinian territory and came to the British side but were watering their livestock at wells in Abyssinian territory. Among those seized were a number of British subjects. He also claimed Dido Doyo, a Boran chief living near the station, who had always been recognized as a British subject.’9 Wolde Gabriel’s seizure of Dido Doyo in ‘no man’s land’ initiated a serious diplomatic dispute between Nairobi and Addis Ababa.10 Clearly, the Ethiopian viewpoint on the frontier vis-à-vis the extent of Ethiopian territory had not changed. Indeed, Wolde Gabriel claimed that Ethiopia had the right to tax the Borana ‘even if they lived 300 miles to the south’ of the border.11 Simply put, this attitude suggested that the frontier moved with the Borana wherever they moved for grazing! The British attempted to defuse the situation by sending a delegation that proposed mutual trade across the frontier, but the Ethiopians were noncommittal, and the delegation returned empty-handed. Lord Bertram Francis Gurdon Cranworth, the head of the trade delegation, observed the tense situation in Borana for himself when he met delegations of the Qallu, Gedo Jillo, who gave him ‘[the]conventional presents of an ox and sheep.’ He observed that Gedo was a man under   9 Moyale District political record book, 1902–1933, p.2, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 10 Ibid., p.3. 11 Thesiger to Grey, 21 January 1910, enclosure in Langley to USSC, 19 February 1910, C.O. 533/80/5167.



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siege: ‘Chief Gettu [Gedo] had four Abyssinian soldiers attached to his person, but whether as spies, tax-collectors or as a mark of respect I do not know. Certainly, they appeared very obsequious to him, and hung on his slightest word’ (Cranworth 1939:145, 146). This was not surprising, given that the Borana under Gedo were the same Borana who were running away, and he, as their leader, knew the cause. By watching every word he uttered, the guards were most probably trying to determine if he was communicating any unauthorized information to the British delegation. Indeed, before the delegation crossed into Ethiopia, the local Ethiopian officials had warned the population about how they should behave. Cranworth noted that: ‘Gerazmach Ghasi [Gashe] with a routine of a large body of armed men, had announced his intention of refusing to give us passage… They have the reputation of hating Europeans and certainly didn’t appear to like us’ (Cranworth 1939:144). Like them or hate them, the Ethiopians were in no mood to show any appreciation towards their imperial neighbor whom they regarded as having ‘appropriated’ their citizens. This may not have been the only issue. The division of the Borana and the Gabra into the gabbar system as fief tenants of the Ethiopian officials and settler-soldiers had created discontent among them. The Ethiopians did not want this kind of information to leak to the outside world, which might explain why every word uttered by the Qallu Gedo interested the Ethiopian guards. The situation, however, could not remain hidden for long as the ‘Gabra and the Borana refugees [crossed in greater numbers to the British side stating] that new regulations had come into being in Abyssinia, by which the Boran tribe had been divided up among the Abyssinian soldiers. These refugees were pursued into British territory by the Abyssinians…suffering considerable losses.’12 The process of dividing the Borana into gabbar depended on the structure of sub-clans. According to one informant, ‘members of the sub-clan of Dambe-Nonno alliance was divided among the settler-soldier families of Angassu and Birasu, while the clan of Waar Jiidda and their associate Gabra families were allocated to the settler families of Bakala Iddo, Gutama Urgesa and Gutama Abba Bisso’ (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992a; see also Oba 2000:103). Another informant noted that ‘members of the sub-clan of Karayu Danqa were allocated to Santi and Malata… Every Borana sub-clan had ‘owners’ to whom they were allocated (Qaabale Galgallo Matoye, interview, 2010). The Borana response to the hateful gabbar system that deprived them of their freedom and liberty was to escape. The system of exploitation was 12 Moyale District political record book 1902–1933, p.4, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2.

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alien, heavy-handed and abusive. Hickey (1984:149) explains: ‘For every hundred head of cattle, sheep, or goats…or karra—the gabbar was required to pay his master an annual sum of $18 Maria Theresa (M.T.) Thaler. In addition, he was obligated to remit $1 M.T. a year per karra, which was designated for the central government.’ The new Ethiopian policy meant that every neftenya was indebted to the central government for the payment of tax by his gabbar. Given that he received the major portion of the tax paid, it would seem that he would be eager to increase the efficiency of tax extraction; however, it does not appear that the new arrangements succeeded in stopping the flow of so-called ‘refugees’ across the frontier. Simpson (1994:90) suggests that ‘[a]s more and more Oromo left, it became increasingly hard for the Ethiopians to support themselves without the levies.’ Attempts to make up for lost revenue by extracting more tribute from the inhabitants only added impetus to the exodus. The Ethiopians forced the Borana to pay taxes to the emperor in the form of large numbers of cattle; they also had to give up ‘one tusk for every elephant…killed’ (Huxley 1953:39). Taxes on goods such as nitrate soda, soda ash and livestock, in addition to some irregular taxes, continued to be levied. The Borana claimed that the Ethiopians charged tax for every uudhu (buttock), for these were the means the Borana used ‘to sit on the land of the emperor.’ Furthermore, there were taxes and tributes on miscellaneous items and sometimes unreasonable demands, such as for ‘a goat large enough to be roped for slaughter, yogurt that is so hard that even seenxi (sharp knives used for cutting raw meat) cannot slice through and the fattest bulls’ (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1993).13 The Borana were obliged to meet demands for every provision that the neftenya (settler-soldiers) needed. The Borana gabbar were not tillers of land (although they were forced to do this), but served in the domestic sphere by herding livestock and providing livestock products and other services free of charge. They also supplied products such as honey, ghee and the horns of big bulls, which were prepared as goblets for drinking tej (mead). The gabbari (bonded people) cleared cattle and horse pens of manure and built houses, while their women collected water and firewood for the wives of the neftenya (Halakhe Huqana Ch’aari, interview, 1994). Under the Ethiopian feudal 13 This informant, who was nearly 102 years old at the time of the interview, had personal experience of the Sidama [Ethiopian] misrule; his personal anecdotes were too numerous to record here.



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system, the gabbari were regarded as the property of their owners and had no legal rights: ‘They were used as…a commodity for facilitating production and the operation of their masters’ households’ (Dilebo 1974:213). The settler-soldiers policed the frontier and collected taxes (Markakis and Ayele 1986:29). Unlike land rights, which are spatially defined, livestock are a mobile asset, renewed by herd productivity and balanced with consumption to sustain herd growth. The frontier therefore provided an opportunity for negotiation by using this mobility to escape taxation. The Borana metaphorically described such ‘escapes’ with a verse in a cattle song that went as follows: galgalu haalkani, milaan khuute, hidansa haada Sidama uufira khuute you crossed the plains of Dida Galgallu by escaping at night and you stopped being roped by putting a distance with the Sidama (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1993).14

In the name of gibir (taxes) the Borana were ordered to provide bulls for every Ethiopian festivity. Society viewed the heavy taxation and demands by the gabbar owners as being similar to slavery. Captain W.E.H. Barrett interviewed Lugga Yaiyu [Laaga Yaayya] after his escape to the British territory: I have run away from Abyssinian territory with five of my people as my tribe (Boran) has been divided up amongst the Abyssinian soldiers. [This] means that we and our wives and children have become slaves, plowing [farms] for the soldier we are handed over to, cutting his fuel, drawing his water, building his houses and our donkeys and camels carrying his loads. We also have to supply our master with meat and milk for him and his friends. [We must not dispose of] our cattle, sheep, and camels without our master’s permission. In addition, we have to pay taxes to the Abyssinian government. This year the Abyssinians have imposed a new tax on us. They counted our stock and now tell us we must pay a sum of dollars for every 100 head [of livestock] they counted. Since our stock was counted, rinderpest has wiped out the large quantities of our animals but the tax is calculated on the count they made.15

A Somali trader, Mahamood Moosa, gave a statement to British officials on the situation of the Borana, declaring that: ‘[t]he Abyssinians are treating their Boran like slaves. They are taking the Government tax from them and then seizing additional stock…for themselves. The Boran are beaten 14 This verse has been modified by this author, a common practice by the waaritu cattle praise singers. 15 Statement of Lugga Yaiyu [Laaga Yaayya] to Captain W.E.H, Barrett on 29th March 1913, Abyssinian affairs: raids and claims, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/1.

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and chained up for the slightest cause… If they get the slightest chance the whole tribe will cross into British territory.’16 Mohamed Ali, another Somali trader, reported that the Ethiopian soldiers referred to the Borana as ‘our food’, meaning that the Boran were expected to supply them with food, work for them, and use their camels to carry loads for the Abyssinians—all without compensation. ‘I have seen old men chained up because they objected to [the treatment] they were receiving.’17 In both cases, the term ‘slave’ is used with a qualifier partly because the status of the Borana was not comparable to that of the peoples of southwestern Ethiopia who were literally enslaved (Donham and James 2002). In its present use, the word refers to ill treatment for the purpose of exploiting their resources and levying taxes, without regard for their personal liberty.18 The pressure on the remaining population in terms of taxation was unbearable. Thesiger gave this critical review of the situation: ‘… The native is obliged to pay a definite amount in cash, kind, and labor to his master, he is forbidden to leave his village, and consequently considers that from being a free man he has sunk to be the slave of the Abyssinians.’19 A report of the frank discussion on 23 April 1913 between Gerazmach Gashe and Lieutenant H.C. Dickinson, then district commissioner of Moyale, provides a better picture: The Gerazmach then went on to say that he understood that the Boran who had crossed had certain complaints against Abyssinian soldiers, such as having things taken forcibly from them. [He] understood the Boran objected to the soldiers using the Boran camels for carrying loads and to their plowing [farms] for the soldiers. The Gerazmach told me that he and his retinue were dependent for their food and everything on the Boran; he also said that other Boran would in all probability cross if they saw that those that had already crossed were not handed back. 20

Thus, the Ethiopians were well aware of the reasons for the Borana to leave their traditional grazing lands, risking attack as they attempted to escape at night across the porous frontier. Ironically, Ethiopian officials 16 Statement by Mahmood Moosa on Abyssinian division of Boran taken by Captain Barrett, Moyale, 4 April 1913, Abyssinian affairs: raids and claims, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/1. 17 Statement taken from Mohamed Ali [Somali trader] by Barrett, Moyale, 4 April 1913, Abyssinian affairs: raids and claims, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/1. 18 Acting assistant district commissioner of Moyale to chief secretary, Nairobi, 12 May 1913, Abyssinian affairs: raids and claims KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/1. 19 Memorandum on Mr. Thesiger’s journey to the southern frontier and Nairobi, FO 371/1880; see also Hickey (1984:140). 20 Lt. H.C. Dickinson to district commissioner, Moyale, NFD, 23 April 1913, KNA/PC/ NFD1/1/2.



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admitted that their sole source of food was the Borana, without whom they would go hungry. The occurrence of daily population crossings, of livestock seizures and of people arrested, were too numerous to report. For the escaping Borana, the dilemma was that their own leaders had become agents for collecting taxes and tribute. In a letter to Captain Barrett, Gerazmach Gashe emphasized that the orders that the ‘Borana should pay a certain amount of tax to the Government [came] from Fitaurari Habte Giorgis. [He claimed that] Fitaurari Gedo and Fitaurari Guyo had accepted the order.’21 Adept at the use of satire, the Borana described Borana state agents as ‘eaters’, compared to those who exploited them. It was impossible to be completely free from the ‘eaters’ as the process had gradually permeated the Borana socio-political system. The ‘eating’ by Borana leaders therefore spawned the creation of local satirical verses, which described the community’s views of the balabat and their assistant qoro who facilitated the extraction of tax and tribute and who were referred as nyaatu (the eaters). Satirical cattle songs communicated the community’s displeasure and metaphorically described how the eaters roped the bulls and took them to their overlords. The collaborators who participated in the ‘eating’ were the subject of negative songs, such as this one: Godana ka Boru nyaap’a saanga adaan nyaata nyaata, gaabaya yaasa Godana, the son of Boru, is an enemy, He eats the bulls through orders of roping them to the overlord, For purposes of eating he takes them to local markets…

Positive songs were composed about local leaders who resisted the ‘eating’: One such verse went as follows: Halakhe Duubana faaya. Inni saanga baasan yaada. Haadha kanke d’iina. Miirgoni ittii gudhana. Sangaan ke gaabana abba yaada kaa Halakhe Duubana is the darling—the good. He is troubled by the bulls collected for eating. He refuses you being roped (meaning the bull). 21 Garazmatch Gashi to Barrett, 18 March 1913, Abyssinian affairs: raids and claims, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/1.

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chapter four The young bulls grow bigger. The bulls fatten more and worry the owner.22

The last part of the verse refers to how a fattened bull in the herd tempted the tax collectors who carried out raids for the benefit of their Amhara overlords. This explains why the bull’s owner was troubled. Thus, the Borana’s only means of resisting excessive collection of their livestock was to cross the British frontier, thereby creating a dilemma for the British— namely, what to do with escaped Borana and other pastoral populations. The Borana “Runaways” British policy regarding the Borana runaways was varied and even contradictory. In one of his letters, after warning of the inevitable response to overexploitation of the Borana, Thesiger suggested that British officials, regardless of the evidence that ‘[the Borana] were being oppressed and misgoverned under the new state of affairs,’ should persuade them to return.23 The colonial chief secretary rejected this suggestion and advised the frontier administration not to return the Borana who sought refuge in British territory, stating they ‘should be protected against further attack.’24 This instruction was not new; but there is no evidence that such protection was afforded to the Borana, apart from the case of Dido Doyo referred to earlier. The instruction was also vague on the question of protection, because it merely suggested ‘as far as possible.’ This allowed the frontier administration to take into account practical limitations, such as other priorities and capacity on the ground. Still this remained the official British policy, according to the telegram dispatched by the Foreign Office to the governor of Kenya, which made it clear that the ‘Boran should be allowed to remain in British East Africa and [that] protection from further ill treatment should be afforded them.’25 From the diplomatic angle, the British firmly refused to hand back ‘runaway’ Borana to the Ethiopian administrators, as can be seen from communications between Fitaurari 22 The satirical cattle songs were sung by Mrs. Gojee Goolo and taped by the author in 1992 at Sololo, Kenya. The persons named in the songs were given pseudonyms to protect their identity. 23 Thesiger, Addis Ababa, to officer-in-charge, Moyale, 28 June 1913, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/1. 24 Chief secretary, Nairobi, to provincial commissioner, Nyeri, 20 June 1913, KNA/PC/ NFD1/1/2. 25 Paraphrase of telegram No. 28777/13, under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, Foreign Office, 3 July 1913 to Thesiger, Addis Ababa, KNA/PC/NFD4/3/1.



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Wolde Gabriel and Captain Barrett in July 1913. These were written in Amharic and translated into English. In one of them, Wolde Gabriel requested: ‘Now I have heard that our Boran we counted have run away and entered the British territory. I ask you to return them.’26 Barrett made three main points in his response to Fitaurari Wolde Gabriel. First, he suggested that Ethiopians must consider transfrontier movements in context rather than characterize them as simply ‘running away.’ Second, he noted that it was the responsibility of the authorities on both sides of the frontier, to protect the nomads, implying that the British had a responsibility to protect those who crossed to their side of the frontier. Third, he addressed the conflict situation at the time, referring to Ethiopian armed groups who crossed the frontier without ‘previous authorization’ to attack both the British and ‘runaway’ Borana. This British interpretation of Article 1(b) of the border treaty27 was deliberate because the causes of the flight of the Borana were clear to both sides. By reducing the problem to transfrontier movements, the British official attempted to find a way of responding to Ethiopian demands diplomatically, while at the same time expressing official concern over the Ethiopian incursions.28 The Ethiopian soldiery on the frontier were upset that ‘their’ civilians, who supplied them with their livelihoods, were running away, and that the British were unable or unwilling to stop them. As far as the British were concerned, the Borana were also to blame for exposing themselves to possible attacks by remaining in the frontier region, crossing into Ethiopia to water their livestock, while residing on the British side of the frontier.29 The British may have feared that their own Borana risked taxation by Ethiopian officials because of their close association with the Ethiopian Borana. The British regarded Ethiopian attacks on the Borana on the Kenyan side of the border to be in ‘total disregard of the agreement about the boundary line.’30 The frontier treaty allowed transfrontier grazing and watering rights for the populations on both sides of the frontier, but a complicating factor was inhabitants designated as both ‘British’ and ‘Ethiopian.’ The implication was that the British administration would 26 Wuldi to Barrett, July 1913, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/2. 27 Barrett to Wuldi, 1913, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/2. 28 Barrett, Moyale, to officer-in-charge NFD, 27 August 1913, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/1. 29 Barrett, Moyale to officer-in-charge, NFD, and to chief secretary, Nairobi, 1 May 1913, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/1. 30 S.F. Deck, Provincial annual report, 1914–1915, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/2.

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prevent the Ethiopians from extracting taxes from British citizens, while the Ethiopian administration would claim rights to do so according to their interpretation of the treaty. Fitaurari Woldi, claimed that the pastoralists were raided only when they used the wells on the Ethiopian side (Hodson 1919; 1927). The two frontier governments held discussions on improving coordination of the movements of the frontier pastoralists and how to avoid conflicts over such movements. Captain Arnold Hodson, whom the Ethiopians regarded with ‘considerable suspicion’ represented the British side.31 The visit by the entire Ethiopian administrative team to the post of Moyale to discuss the frontier signified two things: first that the Ethiopian administration was beginning to understand the use of diplomacy; and second that both sides could gain from improved collaboration across the frontier. Significantly, the Borana balabat were included in this frontier delegation.32 The meetings appeared to lay the ground for a quid pro quo: the Ethiopian nomads living on the frontier would be prevented from running to the British side, and the British ‘[would make] fresh efforts to have the Gwynn border recognized.’33 For the British, recognition of the Gwynn Line by Ethiopia had the potential for solving the question of transfrontier grazing and watering by the pastoralists, which was behind every frontier dispute. For the Ethiopians, the return of the Borana was likely to increase their tax revenue. Unfortunately, this discussion produced no lasting solution to the problem of ‘runaway’ Borana and did not modify the Ethiopian position on the contested border. The period 1917–19 was one of great turmoil on the frontier. The activities of bandits sent many Borana fleeing across the frontier; however, Ethiopian attempts to defeat the bandits and prevent the Borana from escaping were ineffective.34 Further exacerbating the problem was the Ethiopian reprisal of arresting those Borana returning to Ethiopia for not paying their taxes. A minor incident occurred in January 1919, when Ethiopian soldiers raided the cattle of Borana ‘who claimed British asylum’, resulting in an exchange of fire between the Ethiopians and the British frontier police (Brown 1989:374). The ‘tension’ caused by the Ethiopian raids on the British side did not deter the Ethiopians in any way. Each incident resulted in increased numbers of Borana crossing the 31 Moyale District political record book, 1902–1933, p.5, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 32 H.B. Kittermaster, NFP annual report, 1913, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/2. 33 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, Ref. P.350/19/17, pp.2–3, 4 January 1918, KNA/NFD4/1/4. 34 See material in KNA/NFD/4/3/2.



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frontier, and this, in turn, was followed by more raids. By mid-1919, the frontier was increasingly suffering from double political jeopardy, with raids on Borana cattle by the traditional Ethiopian tax collectors as well as by frontier bandits called Tigre. These two factors resulted in ever-increasing numbers of Borana seeking refuge in British territory (Hodson 1927:173). For the Borana, the choice was either to tolerate the Ethiopian raids to extract taxes or to choose to pay the British taxes and claim to be British subjects. The Taxations Compared From 1918 onwards, the British administration contemplated taxing its population, but it lacked the workforce to implement this policy. The possible responses of the frontier pastoralists to the introduction of taxation were widely discussed. Unlike the Ethiopians, the British were not particularly concerned about the population ‘running away’ (the exception to this claim is discussed in chapter 7). One reason for this was that the British side of the frontier was not rich in natural resources like the Ethiopian side. This was mitigated by the relative sparseness of the population in areas subject to British control which would reduce the pressure on existing grazing and watering points. Most important, migratory Somalis had begun to arrive en masse in the NFD and although this was not desirable, the British had little capacity to turn them back. Accordingly, if taxation were to lead to an exodus of these people, this would in fact be a welcome development. The British were also aware of the nomadic nature of the population, and doubted the cost-effectiveness of pursuing so few groups to collect taxes. Hence, the need for a more effective way of collecting taxes formed a major part of the discussion. The preferred action was to take a census of the population to provide statistics on which rates of taxation could be based. This approach was bound to incur problems, given that nomads generally are resistant to being counted; indeed, they considered the counting of their livestock as an abomination. C.H. Plowman, the district commissioner of Moyale in 1918, had some ideas about the rates at which nomads should be taxed: he suggested Rs 15 (Indian rupees) or Rs 20 per 100 head of large livestock, and a different rate for sheep and goats.35 These figures were comparable 35 Letter from Plowman, Moyale, Ref. No. P. 350/19/17, 1 December 1917, and 4 January 1918, KNA/PC/NFD4/1/4.

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to the official Ethiopian tax rates. The difference was that the British taxes were levied on an annual basis, while the Ethiopian taxes were a more frequent affair. The British decided to tax individuals (i.e. adult males) rather than taxing communities or groups collectively. Collective tax on more settled communities was referred to as a ‘hut tax.’ The nomads did not welcome the announcement of a compulsory poll tax on small livestock or bullocks, as this shifted the responsibility from the clans and subsections of the tribe to individual adult males. The perception was that large families, regardless of the number of livestock they owned, would pay much more than they had when the clan was the unit of taxation. The British compensated for lower tax rates by levying heavy fines on livestock that transgressed intertribal grazing borders. While the administration found that it was relatively easy to collect taxes from groups such as the Borana and Ajuran, it was less successful in taxing rebellious groups such the Somalis. T.O. Butter even complained that the groups more willing to pay tax had not received a fair deal, since the protection they received from the administration was not commensurate with the amount of tax levied on them. He emphasized this by comparing their situation with that of the noncompliant Somalis: ‘The Somali tribes who have cost us more than all the rest of the district and have gained more…[in terms of land concessions], escaped without taxation.’ Yet, on the question of how to force them to pay taxes, he concluded, ‘I cannot see much prospect of any advance in administration in NFD.’36 Despite these misgivings, the British intention was to link taxation to resource concessions and citizenship. The tribal sections that paid their taxes would become entirely independent sociopolitical entities that were entitled to appoint their headmen and have allocated areas of grazing and water points. Nevertheless, the British considered community-based methods of taxation to be ‘thoroughly bad, as it cannot be evenly distributed and offers unlimited opportunities for injustice and oppression to the chiefs in whose hands the levying of the tribute is placed.’37 Individual headmen could use various forms of passive resistance, such as not collecting taxes on time, or, in some cases, encouraging their sections to disperse so that they remained out of reach of the administration. What often infuriated 36 T.O. Butter, Meru, to chief secretary, Nairobi, Ref. No. P.284/19/18, 6 August 1918, KNA/ PC/NFD4/1/4. 37 Lt. Col. Muirhead, provincial annual report. 1921, KNA/PC/NFD1/1.



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the British administrators was the habit that some headmen had of questioning orders. For example, the district officer of Sankuri in Jubaland summoned the headman of the section of the Abd Wak (Darood) Somali, who was informed that his section would be the first to be registered, and that the subsection heads had to comply with the instructions within twenty days. The problem was that nomadic communities in general do not make decisions within a given timeframe. Their tradition is to hold discussions in a public forum until consensus emerges: without consensus, enforcement would not work. This caused the district officer to comment that the particular section head ‘[h]as too great a tendency to always question government orders…[and] always appears suspicious of everything and suspects all government orders and proposals of having some ulterior motive.’38 What the district officer did not understand was that while the headman was required to accept responsibility on behalf of his people, he also knew the limits of his authority. Therefore, the ‘sulking’ that was observed was a way of communicating that the given task would not be accepted by his people. The headman needed to ask as many questions as possible, if he was to convince his people. The government perception was that the headman resisted orders, although this was unlikely. The British administration’s response to such resistance was to impose a fine on the subsection, by force if necessary.39 In 1922, the administration issued similar orders in the Garre District, where tax was paid in form of goats and, most important, where the registration of the tribe was to be conducted. The Garre headmen vigorously opposed these proposals. The district commissioner received visits from the Garre chiefs and their mullahs to discuss tribute payments. They informed the district commissioner that their refusal was in accordance with their religion (Islam), which forbade them to pay taxes to nonbelievers. The commissioner was uncompromising: in his own words: ‘I informed [them] that I should collect the livestock immediately.’40 Consequently, the Garre escaped en masse into Ethiopia. There is an interesting similarity between the actions of the Borana in ‘running away’ from Ethiopia and the actions of the Garre in escaping to Ethiopia to avoid taxation on the British side of the frontier. These 38 Sankuri District, intelligence report, October 1922, KNA/PC/NFD3/1/1. 39 Sankuri District, intelligence report, 19 February 1922, No. 584/14/2/22, KNA/PC/ NFD3/1/1. 40 Gurreh District, intelligence report for November 1924, KNA/PC/NFD3/1/1.

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political tensions would play out over several years. The Ethiopians used the Garre to counter British interests, for they considered that the British encouraged the Borana to leave Ethiopia. By contrast, the Garre had found a useful way of dealing with the British administration whenever the issue of registration and taxation came up: the district commissioner observed that ‘at the slightest suspicion [they would] run to the frontier and into the “sympathetic” arms of Abyssinia − only to return as soon as our back is turned.’41 The administration was therefore careful in how it handled the group, particularly with their two principal leaders: Gababa Mohamed Guracha and Mahad Hussein. The commissioner outlined his message in letters sent to the two principal chiefs, who had both escaped to Ethiopia. He stated: …the Government was tired of this unsatisfactory situation and…the time had now arrived for them to definitely decide whether they wish to remain British subjects or not. If they did, they were to immediately return from Abyssinia in order to show their final and definite preference for British territory.42

The administration was persuasive and conciliatory, without appearing to reverse its earlier decisions on taxation. Whether the approach worked was debatable, since the Garre realized that their presence on the frontier brought both rewards and risks. Their strategy was to move between the two sides of the frontier, sensing which side was more likely to be of political and strategic benefit at a particular time. They could ‘play politics’ with both sides, in the process reaping political rewards from their (partial) presence on one side or the other, while slipping back and forth across the frontier to escape punitive measures. The British frontier pastoralists loathed the administrators’ methods of tax collection. A common practice, similar to those used by the Ethiopians, was for officials to visit water sources such as wells where the nomads were forced to gather during the dry season. At other times of the year, fines were collected with difficulty, if at all. In one such incident, a district commissioner described his experience on a tax collection safari among the Ajuran as follows: ‘I had great difficulty in collecting this fine owing to the extreme mobility of these camel people… Many manyattas [pastoral encampments] appeared to vanish completely.’43 Mobility was a critical form of resistance that nomads used to evade taxation, but they risked the 41 Ibid. 42 Kenya Colony, intelligence report, 31 March 1924, pp.17–18, KNA/PC/NFD3/1/1. 43 Kenya Colony, intelligence report, 30 June 1924, p.14, KNA/PC/NFD3/1/1.



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possibility of heavy fines when the administration eventually caught up with them. The use of force was always the British administration’s second line of response; their initial response to any group that resisted the payment of taxes was to issue threats. Threats that warned of worse actions to follow if groups did not comply with policy sometimes failed, for the frontier provided an easy means of evasion. The administration was aware of the fact that some groups, such as the Somalis, could cross into Italian Somaliland, while other groups would cross into Ethiopia. Groups such as the Borana, the Gabra, and the Ajuran, who only had the option of crossing the Ethiopian frontier, tended to cooperate and were, therefore, held up as model ‘law-abiding pastoralists.’ For more resistant groups, the administration had a solution. Storrs-Fox, the district commissioner of Wajir, suggested how the administration should respond to those who failed to pay taxes: Should the matter (of taxation) be brought up again and it is decided eventually to impose the tax it would seem that the best chance of collecting it would be to determine to show the people as clearly as possible that government [will]…get the money at all costs.44 Naturally, they don’t want to pay if they can help it, and the only argument or persuasion that they are likely to listen to…when necessary [is] the use of superior force [author’s italics].

The use of superior force applied only to circumstances in which the administration could not compel defaulters to pay by imposing fines. The frontier nomads had their own way of dealing with the threats. As soon as an announcement was made, before the required date they would gather their herds and cross the frontier to dodge the tax collectors. Their chiefs and headmen would then report that their section had moved across the international frontier due to a shortage of grazing and watering facilities on the British side. The Ethiopian modes of tax extractions did not change: they used raiding of frontier pastoralists. By 1919, the Garre had suffered such extensive predation from Ethiopian tax raids that the population felt compelled to cross back into the British territory. In the Dolo area, the frontier with Italian Somalia, the Ethiopians were angered at‘[seeing] all their sources of revenue disappearing.’45 They made the usual demands for the return of their subjects. The NFD provincial commissioner’s response 44 D. Storrs-Fox, Wajir District annual report for 1927, p.2, KNA/PC/NFD1/5/1. 45 Alan J. Dunn, Serenli, to provincial commissioner, Kismayu, 28 March 1919, KNA/PC/ NFD4/1/4.

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emphasized two main points: first, the Ethiopians were at liberty to do whatever they wished on their side of the frontier. Second, such actions should cease as soon as the refugees crossed to the British side of the frontier. By early 1920, the British administration decided to remove the majority of the Borana, who had previously crossed to the British side of the frontier, in order to avoid the incursions of the Ethiopians (for whom the Borana runaways served as bait). They justified this action on the grounds that the presence of the runaways on the frontier ‘causes [the British] a lot of unnecessary embarrassment.’46 The Borana were given two choices: either accept relocation to Isiolo, deep inside the NFD, where others had previously settled; or return to Dirre, their ancestral country.47 Unfortunately, this did not reduce the number of Ethiopian raids. For example, on 17 July 1920, a large-scale raid on the Borana was conducted into the British territory at a place called Ogorji, near Gurar where the Borana elder Huka Mudana had been murdered, and an estimated 500 head of livestock was driven back into Ethiopia. The looted livestock belonged to Halake Waiyu, Huluka Godana, Happi Liban and Tende Halake. Organized by government zabania (armed retainers), these raids accelerated the Borana departure from the Ethiopian frontier.48 Their departure left the frontier region almost devoid of taxpaying populations, further upsetting Ethiopian officials. The British consul for southern Ethiopia in a communication with Dejazmach Asefaw described the Ethiopian reactions as follows: The Dejazmach was upset about his tenants that had escaped across into Kenya… There were not even Boran to draw water for his men and animals. He asked what good this country was to them now as there was not a single soul living in it. He informed me there were now four thousand of their subjects in our country… He also said that he had received instructions to seize all the tenants when they watered at the border wells…49

The presence of Dejazmach Asefaw at the head of a large military formation close to the Borana frontier worried the British, who wondered about his exact intentions (for the purpose of this Ethiopian military mission, see chapter 5). In one meeting between the Dejazmach and the commander of the King’s African Rifles (KAR) in Moyale, Dejazmach 46 Ibid. 47 Plowman, provincial handing-over report to Waddington, 1920, p.2, KNA/PC/NFD1/1. 48 Letter to British chargé d’affaires, Addis Ababa, 17 July 1920, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/1. 49 Hodson to officer-in-charge NFD with Dejazmatch Assafou’s army, 1 August 1921, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4.



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Asefaw announced that ‘he had orders…from his Government to [get] the refugee Borana [back].’ The British side considered his threats as an ‘intimidation.’50 In his meetings with the minister of war, Fitaurari Habte Giorgis, the district commissioner of Moyale received full briefings on the major concerns of the Ethiopian Government. Habte Giorgis frankly admitted that his province, ‘formerly a very rich one, was now ruined as all the pastoralists had fled to British territory entirely…through the fault of [his Ethiopian] officials.’51 While the British officials had reservations about hosting the Borana who crossed the frontier, partly because of the scarcity of grazing and water, they nevertheless admitted that within the context of international law, there was no precedent to deny refuge to individuals, who sought safety from apparent oppression. Rather, the British position was to encourage the Ethiopians to place adequate forces on the frontier, as this would result in an overall improvement of frontier security.52 The British also had their own plans for improving taxation on their side of the frontier. The aim was to register different ethnic groups to provide a better understanding of the taxable population. While showing a willingness to assist the Ethiopians, the British district commissioner insisted that: the scheme of the Abyssinian Government…is to show an ideal policy on their part and to promulgate among the Boran the fact that we are registering with a view to making a much larger call on them for tribute in the future. The ensuing danger is evident…I would ask that the amount of tribute payable by the Boran should not be increased…[above] an annual tribute of 100 bullocks…53

From the perspective of the Ethiopian officials, the intention of registering the Borana was entirely different: its aim was to coax the Ethiopian Borana into returning to the Ethiopian side of the frontier. At the same time, the British objective was to distinguish the British Borana from the Ethiopian Borana. As far as the British were concerned, Borana who agreed to register and remain on the British side would be considered 50 Letter from 5th KAR, Moyale, to officer commanding troops, Colony of Kenya, 29 July 1921, p.2, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 51 District commissioner, Moyale, to officer-in-charge NFD, 22 February 1923, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/2. 52 This referred to a large Ethiopian force brought to the frontier, about which the British were receiving mixed signals. 53 District commissioner, Moyale, to officer-in-charge NFD, 22 February 1923, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/2.

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British subjects. Captain Cochrane, officer-in-charge at Moyale, informed Ato Gebru of the Ethiopian administration that ‘those who are on this side and have not registered I regard as your people entirely and if discovered [they will] be returned to you.’54 This reversal of British policy requires an explanation. The British were concerned about these delicate disputes over the frontier treaty, which risked denying the tribes on the British side of the frontier access to the wells on the Ethiopian side. This was the reason for their attempts to placate the Ethiopians. However, this British willingness did not seem to have much effect on Ethiopian policy regarding the frontier treaty. Ato Gebru made the Ethiopian position clear in a letter to colonel Llewellyn: If they do not want to pay their tribute in future and yet they come to water and graze in our country they will not be allowed. According to the Proclamation that was made [by Fitaurari Habte Giorgis], those who were the subjects of the Ethiopian Government and have fled away will be arrested, but if they pay their tribute as in the past, no one will touch them. The original British subjects are not prevented from using the wells as long as they behave themselves well on this side, but there are some disobedient Boran who do wrong here and run away breaking the law of the country; [these] are being arrested – [they are] shiftas …55

From the letter, one can deduce four aspects of the official Ethiopian stance on the rights of the frontier nomads. The first was to make a direct link between payments of taxes and access to wells. This also had important implications for the British subjects. The second was that the Ethiopians would treat the pastoralists who ran away and returned to water their livestock at wells on their side of the frontier as criminals to be arrested. These runaways, if arrested, would have to pay fines in tax arrears for the number of years they had absconded. The third was referring to the pastoralists as ‘original British subjects.’ The use of this term remains vague when applied to the Borana, particularly since the Ethiopians considered them Ethiopian citizens regardless of the numbers of years they had lived on the British side, as previously mentioned. The fourth was regarding the escaping Borana as equivalent to shifta-bandits who disobeyed the state and deserved punishment. These uncompromising positions regarding the Borana runaways were the justification for continued Ethiopian cross-border raids. 54 Ibid. 55 Ato Gabru to colonel Llewellyn, 22 July 1923, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4.



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Because of these continuing tax collecting raids, the Borana lacked confidence in the Ethiopian government and remained on the British side of the border despite their preference for the higher and cooler Dirre region, as opposed to the hot Golbo lowlands in Kenya. When handing over the provincial report, E.J. Waddington made the following suggestion to lieutenant-colonel M. Llewellyn: ‘I think that [the Borana’s] preference for their higher country would take them back eventually if they saw a chance of fair government on return.’56 This was unlikely as the ‘exorbitant demands,’ combined with harsh punishments like flogging and imprisonment, intended to force Borana compliance with demands for further payments had probably induced their flight in the first place. The British, surprised by the attitude of the Ethiopian state towards its own citizens, considered it to be ‘an adroit exploiter’ (Chevenix Trench 1964:240). The British view reflects how the Ethiopian empire, at least up until that time, had failed to adapt to the conditions of the frontier, while making it a priority to extract resources from its civilians, even by ruthless means. The administrator in Moyale informed the colonial secretary that it would be an ‘uphill task…to persuade the Borana to return to Abyssinia…as it would be a long time… before they forgot all that they had suffered from the Abyssinian soldiers.’57 One example was Halakhe Addi, who crossed with all the members of his settlements, including vast herds of cattle, estimated at 22 karra (more than 2,000 head), and 70 horses: he feared ‘exorbitant tax, forced labor and [that] his women [would be] taken by force.’58 On the eastern frontier, the Degodia were also escaping from the administration of Lij Nagash, the nephew of Habte Giorgis. Lij Nagash visited Moyale to see the District Commissioner about the Degodia who were escaping. Some 3000 people with 30,000 head of livestock had escaped into the British Territory, and ‘[he] demanded…[that they return] at once…’59 On the Borana frontier, the numbers of people escaping must have also perturbed Fitaurari Habte Giorgis, who had appointed most of the officials to manage ‘his kitchen.’ Apparently, he thought that it was the amount of tax levied and not the method of collection that had forced the Borana to flee. The British were also concerned about tax reforms on their

56 Waddington to Llewellyn, provincial report, 1922, KNA/DC/MBT3/2/1. 57 Letter from district office, Moyale to colonial secretary, Nairobi, Ref. No. 46/106/21, 8 January 1922, KNA/PC/NFD3/1/1. 58 Ibid. 59 Kenya Colony, intelligence report, 31 March 1924, KNA/PC/NFD3/1/1.

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side of the frontier. For frontier pastoralists, however, tax reforms entailed hard and limited choices. The British taxation policy was a source of tribulation for the ‘runaway’ Borana as they were faced with the same evil that they had sought to escape. The option of returning to Ethiopia necessitated serious consideration. British sources suggested that the NFD administration ‘would not regret their going’ if they rejected the poll tax on an individual basis and returned to the Ethiopian side of the frontier.60 The one-to-one personal tax charged by the NFD administration appeared, however, to be more tolerable than the Ethiopian system of gabbar taxation. In practice the Borana simply ‘sat on the frontier and waited to see what was going to happen.’ This is how the provincial report covered the issue: Perhaps the most disturbing incident of the year from the tribesmen’s point of view was the pronouncement that taxation would be imposed on everyone from 1st January 1931 at the rate of sh.10 per poll. Tribesmen were warned that they could not sit in the bush and await events as they had done previously…but they had an option to leave British territory if they wished. They must however remember that such a decision would involve the loss of all the previous rights to water and grazing and could only be made by clans and not individuals.61

No clan would willingly give up its territory or its grazing and watering rights as this would be suicidal in such a drought-prone region where survival of these frontier communities depended on the availability of grazing and water. The official position of the NFD administration was to search for solutions to the ‘perpetual crossing backwards and forwards of the tribes’ but they concluded that ‘it is neither possible nor desirable to [restrain] these migrations though it must very seriously hamper administration.’62 The ongoing dilemma forced the NFD administration and the frontier pastoralists to stretch their wits to see who would give in first: would the administration backpedal on their policies, or would the pastoralists accept payment of taxes? The nomads then asked the practical question of how to pay their taxes, given the lack of a market for their livestock. The previous practice of paying taxes using goats and sheep to provide meat rations for government employees such as the police was found to be undesirable. An important change in the system was the 60 NFD annual report, 1928, p.16, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/3. 61 Moyale District, NFD, résumé of happenings in 1930, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 62 H.B. Sharp, Marsabit District handing-over report to A.N. Bailward, 1930, p.11, KNA/ DC/MBT3/2/1.



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introduction of tax payments in the form of cash, instead of bartering with livestock equivalents.63 The administration organized annual livestock sales, where the buyers were Somali traders. The head tax was fixed at between ten and twenty shillings per year per adult male, which was equivalent to between one and two sheep at the annual auction (Baxter 1954:66). The annual sales ‘caused a glut’ in local markets. This resulted in a drop in the price of (tax) goats in the major markets in Kenya.64 At the end of 1931, after the introduction of compulsory poll tax, the NFD administration evaluated their success and found that it had collected 57 percent of the expected taxes, with the majority of the nomadic groups making a ‘serious efforts to produce their quota;’65 although others evaded paying taxes by crossing the frontier: Large numbers of Gurreh [Garre], with their headmen, crossed over into Abyssinia to escape taxation. Of the Degodia some 20% fled to Abyssinia… The Ajuran were willing to pay but owing to the imposition of quarantine regulations were unable to find a market for their sheep and goats…. The Borana and Gabra were willing to pay but were unable to find a market for their stock. The Sakuye did not attempt to pay.66

The Marehan, another group who oscillated between the frontiers of Italian Somaliland, Ethiopia and the NFD, are a good example of this taxation-induced movement. In 1932, before tax collection, ‘there were approximately 400 men eligible for tax, but these had dwindled to about 50’ by the time tax collection came around.67 The rest of the group had crossed into Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia. The opportunity to escape to Ethiopia or Italian Somaliland was limited to the groups of pastoralists that used the frontiers for their own political benefit. In other cases, the British administration’s success was partly undermined by the quarantine imposed due to the outbreak of contagious livestock diseases. In such cases, taxes were either postponed in certain areas, or if necessary, written off, often after lengthy correspondence on the matter. Given the variation in conditions, tax collections fluctuated from year to year in the NFD. In some years, the full tax quotas were met; in others, there was total failure for reasons beyond the administration’s control.68

63 Moyale District, NFD, resume of happenings in 1930, p.4. KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 64 Ibid. 65 Political records of Moyale District 1931, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 66 Ibid. 67 Political records, Moyale District 1932, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 68 Moyale District, NFD, annual report, 1934, p.17, KNA/DC/MDA/1/10.

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The droughts were periods of great stress, when even the administration admitted that it ‘was an unsustainable time to enforce individual taxation.’69 The challenge- finding a way of enforcing the payment of fines by individual defaulters remained. This was due partly to the preference of the frontier pastoral groups for paying communal taxes.70 In fact, when personal poll tax was enforced and individual defaulters fined, the British administration discovered how the social behavior of groups undermined the whole exercise—the tribe always protected its members. In his handing-over report, H.D. Oldfield71 reminded his successor about this particular form of institutional buffering: A point worth remembering is that any fine imposed on an individual is in fact a collective fine, the fine being collected communally by the headmen, and the offender is punished to no greater extent than any other member of his section or tribe. Even though you actually attach the property of the individual, other stock will be returned to him. This is about all you can do as you have no legal power to prevent people subscribing towards a fine, and if you had, it would be quite impossible to enforce your order.

The administration acknowledged its limitations and the inadequacies of formal laws for forcing compliance when dealing with nomads. Any policy of the British frontier administration to enforce the extraction of taxes from truculent pastoralists would have limited success. The NFD administration was therefore caught between two conflicting policies: one that encouraged the Borana to return to Ethiopia, and the other that asked them to pay taxes that would ensure their recognition as British subjects.72 According to Baxter (2001:243): ‘[t]he Borana silently endured and stayed on [in Kenya] because the circumstances were good and the regime was… not as unpredictable as in Ethiopia. They devised ways of forestalling or sabotaging the moves the administration made against them… Adult males ensured that they paid tax every year, and received officially stamped receipts.’ This did not, however, save them from the Ethiopian tax collectors.

69 Glenday to native commissioner, provincial monthly intelligence report, 27 October 1933, ADM, 15/3/1179, p. 2, KNA/DC/MLE/3/4. 70 Letter from provincial office, Isiolo, NFD, to chief native commissioner, Nairobi, Ref. No. AD 15/3/184, 12 March 1933, KNA/DC/MLE/3/4. 71 From H.G. Oldfield to M.W. Low 1933. Marsabit District Handing-over report, p. 3, KNA/DC/MBT3/2/1. 72 M.W. Low, Marsabit District Handing-over report to E.M. Hyde-Clarke, 1934, p. 4, KNA/MBT3/2/1.



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Under the guidance of Fitaurari Habte Giorgis, the Ethiopians developed a new scheme for extracting taxes and tribute from the Borana. Reformation of the amount demanded in taxation was, however, impossible without reforming the system itself. Although the new scheme was an improvement, its implementation was difficult. While showing a willingness to cooperate, British officials remained skeptical as to whether the Borana would take up the offer. Under Fitaurari Ayela, the tax per karra (herding unit) per annum would be reduced from sixteen to ten Ethiopian dollars. Yet, this did not encourage the Borana to return.73 Fitaurari Ayela’s radical proposal for tax reforms had three parts. The first proposed reform was that in the future the Borana would pay their taxes through their own balabat, who would be responsible to the governor of the Borana province. The second was that government troops passing through the region would receive rations, so they would not take what they wanted from the Borana, as they had done previously. The third was that the Borana did not need to pay any tax other than the amounts paid through their leaders.74 Those who benefited from the gabbar tax model, namely the settler-soldiers, and who felt they would be disadvantaged by the revised tax system, would certainly resist such a policy. It was clear that this proposed tax policy had little chance of succeeding, as there were many actors and interested parties involved, each of whom would exert political influence to get things done their way. It does not appear that Fitaurari Ayela attempted to implement his new policy. Instead, in October 1926, he reverted to the aggressive tax extraction policy of the past as follows: Twelve milangos [12 karra − herding units] of cattle were seized … from certain Boran watering and grazing in Abyssinia, in default of tax. These Boran claimed to be British subjects, and Fitaurari Ayela was requested to return their stock. On subsequent investigations however, it transpired that, with one exception, all the Boran from whom stock had been taken were [old] Abyssinian subjects, who were actually living on the British side, but were keeping their stock in Abyssinia. The one exception had his stock returned to him.75

There are two problems relating to this incident. First, the definition of frontier nomads as citizens of a sovereign state raises the issue of who 73 Kenya Colony, intelligence report, 31October 1924, p.58, KNA/PC/NFD3/1/1. 74 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to British minister, Addis Ababa, 28 February 1923, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 75 Ibid.

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belongs where, especially when the border in fact splits the same community. The second problem was that although the population might have crossed the frontier after the ratification of the international border, one might assume that they had paid British taxes, which technically made them British subjects. The British administration acknowledged the problem inherent in these distinctions, particularly when the frontier nomads belonged to the same ethnic group. The provincial annual report for 1926 described the problem: In the majority of such cases, owing to the intermixture of British and Abyssinian Boran in British Territory, it is almost impossible to identify clearly the stock of the former when in the Abyssinian territory. Moreover, the right of this class of Boran to exemption from taxation by Abyssinian authorities when within Abyssinian territory is not clearly established by [the] treaty.76

It is therefore quite likely that, without actually being conscious about the treaty’s ambiguity, the Ethiopians were within their rights in taxing populations that crossed the frontier, but crossing the international frontier themselves to raid and loot livestock was a right that they had simply arrogated to themselves. On the Ethiopian side of the frontier, whenever there was a change in governorship, new intrigues emerged that had repercussions for the frontier populations and for tax collection. Such internal tensions might reflect resistance to reforms from within the Ethiopian administration. For example, Fitaurari Ayela was put in chains by his successor, Fitaurari Ashenafi, who accused him of corrupt practices and took him to Addis Ababa. Fitaurari Ashenafi also threatened to put his deputy’s successor in chains and tied him ‘to a slave because of a shortfall of $4,000 in the provincial accounts’ (Dutton 1946:204). Fitaurari Ashenafi ruffled many feathers with his reformist agenda regarding internal systems of tax collection and the management of government funds. According to British sources, Fitaurari Ashenafi ‘removed many gabbars from the government soldiery’ for failures of tax returns.’77 These actions did not make Fitaurari Ashenafi popular. His heavy-handedness in trying to bring discipline to a corrupt administration created many enemies among those who had previously benefited from the gabbar system, and whose past privileges appeared to be threatened. Another problem was his relationship with 76 NFP annual report, 1926, p.6, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/3. 77 Isiolo, NFD, provincial monthly intelligence report, December 1931, p.3, KNA/DC/ MDA/3/3.



tax extractions, 1908–193587

the Borana principals with regard to tax collection and labor contributions for public works such as road construction. The Borana and other pastoralists opposed these attempts. The report from major A.T. Miles to Gerald Reece commented on this relationship: …[t]here is also a feeling of hatred by the whole of the Boran tribe against Ashenafi, for his very high-handed methods of dealing with them, in the way he treats Fitaurari Gedo and Guyo in imposing extra taxation, forced labor, etc. The Borana near the frontier lately had a big “baraza” at which they decided, in the event of the return of Ashenafi, to move to the Northern Frontier Province.78

Given the evidence that the Borana had suffered at the hands of various administrators during the early decades of Ethiopian administration, it is difficult to understand why, on this occasion, one man’s action was so bitterly opposed. Indeed, one suspects that those who wanted to settle scores with the deputy provincial governor might possibly have incited or encouraged the so-called Borana reaction. An alternate view also exists. Borana informants told Belete Bizuneh (2008) that Fitaurari Ashenafi was an ‘equalizer of all people.’ By taking from the rich and removing their gabbar, he had brought about equality in the system. As for the Borana’s dissatisfaction with Ashenafi’s administration, the problem might not lie with taxation alone. Bizuneh further suggests that the transfer to the Garre of the country of Walensu, located between the Wachile and Ganale rivers, one of the most valuable grazing lands of the Borana, might be the real cause of Borana opposition (see chapter 7). This situation did not change with the arrival of the new governor of Borana, Ras Desta Demtew, in 1934. He ordered a census of the Borana and their livestock, and dispatched all the senior and junior lords to every corner of the country where there were remnants of the Borana population. The intelligence report of the British consulate in southern Ethiopia describes the tax collection raids in graphic terms: …many of the Boran fled, while most hid a large portion of their cattle. Every officer returned to Mega with a quantity of stock that he had acquired in various ways, and at the end of the year the town was full of animals and their former owners…[who] were accusing the officials of dishonesty. The deputy governor, Fitaurari Tademe and Ras Desta’s Greek Agent [Sava Karasivilis] seemed to have stolen most.79 78 A.T. Miles, handing-over report British consulate Mega, Southern Ethiopia to G. Reece, 1932, p.2, KNA/DC/MLE/1/1. 79 British consulate (Mega), Southern Abyssinia intelligence report for the last quarter of 1934, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/7.

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The looting resulted in ‘enormous numbers of bullocks’ being taken to Addis Ababa on a regular basis. Arnold Hodson (1927:226) observed that ‘[t]he Boran…probably lost more through [such] depredations than if they had been left to the tender mercies of the Tigre [bandits].’ In the first quarter of 1935, the southern Ethiopian consul’s intelligence report concluded that ‘every Boran is anyone’s meat, and they are so frequently called on to produce livestock that some village headmen recently offered to hand over half their cattle at once if they could then be left in peace for two years.’80 This exploitive tax extractions and tribute payments, and the British demands for compliance with the transfrontier treaty on grazing and watering rights, became a proxy for political contests between the two administrations (discussed in chapter 5).

80 British consulate (Mega), Southern Abyssinia intelligence report for the first quarter of 1935, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/7.

CHAPTER FIVE

TRANSFRONTIER GRAZING AND WATERING RIGHTS: A PROXY OF BORDER CONTESTS, 1908–1935 The southern imperial frontier ‘ran through the traditional grazing grounds of no fewer than eight different tribes’ (Reece 1954:442). Due to the unequal distribution of water and grazing resources on the two sides of the frontier, the British, in particular, depended on the terms of the treaty for civilian access to wells and grazing on the Ethiopian side of the border. David Brown (1961:173) refers to such rights in rem, as the right attached to a territory. The rights in rem are legally binding on all persons; however, what one side considers as a right in accordance with a treaty may also be interpreted as an unqualified right by the other side. The legality of such rights can be contested on the basis of other factors, such as disputes over borders. Brown (p.174) compares grazing rights to ‘a grantlicense permitting the tribes to enter the grazing area and a grant allowing them to make use of the resources.’ The license may be revoked and the grant withdrawn under certain circumstances, such as political disagreement with the applying state. The transfrontier treaty between Ethiopia and Britain allowed the frontier nomads to choose which side of the frontier they wished to occupy. They were ‘at liberty to live in Abyssinia or British territory as they think fit’ (Jennings and Addison 1905). The treaty provisions acknowledged that two conditions affected frontier nomads, referring to the ‘subjects’ of each state and to ‘protected persons.’ The protection of nomads would be guaranteed by the government concerned. Further, the terms of the treaty stipulated that no group would be prevented from using the wells that traditionally served them (Hamilton 1974). Although the 1897 treaty recognized the rights of the frontier nomads, it did not specify how to distinguish the rights of the pastoralists from a neighboring territory from the rights of pastoralists from the host territory. The clause dealing with transfrontier grazing and watering agreements, while conceding the rights of the frontier pastoralists, failed to recognize the way pastoralist territories and communities had been divided by the international boundary. In other words, it failed to distinguish between the normal seasonal movements of pastoralists and transgressions of

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international borders (Clifford 1936). Consequently, the application of the treaty terms to the transfrontier nomads became politically charged. Access to frontier water and grazing resources—an obvious need of the transfrontier nomads—was disrupted by demands from the host state that visiting nomads should pay taxes in the same way as their own nomads (Touval 1963). The provision ‘that the tribesmen on whichever side they happened to be were to be subject to the government on that side’ was rather vague, and interpreted differently by different states. Britain regarded the boundary as a physical barrier that divided the resources available to the frontier nomads and assumed that the treaty provided her subjects with unobstructed rights to the wells on the Ethiopian side of the frontier; however, Britain applied the treaty more selectively on her side of the frontier. The British administration formulated numerous conditions that prevented transfrontier nomads from crossing from Ethiopia to the British side, while demanding corresponding rights from the Ethiopians. The Ethiopians understood the boundary in a more flexible way in terms of areas occupied by ethnic groups. They emphasized their right to control, regulate and tax the pastoralists who crossed the frontier to use Ethiopian wells and grazing lands. In addition, the Ethiopians had another dispute with the British. They charged that British frontier policy deprived them of access to citizens who ran away across the frontier to escape taxation. Thus, the treaty became a proxy for political intrigues over a variety of issues (Simpson 1994:167). Contests over Ratification of the Border The issue of the frontier became politically volatile when the British tried to adopt the Gwynn Line (Blue Line) as the new border. Instead of facilitating nomadic movement across the border, the treaty became a source of friction between the two states and between these states and the nomads. Accordingly, when Captains W.E.H. Barrett and L. Aylmer arrived in Moyale in 1909 with a contingent of sixty rank and file soldiers of the Kings African Rifles (KAR), they were informed by the frontier agent, Philip Zaphiro, about impending border disputes: the Ethiopians recognized the Red Line, while the British government claimed that the border was marked by the Blue Line. The two military officials interviewed Balambras Wolde Gabriel over the matter and ‘it was arranged between them that neither government should tax the natives living in disputed



transfrontier grazing and rights: 1908–193591

territory until the question [of the border] had been definitely decided,’1 but the Ethiopian frontier officials did not accept this. They insisted on three things: first, the right to tax people within the contested part of their territory; second, to compel the British to recognize the Maud Line (Red Line); and third, that unless emperor Menelik himself agreed to adjustment of the border, little chance existed for agreement between the frontier officials. On the British side of the frontier, 1910 was the ‘year of [military] reconnaissance’, while 1911 was the year ‘of consolidation in the Northern Frontier District’ (Brown 1989:343). In September 1911, Captain Aylmer took over policing of the frontier as a special service officer.2 His instructions were to focus on patrolling the Red Line (the treaty line) and send official protests whenever he found evidence that Ethiopians crossed this line. Wilfred Gilbert Thesiger, the British minister in Addis Ababa, began negotiations for the acceptance of the Gwynn Line (Blue Line) as the official boundary. The Ethiopian government vigorously opposed this, even suggesting that ‘Gwynn’s border beacons…be removed’ (Hamilton 1974:385). Kenyan governor, Sir Édouard Percy Cranwill Girouard, formulated a new proposal that he communicated to the British foreign secretary ‘[b]luntly warning him that the frontier line as defined by Gwynn would have to be held…and a strong British presence maintained to combat Abyssinian aspirations and encroachments. For the last purpose, regular patrolling along the border was imperative’ (Brown 1989: 338, 339). The colonial secretary advocated an even more radical policy, urging that the Gwynn Line ‘should be taken as the frontier: in the event of any protest being made by the Abyssinian Government they should be informed that the patrolling of that line by our troops was essential to the protection of our tribes from Abyssinian raiders whom they were unable to control.’3 British officials made these demands knowing that the Ethiopians would resist the demarcation of the borderline unless the British kept up the pressure. Hence, the British were left in the very unfortunate situation of being unable to supply their nomads with water and grazing, particularly unfortunate in view of the lack of permanent water sources in the NFD

1 Records for period 1909–1916, Moyale District political record book 1902–-1933, KNA/ PC/NFD/4/1/2. 2 Southern frontier agreement, enclosure no. 23, Gurreh records 1902–1912, KNA/DC/ MDA/4/3. 3 Moyale District political records 1902–1904, p.5, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2.

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lowlands during dry years. In their struggle to survive, nomads on the British frontier had come to rely on cross-frontier resources during periods of drought.4 Legally, the British were bound by the treaty when it was ratified in 1907, but they treated it as provisional until the Gwynn Line, which they viewed as more just and equitable, was settled. Despite the ratification of the treaty, the British regarded the border as legally undefined. The problem was how to administer an international border that was the subject of such disagreement. Officially the British side adopted the Gwynn Line and the maps of the treaty were stamped to the effect that ‘the position of the KenyaAbyssinian boundary must not be regarded as official.’5 Consequently, the land between the two treaty lines became disputed territory, with Ethiopia refusing to accept any extension of the border. The British had to take various political considerations into account. The administration had, for example, established internal borders between different clans on its side of the frontier, which kept the different ethnic groups apart. Some groups lacked sufficient grazing and water resources, while others were better off. This meant that even on the British side conflicts over resources flared up between ethnic groups. The British wanted to use the watering and grazing facilities on the Ethiopian side as a way of reducing pressure on their own resources. These internal conflicts, combined with the disputed border with the Ethiopians, raised the profile of the frontier treaty and made it a source of ongoing controversy. The British continued with negotiations regarding the border, but instability in the Ethiopian state following the death of Menelik in 1913 was a major setback to resolving the issue. The British legation in Addis Ababa approached Lij Yasu, the grandson of Menelik and the emperor elect, and encouraged him to visit the southern frontier and settle the question of border adjustments. The British minister in Addis Ababa complained that ‘[m]atters…are going very slowly owing to the continued absence of Lij Yasu and the incapacity of the Ministers to deal with any serious business.’6 Any hope that the Ethiopian ministers, in the absence of Lij Yasu, would visit the frontier and renegotiate the treaty line were misplaced, as it did not make political sense for Ethiopia to recognize the Gwynn Line as the border. Prospects for progress were not good. In a 4 NFD annual report, 1927, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/3. 5 Reece to chief secretary, Nairobi, Kenya, 8 May 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 6 Thesiger, Addis Ababa, to officer commanding Moyale, Abyssinian affairs: Correspon­ dence with Addis Ababa, 1913–1923,KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/2.



transfrontier grazing and rights: 1908–193593

communication to the chief secretary dated 31 October 1913, J.Q.W. Hope, the officer-in-charge of the NFD, suggested that unless the British minister in Addis Ababa visited the frontier, it was unlikely that high-powered Ethiopian officials would attend. Without their presence, ratification of the Gwynn Line was doubtful, as this was not a matter that could be decided by local officials.7 Ethiopian mistrust of their imperial neighbor was shown by their noncooperation in a matter relating to accommodation for the British consul for southern Ethiopia, the official responsible for the coordination of frontier relations. Disagreement arose over where the consul was to establish his living quarters.8 Additionally, Ethiopian officials destroyed the huts that British officials had built on what they thought was their side of the frontier, but this was disputed by the Ethiopians, who ignored earlier communications on the subject from the British. While this might seem to be a minor border misunderstanding, it demonstrates the extent of the mistrust that existed between the two sides.9 The Ethiopians also disputed British claims to the Gurar wells, contending that they were on the Ethiopian side of the frontier. The Ethiopians pointed out that their soldiers had previously used the Gurar wells and taxed the transfrontier pastoralists for using the water. This happened after the British had withdrawn their police for logistical reasons. The British report emphasized that ‘[a]ccess to the Gurar wells [was] vital to patrolling of the frontier…south of the Red Line, between Moyale and Derkale in the Garre country.’10 The Ethiopians were aware of the dependence of tribes living in British territory on access to water resources across the frontier, and used every available opportunity to challenge British officials. In contrast, discussions with senior officials such as Fitaurari Habte Giorgis, the minister of war, remained cordial, at least as far as the public was aware. The British legation in Addis Ababa advised their officials in the NFD to avoid giving the impression to Ethiopian officials on the frontier or in Addis Ababa that the border dispute was of ‘too great an importance, as far as can be reasonably arranged.’ The proposed approach did not seek to deny the importance of the wells for the British subjects. What was at stake was

7 Hope, NFD, to chief secretary, Nairobi, 31 October 1913, Abyssinian affairs: Correspondence with Addis Ababa, 1913–1923, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/2. 8 Kenyazmatch Bokala to Glenday, August 1915, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/2. 9 Glenday to Fitaurari Woldi, August 1915, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/2. 10 S.F. Deck, provincial annual report, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/2.

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British pride: they did not want to give the impression of desperation.11 This may be why the British minister in the Addis Ababa legation informed the officer commanding troops on the frontier that they should not take seriously the claims from Fitaurari Habte Giorgis regarding a ‘controversial border question.’12 Thus, serious disagreements over the rights granted by the treaty remained unresolved. Disagreements between the two states continued to be driven by the issue of the right to access resources. The problem manifested itself along the sections of the border left undefined by the treaty, particularly the eastern parts of the frontier with the Daua River in the neighborhood of Malka Marri, and the Gaddaduma wells, which became the center of confrontation (Fig. 6). During the early years of the boundary demarcation, both states avoided maintaining a visible presence in the contested areas. The absence of any effective state presence in these parts of the frontier assisted the shadowy bandits who periodically raided British and Ethiopian civilian settlements. The British regarded the situation as unacceptable, as their subjects risked being raided by both bandits and Ethiopian soldiers, the raids were the pretext of extracting taxes from them.13 The Ethiopians suspected that the British construction of roads was meant to deliberately stake a claim to part of their territory. In one incident, Fitaurari Ayela complained to the Moyale district commissioner that ‘the new Moyale-Ramo road passed through Ethiopian territory.’14 This was not confirmed by an on-site examination. The British avoided direct confrontation with the Ethiopians as far as possible in frontier areas with no border disputes. In other parts of the frontier where the border was disputed, the Gwynn Line was taken by the British as the official border. ‘[B]ut since [the Gwynn] Treaty [Line] was never ratified nor agreed to by the Abyssinians,’ its use by the British was a source of continuing conflict with the Ethiopians.15 The British were concerned about the Ethiopians interpretation of the treaty line. They objected to undue emphasis on that part of the treaty that stated that ‘while the subjects of the other country are across the border using 11 Letter from British legation, Addis Ababa, to officer–in-charge NFD, 10 January 1915, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/2. 12 Russell to officer commanding troops, Nairobi, paraphrase of a cypher telegram from the British minister, Addis Ababa, 19 March 1923, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 13 Reece, Gurreh district annual report, 1928, KNA/DC/MDA/1/1. 14 NFD provincial intelligence report for February 1930, NFD, KNA/DC/MLE/3/3. 15 Reece, handing-over report, Moyale District, NFD, to A.C.M. Mullins, 1931, KNA/PC/ NFD4/3/1.



transfrontier grazing and rights: 1908–193595 Negelle Teltele

Yaaballo

Arero

Filtu

ETHIOPIA

ODDO

Hudat Walena Salole Boqol Manyo Wachile Galgalo Dimtu Dubuluk JARA Malka Marri Dhas Har Daua Mega Magado Erdar El der Derkali Lae Mandera Goff Hidilola Lugh Moiale Gaddaduma EI Roba Forrole Uran Sololo Moyale Garba Harre Godoma Gurar Duke Igo

Web

Debel Komoro

Buna

EI Wak

Korondile

Marsabit

Serenil Bardere

Wajir

SOMALIA

K E N YA

Afmadow

Isiolo

LEGEND

Tabdo

Locality 0

100.0 kilometers

Well International Boundary

Kismayu

Fig. 6. The southern Ethiopian and northern Kenyan frontier showing localities of historical importance from 1908-1948. water and grazing, they shall be subject to the territorial jurisdiction’ of the host state. The British frontier administration rejected this interpretation, maintaining that it did not provide Ethiopia with any legal authority in terms of ‘collecting tax from [British subjects] whilst they are temporarily in their country.’ Despite this firm position, the British were not certain if they were ‘legally justified’ in contesting Ethiopian policy decisions. The British persisted in their efforts to find other ways of providing access to the Ethiopian wells, without which their subjects could not survive.16 They continued to hope that the critical wells on the border would finally be transferred to them. Their long-term objective was to get agreement on adjustments to the border to allow their subjects access to water and grazing in times of crisis. 16 Reece, handing-over report, Moyale District, NFD, to A.C.M. Mullins, 1931, KNA/PC/ NFD4/3/1.

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chapter five The Conflicts over the Gaddaduma Wells

The Ethiopian reaction to the British frontier policy was to prevent British subjects from gaining access to the wells.17 However, Ethiopian officials were inconsistent in enforcing this or communicating information with their superiors. In the NFD annual report for 1915, Vincent Glenday reported that Gerazmach Gashi ‘came to confer…about the recent small affair at Godoma. He apologized for Ato Tazama’s refusal of water…’ and issued an order to the official ‘to give water and stop annoying the subjects by seizing their spears and water [buckets]’. The well clusters of critical importance were the Gaddaduma wells. They were the focus of numerous incidents for much of the period covered in this study. They also were a source of ethnic conflict (see chapter 7). Historically, the Gaddaduma wells belonged to the Borana. Recognition of the Gwynn Line would make it possible for British civilians to have access to Gaddaduma as well as to enable the British administration to maintain frontier security (Brownlie 1979). Under the circumstances, British officials decided that a strong military presence and, if necessary, occupation of the Gaddaduma were inevitable.18 They pursued this more aggressive policy for two main reasons: first, to curtail increasing frontier banditry; and second, to facilitate the military occupation of the Gaddaduma wells as well as ‘the Boran country between the Ganale Deria [Doria] and Sagan rivers’ (Simpson 1994:389). The latter policy risked strong Ethiopian opposition. According to British intelligence, the Ethiopians had strongly opposed British military occupation of the Gaddaduma wells in 1919. The British gave the impression that they were determined to maintain their position, a strategy partly designed to take advantage of differences between Fitaurari Habte Giorgis, the powerful war minister, and the young Ras Taffari (later emperor Haile Selassie), whose friendship the British sought to cultivate. The British approach was encouraged by the information provided by Captain Arnold Wienholt Hodson, the British consul in southern Ethiopia who had seen a letter sent by Empress Zauditu and Ras Taffari instructing Fitaurari Makuria, who had arrived on the frontier with a large force, to get rid of the Tigre bandits (see chapter 6), ‘to settle everything and whatever you do, do not quarrel with the English.’19 17 Officer-in-charge NFD, Moyale, 30 July 1913, Abyssinian affairs: correspondence with Addis Ababa, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/2. 18 Kittermaster, handing-over report to L.H. Plowman, Provincial Annual Report 1917–1918, KNA/PC/NFD1/1. 19 Hodson to Gerald Campbell, chargé d’affaires, 3 July 1919, Abyssinian affairs 1919–1920, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/3.



transfrontier grazing and rights: 1908–193597

Meanwhile, the British considered whether to ‘demand an indemnity from Abyssinia’ for economic and human losses that British civilians had suffered from cross-border raids by bandits and Ethiopian officials, which the British linked ‘to the settlement of outstanding questions such as rectification of the southern frontier.’20 British strategy regarding occupation of the Gaddaduma wells was multipronged. On the one hand, they sought to buttress their more aggressive posturing, perhaps intended to push the Ethiopians towards ‘rectification’ of border. On the other hand, the British minister in Addis Ababa and the Colonial Office in London were cautious about making unilateral decisions. More than any other factor, the issue of the Gaddaduma wells strained relations between the two states. The British argued that withdrawal of their forces from the wells would leave Borana civilians coming to water livestock at the wells at the mercy of Ethiopian soldiers and bandits (Hodson 1927:204). The governor issued the following instructions to the frontier officers: ‘His Majesty’s Government reserve to themselves the right to occupy Gaddaduma at any time should occasion require. They reserve this right in order to protect tribesmen under His Majesty’s protection from the attacks of lawless bands of marauders whom the Government of Abyssinia is [at] present powerless to restrain.’21 British frontier officials concluded that the ‘inauguration and judicious execution of a stronger local policy could result in a great measure of safety for the native peoples under [our] protection.’ Much of this aggressive policy was influenced by what they per­ ceived  as ‘an enhancement of British prestige.’22 Captain Hodson spelled out Britain’s aggressive policy in a secret dispatch to the British chargé d’affaires in Addis Ababa, Major J. Hugh Dodds, which was intercepted by Ethiopian bandits (see chapter 6). It was an explosive message that clearly revealed British ambition to wrest Borana country from the Ethiopians. His instructions were: ‘With regard to the proposed delimitation of the frontier so as to bring the Boran within the British administration area, any cession of territory by the Abyssinian Government should be regarded as compensation to His Majesty’s Government for numerous [raids] that have recently been made into British territory by marauding Abyssinians.’23 20 Campbell, British legation, Addis Ababa to officer-in-charge NFD, Moyale, 13 August 1919, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/3. 21 Chief secretary, Nairobi, to officer commanding troops, East African Protectorate, 16 July 1920, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 22 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to chargé d’affaires, Addis Ababa, 17 July 1920, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 23 Hodson to Major J. Hugh Dodds, H.M. chargé d’affaires, Addis Ababa, 18 July 1920, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4.

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Aware that the Ethiopian government would object to this action, he went on to state that ‘it is only right that they should be punished for their misdeeds…’ The dispatch included maps and spelled out the objective of unilaterally altering the international border, which would result in occupying the whole of Borana country in southern Ethiopia and incorporating it into the Protectorate of Kenya. It outlined the justification for this action, including bandit incursions over several years; conflicts over access to the frontier wells; and what the British viewed as the injustice of dividing the Borana, who were the victims of these frontier disagreements. Other justifications included economic damage caused by raids on British civilians and the high cost of policing the frontier. Since Ethiopia refused to pay damages, Hodson argued, she should be forced to give up the Borana country. Not only was the proposal diplomatically explosive, but it was also impossible to achieve in practice. He elaborated: …dual control of one tribe so intermixed as the Boran is impossible. Imagine what it would mean to British East Africa to have this small piece of territory. 1st. There would be a well-defined river boundary. The Sagan on the West and the Ganale Deria [Doria] on the east (I mention the Ganale Deria so as to include the Liban Boran whose country lies North of the Dawa [Daua] River). 2nd. The northern Frontier Administration would cease to be a problem. It would be so simple to administer it once we held this country. There would be meat and grain for the troops; horses, donkeys and camels for transport; plenty of water, and grazing in abundance. 3rd. The headquarters would be at Mega [Mountain]. The consul will migrate to Sidamo and have his consulate at Kuku or Gatelo… In conclusion—the Boran Province is no more part of Abyssinia… They gained it by conquest and they cannot complain if they have to hand it over in their turn to someone stronger than themselves.24

Judged in its entirety the proposal was surprising, but it underscored the extent of contestation between the two imperial states. Political borders were considered to be so fluid as to allow for the shifting of territory, and of a particular community, from the jurisdiction of one state to another. We are reminded of Menelik’s earlier attempts to use the Borana as the “markers” of his frontier with the British. We have no information as to whether the letter quoted above was ever handed by the brigand leader to the Ethiopian officials, and if so, we do not know what the Ethiopians thought of the proposal. There was suspicion that they may have received the letter. We do know, however, that the 24 Ibid. pp.2–3.



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Ethiopian opposition to British occupation of the Gaddaduma wells continued.25 The British believed they had the right to protect their interests in accordance with the frontier treaty, particularly the provision aimed at ‘giving protection [to their subjects] during the approaching dry season.’ The secretariat in Nairobi communicated the following decision to His Majesty’s chargé d’affaires in Addis Ababa: ‘I consider that we should be prepared to remain in occupation of Gaddaduma until we have convinced ourselves that the Abyssinian Government have really put their house in order, and in the event of protest from them, [we] should put forward the demand for fifty thousand Pounds.’26 Like their earlier plans, the British occupation of the Gaddaduma wells was an ambitious scheme to confirm their right to occupy other frontier wells over which there had been conflict with the Ethiopians. The acting officer-in-charge warned, however, that ‘[t]he only piece of territory which might be ceded in this area is that small strip which lies between the two boundaries.’27 Before embarking on any unilateral action, Major J. Hugh Dodds of the British legation in Addis Ababa, met with His Highness Ras Taffari to inform him that ‘conditions on the southern frontier were in no way better and His Majesty’s Government continued to reserve the right to occupy Gaddaduma at any time; that the negligence of the Abyssinian Government was precipitating this course.’28 The British demands far exceeded what was stipulated in the articles of the frontier treaty. The treaty forbade armed bands to cross the frontier on any pretext whatever, without previous authorization from the competent authorities (see chapter 3). In his response, Ras Taffari disputed the British claims, declaring that these rights were ‘extended only to the native tribes living near the frontier and not the British troops.’29 This was a correct interpretation of the frontier treaty. Nevertheless, in his dispatch to Major Dodds in Addis Ababa, the principal secretary in Nairobi took the radical view that the British frontier policy should be expanded in three ways. First, they should maintain the occupation of the Gaddaduma wells. Second, British pressure was likely to force the Ethiopians to send the minister of war, Fitaurari Habte Giorgis, 25 Waddington, acting officer-in-charge NFD, to chief secretary, Nairobi, 15 October 1920, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 26 Ibid., p.2. 27 Ibid. 28 Dodds, Addis Ababa, to H.M.’s principal secretary of state, p.2, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 29 Ibid., p.3.

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to the frontier. The British hoped that this would help restore sanity to the Borana province, which had been ravaged by bandits and raiding soldiers. Most important, this would compel the Ethiopian government to rethink and ‘accept a re-delimitation of the frontier.’ Third, ‘the administration of the Kenya Colony should occupy any portion of the Abyssinian frontier districts they required, and we should force a convenient rectification on the Abyssinian Government.’30 There was however a disconnect in the British policy. The British H.M. chargé d’affaires in Addis Ababa suggested that the plan to reoccupy the Gaddaduma wells was ‘ill advised…at the present juncture.’31 Major Dodds stated that the Ethiopians had ‘gone a long way to meet the wishes of the British Government’, particularly in settlements in other parts of the shared frontier. He warned that British pressure in the south would merely make the Ethiopians ‘show their resentment by putting every sort of difficulty in [the negotiations]’. The British feared that reoccupation of Gaddaduma might create hostility, and rather than ‘bring about an amelioration of the frontier condition’, it might even result in military conflict between Ethiopia and Britain. Major Dodds emphasized that considerable progress had already been made with significant goodwill established on the Ethiopian side. Although this would assist negotiations, the reoccupation of the Gaddaduma wells would set them back. Later, Dodds changed this position, and suggested that ‘[the British] should make a further strong protest and warn the central government that unless adequate and active steps are taken [within a given time], we should be forced to…[maintain occupation of] Gaddaduma.’32 Captain Hodson had a more radical viewpoint. He felt that ‘the occupation of Gaddaduma [was] by far and away the best thing the Kenya colony authorities could have done. It inaugurate[d] a change in policy, i.e. acting instead of talking. The Abyssinians [would] soon learn that it [would] not pay to treat us as they treat[ed] the Boran.’ Further, he called for simple future reprisals: ‘for every fresh raid…another well will be occupied by us.’33 In a letter to Claud Russell of the British legation in Addis Ababa, dated 23 February 1921, Hodson insisted that the Ethiopians must concede the Borana province to the British. ‘Firstly, as a payment in full for all past 30 Ibid., p.4. 31 This is contrary to the views expressed by Major Dodds to Ras Taffari. Letter from British legation, Addis Ababa to principal secretary of state, Nairobi, 20 December 1920, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 32 Ibid. 33 Hodson to Russell, 16 January 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4.



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raids and misdemeanors, secondly, to prevent incidents in the future such as have happened in the past; and thirdly, from a purely humane point of view to save a native race from being ruined.’34 In his opinion, if the British lacked a clear future policy, then the best strategy would be simply to stop talking: …until such a time as a definite policy is formulated. The present idea of just taking over a few wells on the border is…like taking two bites at a cherry. To ensure permanent peace and prosperity the Boran country must come under the British flag. If the…proposal is considered too drastic and would create trouble between ourselves and Italy or France, we might allow the Province in question to remain under the Ethiopian flag, but insist on administering it for them with British officers and police paying the percentage of revenue which would be collected under our just and efficient regime.35

The proposal—a form of self-aggrandizement on the part of the British— aimed to force Ethiopia into accepting changes to the border. This plan went beyond the occupation of a few frontier wells, and included reorganizing the borders and the administration of the Borana province (as suggested earlier in the top-secret dispatch). Whatever rationalization the British offered, this proposal seemed no different from the conquest of enemy territory resulting in one nation administering the territory of the other. The British proposal did not ignore Ethiopia’s capacity to defend its territory against military attack by another imperial power. In fact, the British were aware that the Ethiopians constituted a formidable force and would not only resist forcible border adjustments, but had the capacity to retaliate militarily. This is perhaps why Hodson also presented a less confrontational suggestion involving the demarcation of the southern border.36 He proposed that the boundary commission should decide on the border ‘with the aid of diagrams’ to indicate places of interest to the Ethiopian government in Addis Ababa; this should happen on site, at the frontier, where these points could be physically pointed out to them. The consul warned that, as in the past, the Ethiopian commissioners, might not keep their appointment, and those who did so ‘would…procrastinate at our taking over a single well in their territory.’ This statement suggests awareness that the more radical proposal might come to nothing in the face of 34 Hodson to Russell, 23 February 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid.

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an aggressive Ethiopian response or more passive delay tactics. The British proposals were put forward at a time when there was much uncertainty within the Ethiopian government due to the competition for power between Ras Taffari and Fitaurari Habte Giorgis, which forced frontier officials to take sides. In Nairobi, the colonial secretary was more cautious, advising a delay for redeployment to give the Ethiopians time to send down Fitaurari Habte Giorgis to establish order on the frontier.37 The Ethiopians did not take long to respond to the British proposals about the demarcation of the border. At a meeting attended by Hodson, the British Minister and Fitaurari Habte Giorgis (the minister of war) demanded ‘an explanation’ for the rumored plans.38 The British minister replied, rather undiplomatically, that ‘if the reports were true the Abyssinian Government would find the place considerably improved when they eventually took over…’39 This response forced the Ethiopian minister to remind the delegates that Ethiopia was aware of past scheming on the part of the British over the Gaddaduma wells and thought that the British pursued the policy to take ‘advantage of the disorder in Boran.’40 The British knew that the Ethiopian minister of war was planning to send his army to counter the British occupation of the wells. Hodson had warned the district commissioner in Moyale that the Ethiopians might consider military action. ‘If it comes to fighting the Abyssinian Government they are in a strong position, as they will appeal to the powers and say that we invaded their territory, and that having asked us to move we refused to do so, and that therefore to protect their own country they were obliged to use force.’41 This communication affirmed that a radical frontier policy was unwise and/or unachievable, and that the British administration should consider using other methods to resolve frontier problems. The original British proposal regarding border adjustment had developed into a political conflict that brought the two countries close to war. Although the British wished to avoid military action, they did not want to retreat without making some demands, mainly for financial compensation from 37 Colonial secretary, Nairobi, to officer-in-charge NFD, 11 January 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 38 Hodson to officer-in-charge NFD, 26 March 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/4. 39 Ibid. 40 Hodson to Russell, 23 February 1921, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 41 Hodson to district commissioner Moyale, 31 May 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/4.



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Ethiopia for the loss of life and property resulting from banditry and ethnic conflict from across the frontier. This demand represented a further obstacle to resolving their dispute with the Ethiopians (Hickey 1984:193). The British remained determined to force changes and to challenge Ethiopian control of Borana. The British hoped to achieve two goals by removing their military personnel occupying the wells. The first was to force Fitaurari Habte Giorgis to visit the Borana Province to take steps to restore the deteriorating security situation on the frontier. They intended to take the opportunity to discuss various matters on site with him. Second, they did not want their departure from the wells to be interpreted locally as a capitulation: their plan was to depart after a ceremonial handover when the Fitaurari’s army arrived to garrison the wells.42 On instructions from the secretary of state for the colonies, the British departure was subject to one condition: ‘right to send patrols to these wells without notice …[and] in the interest of the natives on the border to reserve the right…for the same freedom of action which has proved so beneficial’ in the past.43 Perhaps to reinforce this condition, Russell, the British minister in Addis Ababa, wrote a letter to Ras Taffari explaining why British soldiers had occupied the Gaddaduma wells: I have to inform you that the wells of Gaddaduma have been occupied by British troops from Kenya. This was necessary in order to protect the inhabitants of British territory from murder and pillage by bands of robbers and mutinous Abyssinian soldiers who make raids from across the frontier. His Majesty’s legation have often informed you that disorder in Boran is growing worse. As there were no Abyssinian troops in Gaddaduma the British Government have found it necessary to send their troops there, so that there may be no more attacks on British territory from that place, and so that British subjects may use the wells at Gaddaduma according to the Treaty. If Fitaurari Habte Giorgis will go to Boran and establish complete order there, and the Abyssinian Government will give assurance that order will be maintained…the British troops will leave Gaddaduma.44

The aim of the letter is clear, but it was written as a prelude to the British troops vacating the wells. It set out the reasons for the British action, which were to combat insecurity across the frontier and to protect the 42 Acting colonial secretary to the officer-in-charge NFD, 4 April 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 43 Deputy governor, Protectorate of Kenya to H.B.M.’s envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, Addis Ababa, 5 April 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 44 Russell to Ras Taffari, 15 March 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4.

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frontier nomads who watered their livestock at the wells. Although the British were willing to remove their troops, they placed the onus of protecting the frontier on the Ethiopians—hence the suggestion that Fitaurari Habte Giorgis should visit the region. Ras Taffari agreed that the British subjects could use the water, but rejected British occupation of the wells. In his response to the minister’s letter of 15 March, he declared: The agreement made formerly with Mr. Thesiger was that permission was granted to British troops camped on the Boran frontier…[to take] what water they needed from Gaddaduma as a temporary measure, there was no question of the wells at Gaddaduma being occupied by British troops. Again at a later date when Mr. Campbell asked about [it]…we assured him in the same way that the Abyssinian Government never granted any permission to British troops to occupy Gaddaduma…[and not even] in future [author’s italics].45

The letter was categorical. It denied that the occupation of Gaddaduma was ever officially condoned, but British troops were permitted to use the wells during frontier patrol. Clearly, the Ethiopians regarded the British occupation of Gaddaduma as unilateral and unacceptable. His Highness Ras Taffari did, however, add a comment on the subject of insecurity on the frontier: With reference to the attacks made by rebels on the Boran frontier you told me of, that indeed is a source of danger and we have orders to Dejazmatch Assafau to go down there and stay at Gaddaduma district…to examine the matter and keep watch, and [at] the same time to destroy all the rebels down there so that the “shiftas” may not cause any estrangement of the friendship between our Governments or harm the interests of our subjects.46

The future emperor agreed with the British that the actions of the frontier bandits had harmed the subjects of both countries and damaged the relationship between the two governments. His solution was to send the Ethiopian army, commanded by Dejazmach Assefau, to destroy the bandits and secure the wells on the frontier. Whether the British side believed these assurances was a different matter. Of critical importance to Ras Taffari, however, was the unacceptability of British occupation of the wells. His letter ends as follows: ‘We asked you the other day at our conversation at the Ghebbe [the Royal Court]…that an order should be sent down as soon as possible that the British troops who have camped at Gaddaduma should leave …that place…and go back to their 45 Ras Taffari to Russell, 25 April 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 46 Ibid.



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territory…’47 The Ethiopians viewed the British presence in Gaddaduma as alien occupation of sovereign territory, hence the emotional demand that they should return to ‘their territory.’ Nevertheless, it was significant that the Ethiopians accepted their obligation to restore security in the frontier area. Given the likelihood that the arrival of the Ethiopian army while the British were still present might lead to war, they dem­ anded that ‘the British troops…leave Gaddaduma and Abyssinian territory’ immediately.48 The British side understood the implications of this communication. The British minister at the Addis Ababa legation sent an undertaking that ‘the departure of the British troops from the place in question [would] not be delayed.’49 True to Ras Taffari’s word, a large Ethiopian force was dispatched to the frontier, which convinced Hodson that the Ethiopians would attack British forces if they did not withdraw from the Gaddaduma wells. He observed that: It more than ever confirms my opinion that they [i.e. the Ethiopians] intend to try and eject us from Gaddaduma if we fail to evacuate. They would never send their trained mercenaries…down here without some very good reason. Needless to say, if we have to deal with Abyssinians who have been trained by Europeans and know their work, it makes the position a good deal more complicated.50

The Ethiopian army marching on the frontier sent confusing signals as to their intentions. It was far larger than the British force at Gaddaduma. Did they have orders to remove the British troops by force, or were they planning to attack other places, including the Moyale station? Would they cross the frontier at various points to capture and retrieve the Borana runaways? The British officials considered various scenarios. First, the commanding officer might, at ‘his discretion’, continue to occupy the wells until Fitaurari Habte Giorgis arrived, as the British requested. Second, from a political point of view, they felt that they should ‘not evacuate under the present conditions,’ which implied that their evacuation had other reasons than military threats from the Ethiopian army.51 British 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Letter from British Consulate Mega Mountain, southern Abyssinia via British Legation, Addis Ababa to officer-in-charge NFD, 26 May 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/4. 50 Hodson to officer-in-charge NFD, 31 May 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/4. 51 Waddington NFD to officer commanding 5th KAR, 29 June 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4.

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army commanders prepared to bring up additional reinforcements to defend the Gaddaduma wells. They were concerned that the Ethiopians might attack the Moyale station or they might (referring to an instruction from the empress), ‘collect refugees.’52 Indeed, the threat appeared to be real and the Ethiopians kept the British guessing. British suspicion was heightened when senior Ethiopian frontier officials visited and demanded answers to two questions from Hodson: ‘one, whether we would evacuate Gaddaduma and the other if we would return their tenants.’ British officials answered both questions in the negative, but qualified their response by stating that their departure would not take place until Fitaurari Habte Giorgis arrived to impose order on the frontier. Moreover, Borana runaways would neither be forced to return nor be prevented from returning if they wished. Hodson reported that the Ethiopians would be too willing to fight, and if necessary die, to defend their territorial sovereignty but would not cross the frontier to force the Borana to return.53 The dilemma for the British was whether to save face, and preserve their pride, or risk war. In a telegraphic message, the colonial secretary instructed his frontier officials that: [o]ccupation of Gaddaduma [is] to be maintained until you are satisfied that Assafau really has effected permanent improvements on the frontier. If agreeable to Llewellyn, act on his instructions… you can explain to [Assefau] that the occupation [is] not permanent but conditional on his administration [taking action]… Promise him co-operation but avoid immediate evacuation.54

In a private letter to E.J. Waddington, the officer-in-charge of the NFD, Hodson described the arrival of the Ethiopian forces, commanded by Dejazmach Assefau, as ‘an imposing spectacle. His baggage train is miles and miles long. He has at least one cannon with him. He has also two maxims. In total, he has 4,500 men with rifles.’55 Aware of Ras Taffari’s earlier demand that the British ‘get out’, however diplomatically worded this may have been, the time had come for this to happen. Ras Taffari had personally ordered Dejazmach Assefau to lead his army to the frontier. The size of their force surprised the British officials on the frontier and in 52 Letter from Fifth King’s African Rifles, Moyale to the officer commanding troops, Colony of Kenya, 6 July 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 53 Hodson to Russell, 6 July 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 54 Telegram from colonial secretary to officer-in-charge NFD, 13 July 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 55 Hodson to Waddington, private and confidential, 14 July 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4.



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Nairobi. They concluded that the Ethiopians were treating the British occupation of their territory as an issue of national importance. If this were the case, the exodus of the Borana to the British side may not have been the main determining factor in their decision to dispatch the army. The Dejazmach had intended to visit the frontier for discussions with the British officials, but as it turned out, the British wanted to delay his visit to ‘gain more time.’56 Unknown to the British, the Ethiopians may have gained access to the provocative British plans—set out in the secret mail with maps—to take over the entire Borana province, by force if necessary. Hodson reported that he was approached by Ato Gebru who asked to see ‘a map of the country.’ Why did he want to see such a map? Had he seen the secret correspondence, and did he want to confirm the contents? Suspecting this was the case, Hodson refused to show him any maps.57 But the Ethiopian official was not taken in by this and in a riddle-like message commented that ‘Menelik had given [the British] permission to stop at Moyale… [and he] told me [that] his army was impatient and giving him trouble.’ Both sides waged a psychological war, with the British showing indifference (at least in public), and the Ethiopians not disclosing their reasons for deploying their army. Statements by Ato Gebru that his army was impatient and that ‘everything now rests on you [i.e. the British]‘were typically cryptic: ‘no one [could] say what his real [intensions were].’58 Even Hodson, with his long-term experience of Ethiopian political culture, was puzzled. He mused: ‘I do not know what has been behind all this. Whether it is the stolen mails which showed our aims in regard to the Boran province, or whether it is attributable to the articles which recently appeared in the French Press, and which make it appear that we had intentions on their country.’59 Of course, the Ethiopians could not be expected to provide any answers. When the district commissioner asked Dejazmach Assefau about his plans, Assefau informed him that he expected the ‘tenants to be handed over to him that he might adjust their wrongs.’ After visiting the camp of the Dejazmach, the British officials continued to follow the tried and 56 Hodson to officer-in-charge NFD, Moyale, 15 July 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/4. 57 Hodson to H.B.M.’s minister, Addis Ababa, 18 July 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/4. 58 Ibid., p.3. 59 Hodson (with Dejazmatch Assafou’s army, Laga Suri), 20 July 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4.

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tested strategy of emphasizing the importance of following international law with regard to the refugees. As a delaying tactic, Captain Hodson stated that ‘the subject…was a serious one’ requiring consideration and discussion with other officials. He hoped that the delay would enable the British to vacate the Gaddaduma wells before the arrival of the Ethiopian army.60 The British were concerned about developments on the frontier. One important concern was that they could not afford to be involved in another colonial war. A second was that the dispute over the Gaddaduma wells had become much more serious than the British had anticipated. A third was that, while the Ethiopians might not be able to win a prolonged war against the British, their superiority in numbers could give them the advantage in a battle. Hodson reported as follows: I was under the impression that the last thing the F.O. [Foreign Office] wanted was any trouble (over Gaddaduma) when we have our hands so full all over the world at the present moment…To be perfectly candid the question of Gaddaduma has turned out to be a far bigger proposition than any of us thought. I never realized for one minute that troops could reach the border so quickly and in such numbers, because I have naturally been guided by other armies I have seen which dwindled away all along the route and never arrived anywhere. The explanation really is this. The previous ones were sent to fight brigands…as they are all brigands by nature, and have a fellow feeling for them, but when it comes to invasion by the hated foreigner, they are as keen as mustard.61

Although the threat of military action was real, the British had to take other considerations into account. There was little time for diplomacy as the two armies were already on the frontier, with the Ethiopians displaying their military might. Maintaining British prestige was important, particularly when it came to the vexed question of the return of the Borana tenants. The British feared that if the Ethiopians forced an evacuation, it would ‘leave an impression in [the minds of the nomads] that [the British] were resigning the position in the face of large Abyssinian forces.’62 Not returning the Borana tenants was therefore seen as a victory of some sort, because ‘the natives would realize that we had not acceded 60 District commissioner, Moyale, to colonial secretary, Nairobi 28 July 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 61 Hodson with Dejazmatch Assafou’s army, Laga Suri), 20 July 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 62 Officer-in-charge, NFD, to H.B.M.’s minister, Addis Ababa, 27 July 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4.



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to the Abyssinian demands and there would be little, if any, loss of prestige.’63 The British decision, taken on both military and political grounds, was to vacate Gaddaduma in an orderly manner. The British sent the Dejazmach a letter informing him that the British left him the task of clearing the frontier of bandits and keeping the area safe. Moreover, it was important to punish those of his soldiers responsible for the predation and flight of the Borana. The British also had to take into account the political relations between the two states; the possibility that continued occupation would damage any negotiated border arrangements; and their decision might have an adverse effect on the frontier nomads. However, the military consideration took precedence, contrary to earlier assertions that this would not be the decisive factor for the departure from Gad­ daduma. Reporting to the British minister in Addis Ababa, the officerin-charge of the NFD, observed ‘I could not conceive the possibility that the garrison of Gaddaduma (160 rifles) could contend with 8000 Ethiopians armed [with] assorted [weapons]. The fact of the matter is that the Abyssinians regard Gaddaduma from a national standpoint − against the Abyssinian nation [and therefore] retention is an impossibility without a declaration of war.’64 Although there was little indication of an imminent attack on the British station of Moyale, British officials got worried about the close proximity of the Ethiopian army. The commander of the Fifth (Kenya) Battalion of the King’s African Rifles (KAR) added: ‘We cannot therefore leave the garrisons here at their usual normal strength until there is a considerable reduction in the Abyssinian forces.’65 Still, the Ethiopians had their eyes on their so-called Borana ‘tenants’ who crossed the frontier to safety on the British side. The one consistent point in the British policy was their refusal to turn over the Borana who had specific concerns: We will not go back and if the Abyssinian soldiers come and fetch us, we will again run here. We love our old country in which we were born and this desert is a bad place but here we are free. Gladly [we] would…return, if we could be free there. When we see those who drove us here having the punishment they deserve, when we know that there will be one justice for the 63 Hodson (with Dejazmatch Assafou’s army, Laga Suri), 20 July 1921, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/4. 64 Officer-in-charge NFD to H.B.M.’s minister, Addis Ababa, 27 July 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 65 Letter from Fifth King’s African Rifles, Moyale, to officer-in-charge NFD, 29 August 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4.

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chapter five weakest slave and the strongest soldier, when there is no taking of bribes and our cattle and our women are our own, then we will pay our taxes to get these things willing and all will be well. Now we fear for as yet we see nothing but numbers of armed men in our land and many of those we mistrust walking amongst [us].66

The British occupation of Gaddaduma provided the Borana with safe access to the wells for a short time. Once the wells were handed over to the Ethiopian army, they would resume their previous activities and the Borana would again be the victims of armed robbery. The Ethiopian Dejazmach agreed that British soldiers could accompany their civilians to the wells, but the British frontier officials did not welcome this suggestion. In his letter to the colonial secretary, the district commissioner added in frustration: ‘I am most loath to send armed forces to the wells as it gives the Abyssinians a distinct handle against us, and may provoke action on their part which would defeat the end we have in view, i.e. the protection of our natives.’67 Besides the difficulty of ensuring access to the wells for their subjects, the British administration was equally concerned with extortions that occurred when the pastoralists did manage to water their livestock at the wells.68 According to a British report, the large presence of Ethiopian soldiers at frontier wells were likely to ‘lead to depredation [of] Boran stock in the course of time.’69 For their part, the British responded to reports that the Ethiopians were denying British subjects access to the wells on the Ethiopian side of the border. These reports on the refusal of watering rights led to high-level contact with the Ethiopian authorities through the colonial secretary.70 While British information may have been based on rumors or unverified reports, this did not prevent the governor of the East African Protectorate of Kenya from requesting the British minister in Addis Ababa to respond to the rumors. The acting colonial secretary warned that ‘[s]hould the Abyssinians take such action…a case would arise for diplomatic representation but not for military intervention.’71 66 Ibid. 67 District commissioner, Moyale, to colonial secretary, 20 September 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 68 Plowman, provincial handing-over report, to E.J. Waddington, 1920, KNA/PC/ NFD1/1. 69 Waddington, provincial handing- over report, to Lt.-Col. M. Llewellyn, 1921, KNA/ PC/NFD1/1. 70 Officer-in-charge headquarters, Meru to officer-in-charge northern Borana, Moyale, 7 July 1923, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 71 G.L.S. Northcote, acting colonial secretary to officer commanding troops, Nairobi, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4.



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Problems arising from the frontier treaty were compounded by mixed messages from both sides, particularly concerning actions that Ethiopian frontier officials might take to prevent British subjects from watering at the wells. The British relied on their own intelligence reports as well as on a letter from Ethiopian officials. Ato Gebru commented as follows on the subject of access to frontier wells by the British subjects: I have not as yet stopped the people watering at the wells. But the natives might have told you on their own accord for they very well know all their faults. At any rate the minister for war during his visit to the Borana Province and after he made a long conversation with [British officials] at Mega proclaimed the following to the natives: “To those who were subjects of the Ethiopian Government and who were afraid of the shiftas and had fled away, you can now return to your own country where there will not be any robbery again in this country…72

The Ethiopian official did not refer to British subjects who needed water, but explained his position regarding the runaway Borana. The two issues, however, were inextricably linked. Ato Gebru clarified this in his letter by indicating that the people who could have access to the wells were ‘the Boran holding registration tickets’ and he warned that ‘conflict must be avoided with the authorities.’73 Captain D.E. Cochrane’s response was intended to placate the Ethiopians on the question of the unregistered Ethiopian Borana runaways, but he was categorical when it came to the registered British Borana who lived on the British side and watered their livestock at the Ethiopian wells: Now as agreed the natives on either side have access to the wells, I therefore [regard it] as an unfriendly act if you were to interfere with people watering who hold the registration papers. Now, when I say watering, I mean watering only, that is people living on our side I consider have the right to drive their cattle to water unmolested and return to their manyattas; if however they move their stock and manyattas into Abyssinia for their own convenience and grazing then I think you are entirely justified in holding them and dealing with them as you think fit…74

Such statements are surprising, given British frontier policy. In fact, the underlying problem was not whether or not the British subjects were 72 Ato Gabru, Gaddaduma to Captain Cochrane, officer-in-charge Moyale, 22 July 1923, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 73 District commissioner, Moyale, to officer-in-charge NFD, 26 July 1923 Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 74 Captain Cochrane, officer-in-charge Moyale, to Ato Gabru, 26 July 1923, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4.

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registered; it originated in disagreements over the demarcation of the treaty lines. The Ethiopians would always reject rights that the British simply granted themselves. As an additional tactic, Ethiopian officials also used other ethnic groups to disrupt traditional watering arrangements at the Gaddaduma wells. This further disadvantaged the Borana, who were the ancestral rights holders. Captain W.C. Fowler complained in his annual report that the Ethiopian official manning the Gaddaduma wells had given ‘[e]very facility…to the Gurre [Garre] to water…whilst the Boran have had to take pot-luck and water their stock at night. On occasion this has been refused unless a suitable gift of stock was forthcoming.’75 Ethiopian management of the frontier water points frustrated the British administration. The British hosted large numbers of transfrontier pastoralists who, due to maladministration or for fear of their safety, had moved to the British side, while continuing to rely on the transfrontier wells.76 From the evidence, it seems that the British found themselves in a situation where all they could do was complain about the Ethiopian violations of the treaty. The year 1925 was a very dry one, and the British Borana were forced to cross the frontier to water their livestock, whereupon they were arrested by Ethiopian soldiers on the orders of Fitaurari Wolde Gabriel, ‘presumably as he wished to retain them and collect the outstanding tax.’77 The British consul’s intervention did not deter Fitaurari Wolde Gabriel, who insisted that he would picket the wells ‘and that the only Boran who would be allowed to water there, were [those] who had been in British territory prior to 1912.’78 Ethiopian policy aimed to make it more difficult for British officials to decide the fate of the nomads on their side of the frontier who needed to cross the frontier to access water. In 1932, the Ethiopians appointed a new governor who introduced some radical new measures that made implementation of the treaty even more difficult. Fitaurari Ashenafi was part of the old guard in the Ethiopian power hierarchy and, by building military camps at all the frontier wells, did not conceal the extent to which he would use his authority to prevent transfrontier civilians from watering their livestock. In his handing-over report to Gerald Reece, Major A.T. Miles explained the Ethiopian motive for picketing the wells: ‘I am certain that placing soldiers at the wells has 75 Fowler, annual report for Moyale District 1924, KNA/PC/NFD4/3/1. 76 Governor R.T. Coryndon to J.H. Thomas, secretary of state for the colonies, 25 July 1924, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 77 D.R. Brampton, NFD provincial report, 1925, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/3. 78 Ibid.



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been done with one object only, to seize Abyssinian Boran who have gone to live on the British side of the frontier and…water at Ethiopian wells in the dry weather.’79 Miles advised his successor to protest ‘strongly…[i]f Boran refugees (so-called ‘tenants’) who live…on the British side of the frontier and only water their stock in Ethiopia, [were] seized at the wells… by Ethiopian soldiery.’ The report for June 1933 stated: ‘Had it not been for the prompt and effective action taken by Major Miles, H.B.M’s Consul, there is no doubt that much stock and possibly even human beings, would have perished.’80 When between July and August in 1933, Ethiopian soldiers seized the livestock of some British subjects there was a diplomatic reaction. The matter was referred to Addis Ababa for resolution.81 The Ethiopian response was (as usual) that the incidents reported by the British ‘[had taken] place in Ethiopian territory.’82 The following month, the Ethiopians prevented all the pastoralists from the British side from crossing into their territory ‘except on payments of absurdly large fees.’83 Officials in the British consulate in southern Ethiopia interpreted the Ethiopian actions as tantamount to altering the terms of the transfrontier watering and grazing treaty. The NFD administration believed that the strained relations between the two imperial powers reflected a racially motivated mistrust. It admitted that ‘there naturally exists in Ethiopia such a strong inbred mistrust of all Europeans that such a thing as cooperation, as we understand [it] on any frontier, is quite impossible…. One cannot reasonably expect to see eye-to-eye even [on] more trivial matters.’84 Such feelings did not change with the arrival of the new governor of Borana, Ras Desta Damtew, a man who, a few years later, would lose the southern frontier to the Italians.85 The British used the breakdown of peace on this part of the frontier as an excuse to press their demands. V.L. Glenday, warned his successor that ‘until delimitation occurs…[we] must insist on our full rights with regard to the grazing and watering rights as laid down in the Anglo-Ethiopian 79 Miles, handing over report, British consulate, Mega, southern Ethiopia, 1932, KNA/ DC/MLE/1/1. 80 Glenday, provincial monthly intelligence report, June 1933, p.3, KNA/DC/MLE/3/4. 81 Mega intelligence report for the third quarter ending 30 September 1933. Abyssinian affairs, Mega Reports 1932–35, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/7. 82 Mega consulate intelligence report for the third quarter, 1934, Abyssinian affairs, Mega Reports 1932–35, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/7. 83 Mega intelligence report for the third quarter ending 30 September 1933, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/7. 84 Moyale District, NFD annual report 1933, KNA/DC/MDA/1/9. 85 Moyale District, NFD annual report 1934, p.3, KNA/DC/MDA/1/10.

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treaty of 1907.’86 Glenday went on to offer two possible reasons for this approach. First, despite Ethiopian attempts to reinterpret parts of the treaty, they were bound by it legally and could not refuse British sub­ jects  access to water and grazing. Second, it was impossible to stop the Ethiopians imposing taxes on the pastoralists when visiting the water points on their side of the frontier.87 Under Ras Desta, the Ethiopians threatened to abrogate transfrontier grazing rights if the ‘runaway’ Borana were not returned to Ethiopia. The conflict was given a different twist by assigning responsibility about the ‘runaways’ to the British administration, while the Ethiopians continued to impose taxes on British subjects. By the end of 1934, the British frontier administration had shifted their approach from one of confrontation with the Ethiopians over taxation of the transfrontier pastoralists, to one of cooperation. One example of this change in strategy was the repatriation of the Borana who had ‘run away’ several years earlier to Marsabit.88 The Moyale District report for 1935 mentions ‘cooperation on several occasions between [British] tribal police and Abyssinian soldiers dealing with those Boran who attempted to avoid taxation…[The] immigrant Boran [were removed] from this territory…[and handed] over to Ethiopian officials and soldiers waiting for them by arrangement on the border.’89 One cannot be sure what caused this about-turn in British frontier policy. Perhaps the British sought cheaper ways of administering the frontier without getting caught up in the politics relating to the transfrontier pastoralists. This policy was however unsustainable as the frontier was simultaneously assaulted by frontier banditry (discussed in chapter 6).

86 Glenday, Addendum, handing-over report, 1934, KNA/DC/MLE/3/4. 87 Glenday, NFD monthly intelligence report, April 1934, KNA/DC/MLE/3/4. 88 V.L. Glenday to colonial secretary, Nairobi, monthly intelligence report of the officer-in-charge NFD, Isiolo, 6 March, 1934, p.11, KNA/DC/MLE/3/4. 89 Moyale District, NFD report for 1935, p.8, KNA/DC/MDA/1/11.

CHAPTER SIX

TIGRE FRONTIER BANDITRY: A LEGACY OF IMPERIAL CONQUEST, 1908–1934 In the early twentieth century, the southern Ethiopian and northern Kenyan frontier was subject to various types of banditry (Mburu 1999:101). The bandits comprised elephant hunters, slavers, robbers and administrators, both semi-official and official, who combined robbing with forced extraction of taxes from the frontier communities. The groups known under the general term shifta (pl. shiftenant) had traditionally been located on the periphery of the Ethiopian political landscape. They used banditry to seek advancement and recognition in the social hierarchy. Fernyhough (1994) calls them “Christian highlanders” who produced brigands along the border. The frontier environment provided them with a buffer zone with a varied ecology, sources of permanent water and proximity to transfrontier communities (Dutton 1946:131). On the southern frontier, the focus was on the bandits commonly known as Tigre (the local people corrupted the name as kitiire). This chapter shows how an examination of the phenomenon of Tigre banditry contributes to a better understanding of social banditry, particularly with respect to their operational goals and their relations with the frontier states and transfrontier nomads. It investigates the extent to which Ethiopian official and nonofficial relations with the frontier bandits varied from mutual collaboration to the repudiation of their activities at other times. Further, it explores British relations with frontier banditry, including truce arrangements that sometimes resulted in conflict between Ethiopian and British administrations and at other times led to aggressive military actions against the bandits. Here I analyze the extent to which Tigre bandits can be categorized as social bandits when they are part of the legacies of imperial conquest. Fernyhough (1994) argues convincingly that feudal bandits in Ethiopia reflected the social structure, functions and stresses of the time. They operated within the context of the nineteenth and early-twentieth century Ethiopian empire, and reflected ‘different types of social behavior ranging from highway robbery to extortion and kidnapping.’ If we use Hobsbawm’s (1969) ‘social banditry’ category, the causes of banditry in

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Ethiopia stem from poverty and civil war (Parkyns 1966 [1853]). The rise of frontier banditry coincided with the establishment of imperial frontiers, leading to much lawlessness on the periphery, and Hobsbawm’s term ‘feudal anarchy’ might apply to their activities (Crummey 1986:135). Rey (1923:186) describes the extreme periphery in the lowlands as the ‘resort of fugitive criminals…who [lived] by robbery and pillage.’ Their activities on the frontier included organized raids into British territory, where they poached elephants, stole livestock and kidnapped people for ransom. Like other nineteenth-century bandits with special identities and aliases (e.g. Bankoff 1998:323), these bandits were linked to influential individuals from whom they took their names. Their nicknames were derived from their personalized horses or from the areas where they operated. There were the bandits of Abba Nyencha (the lion man) (Roberts 1986:66), Abba Wayaama (the father of the red earth), Abba Bokaa (the father of the rain), and so on. Crummey (1986:1) argues that such names are metaphorical, but also have social functions: they depict the leading bandits as those who, under cover of darkness, overthrew the… legal system and political order.’ The availability of firearms led to banditry becoming a popular pursuit. Shiftenant activities were linked to local commerce. For example, they sold the livestock they had seized at local markets, using traders as their agents in the transactions (Crummey 1986:159, 160). The bandits obviously acquired wealth through their activities, suggesting that their motives were more economic than political. Fernythough (1986:159) considers the Ethiopian banditry to be both ‘primitive and more sophisticated’, dichotomies that reflect the varied causes, objectives and types of organization of the Ethiopian shiftenant. The ‘primitivism’ referred to is association with the feudal system and internal political intrigues and conflicts, while the ‘sophistication’ relates to the use of banditry as a means of upward social mobility. In the case of the southern frontier, the relationship between the Ethiopian bandits and the frontier nomads was one of coercion, rather than willing cooperation. Indeed, the whole purpose of such banditry was short-term. Had it been long-term, one would expect the association between the two groups to yield more results that are positive with the emergence of Robin Hood-type bandits. Yet, even when the bandits appeared to be protecting frontier pastoralists from predatory state officials, their main purpose was the preservation of their assumed fiefdom. Their recruits came from the historical habash highlander groups that shared the cultural values of Orthodox Christianity, as opposed to frontier



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nomadic communities (Note that by the 1940s, the pastoralists on the same frontier participated in banditry. See chapter 12). The Origin of Tigre Even before the establishment of official territorial borders, banditry was a challenge on the British frontier (Mburu 2007:58). This threat, more than any other factor, forced the British to agree to a fixed frontier, which aimed to protect the nomads and the wildlife from bandits crossing the unmarked border with Ethiopia (Low 1965:30). Bandit activities became more prominent after 1908. The combination of the Tigre bandits, Ethiopian elephant hunters and officials raiding the pastoralists for livestock taxes created a chaotic situation that forced the local population to flee the frontier. Hickey (1984:22, 164) reports that the identities of the individuals involved in banditry activities—their ethnic backgrounds, objectives and allegiances—were not obvious. He attributes this to ‘the fluidity of the world of the Amhara frontiersmen’, whose activities were diverse. At one moment they were government officials, then soldiers, and at other times elephant poachers. Due to the complexity of these relationships and objectives, the identity and purpose of Tigre bandits resists easy definition. Notwithstanding the motley nature of the participants in frontier banditry, we can say that the majority were neftenya settlers from the northern Ethiopian highlands and Shawa. Belete Bizuneh (1999:38) states: ‘[d]espite their diverse origin…the name “Tigre” seems to be used as the generic name for [frontier brigandage].’ Charles Chevenix Trench (1965:48, 56), with his lengthy experience of frontier administration, suggests that the bandits were ‘[t]he chief agents of Abyssinian conquest…’ They were ‘volunteers whom a government [could] support or disown according to circumstances.’ Their banditry took the form of short-term activities aimed at robbing a targeted population for quick self-enrichment. The more short-term, opportunistic banditry was often carried out by government officials and soldiers. This distinguished them from the ‘Robin Hood’ type of bandit, of which the southern frontier also had its share. The British knew one infamous bandit, Abdi Mado (Black Abdi) as a notorious poacher, on whom the police had ‘a fat file’ (p.106). Abdi Mado was a frontier bandit with a difference. He focused his attacks on state agents, but because of the geographical location of his operations, he might have had links with bandit groups and traders who helped market the ivory he poached.

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Despite official denials, there is little doubt that the Tigre bandits operated with the knowledge of the Ethiopian officials. The bandits dealt ruthlessly with frontier pastoralists whom they flogged or simply shot; they seized the pastoralists’ livestock or ransomed their children and women (Chevenix Trench 1965:49). Philip Zaphiro, the frontier agent, found when he arrived in 1905 that ‘the Golbo plains had been turned into a massive killing ground, a staging area for well-equipped bands of elephant hunters (Hickey 1984:121). Since it was British subjects who suffered most at the hands of the frontier bandits, the British increased pressure on the Ethiopian administration to halt ‘frontier lawlessness’ (Simpson 1994:141, 142), while the Ethiopians ‘repudiated responsibility for the Tigre.’1 According to Darley (1926:110), the reason for administration’s refusal was the difficulty of differentiating ‘between robbers and government officials.’ The bandits took advantage of the lack of effective policing on the frontier (Robertson 1978). By 1910, threats to the transfrontier nomads, in the form of stock theft and the kidnapping of civilians, had increased (Hodson 1927:22). Meanwhile, the bandits continued to grow in number, and by 1912, their impact was being felt. Earlier banditry activities included opportunistic raiding of trade caravans and looting of the government’s stock of ivory. On 14 December 1912, the British complained to Fitaurari Habte Giorgis, the Ethiopian minister of war, and demanded compensation for 1000 camel-loads of ivory valued at $12,000, which had been stolen by bandits.2 In another encounter on 1 May 1913, the bandits murdered Captain Aylmer and four NFD constabulary escorts in the protectorate, some 40 km from the frontier (Archer 1963:40). This incident marked a political watershed for British and Ethiopian government relations. The British minister in Addis Ababa made ‘the strongest representation’, demanding that action be taken immediately. The first demand was that the Ethiopians should capture the marauding bands and execute at least ten of them, ‘half at Addis Ababa and half at Moyale’ on the frontier. Second, compensation amounting to at least 300,000 MT$ (Maria Theresa thalers) should be paid to the family of Captain Aylmer. Third, the boundary treaty should be ratified. The Ethiopian responded with passive resistance. According to the British, while they agreed to various actions, they made no effort to comply.3 1 S.F. Deck, provincial annual report, p.7, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/2. 2 Letter to Fitaurari Habte Giorgis, 14 December 1912, correspondence with Addis Ababa, British legation, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/2. 3 Gurreh District political record book, 1912–1919, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2.



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Understandably, Captain Thesiger, the British minister in Addis Ababa, was furious and asked the Foreign Office to authorize him ‘to put forward a definite demand’ that included the threat of breaking off diplomatic relations. This was refused, and the Foreign Office asked the frontier officials for ‘a reduction in the demand for the compensation.’4 The Ethiopian government denied responsibility for the Tigre frontier bandits. Perhaps they believed that paying compensation would merely lead to further demands that they could not meet. This did nothing to satisfy the British, who concluded that the Ethiopian government response was to ‘pay [no] attention to the claims for compensation based on the misdoings of the Tigre bandits.’5 The problem of banditry worsened. British intelligence reported that ‘[t]he whole of the Abyssinian border is infested with…Tigre elephant hunters’ (Brown 1989:348). The situation deteriorated after the death of emperor Menelik in 1913. The uncertainty surrounding his succession left the whole frontier in the hands of the minor officials and ex-soldiers who ran amok, looting, and sending the frontier pastoralists fleeing for the safety of the Kenyan protectorate. The extent of the raids across the length of the frontier put the newly established British administration under extreme pressure (Hamilton 1974:386). Frontier bandits shifted their focus to raiding pastoralists at the strategic wells. On 12 May 1913 a group of forty-four bandits, led by one Abba Nyencha (the lion man), attacked the pastoralists at Ajao on the frontier.6 The Ethiopians had promised to ‘[clear] the boundary of Tigre’ but their actions were isolated and ineffective.7 The Ethiopians’ lack of action motivated the British to attack the bandits across the frontier. In one encounter on 16 May 1913, the British police attacked a large party of Ethiopian bandits across the frontier, killing nine and wounding two others.8 Characteristically, the bandits formed alliances with the Somali traders who were active across the whole frontier region. These traders, who operated among the frontier nomads, also supplied intelligence to the British authorities. The traders traded ivory to the Tigre bandits in exchange for livestock. The bandits formed complex vertical relationships 4 Ibid. 5 NFD annual report, September 1915, KNA/PC/NFD/1/6/6. 6 Assistant district commissioner, Moyale, to chief secretary, Nairobi, 12 May 1913, Abyssinian Affairs: raids and claims, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/1. 7 J.O.W. Hope to H.B.M’s minister, Addis Ababa, 30 July 1913, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/ PC/NFD/4/3/2. 8 Gurreh District political record book, 1912–1919, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2.

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with Ethiopian officials and soldiers and horizontal relationships with Ethiopian settlers on the frontier. This axis of shifting political and economic alliances made it difficult to distinguish between what the British called “genuine” and “official” bandits. The Ethiopian hunters, who arrived on the frontier, located themselves at the strategic water points, such as Gaddaduma, ‘terrorizing the natives there…and robbing them of their stock.’9 The events of 1913 changed British frontier policy in terms of dealing with banditry in two major ways. First, there were aggressive engagements with the Tigre bandits. Second, the British warned the Ethiopian administration against allowing their armed retainers and bandits to cross the border. The British police killed those that did cross, such as Lij Gezahaing, a notorious Tigre elephant hunter.10 Rather than being deterred by the British security measures, the Tigre bandits widened their attacks across the British frontier. In the remote eastern frontier on the Daua River, there were reports that the Tigre had formed an alliance with the Garre pastoralists, jointly attacking the Degodia and seizing large numbers of their stock. Under Fitaurari Tedla, the bandit leader, an estimated 200 groups of bandits entered Garre country.11 The Axis of Officialdom and Banditry The British found it difficult to distinguish between officials who might be involved in banditry and true bandits. Ethiopian officials such as Fitaurari Wolde Gabriel participated in banditry to earn promotion. It seemed that the Ethiopian system of administration and officialdom was based on ‘chains of shifting alliances’, rather than on a clearly defined adminis­ trative hierarchy (Hickey 1984:166). These shifting alliances included ‘the “regular” [officials] comprising the “legitimate” [administrators] that served in [their] capacities of provincial authorities [and the] group identified as the ‘Tigre’ the alleged axis of rebellion and raiding’ (Ibid. p.167). The so-called ‘legitimate’ and ‘Tigre’ functions within the administration had competing interests. Each group used both lawful and unlawful 9 Lt. Dickinson to chief secretary, Nairobi, 12 May 1913, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/2. 10 Captain W.C.H. Barrett, officer-in-charge, to chief secretary, Nairobi, 26 May 1913, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/2. 11 District commissioner, Moyale, to chief secretary, Nairobi, 30 June 1916, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/2.



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means to attain dominance. For example, the ‘Tigre’ faction encouraged banditry that disrupted the operations of their opponents, but reduced such activities when they achieved supremacy. In both cases, the ultimate goal was to attain the ‘mantle of the office, and with it, the tools of expropriation’ (p.30). These shifting alliances explain why the British regarded this as a system of administration that employed banditry as a means of social and political promotion. For the sons of lesser lords in the provincial administration, participating in banditry had an additional advantage. Their well-connected social and political networks made them good recruiters of foot soldiers to engage in border banditry for self-enrichment. This in turn assisted them to climb the social ladder and to ‘carve out an independent political base’ for themselves (Hickey 1984:165). Hodson (1927:228) believed that ‘while Woyessa…after his promotion to the rank of Fitaurari extorted from the Boran, his son’, gained a large following of ‘robbers’ in the frontier neighborhood. Members of his band included Abba Bokaa [the father of the rain] with a following of thirty rifles, Haile with a following of fifty and Ayela with ten rifles. This represented only a fraction of the Tigre firepower operating close to the frontier town of Moyale. Other groups under Lij Belay operated on the eastern frontier and later extended their activities all the way to the Daua River and into the region of Liban (see Fig. 6 chapter 5). By the end of 1915, the British NFD administration considered the Tigre bandits as de facto masters of the frontier. After the death of emperor Menelik in 1913, the political weakening in the center and at the provincial level provided the Tigre with the political space to unleash terror. They controlled virtually the whole of the Ethiopian side of the frontier between 1915 and 1918 (Brown 1989:371). On the British side of the frontier, Harold Baxter Kittermaster reported aggressive activities on the part of the Tigre.12 In 1916, news of the deportation of Lij Iyasu, the grandson of emperor Menelik and briefly his successor, and of the ascension of Empress Zaiditu reached the frontier.13 Taking advantage of the political confusion caused by government instability in Addis Ababa, the Tigre bandits conducted attacks along the whole frontier—without fear of reprisal from the Ethiopian administration.14 What surprised observers at the time was that the inability or unwillingness of the Ethiopian administration to act against the bandits 12 Kittermaster, provincial annual report, 1915–1916, KNA/PC/NFD1/3/1. 13 Political record book, Moyale District, 1902–1933, 1916–1927, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 14 Kittermaster, NFD annual report, 1916–1917, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2.

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(Simpson 1994:365). The relationship between the British administration and the Tigre bandits remained shaky. The brigands crossed the frontier, frequently coming up against the NFD constabulary. In one such engagement at Sololo on the Kenyan side of the frontier, a group led by the ex-Balambras Gebre Hidan, a brother of the prominent Tigre leader Lij Belay, fought with the NFD constabulary, ending in the deaths of three of the bandits.15 To avenge the attack on his brother’s band, Lij Belay ‘assembled some 500 Tigre with the avowed intention of attacking [Moyale].’16 The threat was real and the best the British could do was to seek a truce with the bandits. Therefore, the British determined that a truce was in their best interest, whatever damage it did to their prestige. Thus, the frontier political situation was such that the two administrations had little option but to negotiate with the Tigre brigands of Lij Belay. In the presence of Arnold Wienholt Hodson, the British consul of southern Ethiopia, Gerazmach Gashi and Kenyazmach Wolde Gabriel of the Ethiopian administration successfully concluded negotiations for peace with the Tigre brigands. Such a truce seemed unlikely to hold for any length of time, given that the bandits lived on the loot, protection fees and ransom they collected. The peace deal did not suggest any viable alternative livelihood. Nevertheless, the two administrations were cautiously optimistic. Despite the negotiations, the activities of the bandits increased to a point where the Tigre almost amounted to a quasi-government on the Ethiopian frontier. In 1917, this forced the district commissioner of Moyale, C.H. Plowman, to hold direct negotiations with Lij Belay, the bandit leader. The bandits agreed to refrain from raiding British territory, provided the British administration ignored Tigre activities on the Ethiopian side of the frontier. The British report even suggested that this notorious frontier bandit repaid the money his men had extorted from British subjects.17 The amounts repaid included MT$ 118 as well as fourteen cows and two bullocks.18 In late 1918, the political situation deteriorated due to intensifying Tigre activities along the whole frontier. British sources linked the weakened Ethiopian state and its gradual loss of control of the frontier with the arrival of large bands of the Tigre on the border.19 British sources reported 15 Kittermaster, provincial annual report, 1917–1918, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2. 16 Kittermaster, NFD annual report, 1916–1917, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2. 17 Annual reports, 1916–1927, p.12, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 18 Kittermaster, provincial annual report, 1917–1918, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2. 19 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to H.B.M’s consul, southern Abyssinia, 22 September 1918, Abyssinian Affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/2.



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that ‘Gerazmach Gashi fled to Mega and [the eastern region of the Borana] the opposite side [of Daua River] [had] been abandoned by all the officials.’20 An estimated 300 bandits turned their attention to the Ethiopian administration, attacking the garrison at Arero and causing many casualties. This was a major political and military setback, as the garrison was the headquarters of their administration of Borana Province. Heavy military losses showed that the Ethiopians had lost the initiative in their attempts to control the Tigre whose successful attack boosted bandit morale. They occupied the key frontier water points, from where they continued their operations.21 Hodson (1927:157) suggested that the activities of the outlaws ‘had increased so greatly that to all intents and purposes they controlled the whole of Borana country from Mega to the Daua River’, forcing the British side to negotiate with the bandits. Kittermaster observed that: The result of these negotiations was that an atmosphere of almost cordial [relations] was created between the Tigre and ourselves and they promised to abstain from further acts of aggression on…our natives. Mr. Plowman and Mr. Hodson promised to try to obtain a pardon from Addis Ababa for [ex-Balambaras] Gebre Hidan who had fled from justice.22

Awareness of the growing strength of the bandits seemed to foster willingness to negotiate on all sides. The British frontier administration was too weak to defeat them militarily. Thus, the British did not behave much differently from the way Ethiopian officials had in the past: either cooperate with the bandits, or look the other way. Of course, looking the other way enabled the bandits to operate freely. This policy of appeasement, however, placed the British administration in an awkward position in terms of which authority they should be dealing with on frontier issues— the bandits or the Ethiopian officials. After taking over the administration of Moyale from Plowman in 1918, H.T. Bamber reported that the ‘amicable relations [that had been] established’ were under threat because the Tigre had renewed their attacks on British civilians.23 The situation became even more critical after the 20 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to officer-in-charge, NFD, 24 October 1918, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/2. 21 Kittermaster, NFD annual report, 1916–1917, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2. 22 The restoration of Gabre Hidan to his position came about after official intervention from Addis Ababa. He was reported to have died, although the causes are not known. Kittermaster, NFD annual report, 1916–1917, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2. 23 Moyale District records, 1902–1923, p.13, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2.

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principal Ethiopian administrators, Gerazmach Gashi and Kenyazmach Wolde Gabriel, were recalled to Addis Ababa with all their soldiers, leaving the frontier ‘tacitly…in the hands of the Tigre.’24 British officials had little choice but to build a relationship with the Tigre leaders once again. As part of this appeasement, officials ‘provided the two brothers, Lij Belay and ex-Balambaras Hidan, [with] hunting licenses [to visit] Marsabit while they were still bandits.’ This allowed the bandit leaders to travel about 360 km (both ways) to and from British territory with their baggage camels. The British also allowed the Tigre leaders to cross the frontier to collect the ivory of elephants they had shot on the Kenyan side. The district commissioner justified his decisions as follows: Lij Belay brought up again the question of the ivory shot on our side and still not recovered. He said that his brother’s party shot only three elephants and that the other belonged to different [Tigre] parties. I agreed to let him come across, and remove the tusks on condition that he surrendered half to us. My reason was that he… (probably would) have sent across for the tusks without our knowledge…in which case we would not only have looked small but should have lost all the ivory as well.25

Such a degree of cooperation with the bandits raises questions about British intentions. Was it a sign of weakness or a strategy to buy time? Alternatively, were the British using the bandits as a political counter against the Ethiopians and their border raids? There may not be straightforward answers. Nevertheless, this level of cooperation with the British encouraged other bandit leaders to demand the handing over of local pastoralists who had killed Tigre. The district commissioner reported that ‘Lij Kabudda, a half-brother of the murdered Tigre…[came] over the next day and asked me to hand over the murderers to him.’ The demand was of course refused but the official returned ‘[t]he rifle stolen by the Boran [who had killed the Tigre]…’26 This was not an isolated incident: there is other evidence that British officials returned rifles captured from the Tigre.27 The British administration used the tactic ‘for political reasons (Simpson 1994:380, 385). The district commissioner of Moyale in his letter 24 Kittermaster, provincial annual report, 1917–1918, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2. 25 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to H.B. M’s consul of southern Abyssinia, 1 March 1918, Abyssinian affairs, p.3. KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/2. 26 Letter from district commissioner’s office Moyale, to H.B.M’s consul, southern Abyssinia, 6 May 1918, Abyssinia affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/2. 27 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to Thesiger, Addis Ababa, May 1918 Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/2.



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to his superior made the following curious statement: ‘The Tigre, who have been so much lately, have sent in word that they wish to come and see me, and try to come to some arrangement, and I hope to see them in a day or so. If I get them to keep these Abyssinians busy, until orders are sent to them from Addis Ababa, we might be able to stave off the crisis.’28 Not surprisingly, the Ethiopian officials blamed the British for taking sides with the outlaws when they overran the Ethiopian side of the frontier. This did not resolve the matter. According to a British intelligence report, ‘The rebels [Tigre] practically hold the whole country with the exception of Mega and Daka Roba.29 Kittermaster observed: ‘…as they were in possession of the waterholes on the frontier and as our natives were in consequence entirely at their mercy I agreed to a truce with them and though I had practically nothing to offer them they refrained from further acts of aggression.’30 Contrary to the impression given in this statement, Kittermaster acknowledged that he ‘had given some cartridges to Gerazmach Zodi, one of the Tigre leaders’ (Hodson 1927:176). The British blamed the Ethiopians for not confronting the Tigre bandits, while the Ethiopians in turn pointed to the pact the British had made with the bandits. Kittermaster described this new situation as ‘a curious triangular’ of frontier conflict involving the British, the Ethiopian officials and the outlaw Tigre. The bandits exploited their de facto power by kidnapping and ransoming frontier pastoralists. On 22 March 1917 at the Borana village of Ogorchi, ‘the [Tigre] carried off two men as hostages, demanding MT$ 300 as ransom.’31 Six days later the bandits raided another Borana village at Kinissa and ‘took off as hostages three Boran men and four Ajuran women…and demanded as a ransom ten cows and MT$ 20 for each of the Boran, and MT$ 100 for each of the Ajuran.’ A Garre man, Aden Ido, was kidnapped in Darrandu by a party of Tigre and only released when his father paid MT$ 300. Once released, the same gang kidnapped the father and demanded an additional MT$ 400.32 Ransom payments in cash provided the ‘nonofficial’ Tigre bandits with easier methods of extortion as these were not as visible as stolen livestock. Moreover, this method of extortion allowed the ‘semi-official’ bandits to conduct raids and blame them on the ‘official’ Tigre. Between 28 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to officer-in-charge NFD, 6 February 1919, Abyssinian affairs 1919–1920, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/3. 29 Hodson to Thesiger, 9 March 1919, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/3. 30 Kittermaster, provincial annual report, 1918–1919, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2. 31 Moyale District political record book 1902–1923, 1916–1927, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 32 Ibid.

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1915 and 1922, British records reveal a high incidence of kidnappings and ransoming of frontier civilians by the Tigre bandits. In the same year, British intelligence report noted: …the Tigre raids [were] on an extensive scale…carried out all along the frontier. [Caught in these attacks were] Yattani Kuno, Dido Doyo and Sora Sarite [the latter the British headman] who escaped molestation by payment of a sum of MT$ 3000 to the Tigre, but the Garen section of the Ajuran, who refused to pay, had practically the whole of their cattle looted…33

The absence of effective administration on the Ethiopian side combined with large-scale kidnapping of British subjects disrupted the transfrontier grazing and watering of the frontier nomads (Hodson 1927:204). Repeated ransoming of people, such as Yattani Kuno, was the subject of communication between Bamber and the officer-in-charge of NFD. This particular case was described as follows: Yattani Kuno was being blackmailed for a further MT$ 1000 in addition to those he had paid 2½ months ago… As Yattani Kuno is obliged to water in Abyssinia, I am unable to put a post on the well to protect him… I have been compelled to advise him to pay his blackmail. [However, this] again lower[ed] still further the British prestige on this frontier, which incidentally could hardly be lower, for one is compelled at every turn to show one’s complete inability to protect one’s people, or to cope with the Tigre.34

This candid communication reflected the sheer frustration about British inability to protect their subjects from Tigre bandits. The report concluded: ‘[i]t is of little use talking of the greatness of the British empire and what we do if they [i.e. Tigre] annoy us, when…[we] climb down on every possible occasion.’35 Such sentiments may have forced Kittermaster to write to the chief secretary informing him of the repeated outrages of the Tigre. Since the British could not effectively protect their subjects, he may have felt that a way had to be found to compensate for the government’s failures: I now find that Yattani Kuno was compelled to mortgage his cattle to the local traders to raise the dollars to meet this blackmail. Such forced sales are very unfair on the natives. Until we are in position to stop this blackmail, the least that the Government can do is to supply the funds to meet such demands. I ask sanction…to advance dollars in similar cases in the future to 33 Ibid., p.3. 34 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to H.B.M’s consul, southern Abyssinia, 22 September 1918, p.3,Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/2. 35 Ibid.



tigre frontier banditry: 1908–1934127 the natives under threat of blackmail, charging the first instance “suspense Boran compensation account” and trusting to be able to recover subsequently by conversion of tribute indemnities by Abyssinia.36

His request had serious implications for a government already struggling to find the resources needed to administer the NFD. The chief secretary, perhaps in view of its long-term implications, declined the request, stating that ‘His Excellency [the governor] does not like [the] proposals with regard to advances to natives for “blackmail”.’37 As a result, the frontier pastoralists had little option but to turn to the bandits for protection. The frontier pastoralists realized that they could afford to hire the Tigre to protect them from the more dangerous predations of the Ethiopian state (Simpson 1994:200). For example, the Garre hired Tigre bandits to attack Degodia forces at Dadacha Korma Adou on the Daua River. The routing of the Garre resulted in the loss of eighty lives, with fortythree wounded, as opposed to forty-three fatalities among the Degodia. The Degodia lost 100 camels to a joint force of Garre and Tigre bandits at the river crossing of Kone Awal Bona.38 On another occasion, Hodson (1927:171) suggested that the Borana ‘[had bribed] the Tigre…to protect them [from the Ethiopians].’ A pastoralist could save himself by paying ‘gumbo’ (hush money) to the ‘brigands and [holding] his tongue’, which allowed access to the resources critical for the survival of his herds at the height of the dry season. If he refused to pay ransom money, he risked being raided. By 1919, following a questionable deal between Bamber, the NFD acting district commissioner, and the Ethiopian officials, the Borana, who had sought safety on British territory, were forcibly returned to the Ethiopian side of the frontier, where they were faced with extortion. ‘The Boran, choosing the lesser of two evils…made a pact with the Tigre for protection.’39 The Ethiopians raided the Borana cattle being watered at Gadda­ duma and stole about 3000 head, ‘but in the process clashed with the Tigre.’ The district commissioner reported that the ‘Tigre, faithful to their pact with the Boran, attacked ‘and inflicted a defeat on Ethiopian 36 Kittermaster to chief secretary, Nairobi, 20 May 1919, Abyssinian affairs: raids and claims, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/1. 37 Chief secretary to officer-in-charge NFD, Moyale, May 1919, Re: blackmailing in Northern Frontier District, Jattani Kuno, Abyssinian affairs: raids and claims KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/1. 38 Ibid., p.9; see also Glenday, extracts from the Gurreh District annual report, 1916–1917, p.1, KNA/DC/MDA/4/3. 39 Kittermaster, provincial annual report, 1918–1919, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2

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troops…recapturing the expropriated stock.’ By occupying the wells on the frontier, the Tigre had made it impossible for the frontier pastoralists to avoid closing deals with them.40 The British Response The NFD administration officials determined that by sheltering bandits, the Ethiopian government had abrogated its responsibility. For this reason, the British forces unilaterally occupied the frontier wells in 1919, which created a quandary. Their aggression against the bandits violated the terms of the truce.41 According to a British intelligence report, the estimated ‘one thousand rifles’ in the hands of various groups of bandits represented enough firepower to resist the Ethiopian forces.42 After the Tigre broke the truce, the British had little option but to attack them across the frontier. Hodson (1927:179) reported that Kittermaster, who had earlier negotiated the truce with the Tigre, had no hesitation in using force if this would reduce the predation on the frontier nomads. He ordered a KAR detachment, armed with a Lewis gun and supported by the NFD constabulary, to attack a strong Tigre base near Moyale on the Ethiopian side of the frontier.43 The British military operations embarrassed the Ethiopian government. Fitaurari Wolde Giorgis, the Ethiopian war minister, was obliged to prepare the necessary military resources to protect the frontier (Hickey 1984:1176). In about July 1919, the Ethiopian government attempted to reassert its authority by sending a military force to the frontier under the command of Fitaurari Mekuria. Later, additional troops under the command of Kenyazmach Kidane were sent to pursue Tigre bands that had crossed into Liban in the eastern frontier. His force was ambushed at Gorro Qunune and he suffered the loss of 100 men.44 Kidane withdrew ‘leaving the Tigre power there unbroken.’45 Once again, the British forces were left to deal with the bandits. They had ‘the right to penetrate in pursuit as [they] liked across the border.’ British actions against the Tigre 40 Ibid. 41 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to chief secretary, Nairobi, 5 April 1919, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/3. 42 Kittermaster, provincial annual report, 1917–1918, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2. 43 Ibid. 44 Moyale District political record book, 1902–1933, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 45 Plowman, provincial annual report, 1919–1920, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2.



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were decisive, reducing bandit activity in the center and southern parts of the frontier. Meanwhile, Tigre activity continued in the east where attacks on the Garre increased.46 Reinforcements came from the eastern frontier that bordered Italian Somaliland. On 7 May 1919, Captain Knowles of the British army received intelligence reports that an estimated 300 Tigre were ‘awaiting further orders from Lij Belay’, who was located north of Dolo.47 The British forces in Chilako, near Moiale on the Ethiopian side of the frontier, ‘practically annihilated’ a band of Tigre.48 On 7 June 1919, the Ethiopians, with a large force of 1000 rifles under Fitaurari Mekuria, clashed with the Tigre in the area of Arero. The Ethiopians inflicted heavy casualties on the bandits and claimed to capture 19 rifles; however, in June 1919, a complex political situation led to terminating the mission against the bandits.49 This was a signal to the Tigre to intensify their activities. The frontier returned to its previous chaotic state, characterized by frequent robberies, kidnappings and ransom payments. At one time, Fitaurari Tugla, the bandit leader was even bold enough to demand payment from the Borana sections of the Goona moiety of ‘500 dollars and from the [Saabbo] section payment of 250 dollars.’50 This actually approximated the amount of taxes routinely demanded by Ethiopian officials. According to the British consul of southern Ethiopia, the bandits ‘have started a new plan of seizing Boran children which they hold at ransom till the Boran produce money to release them.’51 The bandits under Ato Balata (Abba nyencha) and Lij Ababa (Abba bokaa), who held five Borana, delivered a letter to the district commissioner to reinforce their demands for ransom to be paid.52 In the district commissioner’s words: ‘Tigre have never offered such an open insult to us before, I would respectfully submit that not only should this matter be taken up in the strongest manner possible, but permission should be granted us to take offensive measures against [the bandits] 46 Plowman, provincial annual report, 1919–1920, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2. 47 D.H. Wickham, district commissioner for Mandera, brief record of the recent history of Dolo Post, p.2, KNA/DC/MDA/4/3. 48 Plowman, provincial annual report, 1919–1920, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2. 49 Letter from British consulate, southern Abyssinia, to Kittermaster, 29 June 1919, Abyssinian Affairs 1919–1920, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/3. 50 Letter from British consulate, southern Abyssinia, to Gerald Campbell, H.B.M’s chargé de affaires, Addis Ababa, 27 August 1919, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/3. 51 Ibid. 52 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to H.B.M’s consul, southern Abyssinia, 29 August 1919, Abyssinian Affairs 1919–1920,KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/3.

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across the frontier.’53 In August 1919, as a temporary measure, the British prepared to remove ‘large numbers of Borana…from the danger zone to the Uaso and Marsabit’ for their own safety.54 The Ethiopian government granted temporary permission for the British forces to reoccupy the frontier wells and ‘to patrol the frontier in strength and prevent the outlaws breaking south.’55 In mid-September 1919, Fitaurari Tugla and his band attempted to extort MT$ 1000 from the Borana in Walena on the Ethiopian side of the frontier. Soldiers under Gerazmach Gabriel attacked Tugla’s force and killed three of his companions (Hodson 1927:203). Soon thereafter, on 10 October 1919, the bandits struck again at the Garre pastoralists on or near the frontier wells, capturing 354 head of milk stock. The NFD constabulary struck back by crossing the frontier and attacking the bandits, killing three and recovering the stolen livestock.56 The reprisals against frontier bandits did not have a lasting effect, for by mid-1920 their activities had resumed. The bandits scored a significant prize when they captured an official mail shipment from Addis Ababa to Nairobi that included a number of confidential dispatches (see chapter 5). Hodson reported: The two mail runners were ambushed and taken to [the camp of the brigand leader] Alemu Woyessa,…where they were deprived of the mail and given a letter to me [which reads] “Let it reach the English Government Consul Mr. Hodson…You despise my friendship…Now because of this I have taken your post. Either, send me 50,000 dollars or 50,000 cartridges whichever you like…57

Alemu’s band did not stop at this. It threatened to attack the Moyale station. The British Consul was furious and made scathing remarks about the Ethiopian inability to control banditry. He declared: ‘I took the opportunity of telling them a few home truths…that the anarchy and lawless existing in this country was entirely their own fault and that threequarters of the Government troops if they were not brigands themselves, were actually in league with them.’58 53 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to chief secretary, Nairobi, 11 September 1919, Abyssinian Affairs: raids and claims, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/1. 54 Moyale District records, see records for 1916–1923, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 55 Plowman, provincial annual report, 1919–1920, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2. 56 Southern frontier agreement, enclosure dispatch no. 23p.11, Gurreh records, 1902–1923: KNA/DC/MDA/4/3. 57 Hodson to major Hugh Dodds, 31 July 1920, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PCNFD/4/3/4. 58 Hodson to officer-in-charge NFD, 9 August 1920, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/4.



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Apparently, Alemu Woyessa, the outlaw leader responsible for the theft of the British consul’s mail, was among the bandits who surrendered under an amnesty offered by the Ethiopians. In response, the British sent a strongly worded protest letter.59 The British believed that a clear military strategy was needed to deal a final blow to the Tigre bandits. The British military and the NFD administration felt that the security of the empire states could only be guaranteed ‘[by] holding [the] wells’ which the bandits controlled.60 The NFD administration justified its stance on the grounds of protecting British subjects at the wells.61 Shortly after the British left, about fifty raiders led by Lij Barche attacked the Boran at Ogorchi, killing a headman, seizing 500 head of cattle and demanding ransom.62 There is evidence that Ethiopian-British cooperation to control the Tigre bandits yielded some fruit. The Ethiopian army won significant victories over the bandits in the east on the frontier with Italian Somaliland. In August 1920, forces commanded by Lij Intala (a former Tigre leader, now in government service), attacked the Tigre forces under Lij Barche, resulting in the Tigre leader’s death.63 Simultaneously, the Ethiopians pressed heavily against the Tigre in the Dolo area.64 In October 1920, large numbers of the bandits were killed in a dozen engagements.65 Although the Tigre bandits were hard-pressed from both sides of the frontier, the Ethiopians appeared to be less than enthusiastic in their cooperation with the British. British authorities reported that ‘[b]beyond sending Fitaurari Gabriel with 200 men to cooperate with Mr. Hope, the Ethiopian Government was deliberately refusing to be ‘useful [for] the purpose.’66 Ethiopian officials suspected that the British intended to take the opportunity to raise the issue of border ‘delimitation’ beyond mere adjustments with a view to include the annexation of Borana Province (Hickey 1984:25). These suspicions undermined their joint efforts to eradicate bandits along a common frontier. British ‘protests elicited the usual 59 Waddington to chief secretary, Nairobi, 7 October 1920, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/4. 60 Southern frontier agreement, Gurreh records, 1902–1923, p.11, KNA/DC/MDA/4/3. 61 Waddington, NFD provincial annual report, 1920–1921, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2. 62 Lij Barche was the son of Kenyazmach Gabriel. Moyale District political record book 1902–1933, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 63 Moyale records, 1916–1923, KNA/PC/NFD/NFD/4/1/2. 64 Wickham, Brief record of the recent history of Dolo Post, Gurreh District political record book, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 65 Plowman, provincial annual report, 1919–1920, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2. 66 Southern frontier agreement, p.7, Gurreh records, 1902–1923, KNA/DC/MDA/4/3.

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reply that the robbers had become too numerous to be controlled by Abyssinian officials’ alone.67 This prompted the British to implement a two-pronged strategy to address frontier banditry: diplomacy and military action. In March 1921, Hodson, the British consul of southern Ethiopia, met with the minister of war, Fitaurari Wolde Giorgis, ‘who promised to deal with the British complaints.’68 By now, British officials were accustomed to the Ethiopian government’s responses to such matters and knew the futility of waiting for them to take action. Therefore, they turned to an alternative strategy, to take unilateral action against the Tigre bandits (Hickey 1984:188). The British proposed splitting the frontier operational area between the two forces: ‘Mekuria [might undertake] to deal with any enemy found west of Moyale, while [the British] troops [would] patrol the frontier to the east, with the right to penetrate in pursuit…across the frontier.’69 It soon emerged that the poorly supplied Ethiopians were unable to play their part. Mekuria was forced to remove his forces from the frontier, allowing the bandits to move further south to avoid the British forces. This prompted waves of frontier pastoralists to flee to the British side of the frontier ‘driven desperate[ly] by the depredation of Aba boka, Aba this and Aba that’ as the British Consul report puts it (Hodson 1927:242). The solution envisaged by the British was to place the NFD under military administration and deal decisively with outlawry. Early in 1922, the military took over the task of administering the NFD. Within a short time, the army succeeded in gaining the upper hand against the Tigre. The task of the KAR included the pursuit of the bandits across the frontier, retrieving the livestock they had stolen, and engaging them in combat. By crossing the frontier in hot pursuit, the army prevented the bandits from occupying the frontier wells, thus reducing their ability to extort money from the frontier pastoralists. The British claim that they had eliminated frontier banditry was premature. Although evidence shows that the bandits lost some ground, the end of the struggle was not yet in sight. Not wanting to be left out, the Ethiopian government also began sending military units to deal with the bandits. In 1922, the British military administration recommended arming frontier communities with rifles to defend themselves against the bandits. They justified this as follows: ‘If [the] present policy of following 67 Annual report for Mandera District [Moyale], 1920–1921, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 68 Moyale District records 1916–1913, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 69 Plowman, provincial annual report, 1919–1920, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/2.



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up raiders does not rid us of the Tigre trouble, a possible solution of the problem would appear to lie in arming and organizing of the natives [to protect] themselves against [bandits].’70 Informants assert that this action helped to reduce banditry. One of my sources, who was 101 years of age when I interviewed him in 1992, had a relative who was armed by the British (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992a). He told me that his brother’s age-set of Wakhor Dida (in their 30s in the 1920s) was responsible for ending the menace they had suffered from for so long. Although Tigre activities significantly reduced, the hardcore continued to destabilize the frontier. Most worrying to the British was the report by Fitaurari Ayela, the governor of Borana, ‘that he had been having difficulties with his soldiers and many of them had become “shiftas” owing to their lot not being able to receive their pay, as lately many Boran tenants had fled to British territory.’ He claimed that the loss of the fee-paying population had driven his soldiers to banditry: ‘as they see the bomas allotted to them crossing the frontier, they desert, become shiftas and take law into their hands [by] raiding the nearest natives…to compensate themselves.’ Major Muirhead calculated that 400 to 500 frontier pastoralists with 4000 to 5000 head of livestock had crossed to the British side of the frontier between 1921 and 1922.71 Towards the end of 1922, the composition of the frontier bandits had begun to change. Somalis and ex-NFD police, who had deserted after committing crimes on the British side of the frontier, began cooperating with the Tigre frontier brigands.72 This interesting development indicates that banditry organized by the frontier communities themselves would eventually replace the Tigre. On 28 October 1922, a gang of about ‘40 shiftas with 8 armed Somalis under…Haile Hidan’ operated in the vicinity of Moyale and seized eighty head of sheep from the Borana near Godoma and Gaddaduma on the frontier.73 Another group of twenty shifta crossed the frontier near Sololo and seized 200 head of cattle from the frontier pastoralists. Further to the north in Ethiopian territory, still another band of fifty under Lij Gebru, Gerazmach Zodi’s brother, captured a village in Kuku.74 Fewer incidents of banditry were reported in 1923 and 1924.75 70 Glenday, Garre District annual report for 1920–1921, p.5, KNA/DC/MDA/1/1. 71 District officer, Moyale, to chief secretary, Nairobi, Ref. No. 226/10/6/22, 3 November 1922, KNA/PC/NFD3/1/1. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Gurreh District annual report, 1924, p.6, KNA/DC/MDA/1/1.

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Although the military administration had dealt decisively with the bandits, the British still sought a negotiated solution, and for this reason, the administration was transferred from the military to the civilian administration in January 1925. Moyale station became the diplomatic hub from where the security issues on the frontier were coordinated with the British consul for southern Ethiopia and the governor of the Borana Province.76 The remnants of the Tigre bandits shifted their operations to the eastern frontier bordering the Daua River and Italian territory a region that in the years to come would be known as the ‘banditry triangle’, where the men of Abba Wayaama [the father of the red earth]77 and Abba Bora [the father of the grey stallion], whose real names were Sagatu and Mulatu respectively, operated.78 Their robberies became opportunistic and linked with pastoralist groups such as the Garre. Bandit behavior shifted from the ‘predatory’ to ‘Robin Hood’ type of activity. Perhaps weakened by the lack of recruits and safe havens from which to operate, the Tigre bandits embedded themselves among the nomads. Interestingly, this shift shows that bandits may evolve into the ‘Robin Hood’ type because of weakness rather than strength to pursue their illegal activities. The political situation on the frontier changed significantly after the death of the Ethiopian minister of war, Fitaurari Wolde Giorgis. The Ethiopians moved from the confrontational frontier policy of the past towards a more diplomatic approach. Perhaps because of closer collaboration between the two states, banditry attacks declined appreciably by 1928. The exception was in the eastern part of the frontier where the bandits of Abba Guracha (the father of the black stallion) seized 3000 camels and 500 cattle from the Aulihan Somalis (Hickey 1984:205). The former Tigre leader, Lij Belay, after he surrendered, was given the military title of Gerazmach and allocated the country of Oddo to administer.79 During the 1930s, the British side of the frontier remained peaceful, except for sporadic wildlife poaching.80 The new Ethiopian administration under Ras Desta Demtew, devised a cunning method of controlling banditry. He employed gangs of ex-Tigre bandits to eliminate their former comrades. For example, in 1933 ‘Gerazmach Makonen…stated that his soldiers had fought with the Tigre bands of Kenyazmach Bokala and five of 76 D.R. Brampton, NFD provincial annual report, 1925, p.3, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/3. 77 The region is called Wayaama by the Borana pastoralists because of its red soil and bushy vegetation. 78 Gurreh District intelligence report for April 1926, KNA/DC/MDA/1/1. 79 Résumé of happenings in 1930, Moyale District, NFD, p.3, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 80 NFD intelligence report NFD for April 1931, KNA/DC/MLE/3/3.



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his men had been killed.’81 Towards the end of 1934, sporadic banditry activities mostly occurred within the ‘banditry triangle’ in the eastern frontier region. Their spoils did not amount to all that much at any one time. For example, in March 1934, seventy camels were stolen from the British pastoralists near the frontier with Oddo. The Ethiopians returned twenty-nine of the animals eight months later. In the south, small bandit groups sometimes seized livestock, but the vigilance of the British frontier police kept such incidents to a minimum.82 Frontier banditry gradually ended, but the frontier was about to become a theatre for two political problems: ethnic conflicts (discussed in chapter 7) and the imperial war between Italy and Ethiopia (discussed in chapter 8).

81 Letter from C.A. Cornell, Isiolo, Ref. no. AD 15/3/1, 2 January, 1933, p.4, KNA/DC/ MLE/3/4. 82 Moyale District political record book, 1934, p.2, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2.

CHAPTER SEVEN

NEGOTIATING ETHNIC CONFLICTS: STATES AND FEUDING NOMADS, 1911–1935 In the frontier region of our study, intermittent ethnic conflicts preceded colonial partitioning, which transformed the nature and frequency of these conflicts. In this chapter, I show how frontier politics exacerbated ethnic conflicts along the southern frontier, mainly between the Borana (Oromo) and the Garre (Somali). In both cases, interethnic conflict may have had a symbolic function, possibly due to the historical relationship between those groups. Following colonial intervention, ethnicity became a tool to be used for material gains when the same groups openly competed over previously shared resources. On both sides of the frontier, communities used the authority of the state to settle disputes over limited resources. Sometimes they exploited imperial rivalries, in which each state interpreted the actions of the other as part of a deliberate strategy to undermine its authority (Saunders 1981:170). The imperial states influenced the situation for two reasons. The most obvious was to increase the number of its citizens in the frontier region, as more people meant more revenue from taxes imposed on the nomads. The second reason was to reduce conflict by splitting the resources of opposing groups, although this often backfired and produced the opposite effect (Ray 2008:15). Conflicting groups had recourse to traditional systems of conflict resolution; however, for successful resolution to transpire favorable conditions had to exist between the conflicting groups. In this case study, the methods used to settle a conflict was the Somali dia, or blood money. The imperial states negotiated conflicts with very little knowledge of sociological implications inherent in this indigenous conflict resolution (Abbink 2009). The states developed ‘standards’ for negotiating conflicts, including compensation for victims of conflicts. State then used court rulings to legitimize the decisions. In Somali heer (customary law), clans and sections built alliances based on dia paying groups. The principle was based on a blood money equivalent amounting to the payment of 100 camels for a Somali man who was killed and fifty for a woman. The clan responsible for the killing paid compensation to the victims’ families and their clans. Somali tradition clearly spelled out the rates of distribution. For example, if a woman was

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murdered, then half the payment (twenty-five camels) would go to her clan and the other half to her husband’s clan (Rayne 1921). Unfortunately, there are two reasons why it was a mistake to apply the Somali model of dia payments to all frontier nomads. First, the method was never intended for use by state authorities who did not understand the sociological functions of the dia system. Second, the states ignored the fact that the dia model of compensation made no sense to groups such as the Borana Oromo. The Borana believed in peaceful coexistence according to the tenets of its own aada seera (customary law), which promotes peace as opposed to conflict and war. A drawback of aada seera is that it lacked provisions for material compensation for those killed in conflict. It was difficult for states to apply this philosophical principle, as it conflicted with their obligation to keep law and order. In the view of the authorities, payment of blood money (calculated in terms of livestock) served as a means of political regulation, based on tribal law but implemented by state authorities (Kittermaster 1932:344). Contrary to the Somali dia model, the Borana practiced restitution, which required the return of any livestock that had been seized. In the rare cases of homicide, a qaakhe (fine) was imposed. The figures involved are not defined. The purpose was to negotiate a peaceful settlement on behalf of the whole society, after pronouncing the fine (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992a). The aggrieved parties were not interested in financial compensation, but in public declarations in which the offending clan asked for pardon: The clan whose member committed the murder asked the opposite clan for forgiveness by invoking their daughters, wells, Qallu (ritual leader) and Borana raba and gada and ‘d’aala and daalcha’, implying the social fertility of gender. Such ritualized attributions were more effective than actual exchanges of livestock. According to the Borana worldview, the price of murder is so great that no Borana would commit crimes against another. This is the main difference between the Borana and the Somalis clans, for whom murder was widely practiced as an act of revenge. Under state-managed systems of compensation, however, the murders of Borana by Somalis were valued at half of those committed by Borana on Somalis. This probably related to the symbolic value of camels (managed by Somalis) as opposed to cattle (managed by the Borana), since livestock was used as currency in compensation payments. The sociological rationale for the traditional conflict resolution was never considered. As far as Borana were concerned, the state system lacked equity, not only in life, but also in death.



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In this chapter, conflicts between the Borana and the Garre are analyzed with this background in mind. As shown in chapter 2, some Garre groups were resident in Borana territory as the guests of the clan of Karayu Berre of the Saabbo moiety of the Borana. According to one source, which cites captain Philip Maud, a member of the Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission in 1903, ‘the Garri did at one time acknowledge a degree of Boran suzerainty’ (Hamilton 1974:358). For several centuries, the Garre played a role as an ethnic frontier community, wedged between warring Somali clans and the Borana. Using their multiple identities—they were ethnic Somali as well as speakers of Oromo—they shifted their allegiance between the Borana and the Somali clans as political circumstances demanded. By the early twentieth century, the Garre had ‘[broken away] from [their] traditional hosts’: the Borana (Hickey1984:116). The Borana-Garre Conflict The relationship between the Borana and the Garre was informed by sociopolitical and historical factors as well as competition over resources. After the interventions of the imperial states, the relationship changed from one of paying tribute to one of outright ethnic conflict. The empire states were involved in these emerging conflicts in two ways. By ‘capturing’ resources, the state triggered conflicts over access to resources. More importantly, by assuming the role of arbitrators (while being unable to prevent conflict), these states inadvertently perpetuated the problem: each group took advantage of the disputes between the two imperial states over parts of their shared frontier. Although the empire states facilitated tribal discussions and court settlements, they did not address the causes which created the conflicts in the first place. Thus, the empire states either misunderstood or ignored the drivers of conflict between the two communities. The nature of conflicts between the Borana and the Garre shifted from physical confrontation to frontier politics: one group sought to influence the state against the other group with the aim of gaining access to scarce resources, namely the water and grazing resources, of the other. One way of doing this was to blame the other group for the incessant raids and killing of their people in their struggle for resources. The Garre claimed to be victims of Borana aggression, and vice versa, in the hope of manipulating the British and/or Ethiopian administrations at different times. When such information was difficult to verify, those who reported attacks often

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distorted the story in an attempt to make the other side appear even guiltier. The aim was to force the administrations of the imperial states to address the problem; however, an administration caught up in these ethnic political intrigues was unable to separate complaints based on political grudges from those based on the loss of human lives. According to the Borana, their conflict with the Garre had no historical basis. They believed that the competition over Borana wells and land was a recent phenomenon. During the precolonial period, the Garre lacked the military power to remove the Borana by force, but as circumstances changed, they tried to manipulate imperial frontier politics in their favor. The person at the center of this conflict was the Garre chief, Gababa Mohamed Guracha. Some of the Borana elders I interviewed stated that he had been a herd boy for a Borana family during his youth (Halakhe Huqana Chaari,1 interview, 1994; Roba Bukhura, interview, 1993). Before he became a chief, the leaders of the Garre had experienced cordial relationships with the Borana. Prior to the demarcation of the imperial frontier, the Garre had little choice but to comply with Borana rules for access to resources. After the establishment of the new border, the situation changed radically, becoming more contentious by the 1920s. The conflict began over the Gaddaduma wells (Halakhe Huqana Chaari, interview, 1994). Traditionally the Borana had controlled the Gaddaduma wells, whose strategic location on the frontier made them a point of confrontation between the empire states on one hand, and the Borana and the Garre on the other. The conflict over the Gaddaduma came out into the open in 1919, when Gababa reported that a party of Borana in Gaddaduma, led by one Saako Kootaro, was responsible for attacking his people. Gababa was probably referring to an earlier incident in 1916 when a party led by Saako Kootaro raided the Garre settlements in Bukich Madera and drove their livestock across into Ethiopian territory (Halakhe Huqana Chaari, interview, 1994). Gababa claimed that the war party came from the Ethiopian side of the frontier and that the victims were the Garre, who were British subjects. He insinuated that Saako Kootaro, allegedly the main perpetrator, despised him as well as the British administration. But Gababa did not present evidence of actual attacks and fatalities, or of stock taken by Saako Kootaro’s Borana. Instead, he reported the arrest by NFD police of Kodooffi Kootaro, the younger brother of Saako Kootaro, whose horses 1 Halakhe Huqana Chaari claimed that Gababa Mohamed Guracha was a hired herd boy for the family of Godana Dokicha Rero (of Oditu clan of Borana).



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had strayed across the frontier. Kodooffi Kootaro was brought to face criminal charges before the district commissioner of Mandera at his field camp near Gaddaduma. In this story, Gababa’s aim was to portray the Garre as victims of Borana lawlessness, implying that this was due to the Garre’s allegiance to the British. Although it appeared that Saako Kootaro and Gababa were competing (acting on behalf of their respective tribes) for access to grazing and watering at the Gaddaduma wells, this particular incident was represented as a criminal act. Gababa wanted to send a message to the British administration that, despite his efforts to make peace, the Borana were intensifying their attacks on his people and stealing large numbers of livestock. Why did Gababa play the victim, when there is evidence that he was equally to blame for the conflict with the Borana? It may well have been a strategy to win the British administration over to his side, in the hope that they would provide him with protection and deny the Borana access to the contested resources. This can be seen from Gababa’s narrative: The district commissioner [Mr. Hopkins (of Mandera)] called together the chiefs of the British Boran and Gurre [(Garre) at Gaddaduma and] said he could not do anything but you can kill Saako Kootaro. The chiefs said we will take him to Moyale… I, Gababa, then tried to make peace with Saako Kootaro without success. Saako Kootaro sent word that I was like a “puff adder” that could not move and that he was like a long snake that could sting and get away; he was [also] insulting the British.2

The story has an ethnic slant. The administrator well understood the purpose of the information, but was more concerned in stopping border conflicts in which the citizens of one country disturbed the peace in the other. The British administration used the information about the BoranaGarre conflicts to persuade the Ethiopians to engage in dialogue in accordance with the frontier agreement. Whereas this so-called feud was marked by revenge killings and theft of livestock by both sides, in fact the actual contest was over grazing lands and wells. This is ignored in Gababa’s narrative, which continued: In Jilal [the dry season] the [Garre] went to the Daua and early in 1920 we came back to Gaddaduma. In April one [Garre] named Gedi Ibrahim [from] section Killeh went and killed a Boran at Galagalo [Galgallo Diimtu] because his relative had…been killed…The chiefs of Boran then sent [a word] to me to say that they wished to make peace. I then had Gedi Ibrahim caught and 2 Statement of Gababa, enclosed in letter to colonial secretary, 2 July 1922, KNA/DC/ MLE/5/5.

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chapter seven taken to Mr. Hopkins he was fined five camels and the Boran chiefs were told in…the first rains a baraza would be held at Takaba…with Mr. Hopkins. [Soon]…after the Boran chiefs had received this message they came near Banissa at Guleissa and captured four Mlangos of camels [400 animals] and four Mlangos [of] goats and five Gurreh [Garre were] killed.

Because the conflict was located in a sensitive part of the frontier to which both the Ethiopians and the British had a claim, this dispute had wider political implications. The British administration preferred a negotiated settlement with the cooperation of local leaders, seeing it as more productive. After all, the two communities had much in common because of their extensive historical contact and former peaceful coexistence. More importantly, each side knew the leadership of the other side: indeed, the Borana claimed that the wife of Gababa Mohamed Guracha was from Borana.3 Nonetheless, Gababa had developed a personal resentment of the former Borana dominance. He also sought to exploit the differences between the two empire states over the international frontier. Under­ standing the power relations existing at the time is important in order to appreciate the nature of the contest between the former host (the Borana) and the former client (the Garre). Borana-Garre relations transformed from a mutually beneficial relationship to open warfare. Following repeated revenge attacks and counterattacks, public negotiations attempted to determine the extent of casualties and livestock losses on both sides. The aim of the imperial states was to force the Borana and the Garre to compensate each other for the loss of human life and to return stolen livestock. Repeated outbreaks of feuds forced the two administrations to impose heavy fines, such as 250 bulls, on the warring parties, for attacks and counter attacks but peace was short-lived, and within a short time, hostilities resumed.4 The conflict between the Borana and Garre was not only political, it was also psychological. The undercurrent of old rivalries was always present: the Borana treated the Garre as a junior partner or neighbor. As the former regional power, the Borana resented the way the Garre raised the political stakes by bringing up sensitive issues, such as claims to grazing land and wells. Conversely, the Garre took full advantage of the new frontier politics to challenge the power of the Borana. In this respect, Gababa 3 The late Roba Bukura, who carried the title of Kenyazmach, had personal knowledge of Gababa Mohamed Guracha. He claimed that Gababa married one of his sister’s daughters called Hawo Umur Keteta (an Eji adopted into the Borana). Umur Keteta was the biological father of Roba Buka’s brother by a separate mother. 4 The district commissioner, July 1922, Moyale District, p.17, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2.



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had succeeded. This is why he showed magnanimity in his negotiations with the Borana, while at the same time revealing his steely intention to influence the authorities to change the allocation of resources. This change from passivity to aggression did not reflect any increase in the Garre’s military power. Rather, it was a cunning strategy that relied on appealing to the imperial states and exploiting frontier rivalries to challenge the Borana claim to grazing land and wells. The Garre contested the Borana rights to the Gaddaduma wells and the grazing lands in the eastern border region of the Daua River, critical resources for transfrontier communities on both sides of the border during the dry season. Several incidents involving the Borana and the Garre occurred at these wells. The conflict spread to both sides of the frontier, endangering relations between the Borana and the Gabra, on one hand, and the Garre and the Somali clans, on the other. Public Discussions The two administrations cooperated in seeking a solution to these feuds. Since fines alone were not an effective deterrent, the imperial states turned again to public mediation involving the principal Borana and Garre leaders. The Ethiopian participants in the discussions included Fitaurari Ayella (governor of Borana) and Ato Gebru (frontier administrator), and on the British side, major A.T. Miles (consul at Mega) and captain W.C. Fowler (of the military administration at Moyale). In addition, there were fifteen Borana and Gabra headmen, led by Fitaurari Gedo Jillo and Guyo Anna, representing the Ethiopian side and an equal number of the Garre, led by Gababa, representing the British side. Unfortunately, the peace discussions did not consider the underlying causes of the conflict. Although the Borana wanted this type of dialogue, neither the Ethiopian nor the British administrations allowed it. The Garre welcomed government participation in the peace settlements, which meant they could avoid making public declarations regarding their rights to the resources. This may have been a weak point in Garre strategy. The reasons that the imperial states initiated public discussions differed from those of the pastoralists. The Ethiopians and the British knew that discussion of frontier resource rights opened a political dialogue that might diverge from state policies or from the historical rights of local communities. Aware that such a discussion complicated existing contests, the states hoped to legitimatize the decisions negotiated with

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the protagonists. Administrators thought that decisions reached through negotiation would be more binding than any imposed from above by officials. Unfortunately, both governments failed to understand that each pastoralist group had a different agenda than did the states. Why did the communities involved in conflict resist government intervention (in the form of payment of compensation), while at the same time one group attempted to use the authorities to reinforce its specific claim to the resources of the other group? The meeting of 2 July 1922 illustrates how the protagonists engaged in local power games.5 According to Miles, ‘no settlement could be arrived at without their calling the council and agreeing to the settlement.’ He continued: ‘The [Garre] chief Gababa who is just as important…brought his council but these Boran Fitauraris are so pleased with themselves that they [paid no attention to]…people as this.’ The two administrations decided that ‘the only decision that would satisfy the warring parties was to pay the blood money.’ The British authorities thought that Gababa had behaved well by accepting the payment of blood money; however, their decision to push for the payment of blood money reflects the intricacies of frontier politics. The British reasoned that even if they insisted that Gababa and his people pay compensation for the Borana who had been killed, the Ethiopians would not require the same of the Borana ‘as they [were] so terrified of driving any more into the British territory.’ Contrary to British expectations, the Ethiopian junior officer based at Gaddaduma, Ato Gebru, supported Garre claims. Miles reported that ‘[h]e is liked by our Garre…his list was not compiled as one would assume in favor of the Abyssinia’s Borana but in favor of the [Garre] and when Chief Gababa understated the loss he always corrected it.’ There are two possible reasons for Ato Gebru’s actions. As an Amhara attending the meeting with the local Borana Fitaurari, his aim was to establish his independence, reflecting his power as an agent of the Ethiopian state. Local leaders, by contrast, represented their particular constituencies. From the perspective of the Borana leaders, Ato Gebru’s public support of their adversary seemed like a rebuke from a junior officer, which they chose to ignore. Another explanation, however, is that Ato Gebru’s action represented Ethiopian intentions with regard to frontier politics. The Ethiopian preference for the Garre may have demonstrated their intent to take advantage of frontier politics. 5 Letter from Miles, Moyale, Ref.No. 57/22, 2 July 1922, KNA/DC/MLE/5/5.



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Indeed, unknown to the British, Ethiopian officials had approached the Garre about the possibility of their crossing from British territory to the Ethiopian side. The evidence for this is threefold. First, unknown to the British, Gababa had been paying tributes and taxes to the Ethiopians through the Borana leaders. While still technically a British subject, Gababa paid his taxes through Fitaurari Gedo Jillo to the Ethiopians. According to Borana informants, it was during this period that Gababa began his political intrigues by appealing to the administration of Fitaurari Ayela. Roba Bukhura (interview, 1993) who had personal knowledge of this event, states: ‘Gababa collected livestock from the Garre and with the support of Fitaurari Ayella then accused Kossi Gedo for stealing the Garre livestock…before the government… This was the beginning of the conflict… At the same time, [the] Garre were also paying gibira (taxes) to the English and they used this double game to enter into conflict with us.’ Second, captain Hodson reported hearing from an Ethiopian provincial official that ‘Ato Gebru is intriguing to get our Garre to cross over into Abyssinian territory and has asked the Garre Chief Ali Abdi to come to Gaddaduma.’6 In fact, the British were aware that one Ali Aboukur (of section Rer Tuf Garre) had accompanied Ato Gebru to Yaaballo, ‘ostensibly to have a case settled, but actually to ask what terms the Garre would receive if they crossed into Abyssinia. A promise of protection and good treatment was given.’7 Third, we know that in 1921, without the knowledge of the British administration, Gababa ‘handed over [Garre accused of crimes] to Ato Gebru at Gaddaduma.’ The British district commissioner added: ‘[t]o my knowledge Gababa is trying to both be in with the Abyssinians and the British and lately the [Garre] tribe have penetrated into the Abyssinia even as far as Lei [Lae wells] north of Moyale.’8 During 1922, further hostilities between the Garre and Borana—all incidents occurred on the Ethiopian side of the frontier—upset the Ethiopian government. Each administration blamed the other for events that occurred in the other’s area of jurisdiction. In the British view, such accusations would only end after the groups made the payment of compensation to the families of the victims. Certain inconsistencies in the 6 Hodson to captain Slade-Hawkins, district commissioner, Moyale, October 1921, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/4. 7 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale to officer-in-charge NFD, 31 March 1923, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/2. 8 5th King’s African Rifles on Gurreh Degodia peace treaty of March 1923, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/4.

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British argument suggest that they were also playing frontier politics. Colonel J.M. Llewellyn, in his letter of 3 July 1922 to Fitaurari Ayela, stated that blood money would be paid ‘for all the murders which can be traced to definite persons who did not kill in the defense of their property.’9 Given such a porous frontier, where both administrations were thinly spread on the ground and where intelligence was often lacking, the apprehension of the real killers was not easy. Indeed, distinguishing individuals who killed while defending their property from those who committed revenge attacks; was hardly possible. Furthermore, the societies involved in these traditional conflicts would not surrender culprits easily. The letter continues: We propose that the council of elders of the [Garre] and Boran…meet and decide every case. If they cannot agree then this will have to be done by us in council…I consider that no satisfactory settlement can be arrived at until the Borana chiefs are present… No agreement will be binding to the Boran unless Fitaurari Gedo and Fitaurari Guiyo [Guyo] are present and take their place[s] as heads of their tribes. The Boran all say Gedo is their father and if he is not in agreement the arrangement will not be binding… It is necessary to have the whole question settled not for tomorrow but for all time…

This message can be interpreted in different ways. Obviously, the British administrator was taking advantage of the well-known deteriorating relationship between Ethiopian officials and Borana leaders. The British administration was aware that Fitaurari Gedo and Fitaurari Ayela, the Ethiopian provincial administrator, were not on good terms. Despite their prominence as Qallu (ritual leaders) traditionally responsible for reconciliation, the two Borana Fitaurari were juniors in the Ethiopian administrative hierarchy. The two Borana Fitaurari had different relationships with the British administration. From the imposition of British administration in 1905, Fitaurari Gedo, and before him, his stepfather, Afalata Dido, in the 1890s, had been on good terms with the British. On several occasions, Fitaurari Gedo had privately shown his preference for the British system of governance: however, he chose not to move to the British side because of restrictions on his movements as a ritual leader.10 Nonetheless, he maintained contact with the British. Ethiopian officials were aware of his warm relationship with the British and watched closely 9 Located in KNA/DC/MLE/5/5. 10 The Qallu have restricted residence in the ritual grounds and are rarely allowed by custom to cross to the lowlands of Kenya to visit their people. Society is obliged to pay them homage.



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for any indiscrete communication between them. Although Fitaurari Guyo Anna was popular with the Borana, his relationship with the British administration was strained, and at one time, the British had accused him of being unfriendly. Finally, Ethiopian officials resented the British administrator’s invitation to individual citizens of another sovereign state to attend this important meeting, which they considered to be an Ethiopian prerogative. Colonel Llewellyn, however, revealed the real purpose of his message: ‘Ato Gabru holds four [Garre] in chains who are British subjects. These men Ato Gabru will not give us for safekeeping, as he has had orders not to do so, but I shall be pleased and so will the [Garre] if you could give us four Boran from the list of accused to keep for the trials as at present we do not think we are treated quite fairly in the matter.’11 It was doubtful that the Ethiopian administrators would grant this request, aware of the consequences of such decisions. Nonetheless, Ethiopian officials were equally interested in settling the conflict between the Garre and the Borana. During the negotiations, the two groups were warned that if they failed to agree, the tribes ran the risk of severe punishment; meanwhile, the Garre and the Borana quietly pursued their own agendas. While the Garre believed that the Borana agreement to engage in public discussions would equalize past power relations, the Borana hesitated to push for blood money. Neither group felt that it made sense to pursue a settlement that required the payment of compensation according to the Somali dia model, since one of the parties had no such tradition. Yet, they went along with the discussions as required by the officials of the two governments. After the negotiations appeared to have agreed on the number of casualties and the amount of compensation to be paid, the Borana and the Garre elders asked for more time to consult with their constituencies: Fitaurari Gedo and Gababa both stated that they were willing together with their councils to settle the matter once and for all and asked that the two councils should be allowed until next morning to discuss and…settle the feud… The two councils…were informed that it was [their] business to try and settle the case and the court would hear their decision…and would make amendments if necessary.12

While the tribal councils discussed the matter, the officials were also busy considering the question of punishment. The Ethiopian officials, perhaps 11 Llewellyn to Fitaurari Ayela, 3 July 1922, KNA/DC/MLE/5/5. 12 District officer, Moyale, 7 August 1922 to officer-in-charge NFD, Meru, Ref. No. 124/ 16/22, KNA/PC/NFD3/1/1.

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knowing the way the Borana often made decisions, declared that they would accept whatever agreements the tribal councils reached: if they agreed on blood money payments, then there would be no need for punishment for the past raids. What the two tribal councils actually discussed was never reported, but they asserted that they had ‘unanimously agreed [on the settlement].’ The officials were surprised that no provision was made to exchange blood money as ‘the stock captured by the Boran…had been [re]-captured by shiftas.’13 It is difficult to establish the truth of the story that the stock raided by the Borana had been intercepted by the shifta. Perhaps this was intended to mislead the officials, an example of maneuverers by the nomads to circumvent official plans. Still the story was significant, since it led to an outcome that was contrary to official expectations; nonetheless, the British administration was satisfied that the two groups agreed. Crediting Fitaurari Gedo for the successful outcome, the district officer of Moyale observed that ‘[he] became more of a Boran and less of an Abyssinian as the trial proceeded and in the end was perfectly happy to sit with the [Garre] and Boran chiefs [and] it was chiefly owing to him that a settlement was arrived at.’14 Despite this unexpected outcome, the state officials, particularly the British, were convinced that the use of local leaders to settle conflicts could have a wide application. British officials implemented this strategy by inviting the councils of chiefs and headmen from the conflicting groups on its side of the frontier to ‘thrash out the recent murders of [Garre] by Boran and vice versa and bring their conclusions before the court. They were to assess the numbers killed…on each side and the amount of bloodstock to be paid.’15 The councils, representing both parties, discussed their losses. In this particular case, the human casualties, were equally balanced, seventeen dead on each side. As was the case with the previous discussion on the Ethiopian side of the border, the conflicting groups resisted any attempt to impose blood money fines on their opponents and declared that they had reached a peaceful agreement. In his final submission, captain Fowler, the officerin-charge of Moyale District, addressed Mahad Hussein, representing the Garre: ‘How much bloodstocks have the Boran agreed to pay to the 13 Ibid., p.2. 14 District officer, Moyale, to colonial secretary, 1922, Ref. No. 122/10/6/229, p.2, KNA/ PC/NFD3/1/1. 15 Gurreh-Borana Baraza, statement on the Boran-Gurreh feud of 1922, 1 July 1924, KNA/ DC/MLE/5/5.



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[Garre]’? Mahad Hussein responded, ‘Now that friendship has been restored…the [Garre] will drop this claim.’16 For the pastoralists, finding peace and paying fines were incompatible. The peaceful settlement of conflicts required that fines and punishments be waived, regardless of the level of the conflict. In contrast, the empire states assumed that the parties had agreed on the level of fines needed to compensate either side, according to the degree of harm each had suffered. Both states failed to comprehend that for the groups concerned, peacemaking precluded punishment. Instead, the officials, particularly the British, thought that the local nomads lacked the capacity to settle conflicts, unless their efforts were reinforced by threats, dismissing the sophisticated method of decision-making displayed by the elder councils. Undeterred, the nomads cooperated on their own terms. Both communities were aware that the payment of blood money would not stop revenge attacks. Previously, they had lived together peacefully and the same elders had been involved in settling conflicts before any intervention by the empire states. This history was still fresh in their minds. The Garre-Borana peace settlement held until another incident occu­ rred in the Gaddaduma area in August 1922. Again, the Ethiopian and British administrations called a meeting of the local councils of elders and their leaders on both sides of the frontier. Most of the leaders were the same ones who were involved in the previous settlement, except for Halakhe Anna who now represented his brother Fitaurari Guyo Anna on the Borana side. The Ethiopian officials were Fitaurari Ayela, the governor of Borana, Ato Gebru, the commanding officer at Gaddaduma, and Gerazmach Tezama, while the British officials were major Miles, the British consul in Mega, captain Fowler, the officer-in-charge at Moyale, and captain Legg of the 5th Kings African Rifles (KAR). Gababa and his council of elders represented the Garre. After their initial deliberations, the councils representing the conflicting groups returned to the official meeting with their own terms for resolving the conflict. These terms followed the pattern of the previous settlement, but with a difference this time. The councils agreed that ‘[a]s this blood feud between the two tribes has existed for many years blood money should not be paid except fifty head of cattle by both sides, to recompense relatives of five [Garre] and five Boran…no punishment should 16 Gurreh-Borana Baraza, 1 July 1924 on the Boran-Gurreh feud of 1922, KNA/DC/ MLE/5/5.

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be inflicted for the past misdeeds.’17 The surprise was not the fine itself but the form of payment. The decision of the elder councils was that ‘the fifty head collected by each tribe will not be exchanged, Fitaurari Gedo will collect fifty head from Boran and distribute them to the five Boran [families] mentioned and Gababa [will] do likewise.’ In other words, the decision was that no livestock would cross ethnic lines as compensation, as each side would pay for their own who had been killed. This way of resolving the conflict did not follow Borana customary law. While this may not seem logical, it is what happened. Without definite information on how the local leaders reached this independent decision, one can only speculate. Given a situation where nomads could no longer make their own decisions, they may have devised this outcome as a way of circumventing the unwelcome interference of ‘alien’ courts. Their decision negated the traditional purpose of blood money payment for these two communities. The main purpose of blood money was never to require the victims to provide the compensation for their own kin. Why did this happen? One needs to understand the relationships between the personalities involved. During the precolonial period, the Garre had, as we have seen, established recognition of the Borana Qallu. It is reasonable to suggest that the two leaders relied on their understanding of these earlier relationships, which no doubt would have the support of Chief Gababa, who shared their cultural understanding. The two states’ administrations, however, did not know about these historical affiliations. Despite the decision by tribal elders, the official court handed down the following ruling: The [tribal] councils are informed by the court that they are satisfied with their settlement [that was payment of fifty heads of cattle as bloodstock by each side] but that in the future if any murders take place between the Boran and the [Garre], or [Garre] and Boran, the murderers will be handed over to their respective governments to stand trial… and…the chief of the section…[also] severely punished.18

The Ethiopian and British administrations failed to realize that the two nomadic communities based their decisions on agreement by consensus, rather than on the policing of their people. Depending on the pressure put on them, both societies would protect any of their members accused of criminal activities. One may note that some aspects of the negotiations between the two communities were vague. Although the courts had allowed the conflicting 17 Gurreh-Boran feud, court settlement, 22 August 1922, KNA/DC/MLE/5/5. 18 Ibid.



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groups to enter into discussion, they did not authorize them to make any official rulings. Rather, the courts made the rulings, based on the tribal decisions, and the community leaders were expected to commit themselves to these rulings. In practical terms, however, the manner in which the two communities interpreted and implemented these rulings made complete nonsense of the court decisions. While the courts ruled that there should be transfers of stock, the communities ignored these rulings. Instead, the local leaders devised ways of resolving the conflict that did not involve any transfer of stock. Political Implications of the Garre Change of Citizenship After the Garre crossed to the Ethiopian side of the frontier, the conflict shifted from being a transfrontier problem (i.e. one affecting the BritishEthiopian frontier) to one involving direct competition between the Borana and the Garre over land and wells. One of the causes of the dispute between the British and the Garre was the latter’s refusal to register for tax payments and to agree to provide baggage and meat camels for the British administration.19 This dispute makes the year 1923 a turning point in the history of frontier politics between the two imperial states as well as in the history of relations between the Borana and the Garre. The Garre crossed into Ethiopia at a time when some Borana were crossing in the opposite direction as a result of heavy taxation and the enforced gabbar system that turned them into serfs. The decision of the Garre does not seem surprising when the implications of the intricate frontier politics of the time are taken into consideration. The reasons for the Garre departure from British territory had much more to do with frontier politics and resource allocation than with any desire to escape the collection of taxes. We know that at the same time many Borana opted to settle on the British side. Therefore, the crossing of the Garre provided the Ethiopians with some kind of payback. This time, conflicts between the two pastoral groups could not be resolved because the Ethiopian officials used different methods to deal with the conflicts, changes that engendered bitterness within the British administration. The British administration arrested some important Garre leaders on charges of resisting registration and the collection of taxes. The remaining important Garre leaders retaliated by leading their people into Ethiopia, 19 Ibid.

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together with their livestock. Embarrassed by this incident, the British hoped that when Gababa was released, he would encourage his people to return from Ethiopia. After his release, however, an angry Gababa joined his people on the Ethiopian side and ‘went off at once to Addis Ababa to complain to the authorities about stock taken from the Garre by the Boran.’20 The British administration then blacklisted Gababa and forwarded his personal dossier to the Ethiopian authorities, giving ‘full details of his past history of treachery’, as the report put it. The British hoped to encourage the Ethiopians to turn against Gababa and return him to the British side. Ironically, the British officials expected the Ethiopians to cooperate, despite their failure to return groups such as the Borana, who likewise crossed the Ethiopian border to escape livestock taxes and the gabbar system. The Ethiopians capitalized on the opportunity to welcome Gababa and assign him to the rank of Fitaurari as well as to appoint him as a shumi (junior administrator).21 The movement of the Garre to Ethiopia had enduring effects on relations between the two empire states and between the Borana and the Garre. Now the Garre discovered a new niche in Borana territory. Gababa considered it worth the risk to lead his people en masse into Ethiopia at the same time that the Borana were fleeing in the opposite direction. The prize was the Gaddaduma wells: the British declared that the Ethiopian frontier policy had changed, in that they now ‘[supported]…the [Garre] and the Somalis in preference to the Boran.’22 The Garre action was expected to cause problems for the Borana. For Gababa, the crossing was a short-term victory over the British administration. In the longer term, he gained a prominent position within the local Ethiopian administration. Obviously, he was more valuable to the Ethiopian administration than he was to the British. His wealthy follo­ wers  increased the potential tax income for the Ethiopians. Moreover, because the Garre had occupied a contested section of the frontier, their depar­ture  naturally weakened British claims. Thus, it was politically prudent for the Ethiopians to enhance Gababa’s local political status. As a shrewd politician, Gababa shifted his allegiance to play one administration against the other. The Garre exodus had a major impact on the British administration. The NFD administration negotiated for three years with Gababa to lure 20 NFD annual report, 1945, p.2, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/8. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid.



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him and his people back to British territory.23 From this point onwards, British intelligence monitored Gababa very closely. They reported that the Ethiopian administration had provided him with five donkey-loads of ammunition from Arero to arm his followers. Gababa’s switch in allegiance disappointed the British who had courted him since Vincent G. Glenday’s district administration because they could not control the remaining Garre without him. Gerald Reece bitterly observed that: ‘[s]o long as they [were] led by men like Gababa, Ali Abdi and Aden Shaba, they remained a tribe…but as soon as Gababa was put in prison [and afterwards left for Abyssinia]…the whole fabric of their organization collapsed.’ Reece believed that the British had saved the Garre from Borana domination, and did not understand why the Garre failed to appreciate this.24 The regret expressed by the chief NFD administrator reflected British interests, but not necessarily Garre interests. The geographical location of the Garre suited British frontier politics rather well. As a result of their decision to relocate, the British frontier along the Daua River, and in particular, some points on the border where the border demarcation was vague, could not be effectively occupied, thus risking the invalidation of British claims. For the Ethiopian frontier administration, the Garre migration into their territory did not result in peaceful coexistence with the Borana. In fact, the political marriage of the Garre and the Ethiopians came at a price for both parties. Meanwhile, the Ethiopians created space for the Garre by allocating Borana water resources and grazing lands to them. Another challenge emerged. Unlike the British, who preferred to settle conflicts through joint discussions, Ethiopian officials took a more arbitrary approach, but the decision to reallocate Borana wells and grazing land contributed directly to ongoing conflict between the two groups. Encouraged by the Ethiopian support, the Garre contested the ownership of wells in the Lae tula chains’ (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992b). The Lae tula is part of a huge grazing land that belonged to Borana– These grazing lands are not useable without access to the wells… When the Garre claim the Lae tula, in essence they are claiming all the land which surrounds the water source. These grazing lands traditionally served as drought reserve for the Borana for several hundred years. The grazing lands of the Lae tula are also suitable for all the livestock species (sheep, goats, camels and 23 Intelligence report no. 79/1/5/528 from district commissioner’s office, Mandera, 31 March 1928, KNA/DC/MDA/1/1. 24 Reece to A.C.M. Mullins, 1931, p.14, KNA/PC/NFD4/3/1.

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chapter seven cattle)… These areas for several years were the foci of conflicts… Each time they were driven away they would return… When the Borana protested, the Garre then said; ‘it is the higgi [the law of Ethiopia] that decides’ (Anna Waaqo Doogo, interview, 1992).

Local sources reveal the Garre point of view. The Garre accused the Borana of ‘using their customary law to decide how other groups could gain access to their resources. They claimed that the Borana created subordination… and using their misrule, denied them access to water…and rights [to own land]’ (Anna Waaqo Doogo, interview, 1992). Another informant presents an alternative viewpoint: Contests over land rights [and wells are] an emotive issue… The Borana have not been envious of other groups’ resources… They did not migrate to other groups grazing lands and seek their water. [Rather], the Somali groups for several centuries have benefited from using the water sources and the grazing lands of the Borana. The Borana were accommodating as long as the visitors kept peace. The aada seera [customary law] that governs the use of water and pasture was applied to keep peace… But the migrant Somalis and the Garre have not been able to respect the peace. They used force… (Haji Wario Guracha, interview, 1994).

In the case of the Garre, one informant asserted that their encroachment was promoted by the Ethiopian state (Borbor Bulle, interview, 1993). The role played by the Ethiopian administration in this ethnic conflict illustrates how structural changes to resource borders were attributable to the imperial administration.25 As the prize for shifting allegiance from Britain to Ethiopia, the Garre received control over the Borana wells. The NFD annual report for 1925 states that the Garre ‘were welcomed by the Abyssinians who gave them practically all the Boran wells at Gaddaduma; this naturally led to the fighting at the wells and the feud started again.’26 Supporting the Garre, Gerazmach Angasu unilaterally altered the watering order, sparking a resurgence of fighting. As described in the Kenya Colony intelligence report for May 1925: Gerazmach Angasu…made no attempt to enforce the old custom of the various tribes having [watering rights at the wells] on certain days of the week. He allowed the [Garre] to take [the] wells they pleased; the Borana were forced to bargain for the use of wells with the Garre and the situation became intolerable. The Boran stood a [great] deal, but to have to give

25 Major Muirhead, Provincial Annual Report, Northern Frontier District 1922, KNA/ PC/NFD/4. 26 D.R. Brampton, NFD provincial report, 1925, p.5, KNA/NFD1/1/3.



negotiating ethnic conflicts: 1911–1935155 presents to Somalis to obtain water for his stock, in what is after all his own country, was too much to bear.27

By disrupting traditional systems of resource sharing, the Ethiopian administration provoked ethnic conflict over the wells. Ethiopian officials arranged a settlement at Erdar in December 1925 that required the payment of blood money. But there were glaring differences in the compensation paid by the conflicting groups: for every Borana killed by the Garre, the Borana paid their leaders MT$ 50, while for every Garre killed, the Borana paid MT$ 100. In addition, the government levied a communal fine of MT$ 2000 on the Borana.28 In other words, the Borana actually received no compensation at all for the people they had lost. It is not known what led to this bizarre situation, but whatever the reason, this decision aggravated the conflict, which was now expressly over land that had been taken from the Borana and given to the Garre. A British intelligence report dated 31 May 1925 states that; ‘the [Garre were] given the country [of] Salole (in Wachile, 6 days west of Gaddaduma), Walena-Gulgulo[Galgallu]-Chogorsa[Choqorsa]-Dadacha-Gaddaduma.’29 The Borana deeply resented the loss of these portions of land. The land in question had served as a grazing reserve for their foora (satellite livestock) as well as a reserve during dry and drought years. In effect, the presence of the Garre in the Borana heartland split the Liban Borana from the Dirre Borana. This disrupted the pilgrimage route used by the gada for performing religious ceremonies at specific sites, beginning in Dirre and ending in Liban (Legesse 1973). According to British intelligence, two possible reasons accounted for this decision by the Ethiopian officials. First, it may have served as a warning to the Borana that if they did not return to their territory ‘their old pastures [would] be irretrievably lost.’ Second, it may have been because that the Ethiopians were ‘preparing for a large incursion of the [Garre]’ to overflow into the Borana province.30 British official opinion at the time described the prospects for conflict resolution as bleak. According to an intelligence report31 dated 31 May 1926:

27 Kenya Colony intelligence report, 31 May 1925, p.30, KNA/PC/NFD3/1/1. 28 Ibid, p.6. 29 Ibid. 30 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale to officer-in-charge NFD, 31 March 1923, Abyssinian affairs, KNA/PC/NFD/4/3/2. 31 Kenya Colony intelligence report, 31 May 1926, p.2, KNA/PC/NFD3/1/1.

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chapter seven The so-called settlement will only tend to make matters worse and probably restart the feud in British territory. The giving of Boran territory including Gaddaduma to the Garre will not be tolerated and outbreaks of violence are bound to [take] place as soon as British Boran are obliged to water at the wells…[despite] Fitaurari Ayela[’s] guaranteed protection [of the] British [subjects] watering at Gaddaduma.

As predicted, the conflict involving the Borana and the Garre spread across the international frontier. When major Miles met with Fitaurari Kossi Bukhura, he received firsthand news that the Borana planned to send a delegation to Addis Ababa to ‘complain to the emperor [Ras Taffari had not yet been crowned] about this and if [they could] get no satisfaction he hinted that the Boran would take the matter into their own hands.’32 As shown earlier, the conflict was rooted in either government’s transfer of land and water resources from one aggrieved party to another in a kind of a zero-sum strategy (Ellis 2006). Very likely, these so-called state transfers were decisions by junior officials, influenced by one or other of the conflicting groups. Bizuneh (2008) has produced Ethiopian archival documentations on how the land transfer from the Borana to the Garre was made by the provincial officials against repeated Borana complaints to the Ethiopian government. The Ethiopian provincial governor or his assistants simply publicized such transfers in an awaj (pronouncement) made in the market place. The local pastoralists had to accept this as the official government decision. The death of Gababa Mohamed Guracha in August 1935 further exacerbated frontier political problems and Borana-Garre conflict.33 The mantle of the Garre leadership passed to his son Gerazmach Hassan Gababa, who would play a major role in frontier conflicts for the next few decades. His revenge for past affronts by the Borana was exacted in a calculating manner. A shrewd political player, he made the question of land an important part of his agenda. He shifted allegiance to whoever held power, including the Italians after their conquest of the frontier region in the Ethio-Italian war of 1935.

32 Miles, handing-over report to Reece, 1932, p.2, KNA/MLE/1/1. 33 Gababa Mohamed Guracha was buried southeast of El Chillako.

CHAPTER EIGHT

FASCIST ITALY’S CONQUEST OF ETHIOPIA: THE SOUTHERN FRONT, 1935–1937 The war of 1935–1937 between Italy and Ethiopia was the first time that aerial warfare was used as a weapon of extermination in the Horn of Africa (Sbacchi 1997). It was not the first time, however, that a colonial power used air power against nomads in the twentieth century. In 1920, the British used aircraft against the Somali religious leader, Mohamed Abdile Hassan, in Somaliland (Beachey 1990). The British also deployed air power to put down frontier rebellions in India, northwestern Pakistan, southern Sudan, Trans-Jordan and Iraq (Omissi 1990). Military strategists considered air warfare as an excellent tactic for covering great distances as well as a psychological weapon for terrorizing unarmed civilians, but they stopped short of using poisonous gas against the transfrontier Panthan tribesmen in northwestern Pakistan because of a difference of opinion among their operational commanders (Moreman 1998:127). The Italian-Ethiopian war had long political gestation but was blamed on deliberate border provocation. The Anglo–Italian protocol for demarcation of the shared frontier of British-Italian Jubaland was completed by 24 March 1891 (Capenny 1905), but discussions concerning a fixed frontier between Ethiopia and Italian Somalia did not occur until after Italy recognized the independence of Ethiopia through the Italo-Ethiopian Agreement of August 1897. This treaty defined the Italian-Ethiopian frontier by means of: [a] geographical line drawn from the point of intersection of the 47 meridian with 8 parallel, running south-west (parallel to and at a distance of 180 miles from the Indian Ocean) to Lugh, on the Upper Juba River. In return for an indemnity of £120,000 to the emperor Menelik in 1907 and ratified by a Convention of May 1908, Italy entered into Agreement with Menelik that: ‘from Webi Shibeli the frontier takes a north-easterly direction according to the line of 1897. All the territory belonging to tribes towards the coast is to remain under the control of Italy, and all territory of tribes towards Ogaden is to remain under the control of Abyssinia (Beachey 1990:18).

The frontier between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia, with Dolo representing the border and the Juba River forming the southern frontier with the British East African protectorate, led to three sources of disagreement

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(Melamid 1964:587). The first was the convention of 1897, which defined the jurisdiction of each country and delineated administrative policy for nomadic Somalis on either side of the frontier.1 The convention was signed in Addis Ababa on 16 May 1908. According to the Italian version of the protocol, signed by Giuseppe Colli Di Felizzano and emperor Menelik, the two governments would ‘formally undertake not to exercise any interference beyond the frontier line and not allow the tribes dependent on them to cross the frontier to commit acts of violence…on the other side of the line’ (Brownlie 1979:835). Ethiopia disputed the 1897 agreement between Ethiopia and Italy, negotiated with Major Cesare Nerazzini, acting for Italy (Farer 1979:77). The Ethiopians were ‘exclusively concerned with the legal interpretation of the provisions of the 1908 agreement’; while the Italians considered that the articles of the convention did not contradict the report of Nerazzini (Brownlie 1979:829). Unfortunately, neither government could trace the ‘two Von Habericht maps’ on which the border marks were made by hand (Drysdale 2000:45, 46). The second source of disagreement concerned the interpretation of what constituted the border, defined in the 1897 agreement as being 180 miles from and parallel to the Indian Ocean coast.2 Depending on the interpretation, the prized wells of Walwal in the Ogaden could fall on either side of the border (Barker 1968:8). According to Ravi Laxminarayan Kapil, (1961:99), ‘If the 180 mile formula were adhered to, then Walwal properly belonged to Ethiopia, since it lies over 200 miles from the coast. Conversely, the second clause would seemingly confer title to Italy since it would be shown that the wells at Walwal were regularly used by 1 Article I defined the frontier as the line starting from Dolo at the Confluence of the Daua and the Ganale [rivers], and proceeding eastwards by the sources of Maidaba and continuing as far as the Uebi Sabelli. It followed the territorial boundaries between the tribes of the Rahawein, who were dependent on Italy and all the tribes to the north, which were dependent on Abyssinia. Article II defined the frontiers among pastoral groups. The frontier on the Uebi Sabelli was fixed as the point where the boundaries between the territory of the Baddi Addi tribe (under Italian jurisdiction) and the territory of the tribes that remained dependent on Abyssinia. Article III agreed that the tribes to the west of the Juba, that of the Rahawein, and those on the Uebi Sabelli to the south of the frontier points were dependent on Italy. The Dedjedi and the tribes of Digodia and Afgab, and all those to the north of the frontier line were under the jurisdiction of Abyssinia. Finally, Article IV stated that the frontier proceeded from Uebi Sabelli in a northeasterly direction, following all the territory belonging to the tribes towards the coast, which were under Italian jurisdiction, and the territory of the Ogaden under Abyssinian jurisdiction (Herstlet 1909:1233). 2 Ethiopians and Italians had different interpretations of the treaty. The contentious Article IV of the 1897 agreement was the sticking point. It was disputed whether the border ‘at a distance of 180 miles parallel to the coast of the Indian Ocean’ was in statute miles (Ethiopians) or nautical miles (Italians) (see Baer 1967:45).



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nomadic tribes dependent on the sultan of Obbia, who was under Italian protection.’ The third source was Italian disquiet over the demarcation of the boundary between the British and the Ethiopians, which affected access rights to the Walwal chains of wells, although this could have been potentially speculative and pre-emptive. The Somalis in British Somaliland also used these wells, which the Italians occupied in 1931 when the Anglo– Ethiopian boundary commission arrived at the wells. Because of the importance of the wells to British Somali tribes, the boundary commission may have considered securing the wells as a priority (Robertson 1978:839) or these may have simply been pretexts as the war itself was part of Fascist Italy’s long-term political ambition to expand its colonial empire in East Africa. The Italian War Preparations Fascist Italy’s conquest of imperial Ethiopia was a calculated war of retaliation. The main goal appeared to be to avenge Italy’s humiliating defeat in 1896 at the hands of emperor Menelik II at the Battle of Adwa—a major military victory of an African state over a modern European army in the late nineteenth century (Jonas 2011). In the grand scheme of imperial politics, Italy under Benito Mussolini wanted to link its Horn of African colonies, thereby creating an Italian Oriental Africa (IOA) (Sógoni 2007:85). Mussolini believed that the war would solve the problem of land frontiers and settle the sea frontiers (Rosenthal 1942:7). Italy consolidated its power in the Somali territories, and by late 1923, Governor Cesare Maria de Vecchi had 12,000 troops, which he used to conquer two of the remaining Somali sultanates, Obbia and Majirteen (Mockler 2003:31). Although historians are unsure of exactly when Mussolini began planning to attack Ethiopia, they suggest that such plans may have existed before 1925, but probably crystallized around 1932 or 1933 (del Boca 1969; Baer 1967). This intention to invade Ethiopia was spelled out during the secret negotiations between the British Colonial Office and the Italian representative at the ‘Peace Conference’, when, in connection with ‘Article 13 of the Secret Treaty of London of 6 April 1915, Tiftoni, on behalf of Italy, claimed territories as far west as Moyale.’3 Notes were exchanged in which the British promised to support Italy to expand its sphere of influence in 3 Letter from provincial commissioner NFD, 5 September 1929, KNA/PC/NFD3/1/1.

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Ethiopia; in return Italy would support British plans to secure a dam on the Tana River. The secret discussions between the Italians and the British were exposed in 1925 when the British ceded Jubaland province to Italy (Melamid 1964:587). In response to Ethiopian protests against these secret plans for partitioning the Horn, both countries gave assurances, and in 1928, the Italians even concluded a Friendship Treaty with Ethiopia (Hess 1966). Yet, Italy did not abandon her ambition of taking control of Ethiopia, as was evident in October 1926, when Governor Cesare De Vecchi of Italian Somaliland, one of the quadrumvirs who organized Mussolini’s march on Rome in 1922 ‘decided to push the confines of the colony westward and to take control of the line of water spots, including Walwal and Wardair, [that were]… claimed, in terms of the 1908 Treaty, as the eastern boundary of the Sultanate of Obbia… One purpose of this was to claim Walwal as a dependency of Italy’ (Baer 1967:45, 46). According to a British intelligence report dated 11 May 1929, ‘[t]he Count San Matzano showed Mr. [Gerald] Reece, the approximate line of a new proposed boundary between British Territory and Italian Abyssinia (a hypothetical country then) which ran from East of the [Rift Valley] Lakes to near Mega…[which] indicates that the Italians aspire to obtain possession of certain parts of southern Abyssinia.’4 After 1929, the Italians used indigenous troops and Somali auxiliaries commanded by white officers to establish effective control of parts of Ogaden, and by the ‘spring of 1930 a garrison post [had been] built at Walwal, establishing a permanent Italian occupation’ (Baer 1967:45, 46). Meanwhile, the Italians reassured Somali pastoral populations that the boundary would move westward, ensuring that they resided in a geopolitical space with access to grazing and water sources. By 1932, preparations for war had begun, with open discussion of the ‘Italian colonial question.’ By late 1933 the Italians had published ‘Rassegna Italiana’, a policy document with an accompanying map that showed ‘various phases of the occupation of [Ethiopia]’, indicating on paper the extent to which the Ethiopian frontier had been and would be altered.5 In 1934, coinciding with the arrival of the King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy, the Italians published a new map of Italian Somaliland in connection with a special edition called ‘L’Azione Coloniale’ in which ‘there was no attempt to show a boundary of any kind between Italian Somaliland 4 Letter from the NFD provincial commissioner’s office, Isiolo, to acting colonial secretary, Nairobi, Ref: No. 6438/80/1, 11 May 1929, p.2, KNA/PC/NFD3/1/1. 5 Moyale District, NFD annual report, 1933, p.13, KNA/DC/MDA/1/9.



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and Ethiopia.’6 Such a stratagem insinuated that the frontier was never delineated in the first place. The Italians attack of Ethiopia was three pronged: (1) to arm and incite local Somali pastoralists to attack Ethiopian security posts along the Ethiopian frontier; (2) to create border incidents; and (3) to arm the colonial armies, recruit local militia of Somali zaptie (banda) and build military arsenals for conquering Ethiopia (Hess 1966). Governor Guido Corni, the architect of the ‘Forward Policy’, armed local rulers, such as Sultan Olol Diinle (also known as Olol Dinke) of the Rahawein, and encouraged them to attack Ethiopian tax collecting expeditions.7 Olol Diinle exploited the situation to carry out a personal vendetta against the Ethiopians for imprisoning his father. Emperor Haile Selassie was concerned about the Italy’s Forward Policy and counteracted it by ‘cultivating the support of [Omar Samatar an]…Ogaden [mercenary] by offering him guns, ammunition’ and money to fight Olol Diinle (Farer 1979). The Ethiopian incursion into the Webbi Shebelle valley, the heartland of Olol Diinle’s territory, resulted in the burning down of Fort Mustalil and the enormous destruction of property as far as Beletwein (Mockler 2003:32). The Ethiopians accused Olol Diinle of ‘conspiring to put the whole of the Shebelle under Italian rule.’ His forces soundly defeated the Ethiopian force of 400 armed men, assisted by 700 Shebelle tribesmen, inflicting heavy casualties.8 His forces made further gains, massacring, looting arms and burning down the grain stores of the Ethiopian garrison at Busli. They forced the rest of the Shebelle agropastoralists to flee into Italian territory. Ethiopia retaliated by dispatching the army to deal with the rebellion in the Dolo region.9 The situation along the frontier was already volatile. Even minor incidents raised the political temperature. One example involved an incident when Mukrea Tezama, a minor Ethiopian official, disarmed three banda who were escorting trade caravans and refused to return their firearms. This caused the Italians to mass their army on the frontier.10 These border incidents were not isolated, but represented part of the wider Italian design to provoke war with Ethiopia. Part of the Italian plan 6 Mega consulate, intelligence report for the last quarter of 1934, pp.7–8, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/7. 7 Moyale District, NFD annual report, 1934, p.7, KNA/DC/MDA/1/10. 8 G.A. Cornell, Isiolo, NFP, July 1933, Ref. No. ADM 18/3/673, to chief secretary and native commissioner, Nairobi, p.3, KNA/DC/MLE/3/4. 9 Letter from Glenday, Isiolo, Ref. No. ADM 18/3/1369, 18 December 1933; and Glenday to chief native commissioner, Nairobi 12 March 1933, p.4. KNA/ DC/MLE/3/4. 10 Letter from the provincial commissioner’s office, Isiolo, 12 March 1933, Ref. No. AD 15/3/184, to chief native commissioner, Nairobi, p.5, KN/DC/MLE/3/4.

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was to interfere with the administration of the Ogaden region by pushing banda posts into Ethiopian territory and acting as if the Ogaden and other Ethiopian pastoralists had therefore come under Italian administration. In addition, the Italians transformed their colonial defense forces. Shortly after Governor of Italian Somaliland (later Marshall) Rodolfo Graziani, arrived in Mogadishu in March 1935, the colonial army acquired arms and armaments and began preparations for war. According to Del Boca (2003:113), Graziani purchased hundreds of trucks, 51,000 rifles, 1,585 machine guns, 112 pieces of artillery, 1,800 motor vehicles, 7,857 pack animals, 70 armored cars and 38 planes. The Italians recruited irregulars from the occupied Ogaden region and from across the frontier in Italian Somaliland to fan out and occupy the Walwal wells (Rosenthal 1942:28). The Walwal incident was merely a symptom of the wider conflict, and by the end of 1935, the Italians were fully engaged in war. Graziani’s forces, including the ‘roving frontier and irregular banda’ (Hess 1966:173), fought skirmishes along the Dolo frontier with Ethiopia. Olol Diinle was active inside Ethiopia, attacking the frontier post of Tafere Ketema on the Webbi Shebelle River, arresting his cousin, Hamid Badel (then serving as a district governor in the Ethiopian administration) and subsequently strangling him (Mockler 2003:69). For the Italian colonial administration, the Walwal incident accomplished five main purposes: (1) it allowed Fascist Italy to test feelings regarding the borders with Ethiopia; (2) it actively provoked war: (3) it challenged Ethiopia’s sovereignty over the Ogaden: (4) the occupation of Walwal provided the Italians with enough time to complete preparations for the conquest of the rest of the country (Baer 1967:55); and (5) the incident tested international resolve (Scott 1973). The Ethiopians downplayed the significance of the Walwal episode, at least publicly, treating it as a mere border incident, while Fitaurari Mezelekia of the foreign ministry quietly engaged in diplomatic initiatives. Secretly, the Ethiopians sent the mercenary Omar Samatar, who now fought with Somali irregulars led by Ali Nur, to join the armed forces led by Fitaurari Balchi Shiferra, governor of Jijiga to attack the Italians (Baer 1967). A full description of the Walwal incident is beyond the scope of the present chapter; however, it was significant as the staging ground for Graziani’s conquest of Ethiopia (Foran 1962). Simultaneously, the Italian western front, under General Emilio De Bono (from Eritrea), was activated with the eastern and southern fronts under Graziani. By launching multiple fronts, the Italians aimed to overwhelm Ethiopian forces by rapidly converging on Addis Ababa (Badoglio 1937). The southern front



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was inhabited by nomads whose participation in the war later incubated frontier banditry, resistance and ethnic conflict. The Southern Front ‘War clouds’ hung over the region (Rosenthal 1942:16). Nomadic communities, including the Somali clans in the Ogaden and Italian Somaliland, faced the prospect of a colonial war fought on their territory (Smith 1999:138). On the Italo-Somali frontier, war preparations escalated when Graziani moved his forward headquarters to Biodoa on the Juba River.11 The army established airfields and landing strips as well as fuel and weapon dumps in forward areas, while communication lines were improved as part of the war plans (Smith 1999:37, 38). Throughout these preparations, the Italians ‘rigidly suppressed the publication of any information about military’ preparations for the war with Ethiopia.12 Meanwhile, the Ethio­pians also mobilized on the southern front under the command of Ras Desta Damtew. In Borana, Addis Ababa ordered ‘all the soldiers … to hold themselves in readiness to proceed to Ogaden.’13 With the help of a Belgian officer, ‘several hundred soldiers’ were trained in Sidamo. The Ethiopians were reported to have ‘complete confidence…[in their ability] to hold [their] own against all [foreign forces].’14 From their bases in Italian Somaliland, the Regia Aeronautica carried out aerial surveillance of the movement of Ethiopian forces towards the Italian front (Rosenthal 1942:21). War broke out on 3 October 1935 and both sides began full mobilization. On 5 October 1935, the Italians attacked the Ethiopian town of Dolo and killed Gerazmach Bukra and several of his soldiers.15 The Italian banda advanced further to Amino and Fur, crossing the Daua River at Malka Re.16 On 22 October 1935, the Italian king spurred on the war effort when he visited Lugh where he met the Somali tribal chiefs.17 By the end of the month, the Italians completed their plans. 11 NFD intelligence report for August 1935, p.6, KNA/DC/MLE/3/4. 12 Mega consulate, intelligence report for the last quarter of 1934, p.7, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/7. 13 Ibid. 14 Mega consulate, intelligence report for the last Quarter of April 1935, p.12, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/7. 15 NFD intelligence report for October 1935, p.4, KNA/DC/MLE/3/4. 16 Ibid. 6. 17 Provincial Commissioner, NFD, monthly intelligence report for March 1935, p.3, KN/ DC/MLE/3/4.

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With supplies and forces in forward positions, they occupied both the Italian and the Ethiopian parts of Dolo. From his forward position, Graziani activated his ‘Milan Plan’ to probe the entire eastern and southern fronts to gauge the strength of the defenses (Del Boca 1965:117). In November 1935, the war moved into Ethiopia. The Italian force was estimated to be more than 200,000 strong, including reserves, with the great majority (150,000) being Italian and the rest Eritrean and Somali irregulars, supported by an assortment of armored vehicles (Rosenthal 1942:10). Under the command of Ras Desta Damtew and with the assistance of Dejazamach Gebre Mariam, the southern Ethiopian army set up its base at Negelle, with forward posts and defensive trenches at Filtu, Bokol Manyo and Damole. It also established supply dumps at Wachile, supplied from Borana. Eighty thousand Ethiopian soldiers confronted the massive Italian force (Hickey 1984:217). An estimated 40,000 troops were stationed in Sidamo and Borana provinces. From Bako, Dejazmach Abeba led 2,000 soldiers to join the forces of Ras Desta.18 About 30,000 troops commanded by Ras Nasibu protected the garrisons in Ogaden and Hararghe, and 10,000 troops under the command of Dejazmach Amde Mikael were concentrated in Arsi province (Del Boca 1965:116). The forces of Biene Merid from the province of Ganale Doria and Webbi Shebelle on the eastern front, and the forces of Dejazmach Abebe Damtew from Gemu Gofa, marched on Daggabur on the southern front.19 The Ethiopian force was made up mostly of peasant soldiers who lacked transport to the war front. They had to travel by mule or on foot for distances in excess of 400 km and had to rely on pack animals, mainly camels, for carrying supplies (Nicolle 1997:13). Few motor vehicles were available. The Ethiopians deployed their forces strategically. Fitaurari Ademe, the second-in-command to Ras Desta, was sent ‘to take charge at Filtu, while Fitaurari Tademe, the Deputy Governor of Borana, was in command at [Negelle].’ General troop deployment and strategic orientation was focused ‘towards Beletwein, and a good many [were] scattered’ along the Ethiopian frontier.20 The Ethiopian deployments appeared to take the Italian commanders by surprise. The Sidamo army of Ras Desta reached Magallo, north of Negelle, leading the Italians to suspect that the forces 18 Ras Desta was married to the eldest daughter of Empress Menem, Tanagne Worq. 19 Biene Merid was married to another of the Emperor’s daughters. 20 Mega consulate, intelligence report for the last Quarter of April 1935, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/7. See previous query.



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were planning to outflank them on the west, down the Juba. Meanwhile, Dejazmach Beine Merid marched his soldiers along the Webbi Shebelle front while Ras Desta had hatched ‘an ambitious plan to invade Italian Somaliland and had moved imprudently from his base in Negelle’ (Dugan and Laforce 1973). Ras Desta’s attack at Malka Dida on the Daua, north of Dolo, with an estimated 5,000 troops, may have misled the Italians. At the same time, a force of 2,000 commanded by the Greek trader, Sava Karavasilis, attacked on western flank. This force crossed the Daua at Malka Marri, leading Graziani to believe that it intended to cut ‘across the triangle south of Mandera…thereby taking him in flank and the rear’ with a potential to encircle his forces.21 Unfortunately, the Ethiopians lost the tactical advantage when Ras Desta split his forces into three columns with the intention of advancing on Dolo. This maneuver failed to take into consideration the distances involved (an estimated 400 km from Negelle to Dolo), the weakness in the supply chain and the lack of cover from aerial attack by the Italian air force. Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the Ethiopian commanders was their lack of coordination and formal training. Until the war, the military leaders had been civilians. Their strategy was for each to attack with their separate forces along different fronts. Dejazmach Beine Merid on the Webbi Shebelle front was the first to enter into the fight. He confronted about 1,000 Somali irregulars under the command of Olol Diinle. The Dejazmach was wounded, which shattered the morale of this Ethiopian force (Del Boca 1965:119). Further, the ‘Italians captured the Ethiopian Dolo, killing Gerazmach Makuria and several of his soldiers.’22 According to British intelligence, the Ethiopians claimed to have ‘recaptured Dolo, killing seven Italians and eighteen native levies’ but were ‘compelled to withdraw after ten days owing to artillery fire and [aerial bombing].’23 Graziani split his attacking force into three columns. The first column, under the command of General Morelli di Popolo, advanced through the valley of Ganale Doria towards Barder; the central column, under General Annibale Bergonzoli, proceeded towards Filtu, through Bogol Mayo; and the third, under General Agostini, followed the Daua River with the objective of getting to Malka Marri (Del Boca 1965:120). This last column intended to intercept the flanking maneuvers by the Karavasilis’ forces, 21 Political records, Moyale District, 1935, p.2, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 22 Mega consulate, intelligence report for the fourth quarter of 1935, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/7. 23 Ibid.

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supported by the Garre irregulars led by Hassan Gababa. As a result, Karavasilis’ forces were heavily bombed and forced to flee from the battlefield with heavy losses.24 Critically short of reinforcements, the Ethiopian troops were also short of supplies as they marched further away from their support bases in Borana and Sidamo. Poorly equipped, worn out from long marches and lacking food, discipline broke down and Ras Desta’s forces became mutinous. Ras Desta realized the magnitude of the threat from the Italian invasion. Sensing the likelihood of a catastrophic defeat, he gave orders to his deputy governor in Borana, Fitaurari Tademe, to gather supplies and additional support at his headquarters at Negelle. An estimated 60,000 reinforcements were sent into a dire situation. Forced to live off the land, they confiscated large numbers of camels, horses, other meat stock, and provisions from the Garre, the Gabra and the Borana. In addition, they forced the local pastoralists to make ropes and shoes from animal skins (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992b). The Routing of Ras Desta’s Forces Ras Desta sacrificed his advantage by failing to withdraw while the supplies lasted.25 His overstretched force suffered from thirst and lack of food. It was forced to halt at Malka Dida, some 32 km from Dolo. After long marches through waterless country, outbreaks of various epidemics had ‘swept through its ranks.’ The situation was exacerbated by the heavy bombing conducted by the Italian air force, which devastated the Ethiopian army, estimated at 20,000, and shattered its morale and capacity to fight the enemy.26 The aim of the Italian bombardment was to destroy any source of provisions and eliminate possible pastoralist support for the Ethiopians.27 Graziani was determined to neutralize Ras Desta’s army before undertaking a full invasion of Borana.28 According to Del Boca’s account (1965:121), the Ethiopians were driven away from wells…their provisions almost exhausted…[Ras Desta’s army]…during the terrible retreat were mowed down by machine guns 24 Turnbull, NFD intelligence report, 1935, p.5, KNA/DC/MLE/3/6. 25 Political records, Moyale District, 1935, p.2, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2. 26 Moyale, Northern Frontier, Mandera sub-district, 1936, p.2. KNA/DC/MDA/1/2. 27 Political records, Moyale District, 1935, p.2. KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 28 Moyale, Northern Frontier, Mandera sub-district 1936, p.3. KNA/DC/MDA/2.



italy’s conquest of ethiopia: 1935–1937167 almost as soon as they reached the river banks… The machine gunners had only to aim a few inches above the ground to slaughter them by the hundreds.

On 12 January 1936, the Italian air force dropped 1,700 kg of mustard gas bombs on the Ethiopians; this became known as the ‘massacre of the battle of Ganale Doria’ (Sbacchi 1997). Ras Desta escaped to Negelle by lorry, while Ayela, commanding the forces defending the Filtu front, made ‘a determined stand, and is believed to have caused considerable trouble to the Italians.’29 British intelligence reported that some 7,000 Ethiopians pretended to surrender to the Italians at El Lot near Labbashalinti and then turned on their captors with swords before they were cut down by the Italians.30 An additional 500 members of Ras Desta’s broken army, led by Fitaurari Tademe, reached the Daua at Ghersi, but were pursued and routed by the Italian banda on 18 January 1936. In desperation, his soldiers abandoned their equipment, except for the horses and mules, and retired to Negelle. They eventually joined Desta at Wadara.31 Ras Desta suffered multiple setbacks. First, he requested ‘permission of the Kenyan Government to send supplies to his troops on the Daua River via the Kenya frontier road from Moyale to Mandera’. His request was refused.32 Second, an expected contingent of volunteer soldiers commanded by Guatar Cornia Smith from Nairobi never materialized.33 Third, civilians in Gamu and Konso opposed Desta’s orders for provisions.34 Fourth, the local Garre, who made up a large portion of Karavasilis’ forces, switched to the Italian side. When their Garre and Degodia supporters broke ranks, the Ethiopians lost the support of the frontier pastoralists. Although the Borana did not directly oppose them, they watched the events passively.35 29 Mega consulate, intelligence report for the fourth quarter of 1936, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/7. 30 Desmond O’Hagan to colonial secretary, May 1936, NFD intelligence report, p.5. KNA/DC/MLE/3/6. 31 Moyale, Northern Frontier, Mandera sub-district 1935, pp.6–7, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2. 32 Mega consulate, intelligence report for the fourth quarter of 1936, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/7. 33 From Kenyan colonial sources it appears that Messrs. Spurling and Wilson from Lolgorien farm were turned away at Moyale, but that Smith and 200 askari volunteers never arrived. Graziani suspected that the British in Kenya had armed the Ethiopian forces. NFD intelligence report for August 1935, pp.3–4, KNA/DC/MLE/3/4. 34 Mega consulate, intelligence report for the fourth quarter of 1935, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/7. 35 Ibid.

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Recognizing Italian superior military power and their success against Ras Desta,36 Hassan Gababa, the Garre chief, defected to the Italian side on 29 February 1936. From the perspective of local support, this was one of the most important events of the war, but it came as no surprise. Until the Ethiopian debacle at Ganale Doria, he had staunchly supported Ras Desta, by conducting espionage in Italian Somaliland. For these services, he received the Ethiopian title of Kenyazmach.37 This entitled him to retainers, servants and a gasha of farmland near Negelle Borana, but with Ethiopia’s collapse, he decided it was more prudent to enter an alliance with the winning side (Bizuneh 1999:53). The Italians prized his defection because they assumed that his local political influence would turn many of his followers against the Ethiopians.38 When he surrendered, he also took several Garre elders to Dolo by lorry to hand themselves over to the Italian generals.39 Hassan Gababa shrewdly played multiple roles, from traitor to the Ethiopians to collaborator with the Italians. His shift in allegiance altered the ethnic military balance in favor of the Somali pastoralists and against resident groups such as the Borana and Gabra. His personal goal was to extend his control over key grazing lands and wells in eastern Borana territory and to gradually increase Garre control of these resources on the southern frontier. Another important member of Desta’s camp was the Degodia sultan, Wobur Abdi, who also surrendered to the Italians, thus establishing the Degodia in the Borana land of Liban. He promised to recruit his tribesmen to support Italy’s war effort.40 Having obtained substantive local support, the Italian military strategy focused on arming tribesmen ‘to loot and kill’ as a vanguard preparing the way for their attacking forces.41 The advance of General Agostini’s main Italian force across the Daua River at Malka Marri succeeded in breaking Ras Desta’s forces. Roads and bridges were built at Malka Guba (between Negelle and Mega) and at Malka Marri on the Kenya Frontier. According to Reece’s narrative, ‘[t]he passage across the river of over two hundred vehicles, including tanks and armored cars, was [an ingenious] piece of field engineering.’42 At this 36 Political records, Moyale District, 1935, p.1. KNA/DC/MLE/2/2. 37 Glenday, NFD intelligence report for July 1935, p.4, KNA/DC/MLE/3/4. 38 NFD annual report for 1936, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/6. 39 NFD intelligence report to colonial secretary, Nairobi, February 1936, p.4, KNA/DC/ MLE/3/6. 40 Reece, ‘A narrative of happenings in the province of Borana in Ethiopia from April to August 1936’, p.1. KNA/DC/MDA/1/2. 41 NFD Intelligence Report for the month of November 1936, p.2, KNA/DC/MLE/3/8. 42 Reece, ‘A narrative of happenings in the province of Borana’, p.1. KNA/DC/MDA/1/2.



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crossing, the general met British officers who informed him of the location of the international boundary.43 After the river crossing, the Italian forces suffered their first setback when 400 members of the Eritrean native infantry surrendered to the King’s African Rifles (KAR).44 In the meantime, the Ethiopians suffered another setback when Fitaurari Joher Birrara, who claimed to be the secretary to Ras Desta, was captured by the Italians. He provided valuable intelligence on the morale and preparations of the Ethiopian army. Alberto Giaccardi (1938:2) des­ cribes him as an Abyssinian having a European father and an Ethiopian mother. Giaccardi stated that Ras Desta’s army was in ‘…disorder, the Ras, with barely 200 followers, the Swedish Red Cross, and the Belgian adviser Lieutenant Frere, went into hiding in the Wadara Forest…and telegraphed to the Negus the news of the defeat.’ He quoted Fitaurari Birrara assessment of the situation: We have marched over dried up country unknown to us; Beine Merid did not come to support us; we have gone forward blindly without food and water…We…have been torn to pieces by bombs, mowed down by machine guns, and now defeated, and pursued; at least 3,000 of us have died of hunger and thirst, and we have urgent need of help.

The town of Negelle was bombed using 40-ton high explosives. Ras Desta’s army had withdrawn to build defensive positions at the villages of Wadara and Adola in Sidamo. Here it was joined by the forces of Dejazmach Gebre Mariam, the former governor of Harar and the minister of the interior, and by the forces of Dejazmach Makonnen, the governor of Walamo (Bizuneh 1999:51). The forces of General Agostini briefly occupied Wadara, but then retreated to the Negelle garrison for fear of Ethiopian guerrillalike ambushes making the roads unsafe.45 The war had now reached its climax. During this phase of the war, Fitaurari Ademe Ambesso decamped to the Italian side as did other pastoralists in Liban (Giaccardi 1938:2). Although the Italians claimed that the Borana supported their side of the war, the Borana position was ambiguous. The Italians used the

43 The British deliberately misled the Italians by pointing to the official boundary of Ethiopia as that marked by the Gwynne (Blue) Line, which the Ethiopians had rejected. This would be a major source of transfrontier disputes between the Italian administration in Borana and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. Details can be found in KNA/DC/ MDA/1/2. 44 The Eritreans claimed that their purpose in the war was not to fight their Ethiopian kinsmen but to fight the British. They were sent under KAR escort to the military camp in Isiolo, Kenya. 45 Reece, ‘The Italian invasion’, p.4, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2.

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evidence of the two principal balabat—Guyo Anna (Goona) and Gedo Jillo (Saabbo)—who had both been arrested by Ras Desta (Giaccardi 1938:3). Rumors spread that the Borana were becoming restless: British intelligence reported that ‘the Boran have been greatly influenced by the Italian propaganda, and the majority of the tribe are now extremely antiEthiopian in their sympathies.’46 Perhaps this was the reason that Ras Desta arrested Fitaurari Gedo Jillo and Guyo Anna. He may have wanted to prevent them from surrendering to the Italians as the Somali chiefs had done.47 In the absence of these leaders, any transfer of allegiance by the Borana in Negelle would be inconsequential. An Italian patrol reached Wachile and Web on 1 February 1936, but after an exchange of fire with the Ethiopian forces in retreat from the Ghersi battle, the Italians withdrew to Malka Guba on the Daua River.48 This attack brought news of the Italian invasion of Borana to the frontier. Then the Italians sent aircraft over Mega and other Ethiopian settlements along the southern frontier. Although British intelligence does not report any bombing during this initial appearance, Borana informants recall seeing three planes on the first occasion. One of my informants, then a young married woman, reported seeing two planes on the first occasion, followed by many more. She added, ‘We did not know what it was. It had wings like birds, turning from side to side and people were even saying that the planes were looking into our huts… We then knew that the war for which livestock was collected had arrived.’ To my question, ‘Did you see the planes drop bombs?’, she replied: ‘We were not even allowed to light fires during the night…The planes dropped bombs in the distance… We heard that the settlement of Guyo Gifeesa, of Warjida clan was bombed’ (Qaabale Galgallo Matoye, interview, 2010).49 British intelligence reported that the Ethiopians sent reinforcements of 400 men from the Sidamo to Mega under the command of Negadras Sahale to assume military control. This reinforcement was boosted on 15 February 1936 when Dejazmach Debay arrived ‘with ten lorry loads of troops. The remainder of the force under his command arrived at Mega by 46 Later the ritual settlement of Gedu Jillo, the qallu, was raided by Ethiopians who looted his stock. According to a British intelligence report from December 1936, after the reappearance of the ritual leader, the Borana held an assembly and decided to ‘replace that taken from his village by the Ethiopians.’ NFD intelligence report, December 1936, p.13, KNA/DC/MLE/3/8. 47 Mega consulate, intelligence report for the first quarter of 1936, p.2, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/7. 48 Ibid. 49 She was in her 90s at the time of the interview.



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lorry or on foot.’ The Ethiopians hoped that these reinforcements would enable them to stop the advancing Italian forces. Negadras Sahale moved to Wachile, but could not sustain the Italian position there and withdrew to Arero. In the middle of March, this force returned to Irga Alem with a detachment under Dejazmach Debay to guard Arero and take positions along the Wachile-Mega road.50 In February and March 1936, the Italians paused in their advance to severely punish the pastoralists whom they suspected of giving assistance to the Ethiopian army. For the pastoralists the war was unlike anything they had experienced before. Local informants described planes and machines that ‘rained fire from distances beyond human eyes’ (Godana Ajaa, interview, 1978). The huge quantities of supplies collected by the Ethiopians demonstrated how unusual these events were. Large numbers of livestock were also bombed.51 The Italians attacked pastoralist settlements and livestock at the Daua River crossings.52 British intelligence reported that several bombs fell on the Kenyan side of the frontier.53 Because of the heavy bombing of livestock, the Kenyan administration anticipated ‘large-scale panic and flight of the country…which failed to materialize on any significant scale.’54 Local informants recollect the scattering of the population to escape aerial bombardment: All movements were at night, as during the day the planes would see people running away. We told our wives not to light fires because the enemy might be watching. Question: Did you see any person killed by Italian bombs? No, but we heard that livestock in the east of Liban was being decimated. What we feared most were the Somalis fighting on the Italian side. They caused more damage than the Italian bombs. I think the bombing had psychological effects. The trembling noise and their guns that fire long distances sent us running. I remember during one occasion we were running towards the British border, we had all our little children, the younger ones crying, the older ones disappearing in the darkness with the mothers calling. I even told my wife to throw away our baby daughter because of her cries (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1993).

In a detailed account, Giaccardi (1938) praised the large-scale Italian advances: ‘Oddur and Dolo [in Italian Somaliland] and Gorrahei [on the 50 Mega consulate, intelligence report for the first quarter of 1936, p.2, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/7. 51 Turnbull, NFD intelligence report, December 1935, p.9, KNA/DC/MLE/3/6. 52 NFD annual report for 1935, p.5, KNA/DC/MDA/1/11. 53 NFD annual report for 1936, p.9, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/6. 54 Moyale, Northern Frontier Mandera subdistrict 1936, p.5–7, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2.

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frontier with Ogaden]: 50,000 men spread out over a 900 km front: an unending line of lorries through sandy scorched tracks.’ The sight was overwhelming, particularly for the pastoralists. He reported that the Borana were ‘spellbound by [the] apparatus [of war], the planes were flying vultures and the vehicles were horses that never ate grass, according to one local bard.’ The war machines had also never been seen before by the Ethiopians, who were ‘terrified by them.’ The remnants of the Ethiopian forces, exhausted and harassed on the ground and from the air, with no knowledge of the locations of wells, were at the mercy of the pastoral tribes. The Italian army pressed on with their invasion of the Borana. Following the conquest of eastern Borana (Liban), the districts of Dirre and the Great Rift Valley lakes lay open to Italian occupation. After the occupation of Negelle, the Italians armed the Garre with 200 rifles to use against the Amhara settlers and the scattered forces of Ras Desta. Rifles were also distributed to other frontier pastoralists ‘with the evident intention that they should kill as many Ethiopians as possible’, according to an article in Giornale d’Italia on 14 March 1936. The report continues, ‘[w]e have armed these bands with Mauser rifles, mostly captured by the people themselves from the former Amhara oppressors‘55 to conduct guerrilla warfare against the remnants of Ras Desta’s army. By March 1936, the Italians were ‘holding lines Malka Marri, Malka Guba, Negelle; but were sending forward parties of armed banda among the [Garre] and the Borana…and attacking Ethiopian posts and patrols.’56 The Italians carpet-bombed wide areas on the front line, targeting settlements, livestock and other Ethiopian stations in Sidamo. Irga Alem was bombed on numerous occasions, and on 23 March 1936, about 150 bombs were dropped on Yaaballo.57 Bombs, poisonous gas and corrosive fluids, deployed along the Sidamo frontier and in Borana territory, had a devastating psychological effect on civilians. Allen Smith, a British missionary working in Irga Alem, who witnessed the bombings on 19 March 1936, described the horrendous injuries inflicted by the bombs. At Wadara in Sidamo, Dr. Uland of the Norwegian Red Cross dealt with such cases and photographed some of them.58 55 Cited in Reece, ‘A narrative of happenings…from April to August 1936’, p.2, KNA/DC/ MDA/1/2. 56 Mega consulate, intelligence report for the first quarter of 1936, p.3, KNA/PC/ NFD/4/3/7. 57 Ibid., p.4. 58 Reece, ‘Notes on Italian methods of warfare and administration of the frontier’, p.2, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6.



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Shortly thereafter, in June 1936, the Italian war machine pursued Ras Desta’s forces westward, with the aim of occupying the whole of Borana and establishing their administration there. The greatest challenge facing the Italians was not the Ethiopians, but the terrain, for the region had no usable roads. The task of advancing to the Lake District in the Ethiopian Rift Valley was given to a special logistics division under the command of General Gelaso. His assignment was to occupy the great triangle of land with its ‘base on the borders of Kenya and Somalia’, a region mostly inhabited by Garre, Borana and Somali clans. He had to devise a plan for transporting ‘provisions for 9,000 Italians and 4,000 natives, who required 400 tons of goods every month, not including meat, which could be obtained locally, or the petrol needed to supply 780 vehicles.’ The Italians risked ambush from highly mobile Ethiopian units that, despite their inferiority in terms of numbers and weapons, were able to move rapidly along the Italian communication lines, creating havoc. The Italians acknowledged that these physical challenges were bound to slow their progress. The topography and lack of roads meant that they had to drive mechanized vehicles ‘over ground almost quite unknown, through thick forests… marked by narrow and steep mule tracks. [The roads are] difficult in good or bad weather, for in the dry season the deep layer of sand and dust is up to the hubs, often suspending a lorry on its axles, and during the rains the soil turns into thick sticky mud’ (Giaccardi 1938:7). The Italian Advance on the Borana Frontier In Borana, the Ethiopian presence consisted only of small forces. Between Arero and Malka Guba (on the Daua River) there was only one small detachment; at Mega there were about 1,000 men in defensive trenches; and Yaaballo had a garrison of several hundred soldiers. Along the British Kenyan frontier there were mainly Borana pastoralists and Ethiopian settlers, but no Ethiopian soldiers. The border villages of Moiale59 appear to have made no defensive preparations, although an estimated 70 to 100 men garrisoned the town.60 The Ethiopian administration had lost the will and capacity to protect civilians in Borana or to deal with the Italian 59 The border towns had names that were pronounced differently. The Ethiopian town on the border is Moiale and the British side of the town is Moyale; thus, the two names represent the different sides of the frontier. 60 Reece, ‘Notes on Italian methods of warfare and administration of the frontier’, pp. 6–7, Italian Abyssinian affairs, c. 1936, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6.

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advance. Its response to ethnic conflict was feeble and ineffective. The threat posed by the armed Somali pastoralists was its immediate concern. Moreover, widespread attacks by the Garre and other such groups threatened the Ethiopian garrisons as well as the Borana. According to an informant who witnessed these events: The Garre, alleged to be attacking the retreating Amhara, told the Italians that they needed guns. Hassan Gababa’ s first victims were the residents of the village of Molu Yaya in El Wak near El Aramsami… They massacred ninety three people. The other village was that of Koticha Hache. We were in Habane from where we escaped to Galgalu Dimtu. The village that was wiped out was on the escarpment above us. The only survivor was Tache Kaane who escaped to meet us (Roba Bukhura, interview, 1993).

During the early phase of the war, the Ethiopians responded in two ways. First, they organized a joint defense with the Borana, providing them with rifles to defend themselves and conduct revenge attacks. Second, they coordinated joint punitive missions with the Borana against the Garre. In an engagement on 31 March 1936, Kenyazmach Ejigu, the Shum of Moiale, was killed. Subsequently, a large force of Ethiopians and Borana, armed with rifles, raided the Garre near Gaddaduma and at Gamudda. Gerazmach Abeba and Gerazmach Angasu, supported by 400 armed Ethiopian settlers and Borana, retaliated with punitive expeditions against the Garre and other Somalis, spreading panic in those communities and forcing them to cross into Wajir on the British side of the frontier.61 The Borana forces, led by ‘Ali Laamani [the two Alis—Ali Karara and Ali Birmaji] and other war leaders such as Kijiba Fayo, attacked the Garre at Gob Sukela Gababa [the main Garre settlement at Sukula Gababa] and as many as 80 Garre were killed in that attack’ (Roba Bukhura, interview, 1993). The Garre struck back by killing three Borana children in Harbor, to which the Borana responded by counterattacking the village of Abdulla Osman, causing mass casualties. The attacks were attributed to the Borana war party led by Jirma Bukhura. A month later, the Italian-armed Garre carried out further reprisals on the Borana, resulting in fatalities, as well as the theft of herds and burning down of villages in Agal, near Moyale. Garre irregulars in the Italian forces also raped women and killed several Borana close to Moyale on the British side of the frontier.62 The Italians stepped up their advance. Rather than pursuing the elusive enemy, the special Lake Division 61 Moyale District political record for 1936, p.2, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 62 NFD annual report for 1936, p.17, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/6.



italy’s conquest of ethiopia: 1935–1937175 decided to make for central Borana [and] occupy the Kenya boundary’ which would be safe from attack, and then advance northward into the difficult terrain of Sidamo and the Lake district, where Ras Desta’s army had dispersed. On the nights of 22 and 23 June 1936, the division crossed the bridge at Malka Guba with a force of 5,500 Italians, 3,000 infantry and more than 500 vehicles to complete the conquest of central Borana (Giaccardi 1938:4–5).

The Italians decided to move west. They had received compelling evidence that the British were giving logistical support to the Ethiopians. For example, sometime in December 1935 or January 1936, a man identified as the nephew of emperor Haile Selassie (the source does not name him) visited the town of Moyale in his capacity as the logistics officer for Ras Desta’s army. He intended to buy fuel for the Ethiopian vehicles and order more transport vehicles, which eventually arrived from Nairobi.63 The Italians concluded that the British were giving tacit military support to Desta’s forces by supplying military hardware through Moyale and Mega in an effort to prolong his resistance. The Italians attributed the improved training and increase in modern weapons used by Desta’s army to the ‘benevolent collaboration of the neighboring British possessions.’64 Interestingly, British sources make no explicit mention of the delivery of any offensive weapons. After bringing up their reserves and additional materials, the Italians proceeded with the occupation of southern Ethiopia. Sidamo was open to the Italians and the final occupation of the Borana plateau was just a matter of time. Giaccardi’s dispatches (1938:6–7) describe preparations for the attacks on Mega, Moiale and Yaaballo. They sent patrols in every direction to scout for the remnants of Ras Desta’s army and other Ethiopian forces capable of offering stout defense. They sought to subdue any pastoralist community still resisting Italian authority. Lastly, they built emergency landing strips for bombers and fortified bases where military forces and supplies were concentrated. Once they consolidated their position, they planned to push forward to ‘the Kenya border as soon as possible, and…[to prevent possible] British infiltration, [and, due to] the relative uncertainty of the frontier…to occupy [the] Abyssinian [frontier].’ The Italians employed a three-pronged attack, using infantry and mechanized forces. The first section to advance was the infantry, led by 63 Turnbull, NFD intelligence report, 1936, p.5. KNA/DC/MLE/3/6. 64 Reece, ‘The Italian invasion’, p.8. KNA/DC/MDA/1/2.

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lieutenant colonel Settani, which left Malka Marri with detachments of banda supported by several hundred armed Garre recruits. They traveled on foot and camel via Wande, El Der, Lae, Goff, and Erdar to Chaamok on the Moiale-Mega road, where they awaited the arrival of forces from Mega. On 25 June 1936, the mechanized forces of General Carlo Geloso, newly appointed governor of Galla-Sidamo Province, led the second prong of the advance from Negelle with the aim of taking Mega. On the central Borana plateau, the lack of roads did not necessarily obstruct the movement of the mechanized columns, for their armored vehicles, supported by air cover, allowed the Italians to move at will.65 The Ethiopian forces of Dejazmach Debay and Gerazmach Abeba defended Mega in a two-day battle with the Italians, but on 27 June 1936, the Italians succeeded in occupying the town, forcing the townspeople to flee. The third force, commanded by colonel Zambon from Mega, joined by Lt. Col. Settani, occupied Moiale on 29 June 1936 without a fight. According to British intelligence reports, it appears that the Ethiopians in Moiale were unaware of the fall of Mega. The Italians were well aware that the defenses of Moiale were inadequate and that the seventy or so Ethiopian soldiers were poorly equipped with little ammunition. The British blamed the local Borana for the speed of the attack, for ‘though professing still to be loyal to the Ethiopian Government [they] had treacherously concealed all news of the Italian movements.’66 Whatever the case, the Ethiopians stood little chance against Zambon’s mechanized force, which was equipped with ‘machine gunners, two Arab-Somali companies, some engineers, one or two pieces of artillery, several armored cars, a plane and about two or three hundred armed tribal levies, mostly Somalis—in all a force of about two thousand men.’ Combined with Settani’s infantry, the Italian forces had the capacity to overpower any defense put up by the Ethiopians. Realizing the hopelessness of their situation, the Ethiopians opted to cross the frontier and deposit their flag at the district commissioner’s office in Moyale, Kenya.67 65 Reece, ‘The Italian Invasion’, pp.11–12, District Commissioner Moyale, KNA/DC/ MDA/4/6. 66 Ibid., p.8. This placing of blame by the British was misdirected as the war had been waging over the southern frontier close to Moiale since the routing of Ras Desta’s army at Ganale Doria. Indeed, the same army had forced the Borana to contribute supplies, livestock and horses as well as to provide recruits to the Ethiopians, which the British knew. The same Ethiopian forces were responsible for enforcing this. Rather, the blame was on the British side, for despite the detailed intelligence they had collected, they failed to inform the Ethiopians of the Italian military movements. 67 NFD annual report for 1936, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/6.



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Immediately following successful subjugation of the frontier, the Italians launched the ‘great police operation’, ‘by which their Somali irregulars effectively occupied border villages and flushed the remaining Ethiopian settlers.’ After the fall of Moiale, the focus of Italian military activities shifted to the Sidamo front, where Ethiopian resistance still continued.68 The major remaining task was to conclude the war with the Ethiopian forces of Ras Desta and his lieutenants. The nature of the war changed from open warfare to the use of guerrilla tactics in the forested and mountainous terrain of Sidamo and southwestern Ethiopia, which delayed the pacification of the region. Thus, when Addis Ababa fell to the army of Marshal Pietro Badoglio, extensive guerrilla fighting still took place on the southern front (Badoglio 1937). Ras Desta’s Forces Final Engagement The final Italian offensive engaged the remnants of Ras Desta’s army in Sidamo Province. On 9 July 1936, Geloso occupied Yaaballo. From his headquarters there, he set out to crush the Ethiopian resistance (Bizuneh 1999:56, 57). The Italians dropped bombs containing poisonous or corrosive chemicals on the villages around Irga Alem, indiscriminately targeting civilians and soldiers, and flattening towns and villages (Rosenthal 1942:11). By 13 July 1936, the Italians had bombed and then occupied Hagere Mariam and the surrounding villages, inhabited by northern Abyssinian settlers.69 Geloso’s army possessed overwhelming strength relative to the Ethiopian army: he commanded 426 officers, 9,300 Italian troops, 4,200 native infantry (Arabo–Somali and banda), armed with 12,200 rifles, 450 machine guns and light machine guns, 177 heavy machine guns, 20 pieces of artillery, 12 heavy armored cars, 22 light armored cars and 780 other motor vehicles. This massive Italian force faced the remnants of Ras Desta’s and Dejazmach Gebre Mariam’s forces, which the Italians estimated to consist of 12,000 well-trained and determined soldiers, equipped with 30 field guns and supported by 1,600 Eritrean deserters from the Italian army who were prepared to fight to the death (Giaccardi 1938:3–4). The Ethiopians’ biggest advantage was their knowledge of the difficult terrain, which was ideally suited to guerrilla warfare. 68 Moyale, Northern Frontier, Mandera subdistrict 1936, p.13, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2. 69 Reece, ‘A narrative of happenings in the Province of Borana in Ethiopia from April to August 1936, p.7, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2.

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As early as June 1935, the Ethiopian military had begun planning to use guerrilla tactics against the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. General Eric Virgin, the British advisor to the emperor, had distributed instructions on the ‘general principles…of waging ruthless guerrilla warfare’ throughout the empire (Baer 1997:224). Ras Desta’s forces implemented this strategy in Sidamo, moving into the forested and mountainous terrain north of Kuku, called Jabba Shirre, a kind of natural barrier to the Italian war machine. The Italians were unable to use their mechanized units in the type of terrain. The thick forest cover and mountain mist impaired visibility, severely limiting the effectiveness of bombing raids. When the Italians resorted to carpet-bombing with mustard gas, more local Guji inhabitants were killed than Ethiopian guerrillas. In direct encounters, the Ethiopians inflicted heavy casualties on the Italians. British intelligence reported that the Ethiopian antiaircraft guns shot down a number of Italian bombers.70 Nevertheless, the scale of the Italian bombing of civilians, combined with repugnance of the harsh policies of the Ethiopian government, motivated the civilians to form alliances with the Italians to settle scores with their former oppressors. Uprisings by the civilian population against the Ethiopians spread throughout the Sidamo forestland. Ras Desta’s forces faced constant threats and betrayals. The Ethiopians deployed draconian measures to deal with this rebellion, killing numerous civilians and destroying their property. The Arsi were the first group to attack Ethiopian settlements in farming areas and to kill many Amhara as well as sixty Ethiopian soldiers who escorted a large caravan carrying coffee, hides and skins. They also killed two European missionaries, Messrs. Michell and Devre, who accompanied the caravan to Addis Ababa.71 Towards the end of July, uprisings occurred in Konso and Burji. The Guji (Jam Jamtu) revolted against the Amhara settlers soon after the Italians occupied Kuku (Hagere Mariam). In Kambata, the Walamo also rose up against the Abyssinian settlers, forcing Dejazmach Makonen to return and pacify the situation. Around Arero, the Ethiopian forces avenged themselves on the Garre and Borana civilians for their attacks on the army’s retreating columns.72 In addition, the Ethiopians raided the frontier nomads and looted their livestock.73 Retreating Ethiopian 70 Ibid., p.13. 71 Reece, ‘The Italian Invasion’, pp.4–5, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2. 72 Ibid., p.6. 73 NFD intelligence report, October 1936, KNA/DC/MLE/3/6.



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soldiers and settlers in Teltele broke the nonaggression pact with the Borana by looting thirty-seven kaara (equivalent to between 100 and 200 head each)74 of cattle and killing two Borana. As the war front moved west, the Italian forces became bogged down as Ethiopian guerrilla tactics inflicted heavy losses. Propaganda from both sides implied that the Ethiopians sometimes held their ground against the Italians. In November 1936, the Italian advance from Jaba Shirre and Gatullo ‘ended in something…of an Italian disaster.’ The intensification of the guerrilla attacks by the Ethiopians in the Ginir-Goba area of Bale left the Italians ‘unable to move except in considerable strength.’75 According to British intelligence, the extent of Italian losses prompted the pastoralists to reconsider their support for the Italians. For example, as soon as Hassan Gababa thought that the Italians might lose the war, he began planning for his people to cross into Kenya and surrender to the British.76 In the face of strong resistance, the Italians changed tactics by withdrawing and waiting, hoping that the Ethiopians would run out of provisions. During this brief period of recess the Italians: ‘sent emissaries amongst the tribesmen in the occupied territory to encourage them to revolt against the Amhara, and many messages were sent to the Ethiopians to surrender.’77 They also sent letters, signed by Fitaurari Ademe who had defected to the Italians, to the leaders of the Ethiopian forces. The Ethiopians denounced him as a traitor and adamantly rejected his demand. Although some Ethiopians did surrender, including a group of eight men led by Balambras Aboye, Italian hopes that Ethiopians would surrender on a large scale did not materialize.78 By the end of 1936, it was clear that the Italian plan to destroy the forces of Ras Desta had failed. Despite some setbacks, the Ethiopians continued to attack isolated Italian units. The British reported that the Ethiopian forces in Sidamo had maintained a good level of military strength and had adequate supplies of food and ammunition, coordinated by well-organized units commanded by Negadras Sahale. On 6 December 1936, the British reported heavy fighting between Italian and Ethiopian forces in the forest of Wadara, ‘which resulted in considerable loss to the Italians.’79 74 In this particular case, the Borana lost about 7,400 head of livestock. See, F. Foster, intelligence report for September 1936 to the colonial secretary, p.3, KNA/DC/MLE/3/6. 75 Ibid., p.6–7. 76 Moyale, Northern Frontier, Mandera subdistrict 1936, p.15. KNA/DC/MDA/1/2. 77 Reece, ‘The Italian invasion’, p.14, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6. 78 Reece, ‘The Italian invasion’, p.14, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6. 79 NFD intelligence report for December 1936, p.7, KNA/DC/MLE/3/8.

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Graziani overestimated the size of the Ethiopian force and underestimated the difficulties of advancing through the Sidamo Mountains. Reinforcements expected from Addis Ababa did not arrive.80 Reports from members of the Norwegian and Swedish Red Cross indicate that as far back as August 1936, the town of Irga Alem had been controlled by the ‘Tigre’ deserters from the Italian army; they were responsible for imprisoning two Belgian coffee farmers—Messrs. Blez and Colaris— from Wando. In addition, they had imprisoned a Greek national, Savas Karavasilis, who had commanded a column of Ethiopian and Garre forces on the Daua River, on suspicion of communicating with the Italians.81 Meanwhile, the Italians were forced to use ‘road convoys in strength [to] hold the country to either side of the road.’ According to an intelligence report from November 1936, ‘Ethiopian forces, either troops or “shifta”… [b]ands…[were] harassing both camps and communications at Wadara, [Negelle] and Filtu.’82 Heavy fighting ‘resulted in considerable loss to the Italians’ near Wadara. Analysts believed that these attacks had been conducted by Ras Desta’s forces that had previously taken part in the GobaGinir-Magalo engagements.83 Fighting spread throughout Sidamo, and [the] wounded Italian soldiers were taken to Dolo and Lugh in ‘large numbers.’84 Despite these developments, resistance by Ras Desta’s forces was on the verge of collapse. The End Game of the War Determined to break Ethiopian resistance, Marshal Graziani convened a war council in Yaaballo to review strategy aimed to consolidate the Italian offensive. Severe fighting in Wondo revealed the strength of Ethiopian resistance.85 The scattered Ethiopian shifta and the remnants of Ras Desta’s forces had inflicted heavy casualties on the Italian army. For some time, the whereabouts of his forces were unknown.86 At one point, the British thought that his forces ‘might make for the frontier’, and sent an assistant police superintendent to an expected rendezvous with orders to 80 Reece, ‘The Italian invasion’, p.16, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6. 81 Reece, ‘Notes concerning the Norwegian and Swedish Red Cross units’, p.1, KNA/DC/ MDA/4/6. 82 NFD intelligence report for November 1936, p.1, KNA/DC/MLE/3/8. 83 NFD intelligence report for December 1936, p.7, KNA/DC/MLE/3/8. 84 Ibid., p.9 85 Moyale District intelligence report for January 1937, p.1, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 86 NFD intelligence report for the month of November 1936, KNA/DC/MLE/3/8.



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detain the illusive Ras Desta.87 British intelligence officers concluded that ‘despite severe fighting about Wando in the early part of January 1937 the Italian plan to hem in Ras Desta’s and Gabre Mariam’s forces in the Sidamo highland and then destroy them has failed.’88 By the end of the year, however, the political situation had begun to turn in Italy’s favor. Historical sources disagree on how Ras Desta’s resistance ended. According to an Italian source, the war dragged on because of failed Italian attempts to reach a negotiated agreement with the Ras, who used delaying tactics to avoid surrender. Both Italian and British sources, however, agree that the Eritreans, who had mutinied and joined forces with the Ethiopians, strongly influenced Ras Desta against surrendering to the Italian army. The sources also differ regarding the chain of events. Based on material in the Italian archives, Alberto Sbacchi (1997) analyzes the long-drawn-out negotiations on the terms of surrender between Ras Desta and the Italians. For political reasons the Italians needed Ras Desta alive, as his capture and public display would demoralize his remaining supporters. Meanwhile, the Ras distrusted the Italians and was hesitant to accept terms, so in the end the Italians were forced to attack him. Eventually, the Italians succeeded in isolating and surrounding Ras Desta’s forces at Golicha Sago, northwest of Lake Abaya. Although the Italians succeeded in trapping the Ethiopian forces, Ras Desta still eluded them. They ‘seem to have thought that Desta was still east of the road [Wando junction]…but there is good reason to suppose that he was in fact well west of the road before fighting took place.’89 Here again the sources are contradictory, particularly with regard to the circumstances of his death. British intelligence describes how four Italian columns cornered his forces northwest of Lake Abaya: The western Italian column crossed the Omo and cut off the Ethiopian retreat. A column from Harar marched along the headwaters of the Webbi Shebelle and joined the northern and southern columns before the battle. Desta’s force was therefore surrounded. Some accounts claim that Desta, Gabre Mariam and Bienna Marid were all killed in [this] battle, while others record that as there was no hope of escape, they shot themselves… The Italian version [reported by the British] is that he hesitated for so long [on the conditions of surrender]…that Marshal Graziani broke off negotiations and attacked him.90 87 NFD intelligence report for the month of January 1937, KNA/DC/MLE/3/8. 88 Ibid., p.6. 89 Ibid. 90 H.M. Grant, NFD intelligence report, February 1937, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7.

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The battle lasted between five and seven days, with heavy casualties on both sides.91 The Italian version was that Ras Desta planned to attack Addis Ababa with his remaining army, estimated at 10,000. Another source reported that the Ras was in fact, planning to escape to British Somaliland with the help of local guides, who betrayed him. The same source reported that ‘[b]oth the air force and troops were given a free hand in chasing and completely exterminating the enemy… On February 24, 1937 the Ras was captured…and executed by firing squad’ (Sbacchi 1997:176). Bahru Zwede (2001:169) suggests that Ras Desta, after the mutiny and loss of the force under his command, became ‘[m]ore of…a fugitive, he was hounded from place to place, and his dwindling forces was finally beaten at Goggeti in Gurage country, in February 1937.’ British intelligence reports indicated that the Eritreans, who had earlier mutinied under the Italians and joined the Ethiopian forces, were also destroyed during the fighting. Yet other reports state that part of this force escaped to fight another day. While the Italians reported great jubilation at the final demise of the fugitive Ras, as late as March 1937 there were rumors ‘that Ras Desta has not been killed and local opinion [was] unbelieving to the Italian claim. One eyewitness claimed that the preserved head he saw was not that of Desta, who was well known to him.’92 In March 1937, according to a British intelligence report, about ‘5,000 Abyssinians in the Arussi [Arsi] country under the command of Fitaurari Abraha, an Eritrean Sergeant…[were attacked by] a banda force under the Renegade Ras Haile.’93 The fighting moved westwards as the Italians engaged in fights against the Ethiopian resistance in Burji and Konso highlands. According to British intelligence, ‘on each occasion the Italians were said to have suffered heavy losses.’94 A strong Ethiopian force remained in Bako, where it was reported that ‘an illegitimate son of Lij Yasu is said to have been declared king.’ At this late date, contradictory rumors still spread about Ras Desta’s death or survival.95 From July through September 1937, lowlevel fighting was reported in Gamo and northwest of Maji, but it became increasingly clear that resistance to the Italians had diminished. By the mid-September, there were reports that that ‘300 Eritreans and some locally enlisted troops had mutinied, killing four Italian officers and 185 91 NFD intelligence report for February 1937, p.5, KNA/DC/MLE/3/8. 92 NFD intelligence report for March 1937, p.5, KNA/DC/MLE/3/8. 93 Ibid., p.7, KNA/DC/MLE/3/8. 94 NFD intelligence report for May 1937, p.5, KNA/DC/MLE/3/8. 95 NFD intelligence report for June 1937, p.4, KNA/DC/MLE/3/8.



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native troops.’96 In Mega, Fitaurari Ayela, formerly provincial governor of Borana, gave himself up to the Italians. As a reward, his farms in Hiddilola and Tuka were restored to him. Other high-ranking officials who surrendered, however, were not so lucky, and were executed.97 The final routing of Ras Desta’s army created a humanitarian crisis, with many of the former combatants, along with their families and livestock, fleeing into Kenya rather than surrendering to the Italians.98 Five parties of Ethiopian refugees, estimated to number 6,500, escaped across the border after their last stand at Bako. One of the group’s leaders, Fitaurari Tademe, was wanted dead or alive by the Italians. His force had engaged the Italians at Wadara in Sidamo Province and had defended Jabba Shirre, before falling back to Amaro on Lake Chamo. In Jabba Shirre he had staunchly resisted the mechanized force of General Geloso with only thirty guerrilla fighters.99 On the Borana frontier, the Ethiopians were scattered and begging for food (unlike in former times when they took whatever they needed by force). To the local people, these were reminders that they had lost the war. Borana informants refer to this period as gaaf Sidaamti baadhe (the period when the Amhara vanished). The Borana noted that the Ethiopians moved in small groups at night; they were remembered by their comforting words, ‘daas jeene daas jeeda’ (‘we are happy, be happy’) (Godana Ajaa, interview, 1978; Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1993). The Ethiopians refused to admit defeat to their former subjects who had suffered from their harsh administrative policies. The remnants of the Ethiopian army either joined the shifta or crossed into British territory as refugees. The shifta and the escaping refugees attacked the local Borana population. For example, in December 1936 there were reports that the ritual settlements of Qallu Gedo Jillo at Yaaballo had been attacked ‘by shiftas who killed fourteen Boran and seized a large number of cattle.’100 The British also received information ‘from a Borana from Magado who stated that the Amharas had attacked the Borana levies posted by the Italians at Kanjaro [Kancharo]. There were ten Borana and one Abyssinian casualty.’ The same report added that ‘the Borana [would] get no assistance beyond receiving arms in beating off raids by shiftas’.101 96 NFD intelligence report for September 1937, KNA/DC/MLE/3/8. 97 Moyale District intelligence report for September 1937, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 98 NFD annual report for 1937, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/6. 99 Ibid. 100 G.B. Rimington, NFD intelligence report for December 1936, p.2, KNA/DC/MLE/3/8. 101 Ibid.

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The end of the war resulted in two main trends. First, the imperial frontiers in the Horn of Africa collapsed after the invasion by Fascist Italy, linking her colonies of Italian Somaliland and Eritrea with occupied Ethiopia. Second, the war may have ended for the Ethiopian and the Italian armies, but its greatest impact was on the administration of the frontier pastoralists, for the war introduced different colonial systems of frontier control and frontier relations between the two European imperial powers: Italy and Britain.

CHAPTER NINE

A NEW IMPERIAL NEIGHBOR ON THE FRONTIER: THE DILEMMA OF COEXISTENCE, 1936–1939 Fascist Italy’s vision of an enlarged colony in the Horn of Africa had been realized by 1 June 1936. Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio was appointed viceroy of Italian Oriental Africa, with Addis Ababa as the capital. For the first time, Italy was able to combine the administration of its colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and occupied Ethiopia.1 The Italian occupation of Ethiopia and the expansion of Italian Oriental Africa resulted in major adjustments to the political landscape of the Horn of Africa. Now the Italians shared the southern frontier with the British. These changes dramatically affected the relations between the imperial states and, most profoundly, on frontier nomads. Italian East Africa was divided into five ‘governorates’, including Hararghe province, Amhara (Gondar); Harar (Harar); Galla-Sidamo (Jimma); and Italian Somaliland (Mogadishu). The Borana region was placed under the Galla-Sidamo administration. In the emerging situation, the Italian occupiers shifted administrative borders by transferring some provinces that were formerly part of Ethiopia to Italian Somaliland. For example, the expanded region of Ogaden on the upper Shebelle and Juba rivers was assigned to Italian Somaliland, which had previously been separated by international frontiers. This chapter analyzes the impact of Italian administration on law and order in frontier relations with the British. The Italian Administration of the Borana Frontier The Italian administration of the Borana frontier began with the appointment of colonel Settani as commissario put in charge of the southern frontier of Galla-Sidamo province. His administration extended from Malka Marri on the Daua River in the east and southwards to Lake Stefanie. The region was divided into five districts: Mega, Yaaballo, Moiale, Negelle and 1 Moyale, Northern Frontier, Mandera, subdistrict, 1936, p.17, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2.

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Arero. A residente was appointed for each district with authority to reorganize district administration. The region north of the Daua, including the Oddo district, was administered from Mogadishu, with the residente’s headquarters at Bokol Manyo.2 From here, the residente dealt with administrative affairs in Oddo and the eastern region of Borana.3 The Italians extended their laws for administering Italian Somaliland to the GallaSidamo region. They began sending patrols to villages along the frontier with Kenya. All the Amhara settler-farmers had fled from this area, leaving behind unharvested crops. The Borana and other frontier nomads helped themselves to the ripening crops and the abandoned stock.4 The Italians established chains of police posts manned by banda noncommissioned officers along the frontier. In all these places, the pastoralists were informed of the change in government, a change that was reinforced by practical demonstrations of what this meant. For example, in Mega the population was gathered for a demonstration of Italian military power that focused on the destruction of a mud hut by an Italian tank. In November 1936, the minister of the colonies addressed a large gathering attended by colonial administrators and Somalis from Italian Somaliland, Oddo and Borana provinces. Marshal Rodolfo Graziani ‘issued a proclamation [abolishing] the gabbar system’ and claiming that the Italians had come as liberators of those oppressed by the Amhara (Mockler 2003:93). The Italians aimed to abolish the upper level of the Ethiopian system of administration and its accompanying feudal Amhara structure of gabbar, including the tax system of crop rents and payment of tributes, partly based on the exploitation of labor through the virtual slavery of tenants by government officials, military officers, landlords and the church. The Italian newspapers, Il Giornale d’Italia and Resto del Carlino, ran spurious articles on the destruction ‘from top to bottom of the whole rudimentary structure, political and administrative, of the old Abyssinian Empire’ and on the ‘destruction of the old social system of Ethiopia.’5 The press claimed

2 Gerald Reece, ‘The Italian invasion’,1936, p.18, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6. 3 Moyale, Northern Frontier, Mandera sub-district, 1936, p.14, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6. 4 When the Ethiopian administration returned after the defeat of the Italians in the Anglo-Italian War of 1940, the Borana were forced to pay for the produce lost during the six years of Italian occupation and had to return the livestock looted from the settlers, taking into consideration their reproduction over six years as interest (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992b). 5 Reece, ‘Italian Invasion’, p.7, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6.



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that by abolishing land taxes, the Italians had freed the gabbar from eternal slavery under their former landlords (Brooke 1956:179). Another aim was to encourage the transfrontier pastoralists on the British side of the border to cross into Italian-controlled southern Ethi­ opia. During the initial establishment of the administration, the Italians made lavish promises and gave presents to tribal elders. They offered a three-year grace period during which the pastoralists would be exempt from taxation. Initially, these promises had the desired effect and increased the numbers of pastoralists crossing from the British side of the frontier with their livestock, including the Borana who had previously escaped from the Ethiopian administration.6 The Italians demanded livestock (for meat) and transport in return for which the Borana were paid in yards of cloth and Lira.7 After the Italians occupied the southern frontier, the British in the NFD faced two challenges: first, how to enforce existing transfrontier watering rights of British subjects; and second, to determine which boundary the Italians should recognize-the Gwynn (Blue) Line or the official Maud (Red) Line. Perhaps the uncertainty was related to the fact that the map used by the Italians showed the Gwynn (Blue) Line (Fig. 5). Although the Italians had access to the maps, they did not understand the location of the marked boundary on the ground. The British administration, perhaps aware of this, pushed for recognition of the Gwynn Line, which included several important wells and some disputed areas, particularly along the Daua River in the region called the ‘Jara Salient.’ Access to these areas was critical for dry-season grazing for the Garre, and the British were determined to retain this important area. They maintained that the Gwynn Line applied in the Malka Marri-Hara Daua area, and pointed this out to General Angostine of the Italian administration.8 Still, the British officials had to convince the Italians that the Ethiopian government had never administered the areas pointed out to them. Not surprisingly, the Italians expressed doubts concerning the official EthiopianBritish border. Instead of relying on the official maps, the Italians took into account information provided by the pastoralists on the location of the boundary, 6 Reece, ‘Notes on Italian methods of warfare and administration of the frontier’, 1936, p.7, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6. 7 P.F. Foster, intelligence report for September 1936 to the colonial secretary, p.3, Northern Frontier District, KNA/DC/MLE/3/6. 8 NFD annual report for 1936, p.10, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/6.

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much to the indignation of the British administration. Their most egregious action was to place new border markers in areas that they claimed were in Italian territory. What puzzled the British administration was that the Italians ignored existing maps and looked for evidence on the ground. Perhaps the reason for this was the impression created by the British administration officers who had visited various border points with Italian officials and pointed out the location of the boundary to them instead of using maps. This must have led the Italians to suspect that the boundaries that they were shown might not correspond with the ones officially accepted by the Ethiopians, whatever the British claimed. This disrupted transfrontier movements in accordance with the frontier treaty. The Italians had different ideas about the transfrontier grazing and watering treaty. Because of inconsistencies in the information they gathered, they extended their ‘new frontier’ further into British territory.9 Meanwhile, British reports claimed that some headmen ‘masquerading with the Italians…made wild claims’ about locations that were previously on the Ethiopian side of the frontier.10 The cautious approach of the British, who showed the physical location of boundary markers to the Italian administrators, did not resolve the difficulty. The inconsistencies in the Italian attitude to the treaty are understandable, since they were not party to the original boundary agreement. Most important, implementation of the agreement did not accord with their plans for administering frontier pastoralists, which encouraged pastoralists to remain within the borders of Italian territory in an effort to make the colony self-sufficient. By contrast, the British believed that such a policy deprived pastoralists of the resources they had previously enjoyed according to the frontier treaty. For this reason, the officer-in-charge of the NFP (Northern Frontier Province) arranged to meet his Italian counterpart to settle misunderstandings and to reach an agreement on the way forward. On 26 June 1936, he met with the Italian commissario, colonel Zambon. They arrived at a verbal agreement, which became known as ‘the Moyale Pact.’ This established that frontier matters should be resolved through dialogue with the residente; if these officials could not reach a settlement, then the commissario and the officer-in-charge of the NFP would engage in further discussions. If these failed, then written protests

9 Moyale political record 1936, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2. 10 The NFD 1936 annual report stated that one Abdi Mahad (a Garen Ajuran) claimed that Fugugu was in Ethiopian territory.



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would be made.11 Despite this agreement, the Italians made no effort to comply with the terms of the frontier treaty. The Politics of the Transfrontier Treaty The Italians had anticipated the problem and wanted to keep things the way they were. Writing in the newspaper Revista Delle Colonie, Alberto Giaccardi (1938:6) summed up the situation: ‘Between the English and the Abyssinian authorities there arose almost incessant disputes about the boundary line, rights of grazing and water places.’ The Borana, more than any other group, were concerned about possible exclusion from transfrontier grazing and watering. Already the Italian policy of encouraging the Somalis to expand westward had enabled them to outflank the Borana and push them out of eastern Borana country. The Borana on the frontier crossed into British territory where they felt safe, but they continued to rely on their traditional water sources on the Italian side of the frontier. Their continued access to these wells depended on the way in which the Italians applied their new frontier policy. Although the Italians generally ‘respected the terms of [the] treaty’ during the early part of their administration, their attitude to the treaty remained ambiguous. For example, after the occupation of Moiale, colonel Zambon ‘agreed to… the transfrontier water and grazing rights as set [out] in the treaty with Ethiopia.’ Contrary to this agreement, on 15 September 1937, the residente of Moiale, Captain Giovanni Marconi, ‘informed the District Commissioner that he would not officially recognize the British tribes’ watering rights in Italian territory, pending further instructions.’ The British, cognizant of the constant fluctuating policies of the Italian administration, preferred to discuss the matter on the ground. On 19 September, the residente ‘informed the officer-in-charge that his government would allow British subjects water and grazing rights for that season’, but ‘would not make any future guarantees for the facilities.’12 Naturally, the transfrontier pastoralists bore the brunt of vacillating interpretations of the transfrontier grazing treaty. Environmental conditions remained as unpredictable as ever, making access to the frontier wells critical. Indeed, the period of the Italian occupation of southern Ethiopia coincided with severe droughts that forced the pastoralists to cross over into the Italian territory. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.

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The British reacted cautiously to the Italian administration. Wherever possible they tried to cooperate and sought increased contact between the district commissioner and the residente. On several occasions, such cooperation led to the Italians to invite their British counterparts to public meetings at which the Italians made announcements regarding frontier policies. As a public relations exercise, the Italians took advantage of the presence of British officials to impress on the pastoral communities that they were now under Italian rule. At a large public gathering organized at Mega, the Italians showed that they were conscious of the British concern over the insecurity caused by tribal feuding. On this note, the commissario, colonel Settani, gave orders that prioritized the preservation of peace and the disarmament of civilians bearing rifles, and threatened ‘extreme punishment to the offenders.’ This was in response to the district commissioner’s statement that ‘it was of the first importance that [the Borana] and the…[Somali]…be kept apart.’13 Referring to the Garre, the district commissioner declared that some people were ‘a menace to the whole border and asked for their speedy disarmament.’14 While it was British policy to disarm civilians, the Italians encouraged the pastoralists to bear arms as part of their attempt to combat the Ethiopian shifta. By the end of 1936, the Italians faced great political pressure in their newly acquired frontier areas, which included part of traditional Somali grazing lands in Ogaden as well as in the contested frontier with British Somaliland. The British appealed to the Italians to negotiate regional agreements on transfrontier grazing rights: one giving grazing rights in Ogaden; and another that granted rights to pastoral clans from British Somaliland on the Haud grazing frontier in return for Italian access to the port of Berbera (Drysdale 1964:57). Unfortunately, similar negotiations failed in connection with the southern Anglo-Ethiopian frontier. Finally, the British indicated willingness to give up their claim to some areas of the frontier (such as the Jara Salient), which the Garre considered critical for access to the Daua River.15 These changes, however, proved insufficient to placate the Italian administration. The British realized that the Italian attitude to the treaty had profound implications for frontier administration, especially with regard to the

13 Foster, intelligence report, September 1936, p.8, Northern Frontier District, KNA/DC/ MLE/3/6. 14 NFD annual report for 1936, p.43, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/6. 15 Ibid., p.41.



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undisciplined banda forces on the frontier.16 The Italian banda raised questions about the location of the border and the presence of Borana villages in British territory. The villagers were left with little choice but to move across into Italian territory. The banda posed two administrative problems for the British. First, the banda often crossed the frontier, violating sovereign rights that risked a military clash between the two governments. The British administration complained about the banda tres­passing on British territory as well as about the forced removal of their subjects, while the Italians threatened to abrogate treaty rights to water and grazing across the frontier. A major drought in 1937 caused some Kenyan communities to cross to the Italian side of the frontier. Even after the rains filled the major laga (dry watercourses) in the British NFD lowlands, some pastoralists, who were British subjects, preferred to remain on the Italian side of the frontier. British sources attributed this to tax concessions offered by the Italians,17 but in reality, the banda physically prevented these communities from leaving. To control a frontier that stretched for more than 1,000 km from the Daua River in the east to Lake Rudolf in the west, the Italians established banda posts at strategic places. In March 1937, Lieutenant Lancia, assisted by seventy banda, occupied the settlement of Hiddilola, while Lieutenant Makri of the 15th Nuggeli Cavalry arrived with a force of about forty five Italian soldiers in Moiale. By April, about 1,000 banda had been placed in Hiddilola; some 400 were then sent to Arero, and later, about 200 were dispatched to Magado on the frontier. During the same period, banda posts were established at the Gaddaduma and Sadei wells. Evidence exists that the banda habitually crossed into British territory. In the area of Gamada, the Garre reported that the banda claimed the right to patrol the area as far as the Dandu-Derkale-Hara-Daua road on the British side of the border.18 Banda frontier posts not only monitored the movement of transfrontier pastoralists, but also interfered with the implementation of the frontier treaty. The British administration was well aware that these activities contravened the administrative arrangements for the border established by the British with the Ethiopians.19 The Italians tended to ignore

16 NFD annual report for 1937, p.8, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/6. 17 Moyale District intelligence report for January 1937, p.4, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 18 NFD annual report for 1937, p.8, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/6. 19 V.G. Glenday, addendum to handing-over report to the honourable chief native commissioner, Nairobi, 1934, Ref. No. AD 15/3/1, KNA/DC/MLE/3/4.

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complaints about banda violations of the British frontier, while at the same time; they protested the presence of British army and police units at several sensitive locations along the border.20 In the Obbu region, the banda accused the British district commissioner of wrongly marking certain wells with cairns to show that they were in British territory, claiming that they were in Italian territory. In fact, the cairns had been placed during major Gwynn’s earlier boundary survey, not by the district commissioner. According to British sources, the Italians, for political reasons, preferred to rely on garbled accounts from local people rather than cooperate with the British.21 Italian policy was prompted by political considerations rather than actual disagreement over the transfrontier treaty. Italian officials suspected British motives, because administrators had allowed Ethiopian refugees to settle in Isiolo at the site of the NFD Headquarters. Some of them had fought in the routed army of Ras Desta, so were possible recruits for the Ethiopian resistance. The Italians also believed that the British administration actively encouraged the continued banditry of the Ethiopian resistance forces. Although the British records are not explicit about this, they vaguely mention that a ‘refugee situation [was] being dealt with.’ The statement, ‘[h]ardly had [the] refugee situation [been] dealt with than the Italian authorities threatened to abrogate the transfrontier water and grazing rights’, does not show how the British settled the refugee problem.22 Nor does it show a link between their actions and the Italian threat to abrogate grazing and watering rights. Nevertheless in 1936, the district commissioner reported that the banda ‘boasted’ that this threat was ‘a reprisal for the British accommodation of the refugees.’23 The Italians made it clear ‘that they would refuse all water unless the actual villages crossed in[to]…[Italian] territory. Consequently, nearly all [the] Boran tribesmen west of Moyale crossed the border.’24 They had few other options. According to the 1937 NFD annual report, the banda were ‘completely out of control’; they disregarded the boundary and arrested British civilians watering on the Italian side of the frontier.25 Banda incursions across the frontier into British territory increased. They insisted on their right to make such patrols and said that they had ‘orders to refuse 20 Reece, ‘The Italian invasion’, p. 20, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6. 21 NFD annual report for 1936, p.21, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/6. 22 Ibid., p.21. 23 Ibid. 24 Reece, NFD annual report, 1937, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 25 Ibid., pp.4–5.



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British Boran watering between Sololo and Moyale.’26 The British had concluded that the frontier situation was getting out of hand and required an aggressive response. The NFD assistant police superintendent visited Sololo on 19 and 20 August 1937 to investigate reports of border violations and molestation of British civilians by the Italian banda. There he ‘met banda burning the manyatta of some of the Borana in the territory always regarded as British. These banda told him that their orders were to regard the motor road as the boundary and to refuse permission to anyone recognized as British to water [on the Italian side].’27 Obviously, this exasperated British officials who had in the past threatened minor Ethiopian officials or used their communication channels to the emperor to bypass the regional authorities. The irritation caused by ‘native [Italian] police’, not to mention their Italian superiors running the administration, became increasingly intolerable. Yet, a pattern emerged in the residente’s response to such cases. He ‘eventually agreed to issue orders that British Boran be allowed to water as in the past.’28 Banda activities controverted these orders. On 15 September 1937, the officer-in-charge of NFD met with the commissario, major Signorininni, who promised ‘[that he would] approach his government with regard to the British water and grazing rights, but was not prepared to give any promise or even grant temporary facilities.’ The commissario’s response must have shocked the British administration, even though the British knew that the Italians were inconsistent in their decisions. Soon after this incident, the new residente of Moiale, Captain Marconi, informed the district commissioner that ‘he would not take official cognizance of British subjects watering in the Italian territory pending further instructions.’ This was an interesting position, for it implied that he would unofficially provide the frontier communities with watering and grazing facilities. Although the purpose was unclear, this showed that the Italians had a score to settle with the British, for which transfrontier grazing and watering rights presented a useful negotiating tool in frontier policy.29 The Italians intended to manage the frontier on their own terms by enforcing various kinds of restrictions. They stationed more banda posts, 26 Moyale District intelligence report for November 1937, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 27 On 4 September 1937, the banda burnt eight huts belonging to the settlement of Nyencho Jattani. Moyale District intelligence report for August 1937, pp.2–5; and Moyale District intelligence report for September 1937, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 28 Moyale District intelligence report for August 1937, p.2, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 29 Political records for 1937, Moyale District, KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/2.

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which were more effective in controlling the transfrontier movement of the pastoralists. It became a common occurrence for the banda to cross the border to harass British pastoralists whom they claimed had illegally crossed into Italian territory.30 Incursions were particularly frequent in the eastern part of the frontier marked by the Dandu-Derkale-Hara-Daua motor road and to the west marked by the Turbi-Sololo motor road. The banda raided Borana villages along the frontier in the area of Uran in Obbu and commandeered livestock without payment.31 The banda announced that they would not allow British subjects to water or graze their livestock on the Italian side of the frontier unless they permanently moved to Italian territory. For example, on 13 October 1937, ‘the residente gave orders publicly that all British Borana who wished to return [to British territory] might do so, and promised to tell the banda at…Tuka of this.’ No sooner was this announced than the banda stopped one Galagalo Molole, a British Borana from Sololo, from returning to British territory, threatening to shoot him if did so. He recalled that: …when water was refused by the banda, I struck my manyatta [settlement] and went across to the Italian territory just across the boundary north of the old manyatta of Golich Dabello. I want[ed] to return to the British Territory but the banda came…every day and [said] that if I attempt to move they will fire at me, I dared not move.32

Banda actions caused consternation for both administrations. The British accused the banda (and therefore the Italian administration) of deliberately precipitating incidents that harmed frontier relations. Orders given to the banda did not solve the border problems. On the contrary, the banda became a nuisance because of their harassment of British civilians, whom they claimed were on the wrong side of the frontier. In Gadier on the eastern frontier, Batori Sora, a Gabra, was accused with being on the Italian side of the frontier, when in actual fact he was on the British side. He stated: On 3 September, at about 5 pm, I was at my manyatta Lack Hansa [Lag Mansa?], Gadier, it was near the motor road, eight banda came to my manyatta with a baggage camel, [he mentions them by name and their sections of the Garre]…the man in charge of the banda was a Marehan named

30 See Moyale District intelligence report for April 1937, p.2, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 31 Moyale District intelligence report for June 1937, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 32 Letter from the office of the district commissioner, Moyale, to the officer-in-charge NFD, 21 October 1937, p.3, KNA/DC/MLE/5/5.



imperial neighbor on the frontier: 1936–1939195 Farah… They asked me in whose territory I was living, I said it is British Territory, they then asked me if I was British or Italian subject. I said British; the banda, Farah…then said if you are a British subject why are you living here, this is Italian territory. [I told him] I have been informed by the District Commissioner that British Territory extends up to Burduras; the banda chief then said if you like us you had better come into our territory at Haal [Haar] Jarso; if you do not want to come you must strike camp and go to the other side of the motor road. I said I do not want to go to Italian territory…the banda, Farah then said alright…we will return [you] by force.33

This lengthy quotation illustrates the different views of the frontier pastoralists regarding the banda. It shows that the banda and the pastoralists knew each other. The banda were recruited from frontier communities, and hence, familiar with the location of the international border from before the Italian occupation of the southern frontier. Readers should not be misled by the questions attributed to banda. No doubt, such questions would have revealed the intentions inherent in Italian frontier policy. Clearly, the banda did not want to accommodate frontier populations who lived on one side of the frontier to utilize water and grazing on the opposite side. Following this and other incidents in the same area, the Italians formally complained to the British administration. A letter (translated from Italian), written by Residente Marconi to District Commissioner Ronald George Darroch at Moyale, states: I have the honor to be directed by my superiors to address a formal protest to you because the British police posted near Gadier have since August used, and still continue to use, some wells situated immediately northwest of the hill of Gadier. These wells are in a place, which formerly belonged to the Empire of Ethiopia and is now in our territory of Italian East Africa.34

This letter concerns the location of disputed key wells vis-à-vis the international border. The Italians defined their border as the same as that of the Ethiopian empire. Thus, all the land formerly recognized as part of the empire was assumed part of the land conquered by the Italians. The British maintained that there were some grey areas along the border. While they acknowledged that the wells were located in Ethiopian territory, for practical reasons, they insisted that their transfrontier populations should have access to such wells. Gadier was one such grey area, but

33 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to the officer-in-charge NFD, 24 August 1937, KNA/DC/MLE/2/3. 34 Marconi to Darroch, Ref. No. 2055/AP 13, 11 February 1937, KNA/DC/MLE/5/5.

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the British did not admit this to the residente and instead reiterated the claim that its location was in British territory: …I have the honor to inform you that I am directed by the officer-in-charge, Northern Frontier, V.G. Glenday…to state that I have received your letter No. 2055/A of 2.11.37, but that I cannot understand the reason for your protest. Gadier has been occupied by the British Government for at least twenty five years. As Mr. Glenday himself has told you, Captain [Aylmer] was killed northwest of Gadier hill in May 1913 while driving Abyssinian bandits from the British territory.35 Further, you have yourself seen the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty and the Map, which accompanied it. It is therefore impossible to consider that Gadier ever formed part of the Ethiopian Empire.36

The British aim was to support earlier claims regarding this part of the border, where Ethiopian bandits had murdered Captain Aylmer, the district officer. This was why the British regarded the site to be on their side of the frontier. In response, the Italian banda renewed their claims and increased their incursions to harass the frontier communities. Below is a report of one such incident: …some Ajuran (Gashe) dry camels were taken to Godoma. Two boys aged twenty and sixteen [accompanied] the camels and met four banda at the well called Kallu. An altercation resulted and the younger boy was stripped and his hands tied behind his back with his own tobe [i.e. strip of cloth]… when watering was completed and they were just about to leave two banda of the four seen the previous afternoon appeared, seized a big bull camel and fired a shot stampeding the rest.37

In other cases, the banda confiscated livestock from British citizens in lieu of outstanding meat ration quotas, unless they crossed from the British side to the Italian side. The following cases show harsh treatment meted out to individual families by Italian banda. One case involved Wario Bukicha, a Borana from Obbu, who reported the following incident to the British administration: I was forced to move my manyatta to Italian territory when water was refused British subjects by the banda; the other day I got news that all British Boran who were forced to move across the boundary could now return to 35 This information was either inaccurate or was deliberately misleading. Aylmer’s death occurred in 1913 when he was killed by Ethiopian elephant hunters in the Torbi hills in Kenya. 36 District commissioner, Moyale, to Marconi, Ref. No. C.7/2V, 3 November 1937, KNA/ DC/MLE/5/5. 37 D.D.C Swayne, assistant superintendent of police, to the officer-in-charge NFD, Moyale, 27 September 1937, KNA/DC/MLE/2/3.



imperial neighbor on the frontier: 1936–1939197 British territory… [But] a section of banda, five men, came to prevent my manyatta from moving across [i.e. back to the British side]; when they came they asked who wanted to move across to the British territory—I said, that I did, [then]…the banda came into my manyatta collected all the stock… beat the men and women.38

In other cases, the banda simply crossed the border, looted livestock and captured men whom they took to the Italian side of the frontier. Guyo Dukale reported the following incident: ‘In the manyatta of Wario Bukicha…he found some women and children…but no stock… They informed him that early [that] morning the banda tied all the men up in a line and marched them off…the banda in charge [is a Somali called] Salad.’39 The Italians sanctioned these actions for two reasons. First, as previously mentioned, they had a score to settle with the British frontier administration, which they suspected of supporting Ethiopian resistance. The issue of the transfrontier grazing and watering treaty offered an excellent pretext for provoking the British. The second reason was that banda activities reflected the Italian frontier policy of building up the pastoralist population on their side of the border. Banda attacks were often very violent and violated individual liberties, particularly of women. According to one of my informants, who had personal experience of such treatment: ‘They did heinous things to Borana. They took livestock and slaughtered them without the consent of the owners; they raped women…terrorized women and children by shooting near villages to frighten them [and] interfered with every normal social and economic function of the people’ (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992b). Some victims reported these violent incidents to the British administration. Elema Gababa, a victim of an attempted rape, provided the following account of her experience: …I left the manyatta together with three other women; Adi Golicha, Fulmato [Falmaato] Gulgulo [Galgallo] and Hagiya [Haa Gaaya] Ali, to collect grass for roofing huts from the old manyatta of Jilo Boru, who recently left for Italian Territory on account of the water being closed to British subjects… [While] I was collecting grass… I saw one banda…he came to me and said “whose manyatta do you come from”? I said “[f]rom the manyatta of Halake Wario”, I did not want to tell him that I came from the manyatta of Golicha [Dabello] because [he] disobeyed the banda’s orders…when they ordered him to move to the Italian Territory… [This] banda caught my wrist, the other women ran away, he tried to open my clothes in order to lie with me, 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.

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chapter nine I struggled with him, when he saw that he could not get his own way he hit me on the head with the butt of his rifle…I was unconscious.40

The British administration confronted the residente, Lieutenant Makri of the Carabinieri, and Lieutenant Cerego, commander of the banda, and took them to the scene of these incidents to conduct an inquiry.41 Witnesses and victims were interviewed. During the questioning, the assistant superintendent of the Kenya police noticed that the Italians coached the witnesses and provided incomplete translations of their statements. The Italians claimed that some key witnesses were sick and could not attend, while the residente dismissed the testimony provided by others.42 In another case, ‘The witness…Wario Halake…had been called by the Residente as a substitute… I questioned Wario further and he stated that he had seen with [his] own eyes two women raped by a banda…but the Residente waved this aside as being [not] an important matter.’43 To the dismay of the British officials, the banda who supervised this operation had been promoted to the position of corporal.44 The frontier situation became even more complex after the expiry of the tax concession and the issuance of passes to the frontier communities for the use of watering and grazing facilities. The Italians, Contest the Frontier Treaty In 1938, the Italians introduced a new border policy that required all pastoralists wishing to cross to the Italian side of the frontier, including the British Borana, to pay a compulsory tax for watering and grazing, collecting salt from salt craters and visiting ritual sites to perform ‘jiila’ ceremonies. Major Signorinnini ‘gave instructions that any village of British Boran watering in the Italian territory must be in possession of a pass signed by the residente.’ The tribesmen had three days in which to obtain such passes, after which they were to be refused water unless they could produce their passes.’ The British contended that the new Italian policy was designed to compel British Borana pastoralists to cross into Italian territory voluntarily. To this end, the residente asked the British district 40 Ibid. 41 Moyale District intelligence report for May 1938, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 42 Letter from Moyale to the officer-in-charge NFD, Ref. No. C.7/2V, 21 October 1937, p.5, KNA/DC/MLE/5/5. 43 Ibid. 44 Letter from Moyale, Ref. No. C.2/34/37, 19 October 1937, KNA/DC/MLE/5/5.



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commissioner to provide a list of the villages that needed to cross to the Italian side for water and grazing as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the residente provided the headman Galgallo Mudale and his Obbu Borana with general passes to cross the frontier. The banda across the Italian boundary ‘refused to accept the residente’s pass, stating that it was not in accordance with the Commissario’s instructions.’ It is unclear why this situation occurred. According to a British intelligence report, the district commissioner met with the residente and the Italian administrator, Captain Bianche, to discuss the matter on 20 February 1938. A meeting was arranged with the Italian officer from Tuka responsible for guarding that section of frontier. Following the meeting ‘[i]nstructions were immediately issued that all British tribesmen were to be allowed water…after they were issued with the necessary permits.’45 British-taxpaying Borana rushed to obtain water passes and to cross to the Italian side of the frontier. Within a short time, seventy-two Borana families listed on the British tax register had migrated.46 The British administration had to accept the situation because the implementation of the new policy coincided with the failure of the rains which resulted in a shortage of water and grazing on the Kenya side of the frontier.47 The permits introduced a new dimension to the transfrontier grazing situation, giving the British administration little room to maneuver. If this diplomatic tactic had worked smoothly, the Italians would have avoided future wrangling with the NFD administration over frontier grazing and watering rights; however, the Italian administrators and banda broke the agreement. They closed the wells in the Dadacha Obbu and Sololo parts of the frontier. The banda, who required considerable quantities of water and pastures for their herds refused to share these resources with the Borana.48 The NFD annual report for 1938 related the experience of Galgallo Mudale, the chief of the Obbu Borana: ‘Ever since the Italian occupation, their difficulties in obtaining water have increased and that they have now given up hope of any satisfactory arrangement being reached between the British and Italian government and have therefore reluctantly decided to become Italian subjects.’49 45 D.H. Wickham, Moyale District intelligence report for the month of February 1938, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 46 Ibid. 47 Moyale District intelligence report for May 1938, p.3, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 48 NFD annual report for 1938, KNA/PC/NFD2/2/2. 49 Wickham, Moyale District intelligence report for the month of February 1938, pp.2– 3, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7.

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That one of the most respected British headmen in the frontier region should experience such treatment served as a rebuke to the British administration, which failed to support the people who had remained faithful to its government. British policy of tribal control seemed to have become completely irrelevant. The British administration, however, argued that the reason why British pastoralists moved away from the wells was due to erratic Italian policies and not water scarcity. The Italians might have appeared to honor the transfrontier agreement, but their ulterior motive was to force the British pastoralists to cross the frontier. Ironically, Italian policy closely resembled the British policy of internal administrative control of pastoralist movements. The British shifted groups around depending on the availability of water and grazing by offering concessions to some groups in times of shortage while punishing others when they transgressed. When options ran out, as they did in drought years, the administration simply blamed the neighboring government. The Italians understood the limited alternatives available to the British and took advantage of the situation to publicly embarrass the British administration when given the chance. During a particularly dry period, the residente used the opportunity to order the British Borana, in the presence of the district commissioner of Moyale, to move from the wells of El Gudda on the grounds that ‘the water there was required for the use of the banda at Tuka.’ He offered temporary watering at the wells in Goff, Lae and Erdar in the Italian-controlled part of Ethiopia to the east of Moyale.50 The district commissioner’s account illustrates the diplomatic posturing of the Italian officials: On 23 July 1938 at 9.25 a.m., I proceeded to Tuka with Captain Marconi, Lieutenant Filipo Marci and Lieutenant Corredo…in charge of banda… At 11.45 a.m. a baraza was held—being present about thirty of our tribesmen who water at El Gudda in Italian territory. Captain Marconi singled out one of the Borana named Gulma [Galma] Wakini and told him that if he ever attempted to enter Italian territory again that he would be arrested because he had insulted the banda and endeavored to cause a lot of trouble at El Gudda; he excluded him from the baraza. The Residente then told the tribesmen that as there was only sufficient water for his people and the banda at El Guda they must water at either El Lei, El Goff, Borbor or Dawa Parmer River [in Liban] and they could choose which place they liked, and that when the rains started they could return to British territory. [H]e also gave each adult man to keep three head of milk cattle and water them on the

50 Political records, Moyale, Northern Frontier, 1938, p.3, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2.



imperial neighbor on the frontier: 1936–1939201 frontier wells for use of the old and sick… The Residente gave them permission to water [for two days, thereafter] they must move.51

This report shows both the humane and the tough sides of the Italian administration when dealing with the frontier nomads. Surprisingly, the Italians allowed access to other wells, although the pastoralists in question had to return when the rains fell on the British side of the frontier. This appears to reveal a contradiction in Italian frontier policy. The public warning of possible harsh action if Galma Wakini entered Italian territory again demonstrated a tough stance. It must have been harrowing for the British district commissioner to watch his people forced to march to distant water points at the peak of a very dry year. The event revealed the impotence of British frontier authorities as they stood by and watched the fate of their subjects being decided by rival colonial administrators. For the Italians, the meeting was a public relations exercise that demonstrated that they were in control. The drought caused severe shortages of water and grazing on the British side of the frontier. ‘Many of the tribes were only saved from a serious state of famine by the fact that in Italian territory conditions were slightly better.’52 In a region where life for the pastoralists, even during periods of peace, was a constant struggle to find grazing and water, access to the water and grazing across the frontier was a matter of survival. On the British frontier, the famine produced a flood of pastoralists crossing the border. They endured the predations of the banda who resumed their usual looting of livestock. In the west, the Gabra had between 300 and 400 head of livestock confiscated.53 Despite the obstruction of frontier access rights of British pastoralists, the Italians successfully demonstrated that matters on their side of the frontier were returning to normal. Confident of their control of the frontier, the town of Mega became a communications hub. On 25 June 1938, the Italians organized an agricultural show to demonstrate the benefits brought by their administration. They gave out prizes for horse racing and to the breeders of the best indigenous cattle. The Borana refer to this event as gaafa sangaa dhaawi (the period of the bulls of show) (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992b). At the end of 1938, the British pastoralists, who 51 Letter from the district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to the officer-in-charge NFD, Isiolo, 23 July 1938, Ref. No. ADM. 15/10/3/326, KNA/DC/MLE/5/5. 52 NFD annual report for 1938, p.2, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/7. 53 J.H. Lewis, Handing-over report, Marsabit District, Northern Frontier,1938, KNA/PC/ NFD2/2/2.

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had migrated to the Italian side of the frontier, opted to stay there despite the expiry of the three-year tax grace in January 1939.54 The Italians introduced new types of taxes. They organized a conference of tribal chiefs from Galla-Sidamo province at Jimma to publicize the imposition of new livestock taxes of one, two and five Lira per head for goats/sheep, cattle and camels respectively. The chiefs opposed the tax, pointing out that it seemed to resurrect the old Ethiopian tribute of one reale (about one cent) per head on all livestock. The chiefs were told that the tax would be assessed locally at the wells and the amounts calculated on the numbers of livestock that visited the wells. At the Gaddaduma wells, where most of the transfrontier pastoralists watered their livestock, they were charged 3,000 Lira, at the Lae and Gof wells 4,000 Lira and at other water points a total of 7,000 Lira.55 All this changed when a general system of taxation known as ‘Tributo Globle’ was imposed on the indigenous population of the Galla-Sidamo. Tax was levied on property according to valuation based on ownership of crops, houses and livestock. The exact rate of tax was not stated, but the Italians insisted that it would be much less than previously levied by the Ethiopians. As it turned out, the Italian tax was in fact greater and was resisted. Previously, the Ethiopians had charged tax on nomadic pastoralists, using tribal sections or clans as taxable units, but now the Italians taxed a tribe as a unit. The Italians also imposed another category of tax, called ‘tasso di pascole ed abbereratoia’, on the British pastoralists who crossed the frontier in accordance with the water and grazing treaty. This was a grazing a flat rate tax of three percent of the livestock that had crossed. In Moiale district, for example, the tax on the Garre was at a rate of 125,000 Lira per annum; on the Ajuran 24,000 Lira per annum and on the Borana 40,000 Lira per annum. Further, there was a tax on all livestock slaughtered, at a rates of 12, 8 and 1 Lira ‘respectively on each camel, ox or sheep or goat butchered as well a market [fee] of 8 Lira.’56 If the British Borana required access to water and grazing on the Italian side of the frontier, they had to pay an additional 20 Lira on each karra herding unit. The Borana complained to the Kenyan administration that when they crossed the frontier, they paid double taxes; one tax to the British and another to the Italians. Galgallo Mudale requested that his people be 54 Wickham, Moyale District intelligence report for the month of December 1938, KNA/ DC/MLE/3/7. 55 Northern Frontier intelligence report for November 1939, KNA/PC/NFD3/3/6. 56 Northern Frontier intelligence report for March 1940, p.2, KNA/PC/NFD3/3/6.



imperial neighbor on the frontier: 1936–1939203

‘exempted from British taxation as they could not [afford] the double burden.’57 While the British administration complained to the Italians that the grazing and water tax was unfair, the Italians reasoned that the transfrontier nomads lived on both sides of the border and probably spent as much or more time on the Italian side, during which time they were subject to their laws.58 The pastoralists needed access to water on the Italian frontier, so they had no option but to pay taxes. Those pastoralists, who stayed on the British side of the frontier, risked confiscation of their livestock by the banda after their grazing and watering passes expired. For example, on 9 December 1939, the banda captured approximately 250 head of cattle belonging to the Obbu Borana at border wells because their passes had expired. Appeals were made to Captain Leahy, the Italian officer and the livestock was released, except for eight animals kept in lieu of the unpaid three percent tax. Chief Galgallo Mudale was given tough conditions: he had to make ‘up his mind whether he intends to apply for a temporary permit to water or not. If he does so, they [i.e. the eight cattle] become the three percent tax due from him under the new Galla-Sidamo decree. But if he does not wish to reenter Italian territory’ the cattle would be released to him.59 These conditions violated the terms of the frontier treaty, but there was little that the British authorities could do. Galgallo Mudale was concerned that his people would take up permanent residence in Italian territory, ‘as they [would] not meet both British and Italian taxes [considering that] the latter…holds the better water and pasture.’60 Double taxation of British subjects presented a dilemma to the administration. The district commissioner shared the concerns of Galgallo Mudale: As you are aware, the preservation of the trans-frontier pasturage rights of the Menelik Treaty is essential to enable much of our territory to be inhabited… The Sololo, and other Boran are forced [to water] on Italian side… Headman Galgallo Mudale informs me that he will be unable to restrain the majority of his followers from taking up permanent residence across the frontier, as they will not pay both the three percent to the Italians and Sh. 10 to us…61 57 Northern Frontier intelligence report for April 1940, p.2, KNA/PC/NFD3/3/6. 58 NFD annual report for 1939. p.7, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/7. 59 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to the officer-in-charge, Northern Frontier, Ref. No. ADM. 15/10/3/326, 21 December 1939, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/7. 60 Northern Frontier annual report, 1939, p.9, KNA/DC/MDA/1/12. 61 Memorandum from district commissioner, Moyale, to the officer-in-charge, Northern Frontier, Isiolo, Ref. No. ADM. 15/10/2, 20 December 1939, KNA/PC/NFD/1/1/7.

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The British administration argued that their pastoralists were given access to transfrontier grazing and watering rights under stressful conditions, which should be taken into account when deciding on taxation. It insisted that the right to transfrontier watering should not be linked to payment of taxes, for the purpose of taxation was meant to create acquiescence and allegiance to the government. Paying tax to two colonial administrations confused this aspect of citizen-state relations. Frontier pastoralists faced a dilemma: they became British subjects because they lived under the protection of the British flag and paid their tax; likewise, if (or when) they lived under the Italian flag and paid taxes to the Italian administration, they acquired a different political identity. The Italian Ethnic Policy The Italian policy adversely influenced the British control of the tribal movements, particularly the Somalis. Somali clans constantly moved into the Borana region as well as across the frontier into British territory from the Tana River, through the northern frontier and across into Ethiopia. Their activities threatened the ‘Somali Line’ (in NFD) and created an unsettled situation along the frontier. In particular, the presence of the Degodia increased tension with the Borana between Gaddaduma and Sololo.62 Italian policy favored the Somalis, who seized the opportunity to expand into Borana territory. The Somalis enhanced their position by assisting the Italians in security matters and informing on the Borana. After occupying the southern frontier, the Italians removed from office all the Borana appointed by the Ethiopians and replaced them with Somalis (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992b).63 The Italians preferred to deal with the Somalis because of their perceived hatred of their former Amhara rulers. According to Borana sources, the Italians communicated their policies and instructions through Somali translators who deliberately created conflict by miscommunication of messages to both the Italians and the Borana (Borbor Bulle, interview, 1998). The Italians dealt with communities with irreconcilable interests. On the one hand, resident groups such as the Borana contested encroachment on their territory, while the newly arrived Somalis used every opportunity to expand their grazing territory and take over wells. Hence, the Borana suffered doubly: first, they were 62 Northern Frontier annual report 1939, p.16, KNA/DC/MDA/1/12. 63 Those who remained in office were Kuxuure Haaro, Guyo Xuye and Booru Koote.



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oppressed by the Italians because of their refusal to cooperate and second, they suffered from Somali usurpation of their water and grazing lands as well as the Italian prejudice against them. The Borana blamed the Garre and their leader Haji Hassan Gababa for their situation. Borana informants recall vividly how the actions of the Garre adversely affected their relationships with the Italians. During this period, the Garre seized nearly all the Borana grazing lands and Hassan Gababa took revenge on the Borana leaders for their past political differences. An eyewitness recalls: Hassan Gababa was determined to undermine the influence of Golicha Molu, who had been appointed under the Italians to be responsible for the Borana. Hassan Gababa concocted a story that Golicha Molu had stolen the Gabra camels and asked some Gabra individuals he had coached to level the accusation against him of having taken camels from them by force. In this particular case, Hassan Gababa acted as both judge and jury. On his orders, Golicha Molu was arrested. He told him, “You see during the Ethiopian rule, you dominated us, but today I am the judge and the arbitrator. It is my time.” He had ordered the camels to be brought and when they arrived, he ordered Golicha Molu to kill and eat the white bull [this was a mockery]. When Golicha Molu refused, Hassan Gababa told him, “You will die regretting, this is my era, yours is past… Don’t forget the wachachini of Goro Birresa.”64 He then continued, “Do recall again when Fitaurari Kosi Gedo insulted my father Gababa Mohamed Guracha. These camels are in revenge… I shall henceforth claim the Lae wells…” (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992b).

For frontier pastoralists, family dishonor from the past remained a motive for revenge and humiliating one’s opponents when power relationships between groups were redefined. This situation was made even worse when the same group became an intermediary between the state and their opponents. As close confidants of the Italians, the Garre significantly contributed to the souring of the relationship between the Italian administration and the Borana. Belete Bizuneh (1999:63) vividly describes this: When the Italians arrived in Dirre [they called a meeting with Borana elders who] spoke about water and grazing and…about different Boran customs… The Garri interpreter is however said to have given a misinterpretation of what the Borana representatives said. He is reported to have told the Italians that the Borana carried out their various ceremonies using human blood as 64 This refers to an incident when all the Garre were gathered together to force them to reveal who among them had killed a Borana man. They were forced to sit in the hot sun without food and cover until they gave up the name of the killer. At the time, the shumi was Golicha Molu.

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chapter nine sacrifice. The Italians then told the interpreter to convey to the Borana that this practice of human sacrifice is [abhorrent] and that they should put an end to it. The Borana, who were simply told by the interpreter that they would have to stop slaughtering animals during various traditional ceremonies, refused to accept the Italian orders…At [a follow up meeting…[t]he Italians were told…that the Boran still refused to abandon their…practices. The Italians…are said to have [ordered the killing of] all the delegates.

The Marehan in Liban used similar tactics to sour relations between the Italian administration and the Borana. Their leader, Sheikh Hussein, coveted the grazing lands of Liban. The Marehan claimed that the Borana supported the Ethiopian shifta responsible for ambushing Italian forces. The Italian administration distrusted this community because of its links to the Ethiopians. Claims that were more serious involved the alleged murder of Marehan by the Borana. A Borana informant, also recorded by Bizuneh (1999:62), referred to claims that the Borana had murdered five Marehan (Borbor Bulle, interview, 1998). The truth was revealed when Diima Kuula invited the residente to visit the site and investigate the claims. According to the informant ‘When the grave was opened, five logs, and the blood and entrails of camels were found.’ The Italians continued to oppress the Borana and target their livestock for their suspected support of the Ethiopian shifta. Tesfaye Wolde, formerly an Ethiopian official at Mega, led the shifta bands. Another shifta leader was Taka Gabayo. As time went on, the guerrillas of the Ethiopian shifta, armed with semiautomatic weapons and hand grenades, attacked Italian detachments on a daily basis and caused heavy casualties. For example, in February and March 1939, the shifta attacked the forces of Captain Romco and killed an Italian officer. In addition, a convoy of lorries returning to Gardula was targeted. In July 1939, heavy losses were inflicted on the Italian garrisons at Arero, Surupa and Hobok and three Italian camps near Gardula were destroyed.65 The NFD annual report for 1939 reported that: [t]he activity of shifta has steadily increased during the month of July in 1939 and the internal situation in Galla Sidamo seems to be worse than at any one time since the war ended… [The shifta estimated in hundreds] are reported to [comprise] many ex-soldiers and ex-police trained by the Italians. They are…armed with rifles, automatic weapons and hand grenades.66 65 Wickham, Moyale District intelligence report for the month of December 1937, KNA/ DC/MLE/3/7. 66 NFD annual report for 1939, pp.10–11, KNA/DC/MDA/1/12.



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The Borana supplied the Ethiopian shifta with provisions and information and participated in the fighting (Borbor Bulle, interview, 1997). Borana support for the Ethiopian shifta might have been a reaction to increased harassment by Italian banda and Somali conscripts. In this context, Gedo Jilo, the Qallu, told Italian officials that ‘if the payment of taxes [and meat livestock] to the Italian Government did not ensure [their] protection against [the Somali raids], he would pay his money to the Abyssinians in the hope that they would at least protect his people against the depredation of Italians soldiers.’67 This statement did not go down well with the Italians and probably explained why they prevented Gedo from receiving ritual gifts from the community, which was considered a customary tax. They also arrested the brother of Guyo Anna, the Qallu of the Goona section of Borana, for practicing infanticide. Shifta activities intensified. Widespread defiance by a significant part of the frontier population to the Italian administration signaled a worsening political situation for the Italians.68 In the prevailing circumstances, the frontier soon experienced a second imperial war that would briefly inhibit the use of the frontier as means of control (see chapter 10).

67 NFD annual report for 1940, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/8. 68 Northern Frontier annual report of 1939, p.16, KNA/DC/MDA/1/12.

CHAPTER TEN

WAR, CONTESTS AND CONFLICTS: A BRIEF COLLAPSE OF AN IMPERIAL FRONTIER, 1939–1942 By the beginning of 1937, the Italian administration faced mounting difficulties throughout the Galla-Sidamo province. The Borana resisted administrative interference in their customary obligations to the Qallu.1 Additional pressure stemmed from Italian needs for local recruits in the face of imminent war, in northeast Africa and Europe. On 28 December 1937, a British intelligence officer reported that a German officer, escorted by Italian officers, visited Malka Marri and Negelle where he interviewed Hassan Gababa, the Garre chief, and inquired how the frontier tribes would respond if Germany took over. Gababa replied that ‘one government was much like another.’2 Certainly, the German officer’s visit to Negelle implied a potential shift in colonial power politics. In January 1939, the Italian secretary for the colonies, accompanied by General Pietro Gazzera, the governor of Galla and Sidamo, visited Negelle Borana where he held a large baraza attended by the headmen of various Somali clans. He alluded to imminent war with a European power, informing them that ‘Italy looked to the Somali tribesmen to keep down the Abyssinians.’3 Soon thereafter, the Italians strengthened their defenses along the frontier.4 The Italians built more roads and intensified recruitment of young Somali into the banda forces. In addition, they relaxed pass requirements, allowing more Garre to cross to the Italian side of the frontier.5 The residente traveled to the Garre area and tried to persuade Hassan Gababa to ‘accept arms for his young men, presumably to produce a force…that could take some action against the [Ethiopian] shifta.’ Hassan Gababa, did not want to arm his young men under those terms, preferring a loose arrangement that would enable them to carry ‘out…raids on the Boran and the Gabra.’6 The report does not mention whether Hassan 1 Richard G. Turnbull, Moyale District intelligence report, June 1939, KNA/MLE/3/7. 2 Moyale District intelligence report, January 1938, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 3 Moyale District, intelligence report, January 1939, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 4 Moyale, NFD intelligence report, October 1939, p .2, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7, 5 Mandera District, NFD annual report, 1939, p.9, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2, 6 Moyale, NFD intelligence report, July 1939, p.2, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7,

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Gababa was in fact supplied with rifles. Aware of the internal crisis building within the Italian administration, Gababa began to reconsider his alliance. Meanwhile, the British closely watched events in Italian territory in expectation of the declaration of a European war. The European War Frontier pastoralists were unaware of the pending international crisis, although they noted the relaxation of Italian border restrictions regarding transfrontier movements. British intelligence picked up signals that the Italians had designs over the northern frontier. The British NFD administration began to abandon the frontier just before war broke out, leaving Garissa in August 1939. Shortly after Britain’s declaration of war against Germany on 3 September 1939, District Commissioner Richard Turnbull and his dubas evacuated Moyale, securing government cash and documents. He also ordered the town’s residents to close their businesses and leave. The administration neither forewarned the civilians of its evacuation plan nor explained it. Local inhabitants looted and burned the town; however, before the town was sacked, Jaldesa Jarso and the Borana elders promised traders that the Borana would not take part in sacking their property; in fact, they promised to protect them. They partially succeeded.7 Ironically, the Italian residente of Moiale, Captain Marconi, deployed his banda force of Zaptia to stop the looting and restore order in the British station.8 Afterwards, the Italian residente sent Turnbull a message asking ‘would the British please return’, as he could not keep law and order on both sides of the frontier (Chevenix Trench 1993:153). The British departure adversely affected British prestige as a colonial power in that part of the frontier. In the absence of effective British administration, rumors spread among the frontier communities, creating uncertainty.9 Turnbull admitted that: ‘[t]he matter had an inevitable effect on [our] prestige, already damaged by the events of August and the preceding months.’10 Meanwhile, British officials believed that the pastoralists would interpret their departure as merely an example of the white man’s cunning to

7 NFD intelligence report, September 1939, p.4. KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 8 NFD annual report, September 1939, p.3. KNA/DC/MDA/1/12. 9 NFD intelligence report, August 1939, p.6. KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 10 NFD annual report, September 1939, KNA/DC/MDA/1/12.



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see how the frontier communities would fare in the absence of the colonial government.11 Abdi Nur Gessi, a Murrelle headman, was reported to have said that ‘the tribesmen’s respect for the government was enhanced when they saw how quickly lawlessness set in on the removal of the firm hand.’12 Some considered the British as a benevolent father whose presence was needed to keep peace, while others, as Galgallo Mudale asked, ‘why did the father [i.e. the British] abandon his children [i.e. the British frontier people] without a word?’13 His query implied that a father who leaves his child and exposed them to danger was irresponsible. The chief of the Gabra Miggo, Ido Mamo, doubted the British administration’s commitment to protecting minority groups such as his. Following the British departure, the Degodia crossed the international frontier and joined the Ajuran in forcibly removing the Borana from the frontier at Moyale and Debel and seizing their camels. They replaced the Borana system of lifting water from wells with a human chain with their own rope-and-bucket method.14 British evacuation had further repercussions for the frontier communities. During dry spells, the British usually assisted civilians in obtaining access to transfrontier grazing and watering, but now frontier communities had to fend for themselves.15 The banda took advantage of the situation by forcing the British tribes into Italian territory. In one case, some Gabra cattle that strayed from the Italian side of the frontier were pursued for 22 km into Kenya and driven back to the Italian side.16 The return of the British administration to the frontier just before the outbreak of the war in September 1939 surprised the pastoralists who did not welcome the British back with much enthusiasm. Despite the British statement that these ethnic groups ‘identified their interests more closely with us than with the Italians [and were] glad of our return’, the pastoralists held the British in contempt for abandoning them.17 At first, there was little evidence of war on the Italian side of the frontier. Their forces remained in their pre-crisis positions, except along the 11 NFD annual report, 1939, KNA/DC/MDA/1/12. 12 Moyale, Northern Frontier annual report, September 1939, p.6, KNA/DC/MDA/1/12. 13 Ibid. 14 Moyale, Northern Frontier intelligence report, September 1939, p.5, KNA/DC/ MLE/3/5. 15 Moyale, Northern Frontier intelligence report, November 1939, p.9, KNA/DC/ MLE/3/7. 16 Moyale, Northern Kenya, annual report, 1939, p.7, KNA/DC/MDA/1/12. 17 Moyale, Northern Frontier intelligence report, September 1939, p.4, KNA/DC/ MLE/3/7.

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western frontier with Obbu, where increased Italian troop deployment occurred.18 As the Italians entered the fifth year of their occupation of Ethiopia, the British gathered evidence of their military preparations and internal administrative difficulties. Meanwhile, the Kenyan colonial administration made preparations to abandon the frontier a second time following the declaration of war in Europe in September 1939. While the administration anticipated the possibility of Italian attacks on the NFD, questions arose concerning the how to handle the delicate matter of frontier pastoralists, placed in jeopardy by their position between opposing colonial forces (Thompson 1995:30).19 Since the transfrontier pastoral populations were the most likely victims of an Italian attack, the British administration dispatched police patrols to move them away from the immediate frontier area. The British planned to move the Somali and Borana populations to the Isiolo and Marsabit districts, far from the frontier, and allocate grazing territories to them. Consequently, the frontier districts of Moyale, Wajir and Mandera were abandoned for the second time: the Mandera station was evacuated in May 1940; followed the next month by the withdrawal of the Wajir administration to Buna (Chevenix Trench 1993:154). The British believed that if the pastoralists left the frontier, there would be no need to maintain an administration there.20 Unfortunately, the majority of transfrontier pastoralists preferred to remain in their homeland ‘[as] water and grazing…[were more] important than a change in the nationality of the government.’21 When the British failed to combat aggressive Italian banda harassment on the frontier, the pastoralists concluded that the administration was either unwilling or unable to protect them as they lawfully tended their livestock. Luckily, a good rainfall that year meant that the Kenya-based pastoralists did not need to cross to the Italian frontier. Frontier pastoralists believed that the five years of Italian administration had coincided with drought years. The return of the rains reminded them of the ‘good old Habash [Ethiopian] days’ and that their harsh treatment by the Amhara had been replaced by the Italian era, when ‘even God…refused to give [them] rain.’22 In the metaphorical cultural world of the nomads, everything happened for a reason. They associated various governments with particular events,

18 Moyale, Northern Frontier intelligence report, August 1939, p.6. KNA/MLE/3/7. 19 D.D.C. Swayne, NFD intelligence report, February 1940, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 20 Moyale District intelligence report, July 1940, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 21 NFD annual report, 1940, p.2, KNA/NFD1/1/8. 22 NFD intelligence report, March 1940, p.2, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7.



war, contests and conflicts: 1939–1942213

favorable or unfavorable, even though these events may have been entirely natural, rather than the direct result of a particular administration. The Obbu Borana of Galgallo Mudale opted to remain in the frontier region, but suffered harshly at the hands of the banda. They were also in danger of being eliminated by the Degodia. Therefore, the British administration escorted the population, consisting of 800 people with 10,000 cattle and 3,000 goats, some 180 km across the plains of Dida Galgallu to Marsabit.23 Mussolini’s declaration of war on the night of 10 June 1940 ushered in another political phase on the frontier (Rosenthal 1942:17). The background to the European war is beyond the scope of this volume, but it is instructive to consider briefly the course of the war on the southern frontier, focusing on its effect on frontier communities following the collapse of the Italian administration. The Italians sent reinforcements to the frontier and moved the banda headquarters to Afmadu. They armed the frontier tribes with rifles, instigating raids that terrorized the frontier populations and forced them to flee into British territory. Ido Mamo, the chief of the Gabra Miigo, lost his livestock to the banda, although the animals were returned to him after he complained to the Italians. Another Gabra, Guyo Abrono, lost nine karra (well over 1,000 camels) to the Degodia from the Oddo region of Ogaden province.24 The first European casualties of the war on the frontier were two British intelligence officials who had dined the previous night with the Italian residente, not long before Mussolini’s midnight declaration of war on 10 June 1940. They were arrested by the banda when they went with a small contingent of the British KAR to investigate the activities of Italian soldiers digging trenches on what they considered contested land (Foran 1962:99, 100). The British unit fired a mortar blast, which the Italians returned in a bid to probe the strength of the British defenses. Moyale town was lightly defended as Brigadier Fluffy Fowles, had split his forces. A small unit of the 1st KAR battalion defended the town while the 6th KAR was kept in reserve in the surrounding hills. At dawn the following day (11 June 1940), the Italian force swiftly attacked, but the British army had dispersed under cover of darkness. The Italians looted the town (Mockler 2003:236–37). The main objective of the Italian attack was to establish a defensive barrier by sending the ‘irregulars into the northern

23 R.J.C. Howes, Northern Frontier annual report, 1940, p.2, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/8. 24 ‘Mandera in Italian war 1940–1941’, p.12, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6.

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half of NFD to gain information and to deny [the British control of the area] by controlling the tribesmen [and] moving them back from Wajir area behind the barrier.’25 In response, the British abandoned Buna, opening the frontier corridor to occupation by lightly armed Italian infantry. By 20 July 1940, the Italians had driven 80 km into the NFD and set up defenses at the wells of El Wak (Rosenthal 1942:18). The Italians sent three Caproni planes to drop sixteen bombs on the Marsabit airstrip. At the same time, the British conducted bombing raids on the banda headquarters at Afmadu in Jubaland, and conducted surveillance on the Italian military concentrations and supply dumps. Even at this early stage of the war, it was apparent that aerial warfare would determine the outcome (Foran 1962:103, 104). Civilians from across the frontier at Marsabit, now the British military headquarters, reported on the movements of the banda in the Italianoccupied southern frontier. They also sent letters through the banda lines to the emperor Haile Selassie in exile. According to the May 1940 intelligence report,26 a story about a Borana prophesy regarding prospective British victory helped win local support for the war effort: Borana soothsayers have from time to time been oddly right in the prophecies they read from the entrails of [slaughtered] oxen: their foretelling on 18 May [1940] is recorded as a matter of interest. They said that Moyale would remain peaceful, but…people seeing many soldiers would leave their food and chattels and fly to the bush for safety. That in July the Italians would leave Moyale and the British territory would be increased so that the British Borana would have the use of the wells of Haramsam [near El Wak] and finally the Italian government would seize so much stock from their Boran and [Garre] during June and July as to impoverish those tribes greatly.

While the KAR avoided attacking Italian positions from the Kenyan side, the military prepared to enter Ethiopia and Somalia along two fronts: in the west across the Chalbi Desert; and in the east from El Wak and Garrissa into Italian Somaliland (Rosenthal 1942). A combined British, Common­ wealth and South African force advanced on El Wak to establish a defensive position. A company of KAR, consisting mainly of tactical ‘recce’ units, jointly defended the NFD with the police. The police, acting as a shield for the army, were stationed along the whole length of the frontier from Turkana west of Lake Rudolf (now Lake Turkana), to Ijara in Garissa-a

25 Ibid., p.6. 26 Located in KNA/DC/MLE/3/7.



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strategy designed to stop the Italian banda from penetrating deeper into British territory (Foran 1962:98). The British attack from the western front was designed to encourage the Ethiopians to rise up against the Italians in Galla-Sidamo province. The main targets were Mega and Yaaballo. As the Italians feared, the British succeeded in recruiting 300 Ethiopian refugees cantoned at Taveta in Kenya to form a unit known as ‘Curle’s Irregulars’, named after their British commander, Sandy Curle. In his letters, Curle (2008:242) explained that the unit’s sole objective was to fight behind the Italian lines in Ethiopia: ‘The Italians were always conscious of the threat represented by the vengeful Ethiopians prowling on their flanks.’ The Irregulars succeeded in taking Moyale before the arrival of the main British force. The fall of Italian military positions along the northern frontier was swift (El-Safi 1972). Fighting at Mega was heavy and British forces captured huge quantities of military hardware; Yaaballo fell without a fight (Great Britain, War Office 1942:74). The British tactical attack exposed the undefended Italian rear, forcing the Italians to abandon the Moyale front. By 11 December 1940, the British had reoccupied Moyale, which they found in shambles. As they withdrew, the Italians looted businesses, burned administration offices and carried away livestock and crops. The second military action against the Italians on the NFD eastern front occurred at El Wak. On 15 September 1940, Mandera station was occupied.27 South African mechanized forces overran the Italian defenses without much resistance, forcing the Italians to establish defensive positions in Italian Somaliland (Rosenthal 1942:26). General Alan Gordon Cunningham’s mechanized units crushed the Italian defenses at El Wak on 15 December 1940, ‘not four walls [were left] standing in any part of El Wak or its adjoining villages.’28 This referred to the military defenses, as there was no residential built up areas. The war left an impression on the nomads. According to an intelligence report, ‘[t]he air war between the two colonial powers transfixed the pastoralists wondering about the aerial games, the rumors of planes falling from the sky and the movements of huge conveys of vehicles entering Ethiopia and Somalia from Kenya. The Ingressa [English] ‘have returned to punish the Italians’,29 was a common sentiment.

27 Mandera District annual report, 1941, p.1, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2. 28 Ibid. 29 NFD intelligence report, May 1940, KNA/DC/MLE/3/7.

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chapter ten The Occupied Enemy Territory Administration

The most significant political development of these battles was the expansion of British administration from the NFD into the Borana area of the Galla-Sidamo-region in Ethiopia. Thereafter, the rapid fall of the Italian East African Empire created an immediate power vacuum that the British military filled under the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA). The British OETA occupied the Ogaden region as well as the Borana region of Ethiopia from 1941 to 1942. The former was administered from Somalia, while Borana was administered from the British NFD in Kenya. After the Italians left Borana, the British military faced unsettling ethnic conflicts. Some populations had been displaced, resulting in raids and counter raids between the Borana and Somali groups. These were exacerbated by access to the large quantity of brand new Mauser rifles and ammunition distributed among local pastoralists by the Italians at the outbreak of the Second World War to oppose the British invasion and prevent the return of the Ethiopians (Watkins 1993:140).30 Anarchy and conflict followed the Italian withdrawal from the southern frontier, largely attributable to the Somali attacks on other groups along the length of the frontier.31 Specifically, the Italians had encouraged attacks on the Borana, whom they accused of supporting the British and the Ethiopians.32 According to a British report ‘[a]s soon as the Italians left, and before the [British] assumed control, terrible massacres took place, and many hundreds of Borana, Degodia and others were killed in the endeavors of the Galla [Oromo] to rid their country of Somalis and the attempts of Somalis to exterminate [Oromo].’33 The attacks on the Borana in Liban were brutal (Bizuneh 1999:71). Elsewhere in Dirre, according to a British report, ‘[t]he Boran fell upon the Degodia [of Rer Mahamed], who had gone to Dirre… The [Garre] retaliated and the Marehan, and Ejji (the Darood), and Degodia from [Negelle] then came down and raided [the Borana in] Dirre and Liban… The Rer Mahamed [Degodia] and the Boran were the heaviest losers, closely followed by the Gabra.’34 In the eastern region, the situation was 30 Moyale District intelligence report, June 1940. KNA/DC/MLE/3/7. 31 Report of chief political officer of East African Command, in NFD annual report, 1942, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/8. 32 Reece, NFD annual report, 1941. KNA/PC/NFD1/1/8. 33 KNA/PC/NFD1/1/8, Gerald Reece, NFD annual report for 1942, p.2. 34 Political records Moyale District 1941, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2; see also Reece, NFD annual report, 1941, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/8,



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particularly bad: few Borana survived the massacres and the Marehan and the banda seized huge numbers of livestock (Adugna 2004). Informants, who experienced these events, retain vivid memories. According to one elder: The Borana met sufferings at the hands of two Somali groups: the Garre and the Marehan. The Marehan nearly wiped the Borana from the face of Liban…They displaced those who were left. They looted all the livestock and killed the abba gada Bulle Dabassa (in power) and Boru Dida (retired)… Only Goba Bulle (the future abba gada) who was a child escaped, while the ritual settlement was exterminated. They pushed the Borana into Kenya. It was when we were in this status that the British attacked the Italians… We were in Qararu on the same day the British attacked… We ran to the Badha escarpment. We ran through Daalach and Ilaaliyo [all place names are on the Ethiopian side of the frontier]… As we were returning to our old settlements, the retreating Italian banda and the Somalis were attacking the residents of Ardha Looni… We were on our way to cross into Kenya and [had] reached Gombisa, when the Borana prophet Rooba Kulalo ordered the Borana to make the sacrificial ritual of gorbeesa baaso (the ritual he-goat of baaso, for removing the enemy) that strengthened Borana’s diminishing morale. As this ritual was performed, we gathered hundreds of Calvary with spearmen and some few riflemen and turned back to follow the retreating Somalis… Women in particular raised emotions challenging the men that they will exchange their goorfo (skin garments worn by women) for our attire [This was a mockery]… The British stopped the attacks and the lootings… (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992a).

To deal with this unsettled frontier situation the British appointed lieutenant colonel Gerald Reece, an experienced NFD administrator, to run the OETA during the brief British occupation of Borana province. As senior political officer, he was responsible for the area stretching from Lake Rudolf (now Lake Turkana) in the west through Yaaballo to north of Negelle, and from Oddo to Dolo in the east.35 He was a long-term, nononsense frontier administrator, popularly known by colleagues and pastoralists as kama-kama (a Kiswahili term meaning ‘like…like’, a word he often repeated (Chevenix Trench 1993:158–59).36 Besides his role as the administrator of the newly occupied Borana region, he retained his position as officer-in-charge of the larger NFD. Reece enthusiastically took up the challenge. Already familiar with interethnic raids on the frontier, he used his political and administrative powers to shape events according to 35 Political records for Moyale District for 1941, p.2, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2. 36 This is in reference to his repeated use of the Kiswahili word kama, which translates as ‘like’.

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the British agenda. Whereas previously the border and the sovereign rights of Ethiopia had restricted his actions and prevented him from dealing effectively with frontier ethnic conflict, the wartime situation offered greater opportunity to act. His dilemma was how to make the pastoralists pay for their past misdeeds. Reece also faced another problem. While on the British side of the frontier, laws prohibited the pastoralists from carrying firearms. This was not the case on the Ethiopian/Italian side where arms and ammunition were in abundant supply. Thus, it was crucial to address the long-standing animosity between the Somali and the Borana. Reece was assisted by the Borana Constabulary (BC), comprised of well-trained and highly disciplined Kenyan police officers, 100 noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and section leaders, assisted by 200 local recruits. Their commander was R.K. Allen, the assistant superintendent of police. The BC was stationed strategically throughout Borana province, assigned the responsibility for ‘clearing up the area north of the frontier and maintaining a state of peace’ (Foran 1962:16, 107).37 According to OETA officials, the Borana were among the groups guilty of past misdeeds. One of the first tasks to address was the looting of stock and the murder of British subjects. Police were dispatched to recover as many of the looted animals as possible. Large numbers of livestock were taken to Moyale for redistribution to British Somalis. The informant referred to above recalled how the British went about rounding up the livestock: Their first activity was to force the Borana to give up and return all the livestock looted from the Ethiopian settlers [after the fall of the frontier to the Italians] and those looted from the Somalis. The British, unlike other governments, were shrewd. They did not only use force… They used all kinds of cunning persuasions and intimations to force the Borana to give up the livestock in their possession. Those who took the Ethiopian settlers’ livestock were reported to the Ethiopians when they returned to power…. (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992a).

Naturally, the Borana considered this most unfair as they had suffered greatly at the hands of British Somalis and had not been compensated. The OETA administration delayed in recognizing the degree of losses that the Borana had sustained because of raids by the ex-banda and the Somali 37 The BC was disbanded in March 1941 with seventy of the locally enlisted men joining the Kenya police, fifty going to the consular office and about thirty being sent to the cantonment police in Mega, responsible for the Ethiopian refugees. Moyale District political records, reports of 1941 on the Kenya Police and Borana Constabulary [BC], KNA/DC/ MLE/2/2.



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irregulars in Liban (Chevenix Trench 1993:158). On arrival in Negelle, British forces found the scattered remnants of the Borana. An informant, who in his youth witnessed the massacre of the Borana in Liban by the retreating Italian Somali irregulars, provides the following account: Those of us who survived escaped and hid ourselves among the Arsi Oromo. The Arsi being Muslims were not attacked by the Somalis…Our men discarded the turbans and our women covered their heads to disguise as Muslims…Those Borana who survived escaped… (Dabassa Arero, interview, 1997).

The British attempted to gather ‘the Borana who had taken refuge in different parts of Liban, the majority of whom had lost their stock to the raiders and hence were in a dire situation.’ The British concluded that the Borana could not survive further attacks; they had only twenty four rifles to defend the whole region and the surviving population. Therefore, the British suggested to the Borana leaders Diima Kuula and Cakkeesa Qooto, that the British would escort them and their remaining followers to Dirre to join other Borana groups. Diima Kuula rejected this proposal, contending that if they left Liban, their land would be taken over by the Marehan and the ex-Italian banda who were responsible for the massacre of the Liban Borana (Bizuneh 1999:72). This left OETA with the task of putting right the past wrongs on the frontier. The OETA faced four main tasks. First, it had to disarm the frontier communities and collect the property and equipment left behind by the Italians. Second, it had to identify the groups responsible for widespread looting and force them to return seized livestock. Third, it had to return traditional grazing territories to the various pastoral groups. In addition, its fourth task was ‘the preservation of the peace and the enforcement of a line between the Boran [Oromo] and the [Garre] and Somalis.’38 Although it was impossible for OETA to meet all these aims during its brief regime, it did succeed in restoring order and halting ethnic violence in Borana. In May 1941, Reece went to Negelle and Mandera to disarm the former pro-Italian forces and the local pastoralists, to confiscate Italian property and to transport livestock left behind by the Italian army. These tasks required more police than OETA had at its disposal, so he resorted to diplomacy and threats to encourage the people to gather the livestock and collect moveable mechanical equipment for transport.

38 Moyale District political records 1902–1942, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2.

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The process of correcting past wrongs required that the victimized groups receive compensation for the livestock they had lost. Public hearings were held in which each group reported its losses. In early 1941, the senior British political officer called the leaders of the local pastoralists to attend a baraza at which the Borana also raised the question of the land they had lost to various Somali groups. The Borana and the Gabra had ­suffered severe livestock losses. As mentioned earlier, the Degodia of Rer Mahamed suffered particularly heavy livestock losses. Mr. Lloyd collected livestock from the Garre in the Malka Marri–Banisa area and livestock seized from other pastoralists was taken to Kukuba in Mandera on the NFD frontier for redistribution.39 The Borana in Dirre received 5 camels, 2,547 head of cattle, 34 mules and 672 sheep and goats. The Borana in Liban received additional compensation of ‘5,000 head of cattle that were taken from the Merehan and Eji’ from Filtu.40 The Gabra received 1,280 camels, 1,127 cattle, 2 mules and 526 sheep and goats from others.41 The Garre returned 2,000 head of cattle, 400 sheep and 40 captives to the Borana in June 1941.42 The actual Borana and Gabra livestock losses in Somali raids, however, had been estimated at 30,000 head; thus, the livestock returned to the Borana and the Gabra was only a small proportion of what they had lost, amounting to only 1,285 camels, 3,474 cattle, 1,198 sheep and 36 mules.43 As many as 2,500 camels were returned to Rer Mahamed Degodia.44 Reece reorganized the administration of the northern part of the frontier inhabited by the Garre. He focused on Mandera as a separate district, dividing the area into Muslim and non-Muslim grazing zones: the Muslim Gabra were associated with the Garre and moved to their grazing grounds, while non-Muslim Gabra moved to Borana areas. Acco­ rding to the British administration, interethnic conflict was religiously motivated, with Muslim attacking non-Muslim and vice-versa. This assumption was too simplistic. In general, the conflict between Borana and Somalis was over grazing lands. When it came to disarming frontier pastoralists, the small constabulary had limited success with hardcore frontier criminals. Mr. Lloyd, the political officer, only collected 411 guns from the Garre in Mandera district and in Borana province. 39 Mandera District annual report, 1941, p.2, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2. 40 Moyale District political records 1902–1942, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2. 41 Mandera District annual report, 1941, p.3, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2. 42 Political records of Moyale District for 1941, p.2, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2. 43 NFD annual report, 1941, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/8. 44 Ibid., p.1.



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After only a few months in operation, it was suddenly announced at the end of 1941 that OETA would be transferred to a transitional administration headed by Ethiopians, assisted by British advisors.45 The change had profound implications for frontier security. The Ethiopian administration had been out of power for nearly six years, so its ability to maintain law and order was nonexistent at this point. In January 1942, OETA withdrew from Borana, and the Oddo region was transferred to the British Military Authority (BMA) operating from Somalia.46 The new administration was wracked with conflict and suspicion, with the Ethiopians wishing to exert their authority and the British determined to continue their political control of the frontier. After handing over Borana province to the Ethiopian administration in February 1942, Reece, still officer–in-charge of the NFD, handed over authority to Ras Abeba Aregai, appointed chief administrator of GallaSidamo province (later renamed Sidamo), with colonel Dallas of the OETA appointed as advisor to the Ras. Meanwhile, it was agreed that the BC would continue policing the area until the Ethiopians re-established the security needed to protect the frontier. This did not occur until September 1942, when the BC was withdrawn shortly before the arrival of the Ethiopian forces. The British NFD administration worried that there was inadequate preparation for the resumption of Ethiopian control soon realized that Ethiopia’s modus operandi regarding frontier administration had not changed. British intelligence reported the posting of ill-trained people as government officials and the use of former Ethiopian shifta to police the region, who the British believed were unlikely to halt ethnic raids. In fact, incursions of raiders across the frontier, livestock theft by soldiers and the revival of disputes over watering and grazing rights among pastoralists resumed to once again disrupt frontier relations.47 Before their departure, OETA officials warned the incoming Ethiopian administration of the dangers of allowing the Marehan and other Somali tribes to return to Borana, as they believed this was bound to create conflict and become a source of future frontier insecurity. Reece wrote a letter to Fitaurari Tademe Zeleke, the mislene (mayor) of Negelle, outlining the background to the order given for the repatriation of the Somalis, and delineating the traditional territories to which they should be returned. Reece suggested that the 45 NFD annual report, 1942, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/8. 46 Mandera District annual report, 1942, p.1, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2. 47 NFD annual report, 1942, KNA/NFD1/1/8.

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Marehan had crossed to Filtu where Ras Desta had previously allowed them into Liban and organized water and grazing for them. At that time, there were only a few Marehan, under the leadership of Sheikh Hussein, but during the Italian occupation, a greater number had moved into Liban from Jubaland, their native territory, south of Dolo. Reece contended that the Marehan and the Degodia had frequently instigated ethnic conflict, and blaming the Marehan for the massacre of the Borana in Liban. Originally, the Marehan had come from the Oddo region; a line between the Malka Marri on the Daua and Filtu demarcated their traditional grazing area. The British administrator’s long-term acquaintance with the frontier led to the following comment: [the] Somalis, who never live peacefully with… [Oromo]…had no right to this country in Boran, which has belonged to the Boran for hundreds of years. If the Marehan or Degodia are allowed to encroach again into this country of the Boran there will again be war between them and trouble of every kind. Since some of the Degodia and Boran also live in Kenya, it will also affect the peace of the international frontier and cause war between the Moslem and pagan tribes in the northern frontier of Kenya. I hope therefore that you will not allow either the Marehan or Degodia, or any other Somali tribe, to come back again to Liban or Dirre and thus to cause suffering to the [Oromo] and war on the International Frontier.48

Responsible for shaping administrative policy in the pastoralist dominated region of NFD, Reece was well versed in the ethno history of the Ethiopian–Kenyan frontier, which lends credibility to his comments about the traditional home territories of the groups mentioned and the long-term presence of Borana in the region. He also explained the reasons for the westward movement of warlike groups like the Marehan and the Degodia, facilitated by the Ethiopian and Italian administrations, which had put pressure on the Borana. Wealthy Somalis had been encouraged to enter Liban by Ras Desta as their presence increased tax revenue. The Italians also recruited Somalis into the irregular army and relied on them to provide recruits and supply meat animals during the war against Ethiopia. Now that the Italians had been driven out of the frontier, Reece noted that these Somali groups had opposed the Ethiopians and the Amhara during the war and thus the incoming Ethiopian administration had no reason to trust them: ‘I also mentioned to you how troublesome were the Somalis…many of whom had left their country…[and] were encouraged by the Italians because they were willing to fight against the 48 Reece to Fitaurari Zeleke, 27 November 1941, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.



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Ethiopian and British Governments and act as spies and [are] sedition makers.49 This letter was significant, for it emphasized that the past misdeeds of these groups had undermined both the Ethiopian and the British administrations. He intended to ensure that whatever was done with these groups was in the political interest of both states. Equally interesting is his view that the Ethiopians and the British had in the past used different value systems in governing their subjects. The British considered themselves compassionate protectors of the rights of their frontier communities, unlike the Ethiopians who were simply concerned with extracting taxes from their subjects, regardless of the political inclination of a particular group. Thus, the groups the British considered as spies might well have been acting in the political interests of Ethiopia, particularly in their dealings with the British administration on frontier issues. While the Ethiopians might have been expected to ignore Reece’s advice, it seemed that the Ethiopian administrators took two other points into consideration. First, they were more interested in the bigger political picture with regard to the establishment of the new Ethiopian administration. Second, the Ethiopians were aware that the British inclusion of the Ogaden in their military administration had repercussions for their treatment of the Somalis on the Borana side of the frontier. These two concerns influenced Ethiopia’s pro-Somali policy, which led them to ignore the British suggestion to remove the Somalis from Borana province. The British view was based on their experience on the frontier and not easily dismissed. Reece made it clear that future peace on the frontier and a cordial relationship between the British and the Ethiopian administrations was contingent on an agreement to remove groups likely to disrupt peace on the frontier. Referring to a discussion of these matters with Janhoy (the title used to address the emperor) and Ras Abeba Aregai, Reece stressed that: ‘We have removed from Kenya all the Marehan whom the Italians allowed in and who caused much trouble to us.’50 Reece stressed that in future the Ethiopians must deal with rebellious groups and take responsibility for their participation in increasing frontier conflict. This was particularly important when dealing with a resurgence of frontier banditry (see chapter 12).

49 Ibid. 50 Ibid.

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After OETA was transformed into an advisory body, the emperor appointed the British advisors. Colonel G.C.M. Dowson, who took over as head of OETA, reported that his relationship with Fitaurari Damise were amicable while he was in office, but blamed the Borana for causing a misunderstanding between him and the Fitaurari. It is not clear what the Borana did, but it is probable that they were communicating directly with Fitaurari Damise, without going through the British representative on issues related to the provision of meat stock for the British cantonment at Mega, where prisoners of war and Ethiopian refugees were held. Although the Borana may not have intended to antagonize Dowson, they accused the OETA representative of forcibly seizing cattle, sheep and goats to meet the meat quota. Fitaurari Damise supported the Borana and advised the British to buy livestock from the Yaaballo market to feed their cantonment. The report that the Borana were forced to provide livestock for meat, however, contradicted Dowson’s assertion that the Borana had agreed to sell 100 head of cattle to supply the garrison with meat. That same statement also noted that Guracha Boru Kote, the balabat, had crossed into Kenya to find livestock to supply the garrison’s requirements.51 There is little doubt that the Borana’s complaint received sympathetic consideration from Fitaurari Damise. Dowson misunderstood the Amhara tradition of independent-mindedness, particularly towards foreign colonial powers. Thus, his statement that ‘[s]ince taking over control, relations have been more friendly and he [i.e. Fitaurari Damise] does appear…to carry out what he is advised to do, though such advice conflicts with his avariciousness’ was an expression of political power maneuvering. Previously, the British way of dealing with local Ethiopian administrators was to use threats, often warning junior officers that their actions would be reported to their seniors. For example, Dowson reported to the officer-in-charge at Isiolo that, ‘[s]hortly after taking over I had one slightly unpleasant interview [with Fitaurari Damise] but by taking a firm line and pointing out that adverse reports on his activities might prejudice him with Ras Abeba [Aregai], he came to the conclusion that cooperation [was] his best policy.’52

51 Ibid. 52 Dowson [political officer OETA, Meta], report on affairs in Mega area to officer-incharge, Isiolo, 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.



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The problems between the British and Ethiopian administrations involved more than just the supply of meat. They included the question of Fitaurari Damise’s suitability for his position and his capacity to keep peace along the common frontier with the British territory. Dowson argued that he was ill-educated and that, unlike other ‘noble Ethiopians’, he had not taken part in the resistance to the Italians. In addition, Dowson claimed that his lack of leadership ability and, more critically, his desire to enrich himself made him averse to maintaining peace, and moreover, ‘his replacement by a more capable and influential man would make for…better relations and cooperation between British and Ethiopian officials…for peace on the border.’53 This ignored the emperor’s earlier communication that disapproval of any administrator would be communicated to higher authorities. Colonel Robert Ernest Cheesman, then oriental secretary to the British minister in Addis Ababa, cautioned the OETA political officer against referring such matters to the Ethiopian government, suggesting that the best approach was to use an influential Ethiopian as a channel of communication rather than making it a British affair. Colonel Cheesman was of the view that, since ‘the Italians had systematically disposed of the more influential Ethiopians, [it] is doubted whether any better man could be found for the post.’54 Another second problem for the transitional administration was the lack of an adequate security force to police Borana province and keep peace along the frontier. British officials reported that ‘[a]s there is at present no police force in Borana…[the shifta] bands…have had an upsetting effect on the…Borana, to such an extent that already there has been a considerable exodus into Kenya.’55 The senior political officer of OETA maintained that using the former Habash shifta to police the frontier promoted insecurity. While some shifta leaders had surrendered to Fitaurari Damise at Mega in February 1942, others continued to prey on the Borana on the British side of the frontier. Some Ethiopian shifta bands were grouped under a former resident of Hidilola, Bakala Ido, who was a friend of Damise. Others were led by Idossa Yadassa, Bokala and Gerazmach Asefaw.56 These shifta forces had participated in the Ethiopian resistance 53 Dowson, summary of interviews with colonel Cheesman, oriental secretary to the British minister at Addis Ababa on 18, 20 and 21 April 1942, p.3, KNA/DC/MLE/5/. 54 Ibid. 55 Political records of Moyale District, 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2. 56 Ras Abeba Aregai was recalled to Addis Ababa shortly afterwards to become the secretary of war. ‘Military administration in Borana’, political records Moyale District, 1941, p.2, KNA/MLE/2/2.

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against the Italians. The British report suggested that the shifta robbed local communities and could not be controlled. An incident that happened in May 1942 provides a good example. The Habash shifta, led by Ubishet Kasha, acted as police officers and extorted goods from the Borana across the frontier. At one point, Fitaurari Damise devised a plan to ply the men with alcohol and disarm them when they became drunk, and asked the British administration for assistance in disarming them.57 Discussions on frontier security reflected British rather than Ethiopian concerns. The Ethiopians were prepared to send several hundred untrained men to police the frontier, but the British felt that this would exacerbate the already sensitive situation on the frontier. The official line from the British minister’s office in Addis Ababa cautioned that the Ethiopians should be given time to reorganize their new administration. For the British frontier officials, however, the problem was that the Ethiopian administrative system was feudal, inefficient, slow to respond to crises and corrupt, wracked by the widespread practice of appointed officials seeking self-enrichment, and prone to use force against civilians. The war had not changed these practices. Yet, the reasons might be entirely different from these assessments. Among the hotly contested issues was the British proposal to reestablish consular offices in their prewar stations. Previously, the British consulate at Mega was responsible for the implementation and coordination of frontier treaty agreements. The transformation of OETA into an advisory capacity to the Ethiopian government, combined with a demand for the return of consular offices, revealed a conflict of interest. On this issue, colonel Cheesman, the British minister in Addis Ababa, differed from the Kenyan administration: [it] was most unfortunate that the Kenya government had taken precipitate action by having a ‘Kenya representative’ and a ‘consular Guard’ at Mega, which… might greatly retard…or even jeopardize [the relationship with Ethiopia]. As Ethiopia is now an independent sovereign state, only British officials properly commissioned have the necessary legal status to remain in Ethiopia… [When] there ceases to be a cantonment, not even the political officer has the right to remain.’58

57 Extract from the district commissioner’s (Moyale) records of incursions into Moyale District from Ethiopia in 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 58 Extract from the district commissioner’s Moyale official records of incursions into Moyale district from Ethiopia in 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.



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Before the Italian occupation, British consular offices in Ethiopia had played a significant role in coordinating frontier security and overseeing the application of transfrontier watering and grazing treaties. The Ethiopian government, furious with this postwar request, believed such offices were no longer needed, and sent the following counterproposal to the Kenyan government: [The] Ethiopia Government agreed to reopen Harar Consulate but stated they [would] be glad if H.M. Government did not press Re-establishment [of] British Consulates at Gore, Mega, Maji and Dangila where there were no British commercial interests of importance and few British nationals. Moreover, British Consular jurisdiction no longer existed. In [the] past [the] presence of foreign consuls in outlying parts [of] Ethiopia had a political significance which the [Imperial] Government was anxious should not be attached to relations between [the] Ethiopian Government [and the British Government]… [The] Imperial Government requested formal sanctions [to] H.M. Government to [the] establishment [of] consulates at Nairobi and Aden [and the] re-opening [of] consulate in Jerusalem and of establishment [of] Consular Agencies at Asmara and Khartoum.59

This communication conveyed some important messages to the Kenyan authorities. The Ethiopian government charged that in the past the consulates had exceeded their mandate and interfered with internal Ethiopian matters along the frontier. This time around, imperial Ethiopia intended to exert its diplomatic authority on two levels. First, it demanded similar facilities in British-occupied territories. Second, it insisted that such facilities must serve commercial rather than political purposes. Further, the Ethiopian government maintained that in those frontier regions where there was no direct British interest, a consular office served no function. The Kenyan government considered the proposed arrangement unacceptable because British colonial interests were more than merely commercial. It insisted that the enforcement of transfrontier treaty agreements was necessary to maintain peace along the common frontier. In response, the governor of Kenya telegraphed the British minister in Addis Ababa stating: ‘I have informed the emperor that I cannot accept his reply and that I must insist on H.M.’s Agreement to re-open our consulates here. Any refusal to do so would be regarded by H.M.’s Government as an unfriendly act, and quite incompatible with new relations between our countries…’60 As in the past, the Ethiopians seldom responded 59 Dowson, summary of interviews with Cheesman, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 60 Ibid.

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cooperatively to such aggressive approaches from British administrators in Kenya, particularly if an immediate response was demanded. Although the previous Ethiopian strategy was to resist by delaying or doing nothing; this time the relationship with the British had changed substantially. Because Britain had defeated the Italians and restored the emperor and Ethiopian sovereignty, British administrators believed they held an advantageous political position and expected concessions. They administered a part of Ethiopia linked to Somalia and this likely affected the emperor’s control over his empire (see chapter 11). Perhaps this was why the minister in Addis Ababa suggested that the Kenyan authorities allow the ‘arguments…[to] soak in the emperor’s mind’ for a time.61 There were different opinions on the reestablishment of British consular offices. The emperor’s communication clearly stated the Ethiopian position, which appears to have had the support of the British liaison office in Addis Ababa. In addition, Brigadier Daniel Sandford, a British army intelligence officer who had supported the advance of patriotic forces into the Ethiopian highlands from the Sudan, was known to be sympathetic to the Ethiopian government. He was strongly opposed to the idea of reopening British consulates along prewar lines. He maintained that British advisers could achieve better results than consular officials. Cheesman agreed with Sandford’s position, and argued against intervention by the Kenyan administration lest it precipitate disagreement over what was essentially an Ethiopian affair. Such interference in the affairs of a neighboring country was unlikely to resolve the longstanding­differences over border issues.62 It was pointed out that Ethiopia was a sovereign nation and not obliged to accept consular appointments with political functions. Meanwhile, the Kenyan administration stood its ground on the right to appoint consuls on the frontier of a British colony, especially after its role in restoring Ethiopia’s government.63 It contended that consular offices served three purposes: to goad Ethiopian administrators into taking action on unresolved frontier issues; to gather trustworthy information on the grazing, watering and security situation on the Ethiopian side of the border; and to advise the Ethiopian administrators (even the emperor 61 Cipher telegram from H.M. minister, Addis Ababa to Foreign Office, and to governor of Kenya, Nairobi, (163) K.5522, 5 May 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 62 Report on visit to Addis Ababa in April and May 1942, political officer’s office, OETA, Mega to chief secretary, Nairobi, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 63 Reece to chief secretary, Nairobi, 12 June 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.



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admitted this). Hence, the NFD authorities concluded that ‘under present conditions a British adviser at Mega would not be satisfactory to use as a substitute for a consul.’64 When the Ethiopian government resumed control of this part of their empire, the NFD administration was extremely sensitive concerning the frontier question. Given disagreements about a number of issues, particularly the Ogaden and the Borana, the emperor’s opposition to external interference was understandable. He knew that a consular officer was likely to cast the activities of the Ethiopian administration in a negative light. Kenyan administrators believed that the emperor lacked suitable administrators to deal with the sensitive postwar state of affairs.65 While the British minister in Addis Ababa and the emperor were prepared to compromise, without insisting on equality of consular representation, the senior NFD administrator took a hardline. The proposed arrangements would remove the political power previously held by consular offices, which ‘should be prepared to cooperate in a more sympathetic spirit with local authorities’ and only influence events on the frontier in this way.66 It appeared that British officials wanted to avoid a direct response to the emperor’s request (stated in the cited letter) that Ethiopia be allowed to establish similar consular offices in British colonies, including the region of Ogaden, then administered by the British military. Aware that the British would have little control over Ethiopian consular representatives, BMA officials had deep reservations about the emperor’s proposal. They were apprehensive about the emperor’s changing attitude towards Italian prisoners of war, especially the possibility that he might appoint some of them to technical or consular offices. The chief administrator of NFD posed a hypothetical question: Supposing that David Hall, a German-Galla [Oromo]…international adventurer, who is now acting as one of the emperor’s industrial advisers, were appointed Ethiopian consul at Nairobi…? The refusal of an exequatur by us would probably result in similar action being taken…to one of our own consuls in Ethiopia… I would state that in the provinces which are near to Kenya it is not yet possible for us…to observe any improvement in the ‘new conditions’ in Ethiopia… One may foresee the possibility of conditions so

64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Paraphrase of telegram from H.M. minister, Addis Ababa, Ref. No. ADM.15/5/4/683, 18 June 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.

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Racial overtones aside, the British administration’s hardline was influenced by the recurring question of the contested border, which had strained frontier relations in the past and seemed likely to do so in the future (chapter 11).

67 Reece to chief secretary, Nairobi, Ref. No. AD.15/5/4/658, 6 July 1942, KNA/DC/ MLE/5/3.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE RETURN TO IMPERIAL FRONTIER POLITICS: THE BRITISH AND ETHIOPIA, 1942–1948 This chapter examines the resumption of imperial frontier politics between Britain and Ethiopia during the period 1942–1948. After an absence of six years from the frontier, Ethiopia faced the task of reasserting her authority while the British, who drove the Italians from power and restored Ethiopian rule, insisted on major changes in frontier control. At the beginning of this period, the British Military Administration (BMA) still controlled the Ogaden, which included the region of Oddo, under the 1942 convention—a major source of conflict between the two states. To understand the BMA policies in Ogaden, it is helpful to return to the period of Italian occupation of Ethiopia when the Italians ‘detached the Ogaden from Ethiopia and included…[it in] Italian Somaliland’ (Rennell 1948:74). After the conquest of British Somaliland in 1940, the Italians briefly succeeded in uniting all Somalis in the Horn of Africa under one administration, except those in Djibouti and Kenya. This marked the collapse of previous imperial borders, at least as far as the Somalis were concerned (Potholm 1970:185). In the spring of 1941 the whole of Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland and the Ethiopian Ogaden region came under the control of the BMA (Wolde-Mariam 1964:207). The administration of Ogaden and some of the districts bordering Borana were ‘attached to Somalia from where they were administered under [BMA]’ (Eshete 1991:10). During the BMA administration, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia came under the authority of Mogadishu, creating an historical ambiguity that eventually led to conflict between Ethiopia and the Republic of Somalia in the post-independence period. Still, there were disagreements over the interpretation of the certain articles of the 1942 Convention between the British and the emperor of Ethiopia. Article 3 placed the Reserved Area under the BMA. Under international law, this was considered part of occupied enemy territory, which meant that the Ethiopian administration and police were excluded. Article 5 concerned the administration of the Ogaden and states: ‘His Majesty the emperor agrees that the part of the territory of the Ogaden, which was included in the former Italian Colonial Government of Somalia,

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shall, during the currency of this Convention, remain under the British Military Administration of Somalia’ (Rennell 1948:195). Disagreement arose because when in theory ‘the Reserved Areas and the Cantonments were handled back to the emperor’s sole administration, the Ogaden territory would…[still] remain under the Somalia administration ‘during the currency of the Convention’ (see Rennell 1948:195). The policy of BMA provides insight into the disputes between Ethiopia and the British administration on the interpretation of the 1942 convention and the British proposal for the removal of the ethnic groups blamed for supporting banditry in Borana province. This chapter evaluates the factors that led to the resumption of frontier politics and diplomacy, focusing on differing interpretations of the Anglo-Ethiopian convention of 1942, which set out the terms for the British occupation of the Ogaden and the return of the Borana province to Ethiopia. In addition, it considers Ethiopia’s assertion of her authority on the frontier and the implications of her proSomali policy in land conflicts. The Return to the Ethiopian Administration The Ethiopian administration returned to frontier with only handful of Ethiopian resistance fighters to do the policing—against British advice. Tesfaye Wolde, a well-known shifta leader with about 400 followers, was asked to police Borana Province. The NFD administration would have preferred a small detachment of well-trained police strategically placed in the most sensitive areas of the frontier over a large ill-disciplined force likely to lead to further insecurity.1 Of immediate concern to both administrations was the resurgence of transfrontier banditry. The NFD administration advocated the removal of the Somalis from Borana province as the best solution to this problem, but the Ethiopian administration actively opposed this plan. Before long, diplomatic maneuvering between the two states stalled efforts to curtail banditry. Responding to British demands to reduce banditry and tribal raids, the Ethiopian shizat (prime minister), promised to send a force to deal with the security situation on the frontier.2 Transport problems in Sidamo

1 ‘Record of a meeting held at Government House, Nairobi, on Monday, the 20th of July, 1942, regarding the political situation on the Kenya-Ethiopian frontier’, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 2 J.M. Thomas, Mega, to F.A. Lloyd, district commissioner, Moyale, 4 May 1942, KNA/ DC/MLE/5/3.



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delayed a punitive force of irregulars from reaching Borana. Ras Adefrsew,3 the governor-general of Borana and Sidamo, preferred to wait for the transport to arrive from Addis Ababa, rather than use the local transport already assembled.4 From a British frontier observer’s viewpoint, the slow Ethiopian response to the crisis was not surprising. In principal, the Ethiopians were committed to dealing with the lack of security in Borana province, but they distrusted the British, and so were slow to respond to British suggestions. Suspecting ulterior motives, Ethiopian frontier officials frequently did the opposite what the British wanted, basing their decisions on an assessment of Ethiopian interests. The emperor agreed to send one Ethiopian battalion to Borana to deal with the Somali rebels (chapter 12). Differences of opinion emerged about the leadership of the force and its ability to suppress banditry. The 800man irregular force under major Johannes Abdo had been inactive. The British were ambivalent about him: they conceded that he was an educated and experienced man, but they regarded him as arrogant because he had been rude to NFD administrators. Further, they contended that his pro-Somali attitude made him unsuitable.5 The other initiative centered on a battalion assembled in Jimma, commanded by a British officer, colonel Pierson, with orders to take up a position in Negelle Borana. In the Addis Ababa legation, the British minister supported the formation of Col. Pierson’s force, which would coordinate a strategy with the NFD and the consular office in Mega to tackle the problem of frontier banditry. From both political and military points of view, it was vital that the British should coordinate its effort with the British military administration in Somalia. Meanwhile, disagreements arose over the interpretation of Article 5 in the 1942 Anglo-Ethiopian Convention that stipulated that the Borana region be handed back to Ethiopia. The main dispute was over the Oddo region. Article 5 of the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1942 specified that the area of Ogaden remained under the BMA, but

3 Ras Adefrsew, a court chamberlain, lived in exile in Palestine during the Italian occupation. In July 1940, he joined the emperor in Khartoum and accompanied him to Addis Ababa, where he was appointed governor of Kambatta. Later, he was promoted to Ras and office of governor of Sidamo. See KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 4 Telegram from Dowson to political officer, Addis Ababa, to administrator, Isiolo province, 15 May 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 5 In the 1950s, major Johannes Abdo became a key player in the administration of Borana Province. Rather than solving issues, he left behind him a trail of land conflicts between the Borana and the Somali pastoralists in the Eastern region of Borana (see Bizuneh 2008).

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was silent on the fate of Oddo. The Ethiopians interpreted this to mean that the region should be returned to them while the territory of the ‘Ogaden which was included in the former Italian colonial government of Somalia…remain[ed] under British Military administration’ (Petrides 1983:27). The British maintained that the region covered under Article 5 included all northwestern and western areas of former Italian Somaliland occupied by Somali tribes: this region consisted of several districts, including Ogaden proper, Shebelle and Webbi Gestro east of the Juba River, and the region of Oddo to the west of Juba adjoining the Mandera district of Kenya. Emperor Haile Selassie rejected the proposition that these districts fell under British authority. The emperor’s interpretation of the treaty seemed more accurate because the agreement referred to Ogaden up to Juba, but not to the areas of Oddo west of Juba. Clearly, the British Somalia administration did not base its case on the text of the treaty, but rather asserted that ‘[i]t was…impossible to administer these areas separately; Ogaden proper could not be administered without Webi Shebelle which could not [be] administered without Webi Gestro which in turn could not be administered separately from Oddo.6 An international treaty is a legal framework within which the affected parties conduct a dialogue. The articles of the treaty provide guidelines for dialogue on issues on which the various parties seek agreement. Ethiopia, from its weaker political position, considered that its interests would best be served by strict adherence to the terms of the treaty. The British acknowledged the treaty and the terms of agreement, but also raised practical considerations that went against the legally defined terms in the article of the treaty. The British argued that the British defeat of the Italian forces and their subsequent occupation of Ethiopia meant that Ethiopia was in effect an occupied territory: …to be administered by the conquerors according to the prescribed international usage until the status should be decided by the peace conference. The emperor on his side maintained that he had never renounced his sovereignty, had never ceased to be the legal ruler, and could rightly assume at once all his imperial powers (Perham 1948:390–91).

Evidence of this fundamental difference was the OETA’s brief administration of Borana and the circumstances that led to the transfer of the administration of the Ogaden to the BMA. The British had another objective, 6 ‘Record of a meeting held at Government House’ 20 of July 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.



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however, which was to use the period of occupation to revive old questions relating to the borders. Now that the British held a politically advantageous position, officials thought that Ethiopia would accept respon­sibility for the insecurity caused by its citizens across the border from the British administered territories. The British were inclined to be more forceful in resolving frontier issues, because previous timeconsuming negotiations had made little progress or had even heightened disagreement. The new, more assertive stance appeared bound to create further dissent. The British planned to include Oddo in the Somali region for security reasons, coordinating with the BMA. Placing part of the area under Ethiopian administration, the British claimed, would increase political tensions among some Somali tribes that had resisted the return of Ethiopian rule. Further, the transfer of this area to Ethiopia would form a wedge of Ethiopian-administered land between the two Britishadministered regions, creating a strategically undesirable situation. Such a transfer would mean that the Ethiopians (still considered ‘potentially hostile’ by the British) would be close to sensitive military communication lines; however, a refusal to return Oddo to the Ethiopian administration would upset the Ethiopians. For this reason, major general Lord Rennell suggested that the status of Oddo be regarded as temporary, while the territorial forces helped the Ethiopians to ‘clear up the security mess.’ Since ‘the wording of Article 5 of the agreement was untenable’, rendering the legal situation unclear, he suggested that the British minister in Addis Ababa intervene to retain Oddo ‘on grounds of administrative convenience.’7 He sketched possible scenarios: ‘We would in any event be quite justified in refusing to relinquish anything beyond the Oddo area, as it would render Ogaden administration almost impossible. If the Aulihan [were] handed over, it would mean handing over the Ogaden too and that would mean an Ethiopian-Somali war.’8 The British position revolved around what was practical rather than what was legal in terms of the treaty. It is important to remember that the British still governed the Ethiopian region of Ogaden under BMA, giving them a military advantage as a conquering empire, which meant they could refuse to implement disadvantageous decisions. It was unclear if the emperor would recognize the ‘de facto [British] position in Oddo [considering that it would affect] his juridical claim[s] to administer the

7 Minutes of a meeting held at Suffield House, 23 July 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 8 Ibid.

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area because of its unfortunate omission from Article No. 5 of the Military Convention.’9 Without his cooperation, British officials were unlikely to succeed; significantly, they would not be able to control the activities of the Jeegir Somali bandits. Each side blamed the other for the lack of security in the area. The British linked the presence of the Marehan in the Borana province to the crisis of ongoing banditry. The problem of the Marehan in Borana had been contentious since the OETA period. Gerald Reece admitted that the Marehan had been British subjects at one time, but argued that their ‘nationality… [was now] a moot question.’ When OETA administered the area, the Marehan had been repatriated from the Liban region of Borana to Jubaland, even though their chief, Sheikh Hussein, ‘wanted to stay in Ethiopia…[claiming to be] a loyal subject of the emperor.’ Reece admitted that his plan of repatriating the group to Jubaland was opposed by Brigadier Scuphan of the British military in Somalia, who restricted them to the area of Oddo.10 The NFD administrators blamed Fitaurari Tademe,11 the governor of Borana, for allowing the Marehan return to the Borana Province. According to the British administration, this remained: …the most important of all…[the] demands, for there will inevitably be trouble on the Kenya border…and trouble of increasing gravity if the Ethiopian Government allow detribalized Herti and Isaak and Ogaden and Hawiya Somalis to continue to live in Borana; while many of these men have always been professional robbers and raid organizers, the latest arrivals are mainly ex-Italian soldiers who have no other means of survival than robbery.12

For both political and administrative reasons, the British wanted the group removed, even though prospects for this were remote. One view was that their transfer to Jubaland might not be practical, given the large population that already lived there and the scarcity of grazing and water. Their transfer would strengthen the NFD administration’s ability to control the movement of people on the frontier. Their repatriation to Oddo would hinder this control. Matters would be even worse if Oddo were handed over to the Ethiopian government, for the Marehan would 9 Ibid. 10 Reece to chief secretary, Nairobi, SE.1/2/538, Ethiopian frontier affairs 10 June 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/6. 11 Fitaurari Tedame was deputy governor of Borana under Ras Desta during the war with the Italians. Some British administrators blamed the Ras for having invited the Marehan into Liban in Borana. 12 Reece to chief secretary, Nairobi, p, 10 June 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/6.



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probably ‘break back’ into Liban.13 British officials finally reached a consensus on the need to remove the Marehan from the Borana region of Liban into Oddo. The Ethiopian battalion commanded by colonel Pierson, with possible support from the irregulars, was assigned to undertake this removal, but his force would not be allowed to enter the Oddo area. Senior British officials seemed to believe that they could transfer the Marehan to Jubaland as part of the plan for resettlement, if the Kenyan police held the Daua Parma to block their return. There were two major obstacles to the British plan. First, it was almost impossible to control the nomadic population.14 Second, uncertainty existed concerning the eventual transfer of the region to the Ethiopian government. The success of the British plan depended on how the Ethiopians reasserted themselves in the administration of Borana, for that would determine how the British administration handled the Marehan. The British were unsure about the emperor’s reaction to the plan, but it was unlikely to be favorable in view of the Ethiopia’s insistence on enforcing Article 5 of the 1942 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty. What made the British even more apprehensive was evidence that the Somali Jeegir bandits made an alliance with Ahmed Aden, the son of Sheikh Hussein, the leader of the Marehan. The British suspected that the Ethiopians deliberately allowed bandits to operate in their territory so, by extension; the Marehan presence very likely posed a threat to frontier security. The British concluded that the Ethiopians ‘not only took no action but encouraged the movement [of Marehan back into Borana].’15 The NFD administration believed that, like the Italians, the Ethiopians were ‘keen to increase their [pastoralist] population, and they [were] loath to expel any potential tax payers.’ The NFD’s chief administrator determined that the ‘amount of trouble and expense which will be caused…by the Marehan and Herti and Isaak and Ogaden Somalis who are now in Borana will far exceed any revenue which they accrue from their [taxes].’ This view contradicted Ethiopian pro-Somali policy.16 The NFD administrators preferred to negotiate an agreement with their colleagues in Somalia by ‘thrashing out the matter…and then present[ing] it…to the Ethiopian Government [in] an agreed statement.’17 Two issues 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Cipher telegram No.285, governor of Kenya, to H.M. minister, Addis Ababa, and to secretary of state, No. 637, 31 July 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid.

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that the Kenya government and the Somali administration hoped to agree on were: (1) that the BMA should continue to administer Oddo so long as gendarmerie were available in that area, (2) that coordinated action be taken by colonel Pierson, the commander of the British Military Mission to Ethiopia (BMME), the BMA’s gendarmerie in Somalia and the Kenya police to ‘clean up’ Oddo and remove the Marehan and the Somali frontier bandits (chapter 12).18 In effect, the British administration preferred to undertake unilateral action to establish security on the two frontiers. Ethiopia Re-asserts Her Authority British frontier administrators underestimated the Ethiopians. They ignored the fact that emperor Haile Selassie alone was responsible for making decisions, which Ethiopian administrators would rigorously carry out. In the past, the Ethiopians had surprised the British with their sophisticated preparation for negotiations, effectively deploying knowledge of the relevant facts, while using threats and delaying tactics if necessary (see chapter 13). In this particular case, Ethiopia was determined to reassert her authority on the frontier through changes in leadership and in their Somali policy. For practical reasons, the reestablished Ethiopian administration in Borana needed to levy taxes; so here the wealth of different pastoral groups was relevant. The exclusion of Somali clans from the Borana region would deny the Ethiopians much needed income (Bizuneh 1999:87). To counter British pressure, the Ethiopians did exactly the opposite of what the British officials wanted; that is, they welcomed the Marehan to settle in Borana region of Liban as the best way of resisting British tactics. The new governor of Borana, Fitaurari Tesfaye Wolde, and his assistants in Negelle, Balambras Iman Berhan and Gerazmach Gebre Thekarhashu, already spoke in ‘most respectful terms.’19 about Sheikh Hussein, the Marehan leader. Officially, the Ethiopians recognized Sheikh Hussein by presenting him with the Ethiopian military title of Gerazmach for his peace settlement with Ras Adefrsew.20 The reasser­ tion   of Ethiopian authority forced the British seek new modalities for

18 Record of a meeting held at Government House, Nairobi, regarding the political situation on the Kenya-Ethiopian frontier on Monday, 20 July 1942, p.2, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 19 Letter from Moyale Division police to superintendent-in-charge Northern frontier police, Isiolo, No. 4/43, 1 August 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 20 Ibid.



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cooperation in frontier affairs. A British intelligence report claimed that the man in charge of Borana, Fitaurari Tesfaye Wolde, who had earlier been imprisoned by the British in Kenya, hated the British for putting him in chains.21 British officials did not expect to have cordial relations with him, but, rather than create a political fuss, they demanded that the Ethiopian Third Army, commanded by colonel Pierson, assume responsibility for frontier security. Frontier insecurity created an administrative quandary for the Ethiopians. The diplomatic strategy of cultivating the Somalis as allies was part of a confidence-building exercise designed to oppose the British. Unfortunately, the new pro-Somali policy adversely affected relations among ethnic groups aligned with Ethiopia and others who were opposed to what they regarded as ‘re-colonization.’ The British administration continued to justify its policy based on their role in the liberation of Ethiopia. They conceived their goal as reshaping Ethiopian frontier policy to avoid past antagonism. By contrast, the Ethiopians regarded British policy as an attempt to ‘to impose a quasi-protectorate status over the country [which they, the Ethiopians] resented’ (Bizuneh 1999:70, 75). British inflexibility led to deterioration in frontier political relationships, which the British blamed on an Ethiopian failure to learn from the lessons of the past. The NFD administration believed that the Ethiopian’s inability to impose order on their frontier administration posed a threat to their interests. Conversely, the Ethiopian administrators interpreted British bullying as an attempt to create a pretext to take over the administration of the frontier, as they had at the end of the Italian occupation. The NFD Kenyan administration blamed the worsening security situation on conflict between Muslim Somalis and non-Muslim Borana and Gabra and advocated the disarmament of the tribes as the only effective solution.22 Meanwhile, NFD officials linked increased frontier raiding to the growing availability of firearms that had forced people such as the Borana, who were initially victims, to arm themselves for protection. British intelligence sources reported that hundreds of rifles were brought in from other areas of Ethiopia and exchanged for Borana cattle. In addition, they claimed that Fitaurari Tesfaye Wolde actively encouraged the firearms trade to arm Borana as auxiliaries for policing purposes. Such 21 Reece to chief secretary, Nairobi, Ref. L & O.17/12/3/926, 22 August 1942, KNA/DC/ MLE/5/3. 22 Reece to colonial secretary, on the disarmament of frontier tribes, Ref. L & O.17/7/2/924, August 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3/.

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a policy obstructed the proposed disarmament of frontier pastoralists, yet the NFD administration was insensitive to the fact that, under the circumstances, the newly reestablished Ethiopian frontier administration  needed to arm its citizens to protect Ethiopian interests and keep order. British dissatisfaction with frontier security can be explained in racial terms. The officer-in-charge of NFD questioned whether ‘the local Ethiopian Government [had]…reached a sufficiently advanced state of civilization’ for it to be able to make rational decisions. In an oblique reference to Ethiopian administrators, the NFD administrator was disappointed about the appointment of an ‘ex-brigand’ as governor of Borana, and his ‘ex-robber followers’ as police. Perturbed by the fact that the individuals who policed the frontier did not receive formal salaries, the NFD officials believed that they turned to robbery to support themselves. This type of officially sanctioned banditry, combined with an increase in Somali banditry across the frontier, sowed mistrust between the two administrations.23 Demands for the extradition of criminals by either frontier administration were another source of tension. Usually, the Ethiopians resisted these demands, but the British administration also refused to hand over people who committed crimes in Ethiopia and escaped to the NFD, yet insisted on the extradition of alleged criminals charged with crimes on the NFD side of the frontier. The reason for denying extradition was ‘the variation in the definition of crimes in different countries and the fear that extradition may be used in order to get hold of a fugitive who is wanted by his country not really for a criminal but for a political offence.’24 The Ethiopian penal code, which still ‘prescribe[d] the homely punishment of mutilation [by public hanging or chopping off of hands] for a man who abused the Bishop’,25 was regarded as contrary to the British concept of justice. NFD administrators assumed that Fitaurari Tesfaye Wolde, having himself been a fugitive during World War II, would not hesitate to request extradition without differentiating between frontier pastoralists escaping the predatory tax collection system and real criminals. Further, British sources claimed that the arrest warrants issued by the Ethiopians did not meet 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 The Ethiopian legal code cited was section 173 (revised and reprinted) that prescribes mutilation of criminals. See letter on extradition from Reece to colonial secretary, 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. .



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British legal standards. According to the NFD administration, extradition treaties were unlikely to function effectively on a frontier inhabited by nomadic communities that spent part of the year on one side of the border or the other, according to the season.26 Two important cases illuminate these issues. The first concerned Haji Hassan Gababa, the leader of the Garre, whose political career has been discussed in previous chapters. Fitaurari Tesfaye Wolde, the governor of Borana, wanted to force the return of some Garre communities that had sought refuge in Kenya from bandit attacks. He sent a letter (in Swahili) to the acting district commissioner of Moyale requesting the extradition of Gababa. Acknowledging the treaty between the two ‘Empires’ and alluding to the ‘emperor of Abyssinia and the English’,27 he claimed that he understood that the existing treaty stipulated that each party was obligated to turn over criminals who sought refuge in their country, but had committed crimes in the other. He then provided the names of Garre leaders whom he considered fugitives and requested a response within five days.28 The border treaty, however, did not cover the subject of extradition, despite Fitaurari Tesfaye Wolde’s stated belief that each country was committed to reciprocation. Fitaurari Tesfaye Wolde’s main concern was that Haji Hassan Gababa’s absence left the Garre in Ethiopia without a leader. So long as this situation existed, he believed that the frontier would become unsettled. He blamed the British for allowing Haji Hassan Gababa to cross the frontier with his people.29 Major M. Grant referred the Borana governor to the officer-in-charge of the NFD, Gerald Reece, as the official with the authority to handle this problem. Grant suggested a meeting between the two leaders when the NFD chief administrator arrived in Moyale. He also promised to instruct the district commissioner of Mandera to investigate the possibility of returning the Garre to Ethiopia, but he cautioned the governor that the Garre groups from Ethiopia had already integrated with the British Garre and moved to a remote part of the district where it would

26 Reece to chief secretary, Nairobi, 31 August 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 27 Letter [written in Kiswahili; translated by author] from Fitaurari Tasfaye Walde to district commissioner, Moyale, on extradition of the people who crossed to the British Frontier, 2 September 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 28 Ibid. 29 Second letter [written in Kiswahili; translated by author] from Fitaurari Tasfaye Walde to district commissioner, Moyale, on extradition of the people who crossed to the British Frontier, 2 September, 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.

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be difficult to recover them.30 Clearly, Grant implied that this request might not be granted. The Ethiopian administration’s lack of capacity to police remote areas had forced the Garre to cross to the British side of the border for their own safety after the armed attacks against them had intensified. Haji Hassan Gababa, the Garre chief, had ‘asked for protection and to be allowed to go to El Wak. He was allowed protection but his reputation and [past disloyalty were] so well known that he was not allowed to live with the tribe but sent to the [Marsabit District].’31 Gababa’s request for protection suggested that Garre fortunes had once again diminished; this time the shift was not in their favor. Previously, Gababa had seesawed between supporting the Ethiopians or the Italians. For this reason, the British were suspicious of his motives. However, the British administration faced a dilemma regarding this issue. Although Gababa’s shifting allegiance made things difficult, he was an influential leader whom they might want to use to get the Garre back to the British side of the border. There were risks involved in returning the Garre to Kenya, but Gababa could play a role in reducing frontier banditry. Despite his short stint in detention, he was more valuable to the frontier administration out of jail than in. A shrewd politician, he adroitly manipulated the tensions between the British and the Ethiopians, and still had important cards to play. After his release, he again shifted his allegiance and returned to Ethiopia, a decision that did not surprise the British administration at all. The second important case was the perennial Marehan question. British officials had approached several local and provincial Ethiopian administrators to intervene with the emperor, with the assistance of the British minister in Addis Ababa. Reece, the NFD chief administrator, adopted his usual hardline stance: The question of Marehan was first put to the emperor by me personally fourteen months ago and he then promised to consider it. One assumes that he must by now have done so. Since any operations against the Somali bandits would be futile unless the Marehan were repatriated at the same time, it would be a mistake for us to agree any half measures which did not include the removal of Marehan.32

30 Grant district commissioner, Moyale, to Fitaurari Tesfai Walde, on repatriation of Hassan Gababa, 2 September 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid.



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Reece’s frustration is understandable, but the Ethiopians also had their own reasons for not cooperating. They realized that force alone had failed to reassert their administrative authority in such a volatile region as Borana province. This was particularly important in the Somali region of Ogaden, which was politically part of Ethiopia but remained under the BMA. Traditionally, the Somalis were hostile to the Amhara-dominated Ethiopian administration, but the emperor’s policy of granting privilege to people like the Marehan in return for cooperation seemed designed to gain their support. Chief administrator Reece recognized that ‘the emperor’s policy ha[d] always been to protect Ethiopia by sending to [the] frontier Provinces officials who [would] not be friendly [or] too obliging to their European neighbors.’33 This referred to administrators such as Ras Adefrsew who took an independent view of NFD administration demands regarding frontier security and Marehan repatriation. Reece asked, ‘In view of the fact that Sheikh Hussein’s contribution to the present state of disorder on the frontier is undeniable, [can we not regard] Ras Adefrsew’s action of publicly honoring and giving him high Ethiopian rank, as hostile and obstructive?’34 The NFD administration blamed Ras Adefrsew for creating the impression among the border populations that the two administrations were in open conflict along the frontier. The British had long tried to avoid this, as it created ‘a feeling of certainty amongst the local tribesmen and outlaws that the Ethiopian and British Governments are definitely at loggerheads, and that any action inimical to us will receive support from or be tolerated by local Ethiopian officials.’35 The NFD administration was aware of the need for a cautious approach to dealing with the Ethiopian government for a number of reasons. First, the Ethiopian administration was unlikely to accept terms unless they had been approved and communicated by the emperor. Second, the NFD administration might have made more progress with frontier cooperation had it engaged the Ethiopians in a mutually beneficial way. Perhaps the Ethiopian lack of response to British demands for the removal of the Marehan can be attributed to the emperor, who had political considerations other than frontier security alone. The British administration 33 Reece to chief secretary, Nairobi, Ref. L & O.17/11/1309, 15 November 1942, KNA/DC/ MLE/5/3. 34 Ibid. 35 L.A. Weaving, officer-in-charge, NFD, Isiolo, to the secretariat, Nairobi, Ref. No. S/A. XAF.6/12/111/103, 19 December 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.

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believed that if their approach failed to get an appropriate response from the Ethiopian administration, then ‘His Majesty’s Government [had grounds they] could use to justify [the] strongest pressure on the emperor.’36 What type of ‘pressure’ was proposed was not specified. Based on past behavior, the most likely Ethiopian response was either delaying tactics or a firm refusal to cooperate. Citing the Kenyan governor’s secret telegram to the secretary of state for the colonies, the officerin-charge NFD argued that: Ras Adefrsew [was]…in league with the Marehan Chief, Sheikh Hussein, and that he and [Fitaurari] Tesfaye Wolde will do all they can to oppose removal of Marehan… [The commission] will…only be used as a pretext for further delay unless [the] emperor is pressed…to accept in principle removal of Marehan as [an] essential preliminary to restoration of order on the border.37

Despite continuous complaints from the NFD administration, it became clear that the Ethiopians would not cooperate. While Emperor Haile Selassie was diplomatic, he refused to consider suggestions that would undermine his power. Indeed, Reece had forewarned that Fitaurari Tesfaye Wolde ‘desired neither to give nor to receive any news [from British border officials]’, which turned out to be an accurate assessment. On 20 December 1942, the diplomatic rebuff by the Fitaurari demonstrated the depth of Ethiopian displeasure when he arrived on the border. The British interpreted his rebuff as unwillingness to cooperate. The NFD administration felt bound ‘to warn the emperor that [they] consider Fitaurari Tesfaye Wolde, the Governor, and Ras Adefrsew, the Governor General, untrustworthy and hostile to [the] best interests of the British and Ethiopian Governments.’ They even went so far as to threaten that ‘if the emperor chooses to accept [his officials’] advice instead of that of British officers, he [would be] making himself personally responsible.’38 It is difficult to understand why the British expected the emperor to follow their advice rather than that of his own officials. If anything, the behavior of the Ethiopians toward the British frontier administration remained consistent and predictable. Actions rather than words displayed their displeasure at being ‘pushed around’ by their more powerful colonial neighbor on matters that they considered internal affairs. Perhaps the

36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid.



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Ethiopians felt that they could not influence British frontier policy, or that there was no possibility of a quid prod quo. The side with the most power and influence would determine how the frontier would be administered. While the emperor offered calculated reassurances, he refused to compromise when it came to reasserting his authority. In the true sense of the Amhara metaphor, Zemena warq (separating wax from gold),39 public declarations probably had hidden meanings. British officials were not successful in separating the metaphorical Abyssinian “gold” from the “wax”. They did not grasp the Ethiopian culture of plurality, in which intentions differed from actions. In such instances, the British usually bypassed the local authorities and communicated directly with Addis Ababa through the British minister there or the governor of Kenya or the colonial secretary. Such diplomatic maneuvering did not go down well with the Ethiopian provincial administration on the frontier. A secret telegram from Sir Henry Monck-Mason Moore, governor of Kenya, to the British minister in Addis Ababa, states that ‘[o]ur most recent information is that already a serious position is developing [on the frontier] which calls for immediate and drastic action by Ethiopian Authorities. [B]ut that neither Ras Adefrsew nor [Fitaurari] Tesfaye Wolde have any intention of tackling it.’40 British dissatisfaction was not unusual, but the emperor’s decision to make a trip to the region himself underscored his concern about the deteriorating frontier security situation. Subsequent events showed that the emperor was also aiming to stamp his authority on the frontier. In the Kenyan governor’s opinion, the emperor’s visit represented an important opportunity for the British to communicate the NFD security concerns to him directly. He suggested that the minister in Addis Ababa should see ‘the emperor personally and [urge] that what [was] required [was] immediate action rather than any form of conference…[on] the question of the removal of the Marehan.’41 In their representation to the emperor, the NFD administration insisted on the removal of the Marehan from the frontier because their atrocious behavior undermined security. British officials believed that increased intertribal conflict on the frontier troubled the Ethiopian administration 39 D.N. Levine (1974) uses the symbolism of wax and gold (zemena warq) as a metaphor in the Amharic language; it implies that what you hear is not what you see. There are two sides to the same story, with the imitation (wax) and its hidden meaning (the gold). 40 Weaving, officer-in-charge NFD, Isiolo, to secretariat, Nairobi (Ref. No. S/A. XAF.6/12/111/103), on frontier affairs of Borana, 19 December 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 41 Weaving, secretariat, Nairobi, to officer-in-charge NFD, on Frontier Affairs, Ref. S/A. XAF-6/12/111/110, 29 December 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.

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as much as it did the British. The Ethiopians had realized that groups such as the Jeegir bandits (see chapter 12) were not only well organized but also had a political agenda to reject Ethiopian authority, which challenged Ethiopia’s attempt to establish law and order on the frontier. The British had offered to provide military personnel to train Ethiopian forces to deal with frontier banditry. Reducing border banditry was in Ethiopia’s interest, but the Ethiopians suspected that the British wanted to return to administering the frontier through a proxy force. The British Proposals The British outlined three proposals: the perennial question of removing the Marehan; disarmament of the frontier tribes; and more stringent measures to control frontier banditry. The NFD administration insisted that there could be no permanent peace on the frontier without the removal of Somali tribes like the Marehan from Borana, an idea the British had unsuccessfully advocated since OETA departed from Borana. Their second point was to disarm frontier tribes to prevent a resurgence of banditry and to defuse ethnic feuds. This too was not a new proposal. The third point was to reintroduce the idea of establishing a permanent British-led Borana police force at strategic places along the frontier, a concept closely linked to disarming frontier nomads. The timing of these British proposals was critical as the Agreement of the Military Convention of 31 January 1942, which established the BMA in Somali-occupied regions such as Ogaden, had expired and was up for renegotiation. Perhaps the British administration felt that they could use this ‘as a bargaining factor with the emperor.’42 Emperor Haile Selassie’s response was calculating, but firm. He recognized that the British must be handled carefully and that the previous tactic of making limited concessions had always worked in his favor. Nevertheless, he remained evasive without being confrontational on most of the points in the proposal: he ignored the first point without saying so in unambiguous terms. Mean­ while, the British were anxious for the whole proposal to be accepted, and they spelled out their reservations to convince the emperor. The British minister in Addis Ababa telegraphed the Kenyan governor to report on his discussion with the emperor on the question of the Marehan in Borana. His message read in part: 42 Reece to colonial secretary, Nairobi, 1 February 1944, p.2, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.



the return to imperial frontier politics: 1942–1948247 I spoke to the emperor on January 10th [1944] about Marehan and reminded him of the view which he had expressed to me some time ago that their presence was not beneficial to Ethiopia. I said that as far as [our] information went, a great number of them were still in Boran and that H.B.M.’s Government considered that as long as they remained there was no prospect of permanent peace or security on the Frontier… I asked His Majesty to let me know what the policy of the Ethiopian Government was in the matter. His Majesty replied that he had been considering the question and had decided to summon the Governor of Boran to Addis Ababa to consult on this matter.43

The emperor and his administrators needed to weigh whether the Marehan presence was ‘not beneficial to Ethiopia’ in light of Ethiopia’s new pro-Somali policy. Because the Marehan had willingly collaborated with the Ethiopian administration and appeared to have become a model Somali community, unlike other Somali tribes that continued to resist the reinstated Ethiopian administration, the government decided to ignore the first point in the British proposal. Moreover, Ethiopian officials exercised caution in negotiations with the Somalis because that might inhibit the return of British-occupied Somali regions to the Ethiopian administration. Two problems emerged. The first was who should take responsibility for the disarmament exercise; the second was that the frontier, including those areas of Somalia administered by the BMA, was so extensive that it was practically impossible to police effectively. The second proposal—disarmament—was equally difficult for the Ethiopians to accept. In a society in which gun ownership was part of the culture of supremacy, particularly for the Amhara who had used the gun to conquer and subjugate the people of the south, any disarmament attempt would be resisted. Furthermore, since the BMA still had jurisdiction over some of their land, the Ethiopians considered the British as a potential enemy. Recognizing these considerations, British officials proposed a partial disarmament wherein the Amhara and the Oromo, who came with the habash settlers, continued to carry guns, while the frontier nomads would ‘as a rule be forbidden to possess firearms.’44 What the British administration ignored was that armed Amhara were responsible for much of the depredation of frontier communities, thus their bearing of arms posed a security problem. Disarmament without an effective 43 Telegram No. 2 from H.M. minister, Addis Ababa, to governor of Kenya, 11 January 1944, and to Foreign Office, Ref. Telegram No. 628, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 44 Reece to colonial secretary, Nairobi, 1 February 1944, p.4, on disarmament in Ethiopia, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.

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administrative strategy to keep the area free of guns was futile. Despite the likelihood that the Ethiopians would reject the proposal, Reece pressed for action: What is of great importance is the need for the realization in Ethiopia of the principle that they can no longer expect to be able to allow all their people more especially the Border tribes to possess and acquire firearms without restriction…[It] is felt that the time has come when the emperor should be obliged to make a start by proclaiming to his people that in future civilians will only be allowed to possess and carrying firearms under [strict] conditions.45

This issue had been raised previously. The problem was that the administrator ignored the unique political and cultural circumstances of the Ethiopian empire. The Ethiopians were averse to disarming their frontier communities, reasoning that this exposed them to attack from the British side of the frontier. The British proposal must also be considered from the perspective of their own efforts to police the frontier. Reece contended that the number of armed civilians in the neighboring country was costly for the British, necessitating an unnecessarily large number of police posts on the frontier.46 If the purpose of disarming civilians along the frontier was to reduce the cost of policing for the British, this was hardly an Ethiopian concern. This did not mean, however, that the Ethiopians would not consider disarming people along another frontier; indeed, they were likely to favor disarmament when it came time to return areas of Somalia bordering Borana, such as the Ogaden, as colonel Asefaw Wolde Giorgis confided to the British administration.47 Thus, it appears that the British proposal considered this. The British did not specify who bore the responsibility for disarming frontier civilians, and the existing agreement gave no reason to suppose that this was the task of the ‘Boran police.’48 The assumption seemed to be that it was an Ethiopian responsibility, but the Ethiopians declined to undertake it. Rather, their priority was to extend their administrative influence on the frontier. As coming events would show, it was premature for the British to press the Ethiopians to act. The Ethiopians responded favorably to the third British proposal to post a permanent British-led Borana police force at strategic places along 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Reece to chief secretary, Ref. A.XAF-6/12/VII/208, 15 January 1944, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 48 Mandera District annual report, 1944, p.2, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2.



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the frontier. This force would not have exclusive responsibility for maintaining frontier security: Ethiopian irregulars and the territorials would continue to police the frontier, while Borana police guarded the more contentious places along the border. Thus, at the end of 1943, the Borana police assumed responsibility for guarding a ‘vital sector from El Der to Malka Marri.’49 Major Allen, seconded to the Ethiopian administration from the Kenya police under the OETA, commanded the force. Although the British administration would have liked this force to exercise its security mandate more freely, only certain parts of the border were allocated to it. The police were instructed to observe the Gwynn Line (Blue Line) between Malka Marri and Gundad Guda; the Maud Line (Red Line) between Gundad Guda and Kuffole; and jurisdiction as far as the Maud Line between Gundad Guda and Malka Ursulli. Border disputes had rendered the areas subject to their control as a ‘no-man’s’ land for several years. Perhaps the instructions to the British were meant more to prevent armed conflict between the frontier police of both sides than to eradicate banditry. Still suspicious of British intentions, no sooner were the Borana police in place than Ethiopia deployed its military forces (irregulars and the territorials) on the same frontier, which soon created a standoff when colonel Asefaw Wolde Giorgis dispatched a large force to El Roba in the disputed part of the border.50 He justified this because during the occupation, the Italians had built roads and maintained a military post in the Jara salient. The NFD administration countered that the area had always been Kenyan territory, although they did not deny that it had been under Italian administration during the war. According to the Ethiopians, how could this possibly be British territory now when the British had not resisted the Italian invasion? To prevent clashes between the two forces, major Grant, the British consul for southern Ethiopia, took Ethiopian officials to the area ‘to point [out] to them the Treaty Line from Burduras to Malka Ursulli.’51 This failed to reduce tension, for Ethiopian patrols ignored the de facto border. In mid-April 1944, the British heard rumors that colonel Asefaw Wolde Giorgis intended to renew the attempt on El Roba, claiming that the Ethiopian ‘irregulars and Territorials…were…proclaiming antiBritish sentiments’ and were planning to take the frontier from the ‘Boran

49 Ibid. 50 Mandera District annual report, 1944, p.2, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2. 51 Ibid.

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police.’52 Although there is little proof of this, the incident reaffirmed deep-rooted suspicions that this part of the border was still a source of contention. The greatest challenge to the relationship between the two frontier administrations, however, was Ethiopia’s pro-Somali policy. The Ethiopian Pro-Somali Policy The Ethiopians were apprehensive that a new military structure, such as the British proposed, might have an adverse effect on the implementation of the emperor’s pro-Somali policy. To balance security needs and curtail banditry, the emperor needed a more able administrator in Borana Province. In June 1943, colonel Asefaw Wolde Giorgis, replaced Fitaurari Tesfaye Wolde as the governor. British sources stated that he had taken refuge in British Somaliland where he had lived with the Somalis during the Italian occupation. As a result he ‘was well disposed towards Somalis, and…the [anti-Muslim] campaign…[was] abandoned in favor of a pro-Somali policy.’53 The colonel had appointed a Somali, Sheikh Abdurrahman, as his advisor. The pro-Somali policy encouraged groups such as the Marehan to return to the eastern region of Borana and heightened tensions between the two administrations.54 The Somali group strategy aimed to seek concessions in return for cooperating with Ethiopian officials, while at the same time leaving open the option of moving back into the Borana province. Not all the Somali groups were impressed by the Ethiopian government’s new pro-Somali policy, but those groups whose presence on the frontier was contested by the British attempted to exploit the policy for their own benefit. For example, the presence of Hassan Gababa on the Ethiopian side of the border and his elevation to a senior position with the same military title as Ethiopian officials, allowed him to consolidate his power. He succeeded in persuading the Tuff section of the Garre and later the other sections ‘to cross the border and transfer their allegiance to him.’55 He promised to use his influence to get the Ethiopian government to compensate these groups for past attacks and reduce the tax they paid per head of livestock.56 52 Ibid. 53 Reece, NFD annual report, 1943, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/8. 54 Reece, the officer-in-charge Northern Frontier1944, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 55 Mandera District annual report, 1947, p.3. KNA/DC/MDA/1/3. 56 Ibid.



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As we have seen, the British administration had long complained about the presence of the Marehan in Borana and Ethiopia’s pro-Somali policy (Adugna 2004:82). Against this backdrop, the arrival of the emperor Haile Selassie in Borana in May 1945 was much anticipated. Hope spread that his visit would bring about a reassessment of the Ethiopian administration and an improvement of security in Borana. Details of his meetings are sketchy, but British sources claimed that the visit indicated that ‘[t]he Ethiopians…[were] still suspicious that OETA might return.’57 The emperor’s presence was seen as a show of support for colonel Asefaw, who had taken a radical stand on frontier affairs by resisting undue British influence. In recognition of his services and his authority, the colonel had been given ‘a gold ring [engraved with the coat of arms of the emperor].’58 The British reported that after this ‘[t]he Governor of Borana [became] more difficult than ever to deal with.’ The emperor also promoted his proSomali policy while in Negelle. He met with local Somali leaders to hear their complaints, while other groups such as the Borana, Garre, Gabra and the Guji were excluded and were prevented by colonel Asefaw from petitioning the emperor. Ethiopian officials appear to have accused the colonel of maladministration, these charges were easily dismissed when he produced local Somalis as his supporters, among them Haji Jama of Mega, Sheikh Hussein (the Mareham chief), Hassan Sheilila (Goura), Jillo Jakon (Arsi), Mohamed Hussein (Herti), Abdi Murase (Isaak) and Abdrahaman Sheikh (Ogaden).59 The Somali leaders were entertained and their grievances about raids conducted by the Borana, Guji and other groups were heard. According to British intelligence: …when the Marehan complained that they had been heavily raided by the Boran and Jamjamtu [Guji] he [the emperor] gave 1500 dollars to Abdurrahman Sheikh and Sheikh Hussein for distribution to the Somali poor, and ordered colonel Asefaw to collect the raided stock from the tribesmen concerned and return it to the Somalis together with blood-money payments.60

The previous anti-Somali policy under Ras Adefrsew’s governorship as part of the effort to deal with banditry had been abandoned. The 57 Lloyd, district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to officer-in-charge NFD, Isiolo, Ref. No. 54, 23 May 1945, KNA/DC/MLE/5/4. 58 Ibid. 59 Letter from Lloyd on visit of the emperor Haile Selassie to Borana, 20 April 1945, Ref. No. S.4, KNA/DC/MLE/5/4. 60 Ibid.

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rehabilitation of the Somali groups also went against the interests of previously pro-Ethiopian groups such as the Borana. Worst of all, they were even required to pay blood-money to the people who had raided their livestock, murdered many in their community and appropriated their grazing lands and water resources. For these groups, justice had been subverted. A British intelligence report stated the following: It is clear that colonel Asefaw and the Somalis have gained a complete victory over Ras Adefrsew and the Boran and Jamjamtu. This is also in accord with emperor’s own policy of conciliation towards Somalis, and this [was] probably his chief reason for his support of colonel Asefaw’s administration.61

The Ethiopian pro-Somali policy was completed by the allocation of Borana grazing lands to Somali ethnic groups, resulting in the expansion of these groups in Borana territory, which further upset the political balance. For example, in 1945 when the Degodia crossed from Oddo into Borana Province, British authorities suggested that the ‘move constitute[d] a threat to frontier security as they [were] unlikely to remain at peace with the [Garre].’62 The British feared that the Degodia were likely to constitute ‘a threat to outflank… the Somali line…’ on the NFD side of the frontier.63 Further, it was claimed that ‘[t]he Abyssinians welcomed all the tribesmen they [could] get and are believed to have told the Degodia they [could] go as far as Negelle.’64 Following this Ethiopian concession, the Degodia, previously restricted to the northern banks of the Daua River, expanded southwards by crossing the river. The British admitted that ‘it was…impossible to stop them [as they stretched] from Borana and Oddo in the North through Mandera to Wajir where [the tribal] southern boundary has now been imposed.’65 Controlling the Degodia across international borders had always been difficult. They were the most mobile and aggressive group, and had entered Borana province during the Italian occupation. Subsequently, OETA sent them back to the Oddo region, but the Ethiopians allowed them to cross the frontier once again and they spread in all directions.66 The British

61 Ibid. 62 Mandera District handing-over reports 1944–47, KNA/DC/MDA/2/2. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid., p.9. 65 Ibid., p.16. 66 Ibid., p.16; see also, Mandera District annual reports, 1945–1958, KNA/DC/MDA/1/3.



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attempt to stop the migration of Somali groups by establishing a chain of defensive frontier posts stretching from west to east, defended by ‘a quasimilitary border defense force’ was never a success.67 The Ethiopian pro-Somali policy came with a cost: the concessions over land made to the Somali clans increased contestation over the land claimed by the Borana. To make concessions attractive to the Somalis, the administration of colonel Asefaw Wolde Giorgis made changes to the allocation of land. According to a British source, the Ethiopians put in place a radical ‘policy of separation of the tribes in Borana Province, following the principle applied in Northern Province [of Kenya].’ The new policy recognized the presence of the Somali groups in Borana Province. It officially distributed the Borana grazing land and water resources among other groups, which quickly won ‘support from Hassan Gababa for the [Garre], Musa Wobur Abdi [i.e. the son of Wobur Abdi] for the Degodia and Sheikh Hussein for the Marehan.’68 The Garre, the Marehan and the Degodia had sought this all along, while the British frontier administration disparaged the new policy a ‘clever move’ they saw evil intent, which ‘in the case of the Garre…had won [Hassan Gababa] concessions of water rights…from the Boran.’ The award of extensive areas of Borana grazing lands to the Garre encouraged ‘a large percentage of the Kenyan [Garre] to move over the border.’69 In the Ethiopian administration’s view, the establishment of internal grazing borders in Liban between the Somali clans and the Borana would diminish existing conflicts and make the collection of tax much easier (Adugna 2004:75). Unlike the Somalis who had gone to great lengths to seek favors and bargain for the allocation of grazing land and water resources, the Borana were rather conservative in their dealings with the Ethiopian administration. They did not bribe officials lavishly to influence decisions but relied on verbal objections to the appropriation of their land, hoping that justice would guide the Ethiopian officials. No historical justification existed for dividing Borana grazing land, for the Ethiopians knew that the group had ancestral rights to the land. Although justice may have been on their side, the officials who transferred their resources to their rivals considered other factors.

67 J. Penney, NFD annual report, 1946, KNA/PC/NFD1/8. 68 Ibid. 69 J. Penney, NFD annual report, 1946, KNA/PC/NFD1/8.

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The policy of allocating grazing resources by means of officially created borders, relied on groups remaining within their areas and on the punishment of transgressors by the imposition of fines equivalent to a percentage of their stock. On the Ethiopian side, the crime of kenki (trespassing), which implied the breaking of set rules, was punished by the confiscation of 10 percent of the stock that had crossed the boundary. The Borana, who complained to the regional governor about the loss of their land, were bluntly told that ‘they were insignificant both in numbers and wealth, and the income that the government got through taxation from them was very low…whereas the Marehan were wealthy and…were the major tax-paying group in the region’ (Adugna 2004:76). The Ethiopian pro-Somali policy was therefore, expressly designed to benefit the groups that would provide the most tax revenue. The British approved the Ethiopians’ new land-use policy in the hope that it would bring some order to the chaotic administration of pastoralist communities. It was thought that the new policy would solve one of their principal concerns, which was the southward expansion of the Somalis. This belief was short-lived, however, as groups such as the Degodia disregarded the grazing frontiers and dispersed into Borana-allocated land further to the west, closer to the international border. The British administration was particularly unhappy about the preference given to the Garre, as this encouraged ‘a large percentage of the Kenyan [Garre] to move over the border.’70 On the Ethiopian side of the border, the partitioning of Borana grazing land created a new ethnic political order that, combined with frontier banditry, resulted in a political crisis creating a lasting legacy.71

70 A.C. Loggin, Mandera District annual report, 1948, p.5. KNA/DC/MDA/1/3. 71 At the time that this chapter was drafted (October 2009), the Borana, Degodia and the Garre have intensified fighting, using heavy arms, in the former Dambala Wachu Ranch, which was carved out of Borana grazing land in Liban and given to the Degodia as part of a new ethnic regional state in Ethiopia (since 1991). The participants in the conflict have not changed and the cause of conflict has remained the same—dispute over land.

CHAPTER TWELVE

JEEGIR BANDITRY: REBELLION BY FRONTIER NOMADS 1941–1943 After the collapse of the African Orientale Italian administration in Ethiopia in 1941, a new form of banditry emerged on the southern frontier of Borana. Within ten days of the Italians’ departure, fighting between Somali raiders and Borana pastoralists erupted, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of people and the theft of thousands of heads of livestock. The British OETA took over briefly and the fighting died down for a while. After the termination of OETA and the signing of the 1942 treaty with emperor Haile Selassie, well-trained irregular forces, mostly Somalis but including other Islamic groups such as the Arsi Oromo, joined the insurrection. The ex-Italian banda, trained in guerrilla tactics, unleashed a civil war known locally as olki Jeegira (Jeegir war). Somalis named the group dan usukentei, which refers to the way the gang members shaved their heads in a distinctive manner as a marker of identity. The Jeegir used Islam to unify and mobilize their followers against nonMuslims, although their primary political motivation was to resist the return of the Ethiopian administration. This chapter, analyzes the political environment in which the Jeegir rebellion emerged and the features that differentiated the Jeegir from other frontier bandits. It examines the genesis and goals of these bandit groups, their relationship to frontier communities and how the returning Ethiopian administration’s initial denial of the existence of banditry provided the bandits with the space to operate. It also focuses on the complex diplomacy that arose after the murder of the district commissioner of Mandera district. The Jeegir Banditry The Jeegir represented those sections of the frontier communities that felt disempowered by the return of the Ethiopian government. They refused to accept a government that they believed had trampled on their civil liberties and they used religion as a basis for organizing resistance, which allowed the development of a broad agenda. In contrast to the Tigre, who formed small shadowy bands, the Jeegir deployed large military formations, equivalent to platoons and battalions, which spread fear in both the

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imperial administrators and the pastoralists. Their military organization and the large number of combatants involved meant that their resistance could be seen as a nascent rebellion. Although the Jeegir does not fit neatly into the ‘social banditry’ category, the concept of ‘primitive rebellion’ might well apply (Hobsbawm 1969; Wagner 2007). However, the criteria the bandits used in distinguishing between supporters (Muslims) and victims (non-Muslims) in the frontier populations limited the scope of their motives. For this reason, I categorize this group as ‘bandits’ rather than as ‘rebels’, largely because of the way they preyed on some sections of the frontier communities. Before long, the initial political objectives of the group were overshadowed by their attacks on particular frontier peoples, making it difficult to distinguish their activities from the ethnic feuding and primitive banditry that had characterized the southern frontier for some time. Attacks by Jeegir bandits on non-Somali frontier pastoralists created the impression that the war was one of attrition waged by Muslim Somalis against nonMuslim Borana and Gabra. This resulted in two competing conflicts— Jeegir banditry and ethnic conflict—occurring within the same theatre. Armed from the large stocks of light automatic weapons and ammunition left behind by the Italians, the Jeegir organized raiding parties to cross the frontier (Pankhurst 1951:157). The raiding parties were led by various ringleaders who used Islamic symbols, such as green flags with Koranic script, marked with a crescent to underscore their ideological underpinning. Another important source of recruits was the hundreds of prisoners released from Thika by the British military authorities. During the war, the British had employed them as interpreters and information gatherers.1 The emerging conflict involved the usual ethnic protagonists: Jeegir allies were the Marehan and the Ogaden (Eji); their opponents were the Borana, the Gabra and Sakuye, and sometimes the Garre. By February 1942, a few months after the return of the Ethiopian administration, British intelligence recorded rumors of gangs of well-organized Somali bandits going around recruiting followers. There were reports that the Somalis in Liban, with the exception of the Marehan, resisted Amhara rule, but the Marehan chief, Sheikh Hussein, apparently had a good relationship with the new Ethiopian administrator, Fitaurari Tademe. Then in April ‘the storm broke.’2 Somali bandits began to attack frontier communities. According to information received by the Ethiopian administrator 1 NFD annual report, 1942, p.2, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/8. 2 Political history of Moyale District, 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2.



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in Negelle, the bandits intended to attack the town and remove Fitaurari Tademe and so be free from Ethiopian rule, like the Somalis under British military administration in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The bandits and their Somali supporters attacked Borana and Gabra villages in the Lae area and from there spread their activities eastwards along the frontier.3 These successes emboldened the bandits who then unleashed simultaneous attacks across the frontier. For example, on 13 April 1942, mixed bands of Jeegir launched attacks on the Gabra at Goff and at Lae, about 32 km east of Moyale. An estimated 31 karra (3,100 head) of livestock were seized and several people were murdered. A small Ethiopian force commanded by Bakala Iddo, the police commandant at Gaddaduma, intercepted the group and in the confrontation, his force suffered some losses.4 Local sources described the origins of the Jeegir, the majority of whom were Marehan and Herti-Dolbahanta Somalis. Their leaders were mostly Herti, Hawiya and Ogaden Somalis, while the rank-and-file included Arsi, Marehan, Garre, Degodia, Guura and Ejji (Darood) recruits. There is some disagreement regarding the participation of some groups; Belete Bizuneh (1999:78), argues that the role played by the Garre in the Jeegir is unproven. The Jeegir had several leaders, including Nur Garwein (Herti), Nur Qanyare (Herti), Salad Dagane and Abdi Afgab (Darood). Two leaders of Marehan origin were Warsame (alias Ibrahim Mummin Kassim) or Ibrahim (shifta) and Abdi Ahmed Adan. Like other rural bandits, they were often known by nicknames that imparted an air of mystery: Ilk Bokol (one hundred teeth), Afgab (the one that covers the mouth), Afdub (quiet), Afwein (big mouth), Abdi Fiti (Abdi the tall) or Garwein (with a full beard and the look of a leader). The British gathered intelligence on the bandits from local herders. One witness of a raid, Omar Aden Shaba of the Garre, told the NFD police: ‘During the Bideru raid of early February [1942], I saw Aden Abdulleh of the Marahan [Marehan] Rer Hassan, who appeared to be the leader of the…shifta on the occasion.’5 On 19 April 1942, a group of Marehan dan usukentei from Walensu Laman raided the Garre and stole three karra of camels (about 300 head). On 21 April, a new group of Jeegir consisting of Degodia, Marehan and Arsi crossed the Daua River to attack the Borana.

3 NFD annual report, 1942, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/8. 4 Political history of Moyale District, 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2. 5 ‘Somali raids in Abyssinia and on Kenya frontier, 13th to 21st April 1942’, p.3, Political history of Moyale District, 1902–1942, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2.

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Edin Hassan, a Garre herder, reported that six of the bandits visited his settlement. He said that by their speech …and appearance [he] thought that [four] of them were Darood [Somalis] and [two] were [Oromo]. They said they came from across the Daua. They were…ex-soldiers [i.e. ex-Italian banda]… They were [Jeegir with shaven heads]. They asked us where the Gabra [settlements] were… We said we were Mohammedans and they let us go, saying they wanted nothing of the [Garre].6

During the same period Hagaya Boru, a Gabra, stated that ‘[o]n the day of the raid I was in my village near Gadier. [Five] shifta came… Some said they were Marathan [Marehan] and some said they were Arusi [Arsi]. They spoke to me in Borana but [also] spoke another language among themselves.’ They stole about 300 camels from the village. During February and March 1942, British intelligence reported that the Marehan were using the unsettled frontier situation to return to Liban and were clearly cooperating with bands of dan usukentei, inciting attacks by Muslim groups on non-Muslims across the frontier between Gadier and Hara Daua. In addition, they conducted intensive raids in Galgallu Dimtu in eastern Borana.7 Another witness was Aden Sorabi, a Garre. He states: ‘[o]n about 18 April 1942, I saw many shifta at Jima, near Karayu. These were Arussi, Marahan and Herti… Most were rifle-armed and dressed in Italian [banda] uniform. They said they came from beyond the river.’ He continued his report to the police as follows: They asked where the Gabra were, they mentioned the name of one Bare Kalo, of Gaddaduma, who had named a Gabra camel owner to them. I then travelled to Awal Jarso, Gadeir, where I heard of the raid. I followed the spoor of raided camels and came [upon] two shifta, who seemed [Oromo]. They aimed [their guns] at me but desisted when I said I was of Islam. I then saw three more shifta and learned by their talk that one was Marehan, one Arussi and one Herti. The Herti said his name was Mohamed Afwein. They told me to go that night to Hara Shilma and I would be given my camels back (I mistrusted…them).8

R.K. Allen reported the eyewitness account of Galgallo Roba, a Gabra, of a dawn raid on 11 May 1942: ‘On the day of the raid ten shifta came to my village at Saki Gamadda. I judged them to be Marehan because of their dialect; some wore kikois [loin cloths] and some breeches and turbans. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Intelligence report, Mandera district commissioner 1942, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6.



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They spoke Somali. They stole sixteen [karra] of camels near Saki including sixty-two [camels] of mine.’9 His report emphasized the central role the Marehan played in the Jeegir and intertribal conflict. The British were convinced that Sheikh Hussein, who later became a close associate of the Ethiopian officials, knew about the activities of the bandits. After a raid, he told one of the Garre elders ‘to send someone to his village to pick out [his] stolen camels.’ Allen’s report stated that Sheikh Hussein’s son was one of the gang leaders, confirmed by an eyewitness account by Kore Kulla, a Garre. Four months earlier, eighteen of his camels had been stolen for meat when sixty-five dan usukentei descended on his settlement in Bideru. He identified them as being from the Rer Hassan and the Hassan Isak subsections of the Marehan. ‘They appeared to be led by Omar Mwalim Sheikh Hussein [i.e. the son of the Marehan chief], Abdi Abdalla [Marehan] and Musa Aden and Mwalim Musa [both Herti].’10 The attacks instilled fear among the frontier communities. The district commissioner of Mandera, Captain ‘Wee Willie’ Keir, reported to the district commissioner of Moyale that ‘[i]f the Abyssinians want the Garre to stay in Galgallu they will have to protect them, otherwise they will all [cross to the British side].’11 The attacks were concentrated on the Ethiopian side of the frontier at first, but soon spread to the British side. On 21 April 1942, dan usukentei comprising Arsi Oromo raided the Gabra settlements at Dadabo, north of Dandu, and seized twelve karra of camels estimated at 1,200 animals. On the same day, a second party of attackers seized 600 camels from Gabra herders near Gamudda. Responding to a distress call, Captain Keir and a NFD police detachment pursued the estimated thirty Jeegir armed with rifles who shot and killed Keir, three of his askari and wounded another (Chevenix Trench 1993:159–60). A third party of attackers, consisting mainly of Marehan and Eji, ambushed an Ethiopian police detachment a short distance from Gaddaduma, and drove them from their station. Abdo Mursal, a Garre, reported an encounter with the same group of Jeegir that killed Captain Keir and the police: At 8.p.m on the day of the raid I heard the news. I got the spoor and followed the raided camels to near Gabra [village] where I saw in the distance the shifta camps; two other [Garre] named Bakolle and Aden were with me. We came across two shifta at a pool; they were “jekhea” [Jeegir]. I judged one to    9 R.K. Allen, ‘Somali raids in Abyssinia and on Kenya frontier, 1942,’ KNA/DC/MDA/4/6. 10 Ibid. 11 ‘Somali raids in Abyssinia and on Kenya Frontier, 13th to 21st April 1942’, political history of Moyale District, p.3. KNA/DC/MLE/2/2.

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chapter twelve be a Somal[i] and the [other] one a [Oromo]. We said [we] were Mohamedans and they let us go, saying they wanted nothing of the [Garre]. They spoke of the killing of the European and party.12

The unresolved murder of Captain Keir created a major political dispute between the two frontier states. His death occurred at a time when the Ethiopian administration was undergoing structural changes and was in no position to apprehend the bandits. Agefari Bakala Iddo had temporarily replaced the governor, Ras Abeba Aregai, until Ras Adefrsew Yinadu could take up the position. The diplomatic impasse between the Ethiopian and British governments lasted until the emperor expressed his regrets for the incident in a telegram to Ras Adefrsew, the governor general of Sidamo. His Majesty the emperor’s telegram (translated from Amharic into English) stated in part: The Kenya officers at the Borana borders informed us that Somali rebels had crossed the Kenya borders and at Gadeir they killed a British District Officer, three police and looted a lot of cattle and returned to Ethiopia. They fought twice with Agefari Bakala’s Zabania…and were defeated. Fitaurari Demise and Fitaurari Tademe did not help him. The Somali came from Negelle district and they were of the Marehan tribe. We are exceedingly sorry that such a thing happened and especially that it was on the borders of a friendly country. You must watch carefully that this does not happen again. To make it easier for you to send soldiers to arrest the rebels quickly and return the cattle looted, we have sent you some lorries. Therefore, you must do all the necessary things and let us know the result.13

This is one of the emperor’s rare communications on frontier affairs. He confirms his administration’s lack of adequate security on the frontier and acknowledges the death of the British official. He based his information on the contents of a British message, which stated that the death of the district officer had occurred in British territory and that the bandits had crossed back into Ethiopia. What is significant in his message is the admission that the Jeegir bandits came from Ethiopia’, crossed into Kenya and then returned to Ethiopia. The British information about where the killings occurred was in fact inaccurate: Captain Keir died on the Ethiopian side of the contested border. The British demanded that the perpetrators be arrested and compensation paid for the civilians and constables killed in the incident ‘paid at the 12 Allen, ‘Somali raids in Abyssinia and on Kenya frontier’ 1942, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6. 13 Copy of telegram [translated into English] from Haile Selassie 1, emperor of Ethiopia, 30 April 1942 (22 Nyanzya 1934 EC), KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.



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rate of 1000 MT$.’14 Although emperor Haile Selassie expressed his regret for the murders of captain Keir and three constables, he was not prepared to accept the blame, and stated that: …[the] Ethiopian Government [would] agree to pay fair compensation when, as result of enquiry, it has been established that Ethiopian subjects were the cause of these deaths, but a report from Thomas15 to Bakala is said to show that Somalis or Marehan, Herti and Ogaden tribes, who had caused disturbances …[were] raiders. Accordingly the Ethiopian Government do not accept sole responsibility not rounding up this gang, and suggest that many raids came from Oddo District now under Somali [British Military Administration]. Raiders will be tried in presence of British representative if Ras Adefraew [Adefrsew] is successful in capturing them and recovering stolen stock, and will be executed on border if found guilty. Stock will be returned to the owners.16

This important statement resulted in differing responses from the British and the Ethiopian administrators. What made the emperor’s message noteworthy was the emphasis placed on compensation, but only if the culprits originated from Ethiopian-administered territory. The preliminary investigation seemed to show that they came from an area administered by the British, in the Oddo region. Furthermore, the ethnic groups suspected of the crimes were British subjects. From the Ethiopian perspective, therefore, whether or not the incidents took place on Ethiopian soil was less important than the origin of the culprits and the communities that were involved. For the British administration, however, the critical issue was that the murders occurred in an area under British jurisdiction (that part of the border was contested), and the perpetrators claimed to have come from Ethiopia. The telegraph sent by the emperor irritated the British on a number of counts. First, the expression ‘fair compensation’ was typical of the old Ethiopian frontier response that had been a bone of contention between the two administrations in the past. Reece recalled that the NFD administration under Glenday had fixed compensation claims at 1000 MT $, while the Ethiopians had always insisted on compensation in terms of blood money, equivalent to what the tribes paid each other. The British claimed that some of the people who attacked and killed Captain Keir 14 Ibid. The Maria Theresa thaler was the main currency in Ethiopia at the time. 15 Captain Thomas was the cantonment officer at Mega and also acted as adviser to Ethiopian officials. 16 C.A. Weavin to chief secretary to the officer-in-charge NFD, on raids, death of Mr, W. Keir, 28 May 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.

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were Herti who had lived in Seru in eastern Borana for many years; however, some attackers were Arsi, who were Ethiopian subjects. For this reason, in the British administration’s view, the Ethiopians could not deny responsibility. Major General Lord Rennell (1948), participated in discussions about ‘clearing the matter up’ and advised against politicizing the issues which risked hardening the Ethiopian position. From the discussions, it emerged that three of the five culprits had been arrested by the Ethiopians and were being held at Dalle in Sidamo. The British wanted to see the ‘captured hanged on the border as soon as possible.’ They attempted to put pressure on the Ethiopians to ‘prevent the adoption…of the usual policy of delaying practices.’ The British were, however, unsure about how to communicate their message without provoking questions from the Ethiopians that they would rather avoid. The problem was that there was disagreement about where the murder occurred: the actual site of the incident was in…[the territory claimed by the British], about [a half] mile south of the Maud Line [the one recognized by the Ethiopians], and [two-and-half] to [three] miles south of the Gwynne Line [the one recognized by the British]. It was not desired that the assailants should be handed over to the British authorities, nor that the question should be raised by the Ethiopian authorities as to whether or not they were British subjects.17

The British strategy was self-serving and diplomatically controversial, considering that the British administration was, in reality, attempting to cover up facts likely to weaken their position in the dispute. For these reasons, the NFD administration resisted taking part in a joint investigation with the Ethiopians, while continuing to ask the Ethiopians to pay compensation for a crime committed on the side of the border claimed by Ethiopia. The British maintained that the crime was committed on the contested part of the border and that, the culprits were Ethiopians. The British minister in Addis Ababa opposed this approach and advised more transparent cooperation with the Ethiopians on the matter. On 24 July 1942, he sent a telegram to the governor of Kenya stating that ‘the Ethiopian Government wishes…to appoint a British officer to conduct an investigation on the spot [jointly] with the Governor of Borana…I should be glad to learn whether you wish to nominate colonel Pierson who will

17 Record of a meeting held at Government House, Nairobi, regarding the political situation on the Kenya-Ethiopian frontier on Monday 20 July 1942, p.2, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.



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shortly be in Negelle or some other officer.’18 Reece, the chief administrator of the NFD, was opposed to the choice of colonel Pierson, who, in his view, was ‘employed by Ethiopian Government to represent Kenya at a judicial inquiry’,19 and was unsuitable for this reason as well as because of his unfamiliarity with the frontier problem. He preferred that the British consul at Mega, major Grant, should look after their interests. The NFD administration wanted to be represented by someone in whom they had confidence. Thus, the NFD chief administrator was inflexible on the question of a joint investigation as well as on the choice of the person to represent British interests. He made a counter proposal: I would respectfully submit that the only proper person to continue on our behalf…and to represent therein the interests of Kenya would be His Majesty’s Consul at Mega. To allow any British officer commanding a unit of the Ethiopian Army…to become involved in local politics of such an important and contentious nature would, in my opinion, not only be unfair on him and us but most embarrassing to our consul… [Furthermore, the]…British and Ethiopian officials with an intimate knowledge of local affairs have investigated this matter in Kenya, Borana and Oddo and it is unlikely that colonel Pierson, who has a very limited knowledge…of local tribes and conditions, will be able to make…any useful contribution to what we already know…20

There were other important issues that the NFD administrator wanted to address. It was not just the choice of British representative that they were opposed to; they also did not want this issue to be dealt with in isolation. Their aim was to link the incident to general frontier insecurity, which in turn could not be addressed without tackling the question of the Somali presence in Borana. They were aware that the emperor and his local administration opposed to this approach. The NFD administration’s aim was therefore to broaden the discussion to address banditry and tribal raids along the frontier and the removal of the Somalis from the Borana Province.21 In a cipher telegram message, the governor of Kenya requested that H.M.’s minister in Addis Ababa impress upon the Ethiopians the gravity of the situation on the border and the necessity for urgent action to restore frontier security. He suggested the ‘prompt dispatch [of police] to Borana and neighboring areas to restore and maintain order and [take] any 18 Reece, [Ref. S.42/201] to chief secretary, Nairobi, Ref. A.XAF.6/7/123, on Ethiopian frontier affairs of 18 August 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid.

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retributive action necessary.’22 British officials were, however, aware that the local Ethiopian administration lacked a police force and were in no position to respond to the worsening security situation along the frontier. The NFD administration attributed the incidents to the ‘complete failure of the Ethiopian government to take effective measures to maintain law and order in Borana after the administration was handed back to them some three months earlier by OETA.’23 The British with New Demands The NFD administration demanded immediate action to get rid of the dan usukentei, as well as the arrest and punishment of the murderers. Further, it demanded that all Somalis be removed from Borana and, more specifically, from the area of Liban. There were two problems with the British demands. First, Jeegir banditry activities were widespread and occurred in areas under British administration, such as Oddo. Second, neither the British nor the Ethiopians had sufficient forces to pursue and intercept the bands on the vast frontier. On 7 May 1942, the British consul in Mega sent a telegram to warn the British minister in Addis Ababa about the presence of the shifta in Seru, Borana. The consul suggested that the BMA in Somalia take action to apprehend bandits east of Filtu. The minister replied that a coordinated and concerted effort from both the Ethiopian army and the British military on both sides of the frontier was necessary to defeat the bandits.24 The military in Somalia responded that it had reinforced their posts along the border with Borana at Boqolmanyo and patrolled the frontier.25 Meanwhile, the Kenyan police gathered information about the number of bandits and the composition of the groups involved in various attacks. Jeegir groups varied in number from sixty-five to 130.26 Their effectiveness stemmed from their organized quasi-military formations.27 The dan usukentei was a well-organized and coordinated 22 Cipher telegram from governor, Nairobi to secretary of state for the colonies, 9 May 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 23 Ibid.; and NFD annual report, 1942, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/8. 24 Cipher telegram from H.M minister, Addis Ababa [K. 59] to governor of Kenya [K. 7767], 14 May 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 25 Letter from the armed forces, Nairobi to H.M. minister Addis Ababa, 17 May 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 26 Letter from police division, Moyale, to the acting superintendent-in-charge of Northern Frontier police, Isiolo [No. S. 10/11], 19 May 1942, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6. 27 Letter from Moyale Division police to superintendent-in-charge Northern Frontier police Isiolo, No. MD 4/60, 14 August 1942, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6.



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military force, far superior in numbers and firepower to the forces of the two empire states that opposed them. In May 1942, the Ethiopians sent a force called the Territorial Army, under the command of major Johannes Abdo, to Negelle to deal with the Jeegir and to arrest those responsible for the murder of captain Keir; ­however, the 800 soldiers stationed at Negelle did not take any action.28 Colonel Pierson, the commander of the British Military Mission to Ethiopia (BMME) arrived in Negelle when ethnic conflict and Jeegir activities began spreading across the Borana-Kenya border. There was optimism that the newly arrived British-led Ethiopian force would achieve more success in controlling and removing the bandits now that both sides of the Oddo and Liban–Daua frontiers were controlled by Pierson’s forces, known locally as the Topi Army. His force had two tasks: first, to secure all the wells and other strategic places used by the Jeegir during their operations; and second, to pacify the area by stopping intertribal feuds. The British frontier administration supported this arrangement, because it entailed direct contact with Pierson on broader matters.29 In a letter to the officer commanding British troops in Moyale, colonel Pierson gave an account of the situation: As I only arrived [in Negelle] yesterday, I have not yet found out the situation [in] the district, but I gather that the [Garre] and Borana are fighting and that there is a large raiding party of mixed Somalis which passed Filtu five days ago. I have sent word to the chiefs that disorders are to cease by September 15th, if they do not…operations will commence against them at that date.30

His warning had no effect, since the 3rd Ethiopian battalion was controlled by the local Ethiopian officials, who opposed the British-led force. The Ethiopians blamed the BMA in Oddo for letting the bandits cross into Borana, thereby denying that they themselves were in any way to blame for Jeegir activities.31 Local Ethiopian administrators resented being forced to let a British-led Ethiopian battalion take responsibility for confronting the bandits on their side of the border, although in reality this was an Ethiopian army unit. They suspected that the British plotted to

28 NFD annual report, 1942, p.4, KNA/PC/NFD11/8. 29 Telegram No. 330, administrator to officer-in-charge NFD, 18 September 1942, KNA/ DC/MLE/5/3. 30 Pierson, 3rd Ethiopian batallion, Neghelle to officer commanding British troops, Moyale, 27 August 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 31 Political history of Moyale district, 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2.

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gain undue influence in frontier affairs, given their close relationship with British officers in the 3rd Army. No sooner had the BMME arrived in Negelle, than the colonel Abdo’s battalion of Patriotic Forces (PF) abandoned its position. This force consisted mostly of Masqan Gurage troops, previously part of the Italian banda. In the absence of an organized army, the Ethiopian government had recruited them after the war ended. Unfortunately, this group mutinied, killing their Amhara officers.32 Although the administration quickly quelled the mutiny, frontier defenses were in disarray. Despite this setback, the Ethiopians still resisted using the British-led force. The Jeegir used the absence of a strong Ethiopian response to move across a wide area. British intelligence reported that in mid-July 1942 the …force of [Jeegir] shifta bands who had not already crossed the Daua [River] are now moving east, north-east and south-east into Oddo… On [18 July 1942] some 40 of them, [under the command of Jama Hussein], with [the captured] Gabra camels were [moving] east along the Ganale into north Oddo …while another gang was camped on the Ganale at Eil Aidi [El Addi], north of Siiru.33

This information appears to support Ethiopian claims that the bandits were operating from safe areas in the BMA-controlled region. As the British officials soon discovered, the Jeegir were not just disorganized outlaws; they were experienced in bush warfare, armed with superior weapons and better trained than the Ethiopian irregulars. Furthermore, they possessed extensive knowledge of the terrain, especially the location of water holes, and so moved within the frontier with ease. The NFD administration contended that a stronger force was needed to control the eastern region of Borana and effectively curtail banditry. In the interim, the failure to control the bandits was largely attributable to the political differences and strained relationship between the frontier states (Hamilton 1974:136). Still, the Ethiopian administration intended to prevent the British army from meddling in their internal administrative affairs. In their view, whoever controlled security would inevitably influence or regulate wider frontier matters, and ultimately this potentially compromised Ethiopian sovereignty. Increased frontier banditry aggravated ethnic conflicts, with various groups raiding, murdering and seizing livestock from their neighbors. The 32 Mandera District handing-over reports 1944–1947, KNA/MDA/2/2. 33 Letter from Moyale Division police to the superintendent-in-charge, Northern Frontier police, Isiolo, No. 4/43, 1 August 1942, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6.



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main victims were the non-Muslim Gabra who owned large herds of camels. Many decided to convert to Islam, but their adoption of a new religion did not see an end to these attacks or the loss of their herds. Once wealthy pastoralists, the Gabra now lived on the verge of destitution. By contrast, the fortunes of the Garre fluctuated ‘according to the rise and the fall of the shifta menace’, sometimes as allies of the Jeegir, at other times as victims.34 The Ethiopian administration in Borana province did not yet have the means to deal effectively with banditry and ethnic conflict. Traditionally, its first strategy in dealing with ethnic conflict was to seek to appease the groups involved in the conflict, but this policy did not appeal to the British frontier administrators who considered the Somalis in Borana province as the main cause of political turmoil. Despite British opposition, Fitaurari Tesfaye, governor of Borana, promised the Garre ‘a period of peace’ and attempted to pursue a policy of fair administration. His policy of appeasement did not succeed. The Garre, ‘armed with rifles and bombs’, raided the Borana near the Lae wells, killing fourteen Borana and seizing large herds of cattle. On hearing that a large force of Borana and twenty regular Ethiopian police officers from Gaddaduma were pursuing the stolen livestock, Haji Ali Gababa became apprehensive about the likelihood of revenge attacks on the Garre. As a result, he collected the looted stock with the aim of handing it over as part of a peaceful settlement, but his efforts failed to prevent the situation from worsening. A joint Ethiopian and Borana force attacked the Garre in Galgallu Dimtu. Then the Garre counterattacked at Daka Wata and Balale, with some success.35 During the same period, an estimated 100 Borana armed with rifles and spears attacked the Garre at Bunduras. Two parties of Garre attacked the Borana settlement at Churre Helu, near Moyale, killing another fourteen people and seizing livestock. The Garre were attacked in turn and lost forty people and much livestock. The rest of the year saw repeated attacks and counterattacks.36 When the strategy of appeasement failed, the Ethiopians decided to use Borana recruits, sometimes in combination with their own forces, to attack Somali groups such as the Marehan. The Marehan chief, Sheikh Hussein, went to Negelle to complain to the governor about administrative­ 34 Ibid. 35 Letter from Moyale Division police to superintendent-in-charge, NFD, Isiolo, Ref. No. M.D. 4/43, KNA/MDA/4/6. 36 NFD annual report for 1942, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/8.

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failure to restore peace, repeated attacks and the loss of much live­ stock.37 Ethiopian double-dealing—dangling a carrot before the moderate Somalis, but actually collaborating with the Borana—no longer surpised the British. The Borana organized themselves into three war parties, ‘one under [Diirobo Taacho], the second under Jirma Bukhura and the third [under another Borana war leader] based in Arero.’38 The British referred to them as ‘Boran shifta’ and their apparent aim was to ‘discourage’ the Jeegir and other Somalis from attacking the Borana; however, since they fell under Ethiopian control, Ras Adefrsew forbade them from taking any action not previously approved by him.39 Fitaurari Tesfaye Wolde sent a message to Haji Ali Gababa via Gerazmach Sheikh Hussein, that he wanted to negotiate peace and the settlement of the ‘blood money’ for their human losses.40 The Garre had suffered heavy losses. While they reasoned that a government that attacked them and collaborated with their enemy (the Borana) would not respect any peace agreement, they wavered about whether to cooperate fully with the Jeegir or to seek refuge on the British side.41 British officials reported that the Ethiopian governor had recruited the Borana to support his Zebania forces that were ordered to move to key frontier water points as the bandits approached them from their safe areas across the Daua River in the east. In an incident on 25 August 1942, a forty-strong Borana–Ethiopian force was attacked by thirty Jeegir at Lae wells: ‘In a surprise night attack at the wells, Lij Demise and two of his compatriots were killed and a dozen wounded.’42 The Ethiopian forces could not match the automatic rifles and grenades of the bandits whose overwhelming firepower enabled the Jeegir to escalate their activities across the whole frontier.43 Once again, some transfrontier pastoralists moved over to the British side of the border, while the Somali clans conspired with the Jeegir bandits to take over the grazing lands of the 37 Political history of Moyale District, 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2. 38 Allen, Moyale Division police, to superintendent-in-charge NFD, Isiolo, Ref. No. M.D. 4/43, 10 July 1942, KNA/MDA/4/6. 39 Ibid. 40 Letter from Moyale Division police to superintendent-in-charge NFD police, Isiolo, No. MD 4/53, 17 August 1942, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6. 41 NFD police, Isiolo, situation report, Northeastern Province, SAF.1/31, 28 September 1942, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6. 42 Letter from district commissioner’s office Moyale, to commanding officer, 3rd Ethiopian battalion, Neghelli, 2 September 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2. 43 Letter from Moyale Division police to the superintendent-in-charge NFD police, Isiolo, No. MD 4/54, 23 August 1942, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6.



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displaced­groups. The Ethiopians, however, resisted British pressure to confront the Jeegir. This bordered on a denial of their existence as a political force. The Ethiopian Dilemma There were series of communications between Fitaurari Tasfaye Wolde, the Ethiopian governor of Borana, and major M. Grant, H.M.’s consul in southern Ethiopia, voicing the concerns and views of both frontier administrations. In one letter, Grant described an engagement between the British police and the Somali shifta, which highlighted lack of Ethiopian inertia: …the Somali shifta have fought with my men near Gadier. I understand that you have not posted any of your soldiers along the border between Gaddaduma and Malka Marri and that the border on your side is unprotected. It is most important that you send men to that part as the border [otherwise it] will become uncontrolled unless your men look after your side…from Gaddaduma to Malka Marri… My police are posted and ready [along the whole frontier]…but there is nobody on your side of the border for them to cooperate with. The result of this is that the Somalis from Filtu can come down and cause trouble in our territory.44

The letter reflected two important concerns of the British administration. The first was that the Ethiopian side of the frontier was unprotected. The second was that because the Ethiopians did not match British security arrangements on their side of the border, the Somali bandits were able to move freely from the far eastern region to the frontier. A second, undated letter was more explicit about the urgent need to establish security along the frontier, noting the presence of 300 Jeegir bandits. Written in Kiswahili, the letter stated ‘[shifta] wana tawala inchi yako yote’, which means ‘the bandits have taken over your country and are ruling it.’ The letter bluntly told the Ethiopians that they had given their country up from Gaddaduma to Malka Sulug and Malka Marri to Filtu, and allowed the bandits to operate freely. What probably upset the Ethiopian frontier administration was that the British officials sent this information directly to the emperor without informing them. This had serious implications for the frontier relations, 44 Major M. Grant to Fitaurari Tasfaye Walde, (written in Swahili; translated by author), 11 September 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.

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for it demonstrated that while the British were aware of frontier insecurity, the Ethiopian border administrators deliberately ignored the threat. Grant informed Fitaurari Tasfaye Wolde that Pierson’s BMME force was on its way to the frontier with orders from the emperor (janhoi) to visit Ras Adefrsew. Finally, the consul requested the governor to use his powers to deal with the shifta menace.45 On 26 September 1942, a third letter sent to the governor dealt with the same subject, addressing the nature of the problem. The consul declared that the increasing number of attacks on British frontier police provided evidence of the identity of the bandits who claimed to originate from ‘nchi ya Sheikh Hussein’ (the land of Sheikh Hussein), that is, the country of the Marehan. He then outlined the activities of various groups along the frontier and advised the governor to station sufficient security forces at strategic water points and the river crossing.46 In a letter to Ras Adefrsew, the governor general of Sidamo, the British consul referred to the distribution of the bandits on the frontier and in eastern Borana. He expressed apprehension that ‘[t]hey control all the country east of Gaddaduma, south of Malka Sulug on the Daua River to Filtu in Ethiopia and it is understood that their numbers are increasing daily. This is very dangerous to the people of the Kenya side of the Frontier.’47 Finally, the consul informed the governor general that he had communicated the matter to the British government and asked the governor what steps he was taking to solve the problem. The consul sent a similar letter to Fitaurari Tesfaye Wolde, governor of Borana, referring to a previous message. The consul warned the governor about the presence of the Jeegir bandits and declared that their strength in some places posed an unacceptable threat to British subjects, the British colonial government and the government of Ethiopia.48 The content of these letters conformed to the general pattern of British communications about events on the frontier, and cast an unfavorable light on the Ethiopian frontier administration. It was unlikely that the Ethiopians welcomed such communications, which questioned their effectiveness and cast them in a bad light with their superiors.

45 Ibid. 46 Letter from district officer, Moyale to Fitaurari Tasfaye Walde (written in Swahili; translated by author), n.d., KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 47 Grant to Ras Adafrisau, governor general of Sidamo and Borana, 26 September 1942, on frontier banditry, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 48 Ibid.



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The governor’s reply, written in Amharic and translated into Kiswahili, addressed the claims about the presence of the Somali shifta. He stated that he had sent fifty police officers on a search-and-destroy mission to the areas of the frontier mentioned in the letters. He emphasized ‘[n]a walienda kupeleza upande ya kulia na kushoto hata hawakuona kitu’ (translation: the police had looked everywhere to the right and the left of the frontier and found nothing) and returned after fifteen days to Erdar. He informed the British consul that his forces were posted at strategic water points such as Gaddaduma.49 The governor’s response was probably not meant for local consumption; more likely, it was meant to persuade Addis Ababa that the British consul’s information about the security problems on the frontier was open to doubt. The Ethiopian government’s official denial of the existence of Jeegir bandits surprised the British administration, as it contradicted their police and intelligence reports. In the meantime, the BMA in Mogadishu reported an estimated 4,000 rifle-bearing Guji, and about 550 Somali shifta north of Filtu on their way to Borana to conduct raids and attack the Ethiopians.50 Contrary to the governor’s claims, by October 1942, Jeegir activities had in fact reached fever pitch. British intelligence reported various cases in Liban where Jeegir bandits attacked the Degodia, who fell under BMA authority in the Filtu area. There were several fatalities and a number of camels seized from eleven settlements. At about the same time, bandits fired on the police post at Filtu on 15 October 1942, and five days later, Governor Tesfaye’s patrols were ambushed and suffered casualties. On 21 October, the Degodia, following the trail of the stolen camels, ran into ambushes laid by the governor’s soldiers. Several Degodia were killed and about sixty captured ‘and escorted to Negelle where Sheikh Hussein, the Marehan headman … accused them before ... Ras [Adefrsew] of being themselves bandits.’51 British sources reported that both Ras Adefrsew and Fitaurari Tesfaye Wolde had accepted gifts from various Somali groups known by the British to be active members or sympathizers of the Jeegir. Sheikh Hussein, the Marehan chief, was thought to be encouraging other Marehan from the BMA area in Jubaland to join his people in Liban and several young Marehan men had joined the Jeegir in what the British called ‘this happy 49 Fitaurari Tasfaye Walde to Grant, Mega, 5 October 1942, translated from Amharic to Kiswahili, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 50 Letter from officer-in-charge NFD, 9 December 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 51 District commissioner, Moyale, to chief secretary, Ref. No. L & O. 17/11/1309], 15 November 1942, on the Ethiopian frontier affairs, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.

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land where it is evidently thought that profitable raiding can still be done with comparative [impunity].’52 In the area of Liban (eastern Borana) alone, more than thirteen Jeegir parties conducted attacks against the Degodia in the British-administered areas of Filtu. The shifta led by Saman Arabe and Abdi Hared (popularly known as Abdi Fiti) operated undeterred in eastern Borana. According to British intelligence, business in Negelle ‘[was] at standstill and food [was] short, and highway robbery [was] rife. The country between Negelle and Yaaballo was deserted.’53 Disturbances continued to spread and the Somalis, influenced by nationalist ideas, gathered in large numbers in Magalo under leaders such as Haji Yusuf, Mohamed Afi and Haji Jama (the grandson of Mohammed Abdille Hassan—the ‘Mad Mullah’).54 British sources estimated that the Jeegir operating in eastern Borana along the Daua River numbered over 500, and that seventy percent bore firearms, and the rest spears. Jeegir parties of about forty bandits conducted increasingly aggressive military action along the Daua and between Bediru and Golbo in Liban. Allegiances were often unclear. British sources claimed that Kenyazmach Sheikh Hussein of the Marehan simultaneously supported the Ethiopian administration while also advising the Jeegir. Similarly, the Garre leader, Haji Ali Gababa, persuaded the Jeegir to keep a low profile until his livestock, looted by the Borana, were returned to him.55 The Garre had lost an estimated ninety-six karra of cattle (approximately 10,000 head) and thirty karra of camels (about 3,000 animals) in raids by the Borana in the area of Lae, and were able to retrieve only a tiny fraction. Haji Ali Gababa hoped that the Ethiopians would force the Borana to return the stolen livestock. During this period, Borana forces captured two karra (200 head) of Marehan livestock. The Jeegir and the Marehan planned revenge.56 The Garre attacked the Borana with a huge force and conflict expanded to the key water points in Goff, Lae and Erdar, at the centre of Borana territory.57 Haji Ali Gababa also lost patience with Fitaurari Tesfaye Wolde’s frequent false promises to persuade the Borana to return his people’s livestock in 52 Ibid. 53 Allen to superintendent-in-charge, NFD police, Isiolo, Report No. MD.4/74, 31 October 1942, KNA/MDA/4/6. 54 Ibid. 55 Letter from police division, Moyale, to superintendent-in-charge, NFD police, Isiolo, 27 December 1942, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6. 56 Ibid. 57 Allen, police division, Moyale, to superintendent-in-charge NFD police, Isiolo, Ref. No. 4/88, 13 January 1943, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6.



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exchange for peace. The Borana, perhaps justifiably, doubted that such overtures from the Garre or any other Somali tribe would bear fruit. As the aggrieved party in the conflict, they were in no mood to negotiate. They suspected that the Garre took part in the escalation of Jeegir attacks against them, which were driving them out of their land. The deteriorating situation created a dilemma for the Ethiopian officials concerning how to proceed without appearing to be caving in to British pressure. The political agitation of the Jeegir and the Somali pastoralists led the Ethiopian administration to reassess their policy towards the Somalis and other Islamic groups. The emperor, determined to preserve his authority and deal with the Jeegir bandits and their constituent Somali clans, decided to use irregulars. The emperor ordered colonel D.A. Sandford, advisor to the ministry of the interior, and Ato Getahun Tessama, director general of administrative services, on a fact-finding mission from 24–30 January 1943. They returned to Addis Ababa and advised the emperor that the Ethiopian army was not strong enough to remove the Jeegir bandits and put a stop to ethnic conflict. They pointed out that the Ethiopian government lacked the intelligence-gathering capacity needed to combat the bandits. Moreover, they criticized the Borana administration for failing to engage with the frontier communities and the British authorities (Bizuneh 1999:91). In the meantime, the British administration opted to watch and wait, as their hopes that the Ethiopians would move effectively against the frontier bandits had usually been unfulfilled in the past. British sources suggested that ‘though the emperor does not want serious disorders on the frontier…he does not want either to allow the regular Ethiopian Army with the British officers to control the operations, nor does he want to take action against Somalis, all of whom he seemingly desires to retain in the Ethiopian empire.’58 The British wondered how the Ethiopians would, within a short time, raise a territorial army large enough to attack and defeat the well-organized Jeegir. Keenly aware that the Ethiopians lacked logistics and modern training, the British did not give them much chance of success. The NFD administration feared a repeat of the situation when Ras Adefrsew had undertaken a limited punitive mission and announced the elimination of banditry on the frontier. Afterward, the emperor had been embarrassed when he prematurely announced the establishment of peace along the frontier, when, in actual fact, the bandits had simply kept a low profile. 58 Letter from chief secretary, Nairobi, Ref. G.R. 20/43, 30 January 1943, on Ethiopian frontier affairs, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.

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This time around, British colonial officials and the secretary of state for the colony were convinced, given ‘Ras Adefrsew’s…attitude towards colonel Pierson and his officers whom he had treated with much contempt’ that ‘the emperor [would] ignore the regular Ethiopian army with its British officers and…use only territorials for all purposes throughout the Empire.’ They concurred that such a policy was understandable, in view of the Ethiopians’ proud insistence on doing things their own way. Moreover, the territorial army, which the British compared to the ‘old chiefs retainers of former times’, had a tradition, in both theory and practice, of serving the emperor and the chiefs. The loyalty of such an irregular force was guaranteed, in contrast to the uncertain loyalty of a British-led Ethiopian army.59 When the operations commenced, the NFD administration had secured all the strategic water points on their side of the frontier and their police stood ready to capture bandits who attempted to cross; unfortunately, the Ethiopian initiative never materialized. In the end, the British found themselves guarding the frontier and reporting to the Ethiopians on the activities of the bandits without any response from them. The British were understandably frustrated. Major Grant stated that ‘the only way in which the Ethiopian Government could now be stirred into adequate activity in Borana would be by threatening that if they do not look after their frontier and keep raiders and refugees out of Kenya, then the British Government will have to do it for them.’60 The Jeegir Escalates Attacks The Ethiopians had felt the impact of escalating banditry pressure. On 9 January 1943, the Shum of Moiale informed the district commissioner in  Moyale, Kenya, that bandits were raiding and seizing livestock from tribes across the frontier. British sources estimated the Ethiopian military strength at less than fifty men, who were responsible for a frontier of more than 500 km. The complaint originated with Awaka Gurmu, the police commandant of Gaddaduma. N.F. Kennaway, reported that the commandant ‘seems to…have been getting at loggerheads with the governor Tesfaye Wolde. The Shum complains that Tesfaye will not supply him with sufficient men to staff outposts properly and those he does send are of the caliber of “independent shifta”.’61 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 N.F. Kennaway, district commissioner’s office, Moyale to officer-in-charge NFD, Isiolo, report on the Ethiopian affairs, Ref.No. S.4, 15 January 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.



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The Jeegir had grown in number and were attacking along the whole length of the frontier. By January 1943, intelligence reports alerted British officials that several bands had transformed into fighting groups. There were an estimated 500 to 1,000 armed men ‘coming down from the Daua River and beyond and [laying] waste the country of Borana and the Gabra.’62 On 9 January 1943, the bands of Islamic shifta fought and defeated the Amhara–Borana Ethiopian force at Duke Aba Gura, near Malka Guba, and carried on to Wachile, where they seized Borana cam­ els.  Some bandits formed into attacking groups along the Mega–Dhas road, while others moved from Borbor to Erdar, where the two groups linked up. They routed small groups of Ethiopian irregulars and moved to the well clusters in Goff where they routed another Ethiopian police squad.63 The bandits also attacked civilians within 16 km of the border town of Moyale, where they caused much damage, inflicted many human casualties, and seized large numbers of livestock. By 12 January 1943, mass movements of refugees sought protection from the bandits in Kenya. There was an ‘influx of Borana and Gabra refugees from Islamic shifta raids in Borbor, Edgdar [Erdar], Goff, and Lak [Lag] Sure… The whole non-Somali population of Ethiopia [Moiale] sought and obtained asylum …on the British territory.’64 The Jeegir established their base camp at the wells of Goff, east of Moyale and sent raiding parties across into Kenya. The Jeegir boasted about their military and religious prowess.65 It was clear to the Ethiopians that the banditry had far-reaching political implications—beyond the obvious repression of the non-Muslim population of the area.66 Some bandits crossed the border to attack the Gabra, inflicting casualties and seizing an estimated 300 camels.67 The raiders returned with the stolen camels to the opposite side of the Daua River onwards to Bale province in Ethiopia.68 Bandits roamed widely in eastern Borana and in the whole of Liban and Galgallu Dimtu, without any fear of attack by the Ethiopians.69 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Extract from the district commissioner Moyale’s official records of incursions into Moyale District from Ethiopia, 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 65 Report No. M.D. 4/92, police division, Moyale to the superintendent-in-charge NFD police, Isiolo, 28 January 1943, , KNA/DC/MDA/4/6. 66 Kennaway to officer-in-charge NFD, Isiolo, Ref. No. S.4, 15 January 1943, report on the Ethiopian affairs, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 67 Extract from district commissioner Moyale’s official records of incursions into Moyale District from Ethiopia, 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 68 Reece, NFD annual report for 1943, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/8. 69 Report No. M.D.4/92, police division, Moyale to superintendent-in-charge, NFD police, Isiolo, 28 January 1943, , KNA/DC/MDA/4/6.

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The NFD administration discerned that the problem of banditry was not confined to the Boran–British frontier. All the neighboring provinces under Ethiopian administration to the north, east and northeast were also in turmoil. The British did not believe that the irregular forces and their friendly native support could quell the powerful Jeegir Somali bandits.70 In 1943, the well-armed Jeegir won all offensive operations against them. In February 1943, ‘[t]he Islamic flag of the crescent moon was hoisted at… the shifta encampments.’71 Not only did this display military confidence, but it also represented an expression of Islamic jihad. The bandits routed the Ethiopian irregulars and the Borana in Erdar, causing substantial losses to their enemies. According to the Ethiopian Shum ‘…over 100 Borana and Gabra were killed and some thousands of camels captured.’72 Fitaurari Tesfaye Wolde visited the site of the massacre, but returned to Mega after deciding that the odds were heavily against his forces. The district commissioner at Moyale confirmed that the Jeegir had crossed the Daua and split into two parties at Wachile. The larger of the two parties committed the massacre at Erdar and then withdrew. The second group, numbering 2,855 men, threatened to attack across the whole frontier and cross into British territory once again. The Borana and Gabra refugees and their remaining livestock thronged the frontier.73 The British complained that the planned Ethiopian operation had neither achieved its goal of removing the bandits nor been able to garrison the strategically important wells on the frontier with regular or territorial troops. Further incursions across the frontier seemed likely to occur.74 The NFD administration determined that it could no longer tolerate the bandits’ threat to the people under its authority and repeatedly complained to the Ethiopian administration about the lack of policing of the frontier and the failure to maintain law and order. The British consul at Mega spelled out the British stance on these issues to the governor general of Sidamo in a letter, dated 5 March 1943. He began by listing the numerous incidents that had taken place on the Kenyan side and reiterated the British preference for garrisoning strategic places of the frontier to control border banditry.75 70 Reece to chief secretary, Nairobi, G.R. 20/43, 30 January 1943, on Ethiopian frontier affairs, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 71 District commissioner, Moyale, to officer-in-charge NFD, Isiolo, Ref. S.4 [of 15th January 1943], 2 February 1943, on Ethiopian and border affairs, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Reece to superintendent of police, NFD, Isiolo, Ref.No. L.&O.17/11/326, 1 March 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 75 H.M. consul, Mega, to Ras Adafrisau, 5 March 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.



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By now, these requests from the British were familiar to the Ethiopian administration, which replied that it had sent thousands of soldiers to the frontier. These numbers may have been exaggerated, but it was clear to the British that Ethiopian officials treated every British communiqué on frontier matters with suspicion. British official communications on the matter showed considerable frustration. Despite up-to-date intelligence on the frontier situation and on the strength of the Jeegir bandits, the NFD administration did not succeed in persuading the Ethiopian administration to agree with their way of thinking. However, a radical proposal by the acting superintendent of police to the chief administrator revealed that the British position was also changing: I consider that, with the present lack of government in Borana and Bale Provinces, the potential ‘shifta’ forces that could raid into Kenya are so large and well armed that if they decided to do so they could raid…in such bodies that no police post…however much reinforced, could withstand them… On any scale…police reinforcements, is no solution to border defence… The only real solution is the restoration of order in Boran and Bale by steps that only the Ethiopian Government can take.76

This stance departed from the position previously taken by the British administration vis-à-vis its expectations of the Ethiopian administration. The British administration could not ignore the problem, for their subjects relied on access to water sources on the Ethiopian side and were thus likely to become victims of the Jeegir bandits. Diplomatically, they had no option but to deal with the Ethiopian administration, whatever its perceived shortcomings. This is perhaps implied in the letter from the NFD chief of police. Holding the Ethiopians responsible for border protection and insisting that they ‘put a force for law and order into their south-­ eastern area [of the province]’77 would free the British to concentrate their forces on their own side of the frontier. Unfortunately, all evidence suggests that at the time the Jeegir were becoming even stronger, with additional recruits swelling their ranks. The Jeegir commander, Nur Garwein, even promoted himself to colonel. Whereas previously the Jeegir had focused their attacks and robberies mostly on non-Somali populations and on the Ethiopian forces, they began 76 K.T.M. Holmes, acting superintendent of police, Isiolo, to officer-in-charge NFD, Isiolo, Ref. No. L. & O.17/11/328, 1 March 1943, on border affairs of 8 March 1943, KNA/DC/ MDA/4/6. 77 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to officer-in-charge NFD, Isiolo, Ref. No./SH/347, 14 March 1943, KNA/DC/MDA/4/6.

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to turn their attention to the British Garre who crossed to the Ethiopian side of the frontier for grazing. The Jeegir occupied key water points and used them as a base for attacking civilians on the British side and, more particularly, for robbing the Borana as they crossed the border.78 On 3 May 1943, the Jeegir forces attacked the Borana at Laga Sure in Lae, killing thirty-six adults and a child on the Ajao road. An estimated forty bandits led by Nur Qanyare, under the command of Nur Garwein, went further south to Moyale, where they attacked civilians. They exchanged fire with the Kenyan police, killing two of the police officers, and taking their firearms and baggage camels. This group was also responsible for looting Ajuran villages and for killing five Borana. Another gang under Warsame Shire looted property and massacred fourteen Borana west of Ogorchi. Another band of Jeegir under the command of Abdi Afgab crossed into Kenya and killed sixteen Borana in Komora, near Korondile, seizing 2,000 camels from the Sakuye.79 The situation had deteriorated to such an extent that the Ethiopians were compelled to take a military action to assert their authority and to deflect British pressure. Ethiopia’s Decisive Attacks Although it remained suspicious of British motives and resisted the idea of a British-led army assuming responsibility for frontier security, the Ethiopian government acknowledged the need to do something about the Jeegir. Their strategy for establishing law and order had three prongs. The first was to recruit a large territorial army. The second was to mobilize the irregular peasant forces, which would focus on soft targets. The third was to remove some of the restrictions placed on the British-led 3rd Army. The territorial force was dispatched along the Daua River where it intercepted the bandits who had attacked the Borana; however, most of the ban­dits escaped with the raided livestock across the Daua River. The Ethiopian army attacked remaining pockets of bandits on their side of the  river where the remaining shifta concealed themselves among the Garre in Galgallu Dimtu as well as among the Marehan north of the Daua River.80 The army moved in and attacked the bandits with some success at 78 Reece annual report for March 1943. 79 B.A. Seldom, assistant superintendent of police, No.M.D. 4/110, 22 May 1943, situation report: raids by Somali-Shifta in Moyale, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 80 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to the officer-in-charge NFD, Ref. S.19, 3 June 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.



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Malka Hawacho on the Daua River. From early January through to April 1943, the Ethiopians conducted large-scale attacks on the Jeegir bandits and other Somalis in eastern Borana between Liban and Moyale. The Ethiopian irregulars also engaged Nur Gurwein’s Jeegir forces.81 In implementing the second part of their strategy, the Ethiopians recruited 200 to 400 Borana, as well as numerous Amhara irregulars, with the objective of clearing the Daua River and Galgallu Dimtu areas of Jeegir bandits. The main target of this irregular Ethiopian force was the Garre. In  the meantime, the Jeegir who were congregating in the area of Jara, attacked the Borana near Moiale in Ethiopia, and seized livestock from the Ethiopian police at Godoma.82 On the 21 May 1943, an Ethiopian force under Awaka Gurmu conducted a large-scale attack on the Garre at Hara Daua, a contested part of the frontier, and a massacre occurred. The Ethiopian attack did not discriminate between Somali civilians and bandits. As a result, the Somali pastoralists panicked and fled, fearing the killing and looting that, in their experience, usually accompanied a punitive mission (Bizuneh 1999:92). About forty-four people were killed and several wounded. Huge quantities of livestock, estimated at 1,000 camels, 1,000 cattle, 5,000 sheep and goats, and five donkeys, were seized in that attack alone.83 This particular attack, which I will discuss further in chapter 13, marked a turning point in the war on frontier banditry, but it caused a diplomatic crisis with the British. According to British sources, the attack was instigated by Fitaurari Tesfaye Wolde, who was about to be recalled to Negelle for possible replacement.84 Borana sources remember this incident and argue that Tesfaye was reluctant to attack and that Awaka Gurmu took it upon himself to attack the Garre (Borbor Bulle, interview, 1997). On the other side of the border, the British observed these changes in Ethiopian strategy towards the Jeegir, a move from what they called ‘soft soaping’ to ‘a severe persecution of all Islamic elements.’85 The Ethiopians attacked across the Daua, and their punitive force seized all the Marehan livestock that they could find. The destitute Garre were gathered together with the Borana in the Goff area. British officials reported that the ‘[r]ifles 81 Mandera District annual report, 1943, p.2, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2. 82 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to the officer-in-charge NFD, Ref. S.19, 3 June 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 83 Mandera District annual report, 1943, p.2, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2. 84 Letter from district commissioner’s office, Moyale, to officer-in-charge NFD, Ref. S.19, 3 June 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 85 Ibid.

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confiscated from the [Garre] were sold to the Borana and the killings of [Garre] by Boran were ignored by the [Ethiopian] authorities.’86 The British blamed the Ethiopians, first for inaction, and then for overreacting in dealing with the scourge of banditry. The Ethiopian response had been decisive.87 The 3rd battalion of the Ethiopian army tipped the balance against the Somali bandits. Many bandits dispersed and crossed into Somalia along with Somali civilians. Others surrendered to the Ethiopian army, while some tried to cross into Kenya, perhaps in the hope of disappearing into the Somali communities there. The Marehan Jeegir leaders—including Ibrahim Mumin, Mohamed Ali and Abdi ‘Fiti (Abdi the Tall)—surrendered to the Ethiopians. The Jeegir leaders who surrendered to the Ethiopians were imprisoned (Bizuneh 1999:96, 97). Nur Garwein was cornered in Kenya and killed by the police.88 A large force of the Marehan shifta took their stolen livestock and crossed into Somalia. Many Garre, despite their suffering in the Hara Daua massacre, ‘were hand in glove with the shifta‘and continued to defy the British administration.89 Not wishing to be left out of the action, the British frontier administration presented proposals for cooperation between the two states. The British presented two main proposals for controlling the frontier: first, to allow Kenyan police and the Ethiopian forces to coordinate activities, such as ‘hot pursuits’ by either force, to rid the frontier of shifta; and second, to disarm transfrontier populations. Discussions on combined operations against the border bandits took place on a monthly basis. The aim was to allow the ‘Kenya police and Ethiopian forces to [cross] into either Ethiopia or Kenya…for the purpose of chasing shifta … This shall make it considerably easier to round up the remaining shifta in the frontier area.’90 Talks between colonel Asefaw Wolde Giorgis and the British, however, ran into a ‘divergence of opinion.’ At issue was an agreement about the boundaries that the patrols of each side would observe without crossing into the other’s territory. British officials believed that ‘it was impossible…to agree…on any such line.’91 They also expressed their displeasure with the 86 Ibid. 87 Situation report [4–27 July 1943] from the 3rd Ethiopian battalion at Neghelle, Ref. INT/6, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 88 Reece, NFD annual report, 1943. 89 Mandera District annual report, 1943, p.4, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2. 90 Situation report [4–27 July 1943] from the 3rd Ethiopian battalion, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 91 Minutes of conversations between H.B.M. consul for southern Ethiopia, the officerin-charge NFD and colonel Asafau Walde Giorgis at Moyale, 30 June–1 July 1943, KNA/DC/ MLE/5/3.



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Marehan, who had a long association with the Jeegir bandits, remaining in areas south of the Daua River. As a military man, colonel Asefaw Wolde Giorgis had his own ideas about the British motives for informing him of the return of Somalis, such as the Marehan who probably harbored shifta among them. To prevent British frontier officials from blaming the Ethiopians and taking their usual stance that the area was insufficiently protected, he informed them that he ‘had already dispatched [200 Territorials]… to contact and destroy shifta…[and would] have approximately one thousand soldiers at Mega…in addition to five hundred police being trained.’92 Not only did he want to convey the impression that Borana province was now safe, but he also hoped that the forces he had (or claimed to have) at his disposal would discourage unauthorized frontier crossing from the British side. The British administration offered to permit the Ethiopian forces to cross into British territory, using the road from Derkali to Gurar, on condition that it ‘be clearly understood that such patrols [would] not take any administrative action with regard to the native population, when on the British side of the de facto border.’93 This concession sought to secure cooperation in killing or capturing Nur Qanyare and his band who were on the run. The British asked the Ethiopians to reciprocate by offering similar compromises.94 The Ethiopians, for their part, ran down the remnants of Nur Qanyare’s band, forcing them onto the Kenyan side of Moyale, where they were cornered and killed by Kenyan police in Titu.95 In general, the frontier was peaceful for most of 1944, although there were occasional reports of the activities of a so-called Borana shifta, and remnants of the Jeegir bands said to be active on the frontier between Somalia and Liban and in the Arsi country to the north. The nature of the attacks in Borana province, however, shifted from those by Jeegir banditry to attacks arising from ethnic conflict (Reece 1954:444).

92 Ibid. 93 Letter from British consulate, Mega, to colonel Asfau Walde Giorgis, 10 July 1943. 94 Ibid. 95 A local source claims that the man they called Nur Qaarqaaba, a heavily built and fat man, was killed by local pastoralists (Denge Galgallo Sarite, interview, 2010). See also, Mandera District annual report, 1943, p.3, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF BANDITRY IN 1943: STATES AND PASTORALISTS In the years following the outbreak of the World War II, the southern Ethiopian-northern Kenyan frontier was extremely insecure, characterized by high levels of banditry and government reprisals that caused many fatalities and considerable loss of property among the pastoralists. These losses far exceeded what might be expected from payments of compensation made under the traditional tribal system. In this frontier situation, the British believed that the governments concerned should take responsibility for restitution and compensation, while the Ethiopians viewed these matters as tribal affairs to be dealt with by tribal assemblies. This chapter evaluates conference discussions regarding compensation and restitution for victims of the Hara Daua incident that involved a massacre of Garre pastoralists (see chapter 12). These discussions involved representatives of the Ethiopian and British administrations as well as the claimants from the frontier communities. The highly publicized massacre of the Garre at Hara Daua provides the context for bilateral discussions in 1943. The political implications of the incident were so important that the emperor Haile Selassie sent a highpowered team, led by colonel Kifle, his director general of public security, to visit the site of the massacre on 3 June 1943. Several factors explain why so much attention was focused on this incident. First, the massacre occurred in a contested section of the border, but the locality of the attack was disputed, making it difficult to determine which state had violated whose sovereignty and which was liable to pay restitution. According to British reports, ‘[this] is the one small portion of the frontier where the boundary cannot be mistaken, for the Gwynn Line is well south of the Maud (or Treaty) Line and it is clearly recognizable because of the broad and well-used road running from the Daua River to Malka Marri.’ The Ethiopian government had a different view: neither colonel Kifle nor colonel Asefaw, the governor of Borana, ‘would…admit that it had taken place in British territory.’

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The second contentious issue concerned the number of stock seized.1 The Ethiopians did not deny that stolen livestock was taken to their side of the frontier, but they disagreed that they had been taken from British territory. If they accepted that the incident had occurred on the British side, it introduced a new dimension to the boundary contest, which the Ethiopians wanted to avoid. Aware of the discrepancy between the number of stock stolen and those returned, the British were dissatisfied with the small number returned by the Ethiopian administration in restitution, claiming that the returned stock consisted of only ‘about 200 old or useless cattle and camels…produced by colonel Asefaw…[which] consul Grant was asked to accept…in settlement.’ Grant had instructions from the NFD provincial commissioner, Gerald Reece, to decline ‘this insolent offer.’ Reece was even more specific concerning the British action if the Ethiopians delayed their response, adding that ‘I have today wired [colonel] Asefaw warning him [of the] likelihood our government will cease shortly to regard this incident as tribal unless large increase is made in totals [of livestock] immediately.’ Such threats from the British were quite common and largely ignored by Ethiopian officials or parried by counterarguments. On this occasion, British officials made their claims public, declaring that: ‘It should…be added that we are treating as separate matters the return of the looted stock and the question of compensation for persons murdered.’ Colonel Asefaw replied that: ‘He would not…agree to accept any claims for the “blood money”.’ The Ethiopian delegation proposed that administrative actions alone would suffice in dealing with the British claims; however, to placate the British, they arrested Awaka Gurmu because of his role in the Hara Daua massacre.2 By putting Awaka Gurmu in chains, the Ethiopians hoped to meet the British halfway, but the British protested that ‘it [was] by no means certain that the perpetrators of the “insensate acts of criminal brutality” would be adequately punished’ and that ‘[n]one of the Borana levies has been arrested so far as is known.’ The British were dissatisfied because ‘[a]part from the arrest and the replacement of Awaka Gurmu, no serious attempt had been made either to restore the looted stock or punish the persons who were responsible for the raid.’ The British misread the response by the Ethiopian authorities, and by colonel Asefaw, in particular. Reece reported that: 1 Reece to chief secretary, Nairobi, 19 July 1943, Ref. No. G.R. 197/43, concerning the raid near Hara Daua on 21 May 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 2 Ibid.



compensating victims of banditry285 Colonel Asefaw has admitted some responsibility in his attempts to satisfy us by handing over the few beasts, which his men had purported to collect in Ethiopian territory from the raiders: and our discovery of little girls… enslaved during the raid in the house of the Moyale Shum brings the crime even nearer home.3

The Ethiopian strategy hardened as officials confronted the British claims head-on. In response, the British took the issue to another level by proposing to refer the matter to the central government. Reece justified this action as follows: You will remember that I originally expressed the view that it would be preferable at first to try to reach a settlement of this matter by discussion with colonel Asefaw. [The] Governor…has no desire to take further action or to be either firm or helpful; it is inevitable that it should be referred again, and in…detail, to the central government.4

The problem with the British approach was their uncertainty regard­ ing emperor Haile Selassie’s position, and his view would determine the future course of discussion. The British tended to judge Ethiopian systems of governance by European standards, while at the same time admitting the unpredictability of Ethiopian leaders; however, the British realized that (European) international standards might not be acceptable to the Ethiopians. They were apprehensive that the emperor might ‘submit the usual excuses to the effect that this raid was either purely a tribal affair or that it happened in Ethiopia and was done by the British subjects.’ British officials hoped that it would be possible for the emperor ‘[to]…produce a satisfactory explanation of his officer’s conduct given [such]…overwhelming evidence.’5 An Agenda for Compensating Victims of Banditry The British administration wanted to link the huge loss of life and property at Hara Daua to the widespread Jeegir banditry that operated from Ethiopian soil. The British consul of southern Ethiopia, major Grant, had earlier brought up the issue in a letter to colonel Asefaw.6 He informed the 3 Ibid. 4 Reece to chief secretary, Ref. G.R. 215/43, on frontier affairs, concerning the raid near Hara Daua on 21 May 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 5 Ibid. 6 H.B.M.’s consul for southern Ethiopia to colonel Asefaw Wolde Giorgis, from 30/6/43 to 1/7/43, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.

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colonel ‘that the Kenya Government would shortly put forward considerable claims…on the behalf of the tribesmen, for stock looted over a considerable period.’ The British officials had records of the casualties inflicted and property looted by various groups, including the bandits as well as predatory Ethiopian government agents who extracted livestock taxes from frontier pastoralists. British officials used the Hara Daua incident as a basis for raising the broader question of restitution and compensation of victims. As has been mentioned, Grant expressed his dissatisfaction over the number of livestock returned: During discussion, you pointed out that distribution of recovered stock had already taken place at Negelle under the direction of His Excellency Ras Adefrsew [the governor general of Sidamo]… I pointed out that representatives of the British government had [not] been invited officially to take part in the proceedings of such distributions…[that was] left largely in the hands of headmen of Ethiopian sections of the tribes—who can hardly be relied upon to see justice done to individuals of the British tribes.

Major Grant complained that since headmen of the Ethiopian tribes had carried out the distribution, the British subjects had not received a fair deal. With these issues in mind, the preconference discussions set out to draw up an agreed agenda. British officials first suggested that the conference take place at Mega, but the venue was later changed to Moyale, on the British side of the frontier. Major Grant asked colonel Asefaw to separate contentious from non-contentious issues: [We have] then agreed that, with the approval of our respective governments, a conference should be held at Mega on the 15th September [1943]… at which our two selves and other British and other Ethiopian officers should discuss—and as far as possible, settle, with the aid of the tribal elders, outstanding questions of blood money and claims and counter claims.7

Still, other outstanding issues would influence the conference. In the ensuing discussions between British and Ethiopian officials, two issues kept coming up: namely, alleged banditry linkages among Somali clans in Borana province and the origin of the Jeegir leaders. Grant outlined problem areas that might influence the outcome of the conference, issues that he felt should be kept separate from the discussions on restitution for the losses suffered in the attack at Hara Daua. He explained: 7 Ibid.



compensating victims of banditry287 As the matter of blood-money, for the forty four persons killed [at Hara Daua], presented difficulties of territorial sovereignty as we both claimed Hara Daua as the territory of our respective governments; pending their decision in the matter, we agreed to ask permission from our respective governments that these claims should be presented to and considered by us both, sitting together, at the conference to be held at Mega, on the 15th of September [1943].8

The Ethiopians were well aware that they could not delink the issues. If the incident had occurred on the Ethiopian side, they had to assume responsibility for dealing with the issue of restitution; yet the Ethiopians claimed that the people who triggered the attack at Hara Daua came from British territory. If this was true, this would transfer the blame to the British. Whatever the case, an agreement had to be reached. Major Grant confirmed an agenda that ensured a common ground for the conference: You informed me that you would be glad to hand over for repatriation, with their stock and families, all Herti Somalis in Borana. You suggested that this could be best arranged with the Somalia authorities [then under the British Military administration] and that Filtu would be most convenient point, should the Somali authorities agree, for the hand-over to take place. I undertook to bring to the notice of my government this step for which they have so long, been pressing; but informed you that in the opinion of my government this should apply to all Somalis other than old residents engaged in trade, who would be easy to control.9

Colonel Asefaw was an astute strategist. The role he played in influencing the direction of the conference provides an important model of imperial dialogue on the frontier. The British participants were guided by a secret telegraphic message from the British minister in Addis Ababa through the Kenyan governor in Nairobi about the conference agenda, which set out the rules of engagement as follows: [Colonel Asefaw the] Governor of Boran and Grant [British consul] have now agreed to hold the conference at Moyale on 15th October to settle outstanding questions and this has been approved by Ethiopian government. Full power cannot be granted to governor of Borana to decide and execute decisions but Ethiopian Government proposes to instruct him to collate all information regarding claims and counter-claims in consultations with Grant for transmission to central Government.10

 8 Ibid.  9 Ibid. 10 Secret telegram from H.M. minister, Addis Ababa, to governor, Nairobi, No. S/A.XAF– 6/2/VII/30 A, 11 September 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.

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According to the official instructions, the Ethiopian conference delegates had no executive powers to make concrete decisions; yet, the proposed conference had raised hopes among the frontier pastoralists that its proceedings would at last address their sufferings and lead to agreement on the payment of restitution by the guilty parties, including the governments. The most contentious issue was which government would take responsibility for the loss of livestock and human life caused by the Jeegir bandits. The British proposed that since the Jeegir bandits operated from the Ethiopian side of the frontier, it was reasonable that Ethiopia take the blame for their actions, but Ethiopian officials were wary of the implications inherent in the British proposal. The Ethiopian representatives presented a counterproposal, based on the identities and affiliations of Jeegir leaders. From which sections of the Somali community did they originate and which frontier state was responsible for governing them? Further, on which side of the frontier was the Jeegir leader killed? However, this did not settle the issue of their citizenship. The British administration had also doubted the legality of their own proposal. In an intelligence report to the colonial chief secretary, R. Tatton Brown, the district commissioner in Moyale, anticipated the weakness of the proposal from two perspectives. First, he states: ‘We have not given much thought to the difficulties arising from the fact that it is often impossible to prove whether tribesmen living near the frontier are British or Ethiopian subjects.’11 The dilemma was how to avoid making claims that would apply to Ethiopian citizens who had reported the loss of stock and human life to the British. This was particularly relevant in the case of the massacre at Hara Daua, which was situated in the contested part of the frontier. The officer-in-charge of the NFD warned of two important issues that might undermine the British position. The first was that the frontier communities, regardless of what citizenship they claimed, had suffered equally from banditry. The British official commented that ‘it cannot be maintained that all the sufferers in all these claims are British subjects but it was thought advisable to record these claims to show the extent of the losses suffered by the tribes.’12 The second issue was that British and Ethiopian subjects had suffered equally from the looting and murders committed on frontier communities. He opined: 11 Reece to chief secretary (Ref. No. G.R. 215/43), on frontier affairs, concerning the raid near Hara Daua on 21 May 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 12 Letter from officer-in-charge NFD, Isiolo, to the office of the district commissioner, Moyale, 8 November 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.



compensating victims of banditry289 Where an international boundary severs a nomadic tribe, it is inevitable that repercussions on one side [are] felt on the other side. There can be no clear-cut distinctions between the tribesmen. I do not suggest that the Kenya Government should put forward these claims as directly concerning their own subjects but I do suggest that, as the compensation for losses directly concerns their own tribesmen, they should insist a fair and impartial settlement be made. The losses were undoubtedly aggravated by extortions by Ethiopian officials when the British tribesmen were legitimately making [use] of trans-frontier grazing rights.13

The provincial commissioner raised fundamental issues. The first concerned the Kenyan administration’s proposal that Ethiopia should compensate those citizens who had been attacked in the course of simply exercising their rights to transfrontier grazing and watering. Morally this was the right thing to do, but it went against protocols applying to neighboring states, where each party agreed that they should consult each other about their recommended courses of action. It would have been difficult to do this without a robust counterproposal from the Ethiopian officials. There was no doubt that the frontier communities were the aggrieved parties, but the two states manipulated their views to serve their own political purposes. Colonel Asefaw’s manipulation of the views of the frontier communities at the conference was particularly significant. Prominent local personalities from communities on both sides of the frontier served with equal levels of representation. Their presence had critical importance: there were expectations that they might present alternative viewpoints to those of the two governments; in the event, however, they stuck to the official lines of argument. The Conference Proceedings On 26 October 1943, the conference opened, jointly chaired by major Grant, British consul for southern Ethiopia and colonel Asefaw, the governor of Borana.14 The British delegation consisted of the district commissioner of Moyale; Dima Jaldesa and Kuse Katelo (representing the Kenyan Borana); Hussein Ido Roble (representing the Ajuran); Diid Kanjo and Sora Guyo (representing the Gabra) and Boku Sora (repre­ senting the Sakuye). The Ethiopian delegation included Fitaurari Gebre Yess; Kenyazmach Abbegas; Kenyazmach Gutama; Fitaurari Kosi Gedo 13 Ibid. 14 Mandera District annual report, 1943, KNA/DC/MDA/1/2.

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(representing the Ethiopian Borana); Haji Ali Gababa (representing the Ethiopian Garre); Sheikh Hussein (representing the Marehan); and Abdi Kore and Abdi Jillo (both representing the Ethiopian Gabra). Of these, Kenyazmach Gutama was particularly interesting because he was well known as ‘one of the emperor’s agents’, served as the director of education for the Borana province and, because he spoke English fluently, communicated well with the British officials. Another important delegate was the Amharic interpreter, one Abdurrahman, ‘an Ogaden Somali, reputedly the nephew of the “Mad Mullah”.’ The British suspected that he had ‘been sent down…by the emperor to report on the conduct of the colonel [Asefaw Wolde Giorgis].’15 In his opening remarks, colonel Asefaw, speaking on behalf of the Ethiopian representatives, identified with the frontier communities because of their ‘black skin’, claiming that they were brothers, and deliberately emphasizing that the British delegates represented an alien colonial empire. The British report of the proceedings noted that ‘[t]his introduction of the color question was definite [i.e. intentional] and [was] stressed by other speakers on the Ethiopian side.’16 Such remarks, however, might have reminded the leaders of the frontier pastoralists of their suffering under Ethiopian rule, especially at the hands of the Amhara who considered themselves as racially superior to the pastoralists. The proceedings extended over eight sessions. The local leaders representing the different frontier groups had the opportunity to make demands on the states represented at the conference. The British eagerly awaited their speeches. In contrast, the Ethiopian side initially resisted such direct dialogue. In his opening presentation, colonel Asefaw promised, that ‘his intention [was] to restore peace and prosperity to Boran.’ Kenyazmach Gutama followed by introducing the most contentious subject, one that would bedevil the proceedings. He ‘made light of the past troubles…caused by shifta from the British side who had now all returned there’, a statement that disconcerted the British who knew that Kenyazmach Gutama was close to emperor Haile Selassie. The representatives of the local communities made their speeches in a well-choreographed manner. Fitaurari Kosi Gedo, speaking on the behalf of the Ethiopian Borana, ‘asked for intertribal discussions’, while Dima Jaldessa, speaking on behalf of the Kenyan Borana, blamed the attacks and looting on ‘the soldiers of Ethiopian Government and the shifta.’ 15 District commissioner Moyale, to Reece, Isiolo, 26 October 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 16 Ibid.



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Dima Jaldesa’s speech was immediately interrupted by Kenyazmach Gutuma who objected to his remarks because they cast the Ethiopian government in a bad light. It was clear that local leaders formulated their statements carefully, mindful of possible retribution. For example, Gerazmach Haji Ali Gababa’s view was contrary to the official Ethiopian line. On behalf of the Ethiopian Garre, he alleged that ‘he had known nothing but loss for the last three years….’ At this point he was interrupted by colonel Asefaw who suggested that ‘domestic troubles within Ethiopia were no concern of the Conference.’ This exchange provides an interesting perspective on what qualifies as ‘domestic’ or otherwise, in the context of an international frontier.17 Colonel Asefaw imposed an important condition on the meeting by insisting that the British delegation should not use the forum to ‘force questions’ or to influence ‘British representatives.’18 Ironically, he had no qualms about forcing questions or influencing the Ethiopian representatives as the conference progressed.19 The Ethiopian position remained steadfast in rejecting any attempt to change their views. The Ethiopians argued that the banditry originated from the British side, while the British placed the blame for extortion and banditry squarely on the Ethiopian side, arguing that Ethiopian officials had done nothing to control the bandits. The Ethiopians countered with a similar argument, accusing the OETA of neglecting frontier security. Thus, the early conference sessions were largely characterized by posturing, but this changed as the Ethiopians grew more confident that they controlled the agenda. Omar Aden Shaba, the spokesperson for the British Garre, gave a speech that followed the official British argument: He wished the troubles to be treated on an intertribal basis as the [Garre] although living astride the frontier was one tribe. He was prepared on behalf of the [Garre] to make restitution for wrongs done by the [Garre] and asked for compensation for wrongs done to the [Garre]… He then began to describe the events that had taken place since the British Military Admin­ istration handed Borana back to the Ethiopian Government. He was constantly interrupted by colonel Asefaw20 who stated that he did not concede Omar Aden’s right to speak for all the [Garre]…21 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 District commissioner, Moyale, to Reece, 31 October 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 20 There was obviously a protocol problem that colonel Asefaw had taken advantage of. For this reason it was decided that the British and Ethiopian officials would meet to discuss the procedure. 21 Officer–in-charge NFD to the office of the district commissioner, Moyale, 10 November 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.

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The Ethiopian representatives resisted such arguments because to do otherwise would have implied accepting responsibility for the loss of human life on the frontier. The second claim, which they also disputed, was that the Garre were one tribe, which implied that the representative of the British Garre could speak for the Ethiopian Garre as well. Colonel Asefaw’s agitation arose from the fact that although he could control what the local leaders from the Ethiopian side of the frontier said, he could not do so for the British Garre (who were part of the same aggrieved community). Nevertheless, the disruption of the local pastoralists’ speeches by the administrators was procedurally unacceptable. Moreover, such interventions exposed intergovernmental conflicts in front of the civilian leaders. The British assumed that contributions by the local leaders would lend credibility to their arguments, but they were dealing with a shrewd opponent who was diplomatically abrasive, and this made progress difficult. The British report describes the resulting difficulties: This discussion revealed that colonel Asefaw was not prepared to allow free speech nor to allow the headmen of the tribes to meet together to try and reach tribal settlements. He would hear complaints only. [However, he] would be prepared to listen to all claims, which the Kenyan tribesmen would put forward. The colonel also stated that his tribesmen were afraid to come to British Moyale for a session of the conference…and as a result, a meeting place was made in the dry riverbed that forms the de facto boundary.22

The Ethiopian representatives brought frontier politics into the discussions by shifting the focus from matters of mutual concern related to banditry to questions of sovereignty. On the neutral ground of the frontier, colonel Asefaw was at liberty to raise contentious issues that the British were not prepared to address on their side of the frontier. He probably felt that posing the same questions on the British territory, where he had less control, would weaken his position. His intentions became clearer during the second sitting of the conference on 29 November 1943. The conference report recorded that in ‘[t]he Ethiopian view…there was no trouble in Boran as…Ras Adefrsew [had] made agreement and settlement between the tribes and all the troubles that have occurred are the result of people like Nur Qanyeri coming from Kenya.’23 The issue really focused on the

22 Ibid. 23 Unless otherwise noted, this account of the conference sessions is based on the letter from the district commissioner, Moyale, to Reece, 26 October 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.



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origins of the Jeegir bandits, rather than compensation to the frontier pastoralists for the loss of property and human life. During the second session, the first speaker was Hussein Ido Roble, the chief of the Ajuran. He ‘described briefly the losses of the Ajuran at the hands of Ethiopian soldiers, Borana, Gabra and the Jagher [Jeegir]…[and made] a strong plea for disarmament of the tribes in Ethiopia.’ His argument is significant in two ways. First, he attributed the losses suffered by his tribe to multiple sources, which gives credibility to the Ethiopian view. On the other hand, his call for the disarmament of the Ethiopian tribes was part of official British policy. Even more interesting, was the support he received from the district commissioner of Moyale, who, at the request of colonel Asefaw, read a long list of claims. The report added that ‘[t]he colonel appeared somewhat surprised at the length of these claims—and proceeded to cross-examine Hussein Ido Roble.’ Without mincing words, colonel Asefaw declared that ‘all legitimate claims had already been fully met by the Ethiopian government and that the British government were entirely responsible for all the shifta troubles.’ These claims contradicted the evidence that suggested to the British that the Ethiopian government was to blame for failing to administer its frontier and control banditry. The British claims were historically and geographically accurate. What was not known (and was perhaps overlooked by the British side), was whether the origin of the Jeegir bandits (who operated from the Ethiopian side) was relevant to these discussions. The British argued that the bandits were a product of the Italian occupation and that Ethiopian frontier policy created conditions for the expansion of banditry. What were the reasons for the Ethiopian resistance to the proposals put forward by the British? The first and most probable reason was that the British were asking the Ethiopians to compensate the victims for their livestock losses and human fatalities. The Ethiopians resisted any attempt to place the blame on them, as this might set a precedent for other claims and could prove very costly, given rampant banditry on the frontier. A second possible reason concerned the legal implications, since such an agreement might cast doubt on the sovereignty of the Ethiopian state. A third reason might have been that the Ethiopian state had not exercised power for six years during the Italian occupation of the country. These claims rose at a time when the Ethiopian government was in the process of reasserting its authority and therefore the state might not regard the issues of restitution and compensation as a priority. A fourth reason was that the Ethiopians were well aware that the British wanted to link the

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presence of the Somali clans in Borana to the insurgency by the Jeegir, which would enable them to demand the removal of the Somali clans as part of the solution. It is important to remember that the BMA still occupied land in the Somali region of Ogaden, so establishing friendly relations with the Somalis was part of the emperor’s policy. For these reasons, the Ethiopian delegates took every opportunity to oppose the British view. British officials did not dwell on whether the people who led the Jeegir originated from British territory. Nevertheless, the official British representative had to deal with the Ethiopian line of reasoning. Well aware of the Ethiopian pro-Somali position adopted by colonel Asefaw, major Grant summarized the background of the Somali shifta: Before the Ethiopian government was defeated by the Italians, there were only Borana living in Liban. The Marehan were allowed, by order of Ras Desta [Demtew], to go beyond Filtu. Liban was Borana except one place and that was Seru. There lived a collection of Ejji, Goura, Herti and Arussi [Arsi]. [They were] the start of the troubles. Soyan Omar and men of his ilk were the spies and troublemakers throughout the countryside.

Major Grant suggested that the shifta problems emerged before the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, and linked this with the Marehan and other alien Somalis who had arrived earlier in Borana as clients. This was, he maintained, the source of the problem. Significantly, some of the earlier participants in banditry were in fact Ethiopian citizens, for example, Mohamed Kour, a well-known shifta leader. The second part of major Grant’s narrative concerned the role played by the Italians, noting that ‘When the Italians came they let the Marehan into Liban and one could not forget that the Ejji worked as spies for the Italians. Bururi was another [festering] sore in the countryside, another place containing [the] Ejji and the Darood.’ He contended that the Jeegir leaders had deep roots among these alien groups resident in Ethiopia. The British did not deny that the Ejji were migrants from British territory. Further, they argued that individual bandits were part of the client groups hosted by Ethiopian citizens. The link to the Italians is significant because some of these disgruntled elements served in the irregular Italian forces or worked as spies for the Italians; however, major Grant did not have concrete evidence to link this to the present Ethiopian government. He revisited the subject during the third and the fourth sessions on 31 October and 1 November 1943 respectively. He connected the problem to the transitional period when the British briefly assumed administrative authority (as OETA) in Borana, observing that ‘before the British Government came in, much fighting



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broke out among the tribes… Many thousands of stocks were paid over in compensation…’ Major Grant put forward two other important issues. The first was how the British administration linked the Marehan to banditry activities; the second was how the administration linked the return of the Marehan to the Ethiopians after the defeat of the Italians during the Second World War. With regard to the first issue, major Grant was quite specific on what happened, pointing out that ‘[t]he British Government [had] moved the Marehan back to Oddo’ and that the consul was involved in ‘moving them.’ This claim, which the British regarded as very important, was received with silence from the Ethiopian side. The Ethiopians simply ignored the link between the Marehan and banditry and stuck to their argument. Knowing that the Ethiopians linked the insecurity on the frontier to the presence of the British in Borana, major Grant pursued this issue in the hope of preempting their rebuttal, stating that ‘January 12th [1942] was the date the first killing took place after the return of the Ethiopian administration. This was at [Lae wells].’ Seeking to convince the Ethiopian delegates of the British position, major Grant presented a detailed account, which included the identity of victims, the number of livestock seized, and information about the composition of the shifta. For example, in the above-mentioned case, the Gabra camel herders Huka Bake and Guyo Abrono were attacked by the leader of the shifta, identified as Ilka Boqol.24 The ‘depredations’ of the shifta under his command had lain waste much of the country bordering the Daua River. Major Grant narrated how the same gang had attacked the Kenya frontier, killing captain Keir, the district commissioner of Mandera, the first European victim of Jeegir frontier banditry. He described how another party of shifta led by Abdi Afdub25 had attacked the nearby Gabra. Sheikh Hussein provided unsolicited confirmation that ‘[Abdi Afdub] was Hawiye Habar Gidr.’ Major Grant welcomed this identification, for he knew that Abdi Afdub was a friend of Sheikh Hussein. This historical analysis appeared to irritate the Ethiopian delegation. Colonel Asefaw interrupted through an interpreter, suggesting that ‘much of major Grant’s speeches [were] irrelevant, referring as it did to matters, which had taken place in Ras Desta’s time [note: Colonel Asefaw’s date in 24 The Jeegir leaders had pseudonyms such as Ilk Boqol, meaning ‘a hundred teeth.’ 25 Afdub is a nickname, which means ‘the one with his mouth on the side’, apparently from the way he made facial expressions, including movements of his mouth. In the majority of cases, the names of the Jeegir leaders that were often repeated by all the participants were not their real names.

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this case was inaccurate]. He hoped that Grant would confine himself to more present affairs….’ Undeterred, major Grant proceeded with his account: He spoke of the origins of the Somali in Boran and argued strongly that the Marehan and the alien Somalis in Boran were the root of all the trouble… The troubles arose from the Marehan and the alien Somalis and later…as a result of their raids the country became disturbed and inter-tribal fighting started… He described the various waves of shifta attack from the north of the Daua; from the time that the British Government handed Boran back to Ethiopian Administration. He pointed out how the warnings, sent by colonel [Gerald] Reece, then SPO-Borana, to Ras Abeba Aregai, of the trouble likely to be caused by the presence of these people in Boran, had proven to be true.

Major Grant produced concrete evidence, either in the form of statements from witnesses, some of whom were present at the conference, or in the form of documents. The British based their argument on facts arising from their experience while running the Borana administration during the transitional period. In major Grant’s opinion, the Marehan had concealed the ex-Italian soldiers who were part of the Jeegir. He went on to describe ‘[h]ow the Marehan helped the Ethiopian government…in the Eil Duftu incident [italics for emphasis]. At this place seventy brave patriots had been attacked by shifta… There were some two hundred Marehan with them but they fired not a shot and the Ethiopian soldiers had twenty to thirty of their men killed.’ The context of the italicized text in the preceding quotation was a query as to why the Ethiopians wanted to protect people who were responsible for, or who had abetted, the murder of Ethiopian patriots. In apparent mockery of the Ethiopian habit of selfexaltation and of their culture of patriotism, major Grant, a foreigner, had the temerity to point out the way the Marehan ‘helped’ by just watching while patriots were being murdered. In essence, he questioned colonel Asefaw’s valor as an Ethiopian officer. It is not clear if the comment was meant to reach the ears of the emperor, or whether it was a deliberate provocation. Major Grant’s claims were historically accurate, but the narrative had such a devastating impact on colonel Asefaw ‘that he would not allow the British representatives to express their opinion in his presence.’ But it was not the story that upset the Ethiopian leader, as he knew very well that the facts were authentic. What probably disturbed him was that the British not only blamed his administration, but also dared to question his patriotism in the presence of frontier pastoralists. In effect, major Grant blamed



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the insecurity along the frontier on him by stating these obvious facts before the Borana leaders, whose land had been overrun by the Somalis with the help of the Ethiopian administration. Even more upsetting, the message imputed a lack of patriotism to the Ethiopians who supported the Marehan. The British played on the well-known fact that a close relationship existed between colonel Asefaw and Sheikh Hussein of the Marehan. The British delegate then shifted the discussion to another area of contention: would or should the Ethiopian administration accept the responsibility for the problem? Grant revisited the roles played by Ras Adefrsew, the governor general of Sidamo, and major Johannes Abdo, who as officer-in-charge of the Ethiopian Territorial Army, was tasked with putting down the rebellion in the Borana frontier area.26 He accused both leaders of having done little to remove the Marehan from Liban, and thus encouraging the shifta in their murderous activities. This evidence established a link between Somali groups such as the Marehan and Jeegir banditry as well as the extent of Ethiopian involvement. Both the Marehan and the Ethiopians attacked civilians at Hara Daua and were attacked by the Jeegir. It is important to show that the Ethiopians also suffered at the hands of the bandits to underscore that the argument put forward by the Ethiopian delegation was not factual. The role played by the Marehan in Jeegir activities was also significant. Major Grant linked them to some well-known bandit attacks and referred to the bandits’ claims that they were in alliance with the Marehan. Although this may have been sufficient to prove that the Marehan were active participants in Jeegir banditry, the British delegation still needed to establish that their principal leaders were Ethiopian citizens. This was the trickiest part, for the British anticipated that the Ethiopians would repeat the claim that the bandits had crossed from the area under BMA administration. In reality, the Ethiopians would accuse the British of complacency. To deflect this, Grant presented a narrative of the Jeegir engagement with the Kenyan police in January 1943: ‘Awaka Gurmu called together all the men in Moiale and sent them out to try and stop the shifta; one of those called was Nur Qanyeri…[who] ran away and joined the shifta.’ At this point, colonel Asefaw insisted on calling for a witness, who would necessarily be an Ethiopian, to cast doubt on the credibility of the evidence. (It turned out that no Ethiopian was willing to act as a witness.) 26 The following account is based on information contained in a report from the district commissioner, Moyale, to Reece, 31 October 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.

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To validate the British position, Grant needed to establish the origin of the Jeegir leaders as well as their clans and places of residence. He tried to be as inclusive as possible. Among those he named were: Ibrahim Deere (alias Ibrahim Mumin) of the Bon Marehan; Abdi Ahmed Labba Kijog (thought to be Marehan); Haji Heila, son of Abba Ntalla (Herti), one of the first Somalis to settle at Chaamok near Moiale; Abdille Birhkan of Ogaden, and Ali Kowee of Dolbahanta27 whose father had lived for a long time in Chaamok; Halkano (a Boran who lived with the Ejji); Abdi Ahmad (brother to Sheikh Hussein); and Musa Haid (a former ex-Italian banda who lived in Negelle). He referred to the incident in which Guyo Guutu (alias Sheikh Abdullahi), an Islamized Boran, was attacked near Goff by Nur Qanyeri’s group. His party had crossed into Kenya, killed two police officers and attacked the British Borana in Komoro and the Sakuye at Tulu Roba. The elders present at the conference knew the identity of the leaders. Not only had British intelligence carefully documented Jeegir activities with an account of loss of property and human fatalities, but it also had details of individuals who had been kidnapped. In his concluding remarks, major Grant repeated his request to colonel Asefaw ‘to ask every headman and elder…whether they wished [the trouble-causing Somalis], [who were] alien to the country, to [be removed from] the country.’ Colonel Asefaw declined to respond on the grounds that it exceeded his mandate; however, he gave a careful rebuttal to Grant’s lengthy disputation. He stuck to the line of argument established by his delegation at the outset, making it clear that its position remained unchanged. He maintained that while the British had presented factual evidence, his argument was more important than the facts they presented. He began by responding to the specific claims made by major Grant: In the first place the British government was responsible for the troubles: because they had not continued to administer Boran until the Ethiopian armed forces were ready to come in nor had they left weapons of any kind which the Ethiopian government could have used for administrative purposes. [The British military departure was before] the Ethiopian administration began, there was ample notice of this event but nonetheless the British government took away with them all the weapons of war in the country. As a result the country was left defenseless and in the interim before the Ethiopian soldiers arrived, the shifta came in and made trouble. If the British government had left behind weapons then the trouble would not have occurred. 27 Ali Kowee had been dismissed from his position as interpreter in Mandera, Kenya.



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On careful examination, it appears that colonel Asefaw was correct on some key points. What may have seemed to be an attempt to play the blame game was in fact a solid counterargument. The OETA presence in Borana had been short-lived. After the 1942 treaty with emperor Haile Selassie, the British administration agreed to hand over the Borana region to the Ethiopian administration in return for the right to occupy the Ogaden region. Unfortunately, the OETA also removed all the Borana police and all the weapons captured in the war. Although he was a military man, colonel Asefaw appears to have overlooked the evidence that the British occupation was not friendly to Ethiopia. The British administration had indeed taken over Italian territory, its departure assisted the reassertion of Ethiopian sovereignty, but the Ethiopian army took much longer than expected to replace the British Borana police. The colonel’s second rebuttal concerned the Marehan. On this point, he questioned British sincerity: Major Grant had said that he had moved [the Marehan] from Liban into Oddo. If this was so how was it that the great and the powerful British government were unable to prevent a poor and not numerous tribe like Marehan from returning to Ethiopia? The Ethiopian government had found them in [Negelle] and Liban. He could not understand how they could have got back there, knowing as he did the large numbers of soldiers and the power of the British government.

Colonel Asefaw turned this most contentious issue around and placed the blame squarely on the British administration, contending that it was difficult to expect the Ethiopian government to succeed where the most powerful nation had failed. Further, he argued that when the Ethiopian administration resumed control, it found the Marehan in Negelle. On the question of the citizenship of the Jeegir leaders (as opposed to that of their combatants), his position remained unchanged: they were not Ethiopian citizens, but rather, British subjects. He also provided an explanation for the Hara Daua massacre of the Garre, explaining that they were also Ethiopian citizens and consequently, Ethiopia is contemplating to asking the British to pay compensation. He declared that: The soldiers of Ethiopia had died to recover this stock and a distribution had been made. Those who received compensation included British subjects. Consul Grant knew this. The division had been made fairly and without favoring any tribe on the direct instructions of the emperor. The Ajuran were given 566 head of camels…All tribes were present at this division.

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chapter thirteen When the British took stock from the shifta in Kenya, they did not call in representatives from Ethiopia.28

According to colonel Asefaw, Ras Adefrsew had ordered the distribution of the captured stock in accordance with the emperor Haile Selassie’s instructions. The number of Ajuran stock that was returned was not in dispute; what was in dispute was whether those who had lost livestock to both the Ethiopian army and the Jeegir had received compensation. He backed up this assertion by pointing to the Degodia episode. He exonerated the Marehan and the Ejji from collusion with the shifta and instead dwelt on those groups whom he considered to be the architects of frontier banditry. He maintained that the bandit leaders originated from British territory and repeated their (by then very familiar) names: …it was a fact that there were four shifta leaders—Nur Qanyeri, Nur Garwein, Abdi Afgab and Salad Dagane—and that all four of them were British subjects, and had come from the British [side] to cause trouble in Ethiopia… The Ethiopian soldiers had fought them. He did not feel that the Ethiopian government had anything to return. The shifta came from Kismayu, Eil Wak and Wajir—entirely from British territory. Nur Qanyeri had been imprisoned in British Moyale. He had escaped from prison, stolen a rifle and taken to the bush. He had always been in Kenya…the shifta…were Aulihan and Darood… All the shifta leaders were armed with British rifles.29

The facts given by colonel Asefaw did not correspond with those given by major Grant in his earlier presentation. Not surprisingly, major Grant disputed some of what he regarded as colonel Asefaw’s misinterpretation. Concerning the citizenry of Nur Qanyeri, major Grant reminded colonel Asefaw that the British had a dossier on him, which included a letter signed by Lij Demise ‘stating categorically that Nur Qanyeri was an Ethiopian subject… Nur Qanyeri was imprisoned in Moyale—he had been let out and gone to Ethiopia… The British rifles were those lost when the DC Mandera [captain Keir] was killed.’30 Both officials, however, missed an important point. To identify individuals from the frontier as citizens of one or other country stretched the imagination. An example was the case of Ali Kowee, one of the Jeegir leaders. A former interpreter in the Mandera district commissioner’s office in Kenya, he had been dismissed and then went to Ethiopia. Whose citizen was he? Similarly, guns originating in one country and found in another 28 District commissioner, Moyale, to Reece, 26 October 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid.



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on the frontier did not constitute evidence of a country supporting banditry. While the British felt that their view had the support of the local frontier communities, the Ethiopian side had produced convincing factual evidence relating to the clans of the bandit leaders. In particular, colonel Asefaw associated them with the Aulihan and the Darood Somalis who resided in the NFD in the British side of the frontier or from areas under BMA. He identified the place of residence of each of the Jeegir leaders as follows: Nur Gurwein was another British subject who caused trouble in Ethiopia, was driven out and died in Kenya. Salad Dagane came from Luuq via Bai, caused trouble in Ethiopia, and was killed by Fitaurari Gebre Yess [who was present at the conference] and his soldiers at Malka Magorr [Mogorree]… Equally it could be shown that Abdi Afdub, his wife and family were all British subjects…’31

Interestingly, both the British and the Ethiopians appear to have missed an important point, which was that most of these leaders were ex-Italian combatants, including Nur Gurwein. This group of soldiers remained behind when the Italian army was defeated in Borana and embedded themselves among the Somali civilians. They kept a low profile when the British OETA police arrived. Therefore, the group had a mission that went beyond the interest of particular individuals and they attracted a wide range of people of different backgrounds and ethnicity into their movement. With regard to the Hara Daua incident, colonel Asefaw presented a comprehensive rebuttal of the British account that exonerated Awaka Gurmu and his forces.32 He maintained that the shifta, who attacked the Borana and the Gabra, causing heavy human fatalities, also attacked the Ethiopian forces commanded by Awaka Gurmu. He gave the following account: …Awaka Gurmu, the then Shum of Moiale, was attacked three times by shifta from Kenya, and on the last occasion at Hara Daua itself where Ethiopian subjects had been implicated in the fighting… Awaka followed them and camped at Warsebolle. There he was attacked by… British shifta [including Garre], led by Ibrahim Kore and Aden Ibrahim. They came from Kukuba, Hara Dimtu and Eil Roba. There was battle the whole night [and] 31 Unless otherwise indicated, the following discussion and quotations are derived from the minutes of the Moyale Conference of 26 October–8 November, 1943, KNA/DC/ MLE/5/3. 32 Awaka Gurmu was later hanged in public.

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chapter thirteen thirteen of Awaka’s men were killed and seventeen wounded. Awaka drove them off and followed them to Megittale where there was another band of shifta who attacked him there. He fought them off… In the morning Awaka followed those shifta to Hara Daua where he was attacked by shifta again, a very large band. There were Ethiopian subjects living there and many of them died in the course of the fight with shifta. He demanded compensation for these people from the British government. He would collect the stock on his side that [were] taken by Awaka [Gurmu] but the British must also collect the stock taken by the Garre shifta.

It appeared that colonel Asefaw meant to move the debate in a different direction. He believed that it was the shifta from Kenya who had precipitated the incident at Hara Daua. Here, as readers might infer, the use of the nametag ‘shifta’ did not differentiate the Garre—who were responsible for the attacks on the Ethiopian army—from the Jeegir. He consistently avoided linking his Somali constituents with the Jeegir. There are two interesting lines of argument here. First, he claimed that in the Hara Daua incident and previous incidents, Ethiopia had suffered enormous losses of both civilians and soldiers for which he sought compensation from the British government. His claim that the attackers came from Kenya countered the British claim for compensation for the Hara Daua massacre. Some evidence in the British records supports colonel Asefaw’s position. In a communiqué to the provincial commissioner, the district commissioner of Moyale stated that ‘[i]t is…probably true that Awaka Gurmu was attacked by Ethiopian [Garre] and it is not unlikely that young men from the British [Garre] were [also] involved.’ In his second line of argument, colonel Asefaw offered a possible solution to the problem. He suggested that his administration collect the livestock seized by the Awaka Gurmu-led Borana and Ethiopian forces from the Garre and that the British administration should do the same for the livestock seized by the Garre from Ethiopian citizens. This suggestion was likely to set back any prospect of agreement, since the British were not prepared to admit that their subjects had stolen stock from Ethiopian citizens during that period. To offset this suggestion, the British administration had to find support for their position from the pastoralist leaders. The most likely person to refute colonel Asefaw’ argument was Wobur Abdi, the sultan of the Degodia Somali, who had been brought under escort from Luuq in the Somali territory controlled by the BMA. The conference minutes describes colonel Asefaw as appearing physically upset by the presence of the Degodia leader. He was overheard to say that ‘the Ethiopian government had looked after the Degodia’s interest as though they were their own children.’ The British anticipated Wobur Abdi’s



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presentation, while the Ethiopians, who regarded his willingness to give evidence as a treacherous act, nervously awaited it. Both administrations recognized Wobur Abdi as a man of great authority with impeccable knowledge of the events in question. His presentation challenged colonel Asefaw’s strong rebuttal. Wobur Abdi’s presentation initially focused on a man whom the Kenyan police had arrested on the Ethiopian side of the border and thus exonerated the British of any blame because the man was a criminal. This was his account: First he would deal with the case of the man who had been arrested that morning. Ali Furur alias Ali Karamoi was his name. The man was a thief and had raided the Degodia three or four times. First he was one of a party that had taken sixty-eight camels at Har Dimtu. Then he had taken ten baggage camels at Filtu, camels that had been on the move with a safari of women and goats…He had complained to the colonel but not one of the camels had [been] returned to him.

It is not clear how this particular story was relevant to the conference deliberations, but it seemed to be an attempt to preempt a possible rebuttal by the Ethiopians. Although Wobur Abdi’s evidence could have been the subject of a legal inquiry, its presentation at the conference perhaps indicated a different motive. Possibly, the British aimed to use his presentation to confirm their belief about the identity and origin of the Jeegir leaders, an issue that had occupied much of the conference proceedings. By using this example, the British could absolve its administration of any violation of Ethiopian sovereignty. Wobur Abdi’s explanation of the origin of the shifta was authoritative and warrants close examination. According to his account: The shifta first came from Mano, Herti and Ogaden [countries]. The Goura came and made common cause with the Arussi [Arsi]. They came by Dibbi near Negelle. Jele Nur led the Goura, and Barasa Gababa and Roba Guta led the Arussi. Some sixty Ejji Ogaden and Marehan joined in, led by Nur Gurwein, Salad Dagane [and] Nur Qanyeri. At Bifatu they attacked his people and stole eight thousand camels and killed nine men and one woman. All [his people’s] camel losses have been written down in a book. He had got back about a thousand all told.

This testimony disclosed the origins of the Jeegir leaders. Wobur Abdi linked them to the Ethiopian communities of the Goura, Marehan and Arsi, but also pointed out that some of their leaders originated from faroff regions such as the Ogaden, then under the BMA. He even linked some of them to Sheikh Hussein of the Marehan, a participant at the conference. Turning to more immediate complaints, he alleged that the

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Ethiopian officials had refused to return his people’s camels and delineated how the shifta had attacked his people, stolen their stock and transferred them to Negelle. The recaptured livestock was divided among the supporters of colonel Asefaw. This evidence, if substantiated, weakened the Ethiopian case as it implicated them—as the British had claimed all along. Wobur Abdi added: ‘Captain Demise told me he could not give me my other 7000 camels and sent me to…Ras [Adefrsew who] told me I could not get any more back… He awaited the return of the other 7000 camels at the hands of government.’ Wobur Abdi did not explain why the Ethiopians had refused to return his people’s camels. A common practice used by the empire states at that time was to hold livestock as a way of punishing groups who attempted to transfer their allegiance from one government to another. Perhaps the Ethiopian officials, suspecting the intentions of the British and the Degodia, kept these camels as part of the shared political strategy on the frontier at the time. The departure of the wealthy Degodia to the British side would have entailed a huge financial loss in terms of taxable population for the Ethiopian administration. Consequently, the livestock in this particular case served as ‘collateral’ since the Degodia would not depart without them to the British territory. The continuation of Wobur Abdi’s statement confirms this possible scenario: ‘[He] had gone to the colonel and even though the camels were at that time actually in Negelle, he got not one of them [the colonel was seemingly very upset at this point, commenting that ‘if he told lies like this he would get nothing later on’].’ He then listed the atrocities committed by the Bon Marehan and the Ethiopian army in seizing his people’s camels. On each occasion he had reported the incident to colonel Asefaw, who ignored his requests. Perhaps the most damming claim was that 800 of his camels had been ‘given by colonel Asefaw himself to Sheikh Hussein and Hassan Abdi and [o]f the 7000, some were given to the Arussi [Arsi] and Goura and Marehan…every day some were brought and sold in the market at Negelle.’ Wobur Abdi ended his submission with a demand for compensation ‘for sixteen people killed, the liability with the Ethiopian government.’ An important point of his statement was his allegation that the attackers had come from Negelle in Borana, which was the administrative seat of the Ethiopian government. He also associated the Marehan, who were the root of the turmoil in the Borana area in Liban, with the Jeegir. Their leader was Sheikh Hussein, who was present at the conference and who was protected by the Ethiopian administration. Finally, Wobur Abdi accused alien Somalis—the Marehan and Ejji—as the source



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of all their troubles as well as of the dispute between the two governments, and he advocated their removal from Borana.33 Before he stood down, major Grant posed a question on the origin of the Jeegir, wanting all to hear it; however, he was interrupted by colonel Asefaw who declared that ‘he would not allow the answer to be given in his presence.’ There is little doubt that the Ethiopian case had been dented by the evidence given by Wobur Abdi, who had gone so far as to implicate colonel Asefaw in crimes of negligence as well as to accuse Ethiopian officials of participating in the theft and disposal of his people’s camels. During the seventh session, before colonel Asefaw could question Wobur Abdi, it emerged that he had already left the conference under British escort. Nevertheless, colonel Asefaw stuck to his earlier argument that associated the shifta with Kenya, stating ‘[h]ad these shifta not come out of Kenya then these troubles would never have started.’ He categorically denied the claims made by Wobur Abdi and argued that the Ethiopian administration had returned the stock recovered from the shifta in a way that was fair to all parties. He contended that ‘the Degodia claims were exaggerated.’ After the testimony of Wobur Abdi, the British called on the other pastoralist representatives to present their views. Their speeches were clearly choreographed to represent the positions taken by one or other government. They made no representation on the issue on banditry and said nothing about compensation claims. The first elder to speak was Ali Sora, representing the Kenyan Sakuye. He linked all the shifta leaders to Ethiopia, concluding that ‘[n]ot a single one was a British subject… They wished the two governments to get rid of the people [the Ejji, Marehan and others blamed by the British for the frontier insecurity] and give [his people] a just compensation.’ Next to speak was Diid Huka, representing the Gabra, who focused on how his group had suffered from the beginning of the conflict. His people knew the shifta leaders who were responsible for their misery and he named them as being Ethiopians. Colonel Asefaw interrupted him, despite major Grant’s insistence that the elder should continue with his evidence. At this point in the proceedings, the district commissioner interjected, emphasizing ‘that colonel Asefaw had made a definite allegation that the shifta had all come from British territory and that it was up to the conference to determine the truth, which could only be found by asking the tribal representatives. It was apparent that there was a breakdown in 33 This account of the representations of the local pastoralist leaders is based on the report of the district commissioner, Moyale, to Reece, 26 October 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.

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communication between the two government officials on the important issue of frontier security: Colonel Asefaw had been heavy-handed in preventing the local pastoralists from making their views known, and the British regarded him as intransigent. In a surprise move during the eighth and the final session, colonel Asefaw allowed the local Ethiopian leaders to present their views, even though they very likely felt threatened as was the case of the Garre leader whose speech had been cut short and who, fearing punishment from colonel Asefaws’ administration sought refuge with the British. It is against this backdrop that the presentations by local pastoralist leaders from the Ethiopian side should be judged. Racha Halakhe and Balambras Halakhe Guyo Xuye spoke for the Ethiopian Borana, while Abdi Jilo and Abdi Baji spoke for the Gabra and the Ejji respectively. Racha Halakhe took a position obviously intended to oppose that of Wobur Abdi, who was under British protection. Racha Halakhe avowed that: …[the Borana had] losses at the hands of the shifta, whose leaders [he names]. All…were most certainly British subjects. Eventually the Ethiopian Government came and their soldiers fought against the shifta… Ras Adefrsew divided out [the looted stock]. The Boran got a little but most was lost and a lot went into British territory. If the Ethiopian government had not come all the Boran would have perished. Prompted by Fitaurari Gebre Yess, he said he could not ask for the removal of the alien Somalis. If they did wrong his government would punish them… Again prompted, he said that the British government had taken their rifles from them; that was the cause of their trouble. Their losses in cattle were 48,852 head. They had got a little back; 50,000 goats were taken and perhaps 1500 [were] returned, 8000 donkeys were taken. All this loss was done to them by British subjects. He had complained to major Grant and to Mr Reece, further [that] some 11,000 men [and women] had been killed.

The Borana had suffered most from frontier banditry and related ethnic conflicts. It is surprising that their leaders failed to strongly oppose invaders of their territory. Given the huge losses suffered by the Borana, it is inconceivable that they would willingly allow the alien population that had taken over their land to remain, just because of government policy. This shows the extent to which the Borana had been compromised. There is little evidence that the Borana took the opportunity to influence either of the two empire states during the conference. Through his earlier interventions, colonel Asefaw had neutralized the presentations by local leaders that potentially undermined the Ethiopian position. In this situation,



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the imperial states were able to influence the views expressed by their citizens, even when these were contrary to their own interests. Such compliance was also evident in the speech of Balambras Halakhe Guyo Xuye, a highly respected Borana elder well known locally for his proBorana views on issues like the loss of land to competing groups (see chapter 14). In this particular case, he, too, could not afford to deviate from the line ‘prepared’ by colonel Asefaw: He was thankful that the Ethiopian flag had returned to their country… Stock was taken and then divided by Ras Adefrsew. He [Halakhe] was a witness of that… The Boran were the autochthones of the country. All others are aliens. If the government wished to remove those aliens that was their affair. He could not express an opinion about it…When first he had been attacked by shifta under Sheikh Bano, he had twelve rifles, given by the British; with the use of these, and five others, and the help of Diiribo [Taacho]34 they had got their stock back. Then the British had taken away their rifles…Shifta entirely came out of the British territory. They attacked at Daka Roba… The British warned us against the shifta. Some came and attacked us; Nur Gurwein was the leader, at Dibbi Karsa… They were attacked at Tulu Muka near Lae by shifta under Ilka Bogol. The Gabra knew how stock was taken. The shifta came from El Wak.35

Although Halakhe Guyo’s speech may have lacked coherence, it contained three important points. First, he touched on the matter that lay at the heart of the conflict, namely the question of who was indigenous to the frontier zone and who was alien. His interpretation of the entire conflict concerned land. He underscored the indigeneity of the Borana to the region. While he was quite specific on who was indigenous and who was alien, he did not want to offer an opinion as to what should be done with the ‘alien’ population. His second important point was that the Borana had defended themselves with guns given to them by the British during the short spell of the OETA administration. By taking back the guns when they left, the British exposed them to attack. While confirmation of this claim is lacking in the British records, it was a well-known fact that the British administration had advocated the disarmament of the frontier 34 Diiribo Taacho was a freelance frontier ‘Robin Hood’ of Borana origin who had been variously used by the Ethiopian administration in minor administrative matters. The British would describe him as a shifta because his activities included on attacking those ethnic groups that attacked the Borana. 35 Unless otherwise indicated, these quotations from the representations of local leaders can be found in the minutes of the Moyale Conference, 26 October–8 November 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.

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communities. This goes some way to supporting the colonel Asefaw’s claims that the British bore part of the responsibility for frontier conflict by their failure to enable defense of the frontier, although he did not supply specific details. This Borana claim was quite credible, although the motive behind the claim may have been different. Perhaps the British believed that leaving arms in the hands of civilians, without any regulation of their use, would pose a security risk of the type observed after the departure of the Italians. Halakhe Guyo’s third and final claim was that the leaders of the shifta came from British territory, specifically from El Wak. The Garre, who resided in El Wak, had fought on both sides of the conflict, although their main adversaries were the Borana. Not surprisingly, he pointed a finger in their direction, but he failed to discuss the origin of the Jeegir leaders. His views must have caused some consternation in the British camp. The British officials could not believe how the Borana, so well-known for standing up for the truth, had been compromised. Major Grant waved ‘a branch of the Sacred Sycamore Tree (daambi) which caused consternation among the Boran.’36 Nevertheless, as the British record states ‘…[the Borana’s] words were always carefully twisted by the Ethiopian officials to give the impression which they desired.’ This can also be seen in the statement of Gerazmach Abdi Korre who represented the Ethiopian Gabra. His presentation did not differ significantly from that of the Borana representatives. He detailed raids and looting of stock, and also blamed the same shifta leaders. He confirmed that Ras Adefrsew had made a fair division of the livestock captured from the retreating bandits. The Gabra, who had also suffered much loss of livestock in the conflict, refused to offer any opinion ‘with regard to the Eji’ who had been associated with many atrocities, arguing that this was ‘a matter for government.’ The second Gabra leader to speak was Gerazmach Abdi Jillo. Unlike the others, he provided some perspective on the background of the conflict, while still keeping to the Ethiopian official line. He described: …how after the Italians were driven out, the country became [lawless]. Those responsible for this were ex-Italian Banda who had been brought from the British Territory… They had complained to the British authorities. Major Grant knew about this…. He had got back 700 head of camels from

36 The sycamore tree is a venerated ritual symbol of truth. In this particular situation, it was used for taking an oath, which appeared to have been broken.



compensating victims of banditry309 Filtu and Seru. None of this stock was discovered in Kenya. Captain Thomas and major Grant had also returned 2000 head of cattle to the Dirre and Liban Boran.

His evidence was factual and referred to events both before and after the OETA took over the Borana administration. Gerazmach Abdi Jillo mainly reiterated the Ethiopian side of the story, pointing out that ‘before the Ethiopian government came their hearts had been troubled but after they had come then they got rest… The Ethiopian government had helped…when the shifta attacked them…The stock recovered had been divided out…They had not got so much as one goat from the British authorities.’ The Garre representative, Alio Dikka, had hardly begun to speak when he was interrupted by colonel Asefaw and forced to take a seat. The reasons for this are not clear, but perhaps Alio Dikka’s allegiance was in doubt, and it was feared that he would not toe the official line. Abdi Baji, the representative of the Ejji, however, was allowed to speak unhindered. He contended that the main problem was the shifta: He would confine himself strictly to the truth. The main trouble is shifta. He would not really complain about the British Government. They had had British Officers run the country [during OETA]… The British Officers had gone and left the country empty. They had warned us of the possibility of shifta trouble. They had moved…and ordered their people to keep south of the main road. Major Grant warned us of the trouble that might come and went off to Nairobi. The trouble came when the DC Mandera [captain Keir] was killed. Then Agefari Bokala came and helped the country. Later the whole countryside was aflame. Colonel Asefaw came and was ‘like water… poured on hot charcoal.’ The country was well again. Small children and old men [and women] got justice from Ras Adefrsew and colonel Asefaw, who did not differentiate between British and Ethiopian subjects… All four leaders of shifta without exception were from British Territory. They were all Darood like himself.

Abdi Baji revealed some illuminating facts about alien Somalis who were the main agents in the Jeegir banditry war. He confirmed that all the shifta leaders were from his own Darood clan. This was significant, because most of his clan inhabited the NFD and the southern Somalia. Both areas were under British control, thus suggesting that the shifta leaders were British subjects. With the exception of Abdi Jillo, the Gabra leader, none of the other presenters had linked the Jeegir bandits and their leaders with the ex-Italian banda. This contradicted the evidence given by Wobur Abdi, who had claimed that the Jeegir were from different ethnic backgrounds, which was closer to the historical facts.

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As mentioned before, the Ethiopian government had returned after its six-year absence with its authority much reduced on the frontier. At the time of the conference, the reinstated government was in its second year, so it was essential to reestablish the allegiance of the frontier communities. Such allegiance was not necessarily voluntary. For the Ethiopian delegation, the conference, originally convened to discuss compensation for victims of frontier banditry, turned into a quest for legitimacy. Meanwhile, the British sought to place the burden of responsibility on an administration that had too little time to reestablish symbolic control, let alone political control, over its frontier. While the conference highlighted the extent and the dynamics of frontier politics, it made no progress towards providing any compensation for the victims of banditry. Taken overall, the conference revealed colonel Asefaw as a dexterous strategist who had manipulated the British, handing them nothing but humiliation. The British delegation had pushed for the issue of compensation for the victims of frontier banditry to be considered as the priority; however, he had diverted the whole discussion to a consideration of the identity and origin of the Jeegir leaders. Having achieved his goal of frustrating the British, he proposed in English (up to this this time he had spoken exclusively in Amharic) that ‘the public baraza should stop and that they—he and the British officials—should try to find some agreement.’ In effect, he had neutralized any advantage the British might have had at the outset of the conference. To their credit, the British officials took this public humiliation calmly, no doubt knowing that there were other avenues through which they could pursue the matter. The British assessment of the conference was not surprising. They summarized that ‘[l]ittle agreement could be found…Those attending the conference will draw their own conclusions… ‘They attributed the failure of the conference to the uncompromising position taken by colonel Asefaw, the governor of Borana, whose suppression of the local leaders’ freedom of expression had derailed the conference agenda. In his report, the district commissioner of Moyale admitted that finding ‘a satisfactory restitution of all the wrongs done to the tribes both in the territories bordering Ethiopia … in Borana is a Herculean task.’ The British concluded that the ‘conference [had] brought no material relief to the sufferings of Kenyan tribesmen.’ The conference exposed the underlying political conflicts that existed prior to the occupation of the frontier by the Italians. The British report associated ‘the troubles that have beset this unhappy corner of Africa’



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with conflicts fuelled by ethnic rivalry and with the fact that the Ethiopian government was ‘not prepared to adopt a realistic attitude towards their administrative problems in southern Ethiopia.’ This statement took into account the evidence of the Ethiopian administration’s attempts to deny the existence of problems, or to attribute the problem of banditry operating from its soil to other causes (contrary to all existing evidence). The British administration examined the failure of the conference from the perspective of global and international law and its relevance to the local situation, concluding that: If we are sincere in our adherence to the sixth point of Atlantic Charter— namely the establishment of a peace “which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries; and which will afford assurance that all men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want”…then I feel that this conference has at least amply proved that there exists on the Northern Frontier of Kenya and in the Boran Province of Ethiopia a state of tribal dissension, a state of fear, and a state of want…which calls for unbiased examination and radical rectification.37

This expresses a view that the ideal situation is one in which all humanity is treated equally. Sadly, this was not the case in colonial Africa. The international Atlantic charter had little relation to the events that had occurred on the southern frontier in the forty or so years after the creation of the imperial frontiers. The prevalence of fear and the existence of perpetual wrongs were the dominating issues. Thus, while a sympathetic administrator may have argued for ‘radical rectification’, the systems of government on both sides of the frontier were far from being just. The next chapter examines how the contests and conflicts left persistent legacies on the frontier.

37 Officer-in-charge, NFD, Isiolo, to the office of the district commissioner, Moyale, 10 November 1943, KNA/DC/MLE/5/3.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

POLITICAL LEGACIES OF SHIFTING POLITICS This chapter briefly examines key events in the history of the southern Ethiopia-northern Kenyan frontier from the mid-1940s to the present, with a view to understanding the historical legacy of the period covered in this book. An exploration of how the past helped to mold more recent developments contributes to the on-going dialogue about interactions between postcolonial states and frontier nomads. The term ‘legacy’, as used here, refers to aspects of the history of past generations that continue to influence affairs in the present. It refers to how particular political events have shaped people’s narratives over extended periods. For the frontier nomads, a ‘legacy’ refers to the way the past informs present political relations. The frontier nomads’ perceptions of the past link particular historical periods to present-day local or regional political conflicts. These political legacies are malleable, shifting frontier politics from the local level to the regional level. It is important to note that, as in the past, disputes persist over the former imperial borders at the regional level and ethnic conflicts over grazing lands and water sources (such as wells) among the contesting nomads at the local frontier level. By contrast, the perspectives of the postcolonial states believe that the contest is over ‘the legitimacy of inherited frontiers’ (Geshekter 1984). This issue has led to agitation for dismantling the imperial borders in the Horn of Africa (Touval, 1996; Englebert, Tarangos and Carter 2002). Imperial southern Ethiopian-northern Kenya frontier relations left two legacies: the first was the dispute over particular sections of the border between Ethiopia and Kenya, which was a proxy for all other major disagreements that outlasted the colonial period (Watkins 1993). The second legacy was the ethnic conflict over the transfer of land and water resources from one group to another (Tache and Oba 2009). Land rights were once ancestral rights, but when these became subject to the jurisdiction of the empire states, these rights were manipulated by these states (Suhrke 1991: 28). At a later stage, this issue was joined to regional political agitation, particularly with the approaching independence of Somalia, which highlighted the struggle for unity by Somali groups partitioned by imperial borders. By linking grievances arising from the pastoralist

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transhumance to political aspirations, pro-Somali political movements in the 1940s showed an understanding of the need to connect contests at the local level to contests at the regional level (Geshekter 1984:224). These regional and local contests had four features: (1) the regionalization of frontier conflicts; (2) the protracted issue of interethnic land conflicts; (3) the merging of local and regional conflicts through use of banditry and (4) the settlement of refugees in the contested land (Allen 1994). We will briefly return to the comment on the BMA control of the Somali population under the 1942 Treaty with Ethiopia. The BMA period in the Ogaden saw the rise of Somali nationalism. Somalis who were located in different territories and separated by imperial frontiers strove to create a united movement. Ernest Bevin, the British foreign minister, added fuel to the political fire in his speech at the 1946 Peace Conference, when he suggested a union of all Somalis in a ‘Greater Somalia’ (Lewis 2000). He admitted that the proposal might seem naïve; nevertheless, he urged that ‘British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland and the adjoining part of Ethiopia, if Ethiopia agrees, should be lumped together as a trust territory, so that the nomads should lead their frugal existence with least possible hindrance’ (Lytton 1966:103). By permitting Somali political agitation across the Horn of Africa, the British helped to merge two different themes. On the one hand, Somali nationalists calling for breaking down the imperial borders to bring about a ‘Greater Somalia.’ On the other hand, at the frontier level, long-standing ethnic conflicts over grazing lands took on a much broader political perspective. Contests and petitions over land among different ethnic groups—divided between those who claimed ancestral rights and those who claimed occupancy rights—constituted the mainstream political argument on the frontier. Such contests transformed into wider political conflicts at the regional level, where land claims expanded from claims for traditional grazing land to claims for a larger political space defined in terms of national political unity. With the formation of the Somali Youth League (SYL) movement in 1947, nationalist agitation across the region spread the message of Somali independence and nationalist political goals, which largely overlapped with the local land claims of particular ethnic groups (Touval 1996; Castagno 1964). The Ethiopian region of Ogaden also experienced Somali political agitation that employed unity slogans such as ‘Somali hanoolato, Ethiopia  hadinto’, which translates as ‘long live Somalia and death to Ethiopia’ (Eshete 1991:17). Somali agitation was motivated by what Lewis (2004) calls ‘unusually fortunate’ political factors, by which he means the



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homogeneity­of culture and religion. The political agitation for Somali unity and self-determination intensified after Somalia became an Italian trust territory in 1950, which again raised the old question of its undefined borders with Ethiopia.1 The Italians decided to postpone the problem ‘until such a time as the Somalis themselves could [decide on] the question’, a situation that concerned Ethiopia and Kenya because of its implications for Somali irredentism (Hess 1966:194–95). The pastures of the Horn of Africa were turned into a frontier zone of conflicts involving frontier nomads and regional post-independence states (Doornbos 1993). Regional versus Local Politics Almost immediately after the defeat of the Jeegir bandits in the 1940s, Somali pastoralists on the Ethiopian side of the border organized a rebellion, which continued into the early 1960s (Bizuneh 2008). This conflict had two main features. At the regional level, the call for Somali unification gathered momentum, following the independence of the Republic of Somalia. At the micro level, armed insurgents (Somali tribesmen) crossed into Ethiopia, particularly Borana and Bale (Tareke 1991). The insurgents came from the same groups that had earlier participated in Jeegir banditry on the southern frontier. Both the Ethiopian state and the ethnic groups opposed to Somali expansionist politics felt threatened by these local insurgencies. Here, I again focus on the conflicts between the Borana and the Garre to understand how their relationship influenced the political legacy of the frontier at the regional level. While the Borana sought the support of the Ethiopian state, the Garre, although also soliciting the support of the state, were at the same time involved in armed insurgency within the axis of Somali resistance against Ethiopia. If one compares the ways in which the Borana and the Garre sought to settle land disputes with the Ethiopian state, there emerges a clear pattern of sociopolitical behavior. During interludes of peace, the Garre gained control of large portions of Borana grazing land by influencing government officials, while the Borana repeatedly sent complains to the Ethiopian government. During periods of local and regional conflict, however, the Garre, allied to the regional Somali political movements, came into conflict with the Ethiopian state, thus 1 This was after the BMA handed Somalia back to Italy under UN Charter to guide the country to independence in 1960.

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losing their past gains, while the previous losers—the Borana—enjoyed a more cooperative relationship with the state. This allowed the Borana to press for the land they had previously lost to the Garre. The Borana used the insecurity caused by the insurgency to petition the Ethiopian government for the return of their land and wells that had been transferred to the Somali clans. Not surprisingly, the Garre, who had been the main beneficiary of previous policy, perceived the conflict differently; they believed that land rights included not only ancestral rights but also transferred rights. In contrast, the Borana position was that ancestral land could not be transferred under any circumstance without violating their rights as Ethiopian subjects, a view in keeping with general ideas about sovereign rights of citizenship. This idea informs the history of resource conflicts in this part of the Horn of Africa (Tache and Oba 2009:414). This is why the transfer of the Borana land and wells by the state to another ethnic group was so contentious. In this particular case, since the local provincial officials were blamed for transferring the land in the 1950s, the contestants appealed directly to the regional governors as well as to emperor Haile Selassie. Because of regional agitation for Somali unity and the demand for the removal or realignment of both local (internal) and imperial borders, the Ethiopian government regarded the land issue as increasingly sensitive. Perhaps in an attempt to preserve harmony within the empire, the Ethiopian government initially treated land conflicts as tribal issues that provincial governors could settle by calling tribal conferences in which the ethnic protagonists used history to justify their claims, which shows how the strategies of individual groups changed over time. Fitaurari Halakhe Guyo Xuye (interview, 1992) representing the Borana, affirmed the following: Our petitions of the Ethiopian state over land involved thirteen regional governors at different times… Each time the decision was in our favor but because the others [i.e. the Garre and the Marehan] were using bribes and undue political maneuverings, the decision was unimplemented. The Garre had claimed that the land was given to them by the Ethiopian state [more specifically] by Ras Desta, who allowed them to use pastures and waters of Borana. This was before the Ethiopia-Italian war. Hassan Gababa then asked Ras Desta to give his people separate wells and pasturelands claiming that the Borana were killing his children and women… At that time Muuse Sava Karavasilis, the Greek merchant, was in charge of supervising the border [between us]… Ras Desta asked him to give the people of Hassan Gababa, a land. Muuse Sava asked us to allow the Garre access to our wells and pasturelands… [I objected, but] the Borana leaders—Guyo Anna and Gedo Jillo who were our balabat—agreed to the arrangement. The Garre used seven



political legacies of shifting politics317 wells among the Lae tula cluster…and were allocated 5 to 7 wells in Wachille and Udat. They were to use the Wayaama grazing zone jointly with the Borana.

This narrative implies that the Borana and the Garre perceived the allocation of the water points and grazing lands (to which the Borana leaders had agreed) differently. From the Borana perspective, the Garre merely received user rights, to which they were traditionally entitled, even before the colonial/imperial partitioning of the frontier. But the Garre believed that the agreement denoted the formal transfer of the land to them. During my fieldwork, I interviewed a key informant who at the time of the interview was 100 years old and so had personal knowledge of these frontier disputes. I asked him about the underlying issues driving these historical conflicts. He believed that the conflicts over land were political: The problem of land disputes between the Borana and the Garre is part of family politics. The Gababa family is the leader of the Garre. I have seen the old Gababa Mohamed Guracha. We were residents of the Wayaama grazing zones and our people were neighbors. They married our daughters… The Borana were suspicious of the Garre intentions, not for anything other than…their plans to take it [i.e. land and water]. In the Borana tradition, property rights of land and wells cannot be altered… The Borana conflict with the Garre over land began with Gababa Mohamed Guracha. Fitaurari Kosi Gedo insulted him when Gababa claimed the Lae wells. Since the Garre were knowledgeable of the Borana traditional resource property rights system, such an audacious claim irked the senior balabat… Gababa lost the case when [it was] presented to the Ethiopian officials. When Gababa died, his son, Hassan Gababa, took up the task of claiming Borana land and wells. He was more shrewd and unconventional in the way he dealt with the Borana. He knew the Sidama higgi [Ethiopian law] better than our Borana leaders… He influenced the Sidama officials by all means including bribery which he used to gain temporary favors (Oba Sarite Kura, interview, 1992a),

Sometime between 1952 and 1954, the old issue of disputes between the Borana and the Garre over grazing lands returned, with both groups petitioning the provincial governors. Somali political agitation at a regional level, and the resulting insecurity, might have put pressure on the provincial administration to take action. The Borana governor, major Johannes Abdo, organized a tribal conference in 1952, where each claimant was required to present their case in public. The Borana pushed the Somalis to vacate their grazing lands, while the Somalis (i.e. the Garre, the Marehan and the Degodia) resisted this and tried to maintain the status quo. Major Johannes Abdo made radical decisions that involved a subdivision of the

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grazing lands between the competing groups. The official position was that each community would have its own ‘marked territory’, beyond which it would not trespass. Unfortunately, this produced the opposite effect; rather than ending the conflict, it aggravated it. The two groups petitioned emperor Haile Selassie for a solution. According to a Borana informant: The Borana were not happy about the divisions of their land. [Therefore], they sent a delegation2 to petition the emperor. Their complaint was that the vast tribal territories of the Borana were sub-divided among other ethnic groups forcing them to give up large chunks of their ancestral land. They described to the emperor how different tribes were given parts of their land. For example, the northeastern part of Liban bordering with Bale was transferred to the Arsi. They stated ‘we have lost all the land between the Ganale River and the Ganale/Dolo Road. The land between the Daua River and Negelle was given to the Marehan…and the areas from Daua to Moiale on the frontier were given to the Garre’ (Dabaasa Areero, interview, 1997).

In response to orders from the emperor, the Ethiopian Provincial Admin­ istration (EPA) organized a second tribal conference to discuss land conflicts. The Borana’s position as rist (ancestral right holders of the land) was confirmed, but the Somalis allowed user rights. At the time, the Borana felt that this acknowledgement of their ancestral rights was critically important, particularly as the decision involved all parties, who signed on behalf of their tribes; however, the Somali interpretation was that the state, by dividing grazing lands among conflicting ethnic groups, had recognized their de facto rights. Given these contradictory positions, the Borana might have believed that user rights did not entail formal property rights. The Somalis used politics to turn the argument to their advantage. This forced the Borana leaders to revise their previous agreement and demand the outright removal of the Somalis from their territory. Understandably, the Borana took advantage of the weakening relations between the Somalis and the Ethiopian state: the Ethiopians suspected that Somalis encouraged regional political agitation. The slow response by the provincial administration obliged the Borana to petition the emperor for a second time. The 1954 conference was a historical landmark in the development of Ethiopian justice. The state established two criteria with respect to land claims. The first considered the claims from the point of view of ristinet 2 The Borana elders who presented land complaints to emperor Haile Selassie were Qenyazmach Dima Kula, Gerazmach Jarso Molu, Balambras Guracha Boru, Fitaurari Halakhe Guyo Xuye and Qenyazmach Roba Bukhura.



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(ancestral rights to land). The second considered temporary user rights. Significantly, the Amharic concept, ristinet, applied to land tenure in the northern Ethiopian highlands. This decision to use the term implied that a right to ancestral land was not transferable to any second or third party (Tache and Oba 2009). The Borana used another criterion in their approach to their claims, namely that they had participated in the gabbar (serf) system. Although this feudal system was now regarded as abhorrent, they argued that it made them ‘more Ethiopian’ than groups that migrated into Borana later. When I asked informant Fitaurari Halakhe Guyo Xuye (interview, 1992) about the vagueness of the official rulings on rist and user rights, he explained: The Garre who claimed the Boranaland were not even Ethiopian gabbari (i.e. bonded] like we were… The Garre when the boundary was marked between Ethiopia and the British were British subjects. We became Ethiopian subjects even before the arrival of the British… The eastern grazing lands claimed by the Garre were our ancestral territory… All the Borana residents in the area were referred to as Wayaamtu3 Xuye… Xuye Galgallo was my father.

It is important to remember that when Menelik established his southern frontier, the empire used the Borana as frontier markers, and therefore recognized their rights before the arrival of the migratory Somali groups. What was significant about state-nomad relationships at this time was the use of formal petitions that required each contestant to put his claim in writing (Bizuneh 2008: 197). This was a learning process for the nomads, who observed that the use of official records gave their claims greater authenticity and credibility than claims based on verbal argument. These records served as evidence of the persistent claims that inform the oral history of these groups. Another informant confirmed this: ‘All official documents of the minutes of the conferences can confirm the true owners of the land’ (Dabaasa Areero, interview, 1997). Frontier pastoralists who contested the resources held by others understood the limitations of their claims. When the Garre delegations at the tribal conference were asked to provide justification for their claims, they were evasive. According to Belete Bizuneh (2008: 198): The inquiry…did not advance beyond the first question put to the Garri representative, which was ‘Have they illegally/unlawfully acquired water and

3 The landscapes of red soil are generically referred to as wayaama and the residents as wayaamtu.

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chapter fourteen grazing lands and [did they dispute] the Boran claim that the land in the subprovince belonged to the Boran?’ The Garri representative declined to answer the question by stating that they thought they had been invited before the commission to discuss issues relating to access to/use of water and pasture and not specifically relating to ristinet [ancestral rights].

The Garre might have had two reasons for their evasiveness. First, they may have been buying more time to assess the implications of the longerterm claims and the resolutions that the tribal conference might produce. Second, since their historical claims were refuted they might have found it safer to claim that they were simply utilizing the user rights allocated to them by Ethiopian officials in the past. Provincial officials treated the petition in the same way as they would in normal court proceedings where the disputants presented misikiri (witnesses) to support their claims.4 The Borana spokesperson reported one claim as follows: To the south we have the Warda [the Orma], to the northeast and northwest we have the Arsi and the Guji Oromo…while to the east we have had Somalis, with whom we conflicted. These are our misikiri [witnesses]. However, we have two other stronger witnesses. One was a White man; we fought him at Dukke Iggo [discussed in chapter 2]. The second is the Sidama [Ethiopians]. They fought us at Gobba and took our land. This was in Liban [This refers to the Ethiopian conquest; see chapter 3]. These documented events support our ancestral claims to the land (Roba Bukhura, interview, 1993).

In the case of the Borana-Garre land conflicts, time played an important part. The Garre position held that the conflict over resources was longstanding, predating the colonial period. Borana history, on the other hand, provided evidence of client relationships and mutual reliance but there was little doubt that the Borana had ancestral rights to these resources. The Borana relied on historical evidence, while the Garre additionally used contemporary forms of evidence. Thus, when it was Hassan Gababa’s turn to rebut the Borana claims, he attempted to refute their evidence, although the administrator warned him that evidence such as historical records might undermine his position. Gababa introduced two fundamental points. The first was that the land belonged to the Ethiopian state and not to particular tribal groupings. His aim was to follow the official line of argument, which was that after the conquest of Borana, the land technically ceased to be tribal territory: it was allocated by the state to 4 The witnessing communities, according to the Borana sources, were the Guji and Garre Maaro, both neighbors of the conflicting groups.



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those who paid taxes. His argument was based on the premise that the Garre, as taxpayers, had as much right to the land as any other group. His second tactic was to play the tribal history card. A delegate who attended the tribal conference, Gerazmach Roba Bukhura (1993), when interviewed on the subject, summarized the proceedings as follows: Hassan Gababa claimed that the Garre were early occupants of the land5 but that the Borana drove them out. In his claims, he stated, “We were brothers with the Gabra but the Borana separated them from us. We ran to Irrir.” He was to give his evidence and the name of his country. He called the Garre land as Keddi.6 He said the Borana took the land from them during the gada of Goba Alla (1688–1696). The Borana were asked to respond. They said that the land belonged to them. Their land is Liban, Dirre, Badha and Tertalle, including Golbo [in Kenya]. Hassan Gababa had claimed that one of his evidences was the [ruins of a] mosque in Wachile. He was asked to present his supporting witness. He responded that the first evidence was the mosque itself and the other was Ukho Bake, a Gabra oral historian. The Borana responded…on Ukho Bake, he was not alive and was not born when as the Garre claimed the land was taken from them. As for the mosque, the Borana in their prayers mention the names of the Earth (laaf) and God (Waaq) but not mosques. Regarding the structures, these are found throughout the Borana country. They were constructed to protect women and children from man-eating beasts during the rinderpest epizootic [in 1891] that wiped out livestock.

These claims and counter claims by the two parties were more for the benefit of their audience than to convince each other. Both parties knew very well the history of their relations, but for strengthening their arguments, they used selective historical facts. It is noticeable that none of the groups used the evidence of their more recent historical relationship (see chapter 2). This evidence would have made it clear to the audience that more issues were involved in their relationships. The stage-managed arguments formed only part of a bigger story. Neither the state nor the groups used as arbitrators could verify claims that predated occupation by imperial states. The claim about an old mosque located in Borana territory implied that if religion were taken into account then the Muslims might have resided in the area before the Borana. However, by referring to the socalled mosque as merely one of a number of such structures widely distrib­ uted throughout the region and by associating them with recent historical events, the Borana sought to discount the validity of the Garre claims. 5 This period is vague but from the Garre claims, this may have been in the 17th century. 6 See Kassa (1983). Keddi is not a geographical space. It symbolizes ancestral roots.

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The Garre relied on an oral historian, who had passed on by then, as their witness. Their goal was to confirm the historical oneness of the Garre and the Gabra, so that if the Borana accepted the Gabra as residents, then the Garre too, had to be accepted. It does not appear that this line of reasoning was successful: the Borana simply dismissed it since the historian in question had not even been born at the time (the seventeenth century) when the Garre claimed displacement. Because of the evidence of the Borana, colonel Kifle Ergetu, the vice-minister of the interior, reversed the historical decision made by major Abdo. Bizuneh (2008:209) states: ‘Col. Kifle noted that the Borana, who were the rist owners…had been victims of attacks by migrating pastoral populations whose ancestral lands lay outside of Borana.’ Therefore, the Ethiopian administration of the Borana province decided to settle the Somalis in the Oddo area, but the Somalis rebelled against the policies. They joined secessionist activities and resorted to banditry. In seeking union with Somalia, conflicts over land allocation on the frontiers shifted from the local to regional level, and vice-versa, depending on the main driving forces. As Charles Geshekter (1984:217) suggests, ‘To the Somalis, [conflict] is a matter of connection between territoriality and survival; to the Ethiopians it is the incompatibility between territorial integrity of the state and [secessionism].’ To the Borana it was a matter of ethnic and territorial integrity. At the frontier level, before the 1960s, the Somali clans had begun to redefine the extent of the land to which they believed they had a claim. The increased momentum and profile of the pre-independence movement transformed the dispute from one over user rights ‘to inclusion of the [land within the context of] the emerging independent Somalia’ politics (Adugna 2004:79). This shift to a dispute over international borders had implications for a wider political struggle. The ethnic borders recognized by local groups corresponded with the future borders of a Greater Somalia.7 In this new political setting, the main tribal groupings—the Garre, the Marehan and the Degodia— marched back to the region of Liban as bands of guerrillas recruited by the Somali Republic. A number of skirmishes took place with the Ethiopian army, but the guerrillas’ main target remained the pastoral groups opposed to them. At the local level, the insurgency produced nothing­but grief (Farer 1979). Locally, the conflict of the 1960s was called olki Dhumbur (the war of Dhumbur), a name that referred to a new type of 7 Greater Somalia included the Somali populations living in Djibouti, the Ethiopian Ogaden, British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland and the northern frontier of Kenya.



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gun obtained from Somalia for use in the Ethiopian region of Borana and in neighboring Bale as well as in the Ogaden (Bizuneh 2008). On the southern frontier, the Garre had taken up arms to fight the Borana who in turn were armed by the Ethiopian government. Although there was ‘a mutual interest’ between Ethiopia and the Borana, imperial Ethiopia and the Borana had different goals (Adugna 2004). ‘The Borana ambition was to reclaim their ancestral lands… [and this] coincided with Ethiopia’s protection of [its] sovereignty’ (Tache and Oba 2009:417). By the early 1960s, the regional insurgencies had spread across the frontiers between Ethiopia and Somalia. In 1963, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) launched a rebellion in the Ogaden (Issa-Salwe 1996). On the southern frontier, the Borana, supported by the Ethiopian army, decisively defeated the Garre-led guerrillas in 1969. By the 1970s, the guerrillas, better armed and coordinated, assisted by the WSLF, intensified their activities. Marco Bassi (1997) reports that in 1976, the Muslim Oromo in Bale, together with the Garre, founded the Somali Abbo Liberation Front (SALF) with Haji Hassan Gababa as the political leader and General Waaqo Guutu as the military commander. John Markakis (1998:131) observes that apart from particular activities in their areas of operation in southern Sidamo, the purpose and future direction of the SALF remained rather vague. What was not vague was the broader Somali regional plan. At a local level, the war settled old grievances. Trained guerillas used sophisticated arms and ammunition against civilians (Tegbaru 1987). The objectives had not changed: land still remained the principle item over which each side fought. Between 1974 and 1978, after the fall of the government of emperor Haile Selassie and the coming to power of the Derg, the Garre-led SALF forces effectively occupied the eastern Borana region (Kassa n.d.). In April 1977, the Somali insurgency, led by the Marehan, annihilated a Borana village near Negelle, killing 375 people (Adugna 2004: 89). The SALF captured large sections of the Borana population in both Liban and Dirre. Among the captives was the Abba gada, whose head they forcibly shaved (Borbor Bulle, interview, 1993).8 According to a local source, the Borana were forced to become Muslims and rape was widespread­(Anna Waaqo Doogo, interview, 1993). This was before the Ethiopian army and hizbawi serawit (peoples’ militia) drove out the SALF 8 The Borana abba gada customarily does not shave his facial hair and he must adhere to other avoidance rules while in power. The Garre and the Gabra forced the captured abba gada to violate all these taboos, including taking him to Somalia. The abba gada involved was Borbor Bulle Jaldesa who was the abba gada of the Konitu.

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in 1978. The war caused mass displacement of the population, producing one of the largest international refugee situations. During the 1980s and 1990s, the main political feature of the Horn of Africa was the instability of the states in the region. After the WSLF and the Somalia armed forces failed to occupy Ethiopia between 1977 and 1978, Somalia experienced a political collapse. The political situation in Ethiopia also continued to be volatile due to secessionist wars in the north and south (Tareke 2009). The fighting in Somalia in the 1990s forced the refugees back across the border into Ethiopia, a large proportion of whom were resettled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Borana territory (Bassi 1997). The reception sites were identified based on returnees’ statements about their ethnicity and place of origin (Bassi 1997). The Garre identified all the main water points, which they had previously contested with the Borana, in spite of opposition by the Borana. The Garre, who were mostly stockless, set up small businesses in urban areas, from where they strengthened their political base. Since the urban environment is closely associated with political and economic activity, the Garre Alliance aimed to influence the state as well as the development and relief agencies to extend their political influence (Anna Waaqo Doogo, interview, 1993). Around 1990, the Garre began digging wells within the tula clusters in Lae where they were camped as refugees. The wells they excavated belonged to the Borana clans. In some cases, the Garre claimed they had dug fresh wells within the well clusters, while in others they excavated disused well systems. Urban Garre traders and the UNHCR provided the funds to dig new wells and excavate old ones. Aware of the Borana customary law that prevents any outsider from digging new wells in their territory, they decided not to back down over the wells they had dug. According to local sources, the Borana clan alliance of Dambitu and Nonnitu that owned the well sites agreed to compensate the Garre for their labor; this was set initially at fifteen bulls. However, the Garre changed their minds and demanded 101 bulls. The gada council then took up the issue and decided to reclaim the bulls and contest the Borana rights to the wells (Galma Arero Duba, interview, 1992). This again triggered major armed conflict and fresh refugee problems, this time crossing into Northern Kenya (Schlee and Shongolo 1993). The refugees re-settled in Borana produced dramatic changes in the demography of the Somali population, which strengthened their alliance against the resident Borana population. The ‘returnees’, estimated at 30,000, claimed the Moiale district as their place of origin and settled



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there between 1990 and 1991. Bassi (1997:50) calculated that as a result the Garre and alliance, populations in Moiale increased by some 280 percent, while the natural growth of the population was only 2.9 percent. He argues that the UNCHR ‘[b]y transferring as many Garri-Gabra returnees into the Borana administrative units…[achieved] the old goal of getting access to Borana-controlled resources.’ Bassi concludes that ‘[i]f the operation is successfully completed it will lead to the permanent replacement of one ethnic group by another.’ Since 1991, the Garre have practically occupied the lands of the wells of Lae and Goff, including part of Moiale. Their claims for the land appear formalized for two reasons. The first was that in 1991, when the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)-led forces of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) effectively assumed power in Ethiopia, the new government was suspicious of the close cooperation between the Borana and the former Derg government. The Garre, on the other hand, used political strategies to win favors from the TPLF/EPRDF government. Perhaps counting on the deteriorating relations between the Borana and the state, the Garre began to contest the Lae wells, while also accusing the Borana of past injustices under the Derg. It will be recalled that during the Derg period (1978–1990), the Garre took part in the insurgency against the government and the Borana (Anna Waaqo Doogo, interview, 1992). What appears to have favored the Garre was the organization of administrative structures according to the linguistic distribution of ethnic groups in Ethiopia (Turton 2006). This policy allowed even physically isolated groups to be aligned administratively with their appro­ priate ethnic regional states (Tache and Oba 2009:420). The Borana were included in Oromia state, while the Garre, together with the Borana land that they claimed, were included in the Somali regional state, resulting in an entirely new development in land conflicts (Adugna 2009; Challa 2011). Political activity has shifted from refugee settlement to ‘demographic politics of space’ as Marco Bassi (2010) has argued in his more recent treatment, of the more complex land conflict that is emerging, which, will inevitably transfer these contests from ethnic groups to the regional states—Oromia and the Somali Region—thus making the future outcome of land disputes very uncertain.9 9 These uncertainties of the political future related to the Ethiopian ethnic based federalism, particularly in the frontier region with such a fractured history, will only be a beginning of a new chapter in national and regional configuration in which the Ethiopian state needs to find the underlying cause of the conflicts.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

SUMMARY Nomads in the Shadows of Empires is a history of the frontier marked by the southern borders of imperial Ethiopia and the northern boundary of the British colony of Kenya, a zone that hosted multiethnic nomadic communities in the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries. At different times, three imperial powers sought to gain control over it. This work examined the adversarial politics between imperial Ethiopia and the British colony of Kenya (1896–1935 and 1942–1948); between Fascist Italy and imperial Ethiopia (1935–1936) and between the British and Fascist Italy after the Italian occupation of the southern Ethiopian frontier (1936– 1941). The overall aim of the study is to investigate the legacy of the persistent political crises on this frontier. The study has considered the sociopolitical significance of the internal and external resource frontiers in the precolonial southern Horn of Africa, focusing on their effect on relationships between the Borana and their Somali neighbors (chapter 2). While the external resource borders and ethnic frontiers were not fixed, the internal frontier of the Borana remained stable until the entry of competing imperial forces and the arrival of migratory Somalis. Later, when conflicts with the Darood Somalis occurred, the groups in Jubaland were successful because they adopted the Oromo system of warfare using age sets. None of these earlier conflicts altered the external resource borders in any substantial manner. The relationship between the Borana and the Somalis was characterized by peaceful coexistence, facilitated by the caravan trade and the exchange of ritual items. This allowed early Somali migrants to settle peacefully within the external and internal frontiers of the Borana. Meanwhile environmental alterations caused by an outbreak of smallpox and the rinderpest pandemic resulted in the collapse of Borana human and livestock populations. European travel journals of the time provide a clear picture of the distribution of the external and internal frontiers of the Borana at the turn of the nineteenth century. The making of the imperial frontier, treaty negotiations and the marking of the frontier by two different boundary lines was the beginning of the frontier politics. In expanding the reach of his frontier, Menelik

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combined raids by his peasant army with the spearheads of elephant hunters that thrust his men into the southern lowlands (chapter 3). The British entry through Jubaland, punitive action against the Somalis and their lack of economic commitment weakened their presence on the northern frontier. The resulting delays allowed the Ethiopians to occupy the southern frontier that encompassed some of the richest grazing lands in the frontier zone, leaving the arid lowlands on the northern frontier to the British Protectorate of Kenya. The first boundary commission undertook surveys without proper knowledge of the lie of the land or land-use practices by the local pastoralists, thus leaving the majority of water and grazing resources on the Ethiopian side of the frontier (the Red Line). Emperor Menelik ratified this boundary according to earlier treaties, but rejected the second boundary line that adjusted the treaty boundary in favor of the British (Blue Line). The extractions of taxes by Ethiopian officials and settler-soldiers, through the gabbar system forced the Borana to migrate to the British side of the frontier (chapter 4). This created conflict between the two empire states. The British policy towards the migrants (‘runaways’ to the Ethiopians) varied from verbal assurances of protection to rejection of Ethiopian attempts to retrieve them. This approach was ineffective, given that both British subjects and the ‘runaway’ populations needed to return to Ethiopia to water their livestock. The lack of control over the retrieval and taxation of both British and Ethiopian subjects by the Ethiopians caused ceaseless complaints. Tax reforms by both administrations did not reduce the number of nomads who resisted by migrating. The Ethiopian response was to send raiders to collect livestock taxes, despite their attempts to reform the system, while the payment of taxes technically guaranteed protection for the British nomads from raids by the Ethiopians. Disagreements on the application of the treaty terms to transfrontier watering and grazing rights was due to the British insistence on the recognition of the Gwynn Line (the Blue Line), as it ensured access to water by the frontier tribes and theoretically should have secured the frontier from raids by frontier bandits (chapter 5). This study shows how the Ethiopians interpreted the treaty on watering and grazing rights differently, by linking access by pastoralists from the British side to the payment of taxes. The extraction of taxes from British civilians was the main basis of objections from the British. Since access to the frontier wells was so critical for the British subjects, British officials tried taking a hard line position to force Ethiopia to renegotiate the frontier lines. When this failed, the British adopted an aggressive policy. This had two aims: first, to occupy

summary329 the Gaddaduma wells and to threaten to occupy other wells; second, to adjust the frontier by force and occupy the entire Borana Province. Both plans would have required the use of military force and in both cases the overall British goal was to compel Ethiopia to renegotiate; however, Ethiopia responded aggressively by sending a huge military force to the frontier, compelling the British to withdraw from Ethiopian territory. The analysis of Tigre frontier banditry showed that the bandits were not popular with the frontier pastoralists, and in this respect did not conform to Hobsbawm’s model of social bandits (chapter 6). They had social and cultural affinities with the settler-soldiers and the state officials, but not with the frontier nomads. Tigre banditry served as a means of selfenrichment and of achieving upward sociopolitical mobility. The shifting loyalties and identities of ‘official’ and ‘non-official’ bandits meant that they were politically unpredictable. These shifting identities and functions, from banditry to official recognition, allowed the bandits to move in and out of particular roles as economic and political circumstances dictated. For this reason, Tigre banditry approximated a type of banditry of fortune, rather than a politically motivated banditry as the participants were those who were disenfranchised in allocations of fiefdoms and government promotions or inclined to extort wealth from the frontier populations. The bandits robbed the pastoralists of their livestock and kidnapped people for ransom. The pastoralists reluctantly cooperated because a relatively peaceful life entailed choosing between two evils: the state or the bandits. The lack of strong, centralized state control meant that it took more than two decades to control this group. In this respect, they resembled Hobsbawm’s ‘social bandits.’ Another similarity with this model is that neither empire state was able to provide adequate policing. The British, in particular, chose to cooperate with the bandits by making a ‘non-aggressive’ peace pact. This gave the bandits the legitimacy they needed to increase their influence on the frontier. The Tigre bandits turned to the Robin Hood type out of weakness, rather than any sense of mission. They left an enduring legacy on southern frontier in three ways: (1) guns became the preferred weapon of bandits; (2) banditry influenced ethnic conflicts directly and indirectly and (3) new forms of banditry emerged conducted by the nomads. This study has also discussed the nature of ethnic conflicts and the roles played by the empire states as arbitrators, using local institutional models such as the dia blood money payment (chapter 7). It has shown how the Borana and the Garre resisted the exchange of livestock for compensation and made decisions that went against formal court rulings.

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The two communities were guided by their historical, rather than their contemporary, relationship. Perhaps, this explains their resistance to the payment of blood money. The two groups took the unusual step of each paying for its own members killed by the other group, and vice-versa. This approach to resolving conflict changed when the Garre crossed into Ethiopia and took up residence in Borana country. The Ethiopian administration forced the payment of bloodstock money, but instead of stopping the feud, the relationship between the Borana and the Garre worsened and the conflict spilt across the frontier. The historical analysis of the conquest of southern Ethiopia by Fascist Italy from 1935 to 1937 suggests that Italy used the undemarcated Ethiopian–Italian Somaliland frontier as a pretext to justify its action; however, the conquest served Italy’s long-term goal of expanding her colonial empire (chapter 8). The Italians used overwhelming force to rout the Ethiopian army. Air power and indiscriminate use of mustard gas and other poisons caused terrible suffering among the civilians. The vanquished Ethiopian forces struck back through a campaign of guerilla resistance. The war stimulated population movements, particularly from Italian Somaliland to the Borana region, leaving a legacy of ethnic conflict on the frontier. The Italian administration of the southern frontier contributed to the history of the southern frontier in three ways: (1) it focused on relations between two European imperial administrations in terms of their understanding and application of the transfrontier treaty signed by Ethiopia and the British in the early twentieth century; (2) the frontier administrations had an important impact on the transfrontier grazing movements and taxation policies; (3) the Italian administration, like the Ethiopian before it, used transfrontier issues as an excuse to provoke a boundary dispute with the British (chapter 9). When it came to transfrontier relations, the main difference among the British, the Ethiopian and the Italian administrations was that while the British bullied the Ethiopians, they treated the Italians cautiously. Meanwhile, the Italians suspected that the British supported the Ethiopian resistance, a suspicion that was well founded. Italian policies regarding the access of British subjects to wells and water points on the Italian side of the frontier were unpredictable, but four trends can be identified. First, they used their ill-trained banda frontier police to harass the Borana and control the access of British civilians to water and grazing. Second, the banda provoked frontier populations by crossing into British territory. Third, the Italians introduced a new policy of issuing passes to provide access to watering and grazing,

summary331 as guaranteed under the frontier treaty. Fourth, the Italians imposed taxation on British subjects who crossed to their side of the frontier for water and grazing. Perhaps the most serious impact of the Italian administration on the Borana was its pro-Somali policy that allowed Somali pastoralists to invade and take over large areas of Borana grazing lands. The Somalis also isolated the Borana by spreading disinformation that they had supported the Ethiopian resistance. Meanwhile, ethnic relations deteriorated as a result of arming civilians, mostly Somali irregulars, who, instead of attacking the shifta, turned their guns on the Borana and Gabra. Borana hostility combined with overstretched Italian security and increasing shifta activities created a major political crisis for the Italian administration. The swift British military action brought about the end of the Italian administration. For the second time, the southern frontier came under a European imperial power (chapter 10). The departure of the Italians left a vacuum in the administration of the frontier that unleashed murderous  violence among frontier pastoralists, which was briefly stabilized by the short-lived OETA. With the reinstatement of the Ethiopian administration, the British once again made demands on issues relating to the  frontier. The Ethiopians suspected that the British had multiple objectives, including the settlement of the disputed border with Ethiopia and the implementation of their policy of ethnic control. None of these  corresponded with the Ethiopian administration’s perception of its polit­ ical interests. One of the major issues in dispute concerned the reap­ pointment of consular officials. This increased political tensions on the frontier. As soon as the Treaty of 1942 expired and the British administration handed the Borana region back to Ethiopia, the Ethiopians became suspicious of British plans to stabilize the frontier (chapter 11). Among the British demands were the removal of Somalis from Borana province, the disarmament of frontier groups and control of frontier banditry. Because some areas of the empire, such as the Ogaden region, remained under the British Military Administration (BMA), the Ethiopian government developed a pro-Somali policy. Inevitably the British opposed this policy. Another source of conflict was the way the NFD administration sought to influence affairs on the frontier—the Ethiopians preferred diplomatic channels for dealing with frontier problems. Their usual reaction to British pressure was to employ caution and silence as forms of resistance. While the Ethiopians were successful in dealing with the British frontier administration, their undoing was their marginalization of their own citizens.

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Pro-government groups such as the Borana lost their land to other pastoralist groups because of government favoritism, disregarding ancestral and historical rights long claimed by the group. Jeegir banditry was the product of political processes on the southern frontier of Ethiopia, representing part of the legacy of the Italian occupation (chapter 12). Mostly Somalis, the bandits were recruited from the frontier communities. Most of them were former Italian army banda. Their primary motivation was to oppose the return of the Ethiopian administration. This differentiated them from petty frontier bandits. They had the advantage of familiarity with the local environment and received support from the Somali clans such as the Marehan. Most importantly, their Islamic identity attracted recruits and provided them with a wide support base. The shift in their political goals from insurgency to banditry led to predatory raids on the non-Muslim pastoral populations on the frontier. The Ethiopian administration’s denial of the bandits’ existence gave them space for expansion of their activities. Their superior numbers and weaponry resulted in a large number of casualties and seizure of large numbers of livestock. As the conflict progressed and the Jeegir seized the stock of Oromo groups such as the Borana and the Gabra, ethnic conflict intensified, displacing various groups from their traditional grazing lands. Eventually, the Ethiopians organized a campaign that succeeded in eliminating the Jeegir, despite the British belief in their ineffectiveness. Frontier banditry and ethnic conflict caused huge losses of livestock and massacres of the frontier populations. A British proposal called for debate and deliberation by representatives of the two empire states and the frontier nomads on the question of compensation for the victims of frontier banditry (chapter 13). The British argued that the losses due to banditry went beyond interethnic conflict, and therefore required compensation by the state found responsible. Nevertheless, because of the resistance from the Ethiopian representatives, the discussions focused on the origin and leadership of the Jeegir bandits rather than the declared purpose of the conference. Each state blamed the other. Each side used historical facts to buttress their positions. The representatives of the frontier pastoralists were forced to adopt their government’s line of argument. They failed to take the opportunity to demand compensation for their losses. The situation on the southern frontier continued to be the scene of murders and much looting of property during this period. It remained a zone of great political perturbation that left a legacy of banditry, secessionism and ethnic conflict revolving around access to grazing lands and key wells.

summary333 Imperial control and state-to-nomad relationships on the southern Ethiopia-northern Kenyan frontier left four key legacies that link past and present histories of the frontier (chapter 14). (a) The postwar breakdown of the imperial frontiers, which influenced the way in which the imperial borders were challenged as the independence of Somalia approached. The political vision of Greater Somalia, which aimed to realign the previous imperial frontiers across the Horn of Africa, triggered political agitation at the regional level. This resulted in the downscaling of conflicts over borders to the level of frontier ethnic conflicts. This study has shown that these disputes over land and resources endured for over a century on the frontier. (b) Secessionism, banditry and ongoing ethnic politics were merely symptoms of the historical contests that engaged the respective imperial and national states. The history of the Horn of Africa shows that these disputes have undermined state security and regional political stability. The present-day flow of refugees onto the global scene and the phenomenon of religiously motivated wars are not discussed here, but are the extensions of political problems seen at the micro scale in the Horn of Africa. (c) This book has shown that ethnic conflicts involving the same groups have outlasted several governments, but with the difference that regional and cross-border political alliances are now involved. Different pastoralist groups with either a standing army associated with the state or a civilian militia are now part of a heavily militarized conflict. (d) In southern Ethiopia, particularly in the Borana region, the new internal politics that shifted the land claims from local ethnic disputes to ethnicbased regional state conflicts is unlikely to produce peace. Rather, it could in future contribute to a regional conflagration if these conflicts and their underlying causes are not comprehensively addressed.

GLOSSARY abba (Oromo) Abba (Amharic)

adaa seera (Oromo) ato (Amharic) awaj (Amharic) balabata (Amharic)

Balambaras (Amharic) banda (Italian)

baraza (Kiswahili) ch’iibra (Oromo) Dejazmach

Father The respected name of the priest The Oromo and Amharic names refer to an individual’s personal horse: e.g., abba guraachaa (father of the black stallion) or abba wayaamaa (father of the red soils). This also refers to the hideout of a bandit leader. It is an assertive name that declares that he owns the Country of the Red Soil. In this context, it refers to the eastern grazing lands of Borana. Abba gada refers to the father of the gada who is elected for an eight-year cycle that rotates among the five luuba generation class of the Borana Oromo. While in power, the abba gada is the center of Borana rituals and regarded as the principle political leader customary law an Ethiopian title denoting respect public pronouncement the title given to leading local chiefs among the communities conquered by Emperor Menelik in the nineteenth century. They were responsible for organizing tax collection and served as intermediaries between the state and the society a title of a lesser lord Italian irregular units under the command of white Italian officers for policing the frontier and controlling movements of the pastoralists across the frontier public gathering, usually addressed by government officials defensive war against an enemy attack. an Ethiopian military title meaning commander or general of the gate

336 duula (Oromo)

gabbar (Amharic)

Fitaurari (Amharic)

foora (Oromo)

gaarifati (Oromo)

heshima (Kiswahili)

glossary a war party. If organized for defensive purposes, a gada-organized war party is referred to as duula guuba (the supreme) and if it is used for offensive war is called duula ch’anchalla. The duula uchuuma (the term refers to making a bon fire) is a war party organized by Borana age sets during their recruitment tribute-paying groups comprising the peoples of the south divided among the settlersoldiers. In the southern Ethiopian-northern British frontier, the Borana Oromo and the Gabra were the only two groups divided among soldiers and settlers as serfs a military title meaning a commander of the vanguard. It was a title given to nobles, including nobles representing different ethnic groups satellite herds comprising the dry and young livestock grazed away from the main waara (settlement), comprising milk herds for the family units a term meaning ‘the scoffers’. During the pre-colonial period, the Borana maintained regional identities that often described their political relations with their neighbors or the geographical locations of their settlements. The suffix waar is often fixed before the territorial name. The Liban Borana were saarkamtu (metaphorically invisible; similar to the fruit of the gerwia species). The name refers to their involvement in tribal wars with neighbors. The territorial groups found along the flood plain of the Juba River were called waar goobeesa, a term that refers to floods respect; its current usage refers to a reward for gaining the trust of local leaders. In colloquial usage, it refers to a bribe

glossary337 jeegir (Somali)

Muslim bandits, comprising the peoples of the southern frontier who rebelled against the incoming Ethiopians after the defeat of the Italians during the Second World War. The group comprised former Italian banda who were experienced in guerrilla warfare. Their presence on the border became a major source of contention between Ethi­ opia and the British. The British associated the bands of bandits with Somali ethnic groups living on the Borana side of the border, while the Ethiopians blamed the British administration for allowing its citizens to disrupt security on her side of the border jihad (Arabic) a Muslim war against the non-believers. For pre-colonial Somali pastoralists as well as the jeegir, it became a means of mobilizing the different clans against those considered as a common enemy Kenyazmach a title denoting commander of the right, a  (Amharic-Qagnazmach) title senior to Gerazmach ketama (Amharic) a military outpost; the term also refers to market settlements that often became administrative and business centers. A Borana Oromo analogy that described the laaf (land), seera pre-nineteenth century world in which  (forbidden), dawe (of  the fools). humanity existed in two types of land: the land of ritual where customary rules and regulations were in force, and the wild land where there is no security and the rules pertaining to aada are not enforced. These lands and their inhabitants were referred to as dawe who crossed into the forbidden land where even other Borana were considered as ‘enemies’ due to their failure to subscribe to customary social values. The inhabitants of seera dawe were mistreated by the unruly raba during ritual wars but could escape such mistreatment if they returned to laaf jiila (ritual lands)

338 liicho (Oromo) lij (Amharic) madbet (Amharic)

makwanent (Amharic) manyatta (Kiswahili) mlango (Kiswahili)

naaga (Oromo)

neftenya (Amharic)

nyaatu (Oromo)

glossary a horse whip, but the word also refers to a tribal councilor the son of a noble literally, a kitchen from where food is served. The person who owns the kitchen has the right to eat what is served. Metaphorically, when the emperor of Ethiopia assigned his nobles to administer the regions of the south, it meant their ‘eating’ from the land. Thus, the Borana region was the madbet of Fitaurari Habte-Wolde Giorgis, the minister of war nobility earned through services to the empire a settlement a door; the word designates herding units into which family herds are split to manageable numbers. Each herding unit has its own gate in the kraal, hence referring to the ‘door’. The pastoralists use kaarra (livestock gate) to refer to a herding unit peace and happiness; it refers to the Borana Oromo cardinal tenets of social relations among individuals. Among the Borana, peace is not only expressed in words alone, but also in actions. It is a way of living in harmony with others. All individuals who shared this value, regardless of their ethnicity, were considered to be Borana since they lived by the Borana worldview of social coexistence rifle-bearing soldier or settler; members of Menelik’s forces that settled in conquered territories. They ruled through the use of guns and were agents of tax collections from civilians on the frontier eaters in the sense of local tax collectors

glossary339 qallu (Oromo)

qaakhe (Oromo) Ras (Amharic) saafaar (Oromo) sidama (Oromo) shiifta (Amharic shiftenant pl.) shumi tigre (Amharic?)

tobe (Arabic) tula salaan (Oromo) zemena warq (Amharic)

ritual leader; during the Ethiopian con­ quest, the administration divided the Borana between the two ritual leaders representing the two moieties of saabbo and goona a fine of infinity that can be negotiated but is unaffordable in principal the head, a title given by the emperor to regional administrators a term referring to a Somali generic name for an Ethiopian highlander. bandit, outlaw a minor administrator, a term that is a corruption of the Amharic word shum. It implies a ruler the name given to the bandits of the southern frontier. The origin of the name is unclear but it referred to bands of Ethiopian settlers and officials who used banditry to rob frontier nomads a piece of clothing the nine deep well complexes found in Borana, southern Ethiopia wax and gold; hidden meaning

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INDEX Aada seera, substantial fine 23, 24, 138, 154 Ababa, Lij (bandit leader known by pseudo-name Abba bokaa-father of the rain) 129 Abbegas, Kenyanzmach 289 Abbink, J. 137 Abdi Afgab. See Jeegir Abdi Ahmed Adan. See Jeegir Abdi Baji 306, 309 Abdi Jillo, Gerazmach 290, 308, 309 Abdi Kore, Gerazmach 290 Abdi Mado (black Abdi)-frontier bandit 117 Abdullalhi A. Shongolo. See Schlee, G. Abdulla Osman 174 Abdurrahman, Sheikh, as 250, 251, 290 Abir, M. 23 Abyssinian affairs 16, 67–69, 92–94, 96, 97, 99–113, 118–120, 122–131, 145, 155 Addis Ababa xv, xvi, 38, 43, 50–53, 61, 62, 64, 70, 78, 85, 86, 88, 91–94, 96, 97, 99–101, 103, 105, 107–110, 113, 118, 119, 121, 123–125, 129, 130, 152, 156, 158, 162, 163, 177, 178, 180, 182, 185, 225–229, 233, 235, 237, 242, 245–247, 262–264, 271, 273, 287 Adefrsew Yinadu, Ras, governor general 260 Adefuye, A. xiii Adugna, Fekadu 16, 21, 25, 217, 251, 253, 254, 322, 323, 325 Adwa 33, 159 Afalata Dido (Qallu) 24, 27, 40, 42, 146 Agal 174 Age-sets (Somali). See Simti, seegulià AGROTEC-CRG-SEDES 15 Ahmed Kiti (in 1928) 13 Ali Abdi. See Garre, chief Ali Aboukur, of Rer Tuf Garre 145 Ali Kowee. See Jeegir Ali Sora, representing the Sakuye 305 Allen, R.K. major, Kenya police 218, 249, 258, 259 Allen, T. 314 Allott, A. 5 Amhara 47, 70, 117, 144, 172, 174, 178, 179, 183, 185, 186, 204, 212, 222, 224, 243, 245, 247, 256, 266, 275, 279, 290 Angasu, Gerazmach 154, 174

Anglo-Ethiopian Commission of 1903 139 Anglo-Ethiopian treaty 196, 233, 237 Anna Waaqo Doogo xii, 154, 323–325 Archer, G.F. 118 Arero 19, 29, 38, 39, 123, 129, 153, 171, 173, 178, 186, 191, 206, 219, 268, 324 Arero Bosaro (Borana prophet) 38 Ashenafi, Fitaurari 86, 87, 112 Asiwaju, A.I. 6 Askari (local police) 167, 259 Assefau, Dejazmach 104, 106, 107 Aulihan Somali 26, 134 Austen, R.A. 7 Avanchers, L. des 17 Awaka Gurmu of 274, 279, 284, 297, 301, 302 Ayela, Fitaurari 85, 86, 94, 121, 133, 145–147, 149, 156, 183 Ayele, N. 8 Aylmer, L., captain 21, 22, 90, 91, 118, 196 Badoglio, P. 177, 185 Baer, G.W. 158–160, 162 Baidoa 35 Bakala Iddo Agefari, at 260 Balata, Ato (bandit leader known by his pseudo-name, Abba nyencha-the lion man) 129 Balchi Shifera, Fitaurari. See ItaloEthiopian war Bale province in 27, 275 Bamber, H.T. 123, 126, 127 Banda (Italian; irregular soldier) 9, 161–163, 167, 191, 193, 196, 207, 212, 215, 217, 219, 255, 258, 266, 298, 308, 309, 335, 337 Banditry, tigre frontier bandits 115–135, 329 Banisa 220 Bankoff, G. 7, 116 Ba, Oumar Moussa 8 Baraza (public gathering in Kiswahili) 87, 142, 148, 149, 200, 209, 220, 310, 335 Barber, J. xiv Barche, Lij (a bandit leader) 131 Barker, A.J. 158 Barnes, Cedric xii Barret, W.E.H., captain 67, 71

354

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Bassi, M. 323–325 Batori Sora 194 Baxter, P.T.W. 23, 83 Bayley, C.A. 59 Beachey, R. 157 Belay, Lij. See Frontier banditry Beletwein 161, 164 Bent, J.T. 33 Besteman, C. 20 Bidu Bankhare 19 Biene Merid, Dejazmach 164 Bizuneh, B. xiii, xvi, 39, 87, 117, 156, 168, 169, 177, 205, 206, 216, 219, 233, 238, 239, 257, 273, 279, 280, 315, 319, 322, 323 Blok, Anton. 6, 7 Blood money 16, 137, 138, 144, 146–150, 155, 251, 252, 261, 268, 284, 286, 287, 329, 330 Bloodstock. See Ethnic conflicts Bokala, Kenyazmach 93, 134 Bonaya Buubu 25 Borana Oromo xv, 11, 18, 26, 137, 138. See also Ethnic groups aada seera (customary law) (see gada) Borana country 21, 25, 29, 36, 49, 56, 97, 98, 123, 189, 321, 330 Borana-Garre conflict 139, 141, 156 Borana province xvi, 9, 42, 85, 100, 101, 103, 107, 111, 123, 131, 134, 155, 164, 186, 217, 218, 220, 221, 223, 225, 232, 233, 236, 243, 250, 252, 253, 263, 267, 281, 286, 290, 322, 329, 331 Borana tenants 108, 109 Borana territory 11, 21, 23–26, 31, 44, 139, 152, 168, 172, 204, 252, 272, 321, 324 Dirre Borana 155 Liban Borana 155, 172, 219, 336 victims of armed robbery 110 Borbor (wells) 21 Borbor Bulle 19, 21, 24, 29, 38, 60, 63, 154, 204, 206, 207, 279 Borbor Bulle Jaldesa, abba gada 323 Border treaty Anglo-Italian protocol 49, 50 boundary commission 46, 48, 49, 51, 53 boundary line 2, 46, 53, 55, 56 British-Italian Jubaland 157 Butter survey team 56 Ethiopia-British East African frontier xiii frontier communities 49 frontier pastoralists (see Nomads) frontier treaty agreements 226, 227 Gwynn Line (Blue Line) 46, 53, 54, 56

Imperial British East African Company 39 international boundary 169 Italian Somaliland 77 Maud Line (Red Line) 53, 54 nomads and imperial states 11 partitioned nomads 1, xii southern Ethiopian-Kenyan frontier 13 southern frontier 46, 53, 54 transfrontier grazing and watering rights 1, 71, 89–114 transfrontier grazing rights 45 transfrontier pastoralists 59, 93, 112, 114, 187, 189, 191, 202, 212, 268 transfrontier watering and grazing treaties 227 treaty lines 92, 112 the treaty map 55, 56 Boru Hache 19 Boyes, John 37 British administration the British Borana 79, 112, 198, 200, 202, 214, 298, 299 the British Colonial Office 159 British consul of southern Ethiopia 122, 129, 132 British East Africa 43 the British Garre 241, 278, 291, 292, 302 The British military 128, 131, 132, 214, 216, 221, 229, 231–233, 236, 238, 256, 264, 265, 287, 291, 298 British Minister in Addis Ababa 50, 52 British Somaliland 8, 159, 182, 190, 231, 250, 314, 322 British territory 52, 55, 56 Chargé d’affaires xv, xvi, 3, 78, 96, 97, 99, 100, 129 chiefs 40, 44, 48 Chief Secretary Nairobi 68, 70, 71, 74, 92, 93, 97, 99, 119, 120, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 228, 230, 236, 239, 241, 243, 263, 273, 276, 284 Colonial Secretary Whitehall 3 district Commissioners 79, 145, 192, 201 Governor of Kenya Colony 63 Northern Frontier District (NFD) xv provincial Commissioners 3, 51, 70 Brooke, C.H. 187 Brown David J.L. 89 Brownlie, I. 47, 48, 53, 56, 96, 158 Brown, Monty. 41, 43 Brown, Nathan 7 Brown Tatton, R., colonial chief secretary 288

index355 Buchanan, C.A. 15 Bukicha Madera 196, 197 Bunduras 267 Buxton, D.R. 37 Capenny, S.H.F. 44, 47, 48, 50, 157 Cassanelli, Lee V. 21, 23 Cassia, Paul S. 7 Castagno, A.A. 314 Cavendish, H.S.H. 36 Cerulli, Enrico 20 Chaamok 176, 298 Chalbi desert 214 Challa, Dejene Gemechu 325 Chaudet, Didier, Florent Parmentier and Benoît Pé lopidas xii Chevenix Trench, C. 50–53, 81, 117, 118, 210, 212, 217, 219, 259 Chilako 129 Choqorsa 155 Chure Helu, near 267 Clapham, C. 5 Clifford, E.H.M. 90 Cochrane, D.E., captain 80, 111 Cole, J.W., and E.R. Wolf. 5 Compensating victims blood money 284, 286, 287 British delegations 297, 310 conference proceedings 289–311 restitution 283, 284, 286–288, 291, 293, 310 British representatives 291, 294, 296 compensation 283, 284, 286, 289, 291, 293, 295, 299, 300, 302, 305, 310, 329, 332 Ethiopian delegations 284, 289, 295, 297, 310 Ethiopian representatives 288, 290–292, 332 Conklin, Alice L. 59 Coupland, R. 46 Cranworth, Bertram Francis Gurdon, 2nd baron 64, 65 Crummey, D. 116 Curle, Christian 215 D’aala (giving birth), d’aalcha (begetting) Dabassa Arero 29, 38, 219 Daka Roba, settlement on the Ethiopian frontier 125, 307 Daka Wata 267 Daleo, P.T. xiii, 23, 25

Damtew Abebe, Dejazmach. See ItaloEthiopian war Dandu 50, 191, 194, 259 Darley, H. 3, 118 Darood 11, 13, 17–22, 25, 39, 75, 216, 257, 258, 294, 300, 301, 309, 327 Darrandu 125 Darroch Ronald George at Moyale 195 Daua Parma 237 Daua River 27, 48–50, 94, 98, 120, 121, 123, 127, 134, 143, 153, 163, 165, 167, 168, 170, 171, 173, 180, 185, 187, 190, 191, 252, 257, 266, 268, 270, 272, 275, 278, 279, 281, 283, 295, 318 Day, J.P. 345 Debel 211 Deck, S.F. 71, 93, 118 Del Boca, A. 159 Demise, Lij 268, 300 Denge Galgallo Sarite 281 Desta Damtew, Ras; governor of Borana 113, 163, 164 threatened to abrogate treaty 191 Dida Bitata Mamo (1872–1880) 15, 21 Dida Galgallu to 213 Dido Doyo 64, 70, 126 Di Felizzano, Giusepe Colli. See ItaloEthiopian war Diid Kanjo, representing the Gabra 289 Diiribo Taacho (war leader) 307 Dilebo, G. 67 Dima Jaldesa representing the Borana 289 Dima Kula 318 Dodds, J. Hugh, Major, chargé d’affaires in Addis Ababa 97 Dolo 77, 129, 131, 157, 158, 161–166, 168, 171, 180, 217, 222, 318 Donham, D.L. xiii, 34, 68 Donham, D.L., and Wendy James 68 Donnan, H., and T. Wilson 5 Doornbos, M. 315 Doyle. M.W. xii Driessen, H. 7 Drysdale, J.G.S. 190 Dugan, J., and L. Laforce. 165 Duke Abba Gura 275 Dukke Iggo 320 Dutton, E.A.T. 86, 115 East African Protectorate of Kenya xi, 1, 11, 110 Eide, Øyvid M. 3 Eji 19, 21, 23, 24, 31, 142, 220, 256, 259, 308 El Der 27, 176, 249

356

index

Eliot, C. 41 Ellis, D.G. 7, 8, 156 El Roba 249 El-Safi, Mahassin Abdel Gadir Hag 13, 40, 215 Empires Britain xi, 3, 39, 126, 131, 274, 290, 331, 332 British East African Protectorate of xi, 1, 2, 11, 33, 59, 157 Fascist Italy 1 imperial Ethiopia 1 Empire states xii, 131, 139, 140, 142, 149, 152, 265, 304, 306, 313, 328, 329, 332 Englebert, P.; S. Tarangos and M. Carter 313 Erdar 155, 176, 200, 271, 272, 275, 276 Escher, R. 35 Eshete, Tibebe. 231, 314 Ethnic conflict Borana-Garre conflicts 141 Borana wells 140 conflicting groups 137 cooperation of local leaders 142 frontier politics 137, 139, 140, 142, 144, 146, 151, 153 grazing lands and wells 168 imperial rivalries 137 public negotiations 142 Somali dia model 138, 147 Ethnic conflicts xv, 1, 2, 6, 96, 103, 135, 137–156, 163, 174, 216, 218, 220, 222, 256, 265–267, 273, 281, 306, 313, 314, 329, 330, 332, 333 Ethnic groups xi, 1, 5, 11, 14, 18, 22, 26, 46, 50, 79, 86, 90, 92, 112, 211, 232, 239, 252, 261, 307, 314–316, 318, 325, 336, 337 Farer, T. 158, 161, 322 Fawcett, C.B. 5 Fernythough, T.D. 116 Feudal system 2, 116, 319 Filtu 15, 164, 165, 167, 180, 220, 222, 264, 265, 269–272, 287, 294, 303, 309 Foran, W.R. 162, 213–215, 218 Fort Harrington 52 Fowler, W.C. captain 112, 143, 148, 149 French, C.N. 52 Frontier banditry 1, 6, 7, 9, 96, 114–135, 163, 223, 232, 233, 242, 246, 254, 266, 270, 279, 295, 300, 306, 310, 329, 331, 332 Frontier bandits Abyssinian bandits 196 banditry 7, 9, 96, 114–135, 163, 223, 233, 242, 246, 254, 266, 279, 310, 329, 332

bandits of Abba Nyencha (the lion man) 116 Boran shifta 268 elephant hunters, slavers, robbers and administrators 115 Ethiopian shifta 225 Ethiopian shifta bands under 225 frontier nomads xii, xvii, 1–4, 9, 45, 52, 59–90, 104, 109, 116, 119, 126, 128, 138, 178, 185, 186, 201, 246, 247, 255–281, 313, 315, 329, 332 Habash shifta led by Ubishet Kasha 226 Idossa Yadassa and 225 legacies of imperial conquest 115 official and semi-official bandits 115 protection money 7 raided British and Ethiopian civilians 94 Robin Hood-type of bandits 116 shifta (pl. shiftenant-outlaws) 115, 339 social bandits 7, 115 stolen mail 107 Tesfaye Wolde, shifta leader 206 they poached elephants, stole livestock and kidnapped people 116 Tigre (locally corrupted as kitiire); common name for frontier brigandage 117 transfrontier banditry 232 Frontier nomads Ajuran Somali 23, 24, 74 Arsi Oromo 255, 259 Aulihan 26, 134, 235, 300, 301 Borana 60–87, 255–258, 260, 262–281 Burji 178, 182 Degodia 257, 271, 272 Dolbahanta 257 Gabra 60, 62, 63, 65, 77, 83, 256–259, 266, 267, 275, 276 Garre 75–77, 83, 87, 256–260, 265, 267, 268, 272, 273, 278–280 Goura 303, 304 Guji 271 Hawiya 257 Herti 257–259, 261, 262 Isaak 236, 237, 251 Konso 182 Marehan 83, 256–261, 267, 270–272, 278–281 Ogaden (see Eji) Rahawein 21, 158, 161 Sakuye 83, 256, 278 transfrontier nomads 1, 2, 6, 45, 90, 115, 118, 203 Fukui, K., and J. Markakis, J. 8

index357 Gababa Mohamed Guracha, chief of Garre. See Garre Gabriel, Gerazmach 130 gada 13, 15, 21, 23, 28–30, 38, 138, 155, 321, 324 Gada Adi Doyo (1896–1904) 30 Gaddaduma 16, 48, 49, 55, 56, 94, 96–114, 120, 127, 133, 140, 141, 143–145, 149, 152, 154–156, 174, 191, 202, 204, 257–259, 267, 269–271, 274, 329 Gaddaduma wells Britain’s aggressive policy 97 British, financial compensation from Ethiopia 102–103 British Minister in Addis Ababa 50, 52, 61, 62, 85, 91–94, 97, 103, 109, 110, 118, 119, 225–227, 229, 235, 242, 245, 246, 262, 264, 287 British pressure to force Ethiopians 269 to combat insecurity 103 Dadacha-Gaddaduma 155 dispute much more serious 108 Ethiopian opposition 99 Ethiopians constituted a formidable force 101 Ethiopians displaying their military might 108 force, commanded by Assefau, Dejazmach, ‘an imposing spectacle 106 frontier treaty 99 frontier wells 99 Gadier 194, 195 Galbraith, J.S. 38 Hodson captain, acting instead of talking 100 a large Ethiopian force was dispatched to the frontier 105 a letter to Russel C., Ethiopians must concede the Borana province 100 military occupation 96 from a national standpoint 109 political conflict 102 to protect the inhabitants of British territory 103 secret mail with maps 107 Send the minister of war, Habte Giorgis, Fitaurari to frontier 99–100 Taffari Ras disputed the British claims 99 Galgallo Mudale. See Obbu Galgallu Diimtu 141 Galla-Sidamo province 176, 185, 202, 209, 215, 221 Galma Arero Duba 324

Gamudda 174, 259 Ganale-Dolo road 318 Ganale Doria 164, 165, 167, 168, 176 Ganale River 15, 17, 44, 50, 87, 158, 318 Gardula 206 Garissa 210, 214 Garre-Borana peace 149 Garre, chief 144 Garretson, P.P. xiii Gashi, Gerazmach 69, 96, 122–124 Gebre Hidan, ex-Balambras, brother of Lij Belay Tigre leader 122 Gebre Thekarhashu, Gerazmach spoke 238 Gebre yess 289, 301, 306 Gebru, Ato, frontier administrator. See Gaddaduma Gebru, Lij (bandit leader). See Tigre Gedi Ibrahim, section Killeh 141 Gedo 25, 50, 64, 65, 146 Gedo Jillo, Fitaurari (Saabbo moiety) 60 Gelfand, D.E. 7, 8 Gemu Gofa (Ethiopian southern Province) 164 Geshekter, C.L. 34–36, 313, 314, 322 Getahun Tessama, Ato, on a 273 Gezahaing, Lij, Tigre elephant hunter 120 Ghebbe, Royal Court 104 Giaccardi, A. 169 Gibira (Ethiopian taxes) 145 Gleichen, E. 38 Glenday, Vincent, G. 153, 191, 196 Gob Sukela Gababa (name of Garre settlement) 174 Godana Dokicha Rero 140 Godan Ajaa xix, 28–30, 38, 171, 183 Godoma 96, 133, 196, 279 Goff (wells) 200 Goje Goollo 19 Golbo (hot arid lowlands) 15, 29, 31, 36, 44, 47, 50, 52, 54, 55, 61, 81, 118, 272, 321 Goona (section of Borana moiety). See Saabbo Gorro Qunune (place name) 128 Grant, major in a letter 249, 263, 269, 274, 285–287, 294–300, 305, 306, 308, 309 Graziani, Rodolfo, Marshal 162 Great Britain, War Office 215 Guracha Boru Kote, Balambras 224 Gutama, Kenyazmach 289, 290 Guyo Anna, Fitaurari (Goona moiety) 170 Guyo Gifeesa of Warjida 170 Gwynn, C.W., major 23

358

index

Habash (Ethiopian highlanders) 212 Habte Giorgis, Fitaurari, minister of war 51, 79, 96, 99 Hadinto (in Somali; death to) 314 Haile Selassie, emperor 19, 57, 96, 161, 175, 214, 234, 238, 244, 246, 251, 255, 260, 261, 283, 285, 290, 299, 300, 316, 318, 323 Haji Ali Gababa. See Garre; Jeegir Haji Hassan Gababa, Gerazmach See Garre Halakhe Anna 149 Halakhe Guyo Xuye, Fitaurari 19, 316, 318, 319 Halakhe Huqana Chaari 140 Hamid Badel 162 Hamilton, A. 35, 38 Hamilton, D.N. xiii, 8, 33, 48, 51, 53, 55, 89, 91, 119, 266 Hanoolato (in Somali; long live) 314 Haramsam 214 Harbor 174 Hara Daua 279, 283–288, 297, 299, 301, 302 Heer (agreements; Somali) 16, 137 Hemphill, Marie de Kiewiet 33 Hertslet, E. 158 Hess, R.L. 35, 160–162, 315 Hickey, D.C. 13, 33, 41, 42, 50, 51, 55, 61, 63, 64, 66, 68, 103, 117, 118, 120, 121, 128, 131, 132, 134, 139, 164 Hidan Haile 133 Hiddilola 183, 191 Hizbawi serawit (peoples’ militia) 323 Hobok 206 Hobsbawm, E.J. 6, 7, 115, 116, 256, 329 Hodson, Arnold Wienholt, captain Britain’s aggressive policy (over Gaddaduma) 97 British consul southern Ethiopia 96, 122, 132 cession of territory by the Abyssinian Government 97 Habte Giorgis Fitaurari, minister of war 60, 106 secret dispatch to British chargé d’ affaires in Addis Ababa 97 to wrest Borana country from Ethiopia 97 Hogg, R. 60 Homewood, Katherine xiv Hope, J.O.W. 64, 93, 119 Hopkins of Mandera 141 Hoskyns, Catherine 43 Hou, Jianxin 2 Howard, Allen M., and R.M. Shain xv

Hussein Ido Roble representing Ajuran 289, 293 Hussein Ka Dida Kosaye, Haji xix Huxley, Elspeth 26, 46, 62, 66 Iman Berhan, Balambras 238 Imperato, Pascal J. 33, 47, 56 Imperial African frontiers xiv Imperial Ethiopia Abyssinia (ancient Ethiopian empire) 196 Abyssinian Borana 113 Abyssinian Government 79, 91, 97, 100, 102 Abyssinian settlers 178 the battle of Adwa 159 Borana Province xvi, 9, 100, 101, 107, 123, 131, 134, 155, 221, 232, 233, 243, 250, 252, 253, 267, 286 emperor of Abyssinia 241 Ethiopian administration xii, 61, 72, 80, 86, 87, 118, 120–123, 134, 139, 152–155, 162, 173, 186, 187, 221–223, 225, 229, 231–238, 242–245, 247, 249, 251, 253, 255, 258, 260, 264, 266, 267, 272, 273, 276, 277, 284, 295–299, 304, 305, 307, 311, 322, 330–332 Ethiopian Borana 71, 79, 111, 268, 275, 290, 306 Ethiopian Government 61, 79–81, 91, 98, 100–102, 111, 118, 119, 128, 130–132, 145, 156, 176, 178, 187, 225–229, 236, 237, 240, 243, 244, 247, 250, 255, 261–264, 266, 271, 273, 274, 277, 278, 283, 286, 287, 290, 291, 293, 294, 296, 298–300, 302, 304, 306, 309–311, 315, 316, 323, 331 Ethiopian settlers xii, 173, 174, 177, 218 Ethiopian settler-solders (neftenya) 120 feudalism 2, 67–68, 115, 186, 226 frontier markers 319 gabbar (serfs) xii, 319 Gabbari (bonded) 319 the governor of Borana 143, 149, 164, 238, 240, 262, 269, 283, 289 imperial Ethiopia 13, 23, 33, 159, 227, 323, 327 southern Abyssinia 160 southern borders of imperial Ethiopia 23, 327 southern frontier 2, 31, 33, 37, 42, 43, 46, 97, 116, 157, 204, 216, 255, 315, 323, 328, 332 Imperial frontier politics

index359 Abdo Johannes, major 233, 317 Addis Ababa legation 233 Anglo-Ethiopian convention of 1942 232, 233 British-administered region 235 British colony of Kenya 231, 237, 242 British Military Mission to Ethiopia (BMME) 238 British minister in Addis Ababa 235, 242, 245, 246 chargé d’ affaires in xvi, 3 colonial chief secretary 239, 240, 245–247 Ethiopian-administered land 235 Ethiopian Ogaden 231 Grant, M. major to 241, 249 imperial borders 231 imperial frontier 231 imperial politics 231–254 imperial states xii, xv, 2, 4, 8 imperial wars xv, 6, 135, 207 Moore, Henry Monck-Masson, Sir, governor of Kenya to 245 in Negelle 233, 238, 251 the NFD security concerns 245 occupied enemy territory administration (OETA) 234, 236, 246, 249, 251, 252 Ogaden administration 235 Pierson, colonel take up 233, 237, 238 policies in Ogaden 231 region of Oddo 231, 234 Scuphan Brigadier of 236 second World War 240 the Somalia administration 232, 234 Tesfaye Wolde, Fitauari in 238–241, 244, 245, 250 Imperial states and nomads xi, xv, xvii, 1, 6 Intala, Lij (ex-Tigre bandit leader) 131 Isiolo, district 212 Issa-Salwe, A.M. 323 Italian administration Bianche, captain 199 Cerego, lieutenant 198 compulsory tax for watering and grazing 198 Dadacha Obbu (see Sololo) Dandu-Derkale-Hara-Daua road 191, 194 Diima Kuula invited 206 doubts of Ethiopian-British border 187 drought cause severe shortages 201 Elema Gababa, a victim 197

El Guda (wells) 200 Ethiopian resistance 4, 177, 182, 192, 197, 330 ethnic policy 204–207 forces of Romco, captain 206 Galgalo Molole from Sololo 194 Galla-Sodamo province xvi, 176, 185, 202, 203, 209, 215 Galma Wakini singled out 200, 201 Golicha Molu responsible for 205 Golich Dabello 194 grazing and water 228 grazing and water passes 199 Guyo Dukale witness of banda activities 197 Hararghe province 185 Italian administration xvi, xvii, 2–4, 8, 162, 185–198, 201, 204–207, 209, 210, 212, 213, 222, 249, 255, 330, 331 Italian East Africa 185, 195, 216 Italian territory 40, 134, 161, 191–198, 211, 299 in Italian territory 188, 189, 192, 200, 201, 203, 210 Lancia, Lieutenant 191 Leahy, captain three percent tax 203 Makri Lieutenant 191, 198 Marci Filipo, Lieutenant 200 Marconi Giovanni, captain 189 the Moyale pact 188 Obbu Borana 199, 203, 213 occupied Ethiopia 184, 185 Signorininni, major 193 Taka Gabayo shifta leader 206 Tasfaye Wolde, led the shifta 270 Turbi-Sololo road 194 Wario Bukicha from Obbu 196 Italian occupation Abeba, Dejazmach 164, 176 Abeba, Gerazmach, supported by 174, 176 Aboye, Balambras 179 Abraha, Fitaurari, attacked by Ras Haile 182 Ademe Ambesso, Fitaurari decamped to 169 Ademe, Fitaurari 164, 169 Adola in Sidamo 169 aerial warfare 214 Agostini, General 168 Ali laamani (the two Alis-ali Karara, Ali Birmaji) 174 Ali Nur 162 Amino and Fur 163

360

index

Angostine, general 187 Annibale Bergonzoli, General 165 Arsi province 164 Bako 164, 182, 183 Barder 22 Biodoa 163 Birrara Joher, Fitaurari, secretary to 169 the Borana frontier 38, 173–177 British Somaliland 8, 182, 190, 231, 250, 314, 322 Bukra, Gerazmach 163 colonial war 163 Daggabur 164 Debay, Dejazmach 171, 176 De Bono Emilio, General, western front 162 Dr. Uland of Norwegian Red Cross 172 Ejigu, Kenyazmach, the shum of 174 el Lot near Labbashalinti 167 Eritrea 162, 184, 185 Eritrean and Somali irregulars 164 Ethiopia-Italian war of 1935 156 the Ethiopian army 131, 169, 171, 299 Ethiopian refugees 183, 192, 215 Ethiopian southern front under Desta Demtew, Ras 134, 294 ethnic military balance in 168 Fascist Italy 1, 159, 162, 327 fighting in Gamo and northwest of Maji 182 Filtu, Bokol Manyo and Amole 164 Frere, Belgium adviser to 169 Gebre Mariam, Dejazamach 177 Gelaso Carlo, general 173 Gemu Gofa 164 Ginir-Goba area of Bale 179 Golich Sago, Ras Desta’s hideout 181 guerrilla in 172, 177–179, 337 Guido Corni, governor 161 Hagere Mariam (Kuku) villages 178 Harar 181, 185 Hararghe 185 Irga Alem 171, 172, 177 Italian-Abyssinia 160 Italian administration xvi, xvii, 2–4, 8, 162, 185–198, 201, 204–207, 209, 210, 212, 213, 222, 249, 255, 330, 331 the Italian army 172, 177, 180, 181, 219, 301, 332 Italian-Ethiopian frontier 157 the Italian military 168, 176, 177, 186, 214, 215 Italian Oriental Africa (IOA) 8, 159, 185

Italian Somaliland 1, 33, 77, 83, 129, 131, 157, 160, 162, 163, 165, 168, 171, 184–186, 214, 215, 231, 234, 314, 322, 330 Italian territory 40, 134, 161, 188, 189, 191–198, 200, 201, 203, 210, 211, 299 Italo-Ethiopian agreement of 1897 157 the Italo-Somali frontier 163 Jabba Shirre, natural barrier to 178, 183 Kijiba Fayo 174 Konso 178, 182 Lake Abaya 181 Luuq 163 Magallo 164 Makonnen, Dejazmach 169 Malka Dida 165, 166 Malka Guba 168, 170, 172 Malka Re 163 Matzano San Count 160 Moiale-Mega road 176 Morelli di Popolo, General 165 mustard gas 178, 330 Ogaden 185, 190 Olol Diinle, Sultan 161 Omar Samatar, mercenary 162 poisonous gas 157, 172 Rassegna Italiana 160 Regia Aeronautica 163 Sahale Negadras 171, 179 Sava Karavasilis, Greek trader 165, 316 Settani lieutenant colonel 176, 185 Sidamo 164, 166, 175, 177, 179, 181, 183 Sidamo frontier 172 Smith Allen, British Missionary 172 the southern Ethiopian army 164 southern front under Graziani 162 Sultanate of Obbia 160 Swedish Red Cross 169 Tafere Ketema 162 Tiftoni, on behalf of Italy 159 uprising in Konso and Burji 178 Virgin Eric, General, British advisor 178 Wadara 169, 179 Walwal wells 162 Wardair 160 Wondo in Sidamo 180 Zambon, colonel 176, 188, 189 Zaptie or banda 161 Italo-Ethiopian war 157 Iyasu, Lij 121 Jacquin-Berdal, D. 8 Jara Salient 187, 190, 249

index361 Jeegir banditry Abdi Afgab crossed into 278 Abdo Mursal, encounter with 259 Ahmed Aden, son of 237 attacked at Laga Sure in 278 bandit leaders 300, 301 Borana and Gabra refugees from 275, 276 dan usukentei (gang with shaven heads) 258 defeated Amhara-Borana force 275 frontier banditry and ethnic conflicts 266 gang under Warsame Shire massacred 278 Hara Daua massacre 280 independent shifta 274 Islamic jihad 276 Islamic shifta 275 Jeegir bandits 255–281 Jeegir group 264 Jeegir leaders 280 Jeegir parties 272 Jennings, J.W., and C.A. Addison 89 Jibril Farah of 22 Jijiga 162 Jirma Bukhura 174, 268 Jonas, R.A. 159 Juba River 11, 18, 21, 33, 35, 37, 40, 42, 157, 163, 185, 234, 336 Kabudda, Lij (see Tigre banditry) Mohamed Kour, shifta leader 294 Omar Mwalim Sheikh Hussein, son of 259 road from Derkali to 281 Saman Arabe and Abdi Hared (or Abdi Fiti) operated in 272 shifta encampments 276 shifta under Sheikh Bano 307 Somali bandits 236, 276 Somali jeegir 236, 237, 276, 337 Somali rebels 233, 260 Kambata and Walamo uprising 178 Kapil, Ravi Laxminarayan 33, 42, 158 KAR. See King’s African Rifles (KAR) Karanagh, W. 6 Karayu Berre (of the Saabbo moiety) 139 Karra 66, 81, 85, 202, 213, 257, 259, 272 Kassa, Getachew (1983) 321 Kassa, Getachew n.d. 60 Katzellenbogen, S. 46 Keir Wee Willie, captain 259 Kennaway, N.F., reported 274

Kenyan National Archives (KNA) 13, 18, 34, 62, 91, 118, 141, 159, 185, 209, 232, 256, 284 Khazanov, A.M. 12 Kidane, Kenyazmach 128 Kifle Ergetu, colonel of 322 King’s African Rifles (KAR) 78, 79, 90, 105, 109, 128, 132, 149, 169, 213, 214 King’s African Rifles (KAR) 78, 79, 90, 105, 106, 109, 128, 132, 145, 149, 169, 213, 214 Kirk-Green, A.H.M. 59 Kismayu 23, 40, 42, 77, 300 Kittermaster, H. Baxter 72, 96, 121–129, 138 Kleinschmidt, H. 5 Knowles, captain 129 Kodooffi Kootaro, of horses, strayed. See Saako Kootaro and Garre Komora 278 Korondile 278 Kossi Bukhura, Fitaurari 156 Kossi Gedo Fitaurari 145 Koticha Hache 174 Kreike, E. xiv Kristof, L.K. 5 Kuku. See Sidamo Kuno, Yattani 126, 127 Kuse Katelo, representing the Borana 289 Lackner, Helen 59 Lae wells 205, 267, 268, 295, 317, 325 Lake Rudolf (current: lake Turkana) 43, 50, 191, 214, 217 Lamphear, J. xiii Lattimore, O. 5 Legesse, A. 13, 15, 155 Legg, captain. See King’s African Rifles (KAR) Leopold, M. xiii Leus, T., and Cynthia Salvadori 17 Levine, D.N. 245 Levine, D.N., zemena warq 245 Lewis, I.M. 16 Liban 15, 18, 24, 29, 30, 38, 39, 44, 50, 78, 98, 121, 128, 155, 168, 169, 171, 172, 200, 206, 216, 217, 219, 220, 222, 236–238, 253, 254, 256, 258, 264, 265, 271, 272, 275, 279, 281, 294, 297, 299, 304, 309, 318, 320–323, 336 Lij (son of a noble) 338 Llewellyn J.M., colonel 80, 81, 110, 146, 147 Loola daara (the war to die or to live) 38 Low, D.A. 117 Lugard, F.J.D. 39 Lytton, Noel Anthony Scawen Lytton 33, 36, 314

362

index

Madbet (kitchen; literal) 3 Magado 183, 191 Mahad Hussein. See Garre Makonen, Gerazmach 134, 178 Makuria, Fitaurari 96, 165 Malka Guba 168, 170, 172, 173, 175, 275 Malka Hawacho 279 Malka Mari 94, 165, 168, 172, 176, 185, 187, 209, 220, 222, 249, 269, 283 Malka Solug 269 Mandera 13, 18, 21–23, 36, 49, 55, 56, 129, 132, 141, 153, 165–167, 171, 177, 179, 185, 186, 209, 212, 213, 215, 219–221, 234, 241, 248–250, 252, 254, 255, 258, 259, 266, 279–281, 289, 295, 298, 300, 309 Manyatta (traditional settlement in Kiswahili) 338 Marcus, H.G. 1994. 43, 44, 47 Maria de Vecchi, Cesare governor 159 Maria Theresa thalers (currency used in Ethiopia) 261 Markakis, J., and Nega Ayele. 3, 67 Markakis, John. 3, 7, 8, 67, 323 Maroya, A. xiv, 5 Marsabit 82, 84, 114, 124, 130, 201, 212–214, 242 Matston, T.E. 60 Maud, P. captain 48, 50, 53, 60 Mburu, Nene xiii, 115, 117 McDermott, P.L. 39, 40 McEwen, A.C. 38, 43, 46, 54, 56 McGregor, JoAnn xiv Mega 87, 88, 98, 105, 111, 113, 123, 125, 143, 149, 160, 161, 163–165, 167, 168, 170–173, 175, 176, 183, 185, 186, 190, 201, 206, 215, 218, 224, 225, 227–229, 232, 233, 251, 261, 263, 264, 271, 275, 276, 281, 286, 287 Mega-Dhas road 275 Meir, A. 5, 6 Mekuria, Fitauarari 128, 129, 132 Melamid, A. 158, 160 Menelik emperor death in 1913 92, 119, 121 use the Borana as markers of 98 met with His Highness Taffari Ras 99 Mezelekia, Fitaurari. See Italo-Ethiopian war Miles, A.T. major 87, 112, 113, 143, 144, 149, 156 Mlango. See Karra Mockler, A. 159, 161, 162, 186, 213 Mogadishu 23, 162, 185, 186, 231, 271 Mohamed Abdile Hassan (Mad Mullah) 157

Mohamed Afwein. See Jeegir Moiale 173–177, 185, 189, 191, 193, 202, 274, 275, 279, 297, 298, 301, 318, 324, 325 Molu Yaya in 174 Mombasa 37 Moreman, T.R. 157 Moyale district commissioner (DC) General 68, 79, 94, 102, 108, 110, 111, 119, 120, 145, 176, 194, 196, 203, 232, 241, 242, 271, 275, 276, 288, 290–292, 297, 300, 305, 311 Moyale station 56, 105, 106, 130, 134 Muirhead, major 133, 154 Mulatu. See Tigre bandits Mungean, G.H. 56 Munro, J. Forbes. 8, 40 Murty, T.S. 48 Musa Wobur Abdi (the son of sultan Wobur Abdi) 253 Mussolini, Benito. See Italo-Ethiopian war Mustapha, A.R. 8 Nasibu, Ras. See Italo-Ethiopian war Neftenya (gun carrying settler) 34 Negelle Negelle Borana 168, 209, 233 Nerazzini, Cesare Major 158 Nicolle, D. 164 Nnoli, O. 8 Nomads xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xv, xvii, xx, 1–6, 8, 9, 16, 28, 34, 37, 43–45, 48, 52, 59–92, 104, 108, 109, 112, 115–119, 126, 128, 134, 137–159, 163, 178, 185, 186, 201–203, 212, 215, 237, 241, 246, 247, 256–281, 289, 313–315, 319, 327–329, 332, 333, 339 Northern Frontier Province (NFP) the NFD administration 82–84, 113, 121, 128, 131, 152, 199, 210, 221, 229, 232, 236–241, 243–246, 249, 261–264, 266, 273, 274, 276, 277, 331 the NFD provincial commissioner 77, 160, 284 Northern Frontier District (NFD) constabulary 118, 122, 128, 130 Somali line 204, 252 Noyes, J.K. 5, 6 Nugent, P., and A.I. Asiwaju 6 Nur Garwein. See Jeegir Nur Qanyare. See Jeegir Oba, G. 15, 23, 25, 65, 313, 316, 319, 323, 325 Oba Sarite Kura 11, 19, 23, 24, 30, 52, 65–67, 133, 138, 153, 166, 171, 183, 186, 197, 201, 204, 205, 217, 218, 317

index363 Obbu 192, 194, 196, 199, 203, 212, 213 Obbu region. See Sololo Oddo 22, 134, 135, 186, 213, 217, 221, 222, 231, 233–238, 252, 261, 263–266, 295, 299, 322 Ogorchi 125, 131, 278 Ogot, A. Bethwell xiv Omar Aden Shaba of 257, 291 Omissi, D.E. xiii, 157, 236 Oromo xv, xvii, 6, 11, 13, 17, 18, 20, 23, 26, 33, 35, 38, 53, 66, 137–139, 216, 219, 222, 229, 247, 255, 258–260, 320, 323, 327, 332, 335–339 Osman Abba Jillo Araru 19 Pankhurst, R. 33 Pankhurst, S.E. 256 Parkyns, M. 116 Partitioning of the frontier xi, xiii, 59, 317 Perham, M. 34, 59, 234 Petrides, S.P. 234 Plowman, C.H. 73, 78, 96, 110, 122, 123, 128–132 Political legacy ancestral land 316, 318, 319, 322, 323 crossed into Bale 315, 318, 323 Dambitu and Nonnitu owned the well sites 324 Derg (the military government of Ethiopia) 323, 325 Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 325 Ethiopian Provincial Administration 318 Ethiopian state 315, 316, 318, 320, 325 Garre-Gabra returnees 325 Garre-led guerrillas 323 “Greater Somalia” 314, 322 historical conflicts 317 historical legacy 313 the Horn of Africa 313–316, 324 insurgents 315 interethnic land conflicts 314 Irredentism 315 Italian trust territory in 315 local or regional political conflicts 313 olki Dhumbur (the war after a type of gun) 322 Oromia State 325 political legacy 313–325 post colonial states believe 313 refugees in 314, 324 regional post-independence state 315 secessionist activities 322

Somali Abbo Liberation Front (SALF) 323 Somali nationalists 314 Somali Regional State 323, 325 the Somali republic 322 Somali Youth League (SYL) 314 Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPL) 325 tribal conferences 316–321 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 324 Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) 323 Potholm, C.P. 231 Premdas, R.R. 8 Prescott, J.R.V. xii, 6 Qaabale Galgallo Matoye 65, 170 Qaakhe. See Aada seera, substantial fine Qallu (ritual leader) 60, 138, 146 Raba (grades in the gada) 15, 23, 31, 38, 138, 338 Racha Halakhe 306 Ravenstein, E.G. 17, 23 Ray, B. 3, 8, 137 Rayne, H. 138 Reece, G. 87, 89, 92, 94, 95, 112, 153, 156, 160, 168, 169, 172, 173, 175–180, 186, 187, 192, 216–223, 228, 230, 236, 239–244, 246–248, 250, 261, 263, 275, 276, 278, 280, 281, 284, 285, 288, 290–292, 296, 297, 300, 305, 306 Reese, S.S. 38 Rennell, Francis James Rennell Rodd, Baron 43 Resource frontiers aada seera (customary law) 23, 138 Abba gada Liban Waata Naffuri (1776–1786) 24 Afalata Dido (see Qallu) Borana’s military power 27, 30, 31, 143 caravan trade 11, 23, 327 cholera in 1860s 25 Dadacha Tabdo (Acacia marking the frontier) 13 Dadacha Waar Abi 15 Ejersa Filtu 15 in Elk Wak were Gaarifati-the scoffers 14 ethnic frontiers not fixed 327 European travellers’ journals 26 external resource borders 12–14, 17, 21, 22, 25–29, 327

364

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foora (satellite livestock) 155 gaaf saafaar Dongorso 30 gada Bitata Mamo (1872–1880) 15, 21 gada Guyo Gedo (1744–1752) 21 gada Sako Dadacha (1814–1821) 21 Garre Libin 27 Giibiro Tiiya 22 internal frontier 327 internal resource borders 11, 12, 15, 19, 21, 27, 30, 31 Kablala Somali 17 laaf seera Dawe (frontiers of the fools) 12, 13, 21 lafa danaba (land of booty) 17 Liban 15, 18, 24, 29, 30, 38, 39, 44, 49, 50, 78, 98, 121, 128, 155, 168, 169, 171, 172, 200, 206, 216, 217, 219, 220, 222, 236–238, 253, 254, 256, 258, 264, 265, 271, 272, 275, 279, 281, 294, 297, 299, 304, 309, 318, 320–323, 336 Mado Garse 26 Mata Safaro 27 Mukha Buna 16 naaga Borana (the peace of) 11, 23 Pan Borana Assembly of Gumi Gayo 24 pastoral territoriality 4, 5 Qaddaduma (see Gaddaduma) Raba gada 15, 23 resource borders 11–32, 154, 327 rinderpest epidemic 25 ritual items 24, 327 ritual lands xi, 21, 27, 338 saafaar Moyale 30, 31 Siidi saagal (the nine enemies) 21 smallpox 25 Somali age-sets 20 Southern Horn of Africa 11, 12, 33, 327 sub-humid Badha escarpment 15 tula salaam (the nine tula well complexes) 15 Rey, C.F. 44, 60, 116 Rist (ancestral right holder) 318 Roba Bukhura, Qenyazmach xx, 25, 38, 140, 145, 174, 318, 320, 321 Roberts, A.F. 116 Robertson, J.C. 118, 159 Robin Hood type. See Tigre bandits Robinson, P.W. xiii Robinson, R., J. Gallagher and A. Denny. xv Rodd, J.R. 43–46 Rosenthal, E. 159, 162–164, 177, 213–215 Russell, Lynette. xii, 94, 100–104, 106

Saabbo 21, 23, 31, 60, 129, 139, 170, 339 Saako Kootaro and Garre 140, 141 Sagatu. See Tigre bandits Sahlings, P. 5 Saki Gamadda 258 Salad Dagane. See Jeegir Salole 155 Salvadori, C. xiii Salzman, P.C. xii, 6 Samatar, A.I. 6, 36, 161, 162 Sarite, Sora, British headman 126 Saunders, C. 137 Sbacchi, A. 157, 167, 181, 182 Schlee, G. 17, 18, 21, 23, 324 Scott, G. 162 Seru, in 262, 264, 292, 309 Sheikh Hussein 206, 222, 236–238, 243, 244, 251, 253, 256, 259, 267, 268, 270–272, 290, 295, 297, 298, 303, 304 Shiftas 80, 104, 111, 133, 148, 183 Shizat (Ethiopian prime minister) 232 Sidama (generic name for Ethiopian highlander) 38, 66, 67, 317, 320, 339 Sidamo xvi, 98, 163, 164, 166, 169, 170, 172, 175–181, 183, 185, 186, 202, 203, 206, 209, 215, 216, 221, 232, 233, 260, 262, 270, 276, 286, 297, 323 Simmons, C.S. 7 Simpson, G.L. xiii, 39, 53, 66, 90, 96, 118, 122, 124, 127 Simti, seegulià 20 Singh, A.K. 8 Smith, A.D. 26–30, 35–38, 167, 172 Smith Guatar Cornia. See Italo-Ethiopian war Smith, J. 163 Sobania, N.W. xiii Social banditry. See Frontier banditry Sógoni, B. 159 Sololo 70, 122, 133, 193, 194, 199, 203, 204 Somali 6, 11, 33, 67, 119, 137, 157, 190, 209, 232, 255, 286, 313, 327 Somali clans 11, 16, 17, 21, 24, 25, 35, 139, 143, 163, 173, 204, 209, 238, 253, 268, 273, 286, 294, 316, 322, 332 Somali dia. See Blood money Somali heer (customary law) 137 Sora Guyo, representing the Gabra 299 Soyan Omar 294 Spencer, P. 16 Stokes, M. 6 Suhrke, A. 313 Surupa 206 Swayne, H.G.C. 26, 196, 212

index365 Tache, B. and G. Oba. 313, 316, 319, 323, 325 Tache Kaane, victim of 174 Taffari, Ras (later emperor Haile Selassie) 96 Takaba 50, 142 Tareke, Gebru 315, 324 Tax extraction Borana runaways 70, 78, 80 British tax 73, 74, 82, 84 collective tax 74 compulsory poll tax 74, 83 extracting taxes from 60, 72, 85 gabbar tax model 82, 85 Gibir (taxes) 67 grazing and watering tax 71–74, 77, 79, 82, 88 the Italian tax 202 livestock taxes (see Italian administration) Nyaatu (the eaters) 69 pastoral-state conflict xiii paying taxes using goats 82 state tax extraction 59, 63, 67, 69, 70, 80, 81, 85 taxation of colonial subjects 59 the tax collectors 70, 77 tax concession 191, 198 tax per head of livestock 250 Tedla, Fitaurari 120 Tegbaru 323 Tezama Mukrea, Gerazmach 149, 161 The governor of Borana 149, 236, 241, 251, 262, 283, 310 Thomas, captain 261, 309 Thomas, M. 3 Thompson, V.B. 5, 212 Tibebu, T. 2 Tignor, R.L. xvii, 39, 60 Tigre. See Frontier bandits Tigre banditry 115, 329 Tigre bandits 96, 115, 117–122, 125–127, 131, 132, 134, 329 Tiki, W. and G. Oba and T. Tvedt. 15, 25 Titu (in NFD) 22, 281 Touval, S. 3, 90, 313, 314 Transfrontier grazing and watering rights British tribes access to water across the frontier 55 disagreements between the two states 94 the Gwynn Line (Blue Line) (see Treaty lines) lack of permanent water 91 policy of appeasement 123, 267

ransom payment 125, 129 the Red Line (see Treaty Lines) rights in rem 89 transfrontier grazing and watering rights 71, 89–114, 193, 204 transfrontier nomads 90 transfrontier treaty 89 a truce with bandits 122, 125, 128 use Ethiopian wells 90 watering and grazing facilities 92 Treaty lines 46, 53–56, 91, 92, 94, 112, 249, 283 Triulzi, A. xvi Tugla, F. 129, 130 Tuka 183, 194, 199, 200 Turnbull, Richard, District Commissioner 210 Turton, D. 325 Turton, E.R. xiii, 18, 22, 30, 39 Uaso, deep inside NFD 78, 130 Udat (wells) 317 Ukho Bake, oral historian 321 Uran 56, 194 Van der Pijl, K. 5 Vivian, H. 37, 59 Waaq (God) 321 Waaqo Guutu, general (of SALF) 323 Wachachini (Ethiopian methods of public punishment) 205 Wachile 87, 155, 164, 171 Wachile-Mega road 171 Waddington, acting officer-in-charge NFD 99, 106 Wagner, K.A. 7, 256 Wajir 16, 30, 31, 40, 50, 62, 77, 174, 212, 214, 252, 300 Wakhor Dida (Borana age-set recruited into local paramilitary in 1920s) 133 Walena 130, 155 Walensu Laman 257 War contests Abdi Nur Gessi, Murelle headman 211 Afmadu, banda headquarters 213 Allen R.K, assistant superintendent 218 authority to Ras Abeba Aregai 221, 223, 225, 260, 296 the Borana Constabulary (BC) 218 Borana prophet Rooba Kulalo ordered 217 British abandoned Buna 214

366

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the British Military Authority (BMA) 221 Cakkeesa Qooto to 219 Calvary to follow 217 Cheesman Robert Ernest colonel in 225 Commonwealth and South African force 214 consulate at Mega 226 consulates at 227 Cunningham Alan Gordon, General, crushed the 215 “Curle’s Irregulars” commanded by Sandy Curle 15 Daalach and Ilaaliyo 217 Dallas colonel as advisor 221 Damise Fitaurari in office 224–226 defences at el Wak 214, 215 Dowson G.C.M. colonel advisor 224 expansion of British administration 216 Fluffy Fowles, Brigadier split his forces 213 Gezzera Pietro, General governor of Galla-Sidamo 209 Guyo Abrono lost 213 Habash shifta to police 225 Hall Davis, a German Oromo 229 Harar consulate 227 Ido Mamo, chief Gabra Miggo 211, 213 Jaldesa Jarso, Borana elder 210 killing of abba gada Bulle Dabassa 217 Lloyd livestock from Garre 220 Obbu Borana to remain 213 occupied Borana region of Ethiopia 217 The Occupied Enemy Territory 216 reached Gombisa 217 Reece Gerald appointed Lieutenant General 217 Rer Mohamed Degodia 216 ritual of gorbeesa baaso 217 Sandford Daniel, Brigadier supported 228

The Second World War 216 transitional administration 221, 224, 225 women raised emotions 217 Warda (the Orma) 320 Wario Guracha, Haji xix, 154 Warsame (alias Ibrahim Mumin Kassim) or Ibrahim shifta 257 Watkins, E. 37, 57, 216, 313 Web 170 Webbi Shebelle valley 161 Wellby, M.S. 41 Wickham, D.H., District commissioner 129 Wilding, R.E. 21–23, 25 Wilfred Thesiger, captain, the British Minister in Addis Ababa 62 Wobur Abdi, Degodia sultan 168 Wolde Gabriel, Fitaurari 71, 112 Wolde Gabriel, Ras destroyed the Arsi 35 Wolde Giorgis Asefaw, colonel 248–250, 253, 280, 281, 285 Wolde-Mariam, M. 231 Wolde Mikael, Dejazmach. See ItaloEthiopian war Woyesa Alemu, bandit leader 130, 131 Wylde, A.B. 34, 45 Xuye Galgallo 31, 319 Yaa arbora (ritual settlement) 38 Yaaballo 145, 172, 173, 175, 177, 180, 183, 185, 215, 217, 224 Zaphiro, P., frontier agent 90, 118 Zauditu, Empress 96 Zebania (Amharic: local militia) 268 Zelan (derogatory name) 34 Zeleke Tademe, Fitaurari 221, 222 Zemena warq (with hidden meaning) 245 Zewde, B. 34 Zodi, G. 125, 133